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UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LIBRARIES

COLLEGE LIBRARY

A HISTORY OF

• Ancient — '

PHILOSOPHY

FREDERICK MAYER

UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS
REDLANDS, CALIFORNIA

American Book Company

NEW YORK CINCINNATI CHICAGO BOSTON ATLANTA DALLAS SAN FRANCISCO

All rights reserved. No part of this book protected by the above copyright
may be reproduced without written permission of the publisher.

Mayer: A History of AncieJit and Medieval Philosophy
Manufactured in the United States of America E.P. i

TO MY FATHER

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2011 with funding from

LYRASIS IVIembers and Sloan Foundation

http://www.archive.org/details/historyofancientOOmaye

PREFACE

.his history is designed to present a dynamic approach to the
study of ancient and medieval philosophy. It correlates ancient,
medieval, and modern ideas and shows the perennial significance of
the contributions of ancient thinkers.

To some extent this work is a re-evaluation of ancient philosophy.
Thus, more space than is usual is devoted to the Skeptics and Philo,
who have been very much underrated by earlier historians of phi-
losophy. Philosophy, like many other fields, is often dominated by
convention and tradition. Hence many historians have followed
blindly in the footsteps of Gomperz, Zeller, Burnet, and Robin, who
all had a tendency to underestimate the contributions of post-
Aristotelian philosophy.

Throughout this work an attempt is made to indicate the relation-
ship between ideas and the social environment out of which they
arose, for it is a mistake to believe that ideas develop in a vacuum
or in a process of spontaneous inspiration. Frequently the student is
completely bewildered by the complexity of medieval thinkers and
is unable to appreciate their contributions. But with an understand-
ing of the atmosphere and the environment in which medieval
thought was formulated, especially in religion and in education, he
may obtain a more adequate appreciation of the philosophy of
the Middle Ages. Therefore, particularly in the case of medieval

viu PREFACE

philosophy, the cultural factors which produced Scholasticism are
discussed at length.

Thanks and appreciation are extended to the many persons who
helped in the preparation of this volume: to Miss Marjorie Reitz, Mr.
Irvin Edell, Mr. Robert Tandy, and Miss Nancy Beaver for their
clerical assistance; and, especially, to Dr. Henry Dittmar, Dr. Rich-
ard Eckels, Dr. Alvin Haag, Dr. Lawrence Nelson, and Dr. Ralph
Tyler Flewelling for their kind advice and encouragement.

Frederick Mayer

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Grateful acknowledgment is made to the following publishers and
individuals for permission to reprint material which is in copyright
or of which they are the authorized publishers:

Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.: for excerpts from Selections fro?n early
Greek philosophy, by M. C. Nahm, copyright 1934.

Chatto and Windus: for a quotation from Prologue to the Caiiterbury
tales, by W. W. Skeat, copyright 1933.

The Clarendon Press, Oxford: for excerpts from the following transla-
tions of Aristotle's works: Categories, by E. M. Edghill; De ani?na, by
J. A. Smith; De caelo, by J. L. Stocks; De poetica, by I. Bywater; Meta-
physics, by W. D. Ross; Nichoviachean ethics, by W. D. Ross; Rhetoric,
by W. R. Roberts.

J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.: for citations from Greek religious thought jrovi
Homer to the age of Alexander, by F. M. Cornford, copyright 1923; and
from Later Greek religion, by E. R. Bevan, copyright 1927.

E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.: for quotations from The city of God, by St.
Augustine, translated by John Healey.

Rev. Robert Hammond: for excerpts from The philosophy of Alfarabi.

X ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

f Harper & Brothers: for citations from Mystics of the church, by Evelyn

Underhill; and from Meister Eckhart, a modern translation, by Raymond
Blakney.

Harvard University Press: for citations from Cicero's De natura deorum,

translated by H. Rackham; Philo, translated by F. H. Colson; Sextus
I Empiricus, vol. i, translated by R. G. Bury; Polybius, vol. in, translated by

SI W, R. Paton; and Boethius, translated by H. F. Stewart. All the foregoing

are from the Loeb Classical Library, reprinted by permission of Harvard

University Press.

D. C. Heath and Company: for excerpts from Historical selections, by
Hutton Webster, reprinted by special permission of D. C. Heath and
Company, Boston, Mass.

The International Council of Religious Education: for extracts from the
Bible.

The Jeu'ish Publication Society of America: for "The royal crown"
from Selected religious poeiiis of Soloinon Ibn Gabirol.

Liveright Publishing Corp.: for selections from The dialogues of Plato,
edited by William Chase Greene, published by Liveright Publishing
Corp., New York. Copyright 1927, Boni and Liveright, Inc.

The Macmillan Company: for a quotation from Lucretius, Western
world literature, edited by H. W. Robbins and W. H. Coleman.

The Open Court Publishing Co.: for selections from St. Anselvi, by S. N.
Deane, and Ockha?fi, studies a?id selections, by S. C. Tornay.

Oxford University Press: for excerpts from The essence of Plotinus, by
Grace H. Turnbull. Copyright 1934 by Grace H. Turnbull. Used by
permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.

Random House, Inc.: for quotations from Basic ivritings of St. Thomas
Aquinas, by Anton C. Pegis.

Charles Scribner's Sons: for excerpts from Selectio7is from medieval
philosophers, by R. McKeon, copyright 1929.

Shapiro, Vallentine & Co.: for a quotation from Teachings of Maiinon-
ides, by R. Cohen.

The University of Chicago Press: for selections from The philosophers
speak for themselves, by T. V. Smith; and The coniplete Bible, by
J. M. P. Smith and E. J. Goodspeed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

Acknowledgments

The Greek Spirit

Tlie Beginning of Greek Philosophy

The Philosophy of the Pythagoreans

Heraclitus

The Beginning of Metaphysics

The Philosophy of Pluralism

Atomists and Eclectics

The Sophists

Socrates

lO.

Plato's Search for Reality

100

1 1.

Plato's Social Philosophy

123

12.

Aristotle's Scientific and Metaphysical Theories

137

13-

The Social Philosophy of Aristotle

168

14.

The Beginning of Hellenistic Philosophy

192

15-

The Challenge of Epicureanism

202

16.

The Meaning of Stoicism

224

17.

The Roman Spirit of Philosophy

24s

18.

Contributions of Skepticism

261

19.

Philo's Philosophy

286

20.

The Decline of Rome and the Eclectic Philosophers

309

21.

Neo-Platonism

320

xii CONTENTS

22. Foundations of Medieval Unity 336

23. The Age of Augustine 347

24. The Rebirth of Philosophy 372

25. Arabic and Jewish Philosophy 389

26. Abelard and Bernard 404

27. The Mystics 419

28. The Progress of Scholasticism 437

29. Thomas Aquinas 451

30. Opponents of Aquinas 472

31. Roger Bacon 482

32. Meister Eckhart 497

33. Ockham and the Decline of Scholasticism 507

34. Twilight of Medieval Thought 516
Bibliography 525
Index 535

A HISTORY OF
ANCIENT

MEDIE VAL

PHILOSOPHY

THE GREEK SPIRIT

THE FOUNDATIONS

o understand the development of ancient philosophy, it is neces-
sary to comprehend the Greek view of life with its intellectual
and secular emphasis. Compared with the medieval view of reality,
Greek civilization lacked a supernatural bias and, instead, concen-
trated upon the facts of this world. Most apparent is the intellectual
tolerance which prevailed in Greece. There was no sacred dogma,
no absolute standard of belief or of religion. The priesthood as yet
had not achieved an all-powerful status.

At the same time there were limitations to this tolerant attitude.
The fate of Socrates, the persecution of Anaxagoras, the varied
fortunes of Euripides, the experiences of Aristotle— all these in-
stances illustrate that tolerance was limited, especially in times of
social chaos and external danger. Still, Greek thinkers were aided in
their researches by a general absence of dogmatism and fanaticism.

It is difficult for us to understand the Greek spirit, because in our
civilization the machine is triumphant and has been developed to a
point where it threatens to turn into Frankenstein's monster. In

2 THE GREEK SPIRIT

Greece, on the other hand, the use of machinery was limited. The
ideal of life was a sufficient amount of leisure for man to cultivate
his independence from mechanical tools. To some extent, the Greek
view was rather parasitical. It abhorred utilitarian concepts, and
hence many Greek philosophers were content to speculate about
the nature of the universe without applying their theories to the
concrete facts pf existence and without the use of scientific experi-
mentation.

Perhaps no period in civilization has ever been so rich in specula-
tive boldness and penetrating cosmic insight as the great period of
Greek philosophy. It appears that the Greeks were naturally curious
and inquisitive about the nature of life and the structure of the uni-
verse; consequently philosophers like Democritus, Aristotle, and
Plato observed all aspects of existence and were occupied with
problems which not merely dealt with ethical ideals but also gave a
synthesis of human knowledge.

To appreciate the greatness of the Greek spirit we must compare
it with the Oriental view of life. In the Orient, especially in India,
a rigorous caste system prevailed, whereby the individual was sub-
ordinated to the social group. There was a lack of fluidity. Intel-
lectually, Indian thought as compared with Greek philosophy was
static. The regression of the social system in India naturally brought
about a stress upon mysticism and developed a spirit of escapism.
In Greece, on the other hand, the naturalistic attitude prevailed,
symbolized by a democratic social system and a better adjustment
of the individual to society.

THE GREEK VIEW OF RELIGION

What distinguished Greek civilization, both from its Oriental en-
vironment and from our modern concepts, was its frank polytheis?n.
Almost in every way the Greek gods were different from the God
of the Old Testament. Jehovah appeared as a fierce god of right-
eousness, who demanded absolute obedience and, jealous of his pre-
rogatives, punished his people whenever they rebelled against him
and paid homage to other deities. The Greek gods, on the other
hand, were almost delightfully immoral. They committed acts of
perjury, fought ferocious wars, and frequently showed interest in
adultery. They represented the humanistic spirit of Greek civiliza-
tion.

It must be understood that the Greek gods were exceedingly
corporeal. To be sure, a few philosophers, such as Aristotle, spoke

THE GREEK VIEW OF RELIGION 3

about a spiritual deity, but this was not a general viewpoint. To the
average Greek the gods appeared as magnified human beings who
understood human wishes and human desires and were in active
relationship with man. Religion in Greece had, above all, a social
function. Various city-states had their special patrons; for instance,
Athena watched over the fortunes of Athens. The religious festivals
were occasions of public celebration, and religion influenced al-
most all aspects of Greek life, especially art, warfare, and politics.

There is danger of idealizing Greek religion and overemphasizing
its positive aspects. The Greeks, like other early peoples, were given
to divination, and their practitioners of magic had a wide and
appreciative audience. We need only read the plays of Aristophanes,
especially The birds, to obtain a vivid glimpse of the importance of
divination in Athenian life. The Oracle at Delphi was frequently
consulted and regarded with awe as the source of absolute truth.
A4ilitary expeditions were influenced by astrology, and many phi-
losophers were accused of impiety because they protested against
the growth of superstition.

Thus in Greece, as in other civilizations, a chasm developed be-
tween the religion of the average man and that of the educated
thinker. The average man had a rather naive concept of the uni-
verse and, governed by fear, believed in miraculous events and
was subject to a multitude of prejudices. The philosopher, how-
ever, had a more sophisticated outlook. While he might not directly
attack the public deities, he frequently tried to explain them in an
allegorical manner and occasionally achieved an attitude of com-
plete skepticism. This view was especially dominant in the 5th
century b.c, during the height of Athenian civilization.

In Greece there was much less inwardness and subjectivity in
religious hfe than there is in modern civilization. The relationship
between man and the gods was rather mechanical. If the gods re-
ceived their due and were respected, man could achieve prosperity.
Frequently there was little connection between theology and moral
action. Certain rites had to be performed, and certain rituals had to
be obeyed, but what happened in the heart of the worshiper was a
secondary matter.

Many commentators have pointed to the lack of a sense of moral
alienation in Greek life. Thus, in many ways the Greeks were hap-
pier than we are. They knew nothing of "original sin." They were
not tortured by complexes, nor did they look upon the pleasures
of the flesh from an ascetic viewpoint. This attitude produced a

4 THE GREEK SPIRIT

feeling of well-being. Life was to be enjoyed to the utmost, for it
was not regarded as a pilgrimage amidst a valley of tears and tor-
ture. Still, voices of pessimism emerged; for example, Theognis re-
marked, "It is best never to be born and never to see the rise of the
burning sun." Like Job, he was tormented by the problem of evil,
by the fact that the wicked triumph and the virtuous are defeated:

"Dear Zeus, I wonder at you. For you are king of all; honor and
great power are in your hand; you know well the mind and temper
of every man, and your lordship is supreme over all, O king.

"How is it then, son of Cronos, that your spirit can endure to
keep the sinner and the righteous man in the same state, whether
the heart be turned to soberness of life or to the insolence of men
that are tempted to unrighteous works?

"Heaven has drawn no clear line for men, not even which way
a man must go to please the Immortals.

"Bad men none the less enjoy prosperity, and they who refrain
their spirit from foul deeds are overtaken, in their love of righteous-
ness, by poverty that breeds helplessness and turns aside man's
heart to sin, blinding his wits with overmastering necessity."^

Sophocles expressed the same spirit: "Never to be born is, past
all reckoning, best; next best, by far, when a man has come into
the world, that, as soon as may be, he should return thither whence
he came. For when the days of his youth are gone, and the foolish
dehghts thereof are fled away, the stroke of affliction smites him
and spares not; he is weary and has no rest from envy and strife,
friction and warfare, and the shedding of blood."-

Again, he wondered why the impious are rewarded: "Strange,
that impious men, sprung from wicked parents, should prosper, while
good men of generous breed should be unfortunate! It is not right
that heaven should deal so with men. The gods should manifestly
reward the pious, and the unrighteous should suffer some manifest
punishment for their wickedness. Then the wicked man would not
flourish."^

Sophocles hoped that ultimately virtue would triumph. Never-
theless, the questions he asked regarding the problem of evil in-
dicate the tormenting doubts which dominated Greek life. It is a
mistake to picture the Greeks as being extremely poised and well-
balanced. This is a one-sided view which neglects the pitfalls and

^Theognis, Elegies, }j}.

2 Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 1225.

3 Sophocles, Aletes, frag. 107.

THE GREEK VIEW OF RELIGION 5

inadequacies of the Greek social system and the superstitions of
Greek religion. Life in Greece, as in other civilizations, was subject
to reverses, and there was great instability both in the fate of the
individual and in the social system. It is not surprising that pessimism
attracted so many outstanding minds.

Moreover, this feeling for the tragic sense of life was part of the
Greek doctrine of fatalism:' Fate dominates all, the gods and man
ahke. Not even Zeus can defy the dictates of fate. Man is in-
variably punished when he oversteps his limits. The same happens
to the gods, for they, too, have definite functions and if they in-
fringe upon the privileges of their divine colleagues, retribution and
disaster result.

This concept of fatalism did not make for a static view of life,
for it established a cosmic order in which everyone had a defi?iite
function ^nd a.- definite purpose. And we shall find that philosophers
Hke Plato and Aristotle stressed the importance of an orderly uni-
verse, an orderly state, a systematic ethical idea. They abhorred
chaos and disorder.

Metaphysically, it was taught that the Greek gods did not create
the universe out of nothing; rather, the gods were limited by the
material environment. Mythology pictured a chaos w^hich antedated
even the existence of the gods. This theory explains why Greek
thinkers frequently believed in the eternity of matter.

The Greek view of life was cyclical. Thus, there was no definite
behef in progress. The Golden Age was thought to be part of the
past, not somewhere in the future. For example, Hesiod described
five ages of history. The first he called the Golden Age, in which
men lived Hke the gods, free from toil, pain, and trouble. It was a
period of peace and plenty in which men knew no strife, nor were
they envious of their neighbors. They were not afraid of death, for,
as Hesiod explained, it was regarded as a natural phenomenon and
appeared like a gentle sleep. This race of men was rewarded for
its goodness; hence, they became godlike spirits.

The next age was the Age of Silver. In this age the race of men
was not so sublime as the first race: "But when at last [these men]
came to the full measure of manhood, they lived but for a little
while, and suffered by their folly; for they could not keep their
hands from violent outrage one upon another, nor would they do
service to the Immortals or make sacrifice upon the holy altars of
the blessed gods after the lawful manner of men in every land. Then
Zeus in his anger put them away, because they paid not due honors

6 THE GREEK SPIRIT

to the blessed gods who dwell in Olympus. Now, after that this
race also was hidden in the earth, they are called by men Blessed
ones of the underworld, second in rank; yet they too are attended
with honor. "^

The third age was the Bronze Age, during which men delighted
in warfare: ". . . they were strong and terrible, and dehghted in
deeds of dolorous war and in insolence. They ate no bread, but
their heart was stout and adamant, unapproachable; their strength
was great, and invincible the arms that grew out of the shoulders
upon their thick-set frames. Their weapons and their dweUings
were of bronze, and with bronze they wrought; dark iron was not
yet. These, slain by their own hands, went to the cold dark house
of Hades, nameless. Terrible though they were, black death took
them, and they left the bright light of the sun."^

Then came the fourth race, the race of Heroes: "Now after that
this race also was hidden in the earth, Zeus made yet a fourth race
upon the bountiful earth, a divine race, better and more righteous,
of Hero men, that are called demigods, the race that was aforetime
upon the boundless earth. They were destroyed by evil war and
dread battle."^

The last age, to which Hesiod himself belonged, was the Age
of Iron, subject to turmoil and evil: "For now indeed is the race of
Iron. They shall rest not by day from labor and trouble, nor from
the spoiler in the night season; and the gods shall give them
grievous cares. The father shall not be like to his children, nor
the children to their father; the guest shall not be true to the host
that shelters him, nor friend to friend, nor brother true to brother
as in the old days; parents shall grow quickly old and be despised,
and shall reproach their children with bitter words. Wretches that
know not the visitation of heaven! Such as these would not repay
their old parents for their nurture. He that keeps his oath or is just
or good shall not find favor; but they shall honor rather the doer
of wrong and violence. . . ."'

What is significant in this view of history is Hesiod's beUef in the
fall of man. It was his wish that he had been born at another time,
and constantly he asked. Why do I have to live amidst such dis-

4 Hesiod, Works and days, 109, translated by Cornford, ed., Greek religions
thought jrom Homer to the age of Alexander, p. 25.
^ Ibid., pp. 25-26.
6 Ibid., p. 26.
'^ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

THE GREEK VIEW OF IMMORTALITY 7

tressing circumstances? Thus he looked forward to another age in
which, the cycle having been completed, real goodness and peace
and plenty would again prevail.

Homer and Hesiod represent two divergent attitudes regarding
the Goods of hfe. Homer affirmed and rejoiced in human existence.
With picturesque detail he portrayed the feasts and exploits of an
aristocratic society. Hesiod, on the other hand, wrote about the
common people. In him a strain of puritanism prevailed; aristocracy
to Hesiod implied dissipation and oppression. Thus, he looked back
to the Golden Age, in which real purit}-' of morals and a just social
system had been the rule.

THE GREEK VIEW OF IMMORTALITY

In Greek civilization the accepted view of the afterlife was rather
hazy and indistinct. The souls of the deceased were pictured in
Hades, where they lived a vague and shadowy existence. As a
typical example, we can cite Odysseus' visit to the underworld,
where he finds his mother:

"And I mused upon her words and desired to embrace the shade
of my dead mother. Thrice I started forward to embrace her as my
heart bade me, and thrice she escaped from my arms like a shadow
or a dream, and the grief grew ever sharper in my heart. And I
cried aloud, speaking to her winged words:

" 'O my mother, why dost thou not stay for me who long to
embrace thee, that even in the place of Death we may put loving
arms about each other and find cold comfort in weeping? Is this
indeed but a phantom that Queen Persephone has sent me, that I
may grieve and lament yet the more?'

"And straightway my lady mother answered:

" 'O me, my child, ill-fated beyond all other men, Persephone,
daughter of Zeus, doth not deceive thee, but this is the way with
mortals when they die: the sinews no more hold together the flesh
and bones, but they are overmastered by the force of the strong
burning fire, as soon as the life has left the white bones, and the
shade hovers hke a dream and flits away.' "^

He also meets Achilles, who says: "Seek not to console me for
death, glorious Odysseus. I would rather be on earth as the hired
servant of another, in the house of a landless man with little to live
upon, than be king over all the dead."^

^ Homer, Odyssey, xi. 11, 204, 475 (ibid., pp. 17-18).
^Ibid., p. 18.

8 THE GREEK SPIRIT

But there was another view of immortality which became in-
creasingly popular. It was taught by the Mystery religions, of
which there were two main types in Greece: the Eleusinian and the
Orphic Mysteries. The Eleusinian Mysteries, which arose in the
7th century B.C., promised immortality to all their members and
were characterized by elaborate initiation ceremonies, secret oaths,
and a general attitude of mysticism. They centered around the
story of Persephone, daughter of Demeter and Zeus, who was taken
away by the god of the underworld to be his wife. Naturally the
mother could not reconcile herself to the loss of her daughter.
Everywhere she looked for her, and finally she discovered Perseph-
one's fate. Demeter was so greatly outraged that she revenged her-
self by punishing mankind. She saw to it that famine descended
upon the earth. In the meantime, Zeus began to fear that human
beings would not worship him if they lost all their worldly goods.
Thus the episode ended in a compromise, with Persephone spending
half the time with the god of the underworld and half the time with
her mother. When she is with the latter, spring and light flourish on
the earth; when she is in the underworld, darkness and winter
prevail.

We may wonder how this story was connected with the concept
of immortality. The answer is that Demeter, it was thought, had
revealed the mysteries of hfe to the Eleusinians. Because of her
message man is not to be afraid of death but to look forward to a
new and blessed life.

Another question emerges. Did these Mysteries demand high
moral ideals? Did they require a change of heart? The answer again
is quite definite: The moral attitude was secondary; what mattered
most was active participation in this religion and the acceptance of
its theological requirements. In short, it was verbal allegiance rather
than moral reformation which was demanded by the Eleusinian
Mysteries.

Quite different from the Eleusinian Mysteries was Orphism,
which was connected with Dionysus, the god of wine and passion.
At first its ritual was extremely savage and probably involved human
sacrifice. There was intoxicating music made effective by kettle-
drums and cymbals. The theology of this cult explained that man is
a dual creature, possessed of both good and evil; he is a descendant
of the Titans who devoured Dionysus, the son of Zeus and Per-
sephone. This act of the Titans was instigated by Hera, who thereby
exhibited her jealousy of Persephone. Yet the heart of Dionysus was

THE GREEK VIEW OF IMMORTALITY 9

saved. Zeus ate it and produced another offspring, being aided this
time by a human mother, Semele. Being rather curious, Semele
wanted to see her divine lover, but she was punished for her im-
pudence and destroyed by Zeus. Her child, however, was kept alive,
and Zeus made him the ruler of the world.

The story explains how Dionysus became central in the cult. The
ritual dedicated to him was anything but restrained, for Orphism
attempted to approach divine perfection; man and God were to
become one. This beHef caused a sense of aUenation on the part of
the worshiper, whose soul was regarded at first as being in a state
of sin. Thus a series of transmigrations was necessary, at the end
of which final bliss and union with the divine power could be
achieved.

To accomplish this goal, Orphism prescribed many ascetic prac-
tices and favored vegetarianism. In this religion we find the body
viewed as a source of evil— a contrast with the prevalent Greek
view, which regarded man's body as the source of goodness and
perfection.

In these A4ystery religions, another side of the Greek character
emerges. In promising definite immortality and in preaching an
emotional awareness of life, the Mysteries had more appeal for the
multitude than had the religion of Homer, which pictured the gods
in humanistic terms. Strangely enough, these Mysteries, especially
Orphism, had important followers in philosophical circles. Traces
of the movement can be found in such outstanding thinkers as
Socrates and Plato. As ancient civilization declined and as it lost its
vigor and confidence, these cults gained more and more followers
and ultimately played a prominent role in technical thinking.

Throughout the history of philosophy, we find a conflict between
the emotionalism of the masses and the rational detachment of the
thinkers. At first it seems scarcely possible that the two attitudes
could meet or that they could be combined. Yet, the more we read
and the more we appreciate the history of philosophy, the better
we understand the close connection between the two attitudes. In
certain periods of decline— such as the Hellenistic Age, the 3rd and
the 4th century a.d., and perhaps the 20th century— the religion of
the masses becomes all-powerful and establishes definite dogmas,
categorical ideals, and absolute rules of conduct. Thus faith becomes
supreme, and irrationality is accepted; the philosopher frequently
becomes a medicine man and a rationalizer for the established insti-
tutions.

lo THE GREEK SPIRIT

THE GREEK VIEW OF MAN

Another prominent trait of Greek civilization was its emphasis
upon the golden mean. As we have noted, this doctrine did not
prevail in the religious Mysteries, but it dominated much of the
artistic endeavor and much of the best ethical thinking in Greece.
It implied a close association between art and morality. The good
life, according to the Greek mind, was one which adhered to the
laws of proportion and harmony and was conscious of the limita-
tions of man's existence.

As early as Homer we find that the external goods of life were
regarded with a touch of Epicureanism. The heroes of Homer en-
joyed their existence; they were not ascetic and were not burdened
by a sense of humility. Most of the Greeks had no understanding of
an ethical attitude which makes man completely submissive and a
creature of nothingness praying to an all-powerful God.

The Greek view of man stressed the importance of honor, and it
can be likened to the Renaissance view of "virtu." It is not moral
perfection which counts but, rather, the development of high-
mindedness. The great man, according to Aristotle, knows his
accomplishments, is conscious of his elevated status in life, and is
not hypocritical by being overly modest about his merits. Some of
us might find him extremely conceited, but it must be remembered
that our tradition is different, for it stems back to the Christian view
of the unworthiness of man, whereas Aristotle believed in the in-
finite potentialities of the human being.

Yet there was another tradition in Greek civilization which was
quite different from the ethical system of Aristotle. It is symbolized
by Plato's concept of life. In Plato, as we shall see, there are the
beginnings of asceticism, almost a trace of the Christian outlook
upon life. Plato believed in absolute righteousness, in responding to
evil by turning the other cheek. It is no wonder that Nietzsche, who
admired a heroic attitude, regarded Plato as a representative of
decadence.

Today we are especially conscious of the Greek athletic ideal,
which united mental and physical prowess. The Olympic Games
were illustrative of this spirit, for the victor received such awards
that he was willing to sacrifice almost anything to reach his goal.
In Greek education, the demands of the body were not neglected.
Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle gave a detailed outHne of
physical training. The purpose of athletics was not only to pro-

THE GREEK VIEW OF MAN ii

duce certain physical traits but to enricti the moral life of the
citizen.

At the same time, as we have seen, the proponents of asceticism
gained ground, especially in the Mystery religions. The Greeks
were conscious of a basic duahsm between the body and the mind. At
first, this duahsm did not affect very greatly the course of civiliza-
tion. Thus, in the yth and 6th centuries b.c. the naturalistic spirit was
still strong; but after the Peloponnesian War, in the Hellenistic Age,
the otherworldly attitude became more pronounced, and ancient
philosophy was more and more concerned with the conflict between
man's soul and his physical desires.

Another important part of the Greek ideal of life was the belief
that man could find himself only in his fulfillment of public func-
tions. This view was especially dominant in Athens, where every
citizen took part in the political life of the community. To live
an isolated existence and to dwell only upon subjective problems
were regarded as unnatural. This distinguished Greek society from
the medieval pattern of life. In Greek society the city-state was
the unifying agency, while in the Middle Ages it was man's per-
sonal quest for salvation as represented by the Church.

Again a note of caution! The political emphasis in Greek civihza-
tion produced an attitude of cynicism. From the time of Plato,
many thinkers regarded the perfection of the state as an impossible
task. Hence it was thought that man must be a refuge unto himself,
since he could not rely upon social institutions. Thus the philosophy
of the Cynics found vigorous exponents during the Hellenistic Age.
It indicated that the interests of man were shifting, for in periods
of dechne the possibilities of political life are limited whereas the
potentiahties of the inner life appear to be immense. In the 20th
century we find many of the best young people completely dis-
gusted with political conditions. As a consequence, this "lost genera-
tion" concentrates upon an introspective pilgrimage and exhibits
an existentialist perspective. It was different during the climax of
Greek civilization, when a more balanced view of life prevailed
and it was thought possible to achieve complete satisfaction in politi-
cal and social affairs.

Finally, it must be remembered that Greek society was mainly
patriarchal. Women, especially in Athens, ocupied an inferior posi-
tion; very seldom did they achieve the intellectual level of men.
Their time was spent at home supervising the slaves and carrying
on a multitude of domestic activities. Thus, we hear little about

12 THE GREEK SPIRIT

romantic love in Greek literature and much more about friendship,
especially between men. Occasionally a few intellectual women
emerged, like Aspasia and Sappho, but they had to pay heavily for
their romantic conquests and their independence.

In later times, women achieved a greater degree of emancipation.
In these periods they were less subject to the dictates of men and
had better facilities for education, but still there was no complete
equality of the sexes. Thus we read in Euripides:

"Surely, of creatures that have life and wit.

We women are of all things wretchedest,

Who, first, must needs, as buys the highest bidder,

Thus buy a husband, and our body's master

So win— for deeper depth of ill is this.

Nay, risk is dire herein,— or shall we gain

An evil lord or good? For change is shame

To woman, nor may she renounce her spouse.

And, coming to new customs, habits new.

Seer need she be, to know the thing unlearnt.

What manner of man her couch's mate shall be.

But if we learn our lesson, if our lord

Dwell with us, plunging not against the yoke,

Happy our lot: if not— no help but death.

For the man, when at home they fret his soul.

Goes forth, and stays his loathing heart's disgust.

Unto a friend or age-mate turning him.

We have but one, one heart to seek for comfort.

But we, say they, live an unperilled life

At home, while they do battle with the spear.

Falsely they deem: twice would I under shield

Stand, rather than bear childbirth peril once." ^"

In summary, it must be pointed out that while naturalism gen-
erally prevailed in Greek culture, there are also evidences of
mysticism and metaphysical dualism. We find that the overly en-
thusiatic proponents of classicism have exaggerated the serenity of
the Greek spirit and that a one-sided view results when we see the
Greek ideal of life mainly as an expression of poise, reason, and
harmony. In considering the Greek ideals of Hfe we find basic con-
tradictions, which, as we shall see, found a prominent place in philo-
sophical speculations.

10 Euripides, Medea, 230-251.

THE GREEK VIEW OF MAN 13

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Compare the spirit of Hellenic civilization with that of the Orient.

2. In what ways was the Greek view of life naturalistic?

3. What were the fundamental beliefs of the Mystery religions?

4. Compare and contrast Greek polytheism with Christian monotheism.

5. How did Hellenic religion influence philosophical beliefs?

6. What was the Greek view of the afterlife?

7. What are some of the fundamental contradictions of the Greek
spirit?

8. Why did the Greeks usually lack a sense of sin?

9. What are some of the reasons for the widespread tolerance in Hel-
lenic civilization?

10. Describe the patriarchal spirit of Greek life.

11. How would a Greek thinker criticize 20th-century American civili-
zation?

12. What, in your opinion, were some of the main weaknesses of the Hel-
lenic world-view?

13. What are the permanent contributions of Hellenic culture?

14. Describe the secular basis of Greek life.

15. Why did the Greeks disregard scientific applications?

THE BEGINNING OF GREEK
PHILOSOPHY

THE ENVIRONMENT

^eek philosophy was born on the coast of Asia Minor. The
site was not accidental, for in this region there were a constant
interchange of ideas and a mingling of many cultures. Here, East
and West came together, and the Orient and the Occident met on
equal terms. In these city-states along the coast of Asia Minor, there
were vast riches and also much poverty, especially at Miletus,
where Thales was born. Miletus carried on an enormous amount
of trade; its wealth could scarcely be estimated. It was the destina-
tion of many caravans, which brought with them not only goods
but new ideas and new concepts of life.

But Miletus was living in a constant state of insecurity, for power-
ful neighbors were determined to annex its territory. At first the
Lydians threatened, and it appeared as if they would subdue it. But
the Milesians fought back and were able to prevent foreign domina-
tion. While the other cities along the coast of Asia Minor were
under Lydian hegemony, Miletus remained as powerful as before.

THE ENVIRONMENT 15

Then the Persians conquered the Lydians. In the beginning the
Greeks did not realize how great the Persian danger was. Indeed,
many of the rulers of the city-states in Asia Minor joined the
Persian ranks.

The last great ruler of Aiiletus was Aristagoras. At first he, too,
collaborated with the Persian king; but then a conflict broke out
between the two, and Aristagoras turned to the Greeks for help.
He made a desperate plea at Sparta for assistance but spoke to deaf
ears. In Athens his message was received more favorably; the
Athenians supported him, and other Greek city-states followed
their example. Being an excellent diplomat, Aristagoras gave up
some of his dictatorial privileges and established a democratic gov-
ernment in Miletus.

In 499 B.C., the combined forces of the Greeks subdued Sardis,
but soon reverses occurred. The Persians gathered a powerful army
and navy, and in 494 Miletus fell. The results of this conquest were
far-reaching. The Persians appeared irresistible, and their vic-
tories can be compared with the German triumphs of 1940.

Ironically enough, the Persians were supported by the Phoeni-
cians and Egyptians, who were envious of the naval and mercantile
power of Miletus. Both hoped, if Miletus were destroyed, to dom-
inate the Mediterranean and achieve great prosperity. And, too, the
Persians had in their ranks many Greek collaborators who despised
democratic government and democratic ideals.

The fate of Miletus was somewhat Uke that of Poland under
Germany during World War 11. Most of the male citizens were
killed, while many of the women and children were enslaved. Thus
ended the dominance of Milesian philosophy, and the center of
thinking shifted first to southern Italy and Sicily and later to Athens.

So much for the pohtical conditions. To appreciate the intel-
lectual vigor of the Milesians, we must realize that they were im-
migrants who had left the mainland in search of wealth and a
better way of life. They were not burdened by past traditions and,
like modern Americans, they were secular in their outlook on life.
Frequently they were ruled by tyrants, who, however, made many
social reforms and contributed to the growth of culture. To us, as
to most of the Greek thinkers, the word tyrant has a most unpleas-
ant connotation, but we must not be misled. Tyrants like Periander
at Corinth and Pisistratus at Athens added immensely to the arts
and sciences. Many of the tyrants were determined to Uft the gen-
eral standard of thinking. Like the despots of the Italian city-states

i6 THE BEGINNING OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

in the Renaissance, they built huge buildings and employed poets,
painters, and sculptors. Nor were they averse to philosophical ideas
as long as the philosophers remained conservative in their political
opinions. Later, of course, Plato had a most unpleasant experience
with a tyrant at Syracuse, and he was naturally somewhat preju-
diced on the subject of tyranny. We must not gainsay, however,
the contributions of the tyrants of the 6th century b.c. to the
growth of intellectual life.^

THE INTELLECTUAL ATMOSPHERE

The 6th century b.c. thus was an age of change and flux in which
there was little political stabihty. As we have seen, foreign con-
querors threatened; hence, one day Miletus might be supreme and
the next day its glories only a memory. We find the same instability
in intellectual matters: the Mystery cults were gaining ground, and
they filled Greece and the colonies with closely-knit brotherhoods
which regarded themselves as superior to followers of the orthodox
religion. Their initiates were usually bound together by strict rites,
and if they revealed the secrets of the orders they were Uable to be
killed by the enraged members.

While fervent religious ideas developed, there was greater intel-
lectual skepticism, and the Homeric gods were re-examined more
closely. Penetrating questions were asked regarding their nature
and their origin. We shall find that thinkers such as Xenophanes
and Heraclitus challenged the anthropomorphism and the credulous
attitude of the masses.

It was a century in which the problem of evil achieved real
prominence. Preoccupation with this problem usually occurs in
periods of intellectual maturity. The poets, especially, were wonder-
ing how the omnipotence of the gods could be reconciled with the
existence of earthly misery. The philosophers, likewise, were con-
scious of this basic metaphysical contradiction. For example, we
find in the writings of Empedocles a sense of pessimism and alien-
ation and a feeling that he was banished from the happy circle of
the gods.

THALES

Thales (c. 624-546), the father of Greek philosophy, is surrounded
by a veil of mythology, for we know little about his life although
we have an abundance of legends. There are many stories regarding
^Cf. Botsford, Hellenic history, p. 75.

THALES 17

his manifold scientific accomplishments. He is supposed to have pre-
dicted an eclipse which took place in 585 b.c. It is possible that he
obtained his astronomical knowledge from the Babylonians. There
is a story that he went to Egypt, where he learned what the
Egyptians had done in the field of geometry. He made some con-"
tributions to the science of mathematics. He is said to have measured
the height of the pyramids by the shadows they cast and to have
determined the distance from the shore of a ship at sea. He also tried
to explain scientifically the overflow of the Nile.-

In ancient times Thales was also famous for his ethical contribu-
tions, but again we have no specific evidence of his beliefs. He was
counted among the Seven Wise Men, and it is possible that he
taught a morality based on reason and that he held such maxims
as "Know thyself" and "Nothing to excess."

According to Aristotle,^ Thales seems to have been rather shrewd
in his business dealings. He is said to have once cornered the olive
market and thus showed that a philosopher can be a practical man
as well as a master speculator. And Aristotle relates how Thales
bought up all the olive presses because he thought there would be
an abundant harvest.

Politically, also, Thales was a penetrating and keen judge of
human affairs, for he advocated a Pan-Ionian confederation, without
which he thought the Ionian city-states would not be able to main-
tain their independence. He realized that Persia would become all-
powerful and that the sovereignty of the small states could not
remain inviolate. The rulers of his time, however, were too pre-
occupied with their petty squabbles to listen to him and they laughed
at his suggestions for establishing a central capital which would
unite all the Greek colonies.

The idea of Pan-Hellenic union agitated other thinkers— for ex-
ample, Gorgias, and to some extent, Plato. Like many modern
philosophers, they realized that small political units were outmoded
and that narrow nationalism could not survive.^ But usually the
statesmen who were in power regarded such ideas as highly abstruse
and impractical, only to find out in the course of time that their own

- Regarding his mathematical knowledge see Cantor, Vorlestmgen iiber
Geschichte der Mathematik, vol. i, p. 112.

^ It must be remembered that Aristotle was not a reliable historian of pre-
Socratic philosophy; cf. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of pre-Socratic philos-
ophy, pp. 374-375.

* The most adequate account of the development of Greek federalism can be
found in Ferguson, Greek iviperialism.

i8 THE BEGINNING OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

realism was not justified by the actual turn of political events. In
reality, their concepts of politics were much more obsolete than the
idealistic reflections of the philosophers.

Returning to Thales, his philosophical fame is founded mainly
upon one fragment in which he shows that everything is contained
in water. Water, to him, was the basic principle of the universe. To
a modern observer such a conclusion appears at first glance to be
rather naive, since we think in terms of atoms and electrons and
according to the Einsteinian concept of the universe. But, it must
be remembered, Thales had no scientific apparatus. He was rather
bold in speculating in these ways, for his views were completely di-
vergent from the accepted cosmology, which traced all natural
principles back to divine causes.

We do not know how Thales came to the conclusion that
the world-stuff is water. Perhaps he may have been influenced b>"
the many forms which water takes or by the fact that water is
necessary to sustain life. He explained the position of the earth
as floating on water hke a piece of wood. All this appears to be
rather elementary when viewed in the light of 20th-century
science.

According to other accounts, Thales spoke of the soul as being
endowed with the power of motion and being full of gods, a tenet,
however, which must not be taken literally. It must be remembered
that the Milesians as yet made no sharp distinction between the
immaterial world and man. Everything, according to them, is alive
and moving. Hence, there is no ground for a theistic or spiritual
interpretation of this viewpoint. The^ Milesians, jxgarded-nature as
a vital force, forever alive and in motion; this view contrasts strongly
with the 18th-century standpoint, which viewed matter as being
inert,

/■^What is the lasting significance of Thales? The answer is. He

< raised an important question: What is the nature of the world-stuff?

I His curiosity set off a chain reaction which caused a veritable philo-

I sophical revolution. He tried to verify his studies not by an appeal

to religion or to faith but by mathematical means, and in this way

> he contributed to the growth of Greek science.

ANAXIMANDER

To Anaximander, water was too specific a substance, and in its
stead he substituted as the primary world principle the boundless.
Anaximander, who lived c. 610-545, came from a noble family, and

ANAXIMANDER 19

he led Milesian immigrants to found a new colony. It is believed that
he published his philosophical prose work in 546. Unfortunately we
have only a few fragments of his treatise.

The primary substance, according to Anaximander, has no
visible limits. It is eternal and uncreated. To some extent this con-
cept anticipated the modern view of infinity. It is a doctrine which
is rich in imaginative insight, for according to Anaximander the
world has no spatial limits. Indeed, he spoke of a plurality of worlds.
Whether they existed together, as Burnet"' assumed, or whether they
arose one after another, as Zeller^' believed, we cannot say with cer-
tainty. His view definitely indicated an expansion in the cosmic
picture, for it implied that our sphere is not the only planet and
that the earth does not occupy a privileged position in the cosmic
scheme. Certainly his philosophical views were far superior to
those of medieval thinkers, who had a narrow astronomical outlook
and accepted with almost no exception the geocentric hypothesis of
the universe.

Anaximander, moreover, spoke about an eternal motion which
characterizes the activity of the boundless. He tried to explain that
the world was formed by a separation of opposite qualities, such as
the warm and the cold. At first a sphere of flame surrounded the
earth, somewhat as the bark encloses a tree. Later the sphere was
broken up into parts and hence "the sun, the moon, and the stars
arose."

In another fragment Anaximander says, "And from what source
things arise, to that they return of necessity when they are de-
stroyed; for they suflter punishment and make reparation to one
another for their injustice according to the order of time. . . ."'^

Many varying interpretations of this statement have been given.
Some scholars regard it as a trace of Orphism, as referring to the
wicked state of mankind; others view it in a more sober light, for
it must be remembered that the Greeks generally did not view
existence as a sin. What Anaximander probably meant was that
everything in the universe has a definite place, and that if it did not
confine itself to its limits, it would have to make reparation. In
short, the universe is governed by an orderly process.

Again, we find Anaximander to be very suggestive in his view of
the evolution of man, for, unHke medieval thinkers, he did not speak

^ Burnet, Early Greek philosophy, pp. 62-66.

^ Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen, pp. 234 ff.

^ Simplicius, Fhys. 6r, Nahm, Selections from early Greek philosophy, p. 6z

20 THE BEGINNING OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

of special creation. According to him, in the beginning man had
been a fish and his evolution was the same as that of other animals.
In his original form, Anaximander noted, man was quite different,
for if he had been subjected to a long period of suckling he would
not have survived. ". . . the first animals were generated in the mois-
ture, and were covered with a prickly skin; and as they grew older,
they became drier. . . ."^ All this appears to be rather nebulous, but
it indicates wide scientific curiosity. Furthermore, Anaximander
had a variety of practical interests. Thus, he constructed a globe
of the heavens and invented a sundial. In geography, also, he was
active, and he made a map which was famous in ancient times.

In his astronomical views Anaximander stated: "The earth is a
heavenly body, controlled by no other power, and keeping its posi-
tion because it is the same distance from all things; the form of it is
curved, cylindrical like a stone column; it has two faces, one of
these is the ground beneath our feet, and the other is opposite to
it."»

As to the stars, they "are a wheel (circle) of fire, separated from
the fire about the world, and surrounded by air. There are certam
breathing-holes hke the holes of a flute through which we see the
stars; so that when the holes are stopped up, there are eclipses. The
moon is sometimes full and sometimes in other phases as these holes
are stopped up or open. The circle of the sun is twenty-seven times
that of the moon, and the sun is higher than the moon, but the
circles of the fixed stars are lower."^°

Anaximander held the earth to be a cylinder in form, with its
depth one third of its breadth. Moreover, according to his theory,
the circle of the moon is nineteen times as large as the earth.

If we contrast the theories of Anaximander with those of Thales,
we find a real advance. First of all, Anaximander was more detailed
in his cosmological description than Thales. Second, Anaximander
tried to give a scientific explanation of how the universe arose;
namely, by his doctrine that out of the boundless, opposite qualities
were created. Third, Anaximander was suggestive in his concept
that cosmology should avoid any theory of spatial limitation. This
implies a belief in a plurality of worlds and the existence of other
worlds besides our own. Fourth, he stimulated Greek philosophy
in his theories regarding the origin of man. In noting that man is

8 Hipp., Phil. 6 {ibid., p. 65).

9 Ibid., p. 64.
10 Ibid., p. 64.

ANAXIMENES 21

part of the animal world, he sounds strikingly modern and almost
anticipated Darwin.

ANAXIMENES

Like the other Milesian philosophers, Anaximenes left few frag-
ments of his work, and with him the Milesian tradition closes. It is
quite certain that he was younger than Anaximander; he is said to
have died around 524 B.C.

The main principle according to Anaximenes is air; from it arise
all things, including both human beings and gods. He described
air as always in motion and as holding the world together. To him,
air also had a subjective connotation. Thus he compared it with
the work of the soul: just as the soul is the unifying principle of
man's life, so the air holds the universe together.

Now it may be asked. Why did Anaximenes choose this principle
as the cosmic substance? Of course, no definite answer can be
given, but perhaps he was influenced by the fact that air is neces-
sary to sustain life and that it undergoes a variety of transformations
in fire and in vapor. While air, according to Anaximenes, has a
definite nature, it is boundless and not subject to any spatial limita-
tion. He also called it divine. Here again, it is important not to iden-
tify Anaximenes with a spiritual approach. As yet there was no
clear distinction between material and immaterial things. By divine
he probably meant that air is a superior principle and a key to
cosmic change.

How can this cosmic movement be conceived? Anaximenes
answered, by rarefaction and condensation: "When air is dilated
so as to be rarer, it becomes fire; while winds, on the other hand,
are condensed air. Cloud is formed from air by compression (felt-
ing); and water when it is compressed farther, and earth and
finally stones as it is more condensed."^^

The earth, he maintained, was formed by compression and it
rests on air: "Similarly, the sun and the moon and all the rest of the
stars, being fiery bodies, are supported on the air by their breadth.
And stars are made of earth, since exhalations arise from this, and
these being attenuated become fire, and of this fire when it is raised
to the heaven the stars are constituted. There are also bodies of an
earthly nature in the place occupied by the stars, and carried along
with them in their motion. He says that the stars do not move under
the earth, as others have supposed, but around the earth, just as a cap

11 Hipp., Phil. 7. Dox. 560 {ibid., p. 66).

22 THE BEGINNING OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

is moved about the head. And the sun is hidden not by going under-
neath the earth, but because it is covered by some of the higher parts
of the earth, and because of its greater distance from us."^-

Regarding other phenomena of nature Anaximenes stated, ".
winds are produced when the air that has been rarefied is set in
motion; and when it comes together and is yet further condensed,
clouds are produced, and so it changes into water. And hail is
formed when the water descending from the clouds is frozen; and
snow, when these being yet more filled with moisture become
frozen. And a rainbow is produced when the sun's rays fall upon
thick condensed air."^^

Some of Anaximenes' other speculations are worthy of note. For
example, he thought that the stars are fixed nailheads in the crystal-
line vault and that the earth has the shape of a table. The sun, he
taught, is broad, like a leaf. He tried to explain the cause of earth-
quakes, which he attributed to the dryness and moisture of the earth.

The influence of Anaximenes in ancient times was far-reaching.
In fact, he surpassed Anaximander in significance, according to later
Greek philosophers. Probably we would reverse this judgment and
place Anaximander above Anaximenes. Some of his speculative
theories found their way into the philosophy of the Atomists, who
likewise regarded the earth as a disk and neglected the theory of
spheres outlined by the Pythagoreans. Diogenes of Apollonia
adopted most of Anaximenes' principles and accepted air as the
basic world-stuff.

What is the final significance of Anaximenes? He showed that
there can be a basic relationship between the external principle of
reality and subjective states. The world-stuff appears both as air
and in the form of the soul. Moreover, by his principle of con-
densation and rarefaction, he gave a scientific explanation of change.
In astronomy he made a clear distinction between the planets and
the heavens of fixed stars. He was interested in various other sci-
entific phenomena, such as earthquakes. Unfortunately we do not
have any fragments by Anaximenes dealing with the evolution of
man.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MILESIANS

What characterizes the Milesian philosophy is its scientific spirit.
Its foremost problem was the universe, not man. We shall see later

12 Ibid., p. 66.

13 Ibid., p. 66.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MILESIANS 23

that the process was reversed in the time of the Sophists, when man
—his needs, his desires, and his ideals— became the foremost concern
of philosophy.

What is especially appealing in the Milesian philosophy is the
lack of partisanship and prejudice. As yet the philosopher is not the
defender of a pet theory or pet institution, nor is he the spokesman
for an established belief; instead, he deals impartially with all cosmo-
logical phenomena.

Some of the Milesian theories may appear to us fantastic. This is
only natural but, we must remember, we can speculate with the
aid of scientific instruments. Still, in the perspective of history, our
accomplishments may appear to be just as insignificant to the future
as the conclusions of Milesian science are to us. We must not forget
the debt we owe it, for it was largely responsible for the beginning
of mathematics, astronomy, and geology.

It is interesting to note that popular mythology seems to have had
little influence on the speculations of the Milesians. They were
emancipated thinkers; hence, later on they were frequently charged
with being atheists.

We must stress the iVIilesian use of analogy. As yet there was no
clear distinction between the subjective and the objective world
and between man and nature. Thus we find Anaximander using
a moral principle to bolster up his scientific conclusions. To some
extent the Milesian concept of the universe was extremely poetic.
The world, according to these philosophers, is alive and pulsating
and involved in a process of ceaseless motion. All in all, their philos-
ophy was an excellent foundation for the more sophisticated theories
of cosmology which followed.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What role did the tyrants play in the spread of culture?

2. Describe the fate of Miletus.

3. In what ways did political factors influence the rise of philosophy?

4. Can philosophy develop without an atmosphere of leisure?

5. What is the basic world-stuff, according to Thales?

6. Why did the Milesian thinkers neglect immaterial factors in their
cosmology?

7. What is the significance of Anaximander?

8. In what ways was Anaximander amazingly modern?

9. What is the basic world-stuff, according to Anaximenes?

10. How did Anaximenes explain astronomical phenomena?

11. What are the lasting contributions of the Milesian thinkers?

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
PYTHAGOREANS

PYTHAGORAS

Ihe

.here are few details about the Hfe of Pythagoras, and the cir-
cumstances of his career are surrounded by a host of legends. We
are told that he visited many countries, such as Arabia, Syria, and
India; but modern research regards these accounts as spurious.^ He
was born at Samos and studied assiduously in his youth. During
Pythagoras' mature years, Polycrates, who was almost a Machiavel-
lian figure with no moral scruples, set up a dictatorship at Samos
which stifled the spirit of free inquiry. Consequently Pythagoras
left Samos and, since he was interested in medicine, went to Cro-
ton, which had an excellent medical school.

At Croton, the fame of Pythagoras became widespread. He ad-
mitted both men and women into the order which he established
there. Naturally this co-educational idea appealed to his followers.
He is said to have supplemented the education of the women with
training in the domestic arts.

^ Cf. Zeller, Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy, pp. 31-34.
24

PYTHAGORAS 25

The Pythagoreans established a brotherhood with secret initiation
ceremonies and strict vows, which also had to be kept secret. It
was almost a monastic order with emphasis on vegetarianism. We
find a prohibition of beans and other precepts which link the order
to ancient taboo concepts.- Yet, it is quite probable that such pre-
cepts as "Do not stir the fire with a knife" or "Do not overstep
the beam of a balance" are not to be taken literally. The first prob-
ably means that we are not to swell the pride of the great; and the
second, that we are not to violate the balance of justice and equity.
In short, the teachings of Pythagoras had a popular meaning and an
allegorical meaning revealed only to the initiates.

In the Pythagorean order there was a spirit which reminds us
somewhat of the religious ideals of the iMiddle Ages. For example,
the order stressed rigorous self-examination. At the end of the
day the members of the brotherhood would examine themselves
concerning their wrongdoings and with regard to how successful
their activities had been in promoting a good life. They shared all
their goods and in this way probably influenced the development
of Plato's political ideals.

Politically their sympathies were mostly with the aristocratic
party. This attitude finally caused their downfall, for in the 5th cen-
tury B.C. in southern Italy the democratic movement grew stronger
and finally overthrew the aristocratic regime. The result was the
disintegration of the order, and migration took place. Later we
find the Pythagoreans at Tarentum and in Athens.

According to ancient tradition, Pythagoras lived a saintly life,
never indulged in sensuality, and was moderate in all his habits.
He never told a joke which was off-color or in bad taste. His au-
thority in the order was almost absolute.

We have only a few scant details about his personal beliefs. It is
quite certain that he accepted the doctrine of transmigration. Piety,
to him, was the first law of religion:

". . . Pythagoras conceived the rule of the gods to be most ef-
ficacious for the establishment of righteousness, and he took that
rule as the higher principle for the ordinance of the constitution and
laws and of justice and legal rights. It may be well to add some of
his particular injunctions. The Pythagoreans learnt from him to
think it profitable to believe that the divine exists and looks down
upon the human race and cares for it. . . . They rightly regarded
the living creature as turbulent by nature and various in its

- Cf. Burnet, Early Greek philosophy, p. 106.

26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PYTHAGOREANS

inclinations, appetites, and other passions, so that it needs the threat-
ening of a superior power to chasten it and reduce it to order.
They thought, therefore, that every man, conscious of the variety
of his nature, should never forget worship and piety towards the
divine, but always keep in mind the power that watches over human
behavior."^

The life of Pythagoras was god-centered, and his followers ac-
cepted this fundamental belief:

"All their injunctions with regard to conduct aim at converse
with the divine. This is their starting-point; their whole life is or-
dered with a view to following God, and this is the governing
principle of their philosophy, because it is absurd that mankind
should seek their good from any other source than the gods. It is
as if the citizen of a country governed by a king should pay respect
to some subordinate ruler, and disregard the king himself who rules
over all. They think that mankind behave in that sort of way. For
since God exists and has authority over all, and it is acknowledged
that good should be sought from him that has authority, and all
give good things to those whom they love and take delight in, and
evil to those whom they hate, it is clear that we should do those
things that are pleasing to God."^

Pythagoras also pursued scientific studies which had an enormous
influence on the development of philosophy. He was interested in
geometry, astronomy, and music, fie viewed the earth not as being
flat, as the Milesians had, but as being spherical and occupying the
center of the universe. This viewpoint, it appears, was changed by
the later Pythagoreans.
^ To Pythagoras we probably owe the use of the term philosophy .
To him it meant the love for wisdom. A man who is interested in
the contemplation of the divine, according to Pythagoras, repre-
sents the highest type. On the other hand, there are two inferior
types: those who are merely intent upon worldly success and honor,
and those who live the Hfe of the senses and think only of their
pleasures. This threefold division— /of^r^ of wisdom, lovers of suc-
cess, lovers of pleasure— is significant. It indicates that the Pythag-
orean ideal was one in which the intellectual elite would triumph
and everyone would fulfill his rightful function. It is no wonder that
the sympathies of the Pythagoreans lay mainly with the aristocracy.

3 lamblichus. On the Pythagorean life, 174, Cornford, ed., Greek religious
thought from Ho7fier to the age of Alexander, p. 66.
•* Ibid., p. 65.

HIPPODAMUS 27

Pythagoras had a high regard for philosophy. To him it was not
only a search for a first principle but a way of life leading to
religious salvation. The philosopher, then, in many ways seemed to
him to be like a religious priest who points out the right direction
to the confused multitude. The philosopher, he thought, sees
beyond the pleasures of the present and concentrates upon the
search for eternal verities.

ALCMAEON

The scientific interest of the Pythagoreans was represented espe-
cially well by Alcmaeon, who, though considerably younger than
Pythagoras, was likewise very brilliant. His main work was in
medicine. According to him, health is based on a harmonious dis-
tribution of certain qualities, such as bitter and sweet, dry and wet.
Illness results when one quality predominates and causes disorder.
Alcmaeon was interested in the structure of the brain, and he realized
that it is responsible for the activities of man's mental life. He
used the empirical method in his physiological studies and did not
impose metaphysical principles upon his scientific conclusions.

Alcmaeon advanced psychology by distinguishing between knowl-
edge through the senses and rational thought. Animals, he believed,
are dependent upon sense experience, whereas man can achieve ra-
tional understanding. Still, man's knowledge is limited compared
with that of the gods, for he is guided mainly by hypotheses which
cannot be verified. But the gods, Alcmaeon asserted, possess com-
plete certainty. He stressed the immortality of the human soul,
an emphasis which gives a spiritual twist to his teachings.

PHILOLAUS

Like Alcmaeon, Philolaus was interested in medicine. The body, ac-
cording to him, is dominated by two influences— a warm substance
and a cold substance. The health of the individual depends upon the
right proportion of warmth and cold. In general, Philolaus appears
to have been rather agnostic; and, unlike Alcmaeon, he taught that
the soul is the harmony of the body, and when the body passes away
the soul experiences the same fate.

HIPPODAMUS

The architect Hippodamus of Miletus clearly exhibits the influence
of Pythagorean ideas. He is mentioned in Aristotle's Politics as the
first Utopian writer. Hippodamus had high regard for the number

28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PYTHAGOREANS

three, which he believed to be sacred. Thus, he outHned three main
classes in the division of the state, a procedure which later was fol-
lowed by Plato. Furthermore, in describing the legal system, Hip-
podamus adopted a threefold division.

In this connection it must be noted that the Pythagoreans con-
tributed to the worship of numbers. This mysticism had a lasting
impact upon the ancient world, and it continued throughout the
Middle Ages to modern times. The number three, for example, was
regarded as divine by Scholastic writers and even by Dante, who
divided the Divme comedy into three parts: hell, purgatory, and
paradise.

Hippodamus himself was less superstitious than the Scholastics.
He used scientific principles in town planning, especially at Rhodes,
and his architectural construction served as a model for the artists of
the ancient world.

THE LATER PYTHAGOREANS

The history of the later Pythagoreans witnessed a split between
scientific and religious interests. Some Pythagorean philosophers
continued to adhere to the strict practices of the founder and lived
ascetic lives. Many of them shunned all the conveniences of society
and went around like beggars. Sometimes they even starved them-
selves. Yet the order produced distinguished mathematicians, such
as Eurytus, who was imbued with the importance of number
symbolism. According to Eurytus, numbers characterize all beings;
and he represented them by geometrical figures.

The most impressive figure in the later Pythagorean movement
was Archytas of Tarentum, who Hved in the 4th century B.C. and
was befriended by Plato. He was especially occupied with the prob-
lem of motion. Matter, he asserted, is dynamic, and the same prin-
ciple extends to the soul and to the heavenly bodies. In his personal
life he preached self-control and, according to ancient testimony,
completely Hved up to his ideals. Like Pythagoras, Archytas avoided
all sensual pleasure and was humane in his regard for his fellow men.

THEOLOGY OF THE PYTHAGOREANS

The theology of the Pythagoreans was based to a great extent on
Orphic teachings, and thus they accepted the concept of reincarna-
tion. Man's soul, they taught, has fallen from its divine purity.
After death it is purified in Hades, and then it comes back to earth
in a new transmigration. Pythagoras himself told of many former

THEOLOGY OF THE PYTHAGOREANS 29

states of being. He even thought he had taken part, in an earlier
reincarnation, in the siege of Troy. The goal of life, according to
the Pythagoreans, is complete release from this cycle and ultimate
reunion with the divine forces.

Like the Orphics, the Pythagoreans were duahsts. They felt that
man's essence lies in the soul, which they held to be superior to
the body. The body perishes and is the seat of passions which are
purely ephemeral. The soul, however, is immortal. They divided
the soul into three parts: intelligence, reason, and the heart. They
described the pilgrimage of the soul in the following way:

"When the soul is cast out [of the body] it wanders in the air
over the earth in the likeness of the body. Hermes is warden of souls
and hence is called Conductor, Keeper of the Gates, and God of
the Underworld, for it is he that brings in the souls from their
bodies, whether from land or sea. The pure souls are led to the
highest region, while the impure do not consort with them nor
with one another, but are bound by the avenging spirits [Erinyes]
in bonds that cannot be broken. All the air is full of souls, which
are called Spirits and Heroes. It is they who send to men dreams
and signs of sickness or of health; and not only to men, but to
cattle and other beasts. Rites of purification and expiation have
reference to these beings, and so has the whole art of divination,
omens, and the like."'*

The object of religion, thus, is the conversion of the soul to good-
ness. Wickedness, the Pythagoreans felt, could never be triumphant
for it represents a state of sickness. Full conversion demands a
rigorous process of purification together with moral righteousness:

"For mankind, the greatest thing is the conversion of the soul
to good or to evil. Men are happy when they possess a good soul,
but they are never at rest. . . . Virtue and health are harmony, and
so is all goodness and God. Thus the universe is a harmonious
system. . . .

"Worship should be paid to gods and heroes, but not with equal
honors. We should worship the gods at all times with reverent
speech, wearing white garments and being in a state of purity; the
heroes should be worshiped only after midday.

"Purity is effected by rites of purification, lustration, and asper-
sion; by keeping clean from contact with funeral ceremonies, child-
birth, and every kind of taint; and by abstaining from the flesh of
animals that have been eaten or have died, from mullet and

5 Diogenes Laertius, viii, 25 {ibid., p. 68).

30 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PYTHAGOREANS

melanurus [a fish], from eggs and animals that lay eggs, and from
beans and the other things forbidden also by those who perform
the rites of initiation in the sanctuaries."^

PYTHAGOREAN COSMOLOGICAL
DOCTRINES

The cosmology of the Pythagoreans was closely related to their
religious ideals. In their doctrine of reality we find a dualism which
reminds us of Persian religion, except that the Pythagoreans ex-
pressed it in more mathematical terms. The conflict is between two
forces: the U71 limited and the Limited. The Unlimited, they taught,
represents the principle of chaos, aggression, and aggrandizement
while the Limited stands for order. At first the UnHmited was su-
preme. If we can visualize this condition, we must picture the uni-
verse as complete darkness and disorder, upon which the Limited
arose and with it fire and light.

This metaphysical dualism creates moral opposition, for the Un-
limited stands for evil and wickedness while the Limited represents
goodness. The Unlimited, the Pythagoreans held, is symbolized by
feminine qualities. The Limited, on the other hand, is masculine.
This opposition is continued by the dualism of many qualities, such
as day and night, wet and dry, square and round.

The conflict between the Unlimited and the Limited represents
the spirit of Greek thinking. To the Greeks, the infinite was the
principle of negation and of evil, whereas the finite was the source
of goodness and made for cosmic adjustment. Thus we have the
legend of Prometheus, who was punished by the gods for overstep-
ping the bounds of human aspiration. In this sense the Greeks were
quite difl'erent from modern thinkers, who frequently regard the
infinite as the source of man's real power. Hence, Goethe's Faust
is the story of man's inpnite aspirations and infinite longings. The
Greeks would not have appreciated the Faustian idea because they
worshiped symmetry, order, and harmony.

SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS OF THE
PYTHAGOREANS

In science as in metaphysics, the Pythagoreans made a fundamental
contribution. The Egyptians had already made definite beginnings in
science, but the Pythagoreans showed that mathematics is not
merely a practical activity but has important theoretical conse-
6 Ibid., p. 68.

SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS OF THE PYTHAGOREANS 31

quences. The Pythagoreans regarded mathematics as the most
important science. Did it not develop clarity? Did it not stimulate
man in the consideration of eternal things? Pythagoras himself is
responsible for several theorems, and it is said that he regarded his
conclusions as signs of heavenly inspiration.

This connection between mathematics and religion is noteworthy.
We find it again in later times, especially in Pascal and Descartes,
both of whom combined mathematical interests with religious devo-
tion. The religious strain was especially strong in Pascal, who, al-
though he was a brilliant mathematician, accepted a faith based on
authority.

The science of geometry was elaborated by the Pythagoreans.
They made it severely logical, dividing geometry according to
axioms, theorems, and demonstrations. In arithmetic they likewise
made advances by classifying numbers, studying proportions, and
applying geometrical principles to it. They were certain that all
things can be expressed according to their numerical relationship.
They even had numbers for marriage and justice. Number to them
was the principle of reality.

In this way the Pythagoreans anticipated the spirit of modern
science, which likewise is based on mathematical proportions. Chem-
istry and physics could not develop until certain mathematical
improvements had been made, and throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries changes in mathematics, such as the innovation of non-
EucHdean geometry, produced a revolution in our physical theo-
ries. However, modern science is not concerned with the applica-
tion of numbers to moral ideas but, unlike Pythagoreanism, regards
mathematics as a pragmatic and functional discipline, not as a
preparation for theology.

In astronomy the Pythagoreans also made basic advances. Py-
thagoras himself beheved the earth to be spherical. His later fol-
lowers stated that the earth, as well as other planets, moves around
a central fire. This is almost an anticipation of the heliocentric
theory; but ancient and medieval thinkers refused to accept it and,
instead, believed that the earth is the center of the universe.

To explain eclipses, the Pythagoreans accepted the existence of a
counter-earth. They maintained that there are ten bodies moving
through the heavens, for ten they thought is the perfect number.
The air around the earth, they asserted, is motionless, and all things
in it are mortal; but the uppermost air is always in motion, and all
things in it are divine.

32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PYTHAGOREANS

They accepted the popular behef in stating that the sun, moon,
and other heavenly bodies are gods. They believed that heat prevails
in the uppermost spheres of the universe and is the cause of all life.
Man, then, is akin to the gods because he partakes of heat. In this
view, again, we notice the fundamental dualism between the earth
and the heavens. Naturally, the Pythagoreans felt, the heavens are
superior to the earth, and a different physical composition charac-
terizes their structure. This view generally was accepted in the
A4iddle Ages; and it prevailed until the Renaissance, when thinkers
like Galileo and Copernicus showed that the same laws apply both
to the heavens and to the earth.

ESTHETIC THEORIES OF THE
PYTHAGOREANS

The Pythagoreans contributed greatly to the science of harmonics.
They realized that tunes can be expressed according to numerical
ratios. They spoke about the jmisic of the spheres, which, however,
human ears cannot detect. Music thus played an important role in
their philosophy. It is connected with man's moral traits, they said;
for example, warlike tunes develop in man a bellicose character,
whereas melancholy tunes create a spirit of pessimism and fatalism.
Music, the Pythagoreans felt, can also change our spirits and make
us joyous and exuberant as well as lethargic and listless. They be-
lieved that music can be a valuable tool of education and improve
the intellectual and esthetic standards of mankind.

In their concept of harmony, the Pythagoreans expressed a far-
reaching esthetic ideal. Harmony to them appeared as the principle
of goodness and order. It governs, they said, the movement of the
planets and dominates the constitution of the human body. Har-
mony characterizes the world of the gods. It is the task of man to
imitate this divine harmony and to achieve complete proportion in
his physical, moral, and intellectual hfe.

According to the Pythagoreans the function of art, thus, is imi-
tation. Art is the key to reahty and reminds man of his divine origin
and the possibility of eternity.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
PYTHAGOREANS

The Pythagorean order represents a mixture of science and religion.
Primarily it was a religious cult interested in salvation and deter-
mined to achieve a release from the cvcle of birth and death. Thus,

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PYTHAGOREANS 33

its scientific interest most of the time was subordinated to religious
ideals and to the quest for reunion with the divine. Nevertheless it
gave impetus to scientific studies, particularly in the fields of mathe-
matics, music, and astronomy.

The Pythagoreans showed that philosophic speculation can be
an end in itself, that it ennobles the mind of man and brings about an
attitude of detachment and objectivity. To some extent they were
like Spinoza, interested in seeing life in relation to eternity.

At the same time, the Pythagoreans contributed to the develop-
ment of a_dualistic attitude. They pointed to the conflict between
the UnHmited and the Limited^ darkness and light, good and evil.
This conflict became especially strong in later years, when a re-
vival of the movement took place and its religious aspects were
triumphant.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the fundamental contributions of Pythagoras?

2. What was the Pythagorean concept of religion? Compare the Pythag-
orean view with Catholicism.

3. What were some of the taboos of Pythagoreanism?

4. Describe the dualism of the Pythagorean system.

5. Why did the Pythagoreans favor the principle of order?

6. What were the moral ideals of the Pythagoreans?

7. In what ways were the Pythagoreans primitive in their world-view?

8. How did the Pythagoreans contribute to the progress of music?

9. What were the esthetic views of Pythagoreanism?

10. List some of the thinkers who contributed to Pythagoreanism and
describe briefly their contributions.

HERACLITUS

THE APOSTLE OF CHANGE

.eraclitus (c. 544-484 b.c.) was among the most brilliant of all
the Greek philosophers. In him we find the germ of some of the
most revolutionary modern theories, such as relativity, the identity
of opposites, and the belief that change governs all things.

About his life we have few details, but we know he was born
in Ephesus and came from a noble family. He was a high priest—
an office which was hereditary in his family. In every way he was
aristocratic. He hated the common man, and he looked down upon
vulgar opinions. At the same time, he was no friend of tyranny.
He had contempt for Homer and Hesiod and thought himself su-
perior to all other philosophers. As he explained, he did not accept
the teachings of anyone. Wisdom, to him, was a subjective, person-
alistic process, which could not be acquired by mathematical con-
structions or by the memorization of philosophical theories handed
down by predecessors.

We must appreciate the environment in which Heraclitus lived.
Ephesus, his native city, had acquired great wealth and had taken
the place of Miletus, which had fallen into complete oblivion. It

THE UNIVERSE OF HERACLITUS 35

contained many shrines, and to it came pilgrims from all parts of
Greece. They were especially attracted to the shrine of Artemis, the
guardian deity of the city. But prosperity and political power had
not made the citi/xns of Ephesus wise, for they were governed by
mediocre politicians and frequently persecuted their best and wisest
men. It is not surprising that Heraclitus looked down on the
masses.

Heraclitus generally expressed his views in a vague style; hence
they are subject to different interpretations. He starts his philosophy
by showing that truth is difficult to understand and that most men
lack wisdom:

"Not on my authority, but on that of truth, it is wise for you
to accept the fact that all things are one.

"This truth, though it always exists, men do not understand, as
well before they hear it as when they hear it for the first time. For
although all things happen in accordance with this truth, men
seem unskilled indeed when they make trial of words and matters
such as I am setting forth, in my effort to discriminate each thing
according to its nature, and to tell what its state is. But other men
fail to notice what they do when awake, in the same manner that
they forget what they do when asleep.

"Those who hear without the poucr to understand are like deaf
men; the proverb holds true of them— 'Present, they are absent.'

"Eyes and ears are l>ad witnesses for men, since their souls lack
understanding.

"Most men do not understand such things as they are wont to
meet with; nor by learning do they come to know them, though
they think they do.

"They know not how to listen, nor how to speak."'

Heraclitus was quite certain that much learning does not produce
wisdom. Did not Pythagoras have great knowledge? Did not Hesiod
possess prolific learning? Still, he insisted, wisdom cannot be at-
tained in a quantitative way, for nature is diflicult to explore and
"loves to hide."

THE UN/ VERSE OF HERACEITUS

According to Heraclitus, the universe is in a constant process of .
change. Cool things become warm, and warm things grow cool, -jq^
"You could not step twice in the same rivers; for other and yet

' Heraclitus, frags. 3, 4, 5, 6, Nahm, Selections from early Greek philosophy,
p. ^).

36 HERACLITUS

other waters are ever flowing on."- In other words, if we want
to understand the cosmic life, we must realize that it is dynamic.
It is not in a state of rest, noFls~iFTnert; rather, it is vibrant and
dornmaFed by motion and change. The task of the philosopher, then,
is to explain the change: to show why it is necessary, and""hbw it
functions.

" This change, affirmed Heraclitus, produces an identity of op-
posites. He implied that contrary qualities go together. For exam-
ple, we conceive of light only because there is darkness; we ap-
preciate summer because of winter; we value goodness because of
evil. A world of isolated qualities which would be purely good, or
purely evil, is incomprehensible to us. The universe itself is beyond
good and evil; it contains both alike and indicates their essential
identity.

It may now be asked. What is the fundamental stuff that charac-
terizes the universe? Heraclitus answers, fire. In discussing him,
Diogenes Laertius tells us:

"Coming to his particular tenets, we may state them as follows:
fire is the element, all things are exchange for fire and come into
being by rarefaction and condensation; but of this he gives no clear
explanation. All things come into being by conflict of opposites,
and the sum of things flows like a stream. Further, all that is is
limited and forms one world. And it is alternately born from fire
and again resolved into fire in fixed cycles to all eternity, and this
is determined by destiny. Of the opposites that which tends to
birth or creation is called war and strife, and that which tends to
destruction by fire is called concord and peace.

"Change he called a pathway up and down, and this determines
the birth of the world. For fire by contracting turns into mois-
ture, and this condensing turns into water; water again when con-
gealed turns into earth. This process he calls the downward path.
Then again earth is liquefied, and thus gives rise to water, and
from water the rest of the series is derived. He reduces nearly
everything to exhalation from the sea. This process is the upward
path."^

Thus we have in HeracHtus an upward and a downward path.
Both are necessary and have cosmic significance; whereas during
the summer fire goes upward, during the winter S goes down-
ward. " '

~ Frags. 41-42 (ibid., p. 91 ).

3 Diogenes Laertius, Bks. 4, 9, 8-12 (ibid., p. 96).

THE LOGOS 37

Heraclitus was interested in astronomy, in which he used the
principle of exhalation. He claimed that exhalations from the earth
are dark whereas those from the sea are bright and pure:

"Exhalations arise from earth as well as from sea; those from sea
are bright and pure, those from earth dark. Fire is fed by the
bright exhalations, the moist element by the others.

"He does not make clear the nature of the surrounding element.
He says, however, that there are in it bowls with their concavities
turned toward us, in which the bright exhalations collect and
produce flames. These are the heavenly bodies.

"The flame of the sun is the brightest and hottest; and other stars
are further from the earth and for that reason give it less light and
heat. The moon, which is nearer to the earth, traverses a region
which is not pure. The sun, however, moves in a clear and un-
troubled region, and keeps a proportionate distance from us. That is
why it gives us more heat and hght. Eclipses of the sun and moon
occur when the bowls are turned upwards; the monthly phases
of the moon are due to the bowl turning round in its place little
by little.

"Day and night, months, seasons and years, rains and winds and
other similar phenomena are accounted for by the various exhala-
tions. Thus the bright exhalation, set aflame in the hollow orb of
the sun, produces day, the opposite exhalation when it has got the
mastery causes night; the increase of warmth due to the bright
exhalation produces summer, whereas the preponderance of mois-
ture due to the dark exhalation brings about winter. His explana-
tions of other phenomena are in harmony with this."'^

THE LOGOS

This method of reasoning brings us to Heraclitus' doctrine of the
logos, which governs the change. He thought that all the trans-
formations are orderly and that the universe is dominaLed by btws,
HeTriinself piobably did n'ot give a metaphysical meaning to the
logos. To him it meant simply discourse or wisdom; but later com-
mentators, especially the Stoics, stressed a metaphysical interpreta-
tion of the logos and regarded it as "divine wisdom."

The function of the logos in Heraclitus' world-scheme is mani-
fold. The logos provides for order and for a definite outline of the
cosmic structure. It sees to it that bounds are kept and chaos does
not prevail. The logos has a moral meaning as well, for, according

* Ibid., p. 97.

38 HERACLITUS

to Heraclitus, heavenly bodies are governed by moral laws, espe-
cially by the dictates of justice. In every way the world of nature
and the world of morality can be identified. The result is that
nature obeys the dictates of equity, that it is rational and law-
abiding, not chaotic and tyrannical. If we want to understand the
universe, Heraclitus advised, we must turn our minds to the logos.
It is the measure of perfection and the criterion for human legisla-
tion. It is true that man's world is imperfect and quite inadequate,
but when man sees the entire structure of the universe, Heraclitus
thought, he understands the majesty and perfection of the world
process.

ETHICAL IDEALS OF HERACLITUS

What is noteworthy in the ethical concepts of Heraclitus is his pre-
occupation with strife. War is the father of all things, he claimed,
and those who want to banish conflict are dominated by illusion.
Eternal peace simply means a condition of indifference and lethargy.
In this thinking he reminds us of Nietzsche and Treitschke.

The ideal of life, as taught by Heraclitus, is one of rigorous men-
tal discipline. It distinguishes the wise man from the masses, who are
engaged in trivial and insignificant endeavors. The philosopher
becomes somewhat of a superman; still, his wisdom compared with
that of the gods is limited, for man is called a baby by the gods,
often as a child is so called by man.

To some extent Heraclitus was a pessimist, for he thought birth a
misfortune and death a boon. At any rate, here again Me find an
identity of opposites: Life implies death, and death implies life.
Plutarch comments on this statement and quotes Heraclitus as stat-
ing:

"It is the same thing in us that is alive and dead, awake and asleep,
young and old. For the former shift and become the latter, and the
latter shift back again and become the former.

"For as out of the same clay one can mould shapes of animals and
obliterate them and mould them again and so on unceasingly, so
nature from the same matter formerly produced our ancestors, and
then obliterated them and generated our parents, and then ourselves,
and then others and yet others, round and round. The river of birth
flows continually and will never stop, and so does that opposite
stream of destruction which the poets call Acheron and Cocytus. So
the same first cause that showed us the light of the sun brings also
the twilight of Hades. Perhaps we may see a similitude of this in the

ETHICAL IDEALS OF HERACLITUS 39

air around us, which makes alternately night and day, bringing on
life and death, sleep and waking."^

It is necessary for us to understand Heraclitus' doctrine regarding
the structure of the soul. He taught that the dry soul is the best,
whereas the wet soul is inferior. The soul becomes wet when man
is dominated by sensual pleasures. This state is especially evident in
intoxication. The dry soul he identified with wisdom and with the
perception of the underlying structure of the universe. Quite pos-
sibly, he believed that the wise man is immortal and that he may
become godHke after death. The wet soul, on the other hand, goes
downward and experiences a bitter fate.

In his religious theories Heraclitus inveighed against the popular
rites, for he thought that worshipers celebrated the Mysteries in an
unholy way. He attacked magicians and all those who believe in
superstition:

"For if it were not to Dionysos that they made the procession and
sang the song with phallic symbols, their deeds would indeed be
most shameful; but Hades and Dionysos are the same, to whomever
they go mad and share the revel.

"I distinguish two kinds of sacrifices: those of men altogether
purified, which would occur rarely, as Heraclitus says, in the case
of a single individual, or of some very few men easily counted;
secondly, those that are material and corporeal and composite
through change, such as are in harmony with those who are still
restrained by the body.

"They purify themselves by defihng themselves with blood, as if
one who had stepped into the mud were to wash it off with mud. If
any one of them should observe him doing so, he would think he
was insane. And to these images they pray, just as if one were to
converse with men's houses, for they know not what gods and
heroes are.

"If they are gods, why do ye lament them? And if ye lament
them, no longer consider them gods."*^

In these passages, again, we find evidences of Heraclitus' inde-
pendence. It is difficult to know exactly how he felt about the cur-
rent Mysteries. Some commentators state that he advocated them.^

^Plutarch, Consolation to Apollonius, 106E; Heraclitus, frag. 88, Cornford,
ed., Greek religious thought jrom Hovier to the age of Alexander, p. 82.

** Frags. 127, 128, 130, 130A (Nahm, op. cit., pp. 95-96).

^ Cj. Pfleiderer, Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus im Lichte der MyS'
terienidee.

HERACLITUS

This view, however, can scarcely be supported. He had his own
concept of the gods, and it differed considerably from the popular
anthropomorphism.

THE INFLUENCE OF HERACLITUS

Heraclitus had an important impact upon the history of ancient
philosophy. His metaphysical system became the foundation of the
Stoic doctrines. It influenced the development of Philo; with some
modifications it entered into the Christian logos theory.

Heraclitus' greatness was appreciated by Hegel, who likewise
used paradoxes in his philosophy and believed that the universe is
governed by an unending conflict between thesis and antithesis, out
of which a synthesis emerges. In modern philosophy, thinkers like
Bergson and Dewey have resurrected the concept of change. In the
metaphysics of Bergson, the world is governed by a vital impulse
which obeys no formal laws and is irresistibly forging ahead. In
Dewey's instrumentalism, static ideals are excluded and the dynamic
aspect of reahty is stressed.

In Heraclitus we find a most vigorous spirit. He stands rather
isolated among his contemporaries, for whom he felt great contempt.
Like Nietzsche, he lived alone and believed in an intellectual aris-
tocracy.

Generally speaking, the spirit of Heraclitus did not prevail in
ancient times. Greek thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle were more
concerned with permanence than with change and more interested
in the forms which govern phenomena than in the transformations
of the objective universe.

We may wonder why philosophy traditionally has been gov-
erned by this static viewpoint. There are many reasons for this
attitude. In the first place, philosophers have tried to escape into an
immaterial, changeless realrrTand thus ha^logked ^^^wn iipon thf-
wnHH of flnv-TTn the sernnrl place, the mathematical view has dom-
inated much of philosophy and, as we know, mathematics is con-
cerned^primarily with ahsolute concepts anji^ myamble theories.
Thus thinkers have made a definite distinction between the realm of
impermanence and the realm of eternity, and they have cherished a
sentimental fondness for the latter. In the third place, philosophers
traditionally have been occupied with the concepts of absolute
truth, absolute beauty, and absolute justice. These ideals they can-
not find in everyday life or in social institutions; naturally they pre-
fer their own Utopias, in which perfection reigns.

THE INFLUENCE OF HERACLITUS 41

This, however, was not the spirit of HeracHtus. He realized that
nothing remains at rest and that conflict governs all progress.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How did Heraclitus regard the masses? What 19th-century thinker
shared the same views?

2. What is the meaning of the logos doctrine?

3. How did Heraclitus express the principle of reality?

4. What were the astronomical views of Heraclitus?

5. What was Heraclitus' attitude regarding other philosophers?

6. What modern thinkers have adopted the world-view of Heraclitus?

7. Discuss the statement of Heraclitus that "war is the father of all
things." Can civilization advance without war? Explain your answer.

8. What are the weaknesses of the Heraclitean concept of the flux?

9. What is the basic world-stuff according to Heraclitus?

10. Do you agree with Heraclitus that opposites are identical? Defend
your answer.

11. What are the implications of the Heraclitean philosophy?

THE BEGINNING OF
METAPHYSICS

XENOPHANES

enophanes was born at Colophon, which city he left when the
Persians conquered it in 545 b.c. Unlike Heraclitus, he did not come
from a noble family. In fact, he had to earn his living as a poet; and
one of the kings whom he met felt contempt for him because of
his poverty. He had a keen understanding of the cities and countries
which he visited, and this knowledge contributed to the skepticism
so evident in his philosophy. As a reformer he had definite moral
ideals and feared that civilization was being engulfed by enervating
luxury and the new cult of atheism.

It appears that even in ancient times brawn was worshiped above
brain. The winners of the Olympic Games were celebrated as great
heroes, whereas the wise men were neglected and frequently lived
an anonymous existence. In a fragment, Xenophanes complained
about this state of affairs:

"But if one wins a victory by swiftness of foot, or in the pentath-
lon, where the grove of Zeus lies by Pisas' stream at Olympia, or as
a wrestler, or in painful boxing, or in that severe contest called the

XENOPHANES 43

pancration, he would be more glorious in the eyes of the citizens,
he would win a front seat at assemblies, and would be entertained
by the city at the public table, and he would receive a gift which
would be a keepsake for him. If he won by means of horses he
would get all these things although he did not deserve them, as I
deserve them, for our wisdom is better than the strength of men or
of horses. . . ."^

This was not all. Xenophanes beheved that the citizen would be
ruined by the new luxuries from Lydia. Like the Hebrew prophets,
he urged a simple way of hfe. He told how the citizens exhibited
themselves in the market place, proud and arrogant, dressed in
purple garments and richly perfumed. All these influences he re-
garded as effeminate.

In another fragment he prescribed how men should worship and
how they should exhibit self-control:

"For now the floor is clean, the hands of all and the cups are clean;
one puts on the woven garlands, another passes around the fragrant
ointment in a vase; the mixing bowl stands full of good cheer, and
more wine, mild and of delicate bouquet, is at hand in jars, which
says it will never fail. In the midst frankincense sends forth its sacred
fragrance, and there is water, cold, and sweet, and pure; the yellow
loaves are near at hand, and the table of honor is loaded with cheese
and rich honey. The altar in the midst is thickly covered with
flowers on every side; singing and mirth fill the house. Men making
merry should first hymn the god with propitious stanzas and pure
words; and when they have poured out Hbations and prayed for
power to do the right (since this lies nearest at hand), then it is no
unfitting thing to drink as much as will not prevent your w^alking
home without a slave, if you are not very old. . . ."-

In philosophy he attacked the popular concept of the gods. He
had a rather sublime view of the deity:

"God is one, supreme among gods and men, and not like mortals
in body or in mind.

"The whole (of god) sees, the whole perceives, the whole hears.

"But without eflFort he sets in motion all things by mind and
thought.

"It [i.e., Being] always abides in the same place, not moved at
all, nor is it fitting that it should move from one place to another."^

^ Frag. 19, Nahm, Selections from early Greek philosophy, pp. iio-iii.

2 Frag. 21 {ibid., p. in).

2 Frags. I, 2, 3, 4 {ibid., p. 109).

44 THE BEGINNING OF METAPHYSICS

This concept implies real monotheism. Xenophanes pointed out
that the universe is divine and that the cosmic principle is not sub-
ject to change and destruction. This idea contrasts with the popular
view, which pictured gods according to human ideas and human
desires:

"But mortals suppose that the gods are born (as they themselves
are), and that they wear man's clothing and have human voice and
body.

"But if cattle or lions had hands, so as to paint Avith their hands
and produce works of art as men do, they would paint their gods
and give them bodies in form like their own— horses like horses,
cattle like cattle.

"Homer and Hesiod attributed to the gods all things which are
disreputable and worthy of blame when done by men; and they
told of them many lawless deeds, stealing, adultery, and deception of
each other."^

The last passage, especially, shows that Xenophanes was primarily
a morahst. He asserted that Homer and Hesiod had distorted the
nature of the gods by picturing them as immoral. Naturally their
theory encouraged the citizens to imitate the behavior of the gods.
To counteract this tendency, Xenophanes pictured gods who were
completely moral and set a real example to the worshiper. Yet he
pointed out that our knowledge of religion is incomplete and that
everyone has a different concept of God and believes he has a spe-
cial revelation. Thus in Xenophanes' philosophy we detect a strong
note of skepticism, for no certain truth can be achieved in theo-
logical ?jmtters:

"Accordingly there has not been a man, nor will there be, who
knows distinctly what I say about the gods or in regard to all things,
for even if one chances for the most part to say what is true, still he
would not know; but everyone thinks he knows.

"These things have seemed to me to resemble the truth.

"In the beginning the gods did not at all reveal all things clearly
to mortals, but by searching men in the course of time find them
out better."""'

Xenophanes was just as skeptical about the doctrine of reincarna-
tion. He poked fun at it in the following passage:

"Now, however, I come to another topic, and I will show the
way. . . . They say that once on a time when a hound was badly

* Frags. 5, 6, 7 (ibid., p. 109).
5 Frags. 14, 15, 16 (ibid., p. no).

XENOPHANES 45

treated a passer-by pitied him and said, 'Stop beating him, for it is
the soul of a dear friend; I recognized him on hearing his voice.' "^

In his cosmological speculations Xenophanes held that all things
arise from earth and water. The sea, according to him, is the begetter
of clouds, winds, and rivers. He believed that an infinite number of
suns and moons exist and that the sun is formed each day from small
fiery particles which are gathered together. As to the stars, they are
"formed of burning cloud; these are extinguished each day, but they
are kindled again at night, like coals; for their risings and settings
are really kindlings and extinguishings. . . . The sun is composed of
fiery particles collected from the moist exhalation and massed to-
gether, or of the burning clouds. . . . Eclipses occur by extinction
of the sun; and the sun is born anew at its risings. . . . There are
many suns and moons according to the different regions and sec-
tions and zones of the earth. . . . and at some fitting time the disk of
the sun comes into a region of the earth not inhabited by us, and so
it suffers eclipses as though it had gone into a hole. . . . The sun goes
on for an infinite distance. . . ."''

He made some speculations regarding geology which are espe-
cially interesting in view of later discoveries:

"Xenophanes beUeves that once the earth was mingled with the
sea, but in the course of time it became freed from moisture; and his
proofs are such as these: that shells are found in the midst of the
land and among the mountains, that in the quarries of Syracuse the
imprints of a fish and of seals had been found, and in Paros the
imprint of an anchovy at some depth in the stone, and in Melite
shallow impressions of all sorts of sea products. He says that these
imprints were made when everything long ago was covered with
mud, and then the imprint dried in the mud. Farther he says that all
men will be destroyed when the earth sinks into the sea and becomes
fnud, and that the race will begin anew from the beginning; and this
transformation takes place for all worlds."^

In general, Xenophanes' cosmological theories were still primitive,
especially his view that the stars are fiery clouds which glow at night
and are extinguished by day. He was not systematic in his thoughts
and wrote more as a poet than as a technical philosopher. He also
had a philosophy of history. While the popular mind thought that
technological progress comes from the gods, he realized that men

•Trag. 18 {ibid., p. no).

'' Aet., Plac. 2. 13. Dox. 343 (ibid., pp. 11 2-1 13).

^ Hipp., Phil. 1. 14. Dox. 565 (ibid., p. 113).

46 THE BEGINNING OF METAPHYSICS

are responsible for it. Fire, thus, was not given by Zeus but is the
invention of man. He believed that most people prize material things
too highly and do not appreciate real wisdom.

All in all, Xenophanes' negative conclusions are more significant than
his positive affirmations. More clearly than any other ancient writer,
he described man's innate proclivity for anthropomorphism: his de-
sire to form a concept of God according to his own experiences.

It is difficult for the philosopher to free himself completely from
all anthropomorphic tendencies. Thinking naturally involves limi-
tations. The philosopher, too, is frequently bound by the idol of the
cave, the tribe, the market place, and the theater. He, too, is part of
the tradition and the mores of his times. But the greatness of philos-
ophy lies in its attempt to give an hnpartial view of reality, to see
things in perspective, and to achieve a more refined and sophisti-
cated concept of life. In all these matters Xenophanes made a re-
markable beginning.

PARMENIDES

Among ancient philosophers, Parmenides ranks among the foremost
and most brilliant. Less skeptical than Xenophanes, he was interested
in affirmations and in stating the nature of reality. He described two
ways of life: one deals with truth, the other \\ ith illusion. The way of
truth can be understood by the few whereas the masses naturally
incline to the path of illusion.

^^Parmenides came from a very wealthy family. He lived most of
his life in "Elea, in southern Italy, and is reported to have visited
Athens as an old man. He also had political interests and drew up a
code of laws which governed his native city. Apparently he was
early influenced by the Pythagoreans, who gave him his first philo-
sophic instruction, but he rebelled against their views, especially
against their cosmic dualism, and he pictured them later as adhering
to illusions.

The question arises. How are we to evaluate his poem The way of
opmioji? Various explanations have been given. Some commentators
have maintained that it represents a description of the behavior of
phenomena;^ others have asserted that it symbolizes the vulgar way
of looking at things ;^^ still others feel that it is an attack against his
earher allegiance to Pythagoreanism.^^

^ Gomperz, Griechiscbe Denker, i, 2, ii, § 5.
^0 Fuller, History of Greek philosophy, vol. i, p. 147.
11 Burnet, Greek philosophy, vol. i, pp. 65-66.

PARMENIDES 47

At any rate, a dualism prevails in The way of opmion: "Men
have determined in their minds to name two principles [lit., forms];
but one of these they ought not to name, and in so doing they have
erred. They distinguish them as antithetic in character, and give
them each character and attributes distinct from those of the other.
On the one hand there is the ethereal flame of fire, fine, rarefied,
everywhere identical with itself and not identical with its opposite;
and on the other hand, opposed to the first, is the second principle,
fiameless darkness, dense and heavy in character. . . .

"But since all things are called light and darkness, and the peculiar
properties of these are predicated of one thing and another, every-
thing is at the same time full of light and of obscure darkness, of
both equally, since neither has anything in common with the
other."!-'

On the other hand, in Parmenides' poem The way of truth there
is complete monism. He asks, What is the standard for truth, and
Avhat is the criterion for reality? How must it be conceived.^ He
answers categorically: It must be be regarded according to logical
consistency. His method was somewhat the same as that of Spinoza,
who started with definitions and postulates. Like Spinoza, Parmen-
ides assumed that thought and Being are one:

"It is necessary both to say and to think that Being is; for it is
possible that Being is, and it is impossible that Not-being is; this is
what I bid thee ponder. I restrain thee from this first course of in-
vestigation; and from that course also along which mortals knowing
nothing wander aimlessly, since helplessness directs the roaming
thought in their bosoms, and they are borne on deaf and likewise
blind, amazed, headstrong races, they who consider Being and Not-
being as the same and not the same; and that all things follow a
back-turning course." ^^

What does his logical analysis reveal? It shows that there can be
no paradoxes as Heraclitus asserted and that the law of contradiction
prevails. To say then that night is day, or war is peace, is impossible.
Instead, Parmenides speaks of the absolute existence of Being:

"There is left but this single path to tell thee of: namely, that
Being is. And on this path there are many proofs that Being is with-
out beginning and indestructible; it is universal, existing alone, im-
movable and without end; nor ever was it nor will it be, since it
now is, all together, one, and continuous. For what generating of it

^^ Concerni7ig opinions (Nahm, op. cit., pp. 117-118).
^^ Concernifig truth {ibid., p. 115).

48 THE BEGINNING OF METAPHYSICS

wilt thou seek out? From what did it grow, and how? I will not
permit thee to say or to think that it came from Not-being; for it is
impossible to think or to say that Not-being is. What thing would
then have stirred it into activity that it should arise from Not-being
later rather than earher? So it is necessary that Being either is abso-
lutely or is not. Nor will the force of the argument permit that any-
thing spring from Being except Being itself. Therefore justice does
not slacken her fetters to permit generation or destruction, but holds
Being firm."^^

Being is not subjected to destruction or creation, nor can it be
divided:

"Either Being exists or it does not exist. It has been decided in
accordance with necessity to leave the unthinkable, unspeakable
path, as this is not the true path, but that the other path exists and is
true. How then should Being suffer destruction? How come into
existence? If it came into existence, it is not Being, nor will it be if
it ever is to come into existence. ... So its generation is extinguished,
and its destruction is proved incredible."^-^

Parmenides held that tiiJie a?id change are part of the realm of
■1^ illusion. We believe in the flux because our senses deceive us. In
reality. Being is always the same. "Farther it is unmoved, in the hold
of great chains, without beginning or end, since generation and de-
struction have completely disappeared and true belief has rejected
them. It lies the same, abiding in the same state and by itself; accord-
ingly it abides fixed in the same spot. For powerful necessity holds
it in confining bonds, which restrain it on all sides. Therefore divine
right does not permit Being to have an end; but it is lacking in
nothing, for if it lacked anything it would lack everything.

"Nevertheless, behold steadfastly all absent things as present to
thy mind; for thou canst not separate Being in one place from con-
tact with Being in another place; it is not scattered here and there
through the universe, nor is it compounded of parts."^*^

There is nothing apart from Being, Parmenides continued, and
the concepts we usually use are illusory, for we cannot speak of
spatial change or of things arising and perishing.

"Therefore thinking and that by reason of which thought exists
are one and the same thing, for thou wilt not find thinking without
the Being from which it received its name. Nor is there nor will

1* Ibid., pp. 1 1 5-1 1 6.

^■' Ibid., p. 1 16.

1^ Ibid., pp. 1 1 6-1 17.

ZENO 49

there be anything apart from Being; for fate has linked it together,
so that it is a whole and immovable. Wherefore all these things will
be but a name, all these things which mortals determined in the
belief that they were true, viz., that things arise and perish, that they
are and are not, that they change their position and vary in color. "^^

Being, Parmenides taught, is spherical and completely homoge-
neous: "But since there is a final limit, it is perfected on every side,
likejhejnRSS of a rounded sphere,, equally distantjrom the center at
ever^point. For it is necessary that it should neither be~greater at
allnor less anywhere, since there is no Not-being which can prevent
it from arriving at equality, nor is Being such that there may ever be
more than what is in one part and less in another, since the whole is
inviolate. For if it is equal on all sides, it abides in equality within
its limits."^^

What are the implications of Parmenides' doctrine? In the first
place, his view of reality is directed against the concept of a dynamic
universe. In_the second place, it is a scheme which does not accept
the evidence jqI the senses. He reminds us that we must rely on rea-
son, which shows there is no change, no time, no motion, and no
creation.

It would be a mistake to believe that Parmenides came to an im-
materialistic conclusion. The Being about which he spoke is quite
corporeal and in some ways resembles the world-stuff^ of the Mile-
sians. He raised more questions than he could answer, especially
regarding the nature of reality. Most of the eminent philosophers of
ancient times spoke of him with great respect, which he richly
deserved.

ZENO

Parmenides was followed by Zeno, who ably developed the Eleatic
philosophy. Zeno is described as very handsome and sharp-witted;
and there are accounts of his visiting Athens together with Par-
menides. It is reported that he was a great lover of liberty and a
tireless opponent of tyranny. His writings have been lost, and so we
must rely on second-hand accounts.

In his arguments Zeno used the method of dialectic, which was
later perfected by Socrates. In the dialectic method we start our
intellectual task by assuming the truth of an argument which we
wish to oppose, and then expose its absurdity. It is a very subtle

'^'^ Ibid., p. 117.
^*^ Ibid., p. 117.

50 THE BEGINNING OF METAPHYSICS

weapon, which Zeno used with consummate skill. Turning to the
opponents of Parmenides, he admitted for a moment the truth of
their contention, but at once proceeded to point out their contradic-
tions and fallacies.

Let us assume for the moment that reality is composed of many
parts. What does this assumption imply? The whole must be the
sum of the parts. But here we have a contradictory statement. Drop
a grain and there will be no noise; yet drop a bushel of grain and
certain sounds will be heard. How can we explain this? How can we
understand this paradox? Does it not indicate that we cannot con-
ceive of reality as the sum of many parts?

Take another example. Let us say that reality can be divided, as
the opponents of Parmenides believed. Now let us carry on this
process of division. We finally come to an indivisible unit, but in
our imagination we can carry on the process of subdivision ad in-
finitum. Again a contradiction results. Reality then is finite and
infinite; infinitely small and infinitely large. In Zeno's own words:

"If Being did not have magnitude, it would not exist at all. ... If
anything exists, it is necessary that each thing should have some
magnitude and thickness, and that one part of it should be separated
from another. The same argument applies to the thing that is in
front of it, for that also will have magnitude and will have some-
thing in front of it. The same may be said of each thing once for all,
for there will be no such thing as last, nor will one thing differ from
another. So if there is a multiplicity of things, it is necessary that
these should be great and small— small enough not to have any mag-
nitude, and great enough to be infinite.

"For if anything were added to another thing, it could not make
it any greater; for since greatness does not exist, it is impossible to
increase the greatness of a thing by adding to it. So that which is
added would be nothing. If when something is taken away that
which is left is no less, and if it becomes no greater by receiving
additions, evidently that which has been added or taken away is
nothing."^'*

Parmenides had asserted that outside the sphere of Being, no space
exists. If we admit that there is a space, Zeno declared, "it will be in
something, for all Being is in something, and that which is in some-
thing is in space. So space will be in space, and so on ad infinitwji.
Accordingly, there is no such thing as space."-"

19 Frags. I, 2 {ibid., pp. 121-122).

20 Frag. 4 {ibid., p. 122).

ZENO 51

Most famous are Zeno's paradoxes relating to motion. The plural-
istic philosophy held that space is infinitely divisible. Now, Zeno
asked, if this is so, how can we ever come to the end of it? We al-
ways traverse half the distance. This theory explains the paradox of
Achilles and the tortoise. Achilles can never catch the tortoise, for
it is necessary that he should first reach the point from which
the tortoise started. He will gain, but the tortoise will always be
ahead.

Take another famous paradox. Look at the flying arrow. In reality
the flying arrow is still, otherwise it could not be perceived. "As a
moving body it is always in the present moment (in a space equal to
itself)." Again we have a basic contradiction, declared Zeno, and
he w ent on to show that it is better to accept the view of Parmenides
that there is no motion.

Finally Zeno bolstered up the Eleatic position by giving another
example:

"Half the time may be equal to double the time. Let us suppose
three rows of bodies, one of which (A) is at rest while the other
two (B,C) are moving with equal velocity in opposite directions
[see Figure i]. By the time they are all in the same part of the
course, B will have passed twice as many of the bodies in C as A
[Figure 2].

Figure i

Figure 2

0 0

0000

000

0000

"Therefore the time which it takes to pass C is twice as long as
the time it takes to pass A. But the time which B and C take to reach
the position of A is the same. Therefore double the time is equal to
the half."2i

What is the result of accepting the pluralistic hypothesis? We are
caught in a fundamental paradox. Logic refuses to accept this con-
tradiction and instead inclines to the view of Parmenides, who
denied the reality of motion, change, and plurality.

The paradoxes have occupied many modern philosophers, espe-
cially Bergson and Bertrand Russell. As long as mathematics did not
have a clear view of the infinite and the infinitesimal, no solution
was forthcoming. In his book Mysticism a?id logic (ch. v) Russell
gives a penetrating exposition of the paradoxes and shows how the

^^ Ibid., p. 123.

52 THE BEGINNING OF METAPHYSICS

recent advances in mathematics have eliminated the validity of Zeno's
standpoint.

The layman will probably smile at Zeno's conclusions. He will
think it absurd to reject the reality of change and motion, but it
must be remembered that philosophy tries to go beyond appearances
in the search for a comprehensive view of reality. For this purpose
Zeno used the method of dialectic. To him it was a tool which ex-
posed illusion and the untrustworthiness of the senses.

MELISSUS

With A4elissus we come to the end of the Eleatic tradition. He was
even more prominent in politics than Zeno, and we find him
actively engaged in warfare against the Athenians. He was a com-
mander of the fleet of Samos, and his opponent, strangely enough,
was Sophocles, the great poet. He defeated the fleet of Sophocles;
but his triumph did not last long, and Pericles in 439 b.c. forced the
surrender of Samos. The terms were not exceptionally harsh, except
that the fortifications of the city were to be torn down, tribute was
to be paid, and the fleet turned over to the Athenians. Undoubtedly,
Melissus was more successful in philosophy than in warfare.

Melissus agreed with Parmenides and Zeno that Being is inde-
structible, eternal, and uncreated. But he differed from Parmenides
in a significant way, for he thought that Being is infinite, both spa-
tially and temporally. He argued that if it were finite it would have
a beginning and an end and would not be eternal.

Let us see how Melissus justified his conclusions. He showed first
of all that Being cannot rise out of nothing, for how can it be gen-
erated out of nothingness? We cannot accept the pluralistic hypoth-
esis, for this would imply a limitation of the absolute principle.

"So then the all is eternal and infinite and homogeneous; and it
could neither perish nor become greater nor change its arrangement
nor suffer pain or distress. If it experienced any of these things it
would no longer be one; for if it becomes different, it is necessary
that Being should not be homogeneous, but that which was before
must perish, and that which was not must come into existence. If
then the all should become different by a single hair in ten thousand
years, it would perish in the whole of time.

"And it is impossible for its order to change, for the order existing
before does not perish, nor does another which did not exist come
into Being; and since nothing is added to it or subtracted from it or
made different, how could any of the things that are change their

MELISSUS 53

order? But if anything became different, its order would already
have been changed.

"Nor does it suffer pain, for the all could not be pained; it would
be impossible for anything suffering pain always to be; nor does it
have power equal to the power of what is healthy. It would not be
homogeneous if it suffered pain; it would suffer pain whenever any-
thing was added or taken away, and it would no longer be homoge-
neous. Nor could what is healthy suffer a pang of pain, for both the
healthy and Being would perish, and Not-being would come into
existence. The same reasoning that appUes to pain also applies to
distress."--

Melissus pointed out that there is no emptiness in the universe, for
emptiness implies that nothingness exists, which he thought impos-
sible. He denied that Being moves or that it can be rare or dense or
that it has a body, "for if it did it would have parts and would no
longer be one."

His strongest argument, that Being is one only, is as follows: "For
if a multiplicity of things existed it would be necessary that these
things should be just such as I say the one is. For if the earth exists,
and water and air and iron and gold and fire and the living and the
dead and black and white, and everything else which men say is
real,— if these things exist and we see and hear them correctly, it is
necessary that each thing should be such as we first determined,
namely, it should not change its character or become different, but
should always be each thing what it is. Now we say that we see and
hear and understand correctly; but it seems to us that hot becomes
cold and cold hot, that hard becomes soft and soft hard, that the
living being dies and Hfe comes from what is not Uving; and that all
these things become different, and what they are is not like what
they were. . . . Evidently we do not see correctly, nor is the appear-
ance of multiplicity correct; for they would not change their char-
acter if they were real, but would remain each thing as it seemed,
for nothing is nobler than that which is real. But if they change their
character, Being perishes and Not-being comes into existence. So
then if a multiplicity of things exist, it is necessary that they should
be such as the one is."-'^

Melissus was attacked rather harshly by Aristotle, who declared
that he had violated the law of contradiction. However, Aristotle, it
appears, did not understand the full impact of Mehssus' theories.

22 Frag. 7 (ibid., p. 266).
"Frag. 8 (ibid., p. 267).

5^4' THE BEGINNING OF METAPHYSICS

Generally Melissus' thought was consistent, and he worked out the
conclusions of the Eleatic school in excellent detail.

Again a word of caution! When Aielissus spoke about Being, he
did not imply a spiritual God but, rather, a corporeal entity. Spir-
itual ideals did not emerge until later Greek philosophy.

HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE
ELEATICS

The Eleatic school of philosophy made a permanent contribution to
Greek thinking. It raised significant metaphysical problems, pointed
out the fallacies of common-sense thinking, underlined the value of
mathematics, and heightened an interest in logic. It was an excellent
antidote for the philosophy of Heraclitus, who affirmed so strongly
the reality of change and flux.

In the Eleatic system we have the beginnings of Platonism. No
wonder that Parmenides occupied an important place in Plato's
thinking, for Parmenides believed there must be a profound distinc-
tion between opinion and truth. As philosophy progressed in ancient
times this distinction became more pronounced and more sharply
drawn, and it found its climax in the Christian viewpoint, which
puts the realm of the spirit as absolute reality and the realm of mat-
ter as the source of evil.

That thinking involves paradoxes has been noticed most clearly in
modern times by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of pure reason.
Perhaps the most profound aspect of his work is his discussion of
the antinomies, in which he shows that the universe can be con-
ceived as both finite and infinite, determined and undetermined. Ac-
cording to Kant, reason can never give us complete reality. In this
concept Kant differed from the Eleatics, who accepted reason as
the key to truth.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why was Xenophanes opposed to the popular concept of the gods?

2. Is it possible for religion to get away from anthropomorphism? Jus-
tify your answer.

3. What was Xenophanes' concept of God? Do you agree with him?

4. How did Parmenides regard time and change?

5. How did Parmenides describe reality?

6. What are the paradoxes of Zeno? How can they best be defended?

7. What were the important events in the life of Melissus?

8. Describe the principal tenets of the philosophy of Melissus.

9. Compare the world-view of Heraclitus with that of the Eleatics.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PLURALISM

EMPEDOCLES

fmpedocles was born in Agrigentum, Sicily, which resembled
Miletus in power and wealth. It was a city in which a bitter struggle
was going on between the upper and the middle class. Various dic-
tators arose who reigned in the name of the middle class. Especially
important among them were Phalaris, who punished his enemies in
the most merciless way by roasting them in an oven, and Theron,
who was less harsh than Phalaris and under whom the city flour-
ished. Empedocles himself was a leader of the democratic cause, and
he hated tyranny. When the people offered him the position of king
he refused, so strong were his democratic beUefs.

Agrigentum was a cosmopolitan city to which came traders from
many parts of the Mediterranean coast. As a result its merchants
became opulent, and its upper class indulged in luxurious living. We
cannot appreciate the theories of Empedocles if we do not realize
that many of his views were directed against the prevalent moral
laxity.

56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLURALISM

The lifetime of Empedocles extended from c. 495 to 435 b.c.
He witnessed the war with Syracuse, the attack of the Persians, and
their consequent defeat. In 480 the Carthaginians attacked Sicily,
and they were defeated by the combined forces of Agrigentum and
Syracuse. In the same year the Persian fleet suffered a disastrous
rout at Salamis. Athens was becoming the dominant city-state in
Greece, and this fact changed the balance of power in the Mediter-
ranean.

Empedocles exhibited a dual personality. On the one hand, he was
profoundly religious, and he was worshiped as a man who could
perform miracles.^ On the other hand, his science was up-to-date,
and he anticipated many modern conclusions.

In his cosmology Empedocles accepted four fundamental prin-
ciples: fire, water, earth, and air. He claimed that all things are com-
posed of them. Thus, instead of one substance, as we find in the
philosophy of Thales and the Milesians, he named several substances
to explain the structure of the universe. Like the Eleatics, he main-
tained there is no void. But the question emerges. How does change
arise? How can we describe the phenomenal world? Empedocles
used two principles: love and strife. Love brings the elements to-
gether whereas strife separates them. Both are cosmic forces and
corporeal. Frequently he used sexual terms to describe the action of
love.

In a rudimentary form we have an anticipation of Freudian
theory. This was noticed by Santayana in an essay entitled So7ne
turns of thought in moderji philosophy. Freud, too, described a basic
conflict in the universe between the drive for life and the urge for
death. It appears that to Freud the death principle was more power-
ful, for it led him to pessimistic conclusions and to a feeling that
civilization was doomed.

Empedocles was more optimistic than Freud, at least in his cos-
mology. He described four stages:

The first stage witnesses the supremacy of love. The four ele-
ments are together in complete adjustment, and there is no knowl-
edge of strife. It is almost a Utopian condition.

The second stage sees the appearance of strife. Love now is less
dominant. This is a period of disintegration. War enters the scene
and with it untold human suffering. The only escape is through re-
ligion, which uses definite rites of purification and seeks a release
from earthly suflFering.

''■ Cf. Zeller, Pre-Socratic philosophy, 11, p. 119.

EMPEDOCLES 57

The third stage witnesses a complete dominance of strife, which
now has exclusive mastery. Aietaphysically, it indicates that the four
elements are disunited. As a result earth, air, fire, and water are
separated. Cosmic chaos has reached a climax; it makes individual
existence impossible.

The fourth stage is the triumph of love. Again there are grounds
for optimism. Signs of progress are apparent, for love enters and
banishes strife. Individual things come into existence again, and the
elements are reunited. This is not, however, the end of the world
process according to Empedocles, for he, following the traditions of
Greek thought, regarded life as a cycle which goes on endlessly and
produces a multitude of worlds.

Empedocles' astronomical views are also significant. He held that
"the ether was first separated, and secondly fire, and then earth,
from which, as it was compressed tightly by the force of its rotation,
water gushed forth; and from this the air arose as vapor, and the
heavens arose from the ether, the sun from the fire, and bodies on
the earth were compressed out of the others."-

He described two spheres moving in a circle around the earth.
". . . one [is] of pure fire, the other of air and a little fire mixed,
which he thinks is night."^

His views of nature are startling. Plants, he thought, have capacity
for sensation. Incidentally, he described the physiological structure
of man with some degree of accuracy.

Many of Empedocles' theories were mythological. In his view of
evolution, he taught that first primitive forms arose which had no
sexual differentiation. Through the action of strife, they were di-
vided into species. Some inhabited the earth; others took to water;
while still others felt most at home in the air. Later, strange new-
forms arose, such as heads without necks and eyes without fore-
heads. There was an even greater mixture, resulting in the mating of
creatures with unnatural descendants. For instance, there were off-
spring with the heads of oxen and the bodies of men.

Unhke Aristotle, Empedocles believed in a mechanistic theory of
evolution. There is no concept of teleology in his philosophy; ad-
justment to the environment is all-important. Those forms which
were not adapted to life perished; others, which showed greater
power of adaptation, survived.

2 Aet., Plac. ii, 6; Dox. 334, Nahm, Selections front early Greek philosophy,
p. 142.
^ Plut. Strom. 10; Dox. 582 {ibid., p. 142).

58 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLURALISM

Empedocles stimulated epistemological discussion by his descrip-
tion of tlie work of the senses. His formula was that thought arises
from what is like:

"Empedocles speaks in like manner concerning all the senses,
and says that we perceive by a fitting into the pores of each sense.
So they are not able to discern one another's objects, for the pores
of some are too wide and of others too narrow for the object of
sensation, so that some things go right through untouched, and
others are unable to enter completely. And he attempts to describe
what vision is; and he says that what is in the eye is fire and water
and what surrounds it is earth and air, through which light being fine
enters, as the light in lanterns. Pores of fire and M^ater are set alter-
nately, and the fire-pores recognize white objects, the water-pores
black objects; for the colors harmonize with the pores. And the
colors move into vision by means of effluences. And they are not
composed alike . . . and some of opposite elements; for some the fire
is within and for others it is on the outside, so some animals see
better in the daytime and others at night; those that have less fire
see better by day, for the light inside them is balanced by the light
outside them; and those that have less water see better at night, for
what is lacking is made up for them."^

Besides discussing the phenomena of vision, Empedocles described
the other senses:

"And hearing is the result of noises coming from outside. For
when (the air) is set in motion by a sound, there is an echo within
. . . and the ear he calls an 'ofl^shoot of flesh': and the air when it is set
in motion strikes on something hard and makes an echo. And smell
is connected with breathing, so those have the keenest smell whose
breath moves most quickly; and the strongest odor arises as an
effluence from fine and light bodies. But he makes no careful dis-
crimination with reference to taste and touch separately, either how
or by what means they take place, except the general statement
that sensation takes place by a fitting into the pores; and pleasure is
due to likenesses in the elements and in their mixture, and pain to
the opposite."^

Empedocles gave a physiological explanation of thought and
perception. According to his way of thinking, even the moral and
intellectual qualities of mankind are dependent upon ?nechanistic
factors:

* Theophrastus, de sens. 7; Dox. 500 {ibid., pp. 142-143).
5 Ibid., p. 143.

RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES OF EMPEDOCLES 59

". . . thought is the same thing as, or something like, sensation. For
recounting how we recognize each thing by each, he said at lengtht
Now out of these (elements) all things are fitted together and their
form is fixed, and by these men think and feel pleasure and pain. So
it is by blood especially that we think; for in this specially are min-
gled (all) the elements of things. And those in whom equal and like
parts have been mixed, not too far apart, nor yet small parts, nor
exceeding great, these have the most intelligence and the most ac-
curate senses; and those who approximate to this come next; and
those who have the opposite quahties are the most lacking in intel-
ligence. And those in whom the elements are scattered and rarefied,
are torpid and easily fatigued; and those in whom the elements are
small and thrown close together, move so rapidly and meet with so
many things that they accomplish but little by reason of the swift-
ness of the motion of the blood. And those in whom there is a well-
tempered mixture in some one part, are wise at this point; so some
are good orators, others good artisans, according as the mixture is in
the hands or in the tongue; and the same is true of the other
powers."^

RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES OF EMPEDOCLES

Empedocles' religious doctrines were influenced by the Mysteries.
He stated that men are outcasts trying to regain the bliss of heaven.
Life takes place in "the joyless land, where are murder and wTath
and troops of other spirits of evil, and parching plagues and putre-
factions and floods roam in darkness through the meadow of De-
struction."'

He himself thought he had been on various occasions in earlier
reincarnations a boy, a girl, a bush, a bird, and a fish in the sea. One
time he had been an inhabitant of Olympus, but now he was an
exile from heaven. Life on earth, then, according to Empedocles, is
a pilgrimage:

"There is an Oracle of Destiny, a decree of the gods from of old,
eternal, with broad oaths fast sealed: Whensoever one sinfully de-
files his own hands with blood, or, following after strife, swears a
false oath— even one of those spirits that are heirs of everlasting life,
thrice ten thousand seasons shall he wander far from the Blessed,

® Ibid., pp. 143-144.

'^ Frags. 121, 124, Cornford, ed., Greek religiotis thought jroni Ho?ner to the
age of Alexander, p. 73.

6o THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLURALISM

being born from time to time in all manner of mortal shapes, passing
from one to another of the painful paths of hfe.

"For the power of the Air drives him seaward; and Sea spews him
out upon dry land; Earth casts him into the rays of the blazing Sun,
and Sun into the eddying Air. One from another receives him, and
he is abhorred of all."^

How then can we achieve divinity? How can we be released from
reincarnation? Empedocles stressed, above all, purification, absti-
nence from warfare, and vegetarianism. His doctrine of deity was
more refined than that of popular theology in that he beHeved we
cannot attribute any 77mterial traits to God; rather, we must visualize
him as ineffable mind. He thought that the popular gods had only a
symbolic meaning. While he did not deny their existence, he re-
garded them with considerable indifference.

ATHENIAN CULTURE

With Anaxagoras, whom we shall next consider, the scene of philos-
ophy moves to Athens. He was part of the brilliant revival which
we associate with the Periclean Age. Although he was born at Claz-
omenae, he spent many years in Athens, where he was regarded as
an extremely profound philosopher. In this age Phidias beautified
the city, the great tragic poets elevated the drama to new heights,
and the Sophists stimulated a new interest in education.

The spirit of this Greek enlightenment was well expressed by the
funeral oration of Pericles, delivered in 431 b.c. It commemorates
those who had died during the first year of the Peloponnesian War.
Pericles started out by describing the advantages of democracy.

"We enjoy a form of government which is not in rivalry with
the institutions of our neighbors, nay, we ourselves are rather an
example to many than imitators of others. By name, since the ad-
ministration is not in the hands of few but of many, it is called a
democracy. And it is true that before the law and in private cases all
citizens are on an equality. But in public life every man is advanced
to honor according to his reputation for ability,— not because of his
party, but because of his excellence. And further, provided he is able
to do the city good service, not even in poverty does he find any
hindrance, since this cannot obscure men's good opinion of him."^

Pericles described the spiritual blessings of Athens and compared
them with the stagnation of other city-states:

8 Frag. 115 (ibid., p. 72).

8 Thucydides, ii, 37-41 (Webster, Historical selections, pp. 155-156).

ATHENIAN CULTURE 6i

"Furthermore, we above all men provide ourselves with spiritual
refreshment after toil. Regular games and religious festivals fill our
year, while the life we lead in private is refined. The daily enjoy-
ment of all these blessings keeps dull care at bay. Because of the
greatness of our city, the products of the whole earth stream in upon
us, so that we enjoy the rich fruits of other men's labors with as
intimate a relish as our own."^*^

This description by Pericles is a rather idealistic version of
Athenian democracy. To obtain a correct balance let us take a look
at Aristophanes, who had a quick eye for the limitations of popular
government. In The knights he satirized the mediocre government
of Athens and described how frequently it was ruled by the most
incapable leaders:

Demosthenes, who is a general of the aristocratic faction, addresses

the sausage seller:

"Set these poor wares aside; and now— bow down

To the ground; and adore the powers of earth and heaven.

S.S. Heigh-day! Why, what do you mean?

Dem. O happy man!

Unconscious of your glorious destiny,
Now mean and unregarded; but to-morrow.
The mightiest of the mighty, Lord of Athens.

5.S. Come, master, what's the use of making game?
Why can't ye let me wash my guts and tripe.
And sell my sausages in peace and quiet?

Dem. O simple mortal, cast those thoughts aside!

Bid guts and tripe farewell! Look here! Behold!

(pointmg to the audience)

The mighty assembled multitude before ye!

S.S. (with a grumble of indijference)
I see 'em.

De?n. You shall be their lord and master,

The sovereign and the ruler of them all.

Of the assemblies and tribunals, fleets and armies;

You shall trample down the Senate under foot.

Confound and crush the generals and commanders.

Arrest, imprison, and confine in irons.

And feast and fornicate in the Council House."^^

^°Ibid., p. 156.

^'^The knights, 155-167.

6t THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLURALISM

[The Sausage Seller wonders if there are any means of making a
great man out of him. After all, he is neither well-bred nor well-
bom.]

DeTn. "The very means you have, must make ye so.

Low breeding, vulgar birth, and impudence.

These, these must make ye, what you're meant to be.
S.S. I can't imagine that I'm good for much.
Dem. Alas! But why do ye say so? What's the meaning

Of these misgivings? I discern within ye

A promise and an inward consciousness

Of greatness. Tell me truly: are ye allied

To the families of gentry?
S.S. Naugh, not I;

I'm come from a common ordinary kindred.

Of the lower order.
Dem. What a happiness!

What a footing will it give ye! What a groundwork

For confidence and favor at your outset!
S.S. But bless ye! only consider my education!

I can but barely read ... in a kind of way.
Dem. That makes against ye!— the only thing against ye—

Xhe being able to read, in any way:

For now no lead nor influence is allo\\"ed

To liberal arts or learned education,

But to the brutal, base, and underbred.

Embrace then and hold fast the promises

Which the oracles of the gods announce to you."^-

PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS

Perhaps Aristophanes was exaggerating the weakness of the Athe-
nians, but history abounds in examples illustrating the irrationality
which prevailed in this center of Greek culture. It is quite certain
that the Athenians were conservative in their religious views, as
evidenced by their attitude towards Anaxagoras, whom they put on
trial for his heretical views.

In one of his treatises Anaxagoras had explained that the sun is not
a divinity but a fiery stone. The moon, likewise, he regarded scien-
tifically. As a result he was convicted of atheism and jailed, and it
was only through the help of Pericles that he escaped. He spent his

^^ Ibid., 178-194.

PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS 63

last years at Lampsacus, on the shore of the Hellespont, where he
was greatly admired and treated as one of the prize possessions of
the city.

The persecution of Anaxagoras in Athens was not accidental.
Many conservatives hated Pericles and thought him subversive.
They disliked the association of Pericles with Aspasia and consid-
ered his reforms of the law dangerous to the Athenian government.
Hence, we find that not only Anaxagoras but also Phidias, Aspasia,
and Pericles himself were all exposed to lawsuits and suffered from
the ever-changing moods of the Athenian citizens.

In his cosmology, Anaxagoras asserted that there is no empty
space, but unUke Empedocles he did not believe in a definite num-
ber of particles; rather, he taught that an infimte number of particles
or seeds exist. The substances which we perceive are the result of a
mixture of these particles. These seeds or particles cannot be de-
scribed adequately by the senses. They are best explained by reason.
In his philosophy Mind {nous) has an elevated status. It is infinite
and completely pure:

"In all things there is a portion of everything except mind; and
there are things in which there is mind also.

"Other things include a portion of everything, but mind is infinite
and self-powerful and mixed with nothing, but it exists alone itself
by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything
else, it would include parts of all things, if it were mixed with any-
thing; for a portion of everything exists in everything, as has been
said by me before, and things mingled with it would prevent it from
having power over anything in the same way that it does now that
it is alone by itself. For it is the most rarefied of all things and the
purest, and it has all knowledge in regard to everything and the
greatest power; over all that has life, both greater and less, mind
rules. And mind ruled the rotation of the whole, so that it set it in
rotation in the beginning. First it began the rotation from a small
beginning, then more and more was included in the motion, and yet
more will be included. Both the mixed and the separated and dis-
tinct, all things mind recognized. And whatever things were to be,
and whatever things were, as many as are now, and whatever things
shall be, all these mind arranged in order; and it arranged that rota-
tion, according to which now rotate stars and sun and moon and air
and ether, now that they are separated. Rotation itself caused the
separation, and the dense is separated from the rare, the warm from
the cold, the bright from the dark, the dry from the moist. And

64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLURALISM

there are many portions of many things. Nothing is absolutely sep-

jj arated nor disjunct, one thing from another, except mind."^^

,0^ We must' hot conceive of the jwus of Anaxagoras in teleological

k terms. Both Aristotle and Plato testify to the fact that Anaxagoras

interpreted the mind mechanically and described it in corporeal

terms. In his cosmology he indicated how the mind starts to set

things in motion. This has the following results:

"The dense and the moist and the dark and the cold and all heavy
things come together into the midst, and the earth consists of these
when they are soUdified; but the opposite to these, the warm, the
bright, the dry, and the light move out beyond the ether. The earth
is flat in form, and keeps its place in the heavens because of its size
and because there is no void; and on this account the air by its
strength holds up the earth, which rides on the air. And the sea
arose from the moisture on the earth, both of the waters which have
fallen after being evaporated, and of the rivers that flow down
into it. And the rivers get their substance from the clouds and from
the waters that are in the earth. For the earth is hollow and has water
in the hollow places. And the Nile increases in summer because
waters flow down into it from snows at the north." ^^

Anaxagoras explained that the sun and the moon are fiery stones
carried around by the revolution of the ether:

". . . And sun and moon and certain other bodies moving with
them, but invisible to us, are below the stars. Men do not feel the
warmth of the stars, because they are so far away from the earth;
and they are not warm in the same way that the sun is, because
they are in a colder region. The moon is below the sun and nearer
us. The sun is larger than the Peloponnesos. The moon does not
have its own light, but light from the sun. The revolution of the
stars takes them beneath the earth. The moon is eclipsed when the
earth goes in front of it, and sometimes when the bodies beneath
the moon go in front of it; and the sun is ecUpsed M^hen the new
moon goes in front of it."^^

His views on earthquakes, the nature of winds, and animals
were in advance of his time:

"And winds arise when the air is rarefied by the sun, and when
objects are set on fire and moving towards the sphere are borne
away. Thunders and lightnings arise from heat striking the clouds.

13 Frags. 5, 6 (Nahm, op. cit., pp. 150-151).
"Hipp., Phil. 8; Dox. 561 (ibid., p. 153).
^^ Ibid., pp. 153-154.

PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS 6$

Earthquakes arise from the air above striking that which is beneath
the earth; for when this is set in motion, the earth which rides on it
is tossed about by it. And animals arose in the first place from mois-
ture, and afterwards one from another; and males arise when the
seed that is separated from the right side becomes attached to the
right side of the womb, and females when the opposite is the case."^*'

Notice that he gave a naturalistic account of evolution. Animals
are not created by divine decree, said he, nor is man exempt from
the mechanistic chain of causation.

In the philosophy of Anaxagoras we find a plurality of worlds.
He speculated that other planets are in existence which likewise are
inhabited and which contain the elements of civilization. In this
view he exhibited again a vast and bold imagination.

