A
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY
BY
THE HON. J. W. FORTESCUE, LL.D. EDIN.
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A
HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
LONDON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK BOSTON CHICAGO
DALLAS SAN FRANCISCO
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO
A History of
The British Army
BY
THE HON. J. W. FORTESCUE, LL.D. EDIN
HONORARY FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE. CAMBRIDGE
VOL. X
1814-1815
93
Quae caret or a cruore nostro ?
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1920
V.)0
COPYRIGHT
CONTENTS
BOOK XV Continued.
CHAPTER XVI
THE Low COUNTRIES
PAGE
The Allied Armies on the Continent ..... i
Graham's Expedition to Holland ; Sir Herbert Taylor . . I
The counter-revolution in Holland ..... 2
Russian, Swedish, and Prussian forces in Holland . . 2
Evacuation of Willemstadt by the French and capture of
Breda by the Russians ...... 3
Landing of Graham's force ....... 4
Advance of the French upon Breda ..... 5
Graham compelled to garrison Breda . . . ' . 6
Billow's plan of campaign ....... 7
The episode of Merxem ....... 8
Tricky behaviour of Biilow ...... 9
Advance of Graham and Btllow upon Antwerp . . .10
Biilow and the Swedes summoned to advance upon Paris . 1 1
Unsuccessful bombardment of Antwerp . . . .11
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Defeat of Napoleon at La Rothiere . . . . .12
Negotiations opened at the Congress of Chatillon . 12
Blticher and Schwarzenberg advance on Paris . 1 3
Repeated defeats of Blucher by Napoleon . 1 3
Hesitation of the Allies H
vi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
Bliicher again marches on Paris . . " . ". . .14
The general situation . ' . . . . < . . 15
Castlereagh's Treaty of Chaumont . . . . 15
Advance of Napoleon and retreat of Bliicher . . 1 5
Napoleon defeated at Laon . . . . . .16
He defeats the Russians at Rheims . . . . .16
Schwarzenberg defeats Napoleon at Arcis-sur-Aube . . 17
The Allies again resolve to march on Paris . . . ' 18
THE PENINSULAR WAR
Wellington's comments on Napoleon's campaign of 1814 . 18
Success of his policy in Southern France . . . .19
His difficulties with the Bourbons . . . . 19
His missions to Pau and Bordeaux . . . . .20
The white flag hoisted in Bordeaux . . . . .21
Cantonments of the British army on the road from Aire to
Viella 22
Souk's feint advance and retirement . . . . .22
Wellington resumes his advance . . . . . .23
Combat /of Vic-de-Bigorre ....... 24
Soult retreats upon Toulouse . . . . . .25
Combat of Tarbes ........ 26
Continued retreat of the French ..... 28
Their miserable condition . . . . . . .29
Reasons for Wellington's tardiness in pursuit . . . 30-32
CHAPTER XVII
THE Low COUNTRIES
Graham projects the surprise of Bergen-op-Zoom . . 33
Description of Bergen-op-Zoom . . . . . .34
Bad news prompts Graham to haste . . . . .36
His plan of attack . . . . . . . -37
The attack on Bergen-op-Zoom . . . . . . 38
Reflections upon the operation . . . . . .50
The casualties on both sides ...... 52-3
CONTENTS
Vll
PAGE
Chivalrous behaviour of the French commandant ' . 53
Further preparations of the Allies in Holland ... 54
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
The Allies enter Paris . . . . . . -55
The Senate declares Napoleon dethroned . . . -55
Marmont deserts Napoleon ...... 56
Napoleon consents to abdicate conditionally 57
Souham's defection causes him to abdicate without conditions 58
Napoleon is consigned to Elba . . . . . -58
CHAPTER XVIII
THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY
Bentinck disembarks troops at Leghorn .... 60
His ambitious projects for Italy . . . . . .61
Castlereagh warns him to be sensible ..... 62
General Montresor's operations in the Gulf of Spezia . . 63
Bentinck's advance to Genoa ...... 63-4
His meddling with Italian politics ..... 64
He is sharply rebuked and recalled by Castlereagh . . 65
THE PENINSULAR WAR
Wellington before Toulouse ...... 66
His failure to pass the Garonne ...... 67
Description of Toulouse . . . . . . . .68
Soult's object in shutting himself into Toulouse ... 69
Wellington passes the Garonne above Toulouse ... 70
Soult's dispositions in consequence . . . . 71
Wellington recrosses the Garonne ..... 72
The army again begins the passage of the Garonne . . 73
It is for three days divided between both banks owing to floods 74
Continuance of the passage . . 75
The affair at Croix Daurade ... 75' 6
Soult's dispositions for battle . 77'9
Wellington's dispositions for attack ... . 79-80
viii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PACK
The battle of Toulouse . . :.' ' ; : . ' . . t 80
Souk evacuates Toulouse . . v . i> .'" . 9 1
Suspension of arms . . .. ..',. . . 91
Reflections on the battle of Toulouse . '' ... 92
The casualties upon both sides . . . . . 93
The situation before Bayonne . . . .'-.'*'. 93-4
The sortie from Bayonne ..... . ., 95
General Thouvenot too harshly judged by Wellington . . 97-8
CHAPTER XIX
THE AMERICAN WAR
The situation on the Canadian frontier . . . .100
The American plans . . . . . . . .100
The affair at Lacolle River 101
The British projects 103
Capture of Oswego by Drummond . . . . 103
The affair at Big Sandy Creek . . . . . . 103-4
The Americans revert to a false plan of operations . . 104
Arrival of British reinforcements . ..... 105
Drummond's force in Upper Canada . . . . .106
Advance of General Brown . . . . . .107
Action of the Chippewa . . . . . 1 08
Its issue alarming to the British . . . . . .109
General Brown's subsequent movements . . . 110
Drummond plans a stroke upon his communications . . 1 1 1
Advance of the British to Lundy's Lane . . . .112
The action of Lundy's Lane . . . . . 1 1 3
Drummond invests Fort Erie . . . . 117
The assault on Fort Erie and its failure . . . .118
Siege of Fort Erie turned into a blockade . . . .120
Brown's attack on the blockading force . . . .121
Drummond retreats to Chippewa . . . .122
Feeble end of the American campaign . . . .123
Petty operations on the remoter lakes . . . . .124
CONTENTS ix
*> PAGE
Prevost's plans against Sackett's Harbour and on Lake
Champlain . ;>' ; : . . . . '". . .126
His advance to Plattsburg in co-operation with the fleet under
Captain Downie . . . . . . . .127
His impatience at Downie's delay . . . .128-9
He opens his attack on the Americans . . . .130
Downie totally defeated ; Prevost breaks off the attack and
retreats . . . . . . . 131
Fury of the Navy with Prevost . . . . . .131
Reflections upon his action . . . . . .132
The behaviour of some of the British ships . . . -133
Prevost dies before he can stand his trial . . . 134
His memory unjustly aspersed . . . . . 135
Alarm of the British Ministry in consequence of Downie's
defeat . 136
Wellington reassures them . ... .136
The American War in Canada honourable to the British
Arms 137
CHAPTER XX
THE AMERICAN WAR
Minor operations in America ; Sherbrooke's expedition to
the Penobscot .... ! 39
The expedition against Washington . .140
Landing of the British from the Patuxent . .141
The American dispositions ... H 2
The affair of Bladensburg . H3
The burning of Washington J 45
Panic of the Americans ... .140
The expedition proceeds from Baltimore . . H7
The affair of North Point ... .148
Advance to Baltimore found impossible J 49
The expedition sails for Jamaica . H9
Projects for attack on New Orleans . ! 5
The operation due to naval desire for prize-money I 5 l
x HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
The expedition anchors in Mississippi Sound , . .152
Advance of General Keane upon New Orleans . . 153
The strain of the maintenance of the communications upon
the Navy .... . . '. . . . 154
Keane's failure to grasp the true nature of the expedition . 155
The opportunity that he missed in consequence . . .156
Night attack of General Jackson upon Keane . . 157
The final advantage lies with the Americans . . *59
Supineness of Keane . . . . . . . .160
Arrival of General Pakenham . . . . . .161
His just anger against Admiral Cochrane . . . .161
Quality and strength of his troops . . . . .162
Pakenham's operations . . . . . . 163
Their failure . . . . . . . . .164
New plans suggested by the naval officers . . . 164-5
Their miscarriage . . . . . . . .166
Pakenham's plans for a general assault . . . . .167
The first mishaps in execution ...... 168-9
The attack on the American entrenchments . . .170
General Lambert asks for an armistice after its failure . 173
Retreat of the British . . . . . . . 174
Its hardships and perils , . . . . J 75
The attack upon Mobile ..... .176
Peace concluded with the United States . . . .176
Reflections upon the Mississippi campaign . . . 177-80
The Americans the greater sufferers from the war . . 181
CHAPTER XXI
SUMMARY OF THE PERIOD 1803-1814
The mistakes of the British Government in the planning of
expeditions . . . . . . . .182
Castlereagh's division of the Militia 184
His system breaks down ....... 184-5
The Duke of York's system of double battalions . . .185
CONTENTS x i
PAGE
Sir Harry Calvert's scheme for the Militia . . . , !86
The War Office ; the staff of clerks v' >. .. . . jg6
A paradise of jobbery .... 187
Arrears of accounts ..... igg
The Treasury : the Commissariat . . . . .189
Supply and transport . . . . . . .190
Reforms of 1809 ........ IQI
General Don's recommendations . ..... 193
The Medical Department : its history . . . .193
Abuses of the Medical Board 194
Dr. M'Grigor and regimental hospitals .... 195-6
The Chaplain's Department : its history . . . .196
The Duke of York's reforms . . . . . .197
Dearth of chaplains in Wellington's army . . . 199
Failure of the Horse Guards to remedy it . . . . 200
The Horse Guards : its organisation . . . . .201-2
Wellington and his staff in the field 202
Wellington as trainer of generals ..... 203
The Staff Corps ........ 203-4
The officers of the Army ....... 204-7
The men of the Army ....... 207
Discipline : the lash ........ 207-8
Medals and decorations of honour ..... 208-9
Drill and equipment : the cavalry .... 210-12
The infantry. . . . . . . . 213-14
The Office of Ordnance . . . . . . .214
The Artillery ; the corps of drivers . . . . 215
The Artillery's quarrel with Wellington . . . .216
The Engineers : their grievances . . . . .217
Their merits and demerits . . . . . 218-19
Character of Wellington 219
His service in India and in Ireland ..... 220
His insight into the problems of the Peninsular War . .221
His driving power . . . . . . .222
His complexity of temperament .... . 223
His sense of duty ..... .225
xii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
CHAPTER XXII
HOME AFFAIRS
PAGE
The situation after the peace of 1814 . .... 227
Reductions in the Army . . , .' . . . .' 228
Factious criticism of the Opposition in Parliament . . 229
Liverpool's difficulties with his supporters . . . .230
RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES CAMPAIGN IN THE Low COUNTRIES
Napoleon's escape from Elba and entry into Paris . .230
Collapse of all royalist resistance to him . . . .231
The Plenipotentiaries at Vienna declare Napoleon outlawed. 231
They agree upon the contingents to be placed in the field . 232
Wellington returns from Vienna to the Netherlands . .232
The wretched British army that awaited him . . .234
The question "Are we at peace or at war ?" . . .234
Legal obstacles delay the calling out of the Militia . . 234-5
The Opposition responsible chiefly for this . . . .236
The question of peace or war a real difficulty . . . 236-7
Wellington's army ; its weakness in artillery . . . 237
The German Legion and Hanoverian Militia . .238
Wellington's complaints of his staff examined . . . 239
His principal staff-officers and subordinate generals . . 240
The staff in the Adjutant -general's and Quartermaster-
general's departments . . . . . . .241
The Duke of York's readiness to help him . . . .242
The Allied troops under Wellington's command : the Dutch 242-3
The Belgians 2 43~4
Wellington's difficulties with the King of the Netherlands . 245
The King gives way to him .... .246
Organisation of Wellington's army ..... 246
The subtlety with which the elements were mixed . . 247
The Prussian army ; Bliicher, Gneisenau . . . 248
Napoleon : his position on his return to France . . . 249
Failure of his conceded constitution ..... 250
His measures for raising armies ...... 250
CONTENTS xiii
PAGE
The organisation of his armies . .... . . . ; 251
His principal officers : reasons for Murat's absence > . . 252-3
The Allied plan of campaign .,"" 2 53
Wellington's anxiety to check Napoleon from making head-
way outside France . . . . . . -254
His anxiety for the fate of the British Ministry . . . 254-5
CHAPTER XXIII
CAMPAIGN IN THE Low COUNTRIES
Dispositions of the Prince of Orange and Kleist to meet a
possible early invasion of Belgium .... 256
Wellington's agreement with Gneisenau .... 257
He arranges for the defence of the Low Countries . . 258
Extreme difficulty of his position .... .258-9
The two parties in the Prussian army . . . . . 259
Wellington's feelings contrasted with those of the Prussians
towards France ........ 259
Wellington's conditional orders in case of invasion of Belgium 260
Meeting of the Saxon troops ...... 260
Presages of the coming campaign at the British and Prussian
headquarters . . . . . . . .261
False reports of Napoleon's movements .... 262
Cantonments of Wellington's army in June .... 263
Positions of the Prussian army ...... 264
Extension of the Allied line ...... 265
Faults of the Prussian dispositions ..... 266
Gneisenau's strange orders in case of a French advance . 267
Contraction of the Prussian cantonments with a view to
concentration ........ 268
Napoleon's plan of campaign .... . 268
His concentration ........ 269
The difficulty of " war or peace " again appears . . . 270
Napoleon's orders for the advance into Belgium . . . 272
The French passage of the Sambre ... . 273
xiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
The first collisions with the Prussians : the French left
wing , /. . : .'-.; v . . .274
The French centre .: . . .'" V'. . . . 275
Situation of the French at nightfall of I5th June . . . 276
Proceedings of the Allies : the Prussians .... 277
The British 278
The intelligence received by Wellington during the day . 278-9
The orders finally issued by him ...... 280
Reasons for the surprise of the Allies . . . . .281
CHAPTER XXIV
CAMPAIGN IN THE Low COUNTRIES
The Duchess of Richmond's ball 283
General Constant secures Quatre Bras . . . . .283
Wellington's orders for concentration ..... 284
Napoleon's plans for the i6th of June. .... 285
His vague ideas of his enemy's whereabouts . . . .285
Prussian orders for the 1 6th of June .... .285-6
Dispositions of Perponcher at Quatre Bras .... 288
Wellington's arrival at Quatre Bras ..... 289
His incorrect information furnished to Bliicher . . . 290
His meeting with Bliicher . . . . . . .291
Napoleon's orders to Ney ....... 292
His dispositions for the battle of Ligny and his new orders
to Ney 293
Napoleon realises that the Prussian army is before him . . 294
His new orders to Ney ....... 294
The battle of Ligny ........ 294-6
The late advance of Ney ....... 296
Description of the field of Quatre Bras .... 296
The dispositions of the Prince of Orange .... 298
Ney's dispositions for attack ...... 299
The French open their attack ...... 300
Wellington arrives on the field . . . . . . 300
CONTENTS
His counter-attack . . ..''..
Ney develops his attack in force . . .- 4
The battle of Quatre Bras .
Comments on the action ....
The conduct of the troops : the Netherlanders
The Germans .....
The British ;.-
The French losses
Napoleon's conduct considered .
XV
PAGE
3 OI
302
302
318
319
320
321
322
323
CHAPTER XXV
CAMPAIGN IN THE Low COUNTRIES
The retreat of the Prussians . . . . . .326
The British assemble at Quatre Bras . . . . .327
Wellington learns of the Prussian retreat . . . .328
The pursuit of the Prussians by the French . . . .328
Napoleon decides to divide his army . . . . . 329
His instructions to Grouchy . . . . . .330
Their vagueness and uncertainty . . . . 331
Retreat of Wellington upon Waterloo . . . . .332
Inactivity of Ney . . . . . . . -332
Napoleon advances upon the British . . . . 333
Wellington leaves the cavalry to cover his retreat . . -334
Incidents of the retreat 335-6
The French pursuit not pressing . . . . j. -337
Position of the French left wing and reserve at nightfall . 338
Movements and reports of Grouchy . . . . -339
Orders of Bliicher on the night of the I7th of June . . 340
Incompetence or disloyalty of the Prussian staff . . . 341
Disloyalty of Gneisenau ....... 343
March of the Prussians on Waterloo ..... 343
Movements of Grouchy on the 1 8th of June . . . 343
Napoleon's confidence ... . . 344~5
Wellington resolves to stand his ground .... 346
xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
PAGE
His expectation to be turned by his right . . .' -: . 347
The position of Waterloo . . i . . . . 348
Hougoumont . . '. . . ... . . . . 349
La Haye Sainte . . . . . . . . . 350
Disposition of Wellington's army . ". , ,. . . 350
Its numbers .... .' . . ; - . . 352
The occupation of the position . ..-' . ...... 353
Napoleon's dispositions . . ... . . -353
His main attack to be made on the Allied centre . . .354
The delay in opening it . . . . . . -355
The battle of Waterloo ....... 356
Napoleon's first demonstration on both flanks . . 3 56
Jerome turns his demonstration into a serious attack upon
Hougoumont ........ 356-9
Napoleon detaches troops to check the Prussian advance . 359
His grand attack on the centre ...... 360
Its initial successes . . . . . . . . 361-3
Its total defeat by the British cavalry ..... 364-5
The British cavalry wrecked by its success .... 366
Lull in the action generally ...... 367
Continued fighting about Hougoumont .... 368
CHAPTER XXVI
Second half-hearted attack on the Allied centre . . . 369
Ney prepares a third attack with cavalry only . . .370
Complete failure of this attack ..... -371-3
Bliicher attempts to advance . . . . . ; 374
He is checked by Lobau ....... 375
Renewed vain attacks of the French cavalry. . . . 375
Terrible losses of the French . . . . . 378
Ney repeats his attack with cavalry and infantry . . 378
Its initial failure ....... 379-8 1
Bliicher, reinforced, begins to press the French . . .381
Napoleon throws him back . ...... 382
CONTENTS xvii
PAGE
A new attack masters La Haye Sainte . . . . .382
Napoleon's efforts to push his advantage . . . -383
A fresh attack on Hougoumont is repulsed . . . -384
Danger in the Allied centre . . . . . -385
Bliicher begins to press forward . . . . . -385
Ziethen's corps arrives on the field . . . . .386
Napoleon launches his final attack with the Imperial Guard 387
The attack and its repulse ...... 388-91
The counter-attack of the Allies . . : . ' . .391
Dissolution of the French army ...... 392-3
CHAPTER XXVII
The casualties of the British at Waterloo .... 394-7
The casualties of Wellington's foreign troops . . . 397
Movements of the Prussians ...... 398
Escalade of Cambrai and capture of Peronne . . . 399
The Allies arrive before Paris ...... 399
Surrender of Paris ........ 400
Infamous behaviour of the Netherlanders and Prussians 400-401
The terms of peace ........ 402
The fate of Murat, Ney, and others ..... 403
Surrender of Napoleon ....... 403
St. Helena 404
Comments on the campaign of Waterloo .... 405
The first stage of the campaign ...... 406
The second stage ........ 407
Wellington's nerve in accepting battle .... 409
Napoleon's tactics at Waterloo . . . . . .410
British and Prussian losses in the battle . . . .411
Internal distrust in the French army . ... 413
Reflections on the British artillery and cavalry considered 414-15
Both sides exhausted towards the close of the battle . . 416
Bad quality of all the armies engaged . . . . . 417
The victory was Wellington's . . . 418
xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
APPENDICES
PAGE
I. Effective strength of the British Army, showing organisa-
tion by brigades and divisions, i6th January 1814 . 421
II. The Anglo-Allied Army in the Waterloo campaign . 426
III. Strength of the British Army present at Waterloo . 431
IV. Composition of the Prussian Army under Field-Marshal
Prince von Bliicher . *_ . . . . 432
V. Composition of the French Army under the Emperor
Napoleon . . . . . . . . 434
INDEX . . . . . ' ; . . ... 439
CHAPTER XVI
RETURNING now to the general movement of the 1813.
Allied Armies on the Continent, the reader will recall
that their military forces had been organised into three
principal hosts : the Army of the North under
Bernadotte on the right ; the Army of Silesia under
Bliicher in the centre ; and the Army of Bohemia
under Schwarzenberg on the left. Of the plan of
campaign proposed for these two last something has
already been said ; and it is now necessary to trace the
movements of the first, which were governed in some
degree by the insurrection of the Dutch against French
rule on the I5th of November. The news of this
insurrection was received by the Cabinet in London
on the 2ist of November; and, as we have seen, Nov. 21,
Ministers resolved immediately to send out a force of
about six thousand men under Sir Thomas Graham,
and to furnish in addition twenty thousand muskets,
for the support of the movement.
First of all, however, they resolved to despatch Major-
general Herbert Taylor at once to Holland, in order to
collect all possible information respecting the resources,
means and plans of the insurgents. This officer, who
was an excellent linguist, had begun life in the Foreign
Office at the age of sixteen, and made the campaign of
1793 in Flanders as Secretary to Sir James Murray;
after which, having obtained a commission, he became
assistant secretary to the Duke of York, and continued
with him as Private Secretary at the Horse Guards
until 1805. At the recommendation of Pitt he then
VOL. x i B
2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1813. passed in the same capacity to the service of George
the Third, who until that date, owing to the jealousy
of Ministers, had never had a Secretary, but was now
compelled by rapid failure of eyesight to employ one.
With the old King Taylor remained until his master's
mind gave way, when Queen Charlotte took him over
as Secretary and confidential adviser ; and it was from
the atmosphere of her Court that he was hurried away
at a few hours' notice on a diplomatic mission, with
the promise of the command of a brigade of Graham's
force. One can hardly conceive of a training worse
calculated to fit a man for service in the field ; but
Graham went out of his way to declare not only that
Taylor was a most valuable officer but that he would
make an excellent chief of the staff to any army.
The course of the counter-revolution in Holland
had not, as a matter of fact, been very encouraging ;
for, though there was much enthusiasm, there was no
organisation and no armed force of any kind. The
French commanders, however, evacuated the Hague,
Nov. ,2 3. Rotterdam and Amsterdam in panic ; and on the 23rd
of November a party of Cossacks entered the capital.
These troops were the extreme advanced guard of
General Winzingerode's detachment of Bernadotte's
army which, marching up the Yssel by Zwolle,
Zutphen and Deventer, had reached Amersfort on
Nov. 24. that same day. On the 24th the French, whose
main force was at Gorkum on the Maas, recovered
from their panic, and made a general advance eastward
and northward upon Dordrecht, Woerden and
Amsterdam, and, though repelled by armed burghers
from the first and last of these places, succeeded in
Nov. 30. regaining possession of Woerden. On the 3oth the
Prince of Orange landed at Scheveningen from England ;
but his appearance gave no kind of unity or guidance
to the insurrection. Admiral Verhuell still occupied
Helder for the French with the Texel fleet. Happily
on the same day a Prussian force of fifteen thousand
men under General Bttlow also appeared on the Yssel,
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 3
and took Arnheim, at the junction of the Yssel and 1813.
the Rhine, by storm. Bernadotte, however, unwilling
to compromise his prospects by actual collision with a
French army, made no attempt to support Bttlow and
Winzingerode, but, after loitering for a time on the
Elbe, invaded Holstein and forced the Danes to sur-
render, under an armistice, the whole of that province Dec. 16.
and a part of Schleswig as a pledge for the cession of
Norway to Sweden. Never had man a more single
eye to the main chance than the Gascon Crown Prince.
Such was the situation when on the jrd of December Dec. 3.
Taylor landed at Scheveningen with the twenty thousand
muskets. He found no man ready to take charge of
these arms, no place prepared to receive them, and
no organised body of any kind to make use of them.
There was much shouting of Oranje Boven> and nothing
more. North and eastward the evacuation of Utrecht by
the French and the capture of Arnheim had done some-
thing towards strengthening the position of the insur-
gents, and the occupation of Brielle by armed peasants
afforded a landing-place for troops from England ; but
the enemy still held Helvoetsluis, Gorkum and Nimeguen
on the Maas and Waal, and there seemed slight prospect
of dislodging them. The Russian force on the spot under
General Benckendorff numbered little over six thousand
men ; Billow's fifteen thousand were extended along the
Yssel and the Rhine as far as Dttsseldorf ; Graham's
corps had not even disembarked ; and, as there was
no commander-in-chief, each party acted as seemed
right in its own eyes. On the 6th the French evacuated Dec. 6.
Helvoetsluis, just in time for the Guards to land there ;
but the remainder of the force, together with Graham,
remained wind-bound, and there was no kind of staff,
no paymaster, no blankets nor field-equipage, no trans-
port and no artillery attached to the expedition. Even
so, however, the appearance of the Guards was enough
to make the French evacuate Willemstadt and retire on
Bergen-op-Zoom ; and three hundred of Benckendorff's
Cossacks sufficed to capture Breda, and take six hundred
4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1813. out of the sixteen hundred of the garrison. It was
evident that the enemy was weak and bewildered, and
that any force of real strength might speedily have
recovered Holland, or at any rate have paralysed the
feeble French garrisons and marched upon Antwerp,
which was the great object so far as England was
concerned of sending troops to the Low Countries at
all. But the difficulty, as one officer observed, was
to establish any fixed plan or concert between people
who were all independent of each other, and ac-
knowledged no superior directing authority.
Dec. 10. On the roth the enemy abandoned Willemstadt ;
Dec. 15. and on the I5th Graham with the greater part of his
troops 1 anchored in the Roompot, where lay Admiral
Young's squadron of eleven line-of-battle ships. The
force was of extremely poor quality, including many
boys and old men ; for the battalions had been scraped
together from the dep6ts on the supposition that only
garrison duties would be required of them. Graham had
accepted the command with reluctance from a sheer sense
of duty, and looked forward to no better result than to
Dec. 17. escape disgrace. On the iyth the troops disembarked
at Stavenisse on the island of Tholen, and Graham
hastened forward to the town of the same name in order
to obtain information concerning Bergen - op - Zoom,
Dec. 1 8. which lies about four miles from it. On the i8th he
reconnoitred the fortress in company with BenckendorfF;
and was acquainted that the garrison numbered about
three thousand men of an inferior description, the
1 Graham's Force.
Guards Brigade. Maj.-gen. Cooke det. 1st Guards,
800 ; dets. Coldstream and 3rd Guards,
800 ....... =1600
Skerrerfs Brigade. 2/37th, 500; 44th, 500; 55th,
400; z/69th, 500; Veteran batt., 500 . =2400
Mackenzie's Brigade. 2/35th, 600 ; det. 52nd, 300;
73rd, ?; det. 3/95th, 250 . . . = ?
Gibbs's Brigade. 2/251)1, ? ; 33rd, ? ; 54th,
3/56th, 400 ." . = ?
2nd Hussars, K.G.L.
The 25th, 33rd, 56th, and Veterans did not arrive with Graham.
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
5
French having been reinforced both there and at 1813.
Antwerp. In fact the happy moment had passed away,
and a great opportunity had been lost, chiefly through
the misfortune of continually easterly winds, which
forbade the passage of troops from England.
On the 2oth a messenger reached Graham from Dec. 20.
BenckendorfF, announcing that a considerable corps
of the enemy was advancing from Antwerp upon Breda,
and begging that the British would move forward and
fall upon their left flank. Now, had BenckendorfF
left Breda as he found it, this hostile movement
would have been of no great importance, for the
sole defence of the fortress had been a wet ditch,
which, when frozen, presented no obstacle whatever.
The ramparts were of so gentle a slope that a man
could ride over them ; there were nowhere any pali-
sades ; the place contained few guns and no case-
mates, and was surrounded by outworks which, being
unarmed and unoccupied, could have furnished useful
shelter for an assailing force. Hence the French
had evacuated the place without hesitation ; but
BenckendorfF, anxious to win fame, had persuaded
the Dutch to place fifty guns and other munitions of
war in it without a thought for the garrison that was
to defend it ; and now, when danger threatened, he
called upon his colleagues to make good his mistake.
Graham had no choice but to refuse. He had only
five thousand men all told, no cavalry and no artillery.
It was vital to him to hold Tholen with its bridge in
front of Bergen-op-Zoom, so as to cover Zealand and
his access to the fleet ; it was not less important to
instal a sufficient garrison at Willemstadt, where the
rest of his troops and all his supplies and stores
remained ; and, when these services had been provided
for, there were no men left for the field.
On the following day arrived an aide-de-camp from Dec. 21.
Billow, intimating that his corps was now distributed
along a line east and west, confronting the fortresses
held by the French. Thus he was holding Arnheim
6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1813. opposite Nimeguen ; Bommel and Crevecoeur over
against Bois le Due ; and Gertruidenberg in face of
Breda; and he also asked for assistance in delivering
Dec. 24. t he place last named. On the 24th the Hereditary
Prince of Orange, fresh from Wellington's side in the
Peninsula, appeared at Graham's head-quarters to press
the same request. Graham pushed out a patrol east-
ward from Tholen to Rozendaal with orders to spread
the report that he was advancing with five thousand
men, which had the desired effect of making the
Dec. 25. French retire ; and on the 25th at last the rest of
his troops and his artillery arrived at Willemstadt.
Graham therefore shifted his head-quarters to that
port, and cantoned his troops from west to east from
Tholen through Willemstadt to Zevenbergen, so as to
be at hand to support Benckendorffat Breda.
Hardly had he done so, however, when BenckendorfF
sent word that he must withdraw his troops from
garrison, as Winzingerode was marching for Dtisseldorf,
Graham begged Btllow to advance and save Breda ;
but the Prussians could not arrive before the 5th of
January 1814; and, as the French were again
approaching the fortress and had actually reached
Hoogstraeten, which was half-way to it from Antwerp,
Sir Thomas entreated BenckendorfF to wait still for
a few days. The Russian officer answered that he
must march on the 2nd, but that he would first drive
back the French, and would leave two regiments of
1814. horse to cover the British cantonments, until their own
Jan. 2. cavalry should arrive. On the 2nd, however, he moved
off without engaging the French, and without leaving
a man behind him. A hard frost had set in, which
rendered the ditches of Breda absolutely indefensible.
Though the risk of isolating a part of his small
force in the fortress was very great, Graham felt
compelled in the circumstances to accept it. Accord-
ingly on the 2nd he stationed Gibbs's brigade in the
place ; and immediately afterwards by great good
Jan. 5. fortune there was a few days' thaw. On the 5th
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 7
the Prussians began to arrive at Breda; on the 7^1,1814.
Bttlow established his head-quarters in the town ; and j an 7
the arrival of the British cavalry on the same day
relieved Graham of all further anxiety.
Sir Thomas was now the senior officer on the spot ;
but in deference to the large numbers of troops under
the orders of Bttlow, he generously waived his rank,
and declared his readiness to subordinate himself
to the Prussian General. On the 8th the two com- Jan. 8.
manders met in council, and Bttlow propounded an
elaborate plan for driving the enemy back from their-
advanced station and cutting them off from Antwerp.
The enterprise was by no means without good promise
of success. The French lay at Hoogstraeten and
Wortel, about fourteen miles due south of Breda and
twenty miles north-east jof Antwerp ; and to go from
Breda to Antwerp by way of Hoogstraeten is to
traverse two sides of an obtuse-angled triangle. The
main road from Breda to Antwerp runs almost as
straight as a crow flies from one town to the other,
and passing seven miles west of Hoogstraeten forms
the third side of the triangle. Obviously therefore,
if the Allies succeeded in reaching a point on the main
road due west of Hoogstraeten before the French
quitted their position, they would be nearer to Antwerp
than was their enemy.
Bttlow designed that the British contingent should
cover his right against any attack of the French
from Bergen - op - Zoom or from the forts on the
Lower Scheldt, and should keep well forward so as
to intercept the enemy's retreat from Hoogstraeten ;
while the Prussians should advance along the by-
ways east of the main road from Breda to Antwerp.
The movement began on the loth, when the British Jan. 10.
were assembled at Rozendaal, and Bttlow, marching
some way before instead of behind them, actually
found himself on the great road, as near to Antwerp
as the French were. This was a fine stroke of
luck ; but, as it was not what the Prussian General
8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. had looked for, he scorned it, stuck to his original
Jan. 10. plan, marched by cross-roads to attack the enemy's
front instead of improving his situation in their left
rear, and, after losing a good many men, compelled his
adversaries to retreat upon Antwerp. The British
meanwhile had been by Billow's orders kept halted at
Rozendaal, when they ought to have been pushed
forward to intercept the French retreat ; and altogether
a promising operation was wrecked by Prussian
imbecility.
Jan. ii. On the nth the united force solemnly advanced ten
miles to the south, Graham's head-quarters being at
Calmpthout, and Billow's at Loenhout. In the course
of the night the Prussian cavalry was surprised by
the French at West Malle, and suffered considerably ;
Jan. 12, and on the I2th Billow expressed a desire to concentrate
the army more closely before approaching Antwerp.
On that day, therefore, the First British Division 1
advanced no further than to Capelle ; while the Second
came forward from Nispen and Esschen to Calmpthout.
Jan. 13. On the 1 3th the Guards were detached to Hoevenen
and Orderen to observe Fort Lillo ; while Taylor's
brigade occupied Capelle, throwing out flank-guards
towards Putten and Bergen-op-Zoom, and keeping up
communication with the Guards. The general idea was
that the Second Division of the British should move
south-westward by Eeckeren upon the western flank of
Merxem, while the Prussians should approach the front
of that village by the main road. General Thumen,
who commanded Billow's leading division, marched
upon Merxem accordingly, drove the enemy from a
few houses of the long straggling street, and reported
that he had occupied the whole ; whereupon Billow
summoned the British to join Thumen without delay.
1 First Division. General Cooke.
Gibbs's Brigade : 25th; 33rd; 54th; 56th.
Taylor's (late Skerrett's) : 37th ; 44th ; 55th ; 69th.
Second Division. General Mackenzie.
Guards Brigade.
Mackenzie's : 35th ; det. 52nd ; 73rd ; det. 3/95th.
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 9
The Thirty-fifth, Fifty-second, Seventy-eighth (which 1814.
had lately arrived) and Ninety-fifth, therefore, drew Jan. 13.
near to the village, and were received with musket-
shots which were duly returned by the Ninety-fifth.
Graham and his staff, galloping to the front, ordered
the Riflemen to cease fire, but, being saluted by a volley,
directed the Seventy-eighth to advance. The High-
landers, though not five hundred strong, at once dashed
into the village and cleared it with the bayonet, killing
many of the French, including a general, and taking
several prisoners. It then appeared that Thumen had
never captured more than a small fraction of the village
and that, mistaking the British for French, he had
evacuated even that fraction upon seeing them march
upon it.
Nor was this the last strange episode of the opera-
tions. No sooner were the British established in
Merxem than Bttlow announced that nothing further
could be done, and that he must retire to protect
Breda and his communications from possible molestation
by Marshal Macdonald, who lay with ten thousand
men at Venloo. Graham galloped off to the Prussian
general to represent that the British had been decoyed
into a place within a mile of the glacis of Antwerp and
of a garrison of ten thousand men, and that the Prussians
might at least wait until the red-coats could retreat
simultaneously with them. But Billow would not listen.
His columns were already in motion northward, and
he refused to stop them. Graham therefore maintained
a bold front until nightfall, when he sent away his
wounded, fewer than forty in number, and fell back
to Calmpthout. Even then the Prussian rear-guard
mistook the British for French and was on the point
of firing upon them. In fact the conduct of Billow
and his officers was characteristically Prussian mean,
tricky, selfish, dishonourable, and therefore necessarily
carrying with it nervous apprehension of reprisals alike
from friend and foe. Graham was too good a soldier
to expect any advantage from his colleague's aimless
io HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. movement upon Antwerp, and relapsed without dis-
content into inactivity. He cantoned his troops to
north and north-east of Bergen-op-Zoom at Steen-
bergen, Oudenbosch and Rozendaal, leaving Breda and
its environs to be occupied by the Prussians.
Unsatisfactory to the last degree though the situation
was, Graham with admirable self-control kept his
temper, and spoke highly of Btllow in his public
despatches. In a few days he received a letter from
Bathurst pressing urgently for a second attempt upon
Antwerp, and above all things for the destruction of
the French fleet in the Scheldt, if possible. The enter-
prise seemed impracticable, for the whole of the British
siege-train remained wind-bound in British ports, and,
what was still more discouraging, the Dutch, while full
of complaints of loss of trade and dearness of colonial
produce, remained absolutely lethargic in the matter
of reconquering their independence. However, upon
receiving Graham's representations, Billow agreed to
abandon an attack which he had projected upon
Marshal Macdonald, and to advance again upon Ant-
werp. Heavy artillery was collected from the Dutch
Jan. 30. arsenals ; and on the 3Oth the Allies began their march
southward by the same roads as before, Graham's
head-quarters being on that day at Calmpthout. Btllow
now raised difficulties as to the bombardment of the
fleet at Antwerp, declaring very truly that such an
operation was of interest to no country but England,
and that he should infinitely prefer to extend his left
and throw forward a part of his army upon Malines
and Brussels. Graham compromised matters by agree-
ing to shift his force further eastward to Brecht, thus
enabling the desired extension to be made. On the
Feb. i. ist of February it was arranged that the Prussians
should move on Deurne and the British on Merxem,
but that neither village should be approached till the
morning of the 2nd, when both should be assailed
simultaneously. Graham accordingly advanced no fur-
ther than Brasschaet ; but towards evening an aide-de-
CH.XVI HISTORY OF THE ARMY n
camp came to him from Billow announcing that the 1814.
Prussians were attacking Deurne, that they were meet- Feb. i.
ing with stubborn resistance, and that he desired the
British to make a diversion by falling upon Merxem.
As it was too late in the day for any such thing,
Graham contented himself with sending a patrol to
drive in the French picquets before the village ; and, as
a natural result of Billow's trifling with his own plans,
the Prussians were twice repulsed before Deurne, the
greater part of which was held by the French all night.
At daybreak Graham directed the brigades 1 of Feb. 2,
Skerrett and Taylor to attack Merxem from east and
west simultaneously ; and, though the village had been
covered by abatis and otherwise placed in a good state of
defence, it was carried with little difficulty by Taylor
alone. The loss of the British was slight ; and the
French, who made a very poor resistance, left two guns
and two hundred prisoners in their hands. The British
regiments then proceeded with great activity to construct
their batteries ; but on the morning of the 3rd there Feb. 3,
came a new complication. Biilow announced that he,
and Winzingerode also, had been summoned by Bliicher
to join in the general advance upon Paris. He con-
sented at Graham's request to remain until the 6th ;
and, in order to finish the businesses soon as possible,
Graham's batteries opened fire in the afternoon, and
continued the bombardment of the fleet and dockyard
for two days. Several shells fell in the dockyard and
some on the ships, but there was not a sufficient weight
of vertical fire to prevent the enemy from extinguishing
any flames that were kindled. The Dutch artillery, in-
deed, proved to be very defective. Three large cannon
burst, injuring several men, and the mortars were old-
fashioned and inaccurate. On the evening of the 5th, Feb. 5.
therefore, the ordnance was withdrawn, and on the night
of the 6th Graham quietly led back his troops to Brecht,
Rozendaal and the vicinity, while Billow went forward
to Brussels on his way to join Bliicher. Thus failed
1 33rd, 35th, 56th, /8th, 95th.
12 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. the second feeble attempt upon Antwerp, perhaps the
more certainly, since on the 2nd Carnot had taken
command of the garrison.
Reverting now to the operations of the principal
armies of the Allies, it will be remembered that on the
Feb. i. 1st of February Blucher and Schwarzenberg had de-
feated Napoleon with heavy loss at La Rothiere. In
Paris there reigned panic and despair, and a corres-
ponding elation awoke in the camps of the Allies, where
it was confidently asserted that Napoleon had ceased
to be dangerous, and that the war was practically
over. Already in November 1813, the Allies had put
forward certain proposals, equivocally expressed, as a
basis for peace ; and after long delay Caulaincourt, as
Napoleon's foreign minister, had written on the 6th of
January, privately to Metternich, expressing willingness
to enter into negotiations. In reply Metternich gave
him Chatillon-sur-Seine as the place where the repre-
sentatives of the powers would meet him ; and a first
conference of these representatives, held on the 29th of
January, decided that Caulaincourt should be invited to
meet them on the 3rd of February. The Congress
Feb. 4. opened formally on the 4th, with no great sincerity
upon either side, for each party was inclined to raise or
lower its demands according to the favourable or un-
favourable prospects of its armies at the moment. The
Allies also, through jealousy and diversity of interest,
were much divided as to the terms upon which an
accommodation should be founded ; and only Castlereagh,
who spoke for England, showed resolute decision upon
the one point, that he would agree to no peace which
did not provide for a final settlement of the affairs of
Europe.
So critical, however, was Napoleon's situation after
the defeat of La Rothiere that he was driven to
Feb. 6. desperation. On the 6th of February he retired from
Troyes to Nogent, gave orders for the evacuation of
Rome, Italy, Barcelona and Piedmont, and empowered
Caulaincourt to accept the conditions offered by the
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 13
Allies. These conditions required the reduction of 1814.
France to the frontier which had been hers in 1789.
The Emperor cried out against such humiliation, but in
the early morning of the 8th seemed inclined after all Feb. 8.
to give way. At seven o'clock, however, a messenger
came in from Marmont with important intelligence.
With heads turned by their good fortune at La Rothiere,
the Allies had thrown caution to the winds, and decided
on the 2nd of February to march upon Paris in two
independent columns, Bllicher by the line of the Marne,
Schwarzenberg by the banks of the Seine. On the 6th
accordingly BlUcher set out with fifty-seven thousand
men, without waiting for Schwarzenberg, and advanced,
trailing out his troops in so long a column that each of
his four corps was a day's march apart from its fellows.
The blunder cried aloud for punishment, and Napoleon,
flying to his maps, vowed that in two days he would
change the entire face of affairs.
Leaving the corps of Victor and Oudinot to dispute
the passage of the Seine with Schwarzenberg at Nogent,
the Emperor fell upon Bllicher's third corps at Cham-
paubert on the loth, defeated it completely, and thus Feb. 10.
cut the long line of the Prussian march in two, inter-
posing his troops between the corps of Yorck and
Sacken at Meaux, and that of Blucher at Chalons.
Yorck and Sacken hastily fell back to Montmirail ; but
Napoleon, reaching that place before them, beat them
on the i ith, and pursuing them, beat them again on the
1 2th at CMteau Thierry. On the I3th Blttcher, Feb. 13.
pushing Marmont's weak corps before him with careless
confidence, reached Champaubert ; but on the I4th the Feb. 14.
Emperor, joining Marmont, turned upon the Prussians
and routed them, inflicting a loss of six thousand men
at a cost to himself of only seven hundred killed and
wounded. Napoleon would gladly have hunted Blucher
to Chalons and made an end of him, but Schwarzenberg
had meanwhile advanced as far as Provins, Nangis,
Montereau and Fontainebleau, where he learned of the
succession of disasters which had befallen his colleague.
i 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. The Allies became nervous and irresolute. Schwarzen-
Feb. 15. berg halted on the I5th, and remained stationary for
three days " awaiting the development of Napoleon's
manoeuvres." He was not long kept in suspense.
On the 1 5th the Emperor by forced marches reached
Meaux ; on the i6th he joined the corps of Victor and
Feb. 17. Oudinot at Guignes ; and on the I7th he overthrew the
advanced guard of the Allies, and began a general for-
ward movement.
In the interim the plenipotentiaries, abating some of
their pretensions under pressure of misfortune, had on
the 1 4th agreed to a preliminary treaty offering rather
more favourable terms to Napoleon, and this was sub-
mitted to Caulaincourt on the I7th. With this treaty
as a pretext Schwarzenberg on the same day sent in a
flag to propose a cessation of arms. The only answer
of Napoleon was to continue his offensive operations,
whereupon Schwarzenbeg retreated hurriedly by forced
marches to Troyes. There he faced about and formed
his line of battle ; but Napoleon, having lost contact
with the Austro-Russian army through the false move-
ments of some of his lieutenants, did not come up with
Feb. 22. him until the 22nd, by which time BlUcher had rallied
his discomfited forces at Chalons and had made three
marches towards the Aube to join his colleague.
Napoleon, though he had only seventy thousand men,
had every intention of attacking and beating first the
hundred and twenty thousand before him, and then of
turning north to deal with Blucher ; but Schwarzen-
berg, with the full approval of Castlereagh and of the
Emperor of Austria, retreated in the early hours of
Feb. 23. the 2 3rd. On the advice of the Tsar it was now agreed
that the army of Bohemia should fall back to Chaumont ;
and that Blucher, reinforced by the corps of Winzin-
gerode and Bttlow, should be free to go whither he
would ; upon which decision the fiery old man made
up his mind to march at once upon Paris by way of
Coulommiers.
On the 26th therefore the general situation was as
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 15
follows. Napoleon with seventy -four thousand men 1814.
was at Troyes ; and Schwarzenberg at Chaumont with Feb. 26.
nearly double the number. Blucher with forty-eight
thousand men was making a dangerous flank march
with Napoleon in his rear, and ten thousand men under
Marmont and Macdonald on his front. Further to the
south Augereau was taking the offensive from Lyons
against the Austrian General Bubna in Switzerland,
twenty-eight thousand men against twenty thousand,
with orders from Napoleon to capture Geneva, and then
strike at Schwarzenberg's communications between Bale
and Langres. In Italy Eugene Beauharnais, with forty-
eight thousand men, occupied the line of the Mincio to
repel General Bellegarde with seventy-four thousand.
Lastly Wellington, as we have seen, had manoeuvred
Soult out of the entrenched camp at Bayonne, and was
about to attack him at Orthez.
Upon the arrival of Schwarzenberg's headquarters at
Chaumont, Castlereagh, observing the mutual jealousies
and mistrust of the Allies, brought forward a project
for a new treaty of alliance to summarise and supersede
all former agreements. Hereby the contracting parties
undertook, in case France should reject their terms, to
pursue the war with six hundred thousand men, England
providing a subsidy of five millions for the year 1814,
while in case of a subsequent attack by France, each
bound himself to help the others with sixty thousand
men. The treaty, which was to last for twenty years,
was only signed after some stormy discussion on the
loth of March, but was ante-dated to the ist. This Mar. 10.
instrument was the foundation of the Quadruple Alliance,
called also the Holy Alliance, which governed Europe
until 1848.
Meanwhile, upon learning of Blucher 's march,
Napoleon left forty thousand men under Macdonald to
watch Schwarzenberg, and, quitting Troyes on the 27th Feb. 27.
of February, advanced north-westward with thirty-five
thousand men upon the Prussian General's flank and
rear. Blttcher, hearing of the movement, retreated
1 6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. in alarm to the north-east, and, thanks to the surrender
of Soissons by a weak French commandant, was able
to escape across the Aisne, and march upon ' Laon.
Napoleon beat his rear-guard at Craonne on the yth
Mar. 9-10. of March, but was defeated in a two days' battle at Laon,
and retired on the evening of the loth to Soissons,
which had been reoccupied by a small French garrison.
Had not fortune turned against the Emperor by de-
livering the bridge of Soissons for a few days to his
enemies, he would almost certainly have routed Blticher
and made an end, for a time, of the Army of Silesia.
The prospects of Napoleon were now exceedingly
dark, for he was oppressed not only by his own dis-
appointments but by the defeat of Soult at Orthez, and
even more by the extreme sluggishness of Augereau,
who showed no disposition to make the swift raid upon
Schwarzenberg's communications, which had been de-
signed by his master. However, Napoleon reorganised
his army, though uncertain whither to lead it, until on
Mar. 12. the 1 2th of March he suddenly learned that a detach-
ment of Russians, about fifteen thousand strong, had
occupied Rheims. He at once sent out a force to attack
them, which was done with complete success, the
Russians losing some six thousand men, and the French
little more than seven hundred. On the same day
Blucher, after forty-eight hours of delay, had resumed
the offensive ; but on hearing of the mishap at Rheims
he cancelled his orders immediately. Though he had,
by this time, been reinforced by the corps of Bttlow and
Winzingerode from Holland, he dreaded a rising of the
French peasants in his rear, and mistrusted Bernadotte,
who lay with twenty-three thousand Swedes at Liege
and declined to move. Blttcher's apprehensions as to
the peasantry were well-founded, for the brutality of his
soldiers not altogether unprovoked by the proceedings
of the French during their victorious years in Prussia
was well calculated to produce an insurrection ; but
Bernadotte was only biding his time until the issue of
the struggle should be decided in order to fly to the
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 17
help of the victorious side, and make good terms for 1814.
himself. Schwarzenberg, who had begun a slow and
feeble advance, likewise halted ; and indeed the news of
the defeat at Rheims almost threw the Army of Bohemia
into a panic. Orders and counter-orders were showered
down in rapid succession, and it was finally resolved to
concentrate to the rear between Troyes and Pougy.
On the 1 7th Napoleon marched from Rheims for Mar. 17.
Arcis-sur-Aube, intending to cross the Aube at that
point and fall upon Schwarzenberg's rear. On the i8th,
hearing that his enemy was retiring, he turned a little
westward, hoping to pass the river lower down and to
catch at any rate Schwarzenberg's rear-guard ; but,
though he overtook the tail of it on the i9th, he was Mar. 19.
too late to prevent the general concentration of the
Allied army. He therefore resolved to march eastward,
gather up the garrisons of his frontier-fortresses, and fall
with every man that he could collect upon the rear and
communications of the Allies, taking the route by the
banks of the Aube, as though he were still in pursuit of
their rear-guard.
Finding that his redoubtable adversary was no
longer on his flank, Schwarzenberg took courage,
faced about and actually attacked the Emperor at
Arcis on the 2Oth and 2ist; but, though fighting with
a numerical superiority of three to one and with much
advantage of position, he failed through sheer fright
to destroy the French army. The Emperor therefore
continued his march upon St. Dizier, expecting to draw
the Allies after him ; and indeed the movement did at
first inspire some of the weaker spirits among them
and they were many with the idea of immediate retreat.
But intercepted letters revealed not only the true purport
of Napoleon's manreuvre, but also the existence of serious
disaffection towards his rule at Paris, which might find
active expression if an invading army were to approach
the capital. After much hesitation, therefore, it was
determined first that the Army of Bohemia should pro-
ceed towards Chalons to regain touch with that of
VOL. x c
1 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. Silesia, and then that both should abandon their original
line of operations and advance straight upon Paris,
leaving a detachment only to follow up Napoleon and
Mar. 25. screen their movements. On the 25th of March
accordingly the host faced to the westward, and, having
appointed the 28th as the time and Meaux as the place
for their junction, began the fateful march that was to
end the war.
Many years later Wellington, after expressing un-
bounded admiration for Napoleon's manoeuvres in the
campaign of 1814, declared his opinion that, if the
great Captain had possessed enough patience to continue
the same system for a little longer, he would have pre-
vented the Allies from reaching Paris. Certainly
Schwarzenberg showed most miserable trepidation in
Napoleon's presence. Still some allowance must be
made for a man who is encumbered by the presence of
two Emperors and a King, each one of them capable of
hampering, if not of arresting, his operations, and no
two of them agreed respecting the account to which a
final victory should be turned, were one to be secured.
Blilcher was not immune to the paralysing terror
of Napoleon's presence at the head of an army. The
old Field-marshal was indeed too ill to take up the duty
of command on the second day of the battle of Laon ;
and his orders, which would probably have brought
about decisive results, were countermanded by the
timidity of the greatly over-rated Gneisenau. But, even
so, Blilcher waited for ten days after his success at Laon
before he could gather courage to resume the offensive.
Small wonder that Wellington should have written that
he did not understand the position at Rheims and
Chalons, particularly after the defeat of the French at
Laon. 1
In the south of France Wellington, by adopting
measures in every way the reverse of Bliicher's system
of burning and pillaging, had produced correspondingly
different effects upon the population. By enforcing
1 Wellington Despatch. To Hope, 2 6th March 1814.
CH.XVI HISTORY OF THE ARMY 19
strict discipline in his army, by paying for all produce 1814.
taken from the French, and perhaps most of all by
reviving the coastal trade in all parts occupied by his
troops, he had won not only the confidence but the
goodwill of the inhabitants, and had made the orderly
redcoats far more acceptable neighbours to the peasantry
than were the ill-controlled and ill-nourished levies
which served under the command of Soult. It is a
significant fact that the Marshal's transport-service
suffered greatly because the oxen of the country were
sold to Wellington's commissaries ; and the measures
taken by the French commander to check this traffic
with his enemies tended to throw the peasants more
than ever into the arms of the British. The victory
of Orthez, therefore, produced a favourable impression
rather than the contrary upon Southern France, and
incidentally decided Wellington to make use of the
Bourbons, who had for some weeks been plaguing
him with requests for help and offers of an army of
their partisans. The Duke of Angoulme, son of that
Count of Artois who is better known as Charles the
Tenth, had for a month past been lounging about the
skirts of the British quarters, receiving little encourage-
ment from Wellington, though reviving loyal sentiments
at least among the representatives of the old nobility.
The situation of the British Commander-in-Chief
was a delicate one. To countenance the Bourbons was,
as an act of war, a perfectly legitimate means of under-
mining Napoleon's authority, distracting his energy
and diminishing his resources ; but the Allies were
engaged in negotiations with Napoleon in his capacity
of actual ruler of France. Wellington saw no reason
why a peace with Napoleon should be less secure
than with any other French sovereign. Obviously,
therefore, so long as such a peace might be con-
cluded, it was unfair to invite the partisans of the
Bourbons to compromise themselves for the benefit
of the Allies by open insurrection against one whose
domination over them might any day be re-established
20 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. by the act and agreement of the Allies themselves.
Still, the advantage of strengthening the hold of the
British upon the country, whether by overt consent of
the local authorities or only through the stealthy
toleration of individuals, was very great. Even greater
would be the gain of such conditional countenance on
the part of the French, if the Bourbons should obtain
for the Allies the bloodless surrender of a new port of
supply on the coast, and a centre of friendly influence
upon their right flank during their march eastward in
pursuit of Soult.
Such a port and such a centre seemed to offer
themselves in Bordeaux and Pau ; and accordingly
Mar. 7. Beresford was ordered on the yth of March to enter
the former with twelve thousand men, and General
Fane to approach the latter with a regiment of cavalry,
a battalion of infantry and two guns. Both of these
officers received the same instructions. They were to
continue the existing local authorities in office, if willing
to remain, or, if not, to replace them by others elected
by the inhabitants. If the magistrates and people
should desire to proclaim Lewis the Eighteenth, they
were not to be prevented from doing so. They were
to be assured that, by declaring themselves the enemies
of Bonaparte, they would be considered by the British
as friends and deserving of their assistance ; but they
were to be warned that negotiations for peace were
still in train, and that, upon the conclusion of that
peace, all aid from the British would come to an end.
At Pau the Mayor simply accepted Wellington's
orders, expressing confidence in the discipline and good
faith of the British Army ; and all the troops but a
single squadron were withdrawn. On the I2th of
Mar. 12. March, Beresford's force, preceded by an advanced
guard of forty dragoons, entered Bordeaux. The city,
cosmopolitan as are all great ports, had suffered terribly
from the British naval blockade ; and after twenty
years of war its population had shrunk in 1814 to little
more than one half of its numbers in 1794. The
CH.XVI HISTORY OF THE ARMY 21
Mayor, whose name, Lynch, indicates Irish origin, had 1814.
before the Revolution been in the cavalry of the Royal March.
Household, had settled down after some vicissitudes as
a Bonapartist, but since the end of 1812 had been
intriguing with the Royalists. Very dexterously he
contrived to organise a demonstration in favour of
the Bourbons ; and, in the midst of his complimentary
speech to Beresford, he cast away the tricolour cockade,
donned the white, and hoisted the white flag of the
Royal House of France. Beresford firmly declined
to take possession of the town in the name of Lewis
the Eighteenth, though he promised the inhabitants
protection ; but the Duke of Angoulme, following
stealthily in rear, made a ceremonial entry in the
afternoon. Losing his head completely under the
applause of the crowd, this Prince wrote rapturously to
Wellington of the unanimity, the joy and the acclama-
tions of the good folk of Bordeaux, and announced his
intention of taking over the administration of the district.
Beresford was very sceptical about the joy, and still more
sceptical about the unanimity ; but Lynch, disregarding
all protests from him and from Wellington, proceeded
in a breezy fashion to act as if the Royalist feeling were
as intense as Angoulme had reported it to be. Owing
to the rapid progress of subsequent events no great
harm came of this ; for the Bordelais cheerfully assumed
the white cockade when all fear of Napoleon's venge-
ance had been banished. But meanwhile the port of
Bordeaux was not opened to the Allies, owing to the
lack of an English fleet.
His political measures thus taken, Wellington, after
arranging with Hope for the siege of the citadel of
Bayonne, called up Freire's Spaniards and the heavy
cavalry to take the place of Beresford's detachment,
and on the gth and nth extended his cantonments. Mar. 9-11,
The Light Division moved eastward and southward
from Aire on the road to Plaisance, the Sixth Division
east and northward from the same point towards
Nogaro ; the Third Division followed as far as Barce-
22 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. lonne in support of both ; Hill's division spread itself
from Garlin, about ten miles south of Aire, to St. Mont
on the Adour ; Freire's troops were ordered to
Grenade and Cazeres on the Adour north-west of
Aire ; and head-quarters were fixed on the i oth at Aire
Mar. 14. itself. On the I4th the Light Division was pushed on
to Termes, and Picton's to Tarsac and Riscle ; while
Freire's was echeloned from Caz&res to Barcelonne
and St. Germe. Thus the army was disposed in two
groups on each side of the road from Aire to Viella.
By the 8th Soult had realised that the Allies were
stationary, but knew nothing of Beresford's march to
Bordeaux. On the I2th, however, he was aware of
this latter fact, and, having by reconnaissance ascertained
the presence of the Allies at Garlin, Viella, Riscle, and
Pouydraguin, he ordered his army to march northward
to Conchez and Lembeye as if to make an attack. On
Mar. 1 3. the 1 3th the French infantry advanced as far as Diusse
and a little beyond it, and their cavalry pressed up
against the Allied outposts at three or four points
between Viella and Garlin. Wellington, construing
Soult's unwonted boldness to mean that he had been
joined by ten thousand of Suchet's army, called in his
outlying detachments and concentrated his troops about
Aire. The bulk of them he placed in position behind
the valley of the Lees, with the left at Aire, and the
right about Garlin, keeping only the Hussar Brigade
and the Light Division on the right bank of the Adour.
Mar. 14. Soult spent the whole of the I4th in feeble reconnais-
sance without daring to attempt more, remained
Mar. 1 6. stationary on the I5th, and on the i6th fell back
slightly to southward, followed cautiously by the
advanced parties of the Allies. Wellington, reckoning
his enemy to be stronger than he actually was, reserved
himself until he should be rejoined by the Fourth
Division, which had been left behind to support Beresford
in case of need.
Mar. 17. Soult continued to retire very slowly on the i6th
and iyth. He had Napoleon's orders to keep the
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 23
field of action as near as possible to the Pyrenees, and 1814.
fondly hoped that he was drawing his enemy southward.
On the iyth he sent a small party of one hundred
cavalry to Hagetmau, where they surprised and took
a few officers and men, but caused not the slightest
anxiety to Wellington. 1 The British Commander-in-
Chief had on that day been rejoined by his outlying
troops, which raised his force to some fifty thousand
men ; and on the i8th he marched southward in the Mar. 18.
direction of Vic-de-Bigorre. The advance was made
in three columns ; Hill's corps on the right being
directed upon Conchez ; Bock's cavalry, the Third,
Sixth and Freire's Divisions in the centre upon
Madiran ; Somerset's cavalry, the Fourth and Light
Divisions on the left upon Plaisance ; while Ponsonby's
cavalry, midway between these two last, moved upon
Castelnau. Throughout the day Soult remained
stationary in his positions between Simacourbe and
Lembeye ; and there was a small skirmish between his
troops and those of Hill, a little to the north of the
latter place. The Marshal cherished a vague hope
of catching one or other of the Allied columns in
isolation, and of falling upon it with his whole army ;
but, learning on the night of the i8th that Bock's
dragoons and part of the Third Division had reached
Moncaup, he began to suspect that Wellington designed
to turn his right. In the course of the evening and
night therefore he withdrew his troops eastward to a
position on the east bank of the little river Laysa,
between the forest of Labatut and the village of
Lamayou, with their front to the north-west.
On the morning of the I9th the left column of the Mar. 19.
Allies proceeded from Plaisance to Auriebat ; the central
column marched for Maubourget, with Ponsonbyjs
brigade moving on its left by Caussade, and Freire's
division on its right by Moncaup ; and Hill turned
south-eastward from Conchez upon Lembeye. Very
soon Bock's dragoons came upon Berton's brigade of
1 Wellington Desp. To Hope, i8th March 1814.
24 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. French horse near Maubourguet, and, though repulsed
Mar. 19. in their first attack, presently compelled Berton to
retire south-eastward upon Rabastens. Thus the
direct road to Vic-de-Bigorre was opened to the Allied
cavalry ; and Soult, suddenly awaking to the fact that
the force thus debouching in the valley of the Adour
was no isolated column but the main body of Welling-
ton's army, hurried d'Erlon's two divisions to Vic-de
Bigorre to hold the British in check, and ordered
Clausel and Reille to march with all speed towards
Tarbes.
D'Erlon, going ahead of his troops with his chief
staff-officer, approached the main road just to north of
Vic-de-Bigorre at about eleven o'clock, and to his
amazement saw Bock's brigade before him. He
summoned forward the leading battalions of Fririon's
division, 1 at the double, deployed his skirmishers among
the vines on either side of the road, unlimbered, as soon
as he could, four guns in the road itself, and ordered
Darmagnac's division to take post to his right rear,
south of Vic-de-Bigorre, with its right flank resting on
the Adour. In this position he received the attack
of Picton's division until three o'clock ; when, seeing
the Light Division coming up the bank of the river by
Artagnan, he withdrew Fririon's division, and left
Darmagnac to continue the combat until nightfall. The
struggle was obstinate, 2 for the country was exceedingly
blind, and the French sharpshooters took full advantage
of the shelter offered by hedges and enclosures. The
Third Division, however, did not lose above two
hundred and fifty men, British and Portuguese, few of
whom were killed outright. The French losses were
more serious ; but d'Erlon was bound to make a firm
stand in order to cover the retreat of Clausel and
Reille upon Tarbes. The march of these two divisions
was distressing, for the way lay over deep sand ; but
1 Formerly Foy's Division.
2 See the accounts in Donaldson's Eventful Life of a Soldier;
and in Journal of an Officer of the Commissariat.
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 25
the ground, being strongly enclosed, forbade the British 1814.
cavalry to press them hard, and enabled so skilful a Mar. 19.
leader as Clausel to screen his movements effectually
by rear-guards whose strength it was difficult for a
pursuer to estimate. An English staff-officer, Captain
Light, did indeed gallop from end to end of one such
rear-guard, feigning to be wounded, and counted the
battalions as he rode ; but this was an expedient which
could only be employed once. Eventually three French
divisions encamped in the plain of Ibos, immediately to
west of Tarbes, while Taupin's came into Ger, some
three miles west of Ibos, at midnight. D'Erlon's corps
lay on the road to south of Vic-de-Bigorre with its
advanced posts at Pujo. The outposts of the central
column of the Allies were at Vic-de-Bigorre, and of
the left column at Rabastens.
Early on the morning of the 2Oth d'Erlon fell back Mar. 20.
upon Tarbes, stationing Darmagnac's division in the
suburbs, and that of Fririon to east of it at Aureilhan
on the road to Rabastens. In the night the corps of
Reille and Clausel also had been set in motion towards
the heights on the east of Tarbes. Soult had realised
that he must retreat without delay upon Toulouse by
Tournay and St. Gaudens ; and the artillery-park and
provision-train were to proceed in advance of the army,
the latter refilling its waggons on its way through Tarbes.
At daybreak Reille's advanced cavalry reached Tarbes,
and the divisions of Maransin and Taupin, presently
passing through the town, took up their position on
the heights of Pietat some three miles to south-east
of it on the road to Tournay. Parties both of cavalry
and infantry were posted at the edge of the suburbs of
Tarbes on the roads to Pau and Vic-de-Bigorre ; and
a battalion and a squadron with two guns occupied
Aureilhan. When these dispositions were complete
d'Erlon withdrew Darmagnac's division from the
suburbs, and placed it together with Fririon's on
the left of Reille above the village of Barbazan.
Clausel's corps was stationed on the hills of Orleix and
26 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. Oleac three or four miles north-east of Tarbes on the
Mar. 20. road to Rabastens ; and Berton's brigade of cavalry
came up in rear of it and reconnoitred north-eastward
on the road to Trie. The whole of the French troops
in position fronted more or less westward, 'on the flank
of the line of the Allies' advance.
Wellington, meanwhile, under cover of night had
massed his troops into two columns Bock's cavalry,
the Third Division and Hill's corps at Vic-de-Bigorre ;
and the Light Division, Hussar Brigade, Sixth Division
and Ponsonby's cavalry at Rabastens ; with Freire's
Spaniards and the Fourth Division, which last was still
far distant, following in rear. In the morning they
marched south on both banks of the Adour, Hill
deploying his corps about Tarbes, while the Light
Division moved upon the hill immediately to south of
Orleix, and the Sixth Division, together with the other
components of the left column, struck out of the road
upon Pouyastruc to turn Clausel's right. It was not
until noon that the leading brigade three battalions of
the Ninety-fifth of the Light Division came into
action ; and, since Soult was already resolved to retreat
and had plenty of time for the movement, it is difficult
to say why he accepted battle at all. However, he
thought fit to fight a useless combat, and had carefully
made his dispositions for resistance.
The hill of Orleix is a long, low bare ridge, of
altitude varying from about eighty to two hundred feet,
rising out of a level plain, which is broken by small en-
closures and by deep ditches dug for purposes of irriga-
tion. At its northern end stands Orleix, a neat little
village, which runs for some distance up the slope.
East of it and divided by half a mile of flat ground
is the hill of Oleac, a much more formidable ridge
fully three hundred feet in height. At the northern
end of this range lies the village of Dours, three-
quarters of the way up the ascent, the hill being low
just at that point. The action began with the deploy-
ment of the three battalions of the Ninety-fifth
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 27
against the French skirmishers on the plain before 1814.
Orleix hill. The enemy resisted stoutly, taking ad- Mar. 20.
vantage of every shelter ; but were gradually driven
back upon their main body on the summit of the hill.
The ascent was steep and covered in one place with a
large patch of brushwood ; and, on emerging from this,
the riflemen found the mass of Harispe's division drawn
up in tiers on the crest of the hill, the sharp gradient
of the acclivity enabling them to fire over each other's
heads. For some time the Ninety-fifth could make no
headway, so heavy were the showers of grape and
musketry ; and two of the riflemen present declared
that they had never taken part in so warm an affair
except at Badajoz and Barrosa. 1 The accuracy of the
rifles told, however ; and Clausel dexterously withdrew
his troops from ridge to ridge by Coussan in the direc-
tion of Tournay before the Sixth Division could outflank
him. Hill's troops did not debouch from Tarbes until
two o'clock, the townsfolk cheering the red-coats as
they traversed the streets with shouts of " Vive le Roi."
It was four o'clock before the main body crossed the
summit of Pietat, by which time Reille and d'Erlon were
retiring eastward upon Tournay, leaving Taupin's
division to cover their retreat. The British artillery
fired upon this rear-guard, and Bock's cavalry attempted
to cut off Taupin's withdrawal by way of Mascaras, but
was stopped by d'Erlon's artillery near Lhez on the
right bank of the river 1'Arret. At nightfall Hill's
corps was at Angos and Mascaras, Picton's division being
about a mile north of him at Calavante and Lespouey ;
the Light Division was at Lansac and Laslades, about a
mile north of Picton, and Clinton was at Coussan, from
two to three miles north-east of Alten, but in touch
with him by means of Somerset's and Ponsonby's
brigades of cavalry. Freire halted in rear at Boulin
and Sarrouilles. By ten o'clock Reille and d'Erlon
had safely reached Tournay.
The operations of the Allies failed decidedly on this
1 Surtees and Costello.
28 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. day, Wellington having realised too late what Soult
Mar. 20. well knew that the country was impassable by cavalry
except on the roads. The casualties of the Allies did
not exceed one hundred and fifteen, over ninety of
which fell upon the Rifle Brigade. Those of the French
were probably more numerous, but in any case the
result of the action was to hasten Soult's retreat upon
Toulouse. The shortest route from Tarbes was by
Trie, Boulogne and Lombez ; but this he had sacrificed
by waiting too long in his chosen position ; and he was
compelled to take that by St. Gaudens. His army
Mar. 21. marched at three in the morning of the 2ist on Mon-
trjeau by Lannemezan, d'Erlon's corps leading and
Reille's in rear ; while that of Clausel pursued a parallel
march further to the north by Burg, striking into the
same road at Pinas. D'Erlon on this day halted at St.
Gaudens ; Reille at Villeneuve de Riviere and Bordes,
and Clausel at Montr6jeau. The Allies followed them ;
Wellington's head -quarters being on the 2 ist at Tournay,
while the head of Clinton's division on the same day
reached Burg, and the head of Alten's Lannemezan.
Mar. 22. On the 22nd Wellington sent Hill's corps alone on the
track of the enemy, with strict orders not to commit
his troops to the attack of any considerable force in
position ; and he then set forward the bulk of the army
in two columns; Clinton, Somerset and Ponsonby taking
the road by Burg and Galan to Castelnau-Magnoac ;
Alten and Bock that by Lannemezan and Monlong to
Gaussan. The object was to arrive before Soult on the
Garonne, while nourishing in him the delusion that the
entire force of the Allies was at his heels.
The French, having been unmolested since the 2oth,
started late on the 22nd, the supply-train refilling its
waggons with provisions as it passed through St. Gaudens,
and cantoned for the night on the road between St.
Martory and St. Elix. Towards four in the afternoon,
two squadrons of the Thirteenth Light Dragoons sur-
prised the loth Chausseurs, who formed the extreme
French rear-guard, close to St. Gaudens, charged them,
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
29
22.
and drove them through the town, killing or capturing 1814.
over one hundred of them with trifling loss to them- Mar.
selves. The fugitives brought Soult alarming reports
that the whole of the British cavalry, as well as infantry
and artillery, were before St. Gaudens ; but reconnaissance
had acquainted the Marshal with the march of a strong
British column towards Castelnau-Magnoac; and, divin-
ing with' little difficulty the plans of Wellington, he
determined to arrive before him on the Garonne.
On the 23rd the French army continued its march Mar. 23.
upon Toulouse with extreme speed, and at the sacrifice
of all order. Since the 2ist, when bad weather had set
in, the moral of Soult's soldiers had steadily deteriorated,
and stragglers and deserters had been multiplied. From
one legion of National Guards, which hitherto had been
staunch, only thirty men were left out of six hundred.
The rear-guards and flank-guards of the cavalry were
employed unceasingly in whipping up the laggards ; and
Soult, watching the columns march past him on the
2 jrd, was shocked at their wretched appearance. Nearly
a third of the men were shoeless, about one-fifth of them
were stragglers ; and, had Toulouse been three days'
march instead of one day's march distant, half the army
would have reached it bare-footed. The head of the
column, however, entered Muret, less than twelve miles
from Toulouse, on this day ; and Soult arrived at his
destination untroubled, with many hours one might
say days to spare. Wellington, indeed, had moved
slowly and with great caution, spreading out his cavalry
in all directions, and advancing under cover of it in
three principal columns, the left of which, including
head-quarters, reached St. Lys on the 26th, and there Mar. 26.
came in sight of the French army before Toulouse ;
while the main body of the right under Hill did not
come up to Muret until the 2yth.
Various causes are assigned for the tardiness of the
British Commander in this pursuit. In the first place
there was the weather, which was appalling. Heavy rain
fell so continuously that all roads were knee-deep in mud
30 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. and water ; and at least one officer wondered whether
the war would not be ended by such a deluge. When
the men were in difficulties so great, the labour of bring-
ing forward the pontoons for the passage of the Garonne,
as well as a train of heavy artillery, may be imagined.
Wellington's travelling carriage, with but one man in-
side it, stuck fast at one point of the road on the 26th,
and was only extricated by the addition of four horses
and six oxen to its own team of six mules. But such
embarrassments as these were shared by the French and
indeed contributed not a little to their demoralisation ;
and, since Wellington had expressly ordered Hill not to
be too enterprising in his pursuit, the reasons for the
British slow advance must be sought elsewhere.
The truth seems to be that Wellington was greatly
hampered at this moment by ignorance of the general
situation both in France and in Europe. 1 He had heard
on the 2 2nd of the defeat of Napoleon at Laon ; but there
was a rumour that the Emperor had fallen back to Or-
leans, which might signify that he intended to join Soult,
and to raise the whole country against the Allies in the
south. The next tidings, of Napoleon's attack upon the
Russian detachment at Rheims, also puzzled Wellington,
and inclined him to doubt after all of the victory of
Blttcher at Laon. He was also totally in the dark as
to the movements of Suchet. He had been apprised on
the 1 6th that Suchet had made proposals to the Spanish
Regency to withdraw the French garrisons from Barce-
lona, Tortosa, Peniscola and Murviedro ; and he had
written earnestly to deprecate the acceptance of any such
offer, as tending to increase the strength of the French
armies in the field. But on the 2Oth Wellington heard
at Tarbes that the King of Spain had passed through
Toulouse on his way to Catalonia ; and, if this were
1 " I have no late news from England." Wellington to Hope,
26th March 1814. Comparison of Bentinck's letter of I4th March
(Supp. Desp. xiii. 649) with Wellington's letter to Bathurst of 7th
April in Wellington Desp., will show that on the latter day the letter
of 1 4th March had not reached Wellington.
CH. xvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 31
true, it was always possible that Suchet might intercept 1814
Ferdinand and extort from him the permission to relieve
French garrisons before allowing him to proceed.
William Clinton too thought it unsafe for the present
to move his force away from Catalonia ; and, even if he
had wished to do so, Bentinck had rendered such
removal impossible by taking away all transports for
his Italian expedition.
News from Bordeaux was likewise disquieting. The
French troops, after a short panic, had reoccupied a
fort at the mouth of the Gironde, and the British
squadron was still unable to enter the river. The
Duke of Angoulme, though expressly warned that
the Allies could take no responsibility for the protection
of the Bourbons, was crying out for money and for
troops to put down the partisans of Bonaparte. Lastly
Wellington's own army was very weak in British
soldiers, and contained far too large a proportion of
Spaniards. It was always difficult to prevent the latter
from taking vengeance for the outrages perpetrated by
the French in Spain ; and even the British were relapsing
occasionally into their old vices the men into that
of plunder, and the officers into the appropriation,
with either hire or purchase, of bullock-carts for their
private baggage. If, therefore, Wellington had pressed
his troops forward by forced marches, he would have
filled the country with sick and stragglers who, even if
they had not irritated the peasantry into hostility, would
have fallen an easy prey to any organised rising. Add
to these considerations the fact that Wellington's know-
ledge of the country and of the actual strength of Soult's
army was very imperfect, and it must be acknowledged
that he had good reason to keep his army united and
in fresh condition. It may indeed be urged that the
dispersion of Soult's army would have been the best
guarantee for the safety of his own ; and there can be
little doubt that, if Hill had pressed hard upon the
retreating Marshal, such dispersion might have been
in great measure effected. But the fortune of war is
32 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. capricious ; and even in the last days of the long con-
test the situation, as it presented itself to Wellington,
was still such that he felt unwarranted in taking liberties
or incurring hazards which might imperil all previous
success. 1
1 Wellington Desp. To Bathurst, i8th, 2Oth, 25th March; to
Admiral Penrose and Lord Dalhousie, 2 1st March; to Don P.
Vallejo and H. Wellesley, 22nd March ; to Lord C. Manners and
General Order, 23rd March ; to Sir H. Clinton, 24th March ;. to
Duke of Angouleme, 29th March 1814.
CHAPTER XVII
WHILE the Allies were still fencing with Napoleon in 1814,
Northern France, and Wellington was halted after his
victory at Orthez, Graham had played an astonishingly
bold game in Holland. Being condemned to inactivity
after the failure of his second advance upon Antwerp,
he sent Stanhope to Bernadotte's head-quarters at
Cologne to ask for reinforcements. Bernadotte received
this emissary with great friendliness and promised to
order Walmoden's Hanoverian corps, which was
cantoned on the left bank of the Elbe a little to west
of Hamburg, to join Sir Thomas immediately. Being
at such a distance these troops could not be expected
for several days ; and in the meanwhile Graham
received a letter dated the 28th of February, 1 from
Bathurst, intimating that in all probability his force
would shortly be withdrawn and sent to America, owing
to the failure of the Militia Act to produce recruits.
Sir Thomas had already considered the feasibility of
capturing Bergen -op -Zoom by surprise, but had
rejected the operation as too dangerous, unless it were
positively forced upon him. Existing circumstances,
however, seemed to call for a great effort. The latest
news from France announced the retreat of the Allies,
and the latest instruction from England ordered the
withdrawal of the British force. Unless Bergen-op-
Zoom were taken, therefore, all Holland would be open
1 Stanhope in his journal, which is partly reminiscent, says that
he was charged to inform Bernadotte of the probable withdrawal of
the British force : but dates seem to negative the possibility of this.
D
VOL. X
33
34 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. to invasion ; whereas possession of the town would break
Mar. the line of hostile fortifications between Antwerp and
Flushing, ensure the possibility of naval co-operation
for England, and in brief save the existence of Holland
as an independent state. So Graham argued, not
incorrectly, for ever since the sixteenth century Bergen-
op-Zoom had been the bridge-head which gave the
Dutch access to the continent of Europe, either through
Brabant by land, or by Zeeland at sea, when they were
strong, and, when they were weak, protected them
against invasion.
The fortress itself, brought to perfection by Cohorn
in 1688, in shape resembled a violin, the finger-board
and half of the sound-board to west representing the
port, and the rest of the sound-board to east the town.
Town and port were almost joined together by walls
and buildings, the communication between the two
being a gate, known as the False Gate, in the ancient
castle which stood in the middle of the aforesaid
buildings. The place itself had sixteen bastions and
three gates, the Breda Gate on the east side, the Antwerp
Gate on the south side, and the Steenbergen Gate on
the north side, besides twenty-six sally-ports four
of them spacious enough for the passage of vehicles,
and the remainder also very large which passed into
the casemates and so into the ditches. The eastern
and southern fronts were the strongest, being those
that faced towards France ; and the latter was covered,
over a considerable area, by an entrenched camp with
four redoubts upon four salient angles, which were
practically bastions. The whole of these works had
been finished to the utmost nicety by Cohorn, saving
only that the scarp was not revetted with masonry to a
greater height than sixteen feet above the ditch, which
defect, though of no importance against an attack in
form, afforded dangerous facilities for an escalade.
On the western or water front the fortifications were
wholly of earth, and the scarp, which had no counter-
scarp, was of inclination so gentle that cavalry could
CH.XVII HISTORY OF THE ARMY 35
gallop up it in line. The true defence on this front 1814,
consisted of a broad ditch within, holding six feet of Mar.
water, and of a broad marsh without intersected with
creeks, which, being covered with water at high tide, was
impracticable for trench-making. North of this marsh
was a narrow slip of reclaimed land between dykes and
ditches, called the Little Polder, which ran westward
from the north-west angle of the place, and ended in a
fort called the Water-fort, standing in the midst of a
wide ditch, likewise full of water, with steps leading down
from it to the Scheldt. This work was revetted with
masonry, but the scarp was not above twelve feet high.
Beyond the Polder, and parallel to it on the north side,
passed the canal known as the Zoom, which led to the
port, and formed the communication between it and
the river ; and north of the canal a marsh, similar to
that below the entrenched camp, extended to the Tholen
dyke. This was an embankment which had been
thrown up in the later half of the eighteenth century
for the reclamation of land, and which abutted at right
angles to the canal upon an earthern demi-bastion in
the north-western angle of the fortress. The northern
front was wholly of earth, with ditches full of water
but without demi-lunes ; the defence of this quarter
being dependent upon a vast entrenched camp called
the lines of Steenbergen which, together with other
works, united the irregular quadrilateral formed by
Steenbergen, Bergen-op-Zoom, Klundert and Willem-
stadt into one huge fortified position.
The general scheme of the defences, though well
designed from a Dutch point of view that is to say to
resist an attack from the side of France was by no
means so well adapted to a French garrison, which
might be threatened from any quarter. The lines of
Steenbergen required a whole army for their defence,
and no such army was to hand; indeed Steenbergen
and Willemstadt were actually in the hands of the
Allies. Again the entrance to the Water-fort, which
was well placed for the reception of reinforcements from
36 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. a nation which was mistress of the sea, was for a foreign
Mar. garrison a weak point, which courted an assault by
surprise. The French therefore moved this entrance
back to the gorge of the bastion in rear, and endeavoured
through the bitter winter of 1813-1814^0 keep open
the water, which was the main source of security on
this front, by daily breaking of the ice. Frequently it
was necessary to employ axes and even saws for this
purpose, with enormous fatigue to the troops and
anxiety to the officers. On the north front the want
of demi-lunes was made good by retrenchment and by
palisading of the re-entrant angles between the bastions ;
but, owing to the weakness of the garrison, it was
impossible to occupy these retrenchments in proper
strength. The troops, numbering two thousand seven
hundred men, 1 were raw levies which, none the less,
had improved greatly under the instruction of excellent
officers ; while the commandant, the veteran General
Ambert, maintained both discipline and vigilance, and
had taken every possible precaution against surprise.
In the first days of March Graham advanced his
head-quarters to Calmpthout, and brought the canton-
ments of his right wing forward from Rozendaal to
Putten and Stabroek, with the general idea of preventing
the French from reinforcing Antwerp from Courtrai.
Mar. 7. On the yth unfavourable news from all quarters
prompted him to make his attack without delay. Of
the operations of the Allied forces which were marching
on Paris he knew nothing, except that Grand Head-
quarters had fallen back to Chaumont, which suggested,
to say the least, that affairs were not going favourably.
Of his expected reinforcements under Walmoden the
latest information was that they could not have drawn
nearer to him than Bremen by the 26th of February,
so that, in case of a French invasion of Flanders he
1 i co. Artillery, 79 ; I co. Veteran gunners, 50 ; J co. miners,
42 ; sailors, 400 ; I batt. 1 2th Line, 600 ; I batt. I7th Line, 250;
i batt. 2ist Line, 274; i batt. 5ist Line, 560; 6 companies
Veterans, 300 ; odd units, 145 ; Total, 2700.
CH. xvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 37
would have no troops to stand by him but the Saxons, 1814.
who, though brave enough, were imperfectly disciplined.
In the circumstances Graham decided that, if he meant
to attack Bergen-op-Zoom, he must do so forthwith,
and accordingly he made his dispositions for an assault
on the evening of the 8th, while the waters were still
frozen and his intentions still unsuspected.
Before dawn of the 8th the First Division was Mar.
moved quietly down to Halsteren and Huibergen,
north-west and south-east of Bergen-op-Zoom ; the
Second Division being employed to cover the movement
against any interruption from Antwerp. Four thousand
men were then distributed into four columns, the leaders
of which received the following instructions. On the
right five hundred men of the Twenty-first, Thirty-
seventh and Forty-fourth, supported by six hundred of
the Royals, under Colonel Carleton of the Forty-fourth,
were to march from Halsteren under cover of dark-
ness so as to reach the junction of the Tholen dyke
with the Scheldt at nine o'clock in the evening. From
thence they were to be guided to their point of attack
where the same dyke abuts on the fortress. On the
right centre six hundred and fifty men of the Twenty-
first, Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first under Colonel
Henry of the first-named regiment were to deliver
a feint assault on the Steenbergen Gate. On the left
centre twelve hundred men of the Thirty-third, Fifty-
fifth and Sixty-ninth, advancing from Huibergen under
Colonel Morrice, were to assail the north-eastern angle
near the Breda Gate ; and on the extreme left a thousand
of the Guards under Lord Proby were to move from
Borguliet and attempt to force an entrance by the
Orange bastion, in rear of the entrenched camp on the
southern front. The four columns were directed to be
within cannon-shot of the works by nine o'clock and to
move to the attack at half-past ten ; and three watches
were set in each column to ensure accuracy of time.
Perfect silence was of course to be observed up to the
last moment ; and it was arranged that the watchword
38 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. for the attacking parties should be " Oranje Boven,"
Mar. 8. and the answer " God Save the King." Graham looked
for help from confederates within the fortress, 1 and this
system of watchwords was designed for their benefit.
It was intended that the left centre attack should be
the principal one, that the right and left attacks should
concentrate upon it, and that Henry's column, after
serving its purpose of diverting the enemy's attention
by a false onslaught, should act as a reserve.
So far as human foresight could go, Graham had
performed his part admirably ; and the French, as they
afterwards admitted, had not the slightest suspicion
of the coming assault. Graham's subordinates, how-
ever, contrived to undo all his arrangements. Shortly
after half-past nine, or nearly an hour before the
appointed time, Henry's column entered the works
near the Steenbergen Gate, surprised the guard at that
point, and broke into the retrenchment that covered
the gate. At the first sound of the shots the com-
mandant of the French artillery rushed to the spot and
discharged the guns that flanked this retrenchment from
the east with his own hand ; after which the fire of
artillery and musketry became general on this part of
the front. None the less a small party of Henry's
soldiers contrived to make their way through the
retrenchment, and, using their scaling-ladders to connect
the two ends of the draw-bridge, passed over the ditch,
escaladed the low revetment of the scarp, climbed over
the superior slope and parapet, and reached the interior
of the rampart. It should seem that nearly four
hundred men altogether thus effected their entry into the
fortress, but it does not appear that they were united
in one body, for some of them were certainly over-
powered and bayoneted ; while the rear of the column,
being blasted by a heavy fire of grape and musketry,
was driven back in disorder with considerable loss.
1 " There is no hope of taking Bergen-op-Zoom by coup de main
without an understanding within^ which I am trying to arrange."
Graham to Bunbury, 1st March 1814.
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY
39
It is evident that Colonel Henry, or his subordinates, 1814.
entirely ignored Graham's instructions, not only as to Mar. 8.
the time of onset but as to the employment of the
troops, which were not intended to incur serious danger
except as a reserve in the last resort. As a diversion,
however, Henry's action was completely successful,
since it attracted the whole of the garrison to that
quarter of the fortress.
Meanwhile Carleton, whose force was accompanied
by Generals Gore and Skerrett, realising from the sound
of musketry that the assault had been prematurely
begun, judged it best and probably with correctness
to fall on without delay. The tide was not indeed so
low as it would have been an hour later, but a few
inches more or less of water in the ditch could make
little difference. Advancing along the Tholen dyke
Carleton's soldiers followed it almost to the cross-dyke at
its end, where, turning to their right along the foot of
the glacis, they crossed the Zoom and reached the basin
of the port almost unresisted. A gunboat moored to
command the passage, and two guns mounted for the
same object, were abandoned by the enemy without
firing a shot ; and all would have gone well but for the
heedlessness of the commanders, who appear to have
lost their heads in the apparent certainty of success.
Carleton exultingly shouting " First in Badajoz, first in
Bergen-op-Zoom," turned southward along the gorge
of the bastions that flanked the water-gate, with about
two hundred and fifty men at his heels ; and Skerrett,
who throughout the advance had been crying out,
" Remember, men, you are to get out of that ditch to
your right," himself led the tail of the column to the
left, and taking the two bastions at the western extremity
of the northern front in reverse, made himself master
of them with little difficulty. The Royals, six hundred
strong, were left at the Water-gate without orders, and
unfortunately under command of an officer who could
not be trusted to act upon his own initiative.
The French Governor, who was in the central square
40 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. of the town surrounded by his reserves, had hardly
Mar. 8. learned of the repulse of Henry's attack, when he was
apprised of the successful entry of the assailants into
the port. Losing his head for the moment, he ordered
the whole of the troops with him, chiefly sailors and
veterans, to hasten at the double to the port with several
field-guns ; and in a few minutes he had thrown practi-
cally his last man into one section of the fight. Hardly
had these reserves reached the port, when loud shouts of
"Oranje Boven " were heard from the quarter of the
Antwerp Gate. Carleton, leaving a few troops to guard
the quays, had pushed on along the ramparts of the
western and southern fronts, had assailed the whole of
the French guards in flank, killing a few, taking a
larger number prisoners, and driving the rest before
him to the Antwerp Gate. Here he seized the guard-
house of the gate, leaving detachments to lower the
draw-bridge and to hold the mouth of the street which
debouched into the town. He then continued his
progress, which was little opposed, almost to the Breda
Gate, just south of which he encountered the I2th
Line drawn up in firm array to meet him. Having
dropped many detachments from his handful of men to
secure important points and to guard prisoners, Carleton
can hardly have had a hundred soldiers left with him,
but he rode up to the enemy with perfect assurance,
calling to them to lay down their arms, and was at
once shot dead, as was also the greater part of his
following.
His confidence was not so ill timed as might at
first sight appear, for Morrice's column should by
this time have been near the Breda Gate. But here
the fortune of war intervened. For some inexplicable
reason Morrice's men were seized at the critical
moment with one of those panics to which the best of
troops are subject during a night attack, turned about
before a shot had been fired at them, and fled in all
directions. Graham and the whole of his staff were
galloping among them for some time before they could
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 4 i
be rallied, and in the meantime Carleton's men were 1814.
overpowered, and Gore was fain to withdraw the wreck Mar. 8.
of his column to the bastion immediately to east of the
Antwerp Gate.
Shortly afterwards the fourth column under Lord
Proby and General Cooke came into action. The
Guards, pursuant to the original intention, had moved
to the foot of the glacis between the entrenched camp
and the port, but, finding the ice broken and impassable,
they returned and, passing between the two westernmost
works of the entrenched camp, made for the Orange
bastion, which was the dividing point between the
revetted and unrevetted portions of the southern front.
Arriving before it they calmly descended by ten ladders
into the ditch, reascended the scarp on the further side,
and took possession of the bastion, not however with-
out suffering the loss of several men from the fire of
the French. Cooke then threw his main body into the
houses overlooking the quays of the port, and, keeping
up a heavy fusillade upon the enemy in that quarter,
sent out a strong patrol towards Skerrett on the one
side, and a detachment of the First Guards under
Lieutenant-colonel Clifton towards the Antwerp Gate
on the other.
It was now some minutes past eleven o'clock, and
the fate of Bergen-op-Zoom still hung in the balance.
Of the four columns of attack two and a part of a third
had succeeded in entering the fortress. Skerrett with
one weak detachment was in occupation of the arsenal
and of the northern portion of the port, and had pushed
parties eastward along the north front towards the
Steenbergen Gate. Scattered bodies of Henry's column
were also somewhere in the vicinity of that gate. The
Royals held the Water-gate. Cooke was master of
all the roads south of the basin of the port, and
was pouring in a deadly fire upon the French in the
streets. Finally, Gore, with a remnant of beaten and
discouraged men, still occupied the bastion immediately
to eastward of the Antwerp Gate. The French
42 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. retained no more than six bastions out of sixteen ;
Mar. 8. namely, the one immediately on the west, and the five
immediately to the east of the Steenbergen Gate. The
heavy guns of these six poured a terrific tempest of
grape along their entire front ; and the French field-
guns swept the streets and quays with a fire against
which no troops could stand. There was fierce fighting
about Skerrett's most advanced posts and near the
Antwerp Gate, with isolated contests between small
bodies of men at a score of points ; and at one moment
the bulk of the French came running back to the
central square with loud cries that their ammunition
was exhausted. The occasion was critical and might
easily have led to a panic, for the arsenal and nineteen
out of twenty-two magazines, not to mention the keys
of the other three, were in the hands of the assailants.
But the French officers with admirable coolness rallied
their soldiers ; the chief engineer served out axes ; the
doors of the three remaining magazines were broken
down ; and the French returned to their comrades
laden with cartridges and inspired with fresh hope for
the renewal of the combat.
The issue lay with Morrice's column and with the
Royals. Morrice's soldiers had recovered themselves
and made for the lock of the inundation at the north-
eastern corner of the place, but found their progress
barred by broken ice, and, being tormented by a cross-
fire from the bastions upon either flank, were compelled
to retire with the loss of some two hundred men killed
and wounded. Thus the eastern half of the fortress
was left free of assailants upon all sides. The detach-
ments dropped by Carleton at the Antwerp Gate were
also driven back before they could lower the draw-
bridge ; and a party of French, having brought up a
field-gun, seemed likely to cut off and destroy not only
these soldiers but also the relics of Gore's force, which
had fallen back upon them. In the nick of time,
however, Clifton came upon the scene with his little
body of Guards, who captured the French field-gun
CH. xvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 43
out of hand, fired a volley, and, charging with the 1814.
bayonet, drove the enemy back to the Antwerp Gate. Mar. 8-9.
The French fled in panic, and the Guards, together
with Gore's party, followed them in hot pursuit to the
central square. The fugitives were almost driven from
the square itself, possession of which would have made
the British masters of the town, when a party of fifty or
sixty gens-d'armes, who were formed in line before the
main guard, came forward to stop the rush to the rear.
Thereupon the flying French speedily rallied and formed
themselves into a dense and irregular mass across the
street. Packed too closely to load or fire their arms,
the French swarmed forward upon the British and
recaptured their lost gun, but were borne back in turn
by their opponents and yielded the trophy once more.
For some time the combat surged backwards and
forwards, the gun changing owners more than once,
though neither party had time to fire it ; but gradually
weight and numbers told. Gore and several other
officers were killed, and when at length Clifton also
fell, the British gave way and fled to the Orange bastion
with the French in hot chase at their heels.
In the meantime Skerrett also had been sharply
engaged. The French guard, which he had driven out
of the bastion at the north-western angle, rallied upon
a picquet of three hundred men in the next bastion to
eastward, and established itself there in a building
known as the new powder-magazine. The British for
their part seized a windmill in a still more commanding
position within the same bastion ; and the fighting be-
came exceedingly lively. Despite of inferior numbers
the British gained the advantage, and the French had
actually turned their backs, when four hundred French
sailors together with three field-guns came up to rein-
force them, and enabled them to rally. The combat
was fiercely maintained for a time. Skerrett was
mortally wounded and the leader of the French sailors
was killed ; but after a sharp struggle and many vicissi-
tudes of fortune the windmill was finally stormed by
44 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. the enemy, and the British were driven back to the
Mar. 8-9. north-western bastion.
Throughout this time Cooke had remained stationary
in painful suspense. Clifton, upon his first arrival at
the Antwerp Gate, had reported that he could not open
it owing to the fire of the French from the street on the
side of the town, but that, even if opened, the gate was
useless, since a demi-lune commanding the access to it
from without was still in the occupation of the enemy.
After this brief message no further communication had
arrived from Clifton, and Cooke accordingly gave up
his detachment for lost, but after a time sent Lieutenant-
colonel Rooke of the Third Guards with a small party
towards the Antwerp Gate. As it happened, Rooke
had hardly started when he was met by the French who
were pursuing the fugitives from Clifton's and Gore's
detachments. Harried by the fire of the Third Guards
in front and of the rest of the brigade from the houses
on the right flank, the enemy turned back in disorder ;
and Rooke chasing them beyond the Antwerp Gate
ascertained that the demi-lune before it was still occupied
by the French, and that consequently no entrance by
that way was possible. Graham, however, after the
failure of the attack on the north-eastern angle, had
withdrawn Morrice's troops, and sent them round by
the route which Proby had taken to the Orange bastion.
Here they entered the fortress with perfect ease and
safety, and joined Cooke ; but in the existing state of
uncertainty Cooke decided not to weaken his force by
attempting to seize points which he could not maintain,
and by traversing streets where he might suffer heavy
loss. Graham at the same time sent orders for Henry's
column also to march to this spot ; but since Henry
had converted his feint attack into a real attack and
his reserve into a storming party, there were only about
one hundred and fifty men left to him, and these Graham
eventually judged it better to keep under his own eye.
Shortly after one o'clock the firing died away ; and the
senior officers of the Artillery and Engineers made
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 45
their official report to Graham that the place was in his 1814.
possession. The General accordingly ordered up six Mar. 9.
hundred more of the Guards from Putten and Wow,
besides three hundred and fifty men of the Thirty-fifth ;
all of which added to the remains of Henry's column
and to a few of the Fifty-fifth which Graham had kept
by him, made up a total force of thirteen hundred men.
For five or six hours Sir Thomas never doubted but
that he was master of Bergen-op-Zoom.
Nor was he without some ground for his belief.
Cooke had still under his command over two thousand
men of Proby's, Morrice's and Carleton's columns,
including the six hundred of the Royals, which had
hardly been engaged. Moreover, though the French
had recovered nearly three-quarters of the ramparts as
well as three of the gates, and had taken a number of
prisoners over and above those of the British who had
been killed, they had been very roughly handled in
their contest with Cooke in the southern quarter of
the port. They had in fact been practically driven
from it ; some of them escaping by the False Gate,
where they unlimbered three guns to bar the entrance
into the town and to enfilade the passage to the northern
quarter of the port ; others crossing the basin by the
draw-bridge, which they raised behind them to prevent
pursuit. Moreover, though both Cooke and Graham
were unaware of it, there was still a considerable number
of British in the two bastions adjoining the arsenal at
the north-western angle, and a great many of Henry's
column were hidden away in the vicinity of the Steen-
bergen Gate. But all of these were cut off from Cooke
by the rising of the tide in the basin of the port.
It seems to have been at about three o'clock on a
clear moonlit morning that the fire recommenced, the
French making a determined attempt to drive the
remains of Skerrett's column from the two north-
western bastions. The British at this point displayed
the greatest tenacity and intelligence in defending them-
selves. There was by chance in the more easterly of
46 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. the two bastions a huge pile of palisades, which had not
Mar. 9. been utilised in consequence of the frost. These the
British employed to form a rampart flanking the gorge
of the bastion ; while at the same time they turned
round the heavy guns, which had been mounted to
enfilade the Tholen dyke, so as to command the entrance
to the gorge. In vain the French attempted again and
again to penetrate into the bastion under the fire of their
field-guns : the storm of grape on their front and the
murderous shower of musketry from behind the palisades
on their flank drove them back always with heavy loss.
Indeed had not the aim of the heavy guns been un-
certain, owing to the difficulty of working them,
reversed, upon their platforms, the French columns
would have been annihilated. On the other hand any
counter-attack by the British was out of the question ;
and the two parties remained separated by a dividing
line about midway between the arsenal and the windmill,
which neither was able to pass.
In the southern quarter of the port there was a
similar dead-lock. All French attempts to reach the
Orange bastion by the ramparts on the east side of it
were frustrated by the flanking fire of the Guards in
the houses ; and equally all efforts of the British to
penetrate by the False Gate and its parallel passages
into the town were paralysed by the fire of the French
field-guns at the gate. By the confession of the French
themselves it needed the utmost exertions of their
artillery to prevent the British from forming on the
quays and storming the False Gate out of hand ; but
the brave French gunners were equal to the occasion
and kept the Guards confined to their shelter. Within
the town half a dozen British soldiers had contrived to
get into a house in the street leading to the Antwerp
Gate, from which they kept up a continual fire upon
all passing troops ; and on the other side French marks-
men on the ramparts 1 harassed the Guards with an
1 Cooke says that these "snipers" were in houses, but this is
denied by Legrand.
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 47
incessant fusillade which caused not a little loss. The
contending parties were in fact almost exactly equal in Mar. 9.
strength, and both in a manner committed to disjointed
and incoherent action, the British because they were
actually separated into two distinct bodies, the French
because they blindly accepted the initiative thrust upon
them by their enemies. Hence the contest was strangely
intermittent. For half an hour there would be thunder
of guns, clatter of musketry, furious shouting and all
the hideous clamour of war ; then suddenly an interval
of profound silence with the moon riding softly over-
head, as though perfect peace reigned in Bergen-op-
Zoom.
It was in the course of such a lull between half-past
two and three o'clock in the morning that one of the
French colonels, after a general reconnaissance, repre-
sented to Ambert that it was hopeless to look for success
from partial attacks, and that the troops should be con-
centrated for a general onslaught. More than half of
the garrison were still occupying the works at the eastern
end of the fortress from the Steenbergen Gate to the
Antwerp Gate, to which quarter they had been sent at
the opening of the assault, but where they were now
absolutely useless. Ambert readily accepted this advice,
and ordered his troops to be divided into three columns,
of which that on the right, or northern side, should
advance first and give the signal for those in the centre
and left to advance likewise. The head of the right
column was formed of the 5ist of the line, followed in
succession by the 1 7th and 1 2th, and it was agreed that
these should move with the bayonet from the vicinity
of the windmill into the north-west bastion, while a
party of sailors should slip along the edge of the scarp
so as to turn the rear of the British who were ensconced
behind the palisades.
This plan was completely successful. The British on
the northern front, assailed both in front and rear, gave
way instantly and fled for refuge to the basin of the port
or to the main ditches. The rear of the French column
48 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. with three field-guns then turned to the left, drove the
Mar. 9. British from the arsenal, and crossing the basin of the
port on a small swing-bridge little more than a foot
wide, in defiance of the fire of the Guards from the
houses on the south side of the basin, drove the fugi-
tives before them to the Water-gate. The drawbridge
from this gate over the broad ditch had not been
lowered, there being no occasion to use it ; and the
flying red-coats, unable to pass, jumped down into the
ditch as best they could. Some reached the glacis,
where the cannon of the western front played on them
with grape ; but many more were captured by the
French, who let down scaling-ladders to save them. A
large number of those thus taken were wounded, and
all were wet through to the arm-pits and numbed
with cold.
Upon the approach of the French to the Water-
gate Colonel Muller of the Royals sent an urgent
message to Cooke for help, whereupon Cooke rein-
forced him with the Thirty-third. He would have
done better to summon the Royals to join his own
party, for an officer who had remained supine for six
hours without attempting to move during a strenuous
fight, as had Muller, should not have been trusted with
more troops. Moreover, Cooke had some idea himself
of taking the offensive, and, on the commencement of
the French counter-attack, had asked Graham for
instructions whether to clear the streets or only to hold
the ramparts. Graham's answer left Cooke discretion
to do as he might think best, but promised reinforce-
ments after daybreak. The messenger, however, did
not reach Cooke until too late. Meanwhile the French
brought up their field-guns to play upon the Royals,
who, according to Muller's account, suffered so heavily
from the showers of grape that he was compelled to
surrender. It is, however, evident that he made no
great effort, for the number of his killed and wounded
was under one hundred and twenty, whereas that of the
men taken unhurt exceeded five hundred. The Thirty-
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 49
third, which was of about the same strength as the 1814.
Royals, declined to share their fate, but scrambled over March 9.
the ramparts and returned to Graham, leaving behind
them over one hundred slain and disabled, but only
fifty unwounded prisoners.
Thus the French on the right were completely
successful ; but in the centre and left their efforts were
at the outset fruitless. The central column, attempting
to debouch as before from the False Gate, durst not
face the fire of the Guards in front and flank, and
could do no more than sweep the quays and streets
with grape to keep the British from leaving the
houses. The left column, led by the 2ist, and backed
by a heterogeneous collection of sailors, veterans and
gunners, likewise tried to penetrate into the Orange
.bastion ; but, being greeted not only by a terrible
shower of musketry but by grape from their own guns,
which the British had turned against them, they were
driven back with heavy loss. They held, however, the
bastion immediately to east of the Orange bastion, thus
cutting off Cooke's communications with the exterior,
and it was necessary to thrust them out of it, a feat
which was performed by the Fifty-fifth and Sixty-ninth
the very troops that had succumbed to panic earlier
in the night in the most brilliant style.
Still Cooke's position was extremely anxious. He
could see that matters were going amiss all round him,
though he knew nothing definite ; and the French in
the north-west bastion now turned their heavy cannon
upon him from the opposite side of the port. Lord
Proby suggested that a part of the troops should with-
draw, and a considerable number of them retired in
good order, using the ladders by which they had entered.
The French left column attempted a second attack
during this movement, but was again repulsed by the
Fifty-fifth and Sixty-ninth ; and it seems that the retreat
was unmolested except by the fire from the demi-lune
before the Antwerp Gate, the garrison of which poured
a steady stream of shot upon the British as they crossed
VOL. x E
50 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. the glacis. Nevertheless the remanent of Cooke's force,
March 9. chiefly men of the First Guards, still held their own ;
though the batteries in the north-west bastion were
plying them steadily with shell, the French right
column were now assailing them from the side of the
Water-gate, and the central column was preparing
combustibles to kindle the entire southern quarter of
the port. At this juncture, however, Colonel Jones of
the Guards, who had been taken prisoner, judging from
the reports of his fellow-prisoners from all quarters that
further effort was hopeless, volunteered to stop what he
termed useless butchery. Ambert accepted the offer
on the condition that all British within the walls should
surrender ; and Jones, taking the arm of Captain
Denis of the French artillery, walked down with him
slowly between the two fires of the contending parties,
both officers waving white handkerchiefs, until with
some difficulty the fight was stopped. Cooke, learning
from Jones of the surrender of Muller and of the defeat
of Clifton's, Skerrett's and Carleton's detachments, then
consented that his men should lay down their arms ;
and Graham, moving down with his reinforcements an
hour or two later to take possession of the town, saw
to his infinite mortification that he had come in vain.
Thus failed the assault upon Bergen-op-Zoom, one
of the most singular in its details to be found in the
annals of war. The attempt was perfectly justified by
circumstances ; the idea was bold ; and the initial
combinations, as the event sufficiently proved, were
perfect. Over three thousand men were thrown into
the fortress with little effort ; and yet these, though
they fought with uncommon courage and tenacity, were
vanquished by a heterogeneous garrison of twenty-seven
hundred. This remarkable result was due chiefly to
three causes : first, to Colonel Henry's squandering
of his troops in a real attack, which according to
Graham's plan should only have been a feint ; secondly,
to Skerrett's blunder in leading his men along the
northern instead of the southern * ramparts, and thus
CH.XVII HISTORY OF THE^ARMY 51
failing to join his force to that of Carleton and Cooke ; 1814.
thirdly, and chiefly, to the helpless imbecility of Colonel Marc'h,
Muller, who, instead of opening communications with
Skerrett on one side and with Cooke on the other, so
as to throw his reserve in with decisive effect, kept the
Royals useless and inactive at the Water-gate for six
hours, and then without any sufficient warrant sur-
rendered them as prisoners. Henry and Skerrett
acted in violation of Graham's orders, but Muller in
violation of the simplest duty of an officer, disgracing
not only himself but the noble regiment with which he
was unworthy to serve*. Yet even these faults might
possibly have been made good, had Carleton and Gore,
instead of pursuing the enemy along the whole length
of the southern front, halted their men at the Antwerp
Gate, and driven the French from the demi-lune that
covered and secured this entrance to the fortress. The
whole of the assailants could then have been assembled
to capture the Antwerp Gate, and make their way from
thence over a very short distance to the central square.
