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THE HISTORY
OF BRITISH INDIA,

MILL & WILSON.

IN NINE VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

THE HISTORY OF

BRITISH INDIA.

BY JAMES MILL, ESQ.

FOURTH EDITION WITH NOTES AND CONTINUATION,

By HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A., F.R.S.

MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY, OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETIES OF PARIS, BOSTON AND
CALCUTTA, AND OF THE ORIENTAL SOCIETY OF GERMANY ; OF THE IMPERIAL ACADEMIES
OF ST. PETERSBURGH AND VIENNA ; OF THE IMPERIAL SOCIETY OF NATURALISTS
OF MOSCOW, AND OF THE ROYAL ACADEMIES OF BERLIN AND MUNICH ;
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE ACADEMY OF FRANCE ; PH. DR. IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF BRESLAU ; MED. I)R. IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
MARBURG, ETC. ETC. ; AND BODEN PROFESSOR OF
SANSCRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

VOLUME IV.

LONDON :

JAMES MADDEN, 8, LEADENHALL STREET.

M.DCCC.XLVIII.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016

https://archive.org/details/historyofbritish04mill

CONTENTS.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER III.

Deliberations on a new Plan for collecting the Revenue,
and administering Justice — Death of Colonel Monson, and
recovery by Mr. Hastings of the governing Power — Plan
by Mr. Hastings, for inquiring into the Sources of Revenue
— The Taxes levied by annual Settlements — Resignation of
Hastings, tendered by an Agent, whom he disowns — Trans-
actions of Mr. Hastings, in the Cases of Mr. Middleton, Mr.
Fowke, and Munny Begum — The Directors, ordering the
Transactions to be reversed, are disobeyed — Relations with
the Mahrattas — A detachment of the Bengal Army sent
across India to Surat — Expedition from Bombay against
Poona — Unsuccessful — Fruitless negotiation with the Mah-
rattas — Goddard's Campaign against the Mahrattas — Con-
nexion with the Raima of Gohud — Mr. Francis fights a
Duel with Mr. Hastings, and returns to Europe

CHAPTER IV.

In the Carnatic, Relations between the English and
Nabob — Plenipotentiary, with independent Powers from
the King — English courted by Hyder Ali and the Mah-
rattas, and in Danger from both — Nabob and Plenipoten-
tiary desire Alliance with the Mahrattas — Presidency

CONTENTS.

Page

adhere to Neutrality — Relations with the King of Tanjore
— After Hesitation, War is made upon him — War upon the
Marawars — A second War upon Tanjore — Condemned by
the Directors — Pigot sent out to restore the Raja — Oppo-
sition in the Madras Council — Pigot imprisoned — Senti-
ments and Measures adopted in England — Committee of
Circuit — Suspended by Governor Rumbold, who summons
the Zemindars to Madras — Transactions with Nizam Ali
respecting Guntoor — Censured by the Supreme Council —
Governor Rumbold, and other Members of the Govern-
ment, condemned and punished by the Court of Direc-
tors 63

CHAPTER V.

War with the French — Pondicherry taken — War with
Hyder Ali — Presidency unprepared — Colonel Baillie’s
Detachment cut off — Supreme Council suspend the Gover-
nor of Fort St. George, and send Sir Eyre Coote to
Madras — Hyder takes Arcot, and overruns the greater part
of the Country — Lord Macartney Governor of Fort
St. George — Negapatnam and Trincomalee taken from the
Dutch — Treaty between the Nabob of Arcot and Supreme
Council — Assignment of the Nabob’s Revenues — Telli-
cherry invested — Great Armaments sent from both Eng-
land and France — Disaster of Colonel Brath waite’s De-
tachment in Tanjore — Madras reduced to a State of
Famine — Death of Hyder Ali — Tippoo withdraws the
Mysorean Army from the Carnatic — Operations and Fate
of General Matthews on the Coast of Malabar — Siege of
Mangalore — The General at Madras, refusing to obey the
Civil Authority, is arrested and sent to Europe — French
and English suspend Hostilities in consequence of Intelli-
gence of the Peace in Europe — Operations of Colonel Ful-
larton in Coimbetore — Peace with Tippoo — Behaviour of
Supreme Council to Presidency of Madras 159

CHAPTER VI.

Financial Difficulties — Campaign of General Goddard
on the Bombay side of the Mahratta Country — Attack on

CONTENTS.

Vll

the Bengal side — Peace with Sindia — Supreme Court of
Judicature — Efforts of the Supreme Court to extend its
Jurisdiction — Their Effects upon Individuals — Upon the
Collection of the Revenue — Upon the Administration of
Justice — Interference of Parliament claimed — Granted — •

The Chief Justice placed at the Head of the Sudder
Dewannee Adaulut — Chief Justice recalled — Judicial and
Police Regulations — Provincial Councils abolished, and
a new Board of Revenue set up 297

CHAPTER VII.

Journey of the Governor-General to the Upper Pro-
vinces— History of the Company’s Connexions with the
Raja of Benares — Requisitions upon the Raja — Resolution
to relieve the Company’s Necessities by forcible Exaction
on the Raja — The Governor-General arrives at Benares —

The Raja put under Arrest — A tumultuous Assemblage of
the People — An affray between them and the Soldiers —

The Raja escapes — War made upon him, and the Country
subdued — Condemnation of Mr. Hastings by the Directors
— Double Negotiation with the Mahrattas of Poonah —
Treaty of Peace 359

CHAPTER VIII.

Burdens sustained by the Nabob of Oude — His Com-
plaints— How received by the English — Mr. Bristow re-
moved from Oude — Agreement between Mr. Hastings and
the Nabob — The Begums despoiled — Whether the
Begums excited Insurrection — Alleged oppressions of
Colonel Hannay — The head Eunuchs of the Begums tor-
tured— A present of ten Lacs given to Mr. Hastings by the
Nabob — Governor-General accuses Middleton, and replaces
Bristow — Treatment received by Fyzoolla Khan — Deci-
sion by the Court of Directors, relative to the Begums — Set
at nought by Mr. Hastings — Governor-General’s new Accu-
sations against Mr Bristow — Governor-General’s Plan to
remove the Residency from Oude — Governor-General
repeats his Visit to Oude — Resigns the Government — Fi-
nancial Results of his Administration — Incidents at
Madras 417

Vlll

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IX.

I’age

Legislative Proceedings from 1773 to 1780 — Renewal of
the Charter — Select and Secret Committees of the House
of Commons — Proceedings against Indian Delinquency —

Mr. Dundas's East India Bill — Mr. Fox’s East India Bills
— Mr. Pitt’s East India Bill 522

HISTORY

BRITISH INDIA

BOOK V.

CHAPTER III.

Deliberations on a new Plan for collecting the
Revenue , and administering Justice. — Death of
Colonel Monson, and recovery by Mr. Hastings
of the governing Power. — Plan by Mr. Hast-
ings, for inquiring into the Sources of Revenue. —
The taxes levied by annual Settlements. — Resig-
nation of Hastings, tendered by an Agent, whom
he disowns. — Transactions of Mr. Hastings, in
the Cases of Mr. Middleton, Mr. Fowke, and
Munny Begum. — ■ The Directors, ordering the
Transactions to be reversed, are disobeyed. —
Relations with the Mahrattas. — A Detachment
of the Bengal Army sent across India to Surat. —
Expedition from Bombay against Poona. —
Unsuccessful. — Fruitless Negotiation with the
Mahrattas. — Goddard's Campaign against the

VOL. IV. B

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

Mahrattas. — Connexion with the Raima of Go-
hud. — Mr. Francis fights a Fuel with Mr.
Hastings, and returns to Europe.

book v. The state of the regulations for collecting the re-

venue had for some time pressed upon the attention

mb. 0f the government. The lease of five years, on
which the revenues had been farmed in 1772, was
drawing to a close, and it was necessary to determine
what course should then be pursued. To remedy
evils, which delayed not to make themselves per-
ceived, in the regulations of 1772, a considerable
change had been introduced in 1773: The superin-
tendence of the collectors was abolished : The pro-
vinces (Chittagong and Tipperah remaining under
the original sort of management, that of a chief)
were formed into six grand divisions, Calcutta,
Burdwan, Moorshedabad, Dinagepore, Dacca, and
Patna: In each of these divisions (Calcutta excepted,
for which two members of the council and three su-
perior servants, under the name of a committee of re-
venue, were appointed) a council was formed, consist-
ing of a chief, and four senior servants, to whom
powers were confided, the same, in general, with
those formerly enjoyed by the collectors : They ex-
ercised a command over all the officers and affairs of
revenue within the division: The members super-
intended in rotation the civil courts of justice, called
Sudder Adaulut : The councils appointed deputies,
or naihs, to the subordinate districts of the division :
These naibs, who were natives, and called also aurnils,
both superintended the work of realizing the revenue,
and held courts of fiscal judicature, called courts of

FAILURE OF THE QUINQUENNIAL LEASE.

Dewannee Aclaulut : The decisions of these courts B00K

were subject by appeal to the review of the provincial

courts of Sudder Adaulut ; which decided in the last 1775-
resort to the value of 1000 rupees, but under appeal
to the court of Sudder Dewannee Adaulut at Calcutta
in all cases which exceeded that amount. Even this
scheme was declared to be only intermediate, and
preparatory to an ultimate measure, according to
which, while the local management, except in those
districts which might be let entire to the Zemindars
or responsible farmers, should be performed by a
dewan, or aumil, a committee of revenue, sitting at
the Presidency, should form a grand revenue office,
and superintend the whole collections of the country.1
Such were the alterations adopted in 1773.

At an early period, under the five years’ settlement,
it was perceived, that the farmers of the revenue had
contracted for more than they were able to pay.

The collections fell short of the engagements even for
the first year ; and the farms had been let upon a
progressive rent. The Governor-General was now
accused by his colleagues of haring deceived his
honourable masters by holding up to their hopes a
revenue which could not be obtained. He defended
himself by a plea which had, it cannot be denied,
considerable weight : It was natural to suppose, that
the natives were acquainted with the value of the
lands, and other sources of the revenue ; and that a
regard to their own interests would prevent them
from engaging for more than those sources would
afford. It was contended with no less justice on the
other side, that there was a class of persons who had

1 Sixth Report of the Select Committee, 1781, Appendix, No. 1.

B 2

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

3V- nothing to lose ; to whom the handling of the re-

venues, and power over those who paid them, though

17/5- for a single year, was an object of desire ; and whom,
as they had no intention to pay what they promised,
the extent of the promise could not restrain.

The failure of exaggerated hopes was not the only
evil whereof the farm by auction was accused. The
Zemindars, through whose agency the revenues of
the district had formerly been realized, and whose
office and authority had generally grown into here-
ditary possessions, comprising both an estate and a
magistracy, or even a species of sovereignty, wThen
the territory and jurisdiction were large ; were either
thrown out of their possessions ; or, from an ambi-
tion to hold the situation which had given opulence
and rank to their families, perhaps for generations,
they bid for the taxes more than the taxes could
enable them to pay ; and reduced themselves by the
bargain to poverty and ruin. When the revenues
were farmed to the Zemindars, these contractors were
induced to turn upon the ryots, and others from
whom their collections were levied, the same rack
which was applied to themselves. When they were
farmed to the new adventurer, who looked only to a
temporary profit, and who had no interest in the
permanent prosperity of a people with whom he had
no permanent connexion, every species of exaction to
which no punishment was attached, or of which the
punishment could by artifice be evaded, was to him
a fountain of gain.

After several acrimonious debates, the Governor-
General proposed that the separate opinions of the
Members of the Council, on the most eligible plan

PLAN PROPOSED BY MR. FRANCIS.

for levying the taxes of the country, should he sent
to the Court of Directors. And on the 28th of
March, 1775, a draught signed by him and Mr.
Barwell was prepared for transmission. The leading
principle of this project was ; that the several districts
should he farmed on leases for life, or for two joint
lives, allowing a preference to the Zemindar, as often
as his offer was not greatly inferior to that of other
candidates, or the real value of the taxes to be let.
The plan of the other members of the council was
not yet prepared. They contented themselves with
some severe reflections upon the imperfections of the
existing system, an exaggerated representation of
the evils which it was calculated to produce,1 and an
expression of the greatest astonishment at the incon-
sistency of the Governor-General, in praising and
defending that system, while he yet recommended
another, by which it would be wholly suppressed.

On the 22d of January, 1776, Mr. Francis entered
a voluminous minute, in which he took occasion to
record at length his opinions respecting the ancient
government of the country, and the means of ensur-
ing its future prosperity. Of the measures which
he recommended, a plan for realizing the revenue
constituted the greatest and most remarkable portion.
Without much concern about the production of proof,
he assumed as a basis two things ; first, that the
opinion was erroneous, which ascribed to the Sove-
reign the property of the land ; and secondly, that

book v.

CHAP. 3.

1776.

1 “ In the course of three years more, -we think it much to be appre-
hended, that the continued operation of this system will have reduced the
country in general to such a state of ruin and decay, as no future alteration
will be sufficient to retrieve.” Extract of a Minute from General Claver-
ing, Col. Monson, and Mr. Francis, March 21, 1775.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BChapC 3.' ^ie property in question belonged to the Zemindars.

Upon the Zemindars, as proprietors, he accordingly

1/7G' proposed that a certain land-tax should be levied;
that it should be fixed once for all ; and held as per-
petual and invariable.

This was the principle and essence of his plan ;
and the reasonings by which he supported it, were
the common reasonings which prove the benefit of
certainty in levying contributions for the use of the
state. But Mr. Francis misapplied a common term.
By certainty, in matters of taxation, is not meant
security for ever against increase of taxation. Taxes
may be in the highest degree certain, and yet liable
to be increased at the will of the legislature. For
certainty it is enough, that under any existing enact-
ment of the legislature, the sum which every man
has to pay should depend upon definite, cognoscible
circumstances. The window-tax, for example, is a
certain tax ; though it may be increased or dimi-
nished, not only at the pleasure of the legislature ;
but by altering the number of his windows at the
pleasure of the individual who pays it. By the com-
mon reasonings to prove the advantages of certainty
in taxes, Mr. Francis, therefore, proved nothing at
all against the power of increasing them. The
sacred duty of keeping taxation in general within the
narrowest possible limits, rests upon equally strong,
but very different grounds.

Into the subordinate arrangements of the scheme,
it belongs not to the present purpose to enter. It is
only necessary to state, that Mr. Francis proposed to
protect the ryots from the arbitrary exactions of the
Zemindars, by prescribed forms of leases, in India

PLAN PROPOSED BY MR. FRANCIS.

known by the name of pottahs ; that he condemned B00K v.

the provincial councils, and recommended local

supervisors, to superintend, for a time, the executive 1776-
as well as judicial business of the collections ; a
business, which, by the arrangements made with the
Zemindars and the ryots, he trusted would in a great
measure soon perform itself. On opium and salt, of
which the monopoly had generally been disposed of
by contract, he proposed that government should
content itself with a duty ; and terminate a large
amount of existing oppressions by giving freedom to
the trade.1

That the regulations which had been adopted for
the administration of justice among the natives were
extremely defective, all parties admitted and com-
plained. That robbery and other crimes so greatly
prevailed, was owing, in the opinion of Mr. Francis,
to the reduction of the authority of the Zemindars.

These officers had formerly exercised a penal con-
trol, which Mr. Francis maintained was fully judicial;
which had reference, as Mr. Hastings affirmed, to
nothing but police. As a cure for the existing dis-
orders, Mr. Francis recommended the restoration of
their ancient powers to the Zemindars, who, in the
case of robbery and theft, were obliged, under the
ancient government, to make compensation to the
party wronged ; and in the case of murders and riots,
were liable to severe mulcts at the hand of govern-

1 Report, ut supra, and Appendix, Nos. 14 and 15: see also a publi-
cation entitled Original Minutes of the Governor-General and Council of
Fort William, by Philip Francis, Esq. For the meaning of the terms
Zemindar and Ryot, see i. 271 ; and for the interest which the Zemindar
had in the land, see the considerations adduced on the introduction of the
zemindary system during the administration of Lord Cornwallis.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK A
CHAP. 3.

1776.

• ment. Mr. Hastings, who judged more wisely what
- effects zemindary jurisdiction had produced, or was
likely to produce, treated this as a remedy which was
far from adequate to the disease. In conjunction
with Sir Elijah Impey, he formed the draught of a
bill for an act of parliament, on the subject of the
civil judicature of Bengal. It was communicated to
the Council on the 29th of May. In this plan of
the Chief Governor and Chief Judge, it was proposed,
that in each of the seven divisions, into which, in-
cluding Chittagong, the country had been already
distributed, two courts of record should be esta-
blished; that one should be denominated “The
Court of Provincial Council that it should in each
instance consist of a President and three Councillors,
chosen by the Governor-General and Council, among
the senior servants of the Company ; and have sum-
mary jurisdiction in all pecuniary suits which regarded
the Company, either directly, or through the medium
of any person indebted to them or employed in their
service ; that the other of these courts should be
called the Adaulut Dewanny Zillajaut ; should con-
sist of one judge, chosen, for his knowledge in the
language and constitutions of the country, by the
Governor and Council, from among the senior servants
of the Company ; and should have jurisdiction in
cases of trespass or damage, rents, debts, and in
general of all pleas real, personal, or mixed, belong-
ing to parties different from those included in the
jurisdiction of the Courts of Provincial Council. In
this draught no provision was made for the criminal
branch of judicature among the natives, which had
been remitted to the nominal government of the

POWER RESTORED TO HASTINGS.

Nabob, and exercised under the superintendence of B00K v
Mohammed Reza Khan.1

Early in November, 1776, Colonel Monson died; 1/76-
and as there remained in the Council after that event,
only the Governor-General and Mr. Barwell on the
one part, with General Clavering and Mr. Francis on
the other, the casting vote of the Governor-General
turned the balance on his side, and restored to him
the direction of government.

In the consultation of the 1st of November he had
entered a minute, in which he proposed, as a founda-
tion for new-modelling the plan of collection, that an
investigation should be instituted for ascertaining
the actual state of the sources of revenue, particularly
of that great and principal source, the lands. As
the mode of letting by auction, which had produced
inconvenience, was meant to be discontinued, and the
mode of letting by valuation to be adopted in its
stead, the Governor-General was of opinion, that as
accurate a knowledge as possible of the subject of
valuation ought first to be obtained. He proposed
that this inquiry should be assigned as an exclusive
duty to particular agents ; that two covenanted ser-
vants of the Company should be chosen, with an
adequate appointment of native officers ; and that
their business should be to collect the accounts of the
Zemindars, the farmers, and ryots, to obtain such
information as the Provincial Councils could impart;
to depute, when expedient, native officers, into the
districts for the purpose of inquiry ; and to arrange

1 See Francis’s Minute, ut supra, and the .Draught of Hastings’s Bill ;
Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 13.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1776.

• and digest the accumulated materials. The use of
- this knowledge would be to assess the lands in pro-
portion to their value, and to protect the ryots, by
equitable agreements, or pottahs, imposed upon the
Zemindars. The Governor-General finally proposed,
for the sake as he said of despatch, that all orders
issued from the office, in execution of such measures
as had received the sanction of the Board, should be
written in his name ; and that the control of the
office should be confided to his care.

As every proposal made by the Governor-General
was an object of attack to the opposite side of the
Board, this measure introduced as usual a long train
of debate and altercation. Mr. Francis objected,
1 . That the inquiry proposed was altogether useless ;
as a rate of impost, extracting from the lands their
utmost value, would be cruel to the people, and ruin-
ous to the state ; while, under a moderate assessment,
disproportion between the rate and the value was
worthy of little regard; 2. That if an accurate
valuation were useful, it ought to have been obtained
through the Committee of Circuit ; by whom the
lands were let at auction, for the professed purpose of
ascertaining their highest value ; 3. That the inquiry
would be unavailing, because the Zemindars, farmers,
and ryots would not give true accounts ; 4. That if
real accounts were capable of being obtained, they
wrould be so voluminous, intricate and defective, as
to preclude the possibility of drawing from them any
accurate conclusion ; 5. That a valuation of land, if
accurately obtained, is only true for one particular
year, not for any future one; and 6. That with
regard to the ryots, while the proposed pottahs were

DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROPOSED INQUIRY.

ill-calculated to afford them protection, the interest Bc°0^ 3V-

of the Zemindars, if their lands were restored under

a moderate and invariable tax, would yield the best 1776-
security to the husbandman, from whose exertions
the value of the land arose. A furious minute was
entered by General Clavering, in which he arraigned
the measure as an attempt to wrest from the Council
“ the ordering, management, and government of the
territorial acquisitions,” and as an illegal usurpation
of the powers that were vested exclusively in the
Board. This accusation wTas founded upon the pro-
posal about the letters and the control of the office.

And it is remarkable, that, knowing the jealousy wTith
which any proposal of a new power to himself would
be viewed by the hostile party, and the imputations
to which it would give birth, the Governor-General
should have embarrassed his scheme with a condition,
invidious, and not essential to its execution. That
the objections were frivolous or invalid, it is easy to
perceive. Though the inequalities of some taxes
redress themselves in time, it is a mischievous notion
that inequality in the imposing of taxes is not an
evil : Every inequality in the case of a new imposition,
is an act of oppression and injustice : And Hastings
showed that in the case of India, where the land-
holder paid nine-tenths of the produce of the land to
government, inequality might produce the most cruel
oppression. If the Committee of Circuit had fallen
short of procuring an accurate knowledge of the
sources of the revenue, that could be no reason why
better information should not be obtained. Though
it was acknowledged, that inquiry would be difficult,
and its results defective, it is never to be admitted

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK A

CHAP. 3.

1776.

•that, where perfect knowledge cannot be obtained,
- knowledge, though imperfect, is of no advantage. If
it were allowed, as it was not, that the interest of the
Zemindars would have been such, upon the plan of
Mr. Francis, as Mr. Francis supposed, it is not true
that men will be governed by their real interests,
where it is certain that they are incapable of under-
standing those interests ; where those interests are
distant and speak only to the judgment, while they
are opposed by others that operate immediately upon
the passions and the senses. As the Governor-
General had not proposed that letters from the office
issued in his name should relate to any thing but
services which had received the sanction of the
Council, he insisted that they no more implied an
usurpation of the powers of the Council than the
letters written in his own name, in the discharge of
his function, by any officer who was vested with a
trust. The pernicious purposes to which it was in
vague and general terms affirmed that such a power
might be converted, it is not easy to understand.
And the odium which it was attempted to cast upon
the inquiry, by representing it as a preparation for
exacting the utmost possible revenue from the lands,
and dispossessing the Zemindars, Hastings answered,
and sufficiently, by a solemn declaration, that no
such intention was entertained.

By the ascendency, now restored to the Governor-
General, the office was established. Orders were
transmitted to the Provincial Councils ; and native
officers, called aumeens, were sent to collect accounts
and to obtain information in the districts. The first
incidents which occurred wTere complaints against

QUINQUENNIAL LEASES EXPIRE.

those aumeens, for injurious treatment of the inha- BC^^3V

bitants ; and the opposing party were careful to

place these accusations in the strongest possible 1777 ■
light. From the aumeens, on the other hand,
accounts arrived of frequent refusal on the part of
the Zemindarry agents, and others, to afford infor-
mation ; or even to show their accounts.

The five-years’ leases expired in April, 1777 ; and
the month of July of that year had arrived before any
plan for the current and future years had yet been
determined. By acknowledgment of all parties, the
country had been so grievously over-taxed, as to have
been altogether unable to carry up its payments to
the level of the taxation. According to the state-
ment of the Accountant-General, dated the 12th of
July, 1777, the remissions upon the five-years’ leases
amounted to 118 lacs 79,576 rupees; and the balances,
of which the greater part were wholly irrecoverable,
amounted to 129 lacs 26,910 rupees. In his minute,
on the office of inquiry, Mr. Barwell expressly de-
clared that the “ impoverished state of the country
loudly pleaded for a reduction of the revenue, as ab-
solutely requisite for its future welfare.” 1 In the mean
time despatches arrived, by which it was declared,
that the Court of Directors, after considering the
plans, both that of the Governor-General for letting
the lands on leases for lives, and that of Mr. Francis
for establishing a fixed, invariable rent, " did, for
many weighty reasons, think it not then advisable to

1 Mr. Shore (Lord Teignmouth) said in his valuable Minute on the
Revenues of Bengal, dated June, 1789, printed in the Appendix, No. 1,
to the Fifth Report of the Committee on India Affairs in 1810, that “the
settlement of 1772, before the expiration of the leases, existed, he be-
lieved, no where, upon its original terms.”

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. acl0pt either of those modes,” but directed that the

lands should he let for one year on the most advan-

1777, tageous terms; that the way of auction, however,
should no more be used ; that a preference should
always be given to natives resident on the spot ; and
that no European, or the banyan of any European,
should have any share in farming the revenues. On
the 15th of July it was determined that the follow-
ing plan should be adopted for the year ; that the
lands should be offered to the old Zemindars on the
rent-roll or assessment of the last year, or upon a
new estimate formed by the provincial Council ;
that for such lands as should not in this manner find
a renter, the Provincial Councils should receive
sealed proposals by advertisement ; that the salt
farms should be let upon sealed proposals, a pre-
ference being given to the Zemindar or farmer of the
lands on which the salt was made ; that security
should not be asked of the Zemindars, but a part of
their lands be sold to discharge their balances. Mr.
Francis objected to the rent-roll of last year as too
high ; and Mr. Hastings admitted the justice of the
observation with regard to a part of the lands, where
abatement would be required ; but thought it good,
in the first instance, to try in how many cases the
high rent, for which persons were found to engage,
would be regarded as not more than the taxes would
enable them to pay. Instead of sealed proposals,
which he justly denominated a virtual auction, Mr.
Francis recommended a settlement by the Provincial
Councils. And he wished the manufacture of salt
to be left to the holder or renter of the lands where
it was made ; the government requiring nothing hut

DIRECTORS CENSURE THE OFFICE OF INQUIRY. 15

a duty. With these proposals the Governor-General 3 •

signified no disposition to comply ; but, after fresh

commands from England, the average of the collec- 17"'
tions of the three preceding years was made the basis
of the new engagements.

In their letter of the 4th of July, 1777, the
Directors made the following severe reflections on
the institution of the office of inquiry, and the sepa-
rate authority which the Governor-General had taken
to himself. “ Our surprise and concern were great
on finding by our Governor-General’s minute of 1st
November, 1776, that after more than seven years’
investigation, information is still so incomplete, as
to render another innovation, still more extraordinary
than any of the former, absolutely necessary in order
to the formation of a new settlement. In 1769,
supervisors were appointed professedly to investigate
the subject : in 1770, controlling councils of revenue
were instituted: in 1772, the office of Naib Dewan
was abolished, natives were discarded, and a Com-
mittee of Circuit formed, who, we were told, pre-
cisely and distinctly ascertained what was necessary
to be known : and now, in 1777, two junior servants,
with the assistance of a few natives, are employed to
collect and digest materials, which have already
undergone the collection, inspection, and revision, of
so many of our servants of all denominations. — We
should have hoped, that when you knew our senti-
ments respecting the conduct of our late adminis-
tration, in delegating separate powers to their
President, it would have been sufficient to prevent
us further trouble on, such occasions ; but, to our
concern, we find, that no sooner was our Council

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1777.

• reduced, by the death of Colonel Monson, to a
- number which rendered the President’s casting vote
of consequence to him, than he exercised it to invest
himself with an improper degree of power in the
business of the revenue, which he could never have
expected from other authority.”1

The same mode of settlement was renewed from
year to year, till 1781 ; when a plan destined for
permanence was adopted and employed.2

When Mr. Hastings was in the deepest depression,
under the ascendency of his opponents, a gentleman,
of the name of Maclean, departed for England, and
was intrusted with a variety of confidential affairs,
as the private agent of the Governor-General. F or
the measures adopted against the Rohillas, Hastings
had been censured by the Courts of both Directors
and Proprietors :3 and the Court of Directors had

1 Sixth Report, ut supra, Appendix, Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. Minutes
of the Governor- General and Council of Fort William, by Philip
Francis, Esq.

* Fifth Report of the Committee of Indian Affairs. 1812, p. 8.

3 This is not correctly slated : the Court of Directors passed resolutions
condemnatory of the principles of the Roliilla War, and they were con-
firmed by a Court of Proprietors, but with a very important amendment,
namely — that “ the Court had the highest opinion of the services and inte-
grity of Warren Hastings, Esq., and could not admit a suspicion of corrupt
motives operating on his conduct, without proof.” Proceedings of a
General Court, 6th December 1775. The Resolution to address the King
for the Recall of the Governor, arose out of the charges preferred by the
other members of the Council against Hastings and Barwell, for having
taken bribes, pr exacted sums of money from natives illicitly. This Reso-
lution passed the Court of Directors on the 8th of May, 1776, but at a General
Court held on the 17th May, it was voted by 377 to 271, that the Court of
Directors should reconsider their resolution. In the course of the following
July, after several stormy discussions, the resolution was rescinded, and all
question of Hastings’s removal ceased for the time. MSS. Records. The
account of this transaction, and of that which follows, in the text, is taken from
the Ninth Report of the Select Committee ; not, as it should have been, from

RESIGNATION OF MR. HASTINGS.

resolved to address the King for his removal. Upon book v.

T . & 1 CHAP. 3.

this severe procedure, a Court of Proprietors was

again convened; a majority of whom appeared 1777-
averse to carry the condemnation to so great an
extent ; and voted, that the resolution of the Direc-
tors should be reconsidered. The business remained
in suspense for some months, when Mr. Maclean
informed the Court of Directors, that he was em-
powered to tender the resignation of Mr. Hastings.

If he resigned, a mere majority of the Proprietors,
who appeared to he on his side, could restore him to
the service. If he was dismissed, a mere majority
would not be sufficient. In the letters by which
the authority of Mr. Maclean was conveyed, confi-
dential communications upon other subjects were
contained. On this account he represented the
impossibility of his imparting them openly to the
Court ; hut proposed, if they would appoint a confi-
dential Committee of Directors, to communicate to
them what was neeessary for their satisfaction. The
Chairman, Deputy-Chairman, and another Director
were named. They reported, that they had seen
Mr. Hastings’s instructions in his own hand-writing ;
and that the authority of Mr. Maclean, for the pro-
posed proceeding, was clear and sufficient. Mr.
Vansittart, and Mr. Stewart, both in the intimate
friendship and confidence of Mr. Hastings, gave
evidence, that directions, perfectly correspondent to
this written authority, had been given in their pre-

the documents in the Appendix, which do not in very many instances
authorize the statements of the Report, influenced as they evidently are
by a spirit unfriendly to Warren Hastings. — W.

VOL. IV. C

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1777.

• sence.1 The two Chairmen alone concurred in the
. report. The third Director regarded not the autho-

1 The detail of the Report is unfair, and in this instance the Appendix
does not furnish the means of correcting it. On reference to the original
MS. documents, it is evident that Colonel Macleane’s authority would
have satisfied none but minds ready to catch at any plea for the removal
of an opponent. The Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and Mr. Becher,
report, that having conferred with Mr. Macleane, they find that from the
purport of Mr. Hastings’s instructions, contained in a paper in his own
hand-writing, he declares he will not continue in the government of Ben-
gal, unless certain conditions therein specified can be obtained," of ‘ which,’
they add, * there is no probability.’ This is a very different thing from a
resignation : no conditions had been discussed ; none had been proposed :
their refusal should necessarily have preceded their consequences, and it
was not for the Court of Directors to act upon their notion of a probable
contingency. Again, it was only an intention that was talked of ; and a
mere intention, communicated to a friend, could not by any just reasoning
be converted into an official announcement of a final determination. Even
this intention, however, is not explicitly stated, but is gathered from the
‘purport’ of the instructions. On the other hand, the Court had before
them Hastings’s reiterated intimations that he would not resign, until the
Court had passed sentence upon the disputes between him and his adver-
saries. Letter to the Court, 15th August, 1777. App. No. 113. Macleane’s
conduct in this business it is not easy to comprehend. The Select Com-
mittee, in their usual spirit, find that motive for it which is assigned in the
text, but there were no proceedings in contemplation at the time of his
application to the Court, and it would have been quite early enough to have
had recourse to the manoeuvre for which credit is given him, when the
recall of his principal had been again proposed. It seems not impossible,
however, that he was influenced by views of his own. He had come
home as the unauthorized agent of the Nabob of Arcot, and in Feb. 1776,
addressed the Court, explaining his reasons for having resigned their service
for that object. His account is not very explicit, but it is clear that he
considered himself aggrieved by the Governor and Council of Bengal, and
had some important points to carry with the Court, declaring that ‘ he is,
and must continue to be, a great sufferer, unless the Court should be
pleased to take his case into consideration, and grant him relief.’ This is
dated the 13th February, 1776. On the 10th of October in the same year,
he writes to the Court to announce his being authorized to proffer
Hastings’s resignation as above mentioned. During the whole interval,
he had not relinquished his claims upon the Court ; for not untill the 31st of
March in the next year, does he break with them finally. The whole of his
proceedings display an intriguing spirit, which was very likely to have
made him outstrip his instructions, in the hope of conciliating the ruling
party of the Court. MSS. Records : also Ninth Report, 356. — W.

MR. HASTINGS DISOWNS HIS AGENT.

rity as sufficiently proved. The Directors proceeded 3V-

upon the report : the resignation was formally

accepted: and a successor to Mr. Hastings was 1/77-
chosen. Mr. Wheler was named ; presented to the
King for his approbation ; and accepted. General
Clavering, as senior Member of the Council, was
empowered to occupy the chair till Mr. Wheler
should arrive. And on the 19th of June, 1777,
intelligence of these proceedings was received in
Bengal.

A scene of confusion, well calculated to produce
the most fatal consequences, ensued. Mr. Hastings,
who now possessed the power of the Council, refused
to acknowledge the authority of his agent ; and de-
clared his resolution not to resign. General Claver-
ing claimed the attributes of supremacy ; and
summoned the Members of Council to assemble
under his auspices. Mr. Barwell attended upon the
summons of the one, and Mr. Francis upon that of
the other ; and two parties, each claiming the
supreme authority, were now seen in action one
against the other. An appeal to arms appeared, in
these circumstances, the only medium of decision ;
and Mr. Hastings showed his resolution to stand the
result. The other party, it is probable, felt their
influence inferior to his. At any rate they declined
the desperate extremity of a civil war ; and finally
offered to abide the award of the Supreme Court.

The judges decided that Mr. Hastings had not
vacated his office. This transaction was afterwards
made the subject of a charge against him by those
who moved for his impeachment ; but he accused
the Directors of rashness and injustice, in taking

c 2

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1777

3V • such important steps upon evidence which he af-
— firmed would have been held, in a court of justice,
insufficient to maintain a decision for the trans-
ference of an article of property of the smallest
amount.1

The power recovered by the Governor-General, and
thus strenuously retained, was exhibited in other
triumphs, of slender importance. One of the first
mortifications to which he had been subjected upon
the arrival of the hostile councillors, was the recall
of his agent, Mr. Middleton, from the office of resi-
dent with the Nabob of Oude. It was now his time
to retort the humiliation ; and on the 2d of December
1776, he moved in Council, “ that Mr. Bristow
should be recalled from the court of the Nabob of
Oude, and that Mr. Middleton he restored to the
office of resident.” So far from imputing any blame
to Mr. Bristow, the Governor-General acknowledged
that he had commanded his esteem. As the ground
of his proceeding, he stated, that Mr. Middleton had
been removed from his office without allegation of
fault ; that he had a greater confidence in Mr. Mid-
dleton than in Mr. Bristow, and as the respon-
sibility was laid upon him, it was but just that his
agents should be chosen by himself. The measure
was vehemently opposed by General Clavering and
Mr. Francis ; the usual violence of altercation ensued ;
Mr. Middleton was appointed, and Mr. Bristow
recalled.

The part taken by Mr. J oseph F owke in bringing

1 Ninth Report, Select Committee, 1783, and Appendix, Nos. 107, 108,
109, 112, 113, 114, 115; See also the Charges, No. 9, and the Answer of
Mr. Hastings.

DIRECTORS DISAPPROVE OF HIS MEASURES.

forward the facts, whence imputations had been B00K v

drawn upon the Governor-General himself, had ex

cited a resentment, which, having formerly appeared 1///-
only in bitter and contemptuous expressions, was now
made manifest in acts. The son of that gentleman,

Mr. Francis Fowke, had, on the 16th of August,

1775, been appointed by the Council, against the
voice of the Governor-General, to proceed on a
species of embassy to the new dependant of the
Company, the Raja of Benares. On the same day
on which the Governor-General moved for the recall
of Mr Bristow, he moved for that of Mr. Francis
Fowke, which also, after strong opposition, was
carried by his own casting vote. Mr. Fowke was
recalled, and his commission annulled, on the express
declaration, that “ the purposes thereof had been ac-
complished.” On the 22d of the same month, a
letter of the Governor-General and Council was
written to the Court of Directors, in which the recall
of Mr Fowke was reported, and in which it was
stated that the commission with which he had been
invested was annulled, because the purposes for
which it had been created were “ fully accomplished ; ”

On the very day after the date of this despatch, the
Governor-General moved in Council, and whatever
he moved was sure of acceptance, that a civil servant
of the Company, with an assistant, should be ap-
pointed to reside at Benares !

Upon both of these transactions, the Directors pro-
nounced condemnation. In their general letter to
Bengal, of the 4th of July, 1777, they say, “ Upon
the most careful perusal of your proceedings of the
2d of December, 1776, relative to the recall of Mr.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1777.

' Bristow from the court of the Nabob of Oude, and
- the appointment of Mr. Nathaniel Middleton to that
station, we must declare our strongest disapprobation
of the whole of that transaction. And therefore
direct, that Mr. Bristow do forthwith return to his
station of resident at Oude, from which he has been
so improperly removed.” And in their letter of the
30th of January, 1778, “ You inform us,” they said,
“ in your secret letter of December, 1776, that the
purposes for which Mr. Francis Fowke was appoint-
ed to proceed to Benares, being fully accomplished,
you had annulled his commission, and ordered him to
the Presidency. But it appears by your letter of the
6th of January, 1777, that in less than twenty days
you thought proper to appoint Mr. Thomas Graham
to reside at Benares, and Mr. Daniel Octavius Bar-
well to be his assistant. If it were possible to sup-
pose that a saving to the Company had been your
motive for annulling Mr. Fowke’s commission, we
should have approved your proceedings. But when
we find two persons appointed immediately after-
wards, with two salaries, to execute an office which
had been filled with reputation by Mr. Fowke alone,
we must be of opinion that Mr. F owke was removed
without just cause ; and therefore direct that Mr.
Francis Fowke be immediately reinstated in his
office of resident and post-master at Benares.”

On the 20th of July, 1778, the commands of the
Court of Directors, with regard to Mr. Fowke, came
under the deliberation of the Governor and Council,
when Mr. Hastings moved that the execution of these
commands should be suspended. A compliance with
them, he said, “ would be adequate ” (meaning equi-

CONTROL GIVEN TO MUNNY THE BEGUM.

valent) “ to his own resignation of the service,
because it would inflict such a wound on his authority,
as it could not survive.” He also alleged that in-
telligence might daily be expected from England of
resolutions which would decide upon his situation in
the service ; and, notwithstanding the opposition of
one-half of the Council, he decided, by his casting
vote, that Mr. Fowke, in spite of the command of
the Directors, should not be replaced.

On the 27th of May, 1779, the Court of Directors
write, “We have read with astonishment your formal
resolution to suspend the execution of our orders
relative to Mr. Francis Fowke. Your proceedings at
large are now before us. We shall take such mea-
sures as appear necessary for preserving the authority
of the Court of Directors, and for preventing such
instances of direct and wilful disobedience in our
servants in time to come. At present we repeat the
commands contained in the sixty-seventh paragraph
of our letter of the 30th January, 1778, and direct
that they be carried into immediate execution.”1

The place rendered vacant in the Council, by the
death of Colonel Monson, had been supplied, by the
appointment of Wheler, who commonly voted with
Francis; but as General Clavering died in the end
of the month of August, 1777, the decisions of the
Council were still, by his own casting vote, at the
command of the Governor-General.

Another of the transactions, which, during the
ascendency of his opponents, had most deeply offended
the Governor-General, was the subversion of his

book v.

CHAP. 3.

1778.

1 The original documents respecting these transactions may be found in
the Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1781 ; and in
the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial of Mr. Hastings.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 3.

1778.

regulations respecting the government and house-
hold of the Nabob. As this, however, had obtained
the sanction of the Court of Directors ; and the
appointment of Mohammed Reza Khan in particular
had met with their specific approbation, some colour
for reversing these measures was very much to be
desired. The period, at which the Nabob would
come of age, was approaching. In the secret con-
sultations on the 23rd of July, 1778, the Governor-
General desired that a letter from the Nabob
Mubarek-al-Dowla should be read. In this letter the
Nabob stated that he had now, by the favour of
God, arrived at that stage of life, his twentieth year,
when the laws of his country assigned to him the
management of his own affairs ; he complained of the
severity with which he had been treated by Moham-
med Reza Khan; and prayed that he might be
relieved from this state of degrading tutelage, and
allowed to assume the administration of his own
government and affairs.

Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis maintained, that it
was not competent for the delegated government of
India to subvert a regulation of so much importance,
which had been directly confirmed by the Court of
Directors ; and that the requisition of the Nabob
should be transmitted to England for the determina-
tion of the superior power. Mr. Hastings and Mr.
Barwell insisted that justice admitted of no delay.
It is remarkable, how these contending parties in
India could reverse their pleas, as often as their
interests required that different aspects of the same
circumstances should be held up to view. In 1775,
when the party in opposition to the Governor-
General meant to alter the regulations which he

CONTROL GIVEN TO MUNNY THE BEGUM. 25

had formed, they represented it as their object “toBo°K

recover the country government from the state of

feebleness and insignificance, to which it was Mr. 17 /8-
Hastings’s avowed policy to reduce it.” The Governor-
General, in opposition to these pretences, declared,
that “ all the arts of policy cannot conceal the power
by which these provinces are ruled ; nor can all the
arts of sophistry avail to transfer the responsibility
of them to the Nabob, when it is as visible as the
light of the sun, that they originate from our own
government ; that the Nabob is a mere pageant,
without the shadow of authority, and even his most
consequential agents receive their appointment from
the recommendation of the company, and the express
nomination of their servants.”1 Notwithstanding
these recorded sentiments, the Governor-General
could now declare; “The Nabob’s demands are
grounded on positive rights, which will not admit of
discussion. He has an incontestable right to the
management of his own household. He has an in-
contestable right to the Nizamut ; it is his by inheri-
tance ; the dependants of the Nizamut Adaulut, and
of the Fouzdary, have been repeatedly declared by
the Company, and by this government, to appertain
to the Nizamut. For these reasons I am of opinion,
that the requisitions contained in the Nabob’s letter
ought to be complied with.” 2 In the eagerness of
his passions, the Governor-General, by asserting the
incontestable right of the Nabob to all the powers of
the Nizamut, transferred a great part of the govern-
ment. Under the Mogul constitution, the govern-

1 Minute of the Governor-General on the 7th Dec. 1775, Fifth Report,
ut supra, p. 24, and App. No. 6.

2 Secret consultations, 5th March, 1778. Fifth Report, p. 29, App.

No. 6. (N.)

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3

1778.

■ ment of the provinces consisted of two parts ; the
. Dewannee, or collection of the revenues, and the
administration of the principal branches of the civil
department of justice ; and the Nizamut, or the
military branch of the government, with the superin-
tendence of the criminal department of judicature:
and of these the Dewannee was subordinate to the
Nizamut. In this exalted capacity, it was never
meant to recognise the Nabob ; and the language
exhibits a useful specimen of the sort of arguments,
to serve a purpose, which vague and imperfect notions
of Indian policy have enabled those who were in-
terested always to employ.1 Letters were also

1 At the time when Nuncomar accused Mr. Hastings, an indictment
for a conspiracy was brought against him, Roy Radachurn, and others.
Roy Radachurn was the Vakeel of the Bengal Nabob, and claimed the
privilege of an ambassador. To bring him under the power of the Court,
it was thought necessary to prove that his master was in no respect a
Prince. For this purpose Mr. Hastings made an affidavit, that he and his
council, in 1772, had appointed Munny Begum, and all her subordinates;
that they had appointed courts of law, both civil and criminal, by their
own authority, and without consulting the Nabob ; that “the civil courts
were made solely dependent on the Presidency at Calcutta ; and that the
said criminal courts were put under the inspection and control of the Com-
pany’s servants, although ostensibly under the name of the Nazim; and
that the revenues were exclusively in the hands of the Company.” The
inference was, that not a particle of sovereign power belonged to the
Nabob. Affidavits to the same purpose were made by Mr. George Vansittart
and Mr. Lane. Upon this and other evidence the judges formed their
decision; that the Nabob was not a sovereign in any sense, nor his
Vakeel an ambassador. The words of some of them are remarkable. The
Chief Justice said, that if the Nabob was a Prince, “ the exercise of their
power must be an usurpation in the India Company ;” but this he
affirmed was not the case, for the Nabob’s treaty with the Company “ was
a surrender, by him, of all power into their hands.” After a long argu-
ment to show that there was in the Nabob nothing but a “ shadow of
majesty,” he concludes ; “ I should not have thought that I had done my
duty, if I had not given a full and determinate opinion upon this question.
I should have been sorry if I had left it doubtful, whether the empty
name of a Nabob could be thrust between a delinquent and the laws.”
The language of Mr. Justice Le Maistre was stronger still. “ With
regard to this phantom,” said he, “ this man of straw, Mobarek ul Dowla,

THIS TRANSACTION CONDEMNED.

brought from the Nabob, which the known wish of book v.
the Governor-General coulcl not fail to obtain, request- 1

1778.

it is an insult on the understanding of the Court, to have made a question
of his sovereignty.” “ By the treaty which has been read,” said Mr. Justice
Hyde, “ it appears that Mohareck ul Dowla deprives himself of the great
ensign of sovereignty — the right to protect his own subjects. He declares
that shall be done by the Company.” When this opinion was received,

Mr. Francis moved at the Board, that as it would preclude them from the
use of the Nabob’s name in their transactions with foreign states, the
Directors might be requested, “if it should be determined by them that
the Subah’s government was annihilated, to instruct the Board in what
form the government of the provinces should be administered for the
future.” Mr. Hastings objected to the motion, as the declaration of the
judges told nothing but what, he said, was known, and acted upon, before.

They had used the Nabob’s name, it was true; in deference to the com-
mands of the Directors ; “ but I do not,” said he, “ remember any instance,
and I hope none will be found, of our having been so disingenuous as to
disclaim our own power, or to affirm that the Nabob was the real sovereign
of these provinces.” He next proceeds to condemn the fiction of the
Nabob’s government. “ In effect,” he says, “ I do not hesitate to say,
that I look upon this state of indecision to have been productive of all the
embarrassments which we have experienced with the foreign settlements

It has been productive of great inconveniences ; it has prevented

us from acting with vigour in our disputes with the Dutch and French

Instead of regretting, with Mr. Francis, the occasion which deprives us of
so useless and hurtful a disguise, I should rather rejoice were it really the
case, and consider it as a crisis which freed the constitution of our govern-
ment from one of its greatest defects. And if the commands of our
honourable employers, which are expected by the ships of the season,
shall leave us uninstructed on this subject, which has been so pointedly
referred to them in the letters of the late administration, I now declare
that I shall construe the omission, as a tacit and discretional reference of
the subject to the judgment and determination of this Board ; and will
propose that we do stand forth, in the name of the Company, as the actual
government of these provinces; and assume the exercise of it, in every
instance, without any concealment or participation.” Minutes of Evidence
on the Trial of Mr. Hastings, p. 1071 — 1079. When all these facts are
known, the vehement zeal which Mr. Hastings, because it now suited his
purpose, displayed for the fictitious authority of the Nabob, has a name
which every reader will supply. — M. The Tight of the Nabob to control
his own household, was quite compatible with the absence of political
power, and as long as his administration of the Nizamut was permitted, he
had a right to appoint his officers ; the point in dispute involves no ques-
tion of political power, but of individual patronage. It was a very unne-
cessary exercise of control to withhold from a man of twenty, all voice in
the nomination of his servants and dependants. — W.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. ing that his step-mother Munny Begum, of whom he
CHAF' 3' had formerly complained, “ should take on herself
1778. the management of the Nizamut, without the inter-
ference of any person whatsoever.”1 * Mohammed
Reza Khan was accordingly removed ; Munny Begum
was replaced in her ancient office : subordinate to
her, Gourdass was re-instated in that of comptroller of
the household ; and a person called Sudder-al-Hok
was appointed to the superintendence of the judicial
department. To these several offices, which were all
included in the trust of Mohammed Reza Khan,
salaries were appropriated amounting to 18,000
rupees beyond what he had received. The incapa-
city of Munny Begum, when compared with Mo-
hammed Reza, could admit of no dispute ; and the
pernicious influence of the eunuchs wTho governed
her delayed not to give Hastings uneasiness. On
the 10th of October of the same year (1778), he was
obliged to write to the Nabob, “ That the affairs
both of the Phouzdary and Adaulut were in the
greatest confusion imaginable, and that daily rob-
beries and murders were perpetrated throughout the
country ; — that his dependants and people, actuated

1 Of the mode in which such a letter was procured, nobody who

knows the relative situation of the parties can entertain a doubt. The
judges of the supreme court, upon a letter of the same Nabob, in July,

1775, unanimously gave the following opinion: “The Nabob’s age, his
situation is such, that there is no man, either in England or India, will
believe he would be induced to write such a letter, was it not dictated to
him by the agents of those who rule this settlement : or unless he was
perfectly convinced it would be agreeable to and coincide with their senti-
ments. We always have, and always shall consider, a letter of business
from that Nabob, the same as a letter from the Governor-General and
Council.” Minutes of Evidence on the trial, p. 1079, and Appendix, p.
547. According to this rule, the letter on which Mr. Hastings laid his
superstructure was a letter from himself to himself.

THIS TRANSACTION CONDEMNED.

by selfish and avaricious views, had by their inter- B00K v ■

ference so impeded the business of justice, as to

throw the whole country into a state of confusion.” 177S-
Meanwhile the report of this transaction was re-
ceived in England ; and the Court of Directors, in
their letter of the 4th of February, transmit their
sentiments upon it in the following terms : “ We by
no means approve your late proceedings on the ap-
plication of the Nabob Mubarek ul Dowla for the
removal of the Naib Subahdar. In regard to the
Nabob’s desire to take charge of his own affairs, we
find it declared by one of your own members, and
not contradicted, that the Nabob is, in his own
person, utterly incapable of executing any of those
offices which were deemed of essential importance to
the welfare of the country. The Nabob’s letters
leave us no doubt of the true design of this extraor-
dinary business being, to bring forward Munny
Begum, and again to invest her with improper power
and influence, notwithstanding our former declara-
tion, that so great a part of the Nabob’s allowance
had been embezzled, or misapplied under her super-
intendence. You have requested the inexperienced
young man, to permit all the present judges and
officers of the Nizamut and Phousdary Adauluts, or
courts of criminal justice, and also all the Phousdars
or officers appointed to guard the peace of the
country, to continue in office until he the Nabob shall
have formed a plan for a new arrangement of those
offices: and it is with equal surprise and concern,
that we observe this request introduced, and the
Nabob’s ostensible rights so solemnly asserted at
this period by our Governor-General; because, on a

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

b0°k V. late occasion, to serve a very different purpose, he

has not scrupled to declare it as visible as the light

1778- of the sun, that the Nabob is a mere pageant, and
■without even the shadow of authority. No circum-
stance has happened, since that declaration was
made, to render the Nabob more independent, nor
to give him any additional degree of power or
consequence ; you must therefore have been well
apprized that your late concessions to Mubarek-ul-
dowla were unnecessary, and as such unwarrantable.
As we deem it for the welfare of the country, that
the office of Naib Subahdar be for the present
continued, and that this high office should be filled
by a person of wisdom, experience, and approved
fidelity to the Company ; and as we have no reason
to alter our opinion of Mohammed Reza Khan, we
positively direct, that you forthwith signify to the
Nabob Mubarek-al-dowla our pleasure, that Moham-
med Reza Khan be immediately restored to the office
of Naib Subahdar.1

’ Fifth Report, ut supra, p. 24 — 32, and App. No. 6; also the charges
against Mr. Hastings, No. 17, with Mr. Hastings’s answer; see also the
Evidence both for the Prosecution and Defence in Minutes of Evidence,
ut supra. — M.

No comment is made upon the inconsistency of the Court in their
insisting on the continuance in office of Mohammed Reza Khan, a person
whom they had formerly accused of corruption, and sentenced to imprison-
ment. In all these conflicting orders and opinions, the real state of
things should be kept in view. The majority of the Court of Directors were
friendly to the opponents of Hastings. The majority of the Court of
Proprietors were his friends. In reliance on their support the governor
held his post and his purposes, in defiance of what he not unfoundedly
regarded as the party-spirit of the Directors ; but their opposition, and that
of his council, forced him to devise arguments and assign motives intended
to meet the exigency of the moment, and therefore, sometimes as much at
variance with themselves as were the arguments of those by whom he was
so vehemently and invariably opposed.— W.

RELATIONS WITH THE MAHRATTAS.

The state of the relations between the Company’s book v.

X CHAP. 3.

government and the Mahratta powers had for some

time pressed with considerable weight upon the at- 1778-
tention of the Council. The treaty which had been
concluded by Colonel Upton, commonly distin-
guished by the title of the treaty of Poomnder, had
left the minds of the governing party at Poonah, and
those of the Bombay Presidency, in a state of mutual
jealousy and dissatisfaction. The occupation of
Salsette, and the other concessions which had been
extorted, but above all the countenance and protec-
tion still afforded to Ragoba, rankled in the minds of
the Poonah ministry ; while the Bombay rulers,
condemned and frustrated by the Supreme Council,
but encouraged by the approbation of the Court of
Directors, stood upon the watch for any plausible
opportunity of evading or infringing the treaty.

Colonel Upton, though he remained at Poonah till
the commencement of the year 1777, departed before
any of the material stipulations had been carried into
effect. Futty Sing, as by the treaty it had been
rendered his interest, disavowed his right to alienate
in favour of the Company any portion of the Guica-
war dominions ; and the Poonah Council made use
of the favour shown to Ragoba, as a pretext for de-
laying or evading the concessions they had made.

A new feature was soon added to these disputes,
by the arrival of a French ship in one of the
Mahratta ports, and the reception given at Poonah
to some gentlemen whom she landed, as on a
mission from the king of France. This circumstance
strongly excited the English jealousy and fears.

The object at which the French were supposed to

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. aim, was the establishment of a factory at Poonah ;

CHAP. 3. j . . . .

and the acquisition oi a sea-port on the coast oi

1778. Malabar. These advantages would enable them, it
was apprehended, to sustain a competition with the
English in matters of trade, and to annoy them
seriously in a period of war. The asseverations of
the Mahratta government, that nothing was in view
prejudicial to the interests of the Company, gave
little satisfaction. Colonel Upton, whose partiality
was engaged to the treaty which he had concluded,
and the party whom he served, accused the Bombay
Presidency, and answered for the sincerity and pa-
cific designs of the Mahrattas. Mr. Hastings leaned
to the suspicious side; his opponents urged the
propriety of yielding contentment to the Mahrattas,
especially by the abandonment of Ragoba. The
probability of a rupture between France and Eng-
land was already contemplated in India ; and, as it
was to be expected that the French would aim at
the recovery of their influence in India, so Mr.
Hastings, at least, thought that the western coast
was the place where they had the best prospect of
success ; and the support of the Mahrattas was the
means most likely to be adopted for the accomplish-
ment of their ends.

The progress of inquiry respecting the agent from
France discovered, that his name was St. Lubin; that
he was a mere adventurer, who had opened to the
French Minister of Marine a project, supported by
exaggerated and false representations, for acquiring
an influence in the Mahratta councils, and an esta-
blishment in the Mahratta country; and that he had
been intrusted with a sort of clandestine commission,

THE FRENCH INTRIGUE ALARMS THE ENGLISH.

as an experiment, for ascertaining if any footing or
advantage might be gained. The Presidency of
Bombay represented to the Supreme Council, that
St. Lubin received the most alarming countenance
from the Poonah ministers ; that nothing could be
more dangerous to the Company, than a combined
attack from the Mahrattas and French: And they
urged the policy of anticipating the designs of their
enemies, by espousing the cause of Ragoba ; and
putting an end to the power of men, who waited only
till their schemes were ripe for execution, to begin
an attack upon the Company. The Bombay Presi-
dency were more emboldened in their importunity,
by a letter from the Court of Directors, containing
their observations on the conduct of the Supreme
Council in taking the negotiation with the Mahrattas
out of the hands of the Bombay government, and on
the treaty which the Supreme Council had concluded
with the Poonah rulers. “We approved,” said the
Directors, “ under every circumstance, of keeping all
territories and possessions ceded to the Company by
Ragoba, and gave directions to the Presidencies of
Bengal and Fort St. George to adopt such measures
as might be necessary for their preservation and de-
fence. But we are extremely concerned to find, from
the terms of the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton
at Poonah, that so great a sacrifice has been improvi-
dently made ; and especially, that the important
cession of Bassein to the Company by Ragoba, has
been rendered of no effect. We cannot but disap-
prove of the mode of interference of the Governor-
General and Council, by sending an ambassador to
Poonah without first consulting you, and of their
VOL. IV. D

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1778.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

3V- determination to disavow and invalidate the treaty

formerly entered into by an agent from your Presi-

1//8‘ dency, and solemnly ratified under the seal of the
Company. We are convinced that Bassein, which is
so great an object with us, might have been obtained
if they had authorized you to treat either with Ra-
goba, or with the ministers at Poonah ; reserving the
final approval and ratification of the treaty to them-
selves. This is the precise line we wish to have
drawn ; and which we have directed our Governors-
General and Council in future to pursue. We are of
opinion, that an alliance originally with Ragoba would
have been more for the honour and advantage of the
Company, and more likely to be lasting, than that
concluded at Poonah. His pretensions to the supreme
authority appear to us better founded than those of
his competitors ; and therefore, if the conditions of
the treaty of Poonah have not been strictly fulfilled
on the part of the Mahrattas, and if, from any circum-
stance, our Governor-General and Council shall deem
it expedient, we have no objection to an alliance with
Ragoba, on the terms agreed upon between him and
you.”

While these circumstances were under the consi-
deration of the Supreme Council at Calcutta, intelli-
gence arrived, that the rivalship of Siccaram Baboo
and Nana Furnavese had produced a division in the
Council at Poonah ; that a part of the ministers,
with Siccaram Baboo at their head, had resolved to
declare for Ragoba ; that they had applied for the
assistance of the English to place in his hands the
powers of government ; and that the Presidency of
Bombay had resolved to co-operate with them in his

CO-OPERATION WITH RAGOBA.

favour. This subject produced the usual train °fBc^rKJ‘

debate and contention in the Supreme Council; where

Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler condemned the resolu- 1/78,
tion of the President and Council of Bombay, first,
as illegal, because not taken with the approbation of
the supreme authority; next, as unjust, by infringing
the treaty ; and finally, impolitic, by incurring the dan-
gers and burdens of war: The Governor-General and
Mr. Barwell approved it, as authorized by the sud-
denness and greatness of the emergency, and the de-
clared sentiments of the Court of Directors ; as not
unjust, since the principal party with whom the
treaty was formed now applied for the interference
of the Company ; and as not impolitic, because it
anticipated the evil designs of a hostile party, and
gave to the Company an accession of territorial re-
venue, while it promised them a permanent influence
in the Mahratta councils. It was resolved, in conse-
quence, that a supply of money and a reinforcement
of troops should be sent to the Presidency of Bombay.

The Governor-General proposed that a force should
be assembled at Calpee, and should march by the
most practicable route to Bombay. This also gave
rise to a warm debate, both on the policy of the plan,
and the danger of sending a detachment of the
Company’s army to traverse India through the domi-
nions of princes, whose disposition had not been pre-
viously ascertained. It was finally determined, that
the force should consist of six battalions of Sepoys,
one company of native artillery, and a corps of
cavalry ; that it should be commanded by Colonel
Leslie; and anticipate, by its expedition, the obstruc-
tion of the rains. That commander was instructed

d 2

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I
CHAP. 3

1778.

' • to take his route through the province of Berar, of
- which the rulers were friendly; to obtain, where pos-
sible, the consent of the princes or chiefs, through
whose territories he might have occasion to pass ;
but even when refused, to pursue his march ; to he
careful in preventing injury to the country or inhabi-
tants ; to allow his course to be retarded by the pur-
suit of no extraneous object; and to consider himself
under the command of the Bombay Presidency from
the commencement of his march. That Presidency
were at the same time instructed to use their utmost
endeavours to defeat the machinations of the French;
to insist upon the execution of the treaty ; to take
advantage of every change of circumstances for ob-
taining beneficial concessions to the Company ; and,
if they observed any violation of the treaty, or any
refusal to fulfil its terms, to form a new alliance with
Ragoba, and concert with him the best expedients
for retrieving his affairs.

In the mean time another change had taken place
in the fluctuating administration at Poonah. The
party of Siccaram Baboo had prevailed over that of
Nana Furnavese without the co-operation of Ragoba;
and it was immediately apprehended at Bombay, that
they would no longer desire to admit as an associate,
a party who would supersede themselves. The argu-
ments, urged, upon this change, by Mr. Francis and
Mr. Wheler, did not succeed in stopping the march
of the troops ; because the unsettled state of the
government of Poonah, and the machinations of the
French, rendered it highly expedient, in the opinion
of the Governor-General, that the Presidency of
Bombay should be furnished with sufficient power,

VIEWS OF HASTINGS.

both to guard against dangerous, and to take advan- B(^K ^ •

tage of favourable, circumstances and events.

The detachment experienced some slight obstruc- 1/78-
tion at the commencement of its march, from some
of the petty Mahratta chiefs ; upon which, as indi-
cating danger if it proceeded any further, Mr. F rancis
renewed his importunities for its recall. Mr. Hast-
ings opposed his arguments, on the ground, that after
a few days’ march the troops would arrive in Bundel-
cund, which was independent of the Mahrattas ;
would thence pass into the territories of the Raja of
Berar, in which they would be received with friend-
ship ; that, on quitting the territories of the Raja,
more than two-thirds of the march would be com-
pleted ; that the consent of the Peshwa had been
obtained ; and that the Mahratta chiefs, whatever
their inclinations, were too much engaged in watch-
ing the designs of one another, to be able to oppose
the detachment.

Yaiious were the orders by which its movements
were affected. The Presidency at Bombay, having
taken up hopes that the presiding party at Poonah
would favour the views of the English, and dismiss
the agents of the French, wrote a first letter to the
detachment, requiring them to halt, and wait till
subsequent directions ; and presently thereafter
another letter, desiring them to prosecute the march.

In the mean time intelligence had reached Calcutta,
that war was declared between the English and the
French. Upon this, instructions were despatched to
Colonel Leslie by the supreme Council, not to
advance, till further orders, beyond the limits of
Berar.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1778.

According to the Governor-General, the Company
had nothing to dread from the efforts of the French,
at either Calcutta or Madras : it was the western
coast on which, both from the weakness of Bombay,
and the inclinations of the Mahratta government,
those enemies of the English had any prospect of
success ; and where it most behoved the servants of
the Company to provide against their attempts. He
recommended a connexion with some of the leading
powers of the country ; pointed out the Raja of
Berar as the prince Avith whom it was most desirable
to combine ; and mentioned two services by which
the co-operation of that Prince might be ensured.
One of these services Avas to assist him in the re-
covery of the dominions which had been wrested from
him by Nizam Ali. The other was to support him
in a pretension to the Mahratta Rajaship. The
legitimate, but impotent King of the Mahrattas, had
recently died in his captivity at Sattarah, without
leaving issue : and the Raja of Berar, as a branch
of the house of Sivajee, might urge a claim to the
succession. In pursuance of these objects, an em-
bassy to the court of Berar was voted by the
majority, and despatched. In the mean time another
revolution had ensued in the government at Poonah.
The party of Siccaram Baboo Avas again overthrown ;
and that of Nana Fumavese exalted by the powerful
co-operation of Madajee Sindia. The party of
Nana still appeared to favour the French. The
defeated party, now led by a chief named Moraba, as
the age of Siccaram Baboo in a great measure dis-
qualified him for business, were eager to combine
with the English in raising Ragoba ; and the Presi-

WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS.

deucy of Bombay had no lack of inclination to 3V>

second their designs. A resolution to this effect was

passed on the 21st of July, 1778 ; but it was not till 1779,
the beginning of November, that any step was taken
for its execution. The activity of the Presidency
had been repressed by news of the confinement of the
leading members of the party at Poonah, from whom
they expected assistance, and by instructions from
the Supreme Council not to pursue any measures
which might interfere with the object of the em-
bassy to Moodajee Bonsla, the Regent of Berar.

Early, however, in November, a plan of operations
was concerted; a treaty was concluded with Ragoba;
a loan to a considerable amount was advanced to
him ; and, upon intelligence that the ruling party
at Poonah had penetrated their designs, and were
making preparations to defeat them, it was deter-
mined to send forward one division of the army im-
mediately, and the rest with all possible despatch.

The force which was sent upon this enterprise
amounted in all to nearly 4500 men. A committee,
consisting of Colonel Egerton, Mr. Carnac, a mem-
ber of the Select Committee, and Mr. Mostyn, for-
merly agent of the Presidency at Poonah, were
appointed a Committee for superintending the expe-
dition, and settling the government at Poonah. The
army set out about the beginning of December ;
on the 23d completed the ascent of the mountains,
and arrived at Condola. The enemy now, for the
first time, appeared. From the head of the Ghaut,
or pass, which they secured by a fortified post, the
English, on the 4th of January, began their march
toward Poonah, with a stock of provisions for twenty-

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book gv • five days. They were opposed by a body of troops,

who retired as they advanced, but cut off their

1/79‘ supplies, and seized every opportunity to harass and
impede them. They were not joined, as they had
encouraged themselves to expect, by any chief of
importance, or numbers to any considerable amount.
And it was in vain, as they were informed by Ra-
goba, to hope, that his friends and adherents would
declare themselves, till the English, by some impor-
tant operations and success, held out to them a pro-
spect of safety. The army continued to advance till
the 9th of January, when, at the distance of about
sixteen miles from Poonah, and eighteen from the
summit of the pass, they found an army assembled
to oppose them. The Committee,1 to whom, by a
strange policy, the command of a military expedition
was consigned, began to despair ; and, on learning
from the commissary in chief, that only eighteen
days’ provisions were in store, and from the officer
commanding the forces, that he could not protect
the baggage, without a body of horse, they made up
their minds to a retreat. It commenced on the night
of the 11th. But secrecy had not been preserved ;
and they were attacked by the enemy before day-

1 Mr. Moslyn was soon taken ill and returned to Bombay, where he
died. On arriving at Tullygaum, Colonel Egerton was obliged to relin-
quish the command to Colonel Cockbum, but continued to act as a
Member of the Committee. In either capacity he may be considered as
principally answerable for the failure of the expedition. After crossing
the Ghaut, the movements of the army were so slow, that it had advanced
but eight miles in eleven days, without any excuse for such deliberate pro-
cedure : and when it became a question what was to be done, Colonel
Cockburn expressed no doubt of making good his march to Poona, and
other well-informed officers were ol opinion, that at least they should
maintain their ground whilst the negotiations were carried on. History
of Mahrattas, ii. 366. — W.

WAR UNSUCCESSFUL.

1779.

break ; when they lost a part of their baggage, and 3V'

above three hundred men. It was not until four

o’clock in the afternoon that the enemy desisted from
the pursuit, when the English had effected their
retreat as far as Wargaum. Hope now deserted not
only the Committee, but the Commander of the
troops ; who declared it impossible to carry back the
army to Bombay.1 An embassy was sent to the
Mahratta camp to try upon what terms they could
have leave to return. The surrender of Ragoba was
demanded as a preliminary article. That unfortunate
chief was so impressed with the danger of waiting
another attack, that he had declared his intention of
surrendering himself to Sindia, and had been in
correspondence with that chieftain for several days ;
the Committee were less scnrpulous therefore, in bar-
tering his safety for their own. When this com-
pliance was announced, and the English expected a
corresponding facility on the part of the Mahrattas,
the leaders of that people informed them, that the
surrender of Ragoba was a matter of the utmost in-
difference ; that the treaty, which had been concluded
with Colonel Upton, had been shamefully violated ;
the territory, of the Mahrattas invaded ; and that
unless a new treaty were formed upon the spot, the
army must remain where it was, and abide the con-
sequences. The declaration of the Committee, that
they possessed not powers to conclude a treaty, was
disregarded. The commanding officer declared, that

1 Captain Hartley, who had distinguished himself in command of the rear
guard during the retreat, proposed a plan by which it might be ensured.
The commanding officer, however, despaired of its accomplishment. Hist,
of Mahrattas, ii. 375. — W.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1779.

the attempt to force a retreat could lead to nothing
but the total destruction of the army. It was, there-
fore, agreed to submit to such conditions as the
Mahrattas might impose ; and a treaty was signed,
by which all the acquisitions were relinquished,
which had been made in those parts by the English,
since the treaty with Madhoo Rao in 1756 ; Baroach
was given up to Sindia ; 1 Ragoba placed in his
hands ; the detachment from Bengal was ordered to
return ; and two Englishmen of distinction were left
as hostages for the due fulfilment of the terms.

No approbation could be more complete than that
which was bestowed by the court of Directors on the
object of this expedition. In a letter from the Com-
mittee of Secrecy, dated the 31st of August, 1778,
“ The necessity,” they say “ of counteracting the
views of the French at Poonah appears to us so very
striking, that we not only direct you to frustrate their
designs of obtaining a grant of the portofChoul, but
also to oppose by force of arms, if necessary, their
forming a settlement at that or any other place which
may render them dangerous neighbours to Bombay.
As the restoration of Ragoba to the Peshwaship is a
measure upon which we are determined ; and as the
evasions of the Mahratta chiefs respecting the treaty
of Poonah justify any departure therefrom on our
part, we, therefore, direct, that if, on the receipt of
this letter, you shall be able to obtain assistance from

' It was the policy of the Committee to appeal to Sindia, which, as
Captain Grant observes, flattered him exceedingly, and accorded with his
plans of policy : he nevertheless availed himself of the opportunity to take
every advantage of the English, as far as was consistent with the control
he wished to preserve overNana Furnavees. Mahratta History, ii. 377. — W.

THE DETACHMENT FROM BENGAL.

the friends of Ragoba, and with such assistance find
yourselves in force sufficient to effect his restoration
without dangerously weakening your garrison, you
forthwith undertake the same.” In proportion to
the satisfaction which would have been expressed
upon a fortunate termination of this enterprise, was
the displeasure manifested upon its failure. The
first object which strikes us,” say the Directors, “ is
the slow progress of the army. This we deem an
irreparable injury to the service ; and in this respect
the conduct of the Commander-in-Chief appears ex-
tremely defective. The consequence was obvious ;
the enemy had full opportunity to collect their
strength ; the friends of Ragoba, instead of being
encouraged, by the spirited exertion of our force, to
join his standard, must, as we conceive , have been
deterred from declaring in his favour, by the languor
of our military proceedings.” They condemn the
first resolution to retreat, when “ the army was so far
advanced, the troops full of spirits and intrepidity,
and eighteen days’ provisions in store.” And the
utmost measure of their indignation and resentment
is poured on the humiliating submission which was
at last preferred to the resolution of a daring, though
hazardous retreat ; preferred, on the pretext that the
troops would not again resist the enemy, though they
had behaved with the utmost intrepidity on the for-
mer attack ; and though Captain Hartley declared
that he could depend upon his men, urged every
argument in favour of resolute measures, and even
formed and presented to the commanding officer a
disposition for conducting the retreat. The two
military officers who had shared in the conduct of the

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. expedition, the Directors dismissed from their ser-

.vice; and the only remaining member of the Field

1779- Committee, who had been selected from the civil
branch of the service, for one had died during the
march, they degraded from his office, as a member of
the Council and Select Committee of Bombay.

The detachment which was proceeding from Ben-
gal had wasted much time on its march. Having
advanced as far as Chatterpore, a principal city of
Bundelcund, early in June, it halted till the middle
of August. During this season, when the rains, ac-
cording to Colonel Leslie, interrupted ; according to
the Governor General, favoured the march ; the com-
mander of the troops engaged himself in negotiations
and transactions with the local chiefs ; measures
severely condemned by his superiors, and very open
to the suspicion of selfish and dishonourable motives.
The President and Council of Bombay, on the re-
ceipt of intelligence of a rupture with France, had
earnestly exhorted him by letter to accelerate his
motions. They renewed their solicitations on the
21st of July, when they came to the resolution of
supporting Ragoba. And they urged the delay of
this detachment, and the uncertainty of its arrival,
as a reason for having undertaken the expedition to
Poonah, without waiting for that addition of strength
which its union and co-operation would have be-
stowed. Dissatisfied with the long inactivity of the
detachment at Chatterpore, the Supreme Council
wrote to the commanding officer on the 31st of
August, desiring him to explain the reasons of his
conduct, and to pursue the march. He had put
himself in motion about the middle of the month,

THE DETACHMENT FROM BENGAL.

and was at Rajegur on the 17th, where a party of book v

Mahrattas disputed the passage of the river Kane

On the 17th of September he despatched a letter to 1779-
the Supreme Council from Rajegur, where he still
remained, stating, that the retardation of the de-
tachment had been occasioned by the weather ; that
he had concluded friendly engagements with Goman
Sing, and Koman Sing, two rajas of Bundelcund ;
and had received satisfactory assurances from Moo-
dajee Bonsla, the Regent of Berar, to whom the pro-
position of an embassy from the English rulers ap-
peared to have yielded peculiar gratification.1

The person2 who had been chosen to conduct this
embassy, died upon the journey, before he reached
the capital of Berar. After some fluctuation of
opinion, it was determined not to continue the
negotiation by appointing a successor; but rather
to wait in expectation of some advances from the
Regent.

The party of Mr. Francis now urgently pressed
for a distinct declaration of the design with which
the detachment on its way to the western Presidency,

1 The sentiments of the Court of Directors were unfavourable to this
attempted alliance. In their letter of the 14th of May, 1779, to the
Governor-General and Council, they say, “ The undertaking appears to
us contrary to the Company’s former policy, to our engagements with
Ragoba and Nizam Ali, and doubtful respecting any reasonable prospect
of advantage.” And in another letter dated on the 27th of the same
month, to the President and Select Committee of Bombay, they say,
“ We earnestly hope, that upon your negotiation and treaty with Ragoba
being communicated to our Governor-General and Council, they would
concur with you in giving full effect thereto, and desist from entering into
any new connexions which may set aside, or counteract, your recent
agreements with Ragoba.” Sixth Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781,
p. 84.

2 Mr. Elliot ; — he died on the 12th September. — W.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. was directed to continue its march. There was not

CHAP. 3.

only a complication, they affirmed, hut a contrariety

t779. 0f objects ; the alliance for raising Moodajee Bonsla
to the throne of Sivajee, being inconsistent with the
scheme for establishing Ragoba in the office of
Peshwa. The Governor-General, without any defi-
nite explanation, alleged that the re-instatement of
Ragoba, had never been pursued as an end, but
only as a means ; that his hopes and expectations
were placed on Moodajee ; that the detachment,
whether its services should be required for the resto-
ration of Ragoba, or in prosecution of engagements
with Moodajee, or in opposing the French, ought
equally to continue its march. The opposite party
once more urged in vain their reasons for its recall.
But all parties agreed in condemning Colonel Leslie
for the delay which he had incurred, and the engage-
ments which he had formed ; in pronouncing him
unfit to be any longer intrusted with the command
which he held ; and in transmitting orders that he
should resign it to Colonel Goddard, the officer next
in command. Leslie, however, survived not to re-
ceive the intelligence of his disgrace ; nor to produce,
it ought to be remembered, what he might have urged
in vindication of his conduct. He was an officer of
experience and reputation. It is known, that he
held a high language, that he complained of the
Governor-General, to whom, by his special directions,
he had communicated a private journal of his trans-
actions, and to whom he had trusted for the explanation
of his proceedings. But no inference can safely be
founded on the allegation that the Governor-General,
who had previously defended his conduct, was

OPERATIONS OF THE DETACHMENT FROM BENGAL.

informed of the deadly nature of his disease, and the
hopelessness of his recovery, at the time when he
condemned him and voted for his recall.

By the death of Leslie, the command devolved on
Colonel Goddard on the 3d of October. On the 22d
he wrote a private letter to the Governor-General,
informing him of the progress which the detachment
had made towards the Nerbudda, or the boundary of
Berar. At the same time with the letter from
Colonel Goddard, arrived despatches from Moodajee,
expressing his lamentation upon the death of the late
ambassador, and his hopes that such an event would
not frustrate the plan of friendship which it had been
the object of that embassy to establish. Upon the
receipt of these letters the Governor-General moved,
that the negotiation with Moodajee Bonsla should
he resumed ; and that powers to treat with him
should be communicated to Colonel Goddard. The
opposite party contended, that an alliance with the
Begent of Berar would he equivalent to a declaration
of war against Nizam Ali, and involve the Carnatic
in misfortune ; that neither did Colonel Goddard
possess the qualifications of a negotiator, nor did the
duties of his command enable him to devote his mind
to the business which a negotiator was required to
perform ; and that the Presidency of Bombay, under
whose orders the detachment had been placed, might
take measures in favour of Ragoba, with which the
instructions which might he given in regard to Moo-
dajee would not be reconcilable.

On the 7th of December, after intelligence had
arrived of the second revolution at Poonah, which
the Governor-General regarded as defeating the

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1779.

• original design upon which the assistance of the
. detachment had been sent to Bombay, he proposed
that it should no longer act under the orders of that
Presidency, lest the designs of those rulers should
defeat the negotiation with Moodajee, intrusted to
Colonel Goddard. While this proposition was under
debate, a despatch was received from the resident at
Poonah, stating his expectation of being immediately
recalled, as the Select Committee at Bombay had
determined to proceed against the governing party
at Poonah. After this intelligence, the proposition
of the Governor-General, for retaining the detach-
ment of Colonal Goddard under the immediate
authority of the Supreme Council, received the sanc-
tion of the Board. In the mean time Moodajee
Bonsla, for whose alliance so much anxiety was
expressed, had written an evasive letter to Colonel
Goddard, dated the 23d of November ; manifesting
pretty clearly a wish to embroil himself as little as
possible either with the English or with the Poonah
confederacy. Goddard crossed the Nerbuddah on
the 1st of December; and sent an agent to Nagpore,
to ascertain how far he might depend upon Moo-
dajee. In conclusion, he inferred, that no engage-
ment could be formed between that chieftain and the
English ; but that a friendly conduct might be ex-
pected toward the detachment, while it remained in
his dominions.

By this time the army of Bombay was on its
march to Poonah. But though Colonel Goddard
had transmitted regular intelligence of his movements
to Bombay, he had received no communications from
that quarter ; and remained in total ignorance of

ITS OPERATIONS.

their designs, except from some intimations com- B00K v

... CHAP. 3.

municated by Moodajee, that an expedition against

Poonah was in preparation. Uncertain as was the 1/79-
ground upon which he had to proceed, he had come
to the determination, that the balance of probabili-
ties required his proceeding to Poonah ; when he
received despatches from the Council at Bombay,
unfolding what they had done, and what they were
intending to do ; and pressing it upon him to march
to Poonah, with the smallest possible delay. To
the question why the Presidency at Bombay had not
sooner made Colonel Goddard acquainted with the
design of the expedition, and taken the precautionary
steps for securing co-operation between his detach-
ment and their own, the answer must be, either that
they exercised not the degree of reflection necessary
for that moderate display of wisdom ; or that, they
wished to have to themselves the glory of setting up
a Mahratta government ; or that, to avoid the expense
of the detachment, they wished it not to arrive.
Moodajee, who was afraid to embroil himself with
the Poonah government, if he gave a passage to the
troops of Goddard, and with the English government
if he refused it, was very earnest with him to wait
till he received satisfactory letters from Calcutta.

But, notwithstanding his solicitations, Goddard, on
the 16th of January, began his march from the
banks of the Nerbudda.

He took the great road to Boorhanpoor and
Poonah, and arrived at Charwah on the 22d, where
he received intelligence that the army from Bombay
had advanced as far as the Bora ghaut, a place fifty
miles distant from Poonah.

VOL. IV. E

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. Oil the 24th, he received a letter dated the 11th,

CHAP. 3.

from the Field Committee, who conducted the Bom-

1779- bay expedition, representing, that in consequence of
an alteration which had taken place in the state of
affairs, it was not expedient he should advance ; that
he should either proceed to Surat, if he found him-
self in a conditon to make his way in spite of the
Mahratta horse, hy whom his march would he an-
noyed ; or remain in the territories of the Raja of
Berar, till further instructions. This letter placed
him in a state of perfect uncertainty, whether the
Bombay army had sustained a disaster which cut off
their hopes, or had so flattering a prospect of success,
that all additional force was accounted unnecessary.
On the next day a letter arrived from the Council at
Bombay, apparently written without a knowledge of
the circumstances which dictated the letter of the
Field Committee, and urging him to proceed. Under
the perplexity which this lack of information, and
discrepancy of injunctions, inspired, he resolved to
proceed to Boorhanpoor, in hopes of obtaining intel-
ligence, and arrived at that ancient capital on
the 30th.

There, on the 2d of February, he received another
letter from the Field Committee, dated on the 19th
of January, more mysterious than any which had yet
arrived. It shortly cautioned him against obeying
the order in their letter of the 16th, which on better
consideration they deemed themselves incompetent
to give. Goddard could ill conjecture the meaning
of this warning, as he had not received the letter of
the 16th ; but he believed that it indicated evil
rather than good; and saw well the dangers which

THE DETACHMENT FROM BENGAL.

surrounded him in the heart of the Mahratta country, book v.

CHAp. 3.

if any serious disaster, which might produce a change

in the mind of Moodajee himself, had befallen the 1779-
army from Bombay. He waited at Boorhanpoor till
the 5th, in hopes of receiving more certain informa-
tion, when he was made acquainted with the nature
of the disaster pretty exactly by Moodajee. He re-
solved to retreat to Surat, and marched on the 6th.

On the 9th a vakeel arrived from the Poonah govern-
ment, hearing the letter written by the Field Com-
mittee on the 16th of January. It was the letter in
which, under the dictation of the Mahrattas, they had
commanded his immediate return to Bengal. This
injunction it was the business of the vakeel to en-
force. But Goddard replied, that he was marching
to Bombay in obedience to the orders of the Supreme
Council ; and with the most friendly intentions
toward the Mahratta state. The march was con-
ducted with great expedition. The troops were
kept in such exact discipline, that the people having
nothing to fear remained in their houses, and sup-
plied the army by sale with many conveniences for
the march. They arrived at Surat on the 30th ; a
distance of nearly three hundred miles, in nineteen
days.1

In consequence of these events, it was resolved at

1 It is worthy of remark, that Gazee ad din Khan, formerly Vizir of
the empire, and grandson of the great Nizam-al-Mulk, was at this time
found at Surat, in the disguise of a pilgrim, and confined, till the Supreme
Council, being consulted, disapproved of all acts of violence, but forbade
his appearing within the territories of the Company. See the Letter from
Governor-General to Directors, dated 14th January, 1780. Sixth Report
to the Secret Committee, Appendix, No. 246. — M. It is still more worthy
of remark, that by the expedition of their march, the detachment avoided
a body of 20,000 horse sent from Poonah to intercept them. — W.

E 2

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

chap.

1779.

3V- the Supreme Board, to vest Colonel Goddard with
— full powers for treating with the Poonah government ;
to disavow the convention concluded with the Bombay
committee ; hut to express a desire for accommodation
on the basis of the treaty of Poorunder, if the
Mahrattas, on their part, would afford encourage-
ment by relinquishing all claims founded on that
convention, and by a promise of forming no
connexion, either commercial or political, with the
French. If they should reject these proposals,
Colonel Goddard, whom the Supreme Council now
promoted to the rank of general, was empowered to
renew the war, and if possible to form connections
with the head of the Guicawar family, and the
government of Berar.

Goddard had commenced his correspondence with
the Poonah ministry, when Ragoba made his escape,
and repaired to Surat, where he received an asylum.
Discordance prevailed among the Mahratta chiefs,
and much uncertainty hung over their proceedings.
Dissension broke out betAveen Nana and Sindia, by
whose united power Siccaram and Moraba had been
subdued. With profession of a desire for peace,
they kept aloof from definite terms ; reports were re-
ceived of their preparations for war ; and negotiation
lingered till the 20th of October, when Goddard sent
his declaration, that if a satisfactory answer to his
proposals was not returned, in fifteen days, he should
consider the delay as a declaration of Avar. A reply
arrived on the 28th. Without the surrender of Ra-
goba, and the restoration of Salsette, it was declared
that the Mahratta powers would make no agree-
ment. The General upon this broke off the nego-

GODDARD NEGOTIATES.

tiation, and repaired to Bombay, to concert with that BC^IK3V'
Council the plan of hostilities.

The President and Council of Bombay had 178°-
received, with considerable indignation, the intelli-
gence of the power, independent of themselves, with
which General Goddard had been invested at the
Superior Board. They regarded it as an encroach-
ment upon the rights conveyed to them, both by the
act of parliament, and the commands of the Di-
rectors ; and they had declared that they would
sustain no responsibility for any of his acts. At first
they alleged the great exhaustion of their resources,
as a reason against taking any considerable part in
the war; but when the General held up, as the
first object of his operations, the acquisition, on
which they had long fixed their affections, of a
territorial revenue adequate to all the demands of the
Presidency, they agreed to supply as great a portion
of their troops, as the security of Bombay would
allow ; and furnished him with powers and instruc-
tions to treat with Futty Sing Guicawar, whose
assistance, as placing a friendly country in the rear,
it was of the greatest importance to obtain. With
regard to Ragoba it was proposed to feed him with
such hopes, as should ensure the advantage of his
name ; but to engage themselves as short a way as
possible for a share in the advantages of the under-
taking, to the success of which it was so little in his
power to contribute.

On the 2d of January, 1780, General Goddard
had crossed the Tapti, with a view both to stimulate
the good inclinations of Futty Sing, and to reduce
the fortress of Dubhoy. On the 19th the army ap-

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

I!(°I<^ 3 ' peared before the place. On the next day it was

evacuated by the enemy, when the whole district,

17b0‘ yielding by estimate a revenue of two lacs of rupees,
was taken possession of in the name of the Company.
On the 26th, Futty Sing was at last, with some
difficulty, brought to trust so far in the power of the
Company, as to accede to the terms proposed; and
it was agreed that the Guzerat country should be
divided between the Company and himself, the Com-
pany obtaining that proportion which had formerly
accrued to the Mahrattas ; and the remainder being
rendered independent of the Poonah government,
and freed from every exterior claim. Being joined
by the cavalry of this chief, the General marched
towards Ahmedabad, the capital of the province, be-
fore which he arrived on the 10th of February, and
in five days carried it by storm, with inconsiderable
loss. The united armies of Sindia and Holkar,
amounting to 40,000 men, were in the mean time
advancing towards Surat. The English General, by
rapid marches, arrived in the neighbourhood of their
encampment, near Brodera, on the 8th of March,
and intended to attack them in the night ; but was
prevented by a letter from one of the gentlemen, left
as hostages with Sindia, signifying that professions
were made by the Mahratta chiefs of a desire to
establish amity with the English government. Of
this desire, Sindia afforded a favourable indication
the following day, by sending back the hostages, and
along with them a vakeel, or commissioner, who
acknowledged the hatred borne by his master to
Nana Furnavese, and his desire of a separate arrange-
ment with the English. Upon further explanation

OPERATIONS OF GODDARD.

it appeared, that he was anxious to set into his B00K v-

hands Ragoba and his son, as an instrument for

aggrandizing himself in the Mahratta state ; a pro- 178°-
position to which General Goddard would by no
means accede. Sindia, at the same time, was
offering terms to Govind Row, the brother and
opponent of Futty Sing, and had actually received
him in his camp. Not convinced of his sincerity,
and suspecting his design to waste the season, till
the commencement of the rains, when he would return
home to the business of his government, and to his
intrigues, General Goddard was desirous of forcing
him to a battle, which he constantly avoided, by
retreating, as the English army advanced. To defeat
this stratagem, the General, on the 3d of April,
marched silently from his camp, about two o’clock
in the morning, with four battalions of Sepoy
grenadiers, four companies of European infantry, and
twelve pieces of field artillery. The distance was
about seven miles to the camp of the enemy, which
he entered at dawn. He reached the very centre of
the encampment before he was perceived. The
enemy were thrown into their usual confusion ; and,
though some troops were collected, and made a show
of resistance, they soon abandoned their camp, and
occupied a neighbouring ground. The English made
no delay in proceeding to charge them, when the
Mahrattas dispersed, and left them masters, not only
of the field, but of the country in which it was
contained. A detachment from Bombay took pos-
session also of Parsek, Bellapore, Panwel, and
Callian, and extended the territory of the Presidency
along the coast and towards the passes of the hills in

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1780.

• the way to Poonah. On the 6th of April the
- General was joined by six companies of European
infantry, and a company of artillery, which had
been sent to his assistance from Madras ; and about
the same time five companies of Sepoys arrived for
him at Surat. As the rainy season had now com-
menced, Sindia and Holkar withdrew into then-
own countries ; and the General, after sending back
the Bombay detachment, put his troops into canton-
ments, and prepared for the succeeding campaign.
Sir Eyre Coote, who had been appointed to suc-
ceed General Clavering, both as Commander-in-Chief,
and as a member of the Supreme Council, had
arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of April, 1779 ;
and without showing an unvarying deference to the
opinions of the Governor-General, commonly sup-
ported his measures. Early in November of that
year, in consequence of an application from the Raja
of Gohud, commonly known by the name of the
Rana, a Hindu chieftain or prince, who governed a
hilly district of considerable extent, lying on the
Jumna, between the territories of Sindia and the
Nabob of Oude ; the Governor-General proposed a
treaty, by which the Rana might be empowered to
call for the assistance of the English against the
Mahrattas, of whom he stood in constant danger,
and should agree to assist the English with his
forces, when they should undertake any enterprise
against the contiguous powers. The Governor-
General, who contemplated the continuance of the
war with the Mahrattas, proposed this alliance, both
as a barrier against an invasion, in that direction,
of the territory of the Company or their allies ; and

WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS.

as an advantage for invading the territory of the book v.

Mahrattas, and operating a diversion in favour of the

enterprises wrhich might be undertaken on the side 178°-
of Bombay. The measure was opposed by the
opposite side of the Board, both on the ordinary and
general ground of the importance of abstaining from
war, and also in consideration of the weakness of the
Rana, who had few troops, and not revenue to pay
even them ; whose aid, in consequence, would he of
little avail, and his protection a serious burden. In
the objections of the opposing party the General
concurred ; and even transmitted his protest against
the terms of the connexion. But, as he was absent,
the casting vote of the Governor-General gave his
opinion the superiority, and the treaty was formed.

In the mean time intelligence arrived by a letter
from General Coote, dated the 20th of November,
of an invasion of the territory of the Rana, by a
body of Mahrattas, whom his want of resources made
it impossible for him to resist. Instructions were
dispatched to afford him such assistance as the exi-
gency of the case might require, and the state of
the English forces permit. A detachment of
the company’s army had been prepared in that
quarter, under the command of Captain Popham, for
the purpose of augmenting the forces of Goddard ;
but from the consideration, partly that they could
not arrive in time on the Bombay coast, partly that
they might contribute to the success of his operations
by an attack upon the part which was nearest of the
Mahratta frontier, they had not been commanded to
proceed; and in the beginning of February, 1780,
they were sent to the assistance of the Rana of

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 3.

1780.

Gohucl. Captain Popham found means in tliis
service of distinguishing his enterprise and talents.
With a small force, and little assistance from the
Rana, he expelled the Mahrattas from Gohud ;
crossed the Sind, into their own territory ; laid
siege to the fortress of Lahar, the capital of the
district of Cuchwagar ; and having effected an im-
perfect breach, which the want of heavy cannon
enabled him not to complete, he, on the 21st of April,
successfully assaulted and took possession of the fort.

It had, however, been importunately urged, both
by Coote and Goddard, and was acknowledged by
the Governor-General, that the force employed on
the Mahratta frontier under Captain Popham, was far
from adequate to any such important operations as
could materially affect the result of the war. After
some fluctuations of plans, and great debate and
opposition at the Superior Board, in which Mr.
Francis in particular vehemently opposed the exten-
sion of military efforts, it wTas determined that a
detachment of three battalions, stationed at Cawnpore,
under Major Camac, with a battalion of light infan-
try, under Captain Browne, should threaten or invade
the territories of Sindia and Holkar. In the mean
time Captain Popham, with the true spirit of mili-
tary ardour, after securing with great activity the
conquest of the district of Cuchwagar, turned his
attention to the celebrated fortress of Gualior, situated
within the territory of the Rana of Gohud, but
wrested from his father, and now garrisoned by the
Mahrattas. This fortress was situated on the sum-
mit, three coss in extent, of a stupendous rock,
scarped almost entirely round, and defended by a

WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS.

thousand men. By the princes of Hindustan it had book v.

J r a CHAP. 3.

always been regarded as impregnable. And Sir Eyre

Coote himself, in his letter to the Supreme Council, 178°-
dated the 21st of April, had pronounced it “ totally
repugnant to his military ideas, and even absolute
madness,” to attack it with so feeble a detachment,
and without a covering army to keep off the Mah-
rattas in the field, and preserve the line of commu-
nication. Captain Popham moved to the village of
Ripore, about five coss distant from Gualior, and
employed his spies in continually searching if a spot
fit for escalading could be found. After many and
dangerous experiments, they at last brought him
advice that one part only afforded any appearance of
practicability. At this place the height of the scarp
wras about sixteen feet, from the scarp to the wall
wras a steep ascent of about forty yards, and the wall
itself, was thirty feet high. “ I took the resolution,”
says Captain Popham, “ immediately. The object
was glorious ; and I made a disposition to prevent, as
much as in my power, the chance of tarnishing the
honour of the attempt, by the loss we might sustain
in case of a repulse.” At break of day, on the 3d
of August, the van of the storming party arrived at
the foot of the rock. Wooden ladders were applied
to the scarp, and the troops ascended to the foot of
the wall. The spies climbed up, and fixed the rope
ladders, when the Sepoys mounted with amazing
activity. The guards assembled within, but were
quickly repulsed by the fire of the assailants. The
detachment entered with rapidity, and pushed on to
the main body of the place. In the mean time the
greater part of the garrison escaped by another quar-

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 3.

1780.

ter, and left the English masters of one of the greatest
and most celebrated strong-holds in that quarter of
the globe. This brilliant achievement, for which
Captain Popham wTas rewarded with the rank of
Major, struck the Mahrattas with so much conster-
nation, that they abandoned the circumjacent country,
and conveyed the alarm to Sindia in his capital.1

The opposition which was made by Francis to
these proceedings for pushing the war on the Jumna,
brought to a crisis the animosities which the struggle
between him and the Governor-General had so long
maintained. On the 20th of July, 1780, Mr. Hast-
ings, in answering a minute of Mr. Francis, declared,
“I do not trust to his promise of candour, convinced
that he is incapable of it. I judge of his public
conduct, by my experience of his private, which I
have found to be devoid of truth and honour.” The
ground of these severe expressions, the Governor-
General stated to he a solemn agreement formed
between him and Mr. Francis, which Mr. Francis
had broken. Of this transaction the following appear
to have been the material circumstances. When the
parliamentary appointment, during five years, of the
Governor-General and Council, expired in 1778, the
expectation of a change in the Indian administration

1 For the transactions relative to the Mahratta war the materials arc
found in the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy in 1781, and the
vast mass of documents printed in its Appendix ; the twentieth article
of the Parliamentary Charges against Hastings, and his answer; the
Papers printed for the use of the House of Commons on the Impeachment ;
and the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial of Mr. Hastings. The publica-
tions of the day, which on this, and other parts of the history of Mr.
Hastings’ Administration, have been consulted, some with more, some
with less, advantage, arc far too numerous to mention.

PARTICULARS OF THE ACCUSATION.

was suspended, by the re-appointment, upon the 3V

motion of the king’s chief minister, of Mr. Hastings,

for a single year. Upon the arrival of this intel- 178°-
ligence in India, an attempt was made by some
mutual friends of Mr. Hastings and Mr. Francis, to
deliver the government, at a period of difficulty and
danger, from the effects of their discordance. Both
parties acknowledged the demand which the present
exigency presented for a vigourous and united admi-
nistration ; and both professed a desire to make any
sacrifice of personal feelings, and personal interests,
for the attainment of so important an object. On
the part of Mr. Francis it was stipulated that Mo-
hammed Beza Khan, Mr. Bristow, and Mr. Fowke,
should be reinstated in conformity to the Company’s
orders ; and, on the part of Mr. Hastings, that the
Mahratta war, the responsibility of which Mr. Francis
had disclaimed,, and thrown personally on the Gover-
nor-General, should lie conducted in conformity with
his conceptions and plans. It was this part of the
agreement which Mr. Hastings accused his opponent
of violating ; and of depriving him, by a treacherous
promise of co-operation, which induced Mr. Barwell
to depart for Europe, of that authority which the
vote of Mr. Barwell ensured. Mr. Francis, on the
other hand, solemnly declared, that he “ never was
party to the engagement stated by Mr. Hastings,
or had a thought of being bound by it.” His agree-
ment with regard to the Mahratta war he explained
as extending only to the operations then commenced
on the Malabar coast, but not to fresh operations on
another part of the Mahratta dominions. Mr. Hast-
ings produced a paper, containing the following

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA

BOOK V
CHAP. 3.

1780.

words: Mr. Francis will not oppose any measures
which the Governor-General shall recommend for
the prosecution of the war in which we are supposed
to he engaged with the Mahrattas, or for the general
support of the present political system of his govern-
ment.” To the terms of this agreement, presented
to Mr. Francis in writing, he affirmed that Mr.
Francis gave his full and deliberate consent. The
reply of Mr. Francis was in the following words :
“ In one of our conversations in February last, Mr.
Hastings desired me to read a paper of memorandums
among which I presume this article wTas inserted. I
returned it to him the moment I had read it, with a
declaration that I did not agree to it, or hold myself
hound by the contents of it, or to that effect.” Mr.
Francis added some reasonings, drawn from the
natural presumptions of the case. But these
reasonings and presumptions had little tendency to
strengthen the evidence of his personal assertion —
the ground, between him and his antagonist, on
which this question seems finally to rest. 1 With the
utmost earnestness Mr. Hastings repeated the affir-
mation of the terms on which Mr. F rancis declared
his assent ; and at this point the verbal controversy
between them closed. Soon after, a duel ensued
between Mr. Hastings and Mr. Francis, in which

1 It is a strong corroboration of Hastings’s belief in sucli a promise
having been received from Francis, that he suffered (if he could have pre-
vented it) Barwell’s leaving India. That event he knew would leave him
in a minority ; and nothing but the expectation that Francis would wave
his opposition, in consideration of the concession made to him, could have
reconciled Hastings to the loss of his friend. The decision of the question
therefore turns upon the circumstances under which Barwell quitted
Bengal. — W.

STATE OF AFFAIRS AT FORT ST. GEORGE.

the latter was wounded: and on the 9th of December book v.

7 CHAP. 3.

that gentleman quitted India, and returned to

Europe.1 178a

CHAPTER IV.

In the Carnatic , Relations between the English and
Nabob — Plenipotentiary , with independent Pow-
ers from the king — English courted by Ilyder
Ali and the Mahrattas , and in Danger from
both. — Nabob and Plenipotentiary desire Alliance
with the Mahrattas. — Presidency adhere to Neu-
trality.— Relations with the King of Tanjore. —
After Hesitation , War is made upon him. — War
upon the Marawars. — A second War upon Tan-
jore.— Condemned by the Directors. — Pigot sent
out to restore the Raja. — Opposition in the Ma-
dras Council. — Pigot imprisoned. — Sentiments and
Measures adopted in England. — Committee of
Circuit. — Suspended by Governor Rumbold , who
summons the Zemindars to Madras. — Transac-
tions with Nizam Ali respecting Guntoor. — Cen-
sured by the Supreme Council. — Governor Rum-
bold , and other Members of the Government ,
condemned and punished by the Court of Directors.

While the principal station of the Company’s power

1 Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781, p. 98, and Appendix,

No. 288; also Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1781, p. 14, 18, 30 ;

Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 301, &c.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 4.

1780.

• in India was giving birth to so many important trans-
. actions, their Presidency on the Coromandel coast
was not barren of incidents entitled to a great share
of our regard.

The relation, in which the Company professed to
stand to the country, was different in the Carnatic, and
in Bengal. By the avowed possession of the dewannee,
they entered in Bengal to the direct discharge of
the principal functions of internal government. In
the Carnatic, during the contest with the French,
they had held up Mohammed Ali ; upon the termi-
nation of it, they had acknowledged him, as the
undoubted sovereign of the country. He was estab-
lished, therefore, in the possession of both branches
of power, both that of Nazim, or the military power,
and that of Dewan, or the financial power ; and the
Company held the station of dependents, possessing
their privileges through his sufferance, and owing
obedience to his throne. They possessed a district
of land surrounding Madras, which had been granted
in 1750, and in 1762 was confirmed, by the Nabob
of the Carnatic or Arcot, in recompense of the
services rendered by the Company to him and his
family. This was a sort of estate in land, under
what is called a jaghire tenure, enabling the owner
to draw the revenue, which would otherwise accrue
to government ; and to exercise all those powers
which in India were usually connected with the
power of raising the taxes. This Presidency also
possessed, and that independent of their Nabob, the
maritime district, known under the title of the four
Northern Circars, which they had obtained by grant
from the Mogul in 1765, and enjoyed under an agree-

STATE OF AFFAIRS AT FORT ST. GEORGE.

ment of peshcush, entered into the succeeding year,
with the Nizam or Subahdar.

Partly from characteristic imbecility, partly from
the state of the country, not only exhausted, hut
disorganised by the preceding struggle, the Nabob
remained altogether unequal to the protection of the
dominions, of which he was now the declared sove-
reign. Instead of trusting to the insignificant
rabble of an army which he would employ, the
Presidency beheld the necessity of providing by a
British force for the security of the province. For
this reason, and also for the sake of that absolute
power1 which they desired to maintain, the English
were under the necessity of urging, and, if need
were, constraining, the Nabob, to transfer to them the
military defence of the country, and to allow out of
his revenues a sum proportional to the expense.
The Nabob, having transferred the military power

1 The resolution of maintaining this absolute power is thus clearly ex-
pressed in the letter of the Court of Directors, to the Presidency of
Madras, dated 24th December, 1765. “ The Nabob has hitherto desired,

at least acquiesced with seeming approbation, that garrisons of our troops
should be placed in his forts : it is not improbable that after a time he may
wish to have his protectors removed. Should such an event happen, it
may require some address to avoid giving him disgust, and at the same time
a degree of firmness to persist in your present plan ; but persist you must;
for we establish it as a fundamental point, that the Company’s influence
and real power in the province cannot be any way so effectually maintained,
as by keeping the principal forts in our hands.” See First Report of the
Committee of Secrecy, 1781, Appendix, No. 23. — “ By being in possession
of most of his strong places, the troops being officered by the Company,
and the garrisons perfectly under their orders, the Company have it in
their power to give law to the Carnatic. Without the concurrence of the
Presidency he can do nothing; they are arbiters of peace and war; and
even if one of his own tributaries refuse the pescusli, the payment of which
they had guaranteed, without them he cannot call them to an account.”
Letter from Sir John Lindsay, to the President and Council of Madras,
22nd June, 1771 ; Rous’s Appendix, p. 368.

VOL. IV. F

BOOK V.
CHAP. 4.

1770.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.rf country, was placed in absolute dependence

. upon the Company; they being able to do what they

1770 pleased, he to do nothing but what they permitted.
In a short time it was perceived, that his revenue
was by no means equal to the demands which were
made upon it. The country was oppressed by the
severity of his exactions, and instead of being re-
paired, after the tedious sufferings of war, it was
scourged by all the evils of a government at once
insatiable and neglectful. When his revenues failed,
he had recourse to loans. Money was advanced to
him, at exorbitant interest, frequently by English-
men, and the servants of the Company. He gene-
rally paid them by a species of assignments, called
in India tuncaus, which entitled the holders of
them to the revenue of some portion of the terri-
tory, and to draw it immediately from the collectors.
While his embarassments were by these means
increased, the exactors were encouraged to greater
severities.

In this situation the Nabob and the Presidency
were both dissatisfied, and both uneasy. Finding
his power annihilated, and his revenues absorbed,
after feasting his imagination with the prospect of
the unlimited indulgences of an Eastern prince, he
regarded the conduct of the Presidency as the highest
injustice. The gentlemen entrusted at once with
the care of their own fortunes and the interests of
the Company, for both of which they imagined that
the revenues of the Carnatic would copiously and de-
lightfully provide, were chagrined to find them in-
adequate even to the exigencies of the government ;
and accused the Nabob, either of concealing the

STATE OF AFFAIRS AT FORT ST. GEORGE.

amount of the sums which he obtained, or of impair- 4V'

ing the produce of the country by the vices of his

government. 1770'

Upon the termination of the disputes in London,
toward the end of the year 1769, between the Mi-
nisters of the Crown and the East India Company,
respecting the supervisors, and respecting the power
of the King’s naval officer to negotiate and to form
arrangements with the Indian powers;1 a marine
force, consisting of some frigates of war, was com-
missioned, under the command of Sir John Lindsay,
to proceed to the East Indies : “ to give countenance
and protection to the Company’s settlements and
affairs.” In conformity with the terms to which the
Company had yielded, they vested Sir John Lindsay
with a commission to take the command of all their
vessels of war in the Indian seas : and also, on their
behalf, to treat and settle matters in the Persian
Gulph.”

So far, there was mutual understanding, clearness,
and concert. But in addition to this, Sir John
Lindsay was appointed, by commission under the
great seal, his Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary,
with powers to negotiate and conclude arrangements,
with the Indian Sovereigns in general. This mea-
sure was not only contrary to what the Company had
claimed as their right, against which the Minister
appeared to have ceased, for the time, to contend ;
but it was a measure taken without their knowledge :
and Sir John Lindsay appeared, in India, claiming
the field for the exercise of his powers, before they

1 See the account of these disputes, supra, vol. iii. book iv. chap. ix.

F 2

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1770.

"• or their servants had the smallest intimation that any
- such powers were in existence.

If there was a danger which must stike every
considerate mind, in sending two independent au-
thorities, to act and clash together in the delicate and
troubled scene of Indian affairs, a danger inevitable,
even if the circumstances had been arranged between
the Ministers and the Company with the greatest
harmony and the greatest wisdom ; all the principles
of mischief were naturally multiplied, and each
strengthened to the utmost, by the present stroke of
ministerial politics.

The ground upon which this disputed and impru-
dent exercise of power appears to have been placed,
was the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris, con-
cluded in 1763. With a view to maintain peace in
India, and to close the disputes between the English
and the French, who, according to their own pro-
fessions, appeared to have nothing else in view but to
determine who was the just and rightful Nabob of
the Carnatic, who the just and rightful Subahdar of
the Deccan ; it was there decided and agreed, that
the two nations should acknowledge Mohammed
Ali as the one, and Salabut Jung as the other. It
occurred to the ingenuity of practical statesmen, that
the King of Great Britain, having become party to an
article of a treaty, had a right, without asking leave
of the Company, to look after the execution of that
article ; and hence to send a deputy duly qualified
for that purpose. If this conferred a right of be-
stowing upon Sir John Lindsay the powers of an
ambassador; it also conferred the right of avoiding

SIR JOHN LINDSAY, KING’S COMMISSIONER.

altercation with the East India Company, by taking b°ok v.
the step without their knowlege.1

The power of looking after the due execution of 177°-
the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris was not a
trifling power.

It included in the first place, the power of taking
a part in all the disputes between the Nabob and the
Company’s servants; as Mohammed Ali was in that
article placed upon the footing of an ally to the King
of Great Britain, and hence entitled to all that pro-
tection which is due to an ally. The servants of the
Company had been at some pains to keep from the
knowledge of the Nabob the full import of the new
relation in which he was placed to the British throne ;
as calculated most imprudently to inflame that spirit
of ambition and love of independence, with which it
was so difficult already to deal, and with the gratifi-
cation of which the existence in the Carnatic, either
of his power or of that of the Company, was altoge-
ther incompatible. The hand of Englishmen, and
others, who surrounded the Nabob, for the purpose
of preying upon him, wished of course to see all
power in his hands, that they might prey the more
abundantly. They filled every place with their
outcries against every restraint which was placed
upon him : and in particular had endeavoured, and
with great success, to disseminate an opinion in
England, that he was an oppressed and ill-treated

1 It was impossible to prevent the measure from becoming known to the
Company, and very improbable that they would not resist it : altercation
was delayed, therefore not avoided ; and it would have better become the
ministers to have apprised the Company at once of their determination to
send out an agent of the crown. — W.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I
CHAP. 4.

1770.

prince, while the servants of the Company were his
plunderers and tyrants.

Nor was this all. As the grand intent of the
eleventh article of the treaty of Paris was to preserve
peace between the English and other powers of India,
and as there is nothing in the relations of one state
to another which the care of peace may not be said to
embrace, the whole international policy of the British
government in India was, by the new ministerial ex-
pedient, deposited in the hands of the King’s Minister
Plenipotentiary.