In his doctrine of knowledge Anaxagoras contradicted Em-
pedocles. He thought that sensation takes place through opposite
quahties:

". . . Hke is not affected by hke. And he attempts to enumerate
things one by one. For seeing is a reflection in the pupil, and objects
are not reflected in the like, but in the opposite. And for many crea-
tures there is a difference of color in the daytime, and for others
at night, so that at that time they are sharp-sighted. But in general
the night is more of the same color as the eyes. And the reflection
takes place in the daytime, since light is the cause of reflection; but
that color which prevails the more is reflected in its opposite. In
the same manner both touch and taste discern; for what is equally
warm or equally cold does not produce warm or cold when it ap-
proaches its like, nor yet do men recognize sweet or bitter by these
qualities in themselves, but they perceive the cold by the warm, the
drinkable water by the salt, the sweet by the bitter, according as
each quality is absent; for all things are existing in us. . . . And
every sensation is attended with pain, which would seem to follow
from the fundamental thesis; for every unhke thing by touching
produces distress."^'

Anaxagoras also appHed his metaphysical and epistemological con-
cepts to religion. He did not beheve in divination or miracles. He
was unorthodox and gave only a symbolic explanation of the gods.
Consequently he identified Zeus with nous, and Athena with art.

It is interesting to note that Pericles made use of the scientific
labor of Anaxagoras. During a battle, an eclipse of the sun took

^^ Ibid., p. 154.

^^Theophr., de sens, i-j; Dox. 507 {ibid., pp. 154-155).

66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLURALISM

place— an ev^ent which frightened his warriors. Using the theory
of Anaxagoras, Pericles explained the phenomenon and thus restored
order among his military forces.

SUMMARY

The achievements of Anaxagoras were not inconsiderable. His con-
tributions to mythology, his hypothesis regarding planetary forma-
tion, his belief in the evolution of man, all showed his penetrating
insight. His principles indicate a fervent struggle between religion
and science. Usually the Greeks were tolerant when it came to new
scientific discoveries; but when the new theories became too radical,
the scientists had to suffer.

What caused the intolerance of the Athenians? One factor, of
course, was traditional religion, which had developed an orthodox
cosmological scheme. Another factor was politics. The conserva-
tives wanted to return to the good old days and were opposed to
any new ways of living and any new ideas. Furthermore, it must
be remembered that Anaxagoras was a foreigner, and his concepts
were regarded as alien and subversive.

There is an interesting story about Anaxagoras while he was at
Lampsacus. Upon hearing that the Athenians had condemned him
to death, he remarked that nature had condemned both the
Athenians and himself. This was indeed prophetic, for he died a few
years later, and Sparta destroyed Athenian power by the end of the
Peloponnesian War (404 b.c).

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the significance of the concept of nous in Anaxagoras?

2. Why was Anaxagoras persecuted by the Athenians? Why are modem
thinkers usually persecuted?

3. How scientific were Anaxagoras' views?

4. What is the role of love and strife in Empedocles?

5. How did Empedocles describe the process of evolution?

6. What were the sources of Athenian supremacy, according to Pericles?

7. How did Aristophanes satirize Athenian democracy? In your opinion,
how would he judge American democracy?

8. What are the four stages of life, according to Empedocles?

9. What were the religious views of Empedocles? Compare them with
the religious views of Xenophanes.

lo. What, in your opinion, are the main weaknesses of Empedocles'
philosophy?

ATO MISTS AND ECLECTICS

LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS

eucippus, the teacher of Democritus, ranked high among the
eminent scientific philosophers of ancient times. He was very much
respected by other philosophers, and his views appear to have been
advanced for his time; but his works have been lost, and thus we
can form no definite ideas regarding his concepts. We do not even
know where he was bom. According to ancient accounts it could
have been Abdera, Elea, Melos, or Miletus.

It is probable that he was a contemporary of Anaxagoras and
Empedocles. The loss of his work is extremely unfortunate since,
if we wish to restore completely the history of Greek philosophy,
our only alternative is to identify the views of Leucippus with
those of Democritus, as did the ancient commentators. It appears
certain that most of their views were identical.

Democritus is not as indefinite a figure as Leucippus. He was born
c. 460 B.C. and lived at Abdera. According to many accounts he
reached a ripe old age— ninety years, some say. Many philosophers
seem to enjoy longevity, as can be seen by the advanced age reached
by Bergson, Santayana, Russell, Dewey, and Whitehead in our own
time.

68 ATOMISTS AND ECLECTICS

In his boyhood Democritus showed intense interest in philosophy.
He could indulge in this pastime because he had a rich father, and
he obtained an excellent education through traveling. According
to ancient accounts he visited Egypt, where he was absorbed in
its religious tradition, and also Persia, Chaldea, Ethiopia, and India.
Apparently he visited Athens. This wide experience of travel in
foreign lands lends credence to his alleged boasting that he had
seen more nations than any other Greek.

At Abdera, Democritus built up a formidable philosophical
school. Many students gathered about him, the most promising
being Metrodorus of Chios and Anaxarchus of Abdera.

Democritus wrote most proHfically and covered many fields rang-
ing from philosophy to law. He also devoted himself to astronomy,
physics, biology, psychology, and ethics. Ancient commentators
maintained that his literary productions rivaled those of Aristotle,
who covered almost every subject of knowledge. Unfortunately,
the main works of Democritus have been lost, and in discussing
the Atomic school of philosophy we must rely primarily upon the
commentators.

THE ATOMISTS

The Atomic school ushered in a new scientific period. Democritus
and Leucippus, like the preceding philosophers, were interested in
the basic world-substance; but their evaluation of it was quite differ-
ent. Instead of a single basic substance, they spoke oL an infinite
number of ato?mrS'mce. there is no emptiness in them, it is impos-
sible to cut them. They are solid and completely homogeneous.

What makes'this theory modern is the Atomists' insistence that
motion does not come externally but is inherent in the atoms. They
discarded the view of Empedocles, who needed two external agents
to explain the rotation in the universe. This motion, the Atomists as-
serted, cannot be destroyed, for it is eternal.

Why do the atoms move? What causes them to swirl about?
What is their purpose? No definite answers were forthcoming. The
Atomists simply maintained that we must assume the fact of mo-
tion—an assumption made in modern science, which likewise postu-
lates definite first principles and from these deduces the behavior of
natural phenomena.

The fundamental aim of Democritus was not a description of
why the universe evolves, but how it can be described and under-
stood. Thus he gave us a quantitative interpretation of the world.

THE ATOMISTS 69

The Atomists were progressive in that they asserted positively
that empty space exists. The earlier thinkers, especially the Eleatics,
had conceived reaUty as fullness and had denied that emptiness can
exist. The void, to them, meant Non-being. Anaxagoras and Em-
pedocles hkewise denied the existence of empty space.

The Atomists explained that the fundamental particles move
around in empty space and that this motion gives rise to various
world systems. Here another problem arises. How is this motion to
be conceived? Is it teleological or mechanistic? Does it depend on a
divine force, or is it part of the inherent structure of things? The
Atomists answered unequivocally: Motion is caused by necessity. In
short, the universe must be conceived 2^^~mecJ5anistic structure.

The Atomists anticipated the^eal of modern science, which like-
wise teaches that man's progress lies in a complete understanding of
nature. Only by increasing our power over nature, modern science
tells us, can we achieve an adequate philosophy and bring about a
better civilization.

The Atomists made an important distinction between primary
and secondary qualities: Primary qualities, such as density and hard-
ness, are part of the atoms; but secondary qualities, such as color,
are only assumptions of our senses. The Atomists denied that the
particles can become hard, cold, warm, or dry. By nature nothing
is white, black, or yellow, since color exists only by convention,
according to Atomic philosophy.

The world scheme of Democritus exhibited a bold imagination.
Plutarch tells us:

"Democritus the Abderite supposed the universe to be infinite
because it had not been^ fashioned by any Maker. And again he
says it is unchangeable, and in general he states in express terms the
kind of universe it is: The causes of what now exists have no begin-
ning, but from infinitely preceding time absolutely everything
which was, is, and shall be, has been held down by necessity. But
he says the sun and the moon came into existence. They had their
own motion without having any heat or light but having, on the
contrary, a nature similar to earth. Each of them first came into
being by a pecuHar change of the cosmos, and later when the circle
of the sun was enlarged, fire was included in it."^

Furthermore, as we are told by Hippolytus, Democritus believed
in a plurality of worlds:

^ Plutarch, Strom. 7 (D 581), Nahm, Selections fro?n early Greek philosophy,
pp. 170-171.

70 ATOMISTS AND ECLECTICS

"... and there are an infinite number of worlds differing in
size; in some there is neither sun nor moon, in others they are larger
than ours, and in others there are many suns and moons. The dis-
tances between the worlds is unequal and in some quarters there
are more worlds, in others fewer, and some are growing and others
have reached their full size, and others are disintegrating, and in
some quarters worlds are coming into being and in others they are
ceasing to exist. They are destroyed by colliding with each other.
And some worlds are devoid of living beings and all moisture. In our
system the earth came into being before the stars, and the moon
is nearest the earth, and then the sun, and then the fixed stars. The
planets are not equally distant from the earth. The world remains
at its maturity until it can no longer receive any [nourishment]
from outside."-

The astronomical views of the Atomists were less sublime. They
thought of the earth as a disk in breadth, and hollow in the middle.
In their astronomical theories the influence of Anaximenes was
especially prominent.

An interesting account of perception was^iven by Democritus.
He believed that material objectsgive_off_iniages^which enter our
sense organs:

"^ "These images go to and fro in every direction, springing off
implements, clothes, plants, and especially living beings because of
their motion and warmth, and they not only have impressed on
them the same shape as the bodies . . . but they also assume the
appearances of the changes, thoughts, habits, and emotions of each
person's soul and so are drawn together. And if with these quali-
ties they strike a person, then like living beings they announce
and declare to those who receive them the opinions, arguments,
and impulses of those who released them, provided they retain the
hkenesses articulate and unconfused for impingement. The best re-
sults are obtained in calm air, since their motion is then unimpeded
and swift. But the air of autumn when the trees shed their leaves is
irregular and blustery. Therefore it twists and distorts the images
in various ways dimming and weakening their clearness which is
obscured by the slowness of their progress, while on the other hand
those which dart forth from things warm and fertile and are
quickly conveyed, deliver fresh and significant impressions." ^ Oc-
casionally, in this contact between the senses and the external

2 Hippol., Refut. I, 13 (D 565) (ibid., p. 171).

3 Plut., Quaest conv. viii, 10, 2, p. 734^. {ibid., pp. 179-180).

ETHICS AND RELIGION 7I

•<vorld, error occurs which is due to the constitution of the sense
organs and to the obstruction of the intervening air.

Despite his materialistic bias, Democritus beheved in reason. Per-
ception can give us only probable truth, he said, whereas reason
gives us certainty. It is a mistalce to regard Democritus as a skeptic,
for he was very much opposed to the skeptical conclusions which
the Sophists upheld.

Democritus explained that occasionally the soul achieves direct
contact with the images of the external world, thereby giving a
more adequate picture of phenomena, since this contact is not
blurred by the intervention of the senses. This connection between
the soul atoms and the atomic clusters of phenomena makes divine
knowledge possible. Reason^^to JDemocritus, was not a magic capac-
ity; rather, it was to be interpreted in a naturalistic manner.

ETHICS AND RELIGION

The ethical scheme of Democritus also deserves attention. He began
by praising the value of enjoyment and by showing that the pleas-
ure-pain principle is all-important. This, however, does not imply
physical hedonism because, according to him, the pleasures of the
mind are most significant. The wise man will be independent of his
environment: he will not rely on wealth, fame, or social position;
rather, he will cultivate restraint and sober understanding, avoiding
all excessive desires, for "glory and wealth without wisdom are not
safe possessions."

Characteristic of the Dernocritean moral teachings are the follow-
ing passages:

"Whoever commits disgraceful deeds should be ashamed first
before himself.

"He that contradicts and keeps on talking is unfitted to learn
what he should.

"To do all the talking and not be willing to hear anything is
greediness.

"One should watch the bad man lest he seize his opportunity.

"The envious man inflicts pain on himself as though he were an
enemy.

"The enemy is, not he that injures, but he that wants to.

"The enmity of one's kinfolk is far worse than that of strangers.

"Be not suspicious of everyone, but careful and wary.

"One should accept favors with the expectation of returning
them many-fold.

72 ATOMISTS AND ECLECTICS

"When conferring a favor, keep your eye on the recipient lest he
be a cheat who will requite good with evil.

"Benevolent is, not he that looks to the return, but he that wills
to do good."^

Democritus taught that it is more important to have regard for
the soul than for the body, and to believe in cheerfulness and the
avoidance of all envy:

"It is fitting that men have more regard for the soul than the
body, for the soul's perfection corrects the viciousness of the body,
but the vigor of the body, without reason, does not make the soul
a whit better.

"It is best for man to pass his life with as much cheerfulness as
possible and with as little distress. And this he would do, did he not
find his pleasures in mortal aff^airs.

"A4en attain cheerfulness through moderation in pleasure and
equableness of life. Excess and want are ever alternating and causing
great disturbances in the soul. Souls that are shifting from extreme
to extreme are neither steadfast nor cheerful. You should, there-
fore, fix your mind upon what is possible and be content with what
you have, giving little heed to those who are envied and admired,
and not allowing your thoughts to dwell upon them. Rather, you
should view the lives of the wretched and think of their suffering
so that what you now have and possess may seem great and enviable
to you, and that it be not your lot, while craving more, to suffer
at heart. "^

In turning to the religious theories of Democritus, we find an
emancipated spirit. He regarded the soul as being of the same con-
stitution as the body. Consciousness, then, depends upon the phys-
ical state of the soul. The soul, while more finely polished than the
body, is not an autonomous substance, and death scatters the soul
among other atoms. Consequently, Democritus did not believe in
personal immortality.

". . . Democritus affirms the soul to be a sort of fire or heat. For
the 'shapes' or atoms are infinite and those which are spherical he
declares to be fire and soul. . . . The aggregate of such seeds, he
tells us, forms the constituent elements of the whole of nature [and
herein he agrees with Leucippus], while those of them which are
spherical form the soul, because such figures most easily find their
way through everything and, being themselves in motion, set other

*The golden ?naxims (ibid., p. 214).
5 Stobaeus (ibid., pp. 218-219).

HIPPON 73

things in motion. The Atomists assume that it is the soul which im-
parts motion to animals. It is for this reason that they make life
depend upon respiration. For, when the surrounding air presses
upon bodies and tends to extrude those atomic shapes which, be-
cause they are never at rest themselves, impart motion to animals,
then they are reinforced from outside by the entry of other like
atoms in respiration, which in fact, by helping to check compression
and soHdification, prevent the escape of the atoms already contained
in the animals; and life, so they hold, continues so long as there is
strength to do this."^

Likewise, Democritus offered a simple, naturalistic explanation of
the gods:

"Democritus says that the men of old, when they saw what hap-
pens in the sky, such as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, conjunc-
tions of the stars, and eclipses of the sun and moon, were terrified
and thought that these things were caused by gods."^

Also, he held that "certain phantoms approach men (some of
which are productive of good, others of evil. Hence he prays) to
meet propitious phantoms. (Although not indestructible these phan-
toms are hard to destroy and they are great and marvelous for they
predict the future experience of men by being both seen and heard.
For this reason the ancients seized upon the appearance of these
things and considered it a god, as if God whose nature is inde-
structible were nothing else except these. )"^

Democritus believed that the gods give all good things to man-
kind, but that evil is brought about by men themselves. It is use-
less, according to his philosophy, to speculate on the hereafter,
for there is no certain knowledge regarding the subject.

HIPPON

With Hippon we enter the eclectic tradition in Greek philosophy,
in which originality no longer prevailed. Following Thales, Hippon
regarded water as the fundamental principle of the universe. He
explained the formation of the world by saying that it was due to
fire, which had conquered water. In ancient times he was regarded
as subversive in rehgion and frequently was accused of atheism. Like
Democritus, he had a naturalistic tendency in his philosophy.

^ Aristotle, On the soul, i. ii. 3, Comford, ed., Greek religious thought from
Homer to the age of Alexander, pp. 139-140.

^ Sextus Empiricus, adv. math. ix. 24 {ibid., p. 140).
^ Ibid., ix. 19 (Nahm, op. cit., pp. 217-218).

74 ATOMISTS AND ECLECTICS

CRATVLUS

Cratylus likewise showed little originality in his philosophy. Fol-
lowing the tradition of Heraclitus, he went to extremes in his in-
sistence upon the prevailing flux in the universe. Because he was so
imbued with the prevalence of change, he made no positive intel-
lectual assertions whatsoever. He was occupied mainly with the
philosophy of language and influenced Plato, whom he instructed
in philosophy.

DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA

Diogenes echoed the views of Anaximenes and returned to the
theory of air as the fundamental substance. The changes in the
world he attributed to rarefaction and condensation. He did not
describe air as a mechanistic substance; rather, he believed it has the
power of thought. The air substance, he taught, sustains all life;
when it leaves the body, death ensues.

METRODORUS

Metrodorus was a disciple of Anaxagoras, but he appears to have
been more pious than the latter. It will be remembered that
Anaxagoras and Xenophanes attacked the popular doctrine of the
gods; to this attack Metrodorus replied by giving allegorical ac-
counts of Zeus and by describing the Homeric heroes as divine fig-
ures. He believed in the similarity between divine beings and man.
Nature, to him, was pregnant with sacred symbolism. He greatly ad-
mired Homer's Iliad and thought it contains valuable wisdom con-
cerning the nature of the gods.

ARCHELAUS OF ATHENS

Archelaus was more skeptical than Metrodorus, and in ethics he
made a distinction between nature and convention. Thus he antici-
pated the conclusions of the Sophists.

In his cosmology, he thought that mind and matter have always
been mixed. The two principles which produced the world, accord-
ing to him, are the ivarjn and the cold. The warm, he thought,
is in constant motion while the cold is inert.

His astronomical theory was geocefitric, affirming that the earth
is the center of the universe and was formed by a process of con-
densation and rarefaction. Man, according to Archelaus, is not the
only possessor of mind (nous) ; rather, mind is well distributed

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COSMOLOGISTS 75

throughout the universe. With Archelaus, philosophy shifted to
ethical problems and we take leave of the cosmological school of
Greek philosophy.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE
COSMOLOGISTS

In summarizing the pre-Socratic period we should note that some
of its representatives, such as Democritus, were contemporaries of
Socrates and thus chronologically belong to a later period. How-
ever, philosophically they belong to the cosmological group of
thinkers.

The contribution of the cosmological period can best be ap-
preciated by understanding the nature of the problems that were
raised. The cosmologists' answers were neither final nor absolute and
were overhauled by later philosophers, yet their questions formed
a foundation for almost all the subject matter of later ancient
philosophy.

(i) When the cosmologists discussed the nature of the world-
stuff, an important contribution was made to metaphysics, for meta-
physics tries to penetrate beyond the veil of appearance in its quest
for reality. We have seen that they conceived of the world-stuff in
various ways: ,.

Thales— Water
Anaximander— Boundless

Anaximenes— Air
Pythagoreans— Unlimited vs. Limited

(reducing all things to
number)
Heraclitus— Fire
Parmenides— Being (spherical— finite)

Melissus— Being (infinite)
Empedocles— Earth, Air, Fire, and Water
Anax2Lgoras—Nous
Democritus— Atoms
Hippon— Water
Diogenes of Apollonia— Air

(2) They raised questions regarding the relationship between
Being and change. The Eleatics contended that only Being exists,
while Heraclitus said that everything is in a state^of flux. They

76 ATOMISTS AND ECLECTICS

showed how the universe arose in a scientific way and thus helped
emancipate the Greeks from the rule of early religious mythology.

(3) The cosmologists contributed to the foundation of episte-
mology by their distinction between empirical and rational knowl-
edge. Philosophers like Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus
gave exact accounts of the epistemological process. But important
differences arose. Empedocles believed that sensation is between like
qualities, while Anaxagoras thought it exists between unlike quali-
ties. And the Atomists thought that the atomic clusters issue minia-
ture copies which are absorbed by the senses.

(4) The cosmological period also made a notable beginning in
the field of logic. The use of dialectic by Zeno, the paradoxes
of the Eleatic school, all indicated that a definite methodology was
needed for the philosophic discipUne. Thus the mathematical re-
searches of Pythagoras led to greater exactness in the formation of
philosophic problems.

(5) The cosmologists stimulated the development and progress
of the natural and physical sciences. Astronomy, mathematics, bi-
ology, physiology, medicine, geology— all were aided by these
thinkers who mainly gave a mechanistic rather than a teleological
explanation of phenomena.

(6) Religiously, important advances were made. Xenophanes ex-
posed the fallacy of anthropomorphism. The doctrine of reincarna-
tion was held with fervor by the Pythagoreans and Empedocles,
while Anaxagoras came into conflict with the religious tradition of
Athens. Unlike Christian philosophers, the cosmologists had little
interest in personal immortality, and they did not regard man as a
privileged creature in the universe.

(7) The cosmologists raised the problem of the soul, which was
bound to have repercussions in Plato and Aristotle. Democritus said
that the soul is not qualitatively distinct from the body and that
it has an atomic constitution. This view was rejected by Plato, who
believed in the supremacy of the soul and in its distinct separateness
from the body.

(8) To the science of ethics the cosmologists added new con-
cepts. These concepts were advanced especially by Democritus,
who believed in the pleasures of the mind and stressed the virtue of
cheerfulness.

At the end of the cosmological period man became an important
problem, and attention was turned away from the universe to man's
needs, desires, and ideals. The problem of society appeared. What

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COSMOLOGISTS 77

is the function of the philosopher in society? Should he be demo-
cratic, as Empedocles was, or should he regard himself as a super-
man, as Herachtus did? Can society be saved by the work of the
philosophers, or is society beyond redemption? The attack against
the prevalent institutions was especially sharp in the philosophy of
Heraclitus, who viewed his contemporaries with vast contempt.

(9) Finally, a beginning was made in esthetics. Poets, hke Homer
and Hesiod, were condemned by Heraclitus and Xenophanes, who
beUeved in a more moral concept of literary endeavor than these
two poets showed. The science of harmonics was founded by the
Pythagoreans, who conceived of music as the key to reality and
who also realized that art has an important moral function.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the significance of the Atomic theory?

2. Compare and contrast Democritus with Parmenides.

3. Evaluate the ethical ideals of Democritus.

4. How did Democritus explain the process of knowledge?

5. What was Democritus' attitude toward religion?

6. Compare the Greek view of atoms with the modern atomic theory.

7. What are the weaknesses of Democritus' world-view?

8. Evaluate the contribution of the eclectics.

9. Summarize the main problems of pre-Socratic philosophy.

10. What pre-Socratic thinker do you regard as most significant? Why?

THE SOPHISTS

THE ENVIRONMENT

J. he Sophists of the 5th century b.c. represent a new stage in
Greek philosophy. They arose in a period almost comparable with
the Enlightenment of the i8th century. As during the Enlighten-
ment, the main interests of society were secular and realistic, and
there was an almost universal reaction against the superstitions and
darkness of the past.

The 5th century in Athens marked the rise of a rich merchant
class, and thus there was more leisure to speculate than in earlier
times. A different type of education arose, which, independent of
the ancient traditions, included the new sciences as well as rhetoric.
The opulent merchants and aristocrats wanted their sons to have
the best education. Willing to pay a high price for this privilege,
they turned to the Sophists, whose fame was established throughout
Greece.

The 5th century was an age of political instability, with great
conflict between aristocracy and democracy. Pericles ruled with
wisdom and foresight, trying to unite the warring factions; but fol-

THE ENVIRONMENT 79

lowing his death, the conflict between democracy and oligarchy be-
came more pronounced. In times of stress, the masses frequently
turned to the demagogues and, on other occasions, to opportunists
like Alcibiades.

The balance of power shifted. At the beginning of the century,
the Persian danger had given the Greeks a sense of unity, for they
realized that they had to unite if they were to remain independent.
The victories over the Persians at Marathon and at Salamis were
celebrated as a triumph of the Greeks over the barbarians. However,
victory proved to be indecisive and caused immense discontent.
Athens became progressively more imperialistic and began to use
power poHtics in its relations with the other city-states. This is well
described by Thucydides in his account of the Athenian expedition
against Melos:

"The MeHans are colonists of the Lacedaemonians, who would
not submit to Athens like the other islanders. At first they were
neutral and took no part. But when the Athenians tried to coerce
them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into open hostilities.
The generals encamped with the Athenian forces on the island.
But before they did the country any harm they sent envoys to nego-
tiate with the Melians. Instead of bringing these envoys before the
people, the Melians desired them to explain their errand to the
magistrates and to the chief men."^

The Athenians explained that they would not use fine words
since they realized, in the discussion of human affairs, the question
of justice "enters only between equals, and the powerful exact what
they can."

The Melians believed that if they put up a fight, they would still
have a chance, since wars are not always determined by superior
numbers.

The Athenians repUed: "Hope is a good comforter in the hour
of danger, and when men have something else to depend upon, al-
though hurtful, she is not ruinous. But when her spendthrift nature
has induced them to stake their all, they see her as she is in the
moment of their fall, and not till then. While the knowledge of her
might enable them to beware of her, she never fails. You are weak,
and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do not you be
thus deluded; avoid the error of which so many are guilty, who,
although they might still be saved if they would take the natural

^Thucydides, v. 84 (abridged), Comford, ed., Greek religious thought from
Homer to the age of Alexander, p. 143.

8o THE SOPHISTS

means, when visible grounds of confidence forsake them, have re-
course to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles and the like, which
ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in them."-

Nevertheless, the Melians appealed to the favor of heaven, be-
cause:

". . . we are righteous, and you against whom we contend are
unrighteous; and we are satisfied that our deficiency in power will
be compensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians; they
cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and
for the sake of their own honor. And therefore our confidence is
not so utterly blind as you suppose.

'"'' Athenians: As for the gods, we expect to have quite as much of
their favor as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which
goes beyond common opinion about divine or men's desires about
human things. For of the gods we believe, and of men we know,
that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. This
law was not made by us, and we are not the first who have acted
upon it; we did but inherit, and shall bequeath it to all time, and we
know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are,
would do as we do."^

The Melians refused to surrender, but their resistance proved to
be in vain, for treachery prevailed among the citizens. When the
Athenians conquered the Melians, they killed all the men of military
age and sold the women and children into slavery. This is an exam-
ple of power politics which reminds us of our own period. Is it sur-
prising that some Sophists distrusted empty moralization and ac-
cepted the standard that "might makes right"? Power politics,
however, did not prove to be a complete boon to the Athenians,
who experienced a humiliating defeat by the Spartans in the Pelo-
ponnesian War, which lasted from 43 1 to 404 b.c.

The balance of power was constantly shifting; no nation could be
completely secure. The more powerful a nation became, the more
arrogant were its deahngs with its neighbors. Far-sighted thinkers
spoke of a Pan-Hellenic Union, but this proved to be an empty
dream, for hatred prevailed among the individual city-states.

A more positive result of this incessant conflict was the contact
of Athens with new ideas. New concepts of philosophy, brought in
by visitors, were especially noticeable in the philosophies of Pro-
tagoras and Anaxagoras, both of whom were not regarded with

^ Ibid., p. 145.

^ Ibid., pp. 145-146.

THE STATUS OF THE SOPHISTS 8i

favor by the conservatives. Still, their influence was widely spread
and had a powerful impact on the development of Athenian phil-
osophy.

THE STATUS OF THE SOPHISTS

Traditionally, the Sophists have been regarded with disfavor by
philosophers. This attitude is mainly due to the sharp attacks leveled
against them by Plato and Socrates. With the name itself, there
arises in our mind the connotation of trickery, hypocrisy, and pro-
found cynicism. We are led to believe that they degraded education
and philosophy; that they were men who sold their wisdom for
material gain; and that they were ready to help any side regardless
of the justice of its arguments. Some of us view them as charlatans
who merely popularized ideas without showing any originality. No
wonder that many philosophers devoted much time to attacking the
Sophist way of life!

However, these views are extremely one-sided and quite unjusti-
fied. Actually, the Sophists represented many divergejit viewpoints.
Some believed in complete ethical relativity, while others thought
morals had a more sublime meaning. Some, like Callicles, preached
a A4achiavellian doctrine— that might makes right; others, like Hip-
pias, upheld a belief in absolute justice. We find them not only
bold innovators but also supporters of the established way of life.
In short, no generalization of the Sophists is possible.

One reason why they were so bitterly attacked by ancient philos-
ophers was their incredible popularity. A Sophist coming to Athens
was received with acclaim; admiring disciples gathered around him
and regarded his words as infallible and divine. It became quite fash-
ionable to listen to the teachings of Protagoras and Gorgias, and
what they said was debated assiduously by the educated classes of
Athens. The stir caused by the Sophists in Athens is comparable to
the reverberations made by the Existentialists in 20th-century
France.

Some philosophers attacked the Sophists because they accepted
money for their teachings. Ancient philosophers, like Plato, who
had private means of their own, regarded money payment as a
degradation of philosophy. Such a view should not deceive us. Many
of the Sophists came from a lower economic class, and hence the
money they received was necessary for their livelihood. Some think-
ers will say that philosophy is to be loved for its own sake and not
for any material gain. This sounds better in theory than in practice.

82 THE SOPHISTS

We find in history that philosophy has flourished most when pros-
perity prevailed: for example, in 5th-centmy Athens, 16th-century
Italy, and 18th-century France. On the other hand, periods of pov-
erty have done very little for the development and stimulation of
philosophy.

The Sophists were not callous materialists who sold ideas as a
merchant sells goods. The most prominent of them, like Protagoras,
had a high concept of the nature and function of philosophy and a
strong faith in the moral capacities of man.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SOPHISTS

The Sophists were interested, above all, in the science of rhetoric
and thereby stimulated the development of Athenian law. Pre-
viously the law courts had been poorly organized, and litigants
pleaded their own cases. Now they hired experts. Rhetoric, to the
Sophists, not merely involved the study of speech; it also necessi-
tated a knowledge of literature, grammar, and even logic. The art
of rhetoric was refined by the Sophists, who realized that in an
argument reason very seldom prevails. They taught the orators to
manipulate the emotions of their listeners, to appeal to their biases,
to win sympathy, and to sway the judges.

In education, the Sophists popularized new scientific ideas. They
introduced the physical sciences, especially astronomy and mathe-
matics, into the Athenian curriculum. They gave lectures on the
poets, whose works they interpreted not only from the standpoint
of grammar but also from the viewpoint of esthetics and morality.
By their arguments they stimulated a more insistent concern with
logic. iVIuch of the best work of Plato and Aristotle was done in
opposition to the logical theory of the Sophists.

The Sophists' services to social philosophy should not be under-
estimated. Previously, social institutions had been regarded with
indifference by most philosophers. Now the problem of democracy,
totalitarianism, and tyranny became increasingly significant in philo-
sophical disputes. Politics was no longer an amateur sport open to
all. The Sophists saw to it that many politicians received special
training, which, however, was not always for the best interests of
the masses.

In general, the Sophists reversed the emphasis of philosophy. Pre-
vious to them it had been on the universe; now it was on 77iaJL Thus
they stimulated ethics. They tore down many of the cherished
beliefs of the Greeks, it is true, and they were more destructive than

PROTAGORAS 83

creative. Still, they promoted vigorous discussion and frequently a
healthy skepticism regarding the existence of absolute ethical ideals.

Unlike the cosmologists, the Sophists made no attempt to explain
the fundamental nature of the universe. They were not interested
in the basic world-stuff. They felt that their predecessors had been
naive in occupying themselves with such abstruse problems, for their
own interests were empirical and down-to-earth. In their outlook
on life they were praginatic, concerned with consequences and with
functional results rather than with absolute maxims and absolute
standards.

This outlook created skepticism, not only in metaphysics but also
in religion, morals, and ethics. The attitude of the Sophists did not
long prevail, for Socrates again emphasized absolute laws and gave a
more moralistic interpretation of life.

PROTAGORAS

The outstanding Sophist was Protagoras, who came from Abdera,
the native city of Democritus. We are not certain about the exact
dates of his life, although we do know that he hved in the 5th cen-
tury B.C. In his youth he was a porter and received no formal educa-
tion, but he was so eager for knowledge that he taught himself to
read and write. He traveled a great deal, and wherever he went he
was received as a master of knowledge. In Athens he won the friend-
ship of Pericles and accumulated a fortune through the high fees
which he charged for teaching.

There is a story that Protagoras was accused of impiety because
of his religious views and that he was condemned by an Athenian
court. He preferred exile, it is said, but some historians have chal-
lenged this account and state that he never suffered the enmity of
the Athenians.

Only a few fragments of his works remain. One of them concerns
religion and is entitled On the gods. It asserts that we cannot know
definitely what the gods are like. "We are hindered in our knowl-
edge by the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human
life." What does this imply? First of all, a denial of popular theol-
ogy. Protagoras, like Xenophanes, did not accept the common con-
cept of the gods, and he was not a proponent of fanaticism in reli-
gion. The attitude which he advocated was suspension of judgment.

This attitude, however, does not imply complete atheism but,
rather, agnosticism. We have an impression of Protagoras as a man
who conformed outwardly to the ritual but inwardly was indifferent

«4 THE SOPHISTS

to religion. Thus he reminds us of the 1 8th-century philosophers of
France. They, too, regarded religion with indifference; they, too,
were humanists and interested in man rather than in supernatural
matters.

Another statement of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all
things, expresses fully his humanism. The question arises as to
whether he meant the individual or mankind. No definite answer
is forthcoming. Apparently he believed that truth is purely private
and changing; consequently, there can be no absolute standards in
ethics, metaphysics, or religion. The standard of truth is what works
for the individual and what satisfies him. This standard allows no
ground for coercion; no one can force an individual to believe in
certain dogmas. In this manner he fought for freedom of thought.

Like other Sophists, Protagoras was very much interested in edu-
cation. Like John Dewey, he held that education should start in
early youth. Progressive in his concept of punishment, he did not
think it should be used as a means of vengeance but as a tool for
improvement.

His skepticism was also apparent in his concept of mathematics.
The theorems of geometry, he claimed, do not have absolute va-
lidity. Like Hume, he thought they apply only to an ideal realm.

As a humanist, Protagoras felt that man could be perfected and
that he is distinguished from animals by his mental powers. The task
of education, he held, is to cultivate man's intellectual capacities.
Traditionalism he abhorred in every form, for he thought that all
institutions change and are in an unending state of flux. The politi-
cal and moral systems of mankind, Protagoras taught, were not in-
vented by the gods but can be explained naturalistically as the prod-
ucts of civilization.

GORGIAS

Gorgias came to Athens in 427 b.c, when he was sent to plead
the cause of his native city, Leontini. He spent many years in
Athens, where he became famous and gathered around himself many
disciples. His ideal was to unify Greece and to spread the gospel of
Pan-Hellenism, for he thought the Greek states were dissipating
their energies by internal wars. In his youth he occupied himself
with natural science but later turned away from it and concentrated
on the problem of man.

Gorgias' conclusions were skeptical. Three of his propositions
have come down to us: First, he asserted, nothing exists, meaning

PRODICUS 85

thereby that there is no reality. Had not Zeno pointed out that
thought inevitably arrives at paradoxes? iMust we not think of real-
ity as both one and many, finite and infinite, created and uncreated?
Since contradictions cannot be accepted, Gorgias thought it better
to assert that reality does not exist.

His second proposition was: If anything exists, it cannot be
known. Here again he turned to the previous philosophers, who
already had indicated that the senses are not reliable and are a
source of illusion. But reason, according to Gorgias, is just as un-
trustworthy and cannot give us a key to the cosmic stuff, for we are
caught by the subjective dilemma. We reason from our own desires,
ideals, and wants, which M^e apply to objective phenomena. This
process, however, does not establish truth.

Gorgias' third proposition was: Even if reality could be known,
such knowledge cannot be shared and communicated to others. In
this assertion, he raised the problem of language. Modern semantics
tells us that words do not have an absolute meaning but are purely
relative. Gorgias anticipated this conclusion, for he thought every
word has a different meaning to each individual. For example, my
concept of goodness is different from that of a Japanese or a Chi-
nese. When I have a sensation of love it is purely subjective, and
it is quite different from the sensation of love felt by a different
individual. Words, thus, never fully convey human emotions and
ideals.

HIPPIAS

Among the Sophists Hippias had the most encyclopedic knowledge,
which included the sciences, literature, rhetoric, and history. His
classroom was the market place and, like Socrates, he was indefat-
igable in asking questions. Ethically, he believed in inner self-suffi-
ciency and taught that man should be independent of external things.
Hippias' views were generally far-advanced for his time. He
looked beyond the city-state to the universe, for he realized that all
men have common desires and common aspirations. In many ways
he was a w^orld citizen with no fatherland of his own.

PRODICUS

Prodicus exemplified the skeptical strain of the Sophists. He was not
interested in popular religion, and he thought prayer to the gods
utterly superfluous. For these views he was regarded with suspicion
by the Athenian authorities.

86 THE SOPHISTS

Around him Prodicus saw the enervating influence of luxury.
Consequently he taught young people to shun pleasure and to search
for a heroic way of life. Materialistic values, according to him, are
extremely inadequate. The best way of life is one in which man
becomes emancipated from a reliance on external goods and attempts
to realize his creative, intellectual capacities.

THRASYMACHUS

Thrasymachus, who is pictured vividly in Plato's Republic, ap-
pears as a prototype of Machiavelli. He believed that justice can
only exist when might supports it, and he advocated that the world
be ruled by the strong. Emancipated religiously, he did not accept
the concept of Providence or the belief in divine powers.

It may be asked. Did Thrasymachus accept any absolute moral
principles? The answer is in the negative, for Thrasymachus thought
morality purely conventional. Thus a clever statesman would know
how to be immoral, while the masses would follow conventional
ideals.

CALLICLES

CaUicles was less extreme in his views than Thrasymachus, although
he also opposed the conventional views of morality. To some extent
his views remind us of Nietzsche. He stressed the fact that most laws
had been designed by the weak, thereby thwarting true greatness in
politics. He appealed to a new type of leader who would remold
mankind and not be held back by moral scruples.

Callicles regarded nature as an aristocratic force which aids the
strong and limits the weak. The moralist, he held, must take nature
as his guide, shunning all hypocrisy and sentimentality.

ALCIDAMAS

Alcidamas arrived at conclusions opposite to those of Callicles. King-
ship, itself, is an evil, he asserted, and the state is an agency for op-
pression. Like Rousseau, he taught that man in nature is free, but
that society has enchained him. He demanded the abolition of slav-
ery, a step which was regarded as extremely audacious in the 5th
century b.c. Almost communistic, he believed in a natural law which
makes all men equal and negates all class barriers.

ANTIPHON

Antiphon continued the same strain of radical thinking. There can
be no distinction, he declared, between the citizen and the foreigner,

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOPHISTS 87

and the best attitude is one of internationalism. The gods he regarded
from a rationalistic standpoint; thus, he believed that real progress
can only come about through education, not through religion.

Antiphon developed a social-contract theory in politics. The state,
he taught, represents a contract between the ruler and the subjects.
Such a contract does not imply that the ruler has all the power, for
there are natural laws of justice and equality. Like Alcidamas, he
negated the barriers of race and nationality and looked forward to
the establishment of a Pan-Hellenic Union.

INFLUENCE OF THE SOPHISTS

The influence of the Sophists was not merely felt in philosophy but
extended to hterature and historical writings. Greek historians like
Herodotus and Thucydides felt the impact of the movement, espe-
cially Thucydides, who gave a scientific account of history and was
conscious of the importance of poiver in human affairs. Sophism
influenced to some extent the dramas of Sophocles; but it had an
even more important impact on Euripides, who frequently chal-
lenged the existence of the gods. In Hip poly tus, for example, he
wrote that man can not know anything for certain about the nature
of the gods:

''Chorus. Surely the thought of the gods, when it comes over
my mind, Ufts the burden' of sorrows; but while I hope in the dark-
ness for some understanding, I faint and fail, when I compare the
deeds of men with their fortunes. All is change, to and fro; the life
of men shifts in endless wandering.

''Nurse. The Ufe of man is all suffering, and there is no rest from
pain and trouble. There may be something better than this life; but
whatever it be, it is hidden in mists of darkness. So we are sick of
love for this life on earth and any gleam it shows, because we know
nothing of another. What Hes beyond is not revealed, and we drift
on a sea of idle tales."'*

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOPHISTS

As can be seen, the Sophists invigorated the spirit of philosophy.
They made philosophic disputes more realistic and more functional.
They taught a lesson, not only to Greece but to succeeding ages:
the fundamental problem of thinking is not nature but man. In them
the spirit of humanism was triumphant. They did not pretend to
know the final answers in ethics, reUgion, or metaphysics.
* Quoted in Cornford, op. cit., p. 152.

88 THE SOPHISTS

The Sc^rfiists prmmiendy rased die problem of social ethics. The
qoesdoDS they asked relating to the value of social institutions, laws,
and progress were r^>eated by succeeding philosophers- Certainly it
must be acknowledged that die Sophists made philosophy an excit-
ii^ and sparkling occupation. They enriched the educational cur-
ncolum of Athens and intensified an interest in rhetoric As bril-
liant teachers they made know ledge more practical and more con-
crete.

The questions they asked are still being asked today. \\'e. too,
discuss the relariTit\- of moral standards, and we, too. debate the
problem of ends ry. means in ethics. In the Sophists we find the seeds
of many modem philosophical movements, such as utilitarianism,
pragmatism, positivism, and existentialism.

QUESTIOXS cr TOPICS FOR DISCUSSlOX

1. \Miac wexe die social circmnscances which produced the Sophist
philosophyr

2. Why have the Sophists beoi misunderstood?

3. Describe the afaical views of the Sophists.

4. Discuss the starenrtotr of Protagoras. "Man is the measure of all
things."

5. Evplain the sk^mcism of Gorgias.

6. In what w^ay? did TTxrasymachus reflect the doctrines of rotalitarian-
Ktn?

7. Evahiaxe the contribaticms of CaUicles.

8. Ho^s- did the Sophists change die Athenian edacadonal corriculmn?

9. How did die Sophists view religion r Ek) you agree with their atritude?
Trplain.

10. What were the weaknesses of the Sophist view of life?

1 1. WTiy did the Sophists neglect cosmological problems?

12. ti what way's were the Sophists radical- In what ways were they con-
servative?

SOCRATES

THE TIME OT SOCRATES

.he lite span of Socrates, c. 4-0-399 b.c embraced the rise and
fall of the Athenian empire. His last years were marred by the
fall of Athens and by the ravages of the oligarchic and democratic
factions. Aromid him old fomidations T\-ere cnimbling. -with naked
power replacing justice and -^-ith the political nileis becoming more
arrogant than ever.

Athenian youth, in this period, was guided by the doctrines of
moral relati\-ism. This skepticism made it distrust tradition and any
faith in absolutes. Socrates, however, believed in definite and cate-
gorical moral standards and thought that it was the task of philoso-
phy to resurrect a stable social order based on rational ideas and
expert knowledge. Living in dark times, he experienced, in 429, the
plague of Athens, during which thousands died. The disease, which
\\as explained as an act of di^-ine vengeance, caused the death of
Pericles, the leading light of the Athenian state.

Bervveen 421 and 416. an uneasy truce governed the relations of
Athens and Sparta. This period -witnessed the rise of Alcibiades. one
of the disciples of Socrates. Shiftless, unscrupulous, and interested

90 SOCRATES

only in his own welfare, Alcibiades was one of the main factors in
the downfall of Athens. He was responsible for the Sicilian expedi-
tion which failed in 413 b.c, when the Athenians were defeated at
Syracuse.

Several of the city-states rebelled against the Athenian overlord-
ship. This revolt marked the beginning of the end for Athens. Eight
years later the Spartans, under their great commander Lysander,
destroyed the Athenian fleet. In 404 b.c. the Peloponnesian War
ended, with Athens becoming the subject of Sparta. Between 404
and 403 the oligarchic party was supreme in Athens; the Thirty
Tyrants ruled with an iron hand and used terroristic methods. In
403 B.C. democracy was finally restored, but it was not a government
by the wise and most excellent citizens. Under its sponsorship, in
399 B.C., Socrates was accused of two charges: corrupting the youth
and denying the gods of the state.

VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF
— s^ SOCRATES

Socrates remains one of the most controversial figures in philosophy.
We do not know his exact teachings, since he did not leave any
books at his death. We must rely mainly on the accounts of Plato
and Xenophon. To Plato, Socrates was the ideal philosopher en-
gaged in a tireless quest for wisdom and able to inspire his disciples
with a lofty view of human life. Idealizing Socrates, Plato used him
as the narrator for his most profound ethical and metaphysical teach-
ings.
\ Xenophon, on the other hand, gave a very religious interpretation
'^-of Socrates:

". . . What evidence did they produce that Socrates refused to
recognize the gods acknowledged by the state? Was it that he did
not sacrifice? or that he dispensed with divination? On the con-
trary, he was often to be seen engaged in sacrifice, at home or at the
common altars of the state. Nor was his dependence on divination
less manifest. Indeed that saying of his, 'A divinity gives me a sign,'
was on everybody's lips."^

Xenophon told of Socrates' reliance on God:

". . . Socrates suited his language to his conviction. Further he
would constantly advise his associates to do this, or beware of doing
that, upon the authority of this same divine voice; and, as a matter

1 Xenophon, Recollections of Socrates, i. i, Cornford, ed., Greek religious
thought from Homer to the age of Alexander, p. 175.

VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF SOCRATES 91

of fact, those who listened to his warnings prospered, whilst he who
turned a deaf ear to them repented afterwards. Yet, it will be read-
ily conceded, he would hardly desire to present himself to his every-
day companions in the character of either knave or fool. Whereas
he would have appeared to be both, supposing the God-given revela-
tions had but revealed his own proneness to deception. It is plain
he would not have ventured on forecast at all, but for his belief that
the words he spoke would in fact be verified. Then on whom, or
what, was the assurance rooted, if not upon God? And if he had
faith in the gods, how could he fail to recognize them?"-

Xenophon asserted that Socrates was not at all interested in
science. Thus there could be no doubt about his pious nature:

"No one ever heard him say, or saw him do, anything impious or
irreverent. Indeed, in contrast to others he set his face against all dis-
cussion of such high matters as the nature of the universe; how the
'kosmos,' as the savants [Ht., 'the sophists'] phrase it, came into
being; or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To trouble
one's brain about such matters was, he argued, to play the fool."^

Aristophanes gave us still another picture of Socrates. To be sure,
it was a caricature, since it pictured him as one of the Sophists. In
Aristophanes' The clouds, we find Socrates in a dialogue with Strep-
siades, a peasant, married to an aristocratic lady, who wanted to send
his son to Socrates' school. He is admitted to the house and finds
Socrates suspended in a basket:

''Strep: O, first of all, please tell me what you are doing.
Soc: I walk on air, and contemplate the sun.
Strep: O then from a basket, you contemplate the gods.

And not from the earth, at an\ rate?
Soc: Alost true.

I could not have searched out celestial matters

Without suspending judgment, and infusing

My subtle spirit with the kindred air.

If from the ground I were to seek these things,

I could not find: so surely does the earth

Draw to herself the essence of our thought.

The same too is the case with water-cress.
Strep: Hillo! what's that?

Thought draws the essence into water-cress?

^ Ibid., p. 176.
3 Ibid., p. 176.

92 SOCRATES

Come down, sweet Socrates, more near my level,
And teach the lessons which I come to learn.

Soc: And wherefore art thou come?

Strep: To learn to speak.

For owing to my horrid debts and duns,
My goods are seized, I'm robbed and mobbed, and
plundered.

Soc: How did you get involved with your eyes open.'

Strep: A galloping consumption seized my money.
Come now; do let me learn the unjust logic
That can shirk debts; now do just let me learn it.
Name your ow n price, by all the gods I'll pay it.

Soc: The gods! Why, you must know the gods with us
Don't pass U.v current coin.""'

All in all, Socrates cuts a rather ridiculous figure in The clouds.
He is pictured as a radical moralist who denies the traditional reli-
gious truths and is a corrupter of Athenian youth.

The Humanists in the Renaissance, however, had the opposite
view of this philosopher. To them Socrates was a saint, a veritable
Christian in his faith and virtue. They thought the ideal scholar
would inevitably be Socratic.

Kierkegaard, the father of modern Existentialism, likewise greatly
admired Socrates, whom he used as his model philosopher. He wrote
his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of Socrates. To Kierke-
gaard, Socrates had profound meaning because of Socrates' constant
fight against the Sophists of all time. He stressed the fact that most
of the 19th-century philosophers, especially Hegel, were essentially
Sophists in their beliefs. Kierkegaard appreciated the method of Soc-
rates and, from him, adopted the motto "Know th>'self" as the start-
ing point of philosophy.

Nietzsche, likewise, had much to say about Socrates, but he was
less complimentary than Kierkegaard. He favored the pre-Socratics,
who, he thought, exhibited real strength and real impartiality and
were the supermen of philosophy. In attacking Socrates, Nietzsche
felt that he was fighting against impulses in his own nature. De-
cadence, to Nietzsche, meant faith in morality and in absolute stand-
ards instead of guidance by natural instincts.

Bertrand Russell, in his History of ivesterjj philosophy, pictures
Socrates almost as a Victorian with a definite faith in immortality.

* Aristophanes, The clouds, 224-248.

CHARACTER AND LIFE 93

He points to the puritanism of Socrates' beliefs and the preoccupa-
tion with the demoii, the religious voice inside.

John Burnet stressed the fact that Socrates had many metaphysi-
cal interests and was responsible for the doctrine of the Ideas as
taught by Plato. Socrates, Burnet claimed, was not a moralist pri-
marily but had cosmological interests and hence his philosophy
cannot be understood without this metaphysical background.

CHARACTER AND LIFE

We find Socrates as a loyal citizen of Athens, taking part in several
military campaigns and distinguishing himself by his courage. He
was given, occasionally, to Spartan sacrifices. We are told that he
went barefoot and was also subject to mystical trances. Never cow-
ardly, he was ready to defy the democratic faction as well as the
Thirty Tyrants. He risked his life when, as a responsible officer, he
refused to agree to the trial of the Athenian generals after the battle
of Arginusae. Although he had many friends among the Thirty
Tyrants, he believed in the supremacy of the law; and when they
issued an illegal order, he refused to carry it out.

Socrates was intensely human; perhaps his marriage contributed
to this attitude. Certainly he was not a scholar who preferred isola-
tion, for we find him disputing in the market place and attending
many banquets. His conversation was always sparkling and witty.
There was a strain of Stoicism in his character, too, for he never lost
his dignity, not even during the last days of his life. During the en-
tire trial he retained his composure. Unlike others who had been ac-
cused, he did not ask favors.

Excepting his trial, there are not many climactic events in the life
of Socrates. His father was a sculptor, and his mother a midwife; at
first he thought he would follow in the footsteps of his father, but
he changed his mind and turned to philosophy, which he regarded
as the most important subject of education.

To some extent he was connected with the Orphic Mysteries,
traces of which appear in his religious teachings. When he was
thirty-five, the oracle at Delphi declared him to be the wisest man
of Athens. In the Apology there is an explanation of what the oracle
meant. Socrates was perplexed:

". . . When I heard the answer, I said to myself. What can the
god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know
that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when
he says that I am the wisest of men? And vet he is a god, and cannot

94 SOCRATES

lie; that would be against his nature. After long consideration, I
thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I
could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god
with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is a man
who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accord-
ingly, I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and ob-
served him— his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom
I selected for examination— and the result was as follows: When I.
began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not
really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser
by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought
himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that
he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present
and heard me."^

Socrates went to another man and again provoked enmity:
"And I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me,—
the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I
said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out
the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the
dog I swear!— for I must tell you the truth— the result of my mission
was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the
most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and
better."^

Socrates explained what real wisdom means. It is a mission to
spread real knowledge and real enlightenment: "This inquisition has
led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous
kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am
called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the
wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of
Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to show
that the wisdom of men is worth Httle or nothing; he is not speaking
of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if
he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his
wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world,
obedient to the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom
of any one, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise;
and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him
that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have
no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any

5 Plato, Apology, 21 (Jowett translation, abridged).
^ Ibid., 21-22.

THE DEATH OF SOCRATES

concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my
devotion to the god."^

Why was Socrates hated so widely? The Athenians still remem-
bered his association with Alcibiades and his friendship with the
tyrants. Some whispered that he was responsible for the mutilation
of the statues of Hermes, And, according to rumor, he taught strange
religious doctrines. Moreover, his educational procedure was so
radical that he was regarded as a subversive professor. Then, too,
after the Peloponnesian War there was very little tolerance in
Athens. The political leaders were seeking a scapegoat, and Socrates
was only too conveniently at hand. Hence he was condemned to
take the hemlock.

THE DEATH OF SOCRATES

The execution of Socrates was delayed for a month. Throughout,
he remained faithful to philosophy and in the final hours of his
life held a discourse on immortality:

"It was the hour of the sunset. The jailer entered and stood by
him, saying:— To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and
gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute
the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when,
in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison— indeed,
I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are
aware, and not I, are to blame. And so fare you well, and try to bear
Ughtly what must needs be— you know my errand. Then bursting
into tears he turned away and went out.

"Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and
will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said. How charming the
man is: since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see
me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good to me as
could be, and now see how generously he sorrows on my account.
We must do as he says, Crito; and therefore let the cup be brought,
if the poison is prepared: if not, let the attendant prepare some." ^

Crito, a disciple of Socrates, wanted him to wait a while. Why
should he not take the hemlock later? Why should he not enjoy
himself before passing on to another world? Socrates replied:

"Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in so acting,
for they think that they will be gainers by the delay; but I am right
in not following their example, for I do not think that I should gain

"> Ibid., 21-11.

8 Ibid., Phaedo, ii6.

96 SOCRATES

anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be
ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing and saving a life which is
already forfeit. . . .

"Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and he
went out, and having been absent for some time returned with the
jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good
friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions
how I am to proceed. The man answered: You have only to walk
about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison
will act. At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the
easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of
color or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as
his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say about
making a hbation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The
man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem
enough. I understand, he said: but I may and must ask the gods to
prosper my journey from this to the other world."^

As Socrates drank the cup the disciples could scarcely restrain
themselves:

"And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but
now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished
the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my
own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept,
not for him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having to part
from such a friend. Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found
himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up, and I followed; and
at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time,
broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made cowards of us
all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange out-
cry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might
not misbehave in this way, for I have been told that a man should
die in peace. Be quiet, then, and have patience. When we heard his
words we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked
about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his
back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the
poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while
he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said,
No; and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us
that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: When
the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning

3 Ibid., 116-1 17.

THE BELIEFS OF SOCRATES 97

to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he
had covered himself up, and said— they were his last words— he said:
Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the
debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else?
There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a
movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes
were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

"Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom
I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known,
he was the wisest and justest and best."^*^

THE BELIEFS OF SOCRATES

In his philosophical theories Socrates began with an intense oppo-
sition to the Sophists. They had maintained that all standards are
relative; that virtue is not innate but dependent upon the social
institutions. Their skepticism had challenged the prevailing ration-
alism of the Greek mind.

Socrates, opposing the Sophists, stressed the fact that virtue is
inn ate, and that man is endowed with certain moral principles.
Ethics, according to him, is not a relative subject but one which can
be taught scientifically. The task of the moralist is to develop the
potentialities of man, to create clarity of perception and depth of
insight.

Socrates' identification of virtue with knowledge is famous.
Knowledge, he declared, depends on reason. While the evil man
misses the mark by his ignorance, the good man, guided by real
knowledge, finds true fulfillment.

It appears that Socrates throughout his life was guided by moral
considerations. Still, he was not a puritan, for he did not have a
negative concept of morality. To him the good life was not one of
prohibitions and taboos; rather, it was one of self-realization leading
to an appreciation of the excellent things in existence. Unlike the
puritans, he did not despise human knowledge. To him, to be moral
did not mean to be completely simple intellectuallyY father, it im-
plied high-mindedness and the utilization of all the capacities of man.

Yet in some ways Socrates resembled the Sophists. Not that his
conclusions were the same, but he shared their interests. Like them,
he had little understanding and love for the natural sciences; and he
was blind to esthetic factors. To him, as to the Sophists, the funda-
mental problem of philosophy was man, not nature. But his concept

^^Ibid., 1 1 7-1 18.

98 SOCRATES

•: of knowledge was quite different from that of the Sophists. They

interpreted knowledge as a manifestation of sensations. Socrates, on
the other hand, relied upon insight. This direct awareness of the
nature of reality became the key to his moral teachings. He affirmed
V the value of intuitive wisdom. What mattered was not the quantita-

tive expansion of knowledge but, rather, the achievement of a broad
perspective, the ability to know the truth and to understand the
world. The teachers of his time frequently believed in trivialities.
Since they were pedantic, they often quibbled about unimportant
things. Socrates, however, kept his eye on essentials and was con-
cerned with the perennial problems of human life. ~

According to Xenophon, Socrates held that knowledge has a social
implication. This is one reason why he spoke so much against the
natural scientists, who, he thought, could never achieve definite
truth:

"Do these explorers into the divine operations hope that when
they have discovered by what forces the various phenomena occur,
they will create winds and waters at will, and fruitful seasons? Will
they manipulate these and the like to suit their needs? or has no such
notion perhaps ever entered their heads, and will they be content
simply to know how such things come into existence? But if this
was his mode of describing those who meddle with such matters as
these, he himself never wearied of discussing human topics: What
is piety? What is impiety? What is the beautiful? what the ugly?
What the noble? what the base? What are meant by just and unjust?
. . . What is a state? what is a statesman? what is a ruler over men?
what is a ruling character? and other like problems, the knowledge
of which, as he put it, conferred a patent of nobility on the possessor,
whereas those who lacked the knowledge might deservedly be stig-
matized as slaves."^^

To achieve knowledge, self-examination is indispensable. Thus we
must get rid of our prejudices and biases and abandon all generaliza-
tions. Socrates' task was to point out the inadequacies and the fal-
lacies of Athenian thinking. He pursued truth with an untiring and
single-minded determination.

Real education demands that the mind be emptied of all refuse and
unsubstantiated beliefs. It demands a process of recoTistructioji. Soc-
rates maintained that the unexamined life is not worth living, for an
existence based on complete conformity and complete credulity is
animalistic. Not worthy of the free man, it leads only to cultural

11 Xenophon (Comford, op. cit., p. 178).

THE BELIEFS OF SOCRATES 99

"regression. It is our task, Socrates reminded us, to ask why, and to
be persistent in our queries, regardless of the result.

This explains why the vocation of philosophy is so important. It
is the philosopher's task not merely to teach useful things but to find
the truth. A philosopher, Socrates asserted, is not to be deterred by
extefriaTobstacles, by social disapproval, and by persecution. His is
a sacred task, absolutely necessary for the maintenance of civiliza-
tion.

The religious tone of Socrates' discourse cannot be neglected. We
remember, in the Apology, that he said he would obey God rather
than the authorities, being certain that he was guided by a divine
force. He beHeved in Providence, and there is reason to suppose that
he looked forward to immortality. But his concept of God was
different from that of the popular mind; it was incorporeal rather
than material.

Socrates' method is especially important for the student of philos-
ophy. Like Zeno, he used dialectic, which would grant, for the sake
of argument, the contention of the view which is to be combated
and then dispose of it by showing its absurdity. His method was
founded on the belief that there are absolute truths and that intel-
lectual clarity can best be achieved by universal definitions. He
stressed the dialectical process of bringing out truth as the best tool
for education, for it clearly points out inconsistencies, works against
all intellectual pretensions, and makes the process of knowledge
truly functional.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Relate the main events in the life of Socrates.

2. According to Socrates, what is the function of philosophy?

3. Describe the ideals of Socrates.

4. What is the Socratic concept of God?

5. How did Socrates view death?

6. Explain Socrates' doctrine that "virtue is knowledge."

7. In what ways did Socrates anticipate the spirit of Christ?

8. Describe the dialectical method of Socrates.

9. How modern is Socrates' philosophy?

10. What have been some of the interpretations of Socrates? What is
your own interpretation of his philosophy?

11. Discuss the viewpoint of Socrates that "the unexamined life is not
worth living." Do we live an unexamined life in the United States?
Justify your answer.

PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES

Xlato's philosophy ranks among the most profound and compre-
hensive systems in the history of philosophy. It has seldom been sur-
passed in its beauty and literary setting, for Plato was not merely a
philosopher but also a dramatist of ideas. In him philosophy became
completely alive and intensely moving. The effectiveness of Plato
was heightened by his use of the dialogue. Thus, we invariably have
a personal setting. The atmosphere is not abstract and austere; rather,
there is a touch of intimacy. We feel a sense of leisure. And, unlike
the modern college professor, Plato did not feel constrained to write
a certain number of books. He wrote whenever he desired and when
inspiration guided him.

To approach the philosophy of Plato, we must understand the
influences which conditioned his ideas:

(i) One important influence was Pythagoras, who gave him an
intense respect for mathematics and a high concept of philosophy.
Many of the Platonic religious ideas were derived from Pythag-
orean mysticism. And the dualism that prevailed in Pythagoras can
be found in Plato.

100

SOCIAL INFLUENCES loi

(2) Likewise, Plato owed a great debt to the Eleatics: Parmen-
ides, Zeno, and Aielissus had pointed out that the only reahty lies in
Being, and that change cannot be conceived. Plato identified his
Ideas with the Being of the Eleatics, and, like the latter, he thought
that the realm of Forms is uncreated and exempt from the ravages
of time.

(3) He was also influenced by the concept of mind as taught by
Anaxagoras. Plato, however, changed Anaxagoras' meaning, for he
conceived mind not as corporeal but as immaterial and guided by
cosmic purposes.

(4) Heraclitus also played his part in the formation of the philos-
ophy of Plato, although it was mainly in a negative way. Plato held
that the realm of reality cannot be described as a process of flux, and
he refused to accept the ethics of HeracHtus. Heraclitus was a
Nietzschean, whereas Plato's writings remind us of Christian ethics,
although there is less asceticism in Plato than in Christianity.

(5) We also find the influence of the Sophists in Plato although
he regarded them mainly as obstacles which he tried to destroy.
Especially sharp was his attack on the concepts of Protagoras and
Gorgias.

(6) Most important, however, was the influence of Socrates.
Plato's teachings formed the climax to the views of his teacher. Like
Socrates, he believed in virtue and absolute standards. He was not
an objective scientist, for his main concern was to establish the
supremacy of the Good. Pupils of Socrates, such as Euclid of
iVIegara, already had identified the Good with Being. This identifi-
cation was continued by Plato, who made the intelligible world the
source of all universal values.

SOCIAL INFLUENCES

Plato, in his lifetime, 427-347 B.C., witnessed an unending change in
political and social affairs. He was still quite young when the Pelo-
ponnesian War ended, with Athens humiliated by the victories of
the Spartans. Ironically enough, a few years later the Persians and
the Athenians, aided by Corinth, Thebes, and Argos, joined forces
against Sparta and defeated the Spartan fleet in the battle of Cnidus
in 394 B.C. The Athenians, aided by the generous support of the
Persians, rebuilt the long walls.

The spirit of Salamis and Marathon had long been forgotten. The
Athenians, determined to restore their empire, were wilUng to make
an alliance with anyone who would promote their military strength.

102 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

In the wars between Thebes and Sparta, which lasted from 379 to
362 B.C., Athens joined Thebes and defeated the Spartans in various
sea battles. Gradually the Athenian empire was extended to include
over seventy communities. In 371 b.c, at the battle of Leuctra, the
Spartans were defeated by the brilliant Theban general Epaminon-
das. The victory established the supremacy of Thebes in Greece,
and from 371 to 362 Thebes remained in power. Meanwhile Athens
switched sides and aided Sparta to establish the balance of power. It
can be seen that there was little loyalty in Athenian politics.

This balance of power continued until Macedonia became su-
preme. In 359 B.C., Philip the Second started his rule of Macedonia
and almost immediately began a process of expansion. By 352 he had
advanced as far as Thermopylae, where he was temporarily halted
by the Athenians. A year later, Demosthenes warned the Athenians
of the great danger facing them from the Macedonians. In 348 b.c.
various subject states of Athens were conquered by Philip; and by
347, when Plato died, it already appeared certain that Philip would
become the master of all Greece.

THE LIFE OF PLATO

Whereas Socrates came from middle-class parents, Plato had a
distinguished aristocratic background. His father was a descendant
of one of the kings of Athens; his mother came from the family of
Solon. He had many relatives who were active in political affairs,
the majority on the side of the aristocracy. His education was super-
vised very carefully. There was the conventional curriculum-
music, gymnastics, and instruction in the old poets, especially in
Homer. We are told that he distinguished himself on the battlefield;
in fact, he showed all-around excellence.

We must not think of Plato as a bookish thinker. Besides being
an excellent athlete, he was interested in art; and there are accounts
that he wanted to be a dramatist. From the very beginning he
showed exceptional intellectual promise.

Plato's conversion to the philosophic hfe took several years. His
first teacher was Cratylus, who taught the Herachtean doctrines,
refusing to make any positive intellectual assertions. Plato then
came under the influence of Socrates, and his hfe was changed com-
pletely. Previously he had been pohtically ambitious; everyone
knowing him thought he would be prominent in Athenian afl^airs,
for he was handsome, talented, and had fainily background and
ability. But the death of Socrates changed his outlook. He began to

THE LIFE OF PLATO 103

realize that the Athenians were unstable, and he developed an intense
contempt for the form of democracy which had killed their wisest
citizen.

After the death of Socrates, Plato undertook various travels, due,
perhaps, to the violent feeling of the Athenians against all the fol-
lowers of Socrates. He went to Aiegara and later to Italy, where he
visited the Pythagoreans, becoming especially friendly with Archy-
tas, the chieftain of Tarentum.

Plato then made a visit to Syracuse— indeed a fateful step. He
was invited there through Dion, who was related to the reigning
king, Dionysius the First of Syracuse, a tyrant of the city for over
thirty-eight years. As a ruthless conqueror, Dionysius the First
usually sold his victims into slavery and even robbed temples of their
treasures. It was reported that he sold the robe of the goddess Hera
to the Carthaginians for 120 talents. But he expanded the realm of
Syracuse, and he had a love for the arts. Consequently, in beautify-
ing Syracuse, he made it one of the most magnificent cities of the
Hellenic world. He had pretensions in literature; and one of his
plays. Ransom of Hector, won a prize in Athens,

The relationship between the tyrant and the philosopher was
strained, since they had divergent views on politics and art. Diony-
sius caused Plato to be sold as a slave. This was a simple matter, for
he merely handed Plato over to the Spartans, who, at this time, were
at war with the Athenians. But Plato was fortunate, for one of his
friends, recognizing him at a slave market, caused him to be freed
and sent home.

At Athens, Plato devoted himself to philosophic instruction,
mainly at the Academy, where he taught political science, mathe-
matics, and dialectic. Many of the ruling princes of the Greek world
sent their sons to him for study and enlightenment. The instruction
which he provided was quite informal and consisted mainly of a
personal interchange of views between teacher and students.

When Dionysius died, in 367 B.C., he was succeeded by his son,
who, lacking the abiUty of his father, turned for advice to his uncle
Dion. Plato was reinvited to Syracuse. He accepted and was well
received. For a time he was extremely popular with the new king,
and the court studied his theories of politics and education. But the
army was opposed to Plato; and there were rumors which linked
him to the enemies of the king. Although Dion himself showed
great affection for him, Plato wanted to return to Athens. When a
war broke out, he therefore used the opportunity to leave Syracuse.

I04 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

Meanwhile Dion had been exiled, and he and his nephew had be-
come bitter enemies. Still, Dion was intent upon reconciliation; and,
when the war was over, he urged Plato to return to Syracuse. Both
Dion and Plato had hopes that the king might become a model
ruler. The short visit proved to be a complete failure. Plato, unable
to reform the king, became a prisoner and was released only through
the vigorous efforts of Archytas. He returned to Athens, where
he continued his teachings.

His old age was marred by various disappointments. He sup-
ported Dion in his attempt to seize the rule at Syracuse. At first Dion
was successful, but then he was stabbed by Callippus, who was also
a student at the Academy. Chaos resulted. Calhppus could not main-
tain his power, and in 346 b.c. the king returned to Syracuse, again
to become its ruler. But the citizens still disliked him, and finally
they were delivered from his tyranny by Timoleon, who ruled from
344 to 337 B.C. Under him Syracuse experienced a golden era. He
was a philosopher-king of whom Plato would have approved, but
unfortunately Plato did not witness his reign, for he died in 347 e.g.,
presumably while attending a banquet. Cicero maintained that to the
end of his life Plato was busy working on another dialogue.

THE WORKS OF PLATO

Scholars have tried to discover the order in which Plato's works
were written. The most accurate account is given by Campbell and
Lutoslawski, who divided his literary productions into four periods:
the first, the Socratic group; the second, the first Platonic group;
the third, the middle Platonic group; the fourth, the works of his
later period.

In the Socratic series, we find such dialogues as the Apology,
which contains an eloquent defense of Socrates; the Crito, which
tells of the fidelity of Socrates to the laws of Athens; the Euthyphro,
which contains an outline of the ideal of piety which Socrates cher-
ished. There follow other dialogues, including the Char?mdes, which
discusses among other things the concept of temperance; the Laches,
which deals with moral ideals, especially courage; the Lysis, which
has the theme of friendship and shows that friendship has a transcen-
dental meaning. Then we have the Protagoras, which deals with the
teachability of virtue and attacks the relativistic views of Protagoras.
The Meno gives an intimation of Plato's own concept of knowledge
and defines knowledge as recollection. The Euthydemus also is di-
rected against the Sophists, especially against their logical fallacies.

PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 105

The Gorgias, likewise, inveighs against the superficiahty of Sophist
rhetoric. It gives an excellent contrast between the philosopher and
the practical politician who used Sophist principles.

The first Platonic series includes the Cratylus, which has been neg-
lected by the historians of philosophy, although it is quite significant,
for it contains Plato's concept of language. He maintained that
words do not arise purely from artificial convention and showed
that a knowledge of truth must come before a knowledge of words.
In it he also gave a comprehensive account of verbal fallacies. There
follows the Syviposhnii, which deals with his concept of love;
the Phaedo, which gives an impressive account of his doctrines of
immortality; and the early books of the Republic.

The middle Platonic group comprises the later books of the
Republic, outhning Plato's concept of the ideal state. The Phaednis
starts out with a speech of Lysis on love, followed by a full discus-
sion of the nature of Eros; also, there are references to philosophical
rhetoric. The dialogue combines the theory of Ideas with the Orphic
belief in transmigration of souls. Then we have the Theaetetiis, deal-
ing with the problems of epistemology and directed against the Pro-
tagorean view that man is the measure of all things. There is the Par-
menides, exposing the concept of the Ideas to criticism. The Par-
inenides reveals that Plato was conscious of the paradoxes which his
view of the Ideas involved.

Finally we have the dialogues of his later years. The Sophist is a
continuation of the epistemological viewpoint of the Theaetetiis. The
Politicus, or the Statesfnan, is an attempt to depict an expert states-
man who alone can rule the state. The Philebiis contains a discussion
of ethics and shows how pleasure is related to the Good; likewise, it
portrays the influence of Pythagoreanism. The Timaeus, which was
extremely influential in the Middle Ages, contains many of Plato's
most significant cosmological doctrines. The Critias pictures an agri-
cultural Utopia, which is compared with the imperialistic power of
Atlantis.

The last work of Plato is the Laws. Containing his political and
social ideals, it is a continuation of the Republic. In it there are also
discussions of science, metaphysics, and religion. This last work is
characterized by a dogmatic and austere spirit.

PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In turning to Plato's epistemological theories, we find that he starts
the process of knowledge by a discussion of imagination, the first

io6 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

stage of opinion. In this state, knowledge is very imperfect and can
scarcely distinguish between illusion and fact; everything is hazy,
indefinite, and vague. The difference between external and internal
sensation is scarcely noticed, nor is there a clear distinction between
subjective and objective viewpoints.

The second stage of opinion he calls assurance or confidence. In
this state we learn to describe objective phenomena. Thought be-
comes more distinct and more clearly defined. We realize that there
is a difference between our own views and the external world. We
note that phenomena exist outside ourselves and cannot be con-
railed by our wishes. All this brings about a feeling of confidence
in our mental powers. But as yet our knowledge is not unified; we
merely perceive an unending flux: a Heraclitean picture of the
universe.

We then arrive at the third stage, which Plato calls intelligent
understanding. We leave the realm of opinion behind and enter the
province of real knowledge. Intelligent understanding makes it pos-
sible for us to describe phenomena. We establish a relationship be-
tween causes and efi"ects. Briefly, we are using our scientific re-
sources. Previously the universe appeared chaotic and disordered,
but now we realize that it obeys definite laws, thereby making it pos-
sible for us to control the forces of nature.

Science, however, according to Plato, does not give us a concept
of true reality. It is lacking in many respects. It accepts first prin-
ciples and is still dependent upon sense knowledge, thereby giving
us an incomplete view of nature. It deals too much with concrete
objects and concrete phenomena, and Plato believed that knowledge
in its highest aspects must transcend phenomena and concrete rep-
resentations.

Plato's view has important consequences. It signifies that science
is not the key to reality and that real knowledge must be freed fro7n
bondage to the sejises. This freedom is attained by dialectic, or phi-
losophy, which attempts a unification of knowledge. Leaving the
realm of phenomena behind, philosophy is concerned with the realm
of immaterial For?ns. Reason, thus, gives complete order and unity.
It synthesizes all the other aspects of knowledge and produces
a splendid view of the interrelationship and interdependence of
knowledge.

Ultimately, however, Plato maintained, not even reason is suffi-
cient. The final stage of the mind involves mystical intuitiofi, by
which we obtain a vision of the intelligible realm of Ideas. Involv-

PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 107

ing a transformation of our inner being, it negates the limitations
of time and space. We become part of the absolute realm of beauty
and truth. Th7is a strai?i of mysticism e?iters Plato''s epistemological
concepts.

An excellent account of Plato's concept of knowledge is given
in his allegory of the cave, which we find in the seventh book of
the Republic:

"And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is
enlightened or unenlightened:— Behold! human beings living in an
underground den, which has a mouth open toward the light and
reaching all along the den; here they have been from their child-
hood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot
move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains
from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is
blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there
is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along
the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of
them, over which they show the puppets.

"I see.

"And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all
sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood
and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some
of them are talking, others silent.

"You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange pris-
oners."^

Plato explained that these prisoners of the cave cannot see any-
thing but shadows. To them, truth means only the shadow of
images:

"And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the
prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when
any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and
turn his neck round and walk and look toward the light, he will
suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable
to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the
shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he
saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching
nearer to being and his eye is turned toward more real existence,
he has a clearer vision,— what will be his reply? And you may
further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they
pass and requiring him to name them,— will he not be perplexed?

1 Republic, vii, 514-515.

io8 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are
truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

"Far truer.

"And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not
have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take ref-
uge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will con-
ceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being
shown to him?"^

When dragged upwards, the prisoners of the cave are at first
dazzled by the excessive light of day. Finally able to see the sun, they
begin to understand that the visible sun is the cause of all things.
They, in turn, develop a feeling of pity for the unfortunate in-
habitants of the cave.

Plato described the meaning of the allegory: "The prison-house
is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will
not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be
the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my
poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed— whether rightly
or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is
that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all,
and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to
be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of
light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the imme-
diate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this
is the power upon which he who \\ ould act rationally either in
public or private life must have his eye fixed. "-^

The task of knowledge is liberation from the underground cave
of the sensible world, which contains merely a collection of physi-
cal objects. We cannot be satisfied, Plato wrote, until we reach the
realm of Forms existing in the world above, which contains true
knowledge. In the cave we can see only our own reflections,
vague shadows which create an atmosphere of unreality. Above,
in the intelligible realm, we are enlightened by the Ideas, and we
obtain a true knowledge of eternity.

What does this view of knowledge imply? Plato taught that the
senses hold man in bondage, and the objects of the everyday world,
which present us with flux and change, are not real. Absolute
knowledge demands an effort which can be achieved only by the
few. In Plato's epistemology an aristocratic tone prevails. The phi-

2 Ibid., 515.
^Ibid.,^i-j.

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF IDEAS 109

losopher, to his way of thinking, is a lonely man who, having such a
subhme view of truth, is bound to be misunderstood by his con-
temporaries.

Plato's doctrine of recollection now confronts us. The question
arises. How do we understand universal Ideas? In the phenomenal
world we have only sensible objects, fleeting and changing. Plato
maintained, especially in the Meiio, that when we have a recollection
of knowledge, we are reminded of the universal objects which we
saw before our birth. Our souls, he held, before being imprisoned
in our bodies, had a view of eternal Forms, and we are darkly re-
minded of them in our existence on earth. Certain universal prin-
ciples, then, are innate and a priori and are not derived from our
environment.

We shall notice that throughout the history of philosophy an in-
tense conflict has been waged between those who, hke Plato, believe
in a priori knowledge and those who, like Locke, feel that all knowl-
edge is derived from our environment and the senses. Plato's view
is rationalistic and leads to the exaltation of universal principles.
Locke's view, on the other hand, is empirical and psychological and
emphasizes the reality of the individual. The Platonic view resulted
in a wave of mysticism, which we find, especially, in Neo-Plato-
nism, a movement which arose at the end of the period of ancient
philosophy.

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF IDEAS

In Plato's world, the sensible realm of becoming, change, and trans-
formations is not the object of knowledge. We can have no certain
understanding of it; we can only form opinions of it which are
bound to be fallacious. Reality must be immaterial and must be de-
scribed by infallible laws. iVIoreover, reality must satisfy our esthetic
needs. It cannot be mechanistic, as Anaxagoras had supposed, for it
must fulfill our desire for absolute perfection. The Sophists had
stressed the existence of particular things, with the individual as
the judge of truth. In fact, Gorgias maintained there is no reahty.
Plato's view suggests the opposite. Reality does exist; it is the true
source of all being and all knoivledge.

What then is more important, the universal or the individual?
We already have an inkhng of the answer. Plato stated categori-
cally: the universal. This viewpoint is called realism. Epistemo-
logically, the Platonic view imphes that knowledge is not concerned
with the individual, with Tom, Dick, and Harry. Rather, it is

no PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

concerned with essences and with the universal Forms of Tom, Dick,
and Harry. The specific aspect of things, according to Plato, does
not last. It is merged into the flux; but the Forms (Ideas) have an
eternal existence.

Plato's description of the nature of Ideas reminds us of Par-

menides, except that in Plato the Ideas have lost their corporeal

status. The Ideas, Plato asserted, exist always; since they are un-

"created, they do not pass away. They are perfect and absolute, and

they are not subject to the limitations of the senses.

It must be remembered that the Ideas are also ideals and ob-
jects of aspiration. The Idea of beauty is more perfect than any
corporeal representation we may perceive. The Idea of beauty is a
standard for all evaluation. In short, the Ideas are not only onto-
logical but also teleological concepts. We have Ideas not only for
mental and intellectual values, but also for physical objects and
qualities. We even have Ideas for artificial objects such as chairs,
houses, and so on.

In Plato's later dialogues, especially the Parmejiides, the problem
arises: Can there be Ideas for ugly things? The Parme?iides represents
a discussion between Socrates, who is still quite young, Parmenides,
who is old, and Zeno, who is in his middle years. In this dialogue,
Socrates rejects the concept that there can be Ideas for such physi-
cal objects as mud. Parmenides repHes that when Socrates becomes
more mature, he will change his viewpoint and will not despise even
the meanest things.

The dialogue in the Parmenides indicates that Plato never com-
pletely solved the relationship between Ideas and concrete objects.
For example, Parmenides raises the problem as to whether the in-
dividual participates in the whole Idea or only in part of it. Both
viewpoints lead to contradictions. Socrates holds that Ideas repre-
sent only thoughts; but this, likewise, does not help us, for thoughts
must be of objects. If we say that Ideas exist in themselves, having
an autonomous relationship, then they cannot be understood by
our minds at all.

In the dialogue, Parmenides turns to Socrates and says: "In the
first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or anyone who maintains the
existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist
in us.

"No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.

"True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in
relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF IDEAS in

among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or
whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from
which we receive this or that name when we partake of them. And
the things which are within our sphere and have the same names
with them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the
ideas which have the same names with them, but belong to them-
selves and not to them.

"What do you mean? said Socrates.

"I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:— A
master has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation
between them, which is simply a relation of one man to another.
But there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is rela-
tive to the idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have
nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they are concerned with
themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

"Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning."^

We might escape the dilemma by saying that Ideas exist in the
mind of God, who possesses all knowledge; but do we know the
mind of God? The answer is. No. Thus, the Ideas are still unex-
plained.

The outcome of the dialogue is tentative skepticism, for although
many fundamental problems have been raised, no categorical an-
swers are given.

"These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of
the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we
determine each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears
what may be said against them will deny the very existence of
them— and even if they do exist, he will say that they must of
necessity be unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on
his side, and as we were remarking just now, will be very difficult
to convince; a man must be gifted with very considerable ability
before he can learn that everything has a class and an absolute
essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all
these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them
is able to teach them to others.

"I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say
is very much to my mind.

"And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his atten-
tion on these and the hke difficulties, does away with ideas of things
and will not admit that every individual thing has its own deter-

* Panjienides, 133-134.

112 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

minate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing
on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power
of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted.

"Very true, he said.

"But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we
turn, if the ideas are unknown?

"I certainly do not see my way at present."^

We now come to the problem of truth and error. Again Plato
differed from the Sophists. He showed that knowledge cannot be
defined according to perception. It is not a relative thing, nor is
it dependent upon opinion. Thus, if we say that what is true is
merely a matter of opinion, then why should we take anyone's
word for it?

Knowledge employs, furthermore, the use of categories, which,
however, we do not obtain through our sense experiences but
through reason.

Error arises, according to Plato, when ive adhere to a relativistic
concept of knowledge and rely on our opinions rather than on
reason. When we analyze the paradoxes, we discover that certain
Forms can be combined while others cannot be used together. Fal-
lacies represent contradictory Forms, whereas true knowledge lies
in our ability to use the Forms w^hich are harmonious. The Sophists,
according to Plato, had perverted the meaning of philosophy, for
they had maintained that what exists does not exist and had there-
fore specialized in deception. The task of the true philosopher, on
the other hand, is to clarify the question as to how Forms can be
combined and made intelligible.

THE IDEA OF THE GOOD

The crowning glory of Plato's doctrine of Ideas is the concept
of the Good. He compared it with the sun in the visible world;
for as the sun is the source of all light, so the Idea of the Good is
the source of all knowledge. To some extent, the Idea of the Good
approaches the status of divinity, for it is the source of Being and
superior to truth and knowledge. The Good, according to Plato,
not only is the author of knowledge but far exceeds knowledge in
dignity and power.

To summarize Plato's view of the Idea of the Good, we find
that it is superior to all truth and beauty. As the creator of both
existence and essences it sustains all Being. Thus, we have a three-

^ Ibid., 135.

THE NATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHER 113

storied metaphysical universe: first, the sensible world; second, the
Ideas; third, the Idea of the Good.

But there is another interpretation of Plato's metaphysical arrange-
ment, which regards the Ideas merely as logical essences. Thus they
do not subsist apart from the objects they embody. For example, Ein-
stein's Law of Relativity does not subsist in an independent realm; it
is part of the objects it describes. Likewise, the Idea of the Good
merely represents the complete outline of the universe. It does not
have an ontological status. It contains only the logical interrelation-
ship of phenomena.

Thus, there are two views of Plato's theory of Ideas. The first,
which is traditional, is ontological and pictures a three-storied uni-
verse. The second view, which is more modern in origin, regards
Plato's Ideas as logical essences and pictures a one-storied universe.

THE NATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHER

Plato's concept of philosophy was very lofty. Philosophy, accord-
ing to him, deals not merely with an explanation of phenomena;
indeed, this would be an inferior task. Rather, philosophy repre-
sents a vision of truth and real Being. The philosopher, Plato stated,
is most interested in the welfare of the soul. He is temperate; he is
the spectator of all time and all existence. Some of the philosopher's
other traits Plato described as gentleness, sociability, and harmoni-
ousness. Common opinion, however, has the opposite viewpoint and
regards philosophers as being either villainous or useless.

Why are philosophers regarded as impractical? It appears that
mankind is unwilling to employ their talents and is governed by
those who are dominated by illusions, never having absorbed the
philosophical spirit. iMoreover, some of the followers of philosophy
put it into disrepute.

Plato gave various reasons why philosophers so easily deteriorate.
Primarily, he said, there are very few philosophers; they are, in-
deed, rare among mankind. Second, philosophers may be distracted
by outside activities. A thinker, for example, may engage in war
instead of contemplating eternity. Third, he ma)- be tempted by the
ordinary goods of Hfe, such as wealth and political connections.
Fourth, being of a more sensitive nature, a philosopher is more
easily exposed to injury than the common mass of mankind. "The
most gifted minds, when they are ill conducted, become often pre-
eminentlv bad." Fifth, the force of public opinion often corrupts
philosophy, for the thinker is exposed to all kinds of social currents

114 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

and frequently is contaminated by the idols of his time. His con-
cept of good and evil, many times, will be absorbed from that of
the masses. To survive, he will have to conform; thus, his inde-
pendence is constantly threatened. Sixth, philosophy is threatened
by persecution. Death awaits those who do not agree with the
masses (apparently Plato was thinking of the fate of Socrates when
he made this assertion).

What is significant in this view of the philosopher is Plato's ap-
preciation of real objectivity. His ideal philosopher is almost Spin-
ozistic. We find a man who focuses his eyes, not on the changing
world but on eternity; a man who lives alone in majestic solitude,
inevitably misunderstood by his contemporaries. But Plato pointed
out that such a man owes a debt to humanity and therefore cannot
remain isolated. Thus, in the Republic he explained how the phi-
losopher can best serve the state.

GOD AND THE SOUL

When we turn to Plato's concept of God, we realize immediately
that it is different from the Homeric view. Did not Homer picture
the gods as being intensely human? Did not Homer spread immoral
tales about the gods? In Plato's early dialogues, there is very little
detailed analysis of the gods. In the Republic, he makes it clear that
the gods cannot be the creators of evil and that therefore we must
seek other causes. In the Phaedo, the gods are our guides after death,
but still they do not play a prominent part. In the Tiuiaeus, we find
the myth of creation, which we shall discuss later. God appears as
a ruler, but he does not create the world from nothing as Jehovah
did.

Plato's discussion of the gods appears most fully in the Laivs, in
which he is especially concerned with the atheists, whom he con-
demns most strongly. He tried to prove that the gods exist, that
they care for humanity, and that they must be worshiped accord-
ing to the laws of the country. In the Laics God is the supreme
principle of life, and, to some extent, has replaced the Forms. The
picture is almost theistic, reminding us of Calvinistic theocracy.
Atheists are punished mercilessly, and Plato suggests the use of
secret informers to report to the authorities of the state anyone
who disbelieves in the gods.

In his discussion of religion, Plato pointed out that the soul is
prior to the body and that it guides nature teleologically. He iden-
tified souls with the gods. The confutation of atheism is most clearly

GOD AND THE SOUL 115

given in the tenth book of the Laws, in which the main speaker, the
Athenian, represents the Platonic viewpoint:

^^Athe?iian. No one who beheves in the existence of gods such
as the law acknowledges ever voluntarily does an impious deed or
utters a lawless word. If he does so, it is for one of three reasons.
Either he does not believe in the gods, as I said, or, secondly, he
believes that they exist, but have no care for mankind; or, thirdly,
that they are easy to be entreated and turned aside by sacrifice and
prayer."^

Cleinias, who comes from Crete, believes it is easy to be con-
vinced of the existence of gods. Do not all men, Greeks and bar-
barians alike, believe in them? The Athenian holds a different view-
point. The atheists will not be impressed by this argument.

^''AtheniaiJ. In the first place they say that gods do not exist in
nature, but are the product of deliberate conventions, which, more-
over, vary from place to place, according as each set of men agreed
together to make laws for themselves; also that what is naturally
honorable is not the same as what is legally enjoined as such; while
the principles of justice have no natural existence at all, but man-
kind is always disputing about them and each alteration has no
natural validity, but is valid as a matter of deliberate convention
just at the time and place \\'here it is made.

"All these statements are made by men whom young people
think wise, poets and prose-writers, who declare that the perfec-
tion of right is any claim that violence can make good. Hence our
young men are afilicted with impiety, for they think that gods such
as those which the law bids us to beheve in, do not exist; and there
arises a faction who invite them to live the true life according to
nature, which really means to escape from the slavery of legal sub-
jection to others, and to live in dominion over them."^

The Athenian proceeds by pointing out that atheism should be
met by persuasion, if possible. He describes the philosophy of the
natural scientist, who, he thinks, does not understand the signifi-
cance of the soul:

"The opinions I have described imply a belief that fire, water,
earth, and air are the primary things, called 'nature,' and that soul is
a later thing, derived from them; indeed, that is the plain meaning of
the theory. Have we not here laid bare the source of the unwise

^ Laws X, 885B (abridged), Comford, ed., Greek religious thought from Homer
to the age of Alexander, p. 213.
Ubid., pp. 217-218.

ii6 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

belief held by all these inquirers in the science of nature? The argu-
ment should be carefully examined at every point. It is a matter of
great importance, if it can be shown that the leaders of irreligious
thought have gone astray in their reasoning. I must pursue a line of
thought that is perhaps unfamiliar. This philosophy which manu-
factures irreligious minds inverts the natural order, placing last what
should be first, namely the primary cause of the generation and
destruction of all things. Hence their error about the true nature of
the gods. Nearly all betray their ignorance of the character and sig-
nificance of soul, and especially of its origin. They do not know that
soul is one of the first things, older than any kind of body, whose
changes and transpositions it certainly controls. And if soul is older
than body, it follows that the order of things to which soul belongs
must be prior to the things of the body."^

THE SOUL

As can be seen, much of Plato's philosophy depends on his concept
of the soul. Teaching the pre-existence of the soul, he explained its
existence on earth as due to the fact that it has fallen from its divine
status. He believed in "feincarnation, a doctrine which undoubtedly
was influenced by the Orphic and Pytliagorean philosophy^

In Plato we find a very elaborate description of the afterlife. For
a thousand years after death the soul retains its personality. Follow-
ing this period comes a real extinction, and the individual soul loses
all contact with its memory. The souls are informed that they can
choose the type of life they desire. This choice does not involve real
freedom, for the life they prefer is determined by their previous
existence. The evil man usually chooses an inferior existence,
whereas the good man selects a better existence. In the new rein-
carnation there are no personal ties with the past. There is only a
continuity of character.

According to Plato, the philosopher will be especially rewarded.
After death he will live with the gods, provided he has not taught
fallacious doctrines. On the other hand, those who have lived the
life of the senses will become animals, such as wolves, and will be
punished for their sensuality. This idea involves the view that the
soul is superior to the body, and, consequently, Plato defended the
belief in the immortaUty of the soul. One of his arguments is based
on the unity of opposites. Life implies death, and death imphes life.
We cannot think of one without the other; both are necessary. If

^ Ibid., pp. 218-219.

THE SOUL 117

only death prevailed, the universe could not continue. So death ??mst
turn into life.

Another Platonic argument is that the soul must have existed be-
fore birth. We have a recollection of its pre-existence. Plato felt that
in this life we perceive only relative, not absolute, standards. Our
knowledge of absolute Ideas must be due to pre-existence. He held
that the soul is simple and unalterable and thus cannot be touched by
death, which destroys only material and composite things.

Vigorous objections to Plato's view are made in the Fhaedo. Cebes
and Simmias assert that the soul is the harmony of the body and,
consequently, depends upon the body for existence. Socrates, the
spokesman for Plato in the dialogue, maintains the opposite view-
point: The soul is superior to the body and independent of it. It
cannot be destroyed by various reincarnations, for it always remains
the same.

"And is it likely that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the
place of the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and
noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God
will, my soul is also soon to go— that the soul, I repeat, if this be her
nature and origin, will be blown away and destroyed immediately
on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear
Simmias and Cebes. The truth, rather, is that the soul which is pure
at departing and draws after her no bodily taint, having never vol-
untarily during life had connection with the body, which she is
ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself;— and making such ab-
straction her perpetual study— which means that she has been a true
disciple of philosophy; and therefore has in fact been always engaged
in the practice of dying? For is not philosophy the study of death?

"Certainly—

"That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world
—to the divine and immortal and rational: hither arriving, she is
secure of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their
fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells,
as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods."^

Plato also stated in the Fhaedo that the soul participates in the Idea
of life, thereby excluding the opposite concept, the Idea of death.
According to him, the immortal is imperishable, and, therefore, the
soul cannot be destroyed. When death attacks a man, the mortal
portion of him dies while the immortal substance is preserved for
eternity.

^Fhaedo, 80-81.

ii8 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

Another argument reveals that the soul is not governed by any
external agency but is self-moving and, consequently, is regarded
as being without beginning or end. Plato's view of the soul had
important consequences:

"But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal,
what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion
of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of
neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be
awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have
had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit
not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their
souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is
no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest
virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world
below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; and these
are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the
very beginning of his journey thither."^"

It must be pointed out that Plato was not concerned with personal
salvation. He was quite different from most of the later Christian
theologians. In fact, in Plato the Oriental view of the afterlife was
dominant. Consequently he subordinated personality to the search
for true Being, which can only be found in a reunion with the
divijie.

There are also indications, as the Symposium shows, that Plato
thought of immortality as a state of the mind. By identifying our-
selves with the principle of absolute beauty and truth, we obtain not
only a true view of reality but a view of deathlessness. Once we
absorb this vision, he declared, we are not touched by the passage
of time. We have become emancipated from the limitations of our
senses. We are able, in short, to view life under the aspect of
eternity.

THE PROBLEM OF CREATION

Most of the salient views of Plato regarding creation are contained
in the Timaeus. To the modern observer it appears to be among the
most superficial and naive of Plato's dialogues, although it had an
immense influence upon the Neo-Platonists and thinkers of the
Middle Ages.

The Ti?naeus tells the myth of Atlantis and describes how Athens
fought against the power of Atlantis, delivering Europe and Libya

^^Ibid., 107.

THE PROBLEM OF CREATION 119

from its enslavement. The story inspired many Utopian writers,
especially Sir Thomas More and Sir Francis Bacon. The dialogue,
however, is mainly concerned with metaphysical problems. We are
told by Timaeus, the narrator, why the Creator made this world.
The main reason was his goodness:

"He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of any-
thing. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should
be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest sense the
origm of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing
on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be
good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also
finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregu-
lar and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order, con-
sidering that this was in every way better than the other. Now the
deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest;
and the creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible,
found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than
the intelligent taken as a whole; and that intelligence could not be
present in anything which was devoid of soul. For which reason,
when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and
soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by
nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probabil-
ity, we may say that the world became a living creature truly en-
dowed with soul and intelHgence by the providence of God."^^

The question arises, Are there many worlds, or was only one uni-
verse created? We remember that many of the pre-Socratic philos-
ophers believed in a plurality of worlds. In the Timaeus we are in-
formed there is only one world, composed of fire and earth and
united by air and water. It is perfect, spherical in form, self-suffi-
cient, and not subject to decay. In its center God put the soul, which
he made from two substances— the indivisible (the Same) and the
divisible {i.e., the Other).

At the same time God decided to make creation more perfect;
consequently, he endowed it with immortality. He resolved to have
a moving image of eternity: time.

". . . and when he set in order the heaven, he made this image
eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests
in unity; and this image we call time. For there were no days and
nights and months and years before the heaven was created, but
when he constructed the heaven he created them also. They are all

11 Timaeus, 20-30.

120 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time,
which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence;
for we say that he 'was', he 'is', he 'will be', but the truth is that 'is'
alone is properly attributed to him, and that 'was' and 'will be' are
only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but
that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger
by time, nor ever did or has become, or hereafter will be, older or
younger, nor is subject at all to any of those states which affect
moving and sensible things and of which generation is the cause.
These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves
according to a law of number." ^^

In the Tif/iaeus we are told the seven planets preserve the remem-
brance of time, and the sun was created to afford the measure of
their swiftness. It can readily be seen that Plato's view of science
was teleological. He was mainly concerned with the function of
natural phenomena.

Very significant is Plato's concept of space, which is the third
principle of the universe. We have (i) an intelligible pattern, (2)
a created copy, and (3) space, the "receptacle of all generation." ^^
Space itself is formless. Nevertheless, it has the potentiality of re-
ceiving Forms. It provides a home for all created things. It cannot
be perceived by sense, but by a kind of "spurious reason."^^

This use of the concept of space is noteworthy. Plato identified
space with the principle of Not-beijig. Since space is eternal, it con-
fronted God in the very beginning of creation. It was God's task to
create order out of chaos. Physical space or physical matter is re-
sponsible, to a great extent, for the existence of evil; somehow it
resists the rational tendencies of the Forms. Plato, however, never
gave a completely definite answer to the problem of evil. In the
Laws he suggested that evil may be due to the existence of a wicked
world-soul which might be compared to a devil.

In Plato, we already have the dualism which became so dominant
in medieval philosophy. On the one hand, we have the perfect realm
of the Forms— eternal and immutable. On the other hand, we have
the realm of matter, which represents a constant flux and is the

^source of illusion. Plato distinguished between two causes. One is

1 divine, while the other is necessary. He felt that the necessary cause
▼ exists for the sake of the divine. Lower beings, consequently, exist

^2 Ibid., 37-38.
13 Cf. ibid., 49.
^*Cf.ibid., 52.

THE PROBLEM OF CREATION 121

for the sake of higher beings. The world cannot be understood
according to material principles; its essence must be comprehended
in its teleological structure.

In the Timaeus we have also a discussion of psychological and
physiological factors. We are told that man has two souls: one mor-
tal and the other immortal. Our head is the seat of the immortal soul,
while the mortal is lodged in the breast. The mortal soul is con-
stantly exposed to irrational sensations. This theory appears in-
credible to the modern observer, but, we must remember, the Greeks
had not developed a solid foundation for psychology.

In the Timaeus, as well as in other later dialogues, there is a ten-
dency to use mathematics as the model of the universe. Plato asserted
that matter and space are identical. Elements, thus, can be best under-
stood according to their geometric differences, and their forms rep-
resent the mathematical structure of the universe. Plato asserted
that the solid element is made of cubes. Air is made of octahedrons;
water is made of icosahedrons; and fire is made of pyramids. He also
maintained that the universe itself was made according to a geomet-
rical model.

In his later philosophy Plato suggested that the highest type of
knowledge is contained in mathematics. Arithmetic, then, is the first
science. In this idea we can detect the enormous influence of the
Pythagoreans on the development of the Platonic system.

In defining Ideas as numbers, Plato's philosophy anticipated some
of the conclusions of modern science. Modern scientific progress
has come about mainly by the reduction of qualities to their quan-
titative constituents. Plato, however, was not interested in a func-
tional discussion of mathematics. He thought that mathematics is a
symbol of the divine structure of the universe and that reality can be
expressed in mathematical terms. The same idea was shared by the
continental rationalists of the 17th century who tried to establish a
system of metaphysics based on mathematical principles.

Thus ends Plato's search for reality. As he grew older, he became
more spiritual and more concerned with the problem of God. But in
all his periods he stressed one fundamental fact: reality cannot be
found in the realm of phenomena; it Hes in a super-sensible world
which is eternal, uncorrupted, and immune to change.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Relate the main events in Plato's life.

2. What effect did Socrates have upon Plato?

122 PLATO'S SEARCH FOR REALITY

3. What are the major Platonic writings?

4. Explain Plato's doctrine of Ideas.

5. What does the allegory of the cave imply?

6. How can certainty be reached, according to Plato?

7. How is the doctrine of Ideas criticized in the Farmevides?

8. How did Plato view the physical realm?

9. How did Plato defend the doctrine of the immortality of the soul?
ID. Explain Plato's concept of creation. Compare it with the Biblical view

of creation.

11. What was Plato's view of God? Compare his view with that of Chris-
tian theology.

12. Describe Plato's concept of matter.

13. What did Plato mean by the Idea of the Good?

14. Summarize the main contributions of Plato's metaphysical system.

1 1

PLATO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

THE SPARTAN INFLUENCE

.o appreciate Plato's social philosophy we must understand its
cultural setting. Most of Plato's life was dominated by the conflict
which was being waged between Sparta and Athens. Many com-
mentators have pointed out that Plato was greatly influenced by an
idealized view of Sparta.

The Spartan state was composed of a small group of citizens and
a multitude of serfs, who had scarcely any privileges. The ruling
class lived a parasitical existence; its main occupation was warfare.
Intellectually the Spartans were vastly inferior to the Athenians, and
their education was not concerned with the arts but with training
the body.

Spartan discipline was harsh, and its youth had to endure heavy
hardships. The Spartan youth was issued only one garment a year;
often he was forced to go without food. Always under supervision,
he was constantly subject to athletic training and engaged in boxing
or other rigorous activities to harden his body. The women under-
went as much physical training as the men. Associating freely with
men, they were taught how to wrestle and how to become strong
physically.

123

124 PLATO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The state controlled almost every activity in Sparta. Marriage
and childbearing were not left to the discretion of the individual
but were supervised by the authorities of the state. Those who did
not marry were subject to fines and social abuse. The Spartan
moral ideal was that marriage should produce healthy offspring,
and consequently children who were weak and deformed were
killed. The Spartans were not guided in their actions by brotherly
love or by humanitarian considerations.

Since the Spartan state discouraged luxury, it did not admit gold
but used iron as currency. Collectivism was encouraged; the men
shared their property and ate in common messes. The citizen could
not engage in mercantile trade, and agriculture was therefore the
backbone of the state. However, serfs, not citizens, tilled the soil.
The Spartan state beheved in self-sufficiency, and foreign contact
was discouraged. It was a perfect model for the totalitarian rulers
of later times.

A conception of Sparta can best be obtained by contrasting it with
Athens. While Athens was democratic, interested in culture, and
imbued with love for the arts, Sparta was autocratic, self-sufficient,
and stressed the virtues of militarism.

In Plato's Republic we find, also, emphasis on sharp class division
and stress on collectivism. Plato's rulers lived almost hke the Spartan
citizens. But there is one great difference: Plato believed in the
philosopher-king, who rules the state not by the use of military
measures but through the exercise of wisdo?n.

It is possible that Plato was also inspired by the rule of Archytas
at Tarentum. We know that Archytas used Pythagorean principles
in directing the political affairs of his time. Furthermore, Plato cher-
ished the example of Socrates, and we know that Socrates was op-
posed to unrestrained democracy and believed the state should be
ruled by the wisest and the best.

THE MORAL IDEAL

The influence of Socrates was especially strong in the formation of
the Platonic ethical system, for, like Socrates, Plato felt that virtues
are not acquired and independent of environment. Virtue is one
and the same everywhere. Thus, Plato rejected the relativisjn of
the Sophists.

Does goodness lie in pleasure, as the Sophists believed? Plato re-
jected this view and showed how fleeting and transitory pleasures
are. If we beheve in pleasures alone, we live animahstic lives. He

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE 125

indicated how pleasures vary in intensity and duration, and how
the sources of pleasure differ. Some people, for example, might
spend their lives in pure sensuality, yet this mode of life would not
lead to a full and meaningful existence, which can best be achieved
through philosophical contemplation.

Furthermore, to appreciate and evaluate pleasure, wisdom is
needed. The masses are frequently deluded in searching for imme-
diate ends and ijjimediate satisfactions. Yet, once attained, these ends
and satisfactions become a source of pain. Certainly pleasure cannot
be the ultimate standard, for it refers to something beyond itself
and demands ijitellectual evaluation.

Plato, however, was not ascetic. He did not favor a monastic exis-
tence. As we have seen, he was a man who enjoyed all aspects of
life. Thus he suggested a middle path between hedonisiii and asceti-
cism.

Throughout his moral teachings, Plato subordinated the lower
parts of man, or his irrational nature, to his higher parts, or rational
nature. The higher part is identified with the realm of Ideas; the
lower part with that of matter, or Not-being. Also, he divided man's
irrational nature into two parts: a noble part, which he found in the
heart, and an ignoble part, which he located in the liver. Each part
of man has a ruhng virtue, he claimed, which corresponds to each
part of the soul. Thus we have wisdom, courage, and temperance.
The most important and highest virtue is justice, which stands for
an orderly relationship between the various parts and aspects of our
nature.

The four significant virtues in Plato, then, are contained in wis-
dom, courage, temperance, and justice. Notice that Plato did not
say anything about faith. Later, it will be seen how the medieval
Scholastics gave a supernatural foundation to his ethical system by
adding faith, hope, and charity.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE

In discussing Plato's ethical scheme, close attention must be given to
his treatment of love. We find its best exposition in the Symposium,
where there are two types of love: one, sacred; the other, profane.
Aristophanes, who is present in the Symposiinn, tells us in a satirical
manner how at first human beings had double features; thus they
had two faces, four eyes, and four legs. He says that Zeus, believing
man would become too powerful, consequently severed the forms
and gave to us our present constitution. This explains why we are

126 PLATO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

forever in search of consummation, and why physical love is such a
strong and impelling motive.

The climactic exposition in the Sy?nposiinn is given by Socrates,
who explains that love can be compared with a ladder. Real love,
which involves a search for transcendence, is emancipated from all
acquisitiveness. We start this process first by love for the physical
body, but we realize its imperfection, for we know the beauties of
the body do not last long and are impaired by age and external cir-
cumstances.

Second, we love all physical loveliness; but again something is
lacking, for our mind searches for immaterial entities, and when
we become mature we want to go beyond material things.

Third, we love the beauties of the mind and the soul. Now we have
achieved a higher state. We have turned away from fleeting and
trivial concerns, and we have gone beyond the veil of appearances.
Yet we are not completely emancipated from the senses, and we are
caught by temporal and spatial limitations. Thus, we finally love the
essence or Idea of loveliness. This involves complete identification;
we are no longer conscious of separateness.

As the Symposium describes it: "He who has been instructed thus
far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in
due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will sud-
denly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty ... a nature which in
the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing
and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of view and foul in an-
other, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at an-
other time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if
fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands
or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or
knowledge, or existing in any other being, as for example, in an
animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty
absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution
and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-grow-
ing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who from these
ascending under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that
beauty is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being
led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties
of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using
these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to
all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair
practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the

NATURE OF JUSTICE AND THE IDEAL STATE 127

notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of
beauty is."^

Such absolute beauty is completely independent of the senses. It
cannot be described according to physical models. It is a beauty
"which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the meas-
ure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence
now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to
live seeing them only and conversing with them without meat or
drink, if that were possible— you only want to look at them and to be
with them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty— the
divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged
with the pollutions of mortality and all the colors and vanities of
human life— thither looking, and holding converse with the true
beauty simple and divine? Remember how in that communion only,
beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to
bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not
of an image but of a reahty), and bringing forth and nourishing true
virtues to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man
may."-

Such a view of love is truly inspiring. We can think of it only
according to the process of artistic creativity, for it is quite certain
that when the artist produces his best, he loses consciousness of his
surroundings and becomes part of the subject matter with which he
is working.

THE NATURE OF JUSTICE AND
THE IDEAL STATE

The Republic, in which Plato's political and social ideals are set
forth, belongs to the most influential books of all time. It was
directed primarily against the view of Thrasymachus, who argued
for an autocratic and totalitarian way of life and posed as a realist.
Plato, opposed to such a view, represented ethical idealism.

Thrasymachus was certain that "the just is always the loser in
comparison with the unjust." First of all, in private contracts, "wher-
ever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when
the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the
just less. Second, in their dealings with the state: when there is an
income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the
same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received

^ Symposium, 210-2 1 1 .
^ Ibid., 2 1 1-2 1 2.

128 PLATO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what hap-
pens when they take public office: there is the just man neglecting
his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing
out of the public, because he is just; moreover, he is hated by his
friends and acquaintances for refusing to serve them in unlawful
ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man."^

Thrasymachus proceeded to point out the advantage of 7nass in-
justice. In tyranny, he asserted, the criminal is the happiest of men,
and those who resist because they believe in justice are the unhap-
piest. If he had lived during the Nazi and Fascist regimes in our time,
he could have substantiated his argument by pointing to concentra-
tion camps, torture chambers, and other instruments of modern
civilization.

Thrasymachus gave a comprehensive view of tyranny, "which by
fraud and force takes away the property of others, not little by little
but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as pro-
fane, private and public; for which acts of wrong, if he were de-
tected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be punished
and incur great disgrace— they who do such wrong in particular
cases are called robbers of temples and man-stealers and burglars and
swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the
money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these
names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the
citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consumma-
tion of injustice. For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they
may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from commit-
ting it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a
sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than
justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger,
whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest." ^

Opposed to this cynical view, Plato believed that justice does
exist, and he proceeded to develop his concept of the Utopian state
which is based not merely on convention or on a social contract but
on metaphysical ideals and purposes. His Utopian state avoids the
temptations of wealth and of excessive size. It consists of three
classes: one which rules, one which defends the state, and one which
carries on the economic activities of the community. Naturally, the
state is governed by the wisest men, just as the body is dominated by
the soul.

3 Republic, i, 343-344.
Ubid., 344.

NATURE OF JUSTICE AND THE IDEAL STATE 129

But how can such an ideal state be established? Plato was quite
certain that it requires equality of men and women. However, this
view was distasteful to the Athenians, who as a rule thought men
superior to women and that it is the function of wives to obey their
husbands. According to Plato, however, women can be as intelligent
and as capable as men, and sex is no barrier to political wisdom.

But, we must remember, in Plato's period Athenian women had
already reached a high status, and the dramas of Aristophanes indi-
cate their rebellion against old traditions. As the Athenians became
more cosmopolitan, they naturally retreated from their patriarchal
viewpoint and were more ready to accord a higher status to their
women.

So far, in the Republic, Plato had not been \ ery revolutionary, but
his attitude changed when he demanded a t\'pe of family relation-
ship in which women and children were to be held collectively.
Private property, he advocated, %\as not to be allowed among the rul-
ing class. This point of view, however, does not imply complete
communism, for the common people in his repubhc were allowed to
possess property.

Plato had an elevated concept of eugenics. He advocated that the
most intelligent and handsome men marry the most graceful and
beautiful women, the marriages to be arranged by the state. Regular
mating seasons should take place; men were to marry between the
ages of twenty-five and fifty-five, women between tu'enty and
forty. Like the Spartans, Plato thought that weak and sickly chil-
dren should be exposed to the elements and allowed to die, only
the strong and beautiful being allowed to survive.

Interestingly enough, these Platonic suggestions were followed
by Nazi Germany— not that private property was eliminated, but
the Germans under Hitler did away with most of the insane. They
surpassed Plato in carrying out a vigorous campaign of ehmination
against their political opponents.

Plato was very much concerned with the problem of inbreeding,
for he realized how possible it is for a parasitical ruHng class to arise.
He suggested that those children who are incapable, even if they are
the descendants of the rulers, be placed in another class, while the
brilliant children of the lower classes be admitted to the ranks of
the rulers. To avoid discontent, Plato advocated that the citizen
should be educated into believing that this system is arranged by
divine decree. There should be an official myth, he said, which
teaches that God has created three classes of men: the most

I30 PLATO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

important are made of gold— they are to be the rulers; the next class
are made of silver— they are to be the soldiers; the third are made
of brass and iron— and they are to be the common people. The
objection could be made that no one would believe such a myth.
Plato provided a ready answer, for he thought that while its ac-
ceptance would be difficult in the present generation, education
would influence the people to accept the royal he in later times.

In this view he was again prophetic. It is important to notice how
great the influence of mythology is on political thinking. For ex-
ample, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, propagandists saw to it
that the children accepted categorical dogmas. While the older gen-
eration frequently rebelled, youth was much more willing to adopt
new political concepts.

This subject brings us to Plato's view of education. The ruling
class, he advocated, is to be exposed to a rigorous curriculum. It
starts with music and gymnastics, both of which are vital subjects;
gymnastics for the body and music for the mind. The curriculum
also includes arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, and as-
tronomy, to give the student an appreciation of immutable prin-
ciples. To cap off this study of the sciences, he advocated a course
in harmonics, to elevate the mind to a higher esthetic plane.

All this serves merely as a preparation for dialectic or philosophy,
which can be appreciated only by the few. According to Plato, by
the time the student is thirty-five and has passed extensive tests, he is
ready to rule the state according to the immutable principles of jus-
tice. For the following fifteen years he will use the principles of
wisdom in dealing with political matters, and then he will retire,
subject to recall to resume charge of political affairs.

Plato believed in the philosopher-king, and in a famous passage
maintained: "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes
of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political
greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures
who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to
stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils,— no, nor the
human race, as I believe,— and then only will this our state have a
possibihty of Kfe and behold the light of day."^

Plato asserted that mankind can be saved only if the wisest rule.
The Athenian experiment in democracy had convinced him that
only too often the state is guided by the mediocre. Wise men, he
knew, dislike engaging in pohtical affairs. Thus, he prescribed an

^ Ibid., V, 473.

NATURE OF JUSTICE AND THE IDEAL STATE 131

exact educational curriculum to prepare the wise for the duties of
public office. In Plato's philosophy, political concepts are identified
with ethical ideals. The ruling class, the philosopher-kings, possess
the virtue of wisdom; the soldiers exemplify courage; and the com-
mon people, temperance.

It is a mistake to think of Plato as a proponent of war, for he knew
that culture can best develop in time of peace. He advocated the
humane treatment of prisoners and was very much concerned with
the disintegration of the Hellenic states. Like Gorgias, he believed
in real Pan-Hellenic unity.

Most interesting is Plato's suggestion of censorship. Like Xe-
nophanes, Plato turned against the poets, whom he excluded from
the ideal republic. Having read Homer and Hesiod carefully, he
decided he had no use for them. Had not both of them pictured the
gods as behaving in a thoroughly immoral manner? Did they not
talk about the gods as being swept away by passions? Moreover,
these poets did not stress the dignity of the gods; thereby they
created a poor example for youth. Homer frequently showed that
the wicked live a happy life and the virtuous suffer on earth. This
situation was unedifying from Plato's moral standpoint, and the
students of the ideal Utopia were to be taught that virtue always wins
and vice is inevitably punished.

In discussing the drama Plato inveighed against all plays which
stress badness or portray the pleasures of immorality. Such dramas
are not to be allowed, for no evil acts are to be imitated. He thought
such imitation spoils the character of the actors. In fact, Plato be-
lieved that the disintegration of Athens, to some extent, was due to
the laxity of its poets and dramatists.

In his esthetic theory, Plato made it clear that all art is second-rate.
As an imitation of phenomena art cannot give us reality. It is so dan-
gerous that it must be strictly censored. Art, in short, must edify and
teach a moral lesson. This censorship is even extended to music.
Plato wanted to outlaw the enervating rhythms of the Lydian and
Ionian modes. In their stead, he advocated the use of the Dorian and
Phrygian modes, because they can inspire an attitude of courage and
temperance. He thought music should be siviple; hence, he did not
favor "complex" harmony.

In the tenth book of the Republic, Plato returned to the attack
against the poets. Socrates tells Glaucon: "Whenever you meet with
any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the edu-
cator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for education and for the

132 PLATO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

ordering of human things, and that you should take him up again
and again and yet again to know him and regulate your whole life
according to him, we may love and honor those who say these
things— they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and
we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets
and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our convic-
tion that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only
poetry which ought to be admitted into our state. For if you go
beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or
lyric verse, pleasure and pain will be the lords of your state."^

In the Republic, Plato indicates that the ideal state can easily dis-
integrate. The first stage of disintegration he calls tmiocracy, which
stands for government by ambition instead of wisdom. The ruling
goal is worldly power, and consequently the harmony to be found
in a Utopia is absent.

The second stage of decline is oligarchy, the rule of the rich. Now
money is all-important, and material goals are worshiped. This sit-
uation brings about a conflict between the rich and the poor, with
political affairs being dominated by those who have the most money
and are able to bribe the politicians.

Such a form of government is still to be preferred to the third
type, democracy. In this stage, complete chaos prevails. No atten-
tion is paid to law and order; individualism runs rampant. Plato,
here, was referring to Athenian democracy, which very often dis-
integrated and led to anarchy.

But the fourth stage, tyran?iy, is even more unpleasant, for the
tyrant is guided by the worst of impulses. Plato shows how tyranny
leads to war, how the wisest and best people are eliminated under
tyranny, and how unscrupulous politicians are supreme in this form
of government. Since the tyrant is like a wild beast, his passions can
never be completely satisfied. Of all men, the tyrant is the most
despicable:

"He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real
slave, and is obliged to practice the greatest adulation and servility,
and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which
he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and
is truly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all
his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and dis-
tractions, even as the state which he resembles: and surely the re-
semblance holds? . . .

^ Ibid., X, 606—607.

THE THEOCRATIC IDEAL 133

"Moreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from hav-
ing power: he becomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faith-
less, more unjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at
first; he is the purveyor and cherisher of every sort of vice, and the
consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and that he makes
everybody else as miserable as himself."'^

THE THEOCRATIC IDEAL

In his later years Plato became increasingly conservative. His own
experiences at Syracuse had convinced him that it was almost im-
possible to develop a philosopher-king. Consequently he was espe-
cially concerned with the supremacy of laws, and in the Statesman
he gave up his Utopian idealism. In the Statesman he divided govern-
ments according to their adherence to laws. Thus, there are three
types of lawful government: first, monarchy; second, aristocracy;
third, constitutional democracy. Democracy, in this scheme, is the
worst; monarchy, the best.

Also, he spoke of three lawless types of government: first, tyr-
anny; second, oligarchy; third, lawless democracy. In this scheme
lawless democracy is the best and tyranny the worst. Plato thought
that in lawless democracy there is less oppression than in tyranny, in
which a completely arbitrary rule prevails.

In this treatise Plato stressed the art of government, which he
thought could not be mastered by the masses. Since he beheved in
expert preparation, he felt it ridiculous that pohtical affairs were
frequently entrusted to the most ignorant politicians.

In the Laws, Plato in his discussion of politics became almost
reactionary. He suggested a theocratic government and was quite
ruthless when he dealt with those who are opposed to such a state.
He maintained that the decline of Athens was due mainly to the
decay of morals. He contrasted this condition with early times, in
which an idyllic life prevailed:

"And then, as time went on, the poets themselves introduced the
reign of vulgar and lawless innovation. They were men of genius,
but they had no perception of what is just and lawful in music;
raging hke Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights-
mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs;
imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making one gen-
eral confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth, and,
whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure

^ Ibid., 579-580.

134 PLATO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

of the hearer. And by composing such licentious works, and adding
to them words as Hcentious, they have inspired the multitude with
lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they can judge
for themselves about melody and song. And in this way the theaters
from being mute have become vocal, as though they had under-
standing of good and bad in music and poetry; and instead of an
aristocracy, an evil sort of theatrocracy has grown up. For if the
democracy which judged had consisted only of educated persons,
no fatal harm would have been done; but in music there first arose
the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawlessness;— free-
dom followed afterwards, and men, fancying that they knew what
they did not know, had no longer any fear, and the absence of
fear begets shamelessness. For what is this shamelessness, which is
so evil a thing, but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of
the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty?" ^

Noteworthy in Plato's discussion of the Laws is his doctrine of
economics. He makes it clear that the acquisitive instinct should not
be promoted. Like the Spartans, he believed that no luxury goods
should be allowed. He gives some shrewd advice regarding the
treatment of slaves, who are not to be treated too familiarly. At
the same time, the dictates of justice should prevail in our relation-
ship with them.

In his discussion of education, he starts by proposing proper
care for expectant mothers. He recommends that babies should not
be frightened by loud noises, and that children not be told about
monsters and other unnatural creatures. Their games should be
standardized so that the spirit of rebellion cannot emerge. The
climax of education should be the study of astronomy, not dia-
lectic, as was recommended in the Republic.

Since Plato was especially concerned with the treatment of older
people, he thought it the task of children to take care of their
parents. If they do not, the state should intervene and punish those
who neglect their family duties.

His concept of sex, in the Laws, is puritanical. He inveighs against
the prevailing practice of close friendship among men. The aim of
love, he felt, is procreation, not the happiness of the individual.
He stresses the importance of virginity before marriage and rec-
ommends that adultery be strictly punished. The ideal of con-
tinence is to be encouraged by physical exercises and by sound
educational instruction.

^ Laws, IV, 700-701 .

THE INFLUENCE OF PLATO 135

In his legal philosophy Plato recommended five types of punish-
ment: (i) degrading exposure; (2) corporal punishment; (3) im-
prisonment; (4) segregation; (5) death. The last penalty is to be
applied in cases of sedition, sacrilege, and homicide, and in certain
cases of atheism. Generally, he advocated that punishments be cor-
rective; but the spirit of his discussion indicates that his main pur-
pose was to ostracize the criminals. He was especially severe with
lawyers who did not adhere to the spirit of truth; here he was
probably thinking of the Sophists.

In international relations he adopted Spartan ideals. Like the
Spartans, he thought it best if the city-states were isolated, main-
taining little contact with other states. Foreign traders were to be
kept apart, and visitors who came from abroad to attend the festivals
were to be allowed to stay for only a limited time.

The rulers of the state, he maintained, should be especially versed
in religion. They should accept the existence of absolute moral
laws and believe in the immortality of the soul. They are to be
experts in astronomy, which will endow them with a knowledge
of the immutable laws of the universe.

In this theocratic government, God is the head of the state, which
is guided by a corps of examiners who have power to remove any
magistrate. Also, there is a nocturnal council, charged with up-
holding the laws. This council is composed of ten guardians who
are advanced in wisdom and age, and ten younger men, nominated
by these elders. Thus, Plato thought, the state will be ruled by a
combination of youth and age, making for stability and security in
government.

THE INFLUENCE OF PLATO

Plato's influence on later times has been so immense that it is im-
possible to do justice to it. Seeds of his political ideas can be seen
in the Middle Ages, when sharp class divisions flourished. The three
main classes were: the rulers— kings and priests; the soldiers-
knights; and the common people— serfs. The Catholic Church, in its
organization, embodies to some extent the hierarchical ideas of Plato.
Calvin's theocracy at Geneva affirmed that God is supreme and the
function of the state is to enforce the laws of theology.

The leadership principle of National Socialism in Germany, the
new concepts of eugenics, the place of the elite in Mussolini's Italy,
the status of the Communist Party in Russia— all these indicate a
strain of Platonism.

136 PLATO'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Furthermore, Plato inspired a multitude of Utopias. We can men-
tion only a few, such as M ore's Utopia, Campanella's City of the
sun, Bacon's New Atlantis, and Bellamy's Looking backward. His
ideal that philosophers should be kings is reflected in some ways
in the formation of UNESCO— the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization.

In many ways his metaphysical influence was even more marked
than his political impact. Platonism contributed to the dualistic
movement in ancient thought, especially in Philo, Neo-Pythag-
oreanism, and Neo-Platonism. The Platonic philosophy inspired
Augustine and gave him the substance of his beliefs.

During the Renaissance Platonism was in the foreground of the
reaction against AristoteHan thinking, and it led the protest against
all types of naturalism. Alodern idealists, especially Descartes, Male-
branche, Emerson, and Royce, all owe a tremendous debt to Plato's
philosophy.

QUESTIONS c^ TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How did Sparta influence Plato's Utopia?

2. Discuss the weaknesses of the Spartan state.

3. What did Plato think of democracy? What would be his opinion of
American government?

4. What is the ideal government, according to Plato's Republic?

5. What function do the philosophers have in Plato's Republic?

6. Why did Plato believe in eugenics? What is your own view of
eugenics?

7. How did Plato regard atheism in the Laws?

8. How did Plato attempt to reform education?

9. Discuss the ways in which Platonic concepts have influenced modem
political movements.

ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC AND
METAPHYSICAL THEORIES

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

n turning to the philosophy of Aristotle, we note a pronounced
difference from the philosophy of Plato. What strikes us imme-
diately is the more sober approach, for Aristotle wrote like a college
professor— systematically, with a proclivity for definition and a
love for order. Plato, on the other hand, best represents the poetic
spirit. In him philosophy was truly literary; frequently he used
mythology and allegory to illustrate his points. In Plato the reli-
gious spirit is quite evident, and his doctrine of reincarnation indi-
cates his connection with the Orphic Mysteries. In Aristotle, how-
ever, religion is subordinated to science; and, unlike Plato, he was
interested in biology rather than in mathematics.

Aristotle represents the climax of Greek philosophy. Probably no
one surpassed him in intellectual versatility and power of synthesis.
We owe to him much of our knowledge of earlier Greek philos-
ophy, for he was not merely a speculative thinker but also a compiler

137

138 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

and historian. While he did not always state the opinions of his
predecessors too objectively, it must be remembered that he was
frequently carried away by the heat of the argument and his own
philosophical convictions. In philosophical disputes objectivity very
frequently is lacking. This is true not only in ancient times, for ex-
ample, in the disputes between Plato and the Sophists, and between
Aristotle and Plato, but in modern times, as in the disputes between
Descartes and Hobbes, Schopenhauer and Hegel, and James and
Royce.

What is most admirable about Aristotle is his intellectual balance;
there was little emotionalism in his character. He appears to us
mainly as a bystander, immensely inquisitive, incessantly industrious,
with interest in all the varied aspects of life.

Aristotle became a universal man. In the history of civilization his
variety of interests has, perhaps, been equaled only by Sir Francis
Bacon, Leonardo, Goethe, and Spencer. But he surpassed almost all
these later thinkers in the scope of his investigations and in his
influence on succeeding generations. The accomplishments of Aris-
totle in the field of science were as significant as his contributions
to ethics, esthetics, and politics. As can readily be seen, he was in-
terested both in an understanding of reality and in a description of
the universe.

In his many-sided genius, Aristotle is an excellent representative
of the Greek spirit. His stress on reason, his faith in moderation, his
appreciation of external goods, his love for compromise— all these
traits were part of the Greek ideal of life. Modern thinkers may
have a more adequate scientific background than Aristotle, but they
seldom achieve his objectivity and intellectual balance.

We may now ask why Aristotle has had such a firm hold upon
the human mind. First, his theories could be readily adapted by
various ecclesiastical organizations; therefore his philosophy became
the virtual foundation of philosophical Catholicism, philosophical
Judaism, and medieval Mohammedanism. In his emphasis on cosmic
purposes, he gave a spiritual interpretation of the universe, and in
his attempt to picture the world as a hierarchy he almost anticipated
medieval Scholasticism.

Second, Aristotle spoke with authority. His opinions were not
expressed as hypotheses but as authoritative conclusions. It appears
that mankind is inevitably impressed by definite, categorical af-
firmation. He gave a complete analysis of the various sciences, leav-
ing almost no field untouched and very few questions unanswered.

