THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT
AMERICAN FORTUNES
RUSSELL SAGE.
HISTORY OF THE GREAT
AMERICAN FORTUNES
BY
GUSTAVUS MYERS
AUTHOR OK "THli HISTORY OK TAMMANY HALL,' 1 " HISTORY OK
PUBLIC FRANCHISES IN NEW YORK CITY,'' ETC.
VOL. III.
GREAT FORTUNES FROM RAILROADS
( CONTINUED)
CHICAGO
CHARLES H. KKRR &- COMPANY
1911
Copyright 1909-1910
BY GUSTAVUS MYERS
Kntrrrd ;it Stationers' Hail. London, Eny:., 1910
II v ( ius-lavus M vri's
JOHN F. HIGGINS
PRINTER AND BINDER
376-382 MONROE STREET
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. Ax INSERT ON THE SAGE FORTUNE i i
II. MOKE DETAILS OF THE SAGE FORTUNE 44
III. THE GOULD FORTUXE RESUMED (13
IV r . THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE GOULD FORTUNE . . 80
V. THE BLAIR AND THE GARRETT FORTUNES .... ioj
\"I. THE PACIFIC QUARTET i_'4
\'\l. ]. PIERPOXT MORGAN'S GENESIS 146
\'I1I. THE FLO\VERING OF THE MORCAX FORTUXE . . .177
IX. MORGAX AS A BANKING AND RAILROAD GRANDEE . . J<M
X. MORGAN THE "PEERLESS CAPTAIN* OF INDUSTRY" . . 227
XI. MORGAN AT II is ZENITH _<44
XII. MORGAN AS "Tin-: SAVIOR OF THE NATION" . . . 287
XI f I. THE Hi. KINS FORTUNE 311
XIV. THE HILL FORTUNE . ??8
PART III
THE GREAT FORTUNES FROM RAILROADS
(Continued)
HISTORY OF THE GREAT
AMERICAN FORTUNES
CHAPTER 1
AN INSERT ON THE SAGE FORTUNE
Russell Sage was mellow with experience when Gould
was still in Ins verdant youth ; years before Gould began
his predacious career, Sage had the reputation among the
knowing of being an old hand at political and financial
corruption. Was this reputation justified? And did
Sage garner his first millions by illicit methods? Cer-
tain of his biographers glide nimbly over these ques-
tions, while others tell their ready-made advocates' tale ;
how by his thrift and enterprise, his marvelous business
astuteness, and his imposing array of other mercantile
virtues and faculties he made his great fortune. 1 It
would denote a lack of fidelity to these accounts were
the word "sterling" omitted in connection with virtues;
in the case of our multimillionaires virtues must neces-
sarily be " sterling virtues.'' Were it not that the same
stock phrases abound in all of these eulogies, they might
provoke a gush of emotion, so touching are they, and
often pathetic. Hut the moment the test of examina-
tion is applied they turn out to be sheer inventions.
12 HISTORY OF TllK GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
In fact, all such works betray their o\vn obvious worth-
lessness.
SAGE S GREAT DEFECT.
One of the expected virtue.-, however, Sage griev-
ously lacked, and it was by reason of this omission that
he was the subject of gibes ar.d harsh criticism through-
out his life. So far as the methods that he used in get-
ting together his millions went, he was not attacked;
on the contrary, in his later years at any rate, he was
represented as a very shrewd man who made his money
by legitimate means. It was his niggardliness which
proved the ground for his unpopularity. The severe
economy preached as one of the great stepping stones
to fortune, was condemned alter the fortune had been
acquired. A certain state of public mind or standard
had been built up almost requiring that the millionaire
should be a " good spender " ; he should live sumptu-
ously, blaze forth in glitter, and have some pet philan-
thropy.
Sage's recusant quality classified him as quite distinc-
tive among the verv rich men of his time. Xo self-
indulgence for him, no extravagance, no expensive hob-
bies or splurges. He was a man who displeased his class
and violated its canons; to such it seemed that he made
wealth odious to the masses bv declining to invest it
with that generosity which, it was supposed, softened the
popular hostility to the system allowing its accumula-
tion.
Hence arn-e an undue rasping criticism of his per-
-onalitv. Xearlv all of the millionaire- of his dav.
after piling up their heaps, gloried in some costly con-
reil or re-plendent -how. Xone of thi- fmerv r foolery
TIIK S.U;K Foim.'Nii 13
for the crustaceous Sage. J le >pent just enough to al-
low himself a comfortable domicile on Fifth avenue, one
of the thoroughfares of the rich in Xe\v York city;
aside from this moderate expenditure, he was notoriously
parsimonious; his very clothes were the jest of the coun-
try.
Had he yielded to the prevalent custom of buying the
reputation of philanthropist and " benefactor of man-
kind " by impressive donations or endowments (to be
recouped by further pillage) he would infallibly have
been otherwise judged. Fie made no attempt, however,
to propitiate harsh public opinion; be it said to his credit
that he was unshakenly faithful to his sordid ideals ;
at no time did he curry praise or essay to conciliate by
rlinging out as a social bribe morsels to charity or phi-
lanthropy. \Yhere his compeers (whatever their mo-
tives) confused or deceived the public estimate of them
and their ways by distributing largess every now and
then, he made no advances or pretensions ; in the respect
that he candidly idolized money, moralizing and -ham
almsgiving, cant and humbuggery were absent in his
composition.
IIIS CARF.F.K AT T1IF. START.
Sage was born of farmer folk in 1816 in Oneida
Count}-, Xew York, in an environment of poverty and
cramping horizon. There is a paucity of information
about his youthful days. \Ye learn that as a boy his
dominant yearning was for money, and that he devel-
oped a remarkable capacity for sharp trading. He
clerked in his brother's grocerv store at Troy, doubtless,
we may reasonably surmise, learning all of the profita-
ble little trick< of dealing with customers which an ef-
14 HISTORY OF TIII-: GRKAT AMKRICAN FOKTCNKS
licient clerk \vas taught, expected and paid to do; de-
ceit \vas then, as it is now, the lever of all successful
business. Xo doubt he carefullv. ever so carefully,
saved money, and so likewise did tens of thousands of
other clerks thrift}-, ambitious striplings \vho put it
away as they were beneficently advised. But the rule of
thrift worked wrong-side in irost of their cases; very
few of them became rich, despite their sticking punc-
tiliously to all of the regularly prescribed axioms. Plain
it ever has been that thrift, temperance and hard work
are not the recipe for getting rich, else many millions
of people who have to work hard, and who are thrifty
and temperate, would forthwith become so. The ortho-
dox formulas did not produce riches, as Sage's fellow
clerks found out. What, then, brought wealth to him ?
" Long before down appeared on his chin he had
gained a local reputation of being unu.-ually keen at
'swapping. 5 ' So wrote a eulogist whose description,
slight though it be, gives a clue to Sage's methods in
boyhood days. We are told that he amassed enough
money to open a grocer}- .-tore of his own, and that in
1830, he became a partner in a wholesale grocery estab-
Hshment.
SWINDLE.
On September 12. iS;i. Sage and two other Troy
men formed a copartnership, under the name of Wheeler,
Sage and Slocum. to carry on a general produce busi-
ness at Troy, with a Western headquarters at Mil-
waukee, under the name of Wheeler and Company.
This copartnership was signalized by a memorable Dwin-
dle, which called forth one of the severest decisions and
TTIK SACK niKTrXK 15
denunciations ever handed down by the Supreme Court
of the United States.'"' The firm deliberated concocted
a plan to cheat the creditors of one of its bankrupt
creditors in Milwaukee, and while it was engaged in
this operation. Sage hoodwinked and cheated his own
partners out of the proceeds of the swindle.
The facts as given in the statement of the case and
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
were as follows :
The firm became the owner of a large debt against
one Alanson Sweet of Milwaukee, a debt secured by a
mortgage on valuable real estate. This real estate in-
cluded a large warehouse, which Wheeler and Com-
pany had rented. Proceedings to foreclose the mort-
gage against the bankrupt Sweet were begun in Octo-
ber, 1854, and a decree was passed by the Wisconsin
courts in November, 1855. The Supreme Court's state-
ment of the case went on to say that Wheeler, Sage
and Slocum were desirous of getting a perfect title to
the mortgaged premises, the value of which was
$50,000 when the mortgage was given. But other
creditors had judgments against Sweet, and Sweet
claimed the sum of $12,000 due him from \Yheeler and
Company for three years' rent of the warehouse.
If Sweet put in this defence successfully, a perfect
title could not be secured. Tt was necessary, also, to de-
ceive and bluff the other creditors. In order to grasp
the whole of the real estate, the court said. Wheeler.
Sage and Slocum thought it necessary to purchase cer-
tain judgments, and make other arrangements by col-
lusion. Sage informed Wheeler and Slocum that this
- See Wheeler v. S;ie. \Vall.uv'- Report*. Supreme C':':rt of
the Tnited State*, 1:518 r ( :ll.
[Q HISTORY OF Till-. iIREAT AMERICAN 1-ORTt'NES
could be done 1>v buving off Alexander Mitchell, who
controlled Sweet's defence, for $10.000. The court's
-latement continues :
Sage was authorized to perfect the agreement, and to charge
Wheeler and Slocuin their proportionate amount on the books
of the firm. This agreement or a similar one, was made by
Sage with Mitchell, and judgments purchased under it. ll'ith-
i"i:t tiie knoii'ledge of Wheeler, Sage, hoii'crer, abandoned this
agreement, and made one li'ith Mitchell for his oicvz benefit.
The mortgaged property was sold, and Mitchell became the pur-
chaser, letting Sage have one-third interest on certain condi-
tions; this being done, as alleged, in violation of the rights,
and without the knowledge of Wheeler and Slocum. The mort-
gaged debt \vas fixed at $24.000, two-thirds of which amount
was paid over by Sage to Wheeler a/id Slocum, being, as he
[Sage] said, the best that could be done, and which was ac-
cepted by Wheeler and Slocum on that hypothesis. 3
SAGE SWIXDLES HIS PARTNERS.
Yet, the court went on to relate, enough of the mort-
gaged property, as Wheeler found out and charged, had
been sold to produce $105.000, in addition to unsold prop-
erty, valued at $27,000, still in Mitchell's hands. 4
On the usual legal ground that when a party obtains
an advantage by fraud, he is to be regarded as trustee
of the party defrauded and compelled to account,
Wheeler brought suit against Sage. He sued to have
Sage declared trustee for himself (Wheeler) for one-
third of the mortgaged property still held and unsold by
Mitchell, and for one-third of the proceeds of the prop-
erty that had been sold.
The Supreme Court of the United States declared the
whole Iran-action fraudulent; that while Wheeler, Sage
-Wallace's Reports, Supreme Court of the United States,
i : 519.
4 Ibid.
THE SACK FORTUNE 17
and Slocum had successfully conspired to cheat Sweet's
numerous other creditors. Sage had tricked and cheated
his own partners. They had set out to get by fraud
real estate worth $50,000 for $30,000, and had authorized
Sage to arrange the collusion. Sage had afterward re-
linquished the agreement with Mitchell, and had secured
clandestinely an advantage to himself, "to the injury of
the other parties."
In further stating the court's decision. Justice Davis
continued :
The evidence in this case. consisting mainly of letters inter-
changed between Wheeler and Sage, shows clearly enough that
a scheme was initiated to get title to the property, and that
Sage was the active agent to perfect it, but for some unex-
plained reason it failed. . . . All parties rested in the belief
that negotiations with Mitchell would be successful ; but . . .
Sage abandoned the idea of buying the property on joint ac-
count, and bargained with Mitchell in his own behalf. . . .
The " Warehouse Case," as it is somewhere called in the record,
is anything but creditable to the parlies concerned, and it is
surprising that they should have been willing to give it pub-
licity through a legal proceeding. . . . The scheme was to
get the real estate by depreciating its value through a process
of entering judgment for a large nominal amount, and by de-
ceiving and " bluffing off " other creditors. The court fin Wis-
consin which passed the foreclosure decree] was imposed upon,
and a combination formed, the object and direct tendency of
which was to secure title to the valuable real estate of an
insolvent debtor at the expense and sacrifice of his other cred-
itors.
The court declined to pass judgment, one way or the
other, on the ground that a party who had been engaged
in an illegal transaction, could not expect redress, after
being cheated, in any court of equity. " A proceed-
ing like this is against good conscience and good morals,
and cannot receive the sanction of a court of equity.
1 8 HISTORY 01- Till
It is again>t the jxilicy of the- law to help either
party in such controversies."' 5 The effect of this de-
cision \vas to leave Sage in possession of the proceeds
of his swindling operation.
For seven years Sage held the offices of Alderman of
Troy and of Treasurer of Rensselaer County. Xow it
is that we get the first clea" penetration into the methods
by which he gathered in his first notable amount of
money. Xot by trafficking in weights and measures
was it, nor by petty swindling, but by a transaction in
which as a public official he betrayed the city of Troy
into selling to himself for a small sum a railroad line,
which railroad he later, according to a prearranged plan.
sold to the Xew York Central consolidation at a very
large profit.
HOW SAGE OBTAINED HIS EIRST SWEEP OF WEALTH.
There is nothing vague or conjectural regarding this
illuminating transaction: the facts are inscribed authen-
tically in the public records.
In the years 1840-43. the city of Troy, at public ex-
pense, began to build a railroad running twenty-one miles
from that city to Schenectady. The city of Troy, in
1837 an( ^ 1 $47- borrowed a total of $650.000, and in 1840
the State of Xew York loaned Troy Sioo.ooo, making
8750.000 in all for the construction and equipment of
the Trov and Schenectady Railroad. It was a time when
capitalists passively looked on, allowing many munic-
ipalities and some of the States to build publicly-owned
railroads and operate them for a time, and then, after
many millions of public money had been expended, capi-
Unitcil Stales,
TIFI-: SACK roRTrxi: 19
talists would contrive to take over the ownership unto
themselves. This they did by depreciating and crip-
pling railroads owned by the community, and bv cor-
I O - tf ' ml
rupting public officials to sell or lease them for compara-
tively insignificant sums. It was a favorite practice of
the period, and was worked with great success.
The task of providing themselves with modern means
of transportation frequently devolved upon communities,
since no capitalist would take the initiative in any un-
dertaking in which he did not see considerable immedi-
ate profits. The aim of the community was service ; that
of the capitalist, profit. Communities would never stop
to consider whether a railroad would yield profit ; the
sole question guiding them was that of public need.
The principle which made the people acquiescent in the
loaning or donating of large sums of money to private
railroad corporations was that railroads were a public
necessity, whether publicly or privately built. In New
York State alone, not to mention other States, the rail-
roads originally received from cities, towns, villages and
from the State, the sum of $40,039,496.82 by donation or
investment ; e a very considerable amount it made at a
time when a dollar had a much greater purchasing
power than now. Of this sum, only about one-fourth
part was paitl back ; at various times laws were cor-
ruptly passed releasing the railroad companies from lia-
bility for these debts. Every mile of those railroads is
to-day absolutely owned, or practically so, by private in-
terests.
As the greater number of railroads were owned by pri-
vate corporations, it was not difficult for them to bank-
rupt publicly-owned railroads when they set out to do
2O III.
in:;' freight rind passenger traffic or l>y corrupting public
officials to mismanage llicin. This conflict ol public and
private intere.--t ab.vavs resulted in the triumph of private
interest ; necessarily so because public welfare and pri-
vate profits were an incongruous mixture, the one the
antithesis of the other, and also because the governing
officials were either of the propertied classes or respon-
sive or subservient to them.
By these methods the campaign against the public
ownership of the Troy and Schenectady Railroad was
begun. Small detached railroads were anomalies at best ;
economic development demanded one of two solutions;
either that they became merged in a great public, or in a
great private, system. Disconnected, they were waste-
ful, inconvenient and unsystematic. This essential fact
is fully borne in mind in stating the facts.
Among the railroad capitalists the movement for com-
bination and cohesion commenced at about 1850. In
Xew York State a combination of various bankers, land-
owners and politicians concluded along in 1851 that it
would be an excellent scheme to unite many of Xew
York's separate little railroads into one centralized sys-
tem. They were not prompted, it is true, by solicitude
for the community; very far from it; the community to
them signified a domain for spoils. Xor did they have
any appreciation of the economic forces behind their
project. Their one propelling idea was to buy up the
small railroads for trifling sums and then organize a
corporation and sell those railroads to the corporation at
a tremendous profit. Xevertheless, in carrying forward
the centralizing movement they did a necessary service
to the community, however heavilv the people have ha i
to pav for it. The Troy and Schenectady Railroad was
21
agreed u])on as one of the roads to be included in
o imbination.
A CITY r.KTKAYKI) AND I'LL'NDKRKD.
llo\v was the city of Troy to be induced to sell its
railroad to the clique of projectors? This was the
problem. It did not perturb them long. Russell Sage
undertook to carry through this portion of the bargain.
1 ie was at this time a leading member of the Troy Com-
mon Council, and was serving as one of Troy's directors
in the managing of the Troy and Schenectady Railroad.