On the 26th of July, 1770, Sir John Lindsay, after
having remained some months at Bombay, arrived
at Madras ; and at once surprised and alarmed the
servants of the Company by the declaration of his
powers. In one of their first communications with
Sir John, they say, “When you now inform us, you
are invested with great and separate powers, and
when we consider that those powers, in their opera-
tion, may greatly affect the rights of the Company,
we cannot but be very much alarmed.”1 To their
employers, the Court of Directors, they expound
themselves more fully. “ To give you a clear repre-
sentation of the dangerous embarrassments through
which we have been struggling, since the arrival of
his Majesty’s powers in this country, is a task far
beyond our abilities. They grow daily more and
more oppressive to us ; and we must sink under the
burthen, unless his Majesty, from a just representa-
tion of their effect, will be graciously pleased to recall
powers, which, in dividing the national interest, will

1 Letter to Sir John Lindsay, dated 16th August, 1770, Rous’s Ap-
pendix, p. 254.

SIR JOHN LINDSAY, KING’S COMMISSIONER.

inevitably destroy its prosperity in India. Such is 4V

the danger ; and yet we are repeatedly told, that it

is to support that interest, by giving the sanction of 177°-
his Majesty’s name to our measures, that these powers
were granted, and for that alone to be exerted. It
has always been our opinion, that with your autho-
rity, we had that of our Sovereign, and of our nation,
delegated to us. If this opinion be forfeited, your
servants can neither act with spirit nor success : for
under the control of a sujierior commission, they dare
not, they cannot exert the powers with which they
alone are entrusted. Their weakness and disgrace
become conspicuous ; and they are held in derision
by your enemies.1

The first of the requisitions which Sir J ohn Lind-
say made upon the President and Council was to
appear in his train, when he went in state to deliver
to the Nabob his Majesty’s letter and presents.

They conceived, that, as the servants of the Company
had heretofore been the medium through which all
communications to the princes of India had been
made, and they had been considered in India the
immediate representatives of the British monarch,
and the highest instrument of his government, they
could not appear in the train of Sir J ohn Lindsay
without degradation in the eyes of the natives, and a
forfeiture of the dignity and influence of the Company
which, as they had no instructions upon the subject,
they did not think themselves at liberty to resign.

With the assignment of these reasons, they respect-

1 Letter to the Court of Directors, dated July 20th, 1771, Rous’s Ap-
pendix, p. 400.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAP. 4

1770.

• fully signified to Sir John Lindsay the inability under
- which they found themselves to comply with his re-
quest. This brought on an interchange of letters,
which soon degenerated into bitterness and animosity
on both sides.1

Among the reasons which the President and Coun-
cil assigned for declining to appear in the train of
Sir John Lindsay, they had stated, that any suspicion,
disseminated in the country, of the annihilation or
diminution of the Company’s power “ might, at this
crisis particularly, prove fatal to the existence of the
Company, and the interests of the nation in India :
because they were on the brink of a wrar wfith the
most formidable power in India, which it would re-
quire all their efforts to avoid, while they feared that
all their efforts would be insufficient.”2 * This appre-
hension wTas a good deal exaggerated, to serve the
present purpose ; and the exaggeration yielded an
advantage to Sir John Lindsay, of which he imme-
diately availed himself. He was very sorry, he said,
to find them on the brink of a dreadful war, which
Avas all but inevitable : He pressed upon them the
consideration of the importance of peace to a com-
mercial body : And as he was sent out to watch over
the execution of the eleventh article, of which peace

1 Rous’s Appendix, p. 245 — 253.— In the commencement of the cor-

respondence, the tone of Sir J. Lindsay was that of affronting condescension;

it soon became that of contemptuous sarcasm. The Government of Madras

were evidently alarmed, and treated him with unnessary deference. Their
more prudent course would have been to have refrained from all discussion
with him, until they had received instructions from England; as they
could not be expected to recognize powers utterly incompatible with those
which the Court of Directors had apprised them, had been conferred upon
the commander of the king’s ships in India and his Majesty’s representative
in the Gulph of Persia only. — W. 4 Ibid. p. 248.

SIR JOHN LINDSAY, KING’S COMMISSIONER.

was the main object, he begged they would lay before bc®ok v.

him such documents and explanations, as “ would

make him acquainted with the real state of the Com- 177°-
pany’s affairs.” 1 He also informed them, that he was
“ commanded by his Majesty to apply to them for a
full and succinct account of all their transactions with
the Nabob of Arcot since the late treaty of Paris;
and inquire with the utmost care into the causes of
the late war with the Subah of the Deckan and
Hyder Ali, and the reasons of its unfortunate conse-
quences.”2 To this point the reply of the President
and Council was in the following terms : Duplicates
of our records, and very minute and circumstantial
details of all our transactions, have already been trans-
mitted to the Court of Directors of the East India
Company, our constituents. We have heard, that
when an inquiry at home into the state of the Corn-
pony’s affairs was thought necessary, it was signified
by his Majesty’s ministry to the Court of Directors,
that they would he called upon by parliament to pro-
duce their records ; that they were accordingly called
upon by parliament, and did produce them. This, we
believe, was a constitutional course ; but we have
never heard that the Company’s papers and records
were demanded by, or surrendered to, the ministry
alone ; for that we believe would be unconstitutional.

The Company hold their rights by act of parliament,
their papers and their records are their rights ; we
are entrusted with them here ; we are under oath of
fidelity, and under covenants not to part with them ;
nevertheless all conditions are subservient to the

Rous’s Appendix, p. 250.

2 Ibid. p. 253.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1770

4V ■ laws, and when we shall he called upon in a legal and
— constitutional way, we shall readily and cheerfully
• submit ourselves, our lives, and fortunes, to the laws
of our country. To break our oath and our cove-
nants would be to break those laws. But we hold
them sacred and inestimable, for they secure the
rights and liberties of the people.”1

Corresponding to the jealousy and dislike with
which Sir John Lindsay was received by the Presi-
dent and Council, were the cordiality and pleasure
with which he was received by the Nabob and those
who surrounded him. To the Nabob he explained,
that he was come to recognize him as a fellow
sovereign with the King of Great Britain, and to
afford him the protection of that great King against
all his enemies. The Nabob, who had a keen
Oriental eye for the detection of personal feelings,
was not long a stranger to the sentiments with which
his Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary, and the
Company’s President and Council, regarded each
other. He described the President and Council as
his greatest enemies ; for they withdrew the greater
part of his revenue and power. Sir John, who was
already prejudiced, and ignorant of the scene in
which he was appointed to act, fell at once into all
the views of the Nabob, and the crowd by whom he
was beset. The Nabob laid out his complaints, and
Sir John listened with a credulous ear. The Nabob
described the policy which had been pursued with
respect to the native powers, by the servants of the
Company ; and easily made it assume an appearance

1 Rous’s Appendix, p. 257.

SIR JOHN LINDSAY MISLEADS THE NABOB.

which gave it to the eye of Sir John a character of B00K ,v-

° % J # CHAP. 4.

folly, or corruption, or both. He drew the line of

policy which at the present moment it would have 177°-
gratified his own wishes to get the Company to
pursue ; and he painted it in such engaging colours,
that Sir John Lindsay believed it to be recommended
equally by the sense of justice, and the dictates of
wisdom. The King’s Commissioner, measuring his
own consequence by that of the master whom he
served, and treating the Company and their servants
as not worthy of much regard, on the score either of
wisdom or of virtue, widened the difference between
the partnership sovereigns of the Carnatic. The
royal functionary assumed the character of protector
of the Nabob ; and appeared to interpose the royal
authority, between an ally of the crown, and the
oppression of the Company. The contempt which
the Nabob saw bestowed upon the authority to
which he had been accustomed to bend, and the
dignity to which he appeared to be exalted as an ally
of the British King, augmented his opinion of the
injustice under which he appeared to himself to
groan ; and the letters of the Commissioner to the
ministers in England wrere filled with accounts of the
oppression exercised by the insolent and rapacious
servants of a counting-house, over an independent
and sovereign prince. The feeble discernment which
has generally scanned the proceedings of the East
India Company, and which has often lavished upon
them applause where their conduct has been neither
virtuous nor wise, has almost uniformly arraigned
them for not accomplishing impossibilities, and
uniting contrary effects ; for not rendering themselves

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

4V- powerful and independent, without trenching upon

the power and independence of princes, who would

177°- suffer their power and independence, only in propor-
tion as they were deprived of those attributes them-
selves. Beside this fundamental consideration, it
was not to be disputed, that, left to himself,
Mohammed Ali could not maintain his possession of
the province for even a few years ; and that nothing
but the power of the English could prevent it from
falling a prey to the neighbouring powers, or even
to its own disorganization. Though it is not disputed
that the rapacity of individuals, who preyed upon the
Nabob, may have added to the disorder of his affairs;
it is true that the poverty of the Carnatic, and the
wretched administration of the Nabob, enabled it
not to fulfil the golden hopes of the English, or even
to provide for its own necessities.1

When the President and Council described them-
selves as on the brink of a war, the circumstances
to which they alluded were these. In the second
article of the treaty, which was concluded with
Hyder Ali, in 1769, it was agreed : “ That in case
either of the contracting parties shall be attacked,
they shall, from their respective countries, mutually
assist each other to drive the enemy out: ” and the
party in aid of whom the troops were employed, was
to afford them maintenance at a rate which was
mutually determined. This was a condition so
highly esteemed by Hyder, that all hopes of an
accommodation with him, on any other terms, were,
at the time of the treaty, regarded as vain.

See Rous’s Appendix, No. 17, passim.

SITUATION OF THE ENGLISH.

Within a few weeks Hyder endeavoured to per- B00K v-

suade the English of the great advantage which he

and they would derive, from uniting Janojee Bonsla 177°-
with them, in a triple league. He also informed
them of his intention to recover from Madhoo Row,
the Peshwa, certain possessions which that invader
had wrested from him two years before; and requested
that they would send him a certain number of troops,
no matter how small, merely to show to the world
the friendship which now happily subsisted between
the English and him. The Presidency, pointing out
in what manner this, to which the treaty did not bind
them, would be an act of unmerited hostility
against the Mahrattas, declined compliance with bis
request.

Early in 1770, theMahrattas invaded his country;
and again he solicited assistance, if it were but a few
troops, for the sake of the manifestation on account
of which he had requested them before. If a more
substantial aid was afforded, he professed his readi-
ness to pay three lacs of rupees. It was not very
easy for the English now to find a pretext. They
evaded, procrastinated, and withheld, rather than
refused compliance with his desire.

The Mahrattas reduced Hyder to great difficulties,
nay dangers ; and seemed resolved to annex his
dominions to their spreading conquests. During
this period of his distress, in which he was obliged
to abandon the open country, and to depend upon
his forts, he endeavoured to persuade the English
that their own interest was deeply concerned in com-
bining with him against the Mahrattas, who would
touch upon their frontier, and present them a formi-

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

^ v. cla,ble neighbourhood, if the barrier which he inter-

posed were broken down.

mo. The Mahrattas, too, very earnestly pressed for the
assistance of the English. They had, indeed, by
weight of superior numbers, driven Hyder from the
open country ; but the protection of his strong holds
enabled him still to hold out, and they saw the time
rapidly approaching, when the exhausted state of
the country wmuld compel them to retire for want of
the means to support their army. The skill, there-
fore, which enabled the English to subdue the
strongest places with a rapidity which to them
appeared like magic, rather than natural means, they
regarded as a most desirable acquisition. To attain
this object, they endeavoured to work upon the fears
of the Nabob ; and in their communication with
him, threatened to invade the Carnatic, unless the
English complied with their desires.

The difficulties on the part of the President and
Council were uncommonly great. They state their
view of them in their consultations, on the 30th of
April, 1770. Their assistance would enable the
Mahrattas indeed to prevail over Hyder, but of all
events that was, probably, the most alarming ; the
Mahrattas would in that case immediately adjoin
the Carnatic, with such an accumulated power, as
would enable them to conquer it whenever they
pleased ; and what, when they had power to con-
quer, the Mahrattas would please, nobody acquainted
with India entertained any doubt : If they assisted
Hyder ; that was immediate war with the Mahrattas,
accompanied with all its burdens and dangers : It
was not clear, that both united could prevail over

VIEWS OF THE NABOB OF THE COMMISSIONER.

the Mahrattas ; and if they did, the power of Hyder BC°°^4V*

would bring along with it a large share of the dangers

to which they would be exposed from the Mahrattas, 1770-
if sovereigns of Mysore : If they stood neuter, and
thereby offended both parties ; either Hyder or the
Mahrattas, most probably the latter, would prevail ;
and in that case the victor, whoever he was, would
wreak his vengeance on the rulers of the Carnatic.

Amid these difficulties they conceived it their wisest
policy after all to remain neuter ; to gain time ; and
take up arms, only when the extremity could no
longer be shunned.

The views and wishes of the Nabob were exceed-
ingly different. He was bent upon forming an
alliance with the Mahrattas. In the first place, he
had a personal antipathy to Hyder Ali, which in a
mind like his was capable of weighing down more
respectable motives, and made him express extreme
reluctance to join or see the English concur in any
thing favourable to Hyder. In the next place, the
Mahrattas were successful in working upon the
short-sighted ambition of the Nabob, with the pro-
mise of splendid gifts of territory, which, if they had
the power of giving, they would also have the power
of resuming at pleasure. But in the third place, he
expected, according to the opinion of the President
and Council, to place the English government, by
means of the alliance with the Mahrattas, in a state
of dependance upon himself ; and that was what
he valued above all other things. “ Once engaged
in the war,” said they, “ we are at the Nabob’s
mercy, for we have no certain means of our own.

Enter, we are told, into an engagement with the

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. Mahrattas ; engage to assist them in the conquest of
' the Mysore country, and they will cede to the Nabob
1770. the Ghauts, and all the countries dependant on
Mysore on this side the Ghauts. If we enter into
such a measure, utterly repugnant to every order and
every idea that has been suggested to us by our
employers, we cannot see any end to the conse-
quences, but utter ruin ; we must thenceforth follow
the schemes of the Mahrattas and the Nabob,
wheresoever they shall please to drag us, be it to
place the Nabob on the musnud of the Deccan, or to
subjugate the whole peninsula.”

Sir John Lindsay adopted completely the views of
the Nabob, with regard to the Mahratta alliance : nor
was there any reproach, or exhortation, or threat,
which he spared, to entice or to drive the Presidency
into that measure.

The ministry, it would appear, became in some
degree alarmed at the accounts which they received
of the contentions which prevailed between the
King’s Minister Plenipotentiary, and the servants of
the Company in India ; and they thought of an expe-
dient ; which was, to change the person, and leave
the authority. Sir John Lindsay was recalled, and
Sir Robert Harland, with an addition to the marine
force, was sent to exercise the same powers in his stead.

Sir Robert arrived at Madras on the 2nd of Sep-
tember, 1771. Sir Robert took up the same ideas,
and the same passions exactly, which had guided
the mind of Sir J ohn Lindsay ; and the only differ-
ence was, that he was rather more intemperate
than his predecessor ; and of consequence created
rather more animosity in his opponents.

VIEWS OF THE COMMISSIONER.

The progress of the Mahrattas had become still book v.

more alarming. In the month of November, they

were in the possession of the whole of Mysore, ex- 1771-
cepting the principal forts. They had advanced to
the borders of the Carnatic : and some straggling
parties had made plundering incursions. They openly
threatened invasion ; and it was expected that about
the beginning of January, when the crops would be
ready, they would enter the country. The Nabob
was, or affected to be, in the utmost alarm ; and Sir
Robert Harland urged the Presidency to accept the
terms of the Mahrattas, who bid high for assistance
on the one hand, and threatened fire and sword on
the other. In this trying situation the Presidency
vent the most bitter complaints, at being left by the
Court of Directors, totally without instructions.1
Nevertheless, “although we have not yet,” say they,

“ had any answer from our constituents, to the
repeated representations of the embarrassments we
labour under for want of their clear and precise in-
structions with respect to our conduct in the present
critical situation of affairs; yet it is evident from the
whole spirit of their orders for some years past, that
they look upon the growing power of the Mahrattas
with jealousy and apprehension.” From this ; from

1 “ It is with infinite concern the Committee observe that, notwith-
standing their repeated and earnest representations to the Court of Direc-
tors, of the very critical situation of affairs with respect to the Mahrattas
and Hyder Ally, which were so fully and clearly explained in order to
enable them to give us their sentiments and orders with respect to the
conduct they would wish us to observe in so important and interesting a
matter, we still find ourselves not only without orders, but without the
least intimation of their opinion thereon.” Select Consultations, 29th
November, 1771 ; First Report, Committee of Secrecy in 1781, Appendix,
No. 21

VOL. IV.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

/' an adoption of the same sentiments ; from a regard

to the treaty with Hyder, which rather required them

177K to assist than allowed them to join in destroying that
sovereign, and from a regard to the opinion of the
other Presidencies, they determined not to comply
with the exhortations or commands of Sir Robert.
They would have thought it advisable on the other
hand to support Hyder as a barrier against the
Mahrattas, had not the opposition of the Nabob,
supported as he was by the minister of the King,
placed it, for want of resources, out of their power.
They determined, therefore, to remain neutral ; and
only to collect a body of troops in some central posi-
tion, where they might best protect the country in
case of an attack, and distress the enemy by cutting
off their supplies.

The Mahrattas, notwithstanding their threats, had
not, it would appear, any serious intention of invad-
ing the Carnatic; for in the month of January, 1772,
the Nabob and Sir Robert, finding the Presidency
inflexible against their project of alliance, found the
means of prevailing upon them to promise a cessation
of hostilities till the pleasure of the British King
should be known.1 The Mahrattas were afraid of
provoking the English to join Hyder Ali; and they
began now to feel their situation abundantly uneasy.
The activity and capacity of that great leader were
still able to give them incessant annoyance ; and the
country wTas so excessively ravaged and exhausted,
that the means of subsisting an army could no longer
be found. They became, therefore, desirous of an ac-

1 That they gave money and gave largely, appears plainly from a letter
in Rous’s Appendix, p. 952.

VIEWS OF THE ENGLISH WITH REGARD TO TANJORE.

commodation; and in the beginning of July consented
to a peace, for which, however, they made Hyder
pay very dearly, both in territorial and pecuniary
sacrifices.1

If a judgment may be formed from this instance,
the chance for good government in India, if the
ministers of the crown were to become, and the East
India Company cease to be its organ, would undergo
an unfavourable change. The course into which the
ministers of the crown would have plunged the nation
bears upon it every mark of ignorance and folly ; that
which was pursued by the East India Company and
their servants is eminently characterized by prudence
and firmness.

Amid the pecuniary wants of the Nabob and the
Presidency, both had often looked with a covetous
eye to the supposed riches of the King of Tanjore.
They considered the natural fertility of his country,
and its general exemption from the ravages of the
war which had desolated the rest of the province ;
but they did not consider that the temporizing policy
by which he had laboured to save himself, from the
resentment of all parties, had often cost him consi-
derable sums ; that the wars which raged around
and perpetually threatened himself, had imposed upon
him the maintenance of an army, as great as he
could possibly support ; that the country which he
governed, though fertile, was small ; that the ex-
pense of a court aims to be as grand in a small, as an
extensive country ; that the expense of protecting a

1 Sec First Report, ut supra, p. 28, and appendix, Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23 ;
and the Papers published by the Directors in Rous’s Appendix, Nos. 17,
and 28.

G 2

BOOK V

CHAP. 4.

1771.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1771

jV- small country is comparatively heavy ; that hardly
— any government has ever yet been so good, as not to
expend as much as it could possibly drain from its
subjects ; and that the government of Tanjore was a
true specimen of the ignorance and rudeness of the
Hindus.

Iu the war with Hyder, the Raja of Tanjore had
not only contributed less, both in troops and treasure,
to the maintenance of the war than was expected of
him, hut was known to have held a correspondence
with Hyder ; and if he did not afford, at any rate
promised assistance. Without making any allowance
for the current policy of the feeble princes in India,
who aim at contributing as little as possible to the
wars of the greater powers, from which they see not
that they have any thing to gain, and by professions
of friendship for both parties, to avert the dangers of
their resentment, the Company and the Nabob were
sufficiently disposed to have treated the Raja as a
faithless ally. In the treaty, however, which they
concluded with Hyder in 1769, they insisted upon
including the Mahratta chieftain Morari Rao, whose
territories would have formed a convenient conquest
for Hyder ; and he refused to accept the condition
unless the Raja of Tanjore was admitted to the
same protection. That the Raja might not appear
to owe his safety to the interposition of Hyder,
the English pretended to regard him as their
partisan, and included him in the treaty as their own
ally.

In their letter to the Select Committee at Fort
St. George, dated 17th March, 1769, the Court of
Directors said, “ It appears most unreasonable to us

VIEWS OF THE ENGLISH WITH REGARD TO TANJORE.

that the Rai’a of Taniore should hold possession of B00K v

" d 7 CHAP. 4.

the most fruitful part of the country, which can alone

supply our armies with subsistence, and not contri- 1771-
bute to the defence of the Carnatic. We observe
the Nabob makes very earnest representations to you
on this subject, wherein he takes notice that the
Zemindars of the Carnatic have been supported, and
their countries preserved to them by the operations of
our forces employed in his cause ; and that nothing
was more notorious, than that three former princes
of the Carnatic had received from the Tanjore
Raja seventy, eighty, nay even one hundred lacs
of rupees at a time. We therefore enjoin you to give
the Nabob such support in his pretensions as may be
effectual; and if the Raja refuses to contribute a
just proportion to the expense of the war, you are
then to pursue such measures as the Nabob may
think consistent with the justice and dignity of his
government. Whatever sums may, in consequence
of the above orders, be obtained from the Raja of
Tanjore, we expect shall be applied to the discharge
of the Nabob’s debt to the Company; and if more
than sufficient for that purpose, to the discharge of
his debts to individuals.”1

Upon this injunction of the Court of Directors,
the Select Committee deliberated on the 13th of Sep-
tember, 1769. “ With regard,” they say, “ to the

demand recommended to be made on the King of
Tanjore, our situation at this time is such, for want
of money, that, if there were no other obstacles, that
alone would put it utterly out of our power to un-

1 Official Papers in Rous’s Appendix, p. 525, 526.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. dertake an expedition against him. The treaty of

„ 1762 being before the Hon. Court ; considering also,

177 L on the other hand, the late conduct of the King of
Tanjore, we certainly should not postpone an un-
dertaking so warmly recommended, if it were in our
power now to attempt it consistently with good po-
licy and the safety of the Carnatic. But as the case
is, were the difficulty of money out of the question,
it would become a point of serious consideration,
whether an attempt upon Tanjore might not again
involve us in a war with Iiyder Ally, as the Raja
is expressly included in the treaty lately made with
Hyder Ally Khan. However unreasonable it may
be, that he should enjoy the benefits derived from the
government of the Carnatic, without contributing his
proportion of its expense ; and however impolitic,
and contrary to the natural rights of government, to
suffer such a power to remain independent in the
heart of the province, we must submit to necessity,
and the circumstances of the times. He has indeed
lately made some objections by his letters to the pay-
ment of his annual peshcush, alleging in excuse the
great expense of the troops sent to join our army ;
although, as the Nabob informs us, it be contrary to
the custom of the country for tributary princes to
make any demands for the charges of troops furnished
to the power to whom they are tributary, while em-
ployed within the districts dependent on such power.
Should he persist in requiring an abatement in the
peshcush due on account of his late charges, it might
furnish us with a just pretext to accuse him of a
breach of his engagements, and to take our measures
accordingly when our situation will admit of it. But

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE KING OF TANJORE.

as the case now is with us ; under difficulties to pro- book v

vide the money necessary even for our current ex-

penses; doubtful of the intentions of the Mahrattas ; 177L

suspicious of the designs of the Subah : and appre-
hensive of the King of Tanjore’s calling upon Hyder
for aid, and thus raising a fresh flame, the Committee
are clearly of opinion, that at this juncture the un-
dertaking would be impolitic and unwarrantable.”1

The Raja had urged, that, instead of having any
money, the late expenses, which was the fact, had
involved him deeply in debt ; and he prayed, if a
remission could not be granted, at any rate for a delay
in the payment of the exacted tribute ; an indulgence
to which the expense incurred by him in sending
troops to assist in the wars of the Nabob afforded,
he thought, a reasonable claim.2

Early in the month of February, 1771, the Pre-
sidency received intelligence that the Raja of Tanjore
was setting out upon an expedition against one of
his neighbours the Polygar of Sanputty, one of the
Marawars.3 On the 14th of February, the President
wrote to the Raja, that as Marawar belonged to the
Nabob, as a dependency of the Carnatic, it was
contrary to the treaty between the Raja and him, to
make war upon that country, and that, as the English
were guarantees of that treaty, it was their duty to
request he would relinquish his design.4

1 Papers, ut supra, p. 631. s lb. p. 563, 564.

3 There was no such person as the Polygar of Sanputty. The author
has mistaken apparently the title of the Polygar of Ramnad for the name of
his province. The word occurs in the proceedings of the Madras Govern-
ment Satputty, and is correctly used, as the “ The Raja of Tanjore sent a
force against the Satputtys’ country.” “ Tonderawee is ready to assist the
Satputty,” &c. The proper title is Setu-pati chief of the “Setu” or
bridge, the rocks extending from the continent to Ramiseram. — W.

4 Papers, ut supra, p. 574.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1
CHAP. 4

1771.

The Raja represented that Hanamantagoody was
a district of country which did belong to the King
of Tanjore, and was actually in his possession at the
time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1762 ; that it
had been unjustly seized by the Marawar chief, while
the armies of Tanjore were engaged in the service of
the Nabob; that the King of Tanjore, at the time
when the Nabob was setting out upon his expedition
to Madura, had represented the necessity of wresting
back this territory from the Marawar, but the Nabob
professed to have undertaken the expedition against
Madura only upon the strength of the assistance
which he expected from his dependants, and there-
fore requested execution of his design might be
delayed, till that expedition was accomplished ; that
he had represented the necessity of recovering the
territory in question to the President himself, who
had offered no objections. “ F or these reasons,” said
he, “ I was in hopes to this day, that the Nabob
and your honour would give strict orders to Marawar
to restore our country. I also wrote to my vackeel
on that head. But you and the Nabob did not get
the country restored to me. Besides which, when
the elephants relating to my present from Nega-
patnam were coming, Nalcooty,1 pretending that
the vessel was driven on shore by a storm in his
seaports, seized the said elephants, and detained
them ; concerning which I sent him word, as well
as to your honour ; but he did not return them to
me. If I suffer Marawar to take possession of my
country, Nalcooty to seize my elephants, and Tondi-

1 The Little Marawar

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE KING OF TANJORE.

man to injure my country, it will be a very great book 4V-

dishonour to me among my people, to see such com-

pulsions used by the Poly gars. You are a protector 1771-
of my government : Notwithstanding, you have not
settled even a single affair belonging to me : If I
stay quiet, I shall greatly hurt my dignity : Where-
fore, I marched myself. If you now advise me to
desist, what answer can I give % In the treaty, it
was not forbidden to clear the country possessed by
Marawar, or to undertake any expedition against the
Polygars, who may use compulsions. Since it is so,
it cannot be deemed contrary to the treaty.” 1

The Presidency urged that, whatever was the
truth with regard to the facts set forward by the
Raja, he knew that they were disputed by the
Nabob ; and for that reason was guilty, because he
had taken upon himself to be judge and executioner
in his own cause, when he ought to have reserved the
decision to the English government. In his defence
the Raja observed; “You was pleased to write,
that if I desist in my present expedition, you will
then settle the affairs in a reasonable manner. I
continued to speak to you for this long time concern-
ing this affair, but you have not settled it. Not-
withstanding, if you now write that I did not acquaint
you before I began it, what answer can I make to
it ? I did not undertake to do any thing contrary
to the hereditary custom observed.” 2

The Nabob called upon the Presidency, with
unusual force and boldness of importunity, to make
war upon the Raja ; as the honour of his government

Papers, ut supra, p. 608, 611

2 Ibid, p, 615, a:>d 600

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \
CHAP. 4,

1771.

was concerned in chastising a refractory dependant ;
and the honour of the Company’s government was
concerned in supporting a faithful ally. Sir John
Lindsay vehemently urged the same conclusions, not
without reproaches, that the Presidency were betray-
ing the Nabob, and violating their duty, by even
deferring the assistance which he required.1

On both hands the Presidency were assailed by
the greatest difficulties. There was imminent danger
that the views of Sir John Lindsay, who was the
creature of the ministry, would prevail at home ; and
that the Council, should they refuse to join with the
Nabob, would be condemned, punished, and dis-
graced. They were restrained, on the other hand,
by the consideration of the want of money, of the
improbability of receiving sufficient funds from the
Nabob, of the danger, while the troops were engaged
in a distant quarter, of an attack upon the Circars
by the Nizam, and of a war with the Mahrattas, with
whom the King of Tanjore was allied, and who
already hung over the Carnatic with alarming
menaces. They believed that, beside the Nabob’s
old passion for the conquest of Tanjore, he was at
present stimulated by the desire of that part of the
Mysore country which lay on the Carnatic side of
the passes ; and which he had been promised by the
Mahrattas, as the price of the assistance which they
wished to receive ; that he now despaired of being
able to persuade the English to give that assistance ;
but expected, if he could inveigle them into a war
with the King of Tanjore, that they would then be

Papers, ut supra, p. 579. 283.

VIEWS RESPECTING TANJORE.

glad to form an alliance with the Mahrattas, in order B00K v-

to escape the calamity of their arms. In these cir

cumstances the Governor and Council bitterly com- 1/71-
plained, that they were left by their honourable
masters, with instructions and orders which might be
construed all manner of ways ; and that, whatever
course they took, they were sure of condemnation if
they failed; could expect approbation, only as a con-
sequence of success.1 2 They resolved to collect as
much of the army and of military stores at Tri-
chinopoly, as could be done without appearing to pre-
pare for war ; and to abstain from hostilities unless
unavoidably involved in them.

Inquiring into the supposed dependence of the
Marawar country, the Presidency found, that both
Tanjore and Trichinopoly had alternately made use
of their power to set up and put down the chiefs of
Marawar. But in conclusion, “ it appears,” they
said, “ to us, that the only right over them is power,
and that constitutionally they are independent of
both ; though Trichinopoly, since it has been added
to the government of the Carnatic, having been more
powerful than Tanjore, hath probably received more
submission from them.” Between states in India,

“ power,” they remark generally, “is the only arbi-
trator of right ; established usage or titles cannot
exempt one state from a dependence on another,
when superior force prevails ; neither can they enforce
dependence where power is wanting.” 3

1 See these considerations balanced, and this severe condemnation,
passed upon their employers, Papers, ut supra, p. 662, 663, 666, 679.

2 lb. p. 682, 682*. According to this account, there is no constitution

in India but the law of the strongest The fact is important ; and has

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAT.

1771

These reasonings and conclusions, with regard to
Tanjore, bear date in the records of the Presidency
from the beginning of February to the end of March.
On the 12th of June, when Trichinopoly was suf-
ficiently supplied with stores for defence, and the
question was to be determined whether more should
be sent, the Nabob dissuaded any further prepara-
tions ; alleging that the Mahrattas would never give
the necessary respite for undertaking an exhibition
against Tanjore, and that to him every article of
expense, however small, was an object of importance.
Upon this, the Presidency express themselves in the
following terms : “ When we consider the earnest
and repeated solicitations urged by the Nabob to
engage us in an expedition against Tanjore ; when
we consider the taunts and reflections cast on us by

often (I should not much err if I said always) been mistaken by the inac-
curate minds, which hitherto have contemplated Indian affairs. — M. This
can scarcely be called the constitution of India, although it was the
political condition of the country, growing out of the anarchy conse-
quent upon the Mohammedan invasion, particularly in the South of India.
The operations of the Moguls in the Dekhin, although they broke to pieces
the consistency of both the Mohammedan and Hindu principalities, sub-
stituted no paramount authority in their place, and furnished an opportu-
nity and example to adventurers of all classes to scramble for power, anni-
hilating all right except that of the sword : when the fact is remembered,
therefore, its history should not be forgotten : the circumstances under
which it was true, show it to have been an accident, not a principle. In
the present instance nothing could be weaker than the claims of the
Nawab upon Tanjore, except those of Trichinopoli and Tanjore upon
Marawa. During the vigour of the Pandyan kingdom of Madura, Ramnad
and Marawa were subject to it, but upon its subversion the chief of
Ramnad became independent. Family dissensions divided the country
into separate principalities, which were occasionally terrified into the
payment of tribute to the Rajas of Madura and Tanjore, but which were
never really subject to either. Neither could the Raja of Tanjore be con-
sidered as at any time the subject of the Nawab of the Carnatic, although
occasional precedents existed for the levy of a pesheush from liis- fears.
— W.

NEGOTIATION WITH THE RAJA, 93

Sir John Lindsay for refusing to comply with the book v.

Nabob’s requisition of proceeding immediately

against Tanjore at a time when we were unpre- 177 L
pared ; when we consider that our apprehensions
from the Mahrattas are not near so great, since most
of the grain is now collected in the different forts,
which would render it difficult for an army of
Mahrattas to subsist; all these circumstances con-
sidered, it appears strange that the Nabob should
so suddenly alter his opinion, and should now
decline entering on the expedition, which he so
lately and so earnestly urged us to undertake.” They
conjectured, that, as his grand motive for urging the
expedition at first, was to force them into an alliance
with the Mahrattas, so now, despairing of that
event, he wished not to give the Mahrattas a pretext
for overrunning his dominions.1

On the 24th of July, the Committee resolved,
first, that an expedition against the Raja would, in
itself, be advisable, but being contrary to the incli-
nations of the Nabob ought not to be undertaken ;
secondly, that negotiation should be used instead of
war, and that the negotiation, in which the Nabob
wished the English not to appear, should be left to
be conducted by that ostensible prince.2

No sooner was conference attempted than the Raja
declared, that he had already “ referred all differ-
ences between him and the Nabob to the Company,
and that he wished the Company would mediate
between them ; that he was ready and willing to
settle terms of accommodation under the guarantee

Papers, ut supra, p. 684, 685.

2 Ibid. p. 696.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I
CHAP. 4

1771.

' • of the English, on whose faith and promise he would
- rely ; but that he would never trust the Nabob with-
out the security of the English, as he well knew the
Nabob’s intentions were to accommodate matters for
the present, hut that he had had intentions whenever
opportunity should offer in future.” 1

On the 29th of July, the demands of the Nabob
were presented to the Baja’s vakeel at Madras ; hut
as he required fifteen or twenty days to receive the
instructions of his master, and as the distance of
Madras would aid the Baja in spinning out the time
till the commencement of the rains, the Nabob pro-
posed to send his twmsons to Trichinopoly ; the eldest,
Omdut ul Omrah, to conduct the negotiations ; and
the younger, Mader ul Mulk, to manage the supply
of the army ; while the negotiation, he thought,
should be supported, by the show of inevitable war,
if the Baja declined implicit submission.2

Now was required a decision on the question, wdiat,
if the war should issue in a conquest, was to be done
with Tanjore. The Presidency knew, that the grand
cause of the reluctance which the Nabob had latterly
shown to the war, was a fear lest the Company
should conquer Tanjore for themselves; and, that
there was no accommodation, how unfavourable
soever, which he would not make with the Baja,
rather than incur the hazard of so hateful a result.
The Nabob offered to give to the Company ten lacs
of pagodas, if, after conquering, they delivered Tan-
jore, in full dominion, to him. The Presidency
wished to reserve the question to the proper autho-

1 Papers, ut supra, p. 717.

5 Ibid. 718, 720

WAR WITH TANJORE.

rities in England, but the Nabob would not consent. BC°°^4V'

The Presidency imagined, that as they had now con-

vinced the Raja of the hostile designs both of them- 177L
selvesand theNabob, it was highly dangerous to leave
him possessed of power, which he would have an
interest in lending to the French, or any other
enemy ; and as they could not proceed to war, except
with the consent of the Nabob, it was therefore best
to comply with his terms.1

Early in September, the young Nabob, (such was
the name by which the English generally spoke of
Omdut ul Omrah) who had repaired to Trichinopoly,
to conduct the negotiation, reported to General Smith,
the commander of the English troops, that nothing
but compulsion would bring the Raja to the sub-
mission required. The army was ready to march
on the 12th of September; but the department of
supplying the army had been intrusted wholly to the
Nabob’s second son ; and it was found upon inquiry
that there was not rice in the camp for the consump-
tion of a single day.2

The greatest exertions were made by the general
to enable the army to move; and on the 16th it
arrived before Vellum, a fortress of considerable
strength, and one of the great bulwarks of Tanjore.

The battery, having been constructed first in a wrong
place, was not ready till the morning of the 20th;
and the breach could not have been made practicable
till about three o’clock the next afternoon, but towards
evening the garrison stole out of the fort.3

' Papers, ut supra, p. 726 — 731

2 General Smith’s Letter, ibid. 742.

’ Papers, ut supra, p. 744 — 750.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \

CHAP. 4

1771.

On the 23d the army again marched, and encamped
before Tanjore. They broke ground late on the
evening of the 29th, and by that time began to be
distressed for want of provisions. On the 1st of
October, the enemy made a strong sally, which
threatened to have considerable effects ; but Major
Vaughan, the officer against whose post it was
directed, acted with firmness and judgment, and the
attack was repelled without much loss. The opera-
tions proceeded but slowly. The 27th of October
had arrived, when the engineers reported that the
breach would be practicable the next morning. On
that day the young Nabob signed a peace with the
Raja, and hostilities ceased.1

The Raja engaged to pay eight lacs of rupees for
arrears of peshcush ; 30,50,000 for the expense of
the expedition ; to restore whatever he had taken
from the Marawars ; and to aid with his troops in all
the wars of the Nabob. Vellum was the principal
difficulty. It was finally agreed, that it should be
restored to the Raja, but demolished if the Nabob
chose.

Before this event, a dispute had arisen about the
plunder. Omdut ul Omrah w7as informed, that, by
the usage of war, the plunder of all places, taken by
storm, belonged to the captors. Omdut ul Omrah,
unwilling to lose the plunder of Tanjore, offered a
sum of money in lieu of it to the troops. His offer
was not satisfactory ; and a disagreeable and acri-
monious correspondence had taken place. By con-
cluding a peace, before the reduction of the fort, any

’ Papers, ut supra, p. 755 — 790.

SEVERITY OF THE TERMS.

allowance to the army was a matter of gratuity, not book v.
of right.1

The Presidency were struck, as they say, with 1771-
“ alarm,” wrhen, expecting every hour to hear of the
fall of Tanjore, they were accosted with the news of
the conclusion of a peace. They expressed the
greatest dissatisfaction with the terms, which ought,
in their opinion, to have been nothing less than the
surrender of the fort at discretion. The terms were
not only inadequate, but no security, they said, was
provided for the execution of them such as they were.

On this account they held it necessary to keep them-
selves prepared as for immediate war. Orders were
sent out to give up Vellum without further instruc-
tions. The expectation was entertained, that the
Raja would not be exact to a day in the delivery of
the money and jewels he had agreed to resign. This
happened. The want of punctuality was pronounced
a breach of the treaty ; the guns had not yet been
drawn out of the batteries ; and the troops were
under the walls of Tanjore : the fort of Vellum, and
the districts of Coiladdy and Elangad, were demanded:
a renewal of hostilities was threatened as the only
alternative : the helpless Raja could do nothing but
comply.2

In averting from themselves the effects of this dis-
approbation, the General stated, that he commu-
nicated to Omdut ul Omrah the progress of the
siege, and the great probability of success ; that he
had no control over the negotiation, and was bound
by his instructions to desist from hostilities the

1 Papers, ut supra, p. 827.
VOL. IV.

? Ibid. p. 930, 931.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. moment the Nabob desired: on the other hand,

CHAP 4.

Omdut ul Ornrah affirmed, that he took not a step

177L without consulting the General; that the troops
were under the greatest apprehension on account of
the rains which had begun ; that when the breach
was partly made, he stated the terms to which the
Raja had yielded, declaring that he would not
accept them, if the fall of the place were assured ;
that the General replied, he could not say he would
take the place, but he would endeavour to take it ;
that being asked his opinion, whether the Raja
would give such terms as he now offered, if the
siege were unsuccessful, the General said, “ My
opinion is, that in that case he will give you
nothing, but if he does he is a great fool;” that
when asked if he would guarantee equivalent terms
in case the enterprise miscarried, he repelled the
proposal ; that when peace was then held up to his
view, as what in that case appeared the most politic
choice, he replied, “ It was well; it was at the Nabob’s
option.”1

Before all things were settled with Tanjore, the
Nabob made application for the Company’s forces to
reduce the two Marawar Polygars. The Governor
and Council, in their letter upon this to the Court of
Directors, make the following pertinent remarks ; “It
is well worthy of observation that Marawar and
Nalcooty are the two Polygars whom the Raja of Tan-
jore attacked in the beginning of the year, asserting
their dependence on his government ; while the
Nabob claimed the right of protecting them, as tri-

Papers, ut supra, p. 803, 857.

WAR UPON MARA WAR.

butanes to the government of Trichin opoly. It was

in this cause that the late Plenipotentiary1 took the

field of controversy ; asserted the Nabob’s pretensions 1//L
to us, who did not deny them; exaggerated the out-
rage of the Raja of Tanjore in taking arms against
them : and extolled their obedience and submission
to the Nabob’s government: and he will say,, com-
pelled us to vindicate the Nabob’s dignity. What
honours are due to the minister’s zeal for his friend's
cause ! mark now the reasoning of that friend : the
Raja humbled; Marawar and Nalcooty, from obe-
dient dependants, become immediately dangerous and
ungovernable delinquents; and there can be no safety
to the Nabob’s government unless they are re-
duced.”2

Notwithstanding the contradiction which the Pre-
sidency thus remarked in the pretexts of the Nabob,
they consented, without any difficulty in this case, to
undertake the expedition. The season of the rains
of necessity delayed their operations ; but in the
mean time inquiries were made ; terms were settled
with the Nabob; and the army was kept ready at
Trichinopoly, the nearest of the stations to the place
of attack.

The Nabob imputed no other crime to the Mara-
wars, except their not sending troops to the late war
upon Tanjore, and not paying the money which he
exacted of them. And the Presidency acknowledged
that he had no right over them whatsoever, but that
right of oppression, which is claimed by the strong
man over the weak. The reason for concurring with

1 Sir John Lindsay.

* Tanjore papers, ut supra, p. 1082.

H 2

100

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

4V' the Nabob in bis desire to attack them, was, that

the Nabob, by his ill-usage, had made them his

enemies. They concurred, they said, “not to gratify
the Nabob’s revenge on those Polygars; but because,
if they were not originally and naturally, he has
made them his enemies ; and therefore it is necessary
they should be reduced. It is necessary ; or it is
good policy they should. We do not say it is alto-
gether just, for justice and good policy are not often
related.”1

The objects, however, of the Nabob and of the
Company were somewhat different. The ardent pas-
sion of the Nabob was to destroy every creature who
bore any rule in the country, and place the whole
under his own immediate authority. The intention
of the Company was by no means to proceed to “the
total extirpation of the Polygars ; but only to reduce
them to such a state of dependence, by seizing their
forts and strong-holds, as might prevent their being
troublesome in future.”2

The Nabob’s application for reduction of the Mara-
wars was made at the beginning of November, 1771 ;
at the beginning of December, when the concurrence
and views of the Presidency were understood, he
recommended, if not a dereliction, at any rate a sus-
pension of the design, for fear of the Mahrattas ; and
at the beginning of March, 1772, he renewed his
application for undertaking the expedition. On the
12th of May, a force consisting of 120 artillery-men,
400 European infantry, three battalions of sepoys,
six battering cannon, a body of the Nabob’s cavalry,

1 Tanjore papers, ut supra, p. 969, combined with p. 1085, par. 54.

2 Ibid. p. 1081.

WAR UPON MARAWAR.

101

and two of his battalions of sepoys, marched from book y.

Trichinopoly, accompanied by Omdut ul Omrah,

who was deputed by his father to conduct all ope- 177'2-
rations, not military, connected with the expedition.

They arrived, having met with no opposition, at
Ramnadaporam, the capital of the greater Marawar,
on the 28th. The batteries were opened in the
morning of the 2d of April, and a practicable breach
was effected before the evening. This time a bargain
had been made with the Nabob, that he should not
forestall the wishes of his allies, by the precipitate
conclusion of a peace. Terms were, however, offered
both by Omdut ul Omrah and the General, which,
notwithstanding their inadequate means of resistance,
the people of the Polygar refused. The fort was
assaulted the same evening, and earned with the loss
of only one European and two sepoys killed. The
Polygar, a minor of only twelve years of age, with
his mother, and the Dewan, were taken in the place ;
and soon reduced to a situation which extorted the
compassion of Englishmen. The Nabob bargained
for the plunder by a sum of money to the troops.1

The Nabob’s troops, before the 15th of June, were
put in possession of all the forts in great Marawar ;
and on the 1 6th, the army began its march toward
the other principality of that name. The Polygar
had betaken himself to a strong-hold, named Kala-
Koil, or Carracoil, surrounded by thick woods, which
they approached on the morning of the 23d. An
English officer, with a detachment of the army, was
sent to approach by a road on the opposite side, with

Papers, ut supra, p. 1081 — 1083, and 998.

102

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \
CHAP. 4.

1772.

• a hope, either of drawing off some of the enemy’s
- attention, or of finding an opportunity to enter by
surprise. In the mean time submissive offers arrived
from the Poly gar. To guard against any stratagem
to amuse, the advance of the troops was not inter-
rupted till the morning of the 25th, when Omdut ul
Omrah gave the General notice that peace was con-
cluded, and requested that orders might be sent to
stop the detachment. The orders, it seems, were
intrusted to the Polygar’s vakeels ; the Polygar’s va-
keels, it is said, used not the requisite diligence ; at
any rate the sending of the orders was unhappily if
not criminally mismanaged ; the detachment ad-
vanced ; found the Polygar reposing upon the security
of the treaty, and totally off his guard ; with scarcely
any resistance it entered the place, and the Polygar
was killed while endeavouring to escape at one of the
gates. The Nabob, here too, gave a sum of money
in redemption of the plunder. And these sums
became the subject of immediate animosities and
disputes, among the parties by whom pretensions to
a share of them were advanced.1

The settlement of the territory was rendered diffi-
cult, by excess of misgovemment. The people of
the country, who had facilitated the conquest by re-
maining at their ploughs, and who expected equal
indulgence under one despot as another, were turned
out of their lands, and took arms all over the country.
“ I must represent to you,” said the English officer,
who was left to support Omdut ul Omrah, (these are
the words of a letter addressed to the Council,)

Papers, ut supra, pp. 1083 — 1085, 1006, 1037.

THE PEOPLE OPPRESSED.

103

“ that the settling this country in the manner ex- 4V'

pected by the Nabob, requires extremities of a shock

ing nature. When we are marching, we find all
over the country most villages abandoned by the men,
there remaining in them only women and children,
who, likely if the Nabob persists in this undertaking,
must, with other poor innocents, become a sacrifice
to this conquest : F or, if any of our baggage remain
behind, it is usually taken ; our parties and strag-
glers are attacked. This is done by the inhabitants
of some village or other. Those villages being
pointed out to me, I cannot pass the outrage without
punishment ; and not finding the objects on which
my vengeance should fall, I can only determine it by
reprisals ; which will oblige me to plunder and burn
those villages ; kill every man in them ; and take
prisoners the women and children. Those are
actions which the nature of this war will require :

For, having no enemy to encounter, it is only by
severe examples of that kind, that we may expect
to terminate it, so as to answer the end proposed.”1
Complaining, that they were left without any spe-
cific instructions by the Court of Directors, that they
were commanded generally to support the Nabob
in all his pretensions, that they were blamed as not
having given him a sufficient support, that they were
bullied by the Plenipotentiaries to support him more
than they could believe was either expedient or safe,
the Governor and Council alleged that they were led
on by that friend and ally from one step to another,
without knowing where to stop, and without being

Papers, ut supra, p. lOM.

104

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1
CHAP. 4

J 773.

‘ able to make those reservations in favour of the Com-
- pany which the interests of the Company appeared
to require: In this manner had Tanjore been hum-
bled and fleeced : In this manner the two Marawars
had been conquered, and delivered up as a dominion
to the Nabob. It must be allowed, that except fora
little time when he first demanded the attack on
Tanjore, the Presidency had shown themselves abun-
dantly forward to second, or rather to excite the
Nabob’s ardour for conquest of the minor states.
The Nabob had only one scruple, the fear of then-
conquering for themselves. The declarations how-
ever, of the Presidency, of the Directors, and the
King’s minister plenipotentiary, the interpretations
of the treaty of Paris, and especially the recent ex-
ample in the surrender of the Marawars, raised up a
hope in his Highness that the time was at last
arrived when the long-desired possession of Tanjore
might be fully acquired.

In a conference with the President about the
middle of June, 1773, the Nabob brought complaint,
that there was now due from Tanjore about ten lacs
of rupees, that the Raja had applied to the Mah-
rattas and to Hyder for a body of troops, and had
encouraged the Colleries to ravage part of the Car-
natic territory : and intimated his intention of sub-
duing him ; all which he desired the President to
consider of.1

After a few days, at another conference, “ the
Nabob expressed his earnest desire that the expedi-
tion should be undertaken ; spoke much of his friend-

1 Papers, ut supra, p. 1107.

NEW WAR WITH TANJORE. 105

ship to the Company ; and to show his regard for 4V-

them was willing, in case of success, to give them

ten lacs of pagodas.”1 17 /3-

As the question immediately occurred, what, in
case the expedition was undertaken, was to be ex-
pected from, or done with, their neighbours, Hyder,
and the Mahrattas ; a curious change appeared in
the sentiments of the Nabob. A friendship, he said,
must be established between him and Hyder; for
notwithstanding all that he had done to procure for
the Mahrattas the benefit of English assistance, “ yet
he found they were not fair and open towards him at
Poonah;1 2 and that whether he reduced Tanj ore or
did not reduce it, they would still come against him
when it suited their affairs ; that by God’s blessing,
however, if he and Hyder were joined, they would,
with the assistance of the English, keep the Mah-
rattas effectually on the other side of the Kistnah.”3
On the 22d of June, the question underwent deli-
beration in the Select Committee. As to the com-
plaint about the moneys unpaid, the Committee pass
it over as a matter of slight importance. And as to
the other complaint, that the Raja was looking to
the neighbouring powers for support against the
Nabob, of which they had before them no satisfactory
proof, they were constrained to confess, that, if it were
true, he would not be to blame. “ That the Nabob,”

1 President’s Report to the Select Committee, Papers, ut supra, p. 1108.

* His not getting them the assistance from the English, he represented
as the cause of their want of friendship, since they believed (of course he
had told them) that “ he had got the entire control of the whole English
nation, and could make them do as he pleased.” Ibid.

3 Ibid.

106

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 4.

1773.

• they say, “ has constantly had in view the design of
- conquering Tanjore, will not admit of a doubt. We
are firmly persuaded, that his chief motive for con-
cluding peace with the Raja, at a time when our
troops were upon the point of getting possession of
the place, arose from his jealousy lest the Company
purposed at a convenient opportunity to take the
country from him. By that expedition, however,
he obtained what he earnestly wished for, namely,
the removal of that restraint which he thought
himself under, by the Company’s guarantee of
1762.”

The Committee next record a solemn declaration,
that the treaty, which was then concluded, left the
Raja at the mercy of the Nabob, and bound, by a
sense of self-preservation, to seek for protection
against him in every quarter. “We then expressed
our firm opinion, that the peace, concluded without
the intervention of the Company , would not be con-
sidered by the Raja as any security to him; and that
he would avail himself of the first opportunity of
freeing himself from his apprehensions of the Nabob.
The intelligence communicated to us by the Nabob
of the Raja’s application to the Mahrattas and Ilyder
Ali for assistance, is, in some measure, confirmed by
the advices transmitted to us by Mr. Mostyn from
Poonah:1 Neither is the conduct of the Raja, in this

1 The author of the Defence of Lord Pigot (Introd. p. 63) says, that
by the Nabob, people were employed to personate the Raja’s vakeels at
Poonah : that letters were fabricated ; and all sorts of artifice employed
to mislead the Company’s servants. The Presidency are often complain-
ing that the Nabob’s letters of intelligence state always a set of facts
exactly calculated to support the point, whatever it is, which the Nabob
is at that moment driving.

MOTIVES OF THE ENGLISH TO RENEW THE WAR.

107

instance, to be wondered at. The apprehensions he J'

before had, have been increased by the publication of

the Nabob’s intention of reducing him ; which has 1"3-
gained credit all over the country. He knows that,
in our present situation, wTe cannot interfere in the
disputes between him and the Nabob; that the
Nabob did not even allow his vakeel to visit the
late President. Under these circumstances, it is not
surprising, that the Raja should endeavour to streng-
then himself, by every means in his power, to enable
him to withstand any attempts of the Nabob against
him.”1

That the Presidency had reason to pass over in
silence, or at least with neglect, the complaints of the
Nabob, respecting the payment of the Raja’s debt,
sufficiently appears from the statement of the facts.

Of fifty lacs, exacted as the compensation for peace,
twelve lacs and a half were paid down. By mort-
gaging jewels and land, to the Dutch at Negapatnam,
and the Danes at Tranquebar, he had contrived to
pay the remainder, together with eight lacs for the
peshcush of two years, leaving a balance of only ten
lacs upon the whole. 2

Notwithstanding the absence of criminality on the
part of the Raja, the Presidency resolved that they
ought to destroy him. “ It is evident,” they say,

“ that in the present system,3 it is dangerous to have
such a power in the heart of the province : for, as

1 Papers, ut supra, p. 1117.

* See the Letter from the Dutch to the Nabob (Ibid. 1273) ; Defence
of Lord Pigot, Introd. 64.

3 By present system, they mean the orders from England to support the
Nabob, as absolute sovereign, in all his pretensions; which held their
hands from interfering to protect the Raja.

108

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK "V
CHAP. 4.

1773.

• the Honourable Court have been repeatedly advised,
- unless the Company can engage the Raja to their
interest, by a firm promise of support in all his just
rights, we look upon it as certain, that, should any
troubles arise in the Carnatic, whether from the
F rench or a country enemy, and present a favourable
opportunity of freeing himself from his apprehen-
sions of the Nabob, he would take part against him,
and at such a time might be a dangerous enemy in
the south. The propriety and expediency, therefore,
of embracing the present opportunity of reducing
him entirely, before such an event takes place, are
evident.”1

Never, I suppose, was the resolution taken to
make war upon a lawful sovereign, with the view of
“ reducing him entirely,” that is, stripping him of
his dominions, and either putting him and his family
to death, or making them prisoners for life, upon a
more accommodating principle. We have done the
Raja great injury: We have no intention to do him
right. This constitutes a full and sufficient reason
for going on to his destruction. Such is the doctrine;
the practical improvement is obvious. Do you wish
a good reason for effecting any body’s destruction ?
First do him an injury sufficiently great, and then if
you destroy him, you have, in the law of self-defence,
an ample justification ! 1

In the opinion of the Presidency no danger
attended the operations required for the destruction
of the Raja. As to Hyder, he had too much
business on his hands, and knew his own interest too

Papers, ut supra, p. 1117.

CONDITIONS REQUIRED OF THE NABOB.

109

well, to make the English iust now his enemies on B00K v.

account of the Raja. With regard to the Mahrattas,

they were sure to invade the Carnatic, whenever 1773-
they could expect to do so with any success ; and
that would happen neither sooner nor later on account
of the reduction of Tanjore.1

The next point to consider was, the conditions
upon which the Nabob should be accommodated with
the destruction of the Raja, and the transfer of his
dominions. The first condition was, that the Nabob
should advance cash, or good hills, sufficient for the
expense of the expedition. The second was, that all
sorts of necessaries, excepting military stores, should
be amply provided by the Nabob. The third -was,
that instead of paying for 7,000 sepoys, he should
henceforth pay for 10,000. The condition, which
the Presidency endeavoured before the first war to
obtain, but which they afterwards gave up, that of
reserving the disposal of Tanjore to the Court of
Directors ; and the maxim laid down by the Direc-
tors, and recognised by the Presidency, in the case
of the Marawars, viz. that it was for the interest of
the Company to leave the minor chiefs in the Carnatic
totally defenceless, as likely to aid the Nabob in those
schemes of independence which he incessantly
cherished ; were on this occasion totally neglected.

The Nabob, in these cases, was accustomed to
press his project eagerly, as long as he found the
Presidency reluctant or undetermined; as soon as
he found them engaged, and warm in the project, to
manifest something of indifference or aversion. So

Papers, ut supra, p. 1117.

110

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOKV.it happened, on the present occasion. The Nabob,

after several conferences, told the President, “ he

i/73. -would not be too pressing upon the expedition’s being
undertaken, without it suited the Company’s affairs.’'
The Presidency, however, were in a very different
disposition ; they were determined, and impatient, to
begin the operations immediately.1

The Nabob, without much difficulty, accepted the
conditions, on which the Presidency were eager to
make for him the conquest of Tanjore ; and it was
agreed, that no peace should be concluded with the
Raja, unless it should be found to be absolutely
impossible to effect his destruction. The general
was furnished with his instructions on the 5th of
July. The Nabob bargained with the troops, by a
sum of money, for the plunder of Tanjore, if the
place should be taken by storm. And on the 3rd
of August the army marched from Trichinopoly.

They encamped, after a skirmish, within a short
distance of Tanjore, on the 6th of August. On the
13th the following letter was received from the
Raja. “ The friendship and support offered by

1 Papers, ut supra, p. 1122, 1125. There is secret history in many of
the proceedings of the Company’s servants which it is not possible to
bring forward with such evidence as history admits, and which, except in
a very general manner, it is not within the province of history to trace.
Such articles of evidence as present themselves may be submitted for
consideration. The Author of the History and Management of the East
India Company, than whom no man was better acquainted with the secrets
of Madras, and who, though he is a prejudiced and unfair, is not a menda-
cious writer, says, (p. 219) that the crime of the Raja was his sending to
borrow money of the Dutch ; and had he pursued the plan of borrowing
at Madras, “with more constancy, and to a much larger extent, the Great
Folks at Madras might have had an interest in overlooking, for some
time longer, his designs. But Tulja-ji, though not more faithless, was
less prudent than his father Pretaupa Sing, who had always an expert
agent at Madras to negotiate a loan, when he wished to obtain a favour.”

EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE.

Ill

the English to this country is a matter of universal book v

, J , CHAP. 4.

celebration and report among all the Mahratta and

Rajapoot nations, as well as others. We have 1773-
quietly submitted to the hard terms imposed on us
by the Nabob ; and have given him all that, by these
means, he required. Some deficiency happened in
the revenues of the mortgaged lands ; for the pay-
ment of the sums so deficient, as well as the last
year’s peshcush (though the latter was not yet become
due) I borrowed of the Soucars ; and having engaged
with them also for an additional sum, to discharge
what was due to the young Nabob and other lesser
accounts, I took bills for the whole amount, and sent
them to the Nabob ; who, having protested my bills,1

1 This transaction is explained, in the following mannner, by the Author
of the “ Defence of Lord Pigot.” (Introd. p. 64.) “ It happened that

one Comera, a dubash of the virtuous Mr. Benfield, was at Tanjore, when
the Nabob threatened a second visit. This Comera, servant of Mr.

Benfield, was employed in lending money on mortgages. To him the
Raja addressed hisself; through him, he mortgaged to Mr. Benfield some
districts, which had been formerly mortgaged to the Nabob ; and obtained
from Comera bills on his master, Mr. Benfield, payable at Madras, for the
twelve lacks which by the treaty of 1771 were still to be paid. But it was
not the intention of the Nabob to receive this last instalment. His confi-
dence in the servants of the Company was increased. And he now
determined at all events to get possession of Tanjore. He therefore sent
for the dubash, and by proper application, prevailed on him to deny that he
gave the draughts : by proper applications he raised unexpected scruples
in the breast of the delicate Mr. Benfield. Though he now avows that he
has mortgages to a considerable amount in the Tanjore country ; yet then,
in a more enlightened moment, he discovered that it was his duty, as a
servant obedient to the orders of the Company, to reject any proposal of
lending money on mortgages. He does not indeed deny that the bills were
drawn on him: he allows them to have been drawn, and actually sent to
the Nabob : so far he contradicts his agent. But he seems not to know who
it was that drew them. His own servant, Comera, dwindles, in his
account, into an undescribable creature without a name ; a black man to
the southward, with whom the virtuous Mr. Benfield had indeed some
mercantile concerns. In this statement, the facts of the drawing of the
bills, and of their not being accepted by Mr. Benfield, are established

112

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. has set on f00t an expedition against me. Consider-

ing that no deviation of conduct can by any means

I/7.3. jje t0 my charge, and that I have fulfilled my
engagements in respect of the payments I agreed to,
I am confident you can never consent to this measure.
Some offence should surely he proved upon me,
before an expedition be undertaken against me;
without any show of equity, to wage an unjust war
against me, is not consistent with reason. This
charitable country is the support of multitudes of
people ; if you, Sir, will preserve it from destruction,
you will be the most great, glorious, and honoured of
mankind. I am full of confidence, that you will
neither do injustice yourself, nor listen to the tale of
the oppressor. I only desire a continuance of that
support which this country has formerly experienced
from the English, and you will reap the fame so
good an action deserves.” 1

Ground was broken before Tanjore, late on the
evening of the 20th of August ; and a party was
advanced to a commanding spot within 500 yards of
the walls. On the 23rd, the engineers had run their
parallels to the destined extent, but had not time to
erect a redoubt which was intended to secure their
left. On the morning of the 24th the enemy sallied
in a considerable party, and attacked the trenches
with musketry. They retired upon the brisk

For the remaining points we have only the authority of the writer, and thn
mode of gaining a delicate point at Madras ; the writer, it is to be remem-
bered, a partisan ; but the mode of gaining points at Madras, notorious,
habitual, and altogether concordant with the assertion.

1 Papers, ut supra, p. 1177. Thetoneofthe Raja’s letter is indisputable!
his assertions with regard to matters of fact are as much, or rather as little
valuable, as those of the Nabob.

TANJORE TAKEN.

113

advance of the grenadiers, but not without some loss BT°K ,v'

to the English assailants. On the 27th, in the

morning, the batteries were opened. About the 17/3-
same time the Presidency received from Mr. Mostyn,
at Poonah, a letter, to say, that a dispute between
the Peshwa’s government, and that of Berar, afforded
present occupation to the Mahrattas, and removed
the danger of interruption to the expedition against
Tanjore. The approaches were made, and the
breaching-batteries opened, early in the morning of
the 14th of September. On the 16th a passage, of
twelve feet wide was completed across the wet ditch
which surrounded the walls, and the breach was so
considerable, that the enemy expected the assault by
day-light the next morning, when 20,000 fighting-
men were prepared to defend the breach. This hour
being permitted to pass, they expected no further
attempt till the evening ; but when the sun wras in
the meridian, and intensely hot, and the garrison
had mostly retired to obtain a little refreshment and
repose, the English troops were drawn out, without
noise, to the assault. The success of the stratagem
was complete. The troops entered with scarcely
any resistance, or any loss. And the Raja and his
family were taken prisoners in the fort,1

The Dutch had received the seaport town of Nagore
and its dependencies, in assignment for the money

1 Papers, ut supra, p. 1197. — 1218. In giving an account, the next day,
of the capture of the place, the English General writes to the Presidency ;
“ The situation of the Raja is truly pitiable, and likewise Monajee’s (the
Generalissimo) ; I do therefore hope, as the place has fallen by the English
arms, that the Honourable Board will exert their influence with his
Highness, that those prisoners may be treated agreeable to the rank they
once held in this country.” Ibid. p. 1218.

VOL. IV. I

114

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

b°°k 4V- which they had lent to the Raja of Tanjore, It was

the wish, neither of the English, nor of the Nabob,

1 773- that they should enjoy the advantage of retaining
these possessions. The first pretence made use of
was, that assistance had been lent to the Raja against
the late expedition. Before the troops withdrew
from Tanjore, a letter was written by the Nabob to
the Presidency, recording the complaint, and
demanding assistance to punish the offenders. It
was also necessary to send information of the charge
to the Dutch. They utterly denied the facts ; and
as there appears to have been nothing to prove them,
the charge was permitted to drop. Another resource
remained. The Dutch had purchased Nagore. Upon
this the Presidency gravely and solemnly declare :
“ As the Raja of Tanjore held his lands of the
Nabob in fee, he could not, agreeable to the feudal
system, which prevails all over India, alienate any
part of this country to any other power, without the
consent of his liege lord, the ruler of the Carnatic
Payen Ghaut.” 1 Upon this foundation, they felt
no scruple in joining with the Nabob to make war
upon the Dutch. Yet it is abundantly certain, that
such an idea as that of “ land held in fee ” could
hardly enter into the mind of a native Indian, even
in the way of imagination and conception. Such a
thing as a feudal system or a liege lord, never had a
moment’s existence in India, nor was ever supposed
to have, except by a few pedantic, and half-lettered

1 Consultation of the Governor and Council, 23rd Sept., 1773; Papers,
ut supra, p. 1226. — M. This part of the argument seems to have been
suggested by the ministerial representative Sir Robert Harland. — Papers,
1225.— W.

NAGORE TAKEN FROM THE DUTCH.

115

Englishmen, who knew little more of the feudal ' •

system than the name. If this doctrine were true,

the English had originally no just title, either to 1//3'
Calcutta or Madras. When they obtained the one
from the Subahdar of Bengal, he was the vassal of
the Mogul ; when they obtained the other from the
Nabob of the Carnatic, he was the vassal of Nizam
al Mulk, the Subahdar of the Deccan. Besides, the
Presidency themselves had only two years before
declared that no such thing as feudality existed in
India ; that the only right of one state over another
was power; that the stronger uniformly exacted
tribute of the weaker; but that legal dependence
there was certainly none.1 The troops advanced.

The Dutch made a solemn protest against the
injustice ; but they were not in a condition to make
effectual resistance ; and they prudently retired.

The Nabob complained of the cold-heartedness and
supineness of his English friends, because they would
not support him in attacking the ancient possessions
of the Dutch. At length it was arranged, that the
Dutch should be re-imbursed by the Nabob the
money which they had advanced to the Baja ; and
that they should give up to the Nabob the lands
and jewels which they had received in payment or in
pledge.2

When the former war with Tanjore was projected,
the Nabob, though he would not consent that the
English should garrison Tanjore, if taken, yet pro-
posed that he himself should place in it a garrison of
Europeans. This time he would not consent to even

1 Vide supra, p. 91.

* Papers ut supra, p. 1226, 1273, 1276, 1281, 1290, 1333, 1361.

I 2

116

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 4.

1773.

so much, but insisted upon it, that Tanjore should
be garrisoned with his own troops.1 The Presidency
so far attended to humanity, and the suggestion of
their own general, as to express their wishes to the
Nabob for humane treatment of the Raja and his
family. But they were satisfied with very slight
evidence of the gratification of those desires. The
wretched Raja and his mother addressed a letter,
each of them, to the Nabob ; telling him that they
were remarkably well treated. These letters were
shown to the Presidency, and the Presidency tell the
Directors, “We have much satisfaction to learn, by
letters from the Raja and his mother to the Nabob,
communicated to us, that they are treated with much
attention and humanity in their confinement.”2 The
Nabob could never be at a loss, upon such admirable
terms as these, for a proof of any thing which he
could possibly desire.

Intelligence of the dethronement of the Raja, and
of the transfer of his dominions to the Nabob, was
not delayed by the Company’s servants. It was re-
ceived in London, with all the documents and details,
on the 26th of March, 1774. Three weeks elapsed
before the departure of the last ships of the season ;
but the Directors made no remarks upon the revo-
lution in Tanjore. Upon so great a change effected
in the state of their dominions, without advice or
authority, the sovereign body, as if they had no
opinion to express, that is, were incapable for the
moment of executing the functions of government,
maintained absolute silence. In the course of the

1 Ibid. p. 1230.

2 Ibid. p. 1336.

PROCEEDINGS AT THE EAST INDIA HOUSE.

summer various despatches arrived, describing the book

subsequent measures to which the transfer of the

Tanjore kingdom had given rise. No observations 1774
were elicited from the Court of Directors.1 During
the winter of 1774, and more than two months of
1775, the same silence was observed ; and, if ac-
quiescence might be taken for approbation, the
actors in India had reason to congratulate them-
selves upon a favourable construction of their con-
duct.

1 An explanation is offered of the non-interposition of the Court in
the Tract published under their authority, “The Restoration of the King
of Tanjore considered,” in reply to the “ Statement of Facts,” and which
contains the view of the case derived from the documents repeatedly
referred to. It is admitted that the situation of affairs in England lessened
the attention of the Directors to political concerns in India. In 1769
occurred the necessity of the renewal of their engagements with the
Government of Great Britain, in the midst of great pecuniary difficulties.

In 1771 it became necessary to reduce the rate of dividend, and the court
was engaged in ascertaining the cause of the distress, and investigating
the conduct of those to whom it was imputed. New regulations were the
perpetual subject of discussion by General Courts and Committees of
Proprietors. The succeeding winter produced other inquiries. Two Com-
mittees of the House of Commons sat at the same time, and their proceed-
ings gave full employment to the attention of the Court. In June 1773,
the Constitution and Government of the Company, both in England and
in Bengal, were greatly altered, and the considerations consequent upon
the change were numerous and important, so that the instructions to the
gentlemen appointed by parliament, were not delivered to them before
March 1774. In that month arrived the news of the second expedition and
capture of Tanjore, but the consultations required to explain the measures
of the Council were not received till August, when the Court lost no time
in preparing papers necessary for an attentive investigation. Silence, there-
fore, was not observed through the winter of 1774, for those papers were
submitted to His Majesty’s Ministers in January 1775. On the 27th of
March the intended paragraphs of a letter to Madras were laid before the
Secretary of State, returned with his concurrence on the 7th of April, aud
signed on the 12th of the same month. Although, therefore, the efficiency
of the system to conduct at the same period, great interests both in England
and in India may be called in question ; yet there is no reason whatever
to insinuate that the Court of Directors disregarded or acquiesced in the
transactions in Tanjore. — W.

118

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. The secret history at that time of the East India

House, that is, the history of the interests of the

l77°- individuals by whom it was governed, even if it could
be given upon such evidence as history confides in,
which secret history seldom can be, would not, on the
present occasion, be of any importance. The only
point which deserves our attention is, the general re-
sult ; that the East India Company is a governing
body so constituted, no matter by what secret agency
in the minds of individuals, as to be incapable of
giving, or capable of withholding to give, for nearly
twelve months, an opinion on one of the most
important transactions to which their authority and
power could be applied.

There was no little division, at that time, in the
councils of the East India House. Early in the year
1775, the question was agitated of a successor to the
Governor of Fort St. George. The Court of Direc-
tors, by a small majority, declared for Mr. Rumbold.
A Court of Proprietors, called soon after to deli-
berate upon the subject, reversed their decision, by a
small majority, and made choice of Lord Pigot.

This ancient Governor had returned to England
about the end of the year 1763 ; and had been suc-
cessively raised to the dignities of a baronet, and of
an Irish peer.1 By the weight of his fortune, by his
connexion with individuals, and the reputation of his
services, he enjoyed a great influence in the Com-
pany ; and, after a residence of twelve years in
England, discovered an inclination, or a wish, to

’ He liad gone out a writer to Madras in 1736, and succeeded Mr.
Saunders as Governor in 1754, in which appointment he continued until the
end of 1763. — W.

PROCEEDINGS AT“ THE EAST INDIA HOUSE. 119

resume the burden of the Presidentship at Madras, 4V‘

and to rival the glory of Clive, by introducing the same •

reforms under the Presidency of Madras, as that 1/75
illustrious Governor had introduced in Bengal. The
decision in the Court of Proprietors gave the ascen-
dency to his party in the Court of Directors, and the
gratification of his ambition was no longer delayed.

Respecting the revolution in Tanjore there was no
indecision in the mind of Pigot ; and no sooner was
the ascendency of his party determined, than it also
disappeared in the East India House. The treaty
of 1762, which gave the Raja security for his throne,
was the act, and a favourite act, of Governor Pigot.

The subversion of it became the subject of severe
condemnation in the Company’s Courts. There was
in the transaction, it is not to be doubted, enough to
interest the feelings of any man who looked upon it
with partial, or even impartial eyes ; and to account
for the zeal of Lord Pigot upon the most honourable
motives. That his favourite dubash Moodoo Kistna,
with whom he maintained a correspondence in
England, had rented lands to a great extent from
the Tanjore Raja; that he was offended with the
Nabob, who, after appointing him his agent in
England, had failed in those remittances which made
the place of agent desirable; and that an auction
between two princes for the favour of the powerful
servants of the Company promised a golden harvest
to the relatives and connexions of the Directors,
were allegations thrown out by the enemies of the
new resolutions ; 1 allegations which, if they had

Hist, and Management of the E. I. C. chap. viii.

120

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK A
CHAP. 4,

1775.

' • general surmise, and even general presumptions in
_ their favour, were unsupported by particular facts.1

On the 12th of April, the very day on which the
Court of Proprietors met to choose new Directors,
the Court of Directors proceeded at last to declare
their decision on the business of Tanjore, and to pre-
scribe the rules of future operation.2

Notwithstanding their ambiguous language, and
still more ambiguous conduct, they declared that
they had been perfectly uniform in twm things; in
commanding that no addition should be made to
the possessions either of themselves or the Nabob ;
and in condemning the policy of placing Tanjore
under the dominion of that ruler ; ft more especially,”
they add, “ as they on the spot were of opinion, that,
on account of oppressions exercised by the Nabob in
his own dominions, and of his inveterate hatred to
the King of Tanjore, the Tanjoreans would submit
to any power whatever, rather than to the Nabob.”
First they condemn, though after solemn thanks
formerly given to the Governor who had carried it
on, the war of 1771 ; declaring that though it would
have been right to call the Raja to account for
arrears of tribute, and to interpose between him and
the Marawars, it wras wholly unjustifiable to make
war upon him when he offered to submit to the
arbitration of the Company ; and still more “ on

1 Why then should these allegations be recorded ? There 'vas quite
enough in the nature of the occurrences to warrant their condemnation upon
disinterested principles. — W.

2 As mentioned in a preceding note upon the authority of the official
narrative, the despatch containing the decision of the Court had been finally
prepared on the ‘27th March. The decision did not therefore come in
with the new Directors. — W.

PROCEEDINGS AT THE EAST INDIA HOUSE.

121

any account or pretence, or under any circumstances, 4V’

to put the Nabob in possession of that Kingdom.” 1

They complain, upon this subject, of their servants, 1
as sending them disingenuously incomplete infor-
mation, and then taking their measures without
authority.2

With regard to the second expedition, that in 1773,
intended for the complete destruction of the Raja,
they declare that it was founded upon pretences
which were totally false ; 1. as the Raja was not
proved to have committed any offence ; and, 2. as
the destruction of him, instead of adding to the se-
curity of the Company, had only increased its dangers.

They decree, therefore, that Mr. Wynch, their Presi-
dent, shall be removed from his office; that the
members of their council shall he severely repri-
manded ; and, “ unless their zeal for the interest of
their employers shall manifest a proper sense of
their lenity, that they shall certainly experience
more rigorous marks of their resentment.”3

After this retrospect of the past, the Directors im-
mediately pen their regulations for the guidance of
the future. They regarded two subjects ; 1st, the res-
toration of the Raja of Tanjore ; and 2dly, the manage-
ment of the Company’s own possessions, on the coast
of Coromandel ; that is, the Northern Circars, and
the jaghire lands in the neighbourhood of Madras.

“We are convinced,” said the Directors, addressing
the Council of Madras, “ that success must, in a
great measure, depend upon the wisdom of your

1 General Letter to Fort St. George, 12th April, 1775 ; papers, ut supra,

p. 145.

3 Ibid. p. 146—149.

3 Ibid. p. 150, 151.

122

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. councils, the integrity and firmness of your conduct,

and in no small degree, upon the seasonable exertion

1/75- of those peculiar abilities for which your Right
Honourable President is so justly and eminently
distinguished.”

With regard to the King of Tanjore, the Presidency
were first to provide security, by a proper guard, for
the persons of him and his family ; and next, but
under certain conditions, to restore him to his domi-
nions, as they existed in 1762. The conditions were,
that he should receive a garrison of the Company’s
troops into the fort of Tanjore ; assign lands for their
maintenance; pay to the Nabob the peshcush of
1762 ; assist him with such troops alone as the Presi-
dency shall join in requiring ; form no treaty with
foreign powers, except in concurrence with the English
rulers; and neither directly nor indirectly furnish any
assistance to their enemies.

For the better management of the Company’s pos-
sessions, the Council were directed, “when affairs
respecting Tanjore shall have been accommodated and
finally adjusted,” to form a committee, consisting of
five members of the Council, who should make the
circuit of the Northern Circars, and collect informa-
tion of all those circumstances in the state of the
country which government is chiefly interested in
knowing ; and after this information should be
gained, to take the proper steps for letting the lands
during a term of years, on principles similar to those
on which the lands had been let in Bengal. Respect-
ing the jagliire, which the Nabob hitherto had rented
under the allegation, that the appearance, presented
to the people of the country, of the exemption of any

PROCEEDINGS OF LORD PIGOT.

123

part of his dominions from his immediate jurisdiction, 4V-

would be injurious to his authority ; the Directors

declared their dissatisfaction with the present arrange- 1,/5-
ment, their determination to take the lands under
their own control, unless the Nabob should submit
to their conditions ; and they directed their servants
in the mean time to let them to him, only from year
to year.1

Lord Pigot resumed the office of Governor of F ort
St. George on the 11th of December, 1775. “ Upon
my arrival,” says his Lordship, “ I found a general
reform was necessary in the settlement, to preserve
the Company from ruin.”2 A “ general reform” has
many enemies ; and those, for the most part, very
powerful ones. The injunctions of the Directors
were to proceed immediately to the restoration of the
Raja of Tanjore. It was, however, agreed that the
communication should be made with all delicacy to
the Nabob, to whom it was known that it would be
unpleasing in the highest possible degree. There
wms no expedient to which Oriental artifice could
have recourse, which the Nabob left untried to ward
off the blow. He endeavoured to make it appear
that he had an undoubted right to the possession of
Tanjore; he magnified the merit of his services and
attachment to the Company; he enlarged upon the
disaffection of the Raja ; he claimed the support
which the letter of the King of England, brought by
Sir John Lindsay, had promised him; he deprecated
the policy adopted by the Company, of doing one thing

1 General Letter to Fort St. George, 18th April, 1775 ; papers, ut supra,
p. 153—159.

5 Lord Pigot’s Narrative, &c. ; Defence of Lord Pigol, p. 83.

124

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1776

tv* by their servants in India, and the very reverse by

— their Directors in England, and declared that he was

- unable to understand them in this double capacity.
He tried the tone of humility, he tried that of au-
dacity. He sought to affect their sympathy by re-
minding them of the many Englishmen to whom he
was indebted, and whom, if stripped of Tanjore, he
would be less able to pay : and of that confidence in
their honour with which he had placed his residence,
and that of his family, under the guns of Fort St.
George. He offered to place an English garrison in
the fort of Tanjore ; and only entreated, that the
country might not be taken out of his hands, till the
Company, who had proceeded upon partial informa
tion should decide upon what he had to suggest.

The Council availed themselves of his offer to
admit an English garrison into the fort of Tanjore ;
because it enabled them at once to set the Raja at
liberty, and guard his person. But they showed the
Nabob that the commands of the Directors were pe-
remptory in regard to the time of the restoration, and
left them no liberty to grant the delay for which he
applied. It seems to have been the expectation of
the principal military officer belonging to the Pre-
sidency, Sir Robert Fletcher, that he should be the
person by whom the immediate business of restoring
the Raja should be performed. But when the Pre-
sident signified his intention of proceeding for that
purpose to Tanjore in person, the Council voted
unanimously, that the business should be placed in
his hands ; and as the crop was on the ground, and
the harvest approaching, that no time should be lost
in giving possession of the country to the Raja.

THE RAJA OF TANJORE RESTORED.

125

Sir Robert Fletcher, however, though he had book v

... . . CHAP. 4.

joined in the vote for sending the President, proposed

another for sending along with him two other mem- 1,76
bers, under express and particular instructions of the
Board ; declaring that without this condition he
would not have assented to the vote in favour of the
President ; that the Board were not justified in the
delegation of undefined and unlimited powers, except
in a case of extreme necessity : and that, if this mea-
sure were drawn into a precedent, the effect would
be, to serve the corrupt interests of individuals at the
expense of the public. The proposal was rejected by
a majority of the Council ; but the President took
with him by choice two members of the Council, and
one of them a person who had voted for the depu-
tation.

Lord Pigot set out on the 30th of March, and ar-
rived at Tanjore on the 8th of April. On the 11th
the restoration of the Raja was proclaimed. In-
stead of employing the troops of the Company to do
nothing more than garrison the fort of Tanjore, the
president got the Raja to request that they might
be employed for the protection of the whole country.

And instead of assigning revenue barely to defray their
expenses, to save the trouble and dispute which
accounts are apt to produce, he offered to give a neat
sum to cover all expenses ; namely, four lacs of pa-
godas a year. On the 5th of May, Lord Pigot re-
turned to Madras, and having laid before the Council
a copious diary of his proceedings, with all the docu-
ments which belonged to them, received a vote of
approbation, winch, with regard to the general mea-
sures, was unanimous.

126

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 4.

1776.

Mr. Paul Benfiekl was a servant of the Company
in the civil department, and as yet in one of the
lowest situations. He had betaken himself to more
lucrative functions, than the duties of his office ; and
had become not only a favourite of the Nabob, but
the principal agent, in what was at that time one of
the first concerns in the settlement, the lending of
money.

It appears that Mr. Benfield gave to Lord Pigot a
general intimation of certain interests which he held
in Tanjore, before the departure of that Lord for the
restoration of the Raja, and received from him a
general disavowal of any intention to injure his
rights. Immediately after the restoration of the
Raja was proclaimed, a letter from Mr. Benfiekl was
delivered to Lord Pigot at Tanjore, in which he
stated, that for money lent to the Nabob he had
assignments upon the revenues of Tanjore, to the
amount of 405,000 pagodas, equal to 162,000/. ;
and for money lent to individuals in Tanjore, assign-
ments upon the present crop to the amount of
180,000 pagodas, equal to 72,000/. ; making toge-
ther the immense sum of 234,000/. lent by a junior
servant of the Company, with a salary of a few
hundred pounds a-year, and who was conspicuous,
among other things, for keeping the finest carriages
and horses at Madras.

Lord Pigot replied, that, in a case like this, he
could do nothing more than lay the circumstances
before the Board. Mr. Benfiekl expressed dissatis-
faction that the powers of government were not
immediately exerted to procure him all that he
desired; and he wrote to the Council, expressing

DISPUTE WITH BENFIELD.

127

his confidence that they would afford him “ assist- book v.

J . CHAP. 4.

ance to recover his property, while the Right

Honourable President, under their commission, 1776-
remained in authority over those countries.” Certain
Members of the Board were for proceeding imme-
diately to consider the claims of Mr. Benfield. The
majority, however, decided, that the consideration
should be postponed till Lord Pigot’s return.

A few days after the return of Lord Pigot to the
Board, the application of Mr. Benfield was appointed
for the subject of deliberation. Mr. Benfield was
called upon for particulars and vouchers ; hut vouchers
Mr. Benfield was unable to produce. The trans-
actions, he said, were registered in the boohs of the
Cutcherry ; and the Nabob would acknowledge them.

As for the books of the Cutcherry, they were never
produced; and as for the acknowledgment of the
Nabob, there were two questions ; one whether the
assignments of the Nabob, if the debts were real,
gave any right to the revenues of Tanjore, now
restored to the Raja ; another, whether the whole,
demand and acknowledgment, taken together, were
not a collusion between the Nabob and Benfield ;
a studied fraud upon the Company and the Raja.

For the debts, said to be due from individuals,
which, in the specification, had dwindled down to
30,000 pagodas, there was nothing to give but the
word of Mr. Benfield himself. After due consider-
ation a majority of the Board came to the following
decision : “ That the Raja of Tanjore, being put in
full possession and management of his country by
the Company’s express orders, it is the opinion of the
Board that it is not in their power to comply with

128

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

4V- Mr. Benfield’s request in any respect, those claims

on individuals, which hear the appearance of having

1//U- no connexion with government, not being sufficiently
explained to enable the Board to form an opinion
thereon, and the assignments of the Nabob not
being admissible.”

This resolution was passed on the 29th of May.
On the 3d of June Mr. Brooke, one of the majority
who had thrown out the claims of Mr. Benfield,
entered a minute, in which he stated, that supposing
Mr. Benfield to have demanded the assistance of the
Council, he had voted against him ; if he had then,
as now, understood that he only requested their
assistance, he would have voted for him ; he, there-
fore, moved, that the Board should reconsider their
vote on the claims of Mr. Benfield ; and gave his
opinion, that the crop on the ground, at the time of
the restoration of the Raja, was by the Company
meant to belong the Nabob. The vote for recon-
sideration was supported by the majority. On the
13th of June, the subject being resumed, a motion
was made by Lord Pigot, that the vote of the 29th of
May should be confirmed ; it was negatived by a
majority of seven to five. On the following day
Lord Pigot was proceeding to move that “ all the
claims of Mr. Benfield were private and not public
concerns,” when a member of the Council claimed a
right to priority. The claim of the member was
founded upon the notice which he had given the
preceding day of his intention to put certain motions.
The claim of Lord Pigot was founded upon the
custom of the Presidency, corroborated by con-
venience, that the President should possess the

DISPUTE IN THE COUNCIL.

129

initiation of business. The claims were put to the B00K '

vote, when the question was decided in favour of the

member; and he moved, that the crop sown during 1/76-
the time of the Nabob’s possession be declared the
Nabob’s property, his assignments on it, therefore,
good; and that the Raja should be instructed to
respect and to restore, if they had been disturbed,
the pledges in corn which were held by Mr. Benfield.

When all this was voted, the question of the
President, whether the claims of Mr. Benfield were
private or public, was finally considered. The
majority thought them, “ so far as they regard
Mr. Benfield, private claims ; so far as they regard
the Nabob’s assignments to Mr. Benfield, public.”

The following point was agitated next. On the
28th of June, the President opened a proposal for
establishing a factory at Tanjore. A motion to this
effect was rejected by the majority on the 8th of
July. As he could not obtain a factory, the Pre-
sident supposed that a resident would be useful. He
moved that Mr. Russel, a member of the Council,
and a closely connected friend of his own, should be
appointed resident at Tanjore, and this was carried
without much opposition.

Yelore was the principal military station in the
Carnatic, as a frontier fortress, in the line of invasion
both to Hyder and the Mahrattas ; it was therefore
provided with the greatest number of troops, and
regularly, as the post of honour, assigned to the
officer second in command. Colonel Stuart, the
officer second in command, thought proper to con-
sider Tanjore, where a small number only of troops
were required, as at this time the military station of
VOL. IV. K

130

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 4.

1776.

principal importance in the province ; he therefore
claimed it as his right, and that claim the majority
sustained.

Though liberty had been restored to the Raja,
and his rights proclaimed, much was yet to be done
to put the administration of the country fully in his
hands. The struggle between the President and the
majority in the Council now was, whether Colonel
Stuart, who would manage the business agreeably to
the views of the majority, or Mr. Russel, who would
manage it agreeably to the views of the President,
should have the opportunity of placing the adminis-
tration in the hands of the Raja.

Mr. Russel was one of the gentlemen named by
the Court of Directors to form one of the Committee
of Circuit to explore the Circars ; and this Committee
was directed to proceed upon its mission, as soon as
the final settlement of affairs in Tanjore should be
effected. The majority laid hold of this circumstance ;
and voted, as well for the immediate departure of the
Committee to the northern Circars, as that of Colonel
Stuart to his command in Tanjore. The President
insisted, that neither was there any necessity for
precipitating the departure of the Committee, nor
was the business of Tanjore settled ; that the Raja,
who believed that the interests which had dethroned
him were now triumphant, and those which restored
him overthrown, was in a state of apprehension
bordering upon despair. He proposed that, for the
termination of this unfortunate struggle, two members
of the Board, who were stationed at the out-settle-
ments, and were not involved in the disputes, should
be summoned to attend. This proposition was

CONTEST BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND GOVERNOR.

131

rejected. The President offered to be satisfied, if B00K y.

° * CHAP. 4.

Mr. Russel was allowed to go to Tanjore for only a

few days, to preserve the appearance of consistency in 1776-
the proceedings of the Council, and to quiet the
alarms of the Raja. This too was rejected.

Hitherto the proceedings of both parties, whatever
name they may deserve in point of wisdom or virtue,
were regular in point of form. Only one alternative
now remained for Lord Pigot; the majority was
either to be obeyed, or their authority was to be
resisted. Lord Pigot resolved to resist, and the
method which he pursued was as follows :

He assumed that the President was an integrant
part of the Council ; that it was not competent to
perform any acts of government without him ; and
that he had a right to withhold his concurrence from
any propositions which the majority might urge.

This was pretty nearly the same doctrine which had
suggested itself to Mr. Hastings in Bengal ; but the
practical application was somewhat different.

On the 19th of August, it was moved that a copy
of instructions for Colonel Stuart, prepared by the
commanding officer, should be taken into considera-
tion. The President declared that he would not put
the question. The obstruction presented a question
of importance ; and the majority resolved to adjourn.

The following day the Council assembled, and the
same motion was made. The President declared
that he would not allow the question to be agitated
at the Board. The majority, nevertheless, approved
of the instructions, and prepared the draught of a
letter to the officer at Tanjore, directing him to
deliver over the command of the garrison to Colonel

k 2

132

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1776.

[ • Stuart. The President declared that he would sign
- neither ; affirmed that without his signature they
could have no authority, and warned his opponents to
desist. The minds of the majority were yet embar-
rassed, and they adjourned the Council for two days.
On the 22d of August, the day on which they first
assembled, the majority produced a minute, in which
they deny that the concurrence of the President is
necessary to constitute an act of government ; affirm
that the vote of the majority constitutes an act of
government; and that it tends to subvert the con-
stitution, for the President to refuse either to put a
question, or to carry into execution the decisions of
the majority. The President proposed, that questions
of so much importance should be left to the decision
of their honourable masters ; and that here, till their
pleasure should be known, both parties should allow
the matter to rest.

This, too, was not agreeable to the wishes of the
majority. They came to a resolution, that, as the .
President would not sign the instructions to Colonel
Stuart, and the letter to the officer at Tanjore, a
letter should be written to the Secretary, directing
him to sign them in the name of the Council, and
transmit them as authoritative instruments of govern-
ment to the parties addressed.

The letter was written, and approved by all the
gentlemen of the majority. They began to sign it
in order, and two of them had already written their
names, when Lord Pigot took, or snatched it out of
the hand of the man who held it. He then took a
paper out of his pocket, and said he had a charge to
present against two members of the Board, and

LORD PIGOT ARRESTED.

133

named the two who had just signed the letter which 4V

he had snatched.1 The accusation was, that by sign-

ing orders to the Secretary to give instructions to 1//6-
Colonel Stuart, they had been guilty of an act, sub-
versive of the authority of government, and tending
to introduce anarchy. By the standing orders of the
Company, any member of the Council, against whom
a charge was preferred, was not allowed to deliberate
or vote on any of the questions relating to the charge.

When the two accused members were excluded, the
President had a majority by his own casting vote. It
was therefore voted to suspend the members in
question, and then the President had a permanent
majority. After the vote of suspension, the Council
adjourned to the following day, which was the 23d.

The gentlemen of the former majority forbore to
attend ; but they sent by a public notary a protest,
in which, beside denouncing the principal act of the
following day, they, as the majority of the Board,
declare themselves the governing body, and claim
the obedience of the settlement. This protest was
sent by the same agency to the commanders of his
Majesty’s troops, and to all persons holding any
authority at Madras. In consequence of what he
deemed so great an outrage. Lord Pigot summoned
the Council again to meet at four o’clock, when they
passed a vote, suspending the whole of the members

1 It would appear from this account that Lord Pigot had come prepared
with the charge, in anticipation of what would happen ; but a particular
narrative of the transaction, written by Mr. Floyer, one of the majority, to
Mr. Orme, mentions, that whilst the letter was being written the President
retired from the Council to his own apartment, and after a short interval
returned. It was in this interval that he prepared his charge. Orme
Papers, No. 171. — W.

134

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP, t

1776.

jV‘ who had signed the protest, and ordered Sir Robert
— Fletcher, the commanding officer, to be put under
arrest, and tried by a court martial.

The opponents were not behind in violence. They
speedily assembled, declared themselves a Council
vested with all the powers of government, and
resolved to arrest the person of Lord Pigot, and
confer the command of the army. Sir Robert Fletcher
being ill, on Colonel Stuart.1 The task of perform-
ing the arrest of Lord Pigot was devolved on the
Colonel, who, by acquiescence, had accepted from
him the command of the army. The greater part of
the next day, the 24th, the Colonel passed in com-
pany, or in business, with his Lordship ; breakfasted
with him as well as dined ; and having accepted an
invitation to sup at his house, and made his arrange-
ments to arrest him by the way, was in the carriage
of Lord Pigot along with him, when it was surrounded
and stopped by the troops.

As the point, for which all this confusion was
created, was the extremely minute one, whether Mr.
Russel should or should not go for a few days to
Tanjore, it is not easy to believe, that something
of importance did not remain at the bottom,
which it was not the interest of the parties to
disclose. One thing is certain, that the parties, and

1 In examining afterwards the conduct of the parties, a question was
raised about the time of this resolution to arrest Lord Pigot. It appeared
to have been taken, before the violence of Lord Pigot, in suspending the
whole of the majority, and ordering the arrest of Sir Robert Fletcher.
But the affidavits of the parties, who were prosecuted in England for the
imprisonment of Lord Pigot, and which affidavits were not contradicted,
affirmed, that the figure 8 indistinctly written and mistaken for 3, had been
the source of the error; and that 8 o’clock, and not 3 p. m. was the time
at which the resolution of the majority was taken.

LORD PIGOT ARRESTED.

135

they had the best means of information, cast the most book v

/ _ > CHAP. 4.

odious imputations upon one another, and charged

the most corrupt and dishonourable motives.1 They 1777-
were accused of desiring to have an opportunity of
enriching themselves, the one party by sharing in
the revenues of the Raja, the other by sharing in
those of the Nabob.2 The party who espoused the

1 The real character of the contest it is not difficult to comprehend. It
lay between the Raja of Tanjore and the Nawab, the latter never relin-
quishing his pretensions to the supremacy over the former, or his desire to
get possession of the Revenues of Tanjore, the former maintaining his
claim to independence. Compelled by the orders of the Court to abstain
from the open assertion of his pretensions, the Nawab did all that he could
to embarrass the proceedings of those intrusted with powers favourable to
the cause of the Raja, and he found a strong party to adopt his sentiments
with even more violence than himself. On the other hand Lord Pigot and
his adherents were equally intemperate in their support of the Raja; and,
not content with effecting his restoration, treated the Nabob with indignity,
threatening to remove him to Arcot, or place a guard upon his palace, and
interdicting all communication between him and his friends in the service
of the Company. These feelings of partisanship were no doubt exacer-
bated by interested motives : many of the Nawab’s supporters and friends
were his creditors to a very large amount, to that of nearly a million and a
half sterling, and they could not be expected to view with indifference the
loss of the revenues of Tanjore, upon which they had calculated for a
considerable proportion of their security ; that a few of them had corrupt
inducements in advocating the Nawab’s cause is very possible ; and it is
difficult to believe that Lord Pigot’s personal visit to Tanjore, or the
struggle for the office of Resident at that Court, was free from all wish to
benefit by substantial proofs of the Raja’s gratitude. In proportion as the
dispute continued it included a greater number of persons, until it compre-
hended most of the settlement of Madras ; and the parties principally
engaged in it were urged to extremities by the passions of their adherents
as well as their own. That the insubordinate members of the Council
intended the death of Lord Pigot was an absurd accusation, which,
although resting on the verdict of a Coroner’s inquest in Madras, was
wholly untenable and unproven. The catastrophe, however, contributed,
with the orders of the Court, to terrify all parties into temperance, as at
an early period after the receipt of these orders the Committee report that
dissension had ceased. General Letter from Madras, 5th Feb. 1777 — W.

8 Admiral Pigot declared, in the House of Commons, that his brother
had been offered ten lacks of pagodas, and afterwards fifteen, a bribe,
amounting to about 600, 0007. of English money, only to defer, and that

136

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. vjews 0f Nabob seem to have been afraid, after

the extremities on which they had ventured, to carry

1777- their own resolutions into effect. They had voted
that the crop which was on the ground at the time
of the restoration belonged to the Nabob, and ought
to follow the assignments he had made ; yet the Raja
was not disturbed in the possession of it ; 1 and the
debts, real or fictitious, to Benfield, remained at the
end of their administration still undischarged.2

They proceeded to the further violence of suspend-
ing all those members of the Council, who had voted
with the President ; but it does not appear that any
harshness attended his confinement, or that he was
not indulged with every freedom, consistent with the
means necessary to prevent his resuming his place in
the government.

When intelligence was brought to England of the
violent act of the Council of Madras, it excited among
the members of the Company, and still more in the
nation at large, both surprise and indignation. In
the Court of Directors, the party who defended, or
at any rate attempted to apologize for the authors of
the late revolution, were nearly equal to the party
by whom they were condemned. But in a Court of
Proprietors held on the 26th of March, 1777, a re-

for a short and specified time, the reinstatement of the Raja. See Par-
liamentary History, for the 16th of April, 1779, and Dodsley’s Annual
Register, xxii.

1 The claim was not abandoned, however, and in the beginning of 1777
a sort of compromise was effected with the Raja, who although he refused
to acknowledge any demand upon this account, assented to deposit in the
Company’s Treasury 4 lacks of Pagodas, 160,0007., to await the Court’s
disposal. Only one fourth of this was realized at a date considerably
subsequent to the agreement. MS. Records.— W.

s See their affidavit, Howell’s State Trials, xxi. 1236.

PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND.

137

solution was passed by a majority of 382 to 140, in BC°°^4V'

which it was recommended to the Court of Directors

to take the most effectual measures for restoring Lord 1777-
Pigot to the full exercise of his authority, and for
inquiring into the conduct of the principal actors in
his imprisonment. In consequence of this proceeding
it was, on the 11th of April, carried by a casting
vote, in the Court of Directors, that Lord Pigot and
his friends should be restored to the situations from
which they had been improperly removed ; that seven
members of the Council, including the Commander
in Chief, who were declared to have subverted the
government by a military force, should be suspended
from the service, and not restored without the imme-
diate act of the Directors. But a voie of censure
was at the same time passed on Lord Pigot, whose
conduct in several instances was pronounced worthy
of blame. The means were not yet exhausted of
defeating this turn of affairs. Not only were impe-
diments accumulated, and placed in the way ; but a
fresh set of revolutions were brought forward, im-
porting the recall of both parties, as the only mode of
accomplishing that fundamental investigation which
the importance of the occasion required. These pro-
positions, in favour of which the ministers were sup-
posed to have exerted all their influence, were voted
by a majority of 414 to 317, in a General Court on
the 9th of May. The attention of Parliament was
also attracted. Governor Johnstone, who was dis-
tinguished for the part which he had taken in dis-
cussions relative to Indian affairs, moved, on the 22d
of the same month, a series of resolutions, highly

1 38

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA

/■ aPProving the conduct of Pigot, and the measures

which had been pursued for his restoration, while

1//7- they condemned the proceedings of his enemies, and
the motion for his recall. Almost all the questions
of the English policy, relating to the affairs of the
Carnatic, underwent discussion in a long and ani-
mated debate ; which was closed by a vote of no
more, notwithstanding ministerial influence, than
ninety to sixty-seven, against the resolutions.

After these proceedings, a commission was pre-
pared under the Company’s seal, hearing date the
10th of June, 1777, by which Lord Pigot was re-
stored to his office ; but he was at the same time
directed, within one week after the despatch of the
first ship, which, subsequent to the date of his res-
toration, should proceed from Madras, to deliver over
the government to his successor ; and either by that
ship, or the first that should follow, to take his
passage to England. The members of the Council
who had concurred in displacing Lord Pigot were re-
called; and the military officers, who had been chiefly
instrumental in executing the arrest and confine-
ment, were ordered to be tried by courts martial on
the spot. Till inquiry should be made into the conduct
of both parties in the recent scenes, when it would be
seen which of the actors might deserve, and which
might not deserve to be removed from the service,
the Directors thought proper to form a temporary
government ; in which Sir Thomas Rumbold, after
the departure of Lord Pigot, was to succeed to the
chair ; J ohn Whitehill to be second in council ; and
Major General Hector Munro, Commander of the

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE AUTHORS OF THE ARREST. 139

Forces, to be third, without the power of any further book^v.

advancement.1

Before these orders were received in India, Lord 1777-
Pigot had passed beyond the reach of honour or
disgrace. His constitution, worn out by age, and
the operation of a hostile climate, sunk under the in-
activity of his situation, and the painful feelings
which preyed upon his mind, after a confinement of
somewhat more than eight months. Mr. Whitehill
reached Madras on the 31st of August, 1777, and
being the senior in council, acted as President and
Governor till the 8th of February following, when
Sir Thomas Rumbold arrived.3

1 Nothing was ever made of the inquiry. In October, 1788, the Go-
vernment of Madras informed the Court that they found insuperable
difficulties iu obtaining information on which dependence could be placed.
An advertisement had been published inviting persons to depose on oath
what they knew of the corruption of the parties ; none had come forward.
Application to the Raja and the Nawab was considered inexpedient, as
they were not likely to state any thing to the discredit of their friends.
Trial of the officers by Court Martial was held to be illegal, as no military
offence had been committed; they had all acted under the orders of the
superior authorities. The chief civil servants concerned in the affair
returned to England and remained there, the others crept back again into
the service. Colonel Stuart afterwards commanded the army, and the
military were employed at the siege of Pondicherry. Amidst the public
events that soon ensued, all minor irregularities were forgotten. — W.

2 Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781 ; and Parliamen-
tary History, 1777, 1779, 1780; State of Facts relative toTanjore, printed
for Cadell, 1777 ; Tanjore Papers, printed for Cadell, 1777 ; Lord Pigot’s
Narrative, with Notes of Mr. Dalrymple, &c. ; Defence of Lord Pigot,
drawn up by Mr. Lind ; Case of the President and Council, fairly stated,
&c. Almon, 1777 ; Proceedings against George Stratton and others (in
Howell’s State Trials, vol. xxi.); Hist, and Management of the East India
Company; Considerations on the Conquest of Tanjore, and the Restora-
tion of the Raja. The two last, both by the agents of the Nabob, were
published by Cadell, in 1777. Genuine Memoirs of Asiaticus, in a series
of letters to a friend, during five years’ residence in different parts of India,
three of which were spent in the service of the Nabob of Arcot. By
Philip Dormer Stanhope, Esq., p. 123 — 142.

140

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 4

1777.

Once more the subject was taken up by the
House of Commons. On the 16th of April, 1779,
Admiral Pigot, the brother of the deceased Governor,
began the discussion with a history of the transac-
tions which had led to the deposition of Lord Pigot,
and with the heaviest charges against the actors in
that scene : After which he moved a series of resolu-
tions, affirming the principal facts ; affirming also
that orders had been given to hold courts-martial for
the trial of the principal military officers engaged in
the crime, and directing an address to his Majesty
for the prosecution, by the Attorney-General, of four
of the members of the Council, who had returned to
England. The resolutions gave rise to considerable
debate ; but were finally adopted. Proceedings in
the courts of law were immediately commenced ;
and on the 20th of December, the four members
were tried for a misdemeanour, before a special jury ;
and found guilty. When brought up for judgment,
a fine of 10007 was imposed upon each. To men
of their fortunes, this was a punishment hardly to
be felt : Such is the difference, in the minds of
English judges, between the crime of deposing the
head of a government abroad, and that of writing a
censure upon one of the instruments of government
at home.1

When the northern circars were first delivered into
the hands of the Company, it was judged expedient
to govern the country for a time in the manner which
wTas already established. The Circars of Raja-
mundry, Ellore, and Condapilly, were consigned,

1 Parliamentary History, vol. xx. ; Howell’s State Trials, vol. xxi.

COMMITTEE OF CIRCUIT SUSPENDED.

141

under a lease of three years, to a native, named B00K v-

Hussun Ali Khan, who had previously governed

them, under the Nizam, with the state and authority 1/77-
of a viceroy. The remaining Circar of Cicacole was
placed under a similar administration, but in the
hands of a separate deputy.

A change was introduced in 1760. Adminis-
tration by the agency of natives was discontinued;
and the Circars were placed under the charge of
Provincial Chiefs and Councils, a title and form
which at that period the commercial factories were
made to assume. Under the Chief and Council,
formerly the Factory, of Masulipatam, were placed
the districts of Condapilly, Kajamundry, and Ellore.

The Chief and Council of Vizagapatam received in
charge the southern parts of Cicacole ; and at
Ganjam, where the factory had been discontinued, a
new establishment was made of a chief and council
for those affairs of the country which could be most
conveniently ruled from that as a centre. To these
provincial boards, the financial, judicial, and, in
short, the whole civil and political administration of
the country, was consigned.

The disappointment in their expectations of pecu-
niary supply from the northern circars, as from their
other dominions, and the sense which they enter-
tained of the defects of the existing administration,
had recommended to the Court of Directors the
formation of the Committee of Circuit. This Com-
mittee were directed, by personal inspection, and
inquiry upon the spot, to ascertain with all possible
exactness, the produce, the population, and manu-
factures of the country ; the extent and sources of

142

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V,
CHAP. 4.

1778.

the revenue ; the mode and expense of its collection ;
the state of the administration of justice ; how far
the financial and judicial regulations which had been
introduced in Bengal were applicable in the Circars ;
what was the condition of the forts ; and the circum-
stances of the Zemindars or Rajas ; what the mili-
tary force of each ; the expenses both of his army
and household ; and the means which he possessed
of defraying them. The Directors declared it to be
their intention to let the lands, after the expiration
of the present leases, for a term of years, as in
Bengal; not, however, to deprive the hereditary
Zemindars of their income ; but leave them an
option, either to take the lands which had belonged
to them, under an equitable valuation, or to retire
upon a pension. They avowed, at the same time,
the design of taking the military power into their
own hands, and of preventing the Zemindars from
maintaining those bodies of troops, with which
they were perpetually enabled to endanger the peace
and security of the state.

Within a few days after the deposition of Lord
Pigot, the new Governor and Council drew up the
instructions of the Committee, and sent them to the
discharge of their duties. They had made some pro-
gress in their inquiries ; when Sir Thomas Rumbold
took the reins of government at Madras, in February,
1778.1

In Council, on the 24th of March, the Governor
represented, that on account of the diminution in the
number of members, it was now inconvenient, if not

1 Fifth Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 1810;
Second Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781. App. No. 153.

TREATMENT OF THE ZEMINDARS.

143

impossible, to spare a sufficient number from the 4V-

Council to form the Committee ; that the Committee

was attended with very great expense; that all the 1//S-
ends which were proposed to be served by it might
be still more effectually accomplished if the Zemin-
dars were sent for, the desired information obtained
from the Zemindars, and the jummabundy, or sche-
dule of rent, settled with them at the seat of govern-
ment; that by this expedient the Zemindars would
be made to feel more distinctly their dependence
upon the government, both for punishment and pro-
tection ; that intrigues, and the pursuit of private, at
the expense of public interests, which might be ex-
pected in the Circars, would be prevented at Madras;
and that an indefinite amount of time would be saved.

For these reasons he moved, that the Committee of
Circuit should be suspended, and that in future the
annual rent of the districts should be settled at the
Presidency, to which the Zemindars should, for that
purpose, be ordered to repair. The Council acquiesced
in his reasons, and without further deliberation the
measure was decreed.

As soon as this intelligence reached the Zemindars,
they were thrown into the greatest consternation.

It was expressly urged by the provincial councils on
the spot, that the Zemindars were in general poor,
and hardly able to support their families with any
appearance of dignity ; that many of them were
altogether unable to defray the expense of a distant
journey, and of a residence for any considerable time
at the seat of government ; that the greater part of
them were in debt, and in arrears to the Company ;
that they must borrow money, to enable them to

144

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 4.

1778.

undertake the journey, and still further incapacitate
themselves for fulfilling their engagements ; that their
absence would greatly augment the confusions of the
country, obstructing both the collection of the re-
venue, and the preparation of the investment ; and
that some of them laboured under the weight of so
many years, and so many bodily infirmities, as to
render the journey wholly impracticable.1

The President and Council persevered in their
original design ; and a considerable number of the
Zemindars were brought to Madras. Of the circum-
stances which followed, it is necessary that a few
should be pointed out. In every case the Governor alone
negotiated with the Zemindars, and regulated their
payments ; in no case did he lay the grounds of his
treaty before the Council ; in every case the Council,
without inquiry, acquiesced in his decrees. Of all
the Zemindars in the Northern Circars, the most im-
portant was Vizeram Raz, the Raja of Vizanagaram,
whose territory had the extent of a considerable
kingdom, and whose power had hitherto held the
Company in awe. The character of the Raja was
voluptuousness and sloth ; but along with this he was
mild and equitable. Sitteram Raz, his brother, was

1 Of thirty-one Zemindars summoned to Madras, thirteen did not obey
the summons, nor was their presence enforced. On those who came no
great hardship was inflicted, and the accounts of the alarm and distress
which the order created are no doubt much exaggerated, as the arrange-
ment withdrew, in some degree, the Zemindars from the influence of the
provincial authorities, and deprived them of the valuable Nuzzurs, or
presents which they admitted they were in the practice of receiving. The
exactions at the Presidency were probably more moderate than those in
the provinces. The settlements made with them were not unreasonable
nor injudicious. Minutes of Evidence in the case of Sir J. Rumbold, p.
208, et seq. — W.