Graham's troops, it will be remembered, were of
poor quality, both officers and men, and may be pardoned
for doing their work without intelligence ; but Skerrett
and Carleton were fresh from the Peninsula and should
have shown better judgment. Graham summarised
their attack and failure in a fashion which was picturesque
even if not quite accurate. " The right column went
on like a pack of fox-hounds into cover, and in all
directions, and were annihilated before the Guards got
in." Cooke, whom we have known in earlier days at
Cadiz, made excellent dispositions for himself, but
showed some weakness in withdrawing his troops before
daylight, for he must have known that Graham would
not fail to reinforce him. Altogether it should seem
that Graham alone emerges from this unfortunate
business with credit ; and it was hard upon him that so
brilliant a stroke for such the attack undoubtedly was
should have been paralysed by the defects and the
negligence of his subordinate officers. Still, though
r
52 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. unstinted praise may be meted out to Graham, too
March, much censure should not be visited on his inferiors, for
the entire operation took the most unexpected turns.
The French knew the weakness of the fortress in a
frost, foresaw the possibility of a coup de main, and were
in the highest degree vigilant and alert to avert it.
Nevertheless the frost, as the event proved, was a
hindrance rather than a help to the assailants ; for
Morrice's column owed its repulse to broken ice, and
Cooke's was turned away from its true point of attack
by the same cause. For all the part played by ice in
the struggle, the assault might 'just as well have been
delivered in a thaw. Yet never was a garrison so
completely taken by surprise as that of Bergen-op-Zoom.
Next, the preliminary panic in Morrice's column was
a piece of sheer bad luck, for these same troops be-
haved most nobly later under the command of Cooke.
On the other hand the defence of the north-west bastion
would have honoured veterans of the Peninsula for its
stubbornness and resource, showing that in some corps
at any rate there were good heads among the officers.
To turn now to the French, it must be said at once
that it was greatly to the discredit of the guards in the
redoubts of the entrenched camp that Cooke should
have been able to escalade the Orange bastion without
so much as the raising of an alarm. The supreme
command also seems to have been in feeble hands,
otherwise the bulk of the garrison would never have
been kept on the eastern front, where it was useless,
after the failure of Henry's and Morrice's attacks. The
battalion-commanders, on the contrary, were excellent ;
and it was owing to their energy that the fortress was
saved. But the whole story is made up of such a con-
course of fortuitous accidents that it is difficult to assign
praise or blame to either side. The splendid audacity
of Graham's conception shines out alone with brilliancy
undimmed.
The losses of the British in this affair amounted to
twenty-five hundred and fifty ; the killed amounting to
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 53
nearly four hundred, the wounded to over five hundred, 1814.
and the unwounded prisoners to over sixteen hundred! March.
The Forty-fourth, of Carleton's column, was the regi-
ment which, in proportion to its strength, suffered most
heavily, its killed and wounded numbering over two
hundred out of three hundred and fifty engaged. The
Twenty-first and Thirty-seventh of the same column
were likewise severely punished, as also was the Thirty-
third, which appears to have borne the brunt of Morrice's
unsuccessful assault. The Guards escaped comparatively
lightly, and this bears witness to the skill with which
they were disposed by Cooke ; for there were only
three hundred and fifty of them unwounded at the final
surrender, and yet no efforts of the French infantry
could dislodge them. The French losses are stated,
probably with correctness, at five hundred killed and
wounded, so that their triumph was complete. Four
colours, including one belonging to the First Guards,
fell into their hands ; and they had every reason to
plume themselves upon their success.
Never did victors behave more generously to van-
quished than on this occasion. The British officers were
breaking their swords in fury, declaring that no such
disaster had ever before befallen the British army ; and
the condition of the wounded, covered with blood and
soaked to the skin with icy water, was pitiable. The
French general, Bizanet, treated the whole of them with
equal magnanimity, restoring to the officers their swords
and allowing them to lodge in hotels, while giving every
care and attention to the men. Bizanet had, as he said,
been himself a prisoner of the English in his youth, and
had received such kindness from them that he took
pleasure now in repaying it. When Colonel Stanhope,
of Graham's staff, came to negotiate for exchange of
prisoners, Bizanet declined to look at any papers that
he collected or to set any watch upon his actions. The
General also invited Stanhope to dine with him, and
proposed the health of Graham as a compliment to so
brave and able a commander. Finally he signed an
54 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. agreement for the release of the prisoners, on condition
March, that they should not serve against France or her Allies
in Europe until regularly exchanged. The prisoners
accordingly marched out on the loth, fully at liberty to
fight against the Americans, which, as Stanhope knew,
was the duty already assigned to them by the British
Government. Thus fifteen hundred men were regained
practically without exchange ; and although it was
doubtless a great object to the French to be quit of so
many useless mouths, some credit must be given to the
skilful diplomacy of Stanhope. On the nth this officer
sailed for England with the evil tidings or" failure ;
though the event rightly brought praise rather than
blame to Graham. Bathurst and the Duke of York
expressed their high approval of his spirit and enterprise,
and the Prince Regent broke through all precedent to
give Stanhope a step in rank, as though he had brought
home the report not of a defeat but of a victory. 1
With his force reduced by nearly one half Graham
was powerless ; but the news of Blucher's success at
Laon, which reached him on the I4th of March, set
much of his anxiety at rest. A week later Walmoden
sent word that he should arrive at Lierre and Malines
on the 25th or 26th with his first detachment of
Hanoverians ; but, as this body of troops did not exceed
five thousand men, it seemed likely that Graham would
be condemned to long inactivity before he could hope to
take the field. Some effort was made to collect sufficient
men from Dutch levies and Prussian regiments to
prosecute the siege of Antwerp ; and the preparations
were still going forward 2 when happily circumstances
rendered any fresh campaign unnecessary.
On the 2Qth the Allied armies came before Paris,
1 This account of the assault is drawn from Graham's letters in
the Record Office, W.O. 7, vols. 197-201, most of which are printed
in Delavoye's Life of Lord Lynedoch ; from James Stanhope's MS.
Journa/and from Legrand's Relation de la. Surprise de Bergen-op-Zoom,
Paris, 1816, which from the French side is most valuable.
2 Castlereagh, Desp. ix. 383-393, 406, 425-426, 444-348.
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 55
and on the joth engaged Marmont in battle under 1814.
the walls. Joseph Bonaparte, who was acting as lieu- Mar. 30
tenant to the Emperor during Napoleon's absence in
the field, fled southward early in the day, after em-
powering Marmont to parley with the enemy ; and on
the night of the 3<Dth the capitulation of Paris was
signed, Marmont undertaking to withdraw his troops
outside the fortifications. In the late hours of the
same night the news reached Napoleon, who was
hurrying back in frantic haste from his false movement
to the eastward, and had already passed Fontainebleau.
He sent messengers on in the hope of breaking off" the
negotiations, but, finding that he was too late, went back
to Fontainebleau overpowered by his evil fortune. On
the 3ist the Allied armies entered Paris, where, all Mar. 31.
danger being over, they were welcomed as liberators ;
but the city gave no sign of its feelings as to a change
of Government. There was in fact no public opinion ;
and it was necessary to improvise one favourable to the
views of the Allied Sovereigns. Talleyrand was sent
for, and was the more readily found since he had stayed
at Paris to await this very opportunity. He pronounced
in favour of a restoration of the Bourbons, and suggested
that the Senate should declare the Emperor dethroned.
Thereupon a declaration was drawn up to the effect
that the Allied Sovereigns would treat no more with
Napoleon, and invited the Senate to nominate a pro-
visional government, which should prepare a new
constitution. In the evening Talleyrand spoke with
the most prominent members of the Senate and drew
up the list of the members of the provisional govern-
ment, not omitting his own name. On the afternoon
of the ist of April sixty-four senators out of one
hundred and fifty met and appointed Tallyrand's
nominees without discussion ; and on the 3rd the same April 3.
body, after short consideration of a long preamble
setting forth the iniquities of Napoleon, unanimously
declared that he had ceased to reign.
All this was very well ; but Napoleon was not a man
56 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. to be bound by votes, least of all when he had an army
April 3. of sixty thousand men at his back ; and the Allies were
well aware of it. Their obvious course would have
been to march straight upon Fontainebleau on the ist
of April and crush the few troops that had been able
to overtake the Emperor, before the rest should come
up ; but the Tsar wished to end the war without
further bloodshed, and without risking the chance of
disaster from a possible defeat. There remained, there-
fore, only two possibilities : to alienate Napoleon's
army from him, or, in default, to kidnap Napoleon
himself. Plans were laid to compass both objects, but
precedence was given to the former. Talleyrand and
his followers had from the first moment set themselves
to convert Marmont to their views ; and on the 3rd of
April the Marshal received letters from them and from
Schwarzenberg, enclosing the act of dethronement, and
appealing to him as a good patriot to range himself on
the side of a the good cause."
The path which a good patriot should, in the circum-
stances, have taken is a point upon which men will
argue for ever without possibility of agreement. On
the one side Marmont had from very early days been
attached to the fortunes of Napoleon, and owed his
great position to him. On the other it was un-
questionable that this same Napoleon, who had been
the saviour of France in 1799, had brought about
her ruin between 1807 and 1814, and was responsible
for the occupation of Paris by the Allied armies at
that moment. Being something of a coxcomb, Mar-
mont may have aspired to play the part of Monk.
Being far remote from a fool, he may reasonably have
thought it his duty to cut matters short. The over-
throw of Napoleon could only be a matter of time,
for there was Wellington to be reckoned with in the
south, as well as the Allies in the north ; and pro-
longation of resistance could only mean additional
misery to France and worse terms in the end both for
her and for Napoleon. Whatever his motives, the
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 57
Marshal agreed to withdraw his troops from Napoleon's 1814.
army upon two conditions : that he should be free to April 3.
lead them to Normandy with arms, ammunition and
baggage, and that if, in consequence, Napoleon should
fall into the hands of the Allies, there should be
guaranteed to the Emperor his life and liberty within
some territory to be agreed upon between the French
Government and the Allied powers. Schwarzenberg
gladly accepted the terms ; and on the morning of the April 4.
4th a convention to that effect was signed.
At about the same time Macdonald with the three
corps under his command was approaching Fontaine-
bleau ; and Napoleon, having his troops thus concen-
trated under his hand, had given the order for a general
advance. Nothing was yet known at his head-quarters
of Marmont's defection ; but the news of the decree of
dethronement had reached the army, and had wrought
not a little on the senior officers, who were sick of war
and had learned to distrust the ambition of their chief.
At noon the Emperor, as was his custom, attended the
ceremony of mounting guard. The men showed their
usual enthusiasm, but the marshals and generals formed a
sulky group aside ; and, when the parade was over, Ney,
Lefebvre and Moncey invaded Napoleon's room, and in
no very polite terms pressed him to abdicate. High
words followed, but the Emperor was borne down ; and
he at length consented to abdicate without prejudice to
the rights of his son. Accordingly Ney, Macdonald
and Caulaincourt were despatched to convey his
determination to Schwarzenberg's head-quarters ; and
the three of them, picking up Marmont on their
way, were admitted to the Tsar's presence soon after
midnight. They pleaded the cause of the Napoleonic
dynasty with such eloquence and sincerity that
Alexander was for the moment shaken, and bade them
return at nine o'clock to hear his final decision. But
meanwhile a singular fatality had altered the whole
situation. Napoleon in the course of the 4th sent
word to Marmont and to all corps-commanders to
58 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. repair to head-quarters. Souham, who was in charge
April 4. of Marmont's troops during the Marshal's absence,
inferred from this summons that the Emperor had
learned the secret of Marmont's defection, to which
Souham and other of his officers were privy ; and in
order (as he thought) to save his head, Souham informed
Schwarzenberg that he should lead his force into the
lines of the Allies. This he actually did in the course
of the night. The Tsar, having thus eleven thousand
out of Napoleon's sixty thousand soldiers in his power,
rejected the abdication in favour of the King of Rome,
and insisted upon abdication unconditionally.
The news of Souham's action reached the Emperor
April 5. early in the morning of the 5th, and caused him to
cancel his orders for an advance, and to issue others
for retreat to the Loire. Late in the evening Ney,
Macdonald and Caulaincourt arrived at Fontainebleau
and reported the result of their mission, declaring that
the Allies were about to restore the Bourbons and
would guarantee to Napoleon the sovereignty of Elba.
The Emperor answered that in such circumstances war
was no greater an evil than peace, and unfolded his plans
for retreat to the Loire and for co-operation with the
armies of Soult, Suchet and Augereau. The Marshals
listened in icy silence and withdrew. In the evening
they held a meeting, as the result of which Ney,
Macdonald and Caulaincourt directed Berthier next
day to transmit no further orders which Napoleon
might issue for the movements of troops. Napoleon
made a last appeal to them, but in vain ; and he then
signed the abdication of the thrones of France and
Italy on behalf of himself and his heirs. His officers
hastened to make their peace with Lewis the Eighteenth ;
but the men, less easily reconciled to the change, showed
their resentment by spasmodic outbursts of insubordina-
tion. Anxious to have done with the trouble, the
Allies now stated their final terms to Napoleon ; that
he was to have the island of Elba, and his wife the
duchies of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla, together
CH. xvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 59
with an annual subsidy of 80,000 between them. On 1814.
the night after hearing these terms Napoleon attempted April,
to poison himself; but on recovering, regained com-
posure and accepted his fate. On the 2oth he took
leave of his Guard and set out for Frjus. Acclaimed
with the old enthusiasm on his journey as far as Lyons,
he found a very different spirit reigning in the south,
where he was fain to disguise himself to escape insult
and violence from the people. On the 28th he set sail
from Frejus in the British frigate Undaunted ; and his
reign for the present was over.
CHAPTER XVIII
1814. THE news of the great event took long to reach the
most distant theatres of operations. In Sicily Bentinck,
after active negotiation with Murat and with Bellegarde,
the Austrian commander in Italy, throughout the month
of February, had embarked his first division of troops
at Palermo under General Montresor. 1 Murat, who
had lately occupied Tuscany, wished them to be landed
at Spezia ; but Bentinck, distrusting Murat and con-
ceiving that he desired only to keep the British troops
at a distance, decided to send them to Leghorn, and to
demand exclusive possession of that port. The First
Division sailed accordingly, disembarked at Leghorn on
Mar. 10. the loth of March, and sent back its transports to
fetch the Second Division ; while Bentinck, who had
already despatched an emissary to Bellegarde to beg him
for some cavalry, made his way to Verona to visit that
commander in person. He was greatly disappointed
1 Return of troops embarked for Italy. Feb. 1814.
1st Division. Montresor. Staff, 39 ; Commissariat, 53 ; Medical
Dept., 1 6 ; Paymaster-Gen. Dept., 4 ; R.A., 288 ; R.E., 23 ;
Staff Corps, 31; i/2ist, 1204; i/62nd, 1027; 3rd Line
K.G.L., looi ; 6th do., 971 ; 8th do., 105 ; Duke of York's
Greek L.I., 250 ; 1st and 3rd Italian regts., 1220 ; Calabrian
Free Corps, 6 1 8. Sicilians: Staff, 7 ; artillery, 222 ; engineers,
130; 2nd cavalry, 125; 2nd infantry, 1186. Total: 345
officers ; 8126 n.c.o. and men ; 53 clerks.
znd Division. Macfarlane. Staff, 1 1 ; 2/14^,1140;* 1/3 1st,
713 ; 8th Line K.G.L., 88 1 ; Italian artillery, 53. Sicilians:
2nd cav., 287 ; Grenadiers, 827 ; 3rd and 4th inf., 1222. Total:
244 officers ; 5890 n.c.o. and men.
* This battalion had been withdrawn apparently from Genoa.
60
CH. xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 61
with all that he found there. Bellegarde not only 1814.
declined to spare more than four or five hundred horse, March
but, having lately received a severe check from the
French on the Mincio, was disinclined to do anything
whatever. In fact, according to Lord William's judg-
ment, Bellegarde and Murat were playing the same
game, each wishing to gain time in the hope that events
elsewhere would decide the contest, and each throwing
the responsibility upon the other.
This was probably true, but Bentinck had himself
contributed not a little to the supineness of the two
commanders by his own tactless arrogance. Lord
William had, to speak plainly, lost his mental balance,
which at the best of times was none of the stablest,
and was for taking upon himself the future regulation
of the entire Italian Peninsula. He had already made
mischief by insinuating to the Hereditary Prince of
Naples that Sicily with a free constitution could only be
successfully governed by Great Britain. He had also
offended Murat, who had offered to him the military
occupation of Tuscany, by demanding further the
concession of the civil authority to himself personally.
Lastly, upon landing at Leghorn, he had published
a proclamation respecting the wish of the British
Government to deliver the Italians from tyranny, which
lent itself to misconstruction, and was in fact mis-
construed to mean not only the deliverance of Italy
from the yoke of France, but the establishment under
British auspices of what is called popular government.
Of a truth this was precisely what Bentinck desired to
convey and, if he could, to bring about, without the
slightest reflection upon the state of Europe at large or
upon the relations of his Government with foreign
powers. The poor man's intentions were good, but his
political intelligence was bounded by the first article of
the Whig creed, " I believe in the glorious Revolution
of 1688."
Such proceedings were naturally thought both by
Murat and Bellegarde to have been dictated by the
62 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. British Foreign Office ; wherefore very pardonably
March. Murat became suspicious of British designs against
himself, and Bellegarde of crooked 1 dealing on the part
of England towards Austria. Castlereagh, who was
engaged in the Herculean task of bringing the jealous
powers of Europe to an arrangement which might
secure a durable peace, remonstrated by rebukes which
were unfortunately too gentle. " It is not," he wrote,
" by fighting British against Neapolitan influence
in Tuscany, nor by abandoning Austria to Murat's
augmented intrigues that good is to be done. It is
by staying where you are upon any reasonable system,
and by making the tide flow so strongly in favour of
the Allied cause that Murat will be entrain^ with it."
In another letter, concerning Bentinck's foolish utter-
ances to the Prince of Naples, Castlereagh dwelt on the
danger " of hazarding speculations not only wholly un-
authorised, but inconsistent with the existing relations
of your Court." Lastly, he commented upon Bentinck's
proclamation in the following terms : " This incident
proves how necessary it is, surrounded as your Lordship
must be by individuals who wish for another system to be
established in Italy, not to afford any plausible pretext
for umbrage to those with whom we are acting. . . .
It is not insurrection we now want in Italy or elsewhere
we want disciplined force under Sovereigns that we
can trust." * Such hints would have been accepted by
any sensible man as a warning. They were lost upon
Bentinck. He professed admiration for Wellington ;
but it never occurred to him that it was " by staying
where he was upon any reasonable principle " that
Wellington had driven the French from the Iberian
Peninsula.
Meanwhile General Montresor had reconnoitred the
enemy's position in the Gulf of Spezia on the 24th of
March. Finding the French in too great strength to
permit him to force the passage of the river Magra, he
1 Castlereagh to Bentinck, 3rd April 1814. Castlereagh Despatches,
ix. 427.
CH. xvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 63
made a demonstration against their front opposite ,8i 4 .
Sarzana, and detached a column up the water to turn March
their left^ Whether owing to these dispositions or, as
is more likely, to the menace of the British squadron
under Admiral Rowley on the other flank, the enemy
retired and, being pursued, fled precipitately, abandon-
ing three guns. Montresor then invested Fort Santa
Maria, situated upon a small peninsula which runs
into the Gulf of Spezia. With great exertion fifteen
heavy pieces were brought up over the mountains by
the seamen of the squadron ; batteries were constructed,
and after a cannonade of eighteen hours the fort
capitulated on the 3oth. Thereby was secured a safe Mar. 30.
anchorage for the navy, and a safe dep6t, in the shape
of the islet of Palmaria, for stores. At the same time
the position threatened Genoa, offered a ready com-
munication with Parma by way of Pontremoli, if
needed, and, being inaccessible from the north to
troops with artillery, and covered by the Magra on
the east, afforded an admirable base for an army.
A few days later Bentinck arrived at Leghorn in April,
person, and, hearing that there were only two thousand
men in Genoa, resolved to advance rapidly upon that
city. He therefore pushed north-westward along the
coast with an advanced party, but on reaching Sestri
learned that the enemy at Genoa had been reinforced
to a strength of five to six thousand men. The country
being mountainous and difficult, the roads very bad,
and transport both by land and sea deficient, Bentinck
saw no prospect of bringing up his Second Division
before the I4th, and in the meanwhile could only clear
the way with Montresor's troops. On the 8th of April 8.
April the French were driven from Sestri ; on the
1 2th, after some resistance, they were forced back
from Nervi ; and on the I3th Montresor established
himself at Sturla. The enemy then took up a position
with their right resting on the sea, their centre at San
Martino, and their left covered by two forts. Here
Bentinck attacked them on the lth. A confused
64 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. action followed ; the French front being covered by a
April 17. network of villas and gardens ; but eventually the two
forts on the French left were captured. The enemy
retired precipitately into Genoa ; and Bentinck, advancing
towards the weakest point of the fortifications, began to
throw up batteries. Thereupon a deputation of the
inhabitants came out to entreat that the place might
not be bombarded, since peace was almost certain ; and
after much parley the French General agreed to a
convention under which his troops should share posses-
sion of Genoa with the Allies until the 2ist, and should
then march out with the honours of war. Bentinck's
casualties, on the I3th, I 4 th and i8th together, little
exceeded two hundred killed and wounded, so that the
fighting was not of a very desperate character. Since
Corsica had risen in insurrection against the French,
a detachment was despatched to that island under
Montresor to support the insurgents ; while the rest
of the force was for the most part sent back to Gibraltar
and Sicily. Therewith Bentinck's insignificant campaign
came to an end.
But Lord William had not yet lost sight of his
darling scheme ; and an opportunity soon occurred for
prosecuting it. Bellegarde and Eugene Beauharnais
had, while Bentinck was before Genoa, signed a con-
vention for the evacuation of Italy by the French
troops ; but it was suspected that the Viceroy was
intriguing with the Milanese in the hope that they
would solicit him to be their prince. A deputation
from the senate of Milan had actually started for
Eugene's head-quarters with that object, when the
populace of the city broke into insurrection, appointed
a provisional government, and sent emissaries to the
head-quarters of the Allied powers to beg for protection.
Those that came to Bentinck professed a desire also for
a free constitution ; and the bait was too tempting to be
rejected. Bentinck at once sent General Macfarlane to
Milan " to act as mediator between the parties/' justify-
ing his disobedience to Castlereagh's instructions, which
CH. xvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 65
forbade him to countenance any revolution, upon the 1814.
ground that this revolution had sprung from hatred of April.
French tyranny. Naturally the party represented by
the Provisional Government addressed Macfarlane with
demands for British troops, British commissioners and
British regulation for the future of Italy. Another
soldier, more flighty even than Bentinck, Sir Robert
Wilson, encouraged them ; and Macfarlane assured
Castlereagh that the Italians would receive a British
Prince for King with joyful unanimity.
Castlereagh was much annoyed. He was striving
with infinite pains to make the Powers work in concert ;
and here was a stupid subordinate doing his utmost to
offend both Austria and Sardinia. After venting his
vexation in a letter to Liverpool, denouncing "Bentinck's
intolerable proneness to Whig revolutions everywhere,"
he gave orders for Macfarlane to be recalled from
Milan, and endeavoured to instil into Lord William a
little sound sense. "It is impossible," wrote Castlereagh,
" not to perceive a great moral change in Europe, and
that the principles of freedom are in full operation
the danger is that the transition may be too sudden to
ripen into anything likely to make the world better or
happier. We have new constitutions launched in
France, Spain, Holland and Sardinia. Let us see the
result before we encourage further attempts. ... I
should prefer seeing the Italians await the insensible
influence of what is going on elsewhere than hazard
their own internal quiet by an effort at this moment."
Nor did Castlereagh fail to grant Bentinck leave of
absence, which Lord William had already requested in
the event of a general peace, and to abstain from
employing him again.
Beyond question Bentinck was rightly served. It is
easy for sentimental gentlemen, both British and Italian,
to say that Bentinck anticipated the establishment of
Italian unity and freedom by nearly half a century, and
to exalt him upon that account as an enlightened states-
man. No doubt Italian unity and freedom (if popular
VOL. x F
66 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. government be freedom) may be good things; but
April, even forty years after Bentinck's escapade the Italians
were still unable to achieve them for themselves without
foreign assistance. Had not Castlereagh called Lord
William smartly to heel, the Coalition would almost
certainly have been dissolved ; the great Powers would
have flown at each others' throats : Italy would have
become once more the scene of desolating wars ;
Napoleon who, as Bentinck himself remarked, was
dangerously near at Elba, would infallibly have regained
the throne of France ; and the European conflagration,
which after burning more than twenty years had been
nearly quenched, would have blazed up anew. And
all these misfortunes would have befallen because a
wrong-headed man indulged himself, in direct contra-
vention of the conduct prescribed to him, with the
luxury of translating his very crude prejudices into
practice. Such behaviour, the fruit less of vice than of
stupidity and conceit, cannot be too strongly condemned ;
and Bentinck's example should be held up as a warning
to all generals who dabble in sentimental politics. 1
Let us now return to Wellington, whom we left
Mar. 26. before Toulouse on the 26th of March. On that
morning Soult, finding himself overtaken by his enemy,
withdrew the greater part of his army within the walls
of Toulouse. Clausel's two divisions crossed the
Garonne, and took up their quarters in the suburb of
St. Etienne on the eastern side of the town ; while
Pierre Soult's cavalry, passing also to the right bank,
was echeloned along the border of the river north-
ward from Toulouse to Grisolles. Reille's two divisions
occupied the suburb of St. Cyprien on the western side ;
and only d'Erlon's troops, with two regiments of
horse, remained outside the western front, the main
1 The foregoing paragraphs are based on Bentinck's corre-
spondence in the Record Office. To Sec. of State, 1 5th, 2jth Feb. ;
26th March ; 6th, 2Oth April ; loth May, 1814. Castlereagh
Corres. ix. 400, 409, 427-436, 442, 477-478, 509 ; and an article
by Signer Giuseppe Gallavresi in Archivio Storico Lombardo, 3ist
March 1909.
CH. xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 67
body being concentrated at the junction of the roads 1814.
to Auch and Lombez, and the advanced posts extended Mar. 26.
along the right bank of the Touch from its junction
with the Garonne on the north through Tournefeuille
to the village of St. Simon on the south.
On that evening the Allies bivouacked along a line
from Fontenilles through Fonsorbes-St. Lys to Noe, with
advanced posts pushed out to Leguevin, Plaisance and
Muret. On the 2yth their vanguards advanced con- Mar. 27.
centrically upon the suburb of St. Cyprien, so as to
drive the French inside the walls, and clear the way
for the passage of the river above the city. After a
sharp skirmish Reille's outposts were beaten back from
the bridge of Tournefeuille, and the van of the Allies
was brought forward to Blagnac on the left, Colomiers
and Plaisance in the centre, and Portet on the right.
Soult, suspecting nothing, remained inactive ; and at
eight o'clock in the evening Wellington brought his
pontoons down to the Garonne and began to lay his
bridge. The pontoons were found to be too few for
the breadth of the stream, and it was necessary to with-
draw the whole of the boats, and to march the troops,
that were waiting to cross, back to their quarters. It
is said that Wellington had been warned by his chief
engineer that the pontoons which he was taking with
him were insufficient for a really wide river, and that
this mishap was the result of the Commander-in-Chief 's
obstinacy. Be that as it may, the failure was somewhat
ignominious. 1
Nevertheless on the 28th Wellington made his dis-Mar. 28.
positions still more definitely for a second attempt to
pass the river at the same point. The entire army was
wheeled slightly to its right that is to say to south-
eastward. The Fourth and Sixth Divisions occupied
Colomiers, Tournefeuille and Plaisance ; the Third and
Light Divisions covered the ground from Piaisance to
1 Larpent, p. 488. George Napier says, " I never saw him in
such a rage and no wonder " ; but Larpent's cool contemporary
judgment is more likely to be correct.
68 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. Cugnaux ; Hill's corps prolonged the line through
Mar. 28. Villeneuve and Frouzins to Muret, with a vanguard at
Portet ; and head-quarters were moved eastward from
St. Lys to Seysses. Still Soult remained supine. He
never dreamed of an attempt to cross the Garonne
above Toulouse, and with some reason, for the situation
of the city was such as to make the enterprise most
hazardous.
Toulouse is built upon both banks of the Garonne
at a point where the river offers, to an enemy approach-
ing from the south-west, a re-entrant angle. The bulk
of the city lies upon the eastern bank, the suburb of St.
Cyprien alone standing upon the western bank ; and
the whole, in 1814, still constituted something of a
fortified place with a total perimeter of some three miles.
The suburb of St. Cyprien formed a bridge-head, being
enclosed by a battlemented wall and a ditch, which was
supplemented by a first line of entrenchments, with two
bastions and a block-house, commanding the principal
avenues of approach. A second line of defence had been
thrown up about six hundred yards outside this first
line, and fifteen guns mounted in it, the centre being at
the junction of the roads to Auch and to Lombez. On
the south side this earthwork was prolonged to the edge
of the river, and was strengthened for some distance
from the water by an abatis ; to northward it was eked
out by walls and fortified buildings till it abutted on a
swamp at some distance from the stream. On the right
bank of the Garonne the end of the old wall was masked
along the southern and part of the eastern front by the
houses of the suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne.
From the edge of the latter suburb northward the
fortifications were less obscured by buildings ; and on
the north front, which covered the arsenal, they were
fairly clear. At this point the wall was well flanked
with towers and in excellent order. Beyond the first
line of defence the Languedoc Canal formed a second
along the whole length of the northern and eastern
fronts, every bridge and lock being strongly fortified.
CH. xvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 69
East of this again stands a low line of heights, called 1814.
the heights of Calvinet, forming a natural glacis to the Mar. 28.
river Hers, a deep stream between steep banks, whose
course runs parallel to the Languedoc Canal. The
arsenal within the walls furnished abundant material
and munitions of war.
In this very strong position Soult resolved to fortify
himself still further and to shut himself up. The
inhabitants were in a state of consternation, for the
troops in the town were extremely disorderly, laying
violent hands on everything that they fancied ; and the
requisitions of the Marshal were not less exacting.
But Soult cared for none of their complaints. The
town furnished not a few resources for an army, and
could provide even a small reinforcement in the shape
of a reserve division under General Travot, made up of
the recruiting dep6ts of twenty-four regiments and a
certain number of National Guards. Soult checked
desertion by the promise of two months' pay, swept in
convalescents and malingerers by means of patrols, and
succeeded to some extent in putting down plunder and
marauding. The failure of his previous efforts at
fortification on the Nivelle and at Bayonne might have
warned the Marshal of the futility of these passive
methods of defence as compared with a vigilant and
energetic offensive, but at Toulouse Soult enjoyed an
enormous advantage in the barrier offered to the Allies
by the Garonne. Unless he chose to storm the bridge-
head of St. Cyprien out of hand which could hardly
fail to be a costly operation Wellington was bound
to pass the river in order to manoeuvre his adversary
out of Toulouse ; and, so long as that bridge-head was
in Soult's possession, the Marshal could always concen-
trate the whole of his army to fall upon either part of
Wellington's force as soon as it should be divided by
the act of crossing.
Wellington was resolved to gain Toulouse by
manoeuvre and not by storm ; and he had made up his
mind to cross the river above Toulouse instead of
70 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. below, because he thus approached the city from its
Mar. 28-29. weakest side, where it was unprotected by the canal,
and turned the flank of the heights of Calvinet. The
operation was delicate. If, on the one hand, he attempted
to pass the Garonne below the confluence of the Ariege,
which was less than four miles from the city, he exposed
himself to a flank attack from the greater part of
Soult's army. If, on the other hand, he endeavoured to
throw a corps over the river at a safe distance above
Toulouse, that corps would have two rivers to traverse
instead of one, which would practically sever it from
the rest of the Allies, and would find itself in a difficult
hilly country with roads that in fine weather were bad,
and after heavy rain almost impracticable. Wellington's
deliberate preference for this operation showed that he
had lost all respect for his adversary, and was ready to
take every kind of liberty with him. This being so,
it is somewhat surprising that he did not storm the
suburb of St. Cyprien at once without giving the
French time to recover themselves after their retreat.
Soult's whole scheme of defence depended upon the
bridge-head which enabled him to act upon either bank
of the Garonne. If that bridge-head were lost, the
scheme collapsed, and he had no alternative but to
retreat. An assault at this point would probably have
been costly, but it was not more hazardous, and not
likely therefore to be more costly, than the passage of
the river above Toulouse.
Mar. 30. Be that as it may, on the night of the 3<Dth Welling-
ton laid down his bridge opposite Pinsaguel, above the
confluence of the Ariege, where the stream, being
narrower, required a smaller number of pontoons.
With considerable difficulty, for the river was swelled
by two days of rain, the bridge was completed by four
Mar. 3 1. in the morning of the 3ist; and Hill's corps, Fane's
cavalry brigade, three batteries and Morillo's Spanish
brigade in all thirteen thousand men and eighteen
guns began the crossing at once, while the divisions
of Picton and Freire moved up to replace these troops
CH. xvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 71
about Portet and Muret and Frouzins. Wellington's 1814.
hope was that before daylight Fane's cavalry, one Mar. 31
battery and one brigade of infantry might move up the
Ariege and seize the bridge of Cintegabelle ; and Sir
Rowland was charged to find out if there were a way,
passable by artillery, leading on the right bank of the
Ariege from Cintegabelle across to Montgiscard or to
Castanet, on the great road from Toulouse to Car-
cassonne. With a carelessness, or possibly a temerity,
for which it is difficult to account, Wellington ordered
the bridge of boats to be taken up as soon as Hill's
corps should have traversed it, and to be replaced by
a flying bridge from Muret.
Meanwhile in the course of the night the French
cavalry sent in a report of Hill's movement, but Soult
took no notice until the intelligence was confirmed by
a civil official early in the morning of the 3ist. He
then ordered Clausel to choose a position for the army
to the south of Vieille Toulouse, and made enquiry as
to the possibility of bringing artillery to the spot. At
eight o'clock definite news came in that the British had
laid one bridge and were laying another. By that time
Villatte's division had reached Ramonville St. Agne,
about five miles north-east from Pinsaguel, and
Harispe's division was streaming out of the suburb of
St. Michel. Soult ordered Clausel to check Hill and
drive him into the river before his troops were formed
up, promising to support the movement with d'Erlon's
corps ; and at the same time he directed Reille to be
ready to repel a feint attack upon St. Cyprien, or, if
none should be delivered, to send Taupin's division to
him. Lastly Soult formed Travot's reserve on the
heights of Calvinet facing Toulouse and across the road
to Albi, which was the line of retreat appointed for the
army.
These arrangements were strange, since, for one thing,
Clausel could not attack Hill, who was safe on the
other side of the Ariege ; but Soult's conduct when he
reached Vieille Toulouse was stranger still. The defiling
72 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. of Hill's corps across the bridge lasted until noon, and
Mar. 3 1. Curing the last three hours Soult watched the process,
counted Sir Rowland's numbers with tolerable accuracy,
and yet did nothing. He could see the rest of the
Allied army on the Touch, and concluded or professed
to conclude that Wellington was only making a
demonstration on the south with a view to an attack
upon the town or to an ultimate passage of the river
to the north of the city. But the Marshal made no
attempt to use his bridge-head for purposes of offence.
Hill on his side led his corps beyond Cintegabelle,
pushed his cavalry eastward to Nailloux and Villefranche ;
but, finding no such road as he sought, he counter-
marched by Wellington's direction on the night of the
April i. ist of April, and recrossed the Garonne by the bridge
of Pinsaguel, which Wellington on second thoughts had
allowed to remain where it was. By the afternoon of the
April 2. 2nd of April only a rear-guard remained between the
Garonne and the Ariege ; and Soult, more than ever
convinced by the appearance of British patrols along the
river below Toulouse that Wellington would pass the
stream in that quarter, gave orders for the entrench-
ment of the heights of Calvinet, for placing Toulouse in
a state of defence, and even for bringing back some
artillery which had by his command been already sent
April 3. out of the town. On the jrd, having intelligence
which confirmed his suspicions, the Marshal directed
the trees that lined the road to Albi, between the bridge
over the Hers and an isolated hill called the Mamelon
de la Pujade, to be felled and made into an abatis ; and
he further ordered the preparation of defensive positions
along the canal from its junction with the Garonne to
the Matabiau bridge and thence along the Albi road to
the Hers. Into this re-entrant angle he hoped,
apparently, that Wellington would thrust the Allied
army ; and accordingly he summoned six out of his
seven divisions to the right bank of the Garonne,
leaving Maransin's alone to hold the bridge-head of
St. Cyprien. It seems not to have occurred to Soult
CH. xvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 73
that the march of the Allies across the western front 1814.
of Toulouse might offer a favourable opportunity for April 3.
the offensive. He preferred the old tactics of Orthez
to take up a strong position in the hope that
Wellington would not dare to attack.
Upon the main point the Marshal was not deceived.
No sooner had Hill recrossed the river than the
pontoon-bridge was taken up and replaced by a flying
bridge ; and at dusk of the 3rd the pontoon-train,
followed by almost the entire army of the Allies,
proceeded by St. Martin du Touch, Aussonne and
Merville towards La Capelette ; the Light Division
remaining before St. Cyprien at Plaisance, St. Martin
du Touch and Tournefeuille until Hill's corps arrived
to relieve it, and then taking up a position between
Aussonne and Seilh, so as to be at hand to support
Hill, in case he were attacked. The whole movement April 4-5.
was not completed until the morning of the 5th ; and
meanwhile the bridge had been laid during the night
of the 4th between St. Caprais and La Capelette, at a
point where the left bank was covered with wood and
commanded the right bank. The Third, Fourth and
Sixth divisions of infantry, Somerset's, Ponsonby's and
Vivian's brigades of cavalry, and three batteries of
artillery then crossed to the right bank ; but the
operation was dangerous, for rain had begun to fall
again on the 3rd, the stream was rapidly rising, and
there was a nasty bend in the bridge. From eleven
o'clock until evening the crossing continued, the horses
being led over in single file^and the guns dragged over
by hand, while the bands played " The Fall of Paris "
to hearten the men to their work. At dusk Beresford
and twenty thousand men were on the right bank ; but
rain was again falling. One of the pontoons was
carried away, and the rest were taken up lest they
should meet with the like fate. Before the bridge
could be removed the French floated down dead horses,
trees and a barge full of stones, in the hope of destroy-
ing it, but happily without effect. On the 6th the rain
74 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. continued. The truant pontoon was recovered, but
April 6. to relay the bridge was found impossible, and a flying
bridge was therefore substituted for it. On the jth
the weather improved ; but the current was still too
strong to permit the pontoons to be moored, and not
April 8. until the 8th was the bridge finally re-established.
Throughout these three days the Allied army was
severed in twain by an impassable obstacle, and
practically divided into three parts Hill's corps
before St. Cyprien ; Picton, Alten, Arentschild and
Freire about Merville ; and Beresford on the other side
of the river. Murray, fully alive to the danger, warned
Picton to select ground for a bridge-head, and directed
that every precaution should be taken to prevent the
situation from becoming known to Soult. Wellington
himself passed frequently to the right bank to observe
with natural anxiety what might be stirring. Yet
Soult, to the amazement of his officers, made no effort
to turn his advantage to account. His conduct is
difficult of explanation. It seems that, mistaking
Morillo's Spaniards, which had taken up the outpost
duties of Hill's corps, for those of Freire, he concluded
that Hill also had moved northward to cross the
Garonne ; but he did not make this discovery until the
6th, and in his own letters of the 5th he mentions that
a column of British was on that evening marching to
the point of passage. Plainly, therefore, he was aware
that Hill's corps and another division were still on the
left bank. On the 6th he wrote that he did not know
the exact strength of the Allies on the right bank, but
that he had reason to believe that it included the greater
part of the army. On the yth he affirmed again that
the bulk of the Allies were on the right bank, and
directed his cavalry to obtain more precise intelligence,
but he gave no orders except for further fortification of
his position. It may be that he was aware of the
approach of the main army of the Allies to Paris, and
was unwilling to commit himself to any definite action,
though the news of the occupation of Paris did not
CH. xvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 75
reach him until the evening of the 7th. It is more 1814.
probable that he was sick of his task, cowed by his April 8.
opponent, and incapable of further effort than the
preparation of an entrenched camp.
On the 8th the bridge of boats was restored ;
Arentschild's and Freire's troops passed over it, and
the troops on the right bank advanced in two columns
along the banks of the Hers, Picton's and Freire's
divisions by the road to Toulouse, Clinton's and Cole's
towards Launaguet. It was Wellington's object to
clear the ground sufficiently to permit the pontoon-
bridge to be laid at Seilh for the passage of the Light
Division, and if possible to seize three bridges over the
Hers to enable him to assault the heights of Calvinet.
The British cavalry on the three previous days had
already driven the French horse from the lower course
of the stream ; and the Eighteenth Hussars, which were
on the left flank of the left column, were soon in contact
with Pierre Soult's dragoons. Pierre Soult had orders
from his brother to fall back slowly up the Hers to the
southern end of the heights of Calvinet, but to leave
strong detachments to guard the bridges, particularly
that of Croix Daurade on the road to Albi. Pur-
suant to these instructions Berton's brigade had retired
towards the Lavaur road, and that of Vial had halted
on the eastern side of the bridge of Croix Daurade.
Vial's picquets were surprised by the patrols of the
Eighteenth in the village of St. Loup, and driven
back with some loss in killed and prisoners ; and his
regiments then retired, the bulk of them along the
Albi road, but one of them the 5th Chasseurs to a
village on the flank of the Eighteenth, from which they
opened a galling fire of carbines.
Vivian, who was with the Eighteenth, rode to a
neighbouring height to reconnoitre and was there joined
by Beresford and Wellington, the latter of whom ordered
him to push the enemy over the Hers, promising the
support of infantry if necessary. Detaching a troop to
check the dismounted French on his flank, Vivian leaped
76 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. his horse out of the road to reconnoitre Croix Daurade,
April 8. and ascertained that a mass of French cavalry was on the
other side of the bridge and moving down towards it,
but no infantry. Turning about to rejoin his regiment,
he was struck by a carbine shot in the arm, but
cantered back and gave the order to charge. As he
raised his sword to signal the advance, the bone of his
arm snapped and he fell fainting from the saddle ; but
Major Hughes led the Eighteenth down the road and,
though they were received with a volley of musketry,
they crashed into the head of the French column and
jammed the French horsemen into a confused crowd on
the bridge. In a minute or two the French regiments
were galloping headlong to the rear with the British
hussars in hot pursuit. One hundred and twenty
prisoners, with their horses, were taken ; Pierre Soult
himself narrowly escaped capture ; and the chase ended
only when the hussars came within range of the French
guns, under cover of which the discomfited French
troopers rallied, and forced the Eighteenth to retire.
This regiment was no favourite with Wellington, but
on this occasion he honoured them with " Well done,
the Eighteenth ; by God, well done." Of the British
not more than fifteen, including Vivian, were killed,
wounded and missing. 1
This brilliant little affair, which took place late in
the afternoon, 2 secured communication between the two
columns of the Allies, though by one bridge only
instead of by three as Wellington had designed, those
over the Lavaur and Caraman roads being too far
1 Napier, who apparently did not love Vivian, refused to give
him any credit for the affair, even when Vivian in a singularly
modest letter had laid before him the true state of the case. See
Malet's Memoirs of the i8th Hussars, pp. 93-101. But Napier
emulated Wellington in his unwillingness to take back anything
that he had once said. I have alluded elsewhere to the diseased
condition of Napier's mind while writing his history.
2 Soult gave the hour as ^ P.M. ; but an officer of the l8th states
it at 5 P.M., which seems more probable, for the charge appears to
have ended the operations of the day.
CH. xvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 77
distant to be seized, and having been, moreover, either 1814.
destroyed or prepared for destruction by the French. April 8.
The village of Croix Daurade being in the occupation
of the Fourth Division, the General resolved to attack on
the morrow ; and to that end gave orders for the relaying
of the pontoon-bridge at Assaic, four miles farther up
the river, for the passage of the Light Division. By
some blunder this was not accomplished until three in
the afternoon, 1 and Wellington, after freely venting his
anger upon the responsible officers, deferred the opera-
tion until the loth. Meanwhile on the afternoon of April 9.
the 9th Freire's Spaniards moved from Lespinasse by
St. Alban to Lalande, but no further changes were
made. The rear of the Allies was covered against any
movement on the part of the garrison of Montauban
by Ponsonby's brigade at St. Jory and Lespinasse, and
by a portion of that of Vivian at Fronton.
Soult for his part had expected battle on the 9th,
and had made every preparation for it. The north
front of Toulouse he could safely leave to take care of
itself, the canal being within range of the cannon on
the walls, and every bridge strongly fortified, particu-
larly the twin bridges of Jumeaux at the north-western
angle, which were enclosed by a double bridge-head
with three guns mounted on the outward front. The
eastward front of Toulouse was covered by the heights
of Calvinet, which rise from the side of the town in a
fairly steep slope to a height of about one hundred and
fifty feet, and descend from this summit in less sharp
declivity for about two hundred feet to the valley of the
Hers. This ridge of Calvinet, which extends for some
three miles in a general direction from north to south,
1 La Blache throws doubt on the removal of the bridge farther
up the river ; but his reasons do not seem to me conclusive,
especially against the testimony of Larpent (p. 479) and of Cooke
(ii. 125), who says that the Light Division remained halted near
Aussonne throughout the 9th waiting for the completion of the
bridge, and after crossing it, wheeled to the right near Fenouillet.
They would have wheeled to the right farther north if they had
crossed the river lower down.
78 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. had been fortified by three groups of works to defend
April 9. the access by the roads of Albi, Lavaur and Caraman.
The last-named, which crosses the hill about a mile and
a half from its southern extremity, was dominated by
a redoubt on the summit about two hundred yards on
its southern side ; * and four hundred yards farther to
south of this redoubt was another named La Sypiere,
enclosing a house and grounds at the head of a by-road.
Both of these works were unfinished on the i oth. The
Lavaur road was guarded by a closed work on the crest,
surrounding a house called the Mas des Augustins, 2 and
on Calvinet, the highest point of the ridge, about two
hundred yards in rear and to west of this house, was a
second work of the same description. Farther to the
north a series of epaulments, called the Great Redoubt,
overlooked the hollow road of Peyriolle, which cuts
through the ridge near the northern extremity, and
flanked the more distant Albi road ; while two smaller
redoubts, included in the same system of defence, com-
manded the reverse slope. These entrenchments as a
whole were connected by a road of communication lined
with planks to prevent the slipping of a treacherous clay
soil. The view of the ground from the site of the Mas
des Augustins presents a shallow valley, which offers
a clear field of fire for some twelve hundred yards until
the surface is broken by the low hills on the eastern
side of the Hers.
The defence of the heights at large was entrusted to
Clausel ; and Vial's cavalry brigade was placed at his
disposal to communicate with Berton's in the valley of
the Hers, and to destroy the bridges as the Allies drew
near. In advance of his left St. Pol's brigade of
Villatte's division occupied the villages of Mont Blanc,
Peyriolle and Argoulets on the flank of the Albi road,
1 La Blache by a strange slip has mistaken the orientation of the
battle-field of Toulouse. He has assumed the top of the map,
which he has reproduced, to be the north point, whereas it is in
reality the east.
2 Mas is Proven9al for house. I presume that this was an
ancient convent.
CH. xvm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 79
and the outlying knoll of La Pujade in rear of them, 1814.
cannon being mounted on the summit. Lamorandiere's April 9.
brigade held the Great Redoubt, three regiments of
Harispe's division the Mas des Augustins and Cal-
vinet ; and one battalion of the 9th Light occupied La
Sypiere.
The defence of the canal along the northern front,
from the Garonne to the bridge of Matabiau on the Albi
road, was entrusted to d'Erlon. Darricau's division
was spread along this line ; while Darmagnac's division
was distributed among the market gardens outside the
bridge of Matabiau, excepting the 3ist Light, which
occupied the defences of the bridge of Minimes on the
northern front of the canal.
Of Reille's corps Maransin's division, three thousand
strong, remained in St. Cyprien, with orders to send
its artillery to Calvinet if this could be done without
danger ; and Taupin's division was massed on the Cara-
man road between the canal and the southern slope of
the Calvinet ridge, ready to ascend the hill at the first
summons.
Of Travot's reserve one brigade lined the canal from
the bridge of Matabiau to that of Les Demoiselles, the
next to southward ; and the other, divided between the
ramparts and the quays of the Garonne, was held ready
to reinforce d'Erlon or Reille according to circumstances.
The entire French force in position amounted to some
thirty-eight thousand men.
Wellington did not conceal from himself that the
task before him was to all intent the storming of a
fortress, and that, before he could even form his
columns for the attack, he must march at any rate
some of them for about two miles along the valley
between the Hers and the ridge of Calvinet at a distance
at first of two thousand yards, which gradually
diminished to five hundred yards, from Soult's main
position. This difficult and dangerous duty was
assigned to Beresford with the Fourth and Sixth
Divisions, the Hussar Brigade being also added to his
8o HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. command, so as to cover his left flank when he should
April 10. wheel westward to the attack. To relieve him as far as
possible, Hill was ordered to make a demonstration
against St. Cyprien on the left bank of the Garonne,
and Picton and Alten to deliver feint attacks upon the
north front, the former covering the ground from the
Garonne to the bridge of Minimes, the latter from this
bridge to the Albi road. Bock's brigade of cavalry
was appointed to guard the rear of these in case of a
sortie by the garrison of Montauban.
Upon the left of Alten, Freire's Spaniards were to
advance from Croix Daurade in two columns, of which
the right was to move to west of the Albi road upon
the hamlet of La Pujade, and the left along the road
to the knoll of La Pujade. Arrived there, Freire was
to await the opening of Beresford's attack upon the
ridge of Calvinet, and then, advancing in two lines with
a reserve, was to storm the Great Redoubt and its
outworks. Ponsonby's cavalry brigade was to take
post in support of the Spaniards, and Vivian's was to
march parallel with Beresford's column on the right bank
of the Hers, and to cross the stream when needed.
At three o'clock on the morning of Easter Sunday,
the loth of April, the British columns were in motion,
the Sixth Division moving upon Launaguet, and the
Light Division crossing the Garonne ; and at six
o'clock Soult on the summit of Calvinet saw them
converging towards Toulouse by Lalande, Croix
Daurade and Peyriolle. Vivian's brigade, now under
command of Major von Gruben, pushed forward
actively on the right bank of the Hers, driving Berton's
troopers before them. Vial's cavalry blew up the
culvert of Balma on the Lavaur road before von
Griiben could reach it ; but the ist Hussars of the
Legion, which led his brigade, pushed rapidly on ; and
Captain Schaumann's squadron, charging a superior
force of French which stood in its way, drove them
back in confusion upon their supports and hunted them
down the Lavaur road, where the bridge was blown up
CH. xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 81
only in the nick of time to save it from falling into the 1814.
hands of the hussars. The French lost nearly fifty April
prisoners in this affair ; but von Grttben, wasting no
time, hurried his detachments forward to the bridge on
the Revel road, which was barricaded by casks filled with
earth and defended by a party of the 22nd Chasseurs.
A few of Schaumann's men dismounted and quickly
removed the casks, whereupon the squadron, pouring
through the gap, chased the French horse over the
plain to the shelter of their guns. By eight o'clock
Schaumann's patrols had passed round the rear of the
ridge of Calvinet to the vicinity of the bridge des
Demoiselles on the canal, where they were checked by
the fire of the divisions of Taupin and Travot. Von
Grtiben had done his work thoroughly and well.
A little later, between eight and nine, Hill opened
his false attack against the French defences on the
bank of the river below the town. One of Maransin's
battalions, which occupied the buildings in that quarter,
gave way at once ; and the British were able to establish
in the deserted defences field-guns which took both the
centre of the outermost French line and the bridge of
Jumeaux in reverse. Following up this advantage
gained on the extreme right of the enemy's western
front, Hill gradually pushed back the French within
the rampart of the suburb, and held them there without
attempting any serious attack. Almost simultaneously
with the first advance of Hill, Picton, marching up the
right bank of the river, drove Darricau's sharp-shooters
from a large house, called Petit Gragnague, before the
bridge of Jumeaux, and there took post ; while Alten's
first brigade struck eastward to the support of Freire,
leaving the second brigade to make a demonstration
before the bridge of Minimes. The Spaniards mean-
while advanced steadily upon the knoll of La Pujade,
Somerset's hussars having swept Pierre Soult's cavalry
almost unresisting from the adjacent villages. After
firing a few cannon-shots St. Pol withdrew his guns and
men from the knoll and fell back along the Albi road ;
VOL. x G
10.
82 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. and Freire, after occupying the deserted position,
April 10. halted his infantry and opened fire from his three
batteries upon Villatte's guns below the Great Redoubt.
Wellington then took up his station on the knoll to
watch the progress of the Fourth and Sixth Divisions,
which had reached Croix Daurade soon after seven, and
were streaming in three columns south-eastward towards
Peyriolle, two of the columns moving as far as possible
beyond l range of the French cannon behind the copses
that sprinkled the bank of the Hers, and the third
passing immediately below the slope of Calvinet under
the full blast of the French guns. Soult, upon first
observing their approach from the highest eminence
of Calvinet, immediately summoned Taupin's division
to join him at that point, in evident expectation that
the British might at any moment wheel to their right
and begin the attack.
Beresford's progress was slow, the clay soil being
rendered deep and sticky by the previous heavy rains.
The guns were constantly in difficulties, and, as the
head of the column moved at the double, the rear
lengthened out more and more over ground which
had been poached into a quagmire by the feet of their
comrades. 2 Still Beresford's objective became clear to
Soult, who now sent Taupin's division to the Caraman
road to meet him. Shortly afterwards, at about eleven
o'clock, Freire, owing to nervousness or impatience,
launched his troops in two columns to the attack ; the
right advancing up the Albi road towards the bridge
of Matabiau, while the left under the Spanish General
in person moved straight upon the Great Redoubt.
1 The column nearest to the French appears to have been Anson's
brigade of the 4-th Division, leading, and Pack's brigade of the 6th
Division. The next column was composed apparently of the two
remaining brigades of these two divisions ; and the last column,
nearest the Hers, of their two Portuguese brigades.
2 Personal Narrative of a Private Soldier of the 42nd (p. 245)
says of this march : " It was not a march, we were running all the
time," and this is confirmed by Jameson's Historical Record of the
79th, p. 43.
CH. xvni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 83
Though met by a very heavy fire from the guns by 1814.
the bridge of Matabiau and from the heavier pieces April 10.
mounted on the walls of the city, the Spaniards
advanced gallantly enough to the foot of the slope,
where Freire's column halted in a re-entrant angle
between two spurs and spread out right and left to
envelope the hill and outflank the redoubt. They had
begun to swarm up the incline when two of Dar-
magnac's regiments, which had been concealed in the
gardens that line the road to Albi, suddenly developed
a sharp counter-attack upon the front of the right
column and the flank of the scattered parties of the
left column, which were breasting the ascent. The
Spaniards were seized with panic. The left wing ran
back precipitately, with the exception of one regiment,
which lay down behind a bank and held its ground ;
and the right wing rushed for shelter into a hollow
road on the northern flank of the French entrench-
ments. They could have chosen no worse refuge.
The road was raked from end to end by the heavy
guns on the walls ; and the French infantry, leaping
down to the edge of the hollow, poured a deadly fire
of musketry into the struggling masses below them.
Under so terrible a trial the right wing speedily gave
way, and the whole of the nine thousand Spaniards
streamed back in hopeless disorder ; a few of them by
an evil inspiration following the line of the walls to the
bridge of Minimes under a scathing fire from the
ramparts, and the remainder racing for the shelter of
the knoll of La Pujade.
Upon first perceiving Freire's precipitate advance
Wellington, who had marked the withdrawal of
Taupin's division to south, had ordered Beresford to
suspend his march, wheel westward at once, and open
his attack from the ground where he stood, about the
village of Mont Blanc. But Beresford, who had
likewise noticed Taupin's movements and could see
that the French were posted exactly as Wellington had
anticipated when he had issued his original directions,
84 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. decided not to depart from the plan that had been
April 10. arranged. 1 He did indeed wheel the column that was
nearest to the hill into line, to the right, opposite the
Mas des Augustins, though apparently only from appre-
hension lest the French counterstroke upon the
Spaniards should be extended to his corps ; but finding
his fears to be groundless, he wheeled his men back
into column, and resumed his march southward. 2 For
a time therefore the assault came to an end ; while
Wellington, drawing Alten's division to the Albi road
and barring the way to Croix Daurade with Ponsonby's
cavalry, strove vehemently to rally the disordered
Spaniards. Many French officers marvelled that Soult
did not at once push a counter-attack in this direction ;
and Wellington evidently expected it. " There I am,"
he said to Pakenham, "with nothing between me and
the enemy." " Well, I suppose you will order up the
Light Division now," said Pakenham. "I'll be hanged
if I do," retorted Wellington. 3 Freire's attack was in
fact hopeless of success as an isolated operation ; and,
whatever may be said of his conduct in beginning
it prematurely, the failure of his troops was no discredit
to them. They were only imperfectly disciplined, and
the task set to them was such that Colborne confessed
that he would have been sorry to undertake it with two
Light Divisions. Meanwhile for two mortal hours the
Spaniards were out of action and it was plain that
Beresford's would be, like Freire's, an isolated attack.
It was apparently at about noon or rather later 4 that
the head of Beresford's columns reached the Caraman
road, and wheeling to the right began their deployment
into three lines, Pack's and William Anson's brigades
1 Supp. Dcsp. viii. 740.
2 French accounts mention this manoeuvre (Lablache ii. 491),
and it is confirmed by Sergeant Anton (Retrospect of a Military Life,
p. 126).
8 Moore Smith's Life of Lord Seaton, p. 205.
4 Lablache conjectures 11.30, but, if Beresford was at Mont
Blanc when Friere opened his attack, his columns must have taken
a full hour to reach their station and deploy.
CH. xvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 85
forming the right and left respectively of the first line, 1814.
supported by Lambert's and Ross's in second line, and April 9.
by the Portuguese of Douglas and Vasconcello in third
line. The manoeuvre, however, took some time, for, the
head of Beresford's column having outmarched the rear,
Cole's division had wheeled westward before Clinton's
could come up, and thus Cole's right flank was for a
time uncovered. The 2ist Chasseurs therefore trotted
down the Lavaur road to menace this flank, compelling
Cole to throw out his provisional battalion 1 for its
protection until Clinton, who had deployed without
halting in order to make the greater haste, came up
to his allotted station. But even so Beresford had
reached the attacking point without his artillery, which,
owing to the state of the roads, he had been compelled
to leave at Mont Blanc. Soult on his side had for
nearly an hour been at the point opposed to them, and
had himself disposed Taupin's division for the counter-
attack ; placing Rey's brigade to south of the Sypiere
redoubt, which was still very far from completed and
contained no guns, and Gasquet's brigade to north of the
smaller neighbouring work. He thus made the groups
of entrenchments a centre between the two brigades,
with six of Berton's squadrons on the outer flank of
Rey, the 2ist Chasseurs on the outer flank of Gasquet,
and a single battery, 2 sent by Maransin, in support.
The whole were concealed behind the crest of the hill
after the manner of Wellington himself.
Pack's brigade was still in the act of forming line
when Soult cried, " Here they are, General Taupin ; I
make you a present of them." 3 Taupin, like the
voltigeur general Jardon, was happiest when doing
subaltern's work in the skirmishing line. With some
trepidation he took command of Rey's brigade, and led
it down in close column to the south of the Sypiere
1 Four companies each of the 2nd and 2/5 3rd.
2 Taupin's divisional artillery had been left in the Great
Redoubt.
3 " Les voila, Ge'neral Taupin, les voila. Je vous les livre.
86 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. redoubt, thus offering its flank in some measure to
April 10. Anson's brigade, and at the same time masking the fire
of Maransin's battery near the redoubt. Having made
this blunder he lost his head completely and, instead
of charging down upon the British, gave the word to
halt and deploy. A few rockets, new and unknown
projectiles, threw the French into disorder, and Lam-
bert's brigade, having completed its formation, opened
together with Anson's brigade a very heavy fire.
Taupin fell mortally wounded. His leading regiment
gave way, and the whole of Rey's brigade ran back to
the crest. The battalion that held the Sypiere redoubt
abandoned it in a panic before a charge of the Sixty-
first ; and Gasquet's brigade, which had hardly been
engaged, fell back in the same direction as Rey's
towards the hamlets of Bataille and Sacarin on the
reverse side of the heights, closely pursued by the light
companies of the Sixth Division. An attempt of the
French cavalry upon Clinton's right flank was parried
by throwing out the Seventy-ninth in square ; and
Soult's whole plan of counter-attack was ruined. Upon
the knoll where these hamlets stand the defeated
brigades met Taupin's divisional artillery, which had
been brought there on the initiative of its own com-
mander. Leseur's brigade of Darmagnac's division
was already in position at this point ; Rouget's brigade
of Maransin's division came out to prolong the line
from .the knoll to the Pont des Demoiselles, Maransin's
battery returned safely from the heights ; and thus a
new and irregular line was formed from the summit of
Calvinet through Sacarin to the Pont des Demoiselles
fronting more or less to the east.
The instantaneous success of this attack for the
action appears to have lasted only a few minutes did
not tempt Beresford to hasten his onslaught upon the
remaining entrenchments. He was aware of the
disastrous repulse of the Spaniards, and deemed it
imprudent to risk the slightest possibility of failure.
Therefore, summoning his guns to join him from Mont
CH. xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 87
Blanc, he led his troops no further forward than to the 1814.
Lavaur road, along which line he halted the Sixth April 10.
Division upon the summit of the hill ; while the Fourth
Division, with Somerset's and Vivian's brigades of
cavalry to protect its left flank, took post on the western
slope beyond the hill over against the French position
on the knoll of Sacarin. There was now a long lull.
The firing died completely away ; and Picton, who had
seen the rout of the Spaniards, apprehended from this
ominous silence that Beresford also might be in
difficulties. It may be that his memory reverted to
the storm of Badajoz, where the assault upon the
breaches had failed, and his own escalade had succeeded.
Be that as it may, he conceived it to be his duty to
convert the feint attack, which had been enjoined upon
him, into a real attack ; and unlimbering two guns on
the road which skirts the western side of Petit Grag-
nague, he launched Brisbane's brigade, supported by
Power's Portuguese, to the storm of the bridge-head
of Ponts Jumeaux. A few brave men reached the foot
of the work and assembled in the re-entrant angle,
where the French plied them with showers of stones ;
a few more swept round the entrenchment and passed
under the arch of the first bridge. Both parties were
easily overpowered ; for the main body gave way in
disorder before the blast of grape and musketry from
the defenders. Thrice Picton renewed his assault, and
thrice he was repelled with a total loss of some three
hundred men, including Colonel Forbes of the Forty-
fifth killed and Brisbane himself wounded. Picton's
British battalions were weak ; and his second brigade
had been detached to the bridge of Minimes when the
Light Division had been withdrawn to stay the rout of
the Spaniards. He therefore desisted from his ill-
advised diversion owing to sheer inability to continue it,
which was indeed well, for it had proved to be a costly
failure. 1
1 Both Napier and Lablache place Picton's attack earlier in the
day ; but, though his biographer is rarely trustworthy, his explana-
88 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. Meanwhile the Spaniards after two hours of hard
April 10. work had been rallied and re-formed, and Wellington
returned to his original idea of a simultaneous onset by
Beresford and Freire. The French array now presented
three sides of a square, from Sacarin north-eastward to
Mas des Augustins ; from Mas des Augustins north-
westward to the Great Redoubt ; and from the Great
Redoubt westward to the bridge of Matabiau. The
two salient angles, at the Mas des Augustins and the
Great Redoubt, were the points selected for assault ;
the former being held, it will be remembered, by
Harispe's division, less the battalion that had been driven
from La Sypiere, and the latter by Villatte's division.
Clausel had further at his disposal Vial's cavalry brigade
to aid in the defence. 1 There was, however, much
delay in entering upon this second phase of the action,
for the Portuguese batteries upon the knoll of Pujade
had fired away all their ammunition, and it was long
before their stock could be replenished ; while Beres-
ford's guns were still with great labour toiling up to
the plateau of La Sypiere. They had not yet arrived 2
when at half-past two the order was given to renew the
attack, the Spaniards against the Great Redoubt and
the Sixth Division against the Mas des Augustins. Of
this second onset of the Spaniards there are contra-
dictory accounts. Napier implies that it was but feeble.
Harry Smith, who was present and close by, asserts on
the contrary that it was both heavy and energetic, and
tion that Picton only violated his orders when he heard the firing
cease seems natural and reasonable. The Journal of an Officer in
the Commissariat (p. 321) confirms this view ; and as this officer was
attached to the Third Division, his evidence is of weight.
1 Napier says that one of Maransin's brigades was also in this
part of the field : but I can find no authority to confirm this. One
of Maransin's brigades was in the suburb of St. Cyprien, the other
at Sacarin.
2 So says Napier, who is confirmed more or less by Anton
(Retrospect of a Military Life, p. 132). Wellington's despatch
could be construed to mean that the attack was renewed when
Beresford's guns came up.
CH. xvin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 89
must have been successful if supported by the Light 1814.
Division. Wellington, however, was afraid to commit April 10.
prematurely the only reserve that he possessed ; and
the Spaniards were for the second time repulsed from
the Grand Redoubt.
From the Lavaur road the attack was opened by the
advance of the Forty-second and Seventy-ninth, the
former upon the Mas des Augustins, the latter upon
the Calvinet Redoubt, with the Ninety-first and I2th
Portuguese in support. The Forty-second does not
appear to have been well handled. Pack's order was
for the battalion to attack by wings. The left wing
was drawn up in the hollow road immediately facing its
objective, and could have leaped out and dashed forward
at once, leaving the right wing to follow. Instead of
pursuing this simple procedure Colonel Macara faced the
right wing to the right, counter-marched it past the rear
of the left wing and round its left flank, and then again
counter-marched it across its front. The first counter-
march was more or less sheltered by the hollow road ;
but the second was necessarily performed under the full
blast of the French fire, both of musketry and of
artillery ; l and the right wing was terribly shattered
owing to this foolish piece of pedantry. However,
Macara at last gave the word " Forward, double quick,"
and the Forty-second running forward at the top of
their speed, swept Harispe's conscripts out of the Mas
des Augustins at the first rush. The Seventy-ninth
simultaneously captured the Calvinet Redoubt ; and
the work of Pack's brigade seemed to be done. But
Harispe, speedily rallying the H5th, 34th and 8ist, fell
fiercely upon the Mas des Augustins ; and the Forty-
second, broken and disordered by success and heavy
losses, gave way almost immediately and ran along the
road towards the Calvinet Redoubt. Here they com-
municated their panic to the Seventy-ninth, which
likewise evacuated its captured stronghold, but, quickly
rallying, made its counter-attack and recovered both
1 These guns had been withdrawn from the Mas des Augustins.
90 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. redoubts. It seems, however, that the Highlanders
April 10. were again driven out ; and it was not until Lambert's
brigade also had been thrown into the fight that
Harispe's men, disheartened by the fall in succession of
Harispe himself, and of his second, General Baurot, at
last gave way and retreated to the rear of the knoll
of Sacarin.
It was now four o'clock. Beresford's two batteries
had at last reached the top of the heights, though with
little ammunition, and opened fire with great effect
upon the Grand Redoubt. Picton had renewed his
attacks, unsuccessfully as before, upon the Fonts
Jumeaux and the bridge of Minimes. Beresford with
his exhausted troops was preparing to assail the last of
the French entrenchments at the northern extremity of
the hill, and the Spaniards were making ready to second
him as best they might, when at five o'clock Soult
ordered Villatte to evacuate the Grand Redoubt, which
he did at his leisure, bringing off by hand the guns
whose teams had been killed, and entering the suburb
of St. Etienne at six o'clock. At nightfall the divisions
of Darmagnac, Maransin and Taupin were still in
occupation of the knoll of Sacarin and the broken
ground that extended thence to the Pont des De-
moiselles. One brigade of Travot's reserve was astride
the Montaudran road and the rest of the army within
the cincture of the canal. On the British side Cole's
division bivouacked to north of the Montaudran road,
and the brigades of Vivian and Somerset were extended
along the line of the canal southward from the city.
There was some bickering of musketry on this side and
about the Ponts Jumeaux until dark and even later,
but nothing of importance. The bulk of the Allied
army crowned the heights of Calvinet.
On the morrow Soult wrote to Clarke that he should
not stir for that day ; and Wellington was in no situation
to compel a movement until he could bring further
supplies of ammunition over the river. This tedious
operation occupied the whole of the nth ; but mean-
CH. xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 91
while the British cavalry pushed eastward to Caraman 1814.
and southward almost to the bridge of Baziege, by April n
which the road from Toulouse to Carcassonne crosses
the Languedoc canal. Carcassonne was the meeting-
place which Soult had appointed for the junction of
Suchet's army with his own ; and realising that, unless
he took his departure at once, he might be shut up in
Toulouse, the Marshal decided to evacuate the town at
nightfall. He did so accordingly, and by eight o'clock
on the morning of the I2th the whole of his troops, April 12.
except such of the wounded as were too ill to be moved,
had crossed the bridge of Baziege. Wellington had
intended crossing the canal behind Toulouse on this day ;
but, learning of Soult's retreat, he sent Arentschild's
cavalry, followed by the divisions of Clinton and Cole,
through La Bastide de Beauvoir towards Baziege, near
which the German hussars overtook Pierre Soult's rear-
guard and captured thirty prisoners. Ponsonby's and
Bock's brigades, together with Hill's corps, took the
route by Castanet upon the same point ; and the whole
bivouacked for the night between La Bastide and
Villenouvelle. The French van on this day reached
Castelnaudary, and the main body Villefranche and
Avignonet ; but Soult halted short of Carcassonne on
the 1 3th to learn what was going forward at Paris. April 13.
On the 1 2th two messengers, one English and one
French, arrived at Wellington's head-quarters at
Toulouse to announce the fall of Napoleon and the
establishment of a Provisional Government. They
were at once sent on to Soult, who received them on
the 1 3th. After some delay, owing to the Marshal's
desire to ascertain exactly how matters stood a delay
which Wellington was inclined to abridge by an advance
of his army on the iyth a suspension of arms was
signed on the i8th, and the operations between the April 1 8.
two main armies came to an end.
It would be unprofitable to add to the controversy
whether or not Wellington won a victory at Toulouse.
His attack, as I have said, virtually amounted to the
92 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. storm of the outworks of a fortress. He drove the
April, enemy from those outworks, and in thirty -six hours
would have assaulted the body of the place from its
weakest point, had not Soult wisely decided to evacuate
it and retreat. But it may freely be confessed that this
was the most unsatisfactory action that Wellington ever
fought, and the worst managed. The initial step of
making a flank march of two miles within cannon shot
of the French position could never have been under-
taken except in presence of an enemy demoralised by
frequent defeats ; and, even then, it was so delicate and
dangerous an operation that success could hardly be
expected unless as part of a perfectly combined attack
at other points. Yet, through misfortunes and mis-
conduct of subordinate leaders, all combinations fell to
the ground ; and the simultaneous onset which had been
projected was realised only as three isolated and dis-
jointed assaults, two of which were repulsed with heavy
loss.
Freire's breach of orders was probably due to the
national failing of jactancia, taking the form, in this
case, of anxiety to show that Spanish soldiers could
storm a position without the help of the British. The
result was disastrous, for Freire sacrificed over eighteen
hundred of his eight thousand brave men to no purpose.
Picton was never averse from butting his head against
a wall when the glory of the Third Division was in
question, and he probably rejoiced in finding an oppor-
tunity for so doing. It may be urged in his excuse
that a divisional commander must use his own judgment,
and that the cessation of fire after the repulse of the
Spaniards was certainly ominous of disaster ; but, even
so, one fails to see what possible advantage could be
gained by hurling men against an alert enemy ensconced
within strong fortifications in broad daylight. Such an
attack cannot be called a diversion, and it was far from
being of profit in this case, for some four hundred men
were thrown away with no greater compensation than
the loss of fifty killed and wounded to the French.
CH. xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
93
The blunder was serious, for it reduced Wellington to 1814.
the Light Division as his sole reserve ; and, if Soult April,
had remained in Toulouse on the I2th and withstood an
assault, it might have been more serious still.
But, to turn to a pleasanter side of the battle, the
conduct of the Sixth Division was superb. The whole of
the work fell upon them, and they did it magnificently
though with terrible loss. The flank march alone en-
tailed heavy casualties, and, when that was accomplished,
each of the brigades was called upon for two assaults.
Colonel Coghlan of the Sixty-first was killed ; Pack,
Colonel Cuyler of the Eleventh and Colonels Douglas and
Bermingham of the Portuguese service were wounded.
The Forty-second lost twenty-six officers and three
hundred and eighty-six men killed and wounded, and
the Seventy-ninth, out of just under five hundred of
all ranks engaged, lost eighteen officers and two hundred
and fifteen men. The Sixty -first, whose casualties
numbered one hundred and seventy-five, was brought
out of action by the adjutant, assisted by two ensigns ;
all field-officers, captains and lieutenants having been
killed or wounded. The Sixty - first, Eleventh and
Thirty-sixth, in fact, worthily upheld the reputation
which they had gained at Salamanca. The total
casualties in the Allied Army were four thousand two
hundred, of which about eighteen hundred were Spanish,
about five hundred and thirty Portuguese, and about
eighteen hundred and fifty British. The losses of the
French appear not to have exceeded two thousand, of
which number sixteen hundred wounded, including
Generals Harispe and Baurot, were abandoned to the
Allies at Toulouse.
But, though the principal campaign thus came to an
end, there was still to be bloodshed before Bayonne.
Since the 2yth of February there had been no fighting
before that place ; and, though Wellington had on the
6th of March given instructions for bringing up heavy
cannon from Passages, Hope had expressed his opinion
that, looking to the difficulties of transport, the fortress
94 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. would be as readily reduced by blockade as by siege. 1
April. Wellington therefore advocated at least the reduction
of the citadel, but from one cause or another it was the
April 13. 1 3th of April before the siege-train arrived. Mean-
while a kind of tacit armistice existed in and about
Bayonne ; and, save for scarcity of provisions and of
minor comforts, with much desertion in consequence,
everything within the fortress went on as if in profound
peace. The Governor Thouvenot ascribed his long
inaction to bad weather and the urgent necessity for
completing his imperfect defences ; but he decided to
make a sortie on -the 4th, and only a violent storm
kept him from carrying out his purpose. A few days
later Talleyrand's emissaries passed through Bordeaux
on their way to Soult, and sent word to Hope of the
fall of Napoleon ; but Sir John merely passed on this
news informally to the French officers at the outposts,
awaiting definite orders from Wellington before he
should forward any official communication to Thouvenot.
That General, however, may have thought the intelli-
gence to be merely a blind in order to increase desertion
and distract notice from the preparations for a siege ;
and he resolved to make his sortie in the early hours of
the 1 4th. His object was to clear the blockading
troops away from the junction of the roads that lead
from Bayonne to Bordeaux and Toulouse ; and a force
of five to six thousand men was distributed into three
columns for the purpose. Of these the right column
was to march from the redoubt north of the suburb of
St. Esprit upon the village of St. Etienne ; the left,
starting from two works left of the citadel, was to
march towards the cross-roads ; and the centre was to
sally out when the other two columns had nearly reached
their destination, seize the cross-roads and drive back
the besiegers along the Bordeaux road.
In the course of the night two deserters came into
the British lines, and gave warning of the coming
attack ; and the First Division was under arms by
1 Supp. Desp. viii. 654.
CH. xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 95
three o'clock in the morning. Maitland's brigade of 1814.
Guards was stationed below the glass factory of St. April 14,
Bernard, which building had been carefully fortified by
Lord Saltoun of the First Guards, so as to check any
incursion of the enemy towards the bridge of boats.
Stopford's brigade was lined along the bye-road that
led from St. Bernard to the cross-way ; and Hinttber's
brigade of the German Legion was stationed behind St.
Etienne. Hay's brigade of the Fifth Division had been
brought over temporarily to Boucau, on the right bank
of the Adour, to act as a reserve, but the picquets on
the left, that is to say the east, of the British position
were supplied by this brigade, and Hay himself was the
general in charge for the night.
The sortie opened with a feint on the south-west
towards Anglet, while the French columns moved at a
running pace and without firing a shot upon the British
advanced posts. Such was their impetuosity that they
broke through the line of British picquets at the first
rush, and in quarter of an hour were in possession of
the cross- way ; the left column occupying the St. Bernard
road as far as Montegut, the centre holding the Bor-
deaux road for three hundred yards beyond the cross,
and the right ensconcing themselves in the village of
St. Etienne. Everything at first went wrong with the
British. Hay was killed early at St. Etienne, exhorting
his men to defend the church to the last. Hope, riding
down the bye-road from Boucau towards St. Etienne,
found himself in the middle of the French infantry.
His horse fell, pierced by three bullets, and pinned him
to the ground ; and Sir John, together with two of his
staff, was wounded and all three were taken. The
picquets in this same road, which was deeply hollowed
and in many places enclosed by garden-walls, were cut
off from their main body, and after desperate fighting
were mostly killed or captured. The night was pitch
dark, and the gloom was only deepened by the flashes of
the French guns in the citadel, which covered the sortie
by a heavy fire. Some time necessarily elapsed before
96 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. General Howard, who succeeded to the command,
April 14. could take the fight in hand ; but meanwhile the enemy
were already checked at two points. On the British
left Captain Foster of the Thirty-eighth wi f th a handful
of men defended a single house in St. Etienne with
invincible tenacity, and would not be dislodged ; and
in the centre another party still held the Jewish ceme-
tery immediately to west of the cross-way, and shot
down the French sappers who were trying to fill in the
British trenches.
Presently General Hinilber, who had been sum-
moned by Hay before his fall, brought up his Germans
to St. Etienne, and by a vigorous counter-attack drove
the French from the village, rescuing Foster's gallant
little band, of which the greater part had already
fallen killed and wounded. Howard also directed
Maitland to assail the hollow road from the west, and
Colonel Guise (who through the disabling of Stopford
was in charge of the Second brigade of Guards) to
move upon it from the east. The Third battalion of
the First Guards and the First battalion of the Cold-
stream accordingly advanced unseen until in position to
attack, when the main body lay down to avoid the fire
of the cannon in the citadel, and the skirmishers ran
out to engage the enemy. After a sharp engagement
both battalions leaped to their feet and charged.
The French, fearing to be cut off from the road, ran
back, heavily punished by a flanking fire as they
passed. As they retreated from St. Etienne also a gun
was brought forward to play upon their flank with
terrible effect. Soon after seven o'clock the fire ceased,
and both sides took account of their losses. Those of
the French amounted to nine hundred killed and
wounded, and thirteen prisoners ; those of the British
to six hundred and seventy-eight killed and wounded,
including thirty-three Portuguese, and two hundred and
thirty-six prisoners, almost to a man British. The
Coldstream Guards were the regiment that suffered
most severely, having one hundred and sixty hurt or
CH. xviii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 97
slain, while the Third Guards came little short of 1814.
them with one hundred and fifty-six casualties. The April 14.
bulk of the prisoners also came from the ranks of the
Guards, their picquets having been cut off by the first
rush of the enemy.
Altogether this was a very bloody, little combat, for
there was much actual fighting with the bayonet a
rare occurrence and the bayonet is the deadliest of
weapons. That it should have taken place at all was
most lamentable, for the issue at stake between France
and coalesced Europe had already been decided and
could not be altered by any number of sorties. Wel-
lington in his sweeping fashion stigmatised Thouvenot
bluntly as a blackguard. The epithet seems hard and
makes too little allowance for the French point of view.
Thouvenot was a faithful soldier of Napoleon, who
could not be expected readily to accept the news of his
master's abdication, or to imperil one of his fortresses
upon the authority of an informal report. He would
naturally be suspicious to excess of such reports, for
the unpleasant truth must be told the officers of
Napoleon's army, taking their cue from their chief, did
not deal honourably with their enemies nor even with
their friends. Sufficient proof of this statement may
be found in the trick by which Murat obtained posses-
sion of the bridge over the Danube at Vienna in 1805,
by the infamous treachery whereby Napoleon seized
some of the Spanish fortresses in 1808, and by the fact,
rarely quoted but inexorably true, that French officers
even of the highest rank made no scruple of violating
their parole when prisoners of war. People who make
a principle of not keeping faith stand in preternatural
dread of the wiles of others, and Thouvenot was no
exception to this rule.
Nor did the attitude of the French officers during an
informal truce after the sortie show them or their com-
mander in the most favourable light. They expressed,
possibly with genuine feeling, the greatest dismay at the
tidings of Napoleon's abdication, but treated the late
VOL. x H
98 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. engagement as a matter of no importance and as a mere
military promenade. Moreover, Thouvenot, declining
to listen to any proposal for a suspension of arms, main-
tained a menacing attitude which necessitated the utmost
vigilance on the part of the Allies, until at last on the
April 27. 2 yth of April he received Soult's official commands
that hostilities were to cease. The conclusion seems
inevitable that Thouvenot's offensive action was
dictated principally by the yearning to proclaim himself
unconquered, or in other words by jealousy for the
honour of himself and of the French arms. It cannot
be said that he gained his desire, for, though the Allies
suffered very heavily, the French suffered more heavily
still and accomplished absolutely nothing towards the
raising of the blockade. Moreover, though we may
freely grant that Thouvenot's sentiments were very far
from ignoble, we may legitimately question whether
they were worth the sacrifice of some hundreds of
brave men, French as well as British. This, however,
is a matter upon which French and English cannot be
expected to agree, and which must therefore be left
open to the end of time. It is, however, to be regretted
that the final episode of this long and arduous contest,
in the course of which French and English soldiers had
learned not only to respect but almost to like each
other, should have been a fight which left bitter feelings
between victors and vanquished, because it was brought
about by a pride, which is not very easily to be
distinguished from vanity, rather than by the necessities
of war.
CHAPTER XIX
AT the close of 1813, it will be remembered, the 1814.
Americans could place to their credit one substantial
gain, the destruction of Captain Barclay's fleet upon
Lake Erie. This the British had countered on land
by the reconquest of the whole of the lost peninsula
of Niagara and the capture of Fort Niagara on the
American frontier. Thereby they acquired the absolute
control of the harbour of refuge where the river
Niagara enters Lake Ontario, and a fortress lying on
the flank of any American force that might attempt
the invasion of Canada. The winter of 181314 was
unusually mild and open, which practically frustrated
all operations on both sides, owing to the extreme diffi-
culty of transport by land in the absence of frozen
snow. In January Drummond proposed to march
seventeen hundred men by land from the Niagara
frontier to Detroit, cross Lake Erie on the ice to Put
in Bay Island, and seize the two English prizes Detroit
and Queen Charlotte which had been taken by Perry and
left in that anchorage. The plan was a sound one, and
would have redressed the balance of naval power on Lake
Erie in England's favour ; but it proved to be impossible
of execution because the water was still unfrozen. On
the American side for the same reason as little was
done. Wilkinson on the 1 3th of February broke up
the cantonments in which he had remained since his
ridiculous campaign of 1813, and divided his force
into three parts, two of which took up quarters at
Plattsburg and Burlington upon Lake Champlain, and
99
ioo HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. the third under General Brown went to Sackett's
Harbour. He was followed up in his retreat by a
small British column, which captured from him a
hundred sleigh-loads of supplies and stores.
Throughout the early months of the new year Prevost
petitioned earnestly for reinforcements. His best regi-
ments had been reduced by heavy losses to comparative
inefficiency ; and a promise, which had been given to
him in August, that three new battalions would arrive
early in the spring, seemed likely to be empty of effect,
since its fulfilment depended upon the arrival of troops
from the West Indies after they had been relieved from
England. Moreover, the reinforcements last sent to
Prevost were of inferior quality, being composed of
convicts from the hulks and other undesirable characters,
who deserted in numbers when good opportunity
offered. In the circumstances he had decided to summon
the second battalion of the Eighth Foot to march over land
from Fredericton, New Brunswick, to Quebec, a distance
of from three to four hundred miles, which the men
traversed on snow-shoes through intense cold and occa-
sional violent storms, arriving at the beginning of March
in a condition which called forth high compliments from
the General.
March. At length in the same month the Americans opened
their new campaign. Mr. Armstrong, the Secretary for
War, anticipated, not without reason, that Prevost
intended if possible to re-establish himself on Lake Erie,
though Sir George could not hope to do so without
unduly weakening the garrison either of Kingston or of
Montreal. Armstrong's perfectly correct view was that
the principal effort of the Northern army should be
directed against one or other of these two points, so as
to sever communication between Upper and Lower
Canada; and, though he had been persuaded to deviate
from this plan in the previous year, he was now resolved
to execute it. On the 2Oth of February therefore he
sent two sets of instructions to General Brown at
Sackett's Harbour. The one, which was intended to
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 101
come to the knowledge of the British, directed that the 1814.
General should move with two thousand men by way of March.
Batavia to Buffalo, in order to recover Fort Niagara.
The other, which was strictly secret, prescribed that he
should march across the ice and endeavour to surprise
Kingston, the garrison of which was said, probably with
correctness, to have dwindled to twelve hundred men.
Misunderstanding the purport of Armstrong's orders
and judging himself too weak to attack Kingston,
Brown marched sixty miles towards Batavia, and then
seized with misgiving, hurried back to Sackett's Har-
bour, consulted Commodore Chauncey as to Armstrong's
true meaning, and on his advice returned again to
Buffalo.
The incident would not be worth the chronicling,
had not Brown's movements inspired General Wilkin-
son with a spurious activity. Though Wilkinson was
Brown's senior officer, Armstrong had given him no
hint of his subordinate's operations ; but, on hearing
of them by common report, Wilkinson judged it his
duty to make a diversion in Brown's favour. Ac-
cordingly on the 1 9th of March he advanced north- Mar. 19.
ward from Plattsburg with three thousand men to
the river Lacolle, where the British had converted a
stone mill into a fortified post. Arriving before this
petty stronghold on the 3<Dth, he detached six hundred Mar 30.
men to cut off the retreat of the garrison, and opened
fire upon it from three field-guns. Greatly to his
surprise the defenders, one company of the Thirteenth
under Major Handcock, and another of Canadians,
showed no disposition to run away. On the contrary,
being reinforced by the flank companies of the Thir-
teenth and another company of Canadians, Handcock
actually took the offensive and charged the American
guns. He was twice repulsed, but stoutly maintained
his position till evening, when Wilkinson turned his
back upon the British and solemnly retreated to Platts-
burg. The casualties of Handcock's gallant little party
barely exceeded sixty, of which forty-two fell upon the
102 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. grenadier company of the Thirteenth alone. Wilkinson's
Mar. 30. losses were heavier, 1 though slight ; but so ludicrous a
failure as his was too much even for the Americans.
He was removed from his command, and succeeded by
General Izard.
So far, though Armstrong had indicated the right
line of operations, little had been done towards pursuing
it ; and as it chanced, affairs on the British side were
equally in a state of paralysis. Failing supplies made
marine supremacy on Lake Ontario more than ever
necessary for them ; and Drummond, who had from
the first been eager for an attack upon Sackett's Har-
bour, pressed for the project with increased energy in
April. April. Owing to greater rapidity in building new
vessels, Commodore Yeo's squadron was at the moment
superior to that of Chauncey, who recognised the fact
with no small anxiety. Four thousand troops, however,
were the fewest that could be employed against Sackett's
Harbour with any hope of success, and this number was
greater than Prevost was able, or at any rate willing, to
spare. Prevost, as it seems to me, was wrong, for the
capture of the American naval base on Lake Ontario
would have disorganised all the arrangements of the
enemy; and an object of such supreme importance was
worth a great effort and the running of unusual risks.
Baulked of his purpose, Drummond decided to turn his
expedition against Oswego, where, owing to the mild-
ness of the winter, large quantities of guns and muni-
tions had been accumulated by water to await transport
to Sackett's. Chauncey, however, had taken the pre-
caution of detaining the cannon and equipment in a
safe place twelve miles up the Oswego river ; and, the
Americans having got wind of Dnimmond's intentions,
Brown, who had again returned to Sackett's, detached
three hundred men to reinforce the garrison of Oswego.
On the 3rd of May Drummond and Yeo embarked
1 Edgar, in Ten Tears im Upper Csnadt, states them circum-
stantially at 13 killed, 123 wounded and 30 missing. Mahan gives
the figure at over 70, which is more likely to be correct.
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY
103
something over a thousand men 1 at Kingston; and, 1814.
after some delay through variable winds and gales, a few May 3.
marines, the flank companies of Watteville's, and the
light company of the Glengarries were landed under a
heavy fire from the British men-of-war. The guns of
Oswego received them with a heavy cannonade ; but in
ten minutes the fort was stormed, the garrison as they
retired up the river sinking three heavy guns and a
quantity of naval stores. Seven heavy guns, besides
four of lighter calibre, were taken, together with some
ammunition, and the British returned to Kingston with
their trophies two small schooners, two thousand
barrels of provisions, and a quantity of cordage all
gained at a cost of ninety-five killed and wounded.
This, so far as it went, was well ; though owing to
Chauncey's foresight, the object of the expedition had
been only half accomplished. Still, the heavy cannon
that were required for Chauncey's new ships could only
be moved by water to Sackett's Harbour, and Yeo
used all his skill in distributing his squadron so as to
intercept them. Chauncey, therefore, caused the guns
to be placed in bateaux which could creep along the
coast from creek to creek, with a small force of riflemen
and Indians following them afloat and ashore to defend
them if they should be compelled to take refuge from
attack in any inlet. On the 28th of May these bateaux
dropped down the river to Oswego, and in the night
began their voyage northward on the lake. By noon May 29.
the little fleet had reached Big Sandy Creek, only eight
miles distant from its ultimate destination at Stony
Creek, from whence the guns could be drawn overland
into Sackett's. Here the bateaux entered the river
and anchored two miles from its mouth to await infor-
mation ; but two of their number were missing, having
wandered away in the dark and been captured by the
British small craft which were patrolling the coast.
The officer, Commander Popham, in charge of these last,
1 6 cos. of Watteville's, I co. of Glengarry L.I. ; i batt. of
Marines ; det. of artillery.
io 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. on learning from his prisoners what was going forward,
collected three gun vessels and four smaller boats,
manned them with two hundred seamen and marines,
May 30. and at. daylight of the 3Oth entered Big Sandy Creek,
having landed parties upon either bank to secure
his flanks. 1 The American commander, Captain
Woolsey, who had been duly warned of their coming,
was able to conceal superior forces on the flanks of the
advancing British, which closing in upon their rear cut
off every man that was ashore. After losing over forty
killed and wounded, the remainder of the British
marines and seamen, seeing that resistance was hopeless,
surrendered. The affair was in itself a petty one ; but
its results were great, for they ensured to Chauncey the
armament for his new ships, and therewith the certainty
of being able to meet the British squadron, for a time
at any rate, with equal and, indeed, superior strength.
Popham was tried by court-martial, but was rightly
acquitted, for so great an object as that which he sought
was worth the great risk which he accepted. Yeo,
however, finding his scanty complements diminished by
two hundred good men, was furious. He decided to
abandon the blockade of Sackett's Harbour, and to
stand on the defensive pending the completion of a new
ship of one hundred and two guns, which was already
building and would assure him naval superiority.
June. June was now come, and the Government of the
United States at length formulated its plan of campaign
for the summer. Once again it was decided to make
the principal effort in Upper Canada, against Mackinaw
and the Niagara Peninsula, instead of against Kingston
and Montreal. How Secretary Armstrong was induced
to abandon his own correct strategical views does not
appear. He combated at least the project of wasting
force upon Mackinaw, when the capture of York, which
1 Mr. Lucas describes the advance of these parties as made in a
somewhat foolhardy fashion. On the contrary Popham seems to
have taken every possible precaution consistent with the weakness
of his force.
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 105
was the object of the expedition on the Niagara frontier, 1814.
would in itself cut off and reduce the distant fort on j un e.
Lake Huron ; but he eventually submitted to the
superior ignorance of his colleagues. It was therefore
determined that five thousand troops and three thousand
volunteers under Brown should, under protection of
part of the Erie squadron, be landed on the north coast
of the lake between Fort Erie and Long Point, some
eighty miles to west of it, and advance northward
against Burlington Heights, so as to sever the British
communications between their forts on the Niagara and
York. The rest of the Erie squadron was to escort an
armament of about a thousand men to Mackinaw. As
subsidiary operations General Izard was to make a
diversion against Montreal from Plattsburg ; and fifteen
armed boats, supported by posts from Izard's army, were
to interrupt the passage by water between Kingston and
Montreal. Thus the object which should have been
primary was made secondary, and that which should
have been secondary was made primary, according to
the approved practice of the amateur strategist.
Prevost for his part had both in March and May
been dabbling in negotiations for an armistice, hoping
no doubt to suspend hostilities pending the termination
of the war in Europe, which event might dispose the
United States to agree to an amicable settlement. The
idea did not commend itself to Yeo, who was consulted
by Prevost, nor to the British Government, which did
not receive any report of the proceedings until after the
conclusion of the Peninsular War ; but, as Sir George's
efforts came to nothing, there is no object in dwelling
further upon them. Meanwhile it must be noted that
no reinforcements reached Prevost until June, when
they began to arrive from various quarters ; the Six-
teenth and two companies of artillery from Cork at the
beginning of the month; the Nineteenth from the West
Indies; and the Sixth and Eighty-second from the
Peninsular army at the end of June. Prevost had been
so often disappointed over the coming of promised
io6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. succours that he could not divine what force would be
June, at his disposal for the coming campaign, and was com-
pelled to be cautious in his dispositions. Drummond,
confidently expecting that Niagara would again be the
centre of operations, begged urgently for reinforce-
ments ; and, though ultimately he proved to be correct,
Prevost not unreasonably did not share his opinion.
In two successive years the Americans had undoubtedly
committed the blunder of attacking at the wrong point,
but there could be no certainty that they would repeat
this folly for a third time. On the contrary, since they
had been steadily purging away incompetent com-
manders ever since the beginning of the war, it was
to be apprehended that they might have hit upon a
capable general at last ; and there could be no doubt as
to the military policy that would commend itself to
such a man.
Be that as it may, Prevost was in no position to
July, reinforce Upper Canada until the middle of July ; and
indeed the difficulties of supply in the exhausted pro-
vince of Ontario were such that a general might well
have hesitated to pour new troops into it. In addition
to the soldiers there were some three thousand Indians,
who had retreated with Proctor, and several hundred
homeless refugees to be fed, insomuch that the rations
issued to non-combatants were thrice as many as the
numbers of the armed force. By dint of great personal
exertions and much journeying between York and
Kingston Drummond contrived to fill the mouths, both
useful and useless, that depended upon him ; but at the
opening of July his whole force from York on Lake
Ontario to Long Point on Lake Erie did not greatly
exceed four thousand men. Of these over one thousand
were at York itself; seven to eight hundred were in
Fort Niagara; eighteen to nineteen hundred at Fort
George, Queenston, Chippewa and Fort Erie ; some-
thing under three hundred at Long Point; and four to
five hundred at the important connecting station of
Burlington Heights. A great "many men were on the
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 107
sick list through fever and ague, owing to excessive 1814.
fatigue and exposure. July.
Brown was not much better off than Drummond in
the matter of men. His five thousand regulars and
three thousand volunteers had dwindled to a nominal
total of something less than five thousand white men of
all descriptions, of whom thirty-five hundred were fit
for duty, and six hundred Indians. His regular
soldiers, however, had for some months past been care-
fully trained by competent officers, and were greatly
superior to any American troops that had hitherto taken
the field. Deciding to ignore the menace of Fort
Niagara to his communications, Brown crossed the
Niagara river in two divisions above and below Fort
Erie on the night of the 2nd of July ; and in the even-
ing of the 3rd received the bloodless surrender of the July 3.
garrison of Fort Erie itself. This, considering the
small numbers of the British in the field, was a serious
mishap. Either the posr should not have been held at
all, or its commander, Major Buck of the Eighth,
should have defended it to the last; and it is clear that
Buck did not do his duty. On the 4th Brown pushed July 4.
General Scott's brigade twelve miles northward to
Street's Creek, a small stream two miles south of the
Chippewa, which was the first British line of defence,
pressing back the British advanced parties before him.
In rear of the Chippewa, which is fifty yards wide,
General Riall in the absence of Drummond at King-
ston had collected a force of about eleven hundred
regulars and three hundred militia and Indians, and
would have attacked Brown on that very day but that
he was expecting the arrival of the Eighth from York.
As things were, he contented himself with pushing for-
ward a squadron of the Nineteenth Light Dragoons and
two companies of the Hundredth to reconnoitre, and
was not deterred from his purpose by the intelligence
that the enemy force was superior to his own. Drum-
mond, indeed, after the experience of his last campaign,
had instructed him that he might take liberties with the
io8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. American infantry; nor could Riall divine that the
July 4. troops before him were much superior to any that the
British had yet encountered, and that they were no
longer led by such feeble creatures as Hull, Dearborn,
Smith and Wilkinson, but by a fighting commander.
July 5. On the morning of the fth the Eighth came up,
having made a forced march from their landing-place;
and at four in the afternoon Riall crossed the Chippewa
with his whole force and three guns. He then advanced
southward in three columns, covered by an advanced
guard, with his left on the Niagara river and his right
flank shielded against attack from the forest by a flank
guard of Indians and militia. As it happened, Scott at
the same moment was moving northward from Street's
Creek, not with any idea of fighting, but in order to
drill his men in the open space between the two streams.
A thin belt of forest stretching across this cleared
ground concealed the two forces from each other ; and
Riall's flanking party penetrating through this belt,
began to, annoy the advanced parties which screened
Scott's left. General Brown, who was in front re-
connoitring, thereupon ordered up his Indians and
militia, who thrust back Riall's regulars, but upon
emerging at the further side of the belt were met by
the light companies of the British regulars and
militia, and driven off in hopeless rout. Brown, realis-
ing the situation, at once galloped away to fetch the
remainder of his army, shouting to Scott as he passed
to prepare for an engagement.
Hastily throwing a battalion into the wood to cover
the retreat of the flying Indians and militia, Scott drew
up the remainder of his brigade with its right to the
Niagara river, while Riall continued to advance clear of
the belt of wood, thus laying bare his own right flank.
Scott's left flank being likewise in the air, Riall un-
limbered his three pieces to play upon the enemy's
right, and leaving the Eighth, apparently, to support
the guns, formed the Royal Scots and Hundredth to
attack the American left. Scott met this manoeuvre
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY
109
by filing his left wing away still further to his left, 1814.
until he overlapped the two British regiments, when he July 5.
deployed it and opened fire. This deployment was
executed by the Americans with admirable regularity,
and seems to have anticipated that of the First and
Hundredth, who however met them steadily enough,
though the American fire was seen to be superior.
Both sides now advanced, halting from time to time to
pour -volleys into each other until Brown's remaining
brigade was seen coming up upon Scott's left ; where-
upon Scott, being thus assured of support, wheeled up
his left wing so as to edge his opponents closer into
the fire of his right wing. Riall made a last effort to
save the day by summoning the Eighth to his right,
and ordering the First and Hundredth to charge ; but
the two gallant regiments being caught under a cross
fire, suffered so severely that he was fain to call them off
and to retreat, covering an orderly retirement with the
Light companies and the Eighth.
The change of conditions indicated by this little
action was alarming for the British. Not only were
the casualties of Riall's force far in excess of the
American losses five hundred and fifteen as against
three hundred and thirty-one 1 but in actual fact Riall
had been beaten by Scott's brigade alone, which had no
preponderance in numbers. 2 It is true that Scott, being
assured of the support of Brown's remaining brigade
that of Ripley could throw the whole of his troops
into action at once, whereas Riall was obliged to hold
the Eighth in reserve, so that the British commander
was justified in saying that he contended with an
enemy numerically superior. The manoeuvres in the
combat, despite of the details given in the autobiography
of Scott and in Riall's report, are obscure ; but there is
no doubt that the British troops behaved admirably, as
1 British loss : 148 killed ; 321 wounded ; 46 missing.
American loss : 56 killed ; 239 wounded ; 36 missing.
2 The casualties of Scott's brigade were 44 killed ; 224 wounded.
The casualties of Ripley's brigade were 3 killed ; 3 wounded.
no HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814.15 sufficiently attested by the losses of the First and
July 5. Hundredth, 1 which amounted to close upon half of
their numbers. Still the British were beaten, and it
was evident that the experience of two campaigns had
at last turned the Americans into soldiers who were not
to be trifled with. Drummond's position therefore
became most critical. At the outset his men had been
none too many, and now they had been diminished by
nearly seven hundred, not far from one-fifth of the
entire force. Moreover, the loss of Detroit in the
previous year had left his right, or western flank, un-
protected, and rendered a precarious situation doubly
insecure.
After the action Riall fell back upon Chippewa,
unmolested by the Americans ; but Brown, following
him up, turned the position and compelled the British
July 10. to retire towards Burlington. On the loth Brown
reached Queenston, and there for some days he halted,
eagerly awaiting the arrival of Chauncey's fleet to
bring him heavy guns, cut off the British communica-
tions by water, and co-operate generally in bringing
the campaign to a decisive issue. Chauncey, however,
who had announced that he would sail on the ist, gave
no sign of doing so, but, to the dismay of his Govern-
ment no less than of Brown, found pretext after pretext
for delay, and in fact did not leave Sackett's until the
ist of August. Meanwhile Brown waited in painful
July 15. suspense. On the I5th he made a reconnaissance in
force, which moved round Fort George as far as Lake
Ontario, but failed to entice Riall from his lines. On
July 20. the 2Oth he moved his entire army before Fort St.
George and began to throw up siege-works; where-
upon Riall, seriously alarmed, sent pressing requests
for reinforcements to Drummond at York, but still
1 i /ist. I off., 62 men killed ; 10 off., 125 men wounded ; 30
men missing = 228.
looth. 2 off., 67 men killed ; 9 off., 125 men wounded ; I off.
missing = 204.
There were no unwounded prisoners.
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 1 1 1
refrained, though with an effort, from coming out to 1814.
fight. After waiting for two days Brown on the 22nd July 22.
retired to Queenston, and Riall advanced with seventeen
hundred regular troops and about a thousand militia
and Indians to Twenty Mile Creek. On the 23rd July 23.
Brown learned definitely that it was hopeless to look
for Chauncey's arrival ; and on the 25th he fell back to July 25.
Chippewa, designing to march rapidly thence upon
Burlington Heights and York. Thus matters stood at
a deadlock ; and the only important incident at this
time was the wanton burning of the villages of Queens-
ton and St. David's by the American militia. Brown,
to his honour, dismissed the officer who had ordered
the destruction of St. David's ; but the mischief had
been done and was destined to produce serious
consequences.
On the 22nd Drummond returned from Kingston to July 22.
York, bringing with him four hundred of the Eighty-
ninth and the flank companies of the Hundred and
Fourth, which had been relieved by the arrival of the
Sixth, Eighty-second, Nova Scotia Fencibles and one
wing of the First l in the St. Lawrence two days earlier.
Without delay he planned an offensive stroke against
Brown's communications from Fort Niagara, and with
that object sent the Eighty-ninth and his flank com-
panies to that fort on the 23rd; ordering the com-
mandant, Colonel Tucker, to strengthen himself further
by drawing men from the posts on the other side of the
river, and to move with some fifteen hundred men upon
Brown's advanced base at Lewiston. The operation
was appointed to take place at daylight of the 25th ; July 25.
and Riall was directed simultaneously to advance against
Brown, but to decline a general action unless it were
forced upon him by the enemy, in which case Tucker
was to cross the water to his assistance. At dawn of
the 25th Drummond himself arrived at Fort Niagara,
when, ascertaining that Riall had already made a forward
1 4th batt., lately on service with Graham at Bergen-op-Zoom ;
Prevost to Sec. of State, 1 2th July 1814.
ii2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. movement, he modified his orders ; transferring the
July 25 Eighty-ninth and some of the detachments to the com-
mand of Colonel Morrison with instructions to move
through Queenston to the support of Riall, and leaving
Tucker only some five hundred soldiers, together with
some seamen and Indians, for the march upon Lewiston.
The seamen were taken from four small vessels which,
looking to Chauncey's inactivity, Yeo had ventured to
spare to carry troops, supplies and stores to Niagara.
" Without their help," wrote Drummond some days
later, " I should certainly not have been able to attempt
offensive operations so soon after my arrival."
These changes caused some delay in the march of
Tucker, who upon reaching Lewiston at noon found
that the Americans had already retreated, carrying with
them their guns, but abandoning tents, stores and pro-
visions, which fell into the hands of the British. Tucker
then ferried his troops across from Lewiston to Queens-
ton, where they joined hands with Morrison's, which
had awaited them at that point. After a halt, most of
the Forty-first and Hundredth regiments were sent
back to the forts, and Drummond with the Eighty-
ninth, the light company of the Forty-first and
detachments of the First and Eighth some nine
hundred of all ranks at about four o'clock con-
tinued his march. Riall had, meanwhile, at mid-
night of the 24th-25th pushed forward an advanced
guard of about a thousand men under Lieutenant-
colonel Pearson, and these at seven o'clock occupied
a hill by Lundy's Lane, about a mile to north-
west of the Niagara Falls. The rest of Riall's force
waited under arms at Twelve Mile creek, some eight
miles to westward, until noon, when some fifteen hun-
dred men with four guns were ordered to join Pearson.
The whole of these movements on the Canadian side
were unknown to Brown, who, however, was informed,
apparently rather late, of Tucker's raid upon Lewiston ;
when fearing that it might be extended to a more
important American depot at Fort Schlosser, he decided
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 113
to make a diversion by advancing upon Queenston. 1814.
At a little before five accordingly General Scott's brigade July 25,
came upon Pearson's detachment, the strength of which
had evidently been underestimated by the American
scouts ; for Scott hesitated to attack, and despatched a
message to Brown for reinforcements. Riall, on his
side, mistaking Scott's brigade for Brown's whole force,
ordered his main body from Twelve Mile Creek, which
was still three miles distant, to take up a position on
Queenston heights, and himself directed the retreat of
Pearson's detachment to that point. On the way he
met Drummond, who took personal command of
Pearson's troops and turned them back to reoccupy
Lundy's Lane, sending word to the main body from
Twelve Mile Creek to hasten with all speed to the
same point.
