Copyright N°_
COPYKIGHT DEPOSIT.
HISTORY
OF THE
Army of the Cumberland
ITS
ORGANIZATION, CAMPAIGNS, AND BATTLES
WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE fl. THOMAS
CB,„LV MOM HIS PR.V.TK M.L.TAKY «»»" «» "™^ «» O™"
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED BY HIM
BY
THOMAS B. A 7 AN HORNE, TL S. A.
ILLUSTRATED WITH
CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE MAPS
COMPILED BY
EDWARD pUGEE
LATE SUPERINTENDENT MKOUmCAI ENGINEER'S O^XCE, HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND
TTrO VOLUMES AND ATLAS
VOL. II
CINCINNATI
ROBERT CLARKE & CO
1875
C , H
I according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875,
Tims. B. VAX HORNE AND EDWARD RUGER.
In tho Office of the Librarian of Congress, at "Washington.
ped by OGDEN, Campbell & Co., Cincinnati.
CONTENTS VOL. II.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Campaign in East Tennessee, and Minor Operations in the Depart-
ment or the Cumberland 1
CHAPTER XXIV.
General View of the Status of the Conflict at the Close of 1868. 8
CHAPTER XXV.
Operations in the Department during January, February, and
March, 1864, and Preparations for Aggression 13
CHAPTER XXVI.
The Turning of Dalton 41
CHAPTER XXVII.
Battle of Resaca ..~- 64
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Advance to the Etowah River — The Turning of Alatoona — Bat-
tles near New Hope Church 71
CHAPTER XXIX.
Operations near Kenesaw Mountain, including the Battle at
Kulp's House, Assault of the Mountain, and the Flank Move-
ment 86
(iii)
: BNTS.
(II M'N K XXX.
amav! ■ i re-. Battle of Peachtkbe Creek 109
-
CHAPTEB XXXI.
123
OHAPTEK XXXII.
Tin: Pi urxMovEMI ST8,C1 , m,na. in. mn thi: Battle of Jonesboro and
I MI OV A .IAN 1A
OHAPTEK XXXIII.
■1 LW ,, or the Opposing Armies to the North, and the Evolu-
. .1 New Campaigns 1°^
OHAPTEB XXXIV.
The Remstasoi G kai. Hood's advance from the Tennessee
Kivlk. . rr.Mi.\ atim; in the Battle of Franklin 186
CHAPTER XXXV.
i.i: ,.]■ N ami vi i. i.k, a\i> Trust it of the Routed Enemy 222
CHAPTER XXXVI.
Operations having Relation more or less intimate with
i Hi: Main A KMT DURING NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER .... 270
CHAPTER XXXVII.
M \k< ii to the ^i.a. and the Capture of the Citt of Savannah,
.iv 278
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
i thkougb the carolina^, from savannah to goldsboro and
Raleigh — The Battles op Avertsboro and Bentonville 306
CHAPTER XXXIX.
\i George Stoneman's Cavalry Operations in Tennessee and
N'.kth Carolina 337
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XL.
General J. H. Wilson's Cavalry Operations in Alabama and
Georgia ...
CHAPTER XLT.
Capture ok the Confederate President
CHAPTER XLII.
The Dissolution oe the Army-Summary of its Achievements 369
CHAPTER XLIII.
377
The Dead and their Disposition
APPENDIX.
Organization of Department of the Cumberland 381
Organization of Department of the Ohio 3 &>
List of Officers of Army of the Cumberland who were Killed
in Action or Died of Wounds or Disease during the War... o8G
The Engineer Service in the Army of the Cumberland 439.
HISTORY
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND
CHAPTER XXIII.
CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE AND MINOR OPERATIONS IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND.
General Burnside had been informed that he should have
help as soon as practicable, when first it was known that Gen-
eral Longstreet had been sent against him. General Grant
said to him that he could hardly conceive the necessity of re-
treating from East Tennessee. But as the issue at Chatta-
nooga, though glorious in its coming, had been delayed, it
became imperative at once to make effort to raise the siege of
Knoxville.
November 29th, General Howard marched from Parker's
Gap to Cleveland, taking the lead in the movement upon
Knoxville. He was followed immediately by General Sher-
man's three divisions, under General F. P. Blair, and General
Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps. On the 30th; Gen-
eral Granger left Chattanooga with two divisions of the Fourth
Corps for the same destination.
Brigadier-General Elliot, who had recently been appointed
chief of cavalry in the Department of the Cumberland, and
who had concentrated the troops of his first division at Sparta,
moved in conjunction with the infantry forces. Colonel
VOL. II — 1
2 CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE, ETC.
brigade moved to the head of the column, and on the
December, the Fifteenth Pennsylvania and Tenth Ohio
dry lefl Chattanooga fior Kingston. Colonel Spears' bri-
{ )., Al had been previo .sly Btationedon the north bank of
i ver above Chattanooga, also moved toward
K noxv ij era! Sherman's command embraced more than
• divisions of infantry, while five were left to garrison
Chattam ?a. Supplies tor the troops in motion were .sent up
the river on the steamer Dunbar, but the main dependence
- upon the country.
the 30th, General Howard advanced from Cleveland to
Charleston, on the Hiawassee river. As he approached the
town, tli- enemy's cavalry retreated toward Athens. They
had previously partially destroyed the railroad bridge, andhad
made efforl to destroy the pontoons also. But a large num-
ber of Hi" boats were saved, and during the following night
the railroad bridge was repaired and planked over, so that in
the morning the Eleventh Corps passed over, followed by the
The head of column reached Athens the next
evening. The inarch of the infantry was resumed on the 2d
and Colonel Long hurried on to Loudon to save the bridge, if
possible. He, however, found the enemy in such force that he
could not make a dash, as had been anticipated. The town
was well fortified, and was held by infantry and artillery, un-
der General Vaughan, and he could only skirmish until Gen-
eral Howard should get up. The latter reached the position
on the 3d, hut the enemy had evacuated it the night previous,
having first destroyed the bridge, three locomotives, and from
sixty to seventy-five cars containing commissary stores, cloth-
ing, and ammunition. The pontoon bridge had also been
partially destroyed. Notwithstanding the immense destruc-
tion of supplies, three days' rations were found uninjured.
i this point, Colonel Long was sent with picked men
ommunicate with General Burnside. On the 4th, Colonel
Becker's brigade crossed the river, skirmished with the cav-
alry, and took possession of four rifled cannon, which the
enemy could remove, and captured a flag. Here General
Boward Pound about thirty wagons partially destroyed,
which he repaired for use in forming a temporary bridge,
CAMPAIGN IX EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. S
in anticipation of crossing the Little Tennessee river at Davis'
ford. The route by this ford was not the one which had been
designated, but it was ascertained that time could be saved,
and the march shortened by advancing upon it rather than
upon the road to Morgantown, and General Sherman permit-
ted General Howard to use it.
Before leaving Loudon, General Howard received an order
to command the left wing of the army, while the center and
righ twere placed respectively under Generals Granger and
Blair. These divisions of the army were to act independently,
but to march to each other's support when called by the noise
of battle.
December 5th, General Howard crossed the Little Tennes-
see river, at Davis' ford, by means of an extemporized bridge
formed of wagons and movable trestles, and reached Louis-
ville at dark. At night, the three heads of column communi-
cated at Marysville. Here information was received that
Longstreet had raised the siege of Knoxville, and retreated
eastward. He assaulted Fort Sanders, the key to the position,
on the 29th, and was repulsed with heavy loss. Aware, sub-
sequently, of the proximity of Sherman's army, he sought
safety in timely retreat. All the forces were now ordered to
halt, and the day following, General Sherman met General
Burnside at Knoxville. It was then agreed that the Fourth
Corps should remain and the other forces return to Chatta-
nooga.
The countermarch was commenced on the 7th. A halt was
made at Athens, with the various columns so disposed as to
cover a movement of Colonel Long, who had gone toward
North Carolina to cut off one of Longstreet's trains. Upon
his return, the infantry forces marched to Chattanooga. How-
ard's corps and Davis' division resumed their old relations in
the Army of the Cumberland, and Sherman's divisions returned
to the West.
Though the march to East Tennessee involved no serious
fiffhtina: with Lone-street's command, which was lost to Gen-
eral Bragg in his emergency at Chattanooga, it nevertheless
thoroughly accomplished its object, as it forced the former
from Knoxville toward the East, in what proved to be per-
4 CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE, ETC.
paratien from the Confederate Army of the Tennessee.
hard march, as the troops commenced it immediately
after engagements, and Sherman's forces after a
march from the West. The Latter had « stripped for the
- a1 Bridgeport, and they, with many from other com-
mand8j ,, jtitute of suitable clothing for a winter cam-
paign. Besides, their supplies were drawn mainly from the
try, and in a hurried movement this source is exceed-
. precarious. Supplies were sent up the river in boats it
;,.. but the army was not always near the river; and, on
the whole, tin' circumstances were such as none but veteran
asily overcome. The mills were seized in ad-
d inn night and day ; and a broad belt of country in
march and countermarch paid exhaustive contributions.
e were some excesses which were reprehensible, especially
: iarch was through a region whose inhabitants were
mainly loyal. General Davis' division, by its order on the
h and its restraint from pillage, elicited special praise
from General Sherman. In this commendable and conspicu-
ous bearing, this division represented the Army of the Cum-
berland, which, throughout its existence, was systematically
i lined from pillage and irresponsible foraging.
The objects now were to hold all the territory which bad
gained, to maintain and perfect communications, rein-
force, recuperate, and reorganize the army, and accumulate
supplies and material, all looking to offensive movements, as
early as practicable. The enemy was in no condition for ag-
i on a grand scale, but great vigilance and skillful dis-
ions were necessary to maintain communications and pre-
cavalry raids and guerrilla depredations.
i the withdrawal of the troops from Ringgold, General
>ker resumed the occupation of Lookout valley. General
( Jrufl was directed, with his two brigades, to stop on the way
and bury the national dead on the battle-field of Chicka-
mauga,^ and then to take position on the railroad between
War's visage, despite the glory of heroism and victory, and all the
gentle courtesies which enemies may extend at all times, except when
rage of battle brooks no restraint, is grim and forbidding; but when
the ordinary usages of civilized and Christian nations in the conduct of
CAMPAIGN IX EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. 5
"Whitesides and Bridgeport. Colonel Watkins' brigade of
the First division of cavalry was directed to take post at Ross-
ville ; and the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry was
sent to Caperton's ferry, to guard and observe at that point.
A pioneer brigade, composed of detachments from various
regiments, Colonel G. P. Buell commanding, was employed in
the construction of a double-track macadamized road over the
nose of Lookout Mountain, to serve as a communication
between Lookout valley and Chattanooga, without depend-
ence upon pontoon bridges. Beyond this primary use, this
road was essential to overland communications with Bridge-
port. The repair of the railroad commanded immediate atten-
tion, but as two long and high bridges were to be built — one
over the Tennessee river at Bridgeport, and the one over Fall-
ing "Water, near "Whitesides — much time was required.
When the army returned from East Tennessee, the Eleventh
Corps went into camp at "Whitesides ; two brigades of Davis'
division, east of Missionary Eidge, near Rossville ; and the
third at the mouth of the North Chickamauga. General Elli-
ott was ordered to establish his headquarters at Athens, and
post pickets at Calhoun, Columbus, and Tellico Plains.
During the months of November and December, there were
several brilliant contests in resisting the enemy's cavalry, re-
pressing guerrillas, and scouting to the front to ascertain the
strength and movements of the enemy. And in most cases the
national troops were victorious.
November 2d, Brigadier-General R. S. Granger, command-
war are ignored, then are its features forbidding in the extreme. The car-
nage and suffering are appalling when cool reflection and the kindly-
sympathies have play ; but all strong terms are inadequate to express the
wanton barbarities of war, either in cruelty to the living or dishonor to
the dead, and on both counts the leaders of the rebellion must be con-
victed. Andersonville and other prisons, where starvation and want of
room for captives entailed the intensest suffering and fearful mortality,
And Chickamauga, with its hundreds of unburied dead, give proof of the
most revolting inhumanity. General Bragg accepted an exchange of pris-
oners who were wounded, but he denied burial to multitudes of the slain.
The national dead upon that part of the field occupied by General Long-
street were buried ; but very many on their right, where General Polk
-commanded, lay upon the ground for two months.
g CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE, ETC.
in g at Nashville, sent a mixed command, under Lieutenant-
nel Sculley, Vn^ Middle Tennessee Infantry, to look
Hawkins, and other guerrilla chiefs, near Piner's fac-
Sculleymel them, and having routed the party, pur-
sued to Centerville. At this point, as he was crossing the
. Hawkins attacked in turn, but was again routed, and
i partisans were dispersed. His loss was from fifteen to
twenty killed, and Bixty-six prisoners.
member Ith, Major Fitzgibbon, of the Fourteenth Mich-
igan [nfantry, foughl near Lawrenceburg the guerrilla bands
,oper, Kirk, Williams, and Scott. After a hand-to-hand
Fitzgibbon defeated them, killing eight, wounding
. and capturing twenty-four men. Among the captured
were a captain and two lieutenants. The victor had three
, slightly wounded, and eight horses killed.
( in the 13th, Captain Cutler, with one company of mounted
infantry from the garrison at Clarksville, and a section of
Whitmore's battery, had a contest with Captain Gray's com.
pany of guerrillas, near Palmyra. He killed two, wounded
Mid captured one. The same day, fifteen prisoners were
captured near Lebanon, and forty by Missener, near Columbia.
On the L6th, General Payne sent parties from Gallatin and
ha Vergne. Five guerrillas were killed, and twenty-six were
captured, also horses, cattle, sheep, and hogs, which had been
collected for the Confederate army.
The H'Xt day, Colonel Coburn sent an expedition from
Murfreesboro against the enemy's irregular cavalry. A de-
tachment of the Fourth Tennessee Cavalry captured nineteen
guerrillas and twenty horses, without loss.
(in the 21st, an expedition was sent down the Tennessee
river, which destroyed nine boats for local use, some of them
being Bixty feet long. They were wrested from the enemy.
On the 26th, the First Tennessee Cavalry and Ninth Penn-
sylvania Cavalry, under Colonel Brownlow, attacked Colonel
Mm ray. at Sparta. He killed one man, wounded two, and
captured ten. Extensive salt-works were destroyed, and some
horses and ammunition were taken.
The same day, Captain Brixie's scouts encountered a party
CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE, ETC. 7
of guerrillas near Batlisheba Springs, capturing fifteen or
twenty, and dispersing the remainder.
December 12th, Colonel Watkins, with two hundred and
fifty men, from the Fourth and Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, made
a dash upon Lafayette, Georgia, and captured a colonel of the
Georgia home guard, six officers of the signal corps, and
thirty horses and mules, and returned to his camp at Rossville,
without loss. On the 27th, the colonel sent Major Willing,
with one hundred and fifty men from the same regiments, to
McLemore's Cove and Lafayette. The major captured one
lieutenant, sixteen men, and thirty-eight horses and mules.
On the 15th, General Dodge captured a small party of cav-
alry, under command of Major Joe Fontaine, General Roddy's
adjutant, not far from Pulaski, Tennessee. This party had
made a reconnoissance on the Nashville and Chattanooga and
Nashville and Decatur railroads, which doubtless had some
relation to projected movements or raids. It suggested greater
vigilance along these important roads.
December 27th, General Wheeler, with fifteen hundred
men, appeared at Calhoun, Tennessee, with evident expecta-
tion of capturing a train under escort of Laiboldt's brigade.
Colonel Laiboldt charged this force, and routed it speedily,
and Colonel Long, with one hundred and fifty men, having
come from the opposite side of the river, in support, moved
in pursuit, believing that a small force had been cut off from
the main body. By a saber charge, this force was scattered in
all directions. One hundred and thirty-one prisoners were
taken, including five officers, one a division inspector and one
a surgeon. The number of killed and wounded was not as-
certained. Colonel Long lost two killed, twelve wounded,
and one missing. Wheeler commanded in person, and an-
ticipated rich booty with slight trouble, but failed in his object,
with heavy loss.
CHAPTER XXIV.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE CONFLICT AT THE CLOSE
OF 1863.
The year 18G3 was crowded with disaster to the insurgents.
They were victorious in some of the great battles in Virginia,
but lost fearfully in the battle of Gettysburg. So that, at the
. where < >nly they had been at all successful, their strength
was relatively Less than at the beginning of the year. In the
West, their losses in men, material of war, and territory were
immense. In their effort to maintain their hold upon the Mis-
pi river, they lost two armies, and when subsequently
the •• Father of "Waters" flowed "unvexed to the sea," and the
s-ui'remacy of the national navy upon this great river and its
tributaries was unquestioned, all contiguous portions of the
insurgent states were at the mercy of the national armies.
At the close of the year the central offensive line was resting
upon the northern limits of Alabama, Georgia, and North Car-
olina. The loss of so much territory, the complete division
of what remained by the navy moving at pleasure upon the
Mississippi river, and the immense diminution of men and
means, gave new conditions to the campaigns of the next
year.
les the effect of numerous defeats during the year, two
proclamations of the President of the United States greatly
alarmed the insurgents. On the 1st day of January, 1863, he
pr< claimed freedom to all the slaves in the revolted states, and
in the last month he promised pardon to all below a given
grade, in the insurgent armies.
AlS a sequence of the freedom of the slaves, and as a war
measure of great moment, arms were soon put in their hands.
(8)
GENERAL VIEW AT THE CLOSE OF 1863. 9
At first, however, the enrollment of the frcedmen as soldiers
was only occasionally undertaken by individual department
commanders in absence of any general plan or explicit author-
ity from Washington. Though slavery directly and indirectly
was the dominant cause of the war, there was manifest reluc-
tance for nearly three years to lay hands upon it, and after its
abolition was decreed, the national authorities hesitated to
make soldiers of those whose bondage they had broken. The
slaves had aided the enemy not only by their productive labor,
but also by the construction of defenses, and contributed to
the strength of the rebellion in greater measure, than they had
previously given political weight to the Southern States, in
Congress. The more moderate and far-seeing men of the
South anticipated, from the first, that sooner or later the
African race would be involved in the war. And later than
many of this class anticipated, and a growing party in the
North demanded, the President pronounced the freedom of the
negroes in the seceded states. Their enlistment as soldiers
was so plainly a legitimate consequent that it was not long
delayed. Both measures were repugnant to the traditional
and inveterate prejudices of the Southern people, and of many
in the North as well. In the official utterances of the Confed-
erate President, the reprehension of the civilized world was
invoked upon those who proposed these measures, and the
total destruction of the Africans in America was predicted.
But the argument in their support was so simple and forcible
that serious opposition to either soon ceased in the North. As
the slaves were a source of strength to the rebellion, the logic
of war first declared them contraband, and then demanded
their employment as soldiers. The fact that their freedom
was contingent upon the overthrow of the Southern Confed-
eracy, not only justified their grasp of the musket, but enforced
its obligation. And the results vindicated the policy, as colored
regiments greatly augmented the national armies for the cam-
paigns of 1864.
The President's offer of pardon to the masses in the Con-
federate armies, had marked effect. It gave assurance that
peace could ensue without the entailment of penal criminality
upon those in arms against the government below the rank of
10 GENERAL Vir.W \T THE CLOSE OF 1863.
brigadier-general, and hence removed the necessity that mere
ration Bhould keep them under the standards of treason.
And as this promise of amnesty involved no hard conditions,
and was made al a time of general despondency in the South,
and when Buch was the depreciation of Confederate money,
that no i r man could give even partial support to a
family from his pay as a soldier, it prompted numerous de-
sertions. Desertion being added to the drain of active cam-
as, the diminution of the insurgent armies became alarming
to the leaders. But they still claimed that the independence
of the Southern States was assured, and on this ground, in part
justified a conscription of widesl compass. The people did
,,,,, bear this patiently. Murmurs of discontent became gen-
eral. Occasionally there was open protest and severest criti-
cism. Bu1 as nothing but counter-revolution could remedy
the evil, and as this step plainly led through anarchy to sub-
mission to the general government, the relentless conscription
of jroung and old, and the sweeping appropriation of private
property was endured. As a result, sullenness and discour-
agement took the place of cheer and hope in their armies, and
outward restraint rather than moral force kept multitudes in
the ranks; while the certainty of pardon, in the event of the
failure of the rebellion, induced those not ready to desert to
weigh the cosl of protracting a contest when success was cx-
tremely doubtful. But the leaders, after a year of gigantic
reverses, -landing upon the threshhold of new campaigns
with diminished armies, as boldly as ever declared that subju-
gation was impossible. President Davis, in his annual mes-
sage to his congress, announced that " grave reverses had be-
fallen the Confederate armies," and that the hope of a speedy
termination of the war, entertained at the beginning of the
year, had qo1 been realized, and yet asserted that peace could
only cine with the acknowledgment of the independence of
the Confederate States. Even after General Lee's defeat at
Gettysburg, the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the
retreal of General Bragg's army over Cumberland Mountains,
M. T. Maury assured the world, in a paper published in the
" London Times," that the prospect of success to the South
was brighter than at any former period of the war. Whether
GENEKAL VIEW AT THE CLOSE OF 1863. 11
this assurance was real or assumed, on the part of the leaders,
and whether they had to any great extent the sympathy of
the masses in their avowed hopes, such was the power of the
Confederate government and the momentum of the rebellion,
that armies of fair defensive proportions were maintained, and
some of the Southern generals even entertained projects of
aggression.
The events of the year as affecting the national cause, viewed
from a military or political stand-point, were cheering in the
extreme. The victories of the national armies and the support
of war measures as evinced by the elections, equally indicated
that the crisis of the nation's destiny had been safely passed.
The strength of the rebellion had culminated, and the general
situation gave encouragement to the government and those who
supported it, to strike blow after blow until the final one should
be given. The elections declared the nation's approval of the
President's proclamation of freedom to the slaves, and the pol-
icy of making them soldiers, and universal freedom was now
as firmly established as a condition of peace as the surrender
of the Confederate armies.
The maintenance of the full strength of the national armies
was now the grand problem. The term of enlistment of
very many regiments would expire early in 18G4. Their re-
tirement during active operations would endanger the success
of all plans of aggression which might be formed. In fact,
the speedy suppression of the rebellion turned upon their re-
tention in the service, and yet there was no law to hold them.
Fortunately for the country her citizen soldiers were equal to
the emergency, and their voluntary re-enlistment, more strin-
gent drafting, and the enrollment of the freedmen, gave prom-
ise of adequate armies.
It was evident at the close of the year that the Army of the
Cumberland was again to confront its old enemy, the Army of
tka Tennessee. After its defeat at Chattanooga, this army took
position at Dalton, with a heavy detachment at Buzzard's Roost,
and forces also at the strong positions between Dalton and At-
lanta. The Western and Atlantic railroad courses through the
hills and mountains of Northern Georgia, which give marked
advantage to an army acting on the defensive, against another
12 GENERAL VIEW AT THE CLOSE OF 1863.
depended upon the railroad for supplies. And before the ex-
of the nexl central campaign could be determined,
the Confederate generala exerted themselves to give additional
gth to tl w 1 1 i cl l nature had provided. Whether
they should be able to take the offensive or not, their past ex-
perience suggested the propriety of making provision for de-
far to the rear as practicable, while maintaining a strong
defensive front.
CHAPTER XXV.
OPERATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT DURING JANUARY, FEBRUARY,
AND MARCH, 1864, AND PREPARATIONS FOR AGGRESSION.
At the beginning of the year 1864, and during the first
months of the year, the troops of the Army of the Cumberland
were disposed from Knoxville to Bridgeport, and on the rail-
road from the latter place to Louisville, Kentucky. The atti-
tude of the army was mainly defensive. In fact, it was in no
condition for aggression. At least ten thousand animals had
died during the siege of Chattanooga, and those which survived
were so reduced in strength as to be unfit for service. The
army, too, was temporarily weakened by the absence of numer-
ous regiments that had been granted furloughs upon re-enlist-
ment ; and previous to the completion of the railroad between
Chattanooga and Bridgeport, it was hardly possible to supply
the troops at rest on the defensive line, including the Army of
the Ohio in East Tennessee. Thus restrained from active op-
erations, its chief duty was preparation for future aggression.
As the primary step, it was imperative to make Chattanooga
a reliable proximate base of supplies for an army advancing
toward Atlanta. The Confederate army being in winter-quar-
ters in Northern Georgia, could destroy all the productions of
that region which it did not consume or transport. So that
the accumulation of supplies at Chattanooga, and the continued
maintenance of railroad communications with Nashville and
Louisville, were conditions of a southward advance ; and the
practicability of making Chattanooga a base for offensive op-
erations, hinged upon the capacity of a single railroad.
Two railroads from Nashville meet at Stevenson, Alabama,
but from their junction to Bridgeport, and thence to Chat-
(13)
J I OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
tanooga, there is only a Biugle track. As the bridges at Bridge-
portand Falling Waters were not completed until the 14th of
January, half the winter was gone before there was the slightest
accumulation of supplies; and though subsequently this single
railroad was pressed to its utmost capacity, such were the im-
mediate wants of the armies, and so numerous were the vet-
passing over the road, that the large store-
.hirli had been built at Chattanooga were very slowly
I ' iring the first half of January, the enemy was not active.
era! Thomas Ben1 scouting parties in all directions, but no
indications of aggression were discerned. Apart from the ex-
haustion which the preceding campaigns had produced, a
change of commanders was doubtless one cause of inaction.
Soon after his defeat before Chattanooga, General Bragg had
. removed from command in Georgia, and General Joseph
E. Johnston, while charged with the administration of a mili-
tary division corresponding in extent to the one which had
been created for General Grant, assumed personal command of
the forces immediately south of Chattanooga. His presence
1 ]t.n indicated his appreciation of the importance of the
center of his line, either to regain what had been so recently
lost, or to neutralize Chattanooga, as far as possible, as a base
for aggressive operations.
By this time, the foreshadows of the campaign which Gen-
eral Grant had projected began to appear. Mobile was his
next objective, with Atlanta and Mongomery as important
intermediate points/:- Not being ready to advance upon the
direct line to his objective, he proposed a movement from
his right fiank by General Sherman, while General Thomas
should make effort to hold Johnston's forces at Dalton, and
General Foster, commanding in East Tennessee in room of
< reneral Burnside, should neutralize Longstreet's army. The
objects proposed for General Sherman were the destruction of
the railroads from Vlcksburg to Meridian, and the capture of
Mobile, should its practicability be developed as he advanced.
But before he was ready to move, rumors were current that
Statement of plan by General Badeau, in "Life of General Grant.
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 15
IiOBgstreet was receiving reinforcements from Virginia. This
deranged the plans with regard to the center and left. Gen-
eral Thomas was desirous of recalling his troops from East
Tennessee, to be able to demonstrate strongly against Dalton ;
but it now became necessary that he should have regard to the
contingency of sending additional troops to General Foster.
General Longstreet's attitude had been ambiguous since his
abandonment of the siege of Knoxville, upon the approach of
General Sherman, in December. His presence was a menace,
even in absence of operations of direct offense ; and as it was
possible for reinforcements to reach him from Dalton and
from Virginia, an effort to regain the mountain fortresses of
East Tennessee was probable, especially if General Johnston
could entertain the hope of keeping the war out of Georgia by
carrying it to the [North. Any plan of aggression on his part
would involve the possession of a route to the northeast of
Chattanooga, and for a time such a course was plainly indi-
cated or feigned.
When, on the 15th of January, General Wood advanced to
Dandridge and drove the rebel cavalry from the town, an
offensive return was provoked, which for a time threatened to
change General Grant's plans very materially. Though Gen-
eral Wood was joined by General Sheridan's division and
McCook's cavalry at Dandridge, it was not deemed safe to
hazard a general engagement. For two days there was skir-
mishing, and late in the afternoon of the 18th, there was a
brisk conflict mainly between McCook's cavalry and Long-
street's advance. Three Ohio regiments — the First, Mnety-
third, and One Hundred and Twenty-fifth — were holding the
front as pickets, and were severely pressed by a tentative ad-
vance of the enemy, but they fought bravely to cover the prep-
arations for a retreat. McCook, by a saber charge, cleared
the field and captured two steel rifle-guns, and over one hun-
dred prisoners. This action and the darkness permitted the
safe retreat of the national troops. They fell back, first to
Strawberry Plains, and subsequently to Marysville, followed
by Longstreet.
Simultaneously with this movement, General Roddy crossed
the Tennessee river near Florence, Alabama, with two brigades
1 1 ; OPERATIONS FEOM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
avalry. General Dodge, commanding troops of General
Sherman's army at Pulaski, Tennessee, received information
oo the 20th, that he was preparing boats and concealing them
with the evident purpose of crossing his command for a raid
upon the railroads. General Grant at once advised General
Tin. mas of the fact, and directed him to organize an expedi-
tion to drive Roddy back, and destroy his boats and all ma-
terial which could be used in effecting the passage of the river.
he was across two days before these instructions were
municated, and ( teneral Thomas could only make arrange-
ments i" defeat bis purpose. He directed the detachments
guarding the roads to watch against attacks, and ordered Gen-
eral Crook commanding cavalry at Huntsville, Alabama, to
advance against Roddy and drive him across the river.
ilonel II. O. Miller, Ninety-second Indiana, commanding
one expedition, defeated Johnson's brigade near Florence on
the 26th, killing fifteen, and wounding and capturing a large
number. Among the prisoners were three officers. His own
was ten wounded. General Gillem also sent parties from
the line of the Northwestern railroad against Roddy, as soon
as he beard that he had crossed the river. These parties
returned on the 30th with Lieutenant-Colonel Brewer, two
tains, three lieutenants, and twenty men as prisoners. Hav-
ing thus met forces between him and the railroad in all di-
Roddy recrossed the river, having effected no damage
that compensated for his losses.
January 27th, the cavalry under General Elliott, in a brilliant
action at Mossy Creek, East Tennessee, defeated General Mar-
tin, commanding two divisions of cavalry, Morgan's and Arm-
strong's, and followed his routed forces until darkness ter-
minated the pursuit. Campbell's and La Grange's brigades
were engaged, and they put the enemy to rout by a saber
charge, capturing one hundred and twelve prisoners, including
two regimental commanders and seven other officers, two rifled
guns, eight hundred small arms, Morgan's battle-flag, and two
nental flags, which the enemy had previously captured
from the national troops, andkillcdand wounded over two hun-
dred men. exclusive of prisoners. Morgan's division was
t bor, Highly broken, and Armstrong's was thrown into rapid re-
OPERATIONS FROM JANNARY TO MARCH, 1864. 17
trea*t. Guerrillas were also active. January 20th, one hun-
dred and fifty guerrillas attacked Tracy City, and having three
times summoned the garrison to surrender, were handsomely
repulsed.
The next day, Colonel T. J. Harrison, Thirty-ninth Indiana
Mounted Infantry, sent two hundred men on an expedition to
Sparta, Tennessee, to look after the guerrillas infesting that
region. This party in five subdivisions scoured the country
occupied by the bands of Curtis, Ferguson, Bledsoe, and Mur-
ray. Remaining out several days, they killed four men,
wounded five or six, and captured fifteen, including a captain
and lieutenant. They also captured thirty horses and twenty
stand of arms. .
On the 24th, Colonel Boone, commanding the Twenty-
eighth Kentucky Mounted Infantry , with four hundred and
forty-six men, moved through McLemore's Cove, crossed to
Broomtown valley, and proceeded through Summerville, across
Taylor's ridge, to Dirt Town. Beyond the latter place he de-
stroyed a camp of the Georgia militia, captured fifteen men,
including Captain Hubbard, and returned without loss.
Upon the completion of the railroad from Bridgeport to
Chattanooga, General Thomas transferred the working parties
to the road leading to Knoxville, and on the 24th directed
General Stanley, commanding the First division of the
Fourth Corps, to dispose his command from Chickamauga
Station to the Hiawassee river, to protect the workmen on the
road. As it had been suggested that troops might be sent to
East Tennessee to support Foster against Longstreet, these
troops were thus in readiness to meet this contingency while
guarding the railroad, and watching against the direct move-
ment of troops from Dalton to Longstreet.
As deserters concurred in asserting that General Johnston
was sending troops south from Dalton, General Thomas di-
rected General Palmer to make a reconnoissance with a por-
tion of his command to ascertain, if possible, whether these
representations were true. The latter having accomplished
his office by developing a strong force at Tunnel Hill, returned
to Chattanooga.
vol. n — 2
IS OPERATIONS FEOM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
y, bruary LOth, General Grant directed General Thomas to
prepare for an advance to Knoxville, with such forces as could
be spared from the protection of Chattanooga and its commu-
nications, to assist General Foster to drive Longstreet from
Such a movement was no part of the orig-
inal plan, hut concurrent reports had convinced General Grant
,l iat there bad been a heavy concentration of troops under
Longstreet to secure East Tennessee, and he determined to
prevent it, and relievo that flank from pressure. General
er hud prepared to assume the offensive if he could get at
least ten thousand men from General Thomas. It was deemed
to diminish the forces at Chattanooga, as there was. reason
to believe that Johnston had detached heavily from Dalton to
reinforce Polk against Sherman in Alabama, as well as to
strengthen Longstreet for offense against Foster in East Ten^
The Army of the Cumberland was not in condition to enter
upon a winter campaign, and General Thomas found it dim-
cult to make such preparations as he deemed essential. His
army was greatly diminished by the absence of regiments
having re-enlisted as veterans. Artillery horses and train
animals had not been supplied in room of the thousands that
had died from starvation during the siege, and he advised a
postponement of the movement until the railroad would be
in running order to Loudon. On the 12th, however, the day
previous to the one designated for starting, he was informed
by General Grant that a conversation with General Foster,
who, on a. wo unt of ill-health, had been superseded by General
Schofield, and dispatches from the latter, induced him to doubt
the propriety of moving against Longstreet, and suggested
thai should he not he required to go into East Tennessee, he
should make a formidable reconnoissance toward Dalton, and
if possible occupy that place, and repair the railroads to it.
This order was .riven on the 17th, and at the time there was
some probability that it might be successful, as it was sup-
1' ' 'hat Johnston had weakened his center, especially to
strengthen Polk against Sherman. Two days later, however,
General Thomas received information that Johnston had in
hand six divisions, comprising from thirty to forty thousand
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 19
men, and that no. troops had been sent away, except one bri-
gade of infantry. This intelligence did not, however, induce
General Grant to recall the movement, though it rendered
General Thomas hopeless of success.
The troops were put in motion toward Dalton, February
22d. General Thomas threw General Stanley's division, Gen-
eral Cruft commanding, with such cavalry as he could safely
withdraw from Calhoun, Tennessee, forward on the Spring
Place road, and Johnston's and Baird's divisions, with cavalry
in advance and on the right flank, directly to Ringgold. At
night, Craft's division was at Red Clay, with Long's cavalry
in advance, having been instructed to observe the enemy well
toward Dalton, and give timely warning of any effort to turn
Craft's left flank, or to notify him to advance should Johnston
retire. The other divisions were at Ringgold, in position on
the ridge west of East Chickamauga, with a regiment of
mounted infantry on each flank, and Carlin's brigade thrown
toward Taylor's ridge.
During the evening, General Palmer advised General
Thomas that he had received intelligence that Johnston had
dispatched Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions to reinforce
General Polk, who was falling back before General Sherman,
in Alabama. All available troops were now moved up to dis-
lodge General Johnston, should this report prove to be true.
Davis' division advanced to Ringgold on the 23d, and General
Matthias was directed to send six regiments from Cleveland to
support General Cruft, at Red Clay. Colonel Long advanced
toward Dalton, on the Spring Place road ; first drove in the
enemy's videttes, and when within four miles of Dalton, at-
tacked and routed from camp a regiment of infantry. The
enemy then forming in force, he withdrew to Russell's Mills.
Craft's division advanced to Lee's house, on the road from
Red Clay to Tunnel Hill. The four divisions were now well
concentrated in the vicinity of Ringgold, and after a thorough
reconnoissance on each flank, General Palmer advanced, on
the 24th, to develop the enemy's strength at Tunnel Hill.
After skirmishing three or four miles with Wheeler's cavalry,
he gained possession of the town, when the enemy formed a
new line, and opened with his batteries from a hill, one mile
20 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
beyond General Palmer then withdrew, and encamped three
milea to the aorthwest. The following morning he decided
,,, feel the enemy's position more fully. Baird's division was
south of Taylor's Ridge near Ringgold, and Craft's was well
its left. 1 >;»n i-" :: and Johnson's divisions were in
advance toward Tunnel Hill, with Harrison's mounted
infantry in front, and Boone's on the left flank, and Long's
brigade, supported by Grose's brigade of Cruft's division, was
at Varaell's Btation, on the Dalton and Cleveland railroad.
These pairs of divisions were ordered to advance on different
lines, the former upon Tunnel Hill, and, if practicable, directly
upon Dalt-.n: the latter, with Long's cavalry, to move down
the valley, along the eastern base of Rocky FaceEidge, to
threaten the right and rear of the enemy.
In compliance, the troops on the right advanced in three
columns. A tier the right and left had moved some distance,
the center advanced, hut was soon checked by a battery of
Parrotl guns planted on the summit beyond the' town of
Tunnel Hill, and skillfully handled. The right and left col-
umns Morgan's and Hambright's brigades, again advanced,
and flanking this battery, forced its retirement. Davis' di-
vision, with Johnson's in support, pursued and found the
enemy at Buzzard's Roost, a gap in Rocky Face Ridge, whose
precipitous acclivities and salient summits forbade assault.
Baird and Craft also encountered the enemy as they moved
down Rocky Face valley. Giving ground at first, he soon
offered resistance upon a central hill. An attackw T as here nec-
ry to develop his strength; and General Turchin, with
four regiments, the Eleventh, Eighty-ninth, and Ninety-second
Ohio, and the Eighty-second Indiana, was directed to advance.
Advancing boldly, these troops pressed back the enemy and
reached the summit, but were unable to hold it, as the routed
troops met reinforcements, and returned in overwhelming
force. The conflict was sharp, but it was too unequal to be
maintained, and Turchin yielded the hill. Spirited skir-
mishing and cannonading were continued until nightfall, when
the national troops were withdrawn. Colonel Harrison spent
* General Davis' division had previously closed up from the rear.
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864 21
the night at a gap six miles south of Buzzard's Roost, nearly
opposite Dalton, whence he was driven the following morning
by Cleburne's division, one of the two that had been dis-
patched to Alabama.
As it had been ascertained that General Johnston was
holding his strong positions with forces superior to his own,
General Thomas deemed it futile to attempt to dislodge him,
and that it was even impracticable to maintain his threatening
attitude. The country was stripped of provisions, and his
transportation was not sufficient to supply his command. He
therefore advised General Grant of his embarrassment, and
suggested the abandonment of the enterprise. In reply, Gen-
eral Grant urged him to maintain his position, and make the
impression upon Johnston that an advance into the heart ot
the South was intended, until the fate of General Sherman
should be known. Compliance, however, was not considered
practicable, and as it was known that Johnston had recalled
his divisions from Polk's support, orders were issued for the
withdrawal of the troops. Baird's division was posted on a
line of hills north of the town of Tunnel Hill, to cover the re-
tirement of Johnson and Davis, and then took permanent post
at Ringgold. Davis' division returned to his former position
near Rossville. ' Two brigades of Johnson's division were
posted at Tyner's Station, and the third at Graysville, with a
strong guard at Parker's Gap, to protect Baird's left flank.
Cruft's division returned to Ooltawah and Blue Springs, the
commander sending a detachment to Cleveland to guard his
supplies, where Colonel Long also took post to patrol the left
flank of the army. Colonels Harrison and Boone were
stationed at Leet's tanyard, to observe the enemy toward
Lafayette.
This movement to Dalton involved a loss of more than three
hundred men killed and wounded. Among the wounded
was Colonel Mihalotzy, of the Twenty-fourth Illinois, who
died a few days later at Chattanooga. The enemy's loss was
probably two hundred. As a reconnoissance it was successful,
though there were no such results as General Grant mentioned
as probable. It seemingly recalled the two divisions that
General Johnston had sent against General Sherman, but as
22 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864
the latter had retreated from Meridian on the 20th, six days
previous to their return, the demonstration had no effect upon
their movements. The chief advantages were the develop-
ment of the strength of General Johnston's position before
Dalton, and the suggestion to General Thomas of a plan to
turn it by a movement through Snake Creek Gap. He was
bo impressed with the feasibility of this plan, that upon his
return to Chattanooga, he requested permission from General
Grant to make preparation to accomplish it.
Ea\ ing disposed his troops for defense, General Thomas ad-
dressed himself to preparation for the spring campaign. He
ordered General Butterfield to make a careful examination of
the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, and Captain Merrill,
thirl' engineer of the department, to examine other roads, to
ascertain the minimum force necessary to hold them securely.
He al60 ordered a thorough examination of the railroad to
Tunnel Hill, with a view to its repair, as an important step in
provision for an advance.
These examinations resulted in a more economical pro-
tection of railroad communications, by means of a system of
block-houses at the bridges and other important points, which
hi. an element of power to the close of the war. And
the conclusion having been reached that six thousand infantry
and two thousand cavalry could hold securely the railroads to
iiville, General Thomas recommended that the railroad
guards, as far as practicable, should be drawn from the local
T< in lessee militia.
The month of February closed with the military situation
by no means developed. General Sherman destroyed rail-
roads extensively in Mississippi, but otherwise his expedition
was not compensative. It was not known what Longstreet
would do, whether give further trouble in East Tennessee, re-
turn to Virginia, or join Johnston. Neither were General
Johnston's plans at all indicated. One day would bring ru-
mors from deserters, and from sources more reliable, that he
was nnder orders to withdraw his army from Dalton, followed
on the next by contradictions from sources equally entitled to
credence. But ignorance of the purposes of the enemy did
not prevent preparation for aggression. Reconstruction of
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 23
railroads was pressed westward and southward, and material
and supplies were accumulated as rapidly as possible. Steam-
boats and large storehouses were built. Horses were provided
for the artillery, and efforts were made to recuperate those of
the cavalry worn down by hard winter service. Eight com-
panies of the First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, and
two regiments of colored troops, were ordered to commence
the construction of block-houses and other defenses along the
line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, and the first
Missouri Engineers and Mechanics were detailed for similar
duty on the Nashville and Decatur railroad. In anticipation
of a campaign designed to bisect the Gulf States east of the
Mississippi river, the secure defense of railroad communi-
cations from Chattanooga to the North with the least pos-
sible draft upon the strength of the aggressive columns, was
a matter of great moment. With strong block-houses at all
the bridges, and with earthworks, in addition, at all of the
more important points, a comparatively small force could hold
the roads securely — at least, could prevent all damage that
could not be quickly repaired. One of the greatest embarrass-
ments to Generals Buell and Rosecrans, had been the neces-
sity of scattering their troops in heavy detachments on their
lines of supply. The plan now adopted promised better se-
curity, both to the railroads and to the troops guarding them,
while employing a small portion of the force formerly assigned
to this service. Besides, it transferred the cavalry almost en-
tirely from the rear to the front, and relieved the veteran
infantry from guard duty, as new regiments and local militia
could be trusted to hold the block-houses and earthworks.
At the beginning of March there were indications that General
Johnston was receiving reinforcements at Dalton, and General
Grant was not free from apprehension that Longstreet's army
might join him, in addition to other forces, for an attack upon
Chattanooga. To provide against such a contingency, the
two divisions of the Fourth Corps in East Tennessee were
ordered to be constantly ready for quick movement to support
General Thomas. On the 3d, Wagner's brigade of Sheridan's
division was moved to Calhoun, Tennessee, to relieve the first
brigade of the first division of cavalry, Colonel Campbell
24 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
commanding, that it mighl take post at Cleveland. Five days
l ater Colonel Daniel McCook, commanding second brigade
of Davis' division, was ordered to Lee and Gordon's Mills, to
Qgt h to the front, and observe the enemy upon a line
;,,- former approach. The Bame day, Colonel Harrison was
driven fromLeet's tanyard bya strong force of cavalry. Tins
advance, coupled with rumors that Johnston had been joined
by ten thousand men from South Carolina and by Eoddy's
cavalry, thai Longstreet's cavalry was in motion toward him,
and thai his ti ps were under orders to carry three days'
rations on their persons, intensified somewhat the apprehen-
that an offensive movement was meditated. There were
hanges of troops, however, except that McCook's division
avalry was ordered to Cleveland, since it was not yet
deemed safe to withdraw the Fourth Corps from East Ten-
e, as Longstreet's action was still uncertain.
On the 17th of March, General Grant, having been appointed
lieutenant-general, in command of the entire army, advised
r.i I Tli* »mas that Major-General W. T. Sherman had been
jned to the command of the Military Division of the Mis-
ppi. The assumption of general command by General
• gave the contemplated campaign into Georgia a closer
relation to operations against General Lee's army in Virginia
than had previously existed between movements east and
Soon after his assignment to the command of the military
division, General Sherman went to Chattanooga to confer with
General Thomas with regard to future movements. At this
conference, General Thomas suggested that the armies of the
Tennessee and Ohio, under the respective commands of Major-
Generals McPherson and Schofield, should demonstrate against
Johnston's position before Dalton, by the direct roads to Buz-
zard's Roost, and from Cleveland, while he should throw the
entire Army of the Cumberland through Snake Creek Gap,
which he knew to be unguarded, and fall upon Johnston's
communications between Dalton and Resaca, and thereby
t urn his position completely, and either force him to retreat to-
ward the cast, through a diihcult country poorly supplied with
provisions and forage, with a strong probability of the total
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 25
disorganization of liis army, or attack him, in which event he
felt confident of being able to beat him, especially as he hoped
to gain position in his rear before he should be aware of his
movement. General Sherman objected to this suggestion, for
the reason that he desired the Army of the Cumberland to
form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rally-
ing point from which the two wings, the armies of the Ten-
nessee and Ohio, could operate.
The union of the armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee,
and Ohio in a campaign from Chattanooga as a base, having
been determined upon, preparations of the grandest dimen-
sions possible were at once inaugurated with vigor. The most
difficult problem was that of supplies. Its solution turned
upon the capacity of a single railroad track from Stevenson to
Chattanooga, and thence toward Atlanta. There was steam-
boat transportation from Bridgeport to Chattanooga; but
there was dependence alone upon the track from the former
place to Stevenson. As the accumulation of supplies at Chat-
tanooga had hitherto been slight, General Sherman restricted
railroad transportation to dead freight, and forbade passage to
citizens or private property. He also forbade the further issue
of rations to the destitute citizens of the country. The peo-
ple complained of these measures ; but such was the necessity
for the accumulation of supplies, that he persisted in their
maintenance, against the protests of the citizens, remon-
strances from Washington, and what under other circum-
stances would have been the demands of humanity.
During the month of April, again, as before the battles in
^November, Chattanooga was the scene of the greatest activity.
Troops were constantly coming up from the rear and moving
to position in the front. The quartermaster and commissary
departments were pressed to extreme exertion building steam-
boats, erecting and filling vast storehouses, bringing forward
artillery and cavalry horses, mules, and cattle ; while the rail-
way was almost constantly trembling under the long trains
heavily loaded with supplies and munitions.
General Johnston, in the meantime, was not idle, though he
was restrained in his preparation for an offensive movement,
which it was expected in the South he would be able to make
26 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
in Buch force as to change the theater of war again to the
N,.rth. Be waited for preparation for well-sustained aggres-
Bion, and thus lost an opportunity for partial success. Cleve-
land was the w.ak point in he national line. General Thomas
1 not hold this vital point strongly while the Fourth Corps
remained with General Schofield, and this corps could not be
sat'clv withdrawn until it was known that Longstreet had
abandoned East Tennessee. But before Johnston was well
prepared even for defense, the opportunity was lost for forcing
any concentration of troops which was not required by Gen-
eral Sherman's plan of operations. General Johnston was
fully alive to the importance of successful aggression to change
the tone of feeling in the South, and sought such reinforce-
ments as he thought were necessary. A little later he learned
that he needed more troops than were available in all the
South, upon the plan of defense which was adopted. In the
light of subsequent events, it is plain that in failing to give
adequate reinforcements to Johnston, while General Grant's
armies were widely separated and weakened by the temporary
absence of veteran regiments, the Confederate authorities at
Richmond rendered impossible the aggression for which they
subsequently clamored. In December previous, General Beau-
regard suggested, as the only hope of success, that Richmond
and other important places should be fortified and garrisoned
for defense, and that an immense army should be concentrated
against Grant, at Chattanooga, or thrown in bold offense from
Knoxville. Later, General Johnston's suggestions were some-
what similar, but were unheeded by Mr. Davis and his advis-
ers. The Western army remained in diffusion, until concen-
t rat ion, as a necessity of defense rather than a condition of
ion, was hurriedly effected. Longstreet's army was
sent to General Lee, and from all of the troops that so long
menaced Knoxville, only Martin's division of cavalry joined
General Johnston ; while almost all the national troops that
wintered in East Tennessee were free to join the combination
again-! him. The impracticable President had entertained
visions of successful aggression from Dalton, but had been,
from choice or necessity, so sparing in provision for such enter-
prise, that the thought of it, except in wildest vagary, could
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 27
not be entertained. To require Johnston to advance with less
than fifty thousand men against a combination of armies,
which in defense would greatly exceed one hundred thousand,
was to exact defeat. The fact that the Confederate President
did not discern this, revealed his incapacity as a revolutionary
leader, and his subsequent criticisms of his ablest general, for
the non-accomplishment of a palpable impossibility, manifested
the inveteracy of his self-conceit and his utter misapprehen-
sion of the situation in Georgia. His general had no choice
of methods, but was confined to the defense of his positions
between his enemy and the campaign region south of Resaca.
Had he been able to assume the offensive, he could not have
reached any vital point in the rear of Chattanooga, without a
long detour, in dependence for supplies upon a devastated
country, or on wagon transportation from a remote base. In
his weakness and his restriction from movement by mountain
barriers right and left, he could make no flank movements or
threatening dashes, with infantry or cavalry ; and any expec-
tation of a general advance from Dalton, except with an im-
mense army, through East Tennessee or Northern Alabama,
Bridgeport or Decatur — was groundless.
Having now, from necessity, accepted the defensive, General
Johnston could only make effort to embarrass Sherman's com-
munications with his cavalry, and await the approach of the
armies combining against him. He threw his cavalry into
Northern Alabama, in constant menace, but accomplished no
interruption to communications. General Thomas sent Gen-
eral Geary, with two regiments and one piece of artillery, on
a steamboat, to destroy the boats used by the cavalry in cross-
ing and recrossing the river, as far to the west as possible.
General Geary was only partially successful ; he destroyed a
great many boats in going and coming, but was prevented by
forces on each side of the river from going a great distance.
On the 29th of April, a tentative advance was made by Gen-
eral Baird, having reference to the general movement of the
united armies. He sent three hundred cavalry, under General
Kilpatrick, supported by Vanderveer's brigade, to feel the ene-
my's position at Tunnel Hill. These troops encountered the
enemy and drove him some distance, when developing a greatly
28 OPERATIONS FHOM .JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
guperior fur-,, they were compelled to withdraw. At Davis'
house the enemy pressed them, when they turned and repulsed
him handsomely. The clay following, General Johnston gave
indications of greater strength in front of Ringgold, and Gen-
eral Thomas instructed General Baird to call upon General
Johnson for help in the event of an advance against Ins posi-
During the month, important changes were made in the
Army of the Cumberland. The reorganization of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Corps having been of recent date, they remained
intact, excepl Borne changes in general officers. On the 11th,
the cavalry, under the general command of Brigadier-General
\V. L. Elliott, was organized into four divisions; Colonel Ed-
ward McCook,and Brigadier-Generals Kennard Garrard, Jud-
bod Kilpatrick, and A. C. Gillem, commanding respectively, ac-
C( irding to numerical designation. There were three brigades
each division, and an average of three regiments in each
bri gade. On the 15th, orders were received from Washington,
requiring the consolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps
as the Twentieth, under the command of Major-General
Hooker. Major-General Gordon Granger was relieved from
the command of the Fourth Corps, and Major-General 0. 0.