VIZERAM RAZ AND GOVERNOR RUMBOLD.

145

a man who possessed in a high degree the talents
and vices of a Hindu. He was subtle,, patient, full
of application, intriguing, deceitful, stuck at no
atrocity in the pursuit of his ends, and was stained
with the infamy of numerous crimes. Sitteram Raz
had so encroached upon the facility and weakness
of his brother as to have transferred to himself the
principal power in the province. The yoke, how-
ever, which he had placed upon the neck of the Raja
was galling, and sustained with great uneasiness.
Jaggernaut Raz, a connexion of the family, united
by marriage with the Raja, who had superintended
the details of government, as Dewan, or financial
minister, and was universally respected as a man of
understanding and virtue, had been recently deprived
of his office, through the machinations of Sitteram
Raz.1 The points which required adjustment between
Yizeram Raz and the Company had suggested a
use, or afforded a pretext, for calling him to the
Presidency before Sir Thomas Rumbokl arrived.
Against this order he remonstrated, on the ground
of his poverty, and of the detriment to his affairs
which absence would induce. He offered to settle
with the Council at Vizagapatam for any reasonable
tribute or rent; and complained of his brother
Sitteram Raz, whom he described as engaged in

book v.

CHAP. 4.

1778.

1 The characters given of both these persons are unwarranted by the
evidence or correspondence adduced. Sitaram’s atrocity and Jagannath’s
virtue are both gratuitous. They were both men of ability, and equally so
of intrigue, they were both competitors for the control of Vizeram, and
the management of the Zemindari, and both equally unscrupulous in taking
advantage of every favourable opportunity to provide for their own
interests. If any preference might be claimed for either, it seems to have
been due to Sitaram. — W.

VOL. IV.

146

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. machinations for his ruin. Sitteram had obeyed the

CHAP. 4. # J

very first summons to repair to Madras, and had

1778- negotiated successfully for the farm of one principal
division of the lands. He carried another point of
still greater importance ; which was to receive from
the Presidency the appointment of Dewan to the
Raja. To this regulation the Raja manifested
the greatest aversion. The President addressed him
in the following words ; “ We are convinced that it
is a measure which your own welfare and the
interest of the Company render indispensably ne-
cessary. But should you continue obstinately to
withstand the pressing instances that have re-
peatedly been made to you by the Board, con-
junctively as well as separately, we shall be under
the necessity of taking such resolutions as will in all
probability be extremely painful to you, but which,
being once passed, can never be recalled.” To this
Vizeram Raz made the following answer : I “ shall
consider myself henceforward as divested of all power
and consequence whatever, seeing that the Board
urge me to do that which is contrary to my fixed
determination, and that the result of it is to be the
losing of my country.” The reason which was urged
by the President for this arbitrary proceeding was,
the necessity of having a man of abilities to preserve
the order of the country, and ensure the revenues.
The Court of Directors, however, say, in then’ ge-
neral letter to the Presidency of Madras, dated the
10th of January, 1781, “ Our surprise and concern
were great, on observing the very injurious treatment
which the ancient Raja of Yizianagaram received
at the Presidency ; when, deaf to his representations

SITTERAM RAZ AND GOVERNOR RUMBOLD.

147

and entreaties, you, in the most arbitrary and un-
warrantable manner, appointed his ambitious and
intriguing brother, Sitteram Raz, Dewan of the
Circar, and thereby put him in possession of the re-
venues of his elder brother, who had just informed
you that he sought his ruin : F or however necessary
it might be to adopt measures for securing payment
of the Company’s tribute, no circumstance, except
actual and avowed resistance of the Company’s au-
thority, could warrant such treatment of the Raja.”1
And in one of the resolutions which was moved in the
House of Commons by Mr. Dundas, afterwards
Lord Melville, on the 25th of April, 1782, it was
declared, “ That the Governor and majority of the
Council of Fort St. George did by menaces and
harsh treatment, compel Yizeram Raz, the Raja of
Visianagrum, to employ Sitteram Raz as the Dewan
or Manager of his Zemindary, in the room of Jag-
gemaut, a man of probity and good character ; that
the compulsive menaces made use of towards the
Raja, and the gross ill-treatment which he received
at the Presidency, were humiliating, unjust, and cruel
in themselves, and highly derogatory to the interests
of the East India Company, and to the honour
of the British nation.”

Nor was this the only particular in which the
Presidency and Council contributed to promote the
interest and gratify the ambition of Sitteram Raz.
They not only prevailed upon the Raja to be recon-
ciled to his brother ; they confirmed his adoption of
that brother’s son ; and " agreed,” say the Secret

book v.

CHAP. 4.

1778.

1 Second Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781 ; Appendix, No. 153.

L 2

148

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

Committee of the House of Commons, “that all

under-leases should for the future he made in the

1778' adopted Raja’s name; that his name should be used
in all acts of government ; and that Sitteram Raz
his father, who was in reality to enjoy the power,
should be accepted of by the Board as a security for
this young man.”1

In the opinion of the Directors, even this was not
all. They accused the Presidency of underselling
the lands by a corrupt connivance with Sitteram Raz.
“ The report,” they said, “ of the Committee of Cir-
cuit, and the positive evidence of Sitteram Raz, war-
rant us in asserting that more than double the amount
of the tribute for which you have agreed, might and
ought to have been obtained for the Company. We
are in possession,” they add, “ of one fact, which, so
far as it extends, seems to convey an idea, that the
Zemindars have been abused, and their money mis-
applied at the Presidency.”2 * * 5

The Directors alluded to the following fact ; that
Mr. Redhead, private secretary to Sir Thomas Rum-
bold, the Governor, had actually received from
Sitteram Raz a bond for one lac of rupees, on con-

1 Second Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781 ; p. 16. — M. As Vizeram

was childless, his adoption of his nephew was in strict conformity to Hindu

law; the Council of Madras could not choose but concur in it. That the
reconciliation between the brothers, however enforced, was permanent,
and productive of good effects, was satisfactorily shown by its results.

It was effected in July, 1778. The Chief of Vizagapatam, Mr. Casamajor
from June, 1780 to March, 1782, deposes, that during that period the
brothers lived in perfect harmony, Sitaram being dewan ; that the revenues
had improved and were regularly paid ; and that they could not have been
collected at all if the brothers had been at variance. Whatever, therefore,
the inducements may have been, this transaction did not deserve the
censure cast upon it. — W.

5 See Letter of 10th of January. 1781, quoted above.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT CONDEMNED.

149

dition of his services in procuring for the donor the b^k v.

dewanship of the Zemindary, a reconciliation with

his brother, a confirmation of his son’s adoption, the 1778-
Zemindary of Ancapilly, and the fort of Vizinaga-
ram ; advantages, the whole of which, Sitteram Raz
obtained ; and corruption, of which though made
known to the President and Council by the proceed-
ings of a court of justice, they afforded to the Court
of Directors no information.1

Another fact was ; that to the same Mr. Redhead,
as appeared by a codicil to his will, Ameer ul Omra,
son of the Nabob, had an order from his father to
pay a lac of rupees.

Another fact was ; that two lacs and one thousand
rupees had been transmitted to Sitteram Raz, while
at Madras ; of which money, though he was greatly
in arrear, no part was paid to the Company.

It further appeared ; that according to one of the
checks devised by the Company upon the corruption
of their servants, if Sir Thomas Rumbold pos-
sessed in India any money on loan, or merchandise
on hand, at the time of entering upon his office, he
was by his covenant bound, before he proceeded to
recover the money, or dispose of the goods, to deliver
to the Board a particular account of such property
upon oath: that upon an accurate examination of
the records of the Council during the whole of Sir
Thomas Rumbold’s administration, no proceedings
to that effect could be found: that Sir Thomas
Rumbold, nevertheless, had remitted to Europe,

1 Third Report, Committee of Secrecy, 1781, p. 13, 14. Twelfth Re-
solution of Mr. Dundas, moved in the House of Commons, 25th April,
1782.

150

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. between the 8th of February, the day of his arrival

at Madras, and the beginning of August in the same

*778- year, the sum of 45,000/., and, during the two subse-
quent years, a further sum of 119,0001., the whole
amounting to 164,0001. although the annual amount
of his salary and emoluments did not exceed
20,0001.

Sir Thomas opposed the evidence of corruption
Avhich these transactions imported, by asserting, that
he had property in India at the time of his return,
sufficient to account for the remittances which he
afterwards made. The evidence which he produced
consisted in certain papers and books of account,
which exhibited upon the face of them sums to a
great amount. And one of the witnesses, examined
before the Secret Committee of the House of Com-
mons, stated his having heard in conversation from
Sir Thomas Rumbold, that he had in Bengal, at the
time of his last arrival in India, about 90,0001. ; part
in Company’s cash ; part in bonds, and mortgages at
interest, on some of wffiich three or four years’ inte-
rest was due.1

' Second Report, ut supra, p. 21, 22. — M. These particulars are loosely
and inaccurately stated. It was proved by the evidence and accounts
of Mr. Price, Sir T. Rumbold’s Attorney in Bengal, that at the time
when Sir Thomas quitted Bengal in 1772, the property belonging
to him was 9,92,201 rupees, exclusive of interest, valued at 111,000/.
and bearing interest at from 8 to 10 per cent, which balance was
handed over to other attorneys in the beginning of 1773, at which time
the amount of interest raised the sum to 121,000/. There was also
other property at the same date in Bengal. The evidence as to
what became of this sum in the interval between 1773 and 1777 is
defective: but it is proved that no addition to Sir Thomas Rumbold’s
fortune had been made in England between that time and 1769, and there-
fore it is inferred no remittances had been effected. That some property
had been left in Bengal is also proved by account, but it may be observed

TRANSACTIONS RELATIVE TO THE GUNTOOR CIRCAR. 151

The lands or taxes in the circars were let, some for B00K v-

ten years, some for five.1 The jaghire about Madras

was re-let to the Nabob, not for one, but for three 1778-
years. And in no case was any satisfactory inquiry
performed.

The Directors, complaining that their orders, and
the interests of the Company, had been equally dis-
regarded, and that while the dignity and feelings
of the Zemindars were violated, the rights of the im-
mediate cultivators were left without protection ;
pronounced upon the whole of these proceedings their
strongest condemnation.

In the agreements formed with the Subahdar, or
Nizam, respecting the five northern circars, in 1776
and 1768, it was arranged, that Guntoor, which was
one of them, should be granted in jaghire to Bazalut
Jung, his brother; to be enjoyed by that Prince
during his life, or so long as the Subahdar should be
satisfied with his conduct ;2 and upon expiration of the
interest of Bazalut Jung, to revert to the Company.

About the latter end of the year 1774, the Governor
and Council were informed by letters from the chief
of Masulipatam, that a body of French troops, under

that in March, 1778, the balance of his acconnt current with his agents is
but 1,12,000 rupees; to this is to be added about three lacks paid on
account of monies lent, making a total of something more than 40,0007. It
is also in evidence that he received as salary 49,0007. There still remains
a considerable sum to be accounted for, to explain the large amount of his
remittances to England. Minutes of Evidence, 518, et seq. — W.

1 They were let for five years. The only case in which a lease of ten
years was granted was to Sitaram Raz, for the Haveli or demesne lands,
and this was granted by the Madras Government some time prior to Sir
Thomas Rumbold’s arrival. — W.

2 Not as long as the Subahdar should be satisfied, but until he broke
friendship with the Company. See the treaty in Minutes of Evidence, p.
72.— W.

152

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 4.

1778.

• the command of M. Lally, were retained in the service
. of Bazalut Jung, and received reinforcements and
stores by the port of Mootapilly. The mention of a
French force in the service of a native prince was
sure to kindle the jealousy of the English. The
Presidency of Madras held the affair of sufficient im-
portance to communicate with the Supreme Council
of Bengal on the propriety of using measures to pro-
cure the removal of the F rencli from the territories
of Bazalut Jung: and received the authority of that
Board, not only to insist with Bazalut Jung upon
their immediate dismissal ; but to prepare a body of
troops for marching to his frontiers, and to threaten
him, that “ they would take possession of his country,
and negotiate with the Nizam, even by an entire
renunciation of the revenues, for the cession of it to
the Company.” It was deemed advisable to treat
with the Nizam, as principal in the treaty of 1768,
and a party to every agreement between the Company
and Bazalut Jung: and they desired his co-operation
for compelling his brother, either first to dismiss the
Europeans from his service, and trust to the English
the defence of Guntoor, which was their own ; or,
secondly to let that Circar to them at a rent determined
by amicable valuation. The Nizam replied in friendly
terms ; declaring that he had sent a person of dis-
tinction to procure the removal of the French from
the service of his brother ; and that “ every article of
the treaty should remain fixed to a hair’s breadth.”
From the date of these transactions, which extended
to the beginning of the year 1776, though several
representations had been received of the continuance
of the French in the territory of Bazalut Jung, no

TRANSACTIONS RELATIVE TO THE GUNTOOR CIRCAR.

153

ulterior measures were adopted by the Board until '

the 10th of July, 1778, when the President and

Select Committee entered a minute, expressing a con- l' /8,
viction of danger from the presence, in such a situa-
tion, of such a body of men. A negotiation, through
the medium of the Nabob, without the intervention
of the Nizam, was commenced with Bazalut Jung.

That prince was now alarmed with the prospect pre-
sented by the probable designs of Hyder Ali, and well
disposed to quiet his apprehensions by the benefit of
English protection. On the 30th of November, the
President presented to the Board a proposal, tendered,
by Bazalut Jung, in which that Prince agreed to cede
the Guntoor district for a certain annual payment, to
dismiss the French from his service, and to accept the
engagement of the English to afford him troops for
the defence of his country. On the 27th of January
1779, when the treaty was concluded with Bazalut
Jung, it was thought expedient to send to the court
of the Nizam a resident ; who should ascertain as far
as possible the views of that Prince, and his con-
nexions with the Indian powers or the E rench ; ob-
viate any unfavourable impressions wThich he might
have received ; and transact any business to which
the relations of the two states might give birth. And
on the 19th of April a force, under General Harpur,
was ordered to proceed to the protection of the ter-
ritory of Bazalut Jung.

In the contest with the Mahrattas, in which, at
the Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay, the English
were engaged, the Nizam had expressed a desire to
remain neutral, though he had frankly declared his
hatred of llagoba, and his connexion by treaty with

154

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. Pundit Purdaun, the infant Peshwa, that is, with the

prevailing party of the Poona council ; and though

17/8- an alliance with the Berar government had been at-
tempted by the Supreme Council, on the condition of
recovering for that government some countries which
had been wrested from it by the Subahdar of the
Deccan. When Mr. Hollond, who was sent as resi-
dent by the Presidency of Madras, arrived at Hyder-
abad, the capital of the Nizam, on the 6th of April,
he was received with every mark of respect, and with
the strongest assurances of a desire to cultivate the
friendship of the English. But when, at his audience,
the resident proceeded to explain the transactions,
which, without the participation of the Nizam, had
taken place between the Company and his brother,
the painful emotions of his Highness were visible; he
read over the articles of the treaty of 1768; affirmed
that it was violated by the conduct of the Presidency ;
disavowed the right of the English to interfere in the
concerns of his family ; declared that, if the treaty
was to be regarded, the troops which, without his
leave, were about to march into the country, possessed
by Bazalut Jung, a dependant of the Subah, ought
to be stopped ; if the treaty was not to be regarded,
he should be constrained to oppose them. To the
apology urged by Mr. Hollond, that the probability
of an immediate attack by Hyder Ali left not suffi-
cient time for consulting him, the Nizam replied that
Hyder had no immediate intention to molest his
brother, but was meditating a speedy attack upon
the Carnatic, to be conducted, like the former in-
vasion of that province, by plundering and burning,
while he avoided a battle. The Nizam was jealous

TRANSACTIONS RELATIVE TO THE GUNTOOR CIRCAR.

155

of the presence of a British force with Bazalut Jung, BC°^4V‘

who, with such assistance, he doubted not, would —

soon aspire at independence. The French troops 1778‘
he had taken into his own service immediately after
they were dismissed by his brother ; hut he assured
the British resident that he had adopted this ex-
pedient solely to prevent them from passing into the
service of Hyder or the Mahrattas ; and described
them as of little value, the wreck of the army of
Bussy, augmented by persons of all nations. This
was a contingency, which, in their eagerness to see
the French discharged by Bazalut Jung, the Presi-
dency had somewhat overlooked. It was no doubt
true, as they alleged, that had the Nizam consulted
the friendship of the English, he would have ordered
the French troops to the coast, whence with other
prisoners they might have been sent on their passage
to Europe.

In the Select Committee, on the 5th of June, it
was proposed by the Governor, and agreed, that the
Peshcush or tribute, of five lacks of rupees, which
the Company were bound by their treaty to pay, in
compromise, for possession of the Northern Circars,
the Nizam should he solicited to remit. The
payment of it had already been suspended for two
years, partly on the pretence that the French troops
were not dismissed, partly on account of the ex-
hausted state of their finances. When this proposal
was announced by Mr. Hollond to the Nizam,
he became highly agitated; and declared his con-
viction that the English no longer meant to observe
the treaty, for which reason he also must prepare
for war.

156

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 4.

1779.

Mr. Hollond, who had received instructions to
communicate with the Supreme Council, conveyed
intelligence of these transactions to Bengal, by
sending, on the 3rd of September, copies of the
letters which had passed between him and the
Presidency of Madras. On the 25th of October, the
subject was taken into consideration at Calcutta,
when the proceedings of the Madras Presidency, in
forming a treaty with Bazalut Jung, without the
interposition of his immediate sovereign, the Com-
pany’s ally, and in withholding the payment, and
proposing the abolition of the peshcush, underwent
the most severe condemnation, as tending to impeach
the character of the English for justice and faith,
and to raise them up a formidable enemy, when they
were already exposed to unusual difficulties and
dangers. It was agreed, that the case demanded the
interference of the Superior Board ; and a letter was
wrritten on the 1st of November, 1779, to assure the
Nizam that the intentions of the English govern-
ment were truly pacific, notwithstanding the inter-
pretation which he put upon the proceedings of the
Council at Madras. Mr. Hollond was directed
to suspend his negotiations till he should receive
further instructions from his own Presidency.
Letters were also written to that Presidency, ac-
quainting them, in terms studiously inoffensive and
mild, with the aberrations which it appeared to the
Supreme Council that they had made from the line
of propriety and prudence. The Nizam declared the
highest satisfaction with the friendly assurances
which the Supreme Council had expressed. But

TRANSACTIONS RELATIVE TO THE GUNTOOR CIRCAR.

157

their interference excited the highest indignation and

resentment in the Council of Madras. On the 30th

of December a minute was entered by Sir Thomas l7/9-
Rumbold, the President, in which he treats the
censure which had been passed on their conduct as
undeserved, and its language unbecoming; denies
the right of the Supreme Council thus to interfere in
the transactions of another Presidency, and argues that
their controlling power extended to the conclusion
alone of a treaty, not to the intermediate negotiation ;
he turns the attack upon the Bengal Presidency,
enters into a severe investigation of the policy and
conduct of the Mahratta war, which in every parti-
cular he condemns : this it was which had alienated
the mind of the Subahdar, not the regulation with
his brother, or the proposed remission of the pesh-
cush ; the retention of a peshcush offended not the
conscience of the Bengal Presidency, when them-
selves were the gainers, the unfortunate emperor
of India the sufferer, and when it was a peshcush
stipulated and secured by treaty for the most im-
portant grants. In terms of nearly the same import
the letter was couched in which the Presidency of
Madras returned an answer to that of Bengal, and
along with which they transmitted the minute of
their President.

The Presidency of Madras had not only taken
Guntoor on lease from Bazalut Jung, they had also
transferred it, on a lease of ten years, to the Nabob
of Arcot, though well aware how little the Directors
were pleased with his mode of exaction, either in
their jaghire, or in his own dominions.

The measure of their offences, in the eyes of the

158

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. Directors, was now sufficiently full. In their letter

of the 10th of January, 1781, after passing the

1779. severest censure upon the abolition of the Committee
of Circuit, and the proceedings with the Zemindars
of the four Northern Circars, on the treaty with
Bazalut Jung, the transactions with the Nizam, and
the lease of Guntoor to the Nabob, they dismiss
from their service Sir Thomas Rumbold, President,
John Hill and Peter Perring, Esquires, Members of
their Council of Fort St. George; deprive of their
seat in council Mr. Smith and Mr. Johnson; and
express their strongest displeasure against the com-
mander of their forces Sir Hector Munro.1

1 These transactions are minutely detailed in the Second and Third
Reports of the Committee of Secrecy, 1781 ; in the Appendixes to which the
official documents are to be found. — M. The author does not appear to
have been in possession of the Minutes of the Evidence which was
produced in justification of the Bill of Pains and Penalties introduced by
Mr. Dundas. — W.

WAR WITH THE FRENCH.

159

CHAPTER Y.

War with the French. — Pondicherry taken. — War
with HyderAli. — Presidency unprepared. — Colonel
Baillie's Detachment cut off. — Supreme Council
suspend the Governor of Fort St. George , and send
Sir Eyre Coote to Madras. — Hyder takes Arcot,
and overruns the greater part of the country. —

Lord Macartney , Governor of Fort St. George. —
Negapatnam and Trincomalee taken from the
Dutch. — Treaty between the Nabob of Arcot and
Supreme Council. — Assignment of the Nabob's
Revenues. — Tellicherry invested. — Great Arma-
ments sent from both England and France. —
Disaster of Colonel Brathwaites Detachment in
Tanjore. — Madras reduced to a State of Famine.

— Death of Hyder Ali. — Tippoo withdraws the
Mysorean Army from the Carnatic. — Operations
and Fate of General Matthews on the Coast of
Malabar. — Siege of Mangalore . — The General at
Madras , refusing to obey the Civil Authority, is
arrested and sent to Europe. — French and English
suspend hostilities in consequence of Intelligence of
the Peace in Europe. — Operations of Colonel
Fullarton in Coimbetore. — Peace with Tippoo. —
Behaviour of Supreme Council to Presidency of
Madras.

BOOK V.

War with the French, instead of being, as formerly, CHAP' 5‘
the most alarming to the English of all sources of

1778.

160

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1778.

• danger in India, now held a very inferior station
- among the great objects which occupied their atten-
tion. In the beginning of July, 1778, intelligence
was received in Bengal, which, though somewhat
premature, was acted upon as certain, that war had
commenced between England and France. Without
waiting for a formal notification of this event, which
might be only delayed till the French had made
themselves strong, it was resolved by a stroke,
decisive in their present defenceless situation, to
take possession of the whole of the French settle-
ments in India. With regard to minor places the
attempt was easy ; and Chandernagore, with the
factories at Masulipatam and Carical, surrendered
without resistance ; Pondicherry was the object of
importance, and it was resolved to lose no time in
taking measures for its reduction. Instructions
were sent to Madras, and reached it with unusual
expedition. Major-General Sir Hector Munro, who
commanded the Madras army, took post on an
elevated ground, called the Red Hills, distant about
a league from Pondicherry, on the 8th of August,
and on the 9th summoned the place to surrender.
But his preparations were still so backward, that it
was the 21st of August before he took possession of
the hound-hedge, within cannon-shot of the town,
and ground was not broken till the 6th of September.
It was broken in two places, with a view to carry
on attacks upon both sides of the town at once.

The British squadron, consisting of one ship of
sixty guns, one of twenty-eight, one of twenty, a
sloop of war, and an East Indiaman, sailed from
Madras, toward the end of July, under the command

BATTLE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH.

161

of Sir Edward Vernon, with a view to block up BC°^5V'

Pondicherry by sea. This squadron reached the

scene of action about the time when Sir Hector 177H‘
Munro encamped on the Red Hills and summoned
the fort. The French squadron, under M. Tron-
jolly, consisting of one ship of sixty-four guns, one
of thirty-six, one of thirty-two, and two East India-
men armed for war, sailed immediately, and prepared
for action. The two squadrons met and engaged on
the 10th of August, The battle raged with great
fury for the space of seventy-four minutes, wThen the
three minor ships of the French squadron quitted the
action, and in fifteen minutes after were followed by
the rest. The English ships, which, as usually
happened in engagements with the French, had
suffered chiefly in their rigging, were unable to
pursue the French, which had suffered chiefly in
their hulls. The French squadron reached Pondi-
cherry the same night. Sailing badly, and opposed
by the winds and the current, it was the 20th before
the English recovered their station. Early on the
morning of the 21st the French squadron was per-
ceived under easy sail, standing out of Pondicherry
road. During the day the alternate failure and
opposition of the wfinds prevented the squadrons from
closing ; and towards night the English commander
stood in for Pondicherry road, and cast anchor,
expecting that the enemy, to whom it was an object
of so much importance to keep open the commu-
nication of Pondicherry by sea, would proceed in the
same direction, and commence the action on the
following morning. M. Tronjolly availed himself of
the night. His squadron was out of sight before
VOL. IV. m

162

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1

CHAP. 5

1778.

• the morning, and was no more heard of upon the
- coast.

The garrison of Pondicherry was commanded by
M. Bellecombe, a man whom this abandonment was
not sufficient to dismay. Notwithstanding the total
destruction which the works of Pondicherry had
sustained in the former war, its fortifications had
been restored with great diligence, and it was
defended by a garrison who availed themselves of all
its advantages. The English opened their batteries
on the 18th of September, with the fire of twenty-
eight cannon and twenty-seven mortars, and carried
on their approaches with unremitting vigour ; but
the vigilance, activity, and enterprise of the garrison,
compelled them to caution, and, together with the
rains, which fell in torrents, retarded their operations.
Towards the middle of October, having pushed a
gallery on the south side into the ditch of the fort,
having made a breach in one of the bastions,
destroyed the faces of the two that were adjacent,
and prepared a bridge of boats for passing the
ditch ; having also destroyed the face of the bastion
on the opposite side of the town, and constructed a
float for passing the ditch, they resolved to make the
assault in three places at once, on the south side, on
the north side, and towards the sea, where the enemy
had run out a stockade into the water. All the
marines, and 200 seamen, were landed from the
ships. On the day first appointed for the assault, so
much rain unexpectedly fell, as to swell the water
in the ditch, blow up the gallery on the southern
side, and damage the boats belonging to the bridge.
The loss was diligently and speedily repaired. But

EXPEDITION AGAINST MAHE.

163

M. Bellecombe, who had accomplished all that an
able governor could perform, to retard the fall of the
place, resolved not to throw away the lives of the
gallant men who had seconded his endeavours, and
the day before the intended assault proposed a
capitulation. The English, by the generosity of
their terms, and the liberality of their whole pro-
cedure, showed their high sense of the honour and
gallantry of the enemy whom they had subdued.
The garrison were allowed to march out with all the
honours of war; and, at the request of M. Belle-
combe, the regiment of Pondicherry was compli-
mented with its colours. After a delay of some
months the fortifications were destroyed.

The French now retained in India nothing but
Mahe, a small fort and settlement on the coast of
Malabar. On the 27th of November, the question
of its reduction was agitated in the Council, when
the pride of driving the French entirely out of India
enhanced the apparent advantage of the conquest.
The difficulties were not inconsiderable : the march
of the troops over land, from one side of India to the
other, was long and hazardous : the disposition of
the native chiefs, through the territory of whom it
would be necessary to pass, was not in all cases
ascertained to be friendly : the constitution of Euro-
peans would be apt to fail, under the difficulties of
the march : there was not shipping sufficient to con-
vey the expedition by sea ; it was at the same time
apprehended that Hyder Ali would view the enter-
prise with jealousy and dissatisfaction, and not re-
garded as impossible that he would directly oppose
it. The importance, however, of having no such

m 2

book v.

CHAP. 5.

1778.

1G4

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. talents as those of Frenchmen to cope with in India,

CHAP. 5. . A

and of not leaving to them a place to which either

l779* troops or stores could be sent, though both Hyder
and the Mahrattas had very convenient places with
which they would have gladly accommodated them,
appeared of sufficient magnitude to induce the
Presidency to brave all dangers in undertaking an
expedition against Mahe. Towards the end of
December, it was planned, that the European portion
of the expedition should be conveyed by sea ; that
the Sepoys should march over land ; that they should
rendezvous at Anjengo, and Colonel Brathwaite
receive the command. On the 4th of February
intelligence was received at Madras, of the disaster
sustained by the army of Bombay, on its march to
Poona. The danger to which this event might
expose the expedition, now on its wTay to Mahe,
underwent deliberation in the Council ; but the
confession of weakness, which wTould be implied in
the recall of the troops, and the supposed importance
of accomplishing the object in view, decided the
question in favour of perseverance. Intelligence of
the resolution of Hyder to resent the attack produced
a hesitation j1 and the importance was discussed of
gaining the friendship of that powerful chief by
renouncing the enterprise ; but after a short suspen-
sion, the design was resumed, and Colonel Brath-
waite was instructed to anticipate resistance by
velocity of completion. The expedition encountered

1 A formal communication was made by his Vakeel to the Madras Go-
vernment that he would oppose an attack upon Mahe, or would retaliate by
sending troops into the Carnatic. First Report Committee of Secrecy, p.
21.— W.

HYDER ALI.

165

far less difficulty than there was reason to expect: B00K v

J A CHAP. 5

no opposition was made to the march : the fleet and

the troops arrived safely at the place of rendezvous : 1779-

and Mahe, which was strongly situated, but totally
destitute of supplies, surrendered on the 19th of
March before a cannon was fired. It was occupied
by the English till the 29th of November, when,

Colonel Brathwaite’s detachment being ordered to
Surat to reinforce General Goddard, the fort was
blown up.1

Before Colonel Brathwaite was enabled to com-
ply with his orders, and embark for Surat, he
received a requisition from the chief and factory
at Tellicherry for the assistance of the whole de-
tachment. That settlement had drawn upon itself
the resentment of Hyder by protecting a Nair
chief who had incurred his displeasure. By the
influence of Hyder, a number of the surrounding
chiefs were incited to attack the settlement, which
was closely pressed, at the time of the evacuation
of Mahe. Not conceiving that he could be justi-
fied in leaving Tellicherry in its perilous situation,

Colonel Brathwaite moved with his detachment to
its support. In consequence of the detention of
those troops, the Council at Madras resolved to send
another detachment to the assistance of Goddard,
which were embarked in the months of January
and February, 1780. 2

In 1774, the divisions among the Mahratta chiefs
afforded to Hyder an opportunity, which he dexter-

1 First and Second Reports of the Committee of Secrecy; also the
Annual Register for 1779 and 1782.

2 First Report, ut supra, p. 56.

166

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK r

CHAP. 5.

1780.

• ously and vigorously improved, of turning the tide
- in his affairs. He recovered speedily the territory
which he had lost. He diligently employed the
interval of repose which succeeded, in restoring
order to his country, improving his revenues, aug-
menting the number and improving the discipline of
his troops. His power soon appeared to be rapidly
on the increase ; and afforded alarm to the English,
who, by their evasion of the treaty of 1769, were
conscious of the hatred they had inspired, and were
now jealous of a connexion between him and the
French. He continued to extend his dominions,
and increase his power, with little interruption, till
the latter end of the year 1777, when the Mah-
rattas and Nizam Ali combined to chastise him.
The Mahrattas, under Hurry Pundit and Purseram,
penetrated into the Balaghat country, with an army
of 50,000 men ; hut upon the approach of Hyder,
who hastened to oppose them, they retreated into
the district of Adoni, where they came to an engage-
ment on the 5th of January, 1778, and sustained a
defeat.

Though Hyder was deeply exasperated against
the Presidency of Madras for their continued evasion
of treaty, and refusal of assistance, he was induced by
the state of affairs to make a fresh proposal in 1778.
Harassed, by the hostilities of the Poonah govern-
ment, he had been well pleased to support a pre-
tender in the person of Ragoba : the English were
now involved not only in disputes with the Poonah
ministers, but actual operations for the reinstatement
of that ejected chief ; and in the beginning of July,
1778, Hyder. through his resident at Madras, made

HYDER ALI.

167

a new overture towards an alliance with the English, bCh°^6v‘

offering his assistance to establish Roganaut Rao in

the office of Peshwa ; and requiring only a supply of 1/SU
arms and military stores for which he would pay,
and a body of troops whose expenses he would
defray. The opinion of the Presidency appears to
have been, that such an arrangement might be
useful, more particularly to prevent the formation of
a connexion between Hyder and the French : they
even acknowledged them belief, that had not the
treaty of 1769 been evaded, Hyder never would have
sought other allies than themselves. The Supreme
Council, to whom reference was made, approved in
general of an alliance with Hyder ; but being at that
time zealous to form a connexion with the Raja of
Berar, they directed a modification of the terms in
regard to Ragoba, whose cause, they said, was
supported, not as an end, but a means now deemed
subordinate to the successful issue of the negotiation
with Moodajee.

A friendly intercourse subsisted between Hyder
and the French. He had been supplied by them
with arms and military stores. A number of adven-
turers of that nation commanded and disciplined his
troops; and they were united by a common hatred of
the English power. A desire to save appearances,
however, constrained Hyder to congratulate the
English upon the reduction of Pondicherry ; but,
anticipating the design of attacking Mahe he
gave early intimation of the resentment with which
he would regard any such attempt. Mahe was
situated in the territory of a petty prince on the
western coast, who with the other petty princes, his

168

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
ciiap. 5.

1780.

• neighbours, were rendered tributary to Hyder, and
- ranked among his dependants. The merchants of
various nations, it was declared by Hyder, had
settlements, and performed traffic in his dominions ;
and all of them, as if they were subjects of his own,
he would resolutely defend. To soften his animosity
and prevent a rupture, which the dread of his power,
and, above all, his apprehended union with the
French, clothed in considerable terrors, there was
sent to his presence, in January 1779, a person,
who, though empowered to declare the resolution of
attacking Mahe, should assure Hyder of the desire
which the Presidency felt to study his inclinations,
and to cultivate his friendship. The messenger was
received with hut little respect, and the invasion of
the Carnatic was threatened as the retaliation for
interfering with Mahe.1 At that particular moment,
Hyder was engaged in the conquests of Gooti, of

1 Some confusion has here been made, probably between the written and
personal communications that took place between the two governors. In
January, 1779 no person was sent to Hyder. A letter was addressed to
him by the President, proposing to send a Resident to his court, and
announcing the intention of attacking Mahe. No Resident was sent.
Something later in the year Sir Thomas Rumbold, without communicating
with the Committee, engaged the celebrated Missionary, Schwartz, to go
privately to Hyder, and ascertain his real sentiments, the Governor dis-
trusting the representation of them from Hyder’s own Vakeel, or from the
officers of the Nabob. Schwartz set off on his mission in July, 1779,
arrived at Seringapatam in August, was treated by Hyder with kindness, and
made the bearer of a letter from him to the government, which he delivered
some time in October, as on the 23rd of that month the proceeding was first
communicated to the Committee. In February, 1780, a second mission
was sent to Hyder in the person of Mr. Gray, renewing offers of alliance
with the English, which were disdainfully rejected. Both the missions
furnished sufficient evidence of the disposition and purposes of Hyder.
First Report of Select Committee, 25. Wilks’s South of India, ii. 242.
Life of Schwartz, i. 341. — W.

EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT.

169

Carnaul, and Cudapah ; the former belonging to the BC°°^5V'

Mahratta chieftain Morari Rao, the two last to their

respective Nabobs, dependants of the Subahdar, and 1/80'
thence was hindered from taking effectual measures
to defeat the expedition against Mahe. But the
Presidency were now convinced of his decided aver-
sion ; and were informed of his intention to make
peace with the Mahrattas, for enabling him the
more completely to carry into execution his designs
against the English. Their thoughts were called to
the necessity of preparation ; and they saw nothing
but dangers and difficulties in their path. The
Nabob, as he informed them, and as they knew wTell
without his information, was destitute of money :
and as destitute of troops, on whom, either for
numbers or quality, any reliance could he placed.

Their own treasury was impoverished ; and if the
cavalry of Hyder should enter the country, neither
could the revenues be collected, nor provisions be
procured. More alive than they to the sense of
danger, the Nabob urged the necessity of making
peace with Hyder, by stopping the expedition to
Mahe ; or, on the other hand, of making terms with
the Mahrattas and the Subahdar. So far from at-
tempting to conciliate either Hyder or the S , hahdar,
the Presidency formed with Bazalut Jung the ar-
rangement which has been already described, re-
specting the Guntoor Circar and military assistance,
and which, in the highest degree, alarmed and exas-
perated both. The detachment which under Colonel
Harpur wras sent to the assistance of Bazalut Jung,
attempted to proceed to Adoni, through a part of
Cudapah, which Hyder had lately subdued. His

170

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK Ai
CHAP. 5,

1780.

• troops barricaded the passes ; and the detachment,
- afraid of being surrounded, was obliged to march
back and wait for subsequent orders. Hyder not
only assured Bazalut Jung, by writing, that he would
not permit the English, whom he described as the
most faithless and usurping of all mankind, to esta-
blish themselves in a place so contiguous to his coun-
try, and so important as Guntoor ; but in the month
of November he sent a body of troops into the terri-
tory of that Prince, took possession of the open coun-
try, and joined with Nizam Ali his brother in threat-
ening him with instant ruin, unless he broke off all
correspondence with the English. In this emer-
gency Bazalut Jung was constrained to forbid the
march of the English detachment; and to request
the restoration of Guntoor, as the only means of
pacifying his brother and Hyder, and averting his
fate. The question respecting the Circar came
under deliberation of the Council on the 30th of
December, when the decree was passed that it
should not be restored. Though its importance was
considerable, because situated as it was between the
territories of the Nabob, or, more properly speaking,
of the English, in the Carnatic, and the four
Northern Circars, it completed the communication
between their northern and southern possessions,
and, by placing in their hands the port of Mootapilly,
deprived Nizam Ali of all connexion with the sea,
reduced him to the condition of a merely inland
power, and in particular closed the channel by which
F rench supplies could easily reach him ; yet the
embarrassments created in the Council, by the bargain
they had concluded with the Nabob, for a ten years’

SLOWNESS OF MADRAS PREPARATIONS.

171

lease of that Circar contributed not less, it would book v.

CHAP. 5.

appear, than all other inducements, to the resolution

which they formed. 178°-

Under the apprehensions which the resentment and
preparations of Hyder inspired, the Presidency, at
the end of October, had presented to the Supreme
Council the prospect of a rupture with that chieftain,
the dangerous magnitude of his powTer, and their
want of resources ; had pressed upon them the neces-
sity of forming a peace with the Mahrattas, as in
that event Hyder would he restrained by his fears ;
they had also written in similar terms to General God-
dard at Bombay. Soon after, when they were in-
formed of the probability that hostilities would be
renewed with the Mahrattas, they reiterated the
statement of their apprehensions ; and concluded
that, destitute as they were of resources for all active
operations, they could only collect their troops as
much as possible, and wait to see what the resolutions
of the Supreme Board would enable them to under-
take.

Before the end of November, the Nabob, whose
intelligence respecting the proceedings of the Indian
powers was in general uncommonly good, informed
the Governor, that a treaty had been formed, between
Hyder and the Mahrattas, to which Nizam Ali had
acceded, for a system of combined hostilities against
the English. Though in his answer to the Nabob
the Governor appeared to discredit the intelligence,
it was not long before he was satisfied of its truth ;
and, in the letter, which, on the 31 st of December, the
Select Committee addressed to the Supreme Board,
they represented the treaty between Hyder and the

172

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1780.

• Mahrattas, as an undoubted fact. Still they were
- not so much impressed with a sense of imminent
danger, as to be deterred from sending a body of
troops to the assistance of Goddard, in lieu of those
which were detained at Tellicherry ; being in daily
expectation of a regiment from Europe ; conceiving
themselves sufficiently strong to cover the principal
garrisons ; and deeming it vain, without cavalry, to
attempt to protect the open country against the in-
vasion of a vast body of horse. In the month of
January, 1780, the President wrote to the Court of
Directors, that, notwithstanding the alarms in which
they had been held by the hostile appearances of
Hyder and the Nizam, and notwithstanding the pro-
vocation which the support of Ragoba had given both
to the Mahrattas and the Nizam, there was still a
prospect of tranquillity ; and in the following month,
he repeated, in still stronger terms, a similar as-
surance.1 Till the month of June, no measures were

1 The President in the early part of 1780 was Sir Thomas Rumbold ; he
quitted Madras on the score of ill health in April, and with anticipations,
which after the information he had received, and after the strong provoca-
tion to hostilities of which he had been the author, were unaccountably
delusive. His farewell minute begins, “ It affords me a particular satis-
faction that the whole of the Carnatic and the Company’s northern pos-
sessions are at present undisturbed, and in perfect tranquillity notwith-
standing the unsettled state of affairs with respect to the Mahrattas, and
the connexions occcasioned by the march of the Bengal troops across the
country to Surat. However well inclined Hyder Ali may be to give
disturbance, neither he nor the Nizam have as yet thought proper to put
any of their threats into execution ; and from the arrival of the fleet with
the king’s troops, I think there is the greatest prospect that this part of
India will remain quiet, especially if the Government here cautiously avoid
taking any measures that may be likely to bring on troubles. Minutes of
Evidence, p. 500. And this, after he had excited Hyder’s resentment by
the occupation of Guntoor, the violation of his territory by the unpermitted
march through it of Colonel Harpur’s detachment, and the capture of
Mahe in defiance of his menaces. — W.

APPROACH OF THE DANGER.

173

pursued which had a reference to the war: and even book v.

r _ CHAP. 5.

then it was only commanded that Colonel Harpur's

detachment, which had been transferred to the com- 178°-
mand of Colonel Baillie, should cross the Kistna, to
be more in readiness, “rin case of any disturbance in
the Carnatic.” On the 19th of June intelligence was
received from the officer at Yelore, that Hyder had
begun his march from Seringapatam, and that a
great army was already collected at Bangalore. On
the 28th of the same month, the Select Committee
of Fort St. George declared, by letter to the Supreme
Board, that Hyder had received from the French
islands a great quantity of military stores ; that his
army, which he had been rapidly increasing for two
years past, was now equipped for immediate service ;
that a part of it was already advanced to the borders
of the Carnatic ; and that intelligence had been re-
ceived of his being actually employed in clearing the
road to one of the principal passes.

While the affairs of the Presidency were approach-
ing to their present situation, a division had existed
not only in the Council, but in the Select Committee
itself. The President however and the General had
combined ; and they retained a majority in both.

In contemplation of the resentment of Hyder, and
the progress of his power, the party, the views of
which were apt to discord with those of the leading
members of the government, had strongly urged upon
them, at various times, the necessity of making pre-
parations against the invasion with which they were
threatened by Hyder, and of which they had received
intimation from various quarters. If the resources
of the Nabob and the Presidency combined were un-

174

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

Bc^p 5V- equal to the maintenance of an army sufficient for

the protection of the open country, it behoved them at

1/60' least to assemble the troops ; which, scattered as they
were in petty garrisons over a great extent of country,
could not, in case of an emergency, be collected with-
out a lapse of time; and of which the junction would
become hazardous, and perhaps impracticable, if the
country were pervaded by Hyder’s horse. The ma-
jority, indeed, had expressed their opinion of the ne-
cessity of having the troops collected in a body, and
ready to act, previously to invasion. But they had
not yet become persuaded that the danger was suffi-
ciently imminent to render it necessary that prepara-
tion should begin. 1

On the 21st of July information was brought from
the commander at Amboor, that Hyder and his two
sons, with the principal part of his army, had come
through the pass, and that his artillery was drawn
up in the road to Changama. This intelligence,
though it was confirmed from several quarters, was
treated with slight regard by the party in power :

1 On the 19th June two of the Select Committee, Messrs. Johnson and
Smith, submitted a minute, urging the imminence of the danger, and the
necessity of active preparation, and a similar minute wras presented on the
1 7 th July. On both occasions Mr. Whitehill and Sir Hector Munro,
forming, by the casting vote of the former as President, the majority, moved
that the apprehensions expressed in these minutes were groundless, and
that there was no danger of an immediate invasion. Four days after the
latter occasion Hyder was in the Carnatic. The history of British India
affords no similar instance of such utter want of foresight or such imbe-
cility of purpose. See Minutes of Evidence, p. 509 ; and First Report, p.
28. Even then says the Report of the Select Committee, the advice that
Hyder Ali had invaded the Carnatic with a powerful army was treated
by the people in power with inattention and contempt. It was not till
Conjeveram, not fifty miles from the capital, was plundered by the enemy,
that they could no longer close their eyes to the dangers of their situa-
tion.— W.

HYDER INVADES THE CARNATIC.

175

and on the 23rd, when Lord Macleod represented to
the Governor, “ That perhaps the report of Hyder’s
invasion might be true, and that he thought at all
events they ought to take measures to oppose him ;
the Governor answered. What can we do ? We
have no money. But added. We mean however, to
assemble an army, and you are to command it.” 1
The next day brought undoubted intelligence, that
Porto Novo, on the coast, and Conjeveram, not fifty
miles from the capital had been plundered by the
enemy.

The army, with which Hyder had arrived, was
not less than 100,000 strong: Of his infantry, 20,000
were formed into regular battalions, and mostly com-
manded by Europeans : His cavalry amounted to
30,000, of which 2,000 were Abyssinian horse, and
constantly attended upon his person ; 10,000 were
Carnatic cavalry, well disciplined, of which one half
had belonged to the Nabob, and after having been
trained by English officers, had either deserted or
been disbanded for want of ability to pay them : He
had 100 pieces of cannon managed by Europeans,
and natives, who had been trained by the English for
the Nabob : And Monsieur Lally, who had left the
service of the Subahdar for that of Hyder, was pre-
sent with his corps of Frenchmen or other Europeans,
to the amount of about 400 men ; and had a princi-
pal share in planning and conducting the operations
of the army.

book v.

CHAP. 5.

1780.

1 Lord Macleod was the commanding officer of the European regi-
ment which had lately arrived. See the extract of his Letter to the
Secretary of State, quoted in the First Report of the Secret Committee,
p. 44 and 51.

176

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. The arrival of Hycler, and the rapidity with which

his cavalry overran the country, and spread ruin

1780. and desolation in a circle of many miles round
Madras, filled the Carnatic immediately with terror
and dismay. The people fled from the open country
to the woods, and the mountains ; their houses were
set on fire ; the fields were left uncultivated, or the
crops destroyed : Alarm succeeded alarm : Intel-
ligence poured in from all quarters, that one place
after another was assailed ; till every part of the
Carnatic frontier appeared to be entered, and
even the northern Circars exposed to a similar
fate.

On the 24th of July, the Select Committee as-
sembled in deliberation. The object of greatest
urgency was, to call the troops together, and form
an army in the field. The European regiment at
Poonamallee, that of Velore, the battalion of Euro-
peans, and the four battalions of sepoys cantoned at
Pondicherry, the battalion of sepoys, and the grena-
diers of the European battalion at Madras, the batta-
lion at Trichinopoly, and the artillery at the mount,
received orders to be in readiness to march. Absent
officers w7ere summoned to join their corps ; and all
things necessary for an army in the field were
ordered to be immediately prepared : Letters were
sent to the other Presidencies and settlements : The
Governor-General and Council were importuned for
money ; and informed, that, if the Presidency were
assured of pecuniary means, and not embarrassed by
their ignorance of the state of affairs between the
Bengal government and the Mahrattas, they would
produce an attack on the possessions of Hyder on the

PLANS OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT.

177

western coast, by assistance sent to the detachment 5V‘

at Tellicherry, and the co-operation of his Majesty’s

fleet. J78°-

Colonel Baillie, who commanded the detachment
in Guntoor, consisting of about 150 Europeans, in-
fantry and artillery, and upwards of 2000 sepoys,
was instructed to operate a diversion, by attacking
Cudapah, or some of the other possessions of Hyder.

This step was vehemently opposed in council by the
antagonizing party ; as sure, they said, to fail in de-
taching from his principal object any part of the
attention or forces of Hyder ; and sure to enfeeble
their defence at home, by the absence of so im-
portant a part of their forces, which ought to be
directed to march without a moment’s delay by the
safest route to Madras. As an additional reason for
persisting in their original orders, the Governor and
his majority alleged their doubts of being able to
procure provisions for a greater number of troops
than the marching orders already embraced. But
on the 31st of July, when a letter was received from
Colonel Baillie, representing the difficulties he expe-
rienced in finding subsistence for his troops, or in
detaining the bullocks absolutely necessary for his
march, they altered their instructions, and directed
him to proceed towards the Presidency, taking such
a route as might offer a chance of intercepting some
of the enemy’s convoys.

By the majority, in which both the Governor and
the General were comprised, it was resolved, that
the troops should assemble, and the army should be
formed at a place near Conjeveram ; where they
would be nearer to the stores of provisions laid up

VOL. IV.

178

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \
CHAP. 5.

1780.

• by the Nabob in the forts, and prepared to yield a
- readier support to the garrisons which the enemy
might assault. To constitute the majority of the
Governor, it so happened, that the voice of the
General was requisite ; and if he departed to take
the command of the army, that majority would be
lost. On the ground that his councils at the Presi-
dency were of more importance at this moment, than
his presence with the army, it was moved and voted
that he should not depart ; and that the command of
the army should be intrusted to Lord Macleod.
When the plan of operations, however, and in parti-
cular that part of it which consisted in assembling
the army at Conjeveram, was communicated to that
officer, he represented the danger with which, now
that the country was invaded, the separate detach-
ments would march to a place so distant and ex-
posed; preferred the security of forming a junction in
the neighbourhood of Madras, and of not taking the
field till an army should be assembled sufficient at
least to cope with the principal bodies of the enemy’s
horse ; and declared his aversion to adopt a respon-
sibility in the execution of plans of which his judg-
ment did not approve. These observations appear to
have piqued the General, who insisted upon the
advantage of assembling close to the scene of action,
for the purpose of protecting the forts ; and instead
of acknowledging the difficulty of uniting the forces
near Conjeveram, he ventured to pledge himself to
the Committee for carrying that measure into effect.
Upon this, it became a matter of necessity, that he
should leave his seat in the Select Committee ; but
to preserve its majority to the party to which he

PLAN AGAINST HYDER’s CONVOYS. 179

belonged, a new expedient was devised. On the ' '

allegation, that his plans had no chance of support,

and that his reputation, neither as an officer nor a 1>80-
man was safe, if the managing power were to pass
into the hands of the opposite party, it was, previous
to his departure, proposed, and what was thus pro-
posed, the majority which he helped to constitute
had pre-ordained to decree, that a person, whom he
named, should be appointed as an acting member of
the Committee till his return. It naturally fol-
lowed, that such proceedings should be severely
criticized by the opposite party ; and one member of
the Council excited so much resentment by the
asperity of his remarks, that the majority, first
replied to him with greater intemperance than that
which they condemned ; then suspended him from
his seat at the Board ; and lastly the General wrote
him a challenge.

On the 2d of August, while preparations were
making, and the army was not yet assembled, a pro-
ject was adopted for sending a strong detachment
toward the passes, with a view to intercept the
enemy’s convoys. Colonel Cosby was the officer
chosen to command the expedition ; and a force was
provided for him, out of the troops stationed at
Trichinopoly and Tanjore, strengthened by two re-
giments of the Nabob’s cavalry from Tinivelly
which joined the detachment at Trichinopoly on the
27th of August. Several causes of retardation
operated on the expedition ; but the grand impe-
diment arose from the disaffection of the inhabitants.

The sort of partnership sovereignty, which the

N 2

180

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1
CHAP. 5

1780.

• Nabob and the Company had established in the Car-
. natic, had hitherto been extremely oppressive to the
people, and had completely succeeded in alienating
their minds. Though Hyder was carrying devastation
over the country, he was less detested as a destroyer,
than hailed as a deliverer. While Colonel Cosby found
himself in the greatest distress for intelligence, wThich
by no exertion he was able to procure ; every motion
of his own was promptly communicated to Hyder by
the people of the country : 1 He wTas disappointed and
betrayed even by the district officers of the Nabob :
As he advanced, his march became so much infested
by parties of the enemy’s horse, that all hope of any
successful operation against the convoys was wholly
cut off ; and the danger which surrounded the de-
tachment made it necessary to think of nothing but
the means of re-uniting it with the army. A total
want of intelligence reduced Colonel Cosby to mere
conjecture in choosing his route ; and he fell in with
the army by accident, as it was retreating before
Hyder, on the 12th of September near Chingliput.

Not only every day brought fresh intelligence of
the conquest and devastation effected by Hyder;
Madras itself, on the 10th of August, was thrown into

1 Captain Cosby, in his official letter, dated Gingee, 5th September,
1780, says, “ There is no doubt but that Hyder has, by some means,
greatly attached the inhabitants to him, insomuch that my hircarrahs
{spies) tell me, the news of my marching from Thiagar was communicated
from village to village all the way to Trinomallee, from whence expresses
were sent to Hyder ; and in my march yesterday from Tricaloor, the
country being extremely woody, the line was several times fired upon by
match-lock fellows collected together, I suppose, from different villages,
by Ilyder’s Amuldars. Some of them, till my approach, were issuing
orders six miles from this.” First Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 3.

HYDER LAYS SIEGE TO ARCOT.

181

alarm. A party of the enemy’s horse committed •

ravages as near as St. Thomas’s Mount ; and the

inhabitants of the open town began to take flight. 1,>i0

On the 1 4th of August, the General was obliged
to report, that the place of rendezvous, which he had
persisted in recommending, was unfit ; the want of
bullocks to carry provisions rendering the march
impracticable. On his recommendation, it was
therefore agreed, that the troops should meet at St.
Thomas’s Mount ; and there wait till eight days’ pro-
visions, and bullocks to carry it, could be procured.

Colonel Brathwaite, after sending away from
Pondicherry all the French officers capable of ser-
vice, and taking an oath of fidelity from the prin-
cipal Frenchmen that remained, commenced his
march. He arrived at Carangoly on the 12th of
August ; and found it garrisoned by only a petty
officer of the Nabob and twenty sepoys. They
would have surrendered it, he was well assured, on
the very first summons ; and had it not by a singular
oversight, as it commanded the only road by which
Brathwaite could proceed, been neglected by the
enemy, who had a large body of horse in its neigh-
bourhood, the most serious consequences might have
ensued. The country through which he passed after
leaving Carangoly would have rendered it so difficult
for him to escape, if attacked by the enemy, that he
formed a very contemptible opinion either of Hyder’s
military skill or his means of offence, when he allowed
so favourable an opportunity to be lost. On the 18th,
after a hazardous and fatiguing march, Colonel Brath-
waite arrived at Chingliput, when he received orders
to join the army at the Mount.

182

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I
CHAP. 5.

1780.

After various speculations and reports respecting
- the plan of hostilities which Hyder would pursue,
uncertainty was at last removed, by his marching
towards Arcot, and taking ground before it on the
21st of August. The danger of that place excited
no little interest and alarm. It was not only the
capital of the province, but contained the principal
portion of the very defective stores which the Nabob
had provided ; and afforded to Hyder a situation,
highly convenient, both for the accommodation of his
troops, and for spreading his operations over the
province. From every quarter alarming intelligence
arrived. The troops of Hyder were expected in the
circar of Guntoor, which had neither forts nor sol-
diers sufficient to oppose them, and where the Zemin-
dars were disaffected to the Company and in cor-
respondence with the enemy. An army of Mahrattas
from Berar had marched into Cuttack, and brought
into imminent danger the defenceless state of the
northern circars. A body of Hyder’s troops had
united with the Nairs, and having driven the Com-
pany’s troops from the Island of Durampatnam,
threatened Tellicherry, with all the British posses-
sions on the coast of Malabar. The enemy had
appeared on the frontier of Madura, and the admiral
of the fleet communicated to the President and Select
Committee intelligence which he had received from
Europe, and on which he relied, that a French naval
and military force might soon be expected in India.

While pressed by dangers thus extraordinary both
in number and degree, the Presidency found their
treasury empty ; they had endeavoured to borrow
money upon the Company’s bonds with little effect,

DIFFICULTIES OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

183

the loans of the Nabob bearing a better interest ; 5V •

they made urgent applications to the Nabob for

pecuniary and other supplies, and received from him 1/8°-
a deplorable picture of his own poverty and neces-
sities, of the wretched and unproductive condition of
the whole country, and the oppressive load of his
debts, principally, he said, produced, by the money
which he had expended and lost in the conquest of
Tanjore: To a similar application made to the Raja
of Tanjore, the Raja replied, with a truth not liable
to dispute, that from the total exhaustion of his
country by the recent conquest, and by the oppres-
sive administration of the Nabob for several years,
he was wholly incapable of furnishing any consider-
able supplies. By desertion for want of pay, or
disbanding for want of ability to pay, the Nabob’s
army was greatly reduced. Even that reduced army
was mutinous from the length of its arrears, and a
source of apprehension rather than of hope.

On the 25th of August, the General left the Presi-
dency, and joined the army which was encamped
at St. Thomas’s Mount. Of cavalry, there was one
regiment, belonging to the Nabob, but commanded
by English officers, and it refused to march unless
it received its arrears. The men were deprived of
their ammunition and arms ; and about fifty-six of
them only consented to serve. The rest of the army
consisted of the King’s 73rd regiment, one battalion
of the Company’s European troops, with the grena-
diers of another, five battalions of sepoys, a com-
pany of marksmen, two troops of cavalry, and a large
train of artillery, amounting, officers included, to

184

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. 5209. 1 With the utmost difficulty as much rice had

been provided as would serve the troops for eight

178°- days ; the sepoys were obliged to be loaded with
four days’ supply ; and the utmost efforts barely
sufficed to procure bullocks to carry the remainder.
The General, notwithstanding, insisted upon loading
his march with a number of heavy cannon ; of which,
as he had no fortifications to attack, the use did not
appear to be very remarkable. On the 26th, the
army left the Mount, and, after a march of four days,
reached the camp near Conjeveram. During the two
last days, the rain had fallen with great violence,
had broken the roads, and rendered the march,
especially with heavy artillery, slow and fatiguing.
The enemy’s cavalry had pressed upon them in great
numbers, and wounded and taken some of the men.
The agent of the Nabob, who accompanied the army,
and on whom the General depended to procure both
provisions and intelligence, informed him, that he
had no power for procuring either the one or the
other ; and his only remaining resource was in the
paddy in the fields about Conjeveram.

It had been concerted, that the detachment of
Colonel Baillie should reach Conjeveram on the day
after the arrival of General Munro and the army.2
But on the 31 st, a letter from Baillie gave informa-
tion that he had been stopped about five miles north
from Trepassore by a small river which the rains had

1 1481 European infantry, 294 artilery, 3434 sepoys, thirty-two field,
pieces, four heavy cannon, and five mortars.

2 The junction might have been effected at Madras without difficulty or
danger on the 25th or 2Gth ; and it is clear that the main army should not
have advanced until the junction had been effected. Wilks, ii. 267. — W

baillie’s detachment.

185

swelled. On the same day, it was reported by some
deserters that Hyder had left Arcot, was crossing
the river Palar, and marching with his whole army
toward Conjeveram. On the 3rd of September, the
same day on which Baillie crossed the river by which
he had been impeded, the enemy encamped at five
miles’ distance in front of the army near Conjeveram.
The continuance of the rains, and the necessity of
collecting the rice in the fields, and heating it for
themselves out of the husk, greatly incommoded and
harassed the troops. On the 6th, the enemy moved
his camp to the north-east ; upon which the English
advanced to a high ground about two miles upon
the road towards Bailee and Trepassore, having the
enemy at a distance of about two miles upon their
left. While this movement was performing, Hyder
had sent forward his son Tippoo Saib with a large
body of the flower of his army to cut off the English
detachment with Colonel Baillie, who had now
advanced to Perambaucum, distant from the main
army about fifteen miles. Baillie made a disposition
to resist a prodigious superiority of force ; sustained
a severe conflict of several hours ; and at last repelled
the assailants. By a letter on the 8th, he informed
Munro, that upon a review after the battle he found
the movement, requisite for joining him, beyond the
powers of his detachment ; and intimated the neces-
sity, that the General should push forward with the
main body of the army. The General now found
himself pressed by dangers, to whatever quarter he
turned. All his provisions consisted in a small
quantity of paddy which he had been able to collect
in a pagoda. If he moved, the enemy would occupy

book v.

CHAP. 5.

1780.

186

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
chap. 5.

1780.

• his ground, and cut him off from the means of sub-
- sistence. With the concurrence of his principal
officers, he adopted an expedient, of which the dan-
ger was scarcely, perhaps, less formidable ; that of
still further dividing his little army, by sending a
strong detachment, which, joining Baillie, might
enable him to proceed. About nine o’clock in the
evening of the 8th, Colonel Fletcher marched with
the flank companies of the 73rd regiment, two com-
panies of European grenadiers, one company of
sepoy marksmen, and ten companies of sepoy grena-
diers. The field-pieces, which the General proposed
to send with the detachment. Colonel Fletcher de-
clined, as calculated to impede his march. The men
left even their knapsacks, and marched with only two
days’ provisions. Being joined by this detachment,
Baillie was instructed to move in the evening of the
9th, and march the whole of the night. On that
night the tents of the main army were struck, and
the men lay on their arms. About 12 o’clock some
cannon and musketry were heard ; but they pre-
sently ceased, and all was still. A little before day-
break, a heavy firing of cannon and musketry was
heard at a distance. It was soon perceived that the
enemy’s army had moved : The General gave orders
to march by the right in the direction of the firing.
After proceeding about four miles, he ordered guns
to be fired, as a signal of his approach ; and after a
mile and a half, he repeated the signal. A great
smoke was suddenly perceived, and the firing ceased.
Supposing that Baillie had repulsed the enemy, the
General led the army back into the road, in hopes
to meet him. After marching about two miles, he

PROCEEDINGS OF GENERAL MUNRO. 187

met a wounded sepoy, who had escaped from the book v.

fight, and told him that Colonel Baillie was entirely

defeated. The General concluded that the safety of 178°-
the army depended upon its returning to Conjeveram ;
where it arrived about six in the evening, and where
the arrival of more wounded sepoys confirmed the
report of the disaster.

While the English general was placed in so com-
plete an ignorance of the proceedings of the enemy,

Hyder had intelligence of every transaction of the
English camp : he was correctly informed of the
route of Colonel Fletcher, the number and quality of
his troops, the time of their march, and even the cir-
cumstance of leaving their cannon behind. He sent
a strong detachment to intercept them. But the
sagacity of Fletcher suggesting suspicion of his
guides, he altered his route, and, by cover of night,
evaded the danger. The junction of the two detach-
ments, after the defeat by Baillie, of so large a portion
of the enemy a few days before, struck alarm into
the Mysorean camp. Even the European officers in
the service of Hyder regarded the junction as a
masterly stroke of generalship, intended for the
immediate attack of his army both in front and rear.

Lally himself repaired to Hyder, and entreated him
to save his army from destruction by a timely retreat.

The resolution of Hyder was shaken, till two of his
spies arriving, assured him, not only that the English
army at Conjeveram was not in motion, but that it
was making no preparation to that effect. To his
European officers this intelligence appeared so per-
fectly incredible, that they concluded the spies to be
sold, and entreated Hyder not to incur his ruin by

188

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. confiding in their report. Hyder immediately formed

his plan. A difficult part of the road was enfiladed

178°- with concealed cannon ; and large bodies of the best
part of his infantry were placed in ambush on either
side ; a cloud of irregular cavalry were employed to
engage the attention of the English main army in
the direction of Conjeveram, while Hyder, with the
main body of his army, lay to watch the attack.

Colonel Fletcher joined with his detachment at
half-an-hour after six in the morning of the 9th.
They reposed during the day; and after the parade
in the evening, Colonel Baillie gave orders to be in
readiness to march. Between eight and nine o’clock,
the men moved off toward the left, by way of Sub-
deverim. The enemy began immediately to discharge
their rockets ; but, from the vigilance of the flanking
parties, did little execution. A little after ten
o’clock several guns opened on the rear. The
detachment countermarched, and formed in line with
the front toward Perambaucum. The enemy keeping
up an incessant, though not very destructive fire,
and discovering no inclination to advance, Colonel
Baillie ordered his men to face to the right, and
march into an avenue, which they had passed a few
minutes before. The enemy’s cannon began to do
great execution ; when Baillie detached a captain,
with five companies of Sepoys, to storm their guns.
Though a water-course, which happened at that
time to be unfordable, prevented this detachment
from performing the service on which they were
commanded, the intelligence of their march, which
was immediately communicated to the enemy, threw
their camp into alarm ; their guns were heard drawing

OPERATIONS OF HYDER.

189

off towards the English front, and their noise and book v.

. . ° CHAP. 5.

irregular firing resembled those of an army under a

sudden and dangerous attack. A strong conviction 178°-
of the necessity of preserving every portion of the
little army, with which the mighty host of the enemy
was to be withstood, suggested, in all probability,
both to Colonel Baillie and to the General, a caution
which otherwise they would not have observed.

For what other reason Colonel Baillie forbore to
try the effect of an attack during the apparent con-
fusion of the enemy ; or, for what reason, unless a
hope of being supported by the General with an
attack on the opposite side, he did not, when the
firing ceased, endeavour to proceed, hut remained in
his position till morning, it is not easy to divine.

During the night, Tippoo, who had commanded only
a detachment of the army in the preceding attack,
had an opportunity of drawing his cannon to a
strong post on the road, by which the English were
obliged to pass ; and of sending to his father advice,
on which he immediately acted, of the advantage of
supporting the attack with the whole of his army.

At five o’clock in the morning Colonel Baillie’s
detachment began to advance. A few minutes after
six, two guns opened on their rear; and large
bodies of horse appeared on their flanks. Four
guns, which began to do considerable execution on
their flanks, were successfully stormed; and the
Pagoda of Conjeveram, the object of their hopes,
and the termination of their perils and labour, began
to appear ; when they were informed that the whole
host of Hyder was approaching. ‘f Very well,” said
Baillie, “ we shall be prepared to receive them.”

190

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. And presently after, upwards of sixty pieces of

cannon, with an immense quantity of rockets, began

178°- to play upon this little army. Great confusion was
produced among the numerous followers of the camp,
who were driven in upon the line ; and Hyder’s
numerous cavalry, supported by his regular infantry,
and his European corps, bore upon every point of
attack. Nothing ever exceeded the steadiness and
determination with which this handful of men
sustained the fury of their enemies. No effort could
break their order; while Sepoys, as well as Euro-
peans, repeatedly presented and recovered anus, with
as much coolness and regularity, as if they had been
exhibiting on a parade. Every attack of the enemy
was repulsed with vast slaughter. Their courage
began to abate ; and even Hyder himself was per-
plexed. A movement executed by Colonel Baillie
to the right, apparently with a view to attack the
enemy’s guns, increased the terrors of Hyder ; and
he consulted Lally on the propriety of a retreat;
Lally replied, that as the main army of the English
wms probably advancing upon his rear, no expedient
remained hut to break through the detachment.
When the heroic bravery of this little band presented
so fair a prospect of baffling the host of their assail-
ants, two of their tumbrils blew up ; which not only
made a large opening in both lines, but at once
deprived them of ammunition, and overturned and
disabled their guns. Their fire was now in a great
measure silenced, and their lines were no longer
entire ; yet so great was the awe which they inspired,
that the enemy durst not immediately close. From
half after seven, when the tumbrils blew up, they

BRAVERY OF THE DETACHMENT. 191

remained exposed to the fire of the cannon and 5V *

rockets, losing great numbers of officers and men,

till nine o’clock, when Hyder, with his whole army, 1/80-
came round the right flank. The cavalry charged
in separate columns, while bodies of infantry, inter-
spersed between them, poured in volleys of musketry
with dreadful effect. After the sepoys were almost
all destroyed, Colonel Baillie, though severely
wounded, rallied the Europeans who survived.
Forming a square, and gaining a little eminence,
without ammunition, and almost all wounded, the
officers fighting with their swords, and the men with
their bayonets, they resisted and repelled thirteen
attacks, many of the men when desperately wounded
disdaining to receive quarter, and raising themselves
from the ground to receive the enemy on their
bayonets. Though not more than 400 men, they
still desired to he led on, and to cut their way
through the enemy. But Baillie, despairing now of
being relieved by Munro, and wishing, no doubt, to
spare the lives of the brave men who surrounded
him, deemed it better to hold up a flag of truce.

The enemy at first treated this with contempt.

After a few minutes, the men were ordered to lay
down their arms ; with intimation that quarter would
be given. Yet they had no sooner surrendered, than
the savages rushed upon them with unbridled fury ;
and had it not been for the great exertions of Lally,
Pimorin, and other French officers, who implored for
mercy, not a man of them probably would have been
spared. The gallant Fletcher was among those who
lay on the field of battle. About 200 Europeans
were taken prisoners, reserved to the horrors of a

192

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 5.

1780.

captivity more terrible than death. The inhuman
treatment which they received was deplored and
mitigated by the French officers in the service of
Hyder, with a generosity which did honour to
European education. “ No pen,” says an eye-
witness, and a participator of their kindness,1 “ can
do justice to the humanity of those gentlemen,
without whose assistance, many of our officers must
have perished: hut their merit will live for ever
embalmed in the hearts of all who felt or witnessed
their beneficence.”

Hyder withdrew to Damul, a place about six

1 See “A Narrative of the Captivity and Sufferings of the Officers,
Soldiers, and Sepoys, who fell into the Hands of Hyder Ali, after the
Battle of Conjeveram, September 10, 1780; by an officer of Colonel
Baillie’s Detachment.” It forms the second volume of the work entitled,
“ Memoirs of the late War in Asia,” published by Murray, in 1788.
N. B. Before reading the proof of this sheet, I have had the advantage of
perusing the account of the same action in the second volume (not yet
published) of “ Historical Sketches, &c. by Colonel Wilks.” The account
in the text is taken from the journal of one eye-witness. Colonel Wilks
gives an account from that of another, much less favourable to the de-
tachment and its commander. According to the authority of Colonel
Wilks a series of military blunders, and not much of mental collectedness,
marked the conduct of the leader; and no little confusion and panic
appeared among the men. Which account are we to believe ? Why this ;
that when proof is balanced, it is always more probable that men have
acted like ordinary men, than that they have acted like heroes. — M. The
accounts are less incompatible than the author thinks them. Colonel
Wilks speaks of no panic amongst the men, nor of confusion, till after the
explosion of the tumbrils : his description is equally favourable to their
courage and conduct as that of the text. Both accounts agree as to one
principal cause of the catastrophe, the unnecessary halts made by Baillie,
his neglecting to advance after the first repulse of the enemy, and remaining
in position until day-break. Had the time thus wasted been employed in
pursuing the march, he must, by the morning, have been so close to the
main body that their co-operation could no longer have been prevented,
and Hyder would have either suffered a defeat, or been compelled preci-
pitately to retire. There was no want of courage, but a sad deficiency of
military judgment and decision. — W.

THE ENGLISH GENERAL RETREATS.

193

miles from the scene of action, and the next day
returned to his camp, where he had left the tents
standing, and baggage unmoved, when he marched
to the attack of the unfortunate Baillie. He had
acted, during the whole of these operations, under
the greatest apprehension of the march of Munro
upon his rear. And had not that General been
deterred, through his total want of intelligence, and
his deficiency in the means of subsistence, from
marching to the support of Baillie; had he fallen
upon the rear of the enemy while the detachment
was maintaining its heroic resistance in front, it is
probable that the army of Hyder would have
sustained a total defeat. On returning to Conje-
veram, after intelligence of the fate of the detach-
ment, the General found that the provisions, which
he had been so unwilling to expose, amounted to
barely one day’s rice for the troops. Concluding
that he should be immediately surrounded by Hyder’s
cavalry, and cut off from all means of providing any
further supply, he began at three o’clock the next
morning to retreat to Chingliput, after throwing
into a tank the heavy guns and stores which he
could not remove. Hyder, informed of all the
motions of the English army, sent a body of not less
than 6000 horse, who harassed continually their
flanks and rear, wounded some of the men, and cut
off several vehicles of baggage. Through several
difficulties, they reached, about eleven at night, a
river, within a mile and a half of Chingliput, so
deep, that the rear of the army passed only at nine
o’clock on the following morning. At this place the
General expected to find a stock of provisions ; but,
VOL. iv. o

BOOK V.
CHAP. 5.

1780.

194

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1780.

• with all his endeavours, could hardly procure paddy
- for a day. Fortunately for Colonel Coshy, as he was
about to make a forced inarch to Conjeveram, he
met with one of the fugitive sepoys from Colonel
Baillie’s camp, upon whose intelligence he proceeded
to Chingliput, and though considerably harassed by
the enemy on his march, joined the army in safety
on the morning of the 12th. Leaving the sick, and
part of the baggage, at Chingliput, the whole army,
at six o’clock on the morning of the 13th, began
their march for the Mount, at which they arrived in
the afternoon of the following day. Nothing could
exceed the consternation and alarm of the Presidency,
which now trembled even for Madras ; and destitute
as it was not only of provisions, but supplies of every
kind, if Hyder had followed the English with his
usual impetuosity, and with his whole army assailed
the place, it is hard to tell how nearly, if not com-
pletely, he might have involved the Carnatic interests
of the nation in ruin.1

On the 4th of September the Supreme Council in
Bengal had deliberated upon the situation of the Pre-
sidency of Madras, and the propriety of adding to
their pecuniary resources ; but as the Supreme Coun-
cil were still uncertain as to the reality of Hyder’s
invasion, or the success of the Presidency in raising
money, it was agreed, that proceedings should be
delayed till further intelligence.

1 For the original documents relative to this irruption, see First Re-
port, ut supra, with its Appendix. In “ Memoirs of the late War in
Asia,” i. 134 — 168, besides the concomitant transactions, is a narrative of
the transactions of Baillie’s detachment, from the information of an officer
who belonged to it. The Annual Register for 1782 contains a tolerable
account, chiefly drawn from the Parliamentary Reports.

DELIBERATIONS IN THE BENGAL COUNCIL.

195

The Supreme Council were highly dissatisfied with 5V'

the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, who

had not only passed the severest strictures on their 1780-
policy, but, in the business with Nizam Ali, the
Subahdar, had acted contrary to their declared incli-
nations, and even commands. The Madras Presi-
dency, offended with the interference of the Supreme
Council in their negotiation with the Subahdar, and
with their own envoy, Mr. Hollond, as an instru-
ment in that interference, resolved that he should be
recalled. The Supreme Council, being made ac-
quainted with that resolution by Mr. Hollond, and
apprehending a greater estrangement of the mind of
the Nizam by so abrupt a conclusion of the corre-
spondence with the Company, came to an opinion,
on the 14th of February, 1780, that advantage would
arise from appointing a person to represent them-
selves at the Nizam’s court; and to obviate the
appearance of disunion between the Presidencies,
they made application to the Governor and Council
of Madras, whose servant Mr. Hollond more im-
mediately was, for their permission to vest that
gentleman with the office ; and in the mean time
directed him to remain with the Nizam till the
answer of the Presidency was obtained. The of-
fended minds of the Presidency, not satisfied with
the recall of Mr. Hollond, which had not produced
an immediate effect, suspended him from their ser-
vice. The Supreme Council, now freed from their
delicacy in employing the servant of another Pre-
sidency, appointed Mr. Hollond immediately to
represent them at the court of the Subahdar. They
transmitted also their commands to the Governor

o 2

196

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1780.

• and Council of Madras, under date the 12th of June,
- 1780, to make restitution of the Circar of Guntoor.
N o step however had as yet been taken in the exe-
cution of that measure hy the government of Madras:
and this the Governor-General represented, as a
conduct which demanded the most serious considera-
tion, and the decided interposition of the Sovereign
Board.1

On the 25th, however, of the same month of Sep-
tember, when intelligence had arrived not only of
the actual invasion of Hyder, but of the' discomfiture
of Baillie, and the retreat of the army to the vicinity
of Madras, with the poverty and helplessness of the
Presidency, and the general havoc of the province
by a barbarous foe, the Governor-General, regarding
only the means of recovering the blow, and meeting
the exigency with a clear judgment and a resolute
mind, proposed, that all the faculties of their govern-
ment should he exerted, to re-establish the power of
the Company on the coast. He moved that the sum
of fifteen lacs of rupees, and a large detachment of
European infantry and artillery, should immediately
be sent to the relief of Madras : he also moved that
Sir Eyre Coote should be requested to take upon
himself, as alone sufficient, the task of recovering
the honour and authority of the British arms : and
recommended that an offer of peace should be made
without delay to the Mahratta state. Upon the
joint consideration, first, of the indigence and dangers
of the Bengal government ; secondly, of the proba-
bility of mismanagement on the part of the govem-

1 Second Report of the Committee of Secrecy.

RELIEF SENT TO MADRAS FROM BENGAL.

197

ment of Madras; and, lastly, of the resources which BC°°^5V'

that government still possessed, Mr. Francis objected

to the magnitude of the supply, and would have sent 1/8a
only one-half of the money and none of the troops,
while peace, he said, should he concluded with the
Mahrattas on any terms which they would accept.

It was agreed that Sir Eyre Coote, and not the
government of Madras, in whom confidence could
not he wisely reposed, should have the sole power
over the money which was supplied ; it was resolved,
that the strong measure should be taken of suspend-
ing the Governor of Fort St. George, for his neglect
of their commands in not restoring the Circar of
Guntoor; and on the 13th of October, Sir Eyre
Coote sailed from Calcutta, with a battalion of Euro-
pean infantry consisting of 330 men ; two companies
of artillery consisting of 200 men, wTith their comple-
ment of 630 Lascars, and between forty and fifty gen-
tlemen volunteers. The prejudices of the Sepoys
rendered it hazardous to attempt to send them by
sea ; and till the waters abated, which in the rainy
season covered the low lands on the coast, it was
not practicable for them to proceed by land. The
intention, indeed, was entertained of sending by land
four or five battalions in the course of the next or the
ensuing month, but to that proceeding another diffi-
culty was opposed. Moodajee Bonslah, the regent
of Berar, after showing a great readiness to meet
the proposal of an alliance with the English, had
afterwards temporized ; and, though he afforded Colo-
nel Goddard a safe passage through his dominions,
declined all co-operation by means of his troops, and
even evaded a renewal of the negotiation. When the
disaffection of Nizam Ali towards the English was

198

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

5V' increased, that chieftain united his councils with the

Poonah rulers, and with Ilyder Ali, for the means

1/b0' of gratifying his resentments; and they joined in
threatening the Regent of Berar, if he afforded assist-
ance to the English. The Regent distrusted his
means of resistance, and dared not to form the inter-
dicted conjunction ; The Nizam and the Poonah chiefs
even insisted that he should send an army to invade
and ravage Bengal, and he was afraid to resist the
command : as he had no intention however to bring
upon himself the resentment of the English, he
communicated to the Governor-General intelligence
of the constraint under which he acted ; and, though
he sent into Cuttack an army of 30,000 horse, under
his son Chimnajee Bonsla, he promised to contrive,
by means of delay, that it should not reach the bor-
ders of Bengal, till the season of action was over,
and the rains begun. When it did arrive, which
was early in June, 1780, it was in such distress for
want of provisions, as to find a necessity of applying
to the Bengal government for aid. The policy of
preserving, if possible, the relations of amity with
the state of Berar, as well as the motive of making
a suitable return for the accommodations afforded to
Colonel Goddard on his march, disposed the govern-
ment to comply with its request. The army of
Chimnajee Bonslah was in want of money no less
than provisions ; and on the 21st of September, an
urgent request was tendered for a pecuniary accom-
modation, which the Governor-General privately,
and without communication with his Council, in part
supplied ; at the same time intimating, that it de-
pended upon the recall of that army from Cuttack,

GENERAL COOTE ARRIVES.

or its junction with the troops of the Company, to
enable him to propose a public gratuity better pro-
portioned to its wants. It might in these circum-
stances be presumed, that Chimnajee Bonslah would
not hinder an English detachment to pass through
Cuttack for Madras ; but evil intentions on his part
were still possible ; on that of Nizam Ali something
more than possible ; the hazard of a march by the
countries which they occupied was therefore propor-
tionally great.1

Sir Eyre Coote, with a passage fortunately ex-
peditious, landed at Madras on the -5th November,
and 'took his seat in Council on the 7th. He had
been appointed bearer of the decree by which the
Supreme Council suspended the Governor of Fort
St. George, and this document he now produced.
The Governor not only denied the competence of the
Supreme Board to exercise the authority which they
now assumed; but declared their decision precipitate
and unjust, no contumacy appearing in his conduct
to merit the punishment, which they arrogated to
themselves unwarrantably the power to inflict. The
majority of the Council however recognised the sus-
pension; and the senior member of the Council suc-
ceeded to the chair.

During the interval between the retreat of Sir
Hector Munro to the Mount, and the arrival of the
Commander-in-Chief with the Bengal supplies, the
Presidency at Madras had in vain importuned the
Nabob for means which he had not to bestow. They
appointed Colonel Brathwaite to the command in

1 First Report, ut supra, and Appendix, No. 17; Sixth Report, ditto,
p. 99, and Appendix, No. 294 to 305.

200

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1780.

^•Tanjore; and recommending that a body of cavalry
— should be raised in that country, demanded the as-
sistance of the Raja for that purpose, as well as for
provisions to the troops. They made restitution at
last of the Guntoor Circar ; and at the same time
sent a letter to the Nizam, in which they advertised
him of the compliance they had yielded to his desires ;
made apology for delay in paying the peslicush, and
promised regularity, when the removal of the present
troubles should place it more in their power. Partly
the poverty and weakness of this Prince, partly his
jealousy of Hyder, and partly the assurances which
he had received from the Superior Government in
Bengal had as yet retained him inactive during the
war which he had been eager to excite. The situa-
tion of the Northern Circars was calculated to tempt
his ambition. The troops, with the exception of
garrisons for the three principal places, were all
recalled; but the Sepoys in the Guntoor Circar re-
fused to proceed by sea, and were obliged to be left at
Ongole, while a mutiny was the effect of an attempt
to embark those at Masulipatam and Vizagapatam.
At the first of these places, order was restored by
the address of the commanding officer. At Yizaga-
patam, however, they killed several of their officers,
plundered the place, and went off, accompanied by
five companies of the first Circar battalion. Ap-
prehensions were entertained, that the Sepoys in the
neighbouring Circar would follow their example ;
and that the Zemindars would deem the opportunity
favourable to draw their necks out of the yoke. Sit-
taram Raz, who had been vested with so great a
power by the favour of Governor Rumbold, stood

HYDER TAKES ARGOT. 201

aloof in a manner which had the appearance °fBc„^5v*

design. But Yizeram Raz, his brother, who had

just grounds of complaint, zealously exerted himself 1/80-
to suppress and intercept the mutineers, who at last
laid down their arms, with part of their plunder, and
dispersed.

Immediately after the battle of Conjeveram, Hyder
marched to renew the siege of Arcot, defended by
about 150 Europeans, and a garrison of the Nabob’s
troops. In the service of the Nabob, there was
hardly found a man that was faithful to his trust.

Discord prevailed between the officers of the Nabob,
and those of the Company, during the whole of the
siege. The approaches of Hyder were carried on
with a skill resembling that of the best engineers, and
his artillery was so well served as to dismount repeat-
edly the English guns upon the batteries. After a
siege of six weeks, the town which surrounded the
fort was taken on the 31st of October, by assault;
but the fort was strong, and still might have defended
itself for a considerable time. The favour with
which Hyder found his cause regarded by the people,
he took care to improve, by the protection which he
afforded to the inhabitants of Arcot, and the treat-
ment of his prisoners : the applause of his generosity
easily passed from the people without the fort to the
people within : with the Nabob’s officers he probably
corresponded : the native troops almost all deserted ;
and the fort capitulated on the 3d of November.

The officer who commanded the fort, on the part
of the Nabob, he took immediately into his service
and confidence. Many other of the Nabob’s garri-

202

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA

BOOK

CHAP.

1780

V- sons had surrendered, with little or no resistance,
— generally upon the summons of Hyder’s horse ; and
• though an excuse was furnished, hy the condition in
which they found themselves with respect to the
means of defence, nothing less than general treachery
and disaffection seemed sufficient to account for the
facility with which every place was given up.
Hyder immediately supplied the forts with garri-
sons, repaired the works, and laid in provisions and
stores. He proceeded with great expedition to put
Arcot into the best possible state of defence. Every
avenue which led to it from Madras, and from Madras
to the forts which the Nabob or English still re-
tained, were occupied by large detachments of his
horse, and when need was, even by infantry, and for-
tified posts. By this means, the channel of commu-
nication, not only for supply, but even for intelligence,
was almost wholly cut off.

Not deficient, either in the virtues which inspire
affection, or in those which command respect, Sir
Eyre Coote, as he wTas somewhat disposed to enlarge
in praise of himself, so was somewhat apt to indulge
in complaint of others. In the letters, which after
his arrival in the Carnatic he addressed to the Direc-
tors and the ministers of the King, he drew a picture
in the darkest colours, not only of the weak and
disastrous condition into which the country was
brought, but of the negligence and incapacity, if not
the corruption and guilt, of those servants of the
Company, under whose management such misfortunes
had arrived. It was, however, much more easy to
point out what it was desirable should have been

WANT OF RESOURCES.

203

performed, than, with the defective revenue of the 5V'

Presidency, to have performed it.1 That Presidency

had repeatedly represented both to the supreme 178°-
Council, and to the Directors, their utter incapacity,
through want of money, to make any military exer-
tion : and by both had been left to struggle with
their necessities. It was the poverty of the Carnatic,
and the unwillingness of all parties to act as if they
believed in that poverty, much more, it is probable,
that the negligence or corruption of the government,
which produced the danger by which all were now
alarmed.2

According to the statement of the General, the
whole army with which he had to take the field
against the numerous host of Hyder, did not exceed
7000 men, of wdiom 1700 alone were Europeans.3

1 See the Fourth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, p. 6, where it
appears to have been distinctly announced, by the Governor and Council,
on the 19th January, 1779, that their resources were unequal, even to their
peace-establishment, much more to make any preparations for war.

2 If the poverty of the Madras Presidency was the consequence of misma-
nagement and corruption, it only aggravated their culpability. The resources
of the Carnatic were sufficient, if protected against the prodigality of the
Nabob, the rapacity of his European adherents, and the ignorance or
venality of the Company’s servants, to have maintained the Presidency in
a posture respectable, if not formidable to its neighbours. At any rate the
knowledge of such inadequate resources evinced in the complaints alluded
to, should have deterred the government from provoking hostilities, from a
breach of their engagements with Hyder Ali, from disregarding his dis-
pleasure, and violating his territory, and from injuring and offending the
Nizam. The timely interposition of the Bengal Government alone pre-
vented the active enmity of this latter power, whose co-operation with
Hyder once before experienced, would have been decisive of the fate of
Madras. In no part of the administration of Warren Hastings does he
appear to more advantage than in the wisdom and vigour with which he
rescued the Presidency of Fort St. George from the disastrous conse-
quences of its misgovernment. — -W.

3 His force, therefore, did not exceed that of Munro and Baillie, had their
junction been effected. According to Sir T. Munro, who was then a

204

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

bc°h®^ ,v- Having put down in writing the view which he took

of the situation of affairs, and the plan of hostilities

178°- which it appeared to him most advisable to pursue,
he called a Council of War, consisting of the three
general officers at the Presidency, Sir Hector Munro,
Lord Macleod, and Brigadier-General Stuart ; laid
the paper before them, and desired that, after the
most mature consideration, they would give their
opinions upon it separately in writing. As four of
the principal strong-holds of the Carnatic, Velore,
Wandewash, Permacoil, and Chingliput, represented
by the Nabob as containing considerable stores, were
invested by the enemy, the General proposed to begin
writh the operations necessary for their relief.1 Not
contented with the sanction of the general officers,
he deemed it meet, with a condescension to which
the pride of military knowledge can seldom submit,
to communicate the proceedings of the Council of
War to the Select Committee, and to desire their
opinion. All agreed in approving the plans of the
General, and reposing unbounded confidence in his
direction. As Wandewash was the place in most
imminent danger, the first effort was directed in its
favour. The probability that Hyder would not per-

subaltern with the array, it was not so strong; consisting of but 1400
Europeans, with 5000 sepoys, and 800 native cavalry. Life of Munro,
i. 32.— W.

1 In his representation, the General stated it as a known fact, that they
had not only Hyder, but the whole Carnatic, for enemies ; and, therefore,
not assistance, but obstruction, to expect in every part of the inarch : one
of the Nabob’s rentershaving endeavoured to betray Vellore to the enemy,
he had ordered him, he said, into irons ; hoping, “ that he might be in-
strumental to the discovery of those dark designs, which he had long
suspected to exist in the court of a native power, living under the very
walls of our garrison at Fort St. George.”

ARRIVAL OF A FRENCH FLEET.

205

mit them, unopposed, to pass the river Palar, it was
gallantly and generously observed by Munro, was a
motive rather to stimulate than repel, as the troops
under their present leader he was confident would
prevail, and nothing was, therefore, more desirable
than to bring Hyder to a general action. On the
17th of January, 1781, the army, under the command
of General Coote, marched from the encampment at
the Mount. Hyder was struck with awe by the
arrival of the new commander and the reinforce-
ments from Bengal. So far from opposing the
passage of the Palar, he abandoned Wandewash with
precipitation, as soon as the army approached.1 But
this success was counterbalanced by the fall of the
important fortress of Amboor, which commanded
one of the passes into the Carnatic. From Wande-
wash the army was on its march toward Permacoil,
wThen intelligence was received by express, that a
French fleet had arrived. This wTas an event by
which attention was roused. The direction of the
march was immediately changed ; and the army,
after a few days, encamped on the red hills of
Pondicherry, with its front toward Arcot.

After the reduction of Pondicherry, the inhabitants

book v.

CHAP. 5 .

1781.

1 Wandewash was not besieged by Hyder at this time in person. The
commander of the enemy was one of his generals, Mir Saheb ; the fort
was defended by Lieut. Flint, and a garrison of 300 Sepoys only. The
extraordinary courage, presence of mind, and military talents of Lieut.
Flint, are described with the most interesting minuteness, and with enthu-
siastic, but deserved commendation, by Col. Wilks, ii. 291. See also
Life of Munro, i. 33. Hyder at this period was engaged in the siege of
Vellore, which was defended with successful gallantry by Col. Lang; and
the failure of an attempt to cany it by storm on the 10th of January, as
well as the movements of the English General, induced Hyder to raise the
siege. Ibid. 35. — W.

206

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

C HAP.

1781

,v* had been treated with uncommon forbearance and

— generosity. The fortifications alone were destroyed.
The people were allowed to trade under the protec-
tion of the English ; and the officers to remain on
their parole. Even upon the invasion of Hyder,
when it was entirely evacuated by the English
troops, the officers alone were sent to Madras. The
flattering prospect of being speedily reinforced by
their countrymen, of seeing themselves change places
with the English, and of contributing something to
the recovery in India of the glory and power of their
country, tempted the Frenchmen of Pondicherry to
forget the favours which they had received. They
applied coercion to the English resident; enlisted
sepoys ; and laid in provisions at Carangoly. Sir
Eyre Coote made haste to disarm the inhabitants, to
remove the provisions from Carangoly, and to destroy
the boats. The French fleet, consisting of seven
large ships, and four frigates, lay at anchor off Pon-
dicherry. The English army was closely followed
by large bodies of the enemy’s horse; and on the
8th of February Hyder passed at the head of his
army, within cannon-shot of the English camp:
marching, as was supposed, directly to Cuddalore.
The English drums beat to arms ; and while the
enemy proceeded on one of the two roads which
lead towards Cuddalore, the English marched
parallel with them on the other, and encamped on
the 9th with their right towards the ruins of Fort
St. David, and their left towards Cuddalore. So
feeble were the resources of the English General,
that he was already reduced to a few days’ provi-
sions ; and eager for a battle, as the most probable

HYDER AVOIDS A BATTLE.

207

means of obtaining relief. He moved the army on book v.

the 10th from the cover of the guns of Cuddalore,

leaving the tents standing, and placed himself in 178L
order of battle. He informed the men, as he rode
along the line, that the very day he wished for was
arrived ; and that they would be able in a few hours
to reap the fruit of their labours. The English re-
mained for three successive days offering battle to
the enemy, which he was too cunning to accept;
and on the fourth returned to their camp, with a
great increase of their sick, their provisions almost
exhausted, the cattle on which their movements de-
pended dying for want of forage, Hyder in possession
of the surrounding country, and an enemy’s fleet
upon the coast. The deepness of the gloom was a
little dispelled by the sudden departure of that fleet,
which, being greatly in want of water and other ne-
cessaries, and afraid of the English squadron which
was shortly expected back from the opposite coast,
set sail on the 15th of February, and proceeded to
the Isle of France.

The inability, in the English army, to move, for
want of provisions and equipments, and the policy of
Hyder to avoid the hazards of a battle, prevented all
operations of importance during several months. In
the mean time Hyder reduced the fortress of
Thiagar ; his cavalry overran and plundered the
open country of Tanjore ; and Tippoo Saib,
with a large division of his army, laid siege to Wan-
dewash.

On the 14th of June the fleet returned with a
reinforcement of troops from Bombay. While absent
on the western coast, Sir Edward Hughes had

208

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

J78i.

' • attacked the ships of Hyder, in his own ports of
— Calicut and Mangalore ; and destroyed the rudi-
ments of that maritime power which it was one of
the favourite objects of his ambition to erect.

The want of bullocks, which were the draught
cattle of the army, rendered the movement even of
the English artillery heavy and slow. In hopes of
being now supplied with provisions by sea wThile
they remained upon the coast, the English proceeded
to Porto Novo on the 19th of June, not only to put
a stop to the ravages of the enemy in Tanjore and
the neighbouring districts, hut to yield protection to
Trichinopoly, against which, it was evident, that
Hyder was preparing to march. On the 18th,
General Coote in person conducted a large detach-
ment to the assault of the fortified Pagoda of Chil-
lambram ; where he was repulsed with very con-
siderable loss. This event, w’hich the English
regarded as a heavy misfortune, produced the most
favourable results. At a time when they could by
no means venture to carry their operations from the
vicinity of the sea ; when their imbecility was
becoming dangerously visible ; and when they might
have been soon cooped up within the walls of
Madras, this disaster sufficiently elevated Hyder,
w hose army had increased with the progress of his
arms, to hazard a battle for the sake of preventing
the advance of the English towards Trichinopoly ;
which, as holding in check the southern countries,
wTas regarded by him as an object of great import-
ance ; and against which he was proportionally
desirous that his operations should not be disturbed.
He was dissuaded, it is said, but in vain, from this

HYDER RISKS A BATTLE. 209

rash design, by the prudence of his eldest son; and Bc°^5v‘

advancing on the only road by which the English

could proceed to Cuddalore, he took up an advan- 1/S1-
tageous position, which he fortified wTith redoubts,
while the English were obtaining a few days’ pro-
visions landed laboriously through the surf. Early
in the morning of the 1st of July, the English army
broke up the camp at Porto Novo, and commenced
their march with the sea at a little distance on their
right. To the other difficulties under which the
English General laboured, was added a want of
intelligence, partly from deficient arrangements, but
chiefly, it is probable, from the disaffection of the
people of the country, and the diffusion of Hyder’s
horse, who seldom allowed a spy to return. After a
march of about an hour, the opening of an extensive
prospect discovered a large body of cavalry drawn
up on the plain. It wTas necessary to detach from
the English army, small as it was, a considerable
body of troops for the protection, from the enemy’s
irregular horse, of the baggage and the multitudinous
followers of an Indian camp. The General formed
the army in two lines, and advanced in order of
battle. A heavy cannonade was opened on the
cavalry which occupied the road before them. This
dispersed the cavalry, and exposed to view a line of
redoubts, commanding the road, and the enemy
behind that line, extending on the right and left to
a greater distance on the plain than the eye could
command. The troops were ordered to halt ; and
the principal officers were summoned to council.

The difficulties were almost insurmountable : the
sea enclosed them on the right : impracticable

VOL. iv.

210

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

} • sand-banks on the left : to advance directly upon the
— fire of so many batteries exposed the army to a
dreadful slaughter, if not extermination: and four
days’ provisions, which the men carried upon their
backs, constituted the whole of their means of sub-
sistence. While the Council deliberated, an officer,
walking to a little distance, discovered a road cut
through the sand-hills. It was afterwards found to
have been made by Hyder the preceding night, with
a view to enable him, when the English should be
storming the batteries in front, to throw them into
confusion by falling on their flank ; when his horse
would rush from behind the batteries and complete
their destruction. The army filed off into the newly-
discovered road, the sepoys unharnessing the wretched
oxen, and drawing the artillery more quickly them-
selves. Hyder perceived the failure of his stratagem,
evacuated his works, and moved exactly parallel with
the English army : which, after passing the sand-
banks, turned and faced the enemy. A pause
ensued, during which the General seemed irresolute,
and some officers counselled a retreat.1 Several of
the men fell under the fire of the enemy’s guns,
which had been removed with great expedition from
the batteries, and placed in the line. The second

1 Both Wilks and Munro ascribe this pause to no irresolution in the
General, but to the necessity of waiting until his second line was in posi-
tion. Munro’s account is particularly valuable, as he was present. “ The
General rode along the front (of the first line) encouraging every one to
patience, and to reserve their fire till they were ordered to part with it ;
he only waited for accounts from the second line. An aid-de-camp from
General Stuart told him that he had taken possession of the sand-hills ; he
immediately gave orders to advance, and to open all the guns. The fire
was so heavy that nothing could stand before it.” Life of Munro, 43.
See also a detailed account of the action, in Wilks, ii. 309. — W.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE VICTORY.

211

line of the English army was commanded to occupy book v.

some heights in the rear. Hyder, soon aware of the

importance of this position, sent a division of his 1781.
army to dislodge them. The first line of the English,
led by Sir Hector Munro, now went forward to the
attack ; and at the same time another division of
the enemy endeavoured to penetrate between the
two lines, and attack the General in the rear. For
six hours, during which the contest lasted, every
part of the English army was engaged to the utmost
limit of exertion. The second line upon the heights,
skilfully and bravely commanded by General Stuart,
not only repelled the several attacks which were
made to force them from their advantageous ground,
but successfully resisted the attempt which was made
to penetrate between the lines, and rendered it im-
possible for the enemy to aim a stroke at the baggage
towards the sea. The first line was thus left with
undivided attention to maintain their arduous conflict
with the main body of Hyder’s army ; where their
admirable perseverance at last prevailed, and driving
before them promiscuously, infantry, cavalry, artillery,
they finally precipitated the enemy into a disorderly
retreat. Had the English possessed cavalry, and
other means of active pursuit, they might have
deprived Hyder of his artillery and stores ; and pos-
sibly reduced him to the necessity of evacuating the
province. Their loss did not exceed 400 men ;
and not one officer of rank was either killed or
wounded. The enemy’s principal loss was sustained
in the first attack upon the line on the heights, the
strength of which they mistook, and advanced with
too much confidence of success. In the rest of the .

p 2

212

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP. 5

1781.

• battle, they fought chiefly at a distance, and with
_ their artillery, which was skilfully served. The
consequences of this victory were highly important.
Hyder abandoned his designs upon the southern
provinces. Tippoo raised the siege of Wandewash ;
and both retired with the whole of their army to the
neighbourhood of Arcot.

The body of native troops, which it had been re-
solved by the government of Bengal to send by land
to the assistance of Madras, was long detained by
the negotiations, carried on, as well with the Berar
government, as with Chimnajee, the Commander of
the army in Cuttack. The distress of that Com-
mander for money to pay his troops, and the pro-
posal of a gratuity of thirteen, with a loan of ten,
lacs of rupees ; though distrust of the English
power, now violently shaken, made his father shy ;
induced Chimnajee to engage for a safe passage to
the troops. The detachment was placed under the
command of Colonel Pearce ; and about the end of
March arrived at Ganjam, where it was long detained
by the violence of an infectious disease. This,
together with a great desertion among the sepoys,
materially weakened the battalions ; and their junc-
tion was not effected with Coote, who had returned
to Madras, before the beginning of August.

The object which more immediately engrossed the
desires of the English was the recovery of Arcot.
As the want of provisions was the grand impediment
to that enterprise, and as the enemy were reported
to have laid in great stores at Tripassore, the siege of
that place was undertaken, in hopes to supply the
army for the siege of Arcot. But Tripassore, though

THE ENGLISH NOT SUCCESSFUL.

213

it surrendered after a few days’ resistance, was found B00K'

to contain a small supply of provisions ; and the ad-

vanced parties of Hyder’s army, who was in full 1/yL
march to its relief, appeared in sight, before the
English troops had taken full possession of the works.

Hyder fell back a few miles to what he reckoned a
lucky spot, a strong position on the very ground
where he had defeated Baillie. And the English
General, eager for another battle, which might relieve
him from his difficulties, came in sight of the enemy
about eight o’clock on the morning of the 27 th.

The position of Hyder gave him great advantages,
while his guns bore upon the approaching army, and
the advance was rendered peculiarly difficult by a
number of water-courses cutting the ground. The
second line of the English army, consisting of two
brigades, were directed to occupy a situation of some
strength on the left, while the first line, consisting of
three brigades, formed in face of six or eight cannon,
which they were commanded to storm. No sooner
had they pushed through some intervening under-
wood, than they found the guns removed from the
front, and beginning to fire upon both their flanks;
while at the same instant a tremendous cannonade
opened on the second line. Sir Hector Munro, who
commanded the first line, was ordered to join the
second, which could hardly maintain its ground.

The two lines having closed, and presenting the same
front, were commanded to advance on the enemy’s
artillery. The intervening ground was not only
difficult but impracticable ; where the army stood,
some protection was derived from a long avenue of
trees. This was observed by the whole line ; and

214

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. gjr Sector Munro pointed it out to the General.

“ You talk to me, Sir, when you should be doing

1/8L your duty.” The army accordingly advanced ; the
men began to drop very fast; and grew impatient. A
tumbril blew up, the second in the course of the day.
At an impassable difficulty, the army came to a stand,
and impatiently waited for orders. None arrived.
Sir Hector Munro, seated sullenly by the only tree
that was in the plain, refused to issue a single com-
mand. The battalions, opening for the purpose of
giving way to the enemy’s shot, had fallen into clus-
ters, and become noisy. The second line broke into
great confusion. Two hours did the army remain in
this perilous situation, in which, had they been
vigorously charged by the enemy’s cavalry, they
could scarcely have avoided a total defeat. It is
probable that Hyder’s experience had rendered it
difficult for him to conceive that the English were
in a state of confusion. Night advancing, he ordered
his guns to be drawn off ; and the English returned
to the strong ground which the second line originally
occupied. A conference was held among the prin-
cipal officers, when the impossibility of remaining,
and the danger of advancing, being apparent to all,
one gentleman, in expressing his sentiments, made
use of the word retreat. The General immediately
swore, he had never retreated in his life. He added,
that he would permit the army Xo fall back. Spies
came in with intelligence that Hyder was preparing
to attack the English army between midnight and
break of day. The troops in consequence were or-
dered to pass the night under arms in front of the
camp. The report was false, artfully given out by

PERILOUS SITUATION OF THE ENGLISH.

215

Hyder, to cover his intention of removing in the 5V

night, to a place more secure from surprise. The

next day the English buried their dead, and collected 1/8L
the wounded ; when, being masters of the field of
battle, they fired the guns in token of victory. They
now marched back to Tripassore ; when Hyder, call-
ing the march a retreat , proclaimed a victory, with
all the pomp of war, to the nations of India. 1

The English suffered considerably more in this
than in the previous action ; and the enemy less. Of
the privates not less than 600 were lost to the ser-
vice.2 * 4 Several officers of distinction were wounded,
and some were killed.

Affairs were now in great extremity. The mo-
ment seemed approaching when the army would be

1 The description of this action in the text, is taken evidently from
authorities unfavourable to Sir Eyre Coote, and is at least unprecise.
The account given by Colonel Wilks is much more distinct, and for the
military details more worthy of credit. Munro’s description is brief, but
authentic. “ The position of Hyder was such, that a stronger could not
have been imagined. Besides three villages which the enemy had occupied,
the ground along their front, and on their flanks, was intersected in every
direction by deep ditches and water-courses ; their artillery fired from em-
brasures cut in mounds of earth, which had been formed from the hollowing
of the ditches, and the main body of their army lay behind them. The
cannonade became general about 10 o’clock, and continued with little
intermission till sunset, for we found it almost impossible to advance upon
the enemy, as the cannon could not be brought without much time and
labour over the broken ground in front. The enemy retired as we ad-
vanced, and always found cover in the ditches and behind the banks. They
were forced from them all before sunset, and after standing a short time a
cannonade on open ground, they fled in great hurry and confusion towards
Conjeveram.” Life, i. 45. That his army was saved from a total rout by
the difficulty of getting at it, was politicly converted by Hyder into the

credit of having fought a drawn battle. Such, according to Wilks, it is
termed in the Mysorean accounts, not a victory, as in our text. Wilks,

ii. 326.— VV.

4 The English army lost no more than 421 killed, wounded, and missing,
officers included. Wilks. Our loss was above 500. Munro. — W.

216

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. constrained to quit the field for want of provisions :

- Madras itself was threatened with famine : The fort

i78i. 0f Yelore was so exhausted of provisions, that it
could not hold out beyond a short time longer ; and
the fate of the Carnatic in a great measure depended
on the fort of Yelore. The greatest exertions were
made to enable the army to march to its relief:
Madras was for that purpose actually exhausted of
the means of subsistence. The enemy were encamped
at the pass of Sholingur on the road to Velore ; to
which the English came up on the 27th of September.
A strong body was detached, in order to occupy a rising
ground to the left of the enemy’s encampment, while
the main army advanced in a single line upon their
front. Hyder, from his former experience, had con-
cluded that Sir Eyre Coote would keep the whole of
his troops together ; and had only provided against a
direct movement on his line. His good sense made
him resolve not to change the disposition of his rude
and unwieldy mass in the face of an enemy ; and his
only effort was to draw it out of the field. He en-
deavoured to alarm the detached portion of the Eng-
lish army with a feint ; while, after a short firing, his
guns were hurried off. His horse during these ope-
rations stood the fire of the English cannon, and
suffered severely. Before he could extricate himself,
and before night came to his aid, he had sustained a
considerable loss, with the power of inflicting only a
trifling injury in return.1

1 The accounts of Wilks and Munro arc much more particular and clear
than that of the text. Hyder was taken unprepared, and had not struck
his tents when the head of the British line appeared before his encamp-
ment ; and his only object in the action that followed was to effect his

MINOR OPERATIONS.

217

The English were in no condition to press upon 5

the foe. In the minor operations which succeeded,

as in the whole course of the war, one of the most 1/8L
remarkable circumstances was, the extraordinary
promptitude and correctness of Hyder’s intelligence,
who had notice of almost every attempt, even to
surprise the smallest convoy, and in this important
respect, the no less remarkable deficiency of the
English. On the 26th of October, the General
removed his camp to the neighbourhood of Palipett,
where he obtained a quantity of rice. With this he
afforded Velore a temporary supply ; and was even
encouraged to undertake the siege of Chittore.

That place, not being provided for defence, capi-
tulated in two days ; while Hyder, obliged to
humour his army, was unable to obstruct these
operations. The month of November -was now
arrived, and every thing announced the falling of the
monsoon floods, when the rising of the rivers, and
the softening of the roads, would make the return of
the English army extremely difficult ; so far, too,
from being supplied with subsistence, the army con-
tinued in a state of want ; yet the General lingered

escape without the loss of his guns. To accomplish this he sacrificed his
cavalry. “ He divided his best horse into three bodies, and sent them
under three chosen leaders to attack as many parts of our army at the
same time. They came down at full gallop till they arrived within reach
of grape, when being thrown into confusion, the greater part either halted
or fled, and those that persevered in advancing, were dispersed by a dis-
charge of musquetry, except a few who thought it safer to push through
the intervals between the battalions and their grms, than to ride back
through the cross fire of the artillery ; but most of these were killed by
parties in the rear. This attack enabled Hyder to save his guns. Except
the escort with the artillery, every man in the Mysorean army shifted for
himself. The loss of the enemy was estimated at 5000, that of the
English fell short of a hundred.” — W.

218

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CIIAP.

1781

5V- where he was, apparently absorbed in his own
— chagrin. He was summoned from his reveries
about the middle of the month, by intelligence of
an attack upon Palipett and Tripasore.1 The rains
fell upon him during his march: in the space of a
few days the roads became so deep, that one elephant,
three camels, a great number of bullocks, carriages,
and horses, were left inextricably entangled in the
mud : and the Polar was just fordable when he
passed it on the 21st. On his approach, however,
the enemy abandoned both Palipett and Tripasore :
and after encamping a few days on the Coccalore
plain, above Tripasore, he placed the troops in can-
tonments ; having lost one-third of the force with
which, after his junction with Colonel Pearce, he
marched in August from the Mount.2

1 There was no great delay in the movements of the British force. Chit-
toor was taken only on the 11th November, and on the 16th the army
marched to raise the siege of Tripassore. — W.

2 For the materials of this war with Hyder, up to the present date, the
most important sources are the First, Second, Third, and Sixth Reports of
the Committee of Secrecy, in 1781. Of the military transactions, narra-
tives of considerable value are to be found in the Annual Register; Rob-
son’s Life of Hyder Ali ; and the publication entitled, Memoirs of the late
war in Asia. For part of this campaign, see also Barrow’s Life of Lord
Macartney. To the pages of Colonel Wilks, I can now only refer, not
having had the opportunity of availing myself of his lights, till what I had
written could not be conveniently altered. Where my facts stand upon
the authority of public records, I conceive, in the few instances in which
we differ, that I approximate to the truth more nearly than he. To my
other authorities I should have preferred him ; though it is a grievous
defect, that he so rarely tells us the source from which he derives his in-
formation ; and though I repose no great confidence in the vague censures,
and still more vague eulogies, in which he has indulged. — M.

