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THE HISTORY

OF THE

Italian-Turkish War

September 29, 1911 to Ociober 18, 1912.

COMMODORE W. H. MEHLER

UNITED STATES NAVY

FORMERLY NAVAL ATTACHE TO THE
UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN BERLIN.

ROME AND VIENNA :: :: n ::

Reprinted from Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, with

additions. Compiled from semi-oflEcial publications of the

Naval Ministries of Germany, Italy and Austria,

and other thoroughly reliable sources.

• • •

• • • •

William H. Bebhleb,

Annapolis^ Md.

pBXlfTBD BT

THE ADVWITI8HR-RIBPUBLI0AK,

ANNAPOLIS, MD.

PREFACE.

This history was compiled from the semi-official publications
of the Naval Ministries of Qermany, Italy and Austria, viz.:
Marine Rundschau, Bivista Marittima, and Mittheilungen aus
dem Qebiete des Seewesens, corroborated by the facts as de-
scribed in other foreign publications such as Le Yacht, the Brit-
ish Army and Navy weeklies, the London Illustrated News and
Graphic, besides Ueberall, the organ of the Qerman navy league.
In this compilation conflicting or doubtful statements were elim-
inated and only such details that are thoroughly reliable are
given.

The writer served for a period of three years and nine months
as Naval Attach^ to the United States Embassies in Berlin,
Borne and Vienna, and he knows that these semi-official publica-
tions are thoroughly reliable and therefore he claims that the
facts herein recorded are true.

The account was primarily compiled for the information of
the United States Navy and was submitted by the writer to the
Board of Control of the Naval Institute for revision. This was
thereupon published in a series of four articles in the current
quarterly Proceedings of the Naval Institute for June, Septem-
ber and December, 1912, and March, 1913. The type of these
articles was distributed and in order to preserve the data in book
form the four series of articles were reprinted in a limited edi-
tion for general circulation.

The book contains the four articles that were published with
eonsiderable additional data, such as the complete account of the
defences of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus taken from the Jour-
nal of the Boyal Artillery for January, 1913, embodying the
translation from the Bussian Artillery Journal by Lieutenant
J. K. L. FitzwiUiams, Boyal Horse Artillery on The Coast De-
fences of Turkey. The Honorable Philander Enox, Secretary
of State, Washington, D. C, also kindly sent the writer the full
text of the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne with the decree of the
King of Italy and the Firman of the Sultan of Turkey. This
treaty and accompanying documents are embodied in the ap-
pendix.

This war demonstrated the thorough preparedness of the Ital-
ian Qovemment for the war, not only in regard to the efficient
training of the Italian Army and Navy and their armament and

293981

equipment, but the financial economy of administration that
enabled Italy to acquire the coveted African Provinces without
levying any extra war taxes upon the people.

The Italian Navy proved to be thoroughly equal to all de-
mands that were made upon its personnel and material. The
history of this war is a glorious tribute to the Italian Navy and
the facts herein recorded express recognition of the efficiency of
the Italian Navy in the highest possible degree.

The Italian Navy suffered no losses of materiel and the loss of
life was wholly due to losses in engagements upon landing on
the enemy's shores, in which the Italian Naval Brigades invari-
ably led and took possession of the shores until relieved by the
army which they assisted to disembark from the transports by
their own boats and lighters and other craft they brought with
each convoy.

The Turkish Navy was inefficient. They had not been effi-
ciently trained and in all the engagements the Turkish great
gun fire was ineffective and in efforts to repel the Italian naval
attacks the Turks never inflicted any damage to any vessels of
the Italian Navy and rarely scored a single hit. The lack of
trained gun pointers in the Turkish Army and Navy was evi-
dent in every engagement.

The lesson of the war emphasizes the absolute necessity of an
adequate, thoroughly trained and efficient navy. The exemption
of defenceless coast towns from bombardment in time of war is
clearly shown by the incidents of this war to be unfounded. In
war it is the duty of a naval commander to act promptly and do
his utmost to compel the enemy to yield to the demands of his
government, and in every case where the bombardment of a de-
fenceless port might produce that result and decide the war, or
contribute largely to the result of the war, the fact that a port
is defenceless will not protect it from bombardment.

An adequate, efficient navy is the only reliable defence with
command of the sea. The Italian ports were never exposed to a
bombardment by a Turkish fleet because the Italian Navy had
command of the sea.

The writer desires to express his thanks for kind assistance
and advice of brother officers, especially Lieutenant Commander
Ralph Earle, the Secretary and Treasurer of the U. S. Naval In-
stitute and Editor of the Proceedings.

W. H. BBEHLEB,
Commodore U. 8. Navy,

THE
ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

I Italy declared war against Turkey for commercial reasona and
to provide a neighboring colony for her surplus population. The
Italians believe the prediction of the great African Explorer,
Gerhard Bohly, who, twenty years ago, declared that the power
^ that rules Tripoli will dominate the Soudan. The proximity of
Tripoli to Italy makes its possession desirable.

The importance of the region was recognized by the ancient
Romans. Cyrenaica was very important. The five great com-
mercial ports were known as the Lybian Pentapolis, and existing
ruins of great works, aqueducts, dams, and large buildings reveal
its ancient prosperity. Sallust states that Leptis alone annually
exported forty million bushels of grain and paid a war tax of
twenty-five thousand gallons of olive oil. The Mediterranean
climate prevails, and though the great Saharan Desert ap-^
proaches close to the coast there are large oases and fertile tracts
of land that would enable the country to support a population of
twelve million inhabitants, whereas it now has but one million.

This coast has a number of naturally fine harbors that have
been filled up with sand and ruined by neglect, but which could
easily be reclaimed. Such are Tripoli, Lebda, Misrata, Benghasi,

\ Dema, Mersa, Bomba and Tobruk. The trend of the coast brings
the Tripolitan ports three hundred miles nearer the trade centers
of points around Sahara, and the trade routes converge towards
TripoU.

Ever since the Eongdom of Italy was united Italy has coveted
the opposite coast of North Africa. Forty years ago Bismarck
wrote to Mazzini: ''The Mediterranean is indisputably Italy's
sphere of interest. The control of the Mediterranean should be
the constant goal and the controlling principle of Italian states-
men!" England had long possessed Malta and Gibraltar. In

6 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

1878 she acquired Cyprus while Austria took Bosnia. At the
Berlin Ck>ngress Bismarck and Beaconsfield offered Italy
Mityleni, Tunis and Tripoli ; but Cairoli declined, stating that he
wished to leave the Congress with clean hands. Other nations,
however, stepped in and took forcible possession. France inau-
gurated her Algerian imperial policy and acquired Senegal,
Tschad, and Tunis. France fortified Biserta on the Tunisian
coast and is now proceeding to peaceably acquire Morocco. Dur-
ing the Busso-Turkish war England offered to form a league
with Italy, Austria and Qreece to maintain the status quo in the
Mediterranean, but Italy declined because she did not wish to
disturb her friendly relations with other nations. In 1881, when
France seized Tunis and broke the staVusliuo, Italy claimed to
be too weak to make any serious protest, but, at the renewal of
the triple alliance in 1886, Italy complained that Qermany and
Austria did not protect Italy from French encroachments in the
Mediterranean. Bismarck then is said to have negotiated a
secret treaty with England stipulating that Italy's interests in
the Mediterranean should be preserved. In 1889, however,
England negotiated the Soudan treaty with France defining
boundaries that encroached still further on the borders of the
Tripolitan hinterland. In a secret treaty in 1902, England and
France recognized Italy's claims to Tripoli. In 1904 France
definiteb^ proclaimed Italy's prior right to take possession of
Tripoli under certain contingencies. During the Bosnia-Bul-
garian crisis Italy was supposed to take definite action, but Italy
hesitated because of England's relations with the Toung Turk
government, but since England's attitude has cooled somewhat,
Italy has finally acted. to be no longer reproached for neglecting
her opportunities. These diplomatic incidents explain the neu-
trality of European powers during the war.

The Turks had possesison of Tripoli since 1835, and the in-
habitants regarded Turkish rule as a blessing; they enjoyed
greater freedom and were subjected to much less burdensome
taxation than before. The protectorate of Tripoli was an ex-
pense rather than a source of revenue for Turkey. The expenses
of administration were greater than the revenue from harbor
dues and agriculture. The Turks relieved the people of military
service at first, but in 1901 universal compulsory military service
was re-established and occasioned some opposition, but this was

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 7

long since settled as a necessary feature of the government. The
alleged Italian claim that the country was misgoverned and that
intolerable conditions existed was not well founded.

The Berbers were the original inhabitants of the entire North
African Coast as far as Morocco. These were joined by a large
emigration of Jews after the Babylonian captivity. The Jews
number about 20,000 or one-fiftieth of the estimated population
of one million. These Jews live in the cities and are theieading
merchants ; a few carry on small industries in the interior. The
Arabs invaded, not in great hordes, but by single tribes, from
time to time, when compelled by famine to leave their former
abodes. These tribes captured places from the numerically su-
perior Berbers who were scattered, and gradually they have
amalgamated so that it is rare to find either pure Berbers or
pure Arabs in the country. The negro population is estimated
at 50,000. There are 15,000 Spaniards; 50,000 Turks, Armen-
ians and Albanians; 3,000 Maltese, and only 1,000 Italians; the
rest are Berber- Arabs.

The Turks were chiefly officials or in the army. The Armen-
ians and Maltese competed with the Jews in the trade. The
Italians were far behind all other traders. They had a fiour mill,
an oil mill, one soap factory and an asparagus press, which were
supported by the Bank of Rome at a loss. The export trade with
Italy was valued at $600,000, while the imports from Italy only
amounted to $400,000 per annum. England had the bulk of the
commerce.

The population was extremely fanatical and bitterly opposed
to the Italians. The All-Islam propaganda aroused the religious
fanatics, who are so extremely bigoted that they do not regard
the Turks as true Moslems, and some of the opposition to the
Turkish rule was because the Turks are not orthodox Mahome-
dans. The fact might be used to favor the Italians if managed
with a delicate diplomacy, but the conciliation of the people is a
very difficult task.

The country is agricultural and can only be made profitable
by developing its agricultural resources. Tobacco, cotton, silk,
olives, wine and dates could be profitably cultivated, but such
can hardly be expected of the Italians, who have failed to develop
Italy agriculturally, and in all countries to which Italians have
emigrated they are rarely found to be successful agriculturists.

8 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

The negro is much better qualified for this development, and
even more so are the Berber-Fellaheens, who are acclimated and
familiar with conditions of the soil.

Tripoli is important because of the possibilities of its hinter-
y^ land, though much of the important trade that would have its
natural outlet through Tripoli has been secured by France
through Algiers and by England through Egypt. The bound-
aries of the English and French spheres of influence in the
Soudan and around the hinterland of Tripoli limit its import-
ance to the coast.

Italy has a precarious problem in the conquest of this hinter-
land. France has operated under most favorable conditions to
develop her Algerian policy and in the last ten years after inde-
fatigable labor France has succeeded. How Italy will manage
is problematical. Italy has a most formidable foe in the tribe of
FessanSy who, though numerically inferior and provided with
inferior weapons, are thoroughly accustomed to the hot, dry
/ climate, are a warlike race, very mobile, and possess a knowledge
of the country that will outweigh the superiority in numbers and
equipment of the Italians. Racial sympathy and the fanatical
religious zeal will add to make them almost invincible in the de-
fence of their native land. tUuerilla warfare will probably
prolong the war after the Italian armies overcome the organized
defence so that the peaceful agricultural development must be
long deferred,^ Finally, trade relations with the interior will
cause friction in Italian competition with the English and
French ; and influence relations of the European powers.

England, with her chain of naval bases at Gibraltar, Malta,
and Suez Canal communications, has regarded the Mediter-
ranean in a measure as a Mare Clausum and she cannot favor
the establishment of formidable ports on the other flank of this
line. The British Mediterranean fleet has of late years been re-
duced and greater attention been given to the North Sea, where-
as now the Mediterranean will require more attention. England
and France will increase their Mediterranean naval forces while
Italy will lean more than ever upon the Central European pow-
ers and the triple alliance, in which Germany is so much inter-
ested, will be strengthened.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB. 9

Italy ^s Available Naval Forces When War Was Declarbd.
The SEA-Gomo Fleet, Yige-Admiral Aubry,

Commanding.

1st Squadron, Yiob-Admibal Aubbt, Obqanizbd fob Wab.

1st division.

Battleship, Vittorio Emanuele, flagship.

'< Begina Elena, joined Oct. 5, 1911.

Boma.
Napoli.

1 1

2d division, bbab-admibal pbbsbitkbo.

Armored cruiser, Pisa, flagship.

" Amalfi.

'' San Marco, joined Oct. 1, 1911.

'' San Giorgio, repairing in Spring, 1912.

Torpedo ship, Agordat
Minelayer, Partenope.

2d Squadron, Yioe-Admibal Fabvslu, Gommandimo.

3d division.

Battleship, Benedetto Brin, flagship.

" Begina Margherita, joined Oct. 5, 1911.

St. Bon, subsequently transferred.
Emanuele Filiberto, ready Sept. 30, 1911.

4th division, beab-admibal thaon di bbvkl.

Armored cruiser. Garibaldi, flagship.
' * Yarese.

* * Ferrucio.

* * Marco Polo, subsequently transferred.
Torpedo ship, Coatit.

Minelayer, Minerva.

Division of Tobpedo Boat Inspbctob.
beab-admibal, duke of abbuzzia, commanding fob wab.

Armored cruiser, Yettor Pisani, flagship.
Battleship, St. Bon, transferred from 3d division.

Armored cruiser, Marco Polo, transferred from 3d division.
Prot. cruiser, Lombardia, submarine's mothership.
Destroyer, Artigliere, from destroyer flotilla.

" Fuciliere, *' *' *'

CJorazziere, '* '* ''

'* Alpino, '' " '*

" Zeflftro, '' '' '*

High sea torpedo boats, four to eight, from destroyer flotilla.

THB ITAUAN-TUBKISH WAR

ii mneh better qualified for this development, and
so aie tlie Berber-Fellaheena, who are acclimated and
faBiBar with eonditioiis of the aoiL

Tripoli ii important beeanae of the possibilities of its hinter-
^^^ thoo^ much of the important trade that would have its
BBtaral outlet through Tripoli has been secured by France
Algieis and l^ En^and through Egypt. The bound-
the ig»gi^^ and French spheres of influence in the
and aioond the hinterland of Tripoli limit its import-
to the coast
Italy has a pieearioos problem in the conquest of this hinter-
land. France has operated under most favorable conditions to
devek^ her Algerian policy and in the last ten years after inde-
fotigahle labor France has succeeded. How Italy will manage

Italy has a most formidable foe in the tribe of
who, though numerically inferior and provided with
inferkir weapons* are thoroughly accustomed to the hot, dry
cKmate^ are a warlike race, veiy mobile, and poBBeas a knowledge
of the country that will outweigh the superiority in numbers and
equipsaent of the Italiana. Racial sympathy and the fanatical
rriigMMM seal will add to make them almost invincible in the de-
feiiee of their native land. tXSuerilla warfare will probably
prolong the war after the Italian armies overcome the organized
defence so that the peaceful agricultural development must be
long deferre4<> ■ Finally, trade relations with the interior will
ffaose friction in Italian competition with the English and
French ; and influence relations of the European i>owers.

England, with her chain of naval bases at Gibraltar, Malta,
and Snea Canal communications, has regarded the Mediter-
ranean in a measure as a Ifore Clausutn and she cannot favor
the estahtiriunent of formidable ports on the other flank of this
tine. The British Mediterranean fleet has of late years been re-
duced and greater attention been given to the North Sea, where-
as now the Mediterranean will require more attention. England
and France will increase their Mediterranean naval forces while
Italy will lean more than ever upon the Central European pow-
ers and the triple alliance, in which Germany is so much inter-
«sled» will be strengthened.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

TORPEDO FLOTILLAS OF THE SQUADBON.

320 ioniy Ostroy
* Freccia,
' LampOy
Euro,

830 ioiiB, NembOy
Turbine,
Aquilone,
Borea,

416 ions, Alpino,
Pontieroi
Carabinierei
Fuciliere,

400 tons, Bersagliere,
Granatiere,
GarabaldinOy
Lanciere,

first diviaioii.
it it

1 1

a
1 1

second division.
( < < <

( <

third division.

it €(

<< <<

tt <<

fourth division.

i€ tt

tt tt

DE8TB0YEB8 IN SESERYB.

330 tons, Zeffiro,

' ' Espero,

400 tons, Artigliere,

* * Gorazziere,

320 tons, Strale,

*' Dardo,

300 tons, Fulmine,
28 high sea torpedo boats.

at Spezia.
tt tt

at Tarento.

at Venice.

at Leghorn, schoolship.

Tbainino Ship Division, Beas-Admibal Bokea-Bicgi, Commanding.

Battleship,
tt

Sicilia, flagship.
Sardegna.
Be Umberto.
Armored cruiser. Carlo Alberto.

Other Available Naval Vessels.

Coast defence ship.

Dandolo,

forming a

fifth division

tt tt

ItaUa,

tt tt

Lepanto,

tt tt

Protected

cruiser.

Elba,

Bed Sea.

Puglia,

1 1 t •

Etna,

Liguria,

tt •

Piemonte,

Gunboat,

Govemolo,

Gal. GaHlei,

station. Com

itantinople.

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAB.

MinelaTer,

Tripoli,

at Venice.

Goito,

H It

< I

Montebelk),

ti it

Torpedo ship,

Urania,

at Naples and Speiia.

li ti

Iride,

t t it H (<

1 1 11

Caprera,

1 1 It tt It

CkMst torpedo boats,

abont 60 in

all.

Sibmannee,

5 at Brindisi

, 2 at Spesia and Veniee.

AUXIUARIXS.

OoUier,

Bronte.

Sterope.

Transport,

Citta di Milano.

< (

Carigliano.

Volta.

Repair

ship, VulcanOy at naval base, Augusta.

Ships Stationed Abroad.

Gunboat,

Survey ship,

Prot. cruiser,
tt tt

Arethusa, in the Bed Sea.
Voltumo, ** " " *'
Stafetto, '* *' " "
Calabria, in East Asiatic waterii
Etruria, in American waters.

Tubkby's Available Naval Fobces on Seftembeb 15, 1911.

Battleship Division.

Battleship,

Babarossa Heireddin,

(91)

10,000 tons

Torgut Beiss,

Cbuisino Squadron.

(91)

10,000 tons

Prot. cruiser,

Hamidje,

(03)

8800 tons

tt a

Medjidje,

Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

(03)

8200 tons

Deetrojer,

Jadighiar-i-Millet,

(09)

620 tons

Nemune-i-Hamie,

(09)

it tt

Muavenet-i-MiUije,

(09)

it it

Taschos,

(08)

305 tons

Basra,

(08)

tt it

Samsum,

(08)

tt ti

Tar Hissar,

(08)

t* it

Torpedo mother,

Tir-i-Mugguian,

4052 tofis

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

Besbbve Division.

BatUaih^^,

Messudije,

(74)

(03)

9850 tone

CoMi defence,

AMar-i-Tewflk,

(68)

(W)

5700 tons

tt n

Feth-i-Baelend,

(71)

(07)

2800 tone

<( n

Awn-Illah,

(6»)

(07)

8400 tons

Deftrojer,

Pelenghi Deria,

(94)

900 tons

Berc-i-Sawet,

(07)

750 tons

G^ret-i-Watanije,

(00)

680 tons

Dktachko ToftPBDO Boats.

Anatalia,

(06)

160 tons

Takat,

(06)

tt it

Urea,

(06)

<< n

Ankara,

(06)

tt tt

Dratz,

(06)

tt tt

Kutahia,

(06)

tt tt

Mussul,

(06)

tt it

Alpagot,

(04)

tt tt

Al HiBsar,

(04)

tt tt

Abdul Med j id,

(01)

145 tons

Junus,

(01)

tt tt

Ilamid Abad,

(08)

97 tons

Sivri HifiMsar,

(08)

It tt

Sultan Hissar,

(08)

tt tt

Timur Hlssar,

(08)

tt tt

Stationed in Hasboks.

Cloast defence ship, Muin-i-Zafer, (71) (07) 2800 tone, Beirut.
Destrojer, Peik-i-Schewket, (07) 750 tons, at Hodeida.
24 gunboats of 200 to 650 tons.
20 coast torpedo boats of 40 to 85 tons.
6 special ships of 180 to 2300 tons.

The Turkish OARBisoNg in Tripoli and Ctrenaioa.

The Turkish Army stationed in Tripoli and Cyrenaica was
<sompoBed of the 42d division, consisting of, viz. :

4 regiments of infantry, of 4 battalions of 600 each.

1 battalion of ehassears.

2 regiments of cavalry each of 10 squadrons of 80 to 120 horses.

1 regiment of field artillery each of 6 batteries of 4 to 6 field guns of S-ineh

caliber.
4 companies of engineers.

3 companies of fortress artillery.

THE ITAUAN-TUBKI8H WAB. IS

The complement was 12,000, but at the outbreak of the war
the trained troops numbered about 5000 infantry and 400 oav-
airy with about 2500 to 3000 raw recruits.

The garrison of the city of Tripoli consisted of :

e battalions of infantry with two machine gun companies.

1 battalion of chassenrs.

f^ field batteries.

4 eqnadrons of cavalry.

t companies of fortress artillery.

This organization called for 6000 troops, but at the outbreak
of the war there were but 3000 trained troops with about 2000
raw recruits.

The garrisons in other parts of the province were distributed
in small detachments. It is reported that just before the war
Benghasi had 400 ; Dema, 70 ; Tobruk, 30 ; Solum, 25, and Cy-
rene 10 men.

In addition to these regular troops the territorial troops were
organized in 30 battalions of infantry and 60 squadrons of cav-
airy with a total strength of 20,000.

These combined gave a total strength of the Turkish forces at
28,000 men.

The regular infantry was formerly armed with an old
model of Mauser rifles, but recently they have been supplied with
the latest model of Martini rifles, and the Mauser rifles have
been given to the irregular troops. During the latter part of
September about 10,000 of these old Mauser rifles were sent into
the interior for the territorial troops. The Turks had 50,000
rifles and ample ammunition.

The Defences op the City op Tripoli.

The defences consisted of five old coast fortifications and some
newer earthworks on the land front. On the west side Fort Sul-
tanje and Fort Gargaresch comprised a group of three old earth-
works carrying modem Krupp guns. Italian reports state that
these included some 8-inch howitzers. Fort Sultanje protected
the cable landing from Malta. There was a group of old stone
forts near the town on the north, these consisting of: (1) The
Lighthouse Fort, whose walls were mounted with three old 6-inch

14 THE ITALIAN-TUBKISH WAB.

gona with the lighthouse built on the same wall; (2) The Span-
ish Fort on the harbor mole, and (3) Fort Bosso, west of the
Lighthouse Fort (so-called because of its red walls). Forts 8
and 3 were armed with old small-caliber guns.

Fort Hamidije or Scharasehat is about 6000 yards east of the
(sity on a bluff fifty feet above the sea level, an old earthwork
that commands the outer roadstead and the harbor. The four
modem guns which were formerly mounted in this fort were
taken to Yemen in 1905 and replaced by four old howitzers.
Latest reports state that the Italians found one 9.4-inch, one
6-inch and one 3.6-inch guns in this fort. Field Marshal von
der Gtoltz states that in 1911 the defences of Tripoli had no guns
larger than 6-inch, made in 1870.

A wall 25 feet high, built in the 16th century, encloses the in-
ner city. The land forts encircle the town in a series of earths
works commanding the roads leading into the country.

The Military Conditions at Tripoli.

The lack of heavily armed modem fortifications and the weak-
ness of the garrison, with the easily interrupted line of commu-
nication with Turkey, rendered any attempt to defend the city
from an oversea attack by the Italians hopeless at Tripoli, and
even more so at the other ports.

The defence was still further hampered by lack of food. The
Turkish-Tripolitan troops had long been subsisted by commia-
sary stores from Constantinople. The failure of the crops in
recent years was such that the Turkish government was also
obliged to subsist the poor people. The starving people were
supplied with rations from two large tents at the gates of the
city.

The Egyptian railroad only extended about 200 miles west of
Alexandria with its terminus at Mersah Matruh, which is about
800 miles from the city of Tripoli, so that the Turkish request
of England for permission to send Turkish troops to Tripoli
through Egypt was not of much practical value.

It would have been better to have organized Turkish defence
against the Italian invasion back from the coast. Field Marshal
von der Gtoltz claims that the real defence of Tripoli was in the
interior. The regular forces, being few in number, were insuffi-

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAB. 15

cient. The resistance depended chiefly on the native population,
especially the support of the Shiek Sidi-es-Senoussi, who had
been recognized as the ruler of Djarabul, on the borders of
Barka. The Shiek of Senoussi at first hesitated to oppose the
Italians.

Organization op Italian-Teipolitan Expeditionary Corps.

The partial mobilization of the Italian army for the Tripolitan
expedition was with the 7th and 12th Italian army corps, chiefly
from the cities of Palermo, Rome, Naples, Florence, Verona,
Milan, and Turin. Entire regiments were taken from these
cities, and volunteers increased the regimental strength to the
war footing of 2600 men. The standing army was reinforced
by calling out the category of reserves of 1888. Eighty thousand
reserves were thus added to the army stationed at home.