Howard assigned, and Major-General P. H. Sheridan having
transferred to the Army of the Potomac, Major-General
John Newton was assigned to the position made vacant by his
vacation of the command of the Second division, Fourth Corps.
There were now in the Army of the Cumberland a large num-
ber of re-enlisted troops. During the winter and spring there
re-enlisted eighty-eight regiments of infantry, three of mounted
infantry, sixteen of cavalry, eighteen batteries of artillery, and
twenty-six detachments of all arms, and eight thousand one
hundred and thirty-six recruits in the aggregate were added to
these organizations while on furlough. The importance of the
n -enlistment of these troops can not be overestimated. With-
out them and the " veterans " of the other tw T o co-operative
armies, the Atlanta campaign could not have been safely un-
dertaken ; the war v T ould have been greatly postponed, and its
issue might have been different. The slow movement of the
draft, and the provisional measure of short enlistments could
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 29
not have furnished such troops as were demanded in the spring
of 18C4. Without the veterans, aggression could not have
been entertained, and the feeble armies, during the summer,
might have been compelled to relax their grasp upon the heart
of the rebellious states. It is then the plainest duty of the his-
torian to mention the regiments and other organizations, whose
members, in whole or in part, re-enlisted as " veteran volun-
teers," and ever after bore the grandest name which the war
originated. Of the regiments and batteries whose organization
was maintained under re-enlistment, were the Thirteenth, Fif-
teenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-first, Twenty-sixth,
Thirty-first, Thirty-third, Thirty-sixth, Fortieth, Forty-first,
Forty-ninth, Fifth-first, Fifty-fifth, Sixty-first, Sixty-fifth,
Sixty-ninth, Seventy-first, Seventy-fourth, and Eighty-second
Ohio Infantry ; the First, Third, and Fourth Ohio Cavalry, and
batteries " B," " C," " F," and " G," First Ohio Artillery; the
Twenty-second, Thirtieth, Thirty -first, Thirty -fifth, Fortieth,
Forty-second, Forty-fourth, Fifty-first, Fifty-seventh and
Fifty-eighth Indiana Infantry ; Seventy-ninth Mounted Infan-
try, and Thirteenth Indiana battery; the Tenth, Twenty-first,
Thirty-sixth, Thirty-eighth, Forty-second, Forty-fourth, Fifty-
first, Fifty-ninth, and Sixtieth Illinois Infantry, and batteries
» H "and " I," Second Illinois Artillery ; the Fourth, Eighteenth,
Twenty -first, and Twenty -third Kentucky Infantry ; the Sec-
ond, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, and the
Twenty-eighth Kentucky Mounted Infantry ; the Forty-sixth,
Seventy-third, Seventy-ninth, and One Hundred and Ninth
Pennsylvania Infantry, and the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry ;
the Forty -fifth, Fifty-eighth, and Sixtieth New York Infantry,
and the New York Independent Battery; the Tenth and Thir-
teenth Michigan Infanty ; the Fourteenth Michigan Mounted
Infantry, and the First Michigan battery ; the Thirteenth Wis-
consin Infantry, and the Fifth Wisconsin battery ; the Fif-
teenth Missouri Infantry, and battery "G," First Missouri
Artillery ; the Second Minnesota Infantry ; the Fifth Iowa
Cavalry ; the Eighth Kansas Infantry, and Third Maryland In-
fantry. Of the detachments, there were representatives in greater
or less numbers from the Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, Eighteenth,
and Twenty-fourth Ohio Infantry, and the Tenth Independent
30
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864
battery; the Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty-
nth Indiana Infantry; the Twenty-first, Twenty-second,
and Twenty-seventh Illinois Infantry, and battery " C," First
Illinois Artillery ; the Eighth Kentucky Infantry ; the Seventy-
Q i n th Pennsylvania Infantry; batteries « F " and "M/'New
Fork Artillery; the Firsl Michigan Engineers, and battery
■ • i;.' Firsl Michigan Artillery; the Third Wisconsin battery ;
the Firsl Missouri Engineers; the Tenth Maine Infantry, and
battery "3," Maine Artillery; battery " F," Fourth United
I rtillery, and battery «K," Fifth United States Artil-
lery.
On the Ls1 of May, the Army of the Cumberland was well
in hand, awaiting orders to advance. The Fourth Corps,
Major-General 0. 0. Howard commanding, was at Cleveland.
The Fourteenth, Major-General J. M. Palmer commanding,
was before Chattanooga, and the Twentieth Corps, Major-
Gteneral Joseph Hooker commanding, was mainly in Lookout
valley. The divisions of the Fourth Corps, in numerical
order, were commanded by Major-Generals D. S. Stanley and
.! i >hn Newton and Brigadier-General T. J. Wood ; those of the
Fourteenth, Brigadier-Generals R. W. Johnson, J. C. Davis,
and A. Baird, and those of the Twentieth, Brigadier-General
A. S. Williams and J. "W*. Geary and Major-Generals D. But-
terfield and Lovell H. Rousseau. The division of the latter,
and other troops of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, assigned
as garrisons, comprising thirty-two regiments of infantry, nine
of cavalry, and thirty-nine batteries, were disposed at all im-
portant points from Chattanooga to Nashville, on the direct
road, and at Clarksville and Fort Donelson. The cavalry
comprised four divisions, under Brigadier- General W. L. Elli-
ott — the first, Colonel MeCook commanding, was with the
Fourth Corps, at Cleveland; the second under Brigadier-Gen-
eral Garrard, was ordered to report to General McPherson,
commanding the Army of the Tennessee ; the third under Brig-
adier-General Kilpatrick, was at Ringgold, and the Fourth,
onder Brigadier-General Gillem, was at Nashville. The army
for the field comprised 54,568 infantry, 3,238 cavalry, and 2,377
artillery, with L30 guns; total, 60,773 effective men.
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 31
Organization of the Army of the Cumberland, Major- General George
H. Thomas commandinq, April, 18(14. / f>
Fourth Army Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL O. 0. HOWARD commanding.
First Division.
Major-General D. S. Stanley commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Gen. Charles Cruet commanding. Gen. W. C. Whittaker commanding.
1st Kentucky Infantry. 21st Kentucky Infantry.
2d " " 35th Indiana "
21st Illinois Infantry. 84th " «
38th " " 40th Ohio "
31st Indiana " 51st " «
81st " " 99th " «
90th Ohio " 96th Illinois "
101st " " 115th " «
Third Brigade.
Colonel Wm. Grose commanding.
9th Indiana Infantry.
30th " "
36th " "
59th Illinois "
75th " «
80th " "
84th " "
77th Pennsylvania Infantry.
Artillery.
6th Indiana Battery. Battery " B," Independent Penn.
Second Division.
Major-General John Newton commanding.
First Brigade.
Col. P. T. Sherman commanding.
2d Missouri Infantry.
15th " "
24th "Wisconsin "
28th Kentucky "
36th Illinois "
44th « "
73d " «
74th " «
88th " *
Second Brigade.
Gen. G. D. Wagner commanding.
40th Indiana Infantry.
57th " "
26th Ohio "
97th " «
100th Illinois "
32 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
Third Brigade.
Colonel C. G. Ra*XX& commanding.
3d Kentucky Infantry.
64th Ohio "
65th " "
125th " "
22(1 Illinois "
27th " "
4-Jd "
51st " "
79th " "
Artillery.
Battery " G," 1st Missouri. Battery " M," 1st Illinois.
Third Division.
Brigadier-General T. J. "Wood commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
General A. Willich commanding. General W. B. Hazen commanding.
8th Kansas Infantry. 1st Ohio Infantry.
15th "Wisconsin Infantry. 6th " "
15th Ohio " 41st "
49th " " 93d «
32d Indiana " 124th Ohio "
25th Illinois " 5th Kentucky Infantry.
35th " " 6th " "
89th " " 23d " "
Cth Indiana "
Third Brigade.
General Samuel Beatty commanding.
9th Kentucky Infantry.
17th " "
13th Ohio "
19th " "
59th " "
79th Indiana "
86th " "
Artillery.
Gth Ohio Battery. Bridge's Illinois Light Battery.
Fourteenth Army Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. PALMER commanding.
I-irst Division.
Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson commanding.
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 33
First Brigade.
General W. P. Carlin commanding.
2d Ohio Infantry.
33d "
94th " "
10th Wisconsin Infantry.
15th Kentucky "
38th Indiana "
42d " "
88th " "
104th Illinois "
Second Brigade.
General J. H. King commanding.
15th U. S. Infantry, 1st Battalion.
15th "
16th
18th
18th
19th
2d
1st
1st
2d
1st
11th Michigan Infantry.
19th Illinois "
69th Ohio Infantry.
Third Brigade.
Colonel Jas. M. Neibling commanding.
1st "Wisconsin Infantry.
21st "
21st Ohio
74th "
24th Illinois
37th Indiana
78th Pennsylvania Infantry.
79th " "
Artillery.
Battery "A," 1st Michigan. Battery " C," 1st Illinois.
Second Division.
Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis commanding.
First Brigade.
Gen. J. D. Morgan commanding.
10th Illinois Infantry.
16th " "
60th " "
10th Michigan "
14th " "
Second Brigade.
Col. John G. Mitchell commanding
98th Ohio Infantry.
108th " "
113th " "
121st " "
34th Illinois «
78th " «
Third Brigade.
Colonel Dan. McCook commanding.
52d Ohio Infantry.
85th Illinois Infantry.
86th " "
110th " "
125th " "
22d Indiana "
VOL. II— 3
34 OPERATIONS FROM J LNTTARY TO MARCH, 1864.
'tery.
2d Minnesota Battery. Battery " I," 2d Illinois.
5th Wisconsin Battery.
Third Division.
Brigadier-General A. Baird commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Gen. J. B. TriuHix commanding. Col. P. Vandeeveer commanding.
11th Ohio Infantry. 2d Minnesota Infantry.
17th a (i 9th Ohio Infantry.
31st « " 35th »
3 6t h » " 105th Ohio "
ggjk a « 75th Indiana Infantry.
92d " " 87th " "
82d Indiana Infantry. 101st " "
Third Brigade.
Colonel Geo. P. Este commanding.
4th Kentucky Infantry.
10th «
ii
18th "
ii
10th Indiana
ii
74th
ii
14th Ohio
a
38th "
it
92d Illinois
a
Artillery.
r y-
19th Indiana Battery.
7th Indiana Battery
Twentieth Army Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER commanding.
Company " K," 15th Illinois Cavalry.
Independent Company, 8th 1ST. Y. Infantry.
First Division.
Brigadier-General A. S. Williams commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Gen. Joseph Knipe commanding. Gen. Thos. H. Ruger commanding
3d Maryland Infantry. 2d Massachusetts Infantry.
20th Connecticut Infantry (5). 3d Wisconsin "
4Cth Pennsylvania " 13th New Jersey "
123d New York " 27th Indiana "
141st " " " 107th New York «
150th " " "
* Absent on veteran furlough.
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 35
Third Brigade.
Generae H. Tyndale commanding.
61st Ohio Infantry.
82d " "
45th New York Infantry.
143d " " "
82d Illinois Infantry.
101st " "
Artillery.
Battery " M," 1st New York. Battery " I," 1st New York.
Second Division.
Brigadier-General John W. Geary commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Col. Charles Candy commanding. Col. A. Buschbeck commanding.
5th Ohio Infantry. 27th Pennsylvania Infantry.
7th " " 73d " "
29th " " 109th " "
66th " " 33d New Jersey "
28th Pennsylvania Infantry. 119th New York u
147th " " 134th " " "
154th " " "
Third Brigade.
Colonel D. Ireland commanding.
29th Pennsylvania Infantry.
111th " "
60th New York "
78th " " "
102d " " "
137th " • " "
149th " " "
Artillery.
Battery "E," Independent Pennsylvania. 13th New York Battery.
Third Division.
Major-General D. Butterfield commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
General W. T. Ward commanding. Colonel John Coburn commanding.
70th Indiana Infantry. 5th Connecticut Infantry.
79th Ohio " 20th " "
102d Illinois " 19th Michigan "
105th " " 22d Wisconsin "
129th « " 33d Indiana "
85th " «
36 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
Third Brigade.
Colonel J. Wood, Jr., commanding.
26th "Wisconsin Infantry.
33d Massachusetts "
55th Ohio "
73d " "
136th New York "
Artillery.
Battery " C," 1st Ohio Artillery. Battery " I," 1st Michigan Artillery.
Fourth Division.
Major-General L. II. Rousseau commanding.
First Brigade.
General R. S. Granger commanding.
10th Tennessee Infantry
13th Wisconsin "
18th Michigan "
73d Indiana "
102d Ohio "
Not Brigaded.
68th New York Infantry. 83d Illinois Infantry.
68th " " 71st Ohio «
75th Pennsylvania " 106th " "
23d Missouri " 115th " "
31st Wisconsin "
Artillery.
9th Ohio Battery. 20th Indiana Battery.
Cavalry.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. L. ELLIOTT commanding.
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, attached to Department Headquarters.
First Division.
Colonel E. M. McCook commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Col. A P. Campbell commanding. Col. 0. H. La Grange commanding,
1st Tennessee Cavalry. 1st Wisconsin Cavalry.
2d Michigan " 2d Indiana «
8th Iowa " 4th " "
Tfdrd Brigade.
Colonel L. D. Watkins commanding.
4th Kentucky Cavalry.
6th " «
7th " "
18th Indiana Battery.
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 37
Second Division.
Brigadier-General K. Garrard commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
Col. Wm. B. Sipes commanding. Colonel R. H. G. Minty commanding.
4th U. S. Cavalry. 1st Ohio Cavalry.
7th Pennsylvania Cavalry. 3d "
4th Michigan Cavalry. 4th "
Third Brigade.
Colonel A. O. Miller commanding.
17th Indiana Mounted Infantry.
72d
98th Illinois " "
123d " " "
Chicago Board of Trade Battery.
Third Division.
Colonel "W. W. Lowe commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
5th Iowa Cavalry. 8th Indiana Cavalry.
9th Pennsylvania Cavalry. 2d Kentucky "
3d Indiana Cavalry (1 battal.) 10th Ohio
Third Brigade.
3d Kentucky Cavalry.
5th " "
Fourth Division.
Brigadier-General A. C. Gillem commanding.
First Brigade. Second Brigade.
2d Tennessee Cavalry. 5th Tennessee Cavalry.
3d u ii *10th " "
4th " " * 12th " "
Third Brigade.
«8th Tennessee Cavalry.
*9th " "
*13th " "
Unassigned Troops.
10th Ohio Infantry, Department Headquarters,
1st " Sharpshooters, "
9th Michigan Infantry.
1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics; headquarters at Bridgeport, Ala.
* Not mustered.
38 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
i .
Garrison of Chattanooga.
General Jas. B. Steedman commanding.
First Separate Brigade.
8th Kentucky Infantry. 3d Ohio Infantry.
16th Indiana " 24th" "
29th " " 44th Indiana Infantry.
51st " " 68th " "
■ ncer Brigade. Pioneer Brigade.
18th Ohio Infantry, Chattanooga. Tenn. 1st Battalion, Chattanooga, Tenn.
18th Michigan " " " 2d " " "
21st " " " " Pontoon " " "
22d " " " " 58th Indiana Infantry.
Artillery,
Reserve Artillery.
First Division. Second Division.
Battery "F," 4th U. S. Art. Battery " A," 1st Ohio Art.
a ttQ >> it (i ii (i ].' ii u a
II II JJ " 11 11 11 11 Q. II II II
ii ii 3J" ii ii ii ii jyj ii ii ii
" "H," 5th U.S. " 18th Ohio Battery.
" "K," " " 1st Kentucky Battery.
Garrison Artillery.
Chattanooga, Tenn
4th Indiana Battery. 3d Wisconsin Battery.
8th " " 20th Ohio "
10th " " Battery "I," 1st Ohio Artillery.
Hth " " « "C," 1st Wisconsin Heavy Art.
Battery " K," 1st Michigan Artillery.
Bridgeport, Ala.
Battery " E, 1st Ohio Artillery. Battery " B," 1st Ohio Artillery.
Stevenson, Ala.
Battery " K," 1st Ohio Artillery.
Murfreesboro, Tenn.
Battery " D," 1st Michigan Artillery. 12th Ohio Battery.
8th Wisconsin Battery.
Naahville, Tenn.
12th Indiana Battery. Battery «C," 1st Tennessee Artillery.
Battery " E," 1st Michigan Artillery. « » D » « u
" " I," 4th U. S. Artillery. " « iy> " «(
Fort Donelson, Tenn.
Battery " C," 2d Illinois Artillery.
Clarksville, Tenn.
Battery "H," 2d Illinois Artillery.
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 39
Detached Artillery.
10th Wisconsin Battery, Calhoun, Tenn.
13th Indiana Battery, Gallatin, Tenn.
21st Indiana Battery, Columbia, Tenn.
1st Kansas Battery, Waverly, Tennessee (N. & N. W. R. R.)
2d Kentucky Battery, Tullahoma, Tenn.
Battery "A," 1st Tennessee Artillery, La Vergne, Tenn.
Colored Troops.
12th IT. S. Colored Troops, "Waverly, Tenn. (N. & N. W. R. R.)
13th U. S. Colored Troops, Waverly, Tenn. (N. & N. W. R. R.)
14th U. S. Colored Troops, Chattanooga, Tenn.
15th U. S. Colored Troops, Nashville, Tenn.
16th U. S. Colored Troops, Chattanooga, Tennesee (era route).
17th U. S. Colored Troops, Murfreesboro, Tenn.
42d U. S. Colored Troops, Chattanooga, Tenn.
44th U. S. Colored Troops, Chattanooga, Tenn.
Battery "A," 1st U. S. Colored Light Artillery.
Knoxville, January 31, 1864 — 2 p. M.
■General Geo. H. Thomas, Chattanooga :
I am preparing to take the offensive. To do do this with effect, in the
face of Longstreet's reinforcements, will require at least ten thousand
infantry from you. In addition, that you place working gangs on the
road to the Hiawassee bridge, so as to increase our supplies, which may
be boated over the Tennessee, at Loudon, and afterward sent by rail to
this place. I also require a pontoon train of twelve hundred feet
length. Colonel Babcock will come down in the first boat, to attend to
this. The cavalry from Atlanta is reported to be moving into East
Tennessee, through North Carolina. Seven regiments started on the
13th instant. Please telepraph what is the extent of the assistance you
can give me
J. G. FOSTER,
Major-General Commanding.
Nashville, Tenn., February 6, 1864 — 2.30 p. m.
Major-General Thomas :
Reports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has removed
most of his force from your front, two divisions going to Longstreet.
Longstreet has been reinforced by troops from the East. This makes it
evident that they intend to secure East Tennessee, if they can, and I
intend to drive them out, or get whipped this month. For this purpose,
you will have to detach at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's
division (more will be better). I can partly relieve the vacuum at Chat-
tanooga by troops from Logan's command. It will not be necessary to
40 OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
take artillery or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery-
horses should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules to each one
hundred men should also be taj -m, if you have them to spare. Let me
know how soon you can start.
MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT.
Nashville, February 10, 1864.
-General Thomas:
Prepare to start for Knoxville on Saturday. I will order Logan to
send to ''hattanooga all the troops he can, and still hold his line of the
road. The number will probably be about five thousand men. One
division of your command will have to move out to hold the road to the
lliawassee.
MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT.
Nashville, February 17, 1864.
Major-General Thomas:
Longstreet can not afford to place his force between Knoxville and the
Tennessee. If he does, it will then be time to move against him. The
work of a raid on the road can soon be repaired, if it can not be pre-
vented. Make your contemplated move as soon as possible.
MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT.
Chattanooga, Tenn., February 19, 1864.
Major-General Grant, Nashville, Tenn. :
Assistant Surgeon Jacob Miller, Sixth Missouri Volunteer Infantry,
arrived here yesterday, from Dalton. He was captured at Lebanon,
Alabama, when General Logan sent out an expedition toward Rome.
J I e reports Cleburne's division at Tunnel Hill, Stewart's division between
Tunnel Hill and Dalton; Walker, two miles out from Dalton, toward
Spring Place; Cheatham at Dalton; and Stevenson's and Bate's divisions
to the west of Dalton two miles. He saw all of the camps, and estimates
their force between thirty and forty thousand. He moreover states that
no troops have beon sent away, except one brigade of infantry, which
wont to Rome, about the 1st of this month.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V.
Tunnell Hill, February 26, 1864 — 7 J p. m.
Major-General U. S. Grant, Nashville :
I arrived here last night. Davis and Johnson occupy the pass at
ard's Roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their front, who
.mber them in artillery. It is not possible to carry this place
jsault Genoral Palmer made the attempt to turn vesterday with
Band's and Cruft's divisions, but was met by an equal force, exclusive of
their cavalry, and in an equally strong position as at Buzzard's Roost.
After expending nearly all of his ammunition, he retired durin- the
night, to Catoosa Platform. Our transportation is poor and limited ; we
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864. 41
are not able to carry more than sixty rounds per man. Artillery horses
so poor, that Palmer could bring but sixteen pieces. The country is
stripped entirely of subsistence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is
much superior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report that a portion
of Cleburne's division has returned. I will wait the development of this
dav, and advise you further.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V.
Nashville, February 27, 1864.
Major- General Geo. H. Thomas :
It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be held in full
belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended, until the
fate of General Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of supplies
can be overcome by keeping your trains running between Chattanooga
and your position. Take the depot trains at Chattanooga, yours and
General Howard's wagons; these can be replaced temporarily, by yours
returning. Veterans are returning daily. This will enable you to draw
reinforcements constantly to your front. Can General Schofield not also
take a division from Howard's corps? It is intended to send Granger to
you the moment Schofield is thought to be safe without him.
U. S. GRANT,
Major- General.
Nashville, February 27 — 6 p. m.
Brigadier-General Wliipple, Chief of Staff:
Information has reached Washington, that orders have been given for
Johnston's army to fall back. General Thomas should watch any such
movement and follow it up closely. Can't you draw teams from Bridge-
port and Stevenson, to send supplies to the front? They have teams in
great numbers at those places. Every energy should be exerted to get
supplies and reinforcements forward. Troops will leave here at the
rate of two or three thousand a day, for the front. Many of them go to
Chattanooga.
U. S. GRANT,
Major- General.
Chattanooga, March 5, 1864 — 11 p. m.
Major- General Schofield, Knoxville :
I have just received reliable information that Johnston has been rein-
forced by ten thousand men from South Carolina, and by Roddy, and
that he contemplates making an offensive movement in this direction.
Can you spare Granger's corps ? If so, please direct them to concentrate
at Cleveland, leaving a brigade of infantry and battery at Calhoun, to
guard the railroad at that place.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V.
42 OPEBATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 1864.
Chattanooga, March 5, 18G4.
ted to Major-General Thomas to-day, and also two days
since that the enemy were heavily reinforcing at Dalton. General Grant
thinks it is not improbable that he may advance against us here In
that case we shall need the Fourth Corps, and wish you to hold it m
read , , ,„i. if h be needed. Can not send you any assistance
whUe *» " ti ^'"' y U hUnging ^ US> WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.
EXTB \< TS FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL JOS. E.
JOHNSTON.
On the 17th of February, the President ordered me, by telegraph, to
detach l.i.Mt,nan1>General Hardee with the infantry of his corps, except
Qson'a division, to aid Lieutenant-General Polk, against Sherman
in Mississippi. This order was obeyed as promptly as our means of trans-
portation permitted.
*******
* m the 27th of February, I suggested to the executive by letter, through
I that all preparations for a forward movement should be
made without delay. In a letter, dated 4th of March, General Bragg
desired me " to have all things ready at the earliest practicable moment,
for the movement indicated." In replying, on the 12th, I reminded
him that the regulations of the war department do not leave such prep-
arations to commanders of troops, but to officers who receive their orders
from Richmond.
(in tli.- 18th, a letter was received from General Bragg, sketching
a plan of offensive operations, and enumerating the troops to be used
in them under me. I was invited to express my views on the subject.
In doing so, both by telegraph and mail, I suggested modifications, and
urged that the additional troops named should be sent immediately, to
enable us, should the enemy advance, to beat him, and then move for-
ward; or, should he not advance, do so ourselves. General Bragg replied,
bj telegraph, on the 21st: "Your dispatch of 19th does not indicate
ptance of plan proposed. Troops can only be drawn from other
] points for advance. Upon your decision of that point, further action
must depend.
1 replied, by telegraph, on the 22d: "In my dispatch of the 19th,
I expressly accepl taking offensive, only differ with you as to details. I
me that the enemy will be prepared for an advance before we
are, and will make it to our advantage. Therefore I propose, both
for offensive and defensive, to assemble our troops here immediately."
This was not noticed. Therefore, on the 25th, I again urged tho
of reinforcing the Army of the Tennessee, because the enemy
was collecting a larger force than that of the last campaign, while ours
was less than it had been then.
OPERATIONS FROM JANUARY TO MARCH, 18G4. 43
On the 8th of April, Colonel B. S. Ewell, A. A. G., was sent to Richmond,
to represent to the President my wish to take the offensive, with proper
means, and to learn his views. A few days after, Brigadier-General Pen-
dleton arrived from Richmond, to explain to me the President's wishes
on the subject. 1 explained to him the modification of the plan com-
municated by General Bragg, which seemed to me essential, which re-
quired that intended reinforcements should be sent to Dalton. I urged
that this should be done without delay, because our present force was
not sufficient even for defense, and to enable us to take the offensive, if
the enemy did not.
By Telegraph from Chattanooga, February 28, 1864.
Major-General Grant, Nashville:
General Butterfield, by my direction, has recently examined the line
between here and Nashville, and reports that he thinks six thousand men
will be sufficient to guard that line, two regiments of which force should
be cavalry. From what I know of the road between Nashville and De-
catur, two thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry will be sufficient to
protect that line. One thousand infantry will be sufficient to protect the
line from Athens to Stevenson. Probably both lines of communication
can be guarded by six thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, a
great portion of which should be made up from the local militia of Ten-
nessee, or troops organized especially for the preservation of order in the
state. I believe if I can commence the campaign with the Fourteenth and
Fourth Corps in front, with Howard's corps in reserve, that I can move
along the line of the railroad and overcome all opposition as far at least
as Atlanta. I should want a strong division of cavalry in advance. As
soon as Captain Merrill returns from his reconnoissance along the railroad
lines, I can give you a definite estimate of the number of troops required
to guard the bridges along the road.
GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General U. iS. V.
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT TO THE COM-
MITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
The above proposition was submitted to General Grant for his approval,
and if obtained it was my intention (having acquired by the reconnoissance
of February 23d, 24th, and 25th, a thorough knowledge of the approaches
direct upon Dalton from Ringgold and Cleveland) to have made a strong
demonstration against Buzzard's Roost, attracting Johnston's whole atten-
tion to that point, and to have thrown the main body of my infantry and
cavalry through Snake Creek Gap, upon his communications, which I had
ascertained from scouts he had up to that time neglected to observe or
guard. With this view, I had previously asked for the return to me of
Granger's corps and my cavalry from East Tennessee, and had already
initiated preparations for the execution of the above movement as soon
as the spring opened sufficiently to admit of it.
CHAPTER XXVI.
THE TURNING OF DALTON.
The firsl of May, 1864, was a crisis of the war. Two of the
largest armies hitherto assembled East or West were in read-
ings to move against the enemy at the bidding of the Lieu-
tenant-General. The local objectives of these armies were
distinct, but the common general object was the immediate
suppression of the rebellion. It was proposed to accomplish
this grand aim, by crushing General Lee's army covering
Richmond and General Johnston's standing before Dalton.
These two armies embodied the life of the rebellion.
Generals Grant and Sherman were to move on lines too re-
mote tn admit direct co-operation, but they proposed to be
unit nally helpful by simultaneous aggression. General Grant
was to turbid the transfer of troops from Virginia to Georgia,
by vigor of attack, and General Sherman was to engage John-
ston in such a manner that he could not send supporting col-
umns from Georgia to Virginia. Volunteers were invited for
hundred days, to hold the important points in the rear of
the two great armies, that all the available veteran troops
East might be massed against General Lee, and all in the "West
concentrated at Chattanooga, that General Sherman, with three
armies in one, should dash upon General Johnston at Dalton.
Campaigns, East or West, had never been undertaken under
conditions of similar promise, and the loyal people were hope-
ful of caily and complete success.
The conditions of the Georgia campaign were exceedingly
rable to General Sherman, as compared with the ruling
features of all preceding campaigns in the central theater of
war. The superiority of the national army at Chattanooga
(44)
THE TURNING OF DALTON. 45
had been far greater than in any previous battle in this region,
and in some of the anterior engagements, as at CMckamauga,
the enemy had been superior. But General Sherman's pre-
ponderance of strength was greater than General Grant's when
General Bragg was hurled from Lookout Mountain and Mis-
sionary Ridge. Then the strength of the opposing armies was
perhaps as three to two ; it was now to be as two to one. Be-
sides, General Johnston could not now have, as his predecessor
had always had, when on the defensive, the advantage of inte-
rior lines. The possession of Chattanooga and Cleveland,
with roads converging at Dalton, gave direct lines for General
Sherman's first advance, and with the railroad and river from
Knoxville to Decatur well guarded, and a fortified line of sup-
ply from the north, he could move southward without endan-
gering flank or rear, so long as he could so engage the enemy
as to keep him before him. In the projected campaign, neither
General Sherman nor General Johnston could have the ad-
vantage of interior lines, only so far as the defensive could
give to either, shorter lines for maneuver and array, within a
limited range only. The general line of maneuver being
north and south, forbade great advantage of lines to either.
But General Johnston had other advantages. He had
choice of positions and could always resist behind battlements
with good management, and in giving ground would be con-
stantly gathering to him his reserves ; while General Sherman,
in advancing, would be compelled to detach more and more
from his offensive forces to guard his constantly lengthening
line of supply. So, therefore, the relative conditions of the
campaign were by no means expressed by the comparative pro-
portions of the opposing armies.
The 2d clay of May was first named by General Grant for
the advance of the great armies, but finally the 5th was
announced in orders. General Thomas, however, commenced
his dispositions and movements on the 2d. On this day, Gen-
eral Davis' division joined General Baird's at Ringgold, and
General Butterfielcl's advanced from Lookout valley to Lee
and Gordon's Mills. During the day, General Baird sent
infantry and cavalry detachments to reconnoiter toward Tun-
nel Hill, and developed the enemy in force at that point.
.{,; THE TUENING OF DALTOX.
May 3d General Johnson's division closed upon the other two
;,,•„„. Fourteenth Corps a1 Ringgold. On the day following,
the Fourth Corps, with McCook's division of cavalry on its
lefl „,, lk advanced to Catoosa Springs, and Butterfield's
division advanced to Pleasant Grove, and General Williams'
divi8 ion to Lee and Gordon's Mills. The next day, General
Geary's division, having marched across the mountain from
Bridgeport, closed up od the other divisions of the Twentieth
Corps :l t Leet's tanyard, completing the concentration of the
\ru.v of the Cumberland.
Q eral Sherman originally designed that the Army of the
Tennessee, Major-< General McPherson commanding, should ad-
vance from Decatur by Gunter's Landing and Lebanon, Ala-
bama, to Lafayette, Georgia ; but subsequently, he ordered it to
move upon ( Jhattanooga. This army was not as strong as had
been anticipated, as two of its veteran divisions under General
A. .I. Smith were detained bythe protraction of General Banks'
expedition west of the Mississippi river. With two corps,
General McPherson attained position at Lee and Gordon's
Mills on the 6th, and the same day the Army of the Ohio, Ma-
j 1 1 p-General Schofield commanding, reached Red Clay. At the
close of this day the armies representing the controlling
b1 rength of the contending powers in the West, lay confronting
each other on the eve of one of the greatest campaigns of a
war, made memorable in the annals of the world by the
magnitude of armies, the frequency of great battles, and im-
mense compass of military operations.
General Sherman's three armies for offense now numbered
nearly one hundred thousand men. There were sixty thou-
sand seven hundred and seventy-three men in the Army of
the Cumberland; twenty-four thousand and sixty-five in the
Army of the Tennessee ; and thirteen thousand five hundred
and fifty-nine in the Army of the Ohio. The Army of the
Cumberland comprised fifty -four thousand five hundred and
sixty-eighl infantry, two thousand three hundred and seventy-
Beven artillery, three thousand two hundred and twenty-eight
cavalry, and one hundred and thirty guns; the Army of the
Tennessee, twenty-two thousand infantry, one thousand four
hundred and four artillery, six hundred and twenty-four cav-
THE TURNING OF DALTON. 47
airy, and ninety-six guns ; and the Army of the Ohio, eleven
thousand one hundred and eighty-three infantry, six hundred
and seventy-nine artillery, one thousand six hundred and
ninety-seven cavalry, and eighty -two guns. The grand aggre-
gates were eighty-eight thousand one hundred and eighty-
eight infantry, four thousand four hundred and sixty artillery,
five thousand five hundred and forty-nine cavalry, and two
hundred and fifty-four guns. General Johnston's army em-
braced forty-four thousand nine hundred infantry, artillery,
and cavalry ; two corps, commanded by Lieutenant-Generals
Hardee and Hood, and four thousand cavalry, by Major-Gen-
eral "Wheeler.
General Sherman proposed first to carry Tunnel Hill, and
then threaten a direct attack upon Johnston's main position
before Dalton, while McPherson's army should move through
Snake Creek Gap to operate against Resaca. He accordingly
gave orders, May 6th, requiring General Thomas, on the day
following, to move his center, the Fourteenth Corps, directly
upon Tunnel Hill ; his right, the Twentieth Corps, to Trickum,
and his left, the Fourth Corps, to Lee's house, in support of the
Fourteenth : General McPherson to advance with his army
first upon Ship's Gap and Villanow, and thence to Snake Creek
Gap, and through it as soon as practicable ; and General Scho-
field to move forward to Catoosa Springs, feeling toward Gen-
eral Thomas' left flank.
The Army of the Cumberland moved on the 7th, in com-
pliance with orders. The enemy made a show of resistance to
General Palmer, with infantry and artillery, at Tunnel Hill,
but on the appearance of General Howard's corps upon his
left, his troops fled to Buzzard's Roost. General Hooker, upon
reaching Trickum, threw out detachments toward Buzzard's
Roost on the left, and Villanow on the right, to observe the
enemy. General Kilpatrick's cavalry remained at Gordon's
Springs, in readiness to establish communications with the
Army of the Tennessee, expected at Villanow on the morning
of the 8th.
The next day, Harker's brigade of Kewton's division of
the Fourth Corps advanced along Rocky Face ridge to a
point within a mile and a half of the enemy's signal station.
48 THE TURNING OF DALTON.
Meeting h< to with obstructions forbidding farther advance,
Barkermade preparations to bold the position. Skirmish
lines were then thrown forward from Wood's, Davis', and
Butterfield'e divisions, and the enemy was pressed into his in-
trenchments at Buzzard's Roost, or " Mill Creek Gap,"* and
the three divisions advanced to the entrance.
A.e < General McPherson was now 7 moving upon Snake Creek
< i;i].. it was imperative that a strong feint should be made, to
create the impression that it w T as the intention to carry the
p< .sition 1 >y assault. Accordingly, General Geary was directed
to scale Chattooga Mountain with his division, if practi-
cable, at the point known as Dug Gap, where the road from
Lafayette to Dalton ascends from Mill Creek valley. Chat-
tooga Mountain is separated from Rocky Face ridge by Mill
Creek at Buzzard's Roost, and from that point trends south-
ward.
At the point selected for Geary's ascent, the mountain side
is steep and rough, and the summit is crowned with a palisade
of rocks, with occasional openings that admit passage to the
top. With the One Hundred and Nineteenth New York de-
]. loved as skirmishers, and Buschbeck's and Candy's brigades
formed on right and left, in two lines of battle, Geary moved
up the mountain. Midway, his skirmishers became hotly en-
gaged,but the enemy w T as pressed upward until the main lines
reached the base of the palisades. After resting for a few
minutes, to recover from the exhaustion produced by excessive
heat and protracted exertion, an effort was made to reach the
summit. A few men only succeeded, and they were either
killed or forced back. The position was such that defense
was easy, even by rolling stones from the summit. A second
attempt, however, was made, soon after the first failed, but
with similar issue. General Geary, then brought McGilPs
rifled battery to bear upon the enemy in his front, to cover an
effort of the Thirty-third New Jersey to reach the summit a
half mile to the right, where the enemy made less show of
strength. As in the other cases, a few men gained the crest,
and their shouts invited the advance of the whole line, but
* So designated by General Johnston.
THE TURNING OF DALTON. 49
again there was emphatic failure. By this time, General
Hardee was present with reinforcements, and further effort
would have been madness. Geary "ost heavily, hut his action
being regarded by the enemy as the initiative to carry the po-
sition by assault, it was in some degree compensative, as such
impression was the object of the movement. Night and the
third repulse coming together, the division was withdrawn to
the valley, out of reach of the enemy's guns.
During the afternoon, Johnson's and Baird's divisions were
advanced to Davis' support, and Butterfield's was ordered to
join General Hooker. General Kilpatrick communicated with
General McPherson, and then moved to Trickum. McCook's
division was thrown on Schofield's left flank, to cover the ex-
tremity of the general line, until General Stoneman should
come up. The position for General Garrard's cavalry division
was to be with General McPherson, but it was yet in the rear,
en route from Pulaski, Tennessee.
The next day, the Army of the Cumberland was somewhat
heavily engaged on the east, north, and west of Buzzard's
Boost. The action was intended as a feint, unless it should
be ascertained that General Johnston was withdrawing his
army. Such, however, was the position, by nature and art,
that emphatic feints subjected the national forces to great ex-
posure, and there was considerable loss throughout the line.
The character of the feints may be inferred from the fact that
General Johnston reported that five assaults upon "Bocky
Face Mountain " were repulsed on the 9th of May. His
troops holding Buzzard Boost were Stewart's and Bate's di-
visions, supported by Stevenson's and Anderson's. The
defenses for infantry were at right angles to the roads, and
batteries, covered with abatis, were placed on the adjacent
summits to throw a converging fire upon the valley, which
was flooded by means of well-concealed dams. Carlin's bri-
gade, supported by the remainder of Johnson's division, felt
the enemy's lines on the west; Morgan's brigade of Davis'
division, on the north, and Grose's brigade of Stanley's divis-
ion, on the east. The loss in killed was slight, but a great
many were wounded. The heaviest loss, in comparison with
vol. n — 4
50 THE TURNING OF DALTON.
the number of troops engaged, was in McCook's division on
, xtreme Left. Under instructions from General Schofield,
Colonel McCook made demonstrations on all the roads lead-
in- t.. l):ilt..n «.ii tho east. Colonel La Grange, commanding
hia second brigade, encountered Wheeler, with twenty-two
hundred men,on the road from Varnell's Station. He was at
first su< fill, and pressed Wheeler back to intrenclimcnts
near Poplar Place, but was there repulsed with heavy loss. He
and fourteen officers were captured, and one hundred and
thirty-six of his men were cither killed, wounded, or captured.
Wheeler's Loss was supposed to be greater. During the day,
Hooker's corps was at Trickumto support McPherson in pass-
ing through Snake Creek Gap.
The action the next day was less severe, though the feint
was vigorously maintained with a view to prevent any con-
vent ration against General McPherson. To give him support,
Kilpatrick's cavalry was ordered to join him, and Williams'
division of the Twentieth Corps was sent to his rear. In the
evening, General Hooker was directed to send a division on
the following day to widen the road through the gap, to facili-
tate the pa—age of troops and trains.
General McPherson passed through Snake Creek Gap, and
reached the vicinity of Eesaca at 2 p. m. on the 9th. Finding
the place " fortified and manned," and no roads through the
forest to the railroad, while his flank was exposed to attack
from the direction of Dalton, he withdrew to the debouche of
the gap through which he had passed. During the afternoon
of the 9th, General Johnston learned that two corps of the
national army were in the gap, and sent General Hood to
Besaca with three divisions.
When General Sherman learned that McPherson had not
touched Johnston's communications and had withdrawn to
the gap, he made a change of plan. He desired, from the first,
to hold Johnston at Dalton, and entertained the hope that
McPherson's movement would so interrupt his communica-
tions that he would be forced to give battle at Dalton— an
issue that was preferred to operations " far down into Georgia."
His instructions to General McPherson were to secure Snake
Creek (Jap, and from it make a bold attack on the enemy's
THE TURNING OF DALTON. 51
flank or his railroad at any point between Tilton and Dalton.
He said: "I hope the enemy will fight at Dalton ; in which
•case he can have no force there that can interfere with you ;
but should his policy be to fall back along the railroad, you
will hit him in flank. Do not fail in that event to make the
most of the opportunity, by the most vigorous attack possi-
ble, as it may save us what we have most reason to appre-
hend — a slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it.
In either event, you may be sure the forces north of you will
prevent his turning on you alone. In the event of hearing
the sounds of heavy battle about Dalton, the greater necessity
for your rapid movement on the railroad. If broken to an
extent that would take some days to repair, you can with-
draw to Snake Creek Gap, and come to us or await the devel-
opment, according to your judgment or the information yon
may receive." As soon as he learned that General McPherson
had failed to accomplish any of these objects, except to attain
position at the debouche of the gap, he determined to attack
with his armies through the gap, and issued orders for the
movement.
It was plain to General Sherman, as it had been to General
Thomas, in February, that no effort should be made to dis-
lodge the enemy from Buzzard Roost, by direct attack ; but
he continued the feint, in order to still hold Johnston at Dal-
ton, that he might throw his armies upon his rear. Snake
Creek Gap made it easy to turn Dalton, by an army strong
enough to uncover its communications, or to detach sufficient
forces to risk an engagement with the enemy's whole army.
Through this gap all the fortresses north of Dalton could be
evaded, and the army in passage be under the cover of the
mountains. Had Johnston's army been strong enough for
division to hold the positions north of Dalton, and the lower
mouth of the gap, he could have defied a hundred thousand
men. But as his safety demanded the concentration of his
army on his lines of retreat and supply, he was compelled to
leave the passage undefended, and make roads for the quick
transfer of his army from Dalton to Reseca, should his antag-
onist use the gap for a flank movement. General Sherman's
52 THE TURNING OF DALTON.
orders to effect this measure required the concentration of his
armies in Bnake Creek Gap, on the 12th.
When Genera] Johnston first learned that General McPher-
son had retired from Resaca, he recalled Hood's three divis-
ions,and on the 11th his army was again concentrated at
Dalton. On the morning of the 12th, he was confronted by
II, .ward's corps and Stoneman's cavalry, the remainder of the
national forces being in motion to concentrate in Snake Creek
Gap. Stanley's division was before Buzzard's Roost Gap;
Newton's was holding the north end of Pocky Face ridge,
;U1 .1 the roads around it; Wood's was in reserve on Tunnel
Hill, and Stoneman's troopers were on Newton's left flank.
From the signal station on the ridge, the movements of the
enemy were plainly visible. About 10 a. m. a heavy column
was seen to advance toward Newton's left, as if to turn it.
The menace was of such positive expression that Wood's di-
vision moved to Newton's support. But the enemy, after
driving back Newton's skirmishers, withdrew. General John-
ston's object, doubtless, was to ascertain whether the national
forces had withdrawn from his front, as he had heard the day
previous that Pesaca was again threatened. The evening
before, he had ordered General Polk, who had just arrived
with Boring's division, to defend the place with that division,
and Canty's brigade. But as his safety depended upon bis
knowledge of General Sherman's movements, his reconnois-
Bance was directed to this end. During the day, be was so
fully assured of the flank movement, that, by a night march,
he transferred his infantry and artillery to Pesaca, leaving his
cavalry to cover his rear.
This result was not in harmony with the plans and expecta-
tions of General Sherman, his object being to bold John-
ston's army at Dalton, until his own armies could pass through
Snake Creek Gap; but the opportunity to accomplish it was
Losl 1 "'tween the 9th and the morning of the 13th. On the
9th, Resaca was held by Canty's brigade. The day following,
Genera] Hood was therewith three divisions. On the 11th,
Canty's brigade again held the place, and from the evening
of the 11th until the morning of the 13th, General Polk was
there with Loring's division in addition to Canty's brigade.
THE TURNIXG OF DALTON. 53
General McPhcrson passed through Snake Creek Gap on the
9th, and was on that day with his army within a mile of Res-
aca, and from the 9th to the 18th, he was south of the gap. On
the 11th, Hooker's corps was in supporting distance, and on
the 12th, Palmer's corps and Schofield's two divisions were
close in the rear of Hooker.
Johnston remained in ignorance of Sherman's grand flank
movement until the evening of the 12th, and then he was at
Dalton with his army. After the national armies had gained
Snake Creek Gap, he was unable to ascertain how many troops
passed through it. An army, there, could pass as secretly as a
brigade. He said in his official report, that "Rocky Face
Mountain, and Snake Creek Gap, at its south end, completely
covered for the enemy the turning of Dalton." His ignorance,
then, of the movement until the evening of the 12th, was a
condition of its success. Had McPherson's army and the
forces in his rear, on that day, moved rapidly into position
between Resaca and Tilton, Johnston would have been thrown
from his communications, or been compelled to give battle
upon conditions of great disadvantage.
It was unfortunate that Resaca was not gained at the same
time that Dalton was turned, as the campaign did not furnish
a similar opportunity to defeat Johnston, or press him from
Ms communications. The grandest possibility between Tun-
nel Hill and Lovejoy's Station invited a prompt advance in
force from the debouche of Snake Creek Gap. General
Thomas' plan differed from the one adopted by General Sher-
man. He proposed that the Armies of the Tennesse and the
Ohio should hold General Johnston at Dalton, by a feint upon
his position at Buzzard's Roost, while the Army of the Cum-
berland, sixty thousand strong, should pass rapidly through
Snake Creek Gap, and fall upon Johnston's communications
between Dalton and Resaca, and thus cut him off from his
communications, and either drive him eastward into a moun-
tain region, or force him to give battle on unequal conditions.
General Sherman's first plan proposed to demonstrate against
Resaca, so as to hold him at Dalton to give battle, or induce
General Johnston to abandon Dalton, and then strike his
army in flank, while in motion between that place and Resaca.
54 THE TURNING OF DALTON.
This first Beriea of operations in offense and defense gave
the types of the campaign. The offensive compelled a choice
between the direct attack of fortified positions and the flank
movement. The adopted methods of defense were the main-
tenance of fortified positions as long as practicable, a constant
outlook for opportunities to strike insulated columns, and re-
treal when necessary to save communications. General John-
's leading idea was to fight under cover, and thus reduce
ih,' uational army until he could meet it on equal conditions
of battle, and nt Dalton, and almost daily while he held com-
mand, he gave it revelation. General Sherman's leading ob-
jecl was to entrap or force his enemy into battle under cir-
cumstances which would not neutralize his superior strength,
and of this, his zigzag lines of aggression were the expression.
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL GRANT'S OFFICIAL REPORT OF
OPERATIONS FROM MARCH, 1864, TO JULY, 18G5.
The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Missis-
sippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. John-
Bton, hisablestand best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied
the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine run westward,
Btrongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital,
against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied
a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defend-
ing Atlanta. Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad center,
against the armies under Major-General Sherman.
********
These two armies and the cities covered by them and defended by them r
were the main objective points of the campaign.
*********
General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army to-
break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as
he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If
tin' enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to
the full eztenl of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of
Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to-
do so.
Culpepper, April 25 — 10.30 a. m.
Major-Gt ncral Sherman :
Will your veterans be back to enable you to start on the 2d of May ?
I do not want to delay later. U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant- General,
THE TURNING OF DALTON. 55
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Nashville, April 27, 1864.
Lieutenant- General Grant, Culpepper :
In view of the fact that I will have to take the initiative with twenty
thousand less men in McPherson's army than I estimated, I intend to
order all McPherson's disposable force, twenty thousand (20,000), and
Garrard's cavalry, five thousand (5,000), to Chattanooga, to start from a
common center. I go forward to-morrow.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Culpepper, Va., April 28, 1864.
Major-General Sherman :
Get your forces up so as to move by the fifth (5th) of May.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, Ga., May 8, 1864.
Major-General, Hallecl; Washington, D. C. :
I have been all day reconnoitering the mountain range through whose
gap the railroad and common road pass. By to-night, McPherson will
be in Snake Creek Gap, threatening Resaca, and to-morrow will move to
the attack. Army in good condition. I hope Johnston will fight here,
instead of drawing me far down into Georgia.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, Ga., May 9, 1864 — 8 p. m.
General Halleck, Chief of Staff, Washington, Z>. C. :
We have been fighting all day against precipices and mountain gaps to
keep Johnston's army busy, whilst McPherson could march to Resaca to
destroy the railroad behind him. I heard from McPherson up to two (2)
p. m., w T hen he was within a mile and a half of the railroad. After break-
ing the road good, his orders are to retire to the mouth of Snake Creek
Gap, and be ready to work on Johnston's flank in case he retreats south.
I will pitch in again early in the morning. Fighting has been mostly
skirmishing, and casualties small. McPherson has the Army of the Ten-
nessee, twenty-three thousand (23,000), and only encountered cavalry,
so that Johnson did not measure his strength at all.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
THE TURNING OF DALTON.
1 I KADQCARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Totwel Hill, Ga., May 10, 1864—7 a. m.
.' Ball ■'■-. Washington, D. C. :
I am Btarting for the extreme front in Buzzard Roost Gap, and make
this dispatch thai you may understand Johnston acts purely on the de-
fensive. I am attacking him on his strongest fronts— viz., west and north
—till McPherson breaks his line at Resaca, when I will swing round
through Snake Creek Gap, and interpose between him and Georgia. I
am not driving tiling too fast, because I want two columns of cavalry
that are rapidly coming up to me from the rear— Stoneman on my left
and ' tarrard on my right— both due to-day. Yesterday I pressed hard to
prevent .lohnston detaching against McPherson, but to-clay I will be more
as I believe McPherson has destroyed Eesaca, when he is ordered
to fall back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, and act against Johnston's
flank when he does start. All are in good condition.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.
General: — I propose to leave hereabouts one (1) of your corps — say
Howard's — the cavalry of Colonel McCook, and the cavalry of General
Stoneman, to keep up the feint of a direct attack on Dalton through Buz-
zard Roost, as long as possible, and with all the remainder of the three
armies to march to and through Snake Creek Gap, and attack the enemy
in force from that quarter.
You may at once commence your preparations, and give orders that
tin' force left here is to be under the command of the senior officer, who
will strip his command light, sending all spare wagons to Ringgold; that
the cars run daily to this point with daily supplies, but the main stores
t'i be at Ringgold; that the cavalry watch well the passes north of Tunnel
Hill, and at Pay's Gap; and that in case the enemy detect the diminu-
tion of force, and attack, gradually withdraw in the direction of Ring-
gold, but defend that point at all costs; that a locomotive and construc-
tion train Vic kept here with orders, and prepared, if this retrograde
movement be made necessary ; that the party shall take up, at intervals,
rails, so as to make a repair train necessary to replace them — this, that
the enemy may not have the track to facilitate his movement in pursuit.