Colonel Wilks explains in his preface the authorities he employs, and
the reasons why more precise reference is not given. He writes from
native documents, and from the official records of the Madras government.
To these a particular reference would have been of no use, as they are not
generally accessible. Of the care and fidelity with which they are cited,

DEBATES IN THE EAST INDIA HOUSE.

219

At the Presidency, changes of more than ordinary

importance had taken place during this campaign.

The state of affairs in the Carnatic having greatly 1781 ’

alarmed the Company in England, misfortune pointed
resentment against the men under whose superin-
tendence it had arrived ; and, according to the usual
process of shallow thought, a change of rulers, it
was concluded, would produce a change of results.

So much of misconduct having been imputed to the
servants of the Company, a party appeared to be
forming itself, even among the Directors and Pro-
prietors, who called for an extension of the field of
choice : and represented it as rather an advantage,
that the chief governors in India should not be
selected from the servants of the Company. It
necessarily followed that a party arose who con-
tended with equal zeal that by the Company’s
servants the stations of greatest power and trust in
India ought exclusively to be filled. At a Court of
Proprietors, held on the 30th of November, 1780,

Mr. Lushington moved, “ That it he recommended
to the Court of Directors to appoint forthwith a
Governor of Madras, and that it he earnestly recom-
mended to them to appoint one of their own servants
to fill that vacancy.” It was on the other hand
contended, that the fittest man, not a man of any
particular class or order, ought always to he sought
for the places on which the interests of the commu-
nity principally depended; and that integrity, un-

we have every reason to entertain a favourable belief, and the censures and
eulogies which offend our author, are apparently in all cases judiciously,
although they may be warmly, bestowed. As a military history of a very
important period of our transactions in India, Col. Wilks’s South of India
is a work of the highest possible authority. — W.

220

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 5.

1781.

shaken by the example of plunder and corruption,
a character to lose, and consequently one to save, by
shunning the offences of former governors : were to
be considered as the fittest qualifications in their new
Governor of Madras. The Court adjourned without
proceeding to a ballot ; hut on the 23rd of the same
month the question was renewed. Lord Macartney,
who had recently gained reputation by negotiating a
commercial treaty with Russia, was pointed out to the
choice of the Company ; the advantages of a liberal
education, of political experience, acknowledged
talents and honour, were placed in the strongest
point of view by the one party ; the benefits of local
knowledge, and of the motives to zeal, to industry,
fidelity, and the acquisition of knowledge afforded to
the whole line of the Company’s servants, by the
high prizes of the principal stations in the govern-
ment of India, were amply displayed by the opposite
party : and, on a division, it was decided by a
majority of seventy -nine to sixty, that new men
should be eligible to the office of Governors in
India. The Court of Directors were guided by
similar views ; and on the 14th of December Lord
Macartney was nominated Governor and President
of Fort St. George. After a passage of four months,
he landed at Madras on the 22nd of June, 1781,
and then first obtained intelligence that the country
was invaded.

He came to his office, when it, undoubtedly, was
filled with difficulties of an extraordinary kind. The
presence of a new Governor, and of a Governor of a
new description, as change itself, under pain, is
counted a good, raised in some degree the spirits of

OVERTURE FOR PEACE.

the people. By advantage of the hopes which were
thus inspired, he was enabled to borrow considerable
sums of money. Having carried out intelligence of
the war with the Dutch, and particular instructions
to make acquisition of such of their settlements as
were placed within his reach, he was eager to
signalize his arrival by the performance of conquests,
which acquired an air of importance, from the use,
as sea-ports, of which they might prove to Hyder, or
the French. Within a week of his arrival, Sadras
was summoned and yielded wuthout resistance.
Pulicat was a place of greater strength, with a corps
in its neighbourhood of Hyder’s army. The garrison
of F ort St. George was so extremely reduced, as to be
ill prepared to afford a detachment. But Lord
Macartney placed himself at the head of the militia ;
and Pulicat, on condition of security to private pro-
perty, was induced to surrender.

Of the annunciation, which was usually made to
the Princes of India, of the arrival of a new Governor,
Lord Macartney conceived that advantage might be
taken, aided by the recent battle of Porto Novo, and
the expectation of troops from Europe, to obtain the
attention of Hyder to an offer of peace. With the
concurrence of the General and Admiral, an overture
was transmitted, to which the following answer was
returned, characteristic at once of the country and the
man : “ The Governors and Sirdars who enter into
treaties, after one or two years return to Europe, and
their acts and deeds become of no effect; and fresh
Governors and Sirdars introduce new conversations.
Prior to your coming, when the Governor and Council
of Madras had departed from their treaty of alliance

221

BOOK V.
CHAP. 5.

1781.

222

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 5.

1781.

and friendship, I sent my vakeel to confer with them,
and to ask the reason for such a breach of faith ; the
answer given was, that they who made these con-
ditions were gone to Europe. You write that you
have come with the sanction of the King and Com-
pany to settle all matters ; which gives me great
happiness. You, Sir, are a man of wisdom, and
comprehend all things. Whatever you may judge
proper and best, that you will do. You mention that
troops have arrived and are daily arriving from
Europe ; of this I have not a doubt : I depend upon
the favour of God for my succours.” Nor was it with
Hyder alone, that the new Governor interposed his
good offices for the attainment of peace. A letter
signed by him, by Sir Edward Hughes, and Sir
Eyre Coote, the commanders of the sea and land
forces, and by Mr. Macpherson, a Member of the
Supreme Council, was addressed to the Mahrattas,
in which they offered themselves as guarantees of
any treaty of peace which might be contracted
between them and the Governor-General and
Council of Bengal ; and declared their willingness
to accede to the restoration of Guzerat, Salsette, and
Bassem.

The principal settlement of the Dutch on the
Coromandel coast wTas Negapatam, near the southern
boundary of Tanjore. This, Lord Macartney was
desirous of adding to the rest of the conquests from
the Dutch immediately after his arrival, but was
over-ruled by the opinion of the Commander-in -
Chief, who represented the importance of recovering
Arcot, in the first instance, and of marching after-
wards to the attack of Negapatam. The President

NEGAPATNAM AND TRINCOMALEE.

223

was eager to avail himself of the assistance of the B00K v-

° . CHAP. 5.

fleet and marines, in his design against Negapatam;

assistance without which the object could hardly be 178L
accomplished, and which could only be obtained
while the season permitted shipping to remain upon
the coast. Though the General had been disap-
pointed in his hopes of being able to attempt the
recovery of Arcot, he continued in the north-western
part of the province, apparently disposed neither to
march to the attack of Negapatam, nor to spare for
that enterprise any portion of his troops. To Lord
Macartney the attainment of the object did not
appear to be hopeless without him. The intimation,
however, of a design to make the attempt, brought
back from the General an eager renunciation of all
responsibility in the exploit, a pretty confident pre-
diction of disappointment, and from disappointment,
of consequences deplorable and ruinous. The Pre-
sident declared that, convinced as he was of the pro-
priety, and hence obligation of the enterprise, he
would not shrink from the responsibility. To avoid
interference with the General not a man was taken
from his army. Colonel Brathwaite, who com-
manded in Tanjore, and in whom the President com-
plained that he found not all the alacrity which could
have been desired, was directed with his troops to
aid in the attack. The choice of a leader, too, was
involved in difficulties. After the affront received
by Sir Hector Munro, in the battle of the 27th of
August, he retired as soon as possible from the army
commanded by General Coote, under whom he served
not again, and remained at the Presidency recruiting
his health. It was to him that, in etiquette, the

224

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

Bciiap^V command expedition belonged; but Mr.

Sadlier, with whom he had the violent dispute, was

1782- now a member of the Select Committee ; and he
refused to serve under orders or directions in which
that gentleman should have any concern. The
scruples of the General met a contrast in the liberality
of the Committee ; who readily consented, that he
should receive his instructions from the President
alone; and the President, with the Admiral of the
Fleet, was empowered to form whatever arrange-
ments the enterprise should require. On the 21st of
October the seamen and marines were landed from
the ships; on the 30th the lines and redoubts were
attacked and carried ; on the 3rd of November ground
was opened against the north face of the fort, and
the approaches were pushed on with great rapidity ;
the Governor was summoned on the 6th, after a
battery of ten eighteen-pounders was ready to open
within three hundred paces of the walls ; he refused
to surrender; but on the 12th, after making two
desperate sallies, and after one of the bastions had
suffered from a formidable breaching-battery, he
offered to accept, and received, terms of honourable
capitulation. The amount of troops who surrendered
was 6551, considerably greater than that of the
besieging army. A large quantity of warlike stores,
together with a double investment of goods, no ships
having arrived from Holland for the investment of that
or the preceding year, was found in the place. With
Negapatam the whole of the Dutch settlements on
that coast fell into the hands of the English ; and
the troops of Hyder began immediately to evacuate
the forts which they had occupied in the kingdom of

DUTCH SETTLEMENTS ATTACKED.

225

Taniore. A body of 500 men were put on board book v.

. ' L CHAP. 5.

the fleet, which sailed from Negapatam on the 2nd of

January, and proceeded to the attack of Trincomalee, 1782‘
a celebrated Dutch settlement on the island of
Ceylon. It arrived before the place on the 4th, and
on the 1 1 th the best of the two forts which defended
Trincomalee was taken by storm.1

The deplorable indigence of the Presidency ; the
feebleness of military operations unsupported by
funds ; the power of the enemy, and the diminished
prospect of supplies from Bengal, presented to the
eyes of Lord Macartney a scene of difficulties, from
which it was hardly possible to discover any source
of relief. Participating in the general aversion to
believe that the Nabob was no less exhausted than
the Company, and representing to that chief how
great the interest which he, no less than the Com-
pany, had, in the expulsion of so dangerous a
common foe, the President, at an early period of his
administration, renewed the importunities of the
government on the subject of a pecuniary supply.

The Bengal government, by their letters, had already
given a sanction to strong measures of coercion ;
declaring that, while every part of the Nabob’s
dominions, except the part retained by the English
troops, was in the hands of a foreign power, and could
only be wrested from it by their exertions, the Nabob
could no longer be looked upon as the proprietor of

1 Some Account of the Public Life of the Earl of Macartney, by John
Barrow, F. R. S. i. 67 — 109 ; Annual Register for 1782. — M. Some in-
teresting particulars of the capture of Fort Ostenburg, are given in the
Memoirs of a Field Officer (Colonel Price) on the Retired List of the East
India Service, who was present as a subaltern. — W.

VOL. IV.

226

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. the country : and that such a combination of cir-

cumstances not only justified, hut required, the

]782- immediate assignment of all his revenues, to defray
the expenses of the war.1 The President, express-
ing his desire to avoid this extremity, offered to
accept a few lacs of pagodas as a temporary supply.
This pressure upon the inability of the Nabob drew
from him language of asperity and recrimination ;
and when importunately urged, he at last declared,
that his future contributions were defined, by a
treaty, wdiich he had just concluded with the
government of Bengal. The declaration, though it
justly surprised the President and Council of
Madras, was not at variance with the fact. The
Nabob, who had tried the effect of an agency in Eng-
land, both on the legislative and executive branches
of the government, was advised to make trial of the
same expedient on the controlling Board in India ;
and in March, 1781, he sent, on a commission to
Calcutta, his dewan or treasurer, together, with Mr.
Joseph Sullivan, a servant of the Company, whom,
without the consent of the Presidency, he had ap-
pointed his agent. The object of the Nabob wras to
obtain a clear recognition of his being the hereditary
sovereign of the Carnatic, not subject to any interfe-
rence on the part of the Company in the affairs of
his government ; a promise of exemption from all
pecuniary demands, beyond the expense of ten bat-
talions of troops, to be employed in his service ; an
admission of his right to name his successor, in
pursuance of his wish to disinherit his eldest, in

1 Letter of Gov. -Gen. and Council, Feb. 26, 1781.

TREATY WITH THE NABOB OF ARCOT.

227

favour of his second son ; a promise to add, by
conquest, certain districts possessed by Hyder to
his dominions, and to restore to him the kingdom of
Tanjore; and, finally, the assistance of the Com-
pany, in forming a settlement with his European
creditors.

To this embassy the rulers of Bengal afforded a
cordial reception. For the independence of the
government of the Carnatic Prince, they undertook,
in general terms : His requisition, respecting the

ten battalions and the limit of his pecuniary contri-
butions, was approved: His right to appoint his

successor they recognised as already admitted : The
conquest of certain districts possessed by Hyder, they
declared to be as desirable on account of the Com-
pany’s as the Nabob’s interest : The restoration of

Tanjore they informed him was not placed within
the limits of their authority : With regard to his

European creditors, they proposed, that after the
addition to the principal sum of all interest due to
the 21st of November, 1781, and after a deduction
of one-fourth from all the debts which might have
been transferred from the original creditors by pur-
chase or otherwise, Company’s bonds with the usual
interest should be granted, and paid, according to a
proportion which might be fixed, out of the assigned
revenues : And upon these conditions it was pro-

posed, but not without his own consent, that the
Nabob should make over all the revenues of his
country, during the war, to the Company ; that his
agents, in conjunction with persons appointed by the
Presidency of Fort St. George, should perform the
collections ; and that as much only should be retained

book v.

CHAP. 5.

1782.

Q 2

228

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. by the Nabob as was necessary for the disburse-

CHAP. 5. J J

ments of his family and government. Not only was

1782- this agreement transmitted to Madras, with instruc-
tions to consider it as possessing the validity of a
treaty ; but Mr. Sullivan returned with credentials,
as minister from the Governor-General and Council
of Bengal at the Court of the Nabob.

Nothing is more pregnant with mischief than ill-
worded and indefinite laws; and the best legislatures
have as yet displayed but little of the art of render-
ing the language of their enactments unambiguous
and certain. We have already contemplated the
disputes with the Presidency of Bombay, occasioned
by the loose and imperfect phraseology of the law
which conferred the power of control upon the Pre-
sidency of Bengal. In that instance, the Supreme
Council were even rebuked by their masters for
carrying their pretensions beyond the intent of the
Company, and that of the law ; but on the present
occasion they pushed their interference into the most
immediate and important concerns of the Madras
government ; inveigled from their service and obedi-
ence the servants of that Presidency; and set up an
agency of their own at Madras, which implied the
suppression of the chief powers of the Governor and
Council. Though the character of Lord Macartney
was tinged with vanity as wTell as ambition, he pos-
sessed great temper and urbanity ; and the Governor
and Council of Madras, instead of treating this new
assumption of power on the part of the Bengal
government as an injury, expressed only their appre-
hensions that they were not free to divest themselves
of powers, with which their employers had intrusted

CONDUCT OF THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY.

229

1782.

them, and for the exercise of which they would hold B00K v-

them responsible. They remarked, that they were .

therefore at liberty to consider the scheme of arrange-
ments, which had been transmitted to them by the
Supreme Board, as only materials to aid, not as com-
mands to supersede their judgment. The words,
they observed, in which the Supreme Council had
appeared to sanction the independence of the Nabob,
an independence which they had received the ex-
press and repeated commands of their employers to
prevent, were so adroitly ambiguous, as in fact to
evade the question, and were inconvenient only in so
far as they tended to inflame the pretensions of that
troublesome associate ; but as, in the government of
the country, there were certain departments in which
it was assumed as necessary that the Company’s
government should take a share, and yet those
departments and that share remained totally unde-
fined, the vagueness and ambiguity of the words of
the Supreme Board left the Madras Presidency, if
bound to obey, without any rule to guide their pro-
ceedings. The article which regarded the ten bat-
talions of troops appeared, they said, to them, to
convey a power over their marches and operations,
which the Court of Directors had ever been most
anxious to withhold. The Nabob had requested the
power of employing these troops in settling his
country. The answer of the Presidency is worthy
of record: “ We wash to know what is meant by this
article, before we form any judgment of its propriety :

We know not how troops can be properly said to
contribute to the settlement of a country : If it be

meant that he should have the Company’s forces to

230

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

5V- enable him to punish or extirpate any of his tribu-

taries, and if it be proper to lend our forces for such

1,82‘ a purpose, should we not plainly say so, without
reserve or ambiguity4?” If the Nabob was to have
the troops, in all cases, upon his simple requisition,
“ he might soon,” they add, “ require, what he has
hitherto in vain solicited from the Court of Directors,
the means of attacking, contrary to their express
commands, the principal tributary Rajas who claim
and depend upon the protection both of the Crown
and the Company.” If he was only to be assisted in
those cases which the President and Council should
approve, the clause, though void of meaning, was not
exempt from mischief, as it tended to raise “ a claim,
which, being undefined, would be measured only by
the wishes of the claimant.” The right of the Nabob
to nominate his successor, or to infringe the rule of
primogeniture, they declined to discuss ; but affirmed
their total ignorance of any such admission of that
right as the Governor-General and Council appeared
to assume. That the mode which was proposed for
collecting the revenues, by the agents of the Nabob
and of the Company in conjunction, was calculated to
produce altercations between the different parties,
and to afford the agents of the Nabob a pretence for
defalcations, alleging obstructions from the Com-
pany’s servants, experience, they said, most fully
evinced. Whether the defect proceeded from the
want of intention on the part of the Nabob, or from
his inability to ensure the obedience of his collectors,
it had, through them, been found impossible to obtain
the revenues. With regard to the arrangements in
behalf of the creditors of the Nabob, they were un-

DIFFICULTIES OF THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY.

231

willing to wear the appearance of opposing either b°ok ^

the will of the superior Board, or the interest of the

creditors; hut they professed themselves ignorant, l782-
whether the creditors would regard the arrangement
as advantageous, or the Directors would be pleased
to find the Company pledged for bonds to so great
an amount.

On the point, however, of the assignment, the
situation of affairs, and the sanction of the Bengal
government, appeared to the President and Council
sufficient authority for urging the Nabob forcibly to
concur with their views. With much negotiation it
was at last arranged ; that the revenues of all the
dominions of the Nabob should be transferred to the
Company for a period of five years at least ; that of
the proceeds one-sixth part should be reserved for
the private expenses of himself and his family, the
remainder being placed to his account ; that the col-
lectors should all be appointed by the President : and
that the Nabob should not interfere. By this deed,
which bore date the 2nd of December, 1781, the
inconveniences of a double government, which by its
very nature engendered discordance, negligence,
rapacity, and profusion, were so far got rid of; though
yet the misery and weakness to which they had con-
tributed could not immediately be removed.1

1 This is evidently the main object of the agreement projected, not exe-
cuted, with the Nabob, by the government of Bengal. In the reply of
Hastings to the objections of the government of Madras, he first apologizes
for the interference by the character of Lord Macartney’s predecessors.

“ Your Lordship,” he says, “ will not ask why we thought our intervention
on this occasion necessary, and why we did not rather refer the accom-
modation to the Presidency of Fort St. George, which was the regular
instrument of the Company’s participation in the government of the
Carnatic, but I will suppose the question. I might properly answer it by

232

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \
CHAP. 5.

1782.

It was not one spring alone of dissension which
distracted the government of Madras. The species
of independent authority which had been conferred
upon the General produced many of the evils of a
double government in the Presidency itself. The
General had a susceptibility of temper, which,
heightened by the infirmities of old age, by flattery,
by the difficulties of his situation, and his want of
success, made him take offence with the levity and
hastiness of a child. The civil authority, deprived,
in a period of war, of all share in the military
arrangements, found the business of government
withdrawn from their hands, and themselves degraded
into a capacity little superior to that of agents for
supplying the wants of the army. The visible loss
of authority, by weakening their influence, dimi-
nished their resources; and persons were even dis-
couraged from relieving them by loans. A situation
like this wras ill calculated to please a man of Lord
Macartney’s rank and pretensions. Aware of the
uneasiness which it was probable he would feel, it
was natural for the General to view him with
suspicion from the moment when he arrived. The
mutual desire to save appearances preserved an

another. Why did the Company withdraw their confidence from the
same ministry, to bestow it on your Lordship?” He also declares, that
had he known of Lord Macartney’s nomination, he should have referred
the Nabob to his government. He urges the enforcement of the agreement
as being the act of the government of Bengal, and having been done by
them ; but he lays stress only on the 8th, 10th, Uth, and 12th articles ; the
two first insisting upon the assignment of the revenues ol the Carnatic and
Tanjore, and their application to the purposes of the war; and the two
last proposing the consolidation of the Nabob’s debts, and arrangement
with the creditors. The whole matter was, however, left finally to the
decision of the Madras Presidency.— W.

THE ARMY CONVEYS SUPPLIES TO VELORE.

233

uninterrupted intercourse of civilities, till Lord BO0K v-

r . 1 CHAP. 5.

Macartney discovered his design of attempting the

conquest of Negapatam against the advice and with- 1/82-
out the co-operation of the General. From that
moment the General gave way to his spirit of dissatis-
faction and complaint ; refused to attend the consul-
tations of the Select Committee ; quarrelled with
every measure that was proposed; and even wrote
to the Governor-General and Council that he suffered
from interference with his authority, and, unless he
were vested with power totally independent, that he
would resign the command. Beside the loss of their
authority, and the diminution of their power over
even the sources of supply, the civil authorities
lamented, that they possessed no control over the
expenditure of the army, and that, from the total
disregard of economy, in which, notwithstanding the
ruinous poverty of the government, the General
indulged, that expenditure was enormously great.

It nevertheless appears, that Lord Macartney, aware
of the importance not only of united efforts, but of
the name and influence of Coote, entertained not an
idea of withdrawing from him any portion of that
authority with which he had been intrusted; and
strove to preserve his good humour by studied for-
bearance and courtesy.1

1 In a letter to a private friend, at the time, his Lordship says ; “I
never retort any sharp expression which may occur in his letters. In fact,
I court him like a mistress, and humour him like a child ; but with all this
I have a most sincere regard for him, and honour him highly. But I am
truly grieved at heart to see a man of his military reputation, at his time
of life, made miserable by those who ought to make him happy, and from
a great public character worked into the little instrument of private malig-
nity and disappointed avarice. All, however, has been, and shall be, good-

234

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

bc00^5v. The army had not been many days in canton-

ments, where they expected to repose during the

1782- remainder of the monsoon, when the fall of Chitore
was announced at Madras, and intelligence was
received, that for want of provisions Velore would
not be able to hold out beyond the 11th of January.
No exertion was to be spared for the preservation of
this important place. The treasury was drained to
the last pagoda, to afford some pay to the army,
which was deeply in arrear. But the exorbitant
demands for equipment and conveyance were the
principal source of difficulty and alarm. To carry
the necessaries of thirty-five days for twelve or
fourteen thousand fighting-men, the estimate of the
Quarter-Master was 35,000 bullocks. Not to speak
of the money wanted for the purchase, so great a
number could not be procured ; nor was it easy to
conceive how protection could be afforded from
Hyder’s horse to a line of so many miles as the
march of 35,000 bullocks would of necessity form.
The number of bullocks now in store was 8000.
With these and 3000 coolies, or porters, whom he
could press, it appeared to the President that the
army might convey what was absolutely necessary ;
and the urgency of the case made the General dis-
posed to wave his usual objections. Though with
broken health, he joined the army on the 2nd of
January; but on the 5th he suffered a violent
apoplectic attack, and the army halted at Tripasore.
On the following day, he was so far revived as to
insist upon accompanying the army, which he ordered

humour, and good-breeding, on my part.” Extract of a Letter to Mr.
Macpherson, dated Fort St. George.

OPERATIONS OF THE GARRISON.

235

to march. They were within sight of Yelore on the bCh^5v*

10th, and dragging their guns through a morass, —

which Hyder had suddenly formed by letting out the 1782‘
waters of a tank, when his army was seen advancing
on the rear. Before the enemy arrived, the English
had crossed the morass; when Hyder contented him-
self with a distant cannonade, and next day the
supply was conducted safely to Velore. As the
army was returning, Hyder, on the 13th, again pre-
sented himself on the opposite side of the morass,
but withdrew after a distant cannonade. On the
evening of the 15th, the enemy’s camp was seen at a
distance ; and a variety of movements took place on
both sides on the following day : after mutual
challenges however, and a discharge of artillery, the
contenders separated, and the English pursued their
march to the Mount. The General expressed a
desire of making a voyage to Bengal for the benefit
of his health, but allowed himself to be persuaded
to alter his design.1

After the capture of Mahe, the Madras detach-
ment remained at Tellicherry, besieged by Hyder’s
tributary Nairs. Early in May, 1781, being urgently
demanded for the defence of the Carnatic, the detach-
ment wras relieved by Major Abingdon, who arrived
with a force from Bombay. One of Hyder’s prin-
cipal generals, with a detachment from his army
which greatly outnumbered the garrison, now carried
on a vigorous attack. The utmost efforts of the
besieged were incessantly demanded to counteract the
operations of the enemy ; and the commander was

1 Barrow’s Life of Lord Macartney, i. 109 — 117 ; Wilks’s Historical
Sketches, cli. xxiii; Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 231—234.

236

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I,
chap. 5.

1782.

• under the necessity of applying to Bombay both for
- provisions and troops. The answer declared the
inability of the Presidency to make any further pro-
vision for the defence of Tellicherry, and the reso-
lution to which they had been reluctantly brought of
giving it up. His military notions of disgrace, and
the still more important considerations of the cruel
sacrifice which would thus be made of the lives and
fortunes of the people in the place, as well as the
doubtful possibility of withdrawing the troops, in-
duced Major Abingdon to conceal the contents of
the letter, and to remit a strong remonstrance against
the orders which he had received. It produced the
desired effect, and a packet was immediately des-
patched from Bombay to assure him of speedy
support. The arrival of his reinforcements deter-
mined this enterprising officer no longer to confine
himself to operations of defence. Every thing being
prepared for a sally, upon the signal of the clock
striking twelve, the troops got under arms, on the
night of the 7th of January, and at one, in profound
silence, began to march. After passing a deep
morass, and escaping the notice of the enemy’s
picquets, they stormed an advanced battery at break
of day, and forming the line moved rapidly towards
the camp, when the enemy fled in the utmost con-
fusion, and their leader was wounded and taken.
Master now of the surrounding country. Major
Abingdon turned his thoughts to the re-establish-
ment, in their respective districts, of the various
chiefs whom Hyder had either rendered tributary or
compelled to fly. Having, after this, demolished
the enemy’s works, and improved the defences of the

FRENCH AND ENGLISH FLEETS.

237

settlement, he marched towards Calicut. On the book v.

12th of February he took post within two hundred .

yards of the wTalls, and the next day, a shell having 1782.
fortunately blown up a part of the grand magazine,
the garrison, exposed to an assault, immediately
surrendered.

The hostilities of the F rench and English Govern-
ments, not contented with Europe and America as a
field, at last invaded the two remaining quarters of
the globe. A squadron of five ships of the line and
some frigates, under the conduct of M. de Suffrein,
together with a body of land forces, was prepared at
Brest in the beginning of 1781 ; and sailed in com-
pany with the grand fleet bound to the West Indies
under Count de Grasse at the latter end of March.

About the same period a secret expedition, with
which for some time rumour had been busy, was
prepared in England. The state of the Spanish
colonies in South America, and the rich prizes which
they appeared to contain, had pointed them out as
the destined object to the public eye. But the war
with Holland, and the importance of the conflict now
raging in India, communicated a different direction
to the views of ministers : and the acquisition of the
Cape of Good Hope, with the effectual support of
the war in India, became the ends, for the accom-
plishment of which the enterprise was planned. One
ship of seventy-four guns, one of sixty-four, three of
fifty, several frigates, a bomb-vessel, a fire-ship and
some sloops of war composed the squadron ; of which
Commodore Johnstone, with a reputation for decision
and boldness, received the command, A land force,
consisting of three new regiments of 1000 men each

238

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. was placed under the conduct of General Meadows,

C HAP. 5.

who had purchased fame in the action at St. Lucia

1782- with d’Estaing. On the 13th of March, in company
with the grand fleet destined for the relief of Gibraltar,
the armament sailed from St. Helen’s, and, including
several outward-hound East Indiamen, with store-
vessels and transports, amounted to upwards of forty
sail. The secret however of this expedition had not
been so vigilantly guarded as to escape the sagacity
of the Dutch and the French. The armament under
Suffrein was ultimately destined to reinforce the
squadron now at the Isle of France; and to oppose
the English fleet in the Indian seas. But the par-
ticular instructions of that officer were, in the first
instance, to follow, and counteract the expedition of
J ohnstone, and above all, his design upon the G’ape of
Good Hope. For the sake of water and fresh provi-
sions, the English squadron put into Praya Bay in St.
Jago, one of the Cape de Yerd Islands ; and having
no expectation of an enemy, cast their anchors as
chance or convenience directed. A considerable pro-
portion both of men and of officers, partly for busi-
ness, partly for pleasure, were permitted to go on
shore ; and the decks were speedily crowded with
water-casks, live stock, and other incumbrances. On
the 16th of April, after nine o’clock in the morning,
a strange fleet, suspected to be French, was seen
coming round the eastern point of the harbour ; and
Suffrein, separating from the convoy with his five
sail of the line, soon penetrated to the centre of the
English fleet. The utmost despatch was employed
in getting the men and officers on board, and pre-
paring the ships for action. The French ship, the

ACTION IN PRAYA BAY.

239

Hannibal, of seventy-four guns, led the van, and Bc°°^5v-

coming as close to the English ships as she was able,

dropped her anchors with a resolution which excited 1782-
a burst of applause from the British tars. She was
followed by the ship of Suffrein, of equal force.

Another of sixty-four guns anchored at her stern.

And the two other ships, of sixty-four guns each,
ranged through the fleet, firing on either side, as
they proceeded along.1 The ships being extremely
near, and the guns being played with unusual fury,
much destruction was effected in a little time. After
the abatement of the first surprise, several of the
Indiamen brought their guns to bear upon the enemy
with good effect. Within an hour, the French ships
at anchor had suffered so terribly, that the last of
the three having lost her captain, cut her cables and
began to withdraw. Thus deserted a-stern, and
despairing of success, Suffrein followed her example,
and gave the signal to retreat; the Hannibal alone
remained, a mark to every ship the guns of which
could be made to bear upon her ; and displayed a
resolution, which may be compared with the noblest
examples of naval heroism. She had lost her fore-
mast and bowsprit ; her cable was either cut or shot
away ; in the effort of hoisting more sail to get out
of the fire, her main and mizen masts went over-
board, and she remained as it were a hulk upon the
water. Sustaining the weight of a dreadful fire, to
which, enfeebled as she was, her returns were slow
and ineffectual, she yet joined the rest of the ships

1 That Port Pray a, belonging to the Portuguese, was a neutral harbour,
but little affected the delicacy of the French, though the English observed
the punctilio of reserving their fire till attacked.

240

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1782.

,v- at the mouth of the hay ; and, being towed off,
— erected jury-masts, and proceeded with the fleet.
An attempt on the part of the English to pursue was
totally ineffectual. They sustained not any consi-
derable loss, notwithstanding the closeness of the
action, and the crowded situation of the ships.
Their own steady and determined bravery counter-
acted the effects of surprise, and baffled the well-
concerted scheme of the enemy. They remained to
refit and provide till the 2nd of May, and on ap-
proaching the Cape ascertained that Suffrein had
arrived before them. Though previous to the arrival
of Suffrein that settlement, then supposed of great
importance, was not in a condition to have offered
any considerable resistance to the land and naval
force under Meadows and Johnstone, it was now
accounted vain to make on it any attempt. While
the French fleet lay at anchor in False Bay, it ap-
peared not to the Commodore impossible to make
prize of a fleet of Dutch East Indiamen, in Saldanha
Bay. Success depended on being able, by surprise
and celerity, to prevent them from being run ashore
and burnt. The end was pretty completely attained;
as, out of five ships, four were secured. The Com-
modore in his own ship, with the prizes and most of
the frigates, returned to Europe ; the rest, together
with the troops, proceeded to India. Suffrein,
leaving a sufficient garrison for the protection of the
Cape, sailed for the island of Mauritius ; where he
augmented the French fleet to ten sail of the line,
one fifty gun ship, and several frigates. The Eng-
lish on the 2nd of September stopped at the island
of Joanna, to land and recover the sick, who now

REINFORCEMENTS FROM EUROPE.

241

amounted to a third part both of the seamen and book v.

A # CHAP. 5

soldiers. They left the island on the 24th of the

same month; were becalmed from the 11th of 1782-
October to the 5th of November; at 260 leagues
distant from Bombay, they were carried, by the
shifting of the monsoon, to the coast of Arabia
Felix; on the 26th of November anchored in
Morabat Bay; on the 6th of December, the prin-
cipal ships of war, having on board General Meadows
and Colonel Fullarton with the chief part of the
troops, proceeded in quest of Admiral Hughes ;
the remaining ships, and transports with part
of two regiments, under the command of Colonel
Humberston Mackenzie, left Morabat on the 9th ;
and arrived at Bombay on the 22nd of January,

1782.

The Colonel remained only six days at Bombay,
when he re-embarked the men, and set sail for
Madras. On the 9th of February, at Anjengo, in
the dominions of the King of Travancore, alarming
intelligence reached him from the Coromandel coast ;
that Hyder Ali had overrun the whole of the Car-
natic with an immense army ; that he threatened
Tanjore, Marawar, Madura, and Tinivelly with de-
struction ; that he circumvented and cut off two
Biitish armies ; that dissension, improvidence, and
pusillanimity reigned at Madras ; and that Fort St.

George itself was insulted and endangered. To these
statements was added intelligence that the French
fleet were at this time to assemble off Point de Galle ;
and that magazines for them had for some time been
forming at Columbo and other ports in Ceylon. He
called a Council of War ; when he came to the deter-

VOL. IV. R

242

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. mination, in consequence chiefly of the intelligence

respecting the French fleet, rather to attempt a diver-

1782. sion on the Malabar side of Hyder’s dominions, than
to incur the chances of delay and danger attached to
the voyage round to Madras. He landed his troops,
amounting to scarcely a thousand men, at Calicut,
on the 18th of February, where he joined Major
Abingdon, and as senior oflicer assumed the command.
He immediately took the field ; proceeded into
Hyder’s territories ; drove before him the army which
was left for the protection of those parts ; and took
several forts; when, the monsoon approaching, he
returned to Calicut, and placed his little army in can-
tonments in the month of May.

The French fleet, with a body of land forces, form-
ing part of the armament which under Bussy was
destined to restore the influence of the French in
India, left the islands a considerable time after the
English sailed for Joanna; and, the Admiral dying
on his passage, the command devolved upon M.
Suffrein, a man of great resource, of unwearied enter-
prise, and, in every respect, one of the best naval
commanders whom France had ever produced. The
English fleet, delayed and dispersed by the weather,
incurred considerable danger of a very unseasonable
rencounter ; and the Hannibal, a fifty-gun ship, being
separated from the rest in a haze, unexpectedly found
herself surrounded by the enemy, where, after a fruit-
less though gallant resistance, she was taken. The
F rench fleet arrived on the Coromandel coast in the
month of January, and intercepted several vessels
bound to Madras with grain. Sir Edward Hughes,
after taking Trincomalee, was obliged on the last

UNDECISIVE ACTION BETWEEEN THE FLEETS.

243

day of January to set sail for Madras, being in great
want of stores and provisions, his ships much decayed,
and his crew diminished and sick. On his arrival
at Madras, on the 11th of February, he learned that
he had fortunately escaped the French fleet already
upon the coast ; but still found himself exposed to
their attack in an open road with only six ships of
the line, out of condition from long service, and
almost destitute of supplies. By another fortunate
chance (for had either squadron fallen in with the
French, the most fatal consequences might have
ensued), the ships which carried General Meadows
and his army, consisting of one seventy-four, one
sixty-four, and one fifty-gun ship, arrived the next
day in the road ; and within twenty-four hours,
Suffrein, with ten ships of the line, two ships, includ-
ing the captured Hannibal, of fifty guns, six frigates,
eight transports, and six prizes, hove in sight, recon-
noitred Madras, and anchored a few miles to wind-
ward of the English fleet, which, with the utmost
diligence, was making the necessary preparations for
action. Deceived in his probable expectation of
finding Sir Edward Hughes with only six sail of
the line, not re-inforced, and of signalizing his arrival
by so decisive a blow as the destruction of the
English fleet, he, on the 14th, passed Madras inline
of battle to the southward. The English weighed
anchor, and followed. On the 15th, in the evening,
the fleets passed each other, so near, as to exchange
some shots. On the 16th, the English Admiral
found an opportunity of making a push at the French
convoy separated from the fleet, when he retook five
of the vessels which had been captured on the coast,

r 2

book v

CHAP. 5.

1782.

244

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1782.

■ and a large transport laden with provisions, ammuni-
- tion, and troops. On the 17th, after a variety of
movements, in which Suffrein still kept the weather-
gage, the two fleets came to action late in the day ;
and separated after a short conflict, on the approach
of night, when the French steered to windward, and
the English to Trincomalee.

The French Admiral proceeded to Porto Novo,
and landed 2000 men.1 They were soon joined by
a large detachment of Hyder’s army, under the com-
mand of Tippoo his son, who had just been employed
in inflicting upon the English one of the deepest
wounds which they had sustained during the war.
Colonel Brathwaite, with 100 Europeans, 1500 native
troops, and 300 cavalry, stationed for the purpose of
protecting Tanjore, lay encamped on the banks of
the Coleroon, at a distance of forty miles from the
capital of that name, exposed indeed on an open
plain, hut apparently secured by the intervention of
several large and deep rivers, and the distance of the
enemy. His position gave encouragement to Hyder.
Tippoo, with 10,000 horse, an equal number of
infantry, twenty pieces of cannon, and M. Lally, with
his European troops 400 strong, surrounded Colonel
Brathwaite before he had received even a suspicion
of their march. His first endeavour was to reach
Tanjore, or some other place of safety ; but the
superior force of the enemy rendered this impracti-
cable. The next resolution was to make a brave
defence ; and seldom can the annals of war exhibit a
parallel to the firmness and perseverance which he

t 1 The author of Histoire de la Derniere Guerre (p. 297) says about
3000 ; but, that was, including a regiment of Caffres.

brathwaite’s detachment defeated.

245

and his little army displayed. From the 16th to
the 18th of February, surrounded on all sides by an
enemy, who outnumbered them, twenty to one, did
they withstand incessant attacks. They formed
themselves into a hollow square, with the artillery
interspersed in the faces, and the cavalry in the centre.
Tippoo laboured, by the fire of his cannon, to produce
a breach in some of the lines, and as often as he
fancied that he had made an impression, urged on his
cavalry, by his presence, by promises, by threats, by
stripes, and the slaughter of fugitives with his own
hand. Repeatedly they advanced to the charge ; as
often were they repelled by showers of grape-shot
and musketry; when the English cavalry, issuing
from the centre, at intervals suddenly made by dis-
ciplined troops, pursued their retreat with great
execution. After twenty-six hours of incessant con-
flict, when great numbers of the English army had
fallen, and the rest were worn out with wounds and
fatigue, Lally, at the head of his 400 Europeans,
supported by a large body of infantry, covered on
his flanks by cavalry, advanced with fixed bayonets
to the attack. At this tremendous appearance, the
resolution of the sepoys failed, and they were thrown
into confusion. The rage of barbarians was with
difficulty restrained by the utmost efforts of a
civilized commander. Lally is reported to have
dyed his sword in the blood of several of the
murderers, before he could draw them off from the
carnage. It is remarkable, notwithstanding the
dreadful circumstances of this engagement, that out
of twenty officers, only one was killed, and eleven
wounded. And it is but justice to add, that Tippoo

BOOK V.
CHAP. 5.

1782.

246

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOKV.t^d his prisoners, especially the officers and
wounded men, with real attention and humanity.

1782- The arrival of so important an aid as that of 2000
Frenchmen, augmented to an alarming degree the
army of Tippoo. Cuddalore yielded to their united
force on the 3rd of April, and afforded a convenient
station both naval and military for the French. In
the mean time Sir Edward Hughes left Trincomalee,
having effected the most necessary repairs, and
arrived at Madras on the 12th of March. Towards
the end of that month, the French Admiral slipped
from Porto Novo, hearing that a fleet of English
Indiamen had arrived upon the coast. As soon as
his departure was known at Madras, Sir Edward
Hughes got under weigh ; hut had not lost sight of
the flag-staff of the fort, when he fell in with the
fleet, of which the French were in quest, consisting
of seven Indiamen and two line-of-battle-ships, having
a king’s regiment on board. He ordered the men of
war to join him, and proceeded to land a reinforce-
ment and stores for the garrison at Trincomalee.
His policy was to avoid an engagement till this
service was performed. Suffrein, on the other hand
whose crews were sickly, and his provisions wearing
low, was eager to fight. The two fleets came in
sight on the 8th of April ; but the English Admiral
held on his course, and the French followed, during
that and the three succeeding days, when, having
made the coast of Ceylon, about fifteen leagues
to windward of Trincomalee, the English bore away
for it during the night. This appears to have been
the opportunity for which Suffrein was in wait ; for
having gained the wind of the English squadron, he

OPERATIONS OF HYDER AND THE ENGLISH.

247

was seen on the morning of the 1 2th crowding all

the sail which he could carry in pursuit, while the

English were so alarmingly close upon a lee-shore 1782-
that one of the ships actually touched the ground.

A severe conflict ensued, in which the intrepid reso-
lution of the English again counterbalanced the dis-
advantages of their situation ; and the fleets, after
suffering in nearly an equal degree, were parted by
the night. So much were both disabled, that they
lay for seven days within random-shot, only to
prepare themselves to sail ; and retired, the English
to Trincomalee, the French to the Dutch harbour of
Battacalo, without on either side attempting to renew
the engagement.

The English army, who had now been some
months in cantonments, took the field on the 17th of
April. The object first in contemplation was to re-
lieve Parmacoil ; but on arriving at Carangoly, the
General found it already surrendered. On the 24th
the army encamped near Wandewash, on the very
spot on which Sir Eyre Coote defeated the French
General Lally in 1760. The general orders boasted
of the victory, and a double batta was issued to the
troops ; but on the next day, on account of water,
the position was shifted to the other side of the fort.
Hyder and his F rench auxiliaries lay encamped on a
strong post, on the red hills near Parmacoil, from
which, on the approach of the English, they removed
to another in the neighbourhood of Kellinoor. As
the magazines of Hyder were deposited in the strong
fort of Amee, Sir Eyre concluded that a march upon
that place would draw the enemy to its assistance,
and afford the opportunity of a battle. He encamped

248

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 5.

1782.

on the 1st of June within three miles of the place ;
and Hyder, passing over a space of forty-three miles
in two days, took up his head-quarters at Chittapet,
on the evening of the same day. Before the dawn
of the following morning, the English army were in
motion toward Arnee ; but with the first of the light,
a heavy cannonade was opened on their rear. The
troops came twice to the right about, and the baggage
was brought twice through the files, before it was
possible to discover whence the firing proceeded. A
Council, which was called, and deliberated in great
uncertainty, agreed in opinion, that an attack was
to be expected on the rear, and the army was imme-
diately drawn up to receive it. The enemy’s horse,
in the mean time, occupied the circumjacent grounds,
more elevated than the low spot which was occupied
by the English, and considerably galled them ; while
Hyder, dexterously detaching a division of his army
under Tippoo, carried off the treasure from Arnee,
gave instructions to the commandant, and reinforced
the garrison. Having accomplished his object, he
retired as the English advanced ; and one of his guns,
and a tumbril which stuck in the bed of the river,
were the only trophies of the day. Deeming it vain
to attempt the reduction of Arnee, the English on
the 7th were considerably advanced on their march
back to Madras, when a regiment of European ca-
valry, which Sir Eyre Coote called his grand guard,
were drawn into an ambuscade, and either killed or
taken prisoners. After attempting without success
to lead the enemy into a similar snare near Wande-
vvash, on the 9th, the General proceeded on his
march, and on the 20th arrived at Madras.

SIR EYRE COOTE.

249

On the 29th of that month, by a letter from the 5V'

Governor-General to Lord Macartney, the conclusion

of peace with the Mahrattas was announced at Ma- 1/82
dras. Sir Eyre Coote, as solely invested with the
power of war and peace, of his own authority, and
without consulting the Governor and Council of
Madras, proposed to Hyder, or rather summoned him,
to accede to the treaty concluded between the Eng-
lish and the Mahrattas, to restore all the forts which
he had taken, and within six months to evacuate
the Carnatic ; otherwise, the arms of the Mahrattas
would he joined to those of the English, in order to
chastise him. Lord Macartney, alarmed at so daring
an assumption of the whole power of the Presidency,
is accused of having diverted the mind of Hyder
from peace, by teaching him to doubt the validity of
any agreement with the General, in which the Go-
vernor and Council had not a part. 1 But Hyder too
well knew the politics of India to receive great addi-
tion to his apprehensions from the threats of the
General ; and was too well acquainted with the
intrigues of Madras to receive new lights from the
communication, even if it had been made, which was
thus imputed to Lord Macartney. To retain the
negotiation more completely independent of the civil
authority, the General moved from Madras, on the
1st of July, and lessened his distance from Hyder.

Sir Eyre was a most unequal match for the Mysorean
in the arts of diplomacy, and allowed himself to be
duped. Hyder amused him in the neighbourhood of
Wandewash, till the army had wholly consumed not

1 Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 403, which, being an undistin-
guishing panegyric upon Hastings, takes part against Macartney.

250

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. on]y t}ieir own rjce^ a|so that of the garrison ;

and till he had completely arranged with the French

1/82, Admiral a plan of combined operations for the reduc-
tion of Negapatam. He then demanded a little
time for deliberation, and, suddenly withdrawing his
vakeel, left the General in total darkness with re-
gard to his designs.1

Sir Eyre Coote was obliged to return to Madras ;
and good fortune alone defeated the train which was
laid for the reduction of Negapatam. Suffrein, in
sailing to Negapatam, was descried by the English
fleet, and in spite of every attempt to gain the road
without fighting, was by the skilful movements of
the Admiral constrained to venture a battle. After
refitting at Ceylon, both fleets had returned to the
coast about the end of June ; the French to the port
of Cuddalore, the English to that of Negapatam.
Weighing anchor about three in the afternoon on the
3rd of July, the English Admiral steered in a south-
erly direction in order to gain the wind of the ememy,
and about 1 1 o’clock on the following day the action
commenced. It was close, warm, and general. After
an hour and a half, during which the fire had been
equally well maintained on both sides, the French

1 Colonel Wilks’s account of this negotiation, is somewhat different.
According to him, it originated with Hyder. Some advances to nego-
tiation being made by him through Colonel Brathwaite, a prisoner in
Hyder’s camp ; these advances were followed by the mission of an envoy
to the English camp, charged with no definite proposals, and instructed
merely to feel the dispositions and the probable demands of the English in
the event of a peace being made. Sir Eyre Coote declined to satisfy the
official inquiries of Lord Macartney with regard to the nature of these
communications, conduct certainly uncordial and indecorous, but less
glaringly so, than if the General had taken upon himself to propose terms
of peace without the knowledge of the government. — W.

OPERATIONS OF SUFFREIN.

251

line appeared to be getting into disorder ; and the Eng- book _v-

lish began to cheer themselves with the hopes of a

speedy and glorious victory, when a sudden altera- 1782-

tion of the wind disturbed their order of battle,
afforded an opportunity to Suffrein, of which he
dexterously availed himself, to form a line with those
ships which had suffered the least, for covering the
disabled part of his fleet, and induced the English
Admiral to collect the scattered ships. At the
approach of evening he cast anchor between Nega-
patam and Nagore.1 The French, having passed
the night about three leagues to leeward, proceeded
the next morning to Cuddalore ; and the English
fleet, though it saw them, was too much disabled to
pursue. The English Admiral, after remaining a
fortnight at Negapatam, arrived at Madras on the
20th, in order to refit. In the mean time Suffrein
had proceeded with characteristic activity, a quality
in which he was never surpassed, in preparing his
fleet, for sea at Cuddalore. He was a man, that,
when the exigency required, would work for days,
like a ship’s carpenter, in his shirt. He visited the
houses and buildings at Cuddalore, and, for want of
other timber, had the beams which suited his purpose
taken out. To some of his officers, who represented
to him the shattered condition of his ships, the
alarming deficiency of his stores, the impossibility of
supplying his wants in a desolated part of India, and
the necessity of repairing to the islands to refit ; the
whole value, he replied, of the ships was trivial, in

1 It is said that two of the French line-of-battle-sliips struck during the
action, but that Suffrein fired into them, till they hoisted colours again j
and in consequence were saved.

252

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. comparison with the object which he was comrnis-

CHAP. 5. . . "

sioned to attain ; and the ocean should be his har-

1782- hour, till he found a place in India to repair them. On
the 5th of August, the Governor of F ort St. George
was informed, that the French fleet was already not
only prepared for sea, but had actually sailed to the
southward on the 1st of the month; that the first
division of the French reinforcements expected from
Europe was actually arrived at Point de Galle ; and
that the second, with Bussy himself, was daily ex-
pected. Greatly alarmed for the fate of Trincomalee,
and even of Negapatam, the President and Com-
mittee deemed it requisite to quicken the preparations
of the Admiral, whose activity equalled not his
courage and seamanship, by a letter, in which they
drew his attention to this intelligence, and to the
danger w7hich every day was incurred, while an
enemy’s fleet kept the sea, without a British to
oppose it. The jealousy of the Admiral was acute;
of the time for sailing, he replied, that he was the
judge ; that he was not responsible for his conduct
to the government of Madras ; and that he should
proceed to sea with his Majesty’s squadron under his
command, as soon as it was fit for service.1 He did
not proceed to sea before the 20th of August ; when
he sailed to Trincomalee, and found it already in the
hands of the enemy. Suffrein, after proceeding to
Point de Galle, where he was joined by the rein-
forcements from Europe and two ships of the line,
anchored in Trincomalee Bay on the 25th ; landed
the troops before day the next morning ; opened the

Barrow’s Life of Lord Macartney, i. 122.

NAVAL ACTION.

253

batteries on the 29th ; silenced those of the garrison
before night ; and summoned the place before morn-
ing. Eager to anticipate the arrival of the English
fleet, Suffrein offered the most honourable terms.
The forts were surrendered on the last of the month,
and Hughes arrived on the 2nd of September.

Early on the following morning the French fleet
proceeded to sea; when the English were eager to
redeem by a victory the loss of Trincomalee. The
French had twelve, the English eleven sail of the
line; the French had four ships of fifty guns, the
English only one. The battle began between two
and three in the afternoon, and soon became general.
After raging for three hours with great fury in every
part of the line ; the darkness of the night at last
terminated one of the best-fought actions then re-
corded in the annals of naval warfare. The exertions
of Suffrein himself were remarkable, for he was ill
seconded by his captains, of whom he broke no fewer
than six, immediately after the engagement. For-
tunately for the French fleet, they had the island of
Trincomalee at hand, to receive them ; but in crowd-
ing into it in the dark, one ship struck upon the
rocks, and was lost; and two others were so much
disabled, that ten days elapsed before they were able
to enter the harbour. Suffrein then described them
as presents which he had received from the British
Admiral; who, regarding the proximity of Trinco-
malee as a bar to all attempts, and finding his am-
munition short, immediately after the battle pro-
ceeded to Madras.

Hyder, upon the disappointment of his plan against
Negapatam by the rencounter between the French

book v.

chap. 5.

] 782.

254

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 5.

1782.

and English fleets, returned upon his steps ; and pro-
ceeded toward his magazine at Amee. Upon the
return of the English army to Madras, a plan had
been concerted for the recovery of Cuddalore. The
return, indeed, of Hyder, by alarming the General
for the safety of Wandewash, made him wish to
lessen rather than increase his distance from that
fort ; but after a day’s march, having learned that
Hyder had passed the river Arnee, he proceeded in
the direction of Cuddalore, and on the 6th of Sep-
tember encamped on the red hills of Pondicherry.
Intelligence, here received, of the fall of Trincomalee,
of another action between the fleets, and of the in-
tention of the British Admiral to return to Madras,
induced the General, who had sustained a second
paralytic attack, to return to the same place with
the army.

The Presidency were thrown into the utmost agi-
tation and alarm by an unexpected event ; the re-
fusal of the Admiral to co-operate in the enterprise
against Cuddalore ; and the declaration of his in-
tention to proceed to Bombay, and leave the coast
during the ensuing monsoon. If the coast were left
unprotected by a British fleet, while the harbour of
Trincomalee enabled the enemy to remain, and while
Hyder was nearly undisputed master of the Carnatic,
nothing less was threatened than the extirpation of
the English from that quarter of India. Beside these
important considerations, the Council pressed upon
the mind of the Admiral the situation of the Presi-
dency in regard to food ; that their entire depend-
ence rested upon the supplies which might arrive by
sea ; that the stock in the warehouses did not ex-

DESERTION BY THE ADMIRAL.

255

ceed 30,000 bags ; that the quantity afloat in the book 5V-

roads amounted but to as much more, which the .

number of boats demanded for the daily service of 1782-
his squadron had deprived them of the means of
landing : that the monthly consumption was 50,000
bags at the least; and that, if the vessels on which
they depended for their supply were intercepted,

(such would be the certain consequence of a French
fleet without an English upon the coast,) nothing
less than famine was placed before their eyes. The
Admiral was reminded that he had remained in
safety upon the coast during the easterly monsoon of
the former year, and might still undoubtedly find
some harbour to afford him shelter. A letter too
was received express from Bengal, stating that Mr.

Ritchie, the marine surveyor, would undertake to
conduct his Majesty’s ships to a safe anchorage in
the mouth of the Bengal river. And it was known
that Sir Richard Bickerton, with a reinforcement
of five sail of the line from England, had already
touched at Bombay, and was on his way round for
Madras.

The Admiral remained deaf to all expostulations.

In the mean time intelligence was received that the
enemy was preparing to attack Negapatam. The
President had already prevailed upon Sir Eyre Coote
to send a detachment of 300 men under Colonel
Fullarton, into the southern provinces, which, since
the defeat of Colonel Brathwaite, had lain exposed
to the ravages of Hyder, and were now visited with
scarcity, and the prospect of famine. Within two
days of the former intelligence, accounts were re-
ceived that seventeen sail of the enemy’s fleet had

256

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1
CHAP. 5

1 782.

J- arrived at Negapatam, and that the place was already
- attacked. The most earnest expostulations were
still addressed to the Admiral in vain ; and the morn-
ing of the 15th of October exhibiting the appear-
ance of a storm, the fleet set sail and disappeared.
The following morning presented a tremendous spec-
tacle to the wretched inhabitants of Madras ; several
large vessels driven ashore ; others foundered at their
anchors ; all the small craft, amounting to nearly
100 in number, either sunk or stranded; and the
whole of the 30,000 bags of rice irretrievably gone.
The ravages of Hyder had driven crowds of the inha-
bitants from all parts of the country to seek refuge
at Madras, where multitudes were daily perishing of
want. Famine now raged in all his horrors ; and
the multitude of the dead and the dying threatened
to superadd the evils of pestilence. The bodies of
those who expired in the streets or the houses with-
out any one to inter them, were daily collected, and
piled in carts, to be buried in large trenches made
for the purpose out of the town, to the number, for
several weeks, of not less, it is said, than twelve or
fifteen hundred a-week. What was done to remove
the suffering inhabitants to the less exhausted parts
of the country, and to prevent unnecessary consump-
tion, the Governor sending away his horses, and
even his servants, could only mitigate, and that to a
small degree, the evils which were endured.1 On

1 The violence of the tendency there was to calumniate Lord Macart-
ney is witnessed by the absurd allegations which even found their way
into publications in England ; that he kept the grain on board the ships to
make his profit out of its engrossment. See Memoirs of the late War in
Asia, i. 413. — M. This is not asserted, nor insinuated, by the author of
the work cited : he merely states that such suspicions were entertained,

ALARMING STATE OF MADRAS.

257

the fourth day after the departure of Sir Edward B00K v-

. . . . CHAP. 5

Hughes and his fleet, Sir Richard Bickerton arrived,

with three regiments of 1000 each, Sir John Bur- 1782-
goyne’s regiment of light horse, amounting to 340,
and about 1000 recruits raised by the Company,
chiefly in Ireland ; but as soon as Sir Richard was
apprized of the motions of Sir E. Hughes, he imme-
diately put to sea, and proceeded after him to Bom-
bay. Sir Eyre Coote also, no longer equal to the
toils of command, set sail for Bengal; and General
Stuart remained at the head of the army, now en-
camped at Madras, with provisions for not many
days, and its pay six months in arrear.

The exclusive power over the military operations,
which had been intrusted to Coote, and which,
though it greatly impeded the exertions of the Presi-
dent, motives of delicacy and prudence forbade him
to withdraw, belonged, under no pretext, to General
Stuart ; and the Governor and Council proceeded to
carry their own plans into execution, for checking
the profuse expenditure of the army, and making the
most advantageous disposition of the troops. A re-
inforcement of 400 Europeans was despatched to
co-operate with the Bombay army in effecting a
diversion on the western side of Hyder’s dominions ;

300 of the same troops were sent to the northern
Circars against an apprehended invasion of the
French; and 500 to strengthen the garrison at Ne-
gapatam. Fortunately for the English, the French

according to the manner of the people, originating in some restrictions laid
upon the disposal of the cargoes, thought advisable by the government of
Madras, on public principles, such as were common in those days, before
political economy was understood. — W.

VOL. IV. S

258

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1782.

• had no information or conception of the unprotected
. and starving condition in which Madras had been
left. It remained unvisited, even by a few frigates
to intercept the corn-ships : and from Bengal and
the Circars considerable supplies were received. An
event also arrived, of such magnitude, as to affect
the views of almost every state in India, and sud-
denly to cheer the gloom which darkened the pros-
pects of the English. Their great enemy Hyder
Ali, who began his career in one of the lowest
situations of life ; who, totally destitute of the bene-
fits of education, raised himself to be the sovereign
of a great empire, and displayed a talent for govern-
ment and for war, of which they had met with no
example in India, died at Chittore in the beginning
of December, at an age not exactly ascertained, but
certainly exceeding eighty ; when his destined suc-
cessor Tippoo was at a great distance ; having been
detached to the western coast, to oppose Colonel
Humberstone’s invasion.

That officer, after remaining at Calicut from the
end of May till the beginning of September, pro-
ceeded to Palacotah, a strong fort, situated about a
mile from Palacatcherry, and commanding the great
southern pass between the coasts, with an army con-
sisting of more than 900 British troops, and 2000
Bombay sepoys ; beside 1200 sepoys with European
officers and serjeants, furnished by the King of Tan-
jore; and a proportional train of artillery, of which
however they were obliged, for want of draught
bullocks, to leave the whole of the heavy part, and
one half of the remainder by the way. They re-
mained before Ramgurree from the 20th of Septem-

OPERATIONS OF COLONEL HUMBERSTONE.

259

ber to the 6th of October. Being; deserted in the book v

° CHAP. O.

night, it was garrisoned with convalescents, and

made the centre of a chain of communications. 1782-
After taking another fort on the 14th, they ap-
proached Palacatcherry ; and on the 18th, without
much difficulty, dispersed the enemy, who met them
at about three miles’ distance from the fort. To take
Palacatcherry, without heavy artillery, was, after
three days’ inspection, considered impossible; and
the army were ordered to march at four o’clock on
the morning of the 22nd, in order to occupy a camp
at several miles’ distance, till the battering cannon
should arrive. Unfortunately, the officer who con-
ducted the retreat, instead of putting the line to the
right about, ordered them to countermarch, which
threw the baggage and stores to the rear. Apprized
of all their motions, the enemy dexterously watched
them in a narrow defile, till all except the rear guard
and the baggage had passed, when the enemy sud-
denly made an attack, and the whole of the provi-
sions, and almost all the ammunition, fell into their
hands. It now only remained for the English to
make their retreat to the coast with the greatest ex-
pedition. They were attacked from every thicket ;
exceedingly harassed both on flanks and rear :
during the two first days they hardly tasted food ;
and on the 18th of November, when they reached
Ramgurree, the fortifications of which, as well as
those of Mangaracotah, they blew up, they received
intelligence that Tippoo Saheb, with 20,000 men,
whom the weakness of the English in the Carnatic had
enabled Hyder to detach for the protection of his
western provinces, was advancing upon them with

S 2

260

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \
CHAP. 5.

J7S2.

• rapid marches, and already at hand. They had
- marched hut a few miles on the following morning,
when Tippoo’s advanced parties opened a cannonade
on their rear. Fighting every step of the march,
they arrived towards dark at the river Paniani, which
appeared impassable. After a painful search of two
hours a ford was found, which though it reached up
to the chin of an ordinary man, they resolved to at-
tempt, and happily passed with the loss of but two
black women, among the followers of the camp. The
enemy, expecting to find them an easy prey in the
morning, had totally neglected to watch them during
the night. Next day they reached the town of Pa-
niani, against which the operations of Tippoo were
immediately commenced.1 Before dawn on the 28th
of November, the enemy, divided into four columns,
including a portion of Lally’s corps, with that officer
himself at their head, made a strong assault upon the
English lines, as yet incomplete. They had dis-
lodged a body of sepoys, and were in possession of
the guns, before the English troops got under arms ;
when the forty-second regiment, advancing with
fixed bayonets, threw them into confusion. They
made various attempts to rally, but with considerable
slaughter were compelled to retreat.2 Tippoo con-
tinued the blockade, and was understood to be me-
ditating another attack, when he received the news
of his father’s decease. He departed immediately

1 The command had been assumed by Colonel Macleod, sent by Sir
Eyre Coote for the purpose, and -who arrived at Paniani on the 19th. — W.

! According to Wilks, the assault took place on the 29th; on the 30th
Sir E. Hughes with his squadron touched at Paniani, and reinforced the
detachment with 450 Europeans. — W.

GENERAL STUART’S OPPOSITION.

261

with a few horse, leaving orders for the army to
follow.

No sooner was intelligence received of the death
of Hyder, than Lord Macartney, aware of the feeble
cement of an Indian army, and justly estimating the
chances of its dispersion, if, at the moment of con-
sternation, it were vigorously attacked, expressed his
eagerness for action. General Stuart, instead of se-
conding this ardour, either by having the troops in
readiness, or putting them in motion, was employing
his time and his talents in squabbles with the civil
authority. Slight symptoms of military impatience,
under the command of the Company’s servants, had,
at different times, already appeared. But it was
under Coote, that it first assumed a formidable as-
pect. The independent authority which was yielded
to that commander corrupted the views of the mili-
tary officers ; and General Stuart was well calcu-
lated to uphold a controversy on the subject of his
own pretensions. From the moment of his elevation
to the command of the troops, and to a voice in the
deliberations which regulated their actions, he is ac-
cused of having diligently objected to almost every
proposal ; and of having filled the records of the
Company with teasing discussions on his own dig-
nity, privileges, and emoluments. The King’s offi-
cers, indeed, from an early period of their services in
India, assumed an air, proportionate, as they imagined
to the dignity of the master whom they served ; and
they now, under General Stuart, distinctly asserted
the doctrine of being at liberty to obey, or not to
obey the Company, as they themselves held fit. A
doctrine which implied the extinction of the civil au-

book v.

CHAP. 5.

1782.

262

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1783.

• thority, and went to subvert the government of the
. Company, appeared to Lord Macartney to demand an
explicit and decisive resistance. The Committee
agreed with him in recording a declaration ; That
when the King lent his troops for the service of the
Company, and when they passed from the pay of the
King into the pay of the Company, their obedience
to the Company, till the period of their recall, was a
condition necessary and understood : that the King
reserved to himself the regulation of their interior
economy ; but with regard to their operations, gave
them not so much as instructions ; which were left
exclusively to the Authority, for the service of which
they were employed. The General, having thought
fit to deliver to the Committee what he called an an-
swer to this declaration, and therein to assert a right
of judging when he should obey, and when not, re-
ceived by the unanimous resolution of the Com-
mittee, a positive order to send no commands or
instructions, except on business of discipline or detail,
to any of the King’s or Company’s officers without
the approbation of the Committee. To these deci-
sive measures General Stuart abstained from any
direct or declared resistance; and rather chose to
thw7art the views of the President and Council by
placing obstacles in their way. Upon their earnest
application, when the news arrived of the death
of Hyder, that the army should march, the General
affected to disbelieve the intelligence ; and, if it
was true, replied, that the army would be ready
for action in the proper time. When the fact
was ascertained, and the remonstrances were re-
doubled; when letters were daily received, describing

TIPPOO ASCENDS HIS FATHER’S THRONE.

263

the importance of the moment for striking a decisive 5V

blow ; when the commanding officer at Tripasore .

sent express intelligence, that the whole of the 1783-
enemy’s camp was in consternation, that numbers
had deserted, and that, in the opinion of the de-
serters, the whole army, if attacked before the arrival
of Tippoo, would immediately disband and fly into
their own country, the General declared the army
deficient in equipments for marching at that season
of the year ; though for upwards of a month he
had been receiving the strongest representations
on the necessity of keeping it in readiness for
action, with offers of the utmost exertions of the
government to provide for that purpose whatever
was required.

Tippoo, in the mean time, had admitted no delay.

Having reached Colar, where, he performed the ac-
customed ceremonies at the tomb of his father, he
pursued his course to the main army, which he joined
between Arnee and Yelore, about the end of Decem-
ber. The address and fidelity of the leading officers,1
who concealed the fatal event, had been able to
preserve some order and obedience among the troops
till he arrived; when the immediate payment of
their arrears, and a few popular regulations, firmly
established Tippoo on his father’s throne. Shortly
after his arrival he was joined by a French force from
Cuddalore, consisting of 900 Europeans, 250 Caffrees
and Topasses, 2000 sepoys, and twenty-two pieces of
artillery ; while at this time the whole of the British
force in the Carnatic, capable of taking the field,

1 The two principal ministers of Hyder were Hindus, both Brahmans.

Poornea and Kishen Rao. Wilks, ii. 413. — W.

264

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. amounted to no more than 2945 Europeans, and

CHAP. 5. # 1 *

11,545 natives.

I/83. On the 4th of January the army at last took the
field. On the 5th of February they marched. On
the eighth they arrived at Wandewash, where the
enemy appeared. On the 13th the General advanced
and offered battle ; when the enemy retired in haste
and disorder towards the river. He withdrew the
garrisons from Wandewash and Carangoly, which it
was held impracticable to maintain ; and blew up the
fortifications of both.1 He then marched towards
Velore, and at that place received intelligence that
Tippoo Saib was retreating from the Carnatic, that
he had ordered Arcot to be evacuated, and two sides
of the fort to be destroyed.

Tippoo was recalled, not only by the care of esta-
blishing his government, but of meeting a formidable
invasion on the western coast, which had already
approached the vitals of his kingdom. The English
army, which had been left unobstructed on his de-
parture from Paniani, about the beginning of De-
cember, proceeded about the end of that month, the
sepoys by land to Tellicherry, the European part, by
sea, to Merjee, about three hundred miles north of
Paniani. In January, General Mathews, with an
army under his command, from Bombay, arrived at
Merjee, and summoned to his standard the rest of
the troops on that part of the coast. He took by
storm the fort of Onore, and reduced some other

1 This was done in compliance, and in concurrence with the views of

the Madras government, but General Stuart afterwards expressed his

regret at having precipitately adopted a measure of which the army soon
felt the inconvenience. It also received the condemnation of the Supreme
Government. Wilks, ii, 424, 426. — W.

TIPPOO WITHDRAWN FROM CARNATIC.

265

places of smaller consequence; and about the middle BC°°^5V'

of the month, with a force consisting of about 1200

Europeans, eight battalions of Sepoys, and a propor- l783,
tionate quantity of artillery and Lascars, moved
toward the great pass which is known by the appel-
lation of the Hussain Gurry Ghaut.1 The ascent
consisted of a winding road of about five miles in
length, defended by batteries or redoubts at every
turning. The army entered the pass on the morning
of the 25th, and chiefly with the bayonet carried
every thing before them, till they reached a strong
redoubt at the top of the Ghaut ; this appeared im-
pregnable ; but a party clambering up the rocks
came round upon it behind, and the whole of the
pass was placed in their power. The next day they
advanced to Hyder-nagur, or Bednore, the rich
capital of one of the most important of all the depen-
dencies of Mysore. They were on their march with
no more than six rounds of ammunition for each man,
when an English prisoner arrived, with terms from
the Governor, and a proposal to surrender not only
the city of Bednore, but the country and all its
dependencies. With the capital, most of the minor
forts made a ready submisson ; but Ananpore, Man-
galore, and some others, held out. Ananpore, after
violating two flags of truce, stood the storm, and was
carried on the 14th of February. In Mangalore, a
breach being effected, the commander, unable to
prevail upon his people to maintain the defence, was
obliged to surrender. In these transactions, particu-

1 This movement, intended to advance upon Bednore, was in consequence
of positive orders from the Bombay Government, and in opposition to the
opinion of General Matthews. Wilks, ii. 448.

266

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAP. 5

1783.

• larly in the reduction of Onore and Ananpore, the
. English army have been accused of a barbarity
unusual at the hands of a civilized foe. It appears
not, however, that quarter, when asked, was refused;
but orders were given to shed the blood of every man
who was taken under arms, and some of the officers
were reprimanded for not seeing those orders rigidly
executed.1 After the acquisition of Mangalore the
General, with a portion of the army, returned to
Bednore, where the flames of discord were kindled
by pretensions to the spoil. A vast treasure amount-
ing to eighty-one lacs of pagodas, 801, 000£. besides
a quantity of jewels, was understood to have been
found in Bednore. Of this, though the army was in
the greatest distress for want of money, having re-
ceived no pay for twelve months, some of the troops
for a longer time, the General positively refused to
divide any part. The most vehement complaints and
remonstrances ensued. Refractory proceedings were
severely, if not abitrarily punished ; and three of the
leading officers, Colonel Macleod, Colonel Humber-
stone, and Major Shaw, left the army, and, proceeding
to Bombay, laid their representations before the Go-
vernor and Council. So flagrant to the Governor and
Council did the conduct of the General appear, that
they superseded him ; and appointed Colonel Mac-

1 See Annual Register for 1783; and “A Vindication of the English
Forces employed in the late War, under the command of Brigadier-
General Matthews, against the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun,” by sundry
Officers of the Bombay Establishment. Parliamentary Papers, ordered
to be printed, 11th March, 1791. — M. Wilks states that the garrison of
Anantpore was put to the sword in retaliation for what the English consi-
dered an act of treachery, their firing upon a party advancing under a pro-
mise of the peaceable surrender of the fort ; which promise had, without
any communication with the assailants, been revoked by a different
authority, v. ii, 453.— W.

THE ENGLISH IN REDNORE.

leod, the next in rank, to take the command in his B00K

chap.

stead. Suspicions of his rapacity blazed with violence;

but it ought to be remembered, that he lived not to 1783-
vindicate his own reputution ; and that in circum-
stances such as those in which he was placed, sus-
picions of rapacity are easily raised. 1

Colonel Macleod, now Brigadier-General, and
Commander-in-Chief, returning to the army with the
two other officers, in the Ranger snow, fell in with a
Mahratta fleet of five vessels off Geriah, on the 7th
of April. This fleet was not, it appears, apprized of
the peace ; and Macleod full of impatience, temerity.

1 As far as they originated with the disappointment of the army, they
were unfounded. No such amount of treasure could have been collected
in Bednore. The circumstances of the surrender of that place to the
English, which General Matthews thought little less than providential,
considering the defective state of his equipments, have been fully explained
by Colonel Wilks, from original documents. Bednore was yielded with-
out resistance, from the treason of the governor, Ayaz (Hyat) Khan, one
of Hyder’smilitary pupils or slaves, who had always been in disfavour with
Tippoo, who apprehended disgrace or death upon that prince’s accession ;
and who had intercepted orders for his destruction. He therefore at once
ceded the province and capital to the English, and upon its investment by
Tippoo, made his escape to Bombay. He probably stipulated for the pre-
servation of what treasure there was in the fort, and he claimed compen-
sation for what was lost, when the place was re-captured. His claim was
but 1,40,000 pagodas, and the accounts of the Finance minister of Mysore
state the embezzlement to have been upwards cf one lack, not eighty-one,
as particularized in the text. As usual, therefore, the English were
deceived by their own unreasonable expectations, and as the negotiation
between Ayaz and the General, w'as kept a profound secret; — indeed Col.
Wilks supposes it possible that General Matthews himself was not aware
of the motives of the Governor, which is by no means probable ; — they were
at a loss to understand why they were deprived of even so much of their
booty as was to be divided. The conduct of the General after the occu-
pation of Bednore, when the withdrawal of the positive orders of the Bom-
bay Government left him free to fall back upon the coast, exhibits as great
a want of military judgment, as his disputes with his officers manifested
irritability of temper. Col. Wilks has given a very copious and interest-
ing account of the whole of this calamitous transaction, vol. ii. 448, et
seq. — W.

268

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. and presumption, instead of attempting an explana-
_ tion, or submitting to be detained at Geriah for a few
1783. days, gave orders to resist. The Ranger was taken,
after almost every man in the ship was either killed
or wounded. Major Shaw was killed, and Macleod
and Humberstone wounded ; the latter mortally. He
died in a few days at Geriah, in the twenty-eighth
year of his age, and was lamented as an officer of the
most exalted promise ; a man, who nourished his
spirit with the contemplation of ancient heroes, and
devoted his hours to the study of the most abstruse
sciences connected with his profession.

During this interval, the forty-second regiment
was sent from Bednore to seize some forts below the
Ghauts ; the army was dispersed in detachments, to
occupy almost every town and mud-fort in the coun-
try ; nothing, it is said, was dreamt of but riches ;
intelligence, fortifications, and subsistence, were all
equally neglected. In this state of supine insensi-
bility, Tippoo suddenly appeared on the 9th of April,
drove in a detachment stationed four miles distant at
Fattiput, seized the town of Bednore, with a consi-
derable quantity of ammunition neglectfully remain-
ing without the magazine ; laid siege to the fort ;
and sent detachments to occupy the Ghauts, and
surrounding country. The English in Bednore were
then cut off from retreat ; the fortifications ruinous,
their ammunition expended, their provisions low, and
their numbers diminishing by disease and fatigue as
well as the sword. Honourable terms being pro-
mised, they surrendered by capitulation on the
30th of April ; but instead of being sent according
to agreement to the coast, they were put in irons and

THE ENGLISH IN BEDNORE MADE PRISONERS.

269

marched like felons to a dreadful imprisonment in B00K v-

L m CHAP. 5.

the strong fortresses of Mysore. To apologize for

this outrage upon the law of even barbarous nations, 1783-
Tippoo charged the English with a violation of the
articles of capitulation in robbing the public treasure ;
and the suspicions which were attached to the cha-
racter of the General have given currency to a story
that he ordered the bamboo of his palanquin to be
pierced and filled with pagodas.1

After this important success, Tippoo proceeded to
Mangalore, in which the remains of the English
army collected themselves, with such provisions as
the suddenness of the emergency allowed them to
procure. On the possession of Mangalore, the chief
fortress and the best harbour of Canara, Tippoo, as
well as his father, set an extraordinary value. On
the 16th of May, a reconnoitring party of his horse
appeared on a height near the town. On the 20th
the picquets, on the 23rd the outposts of the gar-
rison were driven in, and the investment of the place
was rendered complete.

1 That the public treasure was divided amongst the English, is uniformly
admitted. Annual Register, 1783. Wilks, ii. 462. Colonel Price who
was then serving with a detachment of General Matthews’s army
nearer the coast, observes, “ The account of the captured treasure was
at the time enormously exaggerated, but the imprudent and unwarrant-
able manner in which at the last extremity it was distributed, and that
after it had been determined to capitulate, furnished too plausible an
apology for that breach of the capitulation of which the Sultan became
immediately guilty.” The same officer gives an account of an operation,
the success of which might have had some effect upon a more favourable
result. A sortie from the citadel took the French detachment so com-
pletely by surprise, that it might easily have been destroyed. One of the
French officers, however, adroitly stepped forward, and requested a parley,
as if preparatory to a surrender. The commandant of the detachment
unwisely halted to receive his overtures, and during the pause the enemy
armed and repulsed their assailants. Memoirs of a Field Officer, 101.

270

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 5.

1783.

During the march of Tippoo from the Carnatic to
the western side of his kingdom, and the operations
which preceded his arrival at Mangalore, the follow-
ing occurrences took place at Madras. As soon as
the General ascertained the departure of the enemy,
he returned with the army, and on the 20th of
February encamped near the Mount. The policy of
supporting the English army in Bednore against
the army of Tippoo, by strong incursions on the
southern and eastern parts of his dominions, pre-
sented itself, in the strongest point of view, to the
Governor and Council. The army stationed in Tan-
jore and the southern provinces received orders to
march towards the west ; and to General Stuart it
was recommended, to march upon Tippoo’s frontier
in the direction of Vellore. Any such movement
he declared to he impossible ; and while the army
remained inactive, Suffrein, whom the British fleet
had not yet returned to oppose, found no difficulty in
landing Bussy, with a reinforcement of French
troops, at Cuddalore. It was an object of great im-
portance to recover possession of that place, before
the works should be strengthened, and the army of
Tippoo, with the French troops which were with
him, should he able to return. To all the expos-
tulations of the Governor and Council, the General
is accused of having replied, only by the statement
of wants and difficulties, operating as grounds of
delay. About fourteen days after the time fixed
upon by himself, that is, on the 21st of April, in
consequence of peremptory commands, he marched
with the army towards Cuddalore. Contrary to his
pledge, that he would not recall to his assistance the

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY AT MADRAS

271

southern army, without the strongest necessity, of book 5V-

which he engaged to apprize the Committee, he .

secretly wrote to the Commanding Officer three days 1783-
before his departure, to join him with the greatest
part of the force under his command. By this abuse
of their confidence, the Committee were induced to
withdraw the discretiouary power over the southern
army, which they had granted at his request. The
march from Madras to Cuddalore, about 100 miles,
is usually performed in twelve days. General Stuart
had no obstruction either to meet or to fear ; he wyas,
to a degree unusually perfect, supplied with all the
requisites for his march ; yet he spent forty days
upon the road, that is, marched at the rate of less
than three miles a-day, though the chance of success
mainly depended upon despatch, and the Admiral,
who was to co-operate with the expedition, declared
that he could not, for want of water and provisions,
remain before Cuddalore till the end of June. The
fleet had returned to Madras on the 12th of April,
augmented to seventeen sail of the line, four frigates,
and some smaller vessels ; and soon after, a fleet of
ten Indiamen, and three store-ships, with 1000 re-
cruits to the army, arrived under convoy of the
Bristol man-of-war, after a narrow escape from the
squadron of Suffrein.

The army arrived at Cuddalore on the 7th of
June, where the enemy had already thrown up, and
almost completed, considerable works. An attack was
to be made on these works on the 13th, in three several
places at once ; and it was planned to give the signal
by firing three guns from a hill. Amid the noise of
firing, a signal of this description could not be heard ;

272

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. ancj attacks were made at three several times.

CHAP. 5.

. The English were repulsed ; but the enemy quitting,

l783- in the pursuit, a part of their works, which were dex-
terously occupied by a division of the English army,
were thrown into consternation, and withdrew. This
attack had nearly incurred the ruin of the English
army, and left sixty-two officers, and 920 men,
almost all Europeans, either dead or mortally wounded
on the field. The English lay upon their arms dur-
ing the night in expectation of an attack, which the
troops, fatigued and unprotected, would have found
it difficult to sustain. But the spirit of Bussy was
chilled by age and infirmities ; and he restrained the
impetuosity of his officers, who confidently predicted
the destruction of the British army.1

On the following day Sir Edward Hughes, and
Suffrein, who had followed him from Trincomalee,
arrived with their respective fleets. The English
remained at anchor till the 16th; on the 17th, and
two succeeding days, the fleets performed a variety
of movements for the purpose of gaining or keeping
the wind ; and about four o’clock on the 20th they
engaged. The English consisted of eighteen sail,
the French only of sixteen, and so leaky, that most

1 No such cause of confusion as that indicated by the text, is noticed by
Wilks, nor does it appear that three simultaneous movements were
intended ; the object was to gain possession of what was considered the
key of the enemy’s position. The first operation, which was merely preli-
minary, succeeded. The second failed, and rendered a third necessary,
which succeeded but partially. Thirteen guns, and the key of the con-
tested position remained in possession of the English army. The retire-
ment of the French on the same night, within the walls of Cuddalore,
evinced their sense of the operations of the day, but their being permitted
during the night to draw off without molestation all their heavy guns, fur-
nished equal evidence of the impression made upon the English by a vic-
tory so dearly purchased. — W.

OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH.

273

of them it was necessary to pump during the battle : book rv

yet Suffrein, by dexterous management, contrived

in several instances to place two of his vessels upon 1783-
one of the English, of which five were but little
engaged. The combatants were parted by night, and
the next day the French were out of sight, but ap-
peared at anchor in the road of Porto Novo on the
morning of the 22nd. The British Admiral, deeming
it inexpedient to attack them, only offered battle, and
then made sail for Madras.1 It has been both
asserted and denied that Suffrein weighed, and
stood after him ; but it is certain that he arrived at
Cuddalore on the following day. He immediately
proceeded to land as many men as he could spare
from the fleet : and measures were concerted between
him and Bussy for the most vigorous operations.

They made a sally on the 25th, which was repulsed ;2
but a grand effort was preparing for the 4th of July;
and so much were the English reduced by the sword,
by sickness, and fatigue, that the most fatal conse-
quences were probable and feared. Sir Edward
Hughes at Madras, and the British army exposed to

1 The English fleet was much crippled by the sickly state of the crews.

Eleven hundred sick of the scurvy had been landed at Madras ; and in the
short space of a fortnight, seventeen hundred more had from the same
cause become unfit for duty. On the other hand Suffrein had been rein-
forced by Bussy on the night of the 17th, with 1200 men, giving him the
advantage at the lowest estimate of 3000 hands more than the strength of
Sir Edward Hughes. After the action, not only were the men re-landed,
but 2400 men wrere furnished from the fleet. Asiat. Reg. 1783. Wilks,
ii. 440.— W.

* In this affair, Marshal Bernadotte afterwards Crown Prince of Sweden,
served as a Serjeant in the French army, and was wounded and taken
prisoner, as he acknowledged at a subsequent period to General Langen-
heim, who at Cuddalore w'as Commandant of the Hanoverian troops in
the British service, and who had treated him with particular kindness.

See the Anecdote in Wilks, ii. 442. — W.

VOL. IV.

274

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. Suffrein and Bussy at Cuddalore, presented a dismal

CHAP. 5. ... 1

prospect to the imaginations of the Governor and

1783. Council; when intelligence was received of the
signature in Europe of a treaty of peace between the
English and French. It was immediately resolved,
though official intelligence had not yet arrived, to
send a flag of truce to Bussy, recommending an im-
mediate cessation of arms. To this proposal the
French commander acceded, with less difficulty than
might have been expected. Bussy even consented to
invite Tippoo to a participation in the peace, and to
send positive orders to the French troops to retire
immediately from his service.

Upon the evacuation of the Carnatic by Tippoo,
the occasion w’as not omitted of making to him an
overture of peace by means of a Brahmen, in the
confidence of the King of Tanjore. A favourable
answer was remitted ; but a point of etiquette, for
which the Governor was a great stickler, leading
to another on the part of Tippoo, broke off the
negotiation. To the application from Bussy, how-
ever, an answer was returned in little more than a
month, offering peace upon certain conditions, and
expressing a desire to send two ambassadors to
Madras. Upon the arrival of the vakeels it appeared
that a peace, upon the basis of a mutual restitution
of conquests, might easily be made ; and for the
acceleration of so desirable an event, especially on
account of the prisoners, to whose feelings, and even
lives, a few weeks were of importance, it was deemed
expedient to send three commissioners along with
Tippoo’s vakeels, to expedite on the spot the business
of negotiation.

GENERAL STUART ARRESTED FOR DISOBEDIENCE.

275

Measures, in the mean time, were pursued for B00K v-

creating a diversion in favour of the detachment

besieged in Mangalore. The two divisions of the 1783-
army which were stationed for the protection, the
one of the northern, the other of the southern pro-
vinces, were reinforced ; and instructed to threaten
or attack the enemy in that part of his dominions to
which they approached. The division in the south was,
in the opinion of Colonel Fullarton, by whom it was
commanded, augmented sufficiently to penetrate into
the very heart of Mysore, and possibly to attack the
capital itself.

Amid these proceedings, the contentions which
prevailed between the heads of the civil and military
departments were hastening to a decision. Along
with, the flag of truce which was forwarded to the
French, it was resolved in the Committee to send
orders for the recall of General Stuart to the Presi-
dency, as well because they could not depend upon
his obedience, as because they deemed it necessary
to hear the account which he might render of his
conduct. After a temporary neglect of the com-
mands of the Committee, the General thought
proper to leave the army and proceed to Madras ;
where, superseding mutual explanations, the cus-
tomary disputes were renewed and inflamed. The
Governor at last submitted to the Committee a
motion, that General Stuart should be dismissed from
the Company’s service. In the minute by which this
motion was introduced, the misconduct of the General
in the expedition to Cuddalore, and the acts of dis-
obedience, which were sufficient in number and
magnitude to imply the transfer of all power into his

t 2

276

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAP. 5

1783.

hands, were stated as the principal grounds of the
. proposed proceeding ; to which the votes of the Com-
mittee immediately imparted their unanimous sanction.
Stuart, however, announced his determination to
retain the command of the King’s troops ; and Sir
John Burgoyne, on whom, as second in rank, the
command would devolve, intimated his intention to
obey the orders of General Stuart. Decisive acts
were now inevitable. The Town Adjutant, accom-
panied by the Governor’s Private Secretary, and a
party of sepoys, proceeded to the villa of the General,
and brought him quietly a prisoner to the fort; where
he remained a few days, and was then embarked for
England.

The original plan, to the execution of which the
army in the south was destined, was, that it should
penetrate on the one side, and the army under Colonel
Humberstone at Paniani on the other, into the coun-
try of Coimbetore, forming a line of communication
from the one coast to the other, through the middle
of Tippoo’s dominions. In this scheme, which was
framed and suggested by Mr. Sullivan, the gentleman
at the head of the civil department in the Trichi-
nopoly district, was included a negotiation for raising
disturbance against Tippoo in his own dominions, by
setting up the pretensions of the deposed Raja of
Mysore. In the months of April and May, 1783,
the forts of Caroor, Aravarcouchy, and Dindigul,
were reduced ; but the exhausted state of the coun-
try, not more from the ravages of the enemy, than
the disorganization of the government, cramped the
operations of the army by scarcity of supplies. The
first object of Colonel Fullarton, who took the com-

OPERATIONS OF COLONEL FULLARTON.

277

mancl of the southern army, was to augment the field

force by battalions from Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and

Tinivelly ; and, vigorously aided as he was by the 1783-
chief civil servants of the Company, not only to pro-
cure supplies, but soothe the minds, and conciliate
the favour, of the different classes of the people. It
was not before the 25th of May, 1783, that he began
to march from Dindigul towards Daraporam. The
reduction of this place, which fell on the 2nd of June,
afforded one incident, which, being a characteristic
circumstance, deserves to be stated. It was impossi-
ble to approach so near the fort as to determine with
precision the most advantageous point of attack. One
spy explained the circumstances of the place to the
Commanding Officer, and another to the Adjutant-
General. Each of these officers drew a plan from
the description which he himself had received ; and
they coincided so exactly both with one another, and
with the facts, that a body of troops marched in a
dark night, crossed a river, and occupied a strong
position within 400 yards of the fort, where the bat-
teries were constructed which effected the breach.

The accuracy with which the Indian spies convey the
idea of a fort, even by verbal communication, and
still more by models made of clay, is represented as
not surprising only, but almost incredible. The
orders which General Stuart, unknown to the Com-
mittee, dispatched to the southern army, stopped them
at this point in their career of conquest ; and they
were within three miles of the enemy’s camp when
they received intelligence that hostilities with the
French had ceased, and that an armistice was con-

278

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAP. 5

1783.

eluded with Tippoo.1 * In the interval Colonel Ful-
- larton had proceeded with great activity in restoring
obedience and order in Madura and Tinivelly, in
which, during the distress of the Madras govern-
ment, almost all the Poly gars had revolted. Accord-
ing to Fullarton, the management of the province by
the Company’s and the Nabob’s servants had been
corrupt and oppressive, and hence pregnant with
disorder, in the extreme. One single exception he
produces, Mahomed Issoof Khan. “ While he ruled
these provinces, his whole administration denoted
vigour and effect : his justice was unquestioned, his
wrord unalterable, his measures were happily com-
bined and firmly executed, the guilty had no refuge
from punishment. On comparing,” says the Eng-
lish commander, “ the state of that country with his
conduct and remarks, I found that wisdom, vigour,
and integrity, were never more conspicuous in any
person of whatever climate or complexion.”3 In the
month of August, when the reinforcements had
joined him from the army at Cuddalore, and the
Polygars were sufficiently reduced and humbled to
be disposed to a general submission, this Commander
moved towards the frontier of Mysore, under instruc-
tions to remain inactive, while the result was uncer-
tain of the negotiation with Tippoo. In the interval
thus afforded, among other arrangements, Colonel

1 Colonel Fullarton received, at the same time, orders from the General
to advance ; from the government to return to the South ; of the relative
judiciousness of these orders, he demonstrated his opinion by disobeying
the latter. The strengthening of General Stuart’s army was of much more
importance than an ineffective attempt at diverting Tippoo from the siege

of Bednore. Fullarton’s View, p. 115. — W.

* Fullarton’s View of the English Interests in India, p. 139.

CONTRADICTORY ORDERS RECEIVED BY FULLARTON.

279

Fullarton established a system of intelligence, under

a defect of which the English had laboured during

the whole of the war: and established it in such 1783-
perfection, even into the heart of the enemy’s coun-
try, that, r‘ during many months,” to use his own
expressions, “ of continued marching, through a
country almost unexplored, he never once failed in
his supplies, nor did any material incident escape
his knowledge.” On the 18th of October, when
the supplies of the army were almost exhausted,
intelligence arrived, that Tippoo had recommenced
hostilities against Mangalore. Colonel Fullarton
had long meditated an enterprise against Seringa-
patam, but none of the forts, directly in the route,
were sufficiently strong to be confided in as an inter-
mediate magazine, or, in the event of failure, as a
place of retreat. It was therefore determined to
march upon Palacatcherry, which was one of the
strongest places in India, commanded the pass be-
tween the coasts, and secured a communication with
a great extent of fertile country. After a march of
great difficulty, much impeded by woods and inces-
sant rain, the army reached Palacatcherry on the
4th of November. They immediately commenced
and carried on their operations with great vigour;
but the strength of the place, and the active resist-
ance of the garrison, threatened them with a tedious
siege. On the 13th, two batteries were opened, and
before sun-set the defences of the enemy were so
much impaired, that their fire was considerably
abated. At night Captain Maitland took advantage
of a heavy rain to drive the enemy from the covert
way, and to pursue them within the first gateway,

280

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK ’
CHAP. 5

1783.

‘ to the second : here he was stopped, hut gallantly
- defended himself, till additional troops arrived ; when
the enemy, alarmed by the idea of a general assault,
called for quarter, and put the English in possession
of the fort. The army then marched to Coimbetore,
which they reached on the 26th of November, and
which surrendered before they effected a breach.
They had now the conquest of Seringapatam, and
the entire subversion of the power of Tippoo, full in
their view. The brave garrison of Mangalore had
long baffled his wdiole army, which had suffered
severely by a perseverance in the siege during the
wdiole of the rains. A chain of connected operations
could now be carried on by the army of Colonel
Macleod on the western coast, and that of Fullarton
in the south. The army of the north was acting in
Cudapah, in which and the neighbouring provinces
the power of Tippoo was ill established. All the
petty princes on the western coast were supposed
ready to shake off their dependance. The co-opera-
tion was confidently expected of the Hindu inhabi-
tants of Mysore, of whom the Brahmens were in
correspondence with the English. Fullarton had
provided his army with ten days’ grain, repaired the
carriages, and made every arrangement for pushing
forward to Seringapatam, with nothing but victory
sparkling in his eye ; when he received, on the 28th
of November, commands from the Commissioners,
appointed to treat with Tippoo, to restore immedi-
ately all posts, forts, and countries, lately reduced,
and to retire within the limits occupied on the 26th
of July. He had made some progress in the execu-
tion of these commands, when he received on the

OPERATIONS OF TIPPOO.

281

26th of January, directions to re-assemble the army, BC°°^5V'

and prepare for a renewal of the war.

The negotiators, whom the President and Council 1,S3’
had dispatched to the presence of Tippoo, for the
purpose of accelerating the conclusion of peace, had
not attained their object without many difficulties
and considerable delay. Scarcely had they entered
the territory of the enemy, when they were required,
and almost commanded, to surrender Mangalore,
which they regarded as the chief security for the
lives and restoration of the English prisoners in the
hands of Tippoo. On their approach to Seringapatam
they were made acquainted with the intention to
conduct them to Mangalore. No communication
was allowed between them and their unfortunate
countrymen, when they passed Bangalore, and other
places in which they were confined. Their letters,
both to and fro, were intercepted. Upon complain-
ing they were informed, that Colonel Fullarton not-
withstanding the commencement of their mission for
peace, had taken and plundered the forts of Pala-
catcherry and Coimbetore. Not aware that the pro-
ceedings of Fullarton were justified by the intelli-
gence which he had received of Tippoo’s breach of
faith to the garrison at Mangalore, they sent their
commands to that officer to restore the places, which,
since the date of their commission, had fallen into
his hands. After a tedious and harrassing journey,
through a country almost impassable, in which some
of their attendants and cattle actually perished, they
joined Tippoo at Mangalore, where he had wasted
almost a year, and a considerable portion of his
army.

282

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1783.

The force with which, in the month of May, in
the preceeding year, he invested Mangalore, is
stated at 60,000 horse, 30,000 disciplined sepoys,
600 French infantry, under the command of Colonel
Cossigny, Lally’s corps of Europeans and natives, a
French troop of dismounted cavalry, commanded by
an officer of the King of France, irregular troops to
the amount of many thousands, and nearly one hun-
dreds pieces of artillery. The British garrison con-
sisted of 696 Europeans, including officers, and 2850
black troops, besides pioneers, and camp followers.
The operations of the enemy proceeded with so much
activity, that on the 27th of May they had completed
eleven embrasures, which the English made an effort
to destroy, but were repulsed. On the 29th, large
stones, some of them weighing 150 pounds, began
to be thrown by mortars into the town. As often as
they lighted upon soft earth, they buried themselves
without mischief: When they fell upon houses, they
laid them open, where no materials could be had to
repair them, to all the inclemency of the monsoon:
When they fell upon a substance harder than them-
selves they were dashed into a thousand pieces ; and
even the wounds and lacerations which were pro-
duced by the splinters proved peculiarly destructive,
hardly any person surviving wrho received them.

From batteries erected on the north, the east, and
the south, a heavy fire was constantly maintained ;
the feeble fortifications on the northern side were
entirely dismantled on the 4th of June; on the 7th
a practicable breach was effected in the wall ; and
the English, especially as a flag of truce had been re-
jected, looked for an immediate assault. In the

OPERATIONS OF TIPPOO AGAINST MANGALORE.

283

mean time they repulsed with the bayonet repeated Bc(^^ 5V'

attacks on the batteries which they had erected with

out the fortress ; repeatedly silenced the batteries of 1783'
the enemy, and spiked their guns, which were as
often expeditiously repaired. Masked batteries were
opened and the approaches of the enemy brought so
near, that they threw fascines on the covered way,
and edge of the glacis. On the 4th of July, the
assault was undertaken. A body of troops, armed
with knives, of the shape of pruning hooks, two feet
long, and with spears mounted on light bamboos of
a prodigious length, rushed into a tower on the left
of the eastern gate, wThile the line marched forward
to support them. The enterprise did not succeed.

The assaulting party were so warmly received, that
they were soon disposed to retreat. On the 6th a
general attack was made on the northern covered
way, which, though very fierce and obstinate, was
also repulsed. The garrison were now obliged to
defend themselves from almost daily attempts to
penetrate into the fort, while they severely suffered
both from scarcity and disease. At last intelligence
arrived of the peace between France and England,
with the orders of Bussy to the French to co-operate
no longer in the hostilities of Tippoo. The French
envoy made some efforts to effect a pacification ;
but even during the suspensions of hostilities, which
were frequently terminated, and frequently renewed,

Tippoo continued his operations. A trait of Indian
humanity ought not to be forgotten. During the
progress of hostilities, and especially after the pros-
pect of peace, the enemy’s centinels in many instances
beckoned to the men to get under cover, and avoid

284

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

bl°h°J A their fire : a generosity which the English were

well disposed to return. At last, after a long and

1/83‘ intricate correspondence, a cessation of hostilities,
including the garrisons of Onore1 and Carwar, was
concluded on the 2d of August. Of this agreement
one important condition was, that the English garri-
son should three times a week be furnished with a
plentiful market of provisions, at the rates ofTippoo’s
camp. This was evaded, and prices were daily, in
such a manner, increased, that a fowl was sold at
eight, and even twelve rupees ; and other things in a
like proportion. At last the market was wholly cut
off; and horse flesh, frogs, snakes, ravenous birds,
kites, rats, and mice, wTere greedily consumed. Even
jackals, devouring the bodies of the dead, were
eagerly shot at for food. The garrison had suffered
these evils with uncommon perseverance, when a
squadron appeared on the 22d of N ovember, with a
considerable army under General Macleod. Instead
of landing, the General, by means of his secretary,
carried on a tedious negotiation with Tippoo ; and
having stipulated that provisions for one month
should be admitted into the fortress, set sail with the
reinforcement on the 1 st of December.2 Even this

1 For a very interesting detail of the defence of Onore, which was
maintained with consummate ability and heroism, by Captain Torriano,
till the conclusion of the treaty, see Forbes’s Oriental Memoirs, iv. Ill
to 175.

2 The excuse was, that it would have been a violation of the armistice,
which did not expire till the 2nd December, and the ships could not wait
another day for want of water. The armistice had been repeatedly
broken by Tippoo. Colonel Wilks states the reasons assigned for this
neglect of the garrison, but they are anything but satisfactory, ii.
■176.— W.

COMMISSIONERS OF NEGOTIATION.

285

supply was drawn from damaged stores bought of a
navy agent, and of the beef and pork, not one in twenty
pieces could be eaten, even by the dogs. Another
visit, with a similar result, was made by General
Macleod, on the 31st of December. The desertion
of the sepoys, and the mutiny of the Europeans, were
now daily apprehended ; two-thirds of the garrison
were sick, and the rest had scarcely strength to sus-
tain their arms : the deaths amounted to twelve or
fifteen every day ; and at last, having endured these
calamities till the 23d of January, the gallant Camp-
bell, by whom the garrison had been so nobly com-
manded, offered, on honourable terms, to withdraw
the troops. The Sultan wms too eager to put an end
to a siege which by desertion and death had cost him
nearly half his army, to brave the constancy of so
firm a foe ; and they marched to Tellicherry, with
arms, accoutrements, and the honours of war.

The negotiating commissioners, whose journey
had been purposely retarded, were now allowed to
approach. The injuries which the English had sus-
tained, since Tippoo had joined in the business of
negotiation, were such, as in a prouder state of the
English mind, would have appeared to call for signal
retribution. But the debility and dejection to which
their countrymen were now reduced, and their despair
of resources to continue the war, impressed the nego-
tiators with a very unusual admiration of the advan-
tages of peace ; and meeting the crafty and deceitful
practices of Tippoo with temper and perseverance,
they succeeded, on the 11th of March, 1784, in gain-
ing his signature to a treaty, by which, on the general

book v.

CHAP. 5.

1784.

286

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 5.

1784.

condition of a mutual restitution of conquests, peace
was obtained.1

It is only necessary, further, to relate the manner
in which the treaty was ratified by the Governor-
General and Council; and to explain the mode in
which, during these momentous transactions, the
relations between the Supreme and Subordinate Pre-
sidency were maintained. Lord Macartney wTas not
only of superior rank to the highest of the Company’s
servants in India, but in him was set one of the first
examples of elevating a servant of the king to a high
station in that country ; and of intercepting the great
prizes which animated the ambition of the individuals
rising though the several stages of the Company’s
service. To these causes of jealousy were added,
recommendations and injunctions, which had been
pressed upon so many governors, and which had not
failed to involve in odium and difficulties as many as
had attempted to obey them ; recommendations and
injunctions, of peculiar urgency, to correct abuses and
effect retrenchments. Though the accomplishments
and talents of Lord Macartney, which were not of an
ordinary kind, and a considerable propensity to vain

1 For the narrative of the preceding events, have been explored, and
confronted, Papers presented to the House of Commons, pursuant to their
orders of the 9th of February, 1803, regarding the affairs of the Carnatic,
vol. ii. ; Barrow’s Macartney, i. 109 — 232; Memoirs of the late War in
Asia, i. 231 — 236, 252 — 286, and 403 — 512 ; A View of the English In-
terests in India, by William Fullarton, M. P., p. 68 — 195 ; Annual
Register for 1782 and 1783 ; the Collection of Treaties and Engagements
with the native princes of India ; and the Sixth Report of the Committee
of Secrecy of 1782. The recent narrative of Colonel Wilks, drawn up
under the advantages of peculiar knowledge, affords me the satisfaction of
perceiving, that there is no material fact which my former authorities had
not enabled me to state and to comprehend.

DEPORTMENT OF HASTINGS AND LORD MACARTNEY.

287

glory might have added to the flames of discord, the
calmness of his temper, his moderation, and urbanity,
were well calculated to allay them. He was aware
of the sentiments to which, among the members of
the superior government, his appearance in India was
likely to give origin ; and lost no time in endeavour-
ing to avert the jealousy which might naturally arise.
He not only assured the Governor-General of the
sentiments of esteem, and even of admiration, with
which all that he knew of his administration inspired
him, but openly disclaimed all designs upon the
government of Bengal ; and declared that the objects
were not Indian to which his ambition was directed.
Mr. Hastings met his professions with similar pro-
testations, both of personal regard, and of desire for
co-operation. He also expressed his regret that the
suddenness of the arrival of Lord Macartney had not
allowed him the opportunity to furnish to that noble-
man the explanation of certain acts, by which the
Supreme Government might appear to him to have
passed beyond the limits of its own province, and to
have taken upon itself an authority which belonged
to the Presidency of which he was now at the head.

Of the acts to which Mr. Hastings made allusion,
one was, the treaty, into which, in the beginning of
the year 1781, he had entered with the Dutch. The
object of that measure was to obtain, through the
Governors of Colombo and Cochin, a military force
to assist in the expulsion of Hyder from the Carnatic;
but as these Governors acted under the authority of
the government of Batavia, for whose sanction there
was no leisure to wait, a tempting advantage was
represented as necessary to prevail upon them to

book v.

CHAP. 5.

1784.

268

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1784.

• incur so unusual a responsibility. The negotiation
- was carried on through the medium of the Director of
the Dutch settlements in Bengal ; and it was stipu-
lated that for 1000 European infantry, 200 European
artillery, and 1000 Malays, who should be paid and
maintained by the Company, during the period of
their service, the province of Tinivelly should be
ceded to the Dutch, together with the liberty of
making conquests in the neighbourhood of Cochin,
and the exclusive right to the pearl fishery on the
whole of the coast south from Ramiscram. In name
and ostent, the sovereignty of the Nabob Mahomed
Ali was not to be infringed ; and the treaty, framed
and concluded for him, was not to be ratified by his
signature. The small value of the cession, and the
extreme danger of the Carnatic, were urged as the
motives to induce compliance on the part both of the
Nabob, and of the Presidency of Madras. The ideas,
howmver, of the Nabob, and of the Presidency of
Madras, differed very widely from those of the
Governor-General, respecting the value both of what
was to be given and what was to be received. They
not only set a high estimate on Tinivelly, but treated
the offer of a body of troops, when they were much
less in wTant of troops than of money to pay and
maintain those which they had, as a matter of doubt-
ful utility. In consequence, they declined to for-
ward the treaty, transmitting their reasons to the
Court of Directors. And the accession of the Dutch
to the enemies of England, of which Macartney
carried out the intelligence, superseded, on that
ground, all further proceedings.1

* Supplement to the First Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1782,
p. 8, 9 ; and the Sixth ditto, p. 118.

DEPORTMENT OF HASTINGS AND LORD MACARTNEY. 289

Of the transactions, which Mr. Hastings might book v.

expect to impress unfavourably the mind of the noble

President, another was, that of which the history has 1784-
already occurred ; the engagement into which he and
his Council had entered, for setting aside the inter-
vention of the Government of Madras, and transact-
ing directly with the Nabob of Arcot. Under the
same predicament was placed the negotiation into
which the Governor-General and Council of Bengal
had entered with Nizam Ali, the Subahdar of the
Deccan, for obtaining from that Prince the aid of a
body of his horse, and for ceding to him in return
the Northern Circars. Though a treaty to this effect
had been fully arranged, yet as the orders for carry-
ing it into execution had not been despatched when
Lord Macartney arrived, Mr. Hastings paid him the
compliment of submitting it for his opinion. On this
occasion also, the Governor-General represented, as
of vast importance, the aid which the Company was
thus to receive ; and ascribed but little value to the
territory which they were about to surrender, both
as it yielded a trifling revenue, and, being a narrow
strip along the coast, was, by its extent of frontier,
difficult to defend. Here again the opinions of the
Governor-General found themselves widely at vari-
ance with those of the Governor of Fort St. George.

Lord Macartney stated the net revenue for that year
of the four Northern Circars, not including Guntoor,
at 612,000 pagodas ; he affirmed that to the English
the defence of territory was easy, not in proportion to
its remoteness from the sea, but the contrary, as a
communication with their ships enabled the troops to
move in every direction ; that as manufacturing dis-

VOL. IV.

290

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

Bcii^ 5 ‘ Uriels, the Circars were of great importance to the

Company’s investment ; that they would he impor-

1784. tant in a still higher point of view, as forming a line
of communication between Bengal and the Carnatic,
and giving to the English the whole of the eastern
coast, when they should be augmented by Guntoor
and Cuttack; and that the friendship of Nizam Ali
was of no value, both as no dependence could he
placed on his faith, and as the expense of his undis-
ciplined and ungovernable horse would far outgo the
utility of their service. On all these accounts Lord
Macartney declared, that, without the special com-
mand of his employers, he could not reconcile it to his
sense of duty to consent to the treaty which was pro-
posed. Mr. Hastings gave way ; but a diffidence so
marked of his judgment, or his virtue, did not lessen
the alienation towards the government of Madras,
with temptations to which the situation of the
Governor-General so largely supplied him.

The first occasion on which his measures gave un-
easiness to the government of Madras, was furnished
by the complaints of Coote, whom that government
found it impossible to satisfy with power. Instead
of interposing with their authority to allay the un-
reasonable dissatisfactions of the querulous General,
and to strengthen the hands, at so perilous a moment,
of the government of Madras, the supreme Council
encouraged his discontent, and laid their exhortations
upon the Presidency of Madras, to place themselves
in hardly any other capacity than that of Commis-
saries to supply his army, and while they continued
responsible for the acts of the government, to retain
with them hardly any other connexion, in no degree to

DEPORTMENT OF HASTINGS AND LORD MACARTNEY.

291

possess over them any substantial control. As the B00K v-

coolness on the part of the Governor-General seemed

to Macartney to increase, and to threaten unfavourable 1/ Sl
consequences, which it was of the utmost importance
to avert, he sent to Bengal, in the beginning of the
year 1782, his confidential secretary Mr. Staunton,
in whose judgment and fidelity he placed the
greatest reliance, to effect a complete mutual expla-
nation, and, if possible, to secure harmony and co-
operation. With this proceeding Mr. Hastings ex-
pressed the highest satisfaction, and declared his
“ anxious desire to co-operate with Lord Macartney
firmly and liberally for the security of the Carnatic,
for the support of his authority, and for the honour
of his administration.” But, even at the time when
he was making these cordial professions, and enter-
taining Mr. Staunton with the highest civilities in
his house, he signed, as President of the Supreme
Council, whose voice was his own, a letter to the
President and Council of Madras, in which, with an
intimation of a right to command, they say they “ do
most earnestly recommend, that Sir Eyre Coote’s
wishes in regard to power may be gratified to their
fullest possible extent; and that he may be allowed
an unparticipated command over all the forces acting
under British authority in the Carnatic.” Though
Macartney announced his determination to act under
this recommendation, as if it were a legal command,
he yet displayed, first in a private letter to the
Governor-General, to which no answer was ever
returned, and also in a public communication, in the
name of the Select Committee of the Council of
Madras, his opinion, that the measure, as it regarded

u 2

292

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. either the antecedent conduct of the governor and

CHAP. 5. # °

. Council of Madras, or the nature of the case, was

1784- destitute of all reasonable ground ; calculated to
involve the Madras government in difficulties; and
liable to produce the most dangerous consequences.
Of the rooted enmity of the Governor-General he
regarded this proceeding as a decisive proof. And
from this time but little between the Presidencies
was preserved even of the appearance of concert.1

Of the inconvenience to themselves of the transfer
which the Supreme Council had ordered of the
powers of the Presidency, one instance speedily oc-
curred. Upon a requisition to send a detachment
from Madras to Bombay, the President and Council
were obliged to return for answer, that compliance
no longer remained in their power, since all autho-
rity over the troops resided in the General. It is
remarkable enough that this incident, which, with
others of the like description, might have been so
easily foreseen, determined the Supreme Council to
revoke the orders which they had formerly given,
and by explaining away the meaning of their former

1 The importance of the services of Coote, and the advantage of leaving
to his experience and skill the control of all military operations, was fully
evinced by the events that followed his retirement and death. Mismanaged
as the war had been by General Stuart and the Government of Madras, it
seems probable that but for the opportune occurrence of peace with France,
the South of India would have been lost to the English. The annihi-
lation of the army at Cuddalore would have been followed by the siege of
Madras, and there was little chance of defending it successfully against
Tippoo and the French. Without denying that there was much to reprehend
in the conduct of the military authorities, yet it is evident that there w^as
a constant disposition in the civil authorities of Madras to appropriate the
direction of military affairs, and to interfere beyond the strict necessity
of interference, which exposed them, not without reason, to the disappro-
bation of the Bengal Government. — W.