The expeditionary corps consisted of the following:

Commander-in-Chief: Lt.-General Caneva di Salasoo.

Chief of Staff: Ma job General Gastaldello.
first division of infantry, i/t.-gbneral count peoori obbaloi.

Ist brigade. Bnd brigade,

82d hifantry. 6th infantry.

84th infantry. 40th infantry.

3 squadrons of cavalry. 6 batteries field artillery.

SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION, LT.-OENERAL BRICOOLA.

3d brigade.. 4th brigade.
22d infantry. 4th infantry.

68th infantry. 63d infantry.

3 squadrons of cavalry. 6 batteries field artillery.

Under direct command of expedition commander:

The 8th regiment Bersaglieres. 1 battery mountain artillery.
The llth regiment Bersaglieres. Several batteries field artillery.
One battalion of engineers. One telegraph company.

One machine gun detachment. Wireless telegraph personnel.

A company of infantry has about 200 men, so that the total
force was about 40,000 men. They had 11 flying machines of
French tjrpes. The Italian infantry had a 2.5-inch repeating

1€ THE rrALIAX'TTBKISH WAB.

gim of Mannlidier-Caraiio type M-91. Badi aoldKr euried 162
emrtridgtty bendes whidi the trmnqMHiB had 24 ourtridges per
man additkmaL Eadi companT carried 105 introidiiiig tools,
of irtiidi 80 were ipadea. The transports had 144 intrenehing
tools per battalkm additknaL

The Italian fidd artillery had 3-inch Kmpp guns M-1906. The
troops had a q>ecial grayish-greai uniform. After Septemb^
27th the Italian railroads were crowded with troc^ assembling
for the expedition. Smaller detachments of troc^ were em-
barked in the transports at Naples, Syraeuse and Angnsta on
September 26, to be ready for emergency.

Declaration of War and Nones to Neutrals.

At 2.30 p. m., September 28, the Italian Chargi d'Afihires in
Constantinople presented the Italian Ultimatam to the Tnridsh
government. This declared that in order to terminate the disor-
ders and neglect caused by the Turkish government in Tripoli,
and Cyrenaica, the Italian government demanded that Turkey
should, within 24 hours, consent to Italy's military occupation
of those provinces. The Turkish government refused and at 3
p. m., September 29, the Italian government declared war be-
tween Italy and Turkey.

The Italian government proclaimed its purpose to take prompt
measures for the protection of Italians and all foreigners in Tri-
poli and Cyrenaica.

Neutral powers were notified that the Tripolitan and Cyrenai-
can coasts were blockaded.

Within a few days France, Russia, Belgium, Spain, Portugal,
Servia, Bulgaria, England and Japan issued neutrality procla-
mations.

The French declaration of neutrality stated that it comprised
the French protectorates including Crete. The English and Rus-
sian governments endorsed the French proclamation, and Italy
was relieved of the protection of the Island of Crete.

The orders of the Turkish government to extinguish the coast
lights and remove sea marks on the coast of Crete were annuUed
by the united action of all consuls in Crete before the neutrality
proclamations.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB. 17

England declared the ialand of Cyprus neutral, and issued
orders for all British subjects not to serve in the armies of the
belligerents. In the middle of October Italy recognized the
neutrality of the island of Samos.

The Italian Naval Problem.

Before the war began Italy notified her ministers to the Balkan
states that Italy's only object was to take possession of Tripoli
and Cyrenaica, and she would avoid any attack upon any other
Turkish territory. The destruction of Turkey's naval and mili-
tary forces was only contemplated in as far as they opposed
Italy's conquest of Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

The Italian naval task was to secure such a command of the
sea that the expedition corps might safely be transported and
landed on the African coast and communication with Italy be
undisturbed.

This task furnished three fields of operations:

1. The Tripolitan waters, by which the expedition corps would
land. The bulk of the navy was employed there.

2. The eastern Mediterranean, especially the Aegean sea
where the Turkish fleet had assembled and which must be pre-
vented from interfering with the landing of the Italian forces.
For this purpose light scouting vessels were used.

3. The Albanian coast, where a number of Turkish torpedo-
boats should be held in check. For this some older armored
cruisers and several destroyers were used.

Events on the TEiPOLrrAN Coast After Declaration op War
Until the Arrival op the ExPEDmoNARY Corps.

The Italian government declared a blockade of the coast of
Tripoli and Cyrenaica extending from the Egyptian to the Tuni-
sian borders. Violations of the blockade were prosecuted accord-
ing to International law and Italian treaties with other powers.

The blockade of the coast, 700 nautical miles, was made ef-
fective by seven battleships and a number of destroyers and
special ships. Ships of the blockade replenished fuel supply by
going to Augusta singly as necessary. At the outbreak of war
Italy had stored 14,000 tons of coal at the naval base at Au-

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAR. 19

gnsta. The naval repair ship Vulcano was stationed at Augusta.

After some discussion the Turkish forces at Tripoli decided to
evacuate the city with the exception of 150 coast artillery sta-
tioned in the forts. The troops began the evacuation September
27, and quietly proceeded to intrench in the hills south of the
city and two days' march distant. The Italians were kept in-
formed of all that transpired in the city through the Mayor,
Prince Hassuna Earamanli, who had declared his adhesion to
Italy.

September 30 the Italians demanded the city should be sur-
rendered on October 2, but this was still further postponed until
October 3, at noon. No reply havng been received, Vice- Admiral
Faravelli, in command of the naval forces, opened fire on the
forts.

The Benedetto Brin and the training ship division, with two
transports and several torpedo-boats arrived and relieved the
Roma, Pisa, Napoli and Amalfi that had been blockading Tripoli,
and which left to join the flagship to the eastward.

The Bombardment of Tripoli, October 3 and 4, 1911.

In the bombardment, the Sicilia, Sardegna, and Re Umberto
were assigned to engage Fort Sultan je on the west; the Bene-
detto Brin, Carlo Alberto, and Emanuele Filberto engaged the
three old stone forts in the center on the mole on north side of
the town; and the Oaribaldi and Ferrucio engaged Fort Ham-
idje to the eastward.

The Varese, Coatit, and 16 destroyers and four auxiliaries
were stationed .to the rear and on the flanks to prevent any sur-
prise from seaward.

Fire was opened at 3.15 at a range of 7000 yards, by the flag-
ship. The forts replied immediately, but all their shots fell short
The Italians fired chiefly with the 6 and 8-inch guns, and they
soon proved eflfective. The heavy guns were not used, probably
to preserve them and avoid too much expenditure of ammuni-
tion. The hits were few and the fire very slow, many shells
failed to explode and were subsequently picked up several thou-
sand yards beyond in the suburbs.

The old stone forts ceased firing at 5 p. m., but the two outer
forts continued firing until sunset, at 6 p. m.

20 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

Though the buildings in the city were avoided, fires were
started in several, and the governor's palace was hit a number
of times. The new lighthouse was completely destroyed. After
dark the ships got under way and cruised in the offing with
screened lights.

At 6 a. m. the bombardment was resumed with greater vigor,
and the other forts were silenced in the following hour. Fort
Sultanje made the greatest resistance. Ten dead were found in
that fort subsequently.

Occupation of Tripoli by the Naval Landing Force.

While the mob in the city sacked the government buildings,
the garrison evacuated the forts, taking their light guns to the
heights in the southern suburbs, from which they reopened fire
but were soon silenced by shrapnel from the ships. The ships
ceased firing at 11 a. m. The Oaribaldi was the first ship to en-
ter close in and she landed a detachment with two officers in
Fort Hamidje that had been evacuated by the Turks. They ren-
dered the breech mechanisms of the guns therein useless and re-
turned on board.

At the same time a torpedo-boat searched for the cable of
mines laid out in the harbor but could not find it.

All the coast forts were severely damaged and their guns
partly dismounted. According to Turkish reports, their garrison
lost 12 men killed and 23 severely wounded. Seven civilians
were killed in the city, but no Europeans. The Italian ships suf-
fered no losses nor any damage from the Turkish fire.

At noon, October 4, the large ships anchored in the offing and
smaller ships entered the harbor. October 5, a landing force of
1200 men under command of the captain of the Sicilia occupied
Forts Sultanje, Hamidje and the Lighthouse Fort, as well as the
consulate and other important places without any opposition.
The Italian flag was hoisted on Fort Sultanje at noon and sa-
luted by the fleet. Shortly after this Fort Hamidje 's magazine
blew up and that store of Turkish ammunition was destroyed.
It is not known if this was done by the Italians or by the Turks.

The landing force immediately arranged for the defence of the
city and established its government. Rear- Admiral Borea-Bicci
was appointed provisional governor, and the former mayor, Has-
suna Earamanli, was appointed vice-governor.

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAB. 21

They proceeded to substitute a temporary lighthouse for that
which they had destroyed. The cable to Malta was repaired and
preparations were begun to provide quarters for the expedition
corps that was expected to arrive October 11.

A native police was established, and by offering payment some
of the natives were induced to surrender the arms, which the
Turkish officials had supplied them. Within a few hours 1500
Mauser rifles were deposited with the Italian officers, and by
October 12, 3250 rifles had been delivered.

During the next day when the Garibaldi, Varese, and Ferrucio
had departed for Augusta to coal, the landing party ashore had
several skirmishes with the Turks. October 8 they repulsed an
attack at Behare, and October 19 another attack at Bu Meliana
Wells, about 1.5 miles southwest of Tripoli. As Fort Sultanje
was much exposed, the Italians abondoned it and it was blown
up. The ships supported the troops during these engagements
and bombarded the Turkish forts used as bases beyond the sub-
urbs. The Turkish forces assembled at Gharian in the hills, two
days' march from Tripoli. General Munir Pasha was relieved
by Colonel Neschat in command during the middle of October,
who gathered all the forces of the province. At first he had a
force of about 10,000 regulars and 10,000 territorial irregulars,
the latter volunteering for the war.

Tobruk, on the Cyrenaica coast, a fine natural harbor, was at-
tacked by the first squadron on October 4. A force of 400 men
landed and soon overcame the brave resistance of the garrison of
25 men. The Italians took possession and established an Italian
municipal administration. Single ships of the first squadron al-
ternately remained at anchor in that harbor. October 10 the first
detachment of the expeditionary army landed at Tobruk. This
was the first battalion of the 40th Infantry, with some coast ar-
tillery and engineers — about 1000 in all. They had sailed from
Naples October 6.

Dema was bombarded October 8, and 40 Italian citizens who
were confined there were released. The place was bombarded
because they had fired upon the Italian boat with flag of truce.

Events on the Albanian Coast.

Before the war six new Turkish torpedo boats were at Prevesa,
Gomenitza and Durazzo to prevent smuggling. They had not

THE ITAIJAN-TUBKISH WAR.

received the orders of the Turkish Naval Minister to take refuge
in Austrian ports when they were attacked by the destroyers of
the Duke of Abruzzia's command.

At 4 p. m., September 29, one hour after war had been de-
clared, the Italians sighted the two Turkish torpedo-boats, Takat
and Anatolia, at sea between Corfu and Prevesa, steering north-
westward. The Italians opened fire, to which the Turkish boats
replied feebly. The Takat steered north, followed by three de-
stroyers, while the Anatalia steered south, chased by two de-
stroyers. The Takat was hit fifteen times, and, on fire she ran
on the beach near Nikopolis and was totally destroyed. Her com-
mander and eight men were killed or drowjjed. The Anatalia
escaped to Prevesa uninjured. The Italian destroyers were not
damaged in this action. They fired 100 shots from 3-inch guns.

September 30 the Italian destroyers Artigliere and Corazziere
attacked the Turkish torpedo-boats Alpagot and Hamid-Abad
lying at anchor at Prevesa, and sank them. An oflBcer from the
Corazziere having landed the night before had definitely ascer-
tained their positions. The Turkish crews, excepting one man,
escaped. The destroyers then entered the harbor. The mob on
shore fired on the Corazziere as she proceeded to take the steam
yacht Tetied out. The Corazziere fired at the mob and both de-
stroyers left with the steam yacht in tow.

The fort at Prevesa is an old stone fort built during the Vene-
tian period, but armed with 20 modem field guns and five 6-inch
Krupp guns. This fort did not fire on the Italians, though the
latter fired 76 shells during the engagement that lasted 45 min-
utes. The garrison was surprised.

This gave rise to exaggerated rumors of an attack and landing
of Italians at Prevesa, which the Italian government denied and
repeated the orders to avoid landing on any Turkish territory in
Europe. The Duke of Abruzzia was directed to revoke his threat
of a bombardment of Prevesa within 24 hours, on October 3, if
the gunboat and two torpedo-boats in Prevesa were not delivered
to him. At the request of the Austrian government the Italians
recalled the Duke of Abruzzia with all the Italian ships from
that coast.

October 5 a motor boat of the destroyer Artigliere, that had
been searching an Austrian mail steamer in the harbor of San
Giovanni, was fired on by some field guns in an earthwork at that

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAR 23

place. The ArtigUere had not yet received the orders to re-
turn to Tarento and she opened fire on the earthwork, and
in the course of 45 minutes expended all her ammunition. She
silenced the fort and injured a number of buildings in the city.
The ArtigUere was slightly damaged and her commander was
wounded. In the meanwhile the Carahiniere arrived and opened
fire on the earthworks, and left after firing for a period of 20
minutes. After these events the Italian government again de-
clared that every possible precaution should be taken hereafter
to avoid all warlike operations in the Adriatic sea.

October 7 the Duke of Abruzzia's squadron again proceeded to
blockade the Turkish torpedo-boats in their ports on the Al-
banian coast.

Events in the Aegean Sea.

The Italians sent but small naval forces to the Aegean sea,
chiefly scQuting torpedo vessels. September 30 a panic was cre-
ated at Smyrna, Salonica and Mityleni by the appearance of
passing Italian warships. Probably the Vittorio-Emanuele,
Boma and Pisa on a cruise, searching for the Turkish practice
squadron.

In Constantinople fears were entertained for the safety of the
Turkish practice squadron that had sailed from Beirut at 10 a.
m., September 28, for the Dardanelles. This squadron was com-
posed of two battleships, two cruisers, nine destroyers and a tor-
pedo-boat mothership. They had no knowledge of war having
been declared. The squadron steamed at economical speed to
the southwest coast of Cyprus, practicing evolutions en route.
Near the island of Kos, at 4 p. m., October 1, a Turkish govern-
ment steamer informed them of the declaration of war. The
British officers in the squadron then decided to remain on board
until their arrival at the Dardanelles. The squadron then pro-
ceeded at full speed between Mityleni and the mainland, and
safely anchored at Nagara in the Dardanelles that evening.

Vice- Admiral Williams, of the British navy, and other British
officers left the squadron. On October 4 the squadron made a
short cruise out of the Dardanelles, but returned the next day
and anchored off Constantinople and remained there until Octo-
ber 16. In the meantime the harbors of Salonica, Smyrna,

24 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

Beirut) and the approaches to the Dardenelles were mined.
Single Italian cruisers were seen in the Aegean sea on October
4 and 6. Three Italian destroyers appeared off Mityleni on
October 15.

The Transportation op the Italian Expedition C!orps.

The Italian Navy Department collected 60 steamers of 1300
to 9200 gross tonnage at Naples, Palermo and Qenoa. A naval
officer was in command of each transport with 25 sailors of the
navy. Those transports that were subventioned as auxiliaries
for war were armed. All the details of embarkation, loading and
routes for the single transports or in a fleet were successfully
kept profound secret. The expedition corps was divided into
two divisions. The first division was sent to Tripoli and the
second to the ports of Gyrenaica. The van sailed in five trans-
ports from Genoa, via Naples, on October 6 for Tobruk with
some troops and material of the second division, and arrived
October 10.

October 9, 62 transports sailed from different Italian ports.
Twelve transports with the staff of the expeditionary corps and
the first division with nine additional transports sailed from
Palermo for Tripoli. Within Italian waters the fleet steamed
in single column of vessels, with cruisers and torpedo boats
ahead and on the flanks. After leaving the Sicilian coast they
formed double column, and in two groups, the first group of 19
transports and the second of 14 transports. Speed was 10 knots.
Two battleships and several destroyers were in the van, and like-
wise two battleships in the rear with more torpedo destroyers.

Destroyers also were disposed to form a chain of outposts
along the course between Tripoli and Augusta, the naval base.
The first squadron was stationed in the passages from the Aegean
sea to the Mediterranean to prevent any interference by the
enemy's squadron. The naval commander-in-chief was, at the
departure of the convoy, at Augusta.

Good weather was experienced and the first group arrived at
Tripoli October 12 ; the second group arrived October 15. These
were preceded by the Varese convoying two transports and a
hospital ship.

The disembarking was accomplished by means of the ships'
boats with a large number of large fishing smacks from the iskmd

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB. 85

of Lampedusa. The landing proceeded at Tripoli without inter-
ruption. The troops from the first group were all landed by
October 15, and those of the second group by October 18, a total
of 20,000 men being landed from the two groups.

Immediately upon landing the army took the positions held by
the naval landing parties, and especially the entrenchments at
the 14 wells of Bu Meliana, which had been the repeated object
of attack by the Turks. The engineers immediately began to
build entrenchments around the city. The army was promptly
engaged with the Turks, who made night attacks on Bu Meliana
on October 15, 16 and 18, both sides suffering losses in killed and
wounded.

October 13, 20 transports sailed from Naples with the second
division, about 9000 men, and arrived off Benghasi October 18,
having experienced bad weather on the passage. This convoy was
escorted by four battleships of the first division, three cruisers,
one destroyer and the two seagoing torpedo-boat divisions. This
group was followed by transports that left Naples between Octo-
ber 15 and 20 with the rest of the Second Infantry Division,
about 6000 men. With these the transportation of the expedi-
tion corps was practically completed.

Events in the Red Sea and Vicinity op Suez Canal.

For the protection of the Italian colony of Brythrea, the Are-
tusa, Volturna and Staff eta were cruising in the Bed Sea and, on
October 2, 1911, engaged the Turkish destroyer Prik-i-Schewket
which fled into the harbor of Hodeida, the Italians then engaged
the ships and forts and withdrew after sinking a custom house
motor boat. The Italian garrison in Erythrea was reinforced
from the 3700 Italian regulars to 10,000 men by recruiting na-
tives. The cruiser Puglia landed 5 and 6-inch guns that were
mounted on the works at Massowah.

September 30 the Turkish armored coast defence ship Muin-i-
Zafer that had been stationed at Beirut arrived at Port Said
and the Turkish transport Kaiseri with 700 Turkish troops came
from Hodeida. Several days later a Russian transport also ar-
rived from Hodeida with 800 Turkish troops. As the Turkish
vessels did not leave within 24 hours the Italian and British con-
suls protested and the Turkish troops were landed and taken to
the hospital because of the prevalence of cholera. The troops

THE ITALIAN-TUBEISH WAB.

were mbseqaently aent nnder Egyptian eacort to Palertme.

The Muiji-i-Zafer and an old TorkialL gunboat were disarmedi,
their guna and ammnnition being landed at Port Said.
Chabt op Rs> Sba.

Tbb Cruises Wab.
When war waa declared both belligerenta proceeded to aeise
anarmed remels of the enemy. The Italians began by seizing
two Bteamera carrying small detachments of Tarkiab troopa off
the Albanian ooaat, and the Turks seiced an Italian steamer in
the Dardanelles loaded with grain and lumber. Subseqnently,

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 87

large vessels were not seized, and prizes were limited to smaller
craft.

The Hague Convention and London Conference on Interna-
tional Law were proclaimed by both belligerents to be respected,
though neither had ratified the Hague Convention which had
been signed by their representatives. The Turks were not even
represented at the London Conference.

The Italian government proclaimed that contraband of war in-
eluded guns and weapons of all description, ammunition and all
material that may be used in war or be directly serviceable for
the land and naval forces. The Turkish government issued a
similar proclamation. To avoid conflict with Russia the Turkish
government agreed to permit neutral vessels to pass through the
Dardanelles from Black Sea ports, provided they did not take
contraband of war and even permitted neutral ships to pass
bound for Italian ports in case their cargoes were not consigned
to the Italian government or to be of service for the military or
naval forces of Italy.

Prize courts were established by both belligerents during Oc-
tober.

The Occupation op Benghasi.

The official report of Lieutenant-Gteneral Briccola gives the
following details of the operations at Benghasi :

On October 18 a fleet of eight transports convoyed by the
Vittorio Emanuele, Regina Elena, Roma, NapoU, Piemonte
Liguria and Etruria with five destroyers and seven high-sea tor-
pedo boats arrived off Benghasi with the staff and half of the
Second Infantry Division. Admiral Aubry's demand for the
surrender of the city was refused by Chakir Bey, who had a force
of 400 regulars and 2500 irregular troops with two rapid fire
batteries.

The Italians opened fire the next morning at a range of 1000
meters on the entrenchments at Berca to the southward, and on
the lighthouse and magazine to the northward. At the same
time, 8 a. m., the squadron landing force of 800 men and four
guns disembarked, followed by the troops disembarking by
means of the ships' boats, 13 pontoon floats and lighters from
Tripoli.

The first sailor company landed at 8.50 on the Quiliana beach

THE ITALIAN-TDEKI8H WAR

2000 yards aonth of the city. One detachment went along the
beach and occupied the Christian eemetet? on a Band done 10
meters high. Pioneers followed the first landing parly and fa-
cilitated landing by five pontoon landing stages. Major-General
Ameglio landed and took command. The Turkish troops sta-
tioned north of the city, to oppose landing there, rapidly r^-

MAP OF BENGHA8L

forced those at Berca and vigorously attacked the ceut«r and
right flank of the Italians. The ships bombarded the Turkish
position, but the sailors in the cemetery were exposed to a heavy
Are and also in danger of the shells from the fleet, so that they
were obliged to temporarily abandon the cemetery. The torpedo
boat Oraa with several armed ships' boats proceeded to the cus-
tom house wharf to see if the Turkish troops had evacuated the

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAR 89

city, but they were met with such a heavy fire from the troops
concealed there that they withdrew. The fleet then directed a
heavy fire on the custom house, which was completely demol-
ished.

At 11.30 Qeneral Ameglio occupied the sand dunes back of
Buscaiba Point with the sailors and two companies of infantry.

The landing of the fourth and sixty-third infantry regiments
was delayed by the heavy seas until 3 p. m. At 3.30 these troops
proceeded to attack the Berca barracks, supported by fire from
the ships. Qeneral Briccola landed and took conmiand« the
troops fighting until sunset against the Turks intrenched at the
barracks. The little town of Sidi Daub was obstinately defend-
ed, and a house to house resistance was encountered in the
streets of the village.

The Turks were obliged to retreat to the city towards evening
while the Italians, for lack of ammunition, remained intrenched
at Berca. During the night the Italians landed more of the
troops so that their total force ashore amounted to 6000 men.

At the urgent request of Qeneral Briccola the ships opened
fire on the southern portion of the city of Benghasi, the Euro-
pean quarter, using searchlights. The bombardment lasted 20
minutes and drove the Turkish troops out of the city ; but it also
destroyed many buildings, including the British and Italian
consulates, and killed many citizens, including 12 Europeans,
mostly British subjects. Admiral Aubry bombarded the city
only after repeated and urgent appeals from General Briccola,
as he had declared before beginning hostilities that the fleet
would not bombard the city.

October 29 the Turks evacuated the city, which was at once
occupied by the Italians. The Turks withdrew to the elevated
plateau east of the city and established headquarters at Bu
Marian, about 20 miles from the coast.

The sailor landing parties re-embarked, but left their guns
ashore to reinforce the field artillery. The Italians reported a
loss of 36 killed and 88 wounded, and estimated the Turkish loss
at 200 killed and wounded.

A few days later the fourth infantry brigade at Benghasi was
reinforced by the 68th regiment of the second brigade. The
Arabs along the coast of Benghasi joined the Italians, while the
Arabs from the interior reinforced the Turkish troops.

90 THE ITAUAN-TUBKISH WAB.

Enver Bey, formerly military attach^ at Berlin, commanded
the Turkish forces. Frequent skirmishes followed, but without
decisive results. The Turks were usually repulsed by the shell
fire from the ships.

The Occupation op Derna.

The Pisa, Amalfi, San Marco, Napoli, Agordat and Coatit,
with three destroyers and several transports with troops, arrived
off Derna, October 15, and negotiations for the surrender of the
town failed. The Pisa then bombarded the town for 45 minutes.
The fire was directed against the barracks and a small fort with
two light guns. The fire was slow at rate of one shot per minute.
As this was not answered a boat with flag of truce was sent in,
but was met with a volley of rifle fire. The four armored cruisers
then opened fire on the town with 6-inch and 7.6-inch guns and
in the course of 30 minutes completely destroyed it. A landing
party of 500 men, escorted by the destroyers, attempted to land
at 2 p. m., but owing to the rough sea and heavy infantry fire
from the Turks intrenched on the beach this attempt was re-
pulsed. The ships then shelled the beach until 4 p. m. The next
day a strong northeast wind and heavy seas prevented any at-
tempt to land.

October 18 the Turks evacuated the place and 1500 men of the
Alpine chasseurs with pioneers and field artillery took posses-
sion.