LIFE AND TIME OF ARISTOTLE 139

Third, the Aristotelian philosophy is geocentric. It stresses the im-
portance of man and the potentialities of man's reason. It flatters
human pretensions and human ideals. Alodern science, on the other
hand, has dehumanized the universe and shown how infinitesimal
man's status is. Naturally, such a view is distasteful to the average
man and must struggle assiduously against the Aristotelian view,
which is antimechanistic and teleological.

LIFE AND TIME OF ARISTOTLE

Aristotle's father was court physician to the Macedonian king
Amyntas, the grandfather of Alexander. His family had long been
interested in medicine, and this scientific leaning probably had a
powerful influence on him.

Aristotle was born in 384 b.c. in Stagira, a town in Thrace.
His parents died when he was young, and he was brought up
by Proxenus, who provided him with an excellent education. When
he was eighteen years old he was sent to Athens, where he entered
Plato's Academy. It was the custom in those times for people, if
they could afford it, to send their sons to distant centers of learn-
ing. The Platonic Academy had already achieved a wide reputation
and was regarded as an excellent school, not only for preparation in
politics but also for scientific studies.

This removal to Athens marked an important step for Aristotle.
Macedonia, it must be remembered, was not as cultured as Athens,
although its ruling class was of Hellenic stock and claimed to be
related to the ruling house of Argos. The common people of Mace-
donia did not speak pure Greek. Generally unrefined, they lacked
the advantages of city life. No wonder that the more sophisticated
Athenians looked upon them as barbarians! At the Academy, how-
ever, Aristotle did not lag behind and soon gained a reputation as
a brilliant student. He studied there until he was thirty-five. When
he finished, he had surpassed almost all the disciples of Plato.

It is quite certain that at the Academy Aristotle's interests were
mainly along metaphysical lines. Scientific studies alone were in-
adequate for him; his early treatises, especially the Protrepticus,
definitely exhibit the Platonic spirit. But later he transcended the
Platonic influence and became independent in his speculations re-
garding the nature of reality.

In ancient times much gossip arose regarding the alleged estrange-
ment between Plato and Aristotle. That there was such an estrange-
ment, however, does not seem to be based upon factual evidence.

I40 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

Aristotle was conscious of the debt he owed his master. His attacks
were rather directed against the shallow interpreters of Plato, es-
pecially Speusippus, whom he regarded as extremely mediocre. The
followers of Plato adopted an ontological interpretation of the Ideas,
a view which intensely displeased Aristotle.

We must not think of Aristotle as an isolated scholar, interested
merely in research. We are told that he was extremely vain about
his personal appearance and wore clothes of the latest fashion. As a
sophisticated man of the world, he could converse on equal terms
with the rulers of his time. After the death of Plato, Aristotle was
invited to the court of Hermeias, ruler of Atarneus and Mytilene,
who was somewhat of a philosopher and had studied at Plato's
Academy. The relationship between him and Aristotle was ex-
cellent, and Aristotle married one of his close relatives.

An important event took place in Aristotle's life in 343 B.C., when
he was invited by Philip to become the tutor of his son Alexander.
Philip of Macedonia, an excellent diplomat and an eminent general,
laid the foundation for the rise of Macedonian power. A master in
the art of strategy, he gradually consolidated his power until he
gained dominance over all Greece. His work has been compared
with that of czar Peter of Russia; and, like the latter, Philip was
determined to unify and civilize his state. He cherished the ideal of
Pan-Hellenic unity; and in 338 B.C., at the congress of Corinth, he
drafted a constitution which united the Greek states under Mace-
donian leadership. He was assassinated while planning an expedition
against Persia and was succeeded by his son Alexander.

As tutor of Alexander, Aristotle had great influence on the course
of world history; not that Alexander accepted all the ideas and
plans of his teacher, for he was self-willed and obstinate. Still, Alex-
ander represented the ideals of high-mindedness and genuine states-
manship which Aristotle preached. But this fact must not be over-
looked: there was a significant spiritual difference between the two.
Aristotle felt only contempt for the barbarians— for those who did
not share the blessings of Greek civilization. However, it was the
ambition and aspiration of Alexander to unite Hellenic with Oriental
civilization. If he had succeeded permanently, history might have
taken a different turn, and the clashes between East and West might
have been avoided. In this respect, at least, Alexander had a more
penetrating vision than his teacher.

Between 340 and 335 e.g. Aristotle was mostly engaged in scien-
tific research at Stagira, where he was aided by Theophrastus, who

THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 141

later succeeded him at his school in Athens. Constantly his research
was aided by liberal grants from Alexander, who, in this manner,
contributed to scientific and philosophic progress.

When Alexander embarked upon his conquest of Asia, in 334
B.C., Aristotle returned to Athens. This time he went as a teacher,
however, not as a student, and he established a new school called the
Lyceum, named after Apollo Lyceus. There was vigorous competi-
tion between the Lyceum and the Academy, and very soon Aris-
totle's school surpassed Plato's. This supremacy was due mainly to
the comprehensive and stimulating lectures of Aristotle, who not
only taught the principles of science but also gave instruction in
politics, rhetoric, and dialectic.

Despite his success in the educational field, Aristotle's position in
Athens was insecure, as he was a foreigner and Alexander's friend,
and there was much resentment against the Macedonian ruler. The
popular prejudice was especially intensified by the efforts of De-
mosthenes, Alexander's implacable opponent. At the same time, Aris-
totle was losing favor with Alexander, who in his last years was
adopting Oriental customs and the Oriental way of hfe. All these,
Aristotle thought, would only lead to decadence and to the dis-
integration of the Greek spirit, and he protested openly to Alex-
ander.

When Alexander died suddenly, in 323 B.C., there were rumors
that Aristotle or Antipater had poisoned him. These rumors, how-
ever, were unfounded, for it appears certain that he died of natural
causes. As soon as the news of his death spread, open rebellion broke
out in many parts of Greece. The anti-Macedonian faction regarded
Aristotle as a subversive influence, and so he thought it wise to leave
Athens. He was accused, also, of atheism; and since he did not wish
to become a martyr, he went to Chalcis, where he died in 322 b.c.

THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

Unfortunately many of the works of Aristotle have been lost. Still,
what remains of his researches is quite bulky and gives evidence of
his indefatigable labors. His logical treatises are called the Organo?i.
They consist of the Categories, which are especially occupied with
the discussion of substance and name the eight categories of thought.
Then there is his book On interpretation, which discusses the vari-
ous types of propositions. The Prior analytics is occupied especially
with the syllogism; in it we find the rules for the categorical

142 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

syllogism and the concept of induction. The Posterior analytics deals
with scientific demonstrations and the nature of scientific knowl-
edge. The Topics deals with dialectical reasoning, and a special
section is devoted to ambiguous meanings. Another part of his
logical work is Oji sophistical refutations, which exposes the verbal
and logical fallacies of the Sophists and makes a distinction between
genuine and apparent reasoning.

Aristotle's main work in the field of physical science is the
Physics (Physica). It discusses such topics as the conditions of
change and the problem of teleology, and it takes up philosophical
concepts such as motion, time, space, the void, and the infinite. An-
other significant treatise in physical science is On the heavens (De
caelo). It deals with the nature of heaven and compares it with
the elements of the earth. Special sections in this treatise are devoted
to a discussion of motion and the properties of the various ele-
ments.

We must not omit Aristotle's other contributions to physical
science, especially his book On ge7ieratioi2 and corruption, which
is concerned with the problem of alteration and the basic elements
of the universe. He is critical in this work regarding the theory of
Empedocles, who believed that the four elements could not be trans-
formed into one another. Another treatise in physical science is en-
titled the Meteorology (Meteorologica), and it deals with the realm
between heaven and earth and also contains some elementary psy-
chological theories. It discusses the nature of comets, planets, and
meteors; and it had considerable influence on scientific develop-
ments in the Middle Ages.

Turning to the biological sciences, we find his treatise Ow the
soul (De aiiinia). In this field we also find the Short physical
treatises (Parva naturalia), which discusses such topics as memory,
reminiscence, and the significance of dreams. More important is
his discussion of animals in On the parts of animals, which among
other topics contains his observations on the methods of natural
science, his theory of classification, and his views on animal struc-
ture. Another treatise in biology deals with concepts of sexual gen-
eration. They are portrayed in On the generation of afiimals (His-
toria animaliimi), in which the physiology of animals is discussed as
well as various views on generation. In all these treatises a great deal
of repetition prevails. As a model teacher Aristotle realized that im-
portant points must be stressed repeatedly if they are to be under-
stood.

THE DIVISION OF ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY 143

Undoubtedly Aristotle's most influential book is the Metaphysics
{Metaphysica). Its title was probably derived from the fact that it
follows the physical treatises in the collection of the Aristotelian
works which were edited by Andronicus of Rhodes. Some of the
problems of the Metaphysics deal with Aristotle's definitions of
philosophical terms and his criticism of earlier philosophers, espe-
cially Plato. He made a distinction between actuahty and potential-
ity, and in Book 12 of the Metaphysics he discusses the nature and
function of the Prime Mover.

In the field of ethics, we have the Nicojnacheaji ethics, dealing
with the various types of virtues, continence, pleasure, friendship,
and happiness. The ethical views of Aristotle are distinguished by
his concept of the Golden Mean and by his faith in the power of
reason and the validity of intellectual virtues. The Eudemian ethics
also vividly portrays the spirit of Aristotelian moral ideals.

In the field of poHtical science Aristotle's Politics is especially im-
portant. Under this heading he discusses not merely the problems
of statesmanship but also the goals and function of education. The
tenor of his political observations is extremely realistic, and to some
extent there are in them iMachiavellian strains.

In the field of rhetoric and literary criticism, Aristotle Hkewise
made far-reaching contributions. In the Rhetoric (Rhetorica) he
gives a systematic treatment of this subject. His observations regard-
ing style and the forms of speech are as vahd today as they were in
his own time.

In the Poetics (De poetica) we have the Aristotelian views regard-
ing tragedy, epic poetry, and comedy. Through these studies Aris-
totle became the founder of literary criticism, and even today we
hear much concerning his definition of tragedy and his insistence on
the three unities of plot, time, and place.

In observing his works from a broad perspective, we are awed
by the breadth and scope of his researches. His power of unification,
his ability to synthesize, his immense depth— all these traits have
seldom been duplicated in philosophy. Thus we can understand
why a modern thinker like Santayana believed that almost all of
subsequent thinking is a mere footnote to the system of Aristotle.

THE DIVISION OF ARISTOTLE'S
PHILOSOPHY

The development of philosophy was aided greatly by Aristotle's
talent for classification. UnUke Plato, he was concerned with

144 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

specific as well as universal facts. Indeed, Aristotle started with
particular phenomena and then arrived at a universal conclusion.
Induction arrives at a generalization through an enumeration of
particular facts, whereas deduction starts with a universal premise
and then derives from it a specific conclusion.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle devoted much space to natural science in
his philosophy. Yet he was not concerned exclusively with an ob-
servation of the phenomena of nature, for he beheved that the
highest and most important science is metaphysics, the study of im-
material being. This viewpoint is extremely significant. It established
the tone of much of later philosophical speculation, for Aristotle
emphasized that the practical sciences are to be subordinated to the
theoretical sciences. The material is to be followed by the im-
material. Thus, philosophers throughout medieval and early modern
times were more concerned with theory than with practice and fre-
quently had a dislike for the realm of action and concrete fact.

In making metaphysics the climax of all knowledge, Aristotle
gave emphasis to the importance of immaterial truths. This love for
metaphysics has never disappeared in philosophy; and although
various movements have arisen in modern times, such as positivism
and dialectical materialism, which protest against metaphysics, it
is still regarded with respect and admiration by most professional
philosophers.

Returning to Aristotle's definition of philosophy, we find that he
regarded logic as a preparatory science to philosophical thinking.
Thus we have theoretical philosophy, which includes three sub-
jects: metaphysics, physics, and mathematics. Theoretical philos-
ophy is followed by practical philosophy, which contains politics
and ethics. Last, we find poetical philosophy, which contains his
theory of art, especially poetry.

In the first book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle indicates that all
men are inquisitive animals and by nature desire to know. "An indi-
cation of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from
their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others
the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even
when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one
might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all
the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences
between things.

"By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and
from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not

THE DIVISION OF ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY 145

in others. And therefore the former are more intelligent and apt
at learning than those which cannot remember; those which are
incapable of hearing sounds are intelKgent though they cannot be
taught, e.g., the bee, and any other race of animals that may be hke
it; and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing can
be taught.

"The animals other than man live by appearances and memories,
and have but little of connected experience; but the human race
lives also by art and reasonings." ^

The philosopher, above all, is interested in a rational explanation
of the universe. This fact means that he deals with first causes and
the principles of things. All this demands wisdom:

"We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as
far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them in
detail; secondly that he who can learn things that are difficult, and
not easy for man to know, is wise (sense-perception is common to
all, and therefore easy and no mark of wisdom); again, that he who
is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in
every branch of knowledge; and that of the sciences, also, that
which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing
it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on
acount of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature
of wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered
but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise
must obey hm?.''' -

Such wisdom, however, is not concerned with specific facts but
with universal knowledge. Aristotle shows that universal ideas are
more difficult for men to grasp, since they are far-removed from the
senses: "And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal
most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles
are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g.,
arithmetic than geometry. But the science which investigates causes
is also instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us
are those who tell the causes of each thing. And understanding and
knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowl-
edge of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses to know
for the sake of knowing will choose most readily that which is most
truly knowledge, and such is the knowledge of that which is most
knowable); and the first principles and the causes are most know-

^- Metaphysics, i, 980 a.
2 Ibid., 982 a.

146 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

able; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things come
to be known, and not these by means of the things subordinate to
them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must
be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authorita-
tive than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing,
and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. Judged by
ill the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the
,ame science; this must be a science that investigates the first prin-
ciples and causes; for the good, i.e., the end, is one of the causes." ^

Aristotle explains that philosophy is not a utilitarian subject. It
is connected with our sense of wonder: "For it is owing to their
wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize;
they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties about the
greater matters, e.g., about the phenomena of the moon and those
of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe." '^

This view of philosophy almost establishes kinship with the gods:
"Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond
human power; for in many ways human nature is in bondage, so
that according to Simonides 'God alone can have this privilege,' and
it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge
that is suited to him. If, then, there is something in what the poets
say, and jealousy is natural to the divine power, it would probably
occur in this case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge
would be unfortunate. But the divine power cannot be jealous
(nay, according to the proverb, 'bards tell many a lie'), nor should
any other science be thought more honorable than one of this sort.
For the most divine science is also most honorable; and this science
alone must be, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it
would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is
any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone
has both these qualities; for (i) God is thought to be among the
causes of all things and to be a first principle, and ( 2 ) such a science
either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences,
indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better." ^

Notice how firmly Aristotle stressed the importance of specula-
tion. Emphasizing the validity of reason, he felt that only by the
exercise of this capacity can man realize his destiny and understand
the principles of reality. He was not satisfied until he had reached a

3 Ibid., 982 a-b.

4 Ibid., 982 b.

5 Ibid., 982 b-983 a.

ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORIES 147

comprehensive outline of the universe. Seldom has a philosopher
had such faith in man's rational capacity.

ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORIES

The logical theories of Aristotle indicate the enormous extent of
his influence. Even today much of the college teaching in logic is
concerned with the Aristotelian syllogism. In Catholic schools it
forms almost the center of the curriculum. Pragmatists and human-
ists, on the other hand, assert that Aristotle's logic is completely
outmoded and that, instead, we should study the relationship of
logic to psychology and deal especially with the science of se-
mantics, ^\'hich is concerned with linguistic pitfalls. The attack
against Aristotle is especially sharp on the part of John De\\'ey, in
his Logic, and in Schiller's Logic for use, which gives a humanistic
account of the function and nature of logic.

Let us objectively and briefly review some of the important ele-
ments of Aristotehan logic. We note at the outset that Aristotle
stresses the importance of the categories. These, the highest classes
into which all concepts can be divided, are the immediate and un-
analyzable constituents of thought. We cannot depart from them in
making any kind of judgment about the external world.

Aristotle, however, varies in specifying the number of categories.
At first he mentions only eight, and later ten categories. The fol-
lowing is a list of the categories:

Substance
' Quantity

Quality

Relation

Place

Time

Action

Passivity
To this list he added State and Position.

Aristotle's concept of the categories, it should be noted, is based
mainly on grammatical distinctions. He was attempting to show that
in making any kind of intellectual assertion we are dependent upon
fundamental intellectual concepts. His preoccupation with the
categories had a decided impact on the history of philosophy. For
example, in German Idealism we find that the categories are re-
garded as a priori; their deduction, according to Kant, is one of the
fundamental tasks of philosophy.

148 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

In his discussion of the categories, Aristotle devoted much space
to substance. As the most important and fundamental category, it
is basic to all reasoning. With emphasis he points out that substance
stands, above all, for an individual thing. Thus he is distinguished
from Plato, who beheved universals to be real. At the same time,
Aristotle used substance in another way:

"All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the
case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing
is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for
instance, of 'man' or 'animal,' our form of speech gives the impres-
sion that we are here also indicating that which is individual, but
the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not
an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not
one and single as a primary substance is; the words 'man,' 'animal,'
are predicable of more than one subject.

"Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quahty, like the
term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but
species and genus determine the quality with reference to a sub-
stance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated. The de-
terminate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus
than in that of the species: he who uses the word 'animal' is herein
using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word
'man.' " «

Aristotle catalogued the common characteristics of all substances.
He showed that a common trait of all substance is that it is never
present in a subject: "For prim^ary substance is neither present in
a subject nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to second-
ary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from
others) that they are not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated
of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for man-
hood is not present in the individual man. In the same way, 'animal'
is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him.
Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may
quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition
cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name,
but also the definition appHes to the subject: we should use both
the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference
to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a sub-
ject." '

*^ Categories, 3 b.
' I hid., 3 a.

ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORIES 149

Furthermore, substance has no contrary: "What could be the
contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or
animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a con-
trary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is
true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that
forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long,'
or of 'ten,' or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much'
is the contrary of 'little,' or 'great' of 'small,' but of definite quan-
titative terms no contrary exists." ^

Nor does substance admit of variation of degree: "Substance,
again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not
mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly sub-
stance than another, for it has already been stated that this is the
case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within
itself. For instance, one particular substance, 'man,' cannot be more
or less man either than himself at some other time or than some
other man. One man cannot be more man than another, as that
which is white may be more or less white than some other white
object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful
than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is
said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A
body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was be-
fore, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at
some other time. But substance is not said to be more or less that
which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was
before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is.
Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree." ^

Besides his treatment of the categories, Aristotle's concept of
definition is extremely significant. A definition, he held, should de-
scribe the essential characteristics of the phenomenon which is to
be defined. Here he turned against the Sophists, who had deluded
their followers by frequently giving superficial definitions. Further-
more, he pointed out, a definition should not be circular. This state-
ment implies that a definition should not contain the subject to be
defined. Thus, if we want to define democracy, we should not say
that it is a government in which a democratic principle prevails.
Moreover, Aristotle asserted that a definition should be neither too
broad nor too narrow; nor should it be stated in negative language.
Again using the example of democracy, it would be a mistake to

8 Ibid., 3 b.
3 Ibid., 3 b-4 a.

I50 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

say that democracy is a form of government in which coercion
does not prevail, since we have introduced a negative term.

In his concept of definition Aristotle was concerned primarily
with essential characteristics. A4uch loose thinking prevails, he
thought, because frequently no exact distinction is made between
essential properties and accidental facts. It should be noted that his
concept of knowledge is eminently systematic. According to him,
the sciences can be organized so that complete coherence prevails,
starting with elementary facts and reaching a climax with a con-
sideration of immaterial Being.

Aristotle realized that if the sciences were to progress, method-
ology was absolutely necessary. The pre-Socratic philosophers gen-
erally had no clear concept of logical order; hence much confusion
prevailed in their theories. In Aristotle, however, the ideal of con-
sistency prevails, and all reasoning is subjected to stringent logical
requirements.

The fundamental logical unit, Aristotle asserted, is the syllogism.
An example of the Aristotelian syllogism is the following:

All Nazis were anti-Semitic.

Hitler was a Nazi.

Therefore, Hitler was anti-Semitic.
The first proposition constitutes the major premise. The second,
the minor premise; and the conclusion is contained in the state-
ment, "Hitler was anti-Semitic." Aristotle demonstrated how var-
ious forms of the syllogism could be obtained. The syllogism itself,
he believed, is based on the law of self-contradiction and the law of
excluded middle.

To some extent, as Bertrand Russell has often pointed out, Aris-
totle had too much faith in the syllogism, for he held that all de-
ductive arguments can be reduced to the syllogism. Yet mathemat-
ics, which is based on deduction, can get along very well without
the use of the syllogism. Furthermore, the syllogism is not helpful
when it becomes necessary to discover new truths. It merely de-
scribes the relationship between propositions. Thus, a syllogism can
be valid regardless of the truth of its assertion. For example, we
might say: "All Germans are warmongers. Fritz Schmidt is a Ger-
man. Therefore, Fritz Schmidt is a warmonger." From a formal
standpoint, the argument is perfectly valid although its truth can
scarcely be maintained.

In the Middle Ages, the syllogistic form of argument was ex-
tremely popular. This popularity led to great intellectual confusion.

ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORIES 151

for it was thought that the main task of the thinker is to draw vaUd
conclusions from universal premises. When Copernicus, Galileo,
and Brahe challenged the Aristotelian concept of nature, their op-
ponents frequently resorted to syllogistic arguments and showed by
logical devices that the heliocentric theory could not possibly be
true. This sort of argument, however, was not due so much to Aris-
totle as to the enthusiasm of his disciples, who were, largely, more
interested in abstract speculation than in a realistic description of
nature.

Scientific demonstration was discussed most fully by Aristotle in
his Posterior ajialytics. Science, Aristotle asserted, is concerned with
the universal causes of things. Using the resources of both induction
and deduction, science has not merely a descriptive function but
also an explanatory significance. Science inevitably asks why phe-
nomena occur, and ultimately it arrives at an all-inclusive defini-
tion.

It should be noted that Aristotle, in his concept of science, was
more concerned with explanation than with control and experi-
mentation. Our modern ideal of science opposes this standpoint,
for we believe in a concrete application of scientific knowledge.
We assume that our knowledge of phenomena is tentative and must
constantly be checked by experiments and hypotheses. Thus, the
modern ideal of science aims at control over nature, whereas the
Aristotelian ideal of science aimed at a rational understanding of
nature.

Aristotle held that the first principles of science cannot be demon-
strated but must be assumed and taken for granted. The study of
first principles, he believed, is the function of metaphysics, \\'hich
is concerned with immaterial being. He thought that intuition is
the original source of himia?! knoxcledge; by this he did not mean
an emotional ecstasy but, rather, an intellectual type of induction,
whereby we know that what is true for one instance can be applied
to all instances; and what is true of one member of the class can be
applied to the total class. In short, primary premises can be grasped
by intuition, and Aristotle believed that this form of inductive rea-
soning is just as certain as deduction, although he relied more
heavily on the deductive method of logic.

In his logical treatises, Aristotle devoted much space to the
fallacies which arise in intellectual arguments. He discussed not
merely formal fallacies but also fallacies which arise out of am-
biguity and are connected with verbal factors. He described how

152 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

errors are frequently made in logic by appeal to reverence, to piety,
and to tradition. The courts of Athens gave him excellent ammuni-
tion for his observations regarding logical weaknesses and logical
errors.

What is the lasting significance of Aristotle's logic? ( i ) Through
it he provided a rational discipline for philosophy. He showed that
all speculation involves logical consistency and must be based on
definite logical principles. (2) He outlined the elements of deduc-
tive logic and described the fallacies which arise in various argu-
ments. (3) He discussed the nature of scientific demonstration and
in this respect gave voice to the ideal of Greek science, which was
interested in rational understanding rather than in experimentation.
(4) He made a distinction between (a) deduction, which starts
with general principles and derives specific facts from it and (b) in-
duction, which starts with particulars and then arrives at a generali-
zation. (5) He made a clear distinction between vahdity and truth:
validity is concerned with the form of logic whereas truth deals
with the content of logic. (6) He laid down excellent rules for
definition, and they can still be used today. Finally, (7) he laid the
foundation for the complete classification of the sciences.

ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICS

Aristotle's discussions in his logical treatises indicate that he believed
truth can be known. He shows in the Metaphysics that truth is both
easy and difficult to discover:

"An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to
attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not
collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature
of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to
the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.
Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial door,
which no one can fail to hit, in this respect it must be easy, but the
fact that we can have a whole truth and not the particular part we
aim at shows the difficulty of it.

"Perhaps, too, as difficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the
present difficulty is not in the facts but in us. For as the eyes of bats
are [blind] to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the
things which are by nature most evident of all."^"

Plato, like Aristotle, explained that scientific knowledge is pri-
marily concerned with universal essences; but Plato had sought

1" Metaphysics, 11, 993 a-b.

ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICS 153

reality in the region of Ideas, which are completely transcendent.
Aristotle made a sharp criticism of the Platonic concept of Ideas.
First of all, he contended, the concept of Ideas does not provide a
fruitful function in philosophy, for Plato asserted that Ideas exist
apart from things. Aristotle asked how we can have definite knowl-
edge of a transcendent realm. Since Ideas are static, he argued, they
cannot account for the change which takes place in the phenomenal
world.

Aristotle also felt that inevitably contradictions arise when we try
to combine universal Ideas with particular existence. In fact, Plato
had never exactly explained how these two realms can be united,
and in the Parjiienides, one of the later dialogues which deals most
clearly with the criticism of Ideas, he had left the entire problem
undecided.

Plato and Aristotle agreed that the world of the senses is in a state
of flux. But this did not mean to Aristotle that we must transcend
the world of the senses and use the Ideas as escapes from reality.
Rather, he felt, scientific knowledge could best be advanced by an
investigation of the forms which reside within phenomena.

If we regard the Ideas as numbers, we are likewise in a dilemma.
Aristotle asked. How can numbers be causes? He shows clearly that
numbers cannot be the principles responsible for the changes in the
phenomenal world. In the Metaphysics he also attacked the earher
cosmologists. Their main error, he felt, lay in not distinguishing be-
tween the various causes.

This brings us to his famous doctrine of the four causes: (i) the
material cause; (2) the efficient cause; (3) the formal cause; (4) the
final cause. " 'Cause' means ( i ) that from which, as immanent mate-
rial, a thing comes into being, e.g., the bronze is the cause of the
statue and the silver of the saucer, and so are the classes which in-
clude these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e., the definition of the
essence, and the classes which include this {e.g., the ratio 2:1 and
number in general are causes of the octave), and the parts included
in the definition. (3) That from which the change or the resting
from change first begins, e.g., the adviser is a cause of the action, and
the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker a cause of
the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4) The
end, i.e., that for the sake of which a thing is, e.g., health is the cause
of walking. For 'Why does one walk?' we say; 'That one may be
healthy'; and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause.
The same is true of all the means that intervene before the end,

154

ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

when something else has put the process in motion, as, e.g., thinning
or purging or drugs or instruments intervene before health is
reached; for all these are for the sake of the end, though they differ
from one another in that some are instruments and others are
actions."^^

To give another example of Aristotle's doctrine of causality, let us
choose the building of a house. First, there must be building material
(material cause); second, an architect (efficient cause); third, an
outline of the form of the house (formal cause); fourth, we must
know why the house is being built (final cause).

It should be noted that Aristotle dwelt mainly upon the final
cause, which, he thought, is the real principle of explanation. He
constantly asked the question. What is the function of things? What
is their ultimate goal? Modern science, on the other hand, takes a
more mechanistic view than Aristotle took and is concerned pri-
marily with description without bothering with ultimate problems.
Another important contribution of Aristotle is his concept of
nature. He used nature in a sixfold sense: " 'Nature' means (i) the
genesis of growing things— the meaning which would be suggested
if one were to pronounce the y in ploy sis long. (2) That immanent
part of a growing thing from which its growth first proceeds. (3)
/ JF / The source from which the primary movement in each natural
^ I object is present in it in virtue of its own essence. Those things are
/ said to grow which derive increase from something else by contact
/ and either by organic unity or by organic adhesion, as in the case of
/ embryos. Organic unity differs from contact, for in the latter case
\ there need not be anything besides the contact, but in organic unities
] there is something identical in both parts, which makes them grow
/ together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of con-
/ tinuity and quantity, though not of quality. (4) 'Nature' means the
/ primary material of which any natural object consists or out of

/ which it is made, which is relatively unshaped and cannot be

I changed from its own potency, as e.g., bronze is said to be the nature

j of a statue and of bronze utensils, and wood the nature of wooden

I things; and so in all other cases; for when a product is made out of

I these materials, the first matter is preserv^ed throughout. For it is in

I this way that people call the elements of natural objects also their

\ nature, some naming fire, others earth, others air, others water,

\ others something else of the sort, and some naming more than one of

\ these, and others all of them. (5) 'Nature' means the essence of nat-
\ ''-'^Ibid., V, 1013 a-b.

ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICS 155

ural objects, as with those who say the nature is the primary mode
of composition. ... (6) By an extension of meaning from this sense
of 'nature' every essence in general has come to be called a 'nature,'
because the nature of a thing is one kind of essence. "^-

According to Aristotle, nature is alive and not static. Thus he is
distinguished from Democritus, who had reduced nature to qua?iti-
tative relations. While Aristotle did not exclude mechanical causes,
he held them to be secondary. He conceived of nature teleologically;
in fact, this concept of purpose is primary in his philosophy. Nature
constitutes an unfolding essence in which the lower realm is sub-
ordinated to the higher sphere, all serving as a preparation for God.

The Aristotelian outlook dominated the Western world until the
Renaissance, and even then it was only slowly overcome. Because of
it, most scientists were concerned with the sublime and heavenly
causes rather than with mundane facts. Modern science has almost
reversed the process. It investigates all aspects of nature, regardless
of their dignity or lack of it. Pavlov, for example, spent many years
investigating the saliva of a dog and its relationship to psychological
processes. Modern science, while less spectacular than Aristotelian
science, achieves more definite experimental results.

Most important, perhaps, in Aristotle's metaphysics is his belief in
the unity of matter and form. Aiatter, he stated, gives the substance
to things; form, their outline and boundary. Every object, then, has
a matter a?id a forjn. But this is not a static relationship, for we con-
stantly observe how matter passes into form and form into matter.
We might take a concrete example. Take the seed of an orange. It is
the matter of which the orange is the form. When we eat the orange,
however, the orange becomes matter for our body, which in turn
becomes a form.

In the sensible world we cannot find formless matter or matterless
form. Thus, Aristotle overcomes the dualism of Plato, who had
sharply distinguished between a realm of becoming and that of eter-
nal Forms. Aristotle, on the other hand, united form and matter and
hence had a more monistic outlook than his teacher.

Also, Aristotle identified matter with potentiality and form with
actuality. In general, he emphasized actuality more than potentiality.
Thus, at least in his doctrine of God, he was more concerned with
the form of things than with their matter or their potentiality. This,
again, is in line with Greek thinking, which was concerned with the
principle of limit, for the form of Aristotle supphes a definite out-

12 Ibid., 1014 b-1015 a.

156 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

line and a definite boundary. It is resisted to some extent by matter,
but no dualistic principle results, and Aristotle, unlike Plato, did not
assert that matter is the principle of Not-being.

He made it clear that actuality is prior to potentiality; that form
comes before matter: "(i) Clearly it is prior in formula; for that
which is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is pos-
sible for it to become active; e.g., I mean by 'capable of building'
that which can build, and by 'capable of seeing' that which can see,
and by 'visible' that which can be seen. And the same account applies
to all other cases, so that the formula and the knowledge of the one
must precede the knowledge of the other.

"(2) In time it is prior in this sense: the actual which is identical
in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is
prior to it. I mean that to this particular man who now exists actually
and to the corn and to the seeing object the matter and the seed and
that which is capable of seeing, which are potentially a man and
corn and seeing, but not yet actually so, are prior in time; but prior
in time to these are other actually existing things, from which they
were produced."^^

This, however, is not the only argument for the priority of the
actual, for Aristotle believed it is also prior in substantiality: ". . .
because the things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form
and in substantiality {e.g., man is prior to boy and human being to
seed; for the one already has its form, and the other has not), and
because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle,
i.e., an end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle,
and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the
end, and it is for the sake of this that the pote?icy is acquired. For
animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have
sight that they may see. And similarly men have the art of building
that they may build, and theoretical science that they may theo-

rize

Another argument is that eternal things are prior to phenomena,
which are in a constant state of flux, and eternal things never exist
potentially:

"The reason is this. Every potency is at one and the same time a
potency of the opposite; for, while that which is not capable of
being present in a subject cannot be present, everything that is being
may possibly not be actual. That, then, which is capable of being

''^^ Ibid., IX, 1049 b.
1* Ibid., 1050 a.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF GOD

157

may either be or not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of
being and of not being. And that which is capable of not being may
possibly not be; and that which may possibly not be is perishable,
either in the full sense, or in the precise sense in which it is said that
it possibly may not be, i.e., in respect either of place or of quantity
or quaHty; 'in the full sense' means 'in respect of substance.' Nothing,
then, which is in the full sense imperishable is in the full sense po-
tentially existent (though there is nothing to prevent its being so in
some respect, e.g., potentially of a certain quality or in a certain
place); all imperishable things, then, exist actually."^''

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF GOD

Aristotle's discussion of potentiality and actuality was founded upon
his belief in a pure actuality, namely, God. Aristotle's God occupies
the pinnacle of the metaphysical structure. God contains no poten-
tiality; he is pure form. The main argument for the existence of God,
in Aristotle, is the necessity of finding a first cause of motion. He
appeals to a force which is unchangeable:

"The first mover, then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists
by necessity, its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first
principle. For the necessary has all these senses— that which is neces-
sary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that with-
out which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be other-
M'ise but can exist only in a single way."^"

For a moment Aristotle's language becomes almost mystical and
exuberant: "And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and
enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we can-
not be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are
waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and
memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals
with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the
fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought
thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought;
for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and
thinking its objects, so. that thought and object of thought are the
same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought,
i.e., the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this
object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity^ is the
divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of con-

i""' Ibid., 1050 b.
!'• Ibid., XII, 1072 b.

158 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

templation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always
in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our
wonder; and if in a better, this compels it yet more. And God is in
a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of
thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent
actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God
is a living being, eternal, most good, so that Hfe and duration con-
tinuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God."^^

God's action is the primary cause of all things, Aristotle asserted,
and God is perfect in every way:

"It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance
which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things.
It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude
but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement
through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and,
while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the
above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite
magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all). But it has
also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other
changes are posterior to change of place."^^

There arises another problem, namely the nature of divine
thought:

"The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems; for
while thought is held to be the most divine of things observed by
us, the question how it must be situated in order to have that char-
acter involves difficulties. For if it thinks of nothing, what is there
here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if it thinks, but
this depends on something else, then (since that which is its sub-
stance is not the act of thinking, but a potency) it cannot be the best
substance, for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it.
Further, whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act
of thinking, what does it think of? Either of itself or of something
else; and if of something else, either of the same thing always or of
something different. Does it matter, then, or not, whether it thinks
of the good or of any chance thing? Are there not some things about
which it is incredible that it should think? Evidently, then, it thinks
of that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change;
for change would be change for the worse, and this would be
already a movement. First, then, if 'thought' is not the act of think-

i'^ Ibid., 1072 b.
^^ Ibid., 1073 a.

ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE 159

ing but a potency, it would be reasonable to suppose that the con-
tinuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Second, there would evi-
dently be something else more precious than thought, viz., that
which is thought of. For both thinking and the act of thought will
belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing in the world, so
that if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even
some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of
thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be of itself
that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of
things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking."^"

Briefly, according to Aristotle, God is only occupied with him-
self. He is not concerned with the universe. He is not personal in the
sense of the Christian God, nor does he respond to our prayers and
to our desires. Our relationship to God must be almost Spinozistic.
In loving him we do not expect to be loved in return. We regard
him as the climax of perfection, according to which we model our
actions and our aspirations.

Some will object to such a concept of God and say that it lacks
content, for Aristotle's God is distant and has no active relationship
with the universe. To some extent the objection is valid, but it must
be remembered that Aristotle's God is based on scientific grounds,
not on spiritual foundations. He is needed as a principle of explana-
tion to give unity to the universe and as the goal of man's intellectual
search.

ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL
UNIVERSE

In turning to Aristotle's theories of physical science, we find them
mostly contained in two books, the Physics and Ow the heavens. To
a modern reader, many of his arguments seem to be fantastic. Un-
doubtedly Aristotle's system is more anthropomorphic than our
own; still, Aristotle was working under handicaps. Greek science, as
yet, had not developed an elaborate system of mathematics. The
instruments which have aided modern science immensely, such as
the microscope and the telescope, were unknown to Aristotle.

In Book One of the Physics, he took up the first principles of na-
ture. He argued against the Eleatic viewpoint that reality is one; the
Eleatics, he maintained, had not given an adequate account of motion
and change. At the same time, he argued against others, who had
reduced the principles of nature to one, two, or three causes.

^^Ibid., 1074 b.

i6o ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

In Book Two of the Physics, Aristotle distinguished the natural
philosopher from the mathematician and described various condi-
tions of change.

Book Three is occupied with a discussion of motion. In it he
enumerated three kinds of motion: quantitative, qualitative, ajid
spatial. Next, he turned to the problem of infinity and criticized the
Pythagoreans for accepting the concept of infinity. He felt that in
reality natural bodies are fijiite.

In Book Four, he took up three main problems: space, void, and
time. He stated that the universe contains space; outside the universe
there can be no space. He concluded, the universe is finite and
spherical.

In turning to the problem of the void, Aristotle invaUdated the
arguments of the Atomists. He beheved there is no void, nor can
there be any emptiness within bodies. Space cannot be conceived
apart from bodies. Thus he followed pre-Socratic philosophy, which
most of the time abhorred the concept of emptiness.

Aristotle's discussion of time is rather abstruse. He contended that
time, like space, is continuous, but unlike space it has neither begin-
ning nor end. He defined time as "a measure of motion." Motion,
then, is necessary for our concept of time, but still there is a distinc-
tion between motion and time, for motion is specific whereas time
is universal. A4otion is connected with particular bodies, whereas
time is the universal foundation of experience. Aristotle believed
that the only reality of time is the present, the now, but that our
mind makes it possible to obtain a consciousness of the past and to
anticipate the future. To some extent, time is subjective; without a
mind it would be impossible to conceive of time.

To summarize Aristotle's views of space, the void, and time, we
find him asserting: The universe contains space, there is no space
outside of it, and space is finite. Unlike the Atomists, he did not
believe in a vacuum, and he maintained that space and time are
united by motion.

The other books of his Physics are less noteworthy. In Book Five
he took up the classification of movements and changes and defined
such terms as together, apart, touch, intermediate, successive, con-
tiguous, and continuous. He discussed the unity and diversity of
movements and made a distinction between movement and rest.

The problem of movement is continued in Books Six and Seven.
In Book Eight he described the first mover, showing how its motion
is eternal, unmoved by anything outside of itself.

ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE i6i

This brings us to Aristotle's view of the physical structure of the
universe. From Empedocles he borrowed the four elements— earth,
air, fire, and water— which make up the physical universe. How-
ever, he held that heaven is composed of ether, the noblest ele-
ment. Its motion is circular, he wrote, whereas the movement of
the other bodies is either upward or downward.

The astronomical doctrines of Aristotle are explained in more
detail in his treatise On the heavens. Book One emphasizes the im-
portance of circular movement, and it makes clear that everything
below the moon is subject to flux and passes away; but above the
moon, nothing can be destroyed or created. He tried to prove that
there cannot be more than one heaven and that there is no place or
time outside heaven. He attacked the theories of his predecessors
who had asserted that heaven can be created.

In Book Two, Aristotle reviewed the opinions of his predecessors
regarding the position and shape of the earth. The earth, he con-
cluded, is at the center of the universe and is spherical in shape.
Consequently he supported the geocentric hypothesis, and his argu-
ments were used to fight those who believed in the heliocentric
theory and asserted that the earth moves around the sun.

In Book Three he discussed the elements of the various bodies and
attacked the views of Democritus, who had reduced nature to
atomic particles. Aristotle states that it is impossible to diff^erentiate
the elements by their shape; rather, they must be differentiated by
their qualities. The elements are not eternal but are generated out of
one another. He describes fire as light, which naturally tends up-
ward; while earth is heavy and thus tends downward.This subject
is discussed in the Fourth Book, which also explains the variety of
motion exhibited by the elements and contains fresh attacks on the
theories of the Atomists.

The significance of Aristotle's physical views, besides his geocen-
tric hypothesis, lies in his distinction between the celestial and the
terrestrial realm. According to him, the heavenly bodies are superior
to the earth, and their motion is distinct from the rectilinear move-
ment of the earth. He almost re-introduced Platonic concepts. His
view that the heavenly bodies are eternal proved to be a stumbling
block in the development of modern science. Today we realize that
flux and change govern everything, and we have almost returned
to the pre-Socratic thinkers who accepted a plurality of worlds.

To visualize Aristotle's astronomy, it is necessary to understand
its main features: The earth is at the center of the universe and

i62 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

stationary; surrounding it are a sphere of air and a sphere of fire.
Aristotle spoke about the component motions of fifty-five spheres.
In his Aletaphysics he explained how he arrived at this number:

"But it is necessary, if all the spheres combined are to explain the
observed facts, that for each of the planets there should be other
spheres (one fewer than those hitherto assigned) which counteract
those already mentioned and bring back to the same position the
outermost sphere of the star which in each case is situated below the
star in question; for only thus can all the forces at work produce the
observed motion of the planets. Since, then, the spheres involved in
the movement of the planets themselves are— eight for Saturn and
Jupiter and twenty-five for the others, and of these only those
involved in the movements of the lowest-situated planet need not
be counteracted, the spheres which counteract those of the outer-
most two planets will be six in number, and the spheres which coun-
teract those of the next four planets will be sixteen; therefore the
number of all the spheres— both those which move the planets and
those which counteract these— will be fifty-five."-**

Then we find the heaven of the fixed stars which is situated next
to God, who is the teleological source of all motion. All this is a
very poetic concept, but scientifically it is of doubtful value, and
the views of Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler have undermined the
Aristotelian hypothesis. Today we accept the heliocentric hypoth-
esis.

THE LEVELS OF THE SOUL

In the field of biology Aristotle undoubtedly made more lasting
contributions than in the realm of physical science. As a naturalist
he was praised by such outstanding scientists as Cuvier and Buffon;
and, indeed, his studies in the History of ammals regarding the prin-
ciples, functions, and structures of various animals were almost
epoch-making in the development of natural science. Again, we
must remember that he lacked instruments and was hindered in his
researches by the general limitations of Greek science.

Aristotle divided zoology into three divisions: first, natural his-
tory; second, the organs and functions of animals (anatomy and
physiology); and third, the growth of animals (embryology). In
the last-named field, especially, he made important advances. He
showed, for example, how the family contributes to generation. He
thought the male contributes the form, while the female contributes

20 Ibid., 1073 b-1074 a.

THE LEVELS OF THE SOUL 163

the substance to generation. All in all, he discussed over five hun-
dred different types of animals. His knowledge of them was not
always exact, and occasionally he relied on the reports of travelers
without making first-hand studies.

To understand nature, Aristotle believed, we must have a knowl-
edge of the soul. According to him, the soul is not merely the prin-
ciple of thought; rather, it is the basic principle of life. He felt that
the problem of the soul is foremost in the sciences:

"Holding as we do that, while knowledge of any kind is a thing
to be honored and prized, one kind of it may, either by reason of
its greater exactness or of a higher dignity and greater wonderful-
ness in its objects, be more honorable and precious than another, on
both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank
the study of the soul. The knowledge of the soul admittedly con-
tributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, above all,
to our understanding of Nature, for the soul is in some sense the
principle of animal hfe. Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its
essential nature, and secondly its properties; of these some are
thought to be affections proper to the soul itself, while others are
considered to attach to the animal owing to the presence within it
of souL"2i

In reviewing the opinions of earlier thinkers about the soul, he
emphasized that the soul is not a harmony as some Pythagoreans
thought; nor is it a self-moving number; nor is it composed of ele-
ments. He regarded the soul as the forjfi of the body. Thus, the soul
is the actuality of which body is the potentiality. Technically, he
defined it as the first entelechy of the body:

"That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural
body having life potential in it. The body so described is a body
which is organized. The parts of plants in spite of their extreme
simplicity are 'organs'; e.g., the leaf serves to shelter the pericarp,
the pericarp to shelter the fruit, while the roots of plants are analo-
gous to the mouth of animals, both serving for the absorption of
food. If, then, we have to give a general formula applicable to all
kinds of soul, we must describe it as the first grade of actuality of
a natural organized body. That is why we can wholly dismiss as
unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: It
is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to
it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that
of which it is the matter. Unity has many senses (as many as 'is'

21 De ani?na, i, 402 a.

i64 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

has), but the most proper and fundamental sense of both is the rela-
tion of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality."^^

To Aristotle, soul and body formed one substance, but the soul
contained various faculties. Among them we find the faculties of nu-
trition, sensation, appetite, locomotion, and reason. Plants contain the
principle of nutrition, animals possess sensation, while human beings
are distinguished by reason.

Aristotle devoted a cursory survey to plants which are distin-
guished by a capacity for nutrition and reproduction. His discussion
of food and nutrition is still quite elementary, as can be seen in the
following:

"Food has a power which is other than the power to increase the
bulk of what is fed by it; so far forth as what has soul in it is a
quantum, food may increase its quantity, but it is only so far as what
has soul in it is a 'this-somewhat' or substance that food acts as food;
in that case it maintains the being of what is fed, and that continues
to be what it is so long as the process of nutrition continues. . . ."--^

Aristotle showed that the process of nutrition involves three fac-
tors: "(a) what is fed, (b) that wherewith it is fed, (c) what does
the feeding; of these (c) is the first soul, (a) the body which has
that soul in it, (b) the food. But since it is right to call things after
the ends they realize, and the end of this soul is to generate another
being like that in which it is, the first soul ought to be named the
reproductive soul. The expression (b) 'wherewith it is fed' is ambig-
uous just as is the expression 'wherewith the ship is steered'; that
may mean either (i) the hand or (ii) the rudder, i.e., either (i) what
is moved and sets in movement, or (ii) what is merely moved. We
can apply this analogy here if we recall that all food must be capable
of being digested, and that what produces digestion is warmth; that
is why everything that has soul in it possesses warmth."-^

Unlike his discussion of nutrition, Aristotle's treatment of sensa-
tion is more exhaustive, although quite unscientific. He believed that
flesh is the seat of sensation. Blood, he thought, communicates par-
ticular sensations and at the same time nourishes the body. He talked
much about spontaneous generation.

Aristotle's discussion of sense-perception is contained in Book
Two of the De annua. He distinguished among five external senses:
sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; all of them have their proper

^^Ibid., 11,412 a-b.
-3 Ibid., 416 b.
■^* Ibid., 416 h.

THE LEVELS OF THE SOUL 165

object. He thought touch the most fundamental sense, but the others
are also important. He made it clear that we do not directly perceive
the external world; rather, we perceive through a medium. For ex-
ample, we are able to smell because of moisture, and we are able to
hear because of the existence of air.

It must be noted that Aristotle subordinated sense knowledge to
rational knowledge. In this respect he represents the Greek view of
psychology. Thus, the Greeks accepted the rationalistic mode of
thinking, whereas modern science believes more in experience, and
thus has an empirical foundation.

To unify all the senses, Aristotle made use of a coTiimon sense
which organizes our perceptions of the external world. This com-
mon sense explains the possibility of consciousness. To make this
point clear, let us be as specific as possible: Through our eyes we
perceive certain colors. But how do we know that we perceive?
Only through a unifying sense which gives order to our sensations
and supplies a much-needed element of unity.

Opposed to sense knowledge, we have the activity of reason,
which is concerned with universal, not specific, factors. Still, intel-
lectual knowledge, Aristotle maintains, is not infallible. Very often
our reason is faulty, for to some extent it is dependent on sense
knowledge. Frequently the mind does not correctly combine the
stimuli of the external world; also, time enters in as a disturbing fac-
tor. Occasionally we do not distinguish correctly between the past
and the present and between the present and the future.

Famous is Aristotle's distinction between the passive and the active
reason. The passive reason is mortal and is connected with the body.
When the body perishes, the passive reason also dies. But the active
reason is truly immortal. Since it is not dependent upon the individ-
ual soul, it is transcendent. He explained how the active reason is
identified with the object:

"Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it
is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to
the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it
forms).

"Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual,
potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the
universe as a whole it is not prior even in time. Mind is not at one
time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its
present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this
alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its

i66 ARISTOTLE'S SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind
as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks."-^

It is the active reason which is the goal of existence. In fact, this
activity characterizes the nature of the Divine Being. In the use of
the active reason we are emancipated from the limitations of time,
space, and individuality. It contains within itself no potentiality and
no trace of possibihty. As complete actuaUty, such a principle can-
not be subject to creation or destruction; in a word, it is truly
eternal.

We find many similarities between Spinoza and Aristotle. Spinoza,
too, spoke about the deathlessness of the intellect, whereby he did
not mean individual immortality. Aristotle, likewise, did not accept
the idea of personal survival after death; rather, he thought that what
survives is impersonal, universal, and independent of material deter-
minations.

A4ost of the medieval scholars did not accept such a doctrine.
They interpreted Aristotle as holding that the individual soul is
immortal, and they identified the individual soul with the active
intellect. They based their theistic arguments upon the contention
of such ancient commentators as Simplicius and Boethius. But a
careful reading of Aristotle scarcely substantiates their views, for he
did not believe in personal immortality but, rather, in the immor-
tality of active reason.

GENERAL FEATURES OF ARISTOTLE'S
PHILOSOPHY

So far, we have not pointed out the cardinal features of Aristotle's
philosophy. For the sake of brevity, let us summarize them under
five headings:

First, Aristotle's philosophy is based on the acceptance of universal
conclusions from which specific facts are derived. It is deductive
rather than inductive, for he taught that reason is concerned with
the understanding of universal principles.

Second, there is stress on the concept of development, which is
not regarded in a Darwinian way but in a teleological manner. The
lower serves as a preparation for the higher; and all development is
chmaxed by the concept of the Prime Mover, who represents pure
form and actuality.

Third, Aristotle believed that the most important subject of phi-
losophy is metaphysics, the science which deals with immaterial

25 Ibid., Ill, 430 a.

FEATURES OF ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY 167

Being, All other sciences he subordinated to this study, which was
to give a comprehensive outhne of reality.

Fourth, Aristotle enumerated three levels of the soul: (a) the vege-
tative soul; (b) the animal soul; (c) the rational soul. In his discus-
sion of man he stressed particularly the power of reason; only the
active reason is i?nmortal in his view.

Fifth, his scientific views were guided by the geocentric hypoth-
esis, which states that the earth is the center of the universe. He
refused to accept the mechanistic hypothesis of Democritus, who
upheld the reahty of atoms and the existence of the void. Instead,
Aristotle believed in irreducible qualities. He thought that space is
finite and that no vacuum exists. His system was dominated by the
concept of purpose, instead of necessity. Teleology, thus, is the key-
note to Aristotle's philosophy.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Relate the important events of Aristotle's life.

2. What are the major works of Aristotle?

3. Compare and contrast Aristotle with Plato.

4. Why was Aristotle disliked by the Athenians?

5. Explain Aristotle's concept of teleology.

6. What contributions did Aristotle make to logic?

7. Explain Aristotle's concept of form and matter.

8. Explain Aristotle's view of God. What is your own concept of God?

9. What are the weaknesses of Aristotelian science? Compare Aristotle's
view of science with the 20th-century concept of science.

10. What is the function of metaphysics, according to Aristotle?

11. Explain Aristotle's point of view regarding the soul.

THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
OF ARISTOTLE

ETHICS

Th,

he ethical views of Aristotle are an excellent representation of
the Greek character. While we miss in them emotionalism and poetic
insight, we can admire them for their restraint and symmetrv\
Throughout iVristotle's ethical philosophy we find moderation and
balance. He realized that moral principles are not innate, as Plato
had believed, but can be developed through the formation of wise
habits. It was his aim to create a system of ethics which could be
used in the formation of a better character and in the building of a
more adequate society. He made it clear that maturity is required
for such a study. This task excludes the inexperienced, for they
are guided mainly by their passions. Maturity, to Aristotle, meant
acting in accordance with a rational principle. Those who achieve
this condition derive inestimable profit from the science of moral-
ity.

In the first book of the Nichomachean ethics, Aristotle discussed
the problem of the Good. He disposed of the popular vieji. that the
1 68 " ""^ — '

ETHICS ^'^^'^ 169

Good consists in wealth or pleasure; rather, he felt the Good must
be aufofiomous and self-sufficient. He found it in happinSssv "^

"Now such a thing, happiness, above all else, is held to be; for
this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something
else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed
for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still
choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of
happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Hap-
piness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor,
in general, for anything other than itself."^

To say, however, that happiness is the main goal of life does not
define happiness. To understand the nature of happiness, Aristotle
stated, we must know the function of man. A man's function, he
explained, cannot be defined by nutrition and growth, for he
shares those traits with plants and animals. Nor can it be perception,
since every animal has that capacity:

"There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a
rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense
of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one
and exercising thought. And, as 'Hfe of the rational element' also has
two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what
we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.
Now^ if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or
implies a rational principle, and if we say 'a so-and-so' and 'a good
so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g., a lyre-
player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all
cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of
the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre,
and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well); if this is the case,
(and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and
this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational prin-
ciple, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble per-
formance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is
performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is
the case,) human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance
with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance
with the best and most complete."-

Happiness, in short, implies a complete organization of life.
To attain happiness we cannot depend on a momentary experience.

1 Nicho7/!achean ethics, i, 1079 a-b.
^ Ibid., 1098 a.

I70 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

Aristotle pointed out that a brief pleasure does not make a man truly
happy.

Continuing his discussion of the Good, Aristotle made a distinc-
tion between intellectual and moral virtue. He considered intellec-
tual virtue superior to moral virtue, for it is based on a knowledge
of ethical principles whereas moral virtue results from a correct way
of Hfe. The function of the teacher and the statesman is to provide
the correct habits and thus to create a better society.

Now, the question arises, How do we know what virtue to
choose?

Aristotle gave a specific answer:

"Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying
in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a
rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of prac-
tical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two
vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on
defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short
of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue
both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect
of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a
mean, with regard to \\hat is best and right an extreme."^

Still, Aristotle realized that not every emotion or passion admits of
a mean. There is no mean, according to him, in cases of theft,
murder, or adultery:

"It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them;
one must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with
regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right
woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do
any of them is to go wrong. It \\'ould be equally absurd, then, to
expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there should
be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would
be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a
deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of
temperance and courage because what is intermediate is in a sense
an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned there is no
mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are done
they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and
deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean."^ He gave a
specific example:

^ Ibid., II, II 07 a.
* Ibid., 1 107 a.

ETHICS 171

"With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the
mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has
no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who
exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls
short in confidence is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains
—not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains— the
mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient
with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such per-
sons also have received no name. But let us call them 'insensible.' "^

He described the mean in economic matters:

"With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liber-
ality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these
actions people exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal
exceeds in spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man
exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. . . . With regard to
money there are also other dispositions— a mean magnificence (for
the magnificent man differs from the liberal man; the former deals
with large sums, the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness
and vulgarity, and a deficiency, niggardUness."^

Most instructive is Aristotle's discussion of justice. He made it
clear that justice does not involve inalienable rights but a sense of
proportion. We have an antidemocratic element in the ethical sys-
tem of Aristotle, for he spoke of a different kind of justice in rela-
tion to the slave as compared with the relationship of free men. His
concept of justice establishes a stratification of society according to
which every person has a definite function and a definite worth, and
consequently a definite status. According to him, women and chil-
dren have less worth than mature men, and subjects are less important
than their rulers.

The ideal man of Aristotle is in every way different from the ideal
person of the Middle Ages. Aristotle believed in self-confidence and
had no use for humility. The perfect man would strive for honor,
according to Aristotle, and, candid in his feelings, would not conceal
his passions. All in all, his actions would be dominated by natural-
istic considerations.

In Book Six of the Nichojnachean ethics, Aristotle described the
various intellectual virtues. Among them he enumerated science,
which contains a knowledge of necessary and eternal factors; art,
which is mainly a technique of production; practical wisdom, which

s Ibid., 1 107 a-b.
6 Ibid., 1 107 b.

172 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

consists in a knowledge of how to secure the ends of our existence;
intuitive reason, which deals with an understanding of the funda-
mental categories and principles of science; and philosophical wis-
dom, which combines scientific principles and intuitive reason. Phil-
osophical wisdom, he wrote, is the highest type of virtue.

In Book Seven, Aristotle turned to the problems of continence,
incontinence, and pleasure. Unlike Socrates, he was conscious of the
fact that often, although we know the right standard, we do not
choose it, for frequently our desires intervene.

In his discussion of pleasure, he steered a middle course betiveen
hedojiisin and. asceticism. He did not consider pain a positive good
nor did he accept the view that pleasures are connected with imme-
diate bodily enjoyment, for the standard of all pleasures is rational
contemplation, which alone is complete and perfect.

Aristotle's balance in this discussion is quite admirable. Unlike
the Stoics, he thought that if we want to live a full life, we need
certain external goods such as health and a moderate amount of
property.

After discussing the various types of pleasures, Aristotle turned to
friendship:

"It is said that those who are supremely happy and self-sufficient
have no need of friends; for they have the things that are good, and
therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing further, while a
friend, being another self, furnishes what a man cannot provide by
his own effort; whence the saying 'when fortune is kind, what need
of friends?' But it seems strange, when one assigns all good things
to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the great-
est of external goods. And if it is more characteristic of a friend to
do well by another than to be well done by, and to confer benefits
is characteristic of the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to do
well by friends than by strangers, the good man will need people
to do well by. This is why the question is asked whether we need
friends more in prosperity or in adversity, on the assumption that
not only does a man in adversity need people to confer benefits on
him, but also those who are prospering need people to do well by.
Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely happy man a soli-
tary; for no one would choose the whole world on condition of
being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature
is to live with others. Therefore even the happy man lives with
others; for he has the things that are by nature good. And plainly it
is better to spend his days with friends and good men than with

ETHICS 173

strangers or any chance persons. Therefore the happy rnan needs
friends."^

According to Aristotle, there are three types of friendship. One
is based on pleasure, another on utility, and the third on a selfless
appreciation of the other person, who is regarded not as means to
one's life but as an end in himself. He also held that friendship indi-
cates the fundamental character of man:

"For friendship is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so is
he to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his being
is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's
being, and the activity of this consciousness is produced when they
live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this. And whatever
existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake
they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their
friends; and so some drink together, others dice together, others join
in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each
class spending their days together in whatever they love most in
life; for since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share
in those things which give them the sense of living together. Thus
the friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of
their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become
evil by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good men
is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are
thought to become better too by their activities and by improving
each other; for from each other they take the mould of the charac-
teristics the)' approve— whence the sa}'ing 'noble deeds from noble
men.' "^

What is especially noteworthy in Aristotle's treatment of friend-
ship is his opposition to romantic love. This attitude again represents
the Greek spirit, which regarded friendship among members of the
same sex as being more important than love of the opposite sex.
Aristotle's views are directed against extreme sentimentality. His
ethical philosophy, throughout, is restrained and sober.

In the Tenth Book of the Nichoiiiachean ethics, he again took up
the problem of pleasure. Pleasures, he showed, differ according to
the activities which they accompan\ ; pleasure is not the sinmmmi
boninn of life. iVIan's pleasure lies in the developvient of his rational
capacities. To achieve the highest pleasure, Aristotle wrote, we must
"appreciate the contemplative life:

'^ Ibid., IX, 1 169 b.
^ Ibid., 1 171 b-i 172 a.

174 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

"We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and
happy; but what sort of actions must we assign to them? Acts of
justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if they make contracts and
return deposits, and so on? Acts of a brave man, then, confronting
dangers and running risks because it is noble to do so? Or liberal
acts? To whom will they give? It will be strange if they are really
to have money or anything of the kind. And what would their tem-
perate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, since they have no bad
appetites? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of
action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, every
one supposes that they live and therefore that they are active; we
cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away
from a living being action, and still more production, what is left
but contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses
all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human
activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of
the nature of happiness."^

The goal of life, then, is the cultivation of our intellect. Such a
state is not exposed to change or to misfortune. If we arrive at this
state, we become almost godlike, and we are able to survey the uni-
verse as a whole. Such contemplation does not imply mortification
of the body. It does not lead to mysticism, wrote Aristotle, for he
explained:

"But, being a man, one will also need external prosperity; for our
nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but
our body also must be healthy and must have food and other atten-
tion. Still, we must not think that the man who is to be happy will
need many things or great things, merely because he cannot be
supremely happy without external goods; for self-sufficiency and
action do not involve excess, and we can do noble acts without rul-
ing earth and sea; for even with moderate advantages one can act
virtuously (this is manifest enough; for private persons are thought
to do worthy acts no less than despots— indeed even more); and it is
enough that we should have so much as that; for the life of the man
who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy. Solon, too,
was perhaps sketching well the happy man when he described him
as moderately furnished with externals but as having done (as Solon
thought) the noblest acts, and hved temperately; for one can with
but moderate possessions do what one ought."^°

^Ibid., X, 1178 b.
'^'^ Ibid., 1 178 b-1179 a.

RHETORIC 175

What, then, are the general features of Aristotle's ethical system?
First, it is humanistic. The goal of ethics, Aristotle stated, is not the
achievement of supernatural bliss; happiness, which stands for the
rational organization of all our capacities, can be achieved on earth.

Second, it is an ethical system which tries to combat the extremes
of bodily pleasure and mortification of the flesh. The Golden Mean
represents a compromise through which virtue and sanity can be
found.

Third, Aristotle lacks the dualism which we find in so many
other ethical systems. There is no struggle and no essential conflict
between our higher and our lower capacities, and between reason
and emotion. The ethical life, according to him, represents a sense
of harmonious proportion in which every capacity and every func-
tion of human nature have their rightful place.

Fourth, the ethical system of Aristotle is extroverted rather than
introspective. Unhke modern ethical thinkers, he was not primarily
concerned with the inner man. He knew nothing of ego, complexes,
sublimation, suppression, and so on. He believed that it is possible
for man to find himself as a member of society and that there is no
fundamental conflict between the individual and the prevailing social
institutions. Hence, we have a social emphasis in the ethical theory
of Aristotle.

Finally, the moral theories of Aristotle are characterized by his
faith in reason. Reason, he thought, can tell us about the means and
the goals of the good life. The difference between men and animals,
he asserted, lies in our possession of reason. It is this capacity which
gives us a kinship with the gods. Thus, supreme happiness in Aris-
totle lies in the use of contemplation, through which we achieve true
detachment and true objectivity.

RHETORIC

The ethical doctrines of Aristotle cannot be fully appreciated unless
we understand his concept of rhetoric. To him, rhetoric meant more
than the art of speech. It was a technique whereby success could be
achieved in political and legal life. He held that rhetoric can be use-
ful in four different ways:

"... (i) because things that are true and things that are just have
a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the
decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must
be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accord-
ingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession

176 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to pro-
duce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruc-
tion, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. . . . Further,
(3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning
can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that
we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make
people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly
what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on
our part may be able to confute him . . . (4) it is absurd to hold
that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself
with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech
and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a
human being than the use of his limbs."^^

To be successful the orator must make his speech credible. He
must stir the emotions of his hearers, being able to prove the truth
or even an apparent truth through convincing arguments.

Aristotle divided rhetoric into three types: one, political (delib-
erative); two, forensic (legal); three, epideictic (adapted to pane-
gyrical display). He was especially acute in his discussion of political
rhetoric; he emphasized the point that the political speaker should
be able to use generalities, a technique which has been so success-
fully used in the 20th century.

To be successful, wrote Aristotle, the political orator should study
the various types of governments. The appeal in a democracy is
different from that in an oligarchy. In a democracy the pohtical
orator should stress common ideals, common interests, and equality.
In an oligarchy, he should dwell mainly on economic factors and
utilitarian motives.

The legal orator should be an expert in psychology. He should be
acquainted with the causes of human action, which are enumerated
by Aristotle under seven headings. The first three are chance, nature,
compulsion; these he regarded as involuntary. The other four-
habit, reasoning, anger, and appetite— he viewed as voluntary. Gen-
erally, he affirmed the reality of free will but declared freedom is
best realized when we act according to reason, not when we are
slaves to emotions and our appetites.

Less important than his discussion of legal oratory is his treat-
ment of epideictic rhetoric, or ceremonial oratory. This involves
a knowledge of virtue and vice. Penetrating are his observations
regarding the use of praise:

11 Rhetoric, i, 1355 a-b.

RHETORIC 177

"To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of ac-
tion. The suggestions which would be made in the latter case be-
come encomiums when differcnth' expressed. When \\ e know what
action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as
suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of
words. . . . Consequently, whenever you w ant to praise any one,
think what you would urge people to do; and \\'hen you want to
urge the doing of an)'thing, think what you would praise a man
for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action,
the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two
opposite forms of expression accordingly.

"There are, also, many useful ways of heightening the effect of
praise. We must, for instance, point out that a man is the only one,
or the first, or almost the only one who has done something, or
that he has done it better than anyone else; all these distinctions are
honorable. And we must, further, make much of the particular
season and occasion of an action, arguing that we could hardly have
looked for it just then. If a man has often achieved the same suc-
cess, we must mention this; that is a strong point; he himself, and
not luck, will then be given the credit." ^-

Aristotle continued his psychological analysis in Book Two of the
Rhetoric. He showed that rationahty is not as important as a knowl-
edge of human emotions. To accomplish his ends the speaker must
put himself in the right Hght and also appeal to the biases of his
hearers. He must impress his audience in such a way that everyone
believes he possesses excellent qualities. His goal will be to have his
hearers agree with him and despise his opponents.

The orator must also realize that he has to deal with various
types of people; for example, if he has to speak to an assemblage of
young people he should know something about the character of
youth:

"Young men have strong passions, and tend to gratify them in-
discriminately. Of the bodily desires, it is the sexual by which
they are most swayed and in which they show absence of self-
control. They are changeable and fickle in their desires, which are
violent while they last, but quickly over: their impulses are keen
but not deep-rooted, and are like sick people's attacks of hunger
and thirst. They are hot-tempered and quick-tempered, and apt
to give way to their anger; bad temper often gets the better of
them, for owing to their love of honor they cannot bear being

^^Ibid., 1367 b- 1 368 a.

178 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

slighted, and are indignant if they imagine themselves unfairly-
treated. While they love honor, they love victory still more; for
youth is eager for superiority over others, and victory is one form
of this. They love both more than they love money, which indeed
they love very little, not having yet learnt what it means to be
without it. . . . They look at the good side rather than the bad, not
having yet witnessed many instances of wickedness. They trust
others readily, because they have not yet often been cheated. They
are sanguine; nature warms their blood as though with excess of
wine; and besides that, they have as yet met with few disappoint-
ments. Their lives are mainly spent not in memory but in expecta-
tion; for expectation refers to the future, memory to the past, and
youth has a long future before it and a short past behind it: on the
first day of one's life one has nothing at all to remember, and can
only look forward." ^^

Quite different from young men, Aristotle asserted, are those
persons who have passed the prime of life and are now in their
declining years:

"They have lived many years; they have often been taken in, and
often made mistakes; and hfe on the whole is a bad business. The
result is that they are sure about nothing and underdo everything.
They 'think,' but they never 'know'; and because of their hesita-
tion they always add a 'possibly' or a 'perhaps,' putting everything
this way and nothing positively. They are cynical; that is, they
tend to put the worse construction on everything. Further, their
experience makes them distrustful and therefore suspicious of evil.
Consequently they neither love warmly nor hate bitterly, but fol-
lowing the hint of bias they love as though they will some day
hate and hate as though they will some day love. They are small-
minded, because they have been humbled by life: their desires are
set upon nothing more exalted or unusual than what will help them
to keep ahve. They are not generous, because money is one of the
things they must have, and at the same time their experience has
taught them how hard it is to get and how easy to lose. They are
cowardly, and are always anticipating danger; unlike that of the
young, who are warm-blooded, their temperament is chilly; old
age has paved the way for cowardice; fear is, in fact, a form of chill.
They love life; and all the more when their last day has come, be-
cause the object of all desire is something we have not got, and
also because we desire most strongly that which we need most

^^Ibid., 11, 1389 a.

RHETORIC 179

urgently. They are too fond of themselves; this is one form that
small-mindedness takes."^^

Then Aristotle turned to the discussion of mature men, whose
character is a mean between that of elderly people and that of
youth:

"They have neither that excess of confidence which amounts to
rashness, nor too much timidity, but the right of each. They neither
trust everybody nor distrust everybody, but judge people cor-
rectly. Their lives will be guided not by the sole consideration
either of what is noble or of what is useful, but by both; neither by
parsimony nor by prodigality, but by what is fit and proper. So,
too, in regard to anger and desire; they will be brave as well as
temperate, and temperate as well as brave; these virtues are divided
between the young and the old; the young are brave but intem-
perate, the old temperate but cowardly. To put it generally, all
the valuable qualities that youth and age divide between them are
united in the prime of life, while all their excesses or defects are
replaced by moderation and fitness." ^^

The skillful orator, Aristotle continued, will vary his remarks
by a knowledge of the positions in life which his assembled hearers
represent. Thus he must study what effects good birth produces in
the individual:

"Its effect on character is to make those who have it more am-
bitious; it is the way of all men who have something to start with
to add to the pile, and good birth implies ancestral distinction. The
well-born man will look down even on those who are as good as his
own ancestors, because any far-off distinction is greater than the
same thing close to us, and better to boast about. Being well-born,
which means coming of a fine stock, must be distinguished from
nobility, which means being true to the family nature— a quality
not usually found in the well-born, most of whom are poor crea-
tures. In the generations of men as in the fruits of the earth, there
is a varying yield; now and then, where the stock is good, excep-
tional men are produced for a while, and then decadence sets in." ^^

Aristotle was quite cynical when he turned to the effect of wealth
on character:

"Wealthy men are insolent and arrogant; their possession of
wealth affects their understanding; they feel as if they had every

^^Ibid., 1389 b.
^^ Ibid., 1390 a-b.
^^ Ibid., 1390 b.

i8o THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

good thing that exists; wealth becomes a sort of standard of value
for everything else, and therefore they imagine there is nothing it
cannot buy. They are luxurious and ostentatious; luxurious, because
of the luxury in which they live and the prosperity which they dis-
play; ostentatious and vulgar, because, like other people's, their
minds are regularly occupied with the object of their love and ad-
miration, and also because they think that other people's idea of
happiness is the same as their own. It is indeed quite natural that
they should be affected thus; for if you have money, there are
always plenty of people who come begging from you. Hence the
saying of Simonides about wise men and rich men, in answer to
Hiero's wife, who asked him whether it was better to grow rich or
wise. 'Why, rich,' he said, 'for I see the wise men spending their
days at the rich men's doors.' Rich men also consider themselves
worthy to hold public office; for they consider they already have
the things that give a claim to office. In a word, the type of char-
acter produced by wealth is that of a prosperous fool." "

Next, Aristotle discussed the impact of power on the human
character:

"Those in power are more ambitious and more manly in char-
acter than the wealthy, because they aspire to do the great deeds
that their power permits them to do. Responsibility makes them
more serious: they have to keep paying attention to the duties their
position involves. They are dignified rather than arrogant, for the
respect in which they are held inspires them with dignity and
therefore with moderation— dignity being a mild and becoming
form of arrogance. If they wrong others, they wrong them not on
a small but on a great scale." ^^

The rest of Book Two of the Rhetoric need not concern us very
much, for in it Aristotle mainly discussed the technical devices of
rhetoric. He showed, for example, how viax'mis should be used:
They lend a tone of morality to the speech, for they express uni-
versal truths which can readily be accepted. Throughout his dis-
cussion he kept in mind that an audience is guided by emotional
reactions rather than by objective reasoning.

In Book Three, he took up stylistic factors. The orator's language,
he made clear, should not be too ornate. He must state his argument
so that the audience can easily understand it. A speech, according to
Aristotle, contains four parts: an introduction, a statement, a proof,

1'^ Ibid., 1390 b-1391 a.
18 Ibid., 1 391 a.

POLITICS i8i

and an epilogue. The introduction, he beHeved, corresponds to the
prologue in poetry and to the prelude in flute music.

He concluded his discussion in the Rhetoric by outUning the parts
of the epilogue.

"(i) Having shown your own truthfulness and the untruthful-
ness of your opponent, the natural thing is to commend yourself,
censure him, and hammer in your points. You must aim at one of
two objects— you must make yourself out a good man and him a
bad one either in yourselves or in relation to your hearers. . . .

"(2) The facts having been proved, the natural thing to do next
is to magnify or minimize their importance. The facts must be ad-
mitted before you can discuss how important they are; just as the
body cannot grow except from something already present. . . .

"(3) Next, when the facts and their importance are clearly un-
derstood, you must excite your hearer's emotions. These emotions
are pity, indignation, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, pugnacity. . . .

"(4) Finally you have to review what you have already said.
Here you may properly do what some wrongly recommended do-
ing in the introduction— repeat your points freguently so as to
make them easily understood. What you should do in your intro-
duction is to state your subject, in order that the point to be judged
may be quite plain; in the epilogue you should summarize the argu-
ments by which your case has been proved." ^^

POLITICS

The realistic note in the Rhetoric is reinforced by Aristotle's Pol-
itics, in which he wrote that man is naturally a social animal and that
a life of political isolation is impossible. The state he regarded as the
highest form of community life. As a member of the state, man is
the noblest of all animals; if he lives outside it, he reverts to a beast.

Unlike modern totalitarians, Aristotle did not beheve that the
state exists as a goal in itself. To him it was not an autonomous
organization, nor did it possess a supermoral status. On the contrary,
he claimed, the purpose of the state is the 7?ioral perfection of its
citizens.

Most remarkable in Book One of the Politics is the discussion of
slavery, which Aristotle viewed as a natural institution. He defined
the slave as a piece of property, and he argued for slavery on the
basis that everywhere in nature we find a ruler and a subject. Slaves,
he felt, could acquire only an inferior type of virtue. But he did

'^^ Ibid., Ill, 141 9 b.

i82 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

not mean that a slave should not receive any education at all, for
he thought a slave could achieve a certain level of moral insight.

Turning from the subject of slavery, Aristotle discussed the rela-
tion of husband and wife. Unlike Plato, he did not believe in the
equality of the sexes. It is best for the husband to rule the house-
hold, he decided, and the wife to take care of domestic duties.

In Book Two of the Politics Aristotle criticized the various con-
cepts of Utopia. He was especially harsh with Plato's Republic, for
he believed such a republic would create too much uniformity and
reduce all citizens to the same level. Furthermore, he objected to
Plato's confiscation of private property, an action which would
only create strife and civil disorder. As for setting up a community
of wives and children, this step in his opinion would destroy natural
emotions.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle regarded private property as a source of
happiness because it teaches men to lead a civilized life and to
enjoy the fruits of their efforts. If it were abolished, he declared,
we would return to lawless barbarism. Plato's Utopia he considered
impractical and utterly unworkable in a realistic society.

As a practical political scientist, he turned to the existing types
of states. Whereas Plato had idealized the Spartan way of life, Aris-
totle knew the weaknesses of the Spartans. Among the defects of the
Spartan state he noted, first, the women were too influential. Sec-
ond, wealth was owned by the few. Third, the executive and legis-
lative organs of the Spartan government had disintegrated. Fourth,
the Spartan state was fit only for war, and yet even in war Sparta
could make little progress because of an inadequate financial system.

Book Three of the Politics discusses the problem of citizenship.
In it Aristotle held that the citizen should know both how to rule
and how to obey. Since citizenship requires leisure, he advocated
that mechanics be excluded from the ideal state.

He defined three types of good governments: monarchy, aris-
tocracy, and polity (aristocratic democracy). Then he noted three
perversions of these good types: tyranny, oligarchy, and extreme
democracy.

He emphasized the importance of having rational laws. Govern-
ments which are based merely on instinct and momentary passion
soon disintegrate, he declared; in the best government there is an
equihbrium of the classes. This ideal influenced the founders of our
American republic, who likewise believed in a definite division of
powers.

POLITICS 183

Every state, Aristotle noted in Book Four, is composed of three
classes: one which is wealthy, another which is poor, and the middle
class. As in his ethical philosophy, he favored a compromise:

". . . The middle class is least hkely to shrink from rule, or to be
overambitious for it; both of which are injuries to the state. Again,
those who have too much of the goods of fortune, strength, wealth,
friends, and the like, are neither willing nor able to submit to au-
thority. The evil begins at home; for when they are boys, by
reason of the luxury in which they are brought up, they never
learn, even at school, the habit of obedience. On the other hand,
the very poor, who are in the opposite extreme, are too degraded.
So that the one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically;
the other knows not how to command and must be ruled like
slaves. Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters and slaves,
the one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be more fatal
to friendship and good fellowship in states than this: for good fel-
lowship springs from friendship; when men are at enmity with one
another, they would rather not even share the same path. But a
city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars;
and these are generally the middle classes. Wherefore the city which
is composed of middle-class citizens is necessarily best consti-
tuted." 20

A government based on the middle class is Hkely to be more
stable: "Thus it is manifest that the best political community is
formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are
likely to be well-administered, in which the middle class is large,
and stronger if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate
than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the
scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant.
Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have
a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much,
and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or
a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme—
either out of the most rampant democracy, or out of an oligarchy;
but it is not so likely to arise out of the middle constitutions and
those akin to them." ^^

According to Aristotle, if a new constitution is to be established,
the legislator must understand the functions, powers, and impor-
tance of the other departments of the government. In this view we

^^ Politics, IV, 1295 b.
21 Ibid., 1295 b.

i84 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

have the genesis of the American form of government, which be-
lieves that justice is best administered when there is a balance of
power among the three branches of government.

Especially illuminating is Aristotle's discussion of revolutions in
Book Five of the Politics. Among the causes of revolution we gen-
erally find a struggle between rich and poor as a danger signal.
Whenever one class becomes too powerful, the danger of poHtical
violence increases. The middle class usually preserves the balance of
power and thus tends to prevent revolutions.

In democratic states, Aristotle averred, revolution is frequently
caused by demagogues who become generals and by intense com-
petition among the politicians. When the rich are persecuted, they
usually rebel against the rule of the people. In oligarchies the people
may resist their oppressors, although oligarchies are usually over-
thrown by their own members. Frequently ambition conspires
against oligarchy, and one man may arise who assumes absolute
control of the government. Aristotle noted that aristocracies tend
to become oligarchies. Aristocracies are threatened both by the
underprivileged class and by ambitious men.

How can revolutions be avoided? How can the spirit of insurrec-
tion be conquered? How can governments be best preserved? Aris-
totle believed that the ruler should exemplify certain virtues, such
as loyalty, abihty, and justice. Furthermore, citizens should be
educated in the spirit of the constitution. To preserve the status quo,
Aristotle made some very practical proposals: (i) The rights of
the underprivileged are to be safeguarded; (2) there is to be har-
mony between ruler and subjects; (3) subversive forces are to be
watched; (4) property quaUfications are to be changed from time
to time; (5) no individual or class is to become too powerful;
(6) corruption among public officials is not to be allowed; (7) no
class is to be oppressed.

Aristotle even gave some excellent advice to the tyrants and
showed how their form of government could be preserved. The
ruler of this type of government "should lop off those who are
too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must not allow
common meals, clubs, education, and the like; he must be on his
guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or
confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit hterary assemblies
or other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to
prevent people from knowing one another (for acquaintance begets
mutual confidence). Further, he must compel all persons staying

POLITICS 185

in the city to appear in public and live at his gates; then he will
know what they are doing; if they are always kept under, they
will learn to be humble. In short, he should practice these and the
like Persian and barbaric arts, which all have the same object. A
tyrant should also endeavor to know what each of his subjects says
or does, and should employ spies, hke the 'female detectives' at
Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers whom Hiero was in the habit of
sending to any place of resort or meeting; for the fear of informers
prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do, they
are more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is to sow
quarrels among the citizens; friends should be embroiled with
friends, the people with the notables, and the rich with one another.
Also he should impoverish his subjects; he thus provides against the
maintenance of a guard by the citizens, and the people, having to
keep hard at work, are prevented from conspiring. . . . Another
practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the manner of
Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his
subjects should bring into the treasury their whole property. The
tyrant is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may
have something to do and be always in want of a leader. And whereas
the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic
of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all men
want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power." —

Yet, there is another method by which tyranny may be main-
tained. Aristotle sounds almost like Adachiavelli, for he stressed the
importance of deception on the part of the tyrant:

"In the first place he should pretend a care of the public revenues,
and not waste money in making presents of a sort at which the
common people get excited when they see their hard-won earnings
snatched from them and lavished on courtesans and strangers and
artists. He should give an account of what he receives and of what
he spends (a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants);
for then he will seem to be a steward of the public rather than a
tyrant; nor need he fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he
will ever be in want of money. Such a policy is at all events much
more advantageous for the tyrant when he goes from home, than
to leave behind him a hoard, for then the garrison who remain in
the city will be less likely to attack his power; and a tyrant, when
he is absent from home, has more reason to fear the guardians of
his treasure than the citizens, for the one accompany him, but the

22 Ibid., V, 1 3 1 3 a-i 313b.

i86 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

others remain behind. In the second place, he should be seen to
collect taxes and to require pubhc services only for state purposes,
and that he may form a fund in case of war, and generally he ought
to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they be-
longed, not to him, but to the pubHc. He should appear, not harsh,
but dignified, and when men meet him they should look upon him
with reverence, and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be re-
spected if he inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he
may neglect, at least he should maintain the character of a great
soldier, and produce the impression that he is one. Neither he nor
any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least offense against
modesty towards the young of either sex who are his subjects, and
the women of his family should observe a like self-control towards
other women; the insolence of women has ruined many tyran-
nies." 23

Aristotle goes on by saying that such a tyrant should be discreet.
If he cannot control his lusts, he should at least hide them. He will
find religion to be extremely helpful.

"Also he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service of
the gods; for if men think that a ruler is religious and has a rever-
ence for the gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his
hands, and they are less disposed to conspire against him, because
they believe him to have the very gods fighting on his side. At the
same time his religion must not be thought fooHsh. And he should
honor men of merit, and make them think that they would not be
held in more honor by the citizens if they had a free government.
The honor he should distribute himself, but the punishment should
be inflicted by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which
is taken by all monarchs not to make one person great; but if one,
then two or more should be raised, that they may look sharply after
one another. If after all some one has to be made great, he should
not be a man of bold spirit; for such dispositions are ever most in-
clined to strike. And if any one is to be deprived of his power, let
it be diminished gradually, not taken from him all at once." -^

This discussion could scarcely be surpassed in its cynical implica-
tions. Aristotle realized that what counts most in political affairs is
appearance and that the people are easily deceived. His discussion
does not imply that he was a friend of tyranny, for he knew that
such a government usually is short-lived and extremely unstable.

^^ Ibid., 1 3 143-1 3 14 b.
^* Ibid., 1314 b-1315 a.

POLITICS 187

In Book Seven of the Politics Aristotle pictured the ideal state. He
believed in maintaining a small population because it is more man-
ageable. The territory of the state should be large enough for the
means of livelihood to be supplied. It should be distant from a har-
bor, which Aristotle regarded as a source of immorality. He felt
that the moral effects of sea trade are inevitably unfortunate. Be-
sides mechanics, he would exclude merchants and businessmen
from citizenship. Only warriors, rulers, and priests should be citi-
zens. In various periods of his life a citizen should be a warrior, a
ruler, and a priest. In old age, the citizens may dedicate themselves
to speculative philosophy. The population of the city, Aristotle
stated, is to contain a harmonious blend of Asiatic and Nordic
races. Here again we notice his ideal of the Golden Mean. Exces-
sive property is not to be allowed and usury is to be outlawed. Aris-
totle, it is clear, was opposed to a profit economy.

He made detailed suggestions regarding the location of the city.
Attention should be paid to strategic necessities, to public health,
and to political considerations. It would be a mistake, he stated, if
beauty were regarded as the only factor, for there is always a
danger that war may break out, in which case city walls are of
primary importance.

In the last part of the Politics, Aristotle turned to education. It is
the task of the educator, he believed, to produce the type of citizen
who can best function in the ideal state. From birth, children should
be watched carefully and guided by the wisest citizens. Special
attention must be placed upon cleanHness of mind and body. The
games of children should be neither vulgar, nor too fatiguing, nor
too soft. If possible, he thought, children's games should be imita-
tions of the activities of later life.

In this educational process the state, according to his plan, super-
vises almost all activities. The state fixes the age of marriage, super-
intends the physical condition of the parents, and determines the
educational curriculum.

Elaborate attention is to be paid to the moral educatio?i of the
citizens. Students are not to be exposed to pictures and plays which
will have a degrading influence on their character, nor is indecency
to be allowed. Aristotle thought it only a short step from indecency
in language to indecency in acts.

The curriculum should embrace reading, writing, and drawing, as
well as music. Physical education is to form the first stage of the
educational process, but the teacher must see to it that athletics is

i88 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

not overemphasized and that physical training does not become a
goal in itself. Music, above all, is an excellent instrument of instruc-
tion, according to Aristotle. Not only does it serve as a form of
recreation, but it is also a moral discipline and leads to a fuller under-
standing of life. He thought that various harmonies should be used
to inspire corresponding moral virtues. Like Plato, he M^as conscious
of the great moral effect of music. All the modes of music are to be
employed but not all in the same manner:

"In education the most ethical modes are to be preferred, but in
listening to the performances of others we may admit the modes of
action and passion also. For feelings such as pity and fear, or, again,
enthusiasm, exist very strongly in some souls, and have more or
less influence over all. Some persons fall into a religious frenzy,
whom we see as a result of the sacred melodies— when they have
used the melodies that excite the soul to mystic frenzy— restored as
though they had found healing and purgation. Those who are in-
fluenced by pity or fear, and every emotional nature, must have a
like experience, and others in so far as each is susceptible to such
emotions, and all are in a manner purged and their souls lightened
and delighted. The purgative melodies likewise give an innocent
pleasure to mankind. Such are the modes and the melodies in which
those who perform music at the theater should be invited to com-
pete. But since the spectators are of two kinds— the one free and
educated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed of mechanics,
laborers, and the like— there ought to be contests and exhibitions
instituted for the relaxation of the second class also." ^^

The goal of Aristotle's educational plan was the enjoyment of
leisure. He subordinated the utilitarian aspects of education to its
cultural implications. What is necessary, what serves as a prepara-
tion for making a living, was not the important consideration for
Aristotle, since he felt that all of education is a preparation for
aristocratic existence. This view of education dominated 19th-
century American educational institutions. Progressive education,
according to John Dewey, maintains the opposite outlook. It
equates education with life and believes that education is never to
be parasitical. Mere culture is regarded with contempt by Dewey,
who favors the democratic spirit and complete adjustment to life.

The problem raised by Aristotle regarding the function of edu-
cation has not been solved. There are many today who believe that
America has gone to the other extreme and stresses utility at the

25 Ibid., VIII, 1342 a.

ESTHETIC THEORIES 189

expense of rational enjoyment and the cultivation of the intellect.
The solution probably lies in a compromise between these two at-
titudes, in an educational system which develops both a cultured
class of leaders and the techniques through which a high standard
of living can be achieved.

ESTHETIC THEORIES

The esthetic theories of Aristotle, as his other views in philosophy,
differ markedly from those of Plato. Plato's discussion of art is
moralistic and puritanical, and he wanted to banish Homer and
Hesiod from his Utopia. While Plato regarded art as an inferior part
of knowledge, Aristotle believed that art attempts to achieve an
understanding of universal essences. This attempt is especially no-
ticeable in poetry, which Aristotle regarded as more philosophical
and of greater import than history.

Aristotle did not insist that all art teach a moral lesson. If censor-
ship is imposed, he beheved, it only leads to a stifling of creativity.
He contended that frequently suppression of certain forms of art
is merely instigated by ignorance.

Especially important in Aristotle's view of art is his view of
catharsis, or the transference of an emotion from ourselves to the
hero or the villain of an art form. Let us say our fate is a deplorable
one. Naturally we feel self-pity; we are sorry for ourselves. But
when we see sufl^ering on the stage, portrayed on a gigantic scale,
we are Hberated from self-pity and obtain a universal understanding.
Art can lift us to a higher level and give us a more comprehensive
view of reahty.

The highest form of art, in Aristotle's view, is tragedy. He gave
various rules for the plot of a tragedy. Three things, though, are to
be avoided:

"(i) A good man must not be seen passing from happiness to
misery, or (2) a bad man from misery to happiness. The first situa-
tion is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply odious to us. The
second is the most untragic that can be; it has no one of the requi-
sites of tragedy; it does not appeal either to the human feeling in us,
or to our pity, or to our fears. Nor, on the other hand, should ( 3 ) an
extremely bad man be seen falling from happiness into misery. Such
a story may arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us
to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned by undeserved misfortune,
and fear by that of one like ourselves; so that there will be nothing
either piteous or fear-inspiring in the situation. There remains, then,

I90 THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

the intermediate kind of personage, a man not pre-eminently virtu-
ous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not
by vice and depravity but by some error of judgment, of the num-
ber of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosper-
ity." 26

What are the elements of a good plot? Aristotle gave a definite
answer:

"The perfect plot, accordingly, must have a single, and not (as
some tell us) a double issue; the change in the hero's fortunes must
be not from misery to happiness, but on the contrary from happi-
ness to misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any depravity, but
in some great error on his part; the man himself being either such
as we have described, or better, not worse, than that." -^

The dramatist must also have a knowledge of human character,
which is to be portrayed in a plausible jnamier:

"In the characters there are four points to aim at. First and fore-
most, that they shall be good. There will be an element of character
in the play, if . . . what a personage says or does reveals a certain
moral purpose; and a good element of character, if the purpose so
revealed is good. Such goodness is possible in every type of per-
sonage, even in a woman or a slave, though the one is perhaps an
inferior, and the other a wholly worthless being. The second point
is to make them appropriate. The character before us may be, say,
manly; but it is not appropriate in a female character to be manly,
or clever. The third is to make them like the reality, which is not
the same as their being good and appropriate, in our sense of the
term. The fourth is to make them consistent and the same through-
out; even if inconsistency be part of the man before one for imita-
tion as presenting that form of character, he should still be con-
sistently inconsistent." ^^

Aristotle's main ideal in art was not professionalism. He would
not have encouraged our modern trend, in which child prodigies
and virtuosos are developed. The primary element in art, he main-
tained, is an appreciation and understanding of life. Furthermore,
he felt that esthetic pleasure varies according to education and so-
cial status. Hence, there cannot be one art for all. The lower classes,
he said, enjoy a different type of art and are more interested in
pleasures which appeal to the senses than in those which appeal to

^^ Poetics, ch. 13, 1452 b-1^53 3,
^"^ Ibid., ch. 13, 1453 a,
?8/^z(^.,ch, 15, 1454 a,

THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE 191

reason. But Aristotle did not believe art is to be guided by the dic-
tatorship of vulgarity (i.e., Hollywood movies); rather, it is to be
determined by the ideals of the best-educated citizens.

THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE

It is impossible to do justice to the immeasurable influence which
Aristotle had on the history of civilization. In the Middle Ages
he was regarded as the master of all knowledge, and he was re-
spected as much in Mohammedan and Jewish circles as in the Chris-
tian Church. The philosophy of Aristotle was used by Aquinas to
buttress the dogmas of the Church.

When the scholars of the Renaissance re-evaluated Aristotle, they
became more skeptical and realized that the Greek philosopher did
not believe in the immortality of the individual soul or in the crea-
tion of the universe by God. He became the source of much heresy,
and an acceptance of his philosophy frequently led to fervent op-
position to the ecclesiastical authorities.

Among modern philosophers Leibniz (1646-17 16), especially,
appreciated the philosophy of Aristotle and like the latter adopted
the principle of teleology. Aristotle aided Leibniz to get away from
a mechanistic concept of nature and to view the universe in dynamic
terms. In France, in the 19th century, the philosophy of Aristotle
inspired a reaction against Comte's Positivism. It led, on the part of
Renouvier and Ravaisson, to a spiritual hypothesis and a personal-
istic philosophy of life.

All in all, it can be said without exaggeration that Aristotelian
philosophy is probably the most amazing system that has ever been
devised in the history of civilization.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Discuss Aristotle's Golden Mean.

2. Enumerate the forms of good government according to Aristotle.

3. Explain the significance of Aristotle's Rhetoric.

4. What advice did Aristotle give to aspiring orators?

5. How can government best be preserved, according to Aristotle's
Politics?

6. How realistic were the political views of Aristotle?

7. What is the significance of tragedy according to Aristotle?

8. In what ways did Aristotle influence literary criticism?

9. What are the weaknesses of Aristotle's ethical philosophy?

10. What would be Aristotle's criticism of Marxism?

11. Describe the ideal commonwealth of Aristotle.

THE BEGINNING OF
HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

THE POLITICAL SETTING

t is worth noting that after Aristotle philosophy greatly declined.
There was a like decline in the field of politics, when the empire
which was created by Alexander was split into several fragments.
Alexander occupies almost the same position in political life that
Aristotle holds in philosophy.

It was the ideal of Alexander to develop a world empire in which
Greeks and Orientals could live side by side. Consequently, he en-
couraged intermarriage and respected the traditions and the cus-
toms of the Oriental nations. During the last years of his life he
was so deeply impressed with the East that many of his close fol-
lowers deserted him, for they thought he was betraying his original
ideals. They were justified in their suspicions by Alexander's wild
excesses. Given to all kinds of vice, he ruled with Oriental pomp
and ceremony and regarded himself as a god who could do no
wrong. Constantly, however, he was lenient in his treatment of
Athens, and he aided in beautifying and extending the glory of that
city.
192

INTELLECTUAL TRAITS 193

The death of Alexander was followed by several wars, during
which there was incessant struggle for power. After the battle of
Ipsus, in 301 B.C., four rulers emerged: Lysimachus, who was king
of Thrace and of the western part of Asia Minor; Cassander, king
of iMacedonia, who claimed complete control over Greece; Seleu-
cus Nicator, who governed Syria and whose realm extended to the
Indus; and Ptolemy, who was ruler of Egypt and also laid claim to
the sovereignty of Palestine.

Ultimately, however, the kingdom of Lysimachus collapsed, and
it was divided among the Syrians and the Macedonians. The other
nations, including Pergamum, were more fortunate, and their rule
lasted until Rome established its great empire. These kingdoms
were agencies of culture diffusion. Through them Greek ideas,
Greek art, and Greek philosophy were spread to all parts of the
civilized world. Thus, the Hellenistic Age arose, which had a dis-
tinctly cosmopolitan and universal flavor.

INTELLECTUAL TRAITS

The Hellenistic Age witnessed a reaction against metaphysics. Its
primary concern was ethical. No attempt was made to see life as a
unity and to investigate the entire structure of the cosmos. It was
an age in which an intense class struggle took place. The poor were
becoming poorer and the rich, especially at Alexandria and at
Rhodes, accumulated more money than ever before.

Of all the cities of the Hellenistic Age, Alexandria was especially
splendid. It had enormous zoological collections, a library with sev-
eral hundred thousand volumes, and a university to which scholars
came from all over the world. In Alexandria, noted scientists pur-
sued their labors. Among them we find Euclid, working in geome-
try; Eratosthenes, in geography; Apollonius, in physics and math-
ematics; and Ptolemy, who gave an authoritative formulation of the
geocentric hypothesis.

In this age science replaced metaphysical speculation. A positivistic
strain predominated. It led to an interest in quantitative measure-
ment and in functional application, and it discouraged a blind faith
on the part of the educated thinker. There was such a lively inter-
change of ideas that no orthodox opinion could last long; instead,
eclecticism became the vogue of the day.

To some extent, there was less creativity than before. While the
art of the Hellenic Age had been symbolized by gracefulness, re-

194 BEGINNING OF HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

straint, and good taste, Hellenistic art became increasingly more or-
nate, more bombastic, and more gigantic. Artists were patronized
now by wealthy men who wanted to display their possessions and
were more interested in impressing their friends than in exhibiting
good taste.

In vain do we look for dramatists of the caliber of Aeschylus,
Sophocles, or Euripides. The primary interest of this period was
comedy. Thus Alenander specialized in domestic situations and
avoided difficult cosmic themes. In Hellenic drama, man's relation-
ship with the gods had been foremost. In the Hellenistic Age, how-
ever, there was a predominance of comic situations, and the
dramatist was primarily concerned with entertaining his audience.

In summarizing, what were the intellectual trends which charac-
terize the Hellenistic Age?
(i) A division between philosophy and the sciences took place;
learning, as in the 20th century, became increasingly spe-
cialized.

(2) There was a departure from pure speculation, and there was a
concentration on application. More interest was shown in me-
chanical inventions than was shown in the Hellenic Age.

(3) Athens lost its monopoly in learning, and we find new in-
tellectual centers such as Antioch, Rhodes, Pergamum, and
Alexandria.

(4) Philosophy was popularized, attracting a wider audience.
There was a tendency on the part of the teacher to ignore the
difficult problems of metaphysics and instead to dwell on so-
cial problems.

(5) Ethics became the dominant subject of philosophical inquiry.
Now the main problem was how man could best achieve a
satisfactory life; philosophers were less interested in cos-
mology than in moral salvation.

(6) The spirit of Hellenistic philosophy was eclectic. Attempts
were made to synthesize and harmonize conflicting view-
points. These attempts frequently symbolized a lack of in-
tellectual originality.

(7) There arose a host of philosophical scholars who were mainly
interested in research and had no independent theories of their
own. Their principal interest was academic; as commentators
they frequently dwelt on minor and insignificant points of
interpretation.

(8) Extremes emerged in the intellectual life of the Hellenistic

THE MEGARIC SCHOOL AND CYNICISM 195

Age. On the one hand, we find extreme superstition; on the
other hand, extreme skepticism. In ethics, we find proponents
of asceticism and hedonism.
(9) In this period philosophy was more closely associated with
religion than in the Hellenic Age. Many philosophers gave a
symbolic and allegorical explanation of religious phenomena.
Like the religious leaders, they frequently resorted to prose-
lyting methods.
(10) The perspective of philosophy and literature was narrowed.
Since conditions were so chaotic, immediate ends and immed-
iate ideals were regarded as most important. The present was
emphasized above all. Intellectual instability was just as evident
as it is in the 20th century. There was an unending succes-
sion of intellectual fads, all of which claimed to possess new
features, but in reaHty most of them merely borrowed from
the contributions of the past.

THE MEGARIC SCHOOL AND CYNICISM

Euclid of Alegara represents a mixture of Eleatic concepts and the
Socratic way of life. As a student of Socrates, he admired the Socratic
concept of virtue and felt that evil has no metaphysical reality.

Since he maintained that Being and thinking are one, monisTn is
the keynote to his philosophy. What appears as changing and tran-
sitory is purely illusory. The One and the Good were united by
Euclid. How he conceived of the One does not appear too clearly.
Occasionally he spoke of it in theistic terms and thus equated it
with a personal god; sometimes he regarded the One in impersonal
terms.

Among the disciples of Euclid's school we find Stilpo of Meg-
ara, who distinguished himself by skepticism in religion. He was
considered so subversive in religion that he was banished from
Athens. In his ethical ideals we find a strong trace of intellectualism.
The goal of hfe he regarded as emancipation from external goods.
The wise man, according to Stilpo, will cultivate his own inde-
pendence and not cherish the illusory values of the masses. Almost
Stoic in his philosophical life, he spoke of the virtue of apathy. In
his system we find the seeds of the system of Zeno, one of his pupils.

Related to the Megaric tendencies was the philosophy of Phaedo
of Elis. As an outstanding student of Socrates, Phaedo mainly re-
peated the views of his teacher, for he identified virtue with knowl-
edge and considered philosophy the best guide to a rational life.

196 BEGINNING OF HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Like many other thinkers of his age, he felt that society was in a
state of decay and that philosophy had an ethical function.

Menedemus of Eretria is a vague figure in ancient philosophy. He
left no writings, and thus it is impossible to give an exact account
of his teachings. But, it appears, he strongly attacked the supersti-
tions of the masses and believed in an emancipated way of life.
Hedonism seemed to him an inadequate philosophy, hence he urged
the cultivation of man's intellectual capacities.

The reaction against hedonism was represented most clearly by
the Cynic philosophers. They stressed the cultivation of virtue,
which they regarded as an absolute Good. They believed that so-
ciety was in a decadent state; that the only hope for man was to
cultivate his inner self. Their scientific interests were almost non-
existent. Like Rousseau, they thought scientific knowledge pre-
vents man from attaining true morality.

The Cynics made a vigorous attack on all social and civilizing in-
stitutions. Marriage they regarded as an evil which makes man de-
pendent on emotional security. They abhorred property, for it
creates inequaUty. They detested political organization, for it leads
to oppression and wars. They did not believe in nationalism, since
they beUeved that man is a universal citizen and thus cannot find
himself by membership in any one nation.

They objected to all external values. Those who believe in fame,
the Cynics concluded, are deluded, for it is of no lasting value. As
for wealth, it merely creates wickedness. Most of all, however, they
attacked man's reliance on pleasures, for hfe based on physical sen-
sations cannot lead to the cultivation of virtue. The Cynics were
moral athletes who tried to strengthen their souls in the same way
as an athlete builds up his body.

Intellectually, the Cynics were nominalists. Nominalism was
quite consistent with their view that all universal institutions are
bad and that the individual alone is the judge of his needs. No laws,
no commandments, no pre-established beliefs can coerce him.

Among the Cynic philosophers we find Antisthenes, c. 445-365
B.C., whose mother was a Thracian slave and who was constantly
ridiculed by Plato. He contradicted Plato, who believed in uni-
versal, for he felt that only individual facts are real. To him, Soc-
rates represented the Cynic view of life, and, like the latter, he was
interested primarily in virtue.

Another outstanding Cynic was Diogenes, who taught the Cynic
doctrines in a spectacular way. His father was a banker, but Diog-

CYRENAIC PHILOSOPHERS 197

enes had no respect for wealth. His adult years were spent in Athens
and Corinth, where he became one of the noted citizens. His
ideal was the life of animals, because it is completely free of human
follies.

One of his pupils was Crates of Thebes, who was extremely
wealthy but so impressed by the Cynic ideal of life that he devoted
himself to a life of poverty. He represented a very warm and hu-
man aspect of the Cynic school and in his teachings exemplified the
rule of compassion.

CYRENAIC PHILOSOPHERS

Quite different from the Cynic philosophers were the Cyrenaic
thinkers. They believed in pleasure rather than narrow independ-
ence, and most of them were men of the world who abhorred the
antisocial activities of the Cynics.

What are the main features of the Cyrenaic philosophy? First,
individualism. The individual, according to the Cyrenaics, is the
Judge of what things are really pleasant. They were even more
nominalistic than their Cynic opponents and thus reacted strongly
against Plato's emphasis on universals.

Second, most of them emphasized that the only real pleasure is
bodily pleasure. It is foolish, they said, to neglect the body, which
can give us such great enjoyment.

Third, they did not believe in waiting for a future life or for
future fulfillment. Great pleasure can be obtained now, they
claimed; consequently they regarded the immediate pleasure as the
most significant.

Among the Cyrenaic philosophers we find certain variations in
doctrine. Aristippus, the founder of the school, was a student of
Socrates. Cosmopolitan and urbane, Aristippus enjoyed all the
pleasures of civilization. He knew how to handle the tyrants of his
time, and he did not hesitate to inflate their ego if flattery served
his purpose. Since he never believed in saving money, he used it to
buy himself fashionable clothes and expensive food, and to enjoy
the companionship of a variety of women. His view of philosophy
was quite simple. To him philosophy was not the study of reality
nor a subject dealing with immaterial truth, but merely a branch of
learning which best teaches us how to enjoy ourselves.

Among Aristippus' students we find Theodorus, who was re-
garded as an atheist, for he believed religion is of no real value. He
specialized in teaching the importance of prudence and expediency.

198 BEGINNING OF HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Hegesias represents a Schopenhauerian conclusion to Cyrenai-
cism. Realizing that in life we are exposed to a thousand frustrations,
he stated that the best attitude is one of complete pessimism. The
multitude beUeves in happiness, yet, Hegesias thought, such a condi-
tion can never be reached. He was a popular lecturer at Alexandria,
but his pessimistic teachings were taken too literally and many of
his listeners committed suicide. Finally the ruler of Egypt pro-
hibited him from continuing these lectures.

THE ACADEMY

After the death of Plato, his school of philosophy was continued by
his followers, but it lacked philosophical vitality.^ Conventionally,
the Platonic school is divided into three periods. The first is the
period of the Old Academy, which lasted from 347 B.C. to 250 b.c.
In this period we find several noteworthy philosophers.

First there was Speusippus, who interpreted the doctrine of Ideas
according to the theory of numbers. He was Httle interested in the
natural sciences, and his philosophy was dominated by the Pythag-
orean spirit.

Then came Xenocrates, who developed a theory of dualism. He
believed in an evil world-soul and thought there were intermediaries
between the divine and the material world. In this doctrine he in-
fluenced the development of Neo-Platonism.

Heraclides of Pontus, more learned than Xenocrates, was inter-
ested in the physical sciences and made several contributions to
astronomy.

Philip of Opus, according to some critics, was the author of Epi-
noinis. As the editor of Plato's Laws, he was interested in academic
scholarship. In his system he stressed the evil world-soul and ac-
cepted the existence of demons. He looked upon human existence
from a pessimistic viewpoint.

The period of the Old Academy closes with Crates and Crantor,
who both specialized in the consideration of ethical ideals.

The iMiddle Academy was distinguished by a skeptical spirit. Its
main representatives were Arcesilaus and Carneades, who both be-
heved there is no absolute truth and so were guided by the standard
of probability. Their contributions will be discussed in detail in
the chapter on Skepticism.

^ Cf. Stein, Sieben Biicher zur Gescbichte des Platonimius; Ueberweg, Gnind-
riss der Gescbichte der Philosophie, vol. i : Zeller, Outlines of the history of
Greek philosophy; Leisegang, Hellenistische Philosophie.

THE PERIPATETICS i99

The New Academy abandoned the skepticism of these two philo-
sophers and was more faithful to the theory of Plato. Among the
thinkers of the New Academy we find Philo of Larissa and Antio-
chus of Ascalon, who combined Platonism with Stoic elements.
Both leaned in the direction of an eclectic philosophy, especially
Antiochus, who tried to harmonize conflicting viewpoints and show
that the great thinkers had agreed on many essential points.

ARISTOTLE'S FOLLOWERS-T H E
PERIPATETICS

The school of Aristotle, like that of Plato, experienced a great decline
after the death of its founder.^ The immediate follower of Aristotle
was Theophrastus, who was head of the Lyceum for over thirty-five
years. Encyclopedic, like his master, he was especially interested in
the science of botany. In his works, especially in his Ethical charac-
ters, he displays a secular spirit. He was penetrating in his denuncia-
tion of superstition:

"Superstition would seem to be simply cowardice in regard to
the supernatural.

"The superstitious man is one who will wash his hands at a foun-
tain, sprinkle himself from a temple font, put a bit of laurel leaf into
his mouth, and so go about for the day. If a weasel runs across his
path, he will not pursue his walk until someone else has traversed
the road, or until he has thrown three stones across it. . . . He will
pour oil from his flask on the smooth stones at the crossroads, as he
goes by, and will fall on his knees and worship them before he
departs. If a mouse gnaws through a mealbag, he will go to the ex-
pounder of sacred law and ask what is to be done; and, if the answer
is, 'give it to a cobbler to stitch up,' he will disregard this counsel,
and go his way, and expiate the omen by sacrifice. He is apt, also, to
purify his house frequently, alleging that Hecate has been brought
into it by spells: and, if an owl is startled by him in his walk, he will
exclaim 'Glory be to Athene!' before he proceeds. He will not tread
upon a tombstone, or come near a dead body or a woman defiled by
childbirth, saying that it is expedient for him not to be polluted. . . .
When he has seen a vision, he will go to the interpreters of dreams,
the seers, the augurs, to ask them to what god or goddess he ought
to pray. Every month he will repair to the priests of the Orphic
Mysteries, to partake in their rites, accompanied by his wife, or (if

2 Cf. Lyngg, Die Peripatetische Schiile; Windelband, History of ancient phi-
losophy; Shute, History of the Aristotelian writings.

200 BEGINNING OF HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

she is too busy) by his children and their nurse. He would seem, too,
to be of those who are scrupulous in sprinkling themselves with sea-
water; and, if ever he observes anyone feasting on the garlic at the
crossroads, he will go away, pour water over his head, and, summon-
ing the priestesses, bid them carry a squill or a puppy round him for
purification. And, if he sees a maniac or an epileptic man, he will
shudder and spit into his bosom."^

Of Eudemus of Rhodes we know very little. In his philosophy he
exhibited little originality and followed closely the teachings of Aris-
totle.

Aristoxenus of Tarentum tried to combine AristoteHan philos-
ophy with that of Pythagoras. He elaborated, especially, upon the
theory of musical numbers and improved the concept of harmony
fundamental in Aristotle's system. He denied the immortahty of the
soul.

Strato of Lampsacus, unlike Aristoxenus, was primarily interested
in the study of nature. His approach to science was mechanistic,
and he neglected the teleological concepts of Aristotle.

Demetrius of Phalerus, who turned to history, was eclectic in his
philosophy. His interests were mainly scholarly, and he collected
the opinions of his predecessors. He industriously promoted the
scientific work at Alexandria.

The later Peripatetics included Andronicus of Rhodes, who was
an editor of the works of Aristotle and particularly interested in the
latter's pedagogical writings. He achieved a high standard of scholar-
ship in his critical study of Aristotelian source material. His spirit
was naturalistic, and we find the same tendency in his pupil, Boethus
of Sidon.

Aristocles of Messana approached Stoic thinking by his concept
of the divine mind, the principle of reality which is the source of all
truth and all values. We find a pantheistic strain in his philosophy,
a divergence from the views of Aristotle.

Alexander of Aphrodisias was more scientific in his approach to
philosophy. He denied the immortality of the soul and did not
accept the concept of teleology. In his epistemology he emphasized
nominalism and maintained that universals exist only in our minds.

In the 6th century a.d., Philoponus and Simphcius did much criti-
cal work in interpreting the meaning of Aristotelian philosophy.
Both asserted that Aristotle identified the individual soul with the
active reason.

3 Characteres, xxviii (xvi), Webster, Historical selections, pp. 323-324.

THE PERIPATETICS 201

With all these philosophers speculative thinking was secondary;
their main interest lay in collecting the opinions of their predeces-
sors. It can be seen that the school of Aristotle failed to maintain a
high standard of philosophical investigation. As time progressed, it
attracted second-rate scholars who lacked originaUty and indepen-
dence in their opinions.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What were the social currents which produced Hellenistic civiliza-
tion?

2. Explain the significance of the Megarics.

3. Discuss the ethical views of the Cynics,

4. Why did the Cynics object to convention?

5. Who were the leaders of the Cynic movement?

6. How did the Cynics view the problem of universals?

7. Compare the Cyrenaics with the Cynics.

8. Who were the leaders of the Cyrenaics?

9. What did Aristippus say regarding pleasure?

10. What are the weaknesses of Cyrenaic philosophy?

11. Trace the development of Platonic philosophy.

12. Describe the progress of Aristotelian philosophy.

THE CHALLENGE OF
EPICUREANISM

THE SOURCES

Th,

he philosophy of Epicureanism was developed under the impact
of a variety of sources. This statement does not imply that it was
not an original movement and that it merely borrowed, for, on the
contrary, Epicureanism represents one of the highlights of ancient
philosophy.

Especially influential in the development of Epicureanism were
the Atomists. In fact, the Atomic philosophy served as the founda-
tion of Epicurus' writings. As we remember, Democritus had devel-
oped a system based on a mechanical interpretation of the universe.
Refusing to accept any type of spiritual foundation, he did not
accept the concepts of immortality, a spiritual soul, or divine Provi-
dence. To some extent he scandalized the Greek mind by the doctrine
of the void and the reduction of everything in the universe to the
movement of atoms.

The more we study the system of the Atomists, the more we
realize how modern it is. It contains no trace of supernaturalism. It

202

THE SOURCES 203

is not concerned with abstruse explanations; rather, it gives a simple
and consistent explanation of the basic structure of the universe.

Ethically, also, the philosophy of Democritus is significant. It re-
gards pleasure as the great goal, not a physical type of enjoyment
but, rather, intellectual stimulation. It speaks of the wise man who
sees through the shallow occupations of mankind and lives a truly
meaningful life. Upholding the ideal of cheerfulness, it is a philos-
ophy which abhors asceticism and mortification of the flesh.

Besides the system of the Atomists, the Sophist philosophy had an
impact on Epicureanism, but the influence of the Sophists was more
indirect and less pronounced than that of the Atomists. The Sophists
beHeved in sensation as the standard of knowledge, and they turned
against religious absolutism. So, too, did the Epicureans, but they
were more interested in science than were the Sophists. Furthermore,
the Epicureans placed less emphasis upon the relativity of knowl-
edge. Still, it must be remembered that the Epicureans, like the
Sophists, did not beUeve in rationalism and that their standard of
truth was likewise severely empirical.

The most immediate influence on Epicurean philosophy came
through the Cyrenaics, who were frank and consistent in their belief
that pleasure is the goal of life. They deliberately ignored any phi-
losophy which stresses virtue as an end in itself and regards hfe as a
pilgrimage and a valley of tears. They taught that life is to be en-
joyed to the utmost; and, as we have seen, they believed particularly
in bodily pleasures. Good food, elegant clothing, luxurious homes,
abundance of wealth— these were the Goods which were most
desired by this group of thinkers.

Intellectually, however, the Cyrenaic movement was handicapped
by its extreme nominalism and lack of scientific knowledge. It never
worked out a complex system of metaphysics which could substan-
tiate its ethical system. In short, it was a rather superficial theory of
life, which had little appeal to man's esthetic and spiritual capacities.

The irony is that Epicureanism has often been interpreted accord-
ing to the tenets of Cyrenaicism. Constantly we hear charges that
Epicureanism is a philosophy which degrades man and reduces him
to his physiological drives. But we must be conscious of the enor-
mous differences between the two movements. Epicureanism is far
more intellectual, far more systematized, and far more complicated
than the Cyrenaic philosophy. Its system of ethics is founded on
scientific ideals; we can almost speak of a religion of science in Epi-
cureanism.

204 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

To appreciate the sources of the Epicurean movement we must
also understand the social currents responsible for its development.
Representing a bitter opposition to the popular concepts of religion,
it was a protest against all forms of superstition. We must remember
that in Hellenistic times the purity of Greek religion had disinte-
grated. The Mediterranean world accepted all kinds of deities;
revival preachers had huge audiences, and the ignorant were only
too eager to believe in miracles.

To the Epicureans such an attitude was not worthy of the human
being. They realized that if it triumphed there could be no rational
philosophy, no naturalistic art, and no intellectual culture. Thus,
they regarded themselves as emancipators and were vigorous in their
struggle against obscurantism and intellectual regression.

EPICURUS

We have few facts regarding the career of Epicurus. He was born c.
341 B.C. on the island of Samos, where his father had gone as an
Athenian colonist. His father was a schoolteacher, and from him he
learned the rudiments of education. We are told that his mother was
a seller of charms and holy relics and that Epicurus helped her in
her profession. We do not know if the story is true, but if it is, it
explains why Epicurus felt such hatred for popular religion.

In 323 we find Epicurus in Athens, where he obtained mihtary
training and took part in the political aff^airs of the community. In
this period he met the poet Menander. This was probably a very
formative stage in his philosophical development. Athenian philos-
ophy was already experiencing a twilight, and only second-rate
figures were teaching in the Lyceum. No wonder that Epicurus had
contempt for many of the philosophers! He satirized both Plato
and Aristotle, and he called Heraclitus a "confusion-maker."

Shortly after 323 b.c. Epicurus left Athens and traveled widely.
He became a teacher of philosophy and in 310 established a school
of philosophy at Mitylene. Yet he was homesick for Athens; hence,
four years later, he moved back to that city, which then became
the center of his activity.

In Athens Epicurus explained his philosophy in a garden which
has become extremely famous in the history of philosophy. His
teaching was informal, and not only free men but women and slaves
were allowed to attend. Epicurus must have made an unusual im-
pression on his hearers, for they all testify to his intellectual strength,
sharp wit, and convincing arguments. He never married, since he

EPICURUS' THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 205

thought that a wife would interfere with his philosophy. Besides, he
had too much faith in friendship and too little faith in love. But he
was a man with tender human feelings. The letters which have been
preserved show his unflagging interest in the affairs of his students.
When one of his disciples died and left a son and a daughter, Epi-
curus took care of their education and in his will provided for them.

Throughout his life he was an industrious writer. Over three hun-
dred treatises are ascribed to him. His great book On nature was
written in thirty-seven volumes. Unfortunately we have only a few
fragments of his work. In his style Epicurus was less elegant than
Plato. While he lacked poetic imagination, his clarity is admirable.
He expressed himself in a comprehensive and succinct manner.

In his later years Epicurus suffered greatly from ill health. He had
never been strong; even as a young boy he had endured a variety of
diseases. As he grew older, gout and indigestion plagued him; but
he never lost his cheerfulness. On the last day of his life he wrote a
letter to one of his disciples, in which he described his pain and the
weariness of his tortured body, but his spirit was still the same as he
recalled a past conversation they had enjoyed.

Thus, it can be seen, Epicurus was sincere in his beliefs, and his
philosophy was not merely a theory of life but a way of action. Liv-
ing frugally, he despised luxuries. He had no desire to reform the
world, and he was not interested in creating social Utopias but was
satisfied in searching for the meaning of existence, in teaching real
wisdom, and in living a tranquil life.

EPICURUS' THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The starting point of Epicurus' epistemology is his belief in sensa-
tion. Unlike Plato, he thought the senses trustworthy. Illusion is not
derived from them, he wrote, but rather from our inabiHty to inter-
pret them correctly. But, it may be objected, the senses often present
us with a false picture of reality. For example, the senses do not indi-
cate that the earth moves nor do they tell us anything about the
relativity of time and space. Epicurus, however, said we should not
blame the senses but our own hasty interpretation of them. Since he
believed in perception as a vaUd guide in intellectual knowledge, his
system is thoroughly empirical. With this attitude he could not
accept a priori truths and vague generalizations. Knowledge, he

taught, does not Hpnp.nH so rn^^fh n^ fp-- — r" — ^^-^^^ J P^: —

Like modern scientists, he urged tentative evaluations and tentative
conclusions.

2o6 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

The question arises, How do we know the external world exists?
How can we be certain that Nature is not merely a realm of illusion?
Epicurus answered, we can rely on sensations which tell us that phe-
nomena exist. Furthermore, we can be certain that the feelings
which we experience subjectively are not part of illusion but do
have reality. Notice how the standpoint of Epicurus differs from
that of Plato. There is no dualism between reason and sensation in
Epicurus. Nor is there an opposition between the world of change
and the world of the Forms. While Plato believed in reason as the
standard of truth, Epicurus believed in sense experience. He felt that
without sense knowledge there would be complete uncertainty and
confusion. For the sake of argument let us state that sense knowl-
edge is not trustworthy. What can we choose as a standard? Reason?
But reason depends on sense experience, Epicurus would say. Intui-
tion? This capacity likewise depends on perception.

"If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard
to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judg-
ments which you pronounce false.

"If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to
discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between
matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sen-
sation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind,
you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by
your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of
truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily
affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does
not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete
ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong
opinion."^

Another problem arises. How can we arrive at a general concept?
How can we establish scientific knowledge? Epicurus answered that
sense impressions are repeated, and this repetition develops general
notions which are the foundations of our opinions. Truth then im-
plies a correspondence between our opinion and the processes of the
external world, while error stands for an invalid interpretation of
phenomena.

Is reason autonomous? Can reason develop without sense percep-
tion? Epicurus answered in the negative, for he thought the tests of
reason must be checked by experience and sense knowledge.

1 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eininent philosophers, ii, Bk. x. Hicks' translation
(Loeb classical library series), 146-147.

EPICURUS' THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 207

Another problem arises. The skeptic will say that the Epicurean
system rests on facts which we do not perceive; for example, the
atoms are invisible. How do we know they exist? Epicurus repHed
that in this case we must rely on analogy, on indirect verification,
for sensation can establish ?iothing which would disprove the exist-
ence of the atoms.

To explain the process of sensation Epicurus spoke of films which
are emitted by the objects of sense:

"Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as
solid bodies, but of a thinness far exceeding that of any object we
see. For it is not impossible that there should be found in the sur-
rounding air combinations of this kind, materials adapted for ex-
pressing the hollowness and thinness of surfaces, and efiluxes pre-
serving the same relative position and motion which they had in the
solid objects from which they come. To these films we give the
name of 'images' or 'idols.' Furthermore, so long as nothing comes
in the way to oflrer resistance, motion through the void accomplishes
any imaginable distance in an inconceivably short time. For resist-
ance encountered is the equivalent of slowness, its absence the equiv-
alent of speed.

". . . The exceeding thinness of the images is contradicted by none
of the facts under our observation. Hence also their velocities are
enormous, since they always find a void passage to fit them. Besides,
their incessant effluence meets with no resistance, or very little, al-
though many atoms, not to say an unlimited number, do at once
encounter resistance."^

Epicurus also discussed the production of these images. Appar-
ently they are formed with great rapidity. "For particles are con-
tinually streaming off from the surface of bodies, though no dimi-
nution of the bodies is observed, because other particles take their
place. And those given off for a long time retain the position and
arrangement which their atoms had when they formed part of the
soHd bodies, although occasionally they are thrown into confusion.
Sometimes such films are formed very rapidly in the air, because
they need not have any solid content; and there are other modes in
which they may be formed. For there is nothing in all this which is
contradicted by sensation, if we in some sort look at the clear evi-
dence of sense, to which we should also refer the continuity of par-
ticles in the objects external to ourselves."^

2 Ibid., 46-47.

3 Ibid., 48.

2o8 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

As is clear, we do not see the object directly, but only its images.
The optical process thus is indirect. We are not in immediate con-
tact with the objects of the external world, for we see only reflec-
tions of them. Still, our knowledge is reliable, just as we can trust
that a portrait is a copy of the original man which it is designed to
describe. "We must also consider that it is by the entrance of some-
thing coming from external objects that we see their shapes and
think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own
nature of color and form through the medium of the air which is
between them and us, or by means of rays of light or currents of
any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our
eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films
coming from the things themselves, these films or outHnes being of
the same color and shape as the external things themselves. They
move with rapid motion; and this again explains why they present
the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mu-
tual interconnection which they had in the object, when they
impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation
of the atoms in the interior of the soHd object from which they
come."'*

Epicurus made it clear that falsehood and error depend upon hasty
opinion. In the process of inference we must not jump to conclu-
sions, and we must be patient in trying to confirm facts. Further-
more, we must understand the exact nature of the original percep-
tion. Very often we arrive at false conclusions because we do not
interpret this original perception correctly. Also, feelings within
ourselves tend to distort the picture of reahty. In a word, the wise
man will be careful in reducing his knowledge to the original sense
perception and in constantly checking the inferences by which he
has arrived at a certain conclusion.

THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

It is interesting to note that Epicurus rejected the training which
was offered in the schools of philosophy. The Platonic Academy,
we remember, recommended especially mathematics, but Epicurus
had little use for this subject. Logic, which had been cherished by
Aristotle, he likewise disregarded. In fact, for deductive logic Epi-
curus had profound contempt. He thought that too much preoccu-
pation with logic would lead to false pretensions and give the mind
an exaggerated power of its own range. Thought, he asserted, should
* Ibid., 49-50.

THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY 209

be applied; and its object must be the external world, not abstruse
propositions.

Thus Epicurus demanded less of his students than did either Plato
or Aristotle. He was satisfied if his disciples knew the fundamentals
of their letters and had open and acquisitive minds.

As for rhetoric, which the Sophists had emphasized, Epicurus said
this might be excellent training for politicians but is of little value
for philosophers. The study of literature, which was part of the
standard Athenian curriculum, he likewise viewed lightly. It only
clutters up the mind with useless details, he decided, and leads to a
pedantic attitude which worries more about the grammar of Homer
than the correct way of life.

Thus it can be seen that Epicurus thought philosophy mainly an
ethical study. He included physical science in it, not because he had
an overwhelming curiosity regarding the nature of the universe but
because physical science is a valuable aid in emancipating us from
ancient superstitions and fears.

The study of philosophy was an immensely practical matter to
Epicurus. It is not to be delayed until a man is very old, for it is
worth while both for the young and for those advanced in age: "Let
no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the
search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too
late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for study-
ing philosophy has not come, or that it is past and gone, is like say-
ing that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more.
Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former
in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good
things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order
that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he
has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise
ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be pres-
ent, we have everything, and if that be absent, all our actions are
directed toward attaining it."^

The more we advance in philosophy, Epicurus taught, the more
we are able to confront life with tranquillity. True knowledge liber-
ates, widens our perspective, and leads to a genuine appreciation of
the universe. True knowledge, however, cannot be gained merely
through quantitative studies and pedantic scholarship; rather, it
depends upon the cultivation of a serene attitude through which
the pains of life and the reverses of our existence can be overcome.

5 Ibid., 122.

2IO THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

EPICURUS' THEORY OF REALITY

The foundation of the metaphysical system of Epicurus was the
system of Democritus but, unHke the latter, Epicurus used the
Atomic theory to bolster up his ethics. His scientific procHvities
thus were subordinated to his moral interests. The starting point of
Epicurus is materialistic. Nothing is created out of the non-existent;
this theory denies spontaneous generation. He affirmed that matter
always exists and we can understand phenomena only by learning
their natural causes.

Did Epicurus teach that matter can decrease? The answer is in
the negative. We cannot speak of destruction in the universe, said
he; elements merely change their composition. Thus the content of
the world remains the same; it is a self-existent and autonomous
whole. This view invalidates any belief in a spiritual creator. Epi-
curus thought that we need no external force to account for the
structure of the universe, for it is not subject to generation or decay
and its processes can be understood through science, not through
theological ideals.

The two basic realities of Epicurus' system are atoms and motion.
Atoms he described as being indivisible, unchangeable, and com-
pletely compact. They have three quahties— size, shape, and weight.