MISCONDUCT OF HASTINGS.

293

words, to substitute a new regulation for the degree
of power with which the General was to be supplied. -
A great diminution, following close in succession
upon a great enlargement of power, was not likely
to produce a healing effect upon such a temper as
that of Coote. He now insisted upon relinquishing
the command of the army ; and on the 28th of Sep-
tember, 1782, sailed for Bengal. Measures for
giving him satisfaction were there concerted between
him and the Supreme Council; and he departed from
Bengal in the following spring to resume the com-
mand. It has been historically stated, and without
contradiction, that nothing but an accident prevented
the two Presidents, even at that trying moment, from
plunging their countrymen in India into something
of the nature of a civil war : That Coote was
despatched with powers to resume the military com-
mand, exempt from dependence upon the Madras
government : And that to this illegal subversion of
the authority of the subordinate Presidency Lord
Macartney was determined not to submit. 1 The
death of the General happily prevented the chance
of a struggle. The ship, in which he was proceeding
from the Ganges to the coast, was chased several
days by some of the French cruisers, and at times
in imminent danger ; the extreme anxiety of this
situation operating upon the irritable and enfeebled
frame of the General, accelerated a third fit of apo-
plexy, and terminated his life on the 26th of April,

book v.

chap. 5.

1784.

1 Memoirs of the late War in Asia, i. 429. — M. This can scarcely be
cited as history. An anonymous author quoting no proofs, can scarcely
be considered as evidence of intentions not reduced to actions. It is unjust
to Lord Macartney, to impute to him the purpose of engaging in something
like civil war. — W.

294

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK A
chap. 5.

1784.

■ only three days after landing at Madras. To such
- an extreme the distrust of the supreme government
was now carried, that a sum of ten lacs of rupees
from Bengal, which arrived a few days after, could
not he received, because the person who brought it
had orders to deliver it not to the civil government,
but into the hands of Sir Eyre Coote. From this
time the Governor-General and Council withheld
from Macartney, not only the powers which were
necessary for effecting by negotiation a division
among the enemies of the English, but all instruction
with respect to their views of peace or war ; and,
instead of those supplies which they had hitherto
afforded in considerable quantity, they forbade the
Carnatic Presidency to draw on the government of
Bengal for a single rupee. Repeated applications
were sent, before any answer was received, for in-
structions in regard to the treaty which Tippoo had
declared his willingness to form. It was not till
after the commissioners had departed that any were
received ; and when they came, they were so equivo-
cally worded, that whatever course the Carnatic Pre-
sidency might pursue, their conduct would equally
stand open to blame.1

The treaty of peace with Tippoo was transmitted
for ratification to Bengal. In the absence of Mr.
Hastings, who was then at Lucknow, it was acknow-
ledged and signed by the Supreme Council, who were
vested with all the powers of government. It was
returned in due form. It was then, with the requi-

1 Papers presented to the House of Commons, ut supra ; Barrow’s Life
of the Earl of Macartney, i. 180 and 233.

MISCONDUCT OF THE NABOB.

295

site solemnity, transmitted to Tippoo. The receipt 5V

of it was acknowledged. And this great transaction

was closed. 1/84

After a number of months had elapsed, a fresh copy
of the treaty was received from Bengal, having the
signature as before of the Members of the Council at
Calcutta, and the additional signature of the Go-
vernor-General at Lucknow. To this instrument was
annexed a declaration, that the Nabob Wala Jah had
a right to be included in the treaty ; and a command
to the President and Council of Madras, “ at their
peril,” to transmit the ratification of the treaty in its
second form to Tippoo.

For understanding this transaction, it is necessary
to recollect, that the Nabob, and along with him, his
mischievous agents, expressed their uneasiness at the
unhappy state of his affairs, by imputing blame to the
Governor, and obstructing the Government. The
Supreme Council had taken part with the complaints,
not only of the General, but also of the Nabob. To
all practicable arrangements for peace, that depen-
dent, ambitious, and insatiate, chief, had shown aver-
sion, and in particular a poignant abhorrence of
Hyder Ali and his son. Important as the blessings
of peace had now become to the exhausted resources
of him and the Company, he treated with unreserved
disapprobation the terms of any treaty which, to the
Presidency, it seemed practicable to obtain; and
neither gave his consent, nor appeared to desire to
become a party, to the arrangement which they en-
deavoured to effect. The treaty of 1769, in which
the Nabob was not included as a party, nor his name
mentioned, appeared to furnish a precedent to justify

296

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 5.

1784.

' a treaty in which, though his participation was not
- expressed, his interests were secured. And as it was
absolutely necessary, on behalf of the Company, that
the Nabob should not have the power of breaking a
treaty, essential to their interests, though by him
violently condemned, it was held a great advantage
to place it on a foundation independent of his will.
Besides, previously to the negotiation, the Supreme
Council wTere so far from holding up the Nabob, as a
necessary and a principal party, that they did not
even direct the communication to him of their in-
structions, or hint the propriety of taking his advice.
The complaint, however, which on this account the
Nabob had been instigated to raise, the Supreme
Council treated now as a matter of infinite import-
ance ; and to Lord Macartney they appeared to be
actuated by a wish to multiply the embarrassments
of his administration. Considering the jealous tem-
per of Tippoo, his distrust of the English, and his
perpetual apprehension of treachery and deceit, Lord
Macartney was convinced, that to present to him a
second ratification of a treaty, after the first had been
received as final and complete, could only serve to
persuade him that either on the first or second of
these occasions imposition was practised ; and that
hostility should anticipate the effect of hostile de-
signs. The danger of such a result determined the
President to brave the resentment of the superior
government, and exonerating his council from re-
sponsibility, he declared his readiness to submit to
suspension as the consequence of his refusal to obey
the orders of the governing Board. The situation
of Mr. Hastings himself became about this time too

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.

297

alarming, however, to leave him inclination for a B00Kr Y

° . . . CHAP. 5.

stretch of his authority ; and the disobedience of ,

Lord Macartney was followed by no unpleasant 1784-
result.1

CHAPTER VI.

Financial Difficulties — Campaign of General God-
dard on the Bombay side of the Mahratta
Country. — Attack on the Bengal side. — Peace
with Sindia. — Supreme Court of Judicature. —
Efforts of the Supreme Court to extend its Ju-
risdiction.— Their Effects upon Individuals. —
Upon the Collection of the Revenue. — Upon the
Administration of Justice. — Interference of
Parliament claimed. — Granted. — The Chief Jus-
tice placed at the Head of the Sudder Dewannee
Adaulut. — Chief Justice recalled. — Judicial arid
Police Regulations. — Provincial Councils abolish-
ed, and a new Board of Revenue set up.

We return to the events which, during these great
transactions in the south, had taken place in Bengal,
and other parts of the British dominions in India.

Before the commencement of the war with Hyder,
the finances of the Company in every part of India

1 Barrow’s Life of Macartney, i. 232 — 238 ; Papers presented to the
House of Commons, ut supra.

298

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. had become a source of distress. The scanty re-

CHAP. 6. # J

sources of Bombay, which seldom equalled the

178°- expenditure of a peace-establishment, had not, even
with the supplies which had been sent from Ben-
gal, sufficed to save that Presidency from the
necessity of draining the channels of loan, and from
sinking in arrear so deeply, even with the pay of the
army, that the General, in the month of August,
1780, declared it was no longer fit to be depended
upon.1 Even Bengal itself, though it had enjoyed
entire tranquillity, and had only contributed to the
maintenance of Goddard’s army, and to other feeble
operations against the Mahrattas, wTas so completely
exhausted, that, in August, 1780, the Supreme
Council were again reduced to the expedient of
contracting debt ; and before the end of the year,
when exertions in favour of the Carnatic were re-
quired, they were obliged to announce to the Direc-
tors the probability of a total suspension of the
investment.2

1 See Goddard’s Letter to the Select Committee of Bombay, dated 24tli
August, 1780, Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, ut supra,
p. Ill and 112. See also p. 89 and 90, with the Appendix, No. 256,
for details, of the extreme poverty and necessities of the Presidency,
“ necessities,” they say, “ now pressing to a degree never before expe-
rienced.”

i Sixth Report, ut supra, p. 101, 102, 103. In a letter to General
Goddard, under date 20th April, 1780, the Supreme Council wrote, “ Our
resources are no longer equal to the payment of your army.” In another,
dated 15th May, they warned the Bombay Presidency against any reliance
on continued supply from Bengal, “ as neither their resources, nor the
currency of the provinces, would endure a continuance of the vast drains,”
&c. In a minute of the Governor-General on the 28th of August, he
said, “ Our expenses have been increasing; our means declining. And it
is now a painful duty imposed upon me, to propose, that we should again
have recourse to the means of supplying our growing wants, by taking up
money at interest. The sum I do not propose, because I think it should
not be limited.”

REDUCTION OF BASSEIN.

299

In the important consultations of the 25th of Sep-
tember, 1780, upon the intelligence of the fatal irrup-
tion of Hyder, it was resolved, that terms of peace
should be offered to the Mahrattas, through the
mediation of the Raja of Berar; and on the 2nd of
October a draught of a treaty was prepared, according
to which all conquests made by the English were to
he surrendered, with the exception of the fort of
Gualior, destined for the Rana of Gohud, and of that
part of Guzerat which had been ceded to Futty Sing
Guicowar : Should the fort of Bassein, however, be
taken by the English forces, before the final agree-
ment, it was proposed to cede, in its stead, all the
territory and revenue which they had acquired by
the treaty of Poorunder. Of this draught, a copy
with power of mediation, was sent to the Raja of
Berar ; and at the same time letters were written to
Nizam Ali, to the Peshwa, to Sindia, and to the
Poonah ministers, apprizing them of the terms on
which the English government was ready and de-
sirous to conclude a treaty of peace.

On the 16th of October, General Goddard, rein-
forced by a body of Europeans from Madras, and re-
lieved from apprehension of Holkar and Sindia by
intelligence that an attack would be made upon their
dominions from the upper provinces of Bengal, put
the army in motion from Surat. The roads were
still so deep, and the rivers so full, that they were
unable to reach their ground before Bassein till the
13th of November. From the strength of the place
and the number of the garrison, the General deemed
it necessary to carry on his operations with regularity
and caution. A battery of six guns and six mortars.

book v.

chap. 6.

1780.

300

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1780.

bv • within nine hundred yards of the fort, was completed
— on the morning of the 28th, Under cover of its fire,
approaches were carried on to a spot within 500 yards
of the wall, where a battery of nine heavy guns was
opened on the morning of the 9th of December,
while a battery of twenty mortars began to play upon
one of the parapets. On the morning of the 10th,
when a practicable breach was nearly effected, the
fort made an offer of surrender, but in consequence
of some demur the fire was renewed, and next morn-
ing the enemy yielded at discretion.1

After the reduction of Bassein, the General re-
paired to Bombay for the purpose of settling with
the Committee the further operations of the army,
and there received intelligence of the irruption of
Hyder into the Carnatic, and the destruction of
Colonel Baillie’s detachment. An attack, which
might operate as a diversion, on the western side of
Hyder’s dominions, was pressed upon the Presidency
of Bombay by that of Madras ; and at the same time
arrived from the Supreme Council intelligence of
their designs respecting peace with the Malirattas,
and a copy of the treaty which it was intended to
offer. Though directed immediately to obey a re-

1 No notice is taken in the text of the important and brilliant operations
of a division of the Bombay army, under Colonel Hartley, in the Concan,
the objects of which were to secure the revenues of the country for the
British authority, and then to cover the siege of Bassein. The first object
was partially, the latter completely, effected. Colonel Hartley defeated, in .
the beginning of October, a considerable Maliratta force at Mullunghur,
and then driving the enemy’s parties out of the Concan, took up a position
not far from the Bhore Ghaut. From hence he fell back to Doogaur,
nine miles East of Bassein, upon the advance of an overpowering force
intended to raise the siege; and there, on the 10th and 11th December,
repulsed every attack of the Mahratta army, 20,000 strong, with the loss
of their general. Duff, ii. 2G1.— W.

EXPEDITION AGAINST THE MAHRATTAS.

301

quisition in writing from the Peshwa to suspend book ^v,

hostilities, General Goddard and the Committee of

Bombay were exhorted to prosecute the war with 178L
vigour, till such time as that application should
arrive. After several fluctuations of opinion, it was
determined not to evacuate Tellicherry ; as a place
which, though burdensome to defend, might ulti-
mately be of importance for commencing an attack
upon the dominions of Hyder : And, notwithstanding
the desire of the Committee to secure the Concan, or
the country below the Ghauts, it was resolved, upon
the recommendation of the General, to occupy the
passes of the mountains, and to threaten the enemy’s
capital, advancing into the country as far as might
appear consistent with the safe return of the army.

The terror which might thus be inspired was expect-
ed to operate as the most effectual inducement to
peace ; and that terror would be the more powerful,
as the two leading chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, were
understood to be occupied in the defence of their
own dominions against the attack carried on from
Bengal.

The army marched from Bassein about the middle
of January. The Mahratta force in the Concan was
computed at 20,000 horse and foot, with about
fifteen guns. It was commanded by Hurry Punt
Furkea, and posted on the road to the Bhore Ghaut,1
by which, as the easiest of the passes, and that
leading most directly to the Mahratta capital, it was
expected that the English would endeavour to ascend.
Notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the

1 It was the same army which had been repulsed by Colonel Hartley,
and had been obliged to fall back into an attitude of defence. — W.

302

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1

CHAP. 6

1781.

• enemy, they offered little resistance in the level
- country, and with only a few slight skirmishes, the
English reached the foot of the pass on the 8th of Fe-
bruary. The enemy had ascended ; and from intel-
ligence it appeared that they had assembled in great
force to dispute the passage. Holkar, whom the
attack from Bengal had been too feeble to retain on
the opposite side of the Mahratta country, and who
had left Sindia as sufficient to cope with the force by
which he was assailed, had lately joined the Poonah
army, of which the whole was encamped near the
top of the Ghaut. The General, who saw the ad-
vantage of audacity and despatch, resolved to storm
the pass the very night of his arrival. The storming
party, which consisted of the grenadiers, headed by
Captain Parker, entered about midnight, and with con-
summate gallantry, forcing the enemy from every
battery and post which they occupied, reached the
summit at five o’clock in the morning.

At the top of the Ghaut, the English army were
not distant more than forty-five miles from the Mah-
ratta capital. On the 12th, a person arrived, com-
missioned, as he said, by Nana Fumavese, the
Poonah minister. His object was, to declare the
earnest desire of the minister to obtain the friendship
of the English ; but he brought with him no creden-
tials to authenticate his mission. For this, he apolo-
gized, by the doubts which Nana felt of the disposi-
tion towards him entertained by the English.
Goddard was not willing that a mere adherence to
forms should obstruct the acquisition of peace. He
instructed him to assure the minister of the readiness
with which the English would second his views for
a termination of the existing contests, and the forma-

INEFFECTUAL ATTEMPT FOR PEACE.

303

tion of an alliance against their respective enemies.
Among other circumstances, the Mahratta agent
affirmed, that the copy of the treaty which had been
sent for transmission to the Regent of Berar, the
Regent, who had not approved of it, had declined to
forward. The General, therefore, transmitted to the
minister a copy, together with information of his
being vested with full powers to treat ; and agreed
to wait eight days for an answer. The answer
arrived within the time prescribed, containing a
simple and explicit rejection of the terms. Fully
acquainted with the progress of Hyder in the Car-
natic, and regarding the eagerness of the English for
peace, as a declaration of inability for war, the Mah-
rattas, at this juncture, expected greater advantages
from continuing, than terminating hostilities. 1 To
the application of the Supreme Council to Moodajee,
that he would employ his mediation between them
and the Poonah government, an answer wTas not re-
ceived till the 9th of January, 1781 ; and when it
did arrive, it contained so many objections to the
treaty, and even advanced so many pretensions on
the part of Moodajee himself, that it not only con-
vinced them of the little prospect of peace, hut
brought into doubt the sincerity of the former pro-
fessions of that person himself.

Notwithstanding this disappointment in the hopes
of peace, and the approach of the English army to
the capital of the enemy, Goddard, convinced that
possession of the capital, which the enemy had deter-

1 Negotiations were also on foot for an alliance between all the Mahratta
states, except the Gaekwar, with Hyder and the Nizam against the
English. — W.

BOOK V

CHAP. 6.

1781.

304

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

Gv- mined to burn, would by no means ensure the at-
— tainment of his object, declined any further progress
into the interior of the country ; and recommended a
system of defensive warfare,1 permitting the return of
the Madras troops to the coast of Coromandel, both
for assistance against Hyder, and to lessen the pres-
sure upon the Bombay finances.

After maintaining their post with little disturbance
at the head of the Ghauts till the 1 7th of April, the
English descended secretly during the night.2 The
difficulty of supplying the troops with provisions,
while the enemy, it was found, could descend by
other passes, and intercept their convoys ; together
with the expense of fortifying the post at the top of
the Ghauts, appeared to surpass the advantage of
maintaining it. The enemy descended in pursuit the
following day. The route from the bottom of the
hills to the coast was about twenty-four miles, through
a country full of bushes, thickets, and narrow de-
files. This was highly favourable to the irregular
and unexpected assaults of the Mahrattas, who greatly
harrassed the English during the three days of the
march : but though several lives were lost, and among
the rest that of Colonel Parker, the second in com-
mand, no material impression was made, nor any
loss sustained of the baggage and stores. The Mah-

1 The recommendation came from the Bombay Government, and now
only obtained Colonel Goddard’s acquiescence upon his finding the im-
possibility of maintaining an advanced position in the Mahratta country,
against such powerful forces as they could bring against him. Duff,
ii. 439.— W.

* Although not attacked in their post, the English had suffered much
from well-concertcd operations upon their communications ; the country
below the Ghaut being overrun by Purseram Bhow, with 1200 horse.
Duff, ii. 437.— W.

FORTUNATE SURPRISE OF SINDIA S CAMP.

305

1781.

ratta army re-ascencled the Ghauts ; and the English, Gv'
left in possession of the Concan, prepared, with the -
Madras detachment, which the reduced state of the
battalions now rendered it desirable to retain, to remain
at Callian through the approaching monsoon.1

On the Bengal side of the Mahratta country, it
was determined, notwithstanding the eminent services
of Major Popham, to supersede that officer in the
command, and relieve his corps by that of Colonel
Camac,2 who having, already advanced into the terri-
tory of the Rana of Gohud, was, about the beginning
of the year 1781, commanded to penetrate, at the
head of five battalions of sepoys, towards Oogein,
the capital of Sindia. The force employed in this
service, as it was too small to prevent Holkar from
returning to assist in turning the balance against
Goddard, so it was too feeble to intimidate even
Sindia alone, and seems to have been saved from
destruction, or at any Tate from flight, by nothing
but a fortunate exploit. Having reached Seronge,
in the month of February, it was surrounded by a
powerful enemy ; its supplies were cut off ; it was
harassed on all sides ; the princes, expected to join
it, stood aloof ; it was reduced to distress for want of
provisions : and the commanding officer was obliged
to apply by letter for the troops stationed at Futty-
ghur, under Colonel Muir, to enable him to retreat
into the country of the Rana. Colonel Muir arrived
at Gohud on the 29th of March. But before this

1 Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1782, p. 100 — 113, with
the official documents, in its voluminous Appendix.

* A typographical error pervades all the previous editions, and instead
of Camac, this officer is termed Carnac, a very different person. — W.

VOL. IV. X

306

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

ROOK

CHAP.

1781.

• time Colonel Camac was reduced to such extremity,
- that on the 23rd of the same month he had summoned
a council of war, in which Captain Bruce, the officer
who commanded the storming party at the taking of
Gualior, recommended, as the only possible means
of preserving the army, to make that very night an
attack upon the camp of Sindia. After some debate
and hesitation, the resolution was adopted. At sun-
set on the 24th, the army moved from their ground,
and after a march of thirteen hours arrived at the
camp.1 The surprise was, happily, complete ; and
all the terror and confusion ensued which usually
result from a nocturnal assault unexpectedly falling
upon a barbarian army. The enemy dispersed, and
fled in disorder, leaving several guns and elephants,
with a quantity of ammunition, in prize to the
victor.

Colonel Muir was so retarded, by want of cattle
for the conveyance of provisions, and by other diffi-
culties,2 * * 5 that he arrived not at Antry till the 4th of
April ; and, as senior officer, upon joining Camac,
he assumed the command. In order to overcome
the backwardness of the Rana of Gohud, whom the
apparent feebleness of the English led to temporize,
and even to intrigue with Sindia, directions were
given to place him in possession of the fort of

1 It is very unlikely that a march of ' thirteen hours ’ should have pre-

luded a surprise, especially a nocturnal surprise, as the interval must have
brought daylight on the assailants. Duff states that it was Sindia’s custom

to encamp every night at the distance of five or six miles, ii. 647 ; and
Colonel Camac, in his official report, says, “ the enemy encamped within
three coss,” a distance of five or six miles. Sixth Report, Append.

1072.— W.

5 “ Difficulties beyond conception,” they arc called by Mr. Hastings.
Sec his “ Answer to the Fourteenth Charge.”

PEACE CONCLUDED WITH SINDIA.

307

Gualior, which had been professedly taken only for BC®^6V’

him. Though the English were now enabled to

remain within the territory of Sindia, they were too 1<&1,
feeble to undertake any active operations ; and spent
several months in vain endeavours to induce the
Rana of Gohud, and the neighbouring chieftains, to
yield them any efficient support. In the mean time
the army of Sindia lay close to that of the English,
which remained at Sissai, a place within the Mah-
ratta dominions, several days’ march beyond the
frontiers of Gohud. The Mahratta horse daily
harassed the camp, and cut off the supplies. And
the troops were reduced to great distress, both by
sickness and want of provisions.1 Happily the
resources of Sindia, too, were not difficult to exhaust ;
and he began seriously to desire an end of the con-
test. About the beginning of August, an overture
was made, through the Rana of Gohud, which the
English commander encouraged ; and on the 16th
of that month, an envoy from Sindia, with powers to
treat, arrived in the English camp. Similar powers
were transmitted to Colonel Muir. Negotiation
commenced; and on the 13th of October a treaty
was concluded. All the territory which the English
had conquered on the further side of the J umna was
to be restored to Sindia : on the other part, Sindia
was not to molest the chiefs who had assisted the
English, or to claim any portion of the territory
which the English had annexed to the dominions of
the Rana of Gohud : it was also agreed, that Sindia
should use his endeavours to effect a peace between

1 Mr. Hastings’ Answer, before the House of Commons, on the Four
tcenth Charge.

X 2

308

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA,

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

gv- the English and their enemies, Hyder Ali, and the
_ Peshwa.1

During these proceedings the Governor-General
and Council were involved in other affairs of no
ordinary importance.

When the wisdom of parliament embraced the
subject of the government of India, and by its grand
legislative effort, in 1773, undertook to provide, as
far as it was competent to provide, a remedy both for
the evils which existed, and for those which might
be foreseen, a Court of Judicature was created, to
which the title of Supreme was annexed, and of
which the powers, as well as the nomination of the
judges, did not emanate from the Company, but
immediately from the King. It was framed of a
Chief Justice and three puisne Judges; and was
empowered to administer in India all the departments
of English law. It was a court of common law, and
a court of equity ; a court of oyer and terminer, and
gaol delivery ; an ecclesiastical court, and a court of
admiralty. In civil cases, its jurisdiction extended
to all claims against the Company, and against Bri-
tish subjects, and to all such claims of British sub-
jects against the natives, as the party in the contract
under dispute had agreed, in case of dispute, to sub-
mit to its decision. In affairs of penal law, its powers
extended to British subjects, and to another class of

1 Hastings’ Answer, ut supra ; A retrospective View, and Consideration
of Indian Affairs ; particularly of the Transactions of the Mahratta War,
from its commencement to the month of October, 1782, p. 72. The
author of this short narrative has evidently enjoyed the advantage of
access to the records of the Bombay government. Some particulars have
been gleaned in the “ Memoirs of the late War in Asia.” See also the
copy of the Treaty with Sindia, in the Collection of Treaties with the
Princes of Asia, printed by the E. I. C. in 1812, p. 97. — M. To these
authorities, the superior one of Duff’s Mahratta History may be added. — W.

ERRORS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

309

persons, who were described, as all persons directly 6V'

or indirectly in the service of the Company, or of —

any British subject, at the time of the offence.

In the establishment of this tribunal, the British
legislature performed one important act of legislative
wisdom. They recognised, and by adopting, they
sanctioned, the principle, that to leave any part of
the emoluments of judges, as so great a portion of
them in England is left, to be made out of fees ex-
tracted from the suitors in their own courts, is an
abuse ; an infallible cause of the perversion of judi-
cature. They enacted that a sufficient salary should
be fixed for the judges ; that no additional emolu-
ment, in the shape of fees, or in any other, should
accrue from their judicial functions. A sure temp-
tation to exert, for the multiplication of suits and of
their expenses, the great powers of judges, was so
far, accordingly, taken away ; and that oppression
which is inflicted upon the public by the unnecessary
delay, vexation and expense of judicial proceedings,
was in part deprived of its fundamental and most
operative cause.1

On the principal ground, however, the parliament,
as usual, trode nearly blindfold. They saw not, that
they were establishing two independent and rival
powers in India, that of the Supreme Council, and
that of the Supreme Court; they drew no line to
mark the boundary between them : and they foresaw
not the consequences which followed, a series of en-
croachments and disputes which unnerved the powers
of government and threatened their destruction. 2

1 They created fee-fed offices, and had the patronage of them ; this class
of impure motives was not therefore destroyed.

* Mr. George Rous, Counsel to the East India Company, in the report

310

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. The judges had not been long in the exercise of

their functions, when the effects of their pretensions

178L began to appear. The writs of the Supreme Court
were issued at the suit of individuals against the
Zemindars of the country, in ordinary actions of debt ;
the Zemindars were ordered to Calcutta to make
appearance, taken into custody for contempt if they
neglected the writ, or hurried from any distance to
Calcutta, and, if unable to find bail, were buried in a
loathsome dungeon.1 In a minute of General Claver-
ing, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, dated the
11th of April, 1775, they declare that process of this
description had been issued into every part of the
provinces. “ Zemindars,” they add, “ farmers, and
other proprietors of the lands, have been seized upon
their estates, and forcibly brought up to the Presi-
dency, at the suit or complaint of other natives, and
detained there, or obliged to give bail, according to
the nature of the case.” By these proceedings, the
minds of the natives were thrown into the utmost
consternation and alarm. They saw themselves
surrounded with dangers of a terrible nature, from a

which he made to the Directors upon the documents relative to this busi-
ness submitted to him in 1780, says: “ It is remarkable, that the judges
on the one hand, and the Council on the other, were perfectly unanimous,
in every measure taken throughout this unhappy contention. This fact
will lead a candid mind to look for the source of this contention, not in
the temper of individuals, but in the peculiarity of their situation. In no
country of which I have read, did two powers, like these, ever subsist dis-
tinct and independent of each other.” See Report of the Committee of the
House of Commons in 1781, on the petitions relative to the administration
of justice in India, of Touchet and others, of Hastings, and the other mem-
bers of the Supreme Council, and of the East India Company, General
Appendix, No. 39.

1 See the description of the horrid gaol of Calcutta, in the First Report
of the Select Committee in 1782 : see also vol. iii. p. 166.

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

311

new and mysterious source, the operations of which '

they were altogether unable to comprehend. The

principles of English law were not only different in 178L
many important respects, from those to which they
had hitherto been indebted for the protection of every
thing which they held dear ; hut opposite and shock-
ing to some of their strongest opinions and feelings.

The language of that law ; its studied intricacies and
obscurities, which render it unintelligible to all En-
glishmen, who have not devoted a great part of their
lives to the study of it; rendered it to the eye of
the affrighted Indian, a black and portentous cloud,
from which every terrific and destructive form might
at each moment be expected to descend upon him.
Whoever is qualified to estimate the facility and vio-
lence with which alarms are excited among a simple
and ignorant people, and the utter confusion with
which life to them appears to be overspread, when
the series of customs and rules by which it was
governed is threatened with subversion, may form
an estimate of the terrors which agitated the natives
of India, Avhen the process of the Supreme Court
began to operate extensively among them.

The evils, not of apprehension merely, but of
actual suffering to which it exposed them, were
deplorable. They were dragged from their families
and affairs, with the frequent certainty of leaving
them to disorder and ruin, any distance, even as great
as 500 miles, either to give bail at Calcutta, a thing
which, if they were strangers, and the sum more than
trifling, it was next to impossible they should have
in their power ; or to be consigned to prison for all
the many months which the delays of English judi-

312

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. cature might interpose, between this calamitous stage,

and the final termination of the suit. Upon the

1781 • affidavit, into the truth of which no inquiry whatso-
ever was made ; upon the unquestioned affidavit of
any person whatsoever; a person of credibility, or
directly the reverse, no difference, that the individual
prosecuted, was within the jurisdiction of the court,
the natives were seized, carried to Calcutta, and
consigned to prison, where, even if it was afterwards
determined that they were not within the jurisdiction
of the court, and of course that they had been unjustly
prosecuted, they were liable to lie for several months,
and whence they were dismissed totally without
compensation. Instances occurred, in which de-
fendants were brought from a distance to the Presi-
dency, and when they declared their intention of
pleading, that is, objecting, to the jurisdiction of the
court, the prosecution was dropped ; in which the
prosecution was again renewed, the defendant again
brought down to Calcutta, and again, upon his
offering to plead, the prosecution was dropped.
The very act of being seized was, in India, a cir-
cumstance of the deepest disgrace, and so de-
graded a man of any rank, that, under the Moham-
medan government, it was never attempted, except
in cases of the greatest delinquency.1

Not only the alarm which these proceedings dif-
fused throughout the country, but the effects with
which they threatened to strike the collection of the
revenue, strongly excited the attention of the Com-
pany’s servants and the members of their govern-
ment. To draw from the ryots the duties or contri-

1 See the evidence of Mr. Ewan Law, Report of the Committee on
Touchet’s Petition, &c., p. 19.

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

313

butions which they owe, is well known to be a B00K- v-

. CHAP. 6.

business of great detail and difficulty, requiring the _ .

strictest vigilance, and most minute and persevering 1781 •
applications. Any thing which strikes at the credit
of the Zemindar, farmer, or other functionary, by
whom this duty is performed, immediately increases
the difficulty, by encouraging the ryot in the hope of
defeating the demand by evasion, cunning, obstinacy
or delay. The total absence of the functionary,
called away to attend the proceedings of the Su-
preme Court, his forcible removal ; or the ignomi-
nious seizure of his person, went far to suspend the
collections within his district, and to cut off the
source of those payments for which he was engaged
to the Company.

It had been the immemorial practice in India, for
that great branch of the government intrusted with
the collection of the revenue, to exercise the depart-
ment of jurisdiction wThich regarded the revenue, to
decide in that field all matters of dispute, and to
apply the coercive process which wTas usual for en-
forcing demands. These powers were now exercised
by the Provincial Councils, and the courts esta-
blished, by the name of Dewannee Adaulut, under
their authority. The mode of decision was sum-
mary, that is, expeditious, and unexpensive ; and
the mode of coercion was simple, and adapted to the
habits and feelings of the people. One or more
peons, a species of undisciplined soldiery, employed
in the collections, was set over the defaulter, that is,
repaired to the house, and there watched and re-
strained him, till the sum in demand was discharged.

In a short time the Supreme Court began to inter-

314

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \

CHAP. 6.

1781.

• fere with these proceedings. The defaulters were
. made to understand by the attorneys, who had
spread themselves pretty generally through the
country, that if they would throw themselves upon
the Supreme Court, they would obtain redress and
protection. They were taught, as often as any
coercive process was employed by the judges of re-
venue, to sue out a writ of Habeas Corpus in the
Supreme Court ; where it was held competent, and
was in practice customary, for the judges to set them
at liberty upon bail. This excited still more vio-
lently the apprehensions of the members of govern-
ment, in regard to the collection of the revenue. As
the disposition to withhold the payment is universal
and unremitting in India, and never fails to lay hold
of every occasion which affords any chance either of
delay, or evasion ; they apprehended that such a re-
source, held up to the people, would breed a general
tendency ; and they concluded, with justice, that if,
in the innumerable cases in which compulsion was
necessary, it could only be exercised through the
tedious, laborious, and expensive forms of English
law, the realizing of a revenue in India was a thing
altogether impossible.

While the Company exercised the office of Dewan,
in other words, that department of government which
regarded the collection of the revenue, and in civil
cases the administration of justice, they had been
careful to keep up the appearance of the Nizamut, or
remaining branch of the ancient government, in the
person of the Nabob ; and to him, the penal depart-
ment of judicature, under the superintendence of the
Naib Dewan, or deputy Nabob, appointed by the

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

315

Company, had in particular been intrusted. To 6V'

this government of the Nabob; which, though.

totally dependent upon the servants of the Company, 1/81-
and subservient to their will, was yet the instrument
of a great portion of all that security for order and
protection which existed in the country ; the Supreme
Court declared, that they would pay no regard. In
their representation, under date of the 15th of
January, 1776, the Governor and Council complain
to the Court of Directors, that Mr. Justice Hyde
had declared publicly on the bench, “ The act of
parliament does not consider Mubaruck al Dowla as
a sovereign prince : The jurisdiction of this court
extends over all his dominions:” That Mr. Justice
Le Maistre had said, “ With regard to this phantom,
this man of straw, Mubaruck al Dowla, it is an insult
on the understanding of the Court, to have made the
question of his sovereignty : but it comes from the
Governor-General and Council: I have too much
respect for that body to treat it ludicrously, and I
confess I cannot consider it seriously :” and that the
Chief Justice had treated the Nabob, “as a mere
empty name, without any real right, or the exercise
of any power whatsoever.”

By these pretensions, the whole of that half of the
powers of government which were exercised in the
name of the Nabob, was taken away and abolished.

By another set of pretensions, the same abolition
was effected of the other half, which, in the cha-
racter of Dewan, were exercised in the name of the
Company.

In the same address, the Governor-General and
Council add the following statement : “ Mr. Le

316

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 6.

1781.

Maistre, in his late charge to the grand jury, declares
that a very erroneous opinion has been formed by
the Governor-General and Council, distinguishing
the situation of the East India Company, as Dewan,
from the common condition of a trading company ;
he makes no scruple of avowing a decided opinion,
that no true distinction, in reason, in law, or justice,
can or ought to be made, between the East India
Company as a trading Company, and the East India
Company as Dewan of these provinces. With re-
spect to the management of the territorial revenue,
he is pleased to declare, that the only true inter-
pretation of the act of parliament is, that our manage-
ment and government is not exclusive, but subject
to the jurisdiction of the King’s Court ; and that it
will be equally penal for the Company, or for those
acting under them, to disobey the orders and man-
datory process of the King’s Court, in matters which
merely concern the revenues, as in any other matter or
thing whatsoever.” The Governor and Council then
declare; “By the several acts and declarations of
the judges, it is plain, that the Company’s office of
Dewan is annihilated ; that the country government
is subverted ; and that any attempt on our part to
exercise or support the powers of either, may involve
us and our officers in the guilt and penalty of high
treason ; which Mr. Justice Le Maistre, in his charge,
expressly holds out, in terrorem , to all the Company’s
servants and others, acting under our authority.”

It would be difficult, in any age or country, to
discover a parallel to the conduct, which this set of
judges exhibited, on the present occasion. Their
own powTers, as it was impossible for them not dis-

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

317

tinctly to see, were totally inadequate to the govern- bv

ment of the country ; yet they proceeded, contrary to

the declared, though badly expressed, intention of 1781-
the legislature, to avail themselves of the hooks and
handles,1 which the ensnaring system of law, admi-
nistered by them, afforded in such abundance, to
draw within their pale the whole transactions of the
country ; not those of individuals only, but those also
of the government. That this was to transfer the
government into their hands is too obvious to require
illustration. When a government is transferred from
one to another set of hands, by a simple act of des-
potism, every branch of authority is directly sup-
plied ; the machine of government remains entire ;
and the mischief may be small, or the advantage
great. But when the wheels of government were
threatened to be stopped by the technical forms of a
court of English law ; and when nothing but those
forms and a set of men who could ostensibly perform
nothing but through the medium of those forms and
the pretence of administering justice, was provided to
supply the place of the government which was de-
stroyed, a total dissolution of the social order was
the impending consequence. The system of English

1 The following is an amusing instance. The Provincial Council of
Dacca, the grand administrative and judicative organ of government, for a
great province, is thus treated : “ Who are the Provincial Chief and Council

of Dacca ? . . . . They are no Corporation in the eye of the law The

Chief and Provincial Council of Dacca is an ideal body .... A man might
as well say that he was commanded by the King of the Fairies, as by the
Provincial Council of Dacca; because the law knows no such body.”
Argument and Judgment of Mr. Justice Le Maistre, on the return to
Seroopchund’s Habeas Corpus. Report, ut supra, General Appendix,
No. 9. See for another specimen, equally beautiful, a few pages onwards,
the maxim Delegatus non potest delegare.

318

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAT. G.

1781.

■ law was so incompatible with the habits, sentiments,

- and circumstances, of the people, that, if attempted
to he forced even upon that part of the field of
government which belonged to the administration of
law, it would have sufficed to throw the country into
the utmost disorder, would have subverted almost
every existing right, would have filled the nation
with terror and misery, and being, in such a situa-
tion, incapable of answering the purposes of law,
would have left the country in a state hardly different
from that, in which it would have been, under a
total absence of lawT : but when the judges proceeded
to apply these forms to the acts of government,
the powers of administration were suspended ; and
nothing was provided to supply their place. Either
with a blind ignorance of these consequences, which
is almost incredible, unless from our experience of
the narrowness which the mind contracts by habi-
tual application to the practice of English law, and
by habitual indulgence of the fancy that it is the
perfection of reason ; or, with a disregard of these
consequences, for which nothing but a love of power
too profligate to be stayed by any considerations of
human happiness or misery is sufficient to account,
the judges proceeded, with the apparent resolution of
extending the jurisdiction of their court, and leaving
as little as possible of the business of the country
exempt from the exercise of their power.

To palliate the invasions which they made upon
the field of government, they made use of this as an
argument ; that the great end of their institution was
to protect the natives against the injustice and
oppression of the Company’s servants, and that

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

319

without the powers which they assumed, it was im- book v.

possible for them to render to humanity this eminent

service. But to force upon the natives the miseries 1781 •
of English law, and to dissolve the hands of govern-
ment, was to inflict upon the people far greater evils,
than those from which they pretended to relieve
them. If the end proposed by the legislature was
really to protect the natives from the injustice of
Englishmen, they made a very unskilful choice of
the means.

The representations, upon this subject, which the
Governor-General and Council transmitted to Eng-
land, induced the Court of Directors, in the month
of November, 1777, to lay a statement of the case
before the Ministers of the Crown. The supposed
dignity of a King's Court , as it inflated the preten-
sions of the Judges, who delighted in styling them-
selves King’s Judges ; contrasting the source of their
own power with the inferior source from which the
power of the Governor-General and Council wras de-
rived ; so it imposed awTe and irresolution upon the
Court of Directors. They ventured not to originate
any measure, for staying the unwarranted pro-
ceedings of the Supreme Court; and could think
of no better expedient, than that of praying the
ministry to perform this important service in their
behalf.

The Directors represented to the ministry, that
the Zemindars, farmers, and other occupiers of land,
against whom writs, at the suit of natives, had been
issued into all parts of the provinces, it was not the
intention of the legislature to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court; that the proceedings, by

320

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

Gv- which they were hurried to a great distance from
— their homes, their persons arrested, and a long con-
finement in the common gaol inflicted upon them,
appeared to he replete with irregularity and injus-
tice; that the parties are “ sure to suffer every distress
and oppression with which the attorneys of the court
can easily contrive to harass and intimidate them,”
before the question whether they are subject or not
to the jurisdiction of the court can be so much as
broached; that after pleading to the jurisdiction,
they are sure of an adverse decision, “ unless they
are able to prove a negative ; that is, unless a native
of Bengal is able, from an act of parliament which
the Governor-General and Council have declared
liable to different constructions, to prove himself not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ; ”
that the consequences were in the highest degree
alarming, as almost all the Zemindars in the
country, standing in the same predicament, felt
themselves exposed to the same dangers ; as the
disgust and hatred of the natives were excited by
the violation of their customs and laws ; and the col-
lection of the revenue was impeded, and even threat-
ened with suspension.

They represented also, That the Supreme Court,
beside extending its jurisdiction to such persons , had
extended it also to such things , as it was clearly the
intention of the legislature to exempt from it : That
these were “the ordering, management, and govern-
ment of the territorial revenues,” including the powers
which that ordering and government required : That
over this department the whole Bench of Judges had
declared their resolution to exercise a power, superior

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

321

to that of the Company : That, accordingly, the pro-
cess of the ordinary Revenue Courts was opposed ;
persons whom they had confined being released by
the Supreme Court ; suits which were cognizable in
none but the Revenue Courts being instituted and
entertained in the Supreme Court ; prosecutions
being carried on by the Supreme Court against the
Judges of the Revenue Courts, for acts done in the
regular performance of the business of the Court;
farmers of the revenue, who had fallen into arrear,
refusing to obey the process of the Revenue Courts,
and threatening the Judges with prosecution in the
Supreme Court, if any coercive proceedings were em-
ployed : That in consequence of these acts, in some
instances, the operation of the Dewannee Courts
was suspended ; in others, the very existence of them
destroyed: And that the Governor-General and
Council, in their capacity of a Court of Appeal or
Sudder Dewannee Adaulut, were discouraged from the
exercise of this important jurisdiction, under the ap-
prehension that their powers might be disputed, and
their decrees annulled.1

Under the third head of complaint, the Directors

1 See vol. iii. p. 529, for the rank which was assigned to this, in the
Catalogue of Provisions for giving to the people of India the benefits of
law. From the first arrival of the Judges of the Supreme Court, the Court
of Sudder Dewannee Adawlut never acted ; and for all that number of
years, which intervened till a new regulation, nothing was provided to
supply its place. A correspondence on the subject between the Council
and the Supreme Court took place in the year 1775. The Court said
that the Council had a right to receive appeals in all cases in which the
Provincial Councils had a legal jurisdiction. This the Council treated as
a denial of any right at all : as the Court, by not telling what they meant
by “ legal,” and reserving to themselves a right of deciding, without rule,
on each case which occurred, had the power of deciding just as they
pleased.

VOL. IV. Y

BOOK V.

CHAP. 6

1781.

322

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book cv- represented, that the Supreme Court had, on the

pretext of requiring evidence, demanded the produc-

1781 • tion in Court of papers liable to contain the most
secret transactions of the government ; that the Se-
cretary of the Council was served with the writ
called a sub poena duces tecum, and attending the
Court without the papers, was informed that he had
brought upon himself all the damages of the suit ;
that upon his representing the impossibility of his
producing in Court the records of the Council which
the Council had forbidden to be so produced, he was
ordered to declare which of the Members of the Coun-
cil voted for the refusal of the papers, and which (if
any) for the production ; that upon his demurring to
such a question a positive answer was demanded, and
every Member of the Council who had concurred
in the refusal was declared to be liable to an action ;
that the Council agreed to send such extracts as had
a reference to the matter in dispute, but persisted in
the refusal to exhibit their records ; that of this
species of demand various instances occurred ; and
that it was manifestly impossible for the Board to
deliberate and act as a Council of State, and as the
administrative organ of government, if publication of
their minutes might at any time be called for, and if
every Member was answerable, in an action of da-
mages, for any measure in which he concurred, to as
many persons as might think themselves aggrieved
by it.

In the fourth place, the Directors represented,
That the penal law of England was utterly repug-
nant to those laws and customs by which the people
of India had been hitherto governed ; that, neverthe-

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT. 323

less, Maha Raia Nuncomar, a native of high rank B00K J-

in Bengal, was indicted, tried, convicted, and ex-

ecuted, for an offence, which was not capital by the 1781 •
laws of the country where the offence was committed ;
that if the Court was unable to mitigate the punish-
ment, it might have deemed it prudent to use its
power of respiting the prisoner until the pleasure of
the King was known ; that this the Directors “ con-
ceived to be a matter of the most serious importance,
and big with consequences the most alarming to the
natives of India ; that the Judges seemed to have laid
it down as a general principle, in their proceedings
against Nuncomar, that all the criminal law of Eng-
land is in force, and binding, upon all the inhabitants
within the circle of their jurisdiction in Bengal.”

The Directors, therefore, adjure the Minister to con-
sider what will be the consequences, if this principle,
and the example grounded upon it, were followed up
with consistency. “ Can it be just,” they say, “ or
prudent, to introduce all the different species of felony
created by what is called the Black Act P or to
involve, as what is called the Coventry Act involves,
offences of different degrees in one common punish-
ment % — or to introduce the endless and almost inex-
plicable distinctions by which certain acts are or are
not burglary ?” They ask whether Indian offenders,
of a certain description, were to be transported to
his Majesty’s colonies in America, or sent to work
upon the river Thames And whether every man
convicted for the first time of bigamy, “ which is
allowed, protected, nay almost commanded by their
law, should be burnt in the hand if he can read, and
hanged if he cannot read % ” “ These,” they add,

Y 2

324

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 6.

1781.

“ are only some of the consequences which we con-
ceive must follow, if the criminal law of England be
suffered to remain in force upon the natives of Bengal.
If it were legal to try, to convict, and execute Nun-
comar for forgery , on the Statute of George II., it
must, as we conceive, be equally legal, to try, convict
and to punish the Subahdar of Bengal, and all his
court, for bigamy , upon the statute of James I.”

On the 2nd of January, 1777, a suit was instituted
before the Provincial Council at Patna, which afford-
ed occasion to the Supreme Court of carrying the
exertion of their powers to a height more extraor-
dinary than they had before atttempted. A person of
some distinction and property, a native Mohammedan,
died, leaving a widow, and a nephew, who for some
time had lived with him, in the apparent capacity of
his heir, and adopted son. The widow claimed the
whole of the property, on the strength of a will, which
she affirmed the husband had made in her favour.
The nephew, who disputed the will, both on the
suspicion of forgery, and on the fact of the mental
imbecility of his uncle for some time previous to his
death, claimed in like manner the whole of the estate
as adopted son and heir of the deceased.

For investigation of the causes the decision of
which depended upon the principles of the Mussul-
man law, the Provincial Councils were assisted by
native lawyers, by whose opinion in matters of law
it was their duty to be guided. In the present in-
stance, the Council of Patna deputed a Cauzee and
two Muftees, by a precept, or perwannah, in the
Persian language, directing them to take an account
of the estate and effects of the deceased, and secure

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

325

them against embezzlement; to inquire into the B00K y-

claims of the parties ; to follow strictly the rules of

Mohammedan law ; and report to the Council their 1781-
proceedings. In all this, nothing appeared which
was not reasonable ; and which was not according
to the approved and established mode of procedure.

On the 20th of January, the Cauzee and Muftees,
having finished the inquiry, delivered their report;
in which, after a statement of the evidence adduced,
they declare their opinion, that neither the widow,
nor the nephew, had established their claims, and that
the inheritance should be divided according to the
principles provided by the Mohammedan law for those
cases in which a man dies without children and
without a will ; in other words, that it should he
divided into four shares ; of which one should be
given to the widow, and three to the brother of the
deceased, who was next of kin, and father of the
nephew who claimed as adopted son. Upon a review
of the proceedings of the native Judges, and a hearing
of the parties, the Provincial Council confirmed the
decree, and ordered the division of the inheritance to
be carried into effect. They did more : as it appeared
from the evidence that part of the effects of the
deceased had been secreted by the widow before
they could be secured by the Judges, and that both
the will and another deed which she produced, were
forged, they put her five principal agents under con-
finement, till they should account for the goods ; and
directed that they should be afterwards delivered to
the Phousdary, to take their trial for forgery.

It is to be observed, that the widow had opposed
all these proceedings from the beginning, not by

326

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK A

CHAP. 6.

1781.

• course of law, but such irregular and violent acts, as
- suggested themselves to an angry and ignorant mind.
When called upon by the Cauzee to appoint, in the
usual manner, a vakeel, or representative, to act in
her behalf, she positively refused ; and when the
Cauzee recommended to her a relative, who had lived
in the house, was much in her confidence, and acted
as her principal agent, she persisted in her refusal,
but sent her seal, with a message that the Judges
might appoint him if they pleased. Upon the
arrival of the Cauzee and Muftees to carry the decree
of the Council into execution, the widow resisted.
The Cauzee and Muftees proceeded to enforce the
orders under which they acted. The widow, contrary
to their request and remonstrances, left the house,
and betook herself to an asylum of Fakeers, which
was in the neighbourhood, carrying along with her
certain title-deeds, and the female slaves. The
Cauzee and Muftees divided the remaining effects,
upon the valuation of appraisers mutually chosen by
the parties, into four shares, of which the vakeel of
the widow chose one for her, and the rest were set
apart for the brother of the deceased. The widow
refused to submit to the decision, or to accept of her
share. She also refused to give up the title-deeds,
which she had earned away, or the female slaves.
In consequence of this proceeding, a petition was
presented to the Council, by the nephew, representing
that she had not complied with the decree, but by
absconding reflected, according to the Mohammedan
ideas, disgrace upon the family, and praying that she
might be compelled to deliver up the papers and
slaves, and to return to the house, under his pro-

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT. 327

tection as representative of the heir. An order was book v.

A # CHAP. b.

directed by the Council to comply with this request.

After some time another petition was presented by 1781
the nephew, complaining that the Cauzee and Muf-
tees had not yet complied with the injunctions of the
Board. Upon this the Council agreed, that the
Cauzee should be reprimanded for his delay, and
directed to proceed immediately in the execution of
his orders. The Cauzee represented by memorial,
that he had not only made frequent demands upon
the widow, but had placed hircarrahs to watch her,
and that in his opinion, that species of constraint,
which was authorized by the Mussulman law, and
customary in the country, namely restriction from all
intercourse by a guard of soldiers, was necessary to
be applied. The guard was ordered, and continued
for a space of six weeks. The widow still refused
compliance and at that time the guard was withdrawn.

The widow was advised to bring an action in the
Supreme Court, against the nephew, the Cauzee, and
Muftees, on the ground of their proceedings in the
cause, and laid her damages at 600,000 sicca rupees,
about 66,000/. The objection taken, on the part of
the nephew, to the jurisdiction of the court, the
judges overruled, on the pretence that every renter
was a servant of the Company.1 The justification
set up for the Cauzee and Muftees was, that they had
acted regularly, in their judicialcapacity, in obedience

1 This decision greatly increased the alarm among the farmers and
other landholders. In the province of Bahar they joined in a petition to
the Governor and Council, praying for protection against the process of
the Supreme Court, or if that could not be granted, for leave to relinquish
their farms, that they might retire into another country. Report, ut supra,
p. 8, Patna Appendix, No. 14.

328

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \

CHAP. 6.

1781.

• to the lawful orders of their legal superiors ; that
_ the Provincial Councils were vested with a power of
determining suits between the natives, with the
advice and assistance of the native lawyers ; that the
established mode in which the Provincial Councils
availed themselves of that advice and assistance was,
by directing them to hear the parties, to collect the
evidence, and to deliver in a report of the whole,
comprehending their opinion of the decision which
ought to be pronounced ; which decision the Council,
upon a review of the whole, or with the addition of
such other inquiries as they might think the case
required, affirmed, or altered, subject only to an
appeal to the Governor and Council; and that a
judge acting in his judicial capacity could not be
responsible in damages to those who might suffer by
the execution of his decrees.

This defence, which to the eye of reason appears
appropriate and irrefragable, the Court treated with
the utmost contempt ; and upon a ground which
rouses surprise and indignation. A form of words,
among the numerous loose expressions, which fall
from the lips and pens of English lawyers, without
any binding authority, or any defined and consistent
application, occurred to the judges. This was the
phrase. Delegatus non potest delegare, “ he who is
delegated cannot delegate.” And upon this, and no
other reason, so much as alleged, they decreed, that
the Cauzee and Muftees, for acting regularly, acting
as they were obliged to act, and had in fact been
accustomed to act ever since the jurisdiction of the
country had passed under English control, were liable
to actions of damages at the suit of every person

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

329

whom their proceedings displeased, that is, one at book ^

least of the parties in almost every cause. It would

he absurd to attempt, by illustration, to render more 178L
apparent the deformities of this proceeding. To
quote a maxim of English law, though ever so high
in authority, and invariable in its force, as a ground
for committing in India a flagrant violation of natural
equity amongst persons who knew not the English
law, nor owned its authority, was an act of chicane,
which the history of judicial encroachments, rich as
it is in examples of injustice, cannot frequently sur-
pass. It is, however, a maxim, of which, even where
admissible, the authority is so little determined, that,
like many more, with which the appetite of judges
for power is in England so quietly gratified, it has
just as little weight or as much, as, in each particular
instance, the judge may happen to please. And in
a variety of remarkable cases, the established course
of English law goes directly against it.1

Deciding, upon the strength of this assemblage of
words, that the provincial council could not delegate
any authority to the native magistrates, even as their
agents; and hence that every thing which these
assistant magistrates had performed was without
authority, [the Supreme Court thought proper to
enter minutely and laboriously into the whole of the
case, and, after voluminous proceedings, gave judg-
ment against the defendants, damages 300,000

1 In Chancery for example ; when cases are referred by the Chancellor
to the Master; when commissions are issued to examine witnesses, &c.
in the common law courts, when cases are sent to arbitration, &c.

330

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. rupees, and costs 9208, amounting to the sum of
CHAP~1 * * * * 6' about 35,000^

1781. At the commencement of the suit a capias was
granted with a bailable clause. A bailiff proceeded
from Calcutta, and arrested at Patna the nephew,
and also the Cauzee, as he was returning from his
duty in one of the courts of justice. The bail
demanded was 400,000 rupees, or about 44,000/.
The Council of Patna, struck with consternation, at
the probable effects of so extraordinary a procedure,
upon the minds of the people, upon the authority of
government, upon the collection of the revenue, and
upon the administration of justice, which it threatened
to stop, by deterring the native lawyers and judges
from yielding their services, resolved, as the best
expedient which the nature of the case afforded, to
offer bail for the prisoners, who, after a confinement
of some time, in boats upon the river, were enlarged.
The Governor-General and Council, as soon as they
were informed of these proceedings, resolved, “ That
as the defendants are prosecuted for a regular and
legal act of government in the execution of a judicial

1 In the judicial investigation, all the chicanery which two of its fruitful

sources, the formalities about notice, and the rules of evidence, could sup-

ply, was played off, with decisive effect, upon the defendants. Mr. Rous,
in his Report quoted above, says, “ When they attempted to mitigate the

damages, by showing the circumstances, they were embarrassed by the
defects of their notice ; afterwards by the rules of evidence. Particularly
they were not able to prove the personal delegation of an authority to
act for her, by a woman of rank, who could not appear without disgrace ;
the public acts of her nearest relations in the house being rejected as no
legal evidence of her consent. With this defect fell the whole of the
exculpation. Lesser difficulties arose from some papers not being trans-
lated : others being fair copies, when the foul draughts were the originals.”

Patna App. No. 39. The Patna Appendix is a rich mine of information

respecting the beauties of English law.

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT. 331

decree (except one of them,1 * * * the plaintiff in the suit bc°°k 6V-

before the Dewannee Adaulut at Patna, whose arrest

is not for any apparent cause) they be supported and 178L
indemnified by government from all consequences
from which they can be legally indemnified.”2
Judgment being given, the defendants were put under
a guard of Sepoys, that they might be conveyed to
Calcutta, to be surrendered. The Cauzee, an old
man, who had been chief Cauzee of the province for
many years, was unable to endure the vexation and
fatigue ; and he expired by the way. The rest were
carried to Calcutta, and lodged in the common gaol,
where they remained till relieved by the interference
of the British parliament in 1781. By that autho-
rity a pecuniary compensation was awarded to them
for their losses and hardships, and the Muftees were
ordered to be not only reinstated in their former
situation and condition, but to be elevated to the
office of Mohammedan counsellors to the court and
council of Patna.

The Supreme Court and the widow were not satis-
fied with these proceedings against the native magis-
trates : an action was also brought against Mr. Law,
and two other members of the provincial council at
Patna. As this prosecution was instituted for official
acts performed in the Company’s service, the Gover-
nor-General and Council thought it fit that the
Company should bear the burden of their defence.

1 i. e. the nephew.

* The Governor-General, though, in his opinion, the examination of
witnesses was a part of the procedure which the Council should not have

delegated, not only affirmed the power of delegation, but his conviction of

the justice of the decision to which, in this case, the Council had come.

See his letter to Mr. Law, Patna App. No. 7.

332

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

6V- Here too the Court decided in favour of the party
— who brought it jurisdiction ; and awarded damages
• to the amount of 15,000 rupees, which money was
paid from the Company’s treasury.

It was in this manner that a thirst for jurisdiction
incited the English judges to interfere with the
administration of justice in the native civil courts.
The following is the manner in which it induced
them to interfere with the jurisdiction of the native
criminal courts. From a former statement it will be
recollected, that the system of criminal judicature
among the natives had been left by the Company
nearly upon the footing, on which they found it, and
on which it had long been established in the country.
It was a branch of authority which was reserved to
the Nabob in his character of Nazim. The judges
of the courts (they were known by the name of
Phoujdary Courts) were appointed by the Naib
Subah, or Nabob’s deputy, by whom their proceed-
ings were reviewed and controlled. They were
entirely independent of all other authority; and it
does appear that, considered as Indian, justice
was administered in them without any peculiar strain
of abuse. About the middle of the year 1777, an
attorney of the Supreme Court took up his residence
at Dacca. In the month of September of that year,
this attorney proceeded to execute a process of
arrest, issued by one of the judges of the Supreme
Court, against the Dewan, or principal public officer
of the Phoujdary Court at Dacca. The process was
issued at the suit of a man of the low rank of a pyke,
or messenger, who had been prosecuted in the
Phoujdary Court for a misdemeanour, convicted, and

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

333

confined till he made restitution. The action was B00K v-

CH AP. 6.

brought against the principal officer of the court, for

trespass and false imprisonment, in the execution of 178L
this decree. A native, employed by the attorney as
a bailiff, who proceeded to the house of the Phoujdar,
or chief criminal judge, entered the hall of audience,
in which the Phoujdar was sitting with several of
his friends, and the principal officers of his court ;
and attempted, in a violent and disrespectful manner,
to seize the person of his Dewan, or principal agent.

It is to be observed, that, in India, a man considers
an indignity offered to his servants, as in reality
offered to himself. No writ or warrant, it was
affirmed, was produced by the bailiff ; and he was
not allowed to perform the arrest. Upon this the
attorney proceeded to the house of the Phoujdar, in
person, accompanied by a crowd of attendants ; and
entered it in a forcible manner, by breaking down the
gate. To see violated the sanctuary of his house,
the mysterious repository of his wives, is a disgrace
to a Mussulman more dreadful than death. The
reserve of Eastern manners, and the respect bestowed
upon the very walls which contain the sacred deposit
of the master, render the forcible entrance of a house
an event which occurs only in the exercise of the
most violent hostility. It is one of the last outrages
which may be expected at the hands of an implacable
foe. When the Phoujdar of Dacca, therefore, beheld
his gate broken down, and an irregular crowd of
men bursting into his house, the greatest calamity
which could befall him rushed naturally upon his
apprehension ; and he proceeded to repel a danger,
which every honourable Mussulman would resist at

334

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK A

CHAP. 6,

1781.

• the expense of his life. An affray arose in the
- court of the house. The father of the Phoujdar
received a wound in the head, from a sword, by an
attendant of the attorney; and the brother-in-law of
the Phoujdar was dangerously wounded in the body,
with a pistol-shot, by the attorney himself.

Mr. Justice Hyde, one of the judges of the Supreme
Court, wrote, after hearing of these facts, to the
military officer upon the spot, instructing him to
afford assistance to the attorney ; and adds, “ I beg
the favour of you, for fear my letters to him should
not be suffered to come safe, to tell him, that I highly
approve his conduct, and doubt not that he will
receive proper support from the court whose officer
he is.”1

It is unnecessary in this case any further to pursue
the proceedings of the attorney or his court. The
Provincial Council gave bail for the Dewan ; trans-
mitted to the Governor-General and Council an
account of the facts ; and they concluded their letter
in the following words: “ It is fitting we should
point out to your notice, that all criminal justice is at
a stand, and seems not likely to be resumed, until
the decisive consequences of the present disputes
shall be publicly declared and known. It touches
the very existence of government throughout the
province, that the jurisdiction of the Phoujdar, and
his superior, theNaib Subah, be admitted; free from
all doubt or ambiguity. How, otherwise, can it be
supposed, a Phoujdar will perform any function of
his office ? How presume to execute a criminal con-

Report, ut supra, p. 24.

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

335

victed, and sentenced to death by the established laws 6V

of the government and his religion, if he is liable

himself to stand to actions of damages, or to answer 1/8L
to a criminal accusation, according to the laws of
England, for any punishment he may inflict % Paint
to yourselves, gentlemen, the anarchy and distraction
which may arise, if the present uncertainties are not
effectually removed ! ”

In England, one of the notions which judges, and
other lawyers, are in a most particular manner eager
to stamp upon the public mind is, That the adminis-
tration of justice is to a most astonishing degree
sensitive and delicate. That the acts and character
of judges should be treated with exquisite, indeed a
religious, respect. That they can hardly hear to he
exposed to criticism, or blame in the slightest degree.

And that, if the criticism is to any considerable
degree searching and severe, it ought to be repressed
and punished, however just, with terrifying penalties.

This doctrine, which is so very palatable to the
judges in England, and so very favourable to all the
abuses of their power, we see in what respect they
themselves retain, when their power may be enlarged,
by trampling upon it in the dust, by annihilating the
power and the dignity of the whole order of judges
by whom law was administered to a great people.

These are specimens of the manner in which the
Supreme Court in India attempted to carry their
pretensions into effect. And specimens are all which
here it is possible to adduce. A summary of the
principal instances in one department, I am happy
to be able to present in the words of Mr. Rous, the
great law-officer of the Company themselves. “ Per-

336

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. sons confined by the courts of Dewannee Adaulut are

collusively arrested by process from Calcutta, or re-

178L moved by Habeas Corpus , where the language is as
unknown as the power of the court. The process is
abused to terrify the people ; frequent arrests made
for the same cause ; and there is an instance of the
purchaser of a Zemindary near Dacca, w7ho was
ruined by suits commenced by paupers, suits derived
from claims prior to his purchase, and who was at
last condemned in considerable damages for an ordi-
nary act of authority in his station. Hence the
natives of all ranks become fearful to act in the col-
lection of the revenues. The renters, and even
hereditary Zemindars, are drawn away, or arrested
at the time of the collections, and the crops embez-
zled. If a farm is sold, on default of payment, the
new farmer is sued, ruined, and disgraced. Eject-
ments are brought, for land decreed in the Dewannee
Adaulut. A Talookdar is ruined by the expense of
pleading to the jurisdiction, though he prevails. And,
in an action, where 400 rupees were recovered, the
costs exceeded 1600 rupees. When to these abuses,
incident to the institution of the court itself, and
derived from distance, and the invincible ignorance of
the natives respecting the laws and practice of the
court, we add the disgrace brought on the higher
orders, it will not, perhaps, be rash to affirm, that
confusion in the provinces, and a prodigious loss of
revenue, must be the inevitable consequences of up-
holding this jurisdiction. The Zemindar of Duck-
ensavagepore, upon pretence that he had been arrest-
ed, and afterwards rescued, has his house broke
open, and even the apartments of his women rudely

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

337

violated. Another Zemindar surrenders himself to 6V‘
prison, to avoid the like disgrace to his family.”

“We have seen with astonishment,” say the Go- 1781‘
vemor-General and Council, “process of contempt
ordered in one instance, and civil process issue in
another, against the Naib Nazim of these provinces
residing at Moorshedabad, a party not owing alle-
giance to the King, nor obedience to his laws ; deriv-
ing no benefit or security whatever, in life or member,
in fame, liberty, or fortune, from the administration
of justice under the authority of these laws ; a
party, it is worth attention, who is the chief magis-
trate of criminal jurisdiction throughout the provinces,
and in whose jurisdiction in matters of criminal
cognizance the judges have not only at all times
acquiesced, but in a particular instance have actually
resorted to it, in aid and exoneration of them-
selves.”1

At length a case arose, in which the disputes
between the executive and judicial powers reached
a crisis. Upon the 13th of August, 1779, a suit was
commenced in the Supreme Court, against the Raja
of Cossijurah, by Cossinaut Baboo, his agent at Cal-
cutta. Upon the affidavit of Cossinaut, a capias was
ordered to issue, in which bail to the amount of
35,000?. was allowed to be taken. The Raja ab-
sconded, to avoid the execution of the writ, and was
unable to fulfil his duty, as Zemindar, in the govern-
ment of the country, and the collection of its revenues.

The writ of capias having been returned as unex-

1 See a very important Letter from the Governor-General and Council
to the Court of Directors, dated Fort William, 25th January, 1780, Report,
ut supra, General Appendix, No. 13.

VOL. IV.

338

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA

book v. ecuted, on account of the concealment of the Zemindar,

another writ was issued to sequester his land and

178L effects. For the execution of this writ, the Sheriff
despatched to Cossijurah an armed force, consisting
of sixty men, headed by a serjeant of the court. It
was represented by the Raja, that they entered the
house, and endeavoured to pass into the Zenana, or
women’s apartment; that of the servants of the
Raja, who attempted to prevent the dishonour of their
master, several were beaten and wounded ; that the
party then broke open and forcibly entered his
Zenana, and plundered his effects ; that they com-
mitted outrages upon his place of religious worship,
and stript it of its ornaments ; and that a stop was
put to the collections, and the farmers prohibited from
paying him their rents.

Upon the first intimation of this procedure, the
Governor-General and Council, by the advice of the
Advocate-General, had come to the resolution of
instructing the Raja not to recognise the authority
of the court, or to pay obedience to its process ; and
orders were sent to the officer commanding the troops
at Midnapore, to intercept the party of the Sheriff,
and detain them in his custody till further orders.
The orders arrived too late to prevent the outrage
committed upon the house of the Raja ; but after-
wards the whole of the party were seized.1

Affairs having come to this extremity, the Go-
vernor-General and Council issued a notification, to
all Zemindars, Choudries, and Talookdars, in the

1 The substance of this is not denied by the Chief Justice. He only
dwells upon the resistance which was offered. See his Letter to Lord
Weymouth, Cossijurah Appendix, No. 26.

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT. 339

three provinces, that, except in the two cases of book v.

being British servants, or bound by their own agree-

ment, they were not to consider themselves as subject 1781-
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, or to obey
its process ; and the provincial chiefs were forbidden
to lend a military force to aid the Court in carrying
its mandates into effect.

A rule was granted by the Supreme Court to
show cause why an attachment should not issue
against the Company’s attorney, and the officers who
were immediately instrumental in seizing the Sheriff’s
officers and their attendants at Cossijurah. The
officers were instructed, by the Governor-General
and Council, to resist the execution of any writ, which
had a reference to acts done in obedience to their
orders in seizing the persons in question. But the
attorney was committed to the common gaol of Cal-
cutta for contempt, and a criminal prosecution carried
on against him. Upon this, even Mr. Rous remarks,1
“ I am sorry to observe, that the judges, at this
period, seemed to have lost all temper, particularly
in the severe and unexampled manner of confining
Mr. Nayler, attorney to the Company, who merely
procured information from the office of the number
of men employed by the Sheriff, and once gave
directions to the vakeel of the Zemindar to withhold
his warrant of attorney ; — both, acts done in obe-
dience to the Governor-General and Council.”

The Governor-General and Council themselves
were at last individually served with a summons
from the Supreme Court of Judicature, to answer to
Cossinaut Baboo, in a plea of tresspass ; but finding

Report of Mr. Rous, ut supra.
Z 2

340

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

Gv- that the suit was brought against them for acts done
— in their collective capacity, as the governing organ
of the country, they delivered, by the Company’s
counsel, a declaration that they would submit to
no proceeding of the Court, in any prosecution
against them as individuals, for acts done by them
as Governor-General and Council ; acts to which the
jurisdiction of the Court did not extend.

These proceedings were not brought to this stage,
before the middle of March, 1780 ; and in the mean
time a petition to parliament had been prepared and
signed, by the principal British inhabitants in Bengal,
against the exercise which the Supreme Court of
Judicature made of their power; and this, together
with a petition from the Governor-General, and
members of the Supreme Council, and also a petition
from the Company itself, was presented in 1780, and
referred to the Select Committee, which afterwards
reported at such length on Indian affairs. In defence
of the Supreme Court, the only matter which appears,
with the exception of the speeches of the Judges in
Court, which refer only to the grounds of their pro-
ceedings in special cases, is contained in three letters
of the Chief Justice, addressed to Lord Viscount
Weymouth, Secretary of State; one dated the 25th
of March, 1779, and the other two dated the 2nd and
12th of March, 1780. In vindication of the attempt
to force the jurisdiction of the Court upon the Zemin-
dars, it is affirmed that although, as Zemindars, they
are not subject to that jurisdiction, yet, as renters
and collectors of the revenue, they are included in
the description of servants of the Company. And
it cannot be denied that the vague and inaccurate

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

341

phraseology of the act, a species of phraseology which v.

forms so remarkable a characteristic of the language

of the English law, and is the source of so many evils, 1/81 •
did leave open a door to the dispute, and to all the
mischief which it produced, and which it threatened
to produce ; though it is clear as day, from the
general import of the act, that no such jurisdiction
was intended to be given. To the allegation of the
mischievous consequences w’hich would ensue, and
which wTere proved to he so extensive and alarming,
the Chief Justice offers no reply. If there is a verbal,
or technical reason, to justify the exercise of his power,
the consequences, in regard to the happiness or
misery of others, are what, from his habits, must to
an English Judge appear, in general, as in the present
case, very much a matter of indifference. To the
accusation of interfering with the administration of
criminal justice in the native courts, over which the
Supreme Court had undeniably no control, the only
defence which is offered by the Chief Justice is, that
in those tribunals justice was administered very ill.

It is, however, abundantly certain, that totally to
destroy those tribunals by prosecuting the Judges
in the Supreme Court, when, having destroyed them,
it was impossible for that Court to substitute any
thing in their room, was not the way to improve the
administration of justice. If those native Courts
were susceptible of reform, as most assuredly they
were, though, considering the state of society and
the former experience of the people, there was at this
particular period some ground for praise as well as
for blame, it would have been a fit and noble exercise
for the mind of the Chief Justice and his brethren,

342

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \

CHAP. 6.

1781.

• to have formed an excellent plan for the administra-
- tion of justice among the natives, and to have recom-
mended it with all the weight of their authority to
parliament and the Company.

The motive in this case, which guided to so des-
perate a line of conduct, cannot he mistaken, and
ought not with hypocrisy to be disguised. It was
not any conception of good ; it was not ignorance of
the evil; for itwTas too obvious to be misunderstood.
It was the appetite for power, and the appetite for
profit : The power sufficiently visible and extraordi-
nary; the profit more concealed:1 Nor can the pleasure
of exercising unbounded sway, through the forms of
administering law, be justly regarded as a feeble in-
ducement. We see what, in this instance, it was
capable of producing : And a faithful history of the
law of England would exhibit no less wonderful
proofs, in the misery which it has brought, and still
obstinately binds, upon the people of England. Of
this important inlet of evil, with which the British
legislature ought to have been well acquainted, they

1 Although these motives may have unconsciously influenced the con-
duct of the judges, yet it were more charitable to refer their unreasonable
pretensions to the novelty of their position, and their consequent ignorance
of their relative and absolute duties. They were English lawyers, had
been sent out to administer English law ; they had been educated in a
belief of its comprehensiveness and perfection. They knew nothing of
India, had never heard of Hindu or Mohammedan law, and would have
despised it if they had : they had been accustomed to know that gross
abuses of law and justice prevailed in India, and they imagined it to be
their first of duties to show that they would resolutely exert the powers
which they thought that they possessed, for the extension of the principles
of the only law which they conceived to be capable of protecting the
interests of society. That they entertained a mistaken opinion of their
own dignity, and an equally unfounded contempt for the Company’s func-
tionaries, originated in the same cause, and to ignorance may be referred
the origin of their indiscretion and intemperance. — W.

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

343

appear, in framing the act for the administration of 6V'
justice in India, to have had no remembrance or

• 1 7ftl

regard. And even when they set that important
example of cutting off the direct profit of the Judges
in the plunder of the suitors, by depriving them of
all direct share in the fees ; they did not cut off an
indirect profit of no trifling importance, by allowing
them to create offices, with emoluments derived from
fees; offices of which they enjoyed the patronage,
itself a valuable power, and of which they could not
fail to discover various ways of disposing for their
own advantage. They still, therefore, retained an
interest, and a very distinct and operative interest, in
the amount of the fees which might be gathered in
the Court ; and the candour is amusing with which
the Chief Justice bewails the decline of those profits,
as one of the principal evils, if not the only evil, for
he scarcely specifies another, which sprang from the
measures taken to circumscribe the jurisdiction of
the Court. “ But one term,” he says, “ has inter-
vened, and the business of the Court, as I estimate,
has fallen off near one-third, and in a term or two,
when the causes already commenced are got rid of, I
expect it will be reduced to the trial of a few causes
arising in Calcutta. The advocates, attorneys, and
officers of the Court, who have not already succeeded,
will be reduced to a most deplorable condition. The
attorneys have petitioned us, that on account of the
difficulty of their procuring subsistence in the present
state of things, their numbers may not be increased
by new admisions : Though persons may come from
England so qualified and recommended, that we may
not be able to comply with this requisition, yet I

344

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

^ gV‘ really apprehend we shall do them little service by

admitting them ; for, it seems to me, it will be only

l781' to give them the privilege of starving in company
with the present attorneys.” 1 That there might be
great abundance of advocates and attorneys, and that
they, and the officers, in regard to whom the Court
possessed the patronage, might be richly rewarded,
appeared to the Chief Justice a sufficient reason why
his court should retain a jurisdiction ruinous to the
country. One of the surest effects of an excellent
administration of justice, the diminution of the number
of law-suits, that is, the diminution of the business of
the Courts; an effect which, if produced by the proper
cause, is so highly to be desired, is here set down by
the judge as one of the greatest of evils. It is no
wonder. It was an effect, directly contrary to his profit
and power. And it may with assurance be expected,
that judges who enjoy the profits of a defective
and vicious system of law, will regard as an evil
whatever has any tendency to lessen those profits ;
that is, any tendency to purify the law of its profit-
able defects.3

1 Report, ut supra, Letter from Sir Elijah Impey to Lord Weymouth,
2nd March, 1780.

* Some opinion may be formed of the sort of faith with which the
defence of the Judge was drawn up, by the misrepresentation which he
made of facts. He thus describes the circumstances of the Patna case.
“ A widow of an Omrah of the empire, to whom her husband had, by
deeds executed in his life-time, given personal effects to the value of some
lacs of rupees, and a considerable landed property, was, under pretence
that the deeds had been forged, though proof was made to the contrary,
plundered and stript of the whole estate, turned out without bed or cover-
ing into the public streets, compelled to take refuge in a monument
inhabited by fakeers, and to depend upon their charity for subsistence,

&c This action was likewise brought against Black Agents, whom

the Council at Patna had, contrary to their original institution, empowered
to hear afid determine a petition,” &c. Ibid. Letter from Sir E. Impey

ABUSES ARISING FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

345

At this stage of the discussions, respecting the
administration of justice, a considerable alteration in
the constitution of the tribunals, in the civil depart-
ment of the native law, was brought forward by the
Governor- General, and adopted by the Council. Ac-
cording to the regulations of 1773, this department
was wholly administered by the Provincial Councils,
sitting as Dewannee Adaulut, or Court of Civil Judi-
cature. It was now, on the 11th of April, 1780,
arranged, that the business of these Courts should
be divided into two parts ; that which peculiarly
concerned the revenue, and that which peculiarly
concerned individuals. A separate court, styled
Dewannee Adaulut, was established for the cog-
nizance of such disputes as arose between individuals :
all such disputes as respected the revenue continued
subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Pro-
vincial Councils. The new tribunals were severally
composed of one covenanted servant of the Company,
who was not a member of the Provincial Council,
nor dependent upon it ; and denominated superin-
tendent of the Dewannee Adaulut. The reason
adduced for this alteration was, to exonerate the
Provincial Councils from part of their burden, and
afford them more time for attending to the im-
portant business of the revenue.

About the same time, an expedient, of which the
foregoing alteration was probably contrived as a sub-
sidiary portion, suggested itself to the mind of the

to Lord Weymouth, 26th March, 1779. “ Black Agents” — this is the

appropriate name he bestows on the Magistrates and Judges of the highest
respectability in the country. “ Hear and determine ; ” — this is what he
affirms, though he knew that they only collected evidence and reported.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 6.

1781.

346

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \

CHAP. 6.

1781.

’ Governor-General, for neutralizing the animosities
- which prevailed between the Sovereign Council and
the Supreme Court ; and thereby for terminating
their disputes. He devised the plan of creating a
Court for the Chief- Justice, with a large allowance
both of power and emolument, dependent on the
pleasure of the executive power. The scheme was
conducted in the following manner. Along with the
establishment of the Provincial Dewannee Adauluts
in 1773, had been appointed a Sudder Dewannee
Adaulut at the Presidency, the object of which was
to receive appeals from the Provincial Adauluts.
The Sudder Dewannee Adaulut was to consist of the
Governor-General and Council in person ; but up to
this time they had not so much as entered upon the
discharge of the functions of this Court ; although
the Governor-General declared, and the declaration
ought not to pass without remark that, if one-half
of the time of the Council were devoted to this Court,
its important duties could not be adequately dis-
charged.1 If a judicial function of the highest im-
portance, for which there was so extensive a demand,
was left for seven years totally undischarged, what
an opinion is it proper we should form of the situation
of justice during all that time? And what opinion
are we to form of a Governor-General and Council,
who let justice remain in that situation? If they had
time for the duties of the office (and few of the duties
of government could be more important), they were
inexcusable for not applying it ; if they had not time,

1 Governor-General’s Minute in consultation, 29th September, 1780;
See First Report of the Select Committee, 1782, Appendix, No. 3.

HASTINGS AND THE CHIEF-JUSTICE ARRANGE.

347

they were inexcusable for not devising and executing Gv'

another plan.

In consultation on the 22nd of September, 1780, 1/8L

the Governor-General introduced a minute, in which
he stated, that the arrangement, established a few
months before, respecting the Courts of civil law, had
produced not the most desirable effects, but a great
deal of inconvenience. “ The institution,” he said,

“ of the new Courts of Dewannee Adaulut, has
already given occasion to very troublesome and
alarming competition between them and the Provin-
cial Councils, and too much waste of time at this
Board.” He represented it as the business of the
Sudder Dewannee Adaulut, not only to receive ap-
peals from these Courts, but to superintend their
conduct, revise their proceedings, remedy their
defects ; and, generally, to form such new regulations
and checks, as experience shall prove to be neces-
sary to the purpose of their institution.” He affirmed,
that it was impossible for the Council of Govern-
ment to spare time from its other functions for this
important duty ; and thus made two declarations :
one, that respecting the disorders of the Dewannee
Adauluts ; another, this respecting the Court of
Appeal : and both expressive of the miserable fore-
sight, which attended his own attempts at legislation.

He therefore proposed, That the constitution of the
Sudder Dewannee Adaulut should be totally changed:

That it should not consist of the Governor-General
and Council : but that the Chief- Justice of the Su-
preme Court of Judicature should be vested with all
its powers. A large salary was intended to be
annexed to the office ; but that, for politic reasons,

348

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 6.

1781.

• was not as yet proposed. And it was expressly
-regulated, that the Chief- Justice should enjoy the
office and the salary, during the pleasure of the
Governor-General and Council. The happy effects
which the Governor-General represented as about to
flow from this arrangement, were these ; that when
the Chief-Justice possessed the superintendence of
the Dewannee Adauluts, that is, obtained the choice
portion of their power, the Supreme Court would no
longer interfere in their jurisdiction ; that when the
Chief- Justice obtained this addition of power, with
the large salary which would attend it, and held them
both at the pleasure of the Council, it “would prove
an instrument of conciliation between the Council
and the Court,” and prevent “ those dangerous con-
sequences to the peace and resources of the govern-
ment, which every member of the Board,” he said,
“ foreboded from the contest in which they had been
unfortunately engaged with the Court.” The im-
putation which was essentially involved in this pro-
position, and which the Governor-General cast upon
the Chief- Justice, wTas the most dishonourable, that
ever was thrown upon the character of the most
infamous of men. The Chief- Justice, in extending
so vehemently the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
had affirmed, That it was an imperious sense of duty
wffiich thus constrained him to act; That by the
King, whose servant he was, and the act of parliament
which constituted the Court over which he was
placed, the boundaries of his jurisdiction, that is, of
his sacred duties, were assigned and marked out ;
That from these duties it was not optional for him to
recede; That the Judges of the Supreme Court of

CONDUCT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE.

349

Judicature were strictly bound to occupy every BC°°^6V‘

portion of the field allotted to them ; And could not

abandon any part of it, either from respect for the 1/S1-
Governor-General and Council, or on account of any
contingent effects which the discharge of their im-
perative duties might be supposed to produce. Yet,
what did the proposition of the Governor-General to
the Council infer? That if they gave to the Chief-
Justice a sufficient quantity of power, and of money,
dependent upon their will, the Chief- Justice would
confine the pretensions of the Supreme Court within
any limits which they might wish to impose. It
might naturally have been objected ; that to such a
proposition the Chief- Justice would never consent.

But Mr. Hastings, it would appear, was better
acquainted with the circumstances of the case : F or
the Chief- Justice immediately discovered, that infinite
advantages would arise from the plan. The propo-
sition was, indeed, opposed, with strong arguments,
by Mr. F rancis and Mr. Wheler. They insisted, that
if the Dewannee Adauluts were defective institutions,
this was not the proper course for their amendment ;
that, if the authority of the Governor-General and
Council, under which they acted, was doubtful, rest-
ing, as Mr. Hastings, to recommend his measure, had
asserted, on the disputed construction of an act of
parliament, the authority of the Council to make the
Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court Judge of the
Sudder Dewannee Adaulut could not be less than
equally doubtful, and the Chief- Justice, by accepting
the office, would acknowledge their authority, and
disclaim the construction which hitherto he had put
upon the act ; that to accept a new office, with new

350

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 6.

1781.

emoluments, and those dependent upon the pleasure
of the Company, seemed inconsistent with the act
which had expressly assigned him a large salary, in
lieu of all other emoluments ; that the duties of the
one office were inconsistent with those of the other ;
especially if the doctrine of the Chief- Justice himself
were sound, that the Judges of the Adauluts might be
sued for damages ; because he might thus have to
answer, in his own Court, for the acts which he had
performed as Judge of Sudder Adaulut; that if the
jurisdiction of the Sudder Adaulut would occupy one-
half of the time of the Council, so it would that of the
Chief- Justice, whose time was already so much en-
grossed, that he could not join with his colleagues in
performing the important office of a Justice of the
Peace for the city and district of Calcutta; that the
present exhausted state of the Company’s finances did
not justify them in creating a new office to which
large appointments were annexed; that the power
which would thus be wielded by the Chief- Justice
would “ too much hide the government from the eyes
of the natives ;” and that, if the attorneys and forms
of the Supreme Court were in any degree introduced
into the business of the Dewannee, “ a new and a wide
door of litigation would be opened.” When these two
opponents of the measure advanced as objections, that
the new powers allotted to the Chief- Justice would
endanger the rights of the Council or of the Company
as dewan, and still might not terminate the endeavours
of the Chief- Justice to encroach on their department,
they estimated far less correctly, than Mr. Hastings,
the powers of the instrument which he proposed to
employ. They did not consider, that, by rendering

HASTINGS AND IMPEY ARRANGE.

351

the Chief- Justice dependent upon themselves foraBOOK,,v-

large portion of money and power, they lost no part

of that power which they lent to him, but gained the 178L
command even of that which he derived from another
source.

It was on the 24th of October resolved, by a ma-
jority of the Council, that the Chief-Justice should
be requested to accept of the office of judge of the
Sudder Dewannee Adaulut ; and at the same time
proposed, that 60,000 sicca rupees per annum, nearly
seven thousand pounds, should be annexed to the
office, under the title of salary, and 7200 sicca rupees,
upwards of eight hundred pounds, under the deno-
mination of rent for an office. The assent of the
Chief- Justice, and his appointment to the office, im-
mediately ensued.

When intelligence of the reconciliation between
the governing Council and the Supreme Court,
effected by the appointment of Sir Elijah Impey,
with a large salary, to the station of Judge of Appeal
from the Dewannee Adauluts, was brought to the
Court of Directors, the case appeared to them of so
much importance, as to require the highest legal
advice; and it was laid before the Attorney and
Solicitor General, Mr. Dunning, and their own coun-
sel, Mr. Rous. It is a fact, more full of meaning
perhaps, when applied to the character of the pro-
fession, than of the individuals, that an opinion, in
the following words — “ The appointment of the
Chief- Justice to the office of Judge of the Sudder
Dewannee Adaulut, and giving him a salary for the
latter office, besides what he is entitled to as Chief-
J ustice, does not appear to us to be illegal, either as

352

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

-ok v. being contrary to the 13 Geo. Ill, or incompatible

with his duty as Chief-Justice ; nor do we see any

178L thing in the late act, 21 Geo. III., which affects the
question” — was signed by the names, J. Dunning,
Jas. Wallace, J. Mansfield. The opinion of Mr. Hous,
the Counsel of the Company, was different, as had
been that of their Advocate-General in India ; and
Mansfield, a few days afterwards, stated, in a short
note to the Directors, that doubts had arisen in his
mind, whether the acceptance of a salary, to be held
at the pleasure of the Company or their servants, was
not forbidden by the spirit of the act, or at any rate
the reason of the case. He concluded in these words,
“ I have not been able to get the better of these
doubts, although I have been very desirous of doing
it, from the great respect I have for the opinions of
those gentlemen with whom I lately concurred, and
whose judgment ought to have much more weight
and authority than mine.”

The question was taken under consideration of
the Select Committee of the House of Commons ;
who treated it, under the guidance of other feelings
and other ideas. In their report, the power conferred
upon Sir Elijah Impey in his new capacity was re-
presented as exorbitant and dangerous ; and so much
the more so, that no regular definition of it was any
where to be found ; no distinct rule of law was any
where pointed out ; but he was to be guided by his
own will ; he was to be moderated by no check ; he
was to be restrained by no appeal ; and he was to
decide upon the fortunes of all the natives of Bengal.
He was provided not only with judicial but legis-
lative powers, being authorized to make rules and

HASTINGS AND IMPEY CONDEMNED IN PARLIAMENT.

353

regulations, that is, to lay down laws, for governing BC®®^GV*

the civil jurisdiction of the country. And all this

power was conferred upon a man, wrho, in the l78L
opinion of Mr. Hastings at least, had been distin-
guished by no disposition to make a moderate use of
his power. The grounds of expediency and policy,
on which, ostensibly, the measure was put, were
treated as having been already proved to be frivolous
and weak, by the arguments of Mr. Francis and Mr.

Wheler, to which no answer had ever been made.

“ The idea,” it was affirmed, “ of establishing peace
upon the ground of adverse claims still unrelaxed,
and which nothing even appears to reconcile but the
lucrative office given to the Chief Justice, can be
maintained but upon suppositions highly dishonour-
able to the public justice, and to the executive
administration of Bengal.” One of the most im-
portant features of the case was then held up to
view : Mr. Hastings, it was remarked, assumed, and
he wTas well acquainted with the circumstances of
the case, in the whole course of his reasoning, that
in substance and effect the Chief Justice was the
whole of the Supreme Court : by selling his inde-
pendence to the Governor-General and Council, the
Chief Justice, therefore, sold the administration of
justice, over every class of the inhabitants of Bengal.

“ By the dependence of one tribunal,” says the
report, “ both are rendered dependent ; both are
vitiated, so far as a place of great power, influence,
and patronage, with near eight thousand pounds
a-year of emoluments, held at the pleasure of the
giver, can be supposed to operate on gratitude,
interest, and fear. The power of the Governor-

VOL. IV. 2 A

354

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. General over the whole royal and municipal justice

in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, is as absolute and

1781- uncontrollable, as both those branches of justice are
over the whole kingdom of Bengal.”

An observation of the Committee is subjoined, to
which the highest degree of importance belongs.
It is founded upon the grand fundamental truth.
That nothing is more favourable to the augmentation
and corruption of the executive power, than the
faculty of doing, through the medium of the courts
of law, things which would awaken suspicion or
hatred, if done by the executive itself.

In the situation in which the dependence of the
Chief Justice has placed Mr. Hastings, “he is en-
abled,” say the Committee, “to do things, under the
name and appearance of a legal court, which he
would not presume to do in his own person. The
refractory to his will may appear as victims to the
law ; and favoured delinquency may not appear, as
protected by the hand of power, but cleared by the
decision of a competent judge.” When a nation is
habituated, even as much as our own is habituated,
to pay a blind and undistinguishing respect to the
character and acts of judges ; the subservience of
the courts of law is an instrument of power, of por-
tentous magnitude.

The consequence of the discussion wThich these
transactions underwent, and of the sensations which
they produced in the nation, was an act of parliament
to regulate anew the Supreme Court of Judicature,
and deprive it of the powers which had been found
destructive : and, upon a change of ministry, an
address to the King was voted by the House of

CHANGES IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

355

Commons, on the 3rd of May, 1782, for the recall of B00K } •

Sir Elijah Impey, to answer to the charge of having .

“ accepted an ofh.ce not agreeable to the true intent 1781 ■
and meaning of the act 13 Geo. III.” 1 2

Soon after his appointment to the office of Judge
of Sudder Dewannee Adaulut, thirteen articles of
regulation for the practice of that Court and of the
subordinate tribunals were recommended by the
Judge, approved by the government, and adopted.

With these were incorporated various additions and
amendments, which were afterwards published in a
revised code, comprising ninety-hve articles. The
number of provincial Dewannee Adauluts was, in
April, 1781, increased from six to eighteen, in con-
sequence of the inconvenience experienced from the
extent of their jurisdiction.

As the establishment of the police-magistrates,
called foujdars and tannadars, introduced in 1774,
followed the example of so many of the contrivances
adopted in the government of India ; that is, did not
answer the end for which it was designed, the judges
of Dewannee Adaulut were vested with power of ap-
prehending depredators and delinquents, within the
bounds of their jurisdiction, but not of trying or

1 For these important proceedings, the Report of the Committee of the
House of Commons, to which the petitions respecting the administration
of justice in Bengal were referred ; and the First Report of the Select
Committee of 1781, with the ample documents contained in their volumin-
ous appendixes, have been laboriously consulted. See also The Speech of
Sir Elijah Impey delivered at the bar of the House of Commons on the
4th day of February, 1788, with the documents printed in the Appendix ;
though this defence refers almost solely to the conduct of the Chief Justice
in the trial and execution of Nuncomar. See also Colebrooke’s Supple-
ment, p. 14, 23, 128; and the Fifth Report from the Select Committee on
India affairs, in 1810, p. 8 and 9.

2 a 2

356

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAr. 6.

1781.

punishing them ; a power which was still reserved to
-the Nizamut Adauluts, acting in the name of the
Nabob. The Governor-General and Council also
reserved a power of authorizing, in cases in which
they might deem it expedient, the Zemindars to ex-
ercise such part of the police-jurisdiction as they
had formerly exercised under the Mogul adminis-
tration. And in order to afford the government
some oversight and control over the penal juris-
diction of the country, a new office was established
at the Presidency, under the immediate super-
intendence of the Governor-General. To this office,
reports of proceedings, with lists of commitments
and convictions, were to he transmitted every month ;
and an officer, under the Governor-General, with
the title of Remembrancer of the Criminal Courts ,
was appointed for the transaction of its affairs. In
November, 1782, in consequence of commands
from the Court of Directors, the jurisdiction of the
Sudder Dewannee Adaulut was resumed by the
Governor-General and Council. 1

Upon these changes, in the judicial, followed close
another change in the revenue system. In 1773 the
plan had been adopted of performing the collection of
the revenues by means of provincial Councils ; hut
under the declared intention of its being only tempo-
rary, and preparatory to another plan ; namely, that
of a Board of Revenue at the Presidency, by whom,
with local officers, the whole business of realizing
the revenue might he performed. Afterwards, when
disputes with Mr. Francis, and other opposing

1 Fifth Report of the Select Committee in 1810; Second Report of the
Select Committee in 1781.

CHANGES IN THE REVENUE SYSTEM.

357

members of the Council, arose, Mr. Hastings had B00K„ v

. . . ° CHAP. 6.

maintained, that the expedient of provincial Councils

was the most excellent which it was possible for him 178L
to devise. On the 20th of February, 1781, however,
a very short time after the departure of Mr. Francis,
he recurred to the plan which was projected in
1773; and decreed as follows; that a Committee of
Revenue should be established at the Presidency,
consisting of four covenanted servants of the Com-
pany ; that the provincial Councils should be
abolished, and all the powers with which they were
vested transferred to the Committee ; that the Com-
mittee should transact, with full authority, all the
current business of revenue, and lay a monthly
report of their proceedings before the Council ; that
the majority of votes, in the Committee, should de-
termine all those points on which there should be a
difference of opinion; that the record, however, of
each dissentient opinion was not expected; that,
even upon a reference to the Council, the execution
of what the majority had determined should not be
stayed, unless to the majority themselves the suspen-
sion appeared to be requisite ; and that a commission
of two per cent, on all sums paid monthly into the
treasury at Calcutta, and one per cent, on all sums
paid monthly into the treasuries which remained
under charge of the collectors, should be granted as
the remuneration, according to certain proportions,
of the members and their principal assistants.

Against this arrangement it was afterwards urged,
that it was an addition to those incessant changes,
which were attended with great trouble, uncertainty,
and vexation to the people : ' that it was a wanton

358

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

k • innovation, if the praises bestowed by Mr. Hastings on
_ the provincial Councils were deserved : that it
divested the Supreme Council of that power over
the business of revenue, with which they solely
were intrusted by the legislature, to lodge it in the
hands of Mr. Hastings : as the members of the Com-
mittee were under his appointment, and the Council
wTere deprived of the means of forming an accurate
judgment on all disputed points ; hearing the reasons
of the majority alone, while those of the minority
were suppressed. To these objections Mr. Hastings
replied, that the inconveniences of change were no
argument against any measure, provided the advan-
tages of the measure surpassed them ; that he was
not bound by his declarations respecting the fitness
of the provincial Councils, when the factious disputes
which divided them, and the decline of the revenues,
proved that they were ill adapted to their purpose ;
that the business of the revenue was necessarily
tranferred from the Supreme Council, because the
time of the Council was inadequate to its demands :
that the Committee of Revenue were not vested
with the powers of the Council, in any other sense
than the provincial Councils, or any other dele-
gates ; but, on the contrary, acted under its imme-
diate control.

It was intrusted to the Committee to form a plan
for the future assessment and collection of the reve-
nues. And the following are the expedients of
which they made choice : to form an estimate of the
abilities of the several districts, from antecedent
accounts, without recurring to local inspection and
research : to lease the revenues, without interme-

JOURNEY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

359

diate agents, to the Zemindars, where the Zemindary j ■

was of considerable extent : and, that they might

save government the trouble of detail, in those 178L
places where the revenues were in the hands of a
number of petty renters, to let them altogether, upon
annual contracts.1

CHAPTER VII.

Journey of the Governor- General to the Upper
Provinces. — History of the Company's Connexions
with the Raja of Benares. — Requisitions upon the
Raja. — Resolution to relieve the Company's Ne-
cessities by forcible Exaction on the Raja. — The
Governor-General arrives at Benares. — The Raja
put under Arrest. — A Tumultuous Assemblage of
the People. — An Affray between them and the
Soldiers. — The Raja Escapes. — War made upon
him , and the Country Subdued. — Condemnation of
Mr. Hastings by the Directors. — Double Negotia-
tion with the Mahrattas of Poonah. — Treaty of
Peace.

It was immediately subsequent to these great
changes in the financial and judicial departments of
the government, that the celebrated journey of the

1 The official documents are found in the Appendix, Sixth Report of the
Select Committee, 1782 : and in the papers printed for the House of Com-
mons, on the question of the impeachment. Sec too the Fifteenth article
of Charge against Hastings, and the answer.

360

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \
CHAP. 7.

1781.

Governor-General to the Upper Provinces took
. place. Important as was the business, which at
that time pressed upon the attention of the govern-
ment, when war raged in the Carnatic, when the
contest with the Mahrattas was carried on in two
places at once, and when the Supreme Council was
so greatly reduced in numbers, that upon the depar-
ture of the Governor-General, one member alone,
Mr. Wheler, was left to conduct the machine of
government, it was to be concluded, that matters of
great concernment had withdrawn the Governor-
General from the principal scene of intelligence, of
deliberation, and of action. The transactions which
he had in view were chiefly those proceedings
which he meditated with regard to the Raja of
Renares, and the Nabob of Oude. The government
was distressed for money, and the intention was
avowed of making those tributary Princes subser-
vient to its supply. The Governor-General departed
from Calcutta on the 7th July, of 1781, and arrived at
Renares on the 14th of August. To understand the
events which ensued, it is necessary to trace from its
origin, the connexion which subsisted between the
English and the Raja.

After the shock which the empire of the Great
Mogul sustained by the invasion of Nadir Shah,
when the subahdars and other governors, freed from
the restraint of a powerful master, added to the ter-
ritory placed under their commaud, as much as they
were able of the adjacent country, the city and dis-
trict of Renares were reduced under subjection to the
Nabob of Oude. This city, which was the principal
seat of Erahmenical religion and learning, and to the

RAJAH OF BENARES.

3G1

native inhabitants an object of prodigious veneration 7V-

and resort, appears, during the previous period of

Mohammedan sway, to have remained under the im- 178L
mediate government of a Hindu. Whether, till the
time at which it became an appanage to the Subah
of Oude, it had ever been governed through the
medium of any of the neighbouring viceroys, or had
always paid its revenue immediately to the imperial
treasury, does not certainly appear. With the ex-
ception of coining money in his own name ; a pre-
rogative of majesty, which, as long as the throne
retained its vigour, was not enfeebled by communica-
tion; and that of the administration of criminal
justice, which the Nabob had withdrawn, the Raja
of Benares had always, it is probable, enjoyed and
exercised all the powers of government, within his
own dominions.1 In 1764, when the war broke out

1 This is an adoption of one of those errors upon which the charge
against Mr. Hastings, in regard to his relations with Cheit Sing, was
founded, and which commences with the Second Report of the Select Com-
mittee, who talk of “ the expulsion of a Raja of the highest rank from
his dominions.” In point of fact, however, no Raja had enjoyed and
exercised the powers of government in the province of Benares, since the
middle of the eleventh century, at the latest. At the period of the
Mohammedan conquest, it was part of the kingdom of Kanoj. It was
annexed to Delhi by the arms of Kutteb, early in the 13th century, and in
the 14th was included in the Mohammedan kingdom of Jonpur. In the
reign of Akbar, it was comprised in the Subah of Allahabad, and in that of
Aurungzeb it was comprehended in that of Oude. In all this time no
mention is made of a Raja of Benares. The title originated in the begin-
ning of the eighteenth century, or a. d. 1730, when Mansa Ram. Zemindar
of Gangapoor, having, in the distracted state of affairs, added largely to his
authority, obtained a Sunnud of Raja, from Mohammed Shah of Delhi — -a
mere honorary title, conferred then, as it is now by the British Govern-
ment, without any suspicion of its implying princely power or territorial
dominion. Mansa Ram procured the title for his son, Bulwunt Sing, who
succeeded him in 1740; so that even the title was only forty years old at
the time of Cheit Sing’s removal. It had never conferred independence,
for the Raja had still remained a Zemindar, holding under the Subahdar of

362

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

} • between the English and the Subahdar of Oude,
— Bulwant Sing was Raja of Benares, and, excepting
the payment of an annual tribute, was almost inde-
pendent of that grasping chief, who meditated the
reduction of Benares to the same species of dominion
which he exercised over the province of Oude. The
Raja would gladly have seen the authority of the
English substituted in Oude to that of the Vizir,

Oude. It is true, that the minutes of Council of various dates speak of the
Raja as a sort of king ; tributary, but reigning in his own right, and by the
position of his supposed kingdom, calculated to be a valuable feudatory or
ally of the British Government. Some of this was merely vagueness of ex-
pression, some of it ignorance. The word Raja seems to have imposed
even upon Hastings; certainly it did upon Clavering and his party; and
language was used in allusion to Cheit Sing, which exposed Hastings to
the charge of contradiction and inconsistency. There is no vagueness or
inconsistency, however, in the document upon which Cheit Sing’s whole
power and right depended. The Sunnud of 1776, granted to the Raja by
the Governor and Council, and which, it is to be observed, “ causes all
former Sunnuds to become null and void ;” confers no royalties, acknow-
ledges no hereditary rights, fixes no perpetual limit to the demands of the
Supreme Government ; but appoints him Zemindar, Aumeen, and Foujdar
of Benares, and other districts. All these terms imply delegated and sub-
ordinate offices, and recognise in him nothing more than receiver of t^e
rents, and civil and commercial Judge. In the Kabooleat, or assent to this
Sunnud, Cheit Sing acknowledges the sovereignty of the Company, and
promises to pay them a certain sum, the estimated net revenue, and to pre-
serve peace and order. Whatever, therefore, may be the fluctuating and con-
tradictory language of the minutes of Council, there is not the slightest pre-
text for treating the Zemindar of Benares as a sovereign, however sub-
ordinate or tributary, to be drawn from the official paper acknowledged by
himself to be the tenure by which he held whatever power he enjoyed. It
is true, that the genuineness of this document was disputed by the pro-
secutors ; and they affirmed that the Sunnud was altered in compliance with
the representation of Cheit Sing, who objected to the insertion of the term,
“ Muchulka,” and the clause annulling all former Sunnuds. They could
not prove, however, that any other Sunnud was ever executed; and what-
ever might at one time have been the disposition of the Council to accede
to the Raja’s wishes, it does not appear that any actual measure ensued.
Even, however, if the omissions had been made, of which there is no proof,
it is not pretended that any clause, exempting the Raja for ever from all
further demands, was inserted ; and this was the only material point at
issue. Minutes of Evidence, p. 60. — W.

THE ENGLISH AND THE RAJA OF BENARES AGREE.

363

whom he had so much occasion to dread. He offered

to assist them with his forces ; and,, to anticipate all

jealousy, from the idea of his aiming at independence, 1/81'
expressed his willingness to hold the country, subject
to the same obligations under them, as it had sus-
tained in the case of the Nabob ; and so highly im-
portant was the service which he rendered to the
Company, that the Directors expressed their sense of
it in the strongest terms.1 When peace was concluded,
the Raja was secured from the effects of the Nabob’s
resentment and revenge, by an express article in the
treaty, upon which the English insisted, and the
guarantee of which they solemnly undertook. Upon
the death ofBulwant Sing in the year 1770, the dis-
position of the Vizir to dispossess the family, and take
the province into his own hands, was strongly dis-
played, but the English again interfered, and com-
pelled the Vizir to confirm the succession to Cheyte
Sing, the son of the late Raja, and his posterity for
ever, on the same terms, excepting a small rise in the
annual payment, as those on which the country had
been held by his father.3 In the year 1773, when
Mr. Hastings paid his first visit to the Nabob of
Oude, the preceding agreement was renewed and
confirmed. “ The Nabob,” said Mr. Hastings,

“ pressed me, in very earnest terms, for my consent,
that he should dispossess the Raja of the forts of
Leteefgur and Bidgegur, and take from him ten lacs
of rupees over and above the stipulated rents : and
he seemed greatly dissatisfied at my refusal.”3 Mr.

1 In tlieir Bengal Letter, 26th May, 1768.

2 This stipulation ceased to be in force under the subsequent Sunnud of
1776. — W.

3 The Vizir had urged no more than he had a right to do, and the

364

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

Bchv^ 71 Hastings, however, insisted that all the advantages
which had been secured to Bulwant Sing, and con-

1781 °

firmed by the Nabob’s own deed to Cheyte Sing,
should be preserved ; and he expressed, in the same
letter, his opinion both of the faith of the Vizir, and
the independence of the Raja, in the following
terms :

“ I am well convinced that the Raja’s inheritance,
and perhaps his life, are no longer safe than while he
enjoys the Company’s protection; which is his due,
by the ties of justice, and the obligations of public
faith; and which policy enjoins us to afford him ever
most effectually : his country is a strong barrier to
ours, without subjecting us to any expense; and we
may depend upon him as a sure ally, whenever we
may stand in need of his services.” It was established
accordingly, that “ no increase of revenue should ever
thereafter be demanded.”1

When the Company’s new government, established
in 1774, resolved upon forming a new arrangement
with the son and successor of the Vizir, lately
deceased ; the interest, whatever it was, which was
possessed by the Vizir in the territory of the Raja
Cheyte Sing, was transferred from that chief to the
Company. Upon this occasion it was resolved, not
only that no infringement should take place of the

opposition of the Governor-General established a claim to the gratitude of
the Benares family. — W.

1 Secret Consultations, Fort William, 4th Oct. 1773; Extract of the
Governor-General’s Report; Second Report of the Select Committee,
1782, p. 12. — M. Here is no acknowledgement of independence, unless
the word “ ally” be so construed ; but in the voluminous correspondence
of the Indian Governments, it is impossible that words should not be used
sometimes in their general sense, without intending a rigid interpreta-
tion.—W.

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

365

previous rights and privileges of the Raja, but that

other advantages should be annexed. Mr. Hastings

took the lead in this determination; and earnestly 1/SL
maintained the policy of rendering the Raja totally
independent in his government of Benares, under no
condition but the payment of a fixed and invariable
tribute. To this, with only a nominal modification,
the Council agreed. It was a primary object, pro-
fessed by all, that the Raja should he completely
secured from all future encroachments, either upon
his revenue, or his power ; and an unanimous resolu-
tion was passed, that so long as he discharged his
engagements, “ no more demands should be made
upon him, by the Honourable Company, of any kind ;
nor, on any pretence whatsoever, should any person
be allowed to interfere with his authority.” To pre-
clude all ground for such interference, the right of
coining money, and of administering penal justice,
was transferred to him. Mr. Hastings proposed that
the Raja should pay his tribute, not at his own
capital of Benares, but at Patna, which was the
nearest station for the business of government, within
the territory of the Company. And the reason which
he suggested is worthy of record : “ If a resident was
appointed to receive the money, as it became due, at
Benares ; such a resident would unavoidably acquire
an influence over the Raja, and over his country ;
which would, in effect, render him master of both.

This consequence might not, perhaps, be brought
completely to pass, without a struggle ; and many
appeals to the Council, which, in a government con-
stituted like this, cannot fail to terminate against the
Raja: And, by the construction, to which his

366

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 7.

1781.

• opposition to the agent would be liable, might even-
- tually draw on him severe restrictions ; and end in
reducing him to the mean and depraved state of a
mere Zemindar.”1 The chain of acknowledgments
is instructive and memorable: 1st, That a resident
of the Company, at the court of a native Prince,
though for ever so confined and simple a purpose, no
more than that of receiving periodical payment of a
definite sum of money, would engross the power of
the Prince, and become, in effect, the master of the
country : 2ndly, That in any disputes which might
arise with the agent, in the resistance offered by the
Prince to these encroachments, the Prince is sure of
injustice from the Company’s government, sure that
all appeals to it will terminate against him, and that
even his attempts to oppose the encroachments of the
agent will be liable to such constructions, as may
induce the Company’s servants to plunge him into
the lowest state of oppression and degradation : and,
3rdly, That this state of “meanness and depravity ”
is the ordinary state of a Zemindar.2

1 Minute in Council of the Governor General on the 12th of June, 1775.

2 Mr. Barwell even went so far, as to record it in his minute as his
opinion and desire, that the Raja should be exempt even from tribute, and
rendered in all respects an independent Sovereign. His words are these :
“ The independence of Gauzeepore (the Raja’s country) on Oude, is a
great political object, and ought to be insisted on ; and whatever may be
resolved respecting the revenue paid by the Raja of that country, the
English government ought not to stand in the same relation to it as the
late Vizir, because the country of Benares and Gauzeepore is a natural
barrier to these provinces; and the Raja should have the strongest tie of
interest to support our government, in case of any future rupture with the
Subah of Oude. — To make this his interest, he must not be tributary to
the English government ; for, from the instant he becomes its tributary,
from that moment we may expect him to side against us, and by taking
advantage of the troubles and commotions that may arise, attempt to dis-
burden himself of his pecuniary obligations.” Bengal Consultation, 13th

UNFORTUNATE CONDITION OF THE RAJA.

367

It was in the end arranged, that the payment

the tribute should he made at Calcutta, a commission

being allowed for the additional expense : and Mr. 178L
Francis was anxious that the independence of the
Raja should be modified no further than by an
acknowledgment of the supremacy of the English ; a
condition not practically affecting his government,
and conducive no less to his security than to the
dignity of those to whom the compliment was
paid.1

Upon these terms the settlement wms concluded ;
and the Raja continued to pay his tribute with an

Feb. 1775. As a specimen of the changes to which the sentiments of these
rulers were liable, compare the words of the Minute of the same Mr.
Barwell, not three years and five months afterwards, viz. in his Minutes in
Council, 9th of July, 1779; “ I have long regarded the military establish-
ment of Benares, under the Raja’s native officers, as a defect; I therefore
most heartily agree to the present proposal for three disciplined battalions
to be kept up and paid by the Raja, and sincerely hope the Company will
direct that the whole force of Benares and Gauzeepore, under the Zemindar,
be placed upon the same footing as the regular military force of the Pre-
sidency.” It is to be observed, that the three battalions were a mere pre-
tence. The Raja was only required to give money; and the battalions
were never raised.