After this there were daily skirmishes and the Turks gave the
Italians no rest. The Arabs from the interior reinforced the
Turks daily, and on October 25 the Italians were reinforced by
the 22d infantry regiment.

October 28 the Turks succeeded in capturing several guns and
ammunition in an attack upon the Italians, but the fire of the
ships drove them back and the Italians were not dislodged.

The Occupation op Homs.

October 16 the Varese, Arpi and four transports with the
eighth Bersaglieri regiment having six field guns were sent from
Tripoli to take possession of Homs. The Turkish commander re-
fused to surrender and as heavy seas and bad weather prevented

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAR. 31

landing during the first three days the Varese and Marco Polo
that arrived on the 17th, bombarded the castle and intrench-
ments on its flanks. The Italians estimated the Turks at 500
regular and 1000 irregular troops. The weather moderated on
October 21 and the Italians landed after overcoming a stubborn
resistance. Two Italian boats capsized. The Turks subsequently
frequently attacked the Italians, but were, as usual, repulsed by
fire from the ships.

The Italian MoiITaby PosmoN at Tbipoli in October^ 1911.

The first corps of the Italians were intrenched around the city
of Tripoli from Fort Qagaresch 2 kilometers west of the city to
Scharaschat 3 kilometers east. The right flank extended from
Gagaresch to Bu Meliana and was held by the 63d regiment.
The 82d and 80th regiments held the center from Bu Meliana to
the village Henni, they occupied the cavalry barracks and Fort
Mesri. The 11th Bersaglieri regiment occupied the left flank
from Henni to Scharaschat. Serving as reserves, in rear, at the
extreme flanks, the naval landing brigades from the training
ships squadron and a part of the 4th infantry were stationed.

The desert afforded unobstructed view of the approaches on
the right flank, so that the Turks were there exposed to the gun
fire from the ships. The center was opposite the edge of the
oasis and the left flank faced the oasis where elevations, trees,
garden walls and buildings obstructed the view of the country
beyond.

It was difficult to reconnoiter this country and the Italians
used aeroplanes, three aeroplanes at Benghasi and six at Tripoli.
The first aeroplane was used on November 1, from which hand
grenades were thrown upon the Turkish camp at Ain Zara.

The Italians used a hand grenade invented by Lieutenant Ci-
pelli, of the navy, who was killed by an explosion of one of these
grenades. These Cipelli grenades are made at Spezia. They are
formed of a steel shell, about the size of an orange, filled with
picrate acid. A cap is inserted just before the grenade is to be
used. It is exploded by a steel ball that is withheld in position
by means of a safety pin that is removed immediately before the
hand grenade is thrown. The steel ball is held in place after the
removal of the safety pin by pressure of the hand. In case the

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34 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

aviator is alone in his flight it is necessary for him to use one
hand on the steering gear while he holds the grenade between his
knees to remove the safety pin with the other hand. The use of
the aeroplanes at Tripoli was much limited by the winds and
dust from the sandy desert.

The Italians suffered for lack of water, as the available wells
were not sufficient to supply them with water. Naval waterboats
were in constant service transporting water from Sicily to Tri-
poli.

Cholera prevailed, and during the first weeks the Italian army
suffered a loss of 25 to 30 men daily, who died from cholera. The
mortality among the civilians in Tripoli was much greater.

The Turkish Position Around Tripoli.

The Turkish garrison of 2870 men withdrew to Ain Zara,
about five miles south of Tripoli, with their main body at Zan-
zur, 12 miles southwest of the city. Their outposts were close to
the Italian lines. By strenuous work the Turkish commander,
Colonel Neschat Bey, organized an effective force, which he re-
cruited from the natives by volunteers, to 20,000 men by Novem-
ber 1, and which was being daily reinforced. These volunteers
were good riflemen and marksmen, but undisciplined. The chief
bases for recruits were at Aziziah, Easr Qharian, and Kasr Vef-
fren, from 40 to 75 miles south of Tripoli.

Engagements at Tripoli During November, 1911.

A series of attacks on the Italians were made in force by the
Turks with 6000 men on October 23-26, chiefly against the Ital-
ian center and left flank. These attacks were supported by a
revolt of the people in the city that was suppressed with great
loss by the 11th Bersaglieri regiment. The Sicilia and Sardegna
participated in the defence of positions on the left flank by shell-
ing the Turks. The Turks were finally repulsed, but they gained
position by capturing Bu Meliana, Henni and Fort Mesri with
several field guns, machine guns and other war material, to-
gether with about 100 prisoners.

The Italians were obliged to take up a new position that ex-
tended from the right flank to Feschlum and Schara Zaniet. The

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB. 35

Turks took possession of the forts around the city, and, on Octo-
ber 31, they began to bombard the city from Port Hamidje. They
were soon silenced by the gun fire of the Carlo Alberto and
Lampo.

In the battles of October 23 and 26 the Italians lost 382 killed
and 1158 wounded. The Italians estimated the Turks lost 1000.

The civilians who participated in the revolt were arrested and
about 100 were convicted and shot. It was reported that a much
larger number of civilians were executed, some stating over 400,
but this has not been verified and was denied by the Italian gov-
ernment. It was reported that some of the irregular Arab troops,
who had expended their ammunition and surrendered, were
shot. In consequence of these reports the Turkish government
protested against the inhumanity of the Italians to the Hague
court. The Italians claim that the native population were only
treated as absolutely necessary for self-defence. General Caneva
then sent 3000 of the citizens as prisoners of war to Qaeta and
the Islands of Ustica and Tremiti. He also compulsorily dis-
armed all the natives.

The Italians were reinforced by fresh troops from Italy to the
number of 30,000 men by November 7, after which they began to
retake the positions formerly occupied. The fifth brigade of in-
fantry that had just arrived recaptured Port Hamidje with dif-
ficulty. The training ship division shelled Port A-Sultanje, and
G-Port Gargaresch. Two battalions made a reconnoissance in
force towards Ain Zara and Zansur.

The Turks made a series of attacks after November 9, but
were repulsed by shell fire from the ships Liguria, Carlo Alberto,
Partenope and Cigno, . The hotly contested entrenchments at Bu
Meliana were recaptured, but had to be abandoned again be-
cause the heavy rains had flooded the neighborhood. In the con-
fusion of the flood the Turks made a vigorous attack on Novem-
ber 17 and captured several Italian guns. The rainy season
deferred extensive invasion into the interior.

November 5, 1911, the King of Italy proclaimed the annexa-
tion of Tripoli and Cyrenaica and under the complete sover-
eignty of the King of Italy.

36 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

Reinforcements for the Italian Troops.

A second expedition corps was formed and transported in de-
tachments to Tripoli and Cyrenaica during the early part of
November. The organizations were as follows :

THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION, LIEUT.GKNERAL DE CHAURAKD.

5th hrigcide. 6th hriaade.

18th refitment infantry. 52d regiment infantry.

93d ref^iment infantry. 23d regiment infantry.

1 regiment field artillery, 6 batteries.
3 squadrons cavalry.

rOURTII INFANTRY DIVISION, LIEUT.-GENERAL COUNT TROMBI.

7th brigade. 8th brigade.

20th regiment infantry. 37th regiment infantry.

79th regiment infantry. 50th regiment infantry.

1 regiment field artillery, 6 batteries.
3 squadrons cavalry.

By November 20, 1911, Italy had sent the following:

16 regiments of infantry 48,000

3 regiments J^ersaglieri 9,000

3 battalions Grenadiers 3,000

4 battalions Alpine Chasseurs 4,000

4 regiments combination field artillery 6,000

3 battalions pioneers 3,000

2 battalions engineers 1,000

12 squadrons cavalry 2,400

3 squadrons Carabineers 600

6 detachments gensdarmes service 1,000

Train 7,000

85,000
Exclusive of a detachment of special troops.

The troops sent to Italy included some of the men on reserve
lists and were not exclusively those belonging to the active army.

Additional reserves were called out to replace these men to
number about 90,000 additional reserves.

As there was a lack of officers trained as aviators, ten civilian
aviators volunteered with a corps of artificer mechanics and 60
engineer soldiers. One-half of these were sent to Derna and To-
bruk and the others to Tripoli.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 3T

The Activity of the Italian Navy.

The co-operation of the navy, after the landing of the first
expedition corps, was to accomplish the following objects :

1. The support of the land forces in engagements on shore
was assigned to the Sicilia, Carlo Alberto, Sardegna and Marco
Polo off Tripoli and Horns.

2. The blockade of the Tripolitan coast, that was first con-
ducted by the cruisers and torpedo vessels, was assigned after
November 10 to the four new Italian mail steamers that for-
merly plied between Naples and Palermo and which were each
armed with six 6-inch guns.

3. The Turkish coasts of Albania, Syria and the Aegean Sea
were reconnoitered by a division of four destroyers in each re-
gion.

4. The passages between Crete and the mainland were guarded
by several ships and destroyers of the Duke of Abruzzia's com-
mand. As the transports conveying troops were constantly go-
ing to and from Tripoli and Italy without convoy it was neces-
sary to guard these passages strictly.

Early in November several cruisers and torpedo boats bom-
barded the small Tripolitan coast ports at Zuara and Adjita
near the Tunisian frontier in order to destroy the contrabrand
stores that had been collected there from across the Tunisian
border.

The ships of the first two squadrons left October 24 for Au-
gusta, Tarento and Naples to replenish stores and fuel, and
prepare for a new series of operations that were rumored to be
contemplated against the Turkish forces in the Aegean Sea.

Tobruk was established as a naval base and some of the fleet
replenished store and fuel there.

The Turkish squadron remained off Constantinople and rarely
left the Dardanelles. In expectation of an attack by the Italian
fleet, the Turkish troops on all the islands of the Aegean Sea
were reinforced, especially at Lemnos, Mythelene, Chios and
Rhodes.

38 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

*The Defences of the Dardanelles and Bosphorub.

Qeneral Remarks.

The Coast Defences and fortified sites of Turkey are few in
number, and, generally speaking, do not merit serious attention,
as they do not answer the modem requirements of defence either
from an engineering or an artillery point of view. The excep-
tions are those of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, which were
considerably improved in 1887 and are still in a fairly satisfac-
tory condition. The land defences, especially at the approaches
to Constantinople at the Tchatalga line, have been much im-
proved of late years and consist of a regular system of separate
forts connected by batteries.

In these days of high explosive shells and rapid firing batter-
ies long and narrow straits require a special form of coast de-
fence. Guns do not require to be of particularly long range
provided the batteries are carefully located to suit the terrain
and are capable of bringing a heavy volume of fire on the re-
quired objective.

The guns used by Turkey along the coasts were nearly all
made by Krupp, while the naval guns were mostly supplied by
the British firms, Armstrong and Elswick.

The Dardanelles Defences.

The Straits of the Dardanelles (or the Hellespont, as they used
to be called), connect the Aegean Sea with the Sea of Marmora.
They have a total length of 42 miles, a width varying from 1400
yards to 8200 yards and a depth of from 70 to 350 feet. A
strong current flows through to the Aegean Sea that impedes
progress of vessels that enter from the Aegean Sea. There are
two important islands in the Aegean Sea near the entrance to
the Straits named Imbos and Tenedos.

Besika Bay is opposite Tenedos. This is a good roadstead and
is often visited by European squadrons, to whom entrance

^This account of the Defences of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus is
taken from the Journal of the Royal Artillery for January, 1913, and is a
translation from the Russian Artillery Journal of August, 1912, by Lieut.
J. K. L. Fitzwilliams, R. H. A., and is the latest and most reliable informa-
tion on this subject.

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAR 89

through the Straits is forbidden. There is a modem fort and a
¥rireless station at Besika Bay.

The defences of the Straits have been strengthened daring the
past 25 years. Batteries have been constructed to command the
narrower portions of the Straits.

The southern entrance is guarded by the batteries at Eum-
Kale on the Asiatic and Seddil-Bahr on the European Shore.
These are separated by a distance of 4060 yards and are built
in the immediate vicinity of the ancient castles of the same
names erected by Mahomet IV in 1659.

The defences are as follows, starting from the Aegean Sea to
the Sea of Marmora:

A — On the European Shore.

1. Ertrogrul Battery — This is east of Cape Challas on the
edge of a small bay and is armed with eight 9.4-inch guns.

2. Seddil-Bahr Battery — This was constructed in 1886 at the
extremity of the Qallipoli Peninsular on the Aegean Sea near
the ancient stone castle of Seddil-Bahr. This is square shaped
¥dth large low towers at each comer, and is now used as an ar-
senal and powder magazine. The battery is armed with six
Krupp 11.2-inch, 10.2-inch and 9.4-inch guns. There are also six
field guns.

3. Souan-Dere-Tabia Battery — ^This is armed with three 47-
mm. Nordenf eldt guns and covers the mine area between Souan-
Dere and Cephas.

4. Ildiz-Tabia Battery— This is built on a hill 300 feet above
sea level and is designed to operate against the ships, which from
a position in Sare-Siglarosk Bay might flank the batteries Ea-
midie and Chemenlek on the Asiastic shore. It is armed ¥dth
fourteen 8.3-inch and 5.9-inch guns.

5. Nordenfeldt-Tabia Battery — Situated a little to the right
and lower than the Ildiz-Tabia Battery, is armed with seven
47-mm. Nordenfeldt guns.

6. Eamidie Battery — ^Near Cape Eidil-Bahr, is armed with
two 14-inch, three Nordenfeldts and one field gun.

7. Namazie Battery — Situated at the narrowest part of the
Straits, is semicular and has sixteen guns of from 10.2 to 8.3-ineh
oaliber, besides one field gun. This is the most important fort

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THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAE. 41

B — On the Asiatic Shore of the Straits.

The defences on the Asiatic shore of the Straits have been con-
siderably changed since 1877. The principal forts are as fol-
lows, viz.:

1. Eum-Eale is a new fort located east of the old castle and it
commands the entrance to the Dardanelles at its entrance into
the Aegean Sea. It commands the area reaching to Siddil-Bahr
on the European side. It is armed with ten guns varying from
11-inch to 5.9-inch in caliber. It also has six field guns and
three 47-mm. Nordenfeldts.

2. Orchanie Battery stands on a high hill southwest of Eum-
Eale and has seven 9.5-inch guns that command the entrance and
approaches to the Straits.

3. Dardanus Battery has two rapid firing 5.9-inch Erupp
guns.

4. Cephas-Tabia Battery is north of Cape Cephas lighthouse
and is armed with three 47-mm. Nordenfeldts.

5. Eamidie Battery is on the shore of Sari-Siglarosk Bay and
has fifteen guns varying from 11-inch to 5.9-inch caliber.

6. Chemenlek Battery has four heavy guns, four 47-mm. Nor-
denfeldts and eleven field guns. It has a search-light and is
eonnected by submarine cable with Nazamie battery on the Euro-
pean shore. This is the strongest and best equipped battery on
the Aisiatic shore. There is a large ammunition store under the
ruined castle Chanak.

7. Medjid-Eavan-Tabia Battery is barely visible from the sea.
It is armed with nine field guns.

8. Medjid Battery is armed with fifteen heavy guns.

9. Nagara Battery is on the right flank of the Asiatic de-
fences of the Dardanelles and has nine guns varying from 10.2-
inch to 5.9-inch caliber.

10. Abilos-Tabia Battery and

11. Maltepe-Tabia Battery are both situated on the crest of a
hill near Cape Nagara and each has two guns of medium caliber.

These defences were considerably strengthened by additional
works and temporary intrenchments during the war. The gar-
risons of all the forts were reinforced by the bulk of the Turkish
army, while the equipment of all the forts was improved by the
addition of numerous search-lights. The Straits were filled with

THE ITAUAN-TUBKI8H WAB.

mines and barricades of steel hawsers were kept ready to com-
pletely close the Straits in case of an attack by the Italians.

The following table shows the number of gmiB and the gar-
risons of the variotui forts on the shores of the Dardanelles :

Ife

Nune of Fort.

1
o

Ertrogrul

8
IB
3

7
6

*
3
8
S

2
S
2

so I

240 3

Sonan-Dere-Tftbia

80 1

Kamidie

Medjid

80 1
IGO 8

ao ..

ISO 4
BO ..

NatnaEie

Dounuin-Bourou

160 B
55 ..

15 ..
15 B
75 ..

Total on European side

107

1280 16

1
1

2
19

15
9

14
4

340 3
80 1

20 ..

S
3

Orchanie

DardanuH

CephaB-Tabia

12
11

"14
17

220 3
140 ..
10 2
10 ..
240 3
300 ..
20 4

9
11

Nagara

Maltepe-Tabia

6
8

Medjid

108

12S0 16

14S

£560 32

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 4t

It is interesting to note that Nagara Battery was constructed
on the ruins of the village Abidos, near which Xerxes ordered a
bridge to be built for the passage of his army across the Straits.

All the batteries were built with great care, and, with the ex-
ception of Kamidie and Namazie, are practically invisible from
the sea. Their positions are, however, easily detected by the
stone barracks which in every case have been built close behind
them and are in full view of passing ships.

If these batteries are well manned and efKciently handled, it
seems almost impossible for any war ship to run the guantlet
safely besides avoiding the mines and breaking through the bar-
ricades. These 107 guns between Cape Cephas and Nagara are
of the latest modem types and they should stop any ship im-
peded by the strong current that runs at the rate of nearly five
miles an hour. The foregoing is merely the strength on a peace
footing and in war these defences are much more formidable, as
was the case during the threatened passage of the Italian fleet.

The Sea of Marmora joins the Straits of the Dardanelles with
the Bosphorus. This sea is 170 miles long and 66 miles wide at
its narrowest part. The Bosphorus connects with the Black Sea.
It is 18 miles long and from 100 to 300 feet deep. The greatest
width is 3800 yards, while the narrowest part is only 700 yards
across. The current flows at a rate of over five miles per hour.
Its width makes it better for opposing the passage of a hostile
fleet, but from an artillery point of view it is not as strong as
the batteries along the Dardanelles.

Beginning at the Sea of Marmora the following are the chief
forts of the Bosphorus:

A — On the European Shore.

A disused fort called Rumel-Kissar stands at the entrance to
the Bosphorus. It is connected by a submarine cable with Cape
Eandidge on the Asiatic side. Darius witnessed the passage of
his army across the Straits from this point. It was here also
where the Crusaders crossed into Asia.

1. Kirich-Boumu Battery is a new construction, but it is
armed with four old pattern 6-inch guns.

2. Telle-Tabia Battery is situated on the cape of the same
name and has two 8.3-inch ho¥dtzer8 on the summit of the hill,

44 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

two 6-inch Armstrong guns shielded and lower down, while on
the beach near an old Genoese castle there are two Nordenfeldts
and a search-light.

3. Rumel-Kavak Battery has two 14-inch Krupp guns and
one 9.4-inch howitzer.

4. Bumel-Kavak Fort is armed with six modem guns.

5. Saritash Battery is on the beach and is armed with four
9.4-inch Krupps and two Nordenfeldts.

6. On Cape Mavromolo, 500 yards north of Saritash Battery,
there is a modem observation station and four howitzers.

7. Boyuk-Leman Battery has four 9.4-inch Erupp guns, a
search-light and an observation station with an ammunition
magazine.

8. Earibje Battery is located on the cape of the same name
and has four heavy guns.

9. Fort Eilia is on the Black Sea, six miles from the entrance
of the Bosphorus, and has seven 6-inch Krupp guns.

B — On the Asiatic Shore.

1. Madjar Battery is 930 yards north of Cape Muk-Boumu.
It is a large square earthwork on the sea shore and it is armed
with twenty Krupp guns varying from 6-inch to 11-inch in cali-
ber. This is the main fort on the Bosphorus.

2. Behind this and higher there is a work containing two Nor-
denfeldts and four field guns.

3. Still higher on the same hill are four 9.4-inch howitzers.

4. Anatole-Kavak Battery lies opposite Rumel-Kavak Battery,
in Europe, from which it is separated by a distance of 1200
yards. It contains eleven Krupp guns.

5. Immediately above the last named there is an earthwork
containing four 9.4-inch guns and four Maxims.

6. There is a battery of two 9.4-inch guns on the beach of
Kichili Bay.

7. Phil-Boumu Battery lies southwest of the Cape of that
name and contains three 6-inch guns.

8. There is an ancient fort on Cape Poras that has a number
of antiquated pieces of ordnance.

9. Anatole-Phenar-Kissar Battery is armed with new pattern
guns of various calibers.

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAE. 45

10. At Cape Boyuk-Boumu, jutting out into the Black Sea,
there is a battery of two field guns, while on a headland north
of the mouth of the river Reva there are four field guns.

Many of the batteries along the Straits of the Dardanelles and
Bosphorus are constructed in or under the cliffs and in many
cases have inadequate protection from splinters of rock, etc.

Additional Defences for the War.

These permanent fortifications were reinforced by mobile de-
fences of the navy. The Turkish fleet was anchored off Nagara
during this war and the flotilla of torpedo boats and the vessels
of the navy were expected to co-operate with the army in de-
fending the passage of a hostile fleet through the Straits of
Dardanelles.

The defences of the Dardenelles that consisted of three forts
at the western entrance with 20 heavy guns and 80 heavy guns
in the forts at the narrow strait between Chanak and Nagara
were strengthened with 120 additional guns, but chiefly of
smaller caliber. These forts were garrisoned by 7000 men and
all the villages and buildings around these forts that might
obstruct the fire of the guns were razed. The old mine fields
forming three barriers at Kum Kale^ Chanak and Nagara were
reinforced by two additional mine fields with Whitehead mines
of the latest construction at Kephes. The old mines were not re-
liable, they had been neglected and in that channel with depths
ranging from 8 to 20 fathoms there is a strong current that
often has a maximum strength of five miles per hour. Twelve
old hulks were provided and made ready to be sunk in the nar-
rowest part of the strait, that is at Chanak, where it is 1300
meters in width. The entire Turkish fleet was also prepared to
defend the passage through the Dardanelles. Admiral Fisher
stated that in view of the topography and conditions in the
Straits of Dardanelles they could not be taken or forced unless
the attacking fleet could afford to sacrifice twenty obsolete bat-
tleships and force the passage with the rest of the fleet, which
should be of the most modern type.

At Oallipolis 25,000 Turks were stationed to defend any at-
tempt to land there.

The heavily armed forts at Cape Karaburun and the Nasiki
peninsula were strengthened and several batteries of rapid fire

4(1 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

guns w«re mounted there to defend the approaches to Saloniea, a
city of 120,000 inhabitants. The entrance to the bay, two miles
wide, was mined. The channels leading into Smyrna were de-
fended by two forts at Sanjak Ealessi, six miles from Smyrna,
which is a city of 300,000 inhabitants. These were strengthened
and a new earthwork fort was constructed with twelve 6-inch
guns with several rapid fire batteries. Twenty thousand Turks
were ready to prevent any landing.

At Mityleni the garrison was reinforced by 2000 troops. All
the other important islands were likewise reinforced; Lemnos,
Rhodes, Samos and Chios each receiving 1500 additional troops
with artillery.

The Turkish government issued rifles to all Mohammedans in
the islands of Aegean Sea, and ordered all Italians that resided
in the region around the Dardanelles to leave, and, in the course
of November, transported many to other parts of the country.

Any attack by Italy on the Turks in Europe or Asia Minor
would involve international complications as all powers have
possessions there, and, besides, the great strength of the highly
trained Turkish army would render such an attempt hopeless.

The Italian government, however, notified the Austrian and
Russian governments of intention to blockade the Straits of
Dardanelles on November 20, 1911. The Russian government
answered in a note, on November 24, that the neutrality of the
Dardanelles must be respected ; and based this claim on the Pon-
tus treaty of 1871, which was further strengthened by the pro-
tocol of the Declaration of London of 1909, that stipulated that
the approaches to neutral ports shall not be blockaded. The
Declaration of London was not ratified by the powers. Russia
also protested against the Turkish contemplated design of plac-
ing barriers in the Straits of Dardanelles.

On November 27 Italy replied that she did not intend to block-
ade the Dardanelles, but, nevertheless, the Turks continued to
strengthen its defences.

The Austrian and Russian ambassadors endeavored to mediate
to secure peace, to which Turkey replied that she had no objec-
tion to concluding an honorable peace, but the loss of the two
African provinces could not be permitted by the Young Turk
government without endangering the country's constitution.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 47

Italian Naval Operations During December, 1911.

The second squadron remained in South Italian ports while
the vessels of the first squadron were distributed among the ports
of Cyrenaica, and seldom visited the home ports. During the
first part of December the Roma, Begina-Elena, San Marco and
Agordat were at Benghasi; the Napoli at Dema; the VittoriO'
Emanuele, Pisa, Etna and Etruria at Tobruk, with 12 torpedo
vessels and the Vulcano; the Marco Polo at Homs, and the train-
ing ship squadron at Tripoli. These vessels co-operated in all
the engagements with the army on shore, by landing parties,
their naval guns and by bombarding the Turkish forces when-
ever within range of the guns of ships. The two old battleships
Italia and Lepanto were prepared as station ships to relieve the
training ship squadron.. The Italians had a large supply of am-
munition for the 43-cm. (16.8-inch) guns of these ships.