A few rails should at once be removed at some point east of the tunnel,
that can again be put down when we want it done.
The pass at Snake creek is represented as very narrow. Please instruct
a division to be there to-morrow, provided with axes and spades, so as to
widen the road as to enable the passage of wagons; also to facilitate the
march of troops by roads and paths outside the wagon track.
General Stoneman will be at Varnell's to-night, and by to-morrow night
all his command will be in, so that we will calculate all to go to Snake
THE TURNING OF DALTON. 57
creek, and close up on General McPherson during the day after to-morrow.
As soon as General Stoneman comes, I will cause him to relieve Colonel
McCook on that flank, so that you may send him to replace General
Geary at Ray's road. Let the troops move as much under cover as possi-
ble ; wagons going round by Villanow, and troops by Mill Creek road.
General Schofield will either go round by Villanow or follow General
Newton.
I am, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, May 10, 1864.
General: — I think you are satisfied that your troops can not take
Rocky Face ridge, and also the attempt to put our columns into the jaws
of Buzzard Roost would be fatal to us.
Two plans suggest themselves :
1. By night, to replace Schofield's present command by Stoneman's
cavalry, which should be near at hand, and to move rapidly your entire
army, the men along the base of John's Mountain by the Mill Creek road
to Snake Creek Gap, and join McPherson while the wagons are moved
to Villanow. When we are joined to McPherson, to move from Sugar
valley on Resaca, interposing ourselves between that place and Dalton.
Could your army and McPherson's surely whip Joe Johnston?
2. I cast loose from the railroad altogether, and move the whole army
on the same objective point, leaving Johnston to choose his course.
Give orders for all your troops to be ready with three days' provisions,
and to be prepared to march to-night. I expect to hear from McPherson
and Schofield as to their situation, also as to the near approach of Stone-
man. He was at Charleston yesterday, and is apprized of the necessity
for haste. Do you think any danger to McPherson should make us de-
lay one day?
Please give me the benefit of your opinion on these points.
Yours, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Major-General Thomas, present.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Tunnel Hill, Ga., May 10, 1864.
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
General McPherson reached Resaca, but found the place strongly forti-
fied and guarded, and did not break the road. According to his instruc-
tions, he drew back to the debouche of the gorge, where he has a strong
defensive position, and guards the only pass into the valley of the Oosta-
58 THE TURNING OF DALTON.
nanla available to us. Buzzard Roost Gap, through which the railroad
naturally and artificially too strong to be attempted. I must
feign on Buzzard Roost, but pass through Snake Creek Gap, and place
D Johnston and Resaca, where we will have to fight it out.
I .' im making the preliminary move. Certain that Johnston can make
„,, detachments, I will be in no hurry. My cavalry is just approaching
from Kentucky and Tennessee, detained by difficulty of getting horses,
and even dow it is less than my minimum. ^ ^ SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,.
In the Field, Tunnell Hill, Ga., May 11, 1864.
, kal:— I received by courier in the night yours of 5 and 6.30 p. m.
of yesterday. You will also, during the night, come to the same con-
clusion.
You have now your twenty-three thousand, and General Hooker is close
in support, so that you can hold all Joe Johnston's army in check should
he abandon Dalton. He can 't abandon Dalton, for he has fixed it up so
well for us, and he observes we are close at hand, waiting for him to quit.
Hecan'i afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his army will
not admit of it.
Strengthen your position, fight anything that comes, and threaten the
safety of the railroad all the time. But to tell the truth, I would rather
he would stay in Dalton two more days, when he will find a larger party
than he expects, in an open field. At all events we can then choose our
ground, and he will be forced to move out of his works. I do not intend
to put a column into Buzzard Roost Gap at present.
See that you are in easy communication with me and all headquarters.
After to-day supplies will be at Ringgold.
Yours,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-Gcneral Commanding.
Mitjor-General McPherson, Commanding Army of the Tennessee, Sugar Valley,
Georgia.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Tunnell Hill, Ga., May 11, 1864.
General : — The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Dalton.
In that event, Howard's and the cavalry will pursue, and all the rest will
f.>ll,,w your route. I will be down early in the morning.
Try to Btrike him, if possible, about the forks of the roads.
Hooker must lie with you now, and you might send General Garrard by
Somerville to threaten Rome and that flank. I will cause all the lines to
be felt at once.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-G encral Commanding r
General McPherson, Sugar Valley.
THE TURNING OF DALTON. 50
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO 3.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Snake Creek Gap, Ga., May\2, 1864.
The object of the movement for to-morrow is to interpose between the
enemy and Resaca, and to break his communications.
I. Major-General McPherson will move his column directly on Resaca,
occupying in force the hills on this side of Camp creek, and his left ex-
tending along up Camp creek. He will prepare to advance a part of his
force from his left to the railroad, and break it, and then fall back to his
line.
II. Major-General Thomas will follow close to General McPherson, and
when he reaches a main road crossing to the Eesaca road, about two
miles this side of town, viz., the Dalton and Calhoun road, he will turn
to the left toward Dalton, prepared to deploy forward and connect on his
right with General McPherson's left, choosing strong positions to cover
the movement on the railroad.
III. Major-General Schofield will follow General Thomas, and at the
first Dalton road, known as the Dalton and Rome road, will turn to the
left and advance to abreast of General Thomas, and connect with him.
General Schofield will leave one brigade in Snake Creek Gap, about five
miles east of Villanow, and the balance of the one division in General
McPherson's intrenched camp at this point.
IV. The cavalry of General Garrard will picket all roads to our rear
and in case of being threatened from the north, will come into Snake
Creek Gap, and cover the rear of the army and the wagon train. The
cavalry of General Kilpatrick will move south of the main road to
Resaca, and be held in reserve near the forks of the road, and be sub-
ject to the orders of the commander-in-chief.
V. All trains will be brought in Snake Creek Gap, and be placed in
convenient order off the road. Great care must be observed in keeping
the road clear, and ambulances and wagons when not traveling the road,
must invariably turn out and leave all the road clear. Each army com-
mander will leave his own wagon guards, and the men should leave their
knapsacks in camp.
VI. The movement will begin at six (6) o'clock a. m. to-morrow.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Resaca, May 13, 1864 — 2.15 p. m.
General Thomas, Commanding Army of (he Cumberland :
Until I hear that Joe Johnston is south of the Oostanaula, I would not
cross at Lay's. We must first interpose between Dalton and Resaca,
threatening the latter all the time. I want Hooker's right and McPher-
son's left strong, until we encounter Johnston, who has not yet got below
Resaca, I think. If he retreat east, we have the advantage. I want the
GO THE TURNING OF DALTOX.
pontoons up, and to secure the railroad on Hooker's right. Palmer
should join on to Hooker, and Hooker should be strong.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Snake Creek Gap, May 13, 1864.
G cneral Sloncman, Commanding Cavalry:
Your note of to-day was received. Very good, indeed. Press down the
valley strong, and communicate with me. Your messenger will find me
where there is most noise of artillery, or near Resaca. You can safely
move on parallel roads, by brigades. Let your packs follow on the heels
of the column. Pick up whatever of provisions and plunder you can.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General Commanding.
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT.
Speaking of the demonstration against Rocky Face ridge, he says:
" This, however, was only designed as a demonstration, and worked well,
for General McPherson was thereby enabled to march within a mile of
Resaca unopposed. He found Resaca too strong to be carried by assault,
and although there were many good roads from north to south, endanger-
in i: his left Hank from the direction of Dalton, he could find no road by
which he could rapidly cross over to the railroad, and accordingly he fell
back and took strong position near the west end of Snake Creek Gap. I
somewhat disappointed at the result; still, appreciated the advantage
gained, and on the 10th ordered General Thomas to send General Hook-
corps to Snake Creek Gap in support of General McPherson, and to
follow with another corps, the Fourteenth, General Palmer's, leaving Gen-
eral Howard, with the Fourth Corps, to continue to threaten Dalton in
front, while the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek
Gap. On the same day General Schofield was ordered to follow by the
same route, and on the 11th the whole army, excepting General Howard's
corps and some cavalay left to watch Dalton, was in motion on the west
side of Rocky Face ridge, for Snake Creek Gap and Resaca. The next
day we moved against Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road,
preceded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry ; General Thomas to come up
on his left, and General Schofield on his. General Kilpatrick met and
drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road within two miles of Resaca,
but received a wound which disabled him and gave the command of his
brigade to Colonel Murray, who according to his orders wheeled out of the
road leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck
the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca, and drove them within their
fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of bald hills, his right on the
Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left
abreast the town. General Thomas came, up on his left, facing Camp
creek, and General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to
General Thomas' left. Johnston had left Dalton, and General Howard
entered it, and pressed his rear. Nothing saved Johnston's army at
THE TURNING OF DALTON. 61
Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the pas-
sage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This fact enabled his
army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good roads
constructed beforehand, partly from the topographical nature of the
country, and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events
on the 14th of May, we found the rebel army in a strong position behind
Camp creek, occupying the forts of Resaca, and his right on some high
chestnut hills to the north of the town."
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT TO THE " COMMIT-
TEE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR."
Shortly after his assignment to the command of the Military Division
of the Mississippi, General Sherman came to see me at Chattanooga, to
consult as to the position of affairs, and adopt a plan for a spring cam-
paign. At that interview, I proposed to General Sherman that if he
would use McPherson's and Schofield's armies to demonstrate on the
enemy's position at Dalton, by the direct roads through Buzzard Roost
Gap, and from the direction of Cleveland, I would throw my whole force
through Snake Creek Gap, which I knew to be unguarded, fall upon the
enemy's communications between Dalton and Resaca, thereby turning
his position completely, and force him either to retreat toward the east,
through a difficult country, poorly supplied with provisions and forage,
with a strong probability of total disorganization of his force, or attack
me, in which latter event, I felt confident that my army was sufficiently
strong to beat him, especially as I hoped to gain position on his commu-
nications before he could be made aware of my movement. General
Sherman objected to this plan, for the reason that he desired my army to
form the reserve of the united armies, and to serve as a rallying point for
the two wings, the Army of the Ohio and that of the Tennessee, to
operate from.
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' OFFICIAL REPORT.
General Hooker was directed to send another division of his command
to Snake Creek Gap, with instructions to repair the road through the
gap, so as to facilitate the passage of infantry and wagons. On the 11th,
it was decided to leave one corps, Howard's, supported by Stoneman's
and McCook's divisions of cavalry, and move to Snake Creek Gap with
the balance of the army, attacking the enemy in front from that quarter,
whilst Howard was keeping up the impression of a direct attack at
Buzzard's Roost. This movement was to commence on the 12th. In-
structions were given to corps commanders to provide their commands
with ten days' rations and a good supply of ammunition, sending all
surplus wagons back to Ringgold. At 9 a. m. on the 13th, General How-
ard's command occupied Dalton, it having been evacuated by the enemy
on the evening of the 12th. Concentrating his troops in Dalton, General
Howard pursued the enemy along the railroad, in the direction of Resaca.
62 THE TURNING OF DALTON.
capturing a considerable number of prisoners. The concentration of the
balai of the army in Snake Creek Gap having been completed by the
n j g hi of the 12th, al 8 a. m. on the 13th, Hooker's corps, preceded by
Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved out on the Eesaca road in support of Mc-
Pherson's troops threatening Resaca.
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HOWARD'S REPORT.
May llth, the troops of the corps were disposed as follows: General
Stanlej to hold the gap; General Newton to hold Rocky Face, and the
roads leading around the north end of it, with General Stoneman's
cavalry covering his left Hank; and General Wood in reserve on Tunnel
Hill. During the evening of this day, and on the morning of the 12th,
the general movement was progressing, and the Fourth Corps found itself
alone confronted by the whole rebel army.
EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL JOS. E. JOHNSTON'S REPORT.
At Dalton, the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the
chances of battle much against us, and even if beaten, they had a safe
refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold, and in the fortress of Chat-
tanooga. Our refuge, in case of defeat, was in Altanta, one hundred miles
oil', with three intervening rivers. Therefore, victory for us could not
have been decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous.
On the 5th of May, this army was in line between Ringgold and Tun-
ixl Hill, and after skirmishing on that day and the following day, on the
7th, pressed back our advanced forces to Mill Creek Gap. On the same
day. Canty reached Resaca with his brigade, and was halted there. On
tli.- 8th, at 4 r. m., a division of Hooker's corps attacked Dug Gap, which
was bravely held by two regiments of Reynolds' Arkansas brigade and
( hngsby's brigade of Kentucky cavalry, fighting on foot, until the arrival
of Lieutenant-General Hardee, with Granbury's brigade, when the enemy
was put to flight. On the 9th, five assaults were made on Lieutenant-
• reneral Hood's troops on Rocky Face Mountain. All were repulsed. In
tin- afternoon, a report was received that Logan's and Dodge's corps were
in Snake Creek Gap. Three divisions, under Lieutenant-General Hood,
were therefore sent to Resaca. On the 10th, Lieutenant-General Hood
reported the enemy retiring. Skirmishing to our advantage continued
all day, near Dalton. Major-General Bate repulsed a vigorous attack
at night. On the llth, Brigadier-General Canty reported that the enemy
was again approaching Resaca. Lieutenant-General Polk arrived in the
evening with Loring's division, and was instructed to defend the place
witli those troops and Canty's. The usual skirmishing continued near
Dalton.
Rocky Face Mountain and Snake Creek Gap, at its south end, com-
pletely covered for the enemy the operation of turning Dalton. On the
THE TURNING OF J)ALTON. 63
12th, the Federal army, covered by the mountain, moved by Snake Creek
Gap toward Resaca. Major-General Wheeler, with 2,200 of ours, attacked
and defeated more than double that number of Federal cavalry, near
Varnell's Station. At night, our artillery and infantry marched for Re-
saca. The cavalry followed on the 13th. On that day, the enemy ap-
proaching on the Snake Creek Gap road was checked by Loring's troops,
which gave time for the formation of Ilardee's and Hood's corps, just
arriving. As the army was formed, the left of Polk's corps was on the
Oostanaula, and the right of Hood's on Connasauga. There was brisk
skirmishing during the afternoon on Polk's front and Hardee's left.
CHAPTER XXVII.
BATTLE OF RESACA.
Early on the morning of the 13th, General Howard dis-
covered that General Johnston had withdrawn from Dalton,
and he at once occupied the town, having driven his cavalry
from it. He then moved in pursuit, and skirmishing as he
advanced, encamped eight miles toward Resaca. In the
morning, General Johnston reached Resaca, Loring's division
having moved out to check General McPherson and give time
for the formation of Hood's and Hardee's corps upon their
arrival from Dalton. He formed his army, now stronger by
several thousand men than at Dalton, with Polk's corps on
the left, resting on the Oostanaula river below the town, Har-
dee's in the center, and Hood's on the right, his right flank
resting on the Connasauga river.
At 8 a. m., Hooker's corps, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry,
moved out upon the Eesaca road, in support of McPherson,
who was advancing against the town. Kilpatrick encountered
Wheeler and drove him nearly to the town, when, being
wounded, he turned over the command to Colonel Murray.
Palmer's corps moved from Snake Creek Gap, two miles
northeast of Hooker, and then moved parallel with the Resaca
road, under orders to proceed as far as the railroad. On reach-
ing the vicinity of the railroad, his skirmishers encountered
those of the enemy, strongly posted on the hills, immediately
west of the railroad, and warmly engaged them until night-
fall. Butterfield's division of Hooker's corps moved forward
to support Palmer's right. Schofield's two divisions advanced
upon Palmer's left. Howard advanced to the vicinity of Re-
saca, and when communications were established throughout
(64) &
BATTLE OF RESACA. 65
the line, it was found that his right was but a mile from Scho-
field'e left.
General Johnston's position was a strong one, with Camp
creek in front, and heavy intrenchments in the immediate
vicinity of the town — the strongest to defend the bridges across
the Oostanaula, and cover the retreat of his army. His outer
defenses consisted of detached redoubts, and extensive rifle-
trenches, and the ground beyond was favorable for defense.
His army was disposed partly in the inner defenses, but mainly
on the high hills north and west of the town, which were for-
tified.
Before delivering battle, General Sherman ordered a pon-
toon bridge to be thrown across the Oostanaula at Lay's ferry,
in the direction of Calhoun, Sweeny's division of the Fif-
teenth Corps to cross and threaten that place, and Garrard's
division of cavalry to move from Villanow toward Rome, to
cross the Oostanaula, and if possible break the railroad below
Calhoun and above Kingston. On the 14th, General Mc-
Pherson crossed Camp creek, near its mouth, and forced
Polk's corps from the hills commanding the railroad bridges
from the west, and secured a lodgment close to his works.
This done, it became necessary to swing round the whole line
formed the previous evening, from Hooker's left to the extreme
left. This movement was made with the right of Johnson's
division, which was the right of the Fourteenth Corps, as a
pivot, and each division advanced until it encountered the
enemy.
As Johnson's right was in proximity to the enemy, the di-
visions to the left met the enemy in succession. Baird's
division was in line on Johnson's left, and Davis in reserve.
General Howard, in compliance with orders from General
Thomas, moved in the morning, to form his corps on the left
of Schofield, and advance upon the main roads to Resaca.
Newton's division, followed by Wood's, moved toward Scho-
field's left, and Stanley's toward the enemy's extreme right,
on the Fulton and Resaca road. When Newton gained Scho-
field's left, Wood changed direction to the left, upon a road
.between Newton and Stanley.
vol. n — 5
<jtj BATTLE OF RESACA,
Carlin'a brigade of Johnson's division was the first to en-
counter the foe. General Carlin crossed Camp creek and
advanced Borne distance over the open ground in front of the
enemy's position, under a severe fire of artil 1 ery an d musketry.
The passage of the creek disordered his lines somewhat, and
being hopeless of holding the enemy's works should he suc-
ceed in an assault, he withdrew, and found shelter and a par-
apet at the bank of the stream. Here he maintained position
all day, and delivered a desultory but destructive fire. Gen-
eral King, perceiving Carlin's repulse, halted his brigade to
the hit and rear. The ground over which the left of Baird's
division and the right of Schofield's line advanced, was thickly
wooded, rendering it difficult to maintain lines, and the troops
farther to the left having gained ground, those having been
delayed moved forward rapidly as they emerged from the
woods upon the open space before the enemy's intrenchments ;
but such was the severity of the musketry and artillery fire
to which they were exposed, that they were soon compelled
to retreat. Some isolated squads had passed Camp creek, and
were driven back; others were so delayed by the miry banks
that they could not withdraw with the main line, and were
compelled to seek cover at the stream. To cover the retreat
and re-formation of Turchin's brigade, and Schofield's right,
Mitchell's brigade of Davis' division, in reserve, moved
quickly to the left, and was severely engaged, while the
broken lines were reformed upon the high ground west of the
creek. As the lines of advance of Howard's corps were con-
verging, the three divisions made close connection before
reaching the enemy's position, and as the convergence of the
roads shortened the battle front continually, the greater por-
tion of Newton's division fell in rear of Schofield's right, in
reserve, and when his left carried the position in its front,
Newton moved to the relief of his left center, and grasped
firmly all the ground that had been gained. In the meantime,
Wood eame abreast of Newton, and drove the enemy from
his rifle-pits, and Stanley formed his division on Wood's left,
wiili one brigade across the Fulton road, to protect his flank.
These movements were all slowly made, in consequence of
dense woods and rough ground, and the resistance of the
BATTLE OF RESACA. 67
enemy. But an advanced line was gained, and from it artil-
lerists poured a fire so destructive as in some cases to drive
the enemy temporarily from his works.
General Johnston, fearing that the lines of investment were
closing around him, determined to assume the offensive, and
if possible turn General Sherman's left flank. General Stan-
ley soon observed indications of the movement. As General
Howard had no reserves to direct to the endangered flank, ho
communicated in person with General Thomas and secured
immediate assistance from the Twentieth Corps. In compli-
ance with orders, General Hooker promptly dispatched Wil-
liams' division, under the guidance of Colonel Morgan,* of the
Fourteenth Colored regiment, and preceeded it to the point of
danger. Williams moved rapidly on the most direct route,
and arrived on the extreme left just as that flank had been
turned and pressed back. Stanley had exhausted all his re-
serves in extending his line against the overlapping of the
enemy. Simonson's battery, by effective execution, was re-
tarding the advance of the enemy to double up the line, when
Williams deployed his division and advanced to the support
of the battery. His terrific fire first checked and then routed
the enemy, and completely defeated this attempt at flanking.
The other divisions of the Twentieth Corps, Geary's and But-
terfield's, followed Williams, later in the evening, and Mc-
Cook's cavalry passed to Hooker's left.
The enemy's troops engaged against the left flank were
Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions and two brigades of Walk-
er's — a strong column in view of the length of Johnston's lines
and the relative inferiority of his army. Another fact evinced
his estimate of the importance of the movement. After its
failure he gave orders for its repetition the next morning, but
was subsequently led to revoke them, when he learned that
the national infantry w^ere crossing the Oostanaula river, near
Calhoun, on a pontoon bridge. To provide against this men-
ace to his rear, he dispatched General Walker to Calhoun.
Such advantages had been gained during the day as prom-
ised success in forcing Johnston to abandon his position, and
* Colonel T. J. Morgan was volunteer aid to General Howard.
63 BATTLE OF RESACA.
orders were issued for a general advance the next morning.
rithstanding this aggressive purpose, the troops covered
themselves with the usual defenses. There was no change in
the Line, excepl that Schofield was directed to withdraw from
the center and pass to Hooker's left.
There was delay in making the attack in the morning,
to awail the result of a reconnoissance hy General Geary, from
the Left flank. Full preparations were not completed until
noon. At this hour the Twentieth Corps advanced— Geary on
the right, Butterfield on the left, and Williams in reserve.
Before the enemy's works were reached, General Hooker di-
rected General Williams to deflect to the left to cover and
protect that flank, again threatened by the enemy, as Gen-
eral Johnston, having learned that there was no immediate
danger from infantry at Calhoun, had repeated his order to
General Hood to advance against the national left. Facing
to the east, Williams' division moved to the point menaced —
Knipe's brigade on the right, Ruger's in the center, and Rob-
inson's on the left. The ground traversed by the advancing
columns was hilly, with woods and open spaces alternating.
Williams' brigades formed lines on a series of hills west of the
railroad and running parallel to it; batteries were planted
with supports to command the ground in front of the line.
The enemy before Hooker, occupied intrenched hills, having
spurs extending in all directions, and batteries were so placed
on the higher points as to enfilade assaulting lines. Geary's
and Bntterfield's divisions advanced with spirit, and though
receiving a heavy fire from artillery and musketry, carried the
nearest hills. Then Butterfield's division — Ward's, Coburn's,
and Wood's brigades — supported by Ireland's brigade on
Geary's left, drove the enemy from a battery, which from a
ruling position was pouring an exceedingly destructive fire;
but another line of intrenehments was so near that the cap-
tors could neither remove the guns nor remain with them.
But, withdrawing to tenable ground, they covered the guns
so fully with their fire that the enemy could not approach
them, and during the remainder of the day the guns remained
between the lines. They were taken during the night by a
detachment of the Fifth Ohio under Colonel Kilpatrick.
In the meantime, the entire line became engaged, from How-
BATTLE OF RESACA. 69
ard's right to Hooker's left; while throughout the whole front
of the "Army of the Cumberland," heavy skirmishing and
artillery action was maintained. General Howard, being
nearest the assaulting corps, kept up a constant fire of artil-
lery and musketry, and in one instance made a positive attack,
and although he did not succeed in holding any point of* the
enemy's line, he prevented the diversion of troops from his
front, to sustain their comrades before General Hooker, against
whose left they were maintaining the offensive with great de-
termination. Near the railroad, in front of Williams, he
massed his forces and advancing as much as possible under
cover, made repeated assaults, but was unable to disturb the
line. Williams' artillery was used with most destructive effect
in the repulsion of these assaults. In front of Williams' right
and Geary's left, there was a long cleared field, compassing
two hills and a ravine, and extending to a wooded hill, upon
which rested the enemy's main line. This field was flanked
on the right by wooded hills, which extended to the captured
battery. About 5 p. m. Stevenson's division left the main line
and charged in column to gain possession of these lateral hills.
This movement, if successful, would have insulated one-
half of Geary's division, which had been concentrated under
Colonel Cobham, in the rear of the guns wrested from the
enemy. But Stevenson was repulsed mainly through the con-
centration of fire from Williams' right and Geary's left. His
leading; regiments were almost annihilated. On both sides,
artillery charged with canister and schrapnel was freely used.
Stevenson's repulse closed the general contest. This attack
of Stewart's and Stevenson's divisions was made after General
Johnston had decided to evacuate Eesaca, but his order for-
bidding the assault was not received in time to prevent it.
During the night of the 15th, General Johnston abandoned
Eesaca. It was observed by those on the outlook the preced-,
ing day, that he was sending his material to the rear. He
had lost positions on his right and left, and had been pressed
throughout his lines by two days of fighting, and the exposure
of his communications in the event of a flank movement,
which had been foreshadowed, made his retreat necessary. He
had attacked the brigade across the river below Eesaca on the
7(1 BATTLE OF RESACA.
15th, and had beeD repulsed, and as General Sherman's front
now presented defenses as well as his own, the transfer of
heavy forces across the river was plainly practicable. He
therefore retreated before embarrassments crowded upon him.
The action at Resaca, though presenting different features
from the one before Dalton, was not essentially different in
type or result. In the latter one, the two armies more fully
confronted each other, and there was more fighting and
heavier losses. The champaign region of Georgia was now be-
fore General Sherman, offering freedom for maneuver and
strategy, which the mountain region had denied.
As the aggregate monthly losses of the Army of the Cum-
berland were reported by General Thomas, it is impossible to
ascertaiD definitely the casualties at Resaca. The Twentieth
Corps lost seventeen hundred and forty-six men, and the other
two corps lost nearly as many in the aggregate. General
Johnston's losses were also heavy, especially when he assumed.
the offensive.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
ADVANCE TO THE ETOWAH RIVER, THE TURNING OF ALLATOONA,
BATTLES NEAR NEW HOPE CHURCH.
Resaca was occupied by the Army of the Cumberland on
the morning of May 16th, and General Sherman gave orders
for rapid pursuit. There was delay, however, in passing the
river, as it was necessary to throw a pontoon bridge at Resaca
and at points above. During the day, the Army of the Ten-
nessee crossed at Lay's ferry, and Howard's corps at Resaca.
As in the pursuit the Army of the Cumberland was to follow
the enemy's line of retreat, General Howard moved forward
toward Calhoun. His progress was slow, as stubborn resist-
ance was offered by the rear-guard of Johnston's army.
The next day, the three armies advanced. Palmer's corps
followed Howard's; Hooker's having crossed above, moved on
the left. On his left, was the Army of the Ohio, and the
Army of the Tennessee advanced on lines on the right of the
central army. Stoneman's cavalry was on the extreme left,
and Garrard's on the extreme right, under instructions to
reach the enemy's rear if practicable.
Early in the day, General Howard found the rear-guard
of the enemy, formed of cavalry and artillery, and at times
supported by infantry. Three lines were presented at short
intervening distances, and generally behind barricades m
woods, with open ground in front, When the first line was
pressed from position, the troops forming it passed to the rear
of the third and reformed. Thus, not only was the rear of
the army covered, but two of the three lines of the rear-guard
itself. The Fourth Corps advanced in two columns abreast,
and pressed the enemy so strongly in the evening that a bat-
(71)
72 ETOWAH— ALLATOOXA— NEW HOPE CHURCH.
tie Beemed imminent. The skirmish lines were reinforced
until they had the weight of linos of battle, and artillery was
freely used. The action terminated as darkness approached,
and during the night, General Johnston abandoned a position
which he had intrenched. His reasons were, that a portion
oik's corps was yet in the rear; that, as he thought, the
expiration of service of the regiments in the national armies
confronting him that had not re-enlisted, would soon reduce
their strength, and he hoped that some blunder would give
him an opportunity to strike a blow without risking a general
battle, or to enter such a contest with advantages to counter-
balance the inferiority of his army.
General Sherman's object now was to compel Johnston to
fight north of the Etowah river, divide his army, or give up
Ri . i ne or Allatoona. In the event of his attempt to hold both
these places, he proposed to break his line at Kingston ; or
should he concentrate at Kingston, to break his railroads right
and hit, ami " light him scpiare in front." To give support to
the cavalry on the right, he directed General Thomas to send
a division from Resaca toward Rome, and Davis' had been put
in motion.
On the 18th, the armies moved forward without change of
order, and at night the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps encamped
near Kingston. At 8 A. M. the next day, the central column,
iley's division leading, advanced toward Cassville. Midway
to that place the enemy opened upon Stanley with a six-gun
battery, from an eminence, but yielded, under the pressure of
an attack with infantry and artillery. Moving in pursuit nearly
four miles, Stanley was again arrested. This time there was a
formidable combination before him, and the enemy was ob-
served to be advancing in two lines of battle. General Howard
promptly deployed his corps — Stanley's and Wood's divisions
in front, and Newton's in support of the left. As soon as the
enemy observed these dispositions, his lines were halted and
their front covered with barricades. When Howard's artillery
opened, the first line retreated in some confusion, and the
Fourth Corps advanced and occupied the position. Here a
junction with Hooker's corps was made, which had engaged
the enemy during the day on the direct road from Adairsville
ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 73
to Cassville. Skirmishing was maintained until dark, when
the three corps bivouacked in close proximity. During the day,
General Schofield approached Cassville, and General McPher-
son moved from Woodland to Kingston.
As reports had reached General Sherman that General John-
ston had been reinforced, he thought it probable that lie would
now give battle in the vicinity of Cassville, and in such expec-
tation he threw his armies from their parallel lines of march,
toward the head of the central column. His cavalry was on
right and left, in effort to break the railroad in Johnston's rear
to force him to battle, or to subject a portion of his army and
trains to capture, before he could cross the Etowah river. Gen-
eral Schofield was under instructions to support the cavalry on
the left, in the accomplishment of this object, and during the
day, McCook's division of cavalry had a brilliant passage of
arms with Stevenson's division of infantry.
It was General Johnston's purpose to give battle at Cassville.
He had been joined by French's division of Polk's corps, and
.the lines which Howard first encountered were Hood's, who
had orders to attack. His lieutenant, however, under the im-
pression that the columns on the east had turned his position,
refrained until it was too late to overpower the head of column.
Even after this failure, General Johnston meditated delivering
battle, but was dissuaded by his lieutenants, Polk and Hood,
though General Hardee gave counter advice. During the night
he crossed the Etowah with all his trains, and moved to his
strong position at Allatoona Pass. This step was a matter of
subsequent regret to him, though it is probable that his sorrow
would have been more profound, had he engaged Sherman's
three armies at Cassville.
Pending these greater movements, General Davis with his
division captured. Rome. His orders did not require him to go
so far from the line of march, but as circumstances, in his judg-
ment, justified the step, and having advised General Thomas
of his purpose, he passed beyoud all co-operation with the cav-
alry, and hurried Mitchell's brigade in advance, on the 17th,
drove back the rebel cavalry, and deployed within range of the
artillery, on De Soto hill, on the west side of the Oostanaula.
McCook's brigade and Morgan's moved forward, and the enemy,
;j etoWAH— ALLATOONA— NEW HOPE CHURCH.
at firsi assuming the aggressive, was driven within his fortifi-
cations. The aexi morning the city was abandoned in too
much hurry to destroy machine-shops and iron-works of great
value, and vasl quantities of stores and cotton, and six pieces
f artillery. General Davis lost in killed and wounded one
hundred and fifty men.
BEYOND THE ETOWAH.
General Sherman did not pursue beyond the Etowah. The
rough hills and gorges around Allatoona presented such ob-
Btacles to maneuver and attack as to deter him from a direct
advance. He chose rather to make a detour to the right, to
turn Allatoona, or throw his armies upon Johnston's com-
munications at Marietta or the Chattahoochee river. He ac-
cordingly gave orders for a few days of rest, and time to repair
the railroad to Cassville, and accumulate supplies at Resaca.
At this period, General Johnston was calling to him in-
fantry from the Southwest and cavalry from Mississippi, and
General Sherman was making effort to maintain his relative
superiority. His losses and constantly lengthening line of
supply were reducing his offensive strength, and he called all
available troops from the rear. May 23d, he ordered General
Blair, with two divisions of infantry of the Seventeenth
Corps, and Long's brigade of cavalry of Garrard's division, to
move on Koine and Kingston, from Huntsville, Alabama.
On this day, he put his armies in motion south of the
Etowah. The Army of the Tennessee crossed the river at the
mouth of Conascne creek, on a bridge which had been saved
from (list ruction, and advanced toward Dallas by Van Wert.
General Thomas crossed four miles south of Kingston, and
moved through Euharley and Stilesboro. General Schofield
crossed near Etowah cliffs, and kept on the left of General
Thomas. Each army had supplies for twenty days in wagons.
M« 'Cook's division of cavalry preceded the central columns,
and reached Stilesboro in the afternoon, and finding the enemy
there in force, with cavalry and infantry, skirmished until
dark. Hooker, Howard, and Palmer encamped south of
Euharley creek. Kilpatrick's division, Colonel W. "W. Lowe
commanding, was left to guard the line of the Etowah — an im-
ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 75
portant duty, as Wheeler's cavalry had been sent to interrupt
communications north of that river. Garrard's division was
covering General McPherson's right flank.
At daylight on the 24th, by direction of General Thomas,
General Hooker sent Geary's division to Euharley creek, to
hold the Alabama road toward Allatoona, and cover the left
flank of the corps, until relieved by General Schoh'eld. The
remainder of the Twentieth Corps was directed to advance to
Burnt Hickory, preceded by McCook's cavalry. The cavalry
commander, upon arrival, was instructed to picket strongly
the roads leading toward Alatoona, and cover the movements
of the army. McCook reached Burnt Hickory at 2 p. m.,
having skirmished with the enemy for several miles. In this
skirmish he captured a rebel courier, bearing dispatches from
General Johnston to a division commander of cavalry, re-
quiring him to observe the movements of the national forces
toward Burnt Hickory, and advising him that his army was
moving toward Dallas and Powder Springs. Later in the
day, General Garrard informed General Thomas that in
moving upon Dallas, he had been attacked by Bate's division,
the advance of Hardee's corps. Thus, from two sources, the
fact was ascertained that General Johnston had divined Gen-
eral Sherman's purpose in time to throw his army before him
near Dallas. At night, the Fourth and Twentieth Corps en-
camped at Burnt Hickory ; the Fourteenth, impeded by trains,
halted some distance in the rear.
The next morning, the march was resumed. McCook's
cavalry moved on the road to Golgotha, followed by Butter-
field's division. Hooker's other two divisions, and Howard's
corps, advanced on roads running south of Butterfield's line
of march. General Howard sought roads to the right, to
avoid the main roads, upon which the trains of Johnson's di-
vision and the Twentieth Corps were advancing. Baird's
division was left at Burnt Hickory, to protect trains and the
rear of the army. The divisions of the Army of the Cumber-
land, marching upon four roads, were under orders to con-
verge upon Dallas, as it was not expected that Johnston's army
would be met nearer than that place. But at 11 a. m. Geary's
division, the central one of the Twentieth Corps, came upon
76 ETOWAH— ALLATOONA— NEW HOPE CHUECH.
the enemy in considerable force. A cavalry outpost had been
previously found near Owen's Mill, where a burning bridge
had caused some delay. After crossing this bridge, General
ryhad deployed the Fifth Ohio as skirmishers in ad-
vance of Candy's brigade, and when within four and a half
miles of Dallas, this regiment became heavily engaged, and
bood after, a charge.was made by the enemy. Candy's brigade
was then rapidly deployed, and after a sharp conflict repulsed
the foe. General Geary immediately extended his skirmish
line, formed Candy's brigade in line of battle, and brought up
Ireland's and Buschbeck's in support. Advancing again, the
division drove the enemy a half mile. From prisoners, it was
now ascertained that Hood's corps was in front, and that
Hardee's was not far distant, in the direction of Dallas. The
situation was now critical, as no supporting forces were near.
General Hooker, who was with his central division, now di-
rected that it should be formed upon a hill affording advan-
for defense, that the skirmish line should be extended,
and make a show of strength by maintaining an aggressive
fire, and that barricades should be constructed. He sent
orders immediately to "Williams and Butterfield to hasten to
Geary's support, and informed General Thomas of the posture
of affairs.
As Williams and Butterfield were several miles distant, they
did not reach Geary's position until late in the afternoon.
Upon arrival, their divisions advanced against the enemy with
Geary's in reserve, under instructions from General Sherman
to drive him beyond New Hope Church, a point where roads
from Marietta, Dallas, and Ackworth meet.
Though the country was hilly and covered with trees and
undergrowth, "Williams' and Butterfield's division, dashed at
the enemy at double-quick, and drove him back a mile and a
halt; to New Hope Church ; but here they received his artillery
fire at short range, and were arrested. Geary moved to the
front again, and though the attack was vigorously made, the
enemy was not dislodged. General Johnston had thrown his
army directly across General Sherman's line of advance, and
was ready for defensive battle. His position was a strong one,
ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 77
ami his troops were under cover. The engagement which
defined his position resulted in heavy losses to hoth armies.
When General Sherman first learned that the enemy was
before him in force, he divined that he was on Johnston's right
flank, and proposed to turn it. With this object in view, he
directed General McPherson to move to the left, if he could
not dislodge the eneny in his front. But General McPherson
did not move to the left as projected, and the opportunity to
pass round General Johnston's right to Ackworth and Mari-
etta was lost.
General Hooker at night intrenched a line in close prox-
imity to the enemy. The Fourth Corps, ordered by General
Thomas to his support during the day, came up by divisions
in the evening and after night, and formed on his left. Davis'
division of the Fourteenth Corps, having left Rome on the
24th, was now in supporting distance ; but Johnson's and
Baird's divisions, having been delayed by the trains on the
roads in advance of them, were still in the rear.
The following day was spent in the concentration of the
armies. General McPherson's army advanced to Dallas, and
General Schofield's was directed to the left of General
Thomas, to turn Johnston's right flank. Garrard's cavalry
formed the extreme right, Stoneman's the left, and McCook'a
covered the rear.
The Twentieth Corps maintained the position assumed the
previous evening. The Fourth was slightly changed by swing-
ing round to occupy a line of hills, trending at right angles to
Hooker's line. This change of front threatened the enemy's
right flank more directly. General Schofield, on Howard's
left, covered the road leading from Allatoona to Dallas, by
New Hope Church. Both Howard and Schofield skirmished
into position ; and so close were they to the enemy that not
only their skirmishers,* but their main lines maintained a con-
tinuous fire.
In the forenoon, General Davis, by direction of General
Thomas, made a reconnoissance to Dallas, to determine the
position of Johnston's left flank and open communications
with General McPherson. He advanced on the Burnt Hickory
road with Morgan's brigade in front, drove the enemy's pick-
yg ETOWAH— ALLATOONA— NEW HOPE CHURCH.
eta through the town, and deployed his division on the east of
the Marietta road. Soon after, the Army of the Tennessee
came ahreast, and was formed in lines extending across the
Villa Rica road.
During the day, McCook, on the left, struck a column of
cavalry in Hank, broke it in two, and captured fifty-two pris-
oners. From his prisoners he learned that Wheeler's cavalry
corps was on Johnston's right Hank. In the afternoon, John-
Bon's division of the Fourteenth Corps came up in the rear of
the Fourth Corps.
The opposing armies were now in closest proximity. Har-
rps was on Johnston's left, Hood's on his right, and
Polk's in the center. The batteries of the two armies were
placed on the commanding positions in the opposing lines,
and Qothing was needed to precipitate the work of death but
a word from either of the commanding generals.
As < General Johnston had twice withdrawn his army under
circumstances not radically different, General Sherman did
not feel confident that he would maintain his position even
for a day, and gave such orders as would compass the issues
of battle or the retreat of the enemy. He directed General
McPherson to connect his left with Hooker's right, so that he
could then move his whole line by the left flank beyond John-
ston's right, and interpose between him and the railroad. In
addition to McPherson's movement, a strong demonstration
by 1 1 01 ker and Howard, and a positive attack upon Johnston's
righl Hank, were ordered.
The effort to turn this flank commanded the personal atten-
tion of Generals Sherman and Thomas, in addition to General
Howard, who was ordered to furnish the assaulting column.
In the beginning, General Sherman designated the point in
enemy's line upon which the assault should be made, but
Generals Thomas and Howard, upon special examination,
perceived that there the enemy could bring a cross-fire of ar-
tillery and musketry to bear upon the approaches, and General
Howard was directed to move his column to the left, beyond
all the troops in line, and endeavor to strike the enemy's
flank.
General T. J. Wood's division of the Fourth Corps was
ETOWAH ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 79
selected to make the assault, to be supported on the left by
General R. W. Johnson's division of the Fourteenth Corps,
and by General McLean's brigade of General Schoficld's
Twenty-third Corps, on the right. The column was formed
in the rear of the extreme left of the Twenty-third Corps —
Wood's division in column of six lines deep, Johnson's on
the left, with a brigade front. After moving a mile to the
east, General Howard supposed that he had reached the ene-
my's flank, and directed General Wood to wheel his command
so as to face the south, and advance. The enemy's works were
soon discovered, and upon examination of their strength, the
column was moved another mile to the east. Here, Generals
Howard and Wood reconnoitered the ground, and ascertained
that the line of works did not cover the whole division front,
and preparation was made for attack. Johnson's division was
slightly refused on Wood's left, with Scribner's brigade in
front, and McLean's brigade was sent to a point in full view
from the enemy's works, a little to the right of the place of
attack, to attract his attention and draw his fire.
At 5 p. m. the entire column marched briskly forward, Ha-
zen's brigade of Wood's division leading, and having driven
back the enemy's skirmishers, assaulted his main line with
great vigor. Hazen at first was without support from John-
son's division on his left, and was so heavily engaged that
General Wood was compelled to move up his supporting lines.
Scribner's brigade was also hurried forward on Hazen's left,
but, before getting abreast of Hazen, was struck in flank from
the opposite side of a creek on the left. Colonel Scribner
halted, to throw out troops to cover his flank, at the crisis of
the assault, and it was soon evident that it had failed. The
Confederate general, Cleburne, threw his reserves and an en-
filading fire upon Wood's left flank, and forced it back, and
his right at the same time was subjected to a cross-fire of ar-
tillery and musketry, and was also without support, as McLean
had not shown himself to the enemy nor opened fire. As
both of Wood's flanks were melting away under a most de-
structive fire, General Howard ordered the withdrawal of the
column. The retirement was made with such deliberation as
permitted the removal of the wounded. General Johnson
80 ETOWAH — ALLATOOXA — NEW HOPE CHURCH.
withdrew to the left and rear of the main line, and General
Wood to a ridge farther to the front and right. General
McLean withdrew entirely, and left the two divisions in com-
plete isolation.
neral Wood lost over ' fourteen hundred men killed,
wounded, and missing. General Johnson's loss was slight in
comparison, but was himself severely wounded. The reported
loss of the enemy was four hundred and fifty.
Two advantages resulted from this unsuccessful assault,
though dearly purchased. A position was secured far on the
enemy's right, which was of importance to subsequent move-
ments, and it was clearly developed that Johnston's right
would be found in strength wherever a column might go to
turn it. At night, Wood and Johnson intrenched their re-
spective positions.
During the day, the enemy came out of his works in front
of Newton's division, but was handsomely repulsed by Wag-
ner's and Kimball's brigades. Colonel Daniel McCook's bri-
gade of General Davis' division seized a mountain pass in
the rebel center, and held it against a night attack by troops
from Folk's corps.
General McPherson found it impracticable to move to the
left, in compliance with General Sherman's orders. General
Johnston was meditating offensive action, and pressed the na-
tional lines throughout their length in search for an opportu-
nity to strike an effective blow. Each commander was watch-
ing for an advantage, and yet each was " duly cautious in the
obscurity of the ambushed ground." During the 28th, there
was brisk skirmishing from flank to flank. General Sherman
was waiting for McPherson's movement to the left, to make
effort to turn General Johnston's position, and the latter was
planning a battle for the next day. At night, General Hood
was instructed to attack the national left the next morning at
dawn, and the remainder of the army was ordered to join in
the action, successively from right to left.
General Hood advanced, but finding an intrenched flank,
refrained from attack and asked for instructions. As this
delay (Ideated the surprise, that was intended, in the initia-
tive, Hood was recalled. But in the evening General John-
ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 81
ston attacked McPhorson, as lie was in effort to leave position
to close up on the center of the national line. Fortunately
the Army of the Tennessee had not moved far from the de-
fenses, and repulsed Hardee's corps with great loss. As a
feint, to cover the assault upon McPherson, the enemy demon-
strated in front of Stanley and Newton, and at intervals during
the day there was artillery action and skirmishing throughout
the battle front.
As General McPherson did not change position, there were
only slight changes at other points in the line. A brigade of
Stanley's division was thrown between Schofield and Wood,
and Colonel J. G. Mitchell's brigade of Davis' division was
placed in position about half-way toward General Hooker.
The chasm here was three miles wide. Colonel Mitchell in-
■frenched thoroughly, and cut roads to his rear to facilitate the
closing up of the right wing upon the center at New Hope
Church.
The purpose to move the whole line to the left was not
abandoned by General Sherman, though the repeated attempts
of General McPherson to leave position, during the last days
of the month, invited the enemy's attacks.
During the month of May, the Army of the Cumberland
lost about nine thousand men. Sixty-six officers and ten hun-
dred and ninety enlisted men Were killed ; three hundred and
one officers, and six thousand four hundred and fifty-one en-
listed men were wounded, and eight officers and eight hundred
and fifty-eight men were missing from the three corps of in-
fantry. Colonels A. S. McDougall, One Hundred and Twenty-
third New York, and John H. Patrick, Fifth Ohio, fell at New
Hope Church, and Colonel Gilbert, Nineteenth Michigan, was
mortally wounded ; Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Lloyd, One Hun-
dred and Nineteenth New York, was killed at Resaca. The
army captured one thousand four hundred and seventy-seven
prisoners, and received five hundred and fifty deserters.
As General Sherman had held his armies before General
Johnston, near Dallas, he had not made effort to ascertain
with what force Allatoona was held, to turn which stronghold
was his primary object in moving his armies to the right. He
VOL. II — 6
82 ETOWAH— -ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH.
had ordered General Blair to move to that point, but on the
first of June be was still ['-av in the rear. But as at this time
General McPherson effected his own disloclgment from the
position thai had been so closely watched by the enemy, and
the united armies could move by the left flank, General Sher-
man ordered General Garrard to move to the east end of
A Hat oona Pass, and General Stoneman to the west with, in-
structions to fight cavalry with cavalry, and infantry with
dismounted cavalry.
As General McPherson's army, by divisions, approached
New I [ope Church, the divisions of the Twentieth Corps
moved to the left of Johnson's division, which had held the
extreme left since the 27th of May. Davis' division relieved
Hovey's of the Twenty-third Corps, and Baird's advanced
from Burnt Hickory to Johnson's rear. Schofield's troops
passed to Hooker's left. At night, Garrard and Stoneman
were at Allatoona.
On the 2d, Hooker moved to the left of Schofield, and Baird
moved to Johnson's left, when Hooker, Schofield, and Baird
moved on a right wheel, drove back the enemy's skirmishers,
and threw General Johnston farther from the roads leading to
Ackworth and Allatoona ; and yet, in front of the new posi-
tions on the left, finished defenses were found. The move-
ments of the day were embarrassed by a rain-storm, which
flushed the creeks and softened the ground.
During the 4th and 5th, the national line was gradually ex-
tended to the left, and by successive steps was advanced to
Johnston's immediate front. From first to last, each army
fortified as it advanced, and the field-works from Dallas far
toward Ackworth revealed to the future the proximity and
nature of the belligerence of the two armies. When at last
General Johnston perceived that General Sherman's move-
ment to the left had given him an open way to Ackworth, he
abandoned the position and threw his army upon the moun-
tains and hills north and west of Marietta.
The Army of the Cumberland rested on the 5th, and on the
next day moved leisurely into position southwest of Ackworth :
Hooker's corps, near the junction of the Sandtown road with
the one leading from Burnt Hickory to Marietta ; Palmer's on
ETOWAH — ALLATOONA — NEW HOPE CHURCH. 83
his left, and Howard's at Durham's house, three miles from
Ackworth. McPherson was now on the left and Schofield on
the right. As all the troops had been under fire for several
consecutive days, though there had been no general battle, a
rest until the 10th was declared. During this period, the re-
pair of the railroad was hastened, and Allatoona was fortified
as a secondary base of supplies.
June 8th, General Blair reached Ackworth with nine thou-
sand men, having left fifteen hundred as a garrison at Alla-
toona. This reinforcement restored the grand aggregate of
the armies again.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 20, 1864.
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
We have secured two good bridges and an excellent ford across the
Etowah. Our cars are now arriving with stores. I give two days' rest, to
replenish and fit up. On the 23d, I will cross the Etowah and move on Dal-
las. This will turn the Allatoona Pass. If Johnston remain at Allatoona,
I shall move on Marietta; but if he fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will
make for Sandtown and Campbellton, but feign at the railroad crossing.
General Davis' division occupies Rome, and finds a good deal of provis-
ions and plunder — fine iron-works and machinery. I have ordered the
Seventeenth Corps, General Blair's, to march from Decatur to Rome. My
share of militia should be sent at once, to cover our lines of communica-
tion. Notify General Grant that I will hold all of Johnston's army too
busy to send anything against him.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 10.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 22, 1864.
II. The several armies will move punctually to-morrow morning, pro-
vided as heretofore ordered, by separate roads, aiming to reach the posi-
tions hereinafter assigned them in the course of the third day, and in
the meantime each wing communicating freely with the center by cross-
roads.
The Army of the Cumberland will move on Dallas by Euharley and
Stilesboro ; the division of General Jeff. C. Davis, now at Rome, marching
direct for Dallas by Van Wert. The Army of the Ohio will move for posi-
tion on the left, via Richland creek and Burnt Hickory or Huntsville.
84 ETOWAH— ALLATOONA— NEW HOPE CHURCH.
The Army of the Tennessee will move, via Van Wert, to a position on the
head of Pumpkin Vine creek, south of Dallas.
'ill Marietta is the objective point, and the enemy is supposed to be
in force at AUatoona, but with cavalry all along the line of the Etowah.
Henceforth great caution must be exercised to cover and protect trains.
*********
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. ^ ^ DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., May 23, 1864.
' Blair, Huntsville, Ala. :
We are now all in motion for the Chattahoochee. Colonel Long tele-
graphs from Pulaski, and should overtake you at Decatur, or soon after
ng. Although you must move on Rome and Kingston by the direct
still you can make believe you have designs on Gadsden and Talla-
Keep silent, and the enemy will exaggerate your strength and
oses. Johnston has called to him all the infantry of the Southwest,
and also the cavalry of Mississippi, so you must look out for them. If
they hang around you, keep Long close in, and watch the opportunity for
him to charge with sabers.
h W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Dallas, Ga., May 27, 1864 — 11 a. m.
General : — If you can 't drive the enemy from his position, work to the
left, so as to connect with Hooker.
We are working on the left of the line in front of us, and as soon as you
are in connection with General Hooker, I will strengthen the left, and
work round in that direction, so we may, if we choose, march round their
extreme right, and reach Marietta or Ackworth.