His first move, it would appear, was to cause a steady
mismanagement of the railroad's affairs so as to create
dissatisfaction, if not disgust, with the continuance of
public ownership and operation. Very deftly \vas his
undermining and sapping work done so deftly and by
such surreptitious methods that no suspicion of his com-
plicity was aroused. A public sentiment unfavorable to
Troy's retention of the railroad was *hen adroitly worked
up; public petitions praying for the sale of the unprofita-
ble and unsatisfactory road began to flow in to the Com-
mon Council.
What did the Common Council now do? It appointed
a committee to consider the question of selling; of this
committee Sage was the most active member. So very
active was he that the committee reported favoring the
selling of the railroad. The proposition was, in fad.
carried by one vote: it was Sage's vote which decided.
Then, on January 24. 1853, another committee of the
Common Council was appointed; its assigned function
was to sell the stock, franchise and propertv of the rail-
road for not less than 200.000. Who was it thai al.-o
singularly happened to be the foremost member of thi-
22 HISTORY OE THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
second committee? The phenomenally industrious Al-
derman Sage. And when the railroad was finally sold,
who was it that bought it? A company headed by Sage,
and Sage it was who became its president. 7 Extra* n--
dinarily considerate were the terms of sale; $50,000 \va-
to be paid down, the remainder in fourteen years.
A LITTLE DISTRIBUTION OF S8.OOO.OOO.
Quite a legitimate transaction, the apologist might say ;
according to the law, however, it constituted malfeasance
in office : many an officeholder in various cities had been
removed for less flagrant acts. It was recognized gen-
erally as a gross piece of corruption, but nothing was
done to interfere with its success nor with the greater
corruption that followed. Having, under form of law,
grabbed the Troy and Schenectady Railroad, Sage sold
it for $900,000 or so to the group of capitalists forming
the Xew York Central Railroad combination. Although
but $50,000 had been paid for it in cash. Sage and his
associates disposed of it not only for the full value of its
$650,000 capital stock, but they also received in exchange
a premium of twenty-five per cent, on that amount in
Xew York Central bonds. In this formation of the Xew
York Central. S8.ooo.ooo in bonds all watered were
distributed a^ a bonus among the owners of the various
railroads embraced in the consolidation : s no insignificant
portion of the eight millions was Sage's share of the
s] (oils.
7 See Investigation of the Railroads of the State of Xew
'"} Committee" K-ei-iative invc-tisation of 1,^70
it! i ' tor} of tlii> Muck watering operation. An ar
i, it "i the I'ruy transacti-m liy F. \Y. Pn\vdl. cnti;led ''Two
; ;- i;i PuMir Uwnership of Strain Railr<->a<l~," :.p
: tin ' (JuancH.v Journal of F.coii"inic-," i>-u.e nf Xo
mi-; S.U;K I-'OKTL'NI; 23
\\'hatcver might be the later outcries of Troy's popu-
lation over the merciless extortions of the Xe\v York
Central Railroad, Sage was now heralded more of a
"prominent citizen" than ever beiore, a citizen oi ex-
ceeding worth, stability and standing. The glorious and
patriotic occupation of politico-business man. with its
radius of opportunities, had proved very lucrative. \et
the national capital. Sage concluded, held out much
greater inducements. Accordingly, the corrupt Troy po-
litical ring, of which he was a leader, caused him to be
elected to Congress ; there he took his seat in December,
1853, and in 1854 was reflected.
That was the era when act after act was passed
granting money and land, either openly or by indirection,
to railroad companies, and giving corrupt powers and
privileges of all miscellaneous kinds to other corporations
and to individual capitalists. In the one year of 1850,
exclusive of other years. Congress passed at least thirty
railroad land-grant acts for the benefit of as many sep-
arate railroad corporations acts under which these
railroad companies obtained the ownership of tens of
millions of acres of public land. The corrupt means
used to get these acts through proved one of the great
scandals of the times, and led to the appointment of
numerous Congressional and State legislative investigat-
ing committees. Few members of Congress and legisla-
tures there were, as was abundantly shown, who did not
take bribes either in money or in stocks and bonds.
! f Sage was barely noticeable in Congress, and a tol-
erably complete blank in public life, he nevertheless all
the more effectively and intimately cohered himself with
many ol these <ame rich railroad project-;. The particu-
lar means whereby he did so are not ascertainable. but
'ertain it is that when he left Congress he was found to
be a conspicuous "insider" of various of these land
grant railroad corporations.
fXRKSTK. \IXKI) FRAUD AXt) I-JRIBIiRV.
lie was called the father of railroad construction
companies in Wisconsin and Minnesota." warbles a rhap-
sodizing writer," apparently confident that the reference
will redound to Sage's undying credit. What this eulo-
gist prudently omits is an account of how these com-
panies secured their charter- and land grants.
The Minnesota and Northwestern Railroad Company
was one of the railroad companies which obtained its
charter and land during the very time Sage was in
Congress ; the act was passed to the accompaniment of
charges of fraud and bribery. As regards this corpora-
tion, however, there is no documentary evidence connect-
ing Sage with it. Hut it is worth while referring to it.
A -elect committee of the House was appointed on
July 24. 1854. to investigate: and although the commit-
tee handed in an evasive, whitewashing report, the testi-
mony given before it undoubtedly proved that somehow
the wording of the act had been fraudulently changed
in the House in the process of engrossing. These
changes, according to J. Travis Rosser. secretary of the
Territory of Minnesota, "gave million- of dollars" to
the railroad company in f|uestion. As originally passed
>enate. the bill had given the donation of land
to the I erritory of Minnesota, not to the company; a- it
hnalh becoming a law. the bill contained the
ifu
TIIF. SACK roKTrXK 2 5
been made in the debate over the bill whereby the op--
position of certain of its opponents was bought off, a
statement which the incriminated denied." The ma-
jority of another committee, appointed on July 10, 1X54.
to investigate charges of bribery reported: ' The under-
signed believe that it is clearly established by the testi-
mony that money has been liberally used to secure the
passage of bills, and they verily believe that much more
evidence could be procured if time had been allowed the
committee to make a more thorough investigation of the
facts." 1L '
Till-; ENTERPRISING FACTORY OWNERS.
This committee found that Samuel Colt, the founder
of a fortune based upon the manufacture of firearms,
paid out at least $15,000 to Dickerson. his attorney and
one of his lobbyists, to buy oft the opposition in Con-
gress to a bill extending Colt's patent rights, the time
limit of which had expired. The testimony indicated
11 Rep. Xo. 352. (854:^5. This act was later repealed. See
Chapter ii. Lowlier was, for a time, acting-president of this com-
pany. He was a notoriously corrupt New York city politician,
and at that very time, wa^ making considerable sums of money,
liy fraudulently Celling land at exorbitant prices, to New York-
city. (See "The History of Tammany Hall." p. 216.) Lowlier,
or, one of these occasions, corruptly sold land to the city of
New York for $106,000, \vhich the Controller refused to pay on
the ground that this sum was live or six times more than the
lard wa-> worth. Lowlier recovered judgment in the couns
against the city, and when the Controller declined to satisfy i
was on the point of causing Xew York's City Hall. ir. iS'-.S.
lie sold at auction, when Mayor Tieinann halted the proceed-
ings, and raided the necessary -ami. As it was, the paintings and
statuary in the City Hall were sold, and were hid in by Mayor
'I ieinann's secretary.
( Mher officers of the Minnesota and Northwestern Railroad
Company were equally notorious Xfu Yo'-k lobbyists and cor-
rtiptionislij.
: - Reports of Committees, T'nim third Congress, l-'ir>i Se>
-ioi.. Vol. lii, Report Xo. 352:35.
26
that about $00,000 in all was spent in getting the bill
pa>sed. Another lobbyist. Jere Clemens, who also did
the disbursing of Colt's bribe money, was, at the same
time, as he admitted under oath, lobbying for various
railroad corporations seeking land grants, and for a bill
similar to Colt's which extended the patent rights of
Cyrus H. McCormick, 1 " a manufacturer of reaping ma-
chines, and the founder of a multimillionaire fortune.
And how other factory owners were bribing Congress
to pass tariff acts was disclosed bv the investigation of a
select committee of the House, the majority of which
committee reported that one firm in particular. Laurence.
Stone and Company, of Boston and Xew York, owners
of the large Middlesex Mills, and the equally large Bay
State Mills, in Massachusetts, had expended 887.000 in
bribes to have the duties on raw woolen materials and
dye stuffs reduced. 14 Failing to get from Congress,
politically pledged to a low tariff, a high protective tariff
on woolen goods, they set out to accomplish the same
result bv securing a reduction of customs duties on raw
material. One of the lobbyists for this firm was A. R.
Corbin. brother-in-law of Clysses S. Grant, the same
Corbin whom Gould later bought up in his gold manip-
ulation. Corbin received ST.OOO in bribes from Laurence.
Stone and Company, and he made no concealment of the
fact that he had been regularly acting for the Tllinoi-.
( 'entral Railroad and other railroad corporations.
(his was the time, it will br recalled, when Commn
rlore Corneliu- Yanderbilt. K. K. Collins, and other
steamship capitalist- were debauching Congress to get
Till-: SACK FORT (.'NIC 2"J
mail subsidies, and when \ underbill was blackmailing
two Pacific steamship lines out of $612,000 a year of the
(Government subsidy funds. It was also during the>e
years that a House committee, after investigation, found
that the enacting charter and the land grant of the DCS
.Moines Navigation and Railroad Company were passed
by bribery. 1 -"' Obviously, judging from the reports of
these various investigating committees, and from the
much more significant circumstances calling for the ap-
pointment of those committees, Congress reeked with
fraud and bribery, of which only slight oozings came to
the surface; and we incidentally get, in passing along,
a lucid insight into some of the methods of the founders
of great fortunes based upon manufacturing industries.
Bribery, indeed, was so undeniably rife that as a sop
to public feeling, one investigating committee after an-
other was appointed to inquire into charges. While on
this subject, digression will be made to deal with two
scandals in particular which came up at this period. It
is well worth while referring to these, first, because they
additionally reveal the utter corruption carried on con-
tinuously at Washington by every section of the capital-
i.-t cla>s, and second, because they disclose some of the
method^ by which one of the most lauded multimillion-
aire financiers and " philanthropists " in the United States
built up his fortune.
This was William W. Corcoran, a Washington banker,
who, after the Civil War, became reputed as one of the
most substantial and respected financiers in the Uniteo
States. During the decades when Gould and Sage were
being" hotly denounced for their frauds Corcoran loomed
up as a >taid, conservative banker and, a man of accred-
ited mo^t honorable pu-t. lie wa^ the chief partner of
work.
the banking firm of Corcoran and Riggs. and bequeathed
82.000,000 for a splendid art gallery to the city of Wash-
ington, and he also established a home for decrepit old
women.
A SIDKWISK (iLANCK AT A NOTED PHILANTHROPIST.
Corcoran was another of the many capitalists who
contrived to assume a coating of protective respectabil-
ity. His methods, however, were of the same fraudu-
lent nature as those of all the other successful money
getters.
Evidences of what these methods intrinsically were
came out in 1854; they made such a rumpus that the
House of Representatives was compelled to undertake
some investigation. According to the written and re-
peatedly made charges of I'enjamin E. Green, a political
figure of the period, Corcoran had extensively bribed
public officials in order to make large sums of money out
of the handling of United States funds and of specula-
tion in them. Under the treaty of Guaclulupe Hidalgo,
the United States had agreed to pay Mexico a large
indemnity for territory ceded after the Mexican War.
['art of this sum was paid by 1850, but a considerable
sum -till remained to be settled. Mexico needed money
badly, and proposed that the United States pay it di-
rect! v to the .Mexican Government without the inter-
mediary of banking houses. Green charged that Cor-
coran bribed Thomas II. IJayly, chairman of the House
Committee on Ways and Mean-, so to mi-repre-ent Mex-
ico's proposition rind manipulate matters that the firm of
Corcoran and I'-iggs -mould be made the middlemni in
iho transaction, " 1'avly." charged Green, "held a con-
trol over all <>f the appropriation bills in most of which
20)
Corcoran was directly or indirectly interested.'" 18 Cor-
coran thus obtained the handling of the indemnity funds,
and made a profit of about $500,000 from the transac-
tion. 17 A select committee of the House of Representa-
tives made a show of investigating the charges against
Bayly, and reported on August 3. 1854, a case of " not
proved."
THE GARDIXRR-MEARS SWIXDLF..
At the very same time Corcoran was involved in an-
other investigation by the House Committee on Judi-
ciarya committee many of the members of which
were themselves corrupt politicians. The transaction
which it was investigating under a resolution passed by
the House on March 6, 1854, was the great swindle per-
petrated by George II. Gardiner and John 11. Mears
upon the United States Government. By perjury,
forged affidavits and bribery these two men obtained
8581,000 from the United States Government upon the
representation that property of theirs had been de-
stroyed in Mexico during the Mexican War. After the
money had been appropriated, the facts as to the " as-
tounding fraud" (as a House Committee termed it)
came out publicly. Both the Senate and the Hou>e in-
vestigated the transaction ; a Senate committee reported
that the claims " were false and fictitious and the award-
obtained upon forged and fabricated papers."
115 Reports of Committees. Thirty-third Congress, First Session,
Vol. ni, Uep. Xt i. ,^4 : 4.
17 Ibid.
18 C. S. Senate Report Xo. i8_>. 1854.
Tt \\ as at this peni>d that vast stretches of valuable land in
the Southwest and the Pacific States were bein,n" obtained by
forced documents and by the testimony of perjuring Mexicans.
See Chapter li. Vol. ii. and the chapter on the Klkins fortune
in Vol. iii.
30 HISTORY OP THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
The people of the United States \vere wrought up over
the. disclosures of this bold swindle, and Congress was
smitten with another of its spasms of virtuous curiosity.
A resolution was passed calling for the recovery of the
money paid out to Gardiner and Mears. But were these
men the real beneficiaries? Who actually got the
money? "Who were the principals behind the fraud?
These were points that had to be inquired into.
As the investigation unfolded it appeared that a group
of bankers and politicians were the parties backing the
fraud. Possibly they instigated it, although this general
belief was not determined. The testimony showed, how-
ever, that when the forged affidavits were being prepared,
money was urgently needed to carry the projected swin-
dle to a successful conclusion. At this point Corcoran
came forward. He loaned 818.750 as funds for the
promotion of the swindle, although he claimed, when the
committee was investigating, that he did not know that
this money was used to buy up testimony and otherwise
complete the chain of fraud. But he admitted loaning
this 818.750 to Robert G. Corwin and Thomas Corwin.
powerful politicians of the day: in return he received
an assignment of the Gardiner claim as collateral se-
curity." Thomas G. Corwin later was appointed
United States Secretary of the Treasury, and it was by
his order, under an act passed by Congress, that the
money was paid out. Of the 8581.875 appropriated, the
sum of 8321.562.50 was nominally in the name of Gar-
diner himself, and 8107.187.50 was awarded to Cor-
coran a- the assignee of Gardiner. Both of these sums.
however, were paid out to Corcoran and entered on
the books of Corcoran and Riggs. and (so the report
3 1
has it) "credited to the parties interested."-" Gardiner.
while being prosecuted for perjury, committed suicide.
The bankers and politicians, however, whose tools
Gardiner and Mears were, did not, it is hardly neces-
sary to say, have to face criminal trial or any other
kind of trial, except a friendly and evasive investiga-
tion. So far as Corcoran's complicity was concerned,
the committee exoneratingly whitewashed him, and re-
lieved him from any legal responsibility.
It is probable that Sage learned many valuable lessons
from his experience at Washington ; Corcoran's particu-
lar kind of banking methods must have opened his eyes
to possibilities. At any rate, already a millionaire, or
nearly one. from the combination of business and pi 'li-
lies. Sage now went into the banking business at Troy,
and became a money lender and usurer on a large scale.
It was at this juncture that he turned up as one of the
largest bondholders of the La Crosse and Milwaukee
Railroad. He had become associated with this project
at about the time he was in Congress, but the fact
was not known until several years afterward, when he
foreclosed. The eulogistic biographer in " America's
Successful Men," treats Sage's connection with the La
Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad in this light fashion:
1 The panic of 1857 found Mr. Sage a large creditor of
-" Rep. Xo. 369. etc. Tt is pertinent to note here that Riggs, of
the firm of Corcoran and Rigg>. \vas accused, in 1808, of handling
a corruption fund employed by the Russian Minister to the United
States to secure the passage of a bill appropriating $7,200,000
for the purchase of Alaska by the United States. The House
Committee on Public Expenditures investigated. Riu'gs denied
the charges. But inasmuch as the members of the Rn^-ia;i
Legation, although requested to appear ar.d explain, refused to
do so, the Committee reported its investigation, "barren of
affirmative or >atisfactory negative re>uhs." See Reports of
Committees. Third Session, Fortieth Congress, i8(>8-<K(. Report
the La Crosse Railroad. . . . To protect, the loan.-.
he had made to the road he found himself compelled to
advance yet larger sums, and later, through legal pro-
ceedings instituted to protect his investment, he became
the owner of the road which afterward became a part 01
the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Raul, of which Mr.