1 The third paragraph of his Minute in Council, on the 13th of February,
1775, was in these words ; “ The present Raja of Benares to be confirmed
in the Zemindary, which may be perpetuated in the family under a fixed
annual tribute, and a fixed fine at each future investiture; the Raja’s
authority in his own country to be left full and uncontrolled.” And this
he further explained in a Minute, dated the 4th of March, in the
following words ; “ In agreeing to the proposed independence of the Raja
of Benares, my meaning was, to adhere strictly to the third paragraph of
my Minute of the 13th of February, that the Zemindary may be perpetuated
in his family on fixed and unalterable conditions. It is highly for his own
advantage, to be considered as a vassal of the Sovereign of these kingdoms,
holding a great hereditary fief by a fixed tenure, and acknowledging the
Sovereign of Bengal and Bahar to be his lord paramount. Speaking my
sentiments without reserve, I must declare, that in settling this article, I
look forward to the assertion or acceptance of the sovereignty of these pro-
vinces. pleno jure, on the part of his most Gracious Majesty, the King of
Great Britain.”

368

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 7.

1781.

• exactness rarely exemplified in the history of the
. tributary princes of Hindustan. Unhappily for him,
he was not an indifferent spectator of the disputes
which agitated the Supreme Council. “ It is a fact,”
says the Governor-General, “ that when the unhappy
divisions of our government had proceeded to an
extremity bordering on civil violence, by the attempt
to wrest from me my authority, in the month of
June, 1777, 1 he had deputed a man named Sumboo-
naut, with an express commission to my opponent ;
and the man had proceeded as far as Moorshedahad,
when, hearing of the change of affairs, he stopped,
and the Raja recalled him.” 2 It is somewhat won-
derful that a circumstance, no greater than this,
should have made so deep an impression upon the
mind of the Governor-General, as to he enumerated,
after the lapse of years, in a laboured apology,
among the causes wdiich justified the prosecution of
the Raja to his ruin.3

In the year 1778, the Governor-General proposed,
that a requisition should he made upon the Raja
Cheyte Sing, for the maintenance of three battalions

1 What he calls the attempt to wrest from him his authority, was his
own refusal to obey the appointment of the Company, when Sir John
Clavering was nominated to the place of Governor-General, upon the
resignation which Mr. Hastings disowned. — M. Having disowned it, he had
not resigned, and the conditional appointment, therefore, fell to the ground.
The attempt to enforce it without the condition, was an attempt at usurpa-
tion.— W.

5 The Governor-General’s Narrative of the Transactions at Benares,
App. No. 1 ; Second Report of the Select Committee, 1781.

3 The manner in which this circumstance is described is uncandid. There
is no reason to infer from the notice taken of the conduct of Cheil Sing,
that Hastings alludes to it from any cherished feeling of resentment. He
alludes to the Raja’s alacrity in fomenting the divisions of the Council, as
one proof among others of his being on the watch for opportunities to throw
off subjection to the English government, and establish his own indepen-
dence.— W.

DEMANDS UPON THE RAJAH OF BERNARES. 369

of sepoys, estimated at five lacs of rupees per annum, 7V-

during the continuance of the war. In settling the

terms of the connexion of the Raja with the Com- 1781-
pany, in 1775, it had been proposed, for consideration ,
by the Governor-General, whether the Raja should
not engage to keep a body of 2000 cavalry constantly
on foot, which should be consigned to the service of
the Company, receiving an additional pay or gratuity,
as often as the public interest should require. But
this proposition was rejected by the rest of the
Council, even by Mr. Barwell, on the score of its
being a mere enhancement of the tribute of the Raja,
under a different name. And the Governor-General
then declared, that “ it was far from his intention
to propose this, or any other article, to be imposed
on the Raja by compulsion; he only proposed it as
an article of speculation.” Mr. Francis and Mr.

Wheler, in 1778, consented that an aid, to the
amount which the Governor-General proposed, should
be requested of the Raja, but demurred as to the
right of enforcing any demand beyond that of the
stipulated tribute ; and Mr. Hastings agreed to
reserve the question of right to their superiors.1 2
Professing a strong desire to show his friendship to
the Company, the Raja, as was to be expected,
endeavoured to obtain an abatement of the sum;
and when he gave his consent to the w hole, expressly
declared that it was only for a single year. In
resentment of these endeavours to limit the amount

1 The expressions in his Minute in Council (9th July, 1778), are these
. . wishing to avoid the question of right”. . . I wish to leave the
decision of future right to our superiors.”

2 B

VOL. IV.

370

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. 0f the contribution, the Governor-General proposed,

that no time should be allowed for the convenience

178L of payment ; but the whole should be exacted
immediately. “ I acquiesce,” were the words of
Mr. Francis’s Minute; “ though, in my own opinion,
it would answer as well to us, and be less distressing
to the Raja, if the subsidy were added in equal
proportions to the monthly receipts of the tribute.”
The Raja pleaded poverty ; and, praying for in-
dulgence in point of time, engaged to make good the
total payment in six or seven months. The Governor-
General treated the very request as a high offence,
and added the following very explanatory words,
“ I will not conceal from the Board, that I have
expected this evasive conduct in the Raja, having
been some time past well informed, that he had been
advised in this manner to procrastinate the payment
of the five lacs, to afford time for the arrival of
dispatches from England, which were to bring orders
for a total change in this government ; and this he
was given to expect would produce a repeal of the
demand made upon him by the present govern-
ment.” A delay, founded upon the hope that the
Governor-General would be stript of power, might
sting the mind of the Governor-General, if it was a
mind of a particular description ; but a delay, founded
upon the hope of remission (even if it had been
ascertained to be the fact) would not by any body,
unless he were in the situation of the Governor-
General, be regarded as much of a crime. Mr.
Francis and Mr. Wheler were over-ruled, and the
resident at Benares was commanded immediately to
repair to the Raja, to demand, that in five days the

DEMANDS CONTINUED UPON THE RAJA.

371

whole of the money should be paid, to denounce to book 7V-

him that a failure in this respect would be treated as

equivalent to an absolute refusal, and to abstain from ^st-
all intercourse with him till further instructions, if
the requisition was not obeyed.

In the following year, the demand was renewed.

The Raja now more earnestly represented the nar-
rowness of his circumstances ; the hardship wdiich
was imposed upon him, by so heavy an exaction ;
his exemption, by the terms of his treaty, 1 from all
demands, beyond the amount of his tribute, which was
most regularly paid ; and his express stipulation, an-
nexed to his former payment, that it was not to be
for more than a year. The Governor-general replied
in terms more imperious and harsh than before ;
threatening him with military execution, unless he
paid immediate and unconditional obedience to the
command. The Raja repeated his remonstrance,
in the most earnest, but the most submissive, and
even suppliant terms. The troops were ordered to
march. He was compelled to pay not only the ori-
ginal demand, but 2000/. as a fine for delay, under the
title of ex pence of the troops employed to coerce him.2

In the third year, that is, in 1780, the exaction
was renewed ; but several new circumstances were,
in this year, annexed to the transaction. The Raja

1 There was no treaty — a Sunud is not a treaty, but a grant or patent
from a superior to an inferior ; no exemption was specified, and although a
specific sum was named, there was no pledge that it should never be
altered. — W.

2 The questions at issue, were the ability and disposition of Cheit Sing
to render effective assistance to the state in a period of real emergency.
Had the latter been evinced, had not a contrary disposition been cherished,
more leniency would have been deserved, and would no doubt have been
manifested, in enforcing the demands of the government. — W.

2 B 2

372

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. sent his confidential minister to Calcutta, to mollify

C HAP. 7 . *

the Governor-General, by the most submissive ex-

1 78i ■ pressions of regret for having incurred his displea-
sure, even by confessions of error and of fault, and
by the strongest protestations of a desire to make
every possible exertion for the recovery of his favour.
This however included not the payment of the five
lacks, of which the agent was instructed to use his
utmost endeavours to obtain a remission. For the
better accomplishment of this object, he was fur-
nished with a secret compliment to the Governor-
General, of the amount of two lacs of rupees. At
first, as we are told by Mr. Hastings, he absolutely
refused the present, and assured the agent of the
Raja that the contribution must be paid. Afterwards,
however, he accepted the present; with a view, as he
himself informs us, to apply the money to a peculiar
exigency of the public service. Be it so. The money
of the Raja however was tendered, for a purpose which
it was impossible to mistake : And that money, with
all the obligation which the receipt of it imported,
was in fact received.1 The contribution, nevertheless,

1 For the circumstances of this present, see Hastings’s Answer to
Burke’s Eighth Charge ; the Eleventh Report of the Select Committee,
1781 ; and the Minutes of the Evidence taken at the Trial of Warren
Hastings. These circumstances are remarkable, and characteristic. At
first, perfect concealment of the transaction ; such measures, however,
taken, as may, if afterwards necessary, appear to imply a design of future
disclosure ; when concealment becomes difficult and hazardous, then dis-
closure made. The Governor-General, on the 29th of June, offered to
apply 23,0007., which, as he described it, appeared to be, though not
asserted to be, money of his own, to the support of the detachment under
Colonel Camac, destined to act in the country of Scindia. Whether the
accommodation was meant to be a loan or a gift did not appear. Of the
receipt of this money as a present no intimation was made to the Court of
Directors before the 29th of November following; when he only alludes to

DEMANDS CONTINUED UPON THE RAJA.

373

was exacted. The remonstrances of the Raja, and 7V'

his renewed endeavours to gain a little time, were

treated as renewed delinquency ; and for these en- 178L
deavours the Governor-General imposed upon him a
mulct or fine of 10,0007 and the troops were or-
dered to march into the Raja’s country, on the same
errand, and on the same terms, as in the preceeding
year.

The Raja again submitted, and the money was
again discharged. But these submissions and
payments were no longer regarded as enough. An
additional burthen was now to be imposed. A re-

it, but expressly withholds explanation. Stating the reason of mentioning
the matter at all to be a desire of “ obviating the false conclusions or pur-
posed misrepresentations ” which might be made of his offer to defray the
expense of Camac’s detachment, as if that offer were “ either an artifice of
ostentation, or the effect of corrupt influence,” he tells them, “ that the
money, by whatever means it came into his possession, was not his own ;
that he had himself no right to it, nor would or could have received it, but
for the occasion which prompted him to avail himself of the accidental
means which were at that instant afforded him, of accepting and converting it
to the property and use of the Company.” Even here, he represents his
converting it to the use of the Company, as a voluntary favour he con-
ferred upon the Company, when the money was in reality the money of
the Company, and when every thing received in presents was theirs. He
had given no further explanation up to the end of 1783; and the first
knowledge obtained in England of the source whence the money was
derived, was drawn from Major Scott by the interrogatories of the Select
Committee. See Eleventh Report, p. 7. — M. The transaction, however
exceptionable in many respects, is not open to one very important part
of the charges here preferred. There was not “ perfect concealment.”
It appeared in evidence that Hastings communicated all the circumstances
relating to this present, to the Accountant-General, who received the
money, and transferred it to the Company’s Treasury, from whence it was
issued in payments on public account. It is undeniable, therefore, that
Hastings never intended to appropriate this money to his own use. Min.
of Evid., 1155, 2747.— W.

1 The payment of this mulct is stated as doubtful, in Burke’s Charges ;
but as it is passed without mention in the Answer, the silence must, in
this, as in other cases, be taken for confession.

374

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

17*1.

7V- solution was passed in the Supreme Council, that
— the Raja, besides his tribute, and the annual contri-
bution of five lacs of rupees, should be required to
furnish to the Bengal Government such part of the
cavalry entertained in his service, as he could spare:
And the resident was instructed by the Governor-
General to make a peremptory demand of 2000.
The Raja represented that he had only 1300 cavalry
in his service, and that they were all employed in
guarding the country, or in collecting the revenues.
The Governor-General reduced his demand, first to
1500, and at last to 1000. The Raja collected 500
horse, as he himself, and without contradiction, af-
firmed, and 500 matchlock men as a substitute for
the remainder : 1 He sent word to the Governor-Ge-
neral that this force was ready to receive his com-
mands ; but never obtained any answer.

The Governor-General had other views. He
wanted money, and he was resolved that the plunder
of the unhappy Raja, whom he disliked, should be
the source from which it was to flow. “ I was re-
solved,” says the Governor-General, “ to draw from
his guilt the means of relief to the Company’s dis-
tresses. In a word, I had determined to make him
pay largely for his pardon, or to exact a severe ven-
geance for his past delinquency.” 2 3 The confession
has the merit of frankness, be the other virtues
belonging to it such as they may. The guilt as it is
called, consisted, exclusively, in a reluctance to

1 A return given by one of his principal officers, stated his established

forces to be above 7000 horse and foot. After his flight from Benares, he
readily assembled above 20,000. Narrative, 43. — W.

3 Governor-General’s Narrative, K., supra.

DEMANDS CONTINUED UPON THE RAJA.

375

submit to the imposition of a very heavy burthen, BC°®^7V'

from which the Raja considered that he ought to be

free.1 1781-

The Rajah was informed of the hostile designs
which were entertained against him, and in order to
mitigate the fury of the storm, sent an offer to the
Governor-General of twenty lacs of rupees for the
public service. The offer was scornfully rejected.

A sum of not less than fifty lacs, was the peremp-
tory demand. From the Governor-General’s in-
formation we learn, that he was at this time offered
a large sum of money for the dominions of the Rajah,
by the Nabob of Oude ; that he was resolved to ex-
tort the obedience of the Rajah ; otherwise to reduce
his forts, and seize the treasure which they were sup-
posed to contain ; or to conclude a bargain for his
dominions with the Nabob Vizir.

It is necessary to be remarked, that Mr. Fowke,
who had been replaced in the office of resident at
Benares by the express command of the Court of
Directors, the Governor-General removed about six
months before his journey to Benares, on the sole
pretence that “ he thought the resident there should
be a man of his own nomination and confidence ; ”
though the Court of Directors had decreed the con-
trary, and issued to that effect their most peremptory
commands. It is also requisite to be stated, that
though the Governor-General, departed for Benares
with the intention of inflicting a severe vengeance on
the Rajah, a design which he communicated in trust

1 This was not “ exclusively ” the guilt of the Raja. His main offence
was disaffection to the Company’s Government, and the purpose of freeing
liimself from it whenever opportunity offered. — W.

376

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1

CHA1-. 7

1781.

• to some of his confidential friends,1 he entered no in-
- timation of this design in the consultations, or records
of the Deliberative Council, but on the contrary a
minute importing nothing beyond an amicable and
ordinary adjustment, and desiring powers for nothing
but to make such arrangements, and perform such
acts, for the improvement of the Zemindary “ as he
should think fit and consonant to the mutual engage-
ments subsisting between the Company and the
Rajah.” The aptness of the expression consisted in
its having sufficient laxity to stretch around all that
the actor had in view, while its more obvious signifi-
cation led not the mind of the hearer to any but
ordinary transactions.

Upon the approach of the Governor-General to the
boundary of the Rajah’s dominions, that Prince went
out to meet him, and, to render the compliment still
more respectful, with a retinue unusually great. Not
contented with a mere interview of form, the Rajah
pressed for a more confidential conversation. “ He
professed,” says Mr. Hastings, “ much concern to
hear that I was displeased with him, and contrition
for having given cause for it, assuring me that his
Zemindary, and all that he possessed, were at my
devotion ; and he accompanied his words by an
action, either strongly expressive of the agitation of
his mind, or his desire to impress on mine a convic-
tion of his sincerity — by laying his turban on my lap.”
Mr. Hastings, according to his own account, treated
the declarations of the Raja as unworthy of his re-
gard, and dismissed him.

1 He communicated it to the only other member of Council, Mr. Wheler,
,is that gentleman publicly acknowledges. Narrative 13, Note. — W.

MR. HASTINGS ARRESTS THE RAJA. 377

Mr. Hastings arrived in the capital of the Raja^ooK \.

on the 1 4th of August ; earlier by some hours than

the Rajah himself. The Raja communicated his 17sL
intention of waiting upon him in the evening. But
the Governor-General sent his prohibition ; and at
the same time directed him to forbear his visits, till
permission should be received. The resident was
next morning sent to the Raja with a paper of com-
plaints and demands. The Raja in reply transmitted,
in the course of the day, a paper in which he endea-
voured to make it appear that his conduct was not
liable to so much blame as the Governor-General im-
puted ; nor deserved the severity of treatment which
was bestowed. The Governor-General, without any
further communication, put him under arrest the
following morning ; and imprisoned him in his own
house with a military guard.

This is the point, at which the reader should
pause, to examine, by the rules of justice, the conduct
of the parties ; since to this time their actions were
the offspring of choice; afterwards, they became
more the result of necessity on both sides.

Suppose the justice of the demand to have been
ever so clear and certain ; suppose that the Raja had
procrastinated, and endeavoured to evade the pay-
ment of his defined and established tribute, which on
the contrary he always paid with singular exactness ;
suppose that importunity on each occasion had been
requisite, and the delay of a few months incurred
even in this case, where blame, if inability hindered
not, might without dispute have been due, it will be
acknowledged, that the behaviour of the Governor-

378

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. General would have been harsh, precipitate, and

cruel. Even the fines, and the soldiers would

1781- have been too hastily and vindictively applied to
an offence, so common in India, and to which any
consequences of importance are so little attached.
The arrest, which to a man of rank is the deepest
disgrace and injury, would have been an excess of
punishment to a very considerable degree beyond
the line of justice and humanity. If so, how much
must be supposed to be added to that excess, when
it is considered that the demand itself was extra-
ordinary, irregular, and liable to the imputation of
injustice ; that some even of Mr. Hastings’ collea-
gues disputed the right of the Company to enforce
any such demand ; and that Mr. Hastings, though
he declared that his opinion was in favour of the
right, dared not to decide upon it, but in express
terms left the question doubtful, and reserved the
decision for his superiors %

Mr. Hastings imposes a heavy burthen upon a
native Prince : His right, in point of law or justice
is a matter of doubt : The Prince shows reluctance
to submit to what he very naturally regards as
oppression : and by some little and ordinary artifices
he endeavours to elude the demand: To this reluct-
ance and these little artifices, Mr. Hastings attaches
the name of guilt: Having sufficiently attached to
them the name of guilt, he holds it requisite that
guilt should meet with punishment : And as it is the
dignity of the state against which the offence has
been committed ; the dignity of the state, which is
infinite, requires that the punishment should be ade-

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE DEFENCE OF HASTINGS.

379

quately severe. If this be justice, a way may be 7V-

found for inflicting any punishment justly at any

time, upon any human being. 178L

There are considerations, on the opposite side,
which must not he forgotten. Mr. Hastings, in his
present exigency, might naturally expect assistance
from the Raja. It was common for the tributary
Princes of the country to be compelled to assist their
superiors in war. And it is probable that Mr. Hast-
ings counted upon that assistance, when, in 1775,
the agreement with the Raja was formed. It is,
however, not a matter of doubt, that by the terms
of that solemn compact, the Governor-General and
his colleagues, whether they so intended or not, did
surrender and renounce all right to make any demand
upon the Raja of such assistance, or of any emolu-
ment or service whatsoever beyond the amount of his
annual tribute.1

Mr Hastings, in contest wTith his accusers, endea-
voured to lay the burthen of his defence upon the
duties which in India a dependant ruler owes to the
authority on which he depends. But if these duties,
whatever they may be, are solemnly remitted by him
to whom they are due, and the right to exact them
is formally given up, the obligation is destroyed, and
becomes as if it never had existed. That the words
of the grant to the Rajah Cheyte Sing barred every
demand beyond that of his tribute, and by conse-
quence that which was now made, Hastings no where
directly controverts.2 He meets not the argument,

1 This, as mentioned above, was cancelled by the Sunnud of 1776.

See p. 262 note. — W.

2 The form of the words was affirmative and negative ; the first clause
defining that which he was to pay ; the latter clause excluding by express

380

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. because it could not be answered ; he endeavours to

defeat it by other means ; by hiding it from obser-

1781. vation, while he sedulously directs the attention to
different points.1

declaration ■whatever was not defined and specified in the former. Ambi-
guity could not more effectually be excluded. The first clause included his
tribute, and nothing else ; the latter negatived whatever was not in the
first clause, that is, whatever was not his tribute. The words to which
reference is always made, are the words of the resolution of the Council.
It is true, that the words of the Sunnud, which was afterwards actually
granted, and which ought to have been exactly correspondent to the words
of the resolution, were too indefinite to fix any thing whatsoever in favour of
the Raja. But this is one of the injuries which the Raja sustained; and
cannot be employed to justify the oppression which was grounded upon it;
it is on the contrary, a heinous fraud, for which the authors, were justly
accountable. And the words of the resolution ought to be the explanation
and the standard of what is left undefined in the Sunnud. It is remarkable,
that there was a great deal of irregularity, and some suspicious circum-
stances, in the mode of making out the deeds, and performing the invest-
ment. The Raja objected to the first forms. They were altered. Other
forms were adopted. And in the charges against Mr. Hastings, voted by
the House of Commons, it is stated, that neither the first set of deeds, nor
the second set of deeds, were entered in the records, or transmitted to the
Court of Directors. In fact, there is so much of the appearance of improper
design in these proceedings, that Mr. Burke scruples not to say, they
“ give, by that complicated, artificial, and fraudulent management, as well
as by his (Mr. Hastings) omitting to record that material document,
strong reason to presume that be did even then meditate to make some
evil use of the deeds which he thus withheld from the Company, and
which he did afterwards in reality make, when he found means and
opportunity to effect his evil purpose.” The design was, however, pro-
bably, no worse than to leave himself a latitude of power with regard to
the Raja. But the indefiniteness of the Sunnud very ill agreed with the
solicitude expressed in Council by the Governor-General, in 1775, to ex-
empt the Raja from dependence, and all chance of encroachment on his
power. It is also necessary to state, that Mr. Hastings avers he had no
concern in making out the Sunnuds, or omitting to record them ; that these
practical operations belonged to the Secretary of the Board, under the
superintendence of the majority, of which at this time he was not a part ;
and that if there was any misconduct, that majority are to answer for it.
See his Defence on the Third Charge.

1 The argument in the text and that in the note, repeated after Burke,
rests upon either an erroneous or a wilful confounding of very different things.
There are no such words in the grant as are here asserted. The grant

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE DEFENCE OF HASTINGS.

381

We must also be allowed to examine the rights
which the custom of India gave to the Prince who
received, over the Prince who afforded, the tribute.
Far were they, indeed, from being of such a nature,
as Mr. Hastings, for the benefit of his own excul-
pation, affirmed. By whose construction ? By the
habitual construction, by the public acts, of Mr.
Hastings himself. The East India Company were
the dependants of the Emperor Shah Aulum, and
paid him a tribute. Did the East India Company
hold themselves bound to obey every demand which
the Emperor might choose to make upon them for
assistance in his wars % Did they not treat him as
a person to whose commands, or most urgent suppli-
cations, not the smallest attention was necessary ?
Did they not even treat him as a person toward
whom they had no occasion to fulfil even the most
solemn engagements *? Did they not, as soon as
they pleased, refuse to pay him even his tribute for

book v.

CHAP. 7.

1781.

contains no clause excluding, by express declaration, all demands beyond
the specified sum ; there is but one grant, one Sunnud, that -which was
duly executed by the government, and accepted by Cheit Sing. Where
then are the conditions to be found which the adversaries of Hastings
choose to consider as conceded ? Either in a Sunnud, granted by the Vizir
in 1773, or in the resolutions of the Council. The former is declared to be
cancelled by the Sunnud of 1776 ; the latter were not final, and the public
would have known nothing of them had they not been dragged into obser-
vation ; and the worst that can be said of them is, that they were incon-
sistent with the measure finally adopted. They afforded to Cheit Sing no
ground of complaint. They had not been communicated to him to raise
hopes which were disappointed. He knew of nothing but the terms to
which he acceded — for him there were no others, and none could therefore
have been violated. Hastings may be blamed for evading opposition, by
acquiescing in purposed stipulations which he did not carry into effect, but
it is not true that any breach of compact was committed. The Sunnud, the
only authority that can be appealed to, remits no duties, relinquishes no
rights, and annihilates no obligations. — W.

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

^H?rV Par^ dominions which they continued

to hold in his name *? Did not their ally, the Nabob

1/81' of Oude, in like manner depend upon the Emperor,
and owe him tribute, which he never paid4? Was
he not even his Vizir; in other words, his chief
minister and servant, and therefore hound by a
double duty to obey, to aid, and to protect him*?
Did he, on these accounts, perform towards him
the smallest act of service, or obedience*? No one,
than Mr. Hastings, better knew, that in India the
obligation of the person who pays tribute to the
person who receives it is deemed so very slight,
as scarcely to be felt or regarded; and no man
was more ready to act upon that principle, when
it suited his purposes, than Mr. Hastings. The
law of the strongest, indeed, was in perfect force ;
and whenever any party had the power to enforce
obedience, it had no limit hut that of his will.1

The relation in which the Company stood to the
Raja, the one as sovereign, the other as subject,
Mr. Hastings represented as conferring “ an inherent
right to impose such assessments as the Company

1 This argument is a complete vindication of Hastings’s proceedings.
No doubt the subordinate authorities of the Mohammedan kingdom of
Delhi, in its declining condition, were well enough disposed to withhold
from the state its just dues, whenever they thought themselves strong
enough to do so with impunity ; but what does the admission of this fact
amount to ? — Not to a justification of the subordinate, but the condemnation
of the principal ; to evidence of extreme impolicy or helpless weakness,
which relaxed irrecoverably the reins of authority, and prostrated the
sovereign at the feet of his subjects. Was it for the Governor of Bengal
to imitate the imbecility and folly of the Mogul, and allow refractory or
rebellious dependants to grow into disproportionate and dangerous im-
portance ? What consequences could have been expected from such a
policy, but those of which the empire of Delhi furnished so striking an
illustration — the utter subversion of the state ? — W.

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE DEFENCE OF HASTINGS.

383

thought expedient.” But, in that case, the compact book v

into which the Company entered with the Raja,1

that on no pretence whatsoever should any demand 1781 •
whatsoever be made upon him, beyond the amount
of his tribute, were a form of words totally destitute
of meaning, or rather a solemn mockery, by which
the Company gave security and assurance to the
mind of the Raja, that they would take from him
nothing beyond his tribute, excepting just as much,
and just as often, as they pleased.2

Mr. Hastings, in his own justification, and after
the time when his conduct had produced the most
alarming events, alleged the previous existence of
designs, and even preparations, on the part of the
Raja, traitorous and hostile to the Company. For
the evidence of these designs, Mr. Hastings presents
his own naked assertion. But to that, in such cir-
cumstances, little value is to be attached. The
assertion was also contradicted ; and by the man
who best knew on what grounds it was made ; by
Mr. Hastings himself. It was contradicted, by his
own actions, a better testimony than his words. So
far from repairing to the capital of the Raja, as to a

1 There was no such compact. — W.

* Mr. Francis at the time remarked; “ I did, from the first, express a
doubt, whether we had strictly a right to increase our demands upon the
Raja beyond the terms which we originally agreed to give him ; which he
consented to ; and which, as I have constantly understood it, were made
the fundamental tenure by which he held his Zemindary. If such demands
can be increased upon him at the discretion of the superior power, he has
no rights ; he has no property ; or at least he has no security for either.
Instead of five lacs, let us demand fifty ; whether he refuses, or is unable
to pay the money, the forfeiture of his Zemindary may be the immediate
consequence of it, unless he can find means to redeem himself by a new
treaty.” Minute in Council, 28th September, 1778; Second Report, ut
supra, p. 30.

384

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 7.

1781.

place where any danger was to be apprehended, he
repaired to it as a place where he might commit
the greatest outrage upon its sovereign without
the smallest dread of opposition or revenge.1

1 The affidavits, appended to Mr. Hastings’ Narrative, instead of prov-
ing that any design of rebellion was on foot, prove the contrary ; by show-
ing the total want of a foundation for the pretended suspicions. Much
testimony was given in defence to this point on the trial. It amounted,
however, to nothing but a statement of rumours, or of equivocal appear-
ances, or of the opinions of witnesses who believed that which they wished.
(See printed Minutes of Evidence on the Benares Charge, p. 1601 to 1616
and 1664 — 1788.) Lieutenant-Colonel Crabb, on the subject of the reports
respecting the disaffection of the Raja — (after the treatment which he had
received, the known existence of a cause for disaffection was very likely to
be confounded with the supposed existence of disaffection itself) — was
asked by the Select Committee (Second Report, Appendix, No. 11), —
“ Whether there were any circumstances in the Company’s situation at
that time to consider those reports probable? He said, Not that he
knew of ; reports were circulated one half-hour, and contradicted the
next ; and no one can trace the origin.” Among the alleged proofs, was
given, a recent augmentation of his troops ; of cavalry, to the amount of
5000; (see the Evidence of Major Fairfax, Report, ut supra, Appendix,
No. 15) ; yet all the horse in his service, when he was obliged to take the
field, amounted only to about 2000; see Hastings’ Narrative, ut supra,
Dd. The same sort of suspicions, and the same sort of reports, existed
against the Nabob of Oude; and with more probability, and with more
danger, because he had greater power. The Goveror-General himself
says, “ I had received several intimations, imputing evil designs to the
Nabob, and warning me to guard myself against them, and especially be
careful that I did not expose myself to the effects of concealed treachery,
by visiting him without a strong guard. Many circumstances favoured
this suspicion. No sooner had the rebellion of this Zemindary (Benares)
manifested itself, than its contagion instantly flew to Fyzabad — and the
extensive territory lying on the north of the river Dewa, and known by
the names of Goorucpoor and Bareech. In the city of Fyzabad, the mother
and grandmother of the Nabob openly espoused the party of Cheyte Sing,
encouraging and inviting people to enlist for his service, and their servants
took up arms against the English. Two battalions of regular sepoys in
the Vizir’s service, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hannay,
who had been intrusted with the charge of that district, were attacked and
surrounded in various places, many of them cut to pieces, and Colonel
Hannay himself, encompassed by multitudes, narrowly escaped the same
fate. The Nabob Vizir was charged with being privy to the intrigues
which had produced and fomented those disturbances; and the little
account that he seemed to make of them served to countenance the sus-
picion.” (Narrative, ut supra, Cc.)

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE DEFENCE OF HASTINGS.

385

By Mr. Hastings the Raja was represented as v

having vast riches, which he ungratefully desired to

withhold from the Company in their greatest distress. 178L
If the fact had corresponded with the assertion, it is
not very allowable, for a mere debt of gratitude, to
prosecute a man to his ruin. Of the riches of the
Raja, however, we look in vain for the proof; and
the fancy of those riches was, in all probability, no-
thing more than a part of that vain imagination of
the unbounded opulence of India, which the expe-
rience of our countrymen might at a very early
period have extinguished in their minds, hut which
their cupidity has, in spite of their experience, kept
alive, to hurry them into many of the weakest and
most exceptionable of their acts. Of the Princes of
India, there has not been one whom, after experience,
they have not found to be poor ; scarcely has there
been any whom, before experience, they have not
believed to be rich.

Mr. Hastings endeavoured to strengthen his justi-
fication by chicaning about the quality of the Raja,
or his dignity and rank. Mr. Hastings denied that
he was a sovereign prince : he was only a Zemindar.

Did this, however, change the nature of the compact,
by which the Company had bound themselves to
exact from this man, whether Prince or Zemindar,
no more than his annual tribute *? W ould Mr. Hast-
ings have asserted, that, being a Zemindar, the Com-
pany had any better right to plunder him, than if he
was a dependant Prince ? Had he been a subject, in
the most unlimited sense of the word, would it have
been any thing else than plunder, not to have taxed
him along with the rest of his fellow-subjects, but to

VOL. iv. 2 c

386

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

ciiap.

1781.

_v have gone to him personally, and singly, and have
— taken from him by compulsion, whatever it was the
pleasure of the exactor to take? Would Mr. Hast-
ings have undertaken to point out where the line of
distinction between a Zemindar, and a dependent
Prince, was to be found? Was not every Zemindar
that had a large extent of territory and power, a
dependant Prince ; and was not every Prince of a
small extent of territory and power, a mere Zemindar?
What could constitute any man a sovereign Prince,
if all the powers of government secured, without
participation, to him and his heirs for ever, over a
country surpassing the extent of considerable king-
doms, did not constitute the Raja of Benares a
Prince ? But the father of the Raja, Bulwunt Sing,
said Mr. Hastings, rose from the condition of a petty
Zemindar. What had this to do with the question ?
Did any one, better than Mr. Hastings, know, that
those who acquired the station of dependant Princes
in India almost uniformly ascended from the lowest
origin? Did the birth of Aliverdi Khan prevent
him from being the Subahdar of Bengal, and leaving
his heir in the state of a tributary Prince?1

1 What was the condition of the Zemindars of the province of Benares,
whose obedience as subjects was due to Cheyte Sing ? The fact is, that
nothing was so indefinite as the title of Zemindar. Mr. Hastings himself
says, “ The expulsion of Cheyte Sing was indisputably a revolution. I
have always called it so.” A revolution, consisting in the mere change of
a land-renter, rcmoveable at pleasure ! It is curious to contrast the words
of Mr. Hastings’s own agent, Major Scott, who had occasion to exalt the
situation of the Raja : “ Mr. Fowke, as Resident at Benares, appears to
him, and certainly is, as an ambassador at a foreign though dependent
court. From that Raja, the company receive 300,000/. sterling a-year.
Benares is a seat of politics ; vackeels, or ambassadors, from every' power
in India reside constantly there.” Evidence of Major Scott, in the Fifth
Report (p. 7) of the Select Committee, 1781. Yet no small portion of the

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE DEFENCE OF HASTINGS.

387

Another of the allegations, upon which the defence book v

was attempted of the demands which Mr. Hastings

made upon the Raja and of the arrest of him for 1781 •
evasions of payment, was ; that the police of the Raja’s
dominions was very defective. It would have been
difficult for his accuser to show in what part of India
it was good. Three instances are adduced, on the
complaint of Major Eaton, the English officer com-
manding at Buxar, in which the people of the coun-
try had behaved without respect to the English
authority, and in one instance with violence to English
sepoys, and even English officers. Upon this, re-
monstrance had been made to the Raja, and, though
it is not alledged that he abetted his officers or people,
yet he had not made redress, to the satisfaction of
the offended party. On the 14th of December, 1780,
the Supreme Council wrote, commanding the Raja
to make inquiry into one of the cases : which, as
there is no complaint to the contrary, except that an
answer had not been received on the 17th of next
month, it would appear that he did. And just seven
months after the date of this letter Mr. Hastings set
out on the journey to inflict that punishment on the
Raja which led to his ruin.1

Another extraordinary declaration of Mr. Hastings
remains to be considered. “ I will suppose,” says
he, “ for a moment, that I have erred, that I have
acted with an unwarranted rigour towards Cheyte
Sing, and even with injustice : Let my motive be
consulted.” Then follows the account of this motive,

evidence adduced for the defence on Mr. Hastings’s trial went to prove
that the Raja was a mere Zemindar. Vide Minutes of Evidence, ut supra.

— M. See preceding note, p. 301. — W.

1 Vide Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, p. 1 GUI .

2 c 2

388

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
chap. 7.

1781.

• in the following words : “ I left Calcutta, impressed
. with the belief, that extraordinary means, and those
exerted with a strong hand, were necessary to pre-
serve the Company’s interests from sinking under the
accumulated weight which oppressed them. I saw
a political necessity for curbing the overgrown power
of a great member of their dominion, and to make it
contribute to the relief of their pressing exigencies.
If I erred, my error was prompted by an excess of
zeal for their interests, operating with too strong a
bias on my judgment.”1 Here some portion of the
truth comes forth. The Company were in want of
money. The Raja was supposed to possess it. And
since he would not give what was demanded willingly,
the resolution was formed to take it from him by
force. The pretence, however, that his power was
overgrown, that is, from its magnitude an object of
danger was utterly groundless. In what respect had
that power increased, during the short period of five
years, from the time when Mr. Hastings and his col-
leagues confirmed and established his power, and
when Mr. Hastings was so far from dreading it, that
he wished to make it still more independent than it
was really made 2 By a small body of troops hastily
collected together, and wretchedly provided both with
provisions and pay, the whole pow er of the Raja was
in a few days, and wfith little bloodshed, completely
subdued. And the military officers declared, that,
even if the country had deliberately rebelled, a single
brigade of the Company’s army would have sufficed
for its reduction.2

1 Governor-General’s Narrative, ut supra, O, No. 1.

2 See the evidence of Lieutenant-Colouel Crabb, Second Report, ut

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE DEFENCE OF HASTINGS.

389

Nor was the Governor-General so perfectly disin- Bc^^7v'

terested, as he was desirous to make it appear. The —

whole power and emoluments of his office, over which 17SL
he watched with so much jealousy and desire, were
the powerful interests by which he was stimulated.

He knew, under the sentiments which prevailed at
home, by what a slender and precarious tenure he
enjoyed his place. He knew well that success or
adversity would determine the question. He knew
that with those whom he served, plenty of money 2
was success, want of that useful article, adversity.

He found himself in extreme want of it. The trea-
sure to which he looked was the fancied treasure of the
Raja ; and he was determined to make it his own. If
under such circumstances as these, a zeal for the
government which he served could sanctify his

supra, Appendix, No. 11. Observe the words of Mr. Hastings himself :
“The treachery of Raja Cheyte Sing has compelled me to retreat to this
place, where I wait to reduce this Zemindary ; a work I trust of no great

difficulty or time Troops are assembling daily, to which he can

afford no opposition.” Governor-General’s Letter to Colonel Muir,
dated Chunargur, 29th August, 1781, ut supra, No. 4. Evidence was
adduced on the trial, however, to prove this point with the rest. V ide
Minutes, ut supra, on the Benares charge.

5 It is not candid to ascribe the motives of the Governor to a wish to
conciliate support at home by the possession of money. He knew that the
very existence of the British authority in India was at stake — Hyder
triumphant in the Carnatic; war with the French and Dutch; the
Mahrattas formidable in the Concan; Madras and Bombay destitute of
resources, and depending wholly upon Bengal for means of keeping an
army on foot. Bengal labouring under financial difficulties, and all the
Governor-General’s views obstructed by a factious opposition ; it was not a
time to reject legitimate means of saving the empire, because they were
informal, or because they were harsh. Whether more candour and
leniency would have effected the same objects may be matter of doubt, but
the object was of a magnitude amply sufficient to justify the means by
which it was accomplished. — W.

390

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

B^K _v- actions, then may Jefferies be regarded as a virtuous

On the very evening of the first day after the
arrival of the Governor-General in the capital of the
Raja, he gave his commands to Mr. Markham, the
Resident ; who proceeded the next morning, with a
few of his orderlies, to the palace of the Raja ; and he
thus reported to his employer the result of his mission.
“ The Raja submitted quietly to the arrest ; and
assured me, that whatever were your orders, he was
ready implicitly to obey : he hoped that you would

1 Mr. Hastings represented his animosity as inflamed by the danger, t«?
which the detachment of Colonel Camac in Sindia’s country was exposed.
The money expected from the Raja was, according to the statement of Mr.
Hastings, destined to that service. But in the first place, Mr. Hastings
was inexcusable, if he left the subsistence of an army, in a dangerous
situation, to depend upon a supply which he knew to be precarious.
Besides, it is, by the Select Committee, in their Second Report, shown,
from a comparison of the dates, that the distress of the army was not an
effect of delay in the payments of the Raja. And it is still further shown
by that Committee in their Eleventh Report, that the present of two lacs
of rupees (23,0001. sterling), which the Governor-General took from the
Raja, he actually proposed to the Council on the 26th of June, 1780, to
employ, (not representing it as money not his own) in supporting the detach-
ment under Camac. The following are a few of the words of the Com-
mittee. “ If the cause of Colonel Camac’s failure had been true, as to the
sum which was the object of the public demand, the failure could not be
attributed to the Raja, when he had on the instant privately furnished at
least 23,0001. to Mr. Hastings; that is, furnished the identical money
which he tells us (but carefully concealing the name of the giver) he had
from the beginning destined, as he afterwards publicly offered, for this very
expedition of Colonel Camac’s. The complication of fraud and cruelly in
this transaction admits of few parallels. Mr. Hastings, at the Council
Board of Bengal, displays himself as a zealous servant of the Company,
bountifully giving from his own fortune ; and in his letter to the Directors (as
he says himself), as going out of the ordinary roads for their advantage ;
and all this on the credit of supplies, derived from the gift of a man, whom
he treats with the utmost severity, and whom he accuses, in this particular,
of disaffection to the Company’s cause and interests.” Ibid. p. 7.

THE ARREST OF THE RAJA RAISES A TUMULT.

391

allow him a subsistence : But as for his Zemindary, book v.

his forts, and his treasure, he was ready to lay them

at your feet, and his life if required : He expressed 178L
himself much hurt at the ignominy which he affirmed
must be the consequence of his confinement, and
entreated me to return to you with the foregoing
submission, hoping that you would make allowance
for his youth and inexperience, and, in consideration
of his father’s name, release him from his confine-
ment, as soon as he should prove the sincerity of his
offers, and himself deserving of your compassion and
forgiveness.”

This conversation had only been a few minutes
ended, when a guard of two companies of sepoys
arrived ; the servants of the Raja were disarmed ;
and he was left in charge of the officers. The sen-
sation which this event produced in the minds of the
people was immediately seen. The government of
the Raja, and of his father Bui want Sing, had for
many years afforded the people an uncommon portion
of justice and protection ; and they had prospered
under its beneficent care. Captain Harper, an officer
of the Company, who had performed a great deal of
service in that part of Hindustan, was asked in evi-
dence by the Select Committee, ‘f How the provinces
of Benares and Gazeepoor were cultivated, compared
with those parts of Bahar which adjoin, and are only
separated by the river Caramnassa*? He said, The
provinces of Benares and Gazeepoor were more highly
cultivated than any he ever passed through ; and far
superior to the adjoining one of Bahar ; and that he
attributed this comparative prosperity of those pro-
vinces to the industry of the inhabitants, and to the

392

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK A

CHAP. 7

1781.

• secure and lenient government they lived under.” 1
- In consequence, the family of the Raja was naturally
beloved ;2 and it sufficiently appears, from the affi-
davits3 adduced by the Governor-General, that the
English were by the natives, in those parts, in a pecu-
liar manner detested. The confinement of their
Prince was an act, which under the ignominious
light in which imprisonment is regarded by the
Indians, they viewed as an outrage of the most
atrocious description. The passions of the people
wrere inflamed ; and they flocked in crowds to the
spot where their sovereign was confined. So little
had any conception of resistance been entertained,
that the two companies of sepoys, who were placed
on guard, had come without ammunition. As the
concourse of people increased, two additional com-
panies, with a supply of ammunition, were ordered
to their support. But before they arrived at the
palace, all the avenues were blocked up, and a
tumult arose which soon led to bloodshed, and at
last to a furious engagement between the people and
the troops. The unfortunate consequence was, that
the sepoys and their officers were almost all des-
troyed. On which side the acts of provocation and
violence began, does not sufficiently appear.4 The

1 Report on the petition of Touchet, &c. p. 56. And the Governor-
General himself, in Iris Minute in Council, 12th of June, 1775, declared
that the Zemindary of the Raja consisted of “ as rich and well cultivated a
territory as any district, perhaps, of the same extent in India.”

s There is no evidence to this effect and the fact is doubtful : it is cer-
tain that no particular respect is felt by the people of Benares for their
memory : the editor has frequently heard Cheit Sing and his father spoken
of by natives as robbers and oppressors. — W.

3 Appended to his Narrative.

4 The Raja asserted, and Mr. Hastings has no where contradicted, that
the provocation was given by the violence and insolence of the English and

THE RAJA ESCAPES.

393

1781.

Rajah, during this confusion, escaped by a wicket book v.

which opened to the river; and, letting himself

down the bank which was very steep, by turbans
tied together, he escaped to the other side. The
multitude immediately followed him across the river,
and left the palace to be occupied by the English troops.

That this assemblage of the people, and the attack
which they made upon the guard, was the fortuitous
result of the indignation with which they were in-
spired, by the indignity offered to their prince, and
that it was in no degree owing to premeditation and
contrivance, was amply proved by the events. The
Raja knew that Mr Hastings was unattended by
any military force ; and, if he had acted upon a pre-
vious design, would not have lost a moment in secur-
ing his person. The Governor-General himself de-
clares ; " If Cheyte Sing’s people, after they had
effected his rescue, had proceeded to my quarters,
instead of crowding after him in a tumultuous
manner, as they did, in his passage over the river, it
is probable that my blood, and that of about thirty
English gentlemen of my party, would have been
added to the recent carnage : for they were about
two thousand, furious and daring from the easy suc-
cess of their last attempt : nor could I assemble more
than fifty regular and armed sepoys for my whole
defence.”1 Nothing was it possible to have said,

their agents. But his assertion, unless supported by circumstances, should
not in such a case go far towards proof.— M. How little credit the Raja’s
account deserves, is easily estimated. He asserts, in a letter to the Gover-
nor-General, that the tumult began by the Sepoys firing on the people.
“ The people of the Sirkar first fired balls from their guns, and discharged
their muskets.” No one has ever disputed the fact that the Sepoys were
first sent without ammunition. Narrative, App. 106. — W.

1 Narrative, ut supra.

394

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAP. 7

1781.

' more decisive of the character of a casual mob, led
- by the mere contingency of the moment, without
foresight, and without an end.

It was by no means worthy of a man of prudence
and experience to have proceeded deliberately to a
measure so likely to make a violent impression upon
the minds of the people, without having made any
provision whatsoever for preventing the unhappy
effects which it tended to produce. Mr. Hastings
at first, was able to assemble for his defence only six
companies of Major Popham’s regiment, about sixty
sepoys which he had brought with him from Ruxar
as a guard to his boats, and a few recruits newly en-
listed for the Resident’s guard; in all about four
hundred and fifty men ; and without provisions even
for a single day.

Ramnagur, was a fortified palace of the Raja, on
the opposite side of the river, close to Benares. It
was not expected that it could for any length of time
resist the effect of artillery ; and the resolution was
taken of reducing it with all possible dispatch. The
remaining four companies of Major Popham’s regi-
ment of sepoys, with one company of artillery, and
the company of French rangers, lay at Mirzapoor;
and were ordered to march to Ramnagur. Major
Popliam was destined to assume the command, as
soon as all the troops intended for the service had
arrived. But the officer, who in the mean time com-
manded the troops, was stimulated with an ambition
of signalizing himself ; and, without waiting for the
effects of a cannonade, marched to the attack of the
palace through the narrow streets of the town by
which it was surrounded. In this situation the

DANGER OF HASTINGS.

395

troops were exposed to a great variety of assaults, 7V

and after a fruitless opposition were compelled to ■

retreat. The commanding officer was killed ; aeon- 1/8L
siderable loss was sustained ; and an unfavourable
impression was made at the commencement of the
struggle, which would have been a serious evil in a
less trifling affair.

The Governor-General now regarded himself as
placed in imminent danger. Letter upon letter was
written to the commanding officers at all the military
stations from which it was possible that timely assist-
ance could be received. Few of these letters reached
their destination ; for all the channels of communica-
tion were interrupted; and so greatly were the
people of the country animated against the English,
that it was extremely difficult for any agent of theirs
to pass without discovery and prevention. The con-
tagion of revolt and hostility flew with unusual
rapidity and strength. Not only did the whole of the
district which owed the sway of the Raja fly to
arms, the very fields being deserted of the husband-
men, wdio voluntarily flocked to his standards and
multiplied his ranks : but one half of the province of
Oude is by the Governor-General affirmed to have
been in a state of as complete rebellion as Benares.

Even the British dominions themselves afforded cause
of alarm ; many of the Zemindars of Bahar had ex-
hibited symptoms of disaffection : and the Governor-
General received reports of actual levies, in that pro-
vince, for the service of Cheyte Sing, The danger
was exceedingly augmented from another source.

The Governor-General was entirely destitute of
money ; and affirms, that the whole extent of both

396

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. hjs treasure and his credit exceeded not three thou-

chap. 7.

. sand rupees ; while the troops were all four months,

1781- and some of them five months, in arrear.1

He was alarmed with the prospect of an attack
from Ramnagur, which report described as about to
take place in the night. His situation at Benares
was regarded, by himself, and by his military officers,
as not defensible ; and he resolved to make his es-
cape to the strong fortress of Chunar. He secretly
quitted the city, after it became dark, leaving the
wounded sepoys behind ; and arrived in safety at the
place of his retreat.

Though the letters of the Governor-General
reached not Colonel Morgan who commanded at
Cawnpore, yet some intelligence travelled to him of
the disorder which had arisen ; and with promptitude
and decision he ordered the principal part of the
force which he commanded to march. The requisi-
tion both for money and for troops, which had been
dispatched to Lucknow, was happily received : and
was promptly obeyed. About the middle of Sep-
tember, one lack and a half of rupees had been
received, and a force was now collected deemed
sufficient for the accomplishment of the enterprise.

The Raja had endeavoured to make his peace
from the moment of his escape. He had written
letters, in which he declared his sorrow for the attack
which had been made upon the soldiers of the guard,
and for the blood which had been spilt ; protested his
own innocence with regard to the effects which had
taken place, and which he affirmed to have arisen

1 Sec his letter to Mr. Whelcr, Appendix to his Narrative, No. 127.

BEHAVIOUR OF THE RAJA.

397

solely from the casual violence of the multitude, in- book v

flamed by the insolence of an English agent ; and

professed his readiness to submit with implicit obedi- 1/81
ence to whatever conditions the Governor-General
might think fit to impose. Not contented with re-
peating his letters, he made application through
every person on whose influence with the English
ruler he thought he might depend ; through one of
the gentlemen of his party ; through Cantoo Baboo,
his confidential secretary ; and through Hyder Beg
Khan, one of the ministers of the Nabob Vizir. All
his applications Mr. Hastings treated as unsatisfac-
tory and insincere ; and deigned not to make to them
so much as a reply. The Rajah collected his forces,
and appealed by a manifesto to the princes of Hin-
dustan. He was reported, truly or falsely, to be also
venting the most extravagant boasts of the ruin
which he meant to bring down upon the English ;
though he totally abstained from all operations not
purely defensive, and in his letters to the Governor-
General appealed to his forbearance, as a proof of
his desire to retain his obedience. In the mean time
he sustained several partial attacks. On the 29th
of August a considerable body of his troops, who
occupied a post at Seeker, a small fort and town
within sight of Chunar, were defeated, and a season-
able booty in grain was procured. On the 3d of
September a detachment was formed to surprise
the camp at Pateeta, about seven miles distant from
Chunar. But the enemy were on their guard, and
received the party in good order, at the distance of a
mile beyond their camp. They fought with a
steadiness and ardour which disconcerted the sepoys

398

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHA1’.

1781.

} ■ ami were beginning to produce disorder, when an
— attack, made with great gallantry upon their guns,
by the two companies of grenadiers, induced them
to leave the field with four of their cannon to the
victors.

Pateeta was a large town surrounded by a ram-
part of earth, which extended a considerable way
beyond the town, to the adjoining hills. It had also
a small square fort, built of stone, fortified with four
round towers, a high rampart, and a great ditch. The
principal force of the enemy was collected at this
place, and at Lutteefpoor, a large stone fort sur-
rounded with hills and a wood, at the distance of
about fourteen miles from Chunar. The strength of
both consisted mostly in the difficulty with which they
were approached. According to the plan of opera-
tions, which the English had arranged, Ramnagur
was first to be assailed, both as it was the place
where their arms had met with a disgrace, and
because reduction of it would restore possession of
the capital, and redeem their credit with the public.
Several days were spent, in conveying battering
cannon and mortars, with other preparations for a
siege, to the camp of Major Popham, which was
placed before the town. In the mean time one of
the natives represented that it would be extremely
dangerous to allow time to the enemy to strengthen
themselves at Pateeta and Lutteefpoor; that the
approaches to both were strongly guarded ; and that
those to Lutteefpoor, in particular, could not be
forced but with a serious loss ; that even if Lutteef-
poor were reduced the object would not be attained,
because the enemy could immediately gain the pass

OPERATIONS OF THE ENGLISH.

399

of Sukroot, which was behind, and. there maintain BC°(^7V

themselves against any force which could assail them:

He, therefore, recommended an attempt to gain pos- 1/b1'
session of the pass by surprise, to which he under-
took to conduct a part of the army by an unknown
road ; and. the more to distract the enemy, he
advised that an attack should at one and the same time
be conducted against Pateeta. His representation was
favourably received; Major Popham, with the quick
discernment and decision, on which so much of mili-
tary success depends, immediately acknowledging
the excellence of the plan. The army was divided
into two parts, of wdiich that which was destined for
Sukroot began their march, under command of
Major Crabb, about an hour before midnight, on
the 15th of the month; and that for Pateeta, con-
ducted by the commanding officer, Major Popham,
about three o’clock on the following morning.

He found the works of Pateeta strong, and the
approach more hazardous than he had anticipated.

He had marched without his battering cannon or
mortars. They were sent for, but made little im-
pression. Apprehensive lest further delay should
frustrate the attempt at Sukroot, he resolved to
make an assault on the morning of the 20th. On
that very morning the other division of the army,
arrived, through ways nearly unpractically, at a
village, about two miles from the pass. Major
Roberts led the storming party at Pateeta, which
hardly met with any resistance. After a slight
stand at the outer intrenchment, the enemy tied
through the fort, and the English soldiers followed
without opposition. The pass at Sukroot was

400

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 7.

1781.

guarded by a body of men with three guns, who
made a stout defence, but after a considerable loss
fled through the pass, in which the English en-
camped for the remainder of the day. The intelli-
gence of the loss of Pateeta, and of the pass,
was carried, at nearly the same time, to Lutteefpoor,
to the Raja. He now, it is probable, began to
despair. About four o’clock on the same day he
fled from Lutteefpoor, and proceeded with a few
followers to the fort of Bidgegur, wThich was his last
resource. His army disbanded themselves ; and
“in a few hours, the allegiance of the country,”
says the Governor-General, “ was restored as
completely, from a state of universal revolt, to its
proper channel, as if it had never departed from
it.”

The Governor-General made haste to return to
Benares, where the formation of a new government
solicited his attention. To quiet the minds of the
people, a proclamation was issued, offering pardon
to all, with the exception of Cheyte Sing and his
brother. A grandson of the Raja Bulwant Sing, by
a daughter, was selected as the future Raja : and as
his years, nineteen, or his capacity, appeared to dis-
qualify him for the duties, his father, under the title
of Naib, was appointed to perform them in his name.
Two important changes, however, were produced in
the condition of the Rajah. His annual tribute was
raised to forty lacs of rupees ; and the police, with
the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the city of Be-
nares, and the criminal jurisdiction of the whole
country, was taken out of his hands. It was alleged
that they had been wretchedly administered under

ARRANGEMENTS FOR GOVERNING BENARES.

401

his predecessor : and it was either not expected, or
not desired, that he should he the author of an im-
provement. A separate establishment was erected
for each, and the whole was placed under the super-
intendence of a native officer, who was denominated
the Chief Magistrate of Benares, and made respon-
sible to the Governor-General and Council. The
power of the mint was also withdrawn from the
Raja, and intrusted to the resident at his court.

After possession was taken of Lutteefpoor, the
army lost no time in marching to Bijygur. The
Raja did not wait for their arrival, but fled for
protection to one of the Rajas of Bundelcund,
fC leaving,” says Mr. Hastings, “ his wife, a woman
of an amiable character, his mother, all the other
women of his family, and the survivors of the family
of his father Bulwant Sing, in the fort.” Mr. Hastings
cuts very short his narrative of the transactions at
Bijygur, and only remarks, that it yielded by capi-
tulation on the 9th of November. These transactions
were not omitted by him, because they were devoid
of importance. The Ranee, that is, the widow of
the deceased Raja, Bulwant Sing, endeavoured,
before she opened the gates of the fort, which had
been her own peculiar residence, to stipulate for
some advantages, and among them for the safety of
her own pecuniary and other effects ; representing
her son, as having carried along with him whatever
belonged to himself.1 Mr. Hastings manifested a

book v

CHAP. 7

1761.

1 The allegation, though it was possible that it might not be true, was
at any rate highly probable. What he took away, Mr. Hastings de-
scribes in the following pompous terms; “As much treasure as his
elephants and camels could carry, which is reported to me to have con-
VOL. IV. 2 D

402

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781.

7V' desire to have her despoiled. What is more remark-
— able, in his letters to the commanding officer, he
employed expressions which implied that the plunder
of those women was the due reward of the soldiers ;
expressions which suggested one of the most dread-
ful outrages, to which in the conception of the coun-
try, a human being could be exposed. The very
words of the letter ought to be produced, that no
inference may be drawm from it beyond what they
evidently support. “ I am this instant favoured with
yours of yesterday. Mine of the same date has

sisted of one lac of mohrs, and fifteen or sixteen of silver, besides jewels
to an unknown amount.” There could be no reason for his leaving be-
hind any part of what belonged to him. “ If he took as much as his
elephants and camels could carry;” and if it amounted only to what the
Governor-General is pleased to represent, the Raja must have been badly
provided with beasts of burden. As the value of his jewels was
“ unknown,” that is to say, no estimate was put upon them by rumour,
it was probably known to be small ; since rumour seldom fails to give a
name to the amount of any portion of wealth, which, from its magnitude,
it is led to admire. Besides, it has never been found, when the exag-
gerations of the fancy were suppressed, by the real discovery of the facts ;
that the value of the jewels of these eastern princes was very great. And,
moreover, the Raja of Benares was but a petty Prince; according to Mr.
Hastings, a mere middle-man, for collecting the Company’s rents ; no
prince at all ; and, therefore, could have had no great superfluity of wealth
to bestow upon jewels. Over and above all which, his family had en-
joyed their state only for some years of his father’s life, and five or six of
his own. But any great accumulation of jewels in any family was seldom
the purchase of a few years, but the collection of several generations.
And still further, it is to be considered, that neither the Raja nor his
father had ever enjoyed the whole of their revenues ; but had always paid
a large tribute, either to the Nabob of Oude, or to the English; and were
subject moreover to the drain, both of wars and of exactions. It ought
likewise to be taken into the account, that they had contented themselves
with moderate imposts upon the people, who were rich ; that is, had never
been oppressed by rents severely screwed up. It is further evident, that
if the Raja had carried much wealth away with him, it must have some-
where afterwards appeared. — M.

That some was taken away is certain. From 250,000/. to 300,000/. was
found in the fort. This is enough to invalidate the Raja’s pleas of poverty
when called upon for a contribution of 50,000/. — W.

OUTRAGES UPON THE PERSONS OF THE PRINCESSES. 403

before this time acquainted vou with my resolutions B00K v-

. J J % CHAP. 7.

and sentiments respecting the Ranee. I think

every demand she has made to you, except that of 178L
safety and respect for her person, is unreasonable.

If the reports brought to me are true ; your rejecting
her offers, or any negotiation with her, would soon
obtain your possession of the fort, upon your own
terms. I apprehend that she will contrive to defraud
the captors of a considerable part of the booty, by
being suffered to retire without examination. But
this is your consideration, and not mine. I should
be very sorry that your officers and soldiers lost
any part of the reward to which they are so well
entitled ; but I cannot make any objection, as you
must be the best judge of the expediency of the pro-
mised indulgence to the Ranee. What you have
engaged for, I will certainly ratify ; but as to per-
mitting the Ranee to hold the pergunnah of Hur-
lak, or any other, without being subject to the au-
thority of the Zemindar, or any lands whatever, or
indeed making any condition with her for a provision
I will never consent to it.”1 2 It was finally arranged
than the Ranee should give up the fort, with all the
treasure and effects contained in it, on the express
condition, along with terms of safety, that the per-
sons of herself and the other females of her family
should be safe from the dishonour of search. The

1 It is remarkable, that of the inferences which are drawn from this
letter, by Mr. Burke, in his Third Article of charge, no notice whatsoever
is taken by Mr. Hastings, in his Answer to that Charge, or indeed of any
thing relative to the surrender of Bijygur, and the fate of the prize-money.

— M. It did not deserve a reply. Any examination which could have
been intended, was of course of a public nature only, applying to the bag-
gage and effects of the Ranee, not to her person. — W.

2 D 2

404

BISTORT OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1

CHAP. 7

1781.

• idea, however, which was suggested in the letter of
- Mr. Hastings, “ that she would contrive to defraud
the captors of a considerable part of the booty, by
being suffered to retire without examination,” dif-
fused itself but too perfectly among the soldiery ;
and when the Princesses, with their relatives and
attendants, to the number of three hundred women,
besides children, withdrew from the castle, the ca-
pitulation was shamefully violated ; they were plun-
dered of their effects ; and their persons otherwise
rudely and disgracefully treated by the licentious peo-
ple and followers of the camp.1 One is delighted for
the honour of distinguished gallantry, that in no part
of this opprobrious business the commanding officer
had any share. He leaned to generosity, and the
protection of the Princesses, from the beginning.
His utmost endeavours were exerted to restrain the
outrages of the camp ; and he represented them with
feeling to Mr. Hastings, who expressed his “great
concern hoped the offenders would be discovered,
obliged to make restitution and punished ; and direct-
ed that recompense should be made to the sufferer,
“ by a scrupulous attention to enforce the perform-
ance of the remaining stipulations in her favour.”2

1 The authority referred to, sanctions no such exaggerated statement as
that of the text. Hastings -writes, “ It gives me great concern that the
licentiousness of any persons under your command should have given
cause to complain of the infringement of the smallest article of the capitu-
lation in favour of the mother of Cheyte Sing and her dependants.” No
other authority for the disgraceful treatment of the princesses by the li-
centious followers of the camp has been found. That they or rather their
attendants were subjected to personal search, is possible, and this may
have been the subject of complaint — the searchers were females. “ Re-
solved:— that ten gold mohurs be given to each of the four female searchers.”
Proceedings of a Committee of Officers, Tenth Report, 532. — W.

* See his Letter, Tenth Report, Select Committee, Appendix, No. 3.

DISPUTE CONCERNING THE PRIZE-MONEY.

405

The whole of the treasure found in the castle, of B00K v-

1 CHAP. 7

which the greater part did probably belong to the

Ranee, and not to the Raja, amounted to 23,27,813 1781 ■

current rupees. The whole therefore, of the trea-
sure which the exiled Prince appears to have had in
hand, not only to defray the current expenses of his
government, but also to advance regularly the Com-
pany’s tribute, was so far from answering to the
hyberbolical conceptions or representations of the
Governor-General, that it exceeded not the provision
which a prudent Prince would have thought it always
necessary to possess.

The army proceeded upon the obvious import of
the words of the Governor-General in the letter, in
which he seemed to desire, that they should not
allow the female relations of the Raja to leave the
fort, without the examination of their persons. They
concluded, that the whole of the booty was “ the
reward to which they were so well entitled,” and
divided it among themselves.1 Among the practical
conclusions deducible from his letter, it appears that
this, at least, the Governor-General did not wish to
receive its effect. He endeavoured to retract the
permission which the army had inferred; and, by
explaining away the terms which he had used, to
recover the spoil for the exigencies of his government.

The soldiers, however, both officers and men, refused
to surrender what they had, upon the faith of the

1 In a letter to tlie commanding officer, without date, but supposed by
the Select Committee to have been written early in November (vide
Tenth Report, App. No. 3.) the Governor-General’s words were still more
precise, with regard to the booty. “ If she (the Begum) complies, as I
expect she will, it will be your part to secure the fort, and the property it
contains, for the benefit of yourself and detachment.”

406

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1

CHAP. 7

1781.

•Governor-General, appropriated. Failing in this
. attempt, he endeavoured to prevail upon the army, in
the way of loan, to aid the Company with the money,
in its urgent distress. Even to this solicitation they
remained obdurate. When Major Fairfax, in his
examination before the Select Committee of the
House of Commons, was asked, “ whether the officers
assigned any reason for refusing to obey the requisi-
tion of Mr. Hasting'? he said, he heard it was,
because the Rohilla prize-money had never been
paid.”1 Mr. Hastings was, therefore, not only
frustrated as to every portion of that pecuniary
relief which he expected from the supposed trea-
sures of the Raja Cheyte Sing; he added to the
burden, under which the Company was ready to
sink, the expense which was incurred by subduing
the revolt.

It is but justice to the Court of Directors to
record the resolutions, in which they expressed their
opinion of the conduct, pursued by their principal
servant in India, towards the unfortunate Raja of
Benares :

“ That it appears to this Court, that on the death
of Suja-ad-dowla, 1775, a treaty was made with his
successor, by which the zemindary of Benares, with

1 Second Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 15. “ Being asked, whether

this was the sole reason ? he said, it was. Being asked, whether he did
not hear it alleged ; that a promise was claimed by the officers from Mr.
Hastings, that the prize-money, in the Rohilla war, when taken, should
be the property of the captors ? he said ; He never heard of a promise
previous to the capture; but he has heard that Mr. Hastings, after the
prize-money was divided, promised, that if they would deliver it up,
government would distribute it, in the manner they should think most
proper.”

DECISION OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

407

its dependencies, was ceded in perpetuity to the East book 7V-
India Company :

“That it appears to this Court, that Raja Cheyte 178L
Sing was confirmed by the Governor-General and
Council of Bengal, in the management of the said
zemindary (subject to the sovereignty of the Com-
pany) on his paying a certain tribute, which was
settled at sicca rupees 22,66,180; and that the
Bengal government pledged itself that the free
and uncontrolled possession of the zemindary of
Benares, and its dependencies, should be confirmed
and guaranteed to the Raja and his heirs for ever,
subject to such tribute, and that no other demand
should be made upon him, nor any kind of authority
or jurisdiction exercised within the dominions as-
signed him, so long as he adhered to the terms of
his engagements :

“ That it appears to this Court, that the
Governor-General and Council did, on the 5th of
July, 1775, recommend to Raja Cheyte Sing, to
keep up a body of 2000 horse ; hut at the same time
declared there should he no obligation upon him to
do it :

“ That it appears to this Court, that Raja Cheyte
Sing peformed his engagements with the Company,
in the regular payment of his tribute of sicca rupees
22,66,180 :

“ That it appears to this Court, that the conduct
of the Governor-General towards the Raja, while he
was at Benares, was improper ; and that the impri-
sonment of his person, thereby disgracing him in the
eyes of his subjects, and others, was unwarrantable,
and highly impolitic, and may tend to weaken the

408

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1
CHAP. 7

1781.

• confidence which the native princes of India ought
- to have in the justice and moderation of the Com-
pany’s government.”

That the conception, thus expressed by the Court
of Directors, of the several facts which constituted
the great circumstances of the case, was correct, the
considerations adduced in the preceding pages appear
to place beyond the reach of dispute. The sensibility
which, in his answer, Mr. Hastings shows to the
inferences which they present, is expressed in the
following words : “ I must crave leave to say, that
the terms, improper, unwarrantable, and highly im-
politic are much too gentle, as deductions from such
premises.” History, if concealment were not one of
the acts by which truth is betrayed, would, out of
tenderness to Mr. Hastings, suppress the material
part of that which follows, and which he gave in his
defence :

“ I deny, that the Bengal government pledged
itself, that the free and uncontrolled possession of the
zemindary of Benares, and its dependencies, should be
confirmed and guaranteed to the Raja and his heirs
for ever :

“ I deny, that the Bengal government pledged
itself that no other demand should be made upon
him, nor any kind of authority or jurisdiction, within
the dominions assigned him, so long as he adhered
to the terms of his engagement :

“ I deny, that I ever required him to keep up a
body of 2000 horse, contrary to the declaration made
to him by the Governor-General and Council, on the
5th of July, 1775, that there should be no obligation
to him to do it :

UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF MR. HASTINGS.

409

“ My demand (that is, the demand of the Board) b°ok 7V

was not that he should maintain any specific number

of horse, hut that the number which he did maintain 178L
should be employed for the defence of the general
state :

“ I deny, that Raja Cheyte Sing was bound
by no other engagements to the Company, than
for the payment of his tribute of sicca rupees
22,66,180 :

“ He was bound by the engagements of fealty and
absolute obedience to every order of the govern-
ment which he served

“ I deny, that the Raja Cheyte Sing was a native
Prince of India.”1

1 On equal grounds might the denial have been set up, that the Com-
pany held the dignity of a prince of India. They were not only the sub-
jects of Shah Aulum, but the subjects of the Nabob of Bengal; and
according to the doctrine of Mr. Hastings, “ bound by the engagements
of fealty, and absolute obedience to every order of the government which
they served.” Hear what the Governor-General and Council themselves
declare respecting their subordinate relation to that Nabob, in their
secret letter (Second Report, ut supra, p. 22), 3d August, 1775. “ In the

treaties entered into with the late Vizir, in the years 1765, 1770, the
Company’s representatives acted as plenipotentiaries from the Nabob
Nujum ul Dowlah, and his successor Syef ul Dowlah.” Hastings’s plan
of defence was this : To avail himself of the indefiniteness and uncer-
tainty which surrounded every right, and every condition in India ; and
out of that to manufacture to himself a right of unbounded despotism.

There is one remark, however, to which he is, in justice, entitled ; that
this indefiniteness, and the latitude of authority, the exercise of which
was, in the practice of the country, never bounded by any thing but
power, constituted a snare into which it was very difficult not to fall. It
is also to be remembered that it is one thing to act under the casual and
imperfect information of the moment of action, agitated by the passions
which the circumstances themselves produce ; and a very different thing
to sit in judgment upon those acts, at a future period, when all the evi-
dence is fully before us, illustrated by the events which followed, and
when we are entirely free from the disturbance of the passions which the
scenes themselves excite. It is the business of history, to exhibit actions
as they really are ; but the candid and just will make all the allowance

410

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. ]y[r Hastings says, “ I forbear to detail the proofs

of these denials and as the pleas involved in them

178L coincide with those allegations of his which have been
examined above, it is only necessary to refer to what
has there been adduced.1 The Court of Directors,
notwithstanding their condemnation of the treatment
which the Raja had received, and notwithstanding
the manner in which, by a train of unhappy circum-
stances, the trial of arms was forced upon him,
thought proper to declare, that his dethronement and
proscription were justified by the war.2

for the actors, of which the case will admit. With regard to Mr.
Hastings, it ought to be allowed, that the difficulties under which he
acted were very great ; and might be expected to betray any but a very
extraordinary man into expedients for relief which would not always
bear examination. Mr. Hastings deserves no hypocritical tenderness
with regard to the instances in which he violated the rules of justice or
of policy ; but he deserves credit, in considerable, and perhaps a large
degree, fbr having, in his situation, violated them so rarely. — M. The
case which is here under review, was one in which there was no violation
of justice or policy. Justice and policy both demanded the punishment of
a disaffected dependant, and it was matter of urgent policy to draw forth
all the resources of the state, when the state, as is universally admitted,
was in imminent peril. Cheit Sing was quite able to afford the most im-
portant services to his Government, and he withheld them. He deserved
no lenity. For his expulsion he had to thank either his own treachery, or
the indiscreet zeal of his followers. A few professions of regret for the
past, and the proffer of a few lacks of rupees, would no doubt have pre-
served his Zemindary and prevented an act of atrocity that left him without
the slightest claim on the forbearance of the Government. It is possible
that Hastings acted with unnecessary rigour in his first communications
with the Raja at Benares, but this was an error of judgment not deserving
of impeachment. — W.

1 Vide supra, p. 330 — 40.

5 The official documents relative to this passage of the history of India
are found, in a most voluminous state, in those parts of the Minutes of
evidence on Mr. Hastings’s Trial, which relate to the Benares Charge ; in
the Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons,
(1781) and its Appendix; in the Third of the Articles of Charge, and
Answer to it, with the Papers called for by the House of Commons to
elucidate that part of the accusation.

NEGOTIATION WITH THE POONAH GOVERNMENT. 411

It was shortly after his retreat to Chunar, thatB°°^7v-

the Governor-General received from Colonel Muir

the intelligence, that Mahdajee Sindia had offered 1/8L
terms of peace. This was an event, calculated to
afford him peculiar satisfaction. One of the osten-
sible objects of his journey was, to confer with the
Minister of the Raja of Berar, who was expected to
meet him at Benares ; and, through the influence of
the government of that country, to accelerate the
conclusion of a peace. That Minister, however, died
before the arrival of Hastings; and the loss of his
intervention rendered the pacific intentions of Sindia
more peculiarly gratifying. So far back as February,

1779, the Presidency of Bombay had recommended
the mediation of Sindia, as that which alone was
likely to render any service. The Colonel imme-
diately received his instructions for a treaty, on the
terms either of mutual alliance, or of neutrality; and
either including the Peshwa, or with Sindia indi-
vidually. If it included the Peshwa, the Colonel was
authorized to cede every acquisition, made during the
war, except the territory of Futteh Sing Guicowar,

Lahar, and the fortress of Gualior ; and to renounce
(but without the surrender of his person) the support
of Ragonaut Rao. He was instructed to retain
Bassein, if it were possible, even with the surrender,
in its stead, of all the territory (Salsette with its
adjacent islands and the moiety of Baroach excepted,)
ceded by the treaty of Colonel Upton; but not to
allow Bassein itself to be any obstruction to the con-
clusion of peace.

When the separate treaty was concluded with
Sindia, who undertook to mediate with the Mali-

412

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAP. 7

1781.

• ratta powers, the Governor-General, who had not yet
- departed from Benares, sent Mr. Anderson and Mr.
Chapman ; the former to the court of Sindia, with
full powers to negotiate and conclude a peace with the
Poonah government ; the latter to the court of the
Raja of Berar, to perform what was in his power
towards the accomplishment of the same object.

The business was not very speedily, nor very easily
concluded. The Poonah ministers, solicited for peace
by the three English Presidencies at once,1 though
they were somewhat shaken in their opposition, by
the defection of Sindia from the war, by the steadiness
with which the English sustained themselves against
Hyder, by the facility with which they had subdued
the Raja of Benares, and the vigour with which they
carried the war almost to the gates of Poonah, were
yet encouraged by the pressure which the English
sustained, and still more, perhaps, by the eagerness
which they manifested for peace.

Colonel Goddard, not yet informed of the steps
which had been taken by Mr. Hastings for urging
the business of peace with the Poonah ministers,
deemed it necessary in pursuance of the powers for
treating and concluding, with which he was invested,
to commence a formal negotiation. And he gave
the requisite commission to Mr. Watherstone, who
arrived at Poonah on the 14th of January, 1782.

1 About the same time that the proposals for a peace were sent from
Bombay and Bengal, a letter was addressed to the Peshwa, in the joint
names of Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr.
Macplierson, through the Vakeel of Mohammed Ali, at Poona, expressing
their wish for peace, the moderation of the Company, and the desire of
the nation to conclude a firm and lasting treaty : a proceeding wholly
unauthorized, contrary to the existing constitution of the Government of
India, and only calculated to obstruct the negotiation. Duff, ii. 455. — W .

TREATY CONCLUDED WITH THE MAHRATTAS.

413

The cunning of the Poonah Ministers taught them bc(j°^7v'

the advantage of negotiation with two ambassadors,

acting under separate commissions ; who, by the 1781-
desire of attaining the object for which they were
sent, might he expected to bid against one another,
and give to the Mahrattas the benefit of an auction in
adjusting the terms of peace. They pretended there-
fore, to be puzzled with two sets of powers : though
they laboured to retain Col. Watherstone, after he was
recalled.1 They put on the forms of distance; and
stood upon elevated terms. Sindia, too, who meant
to sell his services to the English very dear, was dis-
pleased at the commission sent to solicit the inter-
ference of the government of Berar. The extensive
sacrifices, however, which the English consented to
make, the unsteadfast basis on which the power of
the leaders at Poonah was placed, and the exhausted
state of the country, from the long continuance of its
internal struggles, as well as the drain produced by
the English war, triumphed over all difficulties ; a
cessation of hostilities was effected early in March ;
and a treaty was concluded on the 17th of May.

Not only the other territories which the English
had acquired during the war, hut Bassein itself, the
city also of Ahmedabad, and all the country in
Guzerat which had been gained forFutty Sing, were
given up ; and the two brothers, the Guicowars,
were placed in the same situation, both with respect
to one another, and with respect to the Peshwa, as
they stood in previous to the war. Even of the

1 Their wish to retain this officer was however part of a policy not ap-
preciated by the author : the ministers of the Peshwa would have willingly
ooncluded a peace without Sindia’s mediation. Duff. ii. 456. — W.

414

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 7.

1781.

• territory, which had been confirmed to them by the
- treaty of Colonel Upton, the English agreed to
surrender their pretensions to a part (yielding
annually three lacs of rupees), which had not yet
come into their possession when the war was
renewed. And all their rights in the city and terri-
tory of Baroach, valued at 200,000?. a year, were
resigned, by a separate agreement, to Sindia and his
heirs for ever. To Sindia was also given up, by the
liberty of seizing it, the territory, including the fort
of Gualior, of the Rana of Gohud ; who had joined
the English, but, as usual in India with the petty
princes, who choose their side from the hope of
protection on the one hand and the dread of plunder
on the other, had been neither very able nor very
willing, to lend great assistance. Having given
offence by his defect of service, and created suspi-
cions by his endeavours to effect a separate recon-
ciliation with Sindia, he was, in adjusting the terms
of the treaty with Sindia, left to his fate. The amity
of Sindia was purchased, by still further sacrifices,
which evince but little foresight. The project of
Sindia for invading the territories of the Mogul
Emperor, those of Nujuf Khan, and those of other
chiefs in the province of Delhi and the adjoining
regions, was known and avowed. And it was,
intentionally, provided, that no obstruction, by the
treaty with the English, should be offered to the
execution of those designs.1

1 The letter of instructions of the Governor-General to Colonel Muir
says, “We are under no engagements to protect the present dominions of
the King, or those of Nudjiff Khan, and the Raja of Jaynagur; and if
peace is settled betwixt Madajee Sindia and us, I do not desire that he

TREATY CONCLUDED WITH THE MAHRATTAS.

415

All that was stipulated in behalf of Ragouaut Rao 7V ■

was a period of four months, in which he might

choose a place for his residence. After that period 1/8L

the English agreed to afford him neither pecuniary
nor any other support. The Peshwa engaged, on
the dangerous condition of his residing within the
dominions of Sindia, where he was promised security,
to allow him a pension of 25,000 rupees per
month.

An article was inserted respecting Hyder Ali, to
which we have scarcely information to enable us to
attach any definite ideas. The Mahrattas engaged,
that within six months after the ratification of the
treaty, he should be compelled to relinquish to the
English, and their allies, all the places which he had
taken from them during the war. But neither did
the Mahrattas perform, nor did the English call upon
them to perform, any one act toward the fulfilment
of this condition. The English, on their part,
engaged that they would never make war upon Hyder
till he made war upon them; an engagement to
which they as little expected that the Mahrattas
would call upon them to adhere.1

should be restrained in carrying into execution any plans which he may
have formed against them ; at the same time, I think it necessary to
caution you against inserting any thing in the treaty, which may expressly
mark either our knowledge of his views or concurrence in them. It will
be sufficient for us (and Sindia ought to be satisfied with the latitude im-
plied in it) if he is only restricted in the treaty from making encroachments
on our own territory and those of our allies.” Second Report, ut supra,

App. No. 1. By the way, we may here remark, how enormous a difference
exists, between the obligations of fealty which Mr. Hastings imposed
upon himself (as representative of the Company) towards his undoubted
Sovereign the Mogul ; and the obligations which, as supposed sovereign
of Cheyte Sing, he exacted (on the same ground) from that unfortunate
chief. Vide supra, p. 356.

1 In the twentieth article of charge, we have Mr. Burke’s view of the

416

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. The Mahrattas also agreed, and to this the imaei-

nations of the English attached a high importance,

178L that, with the exception of the ancient Portuguese

case. He says, that Mr. Hastings did wish to engage with the Mah-
rattas in a plan for the conquest and partition of Mysore ; that in order
to carry this point, he exposed the negotiation to many difficulties and
delays ; that the Mahrattas, who were bound by an engagement with
Hyder to make no peace with the English in which he was not included,
pleaded this sacred obligation ; but Hastings undertook to instruct even
the Mahrattas in the arts of crooked faith, by showing how they might
adhere to the forms of their engagement, while they violated the sub-
stance ; and what is most heinous of all, that Hastings, having effected the
assent of the Mahrattas to the article which is inserted in the treaty, and
led by his desire of conquest, opposed obstructions to the conclusion of a
peace with the son and successor of Hyder Ali ; that it was for this reason
he endeavoured to bind the hands of the Presidency of Fort St. George,
by withholding his authority from the negotiation; and that it was not till
after a long experience of the total absence of any intention on the part of
the Mahrattas, to engage with him in his schemes upon Mysore, and till he
was assured of the fact by his agent at the court of Sindia, that his late
and reluctant assent to the negotiation was obtained ; and that, after the
peace was concluded, and ratified by the Supreme Council, from which,
he was absent, and of which, by reason of his absence, he formed not a
part, he endeavoured to break it, or at least exposed it wantonly to the
greatest danger of being broken, by insisting that its formal conclusion and
ratification should be of none effect, and that it should be opened again for
the purpose of inserting the useless, if not mischievous, formality of an
article, admitting as a party the Nabob of Arcot. These imputations
receive all the confirmation conveyed by an answer, which, passing them
over in silence, appears to admit them. — M. All these imputations had
no foundation whatever but in the malignity with which Burke came to
regard Hastings. It was no doubt the object of the latter to engage the
Mahrattas in an offensive and defensive alliance, and with this view, the
articles regarding Hyder were inserted. What better course of policy
could be devised ? That the agreement was not acted upon was not the
fault of the British Government, for in truth the treaty was not ratified
by the Peshwa until after Ilyder’s death. The object of Nana Fumavese
in this delay is explained by Duff to have been the intimidation of both
the English and Hyder, by holding out the possibility of a union with
either against the other, by which he hoped to recover from the latter the
territories south of the Nerbudda, and from the former, Salsette. If any
blame could be imputed to Hastings, it was not for delaying or impeding
the treaty, but sanctioning the sacrifices necessary to obtain it. Hist, of
Mahrattas, ii. 4G3. — W.

THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT OBJECT TO THE TREATY. 417

establishments, they would permit no other nation, 7V‘

except the English, to open with them any friendly

intercourse, or to erect a factory within their domi- 1/81-
nions.

The terms of this agreement, the gentlemen of the
Presidency of Bombay arraigned as inadequate, nay
humiliating ; and declared, that had the negotiation
been left to them and to Goddard, who best knew
the state of the Mahratta government, and with what
facility it might have been induced to lower its tone,
a far more favourable treaty might have certainly
been obtained.

CHAPTER VIII.

Burdens sustained by the Nabob of Oude. — His
Complaints. — How received by the English. — Mr.
Bristow removed from Oude. — Agreement between
Mr. Hastings and the Nabob. — The Begums de-
spoiled.— Whether the Begums incited Insurrection.
— Alleged oppressions of Colonel Hannay. — The
head Eunuchs of the Begums tortured. — A present
of ten Lacs given to Mr. Hastings by the Nabob.
— Governor-General accuses Middleton, and re-
places Bristow. — Treatment received by Fyzoolla
Khan . — Decision by the Court of Directors rela-
tive to the Begums. — Set at nought by Mr. Hastings.
— Governor-General’s new Accusations against Mr.
VOL. iv. 2 E

418

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

?ook v. Bristow. — Governor- General's Plan to remove the

CHAP. 8.

Residency from Oude. — Governor-General repeats

1781 • his visit to Oude. — Resigns the Government. — Finan-

cial Results of his Administration. — Incidents at
Madras.

The next of the great transactions to which the
presence of the Governor-General, in the upper pro-
vinces, gave immediate existence, was the memorable
arrangement which he formed with the Nabob of
Oude. In his payments to the Company, that
Nabob had fallen deeply in arrear ; and the extreme
pecuniary distress endured by the Company,1 ren-
dered it necessary to devise the most effectual means
for obtaining what he owed. His country, however,
had, by misgovernment, fallen into the greatest
disorder. The Zemindars were almost every where
in a state of disobedience ; the country was impover-
ished ; and the disposition of the people, either
deserting it or pining with want, threatened the
evils, or promised the blessings, of a general revolt.2
Before the connexion between the English and Oude,
its revenue had exceeded three millions sterling, and
was levied without being accused of deteriorating the
country. In the year 1779, it did not exceed one-
half of that sum, and in the subsequent years fell far
below it, while the rate of taxation was increased,

1 Even the pay of the troops was, every where, four and five months in
arrear.

s The Minute in which the Governor-General introduced the subject
of his journey to the upper provinces, begins in these words ; “ The
province of Oude having fallen into a state of great disorder and confusion,
its resources being in an extraordinary degree diminished, and the Nabob.
Asopli ul Dowla,” &c. Tenth Report of the Select Committee in 1781,
App. No. 2.

COMPLAINTS OF THE NABOB.

419

and the country exhibited every mark of oppressive book v.
exaction.

By the treaty of Fyzabad, formed with the late 178L
Nabob at the conclusion of the Bohilla war, it was
agreed, that a regular brigade of the Company’s
troops should, at the expense of the Nabob, be kept
within the dominions of Oude. Even this burden
was optional, not compulsory; and the Court of
Directors gave their sanction to the measure, “ pro-
vided it was done with the free consent of the Subah,
and by no means without it.” 1

To the first was added, in the year 1777, a
second, called the temporary brigade, because the
express condition of it was, that the expense should
be charged on the Nabob “ for so long a time only
as he should require the corps for his service.” The
Court of Directors were still more anxious, in this
case, than in the former, to determine, that the
burden should not be fastened on the Nabob,
contrary to his will : “ If you intend” (say they,
addressing the Governor-General and Council) f‘ to
exert your influence, first, to induce the Vizir to
acquiesce in your proposal; and afterwards to
compel him to keep the troops in his pay during
your pleasure, your intents are unjust, and a corre-
spondent conduct would reflect great dishonour on the
Company.”

Even the temporary brigade did not put a limit
to the expense for English soldiers whom the Nabob
was drawn to maintain. Several detached corps, in
the Company’s service, were also placed in his pay ;

1 Letter of Directors to the Governor-General and Council, dated 15th
December, 1775.

2 E 2

420

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAP. 8.

1781.

• and a great part of his own native troops were put
. under the command of British officers.

In the year 1779, the expense of the temporary
brigade, and that of the country troops under British
officers, increased, the one to the amount of more
than eighty, the other of more than forty thousand
pounds sterling, above the estimate. These particu-
lars, however, constituted only the military part of
his English expense. The civil expense resulted
from an establishment under the resident, which, with-
out any authority from the Court of Directors, or
any record in the books of the Council, had gra-
dually and secretly swelled to a great amount : and
was increased, by another establishment for another
agent of the Company, and by pensions, allowances,
and large occasional gifts, to various persons in the
Company’s service.

In that year, viz. 1779, the Nabob complained that
the pressure was more than he was able to endure.
“ During three years past,” said he, “ the expense
occasioned by the troops in brigade, and others com-
manded by European officers, has much distressed
the support of my household ; insomuch, that the
allowances made to the seraglio and children of the
deceased Nabob have been reduced to one-fourth of
wThat it had been, upon which they have subsisted in
a very distressed manner for two years past. The
attendants, writers, and servants, &c. of my court,
have received no pay for two years past ; and there
is at present no part of the country that can be allot-
ted to the payment of my father’s private creditors,
whose applications are daily pressing upon me. All
these difficulties I have for these three years past

COMPLAINTS OF THE NABOB.

421

struggled through and found this consolation therein,

that it was complying with the pleasure of the Hon- .

ourable Company, and in the hope that the Supreme 1781
Council would make inquiry from impartial persons
into my distressed situation ; but I am now forced to
a representation. From the great increase of expense,
the revenues were necessarily farmed out at a high
rate, and deficiences followed yearly. The country
and cultivation is abandoned. And this year, in
particular, from the excessive droughts, deductions
of many lacs 1 have been allowed the farmers, who
are still unsatisfied. — I have received but just suffi-
cient to support my absolute necessities, the revenues
being deficient to the amount of fifteen lacs ; 2 and
for this reason, many of the old chieftains, with their
troops, and the useful attendants of the court, were
forced to leave it, and there is now only a few foot
and horse for the collection of my revenues ; and
should the Zemindars be refractory, there is not left
a sufficient number to reduce them to obedience.”

In consequence of these distressing circumstances, the
Nabob prayed, that, the assignments for the new
brigade, and the other detached bodies of the Com-
pany’s troops, might not be required, declaring that
these troops were “ not only quite useless to his
government, but, moreover, the cause of much loss,
both in the revenues and customs ; and that the
detached bodies of troops, under their European
officers, brought nothing but confusion into the

1 Stated by the resident, in his letter, dated 13th December, 1779, to
amount to twenty-five lacs, 250,0007.

s 150,0007.

422

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8.

1781.

. affairs of his government, and were entirely their own
_ masters.”1

This representation, which events proved to be
hardly an exaggeration, and the prayer by which it
was followed, the Governor-General received, with
tokens of the highest indignation and resentment.
“ These demands,” he said, “ the tone in which they
are asserted, and the season in which they are made,
are all equally alarming.” In the letter which was
despatched in his words to the resident, the grounds
on which the Nabob petitioned for relief are declared

to be “ totally inadmissible He stands engaged,”

it is added, “ to our government, to maintain the
English armies which, at his own request, have been
formed for the protection of his dominions, and it
is our part, not his, to judge and to determine, in
what manner, and at what time, these shall be
reduced or withdrawn.” In his minute, in consul-
tation, upon the subject, he says, that by the treaty
made with Asoph ul Dowla, upon the death of his
father, “ he became, eventually, and necessarily, a
vassal of the Company.” He affirmed that “ the
disorders of his state, and the dissipation of his
revenues, were the effects of his own conduct, which
had failed, not so much from the casual effects of
incapacity, as from the detestable choice which he
has made of the ministers of his power, and the
participators of his confidence.”2 And to the Nabob

1 Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 7.

2 The words which follow sufficiently indicate the species of companions
which he meant : “ I forbear to expatiate further on his character ; it is
sufficient that I am understood by the Members of the Board, who must
know the truth of my allusions.” Lord Thurlow, the friend of Hastings,
and his fierce defender on his trial, speaks out plainly, and calls them
without reserve, the instruments of an unnatural passion. See “ Debate

APOLOGY OF HASTINGS.

423

himself he declared, “ Your engagements with the 8V‘

Company are of such a nature as to oblige me to

require and insist on your granting tuncaws for the l781-
full amount of their demands upon you for the cur-
rent year, and on your reserving funds sufficient to
answer them, even should the deficiency of your
revenues compel you to leave your own troops unpro-
vided for, or to disband a part of them to enable you
to effect it.”1

The difficulties, under which the Governor-
General was placed, were severe and distressing.

It is true, that the protection of the Nabob’s domi-
nions rested solely upon the British troops, and that
without loss of time they would have been overrun
by the Mahrattas, had those troops been withdrawn ;
it is true, that the debt due to the Company would,
in that case have been lost ; that a dangerous people
would have been placed upon the Company’s frontier;
that the Company’s finances, always in distress, and
then suffering intensely by war, could not maintain
the same number of troops, if their pay was stopped
by the Yizir. And the law of self-preservation
supersedes that of justice. On the other hand, from
the documents adduced, it is evident, that the Eng-
lish had no right to compel the Nabob, if not agree-
able to him, to maintain any part of those their
troops ; and the Governor-General was not entitled,
as he did, to plead, at once, both the law of self-pre-
servation, and the law of right. The truth also is.

in the House of Lords, on the Evidence delivered at the Trial of Warren
Hastings,” &c. ; a quarto volume got up by Mr. Hastings, and distributed
to his friends, but never published.

1 Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix. No. 7.

424

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

Bchai\r’ ^aw °f self-preservation, when examined,

and brought into conformity with the facts, implies a

strong convenience, and nothing more. It was very
convenient for the English at that time, to have a
large body of troops maintained by a different
treasury from their own. But it will hardly he
maintained, at any rate by the friends of Mr.
Hastings, that in his hands the British empire in
India must have been destroyed, had it been com-
pelled to rely upon its own resources.1 It was for
a great convenience, then, and for nothing else,
that the English, without any claim of right, com-
pelled the Nabob Vizir to maintain their troops ;
that is, treated him as the vassal which Mr. Hastings
described him, and substantially seized and exercised
the rights of sovereign and master over both him and
his country.

Another point well deserves to be considered ;
whether the original brigade of the Company’s troops
was not a force sufficient to protect the Nabob’s
country, against all the dangers with which it was
threatened. If the English, who included in their
own line of defence the boundaries of Oude, did
not provide their due proportion, but impose the
whole upon the Nabob, they defended themselves
at his expense ; they delivered themselves from a
burden, which was their own, and by compelling
the Nabob to hear it, violated the laws of justice.

It is also a question, whether the troops, quartered

1 It would be presumptuous to affirm tliat it must have been destroyed,
but it was enough for the government to apprehend the possibility of such
an event, to justify their employing all available resources for its pre-
vention. It was for something more than convenience; it was for se-
curity.— W.

APOLOGY OF HASTINGS.

425

upon him in addition to that brigade, as they were book v.

kept in idleness in his dominions, were not, with

all their expense, of little use either to him or the i78i.
Company. As they were not employed against the
enemies of the Company, they could be of little use in
repelling them ; and the complaint of the Yizir that
they and their officers acted as the masters in his
country, and as a source both of expense and of dis-
order, is confirmed by Mr. Francis, who, in Council,
pronounced it “ notorious, that the English army
had devoured his revenues, and his country, under
colour of defending it.”1

The Governor-General, when pressed for argu-
ment, made the following avowal ; that ambiguities
had been left in the treaty : And that it was the part
of the strongest to affix to these ambiguities that
meaning which he pleased.2 That this is a very
common political procedure, every one knows. The
allegation, however, in its essence, is, it is evident,
only a varnish placed upon injustice by fraud. In
the present case, besides, it happened, by a singular
chance, that ambiguity had not existence, and the
allegation of it was false. “ So long only as the
Nabob pleased,” was the express condition of the
compact ; and the moment at which the Nabob
desired relief, the most exact definition was applied.

1 Extract of Bengal Consultations, 15th December, 1779 ; Tenth
Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 7.

s His words are these, “ As no period was stipulated for the continuance
of the temporary brigade, or of the troops which are to supply their place
in his service, nor any mode prescribed for withdrawing them ; the time
and mode of withdrawing them must be guided by such rules, as necessity,
and the common interests of both parties, shall dictate. These, either he
must prescribe, or ourselves. If we cannot agree upon them, in such a
division, the strongest must decide.” Ibid.

426

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1781.

The Governor-General surmised a circumstance,
which always seems to have animated him to pecu-
liar severity : that the idea of the instability of the
existing government was among the causes which
emboldened the Nabob to complain. ‘f I, for my
own part,” said he, “ do not attribute1 the demand
of the Nabob to any conviction impressed on his
mind by the necessity of his affairs ; but to the
knowledge which his advisers have acquired, of the
weakness and divisions of our own government.
This is a powerful motive with me, however inclined
I might be, upon any other occasion, to yield to some
part of his demands, to give them an absolute and
unconditional refusal in the present ; and even to
bring to punishment, if my influence can produce
that effect, those incendiaries who have endeavoured
to make themselves the instruments of division be-
tween us.”2

Under the enormous demands of the English, and
the Nabob’s inability to meet them, the debt with
which he stood charged in 1780 amounted to the
sum of 1,400,0001. The Supreme Council con-
tinued pressing their demands. The Nabob, protest-
ing that he had given up every thing, that “ in the
country no further resources remained, and that he
was without a subsistence,” continued sinking more

1 It would be very curious, if the Governor-General at the commence-
ment of the year 1780, was totally ignorant of the ruin of the Nabob’s
finances; and in eighteen months afterwards, viz. at the time of his
journey to the upper provinces, was so convinced of that ruin, as to make
it the principal ground of the extraordinary procedure which he adopted,
when he, allowing the inability to be real, removed the brigade and other
objects of complaint.

2 Extract of Bengal Consultations, 15th December, 1779 ; Tenth Report,
ut supra, Appendix, No. 7.

BRISTOW REMOVED AND MIDDLETON APPOINTED. 427

deeply in arrear : till the time when the resolution B00K v-

r J _ CHAP. 8.

of Mr. Hastings was adopted, to proceed to make

with him a new arrangement upon the spot. ]78L

As a step preliminary to the affairs which the
Governor-General meant to transact with the Nabob,
he withdrew the resident, Mr. Bristow. This gen-
tleman had been appointed by the party of General
Clavering, when they removed Middleton, the pri-
vate agent of Mr. Hastings : The Governor-General
had removed him soon after the time when he re-
covered his superiority in the Council : The Court of
Directors had ordered him to be replaced, as unjustly
and improperly removed : Mr. Hastings, in disobe-
dience of these orders, had refused to replace him,
till it became a condition of the compromise into
Avhich he entered with Francis: And he now re-
moved him again with a fresh violation of the au-
thority of the Court of Directors, in conformity with
whose orders he occupied the place. Mr. Middleton
was again appointed, on the reason, notwithstanding
the condemnation of the Court of Directors, again
avowed, that a person in the Governor-General’s own
confidence was necessary in that situation.

As the Governor-General intended to make a very
short stay at Benares, and then proceed to Lucknow,
the Nabob had already left his capital, in order to
pay him the usual compliment of a meeting, when
he received intelligence of the insurrection. Mr.
Hastings, who wished not for the interview in a
state of humiliation, or under the appearance of
receiving protection from his ally, endeavoured by
a letter to make him return to his capital. But the
Nabob was eager to show the interest which he

428

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1781.

took in the fate of the Governor-General, or eager
to know the situation in which he was placed ; and
hastened with but a few of his attendants to Chunar.
The English ruler was at pains to afford him a
cordial reception. And with little debate or hesita-
tion they made a memorable arrangement. In
consequence of “ the repeated and urgent represen-
tations of the Nabob, that he is unable to support
the expenses of the temporary brigade of cavalry,
and English officers with their battalions, as well as
other gentlemen who are now paid by him,” (such
are the terms of the preamble to the covenant) it was
agreed, on the part of the Governor-General, that
from the expense of the temporary brigade, and of
all other English troops, except the single brigade
left with Suja-ul-dowla, and a regiment of sepoys
for the resident’s guard ; and from the expense of all
payments to English gentlemen, excepting those of
the resident’s office ; the Nabob should be relieved.1

’ See page 372, where it appears that Hastings, little more than a year
before, treated as incendiaries, and threatened with punishment, those
advisers, by whose suggestion he deemed it proper to assume that the
Nabob implored the relief which was now granted, and so much as stated
those sufferings of the country which the Governor-General now held
studiously up to view. To threaten to punish the representation of griev-
ances, as Burke justly on this passage remarks, is to endeavour to obstruct
one of the most sacred duties of a dependent prince, and of his advisers ; a
duty in the highest degree useful both to the people who suffer, and to the
governing power. It affords a curious moral spectacle to compare the
minutes and letters of the Governor-General, when maintaining, at the be-
ginning of the year 1780, the propriety of compelling the Nabob to sustain
the whole of the burden imposed upon him ; and his minutes, and letters,
when maintaining the propriety of relieving him from these burdens in
1781 : The arguments and facts adduced on the one occasion, as well as
the conclusion, are in flat contradiction to those exhibited on the other.
See the Documents in the Second and Tenth Reports, ut supra ; printed
also for the House of Commons on the 16th of Burke’s Charges : and in
the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial.

ARRANGEMENT WITH THE NABOB OF OUDE.

429

According to another article, permission was granted book v.

him to resume such of the jaghires within his terri-

tories, as he himself might choose, with only this 1781 •
reservation, that a pension equal to the net rent
should he paid to the holders of such of them as had
the Company for their guarantee. An article was
also inserted, according to which the Nabob was to
be allowed, when the suitable time should arrive, to
strip Fyzoolla Khan of his territory, allowing him
only a pension in its stead.

Such was all that was seen on the face of this
agreement ; where no advantage to the English ap-
peared. The circumstances, however, which consti-
tuted the real nature of the transaction were only
behind the curtain.

There were two Princesses, known by the name
of the Begums ; the one, the mother of Suja-ul-dowda,
the late Nabob; the other, the widow of the late
Nabob, and mother of the present. These Princesses
the preceding sovereign had always treated with the
highest consideration and respect ; and allowed them
a magnificent and expensive establishment. At the
death of Suja-ul-dowla, those Princesses, according
to the custom of India, were left in possession of cer-
tain jaghires ; that is, the government portion of the
produce of a part of the land, over which, for the
greater certainty of payment, the holder of the jag-
hire was allowed the powers of management and col-
lection. This was the fund, from which the Begums
provided for their state and subsistence ; and for the
state and subsistence of the numerous families of the
preceding Nabobs, placed under their superintend-
ence. Suja-ul-dowla, at his death, had also left to

430

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. the Begums the greater part of the treasure which

happened to be iu his hands; and imagination swelled

1781- the sum to a prodigious extent. Mr. Hastings had
been disappointed in the mine which he expected to
drain at Benares. His power and reputation depended
upon the immediate acquisition of money. In the
riches of the Begums appeared to lie an admirable
resource. It w7as agreed between Mr.. Hastings and
the Nabob, that his Highness should be relieved from
the expense, which he was unable to bear, of the
English troops and gentlemen ; and he, on his part,
engaged to strip the Begums of both their treasure
and their jaghires, delivering to the Governor-General
the proceeds.1

This transaction, however objectionable it may at
first sight appear, Mr. Hastings represented as
attended wTith circumstances wfiiich rendered it not
only just but necessary. The weight of these cir-
cumstances ought to be carefully and impartially
considered.2

1 To enable the Nabob, “ to discharge his debt to the Company in the
shortest time possible,” that is, to get money from him; “ and to prevent
his alliance from being a clog instead of an aid that is, costing money,
instead of yielding it, is declared by the Governor-General to have been
“the chief object in his negotiations with the Nabob.” Letter to Mr.
Middleton, 23rd September, 1781.

* Although the text does not repeat the enormous falsehoods which the
oratory of Sheridan and Burke invented, and has been by some imagined
to excuse, yet the general tone of the narrative is influenced by the misre-
presentations of those masters in the art of rhetorical deception. The
jagirs and treasures of the Begums were of considerable value, and what is
of more consequence, were illegally held. The easy temper of the Nabob
allowed the period of his accession to pass without interfering with the
possessions of theBegums,but their occupancy ofthejagir was always depen-
dant upon his pleasure, and the wealth, which had been his father’s, was
by the Mohammedan law indubitably his own : a mother being entitled
to one-eighth only of her husband’s property, and a grandmother having no

SITUATION OF THE BEGUMS.

431

In the year 1775, not long after the death ofBOOK- v

J ° _ CHAP. 8.

Suja-ul-dowla, his widow, the mother of the reigning

Nabob, complained, by letter, to the English govern- 178L
ment, of the treatment which she received from her
son. She stated that various sums, to the extent of
twenty-six lacs of rupees, had been extorted from her,
under the plea of his being in want of money to dis-
charge his obligations to the English chiefs ; and that
a recent demand had been urged for no less than
thirty lacs, as absolutely necessary to relieve him,
under his engagements to the Company ; and to save
his affairs from a ruinous embarrassment. Upon the
faith of the English government, to which alone she
would trust, she agreed to make this sacrifice; and it
was solemnly covenanted, on the part of her son, and
guaranteed on the part of the English government, 1
that no further invasion should ever be made upon
her, in the full enjoyment of her jaghires and effects,
whether she resided within the dominions of Asoph
ul Dowla, or chose to reside in any other place. This
agreement was far from producing peace between the
Nabob and the Begums. Perpetual complaints of
injurious treatment were made by the Princesses, and
the business of mediation was found by the English
resident a difficult and delicate task.

claim to inheritance -where a mother is living : therefore, as sovereign or
son, the Nabob had full right over the major part of the great wealth and
power which the Begums had appropriated. — W.

1 This covenant was the grand error of the whole proceeding ; for the
English had no possible right to interfere in a family dispute. It was the
unauthorised act of the Resident at Lucknow, always strongly condemned
by Hastings, and acquiesced in by the Council, on the plea of its having
been done, and from the reluctance of the majority to withdraw their
support from the Resident. Min. of Evid. 440. — W.

432

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1781.

In the beginning of the year 1778, those dissen-
sions arose to a great height, and the aged Princess,
“ whose residence the treatment of her grandson ”
(to use the words of Mr. Middleton, the resident)
“ seems to have rendered irksome and disgusting to
her,” resolved to abandon his dominions, and repair
on a pilgrimage to Mecca. To the execution of this
design, the Nabob was exceedingly averse; because
it would withdraw, from the sphere of his power,
the great treasure which he imagined she possessed,
and which at her death, if not before, he could render
his own. Both the Nabob and his grandmother
applied to the resident ; the one for the purpose of
procuring his influence to prevail upon the Begum to
remain ; the other for the purpose of procuring it to
induce the Nabob to allow her to depart. The
Begum complained that she was subject to daily
extortions and insults ; that the Nabob withheld the
allowance which had been established by the late
Vizir for the maintenance of the family of her de-
ceased husband; that had he resumed the jaghires and
emoluments of her servants and dependants ; that he
had made no provision for the maintenance of the
women and children (a very numerous family) of the
late Vizir, his own father; that the education and
condition of the children were wholly neglected ; and
that the favourites of the Nabob wTere allowed, and
even encouraged, to degrade his family by their
oppressions and insults. The resident reported to
the Governor-General and Council, that “ the deport-
ment of the Nabob toward her, his family, and
relations in general, was, he could not but admit,
very exceptionable ; that her claims were very mode-

SITUATION OF THE BEGUMS.

433

rate and just, and such as it would he natural to
suppose the Nabob could not in decency refuse.” He
even suggested, if the Nabob should refuse to comply
with these reasonable demands, “ that the influence
of the English government should be exerted, to
secure to the Begum whatever might appear to be
her rights in which case he doubted not that her
design of departing with her treasure would be
willingly abandoned.

While the resident was endeavouring, but without
success, to prevail upon the Nabob to afford to his
grandmother a reasonable satisfaction, he received
from the second of the Princesses a representation
of the violations which had been committed by her
son of the conditions of the recent treaty ; a treaty
which she called upon the English government, in
quality of its guarantee, to protect. The resident in
vain endeavoured to improve the behaviour of the
Nabob ; and, in reporting upon his disappointment,
observes, “ I have on all occasions, as much as
possible, avoided troubling the Honourable Board
with any matters which reflect upon the conduct
or government of the Nabob, wishing rather to
check and obviate abuses, by friendly admonitions
and remonstrances to his Excellency himself, than
to correct them by an appeal to your authority. But
such is his Excellency’s disposition, and so entirely
has he lost the confidence and affections of his sub-
jects, that, unless some restraint is imposed upon
him, which would effectually secure those who live
under the protection of his government, from violence
and oppression, I am but too well convinced, that no

VOL. iv. 2 f

BOOK V,
chap. 8.

1781.

434

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \

CHAP. 8.

J781.

• man of reputation or property will long continue in
- these provinces.”1

On the 23rd of March, the Council- General, in
which Mr. Hastings had then the ascendant,2 took
under their consideration the complaints of the Be-
gums. With regard to the eldest of the Princesses,
and those of the relations and subjects of the Nabob,
in favour of whom the guarantee of the Company
was not interposed, they held themselves incapable,
in any other way than that of remonstrance and by
tokens of displeasure, to oppose the oppressions of
the Nabob. But as they had become parties to a
treaty for the protection of the second of the Begums,
the mother of the Nabob, they determined to make
use of their authority on her behalf. On the rapacity
which he had practised with respect to the elder of
the Begums, and some of his other relations, their
instructions to the resident were in the following
words, “We desire you will repeat your remon-
strances to the Vizir on these points, in the name of
this government; representing to him the conse-
quences of such an arbitrary proceeding ; the reproach
to which his honour and reputation, as well as ours,
from being connected with him, will he exposed, by
such acts of cruelty and injustice; and the right
which wTe derive, from the nature of our alliance
with him, to expect that he will pay a deference to
our remonstrances.” They add, “ with respect to

1 Mr. Middleton’s Letter to Gov. -Gen. and Council, dated Fyzabad, 3rd
Feb. 1778. Report, ut supra.

- The members were. Mr. Hastings. Mr. Barwell, Mr. Francis, Mr.
Wheler.

TREATMENT SUFFERED BY THE BEGUMS.

435

the Bao Begum (the mother of the Nabob), her book ^v.

grievances come before us on a very different footing.

She is entitled to our protection, by an act, not 1781-
sought by us, hut solicited by the Nabob himself.

W e therefore empower and direct you, to afford your
support and protection to her, in the due maintenance
of all the rights she possesses, in virtue of the treaty
executed between her and her son, under the gua-
rantee of the Company.” 1

Such was the light in which the relative conduct
of the Nabob and the Begums appeared to the
Governor-General and Council, in 1778 ; and on
the footing which was then established, matters
between them remained, till the meeting between
Mr. Hastings and Asoph ul Dowla at Chunar, in
1781, when the Nabob was, by treaty, allowed to
seize the property of the Princesses, and of others
his relations ; and, on the condition of bestowing
that property upon the English, actually rewarded
for the seizure, by obtaining relief from a permanent
and oppressive expense. The reasons which Mr.
Hastings adduced for this proceeding are, that the
Begums had endeavoured to excite insurrection in
Oude in favour of Cheyte Sing, and that they em-
ployed their power and influence to embarrass and
disturb the Nabob’s administration.