Yours, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General Commanding.
General McPherson, Dallas, Ga.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Near Dallas, May 28, 1864.
il Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
The enemy discovered my move to turn AUatoona, and moved to meet
us lure. Our columns met about one mile east of Pumpkin Vine creek,
and we pushed them back about three miles, to the point where the road
forks to AUatoona and Marietta. Here Johnston has chosen a strong line,
and made hasty but strong parapets of timber and earth, and has thus
far stopped us. My right is at Dallas, center about three miles north, and
ETOWAH ALLATOONA NEW HOPE CHURCH. 85
I am gradually working around by the left, to approach the railroad
anywhere in front of Ackworth.
Country very densely wooded and broken ; no roads of any conse-
quence. We have had many sharp encounters, but nothing decisive.
Both sides duly cautious in the obscurity of the ambushed ground.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Dallas, May 30, 1864.
General HaUeck, Washington, D. C. :
To move General McPherson up to the center, he has had to make a
retrogade of a mile or so, owing to difficult ground. Every time he at-
tempted to withdraw division by division, the enemy attacked his whole
line; it may be on the theory that we wanted to draw off altogether.
These assaults were made in the night, and were all repulsed with
comparatively small loss to us, but seemingly heavy to the enemy. If
we can induce the enemy to attack us, it is to our advantage.
Do n't expect us to make much progress toward the Chattahoochee till
Blair comes up, and moves into Allatoona Pass.
*********
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Ackworth, June 8, 1864.
Major-General Halleck, Washington, I). C. :
General Blair arrived to-day, with two divisions of the Seventeenth
Army Corps, about nine thousand (9,000) strong, having left about fifteen
hundred (1,500) in the Allatoona Pass, to fortify and hold it. Colonel
Wright, railroad superintendent, reports he will have the Etowah bridge
done by the 12th instant.
To-morrow I will feel forward with cavalry, and follow with infantry
the moment the enemy develops his designs.
If he fights at Kenesaw Mountain, I will turn it; but if he selects the
line of the Chattahoochee, then I must study the case a little before I
commit myself.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding,
CHAPTER XXIX.
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN, INCLUDING THE BATTLE
AT KULP'S HOUSE, ASSAULT OF THE MOUNTAIN, AND THE FLANK
MOVEMENT.
June 9th, General E. M. McCook, commanding the First
division of cavalry, made a reconnoissance in front, and having
driven back the enemy's pickets, formed a heavy line three
miles in front of General Hooker, and observed the enemy in
force on Pine Mountain. General Johnston's army now
rested with its left on Lost Mountain, its center at Gilgath
Church, and its right extended across the railroad. On the
10th, Palmer's corps advanced southeasterly and confronted
Pine Mountain, and skirmishing, gained an eminence within
artillery range. Howard's corps, with Hooker's in rear, came
abreast. The next day, Palmer and Howard advanced slightly,
and moved by the left flank until Palmer's left touched Mc-
Pherson's right at the railroad. General Johnston's position
was now fully discovered. His lines extended over a series of
hills from Kenesaw Mountain to Lost Mountain, with Pine
Mountain fortified in front. Before him, the ground was so
broken by ravines and so densely wooded as greatly to em-
barrass the advance of the national armies.
Two days of constant rain prevented all motion; but on
the 14th, active overations were resumed. The Fourteenth
Corps, carrying with it the left of the Fourth, advanced a
mile. The right of the Fourth still rested in proximity to
Pine Mountain, with the Twentieth Corps closed compactly
upon it. During the day, Lieutenant-General Polk was
killed upon the mountain by a cannon shot from one of the
guns of Simonson's Indiana battery. The advanced position
(86)
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAAV MOUNTAIN. 87
being now well turned by the forward movement of the left
of the national line, was abandoned the following night, and
the troops withdrawn to the main line of intrenchments be-
tween Kenesaw and Lost Mountain.
It was not known that General Johnston had a second in-
trenched line, and that he might not have time to construct
one, General Sherman ordered an advance of his armies the
next day. General Schofield was directed to threaten Lost
Mountain ; General McPherson to turn Kenesaw Mountain on
the left, and General Thomas to press the center with a view
to its rupture. General Schofield carried a line of works in
his immediate front, which had been left exposed by the aban-
donment of Pine Mountain. General McPherson gained a
hill on his left front, and General Thomas advanced a mile
and a half in the center ; but as in all other cases, General
Johnston had his key-points well fortified and strongly de-
fended. Newton's and Geary's divisions, supported by the
remaining divisions of the Fourth and Twentieth Corps, car-
ried an intrenched skirmish line and advanced nearly to the
main line. General Howard, deeming it unsafe to assault with-
out a reconnoissance, restrained Newton ; but Geary pene-
trated the abatis and maintained a conflict under the enemy's
guns until dark, losing five hundred and thirty-four men.
During the night, the two corps intrenched a line a short dis-
tance from the enemy, and in the morning cannon responded
to cannon, while the usual skirmishing prevailed between the
armies. It being now evident to General Johnston that an
assault could be made with fair prospect of success, he aban-
doned six miles of good field-works and fell back to an in-
trenched line on the Marietta side of Mud creek.
Early on the morning of the 17th, General Thomas ordered
an advance of his army. The Fourth and Twentieth Corps
and the right of the Fourteenth moved over the abandoned
fortifications in a southeasterly direction, and encountered a
skirmish line in front of a series of hills extending southwest
from Kenesaw Mountain. The ground was so favorable to
the enemy that it was not until night that his skirmishers
were driven across Mud creek, and during the night he made
two attempts to dislodge the skirmishers of the Fourth Corps
88 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
intrenched on the wesl Bide of the stream. The next morn-
ing Generals Wood and Newton threw forward a strong
line of skirmishers, and partially surprising the enemy, secured
a portion of his main line. General Harker, of Newton's
division, without waiting for orders, deployed two regiments
to hold the position. Perceiving the advantage, General How-
ard ordered General Newton to move up his entire division in
support. ( reneral Wood gained the ridge across the creek on
the right and intrenched, and General Baird moved his division
promptly on General Newton's left. As soon as it was dark,
Newton's division intrenched within less than one hundred
yards of the enemy's works. The advantage gained was de-
cisive. < reneral Johnston's new line was nearly perpendicular
in direction to his old one, and that portion of the latter which
he had lost was so related to the former that a successful as-
sault was practicable. This General Thomas ordered for the
next day, but the enemy withdrew before morning.
Early the following morning, General Thomas ordered an
advance to ascertain how far General Johnston had receded.
The Fourth Corps, Stanley's division leading, moved forward,
and driving the enemy across Nose's creek, halted on- the Avest
bank ; the Twentieth Corps crossed the creek late in the day,
and formed with its left in proximity to the right of the
Fourth ; and the Fourteenth advanced toward Kenesaw
Mountain and rested in line in proximity to its base, touching
with its right the left of the Fourth. General Johnston's po-
sition was now well defined. Hood's corps was covering
Marietta on the northeast; Loring's was holding Kenesaw
Mountain, and Hardee's extended from the mountain to the
road from Lost Mountain to Marietta. His lines were in view
running along the base of the large mountain over the small
one, and thence on the hills to the southwest. The large
mountain was his salient, and from it right and left he drew
back his flanks to cover Marietta and his communications.
The position was one of great strength, thoroughly intrenched,
and covered against approach by entanglements of every type.
Through three weeks of rain, General Sherman had been
pressing the enemy from position to position, but it was now
apparent that General Johnston must maintain his ground or
OrERATIOXS XEAR KENESAW MOUXTAIN. 89
defend Atlanta much nearer its gates. That he might reach
round his army toward his communications, General Sherman
determined to move his armies by the right flank, hut not at
first to uncover his depot of supplies at Big Shanty, and while
he put the Army of the Cumberland in motion to the right,
he held the Army of the Tennessee east of the railroad, in
readiness, at call, or when the noise of battle should reveal
the necessity to move also to the right.
On the morning of the 20th, General Wood's division and
one brigade of General Stanley's moved to the right to relieve
General Williams' division, that the latter might co-operate
with General Schofield whose advance was resisted on the Sand-
town road. During the forenoon, General Stanley, with Whit-
taker's and Kirby's brigades, crossed Nose's creek and in-
trenched a line, and in the afternoon Whittaker carried a
wooded hill in his front and Kirby a bald one before him.
The former barricaded at once, and held his position against
repeated and furious assaults of the enemy, but the latter hav-
ing been less prompt in constructing defenses, was driven
back. ■ At dark, the extended right of the Fourteenth Corps
touched the left of the Fourth, and Williams' division was in
connection with General Schofield's left.
The next morning, General Newton's division was relieved
by a division from General Palmer's corps, when it moved to
the right of General Wood. This accomplished, General
Howard ordered Kirby's brigade and Nodine's, the left bri-
gade of General Wood's division, to regain the hill which
Kirby had lost the evening previous. It had been intrenched
by the enemy during the night, and his artillery bore upon it,
but these brigades carried it handsomely and intrenched its
crest, under the fire of two of the enemy's batteries. General
Wood then pushed two regiments to the front and right, and
gained an eminence which commanded a long intrenched
skirmish line, and permitted the advance of the right of the
Fourth Corps a distance of five hundred yards. General
Hooker advanced with his left abreast of General Howard's
right, against all the resistance the enemy could offer. This
movement was so threatening, that General Johnston trans-
ferred Hood's corps from his right to his left, leaving on\y
90 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
Wheeler's cavalry in front of the Army of the Tennessee, and
made three unsuccessful assaults during the night to dislodge
General Wood. .,,-«, > r *.
The removal of this corps from General McPherson s front
waB go thoroughly covered by the activity of Wheeler's troop-
ers t liit he was led to believe that there was a concentration
rather than a vacuum behind their bold front. But though
General Johnston succeeded in hiding the uncovering of his
,.,,,],,, :m ,i the heavy concentration on his left, his subsequent
aggression resulted in signal defeat. He gained, however, in
defensive strength at the very point it was most needed, and
defeated the combination to turn his left, and in fact defeated
for a time all efforts to dislodge him. General Sherman's plan
proposed that General McPherson should, " at the first pos-
sible chance, push forward on the line of the railroad and
main Marietta road, break through the enemy and pursue
him, or secure a position on the commanding ridge over which
.' roads pass," while the movement of the Army of the
Cumberland toward General Schofield, who was searching for
the enemy's left flank, should cause him to lengthen his line
- beyond his ability to defend," and give an opportunity to
break it, by a quick and energetic blow. This maneuver en-
tirely failed in its final development through the transfer of
Hood's corps from the right to the left, so secretly that it was
in battle against Hooker's corps, on the Powder Spring road,
before it was ascertained that it was not still before McPher-
son.
The movements ordered by General Sherman for the 22d,
had reference to preparation for attack upon Johnston's left
flank. He directed General Schofield to cross Nose's creek,
and turn the head of his column up toward Marietta until he
reached Hooker, and deploy south of the Marietta and Pow-
der Spring road; while General Hooker was ordered to get
possession of the ground, if practicable, up to Mrs. Kulp's,
and deploy with his right resting on the Powder Spring road.
This accomplished, the remainder of General Thomas' line
was to be advanced in conformity. General McPherson was
instructed to press the enemy in his front, to cover Big
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 91
Shanty, and hold his rear massed in readiness to support
General Thomas, should he become heavily engaged.
At 3 a. m. on the 22d, Cobham's detachment of Geary's di-
vision drove the enemy from the hill a mile in front of the
center of the Twentieth Corps. The whole division soon fol-
lowed, and intrenched a commanding ridge, reversing the
works of the enemy, and covering artillery as well as infantry
lines. Subsequently, Williams' division advanced to Geary's
right, and Butterfield's to his left, each skirmishing into posi-
tion. The corps did" not form a continuous line, but each
division occupied a hill with slopes to right and left, and
between Williams' left and Geary's right there was a swampy
ravine. Williams' right rested on the Powder Spring road,
at Kulp's house, and his division was formed with Ruger's
brigade on the right, Knipe's in the center, and Robinson's
on the left. In front of Robinson, who held a lateral hill,
slightly refused, there was an open space extending to Geary's
front. The ground was open before Knipe, except in front
of his left, and almost entirely wooded in Ruger's front. Gen-
eral Williams' placed Winegar's and Woodbury's batteries
before his center and left so as to command all the open
ground. When the Twentieth Corps had attained this ad-
vanced position, General Howard moved his line forward in
correspondence.
At 3 p. m., General Williams was informed that Hood's corps .
was massed before him. Reporting the fact to General Hooker,
he was directed to deploy his division and construct breast-
works without delay. He had, however, no time to construct
defenses, and barely enough for array, before the enemy was
seen to emerge from the woods beyond the open space in his
front and dash toward his lines. The formation in triple lines
and the peculiar shout of the troops forming them, alike, pre-
saged an assault. The movement was begun with the enemy'a
usual spirit, but Woodbury's canister swept the open ground
with such destructive effect that the enemy was soon thrown
into confusion and retreat. A portion of the column was driven
directly back, and the remainder was forced by volleys from
Knipe's line and Ruger's left, to seek cover in a ravine and
dense clump of trees and underbrush, on Knipe's left front.
92 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
A 3e cond column moved directly against Robinson's position,
being exposed in the open ground to a direct fire from
Winegar's battery, and an enfilading one from Geary's guns
on the left, was also thrown into confusion and rout. As afinal
effort the rebel troops who bad taken shelter in the ravine and
Is, having been reinforced from the rear, attempted to turn
Knipe's lefl think by a stealthy advance under cover; but the
movement having been perceived, Winegar's battery and
y's artillery again opened. The Sixty -first Ohio of Robin-
son's brigade advanced to support the endangered flank, and
the concentric lire of artillery and musketry soon completed
the repulse of the enemy. While Hood's attack was in pro-
-. heavy cannonading was maintained throughout the front
of the Army of the Cumberland.
In the repulse of Hood's attack, General Hooker's artillery
was so remarkably effective, that General Johnston admitted
in his official report that bis troops, Stevenson's and Hindman's
divisions', were compelled to withdraw by the fire of fortified
artillery. His loss was exceedingly heavy; General Hooker's
very light. General Williams, who alone was directly assailed,
lost only one hundred and thirty men, including nineteen cap-
bured on the picket line by the sudden advance of the enemy.
Major D. C. Becket, of the Sixty-first Ohio, was killed.
As soon as the character of the attack upon General Hooker
was developed, General Thomas made provision for his support.
The reserve regiments of the Fourth Corps were immediately
.thrown to the right, and as soon as practicable, Butterfield's
division was relieved by Stanley's, and moved to the rear of
Williams' right . These dispositions were sufficient for defense,
but the transfer of* Hood's corps to General Johnston's left
flank, necessitated a new combination, either to turn his posi-
tion or break through his lines. General Thomas suggested
that General McPherson should attack Marietta from the east
side of Kenesaw Mountain; but General Sherman decided to
attack General Johnston's fortified lines near his center, and
on the 24th, directed Generals McPherson and Thomas to make
] .reparations to assault on the 27th — the former near Little
Kenesaw, and the latter about a mile to the south, in front of
the Fourth Corps.
OPERATIONS NEAR KEXESAW MOUNTAIN. 93
General Thomas designated Davis' and Newton's divisions
to form the assaulting column, and during the night of the
25th, Davis' and Baird's divisions having been relieved on the
left of the Army of the Cumberland by General McPherson's
troops, moved to the rear of the Fourth Corps. On the morn-
ing of the 27th, Morgan's brigade of Davis' division occupied
the intrenchments thrown up by "Whittaker's brigade of Stan-
ley's division. Stanley moved to the left to support ISTewton,
and Baird held his division in direct support on Davis' right.
Hooker's whole corps was held in readiness to support Palmer's
and Howard's.
At 8 a. m. the preparations were complete. The brigades of
Colonels Daniel McCook and J. G. Mitchell were massed in
rear of the intrenchments held by Morgan's brigade, as there
was no cover for formation in front. Their point of attack
was a salient in the enemy's works, conforming to a projection
in the ridge, around whose summit his fortifications were built,
and was selected in consequence of the absence of obstructions
in front. Newton's division was formed with Harker's and
Wagner's brigades in line, slightly separated for better cover,
and Kimball's in echelon with Wagner's. For fifteen minutes
all the artillery available, poured a concentrated fire upon the
points of attack, and then the columns moved forward. From
the moment that McCook's and Mitchell's brigades bounded
over their intrenchments, they were subjected to a galling fire
of artillery and musketry. The distance to the enemy's works
was about six hundred yards, and the ground was rough and
partially covered with trees and undergrowth ; but disregard-
ing the fire of the enemy and the difficulties of the way, these
brigades advanced rapidly until they were under the guns of
the enemy. They reached his works, but such was their
strength, and the spirit of the heavy forces behind them, and
such their own exhaustion, that they were compelled to
halt. At this juncture, their situation was exceedingly
critical. To carry the works was impracticable ; to retreat,
threatened almost total destruction, and the maintenance of
position likewise involved great hazard and loss. As, how-
ever, it was soon ascertained that it was possible to so far
restrain the fire of the enemy by a vigorous response that
defenses could be constructed, General Thomas directed
04 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
General Davis to hold the position and fortify it. Intrenching
tool8 weTe a i once sent forward, and works were thrown up
within afew yards of the enemy. The loss in the advance and
during theday was very great. Colonel McCook fell early mor-
tally wounded ; Colonel Harmon, the next in rank, was soon
after killed, when the command fell to Colonel Dilworth.
Lieutenant-Colonel James Shane and Major John Yager of
Mitchell's brigade received fatal wounds, and from hoth bri-
gades a very Large number of officers and men were killed and
wounded.
The conditions of Newton's assault were somewhat differ-
ent, and so was the result. His troops were less exposed in
the' advance, but the formidable obstructions and entangle-
in, ins held them to a terrific fire under circumstances that for-
bade its restraint. As a consequence, he was compelled to
withdraw his division altogether as soon as it was evident
thai the assault could not be successful. At the moment of
making a second effort to advance, General Harker was
mortally wounded, and in his brigade and in Wagner's the
loss was very great. Some were killed on the enemy's para-
pet.
The aggregate loss to Davis and Newton, in nearly equal
division, was fifteen hundred and eighty killed, wounded, and
missing. The compensation was the lodgment of troops in
proximity to works too strong to be assaulted, and the in-
fliction of a loss to the enemy of two hundred and thirty-six
men, including one hundred captured. The officers and men
engaged in this assault " went to their work with the greatest
coolness and gallantry," as General Thomas testified, but their
valor and sacrifice brought no adequate reward.
During the progress of the action* in the center, Generals
McPherson and Schofield demonstrated strongly on the ene-
my's Hanks. The former threw a portion of his army against
a spur of Little Kenesaw, and though he attained position
near the enemy, did not disturb his line. The latter gained
some advantage at Olley's creek, as opening the way for an-
other flank movement to the right.
Thus far in the campaign, Generals Sherman and Johnston
Lad each kept up the most persistent belligerence to keep the
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 95
other from detaching troops to Virginia. But on the 28th,
General Grant authorized General Sherman to make his move-
ments without reference to the retention of General Johnston's
forces where they were. This independence and the necessity
of active offense induced immediate preparation for an effort
to reach General Johnston's communications. As the ac-
complishment of this project necessitated the temporary
abandonment of the railroad, General Sherman proposed,
should the development of his movement cause General John-
ston to abandon Marietta, to swing in upon the road in his
rear, but should he hold that position, to strike it between him
.and the Chattahoochee bridge.
The Army of the Cumberland lost during the month five
thousand seven hundred and forty-seven men— sixty-seven offi-
cers killed, two hundred and fifty-nine wounded, and eight
missing, and eight hundred and seventy-three enlisted men
killed, four thousand three hundred wounded, and forty miss-
ing. The army captured seven hundred and forty-two
prisoners, including thirty-seven officers, and received five
hundred and two deserters at Nashville and Chattanooga.
During the month, the enemy's cavalry in small parties,
assisted by guerrillas and disloyal citizens, w&s exceedingly
active along the railroad south of Dalton, but wrought no
damage beyond slight interruptions and the destruction of a
few cars. On the 10th, the "District of the Etowah" was
oreated, with General Steedman in command, who was charged
with the protection of the line of supply south from Chatta-
nooga. Soon after, the district commander sent Colonel Wat-
kins' brigade of cavalry to Lafayette, and a few days later it
was attacked by General Pillow with about two thousand
men. Colonel Watkins refused to surrender, and with four
hundred men defended the town until reinforced by Colonel
Oroxton, commanding the Fourth Kentucky Mounted In-
fantry, whose vigorous attack routed the enemy. Pillow's
loss was about three hundred men, including eighty captured.
Watkins and Croxton lost sixty. On the 28th, Brigadier-
General Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps arrived at
Chattanooga, and was soon after disposed to protect the rail-
road north from Allatoona.
96 OPERATIONS XKAli KKXESAW MOUXTAIX.
As these troops gave assurance of secure communications,
and as supplies had been accumulated in such quantity as to
warrant the temporary abandonment of the railroad, General
Sherman gave orders," July 1st, lor the movement of his armies
to the right, to turn the position ho had failed to carry by
assault. I Ii^ orders required that General Thomas should
hold bis intrenchments and observe the enemy until General
McPherson should pass to the right in menace to Johnston's
rear. General McPherson moved his army on the 2d, and the
night following General Johnston withdrew his army, and
when morning dawned, was far on his way to other intrench-
ments. In the pursuit, the Army of the Cumberland first
converged upon Marietta, and then moved on the direct roads
t<> Atlanta. The enemy's rear-guard was overtaken four
miles from Marietta, and driven forward to Ruff's station,
where Ins forces were found in strong earthworks, constructed
long before in provision for retreat. The lines of the Army
of the Cumberland were speedily formed, and at midnight
were again in closest proximity to the enemy. General Sher-
man urged bis army commanders to extreme activity and vigor
to press the enemy in confusion upon the bridges across the
Chattahoochee* But General Johnston was secure against direct
attack. His forecast of the possibilities of the unequal war-
fare bad been so exhaustive that his steps from one intrenched
position to another had all been anticipated. He held his
works at Ruff's station and on his left flank against General
McPherson, until Hood's and Loring's corps were across the
( 'liattahoochce, and then placed Hardee's corps in his intrench-
ments on the right bank of the river to cover the bridges.
General Sherman's plans were soon formed, though their
execution was deferred to give rest to his armies, perfect his
communications, and accumulate supplies in proximate depots,
thai he migbt be free from daily dependence upon the contin-
uity of his communications in the next stage of his cam-
paign. He proposed to make the next advance from his left,
and the initial dispositions were such as at the same time to
protect his communications against an anticipated cavalry
raid north of Marietta. While holding the main portion of the
Army of the Cumberland firmly against Hardee's corps in his
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 97
defenses, and feigning with the Army of the Tennessee and
Stoneman's cavalry far down to the right, lie threw Garrard's
cavalry to Roswell, and disposed the Army of the Ohio, and
portions of the Fourth Corps, to secure and fortify the cross-
ings from Roswell to Paice's ferry. Between the 6th and 9th,
two heads of column crossed the river, one at Roswell and
the other at Phillips' ferry ; and to give security to the cross-
ings, strong defenses were thrown up on the enemy's side of
the river.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 20.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Acworth, Ga., June 9, 1864.
The armies will move forward to-morrow morning.
I. Major-General Thomas, the center, on the Burnt Hickory and the
Marietta road, and such other roads as he may choose between it and the
Acworth and Marietta road, aiming to strike the northern end of Kene-
saw Mountain.
II. Major-General McPherson will move by the Acworth and Marietta
road, with a column following the railroad, and his cavalry well to the
left after passing Big Shanty.
III. Major-General Schofield will cover his wagons well about Mount
Olive Church, and feel well with cavalry and skirmishers down the road
past Hardshell Church, to ascertain the enemy's strength about Lost
Mountain and the ridge connecting it with Kenesaw Mountain. He will
not pass position about Hardshell Church in force until he is certain Major-
General Thomas has reached some point on Kenesaw.
IV. The object will be to develop the enemy's position and strength,
and to draw artillery fire from his intrenched works. . . .
V. Major-General Stoneman's cavalry will cover the right, and Brigadier-
General Garrard's the left flanks. Brigadier-General McCook's cavalry
should be kept to the rear, or to keep up communications.
VI. The movement will begin at six (6) o'clock a. m., and continue until
some one of the columns reaches Kenesaw Mountain, or until the center
is checked.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
R. M. SAWYER
Aid-de-Camp.
vol. n — 7
98 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 11, 1864.
tl Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
Johnston is intrenched on the hills embracing Lost Mountain, Pine
1 1 iil. ;unl Eenesaw. Our lines are down to him, but it has rained so hard,
and the ground is so boggy, that we have not developed any weak point or
Hank.
I will proceed with due caution, and try and make no mistake. The
Etowah bridge is done, and the construction train has been to our very
camps. Supplies will now be accumulated at Allatoona Pass, or brought
right up to our Lines.
One of my chief objects being to give full employment to Joe John-
ston, it makes no difference where he is, so he is not on his way to Vir-
ginia.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 13, 1864.
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
We have had hard and cold rains for about ten days. A gleam of sun-
shine this evening gives hope of a change. The roads are insufficient
here, and the fields and new ground are simply impassable to wheels. As
soon as possible I will study Johnston's position on Kenesaw and Lost
Mountain, and adopt some plan to dislodge him or draw him out of his
position. We can not risk the heavy losses of an assault at this distance
from our base. Cars now run to our very front camps. All well.
There are troops enough in Kentucky to manage Morgan, and in Ten-
nessee to watch Forrest should he make his appearance, as Johnston
doubtless calculates.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 16, 1864.
General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
General Thomas did not make the progress last night I expected. He
found the enemy strongly intrenched on a line slightly advanced from
a straight line connecting Lost and Kenesaw Mountain. I have been
along it to-day, and am pressing up close. Shall study it, and am
now inclined to feign on both flanks, and assault the center. It may
cost us dear, but in result would surpass an attempt to pass round. The
enemy has a strong position, and covers his road well, and the only
weak point in the game is in having the Chattahoochee in his rear. If,
by assaulting, I can break his line, I see no reason why it should not pro-
duce a decisive effect. I know he shifts his troops about to meet our
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 99
supposed attacks, and thereby fatigues his men, and the woods will
enable me to ma6k our movements.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi,
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 21, 18G4.
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
This is the nineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of clear weather
as far off as ever. The roads are impassable, and fields and woods be-
come quagmires after a few wagons have crossed, yet we are at work all
the time. The left flank is across Novaday, and the right across Nose's
creek. The enemy holds Kenesaw, a conical mountain, with Marietta
behind it, and has retired his flanks to cover that town and his rail-
road. I am all ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will
permit troops and artillery to move with anything like life.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding,
Headqtarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, June 22, 1864.
General: — I will start early to look at the position of McPherson as
near the north base of Kenesaw as I can safely do, and then come to
Wallace's, or the house in front, and then over to Hooker. I have ordered
Schofield to cross his whole command over Nose's creek, and turn the
head of his column up toward Marietta, until he reaches Hooker, to sup-
port and co-operate on his right, but to keep his cavalry and a part of hi3
rear infantry on the Sandtown road, prepared to regain it in case the enemy
shows signs of let go. I fear we will get our commands too close, but I
suppose Schofield can find room to deploy south of the Powder Springs
and Marietta road. You may order Hooker to extend to that road and
leave Schofield beyond. If he can get possession of the ground up to
Mrs. Kulp's house, I wish him to do so, and the balance of your line to
conform. I will explain McPherson's orders when I meet you.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 22, 1864 — 9 p. m.
General : — "When on the hill in front of your center to-day, waiting for
you, I signaled General Hooker :
" How are you getting along ? Near what house are you ?
" W. T. Sherman,
"Major-General."
100 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
At this hour (91) I have received this answer:
" Kulp House — 5.30 p. m.
" We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our only ap-
prehension being from our extreme right flank. Three (3) entire corps
are in front of us. „,,,-, TT »
' Major-General Hooker.
I was at the Wallace house at 5.30 p. m., and the Kulp house was within
two miles; and though I heard some cannonading, I had no idea of his
being attacked, and General Hooker must be mistaken about three (3)
corps being in his front. Johnston's army has only three corps, and I
know there was a respectable force along McPherson's front ; so much so,
that this general thought the enemy was massing against him. I know there
was some force in front of Palmer and Howard, for I was there. Still, it is
very natural the enemy should meet Hooker at that point in force, and I
gave Schofield orders this morning to conduct his column from Nose's
creek, on the Powder Spring road, toward Marietta, and support Hooker's
right flank, sending his cavalry down the Powder Spring road toward Sweet-
r, and leaving some infantry from his rear to guard the fords. Cap-
t.iin Dayton says that General Schofield received my orders, which were
in writing. If later information shows that Schofield is not up, send a
staff officer and notify him of the necessity, and, if need be, call off all
of Palmer's, and notify McPherson, who has orders for this very contin-
gency. To-morrow, if need be, we must bring things to a crisis.
Cars and telegraph now all right. Some of John E. Smith's men are
at Chattanooga, so that I think our road will be better guarded. The
cavalry of Lowe should be out on the Tennessee road, patrolling from
Cartersville to Spring Place.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Major-General Thomas, Commanding Army of the Cumberland
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Big Shanty, June 22, 1864.
General: — General Hooker, this p. m., advanced to the Kulp house,
two and half miles southwest of Marietta, and reports finding three (3)
corps. He was attacked twice, and successfully repulsed the enemy.
General Thomas thinks that that will be the enemy's tactics, and that you
ought to attack Marietta from that side of Kenesaw, but I judge the safer
ami better plan to be the one I indicated, viz., for you to leave a light
force and cover that flank, and throw the remainder rapidly, and as much
out of view as possible, to our right.
You may make the necessary orders, and be prepared for rapid action
to-morrow. So dispose matters that the big guns of Kenesaw will do you
as little mischief as possible. Yours, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Major- General McPherson, Commanding the Army of the Tennessee.
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 101
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 28.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Kenesaw Mountain, June 24, 18(14.
The army commanders will make full reconnoissances and preparation
to attack the enemy in force on the 27th instant, at eight (8) o'clock a. m.
precisely. The commanding general will be on "Signal Hill," and will
have telegraphic communication with all the army commanders.
I. Major-General Thomas will assault the enemy at any point near his
•center, to be selected by himself, and will make any changes in his troops
necessary, by night, so as not to attract the attention of the enemy.
II. Major-General McPherson will feign by a movement of his cavalry
and one (1) division of infantry on his extreme left, approaching Marietta
from the north, and using artillery freely ; but will make his real attack
at a point south and west of Kenesaw.
III. Major-General Schofield will feel to his extreme right, and threaten
that flank of the enemy with artillery, and display, but attack some one
point of the enemy's line as near the Marietta and Powder Spring road as
he can with prospect of success.
IV. All commanders will maintain reserve and secrecy, even from their
staff officers, but make all proper preparations and reconnoissances.
When troops are to be shifted to accomplish this attack, the movements
will be made at night. At the time of the general attack, the skirmishers
at the base of Kenesaw will take advantage of it, to gain, if possible, the
summit, and hold it.
V. Each attacking column will endeavor to break a single point of the
enemy's line, and make a secure lodgment beyond, and be prepared for
following it up toward Marietta and the railroad, in case of success.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Kenesaw, June 24, 1864.
General : — I am directed by the major-general commanding to acknowl-
edge the receipt through you of Rousseau's communication in copy, the
original of which also came to hand. The general commanding thinks
quite favorably of the suggestion therein, and desires you to instruct Gen-
eral Rousseau to gradually collect his available force of cavalry and infantry
at Pulaski, Athens, and Decatur, upon the representation of protecting
our roads against Forrest, but really to strike as proposed ; the cavalry to be
well fed, and the infantry stripped for light, rapid movements, and to be
ready to move at telegraphic notice from us. The time to do it will be
when we have forced Johnston across the Chattahoochee
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
Mqjor-General G. H. Thomas, Commanding, etc.
102 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,.
In the Field, near Kenesaw Mountain, June 25, 1864.
d Ilalleck, Washington, D. C. :
I have nothing new to report; constant skirmishing and cannonading.
I am making some changes in the disposition of our men, with a view to.
attack the enemy's left center. I shall aim to make him stretch his line
until he weakens it, and then break through.
***********
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding*
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi
In the Field, June 27, 1S64 — 11.45 a. m.
General Schqfield :
Neither McPherson nor Thomas has succeeded in breaking through, but
each has made substantial progress, at some cost. Push your operations
on the flank, and keep me advised.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding*
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi^
In the Field, June 27, 1864 — 11.45 a. m.
General Thomas :
McPherson's column marched near the top of the hill through very
tangled brush, but was repulsed ; it is found almost impossible to deploy,
but they still hold the ground. I wish you to study well the positions,
and, if it be possible, break through the line to do it; it is easier now than
it will be hereafter. I hear Leggett's guns well behind the mountain.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding,.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi.
In the Field, June 27, 1864 — 1.30 p. m.
General Thomas :
McPherson and Schofield are at a dead lock. Do you think you can
carry any part of the enemy's main line to-day ? McPherson's men are
up to the abatis, and can't move without direct assault. I will order an
assault, if you think you can succeed at any point. Schofield has one
division close up on the Powder Spring road, and the other across Olley's
creek, about two miles to his right and rear.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,.
In the Field, June 27 — 2.25 p. m.
General Thomas :
Secure what advantageous ground you have gained ; but is there any-
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 103
thing in the enemy's present position, that, if we should approach by reg-
ular saps, he could not make a dozen new parapets before our saps are
completed ? Does the nature of the ground warrant the time necessary
for regular approaches ?
011 W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
June 27—10.45 a. m.
Major-General Sherman :
Yours received. Harker's brigade advanced to within twenty paces
of the enemy's breastworks, and was repulsed with canister at short
range, General Harker losing an arm. General Wagner's brigade of
Newton's division, supporting General Harker, was so severely handled
that it is compelled to reorganize. Colonel Mitchell's brigade of Davis'
division captured one line of rebel breastworks, which they still hold.
McCook's brigade was also severely handled, nearly every colonel" being
killed or wounded. It is compelled to fall back and reorganize. The
troops are all too much exhausted to advance, but we hold all that we
have gained.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, June 27.
General Sherman :
Your dispatch of 2.25 received. We still hold all the ground we have
gained, and the division commanders report their ability to hold. They
also report the enemy's works exceedingly strong ; in fact, so strong that
they can not be carried by assault, except by immense sacrifice, even if
they can be carried at all. I think, therefore, the best chance is to ap-
proach them by regular saps, if we can find a favorable approach to bat-
ter them down. We have already lost heavily to-day, without gaining
any material advantage. One or two more such assaults would use up
this army.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Kenesaw, June 27, 1864.
General Halleck :
Pursuant to my orders on the 24th, a diversion was made on each flank
of the enemy, especially on the Sandtown road, and at 8 a. m. General
McPherson, at the southwest end of the Kenesaw, and General Thomas
at a point about a mile further south ; at tho same time, skirmishers and
artillery along the whole line kept up a sharp fire. Neither attack sue.
104 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
oeeded though both columns reached the enemy's works, which are very
Btrong General McPherson reports his loss about five hundred, and
General Thomas about two thousand ; the loss particularly heavy in gen-
and'field officers. General Harker is reported mortally wounded;
Colonel Dan. McCook, commanding brigade; Colonel Rice, Fifty-
:], Ohio, vcy seriously. Colonels Barnhill, Fortieth Illinois, and
Augustine,Fifty-fifth Illinois, are killed.
The facilities with which defensive works of timber and earth are con-
Btructed, gives the party on the defensive great advantage
I can not well turn the position of the enemy without abandoning my
railroad, and we are already so far from our supplies that it is as much as
the road can do to feed and supply the army. There are no supplies^ of
any kind here. I can press Johnston, and keep him from reinforcing
Lee, but to assault him in position will cost us more lives than we can
6pare.
McPherson took, to-day, one hundred prisoners, and Thomas about
as many, but I do not suppose that we have inflicted heavy loss on the
enemy, as he kept close behind his parapets.
J ' l W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
June 27, 1864—9 p. m.
General Thomas :
Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our
railroad ? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured
the way.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, June 27.
General Sherman :
"What force do you think of moving with ? If with the greater part of
the army, I think it decidedly better than butting against breastworks
twelve feet thick, and strongly abatised.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major- General U. S. V.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi
Near Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864.
General Thomas :
Let your troops fortify as close up to the enemy as possible. Get good
positions for artillery, and group as conveniently as you can by corps and
divisions, keeping reserves. Schofield has the Sandtown road within
eleven miles of the Chattahoochee, and he could move by that flank.
The question of supplies will be the only one. I regret beyond measure
the loss of two such young and dashing officers as Harker and McCook.
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 105
McPherson lost two or three of his young and dashing officers, which is
apt to be the case in unsuccessful assaults. Had we broken the line to-
day, it would have been most decisive; but as it is, our loss is small com-
pared with some of those east. It should not in the least discourage us.
At times, assaults are necessary and inevitable. At Arkansas Post we
succeeded ; at Yicksburg we failed. I do not think our loss to-day greater
than Johnston's, when he attacked Hooker and Schofield the first day
we occupied our present ground.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- Genera I Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Kenesaw, June 27, 18G4.
General McPherson :
Is General Blair back ? Report to me fully his operations for to-day.
Schofield' s right division (Cox) has gained a good position on the other
side of Olley's creek and at the head of Nickajack. If we had our sup-
plies well up, I would move by the right flank ; but suppose we must
cover our railroad for a few days.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-G 'eneral Commanding.
Washington, June 28, 18G4 — 4 p. m.
Major-General Sherman •"
General Grant directs me to say that the movements of your army may
be made entirely independent of any desire to retain Johnston's forces
where they are. He does not think that Lee will bring any more addi-
tional troops to Richmond, on account of the difficulty of feeding them.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Kenesaw, June 30, 1864.
General Schofield:
General Thomas is here. He will study the ground well, and prepare
to relieve Hascall's division to-night, in which event I want you with your
whole force to occupy between Olley's creek and Nickajack, to drive the
enemy from the forks of the road, and picket as far down as Nickajack
creek, and as far down on the Sandtown road as possible. At the same
time, General Stoneman's cavalry, supported by McCook, should move
across Sweetwater by Powder Springs, and down the west side of Sweet-
water creek to Sweetwater town, which crossing once secured, Stoneman
to hold it, and McCook to return to Lost Mountain.
General McPherson's command to remain where it is until our stores
are complete, when his cavalry will guard the roads from Marietta to-
ward Allatoona, while McPherson moves with his whole command down
the Sandtown road to the Chattahoochee. If Johnston holds on to
106 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
K mesa* then wo must strike some point on the railroad, between Ma-
rietta and the bridge; but if he lets go of Marietta, then we will swing
acrosa the railroad, to a position that gives us again the use ot the rail-
road - W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO 31.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Ik the Field, near Kenesaw Mountain, July 1, 1864.
The object of the 'contemplated movement is to deprive the enemy of
the great advantage he has in Kenesaw, as a watch-tower from which to
observe our every movement, to force him to come out of his intrench-
ments, or move further south. To attain this end:
I All army commanders will till up their wagons at Big Shanty depot,
to their utmost, with provisions, ammunition, and forage. The chief
quartermaster and commissary will give all necessary orders to clean out
the depots in front of Allatoona, and so instruct that the locomotives and
cars will come forward of Allatoona with great caution, and only when or-
dered by chief commmissary.
II. Major-General Thomas will hold the ground below Kenesaw, as far
as Olley's creek, near Mount Zion ; Major-General Schofield that from
Olley's creek to Nickajack, and General McPherson will move his train
and troops rapidly in a single march, and as little observed from Kenesaw
as possible, to the Sandtown road, and down it to the extreme right, with
one corps near the Widow Mitchell's, another near Ruff's mill on the
Nickajack, and tin; the third in reserve, near the forks of the road.
III. General Garrard's cavalry will cover the roads out of Marietta.
which pass north of Kenesaw, and General Stoneman's cavalry will oc-
cupy Sweetwater (old town), coincident with the movement of McPherson.
General McCook will receive orders from General Thomas. In case the
enemy presses Garrard back by superior and overwhelming forces, he
will send one of his brigades to the flank of General Thomas, and will,
with the others, fall back gradually toward Allatoona, disputing every
foot of ground.
IV. .Major-General McPherson will threaten the Chattahoochee river
and also the railroad, and General Thomas will press the enemy close,
and. at the very earliest possible moment, break his lines, and reach the
railroad below Marietta. All movements must be vigorous and rapid, as
the time allowed is limited by the supplies in our wagons.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de- Camp*
OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 107
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Marietta, Ga., July 3, 1864 — 10 a. m.
General Halleck, Washington, D. C. ;
The movement on our right caused the enemy to evacuate. Wo occu-
pied Kenesaw at daylight, and Marietta at 8.} a. m. Thomas is moving
down the main road toward the Chattahoochee ; McPherson toward the
mouth of Nickajack, on the Sandtown road. Our cavalry is on the ex-
treme flank. Whether the enemy will halt this side of the Chattahoochee
or not will soon be known. Marietta is almost entirely abandoned by its
inhabitants, and more than a mile of the railroad iron is removed betwen
the town and the foot of Kenesaw. I propose to press the enemy close
till he is across the Chattahoochee river, when I must accumulate store3
and better guard my rear.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding,
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Chattahoochee, July 9, 1864.
General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
I telegraphed to you, and Mr. Secretary Stanton answers. Drop me a
word now and then of advice and encouragement. I think I have done
well to maintain such an army in this country, fighting for sixty (60) days,
and yet my losses are made up by the natural increase. The assault I
made was no mistake. I had to do it. The enemy, and our own army
and officers, had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines
formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found be-
hind anything like a parapet, why everybody would deploy, throw up
counter-works, and take it easy, leaving it to to the " Old Man " to turn
the position. Had the assault been made with one-fourth more vigor
(mathematically), I would have put the head of George Thomas' whole
army right through Johnston's deployed line on the best ground for " go-
ahead," while my entire forces were well in hand on roads converging to
my then object, Marietta. Had Harker and McCook not been struck
down so early, the assault would have succeeded, and then the battle
would have all been in our favor, on account of our superiority of num-
bers and initiative. Even as it was, Johnston has been much more cau-
tious since, and gave ground more freely. His next fighting line (Smyrna
camp-ground) he only held one day.
* -K * * *• * * * #
Write me a note occasionally, and suggest anything that may occur to
you, as I am really in the wilderness down here; but I will fight any and all
the time on anything like fair terms, and that is the best strategy, but it
would not be fair to run up against such parapets as I find here.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General,
108 OPERATIONS NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
Is the Field, near Chattahoochee River, July 13, 1864.
Dku . g eneral — 1 have written you but once since the opening of the
campaign but I report by telegraph to General Halleck daily, and he
furnishes you copy. My progress was slower than I calculated, from
two chief , u uninterrupted rain from June 2d to the 22d, and
the peculiar submountainous nature of the country from the Etowah to
the Chattahoochee, But we have overcome all opposition, and whipped
Johnston in every fight when we were on anything like fair terms, and I
think the army feels that way, that we can whip the enemy in anything
like a fair fight ; but he lias uniformly taken shelter behind parallels of
strong profile, made in advance for him by negroes and militia. I regarded
-ault on the 27th of June necessary for two good reasons: 1. Because
.,,•!, iv, as well as my own army, had settled down into the belief that
'• flanking" alone was my game ; and, 2. That on that day and ground, had
the assault succeeded, 1 could have broken Johnston's center, and pushed
his army back in confusion, and with great loss, to his bridges over the
Chattahoochee. We lost nothing in morale in the assault, for I followed
it upon the extreme right, and compelled him to quit the very strong lines
of Kenesaw, Smyrna camp-ground, and the Chattahoochee, in quick suc-
ci ssion. . . .
I have now fulfilled the first part of the " grand plan." Our lines are
up to the Chattahoochee, and the enemy is beyond.
*********
I feel certain we have killed and crippled for Joe Johnston as many as
we have sent of our men to the rear ; have sent back about six or seven
thousand prisoners ; have taken eleven (11) guns of Johnston, and about
ten (10) in Rome; have destroyed immense iron, cotton, and wool mills;
and have possession of all the entire country. My operations have been
rather cautious than bold, but, on the whole, I trust are satisfactory to
you.
*********
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Lieutenant-General Grant near Petersburg, Va.
CHAPTER XXX.
ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, AND BATTLE OF PEACHTREE CREEK.
Acting upon the belief that two corps were across the river,
and intrenched, General Johnston withdrew Hardee's corps
the night of the 9th, and the smoke of the burning bridges
was the first revelation of his action. He selected as his next
line, Peachtree creek and the Chattahoochee below its mouth,
and placed his army on the high ground south of the creek in
waiting to attack the national armies whenever they should
attempt to cross. Should he be unsuccessful in preventing
their passage, he proposed to delay their approach to Atlanta
until his defenses between the Marietta and Decatur roads
could be intrusted to the state troops, and then sally out with
his whole army, and strike the flank most exposed. He was
under the impression that his method of defense, covering con-
tinually, not only his main line, but his skirmishers, with in-
trenchments, had enabled him to inflict losses fivefold greater
than his own, and that such had been the reduction of Gen-
eral Sherman's superiority that he could now safely deliver
offensive battle, especially as he had the fortifications of At-
lanta for refuge in the event of defeat, which, in his esti-
mation, were " too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to
be invested." But as his estimation of the reduction of Gen-
eral Sherman's strength was radically erroneous, there was no
ground for his faith in his ability to meet him in general
battle. He confessed a loss of ten thousand killed and
wounded of infantry and artillery, and though General Sher-
man's loss in the same arms were probably one-half more, the
relative strength of the armies had not materially changed
since the battle of Resaca, and now, as then, he had fifty
(109)
110 ADVANCE UrOX ATLANTA, ETC.
thousand againsl a hundred thousand men for an open battle.
In the (Utilise of fortifications, he was relatively stronger, as
he had gradually received accessions of militia, to be used only
in constructing and holding intrenchments, so that his pur-
!".-.■ i" act offensively before Atlanta was formed in ignorance
of the fad thai General Sherman had maintained a hundred
thousand nun on his offensive front, against all his losses and
the demands of an ever-lengthening line of supply.
To General Sherman, the outlook from the Chattahoochee
was promising in the main, but there were contingencies pro-
ductive of no slight anxiety. He had been able thus far to
maintain his communications against all the forces that Gen-
eral Johnston could detach against them ; but Forrest, the bold
raider, had given remote menace from East Tennessee, and
the possibility of a dash by him from Mississippi Was not yet
entirely removed. And he looked anxiously, though hope-
fully, to Major-General Canby, commanding the newly created
military division of West Mississippi, to so engage the enemy's
forces in the West and Southwest as to prevent their approach
to his rear. Before him, the city of Atlanta, his next objective,
was in view. Its importance as a railroad and manufacturing
center, and the moral effect of its successful defense, might
justly be regarded as overmastering incentives to the enemy
to fortify, and to fight to hold it. To sever its railroad con-
nection with the states west, and cut off supply and reinforce-
ment from that quarter, General Rousseau, with a mounted
force, was in motion from Decatur, Alabama, to Opelika, and
Stoneman had been sent to strike the same road nearer At-
lanta. But another general advance could not be delayed in
waiting for the issues of remote operations, and with the com-
pletion of preparations for it, there came, as an incentive to
prompt motion, the announcement from General Grant that
the transfer of Confederate troops from Virginia to Georgia
was not improbable, and that provision for such a contingency
should be made.
On the 16th, the date of General Grant's dispatch, General
Sherman gave orders for the advance toward Atlanta on the
fi allowing day. McPherson's army had been previously trans-
ferred from the extreme right to Roswell ; Schofield's was across
ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. Ill
in front of Phillip's ferry, and Howard's corps on the south
side, before Power's ferry. The next morning, General
McPherson crossed at Roswell, and moved toward the Augusta
railroad, east of Decatur; General Schofield advanced toward
Cross Keys, and Palmer's and Hooker's corps passed the river
on pontoon bridges, at Paice's ferry, covered by Wood's di-
vision, which marched down the left bank of the river from
Power's ferry, and subsequently rejoined the Fourth Corps,
and with it moved toward Buckhead. Garrard's cavalry acted
with General McPherson, and Stoneman's and McCook's
watched the river and roads below the railroad.
The movement was a right wheel, with Palmer's corps of
the Army of the Cumberland as a pivot. The night of the
17th, the Army of the Cumberland rested on Nancy's creek,
a tributary of Peachtree creek, having pressed back the
enemy's skirmishers from the bank of the Chattahoochee.
The next day it advanced until Palmer's right rested at the
junction of Nancy's and Peachtree creeks, and Howard's
corps at Buckhead. General Schofield approached Decatur,
and General McPherson broke up a section of the Augusta
railroad a few miles east of the town. The line was now a
long one, but the movements prescribed for the 19th were de-
signed to unite the armies before Atlanta, or in that city.
Early in the morning, Woods' division leading, the Fourth
Corps reached Peachtree creek on the Buckhead and At-
lanta road, finding the bridge burned and a heavy fortification
on the high ground beyond, manned with infantry and artil-
lery. In the afternoon, General Wood constructed a bridge
and forced the passage, and drove the enemy from his defenses.
General Stanley crossed the north fork of the creek some dis-
tance to the left, against strong opposition. To the right,
Davis' and Geary's divisions fought their way over the stream.
General Geary covered the construction of a foot-bridge with
a heavy artillery fire, and gained a strong position beyond.
General Davis first threw over Dilworth's brigade, which soon
became warmly engaged, and after a sharp conflict repulsed
the enemy. Mitchell's brigade moved promptly in support,
and participated in the action near its close. All the troops
on the south side intrenched during the night.
112 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC.
Early the- next morningthe remaining divisions of the Army
of the Cumberland passed the stream. This army was now
compactly formed, and was under orders to advance to de-
velop the enemy's purpose with respect to Atlanta. Between
( General Thomas' left and General Schofield's right there was,
however, a wide interval, and General Sherman ordered two
divisions of the Fourth Corps to move to the left to connect
with Crucial Schofield. Their movement to the left did not
till the interval nor greatly diminish its length, but changed
its location in the general battle front, and gave the prepon-
derance of strength to the left wing. When Stanley and
Wood had moved to the left and faced toward Atlanta, in
harmony with General Schofield's column, there was still an
interval of nearly two miles* between the right of their line
and General Thomas' left on the Buckhead road.
When General Williams crossed the creek, he advanced be-
yond General Geary to an eminence abreast of one Johnson
had taken for his division on the left of the Fourteenth Corps,,
and separated from it by a depression. Here he halted, by
direction of General Hooker, as he was near an extensive in-
trenched outpost of the enemy, and his front was covered by
dense woods and thickets. At 10 a. m. General Geary moved
forward to the hill on the left of General Williams, and formed
his division several hundred yards in advance. Later, General
Newton advanced and attained a good position in open ground
on the Buckhead road, a division interval from Geary's left.
General Hooker for a time held Ward's division opposite this
interval, but concealed behind a hill. The resistance offered
to the skirmishers that covered the advance of these divisions,,
and other circumstances, indicated the presence of the enemy
in strong force, and both Newton and Geary made dispositions
for defense. The former placed two brigades in line — Wag-
ner's, Colonel Blake commanding, on the left of the road, and
Kimball's on the right— and held Bradley's in column for sup-
port. Between the two deployed brigades, he placed a four-
gun battery, and constructed slight rail barricades. General
Geary formed his division with Candy's brigade on the left,.