Sage was at different times a director and vice presi-
dent."
THE BRIBERY OF AX ENTIRE STATE.
This explanation reads very smoothly, but it omits a
multitude of details both essential and enlightening. It
-can be said that at a period when briber}' and fraud were
so common as to cloy the popular mind, no transaction
aroused a greater sensation or made a deeper impression
upon a people jaded with continuous exposures of brib-
ery, than the great thefts and briberies committed by
the owners of the La Crosse and Milwaukee railroad.
This corporation had been chartered by the Wisconsin
Legislature in 1852 to build a railroad crossing Wiscon-
sin from Milwaukee on the eastern boundary, to La
Crosse on the western. Two additional acts passed in
the same year allowed it to consolidate with two other
railroads running in different directions.
In June, 1856. Congress passed a bill granting to Wis-
consin approximately 2,388,000 acres of public land in
that State to be distributed among the railroads in Wis-
consin. The enactment of this law was one of thirty
distinct railroad land-grant acts passed in that one year.
'! hat they were put through by bribery was shown by
the report of a House investigating committee which rec-
ommended the expulsion of four prominent Congressmen
on the ground of thrir having been at the head of cor-
33
nipt combinations in Congress.- 1 The La Crosse and
Milwaukee Railroad Company thereupon lost no time in
bribing (and all of the other land-grant railroads did the
same in other States) the Legislature of Wisconsin to
award a huge land grant. \Yhat followed the corrupt
acts of Congress would doubtless never have been made
public had it not been for the fact that another railroad
company was sharply competing with the La Crosse and
Milwaukee Company to get the major land grant from
the \Yisconsin Legislature. Beaten in the contest it re-
vengefully raised charges that bribery had -been used.
The result was the appointment of a joint investigating
committee by the two houses of the Wisconsin Legis-
lature, and it is from their report, covering" more than
three hundred pages, and handed in on May 13, 1858,
that the fullest details are obtainable.
This committee reported that in the construction of
the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad nearly $1,700,000
had been stolen by the directors up to 1856. One method
was by making exorbitant contracts with themselves to
construct their roads ; another was by false construction
charges ; a third was by their buying property as in-
dividuals and then selling it to the company at exor-
bitant prices. These fraudulent methods were common
among the directors of railroads throughout the United
States. According to the findings of the committee, the
La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad directors, composed
of \Yall street bankers and Xew York politicians, had
so plundered the stock, security and property of the
company that it was reduced to a condition of bank-
ruptcy. The plan was thus made imperative of getting
a large land grant in order to rescue the company from
34
The directors at this time ; his holdings, it ap-
pear.^, were in bonds not stocks; lie remained in the
background working 1 through intermediaries.
SSOO.OOO IX I'.RIKKS TO r,KT AX ACT PASSED.
To get this land grant, consisting of about 1,000,000
acres, the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad directors
debauched not merely a few leading membe'rs of the
Legislature, but virtually the whole Legislature, the Gov-
ernor and other State officers, and a large number of
editors of newspapers and politicians. It was this whole-
sale bribery of an entire State, joined with the general
plunder, robbery and sundry swindling, that made so
uncommonly deep an impression upon the public mind :
the newspapers, which in general ordinarily gave scant
space to accounts of bribery, opened up on this occasion,
in evident appreciation of the nature of the scandal, and
published long summaries, in some cases covering a page
and a half in fine print, of the committee's report.
More than $800,000 in bonds and money but chiefly
in bonds had been paid out in bribes to insure the
passage of the land-grant act of 1856, the committee re-
ported. This was an underestimate. According to the
report of the president of the La Crosse and Milwaukee
Railroad Company to the stockholder-, the passage of
this act cost $1,000.000 in bonds.-"- fn his annual report
for 1858 the president of the company bewailed the fact
that the passage of the land-gram act had cost the com-
pany so much. He itemized the expenses incurred. The
mi 7 : SAC.I: FORTCM; 35
first was this brief but significant entry, " Construction
bonds of 1862, issued for (/barter Expenses, $i ,000.000."
'J'be second item enumerated in the list of expenses for
getting the land grant \vas another $1,000,000 spent in
the purchase and consolation of the St. Croix and Lake
Superior Railroad, which railroad was awarded 847,000
acres of public land.- :; A third entry was, " Stock is-
-ncd for Charter Expenses at Madison [the capital of
Wisconsin], $90,000." - 4 A fourth item was one of
210,000 " for services " in getting a charter for a branch
railroad called the Milwaukee and \Yatertown Rail-
road.'--"'
Large as they were, these expenditures were trivial
compared to the value of the land grants received. The
annual report of the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad
Company for 1857 contained a statement from the Wis-
consin Land Commissioner setting forth that the areas
granted were rich agricultural and timber lands, and
valuing them at the sum of $17, 345,600. - 6 Seventeen
million dollars in return for a disbursement of several
millions in bribes was not a bad business transaction.
BiU to revert to the report of the joint legislative
committee of Vv'isconsin : Ji reported that for the pas-
^age of the land-grant act of 1850. $175.00011] bends were
distributed among thirteen specified Senators, the indi-
vidual bribes of whom ranged from $10,000 to $20,000;
that $35",,ooo in bonds had been given in bribes to sev-
'' :; " Sixth Annual Hop., l".n ("r
~ >( 11. id.
-'- Ihid.
-""The Fifth Animal Reu.rt .,{ tie la Cr
R K. Co.. 1857," k ,,5 and HX>.
3*> HISTORY oF Till: C.KKAT AMJ-IKJCAX
entv specified Assemblymen an average bribe of 85.-
ooo : that 850,000 in bonds were given as a bribe to
Coles Hash ford, (dovernor of \\'isconsin. and 816.000 to
other State official-, and that 8246.000 bad been variously
])aid out to certain specified editors and to other persons
of influence.- 7
The committee reported that the bribers used a secret
written code in order to conceal the evidence of bribery.
This code, however, was revealed. The committee com-
mented : ' The bribery or ' buying up ' a great majority
of the Legislature of 1856, is discovered in the back-
ground as a tame fact, while the ingenuity displayed in
the attempt to veil the transaction beyond the possibility
of detection, is so supremely unique as to extort atten-
tion. The actors seem not to have been mindful of the
fact, that no lid was ever large enough to completely
cover up itself." ~*
-"Report of the John Select Committee Appointed to Inves-
tigate Into Alleged Frauds and Corruption in the Disposition
of the Land Grant by the Legislature 01" 1850 and for Other
Purposes: Appendices to [Wisconsin] Senate and Assembly
Journals. 1858.
- s Ibid.. 47. In Wisconsin, not less than in other States, large
numbers of farmers were flagrantly robbed. The robbery of
Nation, States, counties, municipalities and individuals proceeded
at the same time.
Of the corruption and fraud in the case of the Milwaukee and
Superior Railroad Company, an investigating committee reported
that many of the farmer- in Milwaukee County and other parts
of \Vi-con.-in had mortgaged their farms in order to rai.-e money
for the purchase of railroad stocks. These fanners "were
anxiou- to aid in the conduction of a r<>ad which they sup-
TiO-ed would benefit themselves and the public generally." Many
were German-, "confiding, unsophisticated men.'' The commit-
tee continued: "A swarm of the-e vultures known as 'stock
agents' were .-ent out amongst the people, and a- the result
shows, from the evidence herewith, many poor and worthy
men have been robbed of their all. and unless some relief i-
extended to them in some way, will soon be deprived of their
h.ou-e.-. if >aid mortgage.- are of any legal effect." . . Re-
port of Select Committee Appointed I'nder Resolution Xo. 128,
A-.-emblv, to Investigate the Affair- of the Milwaukee and Su-
TIIK S.U;F, FokirxK 37
" The evidence taken." the committee concluded, " es-
tablishes the fact thai the La Crosse and Milwaukee
Railroad Company have been guilty of numerous and
unparalleled acts of mismanagement, gross violations of
duty, fraud and plunder. In fact, corruption and whole-
sale plundering are common features." -"
The}- were not merely common features of the rail-
road corporations in "Wisconsin, but everywhere else in
the United States ; year after year they went on un-
hindered by legislative or Congressional investigations.
The stolen rights and property, far from being forfeited,
became strongly riveted vested rights ; neither the bribers
nor the bribed were troubled with criminal prosecution
except very rarely, and then it was only the subordinate
tools who were sent to prison. Every bribery scandal
would be shortly followed by some new scandal ; the
old would die away or become forgotten, and the new
would absorb public attention for a time,- only to go
through the same process.
Yet. under a noted decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States, the principal, in every transaction
coming within the law, w r as fully liable to punishment.
In January, 1829. in a suit brought by the Government
against Astor's American Fur Company, growing out
of a seizure by General Tipton of liquors intended for
debauching the Indians, that court had laid down this
principle of law ( I'eter's Reports. II, 304) : That what-
ever was done by an agent, in reference to the business
in which he was at the time cmloved. and within the
30 HISTORY OF Till-: GREAT AMERICAN FOK'fl'XES
civil case, in all respects as though the principal were
the actor or speaker. This interpretation, however, was
no more used against other capitalists than it was against
Astor.
The great land grants received by the La Crosse and
Milwaukee Railroad Company were not the only gifts
in the legislative acts of 1856. As a corporation the
company was forever exempted from taxes, and the
lands granted were exempted from taxation for ten
years a sufficient time in which to strip them of their
timber or sell them. Despite all of the legislative gifts,
and additional very valuable donations by towns, coun-
ties and cities, the railroad had been so consummately
pillaged of its money and resources, and so difficult was
it to raise money in the panic of 1857. that it was forced
into bankruptcy. 30
Xow it was. as his biographic limners express it, that
Sage projected himself into the foreground to " pro-
tect his interests." How he did it they do not tell,
but the court records of the time describe his methods
with considerable plainness of speech if not clearness of
explanation. It appeared that Sage had been all along
;; " In the testimony before the \Yi.-consin Joint SeK-ct Com-
mittee of 1858, Safe's name was not in any way brought out.
It is certain, however, that in 1857 Sage wa- a controlling
owner of the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad. The investi-
gating committee reported this testimony of Premiss Dow, a
sii ckholdcr:
" In August and September, 1857. rumors became very cur-
'ni in Xcw York that va.-t frauds had been committed in the
management of the affairs of the company; thai the funds
raised by the -ale of subscriptions of land grant bonds had
been applied to other purposes than building the road: . . .
thai the ' statement ' of the cnmpany was unreliable, as to the
true condition of the company. Many of the holders of land
:.: : bonds 1 ecame alarmed and sales oi them were made as
low a- twi-my cents on the dollar." (Appendix to Assembly
[ounial. \Vi-consin. 1858. p. 105.) Perhaps Sage bought more
of tin bonds al this lim'
Tin-: SAC,]-: KoirrrxK 39
using dummy directors and agents : tliat is to say. he had
put forward certain men \vlio nominally were the own-
ers and active spirits, while he. under cover, was actu-
ally the controlling owner and moving figure. This fact
came out in numerous suits which were carried to the
Supreme Court of the United States, and it is from
the records of this august court that certain details are
obtained.
FRAUH'LKXT I'.O.VDS .\.\I> FKA ClU 'LFXT SALK.
Sage was virtually the owner of a two million-dollar
third mortgage issued to cover the eastern division of the
La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad, extending from Mil-
waukee to Portage City, or about half the breadth of
Wisconsin. The Supreme Court of the United States
set forth in its statement of the case in 1807 that for
these $2.000.000 in bonds, not more than $280,000 had
been paid in monev. " Indeed," said the Court, "the
actual amount is but a little over $150,000.""'' f>y what
the Court called " a fraudulent arrangement," intended
to cheat the stockholders and the creditors of the road,
thi< third mortgage was given precedence and the prop-
ertv was foreclosed. The Supreme Court records do
not show how Sage got hold <>f his bond-, but they do
spread out that the fraudulent Knid issue was followed
bv a fraudulent foreclosure sale.
$200,000 in money was paid. The remainder of the two
millions was in the 1 hands of either directors or under
their control by a fraudulent arrangement." The Court
denounced the foreclosure a< a sale made bv a fraudulent
.JO HISTORY ()!' Till! GRKAT AMERICAN" F< iRTf XKS
notice iii which the interested parties onlv knew what
was about to happen. r; -
This foreclt - 1 eastern division of the La Cros>e and
Milwaukee Railroad was reorganized as the Milwaukee
and Minnesota Railroad Company, with Russell Sage
as its president. The foreclosure had been applied for
on August 17, 1857. It would seem, therefore, that
Sage had become a heavy bondholder during, or im-
mediately after, the very time when the acts were being
bribed through Congress, and that he was one of the
largest bond creditors at the identical time, or soon after,
the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company had
corrupted the entire State of Wisconsin with $800.000
in bonds as bribes. But the precise date of his becom-
ing connected with the railroad is not altogether clear in
the records. After the foreclosure sale, some of the
stockholders and many of the creditors, comprising firms
which had supplied material for the construction of the
railroad, objected to being cheated. A number of legal
actions ensued : these were also carried to the Supreme
Court of the I nitcd States, and from them additional
facts can be gleaned.
One of these cases considered by this court in 1863
was that of several banking firms representing Sage, in
an action against the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad
Company, the purpose of which >nit clearly was to
swindle the stockholders and judgment creditors. On
the face of the action, it was necessary that Sage's Mil-
waukee .anil Minnesota Railroad ( 'ompany. as the suc-
cessor in part of the original company, should mnke a
"-Wallace's Reports. Supremo Court of tin- I'nited State.-, vi :
4'
defence, but very curiously it made none. There was
something very singular about this omission ; what it was
came out in the intervening application of defrauded
stockholders. The records of the case of I'ronson et al
vs. The La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company
read :
After the lime had expired within which the Milwaukee and
Minnesota Railroad Company ought to have answered. Inn lie-
fore an order had been entered taking the bill against them pro
ci'iijcsso, one J. S. Rockwell, a stockholder of the said com-
pany, presented to the court his petition, charging collusion
between the complainants or their agents, and one Russell Sage,
president of the said Milwaukee and Minnesota Railroad Com-
pany, to secure a foreclosure and sale in their cause ; for the
purpose of extinguishing the rights of the said Milwaukee and
Minnesota Railroad Company, which was alleged to be the
owner of the equity or redemption of the mortgaged premises;
and that the president [Sage] of the last named company, al-
though requested by its stockholders, had declined to make any
defense in its cause/'"
Obviously, for the scheme afoot was to so tangle up
the affairs of the company in legal hocus poctts as to have
a valid ground for absolutely cheating (or as the term
went, "freezing out") the stockholder- and judgment
creditor.-, Four years later, as we have just noted, the
Supreme Court of the I nited State- found it so in decid-
ing another case.
Rockwell was not the only stockholder charging col-
lusion. .Another stockholder, Fleming, presented a peti
tion making a number of charges of which collusion was
mcrrlv one. lie also charged that the mortgage issued
hv ihr La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Companv rcp-
resented whai was popularlv known as "Corruption
42
Bonds " and was gotten up " for the corrupt and fraudu-
lent purpose of disposing of said bonds, or a large part
thereof, in payment of pretended debts to the officers and
agents of said company, or their friends, without any
consideration to be paid therefor." Also, " that a large
part of said bonds were so disposed of and given away
in fraud of its creditors.'' [ ' A The attorney for the com-
plaining stockholders said in summing up the case :
" Men placed to manage corporations for the interest of
the stockholders manage them only for their own. They
become contractors, half ruin the corporation, pay them-
selves with its assets at enormous discounts, then resus-
citate things and are rich in the result." "~ J The Supreme
Court of the United States subsequently set aside the
foreclosure sale on the ground that it was fraudulent,
but Sage, by other means, succeeded in keeping his hold.
These are the authentic, exact legislative and court
records. Entirely different are the facts they reveal
from the phrase going the rounds of the press at Sage's
death couched in this or similar language. " Perhaps the
most noteworthy fact in the accumulation of Mr. Sage's
fortune is the absence of graft." And likewise very dif-
ferent are they from the statements given in the lu-
dicrous " histories " prepared by the railroad corporations
t hem-elves.
\Yhile Sage was foreclosing the eastern division of
La Crossc and Milwaukee Railroad, he was, at the
.me time, foreclosing, by reason of his holdings, an-
>.',her division which likewise became a part of the C'hi-
; - ! Wallace's Reports, etc., ii : -'^7. This is one instance uf
manv more -itch instances clearly revealing the real nature <>t
- 1 "- "ability" italists in "developing the resource? of
thr country.'' "Ability" it wa- <>f its kind, and one wholly used
for plunder ,-Mid per-mal enrichment.
''< Ibid.. J05.