The Vettor Pisani, the Duke of Abruzzia's flagship, remained
at Tarento and Brindisi until the middle of December. Some
destroyers and high sea torpedo boats of this division cruised
singly along the Albanian and Grecian coasts, in the Ionian Sea,
the Aegean Sea and along the coast of Asia Minor.

The Liguria, Partenope, Dardo and Euro co-operated in at-
tacking Zuara, Misrata and Argub near the Tunisian frontier.

December 15 the first division arrived at Tarento and the
training ship division at Spezia. All ships were revictualed and
the flag officers went to Rome for a council of war.

The navy was active in the Red Sea, where the squadron was
reinforced by the Calabria returning from the Asiatic station.
It was reported that 20,000 Arabs were organized in Arabia to
attack the Italian colony at Brythrea, and to reinforce the Turks
in Cyrenaica.

The Italian cruisers searched all the Arabian Bed Sea ports
for Turkish vessels and troops. November 19 the Puglia and
Calabria destroyed the port of Akaba, a place of 500 inhabitants,
where Turkish troops had assembled. During the passage of the
British king and queen through the Red Sea en route returning
from the coronation ceremonies in India, all hostilities were sus-
pended until after November 26. November 30 the Calabria and
Volturno bombarded the quarantine station Sheik Said near Pe-
rim and Mocca, 40 miles north of Perim, where 5000 Turks with

48 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

field artillery were preparing to cross the Red Sea and attack
Erythrea. They sank all their sailing craft, including a large
number of dhows.

After clearing the Red Sea of the Turks, the Italians re-estab-
lished the lights on the coast of Erythrea.

Engagements at Tripoli.

November 26, after the arrival of the third infantry division,
commonly designated as the third army corps, the Italians at-
tacked the Turks and Arabs and regained Ports Messri, Henni
and Scharachat that had been occupied by the Turks after the
battles on October 23.

After this repulse, in which the Italians lost 16 killed and 104
wounded, the Turkish main body withdraw from Ain Zara to the
southward. The Turks, however, continued occasional assaults
until December 4, when General Prugoni led a force of 16 bat-
talions of Italian infantry with five batteries of field guns to at-
tack the Turkish intrenchments at Ain Zara, where 3000 Turks
^till remained. In the engagement that resulted in the capture
of Ain Zara the Italians had 17 killed and 94 wounded, while
they estimated the Turkish loss at several hundred killed. The
Italians captured eight guns that had been rendered unservice-
able.

The Italians followed this up with a strong reconnoisance to
the borders of the hill country, 30 to 35 kilometers south and
southeast of Tripoli. Cavalry and aeroplanes served in this re-
connoisance.

The oasis on the east side of Tripoli was bombarded in zones
by the Re Umberto, Sicilia, Partenope, Pulmine and Cassiopea
without finding any enemy therein, so that the 93d regiment of
infantry was sent to garrison Tagiura, about 15 kilometers east
of Tripoli. The Italians next proceeded to intrench the newly
acquired positions. A battery of 6-inch guns and one 8-inch
rifled howitzer that had been sent from Italy to bombard Ain
Zara were now mounted there on the earthworks. A military
railroad was constructed to connect Ain Zara with Tripoli.

The Italians thus found ample room for further operations
into the interior and the fortifications of the approaches formed
a secure base for conquest of the region.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 49

Engagements at Benghasi and Debna m December.

The Arabs and Turks estimated at 15,000, made frequent at-
tacks by day and night on the strongly intrenched Italian gar-
rison in the southern suburbs of Benghasi. The four regiments
of infantry acted on the defensive and were supported by the
San Marco and Agordat. The Italians rarely attempted a sortie.
An attack of 20,000 Turks was repulsed on November 30 with
considerable loss. Shortly after this the garrison was reinforced
by the 57th infantry regiment from Italy. The battleship Regina
Elena also arrived from Tobruk. During the night of December
14 and 15 the Turks attacked in great force, but were repulsed by
aid of the fire from the ships. The Italians lost several field guns.

At Derna the Turks and Arabs were(^^mated at 3500, but
they were being constantly reinforced and a general assault on
the Italian position was expected. During the latter part of
November the garrison at Derna made a sortie with three bat-
talions of infantry and 150 sailors from the Napoli In an en-
gagement of 8 hours the Italians lost 15 killed and 37 wounded.
Such engagements as these were frequent. November 30 Count
Trombi arrived as Governor of Derna with large reinforcements,
consisting of the 26th infantry regiment, one battalion of Alpine
Chasseurs and one battalion of the 20th infantry, by which the
strength of the garrison was increased to 15,000 men.

The Italian and Turkish forces in Tripoli and Cyrenaica were
constantly reinforced. The arrival of the third army corps in-
creased the Italian forces to 120,000 men, which were distributed
as follows : At Tripoli, 70,000 ; at Benghasi, 25,000 ; at Derna,
15,000 ; at Homs, 5000, and at Tobruk, 5000.

The withdrawal of the Turks into the interior enabled them to
•einforce their troops considerably. The cost of the war was
defrayed chiefly by freewill offerings of all Islam. Turkish of-
ficers, and men, weapons, ammunition, and all kinds of supplies
were constantly sent across the Egyptian and Tunisian frontiers^
notwithstanding their neutrality.

The Italians occupied Sidi Barrami on the coast between To-
bruk and Solum to prevent contraband and troops from entering
across the Egyptian frontier, while the naval blockaders guarded
the coast and captured several sailing ships with contraband.

The Italians complained of this violation of the neutrality not

50 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

SO much against that from Egypt, which was done secretly, but
against that from Tunis, where it was carried on openly. The
J^^rench government declared that it did all in its power to stop
the transportation of contraband, and suggested that Italy
should strengthen her forces along the frontier. The effect of
French prohibition stopped the caravan trade via Delibat to
TripoU.

The Turks used Delibat, the eastern terminus of telegraph
communication in Tunis, for despatches to Europe, and they
built a telegraph line from their headquarters south of Tripoli
to Quezzan, five kilometers from Delibat.

The Turkish sick and wounded were tended by French and
German Bed Cross societies and the Turkish Bed Crescent so-
ciety, who reached the Turks and Arabs via Tunisian borders.
The English Bed Cross society sent their supplies to the Turks
via Egyptian frontier.

The Italian government exercised a rigorous censorship over
the press and correspondents of the newspapers were limited
strictly in regard to their reports. These restrictions were so
rigidly enforced that the majority of prominent correspondents
left Tripoli and returned to their homes, and, excepting a few
French correspondents, the Italians only were represented and
their reports were revised by the Italian authorities.

The Italian government, however, permitted all the military
and naval attaches accredited to the foreign embassies and lega-
tions at Bome to visit Benghasi, Tripoli, Dema, Tobruk and
Homs in the steamer Bosnia that was specially provided for them
on condition that they would not publish anything they might
see on the four weeks' cruise that began October 18, 1911.

Operations op the Itallai^ Navy Untu. February 20, 1912.

During January, the Oaribaldi, Varese, Etna and some tor-
pedo boats were at Tobruk, the Ferrucio at Dema, the Etruria
at Benghasi, the Marco Polo at Homs and the Carlo Alberto,
Liguria, Iride and several high sea torpedo boats at Tripoli. The
greater part of the fleet that returned to Italy about the middle
of December remained in Italy refitting, etc.

As the Italian patrol of the Turkish European coasts had been
to a great extent withdrawn and as it was evidently not intended

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 51

to attack such ports, the Turkish goyemment discharged the re-
serves in the garrisons of the islands and some of those on the
mainland.

In the Bed Sea a threatened attack on the colony of Erythrea
caused the Italians to reinforce the naval forces there so that
they had there the Piemonte, Calabria, Puglia, Aretusa, Vol-
turno, and Staffeta, with the four large destroyers Artigliere,
Oranatiere, Bersagliere and Oarabaldino,

The Italian naval commander ascertained that seven small
Turkish gunboats that had been in the Persian gulf were con-
cealed near the Farsan Islands and the above named ships
searched for them. These vessels had been ordered home, but
ran out of coal and were unable to proceed ; as the Turkish trans-
port Kaiseriy which had coal for these gunboats, had been cap-
tured by the Italians. The Italians were ignorant that the lack
of coal had prevented these gunboats from reaching Suez, and
believed that they had entered the Bed Sea to transport Arabs
to reinforce the Turks or to attack Erythrea.

January 7 the Italians discovered the seven gunboats with the
steam yacht Fuad, at anchor at Kunfuda. The Italian ships
opened fire on the gunboats, and, after three hours' firing at
4500 meters, they sank all except three that were beached. The
crews deserted the beached gunboats and the Italians completed
their total destruction the next morning, getting some light guns
and a few trophies from the little squadron. The Italians bom-
barded Kunfuda and captured four Arab sailing vessels and the
yacht Fuad, which they towed to Massowah. They bombarded
small Arabian Bed Sea ports; Akaba (for the third time on Jan-
uary 19), Djebana, Sheik Said, Mocca and Midy. The auxiliary
cruiser Citta di Palermo bombarded a camp on the Sinai penin-
sula, but these bombardments caused very little damage to the
Arabs, as most of the shells failed to explode.

The Italians thereupon declared the coast blockaded for a
distance of 45 miles around Hodeida in the Bed Sea, a seaport
of 45,000 inhabitants.

This blockade became effective January 26, 1912. It was
caused by the transportation of Turkish troops, money and sup-
plies in neutral vessels to Hodeida. The Egyptian mail steamer
Memaleh was seized with 750,000 francs on board consigned to
Turkish officials. The Volturno found 20 Turkish officers on

52 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

board the British steamer Africa and the Austrian Lloyd steam-
er Bregnez. The blockade of Hodeida was assigned chiefly to
the two large armed fast mail steamers Dtica degli Abruzzi and
Duca di Oenova that had been sent from Italy with the cruisers
Liguria and Elba.

In the bombardment of Djebana the Piemonte damaged the
railroad building by the French there and the railroad company
sued the Italian government for 200,000 lires for the damage to
French property. The Italians took oflf about 100 British and
some French residents of Hodeida.

Early in February the Italians supported the Arabian leader
of the insurrection against the Turks, Said Idris, 200 of whose
followers took possession of Farsan Island, while these insur-
gents put the Turkish forces of Yemen on the defensive and
greatly relieved the Italians.

Operations at Tripoli in January.

The Italians were frequently attacked at Ain Zara by the
Turks who established their active headquarters at Aziziah with
their main body at Gharian. The Italians made repeated at-
tempts during January and early in February to capture Zan-
zur, but failed with heavy losses. The failure of an attack with
four battalions of infantry, on December 17, caused the relief
of Lieut.-General Pecori-Giraldi by Lieut.-General Camerana.
The Turkish commander who defeated the Italians was Colonel
Fara, who was promoted to Major-General for his victory. De-
tails of this action were suppressed, but the Italians lost 50 killed
and over 100 wounded.

The Turks surrounded Tripoli exterior to the circumference of
a circle with a radius of 15 to 20 kilometers extending from
near the village of Gargaresch around near Ain Zara to Bir-el-
Turki east of Ain Zara. The natives of Gargaresch affiliated
with the Italians and the Turks captured the town in order to
punish the people for sympathizing with the Italians. On Janu-
ary 18 the Turks repulsed an attack by four battalions of in-
fantry to recapture the place. The Italians were repulsed and
only succeeded in taking the place after a desperate fight two
days later. The Turks then withdrew, but repeatedly renewed
attacks on the Italians there. The Turks repeatedly attacked

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB. 53

Ain Zara, but on February 5 they were driven out of their posi-
tion between Ain Zara and Gargaresch by long continued bom-
bardment with 6-inch siege guns. An attack on Zanzur on Feb-
ruary 22 with four battalions of infantry and three field batter-
ies was repulsed by the Turks.

At Homs the Italians were obliged to remain close to the town.
The Turks attacked repeatedly, but were always repulsed by
shells from the Marco Polo,

Zuara, 105 kilometers west of Tripoli, was a junction of the
trade route between Tunis and Gharian. It was frequently bom-
barded by the Italian ships, but landing detachments were
obliged to re-embark by the Turks.

The occupation of the town was decided upon just before
Christmas when the Pisa convoyed four transports with the 10th
infantry brigade to Zuara. Bad weather prevented landing, and
after waiting several days the expedition returned to Augusta.
The shells from the ships destroyed several buildings in the town
but the energetic Turkish commander repulsed all attempts to
land. The Italians finally abandoned the idea of landing, as it
would require greater sacrifices than the possession of the place
warranted.

In Cyrenaica the Italians extended their occupation during
January and February at Benghasi for a distance of 7 kilome-
ters from the city and likewise at Derna and Tobruk. Strong!
fortifications were constructed, and heavy 6-inch siege guns were (
mounted on the works. At Benghasi the works were connected
by a military field railroad ten kilometers long. At all these
places the Italians acted on the defensive and repulsed the con-
stant attacks by the Turks by aid of shell fire from ships, as
these defences were well within range of the guns of the ships in
the harbors.

Invasion into the interior was not attempted and efforts were
chiefly directed to strengthen the defences of a limited region
along the coast and along the captured seaports. The Italians
planned to prolong the war, and in the course of time by con-
ciliatory conduct towards the Arabs, to win them over and per-
suade them to accept the Italian conquest.

54 THE ITALIAN-TUBKISH WAR

Aviation.

The military aviators rendered good service as scouts. Lieu-
tenant Rossi, of the Italian navy, made 60 flights at Tobruk and
he recommended that the use of the Cipelli hand grenades should
be discontinued because they are too difficult for a single aviator
and very dangerous, besides which they rarely hit, and seldom
exploded in the soft sand of the desert. Most all of the aero-
planes used by the Italians carry the aviator only. These aviators
are obliged to ascend to heights of 1000 meters or more over the
enemy's position that the aeroplane may not be hit by rifle bul-
lets, notwithstanding the lack of proper aiming apparatus. In
a flight at Tobruk, Rossi took Captain Montu as a passenger on
February 1, and when at a height of 600 meters, the aeroplane
was hit five times by rifle bullets and Captain Montu, himself,
was hit and slightly wounded.

The Italian military aeroplanes carry the aviator only and
are of the types of Bleriot, Nieuport, Etrich and Parman, with
50 horse-power motors. They cost about $6000 each, and wiU
serve for about six months. It is contemplated to procure
larger aeroplanes of 70 to 100 horse-power and capable of carry-
ing several passengers. Upon arrival at the theater of the war
they will experiment with various types of hand grenades. The
Italian aviators instead of throwing hand grenades substituted
Arab script calling upon the Arabs to surrender.

Captain Moizo made a flight to scout from Tripoli to Oharian,
85 kilometers south of Tripoli, and return, and on February 12
he made a flight from Tripoli to Homs and return, a distance of
240 kilometers, 150 miles.

Contraband op War Transportation.

Solum, on the coast of the Egyptian-Tripolitan frontier, was
the chief route for Turkish volunteers and contraband of war
to enter Cyrenaica. The railroad terminus at Marsu Matruk,
300 kilometers west of Alexander, was connected by a good auto-
mobile road with Solum, a distance of 200 miles, and thus it was
possible to cover the distance of 500 miles from Alexander in
one day. Caravans then conveyed arms and ammunition in large
quantities from Solum to the Turkish forces in Cyrenaica. Sail-
ing ships loaded with contraband also landed near Solum, where

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAR 55

they could not be seized by Italian blockaders. The Eg3rptian
telegraph operators also received telegrams for Constantinople
via Alexandria and communication was practically uninter-
rupted.

These conditions were changed after December 15 by the
Turkish cession of Solum to Egypt instead of to Cyrenaica, to
which it had always belonged theretofore. Shortly after this
cession Egyptian and British troops occupied Solum and sup-
pressed the contraband trade. Lord Kitchener directed the
strictest measures to guard against any violation of neutrality
by conveying contraband and Turkish troops across the frontier
beyond Solum. The telegraph operators were censored, and the
British cruiser Suffolk arrived off Solum to enforce the observ-
ance of strict neutrality. These measures resulted in stopping
30 Turkish volunteers with two Russian aviators in their efforts
to reinforce the Turks in Cyrenaica. But these measures did
not prevent a large caravan of 175 camels to enter Cyrenaica
from Egypt, presumably via Fayum. This brought a large num-
ber of officers and men to aid the Turks.

The Italians protested at Paris against the contraband trade
and open violations of neutrality across the Tunisian frontier.
This protest was answered by a statement that Italy openly pro-
cured camels and provisions for her troops from Tunis and also
purchased flying machines in France for her forces in Tripoli.
The misunderstanding between Italy and France was such that
the Italians finally ordered the seizure of two of the larger
French steamers plying between Marseilles and Tunis, on which
Turkish officers were suspected of being passengers. The French
steamers Carthage and Manouba were seized off the coast of Sar-
dinia, outside of Italian waters, and were taken to Cagliari where
they were detained four days and released. On board the Car-
thage they found the French aviator Duval with an aeroplane
that the Italians claimed was intended for Turkish military
service. On board the Manouba there were 29 persons who
claimed to belong to the second detachment of the Red Crescent
society, while Italian officers claimed they were military com-
batants. The Manouba was obliged to land these 29 persons be-
fore proceeding on her voyage to Tunis.

The Italians were finally convinced that the aviator Duval did
not intend to go into Turkish service and he sailed to Tunis. The

56 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

29 persons of the Red Crescent society were detained, and, after
considerable correspondence and debates in the French Assem-
bly, they were finally released by the Italians to the French gov-
ernment. Upon arrival at Marseilles these 29 persons were thor-
oughly examined and found to be all surgeons, nurses or sani-
tary attendants, and, with one exception, they were allowed to
proceed to Tunis and thence to the Turkish headquarters. The
one oflScer who was not allowed to proceed had large sums of
money in his possession and was not solely on duty with the Red
Crescent society.

The French government earnestly endeavored to stop all con-
traband trade. January 17, the Russian steamer Odessa arrived
at Sfax from Prevesa and the Tunisian ofScials found a large
consignment of arms and ammunition concealed in the coal bunk-
ers. This cargo of 360 tons of war material was seized by the
French Tunisian officers.

January 25, the destroyer Fulmine seized the French mail
steamer Favignano in Tunisian waters and made a thorough
search with force without finding any contraband on board. This
episode made considerable excitement among the Tunisians, and
caused such an animosity against the Italians that a large num-
ber of Italian residents in Tunis left the country.

The French sent the armored ship Henry IV and four torpedo
boats from Biserta to the southeastern border of Tunis to stop
contraband trade, and enforce the obligations of neutrality.

Italian Naval Operations During February Until March 15.

The Turkish armored coast defense ship Awn-Illah (Help of
Gtod) and destroyer Ankara were lying at Beirut, and the Ital-
ians feared these ships would interfere with the transportation
of Italian troops to the Red Sea.

Rear- Admiral Thaon di Revel arrived at Beirut with the Fer-
ruccio and Oarihaldi early in the morning of February 24. The
Oaribaldi steamed in close and fired a blank shot. The Turkish
commander sent a boat with a flag of truce to the Oaribaldi,
called the Ankara to slip her chain and anchor in his lee close to
the mole, and made preparations to defend his ship.

The boat returned with a written demand upon the Wali of
Beirut for the delivery of the two Turkish ships in the harbor

THE ITALIAN-TnBEISH WAR

J cD ^'I'^^i J>

58 THE ITALIAN-TUBKISH WAB.

before 9 a. m., when unless a reply was received he would pro-
ceed to attack the two ships and he would be governed by Article
2 of the IXth Convention of the Second Hague Conference.

The Italian cruisers proceeded to the eastward in St. Qeorge's
Bay awaiting reply from Wali.

The Wali received the written demand for the surrender of the
two ships at 8.30 a. m., and was in the act of giving his consent ;
when, at 9 a. m., no answer having been received by the Italian
admiral, the two ships opened fire on the Awn-Illah at 6000 me-
ters, which replied slowly for about twenty minutes without
making any hits. At 9.35 a fire broke out on board the Awn-
Illah and ten minutes later the Turks hauled down the flag and
abandoned the ship with the surviving members of the crew of
220 men. The Oaritaldi stood close in and at 600 meters fired
with the 76-mm. battery on the Ankara without inflicting any
damage. The OaribalcU then discharged a torpedo at the Awn-
Illah, but this deviated when half-way and ran in among a lot of
lighters moored within the mole and exploded, causing six light-
ers to sink; ten minutes later the Oarihaldi fired a second tor-
pedo that struck the Awn-Illdh amidships and caused her to sink
until she grounded and laid aground with decks awash. The
Awn-Illdh lost three ofScers and 55 men killed with eight officers
and 100 men wounded.

/ Stray shots from the Italian cruisers did great damage in the
/ city ; 66 civilians being killed in the city and several hundred
\being wounded. A great many buildings were damaged, among
tBem were the Banque Ottoman, the German Palestine Bank, the
Salonica Bank, and the buildings and warehouses of the custom
house, some of which caught fire and were completely destroyed.

The Italians withdrew at 11 a. m., out of sight to the north-
ward. At 1.45 p. m., the two ships returned and the Ferruccio
stood close in and fired upon the Ankara, which was sunk by gun
fire in the course of three minutes. The Italian ships then sailed
to the westward.

In consequence of the Italian action at Beirut the Turkish
government issued an order to expel all the Italians residing in
the Wilayets of Beirut, Aleppo, and Damascus within 14 days
after February 28, 1912 ; and that all Italians residing in dis-
tricts that might in the future be attacked by Italian naval ships

THB ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 5»

should be expelled from those regions. This affected 60,000
Italian residents in those regions.

The expulsion of the Italians from the Wilayets mentioned
was strictly enforced. Those who did not leave voluntarily were
oompulsorily transported.

After February, Italian torpedo boats again patrolled Turk-
ish Mediterranean coasts, and the Italian press stated that hos-
tile operations would be conducted in the Aegean Sea. It was
stated that the Italians had only officially declared their inten-
tion to avoid attacks on the Albanian coast, and did not purpose
to avoid all hostilities against other Turkish coasts.

In the meanwhile, as the Italian forces did not make any im-
portant progress in the conquest of Tripoli, and the friendly
offices of the great powers to re-establish peace had failed, it
seemed highly probable that the threats of hostilities in the
Aegean Sea, published by the Italian press, would be attempted.
The Turks therefore decided to put all places liable to attack in
the Aegean Sea in thorough defence. Measures for this had been
suspended during the previous month, because they were given
to understand that the scene of war would be limited by the Ital-
ians to Africa.

The Turks began to strengthen the defences of the western
approaches to the Dardanelles at Eum Kale and Sedil Bahr.
The mine fields were reinforced and improved; 350 guns were
added to the fortifications, chiefly taken from the forts of the
Bosphorus. The troops were drilled daily at target practice and
40,000 infantry and cavalry were mobilized in the Dardanelles
district.

The passage of merchant ships through the Dardanelles at
night was prohibited, and because of the mine fields all were
compelled to take pilots. Turkish torpedo boats constantly pa-
trolled the approaches and the Turkish fleet was stationed at
Nagara.

At Smyrna four large merchant ships were heavily laden with
stones and held ready to be sunk in the narrowest part of the
harbor channel at about six miles from the city.

Two torpedo boats that had been stationed at Smyrna were
withdrawn to the Dardanelles.

An attack on Salonica was not expected so much because the
commerce of that port was carried on chiefly by the Italian col-

60 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

ony, and Austrians were largely interested. Nevertheless the
Turks strengthened the fortifications and mine fields and rein-
forced the garrisons.

The Italian fleet in the meanwhile had completed all its refit-
tings during the winter and assembled at Tarento and Tobruk.
Vice- Admiral Aubrey died March 4, and Vice- Admiral Paravelli
succeeded as commander-in-chief. He in turn was relieved by
Vice-Admiral Biale.

The ten Italian cruisers in the Bed Sea bombarded several
Arabian ports; Midy, on February 29; Dubab (near Perim), on
March 4, and Shiek Said on March 6. Midy was at the same
time attacked and captured by the followers of the insurgent
Said Idriss, to whom the Turkish- Arabian garrison of 60 men
surrendered.

In consequence of the co-operation of the Said Idriss with the
Italians, the ruler Iman Tahia proclaimed a "holy war," and
called upon all the inhabitants of Yemen to lay aside their in-
ternal grievances and rally to the support of Turkey, to destroy
Said Idriss, and energetically oppose armed resistance against
the Italians.

After the blockade of Hodeida, the Turks established commu-
nications between European Turkey and Southern Yemen via
Aden.

The Cost op the War.

The approved estimates in the Italian Parliament, in March,
1912, show that for the period of five months ending February
29, 1912, the current war expenses amounted to $41,495,000, of
which $5,790,000 was for the navy and $35,705,000 for the army ;
besides which $2,045,800 was expended for special purposes;
$18,914,000 of the amount expended for the army included the
cost of mobilization and conduct of the war — ^transportation of
troops, maintenance of personnel, purchase of horses, ammuni-
tion, and war material — for the troops in Africa ; and $11,966,-
000 was expended to replace the personnel and war material
transported to Africa in the standing army in Italy, and for or-
ganizing additional forces in Italy.

The $5,790,000 expended for the navy was for the extraor-
dinary expense of maintenance, transportation, the increased

THE ITAUAN-TUBKISH WAR 61

complements of ships and subsistence with cost of fuel and mate-
rial consumed.