The position of Lundy's Lane consisted of a low
hill, about a mile in length from east to west by less
than half a mile in depth from north to south, which
rises to a height of about twenty-five feet above a long
gradual slope. It was traversed from east to west by
the road known as Lundy's Lane, and was bounded
on each flank by two more roads which ran parallel to
each other from north to south, the more easterly being
the road to Queenston. The southern and eastern
slopes were covered with wood, and on the side of the
river were skirted by swamps also, which gave some
imperfect protection to the eastern flank; but, weak
though the position was, it was the only one south
of Queenston Heights that offered an advantage for
resisting a hostile advance from the south. Had
General Scott pushed his force boldly forward he might
easily have secured the hill ; but dreading an ambush
he had felt his way cautiously towards it, and was still
six hundred yards distant, when Drummond with some
seventeen hundred men crossed the summit. Un-
limbering two five-pounders upon the highest point,
Drummond formed his line in rear of them and on
the reverse slope of the hill ; the Glengarry regiment
VOL. x i
1 1 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. on the extreme right bestriding the cross-roads on the
July 25. western side, with a part or the whole of the Royal
Scots, Forty-first, Eighty-ninth and Eighth in succes-
sion upon the left of the Glengarry. The left flank
of the Eighth rested on the Queenston road, with a
battalion of militia beyond it ; and one troop of the
Nineteenth Light Dragoons stood on the road to their
left rear.
The array was slightly concave in form, and had
hardly been completed when at half-past six Scott came
up with his own brigade only, and, making a demonstra-
tion along the whole front, detached a column through
the woods against Drummond's left flank. After the
lapse of an hour this detachment fell upon the militia
battalion, which formed the extreme left of Drummond's
line, and drove it back, together with the little party
of the Nineteenth Light Dragoons, in some confusion.
Several prisoners were taken ; and General Riall, who
was wounded at this juncture, being carried in the
wrong direction owing to the growing darkness, fell
into the hands of the enemy. The militia quickly
rallied, however, forming en potence along the Queenston
road, and effectually secured Drummond's left flank
from further danger. Meanwhile the first of Brown's
reinforcements came up, and were thrown by Scott
against the British centre ; but the attack was repulsed
after severe fighting with heavy loss, and Drummond
remained in possession of the hill.
It was now between eight and nine o'clock, and there
was a lull in the action except for a duel of artillery,
while both Generals busied themselves in re-forming
their array for a fresh combat. By this time the whole
of Brown's army had arrived, and the detachment from
Twelve Mile Creek had at last joined Drummond, much
harassed and fatigued by a long day of marches and
counter-marches. The British General, fearing for his
right flank, extended his line on that side by placing
the seven companies of the Royal Scots on the right of
the Glengarries, and the flank companies of the Hundred
CH.XIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 115
and Fourth on the right of the Royal Scots. He 1814.
formed the remainder in second line, a few companies July 25,
of the Eighth in the centre, with some militia on their
right, and the Hundred and Ttyrd, which was a young
regiment, on their left. Brown on his side drew up
two battalions in dead ground at the foot of the hill,
and directed them to storm the British battery, which
had now been increased by a third gun. The Americans
rushed forward gallantly enough. The battalion which
advanced over the open was repulsed with heavy loss ;
but the other crept up through the woods to a log-
fence within twenty yards of the British cannon, poured
in a volley, charged, bayoneted the gunners while in
the act of loading, and then turned the pieces against
the British line. More infantry followed them, and
the American artillery likewise ascended the hill at a
gallop. One gun, having lost all its drivers by a
volley, was carried by the horses into the ranks of the
British and was secured ; but this for a time was the
only success upon Drummond's side.
Bringing up his four remaining guns, he endeavoured
to restore the fight ; and these and the American pieces
fired almost muzzle to muzzle. They were taken and
retaken, and the combat resolved itself into a savage
struggle between small units and individuals for the
summit of the hill. All order was lost in the dark-
ness; battalions, companies and even sections became
intermixed, and the fight was carried on with the
bayonet, with the butt, with any weapon that came to
hand. Brown and Scott were both of them wounded
and disabled. Drummond also was severely hurt, but
continued in command. For three long hours the
battle continued, the Americans, apparently, retaining
the summit of the hill, but unable to carry off the
British guns or to improve their advantage under the
incessant fire of their enemies. At last, just before
midnight, Brown ordered General Ripley to draw off
his troops and retreat to Chippewa, and at dawn the
British reoccupied the crest and recovered their guns.
n6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. Superior discipline had told, and the victory such as
July 25. it was rested with them.
This was the best contested fight of the whole war.
If we are to accept American figures, 1 the numbers
engaged were nearly equal about twenty-eight hundred
of all ranks on each side with a slight preponderance
of regular troops in favour of the Americans, and a
superiority of seven guns against two in favour of the
British. The casualties of the British numbered eight
hundred and seventy-eight, of whom eighty-four were
killed. 2 Those of the Americans, according to their
official report, did not exceed eight hundred and sixty,
of whom one hundred and seventy-one were killed. In
the matter of the numbers actually killed and wounded the
Americans by their own showing exceeded the British
by nearly one hundred ; but, whereas Drummond re-
ported the capture of several hundreds of prisoners,
the American return of missing shows no more than
one hundred and seventeen. Drummond may certainly
have been guilty of exaggeration ; but on the whole I
distrust the American figures, both as to casualties and
as to their strength on the field ; and I incline to the
belief that they had certainly four thousand men present,
and that they lost a thousand of them. Trophies were
almost evenly divided, the Americans carrying off one
British gun, which they mistook for one of their own,
and leaving two of their own behind them. The brunt
of the action fell upon the Eighty-ninth, which went into
action about four hundred strong and lost two hundred
and seventeen killed and wounded, and upon the Royal
Scots, who added one hundred and thirty hurt and slain
to the two hundred and seventy who had already fallen
at Chippewa. Altogether it was a stout little fight,
honourable alike to Americans and British. 3
1 Mahan, ii. 312.
2 British loss: 84 killed; 5 59 wounded; 193 missing; 42 prisoners.
American loss : 171 killed ; 572 wounded ; 117 missing.
3 American writers are fond of asserting that some of the Penin-
sular veterans were present at Lundy's Lane. This is, of course,
untrue.
CH.XIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 117
On the following day General Ripley advanced by 1814.
Brown's order to bring off his dead, wounded and July 2 6.
artillery. Finding the British in occupation of the field
he immediately retired, broke down the bridge over the
river, threw the greatest part of his baggage, supplies
and stores into the rapids, and retreated with much
haste and not in the best order to Fort Erie. Drum-
mond's light troops and Indians followed him and made
a few prisoners ; and Ripley busied himself in enlarging
and strengthening the defences of the fort in anticipation
of an attack. Drummond, after repairing the bridge
and receiving reinforcements which raised his numbers
to over three thousand men, likewise advanced, and on
the 3rd of August invested Fort Erie. The place was Aug. 3.
formidable with new earthworks and batteries, extend-
ing from the fort to the edge of the lake, and flanked
on the side of the river by the guns of Black Rock, and
on the side of the lake by three gun-boats. On the
night of the jrd Drummond made an unsuccessful
attempt to surprise Black Rock ; and two days later
the besieged were heartened by the arrival of General
Gaines to supersede Ripley in chief command. On the Aug. 5.
same day a more formidable enemy arrived in the shape
of Commodore Chauncey with his squadron, who
promptly intercepted and drove ashore a British brig,
and, leaving three of his vessels to watch for British
small craft in the Niagara river, sailed back to the
blockade of Kingston. This was discouraging, for
Drummond had already broken ground and begun to
raise a battery before Fort Erie ; but without naval
command of Lake Ontario he was likely to run short
of ammunition. On the night of the I2th Captain Aug. 12.
Dobbs of the Royal Navy attacked the three vessels on
Lake Erie in open boats, capturing two of them and
chasing away the third ; and Drummond, having opened
fire on the I3th, gave orders for the delivery of the Aug. 13.
assault before dawn of the I5th.
Fort Erie, as constructed by the British, stood about
an hundred yards from the shore, where the Niagara
n8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. river flows out of Lake Erie. The Americans had
Aug. extended the defences eastward by earthworks to the
strand, erecting a stone fort named the Douglas battery
at the water's edge, and southward also by half a mile
of earthworks to a sandy knoll called Snake Hill, from
which point the shore of the lake begins to turn west-
ward. This knoll likewise was crowned by a battery,
and connected with the water by a line of palisades.
The whole of this enclosure was covered by ditches and
abatis, and was garrisoned though of this Drummond
was not aware by a force exceeding his own in numbers.
General Drummond decided to attack in three columns.
The strongest of these, thirteen hundred in numbers,
under Colonel Fischer of Watteville's, was to assail
Snake Hill ; the second, about two hundred and fifty
strong, under Lieutenant-colonel Drummond of the
Hundred and Fourth, was to carry the old fort ; and the
third, of about six hundred and fifty men, under Colonel
Hercules Scott of the Hundred and Third, was to fall
upon the Douglas battery. 1
Aug. 15. At two o'clock in the morning the attack was
opened by Fischer, who had removed the flints from
his men's muskets in order to ensure silence and
surprise. A few men of the two flank companies
turned the line of palisades by wading through the
lake ; but the mass of them were checked by the abatis,
and, giving way under a storm of shot from the American
muskets and rifles, threw the supports, which in the
darkness had entangled themselves in difficult ground
by the water, into hopeless confusion. Watteville's regi-
ment broke, carrying away with it in its flight nearly
all the remainder of the column ; and the small parties
which had entered the lines, being unsustained, were
compelled to fall back. At the sound of the cannonade
1 Fischer's column : Watteville's, 8th ; light cos. 89th and looth ;
a few cavalry and artillery.
Drummond's column: flank cos.4ist and iO4th; dets. bluejackets
and marines.
Scott's column : 2 cos. Royal Scots ; iO3rd.
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY
119
the two remaining columns moved forward to their 1814.
work. That of Scott was driven back with heavy loss Aug. 15.
by the fire of the Douglas battery, and joined that of
Lieutenant-colonel Drummond in the assault of the
old fort. This last attacked with the greatest resolu-
tion, and after three repulses succeeded in establishing
themselves in one of the bastions, from which they
turned the guns upon the Douglas battery. The
Americans strove desperately to dislodge them, but in
vain. All seemed to be in good train, when a store of
ammunition which had been accumulated in the bastion
was accidentally, as it seems, exploded, and blew the
bastion and the whole of its occupants into the air.
Panic followed instantaneously. The survivors of the
column ran back in disorder, and General Drummond
was fain to throw out the Royal Scots for the pro-
tection of their retreat, and to abandon the entire
enterprise.
The British casualties amounted to nine hundred
and five, over five hundred men being returned as
missing, who were probably killed or wounded by the
explosion. The heaviest of the loss fell upon the
Hundred and Third, which, with nearly one hundred and
forty wounded and over two hundred and eighty missing,
was practically annihilated, and upon the flank com-
panies of the Forty-first, whose casualties exceeded eighty.
Watteville's also suffered severely, nearly one hundred
and fifty officers and men having fallen ; but this regi-
ment was considered, justly or unjustly, to have behaved
ill. " Had the troops of Fischer's column been steady
only for a few minutes," wrote Drummond, in a sentence
which was omitted from the despatch printed in the
Gazette, "the enemy must have fled from his works and
have surrendered." A corps composed of mercenaries
of all nations, Poles, Germans, Dutch and Portuguese,
was not likely to have the same cohesion as a British
battalion ; but no troops in the world are exempt from
the peril of panic, especially when their own fugitive
comrades crash into them in the darkness. Drummond
120 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. was certainly unlucky, for his men actually penetrated
Aug. the American works at two different points, and might
well have held their own at the old fort but for the
accident of the explosion. But these are mere com-
monplaces of the fortune of war. Night attacks upon
fortified positions are in the last degree hazardous and
uncertain, and this particular night attack was a dis-
astrous failure. The Americans stated their loss to be
one hundred and twenty-eight, and, whether this figure
be correct or not, their casualties cannot in any case
have exceeded one-fourth of the British. Gaines and
his troops had every reason to plume themselves upon
their success.
Reduced to impotence through the weakening of
his force and the interruption of his communications by
water, Drummond was practically obliged to turn the
siege into a blockade. The first reinforcements from
the Peninsular army the Sixth and Eighty -second had
arrived in the St. Lawrence early in July ; 1 but, though
forwarded up country with all possible speed, the
Eighty-second, owing to the wretched state of the
roads, did not reach Drummond until the 29th of
August, nor the Sixth until the 2nd of September.
Supplies and stores, however, could only be brought by
water, and, though Drummond continued the construc-
tion of batteries within closer range of the American
works, he was short of ammunition and very anxious
about victuals. From the first week of September the
blockade of Kingston became rigorous ; and even the
passage from York to Niagara was so unsafe that
Drummond dared not call up further reinforcements lest
he should be unable to feed them. Commodore Yeo, for
his part, refused to move until the great ship which was
to assure him of naval superiority should be completed ;
and his policy is perfectly intelligible. But naval
superiority was, after all, only a means to an end ; and
there was always the danger lest, while the means
were preparing, the end might be sacrificed. To add
1 Prevost to Sec. of State, I2th July 1814.
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 121
to DrummoncTs difficulties the season was wet and 1814.
unhealthy ; and unceasing sickness among the troops Aug.
from this cause and from want of provisions inclined
him more and more to raise the siege and retreat to
Chippewa. His resolution was hastened by the action
of Brown, who at the beginning of September had Sept.
resumed command of the American army.
The British batteries were three in number, situated
in the midst of thickets, about five hundred yards
distant from the American lines and a mile and a half
from Drummond's main encampment. On the after-
noon of the i yth of September, when the batteries were Sept. 17.
in charge of the Eighth and Watteville's, Brown made a
sortie with two thousand men, sending one column under
General Porter through the woods round the British
right and rear, and keeping a second column under
General Miller hidden in a ravine before the British
centre. The movement was exceedingly well executed.
Porter managed to approach unperceived very near the
British right-hand battery ; and, Miller simultaneously
penetrating the line of picquets between it and the
centre battery, the two columns converged upon the
right-hand battery and mastered it in a few minutes.
After destroying the guns, the two commanders pro-
ceeded against the centre battery, which, after a sharp
resistance, was also captured. Before serious damage
could be done to the guns, however, Drummond's
reserves came up ; and the Royal Scots, Sixth, Eighty-
second and Eighty-ninth, with the Glengarries, speedily
swept the enemy out of the captured works and back to
their entrenchments, with the loss of rather over five
hundred killed, wounded and prisoners. The casualties
of the British in this counter-attack barely exceeded two
hundred, showing that the Americans were still unable
to meet veteran troops in the field ; but of the Eighth
and Watteville's two hundred and fifty were taken
prisoners, besides over one hundred slain or hurt, which
raised the British loss to a total of six hundred and nine.
Since three British guns also had been destroyed the
122 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. balance of advantage in this affair lay decidedly with the
Americans.
Sept. 21. Four days later Drummond, though he had lately
been strengthened by the arrival of the Ninety-seventh,
broke up his camp and retreated to Chippewa. Thir-
teen days of incessant rain had not only swelled his sick
list alarmingly, but had undermined the foundations
of Fort Niagara and Fort George. Reinforcements
could reach the army only by driblets ; and the diffi-
culties of insecure communication harassed him perpetu-
Sept. 24. ally. On the 24th he fixed his head-quarters at the falls of
Niagara, cantoning his troops along the line of the river
from Black Creek to Lake Ontario, with Chippewa for
the point of concentration. Brown made no attempt to
follow him, mistrusting his own weakness ; and the two
Oct. 5. forces remained supine, until on the 5th of October
General Izard with his army arrived at Lewiston from
Lake Champlain. His coming was due to the confused
strategical notions of Secretary Armstrong. At the end
of July this gentleman had suggested that Izard should
advance against either Montreal or Prescott, as a
diversion to save Brown in case larger reinforcements
should be sent to Drummond. The news of Brown's
retreat, however, altered the situation ; and on the I2th
of August Armstrong suggested that Izard should march
to Sackett's Harbour, and embark two thousand men
there for Fort Erie. It is difficult to see the object of
this movement. Brown was in no danger he had in
fact represented Lundy's Lane to be a victory for the
Americans held the command of the water on Lake
Ontario ; and, so long as they did so, Drummond's
situation was precarious. On the other hand on Lake
Champlain there was much to be feared, for British
infantry from France had been pouring into the St.
Lawrence during the first part of August, and was not
likely to remain idle. However, Izard meekly obeyed,
marched four thousand men to Sackett's Harbour,
embarked twenty-five hundred of them there on the
2 ist of September, landed these at the Genesee on the
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 123
south shore of Lake Ontario on the 22nd, and on the 1814.
27th met Brown in consultation at Batavia. As the Sept.
result of this conference Izard, who was the senior
officer, decided to besiege Fort Niagara, and to that end
marched for Lewiston ; but at a second council of war
it was determined to concentrate on the American side
of the Niagara river south of the Chippewa, and to
undertake no sieges until Drummond's force had been
accounted for.
On the loth and nth of October Izard passed his army Oct. 10.
over the Niagara near Black Rock ; and, encamping two
miles from Fort Erie, marched down stream on the
1 3th upon Drummond's lines at Chippewa. Drummond Oct. 13.
watched him with perfect equanimity, for the British
front was unassailable, their left flank covered by the
Niagara, and the country on their right impassable
except by infantry, to meet which he had a superior
force of artillery. Izard came up before the British
position on the I5th, reconnoitred it in force, and, Oct. 15.
disliking the appearance of it, retired again to Fort Erie
in abject helplessness. On the next day he heard that Oct. 16
Chauncey had withdrawn his fleet to Sackett's Harbour
and was throwing up defensive works, that officer being
unwilling to wait for the coming of Yeo's new ship, the
St. Lawrence, which on the I4th of October was at last fit
for commission. Izard, conscious that much would be
expected of him with a force of six thousand fairly
trained troops, wrote querulously to Armstrong bemoan-
ing his hard fate in wanting an enterprise upon which
to employ them. It never occurred to him at any time
to leave Brown to contain Drummond at Chippewa and,
transferring his own force to Lake Erie, to threaten the
British rear from Grand River or Long Point. On the
2ist of October he broke up his camp, sent Brown with Oct. 21.
his troops to Sackett's Harbour, and began to transfer
his own force to the American shore. On the 5th Nov. 5.
of November he blew up Fort Erie, and withdrew
altogether from British territory. Four days earlier,
by a curious irony, Yeo had sailed for Niagara with
I2 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. supplies, stores and a reinforcement of twelve hundred
men, 1 all of which arrivecj. too late.
So ended the campaign of 1814 in the west. There
had been other petty operations on the remoter lakes
in the course of the year. After sundry misfortunes to
the British ships on Lake Erie in the earlier months of
1814, the naval situation had been restored and even
improved by the valour and audacity of Lieutenant
Worsley of the Royal Navy ; and Lieutenant-colonel
Macdonall had successfully routed an expedition which
had ascended the Mississippi against Mackinaw. Late
in October a party of seven hundred marauding
Kentuckians started from Detroit with the idea of
destroying the Canadian resources in that neighbour-
hood, and if possible of penetrating to the head of Lake
Ontario at Burlingham Heights. They were, however,
turned back, before they had traversed more than half
of the ground, by a menace of British troops, and
accomplished no more than a considerable amount of
pillage and devastation, which probably suited them
better than fighting. But all these incidents, though
they ended almost invariably in the discomfiture of the
Americans, were only by-issues of little importance to
the contest in the peninsula of Niagara. There the
Americans, though the quality of their troops and
leaders had greatly improved and the improvement had
been marked by two indubitable successes, had failed
for the third consecutive campaign to accomplish any-
thing. This in itself was discreditable ; but far worse
was the fact that the supreme director of operations in
Washington had allowed himself to be distracted by a
petty reverse on the western frontier into the removal
of troops from the vital point, within striking distance
alike of Montreal and Kingston, to the eastern head of
Lake Erie. Such a blunder deserved punishment at
the hands of Prevost ; and we must now see what
attempt he made to take advantage of the situation.
1 37th; dets. of 6th and Sand; I co. R.A. Prevost to Sec.
of State, ist Nov. 1814.
CH.XIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 125
By the end of August Sir George had not far short 1814.
of sixteen thousand British soldiers in Lower Canada, Aug.
seven battalions of which, numbering about six thousand
men, had come straight from Wellington's army in
France. 1 In writing to announce the despatch of these
troops Lord Bathurst informed Prevost that yet more
battalions were assembling for direct attack on the
American coast, and that, while not recommending any
hazardous forward movement, the Cabinet hoped to see
him take the offensive before the close of the campaign.
The objects commended to his notice were two : first,
protection, which signified the entire destruction of
Sackett's Harbour and of the enemy's naval establish-
ments on Lakes Erie and Champlain ; and, secondly,
permanent security, which was explained to mean the
maintenance of Fort Niagara and of sufficient adjacent
territory, and the occupation of Detroit and the
Michigan country. 2 This letter reached Prevost before
the 1 4th July, enabling him to send Watteville's
regiment at once to Drummond ; and, as the transports
began to enter the St. Lawrence at the beginning of
August, he contemplated opening his campaign for the
destruction of Sackett's and the occupation of Platts-
burg in conjunction with the fleets on Lakes Ontario
and Champlain on the ifth of September.
As regards Lake Champlain he purposed particularly
to avoid any offensive movement on the eastern shore,
because the State of Vermont was strongly opposed to
the war, and had furnished large supplies both of specie
and cattle to the British army. Two-thirds of the
troops in Canada were in fact fed on beef provided by
American contractors and drawn chiefly from Vermont
1 The battalions that came from France, over and above the
6th and 8znd already mentioned, were i/3rd, i/5th, i/9th, 3/2;th,
i /39th, jjyth, i /58th.
2 Bathurst to Prevost, 3rd June 1814. Captain Mahan and Mr.
Lucas both say that they have been unable to find this despatch.
It is in the Record Office with the rest of the Secretary- of State's
despatches. C.O. 43, vol. 23.
126 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. and New York. 1 Meanwhile, as the battalions arrived
Aug. from the Garonne, Prevost encamped them between the
Richelieu and the St. Lawrence; and by the 25th of
August three brigades, under the supreme command of
General de Rottenburg, were stationed along this line. 2
But Prevost had already realised that Yeo's squadron
would not be ready to dominate Lake Ontario until
October, or practically until three weeks later than he
had expected. The first duty of the squadron must
needs be to carry reinforcements and supplies of all
kinds to Drummond, which would mean that offensive
operations against Sackett's Harbour must be delayed
for yet another week. By that time the campaigning
season would be so near its end that the propriety of
even beginning such operations at all would be highly
questionable.
In the circumstances Sir George judged it best to
send Sir James Kempt, who had arrived from France,
with one brigade to Kingston, to be ready to take
command of the attack upon Sackett's, and in the
meanwhile to devote his own attention to Lake
Champlain. The Americans had still naval superiority
upon this lake ; but on the 2th of August a new
British vessel, the Cottfiance, had been launched at Isle
aux Noix, which was designed to be more powerful
than the strongest of the American ships, and would,
it was hoped, be ready for service in three weeks. On
the 3Oth Prevost inspected his first brigade at Chambly,
Aug. 31. and, proceeding on the 3ist to Odell's Town, within a
mile of the American frontier, heard there of Izard's
march to Sackett's with four thousand men. This
unlooked-for piece of intelligence decided him to
advance at once without waiting for the co-operation of
the fleet, in the hope of forcing Izard to return and
1 Prevost to Sec. of State, 27th Aug. 1814.
2 Cavalry, I9th L.D.
Power's Brigade : i/3rd, i/5th, 2/2/th, i/58th.
Robinson's Brigade,] 2/8 th, i/9th, i3th, 3/zyth, 39th, 49th,
Brisbane's > y6th, 88th ; De Meuron's Canadian
Kempt's J Chasseurs.
CH.XIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 127
of thus making a diversion in Drummond's favour. 1814..
Accordingly crossing the frontier he, on the 3rd of Sept. 3.
September, occupied an entrenched camp at Champlain
on the Great Chazy, which was abandoned by the
enemy at his approach, and on the 4th moved on to Sept. 4.
the Little Chazy, where his supplies were to be landed.
Here he saw the naval commander, Captain Downie,
who assured him that the flotilla would be ready to
co-operate with the army within forty-eight hours, and
that, from all that he could ascertain concerning the
American squadron, there need be little misgiving as
to the issue of a naval action. On the 6th, therefore, Sept. 6.
Prevost advanced in two columns to Plattsburg, a
march of twelve miles only, but rendered laborious by
the obstruction of felled trees and ruined bridges, with
which the American commander sought to impede his
progress. Some attempt was made to induce the
American militia to offer resistance, but in vain, the
British columns brushing them contemptuously aside
without even condescending to deploy. By the after-
noon the entire force of the enemy had retreated to
a strongly fortified position on the south side of the
river Saranac.
It is said that Prevost proposed to attack the works
immediately, but desisted upon the representation that
one of his brigades was too much fatigued by a rapid
march from Chazy to be fit for immediate action. 1 If
so, it was a pity that he did not act upon his opinion at
all risks. The departure of Izard had left his successor,
General Macomb, with only fifteen hundred effective
regular troops and about the same number of recruits
and convalescents ; and to this scanty force only seven
hundred dispirited militia had as yet been added. 2
Prevost himself had some eleven thousand men, most
of them of the finest quality ; and one half of them
should certainly have sufficed to sweep the enemy away.
The Saranac itself was fordable ; and three redoubts
1 Life of Sir George Prevost, p. 143.
2 Izard said that he had left 3000 regular troops at Plattsburg.
128 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. with block-houses and connecting field-works held by
Sept. raw levies would hardly have stopped veterans, who
had carried the entrenchments of the Nivelle. The
American flotilla was, it is true, anchored within range
of the shore, ready to enfilade the attacking columns
with its cannon ; but the country, being wooded and
intricate, would probably have masked the fire to a
great extent ; and, if Prevost were prepared in the first
instance to ignore the ships, the reasonable inference is
that their intervention was not greatly to be feared.
Moreover, the heights once taken, the flotilla would
speedily be driven to the open water by the British
guns. On the other hand it was of little advantage to
deprive the American ships of the shelter of the batteries
ashore, unless the British squadron were at hand to
engage them. However, Sir George waited until the
Sept. 7. morning of the yth, when perceiving that the American
ships had taken up a new anchorage at a greater distance
from the shore beyond cannon-shot as he estimated
he summoned Downie to join him at once, if his
squadron were fit for action, and set his men to erect
batteries and siege-guns. Prevost's point and his
reasoning was perfectly sound was that the American
fleet and army were not within supporting distance of
each other, and might be destroyed in detail.
Downie, who had already brought his ships to
Lacolle, twenty-five miles north of Cumberland Bay,
against wind and current, answered that it would be a
day or two before the Confiance would be fit for action,
but that no time would be lost, as he could employ the
Sept. 8. interval in working up to Chazy. On the 8th Prevost
again wrote to Downie that he was only awaiting the
arrival of the squadron to make his attack ; and now
Downie answered more curtly that the Confiance was
still unready, and would remain at Chazy until his guns
were mounted. Meanwhile American militia streamed
daily into Macomb's camp, augmenting his force and
Sept. 9. enabling him to strengthen his defences ; and on the 9th
Prevost sent a third nagging letter, acquitting Downie
CH.XIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 129
of all intentional delay but plainly revealing his own 1814.
impatience, and stating that according to the reports of
deserters the American fleet was inefficiently manned.
Downie replied briefly that he should weigh at mid-
night, and expected to round into Cumberland Bay at
dawn of the loth. "In manning the flotilla and ships Sept. 10.
we are many short," he added ; " I have made applica-
tion to the officer commanding at Chazy for a company
of the Thirty-ninth to make up." The company was
supplied, strange to its work, strange to the officers,
strange to everything; but a strong head wind pre-
vented the squadron from making any way ; and
Prevost, who had held his columns in readiness to
storm since six o'clock in the morning, was fain to
withdraw his troops and address to Downie a fourth
irritating letter expressive of his disappointment. " I
ascribe it to the unfortunate change of wind," he
wrote, " and I shall rejoice to learn from you that
my expectations have been frustrated by no other
cause." Greatly hurt by this undeserved imputation
of dilatoriness, Downie answered verbally to Pre vest's
messenger that he was responsible for the squadron
and did not mean it to be hurried into action until it
was fit to fight ; but, speaking later in the day to his
second in command, he declared that he intended to
convince the General that the naval force would not be
backward in the attack. Before dawn of the nth the Sept, n
squadron weighed anchor with a fair wind and stood
up the narrow channel towards the lake.
In his last letter to Downie, Prevost stated that his
troops had been held ready to storm the enemy's works
at nearly the same moment as the naval action should
commence in the bay. " Nearly the same moment " is
a vague phrase, but Downie after verbal communication
with Prevost's messengers understood it to mean that
the army would assault simultaneously with the opening
of the naval attack, that the American squadron would
thereby be compelled to quit its anchorage, and that in
the consequent confusion the British ships would have a
VOL. x K
130 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. decided advantage. Prevost had thrown up two heavy
Sept. ii. batteries on the shore to keep the American gun-boats
at a distance in case they should stand in to annoy his
flank ; but if, as he maintained, the American squadron
was out of range from his guns, it is not clear why his
attack should cause the ships to move. If he should
master Macomb's position, which was nearer to the
hostile fleet than was his own, he might turn the
American heavy ordnance, which he would capture
there, upon them ; though even then it is uncertain
whether they would have been within range. Thus it
is not clear whether Prevost intended the navy to help
the army, or the army to help the navy. But beyond
question he was working above all things for a naval
victory ; and, from the fact that Downie was instructed
to announce his approach by a discharge of signal guns,
it would be reasonable to conclude that the attack on
land was to precede that on water.
At five o'clock in the morning Downie fired his
signal guns, and, heaving to at 7.30 near the entrance
to Cumberland Bay, went forward in a boat to re-
connoitre the enemy's squadron. This was anchored
in single line ahead north and south across the middle
of the bay, with all the skill that was to be expected from
its brave and capable commander, Commodore Mac-
donough. Downie then made ^ his dispositions to
engage the enemy, and, rounding Cumberland Head at
about nine o'clock, stood into the bay. Prevost,
meanwhile, guessing that a fair wind would certainly
bring the British squadron into action, visited his
second in command at daybreak, and directed the
troops to cook their breakfast and to be ready for the
assault. Simultaneously with the opening of fire by
Downie, Prevost's batteries engaged and silenced the
only American battery that bore upon the water. Orders
were sent to the brigades of Robinson and Power to
move down under cover of the forest to a ford wide on
the left of the American position, and to Brisbane's
brigade to approach the bridge opposite to the enemy's
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 131
centre. Robinson and Power accordingly set their 1814.
battalions in motion, but, being misled by their guide, Sept. n.
were obliged to counter-march, and thus lost at least
an hour in arriving at their point of action. They
then forced the ford, and were in the act of advancing
through the wood, when a message arrived from Prevost
to break off the engagement and to retire.
The reason for this sudden order was cogent. The
squadron under Downie's orders after two hours and a
quarter of incessant fighting had been totally defeated.
Downie himself had been killed in the first few minutes
of the action ; his second in command was a prisoner,
and his flagship had hauled down her flag in a sinking
condition. In the circumstances Prevost rightly judged
it useless waste of life to persist in his attack, and
decided to fall back at once. Without a fleet any
military advantage would have been worthless, and
every day's delay would have made his position more
difficult. Desertion, always considerable in America
owing to the temptation offered by American agents,
was increasing. Provisions were scanty and, owing to
the failure of water-transport, likely to become scantier.
The only roads lay through swamps, and, by reason of
the weather and the obstructions made by the enemy,
were almost impassable. Lastly, the American militia
was gathering in masses all round the British. Prevost,
therefore, with sound judgment retreated on the 1 2th, Sept. 12.
abandoning a certain quantity of stores which he had
no means of removing. His casualties during the
advance, the action and the subsequent retreat amounted
to twenty officers and two hundred and twenty-three
men killed, wounded and missing.
The navy was furious at this mishap, and raised
such an outcry against Prevost that he was recalled to
be tried by court-martial. The gist of the charge
against him was that he had hurried the fleet into battle
before it was ready, in disadvantageous circumstances,,
and for no particular object ; and that he had upset
the whole of Downie's arrangements by failing tp m^j
132 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. his attack at the concerted time. It is certain that the
Sept. ii. Confiance, still uncompleted, and with an untrained
crew that had not spent even a week together to enable
them to know their officers and each other, was unready
for action. It is certain also that Downie, whether
Prevost intended it or not, had interpreted the General's
last letter as an insinuation of backwardness on the part
of the navy. It is quite possible that Prevost designed
this missive to be a spur only and not a taunt ; nor is it
surprising if he did think the naval service somewhat
dilatory, for Yeo had lost the whole of the campaign-
ing season on Lake Ontario by the delay in fitting out
the St. Lawrence, and Downie seemed likely to lose it
on Lake Champlain through his slowness in equipping
the Confiance. That the naval officers can be held
responsible for such delay is, however, in the highest
degree doubtful ; and so far Prevost may be blamed for
putting undue pressure upon Downie. As a military
officer the General was quite incompetent to pronounce
whether a ship was or was not ready for immediate
service, and upon such a point he should certainly have
deferred to the representations of the naval commander.
It must be admitted also that Downie's squadron,
though superior to Macdonough's in the open, was
inferior when attacking the Americans in a carefully
selected defensive position. But that Downie's defeat
was due to Prevost's failure to attack the American
entrenchments ashore seems to me a proposition that
cannot be maintained.
The whole issue turns upon the question whether
Macdonough could be compelled by any of the batteries,
American or British, upon the shore to weigh anchor
and shift position, or, in other words, whether his squadron
was or was not anchored within cannon-shot of the land.
Careful enquiry was made of the American commanders,
with a view to Prevost's trial, and Macomb answered
unequivocally in the negative. Macdonough stated that
his squadron lay a mile and a half from the batteries ;
and, as he moved out from a station closer inshore on
CH.XIX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 133
the night of the 6th, it is a reasonable inference that he 1814.
considered a mile and a half to be a safe distance. Sept. i
Whatever may be said to the contrary, it is inconceiv-
able that a prudent and capable commander, such as
Macdonough was, should deliberately have taken up an
anchorage from which he might be driven, to all intent
at his enemy's own good time, into the jaws of a superior
fleet. 1 This being so, it is evident that, whether misled
by Prevost's staff-officers or not, Downie completely
misconceived the situation. The whole affair seems to
have been the outcome of a most unfortunate misunder-
standing, due principally to the inability of the naval
and military commanders to grasp each the limits of
the other's capabilities.
There was, however, another reason for the indigna-
tion of the naval service against Prevost. In the rival
squadrons the forces were about equal. In each there
was a flagship of superior size, the British Confiance and
the American Saratoga, three smaller vessels and eleven
gun-boats. Downie's dispositions appear to have been
able enough, but at the critical moment of entering
into action the wind failed, with consequences which
were disastrous. The Confiance was compelled to anchor
before she had reached her appointed station ; the
American galleys, being propelled by oars, were enabled
to concentrate their fire upon her ; and the Finch, one
of the smaller British vessels, was unable to reach her
place in the line and drifted ashore upon Crab Island, a
mile to southward. All this was sheer bad luck, the
fortune of war. But the Chub, another small British
vessel, on receiving some damage to her spars, was
allowed by her commander to drift helplessly through
the American line, where she hauled down her colours ;
and seven if not eight out of the eleven British gun-
boats, following the example of the officer in charge of
them, turned tail directly the firing began. Thus the
1 I am aware that in holding this opinion I differ from so great
an authority as the late Admiral Mahan ; but his reasoning does not
convince me.
134 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. Confiance and the Linnet were left to carry on the fight
Sept. 1 1 . practically alone, which they did with signal gallantry
until overpowered. " You owe it, sir, to the shameful
conduct of your gun-boats and cutters that you are
performing this office to me," said Macdonough to
Lieutenant Robertson, Downie's successor, when the
British officer surrendered his sword, " for had they
done their duty, you must have perceived from the
situation of the Saratoga that I could hold out no
longer." The commander of the Chub was severely
reprimanded by the court-martial which tried the
officers and crews of the squadron in England, and the
commander of the gun-boats absconded rather than face
the consequences of his misconduct.
It is difficult to know whether to urge these circum-
stances in accusation or in defence of Prevost. On the
one hand, it seems certain that the British squadron,
properly manned and directed, could and would have
beaten Macdonough's, and that it failed very much
owing to the misconduct of both men and officers.
On the other, it is impossible to believe that the gun-
boats would have behaved so ill as they did, had not
their crews consisted principally of Canadian militia,
imperfectly disciplined for any purpose, and little
stiffened by a small leaven of soldiers and marines.
Downie made no complaint of them that I can discover ;
but an officer of any spirit will never raise difficulties,
and he may well have trusted to the general superiority
of the Confiance to make good all defects.
Prevost died before he could stand his trial and, in
default of his appearance, judgment has been given
against him. This is very unfair. The whole weight
of civil as well as of military direction lay upon him,
and throughout the three wearing years of his command
he was called upon to make bricks without straw. At
the outset he was bidden to do his best without hope of
troops or of money ; and, though he received more of
both than could have been expected, he never received
them at the appointed time, and thus was unable to lay
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY
'35
his plans with any certainty of being able to execute 1814,
them. Above all, he had no naval force, for but few
officers and men could be spared from England ; and yet
this war was to all intent a naval war inland. Hence his
instinct was to husband his resources, to stand constantly
on the defensive, and to welcome every chance of an
accommodation; and it cannot be said that such policy
was altogether incorrect. It was unwise, indeed, to trust
to any negotiation or agreement with the Americans,
for, whatever the good faith of the individual officer
who might treat with him, no confidence could be
reposed in that of the President or of Congress. But the
defensive attitude was the right one in principle, and
was repeatedly approved by Wellington when his advice
was sought. It is easy to blame Prevost, and indeed
Wellington also, for not taking advantage of offensive
successes ; but it must be remembered that Sir George
had only imperfect and irregular information of events
in Europe, and that he had to treat his force as the only
army that existed for the defence of Canada. On the
whole it must be said, taking his civil and military
administration together, that he fulfilled an extremely
difficult duty with no small measure of success, amid
endless worry and anxiety, and latterly, as it should
seem, though he was not yet fifty years of age, under
the burden of failing health. When all is said, the
criticism levelled at Prevost rarely rises above the
natural but superficial cavilling of local and personal
prejudice, and never regards the situation in its entirety.
Yet his is, above all, a case in which it must be re-
membered that, though subordinates may reap the
credit for any local success, the responsibility for every
failure everywhere recoils upon the Commander-in-
Chief.
The ablest and soberest of the American historians
has written that the battle of Lake Champlain, more
than any other incident of the American War, deserves
the epithet decisive. In a sense this is true, so far as
concerns any efforts of the British Government to
136 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. attempt an offensive movement on the Canadian
frontier. In the first alarm after the defeat at Platts-
burg, Liverpool offered the command in Canada to
Wellington, in the hope that he might obtain peace
upon honourable terms. Wellington put forward no
objection, but said bluntly that he could promise him-
self little success. " That which appears to me to be
wanting," he wrote, " is not a General or general officers
or troops, but a naval superiority on the lakes. . . .
This question is whether we shall acquire this naval
superiority. If we can't, I shall do you but little good
in America, and I shall go there only to prove the truth
of Prevost's defence." " Does it not occur to you," he
added a few days later, " that by appointing me to go
to America at this moment, you give ground for belief
all over Europe that your affairs there are in a much
worse situation than they really are?" 1 Here the
great Duke's strong common sense gave him insight
into the heart of the matter. No object was to be
gained by continuance of the war ; and, in a contest
of shipbuilding on the lakes, the natural advantages
enjoyed by the Americans were so great that British
superiority, though existent for the moment on Lake
Ontario, was so precarious that its endurance could not
be counted upon even from month to month. At best,
therefore, England could obtain only a temporary and
superficial success, which might or might not be useful
for purposes of negotiation ; whereas all essential profit
had been gained already. " Considering everything,"
wrote Wellington in one of the letters above quoted,
c< it is my opinion that the war has been a successful
one, and highly honourable to the British arms." This
was no exaggeration, but the strict and simple truth.
The Americans had won two great naval victories on the
lakes ; but here was nothing very extraordinary, seeing
that the naval resources of England were already taxed
to the utmost by operations against France and the
1 Supp. Desp. vol. ix. pp. 425, 435. Wellington to Liverpool, 9th-
i8th Nov. 1814.
CH. xix HISTORY OF THE ARMY 137
United States on the high seas; whereas America had at 1814.
her command a large reserve of artificers and seamen
from her maritime population. Even so, her chief
naval commander, Chauncey, though by no means with-
out talent and energy for organisation, had not shone
in the field of active operations. Indeed it cost Perry
and Macdonough, both excellent officers, no small effort
to cope with the ill-manned and ill-equipped squadrons
of Barclay and Downie.
On land also the Americans were not without their
victories, most notably against the worst of the British
commanders, Proctor ; but, speaking broadly, the
quality of their troops, the leadership of their generals,
and the strategy of their Government were one and all
beneath contempt. After three campaigns they had
indeed succeeded in mastering Detroit ; but they failed
to take the petty station of Mackinaw, they could
establish no footing on the frontier of Niagara, and
they were actually unable to expel the British from
Fort Niagara on their own side of the boundary.
Considering the enormous resources of the United
States and the powerlessness of England, locked as she
was in a grapple with France for life or death, to send
help to Canada, the war was, as said Wellington,
successful and highly honourable to the British arms.
The inevitable inference is that it was disgraceful to\
America ; and so in fact it was ; not because brave
men were lacking in the United States far from that
but because both Government and people conceived
of war not as the highest of human trials, to be
encountered only after much searching of heart and
prolonged training in discipline and endurance, but as >.
an easy and triumphant progress, to be varied by the j
recreation of wanton mischief and plunder. On the '
Canadian frontier the British could do little more than
render nugatory the operations of the American forces ;
and this they successfully did, for it may truly be said
that in that quarter the Americans in three campaigns
accomplished absolutely nothing towards their avowed
138 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. end, the conquest of Canada. It is now time to turn
to the desultory operations in other districts, whereby
the British sought to bring home to the Americans
the fact that he who makes war must expect not only
to give but to receive a buffet.
CHAPTER XX
THE first, though not the earliest in date, of the 1814.
subsidiary offensive operations of the British was an
expedition conducted by Sir John Sherbrooke, Lieu-
tenant-governor of Nova Scotia, with the view of
occupying so much of the State of Maine as should
ensure uninterrupted communication between Halifax
and Quebec. Sherbrooke sailed from Halifax on the
22nd of August with ten transports containing nearly
two thousand men ; l and, escorted by a squadron under
Admiral Griffith, made for the Penobscot river, which
he entered on the ist of September. Having taken Sept. i.
the fort of Castine after a trifling resistance, Sherbrooke
on the 3rd sent a detachment farther up the stream.
These drove away after a slight skirmish a force of
militia, which was endeavouring to protect an American
frigate, and, after forcing the enemy to abandon and
burn the frigate, followed up the militia and compelled
them to disperse. On the 9th the expedition dropped Sept. 9.
down the river again to Machias, when the fort was
evacuated upon the approach of the British ; and
Sherbrooke, having annexed by proclamation all the
country lying east of the Penobscot up to the boundary
of New Brunswick, settled down to occupy it with the
full consent of the inhabitants. Upon Wellington's
representations, however, England renounced all claim
to keep this territory upon the negotiations for peace.
Wellington contended, truly enough, that Sherbrooke's
garrison was so small that it could not claim possession ;
1 Dets. of zgth, 7/6oth, 62nd and 98th.
i39
1 40 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. but it was none the less a misfortune that the new
boundary could not have been preserved, for it might
have averted dangerous discontent and disputes in the
future.
Far more effective in its results was the armament
which descended in August upon the Chesapeake, the
happy hunting-ground of the British fleet during the
year 1813. The only defensive force kept by the
American Government in this quarter was a flotilla of
thirteen galleys and gun -boats under Commodore
Barney, which, owing to their lighter draught, were
able to escape up the rivers if seriously threatened.
Barney was a brave and skilful officer, but his operations
were cramped by the fact that the British had established
and fortified an advanced base at Tangier Island
opposite the mouth of the Potomac, from which their
ships effectually hindered the passage of the flotilla
between the five great rivers the Patuxent, Potomac,
Rappahannock, York and James, that run into the
southern portion of Chesapeake Bay. At the confluence
of the Potomac with its tributary, the Eastern Branch,
stands the city of Washington, which, as the capital
of the United States, the British Government had
selected as the fittest recipient of a first salutary lesson.
The Americans had wantonly wrecked and plundered
York, the capital of Upper Canada ; they were now to
have an opportunity of defending their own chief city.
On the ist of June General Ross had sailed from
Bordeaux with three battalions 1 and one company of
artillery from Wellington's army, and arrived at Bermuda
on the 24th. There he picked up the Twenty-first
and a battalion of marines ; and, proceeding on his
voyage on the 3rd of August, entered the capes of the
Aug. 15. Chesapeake together with his convoy on the I5th.
There were now assembled at the rendezvous four
ships of the line, and several smaller vessels of war,
1 i /4th, 44th, 85th. The 44th had been sent home from
Portugal early in 1813, and had rejoined after the battle of
Toulouse.
CH.XX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 141
from which the naval Commander - in - Chief, Sir 1814.
Alexander Cochrane, furnished Ross with yet another
battalion of seven hundred marines, raising his force
to over four thousand men.
The first object of the expedition was the destruction
of Barney's flotilla at the head of the Patuxent, from
the banks of which river Washington also could be
reached by a short march overland. The squadron
of frigates was sent up the Potomac to keep the enemy
in doubt as to the true route that would be taken by
the army; and on the i8th the main body of the Aug. 1 8.
armament sailed up the windings of the Patuxent
between banks covered with huge forest trees. On the
1 9th the troops were landed at Benedict, on the western Aug. 19.
margin of the river twenty-five miles from its mouth,
and were organised by Ross into three brigades, one
consisting of light troops under Colonel Thornton, the
other two being under Colonels Brooke and Paterson. 1
The force then advanced northward, keeping in touch
with the squadron on the river, to Upper Marlborough,
three miles above Pit Point, where Barney's flotilla
was lying. Perceiving escape to be impossible the
American Commodore withdrew his crews on the 2ist,
leaving only a few men upon each boat to set fire to
her ; and on the 22nd, upon the approach of the British Aug. 22.
vessels, the entire flotilla was destroyed.
From Upper Marlborough two roads led to Washing-
ton, the one bearing nearly due west to a bridge which
carried it over the Eastern Branch immediately into the
city, the other trending north-west to the bridge of
Bladensburg, which lay about five miles farther up the
river. About midway in the former of these roads was
a crossway at a place called Oldfields, where roads forked
out north-westward to Bladensburg, and south-west upon
1 ist Brigade. Lt.-Col. Thornton (85th) : 85th L.I., light cos. of
4th, 2 1st, and 44th; I co. marines; I co. negroes.
2nd Brigade. Lt.-Col. Brooke (4th) : 4th, 44th.
yd Brigade. Lt.-Col. Paterson (2ist) : 2ist, I batt. marines.
Artillery : I six-pounder, 2 light three-pounders.
i 4 2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. Fort Washington, which was the principal defence of the
Aug. 22. capital on the Potomac. There was thus considerable
embarrassment for the American commander who was
charged with the duty of repelling the invaders, for he
could not divine which would be the objective preferred
by his enemy nor, except in the case of Fort Washington,
by what road he would decide to approach it.
The unfortunate individual selected for this trying
duty was General Winder ; and the force at his dis-
posal amounted to between five to six thousand men,
all of whom, with the exception of Barney's four
hundred sailors, were militia. Winder had received his
appointment on the 2nd day of July as military
chief of a large district, which should have furnished
him, according to the returns on paper, with ninety-
three thousand militia. Had a force of even one-
fourth of his strength been obtainable, however raw,
it could have given Ross infinite trouble and perhaps
have turned him back altogether ; for the ground
over which he had advanced was covered with forest,
offering endless opportunities for the admirable mark-
manship of the American riflemen, and presenting at
every step strong positions for defence. So rotten, how-
ever, was the administrative system, and so slow were
the people to answer the call of patriotic duty, that, out of
fifteen thousandjmen summoned by the Government, not
above three thousand had come forward by the 22nd of
August. More were indeed on the way ; but with such
puny numbers Winder had no alternative but to fall
back, finally taking up a position at Oldfields, as the
point which he rightly judged to be most important.
As he had expected, Ross advanced by the western road,
Aug. 23. and at nightfall of the 23rd the British encamped within
three miles of Oldfields. Dreading the effect of a
possible night attack, Winder retired in the darkness to
Washington, burning the bridges over the Eastern
Aug. 24. Branch behind him ; whereupon Ross on the 2 4 th
turned north-westwards, and at noon marched into
Bladensburg.
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY H3
Contrary to Winders orders some militia stationed
at this point had been withdrawn by their officers across A U g 24
the river, though without destruction of the bridge,
and had been formed on some heights astride the road
to Washington on the right bank, facing east. On the
summit was posted a battery, which commanded the
bridge, and on each flank of the guns was an array of
infantry, with a second line in support. Since, however,
the stream was fordable in many places above the
bridge, this second line was weakened in order to
extend the American left, which was further strengthened,
when Winder came up, by the guns that he brought
with him. The dispositions had not long been complete
when the British Light Brigade topped the rising
ground on the opposite side of the bridge ; and though
the Second and Third Brigades were still far in rear,
the men being in bad condition after a long voyage,
Thornton prepared to attack immediately. Ross
assented ; and at about one o'clock in the afternoon
Thornton launched the Light Brigade at the bridge, and
carried the passage, in spite of some loss from the
American artillery. At this moment Barney came up
with his seamen and guns, which were posted by Winder
astride of the road to Washington and opposite the
bridge. While the Commodore was making his dis-
positions, a few rockets thrown by the British towards
the American left sufficed to throw the American
militia in that quarter into panic, and the greater part
of both lines turned and ran. A few only stood firm
for a time, but broke immediately when Winder
attempted to draw them back a little ; and thus the
American left was routed almost before it was engaged.
Presently Thornton, having re-formed his brigade after
passing the bridge, advanced up the road, apparently
without throwing out a single skirmisher, and finding
Barney's battery before him, halted for a few minutes.
The Commodore coolly reserved his fire until Thornton
was within close range, and then swept the British off
the road with grape. A second and a third frontal attack
i 4 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. were in like manner repulsed, and a fourth directed
Aug. 24. against Barney's right was met by a withering fire from
three field-guns and from the musketry of the American
seamen and marines. By this time Thornton himself,
the two field-officers and nine other officers of the Eighty-
fifth had fallen ; and the Light Brigade was ordered to
hold its own until Brooke's brigade could come up.
In about half an hour, as it seems, Brooke appeared, his
men much exhausted by a rapid march under a hot sun
after long confinement on board ship. He was directed
to turn the American right, while Ross galloped off to
take personal command of the Light Brigade. By this
time nearly the whole of the American force had dis-
appeared from the field, with the exception of Barney's
detachment and a body of five or six hundred infantry,
which was very strongly posted upon his right. Brooke
led the Forty-fourth against Barney's exposed left flank,
and directed the Fourth to turn the infantry on the
American right. These last after a feeble volley or two
turned and ran before a charge of half their number of
British ; and Barney was left alone with his naval
detachment, himself and two of his officers badly
wounded, and two more of them killed. His men stood
until some of them were bayoneted at their guns, when,
finding that his ammunition-drivers had fled and that
the whole party was in danger of capture, the Com-
modore ordered them to save themselves. Ten guns and
a few prisoners fell into Ross's hands, among the latter
being Barney himself, who was deservedly treated by
his captors with all possible consideration and cordiality.
He and his little band of disciplined seamen and
marines had covered themselves with honour.
The action, trifling though it was, appears to have
been ill-managed by Ross, who hurried his troops into
action piece-meal, and thus ran great and unnecessary risk
of seeing them defeated in detail. If it be urged that
time was a great object, the obvious answer is that Ross
was obliged, after all, to await the arrival of Brooke's
brigade before he could drive the Americans from their
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 145
position. Thornton also appears to have handled his 1814.
brigade without skill or science, delivering his frontal Aug. 24.
attacks in the most primitive and bludgeon-like fashion,
with the inevitable consequence of temporary failure
and appreciable loss. The casualties of the British
numbered two hundred and forty-nine ; and, strong
though the Americans were in artillery, this was more
than should have been needed to displace four hundred
disciplined men encumbered by a rabble of five thousand.
Harry Smith, who was present, did not hesitate to say
that John' Colborne would have accomplished as much
as Ross at the sacrifice of no more than fifty men.
However, the victory was complete, though the
casualties of the vanquished hardly exceeded fifty ; and
Ross, after a short halt resuming his advance, entered
Washington at eight o'clock on the same evening. In
the morning Secretary Armstrong had ridden out to
the American position with his colleagues, and had
assured President Madison that, in a fight between
regulars and militia, the militia must be beaten. None
the less the President had prepared a supper of forty
covers for his victorious officers ; and this repast, to
Madison's infinite mortification, was consumed by Ross
and his staff.
Then the work of punishment began, scrupulously
judicial but severe. Private property was respected,
and plunder was most strictly forbidden; but all
public buildings, including the President's official
residence and the Parliament House, as well as the
navy-yard, store-houses, barracks and arsenal, were
burned to the ground. Such destruction, even in the
way of reprisal, is revolting to the civilised human mind,
and though rigorously executed in obedience to orders
from Downing Street, was by no means to the taste
of many of Wellington's officers. The Americans of
course shrieked loudly about vandalism, barbarism and
so forth, and their cries were echoed by the ignoble
faction which from beginning to end of the Great War
sought to hamper the British Government and their
VOL. x L
146 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. country in the House of Commons. Nevertheless the
Aug. punishment was righteous, and the Americans had only
themselves to thank for it. York, the humble capital,
but still the capital, of Upper Canada, had been treated
by them in like fashion with far greater parade of
wantonness and insolence ; and both at York and in
sundry villages private property had been destroyed
and pillaged with the brutality peculiar to levies, which
go eagerly afield to oppress the helpless, but fly to
their own homes when they meet armed men. The
burning of the public buildings at Washington was a
salutary lesson to a nation whose conception of war
was the bullying of a weaker neighbour.
The panic caused by this raid of four thousand enemies
was complete. Five small British men-of-war, which
had ascended the Potomac under command of Captain
Gordon, while the main armament went up the Patuxent,
arrived after infinite difficulty and exertion, owing to
Aug. 27. shoal waters, on the 2yth before Fort Washington. The
fort itself, which mounted seventeen heavy guns besides
smaller ordnance, was basely abandoned by its com-
mander at the bursting of the first British shell. There-
upon the town of Alexandria, situated five miles below
Washington, made overtures of capitulation ; and
Gordon, after holding the town for three days, retired,
taking with him a number of trading vessels fully
loaded with merchandise. Meanwhile Ross withdrew
his troops from Washington on the night of the 25th ;
Aug. 29. an d on the 29th returned safe and unmolested to
Benedict. He owed the tranquillity of his retirement,
it seems, to the report assiduously circulated by himself
that he was going next to Baltimore and Annapolis,
upon which the Americans shifted all their troops to
that quarter.
The naval commanders, always eager for operations
ashore and still untaught by the lessons of Cura9oa,
Vera Cruz, Cadiz and Ferrol, now became urgent
for an attack upon Baltimore, not without hope, as
was natural in those days, of a great haul of shipping
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 147
and merchandise and consequently of prize-money. 1814.
Lieutenant De Lacy Evans, of Ross's staff, who later Aug.
rose to some degree of military fame, seconded Admirals
Cochrane and Cockburn ; and only Harry Smith (if his
own story is to be believed) uttered a note of warning.
He represented that half of the men were on the sick
list, owing to fatiguing marches after long confinement
on board ship, that the enemy had been induced by
Ross's own stratagem to concentrate force at Baltimore,
and that the passage up the river to the city had been
obstructed by sunken ships. Ross, before sending
Smith home with despatches, promised to have nothing
to do with the adventure ; and apparently he prevailed
for a time with the Admirals, for Cochrane wrote on the
3<Dth that the next enterprise attempted would be the
reduction of Rhode Island with a view to quartering
the army upon the enemy until November ; after which,
if reinforced, it would proceed southward. On the
2nd of September this same project was still in favour, Sept.
and the more so since the Americans would judge Rhode
Island to be the base for a grand attack upon New
York. They were in fact already fortifying Brooklyn
and Manhattan Island, according to Cochrane's in-
formation, and would thus be unable to spare rein-
forcements for the Canadian frontier an erroneous
calculation, for there was New York militia both with
Brown in his sortie from Fort Erie on the iyth, and
with Macomb at Plattsburg on the nth of September.
However, for some reason which does not appear, the
project against Baltimore was revived, and Ross was
induced to consent to it. 1
The troops were accordingly re-embarked ; and the
squadron, sailing up Chesapeake Bay, anchored at the
mouth of the Patapsco river, which is the water-way to
Baltimore Harbour, while the lighter vessels stood up
the stream to the northern shore a little above North
Point. Here on the morning of the I2th the soldiers Sept. 12.
were landed on the peninsula formed by the Back
1 W.O. i. 141. Ross to Sec. of State, joth Aug., 2nd Sept. 1814.
148 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. River on the north and the Patapsco on the south, at a
Sept. 12. p i nt some thirteen miles from Baltimore. Advancing
northward to turn the head of an inlet, they came upon
the enemy completing his entrenchments across a neck
of land less than half a mile broad from water to water.
This position was abandoned instantly on the approach
of the red-coated skirmishers ; and the British moved
on for another two miles, when, entering wooded
country, they found themselves much harassed by con-
cealed American riflemen. Ross, who was riding in
advance to reconnoitre, was mortally wounded by one
of these marksmen ; but Brooke, taking command,
pressed on to within five miles of Baltimore, when he
was again stopped by some five thousand Americans
with six guns, who were drawn up in dense formation
across a second narrow neck of land, here more than a
thousand yards wide. Brooke promptly sent out the
Light Brigade in skirmishing order, deployed his own
brigade along the whole length of the line, and held his
third brigade in columns on the road, with orders to
deploy to the left and press the American right as soon
as the ground should become sufficiently open to permit
the movement. The water on the American left was
fordable, and for this reason General Strieker, who
commanded their force, had placed one battalion en
potence at the extremity of his line, so as to guard his
left flank. All being ready, Brooke launched his troops
to the attack ; and the Fourth, which had worked its
way unseen close to Strieker's left, suddenly revealed
itself within twenty yards of the battalion mentioned
above. The Americans fired one random volley and
fled ; the whole of the left wing fled likewise ; and
though the right wing stood for a little longer and
seems to have offered some real resistance, all presently
ran away in the haste and confusion of panic, leaving
two guns behind them.
The day being far spent, and the troops much
fatigued by such exertions on their first day ashore,
Brooke halted for the night where he stood, and on the
CH.XX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 149
following morning advanced to within a mile and a half 1814.
of Baltimore. He found the ring of hills, which Sept. 13.
surrounded the city, strengthened by a chain of palisaded
redoubts, which were connected by a small breastwork.
These lines were defended, according to the information
furnished to him, by some fifteen thousand militia with
a considerable number of guns ; wherefore, to neutralise
the superiority of the enemy's artillery as far as possible,
he resolved to delay his attack until the night. In the
evening, however, he heard from Cochrane that the
entrance to the harbour had been blocked by sunken
ships, and that the Navy was consequently unable to
co-operate in any further movement. This fact, as has
been told, was known to the British commanders before
they started on the expedition, but the Admirals had
made light of it, averring that they would remove all
obstacles without difficulty. Brooke, therefore, retired
slowly on the I4th, and, finding himself unpursued, Sep 1 - M-
re-embarked his soldiers at North Point. The opera-
tions had cost the British two hundred and ninety
killed and wounded, of which ninety-two belonged to
the Twenty-first, and ninety-nine to the Forty-fourth
a useless and almost a wicked sacrifice of life, for no
object except, it is to be feared, to bring prize-money
to the Navy. Unfortunately this was not the first nor
the last disaster attributable to the same cause.
With a force now reduced to little more than thirty-
five hundred men, Brooke, in company with Admiral
Malcolm, made a petty raid on the Virginian side of
the Potomac on the 5th and 6th of October ; and then Oct. 5-6.
sailed for Jamaica, where he arrived on the ist of
November. There he was joined on the 2ist by five Nov. 21.
companies of the Rifle Brigade, 1 and by the Ninety-
third Highlanders, which had recently returned, the one
from France and the other from the Cape of Good
Hope. Cochrane with his fleet having already arrived
on the 1 9th, the armament was completed by the
1 3rd Batt. They had arrived at Plymouth from the Peninsula
on the 1 8th of July.
150 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. coming of two West India regiments, and presently
Nov - sailed for the mouth of the Mississippi. Its destination,
as was too often the case throughout this war, had
already been proclaimed in the West Indian newspapers,
and possibly was no secret in any quarter by the autumn
of 1814. In May, very soon after taking over the
command of the North American and West Indian
stations, Admiral Cochrane had despatched to the mouth
of the Apalachicola river a frigate, whose captain,
Pigot by name, after negotiation with the Creek and
Choctaw Indians, had reported that, with the aid of a
few British officers and sergeants, these savages could
gain possession of Baton Rouge, from which base the
conquest of New Orleans and the Lower Mississippi
would be a simple matter. Accordingly Cochrane in
August had sent an officer and a few non-commissioned
officers, together with arms and ammunition, to the
Indians, and seconded Pigot's recommendation to the
Government in Downing Street. His views found all
too ready acceptance with Ministers, who had already
resolved to despatch a formidable force to New Orleans
under Sir Rowland Hill. 1 As it happened, the political
situation was not such as to permit the intended
number of troops to be spared from Europe ; and the
expedition was therefore limited to six thousand men,
of which one brigade, under Major-general Lambert,
was to join the main body in the Mississippi itself.
After the death of Ross, moreover, Sir Edward
Pakenham, Wellington's brother-in-law, and lately
his Adjutant -general, was appointed to the supreme
command.
It is easy to see that the choice of New Orleans as
an objective was due to naval advice, and that this
advice was due chiefly to the desire for prize-money.
1 Sir John Hope had been selected first to command this ex-
pedition ; and Hill was substituted in consequence of Sir John's
capture before Bayonne. Wellington, Supp. Desp. ix. 42. Sir G.
Murray declined the offer of a divisional command in this force,
ibid. 57, 58.
CH.XX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 151
The city was the great dep6t for the exportation of 1814.
cotton and sugar ; and it was estimated that the crops
of these two commodities alone, stored up within it,
were worth in England some three-and-a-half millions
sterling, which tobacco, hemp, lead and shipping would
increase to fully four millions. The seizure of so rich
a hoard, if it could be easily and cheaply effected, might
conceivably be the most telling blow that England
could strike at the United States, a country upon
which it is notoriously difficult to inflict vital injury.
But this was not the reason why the naval officers
recommended it. Prize-money had for nearly two
centuries been the motive for all amphibious operations
recommended by the Navy ; and this of New Orleans was
no exception. If any naval officers had shown stronger
lust of prize than others, they were the Scots ; and all
three of the Admirals engaged in this expedition
excellent men in their own profession were by a
singular coincidence Scotsmen, Cochrane, Cockburn and
Malcolm. Cochrane at the outset estimated that three
thousand British soldiers would suffice to drive the
Americans entirely out of Louisiana, as they would be
joined by all the Indians, disaffected French and
Spaniards ; a piece of folly so childish that it ought to
have warned the British Ministers against listening to
any of his projects. Listen they did, however, though
in their instructions to the commanders they stated the
objects of the expedition to be, first, the seizure of the
mouth of the Mississippi, so as to deprive the American
back-settlements of communication with the sea, and,
next, the occupation of some valuable possessions which
would be useful to hold in pledge against the negotia-
tions for peace. The General was also authorised to
encourage any movement in favour of setting up an
independent Government in Louisiana and of restoring
it to Spain ; but at the same time to make it clearly
understood that the British Government could not
make such independence or transfer of allegiance an
essential condition in the negotiations for peace. This
152 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. policy was dangerously near akin to that which had
made shipwreck of the British cause in South America.
Dec. 2. On the 2nd of December General Jackson, who
had lately commanded American troops in operations
against the Creek Indians, arrived at New Orleans,
where the militia of Kentucky and Tennessee had
already received orders to join him by way of the
river. He was a man who had gained some military
experience in fighting against savages, a rancorous hater
of the British, with whom he had combated as a boy
in the war of the American Revolution, brave, shrewd,
energetic and resolute. His determination, openly
expressed from the beginning, to harass, torment and
annoy the British invaders until they were expelled,
shows that he rightly appreciated the problem set to
him, and had thought out the best means for its
Dec. 8. solution. On the 8th Cochrane anchored off Ship
Island in Mississippi Sound, and began without delay
to make his preparations. It was hopeless to think of
sailing past the forts on the Lower Mississippi, and he
therefore decided to turn those works by approaching
the river through one or other of the creeks that
traverse the huge swampy delta to east of it. From
Ship Island the direct way was across the shallow
lagoon called Lake Borgne, at the head of which a
creek, known as the Bayou Bienvenu, furnished a
landing-place within five miles of the Mississippi.
Five American gun-boats and a few smaller craft
defended this lagoon ; and, having no vessels of
sufficiently light draught to navigate its waters, Cochrane
was obliged to attack them with forty-five rowing boats
Dec. 14. of his fleet. This he did successfully on the I4th of
December, capturing after a very sharp fight every one
of the American vessels. The way being thus laid
open, the advanced guard l was put into the ships' boats
1 Cavalry. I4th L.D., dismounted.
Advance. 4th, 85th, 95th.
ist Brigade. 2ist, 44th, 5th W.I.R.
2nd Brigade. 93rd, yth W.I.R.
CH.XX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 153
and rowed to Isle aux Poix, a wretched swampy islet at 1814.
the mouth of the Pearl river, some twenty miles east
of the intended place of ultimate debarkation. Officers
were sent forward to reconnoitre the Bayou Bienvenu,
who found no sign of opposition to an advance by that
line; and by the 2ist the whole of the land forces Dec. 21.
were assembled at Isle aux Poix. On the morning of the
22nd General Keane and Admiral Malcolm embarked Dec. 22.
with twenty-four hundred men on gun-vessels and
boats, and set sail for the mouth of the Bayou Bienvenu.
Within three miles the largest vessels ran aground, and,
as the voyage proceeded, the lagoon became dotted at
intervals with craft which were hard and fast on the
bottom ; but none the less Keane and Malcolm pressed
on, and after dark reached their appointed destination.
A company of the Rifles, seeing a light not far ahead
upon the north bank, landed, and, advancing stealthily,
surprised and captured an American picquet without
the firing of a shot. They then occupied the captured
post a small artificial mound enclosed within a screen
of reeds ten to twelve feet high, all springing out of a
vast swamp. The leading boats rowed up the creek,
always through a forest of reeds, and the soldiers
disembarking on the south bank found themselves
within seven miles of New Orleans. One by one the
rest of the flotilla came up ; and early on the 23rd Dec. 23.
sixteen hundred men were ashore, and marching for the
river. At the head of the creek the ground was firmer ;
the reeds disappeared ; forests of cypress took their
place, then sugar-canes, orange groves, cultivation and
houses. After some trouble the situation of New
Orleans was discovered, and the road to it ; but the
little party groped its way silently southward, hugging
the banks of the creeks, which furnished the only stable
ground for their feet, and so penetrating at about
eleven o'clock to the house of a Mr. Villere. Here a
second picquet was surprised and captured, with how-
ever the unfortunate exception of an officer, who
contrived to escape and give the alarm at New Orleans.
154 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. Thus far all had gone well ; and the surprise of
Dec. 23. two picquets immediately after the destruction of the
American flotilla did no great credit to Jackson's
vigilance. But the strain upon the men of both
services had been very heavy. The unfortunate blue-
jackets had been in the boats for eight unbroken
days and nights, tugging almost continuously at the
oar ; and some of the soldiers had been cooped up
likewise for six days and nights. Furthermore, shortly
after the flotilla left Isle aux Poix, the rain fell in
torrents, and ceased only to give way to a cutting
north wind, sleet and ice. The boats were so much
crowded that the soldiers had no room to move, but
were compelled to sit still, cramped and half-frozen, for
twelve, eighteen and almost twenty-four hours together.
Yet not a word of complaint was heard either from the
overwrought sailors nor from their comrades of the
army ; though it must have occurred at any rate to the
blue-jackets that an expedition of such a nature could
not be of long continuance. The exertions and hard-
ships of the previous thirty-six hours had served to
bring up but one-third of the army. The boats had
already returned to convey the two remaining brigades ;
but even then all supplies and stores would require to
be transported in the same way that is to say in
row-boats over a distance of seventy or eighty miles
from Ship Island to the landing-place in the Bayou
Bienvenu. Moreover, in case of defeat not only would
re-embarkation of any kind be most difficult and
hazardous, but it would be impossible to find sufficient
small craft to carry the whole of the military force at
once. There are times and circumstances in which
such risks must and should be taken by commanders ;
but to put the country to the expense of sending six
thousand men across the Atlantic for so mad a venture
was little short of criminal.
The Spanish fishermen, who had guided Keane and
Malcolm on their way, pressed them to advance at
once. They urged with some measure of truth that
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 155
Jackson's peremptory measures had made him unpopular 1814.
in New Orleans, that the defences which he had raised Dec. 23,
so far were trifling, that he had no troops worth speak-
ing of to hold them, and that the bulk of the population
of the city would side with the invaders. Moreover it
was not much past noon, and five hours of daylight
would suffice for the work in hand. Had Keane
realised, as he ought, that he was engaged not upon
a military operation but upon a mere buccaneering
adventure, he would have acted upon this advice. The
troops, set down as they were in the midst of chilly,
unhealthy swamps after their long and miserable ex-
posure in the boats, were sure to become sickly ; and
delay would permit his enemies to improve their earth-
works and to collect fresh levies. At best he might
achieve a daring and striking success; at worst he would
sacrifice no more than a small detachment, whose defeat
would indeed mean the ruin of the expedition in itself
no misfortune but could hardly be reckoned a great
disgrace. However, treating affairs seriously as he did,
he pointed to his men still out of condition after a long
voyage, to his supports, supplies, and means of retreat,
all of them eighty miles away, and declined, in spite of
the remonstrances of Admiral Cochrane and Colonel
Thornton, to take the risk. Had he advanced at once,
he would probably have surprised Jackson before the
American concentration had been accomplished.
Jackson had been apprised on the morning of the
23rd of the arrival of a hostile flotilla at the head of
Lake Borgne ; but it was not until two in the afternoon
that he learned of the disembarkation of the British and
fired the alarm-gun. The only field-works so far con-
structed appear to have been an unfinished battery for
two guns thrown up on the road, along the left bank of
the Mississippi, that led to New Orleans, and its function
was to flank one of the many broad ditches that tra-
versed the narrow isthmus, which, pent in between
cypress-swamps on the north and the great river on the
south, gave access to the city from the east. This line
156 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. was held by three hundred and fifty militia, who, upon
Dec. 23. the news of the British landing, had demanded to be
led against the enemy, but had wisely been restrained
by their commander, who was probably shrewd enough
to know that raw levies, who clamour for action, invari-
ably run away under fire and generally shoot their
leaders. The numbers of the Americans were too small
to guard effectually a front of a thousand yards ; and the
ditch itself, though broad, could either have been crossed
upon planks, of which there were plenty at hand, or
could even in places have been forded. The obstacle
therefore might have been carried with little difficulty ;
and, if this had been done by one o'clock, New Orleans
could have been reached by three or a little later. At
that hour there were under Jackson's hand some nine
hundred regular infantry, marines and artillery, with
two guns, and perhaps three hundred volunteers. Seven
to eight hundred more volunteers and militia were
within call, but could not have arrived before four
o'clock at the very earliest, probably not until half an
hour later. There were a couple of small ships of war,
the Louisiana and the Carolina, at anchor within sight of
the British, but their commanders and men were engaged
in throwing up batteries to the north of the city to fend
off an attack from Lake Pontchartrain ; and it is doubt-
ful whether they could have been in position to rake
the flank of the British advance until too late. Thus,
if Keane had moved forward promptly, he would have
found no regular scheme of resistance organised to meet
him ; and, though he must have approached the city
through a long straggling suburb, where riflemen might
have wrought great havoc among his troops, he should
with ordinary good fortune have succeeded in over-
coming all opposition. Jackson, however, was a man
who would have fought to the last, and was quite
prepared to set fire to New Orleans if he could not
hold it.
Having resolved to halt, Keane allowed his weary
soldiers to lounge about at their ease. The weather had
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 157
become soft and mild, and men and officers wandered 1814.
away to the neighbouring houses in search of food and Dec. 23.
wine, wherewith they comforted themselves, though to
no excess, after a long fast and the hardships of the
previous forty-eight hours. In the presence of so
cunning an enemy, renowned for marksmanship and for
skill in all the minor tricks of war, this seems im-
prudent ; but, except for the advance of a few mounted
riflemen, who were at once driven back by the foremost
picquets, the Americans made no attempt to molest the
British. Such was Keane's confidence that, though
aware of the presence of the two men-of-war in the
river, he raised no shelter to shield his bivouac from a
cannonade from the river, nor did he attempt to fortify
his position against any attack either from the water or
from the land. Night fell ; the bivouac was ablaze
with fires; and the men were asleep or cooking. Then
suddenly round-shot came pouring among them from
the side of the river, and a continuous roar, with the
sight of distant flashes, proclaimed that one of the
American ships had dropped down the river to a point
over against Keane's head-quarters, and was pouring in
her broadsides as fast as they could be fired. The
panic and confusion became indescribable. The ground
most heavily scored by the American shot was the alarm
post around Keane's quarters, and thus the centre of
command and the appointed rally ing-place became the
place of greatest danger. The foremost picquet of
riflemen on the New Orleans road, under Captain
Hallen, stuck to their post totally unmoved by the
firing ; the second picquet of the Eighty-fifth, which was
ensconced in a house and a garden somewhat to Hallen's
right rear, succumbed to the panic and ran back to the
bivouac. After vainly trying to array themselves in
some kind of formation, officers and men finally took
refuge under shelter of the raised bank of the river, or
of any other cover that they could find, and there sorted
themselves into a semblance of order.
The confusion was at its height when a dropping fire
158 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. of musketry began opposite to Hallen's picquet. Jack-
Dec. 23. son by five o'clock in the evening had collected some
two thousand men, of which he had directed about
fifteen hundred including the whole of his regular
troops with two guns to assail the British front near
the river, under his personal command ; while five to six
hundred more under General Coffee should fetch a
compass, following the border of the cypress swamp,
and fall upon Keane's right flank. The fire of the
Carolina s guns was to be the signal for the attack, and,
so far as Jackson's own force was concerned, the sloop
opened at the right moment ; but Coffee's column
was still far from its appointed station when the American
advanced guard first exchanged shots with Hallen's
eighty riflemen. Few though they were and unsup-
ported, this little band of green-jackets held their post
with desperate tenacity and would not give way.
Strive as they might, the Americans could not force
their way past them by the main road, for which reason,
swerving to their left, they made their way across
country athwart the British right, and occupied the
house that had been evacuated by the picquet of the
Eighty-fifth. Thence penetrating eastward they came
upon more companies of the Rifles and of the Eighty-
fifth, and engaged with these in a blind and confused
struggle. As both sides spoke the same language,
not even voices could distinguish friends from
foes in the darkness. British fired on British, and
Americans upon Americans. Both sides made prisoners
of their own men, discovered their mistake, and
turned to seek their real foes. Where they met
there were savage encounters with the bayonet and
the butt, without order, without method, and with
no clear object. Once the Americans obtained for
a, moment possession of the road in rear of Hallen,
and captured a reinforcement of thirty men who were
on their way to him, but even so they could not drive
him from his post. Gradually, as Coffee's column
came into action, the enemy spread down the whole
CH.XX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 159
length of the British right flank, and the British posi-
tion was enclosed in a triangle of fire, Hallen marking D ec
the apex, the Carolina the riverward side, and a stream
of musketry the landward side. In one spot the rifle-
men of the two nations stood almost muzzle to muzzle
on each side of a light paling ; in another the two light
three-pounders, which were Keanc's only artillery, stood
silent, the officer in charge of them not daring to fire
and hardly knowing which was his front and which his
rear ; in a third the British were pressing hard upon
the two American cannon, and only with difficulty were
driven back. Gradually superior discipline and experi-
ence told. Some companies of the Twenty-first
and Ninety-third, which had first landed, stayed the
progress of the enemy round the British right
flank, and the Americans began to give way. The
Eighty-fifth recovered the house and garden abandoned
by their picquet ; and the Americans, losing heart
as they lost ground, appear finally to have streamed
back to New Orleans as a disorderly rabble. The
fight had lasted for the best part of three hours ; and
at midnight all firing ceased.
The British loss in this affair amounted to two
hundred and thirteen killed and wounded, and sixty-
four prisoners. The brunt of the work had fallen
upon the Eighty-fifth and Ninety-fifth, each of which
counted over eighty officers and men slain or hurt,
their joint casualties amounting to two hundred
and twenty-eight killed, wounded and missing. The
Americans lost two hundred and thirteen of all ranks,
of whom seventy-four were prisoners. Upon striking
the balance of advantage from these figures, therefore,
the Americans may be said to have come off the better ;
and Jackson certainly deserved success from the prompt-
ness and vigour of his attack. It is perhaps hardly too
much to say that, if he had not encountered Hallen's
handful of veterans from the Light Division upon the
main road, he would have gone near to destroy one
half, if not the whole, of Keane's detachment. Too
160 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. much credit cannot be given to this little party of the
Dec. 23. Ninety-fifth ; and it is distressing to hear that Hallen,
who was severely wounded on this occasion, was still a
captain in 1824, when he retired from the army. By
his good service principally the impetus of Jackson's
onslaught was broken ; and, in spite of that General's
utmost personal exertions, the American troops were so
much shaken by their repulse that, if the narratives of
British officers are to be trusted, they could have offered
little resistance to an immediate advance.
According to American accounts Jackson intended in
concert with Coffee to renew the attack at one o'clock
Dec. 24. in the morning of the 24th, having been reinforced by
a party of militia, but countermanded his orders upon
learning that part of Brooke's brigade had arrived, and
that the rest of it was following. Be that as it may
and Jackson's character was not such as to belie the
story the American General at four o'clock ordered a
general retreat, and withdrew to the line of the canal,
which was flanked by the two-gun battery already
mentioned, three miles from the British bivouac and
four miles below New Orleans. Keane for his part
remained supine. Whether or not a bold advance
would have carried him straight into the city, it is
difficult to say, but certain it is that he made no such
attempt. At dawn of the 24th the Carolina was still
firing upon the British lines, and she continued to do
so at intervals for the rest of the day. Had Keane
moved up to his right to outflank the American works,
so as at least to secure the two-gun battery, which was
open in rear, and to force Jackson to take up a position
closer to the city, he might at any rate have withdrawn
his troops during daylight beyond range of the
Carolina's guns, and possibly have turned the captured
American pieces upon her. But whether he was un-
nerved, or dared not take the responsibility upon
himself when his Commander-in-Chief was hourly
expected, he sat perfectly still.
Dec. 25. On the 25th Jackson began to fortify his position
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 161
in earnest, prolonging the broad ditch which already 1814.
traversed the plain across the road to the Mississippi, Dec. 25.
a little in rear of the battery, and erecting a barricade
of sugar-casks behind the ditch itself from the river to
the cypress-swamp, to serve for a breastwork. The
guns in the battery were also augmented to four heavy
pieces which, raking the ditch from end to end, greatly
increased its efficacy as an obstacle. Keane, no more
than a mile and a half away, allowed the Americans to
pursue this work without the slightest molestation,
although by this time the whole strength of the force,
excepting Lambert's brigade, had disembarked. Sir
Edward Pakenham likewise arrived, full of appre-
hensions, for he distrusted Cochrane and had been most
anxious to take up his command before operations
should have been begun.
When he realised the situation into which the
Admiral had decoyed the army, he was with good
reason furious. To all intent his force was cooped up
on an isthmus three-quarters of a mile broad between
the Mississippi and the swamp. In front was Jackson's
fortified position ; on the river were the enemy's armed
vessels, flanking the only possible line of advance ; and
in rear were the lake and the sea. The only base of
supply was some eighty miles distant, and accessible
only in open boats ; and the last four miles of this
water-way were so narrow that it would hardly admit
two boats abreast. When water-carriage ceased, the
track from the landing-place to the camp a distance
of about four miles was so bad after rains or high
tides that provisions and stores could only be brought
forward upon men's backs. Moreover, victuals, with
the exception of a few cattle, were unobtainable upon
the spot, and the total quantity of supplies in the fleet
did not exceed one month's store, which, taking the
return voyage into account, was none too great. Again
the line of communication was insecure ; for five miles
north of New Orleans was Lake Pontchartrain, from
which there was an outlet into Lake Borgne. The
VOL. x M
1 62 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. squadron could not provide guard-boats to watch this
Dec. 2 5. and other channels, so that it was perfectly open to
the Americans to send a force against the landing-place,
destroy the dep6ts there, and intercept all incoming
barges. Lastly, Lambert's brigade had not yet appeared ;
and the force on the spot was reduced to fewer than
five thousand effective of all ranks. Of these the
Fourth and Ninety-third were strong and excellent ;
the Twenty-first strong but undisciplined ; the Forty-
fourth, only just recruited after heavy losses in the
Peninsula, was indifferent ; and the Eighty-fifth and
Rifles counted little more than five hundred men between
them. The negroes of the West India Regiments,
having been sent away without blankets or warm
clothing, were so much numbed with cold that they
were absolutely useless even for fatigue-duties. For all
practical purposes the effective force numbered little, if
at all, more than thirty-five hundred of all ranks.
In the depth of his disgust Pakenham used strong
language, which was pardonable ; but he used it without
concealment, so that his opinions filtered down to the
privates, which was inexcusable unless he had determined
to abandon the enterprise altogether. This, however,
it seems that he had not ; possibly because he considered
persistence in the undertaking, until he had at least
dealt the Americans a severe blow, to be the only safe
way of extricating his force. Trustworthy information
respecting the enemy's actions was unobtainable, and
Jackson's strength was stated by prisoners at any figure
from seven to fourteen thousand men. The only
method of obtaining intelligence, therefore, was a
reconnaissance in force ; but, before this could be
undertaken, it was necessary to destroy or drive from
their stations the two American war-ships on the
Mississippi, of which the Carolina, by shifting from one
bank to the other according to the British changes of
position, was a source of constant annoyance though
Dec. 26. not of serious injury. Accordingly on the 26th, the
day after his arrival, Pakenham caused batteries to be
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 163
erected on the bank with furnaces for heating shot. 1814.
The Carolina endeavoured to move up the river, but,
being foiled by a head wind, was kindled and burned
on the 27th. The Louisiana was able to shift her Dec. 27.
position, though by general admission she also might
and should have been destroyed ; * and she then took
up an anchorage under the western bank, abreast of
Jackson's entrenchment, so as to sweep the approach
to it with a flanking fire. At dawn of the 28th Dec. 28.
Pakenham, having reorganised his force into two
brigades, 2 advanced with both of them towards the
American line, and, on arriving within cannon-shot, was
greeted with a heavy fire from the battery and from
the frigate on the river. Colonel Burgoyne, who
accompanied the General, agreed with him that a
simple frontal attack was out of the question ; and the
troops, after suffering a loss of forty or fifty killed or
wounded, were withdrawn to a new encampment not
more than two miles from the American lines. Detached
redoubts were thrown up in advance for the protection
of the line pending further operations.
Pakenham now decided that the only possible chance
of success was to breach Jackson's breastwork with
heavy cannon, and, having done so, to assault. The
following days were therefore spent in bringing up ten
eighteen-pounder guns and four twenty-four pounder
carronades from the ships, a very arduous task, which
taxed to the utmost the strength and endurance of the
long-suffering seamen. The American general, of
course, was not idle during this interval, continuing to
strengthen his foremost entrenchments, to mount addi-
tional pieces in them, and to prepare two more lines of
defence in rear ; while Commodore Patterson of the
Louisiana, landing both men and guns on the right
bank of the Mississippi, threw shot unceasingly into the
1 Harry Smith, Autobiography, i. 231 ; James, ii. 363.
2 1st Brigade. Major-general Gibbs : 4th, 2ist, 44th, 5th
W.I.R.
znd Brigade. Major-general Keane : 85th, 93rd, 95th Rifles,
ist W.I.R.
164 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. British camp. This cannonade, added to constant petty
attacks upon the British outposts, to which Jackson
wisely never gave five minutes' rest, caused not a few
casualties, and contributed materially to wear down the
strength and endurance of the invaders. On the
Dec. 31. evening of the 3ist four eighteen-pounders were placed
by the British in battery by the river to keep the
Louisiana at a distance; and six more, together with four
carronades and a battery of field-guns, were mounted as
best they could be under the shelter of casks of sugar,
1815. within five hundred yards of the enemy's line. The
Jan. i. morning of the 1st of January 1815 broke with a dense
fog, which did not clear until eight o'clock, when the
British guns opened fire. The Americans promptly
replied, and it was very soon evident that the British
pieces were overmatched. The British projectiles were
effectually stopped by the bales of cotton of which the
American breastwork was built ; whereas the American
shot quickly demolished the slender protection thrown
up round the British batteries. After a duel of an hour
several of the British cannon had been dismounted from
their naval carriages, and Pakenham was fain to
abandon them and send a party to draw them off under
cover of night a work of great difficulty owing to a
heavy fall of rain. The result of the action was a
great disappointment to him, as he had issued detailed
orders for a general assault, in the expectation that the
American artillery would have been speedily silenced.
The absolute failure of this cannonade convinced
the British general that the American lines could be
forced only by enfilading them from the right bank of
Jan. 2-3. the river. On the 2nd and 3rd Commodore Patterson
landed more guns from the Louisiana on that side, and
kept up a more destructive cannonade than ever ; and
Sir Alexander Cochrane now proposed a very ingenious
plan for passing troops over to the right bank, seizing
this battery of Patterson's and turning the guns upon
Jackson's main line. The Admiral's idea was to widen
and deepen the canal, known as Villere's canal, along
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 165
which ran the road constructed by the British for pur- 1815.
poses of communication, to carry it through the dyke Jan.
of the Mississippi into the stream, and so to make a
direct water-way from the British advanced base to the
great river itself. The suggestion was adopted, and the
work, being begun at once, 1 was pressed forward with
such energy that by the evening of the 6th the naval Jan. 6.
officers were able to report that everything had been
completed to their satisfaction. On that day also
arrived Lambert's brigade of the Seventh and Forty-
third, some seventeen hundred strong ; and Pakenham
matured his schemes for an attack at daylight of the 8th.
In the course of the 7th some fifty boats of all sizes Jan. 7.
were brought into the newly cut canal, and dragged to
within a short distance of the Mississippi. The
Admiral reported that this had been done without the
knowledge of the enemy ; but the whole movement
was perceived by Commodore Patterson from the right
bank of the river, and was duly reported by him to
Jackson. The American general, however, appears to
have taken no notice of this warning, perhaps because
he relied upon an unfinished redoubt, which covered
Patterson's battery about half a mile further down
stream, to ward off any British attack on that side.
This entrenchment was garrisoned by General Morgan
with about one thousand militia and two guns ; and
Jackson contented himself with sending Morgan a few
hundred more militia. The event was to prove that this
neglect might have cost him very dear.
At nightfall of the yth, Colonel Thornton with the Jan. 7.
Eighty-fifth and a naval brigade of seamen and marines,
the latter counting some four hundred men, marched
down to the Mississippi to embark on the boats that
had been brought down the new water-way by the navy.
The time fixed for crossing the river was nine o'clock,
and the troops arrived punctually at their appointed
1 Wylly in his report (Pakenham Letters, p. 257) says that the
canal was not begun until the 6th, after the arrival of Lambert s
brigade, but this is incredible.
1 66 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. station, but found no boats. Hour after hour passed
away, and still the boats came not ; nor was it until
Jan. 8. past one in the morning of the 8th that a few of them
at last began one by one to make their appearance.
Either the naval officers or the engineers had been
deceived in their calculations as to the widening of the
canal. The banks, being of soft soil, had given way
and blocked the channel about a quarter of a mile from
the outlet to the Mississippi, the heaviest of the boats
had grounded in this spot, and the whole of the flotilla
behind it had been blocked. Pakenham, it is said, had
predicted some such misfortune ; but whether he had
done so or not, the misfortune had come. 1 Only with
great difficulty and labour were a few boats brought
forward, and it was impossible for the rest to follow
except after long delay. Thornton was placed in a most
difficult position, for the whole success of the operations
turned upon him. It had been expected of him to land
on the right bank before midnight, storm Morgan's
redoubt and Patterson's battery, and train the captured
guns upon the flank of the American lines before dawn,
so as to be ready to open fire at the signal of a rocket
from Pakenham. Now he was already from seven to
eight hours late, and only one-third of the appointed
number of boats had reached him. Without delay he
took his resolution, sent back the whole of his detach-
ment except the Eighty-fifth and a hundred seamen and
marines, and with fewer than four hundred men in all
shoved off into the stream. He accepted a great risk,
and deserves the highest praise for his enterprise.
On the left bank preparations went on throughout
1 Harry Smith, i. 234-235. According to this account the canal
was on a lower level than the river, and a dam had been constructed
to hold the water in the canal when the dyke of the river should
be cut through. The dam, as Pakenham had predicted, was too
weak to bear the weight of water, and gave way, so that the water
ran back and left the boats stranded until the dam could be repaired.
Wylly (Pakenham Letters) says that the whole of the work on the
canal was done under the eyes of the naval officers and approved by
them.
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 167
the night of the 7th. Under cover of darkness parties 1815.
were sent forward to patch up the batteries that had been Jan. 7-
raised on the ist, opposite the American right and left ;
but, as water appeared within a foot of the surface, the
men were obliged to pare the soil for a great distance
all round in order to obtain earth. Thus the work was
but slowly and imperfectly done, and the epaulments
were still not shot-proof when six eighteen-pound er guns
were, with great exertion, placed within them not long Jan. 8.
before dawn. Pakenham's plans were as follows. Over
three hundred of the Rifles and as many of the Forty-
fourth were pushed forward very early to occupy these
works, and it was ordered that of these six hundred and
fifty men four hundred including three hundred of the
Forty-fourth were to fire, and the remainder to carry
fascines. The officer in command of the Forty-fourth
was further instructed to bring with him sixteen ladders
and the fascines aforesaid, and to ascertain in good time
where these requisites could be obtained so as to bear them
forward with him. Under cover of the firing party and
of the carriers of fascines and ladders, the main attack
was to be delivered by the Twenty-first and the Fourth
under General Gibbs, against the American left, the
light companies of the brigade being thrown out to
Gibbs's right along the edge of the swamp, so as to
protect his right flank.
On the British left the second column, which was
entrusted to Keane, was subdivided into two, whose
movements were to be guided by the effect of the British
artillery upon the American right. On the extreme
left the light companies of the Seventh, Forty-third
and Ninety-third, together with a hundred men of the
First West India Regiment, were to advance along
the rpad under command of Colonel Renny ; while the
bulk of Keane's brigade which was reduced to the
Ninety-third and the First West India was to move
on the right of Renny and parallel with him, and attack
the American right centre, or strike in to the left of
Gibbs, according to circumstances. Both columns were
1 68 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. to be covered by such Riflemen a few score only as
Jan. 8. remained over from Gibbs's brigade. The main bodies
of the Seventh and Forty-third under Lambert were
held in reserve. 1 The total number of white troops of
all descriptions in line upon both sides of the river was
about six thousand rank and file, with six heavy cannon
and one battery of field-guns. In addition to these
there were about a thousand negro soldiers. The
Americans could oppose to this force some six thousand
rank and file, with one thirty-two pounder, four twenty-
four pounders, one eighteen-pounder and eight smaller
guns on the left bank, besides nine heavy guns in
Patterson's battery, and two field-pieces in Morgan's
redoubt, making in all twenty-five cannon mostly of
large calibre.
The whole of the troops fell in at four o'clock and
moved up to their appointed stations well before day-
light, the foremost skirmishers within one hundred
and fifty yards of the American lines, and the Reserve
not more than seven hundred yards distant from it.
But there had been one grave oversight, for Lieutenant-
colonel Mullens of the Forty-fourth had led his
battalion to its place without bringing with him the
ladders and fascines, as had been ordained. He had,
it seems, halted for ten minutes by the redoubt where
he had been told to collect them, but, finding no
engineer there to give him any information, had
marched on under the guidance of a serjeant of
artillery to the post assigned to him in the right-hand
battery. It was said that this officer had become
infected with a spirit like to that which had called
down Wellington's wrath upon the Fifth Division at
1 The accounts of Pakenham's dispositions in Lambert's despatch,
and in the narratives of Cooke, Gleig and Surtees, are all different
and all wrong. Happily a copy of Pakenham's orders was sent by
Keane to Wellington, and is printed together with Keane's journal
in Supp. Desp. x. 394-400. That Riflemen did cover Keane's
left is shown by Surtees (p. 371), who is not likely to have mis-
stated the movements of his own regiment, and his story is partly
confirmed by Cooke, p. 225.
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 169
San Sebastian, and had been complaining that his 1815.
regiment was ordered upon a hopeless venture and was Jan. 8.
foredoomed to sacrifice. But this does not necessarily
imply deliberate neglect on the part of Mullens ; rather
it points to a negligence on the part of the staff which
was to become only too conspicuous in the course of
the day. The mistake was early discovered by General
Gibbs, who gave orders for it to be rectified, and
reported the circumstance to Pakenham. It was then
not yet five o'clock ; and Sir Edward at once despatched
one of his staff to ascertain the true state of affairs.
The staff-officer galloped off on his errand, and shortly
before dawn found the Forty- fourth straggling off to
the front from the redoubt where Mullens had halted
earlier in the morning, carrying the fascines and ladders
in a very irregular and disorderly fashion. This in
the circumstances was not surprising. The battalion,
unlike its brother battalion of Wellington's army, was
ill-disciplined, and the men had been hurried back
at the double over five or six hundred yards of very
deep ground, in order to repair an omission which was
no fault of their own, with every prospect of being
hustled again at the same rate to the front, lest they
should be too late for the attack. They were breath-
less and ill-tempered, the ladders were heavy, and the
fascines made of ripe sugar-cane very weighty
indeed. Moreover, though by right only a small
number of them should have been fascine-bearers and
three-fourths of them should have been in the firing
line, there was every likelihood that the whole of them
would be employed in the work which had originally
been designed for the Rifles. The staff-officer, how-
ever, reported to Pakenham that the battalion would
regain its place in good time, and the General rode off,
apparently satisfied. .
Shortly afterwards he sent for Harry Smith (if that
officer's narrative is to be believed), and told him with
much agitation of the mishap to Thornton's column,
adding that no Commander-in-Chief had ever had such
170 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. difficulties to contend with as himself. It was still not
Jan. 8. quite daylight, and, the ground being covered with
thick mist, Smith answered that there was still time
to withdraw the troops before they could be seen by
the enemy. " That may be," answered Pakenham,
" but I have twice deferred the attack." Smith con-
tinued to argue on the other side, but the General
would not listen and gave the order for the signal-
rocket to be fired. Even then Smith endeavoured to
counsel delay, but Sir Edward was peremptory. The
rocket soared into the air, and Gibbs's brigade moved
forward in column of companies to the assault, the
Twenty-first leading, the Fourth in support, and the
Forty-fourth with the ladders and fascines dispersed
all round, breathless and unable to keep up. The
American artillery received the assailants with a terrific
cross-fire from both sides of the river, and as the
storming party, checked at frequent intervals by the
drains that ran across the plain, slowly drew nearer, the
American musketry wrought havoc in their ranks. So
severely were they punished that when within a hundred
yards of the enemy's line, they hesitated, and, heedless
of the Riflemen, who were skirmishing on their front,
began to fire. The Riflemen threw themselves down
to escape being shot in the back ; and a few of the
foremost of the Twenty-first reached the canal that
covered the American breastwork, and hunted in vain
up and down the bank for a plank or a ladder to enable
them to cross it. One small band of brave men some
say, indeed, two whole companies under Lieutenant
Leavock of the Twenty-first actually traversed the
canal, and scrambled up the entrenchment, where
Leavock saw nothing before him but two American
officers. He summoned them to surrender, but finding
himself alone and unsupported was obliged to deliver
up his own sword. The main body of the column
meanwhile were firing into each other, and rapidly
giving way to panic. Gibbs raged among them
with oaths and reproaches, but could not stop
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 171
them. Pakenham galloped up with his staff to receive 1815.
Gibbs's despairing report that the troops would not j an . 8,
follow him, and directly afterwards Gibbs was struck
down by a mortal wound. Pakenham rode among the
flying soldiers, vainly striving to rally them. A bullet
shattered his knee, and a second bullet killed his horse
under him ; but he was none the less in the act of
mounting a second charger, when he was struck by a
third bullet in the spine and in a few minutes expired.
Gibbs's brigade then dissolved into a disorderly mass of
fugitives, and streamed away to the shelter of the wood
on the British right, in rout and demoralisation.
On the British left the three light companies under
Renny rushed through a terrific fire upon the advanced
redoubt on the right of the American line ; and, though
two men out of every three fell before they reached
the breastwork, the survivors drove out the defenders,
captured four guns and ensconced themselves in the
exterior ditch (the rear of the redoubt being open)
until support should come to them. The Ninety-third
should have been at hand, but Keane also had been
wounded ; and the Highlanders, owing to some strange
order brought to them during the advance, had been
shifted away to the right of Gibbs, where they were
halted in close column within musket-shot of the
enemy, and under the full blast of their fire. There
they stood heroically until some five hundred of them
had been killed or wounded, when very pardonably
they fell back. Renny's companies, finding themselves
isolated and alone, retired from the captured redoubt as
best they could, leaving their gallant commander dead
behind them ; and the entire attack upon the left bank
of the river was defeated with disastrous loss, at a cost
to the Americans of no more than eight killed and
fourteen wounded.
On the right bank Thornton and his little band
fared better. As they stepped ashore, they saw the
signal-rocket, and pushing on with all haste came after
half an hour's march upon an advanced party of
172 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Americans. A boat with one carronade in her bow
Jan. 8. gave these a single round of grape from the river,
which sufficed to set them running without further
resistance. Continuing his progress, Thornton presently
came upon General Morgan's redoubt, and, extending
the Eighty-fifth along the whole length of it as
skirmishers, launched his seamen in column against the
rampart. A heavy discharge of grape from two field-
pieces in front and from a battery in flank staggered
the blue-jackets for a moment ; but, Thornton waving
them forward, they rushed on together with the Eighty-
fifth through the smoke of the American cannon.
The bare sight of them struck the Kentuckians and the
rest of the defenders with terror, and they fled from
their formidable stronghold without attempting to
fight. Commodore Patterson, finding his battery
exposed and defence impossible, spiked his guns and
retired ; and Thornton saw his task accomplished at
no greater sacrifice than that of eighty-three killed and
wounded, more than half of whom belonged to the
Eighty-fifth. Being himself among the hurt, Thornton
resigned the command to Lieutenant-colonel Gubbins
of the Eighty-fifth, who pursued the flying enemy for
two miles, when the news of the failure of the main
attack caused him to halt. But the tidings of his
success had been sufficient to throw Jackson into great
perturbation, for the capture of his entrenchments on
the right bank of the Mississippi had given the British
(to use his own words) a position from whence they
might annoy him without hazard, and even neutralise
the repulse of their comrades on the left bank. He
was about to set every man that he could spare in
motion to regain the lost redoubt, when his anxiety
was relieved in a very different fashion.
After the fall of Pakenham, Gibbs, and Keane the
chief command devolved upon Lambert, who had-
landed only two days before, and knew little of
Pakenham's plans or expectations except that, accord-
ing to Sir Edward's calculation, the forcing of the first
CH.XX HISTORY OF THE ARMY 173
line of entrenchments would not be the most formidable 1815.
work of the day. He had still under his hand two Jan. 8.
superb and well-tried battalions of the Seventh and
Forty-third ; but Gibbs's brigade, though it rallied
at last far in rear, was irrecoverably demoralised.
Lambert brought forward his reserve to cover the
retirement of the rest of his troops, and keeping them
in that position held a kind of council of war.
The casualties of the army on the left bank alone
amounted to close upon two thousand killed, wounded
and missing, 1 the last named being for the most part
men who had been drowned or had been taken within
the American entrenchments. Thus a full third of the
force was killed or disabled, and at least another third
unfit for further fighting. Three officers only, though
the report of Thornton's success was before them,
appear to have been in favour of renewing the attack ;
but only one of these, Colonel John Burgoyne, was
entitled to be heard with real respect. Captain
Codrington of the Navy, who was in charge of the
victualling department, declared that another attack
was imperative, otherwise the whole force would be
starved. " Kill plenty more, Admiral," said Harry
Smith ; " fewer rations will be required." Ultimately,
looking to the danger lest Thornton's detachment
should be cut off, and a counter-attack delivered upon
the main body, Lambert decided to send in a flag of
truce, asking for a suspension of hostilities to bury the
dead and collect the wounded, and despatched Colonel
Alexander Dickson to the right bank to report upon
the situation of Thornton's detachment. The Americans
fired upon the flag of truce both with cannon and
musketry, but eventually received it ; and Jackson
eagerly seized the opportunity to grant an armistice
until noon of the 9th upon the left bank only, on
condition that no reinforcements should be sent to the
right bank by either party during the 8th. Lambert
asked for twenty -four hours to consider this proposal,
1 295 killed, 1186 wounded, 483 missing = 1964.
174 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. and, receiving Dickson's report that Gubbins could not
Jan. 8. hold his position in security with fewer than two
thousand men, ordered Thornton's detachment to
recross the river and rejoin the main body. This was
safely effected under cover of a fog ; and, after remain-
ing on the ground long enough to destroy his heavy
guns, Lambert withdrew his troops through the dark-
ness to their position of the morning, while Jackson
eagerly reoccupied his lost entrenchments on the right
bank.
Lambert's measures were of course preliminary to
a retreat and a re-embarkation ; but a retreat was no
easy matter. During the advance the soldiers had been
brought up the creek in small parties upon the boats of
the fleet. These boats were not numerous enough to
take more than half of the men at a time ; wherefore
there was a risk that the moiety embarked might be inter-
cepted, and the moiety left behind might be stranded
and overwhelmed. How naval officers could ever
have planned a campaign upon such a basis is incom-
prehensible, yet it is certain that they did so. It was
consequently necessary for Lambert to make a road
through a quaking morass in order to march the whole
of his men to the shores of Lake Borgne. This arduous
work occupied nine entire days, during which Jackson
with Excellent judgment refrained from any further
aggression than an incessant cannonade by day and
night, and the despatch of emissaries to tempt the
British soldiers to desert. Both methods met with
considerable success. The bivouac, already rendered
miserable enough by rain all day and frost all night, was
made a purgatory by the incessant storm of shot. The
men, who were not so much depressed as indignant
at their defeat, became sulky and discontented ; the
Forty-fourth was shunned by all other corps of the
army ; and, with this quarrelsome and grumbling spirit
abroad, many listened to the tempting offers of the
Americans and deserted.
At last the road, such as it was, was completed
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 175
a mere track covered with faggots of reeds, and bridged 1815.
by rough branches brought from a distance. At night-
fall of the 1 8th the battalions moved off in dead silence, Jan. 18.
leaving parties to keep the bivouac-fires alight, and after
a short march on the high road entered the track
through the swamp. The faggots soon turned to
powder under the trampling of many feet, and the
weary column struggled on for hours through the star-
light, knee-deep in mud at the best of times, and
hardly able to get forward at all when a creek was
to be passed. More than one man was swallowed up
quick in the mire before his comrades' eyes. However,
in the morning the whole arrived, without any molesta-
tion from the enemy, at the wretched oasis in the desert
of reeds which went by the name of the Fishermen's
Huts. Here officers and men threw themselves down
upon land rather less unsound than that which they had
traversed, and in their drenched and muddy clothes
fell asleep from sheer exhaustion.
The boats were at hand to begin the embarkation ;
but through some miracle of imbecility, which must
presumably be ascribed to Captain Codrington, no
food had been brought with them except for the crews.
The black corps and Forty-fourth were embarked, but,
as the small craft were from seventy to eighty miles
distant from the ships, there was always the chance
that foul weather might condemn the force left on
shore to starvation. Happily no such trial was in store
for the troops. For two days those that remained
on the strand of the lake lived on crumbs of biscuit
and a minute allowance of rum ; but then the boats
reappeared, and all anxiety was at an end. Entrench-
ments were thrown up, although the enemy never
showed themselves ; and the only additional hardship was
the lack of fuel, there being none except reeds, which
flared up for a moment and then expired, providing
neither warmth nor comfort. Gradually the whole
of the soldiers were withdrawn without accident, and
by the end of the month all of them were once more
176 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. aboard the ships, where they found the Fortieth Foot
had arrived as a reinforcement.
Bad weather delayed the departure of the fleet until
Feb. 5. the 5th of February, when Lambert and Cochrane
agreed to sail to Mobile, which lies at the head of a
bay whose mouth is about fifty miles east of the
anchorage at Cat Island. The defences of the place
consisted of a small fort, called Fort Bowyer, on the
eastern horn of the headland that forms the bay, and
of a battery upon the Isle of Dauphin6, which lies
Feb. 7. across the entrance. On the yth the Fourth, Twenty-
first and Forty-fourth were landed, with artillery and
engineers, on the peninsula in rear of Fort Bowyer ; and
the rest of the troops under command of Keane, who
had recovered from his wound, were disembarked on
Feb. 8. the island. On the 8th ground was broken before
Fort Bowyer under the direction of Burgoyne and
Feb. ii.Dickson, and by the morning of the nth sixteen guns
of various calibres were ready to open fire. The com-
mandant thereupon surrendered, yielding up a garrison
of nearly four hundred of all ranks with twenty-eight
guns. The British casualties in this trifling affair just
Feb. 14. exceeded thirty killed and wounded. On the i4th
a sloop of war arrived with the news that the prelimin-
aries of peace between England and the United States
had been signed on the I4th of December 1814, so tnat
all the blood shed before New Orleans had been poured
out in vain. The troops remained at the Isle of
Dauphine until the middle of March, when they sailed
for England.
So ended this ill-fated expedition, of which it may be
said that it provides perhaps the most striking warning
upon record to British Ministers against conducting
operations ashore upon the sole advice of naval officers.
The whole project was based upon the expectation of
prize-money only, as truly as were the expeditions to
Carthagena in 1740 and to Ferrol in 1800, to mention
only two out of many. A scapegoat had to be found
for the mishap, and Lieutenant-colonel Mullens was
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 177
tried by court-martial and cashiered for disobedience 1815,
to orders. The man who should have been tried by
court-martial and shot was Sir Alexander Cochrane.
The callous manner in which he deliberately placed the
troops in a most dangerous situation, and then worked
his faithful blue-jackets to death to keep them there
all with the principal object of filling his own pockets
cannot be too strongly condemned. He added to
these delinquencies the further fault, doubtless also
inspired by cupidity, of omitting to inform Lambert im-
mediately of the conclusion of peace, from which cause
the return of the troops to Europe, where they were
urgently needed, was delayed. 1 On the other hand the
exertions of his officers and men, who had neither rest
nor sleep from the moment when Keane's detachment
was first landed, who cheerfully endured, through week
after week, the endless fatigue of rowing hundreds of
miles, drenched every day and frozen every night
these cannot be too highly praised.