Till': SAG!-: FukTuxi-: 43
cago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad system. Thi>
other division was the Milwaukee and lloricon Railroad,
which was part and parcel of the continuous corrupt
transactions. The "historian" of the Chicago, Mil-
waukee and St. Paul system writes of the episode in this
uninforming way: "The Milwaukee and Horicon Rail-
road, incorporated in 1852, was foreclosed hy Washing-
ton Hunt and Russell Sage in 1863 and by them trans-
ferred to the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul in June,
1863." :;e
The enormous frauds in Wisconsin were only a part of
Sage's activities at this period. At the same time, he
and his fellow capitalists were contiguously carrying
through similar fraudulent operations in Minnesota.
Were it not that occasionally the}- fell to quarreling over
the spoils, and let out secrets in the civil courts, we
should be at a loss to know the precise nature of their
transactions. As it is. certain records of lawsuits sur-
vive to give a fairly clear index of their methods, and
what these were will now be related in an expository out-
line.
"""Outline History of the Chicago. Milwaukee and St. Paul
Railroad Company. Compiled hy the General Passenger De-
partment. iSSS:" 2. The chief attorney for the various rail-
roads merged in tln^ sy-tem was Samuel J. Tilden. who later
posed a< so ^reat a " reformer " in politics, and who was the
Democratic nominee for President of the United States in 1870
It will I". 1 continuously observed that the men nominated hy
both political panic-; for hiuh office, executive, legislative and
judicial, wi-re invariahlv tho-r who had proved their u--rfulre
a- tools, retainers or beneficiaries of the corporate interests.
Witness (iartield and I'laine. implicated in the Credit Mobili -r
>windle, Morton and manv others.
CHAPTER II
MORE DETAILS OF THE SAGE FORTUNE
In the preceding chapter \ve have seen how, by corrup-
tion and fraud. Congress, in 1854. passed an act the
wording of which was so surreptitiously altered as to
give nearly nine hundred thousand acres of public land
in Minnesota direct to the Minnesota and Xorthwe>tern
Railroad company. Composed of a combination of
Eastern and Western capitalists, lobbyists and politicians,
this company proceeded to regale the country with sonor-
ous prospectuses of the great things that it intended to
do in developing the wilderness of the Northwest. Could
the nation doubt the veracity and noble intentions of its
charterers, all solid men of capital ? Was the good
faith of its projectors, headed by that eminent capitalist.
Erastus Corning, of Albany. Xew York, to be ques-
tioned? For once the sweet song failed to charm the
public, which rose in angry protest against the corrup-
tion used, and Congress hastily backslid and repealed thv
act. 1
MOKK 1)LTA[LS ()!' Till-: SACK KURT I ' X L 45
It \va> not often that Congress repealed such corrupt
acts ; when it did so. astonishment \vas general.
GIFTS OF KOTRTELX MILLION' ACRKS.
But the good behavior of Congress was of the briefest
duration; a mere ebullition serving" duty as something
with which to blind the nation. The milling of land-
grant bills went on busily; the repealing of that one
particular act produced an effect which distracted public
attention and which allowed the tmscrutinized passage of
many other acts. Among these were measures giving
six millions of acres of public lands eventually to ex-
pand into fourteen millions in all -to the Territory of
Minnesota ('soon to become a State) for the benefit of
railroad corporations. The proprieties of the usual form
of procedure were now scrupulously observed ; the lands
were donated to the individual States, to be granted by
them to railroad companies. Congress had learned its
lesson of the necessity of sticking to outward forms;
henceforth in the case of State grants the briberv had to
be dually done, part at Washington and part at the
various State capitals.
During the session of 1857 a modest little bill went
gurgling through, tranquilly making the round- of the
committees and becoming a law. At that precise time
main' another act was being dragged out to daylight as
having been passed by bribery, but this especial bill
wended its way unobtrusively, entirely shielded from the
searching blaze of publicity. It was an act incorporating
the Minnesota and Pacific Railway Company to build
a line from St. Paul to St. Anthony's Palls (now the
city of Minneapolis) and authorizing various extension^
in different direction-.
4<> .HISTORY OP THK GRKAT AMKRICAX FORTUNES
The second part of the program was as successfully
accomplished as the first. The Minnesota Legislature
was applied to for the wherewithal to carry this enter-
prising project into execution, and most generously did
it respond. Sundry legislative acts gave to the railroad
company a grant of ten sections to the mile, six hun-
dred and forty acres to the section, the title to succes-
sive grants to vest in the company as fast as every twenty
miles were completed. But these were not the only
benefactions. In dulcet appeals the company informed
the citizens of the State that it needed cash also. Many
of these aforesaid citizens, hardy pioneers with a rough
way of looking at aft airs, were not overcome with emo-
tion at reading these tender appeals. They thought that
the land grant was quite enough of an encouragement.
I kit the Minnesota Legislature " during the corrupt ad-
ministration of Governor Sibley," as contemporary
writers in Minnesota put it was of an extremely sus-
ceptible nature, incapable of refusing a request.- An act
was passed authorizing a 85,000,000 issue of bonds
called the "Minnesota State Railroad Bonds " to be
handed over to the railroad companies in that State.
Xot all of this amount was issued ; the total sum turned
over to the railroad companies under this special act was
about $2,750.000. Large additional sums of money were
then contributed by counties and municipalities, and a
" smart business " was done in persuading farmers and
merchants to invest their money in the railroad.
Whose master mind \vas behind all of thi^ Russell
'-'Legislative corruption was almost continuous "The nu-
merous charters," complained (lovcrnor YV. A. (inrnian to the
Minnesota Legislature, in 185(1. "already granud in Minnesota
for ferries, lumbering, manufacturing, mining, etc., i^ enough to
arouse your vigilance on ibis subject." Many of tho-e char
UTS," he pointed out, "r:n-t become sources of immense revenue
to the corporators." Minnesota Council Journal, 1856:91.
MURK DETAILS OK Till' SAC]-: I-OUTI XI _|~
Sage's. Rarely did lit 1 appear loo prominently in the
foreground, but he was the soft-treading mail who, as
was later revealed, chiefly profited from the transaction
of the .Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company. After
getting the charter, franchises, rights, land grants, fund-
and exemptions what did he and his partners next do?
Valiantly and seductively had they argued for induce-
ments enough to make it possible- for them to open up
the primitive Xorthwest. T>ut the moment that the pri-
mary object was obtained of securing these diverse " in-
ducements." talk ceased and the work of filling their
capacious pockets began with a grim and silent earnest -
ness.
First, in the order of the day, came the customary
freebooting organization of a construction company, com-
posed of the identical men in the railroad corporation.
They made contracts with themselves calling' for ex-
orbitant payments; and then, in addition to these great
cribbings, the}' fraudulently awarded themselves bonds in
return for pretended services. Along with, these em-
bezzlements they placidly set about to cheat the small
bondholders and stockholders, and to fleece the creditors
who furnished them with necessarv supplies and equip-
ment.
The thefts were carried on with such rapid assiduity
that in about a year after the compam had been char-
tered, its treasury had become a vacancv, and the rail-
road was plunged into insolvency and. in 1^5^. lore-
closed. Who bought it in: The srltsame men who
had looted it; as the chiefs of the construction com-
pany thev had taken care to fortify themselves with
enough bonds to put them in the legal* position oi ma-
jority creditors. Some of them, such as Sage, did their
work generally through dummies; others appeared in
[lie open. They might complain, as they did, that the
cause of the company's failure was the difficulty in rais-
ing money during the panic of 1857; but this was a
flimsy, although plausible, excuse.
Presently a unique development turned up. They
caused the railroad corporation to be dubbed with two
new names; by an act slipped through the Minnesota
Legislature, the Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Com-
pany was reorganized into two divisions, one called the
St. Paul and Pacific, the other the First Division of the
St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company.
Why these separate titles for a single railroad proj-
ect? Why this confusing arrangement? The reason
became obvious a little later. It was an adroit artifice
to entrench them in a strong legal vantage to loot and
bankrupt the road still further; the same coterie, in
reality, directed both companies, and as constructors
of a railroad which they themselves directed, they could
hand over to themselves bonds making them unassail-
able creditors of the whole line. An astute piece of in-
genuity ; who.-c was the deft brain that conceived the
device? It was that of the "great reformer." that
evangel of ''pure and uncorrupted Democracy " Sam-
uel |. Tilden. lie wove his legal tangles so well, so very,
very well, that the small bondholders and the manu-
facturer- who had furni-hed materials, found themselves
before long entirely cheated out of their claim-, and with
no chance of ! c^l rerlref 5.
One of these bondholders. Edward C. TTopkin-. with a
wonderful trr ' in the equity of law. bestirred himself
to -ee vvheth; . t'ld not collect on -ome coupons of
bond- that Iv o\vred <'. the old Mirme-otn and Pacific
Railroad. \\ as not (lie St. I'aul and 1'acilic, he claimed,
the successor of the original company, and. therein
bound to respect, and pay, its debts? Was it not a case
ot an old corporation acting under a new name? Th
case came up for trial at St. Paul in the I nited Stai. -
Circuit Court. The eminent and erudite judge was ]ivh:i
F. Dillon the very Dillon, fittingly enough, who sub-
sequently left the bench to become pleader for corpora-
tions in which. ( lould and Sage were the principal direct-
ing spirits.
Judge Dillon handed down some choice bolts of law
which served sufficient notice on other small fry of cred-
itors as to what they could expect. The scope of his
decision was superbly direct; he held that when the Leg-
islature of Minnesota changed the name of the company
in 1862 it created an entirely new corporation which
could not be held responsible for the debts of the old.
Hopkins' suit was ejected from the court, and both lie
and the other creditors were left to ponder in unbroken
leisure upon the mysterious beauties of the law."
But if the company had a new name or, rather, two
new names it retained all of the franchises, privileges
and immunities of the old corporation so ran the de-
cision. From its debts it was relieved; in all its assets
and possessions it was secured. There was the great and
important point: name- were but a serviceable mask un-
der cover of which the "insiders" could defraud the
lesser capitalists. To note the plaintive squeaks of
these outraged victims was a lesson of itself they who
\\ere only too eager to share in the fruits of the bribing
of public bodies, the wrestling of public resources and
the general despoliation of a whole people. Their fine
moral instincts were quickened only when the}- were
defrauded, and then their virtuous indignation was un-
bounded.
HUGE SriiSIDlKS STOLEN*.
\\ hile the projectors were cheating out this crowd of
dupes what were they doing with the huge subsidies
that they had received in one form or another with which
to build the railroad ? The money had certainly van-
ished. \Yhere? Little of railroad construction was
there to show for the alleged expenditure except some
hundred miles of graded prairie. Even the short stretch
of ten miles of main line from St. Paul to Minneapolis
had not been put into operation by 1862 as required by
law. \Yhy not? The rapidity with which such fortunes
as Sage's were being amassed was the answer. The
money was stolen.
When the professional corrupters who had looted this
railroad had originally applied to Congress and to Min-
nesota for gifts of land and money, they had represented
themselves as capitalist- having " ample resources " with
which to carry on the project. All that they needed, was
their plea, was State encouragement in some form, be-
cause " the undertaking was so expensive." After they
had robbed the railroad into bankruptcy, a special com-
mittee of the Minnesota Senate began to investigate their
antecedents and methods. " The sequel." it reported,
" demonstrated that the companies had no ca^h capital at
command, and scarcely credit sufficient to insure prompt
location of their line- of road." 4 The committee went
4 Report of Special Committee on Railroads and Railroad
dram-. February .3, 1860. Minnesota Senate Journal 1850-60:
MORI-: DKTAI I,S OK T 1 1 K SACK K( WIV N !: 5!
So far as your committee can discover, the companies, >incc
the passage of the loan amendment, have not furnished one
dollar of capital to aid in carrying on their gigantic enterprise.
They have sold and hypothecated large portions of the-e bonds
at a ruinous discount. They have paid extravagant salaries \.>
incompetent or inefficient officers. With the exception of ab air
fifty miles of well-built superstructure incomplete, fragme 1 .-
tary and disjointed portions of grading, costing on the average
less than three thousand dollars per mile are all that these
companies can show in return for the munificent issue of bonds
made to them by the State. 5
A vivid picture this gives of the original " construct-
ive ability" of the capitalists an ability conspicuously
displayed in perpetrating the most enormous frauds.
But where in the United Stales was it not likewise so?
The successive events now following' in the history of
this company are dryly incorporated in the records of
the case of John S. Kennedy and Company vs. the St.
Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, including the First
Division, the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, Rus-
sell Sage, Samuel J . Tilden, et al. 6 Although the full de-
tails are not by any means spread out in these records,
some authentic particulars can. at any rate, be gleaned.
By 187 r Sage and his associates had completed certain
of the railroad extensions, and had mortgaged them for
a total of $13,380,000. Nearly all of this money had
been advanced by banking houses in Holland. But sixty
miles of main line were still in an uncompleted state, and
the people of the State were getting dangerously curious
to know why. Millions of dollars had disappeared; all
of the gifts in land and money made to the company
had been sunk thus far in building only some discon-
nected and semi-worthless sections of the projected rail-
road. J hr directors had 10 make a move; tliey did so In
evolving a new scheme for bleeding the too eager and
credulous Holland capitalist.-.
And this is what they did : A group of men com-
prising the First Division of the St. Paul and Pacific,
corporatively met and issued bonds for 815.000.000.
The same men, or their tools, then met as directors of the
St. Paul and Pacific tit is hard to keep these fine dis-
tinctions in mind ) and mortgaged the right-, franchises,
and property, including the land grant-, to the First
Division for ninety-nine years. Then the First Division
corporation, a- construction company, bound itself to
i ; !ele the railroad extensions before .March I. 1873,
on which date, by a recent legislative enactment, the land
grant was to be forfeited in case the extensions were
not built.
'i he terms of the mortgage were explicit and entic-
ing. The whole of the 815,000.000 was to be applied to
building the extensions. On the strength of this agree-
ment about SS.ooo.ooc) more was rai-ed in Holland in
1871. Put there was one bit of information the Sage
e carefullv kept from the Holland capitalists. They
did not tell the Hollanders that a large part of the money
raised was to be applied to the main line, in violation of
the express term.- of the mortgage. 7
What was done with the S8.ooo.ooo rai-ed in Holland?
Th.i- . ' ieh the borrowers swore on -olemn oath to
.MOKI: i>i:i. \ii.s oi-' r:n. SACK IO^TCNK -i
die 1 !' 'llauders, was to be used entirely for constructing
the extension lines, was immediately distributed in vari-
ous plundering \vavs. About 83.000,000 of it was frau !-
nlently diverted t<.) the completion of the main line; large
Minis wore grabbed to pay interest on the main line
mortgage bonds, and other millions were used for what :
For the purchase of iron material and the payment of
contractors for work on the extension line. And who
sold the iron? The First Division Company. The op-
eration was simple; Sage, etc., sold to themselves the
rails, and charged the account against the money ad-
vance,! by the Dutch capitalists. 8
Those were, indeed, halcyon times of bold graft; the
robbery was so large and openhanded that naturally
enot:;. ! 'h the First Division, the treasury of which was
sacked as fast as it was tilled, went into insolvency in
1872. In less than a year more than 8.000,000 had been
''scattered''; we -hould say, concentrated, for the great
bulk of it went into the pockets of a few, and remained
there. Xor was this all. "When the First Division sus-
pended work in October, 1872, it owed its contractors
subordinate firm- who reallv did the constructing work
1 reduced this debt
Tricked and stripped, the Dutch capitalist- now full)
(] their predicament; the monev that tlu-v had
kir.ned from native peoples at home, had been plucked
from them. Mow could ths recover it ? Thev took the
only blep that they could possibly take, which was to
apply for a receiver. Hence the suit brought by John
S. Kennedy and Company, acting for them and for
oilier bondholders. In cold legal phraseology they set
forth their plaint; they had been lied to and defrauded.
'They I the bondholders] also claim," reads the formal
court statement, " that by reason of the insolvency of said
First Division Company, and of various fraudulent and
improper acts of its managing officers which are not
here recited because the court does not deem it material
to the real merits of the application that a receiver
should be appointed," etc., etc.
Judge Dillon concurred that a receiver should be ap-
pointed. L'rgent reasons, he said, compelled it. The com-
pany had a great land grant valued at S6 an acre; and
this was the only adequate security for the $15,000,000
mortgage. I'ut it happened that these land-, or a large
part of them, were to be forfeited if certain extensions
were not completed bv a certain time. It was imperative.
Dillon said, to save that land grant, and as the directors
of the road admitted that there was no money in the
treasury, it was to the best interests of the bondholders
to have a receiver appointed. The receiver would have
authority to complete the extensions. Dillon, thereupon,
on September i, 1875, appointed one Jesse P. Farley a<
receiver.
The next developments were revealed in the -econd
-"it of John S. Kenned\- and Company against the St.
Paul and Pacific Railroad. 10
! 'lJill<in'- f'iro'iil Court Report-, 1879-80. v: 451-459.