The special sum of $2,045,800 was for harbor improvements
at Tripoli, Homs, Benghasi and Dema, as well as for telegraph,
telephone, and sanitary service in North Africa. This sum also
defrayed the cost of laying new cables from Syracuse to Tripoli,
and Syracuse to Benghasi.

The expenses of the army and navy thus estiinated at $42,-
140,000 will be covered by the saving in the budget of 1910-11,
some $11,172,000, and that of 1911-12— estimated at $14,504,-
000 — ^together with $16,464,000 to be deducted from the regular
budgets in the fiscal years 1912-13 to 1917-18. The apparently
low cost of the war has been maintained by the economical ad-
ministration of the finances, and this expense amounts to about
$260,680 per day. But an accurate estimate of the total cost of
the war, of course, cannot be given until after the war is over,
because there are many details that are not considered in the
present estimates. Expert financiers estimate that the war has
in the period ending February 29, 1912, cost a total of $57,900,-
000 or at a daily rate of $386,000.

The Italian finances were thus in favorable condition, especial-
ly as the administration received a large surplus by economy in
the budgets during the recent years. The Italian people were
willing to make great sacrifices for this war, so that there was
no lack of money on the part of Italy to still further prosecute
the conquest of Tripoli.

The Turks spent, up to the beginning of February, about
twenty million francs, chiefly for establishing the new coast de-
fences. February 1, the war minister received an appropriation
of $4,436,320 for coast defences.

The friendly offices of neutral powers to re-establish peace be-
tween the belligerents failed. On March 9 the diplomatic repre-
sentatives of Germany, Austria, England, France, and Russia
took a united step for this purpose with the Italian government
at Rome. They asked confidentially upon what terms Italy would
agree to suspend hostilities. The Italian government replied
March 15, according to the Corriere delta Sera, as follows :

Italy demands that Turkey shall recognize Italy's absolute
sovereignty over the African provinces and withdraw all Turk-
ish officers and troops from Africa, strictly forbidding Turkish

62 THE ITAUAN-TUBKISH WAB.

officers to lead the Arabs in opposing the Italians ; and Italy wiU
then cease hostilities in all parts of the Turkish empire and re-
duce the imposts on Turkish goods to the former rates. Italy
will, on the other hand, recognize the religious Caliphat and give
amnesty to all natives. Italy will assume that part of the Turk-
ish debt apportioned to Tripoli, and will purchase the Turkish
government property situated in Tripoli from the Turkish gov-
ernment. Italy further promises to agree, with other powers,
to preserve the integrity of the Turkish empire.

The Italian parliamentary discussion proves that the nation
fully agreed with the chief demands of the Italian government.

It also appears that Russia had assembled troops on Trans-
Caucasian frontier, had recalled the Russian Ambassador Tsch-
arykow — ^who was in Constantinople for many years — and re-
placed him by Yon Giers, the former minister in Bucharest. The
Russian press also reported that a Russian fleet was ready to pro-
ceed to the Bosphorus in case the Italians forced the passage of
the Dardanelles.

The Sultan presented the Shiek of Senoussi with a sword set
with diamonds, a decoration, and other precious gifts in grati-
tude for his support of the war against the Italians.

Turkey replied to Italy's claim by reasserting her claim to
full sovereignty over her African provinces, and the Arabians
were determined to continue their resistance to the Italian con-
quest under all conditions. The Arabian representatives in Con-
stantinople declared that they will continue the war even if
Turkey yields the annexation of these provinces to Italy.

During the middle of March the Arabians in Tripoli and Cyre-
naica elected delegates to the Turkish Parliament in Constanti-
nople, and declared that the Italian proclamation of annexation
of these two provinces to Italy was null and void.

Mhjtart Operations Up to the Middle op March^ 1912.

The Turks determined to vigorously prosecute the war in
Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and incessantly attack the Italians at all
points. At Tripoli the Italians were kept constantly alarmed by
these attacks by day and night. The Italians also failed after
repeated attempts to capture Zanzur, which was occupied by the
Turks in force, and which they fortified with artillery and ma-

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAR 68

ehine guns. In attacks against Zanzur the Italians used, with
but little effect, two dirigible balloons arranged for throwing
various kinds of bombs and hand grenades.

The Italians collected 3000 burden-bearing camels and 300
riding camels for the camel corps in Tripoli. A battalion of
Askaris and a camel riding detachment arrived from Erythrea
late in February, and was vigorously attacked by Arabs on
March 4 at Bir-el-Turki, the Askaris were routed, and only man-
aged to escape into Tripoli under cover of darkness with heavy
losses.

A Turkish attack on Ain Zara was repulsed on March 10.
Malarial fever broke out in the camp at Ain Zara, and the gar-
rison was relieved by other Italian troops. A portion of the camp
adoining a swamp was abandoned, and an advanced intrench-
ment was captured by the Turks and gave rise to a report that
Italians had abandoned Ain Zara.

A narrow-gauge railroad from Tripoli to Ain Zara was com-
pleted as far as Fornaci, which is 7 kilometers from Tripoli. The
Italians built a field construction railroad to the stone quarries
at Gargaresch for stone to build the breakwater at Tripoli.

The Campaign in Africa in March.

At dawn of February 27, the Italian garrison at Homs sur-
prised the Turks on the Mergheb heights, about four kilometers
from the town and practically commanding the tOMSTi. The bulk
of the Turkish troops had been decoyed from the heights to op-
pose a feigned landing of Italians from a squadron of transports
that appeared off Sliten, about 20 miles east of Homs. The Ital-
ians meanwhile intrenched their position on Mergheb heights so
that when the bulk of the main body of the Turks returned from
Sliten that evening, the Italians defeated them in their efforts to
retake the heights. Subsequently the heights were strongly for-
tified and the Turks could not dislodge the Italians from their
commanding position.

There were many fierce combats at Benghasi from March 8 t-.^
March 12. After these were repelled General Ameglio led a
force of seven battalions, with cavalry and artillery, to the oasis
at Fogat, where he captured 500 Arabs after a desperate resist-
ance. For this brilliant victory Major-General Ameglio was
promoted to lieutenant-general.

64 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

Attacks by the Turks at Dema on March 3, and at Mirsa To-
bruk on March 11 were repulsed with diflSculty.

In these engagements in Cyrenaica during the month endin<^
March 15, 1912, the Italians lost 193killedjiua 350 wuundud,

There was no probability of any decided advance by the Ital-
ians into the interior in the immediate future. The commander-
in-chief, Lieutenant-General Canera, convinced the government
at Rome that successful advances into the interior can only be
made very gradually, and must be accompanied by railroad con-
struction that will secure every step that may be gained. The
chief of staff, Major-General Gastaldello, who originally advo-
cated vigorously pushing the campaign into the interior, was
relieved and replaced by Major-General Ciancio.

There was no probability of any substantial increase to rein-
force the 100,000 troops in Africa, March 15.

The reserves serving in Africa were, however, relieved by
men of the active army.

A German Red Cross detachment succeeded in reaching
Gharian about March 1. This detachment consisted of three
sui^eons and 12 nurses, two of whom died of typhoid fever en
route via Tunis. They attended the sick and wounded in the
Turkish camp at Gharian.

Naval Operations in April.

At the beginning of April, 1912, the bulk of the Italian naval
forces was in the home ports undergoing repairs and recruiting
as in peace. Several divisions of torpedo boats and the four
auxiliary cruisers, the Duca-di-Oenova, Duca-Degli-Abruzzi,
Citta-di-Palermo and Citta-di'Messina, cruised along the Turk-
ish Mediterranean coasts and searched merchant ships of all
nationalities for contraband of war. The naval forces stationed
off the north coast of Africa participated in small engagements
with the land forces on the coast ; among other smaller engage-
ments the Etna bombarded Hoeifa, a small place near Benghasi.

Vice- Admiral Faravelli was obliged to give up the command
on account of a severe nervous ailment, and he was succeeded
on April 9, 1912, by Vice- Admiral Viale, who had shortly be-
fore this assumed command of the second squadron. Vice-
Admiral Amero d'Aste took command of the second squadron.

THE ITALIAN-TUBKISH WAR. 65

After the training of the new Italian recruits was completed,
the reserves of 1887 were relieved.

The fourth division, comprising three Oaribaldis, were in the
harbors of Cyrenaica, partly at Tobruk and partly in the Qulf
of Bomba. It is said that Bomba, which is 55 nautical miles west
of Tobruk, will be the future naval port on the African Medi-
terranean coast. The reason for this change is stated to be that
the magnificent harbor of Tobruk lacks adequate supply of
potable water, and that there is an ample supply of potable
water at Bomba, which can also be easily defended by means of
the islands of Meuelaus and Bomba that command the ap-
proaches to the bay. The depths of water and anchorages are
about the same at Tobruk and Bomba, but the serviceable area
of the harbor at Bomba is considerably greater. The anchorage
at Bomba is only 70 kilometers from Derna, with which it -could
readily be connected by a railroad. In case Bomba should be
selected as the Italian naval port, Tobruk would serve for a base
for light naval forces.

As soon as the report of the occupation of Bomba was cir-
culated a large portion of the Turkish- Arabian forces besieging
Tobruk was withdrawn to Bomba.

The schoolship squadron of three Sardegnas reinforced by
two armored cruisers under Vice-Adrairal Borea Ricci resumed
operations against Zuara. This force was joined by the armored
cruisers Carlo Alberto and Marco Polo, with the auxiliary
cruisers Citta-di-Catania and Citta-di-Syraciisa, six torpedo
boats, three naval tugs and three transports having the two bat-
talions of grenadiers on board, that sailed from Tripoli west-
ward along the coast on April 8, 1912, for Zuara. En route the
latter force bombarded coast places and finally anchored, April
9, 2000 meters distant from the coast in the newly surveyed
harbor at Zuara.

The naval vessels began to bombard the town and fired shells
all day at intervals of five minutes until night. The next morn-
ing 20 armed boats put off from the three transports and, fa-
vored by good weather, made a feint at landing. The armored
cruisers at the same time vigorously bombarded the town. This
bombardment, however, caused no serious damage, but with the
feigned landing had the effect of deceiving the enemy and pre-
venting them from opposing the landing of the Garioni division

M THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

of infantry at a point about 40 kilometers northwest of Zuara.
This division of about 10,000 men had embarked at Augusta in 7
transports during the night of April 7, and under the convoy of
the schoolship division arrived during the night of April 10 at
the peninsula of Macabez on the Tunisian border. With the
support of the warships, including a number of torpedo vessels,
Agordat, Iride, and 6 high*sea torpedo boats, that had sailed
from Tripoli and had met the convoy at sea en route. The navy
immediately sounded out a channel and a landing place in this
difficult locality that enabled the army to begin landing at 3
a. m. and complete the disembarkation the same day without
any disturbance by the enemy.

By noon the next day a detachment of naval brigade and
Askaris also took possession of the small fort Forwa, or Bu
Eamez, at the southern end of the Macabez peninsula about 35
kilometers from Zuara.

The Turkish- Arabian forces did not appear until after the
Italians had secured possession of this fort and that attack was
repulsed. The Italians then still further fortified their positions
on the peninsula and prepared for their advance upon Zuara
from this new base.

A small bay 6 miles long and 1^ miles wide served as a good
anchorage for the Italian vessels, and this place has been es-
tablished as a torpedo boat station for the Italian torpedo craft

April 12 the Italian dirigible airship P-2 and P-3 arrived
from Tripoli. These airships had reconnoitered the Turkish-
Arabian positions at Zuara, and gave the Italians at Fort Bu
Eamez written descriptions of the enemy's strength and posi-
tions at Zuara. The airships then returned to Zuara, where by
means of four small anchors, they were anchored close to the
Italian warships, from which they were supplied with gas and
benzine. They then returned to Tripoli, 120 kimoleters distant,
after an absence from Tripoli of about 12 hours.

The transportation of contraband of war from Tunis via the
coast road Ben Oardane was thus cut by the Italian occupation
of Bu Eamez. This obliged the contraband trade to take the
more difficult and longer route via Dehibat-Nalut, about 150
kilometers further in the interior.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 67

The Bombardment of the Dardanelles.

Although reports of Italian operations in the Aegean Sea had
subsided the Turks continued to maintain their defences in
readiness, especially in regards to the mine fields in the Dar-
danelles. The Turkish fleet remained inactive in the Straits of
Dardanelles, off Nagara.

April 13 the Italian first squadron, consisting of the Vittorio
Emanuele, Roma, Napoli and three armored cruisers of the Pisa
class, sailed from Tarento with the Vettor Pisani, flagship of the
Duke of Abruzzia, and a number of flotillas of torpedo boats.
The press reported that this fleet had sailed for Tripolitan
waters to relieve the naval vessels operating there, but the fleet
went to the Aegean Sea to make a naval demonstration on the
Turkish coasts.. Simultaneously the second squadron sailed
from Tobruk and Augusta for the same destination. This force
comprised the flagship Regina Margherita, Benedetto Brin, St.
Bon, E. Filiberto, three armored cruisers of the Garibaldi class,
three auxiliary cruisers and three naval colliers.

The fleet united during the night of April 17 near the island
of Stampalia, west of Rhodes, and steamed the next morning at
a speed of twelve knots to the northern part of the Aegean Sea,
with the flotillas of torpedo destroyers in advance. The third
division under Vice- Admiral Amero d'Aste remained in the
southern part of the Aegean Sea.

The main body of the Italian fleet arrived in the northern
extremity of the Aegean Sea during the night of April 18, and
cut the cables between Imbros and the Dardanelles as well as that
from Lemnos to Salonica and Tenedos. At dawn the fleet was
off Enos. At 6.30 a. m.. Vice- Admiral Viale steamed thence
southward towards the western entrance of the Dardanelles with
the Pisa and Amalfi well advanced in order to entice the Turk-
ish squadron out of the Dardanelles. About 9 a. m. a Turkish
torpedo chaser was sighted off the entrance, but immediately
withdrew within the straits upon the approach of the Garibaldi
and Varese, The outer Turkish forts then opened fire from the
four coast forts of the Dardanelles, Kum Kale and Orchanie on
the Asiatic side, and Seddil-Bahr and Ertogrul on the European
side. These partly modern fortifications mounted 18 heavy
Krupp guns of 8-inches to 11-inches caliber.

68 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

The Italian ships returned the fire at a range of about 8000
meters and fired for a period of two hours. The three ships of
the first division bombarded the two forts on the European side
and the five ships of the second and fourth divisions engaged
the forts on the Asiatic side. Turkish reports estimate that the
Italians fired 342 projectiles. The forts, especially Fort Or-
chanie, were severly damaged. The barrack buildings were hit
frequently, and in the fort Seddil-Bahr alone the Turks suffered
15 men killed and 18 wounded.

The Turkish fire^waTTneffective, about 150 Turkish projectiles
were fired. The Italian official report states that the Italian
ships sustained no damage, and they expressly denied the Turk-
ish reports that the Varese had been set on fire by the Turkish
projecitles.

The Turks closed the Dardanelles to all shipping upon the
appearance of the Italian fieet, and all the openings in the mine
fields were closed.

While the main body of the fleet was engaged at the Darda-
nelles, the third division was active in the south. The battle-
ship Emanuele Filiberto arrived at 5 a. m. with the torpedo-boat
Ostro, off Bathi, the chief port of the island of Samos which has
10,000 inhabitants, and without any notice immediately opened
fire on the infantry barracks for 1200 men, and completely de-
stroyed them. A Turkish gunboat that was in the harbor was
sunk, the Italians claim, by a torpedo fired from the Ostro, while
the Turks claim she was sunk by her own crew. The Italians
departed immediately after sinking the gunboat.

The Regina Margherita and Benedetto Brin, each with a tor-
pedo boat, cut the cable between Rhodes and Marmarice at both
cable landings.

April 19 the main body of the Italian fleet started back to
Italy leaving the third division with the Pisa, Amalfi and a num-
ber of flotillas of torpedo boats to operate on the coast of Asia
Minor and continue to destroy the cable communications.
Among oth^r places attacked they destroyed the telegraph sta-
tion at Chios and that at Tschesme opposite Chios. They de-
stroyed the radio station at Guelemich, opposite Rhodes, that
formerly held communication with the radio station at Derna,
besides which they destroyed a telegraph station at Smyrna.
These cable and telegraph stations were partly the property of

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 69

the Turkish government, and partly belonged to the Eastern
Telegraph Company.

The Italian fleet bombarded the Dardanelles the day the House
of Deputies opened its sessions in Constantinople with the newly
elected delegates. The address from the Turkish throne on this
occasion was: **The unjustifiable war waged by the Italian.s
still continues notwithstanding the earnest desire for peace.
We also desire peace, but we cannot make peace except upon the
condition that the maintenance of our sovereign rights shall be
preserved intact effectively.''

The Italian press designated the naval demonstration a pro-
test against the address from the throne, as the tenor of that
address was anticipated.

Since sixty steamers with an average of 4000 register tons
passed through the Dardanelles daily, neutral trade was badly
crippled by closing the Straits of Dardanelles. French and
Bussiim shippers complained to their ambassadors in Constanti-
nople, and demanded damages from the Turkish government for
stopping the commerce. The ambassadors and foreign govern-
ments, however, delayed action because the Turks declared, on
April 19, that the Dardanelles would be open to commerce as
soon as there appeared to be no immediate danger of further
attacks by the Italians.

The reopening of the Dardanelles was, however, still post-
poned, because some Italian ships and destroyers continued to
operate in the Aegean Sea.

As the Turks had long expected such an attack by the Italians
they were fully prepared to resist it, and consequently the
Italian attack did not cause any serious damage nor induce a
panic among the people.

Speculators attempted to raise the price of provisions, where-
upon the authorities in Constantinople published a decree that
ample provisions were available in the government depots, and
that the supply of provisions in the markets was ample. All
persons concerned in efforts to raise the price of provisions
would be summarily tried by martial law.

April 16 the representatives of the great powers interrogated
the Sublime Porte to ascertain under what conditions Turkey
would consider negotiations for peace. The Turkish reply was

70 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

in substance that which was expressed in the address from the
throne to Parliament.

Rear-Admiral Williams having retired from the duty of re-
organizing the Turkish fleet, the British Bear- Admiral Limpus,
on the active list, was appointed to relieve him, and he arrived
at Constantinople about the end of April with his staff of British
officers to train the Turkish navy.

Operations in the Red Sea.

The blockade in the Red Sea was extended to about double its
former extent, and was declared to embrace the east coast of
Arabia on the Red Sea for a distance of 83 nautical miles, from
latitude 14° 30' N. to 15° 50' N., and included the ports of
Hodeida, 2000 inhabitants, Loheija, of 45,000 inhabitants, and
Kamaran Island. Neutral ships were allowed five days after the
declaration of the blockade during which to leave those ports.
Neutral ships engaged in transporting pilgrims to Mecca were
allowed to visit the sanitary station on Eamaran Island upon
condition that those vessels should pass the southern coasts of
that island under the escort of an Italian blockading vessel. The
Italians made much of the fact that pilgrimages to Mecca were
not interrupted by the Italian blockaders.

After the Calabria returned to Italy, the Italians had, after
the middle of April, the following naval forces in the Red Sea :
The four protected cruisers, Piemonte, flagship, Puglia, Liguria,
and Elba; the four gunboats, Aretusa, Caprera, Volturno and
Governolo, the surveying ship Staffetta and the four destroyers,
Artigliere, Bersagliere, Granatiere and Oaribaldino.

Italian Military Operations in Africa.

During April the Italian military operations were compara-
tively quiet. The Turkish- Arabian forces attacked all the coast
places occupied by the Italians, but were invariably repulsed
without penetrating the Italian lines. A fanatical attack at
Mirsa Tobruk was a desperate affair, but badly conducted and
disastrously repulsed. Enver Bey claimed a victory at Derna,
but this was disputed by the Italians, whose lines were not pene-
trated. The Italians did not make any advances into the interior
and such an advance did not appear probable soon.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 71

The expedition against Zuara that has been related under the
naval operations was the most important of all the Italian oper-
ations in Africa in April.

Aeroplanes and airships made frequent reconnoitering flights,
and at times threw bombs upon the enemy with contradictory-
reported results.

The railroad from Tripoli to Ain Zara was put in operation
March 19, and the field railroad to Oargaresch was being built.

The Turkish- Arabian forces in the interior were constantly re-
inforced, and it is estimated that they had from 15,000 to 20,000
troops before Tripoli. In Cyrenaica the Tu rks had ah^ "T ^>p"""
troops, but they were outnumbered there by the Italians. In
Cyrenaica the Arabs were temporarily weakened by the depar-
ture of numbers to cultivate their fields in the interior. The
Arabs were still enthusiastic for continuing the war, and the re-
ports of their being weary of the war are not well founded.

Twenty-three thousand Italian reservists, of the year 1888,
were relieved from active war service in Africa; but there was
some delay in getting these reserves home again, and there was
consequently some dissatisfaction in regard to these reserves in
Italy. New troops were being assembled during April at Naples
to replace these reserves in Africa.

In the Red Sea the Arabian insurgent Said Idriss still co-oper-
ated with the Italians in the operations against the Turks in that
region. Late reports from Turkish sources claimed that Said
Idriss had been badly defeated by the Turks, but this lacked
confirmation.

Naval Operations.

On April 17 the Italian navy established a rendezvous on the
island of Astropalia, which has about 2500 inhabitants, as a base
for all the auxiliary vessels of the Italian navy operating in the
Aegean Sea. The auxiliaries comprised transports, colliers, dis-
tilling ships, tank ships, and ammunition ships. The Italians
took possession on April 28, a naval force from the Pisa and
Amalfi of 250 men landing, and capturing the Turkish garrison
of seven men. The large open bay on the southern coast of the
island was made a temporary naval base, and all the vessels
seized by the Italian torpedo boats in the Aegean Sea from Crete
to Enos were brought here for action by prize courts.

72 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

The exact results of the Italian naval bombardment on April
19, at the Dardanelles, are disputed. It is, however, established
that the damage inflicted by the heavy naval guns at 7000 me-
ters on the forts was severe, as the Turkish batteries were fre-
quently hit and the Italians fired more projectiles than the
Turks. The Italians may have sustained some slight injury to
the rigging of their ships, but no serious damage.

But the immediate effect of the Italian naval demonstration
was of much greater importance and interest to the commerce of
Russia from the Black Sea ports.

The necessity of England's neutrality was emphasized in Par-
liament because of the vast number of British subjects among the
Mahomedans and their interests, and, on the other hand, Eng-
land's long traditional friendship with Italy.

The British trade was seriously damaged by closing the Dar-
danelles, but Viscount Morley pointed out that Turkey was jus-
tified by the treaties of Paris in 1856, of London in 1871, and
Berlin of 1878, to close the Dardanelles as long as the Italian
naval forces theatened the security of Constantinople.

April 20 the Russian government protested to the Sublime
Porte against closing the Dardanelles by the Turks in violation
of the Berlin treaty, and to the great injury of Russian com-
merce. This act seriously crippled the export trade of the Black
Sea that amounts to about $315,000,000 annually, and which
sum represents about 43 per cent of the entire export trade of
Russia. Shipments of grain, ore, coal and petroleum were stop-
ped. The grain trade was severely affected, the loss caused at
Odessa alone is estimated at 300,000 roubles with a total loss of
one and one-half million roubles. This grain was consigned to
Italy, southern France, Switzerland, Belgium, England, and
western Germany. The delayed exportation of coal was very
serious, this trade had only recently been developed on the Don,
and was urgently needed because of the coal strikes in England.

At the end of April 20 freight steamers were obliged to wait
in the Black Sea ports with four passenger steamers of the Hus-
sion Steamship Company, one steamer of the Russian volunteer
fleet, and 15 sailing ships. Six passenger steamers and one freight
steamer were prevented from entering at this date. During the
middle of May there were about 150 steamers laden with grain,

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 73

coaly ore, naphtha, lumber^ etc., laid up in the Russian Black Sea
ports waiting for passage through the Dardanelles.

The expense incurred by each of these vessels amounted to
between 200 and 400 roubles daily.

The Turkish government replied to the Russian protest that
the Dardanelles could not be opened as long as the Italian naval
vessels were in the vicinity, but at the beginning of May they
yielded to the pressure of the powers, and after long delays final-
ly reopened the Dardanelles on May 19.

Sixty mines had to be removed from the mine fields in the
Straits of Dardanelles before it would be safe for vessels to at-
tempt to pass. These mines were removed with great difficulty
and required ten working days to clear a channel. One of the
mine-laying vessels, the tug Semendar, was blown up while work-
ing with the mines in the Dardanelles. Eight civilian employees
and 15 military persons were drowned by this accident.

The passenger steamer Texas of the American Archipelago
line struck a mine in going out of the harbor of Smyrna, and the
explosion of the mine caused the ship to sink so rapidly that only
one-half of the people on board were rescued by boats from ves-
sels that immediately went to her assistance.

The Italians then decided to continue pressure upon Turkey
by seizing the other islands in the Aegean Sea, especially the
island of Rhodes.

This island is about ten miles from the coast of Asia Minor.
It had 26,000 inhabitants, including 17,000 Greeks. The Turkish
garrison consisted of about 1000 infantry and artillery. This
garrison was strengthened by a landwehr force of 10,000 native
Mahomedans. Stores of provisions and ammunition magazines
were in the interior of the island. Major Abdullah had com-
mand of the Turks.