Note that Epicurus did not consider the secondary qualities of
the atoms to be real; hence they do not possess color or taste. These
qualities we attribute to them because of our own interpretation.
"Moreover, we must hold that the atoms in fact possess none of the
qualities belonging to things which come under our observation,
except shape, weight, and size, and the properties necessarily con-
joined with shape. For every quality changes, but the atoms do not
change, since, when the composite bodies are dissolved, there must
needs be a permanent something, solid and indissoluble, left behind,
which makes change possible; not changes into or from the non-
existent, but often through differences of arrangement, and some-
times through additions and subtractions of the atoms. Hence these
somethings capable of being diversely arranged must be indestructi-
ble, exempt from change, but possessed each of its own distinctive
mass and configuration. This must remain.

"For in the case of changes of configuration within our expe-
rience the figure is supposed to be inherent when other qualities are
stripped ofi^, but the qualities are not supposed, hke the shape which
is left behind, to inhere in the subject of change, but to vanish alto-

EPICURUS' THEORY OF REALITY 211

gether from the body. Thus then, what is left behind is sufficient to
account for the differences in composite bodies, since something at
least must necessarily be left remaining and be immune from anni-
hilation."^

It is important to note that Epicurus emphasized the existence of
the void. Each atom, he thought, is separated from the rest by empty
space, and both atoms and space always exist. He maintained that
the sum of things in the universe is infinite. "Again, the sum of things
is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of
anything is discerned only by comparison with something else.
(Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with any-
thing else:) hence, since it has no extremity it has no limit, it must
be unlimited or infinite.

"Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the
multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void. For if the void
were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed
anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through
the infinite void, not having any supports or counterchecks to send
them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite,
the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be."^

All changes in the universe are due to the atoms, which are in
continual motion. "Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in
them— out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are
dissolved— vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of
things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a
definite number of the same shapes.

". . . The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. . . .
Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other,
while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have
got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for
entangling."^

The important feature of the metaphysical system of Epicurus is
his behef that the atoms have free will. As they are moving around
in the world, they swerve from their paths. Their motion causes a
collision. As a result of this collision compounds arise, and definite
world systems are born. In this theory Epicurus differed markedly
from Democritus, who beHeved everything to be governed by
necessity. At first glance it makes the Epicurean system inconsistent.

6 Ibid., 54-55.
'^ Ibid., 41-42.
8/^/^., 42-43.

212 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

In fact, many ancient commentators, especially Cicero, thought it
almost invalidated its basic presuppositions.

But, it must be remembered, Epicurus did not believe in absolute
necessity, for if we accept such determinism there can be no place
for moral teachings. To make the matter clear let us imagine that a
predetermined path governs all our actions. Would this not result in
fatalism and in passive resignation to nature?

From a scientific standpoint, the swerving of the atoms proved to
be useful to Epicurus. He thought that the heavier atoms naturally
would fall at a more rapid rate than the lighter atoms. Now there
could be no contact between the two if we accept absolute deter-
minism; and no world system could arise. However, the swerving of
the atoms, undetermined by external necessity, shows why the
planets arose in the universe.

This stress on indeterminism has important implications. It indi-
cates that Epicurus refused to believe in an absolute system of sci-
ence. Not being willing to be bound by religious orthodoxy, he
likewise refused to accept a fatalistic physical science. Freedom to
him was real both in the cosmic structure and in the acts of the
individual. This view, strangely enough, has been verified by mod-
ern science. Heisenberg's theory of indeterminacy has almost an
Epicurean flavor, and it shows that mechanical causality is not valid
in the study of nuclear physics.

Epicurus also suggested by his doctrine that an infinite number of
worlds exist. In this view he was quite consistent, for it was based on
his belief in the infinity of atoms and the infinity of space. Some of
the worlds, he held, are unhke our own, while others resemble our
universe rather closely.

DOCTRINE OF RELIGION

It is a mistake to think of Epicurus as an atheist, for he maintained
that the gods exist but live far away and are unconcerned \\'ith
human destiny. In short, they are quite different from the orthodox
concept, which pictured them as being in constant contact with
man. He asserted that their form is everlasting but their material
contents transitory and composed of atoms which move in the void.
These atoms unite for a moment and then enter into other combina-
tions. They give off certain films or "idols" which are perceived by
human beings and which can be trusted when they tell us that gods
exist.

DOCTRINE OF RELIGION 213

Epicurus made it clear that the gods live a completely peaceful
life. They have no desires which cannot be fulfilled; they are not
exposed to the vicissitudes of suffering. In short, they exemplify the
aspirations and ideals of Epicureanism. His concept of religion, he
indicated, was quite different from that of the multitude.

"For verily there are gods, and the knowledge of them is mani-
fest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men
do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them.
Not the man who denies the gods worshiped by the multitude, but
he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them
is truly impious. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods
are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that
the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings
happen to the good from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are
always favorable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in
men like unto themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their
kind."9

How then are we to conceive of the gods? Epicurus beUeved we
must first of all get away from the view that the gods know emotion.
They are not touched by anger or wrath. They are completely
unlike Jehovah, for Epicurus thought emotion a sign of weakness
which certainly would disturb the peace of mind of the gods. In his
opinion, those who believe then that the gods will reward the vir-
tuous and punish the wicked are mistaken, for gods are not con-
cerned with human actions. They do not take part in human affairs;
such activity would detract from their majesty and self-sufficiency.
Hence it is useless to pray to the gods; they will not respond. In
other words, they are complete isolationists; but their lack of re-
sponse is not to be interpreted as a sign of their weakness but rather
as a sign of their perfection.

What happens, then, to orthodox religion? The answer of Epi-
curus is: It is usually based on fraud and deception, for it pictures a
universe in which the gods intervene and men try to please the gods.
The philosopher, however, will overcome this illusion and order his
actions, not according to vain beliefs but according to the precepts
of wisdom.

Epicurus felt that in replacing orthodoxy by this new concept of
life he actually had achieved a more pious perspective. Was this not
a faith based on freedom rather than on spiritual slavery? Was this
not worthy of a rational human being rather than a savage?

^ Ibid., 123-124.

214 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

He was so deeply impressed by the evils of conventional religion
that he constantly dwelt on them. So, too, did Lucretius, his great
Roman follower. If most prayers were answered, Epicurus noted,
they would only result in evil, for men constantly pray for their
neighbors to be punished. He reminded us that orthodox religion is
frequently based on barbarian rites which are cruel and sadistic in
their inhumanity.

The view of the gods which we find in Epicurus and Lucretius
makes teleology untenable. Lucretius, Hke Epicurus, showed that
this world is not perfect and that everywhere we can find weak-
nesses and flaws. Nature is forever our enemy. We struggle against
ferocious beasts, and frequently we are exposed to storms, earth-
quakes, and pestilences. Certainly these vicissitudes do not indicate
divine care. Furthermore, Lucretius demonstrated, the gods are per-
fectly happy. Why then should they create a world which can con-
tribute nothing to perfection? Incidentally, he thought it impossible
for them to have created a world out of nothing, because matter
cannot be created out of the non-existent.

Following their naturalistic assumptions, the Epicureans taught
that the soul is material. It is made up of four elements— heat, air,
vapor, and a fourth element which they called nameless. The last is
responsible for the intellectual functions of the soul. This distinction
between the rational and the irrational part of the soul is especially
marked in Lucretius. The rational part, he claimed, is located in the
breast while the irrational part, which is lower and less important, is
diffused throughout the body.

The question arises. How does the soul differ from other material
things? Is it a spiritual entity? Is it independent of the body? Epi-
curus did not think so. While he conceded that the soul is made up
of very fine and smooth atomic particles and lighter than the body,
it nevertheless perishes with the body. "Accustom thyself to believe
that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and
death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding
that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not
by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearn-
ing after immortality. . . . Foolish, therefore, is the man who says
that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but be-
cause it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance
when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation.
Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing
that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we

ETHICS 215

are not. It is nothing, then, either to the hving or to the dead, for
with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer. But in the
world, at one time men shun death as the greatest of all evils, and at
another time choose it as a respite from the evils in life. The wise
man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life."^*^
What matters then is not how long we live but how pleasant our
existence is. If we keep this idea in mind, death has no terrors. Those
who state that life has no value at all, that it is better not to be born,
are hypocrites. If they truly believe this, why do they not commit
suicide? If they say it without sincerity, their words are not to be
taken seriously.

ETHICS

In Epicurus' system of ethics, as in his scientific concepts, naturalism
prevails. Thus the basis of his ethical concept is not an absolute ideal
but concrete observation. He called pleasure the beginning and end
of life: it becomes the standard for the good and the criterion for
men's actions. This concept, however, does not include bodily pleas-
ures, for we observe that frequently they cause only pain. For exam-
ple, if we eat too much, indigestion results. If we seek too much
sensual pleasure, we are in a state of weakness and fatigue and ulti-
mately experience satiation. Furthermore, if we seek bodily pleas-
ures too intently, we will constantly be agitated. Our minds will be
restless, forever seeking more stimulations without being able to
achieve contentment. But this is not the way of the wise man who
cherishes tranquillity, repose, and serenity— a condition which Epi-
curus called ataraxia.

The end of our actions is freedom from pain and fear. Such free-
dom indicates the end of our moral search. No longer are we ex-
posed to emotional tempests and to the changing moods of fortune.

It must be realized that Epicurus based his conclusions on his
study of the psychology of desires. The more we multiply our de-
sires, he thought, the less likely we are to find repose and tranquil-
lity. We must concentrate on those desires which are necessary and
essential for our well-being. As for those which are admired by the
crowd, they are purely superfluous and we can neglect them. In
other words, not all pleasure is to be chosen just as not all pain is
to be averted:

"It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking
at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must

'^^Ibid., 124-126.

2i6 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on
the contrary, as a good. Again, we regard independence of outward
things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to
be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly per-
suaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand
least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and
only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much
pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been re-
moved, while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure
when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one's self, there-
fore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for
health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life
without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we
approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of for-
tune."ii

Epicurus was succinct in describing the meaning of pleasure. It is
not to be thought of as prodigahty or as wild dissipation. "By pleas-
ure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the
soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of rev-
elry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other deli-
cacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life, it is a sober
reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance,
and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take
possession of the soul. Of all this the beginning and the greatest good
is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than
philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches that
we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a Hfe of prudence,
honor, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honor, and justice,
which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into
one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them."^^

To accomplish the goal of his moral ideals, Epicurus attacked the
values of the multitude; he especially condemned avarice. Great
wealth, he showed, frequently brings about not tranquillity but rest-
lessness. We believe that money will solve our problems only to find
out that they have been multiplied. The same holds true of honor
and power. We think we are secure when we achieve a high position
in life; but the opposite is true, for power is unstable. We are ad-
mired one day and hated the next. We have friends if we can give
them something they want, and we are friendless if we lose our hold

11 Ibid., 130-131.

12 Ibid., 1 31-13 2.

ETHICS 217

on power. Moreover, such power creates envy, which is the cause of
much anxiety.

Above all, Epicurus taught, we must not be guided by our fears;
if we are, we will be completely unstable. We will forever worry
and fret and wait for imaginary disasters. We must neither be
afraid of the gods nor worry about what happens to us when we die,
for science teaches us that death is the extinction of consciousness
and that the gods do not concern themselves with human destiny.

In his view that anxiety is the cause of most of our troubles, Epi-
curus sounds strikingly modern. To overcome anxiety, he beheved,
education is necessary. Hence it is the task of philosophy to coun-
teract the ills of the mind and to give us a sense of intellectual sta-
bility. Such stability, Epicurus maintained, cannot be found in an
active social Hfe. The wise man thus will not take part in pohtical
affairs; he will not try to reform the existing governments. Rather,
he will cultivate his own capacities and cherish his own happiness.

To achieve this painless existence Epicurus advocated, above all,
friendship. Marriage, he thought, involves too many tempests, too
many storms, and too many uncertainties; it creates ties and leads
to emotional serfdom. Friendship, on the other hand, being less pos-
sessive and less intimate, in his opinion leads to true tranquillity. Evi-
dently Epicurus followed his own precepts for the good life, for he
never married.

His discussion of the various virtues is extremely realistic. He did
not idealize justice; rather, he found its source in expediency. The
state, he held, is the result of a compact between subjects and rulers
whereby both profit. Right and wrong are determined by laws, not
by ideal standards, as Plato had imagined. We cannot speak, accord-
ingly, of an ideal Utopia or of ideal beauty or ideal justice or ideal
truth. Rather, in evaluating moral acts we must look at the conse-
quences.

Why does the wise man obey the laws? Why does he subordinate
himself to political authority? The Epicureans believed that he does
so because of self-interest, for he will then have more intellectual
tranquillity. He will sleep well at night, while those who evade the
laws and commit acts of injustice will suffer in fear of being
detected.

It is true that this is not an idealistic view when measured by
Platonic standards, but, it must be remembered, the Epicureans were
interested in describing society as they saw it, not in picturing ideal
standards. Like the Sophists, they noted that there are no absolute

2i8 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

institutions— all are relative. They applied this concept to interna-
tional law, in which field they showed that various types of justice
prevail. For example, there is one type of justice which prevails be-
tween equally strong nations and another type of justice which exists
between a strong and a weak nation. This theory almost anticipates
Hobbes, who likewise stressed realism in international politics.

The cHmax of the moral system of Epicurus is his belief that the
most important pleasures are those of the mind. The mind has the
power of reflection and can contemplate life as a whole. It can reflect
upon the pleasant occurrences of the past as well as the happy things
which it may expect in the future. Furthermore, it can triumph over
bodily infirmity. Even when sick and plagued by disease, we can
have a cheerful perspective on life through mental concentration.

At the same time, Epicurus taught, the mind can suffer more in-
tense pains than can the body. Modern psychology with its concept
of neuroses and psychoses verifies his viewpoint. We must cultivate
the resources of our mind so that we may not suff^er from pain but
lead a tranquil existence.

Life, it may be said in objection, often presents us with situations
in which the pleasure element is not dominant. Imagine that we are
suffering from cancer and are in great pain. Can we still accept Epi-
curean standards? Epicurus would answer in the affirmative, for
pain, he felt, cannot last very long and, at any rate, acute suffering
persists for only a short period. We can always endure it by the
thought of the happiness which is still obtainable. To revert to our
case of cancer, even under the suffering it imposes we can use our
intellectual resources. And if the pain lasts very long, we will be
released by death, which should not be dreaded but regarded as a
natural event.

The teaching of Epicurus may appear rather impractical, yet he
lived up to his own ideals. Throughout his life he disregarded his
frail condition and never let pain conquer him. It takes a vast amount
of endurance and strength to cherish such a philosophy, and cer-
tainly Epicurus possessed these virtues.

Epicurus spoke about the ideal man, who follows these teachings.
Such a man understands the nature of the universe: "He has dili-
gently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how
easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how
either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. Destiny,
which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to
scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others

LUCRETIUS 219

by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that neces-
sity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant;
whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and
blame naturally attach. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends
of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny which the
natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint
hope that we may escape if we honor the gods, while the necessity
of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to
be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there
is no disorder. . . . He believes that the misfortune of the wise is
better than the prosperity of the fool."^^

Such a way of hfe is not out of our reach. Although occasionally
we may be overcome by certain pains, we can still attain a tranquil
existence. This is a philosophy not just for the professional thinker
but for the multitude. It is not a Utopia for the future but a theory
which can be followed in the present.

Thus it can be understood why the Epicureans were so vigorous
in their beliefs and why they had a strong sense of mission. They
wanted to lighten the burden of humanity, to remove the evils of
supernaturalism and blind faith, and instead preach a way of life
leading to true peace of mind.

LUCRETIUS

We know almost nothing about the Hfe of Lucretius (c. 98-55 b.c),
who gave the most poetic expression to Epicureanism. We are told
that he suffered from periodic fits of insanity and finally committed
suicide. Still, he cherished the ideal of reason which Epicurus re-
garded as the main source of happiness.

The period in which Lucretius lived was extremely stormy. The
civil war between A4arius and Sulla, Spartacus' insurrection, and the
rise to power of Julius Caesar— all these events showed how com-
pletely unstable the political life was. Fortune could not be relied
upon. This fact explains why Lucretius sought refuge in a philoso-
phy of tranquillity and serenity.

The thoughts of Lucretius are expressed in the De rermn natiira,
which almost rivals the Divme comedy in philosophic insight and
imaginativeness. But Lucretius, unlike Dante, took science as his
guide and had no patience with the explanations of religion. Even
in the first book of the poem he tells us about the many misdeeds of
religion. He resurrected the account of Iphigenia, who, according to

^^ Ibid., 133-135.

220 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

tradition, was sacrificed by her father to placate the gods so that the
Greeks would have favorable winds in their war against the Trojans:

"This terror, this darkness of mind, is dispersed

by no radiant sunrise.
Or by the bright shafts of day, but only by

Nature's revealing
A knowledge of her own law, which this first

principle teaches:
That nothing from nothing is born, even by

power divine.
Mankind is held in dominion by fear but for

this one reason:
That seeing on land and in sky so much of whose

cause they are witness
Men think the divinities there are at work.

But when we are certain
That naught is created from naught, what we

seek we divine more clearly:
Both the source from which things can be made

and the way in which all is accomplished
Without divine intervention. . . ."^^

Lucretius preached the joy of contemplation. He realized how
futile most men's lives are.

"It is pleasant when over the ocean winds are

troubling the waters.
To gaze from the shore at another's laboring

tribulation.
Not because any man's troubles are cause for

your joyous delight,
But because it is sweet to perceive what evils

yourself have been spared.
Pleasant also it is to behold the great encounters

of warfare
Arrayed on a distant plain, with nothing of

yours in peril.
But there can be nothing more goodly than

holding serene, high plateaus,

'^*^Dereruni natura, Bk. i. From Robbins and Coleman, ed., Western world
literature. Copyright 1938 by The Macmillan Company and used with their
permission.

LUCRETIUS 221

Well fortified by the teachings of the wise, from

which you may look
Down from your height upon others and see

them wandering astray
In their lonely search for the pathway of life,

co-rivals in genius
Fighting for precedence, working, day and night,

with surpassing toil
To mount the summits of power and the mastery

of the world."^^

Lucretius held that design does not explain anything. To some
extent he anticipated Darwin in his theory of evolution, which tried
to give a naturalistic account of life. There is no essential difference,
he held, between the higher and the lower parts of nature. Man
evolves slowly and is subject to the laws of nature. His actions can-
not be explained according to metaphysical principles.

In his moral system Lucretius warned us against materialism. We
are not to trust externals, for our salvation does not lie in the pos-
session of wealth or honor. We must strive for peace of mind rather
than an accumulation of worldly goods.

In Lucretius, furthermore, we find a systematized philosophy of
civilization. He did not idealize primitive life. It is true that men
were stronger in ancient days, he wrote, but they lived a crude and
unsatisfactory existence and were exposed to all kinds of terrors
which have been removed through science and civilization. Lucre-
tius, following Epicurus, showed how technology advances civiliza-
tion. Most important to him were the discovery of fire, the building
of huts, and the domestication of animals. Inventions which aid in
our control of nature are always due to man himself, he claimed, not
to the intervention of the gods. Yet, civilization is hindered by two
great evils, one is religion, the other the love for vioney. Both must
be conquered if man is to hve a meaningful and painless life.

Lucretius reminds us somewhat of Spencer in his theory that the
universe obeys a cycle— that it grows and decays. This theory does
not imply, however, that death is to be dreaded, for it comes as a
gentle liberator.

"The man to whom pain is decreed hereafter, must
live when it comes;

222 THE CHALLENGE OF EPICUREANISM

But death, by withholding life from him for

whom pain might occur,
All pain precludes. So we know that naught's to

be dreaded in death;
There can no wretchedness come to one who

no longer exists.
Any more than if he'd not been born, when death

claims his mortal hfe. . . ."^^

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EPICUREANISM

In Epicureanism we find one of the perennial philosophies of life.
It is a theory which does not depend on national or religious bar-
riers. Thus we find Epicureanism in a Catholic like Gassendi, in a
pantheist like Whitman, and in a mathematician like Bertrand Rus-
sell. In some ways the spirit of Lucretius in his great poem reminds
us of Russell's A free nmri's worship.

It may be asked why this philosophy is so attractive and why it
has such a constant appeal. In the first place, it is based on individual-
ism. Its starting point is not society but the individual. It is an
acknowledged fact that most artists and thinkers are introspective,
interested primarily in their own emotions, sensations, and needs
rather than in the salvation of society. Thus, frequently they are
attracted by Epicureanism.

In the second place, it is a philosophy which gives us hope in times
of chaos and anarchy. While empires may collapse and wars ravish
the earth, we can still cultivate our own garden and find peace of
mind.

In the third place. Epicureanism is a scientific philosophy, and to
many modern thinkers science appears as an absolute Good and as
the only hope for man's survival. To accept science presupposes a
process of intellectual and emotional reconstruction such as Epi-
curus had made in his period. Such a reconstruction shatters many
of our fond biases and illusions, but it makes us truly emancipated.

Yet, in spite of all its advantages, there is a note of sadness in Epi-
cureanism, just as there is a strain of melancholy in Lucretius. For
it is difficult to live according to the resources of science. It is pain-
ful to get away from our childhood myths. It is disillusioning to
think of the universe as being unconcerned with man's desires and
ideals. Furthermore, the ideal life of the Epicurean, which is dedi-
cated to a painless existence, appears to be rather inert and static.

^^Ibid.

SIGNIFICANCE OF EPICUREANISM 223

It contains a note of futility and negation— almost an approximation
of the Buddhist Nirvana. It is not surprising that many moralists
have rebelled against this standard and have emphasized, instead, a
more active and dynamic approach to the problems of existence.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1 . What influences were mainly responsible for Epicureanism?

2. What is the function of philosophy, according to Epicurus?

3. How did Epicurus view scientific determinism?

4. Describe the cosmological doctrines of Epicurus.

5. How did Epicurus describe the gods?

6. What did Epicurus say about death?

7. How did Epicurus live up to his teachings?

8. What was Epicurus' attitude toward marriage and friendship?

9. What contributions did Lucretius make to philosophy?
10. Why is Epicureanism so attractive to the 20th century?

THE MEANING OF STOICISM

ORIGINS

w3toicism, like Epicureanism, rose from the impact of previous
philosophies. Especially important in its development was the theory
of HeracHtus, who, it will be remembered, taught that everything
in nature is in a state of flux but that this process is controlled by
the universal reason, the logos. The Stoics gave a more metaphysical
meaning to the logos doctrine and thus paved the way for its ac-
ceptance in Christian theology.

As we also remember, Heraclitus identified the universal sub-
stance with fire. This doctrine was adopted by the Stoics, who re-
garded fire as the primary substance and looked upon its changes
as symbols of the variety of the world process. Furthermore, as we
have noted, Heraclitus had a very high concept of the function of
philosophy. Consequently he looked down on the masses, who were
dominated by vain passions and superficial ideals. The same spirit
reappears in early Stoic philosophy, which made a sharp distinction
between the thinker and the multitude and which believed there
could be no compromise between wisdom and popular opinions.

Significant, also, in the development of Stoicism were the teach-
ings of Socrates; in fact, Socrates became one of the saints of Stoi-
224

ORIGINS 225

cism. His self-control, his resignation to death, his emphasis on vir-
tue, his moderate way of Hfe, his faith in Providence, his belief in
guidance by an inner voice— all these things were appreciated by
the Stoic philosophers. To them the life of Socrates indicated that
moral heroism is possible and that man can never be conquered by
the force of external circumstances.

Even more immediate than the influence of Socrates was the
influence of the Cynics. The latter reacted strongly against the
pleasure theory. They were professional teachers of virtue and be-
lieved in moral asceticism. They were spectacular in their teachings
and had no use for conventional social ideals. It would be a mistake,
however, to regard the Stoics merely as imitators of the Cynic way
of life, for they had more extensive scientific interests and, at least
in later times, developed more positive and constructive social ideals.
In a sense Stoicism was a cosmopolitan and urbane form of Cynicism.

Besides the Cynics we must mention the Alegarics. They had a
profound impact on the development of Zeno, the founder of Stoi-
cism. From the Megarics the Stoics absorbed the spirit of monism.
The Megarics asserted that evil has no metaphysical reality, and
their standpoint reappears in the Stoic theory. Furthermore, the
Stoics absorbed from the Megarics a preoccupation with logical
subtleties, which were especially stressed by Chrysippus.

We must not neglect the influence of Plato on Stoicism, for he
had stressed the importance of morality and thought virtues not
relative but absolute. To act merely according to the dictates of
expediency was regarded as inadequate by Plato, and the same
spirit appears in Stoicism. Moreover, Plato's concept of the Good
can easily be identified with the Stoic ideal of world reason. How-
ever, there is a profound difference between the philosophy of
Plato and that of the Stoics. Plato's system was dualistic, while the
Stoics accepted a 7no?iistic interpretation of reality.

The Stoics also owed a great deal to Aristotle. From him they
borrowed the foundation of their cosmology. Like Aristotle, they
believed the earth to be the center of the universe and regarded the
heliocentric theory as both invalid scientifically and impious in a
religious sense. Like Aristotle, they refused to accept the Democ-
ritean picture of the universe. They emphasized the fact that quali-
tative changes cannot be reduced to quantitative laws. Again
following Aristotle, they spoke of two kinds of motion— one recti-
linear, which governs the phenomena of the earth; and the other
circular, which prevails in the movements of the heavens.

226 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

However, the Stoics did not believe in Aristotle's concept of the
four causes; instead, they spoke only of one cause. They also re-
jected his view that a fifth element, ether, exists.

In spite of these rejections of certain parts of Aristotle, the spirit
of Aristotelian science is evident in Stoic reflections, for the Stoics
refused to adopt a mechanistic interpretation of the universe; to
them the concept of design was fundamental. Like Aristotle, they
could not accept a naturalistic concept of evolution, and thus they
regarded man as distinct from the animal world and as the lord of
creation.

THE IDEAL OF PHILOSOPHY

The Stoics had a sublime concept of the function of the philosopher.
They believed a thinker must exemplify his principles in action.
It is not what he teaches that matters so much as his way of life.
To be hypocritical and insincere was regarded as unworthy of a
philosopher, who should be firmly convinced of the validity and
strength of his arguments.

The life of the philosopher, according to the Stoics, is to be
dedicated to the search for virtue. He should surpass his contem-
poraries in moral earnestness and moral discipline. He is to live on
a spiritual mountain from which he surveys the actions of his fellow
citizens. In short, the philosopher must be imbued with a sense of
vocation. Thus he should not aim for public applause or for fame
or for worldly honors. He should regard his profession with deep
earnestness. In a sense, Stoicism regarded philosophy as a surgery
of the soul.

Unhke the Cynics, the Stoic teachers did not neglect their per-
sonal appearance. This attention to appearance does not imply that
they were fashionable or luxurious in dress. On the contrary, they
generally were simple men who lived in a frugal manner and
shunned the luxuries of life. While the Cynics often went to ex-
tremes in their disregard for convention, most of the Stoics avoided
this tendency and were careful not to repel their listeners by slov-
enly dress.

OLD STOICISM

The first period of Stoicism starts with the philosophy of Zeno. He
was born c. 3 3 1 b.c. in Citium, a Greek settlement on the island of
Cyprus. In his ancestry there were Semitic strains, which perhaps
explain his preoccupation with morality. He studied in Athens un-

OLD STOICISM 227

der a variety of teachers and was influenced, in turn, by Cynic,
Megaric, and Platonic doctrines. About 294 b.c. Zeno opened his
own school of philosophy in the painted porch, the Stoa Poikile,
in the market place of Athens. Thus we have the derivation of the
term Stoics— men of the porch.

Throughout his lifetime Zeno was highly honored. Kings and
princes visited him, and the Athenians regarded him as one of the
notable thinkers of the city. In his old age he sufl^ered from a phy-
sical infirmity and chose suicide as the most satisfactory exit from
life.

In his early period Zeno wrote a Utopia, the Republic, which in-
dicates his cosmopoHtan views. As the foundation for his ideal state
he chose the world, not the city-state. He was far less religious than
Plato; thus, he had no use for temples and sacrifices. Incidentally,
he did not beUeve in class distinctions. All men of his republic were
to share the political functions, and all would co-operate for the
welfare of the state. Being idealistic, he advocated that this state
have no law courts, for co-operation was to reign supreme among
the citizens. No one would find it necessary to prosecute another,
because all would be guided by justice. His state, in short, would
be guided by the dictates of love and compassion.

In his metaphysical doctrines Zeno believed in pantheism and
that god and the universe are not distinct. God is material, he
claimed, although his body is much purer than any other substance.
The universe is guided by the logos, which gives form and meaning
to the world process. It is the task of man to order his hfe according
to universal reason and to exemphfy the ideal of consistency which
nature follows.

Unlike Plato, Zeno did not believe there is opposition between
the soul and the body. He thought that the soul is material; but
this hne of reasoning did not lead him to the standpoint of ma-
terialism, for he asserted that the soul is guided by reason, which is
a part of the w^orld-substance.

Reacting against the Epicurean philosophy, Zeno attacked the
pleasure principle. Regarding virtue as the supreme Good, he con-
tended that man could best find himself by emancipation from
dependence on external objects. How do we know what virtues to
accept? How can we understand the good life? This knowledge,
Zeno answered, is best acquired by following the rules of reason,
for we cannot find lasting satisfaction in transitory things but only
in moral independence.

228 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

CLEANTHES

Zeno had many followers, among them Aristo, Persaeus, and Heril-
lus; but his most important student was Cleanthes, who absorbed not
only his doctrines but also his way of life. According to tradition,
Cleanthes was a pugilist and so poor that he had to toil hard to make
a living. Certainly he was not distinguished by intellectual depth.
He was, however, a man of deep religious conviction.

In Cleanthes we find almost a missionary fervor. He regarded
Stoicism as a religion and stressed God's providence and concern
for man. We can honor God, he thought, through prayer and
through following his dictates.

Cleanthes' reUgious ideals are best expressed in his Hym?! to "Zeus:

"Chiefest glory of deathless Gods, Almighty for ever,
Sovereign of Nature that rulest by law, what Name shall we

give Thee?—
Blessed be Thou! for on Thee should call all things that are

mortal.
For that we are Thine offspring; nay, all that in myriad motion
Lives for its day on the earth bears one impress— Thy Hkeness

—upon it.
Wherefore my song is of Thee, and I hymn Thy power for

ever.

"Lo, the vast orb of the Worlds, round the Earth evermore as

it rolleth,
Feels Thee its ruler and Guide, and owns Thy lordship rejoic-
ing.
Aye, for Thy conquering hands have a servant of living fire-
Sharp is the bolt!— where it falls. Nature shrinks at the shock

and doth shudder.
Thus Thou directest the Word universal that pulses through

all things.
Mingling its life with Lights that are great and Lights that are

lesser,
E'en as beseemeth its birth. High King through ages unending.

"Nought is done that is done without Thee in the earth or the

waters
Or in the heights of heaven, save the deed of the fool and the

sinner.

THE MIDDLE STOA iig

Thou canst make rough things smooth; at Thy Voice, lo, jar-
ring disorder
Moveth to music, and Love is born where hatred abounded.

. . ." ^

The rehgious fervor of Cleanthes reminds us of the psalms and of
Ikhnaton's Hymn to the sun. To disbeheve in God he regarded as
a serious crime; and with vigor he wrote against the hehocentric
theory, which he regarded as an aifront to God's providence.

CHRYSIPPUS

While Cleanthes was primarily interested in religion, Chrysippus
was more interested in dialectic. He was head of the Stoic school
from 232 to 206 B.C., and during this period he wrote a multitude
of works. Most of them were rather unoriginal, but he strengthened
the Stoic doctrines by giving to them a definite form and logical
consistency. He was especially concerned in refuting the attacks
of the Skeptics, who maintained that definite knowledge cannot be
found. In this process he modified some of his teachings, although
he never accepted the doctrine of probability.

Chrysippus was followed by lesser lights, such as Diogenes of
Seleucia, Zeno of Tarsus, and Antipater. The last-named indicated
the weakening of the austerity of early Stoicism in his belief that
external goods are not to be despised, since they contribute to
the perfection of virtue.

THE MIDDLE STOA

The second period of Stoicism, which lasted for about two hundred
years (200 b.c.-i a.d.), was marked by the spread of Stoicism to
Rome and other parts of the civilized world. The cHmactic event of
this period was the embassy which Athens sent to Rome in 155 B.C.
The Stoics were represented by Diogenes of Seleucia, who im-
pressed his listeners by his self-restraint and his emphasis on tem-
perance.

The most important thinker in this period was probably Panae-
tius of Rhodes, who studied at Pergamum and at Athens and who
greatly admired Plato and Aristotle. In fact, he modified the early
Stoic doctrines by introducing important elements of Aristotelian
and Platonic teachings.

^ Stobaeus, Ecologae physicae et ethicae, i, 2, 12, Webster, Historical selections,
pp. 287-288.

230 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

Panaetius later visited Rome, where he became acquainted with
prominent statesmen and spread the concepts of Greek philosophy.
Later he became head of the Stoic school at Athens, where he exerted
wide influence.

In his social doctrines Panaetius was rather urbane. He believed
that the Stoic philosophy could not only train the scholar but help
the statesman, the scientist, and the artist. He was more conscious of
the advantage of external goods than was Zeno, and he thought
they might be acquired provided they did not clash with the dic-
tates of virtue. He spoke much about the performance of daily
tasks through which the Stoic might exercise the duties of citizen-
ship. Thus he appealed not merely to those who had found perfec-
tion but, above all, to those who were slowly trying to remould
their lives and find virtue.

In his metaphysical theory Panaetius accepted Aristotle's doctrine
that the universe is eternal. Holding grave doubts regarding divina-
tion, he rejected the belief that the universe can be destroyed
through a conflagration. In every way he was different from Cle-
anthes since he represents a rather secular outlook on life.

Panaetius avoided extremes in his ethical ideals. He considered
soberness especially important. Being influenced by the Roman way
of life, he upheld decorum and dignity. Again the influence of Aris-
totle is evident in his view that virtue is the mean between two
vices. In a word, moderation and balance characterize his moral
speculations.

Posidonius of Rhodes was a student of Panaetius but far more
religious than the latter. He was very much influenced by Plato
and, like him, believed the soul divine in origin and immortal. The
body, he taught, is a jail for the soul; hence, we detect duaHstic
strains in his system. He was less scientific than Panaetius and ac-
cepted divination, which he regarded as an essential part of religion.
He was certain that the universe is governed by the providence
of God and consequently made much of the logos doctrine.

In ethics Posidonius taught that virtue is an end in itself and ex-
ternal goods are to be disregarded. In every way he represented
a more conservative spirit than his teacher, who had a naturalistic
bias.

Hecato of Rhodes was more inclined to agree with Panaetius than
with Posidonius. He did not neglect the social duties; and no man,
he said, can live well without ordering his life in such a way as to
perform the functions of citizenship and of family life. The wise

ROMAN STOICISM 231

man should not abandon his property, Hecato declared, but be
conscious of the duties he owes society as a man and as a citizen.

ROMAN STOICISM

The last period of Stoicism was approximately from i a.d. to 200
A.D. Its center was Rome, and it saw the flourishing of the moral
systems of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus AureHus, whom we shall
discuss later. Other noteworthy representatives were Cornutus
(c. 20-66 A.D.) and Musonius Rufus, who was one of Rome's out-
standing teachers.

Cornutus is known mainly for his treatise dealing with the nature
of the gods, in which he tried to rationalize the popular mythology.
He gave an allegorical explanation of the gods. For example, he
thought Zeus was the soul of the universe and identified Prometheus
with the Providence which governs all things. Hera, the wife of
Zeus, he identified with air. This identification Cornutus regarded
as very appropriate, since he taught that air and fire are closely
associated.

Musonius Rufus was concerned with bringing about a moral
reformation in Rome. He dwelt especially upon the importance of
marriage. If the family were destroyed, he believed, the Roman state
could not last. To him the family was the most essential institution.
He believed that marriage could well be combined with philosophy
and that philosophers should be model husbands— a view which is
somewhat difficult to prove in practice.

Especially admired in later times was Euphrates, who was noted
for his impressive teachings and personal charm. He followed the
precepts of Musonius Rufus and had a family of three children, to
whom he was completely devoted. He did not demand much of his
students in the way of moral asceticism, and he thought worldly suc-
cess could be combined with Stoic detachment.

More strict and exacting than Euphrates was Dio of Prusa (c.
40-120 A.D.). He regarded himself as a missionary whose task was
to save the souls of the wicked. He specialized in speeches addressed
to the multitude and thereby brought philosophy down to earth.
Having contempt for all the luxuries of life, he was satisfied to wear
a shabby cloak. He impressed all with the sincerity of his teachings
and the eloquence of his speech.

Another noteworthy Stoic was Rusticus, one of the teachers of
Marcus Aurelius, who testified to his effectiveness. Rusticus con-
centrated on simplicity of speech and believed moral teachings to

232 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

be all-important. He had little use for rhetoric, poetry, and science.
He maintained that the primary task of the thinker is to be an ex-
ample in his way of life, shunning all triviality and superficiality in
thought and conduct.

What are the distinguishing features of this last period of Stoi-
cism? First of all, Stoicism had become more practical and now
was more closely in touch with the demands of daily life. The au-
sterity of the early teachings was modified. There was not so sharp
a difference between the wise man and the multitude, between vir-
tue and wickedness. It taught that moral perfection cannot be
achieved all at once but can best be obtained through gradual learn-
ing and increasing practice.

More stress was placed on external things, such as property and
the duties and privileges of citizenship. To be sure, these things were
not regarded as absolute Goods, but the Roman Stoics felt that they
could not be neglected.

Furthermore, Stoicism was universalized. The concept of the
natural law which gives certain rights to all people was elaborated.
In this way the Stoics paved the way for the internationalism which
we find in the Medieval Church.

It must not be forgotten that the Roman Stoics were concerned
primarily with the problem of morality. They were less interested
in physics, a subject which was highly regarded by the early Stoics.
The Roman philosophers used moral principles as a weapon against
the degradation of society. They regarded their philosophy as an
expression of universal equality. Thus there was no room in their
system for class distinctions. Their philosophy could be taught with
equal eflFectiveness by a slave, such as Epictetus, or by an emperor,
such as Marcus Aurelius.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

To appreciate the philosophy of Stoicism it is necessary to under-
stand the Stoics' concept of philosophy. Like the Epicureans, they
believed ethics to be primary; but they did not neglect scientific
speculations. To them, philosophy served both to unify the phys-
ical sciences and to point out the essential problems of metaphysics.
Consequently, they dealt with such metaphysical problems as the
nature of the soul and the character of God. Philosophy and science,
they believed, are not opposed to each other, for science uses pri-
marily the analytic technique whereas philosophy uses the method
of synthesis.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 233

The Stoics generally divided philosophy into three fields: first,
logic, which they regarded as the science of reasoning; second,
physics, which also included the study of ontology— that is, God,
the soul, and the universe; and third, ethics, the theory of the good
life. To them ethics was not an abstract study; rather, it was emi-
nently functional. They believed that ethical ideals can be applied
to daily hfe and that such ideals can completely change man's out-
look and character.

In their theory of knowledge, the Stoics asserted that our mind
at birth is a blank tablet. We acquire knowledge through the senses.
Thus the starting point of the Stoics is empirical: We receive im-
pressions both objectively through external stimuli and subjectively
through our own inner feeUngs.

In their epistemology, the Stoics were opposed to Platonic real-
ism. Only the mdividiial is real, they asserted, and the world does
not contain real universals, for we only perceive specific things.
How then do we arrive at general concepts? How can we establish
the laws of science and morahty? The Stoics explained that the
mind unites certain images, hence trains of thought arise. Thus we
can explain certain universal ideas which are common to all man-
kind.

It can be seen that although the mind is a blank tablet at birth, it is
not inert. The mind is dynamic and active, the Stoics averred, and
it synthesizes the impressions which it receives from the outside.
It uses the impressions as a foundation for general concepts which
are found not merely in the field of science but also in morality and
religion. Truths common to mankind, the Stoics held, include our
faith in God and the universality of virtue.

The problem of the origin of error inevitably suggests itself.
Error arises in two ways, according to the Stoics. First, subjectively,
when we are not clear as to the nature of our sensations. Second,
objectively, when we draw a false inference regarding an external
perception. Error is connected with our will. When we receive a
certain image of the external world, our will interprets it. It is
important in this process not to jump to hasty conclusions, the Stoics
taught, for assent is not to be given spontaneously but only after due
reflection.

The Stoics were opposed to the doctrines of Skepticism, which
they regarded as self-defeating. They believed that if Skepticism
became common, no consistent philosophy could arise and in the
long run it would paralyze all moral action.

234 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

The Stoics were also concerned with the standard of truth. They
noted that some representations are hazy, confused, and vague
while others are distinguished by clarity and distinctness and give
a valid idea of the objects for which they stand. This makes them
irresistible and brings to the percipient the conviction that they
are true. This doctrine of the irresistibility of certain concepts was
attacked by the Skeptics, who believed only in probability as the
criterion of knowledge.

To appreciate the Stoic doctrine of knowledge, we must under-
stand the Stoic concept of the soul: The soul is a replica of the uni-
verse. It is composed of a ruling part, the five senses, and the powers
of speech and procreation. The ruling part of the soul resembles
God; it symbolizes the influence of the divine within us. Some
Stoics called it the king and the lawgiver.

The Stoics made no clear distinction between reason and will. In
this point again they showed their profound difference from Pla-
tonic philosophers. The ruhng part of man, they felt, includes both
reason and assent. Our reason not merely has a speculative function
but is also a prelude to action. The will is especially significant, for
through it we can obtain true autonomy and true independence.
To some extent the Stoics foreshadowed the Kantian philosophy,
which likewise emphasized the importance of the good will and
concerned itself with motives, not consequences.

The soul, the Stoics held, is a representation of the universe; it is
essentially material. In its substance it is fiery and thus is identical
with the creative fire which is the basis of the world process. Still,
the soul may have other elements, such as air. In this way we can
account for the variety in human traits. For example, according to
the Stoics, those men who are dull and lethargic may have an
abundance of earth and water in their constitutions. On the other
hand, those who tend to be extremely passionate have an excess of
fire.

Regarding immortality the Stoics had a variety of doctrines. They
all agreed that although the individual soul cannot survive the world
conflagration, its substance cannot be destroyed. Thus Chrysippus
beheved the souls of the good survive until the conflagration. Those
who have lived irrational and wicked lives, on the other hand,
perish when their bodies die.

The process of sensation is explained in a rather elementary way
by the Stoics. They held that from the object there proceed ef-
fluences which influence the sense organs. At the same time the mind

COSMOLOGY IN STOICISM 235

sends out certain waves. When the two meet an imprint results
and knowledge is produced. To make knowledge possible, a medium
is needed for the waves. This medium the Stoics found in air.

At first the Stoics did not elaborate their concept of sensation.
They took many of their principles for granted, but the attacks of
the Skeptics forced them to state their position more clearly. Con-
sequently, they distinguished between a single sensation, such as
taste or sight or smell, and a mind picture which contains several
sensations. When the mind picture is presented to us, said the Stoics,
we can either give our assent that it is true or we can declare it
to be false. When we give our assent too hastily, error results. To be
certain that correct knowledge results, the Stoics advocated a mas-
tering of the object and, in cases of doubt, suspension of judgment.

The great accomplishment of man, according to the Stoics, is his
capacity for reason. We can develop this faculty through the study
of philosophy and careful intellectual discipline. Animals, on the
other hand, do not possess this capacity and are guided by their
sensations. To live well, then, we must cultivate our rational capaci-
ties, for through them we understand the nature of the universe and
are able to know the meaning of life.

COSMOLOGY IN STOICISM

The Stoic cosmology is the center of the Stoic system. It is strik-
ingly different from that of the Epicureans. The latter believed in
a mechanistic arrangement of nature, in which scientific laws domi-
nate everything. The Stoics, however, started with the logos, the
world reason, according to which the universe is fashioned. In other
words, teleology governs the Stoic system. Nature is the source of
Providence. Its laws, the logoi sperjjiatikoi, are individual expres-
sions of the logos spervmtikos, the divine reason. Notice how this
view differs from that of the Epicureans, who regarded nature as
imperfect and denied the providence of God.

Another fundamental Stoic concept is that of world conflagration.
This is based on the theory that in the universe there are both an up-
ward and a downward way. We must imagine earth as the lowest of
the substances; above it we find water, then air, and finally fire.
One element turns into another by a gradual process. Thus, earth
turns into water, then into air, and finally into fire. At last the uni-
verse will be full of heat. Elence the Stoics spoke of a period in
which rivers will be dry, earthquakes will take place, stars will
collide, and all living things will die. This theory does not imply,

236 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

however, that hfe will be forever extinguished, for the conflagra-
tion will be succeeded by reconstruction. While particular worlds
will perish, the universe as an eternal substance will remain the
same. It must be remembered, however, that the theory of world
conflagration was not accepted by all of the Stoics. Panaetius inclined
to the Aristotelian view that the universe is eternal.

The fundamental substance of the universe, according to the
Stoics, is material. But we must not make the mistake of regarding
it as passive and inert, according to the 18th-century viewpoint;
rather, it is a dynamic and active principle. It has the power of
movement and contains within itself the capacity for rarefaction and
condensation.

Time and space, the Stoics held, do not exist separately but are
closely connected as functions of matter. For example, we do not
know time except for the movement of matter. Since matter is
limited, the Stoics spoke of finite space. Here again their views
clashed with those of the Epicureans, who taught that space is
infiJiite.

It is important to notice the place of force in the Stoic world-
picture. Force they regarded as the soul of nature, while matter
they considered its body. In every way nature is alive and contains
the seeds of development, they declared.

As for the nature of God, the Stoics were not consistent in their
views. They described him occasionally as fire or, again, as air. They
spoke of him in theistic and pantheistic terms and identified him
with world-reason, with providence, and with nature. In short, they
used both spiritual and material terms to describe him. They were
definite on one thing, however: God lives not far away and is not
unconcerned with human beings; his providence rules the world.

Let us visualize the Stoic universe. It is spherical in shape; it is
divided into two parts: the earth, surrounded by water; and the
sky, revolving around the earth. The Stoics explained that earth
and water naturally turn downward while air and fire naturally
turn upward. Fire, of all the elements, is the most primary. As the
source of life it can be identified with motion, and it characterizes
the nature of divinity.

The Stoics followed popular belief in accepting the theory that
the stars are divine. They sharply attacked the Epicurean view,
which tried to give a naturahstic explanation of the stars. They
were especially concerned with the classification of the sun, which
Cleanthes regarded as the ruling element in the universe. Compared

THE STOIC SYSTEM OF ETHICS 237

with the Epicurean world-view, the Stoic picture seems more primi-
tive and more susceptible to the influence of popular theology.

To sum up the Stoic picture of the universe we find the following
aspects:

(i) Stoicism is a teleological philosophy; thus it rejects the me-
chanistic view of the Epicureans.

(2) It is geocentric. Indeed, many Stoics regarded the helio-
centric hypothesis as impious.

(3) It is pantheistic, God being regarded as the soul of the uni-
verse and the universe as the body of God.

(4) It is materialistic; body is the ultimate substance. (But we
must think of the Stoic doctrine as a dynamic form of ma-
terialism.)

(5) Nature is governed by world-reason, or the logos. This
point of view impHes that nature is perfect.

(6) The Stoics taught the doctrine of world conflagration. No
world, then, is eternal; but the universe itself does not per-
ish.

(7) Just as laws govern nature, so reason rules man's Ufe. Reason,
then, has not merely a psychological significance— it has also
a metaphysical status, for it characterizes the nature of deity.

THE STOIC SYSTEM OF ETHICS

In passing to the ethical system of the Stoics, we find that they ob-
jected strenuously to the Epicurean concept of pleasure. Instead of
hedonism they emphasized virtue guided by reason.

Diogenes Laertius tells us, "As for the assertion made by some
people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of ani-
mals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure,
if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never
comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suit-
able to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath com-
parable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom.
And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants
and animals, for she regulates the life of plants, too, in their case
without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of
a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals, impulse
has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of
their proper ahment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to
follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more
perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational,

238 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life.
For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically." ^

The goal of life, according to the Stoics, is to live in conformity
with nature:

"By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chry-
sippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the
nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe
alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature
of the individual.

"And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy
for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive.
Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the
state of mind which tends to make the whole of Hfe harmonious.
When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness
of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For
the starting points of nature are never perverse." ^

The Stoics placed moral virtues foremost among the goals of the
good life. Among these virtues we find wisdom, courage, justice, and
temperance:

"Particular virtues are magnanimity, continence, endurance, pres-
ence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowl-
edge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil;
courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we
ought to beware of, and what is indifferent . . . magnanimity as
the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to any-
thing that happens, whether good or evil equally; continence as a
disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or
a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a
knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to,
what not, and what is indifferent . . . good counsel as knowledge by
which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult
our own interests.

"Similarly, of vices, some are primary, others subordinate: e.g.,
folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but
incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they
hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof
the corresponding virtues are the knowledge." "*

2 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers, 11, Bk. vii, Hicks' transla-
tion (Loeb classical library series), 85-86.

3 Ibid., 89.

* Ibid., 92-94.

THE STOIC SYSTEM OF ETHICS 239

It is interesting to note the Stoics' concept of sin. They urged
that four things be shunned: first, fear; second, greed; third, grief;
fourth, excitement. They taught that if we fear the various ordeals
of Hfe, we are being conquered by external circumstances. Thus
we should never regard poverty or sickness as absolute evils, for
we should learn how to endure them courageously. The Stoics were
emphatic in declaring all forms of greed evil. Excessive love for
money, they showed, does not bring happiness or virtue, but only
undermines the health of our souls.

We must beware of anger, they taught. When we face a danger,
we should not be moved by emotions; rather, we should be guided
by an invariable sense of duty. We should not be angry with those
who wish to harm us, for usually they are merely motivated by
ignorance. But, it might be objected, we cannot fight successfully
if our passions are not first aroused. Is not anger a healthy emotion?
The Stoics answered in the negative. We fight better, they believed,
when we are detached and truly objective. Incidentally, they as-
serted that the brave man is usually completely cool. The good
boxer is one who is scientific and not overwhelmed by passion but in
complete control of himself.

Wise men are guided by the ideal of goodness: "At the same
time they are free from pretense; for they have stripped off all
pretense or 'make-up' whether in voice or in look. Free too are
they from all business cares, declining to do anything which con-
flicts with duty. They will take wine, but not get drunk. Nay
more, they will not be hable to madness either; not but what there
will at times occur to the good man strange impressions due to
melancholy or delirium, ideas not determined by the principle of
what is choice-worthy but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the
wise man ever feel grief; seeing that grief is irrational contraction
of the soul. . . .

"They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something
divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of
this word— godless or ungodly— there are two senses, one in which
it is the opposite of the term 'godly,' the other denoting the man
who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note,
the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added,
are also worshipers of God; for they have acquaintance with the
rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the
gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep them-
selves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offenses against the gods,

240 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in
what concerns the gods." ^

To understand the meaning of the highest Good, one must realize
that it represents a life which is ordered according to nature. The
Stoic sage understood that Providence rules the world; consequently
he did not desire nature to be changed to suit his own emotions.
In acting according to the dictates of duty, he taught, man will
not be guided by pragmatic concerns. In his inner hfe he will avoid
all emotionalism and, instead, display a passionless temperament.

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The Stoics applied their philosophy not merely to their daily con-
duct but also to social institutions. In education, for instance, they
beheved that luxury is to be avoided and children are to be brought
up in a simple, almost Spartan, manner. They felt it important to
teach respect and discipline. Emotionalism they discouraged; hence,
they instructed the young student in ways of discipHning himself
and acquiring self-control.

The ideal they upheld was simplicity and frugahty. We should
not forget, they urged, that our characters disintegrate when we
depend on too many material conveniences. Let us bring up our
children, then, to get along without superficialities and without
constantly asking for more material goods. It is especially necessary
for children to obey their parents and for family life to be har-
monious. In marriage we are not to be tempted by external things.
Thus, as Musonius Rufus tells us, we are to concentrate more on the
soul of our partner than on her physical characteristics. Marriage is
not to be based on selfish grounds but on a desire for mutual benefit
and co-operation.

The Stoics were influential in humanizing the treatment of slaves.
Slavery is not a natural condition, they asserted, and in the universal
Stoic brotherhood all men are equal. This statement does not imply
that revolutionary measures should be taken; rather, we should
respect others even when they serve us and are in our power.

Especially strong is the note of universalism found in the Stoics:
We belong not to one city or to one state but to the world. As citi-
zens of the universe we are all equal in the sight of God. All class
distinctions are illusory, and social position is not an absolute Good.
We must cultivate an attitude of humility, for nothing lasts and
everything is subject to the universal flux.

^ Ibid., 1 1 8-1 1 9.

^^kii^

RELIGIOUS IDEALS 241

In the Stoics the distinction between citizens and barbarians
vanishes. Notice how different this spirit is from that of Aristotle,
who looked with contempt upon those who did not share the fruits
of Greek culture. The Stoics quite truly believed in a universal
brotherhood in which complete equality reigns.

Unlike the Epicureans, the Stoics did not think political activity
inconsistent with virtue. In fact, they tried hard to lift the tone of
pohtical discussion. In their rhetoric they taught aspiring politicians
that truth is more important than success. They believed simplicity
of style rather than eloquent words to be the marks of real educa-
tion.

In Stoicism a note of humanitarianism predominates. No wonder
that Stoic philosophers like Epictetus and Seneca protested against
the gladitorial games and tried to bring about a more enlightened
legal system! Every man, they asserted, is an end in himself and is
not to be treated as an object. In short, personalistic strains prevail
in Stoicism.

RELIGIOUS IDEALS

The philosophy of Stoicism is buttressed by an intense faith in the
divine government of the universe. God is the principle that rules
all of nature. He is active in everything— in the skies, in the beauty
of our natural surroundings, and in man's soul. Consequently the
Stoics felt that the worship of God and the recognition of his
majesty must be the primary function of mankind. But how do we
know that God exists? How can atheism be repudiated?

First of all, the Stoics appealed to the universal notion regarding
the existence of God. Such a concept cannot be derived from hu-
man beings themselves. It must be the product of the divine gov-
ernor, who has implanted this idea in the minds of men.

Second, the Stoics believed that man's reason has a divine origin.
Certainly, they maintained, we cannot assume that we are the cre-
ators of rational ideas. Only a supreme being can be the source of
the universal reason. As a corollary to this argument the Stoics
pointed to the existence of the planets and their obedience to definite
laws. All this indicates the work of God.

In the third place, the Stoics emphasized the unity of the uni-
verse. All its parts, they explained, are held together and are har-
monious. The universe amidst constant change and development
would disintegrate were it not for the work of a supreme being.

In the fourth place, the Stoics pointed to man. He does not exist
by mere chance, they argued; rather, he must have been created by

242 THE MEANING OF STOICISM

a divine design. This argument again leads to the belief in the exist-
ence of God.

In the fifth place, the Stoics used a moral argument. If God does
not exist, they claimed, there can be no piety— in fact, all virtues
are shattered. Atheism, consequently, means the denial of universal
laws and universal Providence. Piety, they maintained, is universal
and must have an object, namely, God.

In the sixth place, the Stoics pointed to popular beliefs, especially
in divination. Posidonius was eloquent on this subject, but almost
all the Stoic philosophers believed in it. They regarded nature as a
symbol of the divine quality, and they believed the voice of God
is revealed within man.

It must not be forgotten that the Stoics affirmed the goodness of
the gods, who were viewed as the benefactors of mankind. They
did not accept Homer, who frequently pictured the gods as mortal
and full of passions; rather, they emphasized the rational and spirit-
ual nature of the deities.

While the Epicureans claimed that the gods are completely qui-
escent and isolationist, the Stoics affirmed that the gods are forever
active and frequently intervene in the universe. All the activities
of the gods, they claimed, are designed to promote the virtue of
man, to give him a cosmic view, and to heighten the divine quali-
ties of life.

As can be seen from all these observations. Stoicism produced a
new religious philosophy which tried to rationalize and spiritualize
popular beliefs. It pictured the pantheon of the gods in moral terms
and gave allegorical explanations for the orthodox beliefs. Further-
more, the Stoics spoke of divine messengers and spirits who inter-
vene between man and God. Some Stoics, like Posidonius, beUeved
in good and evil spirits. They spoke of deified men, such as Hercules
and Romulus, who were rewarded for their services by being in-
cluded among the gods.

Although the early Stoics were skeptical regarding religious rit-
ual, the later Stoics took an active part in it. Believing in the value
of prayer, they held that the gods are to be constantly honored.
Man should be grateful for his benefits, they maintained, and should
realize how much he owes to the gods. In praying, they remind us,
we should not ask for impossible blessings; nor must we consider
our own individual advantages; rather, we must think of what is
best for the universe. In fact, Stoics hke Epictetus taught that we
are to be guided by divine destiny and the divine will. The Stoics

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 243

were intent upon self-examination. According to many of their
ablest teachers, at the close of each day we should reflect upon our
actions. This examination is to purify our conscience, strengthen
our virtue, and prevent the occurrence of evil.

As we can see, the Stoic reHgious attitude was dominated by
moralistic considerations; it pictured an active relationship between
man and the gods; and it gave a spiritual content to popular beliefs.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

In their religious philosophy the Stoics could not avoid the problem
of evil. Everywhere in the universe we find imperfection. The virtu-
ous constantly suffer Mobile the wicked seem to be prosperous. How,
then, can evil be explained? How can it be understood by man's
intellect?

First of all, the Stoics considered evil to be merely apparent, hav-
ing no place in the ontological scheme of things. The universe as a
totality is good, they insisted, and is guided by the designs of the
gods. Furthermore, what men call evil, they believed, is often a
blessing in disguise. We sufl^er sickness, we are tortured by pain,
but all these vicissitudes may strengthen our moral resolve and show
us the illusion of striving for external things. We may be exiled
and persecuted for our political beliefs, but we should not be dis-
couraged, since we must realize that there can be no permanent
security and power, for fortune is unstable.

But, it may be objected, we frequently see the wicked on top
while the most virtuous languish in jail. The Stoics reply that the
wicked can never really triumph. On the contrary, their good for-
tune is only apparent and in fact their wickedness is increased by
victory, for their souls inevitably suffer. Good men, however, can-
not be touched by external events, for their souls remain free and
untouched by fate.

The Stoics used still another argument to point out that evil is
only apparent. What we call harmful and unpleasant may strengthen
our souls. We are like athletes who exercise and train hard to achieve
their goal. Our reverses and ordeals do not hurt us; on the contrary,
they augment our moral capacities.

Another Stoic argument held evil to be merely the result of par-
tiahty. We look at the universe according to our own experiences,
which are necessarily limited; but when we see things in their total
perspective, evil has no real status and the providence of the gods
is clearly manifested.

244 T'HE MEANING OF STOICISM

Some Stoics, like Seneca, asserted that God is limited. They meant
that man has to co-operate with God if perfection is to be realized
in the universe. According to other Stoic teachers, what we call evil
is purely relative. In this reasoning they resurrected the Heraclitean
argument that opposites go together. In short, no good without evil,
no perfection without imperfection. We would not appreciate the
Goods of life if we did not encounter occasional reverses.

Another problem suggests itself: Who is responsible for evil, God
or man? The Stoics answered, God is 7iever the source of evil; all
vice can be traced to the misuse of our will, which is completely
free. Let us take a concrete illustration. Imagine a burglar breaking
into a house. He may be tempted by avarice or by his own poverty.
In committing this crime he alone is to be held responsible, for his
will consented to the action.

The Stoics taught that man is emancipated from evil when he
cultivates genuine good will, when he learns the virtue of detach-
ment and apathy, and when he acts according to the dictates of duty.
In short, the Stoics pictured a moral universe in which true freedom
can be gained through the study and practice of virtue. Unlike the
Epicureans, the Stoics refused to accept pleasure as their goal in life
and, instead, regarded virtue as an end in itself. Hence, in Stoicism
we find the genesis of Christianity, which likewise has a moralistic
perspective and which contends that all men are the children of
God.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What were the sources of Stoic philosophy?

2. Describe the Stoic concept of virtue.

3. How did the Stoics explain the process of knowledge?

4. Enumerate and describe the various periods of Stoic philosophy.

5. What is the Stoic concept of religion?

6. Why did the Stoics refuse to accept the reality of evil?

7. What is the function of the logos?

8. Explain the world-view of the Stoics.

9. Compare Stoicism with Epicureanism.
10. Describe the ideal man of the Stoics.

THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF
PHILOSOPHY

THE FOUNDATIONS

he Roman Empire developed a system of laws and government
which marked an important change in the history of civilization.
The new system indicated that the city-state was obsolete and that
the old national boundaries could no longer be maintained. While
the Greeks had never been able to form a unified government, the
Romans developed a world state which included a variety of races,
all united under definite laws and Roman sovereignty.

The secret of Roman success lies not so much in Rome's mihtary
power as in the establishment of a unified system of laws. Roman
law did not vanish with the collapse of the empire; even today many
of the law courts of Europe, Latin America, and South Africa
reflect the influence of Roman legal codes. At first, Roman law was
unwritten; most of it dealt with religious usages. Then it was
changed into civil law. In 449 b.c. concessions were made to the
lower classes (the plebeians), and the civil law was written down in
the Laws of the Twelve Tables.

245

246 THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

As the Roman Empire expanded, these laws were applied to other
Mediterranean nations. Thus, there developed the jus gentium,
which was extended to the states conquered by Rome. Finally, dur-
ing the period of the empire, the jurists systematized legal usages.
Influenced by Stoic precepts, they emphasized natural law, which
held that all men, regardless of origin, have certain innate rights and
privileges and that all legal procedures should be guided by respect
for the dignity of the human being. Between 528 and 534 a.d. Jus-
tinian codified the Roman Law, thus preserving it for modern times.

Behind this system of law lay a definite philosophy of government.
The Roman state was able to expand so rapidly because, at least in
early times, the individual subordinated himself to the welfare of the
nation. Consequently, in Rome there was far less individualism than
in Greece. Roman poUtical theory stressed the need for a careful di-
vision in governmental responsibility. In other words, the legislative,
judicial, and executive bodies of the government were separated.

Yet as Rome became stronger, class warfare became more pro-
nounced. Reformers arose, like the Gracchi brothers, who wanted a
better deal for the masses and therefore urged social and economic
legislation; but they were defeated by the wealthy. By the end of
the 2nd century b.c. the Roman government was in the hands of a
small minority of opulent individuals, while the bulk of the people
had no land and were suffering economic privations. Thus arose a
shiftless proletarian class which had no interest in a stable govern-
ment and was frequently led by demagogues who made extravagant
promises.

The civil war between zMarius and Sulla was more than a conflict
of personalities. Marius represented the people, whereas Sulla cham-
pioned the propertied interests. When Sulla was victorious, he insti-
tuted a reign of terror in Rome during which many lost their lives.
The leaders of the common people were slaughtered.

Under Julius Caesar the first steps in the direction of totalitarian-
ism were taken. He decreased the power of the senate and central-
ized governmental administration. His work was carried on by
Augustus, who strengthened one-man government and tried to
restore the old concepts of Roman piety. His descendants, however,
did not live up to his ideals. One was Caligula, a madman; another
was Nero, who distinguished himself by burning Rome, by whole-
sale murder in his family, and by persecution of the Christians.

In 69 A.D. a new family, that of the Flavian emperors, took over.
They strengthened the Roman monarchy and improved empire

THE FOUNDATIONS 247

administration. At the same time they tried to secure the frontiers
against the barbarian invasions. Now emperor worship became part
of the Roman system of government.

The Flavian emperors were followed by the Antonines. Gibbon
maintained that in this period Rome reached its climax, but perhaps
Gibbon overidealized the reign of the Antonines. Three emperors
especially were eminent in this period— Trajan, who expanded the
Roman empire; Hadrian, who strengthened the internal administra-
tion of Rome; and Aiarcus Aurelius, who ruled as a philosopher-
king.

During the next century the empire was convulsed by revolution
and weakened by the growing power of the army. Diocletian and
Constantine tried to stem the tide, but their efforts were in vain. The
pressure of the barbarians became more pronounced; economic con-
ditions grew more desperate; inflation was rampant; and political
authority was weakened by public irresponsibihty.

The decline of the Roman spirit did not occur suddenly but was
the result of a gradual change. Tacitus, who wrote at the close of
the I St century a.d., already realized how Rome had altered. He
compared the virtues of the Germans with the moral lethargy of the
Roman citizens. The Roman family was disintegrating, he wrote,
and young men had a passion for unusual vices instead of simple
virtues, and were perverted by a philosophy of extreme hedonism.

It is quite certain that the Roman spirit was undermined by con-
tact with Oriental ideals. From it arose the deification of the
emperor, the decline of public morals, and the disregard of citizen-
ship. The vices which came to Rome made for effeminacy in char-
acter. Many Roman citizens were so dedicated to sensual pleasures
that they had no interest in the affairs of their government.

In inheriting Greek culture the Romans did not receive an un-
mixed blessing. Greek studies became fashionable in society, but in
taking up Greek literature many of the youth of Rome were led
away from public duties and, instead, devoted themselves to philo-
sophical speculation. It has frequently been pointed out that the
Romans lacked originality in their speculation. Like modern Amer-
icans, they borrowed and imitated alien ideas. However, they did
not assimilate them.

It can be readily understood that the Romans were far more skill-
ful in applying their ideas than in developing new theories. They
definitely lacked spiritual depth, and thus they were in constant
danger of becoming intellectual parasites. Frequently in Roman

248 THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

literature we find a spirit of satiety which indicates an immense
weariness.

To some extent, the Romans were blessed with too many material
goods, and thus they could not sufficiently appreciate the realm of
the spirit. On the other hand, as Roman history developed, there
arose a vast class which was denied any material privileges and was
consequently ready to succumb to any type of superstition. In short,
Roman culture provided for a multitude of contradictions which, in
the long run, led to the downfall of the empire.

ROMAN LITERATURE

Conventionally, Roman literature is divided into three periods. The
first is the formative period, which lasted from approximately 300
to 100 B.C. It was marked by the development of comedy, especially
by Plautus, who had a Rabelaisian sense of humor; and by Terence,
who was more sophisticated and unlike Plautus did not appeal to the
common people.

The second period is regarded as the height of Roman literature.
Under the republic it saw the emergence of such outstanding writers
as Catullus, Lucretius, Cicero, and Julius Caesar. Catullus specialized
in love poems, which have seldom been surpassed in intensity of feel-
ing and depth of passion. Representative is his poem Love is all:

"Let us, Lesbia darling, still
Live our life, and love our fill;
Heeding not a jot, howe'er
Churlish dotards chide or stare!
Suns go down, but 'tis to rise
Brighter in the morning skies;
But when sets our httle light.
We must sleep in endless night.
A thousand kisses grant me, sweet;
With a hundred these complete;
Lip me a thousand more, and then
Another hundred give again.
A thousand add to these, anon
A hundred more, then hurry one
Kiss after kiss without cessation.
Until we lose all calculation;
So envy shall not mar our blisses
By numbering up our tale of kisses."^
1 Translation by T. Martin.

CICERO 249

Lucretius and Cicero devoted themselves mainly to philosophy,
while Julius Caesar became his own historian in Commentaries on
the Gallic wars.

In the second period of this Golden Age we find another group
of notable writers. Vergil is known to every schoolboy as the author
of the Aeneid, which describes the triumphs of Rome and is expres-
sive of the spirit of patriotism. Vergil celebrated the advantages of
rural life in the Georgics and showed that country life is more serene
than an urban existence.

Horace, who satirized Roman society, was a realistic critic of the
social system of his time. His major contribution was in the develop-
ment of lyrical odes.

Ovid was occupied with classical theology in his more serious
moments; and in a lighter vein he dedicated himself to the problems
of love, which he described in a completely natural manner.

Historical writing in this period was advanced by Livy, who
believed that Rome was faced with disintegration. Through his
writing he attempted to awaken a new sense of social responsibiUty
and patriotism in the Roman citizen.

After Livy, Roman literature declined and finally entered the
third period, the Silver Age (14-117 a.d.). Among the writers of
this age were Seneca, the great Stoic philosopher; Martial, who used
the epigram to describe the corruption of the society of his day;
Juvenal, who satirized with a sense of futihty; and Tacitus, a master
stylist, who, through his Ger?nania, tried to halt the decay of Roman
society.

After this period Roman literature produced only mediocre fig-
ures. A religious tone, which found its climactic expression in The
consolation of philosophy by Boethius, came more and more to
prevail.

In general, Roman hterature is not distinguished by originality.
Borrowing freely from Greek models, it specialized in epic tales. It
lacks the cosmic perspective of such dramatists as Aeschylus and
Sophocles. It does not always adhere to the canons of good taste. It
is often governed by didactic purposes instead of being concerned
with an objective and universal account of life.

CICERO

The eclecticism of the Roman spirit is well represented by Cicero.
He was so deeply impressed by the conflict existing among the

2SO THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

various philosophical systems that he felt no intellectual certainty-
could be achieved. Hence, he relied on probability as his guide.

He tried to combine the features of the various philosophies, thus
creating a mixture of Skepticism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism: "If
it is a considerable matter to understand any one of the systems of
philosophy singly, how much harder is it to master them all! Yet
this is the task that confronts those whose principle is to discover
the truth by the method of arguing both for and against all the
schools. In an undertaking so extensive and so arduous, I do not
profess to have attained success, though I do claim to have attempted
it. At the same time it would be impossible for the adherents of this
method to dispense altogether with any standard of guidance. This
matter it is true I have discussed elsewhere more thoroughly; but
some people are so dull and slow of apprehension that they appear
to require repeated explanations. Our position is not that we hold
that nothing is true, but that we assert that all true sensations are
associated with false ones so closely resembling them that they con-
tain no infallible mark to guide our judgment and assent. From this
followed the corollary, that many sensations are probable, that is,
though not amounting to a full perception they are yet possessed
of a certain distinctness and clearness, and so can serve to direct the
conduct of the wise man."-

In his religious doctrines Cicero firmly believed in the innate
idea of God and rejected the mechanistic world- view of the Epi-
cureans. Like the Stoics, he affirmed a belief in Providence and
the government of the universe by divine design. Still, he did not
believe in divination and had only contempt for oracles and sacri-
fices and poked fun at the cult of astrology. He thought the soul
immortal, though in his private letters he did not touch upon life
after death.

In his ethical system he did not agree with the Stoics that self-
sufficiency is the end of hfe. He was too practical and had read too
much of Plato and Aristotle. Thus he felt that external goods con-
tribute to man's perfection.

In his political theories Cicero spoke of universal citizenship. He
made much of the concept of natural law, which he regarded as the
foundation of political authority. Because of natural law, he thought
all men have definite rights and privileges. He made it clear that the
state must be founded upon ethical authority and cannot be an end
in itself. Among the various forms of government he preferred

2 Cicero, On the nature of the gods, Bk. i (Rackham's translation).

SENECA 251

monarchy. His second choice was aristocracy. As for democracy,
he had no sympathy whatsoever with this form of government.

SENECA

More significant than Cicero's work is the philosophy of Seneca. He
was born in 4 b.c. in Spain. Receiving an excellent education in his
youth, he absorbed both Stoicism and Pythagoreanism. His father
was extremely wealthy, and Seneca, through financial manipulations,
added to the family fortune. For eight years he was exiled on the
island of Corsica, but in 48 a.d. he was called back to become the
tutor of Nero. Evidently he did not succeed too well in his system of
education, for Nero was one of the worst rulers in Roman history.
Eventually he incurred the enmity of his pupil, who charged that
he had plotted against his life. Seneca, knowing what would result,
chose the most graceful way out— suicide. In the final moments of
his life he did not lose composure but remained calm and tranquil.

In Seneca's character we find strange contradictions. On the one
hand, he possessed immense wealth; but on the other hand, he said a
great deal about the advantages of poverty. It may be said to his
credit, however, that he always lived simply and practiced the tenets
of humanitarianism.

Among his works, especially impressive is a letter which he wrote
to his mother during the first year of his exile. In it he told her that
his miseries, after all, were not so great and that she should not grieve
on his account. He had learned to find satisfaction and happiness in
eternal things instead of relying on the fickle benefits of fortune. He
had never been overcome by his prosperity, he wrote, and so now
he could not be overwhelmed by his exile. To some extent, he was
finding advantages in his fate, for now he had real leisure and could
contemplate life objectively. He continued by pointing out that
man needs very little to be happy. We are rich or poor not because
of external advantages but because of the desires of the soul. The
early Romans, he reminded his mother, had been poor, yet had they
not lived a more heroic existence? Nor was he worried, so he told
her, about public disgrace, for, after all, he had to be the judge of
his own actions. He would be answerable for them. He reminded her
that there are many sources of consolation. She should think of him
as happy and cheerful and not worry about him. Above all, he ad-
vised her to study philosophy in order to heal her wounds and cure
her sickness. Philosophy, he was certain, would banish all anxiety,
all sorrow, and all distress.

252 THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

Among the works of Seneca we find: On anger, Oii the brevity
of life, On the tra?iquillity of the soul, On clemency, On the con-
stancy of the sage, On benefits. On providence, On a happy life.
The last treatise is especially revealing. The first chapter starts by
showing that the happy life is not to be gained by searching for
material advantages.

In his concept of education, Seneca neglected the sciences. He had
little use for rhetoric, and he regarded the study of literature as
academic. On the other hand, he had a high respect for philosophic
discipline.

Seneca divided philosophy into three parts: moral, natural, and
rational. "The first concerns our manners; the second searches the
works of Nature; and the third furnishes us with propriety of words
and arguments, and the faculty of distinguishing, that we may not
be imposed upon with tricks and fallacies. The causes of things fall
under natural philosophy, arguments under rational, and actions
under moral. Moral philosophy is again divided into matter of jus-
tice, which arises from the estimation of things and of men; and into
affections and actions; and a failing in any one of these disorders all
the rest: for what does it profit us to know the true value of things
if we be transported by our passions? or to master our appetites
without understanding the when, the what, the how, and other cir-
cumstances of our proceedings? For it is one thing to know the rate
and dignity of things, and another to know the little nicks and
springs of acting. Natural philosophy is conversant about things cor-
poreal and incorporeal; the disquisition of causes and effects, and
the contemplation of the cause of causes. Rational philosophy is
divided into logic and rhetoric; the one looks after words, sense, and
order; the other treats barely of words, and the significations of
them. Socrates places all philosophy in morals; and wisdom in the
distinguishing of good and evil. It is the art and law of Hfe, and it
teaches us what to do in all cases, and, like good marksmen, to hit
the white at any distance."^

He advocated the virtue of self-examination. Every night, he
advised, we should ask ourselves searching questions. If we do this,
we will have fewer vices and achieve peace of mind.

Seneca appealed to Providence, for he regarded God as a father
who is concerned with all his children: "He keeps a strict hand over
those that he loves, and by the rest he does as we do by our slaves;
he lets them go on in hcense and boldness. As the master gives his

3 Seneca, On a happy life, ch. 4.

EPICTETUS 253

most hopeful scholars the hardest lessons, so does God deal with the
most generous spirits; and the cross encounters of fortune we are
not to look upon as a cruelty but as a contest: the familiarity of
dangers brings us to the contempt of them, and that part is strongest
which is most exercised: the seaman's hand is callous, the soldier's
arm is strong, and the tree that is most exposed to the wind takes the
best root: there are people that live in a perpetual winter, in extrem-
ity of frost and penury, where a cave, a lock of straw, or a few
leaves, is all their covering, and wild beasts their nourishment; all
this by custom is not only made tolerable, but when it is once taken
up upon necessity, by little and little, it becomes pleasant to them.
Why should we then count that condition of life a calamity which
is the lot of many nations? There is no state of life so miserable but
there are in it remissions, diversions, nay, and delights too; such is
the benignity of Nature toward us, even in the severest accidents of
human life. ... So that we should not only submit to God, but assent
to him, and obey him out of duty, even if there were no necessity."^

Throughout this book Seneca indicated the disadvantages of the
sensual life and castigated the Romans for making so many provisions
for their bellies and paying so little attention to their virtues. Such
sensuality can have no beneficial results, he averred; it can only un-
dermine the body and lead to disease and infirmity. What, then, are
the results of luxury? First, it leads to superfluity; then to wicked-
ness; and finally men become slaves to their appetites.

He reminded us not to judge harshly the faults of others but to be
conscious of our own shortcomings. He taught the virtue of mutual
co-operation and the need for living for one another. Disregarding
national boundaries, he spoke of one human society in which all are
equal under the providence of God.

EPICTETUS

Unlike Seneca, Epictetus was not blessed by material advantages, for
he was a slave and suffered all his life from ill health. He attended
Epaphroditus, one of the freedmen of Nero, who allowed him to be
instructed in philosophy and later emancipated him from slavery.
When the Stoic philosophers were banished by Domitian, Epictetus
was included among them. He went to Nicopolis, where he opened

a school in which he taught until he died.

The central doctrine of Epictetus i^ faith in God/ He constantly
spoke about the works of Providence. "And what words are suffi-

254 THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

cient to praise them and set them forth according to their worth?
For if we had understanding, ought we to do anything else both
jointly and severally than to sing hymns and bless the deity, and to
tell of his benefits? Ought we not when we are digging and plough-
ing and eating to sing this hymn to God? 'Great is God, who has
given us such implements with which we shall cultivate the earth:
great is God who has given us hands, the power of swallowing, a
stomach, imperceptible growth, and the power of breathing while
we sleep.' This is what we ought to sing on every occasion, and to
sing the greatest and most divine hymn for giving us the faculty of
comprehending these things and using a proper way. Well then,
since most of you have become blind, ought there not to be some man
to fill this office, and on behalf of all to sing the hymn to God? For
what else can I do, a lame old man, than sing hymns to God? If then
I was a nightingale, I would do the part of a nightingale. If I were
a swan, I would do hke a swan. But now I am a rational creature,
and I ought to praise God: this is my work; I do it, nor will I desert
this post, so long as I am allowed to keep it; and I exhort you to join
in this same song."^ \

We must realize, Epictetus wrote, that tha spirit of God is within
each one of us. Thus we must strive to uphoT3~the dignity of the
divine force.

He taught a philosophy of consolation. "Never say about any
thing, I have lost it, but say I have restored it. Is your child dead?
It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored. Has
your estate been taken from you? Has not then this also been re-
stored? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But what is
it to you, by whose hands the giver demanded it back? So long as
he may allow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to an-
other, as travelers do with their inn."^

Epictetus counsels us to behave in life as if we were attending a
banquet: "Suppose that something is carried round and is opposite to
you. Stretch out your hand and take a portion with decency. Sup-
pose that it passes by you. Do not detain it. Suppose that it is not yet
come to you. Do not send your desire forward to it, but wait till it
is opposite to you. Do so with respect to children, so with respect
to a wife, so with respect to magisterial offices, so with respect to
wealth, and you will be some time a worthy partner of the banquets
of the gods. But if you take none of the things which are set before

^Epictetus, The discourses, Bk. i, ch. xvi (translated by George Long).
® Epictetus, The encheiridion, or Manual, xi.

MARCUS AURELIUS 255

you, and even despise them, then you will be not only a fellow
banqueter with the gods, but also a partner with them in power."^

He reminds us that we are actors in a play and advises us to play
our roles well. If we are put into this life as magistrates, we must
exercise justice in our decisions. If we are paralyzed physically, we
must not complain of an unhappy lot. It is not our task to select the
part which has been given to us by God, who governs everything
in the universe. ,-' \

Epictetus beheved the(Golden RuJ^ to be a vahd precept for life.
"When any person treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that
he does this or says this because he thinks that it is his duty. It is not
possible then for him to follow that which seems right to you, but
that which seems right to himself. Accordingly, if he is wrong in
his opinion, he is the person who is hurt, for he is the person who
has been deceived; for if a man shall suppose the true conjunction
to be false, it is not the conjunction which is hindered, but the man
who has been deceived about it. If you proceed then from these
opinions, you will be mild in temper to him who reviles you: for
say on each occasion. It seemed so to him.

"Every thing has two handles, the one by which it may be borne,
the other by which it may not. If your brother acts unjustly, do not
lay hold of the act by that handle wherein he acts unjustly, for this
is the handle which cannot be borne; but lay hold of the other, that
he is your brother, that he was nurtured with you, and you will lay
hold of the thing by that handle by which it can be borne."'^

The moral system of Epictetus is indeed magnificent. Condemn-
ing capital punishment, he urged legal reform, so that mercy would
prevail. He certainly did not believe in slavery. In all his activities, he
thought he was guided by God, and his piety almost reminds us of
the Christian saints.

MARCUS AURELIUS

While Epictetus was a slave, Marcus Aurelius was an emperor. He
was educated in the Stoic school of philosophy and early in life was
taught the virtue of simplicity. When he ascended the throne in
161 A.D., he was confronted by the rebellion of the barbarians and
the insurrection of Parthia. Against his wish, he had to take com-
mand of his armies, and during the next years he tried to bring peace
to the Roman Empire.

^ Ibid., XV.

8 Ibid., XLII, XLIII,

256 THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

Misfortune followed him wherever he went. One of his trusted
friends, Cassius, was envious for the throne and rebelled. There were
ugly rumors about his wife. His family was decimated by death, and
only one child remained.

As emperor, Marcus Aurelius was charitable; he always aided
those who were unfortunate, and he endowed educational and
philosophical institutions. His record, however, was marred by his
persecution of the Christians and by his appointment of Verus as
co-emperor of the East, an act which in later years led to the per-
manent division of the Roman Empire. His son, Commodus, distin-
guished himself by unusual cruelty and by inefficient and corrupt
empire administration.

In spite of these reverses we must not underestimate the idealism
of Marcus Aurelius. In his Meditations we have the portrait of a
noble man, intensely earnest and forever conscious of high moral
purposes. He started his Aleditatiojis by acknowledging his debt to
his family and teachers. He was grateful that he had been imbued
with a love for philosophy and was blessed by a loving family, espe-
cially by a virtuous wife. Roman gossip had it otherwise, but evi-
dently Marcus Aurelius was not disturbed by it.

We are not to be distressed, he tells us, by meeting unpleasant
people, for we must realize that all of us are made for co-operation:
"Begin the morning by saying to yourself: I shall meet with the
busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All
these ill qualities they have by reason of their ignorance of good and
evil. But I, who have seen the nature of the good (that it is beau-
tiful) and of the bad (that it is ugly) and the nature of him who
does wrong . . . can neither be injured by any of them (for no one
can fix on me what is ugly) nor can I be angry with my kinsman,
nor hate him. We are made for co-operation, like feet, Hke hands,
like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act
against one another, then, is contrary to nature, and it is acting
against one another to be vexed and to turn away."^

Marcus Aurelius reminds us that we may depart from life at any
moment. In other words, we must regulate our thoughts and act
with perfect justice. We can take comfort in the fact that the gods
exist and provide for our welfare.

There are two types of knowledge: one stresses physical science,
which Marcus Aurelius regarded as quite useless; the other is con-
cerned with virtue: "Nothing is more wretched than a man who

^ Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 2:1 (translation by G. Long).

MARCUS AURELIUS 257

traverses everything in a round, and pries into things beneath the
earth, as the poet says, and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds
of his neighbors, without perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to
the spirit within him, and to reverence it sincerely. And reverence
of the spirit consists in keeping it pure from passion and thought-
lessness and dissatisfaction with what comes from gods and men. For
the things from the gods merit veneration for their excellence; and
the things from men should be dear to us by reason of kinship; and
sometimes even, in a manner, they move our pity by reason of men's
ignorance of good and bad; this defect being not less than that which
deprives us of the power of distinguishing things that are white and
black."io

Life, he pointed out, is in a constant state of flux, and the body is
subject to decay. We cannot rely on fame, nor can we trust in for-
tune. What, then, can support a man? One thing, and only one-
philosophy.

"But this consists in keeping the spirit within a man free from
violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing noth-
ing without a purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feel-
ing the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and be-
sides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming
from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and
finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing
else than dissolution of the elements of which every living being is
compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in
each continually changing into another, why should a man have any
apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements?
For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according
to nature."^^

He counseled us to avoid all envy and suspicion and always to
keep our thoughts sincere: "Do not waste the remainder of your life
in thoughts about others, when you do not refer your thoughts to
some object of common utility. For you lose the opportunity of
doing something else when you have such thoughts as these: 'What
is such a person doing, and why, and what is he saying, and what is
he thinking of, and what is he contriving?' and whatever else of the
kind makes us wander away from the observation of our own ruling
power. We ought then to check in the series of our thoughts every-
thing that is without a purpose and useless, but most of all the over-
do Ibid., 2:13.
^ Ibid., 2:17.

258 THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

curious feeling and the malignant; and a man should accustom him-
self to think of those things only about which if one should sud-
denly ask, 'What have you now in your thoughts?' with perfect
openness you might immediately answer, this or that; so that from
your words it should be plain that everything in you is simple and
benevolent, and such as befits a social animal, one that cares not for
thoughts about pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any
rivalry or envy and suspicion, or anything else for which you would
blush if you should say that you had it in your mind."^-

We cannot find tranquillity, according to Marcus Aurelius, by
seeking retreats in the country or by visiting the seashore. "But this
is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is in
your power whenever you shall choose to retire into yourself. For
nowhere, either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble,
does a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has
within him such thoughts that by looking into them he is imme-
diately in perfect tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing
else thamthe good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to
yourself this retreat, and renew yourself; and let your principles
be brief and fundamental, which, as soon as you shall recur to
them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send
you back free from all discontent with the things to which you
return."^^

We are to turn our thoughts to universal things; thus we fulfill
our function as human beings: "In the morning when you rise un-
willingly, let this thought be present: I am rising to the work of a
human being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do the
things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the world?
Or have I been made for this, to lie in the bedclothes and keep my-
self warm?— But this is more pleasant.— Do you exist then to take
your pleasure, and not at all for action or exertion? Do you not see
the little plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees work-
ing together to put in order their several parts of the universe? And
are you unwilling to do the work of a human being, and do you not
make haste to do that which is according to your nature? "^^

While the final tone of Marcus Aurelius is melancholy, it contains
a trace of hope. We are infinitesimal— our hope hes in living accord-
ing to nature.

^2 Ibid., 3:4.

13 /Z;/^., 4:3.

^* Ibid., 5:1.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROMAN STOICISM 259

"What do you wish? To continue to exist? Well, do you wish to
have sensation? Movement? Growth? And then again to cease to
grow? To use speech? To think? What is there of all these things
which seem to you worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value
on all these things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow
reason and God. But it is inconsistent with honoring reason and God
to be troubled because by death a man will be deprived of the other
things.

"How small a part of the boundless and unfathomless time is
assigned to every man! It is very soon swallowed up in the eternal.
And how small a part of the whole substance! And how small a part
of the universal soul! And on what a small clod of the whole earth
you creep! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except
to act as your nature leads you, and to endure that which the com-
mon nature brings."^^

Marcus Aurelius did not beHeve in immortality. His ethical system
was not buttressed by the hope of Hfe after death. An immense
weariness prevails in his speculations. We have almost the feeling
that Roman speculation had exhausted itself.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROMAN STOICISM

In summarizing the contributions of Stoicism, we find that it had an
enormous impact on both ancient and modern civilization. Stoicism
was not merely a system of theoretical speculation but a practical
philosophy which changed the existing social institutions.

( 1 ) Stoicism upheld the validity of natural law through which all
men are equal and all men share basic rights.

(2) Stoicism portrayed the ideal traits of the Roman character,
such as self-control, soberness, temperance, and dignity under all
circumstances. It made the Roman character more humanitarian,
especially through its attitude toward slavery and social amusements.

(3) Stoicism proclaimed the supremacy of reason. Man, thus,
could best find himself by following his rational capacity and ad-
hering to his sense of duty. Thus Stoicism anticipated the emerg-
ence of idealism, which we find later in the Kantian philosophy.

(4) Stoicism paved the way for the acceptance of Christianity. In
fact. Stoicism markedly influenced the work of St. Paul, the greatest
of the Christian apostles. Like Christianity, Stoicism preached the
doctrine of love and universal co-operation, but the essential differ-
ence between Stoicism and Christianity Hes in the secular outlook

1^ Ibid., 12:31-32.

26o THE ROMAN SPIRIT OF PHILOSOPHY

of the Stoic thinkers. Generally their moral doctrines were not but-
tressed by a belief in immortality. Also, Stoicism regarded apathy
as the highest virtue whereas Christianity teaches a full expression
of emotions.

We must not neglect, however, some of the negative aspects of
the Stoic gospel. Its antiscientific bias, its rejection of the heliocen-
tric theory, its stress on austerity, its opposition to pleasure— all these
views hindered the development of a balanced philosophical attitude.
From a scientific standpoint Epicurean philosophy was far superior
to Stoicism, for it avoided the concept of design, was less anthropo-
morphic, and gave a systematic and natural account of the universe.

Still, we must not underestimate the contribution of Stoicism to
philosophy and civilization. Seldom have moral teachings been ex-
plained so fervently and so impressively as they were by such think-
ers as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Their books will always re-
main as milestones of Roman civilization, as symbols of an uncon-
querable faith, and as expressions of the greatness of a genuine
morality.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. How can the strength of Roman civilization be explained?

2. What were the major contributions of Rome to world civilization?

3. Describe the spirit of Roman literature.

4. How can happiness be achieved, according to Seneca?

5. How did Seneca criticize contemporary Roman society?

6. What was the view of Epictetus regarding Providence?

7. Describe the life and philosophy of Marcus Aurelius.

8. What are the conclusions of Marcus Aurelius regarding human hap-
piness?

9. Why has Marcus Aurelius been popular in the history of philosophy?
ID. What were the main interests of Roman Stoicism?

CONTRIBUTIONS OF
SKEPTICISM

SIGNIFICANCE

t has been the custom of many historians of Greek philosophy to
neglect the concepts of Skepticism. Very often they devote only a
few pages to the Skeptics. They regard them as minor incidents in
the stream of Greek knowledge and as representatives of a decadent
philosophy, thus contrasting the constructive and affirmative philos-
ophies of Plato and Aristotle with the destructive and relativistic
philosophies of the Skeptics. Such a view, however, does not rest
upon an objective examination of Skeptical philosophy. Thinkers
like Carneades and Aenesidemus compare very favorably with the
outstanding philosophers of Greece, such as Plato and Aristotle.^
What the Skeptics lacked in speculative boldness they made up in
profound and scintillating criticism.

The Greek Skeptics are particularly significant from the stand-
point of modern philosophy, which likewise is based on the method
of doubt and which is suspicious of any absolute foundations. In

^ Cf. Brochard, Les Sceptiques grecs; Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics, Fyrrho to
Sextus; Patrick, The Greek Sceptics.

261

262 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

many ways we have returned to the wisdom of the Skeptics, and,
Hke them, we are satisfied with a partial and tentative evaluation of
the universe.

While the philosophy of ancient Skepticism was to some extent
destructive, it was at the same time a liberating influence. It empha-
sized the fact that the mind of man must be emancipated from old
superstitions and unexamined biases and that without such a purge
no valid philosophical speculation can be carried on. Because of this
emphasis. Skepticism became the foundation of science. If it had
triumphed permanently, Greek science would have been more em-
pirical and \\'ould have made a more significant contribution to
civilization.

Skepticism, however, was destined to become only an interlude
in the intellectual history of ancient times; and, with the rise of the
various religious philosophies, its teachings lost their force and were
soon forgotten.

Greek Skepticism can be divided into three periods. The first saw
the work of such philosophers as Pyrrho and Timon. It was the
formative period of Skepticism, during which its attacks were espe-
cially directed against ethical absolutism.

The second, or middle, period was under the sway of Arcesilaus
and Carneades. Its center was, strangely enough, the Platonic Acad-
emy. In this period the Stoics were especially attacked, and the con-
cept of probabiHty was developed in an exact form.

The third period of Skepticism was dominated by medical studies,
and during it Skepticism reached its maturity under the leadership
of Aenesidemus, Agrippa, and Sextus Empiricus. After these think-
ers, the Skeptical influence waned. During the Middle Ages it was
almost nonexistent.

THE ORIGIN OF SKEPTICISM

The Skeptical influence was never absent in Greek thought, for the
Greek mind, from the very beginning, believed in a tolerant and
many-sided interpretation of life and the universe. The variety of
gods, the differences among the religious cults, the contrast between
idealism and actuality— all these factors were bound to create a
Skeptical attitude. As we have noticed, even in the cosmological
period of Greek thinking a marked Skepticism arose, especially in the
system of Xenophanes. He stated that all gods are interpreted and
evaluated according to human examples and that we project various
human traits and idiosyncrasies upon the deities.

THE ORIGIN OF SKEPTICISM 263

The same criticism was made by Heraclitus, who hkewise believed
his contemporaries deluded when it came to the worship of the gods.
Heraclitus also showed that the universe changes constantly and the
senses alone are not to be trusted. Heraclitus exerted a powerful
impact upon the Skeptics by his concept of relativity and his behef
that opposites are one. The Skeptics, on the other hand, did not
accept the affirmative part of his philosophy, for unlike the Stoics
they did not believe that the universe is governed by reason and
that all change exemplifies definite cosmic laws.

Besides Heraclitus, the influence of Democritus is noteworthy.
The latter, as we have noted, had a deep influence on the Epicureans.
The Skeptics also appreciated him; from him they absorbed an un-
derstanding of the mechanical arrangement of nature, namely, that
necessity governs everything, and a touch of agnosticism regard-
ing the existence of the gods. Incidentally, the ethical theory of
Democritus also played a role in Skepticism, for he believed in
cheerfulness, which was to be the result of proper intellectual and
emotional orientation. The Skeptics, in a similar vein, maintained
that a correct intellectual attitude leads to moral emancipation of the
individual.

Even more influential than Democritus in their impact on Skep-
ticism were the Sophists. To them, as we have noted, the funda-
mental problem of philosophy was man; and they adhered to rela-
tive rather than universal standards. But the difli^erence between the
Sophists and the Skeptics lies in the fact that the Sophists did not
arrange their doubts in a systematic manner, whereas the Skeptics
developed a most coherent and well-defined philosophy.

The Sophists, it must also be remembered, were teachers of rhet-
oric. They believed it possible to teach the art of public speaking
and statesmanship. The Skeptics, on the other hand, did not have a
high regard for social and political aifairs. They believed more
strongly than the Sophists in living apart from society. Of course,
certain exceptions can be noted, especially in the case of Carneades,
who represented Athens in a very important diplomatic mission to
Rome. Generally speaking, however, the statement holds true. The
Sophists lived in a climactic period of Greek development, while the
Skeptics were living in an age already showing signs of decline and
disintegration.

The development of Skepticism was also aided by Socrates. To
the Skeptics, Socrates was noteworthy because of his method of
questioning. Like Socrates, the Skeptics stressed self-examination;

264 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

but, unlike him, they did not arrive at categorical conclusions. They
rejected Socrates' view of the world as governed by Providence; in-
stead, they appealed to a strictly scientific interpretation of the uni-
verse. Still, we must not minimize the influence of Socrates on Skep-
ticism, for many of the Skeptics used the same method. They, too,
had the market place as their classroom; they, too, regarded them-
selves as gadflies; and they, too, thought it their task to make their
fellow-citizens less complacent and less pretentious in their views of
religion and morality.

The direct successors of Socrates, such as the Megarics, the Cyn-
ics, and the Cyrenaics, stimulated the development of Skepticism by
raising many questions regarding the validity of sense knowledge
and by studying various logical fallacies. The ?io?mnalis?n of the
Cynics and Cyrenaics certainly was a preliminary attack against all
universal standards. We find many of the same arguments in the
Skeptics, who, however, were more extreme in their denial of uni-
versal truth.

Strangely enough, the philosophy of Plato also became a tool of
the Skeptics. Not that they believed in the theory of Ideas, but they
used the Platonic arguments in their thesis that the physical world
is subject to change and that man's perception is not to be trusted.
Plato had made a basic distinction between opinion and knowledge.
The Skeptics reduced all knowledge to jnere opinioji and thus indi-
cated that no absolute conclusions can be held.

Many of the arguments of the Skeptics resemble the arguments of
Epicureanism. Especially in the realm of religion is the similarity
between the two movements striking. Like the Epicureans, the
Skeptics did not believe in Providence; nor did they accept divi-
nation. Therefore their philosophy bears a completely scientific
character.

It has been occasionally suggested that Buddhism exerted an influ-
ence on the Skeptical movement. Pyrrho had visited India, and he
may possibly have come into contact with the Buddhist way of
thinking, but there is no definite verification for this conjecture. We
can find several similarities: Hke Buddhism, the Skeptical philosophy
was antimetaphysical, regarding cosmological problems as insignifi-
cant and believing in emancipation from external things. But Skep-
ticism was less nihilistic than Indian Buddhism. Its main foundations
were scientific, not religious.

Above all, we must not neglect the impact of medicine upon
Skeptical philosophy. Greek medicine was divided into two camps.

THE ORIGIN OF SKEPTICISM 265

One was theoretical, based on philosophic abstractions; the other
was severely empirical and made a detailed investigation of diseases.
The empirical school of medicine abhorred any type of vagueness.
It stressed the fact that diseases can be cured only through analytical
study of anatomy and physiology. In this respect it was far superior
to medieval medicine, which was frequently subordinated to theo-
logical beliefs.

To read the writings which have been ascribed to Hippocrates,
the father of Greek medicine, is to receive the impression of an ex-
perimental mind. He used the inductive method and thought all con-
clusions not based on actual observation likely to be fallacious. His
knowledge of the bones and muscles was up-to-date, although his
theories regarding the nervous system were primitive. He showed
the limitations of Greek science by his assertion that the body is
made up of four elements— earth, water, fire, and air— and that it
consists of four types of fluids— blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and
black bile. These theories strike the modern student of medicine as
quite naive and unscientific, but Hippocrates, we must remember,
had a naturalistic concept of health and appreciated the effect of
climatic factors upon the human body. Furthermore, his ideals re-
garding the medical profession as contained in the Hippocratic Oath
are still being followed in our own time.

The progress of medicine was especially promoted in Alexandria.
There Herophilus distinguished himself by researches in the struc-
ture of the eye and the function of the brain. Erasistratus made val-
uable discoveries regarding the functions of veins and arteries. It was
in Alexandria that notable advances were made in surgery and theo-
retical medical research, which extended not only to human beings
but also to animals.

All these trends had a marked influence upon the Skeptical philos-
ophers. We note, for example, that Heraclides of Tarent was one of
the teachers of Aenesidemus, who achieved exactness of observation
under the impact of the broad experimental influence of his teacher.
In short, the empirical school of medicine proved to be an intense
stimulus to the Skeptical movement. It indicated that philosophy
must be based on observation and experiments and that it cannot
progress by the use of generalizations. The empirical school of med-
icine also demonstrated that advancement in philosophy does not
depend upon a complete unification of all theories but is best
achieved through a better understanding of specific facts and spe-
cific concepts.

266 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

THE ENEMIES OF SKEPTICISM

To appreciate the immense contributions of Skepticism, we must
understand the objects of its attacks. Skepticism was especially op-
posed to the Stoic philosophy. Almost in every way the Skeptics
denied the validity of the Stoic arguments. They certainly did not
believe in pantheism, nor did they regard virtue as an end in itself.
Nor did they accept the Stoic explanation of divination and the
existence of the gods. Most of the time the Skeptics looked down on
the Stoic sages, whom they regarded as extremely credulous and
rather naive in their outlook upon the universe.

The Skeptics not merely attacked the Stoics but included in their
assaults the other schools of philosophy, especially the Platonists
and Aristotelians. They tried to demolish the elaborate cosmological
systems of both Plato and Aristotle by showing that they were based
on a false assumption regarding human knowledge. According to
the Skeptics, man cannot achieve an understanding of first principles,
and reason cannot present us with a superior reality. In short, like
Voltaire, the Skeptics claimed that metaphysics is essentially a waste
of time and only leads to confusion.

It must be remembered that they were ardent students of history.
Many of them traveled a great deal; everywhere they observed how
customs and institutions differ. What was held in honor by one
nation was ridiculed by another. The taboos of one city were cheer-
fully accepted by another. No wonder the Skeptics did not believe
in absolute standards and stressed suspension of judgnient!

In reading the Skeptical treatises, especially Sextus Empiricus, we
find a rather sophisticated spirit which reminds us somewhat of 20th-
century philosophy. The Skeptics were attempting to fight against
the biases of the popular mind. They were trying to eradicate the
false conceptions taught by religion. In this attempt they cham-
pioned intellectual freedom, which, to them, was the only hope for
humanity.

It is important to realize that the Skeptics did not view philosophy
as an absolute science. The philosopher, to them, had no superior
insight and no special revelations of reality. Rather, he was a critic
of contemporary institutions and of prevalent ideas, and he demon-
strated how man's mind can be purified from obsolete traditions. If
Skepticism had triumphed, it would have led to a reconstruction of
philosophy; but it was defeated, and thus the spirit of criticism was
long quiescent in the history of civilization.

PYRRHO 267

PYRRHO

Pyrrho is generally regarded as the founder of the Skeptical tradi-
tion. He was born at Elis c. 360 b.c. and is said to have lived to a very
ripe old age. In his youth he was a remarkable student, especially of
literature and science, and very early in his development he took up
the study of philosophy. His teachers introduced him to the Megaric
and Democritean systems.

Adventure entered Pyrrho's life when he accompanied Alexander
the Great on his expedition to India. After the death of Alexander
he went back to Elis, where he spent the remaining years of his life.
He earned his living as a teacher and, like Socrates, believed in a
very informal method of instruction. His teaching was not restricted
to those who were especially interested in philosophy but was ex-
tended to the common people. According to his friends, he pos-
sessed amazing self-control and serenity. Toward physical pain he
showed no fear. It is said that when he underwent an operation he
expressed no emotion whatsoever.

Pyrrho was held in high esteem by his contemporaries, who re-
garded him as a great teacher and were proud of him as lending
intellectual luster to Elis. Despite his Skepticism, he adhered to
established laws since he had no desire to become a revolutionary.
Ironically enough, his life was far more fortunate than that of Soc-
rates, although he was intellectually more subversive than the latter.

The philosophy of Pyrrho is based on the concept that we can
know only phenomena. Reason, then, cannot give us a knowledge
of first principles. We are presented with certain experiences which
we interpret according to certain philosophical tenets. Throughout
his life, Pyrrho noted how philosophers differ among themselves
and how theoretical assertions cannot be considered absolute. He
was skeptical regarding any definite method of achieving truth.
While some believe in the senses, he thought it was only too well
established that the senses are fallible. Those who feel confident in
reason, likewise, have little ground for certainty, for reason, too,
presents us merely with relative standards and depends upon our
own state of enlightenment and upon the culture in which we live.

What then is the best attitude? To Pyrrho, it was an open mind
and a tentative evaluation of all the facts of our existence. To some
extent he was less absolute in his doubts than the later Skeptics.
Hence, he did not assert categorically that there is no truth. He
did not believe that the search for definite knowledge should be

268 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

abandoned. On the positive side, he thought the most adequate
method leads to the suspension of judgment. In other words, any type
of dogmatism must be shunned.

What, then, are the basic elements in the Skeptical attitude?
Pyrrho believed, first of all, in doubt. It is better for the philosopher,
he taught, to deny things than to affirm them categorically. When
we are confronted by any intellectual problem, we must consider
it carefully and see all its aspects, without hastening to a spontaneous
conclusion. We are to keep our minds open all the time and not
make categorical assertions.

In his ethical philosophy, Pyrrho exhibited the same spirit as in his
view of epistemology and metaphysics. Like the Sophists, he be-
lieved ethical standards to be entirely relative. We cannot find,
accordingly, universal certainty in ethics. What is condemned by
one society may be accepted by another. Yet ethical distinctions
are not to be neglected. The wise man will pay due regard to them
and adhere to custom. Like Hume in the 1 8th century, Pyrrho was
a conservative when it came to following established institutions.

It is significant to note that the ethical ideal of Pyrrho was not
entirely negative, for he believed that the right kind of intellectual
and emotional adjustment leads to freedom and to true serenity. If
our minds do not adhere to any set standards, Pyrrho asserted, we
are emancipated from prejudice and achieve a genuine freedom
which leads to an autonomy of the soul.

TIMON

Most of our information about Pyrrho comes from the testimony
of Timon, one of his students. Timon started his career as a dancer
in the theater but soon tired of dancing and devoted himself to
philosophy. At first he was interested in the Alegaric system, but
when convinced of its inadequacy he became an adherent to the
philosophy of Pyrrho. He was an indefatigable traveler. We find
him in Macedonia, in Elis, and in Athens. He was fond of the pleas-
ures of life and, unlike Pyrrho, had an Epicurean strain in his char-
acter.

Timon stated that there is no absolute truth. He attacked the con-
victions of the conventional philosophers and satirized their views
in a treatise called 5/7//. The book takes us to Hades, where an argu-
ment between the various schools of philosophy takes place. All
sides are shown to be inadequate and are ridiculed in the most elo-
quent terms. Only two philosophers are exempt— Pyrrho and Xe-

ARCESILAUS 269

nophanes. In this work Timon showed how the Pyrrhonic method
could be used in clearing up the disputes of philosophy and in
achieving intellectual clarity.

ARCESILAUS

Like Timon, Arcesilaus had a wide intellectual background. He not
only was interested in science and in the arts but was also adept in
logic. He studied under Theophrastus, who was a superior teacher
and gave him the foundation for his scientific knowledge. Later he
joined the Academy and became one of the noted teachers of his
time. He was in contact with many of the princes and kings and was
sent on diplomatic missions by the Athenians. Immensely popular,
he was an impressive scholar and re-introduced the Socratic method
of argument, thus making philosophy more exciting. Abandoning
formal lectures when he became head of the Academy, he taught
his students how to be independent in their assertions and how to
defend their viewpoints. It was his aim to point out the contradic-
tions of the various intellectual systems and to show that probability,
not certainty, must be our guide.

The main attack of Arcesilaus was directed against the Stoics, who
had claimed that one can achieve universal knowledge based on
irresistible impressions. The Stoics, moreover, had made a sharp dis-
tinction between the wise man, who knows the truth, and the masses,
who hve merely by opinion. These views were sharply contradicted
by Arcesilaus. Do we have a definite standard of knowledge? Arce-
silaus answered in the negative. All knowledge, he thought, rests on
opinion. There is no definite distinction between falsehood and
truth. For example, the impression of our dreams is just as irresistible
as the perceptions of our waking existence. The opinion of the fool
is just as definite as the opinion of the wise man. Knowledge of a
thing, in short, does not present us with immediate certainty; it only
gives us probable and relative standards which have to be verified by
experience.

The result of this discussion is the acceptance of relativity. We
must suspend our judgment, Arcesilaus emphasized, when it comes
to intellectual matters, for we cannot make any definite assertions.
As for the Stoic concept of epistemology, it was based on an uncrit-
ical acceptance of certainty, he felt, and it was his task to destroy
the foundations of the Stoic system.

In his ethical ideals Arcesilaus taught that knowledge of moral
laws is secondary. What matters most is action. According to his

270 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

belief, man experiences and feels certain things before he thinks
about them. To live a meaningful life we do not have to be philos-
ophers; rather, we should be practical.

Unlike the Stoics, he did not regard virtue as an end in itself.
We know that he believed in the pleasures of life and occasionally
was not above showing off his learning. Yet he was invariably gen-
erous with his material goods and always ready to help a friend in
need. In Arcesilaus, thus, we find a delightful mixture of hedonism
and skepticism.

CARNEADES

Arcesilaus was surpassed by Carneades, who likewise turned against
Stoic philosophy. He was born c. 213 b.c. and died in 129. He was
adept in the systems of philosophy which existed in his time, es-
pecially in Stoicism, and his teaching was both scholarly and full
of vitality. He was especially skilled in argumentation and often
confused his students about his real opinions because he was able
to present many sides of an argument.

When he went to Rome as one of the elected Greek ambassadors,
in 155 B.C., he made a deep impression on the Roman people. The
reason for the trip was the Athenian pillaging of an allied city, for
which the Athenians were required to pay a large indemnity. They
desired a reduction; hence they sent a diplomatic mission to Rome.

Carneades spoke before distinguished audiences in Rome. Among
his listeners were Cato, the indefatigable enemy of Greek culture,
and other outstanding leaders.

Carneades one day spoke in defense of justice and showed that
the Roman Empire was based on this ideal. The following day he
took the contrary position and indicated that Rome had expanded
through power politics and a disregard for the laws of justice. He
proved that the Romans had violated treaties, destroyed their rivals,
and were intent upon the elimination of Carthage because of this
lust for power. Certainly Rome was not motivated by idealistic
concepts, he pointed out, but had become master of the world
through shrewd manipulation of other nations. He indicated that in
international politics, as in other social relations, there can be no
absolute standards. The action of the Athenians, he therefore con-
cluded, was not to be condemned, for they had only imitated the
principles of the Romans.

We can imagine the shock to the conservative Romans, especially
Cato. Here was a teacher of youth who openly declared that moral

CARNEADES 271

standards are not to be followed. It is not surprising to learn that
Cato determined to prevent the growth of Greek philosophy in
Rome. But he could not stem the tide, and ultimately the spirit of
Carneades triumphed.

In his theory of knowledge Carneades, Hke his predecessors, held
that no definite criterion for truth is possible. Reason, he showed,
cannot present us with absolute standards, for it is not based on im-
mediate certainty; its proofs always rest on relative standards. The
system of dialectic is full of weaknesses; it ends in a vicious circle.
Dialectic, being concerned with the formal relations of propositions,
cannot give us an understanding of the content of experience.

Nor does truth, Carneades reminds us, rest upon an intuitive basis.
If this were so, there would be an absolute standard of knowledge;
but the history of philosophical and scientific opinions demonstrates
that no concept is held universally and acknowledged by all. Car-
neades pointed to the incessant intellectual warfare. Philosophers
can never agree among themselves; they are always at odds. There
is no reason, according to him, to suppose that complete certainty
can be achieved in philosophical arguments. We adhere to various
schools and opinions because of personal biases, not because of our
love for truth.

This is not all. What we think, what we believe, what we accept,
depends on our emotional condition. Intellectual verities thus do not
exist in a vacuum but depend upon our previous adjustment and
our previous outlook on life. Furthermore, Carneades felt, the senses
present us with a constant flux. What appears to us as true at one
time may be false at another. We see an object, then we attribute
various qualities to it, and we jump to a conclusion as to its nature.
It is much better, he believed, to suspend our judgment in regard to
it. If we do so, both science and philosophy may advance at a more
secure rate.

What impresses us especially in the philosophy of Carneades is
his scientific outlook. He advocated that probability be our guide.
There are three stages in this process of probabiHty. We start first
with a simple probability which is applied to an isolated idea. This
is a low degree of probability, for we are not aided by a knowledge
of other concepts and we cannot verify our beliefs.

There is a higher state of probability, which is undisputed. Now
we can unite an idea with other concepts without being contra-
dicted. We can take a certain action on the basis of previous knowl-
edge and previous experience.

272 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

The highest type of probability, however, is one which can be
both tested and verified. Intellectually, we can develop a system of
ideas which have worked in the past and been proved valid. It is
this type of probability which should guide our knowledge and our
intellectual endeavors.

To make the meaning of Carneades concrete, let us imagine we
are trying to select a good teacher. We have a candidate who ap-
pears to have fine traits. This represents the first degree of prob-
ability. Now we look up his past record, which indicates high
intellectual achievement. This is undisputed probability. Finally
we observe him in action, and we make a complete investigation
of his relations with his colleagues, students, and parents. We find
him to be excellent. Thus we have achieved the highest stage of
probability.

Just as in his theory of knowledge, so we find a scientific spirit
in the ethics of Carneades. His speech before the Roman senate in-
dicated that he did not believe in absolute moral standards. The
Stoics, then, were wrong when they stressed the universality of
ethics. Moral codes merely hide human selfishness. In the case of
individuals, moral laws may hold true; but when it comes to nations,
they are usually violated.

Like Hobbes in the 17th century, Carneades upheld self-interest.
Away, then, with abstract principles of right and justice! Away with
superficial idealism!

Like the Sophists, Carneades believed we must study ethics in a
realistic sense without imposing our ideals on the universe. The
standard is nature, he declared, implying that external goods are
not to be shunned and asceticism is not the siimmimi homiin. The
wise man will not disregard the experience of the senses. He will
be careful of his health and try to live in comfort. In short, the
Stoic concept of apathy was not welcomed by Carneades.

In turning to Carneades' theory of religion, we find that he under-
mined the basis of Stoic theology.

"We will begin with the question of the First Principles of the
Universe, and since most theories agree in holding that there are
causes of two kinds, material causes and active causes, we \\'ill begin
by discussing the active causes. These causes are said to count for
more than the material ones. Now the majority of philosophers have
asserted that the supreme active cause is God. We will first, there-
fore, see how the matter stands with God. But there is one pre-
liminary statement which we must make. We Skeptics follow in

CLITOMACHUS 273

practice the way of the world, but \\'ithout holding any opinion
about it. We speak of the gods as existing and offer worship to the
gods and say that they exercise providence, but in saying this we
express no belief, and avoid the rashness of the dogmatisers." -

According to Carneades, we cannot understand the essence of
God: "For if they say that God controls everything, they make
him the author of evil things; if, on the other hand, they say that
he controls some things only, or that he controls nothing, they are
compelled to make God either grudging or impotent, and to do
that is quite obviously an impiety." "^

CLITOMACHUS

Our knowledge of Carneades comes mainly through Clitomachus,
his disciple, who was born in Carthage. For a short period Clito-
machus conducted his own school in Athens, but later he returned
to the Academy and became its head after the death of Crates. Un-
like Carneades, he was more of a commentator and most of the
time repeated the theories of his predecessors. Like Carneades, he
believed that the best intellectual attitude is one which leads to the
suspension of judgment and that any type of intellectual absolutism
must be avoided. The arguments of the various schools of philos-
ophy, he showed, rest upon intellectual vanity, and no definite cer-
tainty can be found.

After Clitomachus, the Academy reverted to dogmatism. This
reversion was apparent to some extent under Philo of Larissa, who
modified the Skepticism of Carneades and affirmed the power of
reason. He wanted to go back to original Platonism. This return
was fully accomplished under Antiochus, the student of Philo, who
at first was a Skeptic but later turned to dogmatism. He lectured in
Rome and Alexandria, as well as at the Academy.

Antiochus was primarily interested in ethics. He attacked absolute
Skepticism, maintaining that any standard of probability is based
on some kind of certainty. To adopt a coherent philosophy, he
maintained, we need conviction. In these arguments he foreshad-
owed the viewpoints of modern idealists, especially Josiah Royce.
The modern idealist, like Antiochus, believes that relative truth
only points to absolute truth and that all fragmentary parts of ex-
perience are connected.

2 Sextiis Eiiipiricus, Hypotyp. iii (quoted in Bevan, Later Greek religion,
p. 52).

3 Ibid., p. 56.

274 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

AENESIDEMUS AND THE PROBLEM OF
CAUSALITY

Probably the most significant representative of Skepticism was
Aenesidemus. With him the scene shifted to Alexandria, which then
became the center of the movement. We know very little about
his life. Authorities differ as to his exact dates, but we can be quite
certain that he lived in the ist century b.c.

Among his works were Against wisdom; Investigation; Pyr-
rhonic sketches; The first i?itroduction to principles; and eight
books of Pyrrhonic discourses. None of the books has survived ex-
cept Pyrrhonic discourses, which we find quoted in a book by
Sextus Empiricus.

Aenesidemus summarized the Skeptical philosophy in his ten
tropes, which indicate that the only vahd intellectual attitude is
one which leads to a suspension of judgment. The first argument,
or trope, shows that different impressions are produced according
to differences in animals. "This we infer both from the differences
in their origins and from the variety of their bodily structures.
Thus, as to origin, some animals are produced without sexual union,
others by coition. And of those produced without coition, some
come from fire, like the animalcules which appear in furnaces;
others from putrid water, like gnats; others from wine when it
turns sour, like ants; others from earth, like grasshoppers; others
from marsh, like frogs; others from mud, like worms; others from
asses, hke beetles; others from greens, like caterpillars; others from
fruits, like the gall-insects in wild figs; others from rotting animals,
as bees from bulls and wasps from horses. Of the animals generated
by coition, some— in fact the majority— come from homogeneous
parents, others from heterogeneous parents, as do mules. Again,
of animals in general, some are born alive, like men; others are born
as eggs, like birds; and yet others as lumps of fiesh, like bears. It
is natural then, that these dissimilar and variant modes of birth
should produce much contrariety of sense-affection, and that this
is a source of its divergent, discordant, and conflicting character." ^

The variety of impressions depends on the various sense organs.
"Thus, in respect of touch, how could one maintain that creatures
covered with shells, with flesh, with prickles, with feathers, with
scales, are all similarly aflFected? And as for the sense of hearing,
how could we say that its perceptions are alike in animals with a

* Quoted in Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Bk. i, p. 27.

AENESIDEMUS ijs

very narrow auditory passage and those with a very wide one, or
in animals with hairy ears and those with smooth ears? For, as re-
gards this sense, even we ourselves find our hearing affected in one
way when we have our ears plugged and in another way when
we use them just as they are. ... So too with the objects of taste;
for some animals have rough and dry tongues, others extremely
moist tongues. We ourselves, too, when our tongues are very dry,
in cases of fever, think the food proffered us to be earthy and ill-
flavored or bitter— an affection due to the variation in the pre-
dominating juices which we are said to contain. Since, then, animals
also have organs of taste which differ and which have different
juices in excess, in respect of taste also they will receive different
impressions of the real objects." ''

The second argument is based on the differences in men. "For
even if we grant for the sake of argument that men are more worthy
than irrational animals, we shall find that even our own differences
of themselves lead to suspense. For man, you know, is said to be
compounded of two things, soul and body, and in both these we
differ one from another.

"Thus, as regards the body, we differ in our figures, and 'idiosyn-
crasies' or constitutional peculiarities." "^

The third argument appeals to the differences in sensation. "Thus
to the eye paintings seem to have recesses and projections, but not
so to the touch. Honey, too, seems to some pleasant to the tongue
but unpleasant to the eyes; so that it is impossible to say whether it
is absolutely pleasant or unpleasant. The same is true of sweet oil,
for it pleases the sense of smell but displeases the taste. . . . Rain-
water, too, is beneficial to the eyes but roughens the windpipe and
the lungs; as also does olive oil, though it mollifies the epidermis.
The cramp-fish, also, when applied to the extremities produces
cramp, but it can be applied to the rest of the body without hurt.
Consequently, we are unable to say what is the real nature of each
of these things, although it is possible to say what each thing at the
moment appears to be." '^

Aenesidemus taught that nature does not create things according
to our sense experience. The concept of nature itself is contradic-
tory. "For he who decides the question as to the existence of Nature
will be discredited by them if he is an ordinary person, while if he

^ Ibid., pp. 31-33.

•5 Ibid., p. 47.

7 Ibid., pp. 55-57.

276 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM^

is a philosopher he will be a party to the controversy and therefore
himself subject to judgment and not a judge. If, however, it is
possible that only those qualities which we seem to perceive subsist
in the apple, or that a greater number subsist, or, again, that not
even the qualities which affect us subsist, then it will be non-evident
to us what the nature of the apple really is. And the same argument
applies to all other objects of sense. But if the senses do not appre-
hend external objects, neither can the mind apprehend them; hence,
because of this argument also, we shall be driven, it seems, to sus-
pend judgment regarding the external underlying objects." ^

The fourth argument depends on circumstances. "And this Mode,
we say, deals with states that are natural or unnatural, with waking
or sleeping, with conditions due to age, motion or rest, hatred or
love, emptiness or fullness, drunkenness or soberness, predisposi-
tions, confidence or fear, grief or joy. Thus according as the mental
state is natural or unnatural, objects produce dissimilar impressions,
as when men in a frenzy or in a state of ecstasy believe they hear
daemons' voices, while we do not. . . . Also, the same water which
feels very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to
us. And the same coat which seems of a bright yellow color to men
with blood-shot eyes does not appear so to me. And the same honey
seems to me sweet, but bitter to men with jaundice." •*

The fifth argument is founded on difference in position, distance,
and place. "For owing to each of these the same objects appear
different; for example, the same porch when viewed from one of
its corners appears curtailed, but viewed from the middle sym-
metrical on all sides; and the same ship seems at a distance to be
small and stationary, but from close at hand large and in motion;
and the same tower from a distance appears round but from a near
point quadrangular.

"These effects are due to distances; among effects due to locations
are the following: the light of a lamp appears dim in the sun but
bright in the dark; and the same oar bent when in the water but
straight when out of the water . . . and sound seems to differ in
quality according as it is produced in a pipe, or in a flute, or simply
in the air." ^'^

Objects thus are viewed not as they are in themselves, but ac-
cording to their position and distance. "Since, then, all apparent ob-

* Ibid., p. 59.
^Ibid., p. 61.
^° Ibid., pp. 69-71.

AENESIDEMUS 277

jects are viewed in a certain place, and from a certain distance, or in
a certain position, and each of these conditions produces a great
divergency in the sense-impressions, as we mentioned above, we
shall be compelled by this Mode also to end up in suspension of
judgment. For in fact, anyone who purposes to give the preference
to any of these impressions will be attempting the impossible. For if
he shall deliver his judgment simply and without proof, he will be
discredited; and should he, on the other hand, desire to adduce
proof, he will confute himself if he says that the proof is false, while
if he asserts that the proof is true he will be asked for a proof of
its truth, and again for a proof of this latter proof, since it also
must be true, and so on ad infinitum. But to produce proofs to
infinity is impossible; so that neither by the use of proofs will he
be able to prefer one sense-impression to another. If, then, one can-
not hope to pass judgment on the afore-mentioned impressions
either with or \\'ithout proof, the conclusion we are driven to is
suspension; for while we can, no doubt, state the nature which
each object appears to possess as viewed in a certain position or at
a certain distance or in a certain place, what its real nature is we are,
for the foregoing reasons, unable to declare." ^^

The sixth argument is based on the fact that all objects come to-
gether and are mixed. "That none of the external objects affects our
senses by itself but always in conjunction with something else, and
that, in consequence, it assumes a different appearance, is, I imagine,
quite obvious. Thus, our own complexion is of one hue in warm air,
of another in cold, and we should not be able to say what our com-
plexion really is, but only what it looks like in conjunction with
each of these conditions. And the same sound appears of one sort
in conjunction with rare air and of another sort with dense air; and
odors are more pungent in a hot bathroom or in the sun than in
chilly air; and a body is light when immersed in water but heavy
when surrounded by air.

"But to pass on from the subject of external admixture— our eyes
contain within themselves both membranes and liquids. Since, then,
the objects of vision are not perceived apart from these, they will
not be apprehended with exactness; for what we perceive is the
resultant mixture, and because of this the sufferers from jaundice
see everything yellow, and those with blood-shot eyes reddish like
blood." 12

^^ Ibid., pp. 71-73.
1^ Ibid., pp. 73-75.

278 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

Aenesidemus demonstrated how the mind adds to this mixture
and thus leads to confusion. "Nor yet does the mind apprehend it,
since, in the first place, its guides, which are the senses, go wrong;
and probably, too, the mind itself adds a certain admixture of its
own to the messages conveyed by the senses; for we observe that
there are certain humors present in each of the regions which the
Dogmatists regard as the seat of the "Ruling Principle"— whether
it be the brain or the heart, or in whatever part of the creature one
chooses to locate it. Thus, according to this Mode also we see that,
owing to our inability to make any statement about the real nature
of external objects, we are compelled to suspend judgment." ^^

The seventh argument is based on the quantity and constitution
of objects. "And chips of the marble of Taenarum seem white when
planed, but in combination with the whole block they appear yel-
low. And pebbles when scattered apart appear rough, but when
combined in a heap they produce the sensation of softness. . . . And
wine strengthens us when drunk in moderate quantity, but when
too much is taken it paralyzes the body. So Hkewise food exhibits
different effects according to the quantity consumed; for instance,
it frequently upsets the body with indigestion and attacks of purg-
ing because of the large quantity taken." ^^

To substantiate his argument, Aenesidemus appealed to medicine.
"As a general rule, it seems that wholesome things become harmful
when used in immoderate quantities, and things that seem hurtful
when taken to excess cause no harm when in minute quantities.
What we observe in regard to the effects of medicines is the best
evidence in support of our statement; for there the exact blending
of the simple drugs makes the compound wholesome, but when the
slightest oversight is made in the measuring, as sometimes happens,
the compound is not only unwholesome but frequently even most
harmful and deleterious. Thus the argument from quantities and
compositions causes confusion as to the real nature of the external
substances. Probably, therefore, this Mode also will bring us round
to suspension of judgment, as we are unable to make any absolute
statement concerning the real nature of external objects." ^^

The eighth argument is based on relativity, which has a twofold
meaning. "And this statement is twofold, implying, firstly, relation
to the thing which judges (for the external object which is judged

13 Ibid., pp. 75-77.
1* Ibid., pp. 77-79.
^^ Ibid., p. 79.

AENESIDEMUS 279

appears in relation to that thing), and, in a second sense, relation to
the accompanying percepts, for instance the right side in relation
to the left. Indeed, we have already argued that all things are rela-
tive—for example, with respect to the thing which judges, it is in
relation to some one particular animal or man or sense that each
object appears, and in relation to such and such a circumstance;
and with respect to the concomitant percepts, each object appears
in relation to some one particular admixture or mode or combina-
tion or quantity or position." ^*^

Aenesidemus considered all things to be relative. "A4oreover, some
existent things are similar, others dissimilar, and some equal, others
unequal; and these are relative; therefore all things are relative. And
even he who asserts that not all things are relative confirms the
relativity of all things since by his arguments against us he shows
that the very statement 'not all things are relative' is relative to
ourselves, and not universal.

"When, however, we have thus established that all things are rela-
tive, we are plainly left with the conclusion that we shall not be
able to state what is the nature of each of the objects in its own
real purity, but only what nature it appears to possess in its relative
character. Hence it follows that we must suspend judgment con-
cerning the real nature of the objects." ^^

The ninth argument is founded on the constancy or rarity of an
occurrence. "The sun is, of course, much more amazing than a
comet; yet because we see the sun constantly but the comet rarely
we are so amazed by the comet that we even regard it as a divine
portent, while the sun causes no amazement at all. If, however, we
were to conceive of the sun as appearing but rarely and setting
rarely, and illuminating everything all at once and throwing every-
thing into shadow suddenly, then we should experience much
amazement at the sight. An earthquake also does not cause the same
alarm in those who experience it for the first time and those who
have grown accustomed to such things. How much amazement,
also, does the sea excite in the man who sees it for the first time!
And indeed the beauty of a human body thrills us more at the first
sudden view than when it becomes a customary spectacle. Rare
things too we count as precious, but not what is familiar to us and
easily got." ^^

^'^ Ibid., p. 81.
i^/^/i., p. 83.
18 Ibid., pp. 83-85.