It remains to examine whether Pakenham made the
best of the position, embarrassing and dangerous
though it was, in which he found himself upon his
arrival. The opinion of his regimental officers was
that he might have rushed the American lines at any
time, without condescending to silence their cannon,
and that he ought to have done so on the ist of
January, if not earlier ; for every day's delay enabled
the enemy to strengthen his defences and to bring
up more guns and troops. On the whole this view
was probably sound. Lieutenant Leavock always
declared that when he and his few men of the Twenty-
first broke into Jackson's lines in the assault of the
8th of January, the whole of the American left was
in flight, in fact that assailants and defenders were
actually running away from each other in opposite
directions at the same moment. There is nothing
incredible in this story, the probable truth of which
is confirmed by the panic of Morgan's troops before
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. x. 269.
VOL. X N
178 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. the attack of Thornton's handful of men on the right
bank of the Mississippi. Yet, as the loss would have
been heavy, and the consequences of failure possibly
annihilation, Pakenham can hardly be blamed if he
hesitated, in face of an adverse opinion from such
a man as Burgoyne, to take so formidable a risk.
Of the actual attack on the 8th of January, it must
be said that the idea of a simultaneous onset upon
both banks of the river was masterly in boldness of
conception, and should have assured success. The
delay in carrying Thornton's force to the right bank
was due to the miscalculations of the naval officers
and engineers, but, though Thornton's stroke did not
fall with the full impetus that Pakenham had designed,
it sufficed, as we have seen, to make Jackson almost
despair of the situation. Should Pakenham therefore
have delayed the assault upon Jackson's main position
until Thornton had carried Patterson's battery ? His
Military Secretary declared that this would have been
fatal. Thornton had crossed the river unobserved thanks
only to a mist ; and, had the signal been held back, his
boats would have returned to bring over a further
detachment of his troops. This would probably have
led to an engagement of the two flotillas of armed
vessels on the river itself ; and as the American flotilla
was, or at any rate was believed to be, the stronger,
it would in all likelihood have destroyed that of the
British. So great was the want of boats in the fleet
that such a disaster would not only have left Thornton's
little party hopelessly isolated upon the right bank,
but would have cut off from the entire force its only
means of retreat. The General was in fact hampered
in this, as in all other operations, by Cochrane's
unpardonable blunder in beginning the enterprise with
only half the necessary number of small craft. Had
Pakenham been apprised at the outset of the initial
failure to launch the boats from the canal into the
Mississippi, he would probably have countermanded
the whole of his dispositions for the day ; but as a
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 179
matter of fact he knew nothing about it until five 1815.
o'clock on the morning of the 8th eight hours after
the original difficulty had shown itself when he judged
it to be too late to make any change of plan. How
it came about that he was so long kept in the dark
upon this subject has never been explained. The naval
officer in charge of the boats should certainly have
informed him at once ; but this does not acquit both
Thornton and Pakenham's own staff- officers of very
serious neglect. It was, as we have seen, probably the
blunder of a staff-officer that permitted the Forty-
fourth to go forward without their ladders and fascines ;
it was another staff-officer's blunder which led Pakenham
to believe, when he ordered the rocket to be fired, that
the Forty-fourth had had time to fetch its ladders and
resume its place at the head of the storming column.
There was no lack of staff-officers in the force, but
they seem to have been either inefficient or ill-handled.
When all is said and done, however, the main fact
remains that the chief reason for the failure of the
assault was that the soldiers instead of running forward
hung back, began to fire wildly and then ran away.
" It was all very well to victimise old Mullens," writes
Harry Smith in his Autobiography ', " the fascines and
ladders all could have been supplied by one word,
which I will not name." This one word is obviously
courage ; and Harry Smith's criticism is amply justified
by the success of Renny and Leavock in breaking into
the American works. It has therefore been suggested
that Pakenham should have chosen the Seventh and
Forty-third, both of them splendid battalions fresh
from the Peninsula, to form the main column of attack,
instead of two imperfectly disciplined battalions such
as the Twenty-first and Forty-fourth. But this is a
question which cannot be discussed without a far more
intimate knowledge of the circumstances at the moment
than any historian can acquire. It is easy upon paper
to set forth a multitude of arguments upon both sides,
but it would be utterly unprofitable. The best troops
180 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
run away, as well as the worst, upon occasion. If it
were not so, military history would hardly be worth
writing.
As to the correctness of Lambert's decision to
abandon further operations and retreat, I think there
can be no question. Success in a renewal of the
offensive was extremely doubtful ; the state of the
supplies both for army and navy was extremely
dangerous ; and above all the object was not worth
the risk. The over-worked officers and men of the
fleet may well have felt indignant at so humiliating an
end to all their labours, but for that they had chiefly
to thank their Admiral. The temptations of prize-
money as formerly distributed have fortunately been
removed from the Fleet, so that we are not likely
again to be plunged into disaster by the cupidity of
admirals ; but it is possible that naval officers have
not yet realised their ignorance of the nature of opera-
tions ashore. In former days they gave their opinions
upon such operations with childish assurance, and by
no means the least of the offenders was Nelson himself. 1
There is no nobler service than the Royal Navy ; but
there are two sentences which should be writ large
on the inner walls of the Admiralty and of the Cabinet's
meeting-place. Never employ the fleet alone for
operations which require the combined forces of Army
and Navy. Never use those combined forces upon the
sole advice either of a naval or of a military officer.
For the rest, the treaty of peace brought no
advantage either to England or to the United States.
The former gained no rectification of the frontier ; the
latter no satisfaction for captures, nor abandonment
of the English doctrine concerning the impressment
of sailors, which was the pretext alleged for American
aggression. Upon a general balance of the results of
the actual fighting by sea and by land, there was little
to be claimed in favour of either party ; but, in the
matter of injury inflicted, the Americans, owing to the
1 See Vol. IV. Part II. of this History, pp. 634-635.
CH. xx HISTORY OF THE ARMY 181
losses caused by the British naval blockade, suffered 1815.
incomparably more than the British. They were in
fact utterly exhausted. Each country, however, learned
respect for the other ; and, in spite of much abusive
language wasted on both sides by scribblers of all
descriptions, the actual combatants in the field treated
each other with humanity and even with friendliness.
Commodore Barney, when he was taken prisoner, was
received, to use his own words, " like a brother " by
the British naval officers ; and Jackson proved himself
to be not only brave and able as a commander, but
courteous in negotiation, modest in reporting his own
achievements, and kind and considerate to the British
wounded who fell into his hands. His countrymen in
New Orleans emulated his example in the matter of
the wounded with a generosity that did them infinite
honour ; and thus the repulse by the Mississippi,
though the most crushing blow that was sustained by the
British army in the course of the war, left behind it
less bitterness than any other. Upon the whole the
war, through the military failures on both sides, the
early successes of the American frigates, and the final
exhausting pressure of the British fleet upon American
sea-borne trade, revealed to both nations their strength
and their weakness, and did more than is suspected
to preserve peace inviolate between them for a hundred
years.
Authorities: There is little of importance in the Archives of
the Record Office that has not been published. The best narratives
on the English side are James's Naval and Military Occurrences
of the War of 1812 ; Gleig's Campaigns of the British Army at
Washington and New Orleans ; Cooke's Narrative of Events in tht
North of France and in the Attack on New Orleans ; Surtees's
Twenty-Jive Tears in the Rifle Brigade, and the Autobiography of
Sir Harry Smith. There is one good letter in the Pakenham
Letters (privately printed 1914), for a copy of which volume I am
indebted to the kindness of Colonel Lord Longford. On the
American side there is Mahan's War of 1812 ; Ingersoll's History
of the Second War ; and Letour's War in Louisiana.
CHAPTER XXI
1803- THE period which is now to be summarised is beyond
l8l 4- question the greatest in our military history, bound
up as it is with the names of Wellington, our one
great general since Marlborough ; Castlereagh, the
ablest of our Ministers for War ; and our best
Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of York. It was
time, indeed, after the miserable blunders of the first
period of the Great War, that there should be some
improvement ; and to-day we are apt to forget, in the
brilliance of the final triumphs in the Peninsula, the
very murky years that preceded it from 1803 to 1808.
The initial follies of Addington's government in
organising the resources of the country for war, the
no less grievous blunders of Pitt, and the sounder
principles but grave miscalculations of Windham, are
one and all sad proof of the unteachable ignorance of
our Governors. Their choice of fields of operations
was no less damning to their wit. There were
Addington's helpless nibbles at the West Indies ;
Pitt's absurd little expedition to the Mediterranean,
and his abortive diversion of troops to the Weser ;
Windham's childish project for the march of a column
across South America, and the general mismanagement
of the operations at Rio de la Plata ; the costly and
useless fighting in Egypt ; and lastly the inexcusable
despatch of Moore's force to Sweden. For five years
British soldiers wandered distractedly about the world
looking for a sphere of action ; though all the while
the peninsula of Italy an ideal theatre for a fleet and
182
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 183
an army working in concert lay open to them, with 1803
Sicily, Malta, and Gibraltar for bases, and the admirable
despatches of Charles Stuart to be their guidance and
inspiration. Until 1808 one enterprise only had been
conceived by any British Government with insight
and executed with swiftness and energy/ the capture
of Copenhagen and the seizure of the Danish fleet.
Then at length the Peninsula was thrown open to
our armies by Napoleon's invasion, and the genius of
Arthur Wellesley apprehended the opportunity which
was offered by such a base as Lisbon and such a country
as Portugal. Castlereagh and Liverpool also, after
deciding to make their effort there, threw into it the
bulk of their strength, and supported Wellington with
all possible loyalty. But there was still much waste
of force owing to the vacillation of Ministers in dealing
with the treacherous and corrupt Court of Naples ;
and the expedition to the Scheldt in 1809, though
great in conception, was too hazardous, too doubtful
of success, and too little favoured by military opinion,
to have been so lightly undertaken. Wellington
declared that he could not have fed the army which
went to the Scheldt, even had it been given to him ;
but based upon Cadiz or Minorca or even upon
Sicily under Thomas Graham or John Hope, it
could have mightily embarrassed Soult in Andalusia
or Suchet on the east coast of Spain. From beginning
to end, therefore, even of the second period of the war,
there is much room for criticism in the employment
of the troops ; and it must be added further that, by
1814, the question of keeping the ranks of the army
filled at all had become an exceedingly anxious one.
It will be remembered that, after the schemes of
Addington and Pitt for maintaining a military force had
been laughed out of existence, resort had been made to
the Militia, recruited by compulsory service in the form
of the ballot, to make good the wastage of the Army by
war. The system of balloting for the Militia being
vitiated by the permission to provide substitutes, Castle-
1 84 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
i8c>3-reagh subdivided the Militia into two parts. First
1814. there was the Regular Militia, levied for the most part
by ballot, but with liberty for all balloted men to
furnish substitutes. This was meant, like the Special
Reserve of 1908, to provide drafts for the Regular
Army ; and authority was given from time to time
by Act of Parliament to batches of ten or twelve
thousand of these militiamen to transfer themselves
to the Line. Incidentally it may be observed that the
competition of recruiting officers for militiamen, when
such a batch was about to be set free, led to scenes
of great disorder about the barracks. Athletic sub-
alterns, such as George Napier, would challenge a dozen
recruits to a jumping match on condition that they
should join him unless they could beat him ; but a
far more common resource was " treating,'* or in
plain words, alcohol. Secondly, there was the Local
Militia, which, like the Territorial Force of 1908, was
designed to absorb the Volunteers, and was recruited
likewise by the ballot ; but in the first instance
substitution was forbidden and personal service made
compulsory. The Local Militiaman's term of service
was four years ; and any individual in the force was
at liberty to enlist in the Line whenever he pleased.
To feed the Local Militia, Castlereagh's original plan
had been to compel two or three hundred thousand
men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five,
chosen by ballot from the mass of the nation, to undergo
military training for a fixed time without pay, as a
part of their duty to their country, and in case of an
invasion to make them serve in the Line. This last
provision, however, was not brought before Parliament/ ;
and for want of it Castlereagh's whole scheme gradually
collapsed.
When the first batch of Local Militia finished their
term of service, there were no trained men to take
their place. Castlereagh, therefore, was obliged to
allow a considerable number of them to re-engage for
a second term ; and this to all intent introduced into
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 185
the Local Militia the fatal principle of substitution. 1803-
The Local Militia Act, as was the case with the Militia 1814.
Act of 1757, had been drawn with the purpose of
passing the entire manhood of the nation through the
ranks by batches in periods of four years. But when
men were allowed to re-enlist for a second term, for a
bounty, they became substitutes for other men who
were ipso facto exempted from a national duty by the
prolonged service of their brethren. From this cause,
and from others which I have set down at length in
another work, 1 the Regular and Local Militia, instead
of supplementing each other, became competitors,
hampering one another ; so much so that another
twelve months of war would have seen the entire
recruiting machinery of the Army broken down. And
break down it will and must in any long and serious
war, unless it be founded upon compulsory National
Training.
The men once provided by Parliament, the Com-
mander-in-Chief and his staff at the Horse Guards
had already perfected their organisation for turning
them to account. The Duke of York's ideal was that
every regiment of infantry should have two battalions,
the first for service abroad and the second for service
at home, and that the battalion at home should supple-
ment that abroad. It does not appear that the second
battalion furnished drafts regularly to the first. More
often these were drawn from the recruits enlisted in
ordinary course at the depots, and from the batches
of militiamen who were periodically turned over to
the Line. Hence, when a battalion abroad had been
very seriously depleted, the Duke was always urgent
for the second battalion to take its place, and absorb
the men of the first battalion on the spot, while the
officers and senior non-commissioned officers should
return home to remake the battalion. The course of
the war, however, upset this arrangement. A few
regiments had no second battalions at all ; some had
1 The County Lieutenancies and the Army.
1 86 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 803- both battalions upon active service ; and Wellington,
I8l 4- as we have seen, was so unwilling to part with officers
and men of experience, that he would amalgamate
two weak battalions into one, rather than accept two
strong but unhardened battalions in their place. This
difficulty was never completely overcome, and indeed
could only have been overcome by the addition to
every regiment of a third battalion. Such a solution
never occurred, apparently, to Castlereagh, though it
was foreshadowed by Sir Henry Calvert, the Adjutant-
general. Sir Henry's idea was to abolish the Regular
Militia altogether, to make the Local Militia a part
of its county regiment, having the same uniform,
facings, and equipment, and to transfer men by the
encouragement of bounties to the second battalion,
just as the second battalion was intended to transfer
them to the first. Had Castlereagh adopted this
scheme, insisting always upon the personal service
of men balloted for the Local Militia, he would have
rendered a transcendent service to his country.
So much for the broad principles of military policy
and the measures for organising the population for
defence. Let us now turn to the departments that
govern the Army, and first of all to the civil administra-
tion comprehended under the name of the War Office
and its chief, the Secretary for War. The functions
of the War Office had by this time become almost
exclusively financial, being concerned with regimental
accounts, through these with the various regimental
agents, and through them again with the business of
regimental clothing. The staff of the Office had
increased enormously, the number of clerks having
swelled, between 1798 and 1806, from fifty to one
hundred and seventeen, though the establishment of
the Army within the same period had been augmented
only from two to three hundred thousand. One
reason for this influx of clerks was no doubt the
circumstance, already chronicled in a previous volume,
that the War Office had taken over much of the
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 187
accountants' work formerly done by the agents ; but a 1803-
far more powerful cause was that the Office was famous I8l 4<
for jobbery and offered extraordinary facilities for it.
The appointment of all clerks, with the regulation of
their salaries, as also of all officials of the Barrack-
master's department, lay with the Secretary at War ;
and, since the fees formerly received by various
officials in the Office had been swept into a common
stock called the " Fee Fund," a large annual sum was
placed at the disposal of the Secretary at War,
over which the Treasury had absolutely no control.
Such a temptation was far too great for the ordinary
politician, and positively overpowering to corrupt and
dishonest men such as Sir George Yonge or to
ingrained jobbers such as William Windham.
The work at large was distributed into two branches,
General Business and Accounts. The daily labour
imposed upon the clerks was five hours' attendance
in the office, with liberty to take home such tasks as
they wished, and to receive extra pay for doing them
there. In addition to their salaries many clerks held
sinecure allowances. One was allowed to supply coal
for the garrison of Gibraltar at a profit ; another was
a barrack-master ; a third, besides wages of 750
and a pension of jioo, possessed the sole right of
printing lists of the Army, Militia, and Volunteers,
which brought him annually yet ^350 more. The
Chief Messenger, by dint of charging extravagant
fees for the delivery of messages, secured to himself
an annual income of no less than 500. Two more
messengers, who had been servants to Sir George
Yonge and Lord Liverpool, drew 30 in salary and over
j2oo a year in fees, yet were never seen at the Office.
In fact the whole place was a sink of jobbery and ex-
tortion, the more repulsive since there were hundreds
of deserving officers, crippled by long service and
wounds, who were starving on a pittance of half-pay.
The chief business of the War Office was the
examination and settlement of regimental accounts,
1 88 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- which function had been taken over from the regimental
I8l 4- agents through the medium of the special regimental
paymasters appointed in I797. 1 These new pay-
masters were soon discovered to be inefficient ; and
the result was a steady augmentation of the number
of clerks in the War Office, and as steady an accumu-
lation of arrears. In 1807 there were over sixteen
hundred regimental accounts still unsettled, more than
one hundred of which were of earlier date than 1783.
For this there were two principal reasons : first, the
inaccuracy of the paymasters, necessitating sometimes
over two hundred corrections in a single account ;
secondly, the extreme complication of the system of
allowances. 2 Recommendations were made for the
remedy of these evils ; but so long as regiments were
treated as the colonel's property that is to say, as
independent units instead of component parts of a
single organism it was hopeless to think of getting
rid of them altogether.
From the War Office I pass to another civilian
department, the Treasury, which, through its control
of the Commissariat, was in charge of the vital business
of transport and supply. The history of the Commis-
sariat during the twenty-one years of the Great War
is singular. In 1793 there was a nominal Commissary-
general, whose office appears to have been a sinecure,
for no money was issued to him, and all contracts for
1 See Vol. IV. of this History, pp. 898-899.
2 Table of Allowances:
i. Beer Money : id. per man per diem.
i. To inn-keepers in stationary quarters, Jd. for every billeted
man.
3. To inn-keepers for every man victualled on march, i id.
4. To men (married) sleeping out of barracks, id. + beer
money.
5. 6. For extra prices of bread and meat (regulated by market
prices).
7. For articles for cleaning arms, zs. 9d. per man per annum.
8. For alteration of clothing, 2s. 6d. per man per annum.
It was pointed out that Nos. i, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 could be consolidated,
and i lb. of bread per day per man be substituted for them.
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
189
food and carriage were made by the Treasury. In 1803-
1797 a beginning of decentralisation was made by I8l 4-
the appointment of District Commissaries to make
local contracts at home, some of whom corresponded
directly with the Treasury and some with the Com-
missary-general ; but after twelve months the whole
of these were placed under the Commissary-general.
That functionary's duty and authority were, however,
strictly limited ; and the general distribution of duty
and responsibility was as follows. Contracts for the
feeding of troops in camp lay with the Commissary-
general ; of troops in barracks with the Barrack-
master-general ; of troops in charge of field-works
and beacons with the general commanding the district;
and of troops abroad with the Victualling Board.
Stores for troops at home were the business of the
Barrack -master- general ; stores for troops abroad
that of the Commissaries of Transport. Add to this
extraordinary confusion the facts that every Commis-
sariat officer received a commission from the War
Office and a " constitution " from the Treasury, that
he drew part of his pay from the one office and part from
the other, and that he was thus irrevocably bound to
serve two masters, and we arrive at a result thoroughly
characteristic of British administration. Happily a
commissary of wide experience, Sir Brook Watson,
who had served with the Duke of York in Flanders,
intervened to put an end to these absurdities ; and by
1806 the whole of these multifarious contracts had
been placed in sole charge of the Commissary-general.
We learn without surprise, however, that the
change was effected at the cost of much unnecessary
expense. In 1805 the Commissariat establishment
for duty at home counted, including the Commissary-
general but exclusive of the central office in London,
just one hundred District Commissaries, Assistants of
various grades, and Central Commissaries, with one
hundred and fifteen subordinates, chiefly store-keepers,
but comprehending a sprinkling of master-bakers and
1 9 o HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- transport-officers. 1 The Central Commissaries num-
1814. bered forty-three, one to each English county, and
had been appointed in contemplation of a French
invasion ; but, as the Duke of York had wisely
parcelled out the country into thirteen Military
Districts, and there were already nineteen District
Commissaries, we have here clear evidence that,
though the Treasury might admit the War Office
into partnership, it would have no dealing with the
Horse Guards. However, upon the appointment of
a new Commissary-general, one Mr. Coffin, in 1806,
Central Commissaries were abolished which was well
and with them, which was probably a great mis-
take, both the master-bakers and the store-keepers.
Strangely enough throughout all this period the
Commissary-general had no control over Commissaries
abroad, so that any officer who went upon active
service passed beyond his jurisdiction, and lost touch
with him completely. Moreover, it must be noted
that, as in Marlborough's time, the Commissariat's
duty to an Army, whether at home or abroad, was
limited to the provision of bread for the men, forage
for the animals, and, if troops were encamped, of wood
for fuel. All other supplies were furnished by the
departments of the Quarter-master-general, Barrack-
master-general, and Medical Department ; and the
sole function of the Commissariat in respect of these
other articles was to stir up the right department.
With the Waggon-Train, being the creation of the
Commander-in-Chief, the Treasury and War Office had
of course no concern ; nor did they make the slightest
attempt to use it even for the purpose of training
their own officers. In fact the Treasury looked upon
its duties of transport and supply as matters purely
of contract and accounts, which the ordinary com-
1 Home Establishment of the Commissariat, 1805 : I Commissary-
general ; 1 9 District Commissaries ; 2 5 Assistant Commissaries ;
12 Acting Commissaries; 43 Central Commissaries; 23 Clerks;
83 Storekeepers ; 5 Master-bakers ; I Director of Waggons ;
i Inspector of Waggons ; 2 Conductors.
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 191
mercial clerk was judged competent to fulfil. The idea 1803-
of training men for those most difficult tasks, the feeding I8l 4-
of an army in the field, and the keeping its stores and
supplies abreast of it, was quite foreign to the official
mind. I have myself perused the accounts of Com-
missaries in the field for long periods, not only in the
Record Office but also in private collections of papers,
and I have never yet found among them any scheme
or account of the organisation of land-transport. Thus
it was that, as I have written elsewhere, Wellington
v/as obliged at the outset of the Peninsular War to
teach his Commissaries the very alphabet of the
business of transport ; though, finding willing and in-
telligent workers among them, he was able to build up
an extremely efficient Commissariat service. But the
Treasury recognised only two descriptions of Com-
missaries abroad, those for the stores and those for
accounts ; and by this very recognition it showed
its ignorance of its business, for such a division of
functions was unpractical and absurd.
In 1809 a new departure was made by the appoint-
ment of a Commissary-in-Chief, who took over the
superintendence of the Commissariat both at home
and abroad, and became the sole channel of communi-
cation between the Treasury and its officials oversea.
The person selected for the post, marvellous to say,
was a soldier, Colonel James Willoughby Gordon,
sometime Military Secretary at the Horse Guards,
and in 1812 for a short period Wellington's Quarter-
master-general. After the old fashion he received his
appointment and 4 a day from the Treasury, his
commission, 3 a day, and a Major-general's field-
allowance from the War Office. This individual hung
about the skirts of the ignoble politicians who paid
their court at Carleton House ; and frequent glimpses
that I have caught of him, both within and without
that unsavoury environment, have inspired me with a
feeling very remote from respect. However, he
accomplished really good work during his two years'
192 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- tenure of the post of Commissary-in-Chief. He could
I8l 4-not do away with the childish practice of equipping
his subordinates with a double commission from two
different offices ; but he contrived at least that they
should receive their salaries from his own department
only, and did something by salutary regulations to
encourage good conduct and discipline among them.
It was he who ordained that all Commissaries must
begin their career at the bottom, and serve for a certain
time in every grade in succession before they could be
promoted to the next ; and this was creditable to him,
for all powers of advancement were vested exclusively
in himself. He also showed courteous attention to all
of Wellington's wishes and representations concerning
his department ; but his reign was too short to correct
many old abuses. During the long war in the West
Indies, from 1794 to 1798, many of the Commissaries
by shameless fraud had made large fortunes ; one
having amassed as much as 87,000 ; and their
examples had infected the whole service. There was
much malpractice at home owing to the greed of
forage - contractors, and more than enough even in
the Peninsula, in spite of all the efforts of Charles
Stuart and Wellington. Such is inevitably the case
when men in receipt of small emoluments are charged
with the handling of large sums ; and the temptation
to Assistant Commissaries in Portugal was the greater,
inasmuch as the Treasury paid them only five shillings
a day, whereas their brethren of the same rank in
England received fifteen. But the ways of the
Treasury are past finding out.
Upon the resignation of Gordon a successor was
found for him in Mr. Herries, who had made some
reputation both as a Colonel of Volunteer Light Horse
and as a financier. His appointment, which took
place in October 1811, was hailed with satisfaction
by the Commissioners appointed to enquire into
Military Expenditure. The duties of the office, so
they averred, were all civil and should therefore be
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 193
executed by a civilian ; and thus they perpetuated a 1803-
blunder which was not rectified until 1888. The 1814.
mistake was the less pardonable inasmuch as General
Don, an officer of very great experience, had laid down
certain rules which should have guided the Com-
missaries into the right track. All commissariat-
officers, pronounced Don, should be properly trained
for their work in the field. No army should move
without a field-bakery. No expedition should be sent
on active service without taking with it a part of the
Royal Waggon Train, to be attached to regiments,
battalions, and departments. A Commissariat Train
should go with them to bring forward bread and
forage ; and only transport additional to this should
be hired by contract. Bread and forage should be
supplied to the troops by the Commissariat in peace
as well as in war, and at home as well as abroad, in
order to teach the Commissaries their duty. By these
propositions Don showed rightly that the duties of the
Commissariat were essentially military and not civil ;
but he was in advance of his time and far too practical
to find favour with the Treasury.
Pursuing my review of the civil departments, I turn
to the Medical. Doctors and surgeons, of course,
formed part of the staff of each regiment and wore the
regimental uniform until well within living memory,
having been originally mere servants of the colonels.
Until 1793 the Medical Department of the Army was
governed by two men, the Physician-general, and the
Surgeon-general, who was also Inspector of Infirmaries.
In 1793 the Inspectorship of Infirmaries was con-
stituted^ separate office, with pay of ten shillings a
day ; and the holder, together with the Physician and
Surgeon-general, each of them receiving two pounds
a day, composed the Medical Board, which reigned
supreme over all medical business in the Army. To
these three was entrusted the appointment of all
medical attendants for hospitals, or in other words
control of all patronage and promotion in their depart-
VOL. x
1 94 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
i8o3-ment ; and in addition to their salaries they enjoyed
I8l 4- many perquisites and private practice. The provision
of medicines and surgical instruments (except in the
case of regimental doctors, who always supplied their
own) was a monopoly granted by patent in 1747 to an
individual, styled the Apothecary - general. The
actual tenant of the office at this time probably a
blameless person in himself received ten shillings a
day for the privilege of gathering in the profits of this
monopoly, and concerned himself no further with the
business.
Experience of the campaigns in Flanders in 1793-
1794 showed how abominably evil was the whole
system ; and in 1798 the Medical Board was recon-
stituted of tHe same three officials, each on a salary of
two pounds a day, but with the patronage parted
among them severally. To the Physician-general fell
the recommendation of physicians to the Army, and
the inspection of medicines ; to the Surgeon-general
the recommendation of staff and regimental doctors,
and the direction of depots of medicines ; and to the
Inspector of Hospitals the recommendation of lower
attendants in hospitals.
This arrangement was, if possible, worse than the
last. Physicians of the army were appointed without
diploma of any kind, and were often placed over the
heads of qualified practitioners ; patronage and pro-
motion were very arbitrarily distributed ; and in short
the jobbery, favouritism, and corruption were such as
to discourage any good man from entering the service.
Evil example in high places of course found imitation
below ; and the general hospitals were hotbeds of waste
and dishonest dealing in favour of every one except the
patients. The Apothecary-general's department like-
wise was honeycombed with evils. The goods delivered
were bad, ill-packed, and excessively dear ; and the
office was so straitly hide-bound by routine that it
actually sent out sago, rice, and opium at enormous cost
to Ceylon, without pausing to reflect that those com-
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
'95
modities, being grown in the island, could be obtained 1803-
of better quality and infinitely cheaper on the spot. I8l 4-
In fact, whether in the matter of men or material,
the head - quarters of the Medical Department were
saturated with abuses. The Duke of York could find
no words hard enough for the Medical Board ; and
the climax came when, amid all the anxiety and
wretchedness caused by the fatal epidemic during the
expedition to the Scheldt, the three members remained
comfortably in London and refused to transport their
precious bodies, to the front. It may indeed be
pleaded for them that they were not young, and
would have been absolutely useless even if they had
repaired to Holland ; but their attitude of helpless
yet complacent expectation was not calculated to
endear them either to the Army or to the public.
Thus, although the Medical Staff of the Army at
large, as distinguished from the regimental doctors,
numbered over three hundred physicians, surgeons,
apothecaries, and purveyors, with salaries varying from
950 to 120 a year, one hears little of any kind
and nothing that is good about any of them. Nor
is this surprising, for it lay within the competency of
the Surgeon-general to nominate any one of them,
whether qualified or not, to be a Principal Medical
Officer, and so to add five shillings a day to his pay.
Of regimental surgeons, on the contrary, one hears
much, and generally much that is good. Wellington's
chief medical officer, Dr. McGrigor, had served in
all parts of the world with different regiments, both
horse and foot, knew the British officer and soldier,
and loved them both. We have seen how, finding it
hopeless to get any good from the base-hospitals in
the Peninsula, he pleaded for regimental hospitals in
order to keep the base-hospitals as empty as possible ;
and, being supported heartily by Wellington, succeeded
in carrying his point. Nothing at first sight could
seem less economical or more wasteful than such a
multiplicity of different establishments ; yet, in exist-
196 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 803- ing circumstances, the system was entirely justified
l8l 4-by success. McGrigor himself had tested it when
he sailed with Baird's contingent from India to Egypt
in 1 80 1 ; when, although there were none but
regimental surgeons with the force, the medical
arrangements had worked smoothly and well. The
secret was that the regimental surgeons, proud of
their corps and anxious to keep its ranks as full as
possible, worked with the greatest ardour not only
to restore their patients to health but to send them
back to the front as disciplined soldiers. Being
constantly in touch with every man, they knew his
constitution and disposition, and possessed, moreover,
a very keen eye for malingering. In the base-hospital
at Belem, on the contrary, all was perfunctory and
orderless. Convalescents were allowed to roam about
at will under no control, and, being marched up to
the front in parties under non-commissioned officers
or officers whom they did not know, were the per-
petrators of all the worst outrages that disgraced the
Army. McGrigor was indeed an able man in his
profession, a thorough soldier and an excellent public
servant. He was prompt in disencumbering the
army of really disabled patients, and equally prompt
in restoring the slightly ill or wounded to the ranks ;
and he is deservedly honoured to this day as the father
of British military hygiene.
From the healer of the body to the ghostly
counsellor is a natural transition, and I come next
to the department of the Chaplain-general. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the chaplain
was an essential part of every regiment's establishment,
with pay of 6s. 3d. a day, obtaining his commission
by presentation or purchase, according to the piety
or cupidity of the colonel. Gradually during the
course of the eighteenth century the chaplains ceased
to attend their corps ; and the office became a sinecure,
still within the gift of the colonel, and generally per-
formed by deputy at the rate of half a crown a day.
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 197
When the Duke of York went to Flanders in 1793 1803-
there was but one chaplain, the Reverend John 1814.
Gamble of the Thirty-seventh, who accompanied the
army. Having noted this, Sir Ralph Abercromby,
before starting for the West Indies in 1795, summoned
the chaplains of all his battalions to assemble at head-
quarters in order to decide which of them should
accompany him. Not one presented himself ; every
man of them pleading the colonel's promise, given
when they purchased their commissions, that personal
attendance should not be required of them. Subse-
quent experience showed that the case of Abercromby 's
army was not singular. Between 1803 an ^ 1808
there were sent over sea nine expeditions of a strength
varying from thirty-five hundred to fourteen thousand
men. Out of these nine, three, namely Craig's to
the Mediterranean, Cathcart's to Copenhagen, and
Moore's to Sweden, were attended by one chaplain ;
while the remaining six, Cathcart's to the Weser,
Baird's to the Cape, Auchmuty's to South America,
Beresford's to Madeira, Spencer's to Southern Spain,
and Wellesley's to Portugal, 1 representing altogether
some fifty thousand men, were without a chaplain of
any kind whatever.
Upon assuming the chief command at the Horse
Guards the Duke of York took the matter up, and
in 1796 introduced drastic reforms. The old system
was condemned root and branch. Existing chaplains
were informed that they must do duty in person with
their regiments, or retire on a pension of four shillings
a day ; and colonels received 500 in the infantry
and 700 in the cavalry to compensate them for the
loss of the presentation. Gamble, who was the Duke's
adviser throughout, then received the appointment of
Chaplain-general, with a salary of i a day ; and it
1 So says the report of the Commission of Military Enquiry, but
there appear to have been at least two brigade chaplains, Mr. Bradford
and Mr. Ormsby, both of whom left interesting books behind them,
Bradford's having been published in 1809.
198 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- was arranged that the balance of 2s. 3d. which remained
1814. over from the regimental pay of the retired chaplains,
together with the full pay whenever a regimental
chaplaincy fell vacant, should be placed in his hands
to form a general Chaplains' Fund. As every single
chaplain, except two in the Life Guards, accepted
the pension, Gamble's financial duties were at first
very onerous ; but he did his work well, and in 1799
was rewarded by the annexation of his office to the
Staff of Great Britain, by an allowance of 100 for
clerical assistance, and by a special grant of 290 to
himself. This was only fair, for, as Chaplain-general,
he held both a military and a civil commission ; and
the Treasury, always ruthless towards those who have
no power to resist, took care to mulct him in income-
tax upon both, to the aggregate amount of half a crown
in the pound. By the end of 1799 the Chaplains'
Fund had accumulated to a sum that was worth
investing, and by 1 805 had reached the respectable total
of 55,ooo.
In the year 1806, the time being ripe, all chaplains
were struck off the regimental establishments. The
Chaplains' Fund was sold out of Consols and poured
into the exchequer ; and .15,000 were placed on the
estimates for the chaplains' department, with a saving
to the country of 18,000 a year. These 15,000
served for the support not only of officiating clergymen
and retired chaplains, who were still embarrassingly
numerous, 1 but for twelve garrison-chaplains in
England, eighteen more abroad, and eleven brigade-
chaplains on foreign service. It is interesting to note,
as an example of the difficulty of dealing with the
Army as a whole in those days, that the Office of
Ordnance still kept its own chaplains at its own rates
of pay for the Artillery and Engineers, of course
exempt from the jurisdiction of the Chaplain-general ;
though the Commissioners of Enquiry expressly
1 There were 130 officiating clergymen and 136 retired chaplains,
of whom only one had the grace to die in the course of the year.
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 199
recommended that these gentlemen also, as was only 1803-
reasonable, should be swept into the Chaplain-general's I8l 4-
net. But the Duke of York had not yet done with
the Cavalry and Infantry. He was eager for the
institution of personal touch between the chaplains
and the men ; and, reflecting that 115 a year the
ordinary pay of a chaplain offered no great temptation
to men of ability and education, he obtained in 1807
the grant of a major's pay 292 a year for all
brigade-chaplains upon foreign service, with the
provision that they should always officiate in person.
There are many who remember that the Duke of
York strenuously upheld the use of the lash in the
British army ; there are few who know that he was
the first who sought earnestly to supplant mere
penalties by moral influence.
It was, however, long before the Duke's reforms
could produce their full effect. In February 1811,
Wellington complained that there was only one
chaplain, an excellent man, with the army. There
had been more, but one and all of them had made
out a pitiful case for leave to return home immediately
after their arrival. The result was that Methodism
had spread fast among all ranks, and that Methodist
meetings were regularly held and attended by both
officers and men. To Methodism in the abstract
Wellington had no objection. * The meeting of
soldiers in their cantonments to sing psalms or hear a
sermon read by one of their comrades is, in the
abstract, perfectly innocent," he wrote ; " and it is
a better way of spending their time than many others
to which they are addicted ; but it may become
otherwise." In plain words, Wellington did not think
it good for discipline that officers and non-com-
missioned officers should assemble to listen to the
exhortations of privates ; nor that even regimental
officers should openly rebuke sins to which their
superiors might visibly and demonstrably be prone.
There was also the danger, well known to all employers
200 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 803- of labour, lest special favour might be shown by
1814. nonconformists, holding the stripe or a commission,
to members of their own congregation. But Welling-
ton was far too wise to attempt to combat a good
influence, even though it might turn to evil, by any
means than by one still better ; and he therefore
pleaded for the despatch of a staff of what he described
as " respectable " clergymen, by which he meant men
whose character and conduct would command the
respect of all ranks. He admitted that the pay was
in itself sufficient to attract the class of clergyman that
he desired, 1 but considered that the retiring allowance
was too small, and the term of service ten years
too long for continuous personal attendance ; and he
therefore advocated the reduction of the term of
service to six years. Religious instruction, as he said,
was not only a moral necessity to every soul in the
army, but of the greatest support and aid to military
discipline and order.
The response of the Horse Guards was most
sympathetic. Sir Harry Calvert, then Adjutant-
general, promised to send out chaplains " selected
with the utmost care and circumspection by the first
prelates of the country " ; and to instruct them to
conclude every service with a short practical sermon.
In due time the reverend gentlemen appeared, but
proved taken altogether to be not quite well chosen
for their duties. The first prelates in the country,
however conscientious, were in those days hardly the
persons to understand what was needed. A clergyman
who is to appeal to sailors and soldiers must be first
1 Mr. Oman (Wellington's drmy, p. 329) says that Wellington in
one of his letters condemned the pay as too small, but in the letter
from which we both of us quote, Wellington says, " I believe the
income, while they are employed abroad, to be sufficiently good " ;
and certainly major's pay and allowance was not ungenerous. But
Mr. Oman has no knowledge of the part played by the Duke of York
in this matter of chaplains, otherwise he would not have given the
credit to Wellington instead of to the Duke. I myself should have
been as ignorant as he, had I not discovered the report of the Com-
missioners of Military Enquiry in an obscure recess of Windsor Castle.
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 201
of all a man, and only secondarily a priest. If he be 1803-
a saint as well as a man, so much the better ; but the l8 H-
most important point is that he should regard himself
rather as a learner than as a teacher. There was one in
Wellington's army who, in action, was always to be
found dangerously near to the firing-line, and met all
remonstrances with the answer that his primary duty
was "to be of service to those now departing this
life." The influence of such a man for good was
likely to be boundless, but he appears to have stood
alone. The more part of the chaplains seem to have
been morally correct, but helpless in their strange
surroundings, ignorant of the world, ignorant of men,
and therefore inefficient. Experience of men was not
so easily gained in those days, when the cure of souls
was associated rather with country villages than with
large towns. The routine of a country parish a century
ago was beyond comparison duller than at present ;
and all parish tradition regarded the recruiting sergeant
as a common enemy, and a recruit as an outcast from
decent society. In any case the chaplains as a body
were a failure. Some were unnerved when confronted
with the stern realities of war ; some were bewildered
by the panic-stricken importunities of Methodist
converts who had lost hope and found hell-fire ;
others were offended at the complacency of those who
had passed through the stage of despair and emerged
with confident assurance of their own salvation. The
work was new to these pastors, and there was no one
to show them how to do it ; yet the seed sown by
that one chaplain, who refused to be kept out of fire,
has borne fruit in our own time an hundredfold.
The ground is now cleared for dealing with the
purely military side of the Army, and first with the
Horse Guards. This office, except for a short interval
between 1 809 and 1 8 1 1, remained under the admirable
direction of the Duke of York as Commander-in-Chief.
It was organised into three principal departments ;
that of the Adjutant-general, which after 1807 took
202 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- over the duty of recruiting in addition to the previous
l8l 4- charge of discipline, armament, and clothing ; that
of the Quarter-master-general ; and that of the
Military Secretary. The Adjutant-general throughout
this period was Harry Calvert, who continued to do
the whole of his work most excellently with one deputy,
three assistants, and twenty clerks. The Quarter-
master-general was till 1812 Sir Robert Brownrigg,
and afterwards James Willoughby Gordon ; and his
staff consisted of a deputy, five assistants, two drafts-
men, and six clerks. The Military Secretary was until
1812 James Willoughby Gordon, and then Henry
Torrens. All of these officers were men of decided
ability, and Calvert, in particular, was remarkable alike
for high character and excellent understanding. Under
their administration the government of the Army was
conducted with efficiency and without friction ; while
the unfailing industry of the Duke of York, his
accessibility to all officers, his readiness to look into
all grievances, and his unswerving loyalty to his
masters in the Cabinet, made him an ideal chief. If
the whole business of the military forces and of the
war could have been left to the Horse Guards, there
would have been infinitely less bungling in the organisa-
tion of the military strength of the country, and a far
smaller proportion of abortive and absurd expeditions.
In a review of British armies in the field at this
period one can hardly touch upon any but that of
Wellington, of which, however, there is little new to
be said. Of his staff I have already spoken in a
previous chapter, but something remains to be added
of the period when his force had risen to a strength
which compelled him to distribute it into three corps
under the command respectively of Hill, Beresford,
and himself. From that moment, and even from the
rather earlier period when the mountains and passes
of the Pyrenees forbade him to look to everything
with his own eyes, we find that his Quarter-master-
general, George Murray, becomes in actual fact the
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 203
Chief of Wellington's Staff. We see Murray on not 1803-
a few occasions, and notably during the manoeuvres I8l 4-
before and after the two battles of Sorauren, issuing
important orders of his own motion and by his own
authority sometimes indeed displaying a wider grasp
of the strategic situation than did his great chief.
Simultaneously we gather from scattered notices in the
printed narratives and journals of various officers that
Murray's reputation at this time was greatly enhanced
in the army, and that he was regarded as second only
to Wellington in ability and even as capable of taking
his place. This is evidence that, when occasion
required it, Wellington could delegate authority, and
forsake his original principle of directing everything
for himself. The result was to raise the standard of
work performed by the staff, and to give far better
training than heretofore to its members.
It is commonly said of Wellington that he could not,
or at any rate did not, train men to any higher command
than that of a division ; and so far as concerns the older
divisional leaders such as William Stewart, Picton,
or Leith this is undoubtedly true. But the limita-
tion of ability lay in these men themselves, not in their
chief. The younger divisional leaders, and even more
the younger brigadiers such as Barnes and Colborne,
were officers of a very different stamp from their
forerunners ; and among the younger members of
the staff Pakenham, in spite of his failure at New
Orleans, and still more notably Harry Smith, showed,
when they came to independent command, that they
were true pupils of Wellington.
Moreover, it must not be overlooked that the so-
called Staff Corps, though composed of officers, non-
commissioned officers, and privates even as any other
regiment of the army, had during the Peninsular War
done much to justify its name. Augmented by 1809
to ten companies of four officers and fifty men apiece,
chiefly artificers, the least of whom received fifteen
pence a day and six men in every company two shillings,
204 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- the Staff Corps was the particular child of the Quarter-
I8l 4- master-general. The officers, selected from every
branch of the army, not excluding the Staff College
at Marlow, were examined by the colonel, an Engineer,
in drawing, trigonometrical surveying, and field-
fortification before they were admitted ; and it is
noteworthy that the two most remarkable feats of
engineering achieved during the war the suspension
bridge at Alcantara and the bridge of boats on the
Adour were the work of Major Sturgeon and Captain
Todd of the Staff Corps. There was no purchase
system in the Corps ; the colonel had no interest in the
clothing, which was provided by the War Office ;
and the Quarter-master-general was supreme over all.
With proper handling and a little larger life on active
service the Staff Corps bade fair to become an institu-
tion whose value would be unfailing and permanent.
Passing from the staff to the regiments of cavalry
and infantry, it will be well to speak for a moment of
the officers in general. From whence, it may be asked,
did they all come ? In the early years of the war,
when men were raised for rank, we know that com-
missions were distributed broadcast, very often to
most undesirable individuals ; and, as is almost
inevitable at times of pressure, particularly under
Parliamentary Government, a good many unfit per-
sons became officers during the latter period of the
war also. Courts-martial upon officers were very
common, rarely on account of misconduct in the field,
but frequently for brawling, insubordination, and
neglect of duty. Duels, though there was plenty of
occasion for them at Lisbon, were few and far between
in the Peninsula, first, because officers, as a rule,
were too busy to get into mischief, and secondly,
because Wellington discouraged duelling. But there
were a certain number of Irish squireens, who were
never happy unless they were picking quarrels or
sending challenges. Taken altogether, the tone among
officers was probably as high as in the present day,
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 205
though their efficiency varied according to that 01*1803-
their regimental commanders. Still, as a body they l8 H-
were good, and worthy both professionally and socially
to hold the King's Commission. One of them,
Kincaid of the Rifle Brigade, lamented that more of
the aristocratic families as he called them did not
send their sons into the army, since he had noticed
that officers from this class were able to secure more
willing obedience with less effort than others. No
one who knows anything of the subject will dispute
the advantage which the habit of command, inherited
through many generations and acquired in childhood,
may confer upon a man ; but the point is whether
Kiricaid's accusation against the " aristocracy," of
shirking service in the army, can be maintained.
The question is most difficult to answer, for in
England a very large proportion of the true aristo-
cracy is untitled, and a very large and increasing pro-
portion of the titled families is not aristocratic ; but,
applying such rude tests as are possible, I judge that
Kincaid was completely mistaken. 1 The vast majority
of the officers of the Peninsular Army were sons and
1 This discovery was a great surprise to me, for I had always
imagined Kincaid to be correct. The only test that I could apply
was to go through the Army Lists of different periods, and note the
number of regimental officers, excluding colonels-in-chief, who bore
hereditary or courtesy titles. This is, I grant, extremely crude, and
likely always to be misleading ; for in the first place it leaves the old
but untitled county families out of account, and in the second it ignores
the accident of new creations in the peerage ; but still it gives some
clue. The following table shows the number of regimental officers,
below the rank of colonel, who bore hereditary or courtesy titles, at
five different dates :
1808. 1813. 1850. 1870. 1899.
Household Cavalry . 2 6 27 23 24
Line Cavalry . 29 56 17 15 37
R.A. andR.E. . 3 3 10 15 13
Foot Guards . . 49 45 52 62 49
Line Infantry . 75 8 5 8 3 49 7 l
158 195 189 164 194
The conclusion would seem to be that the number of aristocratic
206 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- grandsons of the lesser or greater landed gentry,
1814. descended in many cases immediately from younger
sons of various professions, but deriving at the distance
of a generation or two from the old stock. It is,
however, true that the possession of wealth and of
political influence tended to gain for " aristocratic "
officers very speedy promotion and an undue share
of appointments, especially as aides-de-camp, on the
staff. Indeed, many writers of the Light Division
make very much of Lord March's return to regimental
duty from the staff, as though it were something
unusual, and point the moral that he was badly
wounded at once. Hence the true significance of
Kincaid's criticism may be that he rarely met " aristo-
cratic " officers doing duty with their companies ;
and herein he was possibly correct. On the other
hand, the higher grades of the Peninsular Army were
full of aristocrats, who showed themselves for the most
part to be efficient men. Wellington was the younger
son of an Irish peer, as also was Edward Pakenham ;
and Beresford was the natural son of the first Marquis
of Waterford. Hope succeeded his father in the Earl-
dom of Hopetoun ; Colville was a son of Lord Colville
of Culross ; the incorrigible William Stewart was a
younger son of the house of Galloway, and Edward
Paget came of the house of Anglesey. Graham was a
Scottish laird ; Craufurd, Leith, and George Murray
were sons of Scottish lairds of old family. Lord
Dalhousie's title is self-explanatory ; so also is that
of Lord Aylmer, who for some time was Wellington's
Adjutant-general. Picton was the son of a Welsh
squire, and Colborne of a burgess of Lymington. Of
the older generation Sir Charles Grey came of a very
old and highly distinguished Northumberland family ;
Ralph Abercromby was sprung from a Scottish laird ;
so likewise, in the second generation, was James
officers is a fairly constant quantity, and that they tend to increase in
the scientific branches of the Artillery and Engineers, which shows that
they are not worse equipped with brains than their fellows.
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 207
Craig ; David Dundas was son of a Scottish merchant 1803-
and John Moore of an extremely accomplished Scottish I8l 4-
doctor.
As to the men, it is more difficult to speak with
precision. Abercromby recorded that the first lot of
militiamen swept into the army in 1799 were, taken
altogether, superior to ordinary recruits ; and it is
possible that this superiority, though not very strongly
marked, was maintained when the Militia was again
converted into a recruiting depot for the Line. Inas-
much, however, as the vast majority of Militiamen
were substitutes, I greatly doubt this ; and I con-
ceive the Peninsular Army to have been little different
from any other British army that existed between
1660 and 1870 ; having really good men sufficient
to make an admirable body of non-commissioned
officers, and scoundrels enough to lower very greatly
the character of the whole. Wellington was no doubt
hard upon them when, in his sweeping way, he
described them as the scum of the earth ; and yet
there was more than one occasion when the epithet
was justified. Drink no doubt accounted in great
measure for the readiness with which, at moments
of extreme depression or triumph, the better men
followed the example of the worst, as it explained
also the failure which seems in general to have been
unquestionable of promoted sergeants to become
good officers.
But setting the character of the men aside, I con-
ceive that many of the outrages which disgraced
Wellington's army were not a little due to reaction
against a discipline which, though in some ways
excessively rigid, was in others curiously lax. Apart
from the difficulty, already narrated, in the rules which
hampered courts-martial, much depended upon the
quality of officers commanding regiments and bat-
talions. There were some colonels who hardly ever
used the lash, while there were others who were always
inflicting it upon the most trivial occasion ; and it
208 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- was natural that soldiers, who lived in daily dread of
l8 H- a flogging for any slight offence, should break out into
mischief the moment that they discovered a momentary
relaxation of the strong grip in which they were
habitually held down. Meanwhile, even the best and
humanest commanding officers agreed that it was
impossible altogether to dispense with the lash for
the maintenance of discipline. Many disliked the
punishment because it was unequal. The wielders
of the cat differed greatly in strength and skill ; and
the culprits, as was natural, varied so much in con-
stitution and sensibility that, while one man would
break down under a given number of lashes, another
would bear the same number with outward equanimity.
Picketing, the sister punishment of flogging in the
cavalry, was officially abolished in 1806, but was
nevertheless continued in the Fifteenth Hussars, as
Mr. Whitbread complained in Parliament, until after
1810. The whole subject of flogging was brought
up in the House of Commons by Sir Francis Burdett
in 1811 and 1812, when cases of undoubted hardship
and even cruelty were adduced in favour of its aboli-
tion ; but the intent of Sir Francis was so obviously
factious that he was always defeated by large majorities.
The House of Commons is the worst possible tribunal
to pass judgment upon such a question, especially when
the Opposition is embittered and demoralised by long
exclusion from office ; and few Oppositions have
touched a lower depth of degradation than that which
strove against Perceval and Liverpool.
Nevertheless, something was done, though not by
the State, to appeal to the higher feelings of the soldier
through the institution in various regiments of medals
for good and distinguished service. These, let the
fact be emphasised, were a purely regimental affair,
and due to the sympathy of regimental officers, who
are always the soldier *s best friends. The idea seems
to have originated with the Fifth Fusiliers, in which
regiment there was established in 1767 an order of
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
209
merit in three classes for men who had displayed 1803-
exemplary conduct for periods of seven, fourteen, and l8 H-
twenty-one years respectively. In 1785, at the sug-
gestion of King George the Third, a similar order was
introduced into the Twenty-second, which was then
on guard at Windsor Castle. The Seventh Fusiliers
followed the example of the Twenty-second in 1788;
and in 1801 William Stewart carried the principle
further in the Rifle Brigade by giving medals not only
for good conduct but for acts of valour in the field.
Several such orders were instituted between 1815 and
1850, but only one more (so far as I can gather)
before 1815, namely, in the Seventy-fourth, where the
qualification for the first, second, and third classes was
service in not fewer than eight, six, or four general
actions respectively. It became, however, a frequent
practice for regimental officers to give a medal to
individuals for distinguished service during the Penin-
sular War. The first example of the kind known to
me is a medal granted to a private of the Fortieth for
gallantry at Germantown in 1777 ; and the next
belongs to the First Guards in 1809. In 1811 the
officers of the Buffs gave a medal to Lieutenant Latham
for saving the colours at Albuera ; and the Thirty-
fifth granted another to a sergeant who captured a
French drum-major's staff at Arroyo dos Molinos. '
Several more instances might be quoted, among them
that of the Fifty-third, which in 1815 distributed
fifteen medals to as many sergeants, who had been
prominent in different actions of the Peninsular War.
Seeing that no general medal was granted for the
services of the Army and Navy in the Great War until
Queen Victoria's time, it is interesting to note how the
omission was made good by the regimental officers.
Nor can there be any question that such a decoration,
conferred by comrades, was of peculiar honour and
distinction. 1
1 Mr. Oman (Wellington's Army, p. 251) says that there were
" Peninsula period good conduct medals for the loth and nth Hussars
VOL. X P
210 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- As regards drill and tactics, there is little new to
I8l 4- be said, for there was no change in the exercise intro-
duced by the Duke of York when he first took over
the command-in-chief at the Horse Guards. The
cavalry continued, as for years past, to manoeuvre by
threes, half-troops, troops, and squadrons, and, to
judge from the action at Sahagun, was generally
superior in field-movements to the French. The
establishment of a regiment in the field was three
squadrons made up of two troops apiece. In the
matter of reconnaissance and outpost-duties the cavalry
of the German Legion was decidedly superior to the
British, though there were some British regiments,
notably the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, which can
have been little inferior to them. In the matter of
care for their horses, also, the Germans surpassed the
British as decidedly as the British surpassed the
French. The conversion of some of the Light
Dragoons into Hussars caused a certain alteration in
the equipment, the Hussars discarding the old-
fashioned carbine and bayonet in favour of a shorter
and lighter weapon without bayonet. In both cases
the carbine was fixed by an elaborate arrangement of
straps on the offside of the saddle, where it wore out
the thigh of the breeches or overalls and made mounting
a difficult business. 1 Beyond a few superficial changes
(starting 1812), 5th, 7th, 22nd, 38th, 5 2nd, yist, 74th, 88th, 95th,
97th, and some other corps." The regimental histories of the loth
and nth Hussars are silent on the subject. The good conduct medals
of the 5th, 7th and 22nd, as I have shown, belong to the i8th century.
As to the 38th I can discover nothing. There is no record of the
institution of good conduct medals in the regimental history of the
52nd, though there is a case of a regimental medal given to a private
who was in the storming party at Badajoz : and the like is true of the
7 1 st. The regimental order of merit in the 74th was instituted in
1814; that of the 88th in 1 81 8 ; of the 95th in 1801 ; of the 42nd
and 79th in 1819 ; and that of the 26th in 1823. Some information
on the subject may be gathered from Fleming's Catalogue of 'Medals,
1871.
1 This equipment for the carbine was still issued to the Yeomanry
until about 1880.
CH.XXI HISTORY OF THE ARMY 211
of dress and saddlery Hussars and Light Dragoons 1803-
remained practically the same, though possibly the l8 H-
Hussars may have outdone their fellows in the abso-
lutely useless practice of firing from the saddle. It is
very rarely that we find the cavalry dismounted to use
their fire-arms. The sword was the same for both
Hussars and Light Dragoons, being the unwieldy and
ill-guarded weapon described in the account of the
combats of cavalry during Moore's retreat to Coruna.
The sword of the Heavy Cavalry was long, straight
and heavy, better adapted for thrusting than for cut-
ting. As the tendency of all Teutonic nations is to
use a sword as if it were a bludgeon, it was probably
ill-suited to British dragoons. 1
Of the leaders of the British cavalry contemporary
opinion seems to have rated Lord Uxbridge as the
best, and Cotton not far behind him. Of the briga-
diers the name of hardly one has survived, or deserved
to survive. The Germans Bock and Arentschild were
probably the best, and next after them William
Ponsonby, Le Marchant and Vivian. But Wellington
seems to have taken longer to free the cavalry than
the infantry from bad commanders ; and it is possible
that the man whom he valued above. all others in the
mounted branch was the simple captain, Somers
Cocks.
With regard to the dress of the cavalry, the Heavy
Dragoons until the close of 1812 wore the long-
skirted coat, jack-boots to the knee, and cocked hat
which had come down with little variation from the
time of George the Second. These garments were
then replaced by a shorter skirted coat, which gave no
protection to the knee, a brass helmet with a crest and
plume, grey cloth overalls with a broad red stripe, and
half-boots. The Light Dragoons likewise kept, until
1 A highly distinguished cavalry officer told me that in Palestine
in 1918 the British cavalry in the heat of pursuit forgot the legitimate
use of their rapier-like swords, and used them as bludgeons, much to
the advantage of the Turks.
212 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- 1813, the short laced jacket, leather breeches, long
1814. boots, and fur-crested helmet, which had been given
to them when they were first dressed in blue, shortly
after the American War. But in 1813 the laced jacket
was replaced by one with a broad plastron of the colour
of the facings, and the rest of the clothes by grey
overalls with a stripe down the seam, half-boots, and a
shako broadening out from the brim to the crown, in
the front of which was inserted a plume. This head-
dress, borrowed from the French, was probably the
fancy of the Prince Regent, who suffered acutely
from sartorial mania ; and it was condemned by
Wellington for the sound reason that it tended to
confound the French troops with our own. The
Hussars alone preserved the laced jacket, white leather
breeches and Hessian boots. In fact the Peninsular
War marks the period when overalls (so called because
they were buttoned over all other clothing on the leg)
and half-boots began to displace breeches and Hessian
or top-boots among civilians as well as among soldiers.
In an age when the saddle was the most usual means
of travelling for men, the innovation was a foolish one,
for only leather can resist the constant splashing of
mud and water from the knee to the ankle, which is
inevitable when riding on wet roads. Booted overalls,
though already introduced into the French army, 1
had not yet reached the British.
The infantry continued to be governed, so far as
exercise was concerned, by the drill-book of David
Dundas ; but the formation in triple rank was wholly
abandoned in the field, though here and there it may
have continued at home for purposes of parade. 2 Of
the deadliness of the infantry's fire a score of fields have
given emphatic proof ; but it is worth while to recall
1 I gather this from a drawing by Denis Dighton in the Royal
Library at Windsor Castle, representing Suchet and his staff a few
days before the battle of Castalla.
2 I have seen a print of Volunteers drawn up in triple rank during
the period under review.
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 213
that the calibre of the British musket was of sixteen 1803-
bullets, whereas that of the French was of twenty l8l 4-
bullets, to the pound. It is quite possible that the
superior weight of the projectile was not without its
effect in the duel of volleys. It is noteworthy that
Wellington discontinued the former habit of massing
grenadier- companies and light- companies together,
and thus depriving battalions of their best men.
Burgoyne did indeed complain that the grenadiers
ought to have been selected for such work as the storm
of Burgos; 1 but there can be no doubt that Wellington
did away with what was, in its essence, a most pernicious
practice.
In the matter of dress the Peninsular infantry
differed much from their predecessors, in that they
never wore breeches and gaiters, which were abolished,
just before the first campaign began, in favour of
blue-grey trousers, and half-boots in lieu of shoes.
Cocked hats endured for all ranks until 1812, when a
tall felt shako, doubled along the front, took its place.
The coat, which was heavily plastered across the front
with white braid, had no skirt except at the back, where
it took the senseless form of the tails that are still
attached to men's evening dress. The cross-belt and
pouches remained unaltered, a heavy oppression to the
soldier 's chest, while a stiff black leather stock encum-
bered his throat. Many a man owed his break-down,
or even his death, to the belt and stock. Among officers
the fashion was to wear the tails of the coat extravagantly
long, even to the heels, and the cocked hat, which
had earlier been worn rather high and with the points
right and left, absurdly low and with the points fore
and aft. Their appearance was consequently very
ridiculous, 2 and the costume must have been singularly
ill-suited to a campaign. Wellington himself always
wore a blue frock and a more reasonable cocked hat,
1 Life of Burgoyne, i. 234.
2 There is a plate of this hat and coat in Johnny Newcome in the
Peninsula.
2i 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- pantaloons, generally white, and Hessian boots; though
l8l 4- he occasionally cantered round his cantonments in
plain clothes. He cared little, however, what his
officers wore ; and some of them clad themselves
according to the latest fashion that reigned at St.
James's, heedless of the tropical rains of Portugal,
with very unpleasant consequences. It is difficult,
during a campaign at a distance from England, to
insist too strongly upon rigid adherence to the clothing
laid down by regulation, for a man must often wear
whatever he can in default of better ; but I find it hard
to believe that this laxity as regards dress and appear-
ance had no bad effect upon discipline.
I now pass to the Office of Ordnance and to the
corps affiliated to it. It will be remembered that the
condition of the Office had been unsatisfactory at the
close of the eighteenth century, and that this had
reacted upon the Artillery with evil results. The
department was managed, under the Master-general,
by five members, called the principal officers of the
Ordnance, namely, the Lieutenant-general, the Surveyor-
general, the Clerk of the Ordnance who was financial
chief the Principal Store-keeper, and the Clerk of
Deliveries ; the Master-general being supreme over all.
Each of the four junior members had a separate depart-
ment, and it should seem that there was some friction
among them, and that the tendency of each was to
treat his own business as a separate matter ; for the
Commissioners of Military Enquiry recommended
that they should no longer stand apart, but should be
amalgamated into a General Board of Ordnance. One
great difficulty was that the Mastership-general was
a political appointment and constantly changing hands,
which was an absurd arrangement in so highly technical
an office. Lord Chatham appears to have been one
of the most successful of the Masters-general, being,
for all his indolence, an extremely able man ; and Lord
Mulgrave, who was responsible for the department
throughout the greater part of the Peninsular War,
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 215
was also a practical and capable soldier. But the 1803-
Office, to judge by Wellington's complaints, was inert I8l 4-
and incapable of leaving the groove which it had worn
for itself ; 1 and there was more than once unwarrant-
able delay in the despatch of ordnance-stores, while
considerable folly was displayed in the provision of
them. 2 It must be remarked also that though
Wellington complained that his cannon were out-
ranged . by Napoleon's favourite twelve - pounders,
no effort was made to supply him with a gun that
would have enabled him to meet the French on equal
terms.
The field-artillery, to use a modern term, was still
nominally organised in battalions and companies, but
on the field this organisation disappeared and gave
place to batteries or, as they were called, to brigades,
some of which were distributed among the divisions
as divisional artillery, and the remainder lumped
together as a reserve. A serious complication was
the separation of the artillery-drivers from the Royal
Regiment proper. In 1806 the drivers were re-
organised into ten troops and one " riding troop,"
with a total strength of over six thousand of all ranks.
Each troop numbered five officers, five hundred non-
commissioned officers and drivers, forty farriers and
artificers, two rough-riders, and five trumpeters. The
captains, called " Captains Commissaries, " were taken
from every corps in the army,- and the subalterns
were mostly deserving staff-sergeants of the Artillery
itself ; but there were no rules of promotion, the will
of the Master-general a political official, be it re-
membered being absolute. This was one evil ; but
a greater and more obvious defect was that, directly a
1 See, for instance, Wellington Desp., to Bathurst, 2yth Jan. 1813.
2 So Dickson wrote from New Orleans : " With respect to our
ammunition and stores, great quantities of articles have been sent
that are perfectly unnecessary and never have been demanded,
whereas others greatly required have never been sent although de-
manded in the most urgent manner." Duncan, Hist, of the Royal
Artillery, ii. 403-404.
216 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 803- party of drivers was told off to its guns, their officers
I8l 4- passed under the authority of the officers of artillery,
and remained with no duties but those of paymasters.
This was both wasteful and bad for discipline ; and
the Commissioners of Military Enquiry rightly recom-
mended that the drivers should form an integral part
of the Royal Regiment, and that none but subaltern
officers should be appointed to them. The drivers,
however, were not abolished as a separate corps until
1822.
The quarrel between the Artillery and Wellington,
begun by his unceremonious treatment of his senior
officers in the Peninsula, continued by his taking away
the horses from batteries and giving them to the
pontoon-train, embittered by his harshness to Norman
Ramsay, and made irreconcilable by his despatch after
Waterloo, renders it difficult to speak of the relations
between the two. There can be no doubt that no
love was lost between the General and his gunners,
but I find it difficult to believe that all the faults were
on one side. Beyond question the primary cause of
the whole affair was that the artillery did not owe
allegiance to the same master as the rest of the army,
which caused its officers, perhaps unconsciously, to
assume in their hearts that they were after all not
dependent upon him. Their attitude, expressed itself
rather through a habit of mind than through any
outward and palpable manifestation ; but it is easy
to understand that a Commander-in-Chief, and par-
ticularly an imperious man such as Wellington, must
have chafed a good deal over the reflection that a most
important branch of his army was not quite under his
control. Determined to be master, he trampled right
and left upon all the gunners* prejudices ; and, when
the senior officers raised difficulties, he set them aside
one after another until he found the man that he wanted,
Captain Alexander Dickson, whom he raised without
more ado in effect if not in title to the highest place.
As regards the unhorsing of guns for the benefit of the
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
217
pontoon-train, no one can fail to sympathise with a 1803-
battery-commander who sees the teams, which were
his pride, turned over to another branch of the service,
there to be ill-treated and wasted by ignorance and
neglect. But gunners exist for war and not war for
gunners ; a pontoon-train was more necessary even
than cannon ; and it is not likely that Wellington
would have weakened himself in artillery if he could
have helped it. The case of Norman Ramsay, again,
was a hard one, but no harder than that of several other
officers in the army ; and even the crowning grievance,
which we have not yet reached, of- the Artillery at
Waterloo, was not more crying than other regiments
might with equal justice put forward against Wellington.
The simple truth is that the Royal Regiment served
the Duke well, as did the other regiments of the army,
and was in the highest degree efficient ; and, if he in
his turn sometimes grew impatient with it, he at least
never lost one of their guns.
The Engineers, as the past narrative shows, were
crippled throughout the greater part of the war by the
want of trained men ; and the conversion of the Royal
Military Artificers into Royal Sappers and Miners in
1812 came too late to be of real service. Organised
nominally into three battalions, the corps worked
always by companies, three of which complete, together
with detachments of two more, did duty at San Sebas-
tian, numbering rather over three hundred men in all.
One company of them contained the first men produced
by Pasley's school at Chatham, and the first of their
corps that ever wore the red coat. The officers of the
Engineers proper seem to have been the most hard-
worked and the worst paid in the army. The very
subalterns were expected to keep their horse and mule,
and could find plenty of work for them ; but the price
even of second-rate animals in the Peninsula was such
that these unfortunate officers could not equip them-
selves without overdrawing their pay and allowances for
six months. Moreover, being constantly sent away
2i8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- on missions of various kinds by themselves, they could
1814. maintain no mess, and, having no regimental sutler,
were forced to buy all victuals at a ruinous rate. Im-
poverished by these expenses, they could not afford to
keep a decent servant, and suffered further loss of their
baggage and horses from the neglect and dishonesty
of such Spanish or Portuguese lads as they could induce
to accept a pittance of wages. In fact, to use the
language of their own petition for relief, they existed
only " by living in a state of misery and in a manner
much inferior to that of any other branch of the Army,
by dressing ill, riding horses incapable of doing their
duty with alacrity, and consequently frequently leading
to an appearance of lack of zeal, and notwithstanding
all this extreme economy being almost universally in
debt." In such circumstances it is hardly surprising
that the junior ranks of the corps sometimes seemed a
little slack in the performance of their duty. But they
were never backward at a siege, and, in common with
their brother officers, suffered terribly. At Ciudad
Rodrigo seven Engineer officers out of nineteen were
killed and wounded ; at Badajoz thirteen out of twenty-
four, of whom four had joined the army the day before
the assault ; at Burgos three out of five, as well as
every one of their eight military artificers ; and at San
Sebastian eleven out of eighteen. Their industry and
devotion has never received the recognition which it
deserves.
The senior officers have been laden with no small
share of blame for the heavy loss of life incurred at
nearly all of Wellington's sieges. This has been
attributed to their want of skill ; and Wellington
himself was not always complimentary to his chief
engineer, Sir Richard Fletcher. Moreover, it is
certain that bad and even unpardonable mistakes
were made by some among them, as will have been
gathered from my narrative of the sieges. There was
no sharper critic of these blunders, whether the work
of the Engineers or of the Commander-in-Chief, than
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 219
John Burgoyne, and he was particularly plain-spoken 1803-
when he dealt with the failure at Burgos, for which I8l 4-
Wellington in his public despatch acknowledged that
neither the Artillery nor the Engineers were responsible.
After the death of Sir Richard Fletcher before San
Sebastian Wellington desired to make Burgoyne his
chief engineer, and endeavoured to do so by the simple
method of ordering Burgoyne's senior officers to
remain at the base. This expedient, though successful
in the case of Dickson with the Artillery, was neutral-
ised in Burgoyne's case by a protest from Colonel
Elphinstone, who was accordingly called to the front,
only to incur Wellington's unqualified displeasure
for not bringing forward sufficient pontoons for the
bridge over the Garonne. However, there was at any
rate in the Engineers one officer of really brilliant
ability, and more than one subaltern notably
Wellington's favourites, Lieutenants Reid and Wright
who were of most uncommon promise.
Altogether the Peninsular Army, though weak in
numbers, was a very remarkable engine of war, thanks
to its unbounded confidence in its great chief, and was
still improving when its labours came to an end. Yet
it cannot be said that Wellington was an ideal leader,
for he commanded no such adoration from his men as
had Marlborough. To speak plainly, he was not a
lovable character. He was, in fact, never loved in his
life by man or woman ; and one has a suspicion that,
after all, a military career was not that which he thought
to be really best suited to him. As a boy he was shy
and sheepish, with indifferent health, and with an heredi-
tary liking for music, which he cultivated for a time on
the violin ; and his hands were the hands of an artist,
long, taper and delicate. Of his early regimental
days and his first active service in Flanders in 1794
we know nothing ; and it seems that he rarely referred
to them. It was not until he went to India, where
the hot climate appears to have done him extraordinary
physical benefit, that he suddenly blossomed out into
220 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 803- a great soldier and a great administrator. There the
I8l 4- transcendent common sense, which he so much admired
in Marlborough, asserted itself instantly, carrying
with it that penetrating insight into the heart of things,
which is called genius. In planning his campaigns
he displayed remarkable prevision, energy and industry
in providing against all possible contingencies. In
action he was sagacious to see an opportunity and
swift to seize it, audacious in taking risks, calm and
unmoved at the most critical moments, and possessed
of that rare physical courage without which no general
has ever risen to supreme height, but which in his case,
as in Napoleon's, has never been sufficiently recognised.
His Indian campaigns alone, unchequered by failure
except before Seringapatam, together with his adminis-
trative achievements in India, would at any other time
in the nineteenth century have won for him a peerage ;
but he returned home no more than a Knight of the
Bath, with a fortune of 40,000 which had accrued to
him from the prize-money of Seringapatam, and from
the various appointments, civil and military, which he
had held in the Dekhan. This last, fairly and justly
earned, made no small difference to the heretofore
penniless younger son.
Upon reaching England he was consulted by
Ministers concerning expeditions, happily never under-
taken, to the Orinoco, entered Parliament and became
Chief Secretary for Ireland, which post he was actually
holding when he went first to Copenhagen and after-
wards to Spain. He permitted himself no illusions as
to the state of Ireland, but carried on the government
according to the approved fashion, giving occasional
vent to his contempt for jobbers and place-hunters in
a few sentences of that acrid sarcasm of which he was
a master. For his chief, the Duke of Richmond, as
also for a former Lord-Lieutenant, Lord Buckingham,
to whom he had been aide-de-camp as a youth, he
retained to the end a regard which was almost affec-
tionate ; for Wellington never forgot one who had
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 221
befriended him. Then came the expedition to 1803
Portugal, the victory of Vimeiro, fortune's last effort
to injure him in the matter of the Convention of
Cintra, and at length the command-in-chief in the
Peninsula. At the outset he was a little over-elated
by his success in driving back Soult from the Douro,
and was inclined to believe that he could succeed
where Moore had failed ; but the campaign of
Talavera taught him his lesson, and then the tran-
scendent common sense asserted itself, and revealed
to him the secret of a warfare which must slowly and
steadily sap the strength of Napoleon. The entire
population of Spain was hostile to the French ; no
part of the country could be called theirs unless held
down by French bayonets. The French line of com-
munications was long and incessantly harassed ; and
they depended entirely on the country not only for
subsistence but for the pay of their troops. To the
British the sea was open to bring reinforcements,
supplies and stores to the port of Lisbon, which was
his base. If that base could be rendered absolutely
secure, then the advance of a compact body of fifty
thousand men must compel at least that number of
French to be concentrated to meet him ; and the
Spanish territory thus denuded of troops would pass
into the hands of the insurgents, at best to remain
in them permanently, at worst to require time and
bloodshed for reconquest.
There lay the germ of the whole of the Peninsular
campaigns until 1813 ; but there was much to be
done before it could grow to maturity. A Portuguese
army must be created and paid ; a Portuguese
Government must be evolved out of anarchy ; fortified
lines must be thrown up to defend Lisbon ; and,
above all, a British army must be trained, organised,
and perfectly equipped with transport all in the face
of an unstable Government at home, of a chaos of
jobbery and inefficiency in Portugal, of a frightful
dearth of specie all over the world, and consequently
222 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 803- of an exchange of twenty-five per cent at Lisbon
1814. against remittances from London. Such was the
gigantic task which Wellington set to himself at the
close of 1809 and brought to a triumphant issue in
1813, when he bade adieu to Portugal after to all intent
governing it for more than three years. He had to
teach every one of his subordinates his business ; and
this he did, not with the peremptory brevity which
appears in his despatches, but with infinite pains, in-
dustry and patience. With him, as with Marlborough,
it was patience in action that conquered all things,
while impatience showed itself only in writing. He
was indefatigable and he was ubiquitous. It appears
that he was not fond of early rising ; but he made
up for lost time by galloping long distances at head-
long speed on thoroughbred horses. Incapable of
distinguishing sweet butter from rancid or fresh wine
from sour, he was always abstemious and therefore
always in good condition, ready for work himself and,
more important still, to extort work from others. He
had a curious team to drive, for the Portuguese were
stubborn and recalcitrant ; some of his departmental
chiefs were sluggish and unwilling ; and many of his
officers were sulky and headstrong, inclined to jib
or to kick over the traces. But he forced them to pull
together, rating very freely and not sparing the whip
upon occasion, but relying above all upon patient
resolution and the electrifying touch of a strong hand
upon the reins.
His second campaign, that of 1810, showed him
that he had solved the main problem aright. When
Massena was abruptly checked before Torres Vedras,
it was only a question of time before the French
should be driven from the Peninsula. Living on
the country, they could not stay long in one place ;
whereas the British, carrying their victuals with them,
could go where they pleased and stay where they
pleased. The greater the district that the French
might eat up, the greater would be the desert closed
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 223
to them but open to their enemies. So their advance 1803-
and the British retreat would be shorter at every l8 H-
campaign, while difficulties of supply would compel
the dispersion of the French into wider cantonments,
and make their concentration more lengthy and more
arduous. Then would come the time for snatching
away the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz,
as starting-points for a fresh spring eastward, which
should end ultimately only at the Pyrenees.
Only a great military genius could have perceived
these possibilities, and only a great administrative
genius could have turned them to reality. Yet
throughout we are sensible that some of Wellington's
greatest obstacles were of his own making and arose
out of his own prejudices, and that he could have
exerted even greater force with less friction had he
been less of a driver and more of a leader. He was
a St. Vincent and not a Nelson ; a chief, distant,
Olympian and severe, not one of a band of brothers.
True sympathy is rarely to be traced in his letters,
though it is not wholly wanting ; the tone, though
occasionally facetious, is seldom genial ; and the
humour, though unmistakably present, is generally
bitter. I attribute this not to insensibility -for there
were a few recorded occasions when he broke down
completely but to stern and perhaps exaggerated self-
repression. Wellington was not without vanity of a
certain description, as witness his entry into Madrid ;
not without frailty, for he was but a man ; and not
without even a certain conceit, for he was supremely
well satisfied with his own opinions and his own
possessions. But as we see him through the medium of
his own voluminous writings and the records of his con-
temporaries, he seems to me always somewhat artificial,
despite of the rugged genuineness of character which
distinguished him at great crises. Children in his later
years, possibly also his daughter-in-law and one or two
more women, knew the softer and more natural side of
him ; but he could be stern even to them. He held
224 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1803- himself aloof from his officers and never commanded
l8l 4- the confidence of all of his divisional generals. Their
conceit may no doubt account for much ; but one
cannot imagine three of Marlborough's generals hold-
ing such a conference as that of Dalhousie, Clinton
and Stewart on the retreat from Burgos. Yet, for all
his contempt towards his juniors, it is an indubitable
fact that Wellington shrank, even to a fault, from
ridding himself of bad generals, and visited their
blunders upon innocent subordinates with a harshness
which drove some few of them to suicide. So like-
wise he would turn the demerits of a few into a
sweeping condemnation of all ; and would never
revoke, nor even modify, a word of censure once
uttered. In wrath he was something more than for-
midable; and the slightest deviation from his orders,
even for obvious improvement, called his anger forth
in all its terrors. McGrigor once incurred his dis-
pleasure in this way and could not pacify him ; yet,
when McGrigor was later on accidentally injured,
Wellington, knowing his value, offered him, unasked,
every possible comfort and attention. He was not
ungenerous, and gave warm praise on occasion. He
could tell Hill after St. Pierre that the day was all
Sir Rowland's own ; he could acquit his scientific
advisers of responsibility for the failure before Burgos ;
he could boast that it was his distinction among
generals to command an army which would extricate
him from any " scrape " in which he might involve
himself. Yet he deliberately alienated any affectionate
feeling of all ranks from him ; and, when the war
was over, he parted from his soldiers without regret,
and never troubled himself about them again. He
was in fact glad to be quit of them, and made no
pretence to the contrary.
This being so, his ascendancy over the army
appears only the more extraordinary ; showing forth,
in spite of all defects, the extreme greatness of the
man. Ambitious though he was, and fond of power,
CH. xxi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 225
Wellington was above all things a patriot ; and the 1803-
key to the whole of his career is patriotic duty. He I8l 4-
was far prouder of being an English gentleman than
of all his honours and titles ; he believed in the
England that produced such gentlemen, and was
resolved to save her and them. He took over his
army as an instrument to that end, just as an engineer
might take over a gang of labourers to dig a canal,
having no love for the gang in itself, but determined
to make the best of it as a matter of duty. Being a
consummate master of his art, one of the first strategists
and decidedly the first director of a battle of his time,
no doubt Wellington derived some pleasure and
satisfaction from his campaigns, as must every great
artist from his own work ; but, when his purpose was
fulfilled, he threw the instrument aside without
compunction, having no further use for it and little
or no sentiment about it. As fate willed, he was
destined to take it into his hand once again, but he
could not divine the future. The able French
historian of Wellington's campaigns in France con-
cludes his narrative with the words, " Wellington
ended the Spanish war as negotiator of a treaty of
commerce." To an officer of so great an army as
that of France such a termination seems ludicrous if
not ignoble. To Wellington it was nothing but one
more duty to be done for his country and, as such,
quite as well worth doing as fighting a campaign.
Through him this sense of duty penetrated into his
army and carried them triumphant through the
greatest period of British military history. He
offered them no reward, for he did not speak to them
of glory ; he made no effort it would have been
better if he had made it to secure their personal
attachment. He required of them inflexibly their
duty to the utmost, and set the example himself. It
was a hard school and he was a hard master, and to
none more severe than to himself. He is remembered
as one of three great English generals, sharing that
VOL. x Q
226 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 803- honour with Cromwell and Marlborough. His true
I8l 4- title to fame is that he was the most industrious, the
most patriotic, the most faithful, and the most single-
hearted public servant that has ever toiled for the
British nation.
CHAPTER XXII
NAPOLEON, by sentence of the European Powers, was 1814.
conveyed to the island of Elba on the 28th of April
1814 ; and on the 3Oth of May were signed the
Treaties of Paris, which settled for the time, so far as
France was concerned, the ambitions and animosities
which had arisen out of a quarter of a century of war.
Other weighty matters were adjourned until a Congress
of the European Powers should meet at Vienna ; but
meanwhile France received a slight accession to the
territory which she had enjoyed in 1791, and Belgium
was united to Holland under the sovereignty of the
House of Orange. England for her part retained
Malta, Tobago, St. Lucia and Mauritius, and acquired
further the conquered colonies of the Cape, Curacoa
and Demerara from the Dutch by purchase. In these
circumstances, and until hostilities with America
should cease, it was impossible to make very large
reductions in the British army. Wellington's bat-
talions were most of them sent away across the
Atlantic as fast as they were released from France.
The remains of Graham's detachment, with which he
had stormed Bergen-op-Zoom, were marched from
Holland into Belgium, 1 where they were joined in
the course of the summer and autumn by the greater
part of the King's German Legion, 2 and by fifteen
1 2/ist Guards ; 2nd Coldstream Guards ; 2nd Scots Guards ;
2/2$th; 2/30th; 33rd; 2/35th; 2/37th; 2/44-th; 2/$2nd; 54th;
2/69th; 2/73rd; 2/y8th; 2/8ist; det. 95th.
2 That is to say, by all the cavalry, all the Light battalions, five
out of seven Line battalions, both horse-batteries, one and a half foot-
227
228 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1814. thousand Hanoverian Militia. These troops, which
in August 1814 were placed under the command of
the Prince of Orange, were stationed in the Nether-
lands under an agreement with Austria, Russia and
Prussia, to maintain the provisions of the Treaty of
Paris pending the final settlement of Europe by the
Congress at Vienna.
The condition of Ireland was anything but peaceful,
and it was therefore impossible to disembody the
Yeomanry or even the whole of the Regular Militia ; 1
though the Local Militia, under the wording of the
Act by which it was created, was disbanded within six
weeks of the signature of peace. The only direction in
which economy was possible was in respect of the
cavalry, the veteran battalions, and the second battalions.
In the mounted branch the Household regiments were
greatly diminished, and the regiments of the Line were
reduced to an establishment of eight troops of sixty
men apiece ; and in the infantry before the end of the
year eleven veteran battalions, twenty-four second
battalions, and ten thousand foreign corps were dis-
banded. The Artillery was dealt with more summarily,
for no fewer than seven thousand men were discharged.
Altogether by the close of 1814 forty-seven thousand
men had been struck off the strength of the British
establishment. 2
It was not to be supposed that the Opposition in
Parliament would quietly acquiesce in the maintenance
of so large a military force. Their gloomy forebodings
of the past seven years had been steadily falsified ;
and, now that Napoleon had been dethroned and peace
was at last come, they seized the opportunity offered
by Castlereagh's absence at Vienna to offer factious
batteries. There was, however, a good deal of desertion from the
Legion. Wellington Supp. Desp. ix. 394.
1 In October there were about 10,000 Militia in Ireland and
6000 in England. Wellington Supp. Desp. ix. 368.
2 Hansard's Par/. Debates, xxxi. 587 seq. Wellington Supp.
Desp. x. 8.
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 229
opposition to every measure of the Government. They 1814,
cavilled at the appointment of the Prince of Orange to
command British troops as " unconstitutional." They
maintained that it was " unconstitutional " also to dis-
embody a part of the Militia and not to disembody the
whole. So useful are meaningless epithets to those who
speak for the sake of opposing, and oppose for the
sake of speaking. Lord Grenville, who ought to have
known better, declared that there was no occasion for
a larger peace-establishment than in 1792. He, at
least, might have guessed, if not that the Powers who
were rearranging the map of Europe at Vienna were
on the point of flying at each other's throats over the
destiny of Poland, Tuscany and Naples, at any rate
that the weight of England's influence must depend
not a little upon her military strength. Able but
sentimental gentlemen waxed tearful over the dis-
appointment inflicted upon Genoa by Castlereagh, when
he repudiated Lord William Bentinck's foolish and
unauthorised promises of a new Government after the
model beloved of the Whigs.
The Corn Laws and the Income Tax furnished
more legitimate subjects of criticism ; and, when the
Treaty of Ghent brought the American War to an end
on Christmas Eve 1814, Liverpool was dismayed at
the countenance which the Opposition received from
his own supporters, and entreated Castlereagh to return
home with all haste. ' You might as well expect me to
have run away from Leipzig (if I had been there) last
year to fight Creevy and Whitbread, as to withdraw
from hence until the existing contest is brought to a
point," answered Castlereagh with high contempt ; and
indeed it was intolerable that the ablest of living
English statesmen should be withdrawn from the post
of greatest difficulty to listen to an ignoble adventurer
and a vain, though amiable, chatterbox. There was,
however, another Englishman at hand to replace him.
Wellington, since the conclusion of peace created a
Duke, had already been entrusted with diplomatic
230 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. business in Madrid and in Paris. On the 3rd of
February 1815 he relieved Castlereagh at Vienna ;
and by the first week in March the Foreign Secretary
was again in his place on the green benches. Great was
Liverpool's relief. !< The country at this moment is
peace-mad," he wrote on the 2oth of February. " Many
of our best friends think of nothing but the reduction
of taxes and low establishments ; and it is very
doubtful if we could involve the country in a war at
this moment for objects which, on every principle of
sound policy, ought to lead to it." 1
The object which, at Castlereagh's request, Liver-
pool was at the moment contemplating was the
expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples ; the
vicinity of Elba to that kingdom being a circumstance
which kept King Lewis the Eighteenth and equally
Wellington in constant apprehension. 2 The King,
indeed, made the state of Italy his excuse for not
paying to Napoleon a farthing of the j8 0,000 which
the Allies had pledged him to allow to the fallen
Emperor ; and in less than a week after the date of
Liverpool's letter, on the night of Sunday the 26th
" of February, Napoleon embarked by stealth at Porto
Ferrajo, with the four hundred men which he retained
as his guard, and landed at the Golfe de Jouan on the
ist of March. Moving first upon Antibes he found
his overtures repelled by the garrison ; but at Grenoble
he was received by the troops with wild enthusiasm,
and marched thence with fourteen thousand men upon
Paris. Ney, who had set forth to capture his old
master, found himself deserted by his best troops and
embraced his side ; and on the 2oth of March
Napoleon entered Paris amid wild shouts of joy from
discharged soldiers and from officers who were
starving on their half-pay. King Lewis, abandoned
by the army, whose work this revolution really was,
fled first to Lille and, as his prospects grew worse, was
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. ix. 551, 573.
2 Ibid. ix. 503.
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 231
for passing over to England, but was persuaded to 1815.
establish his shadow of a court at Ghent. The Duke April,
of Angouleme, who had collected some kind of a
force about Nimes, with the object of marching on
Lyons and saving at any rate the southern provinces
for the monarchy, gained a trifling success on the
2nd of April, but was surrounded and compelled to
capitulate six days later. On the i6th of April he
embarked at Cette for Spain, and all royalist resistance
to Napoleon in this quarter came to an end.
The Bourbons have been much blamed for their
folly during the first period of their restoration, from
May 1814 till March 1815, and undoubtedly they were
guilty of grave mistakes. But their difficulties, from
the exhausted state of the country, were stupendous ;
and an archangel from Heaven could not have restored
even the beginning of content to France, after all her
misfortunes, within a period of ten months. Yet the
only true supporters of Napoleon's short second empire
were the men who had been discharged in rags and
the officers who had been retired on a pittance, in order
to cover the reconstituted Household troops of France
with gorgeous uniforms.
The news no sooner reached Vienna than the
assembled plenipotentiaries drew up a public declara-
tion that Napoleon Bonaparte had placed himself
outside the pale of public law, and must be delivered
to public justice as a common enemy and disturber
of the peace. To this declaration Wellington, as was
natural, set his hand, and was rewarded by being
denounced by Whitbread in the House of Commons
as one who abetted an openly expressed intention to
assassinate Bonaparte ; an infamous accusation which
might have been excused by Whitbread's ignorance
of the French language, but for which, in his portentous
vanity, he had not the grace to apologise. In every
capital of Europe the alarm was great ; but it was
speedily resolved that the plague should be abated
at any cost. On the 25th of March it was agreed
232 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. between Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria
March. ^ at > pursuant to the Treaty of Chaumont, each of
these Powers should place one hundred and fifty
thousand men in the field, and not lay down their
arms until Bonaparte should have been rendered help-
less for war. In the case of Great Britain it was
arranged that she should be at liberty to substitute
money for men at a fixed rate. Having signed
this instrument and a further convention to grant a
subsidy of five millions sterling to the contracting
parties, Wellington left Vienna on the 29th of March
and, travelling at great speed, reached Brussels on the
night of the 4th of April. The Prince of Orange had
taken alarm from the first. " Bonaparte will, I am
persuaded, enter Paris very shortly," he had written
on the iyth of March. " He will then move down
without delay upon this frontier. " Accordingly, he
had ordered the fortresses of Western Flanders and
Mons to be repaired at once, so as to secure them
against a stroke of surprise, and had despatched a
messenger to ask for help from General Kleist, then
commanding an army of rather over forty thousand
Prussians and Saxons, which were stationed about Aix-
la-Chapelle. The arrival of Wellington in the Nether-
lands was an intense relief to Ministers, for the Prince
of Orange, with rather absurd conceit, declared that
he would not willingly have yielded up his charge to
any other man. He was, in fact, burning to invade
France and to fight Napoleon single-handed ; and,
even after receiving from Bathurst strict orders to do
nothing so foolish, he had maintained his dispositions
for an advance. Young and ambitious of military
glory, he was still unaware, though he was shortly to
prove, that he was unfit even to command a battalion. 1
The information that greeted the Duke upon his
arrival at Brussels was not of the most cheering. Ten
days before quitting Vienna he had urged the re-
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. ix. 593-594, 599, 600, 617-619, 703 ;
x. 5. Le Bas, i. 175-179.
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 233
inforcement of the army in the Netherlands to the 1815.
utmost ; and the answer that awaited him set forth April,
the following facts. The entire strength of British
troops which Ministers could immediately place at
his disposal did not exceed six regiments of cavalry
and twenty-five battalions of infantry. Of these
twenty-five no fewer than fifteen were the " weak
corps and inefficient battalions " which had been
hastily scraped together for the sudden emergency
which called Graham to Holland, and which contained
on an average fewer than five hundred men apiece.
The three battalions of Guards were superior to the
rest in strength, but even they contained four hundred
men too young and weak for service in the field. Of
the ten new battalions promised to him, the third
battalion of the Fourteenth had not been in existence
two years, and at the outset had been rejected for
active work, the Inspector-general remarking that he
had never seen such a lot of boys, both officers and
men. The second battalion of the Fifty-ninth were
likewise unfit for any but garrison duties, being young,
half-trained and weak in numbers. Of the remainder
the first battalions of the Fifty-second, Seventy-first,
and Ninety-first were embarked and sailing for
America, but had been recalled and directed to Ostend ;
while those of the Twenty-third, Fifty-first and Ninety-
fifth were in garrison on the south coast of England.
One and all of these six had served for long in the
Peninsula, though the last three had lost many of
their veteran soldiers owing to the expiration of their
term of service ; and it must be added that the first
battalion of the Fifty-second, by absorbing the rem-
nants of its second battalion, did not add to the number
of units, though it added much to the strength and
quality, of the troops at the front. The utmost that
Ministers could hope to send, beyond this handful
of men, was a brigade of heavy cavalry and four
battalions of infantry from Ireland, with which the
authorities at Dublin Castle were extremely reluctant to
234 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. part, and a battalion of Guards, together with a few
April, squadrons of Household Cavalry as soon as certain
riots, which had arisen in London over the subject
of the Corn Laws, should have subsided. It was
necessary to provide for the safety of Malta, Messina
and Corfu, which would strain the British resources
in the Mediterranean to the utmost ; and in the West
Indies battalions would be required to look after
Martinique and Guadeloupe. In fact, until the return
of troops from America and Canada nothing more
could be done towards the making of a British force
in the Netherlands. 1
Highly indignant that the British army should be
so poorly represented at so critical a time, Wellington
complained bitterly that the Government might liberate
the soldiers in Ireland at once by calling out the
Militia. But Ministers were unfortunately hampered
by technical difficulties, all of which turned upon the
question, bluntly propounded by Whitbread in the
Commons, "Are we at peace or at war ? " At war with
France England certainly was not and had no wish to
be ; but, on the other hand, she had pledged herself in
concert with the Powers of Europe to suppress Napo-
leon Bonaparte, who had just arrogated to himself
supreme authority in France and was supported by
the whole of her military forces. Now the Crown
had no right to call out the Militia except in time of
actual war or insurrection. As it happened, there
were still seventeen thousand British Militia, complete
battalions of respectable strength, embodied under
the emergency of the last war which had been ter-
minated by the first Peace of Paris ; and there would
have been more but for the factious clamour of the
Opposition for their immediate disbandment. But of
the disembodied residue so many men, both principals
and substitutes, had taken their discharge on the com-
pletion of their term of service, that not above twenty
thousand were left, and those were dispersed among a
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. xi. 6, 19-22.
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 235
number of weak battalions. If those twenty thousand 1815.
were summoned by reason of a new war, then all the April,
men of the seventeen thousand, whose period of service
was bounded by the close of the last war, might
reasonably claim their discharge. All that would be
gained therefore by the calling out of the Militia
would be the substitution of fifty or sixty weak bat-
talions, counting in all twenty thousand men, for five
and twenty or thirty respectable bodies numbering
only three thousand less. Ministers judged the seven-
teen thousand to be more valuable than the twenty
thousand, and beyond doubt they were right.
Moreover, the expediency of a ballot was, in the
circumstances, very doubtful. The country was full
of discharged soldiers whom it was most desirable to
regain for the regular army ; but there was every
probability that, in the event of a ballot, they would
engage themselves as substitutes in the Militia, with
the hope of receiving later a large bounty to transfer
themselves later to the Line. The whole situation was
strangely complicated, so much so that the Cabinet took
seven full weeks, dating from Napoleon's entry into
Paris, to come to a decision concerning it. At last, on
the 9th of May, they brought forward a Bill to permit
the Local Militia to volunteer for duties in garrison,
so as to release the old Militia for more important
functions. A fortnight later a second Bill was intro-
duced to draw out and embody the Old Militia itself,
the preamble stating that " there was an immediate
prospect of war with France " ; and it was arranged
that the vacancies should be filled by beat of drum,
and that a moderate bounty should be offered to old
soldiers who would rejoin the regiments of the Line.
These two Bills quickly became law on the I4th of
June, the day before Napoleon crossed the Sambre,
and four days before the battle of Waterloo. 1
1 Hansard, xxxi. 223, 265, 653. Statutes 55, Geo. III. caps.
76, 77. Wellington Supp. Desp. x. 66, 83, 183. Desp., to Bathurst,
6th Apr. 1815.
236 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
It is difficult to understand why Ministers should
April, have waited so long before setting all doubts as to
the Militia Laws at rest by means of the simple
preamble quoted above ; and the whole of this episode
brings into glaring relief the evils of our party system
and the defects of our organisation, even after nearly
a quarter of a century of war, for National Defence.
The eulogists of Napoleon in Parliament had no real
wish to see him again become a menace to Europe,
still less to give him a chance of invading England ;
nor did they even desire their country to lose weight
in the councils of Europe at the Congress of Vienna.
Yet they deliberately laid themselves out to fulfil the
whole of these purposes, simply because by so doing
they might embarrass the Government. French
authors continue to quote their speeches as evidence
that there was a Napoleonic party in the British Parlia-
ment. There was nothing of the kind ; but there
was a certain number of gentlemen who, finding his
name a useful counter in the game of party, did not
hesitate to degrade it by turning it to that contemptible
use. They deceived themselves at least it is charit-
able to believe so they deceived him, and they caused
considerable anxiety to our General in the field ; thus
accomplishing what is probably the greatest degree
of mischief that is possible to small talkers in their
relation to great men.
As to the vacillation of the Government in regard
to the Militia, it must be remarked that the issue
raised by Whitbread whether England were at war
or peace was a real one which troubled even
Wellington at the front long after the words were
spoken in Parliament. " In the situation in which we
are placed at present/* he wrote to the Prince of
Orange on the nth of May, " neither at war or at
peace, unable on that account to patrol up to the
enemy and ascertain his position by view or to act
offensively upon any part of his line, it is difficult if
not impossible to combine our operations because there
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 237
are no data upon which to found a combination." 1815.
Yet the British Navy had begun to take French prizes April.
in the Channel and on the Atlantic seaboard before
the end of March. The Prince of Orange had arrested
French prisoners who were on their way to France
from Russia ; and the Continental Powers had cut off all
regular communications between France and the world
without. All of these were hostile acts, and it is
therefore difficult to understand why Ministers should
have boggled at the wording of the Militia Statutes.
But be it observed that, if our system of National
Defence had been based upon the compulsory personal
service of every man of military age, the difficulty
arising from the wholesale discharge of substitutes
would not have arisen. It would have been sufficient
to call out the Militia, and the ranks would automatic-
ally have been full of trained men. No system of
National Defence is sound which recognises, as the
British system had always recognised, the principle of
substitution.
To return to Wellington's army, cavalry, from the
nature of the American War, was more easily provided
than infantry ; and the Horse Guards had made no
difficulty about the immediate despatch of six regi-
ments of Light Horse which had served in the Penin-
sula. But the whole of them were weak and could
send abroad only three squadrons apiece, of fewer than
one hundred and fifty of all ranks to the squadron.
The Artillery was in a still more woeful plight. There
was plenty of guns and ammunition ; but, since seven
thousand of the Royal Regiment had been discharged
since the Peace of Paris, the Master-general could
provide neither men nor horses. Considering the
difficulty of training gunners and drivers, this im-
mediate and sweeping reduction of the Artillery,
before the Congress of Vienna had concluded its
labours, was reckless in the extreme ; but there the
fact was. Wellington asked for one hundred and fifty
cannon, and the Master-general was unprepared to
238 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. supply immediately more than forty-two. Nor could
April. h e hope to furnish drivers, except by enlisting post-
boys for short periods, so as to make use of those who
were out of place, and by offering four guineas bounty
to such Hanoverians as might condescend to accept it. 1
Over and above the British troops, and almost to
be considered as a part of them, was the King's German
Legion, some corps of which had been halted in the
Netherlands while on their way to Hanover for dis-
bandment. They comprised five strong regiments of
cavalry, eight weak battalions of foot, and three and a
half batteries of artillery with thirty guns, of which
four corps of the horse, five of the foot, and three of
the artillery had served under Wellington in the Penin-
sula. Supplementary to the Legion were the Hano-
verian Militia, consisting of one battery, two regiments
of cavalry, and twenty-five battalions of infantry.
These were all of them young half-trained troops, and
greatly deficient in officers. As the regiments of the
Legion were in want of men, Wellington proposed
that they might be filled up, as in England, by volun-
teers from the Militia ; but, this suggestion being
rejected by the Hanoverian Government, he had no
alternative but to reduce the battalions of the Legion
from ten companies to six, and to transfer the super-
numerary officers and non-commissioned officers from
the Legion to the Militia. This was a false policy,
for it is easier to make good infantry by mixing young
soldiers with twice their number of veterans, than by
keeping the young soldiers together and adding only
an infusion of old officers and sergeants ; but the
Hanoverians decreed that this mistake should be
deliberately made, and made it was. 2
As regards the Staff, Wellington complained bitterly
that he was flooded with officers who were all of them
useless. " I might have expected," he wrote, " that
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. x. 18, 183.
2 Wellington Desp., to the Prince Regent, xyth April 1815.
Beamish, ii. 323 n.
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 239
the Generals and Staff formed by me in the last war 1815.
would have been allowed to come to me again, but April,
instead of that I am overloaded with people I have
never seen before ; and it appears to be purposely
intended to keep those out of my way whom I wished
to have." As the Duke repeated statements to this
effect at intervals to the end of his life, it will be well
to examine the matter more closely. It must be pre-
mised that the Anglo-Hanoverian force which he took
over from the Prince of Orange was an organised
army with its staff complete ; and it will be admitted
that, while it is easy to give a general a free hand in ,
nominating his staff when every place is vacant, it
is difficult, without hardship, to do so when many
places are already filled up by officers who have held
their posts for many months. Nevertheless the Duke
of York, through Sir Henry Torrens, desired Welling-
ton, immediately after his arrival in the Low Countries,
to favour him with his wishes respecting all appoint-
ments; and Torrens himself not only wrote at once to
recall Sir George Murray, who had sailed to Canada to
take the place of Prevost, but privately begged the Field-
marshal not to hesitate, on the score of friendship,
to displace a relative of his own, an old Peninsular
officer, from the Quarter-master-general's department.
To make things still easier, Torrens repaired to the
Netherlands himself to facilitate the arrangement of
these and kindred matters.
The Quarter-master-general to the Prince of Orange
was Sir Hudson Lowe, an officer of great ability, deep
professional knowledge, and very wide experience,
having been present at thirteen general actions in which
Napoleon in person was commanding the French.
Torrens speedily discovered that Lowe " would not
do for the Duke " ; and it was arranged that Sir
Hudson should take his departure immediately upon
Murray's return, and that Colonel de Lancey should
be summoned to resume his old place as Deputy
Quarter-master-general. De Lancey demurred to the
2 4 o HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. " indignity " of returning to a situation which he had
April, so long held in the Peninsula, but presently set out
for Brussels ; and the removal of Lowe to a command
in the Mediterranean at the end of May left De
Lancey in the post, which he had desired, of Chief
Staff Officer. The Adjutant-general was Sir Edward
Barnes, one of Wellington's brigadiers in 1813 and
1814 and an excellent man for the place. The head
of the Artillery was Colonel George Wood ; the head
of the Engineers Sir James Carmichael Smyth, who
had worked out the plans for the very able attack on
Bergen-op-Zoom ; and the Commissary-general was
Mr. Dunmore, who had been specially sent for from
the Peninsular Army by Graham.
The divisional commanders were George Cooke, who
had for some time been in charge of Cadiz and had
served throughout Graham's campaign in Holland,
Vandeleur, Charles Alten, and Hiniiber, all of whom
Wellington had known well in the Peninsula, and
Victor Alten, of whom Wellington had rid himself.
The brigadiers were Peregrine Maitland, who had
already served with the Duke in the Pyrenees ;
Lyon, who had commanded a battalion in Portugal
until 1812 and since then a division of Hanoverians
at Gohrde ; Kenneth Mackenzie, a pupil of Charles
Stuart and of John Moore, who had distinguished
himself in various campaigns ; Frederick Adam, whose
fortunes, unli^ckily for him, had been linked to John
Murray and William Bentinck ; Colin Halkett,
Ompteda, Arentschild, Bussche, Dornberg, and Du
Plat, all of the German Legion, of whom the first four
were veterans of the Peninsula and the last two alone
bore unfamiliar names. In the case of Adam, the
Duke of York represented that he was an intelligent
and distinguished officer to whom a brigade had been
long promised, and that, as he chanced to be in the
Netherlands, he had been placed upon the staff of
the army there. Yet another brigadier, Johnstone,
was in command of the brigade which was on the point
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 241
of starting for America when it was recalled and sent 1815.
to Flanders ; and it was reasonably thought unjust April-
that he should be removed solely on account of the May.
change of destination. So far, therefore, it does not
appear that Wellington had any just grievance against
the original composition of the staff of the army in
the Netherlands ; and it may be added that the first
new names added to the list by the Duke of York
were those of Hill, Colville, Clinton, and Vivian.
Passing next to the junior members of the Prince
of Orange's staff, two out of five in the Adjutant-
general's department had served on the staff of the
Peninsular Army with distinction from beginning to
end ; a third, after brilliant work as a regimental officer,
had joined the staff in 1813 ; a fourth had commanded
a battalion under Graham, and the fifth had been a
staff-officer in the West Indies. In the Quarter-
master-general's department, one of the four deputies
had served in that same department from the first to
the last of the Peninsular War, two more had passed
through the war partly as regimental and partly as
staff-officers, and the fourth, having been attached to
Lord Cathcart while that nobleman was Commissioner
with the Russian armies in 1813 and 1814, could
claim at least a considerable experience of work in the
field. As the whole of these gentlemen retained their
places, there seems to have been no great objection to
them. When Wellington took over the army,
eighteen new officers were added to the Adjutant-
general's department and twenty-four to the Quarter-
master-general's. Among the former are to be found
the familiar names of Elley and Waters ; and, so far as
I can ascertain, nearly all of the remainder had seen
service in the Peninsula, more than one of them on
the staff. There is only one whose appointment
suggests itself to me decidedly as a job. Among the
latter are to be found Felton, Hervey, Jeremiah
Dickson, Lord Greenock, Gomm and four more who
had done the like work in the Peninsula and were men
VOL. x R
242 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. of tried capacity; and of the residue some certainly,
April- and many probably, had learned at least their regimental
May. duty in Spain and Portugal.
For the rest, the Duke of York was ready and
indeed eager to send out Edward Paget, Dalhousie,
Picton and Cole. Kempt, Pack, Byng, and William
Ponsonby were on their way to the Low Countries.
Alexander Dickson was sent out specially to do any
work with the artillery that Wellington might choose
to assign to him. Colquhoun Grant was spared to
take charge of the department of intelligence ; and
McGrigor, though about to take up the duty of
Director-general of Hospitals, offered to come over to
head-quarters and organise the medical service. In
fact, of Wellington's most trusted subordinates only
Murray and Burgoyne were absent, both of them
in America. Altogether, although there was un-
doubtedly some friction in the matter of appointments
to the staff, and there may have been more young
gentlemen than work could be found for, it seems to
me that, except in the matter of reducing its numbers,
Wellington had his own way and had no right to
complain that his staff was without experience. The
secret of all his ill temper seems to have been that
many of his former staff-captains and majors had, by
exchange into the Guards, obtained the rank of
lieutenant-colonel, and were on that account at first
rejected by the Duke of York, though subsequently
permitted to take up their appointments. Wellington's
sweeping statements therefore, on this as on some
other topics, should not be accepted without much
reservation. 1
It remains to consider the Allied armies with
which Wellington was expected to act, both within his
own command and without it. Of the Dutch troops
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. x. 1-6, 9-11, 24, 43, 78-79, 84, 130,
219; Despatches to Torrens, 2ist, 28th April, 5th May; to Maj.-
Gen. Darling, 2nd May ; to Lord Stewart, 8th May ; to Dr. Renny,
22nd May, 1815. Life of Sir William Gomm, p. 348.