Captube op the Island op Rhodes.

The Italian expeditionary army for the conquest of Rhodes
consisted of about 9000 troops, three regiments of infantry, of
which two were sent from Benghasi and one from Tobmk; one
battalion of chasseurs that had been stationed at Tripoli with
several small detachments of light field artillery, cavalry, sani-
tary detachments and train. The latter including a balloon park

74 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

and aviation apparatus. Lieutenant-General Ameglio, recently
promoted for his distinguished services at Benghasi, was in com-
mand of the expeditionary army.

The first and third divisions of the fleet were designated to co-
operate with the army expeditionary corps in taking possession
of Rhodes. The first division under the command of Vice- Ad-
miral Viale left Tarento, April 30, for Rhodes via the provisional
base at Astropalia. A number of transports were assembled at
Tobruk with the third division of the fleet and flotillas of tor-
pedo boats to convoy the expeditionary army. The waters in the
vicinity of the island of Rhodes were in the meanwhile patrolled
by torpedo boats, and a considerable number of Turkish sailing
vessels were seized as prizes. On May 1 they cut the cable from
Rhodes, Scarpanto, and Candia, so that Rhodes was thereafter
without cable communication with the mainland. Turkish re*
ports were transmitted by means of signals, but this method of
isommunication was frequently interrupted, especially at night,
by the Italian searchlights.

The Italian army convoyed by the third division, under the
command of Vice- Admiral Amero, left Tobruk at noon May 2,
and arrived off the city of Rhodes during the night of May 4.

While the vessels of the first and third divisions made a dem-
onstration against the city, the transports, accompanied by tor-
pedo boats, went to Kalithea Bay, ten miles south of the city, on
the east coast of the island. The troops were landed May 4 be-
tween 4 a. m. and 2 p. m., without opposition, and at 2 p. m.
began to advance upon the city overland from the southward. A
light detachment of Turkish troops that had left the city at noon
to oppose the invaders were met on Smith Plateau and quickly
dispersed, while at the same time they were exposed to a bom-
bardment by 11 Italian ships.

The Italian troops halted about 2 kilometers from the city at
7 p. m., and passed the night in that position. The Italian war-
ships displayed their searchlights on the city during the entire
night. The losses during the skirmishes with the advancing army
were very slight. The Italians oflScially reported seven wounded.
During the night the Turkish troops withdrew in small detach-
ments to the west coast of the island via Trianda.

As soon as the troops had landed at Kalithea Bay Vice- Ad-
miral Viale sent an officer to the Wali of Rhodes and demanded

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 75

a surrender of the island. The Wall declared he could not resist
the admiral and had no authority over the Turkish garrison ; and
he therefore declined under protest. The Admiral again de-
manded the surrender of the city the next morning with an ulti-
matum that if not granted within one hour he would proceed to
bombard the city. The representative of the Turkish govern-
ment thereupon yielded, and the Italian army and navy took
possession at 10 a. m., May 5.

The Wali of Rhodes — ^who was also governor of the entire
archipelago from Tenedos to Scarpanto — was captured on May 7
in the harbor of Lindos by the Italian destroyer Ostro as he, with
other Turkish officials, was about to leave the island. He and
his companions, together with 117 other Turkish prisoners, were
sent to Tarento May 11.

The Turkish garrison was prevented from escaping from the
island by the watchfulness of the Italian torpedo boats, and they
rendezvoused in the vicinity of Psithos, a region hemmed in by a
mountain range that crosses the island, and at about 18 kilome-
ters southwest of the city.

May 15 General Ameglio took the offensive against the Turks
at Psithos. He led troops from two regiments from the north-
east and east towards Psithos. Italian troops were landed from
the naval vessels at Kalavarda, 30 kilometers southwest of
Rhodes, and at Malona Bay, 33 kilometers south of Rhodes.

The Turks were thus attacked from three different sides while
the battleship St. Bon bombarded the only other available road
of escape by firing over the hills.

A desperate battle that lasted nine hours was fought, by which
the Turks were dispersed, leaving 83 dead and 26 wounded
among the ravines of the hills. The Italians took possession of
Psithos and passed the night there. The next morning the Turk-
ish commander surrendered. The Turkish garrison of 983 men,
including 33 officers, were prisoners of war. In view of their dis-
tinguished bravery, the Turkish officers were permitted to retain
their swords. The bulk of the Italian forces then returned to the
city of Rhodes. The Italians officially reported a total loss dur-
ing the fight of May 16 as only 4 dead and 26 wounded.

The island of Rhodes was declared to be blockaded with the
exception of the port of the city of Rhodes, commerce with which
could be maintained under the surveillance of Italian authorities.

76 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

The former Italian consul at Salonica, Bivalda, was appointed
governor of Rhodes.

Seizure op Twelve Turkish Islands in the Aegean Sea.

In the period from May 8 to May 20 the vessels of the first
division took possession of the smaU islands of the Aegean Archi-
pelago between Crete, Rhodes and Samos. They hoisted the Ital-
ian flag over these islands and made prisoners of all Turkish
officials and the small Turkish garrisons they found on these
islands.

Among others these islands are : Ealtria, Carpantos, Easos,
Episcopi, Nysiros, Ealimnos, Leros, Patmos, Eos, and Smyni.
These islands were captured without bloodshed. All officials and
military personnel were conveyed as prisoners to Italy.

May 18 the Regina Margherita bombarded the small Asia
Minor port Marmarice, opposite Rhodes, where Turks had as-
sembled and established a depot.

The continued presence of the Italian warships in the Aegean
Sea, and threats published in Italian papers that Italy would
take possession of other larger islands, induced the Turkish gov-
ernment to reinforce those islands and complete their defences.
All persons who could not participate in the defence of these
islands were removed to the mainland, and additional troops
were sent to reinforce the garrisons. Mytileni, which had a gar-
rison of 3000, received a reinforcement of 2000' troops, who were
conveyed thither in small detachments by small boats from
Aivali. The garrison of Chios was in like manner reinforced by
several thousand troops.

The ports in Syria : Beirut, Mersina, Acre, Jaflfe and Haida,
were reinforced and fortified.

Banishment of Italians From All Turkish Dominions.

May 20 the Turkish government decreed the banishment of all
Italians from Turkish dominions; about 50,000 persons, 12,000
of whom were in Constantinople. The decree excepted clericals,
widows, cripples and laborers (about 2000 men), and required
all others to leave within 14 days.

The decree of banishment was handed to the German ambas-
sador, representing the Italian government in Constantinople,

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 77

on May 22. This decree was based upon the manner in which
the Italians conducted the war, and especially protested against
the Italians for taking Turkish civilian officials as prisoners of
war to Italy. It also based its necessity upon the fear of an out-
break by the populace, which was much embittered against the
Italians for the war and the government was not able to protect
Italians residing in Turkey.

A number of Italian ship captains were arrested, as they might
serve as pilots for the Italian navy.

The English and French press published protests against the
Italian seizure of these 12 islands in the Grecian Archipelago,
and claimed that this act materially changed the map of Europe
and strengthened the Triple Alliance in the balance of power
among the European states. Russia, France and England were
weakened by these acquisitions by Italy, and control of the great
commercial route through the Mediterranean was passing to
Italy and the Triple Alliance.

The press demanded that efforts should be made to stop the
war and further encroachments by Italy.

The Italians proceeded to make their possession of these isl-
ands secure and permanent. A fortnightly mail service was es-
tablished from Brindisi via Patras, Pireaus and Astropalia to
Rhodes. The Italian Chamber at the same time established mail
steamer service between Italy and North African ports as fol-
lows:

Syracuse to Tripoli, three times every week.

Syracuse to Benghasi, twice a week.

Palermo, Trapani, Tripoli, once a week.

Genoa, Sicilian ports and North African ports, once a week,
and Venice and North African ports, once a week.

Telegraphic communication was re-established by radio sta-
tions and cables as previously mentioned.

There was no activity of any importance by the navy on the
north coast -of Tripoli and Cyrenaica during May. The school-
ship division and a few ships of the navy cruised on the coast,
but on May 25 the schoolship division left Zuara, or rather the
new base Sidi Ali, to recruit in Italian home ports.

April 28 the Italian transport Domenico with 1275 reservists
en route home was stranded on Cape Spartivento, but torpedo
boats and other vessels rescued the transport.

78 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

Italian Military Campaign in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

During the period from April 15 to May 15, 1912, there were
engagements at all the places occupied by the Italians on the
coast of Africa, but the Italians held their positions throughout
without making any advances in the conquest of the country.
The summer opened with intense heat and violent sandstorms.
An advance into the interior was not contemplated for this
season.

The expeditionary corps that landed at Sidi Ali secured their
position on the line to Fort Forwa, also known as Bu Kamesh.
The occupation of Sidi-Said temporarily stopped the contraband
trade, and the torpedo-boat harbor was completed. A radio tele-
graph station was erected and regular communication was estab-
lished with Tripoli by means of dirigible balloons.

The constantly increasing Turkish- Arabian forces, which were
well supplied with artillery, opposed the Italians all along the
coast. Major Fethi Bey, formerly Turkish military attach^ at
Paris, was in supreme command of the Turkish- Arabian forces.
There were many desperate attacks by the Turks, which were
invariably repulsed, but often with great difficulty.

During the latter part of April the Italians made several ad-
vances to the southwestward, but were compelled to return, and
even lost territory they had previously held.

Zuara was still held by the Turks, but the caravan trade was
considerably reduced via the Tunisian frontier.

At Tripoli sandstorms caused considerable damage. One aero-
plane was destroyed and all the others were damaged, and the
Italians barely held their positions. The defences at Tadjura,
east of Tripoli, were strengthened.

May 2 the Italians at Homs surprised the Turks and captured
the heights southeast of Lebda. The Italians lost four officers
and 61 men killed and wounded in this aflfair, but they repulsed
the Turks and have managed to retain this advantageous posi-
tion, which was strongly fortified.

The spirit of the Turkish- Arabian troops was enthusiastic for
the war. There were between 300 and 400 trained Turkish offi-
cers in the field. They had ample supplies of ammunition and
they were not hampered for commissariat. The prospects of the
crops were good this year.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 79

Naval Operations, June, 1912.

During the month of June the first squadron of the Italian

fleet was in the vicinity of Rhodes and the new base at Astro-
palia. The third division had returned to Italy during the last
of May. The fourth division, which had been undergoing re-
pairs since the end of April, had not completed that work by
the middle of June. The guns of the Oaribaldi, Varese, Ferruc-
do and the Carlo-Alberto were replaced by new guns, as they
had fired more than the limited number of projectiles from the
older guns. The Italian Naval guns are like those of the British
Navy, made on the wire wound system, and they have an en-
durance of only 60 rounds with service charges, and after hav-
ing been fired 60 times they must be replaced or be relined in the
gun factory. The American and German guns are built-up
guns and have a much greater endurance, their limit being at
about 200 rounds.

The Italian torpedo boats disquieted the East coast of the
Aegean Sea. They repeatedly entered the Gulf of Smyrna and
the Gulf of Xeros, northwest of the entrance to the Dardanelles,
without opposition. Their appearance caused a panic among
the inhabitants of the coast and a concentration of the Turkish
coast-defence forces. Considerable excitement was caused by
the operations of the Italian torpedo boats in the bay of Scala-
nova, south of the Gulf of Smyrna, where, in pursuing Turkish
merchant vessels, the Italians bombarded several coast towns.

An attack on Smyrna, and the occupation of the island of
Chios were threatened, and the Italian press clamored for some
decisive blow to make Turkey yield. This demand was inexpe-
dient, as several of the European powers intimated their serious
objection to any further acquisition of islands in the Aegean
Sea by the Italians, and were determined by all means to pre-
vent the closing of the Straits of Dardanelles again. The Turk-
ish government notified the powers that they would completely
close the Dardanelles if the Italians took possession of any of
the larger islands north of Samos.

During the first part of June the Italians transported a con-
siderable number of troops from Tripoli to ports of Cyrenaica,
where they would be more available for operations in the
Aegean Sea.

80 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

For the defence of Smyrna and the adjacent re^on an in-
fantry division was sent from Constantinople and the reserves
were called out, so that in the five districts of Konia, Uschak,
Aidin, Smyrna and Denizli there were 80,000 Turkish troops.

All Italian subjects were compelled to leave the Island of
Chios, where martial law was declared because of the attitude
of the Greeks and the comparatively small garrison of about
1000 Turks.

Thirty thousand Turkish troops were concentrated for the
land defences of the Dardanelles at Gallipoli, under the com-
mand of Bisa Pasha.

The Turkish naval forces remained inactive at anchor in the
Dardanelles. About June 1st the crews of these ships demanded
to be led against the foe, but the ministry declined to permit the
navy to engage the Italian navy.

The occupation of the twelve Turkish islands by the Italians
was agreeable to the Greek inhabitants. The Italians established
a republican form of government in these islands. The admin-
istration of the government was chiefly given to the Greek resi-
dents and each of the small islands had a garrison of only 15
Italians with one oflScer, who carefully refrained from interfer-
ing with the administration, but were available in case the civil-
ian authorities required their services. The Italians organized
a police militia similar to that of the Italian Carabineers. There
were 400 Italians on the Island of Eos.

Rhodes was an exception to this system and was governed by
Italian officials exclusively. The central point of administra-
tion of the group of small islands was at AstropaUa (otherwise
named Stampalia), which was also the Italian naval base. The
mail was carried to the different islands by Italian navy petty
officers and Italian postage stamps were used. The system of
taxation was that which had previously prevailed and all tax
receipts were turned into the Italian Treasury. There was no
change in custom duties, except that all imports from Italy were
admitted free of duty. The Italian war ships seldom visited the
captured islands, except Rhodes and Astropalia.

The forty-second regiment of infantry sailed from Genoa the
last of May to reinforce the Italian garrisons on the captured
islands.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 81

The Italians raised the blockade of Rhodes, but no vessels
were allowed to arrive or depart between sunset and sunrise.
Martial law prevailed. Sir Edward Grey, in June, 1912, stated
in the British Parliament that Rhodes had not been annexed by
Italy and was merely occupied temporarily. During June the
cable between Rhodes and Candia was replaced by the steamer
Citta di Milano.

In the Red Sea, the Italian war ships bombarded the Arabian
port Havza on May 26th and Mokka on June 3rd. The destroy-
ers Artigliere and Oarabaldino returned to Italy during June.

In Tripolitan waters the Etruria repeatedly bombarded an
Arabian camp near Benghasi and the Marco-Polo shelled a camp
near Dema. The Marco-Polo also conducted an expedition for
the capture of the port of Misratah. She sounded the channel
off Buscheifa and planted buoys for the transports. This was
the last of the North African ports — except Zuara — that still re-
mained in possession of the Turks. Nine transports arrived off
Buscheifa on June 14th, convoyed by the school ship division of
three vessels of Sardegna class and six torpedo destroyers. The
war ships landed the naval brigade at Ras Zerek and shelled the
Arabians, who disputed the landing. The auxiliary cruisers
Duca di Oenova, Citta di Messina and Citta di Siracusa, with
three transports, made a demonstration near Sliten to divert the
Turkish- Arabians from Buscheifa. General Camerana landed
at Cape Zuruk on June 16th, about seven miles east of Misratah,
where he was attack by 5000 Turkish- Arabians, who were re-
pulsed on July 2nd. On July 9th the Italians, supported by
shell fire from the ships, attacked the Arabians vigorously and
succeeded in capturing the town of Misratah of 9000 inhabi-
tants. By July 20th, after a series of hard-fought engagements,
they cleared the fertile oasis around this town of aU hostile na-
tives. In the campaign to capture Misratah the Italians lost 9^^.
killed and 121 wougjiedr

The Banishment op Italians From Turkish Dominions.

The Turkish decree of banishment of all Italians from all
Turkish dominions caused a bitter protest from the Italian
press. The German diplomatic agents were accused of neglect-
ing Italian interests in Turkey, of which they had taken charge

8a THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

upon the outbreak of the war. The protest was carried into the
Italian Parliament, but the Prime Minister, Qiolotti, promptly-
stopped all consideration of the subject, because of the agree-
ment with the ministry that during the war the exigencies of the
war would not be discussed by the parliament, as it might aid
and abet the enemy. The charge against the German diplomatic
agents was vehemently refuted.

The Italians were banished without any noticeable incidents,
but the period fixed for their expulsion was prolonged hy the
Turks from June 3rd to June 18th. This banishment was neces-
sary because the bombardment of defenceless coast towns
aroused such a bitter animosity among the people that the gov-
ernment could not protect the Italians from the mob.

The Italians recalled all their officials that still remained with-
in the Turkish dominions and the home authorities were in-
structed to provide for the reception of all banished Italians at
the expense of the government and as soon as possible to give
them employment by the government. The king subscribed the
sum of 100,000 lires for the relief of the banished Italians.

Expenses of the War.

The expense of the war did not require any war loans for the
Italians, who could have maintained the war without extra war
loans much longer, because previous to the war there had been
an accumulation of surplus funds annually for some years by
economy in the annual budgets.

During the middle of June the Turkish government decreed
extra war taxes that increased the ground tax, income tax and
industrial tax 25 per cent. The tax for exemption from mili-
tary service was raised from $233.00 to $380.00, while exemption
from the reserves was raised from $150.00 to $187.00. The taxes
on salt and spirits were likewise increased. A tax of three per
cent was levied on the salaries of all Turkish officials. The extra
war taxes levied amounted to over ten million dollars. The
Turkish finances were in a critical condition, and in the event of
necessity for a mobilization of the entire army the Turkish
Treasury would be bankrupt, especially as France had refused
to loan any more money to the Ottoman government until after
peace shall have been concluded.

THE ITALIAN-TUBKI8H WAB. 83

In a publication by the Naval Transportation Bureau at Na-
ples the expense for transportation of men and material from
the beginning of the war to January 1st, 1912, amounted to 13,-
500,000 lires = $2,605,500.00, and the value of the material
transported in that period was about 80 million lires == $16,000,-
000.00. The following is a list of the transportations :

In October, 13 convoys with 50 steamers.
In November, 21 convoys with 59 steamers.
In December, 21 convoys with 43 steamers.
Total in 3 months, 55 convoys with 152 steamers.

In that period they transported a total of 101,389 men, 15,000
horses and mules, 12,000 head of cattle, 60,000 cwt. of meal, 40,-
000 cwt. of hay and 30,900 cwt. of biscuit, etc.

Operations On Land In North Africa.

During the period from May 15th to June 20th there were
constant engagements at the seat of war in North Africa. May
19th a strong Italian force of five battalions with mountain ar-
tillery and machine guns, marched towards El Atel, on the Tuni-
sian caravan road southwest of Sidi Ali. They were repulsed
by the Arabians and vigorously attacked by the Arabian cav-
alry upon their retreat. Positions remained unchanged.

The Italians started another expedition on the same route on
May 31st, and, after gaining some success, they were finally com-
pelled to return to Sidi Ali.

June 8th the Italians at Tripoli made an attack in force to
capture the oasis of Zanzur. This expedition left Tripoli at day-
light and was composed of 14 battalions of infantry, one brigade
of cavalry and a mountain battery, a total of 12,000 men under
the command of General Camerana. The Turks occupied the
heights of Abd-el-Gilil and the eastern border of the oasis. The
Italians were supported — at long range — ^by the guns of the Ital-
ian war ships oflf the coast. The oasis is 15 kilometers = 9.3 miles
west of Tripoli, and, after a hard-fought engagement, the Ital-
ians intrenched and secured a position on the heights after re-
pelling a flank attack by a fresh brigade that arrived from Bu
Meliana. The main body then returned to Tripoli, leaving the
Arabians still in possession of the oasis.

84 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

Near Lebda the Arabians attacked the Italians on Mergheb
heights on May 30th, June 8 and June 12, but they were re-
pulsed with heavy losses on both sides. On June 12 the Italians
made a counter attack and completely routed the Arabians.

There were numerous skirmishes at all other places and dur-
ing this period the Italians simply managed to hold their posi-
tions without making any advances into the interior.

The cable from Benghasi to Syracuse was opened for business
on June 10th.

Qeneral.

During June and July, 1912, the bulk of the Italian fleet re-
mained in the home ports. The armored cruiser San Oiorgio
joined the fleet in June after having been floated and undergo-
ing repairs for nearly nine months. The remarkable skill with
which the Italians floated this ship was a most creditable per-
formance, a feat that would not have been possible twenty years
ago. Her commanding officer was dismissed from the Italian
Navy for having run his ship aground on the rocks.

The Italian press reported that, in accordance with the unani-
mous wish of all the great powers, Italy would in the future re-
frain from further operations in the Aegean Sea and devote her
active hostilities more to Africa. The Italians did not seize any
more of the Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea, but continued to
cruise and menace the coasts of Asia Minor.

On the Tripolitan coast the Carlo-Alberto, Iride and Ardea
participated in engagements at Sidi Ali, near Zuara, while the
Etruria co-operated with the land forces at Benghasi.

The Italians substituted the army personnel in Africa by re-
lieving 60,000 reservists with an equal number of active service
men belonging to conscription of four years later.

Out of 92 chartered merchant steamers two were used as hos-
pital ships and seven were armed as auxiliary cruisers for the
navy. The remainder were all used for the transportation of
troops and war material. A royal decree in June allotted the
monthly sum of $1,400,000 for war expenses for the navy and
$4,000,000 for the Italian armies.

Considerable discontent prevailed in the Turkish army against
the Young Turk administration. This took such proportions

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB. 85

that orders were issued forbidding Turkish army oflScers from
taking any part in political discussions. The troops in Albania
mutinied and were quelled with diflSculty. The Turks were an-
noyed by the hostile attitude of the inhabitants of the islands
that Italy had taken and occupied in the Aegean Sea. The peo-
ple of Patmos Island instructed their delegates to seek annexa-
tion to Greece or independence.

The Italians were anxious to annex at least some of the islands
that they occupied in the Aegean Sea, more especially Astro-
palia and Rhodes. They urged that in making peace these two
islands should be ceded to Italy in compensation for the banish-
ment of Italians from Turkish Dominions. The seizure of these
islands, in their opinion, did not violate the Berlin Treaty, since
that treaty had been practically annulled by Austria's annexa-
tion of Bosnia, and besides these islands were seized as a result
of operations of war and had been acquired in accordance with
international law.

England was anxious to keep Russia and Germany out of the
Mediterranean Sea. Italy is recognized as a Mediterranean Sea
power and enjoys the most friendly relations with England. The
British Prime Minister stated that Italy's friendship was prized
most highly and he did not object to Italian measures to im-
prove her strategical position in the Mediterranean.

The seizure and permanent occupation of these islands was,
however, thought to increase the preponderance of the Triple
Alliance and the annexation of these islands was opposed by
France.

The Campaign In Africa During July.

On the Tunisian frontier at Bu Kamez the Italians had some
serious engagements with the Arabs. At one time their position
on the peninsular was very precarious, and was only relieved by
timely co-operation of the navy. These engagements around
Sidi Ali lasted for nearly two weeks without cessation, but the
Italians finally stormed the Turkish- Arabian position and gained
a great victory with security of their position on this frontier.
In these battles the Italians lost 18 killed and 114 wounded. The
Turks lost 158 killed and 200 wounded. There were minor en-
gagements in Cyrenaica without any effect. The Turks cap-

86 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

tured a quantity of telephone material, which they used to their
advantage.

During the relief of the reservists the officers were granted
leaves of absence alternately to visit their homes and no serious
operations were contemplated at that period.

The war caused anxiety in diplomatic circles and the en-
tangling nature of conflicting interests presented some knotty
problems. The principles of neutrality tend to make both bel-
ligerents to antagonize all neutrals. The temptation to violate
the obligations of neutrality, coupled with sympathy for one bel-
ligerent, nearly caused a conflict between France and Italy since
the Turks managed to smuggle contraband of war through
French Tunisian territory. The friendship of England was
manifested by a strict observance of neutrality on the Egyptian
frontier in striking contrast to the open smuggling through
Tunis.

Germany was anxious to maintain her influence with Turkey
because of her commercial interests in Asia Minor and Syria,
and especially in the Bagdad railroad and similar enterprises.
The Germans had great influence with the Turks and Germany
was the most favored, nation. This position conflicted with the
interests of Austria and Italy in the triple alliance. Russia pro-
tested against the blockade of the Dardanelles by Turkey, which
caused great losses to her Black Sea commerce. The Kaiser and
the Czar had a meeting in July, which was followed by a visit
to Russia by the President of the French Republic to co-operate,
it is said, in reference to Russia's protest against closing the
Dardanelles. The results of these two conferences are not known,
but the Franco-Russian alliance is reported to have been
strengthened, and that the French and Russian navies are al-
lied for future events in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

England and Germany also became somewhat involved by^
conflicting interests and agitators in both England and Germany
stirred up such a bitter feeling between these two governments
that war seemed imminent. England concentrated her navy in
the North Sea and apparently abandoned the Mediterranean to
France. Germany increased her federated armies by providing
for two additional army corps and by doubling the active fleet
in commission, instead of keeping a large part in reserve as
theretofore. The Reichstag, though composed of a majority in

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 87

opposition to the government, almost unanimously approved the
government's proposals to increase the German army and navy.

Operations op the Italla^n Fleet During July and August.