* Statement in General Howard's report.
ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 113
Jones' on the right, and Ireland's massed in rear of Jones'.
As the ground in front of Jones was wooded, but open before
Candy and on his left, General Geary planted his guns on
Candy's line. Here also barricades of rails were constructed.
A new army commander had been observing the movements
of the national forces since the 17th, as on that day General
Johnston, by order of the Confederate President, had given his
army and his immediate projects to General Hood. General
Johnston had proposed to himself attack General Sherman's
armies as they should cross Peachtree creek, in hopes of press-
ing them in confusion upon the creek and the river beyond,
but he had not anticipated such favorable conditions as now
existed. He had determined to assume the offensive against
Sherman's combined armies, and to make flanks to turn, by
breaking lines ; but his successor had been permitted to see the
wide separation of the two smaller armies from the Army of
the Cumberland, and then to see the latter cross Peachtree
creek bereft of the two divisions which extended its flank be-
tween the forks of the stream, and then advance with its short-
ened left flank thrown forward almost to the hills upon which
his forces were massed for sudden attack, while its right was
wedged in between his works and the creek. And now to add
surprise to exposure, that his success might be assured, he
called in his skirmishers in semblance of entire withdrawal,
and sent soldiers into the national lines, under the pretense of
capture, who should say that there were no heavy bodies of
their troops within two miles. So when, after formation, the
most exposed divisions threw forward their skirmishers to de-
velop the state of things in their front, there was no resist-
ance, and no enemy in view until the moment that the massed
forces were ready to spring from concealment, in boldest at-
tack. The blow was well concealed, and it was well delivered
under the most favorable conditions. It was nevertheless as
complete a failure as any assault of the war.
At 3 p. m. the enemy in masses rushed from the woods. A
division attacked Newton in front ; another passed his left
flank altogether, and thrust itself between Peavine and Peach-
tree creeks, and a third attacked his right flank. As the
vol. n — 8
114 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC.
menace to his left flank involved the greatest danger, General
Newton first repulsed the column on his left, and drove it to
the woods, with Bradley's brigade and his reserve artillery.
Wagner's and Blake's brigades next repelled the front attack,
and dn>vc back the enemy with heavy loss. The latter
changed front at right angles, and engaged the enemy's third
division. "While this division had advanced between Newton
and Geary, in evident belief that then there was a complete
opening in the line, and had faced to the east to engage New-
ton, Ward's division advanced from cover, and the heavy
Bkirmish line, far in advance, composed of the Twenty-second
Wisconsin and One Hundred and Thirty-sixth New York,
Lieutenant-Colonel Blooclgood commanding, held the enemy
in check until the whole division had reached a hill to the
right and rear of Newton. The unexpected appearance of
this division and its destructive fire threw the enemy into
confusion, and he fell back with shattered ranks. General
Ward then advanced to another eminence abreast of Newton
and Geary, and formed his division so as to connect with the
right of the one and the left of the other. The hill he occu-
pied commanded the open space for six hundred yards in
In 1 1 1 1 , and the enemy for a time refrained from attack. During
this interval, General Ward fortified his position. The enemy
first attacked the right of Geary's line, then passed round to
at tack him in flank and rear. Williams' division not being fully
abreast, this advantage was possible. Geary was therefore
compelled to change front to the right with almost all of his di-
vision, and extend his line to connect with Williams, leaving
only five regiments, with his artillery, on his first line. When
the noise of severe battle was first heard by General Williams,
he was in the act of moving artillery to his skirmish line, to
dislodge the enemy from his fortified outpost; but warned by
the heavy volleys of musketry on his left, he deployed his
division at double-quick— Knipe's brigade on the right, Robin-
son's on the left, and Ruger's in reserve— to await the devel-
opment of the attack. He placed his batteries by sections, to
command his front and flanks, and held three sections in re-
serve. Hardly had these dispositions been made before the
enemy advanced upon Williams in great force, and having
ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 115
•driven in his skirmishers, with his line of battle under cover
of the thickets and undergrowth, approached very near with-
out being seen. His attack, as in other cases, was direct in
part, but heavy masses sw r ept down the ravines to right mid
left. Hearing heavy firing on his right, General Williams sent
the Twenty-seventh Indiana to reinforce Knipe's right, This
regiment and the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania speedily checked
and drove back the enemy, and held the ground until the
close of the action. On the left, the attack was more threat-
ening, because made with stronger columns ; but Robinson's
brigade, the artillery, and Geary's line upon the other hill,
poured a destructive fire upon the enemy, and here, too, he
was completely repulsed. This first attack swept from New-
ton's position to Colonel Anson McCook's brigade of John-
son's division of the Fourteenth Corps ; but though signally
repulsed, General Hood did not desist, and soon again, from
Newton to Johnson, the battle raged furiously.
The second general action was commenced upon Newton's
left in effort to double up the line by taking it in reverse as
well as in flank. This time General Thomas sent the artillery
of Ward's division, and in person urged the artillery horses
to the greatest possible speed to meet the emergency, and then
directed their action. These guns, and all of Newton's, with
all kinds of metal most destructive at short range, opened
upon the heavy assaulting columns, and they were again
repulsed. Again the battle raged to the right; but as the
national line was now compact, the enemy exhausted himself
in direct attacks. His infantry assaults, as at first, extended
from Newton to Johnson, and further to the right his forti-
fied artillery was most active, but charge after charge from left
to right was repulsed, until at 6 p. m., when he abandoned his
effort to turn or break the line. In this action, artillery was
used with fearful effect, and so skillfully was it posted, and so
bravely defended, that the enemy did not reach a single gun.
When it is considered that four divisions and one brigade,
in open field, repulsed an attack of the army which was in-
tended to initiate such offense as should destroy Sherman's
armies, the grandeur of this victory becomes apparent. Not
General Hood alone, but General Johnston also, was defeated
116 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC.
in the " Battle of Peachtree Creek." A new policy demanded
by the authorities at Richmond, and by the Southern people,
and a plan of battle elaborated by an able general and put
upon trial under conditions far more favorable than had been
anticipated, was defeated by less than half of the infantry and
artillery of the "Army of the Cumberland." Four divisions,
and a third of another, parried a blow intended to initiate the
ruin of three armies, comprising more than five times as
many men, and the significance of the miscarriage should have
bc.n accepted as the prophecy of the doom of the rebellion.
The national troops fought great odds, introducing aggression
as the policy of a new commander, to stop the further advance
of General Sherman and save Atlanta. It was seemingly a
grand opportunity, but the issue was positive defeat and im-
mense loss. An opportunity for the enemy, it was an
.11 urgency for the exposed flank and the fraction of the na-
tional army subjected to attack. But there were those in
chief and subordinate command, who, by personal direction and
vigor, inspirited the troops made veteran by participation
in numerous battles. Generals Thomas and Hooker were
with their troops at the points of extreme danger, and officers
and men in proportionate service contributed to the emphatic
repulse of the enemy in a combination planned for grandest
effect.
General Hood lost from three to five thousand men. He
left over six hundred dead on the field, and several hundred of
his men were captured. Ward's division captured seven
battle flags and two hundred and forty-six prisoners.
The total loss of the Army of the Cumberland was sixteen
hundred. Colonel Cobham, One Hundred and Eleventh
Pennsylvania ; Colonel Logie, One Hundred and Forty-fourth
New York; Lieutenant-Colonel Randall, One Hundred and
Forty-ninth New York, and many other officers were killed ;
and Lieutenant-Colonel "W. H. H. Brown, Sixty-first Ohio,
and Major Lathrop Baldwin, One Hundred and Seventh New
York, were mortally wounded. A number of field and line
officers were severely wounded. General Newton's loss was
only one hundred, though his division was on the flank and
in extreme exposure.
ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 117
Generals Stanley and Wood were somewhat heavily engaged
during the afternoon and evening, the enemy using artillery
freely. They drove in his outposts, and came up in sight of
intrenchments, with the usual skirmish line in front. Late in
the evening, General Stanley captured a portion of the pickets,
drove in the remainder, and worked up close to the enemy.
The night following, the enemy withdrew from General
Newton's left. The next morning, General Wood advanced
his right a mile and a half, and during the day, the Army of
the Cumberland, from left to right, advanced close to the
enemy's works. Heavy skirmishing was maintained ; batteries
were put in position and kept in continuous action wherever
there was probability of effect, and the new front was strongly
intrenched.
In the night, the enemy retired to the immediate defenses
of the city ; comprising a strong line of redoubts, connected by
curtains, covered by abatis and cheveau de frise. The next
morning, General Thomas advanced his line and intrenched
as close as practicable to the enemy's works. The Fourteenth
Corps fortified a line west of the railroad, the Twentieth Corps
from the railroad to the Buckhead road, and the Fourth
Corps from that road to General Schofield's right — the con-
traction of the line now permitting the reunion of the three
divisions in continuous front. General Thomas' position was
strong, affording commanding points for batteries within easy
range of the city, and bearing directly upon the fortifications
of the enemy. Constant skirmishing and cannonading were
maintained. General McCook's cavalry was thrown on Gen-
eral Thomas' right, along Proctor's creek, and covering the
Macon and Turner's Ferry roads.
On the 22d, while the Army of the Tennessee was changing
position to close in upon Atlauta, General Hood put upon
trial General Johnston's suggestion to sally from the fortifi-
cations and strike the most exposed flank. This time he
gained a temporary advantage, but in the final issue was
defeated with heavy loss.
General McPherson was killed early in the engagement,
while making dispositions to save his left flank.
The same day, General Rousseau arrived at Marietta, having
118 ADVANCE UPOX ATLANTA, ETC.
accomplished his raid through Alabama and Georgia. He-
sui;^cstt'<l the expedition, and had organized and commanded
it by permission of General Sherman. He destroyed over
thirty miles of railroad, several trestle-bridges, many station-
buildingSj and quantities of supplies and materials. He met
and defeated General Clanton at the Coosa river, and another
e at Chehaw station, and having suffered a loss of about
forty men from a command of twenty -five hundred, reached
the tin: iter of war at a time when cavalry reinforcements were
niiu-h needed.
EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL JOS. E.
JOHNSTON.
The character of Peachtree creek, and the numerous fords in the
Chattahoochee above its mouth, prevented my attempting to defend that
part of the river. The broad and muddy channel of the creek would
have separated the two parts of the army. It and the river, below its
mouth, were therefore taken as our line. A position on the high ground
south of the creek was selected for the army, from which to attack the
enemy while crossing. The engineer officers, with a large force of ne-
groes, were set to work to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta, and
mount on them seven heavy rifles, borrowed from General Maury. The
chief engineer was instructed to devote his attention, first, to the works
between Marietta and Decatur roads, to put them in such condition that
they might be held by state troops, so that the army might attack the
enemy in flank when he approached the town. This, in the event that
we should be unsuccessful in attacking the Federal army in its passage
of Peachtree creek.
In transferring the command to General Hood, I explained my plans
to him. First, to attack the Federal army while crossing Peachtree
creek. If we were successful, great results might be hoped for, as the
enemy would have both it and the river to intercept his retreat. Second,
if unsuccessful, to keep back the enemy by intrenching, to give time for-
th.- assembling of the state troops promised by Governor Brown ; to garri-
son Atlanta with those troops, and when the Federal army approached
the town, to attack it on its most exposed flank with all the Confederate
troops.
These troops, who had been for seventy-four days in the immediate
presence of the enemy, laboring and fighting daily, enduring toil, ex-
posure, and danger with equal cheerfulness, more confident and high
spirited than when the Federal army first presented itself near Dalton,
were then inferior to none who ever served the Confederacy.
ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 119
I commenced the campaign with General Bragg's army of Missionary
Ridge, with one brigade added (Mercer's), and two taken away (Baldwin's
and Quarles'). That opposed to us was Grant's army of Missionary Ridge,
then estimated at eighty thousand by our principal officers, increased, as
I have stated, by two corps, a division, and several thousand recruits — in
all, at least thirty thousand men. The cavalry of that army was esti-
mated by Major-General Wheeler at fifteen thousand.
The reinforcements which joined our army amounted to fifteen thou-
sand infantry and artillery, and four thousand cavalry. Our scouts
reported much greater numbers joining the United States army — the
garrisons and bridge-guards from Tennessee and Kentucky relieved by
"one hundred clays' men," and the Seventeenth Corps, with two thousand
cavalry.
The loss of our infantry and artillery, from the 5th of May, had been
about ten thousand in killed and wounded, and four thousand seven
hundred from all other causes, mainly slight sickness produced by heavy
cold rains, which prevailed in the latter half of June. These and the
slightly wounded were beginning to rejoin their regiments. For want of
reports, I am unable to give the loss or the services of the cavalry, which
was less under my eye than the rest of the army. Its effective strength
was increased by about two thousand during the campaign.
The effective force transferred to General Hood was about forty-one
thousand infantry and artillery, and ten thousand cavalry.
According to the opinions of our most experienced officers, daily re-
ports of prisoners, and statements of Northern papers, the enemy's loss
in action could not have been less than five times as great as ours. In
the cases in which we had the means of estimating it, it ranged from
seven to one to ninety to one, compared to ours, and averaged thirteen
to one. The Federal prisoners concurred in saying that their heaviest
loss was in the daily attacks made in line of battle, upon our skirmishers
in their rifle-pits. Whether they succeeded in dislodging our skirmishers
or not, their loss was heavy and ours almost nothing.
Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee, we could have given battle
only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that
the only result of success to us would have been his falling back into
them, while defeat would have been our ruin.
In the course pursued, our troops always fighting under cover, had
very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted, so that the en-
emy's numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly, and we could
reasonably have expected to cope with the Federal army on equal ground
by the time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on this side of that
river would have been its destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of
refuge in Atlanta, too strong to be assaulted, and too extensive to be in-
vested.
120 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC.
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SHERMAN'S COMMUNICATION TO
GENERAL GRANT, OF JULY 12, 1864.
As soon as I hear from General Stoneman, I will shift all of General
McPherson'e army to Roswell, and cross General Thomas three (3) miles
above the railroad bridge, and move against Atlanta — my left well to the
East, to get possession of the Augusta road about Decatur or Stone Moun-
tain. I think all will be ready in three (3) days. I will have nearly one
hundred thousand (100,000) men.
I fe< 1 certain we have killed and crippled for Joe Johnston as many
as we have sent to the rear ; have sent back six or seven thousand pris-
oners.
City Point, Va, July 16, 1864—10 a. m.
-General Sherman :
The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to give the enemy
a firm foothold north, they are now returning with possibly twenty-five
thousand (25,000) troops. All the men they have here beyond a suffi-
■v to hold their string of fortifications, will be a,n element of weak-
ness by eating up their supplies. It is not improbable, therefore, that
you will find in the next fortnight, reinforcements on your front to the
number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that if you get Atlanta,
you set about destroying the railroad as far to the east and south of you
as possible. Collect all stores of the country for your own use, and
select a point that you can hold until help can be had. I shall make a
lerate effort, to get a position here which will hold the enemy without
the necessity of so many men. If successful, I can detach from here for
other enterprises, looking much to your assistance, or anything else-
where.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant- General.
Washington, July 16, 1864—4.30 p. m.
r-General Sherman :
Lieutenant-General Grant wishes me to call your attention to the pos-
sibility of Johnston's being reinforced from Richmond, and the impor-
■ of your having prepared a good line of defense against such an
increase of rebel force. Also, the importance of getting as large an
amount of supplies collected at Chattanooga as possible.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major- General and Chief of Staff.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, on Chattahoochee, July 16, 1864.
Generals Thomas and McPherson :
Dispatches from General Grant and Halleck to-day speak of the enemy
having failed in his designs in Maryland, and cautioning me that Lee
ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC. 121
may, in the next fortnight, reinforce Johnston by twenty thousand
(20,000) men. It behooves us therefore to hurry, so all will move to-
morrow as far as Nancy's creek.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 36.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Chattahoochee, July 17, 1864.
The operations of the army for to-morrow, the 18th July, will be as
follows :
I. Major-General Thomas will move forward, occupy Buckhead, and
the ridge between Nancy's creek and Peachtree, also all the roads
toward Atlanta as far as Peachree creek.
II. Major-General Schofield will pass through Cross Keys, and occupy
the Peachtree road where intersected by the road from Cross Keys to
Decatur.
III. Major-General McPherson will move toward Stone Mountain, to
secure strong ground within four (4) miles of General Schofield's position,
and push Brigadier-General Garrard's cavalry to the railroad, and destroy
some section of the road, and then resume position to the front and left
of General McPherson.
IV. All armies will communicate with their neighbors. The com-
mander-in-chief will be near General Thomas' left, or near General Scho-
field.
Bv order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
J L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de- Camp.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, at San House, Peachtree Road,
Five Miles Northeast of Buckhead, Ga., July 18, 1864.
General : — I have reports from General McPherson to 2 p. M. He has
reached the railroad at a point two (2) miles from Stone Mountain and
seven (7) miles from Decatur; had broken the telegraphs and road, and
by 5 p. m. will have four (4) or five (5) miles broken. To-morrow I
want a bold push for Atlanta, and have made my orders, which I think
will put us in Atlanta or very close to it. Hold on about Howell's mill
and the main road, and let your left swing across Peachtree creek, about
south fork, and connect with General Schofield, who will approach
Decatur from the north, whilst General McPherson moves down from
the East. It is hard to realize that Johnston will give up Atlanta without
a fight, but it may be so. Let us develop the truth.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General Commanding.
Major-General Thomas, Buckhead.
122 ADVANCE UPON ATLANTA, ETC.
[SPECIAL FIELD OEDERS, NO. 39.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Decatdr, July 19, 1864.
The whole army will move on Atlanta by the most direct roads to-
morrow, July 20th, beginning at five (5) o'clock a. m., as follows:
I. Major-General Thomas from the direction of Buckhead, his left to
connect with General Schofield's right, about two (2) miles northeast of
Atlanta, about lot 15, near the houses marked as Howard and Colonel
1 1 « (oker.
I I. Major-General Schofield, by the road leading from Dr. Powell's to
Atlanta.
III. Major-General McPherson will follow one or more roads direct
from Decatur to Atlanta.
Each army commander will accept battle on anything like fair terms,
but if the army reach within cannon range of the city without receiving
artillery or musketry fire, he will halt, form a strong line, with batteries
in position, and await orders. If fired on from the forts or buildings of
Atlanta, no consideration will be paid to the fact that they are occupied
by families, but the place must be cannonaded without the formality of a
demand.
The general-in-chief will be with the center of the army, viz., with
or near General Schofield.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
CHAPTER XXXI.
SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
After the 22d, the situation at Atlanta conformed in the
main to the type of the campaign developed north of the Oos-
tanaula. The two armies presented to each other fortified
fronts, each inviting the attack of the other. The stronger not
being able to secure a general battle on fair terms, was restricted
again to a choice between assault and flank movement. As
the issue of previous assaults did not warrant the attempt to
carry the defenses of Atlanta, the alternative of a movement
by the flank was inevitable. The railroad on the east having
been greatly damaged by General Garrard to Covington, and
nearer Atlanta by the Army of the Tennessee, there remained
but one railroad — that from Macon to Atlanta — which had not
been greatly damaged. If this road were held by the national
forces or damaged beyond use, General Hood could no longer
remain in the city. General Sherman resolved to change the
Army of the Tennessee from the left to the right, and to reach
toward the Macon road from his right flank, and at the same
time throw his cavalry in two heavy columns upon it — five
thousand under General Stoneman to pass to the east of the
city to McDonough, and four thousand under General McCook
to the west to Fayetteville, to meet at Lovejoy's Station and
there destroy the road effectually. This accomplished, General
Stoneman had permission to make effort with his own division
to liberate the prisoners — two thousand at Macon, and twenty
thousand at Andersonville. The object of these movements
was to force the enemy to come out, of Atlanta to fight or be
invested, or force him to extend his lines to the south, and
choose between Atlanta and East Point.
(123)
12-4 SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
The cavalry started on the 27th. General McCook crossed
the Chattahoochee at Eiverton, and moved rapidly on Palmetto
station, on the West Point road. Here he destroyed a section
of the track two and a half miles long, and advanced to Fay-
v\ teville. There he burned a hundred bales of cotton, destroyed
railroad trains, burned a train of four hundred wagons,
killed eight hundred mules, saving a large number, and cap-
tured two hundred and fifty prisoners. He then moved to
Lovejoy's Station to meet General Stoneman. He there burned
the depot and having commenced the destruction of the rail-
road, only desisted when there was such an accumulation of
the enemy that he was forced to defend himself. Hearing noth-
ing of General Stoneman and being strongly opposed on the
east, he turned south and west to Newnan, on the West Point
road. At Xewnan he encountered an infantry force that had
been stopped on its way to Atlanta by the break he had made
in the road at Palmetto. The pursuing cavalry and the infantry
now hemmed him in completely, and he was compelled to drop
his captives and fight. He cut his way out with a loss of five
hundred, and reached Marietta in safety with the remainder of
his command.
General Stoneman went farther and fared worse. He sent
Garrard's cavalry to Flat Rock, and moved through Covington,
down the Ocmulgee, to East Macon. In endeavoring to return,
he was hemmed in and captured with seven hundred of his
command, the remainder escaping. General Garrard engaged
successfully two divisions of cavalry at Flat Rock, and then re-
turned to Atlanta. These cavalry expeditions in the main were
failures, and made no impression upon the situation at Atlanta.
On the 27th, General Howard was assigned to the command
of the " Army of the Tennessee " by order of the President,
and General Stanley, by seniority of rank, to the command of
the Fourth Corps. At this time the Army of the Tennessee
was in motion to the right, and the next morning went into
position on the right of General Thomas, with its line trending
to the south. As a support to this movement, General Davis'
division was ordered to make a detour to Turner's ferry on the
Chattahoochee, and thence to Howard's right, to take the en-
emy in flank should he sally forth as on the 22d. This change
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 125
of the Army of the Tennessee was so threatening that General
Hood threw two corps upon it — Hardee's and Lee's — with great
impetuosity. Attacking again and again, they were repulsed
with immense loss. To create a diversion during the progress of
this action, there was heavy skirmishing on the whole front of
the " Army of the Cumberland ;" but Davis' division, General
Morgan commanding, was unable, through absence of a direct
road, to reach the enemy's flank in time to participate in the
action.
General Morgan was not only embarrassed in not finding
such roads as had been anticipated, but he was left in igno-
rance of the object of his movement— his orders, which were
received late in the morning, not being explicit as to his duty
nor definite in description of the road which he was to pur-
sue, and the consequence was, that the movement so far mis-
carried that he did not reach his camp until very late at night.
The next day he was joined by General Ward's division of/;
the Twentieth Corps, when the two divisions advanced, and
driving back the enemy, ascertained that he had strong in-
trenched lines in their front. Strong reconnoissances from
the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps developed the fact that
General Hood's lines were still strong on his right, although
he had greatly extended his left.
On the 30th, the picket line of the Twentieth Corps was
advanced to high ground, and captured one hundred and
twenty of the enemy, including eight ofiicers. The dash was
a bold one, but the ground was permanently held. The next
day General Davis made a reconnoissance toward the Macon
railroad, and found the enemy within a mile, posted in earth-
works, from which his artillery opened with canister. It
was the old story of extension and counter-extension of lines
and intrenchments, and the weaker army having inner lines
could keep fully abreast, and at the same time have easy con-
centration for sally or defense.
During the month the Army of the Cumberland lost forty
commissioned ofiicers, one hundred and sixty wounded, and
seventeen missing ; five hundred and forty-seven enlisted men
killed, two thousand five hundred and ninety-two wounded,
and three hundred and forty-four missing — total, three thou-
126 SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
.-and seven hundred and nine. General Hooker was relieved
of the command of the Twentieth Corps, at his own request,
and General Williams was assigned to temporary command.
The President gave General Stanley the permanent command
of the Fourth Corps.
On the first of August, General Schofield moved from the
left to relieve Davis and Ward, and the "Army of the Cum-
berland" was holding the left of the investing line. The
Fourth Corps refused its left to cover the Buckhead road; two
divisions of tin* Twentieth were in the center and two divis-
ions of the Fourteenth between the railroad and Turner's
Ferry road ; Garrard's division was on the left of the Fourth
Corps, guarding the approaches from Decatur, and Roswell's
and Kilpatrick's divisions, having been relieved on the line of
the Etowah by McCook's, was on the railroad from Chatta-
hoochee bridge to Marietta. When Davis and Ward gave
room for Schofield on Howard's right, and then moved to the
right of Schofield, the former was on the left in line, and the
latter refused, to form a strong flank.
After the failure of General Hood's third effort at aggres-
sion, he relapsed into the defensive, and General Sherman was
again forced to choose between assault and the " turning move-
ment." The investing line had been moved far to the west
and south, and yet Hood's left flank had not been found. The
supposition was that the main portion of his army was on his
left, extending his intrenchments as far or farther than General
Sherman's, and that his main works on the north of Atlanta
were held by state troops or a slender line of regular troops.
General Sherman's armies had been on a strain for three
months, in frequent battles, and perpetual skirmishing and
watching. But though the enemy had been roughly handled
during July, his army was yet as much out of reach as at any
period of the campaign. General Sherman decided to again
extend his line still farther to the right, so as at least to reach
the Maeon railroad with artillery at short range, and force
General Hood to fight or abandon the city. In the execution
"I' t his plan it was necessary that his right flank should be kept
.•xrredingly strong, while his line throughout its length should
have such firmness as would insure its safety and at the same
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 127
time menace Atlanta from the north so strongly as to prevent
an overwhelming concentration against the advancing right
flank.
On the 3d, Johnson's and Baird's divisions of Palmer's
corps were moved to the right in support of Schofield, while
"W^kTh division moved to the right of the Fourth Corps, and
assisted in covering the space previously held by the Four-
teenth. The Fourth and the Twentieth now held a line of
intrenchments live miles long. During the day, while General
Schofield was rushing to reach the railroad, there was great
activity along the whole line from General Thomas' left to
General Howard's right, in skirmishing and cannonading, to
relieve the pressure upon the right flank in its aggression.
General Schofield succeeded in getting two divisions, one of
his own, and General Baird's, across the head of Utoy creek.
General Baird formed his division on the right of General
Hascall's, with his right swung back toward the creek.
The next morning, General Baird readjusted his line in
expectation of supporting the divisions of General Schofield in
an assault. But no movement was made of a general char-
acter, and late in the day General Palmer directed him to feel
the enemy's works in his front with a brigade. He designated
Colonel Gleason's brigade for this service, which advanced in
double lines with skirmishers in front. Colonel Gleason car-
ried the first and second line of rifle-pits, and approached so
near the enemy's main line, as to develop its location and
character, and drew from it an artillery and musketry fire.
At night he withdrew his brigade, but held with shirmishers ,
the outer line of rifle-pits which he had carried.
The next morning at 8 a. m. General Baird's division was
in line ready to advance. He was instructed to pay no atten-
tion to his connections on his left, as General Cox's division
was to fill the space between him and General Hascall, and
was informed that the latter was already so near the enemy
that he would not advance during the day. He was promised
support on his right by the other two divisions of his own
corps, although he was not yet in communication with them.
Regarding his orders to advance as imperative, he threw for-
ward skirmishers in double the usual strength, and moved tjpr-
128 SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
ward in perilous insulation. As he advanced, he found that
the enemy had reoccupied the inner line of rifle-pits which
Colonel Gleason had carried the evening previous. This line
he again carried against stubborn resistance, capturing one
hundred and forty prisoners. He was then within short
urn-lot range of the enemy's main works. He could advance
n. » farther, unless he assaulted without support, but held the
position, refusing two regiments on his right, and intrenched
himself as rapidly as possible under the fire of musketry and
artillery. The main lines were now four hundred yards apart,
while only thirty yards separated the skirmishers. Baird lost
in this engagement, five officers, and seventy-eight enlisted
men killed and wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Myron Baker,
commanding Ninety-fourth Indiana, was killed.
Soon after General Baird attained position near the enemy,
General Davis' division, General Morgan commanding, formed
on his right, and later, General Johnson's division took po-
sition in the rear of Morgan. As on the 3d, there was great
activity along the line of the left to divert attention from the
advance on the right.
Thus there was just sufficient extension and action on the
right to advise the enemy of what was intended, without gain-
in- any advantage that promised ultimate success. The line
had only been extended by one division. General Sherman's
orders required that the attack on the right should be pressed,
and he had given promise that if it was too hard pressed,
Generals Thomas and Howard should attack somewhere, but
the indications were emphatic that General Hood was rapidly
extending his intrenchments toward East Point, and yet Gen-
eral Sherman was so shut up to counter-movement, that he
said to General Thomas in the evening, " We will try again
to-morrow, and proceed to the end."
Accordingly, the next morning a new effort was made to
reach beyond the enemy's left flank. The Fourteenth Corps,
under command of Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, by
virtue of seniority, General Palmer having been relieved at
his own request, held its own line and that occupied by the
Twenty -third Corps, and the latter moved to the right, beyond
what appeared the day before to be the left flank of the en-
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 129
emy. General Schofield then threw forward Reilly's brigade,
but it was found impossible to penetrate the obstructions be-
fore the enemy's parapets. General Schofield then made a
still larger circuit to the right, for the purpose of " breaching"
his line at a point not protected by abatis, but he found his
lines extended beyond the main Utoy creek. While General
Schofield was operating against General Hood's left, the latter
evinced great activity on his right. He felt General Thomas'
line from right to left, and was so demonstrative against Gen-
eral Stanley, as to make it evident that he was either looking
for a weak point to assault, or was endeavoring to ascertain
the strength of his line, as throwing light upon General Scho-
field's movements. General Hood was now holding his works
north of the city by state troops, supported by movable divis-
ions of regular troops. The main portion of the army was
on his left, extending his defenses to hold the Macon railroad.
General Sherman's line was also greatly attenuated, and as a
compensation for it, the defenses on the north were made ex-
ceedingly strong, and from them shells were constantly thrown
to the city.
In the evening of the 6th, General Sherman said to
General Schofield : " There is no alternative but for you to
continue to work on that flank with as much caution as
possible, and it is possible the enemy may attack us, or draw
out." To General Thomas, he said : " Instead of going round
East Point, I Avould prefer the enemy to weaken, so we
may break through at some point, and wish you to continue
to make such effort. I will instruct General Howard to do
the same at the head of Utoy creek, his right." But Gen-
eral Thomas did not deem it prudent to assault such works,
as there was a certainty of great loss, and with such a column,
as he could form from his attenuated line, there was little
probability of success. His response was : " I will keep the
attention of the enemy fully occupied by threatening all along
my front ; but I have no hopes of breaking through his lines
anywhere in my front, as long as he has a respectable force to
defend them. My troops are so thinned out that it will be
impossible to form an assaulting column sufficiently strong to
VOL. II — 9
130 SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
make an attack sure." In the emergency, General Sherman
ordered heavy rifled guns from Chattanooga to " batter the
town."
On the 7th, General Hood withdrew his troops from the
intrenchments assaulted by General Schofield, which, though
strong and well protected by entanglements, formed no part
of his main line, and their abandonment did not greatly en-
danger his possession of the Macon railroad. During the day
the Fourteenth Corps advanced, carried a line of rifle-pits in
front of the position previously occupied by the Twenty-third
( '<>rps, and established a line close to the enemy's works. The
loss of the corps was seventy men killed, and four hundred
and thirteen wounded. One hundred and seventy-two prison-
ers were taken.
From the 8th to the 10th, General Sherman continued his
effort to reach the Macon road, by the extension of his line to
the right. lie thought it impossible that the enemy could
reach much farther in that direction, but it was finally ascer-
tained that his well-fortified line extended from the Decatur
road, on the east of Atlanta, to East Point, a distance of fif-
teen miles. And as the farther attenuation of the investing:
line was not considered safe, and as the enemy's works were
too strong to be assaulted, General Sherman began to cast
about for a new plan. In the meantime, the heavy guns were
at work throwing solid shell into the city with great fre-
quency, night and day, in expectation that their agency would
reduce ihe value of Atlanta as a " large machine-shop and
depot of supplies."
On the 11th, General Sherman received intelligence through
General Garrard, that General Hood was collecting an im-
mense force of cavalry to operate upon his communications.
It was important to General Hood to cut short General Sher-
man's supplies, but in the effort to do it, by breaking his rail-
road for to the north, he was depriving his own communica-
tions of protection. As soon as General Sherman learned
that Wheeler, with eight or ten thousand troopers, was mov-
ing to the north, he determined to throw his cavalry upon the
railroad south of Atlanta.
The news from the north on the 14th gave confirmation to
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 131
previous reports of Wheeler's intended raid. Early in the
morning of that day he attacked a party guarding a large
herd of cattle near Calhoun, dispersed a portion of the guard
and captured a large number of the cattle, some portions of
which were recaptured by Colonel Faulkner, who pursued
upon receipt of the news. At 3 p. m. General Steedman, at
Chattanooga, was informed that Wheeler was going toward
Dalton. He at once relieved all the troops that could be
spared from the garrison to prepare to move to Dalton. Be-
ing delayed by trains running on unusual time, General Steed-
man did not reach the vicinity of Dalton until midnight ; and
having been informed that the garrison had surrendered, he
awaited daylight, and then moved forward and engaged the
enemy's skirmishers. Hearing firing in Dalton, and learning
that the garrison was still holding out, he dashed into the town
and cleared it of the enemy. He remained for a day, and
learning that the enemy had moved oft', through fear for the
bridges over the Chickamauga, he hastened back to Chatta-
nooga. Colonel Laiboldt had held his position against a supe-
rior force, and General Steedman's quick relief gave him final
safety. The troops under General Steedman were the Second
Missouri, Twenty-ninth, Fifty-first, and Sixty-eighth Indiana,
Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, One Hundred and Eighth Ohio,
and the Fourteenth United States Colored troops, in all about
eighteen hundred effective men. Wheeler's loss was about
two hundred. He left thirty-three dead and fifty-seven badly
wounded on the field. Steedman's, was one officer and eight
men killed, one officer and twenty-nine men wounded, and
twenty-three men missing.
From Dalton, General Wheeler moved north, injured the
railroad slightly at Graysville, threatened Cleveland with a
detachment, and then turned to the northeast. Soon after,
however, he changed his course to meet in Middle Tennessee
another cavalry force under General Eoddy. The latter had
crossed the Tennessee river, near Decatur, to strike the Nash-
ville and Decatur railroad. General Wheeler's primary object
was to damage the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad.
About the same time, the enemy was active near Fort Donel-
son, thus giving a third intimation of purpose to disturb the
132 SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
communications of the national armies before Atlanta. There
however, less force in the raiding columns or more in the
troops defending the railroads than had been anticipated, as
little injury was effected. The failure resulted from the com-
bined opposition of General Rousseau, commanding at Nash-
ville, General Steedman at Chattanooga, and General R. S.
Granger at Decatur.
General Granger sallied forth from Decatur and encountered
Roddy near Athens, Alabama, which place he was besieging.
The garrison had been upon the defensive previously, but
upon his arrival the barricades were removed, and the enemy
was attacked and routed. General Granger then marched up
the Nashville and Decatur railroad to Pulaski, to intercept
"Wheeler, who was moving to the west, followed by General
Rousseau. From Pulaski he moved upon Linnville with
three regiments of infantry, expecting General Starkweather
to join him with a brigade of cavalry in time to give battle.
He met his advance and drove it back, but his cavalry did not
arrive in time to engage the enemy. During the night,
Wheeler abandoned the line of the railroad and moved in the
direction of Lawrenceburg. Granger then left his infantry to
guard the railroad, and assuming personal command of his
cavalry went in pursuit ; and overtaking the enemy as he was
leaving Lawrenceburg, he fell upon Wheeler's rear-guard and
harassed him as he retreated. At this juncture, General
Rousseau ordered General Granger to halt and form a junc-
tion with his own force. For a time the order was not obeyed,
upon the supposition that General Rousseau was ignorant of
the fact that he was up with the enemy and was retarding his
retreat. A second order was received, requiring him to discon-
tinue the pursuit and move upon Athens to intercept Roddy.
The result was that both "Wheeler and Roddy succeeded in
crossing the Tennessee river without loss or embarrassment.
The enemy thus escaped serious punishment, but utterly
failed to interrupt General Sherman's communications.
Having despaired of flanking Hood out of Atlanta, on the
16th General Sherman announced his new plan of operations,
but suspended them first to learn the results of a raid by Kil-
patrick to Fairburn, and subsequently until his cavalry could
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 133
make one more effort to break up General Hood's communi-
cations and compel him to fight or abandon the city. General
Kilpatrick drove back Jackson's division of cavalry from
Fairburn on the 15th, destroyed the station and public build-
ings, and the telegraph and railroad for about three miles. On
the 18th, he, with his own division and two brigades from Gen-
eral Garrard's, in all about five thousand cavaliw, dashed out
from his camp at Sandtown to the "West Point road, and broke
it near Fairburn, and thence moved to Jonesborough, defeated
Ross' cavalry, and commenced the destruction of the road ;
but while thus engaged he was attacked by Jackson's cavalry
and a brigade of infantry, which had hurried up from the south,
and he was compelled to draw off toward McDonougk. He
then made a circuit to Lovejoy's Station, where again, while
breaking the road, he was attacked by the same force. Per-
ceiving that he was almost surrounded, he charged the cav-
alry and cut his way through, capturing four guns and many
prisoners ; but being hard pressed could not incumber himself
with all of his captives, and brought in but seventy men,
three flags, and one gun. He then returned by McDonough
and Decatur.
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL MORGAN'S REPORT OF HIS ACTION
ON THE 28TH OF JULY.
July 28th, received orders to be ready with my brigade at 8 a.m.; re-
ported to General Davis for orders ; was informed by him that he was too
unwell to take command of the division in the field. At 9 a. m. took
command of the division on the Turner Ferry road, to move under the
following order :
v> " July 28, 1864.
Major-General G. H. Thomas;
" Order General Davis to leave camp and move to Turner's ferry, and
then by a road leading toward East Point, to feel forward for Howard
right back with some known point at Turner's ferry. I will be over on
that flank all day, and await to reach out as far as possible.
(Signed,) " W. T. Sherman."
In compliance with above order, I did move to Turner's ferry, halted
an hour for rest and dinner. Having no guide, no correct map of the
country, I had to rely upon such information as I could obtain from resi-
dents. Returning from the ferry, turned to the right at the church, one
mile from the river, and took the road leading toward East Point. The
enemy's pickets were soon met upon the road ; they were well posted and
134 SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
<l numbers, requiring the deployment of a whole regiment to clear
the front. After movingupon this road about one and a half miles, a staff
r of 1 he general commanding division overtook the command, and I re-
1 verbal orders to return as soon as possible to the Turner's Ferry road,
the enemy having attacked General Howard's right. Heavy skirmishing
continuing in front, I determined to advance and take the first road to the
left. This was done, and the division was moved with all possible dispatch
1. 1 Turner's Ferry road, arriving late in evening, and owing to a bad swamp
and a very dark night, was nearly all night in getting into camp.
Headquarters Military Division of tiie Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., July 30, 1864.
Generals Tlwmas and Howard :
I am just back from an interview with General Schofield. . . .
I think General Stoneman has gone to Macon, east of Yellow river, and
that is well. I have ordered General Garrard in on our left, and to-mor-
row night will let him fill with a skirmish line General Schofield's position,
and move all of Schofield's to the right of General Howard, and with the
divisions of General Davis and Ward kept in reserve on the right, to strike
a blow beyond our new right flank when intrenched. Our right flank
must be advanced in close and absolute contact with the enemy; and with
General Schofield on that flank, I think we can make him quit Atlanta,
or so weaken his line that we can break through somewhere, the same as-
our Kenesaw move. . . .
(Signed,) W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 48.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 1, 1864.
I. During the next series of operations, General Thomas will be the
left, General Howard the center, and General Schofield the right army.
The two divisions of Generals Davis and Ward will continue to be held
in reserve toward the right, and in case the enemy attack that flank,
these divisions will report to, and during the action, obey General
Schofield's orders. When not engaged, General Thomas will post them
to cover his communications from danger coming from the South-
east.
II. Brigadier-General Garrard's cavalry will relieve General Schofield
on the left, and occupy in part his trenches, patrol the road about Decatur,
and picket toward Roswell. He will report to General Thomas, and be
prepared to sally out as cavalry from his trenches in case of necessity.
III. All trains of wagons going to and from the depots of Vining's and
Marietta will follow roads converging at the railroad bridge, and never
go north of Buckhead or south of Turner's.
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 135
IV. General Thomas will cause a new infantry flank to be prepared on
the left, north of the Buckhead road, connecting General Stanley's lines
with the old rebel parapet near Peachtree creek.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 51.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 18G4.
The order of movement of the army to-day will be as follows :
I. Major-General Schofield, with his own command and General
Palmer's corps, will move directly on the railroad which leads south out
of Atlanta, at any point between Whitehall and East Point, and will not
stop until he has absolute control of the railroad, but must not extend
more to the right than is absolutely necessary to that end.
II. Major-Generals Thomas and Howard will press close on the enemy
at all points, and reinforce well the points of the line where the enemy is
most likely to sally — viz., on the Decatur, Buckhead, and Turner's Ferry
roads; but more especially watch the outlet along the railroad — viz.,
General Williams' front.
III. On the right we must assume the offensive, and every man be pre-
pared to fight, leaving knapsacks, etc., in present trenches. Wagons will
not be taken east of Utoy creek, until General Schofield has secured
position on the railroad, or so near it that it can be reached by musket-
balls and canister. If necessary to secure this end, ordinary parapets
must be charged and carried, and every hour's delay enables the enemy
to strengthen ; therefore, let it be done to-day.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 4, 1864.
General Palmer :
You will, during the movement against the railroad, report to and re-
ceive orders from General Schofield. General Thomas will personally
look to the front of Atlanta. General Howard will co-operate with Gen-
eral Schofield, and General Schofield, reinforced by your corps, is charged
to reach the railroad. Obey his orders and instructions. Acknowledge
receipt.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General Commanding.
136 SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864.
General Schofield :
Dispatch received. All right. Press the attack on the right. I will
by the sound ; and if I judge you are too hard pressed, will order
ralfl Thomas and Howard to assault somewhere. Get some part of
your command where you can easily reach the railroad with short-range
guns, and then intrench a strong flank. It is worth a battle, and the
;■ the first advantages are followed up, the better. The weakest point
of the enemy must be mathematically at some point between Atlanta
and East Point. Keep me often advised of your progress, and I will
come over any minute you say, but can better handle the whole army
from here by telegraph.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864.
General Tliomas :
General Schofield has been at work to-day with his two divisions, and
holds Johnson's in support. . . .
He tried to break through the enemy's lines by a brigade to-day, but
failed, losing five hundred (500) men. Instead of going round East
Point, I would prefer the enemy to weaken, so we may break through at
Borne point, and wish you to continue to make such an effort. I will in-
struct General Howard to do the same about the head of Utoy creek —
his right.
TV. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 6, 1864.
General Schofield:
I have your dispatch. There is no alternative but for you to continue
to work on that flank with as much caution as possible, and it is possible
the enemy may attack us or draw out. He must defend that road.
TV. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, August 7, 1864.
Mi 'jor-General Sherman :
I will keep the attention of the enemy fully occupied by threatening
all along my front as long as he has a respectable force to defend them.
My troops are so thinned out that it will be impossible to form an assault-
ing column sufficiently strong to make an attack sure.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major- General.
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 137
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1864.
General JIalleck, Washington :
*********
I do not deem it prudent to extend more to the right, but will push
forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be
endured.
I have sent to Chattanooga for two (2) 30-pounder Parrotts, with which
I can pick out almost any house in the town. I am too impatient for a
siege, but I do n't know but here is as good a place to fight it out as
further inland. One thing is certain — whether we get inside of Atlanta
or not, it will be a used-up community by the time we are done with it.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864.
General Howard :
I thank you for the suggestion. I am studying all the combinations
possible, and beg you to think also, and communicate to me; but be care-
ful to keep your own confidence. I spoke of the same thing to-day to
General Thomas, and he goes to look at the railroad bridge, to see to a
proper cover there for the wagons and a corps. I want to expend four
thousand (4,000) heavy rifle shots on the town before doing anything new,
and then will be prepared to act quick. General Schofield has been re-
connoitering the right all day, and after he has answered a few more of
my questions, I will give you the substance of his report.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 10, 1864.
General Thomas :
I have your last dispatch. I hear the guns. I hear the guns and shells
also. The enemy's battery of 32-pounders, rifled, are firing on us here
from the Whitehall fort, to draw off or divert our fire. Keep up a steady,
persistent fire on Atlanta with the 4|-inch guns and 20-pounder Parrotts,
and order them to pay no attention to the side firing, by which the en-
emy may attempt to divert their attention. I think those guns will
make Atlanta of less value to them as a large machine-shop and depot
of supplies. The inhabitants have, of course, got out.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
138 SIEGE OF ATLANTA.
Headquarters Military Division of the Misissippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., Avgust 16, 1864.
General Thomas :
*********
I do think our cavalry should now break the Macon road good. If we
cau save our rations at Marietta and Allatoona, and break the Macon road
for many miles, we can wait as long as Hood.
*********
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1864.
Generals Thomas, Howard, and Schqfield :
We will commence the movement against the railroad about Jonesboro,
Thursday night, unless something occurs in the meantime to mar the
plan. 1 will make my orders, and the preliminary preparations may be
begun.
I f Wheeler interrupts our supplies, we can surely cut off those of Hood,
and see who can stand it best.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 57.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1864.
The movement of the army against the Macon railroad will begin
Thursday night, August 18th, and will be continued on the following gen-
eral plan :
I. All army commanders will send across the Chattahoochee river, and
within the old rebel works at the bridge, and down as far as Turner's ferry,
all surplus wagons, horses, men, and materials not absolutely necessary to
the success of the expedition, and will collect in their wagons, with best
is, bread, meat, sugar, coffee, etc., for fifteen (15) days, after the nine-
teenth (19th) instant, and ammunition, and park them near Utoy creek.
First move. — General Kilpatrick's cavalry will move to Camp creek; Gen-
eral Schofield will cover the Campbelton road, and General Thomas will
move one corps (General Williams') to the Chattahoochee bridge, with
orders to hold it; Paice's ferry bridge, and pontoon bridge (Captain
Kossack's) at Turner's ferry, ready to be laid down if necessary. The
other corps (General Stanley's) will move south of Proctor's creek, to near
Utoy, behind the right center of the Army of the Tennessee, prepared to
cover the Bell's Ferry road. General Garrard's cavalry will fall behind
Peach tree creek, and act against the enemy should he sally against Gen-
eral Williams or General Stanley's corps during the movement.
',/ move.— The Army of the Tennessee will withdraw cross Utoy
creek, and move by most direct road toward Fairburn, going as far as Camp
SIEGE OF ATLANTA. 139
creek. General Thomas will mass his two corps (General Stanley's and
Johnson's) below Utoy creek, and General Garrard's cavalry will join Gen-
eral Thomas by most direct road, or by way of Sandtown bridge, and act
with him during the rest of the move.
General Schofield will advance abreast of and in communication with
the Army of the Tennessee as far as Camp creek.
Third move. — The Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee will move direct
for the West Point road, aiming to strike it between Ecd Oak and Fair-
burn. General Thomas will follow, well closed up into two columns, the
trains between. General Kilpatrick will act as advance, and General
Garrard will cover the rear, under direction of General Thomas.
The bridges at Sandtown will be kept and protected by a detachment
of cavalry, detailed by General Elliott, with a section of guns or four (4)
gun battery.
II. During the movement, and until the army returns to the river, the
utmost care will be taken to expose as little as possible the trains of cars
and wagons. The depots at the bridge, at Allatoona and Marietta, will
be held against any attack, and communication kept up with the army
as far as possible by way of Sandtown. On reaching any railroad, the
troops will at once be disposed for defense, and at least one-third put to
work to tear up track and destroy iron, ties, and all railroad material.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, August 17, 1864.
Major-General Sherman :
Information from all sources seems to confirm the report that Wheeler
has taken off the greater part of his cavalry. I therefore think this will
be as good a time as could be taken to make another raid on the Macon
railroad ; but if you send Kilpatrick, I would insist on his taking the most
practicable route, and avoid the enemy's infantry as much as possible.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 19, 1864 — 10.45 a. m.
General Grant, City Point :
I have your dispatches of 14th and 16th, and also that of 18th. I will
never take a step backward, and have no fears of Hood. I can whip him
outside of his trenches, and, I think, in time can compel him to come out.
I think at this time I have a fine cavalry force on the only road which can
feed him, and, if necessary, will swing my whole army across it also.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
}
CHAPTER XXXII.
THE FLANK MOVEMENT CULMINATING IN THE BATTLE OF JONESBORO
AND THE FALL OF ATLANTA.
Pending General Kilpatrick's movements the shelling of
Atlanta was actively maintained, and feints of various kinds
were employed by General Stanley on the left to confuse the
enemy and lead to the belief that a movement was intended
in that direction; but when, after General Kilpatrick's return,
it was ascertained that the damage to the railroads was not
such as to greatly embarrass the enemy, General Sherman re-
peated his order for the grand movement by the right flank,
which involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta,
and using his armies against the communications of the enemy
rather than against his intrenchments around the city. To
take the place by siege would require too much time, and to
lake it by assault would cost too many lives. His sick, and
all surplus supplies, wagons, and incumbrances, having been
sent to the intrenchments beyond the Chattahoochee, the
Fourth Corps was, on the 25th, withdrawn to the high ground,
in the rear of the Twentieth Corps, to cover the retirement of
the latter to the farther side of the Chattahoochee, to hold the
railroad bridge and the bridges at Paice's and Turner's ferries,
and guard the material there accumulated. Garrard's cavalry
covered the movement of the Twentieth Corps to the rear,
and that of the Fourth Corps to the right, to take position on
the high ground along Utoy creek. This change was effected
on the 26th with but slight molestation, and the night following,
the Fourteenth Corps, now in permanent command of Brevet
Major-General J. C. Davis, was withdrawn from position and
formed on the right of General Stanley, on Utoy creek. The
(140)
FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 141
same night the Army of the Tennessee moved rapidly by a
circuit toward Sandtown. General Schofield alone remained
in position.
The next day the Fourth Corps advanced to Mount Gilead
Church, and, forming line of battle on the road to Fairburn,
skirmished with the enemy's cavalry. The Fourteenth Corps
remained in position, as it was necessary that one corps should
cover another until out of reach of the enemy. General
Garrard's cavalry operated upon the rear and left of the armies
during these movements, and Kilpatrick's having crossed the
Chattahoochee, at Paice's ferry, and recrossed at Sandtown,
was charged with similar service on the right. The Twentieth
Corps, at the Chattahoochee, passed to the command of Major-
General H. W. Slocum.
On the 28th, the Fourteenth Corps passed the Fourth at
Mount Gilead, and reached its designated camp, near Red Oak,
late in the afternoon. General Morgan's division, in the ad-
vance, skirmished with the enemy's cavalry during the day.
The Fourth Corps followed, and the two corps encamped in
line across the "West Point railroad, facing east. The Army
of the Tennessee was on the same road above Fairburn, and
General Schofield was on this road below East Point. Shortly
after dark, orders were received to destroy the railroad, by
heating and twisting the rails and burning the ties. The work
of destruction was continued through the night and a portion
of the following day, by each army, and twelve and a half
miles of the road were thoroughly dismantled. But this was
not the road of most importance to the enemy. The Macon
road passes to Jonesboro, from Atlanta, on the ridge dividing
the waters of the Flint and Ocmulgee rivers, and offered a
good position as a strategic base for ulterior movements, and
on the 30th the armies advanced eastward to reach it, more
directly in rear of Atlanta.