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 243
the reports sent to him were contradictory. In 1815.
general their spirit was said to be good ; but many of April-
the officers of all grades, as well as some of the men, May.
had been in the service of France, and were suspected
to be, not unnaturally, in sympathy with her. The
bond of military comradeship is strong ; and the
French faction in Holland, notwithstanding its defeat
by the bold diplomacy of Sir James Harris in 1787,
had by no means been wholly extinguished. At the
head of the Ministry of War was General Janssens,
who, having fought unsuccessfully against the British
both at the Cape and in Java, would hardly have been
human if he had felt kindly towards them ; and the
officers of almost every department under him were
known to be at heart partisans of the revolution and of
France. The exception among them was the Quarter-
master-general, Major-general Constant de Rebecque,
a loyal, able, and energetic officer, who had accompanied
the Prince of Orange throughout the campaigns in the
Peninsula. The army itself was in course of re-
organisation ; the Dutch fortresses were in bad order ;
and there was a scarcity of muskets.
The Belgian troops were represented, unequivocally
and not inaccurately, to be bad and untrustworthy.
The creation of the army for the service of the King
of the Netherlands had only begun in February 1814,
and had been greatly hampered by want of funds,
clothing and arms, with the inevitable consequence
of much desertion. The officers were said to be
friendly to the French, but the general attitude of the
privates, and indeed of the whole population, was that
of sulky indifference. In 1814, when the Belgians
had received a promise of independence, they had
rejoiced over their deliverance from the yoke of
Napoleon. But when they found their country
annexed to Holland, by no will of their own but for
the convenience of the mightier powers, they were
filled with disgust towards European politics, and
regarded with impartial hatred all the contending
244 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. nations which were preparing once again to turn
April- their fair and unhappy land into an arena for the
May. settlement of their differences. There was no lack of
brave men of all ranks among them ; they had proved
their courage when fighting under the standards of
Napoleon ; but they had no enthusiasm for the new
cause for which they found themselves impressed, and
they saw in it nothing worth the spending of their
blood. An impartial observer is bound to admit that
they were amply justified. Since the Belgians were of
this stamp and the Dutch troops were mostly militia,
it was very doubtful whether they would be of great
military value, whatever their appearance. Wellington
after inspecting them pronounced on them the follow-
ing judgment. The Nassauers (it will be remembered
that a battalion of them had deserted to the British in
France) were excellent ; the Dutch Militia were a very
good body of men, though young ; the Belgians were
young and, some of them, very small, but well clothed
and equipped and, apparently, well disciplined ; the
cavalry were well mounted but indifferent riders. In
his heart, however, the Duke expected little of them,
and he would gladly have imported ten thousand of
the Portugese who had fought, generally, well for him
in the Peninsula ; but his effort to obtain them met
with no success. 1
Altogether the Duke was within the bounds of
moderation when he described his army as infamous.
Nevertheless, though his British troops were for the
most part far inferior to any that he had seen in the
field since 1794, they, together with the King's
German Legion, were his most trustworthy soldiers ;
and he considered it imperative so to mingle them
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. x. 15-17, 167; and see Le Bas, La
Campagne de 1815, i. 34, 3 5 ; and James, Campaign of 1815, pp.
1 8, 19. I am afraid that not all the pleading of Le Bas and his
collaborator can satisfy me that the Dutch and Belgians were good
troops and ready to fight the French. It would be contrary to human
nature if they had been ; and it is no reproach to them, or at any rate
to the Belgians, that they were not.
CH. xxn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 245
with the rest as to impart some measure of stability 1815.
to the whole. In this, however, as in every design April
which he framed for the organisation and disposition May.
of his forces, he was at the outset thwarted by the King
of the Netherlands. This Prince was the son of the
Stadtholder who had taken refuge in England in 1795
and had died there in 1806. Unlike his father, he
lacked neither intelligence nor good intentions, and
was by no means without experience of military
operations in the field. His new position as Sovereign
of the Netherlands made, as the British Cabinet
recognised, the choice of advisers and administrators
very difficult; for he was confronted with the alternatives
of employing men of ability and weight but of doubtful
loyalty, owing to their former connections, or men of
unimpeachable principles but lacking both knowledge
and authority. Some of the most important of those
whom he actually selected were viewed by Wellington
with profound distrust ; and to their influence he
ascribed the steady opposition of the King to all
measures which he recommended. It is likely enough
that the Duke was right ; for the story of British
statesmen from 1688 to 1714 and of Napoleon's
marshals in 1814 and 1815 shows that, where there
are rival dynasties, men generally seek to be on good
terms with both. On the other hand, it must be
admitted that some of the British demands were
calculated to wound the susceptibilities and excite the
suspicion of good Netherlander, most notably that
which required Ostend and Antwerp, the keys of the
British communications, to be entrusted to British
commanders. Still, the Dutch had no one but them-
selves to thank if the Cabinet in Downing Street was
wary in dealing with them. No people could have
shown a more wretched spirit in 1793, 1799 and 1814,
when the red-coats had landed to help and hearten
them to the reconquest of their independence ; and
too much blood and treasure had already been sacrificed
in reliance upon that " rising of the Dutch " which
246 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. was always promised and never fulfilled. The
April- Hollanders professed to mourn over the freedom of
May. which Napoleon had bereft them ; but it was when
they thought of their lost commerce that they wailed
loudly and from their hearts.
Each party therefore watched carefully for foul
dealing in the other ; and Wellington, who with all his
faults was at least a straightforward man, read treachery
in every obstacle raised by the King against his
wishes. Perhaps the Duke hardly made allowance for
the exaltation which kingship might produce upon a
potentate who, up to the past twelvemonth, had possessed
neither territory nor subjects. A sense of the ridiculous
is not too common in royal families. The Prince of
Orange had with difficulty been restrained from in-
vading France in order to measure his military genius
against Napoleon's ; and his father may well have
thought that a crown adds an augmentation to the
brain as well as an adornment to the brow. However
that may be, the contention between the King and
the Duke became so hot that Wellington on the 4th
of May shook the dust off his feet and sent a message
to the effect that, unless His Majesty mended his ways,
the British Commander would have nothing more to
do with him. On the same day the King made over
/ to him with no ill grace the command of the whole
of his troops, with the rank of Field-marshal in the
service of the Netherlands. 1
This difficulty surmounted, the Duke distributed
his army into three corps. The First, commanded
by the Prince of Orange, consisted of the First and
Third British Divisions under Cooke and Charles
Alten, the 2nd and 3rd Netherlands Divisions under
Generals Perponcher and Chasse, and a Dutch Division
of Cavalry under General Collaert. The Second,
under Lord Hill (as we must now call him), was made
up of the Second and Fourth British Divisions under
Clinton and Colville, the ist Netherlandish Division
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. x. 167, 218, 222.
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 247
under General Stedman, and a Netherlandish brigade 1815.
under General Anthing, the whole of the Netherlanders April-
being subject to Prince Frederick of Orange, aged May.
eighteen. The Third Corps, or Reserve, was composed
of the Fifth and Sixth British Divisions, which were
ultimately commanded by Picton and Lambert (for
Cole had married a wife and therefore could not come
in time for the opening of the campaign), the Nassau
contingent of three battalions, the cavalry- divisions of
the British and of the King's German Legion (com-
prehending sixty-nine squadrons in seven brigades,
with six batteries of horse-artillery), twelve squadrons
of Hanoverian cavalry, and three brigades of Nether-
landish cavalry with one battery of horse-artillery.
To the Brunswick contingent of eight battalions, four
squadrons and two batteries were in due time to be
added, for the most part young and raw troops, but
steady enough in the cause of the Allies.
But this list by no means exhausts the details of the
intermingling. In every British Division except the
First, foreigners were blended with red-cbats. Alten's
and Clinton's had each one brigade of British, one of
the Legion, and one of Hanoverians ; Picton's and
Colville's had each two brigades of British and one of
Hanoverians ; Lambert's comprised one brigade of
British and one of Hanoverians. Even so, however,
the subtlety of mixture is not yet wholly expressed. In
Cooke's division of Guards the three young battalions
were stiffened by one old one from the Peninsula. In
Alten's, where all the British were young, the battalions
of the Legion were veterans and the Hanoverians were
regulars ; in Colville's, where the British were both
old and young, the Hanoverians were both regulars
and militia ; in Clinton's, Picton's and Lambert's,
where the British as well as the troops of the Legion
were old, the Hanoverians were all militia. In like
manner the Prince of Orange had been careful to mix
up regular battalions with militia and Belgians with
Dutch. Well might Wellington doubt the quality of
248 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. his arm y an d pronounce that its organisation, together
April- with the choice of officers, was a matter of great
May. difficulty.
By extreme good fortune the extension of Prussian
territory to the extreme west had brought about the
presence of some thirty thousand Prussian troops and
fourteen thousand Saxons, under General Kleist, upon
the Lower Rhine. This force was to be completed
to five corps with a joint strength of a hundred and
twenty thousand men, the whole to be commanded by
Bliicher, with Gneisenau for the chief of his staff.
The number sounded imposing, but the quality of
the troops left much to be desired. Nearly half of
the infantry sixty-six out of one hundred and thirty-
six battalions was composed of militia and, of these
sixty-six, twenty-four were of new formation and in-
cluded six from Westphalia, which had only since
the Peace been placed under Prussian rule. Of the
seventy battalions of the Line two were from the
Duchy of Berg, the appanage of Murat under Napoleon,
and had served in the French Army ; and there were
among the rest eight thousand recruits levied in the
newly acquired provinces between the Rhine and the
Meuse. The clothing, equipment and armament of
all were equally defective, there being in some regiments
muskets of three different calibres, and no uniformity
of belts or pouches. The cavalry was in worse
condition even than the infantry. The regiments of
the Line numbered twenty against fifteen of militia ;
but, of the twenty, one half were of recent creation,
and, of the fifteen, two had only just been scraped
together. The artillery was well provided with guns
but short of gunners in fact in precisely the same
state as the British. Bliicher, the Commander-in-
Chief, was a fine fighting soldier, full of activity in
spite of his seventy-one years, rough and illiterate but
staunch and shrewd, and not in the least afraid of
Napoleon. Gneisenau, who was supposed to make
good what Bliicher lacked in brains, enjoyed a great
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 249
reputation as a scientific officer and a profound
strategist, but did not shine in other capacities, being a April-
timid commander and an indifferent tactician. Un- Ma 7-
aware of his defects, or at any rate unwilling to admit
them, he conceived himself to be undervalued, and
vented his spleen in querulousness, jealousy and
suspicion ; and, though he hated the French, he did
not love the English. His talents, however, when
added to the peculiar qualities of Blucher, made a very
powerful combination.
Let us now turn to Napoleon and take notice of
the force that he could match against these two very
poor armies of Wellington and Blucher. The France
to which he returned was not the France which he
had left behind him in 1814 ; and he presented him-
self to the nation not as Emperor, but as First Consul,
the leader of a revolution which was to overthrow the
evils restored by the Bourbons and deliver the people
from the tyranny of priests and kings. The remnant
of the old revolutionists was inclined to take him at his
word and repeat the violence and outrage of 1793 ;
but, once reinstalled at the Tuileries, Napoleon 's
innate loathing for the mob reasserted itself, and he
began forthwith to resume the pomp and outward
trappings of the Empire as if he were once more
absolute. Here, however, he was checked. Moderate
as well as extreme men exclaimed against a despotism
and clamoured for a liberal constitution ; and, unless
he were prepared to make himself a mere chief of
revolutionary banditti, he was bound to give way.
In truth his return was not very welcome except to
his old companions in arms. The heads of the
provincial administration, though half of them had
been nominated by him and continued in their places
by the Bourbons, showed no zeal in his cause. Their
underlings were actively unfriendly ; and an attempt
to get rid of them by a new election had no effect but
to reinstate them with greater influence. The per-
manent civil service contained many adherents of
250 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. King Lewis. The clergy were naturally irreconcil-
April- ably hostile. In La Vendee there was from the end
May. of April a renewal of insurrection. Everywhere it
was realised that the Empire signified war, whereas
the entire nation longed for peace. The funds,
having fallen with a rush from 78 to 58 within less
than a month, continued to sink slowly through May
and June ; and no efforts of Napoleon could arrest
them. He quickly produced a constitution, more
liberal than that granted by the Bourbons, which
bewildered many and pleased none ; and he appointed
the ist of June for its solemn ratification by the people.
Even in dealing with the troops he was cautious
of exercising arbitrary power. The Army of Lewis
the Eighteenth numbered slightly over two hundred
thousand men, but Napoleon dared not double its
strength by such measures as had been the rule under
the Empire. There were something over one hundred
thousand more men who were on leave or who had
taken leave, or, in plain English, deserted ; and it
was reckoned that sixty thousand of these could be
recovered. The Emperor, however, delayed to call
them to the colours until he had sent a circular to the
powers of Europe making proposals for a peaceful
settlement. This missive was returned unopened by
the Prince Regent of England and rejected with as
little ceremony by the rest. The summons was
meanwhile issued, and seventy-five thousand men
responded to the call. Voluntary enlistment produced
fifteen thousand more, and the enrolment of the
seamen at the national dockyards added yet another
six thousand. At the end of June, moreover, Napoleon
hardened his heart to conscribe the men due for
service in 1815, some of whom had already served
under him in 1814 ; and within a week nearly fifty
thousand of them were assembled in the various
departmental centres. Besides these there were at
his disposal the National Guard, consisting of some
two hundred thousand men between the ages of
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 251
twenty and sixty, and capable of expansion to more 1815.
than ten times that number. Of these he ordered for April-
the present the mobilisation of some two hundred and May.
thirty thousand ; and, notwithstanding recalcitrance
in some quarters, one hundred and fifty thousand were
at their appointed stations, in fortress or in camp, by
the second week of June. With them, five and twenty
thousand veterans and sundry local corps sufficed for
the guarding of strong places and frontier-roads.
Thus there was a fair prospect that half a million
French would be more or less ready for the field by
August ; but small arms and cartridges were scarce
and, though there was abundance of cannon, carriages
and ammunition were deficient. Moreover the maga-
zines were empty, the clothing of the existing troops
was in rags, and both cavalry and artillery were very
short of horses. With his usual energy and resource
the Emperor set himself to remedy these defects and
to repair the fortifications ; and being ably seconded
by Davout, whom he had placed in charge of the
Ministry of War, he achieved an astonishing measure
of success. The order for mobilisation had hardly
been issued before the indefatigable brain had sketched
the organisation of the force, which was altered at the
end of May into its final form an Army of the North,
one hundred and twenty-four thousand men, under
Napoleon's own command ; an Army of the Rhine,
twenty thousand men, under Rapp ; another of the
Alps, twenty-four thousand men under Suchet, with
subsidiary corps, amounting together to fourteen
thousand men, in support ; and two corps of the
Eastern and Western Pyrenees, fourteen thousand
men, under Decaen and Clausel. The greater number
of his generals rallied to him ; but a few stood aloof,
and a few more, though willing, were rejected. Of
the Marshals, Victor, Marmont and Berthier, who
had followed Lewis to Belgium, were struck off the
list, and Augereau with them. Oudinot, Gouvion
St. Cyr, and Kellermann were left severely alone ;
252 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Masse'na and Macdonald were pressed to accept
April- commands but refused them. Berthier, who was at
Ma y- Bamberg when Napoleon left Elba, was anxious to
return to France, but was denied a passport. On
the ist of June he fell, apparently by accident, from
a window on the third floor of his house to the pave-
ment below, and was picked up dead. Soult, therefore,
was installed as Chief of the Staff, a position for which
his great military talents, impaired as they were only by
his irresolution on the battle-field, seemed particularly
to qualify him. In the Army of the North, which was
distributed into five corps, the generals of Spain were
again prominent, the first corps being assigned to
d'Erlon and the second to Reille. The three that
remained were allotted to Vandamme, Gerard and
Mouton, Count Lobau. Drouot took charge of the
Imperial Guard and Grouchy of the cavalry.
There is still a name wanting from the list of
Napoleon's greatest lieutenants, that of Joachim Murat,
King of Naples. On the eve of his escape from Elba
Napoleon had sent him a message, bidding him prepare
for war, since, if the Austrians declared against the
revival of the French Empire, the Neapolitan army
would be required for an important diversion against
them. At the outset Murat declared to the Ministers
at Vienna that his policy should be subordinated to
that of the Emperor Francis ; but, fearing lest Napoleon
might re-annex Italy, he prepared to conquer Italy
for himself. On the 29th of March he moved his
army from Ancona towards Bologna. Then crossing
the line of demarcation between Austrian and Italian
territory, he advanced to Rimini, and on the 3<Dth
published a proclamation calling all Italians to arms
for the freedom and unity of their country. Advancing
next to Bologna, from which the Austrians fell back
before him, he on the 4th of April occupied Ferrara,
Modena and Florence. There his progress was
stayed. The Austrians, having gathered in force
behind the Po, repelled all his efforts to cross the
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
253
river, and taking the offensive thrust him back to 1815.
Ancona. The decisive battle was fought on the 2nd April-
and 3rd of May, which left him a week later with only May.
ten thousand of the forty thousand men with which
he had begun the campaign. On the I9th he fled
from Naples to Toulon, from whence he sent a letter
to Napoleon asking for a command in his army.
Napoleon, sufficiently vexed that his only ally in Europe
should have spent his strength in a mad enterprise
which could profit no one except his enemies, rejected
the overture in harsh terms ; and therewith vanished
all hope that Murat would take his old place at the
head of the French cavalry.
Various plans of campaign were produced from
the various capitals of the powers, but were finally
reduced by Schwarzenberg to one. According to this,
France was to be invaded by six armies simultaneously.
On the extreme right, that is to say in the north,
Wellington with ninety to a hundred thousand men
was to advance between Maubeuge and Beaumont ;
on the left of Wellington the Prussians under Blucher-,
rather under one hundred and twenty thousand men,
were to penetrate between Philippeville and Givet ;
on the left of Blucher one hundred and fifty thousand
Russians under Barclay de Tolly were to enter by
Sarrelouis and Saarbriick ; and on the left of de Tolly
two hundred thousand Austrians and South Germans
were to break in by Sarreguemines and Bile ; and the
whole of them were to converge by P^ronne, Laon,
Nancy and Langres upon Paris. On the extreme south
fifty thousand Austrians and Piedmontese from Upper
Italy, and twenty-five thousand more Austrians, who
were opposed to Murat, were to cross the Alps and
turn right and left upon Lyon and Provence. In
their usual leisurely fashion the Austrians set down
the opening of the campaign for the end of June or
beginning of July, since they and the Russians could
not count upon being complete and in readiness at
an earlier date. Meanwhile, of course, the armies of
254 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Wellington and Bliicher were to form the outposts of
April- the entire host, so as to cover the general concentration
May. on the eastern frontier of France.
Wellington, and for that matter Bliicher also, were
strongly opposed to delay and anxious to take the
offensive as soon as possible, so as to check, or at any
rate to embarrass, the re-establishment of Napoleon's
authority by showing the French people the disastrous
consequence of accepting it. Wellington also insisted
particularly upon the importance of preventing
Napoleon from gathering any headway outside the
boundaries of France. The great Emperor's system
was, so far as possible, to support his armies at the
expense of his enemies, to make war, as Wellington
put it, a pecuniary resource ; and the Duke had truly
foretold in the Peninsula that, as soon as hostilities were
transferred to the soil of France, the zeal of the French
soldiers and inhabitants would very quickly languish.
Again, a triumphal entry, bloodless or the reverse, into
Belgium, would certainly rally the Belgians, and prob-
ably the Dutch also, to Napoleon ; and the moral
effect in Europe would be very great. The new King
of the Netherlands had just set up his capital at
Brussels. The restored King of France had taken
refuge at Ghent. If both of these potentates were
forced to take to their heels because the Allies from
want of energy or alleged military reasons were unable
to protect them, the old legend of Napoleon's invinci-
bility would be re-established and his partisans would
show their heads all over Europe. In England, for
instance and this was what Wellington particularly
dreaded the existing Ministry might be driven from
office with the full assent of their former supporters,
now become " peace-mad," and would be replaced by
such men as Grey, Whitbread and Tierney, hungry
for office after twenty years of exclusion, strongly
possessed by the false beliefs which they had been
proclaiming for years, and practically committed to
a reversal of the Government's policy, not because
CH. xxii HISTORY OF THE ARMY
2 55
it was wrong but because it was the Government's. 1815,
If England withdrew from the Coalition, all resistance
to Napoleon was at an end, for without England's
subsidies the remaining powers could not keep their
armies in the field, and the Emperor might resume
his sway in Europe as early as he pleased. It was in
this light that the coming campaign presented itself
to Wellington. Now, more even than in the worst
days of the Peninsular War, the existing Ministry
depended upon him whether it should stand or fall ;
and upon the maintenance of the Ministry depended
the defeat of Napoleon. A short semblance of success
on the part of the enemy might suffice to bring about
the great disaster. It may seem almost incredible that
a few factious utterances by a handful of mediocre
men utterances inspired rather by vanity, by the
habit of contention and the excitement of rhetorical
combat than by any sincere desire to do mischief
should cramp the movements and vitiate the disposi-
tions of a great commander in the field ; but un-
doubtedly they did so in 1815 ; and the consequences
were likely to have been the more serious because the
commander was, as he truly said, at the head of an
infamous army.
CHAPTER XXIII
1 815. As a matter of fact Napoleon could have invaded
April- Belgium with every chance of success at the end of
May. March. Kleist and the Prince of Orange could not
have raised, between them, more than eighty thousand
men, of which number twenty-four thousand Saxons
and Netherlanders were not to be trusted, and the
remainder were mostly half-trained troops. Against
them Napoleon could have pitted fifty thousand
seasoned soldiers, and, encountering such commanders,
could hardly have failed of a great initial success.
The Prince and Kleist were prepared for such a move-
ment, but could not agree where to meet it. The
Prince of Orange, in his anxiety to take the offensive,
had disposed his troops upon a line running from
Tournai through Ath and along the course of the
Sambre to Namur, where was stationed the Prussian
vanguard ; and he was anxious to give battle on the
south side of Brussels. Kleist, on the other hand,
fearing for his communications, held the maintenance
of the line of the Meuse to be the most important
object. As a matter of strategic principle Sir Hudson
Lowe agreed with Kleist, but considered that strategic
considerations were overruled by the political inex-
pediency of throwing the entire country south of
Brussels, already not too well affected towards the new
King of the Netherlands, into the arms of Napoleon.
Kleist and the Prince accordingly compromised their
difference by arranging that, in case of an attack, the
Prince's own army should retire while Kleist's should
256
CH. xxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 257
advance, and that their united forces should give battle 1815.
at Tirlemont, about thirteen miles east of Brussels. April-
Wellington, as may be supposed, settled the May.
question immediately after his arrival by advocating
that the Prussian army and his own should unite at
once south of Brussels, rather than allow the French
to be in possession of the Belgian capital even for a
moment. The question was no easy one of solution.
The Prussian communications lay towards the east,
the British towards the west, the Dutch towards the
north. Which of them was to sacrifice its line of
operations in case of mishap ? Without immediately
raising this issue, Gneisenau consented to move
Prussian troops farther westward so that the most
advanced of them should occupy Charleroi and the
ground west of it so far as the Roman road from
Binche to Bavai, but asked for further light upon
Wellington's plans. The Duke in reply admitted
that political considerations counted for much in the
disposition which he advocated, and conceded further
that to allow them too much weight, as compared with
purely military exigencies, was as great a blunder as
the converse. He then gave it as his opinion that,
if Napoleon should advance, he would probably choose
the line between the Scheldt and the Sambre, or in
other words that he would strike at the British com-
munications. In that case the Prussians at Charleroi
would form the left of the line, the rest of the
Prussians being concentrated at Namur. Battle would
then be offered south of Brussels, and, in case of
mishap, the entire army would retreat upon Liege
and Maastricht or even, if necessary, still farther east
to Juliers. This signified plainly that, if circum-
stances should demand it, the British and Dutch would
abandon their communications and shift their line of
operation eastward. Gneisenau, emphasising this
point, declared that all difficulties were now at an
end, and that he accepted Wellington's plan with-
out hesitation. Wellington rejoined that only the
VOL. x s
258 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. peculiarity of the circumstances could warrant him
April- in thus giving up his connection with the sea ; but
May. that any retreat of the Allies could at worst be but
momentary indeed they were already in too great
strength to think of retreat or even of being attacked. 1
This last opinion, written on the I3th of April,
referred of course only to the situation of the moment
and signified no more than that a raid from Napoleon
with a small force, for the sake of rallying the Belgians
to his standard, was now out of the question. On the
other hand the collapse of the Duke of Angouleme's
operations forbade an early offensive of the Allies
such as Wellington had hoped to undertake in support
' of the royalists in France. The British Commander
now turned his attention rather to the defence of the
Low Countries, hastening the repair of the fortresses
in West Flanders within the quadrilateral Ostend,
Ypres, Mons, Antwerp, and offering to supply twelve
thousand of the twenty-seven thousand men required
for their garrisons from his British and Hanoverian
infantry. On the 2ist of April Bliicher arrived at
Lie*ge, upon which point the Prussian army was
rapidly assembling ; and Wellington, bidding him
welcome, sent Colonel Henry Hardinge as British
attache to the Prussian head-quarters.
Throughout this time an infinity of business was
pressed upon Wellington. There were long letters
as to the attitude of Spain, equally long letters as to
the prospects of obtaining a contingent from Portugal,
constant references to the business transacted, or
untransacted, at Vienna, the soreness of Prussia at
being restrained from swallowing up Saxony, the
allotment of the German contingents to the armies
of Bliicher and of the Duke himself, the arrangements
for the subsistence, upon Netherlandish territory, of
the Prussian armies, which as usual were extremely
arbitrary and rapacious, above all the distribution of
1 Wellington Desp. To Gneisenau, 5th, loth, i5th April;
to Clancarty, 6th April 1815. Supp. Desp. x. 45, 69.;.
CH. xxni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 259
the subsidies to hungry and impecunious powers, 1815.
whose representatives vied with each other in April-
parading the sacrifices and poverty of their nations. May.
Everything was thrown upon him ; and, as holder
in some degree of the English purse-strings, he was
treated by his German colleagues of all professions,
Blucher perhaps excepted, with a kind of jealous
servility. It was no easy course that was given him
to steer ; and indeed his functions during this cam-
paign, as in the Peninsula, were perhaps even more
diplomatic than military.
In the matter of his relations with the Prussians
there were two initial difficulties. First, the Prussian
army was divided into rival parties, headed by Generals
Knesebeck and Gneisenau ; and, since Knesebeck for
his own ends favoured close joint action between the
British and Prussians, it was natural that Gneisenau
should cherish a contrary view. In the second place,
Wellington's feelings towards France were widely
different from the Prussian. Gneisenau not unnatur-
ally, considering all that his adopted country had
suffered at the hands of the French armies, was for
making the war one of punishment for the French
nation, and a means of " humbling their military spirit."
Wellington wished only to get rid of Napoleon, and to
spare the French as much as possible. It was thus
that he had rendered the approach of the red-coats
more welcome than that of Soult's soldiers to the in-
habitants of Southern France. Some substitute for
Napoleon must, however, be found, and Wellington
agreed with Castlereagh in thinking that the restoration
of Lewis the Eighteenth would be the most certain
means of assuring the tranquillity of Europe for a
short time. But all reports from France were so
unfavourable to this solution, and the Tsar Alexander
was known to be so adverse to it, that Wellington,
while still working for it, thought success almost im-
possible of attainment. 1
1 Wellington Supp. Desp. x. 79, 138, 173.
26o HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. All through April British reinforcements continued
May. slowly to trickle over to Flanders, and at the end of
the month Lord Uxbridge arrived to take command
May i. of the cavalry. On the ist of May there was an
alarm of an attack, and Wellington issued alternative
orders for a concentration of the British and Nether-
landish armies to meet a French advance either
between the Lys and the Scheldt or between the Scheldt
and the Sambre. In the first case the inundations
about Oudenarde and Ghent were to be let loose ;
and the British were to concentrate between the Scheldt
and the Sambre in readiness to cross the former river,
while the Netherlanders were to assemble at Soignies
and Nivelles. In the second event both British and
Netherlanders were to be gathered together at Enghien
and Soignies. The intent was very evidently to cover
Ghent and Brussels, the temporary home of King
Lewis and the newly established capital of King
May 3. William. On the 3rd of May Wellington rode over
to Tirlemont to meet Bliicher, with whom he had a
conversation which he described as very satisfactory,
the purport of it being, apparently, that Bliicher had
promised to stand by him and not allow him to be
overwhelmed by superior numbers. Since the armies
of the two Marshals combined amounted to one hun-
dred and fifty thousand men, and Napoleon's, by all
reports, did not exceed one hundred and fifteen thou-
sand, Wellington had hopes of " giving a good
account even of Bonaparte." 1
The alarm passed off, and the next incident was
a mutiny of Blizcher's fourteen thousand Saxon troops,
which compelled their removal from the fighting line
to the rear. This was no very great matter, for the
loyalty of these Saxons had always been doubtful,
and it was better that they should declare themselves
at a safe moment than in the middle of active opera-
tions ; but it is significant that the King of Saxony
1 Wellington Desp. Memo, from the Prince of Orange, ist
May. To Prince of Orange and Hardenberg, 3rd May 1815.
CH. xxni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 261
entreated Wellington to take them under his command, 1 1815.
attributing their misconduct entirely to rude handling May.
on the part of the Prussians, and engaging to answer
for their fidelity if subjected to the Duke. In the
course of the month the English battalions promised
to Wellington commenced to cross the Channel in
driblets, and he began to chafe at the delay in opening
the campaign. He had fairly good intelligence of
the strength of the enemy from Clarke, Napoleon's
late Minister of War, who was now with Lewis the
Eighteenth at Ghent ; and he was satisfied that the
British and Prussians could not move until the main
body of the Allies should come up ; but none the less
he had an uneasy feeling that every day gained by
Napoleon was to the advantage of the enemy. Intelli-
gence from the frontier continued to be contradictory.
On the 8th of May the Duke wrote that he and May 8.
Bliicher were so well united and so strong that he had
little apprehension of an attack. On the 9th, upon May 9.
the news of a French concentration at Valenciennes
and Maubeuge, he was inclined to contract his can-
tonments a little. A few days later there were signs
that the enemy contemplated a defensive rather than
an offensive campaign ; but, in accordance with con-
certed arrangements, the Prussians drew a little closer
to the British, and on the nth of May Blucher fixed May u.
his head-quarters at Hannut, about twenty miles west
of Liege. Still the prevailing impression both at the
British and the Prussian head-quarters was that their
armies were doomed to a tedious series of sieges of
the French fortresses on the frontier ; and Gneisenau
was inclined to think that the operations would require
five hundred siege-cannon. 2 On the 22nd of May May 22,
French patrols encountered the Prince of Orange's
outposts, a little to the east and to the south of Mons,
and fired the first shots of the campaign ; but the
incident was of no importance. On the 2ist Welling-
ton announced that, though still without some of the
1 Supp. Desp. x. 346, 348. 2 Ibid. x. 335.
262 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 815. German contingents that had been promised to him,
May. he could, after making provision for all garrisons,
take the field with seventy-six thousand bayonets and
May 30. sabres ; 1 and on the 3Oth he wrote to Uxbridge that
there was a prospect of moving shortly. 2 Bliicher was
impatient to open the campaign ; and it was hoped
that, upon the arrival of the Austrians on the Rhine
at about the middle of June, the entire force under the
Prince and Wellington would advance in earnest. 3
June. In the first days of June there were again reports
of a French concentration at Maubeuge, and Welling-
ton on the yth issued his final orders as to the defence
of the fortresses of Western Flanders. 4 French news-
papers, carefully falsified, announced that Napoleon
would leave Paris for Laon on the 6th. Another
report 5 said that he would go to Douai on the same
day, would make a false attack on the Prussians and
a real attack on the English, and destroy both before
the Russians came up. The air was full of rumours
and contradictions ; and Napoleon was reported to be
at half a dozen different places before he had ever left
June 10. Paris. On the loth Clarke sent a final estimate of
the strength and distribution of the French force,
reckoning the troops at Napoleon's disposal in the
north very correctly at one hundred and twenty
June n. thousand men. On the nth a Colonel Dillon of the
British army arrived at Mons, and gave it as certain
intelligence that Napoleon had reached Avesnes. On
June 12. the 1 2th five deserters came into Mons from Landrecies
with information that Napoleon was just come to
Laon. Other intelligencers brought news that Reille's
corps had reached Maubeuge ; that a division of
the Imperial Guard was due to arrive at Avesnes,
to which place head-quarters would be transferred
1 Wellington Desp. To Schwartzenberg, 2ist May 1815.
2 Ibid. To Uxbridge, ist June 1815.
3 Ibid. To H. Wellesley, 2nd June 1815.
4 Ibid. To Prince of Orange, yth June 1815. Supp. Desp. x.
2, 413.
5 Supp. Desp. x. 424.
T"
14
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 263
immediately, and that Soult had passed through Valen- 1815.
ciennes and Maubeuge, incognito, also on his way to
Avesnes. 1 On the ijth there were reports from more June 13.
than one source of a French concentration at Mau-
beuge ; and on the I4th the troops at Maubeuge were June 14.
stated to be moving eastward upon Beaumont. Early
in the afternoon General Dornberg wrote to head-
quarters that, according to the latest accounts, there
were one hundred thousand men between Maubeuge
and Philippeville ; and Hardinge at ten o'clock of
the same night announced that at the Prussian head-
quarters a French attack was expected, and that some
preliminary orders had been given tending towards
the concentration of the Prussian army to meet it.
Nevertheless the Allied armies both of Wellington
and Bliicher remained in their original cantonments,
which, as shall now be shown, were of dangerous
extension.
On the right or west of the line the head-quarters
of Hill's, the Second Corps, were at Ath. Of his two
British divisions, Colville's head-quarters were at
Oudenarde ; the division being thrown back more or
less en potence, with one of its Hanoverian brigades at
Nieuport, Mitchell's brigade about Renaix, and John-
stone's between Courtrai and Oudenarde. Clinton's
head-quarters were at Ath, where was stationed Du
Plat's brigade of the German Legion ; the Fifty-second
and a Hanoverian brigade being posted between the
town and Lessines, with the remainder of Adam's
brigade at Leuze. Next to these, east of Colville and
north of Clinton, were Stedman's Netherlandish divi-
sion, with head-quarters at Sotteghem, cantonments
scattered between that village and Ghent, and Anthing's
Dutch brigade still farther north at Alost.
The First Army Corps, under the Prince of Orange,
had its head-quarters at Braine-le-Comte. Of Cooke's
British division the Guards were at Enghien and Byng's
brigade at the village of Marcq, practically touching
1 Supp. Desp. x. 456.
264 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. the Guards. The head-quarters of Alten's division
June 14. were at Soignies ; Colin Halkett's brigade had been
distributed south-westward of it as far as Lens, Kiel-
mansegge's Hanoverians a little to south of Halkett,
and Ompteda's north-westward towards Ath. Farther
east, Chasse's Netherlandish division, with head-
quarters at Roeulx, was disposed southward towards
Binche, and Perponcher's, with head-quarters at
Nivelles, reached as far south-eastward as Frasnes and
Villers Per win. The Reserve was assembled in and
about Brussels.
The British and Hanoverian cavalry were distri-
buted along the line of the Haine from Mons by
Jemappes, St. Ghislain, Roucourt and Beclers to
Tournai and Menin, with two regiments at Ghent, and
a brigade between Ninove and Grammont, at which
last place were Uxbridge's head - quarters. General
Dornberg, who commanded the 3rd Brigade, was
stationed at Mons and charged with the collection of
intelligence from the frontier. Eastward from Mons
the Netherlandish cavalry watched the frontier as far
as Binche, from which point, or rather from Bonne
Esperance, a little farther south, they were relieved by
the Prussians.
The 1st Prussian Corps, under Ziethen, had its
head-quarters at Charleroi and extended from Fontaine
Tvque on the west through Marchienne to Moustier
on the east, its reserves of infantry being at Fleurus,
of cavalry at SombrefTe, and of artillery at Gembloux.
Its outposts ran from Bonne Esperance, south-eastward
through Thuin and Gerpinnes to Sosoye, a total front
of close on thirty miles.
On Ziethen's left the Ilnd Corps, under General
von Pirch I., 1 had its head-quarters and one brigade at
Namur, another parallel to it on the Meuse at Huy,
a third midway between them to the north at Heron,
the fourth at Thorombais-les-Beguignes, eighteen miles
1 There was a second General von Pirch in command of a brigade
of Ziethen's corps, who is distinguished as Pirch II.
CH. xxni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 265
due north of Namur, the reserve infantry on the road 1815.
between these two places, and the reserve artillery at June 14.
Hannut.
The Illrd Corps had its head - quarters and one
brigade at Ciney, about fifteen miles south-east of
Namur ; the reserve artillery lay on the road to Namur,
with a second brigade of foot north-west of it at
Assesse, and the reserve cavalry on the road to Dinant,
where there was a third brigade of infantry. The
fourth brigade of infantry lay at Huy.
Of the IVth Corps one brigade was with head-
quarters at Liege ; another a little to the north at Liers,
with the reserve cavalry and artillery a short distance to
north-east of it ; a third brigade lay five miles to west
of Liege at Hollogne-aux-Pierres, and the fourth still
farther to west at Waremme.
The shape of the line thus held from Ostend
through Tournai and Mons to Liege was convex, and
in its full extent about one hundred and fifty miles,
of which, roughly speaking, one hundred miles were
guarded by the hundred and five thousand men under
Wellington and fifty by the hundred and twenty
thousand men of Bliicher. The head-quarters of the
two chiefs, Brussels and Namur, were thirty-two miles
apart by road. Taking Nivelles, immediately to north
of Fontaine PEveque, as the point of junction between
the two armies, the remotest of the Prussians at Liege
and of the British at Oudenarde could not possibly
have reached it in less than two days. This dispersion
was explained by Wellington, so far as his army was
concerned, by the imperative necessity for watching
the four great roads that led from Lille, Conde, and
Valenciennes upon Ghent and Brussels. It was on
one or other of these lines, it must be repeated, that
he looked for an attack, if any should be delivered.
He had therefore arranged his dispositions to concen-
trate either to west or to south ; he had made fortified
passages over the rivers ; and he had repaired the
fortresses of Nieuport, Ostend, Ypres, Menin, Cour-
266 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. trai, Oudenarde, Tournai, Ath and Mons, so as to
June 14. place the weakest of them beyond reach of a stroke of
surprise, and to make the strongest of them defy any
onslaught less formidable than a regular siege. A
hostile concentration at Maubeuge in itself by no
means belied his prevision, for the enemy might
advance from thence as readily upon Mons as upon
Charleroi or any other point upon the Sambre.
Assuming then that he had rightly divined his enemy's
purpose, which the event showed that he had not, his
arrangements were intelligible.
The like can hardly be said of the Prussians. The
dissemination of their army was excused upon the
ground that, if the cantonments were contracted, the
victualling of the force became impossible. There was
no doubt some truth in this ; though it seems that
the difficulty was greatly of the Prussian's own making,
for they deliberately imported dissension into the ranks
of the Allies by endeavouring to take their subsistence
by force from the Netherlander instead of paying for
it. 1 But in any case the disposition of the Illrd Corps
within the triangle between Namur, Huy and Dinant,
facing west, seems to be absolutely meaningless as a
defensive measure ; and, as Wellington pointed out,
pending the arrival of the Austrians and Russians, the
attitude of the Allied armies in the Low Countries
was inevitably defensive. If any French offensive
movement were apprehended from Philippeville, a
small corps of cavalry would have sufficed to watch
Dinant and the line of the Meuse southward from
Namur. If again Gneisenau dreaded a blow at his
communications, after the manner of Saxe and Carnot,
the obvious precaution was to shift his line of opera-
tions from Liege and Namur to the great Roman
road, which runs through Tongres to Maastricht, and
to have moved the Illrd and IVth Corps farther to
1 This gave Wellington much trouble. See Despatches. To
Clancarty, I4th May; to Hardinge, 24th May 1815. Supp. Desp.
x. 368, 380.
CH. xxm HISTORY OF THE ARMY 267
the north. But he, even as Wellington, thought his 1815.
own army too strong to be attacked; and the June 14.
arrangements of both were made rather for the coming
invasion of France than for the defence of the Low
Countries.
Still more curious were Gneisenau's orders and
measures in case of an attack on the line of the Sambre.
There were bridges at Lobbes, Thuin, Abbaye d'Aulne,
Marchienne, Charleroi and Chatelet, all of which lay
within the sphere of observation of Ziethen's corps.
No attempt was made to prepare these for demolition ;
indeed the bare fact that they were of masonry was
accepted in the Prussian army as warrant that they
were indestructible. Further, orders were issued by
Gneisenau that no gun was to be unlimbered on the
bridges, and that their defence was to be limited to
a powerful fire of skirmishers. At this rate it is
difficult to understand why the Prussian General went
through the form of stationing three brigades of
infantry on the river at all ; for a few vedettes might
perfectly well have watched the points of passage if
there were no intention to defend them. But it is fairly
evident that Gneisenau still cherished a predilection
for the cordon-system which had ruined the Austrian
campaign of the Low Countries in 1793 and 1794.
However, Ziethen's instructions were, in case he were
assailed in force, to abandon the whole of the ground
that he had been watching from Bonne Esperance to
Chatelet and to concentrate at Fleurus ; which meant
that he was to retire to a flank, leaving a gap of over
fifteen miles in the Allied line from Binche to beyond
Charleroi, and uncovering the direct road from
Charleroi to Brussels by Quatre-Bras. One wonders
whether this was part of the " satisfactory " arrange-
ment agreed to between Bliicher and Wellington.
The Duke had freely offered, in case of a reverse, to
abandon his line of communication with the sea and
to retreat eastward; and upon this understanding
Gneisenau had consented to bring his army forward
268 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. and help Wellington to keep the enemy, if possible,
June 14. out of Belgium. But, if at the first serious thrust at
its line of outposts the Prussian advanced corps were
to shrink away to eastward and throw open the direct
road to Brussels, then obviously Wellington must
either conform to the movement, making a flank march
across the front of the assailing army, or retire north-
ward, if not westward, and be wholly separated from
Bliicher. The neglect of this important point seems
to reflect no great credit upon the foresight of either
commander.
Such was the situation when cumulative intelligence
of the assembly of the French about Maubeuge, Beau-
mont and Philippeville caused Gneisenau at noon of
the 1 4th to order Thielmann and Biilow to contract the
cantonments of the Prussian Illrd and IVth Corps.
Further information received later in the day prompted
him, 1 shortly before midnight, to send further and more
definite instructions with a view to the concentration
of the entire army. Thielmann was to leave small
detachments to watch Dinant and the approaches to
Givet, and bring the rest of his force to the left bank
of the Meuse about Namur ; Pirch I. was to collect
the Ilnd Corps between Namur and Fleurus at Mazy
and Onoz ; and Biilow was politely requested to
gather the IVth Corps about Hannut on the i^th and
to fix his head-quarters there. But no hint was given
to Biilow that this movement was to be part of a
general concentration ; and not a word was sent to
Wellington to inform him that such a concentration
had even been thought of.
Meanwhile Napoleon had been laying his plans
with his best skill. He had early resolved to take
the offensive, and to assail the Allies in Flanders,
hoping that, by beating Bliicher's and Wellington's
armies in turn, he would rally all Belgium to his
standard, bring a peace-loving ministry into power at
Downing Street, and be free to march with his
1 Bliicher was asleep, so Gneisenau took the duty upon himself
CH. xxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 269
victorious army to the Vosges to throw back the 1815,
Austrians and Prussians. It was open to him to June,
strike at the Allies by their right flank, their left
flank, or their centre. He rejected the first and second
plans because, in addition to incidental objections, the
turning of either flank would drive the British to unite
with the Prussians, or the Prussians to unite with the
British, whereas his purpose was to keep them apart and
if possible to defeat them piecemeal. He considered
that nothing less than a victory would drive the British
Ministers from power, whereas Wellington, who was
the better judge on such a point, conceived that the
occupation of even half of Belgium would suffice ;
and therein lies the root of the difference of opinion
between them, which reacted so powerfully upon the
conduct of the campaign. Napoleon therefore decided
to fall upon the armies of Bliicher and Wellington at
their point of junction with all possible secrecy and >
swiftness.
At the beginning of June the five corps of the
Army of the North were posted about Lille, Valen-
ciennes, Mezires, Thionville and Soissons, with the
Imperial Guard at Paris, and the Reserve Cavalry
between the Aisne and the Sambre. Screened by the
fortresses on the frontier and by the belt of forest that
extends from Thuin almost to Namur on the south of
the Sambre, the concentration of these forces was to
such a master of the art no difficult matter, and was
rendered the easier by the unwillingness of the Allies
to send even the smallest military bodies across the
frontier. The Imperial Guard were the first to move,
marching in detachments between the th and the June 5-8.
8th of June upon Avesnes by way of Soissons ; Gerard
with the 4th Corps was the next, leaving Metz on
the 6th for Philippeville; d'Erlon quitted Lille on the
9th for Valenciennes, from which Reille moved out at
his approach, and the two marched eastward upon
Maubeuge. Vandamme shifted from Mezifcres to
Philippeville, and the rest of the troops were directed
270 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. to Beaumont. Napoleon himself left Paris early on
June 12. the 1 2th, breakfasted at Soissons, slept at Laon, and
arrived at Avesnes on the I3th. By the night of the
June 14. 1 4th the whole were assembled on a line of about
sixteen miles between Solre-sur-Sambre and Philippe-
ville. The entire manoeuvre was conducted with the
strictest secrecy ; all communication with Belgium
and the Rhine provinces was closed ; an embargo was
laid on all ships even to the very fishing-boats ; and
at every point from which regular troops had been
withdrawn, National Guards were pushed up to take
their place. Only one small detail went amiss. Soult
omitted to send the requisite orders to Grouchy for the
march of the cavalry, and it was only upon Napoleon's
arrival at Laon, where were Grouchy's head-quarters,
that the mistake was corrected. Even so the whole of
the horse arrived at Avesnes on the night of the 1 3th,
though not without forced marches exhausting to both
beasts and men.
Thus the information which had reached the Allied
commanders on the I2th, I3th and I4th was in the
main correct. The movements of the Guard, of
d'Erlon and Reille were accurately given, and the
progress of Soult, incognito, was truly reported. It
must, however, be said for Wellington and Bliicher
that marches and counter-marches of French troops
upon the northern frontier had for weeks been in-
cessant, and that, until the very end, any attempt to
piece them together as an indication of the enemy's
plans was hopeless. Both of the Allied Commanders
have been reproached for not making greater use of
their cavalry to penetrate Napoleon's intentions ; but
it seems to be literally true that both of them, and not
Wellington only, were embarrassed by uncertainty
whether they were at war or at peace. Billow pleaded
his ignorance of the fact, that there had been no declara-
tion of war, in excuse for the slowness of his movements,
shortly to be narrated, on the 1 5th of June. Napoleon
himself on the yth of June denounced the action of
CH. xxni HISTORY OF THE ARMY 271
England in capturing a French frigate in the Medi-i8i5.
terranean, as " bloodshed during peace " ; and, as if June 14.
conscious that the signal for opening the war lay
with himself, he wrote definitely to Davout on the nth
of June that hostilities would begin on the I4th.
This peculiarity of the situation has, as it seems to
me, escaped the notice of most of the later writers
upon the campaign of 1815. It is urged by at least
one of them that the manifesto of the Allied Powers
of the 1 3th of March was in itself a declaration of war ;
but it was rather a decree of outlawry against an
individual whose authority as ruler of France was
expressly set aside. The document certainly implied
that those who followed Napoleon's banner would do
so at their peril ; but beyond question, if the Allies
had invaded France before Napoleon attacked them,
they would have issued a proclamation calling upon
all Frenchmen to dissociate themselves from him and
promising them good treatment if they should do so.
The Powers of Europe were dealing, as they well knew,
with a military revolt, not with a national movement;
and it would have been impolitic as well as contrary
to their professions to treat the French nation as if it
were the French army. On the other hand, it may
justly be argued that, given such a state of uncertainty
and the presence of a French host under Napoleon,
the utmost care should have been taken that everything
should be ready against a sudden attack. On the
contrary, both Bliicher and Wellington were so con-
fident of their superiority that they took less instead
of more than the ordinary precautions, feeling sure
that Napoleon would not venture upon an offensive
movement. They were wrong in their divination of
his intentions ; but their trust in their own strength
was justified by the result. 1
On the 1 4th, the anniversary of Marengo and
Friedland, Napoleon issued the last of those stirring
1 Carres, de Napotton, 22023, 22040. Pollio, Waterloo (French
translation), 101, 129 n.
272 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. appeals which had so often stimulated his armies to
June 14. victory, and in the evening dictated his justly famous
orders for the movements of the morrow. The army
was to advance upon Charleroi in three principal
columns; Reille's and d'Erlon's corps on the left by
Thuin and Marchienne ; Vandamme's and Lobau's
corps, the Imperial Guard and Grouchy's reserve of
cavalry in the centre by Ham-sur-Heure and Marcinelle ;
Gerard's corps by Florennes and Gerpinnes. The
whole were to be covered by a screen of cavalry from
the centre column and headed by Domont's three
regiments of mounted chasseurs, with Pajol's corps
of six more regiments of light horse and two battalions
of horse-artillery in support. Domont was to start
at half-past two in the morning, Pajol and the heads of
the infantry at three o'clock ; the foot taking the main
roads and the horse the by-roads. Reille, Vandamme,
Pajol and Gerard were to keep themselves in constant
communication with each other so as to arrive in one
united mass before Charleroi. In the centre column the
3rd Corps was to take the lead, to be followed by the
6th Corps at four o'clock and by the various sections
of the Guard at half-hourly intervals between five and
six. The pontoon-train was to provide three sections
to throw as many bridges over the Sambre, which the
Emperor intended to cross with his whole army before
noon, he himself accompanying the advanced guard
of the centre column. For the general purposes of
the campaign he designed to divide his army into two
wings and a reserve, the left wing under Ney, who was
on the point of joining him, the right under Grouchy,
and the reserve, which would be strengthened from
one wing or the other, according to circumstances,
under his personal command.
June 15. At half-past three in the morning of the i^th the
French vanguards crossed the Netherlandish frontier
at Leers, Cour-sur-Heure and Thy-le-Chateau ; but
whether from neglect on the part of the staff or indo-
lence on the part of the generals, there was delay in the
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 273
march of the rear of the columns. D'Erlon did not 1815.
set the ist Corps in motion until half-past four, instead June 15,
of at three, as he had been bidden. The officer who
was carrying the orders to Vandamme was disabled
through a fall from his horse ; and, as Soult sent no
second messenger, Vandamme had no knowledge of
the intended movement until Lobau's corps came up
to his bivouac. The 4th Corps, which should have
marched from Philippeville at three, did not reach
Florennes a distance of not more than five miles
until seven o'clock, and was there bewildered and
dismayed by the desertion to the Allies of one of its
divisional generals, Bourmont, together with the whole
of his staff. However, the advanced parties on the
French centre and left in due time came into collision
with the outposts of Pirch I.'s brigade, and pressed
them slowly back from position to position until
between nine and ten o'clock they reached the Sambre
at Marchienne and Charleroi, and found the bridges
barricaded and defended by infantry and guns.
General Bachelu, whose division led Reille's column,
threw away two hours before he finally cleared the
passage at Marchienne. Even then, the bridge being
narrow, it took four hours for Reille's corps to defile
over the river ; and d'Erlon's corps in consequence
did not even begin to cross until half-past four. Pajol
having failed to carry the bridge of Charleroi by a
charge of hussars, waited till eleven o'clock for the
arrival of Vandamme's infantry, which, having started
late, was still far away ; when up came Napoleon
himself with a portion of the Young Guard, which, on
learning of Vandamme's mishap, he had brought
forward by cross-roads. Under the Emperor's direc-
tion, the barricade was soon broken down ; the
Prussians retired, and Pajol detaching one regiment
the ist Hussars due north towards Gosselies and
Quatre-Bras to clear the front of the left column, led
his main body north-east upon Fleurus on the track
of the retreating Prussians.
VOL. x T
274 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Waiting at Charleroi to watch his troops defile
June 15. over the river, Napoleon received at about two o'clock
a message that the Prussians were showing themselves
in force in Gosselies, and directed Reille to march
his corps in that direction, sending meanwhile the light
cavalry of the Guard under Lefebvre-Desnoettes to sup-
port the ist Hussars. D'Erlon was presently in-
structed to follow Reille, and Ney, reporting himself
to the Emperor at three o'clock, was bidden to take
command of this, the left wing, proceed to Gosselies
and advance along the road to Brussels. At half-past
three orders were sent to Gerard to make for the
bridge at CMtelet instead of that at Charleroi, as
originally ordered ; and meanwhile, as Vandamme's
and Grouchy's troops debouched from the bridge, they
were pushed north-eastward along the road to Gilly.
To deal first with the left wing, Reille's advanced
cavalry was checked at Jumet by some of Ziethen's
light horse and sharp-shooters, who were covering the
retirement of Steinmetz's brigade from Fontaine
l'Evque through Gosselies upon Fleurus. After
some delay the mounted troops on both sides came
into collision ; but there was no decisive result until
the French infantry, which had been hurried forward
by Reille, came up, drove the sharp-shooters from
Gosselies and occupied the village. Steinmetz's main
body at this moment was still to west of Gosselies and
therefore cut off from the direct road to Fleurus ;
but with great decision he launched such troops as he
had at hand upon the French as they issued from the
village, drove them back and, by holding in force the
houses at the north end, was able to draw off the bulk
of his brigade north-eastward to Heppignies and so
to its appointed destination. However, the road to
Brussels was now thrown open ; and Ney, who had
come up in the course of the combat, pushed Lefebvre-
Desnoettes's cavalry northward upon Quatre-Bras and
directed Bachelu's infantry to follow him for three
miles, as far as Mellet, in support.
CH. xxm HISTORY OF THE ARMY
275
Lefebvre-Desnoettes met with no resistance until he 1815.
reached Frasnes, about five miles north of Gosselies, June 15.
where he came upon a battalion and a battery of
Prince Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar's Nassau brigade,
which lay in and about Quatre-Bras. The village had
been prepared for defence ; and, as the Nassauers
showed a resolute front, Lefebvre sent a party round
the eastern flank of his opponents, who thereupon
retired to the border of the wood of Bossu, about a mile
and a half to the south of Quatre-Bras. Following
them up, Lefebvre found himself stopped abruptly by
superior forces at this point ; for Prince Bernhard of
Saxe- Weimar, anticipating the orders of his divisional
commander, Perponcher, had concentrated his brigade
at Quatre-Bras and had sent two more battalions and a
battery to reinforce his advanced party. Having only
cavalry, and those of inferior numbers, under his hand,
Lefebvre realised that it was impossible for him to
attack. It was now nearly seven o'clock ; and, even
if he were to summon infantry from Gosselies, they
could hardly come up before dark. He therefore
fell back for the night to Frasnes, where a battalion
of infantry joined him soon after sunset. He then
sent in his report to Ney, giving the important informa-
tion, gleaned from prisoners, that the troops which he
had encountered at Frasnes had nothing to do with
those that had been engaged at Gosselies. The latter,
he explained, had retired eastward upon Fleurus ; the
former were under Wellington's command ; and the
bulk of the Netherlandish army lay westward about
Mons with head-quarters at Braine-le-Comte. 1
In the centre Pirch II. had occupied a strong
position in rear of Gilly, with his front covered by a
boggy rivulet ; his seven battalions being skilfully
disposed to present a great appearance of strength,
and his flank towards the Sambre being watched by a
regiment of dragoons. Grouchy, who had galloped
1 A translation of the full text of this letter is printed by Col.
James, p. 74.
276 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 815. forward to reconnoitre, would not venture to attack
June 15. without orders ; whereupon Napoleon hurried to the
spot and, taking in the situation at a glance, directed
him to assail Pirch II. 's front with one of Vandamme's
divisions, to turn his left flank with Exelmans's corps
of cavalry and to push on to Sombreffe. This done
the time being about half-past three the Emperor
returned to Charleroi to hasten the march of Van-
damme's infantry ; but, hearing no sound of an
engagement, he rode back soon after half-past five to
Gilly and ordered Vandamme and Grouchy to attack
immediately. Pirch II. thereupon began to retire, and,
though some of his battalions were caught and very
severely handled by the French cavalry, he made good
his retreat with some loss to Fleurus, and was there
allowed to rest in peace. Pajol's and Exelmans's
troopers then bivouacked to south of Fleurus, covering
Vandamme's infantry ; and Vandamme and Pajol
sent in their reports to the Emperor. Vandamme's
was to the effect that the Prussians, whom he reckoned
at ten to fifteen thousand men, were in full retreat,
having left only outposts of cavalry in Fleurus ; and
Pajol confirmed this by stating that, if Vandamme had
given him some infantry, he could have taken Fleurus.
Their testimony therefore avouched the fact that the
Allies had withdrawn towards the north-east.
On the right, Gerard's corps, having marched upon
Charleroi, was delayed rather than hastened by the
order that changed its direction to Chatelet, and hence
only one of his divisions had crossed the Sambre before
dark.
At nightfall therefore the French were thus posted
according to Napoleon's distribution into two wings
and a reserve. Of the right wing Pajol's and Exel-
mans's cavalry lay between Lambusart and Campi-
naire ; Vandamme's corps in and to the east of Soleil-
mont forest ; Hulot's division of Gerard's corps at
Chatelineau, and the three remaining divisions south
of the Sambre at Chatelet. Of the left wing the light
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 277
cavalry of the Guard was at Frasnes. Reille's corps 1815.
was banked up in rear of it on the road to Brussels. June 15,
D'Erlon's corps was at Marchienne, Bachelu's division
lying at Mellet, Foy's and Jerome's in and about
Gosselies, and Girard's division a little further to the
east at Wangenies. Of the Reserve, the Young Guard
was at Gilly, the Old Guard between that village and
Charleroi, and the whole of Lobau's corps on the south
bank of the Sambre. On the whole, therefore,
Napoleon's first day's work had prospered. He had
not reached the road which was the line of junction
between the inner flanks of the Allies the road, that
is to say, which runs south-eastward from Nivelles to
Namur nor had he thrown more than two-thirds of
his army across the Sambre ; but he had struck the
advanced guards of both of the Allied armies and had
found no main body massed behind them. He had
met with brave but not very strenuous resistance ; he
had inflicted substantial loss some twelve hundred
killed, wounded and prisoners upon Ziethen's corps;
and the two Allied armies had retired by divergent
routes, the Netherlanders to the north and the Prussians
to the east. So far, then, all seemed to promise well
for his plan of forcing those two armies apart and
beating each of them independently of the other.
On the side of the Allies the fact of the French
advance became known to General Ziethen at half-
past four in the morning of the i^th, through the
sound of Reille's cannon and musketry when he fell
upon Steinmetz's brigade at Thuin. Ziethen at once
sent information to Bliicher and fired the guns which
gave the signal of alarm. At a quarter-past eight he
despatched a second message reporting that the French
had pushed back the Prussian advanced parties and
had crossed the Sambre in force, that Napoleon was
present in person with his Guard, and that the brigades
of Steinmetz and Pirch II. were falling back to
Gosselies and Gilly. He added that he had sent this
intelligence to Wellington, with a request that the
278 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Duke should concentrate his army at Nivelles, in
June 15. accordance with an intimation which General Muffling,
Prussian attache at the British head-quarters, had
given on the previous day. To the first of these
despatches Blucher replied that the Ilnd, Illrd
and IVth Corps had been ordered to concentrate,
and that by evening they would be respectively at
Onoz and Mazy, at Namur and at Hannut; and he
added injunctions to observe the enemy closely, and
to watch the old Roman road and in particular the
neighbourhood of Binche. The substance of the
second despatch was at once forwarded to Wellington's
head-quarters by Gneisenau, with the further intelli-
gence that the Prussian head-quarters would presently
be transferred to Sombreffe, where they would await
intelligence of Wellington's intentions. The whole
of the Prussian army would likewise assemble on
the morning of the i6th at Sombreffe, where Blucher
intended to accept battle.
On Wellington's side of the field the Prince of
Orange rode out at five in the morning to St. Sym-
phorien, two miles east of Mons, whence, finding all
quiet, he rode to Brussels to dine with Wellington.
At noon there reached his head-quarters at Braine-
le-Comte a letter from General Behr at Mons, reporting
a French attack upon General Steinmetz and a lively
fire about Charleroi, and adding that there was no sign
of the enemy about Mons. This missive was at once
forwarded by General Constant de Rebecque to
Brussels, where the Prince of Orange communicated
it to Wellington at three o'clock in the afternoon. A
little later, further information came into Braine-le-
Comte from General Chasse at Haine St. Pierre and
General van Merlen at St. Symphorien, confirming
the purport of Behr's letter, but containing the
additional details that Steinmetz had evacuated Binche
and would collect his brigade first at Gosselies. At
two o'clock Constant forwarded this news also to
Wellington ; and apparently at about the same time
CH. xxin HISTORY OF THE ARMY 279
he sent orders to Perponcher to assemble his 1st 1815.
brigade on the paved road near Nivelles, and his 2ndj une
at Quatre-Bras, and to Generals Chasse* and Collaert
to gather their divisions together, the former at Fayt,
the latter behind the Haine. Prince Bernhard of Saxe-
Weimar had already placed his brigade in position at
Quatre-Bras before receipt of any instruction from
Perponcher ; but it does not appear that he sent in
any report to Brussels of the approach of the French
to his front.
The next intelligence, therefore, that Wellington
received, so far as can be conjectured, was that
despatched by Ziethen from Charleroi at. nine in
the morning, which arrived between three and four
o'clock ; the rider having taken six hours to traverse
thirty -four miles. An hour or so later Constant's
second report came in. Muffling pressed Wellington
to say whether he would concentrate his army, and
where. The Duke answered that until he had
further intelligence from Mons for his latest report
from that quarter was of half-past ten in the morn-
ing he could not say, but that he would direct
the whole army to be in readiness to march at any
moment. This accordingly he did at six o'clock, 1
and at the same time he directed the Fourth Division
on his extreme right to close in eastward from
Oudenarde to Grammont. Further, the Prince of
Orange was instructed to assemble the 2nd and 3rd
Netherlandish divisions at Nivelles, and, if that place
should have been attacked in course of the day, to
summon thither also the First and Third British
Divisions. At seven o'clock Muffling sent the purport
of these orders to Gneisenau, adding that the Reserve,
or a part of it, would move southward from Brussels
when the moon rose. He also gave Wellington's
judgment of the situation by the light of the very
imperfect intelligence so far supplied to him. The
- 1 The date 5 P.M. in Wellington Desp. is a mistake or a misprint,
See James, p. 96, note.
28 o HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
. enemy such was the Duke's view intended either
June 15. to follow the Sambre downward in order to join other
columns which were coming up from the direction of
Givet, or to attack in the neighbourhood of Fleurus
and, in all probability, in that of Nivelles at the same
time. Wellington's object was to be in position to
meet this latter onslaught. If it were not delivered,
then he would bring the whole of his force to Nivelles
on the morrow, ready to support the Prussians, or, if
the Prussians should have been already assailed, to
fall upon the enemy's flank and rear according to the
arrangement already concerted with Blucher.
Some time later, probably near eight o'clock, came
in Gneisenau's letter, which had been despatched
from Namur soon after noon. Here again the bearer
had failed in his duty, for he had taken from seven
to eight hours to traverse forty miles. The contents
of the letter did little to improve Wellington's know-
ledge. Gneisenau stated that Ziethen had orders not
to retire beyond Fleurus if he could possibly help it ;
and from this Wellington might infer that the bulk of
the enemy's force had turned eastward ; but there was
not a word to show that this was actually the case.
There was not even a hint to indicate that Charleroi
was in the enemy's hands. The news of the Prussian
concentration at Sombreffe was really no news but
simply a confirmation of an existing understanding.
Once again, therefore, Wellington said that he must
await intelligence from Mons before deciding upon
the rendezvous for his army ; and it was not until
ten o'clock that a letter came in from Dornberg to
say that there was nothing on his front. There-
upon Wellington sent out orders for the Reserve to
march southward from Brussels to the cross-roads at
Mont St. Jean, and for the rest of the army to make a
general movement eastward, the Cavalry, Second and
Fourth Divisions upon Enghien, the First Division
upon Braine-le-Comte, and the Third Division upon
Nivelles. This done, he went, together with most of
une
CH. xxiii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 281
his superior officers, to a ball given by the Duchess 1815
of Richmond in Brussels, hoping by his presence toj
discourage sanguine enemies and to hearten despond-
ing friends.
Thus it was that when the hundred and twenty
thousand men of Napoleon were bivouacked com-
pactly within the quadrilateral Frasnes, Fleurus,
Chatelet, Marchienne, Wellington's army was dis-
persed practically over the entire extent of its original
cantonments, while Bliicher's had hardly begun its
concentration. It is idle to contend that the Allies
were not, in the military sense, surprised ; but,
masterly though was Napoleon's assembly of his
troops, it was very greatly facilitated by the screen
of fortresses and forest that lay ready to his hand,
and far more than has been hitherto supposed by
the fact that, so long as he remained within the
boundaries of France, the Allies would not send even
a patrol of cavalry to watch his movements. They
could not have ventured to take the offensive and
invade France without a declaration of their intentions,
whereas it was open to Napoleon to cross the border
and create a state of war whenever it might best suit
him. " The enemy opened hostilities this morning,"
are the first words of Gneisenau's letter to Wellington ;
and, though this had been in a manner expected, yet
such temerity as Napoleon's in bearding a force of
twice his strength was in itself something of a surprise.
Nevertheless, the backwardness of Wellington's con-
centration was due in great measure to avoidable
causes. The Prussians fought their " delaying
actions " sturdily and well ; but their success shows
that, if they had made better preparation for the
defence and for the ultimate destruction of the bridges,
they could* have gained more time for the troops to
assemble in their rear. More blameworthy by far
was the omission of the Prussian staff to keep Welling-
on informed of the course of their proceedings during
the day. It appears that Ziethen ceased to consider
282
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
iSi5.it his duty to report to the British Commander-in-
June 15. Chief immediately after active operations had begun,
that is to say, precisely at the moment when it was
most necessary that Wellington should be fully
apprised of all that was going forward. It was really
monstrous that tidings of vital import should have
been sent from Fleurus to Brussels by way of Namur,
and that a journey of thirty miles should have been
lengthened to nearly sixty. The tardiness of the
despatch-riders was also disagreeably conspicuous ;
and Wellington in after years commented with biting
humour on the fact that the fattest man in the Prussian
army had been selected to carry to him a message
which should have been transmitted with all possible
speed. It will be seen that these were not solitary
examples of the inefficiency of the Prussian staff.
CHAPTER XXIV
AT the Duchess of Richmond's ball Wellington was 1815.
ostentatiously light of heart ; but towards one o'clock June 16.
on the morning of the i6th when the party had
sat down to supper, a third messenger came in
from Constant to the Prince of Orange with the news
that the French had advanced up to Quatre Bras.
Constant added that he had ordered Perponcher to
push forward his ist brigade to the support of
Prince Bernhard's, and had warned Chasse* and Collaert
to be prepared to march with the 3rd Nether-
landish Division and the cavalry to the help of
Perponcher. It will be remembered that Welling-
ton's orders of six o'clock had directed Perponcher 's
and Chasse's divisions to assemble at Nivelles. These
orders came to Constant's hand, it seems, immediately
after the despatch of his own instructions to Per-
poncher ; but with excellent judgment he took upon
himself to disregard them, and to rely upon his own
reading of the situation. Wellington with perfect
coolness explained the state of affairs to his superior
officers, and, after bidding them all withdraw as
quietly and speedily as possible to their posts, left the
ball at two o'clock and went to bed. He was awakened
two or three hours later by General Dornberg, who
had ridden in from Mons, and to whom he gave
instructions to hasten at once to Mont St. Jean and
order Picton's division forward to Quatre Bras.
Thanks to the foresight of Constant, that important
point on the road of communication between the two
283
284 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Allied armies was temporarily secure ; and, with the
June 1 6. rest of his force at Nivelles, Braine-le-Comte and
Enghien, the Duke was prepared to meet attack either
on the direct road from Charleroi to Brussels or further
to westward between Charleroi and Mons. But
towards seven o'clock Wellington decided definitely
that Quatre Bras was his true point of concentration,
and issued further instructions for a continued east-
ward movement of the whole army upon that village,
Genappe and Nivelles. Though it was still uncertain
whether the French advance along the road from
Charleroi to Brussels was made in any force, it was
clear that, in any case, the Anglo-Netherlandish army
must be at hand to support the Prussians if Napoleon's
attack should be delivered against them.
The main significance of the reports brought in
to Napoleon on the night of the i^th was that the
Prussians had retired eastward, and the outposts of
Wellington's army towards the north. He judged
therefore that his primary object was attained. He
had placed his own army between the two Allied
hosts, and he was free to fall upon whichever of them
he pleased to select. He had already decided that,
of the twain, it would be preferable to attack first that
of Bliicher, whose fiery temperament would prompt
him to fly to the succour of Wellington, whereas the
British General, whom he judged to be slow and
circumspect, would be less eager to march to the
support of his Prussian colleague. It is characteristic
of Napoleon that it never occurred to him that two
commanders might act with unselfish loyalty towards
each other. Good faith, upon principle and not for
personal advantage, was a matter that lay beyond his
horizon : he had always lied to his generals in Spain
and they had always lied to him. 1 Had he been
1 On the evening of this same 1 5th of June he had issued a bulletin
claiming in one passage that the day's operations had cost the Prussians
2600 men, of which 1000 prisoners : and in another that 400 to 500
men had been sabred and 1750 captured all at a cost to the French
of 10 killed and 80 wounded. Carres, de Napotton y 22056.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 285
concerned with Gneisenau instead of with Blucher, 1815.
his diagnosis of character would have been less June 16.
incorrect ; for Gneisenau was equally ignorant of the
meaning of good faith, so much so, indeed, that the
mere study of his character has infected one of his
biographers with the same failing. However, having
made this false assumption, Napoleon built his plan
of campaign upon it. At four o'clock in the morning
he sent an officer to Frasnes to learn how affairs stood
in that quarter ; and an hour later Soult despatched
orders to Ney to ascertain the exact position of Reille's
and d'Erlon's corps. Before eight o'clock the Emperor
formulated his plan of operations for the day. Grouchy
and the right wing were to march north-eastward upon
Sombreffe and Gembloux, and to fall upon any Prussian
corps that might be found in either position. Gerard's
corps might be called in, if needed, for the attack on
Sombreffe ; but the Emperor did not expect to be
opposed by more than forty thousand Prussians. He
himself would reach Fleurus between ten and eleven
o'clock, leave the whole of his Guard there, and push
on alone to Sombreffe. Having ascertained that
Sombreffe and Gembloux were clear of the enemy,
he would lead his reserve to join the left wing at
Quatre Bras, from whence both united would make
a night march northward and by seven o'clock in the
morning of the iyth should have reached Brussels.
He impressed upon Ney the importance of occupying
Brussels, which, as he reckoned, might produce great
results ; for so prompt and sudden a march would
isolate the British from Mons and Ostend.
These orders show that on the morning of the 1 6th
Napoleon's ideas of the whereabouts of his enemy were
of the vaguest. He evidently did not expect to find
Blucher in force either at Sombreffe or at Gembloux,
and, supposing that his expectations proved to be
correct, he considered it safe to infer that the Prussians
had withdrawn to a secure distance eastward, and that
he could devote his principal attention to Wellington.
286 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Equally he expected to find the British in retreat.
June 1 6. In the supplementary orders sent by Soult to Ney,
it was enjoined upon the latter to occupy Quatre Bras
with two corps of infantry and one of cavalry, push on
a division of infantry and some cavalry to Genappe,
and send out reconnaissances towards Brussels and
Nivelles, upon which latter point the Anglo-Nether-
landers would probably have retreated. In other
words, he looked that the bare terror of his advance
between them should have caused both of their armies
to retreat, each towards its own base, in opposite
directions, which was the very thing that Bliicher and
Wellington had agreed not to do. Against this
inference, however, must be set the remarkable
allusion to Mons and Ostend in the letter to Ney ;
for, if the British were retiring to the west, it is very clear
that a rapid advance from Quatre Bras to Brussels
would isolate them from neither the one place nor
the other. Indeed, if Wellington, upon the news of
Ney's rapid advance, should face about and march
eastward, he would fall full upon the Emperor's flank.
On the other hand, if we assume that the advance to
Brussels was deliberately conceived with the idea of
cutting Wellington's communications to westward,
then obviously Napoleon expected the Anglo-Nether-
landish army to be at Brussels or to east of it. In
that case Wellington's purpose was not to be mistaken.
He intended to sacrifice his line of operations with
Ostend rather than his contact with the Prussian army ;
and, as we have seen, the Duke had promised Gneisenau
that he would take this course in the event of a retreat.
Had some inkling of this promise and of Wellington's
extreme anxiety to preserve Brussels and Ghent
reached the Emperor's ears ? If it had, and if he really
believed that the Duke had retired north and eastward,
then evidently his plan of falling upon the Allied
armies in detail and beating them separately was
already wrecked. Meanwhile, he was for the present
too prudent to take anything unverified for granted.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 287
He told Ney plainly that his final decision could not
be made until the afternoon or evening, after he had J une l6 -
explored the ground as far as Gembloux ; and he
bade the Marshal post a division at Marbais, as a
central point between Quatre Bras, Sombreffe and
Gembloux, so that he could summon it to the support
of the right wing in case of need. Moreover, the
division at Marbais was instructed to throw out
reconnaissances in every direction, particularly towards
Gembloux and even towards Wavre, the latter place
being nearly fourteen miles due north of Sombreffe.
This indicates that the Emperor kept in view the
possibility that the two Allied armies might make a
convergent retreat towards the north. In fact, he
was utterly in the dark as to the actual positions and
intentions of his enemies ; and his conjectures were
founded upon the false hypothesis that the defeat which
he had inflicted upon the Prussians was so serious as to
make retreat the only possible course for both armies.
On the evening of the 1 5th the Prussian army was
still for the most part far from its point of concentra-
tion, the Ilnd Corps being between Mazy and Onoz,
and the Vth near Namur ; but orders had been sent
to hasten them forward, and some of them were on
march during the night. The IVth corps was hope-
lessly out of reach. Gneisenau had sent Billow only
a polite request, instead of a positive order, to move
to Hannut on the i^th ; and the latter General,
ignorant that hostilities had begun, ignorant that a
general concentration of the army was in progress,
and thinking that, if it were, it would take place at
Hannut, made no speed to arrive at the place betimes,
and was still far east of it when night fell. Fresh
orders were despatched by Blucher to Hannut late in
the forenoon of the I5th, bidding Biilow hasten to
Gembloux at the earliest possible hour on the i6th ;
but, as Biilow was not at Hannut, the letter did not
reach him until hard upon midnight, when he returned
the inevitable answer, that it was physically impossible
288 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. for his corps to reach Gembloux at the appointed
June 1 6. time. At about the same hour Gneisenau recalled
Ziethen's corps from Fleurus to Sombreffe, and by
eight o'clock in the morning of the i6th it was
assembled in position between St. Amand and Ligny ;
the Ilnd and Illrd Corps being still far in rear. By
that time it is to be presumed that Muffling's last letter
from Brussels had come to Bliicher's hand ; and at
half-past ten there reached him a note from a Prussian
aide-de-camp, who had been sent at five o'clock in the
morning to Quatre Bras, reporting that the French
were still at Frasnes and that their patrols had inter-
rupted communication between the two armies for a
time during the night, but that the Prince of Orange
expected the whole of the Netherlandish army and
most of the British to be concentrated near Nivelles
by ten o'clock. At about eleven o'clock Pirch I.'s
corps came up and was placed provisionally between
the Roman road and Sombreffe ; and an hour later
Thielmann's corps likewise presented itself and was
arrayed on the left of Pirch 's from Sombreffe to
Tongrinne. The total force thus assembled numbered
about eighty-two thousand men with two hundred and
twenty-four guns.
The Prince of Orange, meanwhile, had left Brussels
in haste and reached his head-quarters at Braine-le-
Comte at half-past three. After a few words with
Constant he confirmed all the orders given by the
Chief of his Staff, who then rode off to Quatre Bras.
Acting with a strength of initiative not less admirable
than Constant's own, Perponcher had kept Prince
Bernhard's brigade in its former station and had
brought down half of his 2nd brigade, Bijlandt's, to
support it. On his way Constant sent forward
Bijlandt's two remaining battalions and artillery from
Nivelles to join their division, and on reaching Quatre
Bras found Perponcher already engaged in making his
dispositions and in driving back the French advanced
posts. At six o'clock the Prince of Orange arrived
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 289
and, by Perponcher's advice, extended his front to 1815.
give a greater appearance of strength. He sentj uneI 6.
Constant to Nivelles to look to the disposition of
Chasse's division and of Alten's which, once again
through the initiative of Constant, had been bidden
to continue its march from Soignies to Nivelles. He
also despatched orders to the Guards to continue their
march from Braine-le-Comte to the same place
orders which miscarried, for Cooke did not receive
them until he reached Nivelles in the afternoon,
having proceeded thither by his own motion. In the
course of these proceedings Blucher's aide-de-camp
arrived and was sent back with the answer which has
already been quoted ; and at seven o'clock the Prince
reported his proceedings to Wellington, adding that
the French were at Frasnes, with both infantry and
cavalry, but not as yet in force. There was in fact
nothing so far to show that the French advance upon
the road to Brussels might not after all be a feint, dis-
guising a turning movement further to the west.
So the morning of the i6th wore on. At nine
o'clock the Allies had still only six thousand five
hundred men and eight guns at Quatre Bras ; and
shortly after that hour Wellington arrived. From some
stragglers of Steinmetz's brigade he at length learned
some details of what had happened on the previous
day, how the French had crossed the Sambre at
Charleroi and Marchienne, had driven Ziethen back
after sharp encounters at Fleurus and Gosselies, and
had penetrated by patrols as far as the road between
Sombreffe and Quatre Bras. He appeared surprised
and indeed incredulous, as well he might, for not the
slightest report of these things had been sent to him
from any Prussian source ; but he congratulated the
Prince of Orange and Perponcher upon their courage
in acting upon their own judgment, and approved
their dispositions in every particular. Riding forward
to reconnoitre for himself, he found that he could see
nothing owing to woods and folds of ground, and, as
VOL. x u
290 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. the Prince of Orange had no cavalry with him, the
June 1 6. Duke was obliged to be content with conjecture. At
half-past ten, having at last ascertained the whereabouts
of Blucher, he wrote him a letter to the effect that the
Prince of Orange's corps was at Quatre Bras and
Nivelles, that the Reserve and the British cavalry were
on march and would reach Genappe and Nivelles at
noon, that Hill was at Braine-le-Comte, that he himself
could perceive no great force of the enemy before him,
and that he awaited news from the Prussian head-
quarters and the arrival of his troops before deciding
upon the day's operations. This intelligence, supplied
to Wellington by his staff, was very inaccurate, as
the subsequent narrative will prove ; but the Duke
furnished it in good faith and based his own actions
upon the assumed truth of it. The insinuations of
German writers, that he wrote this letter with the
deliberate purpose of deceiving Blucher and making
him fight a battle to cover the concentration of the
Anglo-Netherlandish army, deserve nothing more
than contempt. 1
1 It is a pity that General Pollio (French translation, pp. 197-8)
should write : " Sortons du champ des suppositions Wellington
etait peut-etre plus diplomate que general, il faisait partie du cabinet
anglais bien qu'eloigne de Londres, il occupait une position tres elevee,
supe'rieure a celle de Bliicher, et il s'attribuait en outre une telle
superiority dans son orgueil brittannique qu'il a probablement cru
agir avec Blucher comme il avait agi dans la Pe*ninsule avec ses allies
portugais et espagnols." It is well when quitting the domain of
conjecture at least not to exchange it for that of fiction, not to say
falsehood. Wellington was certainly an able diplomatist, but he did
not base his diplomacy upon deceit, as General Pollio quite gratuitously
assumes. He was not a member of the British Cabinet, to which he
seldom wrote more acrimonious letters than during this short campaign.
Finally, any one conversant with the history of the Peninsular war
(which no foreigner is, and General Pollio very manifestly is not)
would know that, even if it were true that Wellington endeavoured
to save himself by deceiving Blucher, no parallel case could be adduced
from his relations with the Spaniards and Portuguese. General Pollio
evidently is not even aware that the Portuguese troops were commanded
by a British General, paid by the British Treasury, and mingled in every
division with British troops a pretty critic to pronounce judgment on
Wellington whether as General, diplomatist or man.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
291
Shortly afterwards the Duke rode on with Muffling 1815.
to Ligny to see Blucher. He met the old Field- June 16.
marshal near Brye on the right of the chosen battle-
field, where the troops were already forming for the
combat ; and he observed with astonishment that they
were so arrayed on the forward slope of the hill that
no cannon-shot could help striking the supports and
reserves, even if it should miss the fighting line. He
protested mildly. " Every man knows his own troops
best," he hinted ; " but if my troops were so disposed
I should expect them to be beaten." Such criticism,
however gently advanced, was not likely to commend
itself to a theorist such as Gneisenau, who, besides, was
more concerned with the help that Wellington might
be able to afford him than with his own dispositions.
The Duke, who was still inclined to think that the
French were only making a demonstration before
Frasnes, had, during the ride to Ligny, declared to
Muffling his willingness to bring his whole force, if
possible, to the assistance of the Prussians ; and,
though no record of his conversation with Blucher is
preserved, there can be no doubt that he repeated to
the Field-marshal the substance of the words which
he had already used to the attache. From the mill of
Bussy, which commanded a great extent of ground,
the French columns could be seen advancing to the
attack ; and Gneisenau, thinking that practically the
whole French army was before him, urged the Duke
to bring as large a force as possible to Brye to act as
a reserve to the Prussian army. Wellington, sup-
ported by Muffling, was inclined rather to overthrow
the French force before him at Quatre Bras and march
on Gosselies, that is to say upon the rear of the main
French army. The discussion was closed by Wel-
lington, who said, " Well, I will come, if I am not
attacked myself" ; and therewith he started to ride
back to Quatre Bras. It was then apparently between
half-past one and two o'clock.
Let us return now to the French side. Ney received
292 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. in succession Napoleon's own order and Soult's, which
June 1 6. was to the same effect, somewhere about eleven o'clock.
He answered at that hour that he was making his
dispositions accordingly, that there appeared to be
only three thousand infantry and a very few cavalry
in his front, and that, in his opinion, there would be
little obstacle in the way of the Emperor's dispositions
for the march on Brussels. Meanwhile Napoleon,
having given Grouchy his orders and summoned
Gerard to bring the whole of his corps across the
Sambre and lead it straight upon SombrefFe, prepared
to ride to Fleurus. Just before he started he received,
apparently some time before ten o'clock, a message
from the left wing, stating that the enemy was showing
considerable strength at Quatre Bras ; whereupon he
forwarded to Ney through Soult the following order,
which was little more than a confirmation of those
already despatched. "Assemble Reille's and d'Erlon's
corps, and Kellermann's, which will march to join you
at once. With these you should be able to defeat and
destroy any force of the enemy that might present
themselves. Bliicher was at Namur yesterday, and is
not likely to have sent troops to Quatre Bras, so you
will have none but those that come from Brussels to
deal with." Here again we meet with the same con-
fusion of thought as appears in Napoleon's first order
already quoted. What did he mean by " the force
coming from Brussels ? " Why should no hostile
force come up from the west ? Or, if the British at
large were retiring westward, why should they march
southward from Brussels at all, when they could join
the general retreat by moving by the great road to
Ninove ? On the other hand, if a French advance
upon Brussels was to cut the British of? from the base
at Ostend, obviously the bulk of the British force
must be to east or north-east of Brussels, in which
case their movement southward from the capital might
be very formidable. But still more remarkable is the
fact that the purport of the message delivered to
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 293
Napoleon as to the strength of the Allies at Quatre 1815.
Bras must have been made known to Ney before hej une 16.
wrote his answer to the Emperor's first orders, and
that, having once declared the force at that village to
be trifling, he was at no pains to contradict it. The
French commanders one and all seem to have based
their plans upon hypotheses which they took not the
slightest pains to verify by reconnaissance.
At about eleven o'clock Napoleon reached Fleurus
and, ascending to the summit of a mill, surveyed
Bliicher's position at Ligny. He reckoned correctly
that he had only one corps before him, though there
were signs already of the approach of others, and
resolved to attack at once, but was annoyed to find
that Gerard's corps had not come up. Soult had sent
off his orders to Gerard between seven and eight
o'clock, but they seem to have taken two hours to
travel four miles, for they did not come to hand until
half-past nine, or at any rate Gerard did not set his
troops in motion until that hour. It was then neces-
sary for them to defile across the narrow bridge at
Chatelet, and thus it was half-past one before they
reached the field of action. At two o'clock the
Emperor sent through Soult a fourth message to Ney,
which conditionally cancelled the previous instructions
respecting the march to Brussels. Its purport was
that the Prussians had assembled a corps between
Sombreffe and Brye, which would be attacked by
Grouchy with the 3rd and 4th Corps at half-past
two. Ney was therefore required to drive back with
vigour whatever hostile troops might be in front of
him, and, having done so, to fall back towards the
right wing so as to envelop the Prussians aforesaid.
If, on the other hand, the Emperor should have already
defeated them, he would manoeuvre in Ney's direction
to hasten the accomplishment of the operations pre-
scribed to the Marshal.
* At three o'clock Napoleon's dispositions were
complete and he ordered the attack to begin. He
294 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. had at his disposal the 3rd and 4th Corps (Van-
June 1 6. damme's and Gerard's), Girard's division of Reille's
corps, Lobau's corps, which was ordered forward
from Charleroi just as the battle began, also Pajol's,
Exelmans's and Milhaud's corps of cavalry, in
all seventy-six thousand men, or deducting Lobau's
corps, which was not actually on the spot, sixty-five
thousand men. By this time Napoleon was alive to
the fact that he had before him not a corps but an
army ; but he was elated rather than depressed by
the fact, for he asked nothing better than to have
done with Blucher at a stroke. * The issue of this
war may be decided in three hours," he said. " If
Ney executes my orders properly, not a gun of this
army will escape "; and therewith he despatched to
Ney a fifth set of instructions. " We are heavily
engaged with the Prussians " (such was its purport),
" manoeuvre at once so as to envelope their right and
fall with clenched fists upon their rear. If you act
with vigour this army of theirs is lost. The fate of
France is in your hands. Lose not a moment in
marching on the heights of St. Amand and Brye, to
share in what may be a decisive victory." These
instructions completely ignored the possibility that
Ney might have an enemy in front of him ; and, just
at the moment, as it happened, a letter reached the
Emperor from Lobau, telling him that Ney was con-
fronted with twenty thousand men at Quatre Bras.
The news did not disconcert Napoleon. If Ney could
not spare his whole army, he must hold the enemy
before him in check with Reille's corps only, and
send d'Erlon's to make the turning movement upon
Bliicher's right. Napoleon accordingly sent an order
to this effect to Ney.
The battle of Ligny forms no part of the history
of the British army, and only the briefest summary of
its course can be given here. Napoleon opened the
fight by a vigorous attack upon Blucher 's right and
centre, which was met by as strenuous a defence, and
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 295
by counter-attacks which were resisted by the French 1815.
with a stubbornness equal to that of the Prussians j une 16.
themselves. After more than two hours of a bitter
struggle no ground had been gained by either party ;
and, since Lobau's corps was now approaching, Napo-
leon resolved to launch the Guard to a supreme attack
against the Prussian centre ; hoping to cleave the
army in twain, surround the right wing with the help
of d'Erlon, and drive the left wing eastward upon
Namur. The dispositions had been made and the
attack was about to begin when the Emperor was
informed that a strong hostile column was bearing
down upon his left flank, and in fact that the French
troops in that quarter were falling back in disorder,
or, in plain words, running away. Perforce he sus-
pended the assault of his Guard and sent half of them
to strengthen the threatened flank. Bliicher seized
the moment to aim a great counter-stroke at the
French left. He was, however, repulsed, and pre-
sently the Emperor learned that the supposed hostile
column was d'Erlon's corps. So intense seems to
have been his relief at this welcome tidings that he
forgot everything else in the renewal of his attack upon
the Prussian centre ; while d'Erlon, who had just
received a pressing order from Ney to return to Quatre
Bras, counter-marched and left the field of Ligny
behind him.
By about seven o'clock all was ready; and after a
heavy cannonade the Guard were let loose to the assault.
Bliicher, having already used up his reserves on his
right, had little infantry with which to meet them.
The gallant old warrior therefore led his reserve cavalry
in person to the charge, but his troops could make
no impression upon the Guard, and were repulsed
with great loss. His horse was shot under him, and
while on the ground he was ridden over and trampled
on, only escaping at last on a sergeant's horse,
bruised, shaken, and hardly conscious. The whole
of the Prussian centre broke up in disorder, and
296 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. the battle was lost. Sixty-five thousand French had
June 1 6. beaten eighty-three thousand Prussians, through the
fault, not of the Prussian rank and file, but of Gneisenau
and his colleagues of the staff, who had chosen a very
defective position in the first place and defended it
very unskilfully in the second. With a superiority of
nearly four to three they should certainly have given
a better account of Napoleon ; and it is childish to
contend, as German writers have with unblushing
effrontery contended, that Blucher would not have
accepted battle had he not counted upon help from
Wellington. Bliicher was firmly 'resolved to fight in
any circumstances ; 1 and, if his tactical skill had been
equal to his courage and constancy, the result would
amply have justified his determination.
On the French left wing Ney, apparently confident
that he would meet with little resistance at Quatre
Bras, made no preparations for an advance before
receiving the Emperor's commands. Nor were these,
as we have seen, at the outset of a nature to demand
particular activity or haste, since they gave him to
understand that no serious work would be expected
of him before nightfall. He issued therefore no orders
for the march of his infantry upon the road to Brussels
until eleven o'clock, which signified that Reille's
divisions were not fairly in movement before noon, and
that the head of the column did not reach Frasnes
until half-past one. At this spot there were already
Bachelu's division, about five thousand men, Pire's
and Lefebvre-Desnoettes's light cavalry, rather under
four thousand men, and twenty-six guns.
The hamlet of Quatre Bras lies at the intersection
of the roads that lead from Brussels to Charleroi and
from Nivelles to Namur, at a point about two and a
half miles due north of Frasnes. On an elevation,
slightly higher than the undulating ground on every
side, stood a very large farm-house and buildings, with
a few labourers' cottages, all clustered about the actual
1 See James, p. 113.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 297
cross-roads. To westward of the cross the Namur 1815.
road passes through a deep cutting to an embankment, June 16,
and to eastward from an embankment to a cutting,
forming in either case a natural line of defence. From
the farm the ground slopes gently southward along
the Brussels road to a tiny rivulet which, rising about
five hundred yards west of the road, passed under it,
and was dammed up about a thousand yards farther
east into a wedge-shaped pond, called the Materne
Pond, broadening at its eastern end, and measuring
about four hundred yards from east to west. At the
foot of the slope which rises southward from this
rivulet, and just on the eastern side of the Brussels
road, stood another farm, that of Gemioncourt ; and
from the rivulet itself, which likewise bears the name
of Gemioncourt, the ground ascends gently for some
six hundred yards and ripples away southward towards
Frasnes, throwing out, however, within eleven hun-
dred yards of Gemioncourt, a well-marked spur to
the east, which is defined along its southern flank by
a second small rivulet, whose course is parallel to that
of Gemioncourt. Near the eastern extremity of this
spur and about three-quarters of a mile east of the
Brussels road stands another group of farm buildings
known as Pireaumont farm. West of the road and
nearly a mile south-west of Gemioncourt farm, the
farm of Grand Pierrepont marks the source of another
rivulet, that of Odomont, which flows through a
depression in a south-westerly direction, passing a
second farm, Petit Pierrepont, some eight hundred
yards on its downward course. The other main
features of the ground were two woods of considerable
extent, of which the first, Hutte Wood, extended from
a point a little south of Pireaumont for some two thou-
sand yards southward, with a breadth of rather less
than a mile east and west. The other wood, that of
Bossu, extended west of the Brussels road, practically
from Quatre Bras farm to within six hundred yards
of Grand Pierrepont, gradually widening out from a
2 9 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. breadth of about five hundred yards by Quatre Bras
June 1 6. to sixteen hundred yards abreast of Gemioncourt, and
then running out into a narrow tongue from the south-
western corner towards Pierrepont. This Bossu Wood
was of very thick coppice with high but scanty stand-
ards, and was traversed by broad rides convenient for
the passage of troops. North of the Namur road yet
another smaller wood Bois des Cerises or Cherry
Wood stretched from the road itself opposite to the
Materne Pond almost to the village of Sart-Dame-
Avelines. Round the buildings there were orchards
and gardens ; on the borders of the stream were little
thickets and rows of trees ; and the open country was
covered with tall crops of corn. Altogether the
position was blind, and, in the hands of a capable com-
mander, well susceptible of defence ; though the
Hutte Wood effectively screened the movements of an
enemy coming up from the south on the eastern side
of the Brussels road.
Guided by the advice of Perponcher, the Prince of
Orange extended one battalion in skirmishing order
along the spur between the rivulets of Gemioncourt
and Pireaumont to the Brussels road, and thence south-
westward along the Odomont rivulet; the farms of
Pireaumont and Petit Pierrepont forming the two
extremities of the line to left and right, with one
battery upon the road in the centre. Next in rear of
them four battalions were stationed near the southern
border of Bossu Wood, with two more battalions, also
in the wood, in support. Another battery was posted
at the south-eastern angle of the wood, and between
it and Gemioncourt farm, which was strongly occupied ;
and three more battalions were echeloned along the
road from Quatre Bras farm to Gemioncourt. In all,
at two o'clock the Prince had at his disposal about
seven thousand men with sixteen guns ; and at three
o'clock the arrival of another battalion, which had
been released from Nivelles by the coming of Chasse"s
and Alten's divisions to that place, increased his number
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 299
to nearly eight thousand. To hold a good two miles 1815.
of front with so weak a detachment could not but be June 16,
hazardous ; but it was imperative for the moment to
make a show of strength ; and every credit must be
given to Perponcher for the bold face with which he
confronted a critical situation.
At about two o'clock the head of Bachelu's division
Husson's brigade under the personal direction of
Reille, debouched on to the plateau at the north-western
corner of Hutte Wood. Ney, with Fire's light cavalry
of the line and Lefebvre-Desnoettes's of the Guard,
was already on the ground, and had ridden forward
with a single aide-de-camp to reconnoitre. Unable to
see many troops, he concluded that the position was
weakly held, and was for assailing Bossu Wood without
delay. Reille, however, who had observed the scarlet
uniforms of British officers, remembered Wellington's
custom of hiding his men, and pleaded that more
battalions should be brought up before opening the
attack. There was therefore a pause, whilst Bachelu's
second brigade and Foy's division came forward to
the plateau, when four columns were formed and
directed upon the spur between Pireaumont and the
Brussels road. On the extreme right or east were
Pire's division of cavalry, next to the left of it were
the two brigades of Bachelu's division, Campy's on the
right and Husson's on the left ; and the left column
of all was made up of Jamin's brigade of Foy's
division. Gauthier's brigade, together with the cavalry
of Lefebvre-Desnoettes and Guiton's cuirassiers were
held in reserve on the road. The rest of Kellermann's
cavalry corps, to which Guiton's brigade belonged,
had been stationed by Ney at Liberchies, about two
miles south-west of Frasnes. Jerome's division of
infantry was on the march from Gosselies, and d'Erlon's
corps was following in rear of it. Altogether Ney
could reckon that he had thirty-five thousand infantry,
seven thousand cavalry, and ninety-two guns under
his hand or within easy call, of which he had detached
300 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. for his first attack about six thousand infantry, two
June 1 6. thousand cavalry, and six guns.
Before the advance of numbers so overwhelming
the Netherlandish skirmishers fell back towards
Gemioncourt, where Perponcher installed them in
and about the buildings ; and the Prince of Orange
withdrew the two batteries from their advanced
positions to a knoll a short distance south of Quatre
Bras from which they could rake the Brussels road.
Foy then changed the direction of his column to the
left, and drove the Netherlanders from Gemioncourt.
These retreated hastily up the road, but were unlucky
enough to be charged and utterly dispersed by Pire,
who, finding his way obstructed by boggy ground,
had returned to the highway. Meanwhile the head
of Jerome's column came up, releasing Gauthier's
brigade and enabling Ney to press the Nether-
landers back from Pierrepont into Bossu Wood.
There the French could advance but slowly, for the
undergrowth was exceedingly thick, and the Nether-
landers offered some resistance. Nevertheless the
enemy mastered the borders of the wood and pressed
their opponents surely and steadily backward. Let
Netherlandish writers say what they will, the initial
efforts of their comrades do not appear to have been
very strenuous on this day. The advanced posts
were not held with the tenacity which the occasion
demanded, and the troops did not respond as they
ought to the leadership of the gallant young Prince
and the brave and skilful General who were at their
head.
They were now, however, in great measure to
redeem their character. Wellington had returned
from Ligny; and soon after two o'clock the leading
battalions of Picton's division came into sight, 1
Kempt's brigade leading, and the Ninety-fifth, appar-
ently, at the head of the column. Van Merlen's
1 Accounts vary as to the time when Picton's division came up.
The head of the column must have come in about 2 P.M.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 301
brigade of Netherlandish cavalry arrived at almost the 1815.
same moment, and the legion of the Duke of Brunswick June i5.
was following close in the rear of Picton. In the
desperate situation of the moment Wellington saw no
salvation but in a counter-attack. 1 He therefore
directed the Riflemen to move at once upon Pireaumont
and to endeavour to regain it, but at all events to secure
Cherry Wood so as to ensure the safety of the Namur
road and so of communication with the Prussian army.
At the same time he ordered the Netherlanders to
recover Gemioncourt and sent the Twenty-eighth
down to help to hold the buildings. The remainder
of Picton's division was diverted round the east side
of Quatre Bras, with instructions to align itself along
the Namur road, the Ninety-second forming the right
of the line with its right resting on the buildings, and
then in succession upon its left, the Forty-second,
Forty-fourth, Royal Scots, Thirty-second and Seventy-
ninth, 2 with Rogers 's battery of artillery on the right
and Rettberg's on the left of the array. Best's
Hanoverian brigade 3 was ordered to stand in second
line behind the British battalions. On the right
Prince Bernhard, likewise, was bidden to make a
counter-attack and to clear Bossu Wood of the enemy.
These dispositions required some time for their
execution, for it was long before the last of the regi-
ments arrived ; andjmeanwhile the Riflemen, before
they were half-way to Pireaumont, saw the enemy
throw so powerful a force into the farm as to make
attack hopeless. Another body of French was pushing
on towards Cherry Wood, but here the Riflemen
1 The true significance of this counter-attack is missed, as it seems
to me, by all writers except Muffling. Wellington, Supp. Desp. x.
511.
2 This order is conjectural. It is, however, certain that the 9 2nd
was on the extreme right and the 79th on the extreme left, also
(Waterloo Letters, p. 377) that the 42nd was on the right of the 44th
instead of on the left, as it should have been.
3 This brigade belonged to the Reserve and not to Picton's
division at all ; but by some mistake had been sent forward with it.
302 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. anticipated them, and, throwing their reserve into the
June 1 6. wood, lined the road with their skirmishers and engaged
the enemy hotly. Gradually the green -jackets ex-
tended their line down the road to the hamlet of Thyle,
where two companies ensconced themselves in the houses
and for the present secured their left flank. In the
centre the Dutch Militia recovered Gemioncourt, and
deploying in front of the farm beat off an attack of the
French cavalry ; but, finding themselves outflanked by
the advance of Foy on their right, they were obliged
to evacuate the buildings once more. The British
Twenty-eighth, seeing that it had arrived too late,
thereupon counter-marched and returned to their
division. Prince Bernhard, on his side, took the
offensive with great spirit in Bossu Wood, drove the
French with the bayonet from a part that they had
taken, and, with the help of a fresh battalion sent to
him by the Prince of Orange, made shift to maintain
the advantage that he had won.
Wellington's counter-stroke had at least gained time
for Picton to set his division in order, and for part of
the Duke of Brunswick's legion to reach the scene of
action ; though it had failed to recover the important
posts on his centre and left. The possession of Gemion-
court and of the skirts of Bossu Wood enabled Ney
to bring forward his whole army without further
interruption ; and, as he appears to have received at
about this time Soult's letter bidding him drive his
enemy back and then swing round to attack the
Prussians at Brye, he launched his attack along the
whole line in earnest. Sixteen guns were massed to
east of the Brussels road, and twenty-six between
Pireaumont and Gemioncourt. On his right Bachelu
advanced from Pireaumont against the troops on the
Namur road ; in his centre Foy led his division in two
columns along the Brussels road and to the east of it
upon Quatre Bras ; and on the left Jerome threw
Soye's brigade into Bossu Wood and led Bauduin's
brigade parallel with Foy's division on the western
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 303
side of the road. A heavy cannonade heralded the 1815.
onslaught, and it should seem that Bachelu's division j une l6
was the first to come to close action, for his sharp-
shooters were already working deadly mischief among
the British gunners before more than the leading
section of Rogers's battery had come into action.
The bulk of Picton's division was hidden among the
dense crops of rye which covered the fields, and the
skirmishers of both sides were hotly engaged, when
Wellington suddenly ordered Kempt's brigade to rise
and advance. Whether dismayed by the unexpected
apparition, or shaken by the British volley, Bachelu's
leading regiment, the 2nd Light, broke and fled
without awaiting the charge, 1 and the whole division,
turning tail, rushed down the hill to the Gemioncourt
rivulet and would not be rallied even on the plateau
beyond it.
Most of the British battalions pursued no farther
than to a hedge at a short distance from the Namur
road ; but the Forty-second and Forty-fourth advanced
to within a short distance of Gemioncourt, and the
Seventy-ninth, which by Wellington's order had
begun the offensive movement before the rest of the
battalions, pressed the chase to the rivulet and even
beyond it. Foy, however, observing the rout of
Bachelu, had withdrawn the zooth regiment from
Jamin's brigade, and, after bidding that officer continue
his advance to Quatre Bras, had betaken himself with
the looth to the plateau south of Gemioncourt. It
was he who arrested the career of the three battalions,
though the Seventy-ninth, taking shelter behind a
fence, fired volleys at the looth until its ammunition
was exhausted. Not for some time did the Camerons
retire, when, on receiving orders to fall back, they
stole warily from fence to fence and, covered by the
1 This is the account given by Foy, Girod de I'Ain, p. 271. He
says that four British battalions charged; but the 95th was still
detached from Kempt's brigade, so that there can have been only
three.
304 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Thirty-second, regained without serious loss their
June 1 6. original position. From a few of the most headlong
of the Seventy-ninth, whom he made prisoners, Foy
learned that eight British brigades had just come in
from Enghien and Brussels, and that others besides
Netherlanders were on march to Quatre Bras. This
intelligence he no doubt transmitted to Ney.
On the French left the progress of Soye in Bossu
Wood was immediate ; raw troops, such as the Nether-
landers, having little chance in forest-fighting against
veterans ; and Wellington, in order to guard their
left flank and give them confidence, sent two Bruns-
wick battalions down the road to a point midway
between Quatre Bras and Gemioncourt, stationing
the Brunswick cavalry immediately behind them.
Lastly, he posted two more battalions in the corner of
the wood adjoining Quatre Bras with orders to fight
to the last extremity. The foremost of these troops
soon suffered heavily from the fire of a French battery
on the road above Gemioncourt ; and four British guns,
which the Duke of Brunswick had borrowed from
Wellington and unlimbered by his infantry, were
quickly silenced. Shortly afterwards the columns of
Jamin, Gauthier and Bauduin approached on both
sides of the road, and both Brunswickers and Nether-
landers gradually gave way before them. The Duke
of Brunswick, taking command of his squadron of
lancers, charged the advancing French to cover the
retreat of his infantry and hussars, but was beaten back
with heavy loss. The lancers fled to the rear of
Quatre Bras, whither the hussars also retired in more
orderly fashion. One of Brunswick's regiments of
infantry, under his personal command, struck eastward
from the Brussels road towards Picton's division, but
the other, harried by the pursuing French skirmishers
and by the round-shot of the French batteries, broke
and fled in all directions. The Duke of Brunswick,
hurrying back, tried to rally them under cover of a
house and garden called the Bergerie, upon the road
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 305
about three hundred yards south of Quatre Bras, but 1815.
fell mortally wounded by a bullet through the body. j une 16. /
Now Fire's cavalry, two regiments of chasseurs
leading and two regiments of lancers in rear, came /
galloping up the road to complete their success ;
and the Brunswick Hussars were formed again to
meet them, together, it appears, with Van Merlen's
cavalry, which had been hastily ordered to the front
by the Prince of Orange. Both were overthrown and
put to flight without difficulty by the chasseurs and they
streamed away, some straight up the Brussels road to
Quatre Bras, some eastward towards the Namur road.
The chasseurs, close at the heels of the former,
flew up the highway after them, while the lancers,
wheeling sharply to their right, took up the chase of
those that had turned east ; and pursuers and pursued
in a mixed body crowded into the angle between the
two roads.
The Ninety-second, which was the last of Picton's
battalions to come up, had not long taken up their
position, under Wellington's own eye, immediately on
the east side of Quatre Bras ; the men lying down in
the ditch on the south side of the Namur road to gain
shelter from the fire of the French batteries in their
front. As the chasseurs approached them the Duke,
who was watching the fight a short distance in front
of the Highlanders, was obliged to turn and gallop for
his life ; and, crying to the men to lie still, he put his
horse at the ditch, leaped over them, and took his place
in rear of the regiment. As the leading files of the
chasseurs whirled up the Brussels road, the right-
hand company of the Ninety-second wheeled round
parallel to it and poured a destructive fire upon their
right flank, while the Brunswickers in the north-
eastern angle of Bossu Wood simultaneously rained
bullets upon their left flank. This cross-fire fairly
cut the column of the chasseurs in twain. The rear-
most rallied and retired in good order, but the foremost
pressed on into the village and beyond it, cutting down
VOL. x x
306 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. stragglers and fugitives; when, finding themselves
June 1 6. unable to retreat by the way of their advance, they
tried tc find egress through the buildings or along
the Namur road in rear of the Highlanders, and were
shot down to a man. At this point, therefore, the
onset of the cavalry was checked with heavy loss.
The lancers were more fortunate in their venture.