The first squadron cruised in the vicinity of the Turkish isl-
ands in the Aegean Sea, while the second squadron remained in
home ports completing repairs, replacing their guns which had
been fired to the limit of their endurance, and preparing to re-
lieve the first squadron during August.

The Italian Admiral took measures against any possible ef-
forts by the Turkish fleet to recapture any of the islands occu-
pied by the Italians. Some of the ships cruised in the northern
part of the Aegean Sea.

The Reconnoissance of the Dardanelles.

In order to ascertain the preparedness of the Turkish fleet to
attack the Italians, the Italian Admiral decided to reconnoiter
the Dardanelles and also ascertain the condition of the defences.
July 14th the flagship Vettor Pisani, with the destroyers Nembo
and Borea and five high-sea torpedo boats, each of 200 tons —
Spica, Perseo, Astore, Climene and Centauro — ^left Stampalia
for the northern part of the Aegean Sea. At Leros, one of the
small islands occupied by the Italians, the five torpedo boats
were stripped of all equipment clear for action. They were re-
painted in a somewhat lighter color than before and a third of-
ficer was assigned to each one, in addition to the regular comple-
ment. Life preservers were placed on deck, to be available in
case a torpedo boat should be sunk by gun fire, that the crew
might float thereon with the current, that flows at a rate of about
four miles per hour out of the Straits of Dardanelles, and they
could then be picked up by the vessels of the squadron that were
cruising off the entrance to the Straits. July 17th the squadron
steamed to the sparsely inhabited island of Strati (Bozaba),
which lies out of the usual track of commerce and on an unfre-
quented channel. Here Captain Millo joined the flotilla of five
torpedo boats, and, with the Spica as his flagship, took command
of the flotiUa to personnally conduct the expedition. The flotilla
left Strati in the afternoon of July 18th for the entrance to the

THE ITAUAN-TUEKI8H WAE.

sis E

l-nn I i

5 i 1 3 1 , E . i ■ . j I

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 89

Straits of Dardanelles, distant about 60 miles, and where they
arrived at 11.30 p. m. The Vettor Pisani and the Nembo and
Borea remained off the coast out of sight of the land, prepared
when necessary to make a demonstration before the outer forts.
The five torpedo boats proceeded in column at a speed of 12
knots, which was increased to 15 knots on account of the cur-
rent. Upon entering the Straits they first hugged the Asiatic
shore, and then, to avoid the barricade of mines, they went to
the European side of the channel. Fine weather, smooth sea,
and a dark night favored the Italians, so that they passed in
through the entrance between Cape Helles and Kum Kaleh,
which is here about two miles wide, without having been ob-
served. They escaped observation for some time, though the
Turks had four search-lights, two on each cape. One of the four
was, however, not in action at the time. At 12.40 a. m. the As-
tore was picked up by the search-light on Cape Helles, just after
the flotilla had passed in. The alarm was given, guns were fired
and signal rockets were sent up all along the shores of the Dar-
danelles. Fort Seddil-Bahr opened fire on the flotilla.

Captain Millo increased speed to 20 knots and then to 23
knots, while the boats proceeded in close order and as near the
European shore as possible, so that the beams of the search-
lights might not reveal them too clearly because of the diflSculty
of depressing the beams to illuminate the surface close to the
beach at the bluffs. At Suandere, about 6.5 miles northeast
of Seddil-Bahr, they were again exposed to heavy gun flre, but
none of the shots took effect. The flotilla proceeded up the long
stretch through the Straits for eleven miles under fire from field
guns and small arms all along the Straits to Kilid Bahr, while
search-lights revealed their position plainly. At Killid-Bahr the
leading boat was stopped by a barricade of steel hawsers
stretched across the Straits that effectually closed the passage.
During the two or three minutes that the Spica was stopped at
the barricade, the lights on shore and numerous search-lights re-
vealed the batteries on both sides and Captain Millo discerned
the Turkish fleet of seven ships at anchor about six miles to the
northward. Among these ships they made out the Turkish ship
Petk^-Schewket,

As it was useless to try to pass through this strongly defended,
narrow passage, and the cross beams of the search-lights made

90 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

it impossible to distinguish any further details concerning the
Turkish fleet, the flotilla went about and steamed at full speed
for the entrance to the Straits, at first in close order and later in
dispersed order. At 1.30 the flotilla rejoined the Vettor-Pisani,
having escaped without any loss. None of the crews were
wounded and the torpedo boats were only very slightly dam-
aged. The Spica had several shots through her funnels, while
the Astore and Perseo received some shots in their hulls.

The Turkish fleet took no part in defending the Straits, and
for this neglect the Turkish Admiral was relieved of his com-
mand and Tahor Bey was appointed Commander-in-Chief.
Every man in the Italian flotilla was highly rewarded for this
gallant expedition. Captain Millo was promoted to the rank of
Rear- Admiral, passing over 25 ofiScers who were senior to him,
and he was appointed Chief Inspector of Torpedoes. All the
lieutenants in the flotilla were promoted to the rank of Capitaine
de Corvette (Lieutenant Commander). Distinguished-service
medals were presented in person by the King, who also presented
each boat with a special flag.

After this experience the Turks narrowed the open spaces
through the barricades and mine flelds, without interfering with
the passage of merchant vessels through the Straits with pilots.

Operations in the Red Sea.

In the Red Sea the Italian naval forces attacked the fortified
positions and forts at Hodeida with the Piemonte, Caprera and
Aretusa on July 27th and August 12th. In the last bombard-
ment the Italians destroyed a Turkish powder magazine.

The Italians were remarkably successful in maintaining radio-
communication direct between the Marconi station at Caltano-
Pisa, and the station at Massowah Red Sea. The radiograms
traversed a portion of the Sahara desert and were transmitted
for a distance of 2,350 miles.

On the Tripolitan Coast.

The school ship division, consisting of three ships of Sardegna
class, two destroyers and six high sea torpedo boats, convoyed a
fleet of seven transports, with the Tassoni division of infantry,
from Augusta August 3rd to take possession of Zuara. The

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 91

navy conducted the landing of this force on August 5th at a
point about two miles east of Zuara. The naval landing force
constituted the van in landing and the guns of the fleet bom-
barded the coast. The troops were landed by the ship's boats
and 12 coral fishing smacks.

The recently organized Naval Academy division, consisting of
the naval cadet school ship Etna and the naval apprentice school
ships Flavino Oioja and America Vespucci, under the command
of Admiral Bono, had in the meantime relieved the troops of the
garrison in the Italian positions west of Zuara, so that they
could operate against Zuara from the westward simultaneously
with the attack from the eastward and southward. The Carlo-
Alberto followed this movement and supported the march of
Q^neral Lequio along the coast.

Upon arrival of the Italian forces from all three directions
they found the city deserted. The occupation of Zuara thus
completed the Italian possession of the entire coast of Tripoli
and Cyrenaica. The Turkish- Arabian forces had all withdrawn
from the vicinity of the coast, but they still held the Italians in
check against any prolonged excursions into the interior.

Internal Disorders in Turkey.

The crews of the Turkish fleet participated with the army in
the political affairs of the country. The discontent among the
troops in Albania, protesting for political rights and denouncing
special privileges, spread and caused the formation of the Mili-
tary League, to which the majority of the naval oflScers also be-
longed. This league protested against the Young Turk govern-
ment and claimed that they had adopted unconstitutional meas-
ures, especially during the elections; that they had introduced
politics in the army by which mediocre political favorites had
been advanced to the detriment of more eflScient oflScers; that
unnecessary bloodshed be avoided in dealing with the discon-
tented troops in Albania, and finally they held the Young Turk
government responsible for the disastrous war because they
HAD NEGLECTED TO PREPARE FOR PROPJBR DE-
PENCE OF TRIPOLI IN TIME OF PEACE BEFORE THE
WAR.

d2 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

This Military League was most potent in causing the down-
fall of the Young Turk goyemment on July 17th and the dis-
solution of parliament on August 5th. On August 4th the league
sent a delegation of oflScers in the destroyer Nemune-i-Hamie to
Constantinople to demand the dissolution of Parliament. The
destroyer anchored in range of the Parliament House and three
other vessels were ready to follow her the next day when their
demand was conceded. The officers also telegraphed from the
fleet at Nagara that a naval officer should be appointed Minister
of the Navy and they threatened to bring the fleet to Constan-
tinople if that was not done.

The new Minister of Marine — a naval officer — tissued an order
to all officers to refrain from political agitation, and he was sup-
ported in this by the Military League. As soon as Parliament
was dissolved the new government proclaimed martial law to
prevent any uprising of the Young Turks. This was strictly en-
forced in Constantinople, Salonica, Adrianople and Smyrna.
These decisive measures compelled the Young Turk party to
give up all idea of resistance.

The Central Committee, of the Young Turks, assured the new
government that they would refrain from any further agitation.
The league was disbanded and August 14th the army officers
swore allegiance and promised to refrain from political discus-
sion. All officers of the navy and the provinces took the same
oath to refrain from politics.

Cholera prevailed in Constantinople and caused considerable
distress among the people.

These internal disorders interrupted the negotiations for
peace for which Italian and Turkish plenipotentiaries had met
at Lausanne, Switzerland. The fall of the Young Turk govern-
ment, which could not make any peace that involved the loss by
Turkey of the two African provinces, without risking their con-
trol of the government, removed one of the chief obstacles to con-
clude peace. The financial condition and the maintenance of
the mobilized Turkish army created a strong demand for peace
by yielding to the demands of Italy.

Operations During August and September, 1912.

The vessels of the first squadron of the Italian navy were re-
fitting in the home ports when the second squadron sailed from

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 93

Tarento on August 22 for the coast of Syria. The appearance
of this fleet on August 7th and 28th off Jaffa, Haifa and Beirut
caused great anxiety among the inhabitants of those ports. The
fleet, however, merely searched neutral ships for contraband of
war and captured several Turkish sailing ships, after which they
proceeded along the coast of Asia Minor to the islands in the
Aegean Sea that were occupied by the Italians, and thence to the
African ports of Cyrenaica and Tripoli.

The Piemonte and the four large destroyers left the Red Sea
so that the remaining Italian naval forces were the cruisers
Liguria, Elba and Puglia, the torpedo vessels AreUisa and Co-
prera and the special ships Staff eta and Governolo.

The Greeks on the Aegean Islands that had hitherto been un-
der Turkish dominion endeavored to free themselves from Turk-
ish control. The two small islands about six miles west of Samos,
Nicaria and Pumi, with about 15,000 inhabitants, succeeded in
overpowering the Turkish garrisons and declared their inde-
pendence. They sent delegates to Athens and submitted a me-
morial to the European powers for recognition of their inde-
pendence. The struggle of the Greeks for independence on the
island of Samos was supported by the Independence party in
Crete, who sent an armed expedition of 600 men from Crete to
Samos. They attempted to overthrow the Turkish garrison of
900 men and proclaim independence. This attempt was tem-
porarily frustrated by the English and French cruisers Diana,
Medea and Bruix that were cruising in that vicinity. Notwith-
standing this, about 300 Cretans managed to land on Samos to
assist the people against the Turks.

During September the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian ar-
mies in Africa, Lieutenant General Caneva, was recalled and
promoted to be General of the army. The two Corps Command-
ers, Lieutenant General BriccoUa, in Cyrenaica, and Lieutenant
General Bagni, in Tripoli, were given independent command of
their respective districts and in charge of both military and
civil administrative duties.

September 17th there was a battle at Derna, in which the at-
tacking Turkish- Arabian forces were repulsed, leaving 111 killed
on the field. The Italians lost 61 killed and 113 wounded.

September 20th the Italian troops in Tripoli, under the com-
mand of Lieutenant General Ragni, finally succeeded in captur-

94 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

ing the Oasis of Zanzur, after a desperate battle that lasted ten
hours and in which the Italians lost 200 killed. The Turkish-
Arabian forces retreated to Zavia, a place not far from the coast,
and about 24 miles west of Tripoli.

September 13th the Etna bombarded the Arabian i>o6ition at
Zuagla^ near the ruins of ancient Tripoli.

The **Popolo Romano'' published a statement that at the be-
ginning of September there were 95,000 Italian troops in North
Africa, and in the captured Aegean Sea islands. In Italy there
were 150,000 troops in the army, besides 25,000 Carabinieri and
135,000 recruits.

The Italian War Minister published a statement that up to
the beginning of July the Italians had captured 88 Turkish of-
ficers, 227 non-commissioned ofiScers and 1,436 private Turkish
soldiers.

The Turks captured Captain Moizo, the commander of the
Italian aviation corps, on September 10th as his motor failed
while in flight over the enemy's territory between Zuara and
Tripoli.

The negotiations for peace continued during September in
Switzerland, and probabilities of peace were so promising that
the Turks dispersed the army that had been assembled at
Smyrna during August and those extra forces were sent to their
regular headquarters and reserves were ordered to their homes.

These peace negotiations were expedited by the threatened
war of the Balkan States against Turkey. The second squadron
cruised during the latter part of September in the Aegean Sea
off Chios, Mityleni and Haifa and in the vicinity of Smyrna
with the object of bringing pressure on the Turks to yield to
Italian demands and conclude peace.

This demonstration prevented the Turks from reinforcing
their European armies by the troops that had been ordered
shortly before to return to their headquarters from Smyrna.

October 3rd the Coatit bombarded a Turkish camp on the
shore of the Bay of Kalamaki, on the south coast of Asia Minor,
because the Turks had fired upon her as she was towing a prize
out of the harbor. The Coatit also shelled an infantry battalion
on the beach of the Bay of Scalanaova, which was in act of cross-
ing over from Eapomicali to the Island of Samos. The Coatit
fired about 200 projectiles against the fleeing Turkish troops

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 95

and inflicted severe losses. The Commander of the French
cruiser Bruix is reported to have protested against this act as a
violation of international law.

Since the peace negotiations were delayed, the Italians finally
presented an ultimatum fixing the period for acceptance of the
Italian demands at a date not later than October 15th, and they
at the same time began to prepare an expedition against Euro-
pean Turkey to compel the Ottoman government to yield. These
preparations consisted of the organization and transportation of
an expeditionary army and the departure of the first squadron
to reinforce the second squadron in the Aegean Sea. The first
squadron sailed on October 14th, but was recalled by wireless
the next day, when the news was received that the preliminaries
for peace had been signed. The squadron returned to Tarento.

The insurrection on the Island of Samos ended finally by the
withdrawal of all the Turkish troops from that island to Chios.
The Prince of Samos also fled and Sofulis, the leader of the In-
surrectionists, proclaimed an independent republic.

A number of Italian steamers that were employed as auxiliar-
iary cruisers were relieved from naval service. Among these the
Duca di Oenova and Duca delgi Abruzzi had rendered most
valuable service.

The Italian operations in the African campaign were likewise
influenced by the probabilities of peace. At Derna only they
had some serious battles. Here 18 battalions of Italian infantry
made vigorous efforts to extend the area of the territory around
that port. These battles, fought on September 14th, October 7th
and October 11th, resulted in an extension of territory in pos-
session of the Italians to include a rectangular area around Der-
na of about eight square miles, four miles along the coast and
two miles back into the interior, where a line of intrenchments
and fortifled positions were built on hills and along the streams
flowing to the sea.

The Italians occupied Bomba after making feints at neigh-
boring points on both flanks of that port.

In Tripoli everything was quiet after the occupation of Zan-
zur and on September 8th the narrow-gauge Italian railroad
from Gagaresh to Zanzur, about 14 miles long, was opened for
traffic, with a view to further extension to Gharian as progress
should be made in occupying the hinterland.

96 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAB.

The war had prevailed a year from September 29th, and dur-
ing that period, by means of 150,000 troops in Africa and at a
cost of $100,000,000.00, the Italians had succeeded in capturing
and occupying the principal ports, viz. : Tripoli, Homs, Misra-
tab, Zuara, Benghasi, Dema, Bomba and Tobruk. At Tripoli
only they had acquired a considerable area, that extended for
about 24 miles along the coast and about eight miles into the in-
terior. The territory occupied at the other ports was very small
and averaged only about ten square miles at each port.

At the end of September the Italians had about 110,000 troops
in Africa — ^about 45,000 at Tripoli and vicinity, 15,000 at Zuara
and Sidi Ali, 6000 at Homs, 10,000 at Misratab, 10,000 at Beng-
hasi, 18,000 at Dema and 6000 at Tobruk. They were opposed
by about 40,000 Turks and Arabians, half of whom were around
Tripoli. A large number of the Arabians were absent on fur-
lough to till the soil. The Turkish- Arabians had their own field
guns and constantly received supplies from across both the
Tunisian and Egyptian frontiers.

In the year's war the Italians sustained a loss of about 4000
killed and 6000 wounded, which is regarded as comparatively
small. Prom a military point of view the result is regarded as
meagre, primarily due to a misconception of the relations be-
tween the Turks and the Arabian inhabitants of the African
provinces. In the beginning the Italians were greeted by many,
such as the Chief of the Sennoussi tribe, as liberators from the
Turkish yoke, and the Italians thought a small force would suf-
fice to conquer the country with the aid of those who were dis-
satisfied with the Ottoman government. The Arabians hesitated
at first to oppose the Italians, but their failure to win decisive
victories promptly gave the Turks time to organize their forces,
appeal to their religion and oppose the invasion of the unbe-
lievers.

The Italian navy proved equal to every demand upon it and
they displayed a most distinguished eflSciency. In every oper-
ation of the war where it was possible for the Italian navy to
operate they were uniformly successful.

In the convoy of the troops and the landing at different ports
the naval landing parties invariably led and successfully cap-
tured places that they attacked though these advanced naval
landing parties were promptly relieved as soon as the navy

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 97

could convey the military forces ashore by their boats and the
lighters, pontoons and fishing smacks they took with every expe-
dition.

The navy efficiently blockaded the ports and maintained com-
mand of sea, so that the military operations were not intermpted
by any over sea attacks.

The Italian navy co-operated in the defence of ports when-
ever they were attacked and the gun fire from the ships only
enabled the Italians to repulse the desperate fanatical attacks of
the Arabians.

The Turkish navy was decidedly inefficient and did not dis-
pute the Italian command of the sea. The only naval action in
which the Turks made any decided resistance was at Beirut,
where for 20 minutes the Turkish Monitor, the coast defence
ship Avm-Illah, replied to the attack by the two armored cruis-
ers Ferruccio and OaribaMi. In those 20 minutes the Italians
fired so efficiently that the Turkish Commander was obliged to
haul down his flag and abandon the ship. The Turks failed to
score a single hit and did no damage whatever to the Italians.
The Garibaldi fired two torpedoes, both of which were accurate
shots. The first torpedo, however, fouled the moorings of six
lighters that were at the mole and it exploded and destroyed
those lighters and left a clear path for the second torpedo that
struck the Awn-Illah amidship and exploded and sank the ship.

In the operations in the Red Sea the Italian navy completely
blocked any attack on the Italian colony at Erythrea and con-
tributed greatly to the conquest of the African provinces by de-
priving the Turks of the reinforcements they expected from
Arabia.

The most brilliant exploit in the war was the reconnoissance
of the Dardanelles by Captain Millo and his fiotilla of five tor-
pedo boats.

The Italian navy covered itself with glory in this war. The
navy did not suffer any losses whatever, except among the per-
sonnel of the naval landing brigades at different ports where
they were the first to land.

The Turkish navy was not permitted to venture out of the
Dardanelles when any Italian navsd vessels were in the Aegean
Sea, but subsequent events in the Balkan war proved that the

98 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

preparedness of the Turkish navy was underestimated even by
the Turks. They had no confidence in the fleet.

Italy is the first nation to use aeroplanes in war, and they
were operated by Italian naval aviators with considerable suc-
cess, but they did not prove to be as formidable as weapons as
was expected. At first they tried throwing the Cipelli bombs
from these aeroplanes and the '^ London Illustrated News'' had
a very striking illustration of a retreat by Turkish-Arabian
troops being pursued by a flock of Italian aeroplanes that filled
the background of an artistic picture with exploding bombs.
But this was not actually seen, but only dreamed by the special
artist on the field.

The Italians did not, as far as could be authoritatively ascer-
tained, develop a reliable hand grenade to be thrown from an
aeroplane. The Qermans have invented a peculiar sighting ap-
paratus with a gun, by which the bombs from airships can be
fired with some greater degree of accuracy, but these bombs were
not used by the Italians.

The dirigible airships were much more valuable. The Italians
had two in use at Tripoli that made many flights for consider-
able distances from Tripoli to Zuara and return and also from
Tripoli to Qharian and return, making voyages for several hun-
dred miles. In these dirigibles photographs were taken and
these reconnoissances secured accurate reliable information.

This experience demonstrated the indispensable necessity of
aeroplanes and dirigible airships in war.

In wireless telegraphy the Italians were also very successful,
and in all their operations they used this method of communica-
tion much more than ever before.

The Italians also used automobiles, auto trucks and many va-
rieties of motor wagons in all their expeditions, while motor-
cycles were found to be very valuable.

During the war the Italians had in constant service 39 battle-
ships, cruisers and gunboats, 30 auxiliary vessels of all kinds, 23
torpedo boat destroyers, 35 high sea torpedo boats, 16 coast tor-
pedo boats, two hospital ships, one ammunition transport and
one Vulcan repair ship; besides the 88 transports which were
used for transportation of troops and which had each a small
detachment of officers and men of the navy.

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 00

The Italian navy did not have the necessary number of naval
personnel to man aU these ships and large numbers of men be-
longing to the army conscription were employed in the navy,
especially those well adapted for sea service.

Throughout the entire war the army and navy co-operated
with thorough harmony, and this co-operation was most credit-
able and contributed to the success of the war.

The Treaty op Peace Signed at Lausanne, Swipzerland.

Three Envoy-plenipotentiaries from Italy and two from
Turkey negotiated the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne, which was
signed preliminarily by the negotiators on October 15. In ac-
cordance with this treaty, the Sultan of Turkey issued a Firman
on October 17 granting autonomy to Tripoli and Cyrenaica, with
full amnesty to all the people of the Turkish Islands in the
Aegean Sea who had revolted or opposed the Ottoman govern-
ment.

The Sultan's Firman stated that a new government would ad-
minister affairs in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, which would respect
the religion and customs of the people as before, and the Sul-
tan's Viceroy — ^Naib-es-Sultan, Shemseddine Bey — would have
charge of all Ottoman interests in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The
current laws of the Sheriat will continue in force and the neces-
sary Cadi (principal judge) will be designated by the Sultan.

The King of Italy signed a decree October 17 granting full
and entire amnesty to aU inhabitants of Tripoli and Cyrenaica
who had taken part in hostilities, and stating that all the inhabi-
tants shall be permitted to enjoy complete liberty in the Mahom-
medan religion as in the past ; the name of the Sultan shall con-
tinue to be pronounced in public prayers and his personal rep-
resentative shall be recognized. The emoluments of the Sultan's
Viceroy shall be paid from local funds. The rights of the pious
foundation (Wakufs) shall be respected and no impediments
shall be placed between the Mussulmen and their religious lead-
ers, the Cadi and their Naibis, who shaU have incomes from
local revenues.

Another decree will establish a commission, a part of which
shaU be notables of Tripoli, to propose civil and administrative
orders inspired by liberal ideals and in keeping with local uses
and customs.

100 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

The peace plenipotentiaries also agreed to have two commis-
sions, one for Tripoli and one for Cyrenaica, who shall confer
with the Arab chieftans to persuade them to submit to Italian
sovereignty, as in their interest, and to see that all just demands
of the inhabitants shall be granted. These two commissions were
already organized during the middle of October in Cyrenaica.

The Arabian Chief, Said Idriss, was also pardoned. After
the publication of these edicts the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne
was ratified and confirmed on October 18. The eleven articles
of this treaty provide essentially as follows :

Immediate cessation of hostilities.

Recall of all Turkish troops and civil functionaries from Tri-
poli and Cyrenaica.

The evacuation of all Turkish islands occupied in the Aegean
Sea by the Italians.

The exchange and release of aU prisoners of war.

Complete amnesty to aU the inhabitants of Tripoli, Cyrenaica
and of the Aegean Islands.

Italy also agreed to consent to a commercial treaty, in which
higher duties will be imposed by Turkey and certain monopolies
will be granted.

Italy also agreed to support measures to leave Turkey her
economic independence, with the right to act in commercial mat-
ters in the same way as all other European powers without be-
ing restricted by capitulations and other acts now in force.

Italy agreed to suppress all Italian postofSces operating in
Turkish dominions, when other States that have their i>ostof-
fices in Turkey shall suppress theirs.

Italy agreed to support Turkey's efforts to substitute the re-
gime of international law in Turkey, instead of the hitherto
prevailing capitulary regime.

The Ottoman government agreed to fully reinstate all Italian
subjects who had been faithful employees of the Turkish govern-
ment and who had been dismissed on the outbreak of war and
to grant them half pay during the months they had been absent
on account of the war, and furthermore that this enforced ab-
sence would not interfere with their claims for pensions and like
claims.

The Italian government agreed to pay annually to ihe Turkish
Treasury a sum corresponding to that which the two African

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 101

provinces had paid annually to the Turkiah government on the
average during the three years before the war. The Italian gov-
ernment estimated that this annuity will not be less than 2,000,-
000 lires = about $400,000, and Italy is ready to pay to the
Turkish Administration of Public Debt the corresponding capi-
talized sum on demand.