If the testimony of an accuser shall pass for proof,
when that accuser derives great advantage from the
supposition of guilt, and great loss from the suppo-
sition of innocence, no individual is under protec-

’ Report, ut supra. The documents to which reference is here made
were all reprinted, both in the papers called for by the House of Com-
mons, and in the Minutes of Evidence, taken at the Trial in Westminster
Hall.

2 F 2

436

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

v- tion.1 It is further to he remarked, that the insur-

_ rection at Benares happened on the 16th of August ;
and the treaty by which the Nabob was authorized
to resume the jaghires was signed at Chunar, on the
19th of September. The Begums, who had first to
hear of the insurrection at Benares, and then to
spread disaffection through a great kingdom, had,
therefore, little time for the contraction of guilt.
Besides, when the government of the Nabob, as the
English themselves so perfectly knew, had fallen
into contempt and detestation with all his subjects,
it was very natural to suppose, that the servants and
dependants of the Begums, who were among the
severest of the sufferers, would not be the least
forward in exhibiting their sentiments. And as the
seclusion of the Begums rendered it impossible for
them to superintend the conduct of their servants
abroad, they were less than other people responsible
for their conduct.2

But the observation of greatest importance yet
remains to be adduced. What was the proof, upon
the strength which the Begums were selected for
a singular and aggravated punishment ? Answer ;

1 This is arguing as if Hastings derived a personal advantage from the
guilt of the Begums — whatever advantage resulted from the recovery of
the wealth illegally detained by the Begums was entirely public. There
could be no doubt that the position of the Begums, their resources, their
armed followers, their pretensions, and their temper, were injurious in the
highest degree to the government of the Vizir. — W.

2 If the Begums were incapable of responsibility, it followed that they
were unfit to have power. They had no business with armed adherents if
they could not prevent those adherents from perpetrating what they
pleased. The fact is not true. The Begums had the means of controlling
their servants; but had it been otherwise, as asserted in the text, it would
at once justify whatever measures were necessary to wrest from them re-
sources and powers they could not safely be trusted with. — W.

TREATMENT SUFFERED BY THE BEGUMS.

437

no direct proof whatsoever. Hardly an attempt is book^v.

made to prove any thing, except a rumour. Mr. -

Hastings’s friends are produced in great numbers to 1781 •
say that they heard a rumour. Upon allegation of
a rumour , that the Begums abetted Cheyte Sing,
judgment was pronounced, and punishment followed.

Before a just judgment can he pronounced, and
punishment can be justifiably inflicted, it is necessary
that trial should take place, and that the party ac-
cused should be heard in his defence. Was this jus-
tice afforded the Begums'? Not a tittle of it. So
far from it ; that Mr. Hastings, while yet in the heat
of the insurrection at Chunar, when the Begums had
scarcely had time to rebel, much less had he had
time to make any inquiry into the imputation of
guilt ; at a moment when all was confusion, alarm,
and hurry ; when every thing was ready to be re-
ported, and every thing to be believed ; pronounced
a final judgment, to supersede the guarantee of the
English government, to strip the Princesses of Oude
of their estates, and give them up helpless into the
hands of the Nabob.

Of the evidence adduced upon this important point,
it is highly requisite to give a short account. If any-
thing be indispensable to righteous judgment it is,
that evidence should first be collected, and judgment
follow after. Mr. Hastings pronounced judgment,
and sent his instrument, the Nabob, to inflict punish-
ment in the first place. Some time after all this
was done, he then proceeded to collect evidence.

But evidence of what sort4? He brought forward
persons who, he knew (or might know) beforehand,
would give the sort of evidence he wished ; and a

438

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8.

1781.

month after judgment had been pronounced, got
- them to make affidavit, before Sir Elijah Impey, of
the facts, or supposed facts, of which it was useful
for him to establish the belief. It is altogether unne-
cessary to allude to the character or credibility of the
individuals who were taken into this service. It is
perfectly sufficient to observe, that this is a mode of
getting up a proof, by means of which there never
can he any difficulty in getting a proof of any thing.
Find a number of persons, even if not mendacious,
with minds sufficiently partial to you, or sufficiently
influenced by circumstances, to believe as you would
have them (often a very easy matter, whatsoever
may be the state of the facts), and get them to set
down whatever they and you think proper, exposed
to no cross examination, exposed to no counter evi-
dence ; and think, whether it would not he an extra-
ordinary case, in which, upon these terms, any man,
more especially a powerful ruler, could remain with-
out a defence.

The fact is, that recourse to such a mode of defence
betrays a deep consciousness, that the conduct in
favour of which it is set up, stands much in need of
a defence, and seems pretty strongly to imply that no
better defence can be found for it.

The behaviour of the Supreme Judge, in lending
himself to this transaction, exposed him to the se-
verest strictures from the Managers for the Commons’
House of Parliament on the trial of Mr. Hastings.
He acknowledged, upon his examination, that he
went from Benares, where the business was concerted
between him and Mr. Hastings, to Lucknow, the
capital of Oude, for the express purpose of taking

CHARACTER OF THE AFFIDAVITS.

439

these affidavits, though he acknowledged that <r un-
doubtedly, he did not consider his jurisdiction as
extending to the province of Oude and though, in
taking an affidavit, there is so little occasion for any
remarkable qualifications in the Judge, that all he
has to do is to hear a person swear that something in
a paper is true, and to testify that he has heard him
do so. “ What the affidavits contained,” said the
Judge when examined upon the trial, “ I did not
know ; nor do I know at present, for I have never
read them.” He also declared that he did not know,
whether the persons who swore to them had ever
read them. He also said, “ I believe Mr. Middleton,
in consequence of a letter Mr. Hastings wrote to
him, had communicated the subject matter of what
they were to depose to.” At the time of taking the
affidavits of the natives, not so much as a sworn in-
terpreter was present. The judge declared he never
asked of one of the deponents, whether they knew
the contents of their affidavits : and “ had no means
of knowing whether the deponents in the Persian or
the Hindu language understood any thing of the
depositions which they gave, except that they brought
their affidavits ready drawn.” He also admitted that,
he had no means of knowing whether, of the affi-
davits which were taken before him, the whole were
published by Mr. Hastings, or whether all that had
been unfavourable to him had not been suppressed.
In fact, the examination of Sir Elijah Impey, upon
the subject of the affidavits, discloses a curious scene,
in which it appears that one object alone was in view,
namely, that of getting support to any allegations

book v.

CHAP. 8.

1781.

440

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. which Mr. Hastings had set up.1 A set of affidavits,

CHAT. 8. # ° r

thus circumstanced, could be no proof of the guilt of

]78L an absent party.2

These affidavits affim not one criminal fact, on the
part of the Begums. All that they affirm with re-
gard to these Princesses is rumour merely. The
witnesses had heard that the Begums instigated that
disaffection, which manifested itself in almost every
part of the Nabob’s dominions. In one sense this is
evidence of the fairness and honourableness of Mr.
Hastings ; for undoubtedly it goes a certain way to
prove that no undue means were used to put matter
into these affidavits.

Some of them speak directly to certain tumultuary
proceedings in Goruckpore, one of the districts of
Oude. But the insurrection, if such it might be
called, was not against the British authority, for
there was none there to oppose. The Nabob's sepoys
were refractory for want of pay. An Aumil, or renter
of the Begums, showed a disinclination to permit a
party of the Nabob's sepoys to pass through his dis-
trict, which he knew they -would plunder, and hence

1 Sec Minutes of Evidence at the Trial, p. 622 to 661 and 838 to 848.
— M.

2 As usual this is uncandidly stated, and no regard is had to Sir
Elijah Impey’s own account of the transaction. He states that he sug-
gested the arrangement to Hastings, that people in England might be
satisfied that Hastings in his narrative had affirmed no more than the
truth. He thought the public would derive additional confidence from
declarations on oath taken before a judicial authority, and offered his
services accordingly. The narrative of Hastings carries with it proof of
its own credibility and the suggestion of the Chief Justice was a work of
supererogation. His interposition was a mistaken act of friendship, but it
deserved not the strictures made upon it by the managers of the Commons,
strictures of which the acerbity was deepened by the clear and resolute
manner in which Sir Elijah’s evidence was given. — W.

EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE.

441

impose upon him a severe pecuniary loss. And the book 8V*

country people in general showed a hostile disposition

to these same sepoys of the Nabob. What has this 17SL
to do, in the smallest degree, with the British autho-
rity ? And if the sepoys had been British, which
they were not, what proof is given, that the Begums
were the cause of the hatred they experienced, or
knew of the commotions to which that hatred gave
birth % 1

Rumour affirmed that the Begums promoted the
disaffection. If rumour, on such an occasion, were
a proper ground of belief, rumour affirmed that the
Nabob himself, together with his brother Saadut
Ali, not only abetted the disaffection, hut had entered
into a deliberate plan for the extirpation of the Eng-
lish from the country. Why is rumour to be evidence
against one, not evidence against another, just as it
suits the pleasure and convenience of Mr. Hastings T

One of the deponents, who spoke most distinctly
to what he reckoned symptoms of hostility on the
part of the Begums, wTas a Major Macdonald, an
English officer, in the service of the Nabob. He
states that his march, at the head of a party of the
Nabob’s sepoys, was opposed by Zalim Sing, a Ze-

1 Contumely to the Nabob’s officers was no new thing with the Begums,
nor ever treated as rebellion till it suited the Governor-General. In
January 1776, when the Begum was complaining to the English govern-
ment, and when it was affording her protection, the Resident in Oude
writes to the Governor-General and Council : “ In making this complaint,
the Begum forgets the improper conduct of her own servants, who have
hitherto preserved a total independence of the Nabob’s authority ; beat the
officers of his government ; and refused obedience to his Perwannahs.”

Minutes, ut supra, p. 2048.

? W hether the rumours hostile to the fidelity of the Nabob were founded
at all upon fact is doubtful ; but certainly they were shown to be of little
regard when he put himself in the power of Hastings at Chunar. — W.

442 HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. xnindar who had Ions been treated by the Nabob as

CHAP. 8. . . J

■ a rebel. This hostile chief showed, even to Mac-

1781 • donald’s people, a paper purporting to be a sunnud
from the Nabob, restoring him to his Zemindary,
and vesting him with the government of certain dis-
tricts ; and he informed them he had the Nabob’s
instructions to drive, says the affidavit, “ the Frin-
gies out of his districts, that he only waited for the
fortunate hour, boats being already provided from
Fyzabad (which the deponent knew absolutely to be
the case) to cross the Gogra, and carry the Nabob’s
orders into execution: Further, that his Excellency
had altered his sentiments regarding the part he was
to take in the present contest ; that his Excellency
set out with the intent of adhering to his treaty with
the Company, but that Mirza Saadut Ali wrote him
he was to blame if he gave any assistance; that now
was the time to shake off the English yoke ; that it
might not be prudent to declare himself at once ;
that he had only to stand neuter; and, under pre-
tence of defending themselves, direct his subjects to
take arms, and endeavour to prevent the junction of
the English forces, when the matter would work of
itself. The deponent said, he believed the reports,
as before related, at that time, and still is of
opinion, the threats therein contained were intended
to be carried into execution had the league been
successful.” 1

Of the disturbances, moreover, in Goruckpore, and
the hostile disposition manifested by the people to
the sepoys of the Nabob, we are presented with an-

1 Minutes, ut supra, p. 259, 2C1.

EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE.

443

to have been the effect of oppression ; of oppression,

cruel, and extraordinary, even as compared with the 1781.
common degree of oppression under the government
of the Nabob. It was given in evidence, that the
country, from a very flourishing state in which it ex-
isted under the preceding Nabob, had been reduced
to misery and desolation ; that taxes were levied, not
according to any fixed rule, hut according to the
pleasure of the collector ; that imprisonments and
scourgings for enforcing payment, were common in
every part of the country ; that emigrations of the
people were frequent ; and that many of them were
so distressed as to be under the necessity of selling
their children.1

The country thus oppressed was under the manage-
ment of Colonel Hannav, an officer of the Company,
who had obtained permission to quit for a time the
Company’s service, and enter into that of the Nabob.

He was allowed to rent the provinces of Goruckpore
and Baraitch ; and, commanding also the military
force in the district, engrossed the whole of the local
government. Mr. Holt, who was appointed assistant
to the resident at the Vizir’s court about the begin-
ning of the year 1780, was asked, “ Did you hear
that Colonel Hannay was himself in particular dan-
ger from the insurrections in 1781 ‘? — I did. — What
do you suppose those insurrections arose from at first
— did you ever hear of any machinations or contriv-
ances of particular persons, or did you ever hear what

Minutes, ut supra, p. 3S1 — 390.

444

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. the cause was ihat they obiected to? — I have heard

CHAP. 8. . . . J

. it was owing to the misconduct and misgovernment

1781- of Colonel Hannay.” 1

Captain Edwards, another of the Company’s
officers, who had obtained permission to accept of
service with the Vizir, and who was aid-du-camp to
that Prince at the time of Mr. Hastings’ quarrel
with Cheyte Sing, was asked, “ In what situation
was Colonel Hannay,” meaning in the service of the
Vizir? — “ I understand that he rented a great part
of the Nabob’s country, called Baraitch and Goruck-
pore. — Ho you know what was the general fame of
the country with respect to Colonel Hannay ’s admi-
nistration in those provinces? — That the measures of
his government appeared to the natives there very
unjustifiable and oppressive. — Hid you ever see, or
know, any fact or circumstance from which you
could infer in the same manner ? — When I accom-
panied his Excellency the Nabob into that country
(I believe it was the latter end of the year 1779, or
early in the year 1780), the country seemed to be
little cultivated, and very few inhabitants made their
appearance ; and the few that were in the country

1 Minutes, ut supra, p. 391. See to the same purpose the evidence of
Colonel Aclimuty, p. 783. — M. Some other passages should have been
quoted from the evidence of this witness if it was worth while to quote
any. With regard to this very subject he was asked, “ What effect the
administration of Colonel Hannay had in exasperating the natives ? — I
saw no marks of exasperation whilst I was there. — At the time you was
there you saw no marks of exasperation ? — What I mean by exasperation
is — there was no insurrection In clemency to Mr. Holt, it should be
added, that when he was in Goruckpore, and heard one thing and saw
another, he was between sixteen and seventeen years of age. Min.
Evid. 402. It is something beneath the dignity of history to quote such
testimony as this in depreciation of a great public character. — W.

EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE.

445

seemed much distressed; and I understood that the book v.

country had been better peopled, hut that they had

all left the country in consequence of Colonel i781-
Hannay’s administration. — Was it at Lucknow that
you heard the reports concerning Colonel Hannay,
and his oppressions ? It was both at Lucknow and
at many other places : it was a general report.1

It is also a circumstance of great importance, that
when Colonel Hannay entered the service of the
Nabob in 1778, he was a man in debt, or what is
called by the witness “ involved circumstances.”

Before the end of 1781, that is in a period of about
three years, he was understood to have realized a
fortune of 300,000C’ 2

It is now, however, in justice to Colonel Hannay,
to be observed, with regard both to the oppressions
of which he is accused, and the vast amount of his
fortune, that most of the evidence adduced is evidence
rather to the rumour of these facts, than to the facts
themselves. But if this he a plea, as it undoubtedly
is, in behalf of Colonel Hannay, it is a plea,3 it must
be remembered, no less availing in favour of the
Begums. It appears, indeed, with strong evidence

1 Minutes, ut supra, p. 778, 782. Of the insurrections one principal
part at least was occasioned by indignation at the confinement of a great
number of persons in the Fort of Goruckpore, followed by a design to
effect their rescue. See Minutes, ut supra, p, 1963, where a letter of
Colonel Hannay’s is acknowledged, to the officers on the spot, stating
that the release of those prisoners would quiet the country. See the
Cross Examination of Captain Williams, throughout, Ibid. p. 1935 —
1966.

2 Ibid. p. 390, 391.

3 Notwithstanding this admission, it is clear that the ‘rumours’ to
Colonel Hannay’s disadvantage are treated with a leniency, and adopted
with a readiness, not shown to those that were unfavourable to the
Begums. — W.

446

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. from the cross examination of Mr. Hastings own

CHAP. 8. .Till

witnesses upon the trial, that a considerable number

1781- of the Rajas or ancient chiefs of the country,1 who
till that time had remained in possession of their re-
spective districts, paying an annual sum, as revenue,
to the Vizir, were driven out during the administra-
tion of Colonel Hannay ; and that they retained the
country in a state of perpetual disturbance, by
endless efforts for their restoration. 2 This accounts
for the turbulent state of the country. Whether it
was injustice, by which the Rajas were expelled ; or
whether it was impossible to make them obedient
subjects, sufficient evidence is not afforded to deter-
mine.

It is at any rate certain, that Colonel Hannay
became in the highest degree odious to the Vizir ;
he dismissed him from his sendee before the end of
the year 1781, and having heard that he was using
his influence to be sent back, he wrote to the Gover-
nor-General, about the beginning of September fol-
lowing, in these extraordinary terms :

“ My country and house belong to you ; there is
no difference. I hope that you desire in your heart
the good of my concerns. Colonel Hannay is
inclined to request your permission to be employed
in the affairs of this quarter. If, by any means, any
matter of this country dependent on me, should be
intrusted to the Colonel, I swear by the Holy Prophet,

1 Here again the word Raja is misunderstood. In the district of
Gorckpore, every Zemindar, however petty, takes the name of Raja. These
‘ ancient chiefs,’ therefore, are the creation of the text, and they were
nothing but refractory fanners of the revenue, who would not pay their
rents. Goruckpore has always been a troublesome district. — W.

2 Ibid. p. 1909—2008.

EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE.

447

that I will not remain here, hut will go from hence B00K v.

to you. From your kindness let no concern, depen-

dent upon me, he intrusted to the Colonel; and oblige 1781-
me by a speedy answer which may set my mind at
ease.”1

It is also a most suspicious circumstance, that the
accusations of the Begums seem originally to have
come from Colonel Hannay, and to have depended
almost entirely upon the reports of him and his
officers ; who were deeply interested in finding, for
the disturbances of the country, which they ruled,
a cause different from their own malversations.

When the Nabob departed from Chunar, at which
time, according to the statements of Mr. Hastings,
the Begums were in a state of rebellion, he chose to
pass through Fyzabad, the place of their residence,
accompanied merely by his usual attendants, and
about five or six hundred horse : and, according to
the opinion of Captain Edwards, probably entered
the city with only a few attendants, as in general
his rate of travelling far exceeded the utmost speed
of a body of horse.

As every mark of suspicion that rebellion was
excited or intended by the Begums was thus removed
from the behaviour of the Nabob; so not a single
expression ever appears to have been obtained from
him, which implied that they had been guilty of any
such offence ; and yet if he had conceived any appre-
hension from them, it was to the English he must
have flown for protection, and to them he would
naturally have communicated his fears. His aid-du-

1 Minutes, ut supra, p. 660.

448

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. camp, Captain Edwards, who had accompanied him

to Chunar, and proceeded with the rest of the troops

17*L to Lucknow, when the Nabob left the direct road to
his capital to pass through Fyzabad, was asked,
“ Did you hear upon the return of the Nabob, and
Hyder Beg, to Lucknow, any charge, or any thing
that led you to believe, that discoveries of rebellion
or treason had been made by the Nabob while at
Fyzabad? — No, I did not. — When did you first
hear of any accusation, or charge, of any rebellion
or disaffection, against the Begums? — Some time
after I arrived at Lucknow ; about a fortnight after,
I heard the gentlemen in the Resident’s family
mention the different accounts, that Colonel Hannay
and his officers had sent. — Was the intelligence you
received upon that subject confined to communi-
cations, made by Colonel Hannay and his officers,
to the Resident’s office, or did you hear of any other
besides ? I heard that such reports prevailed at
Lucknow, among the natives, which were not gene-
rally believed ; and there were a few who mentioned
they had heard the reports. — The question put to
you is, whether you heard of any other instances
than those mentioned by Colonel Hannay and his
officers? — I heard my own servants say, as they went
through the market-place, they had heard from the
Resident’s servants, that they had heard such reports
did prevail. — Meaning the reports from Colonel
Hannay ? — Yes, meaning those reports. — Did the
natives in general give any credit to these reports? —

No, I do not think they did Did you not hear

more of this sort of report after the treasure was
seized in January, 1782? — I did; I heard the trea-

EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE.

449

1781.

sures were seized in consequence of the report, and B(^1KSV '
the charge and accusation, made by Colonel Hannay
and some of his officers, that the Begums had been
in a state of rebellion.” 1

As Colonel Hannay and his officers, white and
black, were almost the only persons whose affidavits,
originally taken at Lucknow, imputed any acts of
disaffection to the Begums ; so they were his officers,
including the Paymaster of his troops, who alone, or
nearly so, were called to prove the allegation in
England.2 One or two other persons, the aid of
whose testimony was required, could speak to
nothing but reports , at Allahabad, or at Calcutta.

And it appears, with great force of evidence, from
the examination of the witnesses adduced in favour
of Mr. Hastings, that the accusation rested upon the
allegations of Hannay, and his officers: who, them-
selves, could affirm nothing but rumour, or facts of
which it is more probable that they themselves were
the cause than the Begums; and that the story,
being taken up by Mr. Hastings, and propagated by
him and his friends, with all the authority of govern-
ment, was spread abroad among the English through-
out the country, and by them, in the usual manner,
upon no better authority, passively, but not the less
fervently and confidently, believed.3

The departure of the Nabob from Chunar, for
the purpose of seizing the property of his mother
and his grandmother, was urged by Mr. Hastings :

1 Minutes, ut supra, p. 777.

2 Colonel Hannay might have been an indifferent administrator of a
province, though that is not proven, but that is no reason why he and his
officers should be suspected of untruth. — W.

3 See Minutes of Evidence for the Prosecution, p. 361 — 951. Ditto, for

VOL. IV. 2 G

450

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK A

CHAP. 8.

1781.

• upon the arrival, however, of that Prince in his own
- dominions, he manifested a great reluctance to enter
upon the ungracious work. The Governor-General
waited, as he himself informs us, “ with much impa-
tience.” He urged the Nabob by the strongest
remonstrances. He enjoined the Resident, in the
most earnest and most peremptory terms, to leave
no effort unattempted for the accomplishment of this
important event. The reluctance however of the
Nabob continued unsubdued; and Mr. Middleton,
the Resident, was instructed to supersede the autho-
rity of the Nabob, and perform the necessary
measures by the operation of English power. He
proceeded at last to the execution of the Governor-
General’s commands; but the Nabob, shocked at
the degradation which he would sustain in the eyes
of his people, if acts under his government of so
much importance should appear to emanate from any
power but his own, undertook the melancholy task.1
The words of the Resident to the Governor-General
are instructive: “ I had the honour to address you
on the 7th instant, informing you of the conversation

the Defence, p. 1823 — 2008. — M. There can be no doubt that the allega-
tion was in the main true, — that the Begums were disaffected to the British
Government, — that they connived at, if they did not authorize, levies of
armed men for the service of Cheit Sing, — that their followers were pre-
pared to rise in his behalf. There was no actual rebellion, but there was
a manifestation of hostile feeling which justified retribution. — W.

1 According to Mr. Hastings, the Nabob had no objection to plunder
the Begums. But he had given jaghires to certain persons, whom Mr.

Hastings calls his “ Orderlies, and others of that stamp “ the

companions of his looser hours.” These he wished not to resume ; and,
therefore, endeavoured to depart from his engagement of resumption alto-
gether. But the cause appears not sufficient to account for the effect.
If he had resumed the jaghires of his orderlies, which were of trifling
amount, what would have hindered him from giving them something of
equal or greater amount ?

THE NABOB AVERSE TO PLUNDER THE BEGUMS.

451

which had passed between the Nabob and me on B00K

1 ^ CHAP. 8.

the subject of resuming the jaghires ; and the step

I had taken in consequence.” The step was the 17Sl*
issuing of perwannahs or warrants to the Aumils or
agents on the jaghires, to desist from acting in behalf
of the Begums. “ His Excellency appeared to be
very much hurt and incensed at the measure; and
loudly complains of the treachery of his ministers,
first, in giving you any hopes that such a measure
would be adopted ; and, secondly, in promising me
their whole support in carrying it through. But as
I apprehended ” (he means, expected) “ rather than
suffer it to appear that the point had been earned in
opposition to his will, he at length yielded a nominal
acquiescence, and has this day issued his own
perwannahs to that effect; declaring, however, at
the same time, both to me and his ministers, that it
is an act of compulsion.” 1

The resumption of the jaghires was not the only
measure which had been conceived and resolved
against the Begums. Their treasures were to be
seized.2 The Nabob and the resident, with a body

1 Letter to Mr. Hastings, dated 9th of December, 1781. Notwith-
standing these, and the numerous other proofs, that Hastings was well
aware of the reluctance of the Nabob, to proceed to the acts by which his
parents were plundered, Hastings, when it suited his purpose to put on the
show of a wonderful tenderness for the Nabob, wrote to his private agent,

Major Palmer, viz. on the 6th of May, 1783, “ that it had been a matter
of equal surprise and concern to him to learn from the letters of the resi-
dent, that the Nabob Vizir was with difficulty, and almost unconquerable
reluctance, induced to give his consent to the attachment of the treasure
deposited by his father under the charge of the Begum his mother, and to
the resumption of her jaghire, and the other jaghires of the individuals of
his family;” as if he had never heard of these facts before ! Such speci-
mens of Mr. Hastings, as this, meet us often in the records of his govern-
ment.

8 As some confusion took place, though much less than what was

2 G 2

452

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

v. of English troops, proceeded towards the abode of the
- princesses at Fyzabad, where they arrived on the 8th

1782.

expected, and the servants and agents of the princesses -withheld not some
demonstrations of opposition, when the jaghires were taken away ; this
was called resistance ; and Mr. Hastings was willing it should appear that
this was heinous guilt, and that only in punishment of this guilt the reso-
lution of seizing their money was adopted. (See Letter of Governor-
General and Council to the Court of Directors, 11th of February, 1782;
Tenth Report, ut supra, Appendix No. 5.) He himself, however, has
furnished sufficient proof, that the resolution was adopted before the
resumption of the jaghires was begun. “ It may be necessary,” he says,
in his letter dated at Suragegurrah on the Ganges, 23rd of January, 1782,
“ in this place to inform you, that in addition to the resolution of resuming
the Begums’ jaghires the Nabob had declared his resolution of reclaiming
all the treasures of his family which were in their possession, and to which
by the Mohammedan laws he was entitled. This resolution I have strenu-
ously encouraged and supported .... I have required and received the
Nabob’s promise, that whatever acquisitions shall be obtained from the
issue of these proceedings, it shall be primarily applied to the discharge of
the balance actually due from him to the Company.” (Tenth Report, ut
supra, Appendix No. 6; and Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 2078.)
Before the acquiescence of the Nabob could be procured to the execution
of the plan for resuming the jaghires, viz. oil the 6th of December, 1781,
the Resident writes to Mr. Hastings as follows : “ Your pleasure respect-
ing the Begums, I have learnt from Sir Elijah ; and the measure heretofore
proposed will soon follow the resumption of the jaghires. From both, or
indeed from the former alone, I have no doubt of the complete liquidation
of the Company’s balance.” These expressions apply so necessarily to the
seizure of the treasures, that they can be applied to nothing else. In
another letter to the Governor-General, on the following day, the Resident
alludes to the same measure in the following terms : “ His Excellency
talks of going to Fyzabad, for the purpose heretofore mentioned, in three
or four days ; I wish he may be serious in his intention ; and you may
rest assured I shall spare no pains to keep him to it.” The representation
which was made, both in this letter to the Directors, and in the defence
which Mr. Hastings first presented to the House of Commons, that the
opposition of the Begums, to the seizure of their jaghires, was the cause on
account of which the treasure was forcibly taken away from them, Mr.
Hastings in a second defence retracted, affirming that the assertion was a
blunder. See this defence, Minutes of Evidence at the Trial, p. 366. It
was attempted to account for the blunder, by stating that the first defence
was not written, and hardly examined by Mr. Hastings. According to
this account, his blood was very cool upon the subject of his accusation,
notwithstanding the loud complaints he so frequently preferred of the
mental torture which it inflicted upon him. — M. What this last remark

MEANS OF COERCION APPLIED TO THE BEGUMS.

453

of January. The first days were spent in demands 8V

and negotiations. On the 12th the troops were

ordered to storm the town and the castle, but little 17*2-
or no opposition was made ; for no blood was shed
on either side ; and the troops took possession of all
the outer enclosure of the palace of one of the prin-
cesses, and blocked up the other.

Still, however, the female apartments were un-
violated, and the treasure was not obtained. The
difficulty was to lay hands on it without the disgrace
of profaning and polluting the sacred precinct. The
principal agents of the princesses were two aged
personages of great rank and distinction, who had
been in high trust and favour with the late Nabob ;
the eunuchs, Jewar Ali Khan, and Behar Ali Khan.

It was resolved to put those personages in confine-
ment, and apply to them other severities, in order
that the Begums might, by their compassion, be
moved to give up the treasure; or that the eunuchs
themselves should be compelled, by their sufferings,
to give up what was in their own custody, and use
their influence with the princesses to resign what
they possessed. By the torture of one party, money
was to be extorted from another. The cruel lessons
of Eastern despotism were well acquired by English-
men.1

imports is not very clear. The fact was, that a very few days were allowed
to reply to charges of most voluminous extent. It was wholly impossible
for one person, unaided, to compose a reply to each head of accusation.
Hastings wrote some of the answers, his friends wrote others, of which he
approved upon a cursory perusal ; it is more wonderful that so few
mistakes, than that any, should have been made.- — W.

1 This is quite unauthorized. No person was “ tortured and what-
ever punishments were inflicted were not the acts of Englishmen. Except
as guards in the service of the Vizir, they had nothing whatever to do with

454

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1782.

The expedient was attended with success. The
Begums, or rather the elder of the two, in whose pos-
session, as head of the female department, the treasure
was placed, was wrought upon by these proceedings
to make a surrender ; and money was paid to the
English resident to the amount of the bond given to
the Company by the Nabob for his balance of the
year 1779-80.

The eunuchs were not yet released. Another
balance remained, for the year 1780-81. Money for
the discharge of this remaining debt was also
demanded of the Princess. “ She declared with
apparent truth,” says the Resident, “ that she had
delivered up the whole of the property in her hands ;
excepting goods ; which, from the experience,” he
adds, “ of the small produce of the sale of a former
payment made by her in that mode, I refused, as
likely to amount, in my opinion, to little or nothing.”
Money, however, was absolutely required ; and new
severities were employed. To the officer guarding
the eunuchs, the following letter was addressed by
the Resident, dated the 20th of January, 1782.
“ Sir, when this note is delivered to you, I have to
desire, that you order the two prisoners to be put in
irons, keeping them from all food, &c., agreeable to
my instructions of yesterday. (Signed) Nath.
Middleton.”

The sufferings to which they were thus exposed
drew from the eunuchs the offer of an engagement

the proceedings; and the severities adopted were the acts of the Nabob
and his ministers. The orders for their enforcement were addressed to
the officers on duty, through the Resident, but they originated with the
Nabob. — W.

MEANS OF COERCION APPLIED TO THE BEGUMS.

455

for the payment of the demanded sum, which they 8V-

undertook to complete, within the period of one

month, from their own credit and effects. The 17s2'
engagement was taken, hut the confinement of the
eunuchs was not relaxed; the mother and grand-
mother of the Nabob remained under a guard; and
the Resident was commanded, by Mr. Hastings, to
make with them no settlement whatsoever. In the
mean time, the payment, upon the bond extorted
from the eunuchs, was begun ; the Begums delivered
what they declared was the last remaining portion of
their effects, including down to their table utensils ;
and the Resident himself reported “ that no proof had
yet been obtained of their having more.” Before the
23rd of February, 1782, upwards of 500,000/. had
been received by the Resident for the use of the
Company; and there remained on the extorted bond
a balance, according to the eunuchs, of 25,000/. ; and
of no more than 50,000/. according to the Resident.

The prisoners entreated for their release ; declaring
their inability to procure any further sums of money
while they remained in confinement ; but expressing
a confident hope of being able to raise the balance
required, if they were allowed to go abroad among
their friends, and solicit their assistance. So far from
any relaxation of their sufferings, higher measures of
severity were enjoined. On the 18th of May, after
they had lain two months in irons, the officer who
commanded the guard under which they were con-
fined, wrote to the Resident in the following words :

“ The prisoners Behar Ali Khan, and Jewar Ali
Khan, who seem to be very sickly, have requested
their irons might be taken off for a few days, that

456

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK ^

CHAP. 8.

1782.

they might take medicine, and walk about the garden
of the place where they are confined. Now, as I am
sure that they will be equally secure without their
irons as with them, I think it my duty to inform you
of this request. I desire to know your pleasure con-
cerning it.” The nature of the orders under which
the Resident acted, rendered it necessary for him to
refuse the smallest mitigation of their torture. Nay,
within a few days, that is, on the 1st of June, other
terrors were held up to them. They were threatened
to be removed to Lucknow, where, unless they per-
formed without delay what they averred themselves
unable to perform, they would not only be subjected
to still severer coercion, but called upon to atone for
other crimes. As these crimes were not specified,
the threat was well calculated to act upon their fears.
It involved the prospect of unbounded punishment ;
any infliction, in short, for which persons with
arbitrary power in their hands could find or feign a
pretence. Several expedients were offered both by
the prisoners and the Begums, who were alarmed at
the prospect of losing, by removal, their confidential
servants. These expedients -were not treated as
objectionable, on any other score except that of time.
They were rejected. The prisoners were removed
to Lucknow, and cruelties inflicted upon them, of
which the nature is not disclosed, but of which the
following letter, addressed by the assistant-resident
to the commanding officer of the English guard, is
a disgraceful proof. “ Sir, the Nabob having deter-
mined to inflict corporal punishment upon the
prisoners under your guard, this is to desire that his
officers, when they shall come, may have free access

CRUELTIES INFLICTED ON THE BEGUMS’ MINISTERS. 457

to the prisoners, and be permitted to do with them book v.

as they shall see proper.”

All the measures, however, of severity which could 1782-
be devised proved unavailing, though the women of
the Zenana were at various times deprived of food
till they were on the point of perishing for want.

The rigours went on increasing till the month of
December ; when the Resident, convinced both by
his own experience, and the representation of the
officer commanding the guard by which the princesses
were coerced, that every thing wThich force could
accomplish was already performed, and that if any
hope remained of further payments, it was by lenient
methods alone they could be obtained, removed of his
own authority the guard from the palaces of the Be-
gums, and set at liberty their ministers. As endea-
vours had been used to make the severities appear
the act of the Nabob, so the Resident strove to make
the favour appear the bounty of the man by whom
the English sceptre was swayed ; declaring to the
Begums, that it wasthe Governor-General from whom
the relief had been derived, and that he “ was the
spring from whence they were restored to their dig-
nity and consequence.” The letter in which the
commanding officer reported the execution of the
order of release, exhibits what no other words can
express. “ I have to acknowledge the receipt of
your letter of the 2nd instant ; and, in consequence,
immediately enlarged the prisoners, Behar Ali Khan,
and Jewar Ali Khan, from their confinement, a cir-
cumstance that gave the Begums, and the city of
Fyzabad, in general, the greatest satisfaction. In
tears of joy, Behar, and Jewar Ali Khan expressed

458

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1782.

their sincere acknowledgments to the Governor-
General, his Excellency the Nabob Vizir, and to you,
Sir, for restoring them to that invaluable blessing,
liberty ; for which they would ever return the most
grateful remembrance ; and at their request I trans-
mit you the enclosed letters. I wish you had been
present at the enlargement of the prisoners. The
quivering lips, with the tears of joy stealing down
the poor men’s cheeks, was a scene truly affecting.
If the prayers of these poor men will avail, you will
at the last trump be translated to the happiest regions
in heaven.”1

1 Letter to the Resident, dated Fyzabad, 5th of December, 1782.
See Tenth Report, ut supra, and Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 348,
725. Appendix to 2d Art. of Charge, p. 78, 97, 43, 172. — M. The
Eunuchs -were, no doubt, very happy to be released from confine-
ment, but during the greater part of the time it was little more than
nominal. They resided in a spacious and commodious house, belonging
to one of themselves. They had all their servants about them, no restric-
tion was placed on their food, and they were allowed to receive visitors.
For about three months they had irons on their legs, but even then they
could walk in the garden, and their fetters were removed when they
returned from Lucknow, in August. The two Begums, the grandmother
and mother of the Nabob, were subjected to no hardships, nor indignities,
except a guard at the gate of the palace. So little did they suffer, that
their faithful adherents, the two Eunuchs, were desirous they should be
made to apprehend something worse — their forcible removal from Fyzabad.
The officer in command writes to the Resident, “ The Cajahs (the two
Eunuchs) one day told me that if I would pitch the Begum’s camp equipage,
and desire her to prepare for an immediate journey, she would probably
pay the balance due.” With regard to the distress for provisions, suffered
by the inmates of the Khurad Mahal, the inferior women of Shuja-ad-
Dowlah’s Zenana, it appears to have been, in some respects, accidental, and
was one in which the English were not implicated ; their maintenance was
by assignments upon the revenues of a particular district, which revenues
were ill-collected, and the native officer, whose business it was to provide
the establishment with supplies, was deficient in the means. Whether
there was any design in this, or what object was to be effected by it, is not
very obvious, but it was not a case in which the English authorities could
with propriety interfere. Major Gilpin, the commandant of the guard,

PRESENT FROM THE NABOB.

459

Of the transactions of Mr. Hastings with the 8V-

Nabob at Chunar, another feature still remains. A

present was offered ; a present of a sum of no less 1782,
than ten lacs, or 100,0001. sterling ; and notwith-
standing the Company’s laws against presents, not-
withstanding the acknowledged distress of the Nabob,
and his inability to pay the debt which he owed to
the Company, it was accepted. The Nabob was
totally unprovided with the money ; the gift could be
tendered only in bills, which were drawn upon one of
the great bankers of the country. As the intention
of concealing the transaction should not be imputed
to Mr. Hastings, unless as far as evidence appears, 1
so in this case the disclosure cannot be imputed to
him as virtue, since no prudent man would have
risked the chance of discovery which the publicity of
a banker’s transactions implied. Mr. Hastings in-
formed the Directors of what he had received, in his
letter dated the 20th of January, 1782 ; and in very
plain terms requested their permission, as a reward
for his services, to make the money his own.2

however, advanced 10,000 rupees for the expenses of the Mahal. Evidence
of Capt. Jaques and Major Gilpin. — Minutes of Evidence, 849-910. Nothing
could be more grossly unjust than to impute the sufferings which were thus
occasioned, and which were most preposterously and falsely exaggerated,
to the purposes or orders of Hastings.

1 The removal just before of the Company’s agent, Mr. Bristow, and
the appointment of a private agent of his own, ought constantly to be
treated as a ground of suspicion ; because it is exactly what a man with
rapacious intentions would have performed.

4 Letter of the Governor-General, Eleventh Report, ut supra, Appendix
C, No. 1. Why he should have wished for his reward out of this, rather
than any other portion of the Company’s money, at first strikes the mind
as obscure. But a very appropriate reason may be supposed. Drawn
from any of the known sources of the Company’s revenue, the money must

460

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1782.

In the beginning of 1782, when little or no pro-
gress had been made in realizing the sums of money
which the Governor-General expected from his ar-
rangements with the Nabob, he began to express, in
a strain of unusual severity, his disapprobation of the
Resident, Mr. Middleton : either really dissatisfied
with him under the failure of his efforts ; or by a
concerted plan, anticipating the commands of the
Directors for the restoration of Bristow by removing
the confidential agent, now when the confidential
transactions were closed, that the restoration of
Bristow might carry the appearance of his own act,
and receive its completion before the commands of
the Directors should arrive.1 Manifesting extreme
anxiety for the acquisition of the money, on account
of which he had ventured on disreputable ground,
“ the agreement,” he said, “ which I concluded with
the Yizir has yet served only to gratify revenge, or
some concealed interest, and to make me odious to
my own countrymen.”2 The Resident had at first

have appeared in their accounts, and could not be given to the Governor-
General without the consent of the Company at large. The assent of the
Directors obtained, the gift of the Nabob might have never appeared in
any account, no consent of the Company at large have been sought, and
the donation appropriated by the Governor- General without the knowledge
of the public.

1 The complaints against Middleton are exposed to the suspicion of
insincerity; 1. by their unreasonableness; 2. by the conformity of the
artifice to the character of Mr. Hastings ; 3. by its great utility for the
interest of his reputation, as well as of his pride and consequence ; 4. by
the continued and very extraordinary subservience of Middleton, after-
wards, to the views of Hastings, notwithstanding the serious injury which
he now sustained at his hands.

2 Letter to Middleton, dated Benares, 1st of January, 1782. Extracts
from Papers (in No. 1, vol. i.) presented to the House of Commons, 13th

HASTINGS S QUARREL WITH MIDDLETON.

461

suggested his doubts, whether the force which he sv‘

could employ in the resumption of the Jaghires would .

be sufficient to overcome the opposition which he an- 1782-
ticipated. “ I judged it improper,” says the Governor-
General, “ to expose a service of such importance,
either to the hazard of a defeat, or the chance of a
delay, and therefore immediately issued orders for
the march of Colonel Sir John Cumming, with his
entire detachment, for the performance of it.”1 The
Resident hastened to communicate his opinion, that
the Nabob would be alarmed and disgusted at the
march of this force into his dominions ; that the pay-
ment of the detachment would be a breach of the
immediate treaty, equivalent to an order for imposing
upon him anew the expense of the temporary bri-
gade ; that a part of the Nabob’s troops were equal
to the service ; and that a fortnight would suffice for
its accomplishment. Under these representations
the Governor-General ventured not to continue the
march of the detachment ; but he declared to the
Resident, that the contradictions in his statements
covered them with doubts ; and, if the Resident could
not assure him of his perfect competence to the ser-
vice, that he would himself suspend his journey to the
Presidency, and repair to Lucknow for the accom-

of March, 178G, p. 52. The Governor-General, showing a keen sensibility
to the imputations on his character to which the transactions in Outle
exposed, him, (“ I must desire,” said he, “ that your letters, upon all
official and public subjects, may be official ; I cannot receive any as
private, and my reputation and character have been too far committed to
admit of an intercourse which I cannot use as authority”) seemed to think
that the success of the measure, the money in hand, would sanctify the
means. The rule, he well knew, too generally holds.

1 Letter from the Governor-General to the Council, dated 23rd of
January, 1782 ; Tenth Report, Appendix, No. 6.

462

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V,

CHAP. 8.

1782.

plishment of the business in person. The Resident
declared his competence ; and the Governor-General
departed from Benares on his way to Calcutta on the
7th of January. He departed, however, “ after
much hesitation, and I will confess,” says he, “ with
some reluctance. I dread the imbecility and irresolu-
tion which too much prevail in the Nabob’s councils,
and must influence in some degree both the conduct
of the Resident and the Minister ; and I consider the
impending measure of too much consequence to be
exposed to the risk of a disappointment.” The Resi-
dent had stated, that the Governor-General had not
by him been understood as intending the reformation,
this year, of the Nabob’s military establishment, or as
expecting a present supply to the Company’s treasury.
" These,” says the Governor-General, in his letter of
3rd January, “ are fresh instances of what I have had
too frequent cause to complain of, your total inatten-
tion to my instructions.” He then repeats to the Re-
sident the passage in his instructions, in which he
told him, that rt to enable the Nabob to discharge
his debt to the Company in the shortest time pos-
sible was the chief object of his negotiation :” that
the jaghires should be appropriated to that purpose :
and that the reform of the troops should take place
immediately after the settlement of the sum to be
allowed for the personal and domestic expenses of
the Nabob.1 But these expressions are vague, and
necessarily express no more than a very eager desire
for despatch ; and the Resident, for aught that ap-
pears in the words, might be well justified in the

1 Extracts from Papers, ut supra, p. 53, 53; Tenth Report, ut supra
Appendix, No. 6.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE QUARREL.

463

conclusion which the Governor-General thought
proper to condemn.

Mr. Middleton continued the exertions, and prac-
tised all the severities, which have already been
described, for extorting the money which the Go-
vernor-General demanded. Yet he was formally
accused by the Governor-General on the 23rd of
September, and pronounced guilty of remissness in
his duty ; when Mr. Bristow was appointed to fill
the office from which, before the recent transactions,
he had just been removed. In the mean time, that
is, on the 6th of May preceding, Major Palmer had
been sent to Oude, as the private agent of Mr.
Hastings ; and various newr demands were urged upon
the dependent Prince. The current annual claims
varied, from seventy to one hundred and thirty lacs
per annum, previous to the time of Middleton’s
appointment in 1781. The receipts of the Resident
in discharge of those claims, varied from sixty to
eighty lacs per annum, whence the balance of debt
perpetually increased. At the time of concluding
the treaty between the Nabob and Hastings at
Chunar, that balance appeared to stand at forty-four
lacs. The Resident, instead of eighty lacs, which
before was the maximum of the annual payments,
realized one crore and forty-six lacs. By demands,
however, urged by Major Palmer to the amount of
eighty-two lacs, and claims of unknown balances,
which appeared on adjusting the books of the Presi-
dency, the sums, of which payment in that year wTas
required of the Nabob, exceeded considerably two
crores and a-half, that is, were at least equal to twice

book v.

CHAP. 8.

1782.

4G4

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. the annual revenue of the whole country.1 In vindi-

CHAP. 8. J

eating himself from the charge of remissness, in

l782- seizing the treasures of the Begums, Mr. Middleton
shows, that not only had he been successful in
regard to the ultimate acquisition, but that no unne-
cessary time had intervened, and that no instrument
of coercion, except the disgraceful one of violating
the apartments and the persons of the Princesses,
had been left unemployed. “ The Nabob,” he says,
“ was son to the Begum we were to proceed against :
a son against a mother must at least save appear-
ances : circumstances sufficiently marked the English
as the principal movers in the business : the favour-
able occasion was not missed to persuade the Nabob
that we instigated him to dishonour his family for
our benefit : I had no assistance to expect from the
Nabob’s ministers, who could not openly move in
the business : in the East, it is well known, that no
man, either by himself or his troops, can enter the
walls of a Zenana — scarcely in the case of acting
against an open enemy — much less an ally — a son
against his own mother. The outward walls, and
the Begum’s agents, were all that were liable to
immediate attack : they were dealt with — and suc-
cessfully, as the event proved.”2

1 “ The Nabob’s net revenue,” (says Mr. Middleton, Defence to the
Governor-General and Council; Extracts from Papers in No. 1, vol. ii.,
presented to the House of Commons, 13th March, 1786, p. 2.) “ to my
knowledge, never exceeded a crore and a half, but generally fell very short
of that sum.” The Governor-General disavowed the demands which
were made by his private agent, Palmer, and other remissions took place.
—Ibid.

2 Ibid. p. 3.

QUARREL WITH MIDDLETON.

465

The reply which is made by the Governor-General B00K v-

to this defence is remarkable. As usual with the

Governor-General, it is mysterious and equivocal. 1/82-
But if any thing can be gathered from it, they are
the two following things : that he did intend that
Mr. Middleton should have violated the Zenana ; and
that not having acted in that manner, Mr. Middleton,
his own chosen and confidential agent, might, both
by himself and by others, be suspected of having
betrayed his duty for bribes. “ I was pointed,” says
the Governor-General, “ in my orders to Mr. Mid-
dleton, that he should not allow any negotiation or
forbearance, when he had once employed the Com-
pany’s influence or power in asserting the Nabob’s
claims on the Begums. My principal, if not sole
inducement, for this order, which, with the instruc-
tions following it, was as absolute as it could be
expressed, was — to prevent the imputation which is
too frequently, with whatever colour of reason, cast
on transactions of this nature, begun with demands
of sums of money to an enormous amount, supported
with a great military parade and denunciations of
vengeance for a refusal, and all relenting into the
acceptance of personal submission and promise of
amendment : in plainer words, I did not choose to
be made the instrument of private rapacity, if any
such design existed ; nor to expose myself to the
obloquy of it, if such a design did not exist.”1 The
Governor-General, however, no where said to Mr.
Middleton, you shall enter the Zenana itself, if
respect for it prove any obstruction to your designs.

1 Governor-General’s Minute on Mr. Middleton’s Defence, 21st Octo-
ber, 1783. Ibid. p. 14.

VOL. IV. 2 H

466

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1782.

And it would have been equally easy for him to have
condemned the Resident had he understood his orders
in that invidious sense, as it was, according to the
sense in which he did understand them. If the
Resident had been guilty of the violation, and a
storm of odium had arisen, the political conduct of
the Governor-General lays sufficient ground for
the presumption that he would not have scrupled
to form for himself a screen out of his own ambi-
guity.1

Upon the intelligence received of the recall of Mr.
Bristow, and the appointment of Mr. Middleton to
the office of Resident with the Vizir, previous to the
memorable journey to Benares, the Court of Directors
wrote to the Governor-General and Council, in the
following terms : — “ Equally extraordinary, and un-
warrantable, have been your proceedings respecting
Mr. John Bristow. He was appointed Resident at
Oude in December, 1774. In December, 1776, he
was recalled without the shadow of a charge being
exhibited against him. By our letter of the 4th of
July, 1777, we signified our disapprobation of the
proceedings against Mr. Bristow, and directed that
he should be restored to his station ; which direction
we confirmed by our subsequent letter of the 23rd
of December, 1778. Mr. Bristow arrived in India
in February, 1780, and in October of the same year,
it was resolved by your Board, that Mr. Bristow
should return to Oude ; but that his appointment
should be limited solely to the conduct of political

’ Hastings intended that his orders should be obeyed. It was for his
agents to adopt the least objectionable mode of executing them. This is
all that can be fairly inferred from his instructions. — W.

ANIMADVERSIONS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

467

negotiations, Mr. Middleton being at the same time R<[)®^ 8V

nominated to settle pecuniary matters with the Vizir.

On the 21st May, 1781, upon receiving a letter from 1,s2
the V izir, expressing his desire that Mr. Bristow should
be removed from his court, he was again recalled.

But, without entering into the consideration of this
matter, and in order to vindicate and uphold our own
authority, we do hereby positively direct, that Mr.

Bristow do forthwith proceed to Oude, in the station
of our Resident there. You are likewise to observe,
that we shall not suffer any other person to proceed
to Oude, for the management of the finance, one
person being, in our opinion, sufficient to transact
our business there as principal in both those depart-
ments.” 1

Along with the reprobation of the recall, and
command for the restoration of Mr. Bristow, a
similar reprobation and command arrived from the
Court of Directors respecting Mr. Fowke, as
Resident at Benares. The Governor-General, claim-
ing a latitude in disobeying the orders of the Com-
pany, when those orders were “ destructive to their
own affairs,” and alleging that the diminution of
authority of the Governor-General, in displaying to
the eyes of India the defeat of his intentions even
with respect to his own agents, was so destructive ;
insinuating also, besides these general, some parti-
cular objections, of which he spoke in the following
mysterious terms, “ My present objection to his
appointment I dare not put upon record, the

'Company’s General Letter to Bengal, 28th August, 1782 ; Tenth
Report, ut supra, Appendix, No. 8.

2 H 2

468

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

8V- Members of the Board individually know it ; ”
opposed obedience to the Company’s injunctions.

1/82. fpjie Members, however, of the Board, con-

sisting of Mr. Stables, Mr. Macpherson, Mr. Wheler,
and Sir Eyre Coote, were of a different opinion ;
they declared that, where the commands of the
Directors were precise and peremptory, they con-
ceived themselves to have no latitude of choice ;
and Mr. Fowke received his appointment. The
arrangement which the Governor-General had made
for the management of the affairs of Benares had, as
usual, disappointed his pecuniary expectations; and
his dread of blame on the score of the transactions,
to which his journey had given birth, seems upon
this head to have rendered his irascibility peculiarly
keen. The storm of his indignation fell upon the
person into whose hands the collection of the
revenues had fallen, the father of the newly-made
Raja. “ I feel myself,” said Hastings, “ and may
be allowed on such an occasion to acknowledge it,
personally hurt at the ingratitude of this man, and
at the discredit which his ill-conduct has thrown
upon my appointment of him. He has deceived
me : he has offended against the government which
I then represented.” The “ personal hurts” of the
Governor-General seem but too frequently to have
prompted the measures of his administration. If
he was “ personally hurt,” he was ill-qualified to
assume the function of a judge. The Naib had
failed in raising all the money which had been im-
posed as tribute upon the province. Had the
tribute not been, as it was, too large, dismission
from his office might appear to be a sufficient visita-

TREATMENT OF FYZOOLLA KHAN.

469

tion for his offence. He was also deprived of lands, 8V-

thrown into prison, and threatened with death, by

the sole authority of Mr. Hastings, who did not so 1/8‘2-
much as communicate the measures to his Council
till after they were passed ; while the Naib in vain
represented, that the tribute exceeded the means of
the country ; that the ordinary receipts had been
diminished by a drought : and that from a severe
illness, he had, during two months, been incapable
of attending to the painful and laborious duties of
his office.1

Among the articles in the treaty, formed by the
Governor-General with the Vizir at Chunar, one
related to the Nabob Fyzoolla Khan. This was the
chief who survived the ruin of the Rohilla nation in
1774, and who, having occupied a strong post on
the hills, concluded a treaty, under the sanction and
guarantee of the English government, by which he
received in jaghire the country of Rampore and some
other districts of Rohilcund, estimated at a revenue
of fifteen lacs of rupees. “ From the month of Oc-
tober, 1774, to the latter end of February, 1778,”
says the Governor-General, “ we had no reference
made to us relative to Fyzoolla Khan; but on the
25th of February, 1778, we received a letter from
Mr. Middleton, in which he informed us, that reports
had prevailed at Lucknow, that Fyzoolla Khan re-
tained in his service a greater body of troops than
were specified in the treaty of 1774, and that he had
given protection and encouragement to Zabita Khan’s
defeated army. Mr. Middleton, in the same letter.

See the Minutes of Evidence upon the Benares Charge.

470

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

ROOK

CHAP.

1782.

SV' told us, that he did not pay much attention to these
— reports; but added — that the Nabob’s oppressive and
unjust conduct, in various instances, might induce
Fyzoolla Khan to form connexions, and to engage in
schemes, incompatible with his duty and allegiance
to the Vizir.”

The treaty which had been formed between Fy-
zoolla Khan and the Vizir, in 1774, commonly
known by the name of the treaty of Lai Dang, had
been signed by the English Commander-in-Chief, in
the name of his nation, as both a party to the trans-
action, and guarantee of the engagement. Dis-
trusting the faith of the Nabob, and alarmed by the
preceding imputations, which he justly regarded as
proofs that the wish was formed to dispossess him of
his country, Fyzoolla Khan endeavoured to assure
himself more completely of the protection of the
English; and, as if the signature of the commanding
officer was not sufficiently binding, made earnest
application to have the treaty ratified by the Go-
vernor-General and Council. “ Upon this subject,”
says Mr. Hastings, “ I had frequent applications
from him. But the guarantee appeared to me unne-
cessary, except as it would afford great satisfaction
to Fyzoolla Khan; for our government must have
interfered, if the Nabob Vizir had attempted to
encroach upon the rights which Fyzoolla Khan en-
joyed under his treaty with the Vizir. Mr. Middle-
ton deputed Mr. D. Barwell to Rampore, the resi-
dence of Fyzoolla Khan. Mr. Barwell transmitted
to Mr. Middleton a very particular account of Fy-
zoolla Khan’s conduct, which appeared to have been
in no instance contrary to his engagements ; and in

TREATMENT OF FYZOOLLA KHAN.

471

the month of April, his treaty with the Nabob Vizir BC°°^8V

was guaranteed by the Company, agreeably to his

earnestand reiterated requests. By whose suggestions 1/y2-
doubts were instilled into the mind of Fyzoolla
Khan, as to the validity of the treaty which Colonel
Champion had witnessed, I know not.” On the
occasion of the guarantee a present of elephants,
horses, and other articles, with a lac of rupees, or
10,000^. sterling, was made to the Nabob, and one
of a similar sum, or another lac, to the Company.

This transaction was soon followed by another.

In the same year intelligence was received of a war
between England and France. Fyzoolla Khan,

“ being indirectly sounded,” displayed the greatest
readiness to assist. He was under no obligation to
afford a single man ; but, at the suggestion of the
Resident at Oude, made an offer of all his cavalry,

2000 strong, and actually furnished 500. The Go-
vernor-General, on the 8th of January, 1779, wrote
to him, “ that in his own name, as well as that of
the Board, he returned him the warmest thanks for
this instance of his faithful attachment to the Com-
pany and the English nation.”

In the treaty of Lai Dang, were the three follow-
ing articles : “That Fyzoolla Khan should retain in
his service 5000 troops, and not a single man
more : that with whomsoever the Vizir should make
war, Fyzoolla Khan should send two or three
thousand of his troops, according to his ability, to
join him : and that if the Vizir should march in
person, Fyzoolla Khan should attend him with his
forces.”

In November, 1780, the Governor-General and

472

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8.

1782.

• Council recommended to the Vizir to demand, that
is, the Governor-General and Council did themselves
demand, of Fyzoolla Khan, to furnish a body of
5000 horse, “ as the quota stipulated by treaty for
the service of the Vizir.” The treaty however, did
not stipulate for 5000, but only for 2000, or 3000,
according to his ability ; and not for horse, but
troops , of wThich not the whole, but the usual pro-
portion in horse, equity of construction, could by any
means, require : and the troops were not for the ser-
vice of the Vizir, but of the Company.1 With the
strongest expressions of duty and allegiance, Fyzoolla
Khan represented, that his whole force was by treaty
limited to 5000 men ; of which 2000 were horse, and
3000 foot ; that 3000 foot were required for the bu-
siness of his government and collections ; but the
whole was at the command of the Vizir and the Com-
pany. When this answer was received, the Gover-
nor-General, who, together with Mr. Wheler, consti-
tuted the whole Board, and by his casting vote united
in his own person all the powers of government, de-
clared upon record, that “ The Nabob Fyzoolla Khan
had evaded the performance of his part of the treaty
between the late Nabob Suja ul Dowla and him, to
which the Honourable Company were guarantees,
and upon which he was lately summoned to furnish

1 This was too evident to be denied by any body ; but it was expressly
stated to Fyzoolla Khan, by the Vizir, in the letter in which he commu-
nicated the demand, that the demand was made by the direction of Mr.
Hastings, and “not for his (the Vizir’s), but the Company’s service.”
(See the Twenty-second Charge, moved by Mr. Burke,) Mr. Hastings
himself says (see his answer to that charge), “ Fyzoolla Khan was under
no engagement to furnish us with a single man, nor did I ever demand a
man from him.” True, in sound, as usual with Mr. Hastings; false in
substance.

TREATMENT OF FYZOOLLA KHAN.

473

the stipulated number of troops, which he is obliged Bc°°^8v

to furnish on the condition by which he holds the

jaghire granted to him.” 1782-

In defence of this procedure Mr. Hastings states,
that the Company was environed with difficulties :
the burden of the Mahratta war ; the alarming pro-
gress of Hyder Ali in the Carnatic ; the march of the
Berar army into Cuttack : and the prospect of an
armament from France : That Sir Eyre Coote, before
departing for Madras, recommended application to
Cheyte Sing for a body of horse to cover the province
of Bahar ; a battalion of sepoys; 1000 of the Vizir’s
infantry; and as many ofFyzoolla Khan’s troops as
could be procured, for the defence of Rohilcund.

That the British officer who commanded in that dis-
trict complained, by letter, of having with him only
500 of that chieftain’s horse, though, ‘r in his agree-
ment with government, he was obliged to keep up
500 troops for assisting in the defence of Rohil-
cund That in the hurry of business, he, and the
other Members of the Board, were deceived by this
letter in the belief that 5000 was the quota defined ;
and that horse, though not expressed in the treaty,
was undoubtedly understood.1

A deception of such a kind, in matters of such
importance, is not the most honourable sort of apo-
logy, even where it holds.2 The demand, however.

1 Hastings’s Defence on the Charge respecting Fyzoolla Khan.

2 The Vizir knew the terms of the treaty better; and his letter was
before Hastings, in which he admitted that the demand was a breach of
that treaty. “ Should Fyzoolla Khan mention any thing of the tenor of the
treaty, the first breach of it has been committed by him. I will reproach
him with having kept too many troops, aud will oblige him to send the
5000 horse.”

474

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8

1782.

• of the Board went far beyond the erroneous words of
. the letter. The letter spoke of only troops , not
horse ; and it spoke of 5000, as only to he kept up;
not sent out of the country, for deduction was neces-
sary of those required for indispensable service at
home : And the declaration of one of the parties as
to what was understood in a treaty, hut not expressed,
when there is no reason why it should not have
been expressed, is an unavailing pretence, which, if
admitted, would for ever place the -weaker of two
contracting parties at the mercy of the stronger :
As to the dangers of the British government, urged
by the Governor-General on this, as they are on so
many other occasions, there is only one principle
which can render them applicable in his defence ;
viz. that they furnished sufficient grounds for taking
from every prince or lord of the country, whatever
any of them had not ability to prevent him from
taking.

In proceeding to measures of compulsion, Hastings
somewhat lowered his demand. On the 15th of
February, 1781, he decreed in Council, “ that a
deputation to Fyzoolla Khan should be immediately
recommended to be sent by the Nabob Vizir, accom-
panied by an agent from Mr. Middleton in behalf of
the English government, as guarantees, and that in
presence of proper witnesses they should demand
immediate delivery of 3000 cavalry ; and if he should
evade or refuse compliance, that the deputies should
deliver a formal protest against him for breach of
treaty, and return, making their report to the Vizir,
which Mr. Middleton was to transmit to the Board.”
The deputation was sent. Fyzoolla Khan, alleging

FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

475

both his inability and the express words of the treaty,
offered “ in addition to the 1000 cavalry already
granted, to give 1000 more, when and wheresoever
required, and 1000 foot;” together with one year’s
pay in advance, and funds for the regular payment
of them in future. The offer was rejected ; and the
protest made. Hastings suspended all proceedings
upon this protest at the Board ; met with the Nabob
at Chunar ; and signed the following article relative
to Fyzoolla Khan: — “ That as Fyzoolla Khan has,
by his breach of treaty, forfeited the protection of the
English government, and causes, by his continuance
in his present independent state, great alarm and
detriment to the Nabob Vizir, he be permitted, when
time shall suit, to resume his lands and pay him in
money, through the Resident, the amount stipulated
by treaty, after deducting the amount and charges of
the troops he stands engaged to furnish by treaty ;
which amount shall be passed to the account of the
Company during the continuance of the present
war.”

What comes next to be stated is a characteristic
circumstance. In transmitting the treaty of Chunar
to his colleagues at the Board, Mr. Hastings accom-
panied each article with his own explanations and
remarks. Those upon the article relating to Fyzoolla
Khan, were as follows: “The conduct of Fyzoolla
Khan in refusing the aid demanded, though not an
absolute breach of treaty, was evasive and uncandid.
The demand was made for 5000 cavalry ; the engage-
ment in the treaty is literally for 5000 horse and
foot; Fyzoolla Khan could not be ignorant that we
had no occasion for any succours of infantry from

book v.

chap. 8.

1782.

47G

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. ancj that cavalry would be of the most essential

service; so scrupulous an attention to literal expres-

1782. sjon5 when a more liberal interpretation would have
been highly useful and acceptable to us, strongly
marks his unfriendly disposition ; though it may not
impeach his fidelity ; and leaves him little claim to
any exertions from us, for the continuance of his
jaghires. But I am of opinion that neither the
Vizir’s, nor the Company’s interests would be pro-
moted by depriving Fyzoolla Khan of his inde-
pendency : And I have, therefore, reserved the ex-

ecution of this agreement to an indefinite term ; and
our government may always interpose to prevent any
ill effects from it.”

This imperiously calls for some observations. Mr.
Hastings inserts, in an article of a solemn, public
treaty, and sets his hand to the article, that a depend-
ent of the Company has been guilty of a breach of
treaty ; when at the same moment, he writes to his
colleagues, that he has not been guilty of a breach
of treaty, and that his fidelity is unimpeached. He
gives to the Vizir, by equally solemn treaty, what
the Vizir anxiously solicited, as an object of great
desire, permission to dispossess Fyzoolla Khan; yet
he writes to his colleagues, that this was a fraudulent
artifice, and that he never meant the permission to
have any effect. The cause of Mr. Hastings, during
a calm investigation, suffers exceedingly by his
practice and skill in the arts of deceit ; because the
fair colours, which he himself can throw upon his
conduct, become thoroughly untrustworthy, and,
unless where they are supported by other evidence,
cease to persuade.

NEW ARRANGEMENT WITH FYZOOLLA KHAN.

477

When, too, Mr. Hastings informs his colleagues, book ^v.

that by the treaty in virtue of which Fyzoolla Khan

possessed his jaghire, he was bound to afford 5000 ]782-

troops, the information was glaringly incorrect ; for
the oppressed dependant had expressly appealed to
the treaty, and offered obedience to the full extent of
its bonds. Nay, by the treaty, he was rigidly
hound not to retain in his service any more than
5000 troops both horse and foot ; and had he sent
5000 horse to the service of the English, in addition
to which he must have raised horse and foot for the
business of his country, he might have been punished
for breach of treaty, and on this pretext, deprived of
his independence.

F or several months after the return of the Vizir to
his own capital, the Governor-General was impor-
tuned, by applications both from him and from the
Resident, to permit the expulsion of Fyzoolla Khan.

Towards the end of the year, 1782, a negotiation
was opened for a pecuniary commutation of the
military aid. Major Palmer was deputed to Ram-
pore ; and spent a month, as he himself significantly
expresses it, “ in order to effect by persuasion, what
he could have obtained in an hour by threats and
compulsions;” that is, a sum of fifteen lacs of
rupees, on the condition of being exempted from all
future claims of military service.

Endeavour was used to obtain from Fyzoolla Khan
another sum of fifteen lacs ; for which his jaghire,
which was only a tenure for life, was to be converted
into a perpetual hereditary possession. As this
change in his tenure was supposed to be of the
highest importance to Fyzoolla Khan, he very much

478

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book V. surprised the English agent by declaring his inability

• to advance the money required, and declining the

178'2- bargain. From the improving cultivation of the
country, and apparent riches of the people, the effects
of the good government which that lord had main-
tained, the English, as usual, believed, in company
with the Vizir, that his riches were immense.1

Major Palmer bore his testimony, on this occasion,
to the falsehood, too, of the imputations upon which
the oppression of Fyzoolla Khan had been founded :
That he had given encouragement to the desertion
of the ryots of the Vizir ; and that he had a greater
number of troops than 5000. The numbers of the
Rohilla people in this country exceeded that amount ;
but Rohillas, in other than military employments,
were not by the treaty forbidden. At any rate, the
Major adds, “ it does not appear that their number
is formidable, or that Fyzoolla Khan could by any
means subsist such numbers as could cause any
serious alarm to the Vizir; neither is there any
appearance of their entertaining any views beyond

1 The result proved the unsoundness of his excuse, for he did pay the
fifteen lacs, and without any inconvenience. Of the rapid improvement
of his resources, we have undeniable testimony in the life of Hafiz Rehmat
Khan. It is there stated by Mustajat Khan, “ When Fyzoolla Khan took
possession of the territory granted to him by the treaty of Lolldong, he
adopted every means in his power for increasing the cultivation, and, in a
few years, so improved the country, that the produce was treble, or per-
haps quadruple, the former amount. Being prudent in his expenditure his
coffers were well filled, and he was enabled to entertain a large proportion
of the Afghans of Bareilly, Pillibheet, Ownla, &c., all of whom eagerly
flocked to his standard,” p. 130. That in all this Fyzoolla Khan acted
w isely is not denied, but the tendency of his measures was as undeniably
a violation of the spirit of the treaty, into which he had entered ; and their
success is a proof that his plea of inability to furnish either men or money
was dishonest. — W.

FYZOOLLA KHAN.

479

the quiet possession of the advantages which they at
present enjoy.”

It was an object with the Governor-General and
Council, to convince the Court of Directors that the
bargain they had made with Fyzoolla Khan was a
good one, and the money obtained an ample com-
pensation for the alienated right. They now, there-
fore, distinctly understood and affirmed, that Fyzoolla
Khan was bound not to exceed the number of 5000
troops, in horse and foot, and to send to the service
of the Vizir only two or three thousand men ; which,
to the Vizir, they said, was f‘ a precarious and
unserviceable right that “ the rumours which had
been spread of the hostile designs of Fyzoolla Khan,
against the Vizir, were totally groundless ; and if he
had been inclined, that he had not the means to
make himself formidable.” 1 These expressions are
to be contrasted with those made use of, on the 1 st
of April, 1781, by the Assistant Resident, Johnson;
who wras sent for the purpose of making the protest,
in case of the refusal of 3000 horse. On the hunt
for appearances of guilt, he found them at every
step ; and the very day after his arrival, reported,
that “ the Rohilla soldiers, in the district of Rampore
alone, were not less than twenty thousand.” With
great caution should men in power receive from
their agents reports by which their known wishes

1 Secret Letter from Bengal, dated 5th April, 1783; Extracts from
Papers (in No. 2, vol. i.), presented to the House of Commons, ut supra,
p. 44. In the Secret Letter from Bengal, dated 10th March, 1783, the
Governor-General and Council also say, “ This” (the fifteen lacs) “ is a
valuable compensation for expunging an article of a treaty, which was of
such a tenor, and so loosely worded, that the Vizir could never have
derived any real advantage from it. The money will of course be received
by the Company, in part liquidation of the Vizir’s debt.”

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1 782.

480

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8.

1782.

• are flattered ; because the proportion of observers is
. lamentably small, who, in such cases, will not
deceive themselves, and without any formed inten-
tion of mendacity, yet from the very lust of pleasing
the men on whose favour or disfavour their prosperity
or adversity depends, give them reports which will
deceive them. It is necessary, in justice to Mr.
Hastings, to add, that with respect to the permis-
sion, granted by the treaty of Chunar, to resume the
jaghire of Fyzoolla Khan, he afterwards allowed
that his conduct was the proper object of blame.2

It appears that the Yizir relented at a period
rather early in the persecution of the Begums.
Before the recall of Mr. Middleton, he wrote to the
Governor-General several letters, on the particular
subject of the resumption of the estates, and the
confiscation of the treasures of the Princesses, and

1 For the passage relating to Fyzoolla, see Parliamentary Papers, ut
supra; the Twenty -second Article of Charge presented by Mr. Burke; the
Answer of Mr. Hastings ; and the Tenth Report of the Select Committee.
— M. Hastings admits that in the anxiety and alarm, which he naturally
suffered during the crisis of Cheit Sing’s insurrection, he assented, without
due consideration, to the Vizir’s views of dispossessing Fyzoolla Khan;
even then, however, he provided against their being precipitately realized,
and what was the consequence ? They never were realized. It was there-
fore monstrous injustice to impeach him for concurrence in a measure that
never took place, in consequence of his own precautions against its unrea-
sonable accomplishment. That the expulsion of the Nabob of Rampore
might in time become imperative was very probable, for there was no
doubt, whatever may be pretended in the text, that the Nabob’s troops
and resources considerably exceeded those limits to which the treaty pur-
posed to restrict him, and there was as little doubt of his hostility to the
Vizir. The contingency was however obviated by a pecuniary levy, in
consideration of which he was released from all obligation to furnish
troops for the service of the Vizir. So little real injury was done to
Fyzoollah Khan, by this arrangement, that he enjoyed a prosperous
administration until his death, in the year 1794, during which his country
became exceedingly flourishing and prosperous, and he left a large accu-
mulated treasure to unworthy descendants. — W.

SEQUEL OF THE TRANSACTIONS.

481

appears to have severely complained of the oppro- 8> '

brious part which he was compelled to perform. It

was one of the rules of the Governor-General, to lv82'
suppress as much as possible of any correspondence,
of w7hich the appearance would give him pain.

These letters, accordingly, were not entered in the
Company’s records. But what he wrote to the
Resident on the subject of them remains, and shows,
that in his breast they excited the highest resentment.

He chose to consider them as not the letters of the
Vizir ; whom he represents as too void of character,
to write any thing of himself. He called them the
letters of the minister, f‘ who,” says he, “ by an
abuse of his influence over the Nabob, he being, as
he ever must be, in the hands of some person, a
mere cipher in his hands, dared to make him assume
a very unbecoming tone of refusal, reproach, and
resentment, in opposition to measures recommended
by me, and even to acts done by my authority.”

He persisted in ascribing guilt to the Begums, and
said, “ the severities which have been exercised
towards them, were most justly merited, by the
advantage which they took of the troubles in which
I was personally involved last year, to create a
rebellion in the Nabob’s government;1 and to com-

1 When it suited the Governor-General he could assign the disturbance
in Oude to very different causes. In a Minute [Bengal Secret Consul-
tations, 10th December, 1783; Extracts from Papers (in No. 2, vol. iv.)
presented to the House of Commons, upon the 13th day of March, 1786,
p. 7], he says, “ The Zemindars in the provinces of Oude, and in the other
dominions of the Nabob, Asoph ul Dowlah, have ever been either in a
state of actual rebellion, or bordering upon it; even in the time of the
Nabob Sujah ul Dowlah, they could only be restrained by a military force
superior to that which they could oppose to it.” The instigations, surely
of the Begums was not then wanted to account for the little ferment which
took place in Oude, upon the occasion of the explosion in Benares.

VOL. IV. 2 I

482

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. plete the ruin which they thought was impending

. on ours.” “ If it is the Nabob’s desire to forget

1/82- and forgive their past offences, I have no objection
to his allowing them, in pension, the nominal amount
of their jaghires ; but if he shall ever offer to restore
their jaghires to them, or to give them any property
in land, after the warning which they have given
him, by the dangerous abuse which they formerly
made of his indulgence ; you must remonstrate, in
the strongest terms, against it ; you must not permit
such an event to take place; until this government
shall have received information of it, and shall have
had time to interpose its influence for the prevention
of it.” On this, and on various other occasions,
wdiere the Governor-General spoke of pensions with
so much ease, he well knew, that in the circum-
stances and with the disposition of the government
of the Vizir, a pension, unless to Englishmen whom
he feared, little or nothing differed from a name.
Nay more; if the payment had been sure, the
nominal revenue was but a portion of the actual
proceeds ; and the Begums, of course, were to be
robbed of all the rest. It was in fact from this
robbery, namely the revenue which the Nabob could
extract from the estates of the Begums, beyond the
pensions he would bind himself to pay them, that
the money was to come, by which the distress of
Mr. Hastings was to be relieved.1

1 Jagirs and estates are here confounded, although two very different
things ; the Begums had no estates, and every principle of good govern-
ment demanded the resumption of grants held upon the condition of mili-
tary service, which only furnished a pretext for levying armed followers,
and a means of defying the authority of the state. — W.

DECISION OF THE DIRECTORS DISREGARDED.

483

The period at last arrived for the review, by the Bc°° jj- g ' ■

Court of Directors, of the proceedings of then govern

ment in India relative to the Begums. In their 1/82-
letters of the 14th of February, 1783, “It nowhere,”
say the Directors, “ appears, from the papers at
present in our possession, that the Begums excited
any commotions previous to the imprisonment of
Cheyte Sing, and only armed themselves in con-
sequence of that transaction ; and it is probable that
such a conduct proceeded from motives of self-
defence, under an apprehension, that they themselves
might likewise be laid under unwarrantable con-
tributions.” The Court of Directors, in consequence,
gave their commands, that if, upon inquiry, it should
appear that the Princesses had not been guilty of
the practices of which Mr. Hasting accused them,
then- estates should be restored ; and an asylum
offered them within the Company’s territory. In
obedience to this injunction, it was moved by Mr.
Stables, a member of the Supreme Council, that the
inquiry should be instituted.

The conduct pursued by the Governor-General is
the next object of regard. He set himself in oppo-
sition to the inquiry ; and, having a majority of the
Council on his side, he prevented it. The reasons
by which he supported his opposition were as follows.

He asserted, “that the reasons of the Court of
Directors, if transmitted with the orders for the in-
quiry, will prove, in effect, an order for collecting
evidence to the justification and acquittal of the
Begums, and not for the investigation of the truth
of the charges which have been preferred against

2 I 2

484

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. them.” Here the insinuation is, that whenever, in

India, the views of government are known, all evi-

1/82, dence tendered will he sure to coincide with those
Hews. The Governor-General ought to have reflected,
that, if this he true, all the evidence which he pro-
duced against the Begums, Cheyte Sing, or any of
the other parties, whom he pretended to punish under
the colour of guilt, if in other respects less devoid of
the essentials of proof than it really was, ought to he
counted for nothing. Besides, it was neither neces-
sary, nor did the author of the proposal require, that
“ the reasons ” of the Court of Directors should be
transmitted with the order for inquiry. Mr. Hastings
in a further Minute asserted, that the inquiry wrnuld
be fraught with “ evils greater than any which exist
in the consequences which have already taken place,
and which time has almost obliterated.” “ If,” said
he, “ I am rightly informed, the Nabob Vizir and
the Begums are on terms of mutual good will, it
would ill become this government to interpose its
influence, by any act which might tend to revive their
animosities, and a very slight occasion would be
sufficient to effect it. They will instantly take fire
on such a delaration, proclaim the judgment of the
Court in their favour, demand a reparation of the
acts, which they will construe wrongs, with such a
sentence warranting that construction, and either
accept the invitation (to reside under the protection
of the Company), to the proclaimed scandal of the
Nabob Vizir, which will not add to the credit of our
government, or remain in his dominions, but not
under his authority, to add to his vexations and the

NEW MEASURES OF HASTINGS.

485

disorders of the country, by continual intrigues and B°(^8V

seditions. Enough already exists to affect his peace,

and the quiet of his people. If we cannot heal, let us 1/S2-
not inflame the wounds which have been inflicted.”

He added, “ If the Begums think themselves aggrieved
to such a degree as to justify them in an appeal to a
foreign jurisdiction ; to appeal to it against a man
standing in the relation of son and grandson to them ;
to appeal to the justice of those who have been the
abettors, and instruments of their imputed wrongs ;
let us at least permit them to be the judges of their
own feelings, and prefer their complaints, before we
offer to redress them. They will not need to be
prompted. I hope I shall not depart from the sim-
plicity of official language, in saying, the Majesty of
Justice ought to be approached with solicitation, not
descend to provoke or invite it, much less to debase
itself by the suggestion of wrongs, and the promise
of redress, with the denunciation of punishments,
before trial, and even before accusation.” If nothing
remained to stain the reputation of Mr. Hastings,
but the principles avowed in this singular pleading,
his character, among the friends of justice, would be
sufficiently determined.

Although the commands of the Court of Directors,
respecting reparation to the Begums, were strength-
ened by a formal application from the Vizir, “ re-
questing ” (such are the words of Mr. Hastings, in-
troducing the subject to the Board) “ that he might
be permitted to restore, to his grandmother and
other relations, the jaghires which were taken from
them the beginning of last year,” the authority of the
Governor-General was sufficient to prevent, at the

486

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP. 8.

1782.

• present time, the adoption of any measure in their
- favour.1

Notwithstanding the severities practised upon the
family of the Vizir, and the usurpation of his autho-
rity by Mr. Middleton, who even issued warrants
upon his own authority for the resumption of the
jaghires, Mr. Middleton was dismissed for want of
rigour in pressing the demands of the English go-
vernment ; and Mr. Bristow was appointed, under
the implied as well as declared expectation, that he
would supply what had been remiss in the conduct
of his predecessor. Nor was this all. He was fur-
nished with a set of instructions, from the hand of the
Governor-General, hearing date the 23rd of October,
1782. In these instructions, in which he was parti-
cularly referred to the injunctions which Mr. Middle-
ton had previously received, four objects were prin-
cipally pointed out to his attention; 1st, “ To limit,
and separate the personal disbursements of the Vizir
from the public accounts; 2ndly, To reform the mili-
tary establishment, reducing the troops to one uniform
corps, and to the form, if possible, most useful to the
Company, that of cavalry ; controlling even the ap-
pointment of officers, nay, “ peremptorily opposing
it,” as often as the Vizir should persist in a choice
which to the Resident should appear objectionable;
3rdly, To control, or rather to exercise, the power of
appointing Aumils and collectors in the revenue de-
partment, it being reserved to the Nabob’s ministers
to appoint them, wuththe concurrence of the Resident;

1 See the Fourth Article of Charge, and Mr. Hastings’s Answer, with the
Papers printed by the House of Commons in 1786.

HASTINGS INSISTS UPON THE VIZIR’S DEPENDENCE.

4thly, To endeavour to reform the disgraceful state
of the administration of justice.

The grand object of the English government was,
to obtain from the Nabob the payment of the sums
for which they had induced him to become bound.
But such were the disorders of his administration,
and such the effects of those disorders upon the
population and produce of the country, that without
great reforms this payment seemed impracticable,
and without the virtual assumption of the powers of
government into better hands than those of the Yizir
and his agents, all reform was an object of despair.
The government, accordingly, had been converted
into a government of Englishmen, in fact ; conducted
by the instrumentality of the Yizir and his agents,
and under the forms of their authority. Of this, the
points of instruction to Mr. Middleton, described
above, are more than adequate proof.

In the administration of the Nabob, the principal
organ went by the name of the Minister. The
person raised to this office by the influence of the
Governor-General was Hyder Beg Khan. The
character and situation of this person, as described
by Mr. Hastings himself, require to be noticed. In
his instructions to Mr. Bristow, in October, 1782,
he says : “ Immediately on your arrival, sound the
disposition of Hyder Beg Khan. His conduct has,
for some time past, been highly reproachable. Till
within these three months he possessed, without
control, both the unparticipated and entire adminis-
tration, with all the powers annexed to that govern-
ment; the Nabob being, as he ever must be in the
hands of some person, a mere cipher in his.” To

487

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1782.

488

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1782.

so great a degree did Mr. Hastings represent the
Vizir as being the mere tool of the minister, that he
treated the very letters of the Vizir, as literally the
letters of the minister ; and spoke of him and of
them in the following terms : “ He has dared to use
both the Nabob’s name and even his seal affixed to
letters, either dictated to the Nabob, or written
from him without his knowledge.” He then pro-
ceeded to state the necessity, that this man, in
whose hands the Vizir was a tool, should be merely
a tool in the hands of the English Resident ; in other
words, that the English Resident should wield sub-
stantially the powers of government. “ I cannot
omit,” said he, “ to repeat the sentiments which I
expressed in the verbal instructions which I gave
you at your departure, that there can be no medium
in the relation between theResident and the minister,
but either the Resident must be the slave and
vassal of the minister, or the minister at the absolute
devotion of the Resident.” He then describes him
as the mere creature of the English government.
“ He exists,” said the Governor-General, by his
dependence on the influence of our government;
and if he will submit to hold his office on such
conditions as I require, I would prefer him to any
other. At the same time, it will be necessary to
declare to him, in the plainest terms, the footing and
conditions on which he shall be permitted to retain
his place, with the alternative of dismission, and a
scrutiny into his past conduct, if he refuses. These
conditions are described as follows ; “ In the first
place, I will not receive from the Nabob, as his,
letters dictated by the spirit of opposition — but shall

HASTINGS S OPINION OF THE VIZIR.

489

consider every such attempt as his minister's and as 8V

an insult on our government. In the second place, I

shall expect that nothing is done, in his official cha- 1/S2-
racter, but with your knowledge and participation ;
at the same time the first share of the responsibility
will rest with you : the other conditions will follow
distinctly in their places, because I consider you as
responsible for them.” The responsibility implies
the power ; therefore the power was to exist in the
Resident ; and any opposition, so much as by letter,
that is, by complaint, was to be considered as an
insult on the English government,

To the Minister, Hyder Beg, Mr. Hastings him-
self wrote in the following terms. “ In answer to my
letter Raja Gobind Ram received a perwanna from
the Nawab, containing complaints and reproaches at
my interference in his affairs, and his unwillingness
to receive any agent from me. These sentiments,
and these expressions, are neither consonant to the
benevolence of the Nawab’s temper, nor to the
friendship which, I know, he possesses for me ; — but
were dictated for other purposes, known to yourself
only. They are your sentiments, and your expres-
sions ; and not the Nawab’s. But my astonishment
at the other parts of the perwanna is not to be ex-
pressed ; for it declares all I had said respecting the
disordered state of the Nawab’s government to be
entirely false. Either these affirmations were dic-
tated by the Nawab ; or written without his know-
ledge. If they wTere dictated by the Nawab, they
were such as would not admit of a reply from me, in
an immediate address to himself; because I must
have told him that he was deceived, and kept in

490

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. utter ignorance of his own affairs, at the same time

that the whole world, except himself, saw the con-

1782- dition they were in, and the destruction that was
hanging over him. If the letter was written in the
Nawab’s name, hut without his knowledge, what
must have been your opinion of me, that could
induce you to attempt so gross a deception upon my
understanding? In either case, your conduct is
without excuse. Its object I plainly see. By the
authority of the Nawab Vizir you mean your own.
When you make the Nawab to complain of the
usurpation upon that authority, and to assert his
right to the uncontrolled exercise of it, the plain inter-
pretation of this is, that you yourself lay claim to the
usurpation of his authority, and to the uncontrolled
exercise of it. And how has it been exercised ? I
shall not repeat particulars, having already written
to you fully upon them — and the subject is un-
pleasant. But I must tell you that such is their
notoriety, that the report of them is echoed to me
from all parts of Hindostan and the Deccan ; and
the most alarming apprehensions are expressed by
my agents, employed in the remote affairs of this
government, lest they should attract the hostilities of
other powers.” 1 — Such, at the end of October, 1782,
was the opinion declared by Mr. Hastings of the
condition in which the government of Oude was
kept, in the hands of the Nabob and his Minister.

In pointing out to Mr. Bristow the establishment
of new offices, for the business of the revenues, for
reform in the administration of justice, for the

1 Governor-General to Hyder Beg Khan, dated 20th October, 1782.
Minutes, ut supra, p. 797.

CONDUCT OF HASTINGS TOWARDS MR. BRISTOW.

491

appointment of new administrators, and the coercion 8v-

of rebellious Zemindars ; as part of the objects, on

the accomplishment of which, for the reform in the 17S2-
disorders in the Nabob’s government, the desires of
the Governor-General were fixed ; absolute perform-
ance was exacted at the hands of the Resident,
without any other limitation to the exercise of his
power, than what the rules of prudence, and “ every
ostensible and external mark of respect to the
Nabob,” might recommend.

When the Resident had as yet been but a few
months in office, a letter, was written by the Vizir,
dated the 28th of March, 1783, arrived, complaining,
in the most bitter terms, of the assumption of his
authority by the Resident. Instead of treating it,
according to the terms of his paper of instructions,
as the letter, “ not of the Vizir, but of the Minister,
and as an insult on the English government,” the
Governor-General received it with profound respect ;
and on the 21st of April presented it, with the
documents by which it was attended, to the Council,
as a matter deserving their most serious regard.

From the delicacy of the relation, in which, on
account of former oppositions, he stood to Mr.
Bristow, he professed a desire to he guided in his
sentiments, on this occasion, by the sentiments of
the Board. On the 19th of May, consultation upon
the subject took place, when the reserve of the
Governor-General disappeared. He declared, that
tfthe facts, as stated in the Nabob’s complaints,
were usurpations of the authority, and even of the
sovereignty of the Nabob Vizir.” But, what was
more singular, he declared that his instructions to

492

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8.

1782.

• Mr. Bristow did not authorize any usurpation of that
. authority or sovereignty. And he proposed, even
before Mr. Bristow should be heard in his defence,
that certain proceedings of his, the objects of the
Vizir’s complaint, should be immediately revoked.
The Council, however, rejected this proposition; and
only so far concurred with the Governor-General, as
to send Mr. Bristow a copy of the papers, and
require his defence. The tone of the Governor-
General, upon this, rose very high. “ The Governor-
General,” such were the terms of his minute,
“ desires it to be recorded, that he protests against
the resolution of the Board, and will assign his
reasons at large hereafter.” What follows is still
more remarkable. As if he had penned the instruc-
tions by bis sole authority, and as if upon that
authority alone their validity rested, he declared
them no longer of any force. The Minute goes on ;
“ He (the Governor-General) also desires, that as the
instructions given by bim to Mr. Bristow have no
longer any force, and as he solemnly disavows
their authority, under any construction, for Mr.
Bristow to exercise any control over the Nabob Vizir,
or participation in the sovereignty of the Vizir’s do-
minions, the Board will be pleased to cause such
new instructions to be drawn out, and transmitted
to Mr. Bristow, as they shall think proper.” If
the whole extent is admitted of the exaggerating
language of Mr. Hastings and the Nabob, which
nevertheless very far exceeded the facts, the whole
of his paper of instructions not only authorized
but commanded a complete control over the
Nabob Vizir, and not a participation only in the

NEW MEASURES RELATIVE TO THE VIZIR.

493

sovereignty, but the substantial exercise of the 8V
whole.1

On the 24th of July, Mr. Hastings complained 1/82-
to the Board, that Mr. Bristow had been guilty of
disrespect to the Board, in not transmitting his
defence ; and on this occasion could not forbear
alluding to an offence, which he appears never to
have surmised without a purpose of punishment ;

“ Perhaps,” said he, “ Mr. Bristow may wish to avail
himself of the principle, which forbids that any man
should be condemned unheard, to withhold his de-
fence until he shall have exceeded the period which
has been so repeatedly portended for the close of the
present government.” On the 28th of the same
month, he moved, “ That Mr. Bristow, for disrespect
to the Board, and disobedience of the written orders
to him by the Board on the 29th of May, be removed
and recalled from his station and office at Lucknow.”

Yet Mr. Hastings had before him a letter of Mr.
Bristow dated on the 23rd of June, in the following
words : “ Since I had last the honour to address you,

I have been confined to my room by indisposition.

I am now somewhat recovered, and shall not fail to
expedite my reply to your commands of the 29th ult.,
which I have on this account been compelled to post-
pone.” The Board refused to acquiesce in the pre-
cipitate condemnation, recommended to them by their

1 It is memorable, that there is actually in his Paper of Instructions the
following passage : “ From the nature of our connexion with the govern-
ment of Oude, from the Nabob’s incapacity, and the necessity which will
for ever exist (while we have the claim of a subsidy upon the resources of
his country), of exercising an influence, and frequently substituting it
entirely in the place of an avowed and constitutional authority in the
administration of his government,” &c.

494

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 8.

1782.

President ; and soon after, the letter of Mr. Bristow,
dated on the 30th day of July, arrived. The Resi-
dent either absolutely denied the facts which were
asserted in the complaints of the Vizir, or represented
the actions with which he was charged, as actions to
the performance of which he was by the tenor of
his instructions compelled, actions absolutely neces-
sary to accomplish the ends which the English
government had in view, actions attended with bene-
ficial effects, and performed with all the delicacy
possible towards the Vizir. The complaints he repre-
sented as flowing solely from the minister, to whose
interests all reform was adverse, who had opposed it,
in every instance, with all the power of eastern sub-
tlety, with all the power of a despotic influence
tyrannically exercised over the helpless Vizir, and
with all the effect which could be given to this
power by a hold upon the ear of the Governor-
General. On hearing this defence, the Council-
General, with the exception of Mr. Hastings, the
accuser, unanimously declared, that no misconduct
on the part of Mr. Bristow had been proved ; and
by their decision pronounced a heavy condemnation
of their chief. Nothing seems better supported than
the opinion which the minute of Mr. Macpherson
expressed, “ That Mr. Bristow has fully refuted the
accusations advanced against him ; and that, if they
had in some degree been established, they would lie
more against the Board than against Mr. Bristow,
who continually advised them of his endeavours to
carry their instructions into effect.”

The Governor-General meditated an important
change, in the relations between the Nabob of Oude,

ARTIFICE OF HASTINGS.

495

and the English government. He moved that in V

conformity with the proposal of the Vizir, and of his

minister, the English residency should be withdrawn, 1782-
and the joint security of the Nabob and the minister
taken for the discharge of the obligations which the
Company held upon the government of Oude. In
the instructions, to which reference has so frequently
been made, of Hastings to Bristow, “ The Nabob/’
it was said, “ has repeatedly and bitterly complained
of the indignity which he suffers in his authority, by
the usurpation of the Company’s residents ; and has
repeatedly demanded, that whenever the Company’s
balance shall be completely discharged, he may be
free from this vexation, that he may be permitted
to pay the subsidy in ready money ; and that the
assignments which have been granted to satisfy that
demand may be restored him.” The quarter from
which this proposition proceeded, Mr. Hastings at
the same time declared, was no secret to him. It
proceeded, he said, from Hyder Beg Khan. He
added, tf It may not, however, be amiss to talk with
the minister on this subject ; to let him know, that
it is well understood to be a demand for substituting
his authority in the place of the Company’s, and to
invest him with the sovereignty of the Vizir’s domi-
nions.” These words are pregnant with meaning :
in the first place they declare, that the authority, ex-
ercised by the Company, embraced the sovereignty of
the Vizir’s dominions, though, for the sake of crimi-
nating Mr. Bristow, he could erect every interference
in that sovereignty into an act of guilt ; and secondly
they declare, that to withdraw the English residency
from Oude, was to deliver over the Vizir, and his

496

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK \

CHAP. 8

1782.

• sovereignty into the hands of Hyder Beg, whose
- character he painted in the blackest colours. Yet, at
the very moment when he was proposing to offer up
this sacrifice of the Vizir and his sovereignty to the
cupidity and tyranny of Hyder Beg Khan, he was
not restrained from the glaring hypocrisy of express-
ing a deep concern for the indignity which he pre-
tended the Vizir had sustained, by the part which
the English Resident had acted, in endeavouring to
reform his government, and check the malversations
of the minister by whom he was oppressed.

At the very time, however, of penning his instruc-
tions, Mr. Hastings stated that he had an inclination
to the present measure. “ I confess,” says he “ that
1 did myself give encouragement to this proposition ;
knowing at the same time the quarter from which it
came, I mean from Hyder Beg Khan ; but willing
to exonerate this government from the trouble and
responsibility, and the Company from the disgrace,
of whatever might attend the administration of the
Nabob’s government. I thought, too, that it pre-
sented a sure prospect of the regular payment of the
current demands, by the penalty, which would attend
the failure, in the resumption of the former system
of assignments, and in the personal claims which it
would lay on the minister. But his misconduct has-
since manifested itself in so many particular instances
— besides the universal disorder of the country ; and
this is so alarming in its effects to our government,
that I shall hesitate, until I have the surest and
most satisfactory grounds, to recommend an acquies-
cence in such a measure.” What change there was
in the grounds, except for the worse, in the few

THE ENGLISH RESIDENCY WITHDRAWN FROM OUDE. 497
months between the time when this was written, and book v.

CHAP. 8.

the date of his motion, does not appear. Another

point is also remarkable. In the conversation which 1783-
the Governor-General recommended to the resident to
hold with the minister on this subject, he desired him
to ask, provided the sovereignty of the Vizir’s domi-
nions according to the terms of his proposition were
transferred to him, “ Whether, in the event of his
invoking our government in a new scheme of hosti-
lities, by those which his mal-administration may pro-
duce, whether internally, or by invasion in that coun-
try, he shall think himself in justice exempt from the
personal vengeance which we may be disposed to
exact from him.”

In the first letter of complaint, which was received
from the Vizir against Mr. Bristow, the proposition
for the removal of the residency, and the appointment
of Hyder Beg Khan to the entire management of the
country, was renewed; and Mr. Stables, in his Minute
in Council on the 19th of May, 1783, declares, that
this was the “ great object which the minister, and”

(the cipher in his hands) “ his master, had in view,
in preferring their complaints against the Resident.”

Mr. Stables added, “ In justice and candour to the
Nawab Vizir and his minister, I think the Board
ought explicitly to declare that they cannot, on any
account, comply with the Vizir’s request, to grant him
discretional powers over his country, while such
heavy debts remain due to the Company.” In the
debate, too, in Council, of the 31st of July, after the
proposition was formally moved by the Governor-
General, it met with the opposition of all the other
members of the Board. The tone of the Govemor-

2 K

VOL. IV.

498

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

General, however, after the opposition had lasted

• for a little time, grew so high, as to intimidate his

i/«3. colleagues; threatening them with the inconve-
niences of a divided administration, and the loss of
his authority in the difficulties which attended the
government of Oude. They were, therefore, induced
to offer on the 31st of December to acquiesce in his
proposal, provided he wrould take the whole respon-
sibility of the measure upon himself. This, however,
was a load which the Governor-General declined. It
was aftenvards explained, that responsibility with his
fortune, or a pecuniary responsibility, was not under-
stood. Responsibility, thus limited, which in fact was
no responsibility at all, leaving nothing to be affected
but his reputation, which it was impossible to exempt,
he had no objection to undergo. On the 31st of De-
cember, it was determined, that the residency
should be withdrawn ; on receiving the security of
creditable bankers for the balance which the Nabob
owed to the Company, and for the accruing demands
of the current year.

Many grounds of suspicion are laid in this trans-
action. From one remarkable fact, they derive the
greatest corroboration. There is great reason to
believe, that the letters which were written in the
name of the Nabob, complaining of Bristow, were
in fact suborned by the Governor-General, written
in consequence of instructions, that is, commands
secretly conveyed.

When Mr. Bristow was removed, just before the
first journey of the Governor-General towards Oude,
the removal was in like manner preceded by violent
complaints from the Nabob. These complaints were

THE NABOB’S COMPLAINTS SUBORNED BY HASTINGS.

499

suborned. Mr. Hastings himself, when proposing V

the return of Mr. Bristow in 1782, informs the

Nabob’s Vakeel, that “ His Highness,” meaning the 17b3-
Nabob, “ had been well pleased with Mr. Bristow,
and that he knew what the Nabob had written
formerly was at the instigation of Mr. Middleton.”1 2
The instigation of Mr. Middleton was the instigation
of Mr. Hastings.

Besides, it is in evidence, that this was not a sin.
gular case. It was the ordinary mode of procedure,
established between Mr. Hastings and the Nabob.

There was, it appears, a regular concert, that the
Nabob should never write a public letter respecting
the residents or their proceedings, till he had first
learned privately what Mr Hastings wished that he
should express, and that he then wrote accordingly.

This appeared most fully, after the departure of Mr.
Hastings, when the Nabob proposed to carry on the
same practice with his successor. In a letter re-
ceived on the 21st of April, 1785, “ I desire,” says
the Vizir, “ nothing but your satisfaction : And hope
that such orders as relate to the friendship between
the Company and me, and as may be your pleasure,
may be written in' your private letters to me through
Major Palmer, in your letters to the Major, that he
may in obedience to your orders properly explain
them to me, and whatever may be settled he may
first, in secret, inform you of it, and afterwards I
may write to you, having learnt your pleasure — in
this way, the secrets will be known to your mind

1 Extract of an Arzee, -written (27th August, 1782) from Raja Gobind
Ram to the Vizir, by the Governor-General’s directions. Minutes of
Evidence, ut supra, p. 795.

2 K 2

500

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

bookv. alone, and the advice upon all the concerns will be

given in a proper manner.” The same thing is still

l'83' more clearly expressed by the minister Hyder Beg
Khan, on the same occasion. l{ I hope that such
orders and commands as relate to the friendship
between his Highness’s and the Company’s govern-
ments, and to your will, may be sent through Major
Palmer in your own private letters, or in your letters
to the Major, who is appointed from you at the pre-
sence of his Highness, that, in obedience to your
orders, he may properly explain your commands, and
whatever affair may be settled, he may first secretly
inform you of it, and afterward his Highness may,
conformably thereto, write an answer, and I also
may represent it. By this system, your pleasure will
always be fully made known to his Highness, and
his Highness and me will execute whatever may be
your orders, without deviating a hair’s breadth.”
When it was the intention of Mr. Hastings that Mr.
Bristow, who had been withdrawn upon complaints,
which without any dislike to Mr Bristow, the Na-
bob through Middleton had been instructed to prefer,
that obedient sovereign was instructed to make an
application of a very different description. “ The
Governor,” said the Nabob’s Vakeel in the Arzee
already quoted, u directed me to forward to the pre-
sence, that it was his wish, that your Highness would
write a letter to him ; and, as from yourself, request
of him that Mr. Bristow may be appointed to Luck-
now.” In his answer to the Vakeel the Nabob cu-
riously says, “ As to the wishes of Mr. Hastings,
that I should write for him to send Mr. John Bris-

MYSTERIOUS RECALL OF BRISTOW.

501

tow, it would have been proper and necessary, for book 8V-

you, privately to have understood what were Mr

Hastings’ real intentions; Whether the choice of 1783-
sending Mr. J ohn Brishnv was his own desire : Or,
whether it was in compliance with Mr. Macpherson’s
— that I might then have written conformably there-
to.— Writings are now sent to you for both cases.

Having privately understood the wishes of Mr. Hast-
ings, deliver whichever of the writings he shall order
you.”1 — After all this, and after the threats of Mr.
Hastings against all letters from the Nabob which
he might dislike, the meaning of the letters com-
plaining of Bristow cannot be misunderstood. It
was a shrewd surmise of the Nabob, respecting Mac-
pherson : who had become recently a Member of the
Supreme Council, and whose support Mr. Hastings
might require. The accusations, which the Gover-
nor-General afterwards aimed at Mr. Macpherson for
supporting Bristow, fall in, at least, with the conjec-
ture.

The cause which prompted so violent a desire for
his recall is involved in comparative mystery. We
can trace a kind of analogy. As the preceding
removal of Mr. Bristow was immediately followed by
the first visit of the Governor-General to the Nabob ;
so the present removal was immediately followed by
another. This, undoubtedly, proves nothing against
Mr. Hastings : but if there be any other grounds for
suspicion, this tends to confirm them. If these visits
were intended for any unjustifiable transactions
between the Governor and Nabob, the removal of a

1 Minutes of Evidence, ut supra, p. 798, 799, 796.

502

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8.

1784.

witness, whose compliance could not be depended
upon, was just the proceeding which in such circum-
stances, every man would adopt.1

Before the removal of the residency was finally
settled, the Governor-General had represented, that
a great demand existed for his presence in Oude, to
aid in settling the disorders of the country, and in
making such arrangements as would enable the Yizir
to fulfil his engagements. His journey was opposed
by the other Members of the Board. Upon it, how-
ever, for some reason or another, the Governor-Ge-
neral had set his heart. A letter was procured from
Major Palmer, representing the state of the country
as alarming, and urgently requiring the immediate
presence of Mr. Hastings ; with other letters from
the Yizir, and his minister, earnestly requesting to
see the Governor-General at Lucknow. The consent
of a majority of the Council was at last obtained;
and Mr. Hastings was authorized to proceed to
Lucknow, vested with all the powTers of the Board,
to regulate and determine the affairs both internal
and external of the state, and for that purpose to
command even the military resources of the English
government without control. The proposition of the
Governor-General was introduced on the 20th of
January, 1784 ; the consultation was closed, and the
authority of the Board conferred on the 16th of Fe-
bruary; and on the following day, the 17th, the
journey of the Governor-General began.

1 This detail of the conflicting opinions of the council, and of the ma-
chinery by which Hastings maintained a necessary control over the Vizir,
his minister, and the British Resident, is scarcely matter for history, espe-
cially when the object of the whole proves to be the indication of a very
vague inference, unfavourable to the private integrity of Hastings. — W.

SECOND JOURNEY TO THE UPPER PROVINCES. 503

In proceeding to Lucknow, he passed through the B°°^8V‘

province of Benares, which, in the time of Cheyte

Sing and his father, manifested so great a degree of 1/84‘
prosperity ; and, there, witnessed the effects of his
late proceedings. The first deputy w7hom he had
appointed for the Raja was dismissed for the offence
of not making up his payments to the exacted
amount. The second, as might well be expected,
acted upon the “ avowed principle that the sum fixed
for the revenue must he collected.” The consequence
was, that the population were plunged into misery ;
and desolation pervaded the country. “From the
confines of Buxar,” says Mr. Hastings, “ to Benares,

I was followed and fatigued by the clamours of the
discontented inhabitants. The distresses which were
produced by the long-continued drought unavoidably
tended to heighten the general discontent. Yet, I
have reason to fear, that the cause existed princi-
pally, in a defective, if not a corrupt and oppressive
administration.” “ I am sorry to add, that from
Buxar to the opposite boundary, I have seen nothing
but traces of complete devastation in every village.”

“ I cannot help remarking, that except the city of
Benares, the province is in effect without a govern-
ment. The administration of the province is mis-
conducted, and the people oppressed ; trade discou-
raged, and the revenue in danger of a rapid decline
from the violent appropriation of its means.”1 It is
remarkable, how few of the political arrangements of
Mr. Hastings produced the effects which he expected
from them ; and how much his administration con-

1 Letter from the Governor- General to the Council Board, dated
Lucknow, 2nd of April, 1784.

504

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8.

1784.

• sisted in a perpetual change of ill-concerted
. measures. The arrangements for the government of
Benares were his own ; and for the effect of them
he was responsible ; but he enjoyed a happy faculty
of laying the blame at any door rather than his own.
He ascribed the existing evils to the deputy solely ;
and with the approbation of the Council removed
him. The predecessor of that deputy, who trans-
gressed in nothing but the extent of his exactions,
met with a severer fate. To procure some redress
of his grievances, he had even repaired in person to
Calcutta, where, so far from receiving any attention,
he received two peremptory orders from the Supreme
Council to quit the city, and return. Nor was this
all. Upon the arrival of Mr. Hastings at Benares,
he ordered him into prison again ; after which his
vexations and hardships soon put a period to his
life. His poverty was real, and he died insol-
vent.

The Governor-General arrived at Lucknow on the
27th of March. He had some success in obtaining
money from the minister into whose hands the
government was transferred. In order still more to
disburden the revenues of the Vizir, he agreed to
withdraw the English detachment commanded by
Colonel Sir John Gumming, which still was
stationed on the frontiers of Oude at the Nabob’s
expense ; and agreed for this reason, “ That the
Company would gain nothing by its continuance,
since the Nabob had not the means of defraying the
expense ; and whether it remains,” he added, “ on
account of the Company, or be continued to swell
the Nabob’s with an accumulating debt which he

PROCEEDINGS OF HASTINGS AT LUCKNOW.

505

cannot pay, its effects on the Company’s funds will book V

prove the same, while it holds out a deception to the

public.” Mr. Hastings had eluded inquiry into the l785,
truth of the allegations on which the confiscation of
the estates and treasures of the Begums, and others,
had been ordered ; and the commands of the Court
of Directors had till this time remained without effect.

The time, however, was now come, when at least a
partial obedience was deemed expedient ; and Mr.
Hastings reported to the Board, that the jaghires of
the Begums, and of the Nabob Salar Jung, the uncle
of the Vizir, had been “ restored, conformably to the
Company’s orders, and more so to the inclinations of
the Nabob Vizir, who went to Fyzabad for the ex-
press purpose of making a respectful tender of them
in person to the Begums.” The restoration, how-
ever, tardy as it was, fell greatly short of complete-
ness; for Mr. Hastings reported that the personages,
in question, had made a voluntary concession of a
large portion of their respective shares.” The
Governor-General was now so far from expressing
any apprehensions of disorder from the possession of
jaghires by the Princesses and other principal persons
of the Nabob’s family, that he declared his expecta-
tion of their influence in supporting the arrangements
wdiich had taken place with the Vizir.1

The Governor-General departed from Lucknow on
the 27th of August. He arrived at the Presidency
on the 4th of November, resumed his seat at the
Council Board on the 11th, and on the 22nd reminded
the Directors of his request, addressed to them on

1 Letters from the Governor-General to the Council Board, datedBenares,

20th September, 1784.

506

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V

CHAP. 8.

1785.

• the 20th of March in the year 1783, to nominate his
- successor. He now began to prepare for his depar-
ture. On the 8th of February, 1785, he resigned his
oflice, and embarked for England.1

In India, the true test of the government, as affect-
ing the interest of the English nation, is found in its
financial results. In 1772, when the administration
of Mr. Hastings began, the net revenues of Bengal,
Bahar, and Orissa, which, being the principal branch
of receipt, will suffice for that general conception
which is all I can attempt to convey, were 2,373,650/.;
the civil and military charges of the government of
Bengal were 1,705,279/. ; difference 668,371/. : The
whole of the bond and other debts in India were
1,850,166/. ; and the debt in England, including
capital stock, and the sums due to the annuitants,
was 12,850,166/. In 1785, the revenues of Bengal,
Bahar, and Orissa, including the new revenue of
Benares, and the subsidies from Oude, amounted to
5,315,197/. ; the charges, deducting Clive’s jaghire,
30,000/. per annum, which ceased in 1784, one-half
of the allowance to the Nabob of Bengal, and the
tribute to the Mogul, amounted to 4,312,519/. ; the
difference, 1,002,678/., is an improvement upon the
year 1772, of 334,307/. ; but, on the other hand,
the debt in 1786, when the whole of the arrears of
Mr. Hastings’ administration were brought to account,

1 For the preceding train of measures, the reader is referred to the
Papers, relating to the province of Oude, presented to the House of
Commons in the year 1786; to the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixteenth, and
Twenty-second Articles of Charge, presented by Burke, with the Answers
of Mr. Hastings, and the Appendix of Documents printed along with
them ; also to the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, in which the Docu-
ments were printed again.

FINANCIAL RESULTS OF HASTINGS’ ADMINISTRATION. 507

was raised to 15,443,3497 in England: and in book v.