'hiii ' Circuit Court Reports 1879-80, v: 519-536. Ken-
' . iiov.-ever, lift rayed the- inu-rf-.t.s of tlv Dim-h -un-khold
. i-n'lu'k'fl with the rc-ceivi-T. an*! made a fraudulent .-irrange-
l>y 'viiich IK- i KIT;- i-dy ) profited i/normously. Kennedy
my of tlu- millions, the dunation nf ,-,r.mc of
Farley, it seems, made a great ado about the construct-
ing work he was doing, but as a matter of fact, he spent
only about ,$100,000 in the work of constructing and re-
pair. 11 However, he kept up the pretense enough lo
save for a time that part of ihe land tyrant threatened
with forfeiture. lUit by 1878 the people of Minnesota
were again ablaze. Twenty-one years had passed since
the company had been chartered; it had received v;ist
subsidies in mouev and land not only from the Xational
( Government, the State, cities and counties, but from in-
dividuals. All along its route, both completed and pro-
jected, farmers and merchants had subscribed for its
stock, only, they found, to hold worthless bits of paper
which produced neither railroad nor returns. The com-
pany had looted itself twice into insolvency ; it had, by
repeated sleight-of-hand process, defrauded not only na-
tive capitalists, farmers and merchants, but it had done
away with the many millions poured in by the Dutch
capitalists.
TIIK LKC.ISLATURK WAKES fl>.
Xow it was still deep in bankruptcy. The Legislature
could not hold out against this overwhelming expression
of popular indignation. On March <j, 1878. it passed
an act declaring that unless a specified number of mile-
.-hould be built bv certain dates, then the uncompleted
portions, togaher with the land grant-, rights, franchise-.
immunities and appertaining propertv " shall at once be
and become absolutely forfeited to the Stale of Minne-
soia, without nnv act or cercmonv whatsoever. 1 -
a " iiiv.'it philnnihro
50 HISTORY OK THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
It was a drastic law. and some action had to be taken
at once, if the State was to be thwarted. \Yho would
furnish the money necessary to build the uncompleted
sections, and thus prevent the forfeiture of franchises
and land grants? Sage and others, after getting out of
the road all the plunder that they could see in sight,
had retired to use the proceeds of that piracy in repeat-
ing their transactions in other directions. The railroad
itself was in a deplorably bad shape, thoroughly disor-
ganized, and very dangerous to travel on. It had little
equipment and few stations or depots worth considering.
This was the " splendid railroad system " that Sage and
his clique were to build ; this was the result of their
" vast constructive ability!" How much Sage took out
of the project in spoils we are unable to say; there is no
record stating the sum either absolutely or approxi-
mately ; it amounted, most certainly, to many millions of
dollars.
With forfeiture of much of the possessions and many
of the rights of the railroad in imminent danger, four
men, who became noteworthy among the great capital-
ists of our time, stepped forward to get control of the
St. Paul and Pacific system. These were James J. Hill,
yclept the " Jay Gould of the Xorthwest," and three other
Canadians, two of whom attained elevation to the British
peerage. How they secured control, and what they did
thereafter, forms a story not connected with the Sage
fortune: it will be found in full in the chapter on the
I lii'i fortune.
Meanwhile Sage had met Gould in Troy, and had re-
moved to Xew York city. ' The two men." says the ef-
fr ive biographer heretofore quoted, "made nn impres-
-iun upon each other, which afterward deepened into a
JAMES J. HILL.
The Railroad Magnate of Minnesota.
MOKK DLTA1LS UK 'I' 1 1 K
57
friendship famous in financial hi>tory." Famous or in
famous whichever way you prefer to view it. A val-
uable working pair the twain made ; Sage, crafty, som-
ber and reclusive ; Gould supplying the public audacity :
both equal in inscrutable wiles and stratagems. The one
overcautious, the other overreckless, each counterbal-
ancing the other. A prodigious respect Gould learned to
entertain for Sage ; the one associate was Sage whom
Gould could not overreach or fleece.
Subsequently and appropriately enough, Sage hied
himself to Xew York city early in the course of the Civil
War. There, in Wall street, was the headquarters of
many of the railroad corporations which had been, and
were, bribing and plundering. The office of the
LaCrosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company, for in-
stance, was there ; whoever might be the actual physical
builders of the railroads, the owners were either \\ all
street men or kindred capitalists - men who by some
species of fraud or theft had pushed themselves into con-
trol.
And there also in Xew York was the scene of the
greatest activity in the current widespread despoliation ;
from there radiated the plans and plots which later re-
solved themselves into colossal swindles. Had the cen-
ter of this deviltry been elsewhere, there Sage and all
the others of the brood indubitably would have flown.
A money lender on a great scale Sage became; he in-
vented a special svstem of tiMirv -the "put" and
"call" system, the intricacies *.>\ which we shall not at-
tempt to describe. N'uw cmsld be >een what he \vu^
cluing with the million.-, that he was stealing in Wiscon-
sin and Minnesota. 1 " Ordinarily he would loan money
at high enough rates, but in times of panic and Wall
street "squeezes" he demanded -and received as
much as two per cent, a day or sixty per cent, a month.
Friends or enemies, it did not matter ; all alike had to
pay the enormous interest that he exacted if they de-
sired a supply of ready money (which he always kept
on hand ) and thus save themselves from defaulting on
contracts, and so going into bankruptcy. lie was one of
that eminent constellation of patriots who hoarded gold
when it was most needed to carry on the Civil War, and
refused to loan it except at the most incredibly extor-
tionate rates.
At this time little attention was given in the East to
railroad operations in the West; the newspapers were
almost wholly filled with reports of events of the great
Civil War. Few knew of the gigantic thefts and frauds
that Sage was carrying on out in the Xorthwest ; and
when he suddenly became known as a multimillionaire,
glowing accounts were published of him as a wonderful
financier. This praise was always modified, of course.
in And also in Io\va. in the railroads in which State he was
extensively concerned. The capitalist.-, owning the Sioux City
and St. Paul Railroad had caused it to be built in such a zig-
zag fashion that they could fraudulently grab even larger land
trants than the accommodating acts of Congress intended. By
i dging this railroad in O.-ceoia, Dickin-on and O'Brien Countie-,
>\va, this company made claim to iSo. iS4.54 extra acre- of public
;and in those countie-, and prevailed upon the State officials
railroad company called the McGregor \Ye~teni, and had con-
structed his. line through thi> very territory. He demanded a
-hare of those iSrj.ooo acres, and, upon refusal, sued the St.
I'.'iul and Pacific Railroad Company. The case finally came up
in the United Stat<-~ Circuit Com-! in lo\va, on January 20, iXXj,
when Judge Love amiably decided, with tine judicial impartial-
: y, tl . f the two - . ' was entitled to an undivided
. 'and in depute. Fc'K-ral Reporter, x : 435 : 450.
MORI'; UKTA1LS Ol-' "I' LIP: SAdK |-'<)KTl'M-; 5<j
by derision of his extraordinary stinginess, and detesta-
tion of his hard qualities. But there were those who
had been associated with him who smiled at the stories
of his " wizard-like " performances in heaping up mil-
lions ; they knew what his attributed necromancy really
was; of the series of briberies, frauds and thefts. The
particulars of at least one more transaction in which he
was engaged at this time are accessible, however much
many of his other dealings are beyond historical reach.
THE PACIFIC MAIL Sl'lJSIDY.
One of the many corporations in which Sage became a
large stockholder was the Pacific Mail Steamship Com-
pany. This corporation, as we have noted in the Yan-
derbilt chapters, long corrupted Congress to get preda-
tory mail subsidies from the Government. By an addi-
tional act passed by Congress on February i/. 1865, it
received another heavy Government subsidy for carrying
the mails between San Francisco and Asia via Hono-
lulu.
The booty was so rich that different factions of capi-
talists continually fought one another to get control of
the company's treasury. We find from law suit records
that in 1867 that fine, old, massively respectable banking
firm of Brown Brothers and Company was one of the
heaviest stockholders. In its own name, and acting for
authorizing parties, it held 77.831; shares of a total of
the Pacific Mail Steamship Company'.- joo.ooo shares of
capital .-took.
Like the firm of Phelps. Dodge and Company, the
hanking firm of Brown Broihers and Company was pre-
eminently repined (as ii has been since] to be one
<>!~ the " old-fa-hioned firms" of "strict integrity." To
f>o HISTORY o
be sure, ii officially knew nothing of the subsidy bribing
incessantly going on ; owners of enterprises must culti-
vate ignorance of such embarrassing detail--. And could
it be, as William Swinton, a noted writer, charged in a
pamphlet, that the "eminently respectable" Alexander
llrown and his associates were (in our modern phrase-
ology i grafting on the very company in which they were
stockholders ? Swinton charged that they held a con-
trolling lien which amounted to ownership on boiler, iron
and other factories which supplied the equipment of the
Pacific Mail Steamship Company's line. A faction in
December. iXf~, was seeking hard to dislodge them, and
they were successfully fighting back. A pretty mess it
made in the courts.
Finding that Congix-ss was as ever in the bargaining
mood, the owners of this line opened fresh negotiations,
and. with such brilliant success, that another act was
passed in 1872 granting an additional mail subsidy of
S5OO.OOO a year for ten years. 'I lie subsidy plunder was
now so much larger than before that the contest for its
possession, or rather its handling, precipitated a still
more violent ro\\- among its owners. With some ulterior
end in view. Le (irand Lockwood, one of its stockholders,
publicly charged that bribery had been u-ed to get the
act through Congress; Lockwood was certainly not
prompted bv moral motives; he had been a large bene-
ficiary oi the Credit Mobilier swindle. The House of
Representatives took on a look of pained and injured
surprise, bristled up with indignation, and on February
jo, 1^73. ordered the Wav-, and Mean- Commitiee I
vestigate.
Congress did not, nf course, cxpec! that ihr iu\v-ti ;:
ti'>n would realh <!i-rl-r nnv damaging facts; ii ua-
-anguinely anticipated that the inquiry could easily be
The committee was not elated at the testimony: it
found itself compelled to report that "a sum of nearly
one million dollars appears to have been disbursed in
some sort of connection with the passage of the act,"
and " that the results of the evidence are that 8565,000
was paid out to lohbvists ; the disposition of the remain-
ing $335,OOO remains in doubt upon the evidence pre-
sented." ir ' Russell Sage was president of the Pacific
Mail Steamship Omipanv at this time ; he was haled
up to testify, which lie did with a very aggrieved air.
He denied having been connected with the company at
the time that the subsidy was granted, and avowed that
he knew nothing of the alleged bribery. If we are to
accept his word that he was not concerned in the brib-
ery a doubtful acceptation, since in other matter-
he was a proved perjurer 1G then what he probably had
done was to wait until after the $5,000.000 subsidy had
been granted, and then had manipulated matters to get
in control himself. Xo doubt he knew full well of the
bribery, and it is a possible supposition that he had urged
14 House Report Xo. 269. Forty-third Congress. Second Ses-
sion. 1874-75, ii : xvii. Henry Clews, that exalted hanker an?!
moralizer, wa> one of the directors (luring tin's period.
'"' Ihid., xviii.
"' " A proved perjurer." l ; or years Sage swore that his tax
ahle per-onal property did not exceed $2.000.000, and even lhi<
amount he sought to have reduced or wiped oft' the tax books.
After his death the Xe\v York City Tax Ik-part mem prepared
to assess taxes on at least ?.-o,ooo.fK.o personal property inherited
hy his widow, hut the amount of r>- segment was greatly re-
duced when the executor of hi- will -uhmitted an affidavit claim-
ing that $\o.cx}i.).c.(;c> of th.e Sage cash was invested in non-taxahk'
Lockwood to make the charges, in order to raise a pub-
lic slew, and discredit and overthrow the clique in
power.
At all events, whatever the ins and outs, there was
the Pacific Mail Steamship Company with its large sub-
sidies obtained by bribery, and Sage the head of it all in
1873. So far as the identity of bribers and bribed was
concerned, the committee professed to know nothing.
One lobbyist. Richard 1'.. [nvin, testified that he had
paid out .^750,000 to "ciluT persons," 17 but who those
persons were the committee said that it did not know;
it had '' exhausted every resource " in trying to find out,
but in vain. As usual, it was the "' unregulated lobby "
which was to be blamed and which should be purged.
So much for Sage's career up to the time when he
and Gould conjoined in the Union Pacific manipulation
and other transactions. What they and other capitalists
associated with them did in these operations will now be
related.
17 I louse Report, No. 269, etc., 1874-75, ii : I2 3-
CHAPTER III
THE GOULD FORTUNE RESUMED
When haled in 1887 before that inquisitorial govern-
mental body, the Pacific Railway Commission, Jay Gould
vouchsafed little information; such as was elicited from
him was of the most meager character. He said that he
had become the owner of a controlling interest in the
Union Pacific Railroad Company in 1873 by the pur-
chase of fine hundred thousand shares, and that these
holdings were subsequently increased to two hundred
thousand shares. 1 Sage testified that he himself had
begun buying Union Pacific stock in 1868 or i<8n~<).'-' As
soon as the grasp of these men and their associates was
assured, their industriousness began. Without any in-
termediate ceremony two hundred thousand shares of
stock were forthwith issued, all certificates of nothing
else than their self-arrogated power of present and fu-
ture exploitation.
This manufacture, without any interference from law,
of additional titles of ownership, was only one of their
numerous and conterminous activities. Their most plas-
tic and successful plan, by which thev were enabled to
compound loot on a most magnificent scale, was that of
buying in. as individuals, various railroads, and then
-elling them at exorbitant price- to the Union Pacific
Railroad Company, which corporatively they controlled.
64 HI:
With its extraordinary opportunities for self-enrich
mcnt on a great scale, this plan \vas one commonly prac-
ticed by the puissant capitalists of the times. It had not
In any means originated with Gould and Sage : other
railroad capitalists had richly profited bv it; so thor-
oughly has it commended itself as one of the simplest
and most effective mean.- of transferring wealth, that a
long -uccession of magnates have consecutively availed
of it to this very dav. Three generations of Yander-
bilt- have repeatedly demonstrated its value; those illus-
trious generalissimos of the ranks of wealth. J. Pierpont
Morgan and I 7 .. II. llarriman. have been two more of the
radiant cluster who have proved it- enduring worth.
I5y this fraudulent process, incalculable sum- of money,
mounting into the hundreds of millions, have been seized
with facility. So pregnant with spoils has it been that
even the I nited States Industrial Commission of 1901,
distinguished for its easy-going conventions and acquies-
cent attitude, could not forbear saying in its mild, defer-
ential way of transactions in which buyer and seller were
the same parties : " The possibilities of fraudulent
profit- are something enormous under such condition?.
Kormerlv transactions of this kind were often enected
bv individuals who represented another person, or by
families who were dominant influences in the directorate.
\\iih the enormous increase both in number
and magnitude of such Iran-actions, the capital required
now exceeds the actual investment capacity of any except
a few great fortunes." :;
Reduced to simple language tin's is authoritative con-
firmation of the truism that none but the mighty rich
have the means to engage in a great campaign of theft.
Yet to focus attention upon the frauds of these particular
capitalists, without inquiring into the good work which
at bottom they were doing, would be grievously one-
sided and misleading. Notwithstanding their prodigious
frauds, Vanderbilt and Gould and all the other masterful
capitalists were, without being conscious of it, perform-
ing a great evolutionary service of the highest impor-
tance. It was they who were among the leaders in con-
solidating and centralizing transportation and industrial
utilities ; in effacing the old wasteful competition and the
warfare of the little capitalists ; and in establishing an
era of systematic, concentrated private control. It was
done despite statutory law- and judicial decisions, in spite
of every obstacle, for it had to be done ; it was an
inevitable stage of progress preceding further stages. In
doing it, however, the great barons were prompted by
selfish greed only ; they fixed their own price, a colossal
price, taxing the producer to pay whatever toll they de-
manded. *
THE PLUNDERING OF RAILROAD SYSTEMS.
66
sold to themselves as directors of the Union Pacific,
was the Kansas Pacific. This line, about three hundred
and ninety- four miles in length, was another of the many
railroads the history of which was replete with unbroken
corruption. Its chief assets were an issue of Govern-
ment bonds, and a land grant of three million acres in
Kansas and Colorado.
From the very granting of the charter the corruption
was so well established that none but the densely obtuse
could be ignorant of it. But what mattered the means
used ? The greater the corruption, the more certainty
was there that the ensuing privileges, powers and profits
would be all the richer. And the more attractive the
prospects, the more eager in their cupidity were the
luminaries of the financial world to thrust in a hand.
Eminent bankers sharply competed to participate in the
financing of the project ; the floating of the Kansas Pa-
cific loan was finally awarded to two banking firm-.
One of these was Dabney. Morgan and Co., of which
J. Pierpont Morgan was a member, and the other the
house of Morris K. Jesup and Co.. the head of which sub-
sequently managed to become enrolled among the gal-
axy of glorified philanthropists. r> In their advertisements
in ]86(> the-e bankers glowingly descanted upon the
splendid land grant of the Kansas Pacific a grant,
which thev assured all intending investors, -would be more
than sufficient ->ecuritv for loans.