28o CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

The tenth argument relates to morals and laws. All things are
determined by custom. "For example, we oppose habit to habit in
this way: some of the Ethiopians tattoo their children, but we do
not; and while the Persians think it seemly to wear a brightly dyed
dress reaching to the feet, we think it unseemly. . . . And law we
oppose to law in this way: among the Romans the man who re-
nounces his father's property does not pay his father's debts, but
among the Rhodians he always pays them; and among the Scythian
Tauri it was a law that strangers should be sacrificed to Artemis,
but with us it is forbidden to slay a human being at the altar. And
we oppose rule of conduct to rule of conduct, as when we oppose
the rule of Diogenes to that of Aristippus or that of the Laconians
to that of the Italians. . . . And we oppose dogmatic conceptions to
one another when we say that some declare that there is one ele-
ment only, others an infinite number; some that the soul is mortal,
others that it is immortal; and some that human affairs are con-
trolled by divine Providence, others without Providence." ^^

Even more significant than Aenesidemus' general statement of
Skepticism is his attitude regarding causality. His arguments are
summarized in eight modes.

"Of these the First, he says, is that which shows that, since aeti-
ology as a whole deals with the non-apparent, it is unconfirmed by
any agreed evidence derived from appearances. The Second Mode
shows how often, when there is ample scope for ascribing the ob-
ject of investigation to a variety of causes, some of them account
for it in one way only. The Third shows how to orderly events
they assign causes which exhibit no order. The Fourth shows how,
when they have grasped the way in which appearances occur, they
assume that they have also apprehended how non-apparent things
occur, whereas, though the non-apparent may possibly be realized
in a similar way to the appearances, possibly they may not be
realized in a similar way but in a peculiar way of their own. In the
Fifth Mode it is shown how practically all these theorists assign
causes according to their own particular hypotheses about the ele-
ments, and not according to any commonly agreed methods. In the
Sixth it is shown how they frequently admit only such facts as
can be explained by their own theories, and dismiss facts which
conflict therewith though possessing equal probability. The Seventh
shows how they often assign causes which conflict not only with
appearances but also with their own hypotheses. The Eighth shows

^^ Ibid., pp. 87-89.

AGRIPPA 281

that often, when there is equal doubt about things seemingly ap-
parent and things under investigation, they base their doctrine about
things equally doubtful upon things equally doubtful." -°

Notice how in his arguments Aenesidemus attacked the dogmatic
assumptions. He explained that hypotheses are chosen in an arbitrary
way and that philosophers view the world according to their own
prejudices. Throughout his discussion of causation Aenesidemus
revealed his scientific learning. He made it clear that we can not
argue about the immaterial world. Those who define the invisible
realm are wasting their time. We do not know what it is like, for
our knowledge rests on analogy, which necessarily is faulty.

It must be noted that Aenesidemus also developed a metaphysical
system of his own in which, influenced by Heraclitus, he stated that
air is the world substance. Commentators do not agree as to the
significance of this metaphysical system, and some believe it merely
represents an earlier stage of his development.-^

Generally, Aenesidemus was antimetaphysical. He did not believe
in any ultimate principles and did not accept any absolute cate-
gories. To him, neither science, religion, nor morality revealed
any final truth. Knowledge, he felt, must end in tentative evalua-
tions. No large-scale assertions can be made; in everything we must
be guided by relativity.

AGRIPPA

The Skeptical system of Aenesidemus was elaborated by Agrippa,
who lived in the ist century a.d. He proposed five tropes against
the dogmatic philosophers. The first relates to the conflict of opin-
ions; the second is based on the fact that every proof requires an-
other proof; the third is founded on the uncertain and relative
nature of sensation; the fourth states that proof should not rest on
unproved axioms; and the fifth, that reasoning inevitably is involved
in a circle.

In these arguments Agrippa restated the contentions of his prede-
cessors and also attacked the foundations of logical knowledge. The
result is that he denied any kind of intellectual certainty. Let us
abandon, then, any type of metaphysical speculation! Let us give
up all metaphysical dogmatism! Instead, Agrippa taught, let us
rely on the suspension of judgment, which alone will lead to a
successful life.

'^'^ Ibid., pp. 103-105.

2iCf. Patrick, op. cit., pp. 232-237.

282 CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

MENODOTUS

The scientific aspect of Skepticism was especially evident in the
work of Menodotus (70-150 a.d.). He was very bitter in his at-
tack on the Stoics. He also objected to the Skepticism of the Aca-
demy and its theory of probability. He held that it is impossible
for one concept to be more probable than another.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

The life of Sextus Empiricus is surrounded by obscurity. We have
three of his volumes from The Fyrrhonic hypotyposes, and six
books, Against the schoolmasters, which contain attacks against
the teachers of grammar, orators, geometricians, arithmeticians, as-
trologers, and musicians. The third work is Against the dogmatic
philosophers (5 books), which consists of his objections to the
logicians, the natural philosophers, teachers of ethics, and the sys-
tem of morals propounded by the ethical thinkers. Against the
schoolmasters and Against the dogmatic philosophers are usually
united in eleven books under the title Against the mathematicians.

Sextus Empiricus is best known as the historian of Skepticism.
He showed how the categories of science, such as causality, space,
and number, contradict one another. Mathematics, then, is not abso-
lute, but purely relative. So, too, is logic. In other words, no type
of universality can be obtained.

All this should not deter us in our scientific quest, said Sextus
Empiricus, for science can advance best when it is based on specific
factors and when it uses the method of exact observation and ana-
lytical experimentation.

In his ethical theory, Sextus Empiricus followed the earlier Skep-
tics. All standards are relative and full of contradiction, he declared;
and he indicated how philosophers have differed in their view of
the final Good for man.

What then is the best attitude? How should we act in society?
Sextus Empiricus urged conservatism and advocated following the
past. In adjusting ourselves to the existing institutions we can best
develop peace of mind and thus pursue our scientific interests.

LUCIAN

The influence of Skepticism extended to the field of literature as
well as to science, especially in the work of Lucian, who lived about
120-200 A.D. He was a teacher of rhetoric and a prolific traveler.

LUCIAN

283

He visited, among other cities, Antioch, Rome, and later Athens.
In his writings he used the method of satire and constantly exposed
the folly of mankind.

Most interesting from the standpoint of philosophy is Lucian's
Zeus tragoedus. It deals with a debate between Timocles, a Stoic
thinker, and Damis, an Epicurean. The debate is being watched by
the gods. Zeus is especially concerned and asks Hermes, the divine
messenger, if the debate has been going on for a long time.

^'Hermes: Not yet; they were still skirmishing— slinging invective
at long range.

Zeus: Then we have only, Gods, to look over and listen. Let

the Hours unbar, draw back the clouds, and open the
doors of Heaven. Upon my word, what a vast gather-
ing! And I do not quite like the looks of Timocles; he
is trembling; he has lost his head; he will spoil every-
thing; it is perfectly plain, he will not be able to stand
up to Damis. Well, there is one thing left us: we can
pray for him. Inwardly, silently, lest Damis hear.

Timocles: What, you miscreant, no Gods? no Providence?

Da?ms: No, no; you answer my question first; what makes

you believe in them?

TijJiocles: None of that, now; the onus probafidi is with you,
scoundrel.

Damis: None of that now; it is \\ ith you.

(Zeus: At this game ours is much the better man— louder-

voiced, rougher-tempered. Good, Timocles; stick to
invective; that is your strong point; once get off that,
he will hook and hold you up like a fish.)

Timocles: I solemnly swear I will not answer first.

Damis: Well, put }'our question then; so much you score by

your oath. But no abuse, please.

Timocles: Done. Tell me then, and be damned to you, do you
deny the Gods exercise providence?

Damis: I do." ^^

Throughout the dialogue Damis has the stronger argument. Fi-
nally Timocles appeals to syllogism.

^''Timocles: See whether this is a sound syllogism; can you upset
it? If there are altars, there are Gods: there are altars;
therefore there are Gods. Now then.
^-T^eus tragoedus (Bevan, op. cit., pp. 162-163).

284

CONTRIBUTIONS OF SKEPTICISM

Damis- Ha, ha, ha! I will answer as soon as I can get done

with laughing.

Timocles- Will you never stop? At least tell me what the joke is.

Da?nis: Why, you don't see that your anchor (sheet-anchor

too) hangs by a mere thread. You depend on con-
nexion between the existence of Gods and the exist-
ence of altars, and fancy yourself safe at anchor! As
you admit that this was your sheet-anchor, there is
nothing further to detain us.

Timocles'- You retire; you confess yourself beaten then?

Damis- Yes; we have seen you take sanctuary at the altars

under persecution. At those altars I am ready (the
sheet-anchor be my witness) to swear peace and cease
from strife.

Timocles'- You are playing with me, are you, you vile body-
snatcher, you loathsome, well-whipped scum! As if
we didn't know who your father was, how your
mother was a harlot! You strangled your own brother,
you live in fornication, you debauch the young, you
unabashed lecher! Don't be in such a hurry; here is
something for you to take with you; this broken pot
will serve me to cut your foul throat." -^

The gods are worried. Zeus asks what action should be taken.
Hermes consoles him.

"Zew^.* Damis makes off with a laugh, and the other after him,

calling him names, mad at his insolence. He will get
him on the head with that pottery, I know. And now,
what are we to do?
Hermes'- ... It is no such terrible disaster if a few people go
away infected. There are plenty who take the other
view— a majority of Greeks, the body and dregs of the
people, and the barbarians to a man." ~^

THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SKEPTICISM

To sum up the contributions of Skepticism: It gave a scientific
foundation to ancient philosophy. It pointed out that both our sense
knowledge and our reason are untrustworthy and that the best in-
tellectual attitude is one of doubt and suspension of judgment.

-'■^ Ibid., pp. 171-172.
2* Ibid.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF SKEPTICISM 285

In metaphysics Skepticism believed we cannot speak of a superior
reality, for we cannot make any valid intellectual assertions about
the immaterial realm. To some extent this view implies that all meta-
physical discussions are sterile and that it is best to adopt a specific
and experimental view of the universe.

In its attitude regarding science, Skepticism protested against ab-
straction. It thereby tried to separate philosophy and science. More
than any other school of philosophy. Skepticism believed in the
verification of knowledge.

In the realm of ethics the Skeptics pointed to the relativity of all
moral standards. They attacked the Stoic doctrine that virtue is
all-important. As we have noted, their method of doubt did not lead
to revolutionary efforts or to any attempts to reform mankind.

In their method of investigation, the Skeptics resurrected the
Socratic approach. Knowledge, they showed, begins with a pro-
fession of ignorance, but the end process of knowledge likewise
indicates our inabihty to know and understand first principles. Un-
Hke the Stoics, the Skeptics did not accept irresistible impressions; to
them the process of knowledge was entirely relative.

In short, all the categories of science, religion, and morality were
subjected to a searching criticism by Skepticism, which pointed to
the inevitable limitations of the human mind. The universe of the
Skeptics was purely mechanical; it contained no first cause, no divine
soul, and no Providence.

As a consistent philosophical movement. Skepticism did not
re-emerge until the Renaissance. Then Montaigne and Pomponazzi
resurrected the doctrines of doubt and subjected the existing forms
of knowledge to a thoroughgoing criticism. Thenceforth, doubt has
reigned supreme in modern thinking, thereby vindicating the wis-
dom of the ancient Skeptics.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What movements influenced the rise of Skepticism?

2. Describe the philosophical achievement of Carneades.

3. How did Pyrrho aid the progress of Skepticism?

4. Why were the Skeptics opposed to Stoic philosophy?

5. What was the Skeptic viewpoint of causality?

6. What were the ethical conclusions of the Skeptics? How do their
moral principles compare with those of Socrates?

7. Discuss the ten tropes. What is their significance?

8. Describe the contributions of Aenesidemus.

9. What were the weaknesses of Skepticism?

PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

THE HEBREW CHARACTER

.o appreciate Philo we must understand the Hebrew character,
which is one of the most self-contradictory in history. This paradox
was found as early as Biblical times. In the Bible we find, on the one
hand, the capitalistic and thoroughly Epicurean figure of Solomon;
on the other hand, the socialistic and puritanical Amos.

The Hebrews were, perhaps, the most realistic of all peoples. Since
their survival was constantly threatened, they seemed to live in a
perpetual state of undeclared war. They were never quite certain
when the sword of antagonism would be turned against them. In
Alexandria, Philo's native city, they achieved all the privileges of
power, yet within a few years they were subjected to persecution.
Uncertainty of human existence, thus, was always impressed upon
the Hebrew mind. No wonder the Hebrews developed a pene-
trating insight into human character! At the same time, almost
against their better judgment, they hoped for a new society in which
the old hatreds would be forgotten.

THE HUMAN GOD

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Hebrews has been their
concept of God. Jehovah is a very human deity, and he was con-
286

MAN AND MORALS 287

ceived according to the patterns, ideals, and interests of his chosen
people. In early times Jehovah was fairly simple. He was a war god
who promised to destroy all those who oppressed the Hebrews. He
was fierce in his anger, promising to punish children for the sins of
their fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers. His morality was
often inferior to that of man; Moses, several times, had to persuade
him to control himself and to moderate his wrath. That Jehovah
made mistakes is apparent: he regrets the fact that he made man,
and he regrets his covenant with the Hebrews. He is talkative and
repetitious; his speeches are long-winded, and he is not above jeal-
ousy. Strong are his curses, for we read:

"If, however, you will not heed the injunctions of the Lord your
God by being careful to observe all his commands and statutes
which I am commanding you today, then all the following curses
shall come upon you and overtake you. 'Cursed shall you be in the
city, and cursed shall you be in the country; . . . Cursed shall be the
offspring of your body, and the produce of your soil, the issue of
your cattle, and the progeny of your flock; Cursed shall you be in
your coming. And cursed shall you be in your going.' "^

BeHef in one personal God meant for the West that there could
be only 07ie true religion. Thus, worship of God often became a
compulsive rather than a liberative force.

MAN AND MORALS

Next to belief in one God, the Ten Commandments rank high
among Hebraic contributions. It is difficult to know whether this
legacy of the Old Testament has benefited or harmed the develop-
ment of a genuine reflective morality. It is true that the Ten Com-
mandments solidified family relationships, imbued children with
reverence for their fathers and mothers, encouraged a sense of hon-
esty, and spoke strongly against killing; but, at the same time, they
hindered civilization by identifying morality with divine command-
ments. This is a most serious weakness, for moral laws are constantly
changing, not eternal. Furthermore, the categorical form of the Ten
Commandments led to authoritarianism.

The Ten Commandments had a decided influence upon the artistic
stagnation of the Hebrews, for the Second Commandment makes it
very clear that no graven images are to be made of God. Those who
later followed the Hebraic patterns, especially the Calvinists, were

^Deuteronomy 28:15-19 (Smith and Goodspeed version).

288 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

firm opponents to any type of esthetic activity and thus impeded
the growth of civilization.

The Ten Commandments are symbolic of the patriarchal spirit.
The Tenth Commandment is especially instructive when it says,
"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox,
nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbor's." Women, thus, were
regarded as possessions. The same attitude prevails in modern times
when love is intimately associated with the pride of ownership. In
the Ten Commandments there are indications that the behavior
between the sexes is divinely regulated— a concept which has domi-
nated humanity for thousands of years.

The moral system of the Old Testament gave powerful support
to the priestly class, which developed numerous taboos associated
with the religious ritual and saw to it that the laws were followed
strictly. This moral system led to two types of standards: one for
the chosen group and one for outsiders. This dualism has continued
throughout civilization and constitutes the real ethical foundation
of modern nationalism.

MEN AND PROPHETS

In the prophets, the Hebrew religion reached its climactic expres-
sion. However, the greatness of the prophets has been exaggerated.
If they had triumphed, what type of religion would have emerged?
Certainly there would have been love for Jehovah, kindness to man,
and avoidance of social abuses, but religion, at the same time, would
have been somewhat puritanical and would have led to a literal type
of ceremonialism. A piety would have emerged to rival orthodox
Hinduism.

The prophets had a distinct sense of mission. They were imbued
with the thought that they were speaking directly for God. Soc-
rates also felt he was guided by an inner voice and this fact made
him certain of his destiny and rather arrogant in spite of his outward
show of modesty. According to the prophets, there is only oiie way
of life. Their main theme was that worshiping other gods would
bring destruction to the Hebrews, and yet, in many ways, this wor-
ship of the other gods was extremely colorful and esthetically satis-
fying.

On the positive side the prophets expanded the concept of Jeho-
vah, whose warlike activities were now minimized. They were con-
scientious objectors to war and vigorously attacked the abuses of

MEN AND PROPHETS 289

the social system of their time. With them rehgion became more
subjective, a matter of the spirit rather than of external ritual.

Probably the greatest influence of the Hebrews has been felt in
their association of religion \\ ith social causes. Too often religion
has been considered merely an experience of the supernatural; too
often it has been merely an aid to primitive magic. According to the
prophets, there can be no genuine understanding of life which is
isolated from the social ideals of humanity. Thus, we read in Isaiah:

"Hear the w ord of the Lord,
Ye rulers of Sodom;
Give ear unto the law of our God,
Ye people of Gomorrah.
To what purpose is the multitude of your

sacrifices unto Me?
Saith the Lord;

I am full of the burnt offerings of rams,
And the fat of fed beasts;
And I delight not in the blood
Of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats,
When ye come to appear before Me.
Who hath required this at your hand.
To trample My courts?
Bring no more vain oblations;
It is an offering of abomination unto Me;
New Moon and sabbath, the holding of convocations—
I cannot endure iniquity along with the solemn

assembly.
Your new moons and your appointed seasons
My soul hateth;
They are a burden unto Me:
I am weary to bear them.
And when ye spread forth \'our hands,
I will hide Aiine eyes from you;
Yea, when )'e make man\' prayers,
I will not hear;
Your hands are full of blood.
Wash you, make you clean,
Put away the evil of your doings
From before Mine eyes,
Cease to do evil;

290 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

Learn to do well;

Seek justice, relieve the oppressed,

Judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."^

The prophets had various concepts of Jehovah. To Amos he was
a puritanical guardian of the moral law; to Isaiah he was a stern
monarch of all nations. To Jeremiah he was an all-powerful psycho-
analyst, who knew the motives of men. To Ezekiel he was an arbi-
trary judge, and to Deutero-Isaiah he was a deliverer and saviour.

The prophets stressed the theme of love, but it was not complete
and categorical love. Repeatedly the threats of God were revealed,
and the prophets almost gloated over the picture of torment for
sinners and extermination for foreign nations. Ultimately, their work
strengthened the power of the orthodox rabbis just as Bernard and
Francis later aided in the formal expansion of the Church organiza-
tion.

It is a truism that prophets are misunderstood in their time.
Usually, however, they are even more misinterpreted by later gen-
erations. In history there is a perpetual conflict, as Bergson has
shown, between the legalistic ritual of the ecclesiastical leaders and
the spontaneous outlook of the great prophets. Usually the unor-
thodox part of their teachings is discarded by the religious author-
ities, who appropriate only the conservative elements.

THE PESSIMISTIC SPIRIT

The philosophical genius of the Hebrews appears perhaps most
vividly in Ecclesiastes, one of the masterpieces of pessimism. It
expresses an underlying melancholy spirit which coincides with the
disintegration of Hebrew poHtical power.

"There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, and it is com-
mon among men:

"A man to whom God hath given riches, wealth, and honor, so
that he wanteth nothing for his soul of all that he desireth, yet God
giveth him not power to eat thereof, but a stranger eateth it: this is
vanity, and it is an evil disease.

"If a man beget a hundred children, and live many years, so that
the days of his years be many, and his soul be not filled with good,
and also that he have no burial; I say, that an untimely birth is better
than he.

2 Isaiah i: 10-17.

THE PESSIMISTIC SPIRIT 291

"For he cometh in with vanity, and departeth in darkness, and
his name shall be covered with darkness.

"Moreover he hath not seen the sun, nor known any thing: this
hath more rest than the other.

"Yea, though he live a thousand years twice told, yet hath he
seen no good: do not all go to one place?"^

The feehng of life's futihty had been intensified, not only by per-
secutions but by a deep emotional sensitivity. Ecclesiastes speaks for
the wisdom of age, which, after surveying the goods of Hfe, finds
only vanity.

Pessimism has two sources. On the one hand there is a pessimism
of the oppressed, which we find in the novels of Dostoevski, Dick-
ens, and \^ictor Hugo. This type is conditioned by the unbearable
burden of life. On the other hand there is a pessimism caused by
satiation. In Ecclesiastes all the so-called Goods of Hfe are tasted—
wealth, fame, women, wisdom— but the result is only futility.

"Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is
vanity.

"What profit hath a man of all his labor which he taketh under
the sun?

"One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh:
but the earth abideth for ever.

"The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his
place where he arose.

"The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the
north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again
according to his circuits.

"All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the
place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again.

"All things are full of labor; man cannot utter it: the eye is not
satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing.

"The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which
is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under
the sun.

"Is there any thing whereof it may be said. See, this is new? it
hath been already of old time, which was before us.

"There is no remembrance of former things; neither shall there
be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall
come after."^

^ Ecclesiastes 6:1-6.
* Ecclesiastes i : 2-1 1 .

292 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

This pessimistic religion is reserved for the few; it can never make
much headway with the masses, who want strong drugs and absolute
promises. Thus, the popular religion of the two centuries before
Christ was filled with speculations about the future world and pro-
claimed the hope of a Messiah. More and more stress was placed
upon the struggle between the forces of good and evil, especially in
the Book of Daniel. These religious ideas were associated with an
intensification of nationalistic feeling. There was bitter hatred on the
part of the masses against the Greek and later against the Roman
invaders. When the masses rebelled, they fought not so much for
the spiritual ideals of the prophets as for the temple, for national
glory, and for a future Messiah.

PHILO'S BACKGROUND

Ail the contradictions of the Hebrew character appear in Philo. His
philosophy represents a strange mixture of rationalism and religion.
He was well-educated in the Greek classics and had a wide acquain-
tance with the Greek thinkers, but his Hebraic training remained
triumphant to the end.

Philo did not apologize for the Hebrew concept of God. He was
not ashamed of his heritage. On the contrary, he thought the Jew-
ish religion constituted the highest form of spiritual endeavor.

It was no accident that Philo's philosophy developed in Alexan-
dria, for here was a cosmopolitan background. In this city all types
of philosophy mingled. There were Skeptics, Platonists, followers
of Aristotle, Stoics, Epicureans, and later on Neo-Platonists. Here
Hebrew and Christian theology was being formulated. Alexandria
was also a fertile soil for the philosophies of Persia and India. Side
by side we find the most abject superstition and the most advanced
scientific theory. In this atmosphere there was a high degree of
intellectual tolerance. There was little room for philosophical abso-
lutism; in the conflict among the various philosophical movements,
a diffusion of ideas took place. No one philosophical standpoint was
bound to be triumphant. This fact made for eclecticism and for a
union of the various philosophical tendencies.

In many ways Philo's philosophy represents such a spirit, for it
symbolizes a wedding of Greek and Hebrew ideals. However, he
remained true to his Hebrew heritage. As early as Philo's time, many
of his religious brethren were deserting the faith. Attracted by the
promise of security and the desire for complete equality, they joined

PHILO'S BACKGROUND 293

the pagan cults. With bitterness Philo denounced their actions,
which he regarded as almost treasonable.

While Philo borrowed a great deal from earher Greek philosophy,
especially from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, he was not an un-
critical admirer of their systems. For example, in his concept of the
logos, he marked a new departure and used the \vord in a sense
different from that of the Stoics.

He did not agree with Aristotle's concept that the world has no
beginning nor with Aristotle's opposition to Platonic Ideas. He fol-
lowed Plato in a more literal way, but his philosophy is not to be
regarded as an imitation of Platonism, for he was guided by his
Hebraic training and regard for revelation.

The difference between Plato and Philo lies in their main assump-
tions. Plato believed that the universe can be understood through
reason; Philo, however, stressed the importance of faith and regarded
revelation as the real source of philosophical inspiration.

It goes without saying that Philo was vigorously opposed to the
pre-Socratic thinkers. He could not tolerate their materialism and
disregard for spiritual factors. Any purely mechanical explanation
of the universe, he felt, was bound to fail. Like Plato, he emphasized
the supremacy of the immaterial world, and he conceived of matter
as an expression of a higher spiritual reality.

Even more severe was his criticism of the Sophists. In every way,
he thought, they had betrayed the basic ideals of philosophy. Their
championship of relativity, agnosticism, and humanism— all these
views aroused his irate criticism.

In the same manner Philo turned against the Epicureans, who had
interpreted the universe in a mechanistic manner. Such a system he
regarded as inadmissible. He believed that the Epicurean philosophy
of life was superficial and subversive. He could never allow a purely
scientific explanation, for to him it was inferior to rehgious truths.

While there was a Skeptical strain in Philo's philosophy, it was
not an end in itself. To doubt for the sake of doubting, he regarded
as unworthy of a philosopher. On the contrary, his doubt had a
definite purpose. Through it he tried to indicate the Hmitations of
human reason and the need for a new type of adjustment contained
in faith. Thus he initiated a tradition which dominated Europe for
almost a thousand years. By showing the inadequacy of reason, he
pointed to the value of revelation. This attitude marks the medieval
mind, which subordinated philosophy to religious truth.

294 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

A NEW CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY

In this manner Philo developed a new concept of philosophy. Philos-
ophy, to him, was not merely a subject which can give us a knowl-
edge of the universe and teach us the principles of morality. It was
also a method by which we can understand the majesty and provi-
dence of God. It became the task of philosophy to bolster religion,
to explain its riddles and its traditions. Philosophy thus performed
the same function for the educated man that the Torah performed
for the masses.

Philo tried to show the strength and perennial values of faith
through allegory. Obviously, he thought, many parts of religion are
not to be taken literally. As we have noted, the God of the Old
Testament frequently appeared in a most human, and occasionally
in a most unpleasant, light. Through the use of allegory, Philo tried
to develop the spiritual meaning of the religious writings and in this
way explain away their imperfections. He was quite certain that
this allegorical interpretation would be of inestimable value. Not
only would it deepen the faith, not only would it become more
philosophical, but it would be more systematic and more coherent
than ever before. Accordingly, the majesty, perfection, and power
of God would be manifested not only to the masses but also to the
philosophers.

Like the Stoics, Philo divided philosophy into three parts: (i)
logic; (2) physics; (3) ethics. Under the last heading, however, he
included theology, which marked his departure from the Stoic
definition. According to Philo, philosophy deals not merely with
human knowledge but also with the study of divine qualities. In
fact, the study of science he considered to be only a prelude to
metaphysical problems, which represent the climax and the acme of
intellectual achievement.

LIFE AND CHARACTER

We know almost as little of the life of Philo as of the Skeptic philos-
ophers. He was born about 20 b.c. His father was a man of influence
and wealth in the Hebrew congregation. He received every educa-
tional advantage and very early in his youth gained a full acquain-
tance with Greek philosophy. In his writings, he used a rather ornate
style, a fact which probably indicates a very thorough instruction
in rhetoric.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 295

All his life Philo was attracted to contemplation and philosophic
wisdom. He did not envy his brother, who occupied a high political
position in the Roman administration of Egypt, for he yearned for
a quiet life away from worldly success and worldly honors. His
studies were rudely interrupted under emperor Caligula, who
wanted to be worshiped as a god and who bore a dislike for the
Hebrews. In 38 a.d. Alexandria witnessed pogroms; the peace of the
city was broken by angry mobs who attacked the Hebraic popula-
tion. Scenes of destruction and bloodshed were recorded by the
ancient historians, whose tales remind us of the ravages in Nazi Ger-
many. The emperor was determined to set up his image in the temple
at Jerusalem. It appeared almost certain that an uprising of the
Hebrews would take place.

It was in this atmosphere that the Hebrews of Alexandria sent an
embassy headed by Philo to Rome. This honor indicates the high
esteem in \\ hich he was held by his religious comrades. Later he
published an account of the negotiations which demonstrates that
he w as not unacquainted with the ways of the world and could hold
his own in diplomacy.

The Hebrew cause was aided when Caligula was assassinated and
a new emperor, Claudius, took his place. Peace was restored in Alex-
andria and in Palestine. The Roman governor who had aided in the
riots was punished for his crime. All this appeared as a sign of Prov-
idence to Philo, who felt that in this manner God's justice was vindi-
cated. He died some time before 50 a.d.

The meager facts of Philo's life reveal a scholar occupied pri-
marily with philosophical studies. His contemporaries were awed
by his profound knowledge, and they noted with satisfaction that
his wisdom had not decreased his respect for rehgion. Despite his
training in Greek and Latin philosophy, he had no desire to accept
the ways of the pagans. In fact, he looked down on their accomplish-
ments, for he believed that much of their wisdom was borrowed
from the Hebrews. His spiritual guide tvas Moses, not Aristotle; his
eyes were turned to Jerusalem, not to Athens.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

To appreciate Philo's concept of knowledge we must understand
his classification of man into three types: those who are earth-born,
those who are heaven-born, and those who are god-born.

296 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

"The earth-bom are those who take the pleasures of the body for
their quarry, who make it their practice to indulge in them and
enjoy them and provide the means by which each of them may be
promoted. The heaven-born are the votaries of the arts and of
knowledge, the lovers of learning. For the heavenly element in us
is the mind, as the heavenly beings are each of them a mind. And it is
the mind which pursues the learning of the schools and the other
arts one and all, which sharpens and whets itself, aye, and trains
and drills itself sohd in the contemplation of what is intelligible by
mind. But the men of God are priests and prophets who have
refused to accept membership in the commonwealth of the world
and to become citizens therein, but have risen wholly above the
sphere of sense-perception and have been translated into the world
of the intelligible and dwell there registered as freemen of the com-
monwealth of Ideas, which are imperishable and incorporeal."^

Knowledge presents us with a ladder, Philo averred. We rise
from the sensation of the bodily senses to the divine realm of inspira-
tion. The highest form of knowledge, thus, is not reason; rather,
prophecy. This concept shows how Philo differed from the Greek
thinkers, who would not have accepted such a classification.

He made a definite distinction between sensation and reason. Sen-
sation is concerned only with superficial phenomena; it is occupied
with the tangible and visible realm. Reason, on the other hand, uni-
fies knowledge and obtains a view of the essence of life. While sen-
sation is concerned with corporeal things, reason gives us an under-
standing of nmnaterial realities.

Man's mind, Philo believed, is never independent of God. In this
belief he contradicted Protagoras, who held man to be the measure
of everything. Such a view Philo regarded as extremely arrogant.
He declared it impossible to explain the order of the human mind
without having recourse to divine Providence. Accordingly, we
cannot think, indeed, we cannot even have sense experience without
the aid of God. Philo appears to have foreshadowed the view of
occasionalism, which hkewise believes that our mental experience
cannot be explained apart from the direct intervention of God.

How can God be known? How can we understand reality? Philo
answered that this understanding is achieved mainly by the prophet.
The prophet, he stated, not only contains the divine spirit within
him but also legislates for man. Thus Philo accepted the prophetic
miracles and did not regard the prophetic vision as abnormal or

^ On the giants, 60-61 (Lewy, Philo, p. 36).

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 297

deranged. On the contrary, to him it was a sign of God's care for
man and represented the highest state of knowledge. To reach God,
it is necessary to abandon purely scientific knowledge. Every-
thing that corrupts wisdom and takes us away from God is to be
shunned.

Like the Stoics and Socrates, Philo believed in self-knowledge. He
taught that it is useless to carry on investigations into the material
universe.

"Accordingly Holy Writ addresses to the explorer of the facts
of nature certain questions— 'Why do you carry on investigations
about the sun, as to whether it is a foot in diameter, whether it is
larger than the whole earth, whether it is many times its size? And
about the illuminations of the moon, whether it has a borrowed
light, or whether it employs one entirely its own? And why do you
search into the nature of the other heavenly bodies, or into their
revolutions or the ways in which they affect each other and affect
earthly things? And why, treading as you do on earth, do you leap
over the clouds? And why do you say that you are able to lay hold
of what is in the upper air, when you are rooted to the ground?
Why do you venture to determine the indeterminate? And why are
you so busy with what you ought to leave alone, the things above?
And why do you extend even to the heavens your learned ingenu-
ity? Why do you take up astronomy and pay such full and minute
attention to the higher regions? Mark, my friend, not what is above
and beyond your reach but what is close to yourself, or rather make
yourself the object of your impartial scrutiny."^

Such self-knowledge is not an end in itself, Philo declared, for the
more we know our innermost being the more we realize our inade-
quacy. We are filled with a sense approaching despair. We see the
nothingness of all created beings. In this manner we understand that
there must be a supreme being, a standard of all values, all goodness,
all beauty, and all truth. Thus we have mystical strains in Philo's
philosophy, for to him the end of knowledge was the achievement
of intellectual emancipation. We have a paradox, for reason can
only develop by understanding its own inadequacy.

"For what the reasoning faculty is in us, the sun is in the world,
since both of them are light-bringers, one sending forth to the whole
world the light which our senses perceive, the other shedding men-
tal rays upon ourselves through the medium of apprehension. So
while the radiance of the mind is still all around us, when it pours

^On dreams (ibid., pp. 56-57).

298 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

as it were a noonday beam into the whole soul, we are self-con-
tained, not possessed. But when it comes to its setting, naturally
ecstasy and divine possession and madness fall upon us. For when
the light of God shines, the human light sets; when the divine light
sets, the human dawns and rises. This is what regularly befalls the
fellowship of the prophets. The mind is evicted at the arrival of the
divine Spirit, but when that departs the mind returns to its tenancy.
Mortal and immortal may not share the same home. And therefore
the setting of reason and the darkness which surround it produce
ecstasy and inspired frenzy."^

According to Philo, mysticism cannot be achieved without a new
life and a new adjustment. It demands emancipation from the senses
and from all types of pleasures.

"Depart out of the earthly matter that encompasses thee; escape,
man, from the foul prison-house thy body, with all thy might and
main, and from the pleasures and lusts that act as its jailers. . . .
Depart also out of sense-perception thy kin. For at present thou
hast made a loan of thyself to each sense, and art become the prop-
erty of others, a portion of the goods of those who have borrowed
thee, and hast thrown away the good thing that was thine own.
Yes, thou knowest, even though all men should hold their peace,
how eyes draw thee, and ears, and the whole crowd of thine kins-
folk, towards what they themselves love. But if thou desire to
recover the self that thou hast lent and to have thine own possession
about thee, letting no portion of them be alienated and fall into
other hands, thou shalt claim instead a happy life, enjoying in per-
petuity the benefit and pleasure derived from good things not
foreign to thee but thine own."^

The last stage of knowledge, Philo taught, is one of fullness; we
are the recipients of divine grace. He compared it to a bright vision
in which all things are seen in their unity. The prophet utters words
which are not his own; in all his actions he is the interpreter of God
and the messenger of the divine spirit.

It is important to notice that in Philo's theory of knowledge,
revelation is superior to reason. The final state cannot be defined
according to the categories of science; it can only be understood
through religious experience. We cannot attain spiritual emancipa-
tion through quantitative knowledge; rather, we must be inspired
by God and be the recipients of his grace.

7 Who is the heir (ibid., p. 75).

8 On the migration of Abraham, 9-1 1 (ibid., p. 72).

PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSICS 299

The nationalism of Philo is evident in his insistence on the fact
that the Hebrews had the most adequate vision of God. Philosophers
like Socrates, he knew, had a constant awareness of the divine quali-
ties of the universe; but to Philo, Socrates definitely was inferior to
Moses. It was the function of the Hebrew people to extend the mes-
sage of God, to glorify his powers, and to extol his miracles. The
function of the Greek mind, on the other hand, was merely to sys-
tematize knowledge and explain the universe in a rational manner.
While the Hebrews, according to Philo, might be oppressed for the
moment, their future would be a glorious one, for through them
mankind would be redeemed.

PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSICS

In turning to Philo's metaphysical system, we find that he believed
in the existence and unity of God. Hence, his philosophy was theo-
centric: The starting point and end of all human investigation lead
to God. Monotheism is an outstanding feature of his philosophy.
With scorn he rejected the idea that there can be several gods and
that polytheism can be a valid hypothesis for either religion or
philosophy.

Not only was Philo certain of God's existence, but he affirmed
God's providence. Thus he could not accept the Epicurean doctrine
of absentee gods who are unconcerned with the universe. In Philo
we find a constant insistence on the powers of God, who is not Hm-
ited by material principles.

Like Plato, Philo explained the world according to immaterial
principles. What is corporeal, he said, is inferior to immaterial
things; and materialistic philosophy is utterly fallacious, for it ex-
plains the highest principles of life by its lowest constituents.

Throughout the philosophy of Philo we find a teleological em-
phasis. The concept of design plays a paramount role, and the lower
parts of the universe are explained according to higher purposes.
The realm of nature, accordingly, is subordinated to the realm of
grace. Man is inferior to the angels, while the angels are inferior to
God. In every way the universe of Philo represents a rational struc-
ture. All its elements have a part; all perform a definite function.
Unlike the Stoics, Philo did not believe in a world conflagration.
What exists will not be destroyed by God, for such an action would
be inconsistent with his goodness.

Philo regarded atheism as the worst form of wickedness. Like the
Christian philosophers who followed him, he tried to prove to all

300 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

that God exists. We achieve a knowledge of God, according to him,
when we see the order of the universe and when we realize that it is
not a self-existent entity.

"Who can look upon statues or paintings without thinking at once
of a sculptor or painter? Who can see clothes or ships or houses
without getting the idea of a weaver and a shipwright and a house-
builder? And when one enters a well-ordered city in which the ar-
rangements for civil life are very admirably managed, what else will
he suppose but that this city is directed by good rulers? So then he
who comes to the truly Great City, this world, and beholds hills and
plains teeming with animals and plants, the rivers, spring-fed or
winter torrents, streaming along, the seas with their expanses, the air
with its happily tempered phases, the yearly seasons passing into
each other, and then the sun and moon ruling the day and night, and
the other heavenly bodies fixed or planetary and the whole firma-
ment revolving in rhythmic order, must he not naturally or rather
necessarily gain the conception of the Maker and Father and Ruler
also? For none of the works of human art is self-made, and the high-
est art and knowledge is shown in this universe, so that surely it has
been wrought by one of excellent knowledge and absolute perfec-
tion. In this way we have gained the conception of the existence of
God."9

According to Philo, it is impossible to hiow the divine essence
because it is beyond human reason. The search for God, however,
is a quest which makes our life truly meaningful. "We have the testi-
mony of those who have not taken a mere sip of philosophy but
have feasted abundantly on its reasonings and conclusions. For with
them the reason soars away from earth into the heights, travels
through the upper air and accompanies the revolutions of the sun
and moon and the whole heaven and in its desire to see all that is
there finds its powers of sight blurred, for so pure and vast is the
radiance that pours therefrom that the soul's eye is dizzied by the
flashing of the rays. Yet it does not therefore faint-heartedly give up
the task, but with purpose unsubdued, presses onwards to such con-
templation as is possible, like the athlete who strives for the second
prize since he has been disappointed of the first. Now second to the
true vision stands conjecture and theorizing and all that can be
brought into the category of reasonable probability. So then just as,
though we do not know and cannot with certainty determine what
each of the stars is in the purity of its essence, we eagerly persist in

^ The special laws, i, 33-35 (ibid., p. 59).

PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSICS 301

the search because our natural love of learning makes us delight in
what seems probable, so too, though the clear vision of God as he
really is is denied us, we ought not to relinquish the quest."^''

In general, the arguments which Philo propounded for the exist-
ence of God were not original. He appealed to a first mover, to a
first cause, and to the concept that the universe reveals definite
purposes. He was careful to show that God is not material, as the
Stoics beHeved, but spiritual. Being a mystic, he felt it possible to
have a vision of God. In this manner the conclusions of reason
were substantiated by the experiences of the prophets and of the
saints.

It must be pointed out, however, Philo wrote, that God in his
essejice is unknowable. We cannot use human qualities, human at-
tributes, and human traits in describing his essence; instead, God is
transcendent, ineffable, and unknowable. It is important to notice
how this view contrasts with the usual Greek concept of God,
which invested him with human qualities and regarded him as being
limited. In Philo's emphasis on the transcendence of God we have a
change in philosophical speculation. Henceforth, the distance be-
tween man and God is widened. The early comradeship between
man and divine beings is lost and is replaced by an unrelenting stress
upon the majesty of God and the nothingness of man.

Philo did not go as far as most of the medieval thinkers. While
he appreciated the power of God, he did not despair of man. He
did not possess excessive humility. Certainly the chasm between
man and God was not as great in Philo's thinking as in St. Augustine's.

To Philo the transcendence of God did not imply that he is inert.
True, Philo conceded, God is beyond all moral qualities, beyond all
sense experience, beyond all reason, beyond all scientific laws, but
he is not like Aristotle's unmoved Mover. Rather, God is forever
active, forever creative, and forever exercising his providence over
man.

How does God rule the world? How can his transcendence be
combined with a material universe? This is accomplished through the
logos doctrine, one of Philo's notable contributions to philosophy.
We have noticed this doctrine in HeracHtus and in the Stoics; but
in Philo, above all, it has a definite metaphysical function.

The logos, which is eternal, is conceived by Philo in various ways:
(i) as God's essence, (2) "as incorporeal being," (3) as immanent
wisdom. ^^ To some extent, there is confusion in the use of Philo's

^^ Ibid., pp. 59-60.

302 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

term logos, for it exists as an immaterial essence in the mind of God,
as a blueprint of the universe, and as an immanent quality in the
world. Furthermore, besides universal Ideas which mediate between
God and man, we find angels who likewise are the messengers of
deity.

What is significant in this cosmic scheme of Philo was his demand
for intermediaries. Hence, we have angels who serve as ambassadors
between man and God. This concept almost leads to an indirect
polytheism and again foreshadows the medieval view, which re-
garded the universe as being ruled not merely by God but by angels
and saints who aid in the salvation of man.

In his cosmology Philo maintained that the world was created by
God and that it is not eternal, as Aristotle had maintained. Further-
more, Philo thought, the cosmological thinkers were mistaken when
they believed in a plurality of worlds. This is the only universe, he
declared; it is indestructible and consequently cannot be erased by
a world conflagration.

In his specific scientific views there is little originality: The world
is constructed according to a sphere, with the earth as the center of
the universe. It goes without saying that Philo rejected the Epicur-
ean concept of the atoms. While he used natural laws in defense of
his theories, he did not exclude miracles, which he viewed as sym-
bols of the unlimited power of God.

In his belief in miracles, he revealed a pious strain. To him, all
aspects of creation bespoke the immense powers of God. To doubt
God's greatness, according to Philo, is mere foolishness. Anyone
who keeps his eyes open, who observes nature, can understand the
voice of God. Philo did not doubt for a moment that God uses
supernatural phenomena to accomplish his purposes. Through super-
natural phenomena God aided the Hebrews in Egypt, in Philo's
opinion, and sustained them during the long years in the desert.
Miracles, in short, are a vital proof of the providence of deity.

GOD AND MAN

Philo in his philosophy stated that God is not limited by anything.
"God fills all things; he contains but is not contained. To be every-
where and nowhere is his property and his alone. He is nowhere,
because he himself created space and place coincidentally with
material things, and it is against all right principle to say that the
11 Cf. Wolfson, Philo, vol. i, p. 291.

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 303

Maker is contained in anything that he has made. He is everywhere,
because he has made his powers extend through earth and water, air
and heaven, and left no part of the universe without his presence,
and uniting all with all has bound them fast with invisible bonds,
that they should never be loosed. . . ."^-

In God's sight we experience true tranquillity: "God, since his
fullness is everywhere, is near us, and since his eye beholds us, since
he is close beside us, let us refrain from evil-doing."^^

The wise man, therefore, in Philo's philosophy, turns away from
material things and concentrates on the achievement of salvation.
The wicked man, on the other hand, is dominated by his senses and
by the irrational part of his nature. Alienated from God, he is a serf
to necessity and in bondage to his passions. In his struggle for right-
eousness man is aided by the angels, who mediate between the divine
and the material world. Still, there are not only good angels but also
fallen angels, who have lost the grace of God. With this idea a pro-
nounced dualism enters Philo's metaphysical scheme.

The same dualism appears in the struggle between the rational
and the irrational soul. According to Philo, the rational soul, which
contains the principle of freedom, is not bound to the body but
distinct from it. The souls of the righteous will be rewarded by
immortahty. Some will abide with the angels, others will be placed
among the eternal Ideas, while a few will be favored by living in the
presence of God.

What happens to the wicked and to those who have defied God?
Philo maintained that they probably will experience complete obliv-
ion. This fate he regarded as beneficial, for the wicked have defied
the wishes of God. Their lives have been devoted to nothingness;
hence, their destruction is a just punishment.

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The theory of Philo was bolstered by his behef that the Hebrews
were set apart from other nations and had a special destiny. He was
confident that in the long run the Hebraic spirit would triumph.

"What our most holy prophet through all his regulations espe-
cially desires to create is unanimity, neighborliness, fellowship, reci-
procity of feeling, whereby houses and cities and nations and coun-
tries and the whole human race may advance to supreme happiness.
Hitherto, indeed, these things live only in our prayers, but they will,

12 Philo, The covjiision of tongues, 136-137 (Lewy, op. cit., pp. 27-28).

13 On the giants, 47 {ibid., p. 31).

304 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

I am convinced, become facts beyond all dispute, if God, even as he
gives us the yearly fruits, grants that the virtues should bear abun-
dantly."i4

Philo's faith was based on belief in the Messiah who would estab-
lish a new age in which God would be universally worshiped. Then,
the enemies of the Hebrews would be punished, and all would praise
the genius of this people.

The ideal form of government for Philo was a theocracy, a gov-
ernment dominated by religion. His Utopia was based on the Mosaic
code, which he thought more perfect than the Utopias of the pagan
philosophers. He asserted that Hebrew law was revealed by God;
thus it was infallible. This law was superior to all legislative statutes
and to all philosophical concepts. It could never be abrogated, for
it was a gift of God to man.

The new society, which he predicted, would be governed by jus-
tice and peace. Wars would cease, there would be no economic
oppression. All nations, alike, would praise the majesty of God and
rejoice in his goodness. In these ideas Philo's concept of history was
quite optimistic, for mankind would be liberated from superstition
and fear. Nations would not take up arms again; rather, they would
all acknowledge spiritual ideals.

This concept of history is strikingly different from the one which
usually prevailed in Greek philosophy. To most Greek thinkers,
history represented a rise and decline of various nations and cultures.
Many of the historians, like Thucydides, did not appeal to super-
natural causes; rather, they had a naturalistic view of history and
explained how social and economic circumstances determine the
institutions of man.

This, however, was not the method of Philo. To him, history was
guided by one fundamental thought: the providence of God. It had
a definite beginning and a definite end. Thus, in Philo, we have the
beginning of the medieval view of history which found its consum-
mate expression in St. Augustine's City of God.

What, then, is the best state? Will it be democratic or aristocratic?
Philo answered that it will contain a mixed constitution. Its distin-
guishing trait will be its regard for the divine law and its acknowl-
edgment of God's sovereignty. God will become not merely the
ruler of the physical universe but also the governor of the political
affairs of man. Thus Philo's Utopia almost anticipates the Calvinist
ideal of government. Calvin, like Philo, beheved in a theocracy with

i*Ow the virtues, 1 19-120 (ibid., p. 102).

PHILO'S ETHICS 305

God as ruler of the state. Philo, however, was less puritanical than
Calvin, and he would scarcely have approved of coercion in spiritual
matters.

PHILO'S ETHICS

As in his religious theory, Philo in his ethical system marks a depar-
ture from the accepted Greek patterns of thinking. To Philo, the
ethical life was not autonomous but a prelude to religion. Conse-
quently, reason itself is not absolute, but inferior to faith. Worldly
power is unstable, and fame and honor are extremely precarious.
Wealth, likewise, he explained, is subject to capricious fortune.
Faith, however, is in a different category. It truly ennobles man,
widens his perspective, and enriches his spiritual life.

"Faith in God, then, is one sure and infallible good, consolation
of life, plenitude of bright hopes, dearth of ills, harvest of goods,
inacquaintance with misery, acquaintance with piety, heritage of
happiness, all-round betterment of the soul which is firmly stayed
on him who is the cause of all things and can do all things yet only
wills the best. For, just as those who walk on a slippery road are
tripped up and fall, while others on a dry highway tread without
stumbling, so those who set the soul traveling along the path of the
bodily and the external are but learning it to fall, so slippery and
utterly insecure are all such things; while those who press onward
to God along the doctrines of virtue walk straight upon a path
which is safe and unshaken, so that we may say with all truth that
belief in the former things is disbehef in God, and disbelief in them
belief in God.''^^

Unlike many of the medieval scientists, Philo did not believe that
faith leads to emotional depression, for it fills man with hope and
trust. The faithful man is not touched by the vicissitudes of life;
hardship does not undermine his joy.

"After faith comes the reward set aside for the victorious cham-
pion who gained his virtue through nature and without a struggle.
That reward is joy. For his name was in our speech 'laughter,' but
as the Hebrews call it, Isaac. Laughter is the outward and bodily
sign of the unseen joy in the mind, and joy is in fact the best and
noblest of the higher emotions. By it the soul is filled through and
through with cheerfulness, rejoicing in the Father and Maker of all,
rejoicing too in all his doings in which evil has no place, even though
they do not conduce to its own pleasure, rejoicing because they are

15 On Abraham, 268-269 (ibid., p. 90).

3o6 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

done for good and serve to preserve all that exists. . . . He never
knows gloom and depression; his days are passed in happy freedom
from fears and grief; the hardships and squalor of life never touch
him even in his dreams, because every spot in his soul is already
tenanted by joy."^^

The humanity of Philo is revealed in his view of wisdom. The
man who truly understands the universe is not gloomy or pessimistic,
he declares, nor is he subject to dark moods. Rather, his mind is
serene and tranquil, and he is cheerful in his actions. Thus his life
is a true testimony to the po^^'er of God.

On every side, however, man is beset by irrational desires. Above
all, Philo M'arns us against the enjoyment of pleasures, which he
regarded as enemies of man. If we are in danger of being overcome
by sensuality, we should remember that the pleasures of the flesh are
short-lived, and we should turn to the deUghts of the spirit, which
are everlasting.

Above all, we must beware of hypocrisy. Being a keen observer, \
Philo described the contemporary institutions as dominated by
insincere men. True justice could not be found in the law courts;
true piety was seldom at home in the temples. And, in his opinion,
true wisdom was seldom cherished by the teachers. The world
treasures superficial things and worships success, but, Philo reminds
us, the home of the philosopher is not the physical universe, but
God. In God we live; apart from him we are nothing.

Besides hypocrisy, Philo warns us against having too much faith
in the individual; man is not the measure of everything. If so, he
would be the king of the universe. Rather, it is a sign of wisdom to
understand our limitations and to see the source of all values, all
goodness, and all truth. All forms of atheism are to be shunned as
being not only superficial vie\\s but dangerous to the welfare of
our souls.

How can we overcome temptations? How can we live a construc-
tive and pious Hfe? Philo recommends prayer particularly but, as
has been shown, prayer is not to be based on fear. His religion does
not establish spiritual slavery; rather, it points to man's emancipa-
tion. Together with prayer, he recommends the study of the laws. He
felt that such a study ennobles the mind and leads us away from
sensuality.

True knowledge, he affirms, can never be opposed to religion.
Only a superficial understanding can lead us away from God. The

16 On rewards and punishments, 31-35 {ibid., pp. 90-91).

PHILO'S ETHICS 307

more we study the divine books, the more we contemplate the mir-
acles of nature, the more we are led to religion.

The ultimate aim of life, Philo points out, is contemplation and
mystical union. This goal, however, cannot be achieved by neglect-
ing practical duties. Holiness does not begin with the life of the
recluse. We can exhibit a pious and just spirit when we are fair in
our business dealings and exercise moderation in our material desires.
If we hold public office, we should not pay attention to social
approval; rather, we should practice simplicity.

Before we enter upon the contemplative life, Philo advises us to
perfect ourselves in the ordinary virtues. Otherwise the danger
arises that we may choose it merely as an easy way out. Briefly, we
must serve man first before we can serve God. In our relationships
with others we can learn humility and faith and expand our desire
to be charitable.

The contemplation which we seek can be found in two ways:
first, alone in the wilderness, if we are able to withdraw from society
and achieve a genuine perspective regarding Hfe. This method, how-
ever, is not infallible, for we are still part of society and our heart
is often disturbed by passions. Thus, a second method may be just
as adequate, for we can find a measure of solitude even in society.
Philo, for example, described how amidst a crowd he could con-
template spiritual truth. Physical conditions, then, do not matter
greatly; what is of primary importance is our relationship with
God.

To Philo asceticism represented a holy way of Hfe. He admired
the work of the fcsenes, who, he thought, were models in their
practical piety. In his description of the monastic life Philo almost
anticipated the medieval ideal of sainthood. Certainly such an atti-
tude would not have been appreciated by Aristotle, who believed
in a secular existence based on the Golden Mean and on a rational
appreciation of life.

In Philo, however, the tendency is to withdraw from life, to aban-
don this world as the source of illusion and evil. Yet escapism is not
the dominant theme of his philosophy. He still had hope in the
future, and he still believed in fulfilling the duties of practical life.

PHILO'S ACHIEVEMENTS

Professor Wolfson, in his excellent study of Philo, showed that the
latter has usually been neglected by historians of philosophy. Most
of the time they dismiss him with a few paragraphs or a few vague

3d8 PHILO'S PHILOSOPHY

remarks about his system as marking the decUne of Greek thought.
In this way they not merely underrate his influence, which was
considerable and extended to the Hebraic thinkers, the Neo-Plato-
nists, the Christian theologians, and the Arab philosophers, but also
overlook the importance of his approach to philosophy. Philo prob-
ably initiated a new method in the history of Western civilization,
a method based on faith and revelation rather than systematized
reason.

Philo's synthesis of religious and secular thinking marks the foun-
dation of the medieval spirit. In him, Humanism is replaced by a
theocentric perspective, and God becomes the standard for all of
man's actions, thoughts, and ideals. His logos doctrine had signifi-
cant reverberations in Christian theology. It indicated how a media-
tion could be accomplished between a transcendent God and man,
who is part of two worlds, one material, the other spiritual.

Philo is significant, furthermore, for expressing religion in a con-
crete and tangible way. His religion was based on laws and revealed
through prophecy, which to him represented the highest stage of
knowledge. Miracles are not to be despised, he taught, for they
strengthen faith and reveal God's incessant providence.

In Philo we have an emphasis on universalism, in fact, a Hebrew
version of the world state which is to be based on the Aiosaic laws.
UnHke the Stoic world state, it is a theocracy, not a moral com-
monwealth. Still, the Stoic strains in Philo's thinking are quite evi-
dent. We might almost call his philosophy a Hebraic version of
Stoicism. Unlike the Stoics, however, Philo beheved in the imma-
terial structure of the universe. It is not virtue which is the goal of
hfe, he declared; rather, the mystic vision through which man un-
derstands the unity of the universe and achieves a oneness with God.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Describe Philo's religious heritage.

2. What influences motivated his philosophy?

3. How did he express the spirit of Hebrew nationalism?

4. How did Philo justify his belief in the existence of God?

5. How did Philo describe the process of knowledge?

6. What are the main ethical concepts of his philosophy?

7. Describe Philo's mysticism.

8. What were the political aspects of his philosophy?

9. Why was Philo so influential in medieval philosophy?
10. Summarize Philo's contributions to philosophy.

THE DECLINE OF ROME AND
THE ECLECTIC PHILOSOPHERS

THE LAST PERIOD OF ROME

.fter Marcus Aurelius, the Roman empire disintegrated. Aurelius'
son, Commodus, as we have seen, specialized in dissipation and
shocked the Romans by his sadistic activities. When he was assassi-
nated, a civil war broke out with the army becoming the decisive
factor in Roman politics. In 193 a.d. Septimius Severus became em-
peror. He was an excellent soldier with some success in defeating
the barbarians, but he had to depend too heavily on the army, which,
in the long run, undermined the security of Rome.

When the descendants of Severus died, another period of chaos
governed Rome. Murder of the emperors now became common-
place. Twenty were assassinated within a period of fifty years.
Rome was faced not only by external foes, especially the Persians,
but by constant civil strife. It looked, in the 3rd century a.d., as if
Roman power definitely was exhausted.

The decline was temporarily arrested by Diocletian. He tried to
create order out of chaos by measures which led to strong centrali-

309

3IO DECLINE OF ROME AND PHILOSOPHERS

zation and by a reorganization of the administrative functions of the
empire. Diocletian used an enormous secret service through which
he tried to supervise government officials and prevent corruption.
He made it compulsory for his subjects to worship him as the son
of God and adopted almost Oriental ways of despotism. The senate
became merely a debating society with no actual powers. In 301
Diocletian issued an edict to control the price of goods; but the law
could not be enforced, and he was unable to halt the permanent
economic decline.

After the death of Diocletian, another period of civil war broke
out. There were several claimants to the throne, all of whom hated
one another bitterly. Finally, Constantine assumed control. He di-
vided the empire into two parts and built a new capital in the East
which he called New Rovie, but which later was renamed Con-
stantinople. At first the empire remained relatively unified, but
under Theodosius the division became permanent. After 395, East-
ern and Western Rome were governed as separate entities.

Constantine is also significant for the edict of toleration which he
issued in 313. It gave legal status to Christianity.

In his economic measures he was even more extreme than Dio-
cletian. He tried to establish complete absolutism by making it im-
possible for serfs to leave the land and by making the guilds heredi-
tary organizations. He envisioned a completely stratified economy
in which the son would follow in his father's profession and in
which no one could get away from the social class to which he be-
longed.

Constantine tried to enforce tax collection by holding the mem-
bers of the town councils responsible for the revenue of the empire.
Naturally the council members, disliking this function, attempted
to evade it. Despite all the laws, corruption and bribery could not be
stopped. The administrative apparatus became progressively more
inefficient, and it created thousands of bureaucrats who plundered
the nation.

Constantly the danger of the barbarians was becoming more
noticeable. Rome was sacked in 410 by Alaric. Its emperors were
utterly impotent. An excellent example was Honorius, whose reign
lasted from 395 to 423. He had no actual power and was forced to
depend on mercenary soldiers, who were ready to fight for anyone
who promised them plunder.

Rome was sacked again in 455 by the Vandals. Thereafter the
emperor was usually selected by a German general. By 476 a.d.

BASIC REASONS FOR THE FALL OF ROME 311

the triumph of the barbarians became complete, and the Western
Roman Empire ceased to function as an autonomous unit.

BASIC REASONS FOR THE FALL OF
ROME

To appreciate the decline of Rome we must understand the funda-
mental causes which led to its downfall. At the outset it must be
remembered that the decline was not sudden or cataclysmic but
took centuries. The seeds for the eventual downfall of Rome were
laid as early as the time of the Gracchi brothers, who unsuccess-
fully had tried to reform the Roman land system (133 B.C.).

First of all, we must note various political factors. The central
government constantly declined. There was no adequate method of
constitutional succession. Unable to protect the frontiers, the em-
perors could give no real security to many of the provinces. Con-
sequently there were independent states at the frontiers of the em-
pire which were practically immune from the control of the central
government. Another factor in the decHne was the growth of mili-
tarism. The army became practically independent, and it was so
powerful that it could make and unmake emperors. Its soldiers
were frequently without discipline, and their looting and van-
dalism embittered the civilian population. Then, too, the influx of
mercenaries and foreign elements destroyed its effectiveness. The
generals, most of the time, were eager for political power and had
little heart for actual warfare.

The loss of freedom on the part of the Roman citizen was becom-
ing apparent after the time of Marcus Aurelius (121-180 a.d.). The
senate ceased to function as an independent poHtical institution,
while the emperor became an Oriental despot.

The land system of Rome produced economic disintegration.
Most of the farms were owned by a few rich landlords, and the
small farmer could scarcely make a profit. Hence his condition be-
came desperate; and to ward off starvation, he accepted serfdom.
Many farmers who were unwilling to accept the dictates of the
landlords tried to make a living in the cities, but ill fortune followed
them there, too. Thus they were forced to live on the dole, and they
contributed to the general economic disintegration.

It must not be forgotten that Rome exploited its provinces. It
bled them to such an extent as to exhaust their economic resources.
This robbery could be kept up in a period of growth; but when
Rome declined, such wholesale exploitation accelerated the process

312 DECLINE OF ROME AND PHILOSOPHERS

of destruction. In short, Rome did not develop a satisfactory system
of foreign trade. It achieved better political than economic cen-
tralization; and when the barbarians became more successful in their
invasions, this economic isolation increased and provided the foun-
dation for medieval feudalism.

Rome also was experiencing the pangs of inflation. The prices of
goods rose to such an extent that few could purchase the necessities
of life. The laws which were issued to fix prices proved to be
ineffective. Then, too, the debasement of the currency destroyed
the confidence of the people in their monetary system. Money lost
its value, and in its place there arose a barter economy which pre-
vented satisfactory economic relations. The public officials in the
3rd and 4th centuries became notoriously corrupt. People who had
money found it easy to bribe them and to exact special favors. How-
ever, the lower classes were suffering under a crushing burden, and
they resented the exploitations of the bureaucracy.

In this period few outstanding leaders arose. Emperors such as
Diocletian and Constantine were the exception rather than the rule.
The civil wars undermined the confidence of the people in their po-
litical institutions. Patriotism was becoming almost extinct; prac-
tically everyone seemed to be out for his own private gain. Those
leaders who ordinarily would have gone into government service
now chose the army or became religious devotees. Public duties
were neglected, for the government was regarded with suspicion
and hatred by most Roman citizens.

Climatic factors also played a role in the decline of Rome. Soil
exhaustion became a direct menace. As yet, no scientific techniques
had been developed to prevent erosion and safeguard the fertility
of the land. Add to all these factors the growing pressure of the
barbarians, who found many willing collaborators within the
Roman Empire, and you have a definite pattern explaining why
Rome was doomed.

THE LOSS OF MORALE

This decline of Rome was not merely economic and political; it was
also spiritual. It has been the custom of ecclesiastical historians to
speak about the immorality of Rome, but this factor has been greatly
exaggerated. Certainly the Romans in the time of Augustus were
not paragons of virtue; yet it was a period of splendor and mag-
nificence. Instead of blaming immorality, we must look to the de-
cline of morale. There was a lack of public spirit and unity. A gospel

THE LOSS OF MORALE 313

of individualism which neglected the interests of the community
came into dominance.

The old Roman religion, which supported the family system, be-
came almost obsolete. It was replaced by Oriental cults, such as the
worship of the Egyptian gods Isis and Osiris; the Phrygian Mother
Goddess; the Greek Dionysus; and the Persian Mithra, who ap-
pealed especially to the Roman army. These deities were some-
times amalgamated, and it became the custom of many Romans to
pray to several gods and to belong to a variety of sects. However,
all these cults introduced new elements into Roman life. Stressing
future existence, their exponents talked about purification and fre-
quently established saviors to mediate between man and God.

To many Romans, Christianity was on the same level as the Ori-
ental Mystery cults. The challenge of Christianity, however, proved
to be irresistible. Persecutions could not stop the Christian wave
which overwhelmed Roman civilization. Many educated Romans
complained of the otherworldliness, the fanaticism, and the sub-
versive attitude of the Christians. For example, Libanius wrote to
emperor Julian about the Christian destruction of the temples, and
he believed that this razing was done merely for private gain.

For a brief period Julian tried to revive paganism in order to re-
establish the old religion. He attempted to give a philosophical ex-
planation of the gods, since he considered Greek culture far su-
perior to Christian ideals. In his letters he regarded Christianity as
an outgrowth of the Hebraic spirit, which he viewed as inferior to
paganism. Julian's main deity was the sun god, a faith which prob-
ably reveals the influence of Persian beliefs. Like Zoroaster, he
beheved that the sun is the lord of all life and dominates all of
creation. At the same time he tried to infuse a more sublime moral-
ity into the pagan faith, as is indicated by one of the letters he
wrote to the high priest of Galatia:

"The Hellenic religion does not yet prosper as I desire, and it is
the fault of those who profess it; for the worship of the gods is on a
splendid and magnificent scale, surpassing every prayer and every
hope. May Adrasteia^ pardon my words, for indeed no one, a little
while ago, would have ventured even to pray for a change of such
a sort or so complete within so short a time. Why, then, do we
think that this is enough, why do we not observe that it is their
benevolence to strangers, their care for the graves of the dead and
the pretended holiness of their lives that have done most to increase

^ A goddess who governs fate.

314 DECLINE OF ROME AND PHILOSOPHERS

atheism?^ I believe that we ought really and truly to practice every
one of these virtues. And it is not enough for you alone to practice
them, but so must all the priests in Galatia, without exception.
Either shame or persuade them into righteousness or else remove
them from their priestly office, if they do not, together with their
wives, children and servants, attend the worship of the gods but
allow their servants or sons or wives to show impiety toward the
gods and honor atheism more than piety. In the second place, ad-
monish them that no priest may enter a theatre or drink in a tavern
or control any craft or trade that is base and not respectable. Honor
those who obey you, but those who disobey, expel from office. In
every city establish frequent hostels in order that strangers may
profit by our benevolence; I do not mean for our own people only,
but for others also who are in need of money."^

The work of Julian, however, was not successful; and in 392
Theodosius outlawed paganism:

"No official or dignitary of whatsoever class or rank among men,
whether he be powerful by fortune of birth or humble in the con-
dition of his family, shall in any place or in any city slay an innocent
victim for sacrifice to senseless idols ....

"But if any one in order to make a sacrifice dares to offer a victim
or to consult the quivering entrails, let any man be free to accuse
him and let him receive as one guilty of lese-majesty a fitting pun-
ishment for an example, even if he have sought nothing contrary to,
or involving the welfare of, the authorities. For it is sufficiently a
crime to wish to undo nature's laws and to investigate what is for-
bidden; to lay bare secrets, to handle things prohibited, to look for
the end of another's prosperity or to predict another's ruin. . . .

"But if any one has sought to make such a sacrifice in public
temples or shrines or in buildings or in fields belonging to some one
else— if it be proved that the place was used without the owner's
knowledge, he shall pay a fine of twenty-five pounds of gold; and
the same penalty for the man who connives at this crime or who
makes the sacrifice.

"This statute we wish to be observed by judges, defensors and
curials of every city, so that offenses discovered by the latter may
be reported to the courts and there punished by the former. But if
they think anything may be concealed by favor or passed over by
negligence, let them be subjected to judicial action; but if the

2 By that he meant Christianity.

3 Julian, Epistulae, xlix.

DECLINE IN PHILOSOPHY 315

former, being warned, postpone giving sentence and dissimulate,
they shall be fined thirty pounds of gold, and members of their
court shall be subjected to a like penalty."^

This ruling was made complete by Honorius, who inflicted harsh
penalties upon pagan worship:

"The yearly income of the temples shall be cut off and shall be
apphed to help out the expenses of our most devoted soldiery.

"Any images wherever still standing in temples and fanes, which
have received or are receiving religious rites of the pagans, shall
be torn from their temples, since we know this has been decreed
by laws frequently repeated.

"The temple buildings themselves, whether situated in cities or
towns or without the walls, shall be appropriated for public pur-
poses. Altars shall be destroyed in every place, and all temples shall
be given over into our possession to be used for suitable purposes;
the proprietors shall be forced to tear them down.

"In the more polluted places it shall not be permitted to hold a
banquet or to celebrate any solemn service in honor of any sac-
rilegious rite whatsoever.

"Furthermore, we give the ecclesiastical power to the bishops of
these places to prevent these very things.

"Moreover, we inflict a penalty of twenty pounds of gold upon
judges and a like fine on their officials, if these orders are neglected
through their carelessness."^

DECLINE IN PHILOSOPHY

While a new adjustment which emphasized supernaturalism took
place in religion, philosophic speculation lacked originahty. Two
cults, especially, were fighting for supremacy: the Neo-Pythag-
oreans and the Eclectic Platonists.

Among the Neo-Pythagoreans we find Figulus, Apollonius of
Tyana, iVloderatus of Gades, and Nicomachus of Gerasa. Of these,
Apollonius was regarded as a miracle worker, and he was practically
deified by his followers.

The Neo-Pythagoreans borrowed from various schools of philos-
ophy, including Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and especially
Pythagoreanism. They made much of the principle of number,
which they regarded as the original design for the phenomenal

* Codex Theodosianus, xvi, 10, 12 (Alaude A. Huttmann, The establishment
of Christimiity and the proscription of paganis?n, pp. 216-217).
^ Ibid., XVI, 10, 19 (ibid., p. 229).

3i6 DECLINE OF ROME AND PHILOSOPHERS

world. They were conscious of the problem of evil, and thus they
frequently believed in an evil world-soul.

The Neo-Pythagoreans contrasted the heavenly and the earthly
sphere in the Aristotelian manner. They believed that the heavens
are eternal while the earth is impermanent. Like the Stoics, they
emphasized Providence and the perfection of the universe. In their
philosophy, religion played a supreme role. Their teachers were
regarded as inspired saints. Frequently notes of ascetism became
apparent. Accordingly, they practiced abstinence from eating meat
and were opposed to marriage. Following the ancient Pythagoreans,
they established special societies in which goods were held in com-
mon. With such a philosophy, the Neo-Pythagoreans looked down
on the multitude, whom they regarded as being corrupt. The life
of the saint, on the other hand, they considered to be the most per-
fect achievement of man. It constituted their answer to the growing
decay of society.

Among the Eclectic Platonists we find Eudorus of Alexandria,
Thrasyllus, Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, Albinus, Atticus, and
Apuleius. The difference between the two schools is scarcely notice-
able, except that this latter school made more of Plato than of
Pythagoras. There was the same dualism between natural and spir-
itual principles. To the Platonic philosophy various concepts were
added, and there was stress upon mediating deities between man
and God.

In this connection, special notice should be taken of Plutarch.
He represents the twilight of the ancient spirit. He still believed in
political functions; he still had a concept of public duty. But the
new spirit is evident in his writings, for he did not disregard divina-
tion and oracles, and he justified the popular belief in demons. Like
Philo, he believed that God is transcendent; and he assumed that
various deities mediate between man and God. To account for evil,
he established a world-soul which tries to counteract the providence
of God.

Maximus of Tyre sounds somewhat like a medieval Christian
preacher. He believed in demons and asserted that it is the task of
the soul to be emancipated from the body and to be reunited with
its divine source. We must get away from physical lusts, he de-
clared, and, instead, concentrate on God:

"How should a man understand God so long as he is agitated by
a multitude of lusts and extravagant thoughts.^ As well might one
in the clamor and confusion of a democracy think to hear the

DECLINE IN PHILOSOPHY 317

voice of the law and the ruler! . . . For when the soul has fallen
into this turmoil, and surrendered herself to be carried along by the
irresistible wave, she must swim through a sea whence escape is
indeed hard— unless Philosophy take pity on her and suggest her
own reasonings, as Leucothea gave the veil to Odysseus. How then
may a man swim safely through and see God? The whole indeed
you will not see till he calls you to himself; and call you he will at
no distant date. Wait for his call. Old age will come to you— the
guide thither— and Death, about whom the coward laments, whose
approach sets him trembling, but the lover of God bids Death
welcome, and has good courage when he sees him come."*^

Maximus of Tyre defended image worship, whereby he thought
religion could be aided:

"It is not that the Divine Being stands in any need of images or
statues. It is poor humanity, because of its weakness and the dis-
tance dividing it from God, 'as the heaven is high above the earth,'
which has contrived these things as symbols. People who have an
exceptionally strong power of mental realization, who can lift their
soul straight away to heaven and come into contact with God— such
people, it may be, do not stand in any need of images. But such
people are few amongst men. You never find a man in the mass with
a realization of God and able to dispense with aids of this kind. It is
as with the teaching of letters to children. Teachers have an in-
genious way of drawing the letters faintly and guiding the child's
hand over them, till the mental realization required for the art of
writing is acquired by practice. Just in the same way, it seems to
me, the old law-givers invented images for mankind, as it were for
a troop of children, symbols of the honor shown to the gods, a
leading of men by the hand along the way to mental realization."'^

Numenius prepared the way for Neo-Platonism by his concept of
triads. In his metaphysical scheme there are three main principles:
a transcendent being; a creator who is responsible for the spiritual
and phenomenal world; and the universe, which also occupies the
status of divinity. In his sNstem there is a dualism between two
world-souls, one good and one evil. The same opposition is extended
to the soul of man.

What is especially noteworthy in Numenius is his wide acquaint-
ance with various religions. He showed tolerance for the beliefs of
the Egyptians, the Hindus, and the Hebrews. He spoke respectfully

^ Bevan, Later Greek religion, p. 143.
^ Ibid., p. 147.

3i8 DECLINE OF ROME AND PHILOSOPHERS

of Moses. He tried to weave all the philosophies into a coherent
whole; however, he did not succeed too well in this task.

In the system of Numenius the First God is transcendent and
beyond creativity: "Indeed there is no necessity for the First God
to make anything; nay, we ought to look upon the First God as
the Father of the Maker. If, therefore, we were talking about the
Maker, and said that because he was good from the beginning, he
was bound to make the best possible universe, that would be to ap-
proach the argument in a way appropriate to the Being in question.
If on the other hand it is not the Maker but the First God, about
whom we speak, then the statement just made would be impious.
Let no such thing ever pass our lips, I will go on to see whether
by quest elsewhere we can capture the right argument,

"Before capturing the argument, however, let us make to our-
selves a profession of our belief, such as no hearer could misunder-
stand: the First God engages in no works of any kind; he is the
King: but the Maker-God governs, going right through the heavens.
Through him is the sending forth to us of the Mind (Nous) that
is in us; for the Mind is sent down by transmission to all those who
are ordained to partake of it. And so long as this God has his face
towards each one of us and looks at each one of us, so long our
bodies live and act, the God taking care of them by the radiations
of his influence; but when the God turns round to the contempla-
tion of himself, then our bodies die, but the Mind goes on living,
enjoying a life of bliss. . . ."^

To understand God, Numenius continued, we must get away from
sensible things: "Of bodies we can get knowledge either by noting
their resemblance to other similar things, or by the indications to be
found in adjacent things. But of the God (i.e., the First God) by no
possibility can we get knowledge by anything adjacent to It or by
anything like It. We need— nay, take this figure. Think of someone
sitting on a high cliff and seeing, far out at sea, a fishing boat, one
of those small skiffs, a single boat, alone, nothing else near it: by
straining his eyes he can just see it at one moment; at another mo-
ment it is gone. So must a man go far away from sensible things to
converse with the Good, alone with the Alone, where there is no
other man, no other living things, nothing corporeal small or great;
only a vast divine solitude, unutterable, indescribable. . . . But if
anyone clings to sensible things, and imagines that the Good hovers
over these, if he then lives sumptuously and thinks that he has met

^ Ibid., pp. 148-149.

DECLINE IN PHILOSOPHY 319

with the Good, he is altogether astray. For in very truth the method
of attaining That is no easy one, but one above merely human skill,
and the best thing is to detach all interest from sensible things."^

In this period of philosophy are the Hermetic writings, which
belong to the latter part of the 3rd century and evidently originated
in Egypt. They consist of eighteen tracts describing intermediary
deities who shorten the distance between God and man. The uni-
verse of the Hermetic writings is peopled with a multitude of gods.
Like the other philosophies, these writings urge that the sensible
world be transcended if the soul is to regain its purity.

Somewhat earlier than the Hermetic writings are the Chaldean
Oracles, which also contain an eclectic philosophy and affirm
mysticism. In them, reason is subordinated to intuition, and the
otherworldly emphasis is only too evident.

It can readily be seen that the philosophy of this period, generally,
reflected the spirit of disintegration. Theoretical speculations de-
clined in originality; superstition took firm roots in philosophic cir-
cles; and the ideal of reason was subordinated to the ascetic life and
the search for salvation.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What were the economic reasons for the decline of Rome?

2. What role did Christianity play in the decline of Rome?

3. Describe the role of immorality in the fall of Rome.

4. What measures did Constantine and Diocletian take to prevent the
collapse of Rome?

5. Why was the decline of Rome a gradual process?

6. What were the military reasons for the fall of Rome?

7. Explain the meaning of Neo-Pythagoreanism.

8. Compare the philosophical speculations at the end of the Roman
Empire with the philosophy of the pre-Socratic period.

9. Why did religion play such an important role in philosophy during
this period?

9 Ibid., pp. 1 50-1 51.

2 I

NEO-PLA TONISM

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLOTINUS

efore ancient philosophy came to a close, a last Indian summer
took place in the Neo-Platonic movement. Plotinus was its harbin-
ger.^ He undoubtedly ranks among the supreme metaphysicians of
mankind. His influence on Christian theology, on the Renaissance,
and on outstanding poets like Goethe and Emerson can scarcely be
minimized.

Among the systems of cosmology, that of Plotinus ranks high,
both in speculative depth and in imaginative insight. In many ways
Plotinus represents the best strains of his age. In him we find an
otherworldly orientation and a mystical impulse, and thus we see
that his main endeavor was to obtain an insight into spiritual reality.
While other philosophers were appealing to superstition, Plotinus
presented a completely intellectual account of the universe. His
mysticism was not based on revelation or on adherence to any
definite dogmas; rather, it was the product of a systematized philos-

1 On Plotinus, see Inge, The philosophy of Plotimis, 2 vols.; Whittaker, The
Neo-Plato?iists; Whitby, The wisdom of Plotinus; Overstreet, The dialectic of
Plotinus; Mehlis, Plotin; Bouillet, Les Enneades de Plotin.
320

THE LIFE OF PLOTINUS 321

ophy which gave a coherent account of man's relationship to the
cosmos.

THE LIFE OF PLOTINUS

Plotinus was born c. 204 a.d. in Egypt. He received his early edu-
cation at Alexandria, where he studied under Saccas, who was also
the instructor of several Christian theologians. He followed the
emperor Gordian ^\'hen the latter undertook a war against the
Persians, and he used this opportunity to become acquainted with
the religious customs of the East. He is described as a man of saintly
character and attractive personality.

When he was forty years old, Plotinus went to Rome, where he
was acclaimed as the outstanding thinker of his time. He attracted
not only professional philosophers but powerful politicians, and he
gained the favor of the emperor. It was his desire to found a new
Utopia, based on Plato's Republic, which was to emphasize the ideals
of religious mysticism. The emperor was interested in the scheme,
but court intrigue prevented its success.

Plotinus did not write down his thoughts until he was well along
in middle age. His pupil, Porphyry, arranged his fifty-four treatises
into six sets of nine. Thus they are called Eimeads, and they rank
among the masterpieces of philosophical literature.

The First Ennead is concerned with ethical problems. It deals
with such topics as the virtues, happiness, forms of Good, the prob-
lem of evil, and the withdrawal from life.

The Second Ennead is concerned with the physical universe. It
discusses the stars, potentiality and actuality, circular movement,
and quality and form. The last part contains a diatribe against the
Gnostics.

The Third Ennead deals with the philosophical impHcations of
Plotinus' world-view. Such topics are discussed as the problem of
faith. Providence, eternity and time, and the constitution of nature.

The Fourth Ennead describes the nature and function of the soul.
It also discusses the immortaUty of the soul and takes up the prob-
lem of sensation and memory.

The Fifth Ennead deals with the manifestations of the divine spirit.
It explains the doctrine of Ideas of Plotinus and also contains a
notable chapter on intellectual beauty.

The Sixth Ennead contains a variety of topics. Among them we
find discussions of numbers, of free will, and of the kinds of real
Bemg.

322 NEO-PLATONISM

Porphyry's Life of Plotinus indicates the high esteem in which
Plotinus was held by the Romans. He describes the intense concen-
tration of his master and exalts his gentleness. Plotinus was widely
known for his charity; for example, he brought up many orphans
to whom he taught the principles of philosophy. According to
Porphyry, Plotinus died of a disease of the throat. His last words
were, "I am striving to give back the Divine in myself to the Divine
in the AIL"^

PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS

In many ways Plotinus leaned upon Platonic doctrines. Like Plato,
he beHeved in a spiritual type of love. Furthermore, he accepted
Platonic mysticism and the reality of the Ideas. But in Plotinus there
are Ideas of particulars as well as of universals. The main difference
between the two philosophers is shown in their points of emphasis.
Plotinus lacked the social interests of Plato. He did not believe that
mankind could be reformed through a philosopher-king; hence, he
did not try to apply his metaphysical ideals to politics. He had far
less interest in and understanding of mathematics than Plato, and his
writings lack the poetry of the Greek philosopher.

In every way Plotinus was much more single-minded than Plato,
whose philosophy contains a variety of viewpoints and whose intel-
lectual outlook was extremely plastic. Plotinus, on the other hand,
was more consistent; there was one central motive throughout his
life— the belief that life on earth is essentially a descent from divine
purity, and that the soul must regain its union with God.

The metaphysical system of Plotinus is characterized by the con-
cept of transcendence. According to him, there are three realities:
the Ojie, the Mind, and the Soul. The One is like the God of Philo;
it cannot be understood according to the categories of science. It is
beyond existence, beyond truth, and beyond all values. If we try to
define the One, we are bound to fail, for no intellectual predica-
tion is adequate when applied to it.

The One, Plotinus beHeved, is at the summit of all Being: "We
may think of the One as a light before the light, an eternal irradia-
tion resting upon the Intellectual; This, not identical with its
source, is yet not so remote from It as to be less than Real-Being;
It is the primal Knower. But the One, as transcending intellect,
transcends knowing.

^Tumbull, The essence of Plotinus, p. 3.

PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS 323

"The One is, in truth, beyond all statement; whatever you say
would limit It; the All-Transcending, transcending even the most
august Mind, which alone of all things has true being, has no name.
We can but try to indicate, if possible, something concerning It."^

Thus, we cannot express what it is in its essence. We know only
that it is a principle which is beyond reason and mind and which
is the author of all Being.

"Those who are divinely possessed and inspired have at least
knowledge that they hold some greater thing within them though
they cannot tell what it is; from the movements that stir them and the
utterances that come from them they perceive the power, not them-
selves, that moves them; in the same way, it must be, we stand to-
wards the Supreme, when we hold Divine Mind pure, knowing that
this is the mind within, that which gives Being and all else of that
order; but we know too that Other, know that it is none of these,
but a nobler principle, fuller and greater; above reason, mind and
feeling, conferring these powers, not to be confounded with them.

"The All-Transcendent, utterly void of multiplicity, is unity's
self, independent of all else, That from which all the rest take their
degree of unity in their standing, near or far, towards It. It is the
great Beginning and the Beginning must be a really Existent One,
wholly and truly One. All life belongs to It, Life brilliant and
perfect. It is therefore more than self-sufficing. Author at once of
Being and self-sufficiency."^

The One is not to be approached through sense experience, nor
can it be understood through the intellect. We ought not to ask
where it comes from, Plotinus averred, or where it goes. We can
appreciate its greatness through a vision:

"Only by a leap can we reach to this One which is to be pure of
all else, halting sharp in fear of slipping ever so little aside and
impinging on the dual: for the One does not bear to be num-
bered with anything else; it is measure and not the measured. The
First cannot be thought of as having definition and limit. It can be
described only as transcending all things produced, transcending
Being. To seek to throw a line about that illimitable Nature would
be folly, and anyone thinking to do so cuts himself off from the
most momentary approach to Its least vestige.

"As one wishing to contemplate the Intellectual Nature will lay
aside all representations of the senses and so may see what tran-

^ Ibid., p. 162.
*Ibid., pp. 162-163.

324 NEO-PLATONISM

scends the realm of sense, so one wishing to contemplate what
transcends the Intellectual attains by putting away all that is of the
intellect, taught by the intellect, no doubt, that the Transcendent
exists, but never seeking to define It. Its definition could not be
'the Indefinable,' for This is a Principle not to be conveyed by any
sound; It can not be known on any hearing, but if at all, by vision."^

The second reality of Plotinus is called Nous, a term which is
best interpreted by Mind. It is the image of the One and contains
within it the Platonic Ideas. These Ideas, however, do not merely
have an intellectual existence; they are the archetypes of individuals.
The content of the Nous is completely unitary. To appreciate
the divine spirit, we must use self-contemplation, for the soul is a
microcosm of the divine mind.

Plotinus' third reality is the soul. As the architect of the phe-
nomenal world, it contains a world-soul and a multitude of lesser
souls. The world-soul can be seen in two aspects. It is the energy
behind the world and at the same time forms the body of the uni-
verse. The human soul also has two parts— one intellectual, which
is subject to reincarnation; and the other, irrational and part of
the body.

The soul, however, is not dependent on matter, since matter is
purely passive whereas the soul is active. Thus the soul is the essence
of the material body.

According to Plotinus, the world of matter can also be inter-
preted in t\\'0 ways. The corporeal part contains the principle of
Non-being and is full of evil and limitation. It is far removed from
the majesty and perfection of the One. This belief does not imply,
however, that the visible world is to be disregarded and shunned, as
the Gnostics thought.

"Yet we must not think the world of unhappy origin because
there are many jarring notes in it. What image of the Intelligible
Realm could be more beautiful than this world of ours? What globe
more minutely perfect or more admirably ordered in its course?
Or what other sun figuring the Divine Sphere than this sun we
see?

"This universe is a life organized, effective, complex, all-compre-
hensive, displaying an unfathomable wisdom. How, then, can any-
one say that it is not a clear image, beautifully formed, of the In-
tellectual Divinities? This earth of ours is full of varied life-forms
and of immortal beings; to the very heavens it is crowded. And the

^ Ibid., pp. 164-165.

PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS 325

stars moving in their ordered path, circling the universe, how can
they be less than gods?"^

The universe itself is created by a process of emanation, Plotinus
asserted. This creation, in itself, is a timeless process. It can best be
compared with the light of the sun, which illuminates the world
with its brightness. Darkness, therefore, is nothing positive; it
merely indicates the absence of light and distance from the One.
Throughout the process of emanation the One remains the same,
changeless and eternal.

It must be emphasized that the One is beyond space and time, in
Plotinus' philosophy. Time itself is an image of eternity. "To bring
this cosmos into being, the Soul first laid aside its eternity and
clothed itself with Time; this world of its fashioning it then gave
over to be a servant of Time, setting all its progressions within the
bournes of Time. Putting forth its energy in act after act, in a
constant progress of novelty, the Soul produces succession. Time,
then, is contained in differentiation of life; the ceaseless forward
movement of life brings with it unending Time; and life, as it
achieves its stages, constitutes past Time.

"It would be sound, then, to define Time as the life of the Soul
in movement as it passes from one stage of experience to another.
For Eternity is life in repose, unchanging, self-identical, always
endlessly complete; and there is to be an image of Eternity— Time,
such an image as this lower All presents of the Higher Sphere.
Therefore over against this oneness without extent or interval there
must be an image of oneness, a unity of succession; over against the
whole in concentration there must be that which is to be a whole by
stages never final. The lesser must always be working towards the
increase of its being, and this will be its imitation of what is im-
mediately complete, self-realized, endless, without stage."'''

Time, Plotinus taught, must not be conceived as being apart from
soul; rather, it is an inherent part of the soul. If it achieved its orig-
inal unity, time would disappear, for it is connected with the
sensible universe.

In the universe of Plotinus we find an emphasis on oneness. All
things are connected and bound together by cosmic sympathy.
The parts of creation accordingly are affected by this wholeness
in the universe. There is no isolated fact; nothing occurs in a chaotic
way.

^ Ibid., p. 65.
''Ibid., pp. 106-107.

326 NEO-PLATONISM

The scientific ideas of Plotinus were not very advanced. Sub-
ordinating science to his metaphysical interests, he maintained that
the heavens are superior to the earth, for they are the resting place
of the most sublime souls. He assumed that the stars are the abodes
of gods; and he accepted the reality of demons, who live in the
space between the earth and the stars.

In every way Plotinus was an enemy of naturalism. He objected
to the Stoic view, which regarded the material principle as primary
and held that God, himself, has a material form. Plotinus made a
definite distinction between body and soul, and he was emphatic
in his insistence that the soul cannot be interpreted according to
the categories of the body. Any valid explanation, he asserted, must
depend on the higher scale of values. What is sublime in nature,
then, cannot be viewed according to natural facts; on the contrary,
all natural facts must be interpreted according to their spiritual
tendencies.

PLOTINUS' CONCEPT OF THE SOUL

To understand the philosophy of Plotinus we must appreciate his
concept of the soul. He made it clear that the soul is a divine force
and the source of all Providence. It is incorrect to beheve, he said,
that the world-soul is scattered in the universe; rather, the universe
is in the world-soul. Furthermore, it is impossible to divide the souls
quantitatively, for all souls are one. The universe, in short, consists
of an indivisible unit:

"That the soul of every individual is one we deduce from the
fact that it is present entire at every point of the body— not some
part of it here and another part there. Are we to hold similarly
that your soul and mine are all one, and that in the universe the soul
in all the several forms of life is one soul, an omnipresent identity?

"If the soul in me is a unity, why need that in the universe be
otherwise, seeing that there is no longer question of bulk or body?
And if that is one soul and yours and mine belong to it, then yours
and mine must also be one."^

Plotinus appealed to moral reasons to portray the oneness of the
soul: "Reflection tells us that we are in sympathetic relation to
each other, suffering at the sight of others' pain, melted from our
separate moulds, prone to forming friendships; and this can be due
only to some unity among us. There is, then, nothing strange in
the reduction of all souls to one.

^Ibid., p. 151.

PLOTINUS' CONCEPT OF THE SOUL 327

"Invoking the help of God, let us assert that the existence of
many souls makes it certain that there must first be one from which
the many rise. This one is competent to lend itself to all yet remain
one, because while it penetrates all things it cannot itself be sun-
dered; this is identity in variety, like a science with its various sec-
tions standing as a whole; while the portion selected for meeting a
particular need is present actually and takes the lead, still the whole
is in every part; the part invites the immediate interest, but its value
consists in its approach to the whole."^

In Plotinus we also find a doctrine of reincarnation. Like Plato,
he stressed the existence of the soul before birth and its immortal-
ity. Reincarnation, he held, is determined by our action in this life.
The evil man is punished; a murderer is murdered; and the tyrant
becomes a slave. What is the destination of the soul.^ Where does
it go after leaving the body?

"The space open to the soul's resort is vast and diverse. No one
can ever escape the suffering entailed by ill deeds done; the Divine
Law is ineluctable, carrying bound up, as one with it, the fore-
ordained execution of its doom. The sufferer, all unaware, is swept
onward towards his due, hurried always by the restless driving of
his errors, until at last, wearied out by that against which he strug-
gled, he falls into his fit place and, by the vehemence of his self-will,
is brought to the lot he never willed. The law decrees the intensity
and the duration of the suffering, while it carries with it too the
lifting of chastisement and the faculty of rising from those places
(of pain)— all by power of the harmony that maintains the universal
scheme.

"Souls, body-bound, are apt to body punishment; clean souls, no
longer drawing to themselves at any point any vestige of body are,
by their very being, outside the bodily sphere; There where Es-
sence is, and true Being, and the Divine within the Divinity, among
Those, within That, such a soul must be."^"

Do we retain memory of our previous existence? Plotinus as-
serted that memory represents a lower category of existence, for it
indicates multiplicity.

"The memory of friends, children, wife, country, the lower man
retains with emotion, the authentic man passively. The loftier soul
must desire to come to a happy forgetfulness of all that has reached
it through the lower. The more urgent the intention towards the

^ Ibid., p. 152.
^^ Ibid., p. 126.

328 NEO-PLATONISM

Supreme, the more extensive will be the soul's forgetfulness, unless
indeed when the entire living has, even here, been such that mem-
ory has nothing but the noblest to deal with.

"In this world itself, all is best when human interests and the
memory of them have been put out of the way. It is not essential
that everything should be laid up in the mind; the soul does not
take into its deeper recesses such differences as do not meet any of
its needs or serve any of its purposes. Above all, when the soul's Act
is directed towards another order, it must utterly reject the mem-
ory of such things, things over and done with now, and not even
taken into knowledge when they were present. In this sense we may
truly say that the good soul is the forgetful."^^

ETHICAL AND ESTHETIC DOCTRINES

In his ethical doctrines Plotinus started with political virtues. While
he asserted that it is necessary to fulfill the functions of citizenship,
he in general was uninterested in political problems. Unlike his
later followers, Plotinus did not believe strict asceticism is neces-
sary; rather, he affirmed the importance of coj2templatio?i. Like
Buddha, he searched for spiritual enlightenment.

In this connection he raised the problem of freedom. Freedom, he
asserted, hes in our inner being. It cannot be traced to external things.
The wicked man is a serf to his passions and thus lives in a state of
slavery.

"Soul becomes free when, through Divine Mind, it strives unim-
peded towards the Good; what it does in that spirit is its free act;
Divine Mind is free in its own right. But the Good is the sole object
of desire and That whereby the others are self-dispossessing.
Thought insists upon distinguishing between what is subject to
others and what is independent, bound under no allegiance, lord
of its own act. This state of freedom belongs in the absolute degree
to the Eternals in right of that eternity and to other beings in so far
as without hindrance they possess or pursue the Good which,
standing above them all, must manifestly be the only good which
they can reasonably seek."^^

In our search for spiritual emancipation, Plotinus declared, we
must be moved by love. At first we love sensible things, but finally
we come to appreciate the source of all love and thus turn to imma-
terial essences. Like Plato, Plotinus felt that love refers to a higher

^'^Ibid., pp. 126-127.
12 Ibid., p. 208.

ETHICAL AND ESTHETIC DOCTRINES 329

level of existence and thus turns us away from transitory things and
concentrates upon reality.

Beauty, said Plotinus, likewise has a spiritual significance; hence
esthetics is intimately connected with our moral Hfe. The essence of
the beautiful lies not in harmony or symmetry; rather, the beautiful
represents an intimation of divine perfection. There is an ascending
scale of beauty, leading from the senses to the emotions and then to
the immaterial structure of the universe.

"Beauty addresses itself chiefly to sight; but there is a beauty for
the hearing too, for melodies and cadences are beautiful; and minds
that lift themselves above the realm of sense to a higher order are
aware of beauty in the conduct of life, in actions, in character, in
the pursuits of the intellect; and there is the beauty of the virtues.
What loftier beauty there may be yet, our argument will bring to
light.

"What is it, then, that gives comeliness to material forms and
draws the ear to the sweetness perceived in sounds? What is it that
attracts the eyes of those to whom a beautiful object is presented,
and calls them, lures them towards it, and fills them with joy at the
sight? And what is the secret of the beauty there is in all that derives
from Soul? Is there some one principle from which all take their
grace? Finally, one or many, what would such a principle be?

"Undoubtedly this principle exists; it is something which the soul
names as from an ancient knowledge and recognizing, welcomes
it, enters into unison with it. The soul includes a faculty pecuharly
addressed to Beauty, one incomparably sure in the appreciation of
its own. So by the very truth of its nature, by its affiliation to the
noblest existent in the hierarchy of Being— when it sees anything of
that kin, or any trace of that kinship, it thrills with an immediate
delight, takes its own to itself and thus stirs anew to the sense of its
nature and of all its affinity."^^

There was, thus, to Plotinus, a connection between the beauty on
earth and the beauty of reality.

"We hold that all the loveliness of this world comes by com-
munion in Ideal Form. All shapelessness whose kind admits of pat-
tern and of form, as long as it remains outside of Reason and Idea,
has not been entirely mastered by Reason, the matter not yielding
at all points and in all respects to Ideal Form, is ugly by that very
isolation from the Divine Thought. But where the Ideal Form has
entered, it has grouped and co-ordinated what from a diversity of

^3 Ibid., pp. 42-43.

330 NEO-PLATONISM

parts was to become a unity; it has rallied confusion into co-opera-
tion; it has made the sum one harmonious coherence; for the Idea
is a unity and what it moulds must come to unity as far as multi-
plicity may. And on what has thus been compacted to unity, Beauty
enthrones itself, giving itself to the parts as to the sum.

"This, then, is how the material thing becomes beautiful— by com-
municating the thought that flows from the Divine."^^

It can be seen that Plotinus had a more sublime concept of beauty
than had Plato. Plato, we remember, regarded art merely as a second-
rate copy of reahty and banished artists from his ideal Utopia.

The esthetic concepts of Plotinus are connected with his view re-
garding evil. Evil, Plotinus affirmed, has no metaphysical reality. The
pessimist will say that life is a process of competition; everywhere
he sees war and suffering. How can we deny the existence of evil?

"This devouring of kind by kind is necessary as the means to the
transmutation of living things which could not keep form forever
even though no other killed them; what grievance is it that when
they must go their dispatch is so planned as to be serviceable to
others? They are devoured only to return in some new form: the
actor alters his make-up and enters in a new role; the actor, of
course, was not really killed. If dying is but changing a body as the
actor changes a costume, or even an exit from the body like the exit
of the actor from the boards when he has never again to play a part,
what is there so very dreadful in this transformation of living beings
one into another? Surely it is much better so than if they had never
existed; that way would mean the bleak quenching of life. As the
plan holds, life is poured copiously throughout the universe produc-
ing an endless sequence of comeliness and shapeUness, a living
pastime."^^

Furthermore, what we call evil really contributes to the perfection
of the universe. "Now all life, even the least valuable, is an activity,
and not a blind activity hke that of a flame; even where there is not
sensation the activity of life is no mere haphazard play of movement;
any object in which life is present is at once enreasoned in the sense
that the activity peculiar to life is formative, shaping as it moves.
Life aims at pattern as does the pantomimic dancer with his set
movements; the mime, in himself, represents life, and besides, his
movements proceed in obedience to a pattern designed to symbolize
life.

^^ Ibid., p. 43-
^^Ibid., pp. 84-85.

THE RETURN TO UNITY ^^t

"In the case of music, tones high and low are made consonant by
Reason Principles which, being principles of harmony, meet in the
unity of the absolute Harmony. Similarly in the universe, we find
contraries, white and black, hot and cold, winged and wingless,
reasoning and unreasoning; but all these elements are members of
one living body, their sum total; the universe is a self-accordant
entity, its members everywhere clashing, but the total being the
manifestation of Reason."^^

THE RETURN TO UNITY

The goal of Plotinus' philosophy was the achievement of a mystical
vision. First, it leads us to nature, in which we find Providence; then
we turn to the world-soul. "We find that the contemplation pursued
by this, the birth pangs set up by the knowledge it attains, its teem-
ing fullness, have caused it, in itself become all object of vision, to
produce another vision (that of the cosmos); it is just as a given
science complete in itself produces a miniature science, its image, in
the student who has [a knowledge of] all its divisions.

"The primal phase of the Soul, inhabitant of the Supreme and, by
participation in the Supreme, filled and illuminated, remains un-
changeably There; but a secondary phase goes forth ceaselessly as
life streaming from Life; for energy runs through the universe and
there is no extremity at which it dwindles out, but, travel far as it
may, it never draws that first part of itself from the place whence
the outgoing began. No limit exists either to contemplation or to its
possible objects, and this explains how the Soul is universal; where
can this thing fail to be, which is one identical thing in every soul.^
It is not confined within the bournes of magnitude."^^

Then we turn to the Divine Mind. "In the advancing stages of
contemplation rising from that in nature to that in Soul and thence
again to that in Divine Mind, the object contemplated becomes pro-
gressively a more and more intimate possession of the contemplating
beings, more and more one with them. Hence we may conclude that
in Divine Mind itself there is complete identity of knower and
known, no distinction existing between being and knowing, con-
templation and its object constituting a living thing; a life, two
inextricably one.

"This Being is limitless; in all the outflow from it there is no
lessening either in its emanation, since this also is the entire universe,

i« Ibid., pp. 86-87.
^'' Ibid., p. 113.

332 NEO-PLATONISM

nor in itself, the starting point, since it is no assemblage of parts [to
be diminished by any outgo].

"In its character as life, as emanation, though, Divine Mind must
of necessity derive from some other Being, from one that does not
emanate but is the Principle of emanation, of life, of intellect and of
the universe. That Source cannot be the All and must not be a
plurality but the Source of plurality, since universally a begetting
power is less complex than the begotten. "^^

The principle of reality we find in the One; this is our final des-
tiny. "If we define It as the Good and wholly simple, we shall, no
doubt, be telling the truth, but we shall not be giving any certain
and lucid account of It. Our knowledge of everything else comes
by way of intelligence; but this Entity transcends all of the intellec-
tual nature; by what direct intuition, then, can It be brought within
our grasp?

"The answer is that we can know It only in the degree of human
faculty; we indicate It by virtue of what in ourselves is like It. For
in us also there is something of that Being. Wherever you be you
have only to range over against this omnipresent Being that in you
which is capable of drawing from It and you have your share in It;
imagine a voice sounding over a waste of land; wherever you be in
that great space you have but to listen and you take the voice entire
—entire, yet with a diiference."^^

In this way the soul reaches the principle of reality, according to
Plotinus. In the ultimate state there is no separateness, no conscious-
ness of time, space, and plurahty; it even transcends all categories of
personality. Such a state, however, is extremely rare; and Plotinus
experienced it only a few times. Since philosophy cannot explain it
adequately, he reasoned, and since we cannot give a complete
account of it, we had better honor it by silence and the realization
that the mystical experience transcends rational understanding.

THE FOLLOWERS OF PLOTINUS

After Plotinus, the Neo-Platonic movement produced only a few
outstanding philosophers. Among them we find Porphyry (c. 233-
301), who, quite puritanical, castigated the sensual life. He believed
in evil spirits and tried to give an allegorical account of Greek
religion.

''■^ Ibid., pp. 1 1 3-1 14.

^^ Ibid., pp. 1 14-1 15. Plotinus compares the One to a river which has no source
outside itself and yet nourishes all other streams.

THE FOLLOWERS OF PLOTINUS 333

In Porphyry's philosophy we find a theocentric perspective. In a
letter to his wife he maintained, "Let every way of Ufe, let every
work and word, have God present as overseer and witness. And for
all the good things we do let us give credit to God: but for all the
bad things we do the blame is ours, in us who choose; God is blame-
less. For which reason, when we pray to God let our petitions be
worthy of God. Let us ask of him those things only which we could
not get from anyone else. Those things in which the initiative be-
longs to virtuous effort, let us pray that they may be ours, after the
due effort has been made; the prayer of the indolent man is vain
speech. Things which you cannot retain when you have got them,
for such things do not pray to God: because no gift of God can be
taken away, so that what you will not retain he will not give. Those
things therefore which you will no longer need, when you are rid
of the body, make no account of: the things on the other hand
which you will still need when you are rid of it, these things seek
by self-training, beseeching God to stand by you as Helper. Now
you will not need then any of the things which fortune gives and
fortune takes away again. Nor ought you to make request for any-
thing before the proper time, but only when God reveals the right
request as something which is there within you by natural in-
stinct.''^*^

We are to be conscious of God in all our actions. Porphyry
asserted. Above all, we are to avoid impiety. "For a wise man honors
God even when he is silent; but a fooHsh man pollutes the Divine,
even when he prays and offers sacrifice. The wise man then alone
is a priest, he alone loves God, he alone knows how to pray. He who
trains himself in wisdom trains himself to know God, not always
supplicating and sacrificing, but practicing piety towards God by
his works. . . .

"No evil is done to a man by God, for the Divine can only be
beneficent; a man does evil to himself, amongst other things, by his
wrong opinion about God. He who neglects to tend the images of
the gods is not so unholy as he who attaches to God the notions of
the multitude. Do you take heed never to entertain an unworthy
thought about God or about his blessedness or about his immor-
tality."2i

lamblichus, who died about 330 a.d., stressed especially the super-
natural outlook of Neo-Platonism. He described the hierarchy of

20 Bevan, Later Greek religion, p. 211.

21 Ibid., p. 214.

334 NEO-PLATONISM

supernatural beings, who occupied a rather minor place in early Neo-
Platonism. His philosophy stimulated an interest in occult matters.
To substantiate his faith in miracles, he borrowed from Oriental as
well as Pythagorean sources. He thought disbelief a grievous sin, as
can be seen from the following passage:

" 'Thou shalt not disbelieve any wonderful thing about the gods,
or about the divine dogmas.' This maxim sufficiently commands our
reverence and indicates the transcendence of the gods, furnishing
our way and reminding us that we must not judge of the Divine
Power by comparing it with ourselves: it is likely enough that certain
things should be impracticable and impossible for us who are in the
body and have a beginning in birth and are perishable and ephemeral,
subject to all manner of diseases, to hmitations in bulk, to the grav-
ity which carries us towards the center, to sleepiness and want
and surfeit, to foolishness and weakness and obstruction of the soul,
and all other such things. It is true we have, even so, many excellent
endowments from nature, but we are nevertheless in every respect
inferior to the gods: we have neither the same power which they
have, nor a virtue comparable to theirs. This maxim then specially
instils into us knowledge of the gods, knowledge that they can do
everything. For this reason it admonishes us not to disbelieve any-
thing about the gods."--

Proclus surpassed lamblichus in his metaphysical system. Like
Socrates, he believed in self-knowledge as the source of all genuine
philosophy. He was born in Constantinople but studied at Alexan-
dria. As head of the school in Athens, he was considered one of
the outstanding thinkers of his time. In his philosophy we find
innumerable series of triads. In it the principles of Neo-Platonism
are systematized and synthesized with other philosophies.

While Proclus believed in the existence of the Olympian gods, he
accepted also other mediating deities. He thought that man could
not be saved without faith; thus religion plays an important part in
his philosophy.

Proclus was succeeded as head of the Neo-Platonic school in
Athens by Marinus, who distinguished himself in mathematics and
was an excellent commentator on Plato.

Damascius is known to us mainly through his work on First Prin-
ciples. He tried to show that the world was derived from a primary
Being, which he regarded as utterly incomprehensible. Even more
Strongly than Plotinus, he insisted upon the transcendence of reality,

?s l^id., p. 219,

THE FOLLOWERS OF PLOTINUS 335

While he was skeptical in his technical philosophy, he accepted a
variety of superstitions. In this, he reflected the tendencies of his
age.

Simplicius, the student of Damascius, spent most of his time in
commenting on Aristotle's work, which he interpreted in a Neo-
Platonic manner. With him ancient philosophy comes to a close, and
the age of faith fully triumphs over it.

The Christian believers looked with contempt upon the Neo-
Platonic mode of thinking. To them, speculative philosophy was not
merely a waste of time but also incompatible with salvation. This
belief sometimes found expression in overt acts. For instance, in 415
A.D. Hypatia, a learned and scholarly woman, an expert in Platonic
and Aristotelian philosophy, was killed by a mob in Alexandria. The
final step was taken by emperor Justinian, who, in 529 a.d., issued
an order prohibiting the teaching of philosophy at Athens.

Justinian's order signified the end of an age. Independent specula-
tion, a detached consideration of the universe, objective knowledge
—all these attitudes were henceforth abandoned. Instead of reason,
faith now was supreme.

It must not be thought, however, that the influence of ancient
philosophy was erased. Even during the Middle Ages ancient philos-
ophy stimulated many of the noblest minds of Europe. It kept alive
an ideal of life which was based on a secular and naturalistic per-
spective. When ancient philosophy in all its glory was rediscovered
during the Renaissance, it laid the seeds for much of modern civili-
zation. In many ways modern man is more closely associated with
the spirit of Greek and Roman philosophy than with the faith of the
medieval period.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Relate the major events in the life of Plotinus.

2. Compare the world-view of Plotinus with that of Plato.

3. Explain Plotinus' concept of the One.

4. What did Plotinus mean by the world-soul?

5. Explain the process of emanation, according to Plotinus.

6. How did Plotinus view the mechanistic concepts of science?

7. What role did intuition play in the system of Plotinus?

8. Who were the main successors to Plotinus, and what did they con-
tribute to philosophy?

9. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Neo-Platonism?
10. Why did faith replace reason at the end of ancient philosophy?

FOUNDATIONS OF MEDIEVAL

UNITY

THE REBELS

low we turn back the clock to consider the development of
Christian philosophy. While secular thinking disintegrated, Christian
philosophy became more and more important and conquered West-
ern civilization.

The fate of Christianity is symbolic of the life history of a revo-
lution, for Christianity, at least in early times, was a veritable revo-
lution in political, economic, and moral philosophy. It started as a
rebellion against religious formalism and was supported by all those
whose social status was inferior, who wanted a new world and a
?iew hope. Thus, Christianity became a successor to the Spartacus
rebellion (an insurrection of runaway slaves, 73-71 B.C.) and formed
the climax to the reform movements of ancient times.

A revolution of this type does not succeed without martyrs. Their
deaths have almost a sacramental value; and later, when the revolu-
tion succeeds, they become objects of popular veneration. In addi-
tion, Christianity had a coherent organization and definite doctrines.
Furthermore, it was encouraged by the inner weakness of the oppo-

336

THE MEANING OF JESUS 337

sition. The otherworldly philosophy of the Church had been antici-
pated by the growth of Mystery cults, and its negative attitude
regarding wealth had been preceded by economic anarchy, inflation,
and the growth of feudalism.

The Christian revolution, however, ended on a conservative note,
and the Utopia that had been expected was postponed until a distant
and uncertain future. Instead of struggling with economic greed
and exploitation, the Christian soldier conducted a vigorous warfare
against the devil and the lusts of the flesh. Instead of adjusting him-
self to the problems of this hfe, he became an escapist and adopted
a supernatural perspective.

THE MEANING OF JESUS

The period in which Jesus Christ made his appearance had many
similarities with the modern age. Palestine was a scene of a strong
and persistent class struggle. It was a hotbed of nationalism; the
Romans were hated with as much bitterness as the Germans were de-
spised for their occupation of France during World War II. The re-
ligious parties in Palestine were represented by all shades of opinions
from the conservative, literal-minded, and complacent Sadducees
to the strict Pharisees, to the communistic Essenes. The other ex-
treme was represented by those who followed the skepticism of the
Roman conquerors. Most of the time the Romans looked down on
the Jews, whom they regarded as superstitious in somewhat the same
way as we look down on extreme religionists in American civiliza-
tion. It is natural that in such a world the work of Jesus Christ was
bound to be misunderstood. Just imagine what would have happened
if, in 1943, a prophet had arisen in occupied France and, instead of
talking about the devihshness of the Germans and urging armed
resistance, had spoken of a new world order uniting the con-
querors and the conquered, slaves and free men! The Jews of Jesus
Christ's time wanted immediate relief instead of a gospel of love and
compassion.

The simphcity of Jesus has been exaggerated, for he was really of
a complex nature. True, he was not trained in Greek philosophy and
he was not interested in scientific concepts, but his view of life was
penetrating and his parables reveal an imusual depth of wisdom.

Wisdom can be exhibited in two ways. First, it can be shown as
a well-defined, well-ordered metaphysical or scientific system,
somewhat like that of Aristotle— a system which seems to be excep-
tionally profound because it taxes the mental capacities of even the

338 FOUNDATIONS OF MEDIEVAL UNITY

most intelligent student. But the second way of wisdom can be just
as meaningful and as deep although it rests upon simplicity, upon a
few generalizations. Its truth is so striking that it can be understood
by a vast number of people. This is the way of Lao-tse and Jesus
Christ.

The religion of Jesus represents a constant search for life's inner
meaning. This search is not just emotional or spiritual or intellectual
but involves a dedication of the whole man. Its goal is not a reward
but even a greater doubt, and at its end are the cross and the eternal
question of Christ: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken
me?" An even more meaningful translation of his query would be,
"Why hast thou put me to shame?"

This question is disturbing to those who expect genuine religion
to be a solid and unshakable affirmation. Affirmation is an illusion
that we likewise find in philosophy, especially in Plato, who beHeved
that the sensible world is merely a part of eternal Ideas. But life is
not based upon stereotyped and preconceived Ideas, nor can we find
anywhere an absolute road to perfection; rather, life is an unending
maze, and man best finds himself by following faithfully the laby-
rinth and tunnel of confusion.

The paramount achievements of Jesus probably were his ques-
tions, not his answers. Only Buddha in India dared to ask such pro-
found questions as Jesus asked, but his answers were negative, al-
though Nirvana to a mystic means affirmation and fulfillment. The
answers of Jesus were defiantly positive. Let there be tragedy in
life, he taught, let there be suffering and death, yet man can triumph,
for his spirit is invincible.

It must be made clear that Jesus' faith was far removed from the
somber spirit of the Puritans. He is pictured as living with publicans
and sinners. How different is this picture of Christ from that of
Milton and Jonathan Edwards! Such a faith is not nationalistic but
cosmopolitan; it is not the heritage of one people but of other
nations as well, and it touches poor and rich alike. It was not entirely
new in the world, for the prophets and Hillel (a rabbi born c. 70
B.C.) had anticipated it, but Jesus gave it its most complete and uni-
versal expression. The evils he attacked were economic exploitation,
the nationalistic spirit, and the complacency of his time. These evils
are just as real today as in his period.

"And seeing the multitudes, he went up into the mountain: and
when he had sat down, his disciples came unto him: and he opened
his mouth and taught them, saying.

THE APOSTLE PAUL 339

"Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of
heaven.

"Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.

"Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth,

"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness: for
they shall be filled.

"Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.

"Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.

"Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called sons of God.

"Blessed are they that have been persecuted for righteousness'
sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

"Blessed are ye when men shall reproach you, and persecute you,
and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice
and be exceedingly glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so
persecuted they the prophets that were before you."^

For most thinkers in modern times, Christ has lost his divine
aspects. His name has become a formula for right living, although
for some it is still the magic symbol of salvation. To the liberal the
religion of Christ is the beginning, not the end, and its structure
must be completed by the experiences of every generation. It has a
leitmotif but no absolute rules and dogmas. The real Christ has been
obscured by the emphasis placed upon his divine elements and by
the mythology surrounding his resurrection and atonement. His
humility has been veiled by the beHef that he will come back as an
awesome judge. His name has been invoked as a god of war in spite
of his constant and emphatic stress upon peace.

In following the history of Christianity, we find that there was far
more tragedy in Christ's relationship with his followers than in his
own life experiences. Many of his followers understood only the
negative and hteral elements of his faith. They found the true reli-
gion in words and formulas, in abstract beliefs, and in orthodox
philosophies, but in their hves a basically irreligious spirit prevailed.

THE APOSTLE PAUL

It was the task of Paul to become the real apostle of Christianity. He
converted Christianity to his own ideals, and thus the religion of
Jesus was developed on almost the same spiritual level as other
ancient cults. iMany supernatural elements were introduced into
Christianity.

1 Matthew 5:1-12.

340 FOUNDATIONS OF MEDIEVAL UNITY

Paul had an excellent education at Tarsus, a prosperous university
center. His writings indicate that he was familiar with Stoic philos-
ophy and with other literary products of the Greek mind. He was
well acquainted with Roman civilization, since his father was a
Roman citizen, but basically he remained a Pharisee— fanatic, single-
minded, and otherworldly. All the knowledge he had absorbed made
him more suspicious of the pagan world and served only to increase
his stress on faith.

Paul was a strange mixture of contradictory qualities. He was
cruel, as his persecution of Stephen indicates, and his basic cruelty
was never obliterated in spite of his later sacrifices for the faith. It
was sublimated, however, and he found satisfaction in picturing the
damnation of those who oppressed him. He still punished them, but
it was by threat of divine torture.

It is possible that Paul suffered from epilepsy, a fact which may
have heightened his nervous instabiUty. As puritanical as Amos, he
had a terrifying gift of invective; and at the end of the first epistle to
the Corinthians he wrote, "A curse upon anyone who hath no love
for the Lord."

The most famous scene in his life was his conversion on the road
to Damascus. For three days afterwards, it is related, he could not
see. One explanation for his dramatic conversion is that he was
plagued by a guilt complex, his subconscious mind was rebelling
and could be repressed no longer. Perhaps the death of Stephen con-
vinced him that such a faith could not be conquered, or it may have
been that he was exhausted by the long journey and the mid-day sun.
At any rate, it was a cataclysmic experience as vivid as the baptism
of Jesus by John.

Paul's major contribution to Christianity was his realization that
this new religion could have an internatiojial appeal and should be
based not upon the laws of Moses but upon the spirit of Christ. The
essential element of Judaism had been strict observance of the ritual;
to Paul the main factor was jaith, and his view contributed to Chris-
tian unity.

This faith was not in a Messiah, but in Christ as the Son of God.
Why had he been killed? To redeem the world, which was doomed
by the sin of Adam. The faith of Paul was imbued with categorical
formulas; it lacked philosophical detachment, but it appealed to the
masses, to all those who wanted absolute assurance of deliverance.

This concept of faith, it goes without saying, was quite different
from the classical ideal of reason. Faith, as Paul and later Augustine

THE APOSTLE PAUL 341

and Luther interpreted it, involves a definite acceptance of divine
commandments. It obliterates the independence of man and opens
the door to a God-centered perspective.

Paul often spoke about divine grace, a term which has impreg-
nated Western theology to such an extent that it has become
commonplace. This concept of grace is mysterious and arbitrary.
Again and again the theologians asked, "Do we merit God's grace?"
"Are we really among the elect?" The grace of God seems to
have become as unpredictable as the actions of an absolute
monarch.

In his social philosophy Paul contributed a definite element of
conservatism. Many Christians in his time were so sure the second
coming was at hand that they would not work and neglected the
ordinary duties of Hfe. Slaves rebelled against their masters. Some-
times there were scenes of immorality, when initiation rites turned
into drunken orgies.

Paul was uncompromising when it came to moral purity, but as
to social ideals he was vague. Let the slave remain a slave! Let Chris-
tians follow the dictates of the emperor! Soon there would be a
change, for Paul was certain of Christ's second coming.

"Wives, be in subjection unto your own husbands, as unto the
Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ also is the
head of the church, being himself the saviour of the body. But as the
church is subject to Christ, so let the wives also be to their husbands
in everything. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved
the church, and gave himself up for it; that he might sanctify it,
having cleansed it by the washing of water with the word, that he
might present the church to himself a glorious church, not having
spot or wrinkle or any such thing; but that it should be holy and
without blemish. Even so ought husbands also to love their own
wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his own wife loveth
himself; for no man ever hated his own flesh; but nourisheth it and
cherisheth it, even as Christ also the church; because we are mem-
bers of his body. For this cause shall a man leave his father and
mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two shall become one
flesh. This mystery is great: but I speak in regard of Christ and of
the church. Nevertheless do ye also severally love each one his own
wife even as himself; and let the wife see that she fear her husband.

"Children, obey your parents in the Lord; for this is right. Honor
thy father and mother (which is the first commandment with prom-
ise), that it may be well with thee, and thou may est live long on the

342 FOUNDATIONS OF MEDIEVAL UNITY

earth. And, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath: but
nurture them in the chastening and admonition of the Lord.

"Servants, be obedient unto them that according to the flesh are
your masters, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart,
as unto Christ; not in the way of eyeservice, as men-pleasers; but as
servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good
will doing service, as unto the Lord, and not unto men; knowing
that whatsoever good thing each one doeth, the same shall he receive
again from the Lord, whether he be bond or free. And, ye masters,
do the same things unto them, and forbear threatening: knowing
that he who is both their Master and yours is in heaven, and there is
no respect of persons with him."-

THE FAITHFUL AND THE SKEPTICS

As Christian theology was solidified after the death of Paul, the
spirit of intolerance increased. Henceforth, Western civilization
would be haunted by the fear that incorrect belief would lead to
eternal damnation. All types of heresies developed. There were the
Gnostics, who combined in their philosophy Oriental and Greek
patterns of thinking. The Christian principles, thus, were subordi-
nated to esoteric speculation. Among the Gnostics we find Carpo-
crates, Basilides, and Valentinus. The Gnostics were distinguished
by their anti-Jewish spirit; hence they disregarded the Old Testa-
ment. They believed that the universe is dominated by a cosmic
struggle between the forces of good and evil. Evil they identified
with material principles, with the heathen gods, and with the deity
of the Old Testament. It could only be overcome, they thought,
through Christ, who had released man from material bondage and
restored him to primal purity.

What is significant in this philosophy is its opposition to nature
and its attempt to divorce Christianity from the Hebraic back-
ground. The reaction against Gnosticism was so violent, especially
on the part of Tertullian, that any type of pagan philosophy was
regarded with distrust and was viewed as a handmaid of the devil.
This distrust, however, never became as strong in the Eastern
Roman Empire as in the Western. In fact, the philosophical depth
of the Eastern Empire has hardly been surpassed in Western thinking.

Manichaeism divided the world into rival realms of darkness and
light. Following Zoroastrian patterns, the Manichaeans preached

^ Ephesians 5:22-33; 6:1-9.

MEDIEVAL ETHICAL VALUES 343

that man should refrain from idolatry, sex, and sorcery. Mani, their
prophet, considered woman to be the chief agent of the devil. Other
heresies related to the moral living of the Christians. There arose the
Montanists, who demanded a return to the austere ways of early
Christianity and denounced marriage and worldly goods. Eager to
be persecuted, they often gathered in churches where they let them-
selves be burnt to death.

The main controversy, however, related to the question of the
Trinity. Arius, who is described as an austere and pious churchman,
very much admired by the numerous virgins of Alexandria, said
that Christ could not be co-eternal with God, for if God was created
it must have been out of nothing. Christ, said Arius, could not be
from the same substance as the Father. The heresy spread and
reached the ears of the emperor, who, in 325 a.d., called the council
of Nicaea. Three hundred and eighteen bishops assembled and dis-
cussed religious questions, and also attended sumptuous banquets.
Athanasius made an eloquent plea before the assemblage, pointing
out that if Christ had been created by God he could change and
pass from goodness to wickedness. Moreover, he insisted, the Holy
Ghost and Christ were of one substance, for otherwise Christianity
would go back to pagan polytheism. The council agreed with Atha-
nasius, but Arianism was not extinguished. Ferocious wars were
fought over the issue.

Why is this council so important? First, it illustrates that doctrinal
disputes were settled through political measures. Second, it shows
that the question of the divinity of Christ was settled by executive
decree. The majority decided what was right and imposed its will
upon the minority. Third, it displayed little tolerance for those who
disagreed with the prevailing opinions. They were regarded as
enemies of the state and treated with great cruelty.

MEDIEVAL ETHICAL VALUES

The modern reader will probably ask how this dogmatic spirit can
be combined with the teachings of Christ, who emphasized above
all peace and brotherly love. True, medieval Christianity both in its
form and in its substance had little to do with the high idealism of
Jesus Christ; its institutionalism contrasted strongly with the spon-
taneous, informal, and unorganized structure of primitive Christian-
ity. We should remember, however, that medieval Christianity had
become an international religion and had united within its theologi-
cal and administrative system the most heterogeneous features. In

344 FOUNDATIONS OF MEDIEVAL UNITY

addition, it had to adjust itself to the crude ideals of the Teutonic
nations.

Although otherworldly values and the desire for salvation re-
mained dominant throughout the Middle Ages, medieval morality
was not necessarily motivated by passivity. To be sure, the element
of grace was emphasized, and of God's choice of the elect, but at
the same time the doctrine of good works developed. Thus grace
was subordinated in the popular mind to good works, which were
thought to be the chief prerequisites for eternal beatitude. The tem-
perament of the people demanded action and conceived of life as a
struggle between good and evil, and light and darkness. It was not a
sohtary struggle but one in which the whole society participated,
aided by the apostles, the martyrs, the saints, yes, the Blessed Virgin
herself— who all assured man of reward for his virtuous endeavors.

Augustine, the most influential of the Church fathers, showed in
The city of God that, since history began, this mighty battle has been
going on between those who are proud and sinful, belonging to the
abode of the devil, and those who are humble and virtuous, belong-
ing to the abode of God. Consequently in medieval art there was a
restless strain embodying the buoyant, explosive energies of the age,
which contrasted so strongly with the Greek quest for a serene and
balanced world-view.

The Greek ideal of life endeavored to grasp the fullness of man's
existence. Knowledge, like beauty, was appreciated for its own sake,
not for its aid in salvation. It was not so much depth of feeling as
proportion and balance which counted; human nature was not
thought of as having higher and lower parts but as a harmonious
whole, in which the mean or the function of each capacity had to
be found. Striving for self-control was in complete accordance with
a humanistic conception of life. Most of all, stress was laid upon life
on earth. What happened afterwards was not so important.

The medieval ideals, however, were based on the certainty of
rewards to be obtained in a future life. It was a puritanical ethical
system which the Church aimed to perpetuate. Like all authoritarian
moral systems, it was negative rather than positive; it thwarted the
natural drives of human nature; and it demanded perhaps too many
sacrifices from the individual.

Strangely enough, the devil became an agent in effecting the unity
of Christendom. What man did not fear the devil and the forces of
evil in the Middle Ages? All that was foul and sinful in the world
was assumed to be the work of Satan, who could appear in various

MEDIEVAL ETHICAL VALUES 345

forms, perhaps disguised as an animal, as a child, as a beautiful
woman, or as a saint. The fear of the devil and his cohorts kept
many sinners from committing outrageous deeds. As the prince of
darkness he delighted in attracting the souls of men to his abode.
Here eternal pain, unhappiness, and disquietude awaited the sinner.

The medieval artists were probably most picturesque when they
painted Satan. In the sermons of the priests, the devil and his tempta-
tions were portrayed more impressively than the pleasures of heaven.
Dante was at his best when he descended into the Inferno.

The morahty of the Church stressed at the same time that the
pleasures of man are only transitory and that death is the greatest
leveler. The idea that man is only a pilgrim and that the inequaUties
of human nature are only aspects of our earthly existence did much
to increase the oneness of medieval society. Boethius in The consola-
tion of philosophy, a favorite reading piece of the Middle Ages,
summed up this feeling of the essential equahty of man:

"He that to honor only seeks to mount
And that his chiefest end doth count.
Let him behold the largeness of the skies
And on the strait earth cast his eyes;
He will despise the glory of his name,
Which cannot fill so small a frame.
Why do proud men scorn that their necks should bear
That yoke which every man must wear?
Though fame through many nations fly along
And should be blazed by every tongue,
And houses shine with our forefathers' stories.
Yet Death condemns these stately glories.
And, summoning both rich and poor to die.
Makes the low equal with the high."^

THE INTELLECTUAL SPIRIT

The moral ideals of the Middle Ages, it is evident, did not lead to
experimentation in natural sciences. Since God had created all things,
plants, animals, even immaterial objects might harbor sacred verities;
they also might confirm events paramount to the faith. All knowl-
edge, including philosophy and history, was subjugated to Scriptural
interpretation. Such knowledge was useful if it supported the theo-
ries of the Church and if it added to the understanding of revelation,

3 Boethius, The consolation of philosophy, Bk. 11, ch. vii.

346 FOUNDATIONS OF MEDIEVAL UNITY

but man could attain salvation without this background. What a
valid knowledge of philosophy, history, and mathematics had ac-
complished in former times, theology was now called upon to
achieve.