As they swept past the right flank of the Forty-second
and Forty-fourth, which were standing in line close to
the eastern margin of the Brussels road, they were
so closely intermingled with the Brunswick Hussars
and Belgians that the British at first mistook them
for the Allied cavalry. A few old soldiers did indeed
recognise them as enemies and open fire, but were
sternly repressed by Pack ; and the lancers, then
wheeling about, charged down upon the rear of the
.British regiments. The Forty-second, having had a
closer view of the cavalry than the Forty- fourth,
realised their danger and began to form square, but,
before the two flank-companies could run in to close
the rear face, the lancers overtook them and, by the
impetus of their charge, some few of them crashed into
the mass of the battalion. For a moment there was
some confusion. The senior officers sprang forward
to rally the Highlanders, and in a few minutes the
Colonel, second and third in command were dead.
Then the flank-companies closed in, the square was
completed, and the lancers, who had at first broken in,
found themselves imprisoned and were bayoneted or
taken to a man. The rest were driven off by the
musketry of the remaining faces of the square with
very heavy loss. Meanwhile the Colonel of the Forty-
fourth, seeing that there was no time to form square,
faced his rear rank about, and, waiting till the enemy
was within close range, gave them a volley which
emptied many saddles and effectually checked the rest.
One little knot of daring Frenchmen, however, made a
gallant dash for the colours, which were as gallantly
defended ; and, though the precious silk was actually
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 307
torn by the point of a French lance, not a frag- 1815.
ment became a trophy to the enemy. Meanwhile the June 16.
bulk of the lancers fled round the left flank of the
battalion, receiving a volley from the light company
as they passed, and were saluted by another discharge
from the front rank before they finally disappeared.
Let it be added that Colonel Galbois of the 6th French
Lancers received a bullet in the chest during this
encounter, but remained in the saddle and commanded
his regiment two days later at Waterloo. Never did
British soldiers bear themselves better, and never were
they matched against nobler foemen.
On the whole, Ney's great attack had failed. He
had been^completely repulsed at every point to east of
the Brussels road ; and his attempts to turnlthe British
left flank had been steadily foiled by the Riflemen, 1
who, though driven by artillery from their little citadel
at Thyle, continued to defend the Namur road with the
greatest obstinacy. Only in Bossu Wood, which seems
to have swallowed up the bulk of Jerome's division, 2
were the French making progress in spite of the
thickness of the undergrowth. At this point indeed
the resistance of the Netherlanders, as was pardonable
in young troops which had been roughly handled, was
beginning to grow weak ; and, as the Forty-second,
Forty-fourth and Seventy-ninth had suffered very
1 They had been reinforced by a Brunswick battalion, so raw that
they could not be restrained from firing in all directions, and chiefly at
their friends the Riflemen.
2 It is exceedingly difficult to follow the movements of the French
infantry in this action. Soye's brigade of Jerome's division was in
Bossu Wood, but Bauduin's was free to advance between the wood
and the Brussels road. Of Foy's division, one regiment of Jamin's
brigade was covering the re-formation of Bachelu's division, but the
other should have been advancing parallel with Bauduin's brigade;
while Gauthier's brigade, albeit repulsed at the outset, should have
been re-forming or re-formed in rear of Jamin. Apparently all move-
ments of the infantry, except in the wood, were suspended during the
attack of the cavalry ; presumably because the troops to east of the
wood dared not advance until their left flank was cleared. It seems
probable that these last were for long checked at the re-entrant angle
where the northern end of the wood joins the road.
308 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. heavily, being always under the fire of the French
June 16. artillery, Wellington's situation was not of the securest.
But, on the other hand, Ney also was in trouble.
Soult's message had arrived reiterating the order to
march upon the right flank of Bliicher, and warning
him that the fate of France was in his hands; and, as
if in mockery, there came to his hands almost simul-
taneously a message carried by the chief of d'Erlon's
staff, reporting that by the Emperor's order the ist
Corps was on its way to the battle-field of Ligny.
Furious with rage, Ney sent a peremptory order to
d'Erlon to return at once, and calling to him Keller-
mann, told him that the time was come for a great
effort, and that he must hurl his cavalry at the British
and gallop over them. Possibly the Marshal forgot
that three out of four brigades of Kellermann's cavalry
corps were at Liberchies, and only one brigade present
at Frasnes, 1 and was under the impression that he was
about to launch thirty-five hundred men upon the
Allied line instead of eight hundred. Be that as it
may, Kellermann demurred to the order, pointing out
that a single brigade could do little against twenty-five
thousand men. " What matter ? " cried Ney. " Charge
with whatever you have got. Gallop over them. I'll
support you with all the cavalry that I have on the spot.
Off with you ! I say, off with you ! "
Kellermann thereupon went to the head of Guiton's
brigade and led them at a smart trot down the road ;
while the French batteries redoubled their fire upon
the British infantry. Arrived at the summit of the
plateau north of the Gemioncourt rivulet, he increased
his front to a column of squadrons at twice deploying
distance, and advanced at a gallop, hurrying his men
into action before they could perceive their danger.
The first attack was delivered on the east of the road
1 Siborne says that the whole of L'Heritier's division was at Frasnes ;
Houssaye says that Guiton's brigade only was engaged, and this is
confirmed by the reports both of Ney and of Kellermann. The latter
indeed said that he did not know where L'He'ritier's division was.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 309
against the Forty-second and Forty-fourth, which, 1815.
unable to see anything over the tall stalks of the rye in June 16.
which they stood, were warned of the coming wrath
by the inrush of their skirmishers. By this time both
battalions had been reduced to little more than half
of their original strength, but they formed two tiny
squares with perfect steadiness and awaited the shock.
The horses of the cuirassiers, after a rapid advance of
over a mile, the latter part of the distance through
thick corn as high as their withers, were doubtless
somewhat blown ; but their riders pressed them
gallantly on almost to the points of the British bayonets.
Then at last the red-coats drew trigger, and the leading
squadron, broken and shattered by the fire, swerved
away and disappeared. The other squadrons followed
them in wave upon wave, only to meet with the same
fate ; and then, rallying, they renewed their onset
upon two or more different faces of the squares, striving
desperately but in vain to break into the hedge of
bayonets. Some of the rear squadrons, meanwhile,
dashed straight on by the road and parallel to it upon
Quatre Bras and the Highlanders who were aligned
to east of it. " Ninety-second, don't fire till I tell
you ! " shouted Wellington ; and, waiting until the
enemy were within thirty yards, he gave the word,
when a withering volley sent the daring horsemen
back in confusion.
The cuirassiers then retired to rally 1 under the
shelter of the southern slope of the ridge, leaving the
artillery to play upon the squares. Being reinforced by
Pire*'s chasseurs and lancers, they presently renewed
the attack. Once again there was a wild rush upon
Quatre Bras and once again it was shattered by the
1 It is extremely difficult to discover how many distinct attacks
were delivered by the French cavalry. Houssaye treats them all as
one ; Siborne treats them as two ; but judging from the narratives
of the British regiments in Waterloo Letters I conceive that there were
four, one of cuirassiers only, a second of cuirassiers supported by Pire**s
division, and a third and fourth, in one or both of which Lefebvre-
Desnoette's division, or a part of it, took some share.
310 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Ninety-second, though a few brave horsemen made
June 1 6. their way into the village and one French officer was
actually shot in rear of the Highlanders. But the
principal onslaught was, as before, upon the Forty-
second and Forty-fourth, which were fairly hemmed
in and hidden by a mixed multitude of chasseurs,
lancers, and cuirassiers, but nevertheless stood in-
domitably firm and refused to be broken. At last
Picton, weary of waiting for the Netherlandish cavalry
to come to the front, formed the First Royals and
Twenty-eighth in one solid column of companies and
advanced with them from the Namur road into the
thick of the French horse upon the right of the Forty-
fourth. Halting when he had reached a position from
which he could bring a flanking fire to bear in favour
of the Forty-fourth, he suddenly formed both regi-
ments into one square ; and, the Thirty-second and
Seventy-ninth advancing likewise in the same formation
to the south of the Royals and Twenty-eighth, the
division made up a cluster of five squares drawn up
more or less chequerwise for mutual support. At the
same time Best's Hanoverian Brigade came forward
to line the Namur road, which it did with three
battalions, the fourth being pushed somewhat in
advance. Against the new squares of red-coats the
French turned with undiminished spirit and valour.
Unable to see their enemy owing to the height of the
rye, some of Pire*'s troopers fixed their lances in the
ground close to the various squares, and upon these
marks their comrades charged again and again with
desperate but unavailing hardihood. There appears
to have been little method in their attacks. There
was no crash of squadron after squadron upon one
given point, but an endless swirl of horsemen round
and round the squares, which, though slightly thinned
by occasional lance-thrusts, maintained eternally their
deadly rolling fire. Scores of men and horses were
brought down ; and at length the French horsemen
were again called off, to be rallied and re-formed.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 311
Once more the French guns opened on the squares, 1815.
and, worse still, the French sharp-shooters crept up and June 16.
began to pour a destructive fire upon them. Perforce
British skirmishers had to go forward to meet them; but
with so little ammunition that they were at great dis-
advantage. At length the last round was exhausted,
and Pack recalled the skirmishers to the squares ; but,
before the order could be executed, the cuirassiers and
lancers were upon them. Forming into columns of
fours the little band charged through the horsemen,
reached the Forty-fourth and lay down under the
bayonets, the square being so hotly assailed at the
moment that it could not open its ranks even to admit
friends. The French commanders, evidently en-
deavouring to improve their tactics, marshalled their
men for a simultaneous attack upon three sides of the
square of the Royals and Twenty-eighth. Picton uttered
not a word except " Twenty-eighth, remember Egypt,"
and the charge was beaten off, as had been all previous
charges, with heavy loss to the enemy. Thereupon
the old disorder began afresh, and the attack degene-
rated into a confusion of galloping swarms in and out
of the squares. At one point, however, it was at last
successful, for a party of lancers surprised Best's
advanced Hanoverian battalion when deployed in line,
and practically destroyed it. Heartened by this
victory the lancers tried to cross the Namur road, but
were driven back in confusion by the fire of the
remaining battalions which were concealed in a ditch
by the highway. Then for the third time the French
cavalry was drawn off to re-form ; and the red-coats
were left to the mercy of the cannon and sharp-
shooters of the enemy.
The Forty -second and Forty -fourth were now
formed into a single square under the personal com-
mand of Pack ; but, having little ammunition left, they
and the Seventy-ninth were reduced almost to the
limits of their endurance. Happily at this moment
came up two brigades of Alten's division, Colin
312 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
Halkett's British and Kielmansegge's Hanoverians,
June 1 6 t ^ le f rmer f which was directed by Picton to move
down through Bossu Wood and fall upon the French
left, and the latter to reinforce the Riflemen on the
extreme Allied left. Entering the wood, Halkett
encountered an aide-de-camp sent by Pack, who
represented that there were few cartridges left in his
brigade, and that unless speedily supported he could
no longer hold his position. Detaching the Sixty-
ninth to the help of Pack, Halkett led the rest of his
brigade into the wood just in time to stop the Bruns-
wickers, who were on the point of abandoning it. The
Brunswickers were not without excuse, for the bulk of
the Netherlanders were by this time streaming away in
flight along the road to Nivelles. 1 By a few hard
words, aided by the presence of his own brigade, Halkett
induced them to rally in a ditch which ran across the
narrowest part of the wood, and galloped forward to
the ground overlooking Gemioncourt to reconnoitre.
Perceiving below him a large corps of cavalry forming
by detachments, and seeing the French cannon reopen
fire, he despatched an aide-de-camp to warn the Sixty-
ninth to form square, and received an answer that his
orders were obeyed. The French cavalry, reinforced
apparently by Lefebvre-Desnoette's division, 2 was in
fact massing for a fourth and final attack which was
to be supported by infantry. Bossu Wood had by
1 In spite of the statements of Le Bas and Wommersom, the con-
currence of testimony as to the flight of the Netherlanders at this time
is so strong that I cannot overlook it. The private Journal of Colonel
James Stanhope who came up with the ist Guards says : " Soon after
passing Nivelles we met a great many wounded men going to the rear
with ten times their number to take care of them, which did not strike
me as a good specimen of the first trial of our Allies." Such a witness
had no object in saying what was untrue, and he confirms the general
reports of other British writers.
2 Or by some part of it. See Houssaye, Waterloo, p. 214, note. I
do not see how the French cavalry could have come forward again
without reinforcement : particularly as we are told that the cuirassiers
took part in every one of the attacks, and only two regiments of
cuirassiers were present.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 313
this time been nearly cleared of the Allied battalions, 1815.
so that Bauduin's, Jamin's and Gauthier's brigades June 1 6.
were able to advance, some of them in the open, most
of them, it should seem, within the wood itself ; and
Ney had ordered two batteries of artillery to advance
along a ride close to the eastern margin of the wood
and running parallel with it, so as to emerge at the
right moment from the wood into the plain and
prepare the way for the onslaught of the infantry.
Wellington had been temporarily absent from
Q.uatre Bras when Halkett came up, but sent an
aide-de-camp to ask if Sir Colin could follow the
original instructions given by Picton. He was answered
that it seemed unsafe to leave the Brunswickers
unsupported until more troops should come up.
Halkett's brigade was therefore disposed, apparently,
so as at once to take pressure off Picton 's right and
to maintain the defence of the north-eastern angle of
the wood. The whole were echeloned, 1 it seems,
to west of the Brussels road, the Sixty-ninth, together
with two guns of Lloyd's battery which had just arrived,
foremost, and the Thirtieth next to them. As they
reached their appointed ground they began to form
square, in obedience to Halkett's warning, when
the Prince of Orange galloped up and asked them
what they were about, as there was no fear of any
further attack by cavalry. Pursuant to the Prince's
command the two battalions deployed into line, and
the two guns were presently recalled to join the rest
of their battery just south of the farm of Quatre Bras.
Cleeves's and Kuhlmann's batteries of the German
Legion appeared shortly afterwards, whereupon Lloyd's
took post on the west side of the road, Cleeves's on the
east side, and Kuhlmann's midway between them.
Shortly afterwards the French cavalry came up
the road to their fourth attack, and catching sight of
1 It is most difficult to discover the position of Halkett's brigade.
Amid all the libraries that have been written on the campaign of
Waterloo it is almost impossible to ascertain so simple a point as this.
3H HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. the Thirty-third, which was moving in column of
June 1 6. companies through the rye on the highest point of
the plateau, galloped upon them. The battalion
formed square, whereupon the baffled horsemen,
perceiving the Sixty-ninth in a hollow below, wheeled
round and charged down upon them. The Sixty-
ninth being, through the folly of the Prince of
Orange, deployed, made shift to throw itself into
square and, apparently, would have succeeded had
not the captain of the grenadier - company wheeled
the two right-hand companies about in order to fire,
instead of closing the face of the square. In a moment
the horsemen were in the middle of them. The two
companies were destroyed, the rest were partly broken,
the only remaining colour of the battalion was captured,
one hundred and fifty men were killed and wounded,
and the remainder saved themselves by taking refuge
under the bayonets of the Forty-second and Forty-
fourth. 1 Flushed with success, the cavalry turned
upon the Thirtieth, which, however, having had time
to form square, beat them off with a steadiness which
earned warm praise from Picton. Some of the
cuirassiers then essayed a last desperate attempt upon
Quatre Bras, but were shattered to pieces by Cleeves's
guns ; and the survivors fled in headlong panic along
the Brussels road, infecting with their fright some of
the infantry as they passed, and carrying dismay even
to Charleroi and beyond. 2
Nevertheless the danger of Wellington's situation
was never greater than at this moment. The Sixty-
ninth waslfbr theftime dispersed ; the Seventy-third,
upon the sight of the cavalry approaching them, had
1 The Colonel, who was killed at Waterloo, told Captain Rudyard
of Lloyd's battery that the battalion was saved by the fire of a battalion
of Guards (Waterloo Letters, p. 231) ; but it is, I think, impossible
that the Guards were so early on the field.
2 I conceive that these fugitives were the 3rd Leger of Bauduin's
brigade and possibly the 93rd Line of Gauthier's brigade. The 3rd
lost not a single officer killed or wounded, and the 93rd only two
officers.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 315
run into the thicket; 1 and now the French batteries 1815.
concealed in the wood opened fire with deadly effect June 16,
upon the Thirty-third. After enduring the trial for
a short time the colonel deployed the battalion, and,
covered by a regiment of Brunswick cavalry, moved
towards a battalion of Brunswick infantry which was
heavily engaged in the re-entrant angle of the wood
near Quatre Bras. A cry rose that the cavalry was
again approaching, and the Thirty-third rushed into
the wood and dispersed. The Thirtieth appears to
have altered its formation and stood firm, 2 but, with
this exception, Halkett's brigade was for the time out
of action ; and the French cavalry returned to its old
task of rushing round the squares of Pack's brigade.
These still held their ground with noble tenacity, but
Bossu Wood was practically lost to the Allies for the
moment. Its eastern border was full of British troops,
but these were dispersed in the undergrowth, some
of them no doubt glad to find themselves in a safe
place and unwilling to leave it, but all, including the
officers, absolutely lost, without an idea in which
direction they were moving or ought to move, how
they were to assemble themselves and what they should
do when assembled. The French, on the other hand,
were pushing on to the Nivelles road with every
prospect of turning Wellington's right ; and, if
they should succeed in doing this, the day would be
lost.
Happily at this moment the division of Guards,
followed by two Brunswick battalions and a Bruns-
wick battery, approached Quatre Bras, much fatigued
after a march of fifteen hours. The Prince of Orange,
in a high state of excitement, galloped out to meet
them, and encountering Lord Saltoun at the head of
the light companies of the First Guards, ordered him
to strike south-eastward into the western side of Bossu
Wood. Saltoun, unable to see any enemy, asked
1 Morris. Recollections of Military Service, p. 197.
2 Life of Sir William Gomm, p. 355.
316 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. where the French were to be found. " If you do not
June 1 6. like to undertake it," answered the foolish Prince,
excitedly, " I'll find some one who will." Saltoun,
who had served with distinction through the campaigns
of Coruna, Walcheren, Vitoria, the Pyrenees, and
Southern France, quietly repeated his question and,
upon obtaining a reasonable reply, formed his line of
skirmishers and entered the wood. Guided only by the
sound of the enemy's musketry, these pressed forward
steadily, while the Prince of Orange, utterly ignorant
of his business, hurried the succeeding companies in
pairs, as they came up, close on the heels of Saltoun.
Unable to see anything, these supporting companies
could only fire where they could hear firing, and this
undoubtedly caused some loss among Saltoun's men.
However, their advance certainly checked that of the
French on the western side of the wood ; and mean-
while Lloyd's battery, moving. forward from Quatre
Bras, engaged the two French batteries on the eastern
margin of the wood. After a murderous duel which
cost Lloyd several men and two complete teams,
he succeeded not only in silencing them but in
driving back a French column which attempted to
debouch from the trees in that quarter. But farther
to the north two French columns, following not far
upon the heels of the defeated cuirassiers, had turned
north-eastward out of the wood upon Quatre Bras,
one of them occupying the house and garden of
La Bergerie. Sir Edward Barnes therefore placed
himself at the head of the Ninety-second, which
charged the head of the leading column and drove
it back into the garden. Under a murderous flanking
fire from the second column the Highlanders then
assaulted the building and its enclosures, cleared the
enemy from it after a desperate encounter, and fairly
drove the French down before them along the margin
between wood and road until they came under the fire
of the French guns posted on the hill opposite Gemion-
court. Then at last they withdrew into the wood for
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 317
shelter, whence they retired, with ranks terribly thinned, 1815.
to Quatre Bras. j une 16.
Not long afterwards the Second battalion of the
First Guards, after not much less than an hour of
confused fighting, penetrated to the extreme south-
western angle of Bossu Wood, with its companies
naturally much intermixed and its order in great
measure lost. By that time the bulk of Halkett's
brigade had been rallied and reposted level with the
Gemioncourt Brook, with the two new Brunswick
battalions somewhat in advance of them ; and, when
the Guards emerged into the open ground, they could
see the Thirty-third behind the shelter of a hedge to
their left rear. They were however received by so
heavy a fire of musketry and artillery when they
showed themselves, that they withdrew again to a
hollow formed by a rill that runs north and south
through the wood, though even then they suffered
some loss from heavy branches cut off by the French
round-shot. Here, being joined by their Third
battalion, the First Guards advanced again into the
open between the wood and the Brussels road, having
rallied to them a number of lost men of Halkett's
brigade, while Byng's brigade came and began to form
up on their right. The deployment was in process and
the Brunswick battalion was moving down to form
on the left of Maitland's brigade, when the French
cuirassiers made a dash upon the left flank of the
First Guards. The men instantly ran back to line
the ditch at the edge of the wood while the Bruns-
wickers formed square ; and the cuirassiers, met by
the fire of the Guards in front and of the Brunswickers
in flank, were driven back with very heavy loss. Never-
theless all Maitland's attempts to make further
progress and to storm the French battery were
frustrated by the steadiness of the French infantry.
On the Allied left a resolute attempt of Bachelu to
turn Wellington's left was foiled, after much hard
fighting, by the Rifles, with the support of two
3i 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Hanoverian battalions; and soon after sunset all
June 1 6. French attacks ceased, and their cavalry vanished
from the ground. Ney had, in fact, withdrawn all
his troops to Frasnes; and at nine o'clock, as the
darkness thickened, Wellington established his line
of picquets from Petit Pierrepont, through Gemion-
court to Pireaumont, over against the outposts of Ney.
Thus was recovered, after a struggle of six hours,
the original position (the farm of Grand Pierrepont
excepted) which had been occupied by Perponcher in
the morning.
Few engagements are more difficult to follow and
to understand than the battle of Quatre Bras. It is
impossible, in the first place, to say definitely what
numbers of the Allies were in action at any given
moment after the first hour or even half-hour. Fresh
troops were constantly coming up from beginning to
end of the fight, and, though many authors have tried
to settle the hour at which this or that brigade or
division arrived on the ground, the data upon which
they have reckoned are so uncertain that no reliance
can be placed upon them. The hours stated by various
actors who have left narratives of the struggle are,
again, so contradictory that any endeavour to reconcile
them is hopeless. It is also extremely hard to discover
exactly what force of cavalry was at the disposal of
Ney. Some narratives 1 on the side of the Allies state
that Roussel's cuirassiers were present at the end of
the day, but did not charge ; and indeed the ubiquity
of the cuirassiers, as pourtrayed by the concurrence
of many English narrators, would seem to demand
the presence of more than one brigade of this particular
description of cavalry. The constant mention of
lancers also would seem to imply that those of Lefebvre-
Desnoettes as well as those of Pire were among the
1 E.g. Siborne's and the French Te'moin oculaire. See The Battle
of Waterloo, by a Near Observer (loth ed. 1817), p. 129. Siborne also
credits Ney with the whole of Rentier's cavalry division instead of
with Guiton's brigade only.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 319
squadrons which harassed Picton's battalions through 1815.
so many hours. Yet, according to the list of casualties, June 16.
not a single officer of Roussel's brigade and only two
officers of Lefebvre-Desnoettes's command were touched
on the 1 6th of June. The height of the rye-stalks,
the veiling of the French right by Hutte Wood as of
the Allied right by Bossu Wood, and the undulations
of the ground evidently made accurate observation
impracticable. The only certain fact that can be
adduced is that Ney began the fight with about
fifteen thousand infantry, eighteen hundred cavalry,
and thirty-eight guns against about seven thousand
infantry, with no cavalry and sixteen guns ; and that
when the battle ended Ney's force had probably been
augmented by more than a thousand horse, whereas
Wellington's had been swelled by the arrival, at
different periods, of some twenty -two thousand men
and forty-two guns. Of course the value of the
troops that from first to last came under Wellington's
command during the day varied very greatly, but, so
far as bare numbers go, the figures are roughly as
above stated. That Wellington was in constant peril
was due to the facts, first, that every successive rein-
forcement as it came up had to bear the full weight
of the French attack, which had already overwhelmed
its predecessors ; and secondly, that he had no British
cavalry present. For these disadvantages no one can
be held responsible but himself.
The conduct of the troops of all nations in the field,
without exception, varied greatly. Taking first the
Netherlanders, to whom without dispute belongs the
credit of occupying and defending the position of
Quatre Bras in the first instance, it appears that the
27th Chasseurs, the fth Militia and the 2nd Nassau
Light Infantry, all three of them, lost heavily in killed
and wounded ; but of the wounded a very large pro-
portion were but slightly hurt, and the 27th and the
5th both show a discreditable number of men missing.
The losses of the seven remaining battalions, so far as
320
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. they are returned, were slight indeed, except in one
June 1 6. instance, so trifling as to prove that those units took only
a minute share in the action. 1 On the other hand, Van
Merlen's two cavalry regiments seem to have behaved
better, though here again the proportion of slightly
wounded is unduly large ; and Stevenaart's battery
of artillery, which lost all its officers and fifty killed
or wounded, 2 must have behaved not only well but
heroically. The casualties of the Netherlanders, all
told, amounted to a thousand and fifty-eight, of which
nearly three hundred were missing and nearly four
hundred slightly wounded, leaving a balance of only
four to five hundred killed or seriously hurt. For a
total force of nine thousand present, most of them
for the entire day, such a tale of casualties does not
suggest very strenuous resistance or very serious loss ;
and, in spite of all that has been written in defence
of their countrymen by Netherlandish authors, the
contemporary judgment which threw the brunt of the
day's work upon the British and Germans must stand as
confirmed. Nevertheless it would be unfair to judge
too harshly troops so lately raised for a sovereign so
newly appointed ; and at all events the highest praise
must be given to the Netherlandish Generals, Constant
and Perponcher. The like cannot be said of the Prince
of Orange, who succeeded in destroying one British
battalion, and did his best to destroy three more.
His courage was unquestionable, but, considered as
a general officer, he can be described only as a
meddlesome and mischievous encumbrance.
Of the Brunswickers, those that were rallied by
Halkett were not seen at their best, but the rest appear
1 One battalion of militia is omitted from the return altogether,
which, unless it were dissolved, is rather remarkable.
2 The figure given by Le Bas and Wommersom in their text
(i. 507) is i officer and 28 men killed, 2 officers and 83 men wounded,
making 114 casualties out of 119 present. This does not agree with
the return printed in vol. iii. 201, where the figures are i officer and
6 men killed, 2 officers and 13 men severely wounded, 3 officers and
25 men slightly wounded, 14 men missing. Total casualties 63.
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 321
to have conducted themselves well, indeed, for young 1815.
soldiers, admirably. Their losses amounted to nearly j un e 16.
eight hundred and fifty, one quarter of them missing ;
two battalions having each about one hundred casualties
and a third close upon two hundred. The Hanover-
ians also displayed commendable steadiness in spite of
the misfortune which overtook one of their battalions.
Their casualties well exceeded six hundred. Of the
British the battalions of Picton's division rose to
the highest level of excellence attained by British
infantry, their constancy under repeated devastation
by artillery and incessant attacks of cavalry being
superb. The Guards also maintained worthily their
high reputation, being thrown into action at a very
trying moment after a march of twenty-six miles, with
shaken troops on every side of them. The casualties
among them and the battalions of Picton's division
were heavy. In the First Guards the Second and
Third battalions lost over five hundred out of two
thousand rank and file. In Pack's brigade, the Royals
had over two hundred killed and wounded, and Forty-
second and Ninety-second each over two hundred and
eighty, representing in the case of the two last not
far from one -half of their numbers. In Kempt 's
brigade the Thirty-second had very nearly two hundred
casualties, and the Seventy-ninth just over three
hundred. Halkett's brigade, excepting the Sixty-
ninth, escaped more lightly ; but it must be frankly
confessed that as a body they behaved ill, though
Halkett himself selected only the Thirty-third for
reproach. But they were raw young soldiers, rem-
nants of Graham's force, and were hardly equal to the
severe trial of remaining stationary under the fire of
cannon, varied only by occasional charges of cavalry ;
and the Prince of Orange's disastrous interference with
their formation was not calculated to inspire them
with confidence. Nevertheless, their behaviour was a
blot upon the general conduct of the red-coats. The
total losses of the British amounted to close upon
VOL. x Y
322 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. twenty-three hundred, among whom the missing did
June 1 6. not amount to forty. The casualties of the entire
force of the Allies reached the total of forty-eight
hundred exactly.
The losses of the French are stated at forty-one to
forty-two hundred, which is probably not far from
correct. The distribution of loss, so far as can be
gathered from the only source of information the
casualty-list of officers was almost startlingly unequal.
In Bachelu's division there fell altogether thirty-six
officers, of whom fourteen belonged to the 6ist of the
Line, five to the 72nd, and seventeen to the io8th.
On the whole this division suffered severely. In
Jerome's division, the number was the same, thirty-
six, but of these twenty-seven belonged to the 1st of
the Line and six to the 2nd, while in Bauduin's brigade
only three officers were killed or wounded in the ist
Light and not one in the 3rd Light. From this it is
tolerably certain that Bauduin's brigade was but slightly
engaged, and that the 3rd Light ran away in the panic
caused by the flight of the cuirassiers. In Foy's
division eight officers only fell in Gauthier's brigade,
whereas in Jamin's no fewer than twenty-nine were
killed and wounded in the 4th Light alone, besides
fifteen of the rooth of the Line. Foy states his losses
at seven to eight hundred, but it is manifest that the
brunt fell on one regiment principally ; and, when one
reflects on the small share of the work which was
evidently done by Bauduin, one cannot but be filled
with admiration for the persistent gallantry of the
remainder of the French infantry and in particular
of the ist Line and the 4th Light. Not all the
endeavours of the Guards could avail to recover more
ground than had been held by the Netherlanders
in the morning ; and this is no small tribute to the
tenacity of their enemies. Not less remarkable was
the inexhaustible courage and energy of Fire's lancers
and of Guiton's cuirassiers, who suffered terribly in
their attacks upon the British infantry. Here, how-
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 323
ever, there is again an irregularity in the distribution 1815.
of the casualties which is difficult to explain. The June 16.
5th Lancers lost ten officers, the 6th eleven ; but the
ist Chasseurs of the same division lost only two and
the 6th Chasseurs not one. In Guiton's brigade there
fell of the 8th Cuirassiers alone thirteen officers, but
of the i ith Cuirassiers only four. Lastly, in Lefebvre-
Desnoettes* division two officers of the Lancers of the
Guard were wounded, but not one of the Chasseurs.
The conclusion would seem to be that Ney at no time
threw the whole of his forces into the fight, which is
one more testimony to the bravery and endeavour of
those that were actually engaged.
A great deal has been written, after the event, of
Ney's shortcomings in the morning of the i6th, his
failure to assemble his infantry betimes at Quatre
Bras, and his omission to ascertain the strength of the
Allies by a reconnaissance in force. Such criticism
is easy, but it takes no account of the false view of the
entire situation which had been held up to the Marshal
by his master Napoleon. Setting aside his unsur-
passable moral and physical courage, Ney had never
been much more than an exceedingly skilful tactician
in the field, being content with his chief's direction
in higher matters. He had only joined the army after
the actual opening of the campaign, consequently he
knew nothing about his command, and little more than
had been vouchsafed to him in Napoleon's first letter
about the plan of operations. The Emperor had given
him plainly to understand that the road to Brussels
was open, and probably the road to Gembloux also.
Ney naturally presumed that his chief knew best, and
he no doubt laid himself out for a quiet day in which
to settle down to his work before the march to Brussels
at nightfall. Napoleon had in fact fallen into the
error which he had so frequently rebuked in his
subordinates il $e faisait des tableaux, he had conjured
up imaginary pictures of the situation. He had made
up his mind that both of the Allied armies were
3 2 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. retreating, when he discovered first that the Prussians
June 1 6. were standing firm and ready to accept battle. For
this he was more or less prepared. He had his two
wings and his reserve ready for such a contingency,
and welcomed the opportunity of annihilating one
army while in isolation from the other. Once again
he conjured up a picture of forty thousand Prussians
only before him, whereas there proved to be eighty
thousand. For this also he was in a measure ready,
for he had announced that, when necessary, he should
weaken one wing to strengthen the other. He
accordingly proceeded first to summon Ney's entire
force to him, and meanwhile took d'Erlon's corps
from him bodily. But, as the proceedings of the day
developed, it became apparent that the French army
was saddled, not with one pitched battle, but with
two. Both wings were busily engaged at one and
the same time, which was contrary to all of Napoleon's
principles and plans, and the reserve was reduced
practically to d'Erlon's corps, which was needed and
clamoured for equally by Napoleon and by Ney.
The not unnatural result was that d'Erlon spent
the day marching backwards and forwards between
Ligny and Quatre Bras, and did not finally settle down
at Frasnes until night had put an end to the fighting
everywhere. His corps thrown in upon either battle-
field would undoubtedly have secured a decided
success for the Emperor ; and d'Erlon has been much
blamed for obeying Ney's command to return from
St. Amand. We have seen enough of this officer
during the campaign in the Pyrenees to know that he
was not a man to commit himself upon any side so
long as he could find a safe way in the middle ; and
it is therefore not surprising that he should have acted
as he did. But the key to his irresolution and to Ney's
apathy was undoubtedly Napoleon's misjudgment of the
whole situation. Napoleon's first word on the 1 6th was,
practically, " There will be no fighting to-day " ; his
second, " I shall fight a battle to-day, and shall need all
CH. xxiv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 325
my reserves to make it decisive " ; whereas events 1815.
proved that he was destined to fight two severe battles, June 16.
one of them successful, the other unsuccessful, but
neither decisive. A little more tactical skill on the part
of Bliicher would have made both of them unsuccess-
ful, and then his plan of campaign would have been
ruined. Even as it was, his losses certainly not far
short of thirteen thousand men incurred as they were
for no final result, threatened to work havoc with his
operations, for it was certain that two more such
engagements would bring his army to a standstill.
Altogether the 1 6th of June was a bad day for Napo-
leon, and chiefly through his own fault. The fact is
that he overrated the effect of his prestige, and omitted
from his calculations the important factor that the
two generals opposed to him were not afraid of him.
Still less did he bethink him that one of the two was
a commander whom his own generals were afraid to
meet. But for the unpleasant memories of Peninsular
battles Ney would probably have attacked earlier, and
taken Quatre Bras before Picton's division could have
arrived in time to save it. The events of the 1 6th of
June turned, it may be said, chiefly on the singular
circumstance that, at any rate for that day, Welling-
ton's name inspired greater awe into the French than
Napoleon's into the Allies.
CHAPTER XXV
1815. THE armies of Napoleon, Wellington and Ney were
June 1 6. all of them too much exhausted to move on the evening
of the 1 6th; but the Prussians had no choice but to
retire. Some of their 1st and Ilnd Corps had been
very severely handled and were to some extent de-
moralised. Fugitives swarmed along the road to
Lie*ge, and, though many were turned back by Prus-
sian officers, it was reckoned that from eight to ten
thousand forsook their colours and pursued their way
in no sort of order. Some hundreds of Prussian
marauders and bad characters, indeed, even found
their way to Brussels, where, among other depreda-
tions, they stole several horses belonging to British
officers. 1 On the other hand, the actual losses in
action did not exceed six thousand, of which only a
small proportion were prisoners, and the guns cap-
tured by the French little exceeded twenty. Two
of Ziethen's brigades and one of Thielmann's had
firmly arrested the French advances at Brye and before
Sombreffe ; and Thielmann, whose corps had been
little engaged, finally stood fast about Sombreffe till
past ten o'clock. Gneisenau, who was left in com-
mand owing to Blucher's injuries, had at first given
provisional orders for retreat northward to Tilly ; but
he was much inclined to fall back upon Lige, and it
was only after a warm discussion between him,
Bliicher and Grolmann that he at last gave way to
them, and early in the morning of the 1 7th issued the
1 Jackson. Notes and Reminiscences of a Staff Officer, pp. 35-36.
326
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 327
final command for retreat to Wavre. This decision 1815.
has been rightly styled the turning point of the cam-June 16.
paign, and, so far as Bliicher and Grolmann were
concerned, it certainly signified their fixed intention
to stand by their Allies. Gneisenau was influenced
by no such motive ; and indeed the movement by no
means necessarily bound him to co-operation with
Wellington. A retreat upon Liege, if carried out by
the Roman road, would not have been the safest of
operations with a Napoleon within striking distance,
whereas by retiring northward to Louvain he could
strike a second and far securer line of communication
with the Rhine Provinces by Maastricht and Aix-la-
Chapelle. Head-quarters for the night were fixed at
Mellery, and at daybreak of the iyth the whole army June 17.
marched upon Wavre, where Pirch I.'s corps took up its
bivouac to south at Ste. Anne and Aisemont, Ziethen's
to west at Bierges, and Thielmann's to north at La
Bavette. Blilow at the same time was called in to
Dion-le-Mont, about three miles south-east of Wavre,
where he arrived at ten o'clock at night. Thus the
Prussian army effected its retirement without molesta-
tion, and on the night of the i yth was concentrated
in full force and by no means in bad heart. The
only thing which the Prussian staff had omitted to
do was to inform Wellington of their retreat.
At Quatre Bras the British cavalry continued to
stream in through the evening and night ; and by day-
break of the I yth all six of the brigades, one regiment
excepted, had arrived, bringing the total of the force up
to forty-five thousand men. Two aides-de-camp had
been sent to Wellington by Gneisenau in the course of
the 1 6th, the first of whom was wounded near Pireau-
mont and never delivered his message, while the second
brought the news that, though no great success was to
be expected as the outcome of the fight, the Prussians
hoped to hold their ground till nightfall. Relying
upon this assurance the Duke rested at Genappe
for the night, returning to Quatre Bras soon after
328 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. daylight. There was some firing among the most
June 17. advanced skirmishers upon both sides, which after a
time died away. As there was still no information
from the Prussians and it was therefore uncertain
whether the next march was to be in advance or in
retreat, Wellington soon after six o'clock sent a staff
officer, Sir Alexander Gordon, escorted by a troop of the
Tenth Hussars, towards Ligny. This party, after
driving in a French picquet about Marbais, turned north
and, meeting General Ziethen, who was directing the
movements of the Prussian rear-guard, ascertained from
him the truth respecting the events of the i6th.
When Gordon returned with his report, the Duke
looked meaningly at Muffling, who, conscious of his
own good faith, explained that the Prussian aide-de-
camp, who had been wounded at Pireaumont, had
probably been sent to convey this very news. Well-
ington, instantly pacified, proceeded to discuss what
should be done. At present he knew only that
Bliicher had retreated upon Wavre and that Billow's
corps had not been engaged ; and the only course
appeared to be to retire to some position level with
Wavre, and to regulate his future operations by the
reports that should reach him from Bliicher. After
some hesitation the Duke decided to let the men cook
and eat their breakfasts before moving ; and at nine
o'clock a Prussian officer arrived to report Bliicher's
resolution of concentrating at Wavre, and to ascertain
Wellington's intentions. The Duke answered that he
should retire to Mont St. Jean, where, if supported by
one Prussian corps, he should accept battle.
The retreat of Pirch I. and Ziethen, astonishing to
I say, was unobserved on the French left ; but on the
right Pajol's patrols reported at half-past two in the
morning that the Prussians were in motion, and Pajol
without delay sent two regiments in pursuit along
the road to Namur. Stragglers and lost units, includ-
ing a stray squadron and a stray battery, induced the
French hussars to follow this false track, and at five
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 329
o'clock Pajol reported definitely that the enemy was 1815.
retreating along the road to Namur and Ltege. June 17.
Pursuing his way for some hours, however, he began
to doubt if he were right, and at noon, upon the in-
formation of some peasants, he turned northwards by
a by-road towards Louvain. Berton's brigade of Exel-
mans's cavalry corps also followed the road to Namur
for a short distance, but soon turned towards Gem-
bloux, where at nine o'clock in the morning it came
upon Thielmann's whole corps halted for rest. Exel-
mans himself presently came up, but contented himself
with watching the Prussians and sending a despatch,
rather late, to report that he was doing so.
Meanwhile, at about seven o'clock, the Emperor
received PajoPs message above mentioned ; and nearly
at the same time his aide-de-camp, Flahault, returned
from Quatre Bras and gave an account of what had
passed there. Deciding not to issue any definite orders,
Napoleon gave Ney notice that he was proceeding
to Brye, and that, if there were any trouble with the
British army, he would attack it in flank while Ney
assailed it in front, so as to compel it to yield up
Quatre Bras. The rest of the day, he added, would
be spent in collecting stragglers and replenishing stores.
At nine o'clock, accordingly, he left Fleurus for the
battle-field of Ligny, where he inspected his troops and
visited the wounded. Here letters reached him from
Ney, from Pajol and from Exelmans. The first set
forth that the Allied troops at Quatre Bras were an
army and not a mere rear-guard ; the second reported
the capture of guns and prisoners at Mazy on the
Namur road ; and the third announced that Exelmans
was marching with his cavalry corps upon Gem-
bloux in pursuit of the Prussians. 1 Thereupon
Napoleon decided to divide his army, and delivered his
1 Houssaye: Waterloo, p. 232. I think it too much to assume,
as Houssaye does, that Exelmans's first report announced that the
Prussians were at Gembloux in force. This first report does not exist
and can only be reconstructed, by implication, from the text of a second
report, which, in my opinion, warrants no such construction.
330 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. final instructions to that end. To Grouchy he handed
June 17. over Teste's division of Lobau's corps, Vandamme's
and Gerard's corps complete, and the four cavalry
divisions of Pajol and Exelmans, with instructions to
proceed with them to Gembloux. From that centre
the Marshal was to explore in the direction of Namur
and Maastricht, pursue the enemy and discover his
movements. Napoleon himself would meanwhile pro-
ceed to Quatre Bras ; and the line of communications,
which was to be well guarded, would be by the paved
road to Namur. In any case, Grouchy was to keep
his infantry in a compact body with several avenues of
retreat. " It is important," so ran one sentence, " to
discover what Blucher and Wellington mean to do,
and whether they intend to unite their armies to cover
Brussels and Liege by trying their luck in another
battle." i
According to the purport of these instructions, as
I read them, Grouchy 's mission was to be one princi-
pally of reconnaissance and exploration. The Emperor
repeats twice in the course of a few lines that he wishes
to penetrate his enemy's intentions. With this object,
chiefly, as the text appears to indicate, Grouchy was
to pursue the Prussians, and, though he was to start
at Gembloux, he was directed particularly to make
good the ground towards Namur, and indeed to cause
that line to be occupied by National Guards in case
it had been evacuated by the Prussians. This shows
plainly that Napoleon was still wedded to his original
idea, confirmed as it was to some extent by Pajol's
reports, that Blucher had retreated eastwards. In
this case Grouchy might have to deal with a strong
rear-guard at Gembloux ; and it was, apparently, to
1 There are various readings of this order, in some of which the
words " or Liege " are omitted. In yet another version the sentence
runs, "It is important to discover what the Prussians mean to do ;
either they are separating themselves from the English or intend
to try their luck in another battle." I follow the text given by
Houssaye, pp. 236, 237, which is drawn from the Archives de la
Guerre at Paris.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 331
meet this contingency that he had been entrusted with 1815.
a force of over thirty thousand men. Further, Napoleon June 17.
evidently contemplated the chance of his meeting with
the entire Prussian army, or at any rate with a
superior force, otherwise he would not have added
the admonition that many avenues of retreat should
be kept open for the infantry. The possibility that
Wellington and Bliicher might unite their armies and
fight a battle to cover Brussels and Liege is treated
in extremely obscure language. The only line on
which a single battle could be fought to cover both
places would be that of the previous day, Quatre Bras
and Sombreffe, or perhaps Quatre Bras and Gembloux.
Did Napoleon expect Wellington and Bliicher each of
them to assemble his whole army (which so far neither
of them had done) and to fight another action at
Quatre Bras and Gembloux, at which points the pair
of them were said to be massed in strength ? It must
be presumed that he did, for, if the two were to fight
united in a single array, they could only do so safely
by converging north-west and north-east ; and not a
word was said to Grouchy about exploring at all in a
northerly direction or west of Gembloux.
Such vagueness of instruction can only be engendered
by uncertainty and confusion of thought. What Napo-
leon expected and hoped was that the main body of
the Prussians was already withdrawing to Liege by way
of Tongres and Namur, and that Grouchy would break
down their rear-guard and drive it in the same
direction, following it up and keeping it at a distance,
while the Emperor himself should fall upon the British.
He gave special injunctions that frequent intelligence
should be sent to him in case he should be mistaken ;
but he did not give Grouchy to understand that the
right wing was to act as right-flank-guard to the left
wing and reserve, while the Emperor dealt with the
British army. It is true that a commander cannot
always reveal to a subordinate all that is in his mind :
that must depend on various considerations, personal
332 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. and other. If Napoleon had manifested his true
June 17. meaning to Grouchy, the latter might have asked how
he was to fend off ninety thousand men with thirty
thousand ; and the question would have been an
extremely awkward one. Yet, as it seems to me,
this is the gist of the whole matter, that Grouchy did
not know what his master wanted, because his master
either did not know or dared not tell him. The
truth is that the result of the two actions on the 1 6th
amounted to a defeat for Napoleon, and left him not
indeed without resource his genius was too great
for that but with insuperable difficulties before him.
Meanwhile at nine o'clock Wellington had issued
his orders for retreat. The Second British Division,
part of the Fourth British Division and the Third
Netherlandish Division were to march to Waterloo
from Nivelles, and the Second Netherlandish Division
from Quatre Bras, at once. The remainder of the
Fourth Division was to halt at Braine-le-Comte. The
rest of the infantry was to assemble to right and left
of the position, holding its former ground only with
its picquets, and at one o'clock the cavalry was to
form in rear of the position in three lines to cover the
march of the infantry. The corps of Prince Frederick
of Orange was to retire from Enghien to Hal in the
evening, and the Fourth Division (less Mitchell's
brigade) was to move likewise to Hal in the morning
of the 1 8th.
The movement, screened by all the skill of which
Wellington was master, began before ten o'clock, and
continued quietly, though the Duke watched the front
with anxiety until the last of the battalions marched
off, when he said, " Well, there is the last of the
infantry gone, and I don't care now." Ney throughout
this time remained perfectly inactive, which was, in
the circumstances, not surprising. He had been
placed in a false position on the 1 6th ; he had suffered
heavy loss for no commensurate object in consequence ;
he had been left all night unaware of the issue of the
I
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 333
battle of Ligny ; and, of the letters received by him 1815.
from Napoleon's head-quarters on the lyth, one June 17.
expressed displeasure and reproach for the isolation of
d'Erlon's corps, while the other held out the prospect
of a quiet day to be devoted to re-equipment and to
the replenishment of stores. To this it must be added
that the discipline of the French army was extremely
bad, and that the soldiers had fallen at once into the
evil ways, taught to them by many campaigns, of
marauding and plunder. Even the Emperor's maga-
zines had not been spared, and the Guard had been
among the worst offenders. The Provost Marshal,
in fact, resigned his appointment on the iyth in
despair over his impotence to set matters right. 1 After
a hard and discouraging day's fighting in weather of
intense heat, the men had probably indemnified them-
selves by dispersing during the night in search of such
luxuries as were to be obtained by pillage ; and it is
reasonable to suppose that, until late in the forenoon,
the ranks of many regiments were much depleted.
However that may be, there was up to one o'clock
no sign of life on the French side at Quatre Bras ;
and Napoleon, who had arrived at about that hour at
Marbais, losing patience made his way thither in
person with Lobau's corps, the Guard, Domont's and
Subervie's divisions of light cavalry and Milhaud's
division of cuirassiers. His advanced parties struck
against those of the British cavalry shortly afterwards,
whereupon Napoleon deployed his force into two
lines, the cavalry in front with the artillery massed in
the centre, and the infantry in rear, and sent a message
to Ney to advance immediately.
Wellington had for some hours past taken up his
station close to Quatre Bras, sometimes seated on the
ground reading and laughing over the English news-
papers, sometimes riding a short distance forward to
sweep the ground with his telescope. He was much
astonished that the enemy made no movement^ and
1 Houssaye, Waterloo, p. 80.
334 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. seemed to think it within the bounds of possibility
June 17. that they might have retreated. The air was intensely
hot and oppressively still. Angry thunderclouds were
heaping themselves up to northward ; and altogether
it was such a day as saps human energy and makes
even the most active man hope inwardly for peace and
quiet. Wellington was undeceived by the sight of a
mass of cuirsasiers forming alongside the Namur road
about two miles away evidently the first step in
Napoleon's manoeuvre of deployment. At about two
o'clock the cuirassiers were observed to mount and
to ride forward, preceded by lancers ; the advanced
parties of the British horse both in the front and on
the left flank became engaged ; and presently a
picquet of the Eighteenth Hussars came trotting in,
without loss, along the Namur road. Wellington then
left the conduct of the retreat to Lord Uxbridge,
giving orders that anything like a serious engagement
must, if possible, be avoided. Uxbridge accordingly
directed the retirement to be made in three columns.
The two heavy brigades of Somerset and Ponsonby,
together with the Seventh Hussars and Twenty-third
Light Dragoons, formed the centre, which was to take
the Brussels road ; Vandeleur's and Vivian's brigades
composed the left or eastern column, which was to
move by Baisy and Thy ; Dornberg's brigade and the
Fifteenth Hussars made up the right column, which
was to pass the Thy rivulet above Genappe. Vivian's
brigade, being on the extreme left, was drawn up in
line at right angles to the Namur road, with its left
thrown back and two guns upon the road itself.
As the French cavalry advanced, the British cannon
opened fire ; and then, whether owing to the concussion
or not, the storm-cloud burst with a blinding flash and a
terrific roar, while the rain poured down in such streams
as are rarely seen even within the tropics. 1 Vivian,
however, had already observed the French horse turning
1 All accounts agree that the storm was of exceptional violence,
and the rain extraordinarily heavy.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 335
northward to outflank him ; so, ordering his battery to 1815.
retire with all speed, he put his brigade about 1 and j un e 17.
fell back upon Vandeleur's brigade, half a mile in
rear. Vandeleur, instead of waiting for Vivian's
brigade to pass through his own, withdrew as Vivian
approached him, wherein he was probably right,
though Vivian was of a different opinion. 2 The
incident showed the danger of allowing brigades to
manoeuvre on their own account without the control
of a divisional commander. The French were riding
fast to come up on Vivian's left and envelop him,
but the ground had become so deep under the deluge
of rain that their pace failed, and Vivian was able to
fain the bridge over the Thy with little loss. The
re of a few dismounted men sufficed to check further
pursuit by the French when they reached the bridge
itself ; and the brigade reached its bivouac with
trifling loss.
In the centre Somerset's and Ponsonby's brigades
passed through Genappe, which was the only serious
defile in the road, without difficulty, and formed at
the summit of a gentle slope on the north side of the
village, having the Twenty-third Light Dragoons a
little in advance of them, while the Seventh Hussars
as rear-guard remained on the southern side. Though
the bridge at Genappe was so narrow as to admit
horsemen only in single file, the Seventh was with-
drawn safely across it with no great difficulty and was
formed in front of the Twenty-third, with one squadron
in advance. A quarter of an hour later the French
ist Lancers debouched from Genappe, preceded by a
small party of headlong troopers who proved, when
captured, to be drunk. In the narrow streets of the
village the columns became so much crowded that
Uxbridge ordered a squadron of the Seventh Hussars
1 " There began at the same moment as we went threes about
a shower of rain, the heaviest I ever experienced." Memoirs of the
1 8th Hussars, p. 139. (I have altered the original spelling of the
writer, the adjutant of the i8th, who rose from the ranks.)
2 Tomklnson, p. 384: Waterloo Letters , pp. 155-156.
336 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. to charge. They did so, but, though received at the
June 17. halt by the enemy, were unable to make any impression
upon the narrow front of lances which met them in
the streets. After a confused struggle of cutting and
thrusting with alternations of success and failure on
both sides, the Seventh were finally repulsed, and the
lancers imprudently following them up the hill in
pursuit were charged by two squadrons of the First
Life Guards. Under the weight of big men on big
horses the lancers were borne back in confusion into
the village, where, crushed together in the narrow
streets, they could not use their lances and as a natural
result were very roughly handled.
The retreat was then recommenced, covered by the
Union Brigade ; but the pursuit was little pressed, for
the ground, except on the paved road, was everywhere
fetlock-deep and in the ploughed fields hock-deep, so
much so that Uxbridge gradually drew the whole of his
men to the road. By evening the whole had reached
Wellington's chosen position on the ridge of Mont St.
Jean. As usual, Wellington had hidden his troops
away on the reverse slope ; and Napoleon, at the head
of his advanced cavalry, could see little when the head
of his column came up to the ale-house called La
Belle Alliance, which stands on the eastern side of the
Brussels road about fourteen hundred yards south of
the centre of Wellington's position. The Emperor
therefore unlimbered four batteries, two of which
opened fire, and deployed his cuirassiers as if for
attack. The challenge, to Wellington's great annoy-
ance, was at once taken up by Cleeves's and Lloyd's
batteries, which opened upon the columns of French
infantry whose heads hadfbegun to show themselves
about La Belle Alliance. The Duke presently ordered
these guns to cease fire, and Napoleon withdrew,
having ascertained what he wanted to know, that the
Allies were present in force.
French authors have called the retreat from Quatre
Bras to Waterloo a disorderly movement, and one has
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 337
gone so far as to call the French advance upon the 1815.
heels of the Allies " a furious pursuit." It doesj une i7.
indeed appear that Uxbridge, perhaps ambitious of
distinction, delayed the withdrawal of the cavalry for
longer than was necessary or prudent, and that for a
time the retreat of a part of it was, by Uxbridge's
order and example, extremely hurried. Gardiner's
battery of horse artillery, according to one of its
subalterns, galloped for nearly the whole of the
distance, and Mercer's was also hustled backward
in the same fashion. This haste seems, however, to
have been urged upon the artillery only, in order to
get them out of the way ; and, even so, time was
found to replace the cast shoe of a gun-horse of
Gardiner's battery, which does not point to great
pressure on the part of the pursuers. The casualty-
lists likewise fail to bear out the French contention.
The total losses of the cavalry on the i Jth amounted
to ninety-three killed, wounded and missing, of whom
forty-six belonged to the Seventh Hussars and eighteen
to the Life-Guards, which were the only corps seriously
engaged. The twenty-nine remaining casualties were
distributed among seven different regiments, and
were evidently due to the fire of artillery. A pursuit
which produced no greater results could not have been
very furious. Possibly, but for the heavy rain, the
French might have pressed the British horse more
severely ; but even this is doubtful. The only time
at which the French threatened any formidable
enveloping movement was before the Allied rear-
guard had reached Genappe ; and the soil was not at
that period so much saturated as to impede their
movements seriously. Yet they accomplished nothing;
and Vivian's brigade, which was at one moment that
which was in greatest danger, escaped with five
casualties. Altogether Uxbridge's account of the
affair is probably correct that it was the prettiest
field-day of cavalry and horse-artillery that he ever
witnessed.
VOL. X
338 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Throughout the afternoon and evening the rain
June 17. continued with little intermission, and after nightfall
it seems to have gathered new vigour and to have
poured down steadily. Every soul in both armies
was soaked to the skin. The tall rye, which covered
most of the ground, was like standing water, and the
ground was soon poached into mud knee-deep. It
was difficult to light fires and impossible to keep them
up. The Allies were better off than their opponents,
for some at least of them had reached their bivouacs
while the ground was still dry ; and there was food
for them when they arrived. The French infantry,
on the other hand, did not come to their halting place
until after dark, in some cases not until far into the
night, after a most exhausting march through the mud ;
and the service of supply was, as usual, defective. All
discipline seems to have ceased for the time. The
men dispersed in search of food and shelter, pillaging
mercilessly in all directions ; and many of the cavalry
remounted their horses and slept all night in the saddle
as the best means of keeping dry, 1 a fact which is not
without its bearing on the events of the next day.
Napoleon himself indicated the stations for the corps
that came up with him. D'Erlon's corps and Jac-
quinot's cavalry were foremost about Plancenoit,
about half a mile in rear of La Belle Alliance, and the
cavalry of Milhaud, Domont, Subervie and of the
Guard immediately to rear of them. Reille, Lobau
and Kellermann's Cuirassiers stopped at Genappe.
The infantry of the Guard, vainly striving to reach
head-quarters, for the most part lost their way and
sought shelter where they could for the night ; two
or three regiments alone arriving towards midnight
at Glabais, two miles south of Plancenoit. The
Emperor himself slept at Le Caillou, about a mile
1 If this were not narrated by a French authority (Houssaye, p.
274) I should hesitate to believe it. The French had a bad reputation
as horse-masters throughout the Napoleonic wars, but this is the worst
example of the defect that I have encountered.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 339
and a half south of La Belle Alliance on the Brussels 1815.
road. j un e , 7 .
While the French left wing and reserve were thus
engaged, Grouchy had set the right wing in march
for Gembloux, bidding Gerard's corps halt while
Vandamme's marched past it to take the head of the
column. Vandamme moved slowly, not reaching Point
du Jour, where the road from Ligny to Gembloux
crosses that from Quatre Bras to Namur, until three
o'clock. Arriving there at about the same time
Grouchy found news from Exelmans that the Prussian
army was massed on the Orneau, and that he should
follow it as soon as it moved. Exelmans, however,
allowed Thielmann's corps (for it was that which he
had under observation) to slip away unnoticed ; and,
when the infantry marched into Gembloux between
six and seven o'clock, much harassed by bad roads
and rain, Grouchy decided to halt them there for the
night.
The messages sent in by his cavalry in the evening
indicated that the Prussian column, which had seemed
to be marching on Namur, was really moving upon
Louvain ; and intelligence from peasants, confirmed
by the reports of the French light horse which arrived
in the course of the night, went to show that the re-
treating enemy was moving towards Wavre. Putting
all his information together, Grouchy reported to
Napoleon at ten o'clock that the Prussian army had
parted into three columns, of which one had retired on
Namur, a second, which he supposed to be Bliicher's,
was withdrawing by the Roman road towards Liege,
and a third was on its way to Wavre, presumably with
the object of joining Wellington. He added that he
was sending cavalry out towards the Roman road and
should act according to their intelligence, following
the principal mass of the Prussians in whatever direc-
tion they might take, whether to Perwez on the east
or to Wavre on the north, to prevent them in this
latter case from reaching Brussels and to separate them
340 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. from Wellington. But, in the orders which he issued
June 17. for the morrow, he directed every part of his force to
the east, evidently expecting to find the mass of the
Prussians in that quarter. He seems to have regarded
it as a small matter that perhaps a single corps of
Blticher's army might be on its way to join Welling-
ton. His business was to recover and to maintain
contact with the main body, wherever it might be.
The Prussians were assumed to have been badly
beaten ; and, if one column of them had turned east,
towards their base, and another north, presumably
(though it was by no means certain) to gain Brussels,
it was most probable that the main body would wheel
eastward also. So Grouchy appears to have reasoned ;
nor, saving the false assumption in regard to the
Prussians, which was Napoleon's and not his own,
did he reason unintelligently. His force was strong
enough to press a defeated enemy in retreat, but not
to combat an advancing enemy of thrice his strength.
Bliicher, for his part, on the night of the iyth
issued his orders in loyal fulfilment of his promise to
Wellington. Billow's corps was directed to march at
daybreak to Chapelle St. Lambert, about four miles
due east of Mont St. Jean, and Pirch I.'s to follow him
to the same place. Arrived there, they were to halt
and keep themselves concealed if the Allies were not
seriously engaged, but, in the contrary event, they were
to advance and fall upon Napoleon's right or eastern
flank. Thielmann's and Ziethen's corps were to
remain on the Dyle until the movements and inten-
tions of the French at Gembloux Grouchy's troops
should become clearer ; but Bliicher hoped to lead
them also to the assistance of the British. This deter-
mination was taken by Bliicher against the advice of
Gneisenau, and, as a broad principle of action, con-
ceded all that Wellington could have wished. But
the details of execution left much to be desired.
Ziethen's corps at Bierges was within four miles of
Chapelle St. Lambert as the crow flies, Thielmann's
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 34 1
at La Bavette within five miles, Pirch I.'s at Aisemont 1815.
within six miles, and Billow's at Dion-le-Mont within June 17.
seven miles. Thus, when every hour of time was
precious, it was the corps remotest from Wellington
which was selected to march to his aid. There was
one very good reason for choosing Billow's corps in
preference to Ziethen's for this service, because
Billow's, though much harassed by long marches, had
not yet been engaged, whereas Ziethen's had lost
heavily both on the i^th and the i6th ; but there
was no such excuse to be alleged for detaining Thiel-
mann's corps, which had not suffered severely at Ligny.
Moreover, even granting that the preference of
Billow's and Pirch I.'s corps were correct, the arrange-
ments made for their march were, to say the least,
defective. Billow was directed not only to lead the
way but to defile through the narrow streets of Wavre,
whereby not merely was his journey prolonged by two
miles, but the whole of Pirch's troops were compelled
to mark time until the IVth Corps had passed on before
them. If the Prussian staff, with Gneisenau at its head,
did not foresee these complications and their inevitable
result, it stands convicted of gross incompetence ; if
it did foresee them, and of deliberate design contrived
them, it cannot be acquitted of despicable disloyalty
to the Allies of Prussia and to the common cause of
Europe.
Events at the Prussian head-quarters in the early June 1 8.
morning of the i8th throw further light upon the
proceedings of the Staff. Pirch I.'s corps was under
arms at five o'clock, but Billow's leading division did
not reach Wavre until seven. Had all gone well
and it will be seen presently that all did not go well
Billow's corps could not have cleared the village
and the passages of the Dyle before ten o'clock, so
that at best Pirch I.'s corps must have lost three or four
hours' rest for no object whatever. The consequences
to the advance of a third corps in the same direction
were still more serious. Before eight o'clock a
342 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Prussian staff-officer came in from the outposts and
June 1 8. reported that the French at Gembloux had not moved,
but appeared not to exceed fifteen thousand. " But/'
he added, " if they should be thirty thousand, one
corps will be sufficient to guard the line of the Dyle,
for the real issue of the campaign will be decided at
Mont St. Jean." Bliicher, quite agreeing with this
view, wrote to Muffling at half-past nine that he should
lead his troops in person to attack the French right
wing, as soon as Napoleon should make any movement
against Wellington ; and he proposed, if Napoleon
should not attack on the i8th, that the British and
Prussians united should attack the Emperor on the
1 9th. The Field-marshal, beyond all dispute, was
staunch enough, but not so Gneisenau. Of his own
motive and without consultation with his chief, he
added to this letter a postscript, begging Muffling to
make quite sure that Wellington really intended to
fight at Mont St. Jean, and not merely to make a
demonstration, which might be fatal to the Prussian
army. " It is of the highest importance " such
were the closing words " to know exactly what the
Duke will do, in order to arrange our movements."
Here we see Gneisenau naked and unashamed.
Wellington had declared his intention to fight if
Bliicher would support him. Bliicher had accepted
the declaration, as made, with all possible good faith,
and promised the assistance for which Wellington
asked. And then Gneisenau intervened, with dark
hints that Wellington designed only to entrap the
Prussian army so as to save his own, and that Bliicher's
promise (for such is the purport of the words quoted
above) must after all depend upon fresh assurances from
Muffling. No intellectual eminence can exalt a nature
so essentially low as this, a nature which, from sheer
terror of that which is high, abases all others to its
own vile and despicable level. It was no fault of
Gneisenau that the campaign of Waterloo did not end
disastrously for the Allies.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 343
While these matters were going forward, mishaps 1815.
had already begun at Wavre. Billow's leading division j une 1 8.
was hardly clear of the village when an accidental fire
broke out in the principal street, preventing all passage
through it ; and the rest of the corps had to wait until the
fire was burned out. Its march was thus delayed for two
whole hours. Pirch I. was, therefore, unable to move
until past noon, and at two o'clock half of his corps ^>
was still on the east bank of the Dyle. It had been
decided by the Staff that, unless the French at Gembloux
appeared before Wavre in too great force, Ziethen's
corps and possibly Thielmann's also should follow
Pirch I. ; but Bliicher left these details to Gneisenau,
being impatient for the coming battle. He would be
tied on his horse rather than miss it, he said ; and at
eleven o'clock the gallant old man rode off, bruised
and shaken though he was, to join Bttlow. But for
his impetuous energy, Wellington might have fought
the battle of Waterloo, for victory or defeat, without
the help of a single Prussian soldier.
Meanwhile Grouchy for his part had received
reports during the night which satisfied him that the
bulk of the Prussians were moving north-west ; and
at six o'clock in the morning he sent a message to that
effect to Napoleon. " The enemy," he wrote, " is
retiring on Brussels to concentrate there or to fight a
battle after uniting with Wellington. Blucher's 1st
and Ilnd Corps seem to have gone, the one to Corbais,
and other to Chaumont. I am starting for Walhain,
whence I shall go to Corbais and Wavre." There
seemed to him to be no particular reason for haste, so
he did not order the foremost of his infantry to march
until six o'clock ; and, owing to the delay in the dis-
tribution of victuals, they did not start until after seven.
The whole then advanced in one column upon a single
road, excepting one division which, together with three
brigades of cavalry, made a bend eastward in pursuance
of Grouchy's ideas of the previous night. At Walhain
St. Paul Grouchy learned from a retired French
344 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. officer, or from some person passing for such, that the
June 1 8. Prussians who had marched through Wavre were on
the way to the plain of La Chyse, seven miles east of
the village, and were about to mass themselves there
with the object either of fighting the pursuing French
or of joining Wellington. He reckoned therefore
that he could not do better than continue his march
n to Wavre, where he would be interposed between
Wellington and the Prussian army, and from whence,
if the Prussians should move towards Brussels, he
could reach the capital before they did. He wrote a
letter to this effect to Napoleon, adding that Wellington
was no doubt retreating before the Emperor ; and a
heavy distant cannonade which he heard in the direction
of Mont St. Jean an hour or two later availed not, in
spite of the remonstrances of his generals, to make
him change the direction of his march. He reasoned
once again from Napoleon's hypothesis that the
Prussians could not have recovered from their defeat,
that they had no alternative but to retire, and that, as
a natural consequence, Wellington must retreat also.
Napoleon, as the originator of this delusion, of
course cherished it with unshaken attachment. It is
said that he went round his outposts at one o'clock in
the morning to be sure that Wellington was not
escaping by stealth. Soon after dawn came in
Grouchy's letter, written at two o'clock of the i yth, to
the effect that, if the main body of the Prussians proved
to be marching on Wavre, he would follow them to
head them off from Brussels and separate them from
Wellington. All, therefore, seemed to be satisfactory.
Orders for the disposition of the troops had already
been issued on the previous day, from which it appears
that Napoleon intended to move early ; but the soil was
so much sodden after fifteen hours of nearly continuous
rain as to make the movement of artillery extremely
difficult ; and the attack was therefore deferred till nine
o'clock. At eight o'clock the Emperor breakfasted
and spoke with confidence of the issue of the coming
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
345
combat. Soult was not so sanguine, and repeated an 1815.
opinion which he had uttered on the previous morning, j un e 18.
that Grouchy's detachment was too strong and that
part of it should be summoned to the main army.
* You think Wellington a great general because he
beat you," answered the Emperor ; "I tell you that
he is a bad general and that the English troops are
bad troops, and that we will make short work of them."
Reille entering shortly afterwards, Napoleon asked
his opinion of the British army. * When well posted,
as Wellington knows how to post them," he answered,
" I consider it invincible by a frontal attack ; but it
is less flexible than ours. If one cannot beat them by
a direct attack, one can do so by manoeuvring." The
Emperor took no notice.
Jerome presently came in and reported, on the
information of a waiter at the inn at Genappe, that one
of Wellington's staff, when dining there on the i6th,
had spoken of a projected junction between the British
and the Prussians at the entrance to the forest of Soignes.
" After such a battle as Ligny," answered the Emperor,
"the junction of the English and Prussians is impossible
for another two days ; besides, the Prussians have
Grouchy at their heels. It is very lucky that the
English are standing fast. I shall hammer them with
my artillery, charge them with my cavalry to make
them show themselves, and, when I am quite sure
where the actual English are, I shall go straight at
them with my Old Guard." 1 In such a frame of
mind it is small wonder that he was perfectly satisfied
with Grouchy 's report of the previous night. The
Emperor informed him in reply that he was about to
attack the English at Waterloo, but gave him no
further order than to push on to Wavre and drive the
Prussians before him. Grouchy 's letter of the morning,
which reached him shortly after ten o'clock, evoked
from him no further instructions. The Prussians
would need two days longer to recover themselves.
1 Vie Militaire du GSnfral Foy, pp. 278-279.
346 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. The English were bad troops under a bad general.
June 1 8. There was nothing more to be said.
Wellington on his side waited, apparently, until
past one o'clock in the morning of the i8th before he
received Bliicher's letter, assuring him that at least one
Prussian corps would march to his assistance in the
course of the day. It is possible, indeed, that he may
have received some earlier intimation which was
sufficient to satisfy him ; but it is very evident that
he did not at that hour count upon a decisive battle.
Four letters from him, dated at three o'clock in the
morning, are preserved, in each of which he alludes
to the possibility that his position might be turned by
way of Hal, and that Brussels might thereby be un-
covered ; and, to meet such a contingency, he ordered
Antwerp to be placed in a state of siege, recommending
all refugees from Brussels to remove themselves thither.
In the circumstances, it has astonished many that he
should have taken no measures against the possibility
of a retreat, to which he might be compelled either by
Bliicher's inability to support him or by the turning
movement above mentioned. As a matter of fact,
a subaltern of Vivian's brigade did receive orders on
the night of the ijih to look for a road through the
forest of Soignes, parallel to the main road and east of
it, whereby the brigade might retire, covering the left
of the army ; so it is reasonable to infer that other
officers received the like instruction. 1 But the absence
of any general directions in the event of a retreat shows
that Wellington contemplated no immediate necessity
for them. In other words, he was satisfied, either by
his own judgment or by direct intimation, that he
could count upon Bliicher's assistance, and was resolved
to stand his ground until he should be manoeuvred
out of it.
That he should have expected such a manoeuvre
round his right flank has caused general astonishment.
The explanation, however, is not difficult. He fell
1 Waterloo Letters , p. 196.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
347
into Napoleon's error of overestimating the power of 1815.
his own prestige. ;< I think," he said a few weeks June 18.
later at Paris, " that if I had been Bonaparte I should
have respected the English infantry more after what
I must have heard of them in Spain ; and that I should
not have taken the bull by the horns. I should have
turned a flank, the right flank. I should have kept
the English army occupied by a demonstration to
attack or by slight attacks, while in fact I was moving
the main army by Hal on Brussels/' 1 It is objected
to such a conception that it was contrary to Napoleon's
whole plan of campaign, which was to separate
Wellington's army from Blucher's. But this is
wisdom after the event, if not indeed a begging of the
whole question. We have seen from the Emperor's
orders to Ney on the i6th of June that he attached
great importance to the capture of Brussels, not only
for its moral effect but because it would sever the
British from Ostend ; and this idea is wholly incom-
patible with the separation of the armies of the Allies.
If Napoleon had listened to the warnings of Soult and
Reille and the ablest 2 French historian of the
campaign admits that he would have done well to
consider them seriously the vexed question would
have been settled by the choice of the flank, western
or eastern, by which he decided to turn Wellington's
position. The only certain thing is that he could not
have separated the British at once from their base and
from the Prussians by one and the same manoeuvre.
The truth probably is that his projects were at no time
so clear and well defined as he afterwards attempted
to prove them to be.
Be that as it may, the Duke, holding firmly to his
opinion, left Colville's division, less one brigade, and
Prince Frederick's Netherlandish corps, together some
fifteen to eighteen thousand men, at Hal and Tubize,
1 Journal of Colonel James Stanhope. MS. The writer says
that the statement was made at a dinner at Grassini's in Paris in answer
to the question of a French gentleman, and that he heard the words
himself from the Duke's own mouth. 2 Houssaye, p. 320.
348 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. nine to eleven miles west of Mont St. Jean, with orders,
June 1 8. issued late on the iyth, to defend the position at Hal
for as long as possible. In the course of the night
Colville sent a staff-officer, Colonel Woodford, to
Wellington for orders. Woodford arrived early in the
morning of the i8th, but at a time when it was certain
that a pitched battle was imminent. The Duke told
him that it was too late for the division at Hal to move
up, but added, " Now that you are here, stay with me.*'
Evidently Wellington felt confident of Bliicher's early
appearance on the field ; nor was he unreasonable,
for the Prussian advanced parties were actually visible
at ten o'clock filing across the Lasnes less than four
miles to the west.
The morning of the i8th broke dull and overcast.
The thunder-clouds had not yet quite rained themselves
out ; and, though they were rising and the weather
generally tended to improve, there were scattered
showers at different points of the line throughout
the day. 1 The British, roused from their cheerless
bivouac, busied themselves with looking to their arms
and getting rid of the useless charges loaded on the
previous day, too often by firing them off. The
position of Mont St. Jean, or, as we may now call it,
of Waterloo, had been studied by the Royal Engineers,
who had drawn up plans of it before the opening
of the campaign. It consists of two nearly parallel
ridges, that of Mont St. Jean on the north and that of
La Belle Alliance in the south, which run east and
west, and enclose between them a narrow plain. This
plain is more truly a minute watershed, from which
two tiny rills flow east and west, making well-defined
valleys for themselves when, on reaching the hamlets
of Smohain on one side and Braine 1'Alleud on the
other, they change their course to a northerly direction.
1 The contradictory reports of the weather during the day from,
various quarters are most easily explained in this way. Every one
knows by experience how long it is before the last drop falls after a
heavy thunderstorm.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 349
There rises from it, however, a secondary ridge, which 1815.
runs from a point about seven hundred yards north of June 18.
La Belle Alliance for about half a mile north-westward.
The difference in elevation between the highest and
the lowest points of the plain does not exceed sixty feet,
and the gradients are nowhere so severe as to check
the speed of a galloping horse either up or down.
The ground was open and unfenced, and in the summer
of 1815 was for the most part covered with tall waving
rye. Straight through the centre of the position runs
the road from Brussels to Charleroi, marked on the
southern ridge by the farm of La Belle Alliance and
on the northern by that of La Have Sainte, which
stand about eleven hundred yards apart. About three
hundred yards north of La Haye Sainte this road
crosses another, running east and west from Ohain to
Braine 1'Alleud, and then turns slightly westward past
the farm and hamlet of Mont St. Jean to the village
of Waterloo, where it enters the forest of Soignes and
runs through it to Brussels.
The heights of Mont St. Jean, which had been
chosen by Wellington for his battle-ground, offered
advantages which were well suited to his defensive
tactics. The forward or southern slope was a fairly
steep glacis, and the reverse slope was easy, so that all
movements in rear of the fighting line were concealed.
Along the summit, in places slightly in rear of it, ran
the cross-road, already mentioned, from Braine TAlleud
to Ohain, screened, eastward of La Haye Sainte, on
each side by thick hedges which were impenetrable
by cavalry, and passing through a succession of cuttings
six or seven feet deep on the way westward to Braine
TAlleud. In advance of the right centre stands the
mansion of Hougoumont, which, with its grounds,
covered a rectangular space some five hundred yards
square, enclosed with hedges. From north to south
more than half of this area was covered by a park, the
western part of which was coppice and the eastern
open ground. Near the north-western angle stands
350 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. the house with its chapel, its extensive outbuildings,
June 1 8. and its large garden, walled on the south and east sides ;
the whole being surrounded on the north, and more
extensively on the east, by a fenced orchard. In the
centre of the position La Haye Sainte, a quadrangle
stoutly built of stone, was shielded on the north by a
terraced kitchen-garden, and on the south by a long
belt of enclosed orchard which ran along the western
side of the Brussels road, and flanked it for over two
hundred and fifty yards. To the rear of the farm
and on the eastern side of the road were a gravel-pit
and a mound, shut in at the back by a hedge which
adjoined the road. The road itself was blocked by
one abatis at the end of the pit, and by another in
line with the south wall of the farm. On the left of
the position the farms of Papelotte and La Haie,
together with the hamlet of Smohain and the mansion
of Frischermont, presented a third fortified post which,
like Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, thrust them-
selves out like bastions in advance of the main array.
The general form of the position was concave, pre-
senting to any assailant the difficult problem, of attacking
a shallow re-entrant angle.
The extreme left of the line was occupied by Vivian's
brigade of light cavalry, with Vandeleur's brigade
immediately on its right. Then, in succession from
left to right, came the Hanoverian infantry brigades
of Vincke and Best, Pack's British, Bijlandt's Nether-
landers, and Kempt's British, the right-hand battalion
of this last leaning its right flank upon the Brussels
road. Immediately on the west side of this road
stood Ompteda's brigade of the German Legion, and
next to them Kielmansegge's Hanoverians and Colin
Halkett's British, the whole composing Charles Alten's
division. On the right of Halkett, upon the hill in
rear of Hougoumont, stood in succession Maitland's
and Byng's brigades of Guards. 1 On the right of
1 Stanhope of 3/ist Guards says in his journal, " When the battle
began we had two or three squares between us and the 3rd Division ;
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 351
Byng, astride the road from Nivelle to Brussels, was 1815.
Mitchell's brigade, lining the road which runs westward j une 18.
from that road to Braine 1'Alleud. On the plateau
behind Mitchell was massed Clinton's division, and,
in rear of Clinton again, the Brunswick contingent was
held in reserve at the village of Merbe Braine. Lastly
Chasse's Netherlandish Division, with sixteen guns,
held Braine 1'Alleud, having one brigade thrown
forward in advance of the village and at right angles
to the main line of battle. Wellington to the very
end was nervous for his right flank.
The only infantry in second line near the centre
were Kruse's three Nassau battalions in rear of Alten's
division, and Lambert's British brigade, just returned
from America, which did not reach the field until
eleven o'clock and was then stationed at the cross-roads
just in front of Mont St. Jean. The cavalry was for
the most part massed in rear of the centre, the House-
hold and Union brigades under Somerset and Ponsonby
being immediately to west and east of the Brussels
road, with Van Merlen's Nether landers to the rear of
Somerset, Dornberg's and Arentschild's brigades to
Somerset's right, and Trip's and de Ghigny's Nether-
landers immediately behind the Household and Union
brigades. Grant's brigade stood behind the Guards,
with one squadron of the Fifteenth Hussars covering
Mitchell's right flank.
Of the artillery six mounted batteries were with the
cavalry brigades ; the two Brunswick batteries were
with their own contingent, and Bean's, Sinclair's and
Braun's batteries were in reserve about Mont St. Jean.
Ross's battery was on the high ground behind La Haye
Sainte, with two guns pointing down the road; Rogers 's
and Cleeves's were in front of Alten's division ;
Kuhlmann's and Sandham's in front of the Guards;
before it ended, the red-coats were the nearest battalion." The detail
is not very important though it is curious : and the memory of blue
coats interposed between two masses of red is likely to be correct.
352 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Sympher's and Bolton's in reserve with Clinton's
June 1 8. division.
Of the advanced posts, Hougoumont was held by
four light companies of the Guards, two hundred
Hanoverians from Kielmansegge's brigade and one
of Prince Bernhard's Nassau battalions. La Haye
Sainte was entrusted to the 2nd Light Battalion of the
German Legion under Major Baring ; two companies
of the Ninety-fifth Rifles occupying the gravel-pit.
Smohain, Papelotte, La Haie and Frischermont were
occupied by the four remaining battalions of Prince
Bernhard's brigade.
The total number of Wellington's army amounted
to about sixty-three thousand men, 1 of which twenty-
one thousand were British, five thousand of the German
Legion, nearly eleven thousand Hanoverians, fifty-five
hundred Brunswickers, three thousand Nassauers and
nearly seventeen thousand Netherlanders. The cannon
numbered one hundred and fifty-six, seventy-eight of
them British, eighteen of the German Legion and
thirty-two Netherlandish. Thanks to the importunity
of Sir Augustus Frazer, three out of the seven mounted
batteries were furnished with nine-pounder in lieu of
six-pounder guns. Whinyates's battery was provided
with eight hundred rockets in addition to its field-pieces ;
but, in spite of Wellington's repeated representations
from the Peninsula, there were no cannon on the side
of the Allies that could match Napoleon's favourite
t wel ve-p oun der s .
It will be observed that in this line of battle the
corps, into which the army had been originally
organised, were broken up, or any rate disregarded,
probably with the object of depriving the Prince of
Orange of the definite command of any large number
of troops. The Prince had given sufficient trouble
at Quatre-Bras with his mischievous interference ; and
the British troops would have lost much of their con-
fidence if they had thought that they were still to be
1 Houssaye gives him 67,700 men and 174 guns.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 353
subjected to the caprice of so unskilful a commander. 1815.
It will be remarked likewise that Wellington was June 1 8.
careful to intersperse the foreign troops among the
British, leaving them nowhere without red-coats close
at hand ; while the Netherlanders, with the exception
of Bijlandt's brigade, which lay between Pack's and
Kempt's, were carefully ensconced in the villages on
the extreme flanks. " Form as usual " had been the
Duke's sole direction to his divisional generals ; and
accordingly they had drawn up their troops in rear of
the crest of the ridge, leaving the forward slope to be
disputed only by their massed light companies under
a field-officer. Bijlandt's brigade, however, not under-
standing the arrangement, placed itself in line with
the skirmishers. No field-works were thrown up on
any part of the line, though no doubt they would have
been of great advantage. Wellington on the night
of the i yth ordered a company of engineers to come
over from Hal and fortify Braine 1'Alleud; but the
men lost their way in the dark and arrived too late.
Any attempts to entrench the ground on the morning
of the 1 8th were frustrated by want of tools, or in
other words by bad management. Embrasures had,
however, been cut in the hedges for the guns, and both
Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte had been more or
less prepared for defence. The main buildings and
the garden wall at Hougoumont had indeed been made
fairly strong, and at La Haye Sainte the walls had been
loopholed ; but both posts might with a little work
have been made more formidable. It appears that
the Duke forbade any preliminary fortification lest
his intentions should be thereby betrayed.
Napoleon's line of battle was as follows : On the
right stood d'Erlon's corps, with its eastern flank
covered by Jacquinot's cavalry division. Of the
infantry Durutte's stood on the extreme right, and
next to it in succession on the left the divisions of
Marcognet, Donzelot and Quiot, the last named resting
its left flank on the Brussels road. The artillery was
VOL. X 2 A
354 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. posted in the intervals of brigades. West of the
June 1 8. road Reille's three divisions occupied the first line;
Bachelu's division on the right, Foy's in the centre,
and Jerome 's on the left, with the artillery in the front
and Fire's cavalry thrown out westward to guard
the left flank. In second line, behind d'Erlon
was Milhaud's cavalry corps, with Domont's and
Subervie's cavalry divisions massed on its left just
to east of the Brussels road. Lobau's corps was in
rear of Bachelu, with its artillery on its left flank; and
Kellermann's cavalry was extended in rear of Reille,
1'Heritier's division on the right and Roussel d'Harbal's
on the left. In the third line, and in reserve, stood the
Imperial Guard, the infantry and artillery assembled
close to the road, with the light cavalry on the right and
the heavy cavalry on the left. The batteries of horse-
artillery were attached each to its division of cavalry.
In all Napoleon counted about seventy thousand 1 men,
including fifty-two thousand infantry and fifteen
thousand cavalry, with two hundred and sixty-six guns.
He had thus a great superiority in the matter of artillery,
which was even more marked in the weight of metal
than in the number of guns.
The massing of troops on and about the road
revealed his intention of making his principal onset,
as at Ligny, upon his enemy's centre ; which, indeed,
he announced in his last orders, issued at about eleven
o'clock. In these he said plainly that the attack would
be delivered upon Mont St. Jean at the intersection
of the roads by d'Erlon's corps, and that the twelve-
pounder batteries of the ist, 2nd and 6th Corps,
twenty-four guns in all, would be massed together in
support of it. The assault was to be opened by Quiot's
division, on the left, whose left flank would be covered
by a simultaneous advance of Reille's corps ; and the
sappers of the ist Corps were to be ready to barricade
the village of Mont St. Jean. Wellington, on the
1 Houssaye gives the figure at 74,000. I have reduced this, as I
have Houssaye's total of Wellington's army, by 4000.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY
355
contrary, had concentrated the best of his troops, the 1815.
Guards and Clinton's division, on his right, leaving the j un e 18.
defence of his centre to Ompteda's brigade of the Legion,
and to Picton's division, which last had suffered very
heavily at Quatre-Bras. Strangely enough, as events
turned out, the battle was conducted far more according
to the preconception of Wellington than of Napoleon.
The time for this attack was fixed for one o'clock
in the afternoon. The Emperor's original instructions
had been that all troops should be in their appointed
stations by nine o'clock ; but this was found to be
impossible. It took much time to gather in the
scattered bodies that had halted between Genappe
and Plancenoit during the miserable night of the i yth.
Reille's corps started, according to his account, from
Genappe at daybreak, but did not pass Napoleon's
head-quarters a march of three miles until nine.
The Guard, according to one authority, did not break
up its bivouac until ten, and Durutte reported that he
did not take his place on the field until nearly noon. 1
It was natural that the French commanders should
give their drenched and exhausted men some time to
clean their arms and cook their breakfasts ; but it is
probable, looking to the complaints of marauding
made by several French officers, that it took much
time, in at any rate some regiments, to assemble the
soldiers together, and that it was the indiscipline of his
army, countenanced through many campaigns by the
practice of living on the country, which was the true
cause of Napoleon's delay in opening the battle of
Waterloo. He might of course have begun the action
with such troops as he had on the field, but he judged
it wiser to wait until all were practically present, no
doubt comforting himself, quite reasonably, with the
reflection that every hour would improve the ground
for the movement of his cavalry and still more of his
artillery.
Having ridden down the line of his soldiers, who
1 See Houssaye, pp. 316-318.
356 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. received him with wild enthusiasm, the Emperor
June 1 8. shortly after eleven o'clock decided to make a demon-
stration on the Allied flanks, perhaps with some hope
of inducing Wellington to weaken his centre. Accord-
ingly Jacquinot's cavalry made a show of turning the
Allied left about Frischermont, while Reille ordered
Jerome's division to advance upon the approaches to
Hougoumont. Jacquinot was speedily turned back,
with some slight loss, by the muskets and cannon of
the Nassauers ; but Jerome's column advanced steadily
towards the south-western angle of the enclosure, and
threw out a cloud of skirmishers to cover the opening
of the attack. As the French masses came into sight,
three British batteries from the left rear of Hougoumont
opened upon them with such effect that the columns
swerved off to their left. Part of Reille's cannon then
came into action and were supported, pursuant to an
order from Napoleon, by Kellermann's mounted
batteries. The duel of artillery became hot ; and
Bauduin's brigade, advancing in echelon of battalions
from the left, plunged down, not without heavy loss,
into the hollow beneath the southern border of the
coppice. Fire's cavalry covered their left flank as they
moved. With Jerome and Bauduin at their head,
some of the French leaped into the wood and en-
gaged the Nassauers and Hanoverians who were
holding the border. Twice the Allied sharp-shooters
drove the enemy out into the open, and Bauduin
himself was killed at the very outset. But the French
skirmishers, continually strengthened as their supports
came up, presently established their footing within the
coppice ; and, though both Nassauers and Hanoverians
fought stoutly as they retired from tree to tree, they
were pressed back into the orchard. The French
then advanced rapidly through the wood and over the
park in pursuit, but were checked at the wall of the
garden, which had been pierced by two tiers of loop-
holes and was held by a company of the Coldstream
Guards. Strive as they might with the utmost
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 357
gallantry to scale the wall, the French were shot down 1815.
at every point by a murderous fire. Bull's howitzer June 18.
battery by Wellington's orders began to throw shells
into the wood with great effect. The Guards counter-
attacked, the Hanoverians and Nassauers seem to
have rallied to their support, and the French were
driven back with heavy loss upon their supports.
A.i fortified post, when strenuously defended, fre-
quently assumes in the eyes of the assailants an
importance out of all proportion to its true tactical
value. If the centre of the Allied line were pierced,
pursuant to Napoleon's design, Hougoumont would
become untenable on the spot. There was no occasion,
therefore, for the French to do more than occupy the
wood, at once menacing the garrison of the mansion
and barring the way to an offensive movement of the
Allies. But Jerome, nettled at his repulse, called up
Soye's brigade to renew the attack in the coppice, and
directed the remains of Bauduin's to turn the buildings
by the western side. The French stormed forward
with the greatest gallantry, driving the Nassauers before
them ; but a party of the light companies of the
Coldstream and Third Guards, taking shelter behind
a lane and a haystack below the south-western corner
of the mansion, resisted desperately. At length, the
haystack being ablaze and their retreat nearly cut off,
these ran back to the gateway in the northern front of
the buildings and took refuge in the courtyard, where
they began hastily to barricade the gate with whatever
came first to hand. A French subaltern of the ist
Light snatched an axe from one of his pioneers and,
swinging it with gigantic strength, broke down the bars.
A few men rushed after him into the courtyard, but,
after a brief though desperate struggle, four officers
and a sergeant of the Coldstream succeeded by sheer
bodily strength in closing the gate ; and the little band
of French soldiers, with the intrepid subaltern l among
1 His name was Legros. Houssaye calls him lieutenant ; but it
appears from Martineau's list that he was only a sub-lieutenant.
358 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. them, was slain to a man. Others of Jerome's
June 1 8. skirmishers swept round the north side of the buildings,
and others again, extending themselves to westward,
crept up unseen through the tall rye and opening fire
upon Smith's British battery, which was unlimbered
above them, compelled it to retire. Four companies
of the Coldstream under Colonel Woodford, however,
now came up and, driving off the skirmishers first,
fell next upon the flank of the ist Light. Caught
between two fires, from within the wall and without,
the French gave way immediately. Some of Soye's
men, attempting to debouch from the wood into the
orchard, were likewise charged by the light companies
of the First Guards under Lord Saltoun and hurled
back in disorder. Woodford seized the moment to
strengthen the garrison within the buildings ; and
Hougoumont was for the present safe.
By this time Napoleon's dispositions for his main
attack were nearly if not quite complete ; but still
Jerome chose to think that his one corner of the field
was the most important. He had by this time taken the
keen edge off most of the seven battalions of Bauduin's
brigade, which had suffered only trifling loss at Quatre-
Bras, and off the one regiment of Soye's brigade which
had not been severely punished in that action. But,
persisting in his onslaught, he now called battalion after
battalion of Foy's division into action, making use
presumably of Gauthier's brigade, for Jamin's had
lost over forty officers and from six to seven hundred
men on the i6th. Jerome now sent his skirmishers
to creep along the eastern hedge of the park, in order
to turn the enclosures by the east, while the troops in
the wood advanced again to a gap in the fence which
separated the coppice from the orchard. These last
met and forced back Saltoun's light companies of the
First Guards, which fell back slowly from tree to tree,
drawing their assailants under the fire of the red-coats
that lined the eastern wall of the garden. At the same
time Wellington sent two companies of the Third
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 359
Guards down the outer hedge to meet the French 1815.
flanking parties upon the eastern side ; and after a June 18.
sharp fight the enemy was again driven back, though
the British line of defence was by this time contracted
to the southern hedge of the orchard and the southern
wall of the garden.
It was now somewhat past one o'clock. Shortly
before one, Ney, who was in charge of Napoleon's
main attack, had sent a message to say that all was ready,
when the Emperor, who had taken his station on a
high knoll in front of the farm of Rossomme, close to
the Brussels road, observed a column of troops, some
five or six miles to north-east, emerging from the wood
of Chapelle St. Lambert. Uncertain what they might
be, he sent off a detachment of cavalry to ascertain,
when a Prussian hussar, captured by a French patrol
about Lasnes, was brought to him. This man, who
was extremely communicative, reported that the column
just observed was Blilow's vanguard, and that the
entire Prussian army had been assembled on the
previous night at Wavre. The Emperor, who had
already written to Grouchy, ordering him to close in
towards the main French army, now added the informa-
tion gained from the Prussian prisoner, with injunctions
to hasten the movement and crush Biilow, while Soult
appended the further explanation, " Manoeuvre so as
to join our right." Napoleon then sent out Subervie's
and Domont's divisions of light cavalry to observe the
movements of the Prussians, occupy the passages by
which they would debouch, and join hands with
Grouchy's columns as soon as they should" appear.
Lobau's corps was likewise detached to support this
cavalry in some position where it could check the
advance of this new enemy. The total number of
troops thus withdrawn from the field amounted to
some eight thousand infantry and three thousand
cavalry, with thirty-two guns.
Before the last orders had been given, the French
guns opened fire to cover the great advance upon
360 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Wellington's left centre. No fewer than eighty
June 1 8. pieces, twenty-four of them the Emperor's favourite
twelve-pounders, had been massed about and before
La Belle Alliance, and were now raining round-shot
upon the opposite slope as fast as the gunners could
load them. At about half-past one d'Erlon's infantry
began to move in echelon of divisions from the left,
at intervals of a quarter of a mile between divisions.
Quiot's led the way immediately on the east side of
the Brussels road; and then followed in succession to
the right the divisions of Donzelot, Marcognet and
Durutte, the whole numbering some sixteen thousand
men. Quiot's division was formed with its two
brigades side by side, each brigade in close column
of battalions. The remainder were simply massed in
close column of battalions, three ranks deep ; conse-
quently, each division, being made up of eight battalions
of a strength varying from four hundred and fifty to
six hundred men, took the form of a dense mass with
a front of one hundred and seventy to two hun-
dred men and a depth of twenty-four men. The in-
evitable result was that out of some four thousand
muskets only four hundred at most were in the firing
line. This was an old fault, for which the French had
suffered a score of times in the Peninsula ; but it was
aggravated in this instance by closing up the battalions
until they practically made only one body, twenty-four
ranks deep, without leaving any distance between them
for deployment. Indeed it is difficult to see how these
divisions could have been deployed at all unless the
battalions had filed to the right or left by threes, which
was an extremely awkward, if not impossible, manoeuvre
under a heavy fire. To whose instructions this for-
mation was due does not appear ; but Ney, who was
in command of the attack, d'Erlon, who was in com-
mand of the corps, Quiot and Marcognet, the divi-
sional leaders, had all of them served in Spain, and
should have known better than to match men so
clumsily arrayed against British troops in position.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 361
However, d'Erlon's corps, having been defrauded of 1815.
its share of battle on the i6th, was eager for the fight, June 18.
and advanced with loud shouts to the attack.
As the French columns drew near the hostile line,
they threw out skirmishers ; and, as Quiot's division
approached La Haye Sainte, the left brigade inclined
slightly to the left to attack the farm, while the right
brigade continued its advance on the east side of the
road. Swarming into the orchard the French engaged
three companies of the 2nd Light Battalion of the
Legion, which received them with a biting fire, but
were borne back by sheer weight of numbers into the
barn. On the western side of the orchard, however,
two companies of the ist Light Battalion and one of
Hanoverian rifles poured destructive volleys into the
flank of the advancing enemy ; and, Kielmansegge
having detached a light battalion to the assistance of
the garrison, Baring led his men to a counter-attack.
But Napoleon had detached Traverses brigade of
cuirassiers to cover the left flank of Quiot, and these,
coming suddenly upon the skirmishers just as Kiel-
mansegge's men were joining them, caused the whole
to crowd together in confusion. The cuirassiers
charged ; the counter-attack in the garden, being
unsupported, gave way ; the French, sweeping round
the buildings, mastered the garden on the north side ;
and the Germans took refuge where best they could,
some in the main position and some in the buildings.
Ten of their officers fell in this unfortunate affair;
but the men in the buildings stood firm, and not all
the efforts of the French could avail to dislodge them.
Farther to the east the two companies of Rifles in the
gravel-pit were outflanked and forced back upon their
reserves on the mound; and these in turn, sticking to
their position for too long, were obliged to retreat with
some precipitation across the Ohain road, where the
battalion re-formed a few yards in rear of the northern
hedge. Thus La Haye Sainte was totally isolated, but
remained safe in the hands of its valiant garrison.
362 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Still farther to the east, Bourgeois's brigade, struck
June 1 8. by the fire of the Rifles from the mound and of Ross's
guns in the road, had swerved to the right close to
Donzelot's division, while Marcognet's division had
likewise gravitated to its left towards Donzelot's,
so that practically the five brigades advanced as
one. Opposed to them were four battalions of
Bijlandt's Netherlandish brigade (which at noon
had been withdrawn in rear of the road) in first
line, and the remaining battalion, flanked to its right
and left by the brigades of Kempt and Pack, in second
J S N - line. The Netherlanders had been much shaken, as
<^ N was pardonable in raw troops, by the fire of the French
4t*> [ artillery; and, as the masses of the French infantry
drew nearer, they became more and more unsteady.
Finally, after a little wild firing they broke and ran
away, in spite of all the efforts of their officers, and
taking shelter on the reverse slope of the position,
refused, at any rate most of them, to come forward
again. 1 In their flight they carried away with them
for the moment the gunners of Bijleveld's Nether-
landish battery, who, in contrast to its comrades of the
infantry, had stood to their pieces most valiantly.
Thus a large gap was torn in the Allied line, but
Picton, who had marked the wavering of the Belgians,
deployed Kempt's brigade, which, holding its fire until
Bourgeois was within close range at some points, it
should seem, within twenty yards poured in a volley
1 Once again, in spite of all the pleading of Le Bas and Wommersom,
the testimony of all British narrators is so strong as to the misbehaviour
of Bijlandt's brigade that I cannot reject it. Moreover, it seems to be
confirmed rather than refuted by the official report of Colonel van
Zuylen, upon which those distinguished authors so greatly rely. The
Colonel ascribes the feebleness of his compatriots' fire to the fact that
they were formed in two ranks instead of three, which was presumably
the Prince of Orange's doing. He admits that the fall of a few files
produced a gap through which the French columns advanced, that the
British attacked the said columns in flank, and that he himself seconded
their movement with 400 men that he had rallied. If the Nether-
landers had not run away, they would have been in front of the French
and more than 400 strong. Nor would the 400 have needed rallying.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 363
and then charged with the bayonet, causing the enemy 1815.
to recoil with heavy loss. In this affray Picton j une 18.
received a bullet in the temple and fell from his horse
dead.
Donzelot meanwhile pressed on to the summit of
the ridge, where he halted within forty yards of the
road in order to deploy, while his skirmishers pushed
on through the hedges that lined it. Marcognet,
thinking deployment impossible, pressed forward
without attempting to change his formation ; and
his leading battalions bored their way through the
hedges as best they could, though not without disorder.
TXere was nothing, to all appearance, to stop this
mass, some eight thousand strong, but Pack's brigade
of the Royals, Forty-second, Forty-fourth and Ninety-
second, which, after their losses at Quatre Bras,
counted between them barely fourteen hundred
bayonets. Leaving the Forty-fourth in reserve, Pack
formed the three remaining battalions four deep and
advanced, apparently in echelon from the left for
the Ninety-second was the first to come into action
to within twenty yards of the enemy, when they fired
their volleys in quick succession obliquely into the
front and flank of Marcognet's column. It does not
appear that the French were thereby checked, though,
having sustained much loss from the Allied artillery
during the advance, they may have been for the
moment staggered. According to the French account,
which seems the most probable, Marcognet's leading
battalions returned the fire, and leaped forward with
the bayonet. The British did not at once turn,
apparently, and for a few moments there was a con-
fused and deadly fight ; but the odds against them
were too strong full four, indeed if Donzelot's
division be reckoned, full eight to one. The
moment was most critical. Bourgeois's brigade,
though shaken, had not given way past recovery.
On its left Travers's cuirassiers had re-formed after
cutting the Hanoverian battalion to pieces, and
364 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. were advancing up the hill. On its right Donzelot
June 1 8. was deploying on the crest of the ridge, so far
undefeated, and Marcognet was threatening to sweep
everything before him with the bayonet. On the side
of the Allies Kempt's brigade was steady and for the
moment victorious. The gunners, by or without
orders, were leaving their guns and hurrying to the
rear ; x and Pack's brigade, though not past rallying,
was certainly not standing firm. 2 It is small wonder
that Napoleon and his staff, watching the struggle
from La Belle Alliance, thought that all was going
well.
But before the French columns reached the summit,
Uxbridge had ordered the Union Brigade farther to
the left, over against the line of Donzelot's and Mar-
cognet's attack, and had himself taken post with the
Household Brigade immediately to west of the Brussels
road. As Traverses cuirassiers came up the slope he
directed the King's Dragoon Guards and First Life
Guards against their front, with the Second Life
Guards in echelon to their left, and held the Blues in
reserve. Traverses left being somewhat in advance
was first checked, but the right, pushing on, came upon
the deep cutting in the Ohain road immediately to
west of the cross-ways. Scrambling down one side and
up the other, they were met, before they could re-form
their ranks, by the remainder of the King's Dragoon
Guards and First Life Guards. Thus caught at a
disadvantage, the cuirassiers were broken and repulsed.
Some turned straight back and galloped dpwn the
hill, pursued by the two British regiments ; others
inclined to their right, with the Second Life Guards
at their heels, plunged into the Brussels road, and
galloped down it as far as the barricade before La
1 A sergeant of Rogers's battery actually spiked one of his guns at
this time. Waterloo Letters, p. 238.
2 See Waterloo Letters, pp. 72, 77, 81, 82. The only regiment
mentioned as inclined to retire is the 92nd, but I do not believe that,
if they had retired, the others would have stood.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 365
Haye Sainte, where, being stopped, they wheeled to 1815.
their left and fled through the open space between June 18,
the Ohain road and the gravel-pit.
Simultaneously the Union Brigade swooped down
upon the heads of the French infantry columns,
the Royals on the right assailing Bourgeois's brigade,
the Inniskillings falling upon Donzelot and the Greys
upon Marcognet. They were barely one thousand
sabres altogether, but their approach was hidden from
the French by the hollows of the reverse slope of the
ridge, and their onslaught was as furious as it was
sudden. For a moment the French masses seethed
madly as the unhappy men, tightly crowded together,
strove to defend themselves with musket and bayonet ;
and then they dissolved into a mere pack of fugitives,
flying down the slope towards their own position, with
the sabres of the British dragoons playing havoc among
them. As it chanced, some of Traverses cuirassiers
were driven headlong into the broken ranks of the
French infantry, increasing their confusion ; and the
Second Life Guards joining the right of the Innis-
killings, the two regiments combined in the impartial
chase of horse and foot.
Seldom in all military history has there been seen
a more terrific smashing of formed infantry by
cavalry. It is small wonder that the British troopers
became drunk and maddened by their success. Their
horses were good and fairly fresh, for there had been
no weight crushing down their backs all night, as
in the case of the French ; the ground was in their
favour ; the men could not only sit in the saddle but
could ride ; and from ten to fifteen thousand French
were retreating or flying before them. Quiot's troops,
left in isolation at La Haye Sainte, abandoned the
attack. Durutte on the extreme east, after driving
the Nassauers from Papelotte and nearly reaching the
crest of the ridge, found his right flank assailed by the
Twelfth Light Dragoons, who drove him back in great
confusion upon his reserves. It seemed as if the
366 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. British cavalry would sweep all before them ; and no
June 1 8. sound of voice or trumpet could make the men stop.
The Household and Union Brigades galloped on
over the plain and up the acclivity of La Belle Alliance,
until the former came under the fire of Bachelu's
division, which had been slightly advanced to cover
d'Erlon's flank during his attack, and were received
with a storm of bullets which overthrew many men
and scores of horses. Then, seeing a compact body
of cuirassiers advancing against them, they wheeled
about and retreated, the Blues, which were less out of
hand than the rest, striving to cover the retreat.
Farther to the left the Greys, with some of the
Royals and Inniskillings, dashed into the midst of two
divisional batteries, half-way up the ridge, cut down
gunners, drivers and horses, upset the guns into a
ravine, and then swinging sharply to their left assailed
Napoleon's great battery of eighty pieces. The Em-
peror ordered two regiments of Delort's cuirassiers
to attack them ; but, before these could move, the 3rd
and 4th Lancers of Jacquinot's division fell upon the
left flank of the British and bade fair to annihilate
them. In no kind of order, and with horses blown
and exhausted, the remnants of the Union Brigade
could make little resistance nor even attempt to fly.
Sir William Ponsonby was borne down and killed,
and indeed few of them would have escaped, had not
the Twelfth and Sixteenth Light Dragoons of Vande-
leur's brigade come to their rescue, charged the French
lancers in turn, and given their comrades some respite.
Thus tardily and with difficulty the remnants of the
two brigades crawled back to their places behind La
Haye Sainte. Of two thousand troopers and horses
that had charged, over one thousand horses and from
seven to eight hundred men were killed, wounded and
missing. The Twelfth Light Dragoons also had
lost their Colonel, Frederick Ponsonby, who was
desperately wounded, and the strength of a whole
squadron either hurt or slain.
CH. xxv HISTORY OF THE ARMY 367
Over the greater part of the field there was now 1815.
a lull, except for a continuous duel of artillery, while June 18.
both sides regained their positions. D'Erlon's losses
had been very heavy ; and both Bourgeois's brigade
and Marcognet's division were for the present unfit
for further action. At least two thousand French
prisoners had been captured. In one place their
muskets lay in rows on the field as if they had been
grounded by word of command ; and the panic was so
great that some of the fugitives ran as far as Genappe
before they could be stopped. 1 Twenty or thirty
French guns had been disabled. The eagles of the
iO5th and 45th were taken ; and the moral effect of
the charge of the Union Brigade was strong and per-
manent. On the other hand, Donzelot's division,
though not unscathed, had retired in comparatively
good order, and the Allies had paid a heavy price for
their success. The two finest brigades of the British
cavalry had almost ceased to exist ; and there was a
strong feeling that, if they had been supported, their
success might have been more far-reaching and more
permanent. Uxbridge, in fact, had been unable to
resist the temptation of leading the first line of the
Household Brigade himself ; the Blues and the Greys,
which he had designed to act as reserves, had both
been drawn into the main attack ; and at the critical
moment there was no general director of the whole
movement and consequently no support at hand to
maintain the leading squadrons. Uxbridge reproached
himself bitterly to the end of his days for his fault ;
but the mischief was done and could not be amended.
Moreover, one Hanoverian battalion had been anni-
hilated. Bijlandt's brigade, though the officers had
wrought their utmost to hearten the men, was to all
intent out of action ; and hundreds of the Nether-
landish soldiers were hidden away in the forest of
Soignes, where they lay at their ease with piled arms,
cooking their soup and smoking until the time should
1 Houssaye, p. 356.
368 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. come for them to advance in safety or to disperse to
June 1 8. their homes, as the fortune of the day might dictate.
Round Hougoumont the struggle never ceased to
rage with extreme bitterness, as Foy and Jerome threw
more and more of their battalions into the fight.
Byng was obliged to relieve Saltoun by sending down
his battalion of the Third Guards, which cleared the
orchard by a counter-attack and, establishing itself
along the southern hedge, restored security. Napoleon
then sent a battery of howitzers to play upon the
buildings, and, the shells setting fire to a barn, the
flames rapidly spread to the mansion, stables and cow-
houses. The garrison, reinforced by a battalion of
Brunswickers and another of Duplat's brigade, none
the less continued their resistance. The wounded
lying in the burning buildings were left perforce to
their fate in spite of many efforts to rescue them ; but
the survivors fought on. The fire fortunately stopped
at the chapel ; the French infantry, disheartened by
many failures, no longer showed the same resolution
in attack ; and, ensconced in the chapel and in such
other out - buildings as had escaped destruction, the
defenders held grimly on to Hougoumont.