P>ut the usual culmination came. The Kansas and
'acific project was no exception to ihe invariable ex-
TI1K liOL'LU KOU i ( X I. Kl
pericnce in railroad affair-. It was assiduously plun-
dered by the men on top of the heap, and the following
of petty investors were neatly cheated out. Obviously.
stripped as it was, the market value of its stock sunk to
an insignificant point. Gould had been waiting for pre-
cisely this opportunity, but he did not avail himself
of it before he had put through a sort of blackmailing
scheme bv which he could all the more effectually force
the Kansas Pacific into his ownership.
With a loquacity that ought to have aroused keen
suspicion, he proclaimed his purpose to break down the
monopoly held by the Kansas Pacific; once more he
posed as a middle-class benefactor. Thereupon he be-
gan, or, rather, ordered, the building of a railroad in
Colorado which trenched competitively upon part of the
very territory the Kansas Pacific owners regarded as
their own assured domain. Gould's scheme worked to
perfection; Kansas Pacific stock was forced lower still,
and its affrighted owners were speedily compelled to
come to terms. Xo sooner had Gould obtained posses-
sion of the Kansas Pacific, and consolidated it with the
Union Pacific, than he at once abandoned the. Colorado
Railroad. 8
Just how much of Kansas Pacific "Railroad stock
Gould, Sage and Dillon respectively secured is not clear,
but the amount of booty that they collective! v took in by
the fraudulent process of selling this railroad and oilier
railroads to themselves as masters of the Union Pacific, i-
quite clear. Xo mean operation was it -- something mas-
sive was there about it such as might evoke a wonder-
ing admiration on the part of a society wherein great
thefts were placed in an exalted category.
In tlie Higgling exchange of stacks ami bonds and the
C>8 HISTORY OF Till-: GRKAT AMIiRU'AX FORTUNES
fraudulent diversion of funds, they stole (the Govern-
ment termed it "misappropriated") more than $20,000,-
ooo in the Kansas Pacific, the Denver, South Park and
Pacific, and other consolidations alone. From the vol-
umes of the Pacific Railway Commission's report and
investigation, certain definite facts are ascertainahle.
Both the majority report, that of Commissioners Littler
and Anderson, and the minority report of Commissioner
Pattison, set forth that the frauds of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company, under the direction of Gould, Sage
and Dillon, were truly gigantic.
Millions of acres of puhlic land were stolen outright.
Not less than seven million acres were sold without any
patent from the Government. 7 Coal lands of inestima-
ble value were fraudulently seized. 8 Millions of dollars
were fraudulently shuf.\'d from one corporation to an-
other. The stock of the Union Pacific was inflated from
838,000,000 to $50,000.000, the bonded indebtedness from
$88,000,000 to $[26,000.000, and sundry other in-
debtedness from about $4,000.000 to nearly $10.000.000.
The majority report referred '' to the lavish and reckless
distribution of the assets of the company in dividends "
and expressed sharp curiosity as to why the Union Pa-
cific Railroad Company, although doing a large and
profitable business, " found itself early in 1884 on the
verge of bankruptcy."
While these huge stealings were going on. and after
a ( lovernment action for " misappropriation of assets "
had been begun, Gould and his accomplices took steps to
grant themselves immunity from legal consequences.
' It appears," says the majority report. '' that, while this
litigation was pending, certain proceedings were taken
THI-: r.ori.D FOKTI XK KKSI .MI:D b'-j
by the directors whereby by their own acts and votes
they undertook to release themselves from any obliga-
tions or liabilities to the company."
FORTY MILLION DOLLARS GOL'LI)'s SHARK.
The minority report was even severer and more
searching". It set forth that the Union Pacific and the
Kansas Pacific had received about 835,000,000 in ad-
vances from the Government, little of which had been
paid back, and that up to 1887 the sum of $136.314.-
010.73 ''had been dissipated" by the directors of tlK.-e
two railroads/' Fully $84.000.000 of watered stock had
been issued. " The Union Pacific Company." the mi-
nority report went on. " has received $176.294.793.53
in surplus earnings and land sales during eighteen years,
and if its stock had been fully paid, as Congress required
that it should be. and as its officers certified under oath
that it was, nearly all of that money would be applicable
to-day to the payment of the Government debt. The
company has paid out $28.650.770 in dividends, and $82.-
742,850 in interest on bonds, nearly all of which wa-
distributed to shareholders without consideration. !'
ha> sunk over 810,000,000 in Denver. South Park an - :
Pacific; it paid out 810.000,000 to Jay Gould and his
associates for branch lines and other investments which
were worthless." . . . Commissioner Pattison esti-
mated that lav Gould's personal profit from hi> manipu-
lation of the I'nion Pacific amounted to probably 840.-
(K)O.OOO. 10
A large part of the sum that Pattison included in his
estimate of the total theft from the origin of the Union
7O HISTORY OL' TliK GREAT AMERICAN' FORTUNES
J 'acific Railroad was, as \ve have seen, stolen by Gould's
predecessors in the Credit Mobilier swindle.
Inasmuch as technical financial terms often present
mystifying difficulties to the unaccustomed, a definition
of stocks and bonds may not here be out of place; the
more appropriately so since it will explain how the
manipulators of railroad and other property constituted
themselves both shareholders and creditors.
If they desired a railroad to be on a paying basis, they,
as stockholders, took its dividends ; if it suited their
ulterior purposes to bankrupt it, they, as bondholders,
could foreclose and buy it back at a bargain price. In
the phrase of the street, they could '' play both ends
against the middle." Bonds and stocks, although both
classed as capital, differ in certain salient respects.
[kinds are certificates of indebtedness theoretically issued
to those who have made loans to a corporation, and can
be effaced upon payment of the principal. Stocks, on
the other hand, are certificates of ownership theoretical!}
issued to investors : by their nature they are in law per-
petual. In brief, then, the stockholders are the owner-
of a corporation ; the bondholders its creditors.
The query can here naturallv be expected : \Yliy was
Gould not prosecuted for his male-factions? How wa>
it possible for him to have carried through his immense
thefts without some visitation of criminal proceedings?
So long as he robbed the people, the great plodding, pow-
erles- multitude, without any real representation in po-
litical office, it could be understood that his license would
plundered his own class as well ; outraged, betrayed and
pillaged his own associates ; they were men of power ;
why did not they invoke the terrors of criminal law J .
\Vell, some of them did. 15ut it profited them no more'
than it did his opponents in his famous Erie steal-.
Threatened with jail several times, Could easily con-
trived to keep out of it. as did his similars in every great
capitalist fraud. An indictment found against him on
May 13, 1879. by the (irand ]ury of Monmouth County.
Xe\v Jersey, for alleged fraudulent transactions, did not
trouble him in the least. The charge in this case was
made by the Lehigh Car Manufacturing Company that it
had supplied cars to him on false representations; that
it had agreed to accept as payment first-mortgage bonds
of the Xew Jersey Central Railroad, only to discover,
when too late, that these bonds were spurious " consolida-
tion bonds " representing a consolidation that was never
made.
Out of this indictment Could somehow wriggled, and
nine years later lie was as successful in snuffing out an-
other case of criminal proceedings.
This was in 1888; powerful adversaries sought hard
to put him in prison; and it was the knowledge of their
power and persistence that thoroughly alarmed Could.
Certain of these opponents were disgruntled bond-
holders of tin- I )enver 1'acilic Railroad, and thev were
assisted bv the owner of an important Xew York news-
paper whose interests Could had crossed and thwarted
in the telegraph and submarine cable field. The charge
revolved around a tricky piece of periurv by which
Could, Sage and Dillon, in their railroad consolidations,
had embexxled several million dollars in the juggling of
thirty thousand share- of Denver Pacific stock. These
bondholders had begun an action a:':rin-4 Could and
Sage in Xe\v York, in 1885. for restitution; the news-
paper owner dr.ily emitted savage maledictory broadsides
;;gcun>t Gould, a:~.d demanded his punishment. And to
cap it all, the foreman of the Grand Jury sitting was a
fellow capitalist, whom Gould had cheated fifteen years
before in one of his railroad transactions.
it was a formidable combination arrayed against him.
Gould knew it. He realized at once that he had better
settle with the complaining bondholders and light out
and with dispatch ; he thereupon came to terms with
them, and then fled on his yacht and remained in for-
eign parts until the statute of limitations could be
pleaded with success in his behalf, so far as criminal pro-
ceedings were concerned.
A WIDI-; TRAIL OF CORK f I'TION 7 .
Still another question, although an idle one, may arise:
liow was Gould able to get ihe laws necessary for his
numerous frauds, and immunity from legislative and.
other official action? The 'Pacific Railway Commission-
ers' report docs not answer this question elucidatively.
'I he minority report, however, sheds a few more rays
upon lii.- methods. " Hundred.- of thousands of dollars,''
it says, " have been disbur.-ed at the State and Xational
capitals for the purpose of influencing legislation." n
Frequent references are made to " pavments for im-
proper purposes." I lowever, even if the commission had
not explained in its meager, grudging wav the corrup-
tion following Gould everywhere, it could be taken for
granted; hi- trail of bribery and fraud had been a public
stench for full . !\ year-, i:i which respect lie differed
much from '< ; contemporary wealth-seekers, for
Til!-; C.OU.IJ L-'OKTUMi RESUMED 73
whereas lie acquired both name and game they, too, had
the game, yet so cunningly was it bagged that they were
able to slip into the cover of good repute. Also, let this
fact not be overlooked; that the widespread bribery was
but a form of procuring license to prey at pleasure. To
get laws sanctioning theft, and official connivance at th
retention of the proceeds, it was necessary to divide
among the politicians (including some of those on the
bench) a certain portion of the spoils.
By about the year 1883 Gould discarded the Union
Pacific after having, as he believed, looted the marrow
out of it. Doubtless his conclusion was aright, seeing
that no further immediate booty was in sight in that
particular line and at that day. But in the fullness of
time, namel}'. fifteen years later, when the country's
population and resources h?d greatly expanded, a worthy
successor, in the person of Harriman, came irresistibly
along to imitate and elaborate Gould's methods. Xot to
the purpose is it here to anticipate the narrative of Har-
riman's career; this will be faithfully found in its proper
place; but one more addendum is needed to give a kind
of finishing touch to the tale of the Kansas Pacific Rail-
road, if only to show that others knew how to begin
where Gould left off.
The $40,000,000 or thereabouts in loot which Gould
appropriated came in considerable part from the Kan-
sas Pacific transaction. The final swindling of the ( lov-
ernment out of much of the advances that it had given
for this road, occurred in iS<;S at the precise time
when I larriman was bursting brilliantly into wealth and
power.
riie Government held a remaining claim against the
Kansa< Pacific for $13.000,000. A fraudulent plan had
been concocted to have the Government sell its lien at
74 lii.STURY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
one-half of the amount due; a most deftly preconceived
plan it was, and only on the eve of its consummation was
there an\- noise raised. Turpie offered a motion in the
l.'nited Slates Senate that the sale he not confirmed; sup-
porting that motion, Senator Allen rose on February 16.
1898, and remarked that "we might as well enact a statute
taking $6,700,000 out of the Treasury and make an abso-
lute donation of it. It would be no more criminal, no
more in violation of the statutory rights of the people." u>
Senator Morgan, of Alabama, denounced the sale as rob-
bery, Harris called it a swindle, and its promoters thieves.
Robust language, but it did not interfere with the hasty
sale for $6,000,000 of the Government's lien on that very
same day.
VAST AREAS OF COAL FIELDS STOLEN'.
To form any adequate conception of Gould'- thefts
in his manipulation and management of the I'nion Pa-
cific consolidation, a mere money computation falls flat.
The resources expropriated by Gould and by his de-
scendants cannot be expressed in money terms. For ex-
ample, the enormous coal deposits expropriated from the
people -who can say what their exact money value is?
The Interstate Commerce Commission announce.- that
\\
vstem, principally by the Denver and Rio Grande
ilroad, which was one of a number of Western rail-
id li;ies that Gould held onto and bequeathed to hi-
My- fifth Congress, Second
75
obtained? Here we do not have to encounter any in-
tricacies of stock and bond finance ; they were simply
seized with just enough formalities to give some color
of complying with the law. Behind these thin formali-
ties lay a long' path of " fraud, perjury and violence,"
says the Interstate Commerce Commission's report of
1908. In commonplace official diction the story of the
seizure of these deposits is there told ; how for forty
years or more the -Gould and other railroad corpora-
tions have employed dummy " occupiers "- mainly
women -to file fictitious entries on public coal lands,
and then have had the claims transferred. An inexpen-
sive method it has been, ridiculously easy to get much
for little ; the dummy " occupiers " were paid $50 or
$100 each to do their fraudulent work. And if a coal or
an oil deposit could not be obtained by fraud, then if
the numerous testimony taken by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission is correct force was used to oust
such individual occupants as had lawfully acquired the
land. 13
13 One of the capitalists connected with Gould and Sage was
David H. Moffutt, Jr. Mofi'atl was an official of the Denver
Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company, and \\a> associated
with Gould and Sage in the Union Pacific Railroad. He lie-
came one of the foremost millionaires in Colorado. Some of his
methods were revealed in a ca>e he lore the Supreme Court of
the United Stales. The Government had hrouuht suit to cause
tin- cancellation of two patents of land in Colorado, granted
ahout ten years hefore, in i- y 73. This land was partly a val-
nahle mineral tract, containing large deposits of coal and iron.
The Government von its case in the lower courts, and Mofi'af
appeah d. In it- decision the Supreme Court held that Govern-
ment land officials had conspired to defraud the Government ;
that patents of land were made ont in fictitious names of al-
leged settlers; that the affidavits were forged, and that Moffan
was the real her.eficiary and "knew oi the false and fraudulem
character of alleged preemptions." (United States Reports. Vol.
cxii : _'.}-3_>. ) In this particular case, Moffait was defeat. -d. Inn
.1 is \ery likely thai lie was succes>tul m Mimlar instances of ac-
quiring mineral lands.
76 HISTORY Ol ? THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
Continuously, since 1866, these thefts of coal and oil
lands have gone on with but occasional stoppages due
to official investigations. These in nowise served to pre-
vent a fiercer resumption. The Interstate Commerce
Commission recently reported that the Gould and Har-
riman lines in a large region beyond the Mississippi " ab-
solutely dominate the mining, transportation and selling
of coal along their lines." Uncounted paragraphs and
strings of affidavits, all embodied in the official volumes,
sustain the charges of fraud, perjury and violence. Yet
the beneficiaries of those colossal frauds have good rea-
son to smile amusedly at all such futile investigations ; the
ownership of most of the stolen property, however pro-
cured, is theirs ; some the Government succeeded in get-
ting back, but proportionately little. On the whole, the
beneficiaries are well satisfied.
Let it not be supposed that Gould's mind was so pre-
occupied with his Union Pacific piracies that he was
oblivious to opportunities elsewhere. Far from it. This
undersized man, with his mild voice and inconspicuous,
almost effeminate, personality, was, indeed, an irrepressi-
ble conquerer, seizing and pillaging not merely wherever
he went, but in many places and in different fields simul-
taneously. In his own chosen method of warfare, his
mind was an extraordinarily versatile one. wonderfully
gifted at computation, with the virile ability to keep track
of a vast variety of involved transactions at the same
time. \Yith the law end of them he did not have to
concern himself; at call he could always hire a corps of
the most dexterous attorneys, none of whom scrupled to
take as payment a fraction of his thefts. Lawyers, some
of whom became judges in the highest courts in the
Country, and other lawyers who had been iudgcs and had
THI-: GOULD FOKTUXi: UKSU M Kl> 77
resigned to draw large retainers from the very corpora
tions in whose favor they had handed down decision. .
pleaded and plotted for Gould. An excellent client he
was : the litigations in which he was involved were ex-
tensive.
GOULD'S TEXAS PACIFIC UNDERTAKING.
Wherever he appeared, the lesser frauds were over-
whelmed and flung out and he, the great fraud, substi-
tuted himself in their places. This he again demon-
strated in his appropriation and looting of the Texas
Pacific Railroad. This line had received the usual Gov-
ernment subsidies and land-grant gratuities. The cor-
ruption used in the procuring of these was fully revealed
in the celebrated " Huntington letters," which came to
light later in a suit arising between two railroad fac-
tions. The writer of these letters was a man who knew ;
a preeminent corrupter himself; he was none other than
Collis P. Huntington, one of the dictating railroad mag-
nates of the period. In 1876, 1877 anc ^ ^78, the years
covered by his letters, a furious competition in corruption
was in progress at Washington, and Huntington wrote
unreservedly of it. 14
After Congress passed the Texas Pacific Railroad Act,
Gould turned up with a scheme closely resembling the
Credit Mobilier swindle. Forming a construction com-
pany he entered into a contract with the Texas Pacific
''In a letter dated December 17, 1877, Huntington wrote:
"Jay Gould \vem lo Washington about two week's since, ami
I know saw Mitchell, Senator from Oregon. Smce which time
money has been used very freely in Washington. . . . Gould
b.as large amounts ir, cash and he pays it without stint to earn-
In^ points." In a letter dated May 3, 1878. Huntington wrote
that the Texas and Pacific " i<-lk> offered one member of Con-
gress $i,<x)o cash down, $5.000 when the bill passed and $10.000
oi the bonds" if be would vote for the bill, etc., etc.