The absence of an exact knowledge of the physical world made
possible the nearly universal behef in miracles. Miracles were sym-
bols and signs of the providence of God. Saints, from St. Anthony
to St. Francis, needed miracles for the maintenance of their rigorous
way of life. And when the saints were dead, the masses of faithful
but sluggish believers might profit by their sacrifices. Anything
related to the development of the faith— a bone, a martyr's cross, the
prominent proponents themselves— had an extraordinary saving
power. Thousands would devour the current stories which told of
visions, marvelous dreams, and recurrent healing wonders.

Among the erudite Christian scholars of the medieval world, few
protested seriously against the cult of miracles and saint worship.
Many events that had occurred in Biblical times were beyond the
powers of rational understanding. With the advent of the new faith,
the providence of God was expected to reveal itself again. "What is
there among all the works of God," Augustine asked, "which would
not be marvelous were it not cheapened by daily use.'"

Miracles were symbols; moreover, the world, hfe itself, was an
allegory. Men lived, feasted, repented, and died, but Hfe was to have
a spiritual meaning, and this meaning was primary for the medieval
thinker, not secondary. To insist that this life is the only life was
heresy, to concentrate the totality of one's efforts to ameliorate the
world was inadmissable, to appreciate the beauty of the universe for
its own sake was dangerous. These were characteristic modes of
reasoning of the medieval mind.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Evaluate the life cycle of Christianity.

2. How did Jesus view the institutions of his time?

3. How did Jesus expand the concept of love?

4. What are the permanent values of the philosophy of Jesus?

5. Do you think mankind is ready to accept the ideals of Jesus?

6. What brought about the conversion of Paul?

7. Explain Paul's concept of faith.

8. How did Paul spread Christianity?

9. What are the main elements of the social philosophy of Paul?
10. What were the foundations of the medieval world-view?

THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

Th,

. he Christian philosophy which dominated the Middle Ages owed
a great deal to Greek and Roman patterns of thinking. This state-
ment does not imply that Christian theology merely borrowed from
earlier systems of thought; rather, it synthesized them and gave
them a new meaning by its all-controHing emphasis on supernatural-
ism.

As we have seen, in the early days of Christianity, the doctrines
of faith were relatively uncomplicated. Religion, then, was domi-
nated by the expectation of Christ's early re-appearance. Thus, his
followers were not interested in technical theological problems. But
as Christianity expanded and as it was influenced by the Greek
world, there arose a need for a definite formulation of the dogmas.
A formulation was imperative, first, because many divergent opin-
ions had arisen which tended to lead to disagreement and rebellion.
Second, it was needed to meet the attack of pagan philosophers, who
viewed Christianity as a superstitious faith and as being inferior to
the old Greek philosophies. Third, a more concise intellectual state-
ment of the Christian faith was required to appeal to the educated

347

348 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

classes. It was not sufficient to point out to them that Christ was the
son of God and that all other religions were false compared to
Christianity; rather, they needed intellectual arguments which could
persuade them that the Christian faith represented the oiily road to
certainty.

Among the sources of Christian philosophy we find Platonism, for
Plato already had made a sharp distinction between the realm of the
spirit and the realm of matter. He had protested against a relativistic
view of morality and had shown in the Laws that the state must be
governed by religious principles.

Even more direct was the influence of Neo-Flatonism as cham-
pioned by Plotinus. Such doctrines as the transcendence of God, the
unreality of evil, the supremacy of the spirit, the insignificance of a
purely scientific explanation of the universe— all these factors entered
into the Christian world-view.

Besides Neo-Platonism, there was the impact of Aristotle. While
in the early Middle Ages the influence of Aristotle was less marked
than that of Plato, it later assumed a dominant position in medieval
culture. What Aristotle transmitted to Christian philosophy was
primarily a method through which intellectual arguments can be
solved. Accordingly, Aristotelian logic became an almost infallible
technique whereby the Scholastics tried to achieve certainty.

Morally, Christian theology owed a vast debt to Stoicism. Like
the Stoics, many Christian theologians preached the supremacy of
resignation and self-control and regarded the moral life as an end in
itself. The logos doctrine of the Stoics had profound reverberations
in Christian intellectual circles. Incidentally, the concept of the
world state, guided by the providence of God, found a ready wel-
come in the minds of the Christian theologians, who, however,
looked upon this state according to religious ideals and aspira-
tions.

Besides the Greek and Roman influences, we must mention the
Hebrew impact on Christian thinking. Philo, especially, influenced
its development in the Middle Ages. His use of allegory, his concept
of Providence, his doctrine of creation, his ethical ideals, his theo-
cratic principles— all these views became part of the medieval heri-
tage. The Hebraic influence also was manifested in the concept of
sin which dominated the JMiddle Ages. As we have seen, this concept
was almost absent in Greek philosophy, but in this epoch the view
that man has strayed from the path of righteousness and conse-
quently needs salvation became dominant.

> CLEMENT 349

THE APOLOGISTS

The Hellenizing trend, which was already apparent in the Fourth
Gospel, became strong in the Apologists. Among the outstanding
representatives of this group we find Justin Martyr, Minucius Felix,
and Lactantius. Most important of these men was Justin Martyr,
who had studied the various philosophies of Greece. He related that
he had absorbed the teachings of Stoicism, Aristotle, Pythagoras,
and Plato. In none of these systems had he found complete certainty.
Plato had prepared him for Christianity, in which he found the
greatest meaning. Certainly Justin did not despise philosophy, which
he combined with his religious ideals.

We must not, however, interpret the philosophy of Justin as a
mere rationahzation of Christian truth, for he believed in the
supremacy of revelation and considered the essence of knowledge
to be the understanding of God. Without the aid of God, he
claimed, man is a frail being who is tortured by uncertainty and
thus cannot find himself. But with God, through the teachings of
Christ, man achieves his goal in the universe. To make his meaning
clear, Justin used the logos doctrine. He identified Christ with the
Logos. However, occasionally he employed the term in an imper-
sonal sense as representing divine thoughts. Our reason, he felt, is
derived from the divine logos; thus, the more we share in its per-
fection the more we grow intellectually. He explained the suprem-
acy of Christ as consisting in his achievement of total truth.

Naturally, this theory represents a view divergent from early
Christian philosophy. We notice how the explanation of Christ has
changed. Instead of his personal traits and moral quaHties, Justin
emphasized his metaphysical perfection.

CLEMENT

Important in the evolution of Christian theology was Clement,
whose parents were pagans but who, himself, was converted to
Christianity. Most of his work was done in Alexandria, where he
attained fame as a teacher.

Among his works we find the Protrepticus, in which he attacked
the pagan rehgions; the Paedagogiis, in which he touched upon prob-
lems of education; and the Stromateis, in which he dealt with a va-
riety of topics relating to ethics, philosophy, and religion.

Clement's ethical views lacked the severity which we find in later
Christianity. While he denounced the theater and pubUc amusements.

350 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

he did not insist upon asceticism. According to him, the moral life is
not to be guided by excesses but by rational ideals. Salvation can be
attained by all; it does not matter what social position a man holds.
For marriage Clement had a high regard. He realized that celibacy
frequently creates a multitude of temptations, all of which can be
avoided through a wholesome family life.

Generally, Clement emphasized the inner motives of man. Thus,
he felt that property in itself is not harmful but only too great a
dependence on it. Our main goal, he reminds us, should be sharing
worldly goods and using them for our salvation.

How then should we conduct ourselves? What should be our ideal
of life? Clement almost reminds us of Stoicism in his belief in self-
control. He contended that we should rise above emotions and in
this way achieve complete independence. Still, he stressed the fact
that the true Christian believes in love, for the love of God does not
decrease independence; nor does it make us slaves to an arbitrary
deity. On the contrary, it is the road to true emancipation.

Clement exhibited his love for philosophy by stating that if we
love God we must try to understand him. Understanding God does
not come through an irrational faith but necessitates the discipline of
the mind. In short, said Clement, philosophy is an excellent prepara-
tion for the knowledge of God.

How did Clement conceive of God? Is God immanent or tran-
scendent? Clement felt that God is beyond our rational knowledge
and beyond spatial and temporal determination. The only adequate
knowledge of him is negative knowledge. To say, then, that God is
like man is to give a false concept of deity, whose essence surpasses
human understanding.

According to Clement, the contact between man and God is
achieved through the Logos. Through it God exercises his provi-
dence; through it the universe is created. Through it, also, man can
understand God. In this application, the logos doctrine was helpful
to Clement, who used it as a bridge between the world of matter and
the world of the spirit.

ORIGEN

Origen, a pupil of Clement, showed unusual intellectual promise
in early youth. He was an outstanding scholar, not only in Christian
literature but also in Greek philosophy. In his instruction he empha-
sized not merely metaphysics but also the physical and natural
sciences.

ORIGEN 351

Like Clement, he had a high regard for philosophy. Rational truths
are not to be despised, he thought, and no Christian thinker can
neglect the contributions of the Greek mind.

Origen defended the allegorical interpretation of the Bible, which
rationalizes the inconsistencies of the faith. This interpretation is
evident in his tractate Agaijist Celsus. Celsus had claimed that the
Christians were ashamed of their Bible and, therefore, resorted to
allegory. In reply to Celsus, Origen stated:

"Now one might say to him, that if we must admit fables and
fictions, whether written with a concealed meaning or with any
other object, to be shameful narratives when taken in their literal
acceptation, of what histories can this be said more truly than of the
Grecian? In these histories, gods who are sons castrate the gods who
are their fathers, and gods who are parents devour their own chil-
dren. . . . But why should I enumerate these absurd stories of the
Greeks regarding their gods, which are most shameful in themselves,
even though invested with an allegorical meaning? . . . But we offer
to the Creator a worship which is pure, and speak with rehgious
respect of his noble works of creation, not contaminating even in
word the things of God."^

To Origen, civic responsibility was inferior to religious dedica-
tion. ". . . We recognize in each state the existence of another na-
tional organization, founded by the Word of God, and we exhort
those who are mighty in word and of blameless hfe to rule over
Churches. Those who are ambitious of rule we reject; but we con-
strain those who, through excess of modesty, are not easily induced
to take a public charge in the Church of God. And those who rule
over us well are under the constraining influence of the great King,
whom we beheve to be the Son of God, God the Word. And if
those who govern in the Church, and are called rulers of the divine
nation— that is, the Church— rule well, they rule in accordance with
the divine commands, and never suffer themselves to be led astray
by worldly policy. And it is not for the purpose of escaping pubhc
duties that Christians dechne public offices, but that they may re-
serve themselves for a diviner and more necessary service in the
Church of God— for the salvation of men."-

Like Clement, Origen asserted the transcendence of God. We
cannot know God's essence; we can only comprehend God through
his works. The best way to reach God is through the revelation of

1 Origen, Against Celsus, Bk. iv, ch. 48.

2 Ibid., Bk. VIII, ch. 75.

352 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

Jesus Christ, which Origen regarded as far superior to pagan philos-
ophy.

Later theologians attacked Origen for his view that the universe is
eternal. This view is different from the Biblical story, which upholds
creation out of nothing. The reason for Origen's behef in the eter-
nity of the universe was his feeling that otherwise God could not
be regarded as all-powerful. In short, if the universe had not existed
forever, there would be a difference between actuality and poten-
tiality in the Divine Nature. Origen assumed, however, that God
never changes and that God never contains any potentiality but is
pure actuality.

The Platonic strains of Origen's philosophy are evident in his
belief in the pre-existence of the human soul. Our station in this life,
thus, is due to our actions in an earher existence.

In this universe, he affirmed, we find a struggle between good and
evil forces, and man's life is a battle ground. In his quest for salva-
tion man is aided by good angels, while evil angels and the devil try
to lead him into the path of wickedness. Final salvation consists in
his reunion with God.

Important in Origen's philosophy is his faith in jreedom. Unhke
Augustine, he did not teach a doctrine of predestination. It depends
on man as to the side he may choose, whether he wishes to ally him-
self with the forces of good or with those of evil.

Origen believed that frequently God chooses the sinner to pro-
mote the perfection of the universe. "However, lest any one should
mistake my words, and jfind a pretense of wrongdoing, as if his
wickedness were profitable to the world, or at least might be so, we
have to say, that although God, who preserves the free-will of each
individual, may make use of the evil of the wicked for the adminis-
tration of the world, so disposing them as to conduce to the benefit
of the whole; yet, notwithstanding, such an individual is deserving
of censure, and as such has been appointed for a use, which is a sub-
ject of loathing to each separate individual, although of advantage
to the whole community. It is as if one were to say that in the case
of a city, a man who had committed certain crimes, and on account
of these had been condemned to serve in public works that were
useful to the community, did something that was of advantage to
the entire city, while he himself was engaged in an abominable task,
in which no one possessed of moderate understanding would wish
to be engaged. Paul also, the apostle of Jesus, teaches us that even
the very wicked will contribute to the good of the whole, while in

BYZANTINE THOUGHT 353

themselves they will be amongst the vile, but that the most virtuous
men, too, will be of the greatest advantage to the world, and will
therefore on that account occupy the noblest position."^

The optimism of Origen is evident in his assertion that goodness
will triumph in the end, that hellfire will not be eternal but will
merely serve a disciplinary purpose. Accordingly, he believed in
cosmic redemption through which virtue will prevail and evil will
be destroyed.

BYZANTINE THOUGHT

While the Eastern philosophers believed in reason and tried to give
a systematic explanation of faith, those in the West were less inter-
ested in theoretical matters and, instead, affirmed the practical value
of Christianity. As a consequence, the Byzantine Church looked
down on Western intellectual standards.

The Byzantine Church was torn apart, especially by the problem
of image worship. In 725 a.d., Leo III issued a notable edict prohib-
iting image worship. Rebellion broke out, and the empire was almost
convulsed by civil war. In the West, Pope Gregory II violently pro-
tested against the edict. So strong was the resentment of the masses
and the churchmen that finally, in 843, the edict was rescinded and
image worship was restored.

The antagonism between the two churches could never be over-
come. Ritualistic differences and the conversion of the Slavs brought
about a complete break in 1054.

The Western church was influenced by Dionysius the Areopagite,
a pseudonym for a very colorful thinker who applied Neo-Platonic
terms to Christianity. Like Plotinus, he emphasized triadic construc-
tions and taught a gospel of pantheism which made no distinction
between the universe and God.

Important also was John of Damascus, whose main work was the
Fount of knowledge. It is divided into three parts: the first deals
with philosophy, the second with heresy, and the third with an out-
line of orthodox religion. Generally, the viewpoint of John of
Damascus was anything but original; it was a synthesis of Chris-
tianity, Aristotelianism, and Neo-Platonism. He upheld the use of
images in religious worship. Strongly opposed to the pohcy of Leo
III, he showed that images enhance religion, making the work of
religion more concrete and more tangible and strengthening the
faith of the masses.

3 Ibid., Bk. IV, ch. 70.

354 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

The eclectic tendency of John of Damascus appears generally in
Byzantine scholarship. Probably the outstanding scholar of the By-
zantine empire was Michael Psellus (1018-1079). He was an enthusi-
astic Platonic scholar and asserted that philosophy could aid in
creating a more rational statement of the Christian faith.

The main value of Byzantine philosophy was its preservation of
Greek culture. Through translations and commentaries it stimulated
the Western mind. It preserved the purity of the Greek language;
and, after the capture of Constantinople by the Moslems, Byzantine
scholars contributed to the rise of the Renaissance.

WESTERN CHURCH FATHERS

In returning to the West, we notice that its Church fathers had a
more absolute concept of power. This view had already been devel-
oped in the writings of Irenaeus. Especially concerned with the
fall of man, Irenaeus stressed the power of the devil, who
could only be thwarted through man's acceptance of Christian
religion and through personal faith in Christ. According to Irenaeus,
the death of Christ had important consequences. Not only did it
prove Christ's obedience to God, but it released us from the bond-
age of Satan. In accepting Christ we must live righteously and up-
hold the Christian faith, which implies subordination to the Catholic
Church.

Even more important than Irenaeus was Tertullian. In his works
the legal aspects of Christianity are significant, but he lacked the
speculative boldness of Clement and Origen. According to Ter-
tullian, God is a personal ruler— almost a magnified Roman em-
peror. Obedience to God is man's great virtue. If we defy God's
will, we become eligible for the tortures of hellfire, which, to Ter-
tullian, were extremely real. Violently opposed to Greek philosophy,
he declared that dogmas have to be accepted not on the basis of
reason but on the basis of faith. They are not to be despised even
when they appear to be absurd.^ By faithfully accepting dogmas,
man can indicate absolute adherence to God.

Tertullian ended his life as a Montanist and consequently was
regarded as a heretic. Still, his influence on Christian philosophy
was pronounced. More than any other thinker before Augustine, he
stressed God's absolute power. Dogmas, he declared, must be ac-
cepted without questioning; and his picture of hell was terrifying
in its literalness.

* Tertullian's famous statement was: Credo quia absiirdum.

AUGUSTINE'S LIFE 355

Cyprian, like Tertullian, had a significant place in early Chris-
tianity. He was bishop of Carthage and died a martyr's death in 258.
Through him, special emphasis was placed on the unity of the
Church. He declared that outside the Church no salvation could be
found. In this pronouncement he fought against the heretical sects,
who believed in freedom of opinion and were trying to go back to
early Christian beliefs.

Cyprian's view of the continuity of the Catholic tradition, his
insistence that the bishop owes his appointment not to man but to
God, his struggle against the heretics— all these factors were re-
flected in the development of medieval Christianity.

The interests of Ambrose were just as practical as those of
Cyprian. Ambrose was a real statesman of the Church, and it was
partly through his inspiration that Augustine was converted. As
bishop of Aiilan, he was in constant contact with the emperor,
whom he tried to influence according to Christian principles.

Jerome, who was born c. 340, was more interested in literature
than was Ambrose. He was well acquainted with Rome, where he
studied rhetoric and enjoyed the pleasures of hfe. In his later years
he became a hermit and praised the superiority of the monastic life.
As the translator of the Bible (the Vulgate version), he made a
notable contribution to Western civilization. But from the stand-
point of philosophy, Jerome was far less significant than Augustine,
to whom we now turn.

AUGUSTINE'S LIFE

Of all the medieval philosophers, St. Augustine probably had the
most spectacular career. He was born in 354, at Tagasta, of a Chris-
tian mother and a pagan father. In his Confessiojis, Augustine testi-
fies to the virtue and piety of his mother, whose main desire was for
her son to accept the principles of her faith. He was exposed to a
rigorous education in his youth, and in his Confessions he relates
his ordeals at school. He disliked, especially, the study of Greek,
which was taught by a merciless schoolmaster who used physical
punishment as his favorite method of instruction. He liked Latin
literature, especially Cicero, whom he regarded as one of the great
thinkers of all time.

When Augustine later studied at Carthage, he was overcome by
the temptations of that city. For a time he devoted himself to
worldly pleasures, but at an early age he became a professor of
rhetoric. Later he taught at Rome, where he nearly starved because

356 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

his students would not pay him. He went to Milan, where, after
being converted, he dedicated himself to the service of the Church.
He lived in virtual retirement until 391, when he was made a presbyter.
A few years later he became bishop of Hippo, a position which he
held until his death in 430.

While the outward events of Augustine's life were not too spec-
tacular, his spiritual pilgrimage deserves notice. In his early youth he
was mainly interested in the study of literature, and he had little
liking for philosophy. But after reading one of the books of Cicero,
he realized that the study of literature is rather superficial and that
the goal of all intellectual endeavor is the possession of philosophical
wisdom. For the first time he began to ask searching questions re-
lating to his destiny and his final goal in life.

Cicero's philosophy, however, was supplanted by Manichaeism
as the main influence on Augustine, who was attracted to this philos-
ophy because of its dualism, its rejection of Old Testament ideals,
and its intellectual version of Christianity. He could accept this
faith, for it was in accordance with his own philosophical outlook.
On the other hand, he felt contempt for the ideals of his mother,
who, he thought, represented the religion of the unlearned and
ignorant.

Later, however, Augustine gave up Manichaeism because its fol-
lowers pretended to know too much. His main disagreement was
with their astrological views. He became a Skeptic, for he decided
that the way of doubt represents real intellectual honesty. Yet even
as a Skeptic, he did not challenge the existence of God and his
providence; but he could find no assurance about the immortality of
the soul and about man's ability to find an ultimate metaphysical
truth.

Skepticism did not prove to be a lasting solution. It made Au-
gustine doubtful and uncertain and filled him with anxiety and con-
fusion. For a time he felt that life itself was completely black and
had lost all its meaning.

He was saved from this intellectual chaos by Neo-Platonism, to
which he was attracted by its insistence that the soul is immaterial
and by its explanation of the unreality of evil. Neo-Platonism was a
bridge which led him to Christianity, in which he found complete
certainty.

It is no wonder that Augustine had such high regard for Plato,
whom he esteemed as the greatest of all philosophers. Still, to him
Plato was inferior to Christ, and Greek wisdom could not be com-

GOD AND MAN 357

pared with Christian revelation. In his later years Augustine became
the bitter foe of all heretics, and he thundered against their errors
in his desire to preserve the unity of the Church.

GOD AND MAN

Augustine's conversion produced a complete change in his intel-
lectual outlook. Instead of reason and critical thinking, he placed
main emphasis on faith; instead of man and his potentiaUties, he
stressed the sovereignty of God. Throughout his philosophical sys-
tem, he made it clear that apart from God there can be no reality.
To be separated from God, he taught, means eternal damnation, a
life of nothingness and oblivion; to find him leads to eternal bliss.
But it is not enough merely to know God, according to Augustine.
Intellectualism is not a pronounced feature of his system; rather,
the most important feature is love for God. Religion, he stated,
is primarily an emotional concern.

How do we know that God exists? How can we be sure there is
such a principle of reality? Augustine showed little skepticism on
this point. In our search for truth, beauty, and goodness we are
guided by the concept that there is absolute truth, beauty, and
goodness. In a word, relative standards indicate an absolute norm.
This absolute norm, according to Augustine, has no meaning apart
from the existence of God.

He used other arguments as well. For example, he pointed to
the order of the universe, which implies a creator. He appealed to
our conscience, which indicates a divine voice within us. He showed
the physical universe as being contingent and thus necessitating a
first cause. Like the Stoics, he asserted that everyone has a concept
of God; accordingly, universal consent is used to bolster his belief
in the existence of God.

Unhke the Manichaeans, Augustine did not believe in physical
duaUsm. Consequently he affirmed that evil is not positive; it merely
represents the distance from real Being. There can be only one
God, he explained, who has all the attributes of perfection. As for
the universe, it is created by God, and not eternal, as Origen had
stated. It was designed on the basis of the divine Ideas; thus, the
universe rests on a metaphysical model.

In his doctrine of knowledge, Augustine turned away from prob-
ability. We can never be guided, he tells us, by relative standards.
In fact, if only probability exists, there can be no truth. There are
two ways in which we can find eternal truth. One is through the

358 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

study of external things, in which we can find the majesty of God.
The other is through self-contemplation, by which we can under-
stand the divine force within us.

In some ways Augustine anticipated Descartes. Starting with his
own existence, he explained why doubts verify belief:

"I know without all fantastical imagination that I am myself,
that this I know and love. I fear not the academic arguments in
these truths, that say, 'What if you err?' If I err, I am. For he that
has no being cannot err: therefore mine error proves my being:
which being so, how can I err in holding my being? for though I be
one that may err, yet doubtless in that I know my being, I err not;
and consequently, if I know that, I know my being: and loving
these two, I adjoin this love as a third of equal esteem with the two.
For I do not err in that I love, knowing the two things I love, with-
out error: if they were false, it were true that I loved false things.
For how could I be justly checked for loving of false things if it
were false that I loved them? But seeing the things loved are true,
and sure, how can the love of them be but true and sure? And there
is no man that desires not to be, as there is none desires not to be
happy: for how can he have happiness and have no being? "^

The road to philosophy, then, according to Augustine, lies in self-
knowledge. "But since we treat of the nature of the mind, let us
remove from our consideration all knowledge which is received
from without, through the senses of the body; and attend more
carefully to the position which we have laid down, that all minds
know and are certain concerning themselves. For men certainly
have doubted whether the power of living, of remembering, of
understanding, of willing, of thinking, of knowing, of judging, be
of air, or of fire, or of the brain, or of the blood, or of atoms,
or besides the usual four elements of a fifth kind of body, I know
not what; or whether the combining or tempering together of this
our flesh itself has power to accomplish these things. And one has
attempted to establish this, and another to establish that. Yet who
ever doubts that he himself lives, and remembers, and understands,
and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges? Seeing that even if
he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he
doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be
certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does
not know; if he doubts, he judges he ought not to assent rashly.

^ Taken from The city of God, by St. Augustine, translated by John Healey,
published by E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York. Bk. x, ch. 26.

AUGUSTINE'S THEORY OF THE SOUL 359

Whosoever therefore doubts about anything else, ought not to
doubt of all these things; which if they were not, he would not be
able to doubt of anything."^

Since Augustine did not accept Skepticism, he was certain not
only that the self exists but also that we can understand the first
principles of metaphysics. Like Plato, he believed the task of man is
to transcend the realm of phenomena, which is forever changing.
Thus he made a clear distinction between sensation, which gives us
only a partial view of the world and is concerned with the surface of
things, and thought, which gives us an understanding of eternal
truths. Yet thought is not the highest achievement of man, he main-
tained, for in the final stage of knowledge we experience divi?ie il-
lumination and thereby acquire a direct awareness of the majesty
of God.

What should be our attitude regarding knowledge? Should we
despise all pagan philosophy? Should we rely on mere faith? Au-
gustine answered by saying that while behef is primary, it can be
substantiated by rational knowledge. Reason cannot contradict the
conclusions of faith, for both come from the same source— God. In
fact, in the highest stage of knowledge, as we realize, all the sciences
are inferior; and we must subordinate ourselves completely to the
light of God, which illuminates our souls.

AUGUSTINE'S THEORY OF THE SOUL

With special vigor Augustine attacked those who taught that the
soul is material. In this way, his views marked a definite departture
from Tertullian, who had asserted that the soul is corporeal. Au-
gustine substantiated his behef in the immateriahty of the soul by
stating that the soul is everywhere in the body at the same time. If
it were material, it would be bound to a certain place; only on the
supposition that the soul is immaterial can we explain its action
throughout the body.

According to Augustine, the soul has three fundamental activi-
ties: First, it is manifested through the memory; second, it pos-
sesses understanding; third, it contains the will. Therefore, the soul
represents the cosmic Trinity. In fact, Augustine pointed out that
by self-contemplation we can understand the truth of rehgious
dogmas.

Unhke the Neo-Platonists, Augustine beheved no world-soul
exists, for every soul is unique and individual. He made a distinction

^ Augustine, On the Trinity, x, 10.

36o THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

between man and animals by showing that the soul of animals
is irrational, whereas reason characterizes man. The latter, however,
is inferior to the angels, who possess an immortal body.

The soul, Augustine insisted, is immortal. UnUke Plato, however,
he did not believe in its pre-existence nor did he accept the doctrine
of reincarnation. The arguments which he used to establish the im-
mortality of the soul are not original but are found in earlier Greek
philosophy, especially in Plato. Augustine tried to show that the
soul and reason are united. Reason, he assumed, is eternal; hence,
the soul, hkewise, cannot be touched by mortality. Furthermore, he
felt, the soul as the principle of life is responsible for the functions
of the body. When the body perishes, the soul remains untouched.
He also justified his behef in the immortality of the soul by point-
ing to imperishable truths, which are contained in the soul and
which guarantee its survival after death.

Augustine explained that the soul is created and does not emanate
as the Neo-Platonists thought. Its position in the body is not the
result of its fall; rather, it is natural for the soul to be in the body.
While the soul of man cannot exist without its bodily surround-
ings, it is not entirely dependent on its physical environment and is
superior to the body.

Significant for the development of medieval philosophy was
Augustine's concept of matter. Occasionally he spoke of it in Aris-
totelian terms and emphasized the union between form and matter
among created things. It must be remembered, he pointed out, that
God does not contain any matter but is pure actuality. Augustine,
however, also suggested that God has created in matter senfmal rea-
sons which are responsible for the existence of particular things.'^
In short, these seminal reasons are material germs which are copies
of the divine creativity. This doctrine was utilized especially by
Bonaventura, and it aroused much opposition on the part of Aquinas,
who did not accept the existence of seminal reasons.

MORALITY IN AUGUSTINE'S SYSTEM

The bulwark of Augustine's system of morahty is Adam's sin,
which, according to his thinking, has infected all of humanity. Orig-
inally, both Adam's spirit and his body were completely good, but
through pride he gave up his divine heritage and fell from his in-
nocence. The sin of Adam is expressed in man's sexual lust. Au-

''' Cf. J. Martin, Saint August m; Grandgeorge, Saint August in et le Neo-
Flato7iisme.

MORALITY IN AUGUSTINE'S SYSTEM 361

gustine was well aware of the pitfalls of physical temptation. In
him, the ascetic temper triumphed; the celibate life thus appeared
to him as the most perfect form of existence, and he looked with
horror at sexual dissipation.

Being conscious of the soul of man, Augustine emphasized that
without grace and without the aid of the Church man cannot be
saved. Salvation is not due to human merit; rather, it is to be ex-
plained as an expression of God's grace.

Now we can understand the insistent opposition of Augustine to
the doctrines of Pelagius. The latter, who upheld the supremacy of
free will, was more humanistic than Augustine. Pelagius showed
that man can achieve moral perfection without the intercession of
the Church, and he refused to accept the doctrine of original sin.
Augustine could not tolerate such a viewpoint. He reaUzed that if
it gained dominance, it would undermine the sacramental system
of the Church and give man a false behef in his own independence
apart from God. Thus, Augustine developed his famous doctrine
of predestination. Human merits, he maintained, are not sufficient
for salvation. God, from the beginning of creation, has elected
some for salvation and others for hell. Those who are selected by
God cannot resist, so strong and complete is his power. If God has
chosen a man to be a saint, that man will persevere in a godly way
of life. But, Augustine made it clear, we can never be completely
certain of salvation. Thus we must not only depend on the sacra-
ments but also constantly renew our faith.

The doctrine of predestination was not received with enthusi-
asm by the Church. It was attacked, first, because it makes free will
almost an impossibility; and second, because it makes God extremely
arbitrary. Augustine believed that in reality all men deserve damna-
tion, but salvation for some is a sign of God's mercy. The number of
elect in Augustine's view is equal to the number of fallen angels.

In the long run, Augustine's concept of predestination did not
prevail in Cathohcism, which made a compromise between his views
and those of Pelagius. However, the Augustinian concept of pre-
destination was resurrected by Calvin, who likewise was imbued
by faith in divine determinism and by the feeHng that only a few
are eligible for salvation while most human beings are condemned to
damnation.

Salvation, according to Augustine, is symbohzed by faith. Faith
in God means obedience to his laws and submission to his Church.
Faith alone, however, is not sufficient; rather, it must be augmented

362 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

by a change in our way of life. Real faith, therefore, demands a
complete spiritual revolution. The fundamental virtue, said Augustine,
is love for God. All other affections and desires are secondary. For
example, love for one's country is inferior to love for God.

It goes withouts^ing that Augustine rejected the Stoic view
of morality. Virtue, he averred, is not an end in itself; rather, it is
a prelude to the possession of divine grace. He thus subordinated
morality to religion. Nor could he accept the Stoic view that self-
control and apathy are the highest Goods, for, he felt, the religious
man will be full of emotion and will not restrain himself in his love
for God. In other words, the ethical system of Augustine is any-
thing but naturalistic. To be dominated by secular standards, then,
is sinful. We must constantly remember, he asserted, that life on
earth is a mere pilgrimage which serves as a preparation for our ex-
istence in the Beyond.

What, then, is the best attitude in moraUty? How can we be sure
of living a virtuous life? Augustine recommends that we subdue the
desires of our flesh and, if possible, choose the hermit's life. At any
rate, we must abandon any type of hedonism. To discipline our
body, fasting is necessary; the mind can be improved by frequent
prayers. We are not to rely on material possessions; thus we are
to be charitable to the poor and willingly give to the Church. It is
especially important that we avoid any type of heresy, he con-
tinues, for acceptance of paganism or of the enemies of Christianity
destroys the purity of our souls and brings about our damnation.

THE CHURCH

Augustine's philosophy was bolstered by his faith in the ujiity of the
Catholic Church. The Church, to him, was not merely an instru-
ment of salvation; it represented the goal and the fulfillment of
spiritual faith. He made it clear that outside of this Church, no sal-
vation can be found. Within it, we are strong and can look forward
to God's grace, but without it we are lost in utter spiritual dark-
ness. The Cathohc Church, he insisted, is not restricted to national
boundaries, but its authority extends everywhere. In short, the
bishop of Rome becomes the supreme ruler in Augustine's opinion.
To evade his authority is an act of treason, contrary to the com-
mandments of God. Thus Augustine paved the way for the insti-
tutionalization of the Christian faith. Following the ways of Christ
is not sufficient, he claimed, for we cannot find ourselves without
the Church, which alone can dispense the sacraments.

THE CITY OF GOD 363

During this period the question arose, Are the sacraments valid
even when the Church officials lead wicked lives? The Donatists
claimed that the sacraments depend on the moral behavior of the
clergy. Augustine, however, felt that the administration of the
sacraments is independent of the moral standards of the priests, for
the sacraments contain the symbol of God's grace. Through them
man is able to achieve contact with the supernatural essence.

SCIENCE IN AUGUSTINE'S SYSTEM

Since his interests were mainly religious, Augustine had little toler-
ance for the study of physical nature. In fact, he regarded the
natural sciences with contempt and thought it a waste of time to
study the laws of nature. For instance, he believed that astronomy
does not advance the interests of man, for it tries to investigate
the principles of the heavens, which man is not allowed to know.
Toward anatomy, he felt even greater disHke. This study, he be-
lieved, detracts from the dignity of man and gives us a materialistic
world-view.

Accepting the Bible as the source for his world-view, Augustine
believed literally in the theory of creation as told in Gejiesis and
refused to accept the heliocentric world-view. He maintained that
the earth, the center of the universe, is spherical in shape.

Natural laws he regarded as inferior to divine laws. Miracles rep-
resent the providence of God, he averred, and indicate his infinite
power. The universe of Augustine was peopled not only with men
and angels but contained innumerable demons, who were the mes-
sengers of the devil. It was Augustine's habit to explain natural
phenomena according to their supernatural meaning. In all things
he saw the work of God, who to him was the principle of all ex-
planation, all truth, and all certainty.

THE CITY OF GOD

Perhaps the most influential work of Augustine, besides his Confes-
sions, is The city of God. It was occasioned by the sacking of
Rome by Alaric and his cohorts. This event had weighty conse-
quences. Many Romans believed it was caused by their disobedience
to the old gods and their acceptance of Christianity. They wondered
whether they had chosen a false religion; many thus turned back to
pagan practices. Others became openly skeptical, for they felt that
the God whom the Christians worshiped had no power over the
universe.

364 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

To answer these arguments Augustine wrote The city of God,
which consists of twenty-two books. It required more than thirteen
years to complete. It represents not merely a reply to the doubts of
his age but a systematized philosophy of history which is of con-
siderable interest to the 20th century.

UnHke most ancient thinkers, Augustine did not believe history
to be a cyclical process; rather, he affirmed that all of history is
guided by God. Hence, history has both a beginning and an end.
Its beginning is the fall of man; its end is the victory of God over
the forces of evil. It should be noticed that Augustine's philosophy
of history is guided by a teleological world-view. History, thus, is
not to be explained by an enumeration of economic, social, or po-
litical factors; rather, it is to be understood according to divine
laws and divine providence. Furthermore, in Augustine's world-
view, there is an eternal opposition between the forces of good and
of evil. There can be no middle ground between saints and sinners,
between the City of God and the City of the Devil. It remains for
man to make a choice, for he cannot remain neutral. If he elects the
City of the Devil, he may gain worldly power, expand his property,
and enjoy the lusts of the flesh, but in the end he will be punished
for his sins and suffer the consequences of his villainy. On the other
hand, if he chooses the City of God, he may not be recognized on
earth, may be persecuted, may be without material goods, and may
never enjoy public acclaim, but in the end he will be rewarded for
his perseverance and experience the glories of heaven.

Broadly speaking, The city of God can be divided into two main
parts. The first, from Book i through Book 10, deals with the belief
that paganism could have preserved the Roman Empire and that the
Christian religion was responsible for its disintegration. The nature
of Roman imperiahsm is clearly described. The Romans had never
spared their subject populations. Had the Romans not destroyed
Carthage? Had they not created terror among their enemies? Now
they were being subjected to the same treatment by the barbarians.

Augustine compared the Gothic invasion to the Roman civil war.
"What barbarousness of other foreign nations, what cruelty of
strangers is comparable to this conquest of one of their citizens?
What foe did Rome ever feel, more fatal, inhuman and outrageous?
Whether in the irruptions first of the Gauls, and since of the Goths,
or the inundations that Sulla, Marius, and other great Romans made
with the blood of their own citizens, more horrible, or more de-
testable? The Gauls indeed killed the Senate, and spoiled all but

THE CITY OF GOD 365

the Capitol, that was defended against them. But they notwithstand-
ing sold the besieged their freedom for gold, whereas they might
have extorted it from them by famine, though not by force. But
as for the Goths, they spared so many of the Senate, that it was a
marvel that they killed any. But Sulla, when as Marius was yet alive,
sat on the very Capitol (which the Gauls entered not), to behold
from thence, the slaughters which he commanded to be performed.
And Marius, being but fled, to return with more power and fury,
he, keeping still in the Capitol, deprived numbers of their Uves and
states, coloring all this villainy by the decrees of the Senate."^

The second part of The city of God includes Book 1 1 through
Book 22. In it he dealt with the origin of the two cities— the City
of God and the City of the Devil— describing their progress and
final end.

Augustine was especially picturesque when he depicted the tor-
tures of hell. He did not agree with those who felt that the torments
in hell should not be eternal.

"Now must I have a gentle disputation with certain tender
hearts of our own religion, who think that God, who has justly
doomed the condemned unto hell fire, will after a certain space,
which his goodness shall think fit for the merit of each man's guilt,
deliver them from that torment. And of this opinion was Origen,
in far more pitiful manner, for he held that the devils themselves
after a set time expired, should be loosed from their torments, and
become bright angels in heaven, as they were before. But this, and
other of his opinions, chiefly that rotation and circumvolution of
misery and bliss which he held that all mankind should run in, gave
the Church cause to pronounce him miathe?7m; seeing he had lost
this seeming pity, by assigning a true misery, after a while, and a
false bliss, unto the saints in heaven, where they (if they were true)
could never be sure of remaining. But far otherwise is their tender-
ness of heart, which holds that this freedom out of hell shall only be
extended unto the souls of the damned after a certain time ap-
pointed for every one, so that all at length shall come to be saints
in heaven. But if this opinion be good and true, because it is merci-
ful, why then the farther it extends, the better it is: so that it may as
well include the freedom of the devils also, after a long con-
tinuance of time. Why then ends it with mankind only, and ex-
cludes them? nay but it dares go no farther, they dare not extend
their pity unto the devil. But if any one does so, he goes beyond

8 Augustine, The city of God, Bk. iii, ch. 29.

366 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

them, and yet sins in erring more deformedly, and more perversely
against the express word of God, though he thinks to show the
more pity herein."^

While the inhabitants of the City of the Devil are punished for
their insurrection, the members of the City of God will enjoy eter-
nal bliss. "How great shall that felicity be, where there shall be no
evil thing, where no good thing shall he hidden, there we shall have
leisure to utter forth the praises of God, which shall be all things
in all! For what other thing is done, where we shall not rest with
any slothfulness, nor labor for any want I know not. I am admon-
ished also by the holy song, where I read, or hear, 'Blessed are
they, O Lord, which dwell in Thy house, they shall praise Thee
for ever and ever.' All the members and bowels of the incorruptible
body, which we now see distributed to diverse uses of necessity,
because then there shall not be that necessity, but a full, sure, secure,
everlasting fehcity, shall be advanced and go forward in the praises
of God. For then all the numbers (of which I have already spoken)
of the corporal harmony shall not lie hid, which now lie hid: being
disposed inwardly and outwardly through all the members of the
body, and with other things which shall be seen there, being great
and wonderful; shall kindle the reasonable souls with delight of
such a reasonable beauty to sound forth the praises of such a great
and excellent workman."^°

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AUGUSTINE

It is almost impossible to do justice to the enormous influence of
the bishop of Hippo. Not only did he lay the foundation for medi-
eval thinking, not only did he adapt Platonism to Christian ideals,
but he gave a systematic formulation of Christian philosophy which
came to dominate both CathoHcism and Protestantism. Thus Au-
gustinian philosophy became the fountainhead of the Protestant re-
formers, especially of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin. Moreover, Au-
gustine's social philosophy influenced the development of Western
civilization. His condemnation of sex, his praise of asceticism, his
view of original sin— all these factors conditioned the medieval
world-view and found a ready response in Puritanism.

His philosophy of history exerted an influence not only on
religious movements but on secular philosophies. In the struggle
today between the various political ideologies, there is the same

s Ibid., Bk. XVII, ch. 17.
io/i7ici.,Bk.xviii,ch. 18.

THE SPIRIT OF BOETHIUS 367

confidence in absolute standards, the same dogmatism, and the
same fanaticism. Thus, we have a conflict between irreconcilable
ideologies, which are so convinced of the righteousness of their own
cause that they will not accept a middle road.

The theocentric perspective of Augustine brought about a rev-
olution in the outlook of Western man. Even today we are not
emancipated from it. Despite the advances of modern science, de-
spite the theories of naturalism, faith in God remains part of modern
civilization.

Since the time of Augustine, Western man has become more and
more introspective. This soul-searching attitude indicates how dif-
ferent he is from the ancient Greek, who believed in balance and
moderation, and who usually despised introspection. With Augus-
tine, the self m its relationship to God becomes the supreme problem
of philosophy.

Modern philosophical movements such as Existentialism may dis-
prove this concept of God but they still cannot get away from the
problem of the individual. To some extent, the Existentialists are
Augustinians without faith.

It is important to appreciate Augustine not only because of the
answers he gave in so categorical a tone but because of the deep
questions he raised. His world-view may seem antiquated in the
2oth century; his questions, however, have a perennial vitality. We,
too, are trying to find certainty; we, too, are attempting to find
some kind of norm by which we can measure our actions. In short,
it is our belief that the Augustinian approach to philosophy has a
vital meaning for modern man. Augustine cannot be neglected,
because he was one of the great influences responsible for the intel-
lectual development of Western civilization.

THE SPIRIT OF BOETHIUS

Boethius was one of the most attractive of all philosophers. The con-
solatiojj of philosophy, one of the classics of mankind, has an im-
mense attraction for the modern reader. He was born c. 480 a.d.,
the son of an aristocratic family. His father had occupied a high
political office, and he, himself, attained the office of consul. Again
and again he was aided by Theodoric, the Ostrogothic ruler.
Boethius, hke Marcus Aurelius, was proud of his family; his sons
prospered in politics and became joint consuls in 522. Suddenly, in
524, Boethius' career came to a tragic end. Accused of conspiring
against Theodoric, he was imprisoned. He knew that his end was

368 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

near. While in prison he wrote The consolation of philosophy, which
was designed to comfort him amidst the most depressing circum-
stances.

Besides The consolation of philosophy, Boethius wrote other treat-
ises which had a formidable influence on the Middle Ages. He wrote a
manual on arithmetic when he was only twenty; he stimulated the
study of music by his investigation into the laws of harmonics; and
he wrote a treatise on geometry which indicates that he was thor-
oughly acquainted with EucHd. Furthermore he was interested in
astronomy and physics, and he apphed his studies to the improvement
of the educational system of his time. He felt that arithmetic, music,
geometry, and astronomy should be the basis of studies and hence
became the founder of the quadrivium, which formed the substance
of medieval education.

Boethius aided the development of technical philosophy by his
translations and commentaries on Aristotelian logic, and he wrote a
critical study on the philosophy of Cicero. He is believed, also, to
have been the author of several theological tracts, but scholars have
long debated their authenticity.^^

Although Boethius was a brilliant scholar and had an excellent
knowledge of Greek, he lacked originality in his speculations. His
fame rests mainly on his commentaries and moral insight. He has
been called the "first of the scholastic philosophers," indicating that
he regarded philosophy as a prelude to religion and thought that
the facts of this world are to be subordinated to the belief in a
future existence.

In The consolatioji of philosophy we notice especially the influence
of the Stoics, with their denial of the reality of evil. Like the Stoics,
Boethius beheved the main function of philosophy to lie in the
realm of ethics. But we must not neglect the impact of Plato and
Aristotle on Boethius, who all his hfe was interested in these two
Greek philosophers. In fact, it was his ambition to indicate the
essential similarity of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems. Neo-
Platonism also entered into the philosophy of Boethius, for he inter-
preted Plato in a religious and mystical manner. Like Plotinus, he
was intent upon finding the unity and oneness of the universe.

The whole structure of The consolation of philosophy was moti-
vated by Boethius' ceaseless effort to see human life in a broad perspec-
tive, detached from the successes and miseries of human existence.

11 Cf. Hildebrand, Boethius und seine Stellung zwn Cbristentum; Stewart
and Rand, Boethius, Introduction, pp. x-xi.

THE SPIRIT OF BOETHIUS 369

As a profound thinker, he was not satisfied with appearances and
superficialities. This last work starts with some simple observa-
tions on the evils of existence and gradually becomes more involved
and more intricate. It begins with his own personal welfare and ends
with God. Thus Boethius traveled from the microcosm to the
macrocosm. Finally, he was healed of his doubts, since he grasped
the rational nature of the universe and saw himself guided by the
ways of Providence.

Boethius believed that God rules by the use of Providence and
Fate. Providence is distinguished from Fate by being the supreme
inteUigence which controls everything belonging to the eternal
world, while Fate constitutes the method according to which the
divine plan is realized in time and space. Nothing can exist and de-
velop outside the control of Providence; Fate, itself, is subordinated
to it, wrote Boethius. However, the unity which characterizes
Providence is absent in the workings of Fate; this lack of unity
results in moral confusion. God sees from "his high turret of
Providence" all that is most appropriate and beneficial for the indi-
vidual's welfare. He is hke a physician who recognizes the causes
of all sickness. Only God knows how to cure them; only his judg-
ment is reliable and unfailing.

In the last two books of The consolation of philosophy Boethius
celebrated the majesty of God. To be guided by God is true jreedom,
he declared; to turn away from him entails misery and oblivion.
When we realize his power, when we become conscious of his
goodness, human sufferings appear to be trivial and are transcended
by the knowledge that the good man will be triumphant, while
the evil man will be punished for his sins.

Boethius showed at the end of The cojisolatio?i of philosophy how
freedom and determinism can be reconciled: "Wherefore doubtless
all those things come to pass which God foreknoweth shall come,
but some of them proceed from free-will, which though they come
to pass, yet do not, by coming into being, lose, since before they
came to pass, they might also not have happened. But what im-
porteth it that they are not necessary, since that by reason of the
condition of the divine knowledge they come to pass in all respects
as if they were necessary? It hath the same import as those things
which I proposed a little before— the sun rising and the man going.
While they are in doing, they cannot choose but be in doing; yet
one of them was necessarily to be before it was, and the other not.
Likewise those things which God hath present, will have doubtless

370 THE AGE OF AUGUSTINE

a being, but some of them proceed from the necessity of things,
others from the power of the doers. And therefore we said not with-
out cause that these, if they be referred to God's knowledge, are
necessary; and if they be considered by themselves, they are free
from the bonds of necessity."^^

In God's mind the past, present, and future are united, according
to Boethius. He sees and knows all things, but this does not destroy
man's freedom. "For this force of the divine knowledge compre-
hending all things with a present notion appointeth to everything
its measure and receiveth nothing from ensuing accidents. All which
being so, the free-will of mortal men remaineth unviolated, neither
are the laws unjust which propose punishments and rewards to our
wills, which are free from all necessity. There remaineth also a be-
holder of all things which is God, who foreseeth all things, and the
eternity of his vision, which is always present, concurreth with the
future quality of our actions, distributing rewards to the good and
punishments to the evil. Neither do we in vain put our hope in
God or pray to him; for if we do this well and as we ought,
we shall not lose our labor or be without effect. Wherefore fly
vices, embrace virtues, possess your minds with worthy hopes, offer
up humble prayers to your highest Prince. There is, if you will not
dissemble, a great necessity of doing well imposed upon you, since
you hve in the sight of your Judge, who beholdeth all things."^^

THE DARK AGES

After Boethius, European learning experienced a profound depres-
sion. The decline of Latin culture, the growing materialism of
religion, the rise of feudalism, the constant invasions, the new super-
naturalism— all these factors produced intellectual sterility. A few
men stand out: Cassiodorus, a younger contemporary of Boethius;
Isidore of Seville, an industrious encyclopedist; and Bede, the author
of the Ecclesiastical history of the English nation. All of them were
interested in theology rather than in philosophy and were dogmatic
defenders of the Christian faith.

Isidore of Seville is perhaps the best representative of this age.
His writings cover a variety of topics. He wrote commentaries on
the Bible, explained Christian theology, systematized the ritual and
ecclesiastical regulations, and, incidentally, attacked the Jews in a
treatise De fide Catholica contra Jiidaeos. He also wrote on the

11 Boethius, The consolation of philosophy, Bk. v, ch. 6.

12 Ibid.

THE DARK AGES 371

regulations of the monks and tried to define the meaning of Chris-
tian piety. Furthermore, he devoted himself to historical studies,
especially to the history of the saints. He made a brief excursion
into the field of physical science, but his treatment of it was ex-
tremely superstitious.

The same spirit prevails in his twenty books of Etyjnologies,
which were to be an encyclopedia of secular and divine knowledge.
In the twenty books we find no systematic organization. In them
Isidore of Seville discussed such topics as medicine, the derivation
of Latin words, the books of the Bible, trees and herbs, the art of
warfare, and a host of other subjects. Throughout this work he
relied mostly on second-hand accounts and gave supernatural rather
than scientific explanations.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What contributions did Origen make to philosophy?

2. Why is Clement important in Christian philosophy?

3. Relate the philosophical pilgrimage of Augustine.

4. Describe the Augustinian concept of God.

5. Why did Augustine believe in predestination?

6. What was Augustine's attitude towards sex?

7. What was Augustine's philosophy of history?

8. Why was Augustine preoccupied with the problem of evil?

9. What are the weaknesses in Augustine's philosophy?

10. How did Boethius experience the instability of life?

11. Describe the intellectual interests of Boethius.

12. What is the final conclusion of Boethius' philosophy?

THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

CHARLEMAGNE AND CULTURE

ith the ascendancy of the Prankish power, the Germans be-
came the defenders of Rome and the protectors of Christendom
against the onslaughts of the Moslems. Correspondingly, the Eastern
Empire lost its potency. Charlemagne was the logical choice for em-
peror of the Roman Empire. He had made Saxony, Lombardy,
Bavaria, Aquitaine, and the Spanish mark part of his possessions,
and he had fought against the Lombards and the Saracens. Above
all, his wars had been undertaken with the support of the Pope; and,
through Christianizing many pagans, he had enlarged the dominion
of the Church. He issued regulations which were designed to stamp
out the heathen spirit. For example, we read in his Saxon capitulary:
"If anyone shall have fled to a church for refuge, let no one
presume to expel him from the church by violence, but he shall be
left in peace until he shall be brought to the judicial assemblage; and
on account of the honor due to God and the saints, and the rever-
ence due to the church itself, let his life and all his members be
granted to him. Moreover, let him plead his cause as best he can
and he shall be judged; and so let him be led to the presence of the

372

CHARLEMAGNE AND CULTURE 373

lord king, and the latter shall send him where it shall have seemed
fitting to his clemency.

"If anyone shall have entered a church by violence and shall have
carried off anything in it by force or theft, or shall have burned the
church itself, let him be punished by death.

"If anyone, out of contempt for Christianity, shall have despised
the holy Lenten fast and shall have eaten flesh, let him be punished
by death. But, nevertheless, let it be taken into consideration by a
priest, lest perchance any one from necessity has been led to eat
flesh.

"If anyone shall have killed a bishop or priest or deacon, let him
likewise be punished capitally."^

On Christmas Day in the year 800, Charlemagne was in Rome.
This was not his first visit, but the most important one. Pope Leo
had been accused of various offenses and for a short time had
been deposed from his oflice. Having purified himself of the charges
by taking a sacred oath, Leo was judged innocent by Charlemagne
and thus again became head of the Church.

During the Christmas service at St. Peter's, while Charles humbly
knelt in prayer before the high altar, the Pope suddenly approached
him and placed a golden crown upon his head. The people shouted
in unison: "Long life and victory to Charles Augustus, the mighty
emperor, the peace-bringer, crowned by God!" This coronation
scene was probably one of the most dramatic events of the Middle
Ages. However, the de facto power of Charlemagne had not been
extended. Actually, the Eastern Empire continued as a sovereign
power, and the Holy Roman Empire was more a fiction than a po-
litical reality.

Einhard described Charlemagne as being large and strong, with a
lofty stature. Brave in battle, Charlemagne was also wise in council
and did everything in his power to promote learning. His interest in
German culture produced, among other things, a collection of old
hero tales, an ordinance against confining prayer to Hebrew, Greek,
and Latin, and the composition of a German grammar. He also stimu-
lated the learning of Latin and applied himself to the promotion of
liberal studies with great diligence.

As a ruler, he attempted to perpetuate justice and order through-
out his realm. So great was his reputation that the Patriarch of
Jerusalem gave him sacred relics and the keys of the Holy Sepul-
cher, and the famous Haroun al-Raschid sent ambassadors with
1 Webster, Historical selections, p. 412

374 THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

splendid gifts. Charlemagne patterned his government at home on
a theocratic ideal. He intended, as ruler, to establish the moral stand-
ards of the Bible throughout the empire, as can be shown by the
general instruction issued in 802. Each of his subjects who was
twelve years old or more had to swear allegiance to him as emperor.
The oath, however, was more far-reaching than just an expression
of personal loyalty. It attempted to prescribe a rule of life, for
clergy as well as for laity, and sought to bind "those who swear it
to live, each according to his strength and knowledge, in the holy
service of God."

General laws, the capitularies, were to be made public by the
fTiissi doin'mici (the king's messengers), who traveled throughout
the realm to see that the laws were enforced. Sent out usually in
pairs, a bishop and a count, they had to check up on the acts of
the feudal lords.

The Church in this period gave up its policy of withdrawal from
the affairs of the world. In the Carolingian age, many inhabitants of
the City of God came "down to earth," to help reorganize the
affairs of the secular society and to raise the standards of morals,
education, and public welfare.

Charlemagne appointed bishops as well as secular officials and em-
ployed both as niissi dommici and ministers, holding them equally
responsible for any misrule. The emperor also administered monastic
as well as state property. In the same assemblies which dealt with
heresy, such as the council of Frankfort in 794, laws were issued
against political offenses and other administrative abuses. Often,
therefore, Charlemagne prefaced his letters with the sentence, "By
the aid of God, who has established us on the throne of our power."
Like Constantine, he presided over the Church councils and in-
troduced tithes for the support of the religious authorities.

In his cultural endeavors, Charlemagne was able to secure the
co-operation of the learned men of his empire. At the court there
were Peter of Pisa, who instructed the king in grammar; Paulus Dia-
conus, who wrote on the history of the Lombards; and the famous
Einhard, minister of public works, the emperor's biographer and
secretary.

ALCUIN
Alcuin, the most famous of Charlemagne's advisers, came from Eng-
land, where he had profited from instruction at the school of York,
which probably possessed one of the best libraries in Europe in the
8th century. In 781 he met Charlemagne at Parma, where the monarch

ALCUIN 375

invited him to join him in his realm with a view to estabhshing learn-
ing there. With three followers, Alcuin instructed pupils at the palace
at Aachen, which contained many members of the royal family,
Charlemagne, himself, being often present. Compared to the modern
school curriculum, the mode and content of instruction at the palace
were meager but not without stimulation, since Alcuin utilized the
dialectical technique of teaching.

Charlemagne aspired to make the nobility hterate and to spread
the new learning throughout his realm. Therefore he desired to
obtain the most capable instructors in the land. Once he protested
that he did not have twelve clerics of Augustine's and Jerome's
caliber. Whereupon Alcuin rebuked him for his immodesty, since
the "Lord was satisfied with two." Otherwise, Alcuin admired the
unflagging efforts of the king in the direction of education.

Spurred by Alcuin's high motives, Charlemagne himself issued
a famous capitulary, setting forth a plan of enlightenment. In
it he stressed the fact that right living and conformance to the
orders were not sufficient. God would also be pleased by "right
speaking," he wrote, and knowledge preceded action. Then he
mentioned the uncouth letters which he had received from the
monasteries:

"And hence we have begun to fear that, if their skill in writing is
so small, so also their power of rightly comprehending the Holy
Scriptures may be far less than is befitting; and it is known to all
that, if verbal errors are dangerous, errors of interpretation are
still more so. We exhort you, therefore, not only not to neglect
the study of letters but to apply yourselves thereto with that
humble perseverance which is well-pleasing to God, that so you may
be able with the greater ease and accuracy to search into the mys-
teries of the Holy Scriptures. For, as in the sacred pages there are
images and tropes and other similar figures, no one can doubt that
the quickness with which the reader apprehends the spiritual sense
will be proportionate to the extent of his previous instruction in
letters. But let the men chosen for this task be such as are both
themselves able and wilHng to learn and eager withal to impart
their learning to others. And let the zeal with which the work is
done equal the earnestness with which we now ordain it. For we
desire that you may be marked, as behooves the soldiers of the
Church, within by devotion, and without by wisdom— chaste in
your life, learned in your speech— so that if any comes to you to
call upon the Divine Master, or to behold the excellence of the

376 THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

religious life, they may be not only edified by your aspect when
they regard you, but instructed by your wisdom when they hear
you read or chant, and may return home rejoicing and giving thanks
to God Aiost High."2

The teamwork of the king and Alcuin in promoting religious
matters came about because both were opposed to image worship
and the heretical errors of the Adoptionists. Since these subjects
involved state policy, very definite principles of opposition had to
be worked out. Alcuin refuted the position of the Adoptionists,
that Christ was adopted by God rather than begotten, and vigor-
ously inveighed against image worship. As a result, the council of
Frankfort in 794 proceeded to condemn both image worship and
the Adoptionist heresy.

Henceforth Alcuin whole-heartedly turned his interests towards
religious matters and retired in 796 to the monastery of St. Martin's
at Tours. He still maintained his contact with the outside, wrote
prolific letters, tried to teach, and corrected books. In his adherence
to orthodoxy he became intolerant of the slightest murmur of non-
conformity. Thus, he made one of his monks do penance for reading
Vergil.

Moral ideals became dominant in Alcuin's later life. They were
intermingled with his other teachings. At Aachen, he had been as
much an instructor as a guardian of morality. He taught the prin-
cesses to be chaste, and his students to be models in their daily
dealings and to avoid the alluring temptations of the world. He
wrote: "He who would be always with God ought frequently to
pray and frequently to read, for when we pray we are speaking
with God, and when we read, God is speaking to us." It is natural
to expect that such a man would devote most of his work to the
study of the Bible and other religious exercises.

Alcuin's educational writings were overwhelmingly in the field
of the trivium, and no mention of them need be made here since
they follow no original patterns, with the exception of the preface
to his Grammar. In a stimulating dialogue between Alcuin and his
pupils, a noteworthy view is taken as to the end of education.
Alcuin thought that philosophy is the mistress of virtues and, alone
of all earthly riches, never makes its possessor unhappy. According
to him, eternal happiness can be attained in things that are within us
rather than alien to us. Wisdom he found within the soul, while the
gathering of riches is outside its proper sphere; the one is permanent

2 ll;id., p. 574,

RABANUS MAURUS 377

and cannot be lost, the other is perishable and entails bitter grief for
man. Wisdom, itself, should be loved for the sake of God and for
understanding, but not for material gain, for honors, nor for the
enjoyment of transitory pleasures.

Charlemagne lived for ten years after Alcuin's death, holding his
far-flung realm together by his powerful personality and with the
aid of intelligent advisers. When he, in turn, passed away, the decen-
tralizing tendencies of the age surged up and overwhelmed every-
thing else. The ensuing disruption and chaos in government form a
vivid parallel to earlier conditions, and amidst this poHtical disinte-
gration only a few scholars stand out.

RABANUS MAURUS

Typical of the period was Rabanus Maurus, a student of Alcuin. It
was from the abbey school at Fulda, where he received his early
education, that Rabanus traveled with a few fellow students to
St. Martin's at Tours. Alcuin had taken an instinctive liking
for the young student, calhng him Maurus after the favorite disciple
of St. Benedict. Rabanus felt even greater admiration for his master
and planned to follow Alcuin as his prototype for a career as scho-
lasticiis at Fulda. The student, however, finally surpassed his teacher
in the range of his knowledge and scholastic interests.

Since Rabanus lived amidst civil war, famines, and diseases, his
organizing genius was sorely needed, and he was consistently pro-
moted to higher positions. In 822 he became the abbot of Fulda,
where he continued to devote his spare time to educational studies.
After twenty years of conscientious service in this position, Rabanus
resigned to find more time for writing and research. Again he was
called to assume official duties in 847, when he was elected, against
his wish, archbishop of Mainz. He died in 856.

Like all the educated men of his period, Rabanus looked to the
Holy Scriptures as the foundation of knowledge. With Teutonic
thoroughness he wrote commentaries on twenty-three books of the
Old and the New Testament without neglecting the study of the
liberal arts. Regarding pagan knowledge Rabanus was more broad-
minded than Alcuin; in fact, he was more broad-minded than most
of his contemporaries. He thought wisdom could be found in pagan
as well as Christian minds.

One might conclude that such a man was mainly moved by utih-
tarian motives in his use of antique knowledge. Such a view does
little justice to Rabanus. For example, unlike Alcuin, he included

378 THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

the study of literature in his treatment of grammar; and through
logic, he thought, one can discriminate between truth and false-
hood—a most influential view for the later development of this
discipline. Rhetoric Rabanus recommended as an aid to the Christian
preachers against the guile of the heretics and for the settlement of
civil disputes.

Rabanus discovered, likewise, valid reasons for making a place in
the curriculum for the rest of the Hberal arts. Adathematics he
praised, because it was said that Abraham had taught astronomical
and arithmetical lore to the Egyptians. The Church fathers also had
believed that arithmetic could distract the mind from sensuous
desires and focus it on contemplation of the divine. Even the Holy
Scriptures recommend the study of this weighty subject, he de-
clared, since so many mystical numbers are found therein. Without
hesitation he also referred to Plato to substantiate his argument,
inasmuch as Plato had said that the world was created according to
mathematical laws.

And so Rabanus continued to uphold the foundation of the Hberal
arts. Geometry possessed for him a strange divinity of its own. He
maintained that the tabernacle and the temple had been built accord-
ing to geometrical laws consonant with the movement of the heav-
enly bodies, and that music, besides being a part of church service,
contained harmonies used in the creation of the world. Lastly,
Rabanus recommended an understanding of astronomy in order to
destroy the numerous superstitions of the masses and as a reliable
guide to the vast secrets of nature.

A4any of Rabanus' arguments can scarcely be called rational. The
reasons he cited for the study of the liberal arts are taken from the
most diverse authorities, including the Church fathers, the Bible, the
pagan philosophers, and the legends collected and accumulated by
the encyclopedists. However, we can discern a vital principle in
Rabanus' judgment of secular learning. He regarded truth and wis-
dom as virtues, directly inspired by Providence, existing in secular
and religious sources, in intelhgent and simple minds. This was his
unifying ideal which could justify his own classification of knowl-
edge.

One of the most remarkable tractates of Rabanus is a work in
which he defended Louis the Pious against the accusations of Louis'
sons, who had dethroned their father. As a theologian, Rabanus ap-
proached the controversy by quoting Biblical statements about the
necessity of honoring one's parents. Then, in eloquent words, he

STRABO 379

pictured the blessing of such action. It is, furthermore, displeasing
to God to see stubborn resistance against lawful authorities, he
declared, and tried to prove this statement by mentioning the evil fate
of those who rebel against their parents.

SERVATUS LUPUS

While Rabanus Maurus wrote about the political disintegration of
his time, Servatus Lupus, abbot of Ferrieres, suffered personally
from its consequences. During his lifetime he saw Paris besieged
twice; he witnessed the constant raids of the Northmen, who were
devastating the country. Like Rabanus, whose teachings he enjoyed,
he preferred a quiet life devoted solely to scholarship. Instead, he
was called upon to undertake diplomatic missions; to attend ecclesi-
astical synods and diets; and, most unpleasant of all, to take part in
military expeditions. In his correspondence one can catch a glimpse of
the low esteem in which learning was held.

Servatus Lupus' ambition was to acquire a wide knowledge of the
classics. Hence he was an indefatigable borrower of books and man-
uscripts, and he corresponded with distant monasteries. In his letters
he touched upon the most diverse subjects, quoting nearly every
classical writer known in his time. Most of his leisure he spent cor-
recting, explaining, and annotating old manuscripts. Contrasted to
Rabanus, Lupus Servatus was little interested in theological matters,
since he had a humanistic proclivity for the classics. His authority
was such that he was consulted by all those who were interested in
classical knowledge.

STRABO

Another admirer of Rabanus was Walafrid Strabo. As a compiler and
scholar, he attained a unique authority in the Middle Ages. His
Glossa ord'maria, a prodigious commentary on the Old and the New
Testament, was used on numerous occasions by the proponents of
Scholasticism. Such a work, through its bulky size and dry content,
would scarcely interest a modern reader. Much more instructive than
the Glossa is his poetry, especially his account of the vision of Wettin,
abbot of Reichenau.

Strabo related that Wettin had been sick for three days, seemingly
unconscious. The monks who surrounded his bed were chanting
prayers for the life of their abbot. In a vision Wettin saw the face of
the devil, who was dressed like a cleric and surrounded by armed
demons. The abbot was relieved of the torments inflicted by the

38o THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

guiles of the evil forces when angels appeared to chase the demons
away. One of these angels was the guardian of the abbot, and with
this angel he started a conversation. Suddenly the abbot awakened
and saw his fellow monks assembled around his bed.

As Wettin fell asleep again, the angel came back and led him to a
brilHant world. There he saw gigantic mountains and a fiery river
in which sinners were suffering the punishment of hell. In it he rec-
ognized many priests— some of high position and some of the lower
clergy; with them were their concubines, who also were being tor-
tured.

After viewing hell, Wettin saw purgatory: a tower filled with
smoke, wherein the monks were to stay to be purified until the day
of judgment. Next, Wettin looked at a mountain of majestic gran-
deur. He was told by his companion that sinners were living there
exposed to the wind and the rain. Among them was Charlemagne,
punished for his profligacy but evidently destined for eternal life.

At last the abbot came to paradise, the abode of the saints. His
companion then told him that he had died on this day and that he
must obtain the blessing of Christ for his salvation. For this purpose
Wettin asked the intercession of the saints and the martyrs, but only
the Holy Virgin could help him. Deeply grateful for her assistance,
he exclaimed over the advantages of virginity and the blessings of a
celibate life. Then the angel asked him to return to hfe to tell about
his experiences in the other world.

Throughout the poem there is much moralization. Sermons are
delivered on the immorality of the clergy, the necessity for justice,
and the manifold temptations of the world. To succumb to them
means to submit to the devil, Strabo pointed out, and to suffer the
torments of hell.

Strabo was equally skillful in narrating tales about the lives of the
saints. Such literature appealed strongly to his contemporaries' desire
for supernatural aids. Religion had become extremely materialistic, and
the adoration of the Cross and images, the frequent pilgrimages, and
the collection of relics became pronounced features of the religious
life of the people. Against this blind credulity and superstitious spirit
only a few thinkers waged unceasing warfare.

ERIUGENA

Among those who tried to instill a more lofty spirit into religion we
find Eriugena. We know little about his life. Born in Ireland at the
beginning of the 9th century, he was patronized by Charles the

ERIUGENA 381

Bald, who had such confidence in him that he put him in charge of
his palace school. Charles ordered him to translate the writings of
Pseudo-Dionysius and of Maximus Confessor.

Eriugena was an excellent scholar, and his knowledge of Greek
was probably unsurpassed in the 9th century. He wrote not merely
on philosophy but also on religion, in which field he composed a
treatise on predestination which indicated his unorthodox position.
He was consequently condemned by the Church. Incidentally, he
took part in the controversy regarding transubstantiation, and he
commented on several books of the Bible.

Unlike most of the other philosophers of the Middle Ages, Eriu-
gena retained an attitude of intellectual independence. While he
officially adhered to the dogmas of the Church, he held views con-
trary to the spirit of medieval Christianity. The starting point of his
philosophy is God. Like Plotinus, he maintained that the nature of
God is ineffable; thus, we cannot describe God, for he is beyond
goodness, beyond truth, and beyond holiness. We can call God
good if we are certain that we apply this term in a symbolic sense.
Philosophically speaking, however, God can only be defined 7iega-
tively.

Eriugena divided nature into four parts. The first is nature un-
created and creating, which he identified with God in his primary
condition. Emphasizing the transcendence of God, Eriugena de-
clared that God cannot know himself. He is even more sublime than
the Aristotelian concept of deity, for if God had self-knowledge, it
would take away from his supreme perfection. It would introduce
the category of thought, to which God would be subordinated. It is
noteworthy that Eriugena denied creation out of nothing. In this
thought he went back to the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation:
God, who is everywhere, is the source of all substances. Things are
real insofar as they are near God; they are unreal insofar as they are
distant from divine perfection.

The second division of nature, Eriugena wrote, is nature created
and creating. Now God is in active relationship with the universe.
Eriugena used the logos doctrine to indicate that God contains all
the universal forms according to which the world is patterned. He
identified the creation of the universe with the action of the Son,
Jesus Christ, who to him had mainly a metaphysical significance.
We must not interpret him, however, to mean that Christ is merely
human, for he made it clear that Christ, hke the forms of the uni-
verse, is eternal.

382 THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

The third stage deals with particular Being. It is characterized as
nature created without creating itself, accomplished through the
Holy Spirit, through which the corporeal universe emerges. Now
we are conscious of space and time, according to Eriugena. Now we
have reached the most distant point from God. Still, even human
beings participate in the greatness of God, for all of nature manifests
his majesty.

Eriugena explained that although man's mind is the noblest aspect
of his nature, we can never know the essence of the human mind:

"For as God is comprehensible in that one deduces from creation
that he is, and is incomprehensible because what he is can be com-
prehended by no understanding, human or angeHc, nor even by
himself because he is not a what, but is superessential: so it is given
to the human mind to know only this, that it is, but it is in no way
granted to it to know what it is; and, what is even more to be won-
dered at and more beautiful to those who contemplate themselves
and their God, the human mind is more to be praised in its ignorance
than in its knowledge. . . . The divine likeness in the human mind,
therefore, is recognized most clearly in that it is known only to be;
but what it is is not known; and, to put it thus, in it we deny that it
is anything and affirm only that it is."^

Eriugena stated that man is the most important part of creation:
"Moreover, we are commanded, not irrationally, to beheve and un-
derstand that every visible and invisible creature was created in man
alone, since there is no substance created which is not understood to
be in him; no species, or difference, or property, or natural accident
is found in the nature of things which either is not inherent in him
naturally or the knowledge of which can not be in him; and the very
knowledge of things, which are contained within him, is better than
the things of which it is knowledge to the extent that the nature in
which it is formed is better. Every rational nature however is set by
right reason before every irrational and sensible nature since it is
nearer to God. Wherefore too the things of which knowledge is
inherent in human nature are understood not inconsistently to sub-
sist in their ideas. For where they undergo their knowledge better,
there they must be judged to exist more truly. Furthermore, if the
things themselves subsist more truly in their ideas than in themselves,
and if the ideas of them are naturally present in man, then they were
created universally in man. The return of all things into man will
doubtless prove this in its time. For by what reason would they

3 Ow the division of nature, Bk. iv, ch. 7.

ANSELM 383

return into him if they did not possess a certain connatural kin-
ship in him and if they did not proceed in a certain manner from
him?"^

The fourth division of Eriugena's system indicates a return to
God. It is characterized by nature, which neither creates nor is
created. The creatures which have emanated from God are now
seeking a divine homecoming. The lower change into higher cate-
gories of Being and all are re-absorbed into the divine essence.

Like the Greek Church fathers, Eriugena taught that evil is not
metaphysically real. And he did not accept the doctrine of a literal
hell. He was much more optimistic than St. Augustine and had a
more spiritual interpretation of Christian dogmas. In his theory of
knowledge he stressed an extreme realisj?!. Only the universal has
reality. In the phenomenal universe the highest categories have the
most exalted status, and particular things exist insofar as they par-
ticipate in their universality. He described the process of knowledge
in a twofold way. On the one hand, we have an intuitive knowledge
of God, who gives us an understanding of first principles and of the
action of phenomena. On the other hand, we can start wdth sense
knowledge and internal introspection through which God is re-
vealed.

The Neo-Platonism of Eriugena is evident in his beHef that the
most important part of knowledge is the part which deals with God,
for, since God is a universal substance, the author and governor of
everything, knowledge of his actions and his relationship with the
world is the most sublime. This knowledge, Eriugena felt, is best
achieved through reasoji. Unlike St. Augustine, he did not rely on
the sacraments of the Church to expand human thinking.

In general, Eriugena's system can be described as containing pan-
theistic and realistic factors. In him the Neo-Platonic spirit gained a
definite victory. More than any other thinker of his generation, he
tried to give a spiritual interpretation of Christian dogmas, and he
tried to show that the way of philosophy is superior to the way of
theology.

ANSELM

Quite different from Eriugena was Anselm, who, throughout his
life, was a faithful son of the Church. He came from a noble family
in Piedmont, where he was born in 1033. In his youth he entered

4 Ibid., Bk. IV, ch. 8.

384 THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

the monastery of Bee in Normandy. In 1093 he became archbishop
of Canterbury and took part in the dispute between the papacy and
the secular lords.

Throughout his career Anselm tried to improve the moral condi-
tion of the clergy. There was a strain of mysticism in him, and faith
was an intensely personal matter to him. His three main works are
the Monologmvi, which deals with the being of God; the Proslogium,
which contains his famous proof of the existence of God; and the
Cur Deus homo, which contains his doctrine of atonement and indi-
cates how man can be saved through Christ.

In the philosophy of Anselm, faith is the central theme. Belief in
the truth of Christianity, then, is primary. Thus we understand his
statement Credo lit intelligam. Revelation must be accepted before
we can start philosophizing. Reason, thus, is merely an aid to revela-
tion. The Platonic influence played an important part in the devel-
opment of Anselm's philosophy. Like Plato, Anselm was a realist,
and he believed that universals exist outside of particular things.
Such essences as truth, beauty, and goodness do not need particular
exemplifications, he thought, for their existence is autonomous.

In attempting to prove the existence of God, Anselm pointed to
the relativity of all concepts. Since perfection varies in the created
substances, he declared, there must be a universal perfection. He
beheved that finite things are not self-created, thereby pointing to a
universal author, namely God. Furthermore, all beings share a cer-
tain amount of goodness, indicating that a supreme goodness exists
in which all beings participate.

Anselm's main quest in the Proslogium is an understanding of
God:

"Be it mine to look up to thy Light, even from afar, even from the
depths. Teach me to seek thee, and reveal thyself to me, when I
seek thee, for I cannot seek thee, except thou teach me, nor find
thee, except thou reveal thyself. Let me seek thee in longing, let me
long for thee in seeking; let me find thee in love, and love thee in
finding. Lord, I acknowledge and I thank thee that thou hast created
me in this thine image, in order that I may be mindful of thee, may
conceive of thee, and love thee; but that image has been so consumed
and wasted away by vices, and obscured by the smoke of wrong-
doing, that it cannot achieve that for which it was made, except
thou renew it, and create it anew. I do not endeavor, O Lord, to
penetrate thy sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my under-
standing with that; but I long to understand in some degree thy

ANSELM 385

truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to un-
derstand that I may believe, but I beUeve in order to understand.
For this also I believe— that unless I believed, I should not under-
stand."^

Now the fool will say that there is no God, Anselm maintained,
yet even the fool is convinced that something exists in man's mind,
of which nothing greater can be conceived.

"For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is
understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than
which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the under-
standing alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone:
then it can be conceived to exist in reaHty; which is greater.

"Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived,
exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which
nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can
be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no
doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be
conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality."^

Anselm identified this being with God. "And it assuredly ex-
ists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is pos-
sible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist;
and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist.
Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be
conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can
be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is,
then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived
to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being
thou art, O Lord, Our God."^

As early as Anselm's own time a monk, Gaunilo, felt that a con-
cept in our mind does not necessarily have an objective existence.
For example, we may think of a perfect island in the middle of the
ocean, but the island does not necessarily exist. A vigorous contro-
versy flared up between the two, and Anselm tried to refute Gaunilo
by showing that the existence of the island is contingent, whereas
the existence of God is necessary. In short, he declared, when we
think of the greatest being we necessarily think of God.

What are the attributes of God? How can he be characterized.^
Anselm, like Augustine, described the unity, eternity, goodness, and

^roslogiiim, ch. i (translated by Sidney N. Deane).
^ Ibid., ch. II.
^ Ibid., ch. III.

386 THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

perfection of God. He made it clear that God does not exist in space
or time, but that all things exist in God.

"But if through thine eternity thou hast been, and art, and wilt be;
and to have been is not to be destined to be; and to be is not to have
been, or to be destined to be; how does thine eternity exist as a
whole forever? Or is it true that nothing of thy eternity passes away,
so that it is not now; and that nothing of it is destined to be, as if
it were not yet?

"Thou wast not, then, yesterday, nor wilt thou be tomor-
row; but yesterday and today and tomorrow thou art; or, rather,
neither yesterday nor today nor tomorrow thou art; but simply,
thou art, outside all time. For yesterday and today and tomorrow
have no existence, except in time; but thou, although nothing exists
without thee, nevertheless dost not exist in space or time, but all
things exist in thee. For nothing cojitams thee, but thou coiitainest

All beings need God for their sustenance, wrote Anselm. In God,
we find life and wisdom.

"Therefore, thou alone, O Lord, art what thou art; and thou art
he who thou art. For, what is one thing in the whole and another in
the parts, and in which there is any mutable element, is not alto-
gether what it is. And what begins from non-existence, and can be
conceived not to exist, and unless it subsists through something else,
returns to non-existence; and what has a past existence, which is no
longer, or a future existence, which is not yet,— this does not prop-
erly and absolutely exist.

"But thou art what thou art, because, whatever thou art at any
time, or in any way, thou art as a whole and forever. And thou art
he who thou art, properly and simply; for thou hast neither a past
existence nor a future, but only a present existence; nor canst thou
be conceived as at any time non-existent. But thou art life, and light,
and wisdom, and blessedness, and many goods of this nature. And
yet thou art only one supreme good; thou art all-sufficient to thy-
self, and needest none; and thou art he whom all things need for
their existence and well-being."^

In his doctrine of salvation, Anselm explained how mankind be-
came doomed to damnation through the fall of Adam. The fall, he
said, was a deliberate violation of God's will, and only Christ's
atonement could bring about the freedom of man. The restoration

s Ibid., ch. XIX.
9 Ibid., ch. XXII.

ANSELM 387

of man he regarded as a miraculous act which indicates the mercy
of God.

"But after man was made he deserved, by his sin, to lose his exist-
ence together with its design; though he never has wholly lost this,
viz., that he should be one capable of being punished, or of receiving
God's compassion. For neither of these things could take effect if he
were annihilated. Therefore God's restoring man is more wonderful
than his creating man, inasmuch as it was done for the sinner con-
trary to his deserts; while the act of creation was not for the sinner,
and was not in opposition to man's deserts. How great a thing it is,
also, for God and man to unite in one person, that, while the perfec-
tion of each nature is preserved, the same being may be both God
and man! Who, then, will dare to think that the human mind can
discover how wisely, how wonderfully, so incomprehensible a work
has been accomplished? "^°

In this way we can understand the compassion of God: "We have
found it, I say, so great and so consistent with his holiness, as to be
incomparably above anything that can be conceived. For what com-
passion can excel these words of the Father, addressed to the sinner
doomed to eternal torments and having no way of escape: 'Take my
only begotten Son and make him an offering for yourself; or these
words of the Son: 'Take me, and ransom your souls.' For these are
the voices they utter, when inviting and leading us to faith in the
Gospel. Or can anything be more just than for him to remit all debt
since he has earned a reward greater than all debt, if given with the
love which he deserves.""

In his theory of knowledge Anselm showed that man rises from
sense experience to intellectual knowledge and finally grasps the
divine majesty through a mystic light. The highest good for man,
Anselm asserted, is the contemplation of God's majesty. We are in
bondage as long as we are guided by worldly desires and as long as
we are subject to sensual appetites. We achieve emancipation and
freedom when we are guided by God and when we realize that only
through God do we have life and being. Unlike Eriugena, however,
Anselm remained orthodox in his theology. In emphasizing the gulf
which separates man from God, he was certain that without the
Church man cannot be saved.

10 Cur Dens homo, Bk. 11, ch. xvi.

11 Ibid., ch. XX.

388 THE REBIRTH OF PHILOSOPHY

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1 . In what ways did Charlemagne aid education?

2. Describe Alcuin's view of the hberal arts.

3. What was Anselm's concept of faith?

4. Describe Anselm's ontological proof for the existence of God.

5. What is the role of Christ, according to Anselm?

6. In what ways was Anselm a Platonist?

7. Describe Eriugena's concept of reason.

8. Why was Eriugena unorthodox in his philosophy?

9. What is the significance of Eriugena's metaphysical views?

10. Compare Eriugena with Anselm.

11. What was Eriugena's concept of man?

ARABIC AND JEWISH
PHILOSOPHY

THE MOHAMMEDAN RELIGION

jLew men in world history have influenced civilization as much as
Mohammed, born c. 570. He never obtained a formal education, but
he had a fervent spiritual insight. He developed a new religious
movement based on the revelation of Allah, and so convinced was
he that it was the only faith that he started to convert others. In his
native city, Mecca, few would listen. Thus, in 622, he fled from
Mecca to Medina; this flight is known as the "hegira." In Medina he
became the acknowledged religious leader and developed a govern-
ment based on theocratic principles. By 630 his faith had spread
throughout Arabia, and when he passed away in 632 he had sown
the seeds of a world religion.

The faith of Mohammedanism is based on the Koran, which is
supposed to contain the words of the prophet. It consists of 114
chapters, and, like the Bible, contains a good deal of symbolism and
poetry. Much of Mohammedanism depends on the Jewish and the
Christian religion. In fact, Mohammed considered Christ one of the
major prophets.

389

390 ARABIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

Among the main beliefs of Mohammed we find monotheism. He
rejected the doctrine of the Trinity and asserted that God, or Allah,
consists of an indivisible unity. It is the task of man to submit to
Allah's dogmas. The laws of God, thus, are all-powerful; God re-
wards those who follow his ways and punishes those who violate his
ordinances. Another tenet of Mohammed is that God has revealed
himself directly in the Koran. The precepts of this book, conse-
quently, are not mere moral ordinances but represent the will of
God.

In Mohammedanism there are twenty-eight prophets. Most of
them come from the Old Testament; yet, strangely enough, Alex-
ander the Great is included in the list.

Mohammed believed in angels, some of whom are good and favor
man, while others are evil and try to tempt human beings. Inci-
dentally, there is a personal devil which the Mohammedans call
Shaitin. In Mohammedanism there are also other supernatural ele-
ments. There is belief in the Day of Judgment, when Allah will
assign men either to paradise or to hell. Paradise is described as a
lovely oasis which satisfies all the desires of man, while hell is viewed
as a magnified desert in which the sinners are tortured.

After the death of Mohammed, the religion spread like wildfire.
It unified the warring Arabian tribes and imbued them with a love
for battle, since it taught that those who die for the faith are re-
warded in paradise. But the military strength of the Arabs was prob-
ably less significant than their tolerant policy regardmg subject pop-
ulations. In the main, the Arabs were far more tolerant in their at-
titude than the Christians, and they often granted religious freedom
to other faiths.

Mohammed's immediate followers, who were called CaUphs, ex-
panded the power of Islam throughout the Near East. They made
inroads into Africa and threatened western Europe. A period of
civil war ensued between 6^6 and 66 1 when several contenders vied
for the overlordship of the Moslem world. Ultimately, the Ommiad
rulers triumphed and ruled from 66 1 to 750. They were succeeded
by the Abbasid dynasty, which lasted from 750 to 1258 and under
which Islam reached its height.

MOSLEM CULTURE

In many ways Moslem culture was far superior to that of Christian
Europe. It was furthered by numerous scholars, who translated
many of the ancient authorities and thereby preserved Greek learn-

AL-KINDI 391

ing. A magnificent library was established at Bagdad, the splendor
of which could not be duplicated in western Europe. Nor were the
fine arts neglected.

In science the Arabs used the empirical method. They established
hospitals which had separate wards for men and women, and which
frequently contained their own hbraries. They set high standards
for the medical profession. They made fundamental contributions
to the field of optics, especially through Alhazen (965-1039?) They
laid the foundation of physical science by their careful studies of
mathematics, and they advanced chemistry through their classifica-
tion of drugs and their interest in alchemy.

In geography the Arabs exhibited far more correct knowledge
than the medieval Christians. They made exact maps and taught
geography according to scientific principles. Especially significant
in this field were Al-Idrisi and Yaqut, who compiled a geographical
dictionary.

Like Christian Europe, Moslem civilization was torn apart by
internal controversy. As it expanded its territory, the old faith
appeared to be inadequate. Not only do we find a note of Epicurean-
ism, especially in the Arabian Jiights and in Omar Khayyam's
poetry, but we also encounter frank evidences of Skepticism.

Essentially, there was little originality in Arabian philosophical
thinking. It became the task of philosophy to define the doctrines of
faith. Great reliance was placed upon the ancient authorities, espe-
cially Aristotle, who, however, was interpreted according to the
Neo-Platonic spirit. Throughout Moslem history we find an insist-
ent conflict between those who believed in the rules of faith, and thus
were guided by mysticism, and those who relied on reason and,
hence, regarded revelation as an inferior approach to reality. The
struggle was especially strong between the Sufis, who were mystics,
and professional philosophers like Averrhoes, who believed in the
supremacy of reason.

AL-KINDI

Arabian philosophy found its first great representative in Al-Kindi
(died 873), whose fame rests mainly upon his scholarship. Among
other books, he translated the Theology of Aristotle, which he
wrongly ascribed to the peripatetic philosopher.

We know only a few facts about Al-Kindi's career. His father
was governor of one of the provinces, and he himself studied at
Bagdad. He was highly regarded by the rulers of his time. He is

392 ARABIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

significant for laying the foundation of exact philosophical studies in
Islam and for giving a Neo-Platonic interpretation to Aristotie.

ALFARABI

Alfarabi (died c. 950) was more significant than Al-Kindi. In him
we find many Neo-Platonic elements. He identified God with the
One and believed that the goal of man is to return to the primary
unity as represented by the absolute existence of God. Like the Neo-
Platonists, he found no essential difference between the systems of
Plato and Aristotle.

The Greek spirit was readily incorporated into the system of
Alfarabi. He made it clear that before philosophy can be appreciated
a knowledge of the natural and mathematical sciences is important.
Logic, hkewise, he regarded as a preparatory study. Initiation into
philosophy, according to Alfarabi, involves both ethical and intellec-
tual perfection.

Attempting to prove the existence of God, Alfarabi demonstrated
that man has only an imperfect knowledge of God, for our intellect
is limited.

"It is very difficult to know what God is because of the hmitation
of our intellect and its union with matter. Just as light is the prin-
ciple by which colors become visible, in like manner it would seem
logical to say that a perfect light should produce a perfect vision.
Instead, the very opposite occurs. A perfect light dazzles the vision.
The same is true of God. The imperfect knowledge we have of God
is due to the fact that he is infinitely perfect. That explains why his
infinitely perfect being bewilders our mind. But if we could strip
our nature of all that we call 'matter,' then certainly our knowledge
of his being would be quite perfect."^

v_ Alfarabi influenced Western theologians by showing that God's
Q- / existence can be proved in three main ways: first, by the argument

^> \~7 / based on motion, which leads us to a prime mover; second, by the
argument based on efficient causation, which leads us to a first cause;
and third, by the argument based on contingence, which establishes
an absolute necessity.
( / Alfarabi declared God is characterized by infinity, immutability,
' truth, and perfection. He rejected the concept of personal creation;
instead, he beheved in emanation. Unlike most Christian philoso-
phers, he reasoned that the world is eternal.

1 Political regime, pp. 12-13.

AVICENNA 393

"When people say that God created the world, they simply mean
that God produced the world out of matter by clothing it with a
determinate form. The world is certainly God's work, and though
it comes after him as a world-form, yet it is equal to him in time or
eternal, insofar as he could not begin to work on it in time. The
reason for this is that God is to the world exactly what a cause is to ^
its effect. Since the cause in this case is inseparable from the effect,
it follows that he could not, in a given moment, start making it. For,
if he could, that would simply imply imperfection on his part while
he had been trying to achieve his goal. This, of course, is incompat-
ible with the absolute perfection of God."-

AVICENNA

Avicenna (980-1036) not only was interested in philosophy and
theology but made an immense contribution to medicine. He wrote
the Canon of medicine, which was translated into Latin in the 12th
century by Gerard of Cremona.

Avicenna divided philosophy into two parts: one, speculative,
containing mathematics, physics, and theology; the other, largely
practical, consisting of economics, ethics, and politics. In logic he
was especially concerned with clear definitions. In fact, throughout. \ 'j-C -'■ /
his writings we have a conciseness which was seldom attained in ) ^ .^^ '^ ' 'I/
either the Moslem or the Western world.

In his theory of creation Avicenna labored under the influence of
Neo-Platonism. Thus, he spoke about emanation and used triadic
principles. He taught that reason is the superior faculty in man and
that through it we can understand universal principles. However,
according to him, the universal does not have an ontological exist-
ence; it exists simply as a mental concept in the human mind. i

Following Aristotle, he held time to be dependent on movement; )
and he believed that the universe does not contain a vacuum. He
made much of the active intellect which governs all phenomena be-
neath the moon and is responsible for the creation of man's soul.

Since Avicenna was concerned with defending the majesty of
God, he taught that God alone has real Being, and that man realizes y.
his destiny insofar as he identifies himself with God. The highest
stage of knowledge, according to Avicenna, is mystical. In this stage
we are able to obtain a clear comprehension of God. It indicates that
man's soul cannot be corrupted by matter and that personal immor-
tality is an undeniable fact.

2 The sources of questions, in "Collection of various treatises," n. 6, pp. 67-68.

394 ARABIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

Thus, the philosophy of Avicenna is climaxed by his faith in intu-
ition. Accepting the validity of prophecy, reason alone, he con-
tended, is not sufficient if man wants to gain complete certainty.

SUFISM

Avicenna was surpassed in mysticism by Al-GazzaH (1058-1111).
The latter was strongly opposed to the philosophers, who, he
thought, were corrupting the minds of the faithful. He made it clear
that religion is superior to philosophical discipline and that no sal-
vation can be gained without unconditional acceptance of the
Koran. Reason, he asserted, is utterly limited, for it gives us only an
understanding of phenomena. Thus he depended on mysticism,
which gives us an understanding of invisible things and is the best
introduction to the principles of reality.

To achieve the perfection of mysticism, Al-Gazzali recommended
asceticism, including ptrayers, fasting, and the avoidance of all
sensual pleasures. The doctrines of faith are not to be questioned, he
taught, but are to be accepted willingly as the products of religious
consciousness.

His main work in philosophy is The destruction of the philoso-
phers. He is best known to the Western world through his Con-
jessions, which give an emotional description of his intellectual pil-
grimage and indicate that he was a penetrating and sensitive judge
of human emotions.

Through the work of Al-Gazzali, the Sufis expanded their influ-
ence in Moslem culture. The Sufis, like Al-Gazzali, believed in an
immediate awareness of God and were opposed to an elaborate
theology. They taught that man is saved by faith rather than by
intellectual investigation, and they affirmed the effectiveness of in-
tuition. To some extent they represented a protest against an elab-
orate philosophy which was tending to obscure the primary content
of the Mohammedan religion.

AVERRHOES

The most influential of the Arabic philosophers was undoubtedly
Averrhoes (1126-1198), who was born in Cordova. His main inter-
est was in the field of medicine, and in his later years he became a
court physician. During most of his life he was suspected of heresy,
and for a time he was banished from Cordova. Among his works we
find the Destruction of the destruction, designed as a reply to Al-

FOUNDATIONS OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 395

Gazzali, On the agreement of religion with philosophy , and On the
deinonstration of religious dogmas.

Averrhoes felt popular beliefs to be far inferior to philosophical
truth, but he did not argue against the practices of the masses, who,
he thought, are unable to comprehend spiritual reality. He said that
the philosopher, on the other hand, relies mainly upon rational
demonstrations, and his faith is therefore far more spiritual and
elevated than that of the masses.

In the West Averrhoes' philosophy was interpreted as champion-
ing the twofold truth. In other words, something may be tn,ie in
philosophy but at the same time not valid in religion. However, it is
somewhat doubtful if this was the real view of Averrhoes, who held
that there is no direct conflict between philosophy and religion.

While he did not read Aristotle in the original, his commentaries
became famous throughout the Western world, and he was regarded
as one of the standard authorities on the Greek philosopher. He was
especially concerned with the active intellect, which he interpreted
in an impersonal way. Thus, he did not believe in personal immor-
tality. What remains after death, he maintained, is the intellectual
quality which we share with the universal reason.

Following Neo-Platonic patterns, Averrhoes believed in the
emanation of the various substances from the One and refused to
accept the doctrine of creation out of nothing. Like Aristotle, he
thought the universe to be eternal and, consequently, indestructible.
Matter, thus, contains a universal potency. It is actualized through
the forms which represent the rational structure of the universe.

Averrhoes defended, against Al-Gazzali, the value of philosophical
discussion. He held that it could give a spiritual interpretation of the
faith and lead to a symbolic explanation of dogmas which otherwise
would be accepted in their Hteral sense. After his death Arabic
philosophy declined, but his theories played an important part in
Western scholastic circles.

FOUNDATIONS OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

Medieval Jewish philosophy was influenced to a great extent by
Arabic theories. It tried to combine the principles of reason with
the doctrines of faith, and in the work of Maimonides we find a
synthesis which reminds us somewhat of the system of Aquinas. In
the main, medieval Jewish philosophy was based on the belief that
the Hebrew faith is superior to all others and that truth is best at-
tained through the Jewish laws.

396 ARABIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

As in Arabic and Christian philosophy, the commentator spirit
reigned supreme in medieval Jewish thinking. Ancient authorities
were quoted at random and were respected as possessors of infallible
wisdom. Especially great was the influence of Neo-Platonism and
Aristotle. The conflict between faith and reason was just as strong
in the Jewish religion as in Christian and Moslem philosophy. To
many Jewish thinkers, philosophy was not merely a waste of time
but a source of corruption to the mind of man, making him skeptical
regarding revelation. Other thinkers were living in the expectation
of the Messiah who would create a new world and establish a new
kingdom in Palestine. They stressed the Beyond more than did their
earlier compatriots.

Thus, supernaturalism became a permanent feature of the Jewish
mind, but less stress was placed upon personal immortality than was
evident in Christian theology. Instead, more attention was paid to
the future triumph of the Jewish nation and the Jewish ideal of life.

During the Middle Ages the systematization of the Jewish faith
took place. This is most evident in the philosophy of Maimonides,
who reduced the 613 laws of the rabbis to thirteen articles which
form the foundation of the Jewish religion. At this time, too, many
Jewish scholars tried to prove by rational arguments that their reve-
lation was superior to the revelations of Christ and Mohammed and
that they were the chosen people of God. In this belief they repre-
sented the world-view of the Middle Ages, which generally accepted
a dogmatic concept of life.

AVICEBRON

Jewish philosophy was brilliantly represented by Solomon Ibn
Gabirol (Avicebron), who lived in the nth century in Spain. He
was not only interested in philosophy but also a poet of note. His
main work is the Fou?itai?i of life, in which he developed a philos-
ophy based on Aristotelianism, Neo-Platonism, and Arabian sources.
In Avicebron's system, ?nonis7n is all-important. God and matter,
thus, are not two distinct realities, for matter is identified with God.
Like Plotinus, he believed that God, as the principle of reaUty, is
incomprehensible. From God we have a series of emanations which
result in the creation of spiritual substances, soul and matter. Every-
where in the universe, according to Avicebron, we find a union of
form and matter. He believed that a plurality of forms can exist in
the same individual and that matter and form are found not merely
in corporeal beings but also among spiritual substances. In this proc-

AVICEBRON 397

ess of emanation the essence of God does not change. His holiness
remains the same, and his perfection remains unaltered. The uni-
verse, consequently, represents merely the reflection of God, who,
in his essence, remains incomprehensible.

A mystic tone prevails in this Jewish philosopher, who held that
man must get away from the corporeal world, abandon all sensual
knowledge and, instead, face reality with a detached and spiritual
perspective. The goal of man, thus, is a union of the soul with divine
sources. Man's vision is hindered by the senses, but through knowl-
edge and religious practices man may triumph over his lower self
and achieve salvation.

In an eloquent poem called The royal croum, Avicebron shows
the weakness of man. The pessimism is almost like that of Schopen-
hauer.

"Man entereth the world.
And knoweth not why;
He rejoiceth

And knoweth not wherefore;
He liveth.

And knoweth not for how long.
In his childhood he walketh in his own stubbornness,
And when the spirit of lust beginneth in its season
To stir him up to gather power and wealth.
Then he journeyeth from his place
To ride in ships
And to tread in the deserts,
And to carry his life to dens of lions,
Adventuring in among wild beasts;
And when he imagineth that great is his glory
And that might is the spoil of his hand,
Quietly stealeth the spoiler upon him,
And his eyes are opened and there is naught.
At every moment he is destined to troubles
That pass and return,
At every hour evils.
At every moment chances,
On every day terrors.
If for an instant he stand in security,
Suddenly disaster will come upon him.
Either war shall come and the sword will smite him.

J98 ARABIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

Or the bow of brass transpierce him;

Or the sorrows will overpower him;

Or the presumptuous billows flow over him,

Or sickness and steadfast evils shall find him,

Till he become a burden on his own soul,

And shall find the gall of serpents in his honey."^

Amidst these ordeals what can man do? How can he gain cer-
tainty? Avicebron answers, Only by rehance on God. Thus the
poem ends:

"Therefore I beseech Thee, O my God,
Remember the distresses that come upon man,
And if I have done evil
Do thou me good at my latter end,
Nor requite measure for measure
To man whose sins are measureless.
And whose death is a joyless departure."*

JUDAH HALEVI

Like Avicebron, Judah Halevi was a poet and a philosopher. In him
Jewish nationahsm played an important role, and all his life he
looked forward to a return to Palestine. He undertook a pilgrimage
to Jerusalem, but we do not know if he ever reached that city.

Like Al-Gazzali, Halevi believed that reason is inferior to religion,
for reason gives only a quantitative interpretation of life. It does not
see the living reality of God and hence relies on demonstrations
which frequently obscure real faith. God, Halevi affirmed, is to be
found through love, spiritual insight, and a ready acceptance of
revelation.

He was certain that the Jewish nation has a glorious destiny. Did
not the Jews produce the prophets, he asked; did not the Jews
initiate the moral traditions of the Western world? Did not Jewish
suff^ering throughout the ages indicate that theirs is a special destiny?

Like Philo, Halevi subordinated philosophy to prophecy. In his
opinion, philosophy can give only an inadequate explanation of the
universe, whereas prophecy produces an immediate contact with
God. Being orthodox, he was certain that personal immortality can-
not be denied. However, morality is not to be influenced by the
expectation that if we are good we will be rewarded in the Beyond;

3 Gabirors selected poems, translated by Israel Zangwill.
Ubid.

MAIMONIDES 399

rather, we are to exercise virtue for its own sake, as it leads to a
more sublime life.

In his world-view Halevi refused to accept a mechanistic account
of the universe. Following Jewish tradition, he thought God's provi-
dence rules all parts of creation and the Biblical tradition should be
accepted as infallible.

MAIMONIDES

Maimonides was born in 1135 in Cordova. In his youth he visited
Palestine; later he settled in Cairo, where he went into the jewelry
business. Afterwards, he practiced medicine and became court phy-
sician to Saladin's prime minister. In Cairo he was widely respected
both for his scientific knowledge and for his philosophical wisdom.
He became head of the Jewish community in Egypt, and when he
died in 1204 he was mourned by both Jews and Arabs as an out-
standing thinker. In his main work. The guide for the perplexed,
Maimonides tried to combine the philosophy of Aristotle with the
teachings of Moses and attempted to give a rational explanation of
the faith.

He regarded the study of metaphysics, which he equated with the
knowledge of God, as the most significant subject of inquiry. It is
not to be taken lightly, he said, and those who want to devote them-
selves to the subject should have preliminary instruction in the
sciences, logic, and the Bible.

Maimonides realized how difficult metaphysics is. Most people are
unable to understand immaterial causes. Subject to transitory pas-
sions and dependent on sensual pleasures, they do not have enough
detachment to appreciate metaphysical principles. Furthermore,
they are unwilling to dedicate themselves to the arduous study
which metaphysics necessitates.

In the philosophy of Maimonides, God occupies an all-important
position. He made it clear that in God there is no corporeality, no
potentiality, and no resemblance to his creatures. In short, when we
speak of God we can use only negative attributes. In this way he
indicated that God is beyond all human knowledge and understand-
ing. Maimonides insisted upon the transcendence of God. Does this
mean, then, that God is not concerned with the world and that there
is no Providence? Does this imply that our prayers are not an-
swered? Maimonides replied, God is definitely concerned with the
universe and conscious of our prayers. In a word, Maimonides used
the arguments regarding the transcendence of God to indicate God's

400 ARABIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

perfection, without, however, making God disinterested in human
affairs.

Unlike Aristotle, he did not believe that the universe is eternal. It
is created in time, and it exhibits teleological laws, he declared. He
followed Aristotle, however, in showing that the matter of the
heavens is quite different from the corporeal structure of the earth.
He made much of the active intellect, which, unlike Avicebron, he
described as being composed of pure form.

In his ethical principles Maimonides stressed moderation. Thus he
was not a proponent of asceticism. According to him, we must fol-
low the laws but not mortify our flesh. The aim of man is to know
God, he taught. All our activities should be guided by this purpose.
Thus we should work and enjoy our leisure not as goals in them-
selves, but so that we may have time to study the laws and the
revelation of God.

Maimonides spoke of four kinds of perfection. The first and the
lowest relates to property.

"The possession of money, garments, furniture, servants, land, and
the like. The possession of the title of a great king belongs to this
class. There is no close connection between this possession and its
possessor; it is a perfectly imaginary relation when on account of
the great advantage a person derives from these possessions, he says,
'This is my house, this is my servant, this is my money, and these
are my hosts and armies.' For when he examines himself, he will find
that all these things are external, and their qualities are entirely
independent of the possessor. When, therefore, that relation ceases,
he that has been a great king may one morning find that there is no
difference between him and the lowest person, and yet no change
has taken place in the things which were ascribed to him. The
philosophers have shown that he whose sole aim in all his exertions
and endeavors is the possession of this kind of perfection, only seeks
perfectly imaginary and transient things; and even if these remain
his property all his lifetime, they do not give him any perfection."^

The second kind of perfection includes man's body.

"This kind of perfection must likewise be excluded from forming
our chief aim; because it is a perfection of the body, and man does
not possess it as man, but as a living being; he has this property be-
sides in common with the lowest animal; and even if a person pos-
sesses the greatest possible strength, he could not be as strong as a
mule, much less can he be as strong as a lion or an elephant; he,

^ Maimonides, Guide m, 53.

MAIMONIDES 401

therefore, can at the utmost have strength that might enable him to
carry a heavy burden, or break a thick substance, or do similar
things, in which there is no great profit whatever from this kind of
perfection."*^

The third is moral perfection, aimed at improving man's character.

"Most of the precepts aim at producing this perfection; but even
this kind is only a preparation for another perfection, and is not
sought for its own sake. For all moral principles concern the relation
of man to his neighbor; the perfection of man's moral principles is,
as it were, given to man for the benefit of mankind. Imagine a person
being alone, and having no connection whatever with any other
person, all his good moral principles are at rest, they are not re-
quired, and give man no perfection whatever. These principles are
only necessary and useful when man comes in contact with others."'^

The fourth is metaphysical perfection, which leads to a true
knowledge of God.

"With this perfection man has obtained his final object; it gives
him true human perfection; it remains to him alone; it gives him
immortahty, and on its account he is called man. Examine the first
three kinds of perfection, you will find that, if you possess them,
they are not your property, but the property of others; according
to the ordinary view, however, they belong to you and to others.
But the last kind of perfection is exclusively yours; no one else owns
any part of it. 'They shall be only thine own, and not strangers' with
thee.' (Prov. 5:17) Your aim must therefore be to attain this
(fourth) perfection that is exclusively yours, and you ought not to
continue to work and weary yourself for that which belongs to
others, whilst neglecting your soul till it has lost entirely its original
purity through the dominion of the bodily powers over it."^

In discussing the problem of evil, Maimonides leaned upon pre-
vious philosophers. Evil he regarded as being unreal, metaphysically,
for it merely constitutes a privation and an absence of perfection.
The so-called evil which we find in the actions of man indicates a
lack of wisdom. According to him, we certainly should not beheve
that evil governs the universe; anyone who holds this opinion is
dominated by a partial and inadequate viewpoint. Since evil very
often contributes to the perfection of the whole, we must realize,
according to Maimonides, that many of the so-called evils are due

« Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

402 ARABIC AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

to our own nature. We are subject to the temptations of the flesh;
we cannot resist death; to demand a painless existence would be
contrary to the nature of things.

Most evils, Maimonides held, are created by man himself. For ex-
ample, we acquire lustful habits and thereby weaken our bodies;
consequently our health suffers. The wise man moderates his desires
and appreciates all the things which God provides. He dedicates
himself only to the permanent values of Ufe and shuns everything
that is superfluous.

"How many trials and tribulations are due to the lust for super-
fluous things! In our frantic search for them, we lose even those
which are indispensable. For the more we strive after that which is
superfluous, the less strength have we left to grasp that which is
truly needed.

"Observe how Nature proves the correctness of this assertion.
The more necessary a thing is for living beings, the more easily it is
found and the cheaper it is; the less necessary it is, the rarer and
dearer it is. For example, air, water, and food are indispensable to
man. Air is most necessary, for if man is without air a short time he
dies, whilst he can be without water a day or two. And is not air
more abundant and easily obtained than water? Again, water is more
necessary than food, for some people can be four or five days with-
out food, provided they have water. And is not water more abun-
dant everywhere, and cheaper, than food? The same proportion can
be noticed in the different kinds of food: that which is more neces-
sary in a certain place exists there in larger quantities and is cheaper
than that which is less necessary. No intelligent person, I think, con-
siders musk, amber, rubies, and emeralds as very necessary for man
except perhaps as medicines; and they, as well as other like sub-
stances, can be replaced for this purpose by herbs and minerals. This
shows the kindness of God to his creatures, even to us weak
beings."^

Maimonides was opposed to any view which makes anthropo-
morphism the center of religion. Another Jewish philosopher in a
later period, Spinoza, spoke even more strongly about the de-
terministic laws of nature.

Maimonides rejected the belief that all things exist for the sake
of. man. "On examining this opinion, as intelligent persons ought to
examine all different opinions, we will discover that it is erroneous.
Those who maintain it may be asked whether God could have

^ Ibid., HI, 12.

MAIMONIDES 403

created man without those previous creations, or whether man could
only have come into existence after the creation of all other things.
If they answer in the affirmative, insisting that man could have been
created even if, for example, the heavens did not exist, then they
must be asked what is the object of all those other things, since they
do not exist for their own sake, but for the sake of some thing that
could exist without them? Even if the Universe existed for man's
sake and man existed for the purpose of serving God, one must still
ask: What is the end of serving God? He does not become more
perfect if all his creatures serve him. Nor would he lose anything if
nothing existed beside him.

"It might perhaps be replied that the service of God is not in-
tended for God's perfection, but for our own. Then, however, the
question arises: What is the object of our being perfect?

"Pressing the inquiry as to the purpose of the Creation, we must
at last arrive at the answer: It was the will of God. And this is the
correct answer. . . . Logic as well as tradition proves clearly that
the Universe does not exist for man's sake, but that all things in it
exist each for its own sake."^*^

Following Averrhoes, Maimonides insisted that only the active
intellect is truly immortal, for it represents the permanent opera-
tion of reason. What is transitory and ephemeral perishes with the
body. What then is man's task? Maimonides stated categorically
that man must seek God, obey the laws, and constantly extend his
own wisdom.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What were the foundations of Moslem religion?

2. What were the main contributions of the Moslems to world civiliza-
tion?

3. Describe the world-view of Avicenna.

4. What contributions did Averrhoes make to philosophy?

5. Describe the mysticism of Al-Gazzali.

6. How did Maimonides justify his faith in Judaism?

7. How can moral perfection be reached, according to Maimonides?

8. What was the significance of Avicebron in medieval philosophy?

9. How did Halevi view philosophy?

10. Evaluate the spirit of medieval Jewish philosophy.

1° Ibid., Ill, 13.

ABELARD AND BERNARD

ABELARD'S CAREER

.he conflict between Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux was
more than a battle of clashing personalities. They typified the two
conflicting viewpoints of the 12th century: the desire for reason vs.
the unquestioning acceptance of dogmatic truths. But it was mainly
Abelard's work which lent such historic interest to the struggle,
for Bernard represented simply the traditional ascetic spirit and
the reformist tendencies in the Church. Although he was one of
the outstanding saints of the Middle Ages, he did not contribute
anything original to either the emotional or the intellectual de-
velopment of the period. On the other hand, Abelard is part
of the philosophical renaissance which enlightened the 12 th cen-
tury. His accomplishments tended to give greater prominence to
logical thinking and rational investigation of Church dogmas.^

It is interesting and instructive to follow his career. He was
born in 1079 near Nantes of noble parents. His father, Berengar, al-

^ For a survey of Abelard's achievement see Poole, Illustrations of medieval
thought, ch. v; Webb, Studies in the history of natural religion, Part iii, no. 3;
Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, 11, pp. 162-205; McCabe, Peter
Abelard.
404

ABELARD'S CAREER 405

though a feudal lord, exhibited none of the then-prevalent un-
civilized habits and coarse manners of his class. Thus, he had his
son instructed in letters and encouraged him to pursue a scholarly
career. Very early in his Hfe Abelard made up his mind to re-
linquish his inheritance, since he possessed little proclivity for fight-
ing. In his own words, he "gave up the lure of iMars to be educated
in the lap of Minerva."

Abelard was a boy of no more than fifteen or sixteen years when
he left his home to obtain a higher education. As a wandering
scholar he availed himself of the best teachers in the different educa-
tional centers and is reported to have been a student of Ros-
cellinus, one of the most famous dialecticians of his time. This
teacher leaned in the direction of nominalism and maintained
that universals have no reahty apart from particulars. Roscellinus
had freely employed reason in the explanation of the Trinity;
and this application of reason, in addition to his nominalism, had led
him to statements divergent from the official dogma; whereupon
he was quickly condemned by a council. From Roscellinus, Abelard
learned the fundamentals of logic, but he later showed so little
respect for Roscellinus' knowledge that he did not even mention
his studies under him in his autobiography, the Historia calamitatum.

Arriving in Paris in the full vigor and enthusiasm of his youth,
Abelard became a student of the most formidable philosopher of
the day— William of Champeaux. The latter enjoyed the reputation
of being a veritable pillar of orthodoxy and was considered so bril-
Hant and stimulating a teacher that students from nearly every
country flocked to Paris to hear him. As an orthodox churchman,
William held, contrary to Roscellinus, that universals exist independ-
ent from any material substance, and that the group has a real exist-
ence outside of the mind conceiving it and apart from the indi-
viduals making it up.

The controversy between the realists, William's followers, and
the nominalists, Roscellinus' scholars, aroused considerable attention.
Wherever students gathered, the question was assiduously debated;
in fact, it became the outstanding intellectual problem of the
century.

Abelard plunged into the conflict with all the arrogance of his
youth and the brilliance of his debating abilities. Strictly speaking,
he was neither a realist nor a nominalist; for him, universals were
neither things nor names but simply concepts, predicated upon par-
ticulars. Although his viewpoint was neither original nor new, it

4o6 ABELARD AND BERNARD

still constituted a formidable weapon in his hands against the realism
of William. Abelard lost no time in attacking the famous teacher.
One can imagine the delight of his fellow students and the cha-
grin of the teacher at hearing day after day his pupil's caustic
jibes.

Soon William of Champeaux was forced to retreat from his ex-
treme realism. Students began to lose faith in him. At last, after
taking monastic vows, he retired to the bishopric of Chalons-sur-
Marne, where he became friendly with Bernard of Clairvaux. He
could never forgive Abelard for the humiliation suffered at his
hands.-

In the meantime, before this triumph, Abelard had retired from
Paris and established himself as a professor at Melun, near Paris,
where he taught his subtle philosophy to a large crowd of admirers.
So successful was he that in 1 1 1 5, after he had been denied the
right to teach in the cathedral school of Notre Dame at Paris, he
taught at St. Genevieve, and students left his rivals to listen to his
stimulating lectures.

His health was poor, however, and this condition, together with
his filial duty, took him back to Brittany, where he stayed for sev-
eral years. Later, when he looked back more impartially upon his
first academic triumphs, he repented of having incurred the an-
tagonism of William of Champeaux, whom he regarded as one
source of his afilictions.

After his return to Paris and St. Genevieve, Abelard found that
his scholarly fame had not been eclipsed during his absence. Not-
withstanding promising opportunities, he decided to study theology
at Laon in order to gain an acquaintance with the "queen of sci-
ences." Possibly his mother, who had become very religious, in-
fluenced him. He chose to be instructed by one of the outstanding
theologians of his age, Anselm of Laon, who had made Laon a
center of theology. But, again, Abelard appeared little impressed by
the authority of the master and exhibited the same contumacy as
against Roscellinus and Wilham of Champeaux. In taking up the-
ology, Abelard did not discard his logical and progressive mind, so
he could scarcely be expected to agree with the conservative Anselm.
He ridiculed the master as one who "filled his house with smoke
rather than lighting it with the blaze" and compared him in his

2 Later he championed the theory of indijferentisifi, which tries to mediate be-
tween extreme realism and extreme nominalism. It holds that while substance is
individual, it possesses at the same time universal properties.

ABELARD'S CAREER 407

empty eloquence and distrust of reason to a barren tree that is like
the "shadow of a mighty name,"

Abelard's character is illustrated by an incident which took place
at Anselm's school. With his usual tactlessness, he missed classes
and thought it unnecessary to attend Anselm's lectures. Besides,
he referred to Anselm in uncomplimentary terms. During a dispute
with his fellow students, he stoutly maintained that it was super-
fluous for scholars to have instruction in the Scriptures and boasted
that he, the beginner, could lecture upon the most difficult of
prophets on but a day's notice. He selected Ezekiel as the topic of
his lecture and impressed his audience to such an extent by his
learning and eloquence that more students were eager to hear him.
Anselm's feelings at the phenomenal success of the new student
have not been recorded, but he certainly was not wilhng to tolerate
his competition. Abelard voluntarily departed for Paris to resume
his teaching, regarding himself as entirely justified in his arrogant
behavior.

In Paris, he was offered the chair at Notre Dame. There he
reached the zenith of his career. From all over Europe students
thronged to Paris to hear master Abelard. They admired him for his
extraordinary mind and subtle reasoning, his clear and intriguing
lectures which were enhvened by disputes, his use of imagery and
frequent quotations from classical authors. Besides these scholarly
gifts, he was quite handsome and expressed his ideas in a rich, well-
modulated voice. The disputes of the scholars awakened the mental
slumber of medieval Europe. Abelard, by his unique gifts, had
challenged the imagination of his eager students. They learned
from him that scholarship can be a way of life, not reserved for
the monk in his solitary cell but open to all who possess an inquir-
ing mind. This movement took place at a time when the feeling of
the existence of an absolute truth was universal. The young stu-
dents could be as fanatical and single-minded in their quest for en-
lightenment as the monk who consecrated his life to the service
of God or as the knight who went to conquer Jerusalem.

Then Abelard made an unfortunate step. He fell in love with
Heloise, the niece of the canon Fulbert. The canon had placed her
under the tutorship of Abelard— a fateful event for both the master
and his student. Abelard described Heloise as a girl of remarkable
beauty and supreme intelligence. No wonder that both became
thoroughly enamored of one another! Later they were married
secretly, but Fulbert did not keep the union secret. Consequently,

4d8 ABELARD and BERNARD

Abelard put his wife into a convent. This step would, she thought,
for all practical purposes undo the marriage and also save the
career of her husband. But her uncle took a terrible revenge by
hiring ruffians to inflict upon Abelard the most terrible of all
mutilations: they deprived him of his manhood.

This event proved to be the turning point of Abelard's career.
Not only the physical pain which he suffered, but the shame
which he felt influenced his decision. According to old Church
laws, his chances for an ecclesiastical career were now lost. In his
torment he decided to enter the monastery of St. Denis, and he per-
suaded Heloise to take the veil at Argenteuil. Henceforth, until his
death in 1142, his life was full of suffering, disappointments, and
persecutions. Yet his scholarly influence did not wane; students
deluged him with petitions to resume his teaching. He consented
and instructed a huge gathering at a priory belonging to St. Denis.
So great was the deluge of students that many could not be fed or
housed, and the neighboring schools suffered a marked loss in
attendance.

ABELARD AND THE CHURCH

By the publication of his Introduction to theology,^ written to
bring the light of dialectic into the mystery of the Trinity, Abelard's
enemies were given a chance to accuse him of heresy. At the council
of Soissons, in 1121, he was condemned, forced to burn the book
with his own hands, and sentenced to do penance in a monastery.
Soon thereafter, the papal legate reversed the judgment of the
council and pronounced Abelard innocent. Hence, he could return
to St. Denis.

This time Abelard incurred the wrath of the monks by asserting
that Dionysius could not have been the founder of their monastery.
Regardless of the truth of his statements, the monks would not
believe him, since a loss of revenue and reputation was involved.
His life was in jeopardy, and so one night he fled from the monas-
tery to the diocese of Troyes, where he built himself a hermitage
and dedicated it to the Holy Ghost.

This action, again, constituted an insult to his enemies, who had
taken a stand against his dialectical investigation of the Trinity. It is
obvious that the sentence of the council of Soissons had had no
visible effect upon him; to the contrary, it had made him more
critical and challenging.

2 His other theological works were De trinitate and Theologia christiaTta.

ABELARD'S CHARACTER 409

Abelard seized the opportunity to leave the hermitage when he
was called to become abbot of St. Gildas in Brittany. Yet
his troubles were not ended; St. Gildas needed reform, and he
sought to improve the moral condition of the monastery. The
monks responded by making several attempts to kill him. In order
to save his life, he finally left the monastery and returned to Paris
in 1 1 36, where he resumed his teaching.

At this time Bernard became interested in Abelard's writings, be-
cause of Abelard's association with Arnold of Brescia, who taught
that the Church should go back to the apostoHc ways of poverty.
He was not the only ecclesiastic intent upon silencing Abelard,
but he took the lead in opposing him. At the council of Sens, in 1 141,
Bernard secured the condemnation of the master dialectician, who
was charged by William of Saint Thierry with being "the abuser
and not the disciple of the faith; the corrector and not the imitator of
the authorized masters."

Abelard did not wait for his final sentence by the council, having
decided to appeal to Rome, But he never arrived there; instead, he
entered the monastery at Cluny. Here, Peter the Venerable, who
disliked Bernard for his criticism of Cluny and for his excessive
puritanism, was a more pleasant associate. Besides, Abelard was
looked upon as a distinguished guest at Cluny, for he was still con-
sidered one of the ablest minds of Europe. In agreeable surround-
ings he spent his last months in calm meditation, officially recon-
ciled to the Church. He died in 1142.

ABELARD'S CHARACTER

In a letter of condolence, which was as sincere as it was eloquent,
Peter attempted to comfort Heloise by reminding her that she and
her husband would be reunited in heaven. Probably Abelard's only
happy experience, if one excepts his teachings at Paris after his en-
trance into St. Denis, arose out of his relationship with Heloise.
The hermitage at Troyes, which he left when he became abbot of St.
Gildas, he gave to Heloise, who was chosen abbess of a group of
nuns.

To her, religion was less important than Abelard; a letter from
him proved more valuable than any ecclesiastical office. Her love
was self-sacrificing and strong, defying the caprices of fortune. In
her letters Heloise claimed that she would rather be his mistress
than the wife of an emperor. How she sympathized with him in
his many calamities! Seldom have letters unfolded more feeling and

4IO ABELARD AND BERNARD

attachment! She confessed that she was constantly blaming God for
the injustices inflicted upon Abelard, She was still reliving the days
when they had been together.

Abelard's replies to her, however, represent a new facet of his
character. He had absorbed a deeply religious feeling and now
called her the "spouse of Christ." These letters disclose an Abelard
who was not concerned with mundane pleasures but only with
the salvation of his soul, who, furthermore, expressed himself as if
he were insensible to human feehngs. "In my fate I find the work-
ing of grace," he wrote to console her, yet probably thereby deep-
ening her agonies. Toward the last, the letters turned to purely re-
ligious topics, to the history of the nuns, to hymns and prayers.

Nothing illustrates Abelard's character more vividly than his view
of the persecutions he suffered. To him they were, indeed, tragic,
and he lived in constant anticipation of new disaster, like a hero
in a Greek tragedy. His autobiography was written under the im-
pact of misfortune while he occupied the abbacy of St. Gildas. Of
one thing he felt certain— that his enemies were all moved by the
basest of motives. In his opinion they were either ignorant, im-
moral, or envious. Such are the impressions one obtains from his de-
scriptions of William of Champeaux, Anselm of Laon, and Roscel-
linus. His only comfort lay in recalling the fate of Christ and the ex-
ample of the apostles. By opposing the errors of his time, he thought
he might imitate the example of the saints, hoping finally that
everything would work out to the "good of the just." Even in
these thoughts and crushed by many misfortunes, Abelard was
thoroughly convinced of his own brilliance.

ABELARD'S BELIEFS

The strange feature of the story of Abelard is that he combated the
official heretics of his day as violently as did Bernard. He wrote
with vehemence against Tanchelm, who called himself the Son of
God, and Peter of Bruys, who was forcing men to be rebaptized
and telHng them to remove crucifixes and to cease celebrating the
mass. But with similar ardor Abelard turned his rebuke against those
who thought ignorance in credal matters blessed, relying upon
"Amens" as signs of religious devotion, believing, the more readily,
dogmas which could neither be understood nor discussed.

It is not surprising to note that Abelard showed no respect for
authority. He criticized, disrespectfully, misstatements in the Bible
and questioned the infalHbihty of the prophets and apostles. He

ABELARD'S MORAL IDEALS 411

knew that the Church fathers themselves did not agree upon many
points of the faith. Therefore he wrote his famous Sic et non, con-
taining one hundred and fifty-eight propositions upon which the
fathers disagreed. The purpose in his compilation was to incite a
quest for truth among his young readers. "For by doubting we
come to inquiry, by inquiry we discover the truth." Faith, itself,
Abelard called judgment or opinion about things unseen, a defini-
tion that scandalized Bernard.

Abelard considered the dogmas of the faith reasonable and rea-
soning, itself, a noble activity. By reason, Abelard held, man be-
comes like God and most worthy of his creator; hence reason for
the dialectician was the highest activity. Not only the faith, he said,
but even the universe obeys the laws of rationality. Yet, there
are Hmits to the application of dialectic in religious disputes. In an
earlier theological work Abelard attacked certain Sophists who
applied logic in religious disputes without any constructive pur-
poses.

Abelard's religion was far removed from the practices current
in the 12 th century. He was a bitter enemy of the growing ma-
terialism in the Church. As a scholar, he was too sophisticated to
believe in crude miracles and to take a deep interest in the crusades
and other fanatical enterprises of his contemporaries. Yet even a
man of his caHber could not escape some of the hmitations of his
time. He, also, talked occasionally about the devil and his magic
powers.

ABELARD'S MORAL IDEALS

It would be a serious mistake to regard Abelard merely as a vain
professor with a love for disputations and desire for glory. All his
life he cherished the ideal of living a philosopher's life. This involved
for him very definitely the acceptance of poverty. Heloise had
told him that riches and philosophic detachment cannot be com-
bined, and he, himself, had written about such philosophers as the
Pythagoreans, who hved in the wilderness in order to escape the
luxury of the city. How greatly Abelard admired and ideahzed the
ancient philosophers can be seen in his frequent quotations from
their books, even in his discussions of theological questions. He
thought that they, too, were saved, and that in many ways they had
foretold Christian truths.

In his work the Dialogue between a philosopher, a Jew and a
Christian, the philosopher seems to have the best of the argument.

412 ABELARD AND BERNARD

Philosophy, Abelard felt, is more in accord with Christianity than
with Judaism, but his ideal type of Christianity was a positive moral
law rather than a matter of prohibitions and ceremonies, a religion
divested of a literal hell and heaven. He maintained that heaven
constitutes communion with God, and hell is a separation from God.
The dialogue was not completed, but the philosopher finally agrees
that the greatest good is not mere virtue but communion with God.
Faith triumphs by this concession, although it is a very intellectual
faith.

The Dialogue formed the climax of Abelard's ideals and showed
his high regard for the old philosophers, whose simple lives he con-
trasted with the immorality of the clergy of his day. In it there are
embodied Abelard's tireless application of reason and his incessant
quest for a superior spirituality in religion.