CHAPTER XXVI
IT was now about three o'clock. Wellington had 1815.
brought Pack's brigade forward to take the place of June 18.
Bijlandt's, summoned Lambert's brigade to the sup-
port of the Fifth Division, and closed in the whole of
his left towards the centre. The Rifles also had re-
occupied the mound at La Haye Sainte ; and two fresh
companies had been sent into the buildings, the
defence of the orchard being now abandoned. The
Emperor now reinforced Reille's artillery by some
of the Guards' twelve-pounders, making them up to
thirty-four pieces, and ordered them, together with
the grand battery, to play upon the right and left
centre of the Allies. The cannonade was more intense
than the oldest soldier among the Allies had ever
experienced, and Wellington withdrew the first line
along a great part of his left centre a hundred yards
farther to the rear, so as to give them better shelter.
Under cover of this shower of shot and shell Ney led
Quiot's troops once more to the assault of La Haye
Sainte, while one of Donzelot's brigades advanced, not
in columns but in loose swarms, to cover his right
flank. Once again the main attack failed before the
steadfast defence of the German Legionaries under
Baring ; and Donzelot's skirmishers, meeting Kempt's
and Lambert's brigades half- way up the hill, were driven
back before they could make any headway. In fact,
the onset appears to have been half-hearted, perhaps
because the French had not yet recovered from the
VOL. x 369 2 B
370 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. shock of their previous repulse ; and in many narra-
June 1 8. tives of the battle it is not even mentioned. 1
The general retrograde movement of the Allied
infantry upon the reopening of the cannonade had,
however, caught the eye of Ney, who, misconstruing it
as the beginning of a general retreat, conceived the
idea of establishing a footing on the plateau with
cavalry. He therefore summoned Farine's brigade
of Delort's division of cuirassiers ; and, when Delort
pleaded that he could take no orders except from
Milhaud, who commanded the corps, the Marshal,
much incensed, directed not only the brigade but
the entire corps to advance with him. Lefebvre-
Desnoettes's light cavalry of the Guard followed
likewise, with or without orders ; and eight regiments
of cuirassiers, one of lancers and one of mounted
chasseurs, five thousand men in all, trotted down to
the low ground just to west of the Brussels road to
form for the attack. Wellington and his staff stood
amazed. He had looked, possibly, for a still more
formidable assault upon Hougoumont ; and, as most
of Byng's brigade had already been swallowed up by
the first attack, he had brought forward four Brunswick
battalions from Merbe Braine to fill the vacant place.
But a charge of cavalry upon unbroken infantry
seemed, after the experience of Quatre Bras, sheer
madness. The infantry, drawn up by battalions
chequerwise, received orders to form square, and the
gunners were bidden to fire to the very last moment,
and then to take shelter in the nearest squares,
removing first the near wheel from every gun and
trundling it before them to their refuge. 2
Just before Ney set his cavalry in motion, Fire's
horse made a demonstration with both squadrons
1 See Houssaye, p. 364. The authorities quoted by him establish
beyond doubt the fact that this second attack was delivered.
2 This last detail is chronicled in the Life of Sir William Gomm,
p. 373 ; but is probably best known to the mid- Victorian generation
through the pages of Henry Kingsley's Ravens hoe.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 371
and battery against the British right, drawing off the 1815.
Thirteenth Light Dragoons and Fifteenth Hussars of j une
Grant's brigade, as well as the Second Light Dragoons
of the Legion, to oppose it. The trumpets then rang
out, and the noble array of horsemen began to move,
cuirassiers on the right, chasseurs and lancers on the
left, in a north-westerly direction obliquely across the
valley, so as to strike the Ohain road where it ran level
with the rest of the ground. Their formation was in
echelon of columns of squadrons, 1 with the right,
presumably, leading ; and since their front, straitened
as it was between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte,
can little have exceeded eight hundred yards, they
must have presented an ideal target for artillery.
Their advance cannot have been rapid, for the rye
rose well above their girths, 2 and the ground beneath
it, being still wet, must soon have been poached into
deep mud. The pace too must have decreased as they
breasted the hill, which no doubt soon became slippery,
and such horses as had been loaded with their riders
all night must speedily have flagged. The French
artillery necessarily ceased firing as they ascended the
ridge ; and the French cavalry's line being oblique
to that of the Allies, Wellington's guns were able
to pour a tempest of shot not only into their front
but into their flanks, blasting away whole heads of
squadrons when they came within close range. The
French horsemen naturally wavered, for they could
hardly move forward over the heaps of dead horses.
Indeed, opposite Mercer's battery, not far from the
north-eastern corner of the orchard of Hougoumont,
the front ranks turned and, finding themselves pressed
forward by the rear ranks, actually fought them with
blows and "curses in their eagerness to ride back ;
1 Houssaye, p. 371.
2 I never realised how immensely heavy Were the rye-crops on the
field of Waterloo until I found in the Royal Collection at Windsor
Castle nine water-colour drawings of the field, made by Denis Dighton
on the days immediately following the battle in fact, before the dead
had been buried.
372 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. while Mercer's nine-pounders, doubly loaded with case
June 1 8. and round-shot, riddled the seething masses from end
to end.
Elsewhere the French cavalry rode into the batteries,
but found themselves none the better for it. They could
not carry off the guns, and they possessed no means
of spiking them. They could only pass through the
intervals with ranks thinned and disordered, spur
their horses into some semblance of a gallop and fall
upon the squares. But, the farther they went, the
more their front was contracted between the cuttings
of the Nivelles road and the Brussels road, so that the
squadrons became crowded together and their pace
was checked. Moreover, the squares being arranged
chequerwise, it was impossible to assail any one of
them except under a flanking fire from others. Here,
therefore, as at Quatre Bras, the French cavalry was
reduced to an aimless wandering in and out of the
squares, suffering very heavy loss and inflicting very
little damage. Uxbridge meanwhile collected six
regiments from the Brunswick cavalry, Grant's,
Dornberg's and Arentschild's brigades, with which,
backed by three brigades of Netherlandish cavalry,
he made a counter-attack, which swept the cuirassiers
clean off the plateau into the dead ground under the
southern slope of the ridge.
The Allied gunners instantly ran back to their
guns and replaced the wheels ; and meanwhile
Wellington, ceasing to be anxious for his right, had
considerably altered his dispositions in that quarter.
Clinton's division was moved up from its place in
reserve into the front line. Hew Halkett's Hanoverian
brigade was placed as a support to the Brunswickers
on Maitland's right ; the Twenty-third from Mitchell's
brigade was posted in the middle of the Brunswickers
to give them the countenance of a veteran regiment ;
Adam's brigade was stationed on their right ; and
Duplat's brigade took up its position on the slope in
rear of Hougoumont to be ready to reinforce that post.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 373
These changes appear to have been completed 1815.
when the French cavalry, having rallied with amazing j un e 18.
quickness, appeared once again upon the comb of the
ridge and renewed their attack. For the second time
they trotted through an appalling fire of artillery into
the deserted batteries and passed on to repeat their
futile gyrations round and round the squares. Unable
to pierce the hedges of bayonets, small parties of brave
men engaged the red-coated infantry with their pistols,
hoping to provoke the face of some square to waste a
volley upon them and so to give a reserve, which was
kept in rear of them, the chance of charging an array of
empty muskets. Their efforts were fruitless. Not
a red-coat fired except by word of command. The
horses, by this time unable to trot, walked round and
round the bayonets in helpless swarms till they were
shot down ; and the second attack failed as completely
as the first. The French cavalry, therefore, fell back
down the hill ; and as they went, two columns of
Quiot's and Donzelot's infantry, which had advanced
against La Haye Sainte, fell back likewise ; while
some battalions of Foy's division, which had crept
up into the orchard of Hougoumont to turn the flank
of the garrison, were driven back into the coppice by
the Third Guards.
From the heights of La Belle Alliance the appear-
ance of the opposite plateau, with the French horsemen
swarming through the batteries and about the squares,
apparently masters of the ground, made many of the
French think that the victory was won. Napoleon
himself may have thought so for a moment, but he
was soon undeceived ; and Soult, who knew the ways
of Wellington, was probably not deluded for an instant.
The Emperor realised that Ney's attack had been
premature, but, being committed to it, he decided to
support it, and sent orders to Kellermann and Guyot
to lead their ten regiments to the charge. Kellermann
was inclined to demur ; but 1'Heritier marched off his
division at the trot without awaiting further orders,
374 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. and Kellermann had no option but to follow with the
June 1 8. other. Napoleon, in his own narrative, declared that
he wished to hold Guyot's brigade of the Guard in
reserve, and tried to recall it ; but it seems certain
that he did nothing of the kind. Beyond doubt he
hoped to gallop over the right centre of the Allies and
finish off the battle without further ado ; and he hoped
so, because he was beginning to realise that, unless he
could do so, he might sustain a disastrous defeat.
Bliicher had overtaken Biilow's corps at Chapelle
St. Lambert at about one o'clock and had at once sent
out patrols to explore the passages of the Lasnes and
of Paris Wood, which covered the ground for some
fifteen hundred yards, north and south, beyond it.
At about two o'clock, when Billow's rear-guard was
yet an hour's march away, the patrols returned with
the report that the French were still at a safe distance ;
and the Field-marshal at once gave the order to march
upon Plancenoit. The roads were infamous, the
descent to the Lasnes being very steep and the ascent
from the stream westward even steeper ; and the men
were weary after an exceedingly trying march, and weak
from long fasting. It seemed hopeless to attempt to
drag guns axle-deep in mud up so heavy an incline ;
but Bliicher would hear of no difficulties. Along the
line of march he was cheering and encouraging his
men. " I have promised Wellington," he kept saying
to them. " You would not have me break my word."
His strong will and fiery energy stimulated even the most
sluggish to extreme effort ; and at about four o'clock
the heads of his columns reached the western border
of Paris Wood, where the two leading divisions
halted in concealment. Bliicher would gladly have
waited for the rest of Bulow's corps to come up ; but
Wellington's messages, bidding him hasten, became
more and more urgent ; and at half-past four the two
divisions, covered by two regiments of cavalry and
three light batteries, emerged from the wood right and
left of the Plancenoit road. His guns unlimbered
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 375
and opened fire upon Domont's squadrons, which, after 1815.
a dash upon the Prussian hussars, fell back slowly, June 1 8,
and then wheeling off right and left revealed Lobau's
corps extended in two lines astride the road, about a
mile and a 'half east of the highway to Brussels. Lobau,
promptly taking the offensive, drove the Prussians
back ; and Bliicher was fain to halt until the rear of
Biilow's column should close up.
Bliicher's guns must have been heard both by
Wellington and Napoleon soon after half-past four.
His first engagement with Lobau must have occurred
between five and half-past five, just as Kellermann's
and Guyot's squadrons were forming in the low ground,
with the wreck of Milhaud's corps streaming back all
round them. Milhaud's men quickly rallied behind the
new array ; and the whole moved forward once again,
sixty squadrons some nine thousand strong, all cramped
within a front which could barely have held nine
hundred horsemen, knee to knee, without any intervals
whatever. The French batteries, as before, preluded
the attack by a terrific cannonade, which was continued
to the last moment and ceased only as Kellermann's
squadrons breasted the ascent. Advancing on the
track of their predecessors, they could not move fast
over ground poached deep by the trampling of
thousands of hoofs, and fared no better than they.
The front ranks were torn to tatters by the Allied
artillery as they ascended the slope to the batteries, and,
when the survivors had passed by the abandoned
guns, they were sucked by a dozen channels into
the intervals between the squares, where they eddied
round and round them in streams and backwaters,
now firing their pistols, now charging resolutely in
small bodies, but always beaten off by the steady fire
from behind the bayonets. There were squares that
sustained many attacks, but it does not appear that
one of them was broken. 1 There was no particular
1 The French (see Houssaye, p. 383) claim to have broken two or
three squares and to have taken two colours, one from a British
376 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. reason why they should have been, for there was no
June 1 8. thunder of hoofs growing momentarily louder, no wall
of dust rushing steadily nearer, no awful emergence
of maddened horses and gleaming blades in endless
lines and waves from the dust-cloud, no element, in fact,
of the terror which cavalry can strike into infantry
even in the manoeuvres of peace. Instead of all this
there were simply swarms of exasperated men on weary
horses, who walked round and round, fetlock-deep in
mire, swearing loudly and making desperate thrusts
from time to time through the hedge of bayonets, but
doing very little harm and offering generally a capital
target. The incessant procession of these walking
cavaliers might have terrified young soldiers for a
moment, but old soldiers never. Whether to young
or to old it was an ordeal incomparably less trying
than to lie down, either in line four deep or in square,
amid the bursting shells and wicked ricochetting round-
shot which earlier in the day had poured in an un-
broken stream from the French batteries. Under
such a fire men could only endure and hope, for there
was no means of reply ; but, within squares safely
closed up, the disjointed attacks of walking cuirassiers
battalion and one from a battalion of the German Legion. British
and Legion, as is well known, have never admitted that a square was
broken, much less that a colour was lost, at Waterloo. Vague claims
to the capture of colours are too common in the reports of French
officers during the Peninsular War to carry the slightest weight with
me. The receipt of a captured British colour signed by Grouchy's
aide-de-camp (quoted by Houssaye, p. 383) is something more definite,
but would deserve greater credit if it stated the regiment to which the
colour belonged. I have never heard of a colour lost at Waterloo ;
and, as the loss of its colour by the 6gth at Quatre Bras was not
concealed, I do not see how such a mishap could have been kept secret
by any regiment. The 9th Cuirassiers, who claim to have taken a
colour at Waterloo, were engaged at Quatre Bras and may have been
the captors of the 69th's colour, which may have been handed over
to Grouchy as having been taken at Waterloo. The gth lost two
officers at Quatre Bras and thirteen at Waterloo : and in the general
disorganisation after the latter'actionthe mistake could easily have been
made.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 377
were not very dangerous, and afforded endless oppor- 1815.
tunities for telling return blows. June 18.
Gradually the French horsemen began to retire
down the slope, first in small parties, then in broken
squadrons, and finally in complete masses. The
British gunners rushed back to their cannon, but had
barely time to fire a few rounds into the backs of their
enemies before a fresh array came up the hill with
its left close to the eastern fence of Hougoumont,
This was Blancard's brigade of carbineers which
Kellermann, with excellent judgment, had hidden in a
fold of the ground during his advance, to act as a
reserve. These now advanced up the height, backed,
apparently, by a brigade of cuirassiers ; but at this
moment Grant, having undeceived himself as to the
true intent of Pire"s demonstration on Wellington's
extreme right, had left one squadron of the Fifteenth
to watch the French horse in that quarter, and returned
to his original place in rear of Hougoumont. Forming
the Thirteenth Light Dragoons in line he launched
them at the flank of the carbineers, and a few minutes
later directed the Fifteenth Hussars upon the flank of
the cuirassiers. Both charges were successful, driving
the enemy down the hill upon their main body. This
last, however, having rallied, now with the greatest
gallantry renewed its attack ; and the Thirteenth and ,
Fifteenth were compelled to fall back, which they did
with great steadiness, to the rear of the infantry.
Once again the tide of the French cavalry surged
into the intervals between the squares, flooding the space
up to the bayonets but there stopping and rippling
round them through channels now cumbered with
the corpses of man and beast, powerless to break
over the immovable boulders of red -coats. No
men could have showed more persistent bravery
than the French troopers ; but they were opposed
to adversaries as stubborn as themselves. After a
time, as the more daring spirits were struck down,
the attack became feebler and feebler. Riders and
378 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. horses were in fact exhausted. The atmosphere was
June 1 8. still heavy and thunderous, and the crowding of a vast
mass of men and horses, all alike heated by extreme
exertion, made the temperature almost insupportable.
A stream of dismounted cavaliers was constantly
pouring to the rear ; small parties began to follow
them ; the whole wavered irresolutely, then, upon the
advance of the Allied cavalry, gave way and were swept
over the plateau. Their losses had been frightful.
Ney, having had three horses killed under him, was
afoot, raging with fury. In Kellermann's corps both
divisional generals and three brigadiers were wounded
and the fourth brigadier was killed. In Milhaud's
corps both divisional generals and three out of four
brigadiers were wounded, and in the cavalry of the
Guard General Guyot was wounded. Hardly a general
officer was left standing, and there was not a regiment
of cuirassiers which had lost less than a dozen
officers. Nevertheless it seems that Ney gathered the
wreck of them together for a fourth charge, which was
as gallantly delivered as the condition of the horses
would permit, but failed as completely as all the rest.
The flower of the French cavalry had been wrecked
upon a score of attenuated squares.
Ney now resorted to the tactics which he should
have employed at first ; namely, to use infantry and
cavalry in conjunction with each other. Wellington,
anticipating some such design, had some time before
ordered Chasse's Netherlandish Division to march to
a hollow in rear of the Guards so as to liberate Duplat's
and Adam's brigades for work in the front line, and
had reinforced his artillery by two batteries. In due
time two columns of Bachelu's and Foy's divisions,
supported by cavalry, advanced against the centre of the
Allied right wing under a heavy fire from the British
guns. " It was a hail of death," wrote Foy afterwards ;
and the French infantry quailed under it. Bachelu's
men turned first and carried away Foy's in their flight.
Foy himself was wounded, but rallied his men in the
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 379
ravine to the south of Hougoumont before he left the 1815.
field. The attack was then renewed and was met and June 18.
checked for a time by a charge of Somerset's Household
Brigade. But Trip's Netherlandish cavalry, which
were in support, refused to move forward ; and, when
they saw the cuirassiers moving forward against them,
they turned and galloped to the rear, greatly disordering
the 3rd Hussars of the Legion in their flight. The 3rd,
presently rallying, charged and broke the cuirassiers
immediately opposed to them, but were enveloped by
others upon their flanks and were fain to retreat to the
rear of the squares with very heavy loss. Uxbridge
then called upon another Netherlandish regiment, the
Cumberland Hussars, to move forward ; but in this
corps the rawness of the men was supplemented by
the cowardice of their colonel ; and, in spite of all
efforts to make them stand, even out of fire, these
wretched creatures galloped off to Brussels, spreading
panic as they went. Meanwhile, Wellington had
ordered Duplat's brigade to reinforce the right centre ;
and the rifle-fire of its four light companies compelled
the line of French horse to withdraw. The remainder
of the brigade then came up, together with Sympher's
battery, and formed squares to resist the second line
of French horse ; but the French skirmishers during
the attacks of the cavalry had seized the opportunity
to creep up under the eastern hedge of Hougoumont
to the brow of the main position, from whence they
poured in a most galling fire upon the squares. Duplat
fell mortally wounded, and the horses of all the mounted
officers were killed ; but it was impossible for the
Germans to deploy, from fear of a charge from the
enemy's cavalry. The charge was presently delivered,
and was manfully beaten off; whereupon the skir-
mishers swarmed forward again to ply the squares
with bullets while the French mounted batteries
unlimbered to scourge them with grape, so as to
prepare the way for another charge.
Through this most trying ordeal the bearing of
380 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Duplat's battalions was wholly admirable; and presently
June 1 8. they were relieved by the advance of Adam's brigade,
in two lines four deep, with Wellington himself at their
head. The moment was most critical, for the gunners
of the Allies had been driven from their guns, and the
French skirmishers in great force had opened a very
heavy fire upon Adam's advancing battalions. " Drive
those fellows away," ordered the Duke calmly ; and
the Seventy-first together with the eight companies
of the Rifles 1 obediently drove them from the crest,
halted in a slight hollow near the north-east angle of
the Hougoumont enclosures and formed squares, the
Seventy-first on the right, the Fifty-second in squares
of wings in the centre, and the Ninety-fifth on the left.
They were promptly assailed by Guyot's brigade of the
Imperial Guard, but they received them with volleys so
telling that after several charges the French drew off,
there being few but dismounted men left to retire.
Two battalions of Hew Halkett's Hanoverian brigade
then advanced to the southern slope of the ridge,
taking post to the rear of Duplat ; and the right centre
of the Allies was thus firmly re-established.
Simultaneously Ney had directed a part of Donzelot's
division upon La Haye Sainte. Baring, who was
short of rifle-ammunition, sent urgent messages for a
supply but could obtain none, though three additional
companies were sent to reinforce his garrison. The
French made a desperate attempt to break in by an
unclosed doorway, opening on the south side into a
barn, and, failing, set the barn itself on fire. With great
readiness Baring ordered his men to fill their camp-
kettles at a pond in the yard, and though many lost
their lives in thus fetching water, he succeeded
in extinguishing the flames. While these were thus
desperately engaged with one party of the enemy,
another swarm of French skirmishers advanced beyond
the buildings on the western side, with the intention
either of breaking in on the north side or of cutting ofT
1 2nd batt. : 6 cos. ; 3rd batt. : 2 cos.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 381
the post altogether from the main position. There- 1815.
upon the Prince of Orange ordered the 5th and 8th June 18.
battalions of the Legion to deploy and advance ; and
the brave Germans, hoping that there would now be
an end of lying down under a heavy cannonade, ran
eagerly forward driving the French before them.
The 8th, which was in advance, was on the point of
charging with the bayonet when a body of French
cuirassiers, fresh from an unsuccessful attempt upon
Kielmansegge's squares, suddenly burst upon their
right flank by surprise and rolled them up from end
to end. The unfortunate battalion was practically
annihilated, most of its officers were killed, and the
King's colour was captured. None the less the attack
on La Haye Sainte was beaten off, and Baring with his
noble garrison remained still in proud possession.
It was now not far from six o'clock, and in due
course of time two more of Billow's divisions had
debouched from Paris Wood. Blucher resumed his
advance against Lobau, but was met with so stout a
resistance that he was fain to abandon his frontal
attack and gain ground by manoeuvring to turn his
opponent's right flank. Lobau thereupon fell back
to the level of Plancenoit, throwing one brigade into
the village. Blucher then assaulted Plancenoit from
three different points, drove out the French garrison,
entrenched himself there, and bringing forward his
artillery opened a cannonade, throwing some shot as
far as the Brussels road. Twice during the course
of these operations urgent messages came in from
Thielmann at Wavre, saying that he was attacked by
superior numbers and doubted his power to hold out
against them. But Gneisenau had a great as well as
a small side, and on this day the greatness was upper-
most. " Let Thielmann defend himself as best he
may," he answered ; " it is no matter if he be crushed,
so long as we gain the victory here."
With a new enemy pressing upon his right flank and
arrived within cannon-shot of his main line of communi-
382 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. cations, Napoleon realised that no time must be lost.
June 1 8. He gave orders to Duhesme's division of the Young
Guard to retake Plancenoit, and directed Ney to master
La Haye Sainte at any cost. Durutte he had already
instructed to make a fresh attack upon Smohain, so
as to take pressure off Lobau. Duhesme's eight
battalions did their work nobly, driving the Prussians
from Plancenoit with irresistible dash. Ney, hurrying
to the head of the ijth Light, led them against La
Haye Sainte ; and Baring called upon his men for
yet another effort. It was a hard moment for him.
The stock of ammunition was reduced to two or three
rounds a man, and for some reason rifle-cartridges,
though frequently and pressingly sought, were still
not forthcoming. Not the less did his men promise
cheerfully to stand by him to the last ; and this new
onset of the French was met with the same gallantry
as the first. Once again the barn was set on fire and
once again the flames were extinguished ; but, as rifle
after rifle fell silent for want of ammunition, the
French gained ground. Baring, slowly retiring to the
garden, made his men return singly to the main
position, where they rejoined their regiments ; while
he himself joined two companies of the ist Light
battalions close to the cross-roads. No men could
have borne themselves more heroically than these
defenders of La Haye Sainte ; but there was no dis-
guising the fact that, though it was no fault of theirs,
the key of Wellington's centre was lost.
Realising his advantage Ney begged the Emperor
for fresh infantry to turn it to account. " Where am
I to get them ? " answered Napoleon testily. " Do
you expect me to make them ? " 1 There was nothing
for it but to assemble the shattered remains of Don-
zelot's and Quiot's divisions, with the remains of the
cuirassiers, to support the attack on the centre, while
the remnants of Reille's corps were set in motion for
1 Every one assigns a different time to this celebrated speech : but
this seems to me the most likely moment.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 383
a supreme attempt against Hougoumont. The actual 1815.
victors of La Haye Sainte were able from the garden j une i g,
and buildings to command the knoll by the sand-pit
with their 'fire, and to drive away the two companies
of Riflemen which held it ; and then, bringing up
two guns to the bank of the high road, they poured a
storm of grape upon Kempt's brigade on the other
side of it. The Riflemen speedily put a stop to this
by picking off the gunners ; but fresh guns were
brought up to a spur over against the middle of the
British right centre, which played havoc with the
Allied batteries. Now a fresh column of French
issued from behind the farm and, extending into a
close line of skirmishers, fell upon Ompteda's devoted
brigade of the Legion. Alten sent orders to Ompteda
to deploy, if practicable, and drive these tormentors
off. Ompteda, knowing that cuirassiers were lying
in wait in rear of the sharp-shooters, deprecated any
such measure ; but at this moment the Prince of
Orange rode up and, deaf to all protestations, peremp-
torily ordered Ompteda to deploy. Ompteda could
only obey, and placing himself at the head of the 5th
battalion led it forward to the charge. The French
fell back to La Haye Sainte, where they took shelter
among the enclosures ; and then, as Ompteda had
predicted, a regiment of cuirassiers fell suddenly upon
his right flank and swept his men out of existence.
The Riflemen on the other side of the road, after long
hesitation from fear of hitting friends as well as foes,
now poured in a volley which staggered the cuirassiers ;
and the 3rd Hussars of the Legion galloping forward
cleared the whole front of Ompteda's brigade until
compelled by the arrival of fresh bodies of French
horse to retire. In this affray Ompteda, a most
gallant officer, was killed, an immolation to the
ignorance and self-sufficiency of the Prince of Orange.
The Prince himself was presently forced by a wound
to quit the field, and none too soon. In two days he
had succeeded in destroying three good battalions of
384 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. the British and German infantry, each one by the
June 1 8. repetition of the same foolish mistake.
Another body of French skirmishers now turned
north-west from La Haye Sainte, threatening alike
Maitland's brigade, of which the Third battalion of the
First Guards, formed in square, was posted in advance
of the rest, and the square of Riflemen which formed
the left of Adam's brigade. Both were suffering
severely when Wellington ordered the Guards to
deploy and charge, which they did, re-forming square
instantly as the French cavalry came up. The latter
shrank from the attack, but too late to escape from the
bullets of the Guards ; and then, losing their heads,
they galloped along the whole front of the Fifty-second,
losing scores of men from the fire of that regiment.
The pressure upon the Guards was thus relieved ;
but immediately afterwards the principal onslaught
upon Hougoumont was developed by Reille's corps.
The mansion was by this time nearly burned out, but
the outhouses, except on the south side, were still
aflame ; and the defenders were much harassed by the
heat and smoke. Nevertheless their resistance was as
strenuous as ever. The flank-companies of the Guards
still held the walls and buildings. The Coldstream
lined the hedge that bordered the main approach to the
mansion. The Third Guards occupied the orchard,
and, though driven back at first to the road beyond
it, recovered themselves with the help of the light
companies and the 2nd German battalion of Duplat's
brigade, finally, after many vicissitudes of fortune,
re-establishing their position at the front hedge of the
orchard.
All therefore was well with Hougoumont ; but all
was not well in the centre. From the knoll above the
sand-pit their other point of vantage the French
skirmishers poured an active and deadly fire upon the
troops right and left of the Brussels road. Kempt's
and Lambert's brigades, though sorely tried, replied
with spirit enough, though the Twenty-seventh, lying
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 385
in square in the north-eastern angle of the cross-roads, 1815.
suffered terribly. But the survivors of Ompteda's j un e'i8.
brigade were beginning to steal to the rear, and it was
evident that they were exhausted as a fighting force.
He would be a stern judge that would blame them,
for two out of the four battalions had been cut to
pieces and the other two cruelly 'punished. Kiel-
mansegge's young battalions also were much shaken.
Alten, Colin Halkett and Ompteda had fallen; and
Kielmansegge, who was striving desperately to rally
his own men, was left in charge of the division. A
dangerous gap was, in fact, opened and slowly widening
in the British centre, and the situation was critical in
the extreme. Somerset, with the wreck of his brigade
extended in rank entire, so as to make a show, was
endeavouring to instil confidence into the Hanoverians
and to keep them in their places. He had been
ordered some time before to withdraw and to take
shelter from cannon-fire, but had answered that the
slightest movement would make the Netherlandish
cavalry, which were in support of him, turn and run.
The situation was happily saved by Vivian, who,
without orders, brought up his brigade of light
dragoons and, forming them in rear of the wavering
battalions, brought them to a stand ; and Wellington
presently brought up five Brunswick battalions from
the second line to fill the gap more thoroughly.
These last were not at first very steady ; in fact they
gave way in a body. They were not without excuse,
for they were very young soldiers and they had been led
straight into the post of greatest danger ; but through
the efforts of Wellington and other officers they were
rallied. Vandeleur's brigade was presently sent up
by Uxbridge to join Vivian ; and a very dangerous
crisis was successfully passed.
It was now seven o'clock ; and meanwhile Bliicher
had not been idle. Rallying the repulsed battalions
of Billow's corps, he made a strong counter-attack upon
Plancenoit, drove the Young Guard from it, and,
VOL. x 2 c
386 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1 815. again bringing forward his artillery, began to throw
June 1 8. shot dangerously near to La Belle Alliance itself.
Napoleon thereupon formed eleven battalions of the
Guard in squares along the road from Rossomme to
La Belle Alliance, and sent down two battalions of
the Old Guard to retake Plancenoit. The veterans
marched down in columns, plunged into the village
without firing a shot, and in twenty minutes had swept
every Prussian out of it, leaving it to be reoccupied
by the Young Guard. Having thus, as he thought,
cleared his right flank, Napoleon decided that the
time was come for the final blow. He could see on
his extreme right Durutte, already master of Pape-
lotte and La Haie, preparing to ascend the slope,
his own troops fighting strongly and with advantage
in the centre, Hougoumont blazing on the left. All
seemed to be well ; and after nearly eight hours of
desperate fighting the supreme moment was at hand.
He ordered Drouot to set nine battalions of the
Guard in motion, keeping two at Plancenoit, and three
in reserve ; and he himself rode down to lead the
foremost of them into the valley. Reille and d'Erlon
were instructed to advance simultaneously, with such
troops as they could raise, upon the centre and upon
Hougoumont.
But there was one thing which Napoleon did not
and could not see. Soon after six o'clock Ziethen,
after endless delays both in starting and in marching,
had arrived at Ohain with his advanced guard
perhaps five thousand men and had been met by
Colonel Freemantle of Wellington's staff with a
pressing request for an immediate reinforcement, even
if of no more than three thousand men. Ziethen
hesitated to comply until his whole corps should have
come up ; and one of his staff-officers, galloping forward
to judge of the reasonableness of Wellington's demand,
found so many men, wounded and unwounded, making
off, that he reported the British to be in retreat.
1 Waterloo Letters, p. 330.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 387
Shortly afterwards an order arrived from Blucher for 1815.
the 1st Corps to join Billow ; and Ziethen naturally June 18.
moved his troops in that direction. Muffling, how-
ever, perceiving him from a distance, galloped at the
top of his speed to entreat him to join Wellington,
and after much hesitation contrived to persuade him.
But meanwhile much time had been lost ; and the
only advantage so far gained from Ziethen 's arrival
within two miles of Wellington's left was that Vivian
had felt himself justified in quitting his post in
rear of Smohain to reinforce the centre. It was
not until the Imperial Guard was actually in motion
towards the valley that Ziethen 's leading troops at
last debouched from Smohain. At the sight of them
it seems that some of the French troops began to give
way. The Emperor rallied them in person and sent
aides-de-camp flying to all parts of his line to announce
the arrival of Grouchy.
Wellington during this interval had brought for-
ward Chassis Netherlandish divisions from Merbe
Braine to take the place of the Brunswickers in rear of
Maitland and Colin Halkett ; and he was apprised of
the coming attack by a royalist colonel of cuirassiers
who galloped up to Colonel Colborne of the Fifty-
second and told him that Napoleon with his Guard
would be upon them in half an hour. The Duke rode
down the line between the Brussels and Nivelles roads
ordering all battalions to be ranked four deep ; and
in this formation the infantry lay down, to avoid the
cannonade with which Napoleon preluded his final
advance, and awaited the storm. By this time six
battalions of the Guard had reached the foot of the
hollow. The Emperor left one of them * on a slight
eminence midway between Hougoumont and La Haye
Sainte ; and the remaining five were ordered to
advance in echelon from the right, the ist battalion
of the 3rd Grenadiers leading, followed in succes-
sion by the 4th Grenadiers, ist and 2nd battalions of
1 2/3rd Grenadiers.
3 88 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. the 3rd Chasseurs and a single battalion of the 4th
June 1 8. Chasseurs.
Formed each of them in a dense column with a
frontage of seventy to eighty men and a depth of at
least nine ranks, 1 the five battalions moved off in
superb order with two guns loaded with grape in the
intervals between them, five Generals at their head,
and Ney in front of all. Proceeding parallel to the
Brussels road for some distance they found their front
covered by d'Erlon's troops, which were engaged im-
mediately to west of La Haye Sainte, and turned
obliquely to the north-west, with the result that the
right-hand battalion fell slightly to the rear of the
rest. In this order they strode into the re-entrant
angle formed by the British right centre.
By this time the Allied batteries in this quarter had
suffered so much from loss of men and disabled guns
that their fire had grown perceptibly weaker. Cleeves's
and Kuhlmann's guns had actually retired to fetch
ammunition ; Mercer's had grouped themselves into
a strange heap, the men being too much exhausted to
run them forward after each recoil ; and nowhere
was shot any too plentiful. Happily Chasse, a very
fine soldier who had won a great reputation in the
French army, called up Van der Smissen's Nether-
landish battery, which came galloping forward from
the reserve, and unlimbering on the right of Lloyd
opened a rapid fire immediately. The remainder fired
round-shot and grape with all the energy of which
their few harassed and weary gunners were capable ;
and the Imperial Guards were seen to bend under the
stroke like corn smitten by the wind. Still they never
for a moment gave way, though, as the five battalions
continued to advance over the miry ground under a
1 Houssaye thinks that the Guard attacked in squares, and there
is much evidence in favour of his contention. But although the fate
of d'Erlon's corps may have suggested this formation, I think it more
probable that the battalions were really formed in column of double
companies, which would give them the frontage and depth above
described.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 389
continual tempest of shot, they lost their correct intervals 1815.
and distances. The two right-hand battalions seem June 18.
to have dropped somewhat in rear, the third and fourth
battalions, reckoning from the right, united into one,
and the left-hand battalion preserved its place slightly
in rear of the centre. Hence, apparently, it was that
the third and fourth battalions the 3rd Chasseurs
were the first to come into action against Maitland's
brigade of Guards. They could see nothing of the
British line whatever except the guns, for all the red-
coats were lying down ; and they had approached to
within twenty yards when Wellington at last said,
" Now, Maitland ! Now's your time ! " Then the
old story of the Peninsular battles was repeated. The
Guards, four ranks deep, had a front of over two
hundred and fifty men, the two columns of the Imperial
Guard a front of perhaps one hundred and fifty. The
red-coats poured in a volley from the two foremost
ranks which tore the front and flanks of the French to
tatters, and, with the two rearmost ranks to reload for
them, continued to rain on their enemies a murderous
shower of bullets. The senior French commanders fell
among the first ; their men staggered, uncertain what
to do next ; and the junior officers, instead of waving
them forward to the charge, gave the order to deploy.
It was the old mistake of Albuera. Such an evolution
in the face of such a fire at close range was impossible.
The flank-companies tried to come forward, but in-
voluntarily shrank back before the storm of bullets.
Hesitation became unsteadiness, and unsteadiness
turned to disorder. Wellington and Saltoun gave
the word to charge, and the red-coats lowering their
bayonets rushed forward and hurled their enemies in
confusion before them.
Observing the progress of the Guards, Halkett
threw forward the Thirty-third and Sixty-ninth to
protect their left flank ; and it was, apparently, while
these two battalions were thus advanced that the two
right-hand battalions of the French Guard approached
390 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
jgi^. Halkett's brigade. What happened at this point it
June 1 8 * s extreme ty difficult to ascertain. It seems that the
' French gave way before the first volley of the Thirtieth
and Seventy-third, much to the surprise of the British, 1
but that their guns continued to play upon the red-
coats with deadly effect. In an evil moment some one
gave the order for the two British battalions to face about
and take shelter under a bank in rear ; and the whole
brigade rushed back in panic. For a short time they
were so much crowded together that they could not
move ; but, by the exertions of Halkett and their officers,
they speedily recovered themselves, and, backed by
Chasse's Belgians, repelled a second attack, either of
these same battalions of the Guard or of some of
Donzelot's troops. The whole incident is somewhat
obscure, but it is certain that at this point of the
Allied line there was great danger for a time ; and
it seems probable that the first recoil of the Guard
before the British volleys was due either to its previous
losses from Van der Smissen's guns, or to the sight of
their comrades retiring before Maitland's Guards.
Maitland's brigade, indeed, was following up its
success triumphantly ; but, before it had advanced
fifty yards, the brigadier observed the 4th Chasseurs
the left-hand battalion of the French array coming
up to the rescue of their comrades upon his right flank.
He gave the word to retire, but his voice was lost
in the din of battle, and the order came to his men in
the shape of " Form Square." The flank-companies
of his battalions accordingly doubled back to take
their place in square. The officers, who saw the mis-
take, tried to set it right ; and in the general bewilder-
ment the whole brigade ran back, disordered by the
incomplete manoeuvre, to its original station, where it
halted instantly at the word of command and re-formed
with perfect steadiness and calm. Wellington, per-
ceiving the mishap, ordered the Rifles of Adam's
brigade to molest the flank of the 4th Chasseurs ; but
1 Waterloo Letters, p. 330.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY
39
Colborne, anticipating him, led down the Fifty- 1815.
second, and formed it, four deep, along the whole June 18.
length of its flank, to " make the column feel his fire."
Whether the jrd Chasseurs had rallied in rear of the
4th, or whether some of Reille's troops had come up
and joined it, is uncertain ; but it should appear that
there was certainly more than one battalion opposed
to Colborne. As he formed his array the French
opened a fire upon him which brought down one
hundred and fifty men ; but his answering volley was
crushing, and was followed by a charge with the
bayonet, under which the French broke and gave way.
The Fifty-second now continued their advance straight
across the battlefield from west to east, gradually
inclining to their right as the French turned instinct-
ively towards their original position at La Belle
Alliance. The Rifles and Seventy-first were hastening
to form on their left and right; and Colborne, bethink-
ing himself of his danger from a possible attack of
cavalry, was disposed to halt. " No, no," shouted
Wellington. " Go on ; go on."
The Duke was right. The defeat of the Guard
had shaken the French in every part of the field. The
long period of passive endurance was past, and the
time for a general counter-attack was come. While
the Imperial Guard was making its onslaught upon
Wellington, part of Pirch I.'s corps had joined Bliicher,
who had promptly ordered a fresh assault upon Plance-
noit. Ziethen in the meantime had beaten back
Durutte, whose artillery had opened upon Smohain;
and, as his infantry came up, drove him farther from
La Haie and Papelotte. Wellington, leaving Colborne
to take care of himself, ordered Vivian to move down
across the scene of the conflict between the British and
the Imperial Guard, so as to complete the discomfiture
of the enemy, and then galloped, together with a
single staff-officer, from Hougoumont to the left of
his line to order a general advance. When he reached
Kempt and Lambert and bade them move, Harry
392 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Smith, Lambert's brigade-major, was fain to ask in
June 1 8. what direction the movement was to be, for there was
for the moment a lull in the firing and the smoke was
so thick that nothing could be seen. " Right ahead,
to be sure," answered the Duke ; and presently the
smoke cleared away, and a gleam of light flashed down
from the setting sun. The Duke raised his hat high
in air, and at his signal the red-coats stirred at last
from the ground to which they had been rooted, and
broke into a majestic advance.
Under this combined counter-attack of the British,
Hanoverians, Netherlanders and Prussians, the French
gave way at every point. 1 Whole battalions, which had
been brought back from La Belle Alliance after being
engaged, left their arms piled and ran away. Welling-
ton's progress exposed Durutte's flank to the onset of
Ziethen ; the defeat of Durutte uncovered the flank of
Lobau; and by a supreme effort Bliicher drove the
Guard, after a most noble and glorious resistance, from
Plancenoit. All was now confusion except in the three
squares of the Old Guard which Napoleon had held in
reserve, and in the single regiment of Horse-grenadiers.
Vivian, after dispersing a mass of broken infantry, had
charged and routed some cavalry that attempted to
check him; and he now broke into one square of
infantry and passed on, cutting down the fugitives by
scores. Vandeleur followed him; and it was left
chiefly to Colborne and the Artillery to deal with the
squares of the Old Guard, which retreated steadily and
in perfect order, frequently turning to bay. Shortly
after nine Bliicher and Wellington met near La Belle
Alliance, and it was arranged that the Prussians should
take up the pursuit. Vivian pleaded that his brigade
was still fresh, but was met by the rejoinder that the
British had done a hard day's work, and that he must
put his men into bivouac. The energy and resource
with which the Prussians pushed the pursuit has
become a proverb ; but indeed the panic was such
1 Lord Ellesmere's Personal Recollections of Wellington, p. 101.
CH. xxvi HISTORY OF THE ARMY 393
that there was little attempt at a rally. Napoleon him- 1815.
self, after journeying for a short distance in his carriage, June 18.
took to his horse again and so escaped capture. Little
effort was made to check the pursuers at the defile of
Genappe ; and, as no rear-guard had been formed, the
task of the Prussian cavalry, lighted by the moon, was
an easy one. Insatiable in their vengeance for many
evils suffered since Jena, the Prussians pressed the
fugitives hard. Nine several times the weary French
tried to bivouac, to be roused up to renewed flight by
the merest handful of men, indeed by the mere sound
of trumpet or drum. The chase lay over the field of
Quatre Bras, where the hideous spectacle of the still
unburied dead struck the fugitives with fresh horror
and panic. Not until he reached Frasnes did Gneisenau
give the order to halt. The French army that had
fought at Waterloo had, as a military body, literally
ceased to exist.
CHAPTER XXVII
1815 THE Allied troops bivouacked on the ground that
June 1 8. they had won, all except the Thirty-third and Sixty-
ninth, weak young battalions which, having been
cruelly tried both at Quatre Bras and Waterloo, had
reached the limit of their endurance. Wellington
himself rode back silently at a walk to Waterloo
followed by the remnant of his staff, one and all
" wearing rather the aspect of a funeral train than
of victory in one of the most important battles ever
fought." Between ten and eleven 1 he reached the
inn where were his head-quarters, and on dismount-
ing patted his chestnut thoroughbred, Copenhagen,
approvingly on the quarter. The horse, who had
carried his master for fourteen or fifteen hours and
must have galloped more miles than are generally
traversed in the longest day's hunting, lashed out
with his near hind leg as if he had only just left the
stable; and this was the last danger that was escaped
by the Duke on the 1 8th of June. He sat down to
write his despatch ; and later on, the first casualty-
lists were brought to him. He listened as the long
tale of names was read to him, and, before it was half
rehearsed, broke down and cried. Fitzroy Somerset
had been wounded by his side ; two more of his personal
staff, Canning and Gordon, had been killed ; Barnes,
the Adjutant-general, Elley his deputy, and De Lancey,
1 Jackson (Reminiscences of a Staff Officer} says after ten ; the
Duke himself said, a year after the event (Supp. Desp.x. 509), between
eleven and twelve.
394
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 395
the Quarter-master-general, had all of them been 1815.
wounded, the last, as it proved, mortally. Among the June 18,
generals, Picton, who had been struck by a bullet at
Quatre Bras but had concealed the hurt, William
Ponsonby, Duplat and Christian Ompteda had been
killed ; Uxbridge, together with all four of his aides-
de-camp, Cooke, Kempt, Pack, Colquhoun Grant,
Adam and Colin Halkett, had been wounded. Out
of fifty assistants in the departments of the Adjutant
and the Quarter-master-general, two had been killed
and thirteen wounded. Of sixteen officers command-
ing regiments of cavalry, three had been killed and
seven wounded ; of twenty -five commanders of
battalions, one had been killed and eleven wounded.
In the four squadrons of the Life Guards thirteen
officers had fallen ; in the King's Dragoon Guards
eleven, in the Royals thirteen, in the Greys sixteen,
in the Seventh Hussars twelve, and in the Fifteenth
Hussars nine. In the two battalions of the First
Guards seventeen officers had been killed or wounded,
besides fourteen at Quatre Bras ; in the Coldstream
ten, and in the Scots Guards twelve ; in the Twenty-
third, ten ; in the Twenty-seventh, nine out of twenty
present ; in the Thirtieth, sixteen, besides two at Quatre
Bras ; in the Thirty-second, nine, besides twenty-two at
Quatre Bras; in the Thirty-third, nine, besides twelve
at Quatre Bras ; in the Fortieth, eleven ; in the Fifty-
second, ten ; in the Sixty-ninth, six, besides five at Quatre
Bras ; in the Seventy-first, fourteen ; in the Seventy-
third, seventeen, besides four at Quatre Bras ; in the
Seventy-ninth, thirteen, besides seventeen at Quatre
Bras ; in the Ninety-second, six, besides twenty at
Quatre Bras ; and in the two battalions of the Ninety-
fifth, 1 thirty, besides four at Quatre Bras. Lastly, in the
Royal Artillery, out of some eighty officers present, seven
had been killed and fifteen wounded on the 1 6th and
1 8th, and among the slain was Major Norman Ramsay.
1 There were present the ist battalion, six companies of the 2nd,
two companies of the 3rd.
396 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Nor had the men suffered less severely than the
June 18. officers. In the Household Cavalry Brigade the non-
commissioned officers and men killed and wounded
numbered over one hundred and eighty ; and some
two hundred and thirty were missing, having been
taken prisoners. In the Union Brigade the dead alone
exceeded two hundred and fifty and the wounded
were little short of three hundred. The Twelfth
Light Dragoons had over one hundred and ten
casualties of all ranks, and the Seventh Hussars over
one hundred and fifty. In the infantry, the Second
battalion of the First Guards lost nearly one hundred
and fifty non-commissioned officers and men, and the
Third battalion three hundred and twenty-four; so
that the First Guards lost altogether at Quatre Bras
and Waterloo not far from eleven hundred rank and
file out of two thousand present, and not a single man
of them taken prisoner. The Coldstream lost two
hundred and eighty-two and the Third Guards two
hundred and fifteen rank and file out of about a
thousand present, and escaped cheaply. Of the brigades
that had been engaged at Quatre Bras, Halkett's began
the battle of Waterloo with nineteen hundred and
fifty bayonets and came out with fourteen hundred
and thirty ; Kempt's with nineteen hundred came
out with just over thirteen hundred ; Pack's with
fourteen hundred came out with nine hundred and
seventy-five. Among the individual battalions the
Twenty-eighth had since the 1 6th lost two-fifths of its
numbers, the Royals and Thirty-second one-half, the
Forty-second, Seventy-ninth and Ninety-second con-
siderably more than one-half. The battalions that
were engaged at Waterloo only did not suffer so
severely, except the eight companies of the second
and third battalions of Rifles, which lost nearly one-
third, and the Twenty-seventh, which, pent up in
square by the cross-roads above La Haye Sainte, was
cruelly punished without an opportunity of firing a
shot in reply. Out of seven hundred rank and file
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 397
of the Twenty-seventh present no fewer than ninety- 1815.
six were killed outright and three hundred and fifty June 19.
wounded a noble record of stubborn endurance.
The battalions of the German Legion and the
Hanoverians had not escaped more lightly than the
majority of the British, having most of them casualties
varying from one-fourth to one-third of their strength;
while the gaps in the 2nd Light Battalion of the Legion
amounted very nearly to one man in two. The pro-
portion of the fallen among the Brunswickers was on
the whole slightly smaller, for, even reckoning their
previous losses at Quatre Bras, there was not one in
which the proportion of slain or hurt amounted to
one-third of their strength. Nevertheless, among the
eight battalions one showed nearly two hundred
casualties, two over one hundred and seventy, and a
fourth over one hundred and fifty. Of the Nether-
landers it is more difficult to speak. The Prince of
Orange stated their casualties at about forty-two
hundred for the three days of the i^th, i6th and
1 8th of June; half of which, roughly speaking, were
returned as " killed or missing " and the other half
as wounded. From another table it appears that
nearly sixteen hundred of the forty-two hundred were
missing, and over twelve hundred slightly wounded.
As the whole number of the British missing in the
two actions little exceeded six hundred, and the
majority of these were taken prisoners in the wild
charge of the Household and Union Brigades of
cavalry, there is evidently something here which
needs explanation.
However, the main point was that Wellington's army
had lost in all close upon fifteen thousand men, or not
far from a fourth of its numbers, and that none the
less it must continue to advance. So worn out was
every soul after the battle that the chief artillery
officer never thought of collecting the captured guns,
which with characteristic arrogance and dishonesty
the Prussians promptly appropriated to themselves.
398 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. In deference to Wellington's protests, however, they
June 1 8. gave up half of these, which left one hundred and
twenty -two pieces in the Duke's hands. 1 A weary
staff- officer rode out at one in the morning of the
June 19. 1 9th, bearing a terse order for the troops to move
to Nivelles at daylight ; 2 and a few hours later the
Duke betook himself to Brussels to see to various
matters. A vast mass of stragglers of all nations had
found their way to the city, some in charge of wounded
men, more from unmixed solicitude for their own
safety ; and there were disorder and plundering among
these gentry which needed suppression. Lastly, it
was necessary to take some measures for the relief of
the wounded and to detail a small party, both officers
and men, from every regiment which had suffered
heavily, to look after them. In Brussels the Duke
stayed until the 2oth, when he drove over in his
curricle, wearing plain clothes, to join his army at
Nivelles. The ground was still covered with the dead,
and many French wounded were still lying among
them, who bore their sufferings with admirable patience
and received any help that could be given them with
touching courtesy.
On the night of the i8th Billow's corps of the
Prussian army halted at Genappe, and Ziethen's on
the Charleroi road a mile or two south of Plancenoit ;
while three brigades of Pirch I.'s corps marched for
Wavre to the assistance of Thielmann. The last-
named officer had been attacked by Grouchy late in
the afternoon of the i8th, but had held his own
fairly well against odds of two to one until nightfall.
On the 1 9th, Grouchy, having checked a counter-
attack, pressed Thielmann steadily backward along
the Louvain road until in the course of the forenoon
he heard of the result of the battle of Waterloo,
whereupon he resolved to retreat at once to Namur.
Pirch I., who had reached Mellery on the I9th, pursued
1 Basil Jackson, Notes and Reminiscences -, p. 84.
2 Ibid. p. 66.
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 399
from thence on the 2oth, and Thielmann likewise; 1815.
but the French reached Namur with little loss, and June 19.
Grouchy, crossing the Meuse, reached Philippeville on
the 2 ist, and went on his way unmolested.
The main armies of Bliicher and Wellington
marched on the I9th and following days, the former
by Charleroi, Avesnes, Etroeung and Fesmy, the
latter by Nivelles, Binche and Valenciennes, halting
for a day on the 23rd. Le Quesnoi and Valenciennes June 23.
were blockaded by Wellington's troops, Landrecies
and Maubeuge by the Prussians ; and it was decided
by the two commanders to advance to Paris by the
right bank of the Oise, as the defeated enemy were
said to be assembling at Laon and Soissons. On the
24th Bliicher resumed his march, having been joined June 24.
by Thielmann's corps, while Wellington halted at Le
Cateau to await the arrival of his pontoon-trains. On
the 23rd he had detached Colville's division and a few
more troops to Cambrai, which had carried the place
by escalade with trifling loss ; l and the town was
set apart for the residence of King Lewis, who had
re-entered France from Ghent. On the 26th the June 26.
Prussian advanced guard reached Compiegne, and
Wellington's army was between Vermand and P&ronne.
This last place, being fully fortified, refused to sur-
render ; and the Guards were detached to storm it.
The light companies crossed the drawbridge and blew
open the gate, whereupon the Governor speedily
agreed to a capitulation. On the 27th Grouchy with June 27.
a part of his army engaged the Prussians at Compi&gne,
but, finding himself outnumbered, fell back. He
engaged them again on the 28th, and ultimately on June 28.
the 29th entered Paris, before the north side of which June 29.
the whole of the Prussians encamped that evening.
Negotiations for an armistice had already been opened
with Wellington by commissioners from the capital,
but had been rejected until Napoleon should quit
1 Eight killed, twenty-nine wounded. The troops engaged were
the British battalions of Colville's division.
400 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. Paris, which on this same day he did. But even so,
June 29. Paris was not yet taken, and Wellington considered
an attack with the forces at his disposal very hazardous. 1
The French troops, with the help of the lines thrown
up on the heights from Montmartre to Belleville,
could still have checked the advance of the Allies;
and it was therefore resolved to send the Prussians
round to the south side of the city, which was un-
fortified.
June 30. Accordingly on the 3Oth of June and the two
following days the Prussians marched round, not
without some sharp fighting both on the ist and 2nd
of July ; Wellington moved his troops into the places
July 3. vacated by the Prussians ; and on the 3rd, in conse-
quence of overtures from the Provisional Government,
a convention was signed under which the Allies agreed
to suspend hostilities upon the surrender of Paris, and
the French army retired to the Loire.
It was no doubt a relief to Wellington to be quit
of the campaign without more fighting, for, if he had
thought ill of his army before Waterloo, he thought
still worse of it after, when all the best of the men
had been killed or disabled. From want of carriages
and drivers he could not carry with him one-fourth
of the necessary ammunition ; and his staff, its most
efficient members having been slain or hurt, was
useless. Above all, the behaviour of the Netherlanders,
now the greatest part of the army, was infamous.
Neither officers nor men would stay with their com-
panies on the march. They wandered from house to
house, not excepting Wellington's own head-quarters,
robbing, destroying and plundering, forcing the
sentries, rescuing the prisoners, and committing every
description of outrage. In fact, they were simply a
rabble, and for military purposes valueless. Welling-
ton at daybreak of the 26th had ordered a brigade of
the Netherlandish infantry to Peronne to support the
assault. They arrived at nine o'clock in the evening,
1 Wellington's Despatch to Bliicher, and July 1815.
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 4 oi
an hour after the Guards had taken the place ; but a 1815.
few Belgian cavalry were on the spot, who, after the
capitulation was signed, cut the ropes of the draw-
bridge and broke violently into the town. The
British staff- officer, who had arranged the terms,
ordered them out, whereupon the ruffians tried to
cut him down, and the French Governor was actually
obliged to draw his sword to protect him. The
Belgian soldier, properly disciplined and led by good >
officers, has deservedly won high reputation on many
fields ; but in 1815 he was neither disciplined nor
controlled, and it is idle to pretend that such levies
were of any military worth. Such incidents as these
prove that the contemporary narratives of Belgian
misbehaviour at Waterloo are absolutely true, and
they are not to be refuted by specious apologies
proffered after the convenient lapse of a century. It
is, however, fair to add that the Prussians behaved as
ill or worse, both before and after the capitulation of
Paris. They had, it is true, old scores to pay off, but
this was no excuse for behaving, as Wellington put it,
like children. " Among the officers of the Allied
troops," he wrote, " the strongest objections are
entertained to anything like discipline and order";
and this defect caused him not only disgust but not a
little alarm. " If one shot were fired in Paris," he
wrote to Castlereagh on the I4th of July, " the whole
country will rise against us." 1
On the 6th of July the Prussians occupied Paris, July 6.
while Wellington's army stayed outside. Blucher
wished to levy a huge contribution and, from mere
rage at the name, to blow up the bridge of Jena.
Wellington dissuaded him from the former project
until the Allied Sovereigns should arrive, and mean-
while posted a British sentry on the bridge. This
did not prevent the old Marshal from trying to blow
1 Wellington's Despatches. To Castlereagh, I4th July; to the
King of the Netherlands, 1 8th July; to Bathurst and to Sir H. Wellesley,
zoth July ; to Torrens, ist Aug. 1815.
VOL. X 2 D
402 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. it U P> British sentry and all ; but the Prussian engineers
failed on the Seine as they had failed on the Sambre
from sheer ignorance of their business. And then
came the bitter battle of the diplomatists on the terms
of peace ; Prussia and the. German States clamouring
for the dismemberment of France and for a gigantic
indemnity ; the Tsar, Castlereagh and Wellington,
and later Metternich, standing up strenuously against
Nov. 20. them. On the 2oth of November peace was at last
signed. France agreed to the cession of Conde, Givet,
Charlemont, Philippeville, Mariembourg, Sarrelouis,
and Landau, and to the dismantling of Huningen.
The indemnity to be paid by her was fixed at twenty-
eight millions sterling ; and it was arranged that for
five years an army of one hundred and fifty thousand
men 1 should occupy certain places in France at
France's expense, the whole being under the command
of the Duke of Wellington, with headquarters at
Cambrai, for the term of occupation. Martinique
and Guadeloupe, which had been occupied in June
and August by General Leith, the former bloodlessly,
the latter after a little fighting which cost the British
about seventy killed and wounded, 2 were both of them
restored to France.
So ended this long and desolating war ; and it
remains only to recount briefly the fate of some of the
principal actors therein, and to review the final cam-
paign. Murat, in a fit of madness, disembarked on
the coast of his lost kingdom and was captured and
shot on the I3th of October. Ney having been
1 English, Headquarters Cambrai .... 30,000
Wurtemburgers, Headquarters Weissenberg . . 5,000
Russians, Headquarters Maubeuge .... 30,000
Danes, Headquarters Lewarde 5,000
Prussians, Headquarters Sedan 30,000
Hanoverians, Headquarters Tourcoing . . . 5,000
Austrians, Headquarters Colmar .... 30,000
Saxons, Headquarters Conde 5,000
Bavarians, Headquarters Pont-a-Mousson . . 10,000
2 The troops engaged were the 63rd, York Chasseurs, West India
Rangers, and York Rangers. The 63rd had 25 casualties.
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 403
arrested and condemned to death, was shot on the I g I5 .
5th of December. He had sought the honourable
end, that was his due, a thousand times throughout
the long agony of Waterloo ; but the cruel fate
which killed five horses under him reserved the rider
for the bullets of a French firing-party. He lives
immortal as the bravest of the brave. Soult fled
after Waterloo and remained in banishment until
1819, when he began a new career in the service of
France. Of him, as of Marmont and of Victor, we
may perhaps hear again. Massena, worn out by work
and wounds, died in 1817. He will always be remem-
bered in England as the general who, even in the
years of his decadence, never failed to appear where
Wellington least wanted to see him, and evoked the
unstinted admiration of the entire British army by the
masterly skill of his retreat from before Torres Vedras.
Napoleon himself, after leaving Paris on the 29th
of June, set out for Rochefort with some idea of sailing
for America. He reached the port on the 3rd of July,
and, yielding to the pressure of the Provisional Govern-
ment, embarked on the 8th. For some days he waited,
forbidden to set foot again in France and yet not
daring to put to sea in face of the British cruisers ;
and on the I3th he wrote his well-known letter of
surrender to the Prince Regent. The original docu-
ment lies before me as I write, the text in the hand
of some amanuensis, firmly written but containing
one grammatical error, the signature bold and far
more legible than usual, as if to mark with dignity
the close of a transcendently great career. On the
1 5th he embarked on board the Bellerophon and
was carried to Torbay. There had been wild talk
of putting him to death ; and Liverpool wrote flatly
that he wished the King of France would hang or
shoot him, as the best termination of the business ;
but Wellington had no intention of playing the part
of hangman, and the British Government had no idea
of calling upon him to do so. Since, however, it was
4 o 4 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. necessary for the peace of Europe that he should be
kept in safe custody, it fell to England, as practically
the only possessor of distant islands and of a fleet
that could ensure their safety, to take charge of him.
He claimed the right to live quietly in England ; and,
a rumour having got abroad that he was to be sent to
Fort George at the mouth of the Inverness Firth, the
Inverness Local Militia joyfully volunteered to act
as his guard. 1 But before the end of July his place of
confinement had been determined, and sailing in the
King's ship Northumberland he landed on the i6th of
October at St. Helena.
At the pitiful spectacle of a great genius descend-
ing to occupy itself with the pettiest of petty tricks,
intrigues, and mischiefs I am not minded even
to glance. I have as little wish to study the vast
fabric of lies, misstatements, misrepresentations and
calumnies that the idle hands at St. Helena took such
pains to rear to the honour, as their littleness con-
ceived it, of their royal martyr, and to the shame
of his honest and upright custodian. Least of all
would I call to remembrance the degrading use to
which Whig politicians turned the name, which had
made all Europe tremble, to the despicable ends of
party strife. It is enough that Napoleon ended his
life, by his own choice, without dignity and without
resignation. Though a very great captain and a very
great administrator, he was always an adventurer and,
after his rise to supreme power, always a gambler.
From 1803 onward he was continually playing double
or quits until he had exhausted the favours of fortune ;
and, when she turned against him and all hope was
gone, he could not school himself to accept her buffets
with a smile. On the 5th of May 1821 the end
came, and he was carried to his grave by twelve
grenadiers of the Twentieth Foot, no unworthy bearers,
for some of them had faced the brave soldiers of
1 Record Office, H.O. Internal Defence, 322. Lt.-Col. Rose to
Sec. of State, ist Aug. 1815.
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 405
Imperial France at Maida, Vimeiro, Coruna, Vitoria, 1815.
in the bitterest fights of the Pyrenees, at Orthez and
at Toulouse.
The campaign of Waterloo has been made the
subject of whole libraries of books in all languages,
and has been subjected to examination so microscopic
as to be without parallel in military history. The
reasons are readily found. The story is alluring in
the first place, because it is that of the end of a great
European cataclysm, and because the last act of the
drama brought all the foremost actors of the time
upon the stage. But its greatest attraction is that
it only lasted four days, and may therefore be exhausted
with a comparatively small amount of labour. Whether
the excessive toil expended upon it has really made it
clearer and more intelligible than other campaigns,
may well be doubted. Writers have too often
approached it with some ulterior object, to illustrate
some theory of war or strategy, to glorify the share
taken by their own nation or even by their own
regiment, to explain the defeat of Napoleon, to
minimise the success of Wellington, to exalt one
commander, to abase another, to prove that, if some-
thing had not happened, the result would have been
very different, and so forth. To such mistreatment
many, indeed the majority, have added the mistake of
regarding it as an isolated event, whereas, to take one
detail only, it is impossible for one who has not
deeply studied Graham's campaign of 1814 in the
Netherlands, to understand how bad Wellington's
troops really were. But, after all the study and research
expended upon the four days of the I5th to the i8th
of June 1815, and the new material which it has
produced, it must be confessed that the literature of
Waterloo is more prolific of new conjectures than of
new facts. We know that certain orders were issued
on both sides, and that certain messages were sent and
406 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. delivered. But what other orders or messages, verbal
or in writing, may have passed, when the said messages
were despatched, when they were delivered, and
whether the watches in the French, Prussian, British,
and Netherlandish Armies kept uniform time or
varied by half- an - hour, we do not know and shall
never know. Wellington warned aspirant historians
against inquiring too much, on the ground that such
a course would lead to bewilderment rather than truth ;
and he was quite right.
The main facts are simple enough. Napoleon
with one hundred and twenty-five thousand men set
out to fight Bliicher and Wellington with two hundred
and fifty thousand. The two latter had dispersed their
armies in cantonments over a very wide front, and
Napoleon hoped by stepping in between them to
beat them in detail before they could unite, and indeed
before either of their armies could be fully concentrated
in itself. The first stage, that is to say, the work of
the I ^th of June, may be called completely successful.
Everything indeed did not pass exactly as Napoleon
had designed that is the rule rather than the ex-
ception in war but it may be said that the British
and Prussian commanders were surprised on the 1 5th.
In the details of their concentration bad mistakes were
made both by the Prussian staff and by the British
commander ; but the worst mistake of the latter was
set right by his Netherlandish subordinates, Constant
and Perponcher, who saw the importance of clinging
to Quatre Bras. On the i6th it was Napoleon who
was surprised. He expected to reach Gembloux on
one side and Brussels on the other without serious
fighting, and he found himself set down to two pitched
battles. It is urged with justice that, if d'Erlon's
corps had not been kept walking to and fro all day
between the two battle-fields, the issue might have
been very different ; and a vast deal of ingenuity
has been expended to account for d'Erlon's con-
duct. But the explanation is very simple. D'Erlon
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 407
was badly needed upon both battle-fields owing to 1815.
the huge initial superiority of the Allies over the
French in the matter of numbers. The Emperor
had misread the entire situation, and had confused all
his commanders by imposing his misreading upon
them. Yet even so Napoleon was fortunate in the
fact that Bliicher chose a bad position and occupied it
vilely ; for Ligny, or the equivalent to Ligny, would
have resulted very differently if Wellington had been
in command of the Prussian Army. On the other
hand, it was unlucky for the Emperor that Wellington
was in command at Quatre Bras, for no other General
could have handled the early stage of that critical
action with such consummate skill, and no troops but
the British, fighting under his command, could have
made so stubborn a resistance in the face of so heavy
punishment.
At nightfall on the i6th, therefore, Napoleon had
lost a great number of men and had accomplished very
little. The Prussians had indeed been beaten, but not
very severely ; and though ten thousand soldiers of the
corps that had suffered most heavily had dispersed,
there was one more corps which had been little engaged,
and another that had not been engaged at all. It
suited Napoleon's preconceived ideas to assume that
the Prussians were retreating, without thought of
further contest, to the eastward, and that five-and-thirty
thousand men would be sufficient, if not to hunt them
beyond any sphere of usefulness, at any rate to hold
them in check until he should have disposed of
Wellington. But here we find the confusion of thought
due principally to imperfect intelligence, which vitiated
every measure taken by Napoleon after the initial stage
of the campaign. Thirty-five thousand were fewer
than were necessary to paralyse the Prussians if they
were not thoroughly beaten, but more than were
necessary to keep them running if they were.
On the French left wing Ney has been much blamed
for not attacking Wellington earlier, in order to make
4 o8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815, his retreat difficult if not impossible. But it is plain that
Ney was thoroughly bewildered by the course which
events had taken. An easy, almost unopposed, march
to Brussels had been prescribed to him in the first
instance, instead of which he had been stopped before
he had advanced two miles, and had only been able to
hold his ground with great difficulty and serious loss.
He could not fail to infer that the Emperor had made
grave miscalculations at the very outset of the campaign,
that his plans would need revision. The Marshal
had received a great many contradictory commands
on the 1 6th, and the general result had not been
satisfactory. The Allied armies were, according to
Napoleon 's design, to have run away in different
directions as soon as the French host appeared ; but
they had not run away. They had fought desperately,
though disunited. One of them had held its ground,
and the defeat of the other had not been even reported to
Ney until twelve hours after the event. A signal success
does not generally take so long to make itself known ;
and Ney may well have had his doubts as to the plight
of the right wing. There were, in fact, signs of un-
certainty and hesitation in the mind of the Commander-
in-Chief, easily intelligible in one who had started to
fight against an army of twice his own strength, but not
calculated to inspire his subordinates with confidence.
The thunderstorm on the lyth was a complication
decidedly in favour of the Allies ; but, if we are to go
back over past campaigns and alter the weather from
day to day, we shall only lose ourselves in unprofitable
conjectures. It was open to Napoleon to turn the
bulk of his force upon Wellington at Quatre Bras
quite early in the morning of the 1 7th ; and, if he had
done so, it is probable that no weather could have
saved the campaign from ending very differently.
But he did not do so, and when at last he made up his
mind to fling himself upon Wellington's rear-guards,
it was too late. Meanwhile it is to be noted that the
chance of catching Wellington at a disadvantage was
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 409
due to the neglect of Bliicher's staff to apprise the 1815.
Duke of the Prussian retreat after Ligny. But war
is a chapter of accidents ; and any other campaign,
if put under the microscope, would show as many as
that of Waterloo.
The most remarkable point in the whole story is
Wellington's nerve in accepting battle with a very bad
army, before he had actually effected his junction with
Bliicher. It is not impossible that he was prompted
thereto by the desire to choose his position for himself
and to defend it according to his own ideas, after
experience of the Prussian dispositions at Ligny.
Yet he took a tremendous risk, for the best of his
troops had been very roughly handled at Quatre Bras,
and the worst were so bad not because they were
cowards, but because they had no heart in their work
that no reliance could be reposed upon them. The
excellent battalions of the German Legion were from
the first lamentably weak in numbers ; the best of
the British had been very seriously diminished by their
losses at Quatre Bras ; and the Hanoverians and
Brunswickers, the latter of whom had also suffered
considerably, were very young and raw. Altogether,
reckoning only the troops which he could trust, more
or less, he engaged Napoleon at the odds of two
against three. In the matter of guns Napoleon had the
advantage of about eight pieces to five in numbers, and
of weight of metal into the bargain, for the Emperor,
it will be recalled, had several batteries of twelve-
pounders, whereas the Duke had nothing heavier than
nine-pounders. Everything, therefore, was in Napo-
leon's favour, except that he was opposed to a strange
enemy, whom it pleased him to assume to be similar
to all other enemies that he had met. He did not
realise that he was matched against a commander who,
in the actual direction of a battle, was his equal if
not his superior; that the British infantry was as
tenacious as the Russian, but far more active and far
more formidable with the musket ; and that both the
4 io HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. commander and his troops had been well schooled by
experience to meet the somewhat crude tactical methods
of the French army.
The details of the battle itself, except in its broad
lines, are, as usual, so much complicated by conflicting
narratives as to defy all attempt to unravel them. It
is impossible even to be perfectly sure of the number
of battalions of the Imperial Guard which took part in
the final attack, much less of their formation and of
the portion of the Allied line that was struck by any
particular battalion. Only staff-officers can ever catch
a general view of any action ; a great number of these
were killed or wounded in the course of the day upon
both sides, so that they could only give either imperfect
narratives or no narratives at all ; and all witnesses
agree that the smoke was so dense that the regimental
officers always, and the staff-officers for the most part,
were working in the dark.
However, Napoleon pursued his usual method of
making a great bustle from end to end of his enemy's
line, so as to bewilder him as to the true point of the
attack ; but it was a new thing to him to fight against
an enemy which, as a tactical principle, was kept out
of his sight, according (to quote the words of General
Foy) to the excellent custom of the English. It may
well be, therefore, that he had his own share of bewilder-
ment. Be that as it may, it is certain that his attacks
were incoherent what he would have called decousus
though this was a fault which, in general, his worst
enemies would have hesitated to attribute to him.
We may therefore set down to his subordinates the
blunder which converted the advance against Hougou-
mont from a secondary into a primary operation.
But the onslaught of d'Erlon's corps upon the centre,
which was really the most serious movement of the
whole day, might surely have merited some little
personal attention from the General-in-Chief. There
were at least three French generals in the field who could
have warned Napoleon that an attack upon British
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 411
infantry in line by battalions in close column, without 1815.
space to deploy, had again and again been tried and
found wanting. It is true that the assault was finally
routed by a charge of British cavalry ; but this too
might have been foreseen since the day of Salamanca.
There can be little doubt, I think, that this charge had
its effect upon the French infantry all through the day.
Nothing serious was attempted over the scene of the
Union Brigade's attack ; and, according to many
good authorities, the Imperial Guard did not venture
to make its final advance except in squares.
After the failure of d'Erlon, came the great mistake
of attacking unbroken infantry with cavalry only, an
idea which apparently was instilled into the brain of
Ney by the sight of British battalions retiring from the
crest of the hill to the reverse slope. This blunder
on Ney's part and its disastrous consequence must be
placed to the credit of Wellington and of the unseen
array which he alone among his contemporaries
employed when defending a position. Last came the
most trying ordeal of all for the Allies incessant
raids of cavalry and infantry, sometimes supported by
cannon at close range, and launched at many different
points upon the British squares after a pitiless rain
of shot and shell from Napoleon's massed batteries.
The constancy and steadfastness of British, Hanoverians
and Brunswickers under this trial, especially after
the capture of La Haye Sainte had enabled the French
to enfilade a part of their line, was beyond all praise.
More than one battalion broke, and indeed ran, when
brought into the fighting-line under that terrible fire.
But they rallied and came back ; for, wherever weak-
ness was, there by magic appeared Wellington, perfectly
calm and collected, inspiring all with confidence and
fortitude. He said himself that he personally had
saved the battle four times, and, if he had said forty
times, he would not have overstated the truth. The
men would have been glad enough to advance. What
they found so hard to endure was the incessant fire of
4 i2 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. artillery to which they could make no answer. But
they were bidden to stand, and, with Wellington
to command them, they did stand. The miracles
wrought by his presence and personality among a host
of raw troops throw into the background the amazing
patience and firmness with which, through hours of
awful anxiety, he bided his time and forbade any move-
ment until the Prussians should come up. Much is
justly made of Blucher's exhortation to his troops to
enable him to keep his promise to Wellington. Too
little is said and thought of the silent influence and
example by which Wellington infused ever fresh
courage into a thin line of wavering recruits, and fairly
forced them to keep his promise to Bliicher. Without
his presence and that of the officers and men whom he
had taught to meet the legions of France, not only
without fear, but with full confidence of victory,
Waterloo had been lost.
The final issue of the day was of course decided, as
Wellington was the first to acknowledge, by the advent
of the Prussians, which was due wholly to the energy
of Bliicher. With proper management they should
have arrived on the field at two ; as things fell out, they
did not appear until half-past four and did not make
their presence seriously felt until seven. But they
won their way through Plancenoit only by strenuous
and desperate fighting, which cost them between six
and seven thousand killed and wounded and missing.
Their casualties, in actual fact, actually exceeded those
of the British, strictly so called ; as well they might,
for they had many more troops present ; 1 and a
comparison of the casualty lists sets forth some curious
details. The British officers killed numbered eighty-
three, the Prussian twenty-two ; the British officers
1 The British engaged at Waterloo (Wellington Supp. Desp. x.
460-461) numbered 23,991 rank and file, or, adding one-eighth for other
ranks, roughly 27,000 men. Billow's corps at the opening of the
campaign numbered 30,000 and Pirch I.'s 31,000. Deducting one-
third from these figures as a handsome allowance for casualties and
absentees, there are left at least 40,000 men.
CH. xxvii HISTORY OF THE ARMY 413
wounded three hundred and sixty-three, the Prussian 1815,
two hundred and eighty-six. The tale of the privates
is as follows : killed, of the British twelve hundred and
forty-five, of the Prussians eleven hundred and twenty-
two ; wounded, of the British forty-two hundred and
sixty-one, of the Prussians thirty-eight hundred and
sixty-nine ; missing, of the British five hundred and
fifty-eight, of the Prussians thirteen hundred and five.
These figures do honour to both parties, but leave
little doubt upon whom the brunt of the fighting fell ;
though the credit for one of the most successful
pursuits in military history belongs wholly to the
Prussians, and in particular to Gneisenau.
The losses of the French were appalling. The
only means of judging them are from the published
lists of the fallen officers, which are most pitiful to read.
Never did the French soldier cover himself with
greater glory than at Waterloo, his persistent gallantry
in attack being beyond all praise. The weak point
of the Army was its indiscipline. A large proportion
of the men were old soldiers, very many of them released
prisoners from various countries. They had not had
time to settle down under the rule of their idolised
leader ; and, as they themselves had restored him,
they and the junior officers were inclined to look upon
themselves as the real masters of the situation. The
general officers had many of them reconciled themselves
with the Bourbons. They were sick of war. They
pined for a little peace and quiet and, being of longer
sight than the men, doubted the issue of Napoleon's
usurpation. Thus there was some suspicion in the
lower ranks towards the higher, and no perfect sym-
pathy between them. This probably accounted for
the incoherent nature of the principal attacks both in
general and in detail. If one general hung back,
from reasons of sound military prudence, another in
his heart accused him of treason and hurried him on.
So too in the charges of the French cavalry, every
squadron-leader took matters into his own hands and
4H HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. attacked upon his own account, fearful lest his colonel
should be lukewarm in the fight ; and thus there was
no grand overwhelming onslaught made at any time
in the day. Hence, when the Prussians arrived upon
the field in force instead of Grouchy, as the Emperor
had announced, there was a general cry of treachery ;
and the army, saving a few choice regiments, fell
into dissolution. Discipline was always the weak
side of the Napoleonic armies, and at Waterloo the
defect proved fatal. None the less the French
approved themselves most noble fighting-men.
There has been much speculation as to the possible
issue of the fight if the Prussians had failed to arrive
on the field. This is hardly profitable, because
Wellington only accepted battle on the understanding
that Blucher would support him ; and we have seen
how loyally both chiefs stood by their agreement.
There can be no doubt that many even of the better
Allied troops had been tried almost to the limit of their
endurance, and that there were others besides the
Netherlanders who quitted the field without the
Netherlanders' excuse. Wellington in a letter to
Lord Mulgrave six months after the battle declared
himself ill-pleased with the conduct of the Artillery,
alleging that, instead of taking refuge in the squares
when the French cavalry charged, they ran off the
field, taking with them limbers, ammunition and
everything. The Royal Regiment has never forgiven
the Duke for this letter, which indeed seems to be one
of those sweeping indictments to which the great
man was too much prone in moments of impatience.
Whether there was one unfortunate battery which so
misconducted itself, and, if so, which battery it was ;
or whether the whole accusation arose out of some
mistake, some misconception or some misrepresenta-
tion, it is impossible to say. Wellington averred that,
when the French cavalry fell back, there were no
artillery to fire at them ; but I can find no evidence
of this, though plenty against it. Altogether it seems
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 415
to me that this letter must be set aside as too hasty to 1815.
be accurate.
There was some complaint also of the Light
Cavalry on the right wing. Uxbridge rode up to
the Guards of Maitland's brigade and said, "Well
done, men. By God, we stand on you. If I could
only get my fellows to do the same ! But by God,
they won't budge but I'll try again." The writer
to whom we owe this detail 1 adds that the Light
Cavalry in that part of the field were of little profit,
partly because they were brought up for small isolated
attacks instead of in a mass. This, however, is quite
unconfirmed, rather indeed contradicted, by other
authorities ; and it is probable that Uxbridge was
speaking of some of the foreign cavalry which, it is
well known, refused to follow him. In the infantry,
as we have seen, there was at one moment a panic in
Halkett's brigade which, however, soon gave place to
order. Much has been written about the number of
fugitives, chiefly, but by no means exclusively, Nether-
landers, that thronged the road to Brussels ; but this
is due, I think, to the facts that the number of wounded
was very great, and that there was more than the
usual number of spectators in the rear of the army.
Craufurd had much the same story to tell when he
came up to Talavera. On the whole, therefore, I
doubt whether the Allies were so much shaken at the
close of the battle as French writers have been disposed
to think. Up to the very end the French skirmishers
tried in vain to tempt the British squares to fire a volley
at them which might give a chance to the French
battalions to charge while the British muskets were
empty. A few picked marksmen alone answered the
sharpshooters, and the remainder coolly waited for the
word of command to fire. 2 Troops that, after hours
1 MS. Journal of Colonel James Stanhope.
2 Stanhope tells an amusing story which illustrates the perennial
strife between staff-officers and regimental officers. Captain Horace
Seymour, one of Uxbridge's aides-de-camp, seeing that the Guards
4 i 6 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. of harassing attack by all three arms, are still so
perfectly under control cannot be considered shaken.
It must be noticed too that, owing to Wellington's
admirable husbandry of his reserves, he had still,
before the French attacks ceased, Vandeleur's and
Vivian's brigades of cavalry, two battalions of Mitchell's
brigade of infantry and the Hanoverian brigades of
Vincke and Best practically untouched, while the
Fourth and Fortieth regiments of Lambert's brigades,
the former fresh from work in America, had suffered
indeed considerable loss, but nothing so serious as
to impair their righting powers. Colonel James
Stanhope, who had exceptionally good opportunities
for forming a judgment, thought that even without
the Prussians the Allies would have held their ground,
and made their final short advance to La Belle Alliance
on the 1 8th ; but he admitted that it was doubtful
whether the French or the Allies would have retreated
on the 1 9th. Had Wellington retreated, the Forest
of Soignes was easily traversable by troops of all arms,
and the border would have made a good defensible
position for the rear-guard. Whether Stanhope's
opinion were correct or not, it is impossible to say and
unprofitable to argue. All that can certainly be said
is that, when the battle ended, both armies were
rapidly reaching the end of their powers, and that the
ammunition of the French artillery was failing, 1 The
French had endeavoured at the outset to carry matters
forward with a rush, and their failure had cost them
very dear. Thenceforward their efforts, though
rather more methodical, had still for various reasons
continued to be incoherent. The Emperor appears
never to have had complete control of the battle ;
left the fire of the French skirmishers unanswered, galloped up to Lord
Saltoun and said, " G d d n you, don't you see those are French !
Why don't you fire at them ? " To which Saltoun replied, " Why,
d n you, don't you think we know better when to fire than you do ! "
Seymour thereupon vanished.
1 Vie militaire du General Foy, p. 281.
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 417
and an army, whatever its valour, which goes its own 1815.
way in a fight, may collapse suddenly at any moment.
In any case, if the Prussians had not come up and
Napoleon had defeated Wellington, only a very small
fragment of the French army would have been fit for
further work ; and it is questionable whether Napoleon
would have ventured to meet Bliicher, who, it may
be presumed, would have made things very unpleasant
for Grouchy. Had the Emperor again engaged the
Prussians, even successfully, he would have been left
with nothing to meet the advance of the main body
of the Allies ; and Paris would have been occupied
in August or September instead of in July.
On the whole it may be said that Napoleon set out
to achieve the impossible, and that his task was so
heavy and so difficult that it was too much even for
his skill and for his powers. It has been pleaded
that he was no longer at his best, and that he was
seriously hampered by the loss of Berthier as the Chief
of his Staff. But no man is always at his best ; and
Wellington was equally without his old and tried
staff-officer, George Murray. Wellington also was
not at his best, otherwise he would not have left sixteen
thousand men at Hal during the battle. This last
matter constitutes a mystery which will never be
cleared up, for Wellington was not the man deliberately
to leave so large a force idle, though within call of the
battlefield, unless there had been some reason which
in his judgment was of overpowering importance.
Bliicher and Gneisenau were not at their best, other-
wise they would not have accepted battle in so bad a
position as that of Ligny. It may account in part for
their mistakes that not one of the three armies, French,
Prussian and Anglo-German, was really a good one,
all alike having been hastily scraped together, with
imperfect organisation and a large proportion of raw
troops in the ranks. But there were three great
leaders at their head, and under them half-trained
troops became heroes. Napoleon was out-generalled
VOL. x 2 E
4 i 8 HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. and out-fought; but for no other man would the
French horse and foot have dashed themselves so
incessantly against the line of death on the heights of
Mont St. Jean. Blucher's army had been defeated
in a very hard fight, and himself, aged seventy-two,
ridden over and cruelly battered by galloping squadrons.
The old man revived himself partly by strange
remedies, 1 more by his own unconquerable spirit,
and heartened his men to those superhuman exertions
which brought them and their guns, late indeed but
in time, to the field of Waterloo.
Lastly, it must be repeated that throughout the
long agony of eight terrible hours the Allied line
was literally pervaded by Wellington. Wherever
danger threatened, there was the thorough - bred
chestnut horse and the erect figure in the saddle,
wearing the low cocked hat, with the colours of
Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands on the cockade,
short blue cloak over a blue frock-coat and white
leathers the keen grey eyes always alert, the mouth
inflexibly firm, and the expression unchangeably
serene. Now he was heartening some hardly-pressed
British battalion, now rallying some broken auxiliaries,
now leading some young Hanoverians from the
second line into the first ; and in the lulls, when the
musketry was silent and the French artillery was
tearing up the front, he would send his staff to the
reverse slope and, attended by one officer only, would
stand in the full tempest of shot and shell gazing at
the French troops on the other side of the valley. He
was one who was never demonstrative in any circum-
stances, who said little and was sparing of gesture.
But his mere presence diffused an atmosphere of calm
and confidence, and all who were aware of it thanked
God and took courage. His eye too was everywhere.
1 He dosed himself with gin and onions ; and on approaching
Hardinge directly afterwards observed, no doubt with truth, " Ich
stinke etwas." Stanhope. Conversations of the Duke of Wellington^
p. loi.
CH. xxvn HISTORY OF THE ARMY 419
It caught sight of a French gun-carriage flying to 1815,
splinters under^ the blow of an English shot ; and
away flew an aide-de-camp to place under arrest the
commander of a battery who had dared to fire at guns
when the order was to fire only at men. Without
Wellington the Allied line could never have endured
to the end, and he was in a modest way aware of it.
* It has been a damned nice thing," he told Creevey
next day, " the nearest run thing that ever you saw
in your life. By God," he added, as if thinking
aloud, " I don't think it would have done if I had
not been there."
The Prince of Orange on the morrow of the fight
wrote anxiously to the Duke " to know how he could
explain or pass over the conduct of the Netherlands'
troops." The Duke answered, " I shall praise
generally and not in detail, so nobody will know
anything about them." There was glory enough, he
said later, for every one, and he spoke truly. There
was not a nation among the Allies which had not at
one period or another rendered transcendent service
to the cause of Europe in that short campaign ; and
not one that had fought more valiantly than their most
noble and gallant enemy. Had Waterloo not been a
final and decisive battle, it would have been coupled
with Albuera in the popular memory as a great feat
of endurance and tenacity. But, though its fame may
be partly obscured by later and more gigantic contests,
it can never be wholly obliterated. Napoleons do not
so frequently appear that the downfall of them and
of the power that they have wielded can readily lose
significance. By a happy coincidence it occurred
simultaneously to the Commanders-in-Chief in the
field and at the Horse Guards that so heroic a fight and
so momentous an occasion should be commemorated,
for the first time since Dunbar, by the issue of a medal
to every man in the army who had been present ; and
this medal is still the possession most highly treasured
alike in the highest and the humblest of English homes.
420
HISTORY OF THE ARMY BOOK xv
1815. The design is of little merit, yet it is unique, and
worthily unique, among British military medals, for
it bears on the reverse, besides the name and date of
the battle, the name of him without whom there would
have been no victory the one word Wellington.
APPENDIX I
EFFECTIVE STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY.
SHOWING ORGANISATION BY BRIGADES
AND DIVISIONS, i6rH JANUARY 1814.
CAVALRY (Lieut.-Gen. Sir Stapleton Cotton).
Maj.-Gen.
O'Loughlin
Maj.-Gen. Hon.
W. Ponsonby
(Lord C.
Manners, 3rd
Dragoons, from
25th January)
Maj.-Gen.
Vandeleur
Regiment.
1st Life Guards .
2nd Life Guards
Blues
5th Dragoon Guards
3rd Dragoon Guards
4th Dragoon Guards
Maj.-Gen. Fane
Col. Vivian
( 1 2th Light Dragoons .
^i6th Light Dragoons .
? 1 3th Light Dragoons .
\i4th Light Dragoons .
f i8th Hussars
\ist Hussars K.G.L. .
fist Dragoons K.G.L. .
Col. Arentschild | 2nd Dragoons K.G.L.
. f 3rd Dragoon Guards
(Maj-Gen. Fane)| Ist Royal Dragoons
, (7th Hussars
Maj.-Gen. Lord I IQth Russars ^
E. Somerset
Viscount
Barbacena
Col. Campbell
I I 5th Hussars
ist, 6th, nth, 1 2th Portuguese
Cavalry .
4th Portuguese Cavalry
Effective
Rank and File.
277
336
358
386
387
45
348
4i7
427
426
339
332
35
359
459
466
894
264
10,179
421
422
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
INFANTRY.
First Division (Lieut.-Gen. Sir John Hope and Maj.-Gen.
Howard).
Effective
Regiment. Rank and File,
i/ist Guards . . . 785
3/ist Guards .... 776
ist Coldstream Guards . . 767
i /3rd Guards .... 864
I Company 5/6oth ... 50
ist Line Battalion K.G.L. . . 574
2nd Line Battalion K.G.L. . 532
5th Line Battalion K.G.L. . . 482
ist Light Battalion K.G.L. . 568
.2nd Light Battalion K.G.L. . 585
|i/62nd 427
76th 54 6
77th . . .170
8 5 th. ... .430
i /37th (from March) . ....
Total First Division . . 8230
Maj.-Gen.
Maitland
Maj.-Gen. Hon.
E. Stopford
Maj.-Gen.
Hintiber
Maj.-Gen.
Lord Aylmer
Second Division (Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill and Lieut.-Gen.
Sir William Stewart).
Maj.-Gen.
Barnes
Maj.-Gen. Byng ,
Maj.-Gen.
Pringle
Col. Harding
'i/50th
.
345
i/7ist
.
498
i/92nd
.
391
i Company 5/6oth
.
49
l/3rd ...
.
530
i/ 57 th
438
1st Provisional Battalion
f2/3!St .
\ i /66th .
271
278
I Company 5/6oth
.
45
: i/28th
.
485
2/34th
.
410
i/39 th
.
565
i Company 5/6oth
.
47
6th and 8th Portuguese
Line, 6th
Ca9adores
. -
1918
Total Second Division .
6270
Unattached Portuguese Division (Maj.-Gen. Le Cor).
n JI* p n ' -[2nd and I4th Portuguese Line . 1802
APPENDIX I
423
Effective
Regiment. Rank and File.
Brig.-Gen. |4th, loth Portuguese Line, loth
Buchan \ Ca9adores . ' .
1969
Total Le Cor's Portuguese Division .
2771
Third Division (Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Picton).
i/ 45 th .
496
Maj.-Gen.
74 th
438
Brisbane
i/88th
738
4 Companies 5/6oth .
197
i/ 5 th . . . . .
640
Maj.-Gen. Keane
2/87th
371
305
94th . . .
350
Toth, 1 2th Portuguese Line, nth
Maj.-Gen. rower-! 7 A ,
1782
Total Third Division .
5317
Fourth Division (Lieut.-Gen. Hon. Sir G. L. Cole).
3 /2 7 th . .
564
i/4oth .
468
Maj.-Gen.
W. Anson
i //1.8th
i l 7 l
204
1 /4 OL11
2nd Provisional Battalion < /-- ^
i Company 5/6oth
45
fi/7th . .
604
Maj.-Gen. Ross -
20th .
i/23rd
395
420
i Company Brunswick-Oels
42
Col. Vasconcellos
r nth, 23rd Portuguese Line, 7th
Ca9adores
1958
Total Fourth Division .
5389
Fifth Division (Maj.-Gen. Hon. C. Colville).
!3/ist.
320
I/Oth
482
i/38th . . . .
2/47th .
364
256
i Company Brunswick-Oels
25
4 2 4
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Effective
Regiment. Rank and File.
i/+th ..: . te-- . .
344
Maj.-Gen.
268
Robinson
2/84th . , . ,
294
i Company Brunswick-Oels
20
Col. de Regoa ]
'2nd, 1 5th Portuguese Line, 8th
Ca9adores .
1224
Total Fifth Division .
3597
Sixth Division (Lieut-Gen. Sir H. Clinton).
I /42nd . \\'
669
Maj.-Gen. Pack
i/79th ...
594
458
i Company 5/6oth
37
'l/lith
477
Maj.-Gen.
i/32nd .....
464
Lambert
i/36th
365
i/6ist
438
Col. Douglas | 8th ' I2 , th P g^ Line, 9 th
\ Ca9adores ....
J 775
Total Sixth Division .
5243
Seventh Division (Maj.-Gen. Walker).
'i/6th
709
Col. Gardiner
3rd Provisional Battalion -j t o u
271
184
9 Companies Brunswick-Oels
250
^ist ......
268
Maj.-Gen. Inglis-
68th
i/82nd
238
489
Chasseurs Britanniques
288
Col. Doyle
'7th, 1 9th Portuguese Line, 2nd
Ca9adores ....
1912
Total Seventh Division .
4609
Ljght Division (Maj.-Gen. C. Alten).
Maj.-Gen. J 1 /^
Kempt 1 ' 95th
U/95* .....
724
422
365
Col. Colborne ( l (^ '
\2/95th . . .
35o
1 7th Portuguese Line, .1st, 3rd
Ca9adores ....
1350
Total Light Division .
3925
APPENDIX I
425
Unattached.
Maj.-Gen.
Bradford
Brig.-Gen.
Campbell
Lieut. -Col.
Dundas
Capt. Gibson
Effective
Regiment. Rank and File.
r 1 3th, 24th Portuguese Line, 5th
\ Ca9adores .... 1449
{ist, 1 6th Portuguese Line, 4th
Ca^adores .
/Royal Staff Corps
1 3th Royal Veteran Battalion
Total Infantry
Total Cavalry
Add one-eighth for officers
and Serjeants, say . . 7,500
Total of all ranks, say . . 67,000
ANALYSIS
British Cavalry, rank and file ..... 9,021
Portuguese Cavalry, rank and file . . . 1,158
British Infantry (including Germans), rank and file . 32,086
Portuguese Infantry ...... 17,040
APPENDIX II
THE ANGLO-ALLIED ARMY IN THE
WATERLOO CAMPAIGN
Commander-in-Chief. Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G.
Quarter-master-General. Colonel Oliver De Lancey.
(G.) signifies regiments that had served with Graham in the
Netherlands ; (P.) regiments that had served in the Peninsular War.
FIRST CORPS (The Prince of Orange)
First Division (Maj.-Gen. Cooke).
1st British Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Maitland
2nd British Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir John
Byng
2/ist Guards (G.)
3/ist Guards
2nd Coldstream Guards (G.)
2/3rd Guards (G.)
Artillery Sandham's British and Kuhlmann's K.G.L. field-batteries.
Total 4061 infantry, 12 guns.
Third Division (Lieut.-Gen. Sir Charles Alten).
5th British Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir Colin
Halkett
2nd K.G.L. Brigade
Col. von Ompteda
ist Hanoverian Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Count
Kielmansegge
Artillery Lloyd's British and Cleeves's K.G.L. field-batteries.
Total 6970 infantry, 1 2 guns.
426
2/ 3 oth (G.), 33rd (G.)
2/6 9 th (G.), 2/ 73 rd (G.)
ist and 2nd Light Battalions K.G.L.
5th and 8th Line Battalions K.G.L.
-6 Hanoverian battalions
APPENDIX II 427
Second Netherlandish Division (Lieut.-Gen. Baron de Perponcher).
1st Brigade )
Maj.-Gen. de Bijlandt / 5 Neth erlandish battalions
2nd Brigade
Prince Bernard of Saxe-U Nassau battalions
Wiemar J
Artillery One field-battery, Bijleveld's horse-battery.
Total 7700 infantry, 1 2 guns.
Third Netherlandish Division (Lieut.-Gen. Baron de Chasse").
. Detmers } 6 Netherlandish battalions
. d'Aubreme } 6 Netherlan ^h battalions
Artillery A field-battery and a horse-battery, Netherlandish.
Total 6669 infantry, 16 guns.
TOTAL FIRST CORPS 25,400 infantry, 56 guns.
SECOND CORPS (Lieut.-Gen. Lord Hill)
Second Division (Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Clinton).
3rd British Brigade \ 1/5 2nd (P.), 1/7 1st (P.)
Maj.-Gen. Adam /2/9$th (P.), 3/95*h (G.)
ist K.G.L. Brigade \ist, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Line Battalions
Col. Du Plat / K.G.L.
Artillery Bolton's British and Sympher's K.G.L. field-batteries.
Total 6833 infantry, 12 guns.
Fourth Division (Lieut.-Gen. Sir C. Colville).
6th British Brigade U/35th (G.), i/54th (G.)
Maj.-Gen. Johnstone /59th, i/gist (G.)
6th Hanoverian Brigade 1
Maj.-Gen. Sir James j-5 Hanoverian battalions
Lyon J
Artillery Bromc's British and Rettberg's Hanoverian field-batteries.
Total 7217 infantry, 12 guns.
428
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Corps of Prince Frederick of the Netherlands.
ist Netherlandish Division\D'Hauw's Brigade, 6 battalions
Lieut. -Gen. Stedman /De Eerens's Brigade, 5 battalions
Total 6437 infantry, and one field-battery of 8 guns.
Anthing's Netherland 1 , ,. , c ,, ,
Indian Brigade /* battahons and I field-battery
Total 3499 infantry, 8 guns.
TOTAL SECOND CORPS 23,986 infantry, 40 guns.
ist Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Lord E.
Somerset
2nd Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir W.
Ponsonby
3rd Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir W.
Dfirnberg
4th Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir J.
Vandeleur
'5th Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir
Colquhoun Grant
6th Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir Hussey
Vivian
7th Brigade
Col. Arentschild
CAVALRY
ist and 2nd Life Guards, Blues
Royals, Greys, Inniskillings
ist and 2nd Light Dragoons K.G.L.
23rd Light Dragoons
lith, 1 2th, 1 6th Light Dragoons
yth and I5th Hussars
2nd Hussars K.G.L.
loth and i8th Hussars
ist Hussars K.G.L.
1 3th Light Dragoons
/3rd Hussars K.G.L.
Artillery Bull's (howitzers), Gardiner's, Mercer's, Ramsay's,
Webler-Smith's, and Whinyates's horse-batteries.
Total 8471 cavalry, 36 guns.
Brunswick Cavalry
Netherlandish Cavalry
"| i regiment and
/ cavalry
I squadron, 922
3 brigades (Trip, de Ghigny, Van
Merlen), 7 regiments, and 2 half-
batteries
Total 3405 cavalry and 8 guns.
TOTAL CAVALRY 14,482 and 44 guns.
APPENDIX II
GARRISONS
429
.<?) 2 /37th (G.), 2/ 7 8th (G.)
3 British garrison battalions.
Seventh Division.
7th British Brigade
Total 3233 men.
Hanoverian Reserve Corps 12 Landwehr battalions in 4 brigades
Total 9000 men.
TOTAL GARRISONS 12,233 men.
GRAND TOTAL (including 1240 Engineers and waggon -train V-
105,834 men and 204 guns.
RESERVE
Fifth Division (Lieut-Gen. Sir Thomas Picton).
8th British Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir James
Kempt
9th British Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir Denis
Pack
5th Hanoverian Brigade
Col. von Vincke
i/28th (P.), i/ 32 nd (P.)
i/79th (P.), i/9Sth (P.)
i/ 4 th (P)., i/2 7 th (P.)
i/ 4 oth(P.), 2/8 ist (P.)
3/ist (P.), i/ 42 nd (P.)
2/ 44 th (P.), i/ 9 2nd (P.)
[-4 Landwehr battalions
Artilkfy Rogers's British and Braun's Hanoverian field-batteries.
Total 7158 infantry, 12 guns.
Sixth Division.
loth British Brigade
Maj.-Gen. Sir John
Lambert
4th Hanoverian Brigade \ T , , . ..
r 1 B t 5-4 Landwehr battalions
Artillery Unett's and Sinclair's field-batteries.
Total 5149 infantry, 12 guns.
British Reserve Artillery.
2 horse-batteries (Ross and Bean).
3 field-batteries (Morisson, Hutchesson, Ilbert).
Brunswick Corps (The Duke of Brunswick).
Advanced guard, 4 companies infantry, detachment cavalry, 2
brigades (each 3 battalions), and 2 batteries.
Total 5376 infantry and 16 guns.
430 HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Nassau Contingent (General von Kruse), 3 battalions.
Total 2841 infantry.
TOTAL RESERVE 20,524 infantry, 64 guns.
TOTAL STRENGTH BY NATIONALITIES
Nation.
Infantry.
Cavalry.
Guns.
British .
. 20,310 rank and file
5,91 1 rank and
file 90
K.G.L.
3,285
2,560
18
Hanoverians .
13,793
1,682
12
Brunswick
5,376
922
16
Nassau .
. 7,308 all ranks
Netherlanders
. 18,838
3,405 all ranks
56
68,910
14,480
192
(Taken from The Campaign 0/1815, by Lieut.-Col. W. H. James.)
APPENDIX III
STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY PRESENT
AT WATERLOO
(Abridged from the Field-State printed by Siborne, which, however,
seems from internal evidence to be imperfect.)
H w a
2 TJ g
S2
8 ,3
g
S2 g
| So 1
O
2
.2 So
g
O w
o 1
6
5 2
1
R.A. 175
4769
INFANTRY.
K.G.L. Art.
25
546
f I8t .
f 2/I8t Gds.
29 752
R.E.
37
Brit.
L 3/ist Gds.
29 818
Sappers & Miners
Waggon-Train
10
16
735
285
ist
2nd
. Brit. 1
f2/C. Gds.
[2/3rd Gds.
36 1006
34 I 2i
Staff Corps
18
251
f
[2/ 3 Oth
4 593
Cav. fistL.G.
16
229
5th
i/ 33 rd
3 1 535
1 2nd L.G.
istn *
20
215
Brit.
2/6 9 th
30 511
] Blues
IK.D.G.
'9
29
232
568
3 rd.
2/ 73 rd
[5th Line K.G.L.
23 475
3 1 47 1
ist. D.
30
398
2nd
8th Line K.G.L.
32 513
2nd 2nd D.
28
414
K.G.L/
ist Light K.G.L.
32 458
6th D.
26
419
2nd Light K.G.L.
31 406
ist L.D.K.G.L.
34
500
[i/52nd
59 J 79
3rd 2nd L.D.K.G.L.
33
472
3 rd
1/7 ist
5 93 1
23rd L.D.
28
3 I 3
Brit.
Det. 3/9 5th
10 193
nth L.D.
2 7
408
- n J
2/95th
34 621
4th I2th L.D.
26
401
2nd <
r ist Line K.G.L.
29 426
i6th L.D.
3
403
ist
2nd Line K.G.L.
29 463
(7th Hrs.
5th4 1 5th Hrs.
18
28
344
419
K.G.L.Wd Line K.G.L.
Uth Line K.G.L.
3 553
30 448
(2nd Hrs. K.G.L.
{ioth Hrs.
i8th Hra.
ist Hrs. K.G.L.
36
26
3*6
547
426
55
4 th I
Brit. |
'
'3/Hth
k i/J"t
[l/28th
38 592
44 697
45 474
35 521
I3th L.D.
28
420
8th
i/32nd
26 477
3rd Hrs. K.G.L.
37
647
Brit. "
i /79th
26 414
rt-h
i/ 95 th
17 401
5tn-
'3/ist
36 417
9 th
i/42nd
17 312
Brit.
2/44th
20 450
.i/ 9 2nd
22 400
of ll
r i/4th
27 643
lOLil
i/27th
21 729
"
w i /4oth
43 819
431
APPENDIX IV
COMPOSITION OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY UNDER
FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE VON BLUCHER
Chief of Staff. Lieut. -General Count von Gneisenau.
Quarter-master-General. Major-General von Grolmann.
IST ARMY CORPS (Lieut.-Gen. von Ziethen)
ist Brigade . . Steinmetz . . 9069 men 16 guns
2nd . . Pirchll. . 8018 18
3rd . . Jagow . . 7146 8
4th . . Henckel . 4900 8
Reserve Cavalry . Rader . . . 2175 8
Reserve Artillery . Rentzell . . . . . 30
Total Ist Corps 31,308 men, 88 guns.
UND ARMY CORPS (Gen. von Pirch I.)
5th Brigade .
Tippelskirch .
. 7153 men
8 guns
6th
Krafft .
. 6762
8
7th
Brause .
6503
8
8th
Bose
6584
8
Reserve Cavalry
Wahlen .
- 4471
8
Reserve Artillery .
.
.
32
Total Ilnd Corps 31,473 men, 72 guns.
IIlRD ARMY CORPS (Lieut.-Gen. von Thielmann)
9th Brigade . . Borcke *. . . 7262 men 8 guns
loth . . Kemphen . . 4419
nth . Luck . . 3980
1 2th . . Stulpnagel . .6614
Reserve Cavalry . Hobe . .1981
Reserve Artillery . Grevenitz . .16
Total Illrd Corps 24,256 men, 56 guns.
r 432
APPENDIX IV
CORPS (Gen. Count Bulow)
433
I 3th Brigade .
1 4th
i 5th . .
1 6th
Reserve Cavalry
Reserve Artillery .
Hake .
Ryssel .
Losthin .
Killer .
Prince William
Bardeben
. 6560 m<
. 7138 ,
- 7H3 ,
6423 ,
m 8 guns
8
8
8
16
.32
Total IVth Corps 30,585 men, 80 guns.
SUMMARY
1st Corps .
Ilnd Corps
Illrd Corps
IVth Corps
27,817 infantry
2,675 cavalry
88 guns
25,836
4,47 1
72
20,611
2,581 '
56
25,38i
3,921
80
Total . -99,645 13,648 296
(exclusive of gunners, engineers, and train.)
(Abstracted from Appendix to The Campaign 0/1815, by
Lieut-Col. W. H. James.)
VOL. X
2 F
APPENDIX V
COMPOSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY UNDER
THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON
Chief of Staff. Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia.
IMPERIAL GUARD (Dfcouor)
Infantry. Men.
Friant ist, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Grenadiers .... 4,140
Morand ist, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Chasseurs . . . . 4,603
Duhesme ist, 2nd Tirailleurs, ist, 2nd Voltigeurs . 4,283
Total Infantry . . . 13,026
Cavalry.
Lefebvre DesnoSttes Lancers and Mounted Chasseurs ^
Guyot Dragoons and Horse Grenadiers . . \ 4100
D'Autancourt Gendarmerie d'lite
Artillery.
Desvaux 13 foot- and 3 horse-batteries.
Engineers and sailors of the Guard.
Total 20,755 men > I22 guns.
FIRST CORPS D'ARM^E (D'ERLON)
First j ? Brigade, 54th, 55th Line
' 1 Bourgeois's Brigade, 28th, iO5th Line
^UlWl. ^
Second Schmitz's Brigade, I3th Light, I7th Line
Division. K Aulard s Brigade, loth, 5 ist Line
Douzelot.
T . rd [Noguez's Brigade, 2 ist, 46th Line
Division. ^ Gre 5 nier > s Br f d 25th / 45th L i n e J39OO
Marcognet. {
434
APPENDIX V
Fourth
First
Cavalry
Division.
Jacquinot.
Eighth
Division. -
Lefol.
T J en . th jGengoux's Brigade, 34th, 88th Line
Division. - - -
Habert.
435
Men.
Division. {JJS'M^g^^iSl! I 3853
Bruno's Brigade \3rd Chass., 7th Hussars ) ,
Gobrecht's Brigade/ 3rd, 4 th Lancers / l?O(
Artillery 5 foot-batteries, I horse-battery.
Engineers 5 companies.
Total (with train) 20,731 men, 46 guns.