Railroad Company to build the westward extension, em-
bracing about six hundred miles. For this work $12,-
ooo.ooo in bonds was to be paid, and a stock bonus of
another $12,000,000. A very remarkable contract it was,
tantamount to giving Gould a present of the system ; its
execution could be explained only upon the premise that
Gould had bought up a sufficient number of the railroad
directors, with an assurance that they would get a gen-
erous clip into the plunder. For by the terms of the
contract, the stockholders of the Texas Pacific owned a
one-sixth interest only in the construction company;
this left the Gould syndicate with 810,000.000 in stock.
which easily sufficed to give it the mastery of the road.
It placed him in a position where he could elect its di-
rectors, make further contracts with himself on any basis
he chose, manipulate its affairs, and. in general, make
them dovetail with his manv other schemes.
MORE RAH. ROAD SYSTEMS GATHERED IX.
The Texas Pacific was one of the lour main lines that
Gould and Sage obtained control of by their well-known
methods. These it is scarcely necessary to recapitulate.
Another of their lines was the \Yabash, composed of
sixty-eight originally separate little railroads in Ohio.
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois. Missouri and Iowa. Within
five years of the time they gained hold of the Wabash.
< lould and Sage had obtained a great series of privileges
from various States, looted the railroad of millions of
dollars, and then had thrown it into bankruptcy. 1 '' So
nauseatingly fraudulent were their method-, that fudge
Gre-ham. of the United States Circuit Court one of
i. 7'J
the few judges of independent character- removed re-
ceivers whom Gould and Sage had caused to be ap-
pointed, and accompanied this act with a caustic de-
nunciation ; all of which had no effect upon Gould's own-
ership ; he retained its control and it descended to his
family.
Each new haul gave Gould and Sage a still greater
supply of resources with which to manipulate other rail-
roads and other public utility systems into their control.
The Missouri Pacific, with its chain of railroads for the
building of which the State of Missouri had advanced
$25,000,000, was next added to the list. It suited the
plan of Gould and Sage not to drive this railroad into
bankruptcy as they had the others. In this instance
they had a special design. By fraudulently diverting
freight traffic at the expense of their other railroads, they
so increased its " earnings " that its stock commanded
a high value ; the selling of the stock at the apex price
yielded them large sums. Then they would depreciate
the value of the stock and buy it back. The Missouri
Pacific is to-day one of the most prized possessions of
the Gould family: its control is so compactly a matter of
callow family inheritance that only recently, in 1909,
Kingdon Gould, a grandson of Jay Gould, was installed
as a director.
All of these various svstems were annexed bv Gould
in approximately the same years that he was plundering
the I nion Pacific. Shall we enter into a recital of the
network of details by which the final result was ac-
complished? The maneuvering, the coercion here, the
bribery there, the undermining of this faction of capital-
ists, and the overthrow of that, the legal devices and
long-drawn law suits- all these form a complex nar-
rative which, if copiously described, would be confusing
SO HISTORY Op Till'. C,RKAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
and wearisome. But the haltering' methods Gould used
in getting hold of other properties are worth an outline,
-ho\ving as they do, the manner in which the railroad
and industrial kings fought out their wars.
VAXDERBILT BLACKMAILED AND OUTGENERALED.
In looking about for new properties to add to their
possessions, Gould and Sage, when sacking the Union
Pacific Railroad, decided that the Western Union Tele-
graph system should be theirs. Any other set of capital-
ists would have hesitated long before venturing such ;..
plan, for that company, the strongest of all the telegraph
companies, was controlled by William H. Yanderbilt. the
richest capitalist in the United States. Gould and Sage
were not at all deterred by the prospect ; they had a plan
by which they could force out Yanderbilt ; it was none
other than the species of blackmailing scheme which
they had u-ed to coerce the Kansas Pacific directors, a
scheme which Yanderbilt himself had employed, arid
which competing capitalists had used against him.
This oft-used scheme of the day was the very simple
one of building a competitive telegraph line. Again
Gould came forward with the posture of being an "an-
tagonist of monopolies''; sweetly did he discourse on
the necessity of complete competition. It was at this
time that Senator Yest minted his trenchant comment
upon the professions of the money seekers. " When they
speak they lie : when thev are silent they are stealing.'''
an epigram deserving of perpetuation.
.Along the line of the Union Pacific Railroad and
of their other railroads. Gould and Sage ordered the
construction of a telegraph line, with the fixed purpose
of compelling Yanderbilt either to buy or to >ell. So
8 1
seriously was. the business of the Western Union Tele-
graph Company cut in npon, that, in self-protection, it
was finally forced to buy Gould's competing line for
about, it \vas understood, $10,000,000. Having pock-
eted this large sum wrenched from Vanderbilt and his
associates, Gould tlien ])lungecl in and took away their
entire telegraph, system. I'.y every trick and art of
Stock Exchange speculative methods, Gould forced
down the price of V\"estern Union stock, and gradually
bought in quantities. To Vanderbilt's complete surprise
and extreme mortification, Gould turned up in iSSi not
only with a control of the We: tern Union, but also of
the American Union Telegraph Company which he had
sold to Yanderbilt but a short time previously.
Upon obtaining control of the Western Union Tele-
graph Company, Gould immediately increased its stock
and kept on increasing it. Triumphant, gorged with
spoils and power. Gould did not have to court the sup-
port of all that was considered solid and respectable
among the money aristocracy. '! hey knew him to be a
great thief, and he knew their caliber, despite the ex-
terior that they had woven about themselves. The in-
stinct of kind for kind is unerring; which instinct in a
money world is reinforced by that invariable principle
of action whereby wealth-seekers rally around him who
proves, his supreme abilitv to get away with the plunder.
The vanquished are expeditiously deserted; the success-
ful (locked about. Such fellow kings of wealth as John
Jacob Astor, J. I'ierp-.nt Morgan. Collis 1\ Iluntington
and others were among the noble array to be found in
Gould's board of directors; a notable lot manv. or all.
82
ui whom had pur-ued career.- more or less paralleling
Gould's ; a sophisticated confraternity they comprised,
fully and finely capable of understanding one another.
All were wary old stagers ; Gould could not easily
overreach them ; while all of them were not quite as
astute as Sage, most were widely schooled in every
devious tactic and ruse of financial and industrial war-
fare. Their safety lay in their lack of trust : the very
reverse of the virtues they preached was developed by
the necessities of their conflict. But when a credulou-
man, such as Cyrus \V. Held, the originator of the sub-
marine cable, stepped along with his confiding' faith in
Gould's friendship, spoliation and ruin were easv ac-
complishments. Field was simple enough to believe in
Gould ; only after Gould had mercilessly squeezed his
wealth out of him, and had turned him adrift a bank-
rupt, did Field, too late, begin to realize that friendship
had no place in the competitive whirligig. Field had
little reason to whine over his misfortunes: the wealth
that Gould tore from him \va- the product of a series of
fraud- in the results of which lie was very willing to
share.
GOULD SWFFT'S [\ FLFVATF.n RAILROADS.
This fleecing of Field happened in Gould's thimble-
rigging of elevated railroad stocks in Xew York city.
Xo part whatever had Gould in the building of this ele-
vated system: the franchises by which the roads were
constructed and operated had been obtained bv bribery.
Afu-r other capitali-t- had done the bribing and had
<diown how profitable these elevated railroad- were.
Gould and Sage reached out for their ownership.
It was fairlv well e-tabli-hed before the Hepburn
Legislative committee, in 1^7'j. that about $650,000 had
been expended in bribes to get the ehurter of one of
these elevated railroad companies, the ( iilbert, later
called the Metropolitan. Under examination, Jose F.
Xavarro. one of the officials of the company, testified
that up to the time the building of this railroad \va>
started, $650,000 had been spent. Questioned- as to
whether it had been expended at New York or at
Albany (the seat of the Legislature) he replied that
he did not know. It was quite clear from the inter-
rogatories and answers that this $650,000 had been used
as a corruption fund. 10 Probably a similar sum had
been used to get the franchise of the other elevated
railroad, the Xew York.
The old device, so familiar in railroad building, of
organizing a construction company, was employed in
the building of the elevated railroad:- 1 . A company
called the Xew York Loan and Improvement Company
was brought forth to carry on the work of construc-
tion. The same men were directors of both construction
company and elevated railroad companies, and made
fraudulent contracts with themselves. 17 Such capi-
talists and "philanthropists" as George M. Pullman,
John P. Kennedy !s and others profited heavily from
"' Railroad Investigation of the State of Xew York, 1870. v: 4.-,.
These franchises uri.uinated during the period of UK- Tweed
regime. I he Xew York Legislature was then hem.u freqnently
corrupted. When the franchise for the ISleecker Street and
l-'ulton Ferry surface line, Xew York City, was obtained. 8434,-
i* i<> of its honds were dFtribnted siratuifou-dy. (See "The His-
tory of Public I'ranchiM^ in Xew York City, p. ui.)
'^ Ibid.. 12.
'""Of Pullman some facts have been broMLiT,: out in Vol. i of
this work. Another example (0 his m<;h(>ds and standard;-
at about tin's time may be instructive. After Jacob Sharp h;.d
bribed the Xew York City Board of Aldermen with ;\"<rO.;nx; i::
ca-'h. in 1884. to ^ive Sharp a franchise for a suriace railway
<<;i Bn>adwav, the owner-; of the f ranch! -c i-'sued SCKJ.OOO ir
these fraudulent transactions ; thev were, at the saur.,-
lime, reaping wealth el ewhcre bv many other methods
of the same character.
After the first two elevated railroads were built, a
new scheme of plunder was conceived and earried out.
A company called the Manhattan was chartered Vv'ith a
capital of 82,000,000, ostensibly to build elevated rail-
ways, liut it did not build a single foot; the same clique
in control of the New York Loan and Improvement
Company turned up in control of the .Manhattan, and
they leased the two existing roads to the Manhattan.
Little actual cash did this lease cost them; they illegally
increased the Manhattan's capital stock from $2,000,000
to $13,000, OCX), which amount they divided as loot. 10 Ky
stockjobbing methods Could and Sage then crushed out
most of the small stockholders, and secured control.
They proceeded to water the stock still more, consoli-
date the whole system, and crowd out the more pow-
erful stockholders.
FIKI.I) Til KOWX OTT.
Certain of the heavy stockholders, such as Field,
stood in with Gould and Sage, but other- bitterly fought
the various fraudulent moves and expedients that Gould
and Sage brought into play. The outcome of the en-
-liing legal contest could be forecasted. Gould seldom
-tork ;:nd ,S'2.5Of>.rx>o in bond- for tin- construction of a railway
three miles in length, and the- real coM of \vliirh \va^ only
- lO.nou Tbc-c bonds were nnlruv fully and dishonestly issued.
i'nllnian knew that fact, and also of the' bribery. In exchan"-'
for cars --npplird by liim. he rec'.^-cd SI.-O.OTJO of thc-c hopd-
nt fifty run- on tin- dollar. Sec rcpDrl of. and testimony b
tore, the Xew N'nrk Senate fnvesiii.'atiny ('onunilter. " ;-
fVimmittee Broadway K'ailrnafl. iKs'.'i": 1X1.
!!l Railrrtad Fnve libation nf the Slat' 1 of \\-\v N'nrk, 187';,
v : o rind 7.
85
\vcnt into court without owning his judge. The judicial
tool this time was Westbrook of the New York Supreme
Court; when Gould had started out in his career of
theft, \Yesibn><>k had been his first lawyer. Now as
judge, Westbrook issued orders and injunctions backing
up Gould and Sage's fraudulent acts. Mis subservience
\\ as so notorious that he once held court in Gould's pri-
vate office in the Western Union Telegraph Company's
office and issued an injunction.-
After becoming absolute masters of the elevated rail-
way sy.-tcms in Xew York city Gould and Sage no longer
had any use for Field. At the first opportunity the stock-
market was rigged to divest Field, and he was thrown
out to linger and die a ruined man.
-'" Tin- Xe\v York State Assembly later impeached Judge \Vcst-
brook for malfeasance in office; hut from the Senate, as trial
body, he managed to get a verdict of acquittal.
CHAPTER IV
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE GOULD FORTUNE
What was the concrete result, the grand culmination
of Gould's fifteen years of plundering? He, himself,
gave a demonstration when on March 13, 1882, he called
in Sage and other associate? and exhibited to them a
box crammed with securities. Disparaging reports had
been scattered in Wall street thaKhe had been hard
hit by recent declines in the stock market : and it was
to belie these statements that he summoned in witnesses
to attest by impressive proofs that his wealth and power
were unaffected. He spread out $23.000,000 of West-
ern Union stock; $12,000,000 of Missouri Pacific stock,
and $19,000,000 of other stock-. ' There is not another
man in America except Yanderbilt," observed Sage,
" who could make such a display of stock as that." But
the securities thus revealed were only a part of Gould's
wealth; they did not include many other varieties. Two
years later he ostentatiously made another and still
larger display.
Tho^e heaps of stocks and bonds were the legal tokens
of this one man's far-reaching power. By their owncr-
-lilp lie was vested not only with the mastery of the
great inflowing revenues from numerous corporations,
but the autocratic control over a vast army of wage
workers. Every dollar of hi? fortune had been ex-
horted by deceit, bribery, fraud and theft, yet here he
-.;;-. one of the dominating magnates of the country, the
86
owner of a ramification of properties, the dictator of the
fate oi tens of thousands of workingmcn. P>ehind him.
as an impregnable fortification, stood the Law. guaran-
teeing him the possession of that which he had seized
by theft.
Hut a tew years back and ( lould was buying law to
escape law; and now here he was unbranded with the
prison stigma, thanks to his money, and lording it over
the nation, lint ever there clung to him that >ame
crass, indiscriminate brutality of method in dealing both
with the powerful and the weak; just as he struck hard
at competing capitalists, without timiditv or mercy, so
d.id he openly and candidly browbeat and terrorize his
legions of workingmen. Of him it could not be said that
he shrank from assailing the strong, while overawing
the feeble. Me warred on both capitalist and on labor.
organized and unorganized, and did so with equal fe-
rocitv whether by involution or frontal onslaught.
( amid was not the politic sort of magnate who cut the
pay of his workingmen, and then, as a solace, presented
them v, itl'i a tov philanthropy; he did not polish greed
with hvpocrisv. When he reduced the pav of the work-
er-- on his line 1 -, he did it with a bold aggressiveness, dar-
ing them to challenge hi-- power.
l : ew magnates, while in the very process of putting
through some colo>sal fraud, had the hardihood to incite
oi tln-ir emploves and oi the people-.
to wail until lh>' agitation over their in-
had hern tempered hv a eertain lapse oi
ai ;- pnlic\ m 11 ncca^tun jtindered
tlu- verv nme> \vl:en he was del raiuliiii'
88 HI:
and bribing, he belligerently attacked his workers and
compelled them to accept lower wages. What if a
public outcry should go up? lie had been menaced with
many outbursts of fierce, withal futile, public indigna-
tion : they had not interfered with his accumulations ; he
viewed them with a cynical scorn.
In 1881 he and his 'clique were loaded down with
spoils ; the people had grown exceedingly restless, stung
by their poverty, on the one hand, and contemplating
the gigantic wealth of the capitalists on the other.
Gould went ahead as if public protest were as nothing.
He added, as we have seen, 813.000.000 of watered stock
to the capital of the elevated railroads in Xew York
city, and at the same time forced the agents and gate-
men on those roads to submit to new terms. They had
been complaining that they had to work from twelve
to fifteen hours a day for the wretched pittance of 82
and 81.75 a day. Gould listened to their grievances,
and conciliated them with an order reducing their day's
work to twelve hours. But their visions of scanty tri-
umph vanished when they learned that he had also cut
'heir pay.
At the very time that he was looting the railroads in
the West, he reduced the wages of the men on the Mis-
sotiri Pacific and defied the labor unions, causing great
-trike- in 1885 and 1886, by which, however, his rail-
road workers gained virtually nothing. Most typical of
the servility of many newspapers and politicians were the
alm-e and obloquy with which the labor leaders who con-
ducted those -trikes were overwhelmed, Let a man
champion tlu j cause of the oppressed, and no matter how
loity hi- ideals or noble his nature, he was at once sub-
jected tn an endless stream of ridicule and traducing.
'L he servitors of the public press and the retainers of
1'RKSKXT STA'JTS OF 'I' I IK GOULD FORTl'NK 80,
politics joined in a vicious persecution ; Martin Irons,
who managed the Missouri 1'aciiic strike, was defamed,
hounded and blacklisted. It was pitiful to see this man,
one of the purest, best and self-sacrificing, precariously
compelled in after years to sell peanuts for a living; and
he now lies in an obscure grave, quite forgotten, while
the remains of Gould, one of the master thieves of the
period, repose in a spacious mausoleum, and the children
of Gould are among the oligarchy of families ruling the
United State-.