Article XI required that hostilities cease on the date of signa-
ture, October 18, 1912.

The sovereignty of Italy over Tripoli and Cyrenaica was rec-
ognized by Germany, Austria, and Russia on the date of signing
the preliminary treaty, October 15, and by England shortly aft-
erwards, while France delayed in order to define the Tunisian
boundary of Tripoli.

The full text of this treaty was kindly sent to the writer by
the Honorable Philander Knox, Secretary of State, Washing-
ton, D. C, and the exact translation of the treaty and accom-
panying decree of the King of Italy and the Firman of the Sul-
tan of Turkey are herewith embodied in the appendix.

By this treaty the Italians have endeavored to conciliate the
Turks and Arabians to their conquest of Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
The Italians were most anxious to retain at least two of the
Aegean Sea islands and their conduct towards the inhabitants
of those islands made these people anxious to remain under the
Italian government. But the Italians realized that every effort
should be made to conciliate the Turkish- Arabians so that they
would not have a long guerilla warfare to disturb them in their
plans to develop the country. Since peace was concluded the
Arabians have submitted without any further attacks on the
Italian positions.

Italy avoided any sympathy with the Balkan States and that
war has operated to establish Italy's sovereignty over Tripoli
and Cyrenaica more than would have been possible by forcible
invasion into the interior by the Italian armies.

The banishment of aU Italian subjects from the Dominions of
Turkey was a great hardship and created a bitter hostility, but
the treaty has softened those animosities by a most remarkable
and wise provision that all Italian subjects who had been em-
ployed by the Ottoman government and who had been dismissed
on account of the war and consequent hostilities shall be fidly
reinstated with all rights to pensions et cetera as if they had re-

102 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR

mained in service and forthermore that they should receive half
pay during the time they were absent. This clause had the ef-
fect of compelling the Ottoman government to give half pay to
many Italians for the time they were actually fighting against
the Ottoman government.

The banishment of the Italians was, however, urgently neces-
saiy, not only as a war measure, but because of the claims of
humanity since the incidental destruction of life and property
by Italian bombardment of defenceless ports and often without
any notice had aroused the populace, especially at Beirut and in
Syria, so that the Turkish government was unable to protect the
lives of Italians against the infuriated Turkish mobs.

The bombardment of defenceless ports is supposed in theory
to be contrary to international law, but in the conduct of war
the fact that a port is defenceless will not prevent its being bom-
barded if the Commander of the attacking force finds it neces-
sary to bombard it in order to compel the enemy to conclude
peace. The Italians did not act in any exceptional manner and
the practice of bombarding towns whether defended or not is
general. Admiral Sampson bombarded San Juan, Porto Rico,
without any previous notice on May 12, 1898. He engaged the
fort on the Morro there and 44 persons were killed in the city,
including, among other non-combatants, many women and chil-
dren, besides destroying many buildings by projectiles that went
over and beyond the Morro into the city. The only sure protec-
tion is in having command of the sea by an efficient navy so that,
as was the case in this war, the Turkish navy did not venture
near any Italian port.

These moderate demands of Italy for the acquisition of Tri-
poli and Cyrenaica are wise and Italy intends to develop the
country so that the desert regions will bloom as a prosperous,
civilized country.

Harbor Works in Ports op Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

The Minister of Public Works has published the details for
the development of the ports of the African coast.

The first work in this new Italian colony will be extensive har-
bor works, which are to be executed in three periods. These
harbor works consist of building breakwaters and quay walls and

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR. 103

dredging in the harbors of Tripoli, Benghasi, Dema and Horns.
The work planned for the first two periods in those ports has
been commenced and was at this period, March, 1913, well ad-
vanced to completion and wiU be available for use by the end
of 1913.

The works planned and being constructed in these different
ports areas foUows:

. At Tripoli.

The construction of a breakwater 4000 feet long on the north-
west side of the harbor to connect the chain of reefs that run
parallel to the coast. This breakwater wiU provide a smooth
harbor against the prevailing wind and sea. It is proposed to
extend this to be 5500 feet long in the future.

2. The removal of rocks within the harbor and for dredging
the harbor to a depth of 25 to 28 feet.

3. The erection of a protecting shield on the south side of the
harbor to protect it from the sandstorms that come from the
southeast quadrant; and also the construction of a dam on the
north side of the harbor to shelter it from the seas coming from
the northeast.

4. The construction of quay walls and wharves to provide
depths alongside of from 13 to 25 feet with depths in places up
to 30 feet and final dredging to give a uniform depth of 33 feet
in the harbor.

5. The equipment of these quays and wharves with cranes,
railroad tracks, magazines and roadways.

6. The construction of a marine railway or a dry dock with
a plant for repairing ships and machinery.

7. The completion of other dependent works, such as the
lighthouse, bouys, sanitary station, fresh water distilling plant
and coal depots.

The natural conditions at Tripoli will permit these works to
be done at a comparatively small expense and this port, which
was heretofore almost inaccessible for commerce, will be one of
the safest and most commodious ports in the Mediterranean. Its
area will be about double that of Qenoa.

The breakwater at Tripoli was completed for a length of 2000
feet in February, 1913, as was the proteotlng dam or shield to

IM THE ITAUA^^TUUUHU WABL

prcTcot Mnd bdnf Mown into the kariior by mnjk^imnam in the
iouthern part of the harbw. B j Mardi 31it 2,500,000 liras =
iCOMOO was expended on the Tt^kA hariwr works.

In their ili^ta in aeroplanea the ayiatOTS diae ovcr e d the wredk
of the United Statea fripite Philaddphia, wfaieh had been edi-
tored by the Tripolitans in the war of 1812, after die had been
ran upon the roeka in that harbor and where ahe waa aobae-
qnently ao gallantly deatroyed by Deeatnr in that war. The
idea of the removal of that ship waa seriooaly ecmaidered, but
her condition wonld not warrant the expense and it is hi^^ily
probable that after having been lying <m her side for about 100
years ahe wonld not float. The Italian government <rfEered tha
United States every facility to raiae the Philadelphi|i if tiicy de-
sired to do so. The experience of aviation for observation of the
bottom of sea shows that sabmarines are cleariy visible when
submerged.

At Homs.

For a greater part of the year there is a heavy surf at H<mis,
but the Italians began to build a breakwater there to provide a
harbor of refuge for torpedo boats and they have built wharves
for coasting steamers that have been established alcmg tiie en-
tire coast.

At Macabez.

T%is peninsular is destined to be utilized for a good harbor
instead of Zuara. This port will be a base for torpedo boats and
they have dug a canal there which will eventually be 2100 feet
long and 16 feet deep.

At Misubatah.

The naval administration has begun to build an artificial har-
bor at Misuratah by constructing two breakwaters perpendicu-
lar to the coast and dredging out the partially enclosed area.

At Benghasi.

Here it is proposed to construct a harbor for light draft coast*
ing vessels. The present plan is to make use of the bay south of
the town by enlarging the small bight near the custom house
and building a breakwater from the Christian cemetery on the
northern end of Busoaiba poipt. This work was started before
peace was signed.

THB ITAUAN-TUBKI8H WAS. 105

At Debna.

The hydrographic and local conditions at Dema are similar
to those at Horns and a heavy surf breaks on the beach during a
greater part of the year.

A quay wall was begun during the war and upon completion
of the proposed harbor works a small harbor will be enclosed by
a breakwater 1000 feet long. The depth will be, when dredged,
about 14 feet.

A contract was signed by the Italian government with the
Khedive of Egypt and English authorities for the construction
of an extension of the railroad from Alexandria to Derna. This
railroad is to be completed within three years and the work is
being pushed vigorously.

At Tobbuk.

The most excellent natural harbor is of much greater military
strategical value than of commercial importance. The work of
developing this port has been given to the Italian naval minister,
but little has been done beyond the completion of the lighthouse
at Bas-AUem-el-Nix, which was started by the Turkish govern-
ment.

All these works will give employment to large numbers of the
Arabian inhabitants and prospects for peaceful development of
these African colonies were very encouraging.

Conclusion.

The lessons taught by this war should not be ignored. In the
first place we find the Italians thoroughly prepared to make use
of all modem inventions that might be useful in operations of
war. Automobiles, motorcycles, motor trucks and vehicles of
all kinds were valuable. Aeroplanes and airships were indispens-
able. Wireless telegraphy was absolutely necessary, both for mili-
tary and naval services. Search-lights played a most important
role, especially for the Turks, in guarding the passage of the
Dardanelles. Torpedoes proved to be efficient in the only case
where there was opportunity to use that weapon, viz., in the bom-
bardment at Beirut, when a torpedo sank the Turkish armored
coast defence ship AwnJlldh.

ld« THE ITAUAN-TUBKISH WAR

The co-operation of the Italian army and navy was harmoni-
008 and much more so than in previous wars where this lack of
co-operation caused disaster, especially when the French at-
tempted to invade Ireland in the wars during the period of the
Directory. The urgent necessity of a National Council of De-
fence for the United States army and navy to secure this har-
monious co-operation of the two services is emphasized by the
creditable experience of the Italian army and navy.

The Italian navy suffered no losses during the war because
the Turks were not trained in target practice. The accounts of
all the battles show that the Turkish great gun fire had no effect.
The Turks did not score a hit in any engagement. The AwnJUah
was hit so frequently in 20 minutes that the Turkish commander
was obliged to haul down his flag and abandon the ship while
not a single shot hit either of the two Italian ships.

The brilliant reconnoissance of the Straits of the Dardanelles
by Captain Millo and his flotilla of five torpedo boats, in which
they were under fire of over one hundred guns at close range for
a period of about two hours without sustaining any serious dam-
age, is proof of the lack of training in the Turkish coast de-
fences.

Modem weapons are instruments of precision and it is abso-
lutely necessary to have skilled gunners to operate these scien-
tific instruments of precision. It costs over one thousand dollars
to fire one projectile from the large modem guns of 12-inch cali-
ber, and it is a criminal extravagance and suicidal to waste a
single shot from these guns. The training necessary to fire these
guns with perfect accuracy is absolutely necessary and this is
expensive ; but in the British navy they know this and the Brit-
ish Admiralty authorizes practically unlimited money for tar-
get practice. In no calling in life do men allow unskilled labor
to handle tools of precision. Modern weapons are as intricate
as any elaborate clock work and it is necessary in time of peace
to prepare qualified gun pointers if the gun is to be of any use.

Germany is a Nation in arms in recognition of the necessity
of being prepared for war. The other great European powers,
England, France, Spain, Turkey, Russia and Italy, and also the
United States, China and Japan, have been at war during the
past 40 years, but Germany has had no war because she is so
strong in her armaments and preparedness for war that no na-

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 107

tion will dare to go to war with her. It is therefore absolutely
necessary in time of peace to prepare for war, if peace is to be
maintained.

The most conspicuous lesson of the war is the well-known nec-
essity of having command of the sea. Italy had long coveted the
northern coast of Africa and hesitated long to attempt to take it
until Italy knew that she could depend upon the eflSciency of her
navy to give her absolute command of the Mediterranean against
the Turks, from whom they intended to take the African pro-
vinces, regardless of the wishes of the Arabian inhabitants.

This command of sea enabled the Italians to transport invad-
ing armies to Tripoli and Cyrenaica and proceed to take islands
in the Aegean Sea without any opposition by the Turkish navy.

The Italian Nation had diligently trained her navy for this
degree of efficiency, and the result justified the expense.

The Turks had conquered the territory in Europe and their
African provinces by the sword, but they neglected to keep the
sword bright and sharp for modern times. They did not in
peace prepare for war by sea, and when the Italians felt strong
enough to take these coveted African provinces they proceeded
to do so.

The lesson is that of the history of all nations in all the world
in all ages. This experience is merely another illustration of the
infallible teaching of our Saviour, viz. :

**When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are
in peace.

But when a stronger than he shall come upon him, and over-
come him, he taketh from him all his armor wherein he tmsteth
and divideth his spoils.'' — St. Luke XI, verses 21 and 22.

Eternal Vigilance is the price of Liberty.

rt^MBHMMM^MMHMM^

APPENDIX.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON. D. C.

December 7, 1912.
Comnodore H. H. Beehler,

Aoton^ Annapolis 9

Maryland,

Sir:

In compliance with your request under the
date of November 25th » I take pleasure in send-
ing you herewith a translation of the Treaty
of Peace between Italy and Turkey signed at
Lausanne 9 on October 18th last^ and a transla-
tion of the Imperial Firman of the Sublime
Porte published on October 17th granting auton-
omy to the former Turkish Provinces of Tripoli
and Cyrenaica ; and a translation of the Proc-
lamation of Peace of General Ragni, Commander
of the Corps of Occupation of Tripolitania,
communicating the Decree of the King of Italy
under date of October 17th,

I am^ sir^

Your obedient servant »

Enclosures:

Treaty of Peace , Oct. 18;

Firman, Oct. 17;

Proclamation of Peace, Oct. 17.

766.67/412

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAS. Ill

TREATY OF PEACE

bbtwbbh

ITALY AND TURKEY

SiQNED AT Lausanne, Switzerland, Ootobeb 18, 1912.

His Majesty the King of Italy, and

His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans

being equally desirous of putting an end to the state of war ex-
isting between the two countries, have appointed as their pleni-
potentiaries :

His Majesty the King of Italy :

Mr. Pietro Bertolini
Great Cross of the Order of the Saints
Maurizio and Lazzaro, Deputy to the Parliament

Mr. Guido Fusinato
Great Cross of the Order of the Crown of Italy
Grand Official of the Order of the
Saints Maurizio and Lazzaro
Deputy to the Parliament
Member of the Council of State

Mr. Giuseppe Volpi

Commendatore of the Orders of the
Saints Maurizio and Lazzaro and of the
Crown of Italy.

His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans :

His Excellency Mehemmed Naby Bey
Great Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Osmanie
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans

His Excellency Roumbeyoglou Fahreddin Bey
Grand Official of the Imperial Order of the Medjidie
Commander of the Order of the Osmanie
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans

112 THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR.

Who, after having exchanged their respective Full Powers,
and having found them in good and due form, have agreed upon
the following articles:

Article I. — The two governments undertake, immediately
after the signature of the present Treaty, to take the necessary
steps for the immediate and simultaneous cessation of hostilities.
Special Commissioners will be sent to the scenes of hostilities to
ensure the execution of the above-mentioned steps.

Article II. — The two governments undertake, immediately
after the signature of the present Treaty, to send orders recall-
ing their officers and troops, and also their civil functionaries,
respectively, the Ottoman Government from Tripoli and Cyre-
naica, and the Italian Qovemment from the islands occupied in
the Aegean Sea. The effective evacuation of the above-mentioned
islands by the Italian officers, troops, and civil functionaries wiU
take place immediately after the evacuation of Tripoli and Gyre-
naica by the Ottoman officers, troops, and civil functionaries.

Article III. — Prisoners of war and hostages wiU be ex-
changed with as little delay as possible.

Article IV. — The two governments undertake to grant full
and complete amnesty, the Boyal Government to the inhabitants
of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and the Imperial Government to the
inhabitants of the islands in the Aegean Sea, subject to Ottoman
sovereignty, who may have taken part in the hostilities or may
have compromised themselves in that connection, without com-
mitting crimes against the civil law. In consequence, no indi-
vidual of any class or condition shall be proceeded against or
troubled in his person or property, or in the exercise of his rights
on account of political or military acts, even of opinions ex-
pressed during the hostilities. Persons detained or deported for
such cause shall at once be set free.

Article V. — All treaties, conventions, and undertakings of all
kinds, sorts, or nature concluded or in force between the two
high contracting parties previously to the declaration of war
shall at once come into force again, and the two governments
shall be placed in regard to each other, as shall their respective
subjects, in the identical position in which they were before the
outbreak of hostilities.

THE ITAUAN-TUBKISH WAB. IIS

Abticle VI. — Italy undertakes to conclude with Turkey, at
the same time as she renews her commercial treaties with other
Powers, a commercial treaty based on European public law —
that is to say, she consents to leave Turkey all her economic in-
dependence, and the right to act in commercial matters and mat-
ters of Customs in the same way as all European Powers with-
out being bound by the Capitulations and other Acts now in
force. It is clearly understood that the said Commercial Treaty
shall not come into force except in so far as commercial treaties
concluded by the Porte with other Powers on a similar basis
shall be in force. Further, Italy consents to the increase from
11 per cent to 15 per cent of the ad valorem Customs duty in
Turkey, as well as to the creation of new monopolies, of the levy-
ing of consumption surtaxes on the five following articles : Pe-
troleum, cigarette paper, matches, alcohol, and playing cards.
All this is on condition that the same treatment be applied sim-
ultaneously and without distinction to the imports from other
countries. In so far as there is a question of the importation of
articles which are the object of monopolies, the Administration
of such monopolies is bound to procure goods of Italian origin,
according to a percentage based on the annual importation of
these goods, provided that the price offered for the supply of
such monopoly goods shall be in conformity with the state of the
market at the moment of purchase, taking into consideration the
qualities of the goods to be supplied and the average price rul-
ing during the three years preceding that in which war was de-
clared for similar qualities. It is further understood that, should
Turkey, instead of establishing new monopolies on the five ar-
ticles mentioned above, decide to levy consumption surtaxes on
them, such surtaxes shall be imposed in the same degree on the
similar products of Turkey and all other nations.

Article VII. — The Italian Government undertakes to sup-
press the Italian postoffices operating in the Ottoman Empire at
the same time as the other States having postoffices in Turkey
shall suppress theirs.

Article VIII. — ^As the Porte proposes to open negotiations,
at a European conference or otherwise, with the Great Powers
interested for the cessation of the capitulary rigime in Turkey,
and the substitution for it of the rigime of international law,
Italy, recognizing the good grounds for these intentions of the

114 THE ITALIAN-TUBKISH WAR.

Porte, declares its willingness henceforth to give the Porte its
full and sincere support to this end.

Article IX. — The Ottoman Government, being desirous of
testifying its satisfaction with the good and loyal services ren-
dered to it by Italian subjects employed in different branches
of the Administration, whom it was forced to dismiss on the out-
break of hostilities, declares its readiness to reinstate them in
the situations which they gave up. Half pay will be given to
them for the months that they were unemployed, and this inter-
ruption in their service will in no way prejudice employees hav-
ing the right to a retiring pension. Further, the Ottoman Gov-
ernment undertakes to use its good offices with the institutions
with which it has relations (the Public Debt, Railway Compan-
ies, Banks, &c.) to obtain the same treatment for Italian sub-
jects who were in their service and found themselves in a similar
position.

Article X. — The Italian Government undertakes to pay an-
nually to the Caisse of the Public Debt, on account of the Im-
perial Government, a sum corresponding to the average of the
sums which, in each of the three years preceding that of the
declaration of war, had been assigned to the service of the Pub-
lic Debt out of the receipts of the two provinces. The amount
of the said annuity shall be determined in agreement by two
Commissioners appointed, one by the Royal Government and
the other by the Imperial Government. In case of disagreement
the decision shall be referred to an arbitral court composed of
the said Commissioners and an arbitrator appointed by agree-
ment between the two parties. Should no agreement be reached
on this point, each party shall designate a different Power, and
the choice of arbitrator shall be made jointly by the Powers thus
selected. The Royal Government and the Administration of the
Ottoman Public Debt, by the intermediary of the Imperial Gov-
ernment, shall have the right to demand the institution for the
above-mentioned annuity of a corresponding sum capitalized at
the rate of 4 per cent.

As regards the foregoing paragraph, the Royal Government
declares that it recognizes at once that the annuity cannot be
less than the sum of 2,000,000 Italian lire, and is ready to pay
to the Administration of the Public Debt the corresponding cap-
italized sum directly a demand is made for it.

Article XI. — ^The present treaty shall enter into force on the
day of its signature.

THE irAUAN-TTBXISH WAB. Ill

TRANSLATION-

nCPBBIAL P1BMAN GRANTING AUTONOMY TO TRIPOU AND CTSBNAICA.

Since my Government desures, cm the one hand, effectively to
aid you in the defence of your country, which you need, and
Bees the impossibility of doing so, and since, on the other hand,
the Government thinks of your present and future happiness
and dedres to put an end to a war as ruinous to yourselves and
your families as it is disastrous for the State,

In the hope of restoring peace and happiness in your country
and reljring upon Our sovereign rights. I grant you complete
autonomy.

Tour country shall be governed by new laws and special regu-
lations, and, in order that they may conform to your customs
and practices, you must enlighten your compatriots with your
counsel and act as their guides.

Shemseddine Bey, a high dignitary of the Empire, formerly
Imx>erial Minister of Pious Foundations, decorated with the Or>
ders of the Medjidi^ and of the Osmani^, has been invested by
Us with the title of Naib-es-Sultan (Viceroy) near you. We
entrust to him the protection of Ottoman interests in your
country.

The full powers which I delegate to him are for a period of
five years; at the end of that time his mission may be renewed
by Us or We shall designate his successor.

Our Imperial desire being the application of the provisions of
the Sheri law and in order to assure the realization of this ob-
ject, the necessary Cadi (Principal Judge) shall be designated
and named by Us.

The aforesaid Cadi shall proceed to the nomination of Naibs
(Judges Substitute), chose among the native Ulemas in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Sheri.

The emoluments of the Cadi shall be paid by Us, those of the
Naib-es-Sultan and all the other functionaries of the Sheri shall
be paid from the revenues of the country.

116 THE ITALIAN-TUBKISH WAR

PROCUkMATION OF PEACE

TRANSLATION

PROCLAMATION

We, General Ottavio Bagni, Grand Officer of State, Com-
mander of the Corps of Occupation of Tripolitania, commnni-
eate what follows:

Peace has been concluded between Italy and Turkey.

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan signed yesterday, October
17th, 1912, the Firman thereof and the same day His Majesty
Victor Emanuel III, King of Italy by grace of God and the will
of the Nation, signed the following decree :

Considering the law of the 25th of February, 1912, NR 83, by
which Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were put under the absolute
and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy, in order to
hasten the pacification of the aforesaid provinces ; having heard
the Council of Ministers, upon the proi>osal of the President of
the Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, we have de-
creed and do decree:

Art 1. Full and entire amnesty is granted to all the inhabi-
tants of Tripcditania and Cyrenaica, who have taken part in the
hostilities and became compromised thereby, except in cases of
ordinary crimes; in consequence no individual to whatever class
or condition belonging, shall be tried and molested in person, or
in goods or in the exercise of their rights because of any political
and military acts committed or opinions expressed during hos-
tilities. Persons detained and deported for such motive are to
be put at liberty immediately.

Art 2. The inhabitants of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica will
eontinue to enjoy the most complete liberty in the Mohammedan
religion, as in the past ; the name of His Imperial Majesty, the
Sultan, as Calif shall continue to be pronounced in the public
prayers of the mussulmen ; and his personal representative, nom-
inated by him, shall be recognired. His emoluments shall be
taken from the local public funds, the rights of the pious f oun-
dations (Wakufia) shall be respected as in the past and no impe-

THE ITALIAN-TURKISH WAR 117

diment shall be put between the muaBulmen and their chief re-
ligions leader called the Cadi, who shall be appointed by the
Seeich Ul Islam and their Naibis appointed by him and their
emoluments shall be taken from the local income.

Art. 3. The aforesaid representative is also recogniied as
Cfuardian of all the interests of the Ottoman State and Ottoman
subjects, such as remained in the two provinces after the law
of the 25th of February, 1912.

Art 4. By another decree there will be nominated a com-
mission, a part of whom shall be Notables of Tripoli, to propose
for the two provinces such civil and administrative orders as are
inspired by liberal ideals and in keeping with the local uses and
customs. We order that the present decree, stamped with the
Seal of State be placed with the official collection of decrees and
laws of the Kingdom of Italy, ordering everyone therein con
cemed to observe it and have it observed.

Given at San Bossore, the 17th of October, 1912.

Signed: VITTORIO EMANUBLE III.

Countersigned: GIOLITTI, DI SANOIULIANO, FINOC-

CHIARO APRILS, FACTA, TBDBSCO,
SPINGABDI, LBONADI CATTOLICA,
CBEDABO SACCHI, NITTI.

MPiW««W

118 THE ITALIAN-TUBKISH WAB.

Chiefs, Notables and all Pbck'les of Tbipolitania.

Hear : Ererytbing fixed by the will of Gkxi^ Lord of the Uni-
Terse, is fulfilled on the appointed day.

Peace is concluded.

Now that the two Sovereigns, by complete accord, have deter-
mined that hostilities should cease between the armies, it would
be useless and criminal to keep the country in a state of anarchy
4uid affliction.

Let every one re-enter his own land and return to his accus-
tomary work under the just rule of the Benign Government of
His Majesty, the King of Italy.

All must co-operate according to their capacity and power
with the Qovemment authorities to repair the ravages of war
and to promote the progress and prosperity of the country un-
der the protection of careful justice, dedicating every activity
to wotkf trade and fruitful cultivations.

Given in Tripoli, the 18th of October, 1912.

IL TBNENTB GENERALE,

Commander of the Corps of Oc-
cupation of TripoUtania.

O. Raoni.

JONS. i9ig

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Full text of "The History of the Italian-Turkish War, September 29, 1911, to October 18, 1912"

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