LIFE AND IDEALS OF BERNARD

When we turn from Abelard to Bernard, we are bridging a gap
between reason and revelation, between dialectic and contempla-
tive religion. The career of Bernard does not arrest our attention
as sharply as that of Abelard. This statement does not mean that
Bernard's life was not dramatic and his ideals exceptional, but he
embodied best and most adequately the inspirations of the past,
while Abelard foresaw the future.^

Like the logician Abelard, Bernard was born of knightly parents.
His father was a descendant of the counts of Chatillon, while his
devout mother claimed relationship with the noble house of Bur-
gundy. Both parents led upright and self-sacrificing hves. The
mother, it is reported, was often seen administering to the poor of
the neighborhood, caring for the sick and infirm with her own
hands. From her, Bernard absorbed such fervent devotion to the
religious cause that at twenty-two he entered the monastery of the
Cistercians, together with five brothers and twenty-five friends.

In making the choice of the strict order, Bernard resolved to lead
an ascetic life with its inevitable privations and innumerable sacri-
fices. At Citeaux, the abbot, Stephen Harding, was busily engaged
in establishing reforms designed to conform more strictly to the
monastic usages of the Benedictine rule. The entrance of the young
nobles into the abbey at Citeaux, in preference to older houses like
Cluny, caused the unexpected upswing of the Cistercians; within
two years Citeaux was full to overflowing.

* On Bernard see Vacandard, Vie de St. Bernard, abbe de Clairvaux, i vols.

BERNARD'S RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES 413

Scarcely aware of the outer world, Bernard accepted his new
profession with intense earnestness and unflinching courage. Like
the rest of the monks, he ate the coarsest food, kept the nightly
vigils, shaved no more than seven times a year, willingly obeyed the
rules of silence, and even devised his own means of self-punishment.
So determined was he to shut his eyes to all that disturbed or pre-
vented the realization of his ideals that, it is reported by his biog-
rapher, for a year he lived in the hall of the novices without notic-
ing whether the ceiling was vaulted or flat. In later life he rode for
an entire day along beautiful Lake Geneva without perceiving the
fact. At the same time, he read the Bible painstakingly and, by con-
stant use of the text, acquired an aptness in quoting from it beyond
that of any other medieval writer of his day.

We see, then, how in every possible way Bernard surpassed his
fellow monks in mortification, learning, and charitable temperament.
In less than three years from the time he had entered, he was given
charge of twelve monks, many of them older than himself, and
instructed to found a daughter monastery. They went into Cham-
pagne, and there in a sunny valley near a little river they set up a
monastery and called it Clairvaux. Bernard remained abbot of
Clairvaux until his death in 1153, although the highest Church
ofiices were offered to him.

At the outset of the new venture, Bernard fell ill and was near
death. He never fully recovered his health, and by abstinence, fasts,
and vigorous travels he exhausted his frail body. Persuaded by Wil-
liam of Champeaux to preach among the people, he traveled in
several countries in an attempt to invigorate the moral tone of
secular and ecclesiastical life.

Yet Bernard always turned back to Clairvaux, where he pursued
his religious studies. Because of his reputation, novices from the
city and country and other monasteries flocked to Clairvaux. He
watched over them with anxious eye, being as concerned with their
welfare as with the government of the king of France.

BERNARD'S RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

As counselor and critic of Popes, Bernard attained a unique position
in Europe. In 1 1 30 he was called upon to decide between the con-
flicting claims of two rival Popes, Anacletus and Innocent II; and
by throwing his powerful influence behind Innocent II, he decided
the issue in favor of the latter. We find that for this purpose Bernard
wrote hundreds of letters, made innumerable trips, and pleaded at

414 ABELARD AND BERNARD

councils; but when he had reached his goal, he returned gladly to
Clairvaux.

It was Bernard's responsibility to preach the Second Crusade.
So responsive was the multitude that vast armies rushed to the Holy
Land, though they were unsuccessful in the enterprise. When he
preached to the Germans on the proposed crusade, most of his audi-
ence could not understand a word of what he was saying, but they
were so carried away by his personality that thousands volunteered
for the expedition. Not only by sharpness of wit but by appearance,
worn out by fasts and vigils as though he had come from another
world, Bernard made his audience aware of his idealistic purpose.
The people knew about his virtuous life, past deeds, and humility.
At iMilan they fought to get a piece of his clothing to keep as a
relic; and when he came back through the Alps, shepherds came to
receive his blessing.

Bernard was convinced that he was sent by God to preach the
word. Therefore, everything that went on— the injustices, immoral-
ity, lethargy, and negligence of the leaders of man— he regarded as
his province; nevertheless, he remained always humble.

BERNARD AND ABELARD

In contrasting the personahties of Bernard and Abelard, we find
that they were opposites in many ways. Fundamentally, Bernard
was introspective and mystical in temperament; Abelard was ana-
lytical and inquisitive. The abbot of Clairvaux sought to find an
approach to God by contemplation and emotional ecstasies, and he
treasured the inner life more highly than outward appearance.

To Abelard, reason was the link with the supernatural. Primarily,
he wanted to be successful, to win fame and glory. He had a keen
eye for the praise of his contemporaries. Consequently, one is not
always convinced of his sincerity. Bernard, on the other hand, pos-
sessed a fanatic zeal for the Church. When he entered the cloister,
he took along as many of his relatives and friends as possible. He
could have obtained almost any ecclesiastical office but he refused,
for he wanted to live an ascetic fife.

Bernard wrote hundreds of letters in a tone of profound humil-
ity, belying his position in the general affairs of Europe. By utter
self-abnegation he won his triumphs. How much he enjoyed his
power is a question difficult to determine. With poor health, con-
tinuous travels must have become an unpleasant burden for him, and
an active political life distasteful to his contemplative mind. Ber-

JOHN OF SALISBURY 415

nard's entire life was devoted to the fortunes of the Church, whose
interests he advanced with tireless energy.

Abelard was proud and self-reliant and by human knowledge at-
tempted to understand the problems of the day; to be right in scho-
lastic questions became a passion, and those who disagreed with him
he regarded as ignorant and jealous. As one reads his Historia calami-
tatinn, one is astounded at the unbounded self-esteem of Abelard
in his prime. In haughty manner, William of Champeaux and An-
selm of Laon are attacked with neither modesty nor poise. His
handsome physique contrasted with Bernard's frail, worn-out body
"marked by grace, spiritual rather than corporeal." When the two
met at the council of Sens, it was an encounter of the representa-
tives of two different worlds; and Bernard, sensing the difference,
treated Abelard with vituperative vehemence, although he had
previously confessed that he knew little of the issues at stake.^

GILBERT DE LA POREE

Like Abelard, Gilbert de la Poree tried to achieve a compromise
between extreme realism and extreme nominalism. He was born in
1076 at Poitiers. He taught at Chartres and at Paris; later he became
bishop of Poitiers.

De la Poree did not state his philosophy in systematic form, and
he lacked the boldness of Abelard. In general, he was interested
in synthesizing conflicting viewpoints. Like Boethius, by whom he
was influenced, he combined the basic tenets of Platonism and Aris-
totelianism; but he avoided a Neo-Platonic emphasis and thus did
not identify the metaphysical forms with the mind of God.

JOHN OF SALISBURY

John of Salisbury (c. 1115-1180) even more than Gilbert de la
Poree reflected the fundamental spirit of Abelard's system. He
received his early education in England and from there proceeded
to France, where he studied under the eminent teachers of his
time. He achieved ecclesiastical honors and later became bishop of
Chartres.

In John of Salisbury the humanistic spirit was dominant. Familiar
with classical philosophy, he was independent in his attitude regard-
ing Scholasticism. He made it clear that logic is not an end in itself
but is to be cultivated together with other philosophical disciplines.

^ Cf. Meyer, "Die Anklagesatze des Heiligen Bernard gegen Abalard,"
Nachrichten der Gotthigen Acad., 1898, pp. 397-468.

4i6 ABELARD AND BERNARD

Although he was acquainted with both Skepticism and Epicureanism
and gave a rather searching exposition of the two movements, he
retained his faith in the Church and believed in the immortalit>'
of the soul.

In politics John of Salisbury is known best for his Polycraticus,
probably the outstanding work on political science in the 12th cen-
tury. Subordinating kings to the Church, he believed they should
exemplify moral perfection. He maintained that an abuse of power
should not be tolerated by the people, and thus he favored the kill-
ing of tyrants.

THE ECLECTICS

Peter Lombard and Alananus of Lille contributed no original doc-
trines to 12th-century philosophy. Peter Lombard is best known
for his Four books of sente7ices, which became one of the primary
philosophical textbooks of the Middle Ages. He beUeved that the
authority of the Church fathers was to be taken for granted, and thus
he did not express any independent opinions.

Alananus of Lille, a Cistercian monk, had more poetic interests
than Peter Lombard, but he, likewise, lacked originality. He stressed
the power of reason and felt that logic could investigate the mys-
teries of the faith. In his cosmology he used the Pythagorean prin-
ciple of numbers and maintained that nature mediates between God
and individuals.

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF CHARTRES

The school of Chartres in the Middle Ages was the center of clas-
sical studies and thus favored a humanistic outlook. Bernard of
Chartres taught that three substances exist: (i) God, who is absolute
and perfect; (2) Ideas, which represent the divine archetypes for
the phenomenal world; and (3) matter, which is created by God.
He avoided pantheism by showing that God alone is perfect and
that the two other substances are relative and derived from God's
perfection. In his theory of knowledge he was an extreme realist,
believing that Ideas, having an ontological reality in nature, exist
prior to individuals.

Theodoric of Chartres exhibited Neo-Platonic and Pythagorean
strains in his philosophy, but he remained true to his Christian faith.
Interested in science and in classical hterary studies, he became one
of the outstanding teachers of his time. He maintained that God's
essence is transcendent and cannot be comprehended by man's finite

PANTHEISTIC HERETICS 417

mind. All beings are real, he taught, insofar as they participate in
divine perfection. Thus, pantheistic strains entered his philosophy.
William of Conches (died 1154) was a student of Bernard of
Chartres and especially interested in natural science. He used, in his
philosophy, the Atomic hypothesis and was acquainted with the
theories of Hippocrates. In his earher teaching he identified the Holy
Ghost with the world-soul. This doctrine was regarded as heresy,
and because of the attacks of other scholars he abandoned it.

ADELARD OF BATH

Adelard of Bath, hke Wilham of Conches, was interested in science.
He traveled widely in Greece and Asia Minor. He taught at Paris
and Laon and translated some of the works of Euclid. In his philos-
ophy influences of Democritus and Pythagoras are evident, as well
as Platonic and Augustinian strains. Thus, Adelard stressed the im-
portance of reason and believed intellectual concepts to be innate.
His epistemological viewpoint leaned in the direction of indiffer-
entism.^ He showed that the soul is immaterial and immortal and,
consequently, superior to the body.

PANTHEISTIC HERETICS

Pantheists, such as Bernard of Tours, Amalric of Bene, and David
of Dinant, played a prominent role in shaking the faith of the
Scholastics. Bernard of Tours represents a pantheistic tendency in
the De nnmdi miiversitate, a metaphysical poem which is extremely
subtle. He beHeved in the existence of a world-soul, which he inter-
preted in a Neo-Platonic manner. Unlike the orthodox Scholastics,
he accepted the reality of emanation. Consequently, he did not
accept the doctrine of personal creation. In his epistemological con-
cepts he adhered to extreme realisju. Thus he neglected individual
beings and emphasized the importance of universal essences.

Amalric, a teacher at Paris, asserted that man and God are iden-
tical and that God can be found everywhere. Thus, there is only one
substance: God and his perfection is the standard of all knowledge.

David of Dinant was condemned in 12 10 for being heretical. He
taught a doctrine of pantheistic materialism, for he asserted that God
and prime matter are identical. We find almost Eleatic strains in his
system, for he maintained that the world of the senses is illusory.
The diversity of nature, time, change, and motion thus are not real;

•5 This view was also accepted by Walter of Mortagne and William of
Champeaux.

4i8 ABELARD AND BERNARD

there is only one substance, which is eternal and material rather than
immaterial, as the orthodox Scholastics maintained.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Relate the principal events of Abelard's life.

2. Describe Abelard's method of doubt.

3. Why did Abelard oppose William of Champeaux?

4. What were Abelard's ethical views?

5. What is the significance of the Sic et no?i?

6. Why did Bernard attack Abelard?

7. Discuss the contributions of the pantheists to 12th-century thought.

8. What is the significance of John of Salisbury?

9. What were the main philosophical problems of the 12th century?

THE MYSTICS

SIGNIFICANCE

n order to understand the philosophical conflict of the Middle
Ages it is necessary to discuss the mystic spirit of medieval religion.
Mysticism can be defined as an intuitive quest for a union with the
principle of reality. The stages of this experience are usually di-
vided into (i) purgation, (2) illumination, and (3) union. Mysti-
cism played an important role in medieval Judaism and Moham-
medanism. Fundamentally, it symbolized the prevailing preoccupa-
tion with the supernatural realm. We can find mystic strains in
nearly all the prominent medieval Christian thinkers.

Several weak points are noticeable in the medieval mystics. Many
of their prophecies and visions had a pathological foundation and
were products of overburdened or perverted minds. Furthermore,
mysticism was connected with the habit of thinking in allegory,
so prevalent in this period.

The Middle Ages found a mystical medium in numbers. Augus-
tine had regarded numbers as constituting the thoughts of God,
and, therefore, in the Middle Ages the science of numbers tended to
become the science of the universe itself. By the 12 th century a

419

420 THE MYSTICS

systematized form of numerology, often founded on Scriptural
references, had grown up. For example, twelve was the symbol of
the Church; therefore, it was said, Christ chose twelve apostles. It
was thought significant that twelve is the product of three and
four. Three constituted the symbol of the Holy Trinity and signi-
fied spiritual matters, while four stood for the four elements and re-
ferred to material things. According to this science of numbers,
when three is multiplied by four spirit and matter form a unity
and are crystallized in the revelation of the Christian Church, repre-
sented by the twelve apostles.

Another example is the number seven, which stands for man.
Since four plus three are seven, man is composed of both matter
and spirit. We find this number seven in the seven ages into which
human life is said to fall; in the seven virtues and seven deadly sins;
in the seven sacraments; and in the seven tones in which the Church
offered praise in its daily ritual; and, finally, in the seven days in
which the world was supposedly created.

This sense of the mystical efficacy of numbers permeates nearly
all the great works of the Middle Ages. The great summae are
examples of it in the division of their subject matter. Their connec-
tion with symbolism suggests the obsession of medieval thought
with analogies, for if we examine the mystical numbers, such as
seven, we see that they are not based upon rational thought but
upon analogies. The latter tended to emphasize the unitaiy aspects
of medieval civilization, so that the mystics could find fundamental
similarities on all levels of existence.

THE MYSTIC SPIRIT

Commonly it is assumed that the mystic is one who turns away
from the affairs of the crowd and takes no interest in the general
conditions of his time. This idea is mistaken if we intend to apply
it to the medieval protagonists of a contemplative life. Hugo of St.
Victor, St. Francis, and Jacopone da Todi, to mention a few, all
intended to share their experiences with others. They were engaged
in the enlightenment of the secular leaders. They did not ignore
the sins of mankind and the imperfection of the social institutions
of their day.

The approaches taken by the mystics differed markedly. Some
mystics were scholarly, like Hugo of St. Victor; others were emo-
tional, Uke Elizabeth of Schonau. They came from all classes of so-
ciety and had different attitudes toward life. But they were alike

THE SCHOOL OF ST. VICTOR 421

in their steady belief that material goods and dependence upon social
approval cannot be combined with a contemplative life and that
their experiences were real, guiding them to the Truth. Generally,
they all subordinated intellectual knowledge to the action of the
emotions. They sought for a higher sphere of religion, where ra-
tional knowledge would not be sufficient, for the completion of
the mystic experience brought about a childlike feeling of innocence
and purity.

The mystic starts with an increasing attention to his own personal-
ity and is at first conscious only of himself and the goal which he
wants to attain. He aims at the absorption of his self into a larger
whole. Intellectually, this endeavor signifies that a heroic attempt
is being made to see the problems of the world from the inside,
to obtain a knowledge of the essential workings of nature through
identification with it.

Characteristic of the mystic spirit of the Middle Ages was the
ardent emotional temperament displayed by a group of nuns— Eliza-
beth of Schonau, Mechthild of Magdeburg, and Gertrude the Great.
These women, through intense spiritual love, expected to be united
with God. They were not indifferent to nature, or to the sufferings
of humanity, or to ornaments— all age-old subjects of feminine inter-
ests. Gertrude reported that once Jesus, when she invoked his name,
"impressed upon the lips of her soul, so to speak, a kiss the sweet-
ness of which surpassed that of honey beyond compare." Her pas-
sionate relationship with God was crystallized in the symbol of the
"Sacred Heart." These nuns understood the divine according to
the human elements of their faith.

THE SCHOOL OF ST. VICTOR

On the other hand, Hugo of St. Victor's mysticism rested upon
solid theological foundations. He was a prior of the school of St.
Victor, which had been founded by William of Champeaux, first
the teacher and then the most ardent opponent of Abelard. Hugo
of St. Victor's teachings were synthesized by Richard (died 1173),
who succeeded him. Adam of St. Victor was the mystical poet of
the school and composed some outstanding religious hymns.

Hugo of St. Victor had none of Bernard's distrust of Scholasticism
and reason. Thus his theories about the mystic stages of contempla-
tion are methodical, and in De sacra??ie7itis, a treatise on sacraments,
he became a forerunner of the precise method of 13th-century
Scholasticism. The most famous of Hugo's theories regarding the

422 THE MYSTICS

stages of the mind in apprehending the supern^itxiral—cogitatio,
meditatio, and conte7nplatio— expresses the experiences which every
mystic has to pass through. Cogitatio is the perception of things
through the senses; meditatio is an inquiry into the veiled mean-
ing of life and nature; and contemplatio is the insight which is
thus achieved regarding the substance of reality.

Hugo of St. Victor possessed the rare gift of clarity in setting
forth his ideas. In faith he distinguished between two component
factors, knowledge and affection. Affection he valued the more
highly, since thereby the will turns away from mundane pleasures
to God. In his ideal of affection lies the germ of Schleiermacher's
"emotion."^

Richard of St. Victor was praised by Dante in the Paradiso as a
scholar "who was in contemplation more than man." Like Hugo of
St. Victor, he disliked mere academic knowledge but found a niche
for reason in mysticism. The highest stage of contemplation in-
volved, for Richard, an utter alienation of the mind, a loss of one's
own consciousness, "when all is one and one is all," with a result-
ing feeling of ecstasy.

FRANCIS OF ASSISI

More significant than Richard of St. Victor was Francis, who was
born in Assisi about 1182. As the son of Pietro di Bernardone, a
wealthy cloth merchant, Francis turned against everything that was
cherished and prized by his family. At his death in 1226 his glory
consisted mainly in having despised worldly goods and having faith-
fully kept his vows to "Lady Poverty."

The picture we receive of Francis' early manhood before his
conversion is of a young aristocrat, fond of amusements, gaiety,
and good company. Endowed with a sparkling temperament, he had
a great capacity for enjoyment. And so, as the leader of an easy-
going band of young men who spent much of their leisure time in
feasting and reveling, Francis developed expensive habits. Although
his father, Pietro, was quite prosperous, such extravagance did not
please him; but, since it elevated his social status and brought aristo-
crats to his home, he was not too harsh with his son. Already, in
this early stage of his life, Francis craved to be the best; he wanted
to be the noblest knight, admired by all. In order that all might
know his aspirations, he wore the most sumptuous clothes and the

^ Cf. Stockl, Geschichte der Pbilosophie des Mittelalters, 11, pp. 309-367.

FRANCIS OF ASSISI 423

finest armor. When held captive for tvvelve months after a combat
with the citizens of Perugia, he did not lose his cheerfulness and
optimism. He never doubted that he would be a great baron one
day, "that the day would come when he would be adored by the
whole world."

After returning from captivity, he fell ill and as a consequence
experienced a decisive inner crisis. Thus, around 1204 he was started
on the way to conversion by a growing sympathy with the suffer-
ings of humanity. Francis' religious mission lay not in ascetic retire-
ment, in fleeing from the evils of his day, but in compassion for the
oppressed. At first, he wanted to continue on his former path, to
feast and to fight knightly combats, but soon this no longer satis-
fied him.

After a long banquet, it is said, where he as always was pro-
claimed king of the revelers, Francis was found by his companions
absorbed in deep thought, unconscious of all that was going on
around him. When asked about it, somebody shouted that Francis
was probably thinking about taking a wife. Then he exclaimed with
gusto: "I am thinking of taking a wife more beautiful, more rich,
more pure than you could ever imagine."

The symbol of his moral transformation was his compassion for
the leper, the most unfortunate of the social outcasts of the Middle
Ages. According to Bonaventura, his official biographer, while Fran-
cis was riding one day he accidentally met a leper, who at first filled
him with loathing. But then he leapt from his horse and embraced
him. "When the leper stretched forth his hand as though to receive
alms, he kissed it, and then put money therein."

Francis had won a victory over himself. His human sympathies
had triumphed over his esthetic sense of beauty. Could there be any
creature more disgusting to him than a leper? Imagine Francis, the
handsome knight, imbued with chivalric notions and the romantic
tales of the troubadours, being confronted by this spectacle of dis-
ease and lowliness. His illness, however, had shown him his own im-
potence and the emptiness of his romantic dreams. He had learned
that military prowess and bodily strength are superficial and eva-
nescent things. Experience had taught him that human life is solitary
and vain without a measure of kindliness and compassion. The en-
counter with the leper, a pilgrimage to Rome, where he borrowed
the rags of a beggar to plead for alms for a whole day, his experi-
ences before the crucifix at St. Damian— all were signs of rehgious
awakening.

424 THE MYSTICS

Francis decided to rebuild the chapel of St. Damian, which was
falling into ruin. He neglected his appearance and spent whole
days in seclusion. When he sold his father's goods to repair the little
chapel, his father attempted to restrain him by force and call
him before the magistrates. But Francis requested that his case be
decided in the bishop's court. In the presence of a large crowd the
bishop advised Francis to give up all his propertv'. He comphed
willingly, and dramatically returned his father's goods to him. A
hair shirt and a cloak which he obtained from a servant of the
bishop of Assisi were enough for him. Even this habit was stolen
from him, but he felt happy for having thus consummated his strange
nuptials with "Lady Poverty."

Francis, conscious of his change of allegiance, knew that he could
not belong to one family or to one city; his was now a universal
mission. He showed no eagerness to join the crowds of Cluniacs or
Cistercians or other organized monks; he wanted to follow a new
path to satisfy his longing for liberty. And so from 1209, the year
when he started out to preach, following the example of the apostles,
"wearing neither two coats, nor shoes, nor staff," the vision of his
task expanded. The decade which followed was filled with cease-
less activity.

Soon disciples attached themselves to him. Their first settlement
was a little hut near a leper hospital. They drew up a simple rule
embodying the teachings of Christ and set out for Rome to obtain
its sanction from Pope Innocent III. After some hesitation, the Pope
gave his verbal assent to the rule. Francis and his followers called
themselves the jnwores, or poor folk, to indicate their humble sta-
tion in life.

The foundation was laid for a second order of Franciscans by
Lady Clare, who was so deeply impressed by one of Francis' sermons
that she left her rich home to found the sisterhood of the "Poor
Clares" at St. Damian. This she governed for forty years, true to
the ideals of Francis.

The order expanded in other directions. It organized missions and
opened its doors to laymen. It was called, at first, the "Order of
Continents or Penitents" and received those who vowed to live in
peace and charity.

Francis was tireless in his preachings. The sincerity of his ser-
mons and the appeal of his personality converted whole communi-
ties. Wherever he went it was the same; the pent-up enthusiasms
of Europe were let loose. Men of wealth renounced their posses-

FRANCIS OF ASSISI 425

sions that they might Uve among lepers— "God's patients," as Fran-
cis called them— and wash their sores. The scholar abandoned his
books in order to achieve salvation.

Francis wanted to convert the infidels or, in case of failure, to find
martyrdom. Between 1 2 1 2 and 1 2 1 5 he tried to go to Spain and to
Palestine but failed to reach either destination. In 12 19, however,
he embarked for Egypt, where the crusaders were besieging Da-
mietta. There he was captured, and martyrdom seemed certain for
him. But when he was brought before the sultan, he preached the
Gospel. The monarch did not know how to deal with him, and so
he was allowed to return to the Christian camp, from which he con-
tinued on his way to Palestine.

When he returned to Italy in 1220, his order was faced with
grave problems. He had previously been forced to face difficult
tasks arising out of the expansion of his order. A lax interpretation
of the rules had crept in. Such a condition was unavoidable in a
growing religious group, but Francis did not intend to be the nom-
inal leader of an organization which was not true to his ideals, and
so he gave up his position as the head of the order. In the fall of 1220
he became a private brother and humbly pledged his allegiance to
the new minister-general.

Francis had finished his official work for the order, except for his
help in the composition of a new Rule which was adopted in 1223.
He had to compromise a great deal with those who insisted on less
severe restrictions and more careful provisions for the organization
of the order. To some extent, he felt that his work had been a
failure since he had not succeeded in converting the infidels and
had failed to maintain the purity of his followers. Yet, during the
last years of his life, when his eyesight was weakening and sickness
was plaguing his body, his faith in Christ was renewed by his mys-
tic experiences on iVIount Alverno, where he felt the stig7?mta,
the imprint of Christ's wounds upon his body.

In this experience, Francis found new strength and conviction
that the kingdom of heaven would be opened to him. To his order
he was a fatherly adviser who had already set his eyes on another
world. The vision of the Beyond gave him a sense of quietude
and serenity. The Franciscan brothers around him were filled with
awe at his perseverance and talked about his miraculous powers.
It seemed as if the "Little Man" of Assisi had become the center
of the religious universe. He was quite unafraid of death. Accord-
ing to Thomas of Celano, he welcomed "Sister Death" with a song.

426 THE MYSTICS

True to his ideals, even in his last hour, he was stripped of his cloth-
ing and laid on the bare ground. This was his last impressive gesture
to "Lady Poverty."

ST. FRANCIS AND HIS AGE

St. Francis responded to the immediate challenge of his age. His
work and his ideals were conditioned by the religious situation
of his time. The reform of Pope Gregory VII and the influence
of the Cistercian order and other regenerated monasteries had not
been lasting and enduring. Simony, incontinence, and the exactions
of the Church courts continued, and many bishops regarded the
priestly office as a feudal fief and themselves as secular officeholders.

From all sides criticism was heaped upon the religious institutions.
Bernard lashed the simoniacs and the incontinent priests ^\'ith a
vehemence not even surpassed by the heretics. The chaplain of
Henry II of England called "the clerics worse than the pagans"
and pictured the organization of the curia as one in which bribery
and corruption abounded. Satire was used to describe the immor-
alit}^ of the clerics in the romances of Reynard the fox, who, when
faced \\ith death, thought little about confession and called the
churchmen "hypocrites."

In the 1 2 th centur\^ paganism had made rapid progress in the south
of France— a paganism motivated by unquenchable lust for life,
which found its best expression in Aiicassin et Nicolette. Aucassin's
love for the beautiful Nicolette was so great that even the prospect
of hell did not discourage him. On the contrar}^ he did not want to
go to heaven, "for there are the old priests and cripples." This un-
fettered spirit of rebellion was not confined to the nobles. It like\\'ise
affected the common man and the theologians, who all desired an
eifective reform in the moral conduct of the religious leaders.
Heretical sects like the Waldensians and the Albigensians were
springing up to emphasize the need for poverty.

THE WALDENSIANS

The Waldensians were named for Waldo, a rich merchant of Lyons.
According to reliable accounts, he was a successful businessman
before he became inspired by a jongleur's recital of the deeds of St.
Alexis, when he resolved, suddenly, to follow in the footsteps of the
saint. Consequently, he divided his property, giving part to his wife,

THE WALDENSIANS 427

providing for his daughter, and distributing the rest to the poor. So
complete was his abandonment of all property that he had to beg for
food from an acquaintance, whereupon his wife appealed to the
archbishop of Lyons, who ordered him to accept food from her.
Soon Waldo had a crowd of followers, who brought the Bible into
the layman's home. They adopted a special costume and were called
the "Poor Men of Lyons."

Representative of Waldo's burning zeal was his endeavor to study
and understand the Bible. He paid some priests to translate it into
the vernacular, so that he could learn many passages by heart. It
seems evident that the leaders of the movement were quite ignorant
of theological points, a fact which caused cultured churchmen a
great deal of amusement. When Waldo's followers sought permis-
sion to preach from two different Popes and from the Lateran coun-
cil in 1 1 79, they were flatly refused. These decisions were based on
the opposition and disloyalty of the Waldensians, but the main
Waldensian doctrines also were incompatible with Church dogmas.
This group maintained that God is to be obeyed rather than men,
that laymen and even women have the right to preach, and that
masses for the dead are useless.

As the break with the orthodox tradition became inevitable, the
Waldensians adopted a new historical interpretation, which stated
that after the time of Silvester II (Pope, 999-1003) the Christian
faith had become corrupt and that Waldo was the inheritor of the
apostoHc tradition.

The "Poor Men of Lyons" stressed the moral aspects of Hfe and
prohibited kiUing, swearing, and lying as mortal sins. As antisacer-
dotalists, without any elaborate organization, they became dangerous
foes of the Church, and the rapid development of their teachings
through Avignon, Savoy, Bohemia, and Pomerania bears testimony
to their popularity. Even the persecutors of the Waldensians paid
tribute to their courage and puritanism.

The Church faced opposition from another sect even more radical
in their tenets, a sect of ancient lineage. Augustine, as we have seen,
had already combated the Manichaeans after he had been converted
to the Christian faith, but neither he nor cruel persecutions were
successful in stamping out the followers of Mani. From the East,
the doctrines of the Aianichaeans were spread to Europe, appearing
in Italy, France, the Low Countries, and Germany. At the end of
the 1 2th century the Manichaeans had a large following in southern
France, where they were known as Albigensians.

428 THE MYSTICS

Christ, for the Albigensians, existed merely as the highest angel,
whose crucifixion had no spiritual meaning. From the Orient the
Albigensians adopted belief in the transmigration of souls and the
worthiness of suicide. Life on earth, for them, constituted an ordeal
and a preparation for paradise.

They condemned marriage in general and encouraged a celibate
life, but only the leaders of the faith were obliged to shun marriage.
With this asceticism they combined various food prohibitions.
Cheese, milk, meat, and eggs were on their forbidden list. They
claimed that human Hfe is sacred, that one should not swear or lie,
and that the sacraments are useless. An inquisitor described their
beliefs in the following ways:

"Then they attack and vituperate, one after the other, all the
sacraments of the church, especially the sacrament of the Eucharist,
saying that it cannot contain the body of Christ, for had this been
as great as the largest mountain Christians would have consumed it
entirely before this. ... Of baptism, they assert that water is material
and corruptible, and is therefore the creation of the Evil Power and
cannot sanctify the soul, but that the churchmen sell this water out
of avarice, just as they sell earth for the burial of the dead, and oil
to the sick when they anoint them, and as they sell the confession
of sins as made to the priests. Hence, they claim that confession
made to the priests of the Roman Church is useless, and that, since
the priests may be sinners, they can not loose nor bind, and being
unclean themselves, can not make another clean. They assert, more-
over, that the Cross of Christ should not be adored or venerated. . . .
They proclaim many other scandalous things in regard to the sacra-
ments. They, moreover, read from the Gospels and the Epistles in
the vulgar tongue, applying and expounding them in their favor and
against the condition of the Roman Church in a manner which it
would take too long to describe in detail, but all that relates to this
subject may be read more fully in the books they have written and
infected, and may be learned from the confessions of such of their
followers as have been converted."-

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ST. FRANCIS

Francis was influenced by these movements. Even the organization
of his Tertiaries had not been without precedents, for the "Humil-

2 Bernard of Gui, Fractica inquisitionis heretice pravitatis, v, i, 4 (Webster,
Historical selections, p. 433).

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ST. FRANCIS 429

iati," a somewhat similar group, had been founded as early as the
1 2th century. But the unique contribution of the Franciscans was
their intense enthusiasm for poverty.

The life of Francis was full of dramatic and colorful happenings
which taught his followers the essential wickedness of money and
property. He inspired them "to flee it like the devil." He had no
hatred for rich people, however. He hated material possessions not
for themselves but for the attitude they created in society. "If we
possessed property," he told the bishop of Assisi, "we should have
need of arms for its defense, for it is the source of quarrels and law-
suits." This idea did not mean that the Franciscans could idle and
live a life of laziness. On the contrary, they had to work hard and
assiduously.

The touch of vehemence and the extravagance in his injunctions
against property reveal how important this problem was for him.
He knew that the moral corruption and the depravity which he was
attempting to correct were due largely to material possessions,
which created a certain attitude incompatible with genuine religious
devotion. In the prosperous communities of Italy he could clearly
see the religious indifference and the skepticism of the growing
merchant class.

The compassion which Francis felt for the poor is the most illu-
minating feature of his character. He possessed a unique sensibility
to the misfortunes of others, and he wanted to be one with all un-
fortunate creatures on earth. Only in this way could he appreciate
and feel the agony of Christ.

Characteristic of Francis was his humility. In spite of his religious
inspiration and the world-wide influence of his order, he remained
to his dying hour "little Brother Francis, the least of your servants."
He typified the medieval attitude of exhibiting the insignificance of
one's achievement. Undoubtedly, it was not just feigned in his case.
It was his conviction that God blessed most the lowly and the humble.
In his own order he never expected excessive praise or any special
privileges. He had little use for the man of knowledge who relied
upon it to solve the riddles of the universe and dared to scrutinize
the mysteries of the faith.

If Francis, himself, had acquired an elaborate scholastic education,
and if he had attended the universities, he could not have found so
simple an ideal. This lack of formal schooling saved him from a
sophisticated attitude and made his heart more responsive to the call
of God.

430 THE MYSTICS

JOACHIM OF FLORIS

Also important in shaping contemplative religion was Joachim of
Floris (died 1202).^ The son of a nobleman, he lived a very agree-
able life until he started on a long tour to the East with a crowd of
friends and retainers. When he arrived at Constantinople he was
confronted with the ghastly specter of the plague and witnessed dire
tribulations, which deeply impressed him. One can imagine how
guilty the sensitive Joachim, who was neither superficial nor entirely
selfish, felt for his pomp and pride amidst appalling human misery.
He sent back all his retainers but one and set out as a humble peni-
tent and pilgrim, clad in a shabby tunic, to visit the Holy Land.

With this decision, Joachim the ascetic had triumphed over
Joachim the knight; his whole life from this time on became a model
of charity. It is reported that he gave his garments to some destitute
Saracen, and that as a monk in the abbey of Corazzo he excelled all
in obedience and rigorous mortifications. Although he experienced
rapid advancement in his monastic profession, he preferred the
quietude of the wilderness to the rigorous duties connected with
the abbotship of Corazzo.

With the permission of Pope Lucius III, he subsequently retired
to a hermitage, where he spent the last years of his Hfe. But, like
other hermits, he was soon summoned by faithful followers to be-
come, against his wish, the head of a new order whose rule was
approved by Pope Celestine III in 1196. So devoted was he to the
ideal of poverty that he once gave all his clothes away in order to
help the victims of a famine which had devastated vast regions of
Sicily in 1201.

At all times Joachim delighted in attending the sick and the poor.
It was his habit to wash with his own hands the floor of the infir-
mary. Moreover, by his power of persuasion he saved many towns
from the brutality of Henry VI, the German king. In his social serv-
ice he made no distinction between Christian and infidel, trying to
convert the latter by example rather than by preaching.

It was as a visionary, however, that Joachim left the greatest
imprint upon the medieval world. Luke, his biographer, asserted that
Joachim was in direct contact with Christ and related that he ful-
filled the office of mass with a "joy and happiness that gave him an
angelic countenance." Fasts and nightly vigils could not wear
Joachim out; on the contrary, he became more elated with his self-

3 Cf. Sedgwick, Italy in the thirteenth century, vol. i.

JOACHIM OF FLORIS 431

imposed sacrifices. He possessed the gift of inspiring his listeners
with sermons based on his visions. When delivering a sermon, he
usually started in a low, scarcely audible voice, which progressed in
volume until it resounded like thunder and struck the listeners with
its torrential eloquence.

One of Joachim's earliest visions relates how near to death he was
in a desert, where he could find no water. Finally, he saw a man
standing near a river and heard him say, "Drink of this stream."
He obeyed, and when he awoke, although he had previously been
illiterate, he now had absorbed a profound knowledge of the Bible.
Kings and nobles visited him, among them Richard of England and
Philip Augustus of France, who had heard of his miraculous expe-
riences and desired to know whether the crusade they were plan-
ning would be successful.

In his writings Joachim dealt with theological topics, attacking
Peter Lombard's exposition of the Trinity; he also wrote against the
adversaries of the Christian faith. But his revolutionary doctrines are
contained in three works: a concordance, a psalter, and a commen-
tary on the Book of revelation. In these works, Joachim divided
the history of humanity into three stages: the first under the rule of
the Father, which lasted until the birth of Christ; the second under
the ride of the Son; and the third under the ride of the Holy Ghost.
Thus Joachim, aware of the insufficiency and failure of religion in
his day, did not end the fulfillment of history with the introduction
of the New Testament but with the reign of contemplative religion.
He had already announced that there were dark days ahead for the
Church, for the old Benedictine purity was being neglected to the
disadvantage of all believers.

In his writings Joachim predicted that in the last generation there
would be terrible tribulations with the reign of Anti-Christ, ^\'hen
sacrifices would be of no avail and man would have to endure more
persecutions and misfortunes than ever before. He thought this
period would be short, for, otherwise, man would perish. After it,
he continued, true religion will rise to give peace and unity to the
people, who will all unite in the praise of God. In this final stage,
through the help of the monastic orders, mankind will be converted
to the contemplative life.

It seems clear that Joachim wrote as a hermit with a hermit's
world-view. For him, as for countless ascetics, the rule of the secular
clergy had failed to bring about a Utopian condition; and he cen-
sured them relentlessly for their avarice and greed, a view which

4^2 THE MYSTICS

made him even doubt that they could be saved. According to him, a
purified and elevated monasticism would finally be triumphant, for
the rule of the Holy Ghost would be filled with peace, love, and
liberty.

Joachim's ideas were not far from the radical type of pantheism
advocated by Amalric of Bene, a thinker who saw the human being
as part of God. While Joachim of Floris was not a revolutionary, his
followers took the prophecies of the saint literally and speculated
on such items as the nature of the Anti-Christ and the beginning of
his savage rule. Many were absolutely convinced that Frederick II,
the skeptic opponent of the papacy, was actually Anti-Christ. With
fearful anticipation some Christians looked forward to the year 1260,
which was to start Anti-Christ's reign.

One party of Franciscans, who believed in the primitive rule of
Francis and in absolute adherence to poverty, found the writings of
Joachim much to their liking. Since they were convinced that Fran-
cis had brought about a complete revolution in religious worship but
had not been followed by the majority of his order, they believed
themselves destined to reform humanity. Joachim of Floris was
adopted as the father of these "Spiritual Franciscans" when there
appeared, in 1254, a book called Introduction to the eternal gospel.
It is an edition of Joachim's three most important works together
with an elaborate introduction and commentaries. In it Gerard, the
editor, delineated the ideas of the prophet and fashioned them to his
own purpose. He asserted that as early as 1200 the spirit of life had
departed from the Old and the New Testament and that it dwelt
from this time on in the Eternal gospel, which was to be a guide for
the rule of the Holy Ghost just as the New Testament had been a
guide for the generations from Christ to Joachim of Floris.

In actual substance there is little difference between Joachim and
his commentator, but there is a sharp disagreement in spirit. Joachim
viewed the problems of the Church in a constructive way, while his
commentator wrote as an acrimonious critic, whose ideal was to
remould the entire Christian organization according to the early
Franciscan movement.

JACOPONE DA TODI

One of the "Spiritual Franciscans" was Jacopone da Todi, who com-
bined in his mysticism the teachings of Joachim of Floris and of
Francis. In reading Jacopone's life story, we realize that he was not

JACOPONE DA TODI 433

just a model character but a man with human sympathies and pene-
trating criticism of his own and other people's failings.

Although we possess little authentic material about his life, we
know that he came from a noble family and exhibited extravagant
tastes and wild aspirations in his youth, giving few thoughts to
political or religious principles. At forty he was a successful lawyer,
not too scrupulous in his practice but a man with a commanding
voice in the affairs of his community. In him, artistic and sensual
traits were intermingled. He was fond of poetry, music, and the
company of beautiful women.

According to legend, the turning point in Jacopone da Todi's life
came when his young wife was killed in the collapse of a platform
at a marriage festival. Shocked by her death, he was deeply moved
when he found beneath her splendid attire the rough shirt of a peni-
tent. The discovery completely changed his own outlook upon life,
and he decided to turn his thoughts to his own salvation. He gave
away his property and joined the Third Order of St. Francis. After
his conversion, Jacopone determined to follow Francis in his most
ascetic practices. This resolve involved a complete transformation of
his character. He hked to show himself as "God's fool." People
thought him insane because he was so eccentric.

During his first period in the Franciscan Order, lasting about ten
years, Jacopone was a Tertiary wandering about Italy and preach-
ing to the people with intense fervor and imaginative style. In 1278,
however, he sought permission to enter a monastery of the friars at
Todi, and, since they lived under relaxed rules, they showed some
hesitation but finally accepted him. Nevertheless, he continued to be
one of the most prominent adherents to the "Spiritual" faction, as
can be seen by his participation in a rebellion against Pope Boniface
VIII. Consequently, he was thrown into prison on orders of Boni-
face and not released until the Pope's death in 1303. After his release
from jail he experienced three more peaceful years before he died
in 1306.

Jacopone's life in the Franciscan Order can be divided into three
stages, according to his respective mystical experiences: first, his
"wander years" until about 1278, corresponding to purgation; sec-
ond, his stay in the monastery and political experiences until 1303,
the period of illumination; and finally, his last three years, a period
of creative union.

The first period of his mystic life begins with his abandonment of
material goods and growing distrust of learning— a feeling he shared

434 THE MYSTICS

in common with the founder of the Franciscan movement. So ab-
sorbed was he in his past shortcomings that he longed for death and
wished disease would take him away. An intense inferiority feehng
produced morbid strains in his character. He saw the existence of
man as a succession of endless miseries. We have to view Jacopone
as one who was literally mad for Christ, as a revivalist who inspired
his audiences with dark visions. He was imbued with a glowing
desire for union with God and expressed himself in incoherent
songs. However, his sacrifices were not complete, for there were
occasions when he craved sanctity, and he knew that desire for social
approval stood in the way of his spiritual perfection.

Hence, he took a step toward the utter renunciation of his will
and reached the second stage in his mystic experiences, illumination,
by becoming a lay brother in the monastery. For him, it resulted in
subordination to discipline and strict obedience to his superiors. Yet
he was not bUnd to the ambitions of the monks, to their thirst for
riches and learning and a saintly reputation. As a conformist to a
puritanical mode of worship with a predilection towards squalor
and filth, he was not pleasant company for the more sophisticated
friars. The grievances in a monastery, he learned, can be just as dis-
turbing as the contempt of the masses.

In this transitional period Jacopone began to comprehend the
power of tears, a sign of heightening emotional intensity accompa-
nied by self-criticism. He prayed for death. Furthermore, he was tor-
tured by fantastic visions and painful headaches. Only by centering
his mind on God could he weather these emotional storms. Symbolic
of his mood is one of his most intense poems:

"Before I knew its power, I asked in prayer
For love of Christ, believing it was sweet;
I thought to breathe a calm and tranquil air.
On peaceful heights where tempests never beat.
Torment I find instead of sweetness there.
My heart is riven by the dreadful heat;
Of these strange things to treat
All words are vain;
By bliss I am slain,
And yet I live and move.

Now on no creature can I turn my sight,
But on my Maker all my mind is set;

PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCE OF THE MYSTICS 435

Earth, sea, and sky are emptied of delight.
For Christ's dear love all else I clean forget:
All else seems vile, day seems as dark as night;
Cherubim, seraphim, in whom are met
Wisdom and Love, must yet
Give place, give place.
To that one Face
To my dear Lord of Love."*

Finally Jacopone was rewarded by an overflowing of bliss, the
gift of "a double life," and he felt "so fierce the fire of love." He
was a new creature and wrote: "I in Christ am born." He yearned
for the same kind of devotion as Dante felt when he first met Bea-
trice; it is a fierce devotion, satisfied only by complete union. Thus
the last stage in his mystical religion led to a full union with God,
where Jacopone found measureless and endless light.

PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCE OF THE
MYSTICS

The mystics played a most important role in philosophy. Although
many of them, like Francis, had httle interest in intellectual matters,
their attitude produced a basic change in medieval thinking:

( 1 ) They contributed a strain of individualism. Against the abso-
lutism of ecclesiastical organization they asserted the dignity and
potentiality of the individual. Less concerned with ritual, they dealt
mainly with man's inward spiritual experience. Above all, they em-
phasized the need for personal salvation and for a personal awareness
of God.

(2) The mystics influenced the reaction against reliance upon
formal logic. Since they stressed faith, they felt that reason repre-
sents a lower category of knowledge. They declared that salvation
cannot be gained by dependence on secular learning but that a real
religious experience is necessary.

(3) The mystics gave an impetus to pantheis?n. Although most of
them were loyal to the Church, they often tended to disregard the
distance between God and man and showed how man contains the
spark of divinity. To them, the universe represented a complete
unity. Thus they did not accept the diversity and phenomenal
changes which the senses picture.

* Lauda 90, quoted in Underhill, Mystics of the church, p. 97.

436 THE MYSTICS

(4) In their epistemology they leaned in the direction of intui-
tionism. Hence, the followers of St. Francis upheld the reality of
divine illumination, which can be understood only through insight
and intuition. In modern times intuitionism has made for irrational-
ism (as exemplified in the philosophy of Bergson and Schopen-
hauer). In the Middle Ages it was different, for to the mystics the
divine light represented absolute perfection and indicated that com-
plete certainty can be achieved by man.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why did the mystic spirit flourish in the Middle Ages?

2. Explain the importance of mysticism in the Middle Ages.

3. What were the contributions of Hugo of St. Victor to medieval
mysticism?

4. How did Francis express the ideals of Christianity?

5. What was Joachim of Floris' philosophy of history?

6. Explain the doctrines of the Waldensians.

7. In what ways were the Albigensians heretics?

8. What contributions did the mystics make to philosophy?

9. What were the weaknesses of the mystical spirit?
ID, Why was the Church suspicious of mysticism?

THE PROGRESS OF
SCHOLASTICISM

EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION

.he reaction against mysticism was strongest in the universities,
which stressed the ideals of reason. The term university itself pos-
sessed a meaning in the Middle Ages different from that of today.
It was taken from the Roman law and appHed to any corporate
group such as trade guilds, the municipalities, the various benefit
societies, and the monastic knights. In its formal organization, the
medieval university imitated the craft guilds in their system of ap-
prentices, journeymen, and masters, and possessed, at the height of
its growth, the same pageantry and adherence to definite stages of
promotion as the guilds. However, many medieval documents refer
to the university proper as a "general center of studies," a stiid'mvi
generate. Such a center of studies needed no endowment, no campus,
and no athletic program; all that was necessary was a group of
students eager to learn and a number of teachers anxious to teach.
Nevertheless, the idea of a corporation suggested by the term uni-
versity describes accurately its structural development in the Middle
Ages.

437

438 THE PROGRESS OF SCHOLASTICISM

Two universities particularly exemplify the prevalent form of
academic organization: Bologna and Paris. At Bologna, Irnerius,
who was the first notable student of the Justinian Code, taught, to
an admiring crowd of students, the principles of Roman law which
had been either neglected or unknown in the early Middle Ages.
There, in 1140, the monk Gratian wrote the Decretzmi and became
the chief authority for the study of canon law, which regulated and
controlled the judicial system of the Church.

The students who attended this university and studied law were
usually quite mature; some even had families. And thus they insti-
tuted a form of organization which left nearly all decisions and
regulations in the hands of the student body. They acted as a cor-
poration against the demands of the townspeople, for they could
always employ a very effective weapon against them: migration to
another town.

Professors were controlled in the same manner; not only their
salaries but their lectures and ways of delivery were minutely regu-
lated by the students, who themselves were organized into two sec-
tions: the cisjnontane, who were scholars from Italy, and the tra?is-
montane, who were scholars from beyond the Alps. The professors
had only the power of granting degrees, while the students stoutly
asserted their independence against both masters and townspeople
by migration to Arezzo in 1 2 1 5 and, seven years later, to Padua.

But Paris played a more decisive role throughout the A4iddle Ages.
This city was the intellectual metropolis of the West. It was there
that the first university was established in northern Europe, there
that the recovery of Aristotle's works brought about a far-reaching
reconstruction in thought, there that Scholasticism had its home and
displayed its most effective influence. After Abelard had started, in
Paris, to popularize dialectic by his colorful teaching methods and
his audacious opposition to tradition-ridden authority, thousands of
students had come to the city and there continued their studies after
his death. The modern student of medieval philosophy becomes so
habituated to finding Paris referred to as the capital of intellectual
activity that he tends to forget the very existence of the lesser cen-
ters, such as Oxford for the Franciscans and Cologne for the Domin-
icans.

The university of Paris is believed to have originated in 1200,
although there was a college in existence as early as 1 1 70. Its direct
predecessor was the Cathedral School of Notre Dame, where the
orthodox William of Champeaux had lectured; but the school of St.

AUTHORITIES 439

Genevieve, where Abelard became famous, and the school of St.
Victor, which harbored the mystic teachers Hugo and Richard, also
contributed to the growth of the university.

In Paris the masters of the four faculties— arts, medicine, canon
law, and theology— possessed complete legislative, judicial, and exec-
utive powers. The masters of the arts, the largest department of the
university, were divided into four nations— the French, the Picard,
the Norman, and the English— following broad geographical divi-
sions. Together the masters elected at short-time intervals a head of
the university, whom they called rector. The candidates for degrees
were licensed by the chancellor of the cathedral chapter of Notre
Dame. This arrangement was begrudged by the members of the
master guilds, who would have preferred themselves as the regula-
tors of university teachers.

Usually the medieval student had to study four or five years to
obtain his Bachelor of Arts, and three or four years more to become
Master of Arts. To obtain a degree as Doctor of Theology, he was
obliged to continue his studies over a longer period of time. At Paris
he had to be at least thirty-five years old and to have completed
fourteen years of residence work. Theology, medicine, and law
were the proper subjects for graduate work. The course leading up
to the Bachelor of Arts degree consisted mainly of studies in gram-
mar, rhetoric, and logic; the subjects of the quadrivium were gener-
ally thrown into the background.

AUTHORITIES

Aristotle became the chief textbook authority in the universities.
Translations from his work had been made both in Spain and in the
East to enrich the existing store of his writings, of which only a few
were known at the time of Abelard. The introduction of the rest of
his work stirred up a number of heresies, and consequently, in 12 10,
the provincial council unequivocally forbade the new Aristotle to
be taught in Paris. Five years later the prohibition was renewed but
applied only to his physical and metaphysical books.

In 1 2 3 1 Pope Gregory IX again confirmed this condemnation but
made a significant reservation in that he decreed the prohibition to
last only until the books could be examined and purged of all heresy.
After this task had been accomplished, a statute issued by the Fac-
ulty of Arts ordered nearly all Aristotelian writings to be used as
textbooks.

440 THE PROGRESS OF SCHOLASTICISM

Aristotle was not the only authority used in the universities. In
grammar, Priscian and Donatus were consulted; in rhetoric, the com-
mentaries of Boethius on classical authors were used. Theological in-
struction was based chiefly on the Four books of sentences, written
by the scholarly Peter Lombard. For lawyers, the commentaries of
Gratian and Irnerius were authoritative; while in medicine, which
was best taught at Salerno, a host of Moslem medical works supple-
mented such classical authors as Hippocrates, Galen, Celsus, and
Aristotle.

Paris served as the model for the universities of the Low Coun-
tries, Germany, Great Britain, and northern France; Bologna, on the
other hand, became a pattern for the creation of universities in Italy,
southern France, and Spain.

THE IDEAL STUDENT

The discussion relating to the organization of the universities re-
mains incomplete if we do not briefly outline the ideals of university
life. The studies were intended to bring about an intimate comrade-
ship between professor and student. For instance, Thomas Aquinas
followed his master, Albertus Magnus, wherever he went. Within
the university a new nobiUty grew up, founded upon brain power
rather than upon physical prowess. However, the universities were
not completely secularized in the iMiddle Ages, and thus the ideal
student as pictured in the sermons of the priests could have been an
ideal monk. At Paris the connection between the Church and the
university was especially close, but this continued to be the case in
nearly all the higher institutions of learning.

In their sermons the priests spoke of model students who studied
from daybreak until nightfall, only taking time out to eat and to
pray. They pictured scholars who were unaware of anything going
on in the outside world, who were completely unresponsive to the
lures of the opposite sex, who cared not for their health nor for
their appearance, whose modesty and meekness added to their bril-
liant mental capacities.

The highest maxims of the Church encouraged an ascetic attitude
on the part of university students and praised, most highly, reflective
and introversive traits. The need for a sound system of recreation
was totally ignored by the educational authorities.

Chaucer's description of the student in the Canterbury tales most
vividly portrays the accepted medieval ideal. The student is a dili-

WILLIAM OF AUVERGNE 441

gent clerk of Oxford, lean and thin, in ragged clothes, who spends
the little money he has on the books of Aristotle.

"A clerk of Oxford next my notice caught.
That unto logic long had given his thought.
His horse appeared as lean as is a rake.
And he was nowise fat, I undertake;
But looked all hollow, and of sober mien.
Full threadbare was his upper mantle seen;
For he, as yet, no benefice could gain.
Nor would he worldly office entertain.
For rather would he have, beside his bed.
Some twenty books, all clad in black or red,
Of Aristotle and his philosophy,
Than fiddle, costly robes, or psaltery.
But, though among philosophers enrolled,
Within his chest he had but little gold;
But all that he might gain from any friend
On learning and on books would he expend,
And duly for the souls of those he prayed
That for his studies gave substantial aid.
To gather learning took he care and heed,
i\nd ne'er a word would utter more than need;
And all was said in form and reverence.
In brief and lively terms, and full of sense.
To moral virtue tended all his speech.
And gladly would he learn, and gladly teach. "^

WILLIAM OF AUVERGNE

William of Auvergne in many ways exhibited new academic ideals,
although, generally, his philosophy was conservative. He was much
less receptive to the AristoteUan influence than some of his suc-
cessors, and he remained critical regarding Aristotle's principles. He
studied theology at Paris and later taught there, becoming one of the
outstanding scholars of his age.

It is noteworthy that William was especially influenced by
Arabian philosophers. He did not agree with them, however, in
believing that the universe is eternal and can be explained according
to the process of emanation. Hence, he insisted that God had created
the world out of nothing.

^ Chaucer, Prologue, 285-308 (Skeat, The prologue to the Canterbury tales,
pp. 14-15).

442 THE PROGRESS OF SCHOLASTICISM

Like Augustine, William was imbued with the perfection and
majesty of God. Compared with God, he taught, human beings are
limited; they achieve their destiny only insofar as they participate
in divine grace. He totally rejected the mechanistic hypothesis. Ac-
cording to him, the universe can only be conceived according to
dhme purposes. He was certain that God's providence extends to all
the events of life.

William's doctrine of the soul shows traces of both Aristotelian
and Augustinian concepts. He believed that man has only one soul;
he did not make a distinction between the soul and its faculties. He
made it clear that the soul is the ruling principle of the body. In the
soul, according to Wilham, we cannot find any material traces. The
soul, he affirmed repeatedly, is simple, immaterial, and immortal.

In his theory of knowledge, William refused to accept the con-
cept of the active intellect. Knowledge, he averred, starts with sense
experience; our potential intellect derives an inteUigible form from
the senses without the intervention of the active intellect. In the
highest stage of knowledge we experience a special illumination
which transcends any type of rational experience. Through this
illumination we understand the first principles of knowledge and are
able to gain complete certainty.

ALEXANDER OF HALES

The life of Alexander of Hales, hke that of William of Auvergne, is
veiled by obscurity. We do not know the exact date of his birth. We
know, however, that he studied in Paris and, in 1222, became a
Franciscan. For several years he was professor of theology at the
university, and he died in 1245. His philosophy shows a systematic
spirit. In the solution of philosophical problems he fairly described
opposing viewpoints and occasionally drew upon Arabian and Jew-
ish sources.

Like WiUiam of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales opposed the doc-
trine of emanation. He was certain that the universe had been
created by a personal act of God. That God exists can be proven,
he declared, both by viewing the order of the external world and
by realizing the nature of our ideas. Being finite, we are not autono-
mous but need an infinite cause to explain our existence. He made
it clear that the universe had been created according to God's per-
fect knowledge. Such creation implies the supremacy of divine pur-
poses. All beings and creatures in the universe, thus, have a definite
place and a definite function.

ROBERT GROSSETESTE 443

In his doctrine of the soul, Alexander of Hales beheved in sub-
stantial forms, a view generally held by most of the Franciscan
thinkers. By this doctrine he imphed that the soul has its own matter
and its own form; likewise, the body has its own corporeal form and
matter. Still, body and soul are joined together. Needless to say,
since both have their substantial forms, this union is rather tenuous.
The main purpose of Alexander of Hales was to safeguard the integ-
rity of the soul, and by giving it a separate form he thought he could
establish its immortality without any doubt.

Another interesting doctrine which we find in Alexander of
Hales' philosophy is his belief that matter has various manifestations.
Thus he distinguished between spiritual and corporeal matter, the
latter representing the lowest type.

This view, that we have various types of matter, was rejected by
Thomas Aquinas, who was more faithful to the Aristotelian doctrine
of matter.

JOHN DE LA ROCHELLE

John de la Rochelle was one of the disciples of Alexander of Hales.
He was born c. 1200 and when still quite young became a professor
at Paris. His main work is the Sufmna de an'mm. Like Augustine, John
de la Rochelle identified the soul with its faculties. In his system
there is room for the active intellect, a theory which, however, does
not imply that personal immortality is an illusion. He showed that
we can reach certainty only through divine illumination, which rep-
resents an act of grace.

In the philosophy of John de la Rochelle, as in that of other Fran-
iscans, a mystical element prevails. Reason, thus, is subordinate to a
direct intuition of God. However, this mysticism does not lead to a
pantheistic doctrine, for John emphasized the distance separating
man from divine perfection.

ROBERT GROSSETESTE

More significant than John de la Rochelle was Robert Grosseteste,
who became chancellor at the university of Oxford. Grosseteste was
interested not merely in theology but also in the physical sciences,
and he was far superior to the other philosophers in his view that
nature can be understood only through mathematical principles.
Like most English philosophers, Grosseteste championed the scien-
tific tradition, which frequently was neglected during the Middle
Ages.

444 THE PROGRESS OF SCHOLASTICISM

The philosophy of Grosseteste represents a strange synthesis of
Augustinian, Neo-Platonic, Aristotelian, and Franciscan elements.
In his philosophy he emphasized free will; if the human will is
not free, he felt, we cannot explain man's moral actions. This con-
cept of free will, however, does not imply that man can be saved
without the intercession of the Church, which acts as an interme-
diary between human beings and God.

In his doctrine of God, he exemplified the mystical spirit by
speaking of God as light. In fact, the principle of light plays a large
role in his system. Perfection is determined by the way and the
extent in which we share in the divine luminosity. He believed that
the light of the soul is superior in clarity to the light of the body.
Furthermore, light explains the perfection of the universe and is the
symbol of man's knowledge. All truth, according to Grosseteste,
represents a state of illumination.

"Created truth too, therefore, shows that which is, but not in its
own illumination (lumen), but in the light (lux) of the supreme
truth, as color shoMS body, but only in the light spread upon it. Nor
is this an insufficiency of light, that it reveals body through color,
since color itself is not a shining light added to a superfused light;
but the power of light is this, that light does not obscure color which
lights up beyond itself, but, on the other hand, it does not illumine
that which Hghts up beyond itself. In the same fashion is the power
of the light of the supreme truth, which so illumines the created
truth that, illumined itself, it reveals the true object. Consequently,
the light of the supreme truth is not to other truths as the sun is to
other luminaries of the sky, which it obscures in its brightness, but
rather as the sun to colors which it illumines. The light alone, there-
fore, of the supreme truth shows first and through itself that which
is, as light alone shows bodies. But by this light the truth of the
thing, too, shows that which is, as color shows bodies by the light of
the sun."-

Now the knowledge of supreme truth depends upon the purity
of heart of the behever. All share in the vision of supreme perfec-
tion, Grosseteste continued, but the virtuous see it in the light of
truth itself.

"In this manner, I think that many impure men, too, see the
supreme truth and many of them do not perceive in any wise that
they see it, as, if anyone should see colored bodies for the first time

^ On truth (McKeon, Selections jrom medieval philosophers, vol. i, pp. 273-
274).

BONAVENTURA 445

in the light of the sun and should never turn his gaze to the sun, nor
should have learned from any one that there is a sun or any other
light that illumined bodies which are seen, he would ignore wholly
that he sees bodies in the light of the sun and he would ignore that
he sees anything besides only colored body. The pure in heart, how-
ever, and those perfectly purified, look upon the light of truth in
itself, which the impure are not able to do. There is no one, there-
fore, who knows any truth, who does not also know in some man-
ner, knowingly or ignorantly, the supreme truth itself. It is evident
now, therefore, how the pure in heart alone see the supreme truth
and how not even the impure are kept wholly from the vision of
it."3

BONAVENTURA

One of the outstanding Franciscan philosophers was Bonaventura.
He was born c. 122 1 in Tuscany, joined the Franciscans, and then
studied at Paris. He became a teacher of theology in 1253 and in
1257 was made head of his order. Three years later he drew up a
new constitution for the Franciscans. He consistently rose in fame
and thus was raised to the office of cardinal. He died in 1274 while
attending the council of Lyons.

What is most significant in the philosophy of Bonaventura is his
mysticism. He shows that man is equipped with a threefold vision:
first, with the eye of the flesh; second, with the eye of reason; and
third, with the eye of contemplation, which represents the highest
stage of his knowledge.

To find God, he explained, we must use a spiritual ladder which
leads us from external nature to the soul, in which we find a reflec-
tion of God's grace. Utilizing the virtues of faith, hope, and charity,
we are able to comprehend God in his perfection and goodness.

The doctrine of the Trinity, Bonaventura asserted, has not only
a metaphysical but also a mystical function. In the highest stage we
experience an ineffable vision, which cannot be described by the
categories of philosophy. He declared that human reason should be
subordinated to divine revelation:

"For the Source lies not in human investigation, but in divine
revelation, which flows from the Father of lights, from whom all
fatherhood in heaven and earth is named, from whom, through his
Son Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit flows in us; and through the Holy
Spirit bestowing, as he wills, gifts on each, faith is given, and

^ Ibid., pp. 274-275-

446 THE PROGRESS OF SCHOLASTICISM

through faith Christ dwells in our hearts. This is the knowledge of
Jesus Christ, from which, as from a source, comes the certitude and
understanding of the whole Scripture. Wherefore it is impossible
that any one should advance in its knowledge, unless he first has
Christ infused in him. . . .

"The Progress of Holy Scripture is not bound to the laws of
reasonings and definitions, like the other sciences; but, conformably
to supernatural hght, proceeds to give to man the wayfarer a knowl-
edge of things sufficing for his salvation, by plain words in part
mystically: it presents the contents of the universe as in a Sunmia,
in which is observed the breadth; it describes the descent (from
above) in which is considered the length; it describes the goodness
of the saved, in which is considered the height; it describes the mis-
ery of the damned, in which consists the depth not only of the uni-
verse itself but of the divine judgment. . . ."■*

Philosophy can deal only with the facts of nature, Bonaventura
resumed, whereas theology represents the Holy Spirit and symbolizes
the working of grace:

"Philosophy treats of things as they are in nature or in the anima
according to the knowledge which is naturally implanted or
acquired. But theology as a science founded upon faith and revealed
by the Holy Spirit, treats of those matters which belong to grace
and glory and to the eternal wisdom. Whence placing philosophic
cognition beneath itself, and drawing from nature as much as it may
need to make a mirror yielding a reflection of things divine, it con-
structs a ladder which presses the earth at the base and touches
heaven at the top: and all this through that one hierarch Jesus
Christ, who through his assumption of human nature, is hierarch
not in the ecclesiastical hierarchy alone, but also in the angehc;
and is the medial person in the divine hierarchy of the most blessed
Trinity."^

In his metaphysical doctrines Bonaventura started with the exist-
ence of God as the fundamental principle of philosophy. He ac-
cepted the ontological proof, for he held that essence and existence
are identical. Relative certainty, he maintained, implies an absolute
certainty. We find God in the experience of our soul. In fact, accord-
ing to Bonaventura, the majesty of God is revealed throughout na-
ture, which obeys his laws and which is dominated by his divine
providence.

■* Breviloqiiim?!, Prologus.
5 Ibid.

MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA 447

Like most of the other Scholastics, Bonaventura asserted the doc-
trine of emanation to be invalid and believed the universe to have
been created in time by God. Whereas in God, he said, essence and
existence are identical, created beings have a form and a matter. This
condition also applies to angels, who do not have pure forms but a
material substratum.

Bonaventura reasoned that matter is active, that it contains germs
which are responsible for the production of variety in nature. These
he called seminal reasons. Likewise, he talked about the plurality of
substantial forms. By this term he meant that both the body and the
soul have each its own form. The form of the body, however, is a
potentiality of which the soul is the actuality. This doctrine was
rejected by Aquinas, who believed in a more intimate union between
body and soul.

In general, the philosophy of Bonaventura is characterized by
emphasis on the will. Intellectualism, thus, is not adequate in the
search for God, for to love God is more important than to know
him. In the highest stage of knowledge, Bonaventura declared, philo-
sophical categories are inadequate and, instead, we have a state of
emotional ecstasy.

MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA

Matthew of Aquasparta was one of Bonaventura's pupils. He was
born between 1234 and 1240 and died in 1302. He taught at Paris
and at Bologna and later became a professor in Rome. In 1288 he
was made cardinal.

The Augustinian influence was especially evident in Matthew,
who throughout his life fought against Skepticism and opposed any-
one who doubted the truth of Christian dogma. In his philosophy
we have a strain of occasionalism. He explained that God not only
is the author of our intelligence but responsible for all our intellec-
tual reactions. In short, we think through God; intellectual certainty
depends upon the co-operation of divine forces.

"For God is the whole cause of things and cause of the whole of
things: therefore, things depend on his providence. But things are
not the necessary cause of our knowledge; for God could imprint
on our understanding species of things through which we should
know, as he imparts them to angels. Moreover, things are not the
whole and only cause, but together with the light of our active
intellect and the divine light; and therefore, if they are in some
manner the original cause, still they are not the conservative cause,

448 THE PROGRESS OF SCHOLASTICISM

nor with respect to its conservation does our knowledge depend on
things.''^

Human truths, according to Matthew of Aquasparta, depend upon
the divine light, which we find within ourselves and of which we
have an immediate awareness.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS

In turning to Albertus Magnus we are entering a different tradition,
which culminates in the work of Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of
the medieval Scholastics. Albertus Magnus was a Dominican, the
descendant of a noble German family. He taught in various cities,
among them Freiburg, Strasbourg, and Cologne, and later in Paris,
where he was recognized as an inspiring teacher. In 1248 he re-
turned to Cologne to undertake the reorganization of the univer-
sity. He rapidly advanced in ecclesiastical honors and became bishop
of Ratisbon in 1260.

During the last years of his life, Albertus Magnus lived in virtual
retirement, interrupted only when he heard that the teachings of his
famous student were condemned in Paris. With vigor he defended
Thomas Aquinas, for whom he had iminense respect. His death in
1280 was a great loss to the Dominican order.

The starting point of Albertus Magnus' philosophy was natural
science, and he investigated nature more thoroughly than any other
thinker in his day. He was especially interested in botany and zool-
ogy. Independent in his researches, he frequently departed from
Aristotelian concepts. Unlike Augustine, he did not believe that the
study of physical nature is a waste of time; rather, he felt that it
adds to our understanding of the majesty of God.

In his scientific method Albertus Magnus did not merely rely on
deduction but used the inductive method as well. He repeatedly
warned his students not to accept theories merely on the basis of
authority but to make experiments for themselves and to form their
own hypotheses.

His philosophy reflects a variety of influences; Aristotle, the Jew-
ish thinkers, Neo-Platonists, Arabian commentators, all left their
impress. His interpretation of Aristotle was more objective than
that of his predecessors. The faith, he was sure, could not be dis-
turbed by the introduction of AristoteUan concepts. Nor were his

8 Ten disputed questions on knowledge (McKeon, op. cit., vol. 11, pp. 263-
264).

ALBERTUS MAGNUS 449

Christian ideals shaken by Arabic and Jewish influences. He strongly
believed in revelation, in the immortality of the soul, and in the need
for the mediation of Jesus Christ. His doctrines were opposed to all
forms of pantheism, for his concept of the universe was pluralistic
and made a sharp distinction between God and nature.

The Augustinian impact was evident in his philosophy, especially
in his belief in seminal reasons, which he used to explain the activity
of nature. He believed that the universe is not eternal although man
cannot demonstrate this fact by the use of reason.

Unlike Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus held that angels have
both form and matter. Like the other Scholastic philosophers, he
thought the Arabic thinkers mistaken in their belief in a world-soul
and a universal intellect.

In his proof of the existence of God, Albertus Magnus turned
against the old tradition in his refusal to accept the ontological argu-
ment. He depended on the cosmological argument for the existence
of God, which implies that we cannot have an infinite regress and
that we need a first cause to explain the multitude of effects in the
phenomenal world. Regarding his doctrine of the soul, Albertus
Magnus declared the soul to be immaterial, and its intellectuality not
derived from matter.

"It is, moreover, easy for us to come to a decision concerning the
nature of the intellectual soul, since it has its nature from the fact
that it is a procession from the first cause, but not emanating to the
point of intermixture with matter; and therefore it is even called by
some wise men of our dispensation the image of God. For it has
from its assimilation to the first cause, a universally active intellect,
which is like a separated light, as has been shown properly in the
third book 07i the Soul. Nevertheless, from the fact that this nature
is appropriated to the organic physical body, its intellectual nature
is immersed a little, and therefore it has a possible intellect which
derives its material from imagination and sense: and since this nature
is separated and not immersed in matter with respect to itself, it is
necessary that it be universal; and therefore the soul is universally
cognitive of all things intellectually, and not only of certain things,
for certain things are not made determinate except by matter; but
we said that the intellect is separate."^

Albertus Magnus opposed, thus, the principles of Avicebron, who
believed that the intellectuality of the soul is derived from matter.

^ The short natural treatises on the intellect and the intelligible (ibid., vol. i,
p. 344).

450 THE PROGRESS OF SCHOLASTICISM

"This statement, of course, is erroneous and opposed by all peri-
patetics, for the intellect is by no means all things in potentiality as
first matter is all things in potentiality, because the forms which are
individual with respect to material being are not separate from those
which are in potentiality in matter. The forms, however, which are
in potentiality in the intellect, are universals, separate from individu-
ating elements, and especially from matter, existing not here and
now, but everywhere and always.

'Tor all this, however, matter does not make forms to be in them-
selves by means of something which is of the same nature and genus
as matter. But the intellect has something of its own, namely, the
active intellect, which makes forms to be in the intellectual soul."^

In Albertus Magnus we find a transitional standpoint. To some
extent he was still part of the past and accepted the Augustinian
framework of knowledge; but he anticipated the future by his scien-
tific interests and his reliance upon Aristotle. Thus he paved the way
for the work of Thomas Aquinas.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Describe the university of Bologna.

2. How did the university of Paris differ from Bologna?

3. Compare the medieval professor with the modern professor.

4. Describe the clerk of Oxford as pictured by Chaucer.

5. How did the rediscovery of Aristotle invigorate philosophy?

6. Describe the philosophical views of Alexander of Hales.

7. Explain the main beliefs of William of Auvergne.

8. Why was Grosseteste more advanced than his contemporaries?

9. What is the highest form of knowledge, according to Grosseteste?

10. In what way did Albertus Magnus exhibit an interest in science?

11. Describe the faith of Bonaventura.
8 Ibid., p. 345.

THOMAS AQUINAS

THE SPIRIT OF AQUINAS

.quinas reflected all the currents of medieval life. Through him
Aristotle became one of the guiding influences of Catholicism. In his
system Aquinas presented a definite outline of the relationship be-
tween philosophy and theology and demonstrated how man's faith
can be bolstered through reason. While he was especially influenced
by Aristotle, there nevertheless are Augustinian strains in his philos-
ophy. Like Augustine, he made a sharp division between man and
God and was certain that the human soul is immortal.

Through his teacher, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas absorbed a tire-
less interest in nature, and his philosophy is consequently more empir-
ical than that of his predecessors. We notice his powers of observa-
tion and frequent appeals to natural and physical science in support
of his arguments. We do not imply, however, that Aquinas accepted
a modern perspective. A naturalistic explanation of life he regarded
as utterly inadequate; to him, metaphysical descriptions were supe-
rior to scientific hypotheses.

To appreciate the world-view of Aquinas we must remember that
he generally followed the Aristotelian physical theories. Thus he

451

•452 THOMAS AQUINAS

regarded the movement of the heavens as superior to the movement
of the earth and asserted that while heaven is dominated by a spher-
ical motion, the earth is governed by a rectilinear motion. He be-
Ueved the geocentric hypothesis to be the most trustworthy, al-
though he was not categorical on this point.

Aquinas' scientific views were dominated by his belief in divine
intervention. God, thus, is the beginning and end of all wisdom. We
cannot explain lower creatures of the universe according to the laws
of causality. We can only describe them according to the laws
which govern the highest realms of being. In short, Aquinas' uni-
verse contains five distinct classes: first, the inorganic realm; second,
the realm of animals; third, the realm of man; fourth, the realm of
the angels; fifth, the realm of God. All of nature, according to Aqui-
nas, is guided by God, who represents both the source and the end of
existence. Without God's intervention man remains in a state of sin
and complete ignorance, and his life represents a pilgrimage of
futility.

It was the desire of Aquinas to fight against any type of heresy.
While he used the Arabian commentators, he did not agree with
their doctrines. He could not tolerate their impersonal view of life
and denial of personal immortality, for he was an insistent believer
in Christian truth, without which he thought man can not gain
certainty.

THE LIFE OF AQUINAS

Aquinas was born c. 1225, the son of a noble family in Italy. In his
early youth he was sent to Monte Cassino, where his uncle was one
of the leaders of the order. He was imbued with the liberal arts, and,
probably at Cassino, he acquired a taste for philosophy. Later he
studied at the university of Naples, where he was exposed to all
kinds of worldly temptations; but, according to his biographers, he
remained free from all these influences and instead devoted himself
to intellectual studies.

Against the opposition of his family, Aquinas joined the Domini-
can order in 1243. His family went so far as to imprison him, for
they regarded an ecclesiastical career as unworthy of his talents. He
escaped from imprisonment and went to Paris, where he attended
the university, and later to Cologne, where he was exposed to the
teachings of Albertus Magnus.

As a student Aquinas was rather reticent and did not very often
express himself. His fellow students thought him slow intellectually,

THEOLOGY 453

but they certainly were mistaken, for Aquinas probably was one of
the most brilliant scholars of all time. After remaining in Cologne
for four years, he returned to Paris, where he became one of the
Dominican professors. Later he taught in Rome and then returned
to Paris in 1269. At this time he was fighting especially against the
Averrhoist heresy. In 1272 he departed again for Italy, where he
taught at Naples for a year. His death took place in 1274. Among
Aquinas' most influential books we find the Swnnm theologica and
the SuTfmm contra Ge?jtiles.

THEOLOGY

Aqumas based his philosophy on the certainty of God's existence.
He realized that many theologians believed universal consent to be
sufficient in establishing the existence of God, but he refused to
accept this argument. There were other theologians who asserted
that the existence of God is an object of faith which cannot be dem-
onstrated by philosophy. Aquinas, however, maintained the exist-
ence of God can be known by natural reason. He used five argu-
ments in his attempt to prove his point.

The first argument was derived from the nature of motion: "It
is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things
are in motion. Now, whatever is moved is moved by another, for
nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuahty. But nothing can be reduced from potenti-
ality to actuality except by something in a state of actuahty. Thus
that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially
hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it
is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
potentiality in the same respect, but only in difi^erent respects. For
what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but
it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that
in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both
mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, what-
ever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is
moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by
another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on into in-
finity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequent-
ly, no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inas-
much as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only

454 THOMAS AQUINAS

because it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive
at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands
to be God."i

The second argument was based on causation: "In the world
of sensible things we find there is an order of efficient causes. There
is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is
found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to
itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible
to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order,
the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate
is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause
be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take
away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among ef-
ficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate,
cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity,
there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate
effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly
false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to
which everyone gives the name of God."-

The third argument was founded on the concept of possibility
and necessity: "We find in nature things that are possible to be and
not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to be corrupted,
and consequently, it is possible for them to be and not to be. But
it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which can not-be
at some time is not. Therefore, if everything can not-be, then at one
time there was nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even
now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does
not exist begins to exist only through something already existing.
Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have
been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even
now nothing would be in existence— which is absurd. Therefore,
not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something
the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either
has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible
to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity
caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient
causes. Therefore we cannot but admit the existence of some
being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from

1 Simmta theologica, i, Question 2, Art. 3. From Basic writings of St. Thomas
Aquinas by Anton C. Pegis. Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc.
Copyright 1945 by Random House, Inc.

2 Ibid.

THEOLOGY 455

another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men
speak of as God."^

The fourth argument was based on the concept of gradation:
"Among beings there are some more and some less good, true,
noble, and the like. But more and less are predicated of different
things according as they resemble in their different ways some-
thing which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter accord-
ing as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there
is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and,
consequently, something which is most being, for those things
that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in
Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in
that genus, as fire, which is the maximum of heat is the cause of all
hot things, as is said in the same book. Therefore there must also be
something w^hich is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness,
and every other perfection; and this we call God."^

The fifth argument rested upon the divine government of the
world: "We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural
bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always,
or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.
Hence, it is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but
designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards
an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowl-
edge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. There-
fore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are
directed to their end; and this being we call God."°

Notice that in his arguments for the existence of God Aquinas
did not accept the ontological proof, which he regarded as in-
adequate. The proofs he gave indicate his systematic way of
philosophizing.

After having established the existence of God, Aquinas proceeded
to show what the attributes of God are. We know, for example,
that God is not subject to composition and that he is unchanging.
Hence, there is no potentiality in God; rather, Aquinas made clear,
God is pure actuality or pure form.

Furthermore, God is the same as his essence: "To understand this,
it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the suppositum, for the essence

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.
s Ibid.

456 THOMAS AQUINAS

or nature includes only what falls within the definition of the
species; as humanity includes all that falls within the definition of
man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity
signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter,
with all the individuating accidents, does not fall within the defini-
tion of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this black-
ness or whiteness, etc., do not fall within the definition of a man.
Therefore this flesh, these bones and the accidental qualities desig-
nating this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet
they are included in the reality which is a man. Hence, the reality
which is a man has something in it that humanity does not have.
Consequently, humanity and a man are not wholly identical, but
humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined function as the formal con-
stituent in relation to individuating matter. The situation is different
in things not composed of matter and form, in which individuation
is not due to individual matter— that is to say, to this matter— but
the forms themselves are individuated of themselves. Here it is neces-
sary that the forms themselves should be subsisting siipposita. There-
fore suppositum and nature in them are identified. Since, then, God
is not composed of matter and form, he must be his own Godhead,
his own Life, and whatever else is so predicated of him."''

Aquinas asserted that there is no matter in God, who is a pure
spirit. In a word, God is the source of all perfection. This assertion
raises the problem of providence and evil. Is evil metaphysically
real? Like the Neo-Platonists, Aquinas answered that evil repre-
sents merely a privation of form:

"In action, evil is caused by reason of the defect of some prin-
ciple of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent.
Thus, the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by
reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of chil-
dren, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the
lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the
proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent,
sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter.
It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when
there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the
privation of another form; as for instance, when on the form of fire
there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. There-
fore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more

s Ibid., Question 3, Art. 3.

THEOLOGY 457

perfectly does it impress its own form; so also the more perfectly
does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall
air and water comes from the perfection of the fire, but acci-
dentally; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of
water, but at the introduction of its own form, though by doing this
it also accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the
proper effect of the fire— as, for instance, that it fails to heat— this
comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of
some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the /

matter, which does not receive the action of the fire acting on it. /

But the fact itself that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to /

which it belongs essentially to act. Hence it is true that evil in no
way has any but an accidental cause.""

All this does not invalidate God's providence. In this way Aquinas
turned against the ancient philosophers, especially Democritus,
whom, however, he did not interpret correctly, for he ascribed
the doctrine of chance to the Greek Atomist.

"We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine
providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual
being. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an
end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the
causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the
effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference
toward the end, because the effect comes from some other cause
outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, who is
the first agent, extends to all beings not only as to the constituent
principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles;
not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible.
Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily
directed by God towards the end. . . ."^

Unhke Augustine, Aquinas did not emphasize the divine will;
rather, he asserted that God does not act in an arbitrary manner but
that God's actions are determined by his goodness. As the cause
of all Being, Aquinas continued, God created the world, which was
made out of ?iothmg. In other words, all species were produced at
once, a conclusion which Darwin attacked in his theory of evolu-
tion. It is a mistake to assume, according to Aquinas, that God was
affected by the act of creation, for he remained the same in his per-
fection and majesty. It may now be asked why God created the

■^ Ibid., Question 49, Art. i.
^ ibid., Question 22, Art. 2.

458 THOMAS AQUINAS

world. What was his goal? Aquinas answered that it was an expres-
sion of his goodness. Through this act God established a definite
purpose, namely, the vision of his own perfection.

The skeptic may inquire why there are so many gradations in the
universe and why there are so many forms of life. Again Aquinas
has a ready answer. He believed that in this manner creation was
more diversified and exemplified the various aspects of the divine
nature. Creation itself shows the generosity of God, who certainly
was not obliged to make every man equal.

Regarding the eternity of the world, Aquinas refused to accept
the Aristotelian viewpoint. Yet, he asserted, reason can neither
prove nor disprove whether the universe is eternal. Here he relied
on faith, which maintains that matter was created by God.

COSMOLOGY

Most significant in the cosmology of Aquinas was his view of matter

y and form. According to him, ?natter cmmot exist apart jrom form.
Some of the Scholastics had asserted that matter can be autonomous,
but Aquinas felt this really to be a contradiction, for matter, he said,
is undetermined and consequently cannot exist by itself.

The distinction between men and angels, he wrote, lies in the
fact that angels do not have bodies but are pure forms. Men, on
the other hand, contain both matter and form. He rejected the
Franciscan doctrine that man can have several forms. Thus he threw
out the old tradition of Scholasticism which upheld the existence of
a plurality of substantial forms.

In describing the principle of individuation Aquinas made it

clear that ?natter is the principle which distinguishes one individual

tirom another. The imperfection of the universe can be attributed to

/ the resistance of matter to form. We must not interpret Aquinas,

/ however, to state that matter is the metaphysical principle of evil.
Like Aristotle, Aquifias identified jnatter with pote?itiality and form
zvith actuality. The form, then, is the determining principle, since it
represents actuality. Whereas human beings can never be completely
emancipated from potentiality, he maintained, God represents pure
actuality.

\ Aquinas followed Aristotle, too, in his view of space and time.

I Space, he held, cannot be abstracted from the existence of bodies.
He did not accept the doctrine that space is infinite, for this would
have been contrary to Christian theology. He showed time to be de-
pendent on motion; and he made it clear that time, Hke space, is

DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL 459

finite. Still, he was certain, the human concept of time differs from
that of God, in whom past, present, and future are comprehended
simultaneously.

DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL

In his concept of the soul Aquinas brought about a simplification in
medieval philosophy. Unlike the Neo-Platonists, he did not believe
there are forms which intervene between the soul and the body.
Both are joined in a definite union, he asserted; the body repre-
sents matter or the potential principles of life, whereas the soul
represents the form or the actual principles of life. The union of the
soul and the body is not merely accidental. It is needed for complete
activity in man. By the term soul Aquinas referred not merely to
man's intellectual capacities but to all his vital activities. Because of
his possession of a soul, Aquinas declared, man is a rational crea-
ture. The soul, consequently, is the director of the body and su-
perior to it. However, it depends on the body for its operations,
and the body influences its outlook and activities.

Aquinas made a sharp distinction between three types of soul:|
first, the vegetative soul, which governs plant life; second, the sensi-j|
tive soul, which governs animal life; and third, the rational soul,i
which dominates human life. The rational soul is the highest manif es- ^
tation of life, since it represents the supremacy of mtellect over
matter.

Aquinas was not very much concerned about animal life. He
taught that animals exist for the sake of man, who is the highest
member of creation. He did not favor cruelty to animals, not so
much out of respect for animal life but, rather, because he desired
to prevent any type of callousness on the part of human beings.
Aquinas lacked the lyrical feeling of Francis, who regarded all parts
of creation as symbols of God's providence.

Aquinas explained that while the soul of man is one and while it
possesses unity, it is distinguished by several faculties. Thus, he
enumerated the faculties of locomotion, nutrition, sensation, reason,
and appetite, which includes man's will. That the soul is immaterial
he accepted without question. He bolstered his argument by point-
ing to the fact that we are able to know immaterial things, and
that man's ideas possess not merely a relative but a universal neces-
sity. With vigor he attacked the philosophers who asserted that the
soul is corporeal and that it is completely dependent upon bodily
operations.

46o THOMAS AQUINAS

The soul, Aquinas taught, depends only extr'msically upon the
/ body. Consequently he believed in personal immortalit^^

"We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the
human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two
ways— in itself and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any sub-
sistent being to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by
the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and
corruption belong to a thing in the same way that being belongs to
it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. There-
fore, whatever has being in itself cannot be generated or corrupted
except in itself; while things which do not subsist, such as acci-
dents and material forms, acquire being or lose it through the gen-
eration or corruption of composites. Now it was shown above that
the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul
is, so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are
corrupted, while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it
were corrupted in itself. This is impossible, not only as regards the
human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form
alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of the
thing itself is inseparable from it. But being belongs to a form,
which is an act, by virtue of itself. And thus, matter acquires actual
being according as it acquires form; while it is corrupted so far as
the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be
separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent
form to cease to exist."^

Even if we grant that the soul is composed of matter and form,
Aquinas continued, its incorruptibility must still be maintained.

"For corruption is found only where there is contrariety, since
generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries.
Therefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject
to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety
in the intellectual soul; for it is a receiving subject according to
the manner of its being, and those things which it receives are with-
out contrariety. Thus, the notions even of contraries are not them-
selves contrary, since contraries belong to the same science. There-
fore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. "^"^

Furthermore, our desire for immortaUty cannot be in vain.
Aquinas almost anticipated Unamuno's argument in The tragic sejise
of life:

^ Ibid., Question 75, Art. 6.
10 Ibid.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 461

"Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that every-
thing naturally aspires to being after its own manner. Now, in
things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The
senses indeed do not know being, except under the conditions of
here and now, wheireas the intellect apprehends being absolutely,
and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally
desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. There-
fore every intellectual substance is incorruptible."^^

Following Christian theology, Aquinas stressed the reality of
resurrection. Thus, the soul which survives after death will ulti-
mately be reunited with the body. Incidentally, he did not accept
the Neo-Platonic view of the emanation of the soul, for he believed
that it is created by God.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In all his theories Aquinas was guided by the view that the realms
of reason and faith are not opposed to each other. In fact, a com-
plete harmony exists between the two, he declared, and reason can
be helpful in establishing the foundations of Christian philosophy.
Still, he thought the human mind is limited; thus a rational dem-
onstration is inadequate in proving the resurrection, the incarna-
tion, and the atonement. Reason, he was sure, cannot disprove the
essential facts of the Christian faith, for he contended that Christian
dogmas are completely consistent and that they represent God's
revelation.

In a sense we have a two-way passage in Aquinas. On the one
hand we have reason, which starts with man and ultimately reaches
God. On the other hand we have faith, which starts with the
revelation of God and is supported by man's rational capacities.

The sciences were classified by Aquinas into three parts: (1)
physical; (2) mathematical; (3) jfietaphysical. Of these three, he
was mostly concerned with metaphysics, which represents the
highest degree of abstraction.

In Aquinas' works philosophy is distinguished from theology be-
cause of its use of reason. Philosophy depends upon systematic dem- \
onstrations, while theology uses the method of faith. Still, there is
no absolute division of the two fields, for all knowledge is a unified
whole. Theology Aquinas likewise divided into two fields: natural
theology, which relies on reason; and revealed theology, which uses
the method of faith.

" Ibid.

4b THOMAS AQUtNAS

In his doctrine <rf kowdet^e. Aqnans ^gs « rr.,c;ri:;
He did not agree with Haro that mirrersak hare an ob ; . :
ence in natnte. bi dus cooDHXiQa he idiaEsed to aocep:
essences^ He tangiic dot: muveisak exist in doee 'vn r
causes in the miod of God {amie remi); second, as : : :
human mind (post wern^; thiidL, as the essence of thine.-
Notice how Aqoinas tried to mediate between extreme
and extreme realism. He did this by showii^ that mi: .
Tarioos meanmgs when a^^ilied to G<idL man. and natnrf

FoJloxring- AT^wdc. Aquinas ihdt that science is coe.: ; rr ; .
miirersal ess^c . ~ -js. kno\rkd^ is coiioe|itnaL Cono^cs. how-
ever. i~; ~:: ; rr* "t "~r ~""~ "~ ~~m uiih nnmateTri ~~r_':>~

Acc:r; ■_ : ■ :-: - '^•r-fUmg that zre

- .- . ^. ■; ::;j;s> ;: - ■ :i3e StaitS w-:~ ; .:-

it > ir Aqimias h

: Franciscan

~-il view erf the

:a. It is rr.e r^

view wfaidi .- ... ; nee bdieves knowl-
edge is best I : : Jiinicsiar qualities.
Xof does mc . ... >r immaterial Being,
which it disc :i\-sical heritage.

ETHICS 463

ETHICS

The ethical system of Aquinas w as based on his consideration of
the highest Good. He beheved this impossible of achievement in our
present existence, ^^'e must \\ait for the Be\'ond, he taught, in
which we can arrive at a complete vision of God.

Unlike the classical morahsts, he emphasized the superiority of
theological virtues. He had much to say on the subject of faith.
\\Tiile he was tolerant regarding unbelievers and advocated associa-
tion with them provided one's faith was not corrupted, he was
sharp in his denunciation of heretics. He thought that heretics
should be excommunicated and, if they persisted in their errors and
if all hope for their conversion was in vain, put to death as a tirring
punishment. Death should not be intiicted directly b\- the Church
bur through secular judges, who would see to it that the heretics
received their just pimishment.

Aquinas maintained that the foundation oi virtue is charity,
which, to him, meant more than philanthropy, for it stood for the
spirit of love. The love for God comes rirst, he affirmed, and all
other things are to be subordinated to it. His concept of love, how-
ever, was not absolute since it did not include heretics.

Because asceticism played a strong role in the moral system of
Aquinas, he agreed with Augustine that cehbacy is to be preferred
to marriage. .Married Hfe. thus, in his opinion is inferior to a monastic
existence.

Aquinas had a profound ettect on later ages through his assertion
that matrimony cannot be dissolved, for, he believed, the dissolu-
tion of marriage not only destroys civil societA- but is an act against
God. He asserted that monogamy is a natural condition for man.
Incidentally, he advanced strong arguments against birth control.
In the family, the father is to be supreme, he declared. As can be
seen, Aquinas' views are representative of the patriarchal spirit of the
Middle Ages.

Regarding freedom of the Mill, he asserted that man is in a dif-
ferent position from God, for God, being the source of all good-
ness, cannot choose evil. Man, on the other hand, is constantly per-
plexed by various alternatives. We are caught by material desires
and frequently are in doubt as to the end of life. We choose things
which are inferior and lead us away from God. We can gain com-
plete freedom, he advised, by choosing those things \\hich promote
our eternal happiness and approximate the divine nature.

464 THOMAS AQUINAS

Aquinas was emphatic in his view that the humaii will is not
determined by external thi?7gs. It is up to us, he averred, to choose
among various alternatives. When we elect superficial and vain
goals, we become eligible for the punishment which is connected
with such action.

In his moral theory Aquinas exhibited an intellectual inclination,
for he believed that the end of man is to know God. This knowl-
edge can be acquired through reason, revelation, or intuition. He
almost omitted a discussion of intuition; consequently, he did not
believe in the illumination of the soul. He felt the intellect to be
more significant than the will. Through the intellect we attain cer-
tainty, whereas the will reniains subject to change.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Aquinas, whose political philosophy is representative of 13th-cen-
tury thought, stressed morality as an ideal of statehood. His theories,
which may seem Utopian to the modern reader, were influenced by
the accomplishments of Innocent III, probably the greatest of the
medieval Popes.

To Aquinas, the origin of the state was inseparably linked with
the social nature of man, and from Aristotle he borrowed the de-
scription of man as a political animal. Since man is not equipped
by nature for self-preservation, in the same manner as are animals,
he can only attain the goals of his existence in conjunction with
others.

Social authority, Aquinas contended, is therefore grounded in the
very nature of man and is derived from God. There would have
been a state and society even if man had not been expelled from
Paradise.

The state, in Aquinas' teaching, is based upon the organization of
the family, which owes its origin to a God-implanted instinct. The
family is the primary social organism and existed before the com-
munity. Essentially, the family is a permanent, unchangeable in-
stitution, since it both rests upon the supernatural will and satisfies
"natural" needs.

Behind Aquinas' political theories there is therefore a certain kind
of historical perspective, although historical knowledge was limited
in the Middle Ages. For instance, one supposition which the writers
of the Middle Ages accepted as a factual basis for their theories, and
Aquinas was no exception, pertained to the life of man in Paradise,
when he was free from the guilt of original sin.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 465

To the writers of Aquinas' time, history began with the highest,
noblest, and most satisfying existence, while history as we know
it started with the "brutish" life of savages.^^ At the outset of any
genetic study, the medieval student found himself confronted with
the inspiring ideal of Paradise, offering him hope for future salva-
tion. The modern student, however, finds himself disillusioned when
he starts to study history; he begins to realize that although man has
come a long way from the illiterate primitive with his totem and
taboo, we are still bound to preliterate culture forms in many in-
stances.

After the expulsion from Paradise, according to medieval writers,
man encountered anarchy, division, and disunity. But through group
organization he guaranteed a better hfe and established security.
The nations, then, which existed before the Christian revelation
were merely training grounds and experiments in human organiza-
tion. Only in the Christian state, guided by the teachings of the
Church and faithful to her leaders and doctrines, did man reach
an approximation to the happiness of Paradise.

Besides this historical background, which we must take into ac-
count in any consideration of Aquinas' political philosophy, there
must be a correlation of his poHtical and other philosophic theories.
Society, according to Thomistic ethics, cannot be all-powerful and
coercive. The state cannot be an impersonal organism dominating
everything, for its raison d'etre lies primarily in the service which
it performs for the welfare of the human being.

Again, a theoretical question emerges. Is the state a real Being?
No, Aquinas would have emphatically answered. And he would
have been supported by the legal theorists. They defined the state
as a collection of individuals, in short, as a fictitious entity. The
pluraHstic philosophy of Scholasticism denied that the universal is a
veritable thing and maintained that the "only real beings are indi-
vidual beings." Accordingly, Aquinas asserted, the city or the state
has no real entity outside the individuals composing it. The indi-
vidual possesses unity, while the universal possesses reality only in
so far as it is composed of individual substances.

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

According to Aquinas, there are four kinds of laws: (i) the eternal,
(2) the natural, (3) the divine, and (4) the human law. There must
be an undeviating canon or maxim for the whole of creation— the
^- C/. Gilson, The spirit of medieval philosophy, pp. 389-390.

466 THOMAS AQUINAS

Eternal Law, a blueprint according to which the world is created
and governed. In its essence this law cannot be comprehended by ra-
tional man. Its imprint can be reflected in the natural law, which
causes all created beings to seek a life compatible with their endow-
ments; to seek good and to avoid evil; and to preserve their lives.
The natural law supplies the human being with inalienable rights
which are his by the very nature of things, such as the right to beget
children and to live in society.

While natural law is common to all people, Aquinas thought, di-
vine law is the prerogative and priceless heritage of the Christian.
He declared it could be identified with the revelation of religion,
with those celestial mysteries and miracles which the Christian re-
ceives through the grace of God and which natural law would never
have found. Thus, the Ten Commandments are products of the
divine law.

Finally, Aquinas concluded his classification of laws with human
law, which he divided into jus gentium and jus civile. Human law,
he explained, represents natural law applied to specific cases. For
example, according to natural law it is wrong to commit murder,
but it is up to human law to provide appropriate punishments, vary-
ing according to customs and circumstances. Human law has no au-
thority to contradict natural law or to violate fundamental prin-
ciples of conduct. Such usurpation, in Aquinas' opinion, would upset
the whole scheme of cosmic government.

The power of civil authority is to be limited specifically, he
averred, in so far as certain fundamental rights of citizens are con-
cerned. The life and property of free men must be strictly respected
by the rulers. In the same way, slaves and Jews should be safe-
guarded in so far as they, too, enjoy the protection of the natural
law. Thus, children of Jews should not be baptized without the per-
mission of their parents. Any such action would run counter to
the natural right of a father to decide for his offspring. The higher
realm of natural law has ascendancy and priority over positive
human legislation in Aquinas' legal theory. Only the laws that spring
out of the rational will of the lawgiver are valid, but if they are
decided by mere caprice or arbitrary decision they become symp-
toms and instruments of injustice. The king, therefore, cannot do
just as he likes, for his laws are supposed to substantiate justice.

This insistence upon the claims of justice was a fundamental fea-
ture of legal theorizing in the Middle Ages. Canon, feudal, and civil
lawyers agreed that laws were superior to political authority and

POLITICAL AIMS 467

that the king was bound to observe them. The sacred character of
law corresponded to the awe with which the masses regarded the
dogmas of the Church.

TYPES OF GOVERNMENT

Thomas Aquinas divided governments into six types, which he fur-
ther classified as being good or bad, just or unjust. The three types
of bad government he found in demagogy, oligarchy, and tyranny,
while he considered the polity (restrictive democracy), aristocracy,
and monarchy good types.

He preferred monarchy to the others because he regarded it as
being consonant with the laws of nature and the idea that one God
rules the world. The government by one ruler, he insisted, is best
equipped to effect unity and peace and avoid incessant quarreling.
But an arbitrary and oppressive ruler administers the worst type.

However, Aquinas held tyrannicide unallowable. The people
have three alternatives when they are ruled by an arbitrary dictator:
(i) they may depose him legally by electing somebody else; (2)
they may appeal to a higher authority; (3) they may wait for the
help of God. Certainly, his antirevolutionary attitude is indicative of
the Scholastic mind. It vividly manifests the belief in the immediate
government of the world by God as the source of all justice and
as the eternal judge who punishes tyrants for their misdeeds.

In order to prevent tyranny Aquinas, following Aristotle, be-
lieved that a limited mo?iarchy might be advisable. It would lead to
the active participation of the aristocrats, he felt, and the common
people would have a share in the government and be attentive to
the maintenance of peace. In other words, by giving the people a
limited voice in the government, the government could be assured
of a more permanent existence.

POLITICAL AIMS

According to Aquinas, the aim of both the society and the indi-
vidual must be the same in that they should each seek to attain
eternal beatitude and the vision of God. The state can only in-
directly contribute to the attainment of eternal blessedness, since
the Church, as the dispenser of the sacraments and as the visible
institution of salvation, brings the individual into touch with the
supernatural realm. Life on earth is directed towards the existence
Beyond, and the state's task and responsibility is to prepare earthly
conditions for heavenly happiness.

468 THOMAS AQUINAS

Specifically, Aquinas held, the fulfillment of peace must be the
chief endeavor of the state. The ruler must provide for a vigorous
defense against external foes and also maintain the unity of the gov-
ernment in internal matters. Peace, thus, means the same to the
state as health means to the body. But war in certain cases is per-
missible, provided hostilities are initiated and carried on by the au-
thority of the sovereign, who has both a just cause to defend and
the intention of destroying evil.

Aquinas, in discussing the controversial war question, was far less
Utopian than earlier writers. There was no doubt in his mind that
wars can have beneficial results and that one who dies for a just
cause can partake of eternal happiness. However, he pointed out, the
clerics should not be permitted to participate in military operations
because of the sanctity of their ofRce and the dangerous conse-
quences which active warfare undoubtedly would have for their
moral attitude.

The question emerges now— and it is one that has tormented many
religious consciences— regarding moral standards in wartime, How
can we reconcile the lofty commands and mandates of the Bible
with the slaughter and bloodshed of military campaigns? Aquinas
partially accepted the disparity between the ethical provisions of
everyday hfe and wartime morals. It is permissible for the soldier to
kill, according to Aquinas, if he acts under the command of his
ruler and if the welfare of the whole group demands the death of
the enemy. If the soldier is motivated, on the other hand, by mere
personal feelings, or if he just wants to enrich himself, he is guilty
of a grave sin. The opposing parties are bound by the same solemn
moral obligations in war as in peace. They cannot break a promise
or be dishonest. Yet, to conceal one's true intention is permissible,
Aquinas contended, since this is part of the art of war and does not
violate the laws of justice. If we read the second part of the Simnna
theologica correctly, we can be sure that Thomas Aquinas would
scarcely have been in favor of the treaty-breaking we have witnessed
in our own days.

Consonant with the ritualistic spirit of the Middle Ages, Aquinas
believed that even in wartime the sacred holidays of the Church
are to be observed, as well as the customary prayers and other essen-
tial religious devotions. But in extreme emergencies, even on sacred
holidays, battles may take place.

Another task of the state, he wrote, consists in the supply of
material necessities for its citizens. This does not mean that the needy

MORALITY AND THE STATE 469

should live off the state but that they should secure the help of
their fellow citizens to prevent suffering and starvation. Further-
more, when a ruler founds a new city, he is to be very careful in
selecting the locality and environment. A temperate climate and a
fertile agricultural region are ideal for city development.

The state, Aquinas held, cannot take a laissez-faire attitude with
regard to economic conditions but is obliged to maintain justice in
economic relations as well as in legal matters. The ruler preferably
should possess great wealth so that he may not be tempted to tax
the people except under constitutional provisions and in times of
great public danger. Also, the ruler is obliged to select suitable sites
for schools and universities and to encourage and provide for a
comprehensive system of education.

Aquinas found it characteristic of tyrants that they tend to sup-
press culture ruthlessly in order to prevent overthrow of their
regime. Thus, even in the Middle Ages learned writers understood
the positive correlation existing between tyranny and ignorance.

MORALITY AND THE STATE

The immediate responsibihty of civil authority, Aquinas taught, lies
in the encouragement and protection of the virtuous life of the
citizens. For this purpose laws are instituted, not only to prevent
evil but also to inspire real ethical behavior. The state is to be a
righteous guardian and a moral policeman. Aquinas condemned the
wild desire for pleasure that makes citizens effeminate and brings
about a general disintegration of propriety and rectitude. In this re-
spect he was one with the founders of New England.

Religion and morals were tied closely together in the Middle
Ages, and thus we understand Aquinas' belief that the moral be-
havior of the people could be fully developed only if the ruler re-
spected and obeyed the representatives of religion and adhered
strictly to the laws of the Church. It was the mission of the king
to punish heretics and all those who violated the sanctuaries of the
faith.

Aquinas took it for granted that the ultimate success of a ruler
depends upon his moral virtues. The mark of a good sovereign is
that he surpasses all in the excellence of his character. Wisdom,
Aquinas averred, is especially useful for the sovereign, since the
art of government requires most of all the use of reason. Next, the
ruler should distinguish himself by a superior sense of justice and
be imbued with a sincere fear of God and deference to the moral

470 THOMAS AQUINAS

laws. He should be temperate and chaste in his way of living and
avoid, as a matter of course, any deeds of profanation, greediness,
and impetuosity. What should be the incentive of the good sov-
ereign? Neither honor nor glory should satisfy him, because he will
reap the most valuable rewards in heaven.

Just as the position of the ruler in the state resembles the power of
God over the universe, Aquinas declared, so the good king receives
a more ample consideration from God than does the ordinary man.
But the tyrant will be held accountable for his misdeeds by God
and is certain to suffer a heavier punishment than the ordinary man.

John of Salisbury, in his Polycraticus, had compared the govern-
ment of mankind to an organism in which the priests are the soul,
the prince is the head, and the senate is the heart. Just as John of
Salisbury elevated the power of the priest, so Thomas Aquinas
placed the ecclesiastical state above the worldly state, because man
aims primarily at the attainment of God.

THE CHURCH

Thus in his religious philosophy Aquinas maintained that we can-,
not be saved without the intercession of the Church. The sacra-
ments of the Church are valid, regardless of the moral qualities of
the priest. They have two main purposes: first, to perfect man in
the worship of God; and second, to prevent sin. He held that all
the seven sacraments are necessary for salvation. Thus baptism
governs the beginning of life, confirmation stands for man's growth,
and the eiicharist preserves the strength and spirit of man. Our
sins are healed in two ways. By pe?ia?ice, though which we repent
our wickedness, and by extreme u?iction, through which we pre-
pare ourselves for eternal life. Furthermore, the sacraments have
a social meaning. Ordination stands for the spiritual power of the
priesthood, whereas marriage represents "not only a sacrament but
an ordinance of nature." It indicates that we are aware of the
divine governance of human reproduction.

In his religious philosophy Aquinas stressed the work of Jesus
Christ. He showed how Christ serves as the mediator between
man and God, and how through him forgiveness of sins, deliver-
ance from Satan, and reconciliation with God are possible. In imitat-
ing Christ, man is not following a negative rule of Ufe; rather, he is
perfecting himself in the love of God and in complete spirituality.
Can this spirituality be attained outside the Church.^ Can we achieve
complete bliss apart from Catholicism? Aquinas answered in the

THE CHURCH 471

negative. Grace, he declared, is given not to the individual but to
Christ as the head of the Church. It is administered by the priests,
who are the representatives of God on earth.

In this way Aquinas defended the spirit of orthodoxy. In his work
we find a complete formulation of Catholic philosophy. Avoiding
any extremes, he was conscious of both God and man, of the body
and the soul, of the intellect and the will, of reason and revelation.
He built a bridge between these realms because he felt that the
universe is governed by divine purposes.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Relate the salient events of Thomas Aquinas' life.

2. How did Aquinas defend the existence of God?

3. Describe the epistemological views of Aquinas.

4. What is the role of teleology in the system of Aquinas?

5. Why did Aquinas believe in the immortality of the soul?

6. Describe the traits of the ideal ruler according to Aquinas.

7. How did Aquinas defend the sacraments of the Church?

8. What were the ethical doctrines of Aquinas? What is your own
evaluation of them?

9. What was his attitude toward heretics?

10. What were the scientific views of Aquinas?

OPPONENTS OF AQUINAS

BASIS OF OPPOSITION

pposition to the philosophy of Aquinas was based on both
philosophical and personal reasons. Since Aquinas was a Dominican,
many Franciscans naturally had a dislike for his views. We find that
in 1277 the philosophy of Aquinas was condemned in Paris. The op-
position was even stronger in England, and at Oxford his philosophy
was almost outlawed.

Philosophically, the antagonism was so great because of the in-
tellectualisrn of Aquinas. In general, he was little interested in intu-
ition, for he did not believe in an inner light through which man
can achieve certain knowledge. Refusing to accept the Augustinian
system of epistemology, he relied mainly upon Aristotle's descrip-
tion of knowledge. Many thinkers believed that Aquinas depended
too much on the Greek thinker and that he had introduced alien
and inconsistent elements into the Christian faith. In rejecting the
doctrine of substantial forms, he had negated the basis of much of
earlier Scholasticism.

Another reason for the opposition was the rationalistic approach
of Aquinas. Throughout the Middle Ages many scholars followed

472

HENRY OF GHENT 473

St. Bernard and believed that faith is to be accepted as the starting
point of all human endeavor. Philosophy, thus, was viewed as an in-
significant subject which could not contribute anything to the per-
fection of religion. In their opinion, Aquinas had relied too much on
natural theology and not enough on guidance by the concepts of
revelation. Still, the philosophy of Aquinas triumphed, and in 1323
Pope John XXII canonized him.

What were the reasons for his victory? Why has his system be-
come the official philosophy of the Catholic Church? There are
several answers to explain Aquinas' great popularity.

First of all, the dominance of Aquinas was due to his systematic
presentation. To read his works is to receive an impression of order,
simplicity, and truly encyclopedic knowledge. Even those who dis-
agree with him are struck, generally, by his objectivity and his
fairness in handling controversial problems.

Another reason was the orthodoxy of Aquinas. He did not believe
that man alone can find God, but that the intercession of the Church
is absolutely necessary. He gave a clear formulation to the sacra-
mental system and throughout his life defended the powers of the
papacy.

Another trait which increased his popularity was his modera-
tion. Thus, while he beheved asceticism to be the best way of life,
he had an understanding of the problems of matrimony and made
the family system central in his ethical philosophy.

Furthermore, there was a humanistic element in his system. This
does not imply that he believed man the center of hfe; on the con-
trary, he regarded God as the source and end of all Being. Still, he
was aware of the physical and spiritual needs of human nature.

In addition, Aquinas' starting point was empirical. Thus, his theo-
ries later on could be combined with the researches of modern sci-
ence. Consequently he became the patron saint of the Neo-Scho-
lastic movement which in the 20th century added new vitahty to
Catholic philosophy.

The philosophers who followed Aquinas modified his theories.
Many, like Duns Scotus (c. 1 266-1 308), rejected the fundamentals
of his belief, yet almost all of them remained faithful to the Catholic
Church.

HENRY OF GHENT

The life story of Henry of Ghent (died 1293) indicates that he was
a prominent member of the university of Paris. He taught theology

474 OPPONENTS OF AQUINAS

and in many ways modified the theories of Aquinas. He was more
Augustinian than Aquinas and stated that final truth can be found
only through the divine light which is infused by God into the
human mind.

As a voluntarist, Henry of Ghent was opposed to the intellectual-
ism of Aquinas. The intellect, he felt, is passive whereas the will is
constantly active; consequently, the will is master of the intellect.

GODFREY OF FONTAINES

Godfrey of Fontaines, like Henry of Ghent, taught theology in
Paris, where he was regarded as an outstanding member of the
faculty. He was interested not merely in philosophy but also in law,
and he was active in political life. Although supporting the Thomist
philosophy when it was condemned by the ecclesiastical authorities
in Paris, he was not an unqualified supporter of Aquinas.

Unlike Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines believed the will
to be subordinate to the intellect. He thought that the will is com-
pletely dependent upon man's reason and inevitably conditioned
by his understanding.

In his concept of individuation, he opposed the views of Aquinas
that it can be found in matter. It is due, Godfrey suggested, to the
substantial form. Aquinas had asserted God can know individuals,
but Godfrey felt God knows only species, which, however, give
him a clear knowledge of all particular things.

JOHN PECKHAM

Peckham was one of the foremost opponents of the philosophy of
Aquinas. A student of Bonaventura, he taught at the university of
Paris and later at Oxford. In 1279 he became archbishop of Canter-
bury.

Following earlier Scholasticism, Peckham maintained that the soul
is composed of both matter and form. He believed in the doctrine
of the plurahty of substantial forms and refused to accept the sim-
plified theory of Aquinas, who, as we remember, had rejected the
view that a plurality of forms exists.

In his epistemology Peckham asserted man has a direct knowledge
of God. He stressed the reality of divine illumination. We can
have certainty in knowledge, he declared, for intuition, which is
part of the grace of God, is entirely reliable.

Like Henry of Ghent, Peckham felt the will to be superior to
the intellect. Consequently, he was more concerned with man's

RAYMOND LULLY 475

emotions and actions than with his knowledge. To find God, then,
man's character is more significant than his philosophical under-
standing.

As a fervent opponent of Aquinas, Peckham boasted that at a
public disputation he had defeated him and won an acknowledg-
ment of error. Others, however, point out the falsity of this state-
ment—Aquinas had merely shown immense self-control in not being
belligerent when attacked by Peckham.

RICHARD OF MIDDLETON

Richard of Middleton also taught theology at Paris. A member of
the Franciscan order, he later went to Naples to take charge of the
education of the son of Charles II. He tried to combine the philos-
ophies of Bonaventura and Aquinas. In his own philosophy he
followed the earlier Scholasticism in identifying the soul with its
faculties, but he adhered to Aquinas in not accepting the ontological
argument for the existence of God and in rejecting the doctrine of
seminal reasons.

In his epistemology he opened the door to nominalism for, he
asserted, universals do not have an objective existence in nature,
and only individuals are real. Science, consequently, cannot give us
a picture of immaterial things, for science deals with abstractions.
However, this nominalistic view of science did not undermine Rich-
ard's faith, for he believed man, through intuition and reliance on
faith, can find God.

RAYMOND LULLY

Raymond LuUy was born c. 1235. He was an excellent student of
Arabic, and his main ideal was to convert the Mohammedans to
Christianity and to extinguish the Averrhoist heresy. He was a
teacher at Paris and also a missionary to Mohammedan countries.
Durmg one of his missionary endeavors in 13 15, he was stoned to
death by Mohammedans.

In LuUy the rationalistic ideal was dominant. Reason, he believed,
could prove the truths of the Catholic doctrines and show all other
philosophies and religions to be based on falsehood. He opposed the
view of Averrhoes that something can be true in philosophy but
false in religion. On the contrary, he felt that the realm of faith
and revelation cannot be separated from that of natural theology.

Historically, he is important because he tried to reduce philosophy
to a system of logical principles. He developed a logical machine,

476 OPPONENTS OF AQUINAS

which represented his faith that ideas can be manipulated through
geometrical letters and that mathematical concepts represent the
principles of reality.

Later, Leibniz in many ways tried to do the same by developing
a universal method for philosophy. Since LuUy, philosophers have
attempted to use mathematical symbols as the keys to reality and
in this way get away from the vicissitudes of Unguistic conventions.

AVERRHOISM

Throughout the 13th and 14th centuries the faithful philosophers
fought a bitter war with the Averrhoist doctrines. The Averrhoists
felt they had interpreted more faithfully the original meaning of
Aristotle than had the Scholastics, and they frequently arrived at
conclusions which could not be combined with the dogmas of Chris-
tianity. Among their principles we find especially the view that
philosophy and theology are separate sciences and that reason is
superior to faith. Certain principles, they claimed, may be taught
to the masses, who will accept them on the basis of authority, but
philosophers will exhibit their independence in discussing and ex-
plaining the principles of reality. Unlike the Scholastics, they did
not believe reason and faith to be consistent. In this way, they shat-
tered the foundation of medieval certainty.

Generally, in their philosophy the Averrhoists adhered to deter-
ministic principles. Not only do celestial beings influence the crea-
tures on earth, they averred, but man's moral actions cannot be
explained on the basis of free will. Mainly, they tried to give a
scientific explanation of ethical ideals and thus negated the indeter-
ministic view of the Scholastics.

Much opposition was caused, also, by their rejection of personal
immortality. Following Averrhoes, whom they regarded as an in-
spired prophet, they beHeved only the active intellect to be im-
mortal. Since the active intellect is truly universal and does not con-
tain any taint of individuality, when we die personal desires and
personal feelings are obliterated. This view, to some extent, antici-
pated the Spinozistic doctrine of immortahty.

Just as heretical as its doctrine of immortality was the Averrhoist
doctrine of creation. Accepting the eternity of the universe and
believing in emanation, the Averrhoists in their world-view negated
the BibUcal foundation of Scholasticism. Thus they limited the
power of God and generally adhered to an impersonal rather than
a personalistic philosophy.

DUNS SCOTUS 477

The outstanding philosopher of this group was Siger of Brabant,
who M^as a Master of Arts at the university of Paris. His philosophy
was the object of frequent attacks by the orthodox Scholastics. The
Inquisition was concerned with his teachings, and in 1277 he was
forbidden to instruct the students at Paris. His appeal to Rome was
in vain. He died very tragically, assassinated by one of his own
students.

Siger, one of the outstanding commentators on Aristotle, felt that
Aquinas had misunderstood the meaning of the Greek thinker. Fol-
lowing the Aristotelian philosophy, Siger showed that the universe
is eternal and personal immortality merely an illusion.

DUNS SCOTUS

One of the most learned of medieval philosophers was Duns Scotus,
who, like Siger of Brabant, was critical of Aquinas but remained
within the bounds of orthodoxy. We know only a few facts about
his life. Some beheve he was born in 1266; others, in 1274. Scotland
is thought to have been his birthplace. He became an eminent teacher
at Oxford, where he remained for some time, and then he changed his
residence and went to Paris. Afterwards he instructed at Cologne,
where he died in 1308.

Although Duns Scotus passed away while he was still quite young,
he produced a multitude of books. The best-known of them are his
commentary on Peter Lombard, the Opus Oxojiiense, and the Re-
portata Parisieiisia. In his philosophy, he narrowed the domain of
reason and, instead, stressed the essential supremacy of faith.

In Scotus we find an emphasis on a priori principles. Being inter-
ested in mathematics, he held that only a priori demonstrations can
give us certainty. A posteriori arguments, on the other hand, he
regarded as less significant, for they establish merely probabilit>''
instead of certainty. In his theory of knowledge he asserted that
thought represents an external reality. Thus he opposed a skeptical
philosophy.

Duns Scotus showed, first, that certainty can be gained through
the understanding of universal principles:

"With reference to certitude of principles I say this: that the
terms of principles known through themselves have such an identity,
that one term known evide?itly includes the other necessarily; and
therefore the understanding compounding those terms, from the
fact that it apprehends them, has in itself the necessary cause of the
conformity of that act of compounding to the terms themselves of

478 OPPONENTS OF AQUINAS

which the composition is, and likewise the evident cause of that con-
formity; and therefore, that conformity is evident to it necessarily.
. . . But this conformity of composition to terms is the truth of
cojnposition: therefore, the composition of such terms can not stand
unless there is truth, and thus the perception of that composition
and the perception of terms can not stand, unless the perception of
conformity of composition to terms stands and thus the perception
of truth, for the first percepts obviously include the perception of
that truth."^

Second, certainty can be gained through experience: "Concern-
ing the second type of knowables, namely concerning things known
through experience, I say that although experience is not had of all
singulars, but of a large number, and that although it is not always
had, but in a great many cases, still one who knows by experience
knows infalHbly that it is thus, and that it is always thus, and that
it is thus in all, and he knows this by the following proposition re-
posing in the soul, whatever occurs as in a great many things fro?n
some cause which is not free, is the natural effect of that cause,
which proposition is known to the understanding, even though it
had accepted the terms of it from erring senses; for a cause zvhich
is not free can not produce as in a great many things, an effect to the
opposite of which it is ordered, or to which it is not ordered by its
form: but a casual cause is ordered to the producing of the opposite
of the casual effect or to not producing it; therefore, nothing is the
casual cause in respect to an effect produced frequently by it, and if
it is not free, it is a natural cause.

"That, however, this effect occurs by such a cause, producing as
in a great 7nany cases, this must be learned through experience; for
to discover such a nature at one time with such an accident, at an-
other with such another accident, it must be discovered that, how-
soever great might be the diversity of such accidents, such an effect
always followed that nature; therefore, such an effect follows not
through some accident accidentally of that nature, but through the
very nature in itself."-

Third, certainty can be gained through our actions: "And as there
is certitude concerning waking as concerning something known
through itself, so likewise of many other actions which are in our
power, as that I understand, that I hear, and thus of others which

1 Comnientaria Oxoniensia ad iv. libros uhtgistri sententiarmn (McKeon, Se-
lections jroni medieval philosophers, ii, pp. 324-325).
^ Ibid., p. 327.

DUNS SCOTUS 479

are perfect acts; for although there is no certitude that I see white
which is located without, either in such a subject or at such a dis-
tance, because an illusion can be caused in the medium or in the
organ and in many other ways, nevertheless there is certitude that I
see, even though an illusion be caused in the organ, which illusion
in the organ seems to be the greatest of illusions, as for example,
when an act is caused in the organ itself, not by a present object, but
such as is made naturally by a present object. And thus the faculty
would have its act, if such an illusion or passion were supposed, and
that would truly be what is called vision there, whether it be action,
or passion, or both. But if the illusion were not caused in the organ
itself, but in something proximate to it, which seems to be the organ,
as, if the illusion were not caused in the concourse of nerves, but if
the impression of the species such as is naturally made by the object
were caused in the eye itself, still sight would see; because such a
species, or what is naturally seen in it, would be seen, for it would
have sufficient distance with respect to the organ of sight, which is
in the concourse of those nerves, as is evident from Augustine in
Book VI O71 the Trinity, chapter 2, because the remains of things
seen, remaining in the eye when the eyes are closed, are seen; and
according to the Philosopher O?? se?ise and the se?ised, because the
fire which is generated by the violent elevation of the eye and which
is multiplied as far as the closed eyelid, is seen; these are true visions,
although they are not the most perfect visions, because there are
here sufficient distances of the species to the principal organ of
sight."=^

In his doctrine of universals Duns Scotus held that while we start
with particulars, science inevitably is concerned with universal
terms. The most important universal term, he maintained, is the con-
cept of Being. Regarding the principle of individuation, he believed
that it is not matter as Aquinas had supposed or substantial forms
as Bonaventura believed, but that it is caused by the "thisness"
(haecceitas) of things. This quality represents an immanent form in
the species.

In Duns Scotus the will plays an important role. He asserted that
the will of God is absolute. A4orality, according to him, is based on
the divine will. We do not gain perfection simply through intellec-
tual knowledge but, rather, through the exercise of our ?noral capac-
ities. He emphasized that action is more significant than contempla-
tion, and he identified action with the will.

3/^>iJ., pp. 329-330.

48o OPPONENTS OF AQUINAS

In every way Duns Scotus rejected the intellectualism of Aquinas.
Since the will commands intelligence, he wrote, both virtue and vice
are connected with our voluntaristic capacities.

To Duns Scotus, God, above all, was the supreme lawgiver. Any
disobedience on man's part is rigorously punished by God. It is not
for us to question the decrees of God; rather, we must without
reservation observe his commandments. Since the will of God is
absolutely free, God could have established any kind of moral order.
For example, he could have legalized murder and made injustice the
law of life. How do we know, then, what is right and what is
wrong.5 How do we understand what is virtuous and what is
wicked? Duns Scotus answered in the traditional way: We must fol-
low the Bible and be guided by the Church.

Can God will anything? Can he establish a universe which is com-
pletely inconsistent? There is only one exception, according to Duns
Scotus. God cannot violate the law of co?itradiction. Thus, in God's
perfection he cannot tolerate other gods. Furthermore, his majesty
demands that all evil actions of man be punished and his good deeds
rewarded.

In his technical philosophy Duns Scotus disagreed with Aquinas
in his view that all created beings, including angels, have both matter
and form. He spoke of various types of matter. Furthermore, he
rejected the view of Aquinas that the existence of God can be based
on the argument from motion.

The main difference between the two philosophers lies not so
much in their technical principles as in their general outlook. Duns
Scotus was a voluntarist. To him, the practical life, the life of action,
was all-important. To Aquinas salvation consisted essentially in an
act of contemplation, whereby man achieves a view of God; to
Scotus salvation was achieved through an act of the will, which he
regarded as far more sublime than contemplation.

Still, we must not minimize the similarities between Scotus and
Aquinas, for both beheved there is no essential difference between
faith and reason, although Scotus narrowed the domain of reason.
Both rejected the Augustinian viewpoint that knowledge consists in
divine illumination; both were opposed to the Averrhoist philosophy
and rejected philosophical skepticism.

What is the permanent significance of Duns Scotus? What is his
essential contribution to philosophy? First, he taught the supremacy
of the will. As is frequently pointed out, in this view he almost
anticipated Immanuel Kant, but it must be remembered that Kant

DUNS SCOTUS 481

believed in the autonomy of morality whereas Duns Scotus prac-
tically returned to Tertullian in emphasizing the majesty of God.
Second, he taught a doctrine of unconditional obedience; what God
commands must be followed by us even though our reason cannot
understand it. Rebellion against the will of God is a great sin. In
Duns Scotus' works God is explained in a far more arbitrary man-
ner than in the system of the other Scholastics.

Third, Duns Scotus narrowed the realm of philosophy. The most
important subject to him, consequently, was theology, which reveals
to us the purposes and goals of life. Theological principles, he
taught, must be accepted on the basis of faith; reason cannot dis-
prove the vahdity of the dogmas of religion. He made it clear, inci-
dentally, that theology is an eminently practical subject, for it shows
how salvation can be attained.

Fourth, Duns Scotus was important as a critic. Frequently he indi-
cated the inadequacy of previous philosophical demonstrations. He
was extremely subtle in his arguments and in his definitions. In fact,
occasionally his writing is so involved and technical that it is very
difficult to understand.

Duns Scotus almost supplied a death blow to Scholasticism. By
narrowing the domain of reason, by pointing out the contradictions
of the previous thinkers, and by making technical thought so com-
plicated that it could be understood only by the few, he narrowed
the entire basis of Scholasticism. More and more, its students felt
this method of philosophy to be merely concerned with the manipu-
lation of words and to lack organic vitality.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What caused the victory of Aquinas' philosophy?

2. Compare and contrast Duns Scotus with Thomas Aquinas.

3. In what ways was Duns Scotus like Bonaventura?

4. How did Duns Scotus describe God? Compare his view of God with
that of Aristotle.

5. What was Duns Scotus' attitude toward intellectualism?

6. Why did Scotus regard theology as a practical science?

7. How did Scotus oppose Skepticism?

8. In what ways did the philosophy of Duns Scotus undermine Scholas-
ticism?

9. Describe the philosophical achievement of Godfrey of Fontaines.

ID. Which thinker do you prefer, Duns Scotus or Thomas Aquinas?
Justify your answer.

ROGER BACON

BACKGROUND

nfortunately we have few reliable facts regarding Roger Bacon's
background and his effect upon his contemporaries.^ Like Abelard,
he suffered for his audacious views, which ran counter to the out-
look of the Church; but his works, unlike those of his great prede-
cessor, caused no storm of indignation in the circles of the orthodox.
This was due to the universal sway of Scholasticism, the dominant
intellectual religion of Bacon's time, which impressed the minds of
his contemporaries.

Bacon's ultimate interests lay somewhere else. For him, meta-
physics and dialectical arguments had a secondary importance. It is
certain that he was by no means the only one who shunned the
subtleties of the Scholastics. However, those who, like him, were
interested in science, in experiments, and in the exact observation of
nature were in the minority. Still, it would be a mistake to think that
the men who devoted all their time to science were persecuted by
the Church for their experimentations. They were regarded as char-

1 Cf. Charles, Roger Bacon: sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines; Roger Bacon
essays, edited by A. G. Little.
482

LIFE AND WORKS 483

latans and magic workers rather than as enemies of the established
faith. The danger which came from their studies was less pro-
nounced than that which threatened from the pens of renegade
theologians.