The Fourth and Fourteenth Corps moved to Couch's house,
formed a line trending to the northwest, and went into camp.
The leading divisions of each corps skirmished with infantry
and cavalry, and at night it was ascertained that there was a
force of the enemy at Morrow's mill, on Crooked creek,
three-fourths of a mile from General Stanley's left. General
1 1_> FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC.
Thomas was in communication with General Howard beyond
1 Renfrew's, but not with General Schofield on the left. General
< rarrard was guarding the left and rear, at Red Oak, and Gen-
eral Kilpatrick was on General Howard's right.
General Sherman having ascertained that General Howard
was near Jonesboro, directed General Thomas to send Stan-
Ley's corps toward Rough and Ready, in connection with
Schofield, and to send forward a strong detachment from the
Fourteenth Corps to " feel for the railroad." In compliance,
Genera] Baird, with his own division, and Mitchell's brigade
of Morgan's division, was sent forward from the center, and
an early advance discovered that the enemy's trains were in
motion on a road to the east toward Jonesboro, and later in
the day it was ascertained from captured stragglers that Har-
dee's and Lee's corps had passed.
In the afternoon General Baird's leading detachment reached
the railroad about four miles from Jonesboro. Although
greatly in advance of other columns, General Baird determined
to hold the railroad by strengthening Colonel Carleton's party
in the advance, and sending Colonel Gleason's brigade for-
ward in support. The Fourth Corps formed a junction with
the Twenty-third, at the railroad, and rested on the road south-
east of Rough and Ready, in a barricaded line facing Jones-
boro. Carlin's division, formerly Johnson's, moved to Ren-
frew's to cover the trains, and late in the afternoon was
ordered to support General Howard, who had been attacked
by Hardee's and Lee's corps. Carlin moved as ordered, but did
not reach the field until after General Howard had completely
repulsed the enemy.
The situation was now partially developed. Two corps of
Hood's army were at Jonesboro. It was not known that Stew-
art's corps had left Atlanta, but as the army was in force at
Jonesboro, General Sherman determined to move against that
place, and if Stewart was not there to thrust his forces between
the two portions of Hood's army. Deeming it probable that
the third corps would abandon Atlanta, he directed General
Thomas to order General Slocum to. make a reconnoissance
toward Atlanta to determine the state of affairs, and also to
send a cavalry force toward Decatur to observe the enemy in
FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 143
that direction. Circumstances now indicated a speedy solution
of all problems having connection with Atlanta.
General Sherman's orders for September 1st required all the
forces to turn upon Jonesboro. General Howard was already
before it, and General Davis, with Morgan's and Carlin's divis-
ions, joined Baird's on the railroad, and the whole corps was
soon on Howard's left. Generals Schofield and Stanley, having
a longer march, and owing to railroad destruction and other
causes, were greatly delayed. General Garrard was still in the
rear, and General Kilpatrick was sent down the west bank of
Flint river to threaten the railroad below Jonesboro, and Gen-
eral Blair's corps of the Army of the Tennessee was sent in the
same direction. This immense combination had been directed
against Hardee's corps alone, which had been left behind to
cover the retreat to a point where the dissevered army could
be reunited.
After occupying the position vacated by General Blair's
corps, General Davis directed General Carlin to send a brigade
to explore the ground toward the railroad upon which General
Stanley was advancing. The reconnoissance was made by Edie's
brigade of regulars, and was strongly resisted by the enemy.
It was, however, pressed until a commanding hill beyond Mo-
ker's creek was carried, from the front of which the enemy's
works could be attacked with advantage.
At this juncture General Thomas reached the head of column,
to whom General Davis reported the condition of affairs, and
suggested a plan of operations. Having received permission
to make the attack directly before the hill which Edie had
gained, General Davis pushed his troops in column to that point,
and deployed for action. Carlin's second brigade was formed
on the right of Edie's. General Morgan crossed the creek and
connected the left of his division with Carlin's right. General
Baird formed his division in rear of Carlin's left, which rested
on the railroad. General Morgan's movement was executed
over rough ground, and in exposure to the enemy's artillery.
About the time that the formation of the Fourteenth Corps
was completed, General Stanley's head of column appeared on
Carlin's left, and Grose's and Kirby's brigades of Kimball's
144 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC.
division were deployed, under instructions to push the enemy
vigorously on the left of the railroad.
The troops of the Fourteenth Corps designated for the at-
tack, were < reneral Carlin's two brigades and General Morgan's
entire division, and were formed in double lines, and as nearly
< tiguous as the ground would permit. The distance to the
enemy from Morgan's division, when deployed, was about one
thousand yards ; the intervening space was open, but swampy,
and cut with ditches. The distance to the enemy's works in
General Carlin's front could not be determined, as a dense
thicket interposed. The defenses of the enemy were in the
woods on a ridge, at various distances from the edge of the
wooded ground, but in no case exceeding one hundred yards.
Morgan's division was formed by brigades in column of regi-
ments in echelon, from left to right — Lum's, Mitchell's, and
Dihvorth's — and were ordered to assault with the bayonet
alone.
At 4 p. m., after a heavy cannonade from Prescott's and
Gardner's batteries on Carlin's ridge, the troops moved for-
ward, but owing to the thickets in Carlin's front, and the
swampy ground and ditches before Morgan, their progress
was slow, and there was difficulty in maintaining alignments
and direction. When the whole line had advanced to the
slope of a hill, and an open field within three or four hundred
yards of the enemy's position, it was halted for readjustment,
the ground offering some protection. Thus far the enemy's
fire had been only slightly felt, except by Edie's brigade, which
was some distance in advance of the troops on the right, and
had already carried a projection of the enemy's works, and
was exposed to a most galling fire. To give Edie support, or
rather to relieve him from position in the line, Este's brigade
of Baird's division was thrown forward, and took part in the
general attack which followed. The other two brigades of
Baird's division were retained on the left, to push the advan-
tage on that flank, should a general assault prove successful.
At 5 p. m., the rectified lines again moved forward, and the
attack was quickly and vigorously made along the whole bat-
tle front. There had been so many unsuccessful assaults made
by both armies during the campaign, that the enemy regarded
FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 145
this attempt to carry his intrcnchments, so strongly defended,
as an exhibition of folly and harmless audacity. But it was
soon revealed that the most determined resistance could not
arrest or defeat the bold assault.
Morgan's division carried its entire front, and gloriously re-
versed the issue of its assault near Kenesaw Mountain on the
27th of June. The brigades of Mitchell and Dilvvorth there
clung to the hillside under the enemy's guns, having failed
in assault ; here they leaped the fortifications, and under
sword and bayonet held captive the troops set for their de-
fense.
Este's brigade was successful at once on its riffht, the Tenth
Kentucky and Seventy : fourth Indiana gaining the intrench-
ments in their front ; but the Fourteenth and Thirty-eighth
Ohio, on the left, met such obstructions, as compelled them to
halt. They, however, held their ground under a fire of fearful
effect. Colonel Este, who had been in the charge on his right,
now turned his attention to his left, and meeting with Colonel
W.T.C. Grower, Seventeenth New York, of General Morgan's
left brigade, requested him to put in his regiment, which he
did with great gallantry and success, though he was himself
one of the first to fall. Joined by this regiment, Este's left
carried the works in front, and captured a large number of
prisoners. Moore's brigade, Carlin's left, encountered such
obstructions as held it in check for a time, but finally joined
the remainder of the assaulting troops in the enemy's works.
Equal success on the part of the Fourth Corps might have
resulted in the capture of Hardee's command ; but Kimball's
and Newton's divisions were so delayed by the thick under-
growth, and the enemy's skirmishers, that they did not get
before his main lines until 5 p. m., and then Grose and Kirby
only succeeded in breaking through the entanglements in
front of his barricade, while Newton, who was compelled to
make a larger circuit, passed beyond the right flank of the
enemy, when it was too dark to take advantage of his position.
Although Hardee's corps was neither captured nor annihi-
lated — a conjectured result, had the troops on the left reached
the field earlier — the action was the most brilliant and success-
VOL. II — 10
146 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC.
ful of its type during the campaign. All other assaults of
main lines by either army li ad resulted in failure, and, as a
general rule, the defensive in positive battle had been success-
ful; but here a strongly intrenched line was carried, with the
capture of nearly a thousand men, including one general offi-
cer, and many of inferior grades, also eight guns, and seven
battle (lags. During the night, about one thousand men in
addition cither surrendered or were captured.
The contest closed so late in the evening that pursuit was
impossible, and the troops bivouacked in the enemy's works
connecting with the Fourth Corps at the railroad. During
the night, Hardee fell back to Lovejoy's Station. The next,
morning the national forces followed, except the Fourteenth
Corps, left behind to bury the dead and collect the material
abandoned by the enemy. The troops in pursuit reached the
vicinity of the station at noon. The Fourth Corps formed
line of battle, and made preparations to attack the enemy who
was busy fortifying a line across the railroad, a mile north.
The necessity of resistance at this point had not been antici-
pated, and the enemy was extemporizing defenses. General
Stanley's line was formed with Wood's division in the center,
and Newton's and Kimball's on the right and left. As his
attack was to be co-operative with the Army of the Tennessee,
he waited for General Howard to fix the time, and at 3 J p. m.
as directed, advanced his line. Upon reaching the immediate
vicinity of the enemy, he did not deem it advisable to attack
at the railroad, as Hood's artillery swept this point completely.
Supposing that the Army of the Tennessee would so hold the
enemy by attack, that he could reach his right flank, General
Stanley advanced his center and left. The ground, however,
was so unfavorable, on account of roughness, streams, and
marshes, that Wood's and Kimball's divisions did not get near
the position until nearly 6 p. m. While General Wood was
selecting a point for attack, he received a wound which obliged
him to relinquish his command. However, his left brigade,
Kncil. r's, charged and carried the enemy's works, but could
not maintain its hold, as it was subjected to an enfilading fire
<>n both flanks. Kimball's column was exposed to a sweeping
artillery fire, and the ground before them being open, the
FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 147
order to charge was countermanded. Both divisions in-
trenched. General Sherman did not deem it advisable subse-
quently to press the attack, as he was led to believe that
Hood had halted merely to cover the roads to McDonough
and Fayetteville, and that it was then too late to intercept
Stewart's corps, reported to be in retreat from Atlanta upon
McDonough.
Pending the movement south of Atlanta, General Slocum
strengthened the position at the Chattahoochee, and watched
the enemy closely toward Atlanta. The explosions during
the night of the 1st called forth a special reconnoissance. As
Colonel Coburn, commanding the advance, approached the
city on the 2d, he was met by the mayor, who made to him a
formal surrender of the place. After entering Atlanta, Colonel
Coburn exchanged a few shots with Ferguson's cavalry, act-
ing as a rear-guard of the retreating army, and captured one
hundred men. General Slocum soon after occupied the city
with seven brigades, and found twenty pieces of artillery and
several hundred small arms ; but General Hood had destroyed
almost all valuable material which he could not remove, in-
cluding eight locomotives and eighty-one cars loaded with
ammunition and supplies. The explosion of the ammunition
had been heard at Jonesboro, and was the first indication of
the total abandonment of the place. As General Sherman had
interposed between Stewart's corps at Atlanta, and Hardee's
and Lee's on the Macon road, the retreat of the former was
the only condition of safety.
The losses in the engagements south of Atlanta amounted
in the aggregate to twelve hundred men. Fifteen hundred
of the enemy were captured, and he left three hundred dead
on the field of battle.
September 3d, General Sherman announced the conclusion
of the campaign, and gave orders for the return of his armies
to Atlanta, to rest and recuperate until the enemy's move-
ments or some new plan of his own should call them again to
action. As the enemy remained in his intrenchments at Love-
joy's Station, General Sherman did not withdraw his army at
once. Both commanding generals sent their trains to the
148 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC.
rear; and thus indicated a mutual disposition to widen the
breach between them for a time at least.
On the 5th, the Fourth Corps quietly withdrew from posi-
tion and joined the Fourteenth at Jonesboro, at daylight on
the 6th. Though the general withdrawal was impeded by a
rain-storm and consequent bad roads, it was successfully con-
ducted. The enemy manifested a disposition to annoy the
two corps at Jonesboro, but there was no action beyond the
exchange of a few shots. The next day, the army moved
to Rough and Ready, the enemy refraining from pursuit, and
went into camp on the 8th, on the outskirts of Atlanta — the
Fourteenth Corps on the right of the Campbellton road, and
the Twentieth and Fourth Corps to the east in reserve. Pick-
et s were thrown out well to the front upon commanding posi-
tions. Thus, Atlanta was gained after a campaign of four
months, involving strategical and tactical combinations on a
grand scale, but without a general decisive battle. General
Sherman did not risk a general assault, and the Confederate
generals did not offer battle with a broad front, except with
intrenched lines ; but there were many engagements of great
severity, and constant skirmishing on a scale that produced
great waste of life.
The fall of Atlanta was hailed by the Northern people as a
result of great moment. The noise of cannon all over the
land, orders of congratulation from Washington and army
commanders gave expression to the general appreciation of
the campaign and its issue. The moral effect of the consum-
mation was indeed great North and South, and yet, as no army
had been destroyed or signally defeated, the possession of
Atlanta was only a partial solution to the war problem in the
West. The march southward of Sherman's armies, despite
the heaviest concentration that could be made in resistance,
the destruction of extensive manufactories of materials of
Avar, and the palpable diminution of the central insurgent
forces, were grand results indeed; but the Confederate Army
of the Tennessee was not annihilated, and until it and the
one in Virginia should be, the end of the war could not come.
The end was indeed foreshadowed by the fact that the national
armies could force their way into the South anywhere, sub-
FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 149
ject to the one condition of supplies. But this war, beyond
most wars, was a conflict of ideas, and the persistence of the
parties to it revealed the overmastering force of the antago-
nistic opinions. The protraction of the war had intensified
the original antagonisms, and had, besides, involved the two
sections in debt to such an enormous extent that financial ruin
was inevitable in the defeat of either. The success of the
North would restore the Union and place its debt upon the
whole country. The success of the South would be a division
of the country, with a burden of debt to each portion of crush-
ing weight. So that now, not only the primal causes of the
war and the extreme reluctance of a proud people to yield to
an enemy, but financial considerations, precluded peace so long
as the South could maintain armies. The campaigns of the
summer had made a heavy draft upon the strength of the Con-
federate armies; but the two which unfurled their banners
before Grant and Sherman in May were intact, though one
had been shut up in Richmond and the other had been bat-
tled and flanked out of Atlanta. General Canby and Admiral
Farragut had neutralized Mobile, though the former had been
bereft of the corps intended for its complete reduction to rein-
force the Army of the Potomac. There were troops yet in the
Gulf States, east of the Mississippi, to raise Hood's army to its
maximum strength, though their accretion would reveal the
desperate straits of the insurgents. There were forces beyond
the Mississippi, whose isolation hitherto, through the viligance
of General Canby, had prevented a more potential combination
against General Sherman in Georgia. These troops were raid-
ing in Missouri, and by predatory warfare were doing local
mischief without affecting the general issue. The rebellion,
then, was palpably resting upon the armies of Lee and Hood.
The former, by political considerations, if not by purely mili-
tary ones, was restricted to the defense of the Confederate cap-
ital. Hood's army alone had freedom of motion, and to de-
termine how best to use that freedom was to the insurgent
leaders the great problem of the hour.
The aggregate casualties of the Army of the Cumberland,
during the campaign, from the 1st of May to the 6th of Sep-
tember, were as follows : One hundred and ninety-six officers
150 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC.
and two thousand eight hundred and forty-five men enlisted
were killed; eight hundred and ten officers and fourteen
thousand nine hundred and seventy-three enlisted men were
wounded; one hundred and four officers and two thousand
six hundred and throe enlisted men were captured — in all,
twenty-one thousand five hundred and thirty-four men. Dur-
ing the campaign forty-three thousand one hundred and fifty-
three were reported sick to Major George E. Cooper, surgeon
United States army, medical director of the department.. Of
these, twenty-six thousand one hundred and eighty-four were
sent to the rear ; two hundred and seven died from disease,
and one thousand and sixty-seven died from wounds. Almost
all others, sick or wounded, were returned to duty.
General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, reported the cap-
ture of four guns by the Twentieth Corps, at Resaca, in battle,
and four left by the enemy in his fortifications; ten guns
captured by General J. C. Davis, at Rome ; twenty left by the
enemy in Atlanta, and eight captured by the Fourteenth
Corps, at Jonesboro. He also reported the expenditure of
86,611 rounds of artillery ammunition, 11,815,299 rounds oi
infantry ammunition, and the loss of 1,439 artillery horses.
During the period the army captured 8,067 men from the
enemy and received 2,162 deserters, as reported by Colonel
Parkhurst, provost marshal general of the department. These
statistics reveal the cost of war.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 13, 1864 — 8 p. m.
General Hallcck, Washington, D. C. :
We have now pressed the enemy's lines from the east around to East
Point on the south. The nature of the ground, with its artificial defenses,
makes it too difficult to assault, and to reach the road hy a further exten-
sion will be extra hazardous. I have ordered army commanders to pre-
pare for the following plan: Leave one corps strongly intrenched at the
I liattahoochee bridge in charge of our suplus wagons and artillery ; with
-uxty thousand (00,000) men reduced to fighting trim, to make circuit of
devastation around the town, with a radius of fifteen or twenty miles.
To do this, I go on faith that the militia in Atlanta are only good for
the defense of its parapets, and will not come out.
I would like the utmost activity to be kept up in Mobile Bay, and if
FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 151
possible, about the mouth of Apalachicola ; also, to be assured that no
material reinforcements bave come here from Virginia.
If ever I should be cut off from my base, look out for me about St.
Marks, Florida, or Savannah, Georgia.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 13, 1864.
General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
In making the circuit of Atlanta, as proposed in my dispatch of to-day,
I necessarily run some risk. If there be any possibility of Admiral Far-
ragut and tb e land forces of Gordon Granger taking Mobile (which rebel
prisoners now report, but the report is not confirmed by Macon papers of
the 1 1th, which I have seen), and further, of pushing up to Montgomery,
my best plan would be to wait awhile as now, and, at proper time, to move
down to West Point, and operate into the heart of Georgia from there.
Before cutting loose, as proposed, I would like to know the chances of
our getting the use of the Alabama river this campaign. I could easily
break up the railroads back to Chattanooga, and shift my whole army
down to West Point and Columbus, a country rich in corn, and make my
fall campaign from there.
I know Fort Morgan must succumb in time.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 17, 1864.
Generals Thomas, Scliojicld, and Howard:
I now have positive and official information that General Wheeler has
gone up into East Tennessee, beyond Spring Place. We will repair all
damages to railroad and telegraph to-night. I will not move our infantry
now, but break the Macon road all to pieces with our cavalry to-morrow
night. Therefore, be active, and demonstrate against Atlanta, to occupy
the entire front, and make them believe we will attack them in their
trenches during to-morrow and next day.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Maj 'or- General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Atlanta, Ga., August 24, 1864 — 8 a. m.
Generals Thomas, Schoficld, and Howard :
I will ride down to the bridge to-day, to see the lay of the ground and
the character of the redoubts there. Go on and make all preparations
possible, so that our movement, when begun, may proceed rapidly and
safely. Our maps should be compiled, and as many roads laid down be-
tween Red Oak and Jonesboro as we can be sure of existence.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-Gcncral Commanding.
152 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC.
Ukadquarters Military Division op the Mississippi,
August 24, 18C4.
Major-Gcncral Sherman :
A tire seems to be raging in Atlanta, direction ten (10) degrees south
of east from my tree. Can see heated air rising in dense columns; seems
to be spreading. Town is filled with smoke.
I have directed my heavy guns to fire on the town.
0. 0. HOWARD,
Major-General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Lovejoy's Station, Ga., September 2, 1864 — 8 p. m.
Major-General Thomas :
Until we hear from Atlanta the exact truth, I do not care about your
pushing your men against breastworks. Destroy the railroad well up to
your lines. Keep skirmishers well up, and hold your troops in hand for
anything that may turn up. As soon as I know positively that our troops
are in Atlanta, I will determine what to do.
I have ordered General Schofield to feel for the McDonough road, to
prevent reinforcements coming to the enemy from that direction.
Yours, etc., W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 63.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, near Lovejoy's, September 3, 1864.
I. Army commanders will, during to-day, send to Jonesboro all sick
and wounded men, all empty wagons and prisoners of war, also all surplus
wheels not needed for a five days' stay in front, ready to start to-morrow
morning, at 6 o'clock, from Jonesboro to Atlanta. Each army will send
a regiment to escort these wagons, and General Thomas will send an ex-
perienced colonel to conduct the train into Atlanta, there to wait further
orders.
I I. The army will be prepared to move back to-morrow or next day —
the Army of the Cumberland to Atlanta and Chattahoochee bridge, the
Army of the Tennessee to East Point, and the Army of the Ohio to De-
catur. Major-General Thomas will have General Garrard's cavalry ready
to act as rear guard.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 66.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In TnE Field, near Jonesboro, Ga., September 6, 1864.
I. The General-in-Chief communicates, with a feeling of just pride and
satisfaction, the following orders of the President of the United States.
FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC. 153
and telegram of Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, on hearing of the cap-
ture of Atlanta :
Executive Mansion,
Washington, D. C, September 3, 1804.
The national thanks are rendered by the President to Major-General
W. T. Sherman, and the gallant officers and soldiers of his command
before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability, courage, and perseverance
displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor, has re-
sulted in the capture of the city of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges,
and other military operations that have signalized the campaign, must
render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have
participated therein to the applause and thanks of the nation.
(Signed,) ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.
Executive Mansion,
Washington City, Septmber 3, ] 864.
Ordered:
1st
2d. That, on Wednesday, the 9th day of September, commencing at
the hour of 12 it., there shall be fired a salute of one hundred (100) guns,
at the arsenal at Washington, and at New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Pittsburg, Newport, Kentucky, St. Louis, New Orleans, Mobile,
Pensacola, Hilton Head, and Newbern, or the day after the receipt of this
order, for the brilliant achievements of the army under command of
Maior-General Sherman, in the State of Georgia, and the capture of At-
lanta. The Secretary of War will issue directions for the execution of
this order.
^Signed,) ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of the United States.
City Point, Va., September 4, 1864 — 9 p. m.
Major-General Sherman :
I have just received your dispatch, announcing the capture of Atlanta.
In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute to be fired with
shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute
will be fired within an hour, amidst great rejoicing.
(Signed,) U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant- General.
II All the corps, regiments, and batteries composing this
army, may, without further orders, inscribe "Atlanta" on their colors.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
[GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 134]
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Atlanta, Ga., September 9, 1864.
Soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland:
The major-general commanding, with pride and pleasure, congratu-
lates you upon the fact that your achievements during the campaign
154 FALL OF ATLANTA, ETC.
which has just closed, in connection with those of the Armies of the
Tennessee and Ohio, have received such distinguished marks of appre-
ciation as the thanks of the President of the United States, and of the
major-general commanding the Military Division of the Mississippi.
ir commander now desires to add his to those you have already re-
1 for th" tenacity of purpose, unmurmuring endurance, cheerful
obedience, brilliant heroism, and all those high qualities which you have
displayed to an eminent degree, in attacking and defeating the cohorts
of tnason, driving them from position after position, each of their own
choosing, cutting their communications, and in harassing their flanks and
rear, during the many marches, battles, and sieges of this long and event-
ful campaign.
It is impossible, within the limits of an order like this, to enumerate
the many instances in which your gallantry has been conspicuous, but
among them may be mentioned the actions of Rocky Face Mountain
and before Dalton, fought between the 8th and 13th of May; of Resaca,
on the 14th and 15th; of Adairsville, on the 17th, and of New Hope
Church, on the 20th of the same month ; of Culp's Farm, June 22d ; Peach-
tree creek, July 20th, and the crowning one of Jonesboro, fought Sep-
tember 1st, which secured the capture of the city of Atlanta, the goal
for which we set out more than four months ago, and furnished a brilliant
termination to your struggles for that long period.
Let these successes encourage you to the continued exercise of those
same high qualities, and to renewed exertions in the cause of our country
and humanity when you shall again be called upon to meet the foe; and
mred, the time is not far distant when your prowess will conquer
\ hit territory now remains within the circumscribed limits of the re-
bellion. A few more fields like those whose names now crowd your
standards, and Ave can dictate the terms of a peace alike honorable to
yourselves and our country. You can then retire to your homes amid
the plaudits of your friends, and with the proud consciousness that you
have deserved well of the country.
Our rejoicings are not unmixed with a proud regret for our brave com-
rades who have fallen. Their graves mark the spots where they went
down amid the din and roar of battle, dotting every field and hillside,
or lying beneath the spreading boughs of the forest along our route; they
will, in future days, serve like finger-boards, to point out to the traveler
the march of your victorious columns. Those silent mounds appeal to us
to remain true to ourselves and the country, and to so discharge the
high duty devolving upon us that their lives, which they so freely offered
up, may not prove a useless sacrifice.
By command of Major-General Thomas.
WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
THE MARCH OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES TO THE NORTH AND THE
EVOLUTION OF NEW CAMPAIGNS.
"When General Sherman, August 13th, informed General
Halleck that he would make the circuit of Atlanta with his
armies, he suggested that.it might be prudent to break up the
railroad to Chattanooga, and shift his armies to West Point
and Columbus, and there make his base for the fall campaign.
To this General Grant replied, advising that there should be
no backward movement, even if his roads should be so cut as
to preclude the possibility of supplies from the North, and
said : " If it comes to the worst, move South as you suggest."
After General Sherman had taken the city, without overthrow-
ing the army which had so long defended it, he was occupied
with the question of its use in future operations. That he
might hold it for purely military purposes, he banished the
citizens, giving them choice to go North or South ; and as the
defenses constructed by the enemy were so extensive that only
an army could utilize them, he established an inner line of
works, which, held by an ordinary garrison, would protect his
depots. That he might accumulate supplies for future enter-
prise, he restricted the railroads to persons connected with the
army, and the transportation of military stores. But under-
lying these essential preparations, even to hold Atlanta defen-
sively, there was the grand problem of farther aggression. To
hold Atlanta and the long railroad to his primary base, and
have forces to advance, in the manner of his previous move-
ment, required an impracticable augmentation. As the enemy
was now free to detach heavily, to break his communications,
he was compelled to send troops to the rear, and, besides this
(155)
156 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
draft, he was constantly losing regiments by expiration of
term of service. Despairing of being able to cling to the rail-
roads in advancing from Atlanta, he, in common with General
Grant, was looking for a southern base to which he might
hap, without intervening communications. General Grant
suggested that General Canby should act upon Savannah, and
General Sherman upon Augusta. General Sherman in reply
expressed his willingness " to move upon Milledgeville, and
compel Hood to give up Macon and Augusta, and then turn
upon the other," if he could be assured of finding provisions
at Augusta or Columbus; but without such assurance he
w< >uld risk his. army by going far from Atlanta. The country,
in any direction southward, would supply an army that could
maintain motion and freedom to forage, but the contingency
of slow maneuvers or stopping to dislodge an intrenched
enemy, coupled with constraint in foraging, was the barrier to
a campaign having a remote objective. The questions of the
direction and object of an advance, though discussed at length
by Generals Grant and Sherman, remained unsettled until
General Hood's movements gave a turn to affairs which had
not been anticipated by either.
Soon after the fall of Atlanta, the Southern President left
Hichmond to confer with his western generals with regard to
the next campaign, and to use his eloquence to rouse the
people from despondency. His removal of General Johnston
from command had not averted disaster. He had watched the
closing in of the national lines around his capital, but the con-
ditions of warfare were there inveterately denned, and he sped
to the West to give shape to some new enterprise in solution
of the problems imposed by the issue of the preceding dis-
astrous campaign.
It would have been well had he called General Johnston to
Palmetto, and this he doubtless would have done, had his sole
object been to give a successful issue to a new campaign; but
even in this supreme moment, personal considerations were
dominant, and the justification of his removal of his ablest
western general from command, took rank with the projects
which involved the fate of the Confederacy. He now needed
judicious counsel, for another campaign of dire issue would be
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 157
fatal. Nearly one hundred thousand national troops were
holding Atlanta, and preparing to utilize all the advantages
gained in the previous campaign. It was not possible to in-
crease Hood's army promptly to such an extent as to justify
direct ofl'ense in open field, much less against Atlanta. The
Confederate leaders were then restricted to the continuance
of the defensive, wherever General Sherman should invite de-
fense, or to some diversion that would retard or avert the
blow which he was meditating. It was decided that Hood's
army should be thrown upon General Sherman's communica-
tion, and the forces under Smith and Magruder called over
the Mississippi river for conjunction in Northern Alabama ;
that the united armies, gathering recruits as they advanced,
should sweep through Tennessee and Kentucky, and stand a
hundred thousand strong upon the banks of the Ohio. Critics
have been swift to condemn Hood's advance to the North,
and considered as an independent movement, it is seemingly,
at least, open to criticism ; but regarded as a part of a compre-
hensive plan, it is not apparent that his army could have been
used to better advantage. That the expectation of gathering
a vast army on the Tennessee river was the inspiration of
Hood's movement, which in itself promised no mean results,
is plainly true ; for before he had crossed the Chattahoochee,
the Confederate President sent an order (which General
Canby intercepted) to Smith and Magruder to cross the
Mississippi river with their forces. The assumption of the
practicability of their conjunction with Hood, is the explana-
tion of Mr. Davis' prophetic declarations in speeches through-
out the South, that should the absent soldiers return to their
colors, General Sherman should be forced into a retreat as dis-
astrous as that of Napoleon from Moscow, and the Confeder-
ate army would advance in triumph to the Ohio river. The
precedents of the war were against the plan itself, as even in
the first flush of the rebellion all aggression with remote ob-
jectives had resulted in failure ; while in no case during the
conflict, had a Confederate army been thrown with ultimate
advantage upon the communications of a national army whose
aggressive pressure could not be resisted. Latterly, all de-
fense in the West had been unsuccessful, and the disparity of
158 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
aggregate forces forbade all sober-minded Southerners the
hope that any plan could be devised whose execution would
arrest, much Less avert the downfall of the rebellion.
General Hood remained at Lovejoy's Station, quietly recu-
perating and reinforcing his army, until the 20th of September,
when tiiose on the outlook informed General Sherman that he
w as in motion. General Sherman's first thought was that he
was drawing back to Macon, and would send reinforcements
to Richmond. The next day, however, it was apparent that
( General Hood had only shifted his army to Palmetto Station,
and was there intrenching. This movement, and the appear-
ance of Forrest with a force of six or eight thousand men in
Tennessee, were the first steps in the execution of the new plan
of operations. General Sherman now surmised that General
Hood had resolved to throw his army on his flanks, to prevent
the accumulation of supplies, and made dispositions to thwart
] iii n. He sent General Newton's division to Chattanooga, and
ordered General Corse to unite his division at Rome, to act
against any force that might threaten Bridgeport from the di-
rection of Gadsden. Having provided for the defense of these
important points, he left the disposition of Forrest to the dis-
trict commanders — Generals Steedman, Granger, and Rousseau.
A raid from Forrest into Middle Tennessee had been ex-
pected by those in the rear, though not by those in the front.
About the 12th of the month, General Granger received through
his scouts information, which he deemed reliable, that such was
his purpose, if the corps of General A. J. Smith had been re-
in ived from West Tennessee. He therefore expressed his con-
victions to General Sherman, and asked if Smith's corps had
lefl Tennessee. General Sherman directed General Thomas to
inform him that he need feel no uneasiness about Forrest, as he
had gone to Mobile. Notwithstanding this positive assurance
that there was no danger, General Granger sent a force to re-
connoiter in the direction of Forrest's anticipated approach.
In obedience to his order, Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott, command-
ing the Sixth Tennessee Cavalry, advanced toward Florence,
and having returned to the main road, after a short detour,
found himself in the rear of a cavalry force of eight or ten
thousand men. And thus was positively revealed the first of
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 159
a scries of aggressive movements on the part of the enemy,
which gave a new complexion and unexpected issues to mili-
tary operations in Tennessee and Georgia.
September 25th, it was supposed that General Hood was
moving toward the Alabama line, and this opening of the way
for a march to the sea, turned General Sherman to the consid-
eration of a movement thither without an intermediate base
of supplies. General Grant, however, suggested that his at-
tention should first be given to affairs in his rear, and appre-
ciating the situation in Tennessee, and knowing that desperate
efforts would be made to force Sherman to relax his grasp
upon Georgia, ordered all the spare troops in the West to
Nashville, that no further redaction of forces at Atlanta might
be necessary. On the 28th, General Sherman said to General
Grant : " I want Apalachicola arsenal taken, also Savannah,
and if the enemy does succeed in breaking my road, I can
light my way to one or the other place, but I think it better
to hold on to Atlanta and strengthen to my rear, and there-
fore I am glad that you have ordered troops to Nashville."
And to President Lincoln, he said : " It would have a bad
effect, if I am forced to send back any material part of my
army to guard roads, so as to weaken me to an extent that I
could not act offensively, if the occasion calls for it." Cling-
ing thus to Atlanta, he was nevertheless so apprehensive with
regard to his communications, that he sent General Thomas
to the north to provide for their security, having previously
ordered General Morgan's division to Chattanooga, and a bri-
gade of the Army of the Tennessee, and the cavalry from
Memphis, to Eastport, to operate against the flank of any force
going into Tennessee by any of the fords near Florence.
General Thomas started on the 29th, and the same day there
came to General Sherman the first intimation that Hood was
crossing the Chattahoochee. The day following it was known
that a portion of his army was across, and by the first of Oc-
tober the movement was well developed, except in respect to
its ultimate object. The direction of the march did not indi-
cate an advance to Blue Mountain, but toward General Sher-
man's communications, and citizens reported that Rome was
General Hood's destination. In doubt of his purpose and
160 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
destination, General Sherman made provision for two contin-
gencies — the enemy swinging across to the Alabama line and
thence into Tennessee, or striking the railroad south of King-
ston. In the one case, he proposed to send back to Chatta-
nooga all the troops from Kingston north, and with all south
of Kingston to move to the sea-board, and in the other, he
would turn upon Hood and attack him.
To ascertain the direction of the enemy's march before put-
ting his own armies in motion, General Sherman sent General
Garrard to Powder Springs, General Kilpatrick to Sweet-
water, General Howard to reconnoiter to Fairburn, and Gen-
eral Cox, commanding the Twenty-third Corps in absence of
General Schofield, to send a division to Flat Rock. His ob-
ject, in addition, was to get the bridges over the Chattahoo-
chee, and then place his armies between them and General
Eood. But the latter was indifferent to all such designs, as
li-> had cut loose from all connections in his rear. General
Sherman regarded his movement as ostentatious, but it was
one of desperation rather, and right boldly did he and his
army dash on to the issues involved. He was vigorously ex-
ecuting his part of the grand combination which had been
projected, to change, if possible, the theater and the issue of
the war in the West. Having crossed the Chattahoochee, he
tli icw Stewart's corps upon the railroad north of Marietta,
and with the remainder of his infantry forces, moved toward
J ►alias, his cavalry, under Wheeler, being already in Northern
Georgia. Stewart reached the railroad, and commenced its
destruction, October 2d, and citizens reported that it was Gen-
eral Hood's purpose to attack Acworth and Allatoona, after-
ward Rome, and in the event of repulse, to retreat to Blue
Mom i tain, Jacksonville, and Selma. General Sherman now
ordered General Stanley to move with ten days' rations to
Ruff's Station, and open communications with General El-
liott, who, with his cavalry divisions, was over toward Sweet-
water and Nose's creek. The next day, he ordered all his
remaining forces, except the Twentieth Corps, which was left
to bold Atlanta and the railroad bridge over the Chatta-
hoochee, to follow Stanley. In the evening of the 4th, the
advance of the latter encamped near Little Kenesaw Moun-
MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 161
tain. General Hood's infantry was then advancing upon Al-
latoona, having captured the garrisons at Big Shanty and
Acworth, and destroyed the track of the road for several
miles. The same day, General Elliott found the enemy be-
tween Dallas and Big Shanty, occupying the old works of the
national army, in more force than could be dislodged by dis-
mounted cavalry.
General Sherman had been convinced of General Hood's
audacity too late to protect his communications, and was now
anxious with regard to his depot of supplies at Allatoona.
He had previously ordered General Corse to reinforce the gar-
rison from Rome, should the enemy approach from the south ;
and this provision saved the place. General Corse reached
Allatoona with a few regiments, on the 4th, and the next
morning he was attacked by French's division of Stewart's
corps. General Sherman, while signaling his presence at
Kenesaw Mountain, and his purpose to give the earliest pos-
sible support, witnessed the repeated repulse of the enemy.
The gallant resistance of the garrison, and the movement of
General Cox to his left, induced General French to withdraw
entirely during the afternoon, having lost at least a thousand
men. This was not a promising initiative for General Hood,
and its probable bearing upon his plans was added to other
circumstances of positive character to conceal again, for a few
days, his ultimate purpose. French's division remained in the
rear of the army, and offered such resistance to General El-
liott, that it was impossible to ascertain in what direction the
enemy's standards were pointing. From the 5th to the 10th,
it was not known whether they were pointing northward or
westward.
During this period, General Sherman again proposed to
General Grant to break up the railroad to Chattanooga, and
move with wagons to Savannah, entertaining the opinion that
Hood would move to the West. But on the 10th, learning
that he was marching toward Rome, he ordered his generals
to move upon Kingston with a view to support General Corse
at Rome, should the enemy approach in force. General Hood
crossed the Coosa river twelve miles below, in feint upon
VOL. II — 11
1G2 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
Rome, to cover another dash upon the railroad and his march
northward. General Sherman's forces were concentrated in
the vicinity of Kingston on the 11th, but again General Hood's
movements were in doubt, as he disappeared from the vicinity
of Rome without indicating where he was going. General
Sherman, on the 12th, made effort to develop his movements,
by sending Garrard's division* and the Twenty-third Corps
across the Oostanaula, while a brigade from Hazen's division
moved down the Coosa from Rome. In the meantime, Hood
moved rapidly toward Rcsaca with his whole army. Here,
again, provision had been made to reinforce the garrison, as,
in compliance with General Sherman's contingent orders, the
troops at Cassville, Colonel Watkins' brigade of cavalry, and
General Bauni, with three hundred and fifty infantry, moved
forward before the place was invested. Colonel "Watkins left
his horses on the left bank, and placed his men in the intrench-
ments on the other side. General Hood demanded the sur-
render of the place on the 11th, under the threat that no pris-
oners would be taken if he should be compelled to carry the-
works by assault. But though General Baum refused to
capitulate, and General Hood had a heavy force, probably two
corps present, and threw a line around the town from the river
above to the river below, he may have been deterred from
attack by the uncertainty -of the issue, or may have considered
the temporary possession no compensation for the cost of tak-
ing it.
While halting before Resaca, General Hood sent detach-
ments to destroy the railroad toward Dalton, and having him-
self withdrawn on the 12th, he demanded the surrender of
the latter place the next day. Colonel Johnson, commanding
the Forty-fourth Colored regiment, was convinced that resist-
ance was useless, and accepted terms. The garrison at Tilton
was also captured. Early in the day, General Schofield had
reached Dalton on his way to join General Sherman, but not
being able to go farther, and learning that the enemy was ad-
vancing, he returned to Cleveland with his train and what
* General Garrard drove a brigade of the enemy through the entrance
to Chattooga valley, and captured two guns.
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 163
public property it was practicable to save. From Dalton,
General Hood, with Lee's and Cheatham's corps, passed into
Snake Creek Gap. Stewart's corps destroyed the railroad to
Tunnel Hill. General Sherman reached Resaca on the 14th,
and disposed his forces to strike the enemy in flank, or force
him to fight by shutting him up in Snake Creek Gap. He
sent General Howard to the southern entrance, and General
Stanley, with his own and Davis' corps, by Tilton, to the
northern entrance. But though General Howard skirmished
to hold General Hood in the pass until General Stanley should
reach his rear, his effort was ineffectual, as he retreated to the
north before Stanley could intercept him by closing the Gap.
Having emerged from the pass, General Hood had freedom of
motion north and west. On the 16th, General Sherman threw
his columns to Lafayette to cut off his retreat, but he was able
to unite his forces in time to attain a safe position between
the Coosa and Lookout Mountain.
Reference should here be made to operations by which For-
rest was expelled from Tennessee. This bold trooper crossed
the Tennessee river at Waterloo, September 20th, and two days
afterward appeared before Athens, Alabama. Colonel Camp-
bell, commanding the post, after skirmishing with the enemy
for a short time, withdrew from the town to the fortifications.
This step exposed the public buildings and stores, and Forrest
immediately applied the torch. The next day he invested the
fort, which had been constructed for defense by a small force,
and opened with his artillery. Colonel Campbell responded with
spirit, and refused two calls to surrender, but finally, through
a personal interview with Forrest, was induced to conclude that
resistance was useless. Forrest adopted the policy, which in
many instances was successful, to make a show of force to in-
duce surrender, when there was no intention to attack, or at
least a great reluctance to do so, in view of inevitable loss or
uncertain issue. The garrison surrendered consisted of four
hundred and fifty men of the One Hundred and Sixth, One
Hundred and Tenth, and One Hundred and Eleventh Colored
regiments, and one hundred and thirty men of the Third Ten-
nessee Cavalry. A half hour later, the Eighteenth Michigan
and One Hundred and Third Ohio arrived, and were surren-
164 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
dered after an engagement. This was an auspicious beginning
for Forrest, but fortunately proved to be his only important
success.
From At In -I is he advanced toward Pulaski, and destroyed
the Nashville and Decatur railroad for several miles. At Pu-
laski, General Rousseau was awaiting his coming with such
force that Forrest withdrew after a skirmish. The same day,
the 29th, one of his detachments appeared on the JSTashville and
( 'liattanooga road, north and south of Tullahoma, cut the tele-
graph wires, and injured the track. The road was soon repaired,
bu1 the party having touched it, was the advance of Forrest's
main force, which passed Fayetteville the night following,
moving toward Decherd. Having learned, however, that
heavier forces were before him than he wished to meet, he
changed direction and divided his forces. General Rousseau
had moved by rail, the day previous, to Tullahoma, and Gen-
eral Steedman had crossed the Tennessee river, and was ad-
vancing north upon the road with five thousand men, and in
the face of the two columns, Forrest turned back, sending Bu-
ford with four thousand men to Huntsville, and moving him-
self with three thousand toward Columbia. Buford reached
Huntsville the night of the 30th, and made an ineffectual de-
mand for the surrender of the place. Remaining during the
night, he repeated his demand with similar issue the next morn-
ing, and then moved off toward Athens. Here he made an
attack at 3 p. m., and was repulsed by the Seventy-third Indiana,
Lieutenant-Colonel Slade commanding, which had been sent
thither by General Granger to regarrison the post, immediately
: 1 1 1 1 ■ r Colonel Campbell's surrender. Buford anticipated an easy
victory, but was twice repulsed, and was pursued after with-
drawal, by a small party of General Granger's cavalry. He
crossed the Tennessee, at Brown's ferry, on the 3d of October.
General Forrest succeeded no better. He reached Columbia
on the 1st, but refrained from attack. He remained in the vi-
cinity until the 3d, and then moved in the direction of Mount
Pleasant, destroying five miles of railroad between Cartersville
and Spring Hill. By this time, four columns were converging
upon him, under the direction of General Thomas. General
"Morgan's division having arrived at Huntsville the night of
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 165
the 1st, moved through. Athens to secure the crossing at Bain-
bridge ; General Rousseau was on his way from Nashville with
four thousand men, who had been hastily mounted ; Croxton
was advancing throughLawrenceburg,andGeneralWashbii]-iK',
with three thousand infantry and fifteen hundred cavalry, was
passing up the Tennessee river, under instructions to leave his
infantry at Johnsonville and join General Rousseau at Pulaski,
with his cavalry. In addition to these dispositions, Lieutenant-
Commander Forrest, commanding the naval force on the Up-
per Tennessee, was requested to send gunboats to Florence, if
the stage of water would permit, This combination might
have resulted in Forrest's capture, had not the high water in
Elk river detained Morgan, who did not reach Rogersville until
the night of the 4th, while Forrest passed through Laurence-
burg the same night, and crossed at Bainbridge on the 6th, his
rear forces having been reached by Washburne's advance. But
if Forrest was neither captured nor defeated, the main line of
railroad was saved from serious damage, and to break it was
doubtless the chief object of his raid.
As soon as General Thomas was advised of Hood's north-
ward march, he made dispositions to offer resistance on the
line of the Tennessee river, and especially to defend Chatta-
nooga and Bridgeport — the most important points on the
direct line of supply. He first directed General Rousseau to
destroy all ferry-boats and other means of crossing the river
below Decatur, and then take post at Florence, Alabama,
and ordered General Morgan to return to Athens. When the
direction of General Hood's march was clearly indicated, he
directed General Croxton, with his brigade of cavalry, to cover
the crossings of the river from Decatur to Eastport, and hur-
ried Morgan's division from Athens to Chattanooga, Steed-
man's from Decatur to Bridgeport, and Rousseau's from Flor-
ence to Athens. The garrisons at Decatur, Huntsville, and
Stevenson were not reinforced, that there might be the heavi-
est concentration possible, should the enemy advance toward
Chattanooga or Bridgeport.
The northward march of Hood's army, on General Sher-
man's communications, created an intense alarm all over the
North, from which the highest military circles were not free.
166 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
A - a consequence, all available troops in the Department of
the Ohio, and all, in fact, far and near, were directed to Gen-
eral Thomas; and so threatening was the emergency in the
estimation of the lieutenant-general, that he advised the with-
drawal of all the forces on the railroad " from Columbia to
Decatur, and thence to Stevenson." General Thomas, how-
•. did not adopt the suggestion, and subsequent events jus-
tified his action.
When, on the 13th, General Thomas ascertained that Hood's
advance was at Lafayette, Georgia, he directed General Wag-
in a\ in command at Chattanooga, to call in all the detachments
from Tunnel Hill, north, and make preparations to hold his
important post. Accordingly, a very large number of guns
were mounted in the fortincatious, which had been made
exceedingly strong by Colonel Merrill, with his engineer regi-
ment and the forces left as a garrison, while all the outlying
troops were concentrated for the defense of the town and sup-
plies.
Upon General Schofield's return from Dalton to Cleveland,
General Thomas directed him to assume command at Chat-
tanooga, and add to the garrison all the troops within reach.
But though General Hood was so near, he had no thought
of putting his army between the mountains, south of Chatta-
nooga, at least while General Sherman was in his immediate
rear, and soon moved westward to avoid battle and pursue the
accomplishment of the ultimate object of his march to the
north. As soon as he turned westward, General Thomas sent
General Schofield, with Morgan's and "Wagner's divisions, up
Will's valley to watch against the approach of the enemy
toward Bridgeport, but soon recalled him, having gained
knowledge of General Hood's movement upon Gadsden.
When General Sherman learned that Hood had turned west-
ward, he proposed to follow him wherever he might go, but
did not believe that he meditated the invasion of Tennessee,
though the declarations of the Confederate President and Gen-
eral Hood gave assurance of this design. The pursuit of Hood
was maintained by various routes to Gaylesville, and there
General Sherman halted his armies to await the repair of the
railroad and the developments of the enemy. He stationed
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 167
the Army of the Tennessee near Little river, to support the
cavalry and observe the enemy toward Will's valley; the
Army of the Ohio at Cedar Bluffs, to feel forward to Center
and in the direction of Blue Mountain ; and the Army of the
Cumberland at Gaylesville. While in this region the armies
drew their supplies from the country.
Although General Hood had not achieved the grand results
which the sanguine President had predicted, he had neverthe-
less been so far successful as to perplex the national com-
manders and give hope to the insurgents. He had not forced
General Sherman into a disastrous retreat, but he had drawn
him to the north, not in abandonment of Atlanta and his forti-
fied positions, but with nearly all his forces. He had twice
thrown his armies between General Sherman and his base ;
had maneuvered with skill; had captured the garrisons at
Big Shanty, Acworth, Tilton, and t Dalton; had destroyed
nearly thirty miles of railroad, and, except in his attack upon
Allatoona, had received no harm. He had moved in boldest
disregard of railroads and communications, contrary to the
precedents of the previous campaign, and, in fine, his north-
ward march had been brilliantly executed. The resulting
problems were freighted with the gravest issues. The insur-
gents were now too far exhausted to bear the overthrow of
his army in its perilous adventure to the north, and yet Hood
held boldly to his plan, as though assured of success. A new
base, with railroad communications, was in preparation for
him in Northern Mississippi, under the direction of General
Beauregard, now in supreme command in the West, not for
defense, but for aggression of the boldest type, whose expla-
nation is found in the expectation that the trans-Mississippi
forces would swell Hood's army for its resistless sweep through
Tennessee and Kentucky. General Canby's dispatch to Gen-
eral Sherman, dated October 18th, gives evidence of the
effort to reinforce Hood's army from the West ; as, without
heavy reinforcements, aggression, in the face of General
Sherman's armies, was palpably impossible. ISTo doubt the
minor object was to decoy General Sherman from the Chatta-
nooga and Atlanta railroad, and the undoing of the campaign
on that line ; but the main one was the invasion of Tennessee
108 jfAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
and Kentucky. Subsequently, General Sherman's movement
to the south so changed the situation that this invasion was
attempted without the trans-Mississippi forces.
While the rebel generals were preparing to invade Ten-
Dessee and Kentucky, General Sherman was engrossed with
the project which he first suggested as a contingency when
aboul to make the circuit of Atlanta, in August, and which
he had since repeatedly brought to the attention of General
Grant. At Atlanta, Allatoona, Kingston, and now, while
awaiting, at Gaylesville, the repair of the railroad, he made
suggestions to General Grant, from day to day, concerning
the " march to the sea." He was unwilling to follow Hood
farther west, as in this way, it had been planned that he should
be decoyed from Georgia. By the 20th of October his plans
for a counter-movement were well matured, and his utterances
and orders foreshadowed, their early execution. He proposed
to leave General Thomas in command of the military division in
his absence — which at first he thought would be ninety days, as
in that time he could go to the sea and return — giving him as
an army for defense the Fourth Corps, the garrisons in Ten-
] ii Bsee and Alabama, and the new troops that had been ordered
to Nashville. For himself he would retain the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third Corps,
and a cavalry corps of three divisions, comprising twenty -five
hundred men each, under the command of Brevet Major-Gen-
eral J. II. Wilson, recently sent by General Grant to be chief
of the cavalry of the military division. These troops were to
be trimmed to perfect efficiency. The railroad was to be re-
paired to Atlanta, for use in preparation for the march beyond,
and then to be destro}~ed.
Telegraphic communication between Chattanooga and At-
lanta was established October 20th, and on the 28th the rail-
road was in running order. In the meantime General Hood
assumed the offensive. Advancing from Gadsden, he appeared
before Decatur on the 26th and made an attack, but not with
such force as indicated a purpose to storm the place — his
tlnve corps of infantry being near, and his cavalry being dis-
posed on the south bank of the river, from Guntersville to
Eastport. General Thomas sent two regiments to General
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 169
Granger, from Chattanooga, and instructed him to hold his
post at all hazards. This was a feehle reinforcement, hut he
had no other spare troops to throw before the enemy. The
divisions of Morgan and Wagner had been recalled from Ten-
nessee by General Sherman, and for the defense of the line of
the Tennessee river there were the usual garrisons, and Gen-
eral Croxton's brigade of cavalry spread out on the north bank.