SECOND CORPS D'ARME (REILLE)
TV I Husson's Brigade, 2nd Light, 6ist Line
Bached [ Can W' S Bri S ade > 7-d, ,*oM Line
sixth r
Division. I Bauduin's Brigade, ist, 3rd Light V R
Jer6me j Soye's Brigade, 1st, 2nd Line // 81 9
Bonaparte. \
DivSon J Devilliers ' s Brigade, nth Light, 82nd Line
Girard >
von , ,
Girard/ l Piat>s Brigade, 1 2th -Light, 4th Line
Division. JGauthier's Brigade, 92nd, 93rd Line ] gg
p JB. Jamin's Brigade, 4th Light, looth Line j^'
Second f
Cavalry I Huberts's Brigade, ist, 6th Chasseurs \ 2 o6
Division. 1 Vathiez's Brigade, 5th, 6th Lancers )
Pi re'.
Artillery 5 foot-batteries, I horse-battery.
Engineers 5 companies.
Total (with train) 25,179 men, 46 guns.
THIRD CORPS D'ARMEE (VANDAMME)
Billard's Brigade, I5th Light, 23rd Line
Corsin's Brigade, 37th, 64th Line /*
Dupeyroux's Brigade, 2 2nd, 7oth Line U 2 4
2nd Swiss Foreign Legion J
436 HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Men.
Eleventh
I
T^. Dufour's Brigade, izth, c6th Line 1 f
Division. K T i T j i o/- i T M l6C
Berthezene. I La S arde s Brigade, 33^, 86th Line / * -
Dommanget's Brigade, 4th, pth Chasseurs 1
Vinot's Brigade, izth Chasseurs | IOI 7
Third
Cavalry
Division.
Domont.
Artillery 4 foot-batteries, I horse-battery.
Engineers 3 companies.
Total (with train) 18,105 men, 46 guns.
FOURTH CORPS D'ARME~E (GERARD)
D^sbn. / Romme ' s Brigade, 3 oth, 9 6th Line
Pi h I Scoffer's Brigade, 6th Light, 63rd Line
Thirteenth f T ^ . . , . ,
Division J Le Ca P ltame s Brigade, 59th, ;6th Line
Vicherv' 1 Des P rez ' s Brigade, 48th, 6oth Line
Fourteenth f TT , , -r, . ,
Division J Hulot s Bri S ade ' 9 th Ll S ht > i "h Line
Bourmont. \ Toussaint ' s Brigade, 44 th, 5oth Line
Seventh
Cavalry
Division.
Vallin's Brigade, 6th Hussars, 8th Chasseurs
Berruyer's Brigade, 6th, i6th Dragoons
Maurin.
Artillery 5 foot-batteries, I horse-battery.
Engineers 3 companies.
Total (with train) 16,219 men > 46 guns.
SIXTH CORPS D'ARME (LOBAU)
Nineteenth fr, 1t . , n .
Division. J ^ elI T air s . Brigade 5 th, I ith Line
Simmer. [ M ' J amm s Bri g ade > 2 7th, 84th Line
Twentieth (^ , . .
Division J ony s Bn g ade 5 th Ll g^t, loth Line \
Jannin.' | Tromelin ' s Brigade, 47th, loyth Line j 2 '
APPENDIX V 437
' s Bri ade 8th Light, 4 oth Line
Teste Penne ' s Bri g^e, 65 th, 75 th Line
Artillery 4 foot-batteries.
Engineers 3 companies.
Total (with train) 10,821 men, 32 guns.
RESERVE CAVALRY (MARSHAL GROUCHY)
FIRST CAVALRY CORPS (PAJOL)
St. Laurent's Brigade! , , u
Ameil's Brigade ) Ist ' ^ th ' 5 th Hussars
A. de Colbert's Brigade, 1st, 2nd Lancers
Merlin's Brigade, nth Chasseurs
Fourth
Cavalry
Division.
P. Soult.
Fifth
Cavalry
Division.
Subervie.
Artillery 2 horse-batteries.
SECOND CAVALRY CORPS (XELMANS)
Ninth f
Cavalry I Burthe's Brigade, $th, I3th Dragoons
Division. 1 Vincent's Brigade, 1 5 th, 2Oth Dragoons
Strolz. [
Tenth f
Cavalry I Bonnemains's Brigade, 4th, I2th Dragoons
Division. 1 Berton's Brigade, I4th, iyth Dragoons
Chastel. [
Artillery 2 horse-batteries.
THIRD CAVALRY CORPS (KELLERMANN)
Eleventh f
Cavalry I Piquet's Brigade, 2nd, yth Dragoons
Division. 1 Guiton's Brigade, 8th, nth Cuirassiers
1'Heritier. [
Twelfth C
I Blancard's Brigade, 1st, 2nd Carbineers
I Don P' s Brigade, 2nd, 3rd Cuirassiers
d'Harbal. (
Artillery 2 horse-batteries.
Men.
2536
3116
3400
438 HISTORY OF THE ARMY
FOURTH CAVALRY CORPS (MILHAUD)
Dubois's Brigade, 1st, 4th Cuirassiers
Travers's Brigade, 7th, I2th Cuirassiers
Farine's Brigade, 5th, loth Cuirassiers
Vial's Brigade, 6th, 9th Cuirassiers
Men.
Thirteenth
Cavalry-
Division.
Wathier.
Fourteenth
Cavalry
Division.
Delort.
Artillery 2 horse-batteries.
TOTAL RESERVE CAVALRY 11,849 men (without train), 48 guns.
SUMMARY
Infantry.
Cavalry. Artillery. Engineers, etc
. Guns.
13,026
4,100
2,786
109
122
16,885
1,706
1,096
330
4 6
20,635
2,064
1,700
409
4 6
I5.I30
1,017
1,084
146
38
13,401
1,500
M 1 ?
2OI
38
8,573
...
765
189
32
11,849
1,222
...
48
Imperial Guard .
ist Corps d'Armee
2nd
3 rd
4 th
6th
Reserve Cavalry .
Total . . 87,650 22,236 10,070 1,384 370
Grand Total (including train) 124,139 men, 370 guns.
(Abridged from Appendix to The Campaign of 1815, by
Lieut.-Col. W. H. James.)
INDEX
Abb6, General (French),*ix. 116, 160,245,
257, 261, 362, 364, 368, 372, 390, 464,
490 ; at Sorauren, ix. 273, 275, 293, 298 5
at the Nivelle, ix. 435, 437, 439 ; at the
Nive, ix. 453, 456-7 ; at St. Pierre, ix.
466-76
Abechuco, ix. 164, 181-2
Abercromby, Lieutenant-general Sir Ralph,
x. 206
Aboville, General (French), ix. 151
Adam, Major-general, ix. 41-3, 374, 377,
381-2 j in the Waterloo campaign, x.
240, 263, 372, 378, 385
Adarca, ix. 250
Addington, Henry (Lord Sidmouth), x. 183
Adour river, ix. 486-8 ; the passage of, ix.
49 2 ~3> 499-5 02
Aezcoa (N. Spain), ix. 120-22
Ahetze, ix. 209
Ainhoa, ix. 213, 216-17, 245, 248, 257,
289, 301, 362, 369, 390-91, 393, 395,
406,412,424-5,435
Aire (Southern France), ix. 517, 518
Alcoy, ix. 38
Aldudes valley and river, ix. 214, 217, 245,
247, 250, 263, 291, 301, 394, 423, 425
Alexander, Tsar of Russia, ix. 234-5, 238,
240, x. 402 ; his policy after Napoleon's
defeat in Russia, ix. 23-6 ; his designs
after Leipzig, ix. 473, 476 ; his part in
Napoleon's* abdication, x. 57-8
Ali (village), ix. 183
Alicante, ix. 27, 29, 37, 38
Almandoz, ix. 272, 276
Almunia (N. Spain), ix. 35
Alten, General Charles, ix. 281, 292, 298
*99 39 6 4 J 3> 4*4, 444, *.. 2I ^6-7,
*>7> 73'5 77> 93 ; at the Bidassoa, ix.
401-2; at the Nivelle, ix. 427-30, 438-9 ;
at the Nive, ix. 455-7 j at Orthez, ix.
505 ; at Toulouse, x. 80-8 1, 84, 87 ; in
the Waterloo campaign, x. 240, 246-7,
264-7, 289, 298, 311, 350, 383, 385
Alten, General Victor, ix. 84, 87, 99, 130,
138, 197, 444, 450, x. 240
Altobiscar, ix. 246, 250, 254, 362, 425
Alzate Real. See Boar's Back
Alzuza, ix. 271, 275, 284
Amarante, General (Portuguese), ix. 130,
!37
Ambert, General (French), Governor of
Bergen-op-Zoom, x. 39, 47, 50
America, United States of. See United
States
Ametsonde, ix. 467
Amherstburg (Canada), ix. 317, 324
Amots, ix. 407, 410-11, 424, 430-31,
435-6
Angouleme, Duke of, x. 19, 21, 31,
231
Anhaux, ix. 252
Anir, ix. 213
Anson, General William, ix. 129, 184, 196,
20 1, 253, 255, 514, 516 ; at Sorauren,
ix. 270, 275, 278 ; at Toulouse, x. 84,
86
Anthing, General (Netherlandish), x. 247,
263
Antwerp, Castlereagh's anxiety to secure,
ix. 474 ; abortive operations for capture
of, x. 5-12
Arabin, Captain (R.A.), ix. 378-9
Aranguiz, ix. 168, 170, 1 80
Arbonne, ix. 449, 454, 463, 485
Arcangues, ix. 439, 449-50, 454, 459, 462,
485
Arentschild, General, x. 74-5, 91, 2H ;
in the Waterloo campaign, x. 240, 351,
372
Aretesque, rock of, ix. 256-9
Arga river and valley, ix. 267, 269-73,
275-6, 284-5, 28 9
Ariege river, x. 70-72
Ariftez, ix. 163-6, 170, 175, 177-9, l8 9>
191
Ariscun, ix. 214
Arleta, ix. 269-70
Armentia, ix. 164, 166, 1 80, 183
Arms, Armour, and Accoutrements, tin
camp-kettles issued, ix. 100
439
440
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Armstrong, Mr., American Secretary for
War, ix. 337-8, x. 100-102, 122, 145
Army, the British, in the British Isles,
strength and duties, 1812, ix. 15, 16 ;
recruiting of, ix. 77 ; its weakness, ix.
79 ; survey of (1803-14), x. 182 sq. ;
account of the Commissariat, x. 188 ;
account of the Medical Department, x.
193-65 account of the Chaplain's Depart-
ment, x. 196-201 ; account of the Horse
Guards, x. 201-2 ; account of the War
Office, x. 1 86-8 ; account of the officers,
x. 204-7 ; account of the men, x. 207 57.;
flogging in, x. 207-8 ; changes in dress,
x. 210-14 ; the cavalry, x. 210-12 ; the
infantry, x.
Army, the British, in the Low Countries,
1815, x. 227, 233
Army, the British, in the Peninsula, rein-
forcements for, ix. 15, 77-9 ; provisional
battalions, ix. 79-81 ; want of horses for
cavalry, ix. 82 ; dearth of artillery, ix.
83 ; changes of generals (1812-13), ix.
84-91 ; the Commissariat, ix. 91, x.
188-93 5 means for improving discipline,
ix. 95-7 ; staff corps of military police
formed, ix. 97-8 ; medical service, ix.
100-104 j i ts amusements, ix. 108-10 j
indiscipline after victory, ix. 186-7, I 97~
198 ; measures for recruiting, ix. 416-20 ;
desertion, ix. 443 ; detachments sent to
America, x. 120, 125 5 the Chaplain's
Department, x. 196-201
Army, the British, on the east coast of
Spain, ix. 34-70
Arneguy, ix. 250, 362
Arraunts, ix. 209
Arriaga, ix. 163, 168, 180-84, 189
Arrola, peak of, ix. 250
Ascain, ix. 209, 362, 406, 411, 424, 426,
428, 430-32 .
Ashworth, Colonel, ix. 211, 276; at the
Nivelle, ix. 437 ; at St. Pierre, ix. 465,
467-8,470
Atalosti, pass of, ix. 246, 251, 265
Atchiola, ix. 215, 259, 266
Atchulegui, ix. 412-13, 435-7
Atchuria, ix. 395, 428
Augereau, General, ix. 20, x. 15, 16, 251
Austria (and see Metternich), her policy
after Napoleon's defeat in Russia, ix. 20-
26 j forced into a coalition by England,
ix. 233-4
Avy, General (French), ix. 165, 170,
175-6
Aya, Mount, ix. 248, 362-5, 367, 396
Aylmer, Colonel Lord, ix. 90, 352, 365,
368, 413, 424, 492, 499, 502-4, x. 206 }
at the Nivelle, ix. 426 ; at the Nive, ix.
454, 458, 461-2
Bachelu, General (French), x. 273-4, 277,
*9 6 > 2 99> 3 2 -3 37-> 3*7, 3" 355.
3.66, 378
Baigorry, valley of, ix. 214, 245-7, 250-51,
289, 362, 395
Bailie, General (French), ix. 470
Balaguer, Pass of, ix. 51, 52, 63, 69
Baltimore (Maryland), the attempted raid
on, x. 147-9
Barbastro (N. Spain), ix. 35
Barbot, General (French), ix. 117, 119,
135, 1 60, 221 } at the Nivelle, ix. 429-
43 2
Barcenas, Colonel (Spanish), ix. 297, 299
Barclay, Captain (R.N.), 326-32 ; his defeat
on Lake Erie, ix. 331-2, x. 99
Barclay de Tolly, General (Russian), x.
253
Baring, Major (K.G.L.), x. 352, 361, 369,
380, 382
Barnard, Colonel Andrew, ix. 175-6, 189 ;
at Orthez, ix. 508
Barnes, General, ix. 260, 266, 300, 304 ;
at St. Pierre, ix. 465, 467-8, 470 5 in
the Waterloo campaign, x. 240, 316
Barney, Commodore (American), x. 140-
141, 143-4, 181
Barrois, General (French), ix. 135
Barrouillet, ix. 449, 450, 454, 457, 459,
462
Bassussary, ix. 449-50, 454, 457, 460, 462
Batavia (U.S.A.), x. 101
Bathurst, Earl, Secretary of State for War,
ix. 37 j his measures to provide specie
for Wellington, ix. n, 13 j his instruc-
tions to Sir G. Prevost (1814), x. 125
Battles, Combats, and Sieges :
Adour, passage of, ix. 492-3, 499-502
Aire, ix. 518
Aldea Lengua, ix. 138
Arcis-sur-Aube, x. 13
Bautzen, ix. 234
Bayonne, sortie from, x. 94-7
Bejar, ix. 115
Bergen-op-Zoom, x. 34-54
Biar, ix. 41
Bidassoa, passage of, ix. 397-407
Bladensburg, x. 141-4
Borodino, ix. 5, 10
Brienne, ix. 491
Cabrerizos, ix. 138
Castalla, ix. 42-7
Castro Urdiales, ix. 123
Champaubcrt, x. 13
Chateau Thierry, x. 13
Chateaugai, action at, ix. 337-40
Chippewa, x. 108-9
Chrystler's Farm, ix. 342-3
Craonne, x. 16
Dennewitz, ix. 387
INDEX
44 i
Battles, Combats, and Sieges (contd.) :
Dresden, ix. 387
Gbhrde, ix. 387
Grossbeeren, ix. 387
Katzbach, ix. 387
Kulm, ix. 387
Laon, x. 16
La Rothiere, ix. 49 1
Leipzig, ix. 387-8
L/y, x. 294-5
Lundy's Lane, x. 113-16
Lutztn, ix. 235
Maya, ix. 256-61
Merxem, x. 8-9, n
Morales, ix. 142
Moravian Town, ix. 234-5
New Orleans, x. 157-60, 167-73
Nive, ix. 455
Nivelle, ix. 422-41
Ordal, ix. 376-84
Orthez, ix. 505
Osma, ix. 155-7
Plattsburg, x. 130-31
Pozo de lo Sal, ix. 1 1 6
Quatre Bras, x. 296 sqq.
Rheims, x. 1 6
Sackett's Harbour, ix. 313-17
St. Pierre, ix. 465
San Marcial, ix. 362-8
Sorauren, ix. 269-302
Stony Creek, ix. 318
Tafalla, ix. 116
Tarbes, x. 26-7
Tarragona, ix. 50-65
Tolosa, ix. 203
Toulouse, x. 80-91
Vic-de-Bigorre, x. 24-5
Villafranca, ix. 201-2
Vitoria, ix. 16 1 sq.
Waterloo, x. 355 sq.
Yanci Bridge, ix. 296-8
Bauduin, General (French), x. 302, 304,
307 3'3. 3", 356-8
Baurot, General (French), at Toulouse, x.
9 93
Baynes, General Edward, ix. 314
Bayonne, ix. 120, 244, 391, 393 j the
entrenched camp of, ix. 439, 448, 490,
x. 21 ; sortie from, x. 94-7
Bayonnette, La (ridge), ix. 248, 364, 390-
393> 39 6 > 402, 413
Baztan, the valley of, ix. 197, 204, 208,
209, 211-16, 245-7, 250, 263-6, 281-2,
284, 291, 293, 362, 425
Bean, Major (R.A.), 351
B6asain, ix. 290-91
Beauharnais, Prince Eugene, ix. 483, x.
15, 64
Beaver Dam, ix. 312-13, 319
Beckwith, General Sir Sidney, ix. 321-2
Beharia, Mount, ix. 252
Behobie, ix. 249
Behorobie, ix. 251, 364-5, 391, 395, 397-8
Behr, General (Netherlandish), x. 278
Belch6nia, ix. 410
Bellegarde, General (Austrian), ix. 483, x.
15 j his dealings with Lord W. Bentinck
in Italy, x. 60-62
Benckendorff, General (Russian), his opera-
tions in Holland, x. 4-6
Bentinck, Lord Frederick, ix. 374, 377>
381-2
Bentinck, Lieutenant-general Lord William,
ix. 67, 69, 223, 373-384 j his competition
with Wellington for specie, ix. n, 14;
his plans for a liberation movement in
Italy, ix. 26-9, 210 j his troubles in
Sicily, ix. 30-33, 3755 his advance
against Suchet, ix. 374-86 ; his instruc-
tions from Wellington after Vitoria, ix.
210 5 his designs upon Corsica, ix. 48 1-2 j
his campaign in the Riviera of Genoa,
ix. 482-3, x. 60-64; offends both
Austria and Murat, x. 61-2; his inter-
ference with the Milanese, x. 64-5 j re-
called by Castlereagh, x. 65-6
Berdaritz, Pass of, ix. 245-6, 248, 251,
266, 299
Berdun, ix. 22 1
Beresford (ship), ix. 323
Beresford, Sir William (Marshal in the
Portuguese Army), ix. 77, 89, 414, 450-
451, 460, 464, 485, 492, x. 23, 73, 203,
206 j at the Nivelle, ix. 430, 438 j at
the Nive, ix. 495-6, 498 ; his mission
to Bordeaux, ix. 517, x. 20-215 at
Toulouse, x. 78, 80-90
Bergen-op-Zoom, x. 3, 4 j description of,
x. 34-6 ; the assault on, x. 37-54
Berlier, General (French), ix. 452 j at the
Nive, ix. 458 ; at Orthez, ix. 505, 509
Bermingham, Colonel (commanding Portu-
guese brigade), x. 93
Bernadotte, Charles John, Crown Prince of
Sweden, ix. 25, 237, 240 ; intended for
throne of France, ix. 473, 476 ; in com-
mand of Army of the North, x. I, 3, 4,
16
Bernewitz, General, ix. 84, 87
Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar, Prince, x. 275,
279, 283, 301-2
Berri, Due de, ix. 389
Berrioplano, ix. 269
Berroeta, ix. 209, 211-13
Berthier, General (French), x. 251-2, 417
Bertoletti, General (French), ix. 54, 61,
223
Berton, General (French), ix. 505, 513,
x. 23-4, 26 ; at Toulouse, x. 78, 80 ;
in the Waterloo campaign, x. 329
442
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Best, General (Hanoverian), x. 301, 310-
311, 350, 416
Beunza, ix. 290
Bidarray, ix. 425
Bidart, ix. 440, 454
Bidassoa, river, ix. 245, 364-7, 391, 394-5 ;
first reached by British, ix. 204 ; passage
of, ix. 397-407
Bijlandt, General (Netherlandish), x. 288,
35<>, 353, 3 6 7, 3 6 9
Bijleveld, Major (Netherlandish), x. 362
Bilbao, ix. 123, 152, 158, 161, 167, 201
Biriatou, ix. 245, 248, 362, 367, 395,
397
Bizanet, General (French), x. 53
Black River Bay, ix. 315
Black Rock, ix. 346-7, x. 117, 123
Bladensburg, action of, x. 141-4
Blancard, General (French), x. 377
Bliicher, Marshal, ix. 234, 387, 474-5,
490 ; in command of Army of Silesia,
x. I ; his march on Paris wrecked by
Napoleon, x. 13-16} in Waterloo cam-
paign, x. 248-9, 253, 258-62, 325-8,
331, 34, 342-3, 374-5 38i> 385, 387,
391-2, 399, 401, 407, 409, 412, 417-18
Boar's Back, ix. 371, 392, 402, 405
Bock, General, ix. 129, 184, 444, x. 23-
24, 91 ; at Toulouse, x. 80, 211
Bolton, Major (R.A.), x. 352
Bordagain, the entrenched camp of, ix.
391, 406, 410
Bordeaux, General Beresford sent to, ix.
517 ; the counter-revolution at, x. 21,
3 1
Borja (N. Spain), ix. 35
Bourbon, the House of, its negotiations
with Wellington, ix. 389, x. 19-20
Boyd, Colonel (American), ix. 342-3
Boyer, General (French), ix. 135, 452,
488-9
Bradford, Colonel, ix. 132, 182, 196, 202,
424, 439, 502-3 ; at San Sebastian,
ix. 227 ; at the Nive, ix. 454, 458
Braga (N. Portugal), ix. 129
Bragan?a (N. Portugal), ix. 129
Braun, General (French), ix. 213
Braun, Major (K.G.L.), x. 351
Breda, captured by General Benckendorff,
x- 3; 5, 6
Brennier, General (French), ix. 17
Brindos, tang de, ix. 449, 454, 461
Brisbane, General Thomas, ix. 895 al
Vitoria, ix. 177-9 ; at Toulouse, x. 87
Brooke, Lieutenant-colonel (4th Foot), x,
141, 144, 148-9
Brown, General Jacob (American), ix. 314
x. 100-101, 105, 107-15, 121-3
Brownrigg, Lieutenant-general Sir Robert
Quarter-master-general, x. 202
Jrunswick, Duke of, x. 301-2, 304 j
troops of, in Waterloo campaign, x. 305-
306, 312, 315, 320, 370, 372, 385, 397
Jubna, General (Austrian), ix. 23, 235, x.
Juck, Major (8th), x. 107
Juftalo, ix. 307, 346-7, x. 101
Bull, Major (R.A.), x. 357
Billow, General (Prussian), his operations
in Holland with Graham, x. 3, 5-16 5
in the Waterloo campaign, x. 268, 287,
327-8, 340, 341, 343, 359, 374-5, 381,
385, 387
Junbury, Colonel Henry, his mission to
Wellington, ix. 49 1
Junbury, Colonel (3rd Buffs), ix. 468, 471
Juquet, General (French), ix. 122
Burdett, Sir Francis, M.P., x. 208
Burgos, ix. 114, 1 1 6-1 8; blown up and
evacuated by the French, ix. 151
Burgoyne, Colonel John (R.E.), ix. 230,
359, x. 163, 173, 176, 219
Burguete, ix. 213-15, 245, 254
Burlington Heights (Hamilton), ix. 313,
317-18, 323, 336-7, 344-5, x. 99, 105-6
Bussche, Major-general (K.G.L.), x. 240
Byng, General John, ix. 89, 90, 205, 246-
247, 250-56, 264, 285, 294-5, 299, 518 j
at the Nivelle, ix. 437 ; at St. Pierre,
ix. 468-9 ; in the Waterloo campaign,
x. 263, 317, 351, 368
Cadiz, British troops withdrawn from, ix.
445
Cadogan, Colonel (7ist), ix. 171
Cadoux, Captain (95th), ix. 370-71
Cafe Republicain, ix. 395, 398-9
Caffarelli, General (French), ix. 112-14,
116-17, 131, 192
Calvaire, Mont de, ix. 391, 395, 399> 400,
413
Calvert, General Sir Harry, Adjutant-
general, x. 1 86, 200, 202
Calvinet, Heights of (Toulouse), x. 69-72,
77-82, 89-90
Cambaceies, M. de, ix. 241
Cambo, ix. 301, 391, 393, 413
Cambrills, ix. 66-8, 71
Cameron, Colonel, ix. 174, 256, 258, 467
Camp des Gendarmes, ix. 400
Campbell, Colonel (commanding Portuguese
brigade), ix. 247, 250, 253, 257, 263,
265, 270, 459, 499, 502-3 ; at Sorauren,
ix. 272, 277, 290, 291
Campbell, General (E. coast of Spain), ix.
36-7
Campy, General (French), x. 399
Canning, Colonel, x. 394
Carcassonne, Soult retreats on, after
Toulouse, x. 91
INDEX
443
Carey, Lieutenant-colonel, ix. 378-9, 382
Carleton, Colonel, at Bergen-op-Zoom, x.
37, 39-40, 51
Carolina (American ship), x. 156, 158, 160,
162-3
Casapalacio, General (French), ix. 217
Cassagne, General (French), ix. 145, 215-
216 ; at Vitoria, ix. 165, 175-6
Cassan, General (French) ix. 420-21
Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount, ix.
25, x. 12, 14, 15, 182, 402 5 rejects
Metternich's offer of mediation, ix. 235 ;
exerts power of the purse, ix. 233-4,
237 ; his anxiety for Antwerp, ix. 474 j
his treaty of Chaumont, x. 15 ; his
wrath with Lord W. Bentinck in Italy,
x. 62-6 ; his system for recruiting the
Army, x. 183-6 ; at Vienna, x. 228-9 ;
his return to England, x. 230
Cathcart, General Lord, ix. 26, 234, 237,
x. 241
Catherine, Queen of Naples, ix. 30-33
Caulaincourt, M. de, ix. 236, 240, x. 57-8
Champlain, Lake, ix. 321, 328, 341 j
Prevost's operations on, x. 125-34,
battle of, x. 130
Chandler, General (American), ix. 318
Chaplain's Department of the Army, x.
196-201
Chapora, ix. 412-13, 425, 435
Chass, Major - general (Netherlandish),
x. 246, 264, 278, 283, 289, 298, 350,
378, 387-8, 390
Chateaugai, action at, ix. 338-40
Chateaugai, river, ix. 337-40
Chateau Pignon (Pyrenees), ix. 251-2
Chaumont, Treaty of, x. 15
Chauncey, Commodore (American), ix.
306-7, 309-12, 317, 320-21, 323, 326,
337-8, 343, x. 101-4, JI 7, 123
Chazy, Great, river, x. 127-9
Chippewa, x. 122-3 5 action at, x. 108-9
Chofre Sand-hills (San Sebastian), ix. 226,
356
Chouille, ix. 397, 400, 413
Chowne, General (late Tilson), ix. 84-5
Chrystler's Farm, action at, ix. 342-3
Chub (ship), x. 133-4.
Ciboure, ix. 410
Ciga, ix. 213-14
Clarke, Duke of Feltre, ix. 112, 124-7,
146, 192, 209
Clausel, General (French), ix. 146-9, 151,
*53 J 57 i59- 6l 89, J 93 210, 243,
251-3, 256, 265, 267, 362-7, 392-3, 395,
412, 425, 486-7, 489, 504, 512, 516,
x. 24, 28, 71, 251 5 appointed to com-
mand the Army of the North, ix. 117 5
his operations for pacification of Northern
Spain, ix. 117-27 5 his movements after
Vitoria, ix. 205-8, 218-22 j joins the
main army in France, ix. 222 ; at the
battle of Sorauren, ix. 283-92, 296, 298,
300, 303 ; at San Marcial, 365-7, 369-
370 j at the passage of the Bidassoa,
ix. 401-2, 405, 409 ; at the Nivelle,
ix. 431-5, 441 j at the Nive, ix. 453,
455-7> 4 6 ^ j at Toulouse, x. 78, 80
" Clausel's Ridge," ix. 270, 275, 278, 284,
287
Clay, General (American), ix. 324-6
Cleeves, Major (R.A.), x. 313, 336, 351,
388
Clifton, Lieutenant-colonel, x. 41-2, 50
Clinton, General Sir Henry, ix. 86, 436,
452, 489, 495, 498, 516, x. 23, 26-8,
6 7 73, 915 at the Nivelle, ix. 436-7,
439} at the Nive, ix. 454, 4565 at
Orthez, ix. 507, 509 ; at Toulouse, x.
78, 80, 82, 85-8, 90 j in the Waterloo
campaign, x. 241, 246-7, 263, 351-2,
355. 372
Clinton, General Sir William, ix. 36, 58,
37 3i 376, 3 8 3 479> 4 8l > 4 8 4> x - 3 1
Coalition of May 1813 formed, ix. 234-8
Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander, x. 141,
147, 149-52, 164, 176 j his responsi-
bility for the Mississippi expedition, x.
151, 177-8
Cockburn, Admiral Sir George, ix. 322,
x. 151
Codrington, Captain (R.N.), x. 173, 175
Coffee, General (American), x. 158, 160
Coffin, Commissary-general, x. 190
Coghlan, Colonel (6ist), x. 93
Colborne, Colonel John (52nd), ix. 422,
450, x. 145, 203, 206 j at the Bidassoa,
ix. 401-4 5 at the Nivelle, ix. 427-9,
432-4, 440 ; at the Nive, ix. 498 j at
Orthez, ix. 510-11 j at Waterloo, x.
387, 392
Cole, General Sir Lowry, ix. 247-50, 252-
257, 263, 265-7, 365-8,413,424, 450,
516, x. 22-3, 6 7> 73> 77, 9* 24*5 at
Vitoria, ix. 169, 174; at Sorauren, ix.
269-73, 285, 289, 296, 298, 302; at
the Nivelle, ix. 430, 434, 439, 489,
492- 3 j at the Nive, ix. 4985 at
Orthez, ix. 506-11 ; at Toulouse, x. 78,
82, 85
"Cole's Ridge," ix. 270-72, 277, 282, 287
Collaert, Major-general (Netherlandish),
x. 246, 283
Collier, Commodore, ix. 424
Colour-sergeants instituted, ix. 100
Colville, General Charles, ix. 396, 406-7,
413, 424, 444, 454, x. 206 ; at Vitoria,
ix. 177, 179 ; at the Nivelle, ix. 436 j
in the Waterloo campaign, x. 263, 347,
399
444
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Commissari Ridge, ix. 392
Commissariat. See under Army
Confiance (ship), x. 128, 132-4
Conroux, General (French), ix. 135, 137,
139, 140, 250, 362, 364, 368, 390, 392 ;
at Vitoria, ix. 165, 172 j in the retreat
through the Pyrenees, ix. 209, 212, 214,
217-18 ; at Sorauren, ix. 271, 275, 277-
279, 281, 284, 287-8, 290, 296, 3015
at the Bidassoa, ix. 402-5 ; at the
Nivelle, ix. 430-35, 437-8
Constant de Rebecque, Major-general
(Netherlandish), in the Waterloo cam-
paign, x. 243, 278, 283, 288-9, 320, 406
Cooke, Lieutenant (43rd), ix. 455
Cooke, Major-general George, at Bergen-
op-Zoom, x. 41, 44, 48-53; in the
Waterloo campaign, x. 240, 246, 263,
289, 395
Copons, General (Spanish), ix. 49, 384-5,
477. 479> 4 8 4 and the campaign of
Tarragona, ix. 52-7, 60-72
Cornwall (Canada), ix. 342-3
Cotton, General Sir Stapleton, ix. 89, 192,
264, 493
Coutard, General (French), ix. 446
Craig, Lieutenant-general Sir James, x. 206
Craufurd, Major-general Robert, x. 206
Creevy, Thomas, M.P., x. 229, 419
Crispijana, ix. 180
Croghan, Major (American), ix. 329
Croix Daurade, x. 75-7, 80, 84
Croix des Bouquets, ix. 204, 369, 390-91,
399, 400, 413
Croker, John Wilson, Secretary to the
Admiralty, ix. 415
Curto, General (French), ix. 169, 181
Cuyler, Colonel (nth), x. 93
Da Costa, General (Portuguese), ix. 468,
5i8
Dalhousie, General, Earl of, ix. 169, 260,
263-4, 365, 369, 405, x. 206, 242 ; at
Vitoria, ix. 172, 175-7; in pursuit of
Clausel, ix. 206 ; before Pamplona, ix.
2ii ; at Sorauren, ix. 271, 274, 281,
285, 292-3, 295, 298-300
Dantzig, ix. 9
Darmagnac, General (French), ix. 137,
145, 152, 215-16, 248, 257-8, 266, 451,
464, 488-9, 493-4, 497> S^-iS, x. 24-5 ;
at Vitoria, ix. 165, 171, 175, 177 j at
Sorauren, ix. 273, 275, 290, 293, 296,
298 ; at San Marcial, ix. 364-7, 369,
406 ; at the Nivelle, ix. 435 ; at the
Nive, ix. 453, 457 ; at St. Pierre, ix.
466-9; at Orthez, ix. 505, 507-9, 511-
513 ; at Toulouse, x. 79, 86, 90
Darricau, General (French), ix. 136, 137,
425, 427, 433, 446, 464, 486, 488 ; at
Vitoria, ix. 165, 172 ; at the Nivelle,
ix. 438-9, 441 ; at the Nive, ix. 453 ;
at St. Pierre, ix. 466-8 ; at Toulouse,
x. 79, 8 1
Davoust, Marshal, ix. 387, x. 251
Dearborn, General (American), ix. 306-7,
39 349
Decaen, General (French), ix. 53, 55, 56,
62, 66, 374, 377, 389, x. 251
De Ghigny, General (Netherlandish), x. 351
Delancey, Colonel Oliver, ix. 90, x. 239-40,
394
Delort, General (French), x. 366, 370
Del Parque, General (Spanish), ix. 34, 48,
49, 64, 70, 207, 223, 373-4 ; called up
to Pamplona, ix. 394
Denmark, and the cession of Norway, ix. 25
D'Erlon, General (French), ix. 137, 145-6,
148, 160, 209, 211-13, 2I 5> 2I 7 2 5>
257-8, 261, 265-6, 362, 390, 412, 425-6,
464, 487, 494, 517, 519, x. 24-8, 71 ;
at Vitoria, ix. 170-71, 175, 177, 182-4;
in the retreat through the Pyrenees, ix.
209, 212-13, 218; at Sorauren, ix. 273-6,
281-3, 288, 290-92, 298, 303 ; at the
Bidassoa, ix. 406, 409 ; in the Waterloo
campaign, x. 269, 270, 272, 274, 277,
285, 292-5, 308, 322, 338, 353, 360-
367,386,388,406,411
D'Espana, Carlos, General (Spanish), ix.
34, 267, 420, 504 ; summoned to join
Wellington, ix. 487
Detroit, ix. 308, 324, 332, 337
Detroit, river, ix. 306, 326
Detroit (ship), ix. 329, x. 99
Dickson, Colonel Alexander (R.A.), ix. 90,
!77, x - I73 i7 6 2l6 > 24 1
Dickson, Lieutenant -colonel Jeremiah, x.
241
Diebitsch, General (Russian), ix. 21
Digeon, General (French), ix. 137, 140,
142-4; at Vitoria, ix. 165, 167-8, 180,
183-4, 1 9
Dobbs, Captain (R.N.), x. 117
Domont, General (French), in the Waterloo
campaign, x. 272, 333, 338, 354, 359,
375
Donamaria, Pass of, ix. 209, 247, 283,
292-3, 295
Donkin, General, ix. 45, 52, 56, 62, 69
Donzelot, General (French), x. 353, 360,
362, 364-5, 369, 373, 380, 382, 390
Dornberg, Major-general (K.G.L.), x. 240,
263-4, 280, 283, 324, 350, 372
Douglas, Colonel (commanding Portuguese
brigade), ix. 406 ; at Toulouse, x. 85, 93
Douro, river, campaign of 1813, ix. 129,
141, 144
Downie, Captain (R.N.), x. 127-34
Dragoons, Heavy, British, x. 211-12
INDEX
445
Dragoons, Light, British, x. 210-11
Dresden, ix. 233, 240
Dress of the Army, x. 210-14
Drill of the Army, x. 210, 212
Drouot, General (French), x. 386
Drummond, Lieutenant-colonel (io4th), x.
118-19
Drummond, Lieutenant-general Gordon, ix.
345-7, x. 100, 102, 106-7, 110-16,
117-23
Duhesme, General (French), x. 382
Dundas, General Sir David, x. 207
Dunmore, Commissary, x. 240
Du Plat, Major-general (K.G.L.), x. 240,
263, 368, 372, 378-9, 384, 395
Duran (Spanish partisan leader), ix. 221
Durana, village, ix. 162, 180, 189
Durango, ix. 158, 162
Durban, Colonel Benjamin, ix. 129, 169
Durban's Bridge, ix. 163
Durutte, General (French), x. 353, 355,
360, 365, 386, 391-2
Ebro, river, turned by Wellington in 1813,
153-7
Echalar, Pass of, ix. 213-14, 245-7, 3^3,
366-7, 392, 395, 413, 424
EgUes, river and valley of, ix. 271, 275
Elda, ix. 38
Elgorriaga, ix. 209
Elhorrieta, Pass of, ix. 245
Elio, General (Spanish), ix. 36, 48-9, 64,
70, 207, 223, 373
Elizondo, ix. 212-14, 248, 257, 263-5,
273, 275, 283, 289, 294-5
Elley, Colonel John, x. 241, 394
Elphinstone, Colonel (R.E.), x. 219
Elsabara, ix. 247
Endarlaza, ix. 364, 366, 391, 396
Erie, Fort, ix. 318, 346, x. 105-7 ;
captured by Americans, x. 107 j be-
sieged and assaulted by British, x. 117-
123 ; blown up by Americans, x. 123
Erie, Lake, ix. 308, 320, 324, 328, 330,
336, 348
Eroles, General (Spanish), ix. 53, 56, 376,
379
Errazu, ix. 299
Erro, river, ix. 265-7
Erskine, General Sir William, ix. 84,
86
Esain, ix. 288
Esla, river, ix. 141
Espelette, ix. 216-17, 248
Espinal, ix. 251, 254, 265
Etulain, ix. 283, 290
Eugui, Pass of, ix. 265, 289, 294
Evans, Lieutenant de Lacy, x. 147
Exelmans, General (French), x. 276, 329-
33, 339
Fane, General Henry, ix. 138-9, 496, 516,
X. 20, 70-71
Farine, General (French), x. 370
Felton, Lieutenant-colonel, x. 241
Ferdinand, King of Spain, ix. 241, 277-8,
481, 484
Fifteen Mile Creek, ix. 312
Finch (ship), x. 133
Fischer, Colonel (Watteville's Regiment),
x. 118-19
Fisher, Lieutenant-colonel, ix. 90, 107
Fitzgibbon, Lieutenant (49th), ix. 319
Fletcher, Colonel Sir Richard (R.E.), x.
218
Flogging in the Army, x. 207-8
Forjaz, Dom Manoel, ix. 414
Fort San Felipe, ix. 52-4, 64, 69
Forty Mile Creek (Grimsby), ix. 313, 319
Foster, Captain (38th), x. 96
Foy, General (French), ix. 115-18, 135,
155, 161, 248, 252, 255, 271, 362, 365,
3 6 9, 390, 395, 4i3, 425-6, 437-9, 44*,
45 ! 453, 455 486-7, 493~5, 497, 5*7'
518 ; his operations in Northern Spain,
ix. 119-22 ; his retreat into France, ix.
200-205 5 at Sorauren, ix. 273-6, 281-4,
286, 288-92, 298, 301, 303 j at the
Nive, ix. 455, 458-9, 461 j at St. Pierre,
ix. 469, 471 ; at Orthez, ix. 507-9,
511-135 in the Waterloo campaign, x.
277, 299, 302-3, 307 ., 322, 354, 368,
373, 378
Francis, Emperor of Austria, ix. 236, 473-4
Fraser, Major (Royal Scots), ix. 230
Frederick Augustus, King of Saxony, ix.
234
Frederick William III., King of Prussia,
ix. 20-25, 233, 235, 237, 240, 473-4,
476
Freemantle, Colonel, x. 386
Freire, General (Spanish), ix. 130, 365,
422, 424, 426, 442, 487, x. 21-3, 27,
74-5, 77 > at San Marcial, ix. 368, 372,
397 ; at the Bidassoa, ix. 398, 400-401,
404-5 } at the Nivelle, ix. 433, 439 ;
at Toulouse, x. 80, 82-4, 88-92
French Army, ill faith of officers, ix. 17, x.
97-8
French Armies in Spain :
The main army driven out of Spain, ix.
216 j reorganised by Soult, ix. 243
Army of Aragon (and see Suchet), ix.
376-82, 384
Army of Catalonia (and see Suchet), ix.
384
Army of the Centre, ix. 34, 114; Vitoria,
ix. 165 ; its position after the retreat,
ix. 209
Army of the North. See Caffarelli,
Clausel
44 6
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
French Armies in Spain (contd.} :
Army of Portugal, ix. 34, 115, 208;
Vitoria, ix. 166 5 its position after
the retreat, ix. 209
Army of the South, ix. 34, 1 14, 208 j
Vitoria, ix. 165 ; its position after
the retreat, ix. 209
French Army, Regiments :
Infantry
ist Light, x. 310-11, 357
2nd Light, ix. 400
3rd Light, x. 322
4th Light, ix. 428
6th Light, ix. 254
9th Light, ix. 433-4
i2th Light, ix. 506, 508
1 3th Light, x. 382
1 6th Light, ix. 258
27th Light, ix. 138
3 ist Light, ix. 431-4
34th Light, ix. 280, 402, 407
ist Line, ix. 298, x. 322
2nd Line, x. 322
3rd Line, ix. 395, 399
7th Line, ix. 380 .
8th Line, ix. 258
1 5th Line, ix. 395, 399
24th Line, ix. 400
32nd Line, ix. 279, 402, 407
34th Line, ix. 428-9, x. 89
39th Line, ix. 460
40th Line, ix. 117, 428
44th Line, ix. 380 .
45th Line, x. 367
47 th Line, ix. 279, 431, 433-4
5oth Line, ix. 400
59th Line, ix. 280, 432
6 ist Line, x. 322
70th Line, ix. 433
72nd Line, x. 322
8 ist Line, x. 89
88th Line, ix. 433-4
94th Line, ix. 138, 470
looth Line, x. 322
loist Line, ix. 395, 399, 400
io5th Line, ix. 395, 399, 400, x.
367
io8th Line, x. 322
1 1 5th Line, x. 89
1 1 8th Line, ix. 297, 400
1 1 9th Line, ix. 391, 497
1 20th Line, ix. 278
1 22nd Line, ix. 278
Imperial Guard x. 333, 386
3rd Grenadiers, x. 387
4th Grenadiers, x. 387
3rd Chasseurs, x. 388-9, 391
4th Chasseurs, x. 388, 390-91
French Army, Regiments (contd.) :
Cavalry
ist Chasseurs, x. 323
5th Chasseurs, x. 75
6th Chasseurs, x. 323
loth Chasseurs, x. 28
1 5th Chasseurs, ix. 498, 505
2 ist Chasseurs, ix. 510, x. 85
22nd Chasseurs, x. 81
25th Dragoons, ix. 505
ist Lancers, x. 323
3rd Lancers, x. 336
4th Lancers, x. 366
5th Lancers, x. 323
6th Lancers, x. 323
8th Cuirassiers, x. 323
nth Cuirassiers, x. 323
French Creek, ix. 340
French Mills, ix. 343
Fririon, General (French), ix. 181, 184-5,
217,451, 5 5, 5<>9, x - 2 4-5
Fuente de la Higuera, ix. 40-46
Fuenterrabia, ix. 362-4, 396-8
Gaines, General (American), x. 117, 120
Galbois, Colonel (French), x. 307
Gamarra Mayor, ix. 180-82, 184, 189
Gamarra Menor, ix. 181
Gamble, the Rev. James, Chaplain-general,
x. 197-8
Gardiner, Colonel, ix. 510
Gardiner, Major (R.A.), x. 337
Garonne, river, Wellington's passages of,
x. 66-75
Gasquet, General, x. 85-6
Gauthier, General (French), ix. 278-9,
289, 400 j at the Nive, ix. 458 ; in the
Waterloo campaign, x, 299, 300, 304,
307 ., 313, 322, 358
Gave d'Oloron, ix. 493-4, 496 ; passages
of, ix. 496-7
Gazan, General (French), ix. 131-3, 136-
137, 139-40, 145 ; at Vitoria, ix. 165-6,
170, 172, 182-3, I 9 I > 20 9 5 ' n the
retreat through the Pyrenees, ix. 209,
212-18
Gazan, " Madame," ix. 208
Genoa, occupied by Bentinck, x. 63-4
George, Fort, ix. 311-13, 319-20, 324,
3 z6 337, 344-5, x - II0
Gerard, General (French), x. 252, 269,
272, 274, 276, 285, 292-4, 330, 339
Gibbs, Major-general, sent to Stralsund
with troops, ix. 237 5 with the Mississippi
expedition, x. 163 ., 167-73
Girard, General (French), x. 274, 277, 294
Giron, General (Spanish), ix. 147, 149,
153-4, 169, 182, 189, 201, 366 - 8,
423-4 5 recalled by Spanish Government,
INDEX
447
ix. 210 ; at the Bidassoa, ix. 398, 401, !
405, 407, 409 5 at the Nivelle, ix. 434, i
439
Gneisenau, General (Prussian), ix. 491 j
his plan of campaign, December 1813,
ix. 474 j in the Waterloo campaign, x.
248-9, 257-9, 261, 266-8, 278-81, 285-
286, 288, 291, 296, 326-7,340-42, 381,
4!3> 4 1 7
Gobeo, ix. 163, 168, 181
Gomecha, ix. 163, 166, 179
Gomm, Major William, ix. 231, x. 241
Gordon, Captain (R.N.), x. 146, 394
Gordon, Captain Sir Alexander, x. 328
Gordon, Colonel Willoughby, ix. 84-7, x.
191-2, 200
Gore, General, at Bergen-op-Zoom, x. 39,
42-3
Gorospil, Path of, ix. 256-7, 438
Gorraiz, ix. 269-71
Graham, General Sir Thomas, ix. 89, 247-
248, 250, 276, 297, x. 183, 206 j cam-
paign of Vitbria,ix. 130, 136, 147-50, 153,
157 ; battle of Vitoria, ix. 180-84, 189 j
pursuit after Vitoria, ix. 196-205, 218 ; in
charge of siege of San Sebastian, ix. 227-
232, 353-61 ; ordered to Holland, x. i;
his operations in Holland, x. 6-12, 33-545
assault on Bergen-op-Zoom, x. 33-54
Grand Jonco, ix. 397, 399
Grant, Major-general Colquhoun, ix. 143,
423, 425, x. 242, 351, 37I -2, 395
Greenock, Lieutenant-colonel Lord, x. 241
Greig, Admiral (Russian), ix. 27, 28
Grenadier Island, ix. 338-40
Greville, General, ix. 398, 400
Grey, General Sir Charles (afterwards isl
Earl Grey), x. 206
Grolmann, General von (Prussian), x. 326'
3 2 7
Grouchy, Marshal, x. 270, 275, 285, 292
2 93 33-3 2 339-4, 343~5 359 3 8 7
39 8 '9
Gruardet, General (French), ix. 213-16
45 1. 469
Grttben, Major von (K.G.L.), x. 80-8 1
Guadeloupe, Isle of, ix. 25, x. 234 } taken
in 1815, x. 402
Gubbins, Lieutenant-colonel (85th Foot]
x. 172
Guetaria, ix. 226
Guise, Colonel, x. 96
Guiton, General (French), x. 299, 308
322-3
Guy, General (French), ix. 368, 372
Guyot, General (French), x. 373-5, 377
378, 380
Habert, General (French), ix. 41, 377
Haines, Commissary, ix. 109
Halkett, Colonel Colin, ix. 155, 182, 426 ;
in the Waterloo campaign, x. 240, 264,
3*2-11, 3'5 37, 32i, 35, 385, 387,
389, 395-6
Halkett, General Hew (Hanoverian), x.
35
lall, Major-general (American), ix. 346
lallen, Captain (95th), x. 157-60
Hallowell, Admiral, ix. 50, 57, 58, 65,
67-8, 70, 71
Hamilton, Colonel (Portuguese), ix. 425,
43 6 -7
Hampton, General Wade (American), ix.
338-41, 349
lampton Roads, ix. 322
landcock, Major (i3th) x. 101
Hanoverian troops, in Waterloo campaign,
x. 238, 247, 397
lardenberg, Count, ix. 235
iardinge, Colonel Henry, x. 258, 263
Harispe, General (French), ix. 40, 70, 379,
446, 486, 488-9, 492-4, 517, x. 27, 71,
79, 88-90, 95
Harrison, General (American), ix. 306,
H-6, 333, 336, 344
Eiarvey, Colonel, ix. 318
Hausa, Mount, ix. 251, 257
Havelock, Lieutenant William, ix. 405
Hay, General, ix. 297, 457, 461-2, 485,
492, 495, 499, 502 j at San Sebastian,
lx ' 355 357-8 5 at the Bidassoa, ix. 398-
400 j at the Nive, ix. 454-5 j killed before
Bayonne, x. 95
Hendaye, ix. 362, 364, 395, 398, 413
Henry, Colonel, at Bergen-op-Zoom, x. 37-
39 44, 50-52
Hernani, ix. 283, 363
Herries, Commissary-general, x. 192
Hers, river (Toulouse), x. 69, 72, 75,
77-82
Hill, General Sir Rowland, afterwards
Lord, ix. 109, 115, 218, 247-50, 256,
362, 413, 421, 425, 444, 463-4, 485,
487, 492-3, 498, 516, 518-19, x. 21-2,
26, 30, 68, 70-74, 203, 224 ; campaign
of Vitoria, ix. 132-3, 137-8, 149-50,
153-4, 157 } battle of Vitoria, ix. 168 j
charged with blockade of Pamplona, ix.
205 j his absence from combat of Maya,
ix. 263-5 5 during and after battles of
Sorauren, ix. 273-6, 281, 285-6, 290,
292-3, 298-300, 301 ; at the Nivelle, ix.
4.35-8/441, 444} at the Nive, ix. 450-52 ;
at St. Pierre, ix. 465-72 ; at Orthez, ix.
506-7, 512 ; at Toulouse, x. 80-8 1 ;
selected to command an expedition to
New Orleans, x. 1 50 ; in the Waterloo
campaign, x. 241, 246
Hintiber, General, x. 95-6 j in the Waterloo
campaign, x. 240
448
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Holland, feebleness of counter-revolution
in, x. 2, 3 5 operations in, x. 6-12, 33-
54
Hope, General Sir John, ix. 413, 424, 440,
460, 485, 492-5, x. 21 j at the Nivelle,
ix. 426, 439, 444 ; at the Nive, ix. 452-
45 3 460-62 j at the passage of the Adour,
ix. 499-502 j at the sortie from Bayonne,
x - 93-7
Horse Island (Lake Ontario), ix. 314-15
Hougoumont, Chateau of (Waterloo), x.
349, 35 2 '3> 368, 373, 383
Houston, General, ix. 89
Howard, General, ix. 365, 397, 454, 485 j
at the Bidassoa, ix. 398-400 ; at the
sortie from Bayonne, x. 96
Huarte, ix. 245, 267-72
Huebra river, ix. 129
Huesca (N. Spain), ix. 35
Hughes, Major (i8th Hrs.), x. 76
Hulot, General (French), x. 276
Hussars, British, dress and equipment of,
X. 210-12
Husson, General (French), x. 299
Ibafieta, ix. 251
Ibantelly, Pic d', ix. 300, 365
Inglis, General, ix. 287, 366
Iragui, ix. 289
Iratin valley and river, ix. 247
Irissary, ix. 217, 218
Iroz, ix. 267, 271, 287
Irun, ix. 245, 250, 365
Irurita, ix. 209, 214, 264-5, 273, 281, 294-
295
Irurzun, ix. 274, 281, 283
Ispe'gui, pass of, ix. 2 1 3, 245-6, 260, 262, 266
Izard, General (American), x. 102, 105,
122-3
Jaca, ix. 218-19, 221
Jackson, General Andrew (American), x.
152-65, 173-4, 177-8, 181
Jacquinot, General (French), x. 338, 356,
366
Jaizquibal, ix. 362
Jamin, General (French), x. 299, 303-4,
307, 313, 322, 358
Janssens, General (Netherlandish), x. 243
Jerome Bonaparte, General (French), x.
277, *99 3o 37 37 354, 35 6 -8
[ohnstone, Major-general, x. 240, 263
[olimont, ix. 404, 424
[ones, Colonel (Guards), x. 50
[ones, Lieutenant Harry (R.E.), ix. 359
[oseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, ix. 34,
2195 his difficulties with Napoleon's
orders, ix. ii 1-15, 124-6, 146-7; campaign
of Vitoria, ix. 135-61, battle of Vitoria,
ix. 166-7, I 7 I J 75 i his flight from
Vitoria, ix. 185 ; his instructions to
Suchet, ix. 207 ; relegated to private
life, ix. 242
Jourdan, Marshal, ix. in, 126; campaign
of Vitoria, ix. 133-7, 144-7, IS 1 ' 6 *,
165-8 ; retreat from Vitoria, ix. 195 sq, ;
his plans after Vitoria, ix. 218-19 ; dis-
graced by Napoleon, ix. 242
Jumeaux, bridges (Toulouse), x. 77, 81,
87, 90
Kalisch, Treaty of, ix. 24, 26, 237
Kaluga, ix. 6, 7
Keane, General John, ix. 496, 498 j in
New Orleans expedition, x. 153-61, 167,
171-2, 176
Kellermann, General (French) (Duke of
Valmy), x. 251, 292, 299, 308-9, 338,
356, 373-5> 377
Kempt, General James, ix. 301, 455-6 j
at Vitoria, ix. 175-7 5 at San Marcial,
ix. 367 j at the Bidassoa, ix. 401-4 ; in
America, x. 126; in the Waterloo cam-
paign, x. 242, 300, 303, 321, 350, 362,
364, 369, 384, 391, 396
Kennedy, Commissary-general Sir Robert,
ix. 91, 108
Kielmansegge, General (Hanoverian), x.
3^, 350, 352, 361, 385
Kingston (Canada), ix. 306-8, 311, 314,
33 1 336-7, 344, x. 100-101, 103
Kleist, General (Prussian), x. 248, 256
Knesebeck, General (Prussian), x. 259
KSnigsberg, ix. 9
Kowno, ix. 9
Kruse, General (Netherlandish), x. 351
Kuhlmann, Major (K.G.L.), x. 313, 351
Kutusoff, General, ix. 6-8
La Bisbal, General (Spanish), ix. 302
Lacolle river, x. 101
La Haye Sainte (Waterloo), x. 349-50,
354, 361, 380-81
Lamarque, General (French), ix. 41
Lamartiniere, General (French), ix. 152,
212, 217, 248-9, 265-7, 3 62 -4 i at
Vitoria, ix. 166, 181 ; at Sorauren and
after, ix. 275, 279, 284, 288-9, 295-8 j
at San Marcial, ix. 367-9, 391-2
Lambert, General, ix. 516 j at the Nivelle,
ix. 437 ; at Toulouse, x. 85-6 ; in the
New Orleans expedition, x. 150, 161-2,
165, 172-4, 176, i8e ; in the Waterloo
campaign, x. 247, 351, 369, 384, 391-2
Lamorandiere, General (French), x. 79
La Mota Castle (San Sebastian), ix. 225
La Pujade, knoll (Toulouse), x. 72, 79-
83
Larpent, Francis Seymour, Judge-Advocate-
General, ix. 95
INDEX
449
Las Miguetas Tower (San Sebastian), ix.
225, 228, 359
La Sypiere, redoubt (Toulouse), x. 78,
85-6, 88
Laurign^, Mount, ix. 254-5
Lawrence (ship), ix. 323
Leavock, Lieutenant (2ist Foot), x. 170,
177, 179
Lecarroz, ix. 215, 273
Le Cor, General (Portuguese), ix. 465, 468,
470, 485, 492-3
Lecumberri, ix. 274, 292, 294
Lefebvre, General (French), x. 57
Lefebvre-Desnb'ettes, General (French), x.
274-5,296, 312, 318-19, 370
Legasa, ix. 264-99
Leghorn, occupied by Bentinck, x. 60-6 1
Leifar-Atheca, Mount, ix. 252-3
Leith, General Sir James, ix. 89, 353, 357,
x. 203, 206, 402
Leiza, ix. 294
Le Marchant, Major-general, x. 211
Lermanda, ix. 177, 180
Lesaca, ix. 264, 298, 365-7, 369
Leseur, General (French), x. 86
Leval, General (French), ix. 132-3, 135-7,
139, 140, 141, 145, 209, 215-175 at
Viton'a, ix. 165, 177-9 > at the Nive,
ix. 457-61 j his division sent to Paris,
ix. 490
Lewis XVIII., King of France, x. 230,
260
Lewiston, ix. 346, x. 111-12
L'Hritier, General (French), x. 354, 373
Light, Captain, x. 25
Ligny, battle of, 294-5
Lindux, ix. 251-5, 362
Linzoain, ix. 245, 256
Liverpool, Robert Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of,
ix. 10, 18, 403 ; his troubles with his
supporters after the peace of 1814, x.
229-30
Lizasso, ix. 247, 264, 272, 274, 276, 280-
283, 285, 288-90, 292-3
Llobregat, river, ix. 374
Lloyd, Major (R.A.), x. 313, 316, 336, 388
Lobau, General Count (French), x. 252,
272-3, 294-5, 330, 333
Long, General, ix. 84-5, 87
Longa, General (Spanish), ix. 113, 116,
130, 132, 154, 201-2, 247, 365, 413,
423-4, 443 ; at Vitoria, ix. 167, 181,
189 j at the Bidassoa, ix. 401-3 ; at the
Nivelle, ix. 433
Long Point, ix. 327-8
Los Hornos, Tower of (San Sebastian), ix.
225
Losterenea, ix. 465, 467
Louis XIV.'s Hill, ix. 395, 399, 430-32
Louisiana (American ship), x. 156, 163
VOL. X
L8w, General, ix. 84-5
Lowe, Colonel Sir Hudson, x. 239
Lumaferde, ix. 397
Lundy's Lane, x. 112-16
Lyon, Major-general, x. 240
Macara, Colonel (42nd), x. 89
M'Clure, Brigadier (American), ix. 344-6,
34-8-9
Macdonald, Marshal, ix. 21, 387, x. 10,
'5, 57-8, 252
Macdonall, Lieutenant-colonel (Canadian),
x. 124
Macdonell, Lieutenant-colonel (Canadian),
ix. 339-40
Macdonough, Commodore (American), x.
I 3-34
Macfarlane, General, ix. 31, 32, 375 ; in
Italy, x. 60, 64-5
M'Grigor, Dr. James, Wellington's prin-
cipal medical officer, ix. 101-3, x. 193-6,
224
Macguire, Lieutenant (4th Foot), ix. 354-5
Mackenzie, General John, ix. 36, 41, 45,
64, 65, 67
Mackinaw, ix. 336, x. 104-5, 137
Macneill, Captain (8th Foot), ix. 309-10
Macomb, General (American), x. 127, 132
Madden, Colonel (commanding Portuguese
brigade), ix. 278, 286
Madison (ship), ix. 323
Madison, James, President of the United
States, ix. 306, x. 145
Maitland, Major-general Peregrine, ix. 36,
426, 500, x. 95-6 j in the Waterloo
campaign, x. 240, 317, 350, 387, 389,
390
Malcolm, Admiral Sir Pulteney, x. 149,
i5' *53
Malo-jaroslavitz, ix. 6
Mandela, ix. 397, 400-401, 413
Maransin, General (French), ix. 165, 170-
171, 209, 214-16, 248, 257, 259-61,
3 6z 37 39, 39 2 446, 493-4, 519, x.
72, 86, 90 j at Sorauren, ix. 275, 293 ; at
San Marcial, 367, 369 ; at the Bidassoa,
ix. 402 ; at the Nivelle, ix. 430-35 ; at the
Nive, ix. 457 ; at St. Pierre, ix. 469-70
Marcalain, ix. 281, 290
Marcognet, General (French), x. 360, 362-
365
Margarita, ix. 166, 177
Marmont, Marshal, x. 13 ; and Napoleon's
abdication, x. 53-8, 251, 403
Martin, Admiral, ix. 104-6, 416
Martinique (West Indies), x. 234 ; taken
in 1815, x. 402
Mas des Augustins (Toulouse), x. 78, 84,
88-9
Mass6na, Marshal, x. 252, 403
2 G
450
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Mathieu, Maurice, General (French), ix.
51, 56, 61-2, 65-71
Maucomble, General (French), ix. 468,
470, 501
Maucune, General (French), ix. 118, 137,
145, 155-7, J ^9> l %9i 200-202, 215,
248, 252, 267 ; at Sorauren, ix. 271,
275, 278, 284, 286-9, 296, 298 j at San
Marcial, ix. 367, 369 j at the Bidassoa,
ix. 398, 400, 409
Maumee, river, ix. 306, 325
Maya, pass of, ix. 214-17, 245, 247-8,
250, 252, 256-61, 273, 289, 295, 300,
302, 304, 362-3, 396, 413, 423
Medals, for non-commissioned officers and
men, x. 208, 209
Medical service reforms, ix. 101-4, x. 193-
196
Meigs, Fort, ix. 324, 328
Melville (ship), ix. 323
Melville, Lord (First Lord of the Admir-
alty), ix. 105
Mendionde, ix. 216, 218
Mendizabel, General (Spanish), ix. 113,
154
Mendoza, ix. 163, 169, 171, 175
Menne, General (French), ix. 167, 181,
372
Mercer, Major (R.A.), x. 337, 371-2, 388
Mermet, General, ix. 134, 139, 181
Merxem (Holland), action at, x. 8-9, II
Metternich, Count, ix. 475, x. 402 j his
policy after Napoleon's defeat in Russia,
ix. 22-6 ; his machinations for Napoleon's
overthrow, ix. 235-9, 473-4
Meyer, General (French), ix. 379
Milan, Lord W. Bentinck's political inter-
ference with, x. 64-5
Milhaud, General (French), x. 333, 338,
354, 37, 375, 378
Military Artificers, Royal, x. 217
Military police formed, ix. 97-9
Militia, British, the old, ix. 77, x. 183-5 5
failure of the Government's efforts to
utilise (1813), ix. 416-20; legal diffi-
culties against embodiment of (1815), x.
234-6} Local, x. 184-6, 235
Miller, Colonel (commanding Portuguese
brigade), ix. 365-6
Miller, General (American), x. 121
Mina, General (Spanish), ix. 205-6, 423
425, 486, 489 $ his exploits of 1812, ix
35 ; his exploits of 1813, ix. 116-23
his pursuit of Clausel, ix. 218-22 j before
Zaragoza, ix. 264 j moves up to Ronces-
valles, ix. 394, 413 j at the Nivelle, ix
43 8 > 44i
Minimes, Bridge of (Toulouse), x. 79, 81
83, 87, 90
Mitchell, Major-general, x. 332, 351, 416
Vlobile, expedition to, x. 176
VIocquery, General (French), ix. 177, 470
Mogente, ix. 36
Moira (ship), ix. 323
VIoncey, General, x. 57
VIondarrain, ix. 362, 369, 412, 435
Vfondragon, ix. 200-201
VIont de Marsan, ix. 517
VIonte Iguedo (San Sebastian), ix. 225
Vlonte Olivo (Tarragona), ix. 50, 51, 56,
58, 59, 62, 63
Monte Orgullo (San Sebastian), ix. 225-6,
355-7, 3o
Vlontfort, General (French), ix. 395, 458
VIontresor, General, x. 60-63
Vloore, Lieutenant-general Sir John, x. 207
Moravian Town, action at, ix. 332
Morgan, General (American), x. 165-6,
172, 177
Morillo, General (Spanish), ix. 129, 205,
247, 250, 290, 292, 298, 423, 425, 452,
464, 487, 492-4, 496, x. 70, 74 j at
Vitoria, ix. 171 ; at the Nivelle, ix. 438,
44 i
Morrice, Colonel, at Bergen-op-Zoom, x.
40, 42, 52-3
Morrison, Lieutenant-colonel, ix. 341-3, x. .
1 12
Moscow, ix. 5
Moskowa, river, ix. 5
Mouiz, toile de (redoubt), ix. 4x1, 427
Mouriscot, Lake, ix. 449, 461
Mousseroles, Soult's entrenched camp at,
ix. 464, 470
Muffling, General (Prussian), x. 278-9,
291, 342, 387
Mulcaster, Captain, ix. 341
Mullens, Lieutenant-colonel (44th Foot),
x. 168, 176, 179
MUller, Captain (de Roll's), ix. 378
Muller, Colonel (ist Foot), at Bergen-op-
Zoom, x. 48, 50-51
Murat, Joachim, King of Naples, ix. 475 j
his measures after Napoleon's defeat in
Russia, ix. 26, 28-30 ; leaves Napoleon
after Leipzig, ix. 388 ; signs an armistice
with Bentinck, ix. 482-3 ; his further
dealings with Bentinck, x. 60-62 ; his
behaviour after Napoleon's return from
Elba, x. 252-3 ; his end, x. 402
Murguia, ix. 167, 169, 191
Murray, Major-general Sir George, ix. 85,
206, 239, 422-3, x. 417 j a real Chief of
Staff, x. 202-3
Murray, General Sir John, appointed to
command on east coast of Spain, ix. 375
his campaign of 18 1 3, ix. 37-70 ; Castalla,
ix. 42-7 ; Tarragona, ix. 53-64 ; tried
by court-martial, ix. 70-71
Musnier, General (French), ix. 56
INDEX
45 1
Napier, Colonel Charles, ix. 321
Napier, Major William (43rd), ix. 428-9, 45 5
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the
French, his Russian campaign, ix. i-io ;
his measures for raising new armies, ix.
19, 20, 113-14; his orders responsible
for disaster, ix. 192 ; his abortive efforts
to secure Austria, ix. 233 ; his campaign
in Saxony, ix. 234-5 ; his negotiations
for an armistice, ix. 236 ; hears of battle
of Vitoria, ix. 239 5 new Coalition
formed against him, ix. 236-40 ; his
victory at Dresden, ix. 386 ; his subse-
quent defeats, ix. 387 ; his disaster at
Leipzig, ix. 387-8 ; his efforts to raise
fresh levies, ix. 446 - 7 ; disarms his
foreign troops, ix. 447 ; his secret nego-
tiations with Ferdinand of Spain, ix.
477-8 ; his victory at Brienne and de-
feat at La Rothiere, ix. 491 ; opens
negotiations with the Allies, x. 12 5
his campaign of 1814, x. 13-18 5 the
circumstances that led to his abdication,
x. 55-9 j sails for Elba, x. 59, 227 ; his
escape from Elba and progress to Paris,
x. 230-31 ; the Great Powers decree
him an outlaw, x. 231-2 ; his position
on his return to France, x. 249-50 ;
raising and organisation of his armies,
x. 250-53 ; his plan of campaign, x.
268-70 ; his concentration and advance,
x. 271-2; on I5th June, 1815, x. 273-
274, 281 ; on 1 6th June, 1815, x. 284-
287, 291, 321-3 ; on I7th June, 1815,
x. 329-33, 336; on i8th June, 1815,
* 345. 355- 6 , 359, 3 8 *, 3 86 , 393 5 in
campaign of Waterloo, x. 406-11; his
end, x. 402
Navy, the Royal, its share in the siege of
Tarragona, ix. 51, 55, 57, 61 (and see
Hallowell) ; Wellington's complaints of
insecurity of his communications, ix.
100-107, 415-16
Navy Point (Sackett's Harbour), ix. 314
Nesselrode, Count, ix. 22, 235
Netherlands, the, William, King of, x.
245-6
Netherlands, the, troops of, furnished to
Wellington, x. 244, 319-20, 362, 379,
397, 400-401
New Orleans, the expedition to, x. 1 50
Newark (Canada), burned by Americans,
ix. 344, 346-8
Ney, Marshal, ix. 387, x. 57-8, 274, 285-
287, 291-4 ; at Quatre Bras, x. 296, 299,
307-8, 318-19, 323-5, 339, 347, 359
369, 37 8 3 8o 3 8 2, 4 2 , 407- 8 , 4 11
Niagara, Fort, ix. 308, 311-12, 320, 323
336-7, 344, x. 99, in, 137; captured
by British, ix. 345
Niagara, river, ix. 306, x. 104-5
Niagara (ship), ix. 323
Niemen, river, ix. 4
Nive, river, ix. 245, 249, 391, 393 ; the
country about, ix. 499 ; passage of, ix.
450-53 ; battle of, 453-63
Nivelle, river, ix. 245, 391 ; battle of ix.
423-42
O'Callaghan, Lieutenant-colonel, ix. 173
Ochagavia, ix. 219
O'Donnell, General (Spanish), ix. 130, 211 ;
blockading Pamplona, 246, 264, 267,
274, 285-6, 292, 293
O'Donoju, General (Spanish), ix. 478
Officers, British, whence drawn, 204-7
Ogdensburg, ix. 308, 338, 341
Pack, General Denis, ix. 89, 196, 247,
264 ; at Sorauren, ix. 276-7 ; at the
Nivelle, ix. 437, 439 ; at Toulouse, x.
84 ; in the Waterloo campaign, x. 306,
312, 3x5, 321, 350, 353, 362-4, 368,
395- 6
Paget, Lieutenant-general Edward, x. 206,
242
Pajol, General (French), x. 272-3, 276,
329-30
Pakenham, General Sir Edward, ix. 90,
154, *95, 28 5 463, x- 84, 203 ; ap-
pointed to command at New Orleans,
x. 150 ; his arrival and operations, x.
161-7, 169-72, 177-9
Palermo, ix. 374-5
Palmaria, Isle of, Bentinck's naval base in
Italy, x. 63
Palombieres, Les, ix. 300
Palombini, General (French), ix. 113,
117-19, 158
Pamplona, ix. 119, 121, 123, 158-9, 195,
394 ; blockade of, ix. 205, 244-8, 264 ;
successful sortie from, ix. 267 ; surrender
of, ix. 420-21
Pancorbo, ix. 121, 152 ; surrender of, ix.
211
Pannetier, General (French), ix. 49, 63-5
Paris, General (French), ix. 35, 208, 395,
413, 441, 451-2, 464, 486, 493, 513
Pastor, The (Spanish guerilla leader), ix.
122, 123
Paterson, Lieutenant-colonel (2ist), x. 141
Patterson, Commodore (American), x.
163-5, 172, 178
Pau, mission sent by Wellington to, x. 20
Peacocke, Sir Nathaniel (7ist), ix. 471
Pearson, Lieutenant-colonel, x. 112-13
Pellew, Admiral Sir Edward, ix. 57, 62,
65
Penne, Villemur, General (Spanish), ix.
34, HO
452
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Penobscot, river, Sir J. Sherbrooke's opera-
tions in, x. 139 .
Penrose, Admiral, ix. 499, 501
Perponcher, General (Netherlandish), x.
246, 264, 275, 279, 283, 288-9, 298,
300, 320
Perry, Lieutenant Oliver (U.S. Navy), ix.
308, 324, 329, 340, 348, x. 137; his
victory on Lake Erie, ix. 330-32
Philippon, General Armon (French), ix. 17
Picton, Lieutenant-general Sir Thomas, ix.
87, 89, 247, 362, 395, 459, 485, 488-9,
492-4, 49 6 ,.49 8 . 5*6, x - 2I 26-7, 6 7, 75,
206 j at Vitoria, ix. 176-8 ; in pursuit
of Clausel, ix. 206 ; before and after
Sorauren, ix. 266, 269, 271, 285, 288,
291, 294, 301 ; at Orthez, ix. 506,
508-9, 514 $ in the Waterloo campaign,
x. 283, 300, 303, 313-14, 319, 321,
325i 355, 3 6 2
Pigot, Captain (R.N.), x. 150
Pike, General (American), ix. 310
Pike, General (ship), ix. 320, 322
Pinoteau, General (French), ix. 367, 395
Pirch I., von, General (Prussian), x. 264,
288, 327-8, 340-41, 343, 39 1 , 398
Pirch II., von, General (Prussian), x. 275-
277
Pir6, General (French), x. 296, 298-300,
305, 309, 322, 356, 370, 377
Plattsburg, ix. 341, 343, x, 101, 105, 125 ;
the action at, x. 1 30-3 i
Pleischwitz, armistice of, ix. 236
Plenderleath, Major (4gth), ix. 318
Poirier, Col du, ix. 391
Ponsonby, Colonel Frederick, ix. 199, x. 366
Ponsonby, General William, ix. 129, 169,
186, x. 23, 26-8, 73, 77, 91, 211 ; at
Toulouse, x. 80 ; at Waterloo, x. 366
Ponza, Island of, taken and abandoned, ix.
29-32
Popham, Admiral Sir Home, his squadron
on the north coast of Spain, ix. 35
Popham, Commander (R.N.), x. 103-4
Porter, General (American), x. 121
Portuguese Government, Wellington's diffi-
culties with, ix. 76-7, 414-15
Portuguese Regiments
ist Line, ix. 459
3rd Line, ix. 459
4th Line, ix. 280
8th Line, ix. 398, 437
loth Line, ix. 280
i2th Line, ix. 280, 437
17th Line, ix. 401
ist Cajadores, ix. 403-4
3rd Cayadores, ix. 402-4, 508
6th Ca9adores, ix. 115
7th Ca9adores, ix. 277
8th Ca9adores, ix. 454
Power, Colonel, commanding Portuguese
brigade, ix. 179, x. 87 j at Plattsburg, x.
I3Q-3 1
Prague, Congress of, ix. 239
Prescott, ix. 341
Prevost, Colonel, ix. 51, 52, 55, 64
Prevost, General, Sir George, Commander-
in-Chief in Canada, ix. 307, 311, 313,
326, 331-2, 335, 338-40, x. 100-101,
105-6 $ his attack on Sackett's Har-
bour, ix. 313-17 ; his attitude towards
the Navy, ix. 323-4 ; his operations on
Lake Champlain, x. 125-34 j review of
his services, x. 134-5
Pringle, General, ix. 256-9, 265, 492 ; at
St. Pierre, ix. 465, 468
Proby, Colonel Lord, at Bergen-op-Zoom,
x- 37, 4i
Proctor, Colonel (41 st), ix. 306, 324-36 j
his trial by court-martial, ix. 335-6
Prussia, her policy after Napoleon's defeat
in Russia, ix. 20-26 ; her defeats at
Lutzen and Bautzen, ix. 234-5 ; drawn
into the new coalition, ix. 237
Puebla de Arlanzon, Heights of, ix. 162-4,
168, 170-72, 176 ; the pass of, ix. 158
Purdy, Colonel (American), ix. 339-40
Put-in Bay, ix. 330 .
Pyrenees, the Western, description of scene
of operations, ix. 244-5
Quatre Bras, battle of, x. 296 sqq.
Quebec, ix. 311, 321
S^ueen Charlotte (ship), ix. 323, x. 99
Queenston (Canada), x. 106, in
Quiot, General (French), x. 353-4, 360-61,
3 6 5, 3 6 9, 382
Radetzky, General (Austrian), ix. 474
Ramsay, Captain Norman (R.A.), ix. 199,
x. 216-17, 395
Rapp, General (French), x. 251
Reeves, Lieutenant-colonel (27th), ix. 377,
382
Regiments, British :
Cavalry
ist Life Guards, ix. 78, x. 336, 337, 364,
3 66 '7, 395- 6
2nd Life Guards, ix. 78, x. 364-7, 395-6
Royal Horse Guards, ix. 78, 107, x. 364,
366-7
ist Dragoon Guards, x. 364, 366-7, 395-6
4th Dragoon Guards, ix. 83)
ist (Royal) Dragoons,J]x. 336, 365-7,
395- 6
2nd (Greys) Dragoons, x. 336, 365-7,
395- 6
6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons, x. 336,
365-7, 395-6
INDEX
453
Regiments, British (contd.) :
Cavalry (contd.}
7th Hussars, ix. 496, x. 334-6, 337, 395-6
1 2th Light Dragoons, x. 365-6, 395-6
gth Light Dragoons, ix. 83
loth Hussars, ix. 79, 142-3, 278, x.
209 ., 328
nth Light Dragoons, ix. 83, x. 209 n.
1 3th Light Dragoons, ix. 506, x. 28,
37, 377
i4th Light Dragoons, ix. 150, 506
1 5th Hussars, ix. 79, 175, 184, 188, x.
334, 37i, 377, 395
1 6th Light Dragoons, ix. 188, x. 210, 366
:8th Hussars, ix. 79, 104, 141-3, 185,
188, 279, 486, 498, x. 75-6, 334
igth Light Dragoons, x. 107, 114
zoth Light Dragoons, ix. 38, 379
23rd Light Dragoons, x. 333-4
Royal Engineers
Their defects in siege operations, ix. 231
Account of the Corps, x. 217-19
Artillery
Account of, x. 215 ; its quarrels with
Wellington, x. 217, 414
Cleeves's battery, x. 313, 336, 351, 388
Dubourdieu's battery, ix. 204
Lloyd's battery, x. 313, 316, 326, 388
Rocket troop, ix. 388
Rogers's battery, x. 301, 351
Ross's troop, ix. 178, 196, 362
The Corps of Drivers, x. 215-16
Whinyates's, x. 352
Infantry
First Guards, ix. 101-2, x. 53, 96, 209,
233, 3'5 317, 321, 358, 384, 395- 6
Coldstream Guards, x. 96, 233, 356-8,
384, 395-6
Third Guards, x. 44, 96, 233, 357-8, 368,
373, 3 8 4, 395- 6
Line Regiments
ist Foot (Royal Scots), ix. 182, 188, 227-
230, 237, 320, 327, 345-7, x. 37, 108-
112, II4-I6, 121, 301, 310-11, 363,
39 6
3rd Foot (Buffs), ix. 465, 468-9, x. 209
4th Foot, ix. 354-5, 358, 462, x. 140,
144, 148, 162, 167, 170, 176
$th Foot, x. 210 .
6th Foot, ix. 511, 515, x. 105, in, 120,
121
7th Foot, x. 165, 168, 209, 210 n.
8th Foot, ix. 309-10, 312-13, x. 100,
107-9, I12 , II 4' I 5 I21
9th Foot, ix. 182, 227-30, 355, 358, 400,
458-9, 461
loth Foot, ix. 29, 39 n.
Regiments, British (contd.} :
Line Regiments (contd.)
nth Foot, x. 93
1 3th Foot, x. 101
I4th Foot, x. 233
i gth Foot, x. 105
20th Foot, ix. 514, 405
2ist Foot, ix. 39 ., 518, x. 37, 53, 140,
141, 149, 162, 167, 170, 176, 177
22nd Foot, x. 209, 210 n.
23rd Foot, x. 233
25th Foot, ix. 237
i/27th Foot, ix. 27 .
2/27th Foot, ix. 36, 41 n., 376, 378-9
3/27th Foot, ix. 278, 280, 384-5, 395-7
28th Foot, ix. 188, 492, x; 301-2, 310-
311, 396
3oth Foot, x. 314-15, 390, 395
3ist Foot, ix. 253, 469
32nd Foot, x. 301, 320, 395-6
33rd Foot, ix. 237, x. 37, 313, 315, 317,
3 2I 389, 394, 395
34th Foot, ix. 1 88
35th Foot, x. 9, 45, x. 209
36th Foot, x. 93
37th Foot, x. 37, 53
38th Foot, ix. 182, 228-30, 358, x. 210 n.
39th Foot, ix. 188, 258, 261, 492-3
40th Foot, ix. 275, 278, x. 176, 209,
395
4ist Foot, ix. 324-6, 327-9 333-5, 344-
346, x. 112, 114, 118-19
42nd Foot, ix. 515, x. 89, 93, 301, 303,
306-7, 309-11, 314, 321, 363, 396
43rd Foot, ix. 301, 402, 428-9, 456,
507, x. 165, 167, 168
44th Foot, x. 53, 140, 149, 162, 167-70,
176, 179, 3 01 , 33, 3 6 -7> 39- J1 ,
34, 363
45th Foot, ix. 188
47 th Foot, ix. 354-5, 358,459
48th Foot, ix. 278, 280
49th Foot, ix. 318, 341-3
5oth Foot, ix. 115, 173, 188, 257, 259,
261,465,467, 470, 518
5 ist Foot, ix. 141, 498
52nd Foot, ix. 157, 179, 403-4, 429,
433"4, 45 6 S 10 '^* x - 9, 2I
2 33 38o, 384, 39 1 , 395
53rd Foot, x. 209
54th Foot, ix. 237
55th Foot, x. 45, 49
57th Foot, ix. 469, 470
58th Foot, ix. 45 .
59th Foot, ix. 354-5, 358, 459, 462, x.
2 33
6 ist Foot, x. 93
62nd Foot, ix. 39
66th Foot, ix. 469-70
454
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Regiments, British (cantd.) :
Line Regiments (contd,}
69th Foot, x. 37, 49, 313-14, 321, 389,
394, 395
yist Foot, ix. 171-3, 256, 259, 262,
465, 467-8, x. 210 ., 233, 380, 391,
395
73rd Foot, ix. 237, 388, x. 314, 390,
395
74th Foot, ix. 178, x. 210 .
75th Foot, ix. 29
76th Foot, ix. 352
78th Foot, x. 9
79th Foot, x. 89, 93, 301, 303, 306-7,
311, 321, 363, 395-6
82nd Foot, x. 105, in, 121
84th Foot, ix. 352
85th Foot, ix. 352, 368, x. 140, 141,
157-9, 162, 165, 172
87th Foot, ix. 1 80, 1 88
88th Foot, ix. 178, 510, 514, x. 210 .
8gth Foot, x. 111-12, 114, 116
9ist Foot, ix. 237, x. 37, 89, 233
92nd Foot, ix. 173-4, 256, 261, 465,
467-8, 470, 493, 510, x. 305, 309-10,
316, 321
93rd Foot, x. 149, 162, 171
94th Foot, ix. 188
95th (Rifle Brigade), ix. 109, 301, 370,
402-4, 428-9, 434, 456, 507, x. 9,
210 ., 300-302, 312, 317, 361, 369,
380, 383, 390-91, 395
95th, ist Battalion, ix. 156, 175,
196
95th, 3rd Battalion, ix. 156, 196, x. 149,
*53 !57-9> l6z l68 > J 7
97th Foot, x. 122, 210 n.
looth Foot, ix. 315, 320, 344-5, x. 107-
IIO, 112
io3rd Foot, x. 115, 118-19
I04th Foot, ix. 327, x. in, 118
King's German Legion
2nd Line, x. 384
4th Line, ix. 45 ., 376, 380
5th Line, x. 381
6th Line, ix. 45 .
8th Line, x. 381
ist Hussars, ix. 156, x. 80
2nd L.D., x. 371
3rd Hussars, x. 379, 383
Colonial Regiments
Glengarry (Canada), ix. 312-13, x. 103,
113, 121
Newfoundland, ix. 309, 312-13, 320
Nova Scotia Fencibles, x. in
ist West India, x. 162, 167
5th West India, x. 162
Regiments, British (confd.) :
Foreign Troops
Brunswick, ix. 379, x. 370, 372, 385,
397
Brunswick-Oels Regiment, ix. 260
Calabrese, ix. 376-8
de Roll's, ix. 376, 378, 384
Watteville's, x. 103, 118-19, 121, 125
Reichenbach, Treaty of, 237-8
Reid, Lieutenant (R.E.), ix. 227, 404, x.
219
Reille, General (French), ix. 114, 115, 131,
i33> !35- 6 i44~ 6 !5 2 > X 55 T 57 *4,
209, 215-17, 243, 251-6, 265, 267-8,
425, 464, 490, 516, x. 24-5, 27-8, 66-7
at Vitoria, ix. 166, 172, 180-81, 184,
1895 at Sorauren, ix. 271, 273, 275,
283-9, 291, 295-7, 300, 301, 303 } at
San Marcial, ix. 367 ; at the Bidassoa,
ix. 399-401 ; at the Nivelle, ix. 438-40 j
at the Nive, ix. 453, 461 ; at Orthez,
ix. 508 ; at Toulouse, x. 79 ; in the
Waterloo campaign, x. 252, 269, 270,
272
R6mond, General (French), ix. 177, 372
Renny, Lieutenant-colonel, x. 167, 171
Rey, General (French), Commandant of
San Sebastian, ix. 224, 226, 248, 357,
360, 430, x. 85-6
Rhune, the Great (mountain), ix. 245, 300,
301, 303, 362, 392, 396, 402, 405-7,
413, 422, 426-7
Rhune, the Little (mountain), ix. 362, 411,
423-4, 427-9, 433
Riall, General, ix. 346-7, x. 107-14
Ripley, General (American), x. 109, 115,
117
Robert, General (French), ix. 41, 44
Robinson, General, at Vitoria, ix. 181-2 j
at San Sebastian, ix. 354-8 j at the
Bidassoa, ix. 398-9, 401 ; at the Nive,
ix. 457-8, 462
Roche, General, ix. 36-8
Rockets, in action, ix. 388, 501, x. 86
Roederer, Mons., ix. 241
Rogers, Major (R.A.), x. 301, 351
Roncal (N. Spain), ix. 120-22, 219
Roncesvalles, valley and pass of, ix. 197,
209-18, 245-6, 249, 251, 291, 301, 394,
413, 421, 423, 425
Rooke, Lieutenant-colonel (3rd Guards), x.
44
Ross, General John, ix. 252, 253, 256,
459 ; at Sorauren, ix. 270, 272, 275,
277-8 j at Toulouse, x. 85 j his expedition
to Washington, x. 140-46 ; his expedition
to Baltimore, x. 147-8 j his death, x.
148
Ross, Major (R.H.A.), ix. 178, 196, x. 362
INDEX
455
Rottenburg, General de, ix. 327-9, 336-7
Rouget, General (French), ix. 497, 518-19 ;
at the Nivelle, ix. 430-32 ; at Orthez,
ix. 505-6, 512-13 j at Toulouse, x. 86
Roussel d'Harbal, General (French), x.
3'8, 319, 354
Rowley, Admiral, with Bentinck in Italy,
x. 63
Royal George (ship), ix. 323
Sacken, General (Prussian), x, 13, 56-8
Sackett's Harbour, ix. 307, 309, 311, 320,
323, 33 1 * 337-8, 343, * 100-104, 122-3,
125-6 } the British attack of, ix. 313-17
Sagunto, ix. 36, 207
St. Cyprien (Toulouse), x. 66-74
St. Cyr, General Gouvion (French), x. 251
St. David's (Canada), ix. 312
St. Elmo (bastion, San Sebastian), ix. 225,
355
St. Etienne (Bayonne), x. 94-6
St. Etienne de Baigorry, ix. 362
St. Gaudens, x. 28
St. Ignace, Col de, ix. 411-12
St. Jean (bastion, San Sebastian), ix. 353-4,
359, 3 6 2-3, 390, 393, 413
St. Jean de Luz, ix. 208-9, 212-15, 245,
283, 365, 391, 400, 406, 410
St. Jean Pied de Port, ix. 209, 212-15,
244, 248-50, 252, 283, 289, 301, 423,
4^5
St. Lawrence, river, ix. 308, 328-9
St. Palais, ix. 426
St. Pie, ix. 209, 212, 216, 432, 434
St. Pierre d'Irube (battle of), ix. 465-72
St. Pol, General (French), ix. 172, 213,
x. 78, 8 1 ; his brigade of Italians sent
away, ix. 447
St. Regis (Canada), ix. 338, 341, 343
Salaberry, de, Lieutenant-colonel (Cana-
dian), ix. 338
Salain de Lesaca, ix. 366, 396
Salinas, ix. 165
Salmon River (Canada), ix. 343
Saltoun, Lord (ist Guards), x. 95, 315-16,
358, 368, 389
Salvatierra, ix. 160, 195-6
San Bartolomeo (St. Sebastian), ix. 226-7,
35*
Sanchez, Julian, General (Spanish), ix.
130, 140, 143, 151
San Cristobal (Pamplona), ix. 276
Sandham, Major (R.A.), x. 351
Sandusky, ix. 328
Sandwich (Canada), ix. 332-3
Sanesteban, ix. 195, 204, 209, 213-14, 217,
4*3
Sanguesa (N. Spain), ix. 35
San Marcial, ix. 397 ; action of, ix. 362-8
San Sebastian, ix. 161, 204 5 description
of, ix. 224-6 ; siege of, ix. 224-32 ; first
assault of, ix. 228-31 ; second assault of,
ix. 354-8
Santa Barbara, ix. 300, 366-7, 371, 396
Santa Clara, Island of, ix. 225
Santander, ix. 211
Santona, ix. 117, 123, 152
Sappers and Miners, Royal, x. 217
Saranac, river, the American position on,
x. 127
Saratoga (American ship), x. 133-4
Sare, ix. 209, 216-17, 248, 301, 362, 368,
39 392, 39 6 , 405-7, 423-4, 43Q-3 1
Sarrut, General (French), ix. 117, 123,
124, 135, 148, 152, 155; at Vitoria,
ix. 1 66, 169, 180-84, 190
Sarsfield, General (Spanish), ix. 374, 376,
382
Saxony, Army of, deserts Napoleon at
Leipzig, ix. 388 j troops of mutiny, 1815,
x. 259
Schaumann, Captain (K.G.L.), x. 80-8 1
Schlosser, Fort, ix. 346
Schwarzenberg, Count, ix. 233, 474, 490,
x. I3 , 15, 17, 253
Scott, General Winfield (American),
x. 107-9, * 1 3' I S
Scovell, Major, ix. 98-9
Serres, ix. 362, 369, 390, 406, 410, 425,
427, 431-2
Severoli, General (French), ix. 35, 377,
447
Sheaffe, Colonel, ix. 308-9
Sherbrooke, Lieutenant-general Sir John,
his operations on the Penobscot, x. 139
Sherer, Captain Moyle, ix. 258
Sicily, political troubles in, ix. 30-33, 375
Sierra de Morillas, ix. 162, 164, 174
Sinclair, Major (R.A.), x. 351
Skerrett, General, at combat of Vera, ix.
370-71 j in Holland, x. n j at Bergen-
op-Zoom, x. 2, 39, 42, 46, 50, 51
Slade, General, ix. 84-6
Smith, Captain Harry (95th), ix. 108, 179,
404, 422, 429, x. 145, 169, 170, 173,
179, 203, 391-2
Smith, Major (R.E.), ix. 226
Smith, Major (R.A.), x. 358
Smolensk, ix. 7, 8
Smyth, Colonel Sir James Carmichael
(R.E.), x. 240
Socorry, ix. 400, 426
Somerset, Brigadier-general Lord Edward,
ix. 444, 498, x. 23, 27-8, 78 ; at Tou-
louse, x. 8 1, 87, 90; in the Waterloo
campaign, x. 334-5, 351, 385
Somerset, Colonel, Lord Fitzroy, x. 394
Somport, pass of, ix. 219, 385
Sorauren, ix. 245, 269 ; battles by, ix. 274-
281, 286-9
456
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
Sos (N. Spain), ix. 35
Soubicia, ix. 392, 396, 402
Souham, General (French), x. 58
Soult, General Pierre, ix. 243, 441, 452,
463-4, 486, 488, 492-5, 497, 505, 516,
x. 66, 75-6, 91 j at Vitoria, ix. 165
Soult, Marshal, ix. 131 ; made Commander-
in-Chief in the Pyrenees, ix. 241 j his
character, ix. 242-3 ; reorganisation of
his army, ix. 243 ; his plans for driving
the Allies back to the Ebro, ix. 248-9 ;
his irresolution during the operations, ix.
266 ; his movements, ix. 273, 290 ; his
last effort to save San Sebastian, ix. 361-
371 ; his dispositions to defend Bidassoa,
ix. 398 j out -manoeuvred at the Bidassoa,
ix. 406 ; his bad relations with Suchet,
ix. 3885 at the Nivelle, ix. 435, 441 ;
his efforts to raise recruits, ix. 445-7 ;
retains his German troops, ix. 447 j his
Italians taken from him, ix. 447 ;
desertion of his German troops, ix. 460 ;
at St. Pierre, ix. 47 1 ; his reorganisation
of his army after the Nive, ix. 485-6 ; his
dispositions to guard the Adour, ix. 486 ;
more troops taken from him by Napoleon,
ix. 489 ; at Orthez, ix. 504-15 ; his
movements after Orthez, x. 22-9 ; before
Toulouse, x. 66-75 ; at Toulouse, x. 77-
79, 82, 85, 90; after Toulouse, x. 90,
91 j in the Waterloo campaign, x. 252,
285-6, 292-3, 345, 359, 373, 403
Soye, General (French), x. 302, 304, 307 .,
35.7
Spanish Government, Wellington's diffi-
culties with, ix. 75, 76, 414-15
"Spanish Hill," Sorauren, ix. 270, 275,
278, 279
Sparre, General (French), ix. 459, 466, 490
Spezia, Gulf of, Bentinck's landing in,
x. 62-3
Spry, Colonel (commanding Portuguese
brigade), ix. 413
Staff Corps, the (the .Quarter-master-
general's engineers), x. 203-4
Stanhope, Colonel James, ix. 200, x. 53-4,
416
Stedman, General (Netherlandish), x. 247,
263
Stein, von, ix. 21, 23
Steinmetz, General von (Prussian), ix. 274,
277-8, 289
Stephenson, Fort, ix. 328-9
Stewart, General Sir Charles, ix. 26, 79,
234, 236-7
Stewart, General William, ix. 257-63,
293, x. 202 ; rebuked by Wellington,
ix. 262-3 ; at the Nivelle, ix. 436-7 j at
St. Pierre, ix. 467-8 ; at Orthez, ix. 512
Stony Creek, action at, ix. 318
Stopford, Major-general, ix. 426, 500-502,
x. 95
Stralsund, British troops sent to, ix. 237
Strangways, Lieutenant (R.N.), ix. 388
Strieker, General (American), x. 148
Stuart, Sir Charles, Minister at Lisbon, ix.
77, 93
Stubbs, Colonel (commanding a Portuguese
brigade), ix. 253, 270
Sturgeon, Major, x. 204
Subervie, General (French), x. 333, 338,
359
Subijana de Alava, ix. 163-5, 173, 176
Subijana de Morillas, ix. 158, 169
Suchet, Marshal, Duke of Albufera, ix.
194, x. 251 5 his position in the autumn
of 1812, ix. 35 ; his campaign against
Murray, ix. 38-69, Biar, 41, Castalla,
42-7 $ his movements after the siege of
Tarragona, ix. 207 j his plans after
Vitoria, i . 219-23 j retires north of the
Ebro, ix. 223 ; evacuates Tarragona, ix.
374 j retires to the Llobregat, ix. 374,
383 ; combat of Ordal, ix. 377-9, 382-3 ;
his bad relations with Soult, ix. 388
Sumbilla, ix. 209, 213, 245, 264, 294-6,
298-300, 423
Sweden, ix. 25, 238
Sympher, Major (R.A.), x. 352, 379
Talleyrand, C. M. de, ix. 474
Tarbes, ix. 385
Tarragona, ix. 206-7,223, 273, 383 ; siege
of, by Sir J. Murray, ix. 50-65 j fortifica-
tions of, blown up, ix. 374
Taupin, General (French), ix. 117, 124,
135, 160, 250-51, 362, 390, 392-3, 488,
493-4, 497, 5'8-i9, * *7, 7* at
Sorauren, ix. 271-2, 277-9, 2 9^ > at
San Marcial, ix. 364-7, 369 j at the
Bidassoa, ix. 402, 405 ; at the Nivelle,
ix. 430-32, 434, 439, 441 j at the Nive,
ix. 457 j at Orthez, ix. 506, 508, 510-
5135 at Toulouse, x. 82-3, 85-6, 90
Tauroggen, Convention of, ix. 21
Taylor, Major-general Sir Herbert, x. 1-3,
8-9
Tchitchagoff, Admiral (Russian), ix. 26
Tecumseh (Indian chief), ix. 324, 328, 335
Ten Mile Creek, ix. 319
Teste, General (French), x. 330
Thames, river (Canada), ix. 333, 337
Thielmann, General von (Prussian), x.
268, 288, 326-9, 339, 343, 381, 398-9
Thornton, Lieutenant-colonel (85th), x.
141, 143-4, 155, 165-6, 169, 171-4,
178-9
Thouvenot, General (French), ix. 151, 215-
217, 433, 490 ; sortie from Bayonne, x.
94-8
INDEX
457
Tilly, General (French), ix. 135, 137, 139,
140, 165, 2195 at Vitoria, ix. 165, 172
Tilson. See Chowne
Tirlet, General (French), ix. 148, 183,
210
Todd, Captain, x. 204
Tolosa, ix. 195, 274
Tompkins, Fort, ix. 314
Torrens, General Sir Henry, Military
Secretary at the Horse Guards, ix. 85,
x. 200, 239
Tortosa, ix. 222, 374, 382
Toulouse, Soult shifts his line of operations
to, ix. 519; his retreat on, x. 23-4;
the battle of, x. 80-91
Travers, General (French), ix. 361, 363-5
Travot, General (French), ix. 446
Treilhard, General (French), ix. 135, 283,
295-6, 426, 451, 488 ; at Vitoria, ix.
165, 1 80 j his division sent to Paris, ix.
49
Tres Puentes, ix. 162-5, ! ^9 1 75'6
Trip, General (Netherlandish), x. 351, 379
Tucker, Colonel, x. 111-12
Twelve Mile Creek, ix. 313, x. 113
Twenty Mile Creek, ix. 344, x. i n
Ulzana, river and valley, ix. 269-71, 274,
276, 285, 289, 292
United States of America, the war with,
ix. 17, 306-49
Urdax, ix. 215, 217, 257, 298, 362, 368,
402, 436
Urrugne, ix. 204, 249, 369, 390, 392, 400-
401, 406, 426
Ursonia, Mount, ix. 391, 413
Urtiaga, ix. 245, 251
Urtubie, ix. 410-11
Urumea, river, ix. 225-7, 356
Ustaritz, ix. 209, 439, 444, 450, 452, 460
Uxbridge, Lieutenant-general Earl of, x.
211 ; in the Waterloo campaign, x. 260,
264, 334-6, 337, 364-7, 372, 379, 385,
395>4iS
Val Carlos, ix. 245-7
Val d'Aspe, ix. 395
Valencay, the negotiations of, ix. 477-9,
489
Valladolid, ix. 112, 113, 115
Vails, ix. 223
Vandamme, General, ix. 387 ; in the
Waterloo campaign, x. 252, 269, 272,
273, 276, 294, 330, 339
Vandeleur, General, ix. 424, 444, 503 ; m
the Waterloo campaign, x. 240, 334-5,
385, 392, 416
Vandermaesen, General (French), ix. 117,
160, 252-4; at Sorauren, ix. 272,
277-80, 287-8, 296, 298, 300 ; at San
Marcial,ix. 368-9; at the Bidassoa,ix.4O5
Van der Smissen, Major (Netherlandish),
x. 388, 390
Van Merlen, General (Netherlandish), x.
?8, 35, 35 1
Vasconcellos, General (Portuguese), ix. 508,
x. 85
Velate, pass of, ix. 212, 245, 250-2, 265,
274-8, 292, 299
Venta d'Orisson, ix. 250-52, 362
Vera, pass of, ix. 195, 204, 209, 245-7,
298, 362-3, 365, 367, 392, 396, 402-3;
combat of, ix. 370-71
Verhuell, Admiral (Dutch), x. 2
Vermont, State of (U.S.A.), sells supplies
to British army, x. 125
Vial, General (French), ix. 497, x. 78, 88
Vic de Bigorre, combat of, x. 24-5
Victor, Marshal, x. 251, 403
Vieux Mouguerre, ix. 463
Villaba, ix. 246, 268, 276-7
Villafranca, ix. 201-2, 376
Villatte, General (French), ix. 136-9, 362,
364, 390-91,427,454,493,497,518-19,
x. 78 ; at Vitoria, ix. 165 ; at San
Marcial, ix. 368-9 ; at the Bidassoa, ix.
405 ; at the Nivelle, ix. 438 ; at the
Nive, ix. 458-9 ; at Orthez, ix. 505,
512-13 ; at Toulouse, x. 75, 82, 88, 90
" Villatte, Madame," ix. 208
Villefranque, ix. 462, 465
Vincent, Brigadier-general, ix. 312, 317-19,
326, 336, 344
Vincke, General (Hanoverian), x. 350, 416
Viscarret, ix. 247, 265
Vitoria, ix. 117, 119 ; description of
ground, ix. 161-5
Vivian, General Hussey, x. 73, 75-7 ;
in the Waterloo campaign, x. 241, 334-
335 337> 346, 3 8 5> 3 8 7> 39 1 ' 2 , 4*6
Volunteer, Fort, ix. 313
Waggon-train, the Royal, x. 190 ; and see
Army, the British, Commissariat
Waldron, Captain, ix. 44
Walker, General, ix. 90, 171, 511
Wallace, Colonel, ix. 508
Walmoden, General (Hanoverian), ix. 387,
x. 54
War Office, the, account of functions of,
x. 186-8
Warren, Admiral Sir John B., ix. 321
Washington, the expedition to and capture
of, x. 140-46
Watson, Sir Brooke, Commissary, x. 189
Wellesley, Richard, Marquess, and the
question of specie in Spain, ix. n, 12
Wellesley, Sir Henry, Ambassador at
Madrid, ix. 478
Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Earl, Mar-
quess, and Duke of, ix. 182, x. 402 ; his
458
HISTORY OF THE ARMY
difficulties for specie, ix. 11-13,91-4; his
winter quarters for 1812, ix. 34 ; his in-
structions to Sir J. Murray, ix. 48 ; his
difficulties with the Spanish Government,
ix. 75-6,414-15 ; his methods of ridding
himself of generals, ix. 84-8 ; his com-
plaints against the Navy, ix. 100-107,
211, 485 ; his passion for fox-hunting,
ix. 1 08 ; opening of the campaign of
1813, ix. 128-31 ; campaign of Vitoria,
ix. 131-61, battle of Vitoria, ix. 162
sqq. ; his severity to Norman Ramsay,
ix. 199-200 ; his attempt to intercept
Clausel, ix. 205-6 ; and the first assault
on San Sebastian, ix. 231-25 his move-
ments during the fighting of July 1813,
ix. 259, 271 ; his reasons for not pressing
the pursuit, ix. 350 ; his quarrel with
the 5th Division at San Sebastian, ix.
353-4; his unfavourable opinion of
Allied operations on the Continent, ix.
389 ; preparations for passage of the
Bidassoa, ix. 394-6 ; his difficulties with
the Portuguese Government, ix. 414-1 5 ;
his resolve to invade France, ix. 421 ;
Nivelle, ix. 422-41 ; his policy towards
the inhabitants of France, ix. 443-4 ;
cantons the Spaniards in Spain, ix. 443 ;
ordered to continue invasion of France,
ix. 448 ; his orders for the passage of the
Nive, ix. 454 ; his criticism of the Allies'
plan of campaign on the Continent, ix.
476 ; his situation after the battle of the
Nive, ix. 485 ; his financial position
improved, ix. 491 ; his admiration for
Napoleon's campaign of 1814, x. 18 ;
his policy in Southern France, x. 19 ;
his difficulties with the Bourbons, x.
19-20, 31 ; sends missions to Bordeaux
and Pau, x. 20, 21 j his movements
upon Toulouse, x. 23-7 ; his manoeuvres
before Toulouse, x. 66-76 ; battle of
Toulouse, x. 80-91 ; his opinions on the
American War, x. 135-6 ; considered as
a trainer of generals, x. 202-3 j his
career and character reviewed, x. 219-26 ;
his arrival in the Netherlands, April
1815, x. 232; his army for the cam-
paign of Waterloo, x. 233-4, 237-8 ; his
difficulties over the question of peace or
war, x. 236-7 ; his complaints about his
staff examined, x. 238-42 ; his difficulties
with the King of the Netherlands, x.
245-6 ; his misgivings as to the British
Ministry, x. 254-5 ; on I5th June 1815,
x. 278-82 ; on 1 6th June 1815, x. 283-
284, 289, 300, 305, 325 ; on i7th June
1815, x. 332; on i8th June 1815, x.
34 6 , 3 6 9-7o> 3 8o 3 8 5 3 8 9> 39 1 , 39 8
409, 411-20
Wessenberg, Count, ix. 25
Whinyates, Captain (R.A.), x. 352
Whitbread, Samuel (M.P.), x. 208, 229,
231,236
Whittingham, General, ix. 36-8, 42-7, 49
Wilkinson, General (American), ix. 337-
343, 349, x. 99, io!-2
Willemstadt, x. 4, 56
Williamson, Colonel, ix. 59, 60
Wilson, Colonel (commanding Portuguese
brigade), ix. 397
Winchester, General (American), ix. 324
Winder, General (American), ix. 318, x.
142-4
Winzingerode, General (Austrian), x. 2, 3,
6, 14
Wood, Colonel George (R.A.), x. 240
Woodford, Colonel Alexander, x. 348, 358
Worsley, Lieutenant (R.N.), x. 124
Wright, Lieutenant (R.E.), x. 219
Yanci, ix. 247-8, 264, 295, 423
Yecla, ix. 38
Yeo, Commodore, Sir James (R.N.), ix.
311, 317, 319, 323, 326, 337-8, x. 102-
105, 120, 123
Yonge, Sir George, x. 187
York (Toronto, Canada), ix. 307-11, 337,
x. 104, 1 06 ; sacked by Americans, ix.
310
York, Frederick, Duke of, Commander-in-
Chief of the British Army, ix. 79, x. 54,
182 ; the question of Provisional Bat-
talions, ix. 79-81 ; and Wellington's in-
efficient generals, ix. 84-8 ; his good
service to the Army, 1803-1814, x. 185-
186, 197-9 ; his staff at the Horse
Guards, x. 201-2 ; and Wellington's
staff of 1815, x. 239
York, General (Prussian), ix. 21, 23
Young, Admiral, x. 4
Yropil, Mount, ix. 251
Yurre, bridge, ix. 163
Zabaldica, ix. 270-71, 295, 297-8
Zadorra, river, ix. 161-4, l ^7> 1 7&
Zante, ix. 33
Zaragoza, ix. 35, 207-8, 218-22, 264
Ziethen, von, General (Prussian), x. 264,
274, 277, 280-81, 289, 340, 343, 386-
387, 391-2, 398
Zuazo, ix. 166, 169-70, 179, 180
Zubieta, ix. 218, 274, 292
Zubiri, ix. 245, 252, 264-5, 283
Zugarramurdi, ix. 216, 300, 362, 368, 413
Zurella, pass of, ix. 245
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50 A history of the British
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