Even Scholastics such as Albertus Magnus, the celebrated teacher
of Thomas Aquinas, were engrossed in the study of nature. They
carried on their research without deviating from the path of Church
dogmas. It was thought that just as theology and philosophy could
be fully harmonized, so theology and scientific studies might be
combined with visible benefits to both.

LIFE AND WORKS

Returning to the career of Roger Bacon, we find that we cannot
establish the exact date of his birth. It is commonly assumed to be
between 12 10 and 12 14, at Ilchester in Somerset, England. He be-
longed to a noble family. His brother seems to have been a wealthy
man, but he, together with the other members of the family, subse-
quently suffered pecuniary loss and exile for loyalty to king Henry
III in his struggles against the barons (i 258-1 265).

Bacon was able to attend the university of Oxford, where his rela-
tive Robert Bacon taught. There the Dominicans had established a
school in 1221, and three years later the Franciscans followed their
example. At Oxford, Roger Bacon could listen to the stimulating
lectures of Edmund Rich, who was the first scholar in western
Europe to comment on the Sophistical refutations, a book in Aris-
totle's logical treatise, the Organoji.

Bacon also studied with Grosseteste, who surpassed the scholars of
his day in his knowledge of the Greek language. Bacon bore witness
to Grosseteste's scientific achievements, to his sincere interest in
philology, and to his dislike for the incorrect translations of Aris-
totle. From him he inherited a desire for fluent mastery of Greek.
In Bacon's physical treatises the influence of Grosseteste is unmis-
takable. To this bishop of Lincoln, Bacon owed much, and in his
writings he paid tribute to the creative genius of his teacher.

At Oxford, Roger Bacon received instruction by professors who
had a broad perspective, not only in theology and philosophy but
also in languages and physical sciences. The scientific studies were
part of Oxford's tradition.

From Oxford Bacon went to Paris, and he stayed there on several
occasions. At Paris, Bacon could have received instruction from

484 ROGER BACON

Albertus Magnus and from his own countryman, Alexander of
Hales. But he showed no trace of admiration for their theological
labors and turned, instead, to the natural sciences cultivated by the
Arabian scholars. Among them he found Avicenna, Averrhoes, and
Alhazen especially to his liking.

Roger Bacon himself confessed "he learned more important truth
beyond comparison from men of humble station, w ho are not named
in the schools, than from all the famous doctors." In 1267 he claimed
to have spent much money on secret experiments and on other
things of interest to him. We find in him, then, an ardent devotion
to study, a devotion compelling him to sacrifice his material goods
in order to further his research.

After receiving the degree of Master of Arts at Paris, Bacon re-
turned to Oxford and joined the Franciscan Order. Although this
move eased the burden of his teachings, his liberty of expression was
now limited because of the conservative policies of the Franciscans.
When Bonaventura became the head of the Franciscans in 1257, he
initiated a conservative policy pertaining to all publications, be-
cause the order was suspected of heresy.

In the years between 1256 and 1266 Roger Bacon lived in a state
of semi-retirement conditioned by poor health. He does not seem to
have taken an active interest in the affairs of the universit>\ Still, he
carried on difficult experiments in physics, particularly in optics
and in astronomy, and kept on instructing boys in the natural sci-
ences. These ten years were wisely spent and prepared him for more
important tasks. In 1266 an event happened which appears to have
been the turning point in his life: the Pope became attentive to his
work.

The fame of Roger Bacon had spread to the ears of Guy de
Foulques, the papal legate in England, and when De Foulques as-
cended the papal throne as Clement I\' in 1265, he did not forget
Bacon's extraordinary attainments. In the following year he wrote
to the friar to send a copy of his works, urging secrecy and speed.
Bacon was full of gratitude and extremely happy to have this unique
opportunity. He explained to the Pope the difficulties he had been
forced to overcome: poor health, a lack of assistants, lack of co-op-
eration on the part of his superiors, and his own method of composi-
tion, which necessitated four or five drafts of his writings before he
was satisfied. All these factors obstructed his work. He intimated
that he might get more done if he received some money from the
Pope.

BACON'S ORDEALS 485

Unfortunately, the manuscripts he was supposed to deUver were
not ready, but within eighteen months he completed his three large
treatises: the Opus tnajus, the Opus nnnus, and the Opus terthmi. The
Opus mmus and the Opus tertiinn were intended to be introductions
and summaries to the Opus inajus, but in regard to some subjects such
as alchemy they went into far greater detail. The style of the treatises
is very lucid in contrast to the involved method of writing character-
istic of the Scholastics.

The three books were designed to appeal to Clement's practical
mind, to convince him of the salutary value of scientific studies, both
for the leaders of the Church and for the masses. Roger Bacon
wanted to bring about a complete change in emphasis in the educa-
tional curriculum, maintaining that the subjects of the quadrivium
were better designed as preparation for theology than were logic
and rhetoric.

BACON'S ORDEALS

Roger Bacon's idealistic hopes, however, were not realized. It is
questionable whether the works sent to the Pope actually reached
their destination; moreover, Clement IV died in 1268.

After the papal see had remained vacant for three years, Gregory
X was elevated to this august position; but since he owed his elec-
tion to Bonaventura, he showed no favors to Bacon, who was at
odds with the policy of his order. We can imagine Bacon's disap-
pointment. In 1272 he wrote an acrimonious treatise, the Covipen-
dium studii philosophiae, which gave vent to his bitterness. No one
was left untouched by his invective. He lashed the corruption of the
clergy, including the Pope, who, he said, set a bad example. He
claimed the disintegration of the secular morals was due to the ex-
ample of the Church. He attacked with even greater force the shal-
lowness, the false presumptions, and the incapacity of the Scholas-
tics, particularly their bUnd reliance upon the untrustworthy trans-
lations of Aristotle.

The reaction against the audacious voice of Bacon came several
years later. In 1277 he was summoned to the chapter of the Fran-
ciscan Order in Paris; and the minister general Jerome of Ascoli, who
had succeeded Bonaventura, by "the advice of many friars con-
demned and reprobated the teaching of Friar Roger Bacon of Eng-
land, master of sacred theology, as containing some suspected nov-
elties, on account of which the same Roger was condemned to
prison." There were other causes responsible for the imprisonment

486 ROGER BACON

of Roger Bacon. That he was suspected of having taught magic arts
was less punishable than his continued attacks on the Dominicans
and members of his own order and his defense of the Arabian
scholars. He had offended the prominent scholars of his day, and his
powerful friend and protector, Grosseteste, the bishop of Lincoln,
who could have helped, had died in 1253.

Bacon languished in prison until 1292, when the new minister
general of the order set him free. In the same year he wrote the Com-
pe?idiu?n stiidii theologiae, but because of his imprisonment he was
unable to complete his Scriptimi principale, which was intended to
be the encyclopedic summary of his studies. We do not know
whether Roger Bacon died in 1292 or 1294; we are certain, however,
that he was buried in the Franciscan Chapel at Oxford.

SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY

Bacon's death caused scarcely a ripple in the intellectual world, and
up to the 1 6th century only three of his minor works were printed.
The obscurity of his life and his labors in science, together with his
aloofness from the affairs of his day, caused his name to be linked
with magic. This impression of Bacon dominates Robert Greene's
play. Honourable history of Friar Bacon a?id Friar Bungay. Greene
had found a very popular theme which already had been worked
out in the Middle Ages. Few of the great scholars like Gerbert of
Aurillac, Albertus Magnus, and Roger Bacon escaped the suspicion
of possessing magical powers. Such a view can be understood by
virtue of the superstitious bent of the times. But the picture of Bacon
as a superman who never accepted the tendencies of the Middle
Ages, as a modern in his ideals, is less excusable. We shall see that
Roger Bacon in many ways suffered from the limitations of his own
age, and that his ultimate aspirations aimed not at the overthrow of
theology as "the queen of sciences" but at the establishment of a
more solid and durable foundation for Christian theology.

Roger Bacon took part in the debates on the subjects foremost in
the minds of the Scholastics. He, too, took a stand, for example, on
the problem of universals. He combated the pantheistic tendencies
of Averrhoism. Even his Opus jnajus contains much metaphysical
ballast.

All this was not merely incidental to Roger Bacon's work in other
fields; it formed an attempt at orientation amidst divergent intellec-
tual currents. A modern scientist, without being interested in the
technical problems of philosophy, would adopt a certain kind of

SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY 487

world-view necessary for classifying and unifying his own discov-
eries and theories. Such was Bacon's position towards nominalism.
One individual, he maintained, "is of more account than all the
universals in the world." Had not God created the world for the
sake of individual persons rather than for universal man? Further-
more, individuals can be observed; there is something substantial
about them. Science, thus, could only progress in the direction of
no?m?ialis7n.

When Roger Bacon discussed such a problem, vital for his world-
view, one feels that he did not merely perform a good piece of
verbal shadow-boxing. On the contrary, he showed little patience
with logical subtleties and with abstract concepts which could not be
verified by observation and experiments. He told his students: "Look
at things, try them, see how they act on you, how you act on them.
As to the matter and form that may underhe them, leave that to
God."

It seems to be a well-established fact that Roger Bacon accepted
the official dogmas of the Church. He did not doubt the absolute
authority of the Scriptures, provided a pure text could be found.
Like Abelard, he did not believe in the infallibility of the Church
fathers, for he knew they were limited in their knowledge. However,
this independent view was in complete accord with the opinions of
the famous Scholastic doctors. The Sic et no?i of Abelard had
caused a storm of indignation, but a century later such writing
would have produced no sentence of excommunication nor hard-
ships for its author.

Although Roger Bacon blamed the incorrect translations of Aris-
totle for much of the misunderstanding of his doctrines, he regarded
him as the "great" philosopher and quoted frequently from his
works. This regard, however, did not prevent him from disagreeing
when the occasion arose.

Bacon's respect for the ancient philosophers was great. That they
were not Christians made no difference to him. He preferred Sen-
eca's moral teachings to the doctrines of the Christian teachers and
stressed the purity and integrity of the ancient philosophers. Even
the Mohammedan thinkers got their share of praise for their excel-
lence and accuracy in scientific observation.

For Bacon, the summit of the Scholastic mountain was theology.
He advocated that children obtain a thorough instruction in the
Bible rather than in the current "fables of Ovid" because he thought
the latter harmful to the faith. Convinced of the practical value of

488 ROGER BACON

the sciences, he wanted them applied chiefly to pious instruction in
order to raise the level of religious contemplation and to destroy the
faith of infidels. His view of the sciences as supporters and pillars of
Scriptural revelation would have strengthened the unity and soli-
darity of Christianity. Like other medieval scientists, he emphasized
the point that sin constituted a formidable obstacle to the mastery
of science.

Bacon confused history with fable and mythology, showing no
sense of discrimination and asserting, for example, that Prometheus
was the "first teacher of philosophy and his brother Atlas the first
great astrologer." We cannot blame Roger Bacon for such inaccu-
racies in historical knowledge, since history in the Middle Ages con-
tained more fable than truth.

BACON AND MEDIEVAL SCIENCE

Roger Bacon was limited in his researches by the methods and
knowledge prevalent in his day. Science was based upon authority,
revelation, and superstition. With the discovery of Aristotle's phys-
ical treatises, the sciences which in our day have become autono-
mous were entirely derived from Aristotle's writings. It took cen-
turies to get rid of some of Aristotle's ideas, such as his behef that
four elements make up the universe and his denial of the sexuahty
of plants. In medicine, the books of Galen were used, but the
method of examination applied to the sick was unspeakably crude.

Revelation played an especially important role in medieval geog-
raphy. Since people did not travel extensively in those days, they
assumed that the world was extremely small. The book of Gejiesis
in the Bible served as an authoritative and infallible guide for the
geological structure of the earth.

It can be readily seen that the spirit of medieval science was char-
acterized by the willing acceptance of superstitions. The belief that
the stars and other celestial bodies exert an influence upon the des-
tiny of human beings was accepted even in the most educated circles.
It was thought that certain plants possess occult powers, and that
by the use of herbs and other objects found in nature one might be
able to coerce the supernatural spirits. Above all, alchemy occupied
the minds of the medieval scientists. They attempted to transmute
the base metals into gold and to find the philosopher's stone, which
would act as a cure-all and reveal the secret of eternal youth.

We might dismiss all this as base superstition; yet we find astrol-
ogy and alchemy contributing to the expansion of scientific knowl-

THE NEW TECHNOLOGY 489

edge. That Roger Bacon was interested in alchemy and in astrology
has been used to his disadvantage and to the disparagement of his
genius. We must realize, however, that in the Middle Ages every-
thing was linked with supernatural causes. Thus we find traces of
astrology and alchemy in nearly every science during the Middle
Ages.

BACON'S CRITICISMS OF
CONTEMPORARIES

Roger Bacon was profoundly critical of the knowledge possessed by
his contemporaries. In the Op7(s majus he wrote about four stum-
bling blocks to the comprehension of truth, consisting of (i) frail
and dubious authority; (2) long-established custom; (3) influence
of the ignorant masses; and (4) hiding one's ignorance behind a
show of wisdom. These stumbUng blocks bear a close resemblance
to the four Idols of Francis Bacon.

He became more specific when discussing the stumbling blocks
of the theologians. To begin with, he asserted, philosophy dominates
theology in practice. Theology should be less concerned with the
things of nature than with the mysteries of the faith, such as the
Trinity. But Roger Bacon did not stop there. He reproved the theo-
logians for their ignorance and neglect of the "exact" sciences, such
as optics, alchemy, mathematics, and philology. He believed that the
Vulgate version of the Bible at Paris was extremely defective; hence,
no one could get the correct literal meaning of the sacred text or its
spiritual significance. He also fought a private war with translators,
reproving them for ignorance of the meaning, content, and original
language of the books which they had translated. Such was his
adverse criticism of Gerard of Cremona, who had translated Euclid
from the Arabic.

Bacon also lamented the state of education, with teachers turning
their energies to speculation and to abstract theories instead of in-
struction in the practical sciences. When he remarked that he could
teach a capable student in four years what he himself had learned
in forty, he summarized the inefficiency of 13th-century teaching
methods. He deplored, moreover, the sad neglect of sciences like
optics and physics.

THE NEW TECHNOLOGY

Roger Bacon was equipped with a constructive and visionary mind,
and his critical inclination was overshadowed by ideals of possible

*.-'

490 ROGER BACON

reforms. For instance, he pointed out that it was necessary to con-
struct mathematical tables and instruments to make a correction in
the calendar, since, he calculated, it had gained one day in each one
hundred and thirty years.

His interests seem to have been extensive in the field of optics. He
understood the laws of reflection and the phenomena of refraction;
he described a telescope, besides experimenting with mirrors and
lenses. Yet, when giving a description of the countries of the world,
he accepted without question the view that the earth is the motion-
less center of the universe.

Although Bacon was not an inventor in the strict sense of the
word, he envisaged and pictured many inventions which have come
true in our day:

"Now that these matters are understood, I shall tell of certain
marvels wrought through the agency of Art and of Nature, and will
afterwards assign them to their causes and modes. In these there is
no magic whatsoever, because, as has been said, all magical power is
inferior to these works and incompetent to accomplish them. First,
then, of mechanical devices.

"It is possible that great ships and sea-going vessels shall be made
which can be guided by one man and will move with greater swift-
ness than if they were full of oarsmen.

"It is possible that a car shall be made which will move with ines-
timable speed, and the motion will be without the help of any living
creature. . . .

"It is possible that a device for flying shall be made such that a
man sitting in the middle of it and turning a crank shall cause arti-
ficial wings to beat the air after the manner of a bird's flight.

"Similarly, it is possible to construct a small-sized instrument for
elevating and depressing great weights, a device which is most use-
ful in certain exigencies. For a man may ascend and descend, and
may deliver himself and his companions from peril of prison, by
means of a device of small weight and of a height of three fingers
and a breadth of four.

"It is possible also easily to make an instrument by which a single
man may violently pull a thousand men toward himself in spite of
opposition, or other things which are tractable.

"It is possible also that devices can be made whereby, without
bodily danger, a man may walk on the bottom of the sea or of a
river. Alexander (the Great) used these to observe the secrets of the
sea, as Ethicus the astronomer relates.

THE NEW TECHNOLOGY 491

"These devices have been made in antiquity and in our own time,
and they are certain. I am acquainted with them exphcitly, except
with the instrument for flying which I have not seen. And I know
no one who has seen it. But I know a wise man who has thought out
the artifice. Infinite other such things can be made, as bridges over
rivers without columns or supports, and machines, and unheard-of
engines."^

Roger Bacon also experimented with burning glasses, gunpowder,
the magnet, Greek fire, artificial gold, magic mirrors, and the philos-
opher's stone. Those subjects which are least important today as
objects of scientific study, such as astrology and alchemy. Bacon
thought most valuable. He lashed his contemporaries for not study-
ing enough astrology and for not heeding the influence of the stars
upon the conduct of their lives.

Even Thomas Aquinas did not deny that the celestial bodies
exerted an indirect influence upon the lives of men without impair-
ing freedom of the will. Roger Bacon stayed on the path of ortho-
doxy and left room for individual selection, but he was also con-
vinced that astrology was an unexplored gold mine for the medieval
scientist.

Bacon devoted much time and money to the drawing up of
tables to show the correct constellations of the stars, "so that every
day we could consider in the heavens the causes of all changes on
earth, and find similar configurations of heaven in the past and
similar effects; and calculate the same for the future. And so all
things would be known."

Tables such as he proposed here would have little practical value,
but, he thought, they would be worth a "king's treasure." Reared in
the educational system of the Church, he looked to the heavens for
the highest truths and there expected his scientific ideals to be real-
ized.

Of course. Bacon was intensely interested in practical inventions,
too, but they were less important to him than those which were
marvelous and would confirm his rehgious beliefs. He did not
occupy his time with experiments to make airplanes or motor-driven
cars. He did not have the instruments necessary for them. Moreover,
he did not consider them as "vital" as astrological tables, for the lat-
ter could prepare him and aid him in the attainment of the future
life. In other words, the things which we regard today as practical
were considered impractical in the Middle Ages. To Bacon, moral

2 Epistula de secretis operibus artis et naturae, et de nullitate magiae, 4.

492 ROGER BACON

philosophy and theology were more practical than science. There-
fore he experimented a great deal with alchemy in order to find out
how nature "tries ceaselessly to reach perfection— that is, gold."

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Yet Roger Bacon was not a supporter of sweeping generalizations.
He knew that natural science is complex and cannot be explained in
terms of one hypothesis. Thus, in alchemy, he did not think of the
elements as part of a universal primary nature or that it would be
possible at all to reduce them to this indefinite principle, which for
other alchemists continued to be the only existing reality in a world
of appearances. Primary matter constituted, for them, a magic for-
mula which would solve all the ills of the world. Bacon thought, on
the contrary, that the purity of matter could only be restored by the
harmonious blending of the elements. Now this would have been a
more complex process. In the same way, he avoided a belief in the
omnipotent sway of celestial bodies and left room for the action of
free will in the individual.

Bacon's distrust of sweeping generahzations and his understanding
of the complexity of the problems of natural science were influ-
enced by his acceptance of the Church dogmas, his connection with
Scholastic theology, and his conception of education. Theology and
the Church teachings were highly complex in the 13th century.
Many volumes were needed in order to clarify the facts of salvation.
Catholic theology had become aware of an expansion of knowledge.
It had assimilated, or attempted to assimilate, teachings propagated
by infidels and unbelievers. It was a difficult task to harmonize ad-
vanced philosophy with the simple tenets of the faith. In order to
accomplish this, one had to know a great deal of philosophy. Like-
wise, the scientists of the Western world became aware of a body of
knowledge accumulated by the Arabian scholars which opened up
a multitude of new problems, resulting in an extension of specula-
tion and experimentation. The scientific researches of the Arabs had
to be harmonized with the articles of the Christian religion.

Roger Bacon assumed that the truth of science could not disturb
the calm equilibrium of his religious faith. His ideal was to use the
weapon of the infidels— scientific study— for their own destruction.
Ultimately, he believed that Christianity would not conquer the
world by force but convert the infidels by the strength of marvelous
arguments based upon exact experimentation which would verify
the miracles of Christian revelation.

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS 493

Although Bacon made some exaggerated claims about his ability
to impart knowledge to his students and about the ineptitude of
contemporary teachers, these should not be construed to imply that
in his opinion the road to knowledge is an easy one. On the contrary,
he wanted a more intricate and analytic system of instruction to
supplement the current knowledge of Latin, grammar, logic, and
metaphysics with a comprehensive study of the natural sciences. He
attacked the friars who ventured to study theology without suffi-
cient preparation. If anything, he envisaged an educational proce-
dure more difficult, more complete, and more factual than that of
his own time.

In his systematic theories Bacon was well ahead of his contem-
poraries. For example, he formed the conjecture that the transit of
light from the stars occupies time, though we cannot perceive it, and
he supported the view of the sphericity of the earth— a theory which
indirectly influenced Columbus.

However, Bacon was seldom original. He frequently acknowl-
edged his debt to his predecessors, especially to Aristotle and the
Arabs. At times he seemed to be borrowing from the extensive work
of his teacher, Grosseteste. But this borrowing does not imply that
he could not apply the facts. His power in appHcation, rearrange-
ment, and combination of previously established facts was unsur-
passed in the Middle Ages. His imagination in regard to the possi-
bilities of science rivaled that of Dante in the field of poetry. In this
manner he overcame the limitations of his own day and of his own
bitter fortunes. It is difficult to draw a line where Bacon's imagina-
tion stops and the mystic spirit starts, for he did not always remain
on the solid ground of experience but aspired to find the higher
realm of religious visions. He did not believe in religion in order to
demonstrate his orthodoxy; a sincere belief in the doctrines of the
faith was part of his nature and his Franciscan environment.

To counteract the monopolization of education by dialectic and
metaphysics, Roger Bacon urged the study of languages and mathe-
matics. He was convinced of the utility of such study for the secular
rulers and for the Church; languages he considered indispensable for
the student who wanted to read original texts of theology and phi-
losophy. Especially, he commended the study of Hebrew, Greek,
and Arabic and, therefore, composed a Greek and Hebrew grammar
to facilitate the instruction of students. The highest stage of linguis-
tic learning, he declared, is to speak a foreign language with the
same facility as the mother tongue. A second degree of proficiency

494 ROGER BACON

is the ability to translate it, and a lower stage of linguistic knowl-
edge is the mere capacity to understand it. For a student this last
capacity would be sufficient, but it was Roger Bacon's ideal to
master Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic like his mother tongue. There
is no proof that he succeeded; it is doubtful whether he was much
better than the translators whose ignorance he decried. They, how-
ever, were in a better position to travel in foreign lands and learn
the languages as they were actually spoken.

Bacon's ideal was reahzed to some extent at the council of Vienna
in 1 3 12. There the establishment of schools of Oriental languages
was ordered in the universities of Paris, Oxford, Bologna, and Sala-
manca. Unfortunately, the decree of the council proved to be unsuc-
cessful. The students did not respond to the new courses; the teach-
ers were underpaid and half-starving; thus, there existed no strong
stimulus for either teacher or student to devote himself to this field
of research.

For Roger Bacon the study of philology possessed another attrac-
tion in the mystic power of words. He pondered about the "tyranny
of words" from the standpoint of their magical value in coercing
supernatural forces. His ideal was to get ultimately to the root of
the spiritual meaning of the Bible. He envisaged a revision of the
Bible, which had become invalid through many changes and poor
translations. This revision was to be carried out by a papal com-
mission composed of outstanding scholars.

MATHEMATICS AS THE FOUNDATION
OF SCIENCE

Mathematics Bacon prized even more highly than philology. He
called it "the gate and key of the natural sciences, the alphabet of
philosophy." In all sciences he found traces of mathematics, and he
saw that the fundamental concepts in physical science, like matter
and force, could be expressed by mathematical concepts. For him,
mathematics replaced logic as the fundamental discipline. The objec-
tion which he had against logic was its abstraction and its faulty
consideration of reality, because logic cannot give us absolute cer-
tainty. Moreover, he claimed that we do not need instruction in this
field because we have a natural grasp of it and need learn only its
technical terms.

This point of view represents Bacon's reaction against excessive
reliance upon argumentation. We can scarcely imagine to what ex-
tent logic dominated the instructional program of medieval univer-

EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE 495

sities. It was no accident that the masters of logic were the most
arrogant, self-satisfied, and dogmatic teachers of the age. They
looked down upon experimentation and observation of natural phe-
nomena. If Bacon could have replaced logic with mathematics, or
at least subordinated it, it would have been a revolutionary change.
He could not, for logic was too solidly entrenched in the univer-
sities.

EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE

Nevertheless, Roger Bacon did not arrive at any striking results in
his study of mathematics. What mattered was his appreciation and
understanding that mathematics forms the key to the physical sci-
ences, and in this respect he resembled Descartes. But he also recog-
nized the fact that mathematics cannot be the noblest natural science
even though it is fundamental. For him, the queen of the natural
sciences was the scientia experimentalis, experimental science. Estab-
lished on the twin pillars of mathematics and experience, it has a
most durable foundation.

Now experimental science has three prerogatives: (i) it confirms
conclusions to which other scientific methods already point; (2) it
distinguishes between truth and falsehood; (3) it creates new depart-
ments and methods of science.^

It would be wrong to say, however, that Roger Bacon resembled
the modern research scientist, for he experimented with many sub-
jects, such as alchemy, which are unrelated to exact measurement.
He expected marvelous results from his experiments but lacked the
impartiaHty with which a modern scientist approaches his field of
study. Finally, he relied too much upon the validity of the sense
organs and did not sufficiently appreciate the need for exact verifica-
tion.

What is the function of the experimental method? How can it be
applied? Here Bacon showed most clearly his connection with the
ideals prevalent in the Middle Ages. By the application of the experi-
mental method he expected to arrive at a more exact understanding
of the spiritual meaning of the Bible, to convert the infidels by prov-
ing the miracles of the Christian faith, to exterminate the errors of
magic, and to meet the challenge of the Anti-Christ, who was ex-
pected to descend upon earth fully equipped with a knowledge of
experimental science and of mechanical inventions. If one could

3 Cf. Thomdike, "Roger Bacon and experimental method in the Middle
Ages," Philosophical review (1914), pp. 271-298.

496 ROGER BACON

understand the secrets of nature, Bacon said, it would be easier to
cope with the guile of Anti-Christ. "By studying the Bible, certain
prophecies, and astronomy, the Church would be able to know the
date and place of Anti-Chris,t's appearance."

We have emphasized the fact that Roger Bacon remained within
the limits of orthodoxy. At the same time, he represented a change
in ideals from the Patristic Age. The Church fathers had little pa-
tience with those who were bent upon experimenting and observing
the working of nature, since these interests had little relation to the
hfe Beyond, where man would live a different kind of existence. In
the beauty of nature they saw the snares of the devil; and in any-
thing which appeared mysterious and inexplicable, the work of
demons or angels.

The otherworldly attitude of the Church prevented the advance-
ment of the natural sciences in the Middle Ages. Progress in scien-
tific study could only come from without, by the recovery of
ancient writings. When these finally were introduced, together with
the commentaries of the Arabian scholars, a new field of study was
opened up.

An orthodox scholar like Roger Bacon believed that everything
in the universe is reasonable and reflects the rationality of the Crea-
tor. Science thus becomes a confirmation of God's wisdom. Hence,
in the Opus Tnajus, after discussing the natural sciences, Bacon
turned in the concluding chapter to moral philosophy, "nobler than
all the other branches of philosophy." To him, scientific study did
not constitute an end in itself; it formed an avenue to salvation and
was definitely subordinated to the knowledge of God.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the major works of Roger Bacon?

2. Why was Roger Bacon regarded with suspicion?

3. Why was mathematics important to Roger Bacon?

4. In what ways did Roger Bacon criticize his contemporaries?

5. How did Roger Bacon view alchemy?

6. What are the obstacles preventing the progress of science, according
to Bacon?

7. Describe Bacon's concept of experimental science.

8. What is the purpose of science, according to Roger Bacon?

9. In what way was Roger Bacon modern? In what ways was he medi-
eval?

10. Describe the weaknesses of the Baconian world-view.

MEISTER ECKHART

LIFE AND TIMES

e do not know the exact date of Eckhart's birth, but it is be-
lieved to have been around 1260. His father was an overseer in the
employ of one of the feudal lords, and thus Eckhart was able to
obtain an excellent education. In his youth he entered the Dominican
monastery. Later he studied at Cologne, where there were a number
of illustrious theologians, including Albertus Magnus. There is no
verification, however, for the belief that Magnus instructed Eckhart.
The religious career of Eckhart was spectacular. He became head
of a monastery at Erfurt. In 1 300 he was sent to Paris, where he
championed the Dominican philosophy against that of the Francis-
cans. He used vigorous language, and from that period on he was
opposed to Scholastic subtlety, which he thought alienated man from
God. In 1302 he became Master of Theology. The following year
he was appointed head of the Dominicans in Saxony, and four years
later he became vicar of Bohemia. Administrative work continually
sapped his energy, for he was constantly engaged in missions for his
order.

497

498 MEISTER ECKHART

In 1309 Eckhart was nominated to head the Dominican order in
Germany, but because of his antagonism to the Franciscans he was
not appointed. Three years later he returned to Paris and, in 13 14,
went to Strasbourg. Contemporary chroniclers speak of his amazing
success as a preacher. Wherever he went crowds followed him.
Many of his ideas were difficult to understand, almost incompre-
hensible, but the people admired his passionate sincerity and realized
that he spoke not merely as a theologian but as a man of profound
faith.

When, in 1320, Eckhart was appointed to teach at Cologne, his
success seemed to be assured. He did not realize that he had entered
the lions' den. The archbishop of Cologne, a Franciscan, had little
love for the Dominican order and was greatly concerned about the
spread of anti-ecclesiastical feeling in the Rhineland. Charges were
made against Eckhart claiming that he negated the foundations of
the Catholic faith. The Inquisition took over; at first Eckhart was
acquitted. The acquittal, however, was due to the work of a Domin-
ican, who naturally favored Eckhart. But the bishop was anxious to
silence Eckhart, and so he appointed two Franciscans to continue
the investigation. Eckhart submitted an eloquent defense to the
judges, in which he categorically denied all the charges. A trial fol-
lowed in 1327 in the archbishop's court. Like Abelard, Eckhart
appealed to the Pope but was denied. Later, after his death, his views
were sharply condemned by the Church. But the impact of his theo-
ries was felt by the proponents of the Protestant Reformation.

Among the influences on his work we find Boethius, Augustine,
and Dionysius the Areopagite; incidentally, Neo-Platonism also
found a ready reception in his system. Denifle, in his work on Eck-
hart, pointed out that many of his views are found in Aquinas. It is
true that Eckhart quoted frequently from Aquinas, but his emphasis
was quite different, for he was less orthodox in his views than the
official philosopher of the CathoHc Church.

In his BibHcal studies, Eckhart leaned especially upon the Wisdom
Literature, and he had a great fondness for the Fourth Gospel. His
view of faith was like that of St. Paul except that his philosophical
training was far more extensive than the apostle's.

Among Eckhart's works we find his early treatise. The talks of
instruction, especially significant. In his mature years he wrote the
Book of divine comfort, which he dedicated to the queen of Hun-
gary. His treatise About disijjterest and his sermons, likewise, are
noteworthy. For a full understanding of Eckhart we might also in-

ECKHART'S CONCEPT OF GOD 499

elude his Latin work, the Opus tripartitum, and his Defense, in
which he rephed to the charges of the archbishop.

ECKHART'S CONCEPT OF GOD

Like the Neo-Platonists, Eckhart stated that God in his essence is
completely incomprehensible. Thus we cannot attribute any qualities
to the Godhead. When we use theological terms we are only apply-
ing symbols, not terms which have a corresponding reality. Since
God is completely immovable and disinterested, he is not affected by
the Creation.

"Bear in mind also that God has been immovably disinterested
from the beginning and still is and that his creation of the heavens
and the earth affected him as Httle as if he had not made a single
creature. But I go further. All the prayers a man may offer and the
good works he may do will affect the disinterested God as little as
if there were neither prayers nor works, nor will God be any more
compassionate or stoop down to man any more because of his pray-
ers and works than if they were omitted.

"Furthermore, I say that when the Son in the Godhead willed to
be human and became so, suffering martyrdom, the immovable dis-
interest of God was affected as httle as if the Son had never become
human at all."^

The objection may be raised that according to this theory God is
not interested in man. Eckhart, however, showed this to be an in-
correct view.

"Now pay close attention and understand what I mean, if you
can. When God first looked out of eternity (if one may say that he
ever first looked out), he saw everything as it would happen and at
the same time he saw when and how he would create each thing.
He foresaw the loving prayers and the good deeds each person
might do and knew which prayers and which devotions he would
heed. He foresaw that tomorrow morning you will cry out to him
in earnest prayer and that tomorrow morning he will not heed you
because he had already heard your prayer in his eternity, before you
became a person; and if your prayer is neither honest nor earnest,
he will not deny it now, for it is already denied in eternity. In that
first eternal vision, God looked on each thing-to-be and therefore he
does what he now does without a reason. It was all worked out
beforehand.

1 Meister Eckhart, a modem translation, by Raymond Blakney, p. 85. Re-
printed by permission of Harper & Brothers, New York.

500 MEISTER ECKHART

"Still, even if God remains forever unmoved, disinterested, the
prayers and good works of people are not lost on that account, for
well-doing is never without its reward. Philippus says: 'God the
Creator holds things to the course and order he ordained for them
in the beginning.' To God there is neither past nor future and he
loves the saints, having foreseen them before ever the world began.
Then, when events, foreseen by God in eternity, come to pass in time,
people think that God has taken a new departure, either to anger or
toward some agreeable end; but it is we who change, while he re-
mains unchanged. Sunshine hurts aiHng eyes but is agreeable to
sound ones, and yet it is the same sunshine in both cases. God
does not see through time, nor does anything new happen in his
sight."^

Creation itself, according to Eckhart, is the result of a personal
God who is different from the Godhead. This personal God is in
active relationship with human beings. How then shall we love God?
How shall we approach him.^ We must love him, Eckhart wrote, not
because we expect rewards, not because we desire the pleasures of
heaven, but because we see the oneness of the universe, for God is
within us. In fact, all things are one— and part of God. Outside him,
there is no real Being.

This doctrine means that the world process is almost Uke the one
which Eriugena pictured. All things are created by God, and
they tend to return to him. History, thus, contains an enormous
cycle which shows that man cannot find himself apart from God.

Eckhart believed the kingdom of heaven can be found within
man, for God creates Christ in two zvays: first, as part of the Trinity
and, second, in the soid of man. We find God thus not in outward
acts, not through distant pilgrimages, but by turning our attention
upon the reality of the soul. The human soul then is divine. It is not
only a copy of divinity; rather, it is the container of the divine
spark. The result is that man can know God directly. He does not
have to depend upon theology or upon revelation. All that is neces-
sary is to understand the union which binds him to the divine power
and which reveals that God is in man.

The knowledge which man can achieve of God does not depend
on the hereafter. Unlike Aquinas, Eckhart felt we can achieve the
vision of God right here on earth, and thus we anticipate immortal-
ity. It is this vision and this feeling of union which constitute the
climax and the fulfillment of our existence.

2 Ibid., pp. 85-86.

THE MORAL WEAL 501

THE MORAL IDEAL

To achieve the knowledge of God, Eckhart taught, it is necessary
to be pure in spirit. We must abandon personal property. God wants
us to dedicate ourselves to him exclusively and to give up all other
interests.

"His chief delight and fun consist of this and the more exclusively
he can be our own the greater his joy is. Thus the more things we
keep for ourselves, the less we have his love; the less we own things,
the more we shall own him and his. When our Lord went to speak
of things that are blessed, he put poverty of spirit at the top of the
hst and that shows that all blessings and perfection begin with being
'poor in spirit.' In fact that is the only foundation on which any
good may rest; otherwise [what seems good is] nothing at all,
neither this nor that. When we got rid of outward things, in return,
God shall give us all that heaven contains, yes, heaven and all its
powers, and all that flows out of God. Whatever the saints and
angels have shall be ours as much as theirs.

"If, therefore, I deny myself, God will be mine much more than
any thing could be; he shall be mine as much as his own, neither less
nor more. He will be mine a thousand times more than any personal
property one might own and keep in a safe. Nothing was ever
owned to the degree that God may be my own, together with all
that is his."^

We must learn to curb our desires. "He is far more blessed who
gets along without things because he does not need them, than he
who owns everything because he needs it all; but best of all is the
person who can go without because he has no need. Those, there-
fore, who can dispense with more and scorn more will have denied
themselves more. It looks like a great deed when, for God's sake,
someone gives a thousand marks of gold to feed the poor and build
convents and cloisters, but much more blessed is he who disdains
that much stuff on account of God. A person really has the King-
dom of Heaven when he is wise enough to put off everything for
the sake of God.

"To which you may say: 'Yes, sir, if only it were not for one
thing— that my faults prevent me. . . .'

"If you have faults, then pray often to God to remove them from
you, if that should please him, because you can't get rid of them
yourself. If he does remove them, then thank him; but if he does

3 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

502 MEISTER ECKHART

not, then bear them for him, not thinking of them as faults or sins,
but rather as great discipHnes, and thus you shall merit reward and
exercise your patience; but be satisfied whether he gives you what
you want or not. For he does give to each, according to what is best
for him and what best fits the need. If a coat is to fit, it must be cut
to measure, for what fits one will not fit another; each person must
be measured if his coat is to fit."^

The most important virtue, according to Eckhart, is Abgeschie-
denheit, or the abandonment of self. He put this disinterest on a
higher plane than love.

"My first reason is as follows. The best thing about love is that
it makes me love God. Now, it is much more advantageous for me
to move God toward myself than for me to move toward him, for
my blessing in eternity depends on my being identified with God.
He is more able to deal with me and join me than I am to join him.
Disinterest brings God to me and I can demonstrate it this way:
Everything likes its own habitat best; God's habitat is purity and
unity, which are due to disinterest. Therefore God necessarily gives
himself to the disinterested heart.

"In the second place, I put disinterest above love because love
compels me to suffer for God's sake, whereas disinterest makes me
sensitive only to God. This ranks far above suffering for God or in
God; for, when he suffers, man pays some attention to the creature
from which his suffering comes, but being disinterested, he is quite
detached from the creature. I demonstrate that, being disinterested,
a man is sensitive only to God, in this way: Experience must always
be an experience of something, but disinterest comes so close to zero
that nothing but God is rarefied enough to get into it, to enter
the disinterested heart. That is why a disinterested person is sensi-
tive to nothing but God. Each person experiences things in his own
way and thus every distinguishable thing is seen and understood ac-
cording to the approach of the beholder and not, as it might be,
from its own point of view."^

Disinterest creates a knowledge of God, Eckhart asserted. It is
emancipated from physical and fleshly pleasures.

"Heed this, intelligent people: Life is good to the man who goes,
on and on, disinterestedly. There is no physical nor fleshly pleasure
without some spiritual harm, for the desires of the flesh are con-
trary to those of the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are contrary

^ Ibid., pp. 39-40.
5 Ibid., pp. 82-83.

THE MORAL WEAL 503

to the flesh. That is why to sow the undisciplined love of the flesh is
to be cut off by death, but to sow the disciplined love of the spirit is
to reap of the spirit, life eternal. The less one pays attention to the
creature things, the more the Creator pursues him.

"Listen to this, man of intelligence: If the pleasure we take in
the physical form of Christ diminishes our sensitivity to the Holy
Spirit, how much more will the pleasure we take in the comfort of
transitory things be a barrier against God? Disinterest is best of all,
for by it the soul is unified, knowledge is made pure, the heart is
kindled, the spirit wakened, the desires quickened, the virtues en-
hanced. Disinterest brings knowledge of God; cut off from the
creature, the soul unites with God; for love apart from God is like
water to a fire, while love with God is the honeycomb in the
honey."^

The life which Eckhart advocated involves not merely contempla-
tion but also active service. To retire from the world, to live apart
from mankind, he considered inadequate. Since the ideal Christian
does not despise the duties which life imposes, he will not be an
isolationist. He will fulfill his vocation among his fellows.

Still, Eckhart was primarily concerned with the inner life, for
to him the soul was the principle of reality. God is revealed through
the fertility of the soul:

"Above all, claim nothing for yourself. Relax and let God operate
you and do what he will with you. The deed is his; the word is his;
this birth is his; and all you are is his, for you have surrendered self
to him, with all your soul's agents and their functions and even
your personal nature. Then at once, God comes into your being and
faculties, for you are like a desert, despoiled of all that was pe-
culiarly your own. The Scripture speaks of 'the voice of one crying
in the wilderness.' Let this voice cry in you at will. Be like a desert
as far as self and the things of this world are concerned."'^

How can we achieve this state? Shall we just wait apathetically?

"This is the answer. External acts of virtue were instituted and
ordained so that the outer man might be directed to God and set
apart for spiritual life and all good things, and not diverted from
them by incompatible pursuits. They \vere instituted to restrain
man from things impertinent to his high calling, so that when God
wants to use him, he will be found ready, not needing to be brought
back from things coarse and irrelevant. The more pleasure one takes

® Ibid., p. 90.
''Ibid., p. 115.

504 MEISTER ECKHART

in externalities the harder it is to turn away from them. The
stronger the love the greater the pain of parting.

"See! Praying, reading, singing, watching, fasting, and doing
penance— all these virtuous practices were contrived to catch us and
keep us away from strange, ungodly things. Thus, if one feels that
the spirit of God is not at work in him, that he has departed inwardly
from God, he will all the more feel the need to do virtuous deeds—
especially those he finds most pertinent or useful— not for his own
personal ends but rather to honor the truth— he will not wish to be
drawn or led away by obvious things. Rather, he will w^ant to cleave
to God, so that God will find him quickly and not have to look far
afield for him when, once more, he wants to act through him.

"But when a person has a true spiritual experience, he may boldly
drop external disciplines, even those to which he is bound by vows,
from which even a bishop may not release him. No man may release
another from vows he has made to God— for such vows are con-
tracts between man and God. And also, if a person who has vowed
many things such as prayer, fasting, or pilgrimages, should enter
an order, he is then free from the vow, for once in the order, his
bond is to all virtue and to God himself."^

Now, Eckhart pointed out, we can understand the road which
leads to God. We must conquer all turmoil and strife, and we must
get away from all external attachments. We must abandon the desire
for pleasure, wealth, fame, and honor. Also, we must give up self-
love and the desire for social advancement. We must transcend even
the ritual of religion. In this denial we must see only the will of God.
His will must become our will, and his perfection must become our
perfection. In this state there is no separateness; man and God have
truly become one.

As a mystic, Meister Eckhart taught that space and time are not
real. In the experience whereby we feel the unity of man and God,
spatial and temporal factors are transcended. It is a state of illumina-
tion, in which the light of God blends \\'ith the light of the soul.
In the final state of man a paradox emerges. The self, by being
destroyed, experiences a glorious rebirth.

"Not only the Son of the heavenly Father is born in the darkness
which is his own, but you, too, are born there, a son of the same
heavenly Father, and to you also he gives power. Now see how
great the profit is! For all the truth the authorities ever learned by
their own intelligence and understanding, or ever shall learn up to

^ Ibid., pp. 1 1 5-1 1 6.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ECKHART 505

the last of days, they never got the least part of the knowledge that
is in the core [of the soul]. Let it be called ignorance or want of
knowledge, still it has more in it than all wisdom and all knowledge
without it, for this outward ignorance lures and draws )'0u away
from things you know about and even from yourself. That is what
Christ meant when he said: 'Whosoever forsaketh not himself and
mother and father and all that is external is not worthy of me.' It
was as if he would say: 'Whosoever will not depart from the ex-
ternahty of creatures cannot be born or received in this divine
birth.' By robbing yourself of self and all externahties you are
admitted to the truth.

"And I really believe it, and am sure that the person who is right
in this matter will never be separated from God by any mode [of
action] or anything else. I say that there is no way he can fall into
deadly sin. He would rather suffer the most shameful death than
commit the least of mortal sins, as did the saints. I say that he could
not commit even a venial sin nor consent to one in himself or other
people, if it could be prevented. He is so strongly attracted and
drawn and accustomed to this way of life that he would not turn
to another. All his mind and powers are directed to this one end."^

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ECKHART

Many philosophers have considered Eckhart the real founder of
German philosophy. He used the German language with consum-
mate skill; in fact, he had the vigor which we later find in Martin
Luther. In many ways his mysticism helped pave the way for the
Reformation. While he was faithful to the Church, he negated
its basic tenets. He taught that what matters most is the individual's
approach to God and that no external mediation is needed.

In the 19th century Eckhart was rediscovered by the Romanticists
—especially by Baader, who regarded him as one of the outstanding
philosophers of all time. Hegel was inspired by Eckhart's system,
as was his great opponent, Schopenhauer. The German Idealists
were impressed with his system, since he taught that the scientific
realm is secondary' to the vision of God and that reason must be
subordinated to intuition.

Strangely enough, Eckhart's philosophy was used by the Nazis.
For example, according to Alfred Rosenberg, Eckhart anticipated
the teachings of Fascism. His theories were also used to substantiate
the New Faith movement in Germany, which tried to get away

^ Ibid., p. 102.

5o6 MEISTER ECKHART

from orthodox Christianity and used such abstractions as the "Ger-
man soul," "German culture," and "German religion." Still, when
we read Eckhart in the original, we find little reason for such iden-
tification. Eckhart did not speak as a German; his faith and his
philosophy had no boundaries, and he represented religion in its true
universahty. Essentially nothing mattered to him but God; away
from God there is nothingness, he claimed, but with him eternal
bliss and glory can be found.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why was Meister Eckhart suspected of heresy?

2. Describe Eckhart's view of poverty. Do you agree with it? Explain.

3. Explain Eckhart's concept of God. Compare it with that of Aquinas.

4. What does Eckhart mean by disinterest? How can it be achieved?

5. Explain Eckhart's doctrine, "God is within man."

6. According to Eckhart, what are the obstacles in man's quest for union
with God?

7. Why did Eckhart prefer an active life?

8. What are Eckhart's main works?

9. What are the attractive features of Eckhart's philosophy?

10. Why is Eckhart so popular in modern times?

11. Summarize Eckhart's contributions to philosophy.

OCKHAAl AND THE DECLINE
OF SCHOLASTICISM

DISINTEGRATION OF SCHOLASTICISM

Scholasticism in the 14th century did not achieve the same au-
thority as in the previous century. It was still the favorite method
of philosophy; it still dominated the thinkers of the age, but its
vitality was gone. The 14th century in many ways was like our
own. The same spirit of disintegration, the same physical insecur-
ity, and the same intolerance prevailed. Many thought that the
world was coming to an end, just as today the fear of atomic de-
struction is overwhelming. Still, the 14th century contained the
seeds of a new age, and its spirit of disintegration was merely the
prelude to a new age of culture. Perhaps the 20th century, despite
its wars, revolutions, and chaos, may also be the overture to a new
age and a new renaissance.

The decline of Scholasticism was not cataclysmic; rather, it took
many decades. Even after Scholasticism disappeared as the ruling
method of philosophy, it continued to hold sway in Catholicism, and
it has experienced a rebirth in the 20th century through such able
thinkers as Gilson and Maritain. The reasons for its decline cannot

507

5o8 OCKHAM AND DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM

be separated from the general changes in culture which occurred
in the 14th century. A re-orientation took place, changing the cen-
ter of man's perspective and bringing about scientific secularism
instead of religious supernaturalism.

It appears certain that the vitality of Scholasticism had been
exhausted. In Aquinas, Scholasticism had reached its most original
expression, but following him, except Duns Scotus, second-rate
thinkers predominated. They were commentators who, most of the
time, quibbled over unessential details. The language of the Scho-
lastics in the 14th century became extremely obscure, and it is dif-
ficult to know what they really meant. Endless disputes took place
which had as their foundation such abstract topics as the nature
of the angels or the concept of substantial forms.

It is no wonder that the world outside the universities fre-
quently regarded the Scholastics as old-fashioned. Being dominated
by tradition, they continued in the ways of the past and neglected
the new forces which were rising in Europe, namely capitalism and
nationalism.

It must be remembered that Scholasticism rested upon a moral
ideal. The acquirement of virtues was regarded as necessary, both in
poHtical and in economic affairs. The ruler, as we have seen, was
to be a model citizen, and he was to inspire his subjects with respect
for religion and with a pious attitude toward the papacy. But the
Scholastic ideal was scarcely designed to meet the demands of power
politics, which dominated the 14th century.

The decline of Scholasticism coincided with the breakdown of
the feudal order. Society was becoming dynamic rather than remain-
ing static. Class barriers became less distinct, and everywhere the
desire for profit was evident. The philosophical hierarchy, which
Scholasticism pictured, could not be maintained any longer. The in-
tellectual as well as the social universe thus was involved in an
unending state of flux in which tradition had no real place.

From a social standpoint it is necessary to notice the shift which
substituted the middle class for the old aristocracy. Learning in the
Middle Ages had been practically monopolized by the Church,
whose main ideal was the supernatural. Now, however, the middle
class took over, and it was more interested in law, medicine, and
practical subjects than in religion. The spirit of pragmatism thus
triumphed in the 14th century. More and more frequently students
asked, What is the practical value of the subject? How can it be
applied to life?

AUREOLI 509

In the 13 th century the universities of Europe had maintained a
rather high scholastic standard. It was different in the 14th century,
when almost everywhere the course of studies was shortened and
some of the strict requirements for degrees were removed. This
movement was especially evident in the field of theology. It re-
sulted in superficiality of knowledge and, frequently, in second-rate
teaching.

The decline of Scholasticism coincided with diminishing respect
for Aristotle. This attitude was not merely due to the rediscovery of
other Greek thinkers but also caused by a re-evaluation of Aris-
totle's theories, which frequently were found to be in disagreement
with the basic tenets of Christianity. The attack against Aristotle
proceeded on many fronts. In the field of methodology the scientists
substituted experimentation for deduction. In the field of physical
science they omitted the concept of design. In religion, mysticism
replaced the rationalism which is part of the Aristotelian theology.

The new philosophy was aided, above all, by the revival of
nominalism, which found its strongest representative in Ockham.
Although nominalism started as a highly academic movement and
was understood only by a few, it created a veritable intellectual
revolution.

DURANDUS

Among the predecessors of Ockham we find Durandus, a Dominican
who taught theology at Paris and became, in his later life, a bishop.
Although he remained faithful to the spirit of orthodoxy, his views
marked a departure from the Scholastic path. Durandus rejected
the concept of the active intellect, which he believed unnecessary
in explaining the process of knowledge. He asserted that the in-
dividual is the only reality and universals do not exist as ontological
essences. Regarding general philosophy, he felt that dialectical knowl-
edge alone is not sufficient. In fact, Durandus held that reason and
faith are opposed to each other. In this way, he contradicted the
fundamental spirit of medieval philosophy.

AUREOLI

Although Aureoli was a Franciscan, he agreed with Durandus in his
fundamental philosophy. He occupied a high position in the Fran-
ciscan order and became bishop of Aix in 1321.

Aureoli believed that the universals are not real. Thus, he said,
knowledge is concerned with specific facts. He tried to simplify

5IO OCKHAM AND DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM

philosophy by denying the distinction between essence and exist-
ence, and he thought it unnecessary to separate the soul and its
faculties.

Like Durandus, he found no place in his system for the active
intellect. It is interesting to note that Aureoli started out as a Scotist
but in his later teachings practically approached the viewpoint of
Ockham.

OCKHAM'S CAREER

Scholasticism was almost given its death blow by Ockham. He was
born in Surrey, c. 1300, did his undergraduate work at Oxford, and,
when still quite young, started to teach there. Very soon Ockham
was suspected of heresy and called to appear before the Pope in
Avignon. For a time he languished in jail, but this experience did
not break his spirit. Extremely audacious, he advocated the view-
point of the "Spiritual Franciscans" and found a willing supporter in
emperor Louis of Bavaria, who protected him. In 1328 Ockham was
excommunicated, but he nevertheless kept up his activities against
the papacy.

NOMINALISM

In his philosophy, Ockham began by showing that reality cannot
be conceived as being universal; rather, it is individual. The only
form of knowledge deals with specific facts. Our intellectual proc-
esses do not need intermediary species. All real knowledge, he
taught, is based on intuition; abstraction, on the other hand, does
not give us a true picture of reality. Away, then, with the active in-
tellect! Away with the substantial forms! Thus, we understand the
importance of Ockham's "razor," with which he tried to abolish
the useless entities of the metaphysicians.

Important in his philosophy is the concept of "signs." He showed
that there are three kinds of discourse: written, spoken, and con-
ceived. The last is in the mind only. Knowledge is reduced to a
"sign" which stands for the object. We have two types of sciences:
one natural, the other artificial. The latter is applied to language
and writing.

Ockham made it clear that knowledge must be based on experi-
ence, that we do not perceive the object directly but know it only
through a sign. This idea introduces epistemological dualism, for his
theory of signs constitutes a medium between the subject and the
object.

NOMINALISM 511

Ockham made a sharp distinction between intuitive and abstract
concepts. According to him, intuitive concepts are the more direct
and have greater emotional force. Abstract concepts, on the other
hand, can be manipulated by the mind and frequently do not cor-
respond with the objects which they are supposed to represent.
In short, they are mental labels by which we classify the multitude
of particular things.

What then happens to such laws as that of causality, and the
eternal ends about which the Scholastics spoke? Are they real? Do
they find a counterpart in the realm of nature?

Ockham answered in the negative. They are fictions of the human
mind through which it tries to understand the processes of nature,
he declared, but they do not have a corresponding reality in the
realm of bodies.

Why do we use universal terms? Ockham stated not because
they are absolute, or because they refer to a universal reality, for
only individuals are real, but because of their practical function. In
this way the mind can manipulate the objects which it perceives in
the external world.

The magnitude of the intellectual revolution which Ockham in-
stigated can scarcely be exaggerated. Almost with one stroke he
ehminated the universals which Scholasticism had inherited from
its Platonic background. It was a direct blow against all the abstract
forms which the medieval philosophers upheld. Since entities were
not to be duplicated, philosophy was to be simplified. Philosophy'' s
maifi task now ivas to explain and to define individuals. From a
social standpoint, this marked the basic democratic tendency of
Ockham. He turned the attention of the intellectual world away
from universal concepts, and, instead, emphasized the reality and
dignity of the individual. No wonder he attacked the papacy so
strongly, and no wonder he believed in a more democratic basis of
Church government!

In his religious philosophy, Ockham felt that we cannot prove
the existence of God; thus we beheve in God because of faith, not
because philosophy demonstrates his existence. The same is true
when it comes to the immortalit)^ of the soul. We cannot prove the
soul's immortaUty by using technical arguments; we can only rely
upon the dogmas of theology. What happens, then, to our knowl-
edge of God? Can we understand his attributes? Ockham again
answered in the negative. Our knowledge of God is only probable;
we must rely on faith.

512 OCKHAM AND DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM

OCKHAM'S ETHICS

In his ethical theory, Ockham insisted upon the subordination of
the intellect to the will. This voluntarism had been anticipated hj
Duns Scotus, but Ockham emphasized it even more strongly than
had his distinguished predecessor. Moral goodness, then, does not
lie in the intellect, but in the will. Evil, likewise, is connected with
our emotions rather than with our understanding. To love God is
more important than to understand him intellectually.

Ockham's voluntaristic viewpoint led to an arbitrary concept
of divine power. For example, he asked why some are predestined
for heaven, while others are predestined for hell. He answered that
this is to be explained not by the dictates of justice but by the divine
will. The same explanation holds true with regard to conversion.
Thus, St. Paul was converted on the road to Damascus although
he possessed no previous merit of his own, simply because of God's
will.

Ockham pointed out that God is not obligated to act in any way.
"With him a thing becomes right solely for the reason that he
wants it to be so. If God as a total cause were to instigate hatred to-
ward himself in the will of somebody— just as he now causes it as a
partial cause— such a person would not be guilty of sin and neither
would God, because he is not obligated to anything. In this case
the person would not be obligated either, because this act would
not be in his control."^

NATURAL SCIENCE IN OCKHAM'S WORKS

Regarding Aristotle, Ockham exhibited an attitude of independence.
He showed that frequently the physical views of Aristotle cannot be
substantiated. Ockham's concept of motion was strikingly different
from that of Aristotle, who appealed to an external cause, for Ock-
ham considered motion to represent a natural capacity of bodies.
Furthermore, Ockham beHeved a plurality of worlds is possible.
Here, again, he contradicted Aristotle, who stated that the earth by
its very nature moves toward the center of the universe and that any
other world would do the same.

"It may be objected as the philosopher does in his work on
Heaven mid the world, that if there were another world, then the
earth of that world would either move toward the center of this
world or not. It cannot be said that it would not, because bodies of

1 Translated by Tomay, Ockham, studies and selections, p, 1 80.

OCKHAM'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 513

the same element move to the same place; therefore, because the
earth of this world moves by nature toward the center of this
world, the earth of that other world \\ ould move by nature toward
the center of this world also. If however, the earth of the other
world does not move toward the center of this world, then, by
its nature, it recedes from the center of this world. But this is
impossible, because no heavy body ever moves by nature from the
center.

"If to this point it is replied that the individual objects of the
same element move by nature to the center yet not identically to
the same but each to its own center even though these be nu-
merically diverse, the Philosopher answers that this would be im-
possible, because, then, the different parts of our earth would move
towards various centers, the opposite of which is apparent to our
senses."

The answer of Ockham is clear and concise, and indicates his
scientific bent:

"All individual objects of the same element could by their nature
move toward exactly the same place, in case they occupied succes-
sively the same spot lying outside their natural place. Exactly this
would happen if the earth of the other world were put where the
earth is within this heaven. It would move toward the same place
as does the earth of this world. Considering, however, that it is out-
side of this world and within the heaven of another world, it will
just as little move toward the center of this world, as a fire going
up at Oxford would move identically toward the same place as if it
were at Paris."-

OCKHAM'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

In his political philosophy Ockham protested against the supremacy
of the Pope. To say, then, he declared, that the Pope is completely
absolute is a mistake; if he were, the Pope would exercise privileges
which belong only to God. Furthermore, Ockham made it clear,
the papacy is not to interfere in intellectual matters, for complete
freedom is to prevail in the discussion of the philosophers. In this
view, again, he anticipated much of modern thinking.

Ockham enumerated the various wrongs committed by the
Church at Avignon:

"The church of Avignon tries to rule over all Christians tyran-
nically, inflicting upon the faithful of Christ serious and enormous

-Ibid., pp. 168-169.

514 OCKHAM AND DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM

injustices. To do this more freely and without any fear, she perse-
cutes tyrannically all those who dare to start an argument about her
powers, even though they do it with the best of motives. Thus it
comes about that in the universal and other studies, no doctor or
master dares even to offer or accept a thesis for debate and de-
termination with reference to the power of the Pope. At the same
time, such debates about the papal power ought to be pleasing both
to the Pope and to his subordinates, and welcomed by them inas-
much as knowledge of the what and how and why with reference
to the power of the Pope, is necessary for both parties.

"The church of Avignon does an especial wrong to the Roman
Empire by claiming greater temporal right over it than over other
kingdoms. This church does not possess such prerogative over the
Roman Empire either by divine or human rights. . . ."^

This is not all. Ockham believed that the Church was also unjust
regarding the individual behever:

"They usurp a power which they do not possess, depriving the
faithful, clergy and laity, of their possessions, rights and liberties.
They impose upon their shoulders unsupportable burdens. They in-
stigate warfare among the Christians, sedition and discord, and fo-
ment them after instigation. They impose wicked sentences and
unjust procedures, trapping the simple-minded. They materially im-
pede the progress of science and coerce the more learned and intelli-
gent to submit their intellect to them in captivity, against reason and
against the holy scriptures. Innumerable other injustices and exces-
ses could be adduced, whereby they inflict the Christian people,
disturb them, seduce them and try to force them into servitude
against the hberty of the law of Gospel."^

THE INFLUENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE
OF OCKHAM

Ockham may be considered the founder of a new philosophical
tradition. Stimulating an interest in scientific experimentation, he
added to the opposition to Aristotle. He showed that most of the
dogmas of religion cannot be substantiated by reason, and he made
it clear that the basic concepts of Scholasticism are useless.

Ockham appeals to us especially because of his modern con-
clusions. In him we have the germs of voluntarism and pragmatism,
as well as logical positivism. The conclusions of his philosophy led

3 Ibid., p. 1 99.
* Ibid., p. 201.

SIGNIFICANCE OF OCKHAM 515

to epistemological skepticism. In this way he undermined the cer-
tainty of the Middle Ages.

In many ways Ockham reminds us of Kant. In him, as in Kant,
there were the same dislike of intellectualism and the same emphasis
on faith. Both were unorthodox in their religious views, although
Ockham had to suffer more severely than Kant. Furthermore, both
undermined the foundations of metaphysics and were especially
keen in their discussions of the cosmological argument for the
existence of God.

In his scientific views Ockham anticipated both Descartes and
Newton. In a rudimentary sense, he stated both the law of inertia
and the law of gravitation. His concept of the homogeneous nature
of the world-stuff was adopted by Nicholas of Cusa, while his
championship of infifiity found a place in the cosmology of Bruno.

The Ockhamist movement greatly stimulated the development
of new scientific ideas and formed the vanguard of the anti-Aris-
totelian movement. Among its representatives we find John Buridan,
Nicholas of Oresme, and Albert of Saxony— all of whom contributed
to the destruction of the medieval world-view and to the establish-
ment of the astronomical concepts of Galileo and Copernicus.

In his concept of logic Ockham undermined the deductive
method of Scholasticism. The Scholastics held that the categories of
reason have an otitological significance, and they started with uni-
versal assumptions and then drew specific conclusions from them.
Ockham, however, reversed their method. Every science begins
with individuals, he indicated, and universals are not real but only
sigi'is and tools of reason standing for specific things.

Ockham's nominalism produced a new world-view. In logic it
led to the inductive method; in epistemology it led to the develop-
ment of empiricism; in politics it led to a democratic emphasis; and
in social theory it produced the germs of individualism.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Describe Ockham's concept of nominalism.

2. How did Ockham stimulate the progress of science?

3. What was Ockham's attitude toward Aristotle?

4. Describe Ockham's ethical doctrines.

5. In what ways was Ockham a voluntarist?

6. How did Ockham contribute to the development of skepticism?

7. Why did Ockham object to the theory of papal infallibility?

8. How did Ockham contribute to the development of free thought?

9. In what ways was Ockham a heretic?

TWILIGHT OF MEDIEVAL
THOUGHT

DECLINE OF THE CHURCH

J. he disintegration of Scholasticism was intimately connected with
the decline of the Church. In the 14th century the Church was
threatened by the national states, which resented the temporal pre-
tensions of the papacy. The local clergy tended to become more in-
dependent of Rome and strove to become autonomous, both po-
Utically and religiously. The middle class resented the supernatural
ideals of the Church and, instead, emphasized a naturalistic philoso-
phy of life. Everywhere forces were stirring which later led to the
Reformation and the inauguration of our modern scientific world.
Trouble had broken out at the end of the 13th century between
Philip IV and Boniface. PhiUp had taxed the Cistercian order in
France very heavily, and Boniface had answered by a bull, Clericis
laicos, which maintained that the king had no right to tax the clergy
without the permission of the Pope. PhiHp replied, however, by
cutting off the revenue of the papacy. In another bull, Unam
Si6

DECLINE OF THE CHURCH 517

sanctum, the Pope again expressed his behef in the supremacy of
the Church.

"That there is one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church we are
impelled by our faith to beheve and to hold— this we do firmly be-
Heve and openly confess— and outside of this there is neither salva-
tion or remission of sins. . . . Therefore, in this one and only Church,
there is one body and one head— not two heads as if it were a
monster— namely, Christ and Christ's Vicar, Peter- and Peter's suc-
cessor, for the Lord said to Peter himself, 'Feed my sheep': my
sheep, he said, using a general term and not designating these
or those sheep, so that we must believe that all the sheep were com-
mitted to him. If, then, the Greeks, or others, shall say that they
were not entrusted to Peter and his successors, they must perforce
admit that they are not of Christ's sheep, as the Lord says in
John, 'there is one fold, and one shepherd.'

"In this Church and in its power are two swords, to wit, a
spiritual and a temporal, and this we are taught by the words of the
Gospel, for when the Apostles said, 'Behold, here are two swords'
[in the Church, namely, since the Apostles were speaking], the
Lord did not reply that it was too many, but enough. And surely he
who claims that the temporal sword is not in the power of Peter
has but ill understood the word of our Lord when he said, 'Put up
thy sword in its scabbard.' Both, therefore, the spiritual and the
material swords, are in the power of the Church, the latter indeed
to be used for the Church, the former by the Church, the one by
the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, but by the
will and sufferance of the priest. It is fitting, moreover, that one
sword should be under the other, and the temporal authority sub-
ject to the spiritual power. . . ."^

But this language did not impress the king, who continued to
maintain his independent position.

Between 1309 and 1376 the papacy was completely controlled
by France, with the Popes residing at Avignon. Consequently, they
lost much of their standing, especially in England and France. Later
the Church was torn apart by a schism. There were several Popes,
all claiming the high office. This action undermined the faith of
Europe and the effectiveness of the papacy. The disunity of the
Church lent support to the conciliar movement, which believed
in a more democratic Church administration and claimed that au-
thority rests with the individual believer, not with the Pope.

^ Webster, Historical selections, pp. 463-464.

5i8 TWILIGHT OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

MARSIGLIO OF PADUA

The most famous defense of the conciliar theory was probably con-
tained in the work of MarsigHo of Padua, who, like Ockham, was
under the protection of Louis of Bavaria. His work was publicly
condemned at Rome, but it had an important influence on the de-
velopment of modern political theory. What was Marsiglio's aim?
He wanted to destroy the system of papal control. He believed that
spiritual authority is not supreme but subordinate to the secular
rulers.

Aristotehanism was quite evident in his viewpoint. He regarded
the state as a natural institution and upheld the importance of rea-
son. The Churchmen, MarsigHo asserted, do not have a special func-
tion and their task is no more significant than the task of any
other class; rather, they are subordinate to the prince, who is su-
preme. Incidentally, he declared, those who violate religious ordi-
nances are not to be punished by the Church, which can only in-
struct but has no actual political power.

What happens, then, to the doctrine of papal infallibility? Mar-
sigHo denied it categorically. Real authority, he held, belongs to the
Church body as a whole.

In his theory of government, MarsigHo of Padua made the legis-
lative branch supreme. This theory implies that the laws are to be
followed in a strict way and that ultimately the people are
sovereign.

WYCLIFFE AND SOCIAL REVOLT

John Wycliffe combined religious and philosophic interests in
his career. He received his doctorate in theology at Oxford, where
he enjoyed large audiences. In his technical philosophy he was a
Platonist but, in general, he was more significant for his social views
than for his metaphysical concepts.

He was especially radical in his doctrine regarding property.
In Paradise, he averred, man needs no property, and, strictly speak-
ing, property is the result of sin. He urged the Church to get rid of
its temporal possessions and, in this way, return to the way of Hfe
advocated by Jesus Christ. The papacy immediately became suspi-
cious of these doctrines. It appeared that Wycliff^e would die a
martyr's death, but he was protected by the secular authorities in
England, and the university of Oxford insisted there be no inter-
ference with his freedom of speech.

WYCLIFFE AND SOCIAL REVOLT 519

In Wycliffe's philosophy we find radical social views. Thus, he
established an order of priests called Lollards, whose task it was to
administer to the poor. They became popular in England and tried
to improve the spiritual life of the Church.

There is no reason to suppose that there was an active connec-
tion between Wycliffe and the leaders of the Peasants' Rebellion,
but these leaders were undoubtedly inspired by his work. The
peasants were led by John Ball, who had been a^ priest. Froissart,
who was violently opposed to Ball, vividly described his beliefs and
activities:

"A crazy priest in the county of Kent, called John Ball, who, for
his absurd preaching had been thrice confined in the prison of the
archbishop of Canterbury, was greatly instrumental in inflaming
them with those ideas. He was accustomed, every Sunday after mass,
as the people were coming out of the church, to preach to them in
the market-place, and assemble a crowd around him; to whom he
would say: 'My good friends, things can not go on well in England,
nor ever will, until everything shall be in common; when there
shall neither be vassal nor lord, and all distinctions levelled; when
the lords shall be no more masters than ourselves. How ill have they
used us! And for what reason do they thus hold us in bondage? Are
we not all descended from the same parents, Adam and Eve? and
what can they show, or what reasons give, why they should be more
the masters than ourselves? except, perhaps, in making us labor
and work, for them to spend. They are clothed in velvets and rich
stuffs, ornamented with ermine and other furs, while we are forced
to wear poor cloth. They have wines, spices, and fine bread, when
we have only rye, and the refuse of the straw; and, if we drink,
it must be water. They have handsome seats and manors, when
we must brave the wind and rain in our labors in the field; but
it is from our labor [that] they have wherewith to support their
pomp.' "2

Thus it can be seen that the reaction against the Church came
not only from the upper classes but also from the common peo-
ple. The 14th century was an age of social revolution intensified by
constant dynastic wars.

The views of WycKffe not only spread among the lower classes
but influenced John Huss (i 369-141 5), who combined religious
radicalism with pohtical patriotism. His following in Bohemia was
widespread, and the Church leaders realized that he threatened

2 Ibid., p. 541.

520 TWILIGHT OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

their supremacy. At the council of Constance his views were exam-
ined, and he was condemned as a heretic and sentenced to be burned,
although he had been given a promise of safe-conduct. This sen-
tence did not discourage his followers, however, and in the i6th
century it produced a full revolt led by Luther and Calvin.

NICHOLAS OF AUTRECOURT

The disintegration of the Church was not only evident in social
matters; it was just as pronounced in philosophy. Among those who
produced a new ideal in philosophy, we find Nicholas of Autre-
court. In his philosophy he appealed to the atomic theor}^ and
showed how the qualitative aspects of nature can be reduced to
their quantitative constituents. He was certain that growth and
decay are due to the action of atoms.

He felt that God's existence cannot be established by reason.
He still believed in God; but this belief was based on faith, not on
rational grounds.

Nicholas of Autrecourt is perhaps most famous for his denial of
causality. In nature we experience certain events, and we jump to
the conclusion that they are united by the ties of logical necessity.
This, however, according to Nicholas, is a fallacious procedure. We
can 07ily knoiv the existence of the self, which is based o?i intuitio7i.
Our certainty does not reach to anything else.

Nicholas condemned Aristotle in a severe way, for he believed
Aristotle had undermined philosophy by a series of useless abstrac-
tions. Like Ockham, Nicholas of Autrecourt insisted that entities are
not to be duplicated in philosophy and that we must be faithful to the
empirical method.

JOHN OF MIRECOURT

The viewpoint of Nicholas was repeated by John of Mirecourt,
who likewise started with the concept of the self and did not accept
the conventional proofs of the existence of God. Like Nicholas, he
said that there is no logical necessity in nature and that we cannot
explain the concept of substance. For example, we perceive various
impressions of phenomena. This perception, however, is no vahd
foundation for understanding the essence of phenomena.

In short, John of Mirecourt held the powers of the mind to be
limited. We can have certainty when we turn to the self, he claimed,
but when we reason about the external world, substances and es-
sences, probability must be our guide.

DISINTEGRATION OF SCHOLASTIC CERTAINTY 521

BURIDAN

In passing, we must mention Buridan, who was interested in both
philosophy and science and whose astronomical speculations indi-
cate a divergence from orthodox Scholasticism and Aristotelianism.
He believed in nominalism and thus rejected the Scholastic view of
universals. Freedom of the will, he insisted, hes in the suspension
of judgment, through which we carefully consider various alterna-
tives and through which we finally arrive at a satisfactory decision.
He meant that the will can be guided by the intellect.

His opponents probably countered with the story of the ass
which starved to death while it stood, undecided, between two
bales of hay. Buridan, however, would scarcely have agreed that
such hesitation is possible, for he thought man's reason inevitably
would make a satisfactory choice and, in the power of rational
deliberation, true freedom could be found.

BRADWARDINE

More deterministic than Buridan was Thomas Bradwardine, who
taught at Oxford and, in 1349, became archbishop of Canterbury.
He stressed the arbitrary will of God, which he regarded as the
basic cause of all activity, including human desires and human
actions. It may be asked then. Is God the source of evil and sin?
Aquinas had denied this doctrine, but logical consistency led the
archbishop to declare that God is the author of sin— a doctrine
which scandalized many orthodox professors.

What then is the function of man? How should he act in relation-
ship to God? In his answer to this question Bradwardine was still
quite conventional: Man should subordinate his will to the divine
majesty, and he should attempt to emancipate himself from sinful
pleasures and from all external things. In fact, man should disre-
gard even the dictates of reason; only God should be his guide.

DISINTEGRATION OF SCHOLASTIC
CERTAINTY

Throughout the 14th century Averrhoism contributed to the dis-
integration of the Scholastic movement. It found its outstanding
representative in John of Jandun, who, in the main, repeated the
arguments of Siger of Brabant. Believing that matter is eternal and
rejecting personal immortality, he made much of the deathlessness
of the active intellect. In him, also, we find the doctrine of the

522 TWILIGHT OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

double truth. In natural philosophy he was guided by Averrhoes,
but in theology he subordinated himself to the Christian religion.
Thus he saved himself from too much censorship by the orthodox
theologians.

Averrhoism was especially powerful in Italy, at the university of
Padua, which later contributed much to the secular philosophy of
the Renaissance. At Bologna, Averrhoistic philosophy led to a
greater interest in science, particularly in the field of medicine. The
scientists of both Padua and Bologna were noted throughout the
14th century for their agnosticism and opposition to the Church.

To conclude, we find that the unity of the Church was not only
disrupted by the struggle between the kings and the papacy and
by the growing conciliar movement but also shaken by new philo-
sophical theories which could not be combined with the Scholastic
ideal of knowledge. Divergent philosophical movements combined
to bring about a new world-view. On the one hand, mystics like
Eckhart showed that the intercession of the Church is unnecessary
and that salvation must be based on an immediate contact between
man and God. On the other hand, nominalistic philosophers attacked
the concept of causaHty, and they showed the weaknesses of the
Scholastic and Aristotelian theories. Their motto was: Back to nature
and experimentation.

THE NEW SPIRIT TAKES OVER

After the 14th century the method of philosophy completely
changed. Instead of to theology, the queen of the sciences, scholars
now turned to nature and used mathematical principles by which
they described the order of the universe. The localism of the Mid-
dle Ages was shaken almost everywhere, first, by new geographic
discoveries; second, by the vast imperialistic expansion of the various
states; and third, by the introduction of capitalistic economy, which
supplanted the feudal system.

It was an expansion not only in geographic, political, and eco-
nomic matters but also in scientific theory. The world-view of the
Middle Ages was shown to be utterly fallacious and inadequate.
The method of allegory, of blind belief in miracles, was under-
mined. In its stead, the scientists and the philosophers now appealed
to tentative hypotheses and tentative theories. The new age was
far more adventurous, intellectually, than the Middle Ages. It was
more bold in its hypotheses, more penetrating in its scientific re-
searches, and more functional and practical in its use of inventions.

THE NEW SPIRIT TAKES OVER 523

Ever since the Middle Ages, modern man has been guided by
a naturalistic view of life. He is confronted by a variety of
churches and a multitude of philosophies instead of one church
and one ideal of philosophy.

As yet we have found no substitute for the intellectual unity
which characterized the Middle Ages. Although we are emancipated
from supernaturalism, we tend to be just as fanatical as our medieval
ancestors, our fanaticism extending to social and economic philoso-
phies. Thus modern man is suspended between a past which he can-
not recover and a future which he cannot comprehend.

QUESTIONS & TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Describe the views of Marsiglio of Padua.

2. Why did the peasants revolt against the Church?

3. How did Wy cliff e influence the opposition to the papacy?

4. Why was Huss burnt at the council of Constance?

5. What was the significance of the conciliar movement?

6. What was Autrecourt's philosophy?

7. What was Bradwardine's view of determinism?

8. Describe the philosophy of Buridan.

9. What forces caused the collapse of the medieval world-view?

10. What were the advantages and disadvantages of the medieval spirit?

11. Should modern man accept the certainty of medieval philosophy?
Explain.

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WEBB, c. c. Studies in the history of natural theology. New York: Oxford
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ARISTOTLE

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BARKER, E., cd., PoUtics (translated and abridged). New York: Oxford
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BURNET, J., Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920.

cHERNiss, H. F., AristotWs criticism, of pre-Socratic philosophy. New York:
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528 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

AUGUSTINE

BAXTER, J. H., Select letters. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 193 1.

BUTLER, E. c. Western mysticis7n. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1922.

DRAKE, F., Masters of the spiritual life. New York: Longmans, Green &
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FIGGIS, J. N., The political aspects of St. Augustine'' s City of God. New
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w^ARFiELD, B. B., Studies in Tertullian a?id Augustine. New York: Oxford
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BACON

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CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

BIGG, c, Christian Platonists of Alexandria, id edition. New York: Oxford
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TOLLiNTON, R. B., Cle?nejit of Alexandria, 2 vols. New York: The Mac-

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DEMOCRITUS

BAILEY, c. The Greek atomists and Epicurus. New York: Oxford Uni-
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BEARE, J. I., Greek theories of elernentary cognition frofn Alcmaeon to
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ZELLER, E., Pre-Socratic philosophy. New York: Longmans, Green & Com-
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DUNS SCOTUS

CAMPBELL, B. J., ProblejH of One or plural substantial forms in man as

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ECKHART

BLAKNEY, R. B., Mcistcr Eckhart, a modern translation. New York: Harper

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FIELD, c, tr., Meister Eckharfs sermons. London: Allenson & Co., Ltd.,

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MULLER-THYM, B. J., Establishment of the university of being in the doc-
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STEiNER, R., Mystics of the renaissance and their relation to modern

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EPICURUS

BAILEY, c. The Greek atomists and Epicurus. New York: Oxford Uni-
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Epicurus, the extant remains. New York: Oxford University Press, 1926.

530 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

GATES, w. J., Stoic and Epicurean philosophers (complete extant writings
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TAYLOR, A. E., Epicurus. New York: Dodge Publishing Co., 19 10.

WALLACE, w.. Epicureanism. London: Society for the Promotion of Chris-
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ERIUGENA

BETT, H., Johannes Scotus Erigena. New York: The Macmillan Company,

1926.
ERHARDT-siEBOLD, E. VON and ERHARDT, R. VON, AstronoTfiy of Johannes

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GARDNER, A., Studies in John the Scot. New York: Oxford University

Press, 1900.
POOLE, R. L., Medieval thought, 2d edition. New York: Oxford University

Press, 1920.

HERACLITUS

BYWATER, I., Heracliti Ephesii reliquiae. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1877.

DiELs, H. (G. M. Stratton, ed.), Theophrastus and the Greek physiologi-
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GOMPERZ, H., Heraclitus of Ephesus. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1939.

wiNDELBAND, w., History of ancient philosophy , 3d edition. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.

ZELLER, E., Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy , 13th edition. New
York: Henry Holt & Company, 193 1.

NEO-PLATONISM

BIGG, c. Christian Platonists of Alexandria, 2d edition. New York: Oxford

University Press, 191 3.
DODD, E. R., Select passages illustrating Neoplatonism. New York: The

Macmillan Company, 1923.
GLOVER, T. R., Conflict of religions in the early Roman empire, 3d edition.

New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.
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Press, 191 7.
INGE, w. R., The philosophy of Plotinus, 2 vols. New York: Longmans,

Green & Company, 19 18.
JONES, R. M., Studies in ?nystical religion, 3d edition. New York: The Mac-
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TOLLiNTON, R. B., Alexandrine teaching on the universe. New York: The

Macmillan Company, 1932.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 531

OCKHAM

BIRCH, T. B., D& Sacramento altar is (in English). Burlington, Iowa: Luth-
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CARRE, M. H., Realists and nominalists. New York: Oxford University

Press, 1945.
DE wuLF, M., Philosophy and civilization in the Middle Ages. Princeton,

N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1922.
DE WULF, M., The spirit of ?nedieval philosophy . New York: Charles

Scribner's Sons, 1936.
JACOB, E. F., Some notes on Ockhajn as a political thinker. Manchester,

England: John Rylands Library, 1936.
MOODY, E. A., The logic of WilliaTn of Ockhain. New York: Sheed &

Ward, 1935.
TORNAY, s. c, Ockham, studies and selections. La Salle, 111.: The Open

Court Pub. Co., 1938.

ORIGEN

BIGG, c. Christian Platonists of Alexandria, 2d edition. New York: Oxford
University Press, 19 13.

CADiou, R., Origen, his life at Alexandria. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Com-
pany, 1944.

FAiRWEATHER, w., Origen and Greek patristic theology. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928.

FAYE, E., Origen and his work. New York: Columbia University Press,

1929-

RUST, G., A letter of resolution concerning Origen a?id the chief of his
opiniojis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1933.

.■: PHILO

CAIRO, E., The evolution of theology in the Greek philosophers. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1904.

coNYBEARE, F. c, PhUo'. About the contemplative life. New York: Oxford

-■•' .University Press, 1895.

GOODENOUGH, E. R., Introduction to Philo Judaeus. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1940.

GUTHRIE, K., The fnessage of Philo judaeus of Alexandria. Keansburg, N.
J.: The Platonist Press, 1909.

LiETZMANN, H., Beginnings of the Christian church. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1907.

scHURER, E., History of the Jewish people in the time of Jesus Christ, New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891.

UNDERHiLL, E., Mysticism. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 191 1.

532 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

woLFsoN, H. A., PhUo: Foundations of religious philosophy in Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam, i vols. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1947.

PLATO

ADAM, J., Vitality of Platonism. New York: The Macmillan Company,

1928.
BARKER, E., Greek political theory. New York: The Macmillan Company,

1919.
BURNET, J., Platonism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1928.
CORNFORD, F. M., Before and after Socrates. New York: The Macmillan

Company, 1932.
DEMOS, R., The philosophy of Plato. New York: Oxford University Press,

1925.
Dialogues of Plato, translated by Jowett. New York: Random House,

Inc., 1937.
FIELD, G. c, Plato and his contemporaries. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.,

1930.
LUTOSLAWSKI, w.. The origin and growth of Plato's logic. New York:

Longmans, Green & Company, 1897.
MORE, p. E., Religion of Plato. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University

Press, 192 1.
PATER, w. H., Plato and Platonis7n. New York: The Macmillan Company,

1908.
POST, L. A., Thirteen epistles of Plato. New York: Oxford University Press,

1925.
RiTTER, c, The essence of Plato's philosophy . New York: Dial Press, Inc.,

1936.
SHOREY, P., What Plato said. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933.
TAYLOR, A. E., Plato. Ncw York: Dial Press, Inc., 1936.
ZELLER, E., Plato and the older academ.y. New York: Longmans, Green &
. .■ Company, 1931.

PLOTINUS

CAiRD, E., The evolution of theology in the Greek philosophers. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1904.

FULLER, B. A. G., History of Greek philosophy , 3 vols., revised edition. New
York: Henry Holt & Company, 1945.

GUTHRIE, K. s., ed., Plotijzus: Co?nplete works, 4 vols. La Salle, 111.: The
Open Court Pub. Co.

INGE, w. R., Philosophy of Plotinus, 3d edition, 2 vols. New York: Long-
mans, Green & Company, 1929.

MORE, p. E., Hellenistic philosophers. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1923,

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 533

ZELLER, E., Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy, 13th edition. New
York: Henry Holt & Company, 193 1.

PYTHAGORAS

BURNET, J., Early Greek philosophy, 3d edition. New York: The Mac-

millan Company, 1920.
DiELs, H. (G. M. Stratton, ed.), Theophrastus and the Greek physiological

psychology before Aristotle, 2d edition. New York: The Mac-

millan Company, 19 17.
FABRE d'olivet, A.,The golden verses of Pythagoras. New York: G. P.

Putnam's Sons, 1925.
Gow, JAMES, A short history of Greek ?7iatheinatics. New York: G. E.

Stechert & Company, 1923.
GUTHRIE, K. s., Pythagoras. Keansburg, N. J.: The Platonist Press, 1920.
HEATH, T. L., A history of Greek mathematics. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 192 1.
MEAD, G. R. s., Orpheus. Keansburg, N. J.: The Platonist Press, 1896.
TAYLOR, T., Life of Pythagoras. Wheaton, 111.: Theosophical Press, 191 8.
ZELLER, E., Outlijies of the history of Greek philosophy, 13th edition. New

York: Henry Holt & Company, 193 1.

SKEPTICS

BEVAN, E. R., Stoics and Skeptics. New York: Oxford University Press,

1913-
PATRICK, M. M., The Greek Sceptics. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1929.

SOCRATES

BURNET, J., Greek philosophy, T hales to Plato. New York: The Macmillan

Company, 19 14.
coRNFORD, F. M., Before and after Socrates. New York: The Macmillan

Company, 1932.
DAWSON, M. M., The ethics of Socrates. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,

1924-
FORBES, J. T., Socrates, revised edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1913.
GOMPERZ, T., Greek thinkers, vol. 2. London: J. Murray, 1914.
GROTE, G., History of Greece (Everyman's library). New York: E. P. Dut-

ton & Co., 1907.
TAYLOR, A. E., Socratcs. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1939.
XENOPHON, Memorabilia. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1923.
ZELLER, E., Outlifies of the history of Greek philosophy, 13th edltiort.

New York: Henry Holt & Company, 193 1.

534 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

STOICS

ARNOLD, E. v., Roman Stoicism. New York: The Macmillan Company,

1911.
BEVAN, E. R., Stoics and Skeptics. New York: Oxford University Press,

1913-
DAVIS, c. H. s., Greek and Roman Stoicism and some of its disciples: Epic-

tetus, Seneca. Boston: Small, Maynard & Co., 1903.
MURRAY, G., Stoic phUosophj . New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.
GATES, w. J., Stoic and Epicurean philosophers. New York: Random

House, Inc., 1940.
WENLEY, R. M., Stoicism and its ififluejice. New York: Longmans, Green

& Company, 1927.

THALES

BURNET, J., Greek philosophy, Thales to Plato. New York: The Macmillan

Company, 19 14.
ZELLER, E., Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy , 13th edition. New

York: Henry Holt & Company, 193 1.

INDEX

Abbasid dynasty, 390
Abdera, school at, 68
Abelard, 404-412, 414-415
About disinterest (Eckhart), 498
Academy, at Athens, 103, 139, 141,

198 ff., 262, 273
Acheron, 38
ActuaHty, in Aristotle's metaphysics,

155 ff.
Adam of St. Victor, 421
Adelard of Bath, 417
Adoptionists, 376
Aenesidemus, 261, 262, 274-281
Afterlife, Greek concept of, 7-9;

Plato's concept of, 116 ff.; see

also Reincarnation
Against Celsus (Origen), 351
Agrigentum, 55
Agrippa, 262, 281
Alananus of Lille, 416
Alaric, 310

Albert of Saxony, 515
Albertus Magnus, 448-450; quoted, 449
Albigensians, 427 ff.
Albinus, 316
Alcibiades, 89-90
Alcidamas, 86
Alcmaeon, 27
Alcuin, 374-377
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 200
Alexander of Hales, 442-443

Alexander the Great, 140, 141, 192-

193, 390
Alexandria, 193, 292, 295
Alfarabi, 392-393
Al-Gazzali, 394
Alhazen, 391, 484
Al-Idrisi, 391
Al-Kindi, 391-392
Amalric of Bene, 417
Ambrose, 355
Anaxagoras, 62-66, 75, 76; influence of,

on Plato, 1 01; quoted, 63 ff.
Anaxarchus, 68

Anaximander, 18-21, 75; quoted, 20
Anaximenes, 21-22, 75; quoted, 21, 22
Andronicus of Rhodes, 200
Anselm, 383-387; quoted, 384 ff.
Anselm of Laon, 406 ff.
Anthropomorphism, 46, 76
Antinomies, Kant's discussion of, 54
Antiochus of Ascalon, 199, 273
Antipater, 229
Antiphon, 81, 86-87
Antisthenes, 196
Antonine emperors, 247
Apollonius, 193
ApoUonius of Tyana, 315
Apologists, the, 349
Apology (Plato), 104; (Socrates), 93-

94
Apuleius, 316

535

53<S

INDEX

Aquinas, Thomas, 450-471; influence
of, on Eckhart, 498; opposition to,
472 fJ.; quoted, 453 ff.

Arabic philosophy, 389 ff.

Arcesilaus, 198, 262, 269-270

Archelaus, 74-75

Archytas, 28

Aristagoras, 15

Aristippus, 197

Aristo, 228

Aristocles of Messana, 200

Aristophanes, 3, 61-62, 91-92

Aristotle, 10, 53, 64, 137-167, 168-191;
and Plato, 137 ff.; concept of God
of, 157-159; concept of Ideas of,
153; criticisms of, 153; esthetic...
theories of, 1 89-1 91; ethics of, 143,
144, 168-175; influence of, on:
Aquinas, 451 ff., Averrhoes, 395,
Bacon, 487, Boethius, 368, Chris-
tianity, 348, Jewish philosophy,
396, medieval universities, 439,
Moslem civilization, 391, Philo,
293, Stoicism, 225-226; life and
time of, 139-141; logical theories
of, 147-152; scientific theories of,
159-162; scope of knowledge of,
137-139; social philosophy of, 168-
191; works of, 141-143

Aristoxenus of Tarentum, 200

Arius, 343

Art, Aristotle's theory of, 144, 190-191;
Pythagorean definition of, 32

Asceticism, 10, 11; in Aquinas' system,
463; of Francis of Assisi, 424 ff.; of
Jacopone da Todi, 433; of Joachim
of Floris, 430 ff.; of Philo, 307; of
"Poor Men of Lyons," 427

Asia Minor, as site of Greek philoso-
phy, 14 ff.

Aspasia, 12, 63

Astronomy, of: Anaxagoras, 64-65;
Anaximander, 20; Anaximenes, 21-
22; Aristotle, 161 ff.; Atomists, 70-
71; Empedocles, 57; Heraclitus,
37; Pythagoreans, 31-32; Xeno-
phanes, 45

Athena, 3

Athenian civilization, 3 ff.

Athens, 56; culture of, 60-62; down-
fall of, 89-90; in 5th century b.c.,
78-81; relations of, with: Melos,
79 ff., Sparta, 89, 101-102

Athletic ideal, in Greek life, 10 ff.

Atomists, 22, P02-203; ^nd Eclectics,

67-77 ■" "

Atoms, Epicurus' theory of, 2ioff.
Atticus, 316

Aucassin et Nicolette, 426
Augustine, St., 344, 355-367; early life

of, 355-356; influence of, on:

Aquinas, 451 ff., Eckhart, 498;

quoted, 358 ff.; significance of,

366-367
-.^ugustinian Age, 347-371
-Augustus, 246
Aureoli, 509-510
Averrhoes, 391, 393-395, 484
Averrhoism, 476-477, 521-522
Avicebron, 396-398; quoted, 397-398
Avicenna, 393-394, 484

Bacon, Roger, 482-496; background of,
482-483 ; interest of, in technology,
489-492; life and works of, 483-
486; quoted, 490-491; scientific
theories of, 486 ff.; theories of, of
language, 489, 493-494

Balance of power, in Greece, 79 ff.

Ball, John, 519

Basilides, 342

Beatitudes, The, 339

Bede, 370

Bergson, Henri, 40, 51

Bernard of Chartres, 416

Bernard of Clairvaux, 404, 409, 412-
415, 426

Bernard of Gui, quoted, 428

Bernard of Tours, 417

Bevan, E. R., quoted, 272-273, 283-
284, 316 ff., 333 ff.

Bible, quoted, 287, 288, 289-290, 291,

339, 342

Birds, The (Aristophanes), 3

Blakney, R., quoted, 499 ff.

Boethius, 249, 345, 367-370, 440; influ-
ence of, on Eckhart, 498; quoted,
345, 369-370

INDEX

537

Bologna, university of, 438 £f.
Bonaventura, 445-446, 484; quoted,

445-446
Boniface, 516 ff.; quoted, 517
Book of divi?ie covifort (Eckhart),

498
Bradwardine, Thomas, 521
Buddhism, influence of, on Skeptics,

264
Buridan, John, 515, 521
Burnet, John, 83
Byzantine Church, 353-354

Cahgula, 246, 295

Caliphs, 390

Callicles, 81, 86

Callippus, 104

Canon of ?nedicme (Avicenna), 393

Cajiterbury tales (Chaucer), 440-441

Carneades, 198, 261, 262, 270-273

Carpocrates, 342

Cassander, 193

Cassiodorus, 370

Categories, of Aristotle, 147 ff.

Categories (Aristotle), 141

Catharsis, Aristotle's view of, 1 89

Catholic Church, Aquinas' view of,
470-471; Augustine's view of, 362-
363; decline of the, 516-517

Catullus, 248

Causality, Aristotle's doctrine of, 153-
154; problem of, 274 ff.

Cave, Plato's allegory of the, 107-108

Celsus, 440

Chaldean Oracles, 319

Charlemagne, 372 ff.; quoted, 372 ff.

Charmides (Plato), 104

Chartres, philosophers of, 416-417

Chaucer, quoted, 440-441

Christianity, growth of, 336 ff.; in
Roman Empire, 313; sources of,
347-348

Chrysippus, 229, 234

Church, decline of the, 516-517; see
also Catholic Church and Chris-
tianity

Church fathers. Western, 354 ff.

Cicero, 248, 249-251; influence of, on
Augustine, 356

Citizenship, Aristotle's theory of, 182
City of God, The (Augustine), 344,

358ff., 363ff.
City-states, Greek, 1 1
Claudius, 295
Cleanthes, 228-229
Clement, 349-350
Clement iv, 484
Clitomachus, 273

Clouds, The (Aristophanes), 91-92
Cocytus, 38

Cogitatio, stage of mysticism, 422
Comte, Auguste, 191
Commodus, 256, 309
Compendium stiidii philosophiae

(Bacon), 485
Co7isolation of philosophy , The

(Boethius), 345, 367 ff.
Constantine, 247, 310, 312
Contemplatio, stage of mysticism, 422
Contradiction, law of, 47
Copernicus, 32
Comford, F. M., quoted, 6, 7, 26,

29, 30, 39, 59 ff., 73, 79-80, 90 ff.,

98
Comutus, 231

Cosmologists, achievements of, 75
Cosmology, of: Anaxagoras, 63-65;

Aquinas, 458-459; Aristotle, 160-

161; Philo, 302; Plotinus, 320 ff.;

Pythagoreans, 30; Stoics, 235-237;

see also Astronomy
Crantor, 198
Crates of Athens, 198
Crates of Thebes, 197
Cratylus, 74, 102
Cratyhis (Plato), 105
Creation, according to Plato, 11 8-1 21
Critias (Plato), 105
Critique of pure reason (Kant), 54
Crito, 95-97
Crito (Plato), 104
Cur Deus homo (Anselm), 384
Cynicism, 11, 195-197, 225
Cynics, 196 ff., 225, 226; influence of,

on Skeptics, 264
Cyprian, 355
Cyrenaic philosophers, 197-198, 203;

influence of, on Skeptics, 264

538

INDEX

Damascius, 334-335

Dante, 28

Dark Ages, The, 370-371

David of Dinant, 417

Deane, S. N., quoted, 384 ff.

De anima (Aristotle), 142, 162 ff.

De caelo (Aristotle), 142

Decretmn (Gratian), 438

Deduction, method of, 152; Aristotle's,

166
Defense (Eckhart), 499
Definition, Aristotle's concept of, 149-

150
De la Poree, Gilbert, 415
Delphi, Oracle at, 3
Demeter, 8

Demetrius of Phaleris, 200
Democritus, 67 ff., 75, 76, 202, 203, 263
Demosthenes, 102
De poetica (Aristotle), 143
De rermn natura (Lucretius), 219-223
De sacramentis (Hugo), 421
Descartes, 3 1
Destruction of the philosophers, The

(Al-Gazzali), 394
Devil, medieval concept of, 345
Dewey, John, 40
Dialectic method, 49-50, 99
Dialogue between a philosopher, a Jew

and a Christian (Abelard), 411-

412
Diocletian, 247, 309-310, 312
Diogenes, 196-197
Diogenes Laertius, quoted, 29-30, 36,

37, 206 ff., 237 ff.
Diogenes of Apollonia, 22, 74, 75
Diogenes of Seleucia, 229
Dion, relationship of, with Plato, 103-

104
Dionysius the Areopagite, 353; influ-
ence of, on Eckhart, 498
Dionysus, 8-9
Dio of Prusa, 231
Divine comedy, The (Dante), 28
Donatus, 440
Dualism, in works of: Aristotle, 175;

Parmenides, 47; Plato, 100, 120-

121; Pythagoreans, 29-30; Xeno-

crates, 198

Duns Scotus, 473, 477-481
Durandus, 509
Dynamism, in universe, 36

Eckhart, Meister, 497-506

Eclectics, the, 315 ff-, 416; and Atom-
ists, 67-77

Eclipses, Aristophanes' theory of, 45;
Greek explanation of, 31; Hera-
clitus' theory of, 37

Education, theory of, of: Aristotle,
187 ff.; Bacon, 493-494; Boethius,
368; Greeks, 10 ff., Rabanus
Maurus, 377-378; Sophists, 82;
Spartans, 123-124; Stoics, 240

Einhard, 374

Eleatic philosophy, 46-54

Eleatics, the, 69, 75, 76; influence of,
on Plato, 1 01

Eleusinian Mysteries, 8-9

Elizabeth of Schonau, 420, 421

Elmpedocles, 55-60, 75, 76, 142

Ejineads (Plotinus), 321 ff.

Ephesus, 34-35 ->j

Epictetus, 231, 253-255^ -quoted, 253 ff.

Epicureanism, 202^23; influence of,
on: Moslem world, 391, Philo, 293,
Skeptics, 264; significance of, 222-
223; sources of, 202-204

Epicurus, 204 ff .

Epistemology, of: Elmpedocles, 58-59;
Epicurus, 205 ff.; Plato, 105 ff.;
Stoics, 233

Erasistratus, 265

Eratosthenes, 193

Eriugena, 380-383; quoted, 382 ff.

Error, problem of, according to Plato,
112

Esthetics, of: Aristotle, 1 89-191; Plo-
tinus, 328 ff.; Pythagoreans, 32

Ethical characters (Theophrastus), 199

Ethics, of: Aquinas, 463-464, 469-470;
Aristotle, 143, 144, 168-175; Atom-
ists, 71-73; Epicurus, 215-219;
Heraclitus, 38-40; medieval Chris-
tianity, 343 ff.; Ockham, 512;
Philo, 305-307; Plotinus, 328 ff.;
Socrates, 97-99; Sophists, 82-83;
Stoics, 237-240; Xenophanes, 43 ff.

INDEX

539

Euclid, 193, 195

Eudemus of Rhodes, 200

Eudorus of Alexandria, 316

Euphrates, 231

Euripides, 12, 87; quoted, 12

Eurytus, 28

Euthydemus (Plato), 104

Euthypbro (Plato), 104

Evil, problem of, 16; in writings of:
Eriugena, 383; Maimonides, 401-
402; Plotinus, 330-331; Stoics, 243

Evolution of man, 19-20; Anaxagoras'
theory of, 65; Empedocles' theory

of, SI
Ejcperimental science, Bacon's interest
in, 495-496

Faith, principle of, as advanced by
Apostle Paul, 340-341; in writ-
ings of: Aquinas, 461 ff.; Anselm,
348 ff.; Augustine, 357 ff.; Boethius,
369; Ockham, 515; Philo, 293, 294,
305 ff.; Sufists, 394

Fallacies, Aristotle's view of, 151-152

Faust (Goethe), 30

Feudalism, breakdown of, 508

Figulus, 315

Fire, as basic world-stuff, 36, 224

Flavian emperors, 246-247

Force, Stoic concept of, 236

Form and matter, in Aristotle's meta-
physics, 155 ff.

Forms, in Plato's philosophy, iioff.

Fountain of life (Avicebron), 396

Fount of knowledge (John of Damas-
cus), 353

Four books of sentences (Peter Lom-
bard), 416

Franciscan Order, 424 ff .

Francis of Assisi, 420, 422-426

Frankfort, council of, 374, 376

Free will, doctrine of, 361; in writ-
ings of: Aquinas, 463; Bacon,
493; Boethius, 369-370; Epicurus,
211 ff.; Origen, 352 ff.; Pelagius,
361

Friendship, Aristotle's concept of,
172 ff.

Froissart, quoted, 519

Gabirol, Solomon Ibn, 396-398

Galen, 440

Galileo, 32

Gaunilo, 385

Geocentric hypothesis, in Aristotle's
system, 167

Geology, Xenophanes' concept of, 45

Geometry, elaborated by Pythagor-
eans, 31

Gertrude the Great, 421

Glossa ordinaria (Strabo), 379

Gnostics, 342-343

God, concept of, in philosophy of:
Alfarabi, 392-393; Anselm, 386-
387; Aquinas, 453-458; Aristotle,
157-159; Duns Scotus, 480; Eck-
hart, 499 ff.; Greeks, 2 ff.; He-
brews, 2, 286 ff.; Ockham, 511,
512; Philo, 299 ff.; Plato, 11 4-1 16;
Stoics, 236, 241 ff.

Godfrey of Fontaines, 474

Golden Age, 5 flF.

Golden Mean, 10, 187

Good, concept of the, in Plato, 112-
113; problem of the, 1 68 ff .

Gorgias, 17, 81, 84-85, 105

Government, in philosophy of: Aqui-
nas, 467-469; Aristotle, 1 82 ff .;
Roman, 246

Gracchi brothers, 3 1 1

Grace, Christian doctrine of, 341, 361-
362

Gratian, 438, 440

Greek-Persian relations, 79

Greek philosophy, beginning of, 14-23

Greek spirit, 1-12, 138

Gregory 11, Pope, 353

Gregory ix. Pope, 439

Gregory x. Pope, 485

Grosseteste, Robert, 443-445; quoted,
444 ff.

Guide for the perplexed, The (Mai-
monides), 399

Hadrian, 247

Halevi, Judah, 398-399

Happiness, Aristotle's concept of,

169 ff.
Harding, Stephen, 412

540

INDEX

Harmonics, 77; Pythagorean contribu-
tion to, 32
Healey, John, quoted, 358 ff.
Hebrews, 286 fif.; influence of, on

Christianity, 348
Hecato of Rhodes, 230-231
Hegel, 40
Hegesias, 198
Hellenistic Age, 1 1 ; intellectual traits

of, 193-195; philosophy in, 192-

201; religion in, 9
Heloise, 407-408, 409-410
Henry of Ghent, 473-474
Heraclides of Pontus, 198
Heraclides of Tarent, 265
Heraclitus, 16, 34-41, 75, loi, 224, 263;

quoted, 35 ff.
Heresies, in early Christianity, 342 ff.
Heretics, i2th-centur>', 417-418
Herillus, 228
Hermeias, 140
Hermetic writings, 319
Herophilus, 265
Hesiod, 5 ff., 44; quoted, 6 ff.
Hicks, G. D., quoted, 206 ff., 237 ff.
Hillel, 338
Hippias, 85

Hippocrates, 20, 21, 22, 265, 440
Hippodamus, 27-28
Hippolytus, quoted, 70 ff.
Hippolytus (Euripides), 87
Hippon, 73-75
Historia anmialiuin (Aristotle), 142,

162
Historia calamitatmn (Abelard), 415
History, concept of, of: Aquinas,

464-465; Augustine, 364, 366-367;

Philo, 304-305
Holy Roman Empire, 373
Homer, 7, 44

Honorius, 310, 315; quoted, 315
Horace, 249

Hugo of St. Victor, 420 ff.
Humanism, in Aristotle, 175
Humanitarianism, in Stoicism, 240, 241
"HumUiati," 428-429
Huss, John, 519-520
Hymn to Zeus (Cleanthes), 228-229
Hypatia, 335

lamblichus, 25-26, 333-334; quoted, 26
Idea of the Good, Plato's, 11 2-1 13
Ideal man, of Aristotle, 171; of Epi-
curus, 218-219
Ideal state, of: Aristotle, 181 ff.; Philo,

304-305; Plato, 127 ff.; Zeno, 227
Ideas, doctrine of the, 93, iioff., 121
Identity of opposites, theory of, 34, 36
Immortality, Greek view of, 7-9; Stoic
belief in, 234; see also Reincarna-
tion
Indifferentism, defined, 406, 417
Induction, method of, 152
Infinity, Aristotle's view of, 160
Intellectuality, medieval, 345-346
Introduction to the eternal gospel

(Joachim), 432
Introduction to theology (Abelard),

408
Intuition, Aristotle's stress on, 151;
Plato's theory of, 106-107; see also
Mysticism
Irenaeus, 354
Imerius, 438, 440
Isidore of Seville, 370-371
Islam, 389 ff .

Jacopone da Todi, 420, 432-435;

quoted, 434-435
Jehovah, 286 ff.
Jerome, 355
Jerome of Ascoli, 485
Jesus Christ, 337 ff., 470-471
Jewish philosophy, foundations of

medieval, 395 ff.
Joachim of Floris, 430-433
John de la Rochelle, 443
John of Damascus, 353-354
John of Jandun, 521-522
John of Mirecourt, 520
John of Salisbury, 415-416, 470
Jowett, quoted, 93 ff.
Julian, 313-314; quoted, 313 ff.
Julius Caesar, 246, 248, 249
Jus gentium, 246

Justice, Aristotle's concept of, 171 ff.
Justinian, 246, 335
Justin Martyr, 349
Juvenal, 249

INDEX

54»

Kant, Immanuel, 54

Kierkegaard, 92

Knights, The (Aristophanes), quoted,

61-62
Knowledge, theory of, in writings of:

Aquinas, 461-462; Philo, 295-299;

Plato, 105 flf.
Koran, the, 389

Laches (Plato), 104

Lactantius, 349

Language, Bacon's view of, 489, 493-

494; Plato's theory of, 105
Lauda 90 (Jacopone), 434-435
Law, Aquinas' philosophy of, 465-466;

Plato's theory of, 105; Roman,

245-246
Law of contradiction, 47
Laws (Plato), 105
Leibniz, 191, 476
Leo III, Pope, 353, 373
Leucippus, 67 ff .
Lewy, quoted, 296 ff .
Libanius, 313

Life of Plotinus (Porphyry), 322
Limited, Pythagorean concept of the,

30
Literary criticism, in Aristotle, 143
Literature, Roman, 248-249
Livy, 249

Locke, as contrasted with Plato, 109
Logic, Aristotle's theories of, 144, 147-

152
Logos, doctrine of the, 235; Christian,

40; Heraclitus' view of, 37-38;

Philo's use of, 293, 301-302
Lollards, 519
Lombard, Peter, 416, 440
Long, George, quoted, 253 ff.
Love is all (Catullus), 248
Lucian, 282-284; quoted, 283-284
Lucretius, 214, 219-222, 248, 249;

quoted, 2i9ff.
Lully, Raymond, ^^1^-^16
Lyceum, in Athens, 141, 199
Lydians, 14-15
Lysander, 90
Lysimachus, 193
Lysis (Plato), 104

iMacedonia, 139; supremacy of, 102

Alaimonides, 396, 399-403

Alan, Hesiod's "races" of, 6 ff.

Alani, 343

Alanichaeans, 343, 427; influence of,
on Augustine, 356

Marcus Aurelius, 231, 247, 255-259;
quoted, 256 ff.

Marinus, 334

Marius, 246

Marsiglio of Padua, 518

Martial, 249

Alartin, T., quoted, 248

Aiathematics, in philosophy of: Aris-
totle, 144; Bacon, 494-495; Plato,
121; Pythagoreans, 31

Matthew of Aquasparta, 447-448

Matter and form, in Aristotle's meta-
physics, 155 ff.

Maxims, Aristotle's use of, 180

Maximus of Tyre, 316-317

AdcKeon, R. P., quoted, 444 ff ., 477 ff .

Mean, the Golden, 170 ff.

Mechthild of Alagdeburg, 421

Medea (Euripides), 12

A'ledicine, Greek, 264-265

Meditatio, stage of mysticism, 422

Meditations (Marcus Aurelius), 256 ff.

Megaric school, 195-197, 225; influ-
ence of, on Skeptics, 264

Alelians, 79 ff.

Alelissus, 52-54, 75; influence of, on
Plato, 101; quoted, 52 ff.

Alenander, 194

Alenedemus of Eretria, 196

Meno (Plato), 104, 109

Menodotus, 282

Metaphysics, beginning of, 42-54; in
writings of: Aristotle, 144, 151,
152-157, 166-167; Epicurus, 210 ff.
Heraclitus, 40; Alaimonides, 399 ff.
Philo, 299-302; Plotinus, 322 ff.
Pythagoreans, 30; Stoics, 232 ff.
Zeno, 227

Metaphysics (Aristotle), 143, 144 ff.,
152 ff., 162

Meteorologica (Aristotle), 142

Methodology, Aristotle's stress on,
150

542

INDEX

Metxodorus, 74

Metxodorus of Chios, 68

Middle Stoa, the, 229-231

Milesians, achievements of the, 22-23

Miletus, 14-15, 34

Minores, the, 424

Minucius Felix, 349

Missi dominici, 374

Moderatus of Gades, 315

Mohammed, 389-390

Mohammedan culture, 390-391

Mohammedanism, 389 ff.

Monism, in: Aristotle, 155; Avicebron,

396 ff.; Euclid, 195; Melissus, 53;

Parmenides, 47; Zeno, 51
Monologimn (Anselm), 384
Monotheism, in Mohammedanism, 390;

of Philo, 299 ff .; of Xenophanes,

44
Montanists, 343
Morality, in Greek religion, 8-9; in

system of: Augustine, 360-362;

Eckhart, 501-505; Lucretius, 221;

see also Ethics
Moslems, 389 ff.
Motion, Anaximander's theory of, 19;

Aristotle's classification of, 160;

Epicurus' theory of, 210 ff.
Music, Pythagorean ideas about, 32
Musonius Rufus, 231
Mystery religions, 8-9, 16, 28-29, 39~

40, 59-60, 93
Mysticism, in writings of: Al-Gazzali,

394; Anselm, 387; Avicebron, 397;

Eckhart, 504-505; Plato, 106-107;

stages of, 419, 421-422
Mysticism and logic (Russell), 51-52
Mystics, of Middle Ages, 419-436

Nahm, M. C, quoted, 19 ff., 35ff., 43ff.,
47 ff., 50 ff ., 57 ff ., 63 ff., 69 ff.

Naturalism, in Epicurus, 2 1 5 ff .

Natural science, in Aristotle, 144, i62ff.

Nature, Aristotle's concept of, 154-155;
Eriugena's classification of, 381-

383
Neo-Platonism, 109, 320-335; influence
of, on: Augustine, 356; Averrhoes,
395; Boethius, 368; Christianity,

348; Eckhart, 498; Eriugena, 383;

Jewish philosophy, 396; Moslem

culture, 391, 392, 393
Neo-Pythagoreans, 315 ff.
Nero, 246

Nicaea, council of, 343
Nicholas of Autrecourt, 520
Nicholas of Oresme, 515
Nicomachean ethics (Aristotle), 143,

168 ff.
Nichomachus of Gerasa, 315
Nietzsche, 10, 92
Nominalism, in Cynic philosophy, 196;

in Middle Ages, 509
Nominalists, 12th-century, 404 ff.
Nous, 63 ff., 324 ff.
Numbers, mystical belief in, 27-28, 31,

419 ff.
Numenius, 317-319; quoted, 318-319
Numerology, 420 ff.

Ockham, 510-515; quoted, 512 ff.

Ockhamist movement, 514-515

Odysseus, 7

Olympic Games, 10

Ommiad rulers, 390

On generation and corruption (Aris-
totle), 142

On interpretation (Aristotle), 141

On nature (Epicurus), 205

On sophistical refutations (Aristotle),
142

On the generation of animals (Aris-
totle), 142

On the heavens (Aristotle), 142, 159,
161 ff.

On the parts of animals (Aristotle),
142

On the soul (Aristotle), 142

Opus majus (Bacon), 485, 489, 496

Opus minus (Bacon), 485

Opus tertiuni (Bacon), 485

Opus tripartitum (Eckhart), 499

Oracle at Delphi, 3

Oratory, Aristotle's discussion of,
i76ff.

"Order of Continents or Penitents,"
424

Organon (Aristotle), 141

INDEX

543

Origen, 350-353; quoted, 351 ff.
Orphic Mysteries, 8-9, 28-29, 93
Ovid, 249

Paedagogus (Clement), 349

Palace School, at Aachen, 375 fT.

Palestine, 337

Panaetius of Rhodes, 229-230

Pan-Hellenic Union, 17-18, 140

Pan-Ionian Confederation, 17

Pantheistic heretics, 12th-century, 417-

418
Paradoxes, 76; of Zeno, 51-52
Paris, university of, 438 ff.
Parmenides, 46-49, 75; influence of, on

Plato, 1 01; quoted, 47 ff.
Parmenides (Plato), 105, 110-112
Parva naturalia (Aristotle), 142
Pascal, 31
Patriarchies, 1 1 ff .
Paul, the Apostle, 339-342
Paulus Diaconus, 374
Pavlov, 155

Peace, Heraclitus' opinion of, 38
Peckham, John, 474-475
Pelagius, 361

Peloponnesian War, 80, 90
Perfection, Maimonides' classification

of, 400 ff .
Periander, 15
Periclean Age, 60-62
Pericles, 52, 63, 65-66, 78, 89; funeral

oration of, 60-61
Peripatetics, the, 199-201
Persaeus, 228
Persephone, 8
Persians, 15, 79
Pessimism, in Hebrew religion, 291-

292; of Heraclitus, 38
Peter of Bruys, 410
Peter of Pisa, 274
Peter the Venerable, 409
Phaedo of Elis, 195-196
Phaedo (Plato), 105, 11 7-1 18
Phaedrus (Plato), 105
Phalaris, 55
Phidias, 60, 63
Philebus (Plato), 105
Philip IV, 576 ff.

Philip of Macedonia, 102, 140

Philip of Opus, 198

Philo, 40, 286-308; Aristotle's influence
on, 293; concept of God of, 299 ff.;
cosmology of, 302; doctrine of
faith in, 293, 294, 305 ff.; Epicurean
influence on, 293; ethics of, 305-
307; metaphysics of, 299-302;
quoted, 296 ff.

PhUolaus, 27

Philo of Larissa, 199, 273

Philology, Bacon's regard for, 493-494

Philoponus, 200

Philosophy, Alcuin's definition of, 376-
377; Aristotle's definition of, 146;
beginning of Greek, 14-23; divi-
sion of Aristotle's, 143-147; Epi-
curus' definition of, 208 ff.; PhUo's
concept of, 294; Plato's concept
of, 113-114; Pythagorean defini-
tion of, 26; rebirth of, in Middle
Ages, 372-387; Roman spirit of,
245-260; Socrates' concept of, 97-
99; Stoic concept of, 226, 232-235

Physical science, Aristotle's theories
of, 142, 159-162; Sophist view of, 82

Physics (Aristotle), 142 ff., 152 ff.

Pisistratus, 15

Plague of Athens, 89

Plato, 10, 16, 17, 54, 64, 81, 90, 100-12 1,
322; and Aristotle, 137 ff.; concept
of Ideas of, 152-153; esthetic theo-
ries of, 189; influence of, on:
Augustine, 356, Boethius, 368,
Christianity, 348, Philo, 293, Skep-
tics, 264, Stoics, 225; quoted, 93 ff.,
126 ff.; works of, 104-105

Plautus, 248

Pleasure, Aristotle's theory of, 172 ff.;
Epicurus' definition of, 216

Plotinus, 320-332; belief of, in rein-
carnation, 327 ff.; cosmology of,
320 ff.; ethics of, 328 ff.; meta-
physics of, 322 ff.

Pluralism, philosophy of, 55-66; in
Anaxagoras, 65

Pliurality of worlds, 19; Atomists'
theory of, 69-70

Plutarch, quoted, 38-39, 57, 69 ff., 316

544

INDEX

Poetics (Aristotle), 143

Political philosophy, of: Aquinas, 464-

465; Aristotle, 143, 1 81-189; Ock-

ham, 513-514
Politics (Aristotle), 143
Politicus (Plato), 105
Polycrates, 24
Polycraticus (John of Salisbury), 416,

470
Polytheism, Greek, 2 flf.
"Poor Clares," 424
"Poor Men of Lyons," 427
Porphyry, 321, 322, 332-333; quoted,

333 ff.

Posidonius of Rhodes, 230, 242

Posterior analytics (Aristotle), 142, 151

Potentiality, in Aristotle's metaphysics,
155 ff.

Pragmatism, of Sophists, 83

Predestination, belief in, of: Augus-
tine, 361-362; Boethius, 369-370;
Eriugena, 381

Prior analytics (Aristotle), 141-142

Priscian, 440

Proclus, 334

Prodicus, 85-86

Prophets, Hebrew, 288-290, 338; in
Mohammedanism, 390

Proslogiimi (Anselm), 384-385

Protagoras, 81, 83-84

Protagoras (Plato), 104

Protrepticiis (Aristotle), 139; (Clem-
ent), 349

Psellus, Michael, 354

Ptolemy, 193

Pyrrho, 262, 264, 267-268

Pythagoras, 24-27, 76; influence of, on
Plato, 100

Pythagoreans, 22, 25, 75; philosophy
of, 24-33; science of, 30-32; the-
ology of, 28-30

Rabanus Maurus, 377-379

Races of man, Hesiod's, 6 ff .

Ravaisson, 191

Realists, of 12th centur>% 404 ff.

Reality, concept of, of: Anaxagoras,
109; Epicurus, 2iotf.; Gorgias,
109; Plato, 109 ff.; Sophists, 109

Reason, Aquinas' concept of, 461 ff.;
Aristotle's distinction between ac-
tive and passive, 165-166; Stoic
theory of, 234, 235

Reincarnation, 76, 116; Albigensian be-
lief in, 428; Empedocles' theory
of, 59-60; Plotinus' belief in,
327 ff.; Xenophanes' view of, 44

Relativity, theory of, 34

Religion, of: Anaxagoras, 65; Aris-
totle, 157-159; Atomists, 72-73;
Empedocles, 59-60; Epicurus, 212-
215; Greeks, 2-7; Hebrews, 286 ff.;
Heraclitus, 39-40; PhUo, 299 ff .;
Plato, 1 1 4- 1 16, 137; Plotinus,
327 ff.; Socrates, 90; Stoics, 241-
243; Xenophanes, 43-44; see also
Catholic Church, Faith, Moham-
medanism, Mysticism

Renouvier, 191

Republic (Plato), 105; (Zeno), 227

Revolution, Aristotle's theory of, i84fT.

Rhetoric, Aristotle's, 143, 175-181;
Sophist view of, 82

Richard of Middleton, 475

Richard of St. Victor, 421, 422

Roman Empire, 245 ff.

Roman law, 245-246

Roman literature, 248-249

Roman philosophy, 245-260

Roman Stoicism, 231-232, 259-260

Rome, decline of, 247-248; 309 ff.

Roscellinus, 405

Royal crown, The (Avicebron), 397-
398

Russell, Bertrand, 51-52, 92-93

Rusticus, 231-232

Sappho, 12

Saxon capitularies, of Charlemagne,
372 ff.

Scholasticism, 417-418, 437-450, 483;
disintegration of, 507 ff .

Science, attitude toward, of: Aquinas,
461; Aristotle, 151; Augustine, 363;
Bacon, 486 ff.; medieval period,
488-489; Milesians, 22-23; Mo-
hammedans, 391; Ockham, 512-
513; Plato, 106; Pythagoreans, 26

INDEX

545

Seleucus Nicator, 193

Seneca, 231, 249, 251-253

Sens, council of, 409

Sense perception, Aristotle's discus-
sion of, 164-165; Empedocles'
theory of, 58-59; Epicurus' view
of, 205 ff .; Skeptic theory of,
274 ff.; Stoic concept of, 234-235

Septimius Severus, 309

Servatus Lupus, 379

Sextus Empiricus, 262, 282; quoted, 73,
272 ff.

Short physical treatises (Aristotle), 142

Sic et non (Abelard), 411, 487

Siger of Brabant, 477

suit (Timon), 268-269

Simplicius, 19, 200, 335

Skeat, W. W., quoted, 441

Skepticism and Skeptics, 261-285;
achievements of, 284-285; enemies
of, 266; in Augustine's philosophy,
356; influence of, on: Moslem
civilization, 391, PhUo, 293; of
Sophists, 83; origin of, 262-265;
significance of, 261-262

Social philosophy, of: Philo, 303-305;
Socrates, 98-99; Sophists, 82;
Stoics, 240-241

Socrates, 81, 89-99, 102, 224-225, 288;
death of, 95-97; influence of, on:
Plato, loi. Skeptics 263-264; re-
ligion of, 90-91

Socratic series, of Plato, 104-105

Sophists, 60, 78-88, 203; and Socrates,
97-98; attitude of, toward problem
of evil, 243-244; influence of, on:
Philo, 293, Plato, loi. Skeptics,
263; significance of, 87-88

Sophist (Plato), 105

Sophocles, 4, 52

Soul, concept of the, of: Aquinas, 459-
461; Aristotle, 162 ff.; Augustine,
359 ff.; Epicurus, 214-215; Hera-
clitus, 39; Plato, 116-118; Plotinus,
326 ff.; Stoics, 234; Thales, 18

Space, Aristotle's discussion of, 160;
Stoic concept of, 236

Sparta, education in, 123-124; relations
of, with Athens, 89, 101-102

Speculation, Aristotle's stress on, 146-

Speusippus, 198

Spinoza, 166

States, Aristotle's catalogue of, 182 ff.

Statesjnan (Plato), 105 /

Stilpo of Megara, 195

St. Martin's at Tours, 376, 377

Stoa Poikile, 227

Stobaeus, quoted, 72, 228-229

Stoics and Stoicism, 40, 224-244; cos-
mology of, 235-237; ethics of, 237-
240; ideal of philosophy of, 226;
influence of, on: Boethius, 368, on
Christianity, 348; Old, 226-227;
origins of, 224-226; religious ideals
of, 241-243; Roman, 231-232; so-
cial philosophy of, 240-241; Soc-
rates and, 93

Strabo, 379-380

Strato of Lampsacus, 200

Stromateis (Clement), 349

Subjectivity, in religion, 3 ff .

Substance, Aristotle's category of,
148 ff.

Sufism, 391, 394

Sulla, 246

Simmia contra Gentiles (Aquinas), 453

Sinmna theologica (Aquinas), 453

Supernaturalism, Christian belief in,
347ff.

Superstition, Theophrastus' denuncia-
tion of, 199-200

Syllogisms, in Aristotle's works, 141-
142, 150; use of, in Middle Ages,
150-151

Symposium (Plato), 105

Syracuse, golden era of, 104

Tacitus, 247, 249

Talks of i?istriiction, The (Eckhart),

498
Tanchelm, 410
Technology, Bacon's interest in, 489-

492
Ten Commandments, The, 288-289
Terence, 248
Tertullian, 342, 354
Thales, 14, 16-18, 75

546

INDEX

Theaetetus (Plato), 105

Thebes, supremacy of, 102

Theodoric of Chartres, 416-417

Theodorus, 197

Theodosius, 310, 314-315; quoted,

314 ff-

Theognis, quoted, 4

Theology, of: Aquinas, 453-458; Ba-
con, 487-488; Pythagoreans, 28-30

Theophrastus, 140- 141, 199-200;
quoted, 58 flf., 65

Theron, 55

Thirty Tyrants, 90

Thrasyllus, 316

Thrasymachus, 86

Thucydides, quoted, 60-61, 79-80, 87

Timaeus (Plato), 105

Time, Aristotle's discussion of, 160;
Stoic concept of, 236

Timoleon, 104

Timon, 262, 268-269

Tolerance, in Greece, 1-12

Topics (Aristotle), 142

Tomay, quoted, 512 ff.

Tragedy, as art form, 189-190

Trajan, 247

Transmigration of the soul, see Rein-
carnation

Truth, Aristotle's definition of, 152;
Heraclitus' view of, 35; Plato's
concept of, 112

Tumbull, quoted, 322 ff.

Tyrants, 15-16; Aristotle's advice to,
i84ff.

Underhill, E., quoted, 434-435

Unity, foundations of medieval, 336-

346
Universalism, in Philo's works, 308; in

Stoic philosophy, 240-241
Universities of the Middle Ages,

437 ff.
Unlimited, Pythagorean concept of

the, 30
Utopias, Aristotle's opinion of, 182,

187 ff.; see also Ideal state

Valentinus, 342

Validity, Aristotle's definition of, 152

Vandals, 310

Vergil, 249

Vienne, council of, 494

Virtue, concept of, of: Aquinas, 463;

Aristotle, 170 ff.; Cynics, 196;

Eckhart, 502 ff.; Epicurus, 217-

218; Stoics, 237 ff.
Vision, Empedocles' theory of, 58

Waldensians, 426-428

Waldo, 426 ff .

War, Aquinas' philosophy of, 468;

Heraclitus' opinion of, 38
Way of opinion, The (Parmenides),

46-47
Way of truth, The (Parmenides), 47
Webster, H., quoted, 60 ff., 199-200,

228-229, 372 ff-, 428, 517, 519
Wettin, vision of, 379-380
Will, Stoic concept of the, 234; see

also Free will
William of Auvergne, 441-442
William of Champeaux, 405 ff.
William of Conches, 417
World-stuff, concept of, of: Anaxi-

mander, 18-19; Anaximenes, 21;

Atomists, 68-69; Heraclitus, 35-

37; Melissus, 52-53; Parmenides,

48-49; Sophists, 83; Stoics, 236;

Thales, 18; Xenophanes, 45; Zeno,

50
Wycliffe, John, 518-520

Xenocrates, 198

Xenophanes, 16, 42-46, 76, 262; quoted,

43 ff., 90 ff .
Xenophon, quoted, 90-91, 98

Yaqut, 391

Zangwill, Israel, quoted, 397-398
Zeno, 49-52, 76; influence of, on Plato,

loi; quoted, 50 ff.
Zeno (founder of Stoicism), 195, 226-

227
Zeno of Tarsus, 229
Zeus tragoedus (Lucian), 283-284
Zoology, Aristotle's classification of,

162-163

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JAN 0 Q 198:

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History of ancient & medieval philo main
180.9M468hC.2

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