In the emergency General Sherman ordered General Stanley
to report with his corps to General Thomas, and, by order,
placed the latter in command of all troops and garrisons in his
military division, not in his own presence, contingent upon
his separation from his division " by military movements -or
the accidents of war."
On the 27th, General Hood intrenched his position before
Decatur, skirmished during the day, but used no artillery,
though he put guns in position. Under the cover of darkness,
he drove in General Granger's pickets with a strong force, and
established a new line within five hundred yards of the town.
The next day, General Granger made a successful sortie. His
troops advanced, under cover of the guns of the fort, down
the river bank and round to the rear of the enemy's rifle-pits,
and by a bold charge cleared them, killing a large number of
men and capturing one hundred and twenty. A battery above
the town was also captured by the Fourteenth United States
Colored troops, Colonel T. J. Morgan commanding, but the
position being too much exposed to be held, the guns were
spiked and the regiment under orders retired to the fort. In
the charge, Colonel Morgan lost forty men killed and wounded,
including three officers killed. This resistance to the estab-
lishment of his investing lines, and his lack of provisions, in-
duced General Hood to withdraw his forces altogether at 4
a. m. on the 29th. He could neutralize the place by passing to
the west and meet his supplies, while he could secure crossings
at less cost down the river ; and these considerations doubtless
induced his withdrawal. He lost several hundred, perhaps
more than a thousand men, while inflicting a loss of eighty,
and kept his troops in action in almost utter destitution of
provisions.
General Hood has not reported his objects in the various
170 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
movements of his campaign, and hence his purpose in oper-
ating against Decatur has not been authentically revealed.
All circumstances, except his own statement of his plan, lead
to the belief that he expected to cross the Tennessee river at
Decatur and move rapidly upon General Sherman's communi-
cations in Middle Tennessee, and cut off his supplies entirely.
The press in the South, and his own officers, entertained and
expressed the opinion that this extreme aggression was medi-
tated. The opposition of General Granger's small force at
Decatur was so positive, even showing the purpose of offense,
thai he was deterred from the effort to carry the position by
assault. There was a diversity of opinion among his gen-
eral officers as to the wisdom of his withdrawal from Decatur,
as it involved the abandonment, for a time, of his advance to
.Nashville.
During the 29th, General Croxton discovered that the enemy
was crossing the Tennessee river at the mouth of Cypress
creek, two miles below Florence. He concentrated his forces
as far as practicable, but was unable to regain the north bank.
Having been informed of this turn of affairs, General Thomas
directed General Hatch, at Clifton, commanding a cavalry
division of General Howard's army, and under orders to join
< General Sherman in Georgia, when ready for the field, to move
to General Croxton's support, and urged both commanders to
keep the enemy from crossing other forces, if possible, until
the Fourth Corps could arrive from Georgia and get into posi-
tion to meet him. It was, however, too late to defend the line
of the Tennessee river, as Hood was master of too many
crossings ; and when General Wood's division, the advance of
the corps, arrived at Athens, on the 31st, General Thomas
ordered General Stanley to unite his command at Pulaski and
await further instructions. The same day, General Schofield
was ordered to move from Eesaca, Georgia, to Columbia, Ten-
Qessee, to combine with General Stanley and the cavalry to
resist the advance of the enemy into Middle Tennessee. That
an invasion was meditated had become evident from Southern
newspapers, and prisoners and deserters from Hood's army
bore testimony to this purpose. The conjecture that he could
not supply his army on the Tennessee or north of it was now
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 171
plainly groundless, as he had established communications by
the repair of the Ohio and Mobile railroad, and supplies were
coming to him from Selma and Montgomery, through Corinth,
and thence eastward to Cherokee Station, on the Memphis
and Charleston railroad. And while he had thrust the heads
of infantry columns over the river at Florence and at points
above and below, he had sent Forrest with his bold troopers
up the Tennessee river to break up General Thomas' line of
supply by the river and the Northwestern railroad.
Forrest appeared at Fort Heiman, an earthwork on the west
bank of the Tennessee, about seventy-five miles from Padu-
cah, where, three days later, he captured gunboat No. 55, and
two transports, having previously burned the steamer Em-
press. On the 2d of November, he planted his batteries above
and below Johnsonvillc, the western terminus of the North-
western railroad, and an important depot of supplies. His
guns blockaded the river, and shut in before the town three
gunboats, eight transports, and about a dozen barges. The
garrison comprised a thousand men from the Forty -third
Wisconsin and the Twelfth United States Colored regiment,
and a detachment of the Eleventh Tennessee cavalry, under
the command of Colonel C. R. Thompson, of the Twelfth Col-
ored regiment. The naval forces, under Lieutenant E. M.
King, attacked the enemy's guns below the town, but though
repulsed after a severe conflict, they recaptured a transport
having on board two 20-pounder Parrott guns and quarter-
master's stores, and forced Forrest to burn the gunboat cap-
tured on the 31st of October. On the 4th, the enemy opened
fire upon the gunboats from the opposite bank. The guns on
boats and land responded briskly, but were soon disabled, and
for fear that they would fall into the hands of the enemy, both
gunboats and transports were fired. The flames reached the
stores on the levee, and property worth a million of dollars
was consumed. It was fear rather than necessity that caused
this waste, as Forrest withdrew soon after altogether, having
delivered a furious cannonade. He crossed the river above
the town, by means of extemporized flat-boats, and moved to-
ward Clifton, with evident design of co-operating with the
main army.
172 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
On the evening of the 5th, General Schofield reached John-
sonville with a portion of his command, having moved rapidly
by rail, in compliance with instructions from General Thomas
to save the gunboats and supplies. Having left a sufficient
force to defend the place, he then proceeded to join General
Stanley at Pulaski, to assume command of the forces before
the enemy. He was assigned to this position, byreason of his
rank as a department commander, though General Stanley
was his senior as a major-general.
General Hood was now free to invade Tennessee, as the low
stage of water in the river prevented the effective use of the
gunboats against his pontoon bridges, and General Thomas
could not offer a strong army on the north bank. He was
also free to move to the southwest should General Sherman
concentrate his armies against him; but General Sherman
was unwilling to do this. His preparations for his march
through Georgia were nearly completed, and he was unwilling
to take a step backward, to pursue Hood. He made provis-
ion, however, for reinforcing General Thomas, by calling two
divisions, under General A. J. Smith, from Missouri, and by
sending back General Wilson, and the cavalry of McCook's
and Garrard's divisions to give a good remount to Kilpatrick's
division, retained by himself.
General Hood's threatening attitude called forth a fresh
discussion of General Sherman's projected march between him
and General Grant, but induced no change of plan. The
conclusions reached were these, that turning back would undo
the work of the preceding campaign, give up the territory
which had been gained, and fulfill the predictions of Mr. Davis
with regard to the effect of Hood's advance to the North, and
that he could not be overtaken if followed ; and on the other
Land, going forward would destroy the railroads of Georgia,
inflict immense damage, and produce a most potent moral
effect, in illustrating the vulnerability of the South. In his
last communication to General Grant, General Sherman said :
" If we can march a well-appointed army right through this
territory, it is a demonstration to the world — foreign and do-
mestic — that Ave have a power which Davis can not resist.
This may not be war, but rather statesmanship. Nevertheless
MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 173
it is overwhelming to my mind, that there are thousands of
people abroad and in the South who will reason thus : If the
North can march an army right through the South, it is proof
positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving
only its willingness to use that power:" This moral effect was,
indeed, the justification of the movement, as General Sherman
proposed to use the territory which he had gained in Georgia
as a track simply for his march, and not hold any part of
Georgia except his objective on the Atlantic shore, while he
left behind him one of the two great armies upon which the
existence of the rebellion depended. It is true, however, that
even in his last dispatches before starting, he expressed the
conviction that Beauregard and Hood would be forced by
public clamor to follow him. He retained for himself from
his three armies the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Twentieth Corps, and one large division of cavalry, in all
sixty thousand infantry, and five thousand five hundred cav-
alry, and one piece of artillery to every thousand men.
City Point, Va., September 10, 1864.
Major-General Sherman :
As soon as your men are properly rested and preparations can be made,
it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced.
We want to keep the enemy continually pressed to the end of the war.
If we give him no peace while the war lasts, the end can not be far dis-
tant. Now that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know
but it will be the best move for Major-General Canby's troops to act
upon Savannah, while you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from
you on this matter.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant- General.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Atlanta, Ga., September 14, 1864.
Brigadier-General R. S. Granger, Decatur :
General Sherman informs me that General Smith has been directed to
Missouri by orders from Major-General Halleck; also, that he has official
information that Forrest and his command reached Mobile on the 8th
instant. You must therefore apprehend no trouble from any but Roddy,
Wheeler, and the parties which have already been in Tennessee.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
174 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864.
ant-General U. S. Grant, City Point:
Hood is evidently on the west side of Chattahoochee, below Sweet-
water. If he tries to get on my road this side of the Etowah, I shall at-
tack him; but if he goes on to the Selma and Talladega road, why would
it not do for me to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has and
the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta, and
then march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads and
<loing irreparable damage? We can not remain on the defensive.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1864 — 2 p. m.
General G. H. Thomas, Chattanooga :
I have your dispatch of noon. Use your own discretion as to matters
north of the Tennessee river. If I can induce Hood to swing across to
Blue Mountain, I shall feel tempted to start for Milledgeville, Millen, and
Savannah or Charleston, absolutely destroying all Georgia, and taking
either Savannah or Charleston. In that event, I would order back to
Chattanooga everything the other side of Kingston, and bring forward all
else; destroy Atlanta and the bridge, and absolutely scour the Southern
Confederacy. In that event, Hood would be puzzled and would follow
me ; or if he entered Tennessee he could make no permanent stay. But
if he attempts the road this side of Kingston or Rome, I will turn against
him. Forrest will not attack our forts — that is manifest; but will try and
get possession of Decatur. All the infantry and cavalry not in forts or
blockhouses should be directed against him by roads — say the Shelby ville
pike and Favetteville.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 68.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., October 3, 1864.
The following movements are ordered :
I. Major-General Slocum, with Twentieth Corps, will hold Atlanta and
the Chattahoochee bridge, and all detachments of other troops or corps
will report to him and be assigned by him to posts looking to the secu-
rity of the depot.
II. All the rest of the army, provided with ten (10) days' rations, will
move by the Chattahoochee bridge to Smyrna Camp-ground— the Army of
the Cumberland, Major-General Stanley on the center, looking west; the
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 175
Army of the Ohio, Brigadier-General Cox, on the right, and the Army of
the Tennessee, Major-General Howard, on the left.
III. The commanding general will be near the center.
By order of General W. T. Sherman.
(Signed.) L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 85.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In tiie Field, Kenesaw Mountain, October 6, 1864.
I. Major-General Stanley, Army of the Cumberland, will occupy a strong
defensive position across the Marietta and Burnt Hickory, and Marietta
and Dallas roads, his right near Pine Hill and left behind Nose's creek.
II. Major-General Howard, Army of the Tennessee, will join on to the
left of Stanley, and make a line covering the Powder Spring road, and
the cavalry on the flank ; General Kilpatrick will prevent the enemy from
reaching the railroad below Marietta.
III. Brigadier-General Cox, Army of the Ohio, will move on the Burnt
Hickory road, via Pine Hill and Mount Olivet Church, west, until he
strikes the road by which the enemy have moved on Allatoona. He will
have his columns ready for a fight, but not deployed. He will park his
wagons near Kenesaw.
IV. General Elliott will send cavalry to-day to Big Shanty, Acworth,
and Allatoona, and bring official reports.
V. . . .
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 87.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Kenesaw, October 8, 18G4.
I. The armies will march at once toward Allatoona — that of the Ohio by
the roads southwest of Acworth ; that of the Cumberland by roads south
and west of Kenesaw Mountain, leading through Acworth, and that of
the Tennessee by roads north and east of Kenesaw, via Big Shanty and
Acworth.
II. The Army of the Ohio will halt for orders near good grass and
water, two or three miles this side of Allatoona; that of the Cumberland,
this side Acworth, and that of the Tennessee this side of Big Shanty,
all giving attention to the grazing of their animals when not on the
march.
IV. Until further orders, General Elliott will keep his cavalry force
watching the enemy, but ready to march rapidly to Stilesboro and the
Etowah bridge, if the enemy turns north toward Rome or Kingston;
otherwise the cavalry will remain at the front or left flank of the army.
176 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
V. Should the enemy attempt our road about Kingston or to invest
Rome, the army must be prepared to leave at Allatoona the principal
wagon trains, and to march rapidly to the points threatened; but if the
enemy simply moves off toward Jacksonville or Blue Mountain, the army
will remain, its right at Alatoona and left at Kenesaw, until our roads are
repaired.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
3 L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Allatoona, Ga., October 9, 1864.
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Va. :
It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood,
Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without
home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to
the end of the Selma and Talladega railroad at Blue Mountain, about
sixty (60) miles southwest of Rome, from which he will threaten King-
ston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama.
I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga, and strike
out with wagons for Milledgeville and Savannah. Until we can repopu-
late Georgia, it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its
roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By at-
tempting to hold the roads, we will lose a thousand men monthly, and
will gain no result. I can make the march and make Georgia howl. We
have over eight thousand (8,000) cattle and three million rations of bread,
but no corn; but we can forage in the interior of the state.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Carterville, October 10, 1864.
General Grant, City Point :
Dispatch about Wilson received. Hood is now crossing Coosa, twelve
(12) miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and
Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel
Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee, to
defend the state ? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements
ordered reach Nashville.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 89.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., October 11, 1864.
The army will move to-morrow morning early on Rome — the Armies of
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 177
the Ohio and Tennessee by the river roads, and the Army of the Cumber-
land by a detour via Woodland; all to reach Rome to-morrow night.
Trains will be taken to Rome.
By order of Major-Gen eral W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 90.]
Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi,
In the Field, Rome, Ga., October 12, 1864.
Orders for to-morrow, October 13th, will be as follows :
I. General Corse will dispatch his division and the brigade of the Fif-
teenth Corps attached to his garrison, and the First Alabama Cavalry,
down the Coosa river, on its east bank, toward Coosaville, to develop the
force guarding the bridge by which the enemy crossed. He will send
one (1) battery with the expedition, and equip the whole party light.
II. General Elliott will, at the same time, dispatch down the west bank
of the Coosa a division of cavalry for the same purpose — viz., to develop
the force guarding the bridge by which the enemy crossed.
III. All the armies will be held ready to move at a moment's warn-
ing.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
BY TELEGRAPH FROM " WASHINGTON, 12 m., NASHVILLE,
OCTOBER 13, 1864."
Major- General Geo, H. Thomas, Nashville:
Two old regiments from General Pope and several new ones from Ohio
and Indiana are on their way to Nashville. Schotield and Burbridge are
ordered to send to you everything that can be spared from Kentucky.
Put yourself in communication with them. General Grant directs that
you collect your forces, and be prepared to meet Hood wherever he may
present himself on the Tennessee, and that you take the supplies of the
country without compunction. By thus supplying your own army, you
will leave none for him.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major- General.
City Point, Va., October 13, 1864.
Major-General Hallech :
For Major-General Thomas' information:
I think it will be advisable for Major-General Thomas now to abandon
all the railroad from Columbia to Decatur, thence to Stevenson. This
will give him much additional force.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT.
VOL. n — 12
178 MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
Washington, October 14, 1864.
Major-General Thomas :
Lieutenant-General Grant suggests the abandonment of the railroad
from I !olumbia to Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, in order to give you
more force against Hood. MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 91.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Resaca, Ga., October 14, 1864.
The first movement will be to free the Snake Creek Gap.
I. General Howard will bring up all the men of his command he can
get at 7 a. M. to-morrow, and move direct on Snake Creek Gap, approach-
ing carefully, and holding his column ready to pass through when relieved
by General Stanley's movement.
II. General Stanley will cross over to the hills about two (2) miles
north of the gap, somewhere south of Tilton, and with infantry, reach
the summit, and, if possible, find a way across into the valley toward
Villanow.
III. General Cox will come up and follow General Howard.
*********
V. General McCook will send all the cavalry he can raise boldly to Buz-
zard Roost Pass, to threaten the enemy in that quarter, and to give Gen-
eral Stanley notice of any force in that vicinity. As soon as General
Garrard comes up, he will be dispatched in the same direction.
*********
Bv order of Maior-General Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 92.]
Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi,
In the Field, October 15, 1864.
The movement to-morrow will be on Lafayette, the primary object
being to secure possession of Ship's Gap.
I. (leneral Howard will move rapidly on Villanow and Ship's Gap, to
secure the summit, and mass to the right.
II. General Stanley will follow and mass to the left of the gap.
III. General Cox will halt for orders at Villanow, guarding roads north
and south.
] V. General Garrard's cavalry will come through Snake Creek Gap and
guard the trains. General Elliott will dispatch Colonel Watkins' cavalry
and scouts to open communication with Chattanoogo, to let them know
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 179
•that this army is in pursuit of Hood, and to inform me of the state of
facts along the road and at Chattanooga.
** * * * * * * *
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. ^ DAyT0N
Ai d-d e- Camp.
Headquarters Military Division op the Mississippi,
In the Field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 16, 1864.
■General Thomas, Nashville :
Send me Davis' and Newton's old divisions. Re-establish the road, and
I will follow Hood wherever he may go. I think he will move to Blue
Mountain We can maintain our men and animals on the country.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Atlanta, October 17, 1864.
Major-General Sherman :
I have a Montgomery paper of the 12th. The dispatches from Hood,
as well as the editorials, state that Beauregard is with Hood, and that the
army is going to cross the Tennessee river. ^ SLOCUM
Major-General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Ship's Gap, Ga., October 17, 1864.
General Thomas, Nashville:
Hood won't dare go into Tennessee. I hope he will. We now occupy
Ship's Gap and Lafayette, and Hood is retreating toward Alpine and
Gadsden. I am moving General Garrard to-day to Dirttown, and will
move General Corse out to Coosaville, and with the main army move on
Summerville.
If Hood wants to go into Tennessee, west of Huntsville, let him go,
and then we can all turn on him and he can not escape. The gunboats
can break any bridge he may attempt above Decatur. If he attempts to
cross, let him do so in part, and then let a gunboat break through his
bridge. I will follow him to Gadsden, and then want my whole army
united for the grand move into Georgia.
b W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
New Orleans, October 18, 1864.
Major-General Sherman :
I learn by an intercepted dispatch from Jeff. Davis to Kirby Smith,
dated at Montgomery on the 30th, that the orders to cross the Mississippi
had been received. I presume that duplicate of this dispatch has reached
Kirby Smith, as Magruder's force, about eighteen or twenty thousand
(IS. 000 or 20,000) men, suddenly left General Steele's front and moved
in the direction of the Washita river. 1 have sent a fast boat to commu-
180 MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
nicate this intelligence to the troops and gunboats on the river, and as
I have now about eight thousand (8,000) troops afloat, and will at once
increase the number, I think the crossing can be prevented. The cross-
ine will probably be attempted in the neighborhood of Gaines' Landing.
ED. R. S. CANBY,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 1864 — 12 m.
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
Hood has retreated rapidly by all the roads leading south. Our ad-
vance columns are now at Alpine and Melville Post-office. I shall pursue
him as far as Gaylesville. The enemy will not venture toward Tennessee,
except around by Decatur. I propose to send the Fourth Corps back to
General Thomas, and leave him that corps, the garrisons and new troops,
to defend the line of the Tennessee, and with the rest to push into the
heart of Georgia, and come out at Savannah, destroying all the railroads
of the state.
The break at Big Shanty is repaired, and that about Dalton should be
in ten (10) days. We find abundance of forage in the country.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Summerville, Ga., October 19, 18G4.
General G. H. Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. :
Make a report to me as soon as possible of what troops you now have in
Tennessee, what are expected, and how disposed. I propose, with the
Armies of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and two corps of yours, to sally forth
and make a hole in Georgia and Alabama that will be hard to mend.
Hood has little or no baggage, and will escape me. He can not invade
Tennessee, except to the west of Huntsville. I want the gunboats and
what troops are on the Tennessee to be most active up at the head of
navigation. I want General Wilson and General Mower with me, and
would like General McCook's division made up to twenty-five hundred
(2,500) men mounted. I will send back into Tennessee the Fourth
Corps, all dismounted cavalry, all sick and wounded, and all incum-
brances whatever, except what I can haul in our wagons, and will prob-
ably, about November 1st, break up the railroad and bridges, destroy At-
lanta, and make a break for Mobile, Savannah, or Charleston. I want you
to remain in Tennessee, and take command of all my division not actually
present with me. Hood's army may be set down at forty thousand
(40,000) of all arms fit for duty ; he may follow me or turn against you.
If you can defend the Line of the Tennessee in my absence of three (3)
months, is all I ask.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
MAKCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 181
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 26, 1S64.
Major-General Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. :
A reconnoissance pushed down to Gadsden to-day reveals the fact that
the rebel army is not there, and the chances are it has moved west. If it
turns up at Guntersville, I will be after it; but if it goes, as I believe, to
Decatur and beyond, I must leave it to you at present, and push for the
heart of Georgia. All I want is to get my sick and wounded back to a
safe place. I start the Fourth Corps back to-morrow, via Muston's and
"Valley Head, ordering it to Bridgeport or Chattanooga, according to what
orders Stanley may have from you. Stanley will have about fifteen
thousand (15,000) men. Beaureguard may attempt Tennesse from the di-
rection of Muscle Shoals, but when he finds me pushing for Macon, Mil-
ledgeville, etc., he will turn back. I send you a copy of my order giving
you supreme command in my absence.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Nashville, October 26, 1864 — 2 p. m.
Major-General Sherman :
General Granger telegraphs me again, to-day, that Hood's army is threat-
ening to cross the Tennessee river at various places between Guntersville
and Decatur. I have sent down to him all the reinforcements I have to
spare at this time. Have you any information that Hood has moved with
bis army in the direction indicated in these reports ?
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General.
[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 105.]
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Gaylesville, Ala., October 26, 1864.
In the event of military movements or the accidents of war separating
the general in command from his military division, Major-General Geo.
H. Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, will exer-
cise command over all troops and garrisons not absolutely in the presence
of the general-in-chief. The commanding generals of the departments,
Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee, will forthwith send abstracts of their
returns to General Thomas, at Nashville, in order that he may understand
the position and distribution of troops; and General Thomas may call
for such further reports as he may require, disturbing the actual condition
of affairs and mixing up the troops of separate departments as little as
possible consistent with the interests of the service.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.
L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.
182 MAECH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
Headquarters Department of the Cumrerland,.
Nashville, November 1, 1864 — 9.30 A. m.
Brigadicr-GeneralJno. F. Croxton, Shoal Creek, via Pulaski:
Your dispatch of yesterday, reporting your position on Shoal creek, re-
d Hold that position as long as possible, so as to enable General
Stanley to get into position at Pulaski. Should you be compelled to fall
back do so with the view of covering Stanley's march from Athens. I
ha v, .'ordered General Hatch to co-operate with you. Acknowledge receipt
and report state of affairs. geq r THQMASf
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding-
Nashville, November 1, 1864 — 7 p. m.
Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. :
Your dispatch of 11.30 a. m. this date, received. General Croxton re-
ports that last night he held the fords of Shoal creek, eight miles east
and ni no miles north of Florence, and that he will retard the enemy as
long as possible. Stanley's troops are now arriving at Pulaski. I hope
they will all be there at 12 m. to-morrow.
I have halted General Hatch at Pulaski, and he is co-operating with
General Croxton against the enemy. If I had General Schofield, should
feel perfectly easy. I have given such instructions as ought to expedite
his arrival. It will be necessary to hold the usual guards on the railroad
until the troops can pass over. I will give instructions to have them con-
centrated as soon as the troops have passed. I despair of getting any
troops from Missouri in time to be of any service. None of my tele-
grams have been answered by General Eosecrans. Be assured I will do-
the best I can. m „^,,.^,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Rome, Ga., November 1, 1864.
Lieutenant-General XI. S. Grant, City Point, Va. :
As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is now in the
full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my communications
and defeat this army. His infantry, about thirty thousand (30,000), with
Wheeler's and Roddy's cavalry, from seven to ten thousand (7,000 to
10,000), are now in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and
the water being low, are able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scat-
tered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee, and Gen-
eral Thomas reports the capture by him of a gunboat and five trans-
ports. General Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski, Stanley's corps,
about fifteen thousand (15,000) strong, and Schofield's corps, ten thousand
(10,000), en route by rail, and has at least twenty to twenty-five thousand
(20,000 to 25,000) men, with new regiments and conscripts arriving all
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 183
the time; also, General Rosecrans promises the two divisions of Smith
and Mower, belonging to me, but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in
less than ten (10) days. If I were to let go Atlanta and North Georgia,
and make for Hood, he would, as he did here, retreat to the southwest,
leaving his militia, now assembling at Macon and Griffin, to occupy our
conquests, and the work of last summer would be lost. I have retained
about fifty thousand (50,000) good troops, and have sent back full twenty-
five thousand (25,000), and have instructed General Thomas to hold de-
fensively Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all fortified and provis-
ioned for a long siege. I will destroy all the railroads of Georgia, and do
as much substantial damage as is possible, reaching the seacoast near one
of the points hitherto indicated, trusting that Thomas, with his present
troops, and the influx of new regiments promised, will be able in a few
days to assume the offensive.
Hood's cavalry may do a good deal of damage, and I have sent Wilson
back with all dismounted cavalry, retaining only about four thousand
five hundred (4,500). This is the best I can do, and shall, therefore,
when I get to Atlanta the necessary stores, move south as soon as pos-
sible.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
Citt Point, November 1, 1864 — 6 p. m.
Major-General Sherman :
Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to
entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign ? With
Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I
believed, and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the
neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now
that he is so far away, he might look upon the chase as useless, and he
will go in one direction while you are pushing the other. If you can see
the chance for destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make
your other move secondary.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieidenant-General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 2, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, City Point, Va. :
If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my
movements, I have thrown Beauregard well to the west, and Thomas will
have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until reinforcements
meet him from Missouri and recruits. Wo have now ample supplies at
Chattanooga and Atlanta to stand a month's interruption to our com-
munications, and I do n't belive the Confederate army can reach our lines,
save by cavalry raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate
184 MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC.
that. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow me in my
contemplated movement through Georgia.
F W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
City Point, Va., November 2, 1864—11.30 a. m.
Major-General Sherman :
Your dispatch of 9 a. m. yesterday is just received. I dispatohed you
the same date advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far
north, ought to be looked upon more as the object. With the force, how-
ever, you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of
Hood, and destroy him. I really do not see that you can withdraw from
where you are, to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in
territory. I say, then, go on as you propose.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 10, 1864.
General Thomas, Nashville :
Your dispatch of 5 p. m. is received. All will be ready to start from
here the day after to-morrow. Keep me well advised. I think you will
find Hood marching off, and you should be I'eady to follow him. Decatur,
Tuscaloosa, Columbus, and Selma are all good points to forage and feed
an army.
Let me keep Beauregard busy, and the people of the South will realize
his inability to protect them.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field, Kingston, Ga., November 11, 1864.
Major-General Thomas, Nashville, Tenn. :
Dispatch of to-night received. All right. I can hardly believe Beau-
regard would attempt to work against Nashville, from Corinth as a base,
at this stage of the war, but all information seems to point that way. If
he does, you will whip him out of his boots ; but I rather think you will
find commotion in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned
Rome, and in two more will burn Atlanta, and he must discover that I
am not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart of
Georgia. About a division of rebel cavalry made its appearance this
morning south of the Coosa river, opposite Rome, and fired on the rear-
guard, as it withdrew. Also, two days ago, some of Iverson's cavalry —
about eight hundred (800)— approached Atlanta from the direction of De-
catur, with a section of guns, and swept round toward Whitehall, and
disappeared in the direction of Rough and Ready. These also seem to
MARCH TO THE NORTH, ETC. 185
indicate that Beauregard expected us to retreat. I hear of about fifteen
hundred (1,500) infantry down at Carrollton, and also some infantry at
Jonesboro, but what numbers I can not estimate. These are all the en-
emy I know to be in this neighborhood, though a rumor is that Breckin-
ridge has arrived with some from West Virginia. To-morrow I begin the
movement laid down in my Special Field Order No. 115, and shall keep
things moving thereafter. By to-morrow morning all trains will be at or
north of Kingston, and you can have the exclusive use of all the rolling
stock. By using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalry in your
fortifications, you will have Schofield and Stanley and. A. J. Smith,
strengthened by eight or ten new regiments and all of Wilson's cavalry.
You can safely invite Beauregard across the Tennessee, and prevent his
ever returning. I still believe, however, that the public clamor will force
him to turn, and follow me; in which event, you should cross at Decatur,
and move directly toward Selma, as far as you can transport supplies.
The probabilities are the wires will be broken to-morrow, and that all
communication will cease between us ; but I have directed the main wire
to be left, and will use it if possible, and wish you to do the same. You
may act, however, on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16th,
with about sixty thousand (60,000) men, well provisioned, but expecting to
live liberally on the country.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major- General.
CHAPTER XXXIV. .
THE RESISTANCE TO GENERAL HOOD'S ADVANCE FROM THE TEN-
NESSEE RIVER, CULMINATING IN THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.
The responsibility of repelling General Hood was now
thrown upon General Thomas, and the most stupendous in-
terests turned upon his success. Not in figure, but in fact, the
territory gained by all the battles in Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Georgia was in jeopardy. The peril was not such as is in-
evitable when two equal armies meet in battle, but such as is
intertwined with the contingencies of improvising an army
against a bold invasion. It is true that General Thomas ex-
pressed himself hopefully in his last dispatch to General Sher-
man, but his assurance was based upon the fact that General
Smith's forces were then due at Nashville, and the expectation
that his cavalry would be speedily remounted, and that the
coming of the promised reinforcements from the North would
not be delayed. In these expectations he was disappointed,
and the situation in Tennessee was most unpromising during
the month of November. General Hood's army was stronger
than when, under General Johnston, in May, it boldly con-
fr< >nted a hundred thousand men. His three corps of infantry,
under Generals Lee, Cheatham, and Stewart, comprised from
forty to forty-five thousand men, and his cavalry corps from
ten to fifteen thousand, under Forrest, one. of the boldest gen-
erals in the South. Against this compact army, at least fifty
tin una n d strong, General Thomas had a movable army of
twenty-two thousand infantry and four thousand three hun-
dred cavalry. He had, in addition, the garrisons at Chatta-
nooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, Huntsville, Decatur, Murfrees-
boro, and Nashville, and the detachments in block-houses
(186)
BATTLE OF FRAXKLIX, ETC. 187
on the railroads ; but it was not considered safe to withdraw
the troops from either of the two railroads leading from. Nash-
ville to the Tennessee river, until General Hood should indi-
cate his line of advance. General Hood, with the exception
of Forrest's raid in West Tennessee, confined himself to oper-
ations near Florence, during the first half of the month. His
main reason for clinging to the Tennessee river was doubtless
the uncertain attitude of General Sherman in Georgia. He
may have still hoped that reinforcements from the other side
of the Mississippi might join him as previously anticipated.
But though refraining from positive offense, he was preparing
for it. His forces which crossed the Tennessee river on the
20th of October, drove back General Croxton and covered the
laying of a pontoon bridge. Lee's corps soon after crossed and
intrenched, having cavalry in front. November 4th, General
Croxton was driven across Shoal creek, but the enemy ad-
vanced no farther. General Hatch, with his division of cav-
alry, joined General Croxton on the line of Shoal creek on
the 7th, and these officers then watched closely and reported
the movements of the enemy. Wishing to ascertain the ene-
my's strength in his front, General Hatch crossed the creek on
the 11th, and drove back the enenry's cavalry upon the in-
fantry, and ascertained that there was a large force on the
Waynesboro road. The next day telegraphic communication
between General Sherman and General Thomas was severed ;
and as soon as it was thus known that General Sherman had
started on his great expedition, there was the most anxious
watching in Hood's front, in the endeavor to ascertain how
the " march to the sea " would affect the situation in Tennes-
see. The alternative to General Thomas and his little army
was the defensive in Tennessee, or the offensive in Alabama,
accordingly as Hood should advance or retreat, and all were
eager for the development of his intentions. Generals Hatch
and Croxton watched closely for decisive indications, and
although the high stage of water in the Tennessee delayed a
general advance, it was soon evident that such a movement .
was meditated. To delay Hood's advance as much as pos-
sible, General Hatch obstructed the roads crossing Shoal
creek, and sent rafts down the swollen river to break his
188 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
bridges. Reports were current, subsequently, that his bridges
did part, and from this or other causes, he did not complete
the transfer of his army to the north bank until the 19th,
when his movement was completely developed. Colonel
Coon, commanding General Hatch's right brigade, crossed
Shoal creek, which still separated the opposing cavalry, had
a severe conflict, and did not return until he had discovered
the advancing infantry. The possibility of General Hood fol-
lowing General Sherman was now at an end.
Up to this time General Thomas had hoped that the enemy
would be so delayed, that he could concentrate his forces to
give battle south of Duck river, but this was now plainly im-
possible. General Smith had not arrived, new regiments had
not come as fast as old ones had been discharged upon expira-
tion of terms of service, and the dismounted cavalry had made
but little headway in securing horses, arms, and accouterments.
His only resource then was to retire slowly, and delay the
enemy's advance, to gain time for reinforcements to arrive
and concentrate. It was hoped that the state of the roads
would prevent the advance of infantry, but Hood appreciated
the effect of delay, and pressed forward. He advanced on the
19th, on the Waynesboro and Butter Creek roads, with his
cavalry mainly on his left. The direction of his advance indi-
cated that he would strike Columbia, rather than Pulaski, and
General Thomas authorized General Schofield to move to the
former place, if Hood's approach to that point should be
developed. General Hatch concentrated his division at Lex-
ington, and on the 21st, withdrew to Lawrenceburg, where he
was attacked the following; morning-.
A severe fight continued through the day, but General Hatch
held the position against a heavy force of cavalry, with nine
pieces of artillery in action. The same day, General Schofield
commenced the removal of the public property from Pulaski,
preparatory to falling back to Columbia, and moved with the
divisions of Generals Cox and Wagner to Lynnville, the latter
covering the passage of the trains. The next day General Cox
advanced ten miles toward Columbia, and General Stanley, with
the divisions of Generals Wood and Kimball, reached Lynnville.
Colonel Capron was before the enemy on the Mount Pleasant
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 189
road, and Generals Hatch and Croxton covered the movement
from Pulaski, the latter having a severe fight at the junction
of the roads to Pulaski and Campbellsville, maintaining his po-
sition and retiring at leisure by night to Campbellsville.
In the meantime, General Thomas made dispositions looking
to the defense of the line of Duck river, and the Nashville and
Chattanooga railroad. He ordered the two brigades of Gen-
eral Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps to move from
Johnson ville — one by rail through Nashville to Columbia, and
the other by road through "Waverly — to occupy the crossings
of Duck river at Williamsport, Gordon's ferry, and Centerville.
General Granger was instructed to withdraw his command from
Decatur, Athens, and Huntsville, and reinforce the garrisons
of Stevenson and Murfreesboro, to protect the Nashville and
Chattanooga railroad. He sent Colonel Yon Schrader, his
inspector-general, to Chattanooga to assist in the organization
of the detached troops belonging to General Sherman's army,
and another officer — Lieutenant M. J. Kelley — to Paducah, to
hasten the coming of General Smith. His engineers were busy
with the construction of fortifications at various points, espe-
cially at Nashville, while effort was made to provide pontoon
trains in room of those which had gone to Savannah.
General Hood's rapid advance from Florence had been made
with the hope of cutting off General Schofield from Columbia,
and barely failed in this object, as the national troops gained
the place by a night march. General Stanley, having been in -
formed after midnight that Colonel Capron had been driven
from Mount Pleasant by an infantry force, roused his corps
and hastened toward Columbia, twenty-one miles distant. Gen-
eral Cox started at the same hour, and reached Columbia in
time to save Capron from defeat and the town from capture.
"When within three miles of Columbia, General Cox crossed
to the Mount Pleasant road and intercepted the enemy's forces,
which were pressing Capron back upon the town. As the di-
visions of the Fourth Corps arrived, they formed in line of bat-
tle south of Duck river and intrenched. General Hatch was
attacked at Campbellsville by cavalry supported by infantry.
Colonel Wells, commanding first brigade, at first repulsed the
enemy, but subsequently the whole command was compelled
190 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
to retire to Lynn vi lie ; there the fighting was continued until
after dark, when General Hatch withdrew to Columbia.
With a view to check the enemy and hold the place, heavy
works were thrown up before Columbia, and the cavalry, Gen-
eral Wilson commanding in person, was disposed to watch
against turning movements up and down the river. Hatch's
division and Croxton's brigade were stationed on the Shelby -
ville road, six miles east of Columbia, and Capron's brigade at
Rally Hill, on the Lewisburg turnpike. Colonel Stewart, with
three regiments from Hatch's division, was sent to the right to
the lords between Columbia and Williamsport ; Capron's bri-
gade, and the Eighth Iowa and Seventh Ohio Cavalry regiments
were here formed into a provisional division under command
of General R. W. Johnson.
During the 24th and 25th, the enemy skirmished before Co-
lumbia, but showed nothing but dismounted cavalry, until the
20th, when his infantry appeared, and during that day and the
next lie pressed the lines, but made no assault. General Scho-
field constructed an interior line of works, but these were soon
regarded as untenable, as the enemy manifested an intention
to pass round the position. An effort was made to cross to the
north bank the night of the 26th, but failed on account of a
severe storm and entire darkness. The night following, the
movement was accomplished, and General Schofield left Gen-
eral Ruger to hold the crossing at the railroad bridge ; placed
( reneral Cox's division before the town, and directed General
Stanley to station his corps on the Franklin turnpike, in read-
iness to meet the enemy should he attempt to cross near Co-
lumbia. These dispositions were made by General Schofield
in hope that he could hold the line of Duck river, until
reinforcements should arrive ; but the promised reinforce-
ments had not reached Nashville. General Thomas had re-
ceived twelve thousand raw troops, and had sent North,
either on final discharge or to vote, fifteen thousand veterans.
General Smith had not come, and only one thousand cavalry
had found horses and the front. General Thomas had ob-
tained permission to call upon the governors of the Western
States lor troops, but was cautioned to use such troops spar-
ingly.
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 191
The 28th was passed in quietness, at Columbia, though
there were palpable indications that quietness there meant ac-
tivity in another quarter. At noon the enemy's cavalry ap-
peared at various fords, between Columbia and the Lewisburg
turnpike, in such force as to indicate plainly the purpose to
cross. General Hood's cavalry was especially massed at
Huey's Mills, eight miles above Columbia, and having there
driven in General Wilson's pickets, began to pass over the
river. At 2.10 p. m. General Wilson notified General Scho-
iield of the enemy's movements, and informed him that he
would concentrate his cavalry at Hunt's creek, on the Lewis-
burg turnpike, expressing the belief that the enemy would
swing in between them and strike the road to Franklin, at
Spring Hill.
General Wilson's cavalry detachments, at the various fords,
held their respective positions as long as possible, but all were
finally driven back, and it was then evident that three divisions
•of cavalry— Chalmers', Buford's, and Jackson's— had crossed
Duck river. By 7 p. m. General Wilson had concentrated his
command, as far as practicable, at Hart's Cross-roads. Major
Young, of the Fifth Iowa Cavalry, commanding detachments,
was intercepted, but cut his way through the enemy's lines
with trifling loss. During the night General Wilson ascer-
tained that General Forrest was moving toward Franklin,
and also that General Hood's infantry forces were expected to
cross before morning. In view of the palpable peril, he ad-
vised General Schofield to withdraw to Franklin, and sug-
gested that his command should be at Spring Hill by 10 a. m.
the next day. When General Thomas was informed of the
probable state of things at Columbia, he directed General
Schofield to withdraw to Franklin, as soon as he should gain
certain knowledge of the reported movements of the enemy.
And very soon afterward, at 3.30 a. m. on the 29th, he directed
him to withdraw from Columbia, as by this time he was con-
vinced that General Hood had turned General Schofield's
position.
The situation at Columbia on the morning of the 29th, and
during that day, was exceedingly critical. General Hood's
infantry forces were crossing the river during all the early
192 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
hours, at Huey's Mills, on a road leading directly to Spring
Hill ; his cavalry forces had very early cut off all communica-
tion between Generals Schofield and Wilson, and were press-
ing the latter back upon Franklin, on the Lewisburg turn-
pike, General Wilson having chosen this line of retreat as
the one upon which he could best resist General Forrest, and
cover the retirement of the infantry on the direct road from
Columbia to Franklin.
To develop the facts fully, before withdrawing altogether
from Columbia, General Schofield directed General "Wood to
Bend a brigade up the river to watch the enemy ; ordered Gen-
eral Stanley to move with two of his divisions to Spring Hill,
to hold that point and cover the trains and spare artillery ; left
General Cox to guard the crossing at Columbia, and ordered
Ruger's division to take position on the turnpike, in rear of
Rutherford's creek, leaving one regiment to hold the ford at
Columbia, near the railroad bridge — this bridge having been
partially destroyed and all the others entirely.
General Wood sent Post's brigade early, to reconnoiter up
the river; and at 8 a. m. General Stanley moved toward
Spring Hill with Wagner's and Kimball's divisions. Before
reaching Rutherford's creek, four miles distant, he learned
that the enemy was crossing infantry and trains above Colum-
bia, and was moving to the north on a converging road which
touched General Schofield's line of retreat at Spring Hill.
Apprehending that the forces that Colonel Post reported to be
crossing the river might make a flank attack upon the troops
between Duck river and Rutherford's creek, he halted Kim-
ball's division and formed it facing east, and then proceeded
to Spring Hill with Wagner's division. When within two
miles of the place, at 11.30 a. m., he was informed that the
enemy's cavalry was approaching from the direction of Rally
Hill. The noise of firing east of the village immediately
called the division to rapid motion, and the town was gained
in time to meet the enemy, who was driving back a small force
of national toops, composed of infantry and cavalry. Colonel
Opdycke immediately deployed his brigade and drove back
the enemy's cavalry, when General Stanley threw forward the
division to hold the town and protect the trains. Opdycke's
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 193
and Lane's brigades were deployed to cover such space as
served to park the wagons, and Bradley's was advanced to
hold a wooded knoll nearly a mile to the east, which com-
manded the approaches from that direction.
At the time these dispositions were made, it was not known
that heavy forces of infantry were near ; but this fact was soon
after developed by a fierce assault upon General Bradley. The
nature of the attack, confirming the jirst reports of the ad-
vance of the Confederate army to the cast of Columbia, gave
demonstration of the greatest peril, not only to General Stan-
ley, but to the four divisions behind him. General Hood's
columns had now passed General Schofield's left flank, and
were enveloping a single division, twelve miles in his rear, or
twelve miles in advance, when he should face to the north to
retreat.
"When the enemy's infantry attacked General Bradley from
the east, his cavalry on the west of the town threatened the
railroad station, and then fell upon a small train, composed of
some baggage-wagons, at Thompson's Station, three miles north.
About the same time, General Stanley received a dispatch
from General Schofield, confirming the reports that had first
indicated the strategy of General Hood, and led him to fear
that a heavy force was enveloping his position. He could not
therefore reinforce General Bradley, lest he should thereby
expose his trains to capture or destruction.
General Bradley repulsed two fierce attacks, but in the third
his right flank was overlapped by the enemy's line, and he was
compelled to fall back to the town, where his shattered bri-
gade was rallied and reformed. The enemy followed, but fell
under the fire of eight pieces of artillery, at good range for
spherical case shot, and was also taken in flank by a section
on the turnpike, south of the town. A portion of the attack-
ing troops then fled to the rear, and other portions sought
cover in a ravine between the opposing lines. General Stan-
ley reported Bradley's loss at one hundred and fifty men killed
and wounded, and the enemy's at five hundred. General
Bradley received a severe wound while encouraging his men
VOL. II — 13
194 BATTLE OF FRANKLIX, ETC.
to resist the last attack, and the command of the brigade
passed to Colonel Conrad.
As darkness fell, the enemy's lines were extended until a
corps of infantry was in order of battle facing the Franklin road.
Two other corps were near a little later, one deployed also, and
Forrest's troopers were on the main road, both north and
south of Spring Hill. It seemed hardly possible in this post-
ure of affairs that General Schofield's forces and trains could
elude tlii* involution by General Hood's army, and yet this
result was achieved without a serious contest.
During the day, the enemy covered his movement past
General Schofield's left to his rear by earnest efforts, as Gen-
eral Schofield believed, to force a crossing and lay a pontoon
bridge at Columbia, that he might thus secure a passage for
his artillery, which was impracticable at Huey's Mills. His
repeated attacks were all repulsed by General Cox, and at 3
p. m. General Schofield became satisfied that the enemy would
not attack on Duck river, but was moving two corps directly
to Spring Hill. He then gave orders for the withdrawal of all
the troops when darkness would cover the movement, and
with General Ruger's division hastened forward to open com-
munications with General Stanley. At dark, he brushed away
the enemy's cavalry from the road, three miles south of Stan-
ley, and joined him at 7 p. m. Whittaker's brigade of Kim-
ball's division followed Ruger's closely from Rutherford's
creek, and upon arrival was posted parallel to the turnpike,
where the enemy's left rested within eight hundred yards of
the road, to cover the passage of the troops still in the rear.
General Schofield, leaving the management of the march and
the safety of the trains to General Stanley, then moved again
with Ruger's division to clear the road to Franklin. As he
approached Thompson's Station, the enemy's cavalry disap-
peared, and then the road was open from Columbia to Frank-
lin, though an army of at least fifty thousand men was in
closest proximity to it, and along its front four divisions and
an immense train were at rest or in motion, and yet there was
only slight skirmishing here and there, and occasional picket-
firing. There was momentary expectation that this great
army would take a step forward, and press troops, artillery, and
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 195
trains from the road in confusion and rout; but still the move-
ment went on without interruption by the enemy.
Having cleared the road at Thompson's Station, General
Schofield returned to Spring Hill to make arrangements and
dispositions to avert his extreme peril. He did not anticipate
the possibility of his getting his army out of the reach of the
enemy that night, and feared that he would be forced to fight
a general battle the next day, or lose his wagon train. In the
emergency he had dispatched a staff officer to Franklin to
bring forward the command of General A. J. Smith, which he
supposed had reached Franklin.
At 11 p. m. General Thomas, believing that General Scho-
field had, in obedience to his order of 3.30 a. m., withdrawn
from Columbia earlier in the day, telegraphed to him at Frank-
lin to withdraw from that place also, should the enemy attempt
to get on his flank with infantry. As General Smith's troops
had not yet arrived at Nashville, he considered it necessary,
should the enemy advance quickly upon General Schofield, to
concentrate his forces at Nashville.
General Cox left Columbia at 7 p. m., followed by General
Wood, and the latter by General Kimball. There was some
delay at Rutherford's creek, as the bridge was inadequate for
the emergency, but nevertheless the divisions, one after an-
other, arrived at Spring Hill — the foremost of the three at 11
p. m. The enemy's pickets fired into the column frequently,
but when they did not come upon the road, the national troops
gave no response. The enemy was so close to the road, that
when a column was not moving upon it, it was difficult for a
single horseman to pass.
The danger did not end with the arrival of the last division
at Spring Hill. It was 1 a. m. before a train of eight hundred
wagons, including artillery and ambulances, could move to-
ward Franklin, in rear of Cox's division, as at starting the
wagons had to pass singly over a bridge. This caused delay,
and consequently peril, as an attack was inevitable, unless the
train and troops could be put on the road and in motion be-
fore daylight. General Stanley was advised to burn at least a
portion of the wagons, to avoid an attack, but he determined
to save all, if practicable. At 3 a. m. an attack upon the head
196 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
of the train, north of Thompson's, was reported, and all
wagons on the road were stopped until General Kimball could
rush forward to clear the road, and General Wood deploy his
division on the east of the road. The attack was repulsed by
Major Steele, with stragglers that he had gathered together,
and then the train, bereft of ten wagons burned by the enemy,
moved on, with Wood's division on the right and Wagner's
in the rear. At 5 a. m. the last wagon crossed the bridge, and
then all was in motion. The enemy's cavalry was on the hills
to the right for awhile, and made one or two dashes, but these
were easily repulsed by Wood's skirmishers, with the help, at
one time, of a section of Canby's battery. Colonel Opdycke's
brigade formed the rear-guard, and though skirmishing
with tin- pursuing forces of the enemy, kept them so well in
check as to save the weary and lame from capture. Rarely
has an army escaped so easily from a peril so threatening. It
has been accepted as true that General Hood ordered one corps
general and then another to attack the national troops when
passing so near the front of his army, at Spring Hill; but
these generals disobeyed the orders, so plainly imperative from
the situation itself, as well as from the voice of the com-
mander-in-chief. From whatever cause the failure resulted,
the opportunity of the campaign was lost to the Confederate
army.
General Schofield, with the head of his column, reached
Franklin before daylight, and he immediately made prepara-
tion to pass the Harpeth river, as he had been ordered by
General Thomas to fall behind this stream. The railroad
bridge was fitted as rapidly as possible for the passage of
wagons, and a foot-bridge was constructed, which also proved
adequate for them. General Schofield's aim was to get his
train and artillery over the river before the enemy could at-
tack him, but he nevertheless instructed General Cox to put
the troops in line around the town, as the several divisions
should arrive. The Twenty-third Corps formed the left and
center — Cox's division on the left with its left flank ou the
river, Ruger's on its right, and Kimball's completing the cir-
cuit to the river on the right. Wood's division crossed to the
north bank to be directed to the support of either flank in the
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 197
event of a turning movement, and Wagner's was left in front
to check the enemy, should he form his army to attack. Colonel
Opdycke reached the heights two miles south of the town at
noon, and was ordered to halt to observe the enemy. Crox-
ton's brigade of cavalry was pushed back by infantry on the
Lewisburg turnpike, and at 1 p. M. Colonel Opdycke re-
ported heavy columns of infantry advancing on the Columbia
and Lewisburg roads, when the division was withdrawn to
the more immediate front of the army on the Columbia road.
Colonel Opdycke, at his own notion, came inside the main line,
and halted his brigade on the Columbia road in rear of the
junction of the right and left flanks of Cox's and Ruger's di-
visions of the Twenty-third Corps.
The line as formed, was about one mile and a half long,
inclosing the town, except on the north where the Harpeth
river was the boundary, with its flanks touching the river.
The line rested on a slight elevation, or series of low hills,
which encompassed the town. The troops threw up breast-
works, and a slight abatis was also constructed in places.
The artillery of the Twenty-third Corps was on the north side
of the river, and a portion of it placed in Fort Granger — a
fortification previously constructed so as to command the rail-
road, which leaves the town near the river, and runs in paral-
lelism with it for some distance. The batteries of the Fourth
Corps were held on the south side, some of them having been
placed on the line and others in reserve. The Sixth Ohio Light
Artillery and the First Kentucky battery were in position
on the right and left of the Columbia road, before the bat-
tle opened. Battery "M," t Fourth United States Artillery,
and battery " G," First Ohio Light Artillery, were placed
with the left brigade of the Twenty -third Corps, and Bridge's
battery, Illinois Light Artillery, was posted in the center of
Strickland's brigade of Ruger's division. The position was a
good one for defense, and the undulations of the ground in
front exposed the enemy in approaching. The key-point was
Carter's Hill on the Columbia road, and was opposite the cen-
ter of General Hood's army, which was advancing on the
Lewisburg, Columbia, and Carter's Creek turnpikes.