India, including China, to 10,464,9557 ; a sum of

25,908,3347 ; to which should be joined 1,240,0007 l785-
the sum which was yielded by the subscription at 155
per cent, of 800,0007 added this year to the capital-
stock. The administration of Mr. Hastings, there-
fore, added about twelve and a-half millions to the
debt of the East India Company ; and the interest at
five per cent, of this additional debt, is more than the
amount of the additional revenue.1

Nor is this the only unhappy result in the financial
administration of Mr. Hastings. The net territorial
revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, instead of
increasing had actually declined. In the year ending
the 1st of May, 1772, they amounted to the sum of
2,126,7667, and in the year ending on the same
day in 1785, to that of 2,072, 96372 In Lord Corn-
wallis’s celebrated revenue letter, dated 16th Novem-
ber, 1786, it is allowed, that the state of the accounts
exhibits a debt in India of 8,91,25,518 rupees, and
assets valued at 5,81,24,567, with a balance against
the Company of 3,10,00,950. But Lord Cornwallis
observes, that the amount of assets is so much made
up for the sake of show, that is, delusion, that it pre-

1 For these statements see the accounts exhibited in the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Reports of the Committee of Secrecy, in 1781 ; and the accounts
presented to parliament for the several years. See also Bruce’s Plans for
British India, p. 323. — M. It should not be forgotten, however, that
during his administration he had to provide, from the revenues under his
management, for the whole charge of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies,
during most ruinous wars, for armaments sent to their succour, for
operations and negotiations intended for their relief, and for the defence of
Bengal. The addition to the debt was as moderate as could have been
looked for under such extraordinary pressure. — W.

s An account presented to the House of Commons, March 30th, 1786.

508

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. sents a result widely distant from the truth; and

that the balance between the debts, and such assets as

]785- are applicable to their extinction, would not, in his
opinion, fall short of 7,50,00,000 rupees. “ Of this
debt something more than a crore of rupees was sub-
scribed for transference to England, leaving a debt of
about 6| crore, “ nearly the whole of which,” he
says, “ is running at an average rate of interest of 8|
per cent, per annum.” “ For the discharge of this,”

See also the following statement of the Bengal Revenues, taken from the
printed Minutes of Evidence on Mr. Hastings’ Trial, p. 1275.

Years.

Current net
Colleetions.

Balances col-
lected.

Total.

Bengal charges
Collection.

1776—7

187,15,865

13,94,769

201,10,634

49,05,739

1777—8

170,49,710

20,78,451

191,28,161

53,80,818

1778—9

173,95,871

19,19,747

193,15,618

56.45,947

1779-80

180,21,226

15,66,322

195,87,548

56,80,637

Rupees.

711,82,672

69,59,289

781,41,961

216,13,141

1781—2

189,55,004

6,23,989

195,78,993

66,55,869

1782—3

188,24,855

6,50,462

194,75,317

59,63,661

1783—4

181,93,492

4,49,916

186,43,408

71,29,094

1784—5

176,68,646

8,91,701

185,60,348

73,73,738

Rupees.

73,641,997

26,16,069

762,58,066

271,22,362

Less in last four years .

. 18,83,895

Increase in

last four years

55,09,221

1777—1780

Total

580,31,327

1781—1784

576,97,718

Less in last three years

3,33,909

1774—5

195,69.610

17,40,399

213,10,009

1775-6

195,25,825

12,18,176

207,44,001

1776—7

187,15,865

13,94,769

201,10,634

578,11,300

43,53,344

621,64,644

Total in 1781

1784 ...

576,97,718

Less in last three years.

44,66,927

HISTORY OF THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY RESUMED.

509

his Lordships adds, “ your Bengal government alone book 8V-

can hereafter furnish a fund ; which (under the limi-

tations in the estimate) is stated at a gross sum of 1785-
about 46,00,000 current rupees per annum. And

Another View of the Collections under the Bengal Government.

Years.

Current Col-
lections.

Collected

account

Balances.

Gross Col-
lection.

Charges

Collection

Annual Receipts
into the
Treasury.

1772-

-3

2,37,29,763

18,18,226

2,56,17,989

41,56,970

2,14,61,019

1773—4

2,35,77,528

18,05,528

2,53,83,057

43,02,596

2,10,80,460

1774—5

2,37,20,882

17,40,399

2,54,61,282

41,51,272

2,13,10,009

1775-

-6

2,40,33,296

12,18,176

2,55,51,472

45,07,471

2,10,44.001

1776-

-7

2,36,21,604

13,94,769

2,56,16,373

49,05,739

2,01,10,434

1777-

-8

2,24,30,527

20,79.450

2,45,08,978

53,80,818

1.91,28,160

1778-

-9

2,30,41,818

19,19,747

2,49,61 565

56,45,946

1,93,15,618

1779-80

2,37,01,863

15,66,321

2,47,68,185

56,80,937

1,90,83,547

1780-81

2,26,82,691

14,24,542

2,41,07,233

60,98,510

1,80,08,723

1781-

-2

2,56,10,873

6,23.989

2,62,34,863

66,55,869

1,95,78,993

1782-

-3

2,47,88,515

6,50,461

2,54,38,977

59,63,660

1,94,75,316

1783—4

2,53,22.585

4,49,915

2,57,72,201

71,29,093

1,86,43,107

Mr. Stuart’s Minute on the Revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa ;
Minutes of printed Evidence of Hastings’ Trial, Appendix, Art. vi. No. 157,
p. 904.— M.

This statement, it may be remarked, explains the preceding, and puts
in a clearer light, The real nature of the financial operations of Hastings’s
administration. The absolute collections of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa,
had not declined, on the contrary, they had increased. The total collec-
tions of 1772 were rupees 2.56.17.000 ; those of 1783, 2.57.72.000, giving a
surplus on the latter of rupees 1.55.000. The former period too, it should
be remembered, was the first year of the new settlement, under which
farmers of the revenue bade against each other, and raised the amount to a
height which proved ruinous. The charges of collection had at the same
time increased, and these being deducted from the collectors, left a decrease
upon the “ net” collections. As observed by Mr. Macpherson, the suc-
cessor of Hastings, those charges “ might more properly be called the
increasing expenses of our government, than the increased expenses of the
collection of the Revenue,” including, in fact, the charges of the Dewani
and Foujdari Adaulut, or Civil and Criminal Courts, besides many other
expenses only remotely connected with the business of collection. Min.
Evid. 714, 722 — 904. The strong tendency of such charges to increase,
and the difficulty of effectively controlling them in seasons when the
energies of the government are absorbed by great political interests, are so
universally a part of the history of all administrations, in all countries, that
they reflect no particular discredit on the government of Hastings. — W.

510

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAF. 8

1782.

• the ordinary expenses of your different settlements,
- allowing for the provision of an European investment,
at present exceed their resources.”1 That is to say ;
The revenue of the Indian government at the close
of the administration of Mr. Hastings, was not equal
to its ordinary expense.

The incidents which had occurred under the Pre-
sidency of Madras, from the period of terminating
the war with Tippoo, till the time when Mr. Hastings
surrendered his office, remain to he adduced.

The situation of the Nabob of Arcot, as it had
long been, so it continued to be, a source of uneasi-
ness and of difficulty to the English rulers in the
southern Presidency. The wretched government
which that Nabob maintained, and which his want
of talents, his want of virtue, and the disadvantages
of his situation, disqualified him for improving, not
only sunk the people into the deepest wretchedness,
but cut off the resources required for the defence of
the country. The impossibility, which the Presi-
dents had experienced, of obtaining, through his
hands, the means which were necessary to provide for
the security of the province; or their connivance,
from unworthy motives, at his unwillingness to
provide them, had laid open the country to all the
disasters, to which the weak and unprotected state
in which it was found by Hyder Ali exposed it.
When the war began, the strongest necessity existed
for rendering the resources of the country available
to its defence. Supplies, in the highest degree
defective, had been obtained from the Nabob; nor

1 Extract from Revenue Letter, printed by order of the House of
Commons, 1787.

MACHINATIONS AGAINST LORD MACARTNEY.

511

was there any rational prospect of improvement. ®°°rK8v‘

F or the payment of particular debts, both to the

Company and to individuals, it had been usual with 1782-
him, according to the custom of Indian princes, to
grant assignments on the revenues of particular
districts; and no inconsiderable portion of the
whole was under this disposition. As the exigency
was peculiarly violent ; nothing less being imme-
diately at stake, than the existence, in the Carnatic,
of both the Nabob and the English ; Lord Macartney
regarded an extension of the same expedient, namely,
an assignment of all his revenues, as the only feasible
plan for meeting the present difficulties ; and com-
pliance with it, as no unreasonable condition imposed
on the Nabob, seeing the proceeds were to be em-
ployed for his own defence, and that it was impos-
sible, he could, if defended at all, be so well
defended, by any other means. Not without great
difficulty the consent of the Nabob was obtained.

It was an arrangement far from agreeable to that
vanity and ambition, which formed a strong ingre-
dient in his character. And there was no want of
persons in his confidence who inflamed his discon-
tent; and who excited him to employ every strata-
gem to obtain the surrender of the power he had
given away.

It has already been observed, that the seat or
durbar of the Nabob, who had taken up his residence
at Madras, was one of the most corrupt and active
scenes of intrigue, that had ever been exhibited in
India. The Nabob, who was totally incompetent to
his own defence, was necessarily in a state of abject
dependence upon the Company ; but, receiving di-

512

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. rectly the revenues of the country, he endeavoured,

as tar as possible, by the application ot money, to

1782- secure the gratification of his will. His policy was,
to purchase friends among the English rulers ; and
to excite opposition to those whose acquiescence he
failed in acquiring. The effects were mischievous,
in a variety of ways. The servants of the Company
were too frequently taught to look to the violation,
rather than the performance of the duties, as their
most certain source of reward ; and the business of
the Presidency was in general disturbed by a violent
spirit of division and counteraction.

The mind of the Nabob was of that class of minds
which must, by a kind of necessity, be always
governed by somebody ; and in the imbecility of age,
and of a constitution Avorn with indulgence, he now
leaned more absolutely on the accustomed support,
than at an earlier period of his life. The persons
who at this period had acquired the entire ascendency
over him Avere Ameer ul Omrah, his second son, and
Paul Benfield. The former is described as excelling
in all the arts of eastern, the latter in all the arts of
western, villany. The passion of the former was
power, the passion of the latter, money ; and this
much, at least, appears, that both pursued their ends
with much ardour, with great talents for intrigue,
with great audacity, and not much of moral restraint.
The immediate object of the former was to get his
elder brother disinherited, and to obtain the succes-
sion for himself. For this purpose the old Nabob,
whose passions and those of his favourite were one,
had employed all his arts to obtain from the Com-
pany an acknoAvledgment, that he had the right of

MACHINATIONS AGAINST LORD MACARTNEY. 513

naming his successor, without regard to the esta-BOOK^v.

blished order of inheritance. With a view, by

obtaining favour with the English, to pave the way 1782-
to this and other desirable objects, the Ameer ul
Omrah had acted the part of a zealous instrument in
obtaining the consent of his father to the assignment
of the revenues. When he found that Lord Macart-
ney was as little subservient to his purposes, after this
event as before, his disappointment and his enmity
were equally strong. His endeavour was to render the
assignment useless ; to annul, if possible, the trans-
action. As he had his father’s mind compliant in all
things, so he had it eager in the pursuit of an end,
the hope of which served as a balm to the wound
his pride had received, in ever relinquishing the
management of the revenues. In Benfield he met
with an able coadjutor. Benfield had been re-
moved by Lord Macartney from some of the offices
which he held as a servant of the Company. The
liberalities and the views of the Nabob and his son
pointed out a path to fortune as well as revenge.

The first expedient was, by practising on the
renters, and other persons in charge of the revenues,
to render unproductive the collections. Disordered
and desolate as the country was, without a govern-
ment, and ravaged by a destructive foe, the realizing
of any revenue was in itself a difficult task. Lord
Macartney had appointed a committee, consisting of
some of the most trust-worthy of the Company’s
servants at the Presidency, for conducting the busi-
ness relative to the assigned revenues. They
speedily discovered, that secret orders and sugges-
tions, which counteracted all their proceedings, had

2 l

VOL. IV.

514

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. been sent into the districts. The people had been

taught to distrust the validity of the engagements

J 782. formed with the English government; and hence to
practise all the arts of delay and evasion. The
greatest oppression was evidently exercised upon the
unhappy cultivators : yet little could be obtained
from the renters and collectors for the Company’s
treasury; while large sums, it is affirmed, were
privately sent to the Ameer ul Omrah. 1

The known enmity of Sir Eyre Coote to Lord
Macartney suggested the first stratagem for over-
turning the engagement with the President. A bait
was offered, the attractions of which, it was supposed,
the avidity of the General for power would not be
able to resist. The Nabob offered to vest in his
hands full authority over all the officers of his
government and revenues. But the General too
well knew what a frightful chaos his government
was, to have any desire for the responsibility of so
dangerous a trust.

As soon as it was found that the ear of the
Governor-General was open to representations against
the Governor of Madras, it was a channel in which
the Nabob and his instruments industriously plied.
Lord Macartney was accused of not having abilities
to render the assignment of the revenues productive :
of enhancing the disorders of the country ; and,
above all, of practising the utmost cruelty and oppres-
sion towards the Nabob and his family. Letters of
this import were not only sent at various times in
the Nabob’s name to Bengal ; but one was written
and transmitted to the British King.

1 Barrow’s Life of Macartney, i. 241.

CONDUCT OF HASTINGS TOWARDS MACARTNEY.

515

Sufficient encouragement having been received B00K v-

from the Governor-General, the Nabob ventured at

last to solicit the restoration of his revenues, by the l783-
surrender of the assignment ; and his former agents,

Assam Khan, and Mr. Richard Sullivan, were sent
on a second mission to Bengal, in January, 1783.

Their criminative representations against Macart-
ney were received; and not only entered on the
records, but immediately sent to England ; without
communication to the party accused ; and of course
without an opportunity afforded him of obviating
their effects, however undeserved, by a single word
of defence. A most singular examination of the
Nabob’s agents or advocates took place before the
Supreme Council, on the subjects on which the
Nabob prayed their interference. The agents were
directed to state whatever they knew, and did state
whatever they chose ; matters of hearsay, as much
as of perception ; without a word of cross-exami-
nation, from an opposite party, to limit and correct
the partial representation of interested reporters.

After completing their statements, and not before,
they were asked, if they would swear to the truth of
what they had stated. The compulsion was almost
irresistible. To have said, they would not swear,
was to confess they had not spoken truth. Assam
Khan, however, excused himself, on the plea that it
was not honourable for a Mussulman to confirm
what he said by an oath. Mr. Sullivan had no such
apology, and therefore he took his oath, but with a
tolerable latitude ; that, “ to the best of his belief
and remembrance, he had spoken the truth, and
nothing but the truth ; ” an oath which, if we have

2 L 2

516

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

-- ^ • charity enough to believe it to be in no degree

strained, affected not any part of the truth, however

1/M material, which it might have suited and pleased
him to suppress.

On the strength of this information, partial and
interested as it was, a resolution was passed, on the
8th of January, 1783, to surrender the assignment
into the hands of the Nabob; though not only had
this assignment been formerly approved and highly
praised by the Governor-General and Council, as an
act of equal utility and justice, but the delicacy of
the Madras government, which endeavoured to
accomplish the end by gentle means, had been
treated as too scrupulous, and the utility of a greater
severity particularly and strongly displayed.1

The interruption and disturbance which the Nabob
was able to give to the government of Madras, he was
emboldened to carry to the greatest height, by the

1 The reader should have before him the very words. In the letter
from the Governor-General and Council to the president and Select
Committee of Fort St. George, dated 5th April, 1782, they “regret,’’
they say, “ that the government of Madras should have suffered any
consideration, even of delicacy towards the Nabob, or attention for
those feelings which it might be natural for him to retain, to restrain
them from availing themselves as effectually for the assignment as the
desperate necessity which exacted such a concession, inevitably de-
manded.” They add a great compliment, and say, “ Happy would it be
for the national interest and reputation, if the same disinterested and
forbearing spirit should invariably dictate the conduct of their affairs.”
They rise to the use of unlimited terms, instructing the Governor to
assume every power necessary to render the assignment effective — “ in
a word, the whole sovereignty” (such is their expression) “ if it shall
be necessary to the exercise of such a charge, not admitting the inter-
position of any authority whatever, which may possibly impede it. If
you continue the Nabob’s agents; or suffer them to remain, under what-
ever denomination, in the actual or virtual control of the revenue, they
are your servants, and you alone will be deemed responsible for all
their acts. And your intercourse with the Nabob may and ought to be
restricted to simple acts and expressions of kindness.”

ASSIGNMENT OF THE CARNATIC TERRITORY.

517

encouragement which he received from so high a v.

quarter. A viler display of hypocrisy is not upon

record, than the language in which the author of the 1783‘
calamities of the whole Rohilla nation, of those of
Cheyte Sing, and of the Begums of Oude, affected to
bewail the cruelties which, he said, were practised
upon the Nabobs of the Carnatic and Oude, by Lord
Macartney, and Mr. Bristow. “ The condition,” Mr.
Hastings said,1 “ of both Princes is equally destitute
and equally oppressed; and the humiliation of their
remonstrances shows them to be equally hopeless of
any redress but in the mercy of their oppressors.”3
Orders were despatched to Madras for the restoration
of his revenues to the Nabob ; of which the sixth
part, which he had reserved to himself, as requisite
for the maintenance of his family and dignity, had
been exactly paid; and in reality yielded to him more
money for his private purposes, than he had ever
before enjoyed. It curiously happened, that before
the orders of the Supreme Council arrived at Madras,
despatches were received from the Court of Directors,
which conveyed their approbation of the assignment,
and commanded the assistance of the Bengal govern-
ment to render it effectual ; despatches which, at the

1 In Ins Minute on the 2nd of November, 1783, printed among the
papers presented to the House of Commons on the 13th of March, 1786.

For the opinion which Mr. Hastings entertained of the mischievous cha-
racter of the Nabob, and of the intrigues of which he was at once the
cause and the dupe, entertained as long as since the period when he was
second in council at Madras; see the records of that Presidency in
Rous’s Appendix, p. 682*, 688*, 704, 717, 718, 729.

2 Nothing is here stated but the truth; and the cases of both princes were
not analogous to those with which they are contrasted. At the same time
there is no doubt that Hastings would have felt little sympathy for either,
if he thought their situation incompatible with public benefit or necessity.

— W.

518

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. same time, contained the condemnation of the trans-

action by which Mr. Sullivan was appointed an agent

I/83. 0f t]ie Supreme Council at the residence of the
Nabob, and a declaration that the only organ of com-
munication with Mohammed Ali was the Governor
and Council of Madras. Upon this communication
from the Court of Directors, the Governor and
Council applied to the Supreme Council for the as-
sistance which they were commanded to yield. After
a hesitation of a few months, the Supreme Council
resolved to disobey : And informing the Governor
and Council of Madras, that they assumed the right
of judging for themselves, they repeated their orders
of the 13th of January, and commanded the surrender
of the assignment.

The consequences of obedience appeared to Lord
Macartney of the most alarming description. The
pay of the Madras army was at that moment seven
months in arrear : from the resources of the Carnatic
alone was any supply to be obtained : not a single
pagoda, since the death of Sir Eyre Coote, had been
sent from Bengal : if the assignment was given up,
the slender produce of the Circars, which Mr. Hast-
ings wmuld have sacrificed, would alone have re-
mained : and neither the native, nor European troops,
could be expected to bear any addition to the pri-
vations which they now endured. With a prospect
of the actual dissolution of the government, if the
revenues, on which every thing depended, were at
so extraordinary a moment given up ; and fully im-
pressed with the conviction, that to surrender them
to the Nabob was to render them unavailing to the
defence of the country, defence which then fell upon’

ALLOWANCES TO BE MADE FOR HASTINGS.

519

the Company without any resources, and oppressed book v.

them with a burden which they were unable to bear,

he resolved to maintain the assignment, which, at 1785.
the close of the second year, had yielded one million
sterling from those very countries, which for eighteen
months after the invasion of Hyder Ali had not con-
tributed a pagoda toward the expenses of the war.

With this disobedience, Mr. Hastings, whose ad-
ministration was now so formidably assailed in Eng-
land, and who was deeply concerned in the success
with which he might perform the business of winding
it up, found, either not leisure, or not inclination, to
enter into contest.1

After the unreserved exhibition, which I have ac-
counted it my duty to make, of the evidence which
came before me of the errors and vices of Mr. Hast-
ings’s administration, it is necessary, for the satisfac-
tion of my own mind, and to save me from the fear
of having given a more unfavourable conception than
I intended of his character and conduct, to impress
upon the reader the obligation of considering two
things. The first is, that Mr. Hastings was placed
in difficulties, and acted upon by temptations, such as
few public men have been called upon to overcome :

And of this the preceding history affords abundant
evidence. The second is, that no man, probably, who
ever had a great share in the government of the
world, had his public conduct so completely explored,
and laid open to view. The mode of transacting the
business of the Company, almost wholly by writing;

1 Papers presented to the House of Commons, pursuant to their orders
of the 9th of February, 1803, regarding the affairs of the Carnatic, vol. ii. ;
Barrow’s Life of Lord Macartney, i. 238 — 280

520

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK ^

CHAP. 8.

1785.

• first, by 'written consultations in the Council ;
- secondly, by written commands on the part of the
Directors, and written statements of every thing done
on the part of their servants in India; afforded a
body of evidence, such as under no other government
ever did or could exist. This evidence was brought
forward, with a completeness never before exempli-
fied, first by the contentions of a powerful party in
the Council in India ; next by the inquiries of two
searching committees of the House of Commons ; in
the third jdace by the production of almost every
paper which could be supposed to throw light upon
his conduct, during the discussions upon the proceed-
ings relative to his impeachment in the House of
Commons ; lastly, by the production of papers upon
his trial. And all this was elucidated and commented
upon by the keenest spirits of the age ; and for a
long time without any interposition of power to
screen his offences from detection. It is my firm
conviction, that if we had the same advantage with
respect to other men, who have been as much en-
gaged in the conduct of public affairs, and could view
their conduct as completely naked, and stripped of
all its disguises, few of them would be found, whose
character would present a higher claim to indul-
gence than his. In point of ability, he is beyond all
question the most eminent of the chief rulers whom
the Company have ever employed ; nor is there any
one of them, who would not have succumbed under
the difficulties which, if he did not overcome, he at
any rate sustained. He had no genius, any more
than Clive, for schemes of policy including large
views of the past, and large anticipations of the

POINTS OF MERIT IN HASTINGS’S ADMINISTRATION.

521

future ; but he was hardly ever excelled in the skill 8

of applying temporary expedients to temporary difh

culties ; in putting off the evil day ; and in giving a 1,8a'
fair complexion to the present one. He had not the
forward and imposing audacity of Clive ; but he had
a calm firmness, which usually, by its constancy,
wore out all resistance. He was the first, or among
the first of the servants of the Company, who at-
tempted to acquire any language of the natives, and
who set on foot those liberal inquiries into the lite-
rature and institutions of the Hindus, which have led
to the satisfactory knowledge of the present day.

He had the great art of a ruler, which consists in at-
taching to the Governor those who are governed; his
administration assuredly was popular, both with his
countrymen and the natives in Bengal.1

1 The same course is here adopted that was pursued in regard to Clive,
and an inculpatory review of almost all the leading measures of the admi-
nistration of Hastings is nullified by a tardy admission of its general
merits. But if all his most important acts are open to the charges of
cruelty, injustice,vindictiveness, corruption, vileness, self-seeking, dishonesty,
and hypocrisy ; if he trampled upon the just rights of all the native princes
with whom he had to deal ; if he instigated and fostered wars of unjust
aggression ; if he interfered unauthorizedly and impoliticly with the powers
of the other Presidencies ; if he patronized base and corrupt men, and dis-
missed and persecuted honest men ; if he employed the authority of justice
to sanctify falsehood, and even to minister to his vengeance ; it is not pos-
sible to conceive in what his redeeming virtues consisted. It cannot be
believed, that with all this mass of criminality against him, he should have
enjoyed the attachment of those he governed, and that his administration
should have been popular, not only with his countrymen, but with the
natives of Bengal. The more ready solution of the problem is, the falsehood
of the accusation. That every act of a government, so full of momentous
and perilous matter as his, should be free from rational exception, perhaps
from just censure, would be a phenomenon to which the history of man
could afford no parallel. Like other men, he was occasionally ignorant or
imperfectly informed ; he doubted, he wavered, he changed his opinion,
he was biassed by his feelings ; he judged erroneously, he acted wrongly.
He was not, however, judged like other men, by his acts, but every

522

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

chap.

1780.

CHAPTER IX.

Legislative Proceedings from 1773 to 1780. —
Renewal of the Charter. — Select and Secret Com-
mittees of the House of Commons Proceedings

against Indian Delinquency. — Mr. Dundas’s Past
India Bill. — Mr. Fox's East India Bills. — Mr.
Pitt's East India Bill.

v. It is now time to inquire into the proceedings to
_ which the affairs of India had given birth in England
since the last great legislative interference. From
the year 1767 till the year 1773, the East India
Company was hound to pa.y to the public, yearly, the
sum of 400,000/., “ in respect of the territorial
acquisitions and revenues lately obtained in the East
Indies.” But in the year 1773, the financial embar-
rassments of the Company became so great, that
they were obliged to solicit, and they received, a loan
from the public of 1,400,0001. At that time it was
represented, “ That in the then circumstances of the

mistake or misconception, every hasty impression, every fluctuating pur-
pose, every injudicious resolution, was hunted out, made public, and
arrayed in evidence against him. The Author may well say, that few
statesmen could endure such a searching exposure. The ultimate decision
of the world will, however, be pronounced not upon a pitiful dissection of
his private, but the great body of his public acts, and this decision has
already elevated him above grovelling detraction. We look now with
wonder, not unmixed with contempt, upon the almost insane virulence
with which he was assailed, and think of him in no other character than that
of the ablest of the able men who have given to Great Britain her Indian
empire. — W.

LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS.

523

East India Company, it would not be in their power gv-

to provide for the repayment of such loan, and for

the establishing their affairs upon a more secure 178°-
foundation for the time to come, unless the public
should agree to forego for the present all partici-
pation in the profits arising from the territorial
acquisitions and revenues lately obtained in the East
Indies.”1 It was, accordingly, at that time enacted,
that it should not be lawful to make a dividend of
more than six per cent, per annum on the Company’s
capital stock, till that loan was repaid ; and that the
w7hole of their surplus profits should be applied to
its liquidation: that after the loan of 1 ,400,000?.
should be repaid, it should not be lawful to make a
dividend of more than seven per cent, per annum,
upon the capital stock, until, by the application of
the whole of their surplus profits, their bond debt
should be reduced to the sum of 1,500,000?. In the
year 1779, the loan being repaid, and the debt
reduced, according to the terms of the preceding
ordinance, an act was passed, to be in force for one
year, permitting a dividend of eight per cent, for
that year, and reserving the surplus profits for the
future disposal of the legislature. In the year 1780,
another act was passed for one year also, containing
precisely the same enactments as that of the preceding
year.

As the exclusive privileges were to expire upon
three years’ notice after the 25th of March, 1780, it
was now high time to treat about a renewal of the
charter; and accordingly, during the latter part of

Such arc the words of the preamble of the act, 21 Geo. III. c. 65,

524

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK 1

CHAP. 9

1781.

T- that year, and the beginning of 1781, much nego-
- tiation took place between the treasury and the East
India House. In parliament, the business was of
very difficult handling. The contests between the
Supreme Council and Supreme Court, which were
represented as actually opposing one another with an
armed force, had given occasion to petitions from the
British subjects in India, from the Governor-General
and Council, and from the East India Company ; and
had made a deep impression upon the public mind.
The complaints and representations of Mr. Francis,
taken up warmly by a powerful party in the legis-
lative assembly, had filled the nation with ideas of
injustice and other crimes on the part of Mr. Hast-
ings. Intelligence had been received of the irrup-
tion of Hyder Ali into the Carnatic, with the strongest
representations of the misconduct of those agents
under whom so much calamity had arrived. And
strong fears were excited, that the ruin of the
English interests, in that part of the world, was at
hand.

The points were two, upon which the views of the
minister and the Company found it difficult to concur;
the right to the territory ; and the remuneration due
to the public for the advantages which the East India
Company were allowed to enjoy. According to the
minister, the right of the crown to all territory
acquired by subjects, was a matter of established
law. The Company were at this time sufficiently
bold to assert, that the Indian territory which they
had acquired belonged of right to themselves. On
the other point, the only question was, what propor-
tion of the proceeds from the Indian territory the

PROPOSITIONS OF LORD NORTH.

525

East India Company should be made to give up to B®°^9V'

the nation.

Lord North was now tottering on the ministerial 1781>
throne ; the East India Company were, therefore,
encouraged to greater boldness, in standing out for
favourable terms ; and they declined to bring forward
a petition for a renewal of the charter, on those
terms to which the minister desired to reduce them.

On the 9th of April, 1781, he represented, that
“ though he did not then intend to state any specific
proposition relative to the future management of the
Company’s affairs, still he held it to be his duty to
state to the House some points, that would be very
proper for them to consider, before they should pro-
ceed to vote. First, the propriety of making the
Company account with the public for three-fourths
of all the net profits above eight per cent, for
dividend ; Secondly, of granting a renewal of the
charter for an exclusive trade for a short rather than
a long term ; Thirdly, of giving a greater degree of
power than had been hitherto enjoyed, to the
Governor of Bengal, that, in future, among the
members of the Council, he might he something
more than a primus inter pares, equal with the name
of chief; Fourthly, of establishing a tribunal in
England, for jurisdiction in affairs relating to India,
and punishing those servants of the Company who
should be convicted of having abused their power;

Fifthly, the propriety, as all the despatches received
from India by the Directors were by agreement
shown to his Majesty’s Secretary of State, of making
all despatches to India be shown to him before they
were sent, lest the Directors might, at some time or

526

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1781

gv- other, precipitate this kingdom into a war, without
— necessity, with the princes of that country ; Sixthly,”

• he said, “ it would be the business of the House to
determine, upon wThat terms, and whether with or
without the territorial revenues, the charter should
be renewed ; Seventhly, whether, if government
should retain the territories, it might not compel the
Company to bring home the revenue for govern-
ment; and, Eighthly, whether any, and what regu-
lations ought to be made, with respect to the
Supreme Court of Judicature.” 1 *

Of these propositions, the third, the fourth, and
the fifth, are remarkable, as the archetype, from
which were afterwards copied three of the principal
provisions in Mr. Pitt’s celebrated East India bill.3
At last a compromise was effected between the

1 See Parlimentary History, xxii. 111.

s The purport of these three propositions he expressed more explicitly
on the 25th of May. “ He had an idea which he had once thrown out,
of giving the Governor-General greater powers than were at present
vested in him ; authorizing him in some cases to act independently of
his Council, only stating to them, after he had so acted, the reasons
upon which he justified his conduct, and sending home those reasons;
together with such as the Council should at the time have delivered, in

case they differed in opinion from the Governor-General Another

matter he designed to introduce was this: At present the Company were
obliged to send copies of all their despatches from India, but not of any of the
orders and instructions which they sent out : He meant, therefore, to insert
in the bill a clause, obliging them to show to the Lords of the Treasury,
or the Secretaries of State, all their instructions to their servants that
related to their political and military conduct ; and to add further, that
if his Majesty thought proper to signify, through his Secretaries of State,
to the Directors, any order relative to the particular conduct of the Com-
pany’s servants, in regard to the prosecution and management of war in
India, or to the political direction of affairs, or to any treaties with the
powers in India, that the Directors should be obliged to obey such order,

and to send it out to India immediately He thought it would be

a desirable thing to establish a Court of Judicature in this kingdom, to
hear and determine, in a summary way, all charges of peculation and
oppression in India.” Ib. p. 326.

RENEWAL OF THE CHARTER.

527

minister and the Directors. A petition for renewal B00K v-

of the charter was presented from the Directors, on

the 26th of June, 1781. And an act was passed, of 178L
which the following were the principal provisions :

That, whereas the Company, since the 24th of June,

1778, when they had paid their loan to the public,
and reduced their bond debt to the pre-appointed
limits, had been in possession of all the profits arising
from the Indian territory, exempt from participation
with the public, they pay 400,000?. to the public, in
discharge of all claims upon that account previous to
the 1st of March, 1781 : That all the former privi-

leges granted to the Company be continued to them,
till three years’ notice after the 1st of March, 1791 :

That the Company pay out of their clear profits, a
dividend of eight per cent, per annum on the capital
stock, and of the surplus three-fourths to the public,
reserving the remainder to their own use : And that

the claims with respect to the territory, on the part
both of the Crown and of the Company, remain un-
affected by the present act. Of the propositions,
thrown out by the minister, for the introduction of
reforms into the government of India, only one was
carried into effect ; namely, that regarding the powers
of ministers over the political transactions of the
Company. It was ordained that they should com-
municate to ministers all despatches which they sent
to India, with respect to their revenues, and their
civil and military affairs ; and that in all matters
relative to war and peace, and transactions with
other powers, they should be governed by the direc-
tions which ministers might prescribe.1

' 21 Geo. HI. cap. 65.

528

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK
CHAP. 9.

1781.

On the 12th of February, 1781, petitions from the
Governor- General and Council, and from a number
of British subjects residing in Bengal, and from the
United Company of merchants trading to the East
Indies, against the pretensions and proceedings of
the Supreme Court of Judicature, were read in the
House of Commons ; and after a debate it was
agreed, that a Select Committee should be chosen to
whom they were referred. This wms that celebrated
committee who were afterwards instructed to take
into consideration the administration of justice, in the
provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa ; and in what
manner that country might be governed with greatest
advantage to the people both of Great Britain and of
India; in which Committee the most conspicuous, as
well as the most laborious member, was Edmund
Burke.

The Select Committee was moved for by General
Smith, who belonged to what is called the opposition
party in the House ; and it was chiefly composed of
members who had acted not in concert with the
minister. That a wTant of equal zeal for the elucida-
tion of Indian delinquency might not be imputed to
his party, the minister, on the 30th of April, imme-
diately after the arrival of newTs of the irruption of
Hyder Ali into the Carnatic, moved for the formation
of a Secret Committee, who should inquire into the
causes of the war, then subsisting in the Carnatic,
and into the state of the British possessions on the
coast. This Committee was composed almost entirely
of persons connected with the minister ; and Mr.
Henry Dundas, then Lord Advocate of Scotland,
was its presiding and most active member.

FORMATION OF MR. DUNDAS’S COMMITTEE.

529

The first of these Committees presented the House book v

x # # CHAP. 9.

with twelve Reports, the other with six ; and the

public is deeply indebted to them for the publication 178L
of the most important documents of the Indian go-
vernment, during the period to which their inquiries
applied. Any considerable desire for the welfare of
India, guided by any considerable degree of intelli-
gence, would have drawn a great lesson from that
example. An adequate plan for a regular, and suc-
cessive, and still more perfect publication of the most
material documents of the Indian administration,
would be one of the most efficient of all expedients
for improving the government of that distant depend-
ency.1

On the 23rd of May, a report from the Select Com-
mittee on the petitions against the Supreme Court
was read ; and leave given to bring in a bill, for the
better administration of justice in Bengal, for the
relief of certain persons imprisoned at Calcutta under
a judgment of the Court, and for indemnifying the
Governor-General and Council for resisting its pro-
cess. The subject was debated on the 19th of June,

Mr. Dunning being the most remarkable of the oppo-

1 The Reports of the two Committees, described in the text, undoubtedly
contain a vast mass of authentic and important matter, so as to have
extracted from the Records of the Company all that is of consequence for
the elucidation of events during the periods to which they refer. Some of
the contents are trivial and irrelevant, but the whole compilation is of
exceeding value. Many important official documents, illustrative of the
history of British India, have been published from time to time, since the
date of those celebrated Reports, and, consistently with the spirit of the
present day, official muniments regarding India are likely to be multiplied.
Their utility, however, is even already impaired by their abundance, and
the labour of consulting them is unfavourable to their being advantageously
consulted. A systematized and judicious selection is wanted, to render
them conveniently subservient to public information. — W.

VOL. IV. 2 M

530

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
ciiAr. 9.

1782.

nents of the bill. It was passed without delay ; and
it exempted from the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court the Governor-General and Council, all matters
of revenue, and all Zemindars, and other native
farmers and collectors of the revenue.1

Lord North resigned the office of Minister in the
month of March, 1782 ; and was succeeded by the
Marquis of Rockingham and party, the hostility of
whom to the present managers in India was suffi-
ciently known.

On the 9th of April, 1782, Mr. Dundas moved
that the reports wffiich he had presented as Chairman
of the Secret Committee should be referred to a
Committee of the whole House; and, in a speech of
nearly three hours in length, unfolded the causes and
extent of the national calamities in the East. He
expatiated on the misconduct of the Indian Presi-
dencies, and of the Court of Directors ; of the former,
because they plunged the nation into wTars for the
sake of conquest, contemned and violated the en-
gagement of treaties, and plundered and oppressed

1 The object of the act is not so much to exempt from the jurisdiction of
the Court natives of India inhabitants of the provinces, as to forbid the
pretexts under which they had been attempted to be brought within that
jurisdiction. It is therefore enacted, that no person shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, for, or by reason of his being a land-
owner, land-holder or farmer of land, or deriving his support in any way
from connexion with landed property, or exercising any ordinary or local
authority commonly annexed to the possession or farm of lands. It also
declared that no native, for or by reason of his being employed by the
Company, or British subjects, either in public or private matters, should
become subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in any questions
of inheritance or contract, except under special agreement. The exemp-
tions of the Governor and Council, and the prohibition of the Court’s inter-
ference on matters of revenue, are as stated in the text. See a useful
compilation, entitled the Law relating to India and the East India Com-
pany, 1840, p. 41. — W.

RESOLUTIONS MOVED BY MR. DUNDAS.

531

the people of India; of the latter, because they
blamed misconduct only when it was unattended
with profit, but exercised a very constant forbearance
towards the greatest delinquency, as often as it was
productive of a temporary gain. The speech was
followed up by a number of propositions, which he
moved in the shape of resolutions. Beside the
reproaches which these resolutions cast upon the
general strain of the Company’s administration in
India, they pronounced a condemnation, so strong,
upon the measures of the Presidency of Madras, that
nothing less than criminal proceedings against the
authors of them could accord with so vehement a
declaration of their guilt. The resolutions were so-
lemnly voted ; articles of charge against Sir Thomas
Bumbold and other Members of the Madras Council
were adopted ; and a bill of pains and penalties, for
breaches of public trust, and high crimes and mis-
demeanors, committed by Sir Thomas Rumbold, was
introduced by Mr. Dundas. The bill was read a first
time. Before the second reading, Sir Thomas Rum-
bold was heard in his defence. The session drew to
a close, before a great progress was made. In the
beginning of 1783, the state of the ministry was
unsettled. And, as if, when ministry is unsettled,
parliament were inadequate to its functions, the bill
was neglected till the middle of the session. After
the middle of the session, the members soon began to
be remiss in their attendance.1 And on the 19th of

book v.

CHAP. 9.

1782.

’ On the 2nd of May, 1783, “ The Lord Advocate complained of the very
thin attendance that he had hitherto found, whenever the bill of pains and
penalties against Sir Thomas Rumbold became the subject of discussion. He
wished to know whether it was seriously intended to pursue the business to
theendor not? Ifitwas the intention of the House to drop it, he wished to

2 M 2

532

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

December, immediately after the dismissal of Mr.

Fox’s coalition ministry, a motion was made and

1783- carried for adjourning the further consideration of
the bill till the 24th day of June next, hy which the
prosecution was finally dropped. Sir Thomas con-
sented to accept of impunity without acquittal ; his
judges refused to proceed in his trial, after they
had solemnly affirmed the existence of guilt; and
a black stain was attached to the character of
them both.

Beside his prosecution of Sir Thomas Rumbold,
Mr. Dundas proceeded to urge the legislature to spe-
cific propositions against Mr. Hastings, and Mr.
Hornby, the presiding members of the other Presi-
dencies. Against Mr. Hastings, in particular, he
preferred a grievous accusation, grounded on the re-
cent intelligence of the ruin brought upon the Raja
Cheyte Sing. On the 30th of May, 1782,’ he moved,
and the House adopted, the following resolution :
“ That Warren Hastings, Esq. Governor-General of
Bengal, and William Hornhy, Esq. President of the
Council of Bombay, having in sundry instances acted

be made acquainted with that circumstance, and then he would not move
for another hearing on the subject: for it was a mockery to go into the
evidence on the bill, when there could not be kept together a sufficient
number of members to make a house. — Mr. Fox declared, that, to drop
the bill would be productive of the most fatal consequences ; for it would
convince the world, that the most atrocious misconduct in India would meet
with impunity in parliament. And, therefore, he requested gentlemen
would, for the credit, honour, and interest of the country, attend to the
evidence for and against the bill. If the bill should be lost for want of
attendance, it would not clear the character of Sir. T. Rumbold. On the
other hand, it would hold out this idea to the people of India, that it was
in vain for them to expect redress of their grievances in England — Mr. W.
Pitt thought, that some mode might be devised to enforce attendance, as
in the case of ballots for election committees.” Parliamentary History,
xxiii. 805.

RESOLUTIONS AGAINST MR. HASTINGS.

533

in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of
this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on
India, and enormous expenses on the East India
Company, it is the duty of the Directors of the said
Company to pursue all legal and effectual means for
the removal of the said Governor- General and Presi-
dent from their respective offices, and to recall them
to Great Britain.” The Marquis of Rockingham
was still minister ; and his party appeared to have
firmly determined upon the recall of Mr. Hastings.
The vote of the House of Commons was therefore
followed by a similar proceeding on the part of the
Directors. But the death of the Marquis, which
happened at this critical period, gave courage and
strength to the friends of that Governor, and in a
Court of Proprietors of East India Stock on the 31st
of October, 1782, the order of recall which had been
made by the Court of Directors was rescinded by a
large majority.

On the 24th of April, 1782, the Chairman of the
Select Committee presented a series of resolutions,
which referred to little more than two points. Mr.
Sullivan, who was Chairman of the East India Com-
pany, had mis-stated a conference held between him
and certain Members of the House of Commons ; and
the consequence had been, that the relief intended to
certain persons confined in the common gaol at Cal-
cutta, had been considerably delayed : Mr. Sullivan
had also postponed the transmission of the act of par-
liament for the remedy of the evils arising from
the proceedings of the Supreme Court of Judica-
ture : Mr. Sullivan had, moreover, hound a clerk at
the India House, peculiarly qualified to give infor-

book v.

CHAP. 9.

1783.

534

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1783.

3V< mation, by an oath of secrecy, from communicating
— evidence to the Select Committee. A series of reso-
lutions were, therefore, moved and carried for the
censure of Mr. Sullivan. This is the first of the
points to which the resolutions moved on the part of
the Select Committee referred. On the second, viz.
the conjunct transaction of Mr. Hastings and Sir
Elijah Impey, in making the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court head of the Sudder Dewannee Adaulut,
it was resolved. That the dependence of the Chief
Justice, created by holding emoluments at the plea-
sure of the executive government, was inconsistent
with the faithful administration of justice : That the
Governor-General and Chief Justice were highly
culpable in that transaction : And that the appoint-
ment should be immediately vacated and annulled.
To these resolutions were added other two : The
first, f‘ That the powers given to the Governor-General
and Council by the East India Act of 1773, ought to
be more distinctly ascertained : ” The second, “ That
it will be proper to reduce into one act the several
acts of parliament made to regulate the East India
Company, and further to explain and amend the
same, and also to make new regulations and pro-
visions to the same end.” The whole of these re-
solutions were carried ; and upon those which related
to the dependence, in other words the corruption, of
the Chief Justice, was founded a resolution, voted
on the 3rd of May, for an address to the King, that
he would recall Sir Elijah Impey, to answer for his
conduct in that transaction.

The vote of the Court of Proprietors, in opposition
to the recall of Mr. Hastings, was severely repro-

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT CONTINUED.

535

1783.

bated by Mr. Dundas, at the beginning of the next book v.

session of parliament, when he moved, that all the

proceedings in relation to it should be laid before the
House ; and pronounced it an act both dangerous in
principle, and insulting to the authority of parliament.

On the 5th of March, 1783, a petition from the
United Company of Merchants trading to the East
Indies was presented to the House of Commons, and
referred to a Committee. It set forth, that having
paid 300,000/. of the sum exacted of them for the
benefit of the public, by the late act, they were
unable to pay the 100,000/. which remained; that
the advances which had already been received by the
public “ were made under mistaken ideas of the
petitioners’ pecuniary abilities;” that the aid neces-
sary to carry on their affairs only to the 1st of
March, 1784, would upon the most moderate calcu-
lation be 900,000/., even if excused the payment of
the sum of 100,000/., due upon the late agreement;
and they prayed, that if re-imbursement be not
made to them, they be allowed to increase their
bond debt, without diminishing their dividend,
which would affect their credit ; that they be not
required to share any thing with the public, till the
increase thus made of their bond debts be again
wholly reduced ; that the term of their exclusive
privileges, a short term being injurious to their
credit, should be enlarged ; and that the petitioners
be relieved from that share of the expense attending
the service of the King’s troops and navy which
according to the late act they were bound to afford.

Two acts were passed for their relief; the first
allowing more time for the payment of the taxes for

356

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

v. whiCli they were in arrear, and enabling them to

borrow money on their bond, to the amount of

1783- 500,000/. ; the second act (the relief granted by the
first being found insufficient), accommodated them
with a loan from the public to the amount of
300,000/. ; both acts permitting them to continue a
dividend of eight per cent, ; though, after paying
necessary expenses, their receipt fell short of that
dividend by a sum of 255,813/. 1 They borrowed
money, therefore, to be divided among themselves,
to that amount ; a singular way for a trader to keep
out of debt.

Upon the death of the Marquis of Rockingham,
the Earl of Shelburne, afterwards Marquis of Lans-
downe, became minister, and continued in office from
the 13th of July, 1782, till the 5th of April, 1783.
At that time, the coalition of Lord North and Mr.
Fox gave existence to the ministry which that cir-
cumstance has served to designate, and to charac-
terize.

The former exertions of Mr. Dundas, in the
investigation and adjustment of the nation’s Indian
affairs, were followed up by a bill, which he intro-
duced to the House on the 14th of April, 1783. Its
principal provisions were these ; That the King
should have the power of recall over the principal
servants of the Company : That the Governor-
General and Council of Bengal should have a con-
trolling power over the other presidencies ; and that
the Governor-General should have a power of acting,
on his own responsibility, in opposition to the opi-

1 Sec the acts of 23 Geo. III. cap. 36 and 89; and Cobbett’s Pari.
Hist, xxiii. 571.

MR. DUNDAS’s EAST INDIA BILL.

537

nion of his Council: That the Governors at the 9V *

other presidencies should not have a power of origi

nating any measure contrary to their Councils, hut 1/83'
a power of suspending their action by a negative till
the opinion of the Controlling Presidency should be
known : That the displaced Zemindars should be
replaced: That the Raja of Tanjore should be
secured in all his present possessions. In his
speech he repeated his former arguments for the
recall of Mr. Hastings ; and then launched out into
the numerous and extraordinary circumstances,
which pointed out Lord Cornwallis as the fittest
person in the world for the government of India.

“ Here there was no broken fortune to be mended !

Here was no avarice to be gratified ! Here was no
beggarly, mushroom kindred to be provided for ! No
crew of hungry followers, gaping to be gorged!”1
Leave was given to bring in the bill. But Mr. Dun-
das, who was now in opposition, and of course received
no encouragement from the ministry, did not perse-
vere.

On the 11th of November, in the year 1783, a new
parliament met. In the speech from the throne they
were informed, that definitive treaties of peace had
been signed, or preliminaries ratified, with the
courts of France and Spain, with the United States
of America, and the States General of the United
Provinces. They were also informed, that among
the important objects, the urgency of which had
required their presence after so short a recess,
the affairs and government of India solicited the

1 See the acts of 23 Geo. III. cap. 36 and 39; and Cobbelt’s Pari.

Hist, xxiii. 759.

538

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. utmost exertions of their abilities, and that the

fruit was now expected of those important inqui-

1/S3- ries, which had been so long and diligently pur-
sued.

By the treaty of peace with France, Pondicherry,
and Carrical, to both of which some territory was
annexed, the whole of the possessions which France
enjoyed in Bengal and Orissa at the commencement
of the war, together with Mahe, and the power
of restoring their factory at Surat, were conceded
to the French. In the treaty with the Dutch,
Trincomalee was restored; but Negapatam was
retained.

The opponents of the ministry, in both houses of
parliament, proclaimed aloud the necessity, occasioned
by the state of affairs in India, for instant and effectual
reform. They enumerated the abuses which appeared
to prevail; and they called upon, they stimulated,
and importuned the minister to bring forward a
scheme of improvement, and without delay to gratify
the impatient expectation of the people. In these
vehement calls, the voice of Mr. William Pitt was
distinguished for its loudness and importunity. At
that time it suited him to desire not only reform,
but complete reform : reform, co-extensive with the
evil, possible to be removed ; and the good, capable
of being attained. He challenged and summoned
the minister to bring forward a plan, “ not of tempo-
rary palliation or timorous expedients ; but vigorous
and effectual; suited to the magnitude, the import-
ance, and the alarming exigency of the case.” Mr.
Fox afforded his adversaries but little time to com-
plain of delay.

MR. FOX’S EAST INDIA BILL.

539

His plan was divided into two parts, and intro- book gv-

duced in two separate bills ; one having a reference

to the governing power at home ; the other to the 1783-
administration in India.

I. For constituting an organ of government at
home, the two existing Courts, of Directors, and
Proprietors of the East India Company, were to be
abolished, as totally inadequate to the ends of their
institution ; and, in their room, seven commissioners
were to be named in the act, that is, chosen by the
legislature. These commissioners, acting as trustees
for the Company, were to be invested with full powers
for ordering and administering the territories, reve-
nues and commerce of India ; and to have the sole
power of placing and displacing all persons in the
service of the Company, whether in England or
abroad.

The following were the most material of the sub-
ordinate regulations.

F or managing the details of the commerce, but
subject to the authority and commands of the Supe-
rior Board, nine assistant Directors were to be named
by the legislature, being Proprietors, each, of not less
than 2,000?. of East India capital stock.

In the superiorbody, vacancies were to be supplied
by the King: in the inferior they were to be supplied
by the Proprietors, voting by open poll. Removals
in the superior body were to be performed by the
King, upon the address of either house of parliament;
in the inferior, by the same authority, and also by
concurrence of any five of the Chief Directors, re-
cording their reasons.

For the more speedy and effectual repression of

540

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. offences committed in India, the Directors were,

CHAP. 9. .

within twenty-one days after the receipt of any accu-

I783- sation or charge, to enter upon the examination of it,
and either punish the offender, or record their reasons
for not punishing.

Before any person who had served in India, and
against whom any charge appeared, should be al-
lowed to return, the Directors were to make a
particular inquiry into the circumstances of the
charge, and to record their reasons for permitting the
return.

Upon knowledge of any dispute subsisting between
the heads of the different settlements, or between the
heads and their councils, the Directors were to insti-
tute immediate inquiry, and come to a decision in
three months, or to record their reasons why they
did not.

If the constituted authorities at any of the settle-
ments should require the direction or opinion of the
Directors, they were to give it in three months, or to
record their reasons for not giving it.

If any injury to any native prince should be com-
plained of, or appear, the Directors were to inquire,
and to make compensation wherever it was due.

For publicity, one expedient was thought to suffice,
that the Directors should once in six months lay
before the Proprietors the state of the commerce; and
before the commencement of each parliamentary
session, should present to the ministers, certain
political and commercial statements, which the minis-
ters should exhibit to parliament.

It was provided that no Director or Assistant
Director, should, while in office, hold any place of

MR. FOX’S EAST INDIA BILL.

541

profit under the Company, or any place during plea-

sure under the King ; but neither was to be disqua- —

lified for retaining a seat in parliament. And the act 1783-
was to continue in force during four years.

II. Under the second part of the plan, that which
had for its object the reform of the immediate admi-
nistration in India, no improvement whatsoever, in
the order and distribution of the powers of govern-
ment, was attempted, and hardly any thing higher
was proposed, than to point out what were deemed
the principal errors or delinquencies into which the
Indian government had strayed, and to forbid them
in future.

Stiict obedience was enjoined to the commands of
the Directors, because Mr. Hastings, whenever a
strong motive occurred, disobeyed them.

The councils were forbidden to delegate their
powers ; because, in two memorable instances, those
of his journeys to the Upper Provinces, the Supreme
Council had delegated theirs to Mr. Hastings.

The regular communication to the councils of all
correspondence was rendered imperative upon the
Governor-General and other Presidents, because Mr.
Hastings, when he had certain objects to serve, had
withheld parts of the correspondence.

Because the other servants of the Company had
usually united with the governors, in those proceed-
ings of theirs which were most highly condemned,
the servants were to be rendered less dependent upon
the governors, by lodging a greater share of the
patronage in the hands of the commissioners.

No banyan, or native steward, of any of the prin-

542

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. cipa] servants was to be allowed to rent the revenues ;

because the banyan of Mr. Hastings had rented them

1783- to a great amount. Such renting to the banyan was
declared to be the same thing as renting to the
master.

No presents were to be taken even for the use of
the Company ; because Mr. Hastings had taken
presents, and screened himself by giving them up at
last to the Company.

The abolition was to be ordained of all monopolies ;
because the Company’s servants in Bengal had been
the cause of evil, by monopolizing salt, beetel-nut,
and tobacco.

Passing then from the imputed errors in Bengal to
those at Madras, the bill proposed to enact :

That no protected or dependent prince should re-
side in the Company’s territory, or rent their lands ;
because the Nabob of Arcot had disturbed the Presi-
dency with intrigues by residing at Madras, and
had rented, as was alleged, corruptly, the Madras
jaghire :

That no civil or military servant of the Company
should lend money to such prince, rent his lands, or
have with him any pecuniary transaction ; because,
the lending of money to the Nabob of Arcot, renting
his lands, and other money transactions between him
and the Company’s servants, had given rise to many
inconveniences.

As the inaccurate definition of the limits prescribed
to the control of the Governor-General and Council
over the other Presidencies had been fertile in dis-

putes, an attempt, but not very skilful, was made to

MR. FOX’S EAST INDIA BILL.

543

remove that deficiency, by enacting that it should

extend to all transactions which had a tendency to

provoke other states to war. 1/83‘

The old prohibition of the extension of territory
was enforced; by forbidding hostile entrance upon
any foreign territory, except after intelligence of
such hostile preparations, as were considered serious
by a majority of the Council ; forbidding alliance
with any power for dividing between them any
acquirable territory ; and loans of troops to the native
princes ; excepting, in all these cases, by allowance
of the Directors.

The project of declaring the Zemindars, and other
managers of the land revenue, hereditary proprietors
of the land, and the tax fixed and invariable ;
originally started by Mr. Francis, and in part pro-
posed for enactment in the late hill of Mr. Dundas ;
was adopted.

Instead of the regulation, introduced into the Dill
of Mr. Dundas, that the Governor-General should
have a power of acting upon his own responsibility,
independently of the will of his Council, power was
only to be given to him, and to the Presidents at the
other settlements, of adjourning or postponing, for a
limited time, the consideration of any question in
their respective councils.

A mode was prescribed for adjusting the disputes
of the Nabob of Arcot with his creditors, and with
the Raja of Tanjore.

All offences against the act were rendered amenable
to the courts of law in England and India. And all
persons in the service of the Company, in India, or

544

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

gv- in that of any Indian prince, were declared unfit,

during the time of that service, and some succeeding

1/83- time, to hold the situation of a member of the lower
house of parliament.

No proceeding of the English government, in
modern times, has excited a greater ferment in the
nation, than these two bills of Mr. Fox. An alarm
diffused itself, for which the ground was extremely
scanty, and for which, notwithstanding the industry
and the art with which the advantage was improved
by the opposite party, it is difficult, considering the
usual apathy of the public on much more important
occasions, entirely to account. The character of
Mr. Fox, who was at that time extremely unpopular,
and from the irregularity of his private habits, as
well as the apparent sacrifice of all principle in his
coalition with Lord North, was, by a great part of
the nation, regarded as a profligate gamester, both
in public and in private life, contributed largely to
the existence of the storm, and to the apprehensions
of danger from the additional power which he
appeared to be taking into his hands.1 In the House
of Commons, indeed, the party of the minister emi-
nently prevailed ; and though every objection which
the imaginations of the orators could frame was urged
against the measure with the utmost possible perti-

1 To prevent misconception, it is necessary to preclude the inference
that I concur in the opinion, which I give in the text, as one among the
causes of a particular effect. In the private character of Mr. Fox, there
was enough, surely, of the finest qualities, to cast his infirmities into the
shade. And though, absolutely speaking, I have no great admiration to
bestow upon him, either as a speculative or practical statesman ; yet,
when I compare him with the other men who had figured in public life in
his country, I can find none whom I think his superior, none, perhaps,
his equal.

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF FOX’S BILL. 545

nacity, vehemence, and zeal, the bill passed by aBc°°^9v'

majority of more than two to one.

In the mean time opportunity had been found for 1783‘
alarming the mind of the King. The notion circu-
lated was, that, by vesting the whole patronage of
India in the hands of Mr. Fox, by vesting it in a
board of commissioners, under his appointment, it
would be impossible for the King ever to employ, as
minister, any other man ; and the power of Mr. Fox
would be rendered absolute over both the King and
the people. Instead of having recourse to the expe-
dients, which the law had placed in his hands, of
dismissing his ministers, or even dissolving the
parliament ; a clandestine course was adopted, which
violated the forms of the constitution. Though it
had often been declared that the constitution depended
on the total exemption of the deliberations in par-
liament from the impulse of the royal will, the King
employed Lord Temple to inform as many as he
thought fit of the peers of parliament, that those
who should vote for the Indian Bill, he would take
for his enemies. On the day of the second reading
of the bill, the minister was left in a minority of
seventy -nine to eighty-seven.

The outcry which was raised against this measure
holds a considerable rank among the remarkable
incidents in the history of England. It was a
declaration, a vehement declaration, on the part of
the King, and of the greatest portion of all the leading
orders in the state, as well as of the body of the
people, that the Commons House of Parliament, as
now constituted, is altogether inadequate to the ends
which it is meant to fulfil. Unless that acknow-

2 N

VOL. IV.

546

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

-ok, ledgment was fully made, the outcry was groundless
and impostrous.

1783. The essence of the change which Mr. Fox pro-
posed to introduce consisted in this, and in nothing
hut this : That the Board of Directors should be
chosen, not by the owners of Company’s stock, but
by the House of Commons.

Surely, if the House of Commons were a fit
instrument of Government, a better choice might be
expected from the House of Commons, than from the
crowd of East India Proprietors. The foundation
on which the justice of the clamour had to rest, if
any justice it contained, was this; that the House of
Commons would act under a fatal subservience to the
profligate views of the minister. But to suppose that
the House of Commons would do this in one instance
only, not in others, the motive being the same ; that
they would make a sacrifice of their duty to their
country, in one of the most ruinous to it of almost all
instances, while in other instances they were sure to
perform it well, would be to adopt the language of
children, or of that unhappy part of our species
whose reason is not fit to be their guide. If the
House of Commons is so circumstanced, as to act
under motives sufficient to ensure a corrupt compli-
ance with ministerial views, then, undoubtedly, the
House of Commons is a bad organ for the election
of Indian rulers. If it is not under such motives
to betray the interests of the country to the views
of ministers, then it is undoubtedly the best instru-
ment of choice which the country can afford: Nor
is there any thing which can render it, compared
with any other electing body, which could be formed

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF FOX S BILL.

547

in the country, unfit for this function, which does B°^iKgv-

not, by necessity, imply an equal unfitness for all

its peculiar functions: If it is unworthy to be trusted ,783-
with the election of East India Directors, it is still
less worthy to be trusted with the purse-strings of
the nation : If there would be danger to the British
people in the one case, the danger is far greater in
the other.

A heart-felt conviction, that the House of Com-
mons, as now constituted, is totally unworthy of trust,
announced in the strongest of all possible terms, by
the King, by the principal part of the aristocracy, of
the whole, in short, of that part of the nation whose
interests and ideas are in the strongest manner
linked to monarchical and aristocratical privileges and
distinctions, is of infinite importance ; because it may
be so employed as to make them ashamed of that
opposition to reform, which, by so many selfish and
mean considerations, they are in general engaged to
maintain.

There is but one allegation, which appears
capable of being employed to elude the force of this
deduction: That the House of Commons would not
act under a profligate subservience to the views of a
minister, if subject only to the influence which was
then at the command of the minister ; but would be
sure to do so, if subject to all that influence which
would be created by adding the patronage of
India.

This allegation, then, rests upon the assumption,
that the profligate subservience of the House of Com-
mons depends wholly upon the degree, more or less,
of the matter of influence to which it is exposed : If

2 N 2

548

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK
CHAP. 9.

1783.

• the quantity to which it is exposed is sufficiently
- small, it will have no profligate subserviency : If the
quantity to which it is exposed is sufficiently great,
its profligate subserviency will he unbounded. Admit
this: and is any thing necessary, besides, to prove the
defective constitution of that assembly ? In taking
securities against men, in their individual capacity,
do wTe rest satisfied, if only small temptations to mis-
conduct exist? Does not experience prove, that even
small temptations are sufficient, where there is
nothing to oppose them ?

In the allegation is implied, that the House of
Commons wrnuld, as not yet feeling the influence of
Indian patronage, have, in choosing men for the
Board of Direction, at that first time, chosen the best
men possible ; hut these men, being the best men
possible, would have employed the Indian patronage
placed in their hands, to corrupt the House of Com-
mons into a profligate subservience to the views of
the minister. F or what cause ?

The analysis of the plea might, it is evident, be
carried to a great extent, but it is by no means
necessary ; and for the best of reasons ; because
the parties wTho joined in predicting the future
profligacy of the House, universally gave it up.
The House of Commons, they said, is now, is at
this instant, that corrupt instrument, wffiich the
patronage of India applied to it in the way of influ-
ence wrnuld make it. The House of Commons, they
maintained, was then at the beck of the minister;
was, even then, in a state of complete subservience,
even for the worst of all purposes, to the minister’s
views. Mr. Pitt said, “ Was it not the principle,

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF FOX’s BILL.

549

and declared avowal of this bill, that the whole B00K f

system of India government should be placed in

seven persons, and those under the immediate ap- 1/S3-
pointment of no other than the minister himself'?

He appealed to the sense and candour of the House,
whether, in saying this, he was the least out of
order '? Could it be otherwise understood, or inter-
preted ? That these seven men were not to he ap-
pointed solely by the minister?”1 On another occa-
sion, he said, that he objected to Mr. Fox’s hill,

“ because it created a new and enormous influence,
by vesting in certain nominees of the minister all the
patronage of the East.”2 Mr. W. Grenville (after-
wards Lord Grenville) said, “ The hill was full of
blanks, and these blanks were to be filled by that
House : It was talking a parliamentary language to

say, the minister was to fill the blanks ; and that the
seven commissioners were the seven nominees of the
minister: Seven commissioners chosen, by parlia-

ment ostensibly, but in reality by the servants of the
Crown, were to involve in the vortex of their au-
thority, the whole treasures of India : These, poured
forth like an irresistible flood upon this country, -would
sweep away our liberties, and all that we could call
our own.”3 But if parliament would choose these
seven commissioners at the beck of the minister ;
what is there they would not do at the beck of the
minister ! The conclusion is direct, obvious, and

1 Debate on Mr. Fox’s motion for leave to bring in his East India
bills ; Cobbett’s Pari. Hist, xxiii. 1210.

* Debate on the state of the nation; Cobbett’s Pari. Hist. xxiv. 271.

3 Debate on Mr. Fox’s motion, ut supra, Cobbett’s Pari. Hist, xxiii.
1229.

550

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 9.

1783.

irresistible. Upon the solemn averments of these
statesmen, the question is for ever set at rest.1

At the same time it must be admitted, that the
bills of Mr. Fox, many and celebrated as the men
were who united their wisdoms to compose them,
manifest a feeble effort in legislation. They afford
a memorable lesson ; because they demonstrate, that
the authors of them, however celebrated for their skill
in speaking, were not remarkable for the powers of
thought. For the right exercise of the powers of
government in India, not one new security was pro-
vided; and it would not be very easy to prove, that
any strength was added to the old.

I. There was nothing in Mr. Fox’s number Screw,

1 The character here given of the House of Commons is an exaggerated
picture of defects inseparable from its consitution at any period, insepa-
rable from the constitution of all popular assemblies, and proofs not of
profligacy; the term is absurd; but of the bounded extent of human
wisdom and virtue. No assembly, comprising a number of persons of
various tempers, prejudices, education, intelligence and interests, will
ever be capable of considering any question whatever upon its own merits
alone, and, according to their unbiassed judgment ; they will and must act
under various influences, the combination of which constitutes the grand
element of all parliamentary opinion — party. The ministerial party, be the
House of Commons sublimated to the utmost tenuity of purification by the
alembic of reform, must always comprise in it elements of strength which
may be more than a match for the utmost efforts of the opposition, and it
must, therefore, ever be an object of prudent precaution to guard against
their augmentation, either in number or efficiency. It was no universal
conviction, therefore, that the House of Commons of 1783 was in a
special degree unworthy of trust, which rendered the proposed ministerial
accession of patronage so widely unpopular, but a reasonable jealousy of
that additional influence which not only at that particular period, but in all
time to come, in reformed or unreformed Parliaments alike, must have
accrued to the party of the minister from his monopoly of the East India
patronage. It is taking a very circumscribed view of the measure to
consider it only in relation to any particular state of the national repre-
sentation : the objections to it are abstractedly valid at all seasons, and are
founded on the constitution of Parliament, and the nature of man. — W.

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF FOX’S BILL.

551

more than in the Company’s number Twenty-Four , fJV-

to ensure good government : and by this change of

one electing assembly for another, the nation decided, 1<s3‘
and under the present constitution of the House of
Commons decided well, that had would only be im-
proved into worse.

If such was the nature of the fundamental expe-
dient, it cannot be imagined that the subsidiary ones
would impart a high degree of merit to the whole.

If not absolutely nugatory, they were all feeble in
the highest degree. What useful power of publicity,
for example, was involved in transferring annually
to the hands of the ministers, a certain portion of
Indian papers*? A proper policy being established
between the minister and his seven directors, they
could present to parliament every thing which favoured
their own purposes, keep back every thing which
opposed them ; and thence more effectually impose
upon the nation. It seems, from many parts of the
hill, to have been the opinion of its authors, that if
they only gave their commands to the rulers of India
to behave well, they would he sure to do so. As if
there was no channel of corruption but one, it was
held sufficient, if the directors, while in office, were
prohibited from holding places of profit under them-
selves, and places of profit during pleasure under the
King.

The seven directors, in the case of some of their
most important decisions, were bound to record their
reasons ; a most admirable security where the public
are to see those reasons : Where they are to be seen

only by the parties themselves, and by those who
have like sinister interests with themselves, as in

552

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. this case by the minister, they are obviously no
security at all,

1783' Good conduct in any situation depends upon the
motives to good conduct, which operate in that situa-
tion ; and upon the chance for intelligence and probity
in the individuals by whom it is held. That, in
regard to motives, as well as intelligence and
probity, the public had less security for good con-
duct, in the case of the ministerial commissioners,
than in the case of Directors chosen by the Com-
pany, will be fully made to appear, when we come
to examine the nature of the ministerial board erected
by Mr. Pitt ; a board, which, in all those par-
ticulars, is very nearly on a level with that of Mr.
Fox.

II. With regard to that part of the scheme which
was intended to improve the state of administration
in India, no change in the order and distribution of
the powers of government was attempted. The plan
of the machinery, therefore, that is, the whole of its
old tendency to evil, described by Mr. Fox as enor-
mous, was to remain the same. All, it is evident,
that, upon this foundation, could be aimed at, was,
to palliate ; and in the choice of his palliatives, Mr.
Fox was not very successful.

Merely to forbid evil, in a few of the shapes in
which it had previously shown itself, was a slender
provision for improvement, when the causes of evil
remained the same as before ; both because there
were innumerable other shapes which it might
assume, and because forbidding, when there is no
chance, or little chance, of harm from disobedience,
is futile, as a barrier against strong temptations.

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF FOX’S BILL.

553

To lessen the power of the Chief Ruler in selecting 9V'

the immediate instruments of his government, was —

so far to ensure a weak and distracted administra- 178a
tion. The sure effect of it was, to lessen the power
of a virtuous ruler in obtaining assistance to good :

And as the co-operation of the inferior servants, in
the imputed plunder, embezzlement, and oppression,
was secured, not by the power of the Governor-
General to promote them ; but by the common
interest which they had in the profits of misrule ;
his not having the power to promote them was no
security against a co-operation secured by other
means.

In respect to sanctions, on which the efficiency of
every enactment depends, Mr. Fox’s bill provided
two things ; chance of removal, and prosecution at
law ; nothing else. In respect to chance of removal ;
as the effect of the bill was to render the minister
absolute with regard to India, those delinquencies
alone, which thwarted the views of the minister,
created any danger; those which fell in with his
views were secure of protection. F rom prosecution
at law, under tribunals and laws such as the English,
a man who wields, or has wielded the powers of
government, has, it is obvious from long experience,
very little to fear.

It really is, therefore, hardly possible for any thing
in the shape of a law for regulating the whole govern-
ment of a great country, to be more nugatory than
the bill of Mr. Fox.

On the great expedient for ensuring the rights of
the native subjects, borrowed from Mr. Francis, the
scheme of declaring the rent of the land unchange-

554

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 9.

1783.

able, and the renters hereditary ; we have already
made some and shall hereafter have occasion to make
other remarks ; to show, that it is founded upon false
ideas, and productive of evil rather than good.

The prohibition of monopolies, and presents, and
some other minor regulations, were beneficial, as far
as they went.

If this project of a constitution for India proves
not the existence of a vast portion of intellect, among
those by whom it was framed, the objections of those
who had only to criticize, not to invent, appear to
prove the existence of a still smaller portion among
its opponents. Not one of their objections was
drawn from the real want of merits in the plan ; from
its total inefficiency, as a means, to secure the ends,
at which it pretended to aim. They were all drawn
from collateral circumstances ; and, what is more,
almost all were unfounded.

The danger to the constitution, in giving the ap-
pointment of Directors to the House of Commons,
was the subject of the principal cry. But it has been
shown, that this could have no injurious effect, unless
the House of Commons were already perverted from
its supposed ends, and the goodness of the consti-
tution destroyed.

Much rhetoric was employed to enforce the obli-
gation created by the “ chartered rights of men.” But
it was justly observed, That the term “ chartered
rights of men,” was a phrase full of affectation and
ambiguity : That there were two species of charters ;
one, where some of the general rights of mankind
were cleared or confirmed by the solemnity of a pub-
lic deed ; the other, where these general rights were

CONCESSIONS TO THE COMPANY.

555

limited for the benefit of particular persons : That gv

charters of the last description were strictly and

essentially trusts, and ought to expire whenever they l'84-
substantially vary from the good of the community,
for the benefit of which they are supposed to exist.

The loss of the India bill, in the House of Lords,
was the signal for the dissolution of the ministry.

At the head of the new arrangement was placed Mr.

Pitt. On the 14th of January, 1784, he moved for
leave to bring in a bill on the affairs of India. A
majority of the House of Commons still supported
his opponent, and his bill was rejected. Mr. Fox
gave notice to the House of his intention to bring in
a second bill. On the 10th of March, however, par-
liament was dissolved; and in the new House of
Commons the minister obtained a decided majority.

The re-introduction of his India bill could now wait
his convenience.

The new ministry had been aided in the triumph
obtained over their opponents, by all the powers of
the East India House, who had petitioned against
the bills of Mr. Fox, had employed every art to
excite the public disapprobation, and had exerted
themselves at the general election to swell the
ministerial majority. The minister owed a grateful
return. The Company’s sale of teas was a principal
source of their income. It had of late been greatly
reduced by the powers of smuggling. As high price
afforded the encouragement of smuggling, a sufficient
reduction would destroy it. Any part of the mono-
poly profit would not have been a pleasant sacrifice
to the Company. The public duties, they thought,
were the proper source of reduction : and it pleased

556

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
chap. 9.

1784.

• the minister to agree with them. On the 21st of
- June, he moved a series of resolutions, as the foun-
dation for an act, which soon after passed, and is
known by the name of the Commutation Act. The
duties on tea, about 50 per cent., were reduced to
12| per cent. It was estimated that a diminution
would thence arise of 600,000/. in the public
revenue. Under the style and title of a commu-
tation, an additional window-tax, calculated at an
equal produce, was imposed.

To relieve their pecuniary distress, the Company,
as we have seen, had applied to parliament for leave
to borrow 500,000/., and for a further aid, after-
wards, of 300,000/. in exchequer bills. They had
also prayed for a remission of the duties which they
owed to the public, to the amount of nearly a
million. They were bound not to accept, without
consent of the Lords of the Treasury, bills drawn on
them from India, beyond the annual amount of
300,000/. Bills however had arrived from Bengal
to the amount of nearly one million and a half
beyond that amount. For these distresses some
provision had been made before the dissolution of the
preceding parliament. The minister now introduced
a bill, to afford a further relief in regard to the
payment of duties, and to enable them to accept
bills beyond the limits which former acts of the
legislature had prescribed.

In other pecuniary adventures, the receipts upon
the capital embarked are in proportion to the gains.
If profit has been made, profit is divided. If no
profit, no division. Instead of profit, the East India
Company had incurred expense, to the amount of an

PITT’s EAST INDIA BILL.

557

enormous debt. It was proposed that they should book ^v.

still have a dividend, though they were to borrow

the money which they were to divide, or to obtain 1784-
it, extracted, in the name of taxes, out of the pockets
of their countrymen. A bill was passed which
authorized a dividend of eight per cent. In defence
of the measure, it was urged, that unless the dividend
was upheld, price of India stock would fall. But
why should the price of India stock, more than the
price of any thing else, be upheld, by taxing the
people ? It was also urged, that not the fault of the
Company, but the pressure arising from the warlike
state of the nation, produced their pecuniary distress.

If that was a reason, why was not a similar relief
awarded to every man that suffered from that cause?

The arguments are without foundation ; but from
that time to this they have supported an annual
taxation of the English people, for the convenience
of the parties on whom the government of India
depends.

At last, Mr. Pitt’s bill, for the better government
of the affairs of the East India Company, was again
introduced ; and, being now supported by a com-
petent majority, was passed into an act, on the 13th
of August, 1784. With some modification, it was
the same with the bill which the former House of
Commons had rejected.

The Courts of Directors and Proprietors remained,
in form, the same as before. The grand innovation
consisted, in the erection of what was called a Board
of Control. This, together with, 1. The creation of
a Secret Committee of Directors ; 2. A great dimi-
nution in the powers of the Court of Proprietors;

558

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

chat.

1784

9V- 3. A provision for a disclosure of the amount of the
— fortunes brought home by individuals who had been
• placed in offices of trust in India ; 4. The institution
of a new tribunal for the trial and punishment of the
offences liable to be committed in India ; constituted
the distinctive features of this legislative exertion;
and are the chief particulars, the nature of which it
is incumbent upon the historian to disclose. The
other provisions were either of subordinate efficacy,
or corresponded with provisions in the bills of other
reformers, which have already been reviewed.

I. The Board of Control was composed of six
Members of the Privy Council, chosen by the King,
of whom the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and one
of the principal secretaries of state were to be two ;
in the absence of whom, the senior of the remaining
four was to preside. In point of fact, the whole
business has rested with that senior ; the other com-
missioners being seldom called to deliberate, or even
for form’s sake to assemble. The senior is known by
the name of the President of the Board of Control,
and is essentially a new Secretary of State ; a secretary
for the Indian department. Of this pretended Board
and real Secretary, the sphere of action extended to
the whole of the civil and military government, exer-
cised by the Company ; but not to their commercial
transactions. Its duties, very ill defined, or rather
not defined at all, were adumbrated, in the following
vague and uncertain terms: “From time to time, to
check, superintend, and control, all acts, operations,
and concerns, which in any wise relate to the civil
or military government, or revenues, of the territories
and possessions of the said United Company in the

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT’s BILL.

559

East Indies.” All correspondence, relative to the 9V-

government, was to be communicated to the Board ;

including all letters from India, as soon as received, 1784-
and all letters, orders, or instructions intended for
India, before they were sent. The Board was also
to be furnished with copies of all proceedings of the
Courts of Directors and Proprietors ; and to have
access to the Company’s papers and records. By one
clause it was rendered imperative on the Court of
Directors to yield obedience to every command of the
Board, and to send out all orders and instructions
to India altered and amended at the pleasure of the
Board. On the second introduction of the bill, when
a sure majority made the minister bold, a power was
added by which, in cases of secrecy, and cases of
urgency ; cases of which the Board itself was to be
the judge ; the Board of Control might frame and
transmit orders to India without the inspection of
the Directors. It was only in the case of a doubt
whether the orders of the Board of Control related
or did not relate to things within the sphere of the
civil and military government, that the Directors
were allowed an appeal. Such a doubt they were to
refer to the King in Council. An appeal from the
King’s Council, to the King in Council, was an
appeal from men to themselves.

Of two bodies, when one has the right of unlimited
command, and the other is constrained to unlimited
obedience, the latter has no power whatsoever, but
just as much, or as little, as the former is pleased to
allow. This is the relative position of the Board of
Control, and the East India Company. The powers
of the Board of Control convert the Company’s

560

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.

CHAP. 9.

1784.

Courts into agents of its will. The real, the sole
governing power of India is the Board of Control,
and it only makes use of the Court of Directors as
an instrument, as a subordinate office, for the ma-
nagement of details, and the preparation of business
for the cognizance of the superior power.

The real nature of the machine cannot be dis-
puted, though hitherto its movements have been
generally smooth, and the power is considerable
which appears to remain in the hands of the Direc-
tors. The reasons are clear. Whenever there is not
a strong motive to interfere with business of detail,
there is always a strong motive to let it alone.
There never yet has been any great motive to the
Board of Control to interfere ; and of consequence it
has given itself little trouble about the business of
detail, which has proceeded with little harm, and as
little benefit, from the existence of that Board. So
long as the Court of Directors remain perfectly
subservient, the superior has nothing further to
desire. Of the power which the Directors retain,
much is inseparable from the management of detail.

The grand question relates to the effects upon the
government of India, arising from an authority like
the Board of Control, acting through such a subor-
dinate and ministerial instrument as the Court of
Directors.

It is evident, that, so far as the Directors are left
to themselves, and the Board of Control abstain from
the trouble of management, the government of India
is left to the imperfections, whatever they were, of
the previous condemned system, as if no Board of
Control were in existence. In that part of the

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITTS BILL.

561

business, in which the Board takes a real share, book v

it is still to be inquired, what chance exists, that

better conduct will proceed from the Board of 1784-
Control, than would have proceeded from the Court
of Directors

Good conduct in public men arises from three
causes ; from knowledge or talent ; from the presence
of motives to do good ; and the absence of motives
to do evil.

I. Few men will contend that the lord, or other
person, whose power, or powerful kinsman, may re-
commend him for President of the Board of Control,
is more likely to possess knowledge or talent, than
the Court of Directors. That which the practical
state of the British constitution renders the presiding
principle in directing the choice of men for offices
wherein much either of money or power is to be en-
joyed, affords a much greater chance for ignorance
than knowledge. Of all the men who receive edu-
cation, the men who have the most of parliamentary
influence are the least likely to have any unusual
portion of talent ; and as for appropriate knowledge,
or an acquaintance in particular with Indian affairs,
it cannot be expected that the Board of Control
should ever, except by a temporary and rare con-
tingency, be fit to be compared with the Court
of Directors : besides, it would have been easy,
by laying open the direction to men of all descrip-
tions, and by other simple expedients, to increase
exceedingly the chance for talent in the Court of
Directors.

II. If the Board of Control then is more likely
than the Court of Directors to govern India well,

VOL. iv. 2 o

562

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. the advantage must arise from its situation in regard

to motives : motives of two sorts ; motives to appli-

1784- cation ; and motives to probity. Both the Board
of Control, and the Court of Directors, are destitute
of these motives to a high degree; and it is a
matter of some nicety to make it appear on which
side the deficiency is most extraordinary.

Motives to application, on the part of the Board of
Control, can be discovered none. And application,
accordingly, such as deserves the name, a careful
pursuit of knowledge, with incessant meditation of
the ends and the means, the Board has not even
thought of bestowing. If Mr. Dundas be quoted as
an objection, it is only necessary to explain the cir-
cumstances of the case. The mind of Mr. Dundas
was active and meddling, and he was careful to
exhibit the appearance of a great share in the
government of India : but what was it, as President
of the Board of Control, that he ever did? He
presented, as any body might have presented, the
Company’s annual budget, and he engrossed an ex-
traordinary share of their patronage. But I know
not any advice which he ever gave, for the govern-
ment of India, that was not either very obvious, or
wrong.

The institution of the Board of Control, as it gave
no motives to application in the members of that
Board, so it lessened prodigiously the motives to
application in the Court of Directors. Before the
existence of the Board of Control, the undivided
reputation of good measures, the undivided ignominy
of bad, redounded to the Court of Directors. The
great sanction of public opinion acted upon them

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT’S BILL.

563

with undivided energy. Men are most highly stimu- book y.

lated to undergo the pains of labour, when they are

most sure of reaping the fruits of labour ; most 1784-
surely discouraged from labour, when they are least
sure of reaping its advantages ; but, in taking pains
to understand the grounds of action, and laboriously
to frame measures adapted to them, the Court of
Directors, before their subjugation to the Board of
Control, were sure of reaping the fruits of their
labours in the execution of their schemes. What
motive, on the other hand, to the laborious considera-
tion of measures of government, remained, when all
the fruits of knowledge and of wisdom might be
rejected by the mere caprice of the President of the
Board of Control ?

Such is the sort of improvement, a retrograde im-
provement, in respect to knowledge or talent, and
in respect to application, which the expedient of a
Board of Control introduced into the government of
India.

It only remains that we examine it in relation to
probity ; and inquire, whether the men who compose
it are subject to the action of stronger, or weaker
motives, to the exercise of official probity, than the
Court of Directors.

There are two sorts of motives, on which, in re-
gard to probity, the conduct of every man depends :
by the one he is attracted to virtue ; by the other
repelled from it.

In regard to attracting motives, very little is pro-
vided to operate either upon the Board of Control,
or the Court of Directors. The sanction of public
opinion, the credit of good, and the discredit of bad

2 0 2

564

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK

CHAP.

1784.

gv- conduct, is one source ; and it does not appear that
__ there is any other. In the first place, it ought to be
remembered, as a law of human nature, that the
influence of this sanction is weakened, or more truly
annihilated, to any important purpose, by division.
Whatever might have been its force, upon either the
Board of Control, or the Court of Directors, acting
alone, it is infinitely diminished when they act both
together, and by sharing, go far to destroy respon-
sibility.

For the salutary influence of public opinion, both
the Board of Control, and the Court of Directors, are
unfavourably situated ; hut it will probably, without
much dispute, be allowed, that the Court of Directors
is the least unfavourably situated. So long as they
acted by themselves, the Court of Directors were ex-
posed, without shelter, to the public eye. The Pre-
sident of the Board of Control is the mere creature
of the minister, existing by his will, confounded
with the other instruments of his administration,
sheltered by his power, and but little regarded as the
proper object either of independent praise, or of inde-
pendent blame.

With regard to motives repelling from probity, in
other words, the temptations to improbity, to which
the Board of Control and the Court of Directors are
respectively exposed, the following propositions are
susceptible of proof: That almost all the motives of

the deleterious sort, to which the Court of Directors
stand exposed, are either the same, or correspond,
with those to which the Board of Control is exposed :
That those to which the Court of Directors are ex-
posed, and the Board of Control is not exposed, are

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT’S BILL.

565

of inconsiderable strength : That those to which the Bc°c^p gv

Board of Control is exposed, and the Court of Direc

tors are not exposed, are of great and uncommon 1/ 84-
strength: And that by the conjunct action of the

two bodies, the deleterious motives of the one do not
destroy those of the other, but combine with them,
and increase the power of the whole.

It is to be observed, that neither the Board of
Control, nor the Court of Directors have any direct
interest in the misgovernment of India. Their
ambition is not gratified by the unnecessary wars,
nor their pockets filled by the oppressions and pro-
digalities of the Indian rulers. In as far as the
Directors are proprietors of India stock, and in as
far as good government has a tendency to increase
the surplus produce of India, and hence the dividend
upon stock, the Court of Directors have an interest
in the good government of India. The Board of
Control, as such, has necessarily no such interest;
in this respect, therefore, it is inferior to the Court of
Directors.

If exempt from motives of the direct kind, to
the misgovernment of India, it remains to inquire
what are the motives of the indirect kind, to the
action of which the Board of Control, and the
Court of Directors, are severally and respectively
exposed.

In the first place, we recognise the love of ease ;
an incessant force, and for that reason of the most
potent agency in human affairs. Bating the cases in
which the result depends not upon the general
qualities of the species, but the accidental ones of
the individual, this is a motive which it is not

566

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I

CHAP. 9,

1784.

■ easy to find other motives sufficient to oppose ;
- which, in general, therefore, prevails and over-rules.
This is a motive, to the counteraction of which, there
is scarcely any thing provided, in the case either of
the Board of Control, or of the Court of Directors.
To a great extent, therefore, it is sure to govern them.
Provided things go on in the beaten track, without
any unusual stoppage or disturbance, things will
very much be left to themselves.

Little, however, as is the application to business,
which can rationally be expected from the Court of
Directors, still less can be looked for on the part of
the Board of Control, where either hereditary idle-
ness and inefficiency will preside ; or the mind of the
President will be engrossed by those pursuits and
struggles on which the power of the ministry, or the
consequence of the individual, more immediately
depends. The consequence is certain ; whenever
aversion to the pain and constraint of labour governs
the superintendent, the interest of the subordinates,
in every branch, is naturally pursued at the expense
of the sendee, or of the ends which it is the intention
of the service to fulfil.

Beside the love of ease, which every where is one
of the chief causes of misgovernment, the motives to
the abuse of patronage, and to a connivance at delin-
quency in India, seem almost the only deleterious
motives, to the operation of which either the Board
of Control, or the Court of Directors, are exposed.

In regard to patronage, the conduct of the Court
of Directors will be found to exhibit a degree of ex-
cellence which other governments have rarely at-
tained. In sending out the youths who are destined

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT’s BILL.

567

for the different departments of the sendee, the Direc- gv-

tors have been guided, no doubt, by motives of affec-

tion and convenience ; but all youths go out to the 1784-
lowest stations in their respective departments, and
can ascend only by degrees. The rule of promotion
by seniority has sometimes been too rigidly observed ;
seldom, comparatively, violated by favouritism. The
Directors, who send out their relatives and con-
nexions, have very often retired from the direction,
before the youths whom they have patronized are of
sufficient age or standing in the service, to occupy
the stations in which the power of producing the
greater evils is enjoyed.

But, as the constitution of the Court of Directors
has prevented any considerable abuse of patronage ;
so the situation of the British minister, depending as
he does upon parliamentary interest, creates, it may,
without much fear of contradiction, be affirmed, a
stronger motive to the abuse of patronage, than,
under any other form of government, was ever found
to exist. In this respect, good government is far less
exposed to violation from an institution such as
that of the Court of Directors, than an institution
such as that of the Board of Control.1

1 “ With respect to the abuse of patronage,” said Mr. Windham, in
his famous speech (May 26th 1809) on Mr. Curwen’s Reform Bill, “ one
of those by which the interests of countries will in reality most suffer, I
perfectly agree, that it is likewise one, of which the government, pro-
perly so called, that is to say, persons in the highest offices, are as likely
to be guilty, and from their opportunities more likely to be guilty than
any others. Nothing can exceed the greediness, the selfishness, the
insatiable voracity, the profligate disregard of all claims from merit or
services, that we often see in persons in high official stations.” Par.
liamentary Debates, xiv. 758; for publication in which the speech was
written and prepared by the author.

568

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK I
chap. 9

1784.

To connivance at delinquency in India, the Direc-
tors may be supposed to be led by three sorts of
motives :

1. Inasmuch as they may have been delinquents
themselves ;

2. Inasmuch as they may send out sons and other
relatives, who may profit by delinquency ;

3. Inasmuch as delinquents may be proprietors of
India stock, and hence exert an influence on the
minds of Directors.

1 . The motive to connive at any delinquency, in
which a man is to have no profit, because he himself
has formerly been delinquent in a similar way, must
be regarded as a feeble, if any motive at all. Ex-
perience proves it. Clive was not less violent against
the undue emoluments of the Company’s servants,
because he had drawn them so copiously himself. If
the Court of Directors be inferior in this respect to
the Board of Control, it must be allowed to be an
inferiority easily compensated by other advantages.
Besides, if a man must be supposed to sympathize
with delinquency, because he has been a delinquent
himself, the disposition is pretty nearly the same
which leads to delinquency in India and in England ;
and hence a danger fully as great, of finding this
kind of sympathy at the Board of Control, as in the
Court of Directors.

2. The Directors may send out sons and nephews.
So may the Secretary of State for the India depart-
ment, the President of the Board of Control.

3. East India delinquents may operate on the
minds of Directors through influence in the Court of
Proprietors. East India delinquents may also

MERITS AND .DEMERITS OF PITTS BILL.

569

operate on the minds of ministers through parlia- book gv-

mentary influence. And the latter operation, it is

believed, will certainly appear to be, out of all 1784-
comparison, the stronger, and more dangerous
operation of the two.

In point of fact, the influence exerted upon the
Directors through the Court of Proprietors has never
been great. The Court of Directors have habitually
governed the Court of Proprietors • not the Court of
Proprietors the Court of Directors. The Company’s
servants returned from India have not been
remarkable for holding many votes in the General
Court.

The powerful operation of ministerial support
extends to every man in India, whose friends have a
parliamentary interest in England. The men who
have the greatest power of doing mischief in India,
are the men in the highest stations of the govern-
ment. These are sure to be generally appointed
from views of ministerial interest. And the whole
force of the motives, whatever they are, which
operate to their appointment, must operate likewise
to connivance at their faults.

In every one of the circumstances, therefore, upon
wThich good government depends, the Board of
Control, when examined, is found to be still more
defective, as an instrument of government, than the
Court of Directors, the incompetency of which to
the right government of India, had been so loudly
and so universally proclaimed,

What will be said in its favour is this : That the
Board of Control and the Court of Directors check
each other. To this end we must of necessity

570

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. suppose, that where the Court of Directors may have

an interest in misgovernment, the Board of Control

i/S-i. wpj pave no suc]1 interest, and in that case will not
allow the Court of Directors to pursue their interest;
that, in like manner, where the Board of Control may
have an interest in misgovernment, the Court of
Directors will have no such interest, and in that case
will not allow the Board of Control to pursue their
interest.

According to this supposed mode of operation, the
interests of all the governing parties are defeated.
The theory unhappily forgets that there is another
mode of operation ; in which their interests may he
secured. This is the mode, accordingly, which
stands the best chance of being preferred. It is a
very obvious mode ; the one party having leave to
provide for itself, on condition that it extend to the
other a similar indulgence. The motives to mis-
government, under this plan, are increased by
aggregation, not diminished by counteraction. Such
are the greater part of the pretended checks upon
misgovernment, which have ever been established in
the world; and to this general law the Board of
Control and Court of Directors do not, certainly,
form an exception.

There is still another circumstance ; and one to
which the greatest importance will doubtless be
attached. So long as the government of India was
independent of the minister, he had no interest in
hiding its defects ; he might often acquire popularity
by disclosing them. The government of India, in
these circumstances, was subject to a pretty vigilant
inspection from Parliament. Inquiries of the most

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT’S BILL.

571

searching description had twice been instituted, and Bc°^gV-

carried into its innermost recesses. The persons

charged with the duties of government in India, 1784-
acted under a full sense of the attention with which
they were watched, and of the exposure to which
their conduct was liable. A beneficial jealousy was
preserved alive, both in parliament, and in the nation.

At that time both erred, perhaps, by too much,
rather than too little, of a disposition to presume
among their countrymen in India the existence of
guilt : a disposition far more salutary, notwithstand-
ing, than a blind confidence, which, by presuming
that every thing is right, operates powerfully to
make every thing wrong. A great revolution
ensued, when the government of India was made
dependent upon the minister, and became -in fact an
incorporated part of his administration. Then it
was the interest of the minister to prevent inspec-
tion ; to lull suspicion asleep ; to ward off inquiry ;
to inspire a blind confidence ; to praise incessantly
the management of affairs in India; and, by the
irresistible force of his influence, make other men
praise it. The effects are instructive. From the
time of the acquisition of the territorial revenues of
Bengal, parliament and the nation had resounded
with complaints of the Indian administration. The
loudness of these complaints had continually in-
creased, till it became the interest of the minister to
praise. From that very moment complaint was
extinguished ; and the voice of praise was raised in
its stead. From that time to this, no efficient
inquiry into the conduct of the government in India
has ever taken place. Yet, in the frame of the

572

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V.
CHAP. 9.

1784.

government, no one new security can be pointed
out, on which a rational man would depend for any
improvement; and the incumbrances of the East
India Company have continued to increase.1

II. It was ordained by this act, that the Court of
Directors should choose a Committee of Secrecy, not
to exceed the number of three. As often as the
Board of Control should frame orders which required
secrecy, they were to transmit these orders, without
communicating them to the Court of Directors ; and
receive answers to them under the same concealment.
This was a regulation which enabled the Board of

1 The assertion that complaint was extinguished by the new bill, is
somewhat incompatible with the fact, that it was immediately followed by
the impeachment of Hastings. It is also possible that that very impeach-
ment exercised more influence than the Bill. So impotent a conclusion,
after such pompous note of preparation was well calculated to disgust the
public, and teach them the salutary lesson of listening in future to com-
plaints with caution and distrust. It would, however, have been more
generous to have believed that complaint ceased because grievances ceased ;
not because the minister had an interest in silencing the aggrieved. And
whether he had or not an interest in so doing, the position in which he
was now placed was very unfavourable for such a purpose. The author
has omitted to notice the origin of a new principle in all questions affecting
India, which is, an English House of Commons is more likely to operate
as a stimulus to attention than any disinterested tenderness for the con-
dition of the people of India. The administration is now responsible for
the foreign and domestic policy of India. This is quite enough to provoke
jealousy, to animate inquiry, to keep open the eyes of opposition in a
persevering vigil, which the absence of all party-feeling would be too
soporific a state to maintain. So far, therefore, was the institution of the
Board of Control from administering a narcotic to the representatives of
the people in Indian questions, it had a tendency to supply them with new
inducements to vivacity. That it failed so to do, that no more instances of
public ingratitude welcomed the return of the Governor-Generals, who
succeeded Warren Hastings, is to be attributed in candour and in truth to
the extinction of all pretext for a similar abuse of the power of the Parlia-
ment, as well as to an improvement in the spirit of the House, and to a
more extensive knowledge of the nature of our Indian empire, and the
difficulties of its administration, amongst the educated portion of the
people. — \V.

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT’S BILL.

573

Control, and the Committee of Secrecy to annihilate, bc^k v.

as often as they pleased, the power of the Court of

Directors. With respect to the government of India, 1784-
the Court of Directors might be regarded as in fact
reduced to three. Of this subsidiary regulation the
effect was to render more complete the powers of the
Board of Control.

III. It was ordained, that no act or proceeding
of the Court of Directors, which had received the
approbation of the Board of Control, should be an-
nulled or in any way affected, by the Court of Pro-
prietors. This was a provision, by means of which,
as often as it pleased the Board of Control, and the
Court of Directors, they could annihilate all direct
power of the Court of Proprietors. By these several
regulations, for more and more lessening the number
of persons in whom any efficient part of the power
of the East India Company remained, the facility of
using it as a tool of the minister was more and more
increased.

IY. The next important provision, in the bill of
Mr. Pitt, was that by which it was rendered obli-
gatory upon the servants of the Company, to give an
inventory of the property which they brought from
India. If the undue pursuit of wealth was there the
grand cause of delinquency, this undoubtedly was a
regulation of no ordinary value. When the amount
of a man’s acquisitions in India was known, com-
parison would take place between his acquisitions
and his lawful means of acquiring ; and the great
sanction of popular opinion would operate upon him
with real effect. The difficulty of convicting the
delinquent would thus be exceedingly diminished ;

574

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

^hap^ 9' anc^ this ProsPect °f punishment would contribute
powerfully to save him from crime.

I7S4. To the credit of the authors of the bill be it spoken,
means of far greater than the usual efficacy were em-
ployed to force out the real state of the facts, and to
defeat the efforts of concealment or deception. The
parties were rendered subject to personal examination
upon oath ; and, for false statement, to the forfeiture
of all their goods, to imprisonment and incapacitation.
Information tending to the detection of falsehood
was called for by the greatest rewards.1

So important an instrument of good government,
as this, ought not, assuredly, to he confined to India.
Wherever the pursuit of wealth is liable to operate
to the production, in any degree, of had government,
there undoubtedly it ought to exist.

V. A new tribunal was constituted “ for the pro-
secuting and bringing to speedy and condign punish-
ment British subjects guilty of extortion, and other
misdemeanors, while holding offices in the service of
the King or Company in India.” The Judicature
was composed of one judge from each of the common

1 These clauses were repealed, only two years afterwards, in the
amended Bill, by Act 26, Geo. III. cap. lvi., and, notwithstanding the
commendation bestowed upon them in the text, most justly ; for as even
Burke, although he opposed some of the amendments, observed of the
original law, which rendered every individual who had been in India
accountable for his fortune, it was incongruous with the national character,
a violation of national rights, unbecoming to the legislature, and disgraceful
to the country ; it afforded every subterfuge which villany could desire,
and exposed honesty alone to ridicule and contempt.” The orator treated
the following scheme, for the establishment of a Special Tribunal for
Indian Delinquencies, with equal severity. All that had been said in its
condemnation “ fell short of its turpitude ; it had no authority, example,
similitude, or precedent, except perhaps the Star-Chamber of detestable
memory.” Parliamentary History, xxv. p. 1276. — W.

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITTS BILL.

575

law courts in Westminster Hall, chosen by his Court; book gv-

four peers, and six members of the House of Com-

mons, chosen, after an operose method, by their re- 1784-
spective houses of parliament.

Of the procedure, according to which justice was,
in this channel, to be administered, the only part
which it is here material to notice, is that, which
regards its powerful instrument. Evidence.

For more effectually opening the sources of evi-
dence, it was ordained, that witnesses should be
compelled, by punishment, as for a misdemeanor, to
attend, and by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion
of the Court, to give evidence. The Commissioners
or Judges might send for papers, persons, and records,
and commit to prison for all prevarication.

The punishment of offences committed in India,
by trial in England, conducted under the rules of
evidence mischievously established in the English
courts, was impracticable, and the attempt absurd.

This important truth seems, in part at least, to have
been now very clearly perceived by the legislature ;
and an attempt was made, very feeble indeed, and
far from commensurate with the evil, to remedy a
defect of the law ; a disgusting defect, which ensured,
or little less than ensured, impunity to one of the
highest orders of crimes.

f‘ Whereas the provisions made by former laws ”

(such are the words of the statute,) “ for the hearing
and determining in England offences committed in
India, have been found ineffectual, by reason of the
difficulty of proving in this kingdom matters done
there,” it was enacted, that witnesses should be ex-
amined in India by the competent judges, that their

576

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

book v. testimony should be taken down in writing, and

that, when transmitted to England, it should be re-

1784. ceived as competent evidence by the tribunal now to
be established. It was further enacted, “ in order ”
(says the statute) “ to promote the ends of justice, in
ascertaining facts committed at so great a distance
from this country, by such evidence as the nature of
the case will render practicable,” that all writings
which might have passed between the Company and
their servants in India, might, as far as they related
to the facts in question, be read, and their evidence,
as far as to the Court might appear to weigh upon
the question, should be received. And also, upon the
prayer of either of the parties, power was given of
obtaining the examination, upon interrogatories,
before a commissioner duly appointed, of absent
witnesses, the depositions of whom, in this manner
procured, should be admitted as evidence.

Of this important provision, in the East India bill
of Mr. Pitt, the nature will appear, if we consider,
first the necessity for it, and next its adaptation to
the ends which it had in view.

1 . The necessity for it implies, that there was no
tribunal, as yet existing in this kingdom, which was
adequate to the purpose of punishing and repressing
crimes committed in India ; because, if there was any
such tribunal, no other, for a pui’pose which might
have been answered without it, ought to have been
called into existence. By enacting, therefore, a law
for the creation of this new tribunal, the legislature
of the country, with all the solemnity and weight of
legislation, declared, that, for the punishment of
crimes of the description here in question, the other

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT’S BILL.

tribunals of the kingdom, the courts of law, the courts
of equity, and even the high court, as it is called, of
parliament, are unfit. In what respect, unfit? Not
merely for their absurd exclusion of such evidence as
it was ordained that the new tribunal should receive.
Because, had this been the only objection, it might
have been easily removed, by simply prescribing what
sort of evidence they ought to receive. They were
therefore, according to the declaration of the legisla-
ture, unfit on other grounds, and these so fundamental,
that no superficial change could remove the unfitness.

This declaration is of very great extent. For if
the tribunals, previously existing, were all, even with
such rules for the admission of evidence, as the
legislature might have compelled them to observe,
unfit to try and to punish the crimes of high func-
tionaries in India, they were equally unfit to try and
to punish the crimes of high functionaries in Eng-
land. The crimes of high functionaries are not one
sort of thing in England, another sort of thing in
India. They are the same sort of thing in both
countries. And the only difference is, that the means
of proof are to be brought in one case from a greater
distance.

That the courts of law and equity are not tribunals
by which the crimes of high functionaries can be
repressed, was already the doctrine of the constitu-
tion ; since it appointed the method of impeachment
before the high court of parliament. The present
declaration of the legislature bore, then, particularly,
only upon the method of impeachment. That the
declaration was just, in regard to the method of im-
peachment, if any doubt till then could possibly have

VOL. iv. 2 p

577

BOOK V.
CHAP. 9.

1784.

578

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

B00K v- remained, was made appear, according to the con-

fession of all parties, even in parliament, a few years

1784. afterwards, by the trial of Mr. Hastings.

We may then proceed upon it as a fact, fully esta-
blished by experience, and solemnly recognised by
the legislature, that, as far as law is concerned, there
is impunity, almost or altogether perfect, to the
crimes of high functionaries in England.

2. If wTe consider the adaptation of this tribunal
of Mr. Pitt to the ends wdrich it had in view, we
shall first perceive that it was so constituted as to be
an instrument in the hands of the minister, and sure
to do whatever could be done with any tolerable
degree of safety, to secure his objects, whatever they
might be.

It consisted of two parts ; three judges sent from
the three courts of common law ; and ten members
from the houses of parliament. The subservience of
the judges of the common-law courts to the minister,
or to the master of the minister, is the doctrine of
one of the most remarkable parts of the British con-
stitution; the trial by jury. If it were not for the
wrong bias to which the judges of England are
liable, and ail biases are trifling compared with the
bias towrards the Court, the institution of a jury
would not only be useless, but hurtful. And if
this be the doctrine of the constitution, there is
assuredly none of its doctrines, which an experience
more full and complete, an experience more nearly
unvarying, can be adduced to confirm.

Such is the state of the case, in as far as regards
that part of the proposed tribunal, consisting of the
ordinary judges. With regard to that part which

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT’S BILL.

579

consisted of members chosen by the two houses ofBOOKnv

parliament, the case is cleared by the doctrine of the

authors of the hill themselves. Mr. Pitt and his 1784
friends maintained, and nobody affected to deny, that
the members to be chosen by parliament for Mr.

Fox’s Directors, would be “nominees” of the
minister. There was nothing which could give the
minister a power of nomination in that, which he
would not possess in the present case. The second
class of the members of the tribunal would, therefore,
be “ nominees ” of the minister.1

The subservience of the whole would for that
reason be complete. So far only as it was the
interest of the minister that justice should be well
administered, so far only would there be the intention
to administer it well. How far, even when it had
the intention, it would have the other qualities
requisite for the detection and punishment of the
official offences of official men, would demand a long

1 For some curious information on tliis subject, see a debate 'which,
took place in the House of Commons, on the 16th of February, 1785,
on the positive fact, that a ministerial list of members to be balloted for
on the very first choice for this new tribunal, was handed to members,
by the door-keeper, at the door of the House. Cobbett’s Pari. Hist. xxv.
1054 — 1060. After some experience, viz. on the 19th of March, 1787,
Mr. Burke said, “ that the new judicature was infinitely the worst sort
of jury that could be instituted, because it had one of the greatest objec-
tions belonging to it that could belong to any panel. The members of it
were nominated by the minister, and it was known soon after the com-
mencement of every session who they were.” Cobbett’s Pari. Hist. xxvi.
748. Mr. Pitt said, “ if the Right Hon. Gent, meant generally to in-
sinuate, that, in every act of the House, the influence of the minister was
prevalent, he should not attempt to enter into the question, nor did he
think such an insinuation decent or respectful to parliament.” This, if
not an admission, was not far from it. The only other circumstance
with which he attempted to contradict the assertion was this, that each
gentleman gave in a list. True; but what list? The minister’s list, or
another ?

2 P 2

580

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

BOOK V
CHAP. 9.

1784.

inquiry sufficiently to unfold. I must leave it to the
. reader’s investigation. Enough has probably been
said to give a correct, if not a complete, conception of
this new expedient for the better government of
India.

Such were the five principal provisions in the cele-
brated India bill of Mr. Pitt. Of other particulars,
not many require to he mentioned ; and for such as
do, a few words will suffice.

As the increase of the patronage and influence of
the minister was the foundation of the furious outcry,
which had been raised against the plan of Mr. Fox,
there wTas a great affectation of avoiding all increase
of ministerial patronage, by the bill of Mr. Pitt. In
particular, no salaries were annexed to the offices of
President, or Members of the Board of Control ; and
it was stated, that these offices might always be filled,
without increase of expense to the nation, or of influ-
ence to the Crown, by functionaries who enjoyed other
places of profit. We shall afterwards see, that this
was a mask ; which it was not long thought necessary
that the project should wear.

The patronage of India was left to the Directors,
subject to the following inroads : That the nomination
of the Commander-in-Chief, wTho should always be
second in Council, should belong exclusively to the
King ; That the Governor-General, Presidents, and
Members of all the Councils, should be chosen, sub-
ject to the approbation of the King: And that the
King should have the power of recalling them.

When it is said that the patronage of the Company
was left with the Directors, it can only, by any body,
be meant, that it was ostensibly left. For it never

MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PITT S BILL.

581

can for one moment be doubted that whatsoever g '

patronage is in the hands of the subordinate and

obeying body, in reality belongs to the superordi- 1/84'
nate and commanding. To ministerial purposes in
general the patronage of the East India House is the
patronage of the minister : In all the departments
subordinate to the minister a large portion of the
patronage necessarily follows the superintendence of
the details. And it is probable that, in the East
India House, a less proportion of the patronage re-
mains, not placed immediately at the command of the
minister, than in the most immediate departments of
his administration, those, for example, of the Admi-
ralty, and the Commander-in-Chief.1

1 Mr. Burke said, “ The new bill (Mr. Pitt’s) vested in the Crown an
influence paramount to any that had been created by the first bill (Mr.
Fox’s). It put the whole East India Company into the hands of the
Crown : And the influence arising from the patronage would be the more
dangerous, as those who were to have the distribution of the whole, in
reality, though perhaps not in name, would be removeable at the will and
pleasure of the Crown.” Cobbett’s Pari. Hist. xxiv. 354. Mr. Fox said,
“ By whom is this Board of Superintendence to be appointed ? Is it not
by his Majesty ? Is it not to be under his control ? In how dreadful a point
of view, then, must the very supposition of an agreement between this
Board and the Court of Directors strike every one who attends to it!
Must not the existance of such a union extend the influence of the prero-
gative, by adding to it the patronage of the Company ? Is it not giving
power to the Sovereign for the ends of influence, and for the extension
of that system of corruption which had been so justly reprobated ?” Ibid.
395. Mr. Fox again said, “ The last parliament, to their immortal
honour, voted the influence of the Crown inconsistent with public liberty.
The Right Hon. Gent., in consequence of that vote, finds it probably
unequal to the great objects of his administration. He is therefore willing
to take the present opportunity of making his court — where he knows
such a doctrine as the above will never be acceptable — and the plain
language of the whole matter now is — that the patronage of India must be
appended to the executive power of this country, which otherwise will not
be able to carry on schemes hostile to the constitution in opposition to the
House of Commons.” Ibid. 337. — To these authorities may be added
that of the Court of Directors. In the “ Reply to the Arguments against

582

HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.

*00K v. Such were the contrivances for improving that part

of the machinery for the Indian government, which

1784' had its seat in England. For immediate operation
upon the faults of that part of it which had its seat,
by unavoidable necessity, in India, the provisions of
Mr. Pitt coincided to a great degree with the pal-
liatives of Mr. Fox. A control was given to the
Governor-General and Council of Bengal over the
other Presidencies. Aggressive wars, presents, and
disregard of orders, were forbidden. The Zemindars
who had been displaced, were to be restored, and
their situation as much as possible rendered perma-
nent ; though nothing was said about their hereditary
rights, or a tax incapable of augmentation. The
debts of the Nabob of Arcot, and his disputes with
the Raja of Tanjore, were to be taken into consider-
ation, and a plan of adjustment was to be devised,
by the directors.

(he Company’s Claim,” &c. dated East India House, 19th January
1805, it is affirmed, “ The control and direction of Indian affairs is not with
the Company : unless, indeed, it be argued, that the small share of patron-
age left to them constitutes power and influence : All the great wheels of
the machine are moved by government at home, who direct and control
the Company in all their principal operations in India.” See State
Papers in Asiat. Ann. Reg. for 1805, p. 201.

END OF VOL. IV.

E. Varty, Printer, 27, Camomile Street, Bishopsgate.

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