General Croxton resisted the enemy's infantry on the Lewis-
198 BATTLE OF FRAXKLIX, ETC.
burg road until 2 P. M., when, having learned that Forrest was
moving to his left, as if to cross at Hughes' ferry, he crossed
at McGarock's ford. He had hardly gained the north bank
before it was reported that the enemy's cavalry were endeavor-
ing to cross at several points above Franklin. General Wil-
son now threw his whole force before General Forrest, and
held him in check during the day and following night, in
some cases driving back detachments after they had succeeded
in crossing the river. Had General Forrest succeeded in
crossing with his whole force, he could have caused a heavy
detachment of forces from the little army to protect the trains
already in motion toward Nashville, in anticipation of the
withdrawal of the army from Franklin at 6 p. m., should Gen-
eral Hood make no attack.
At the time that General Croxton was forced to cross the
river. General Hood's infantry began to appear in great force
in front of Wagner's two brigades, but it was not believed by
the ranking generals of the national army, until 4 p. m., that he
would attempt to carry the position by assault. But at this
hour his army emerged from the woods, in splendid array,
heavily massed on the Columbia road, two corps in front and
one in reserve, and soon brushed away the two brigades of
Wagner's division, posted in extreme exposure on the plain,
opposite the massive center of the Confederate army. Gen-
eral Wagner had been instructed to check the enemy with
these brigades, without involving them in an engagement with
superior forces, but had, notwithstanding, directed their com-
manders, Colonels Conrad and Lane, to hold their position as
long as possible. Conscious of their extreme peril they threw
up barricades, and when General Hood finally advanced
against them with his main lines, uncovered by skirmishers,
their effort to check him precipitated a conflict so unequal as
to have been hopeless from the first. When broken by the
attack of an army, they fell back in great haste and disorder,
and formed a shield for the enemy following upon their steps.
The veteran troops mainly succeeded in reaching the main
line of the national army, but a large portion of the raw
troops were captured. The pursued and the pursuers broke
through the intrenched line in company, carrying away por-
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 199
tions of Reilley's brigade, on the right of General Cox's divis-
ion, and Strickland's, on the left of General Ruger's. And
thus, without conflict on the immediate front of the national
army or on the parapet, General Hood gained a lodgment at
the key-point of the position, and commanded the direct ap-
proach to the bridges. He had gained this advantage, almost
without firing a shot, after the rout of Conrad and Lane, and
without receiving one, except that a portion of the troops of the
brigade of the latter, having loaded guns, wheeled and fired
as they crossed the intrench ments. Such an advantage, to an
army of more than double the strength of the divisions
holding the position, according to the precedents of war, was
decisive of complete victory. But in this case it was not,
though at first it seemed to be entirely so. The enemy's cen-
ter, made strong to thrust itself through the national line,
had gained its immediate objective, and commenced at once
to use two captured batteries in enfilading the national line,
right and left, to double each fraction upon the flanks, and
grasp the bridges between them. Two of the three brigades of
Vaguer' s division, the only troops south of the river not in
the main line, were so shattered that they could not be rallied
for the emergency, and every moment of delay in attacking
the enemy's forces that had gained the center, permitted their
reinforcement from his rear lines. The teams from the cap-
tured batteries galloped to the rear, and intensified the im-
pression that the disaster was fatal. Conrad's brigade had
entered the intrenchments near the Columbia road, and on the
right of this road the enemy gained at the first dash three or
four hundred yards of the line. Lane's brigade had crossed'
the parapet several hundred yards to the right, without dis-
turbing the troops at that point, and its volley had a marked
effect upon the enemy. Toward the breach, the enemy's
heavy central lines began at once to press, and to it his lateral
lines were turned, in seemingly overwhelming convergence.
To General Hood, the advantage so easily gained, promised
the capture or destruction of the national army, and he and
his army were inspired to quickest action to maintain and
utilize it for this grand achievement. And he certainly could
have maintained his hold of the national line, and used it for
200 BATTLE OF FRANKLIX, ETC.
extreme success, had time been given him to thrust into the
breach his rapidly-advancing and massive rear lines; and as
it was, he began to gain ground right and left from the Co-
lumbia road.
When General Stanley first heard the noise of battle, he
was with General Schoficld, at his headquarters on the north
bank of the river, a fifteen minutes' ride from Carter's Hill,
and was entertaining the conviction, from the strength of the
position and the former course of the enemy, that an assault
was entirely improbable. But as soon as an attack w T as indi-
cated to him and others, in their distant view, he rode rapidly
to his troops, and reached the left of Opdycke's brigade to find
that a disaster, seemingly prophetic of the overthrow of the
army, had came with the first onset of the enemy. In quick
provision for the emergency, he approached this one reserve
brigade, to order it to charge the enemy in the breach ; but
seeing its gallant commander in front of its center leading it
forward, he gave no orders, for none were needed, and taking
position on the left of the line, the corps and brigade com-
manders, with common purpose to hurl back the enemy and
restore the continuity of the line, cheered as they led this
heroic brigade. When Colonel Opdycke had first seen the
enemy within the intrenchments, he turned to his men from
the front of the center of his brigade, to find they had already
fixed bayonets for the encounter, which they plainly foresaw
would be desperate and decisive ; for they were veterans who
had charged the enemy on other fields, and yet they had never
been called by orders, soldierly instincts, or patriotism to such
a conflict as was now plainly before them. Their commander
saw, in this unbidden act of preparation, and in their eyes and
attitude, the response to his own purpose, and his ringing
order, " First brigade forward to the lines," was in harmony
with the stern will of every, officer and man of that brigade.
And when he dashed on the breach, he gave expression to the
courage and purpose of every man in that self-appointed for-
lorn hope, while those near General Stanley shouted: "We
can go where the general can." Opdycke rode forward until
he reached the enemy, followed closely by his brigade. He
first emptied his revolver, then clubbed it in the hand-to-hand
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 201
conflict, and as the deadly struggle raged more fiercely, he
dismounted and clubbed a musket. His men fought as did
their leader, and with bayonets baptized in blood, they hurled
the enemy from the intrenchments and saved the army. This
was one of the supreme moments of battle which heroes rec-
ognize, and by which only the bravest of the brave are in-
spired to deeds of daring, transcendent from motive and mo-
mentous results. Four regimental commanders fell in the
charge, but other officers of similar temper maintained the
gallant leadership. Colonel Oydycke, foremost in the charge
and throughout the ensuing conflict in the intrenchments, es-
caped injury. General Stanley also escaped for a time, but in
leaving this brigade to look after other dispositions, was pierced
in the neck by a bullet, and was compelled to leave the field.
Colonel Opdycke's brigade recaptured eight pieces of artil-
lery, and with them four hundred prisoners ; wrenched ten
battle-flags from the hands of the enemy, and left the ground
behind them strewn with a greater number, which dropped
under their blows. The number of prisoners and battle-flags,
shows most plainly that General Hood was holding the po-
sition with an exceedingly strong force.
The recaptured guns again changed the direction of their
missiles of death, while the sheet of flame from Opdycke's bri-
gade and others in reach revealed to the enemy the necessity
of other charges upon new and less promising conditions, or
the abandonment of the conflict. Opdycke's charge regained
nearly all the line that had been lost, but the enemy still held
a small salient to the right of the Columbia road, and to main-
tain this point and widen the breach, General Hood and his
subordinate commanders exerted themselves to the utmost.
In counter effort, small portions of Conrad's and Lane's bri-
gades were directed to Opdycke's support. The enemy's first
heavy line in his front was not more than fifty yards distant,
and in addition to a direct fire from this line, he was subjected
to an enfilading one from the troops still in the intrenchments
on his right. It was. next to impossible for his brigade to
maintain position under this deadly cross-fire, but yet, in
twenty minutes, through the vigorous support of troops on
right and left, the enemy was entirely expelled, and the con-
202 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
tinuity of the line re-established. Then, in seeming retribution
for General Schofield's escape at Spring Hill, and his own dis-
lodgment from his hope-giving grasp of the key-point of the
national line, General Hood repeated his assaults with the
expression of frenzied vengeance and valor. His subordinates,
with a recklessness of life in keeping with the charge of
( >pdycke and his heroic brigade, led their columns to the mus-
kets of the national troops, charging repeatedly, mainly at
Carter's Hill, and only desisted with the fall of night. In
leading a charge, General Cleburne, the most dashing division
commander in the Confederate army, fell upon the parapet in
front of Opdycke's brigade, and in the whole contest, five,
other generals were killed, six wounded, and one captured —
a fact which reveals how the columns of the enemy were led ;
while the loss of thirty-three battle-flags manifests the
strength of the columns which gained the national lines.
The defensive fire was so rapid from 4 p. m. to nightfall that
it was difficult to supply the troops with ammunition. One
hundred wagon-loads of artillery and infantry ammunition
were used from the Fourth Corps train alone, and this ex-
penditure wrought fearful havoc in the ranks of the enemy,
whose boldness placed them much of the time at short range.
Firing, of more or less severity, was maintained until nearly
midnight, the enemy continuing his activity to determine the
time of the withdrawal of the national army, and to embarras
such a movement.
General Hood buried seventeen hundred and fifty men on
the field. He had three thousand eight hundred so disabled
as to be placed in hospitals, and lost seven hundred and two
captured — an aggregate of six thousand two hundred and fifty-
two, exclusive of those slightly wounded.
General Schofield lost one hundred and eighty-nine killed,
one thousand and thirty-three wounded, and one thousand one
hundred and four missing — an aggregate of two thousand three
hund red and twenty-six. More than half of this loss was from
AVagncr's division, from the exposure of Conrad's and Lane's
brigades, and from the charge and subsequent fighting of Op-
dycke's brigade.
The battle of Franklin, for its proportions, was one of the
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
203
grandest of the war. The salient features of this battle were
the position and action of the two brigades posted in front of
the main line, and the gallantry of the third, after the enemy
had carried the intrcnchments on Carter's Hill.
The reports of Generals Schofield, Stanley, and Cox declare
that it was not the expectation that the brigades in front should
resist until they should be compromised in an engagement with
superior forces, and that General Wagner was so instructed.
Nevertheless, the two brigade commanders were instructed by
General Wagner to hold their position as long as possible, and
having been thus impressed with the necessity of extreme re-
sistance, they did not abandon their position until forced to do
so by the bayonets of the enemy, and then their hurried retreat
brought disaster to their own army. Their resistance, if not
prudent, was exceedingly gallant, and veterans and new troops
alike displayed the highest qualities of soldiers in confronting
in actual conflict an army of three corps, and deserve mention
in history as brave and heroic, under circumstances of extreme
trial and peril.
With regard to the second prominent feature of this battle,
it may be said that seldom in the history of war has a single
brigade* made itself so conspicuous in saving an army, and its
transcendent action must be accepted as proof that its previous
training and experience, and the manhood of its members had
given the morale— the elan requisite for such an emergency.
It was no new experience for Colonel Opdycke to ride in a
charge in advance of his men, for this he did in developing the
enemy in front of General Thomas' right, after the great dis-
aster at the battle of Chickamauga. He charged, too, with a
demi-brigade on Missionary Ridge, and with his regiment, the
One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, on Rocky Face Ridge,
and the officers and men of his brigade were meet for such a
leader. And General Stanley, sick as he was, manifested his
appreciation of the emergency as well as his personal gallantry,
in descending from the command of a corps to take the left
*This brigade comprised the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio; the
Twenty-fourth Wisconsin ; the Thirty-sixth, Fourty-fourth, Seventy-third,
Seventy-fourth, and Eighty-eighth Illinois regiments.
204 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
of a brigade, in an action plainly decisive of the battle. For
beyond all power of generalship to mold the battle or control
i t s issue, the simple charge of Opdycke's brigade stands in bold-
est relief.
The enemy having been repulsed and the trains transferred
to the north bank of the Harpeth river, the problem to solve
was the safe withdrawal of the army to Nashville. It was
still in General Hood's power, having great superiority in both
infantry and cavalry, to cross the river above General Scho-
field's position, and unless prevented by battle or withdrawal,
to throw his army between Franklin and Nashville. As to
the propriety of withdrawal, there was no question, either
with the general officers at Franklin, including General Scho-
field, or with General Thomas. So that the movement to the
rear, meditated before the battle, was commenced as soon as
the quietness of the enemy permitted. During the early part
of the night the artillery was transferred to the north bank,
and at midnight the army crossed the river without loss or
special hinderance. General Wood retained his position until
3 a. m., and then moved northward as the rear-guard of the
army. General Hood perceived the retirement early, and
though following closely, wrought no damage. General Wood
had destroyed the bridges before leaving position, and his divis-
ion in rear of the army, with Wilson's cavalry on its flanks,
was able to beat back General Hood's head of column, which
he could not under the circumstances make strong in time,
even to greatly harass so strong a force. With the exception
of a brush between Hammond's brigade of cavalry and some
portion of Forrest's command at Brentwood, the enemy pro-
voked no engagement, and the army marched quietly to Nash-
ville. The rear column reached that city at 1 p. m., and the
different corps were assigned to positions on the defensive line
which General Thomas had selected. The Twenty-third Corps,
under General Schofield, was assigned to the left, extending
to the Nolensville turnpike ; the Fourth Corps, General Wood
commanding, in room of General Stanley, disabled by his
wound, took position in the center; and the corps from the
" Army of the Tennessee," General A. J. Smith commanding,
BATTLE OF FRANKLIX, ETC. 205
having arrived the day before, held the right, with its flank
touching the river below the city.
In view of General Hood's superiority of force, his opera-
tions thus far had fallen behind just expectations. He had
allowed General Schofield to pass safely before his army, after
he had touched his communications, while he was yet at Co-
lumbia, and he had met most disastrous defeat at Franklin, in
assaults that could not be repeated with greater vigor. The
consequent depression in his army was doubtless excessive.
Thus far, none of the grand results of his northward march,
as announced with prophetic emphasis by Mr. Davis, had been
achieved, although General Sherman had swept southward
from Northern Georgia and on toward Savannah, with sixty-
five thousand men ; and the Confederate army, of which so
much had been expected, was now far from its base, thus far
defeated in the accomplishment of its great aims, with the
consciousness that the conditions of ultimate success were
passing day by day beyond the range of possibilities. To go
back would express total defeat; and before General Hood
was a fast-increasing army, posted on a strong defensive line,
with a deep river behind, and its key-points fortified early in
the war ; and as he could not at once go round Nashville, he
sat before the city and extended his lines in semblance of a
siege, which should last until General Thomas should be fully
ready to throw him upon the defensive.
General Thomas had hoped to deliver battle at some point
farther to the south; but his reinforcements had come too
slowly, and his cavalry horses had come as tardily as his acces-
sions of troops. His forces were not fully in hand, and those
that had fought their way from Columbia were physically ex-
hausted beyond the ordinary experience of veterans on long
marches and months under fire. During the seven days of
Hood's advance from the Tennessee, he had hurried his prep-
arations for the battle now palpably imminent. On the 29th
of November, he had ordered General Milroy to abandon
Tullahoma and retire to Murfreesboro, leaving a garrison in
the block-house at Elk River bridge. The same day, he had
ordered General Steedman, with a provisional division of five
thousand men, composed of detachments from the corps with
206 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
General Sherman and a brigade of colored troops, to move to
Nashville. Nashville had been placed in a state of defense;
additional fortifications had been constructed under the direc-
Bion of Brigadier-General Tower, and the whole had been
manned by the regular garrison, reinforced by a provisional
force, under Brevet Brigadier-General Donaldson, chief quar-
termaster, composed of the employes of the quartermaster
and commissary departments. No other forces were now ex-
pected, except the brigade of General Cooper, of Euger's
division, which having watched the fords of Duck river, below
Columbia, was now marching to Nashville by a detour to
evade the enemy. With the cavalry remounted, and this hete-
rogeneous force organized, General Thomas proposed to
assume the offensive and dispute with General Hood the pos-
session of Tennessee.
Nashville, November 12, 1864 — 8.30 a. m.
Major-General Sherman :
Your dispatch of 12 o'clock last night received. I have no fears that
Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you I
will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will then
thoroughly organize, and, I believe, shall have men enough to ruin him,
unless he gets out of the way very rapidly. The country of Middle Ala-
bama, I learn, is teeming with supplies this year, which will be greatly to
our advantage. I have no additional news to report from the direction
of Florence. I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's
army is near Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will at least have a
clear road before you for several days, and that your success will fully
equal your expectations.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major- General.
Vicksburg, November 8, 1864, via Cairo, November 14, 1864.
Major-General Sherman :
Major-General Thomas:
Your dispatch of October 30th was received yesterday. Hatch's divis-
ion of cavalry was at the Tennessee river at last account. Two infantry
divisions under General A. J. Smith, and a brigade of cavalry, are in Mis-
souri in pursuit of Price. They have been ordered to Memphis by nearest
route, but this is contingent on where the orders may reach them, and the
time uncertain. The effective field force left on the river is very light, and
the posts from Cairo to Natchez are held by small garrisons, but I will, to
the extent of my force, carry out your instructions. A demonstration of
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 207
three thousand cavalry from Baton Rouge promised into Lower Missis-
sippi. Magruder is moving in force on Major-General Steele, at Little
Rock. The enemy is threatening to (move on) cross to the east side of
the Mississippi, at Gaines' Landing, where Major-General Reynolds is
ready for them.
N. J. P. DANA,
Major-General.
IIeadquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 10, 1864 — 9 a. m.
Adjutant-General U.S. A., Washington, D. C. :
Please direct the return to this department immediately of all conva-
lescents belonging to the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twen-
tieth Army Corps, to report at Chattanooga, and those of the Fourth and
Twenty-third Army Corps to report at Decatur, Alabama. These men
were furloughed by direction of the War Department to permit them to
vote in their several States.
GEORGE II. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 11, 1864 — 11 a. m.
Major-General Stanley, Pulaski :
Have Capron make a scout out in the direction of Clifton, and ascertain
the truth of rumors which are constantly coming to these headquarters,
that a large force of the enemy's cavalry is on the Lawrenceburg road,
between Lawrenceburg and Columbia.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Nashville, November 14, 1864.
Brigadier-General Hatch, Tyler Springs via Pxdaski :
Your telegram of 2 a. m. to-day is received. Keep a good lookout.
Report all you observe, to General Schofield, at Pulaski, as well as myself.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Nashville, November 14, 1864.
Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, St. Louis :
Your dispatch received. Please send a courier to overtake Colonel
Winslow and direct him to this place, via Louisville, as rapidly as
he can.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major- Gen eral.
208 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
City Point, November 15, 1864 — 11 a. m.
Major-General Thomas, Nashville:
If Hood commences falling back, it will not do to wait for the full
equipment of your cavalry to follow. He should, in that event, be pressed
with such forces as vou can bring to bear upon him.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant- General.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 15, 1864 — 4 v. m.
Lieutenant- General Grant, City Point, Va. :
Your telegram of this morning just received. I am watching Hood
closelv, and, should he move after General Sherman, will follow him with
what force I can raise at hand. The reports this morning are that he is
moving in the direction of Waynesboro. A cavalry force has been sent
to ascertain the true state of facts.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 16, 1864 — 10 a. m.
Major-General Schqfield, Pulaski :
Your dispatch of yesterday just received. Send me the first reliable
news you have from Hatch. Smith telegraphed me two days ago, that
his troops had been delayed by bad roads and impassable streams, but
that he would make all possible speed. I can not say when he will be
here.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Headquarters Military Division of the West,
Tuscumbia, November 17, 1864.
General J. B. Hood, Commanding, etc., General :
General Beauregard directs me to say that he desires you will take the
offensive at the earliest practicable moment, and deal the enemy rapid
and vigorous blows, striking him whilst thus dispersed, and by this
means distract Sherman's advance into Georgia. . . .
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEORGE W. BRENT,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.
Cherokee, Ala., November 17, 1864 — 3.30 p. m.
Major-General Howell Cobb, Macon or Griffin, Ga. :
Have ordered General Taylor to send at once all troops he can possibly
spare, and General Hood to send immediately one brigade of Jackson's
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 209
cavalry division, or the whole division, if it can possibly be spared at this
juncture. A victory in Tennessee will relieve Georgia.
*********
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General.
Pulaski, November 18, 1864.
Major-General Thomas .
I have received no report from General Hatch this evening. His re-
port yesterday indicated that Hood was about to move, but I think there
is no probability of his moving this way while this weather continues.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major- General.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 19, 1864.
Major-General A. J. Smith, or commanding officer of troops en route for Nashville,
Paducah, Ky. :
Start for Nashville, via Cumberland river, as soon as possible after re-
ceiving this, with what troops you have, and leave orders for the balance
to follow the same route.
Acknowledge receipt,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 19, 1864 — 2.30 p. m.
Major-General Schofield, Pulaski :
If the enemy advance in force, as General Hatch believes, have every-
thing in readiness to fight him at Pulaski, if he advances on that place,
or cover the railroad and concentrate at Columbia. Should he attempt
to turn your right flank, in the latter case — that is, the attempt to turn
your right flank — General Hatch should cover the fords and ferries across
Duck river, and hold them when you concentrate at Columbia. Report
to me at once, should you be compelled to leave Pulaski, that I may give
the. necessary orders for the concentration of the troops on the Nashville
and Chattanooga railroad. I can hardly think, however, that the enemy
will attempt to advance in such weather as we now have. I shall send
an officer to-morrow morning to hurry General Smith's troops along as
fast as possible to this place. Give the necessary orders to Hatch and
Croxton, in case of a decided advance of the enemy.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. 8. V. Commanding.
vol. n — 14
210 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
Pulaski, November 19, 1864.
Major-General Thomas :
Your dispatch of 2.30 p. m. is received. I have already given the neces-
sary preliminary instructions to Hatch, and will have everything ready
to carry out your orders in the event of Hood's advance. I do not be-
lieve he will attempt to move his infantry in this state of roads, but
Forrest may make a raid on our railroads.
y J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major- General.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 20, 18G4 — 2.30 p. si.
Major-General Schojield, Pulaski :
If Forrest makes a decided advance, I think it would be best for you to
go to Lynnville with two divisions, leaving Stanley two at Pulaski. In
order to have everything out of your way, the construction party which
went to Pulaski a few days since had better come back to Columbia, and
all surplus stores should be prepared to be sent back in case Hood's army
advances. Give Hatch instructions according to your movements, and
urge upon him the necessity of getting the most reliable information he
can. I will order Ruger with one brigade to Columbia.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Nashville, November 20, 1864 — 5.30 p. m.
Major-General A. J. Smith, St. Louis, Mo.:
Your dispatch of this date just received. I wish you to make every
exertion to reach this place with all possible dispatch. Bring with you
all the troops ordered to report to you at Paducah, as well as all others
belonging to your command. You will come to Nashville, via the Cum-
berland river. I have sent an officer with orders to bring Winslow's cav-
alry to this place without delay.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 21, 1864.
Major-General Schojield, Pulaski :
Have you seen General Hatch's dispatch from Lexington at 8 a. m. to-
day? It is very detailed, and he thinks it reliable. I have just received
your two telegrams of 11 a. m. and 12 m., and approve the move. I have
sent General Wilson out to take general charge of the cavalry, and di-
rected him to report to you. He will reach Lynnville to-morrow morning.
GEO. II. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 211
Nashville, Tenn., November 23, 18G4— 10 p. M.
Major-General H. W. Ilallcck, Washington, D. C. :
It has occurred to me since my last dispatch was sent to you that it
might be advisable to call on the governor of Indiana for some of the
militia of that state, and I would like to know whether 1 am authorized
to make the application. There are no available troops in Kentucky.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Nashville, Tenn., November 23, 1864 — 1 p. m.
Major-Gencral W. S. Rosecrans, St. Louis, Mo. :
Has General Smith and command embarked for this place yet? If so,
when ? They should hurry forward as rapidly as possible. Please answer
on receipt of this.
1 GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Nashville, November 23, 1864.
Colonel Wm. E. Merrill, Chattanooga :
The major-general commanding directs that you organize a pontoonier
battalion out of your regiment. Yours about the canvas received ; will
be attended to. „
WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Brigadier- General.
Columbia, November 24, 1864.
Major-General Thomas :
I now have your dispatch of 9 a.m. I do not believe Forrest has had
time to get across Duck river yet, and hope the troops you have sent will
be in time to prevent him. Capron was driven in very rapidly, and by a
pretty large force. Cox arrived just in time to beat it back, and punished
it very severely. Hood had ten miles the start of Stanley at noon yester-
day, but Stanley outmarched him, and reached here at 10 o'clock to-day.
His troops are all here and in position. Colonel Moore got here last
night. My orders to Hatch are as you suggested. I have not heard from
him to-day.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major- General.
Columbia, November 24, 1864 — 1.30 p. m.
Major-General G. H. Thomas :
Do you think it important to hold Columbia? My force is not large
enough to cover the town and the railroad bridge. I can hold a shorter
line covering the railroad bridge, leaving the town and the railroad depot
outside; but in any case the enemy can turn the position by crosssing above
212 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
or below, and rendering withdrawal to the north bank very difficult.
Please give me your views soon. ^ ^ SCHOFIELD,
Major- General.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 24, 1864 — 3 p. m.
Major-General Scho field, Columbia :
If you can not hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north
bank of the river. From the description given, I supposed the line was
sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it securely and have
a reserve. But it is better, of course, to substantially check the enemy
than to run the risk of defeat by resisting too much. Where is Stanley?
Is he with you?
3 GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. iS. V. Commanding.
Washington, November 25, 1864 — 12 m.
Major-General Thomas :
Secretary war authorizes you, if you deem it necessary, to call upon the
governor of Indiana and of any other Western states for troops. As this
force is very expensive, if compared with its value against an enemy, it
should be used as sparingly as circumstances will admit. Dispatches just
received from Hilton Head indicate that General Sherman has captured
Milledgeville and Macon, and that Beauregard has been recalled from
Tennessee to fall on General Sherman's rear. This is also indicated
through Beauregard's proclamation to the people of Mississippi, sent
from Corinth through Selma.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
City Point, Va., November 24, 1864: — 4 p. m.
Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, Nashville :
Following proclamation just taken from papers of 21st. Do not let
Forrest get off without punishment.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 25, 1864.
Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Va. :
Your dispatch of 4 p. m. yesterday just received. Hood's entire army
is in front of Columbia, and so greatly outnumbering mine at this time,
that I am compelled to act on the defensive. None of General Smith's
troops have arrived yet, although they embarked at St. Louis on Tuesday
last. The transportation of General Hatch's and Griersdn's cavalry was
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 213
ordered by General Washburne, I am told, to be turned in at Memphis,
ivhich has crippled the only cavalry I have at this time. All of my cavalry
Kras dismounted to furnish horses to Kilpatrick's division, which went
with General Sherman. My dismounted cavalry is now detained at
Louisville, awaiting arms and horses. Horses arc arriving slowly, and
arms have been detained somewhere en route for more than a month.
General Grierson has been delayed by conflicting orders in Kansas and
from Memphis, and it is impossible to say when he will reach here. Since
being in charge of affairs in Tennessee, I have lost nearly fifteen thou
sand men, discharged by expiration of service, and permitted to go home
to vote. My gain is probably twelve thousand of perfectly raw troops ;
therefore, as the enemy so greatly outnumbers me, both in infantry and
cavalry, I am compelled for the present to act on the defensive. The
moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood, and if Forrest
can be reached, he will be punished.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major- General TJ. S. V. Commanding.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 25, 1864 — 11.20 a. m.
Major-General Schofield, Columbia:
In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck river, I wish you
to keep some cavalry on the south side of it, to observe and delay Hood's
advance on Chattanooga railroad as much as possible. I hope to have
five (5) regiments of Granger's troops in Murfreesboro to-day. Have
made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to Murfreesboro on this side
of Duck river ; also, if the enemy advances, the cavalry on the south side
of Duck river should cover the approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at
that place, and hold the bridge in case of an advance in force. I have
asked Steedman how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy's
rear, should he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon.
About one thousand of Hatch's cavalry have arrived here from Mem-
phis dismounted, and they will be mounted here as soon as possible, and
sent to the front. Three regiments should start to-day, making about
one thousand men. Have not heard of any of Smith's troops yet. Some
of them will surely be here to-day. If Hood moves on the Chattanooga
road, I will send Smith to Murfreesboro, as we shall be enabled thereby
to concentrate more rapidly. If you can hold Hood on the south side of
Duck river, I think we shall be able to drive him back easily after con-
centrating. Answer, giving your views.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General TJ. S. V. Commanding.
214 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
Headquarters Department of the Cumbebland
Nashville, November 26, 1864.
Rear- Admiral Lee, Mound City :
If you have any iron-clads which can resist heavy shot, I will be obliged
if you will order them up the Tennessee river as far as they can go, on a
reconnoissance. Hood is threatening Columbia, and I am anxious to know
positively whether he has all his force with him or not.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Washington, November 26, 1864 — 12 m.
Major-General TJwmas :
All troops ordered from Missouri are under your orders, and will
be subject to your disposal. Any others, embracing all officers and
troops belonging to Sherman's force in the field, left behind by their com-
mands, will be under your orders till they can again join their proper
corps. If you call for any militia, notify adjutant-general's office.
H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff.
Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, November 27, 1864.
Major-General Schqfeld, Columbia, via Franklin :
Your dispatch of 10 a. m. yesterday received. I will send you all the
available infantry I can raise. I expect some of Smith's command here
to-day, and will send it forward as rapidly as possible. Sent you two
regiments of cavalry day before yesterday, two yesterday, and will send
another to-day. If you can hold Hood in check until I can get Smith
up, we can whip him.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Paducah, November 27, 1864.
Major-General Thomas :
I have just arrived at this point. The brigade, Seventeenth Army
Corps, and First division, Sixteenth Army Corps, will proceed immediately
to destination, in obedience to your telegram of the 19th inst. The Third
division will be up early in the morning. Telegraph me at Smithland.
A. J. SMITH,
Major- General,
Ducktown, November 27, 1864 — 12.30 p. m.
Major-General Thomas :
The enemy has made no real attack, and I am satisfied he does not
mean to attack. My information, though not very satisfactory, leads me
to believe that Hood intends to cross Duck river above Columbia, and as
near it as he can. I shall withdraw to the north bank to-night, and en-
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 215
deavor to prevent him from crossing. Wilson is operating mainly on my
left, with a portion of his command south of the river. I have no late in-
formation from him. I have succeeded in getting your cipher of the
25th translated. I believe your dispositions are wise.
J. M. SCIIOFIELD,
Major-Gcneral.
Near Columbia, November 28, 18G4— 3.30 p. m.
Major-General Thomas :
The enemy has crossed in force a short distance this side of the Lewis-
burg pike, at noon to-day, and has driven our cavalry back across the
river on that pike at the same time. The force is reported to be infantry,
but I do not regard it as being probable. Wilson has gone with his main
force to learn the facts, and drive the enemy back, if possible.
J. M. SCIIOFIELD
Major-Gcneral.
Nashville, November 28, 18G4.
Major-Gcneral Schoficld, near Columbia :
Your dispatch of 3.30 is just received. If General Wilson can not suc-
ceed in driving back the enemy, should it prove true that he has crossed
the river, you will necessarily have to make preparations to take up a new
position at Franklin, behind Harpeth, immediately, if it becomes neces-
sary to fall back. GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Nashville, November 28, 1864.
Major-General Schofield:
You can have some of the pontoons you used at Columbia sent to
Franklin, to lay a bridge there. I will answer your other telegram in a
few moments.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Near Columbia, November 28, 1864 — 11 a. m.
Major-General Thomas:
I am in doubt whether it is advisable, with reference to future opera-
tions, to hold this position or retire to some point from which we can
move offensively. Of course, we can not recross the river here. I could
have easily held the bridge-head at the railroad, but it would have been
useless, as we could not possibly advance from that point. Please give me
vour views and wishes. „ T _
y J. M. SCIIOFIELD,
Major-Gcneral.
;21(3 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
Near Columbia, November 28, 1864 — 6 p. m.
Major-General Thomas :
The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on the Lewisburg
pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill. Wilson is trying to go on
the Franklin road ahead of them. He thinks the enemy may swing in
between him and me and strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's bri-
gade halted there. Please give orders, if you know where it is.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-Gcneral.
Near Columbia, November 28, 1864 — p. m.
Major-General Thomas:
If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, where do you
propose to fight him? I have all the force that is necessary, and Smith's
troops should be placed with reference to the proposed point of concen-
tration.
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.
Nashville, November 29, 1864 — 3.30 a. m.
Major-General Schofield, near Columbia :
Your dispatches of 6 p. m. and 9 p. m. yesterday are received. I have
directed General Hammond to halt his command at Spring Hill, and re-
port to you for orders, if he can not communicate with General Wilson,
and also instructing him to keep you well advised of the enemy's move-
ments. I desire you to fall back from Columbia, and take up your posi-
tion at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at Spring Hill to contest the
enemy's progress until you are securely posted at Franklin. The troops
at the fords below Williamsport, etc., will be withdrawn, and take up a
position behind Franklin. General A. J. Smith's command has not yet
reached Nashville. As soon as he arrives, I will make immediate disposi-
tion of his troops, and notify you of the same. Please send me a report
as to how matters stand, upon your receipt of this.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. 3. V. Commanding.
Headquarters, Hart's Cross-roads, on Franklin and Lewisburg Pike,
November 29, 1864 — 3 a. m. ; via Franklin, 9.30 a. m.
Major-General Thomas:
Forrest's cavalry, Buford's, Chalmers', and Jackson's brigades, a part of
Hanley's and Biffle's regiments, crossed Duck river on this road, and at
several fords between it and Iluey's Mills, seven miles above Columbia,
yesterday. A pontoon train, sufficient for three bridges, had arrived at
Iluey's just before dark. The bridges were expected to be ready by 11
o'clock last night, and their infantry across by daylight this morning.
The cavalry began crossing about noon, at Davis' fords, near Iluey's, but
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 217
could not get across at Hardison's, on the pike. Capron's and Garrard's
brigades were struck in flank and rear by rebels, at Rally Hill. I have
kept Major-General Schofield fully informed, and, at 1 a. m., sent him
the information above, advising him to get back to Franklin at once. I
have all of my command, except Hammond's and Hatch's first brigade,
here. I do n't know where the former is. The latter has been watching
the river at Knobgrass creek, and was ordered, at sunset last night, to
join him at Spring Hill. I shall delay the enemy all in my power, if he
presses me, and follow him wherever he goes. I have information from
Franklin's Hill to-day. The Sixth Illinois is now probably near that
place to-night, having gone to Shelbyville on a scout. I am sure, from
what prisoners tell me, that the enemy is aiming for Nashville, via Frank-
lin ; his present direction, location of his bridge, and other circumstances
point clearly to that conclusion. This being so, I shall probably cross the
Harpeth midway between Triune and Franklin, and aim for Nolensville.
Everything should be got off the railroad to-day. Hurry forward all cav-
alry, via Nolensville. I think everything should be concentrated at
NashviUe - J. H. WILSON,
Major- General.
Headquarters Army of the Ohio, November 29 — 8.30 a. m.
Major- General Thomas :
The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force, on the Lewisburg pike, and
General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's Mills, about
five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry reconnoissance to
learn the facts. If it prove true, I will act according to your instructions
received this morning. Please send orders to General Cooper,* via
Johnsonville ; it may be doubtful whether my messenger from here will
reach him. _
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major- General.
Headquarters, 4J Miles Southeast of Franklin,
November 29, 1864 — 2 p. m., via Franklin.
Major-General Thomas:
The enemy pressed the rear of my column closely as far as the Ridge
Meeting-house, and by marching around my left prevented me from
getting upon the Fayetteville road. My impression is that Forrest is
aiming for Nashville, via Triune and Nolensville. A part of his force
may have cut into Spring Hill. Heavy artillery firing heard in that
direction since 1 1 a. m. I can not hear from Schofield, but fear he may
not have reached Franklin. I shall hold Hatch's second - brigade and
* Commanding a brigade of General Ruger's division.
218 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
Hammond's here till I know all is clear. In the meantime, Johnson and
Croxton are crossing the Harpeth at Henderson's ford, with orders to
push strong parties to Triune Zend Grove, and thereby to push on
to Nolensville to-night, if they find the enemy moving in that direction.
I shall go in the same direction as soon as I can leave here with safety.
You had better look out for Forrest at Nashville to-morrow noon. I '11
be there before, or very soon after he makes his appearance.
J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.
Nashville, November 29, 1864 — 11 p. m.
Major-General Schofield, Franklin :
General Wilson has telegraphed me very fully the movements of the
enemy yesterday and this morning. He believes Forrest is aiming to
strike this place, while the infantry will move against you, and attempt
to get on your flank. If you discover such to be his movement, you had
better cross Harpeth at Franklin, and then retire along the Franklin
pike to this place, covering your wagon train and the railroad. I directed
General Cooper, in accordance with your wishes yesterday, to withdraw
from Centreville, by the Nashville road, crossing Harpeth at widow Dean's,
and to report to you from that place for further orders. You had better
send orders to meet him.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. V. Commanding.
Franklin, November 29, 1864 — 10 p. m.
Major-General Thomas :
Major-General Schofield directs me to inform you that the enemy's
cavalry crossed Duck river in force at daylight this morning, at Huey's
Mills, six miles from Columbia, and pushed at once for Spring Hill. Their
cavalry reached that point at 4 p. m., and their infantry came in before
dark, and attacked General Stanley, who held the place with one division
very heavily (engaged?). General Schofield's troops are pushing foi
Franklin as rapidly as possible. The general says he will not be able to get
farther than Thompson's Station to-night, and possibly not farther than
Spring Hill. He regards his situation as extremely perilous, and fears ha
may be forced into a general battle to-morrow, or lose his wagon train.
General Wilson's cavalry have been pushed off toward the east, and do
not come with our infantry, nor cover the pike. Thinking that the troops
under General A. J. Smith's command had reached Franklin, General
Schofield directed me to have them pushed down the Franklin pike to
Spring Hill, by daylight to-morrow. I left General Schofield two hours
ago, at Thompson's Station.
W. J. TWININGS,
Captain, Aid-de-Camp, and Chief Engineer, Army of Ohio.
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 219
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL THOMAS' REPORT.
The important result of this signal victory can not be too highly appre-
ciated, for it not only seriously checked the enemy's advance and gave Gen-
eral Schofield time to move his troops and all his property to Nashville,
but it also caused deep depression among the men of Hood's army,
making them doubly cautious in their subsequent movements. Not
willing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having accom-
plished the object of the day's operations — viz., to cover the withdrawal of
his trains — General Schofield, by my advice and direction, fell back during
the night, to Nashville; in front of which city, line of battle was formed,
by noon of the 1st of December, on the heights immediately surrounding
Nashville.
EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL SCHOFIELD'S REPORT.
The troops rested in this position on the 28th, and I had strong hopes
of being able to hold the line of Duck river until reinforcements should
arrive; but I learned from General Wilson, about 2 a. m. on the 29th, that
the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing near the Lewisburg pike, and
about daylight in the morning, that his infantry was also crossing at
Huey's Mills, five miles above Columbia, from which a road leads into the
Franklin pike, at Spring Hill. The enemy might endeavor to reach the
latter place in advance of me, and thus cut off my retreat, or strike me
in flank near Duck river, or both. He had already forced a column of
cavalry between General Wilson and me, and cut off all communication
between us. I therefore sent General Stanley with a division of infantry
to Spring Hill, to hold that point and cover the trains ; General Cox was
left in his position, to hold the crossing at Columbia ; Generals Wood and
Kimball were put in line facing Huey's Mills, with a brigade thrown for-
ward to reconnoiter, and General Ruger was ordered to move on to the
pike, in rear of Rutherford's creek, leaving one regiment to hold the ford
near the railroad bridge, the bridges having been destroyed.
* * * * * * * * *
About 3 p. m. I became satisfied that the enemy would not attack my
position on Duck river, but was pushing two corps direct for Spring Hill.
I then gave the necessary orders for the withdrawal of the troops after
dark, and took General Ruger' s troops and pushed for Spring Hill, to re-
open communication with General Stanley, and was followed at a short
distance by the head of the main column. I struck the enemy's cavalry
at dark, about three miles from Spring Hill, but we brushed them away
without difficulty, and reached Spring Hill about seven o'clock. . . .
I arrived at Franklin with the head of the column a little before day-
light on the 30th, and found no wagon-bridge for crossing the river, and
the fords in very bad condition. I caused the railroad bridge to be pre-
pared for crossing wagons, and had a foot-bridge built for infantry, which
fortunately proved available for wagons, and used the ford as much as
possible. I hoped, in spite of the difficulties, to get all my material, in-
220 BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC.
eluding the public property and a large wagon train, across the river, and
move the army over before the enemy could get up force enough to
attack me; but I put the troops in position as they arrived on the south
side — the Twenty-third Corps on the left and center, covering the Colum-
bia and Lewisburg pikes, and General Kimball's division of the Fourth
Corps on the right, both flanks resting on the river. Two brigades of
Wagner's division were left in front to retard the enemy's advance, and
General Wood's division, with some artillery, was moved to the north
bank of the river, to cover the flanks, should the enemy attempt to cross
above or below. The enemy followed close after our rear-guard ; brought
up and deployed two full corps with astonishing celerity, and moved
rapidly forward to the attack. Our outposts, imprudently brave, held
their ground too long, and hence were compelled to come in at a run.
In passing over the parapet, they carried with them the troops of the
line for a short space, and permitted a few hundred of the enemy to get
in ; but the reserves sprang forward, regaining the parapet, and capturing
those of the enemy who had passed it. The enemy assaulted persistently
and continuously with his whole force, from about 3.30 p. m. until after
dark, and made numerous intermittent attacks at a few points until
about 10 o'clock p. m. He was splendidly repulsed along the whole line
of attack. . . .
It is to be observed that more than half our loss occurred in Wagner's
division of the Fourth Corps, which did not form part of the main line
of defense. This loss arose in two brigades of that division, from their
remaining in front of the line after their proper duty as outposts had
been accomplished, and after they should have taken their position in
reserve ; and in the other brigade (Colonel Opdycke's), in its hand-to-
hand encounter with the enemy over the parapet, which had been tem-
porarily lost by the precipitate retreat of the other two brigades.
->:- -x- * •;:- **.***
My experience on the 29th had shown how entirely inferior a force
my cavalry was to that of the enemy, and that even my immediate flank
and rear were insecure, while my communication with Nashville was en-
tirely without protection. I could not even rely upon.getting up ammu-
nition necessary for another battle. To remain longer at Franklin, was
to seriously hazard the loss of my army, by giving the enemy another
chance to cut me off from reinforcements, which he had made three
desperate futile attempts to accomplish. I had detained the enemy long
enough to enable you to concentrate your scattered troops at Nashville, and
had succeeded in inflicting upon him very heavy losses, which was the
primary object. I had found it impossible to detain him long enough to
get reinforcements at Franklin. Only a small portion of the infantry
and none of the cavalry could reach me in time to be of any use in
battle, which must have been fought on the 1st of December, for these
reasons. After consulting with corps and division commanders, and ob-
taining your approval, I determined to retire the night of the 30th toward
Nashville.
BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, ETC. 221
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL STANLEY'S REPORT.
From 1 o'clock until 4 p. m. in the evening, the enemy's entire force
was in sight, and forming for attack; yet, in view of the strong position
we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during the
campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault.
I felt so confident in this belief, that I did not leave General Schofield's
headquarters until the firing commenced. About 4 o'clock the enemy
advanced with his whole force, at least two corps, making a bold and
persistent assault, which, upon part of the line, lasted forty minutes,
when Wagner's division fell back from the heights south of Franklin.
Opdycke's brigade was placed in reserve, in rear of our main line on the
Columbia pike; Lane's and Conrad's brigades were deployed, the former
on the right, the other on the left of the pike, and about three hundred
yards in advance of the main line. By whose mistake I can not tell, it
certainly was never a part of my instructions, but these brigades had
orders from General Wagner not to retire to the main line until forced
to do so by the fighting of the enemy.
Speaking of the effect of their retreat, General Stanley said : " It was at
that moment I arrived at the scene of disorder, coming from the town
on the Columbia pike. The moment was critical beyond any I have ever
known in battle. Could the enemy hold that part of the line, he was
nearer our two bridges than the extremities of our line. Colonel Opdycke's
brigade was lying down about one hundred yards in rear of the works.
I rode quickly to the left regiment and called to them to charge ; at the
same time I saw Colonel Opdycke near the center of his line, urgin» his
men forward. I gave the colonel no order, as I saw him engaged in
doing the very thing to save us, namely, to get possession of our line
again."
EXTRACT FROM GENERAL J. H. WILSON'S REPORT.
At 1 a. m. (November 29), I sent a dispatch to General Schofield, in-
forming him that the force at Huey's Mill was Forrest's cavalry, consisting
of Chalmers', Jackson's, and Buford's divisions, and Biffle's regiment;
that the rebel infantry were to have began crossing two hours before, by
three pontoon bridges under construction at the same place. Believing
the information to be perfectly correct, I therefore suggested that our
infantry should reach Spring Hill by 10 a. m. of that day.
CHAPTER XXXV.
BATTLE OF NASHVILLE AND PURSUIT OF THE ROUTED ENEMY.
The arrival of General Steedman with his command from
Chattanooga, December 1st, in the evening, completed the
concentration of forces, which had been so unexpectedly de-
layed. Three lines of defence had been abandoned because
the promised troops had not appeared in Tennessee. And
now that the concentration had been effected, the improvised
army contained three corps, each one of which represented a
distinct department ; a provisional division made up of de-
tachments from almost every organization, large and small,
embraced in the sixty-five thousand men, then on " the march
to the sea ;" an infusion of raw infantry regiments ; the greater
portion of the cavalry of the Military Division of the Missis-
sippi, but still largely dismounted ; and colored soldiers, who
were to have their first opportunity in the central theater of
war, to fight by brigades.
General Thomas had held General Steedman's command,
on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad for two
reasons — one, the complications in East Tennessee, of which a
narrative will be given in another chapter ; and the other, the
probability that General Hood would strike that important
railroad south of Nashville. Having arrived, General Steed-
man took position about a mile in advance of the left center
of the main line, and east of the Nolensville turnpike. Gen-
eral Wilson, with his cavalry, had previously taken a strong
position at Thomson's Chapel, on the Nolensville turnpike,
covering the space between General Schofield's left and the
Cumberland river.
General Hood being still greatly superior in cavalry, there
(222)
BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 223
was clanger that he would detach a large portion of it to inter-
rupt the vital communications with Louisville. To guard
against the passage of his cavalry over the Cumberland, above
Nashville, General Hammond's brigade of cavalry was sent
to Gallatin on the 2d, to watch the river as far up as Carthage.
And the day following General Thomas threw all the remain-
ing cavalry across to Edgefield, and then General Steedman's
command covered the space between General Schofi eld's left
and the river.
General Hood's infantry did not approach Nashville until
the 3d, when General Thomas' outposts were driven in, and
soon after the enemy began to establish his main line. The
next morning his salient was seen on Montgomery Hill, within
six hundred yards of the center of the national line. Gen-
eral Hood's investing lines occupied the high ground on the
southeast side of Brown's creek, extending from the JSTolens-
ville turnpike, across the Granny White and Franklin turn-
pikes, in a southwesterly direction, to the hills south and south-
west of Richland creek, and down that creek to the Hillsboro
turnpike. From his right, on the Nolensville road to the
river, above the city, and from his left, on the Hillsboro road
to the river below, his cavalry were posted. Intent upon com-
pleting and strengthening his line, General Hood made no re-
sponse to the fire of artillery, which opened upon him from
several points. It was doubtless necessary, too, that he should
be economical in the use of his ammunition, as it was difficult
for him to replenish from his base at Corinth.
Although not active, at Nashville, General Hood was enter-
prising in other directions. He sent Bate's division of Cheat-
ham's corps to reduce Murfreesboro and other minor points
in the vicinity, and on the 4th the block-house, at Overall's
creek, five miles north of Murfreesboro, was attacked by this
force. But such was the strength of the block-house con-
structed for the defense of the railroad bridge, that although
seventy-four artillery shots were fired against it, the garrison
held out until General Milroy arrived with reinforcements
from Murfreesboro, consisting of three regiments of infantry,
four companies of cavalry, and a section of artillery. General
Bate was then attacked and driven away. During the 5th,
224 BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC.
6th, and 7th, having been reinforced by a division from Lee's
corps, and twenty -five hundred cavalry, General Bate demon-
strated heavily against Fortress Rosecrans, near Murfrees-
boro, held by eight thousand men, under General Rousseau.
The enemy declining to make a direct attack, General Milroy
was sent against him on the 8th, with seven regiments of in-
fantry. He was found on the Wilkinson turnpike behind rail
barricades, which were carried by assault — General Milroy
capturing two hundred and seven prisoners and two guns, and
suffering a loss of thirty men killed, and one hundred and
seventy-five wounded. The same day Buford's cavalry, after
shelling Murfreesboro, entered the town, but were driven out
by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. The
whole force then moved to Lebanon and down the bank of
the Cumberland river to Nashville, threatening to cross, to in-
terrupt the Louisville and Nashville railroad.
A portion of the enemy's cavalry, under General Lyon, suc-
ceeded in crossing the Cumberland river above Clarksville, on
the 9th. The object of the movement was to reach the Louis-
ville and Nashville railroad, at some point in Kentucky, and
to prevent its accomplishment General Thomas directed Gen-
eral McCook, who was in Kentucky, to remount Watkins' and
La Grange's brigades of cavalry, and to look after Lyon with
these brigades.
During the first half of December, General Grant felt great
uneasiness with regard to the situation in Tennessee, fearing
that General Hood would pass round Nashville and march
into Kentucky reproducing the scenes and issues of the sum-
mer and autumn of 1862. Believing that General Thomas
should have delivered battle immediately after the engagement
at Franklin, he urged him thereafter, from day to day, to at-
tack General Hood. General Thomas, on the other hand,
thought it advisable to remount his cavalry and make other
preparations, that he might be assured of victory, before as-
suming the offensive, and at the same time gain the full results '
of victory by a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, when defeated
and routed. He was confident of final success, and was vigi-
lant in guarding the river with his cavalry, and secured the
services of the gunboats of the Eleventh Division of the Mis-
BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, ETC. 225
sissippi Squadron, under Lieutenant-Commander Leroy Fitch,
to patrol the river above and below the city. During the
first eight days of the month, General "Wilson had raised his
cavalry to good strength, by the influx of new horses and
by ransacking the corrals for convalescent animals, and in
this time much had been done to supply the army with the
transportation essential to successful pursuit, and with pon-
toons for the full rivers. But delay for any cause was dis-
pleasing to General Grant, as besides the supposed danger
to Kentucky, the troops under General Canby on the Mis-
sissippi river, intended for co-operation with General Sher-
man, were detained to prevent the trans-Mississippi Confed-
erate forces, from joining General Hood, and on the 9th of
December at the suggestion of the lieutenant-general, an
order was issued by the President, relieving General Thomas,
and placing General Schofield in command. General Thomas
himself preferred to be relieved rather than be responsible for
a battle fought under unfavorable conditions. The order re-
lieving him, however, was subsequently suspended ; but there
was no respite to the urgent communications requiring the
deliverance of battle 