TIIKFT RKWAROF.l) WITH POWER AND SPl.KXDOR.
At forty-rive years of age Gould possessed more than
a hundred million dollars. He was prematurely old ;
his beard was streaked with gray, his hair thin, and his
swarthy, bilious, glowering face was rigid with hard,
deep lines. His form had shrunk so that he looked more
insignificant than ever before. Tint when he traveled,
no one could mistake the evidences of sovereign power.
From one end of the country to the other he rode in a
palatial private car, handsomely appointed, containing
every comfort and luxury then devised an observation
room, a parlor, a dining hall, sleeping rooms, a kitchen
and porter's quarters. His yacht, Atalanta, was sump-
tuous, indeed. His manner of life befitted that of a
full-blown magnate. At Irvington-on-the-Hudson !v
sequestered himself in a great and costly man-ion,
rounded by live hundred acres. Attached to it was < v
of the finest conservatories in the world. His city resi-
dence i?i Xew York city was a massive, somber brown-
stone house at the northeast corner oi Filth avenue and
rty-seventl] street, i:i the very hran of the aristocratic
: in
go MI <
I le. however, had other mighty powers not evidenced
in outward display. For some years he owned a new--
paper, the Xew York " World " : a curious sight it was
to see one of the great pirate-, who manv a time had
narrowly escaped prison, intruding the public as to it-
duty, moral, political and otherwise. But the known
lact that Gould owned this newspaper helped to dis-
count its utterances and reduce its circulation. 1
A much more successful and insidious method of in-
fluencing public opinion was bv his control of the West-
ern l/nion Telegraph Company, and. through that corpo-
ration, of the Assi elated Press, the foremost news dis-
tributing agency in the United States. Distorted, mis-
leading or false news dispatches were manufactured or
artfullv colored and -upplied to the public press. These
not only gave Gould superior underhand facilities for
influencing the course of the stock market, but they
were also used in favor of capitalists and against labor
and radical movements at every opportunity. The pub-
lic \vas fed on grossly perverted news accounts of strikes
and labor and political movements; upon this fabricated
new.- the newspaper owner-, themselves capitalists or
largely servile to capital, l^ed hostile if not malevolent
editorial-; and the combination of the whole was used
to prejudice the ma-- of the public against anv move-
ment or agitation threatening the complete sway of
capital.
the block fronting his Xe\v York citv mansion he would
nervously pace for hours during the long, shadowy vigils
of the night a little, shrunken, cankered man vainly
endeavoring to tire his mind and frame into an exhaus-
tion compelling sleep. He died on the morning of De-
cember 2. 1892, and his body was interred in a classic
mausoleum, costing Si 10,000, in \Yoodlawn Cemetery.
Many multimillionaires, whose ways and station were
akin to (iould's, and some of whose careers were inter-
woven with his, showed up at the funeral services. Rus-
sell Sage was there, and J. Pierpont Morgan and Collis
1'. Huntington and a group of others an impressive
procession of money lords with appropriate visages and
attired in the immaculate garb of mourning, although
not a soul really mourned Gould save his own family.
His will disclosed an estate of nominally 877.000,000,
but this was merely the exoteric side of the testamentary
document; the e-tate amounted to far more. All was
nates. Gould did not transmit the bulk of his wealth to
hi- eldest s< in.
Xow, when fav Gould died, many newspaper-owning
scavengers, who during his lifetime had bootlicked him
or kept fearfully silent, belched forth vituperation and
rehearsed his odious deed-.
Their misrepresentations consisted not in exaggerating
hi> evil that were not possible but in singling him
out as an exceptional defrauder, and in detaching him
from 'he system whirl: produced him and which alone
could be held responsible.
Guiild parsed a\va\ ihe mo>1 haled man in the United
Sue:;; 1 amM'i ns hr.d never Concerned him. Inil
hi- chil Iren devel< ' ed the vearning U r recognition. At
every step, at first, there came an outrush of the old
taunt that their father's fortune had come from ] ullage
and wrecking. Yet all of the founders of fortunes were,
without a single exception, of a stripe ; all had tricked,
: ; cd. deceived, bribed, defrauded and stolen.
With hundreds of millions of dollars, however, at
their command the (loulds were able to overcome all so-
cial obstacles. When one has money enough an elect
social position does not have to be accorded ; it can be
taken by assault. One of the easiest routes is by buying
an entree into the caste of European titled nobility, which
in the.-e bu.-iness days does a lively trade huckstering
names for cash. Accordingly, in 1895 Anna Gould, one
of Jay's daughters, was transformed into the Countess
de Castellane. and the Count received the opportunity
of requisitioning manv of the Gould millions. During
the next eleven year- lie right jovially availed himself
of it. and squandered millions with a fine prodigality,
and went through fantastic antics until a divorce cruelly
put a .-top to them. But Aline. Gould a-cended still
higher in the pages of the Almanach de Gotha. The
Count'- successor is the Prince de Sagan. a perceptive
scion who i- doing his valuable part in demonstrating
how the feudal nobk-.-. often deprived of their -tolen
c.-tates at hume bv revolution and dis.-ipation, can lei-
-urery recoup by allying themselve- with estates stolen in
newer countries
Tn lav to- 1 much .-tre-s upon the social a.-piratinn- and
doing- of the Gould family would obscure the titanic
industrial conflict in which thev have been engaged. Af-
ter Jay Gould'- death the wealth and possession-; of the
family grea'ilv increased and iis conquests were ex-
tended.'
i'>t;t this process has noi. been allowed to continue un-
restricted. The last few years, as \ve have already
pointed out, have ushered in a terrific contest for tii.'
exclusive mastery of the nation's resources. Looking
hack fifty years, \ve see a large number of petty, conse-
quential industrial bosses, each running his own little-
railroad or factory. A change then takes place ; great,
energetic capitalists develop, who make war upon the
petty bosses and by fair means or foul crush them, seize
their properties and consolidate these into great systems.
The petty railroad owners disappear and their places are
taken by such overbearing magnates as the Vandcrbilts,
the Goulds, Huntington, Morgan, Hill, and the like. Ten
years ago all of these men were magnates of colossal
power, each heading some great system, and despotically
dictating over some particular domain.
Xow another stage in the process of industrial evolu-
tion is being reached which signifies the decline of
overlords of the Gould type, and which foretells the
approaching climax of capitalist institution-. Mighty
as these magnates have been, they are gradually and
inexorably being subordinated by a still mightier power,
the most puissant of all. The aim of this all-pervading
- Many of the large properties of which they became owners.
dr partial owner.--, had a broad foundation of fraud. While
neither Jay (iould nor his children committed the-e paiticular
fraud-;, yet they benefited by the original frauds. The Co'o-ado
( '( i;d and iron Company is a case in instance. In a mt broiuii;
in iS<;7 to vacate the land title of thi-- company, the Govertvneiv
charged that the company's ci.al and mineral lands had been < .!>
t nined by conspiracy and fraud. The lower court? sustained the
Government, but the Supreme ('our' of the I nitcd State- decided
thai although undi >uhtrd!y fraud h:.d been used, yet the proof
presented was not sulncient for an adverse decision. Supreme
Conn Repi irter. viii : 131-141.
94
power is industrial absolutism; and in the pursuance of
this inevitable end it is grinding down all opposition
even as the GoukK the Yanderbilts and others have
squelched lesser magnates heretofore. Xo longer are
the Goulds able to extend their power much; the climac-
teric period has arrived when they have to fight hard to
retain what they have.
TII1-: KISIXG AUTOCRACY.
This supreme power, clutching at every form of the
production and distribution of products, is the Standard
Oil Company, headed by the Rockefellers.
Thirty-five years ago it obtained a monopoly of oil
products by getting secret railroad rates, and by other
crushing methods. At first it ingratiatingly approached
the railroad magnates as a supplicant seeking favors.
Soon, as a matter of policy, it made these magnates shar-
ers in its profits. Then it began to buy its way into the
ownership of railroads. Its profits have been so fabu-
lously vast that it has been under the constant, uncs-
capable necessity of reinvesting its vast surplus, ever
growing vaster. This surplus it has applied to buying
up railroads, bank, mine, public utilitv and industrial
stocks and securities of all descriptions. With this fixed,
unchanging policy its power grew to such an extern that
its members began to push themselves in as director-, oi
a great variety of corporations. For a period it then
carried on a policy of having "a community of inter-
est'' with the large magnates in every field: of working
in cooperation with them in determining industrial mat
ters. I'ut during all of this time it wa< encroaching! .
buving mere- and more stocks of all kinds; so that now
it ha-; arrived at tin* point where, operating through such
GEORGE GOULD.
Eldi-st Son of J. Gould, and Chief Wielder of the Gould Fortune.
general-; as Mir laiely lepartcd I larriman, it is gradu-
ally forcing the \'aiulcrbilts. the ( ion!.'!-- and oilier first-
rank magnates of a decade ag< > to a secondary place,
and entrenching itself in autocratic authority. Several
of the railroads long ruled over by the Goulds have be-
come, to a considerable extent, Standard Oil adjuncts.
Industrial battles, such as that between George Gould
and the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1902, will, as' occur-
rences, soon be extinct. This warfare arose over
( iould's project to extend the AYabash Railroad to the
Atlantic seaboard. The Pennsylvania Railroad promptly
objected to a competitor in its richly profitable territory.
The ensuing struggle was fought out in legislatures,
common councils, courts. Congress, and by actual phys-
ical force. So completely have the Pennsylvania Rail-
road magnates ruled that State for fifty years ihat it did
require- considerable temerity on Gould's part to war
upon them."'
3 As an instance of the exercise of the Pennsylvania Railroad's
great political power, the following account is significant. 1;
shows ho\v Cassatt, president of that railroad, and a few other
industrial magnates and political bosses, decided that Philander
Knox (at present, 1010. United States Secretary of State)
should be chosen a raited States Senator. Knox was long- a
corporation lawyer. The Governor of Pennsylvania was ordered
to ratify the choke of this gr-np of pnliiicnl dictators, and did
so. "I his account was published editorially in "Collier's
Weekly," i-Mie of June S, 1007. and rcpuhlished in the same
peri' 'dical. issue of X<>vei;;l>er 2~. [909,. !t- accuracy was not-
disputed, and no denial- were made, or suits for libel brought.
The account read :
"Mr. Knox's pulitical g'ene.- is had for i 1 ^ -etting the genera!
>ithces 01 t!ie I'enn.^ylvania Railroad in Philadelphia. There
met, to name a sii e>M>r fur (he recently decea.-ed Ouay, Sena-
tor Penrose. Henry ('. I ; rick. ']/.' Durham, tiie Philadelphia
boss, who was tlu-n at the height of his power, and the late
President Cassatt. ['etween tl;e p li i and the t\\o mei '
business a in.idit.t was arranged. K;ii'X ^knjiild be Seiiator.
. . . Then the party adjourned i'' dinner a; President Cas-
satt's liou.-e. Tn tlii- was invi'Kl (Jovernor Pennypacker, who
hcid the app' >int ing. \\'hi!e the resl tinkered the walnuts, \\-u-
'/> M l- ; H'XV Or 'I ill: CKKAT
( >:ic oi i!ic most marked instances .-bowing the ex-
tremes lhat the Pennsylvania Railroad magnates went in
their rule, was the Riot Indemnity bill which thev at-
tempted in 1879 to get the Legislature of that State to
pass. It is advisable' to present a sketch of the circum-
stances of this bill, inasmuch as it gives a good idea of
the methods of A. J. Cas>att, long the president of the
Pennsylvania Railroad. It was Cassatt whom George
Gould had to fight in 1902; the methods Cassatt used
in 1879 were the methods lie invariably used. \Yith
all his unscrupulousness Jay Gould never had the face to
do anything approaching in enormitv the Riot Indemnity
bill of Cassatt. Vet when Cassatt died recently the most
lavish eulogies were everywhere published; he passed
away in the full attributes of superior respectability.
\\ e have seen, in an earlier chapter, how the Penn-
sylvania Railroad's officials, during the great strike of
18/7, ordered their agent- to set a number of worthless
freight cars at I'ittsburg on fire, in order to charge the
strikes with being riotous, and so have a pretext for
calling out the military.
That very crime of arson these magnates, two years
later, made the basis for an attempt at plundering the
people out of 84.000,000 at one grab. In the whole in-
dustrial historv of the country no avowedlv bolder
-cheme had ever been tried before. When, in [87'], a
bill \vas introduced in the Pennsylvania Legislature to
indemnify the railroad, to the amount of about $4.000,-
rri?c invited the Governor into thr liack yard to look at the
moon. ' Tt'-^ Knox.' said Pcnrose to tlu- Governor. .And Knox
it \va-. . "I < i thi- rarrative some minor intcresl i- lent by
tlic faci thai Prc-sidi-nt rassatt \va- a Democrat. '"
OOO, for the loss of property, the news was received with
general amazement. Oissatt pushed the bill, and it
would have become law had not some of the legislators
revolted at the brazenness of the plan. A few de-
nounced it as a monstrous fraud; one, in particular. Rep-
resentative Wolfe, charged that bribery was being used,
and demanded an investigation. Whereupon, a commit-
tee of investigation was appointed on April 9. 1879.
The report of this committee specifically stated that
three members of the Legislature had been guilty of
bribery. From the evidence it was clear that Cassatt
and Quay- -the latter a corrupt politician at the head
of the Pennsylvania Republican machine had leagued
forces to rush the bill through ; that many members had
been bribed either with money or with promises that cer-
tain bills of theirs would be passed ; that corrupt com-
binations existed among members to pass important leg-
islation, and that many editors of influence throughout
the State had been bought to advocate the passage of the
bill. 4
A WAR OK Ml LTI. \ni.LIOXAIRK.S.
Such were the ways of C'assatt, the head of the forces
that ( ieorge (lould had to encounter. Of all result-,
Gould sought most to get an entrance into Pitt-burg
with its stupendous annual traffic of 75.000,000 tons.
The government of that city was owned by the Penn-
1 Pel ruff. Kemlile, Suiter. Ruir,'cn?er rind Crnvfnrd, nil lejr!.--
! ;; ; '.'~:- or lobbyists, were comieted, hi iS^o, oi hril'i.-ry, and each
' : - -enters ! to a year's i:>r>n- " : - : !:i passing sentence
j '':. ! V;:r ; r marked ill:;! ' "' i' : . " i ' 'i a common occnr-
r pre i 1 : t]v I Vnnsylv.'.nia l.ev.i- li'ti.ro i~;>r years.
" ; , ; i';- .;',.: ii the coi'rr.i.iiiin ai^-iu::.:;: the attempted v>a--a^e
I
0,8
\lvania Railroad. But what of that? If money could
put in and run one set of officials, money could also
put in another set. So George Gould deeided. and
rightly. The government of Pittsburg now became the
.-take : Gould adroitly caused the question of the entry
of the Wabash Railroad to be made an issue of the
municipal election of 1902.
Backed by his millions, so it was said, a '' reform "
movement was generated and blown into lusty growth.
Gould carried his point : a Common Council favorable
to his plans was elected. 3 At the same time Gould had
a bill passed by Congress allowing him to bridge the
Monongahela River. The statement has been made that
it cost him $12,000.000 to get an entrance into Pittsburg,
but the documentary proof is wanting. After spending
$35.000,000, he carried through his \Yabash plans.
Xow the warfare of force began. In retaliation for
Gould's victory, the Pennsylvania Railroad magnates or-
dered all of his Western Union Telegraph poles along
that railroad's right of way to be cut down. If the
telegraph operator.-- had gone on a <trike, the cry would
have been raised that they were dangerously interrupting
an essential public business, but violence when com-
mitted by magnates was held a -acred right of property.
and no protects of Government officials were heard.
This transaction has been only one of main' of those
of corporations controlled largely or partially by the
Thi- "reform" movement \va- In-raided as one which would
;-;!;! raic 1'itt -hurv. The increasing o irruption, cau-ed by the
. i.-s interests in hnbiny puMic hodie-. \va- evidenced re-
-nly. Tile c<>n\ ictiou of o-;e of the principal bribe taker- wa-
followed hy hi- cnnfes>i-in. and hy tlic confessions, in Marc! 1 .
\<>io. nf many mr.rc memhcr- of (lie Pitt-hnru" Common Council
These confessions ili-cln-cd a vast sysu-m nf lirihery hy sterl
macrnates, hank- arid other business in'"rest->. \t tlie present
\vritiii" ' April, 1010). forty-one councilnien arc under indict-
nit-n 1 . and more than a -core of others have confessed.
PRESENT STATUS OK THK Got'LD I'OKTUNK 99
present generation of Goulds, in a work, being pub-
lished serially at the present writing (1910), and written
by Judge I' en B. Lindsey. a public-spirited juri.-t who
has the most intimate knowledge of Colorado affairs,
Judge Lindsey reveal- in detail some extent of the cor-
ruption in that State. lie tells how nearly all of the
officials and judges are corporation tools; how vast num-
bers of fraudulent votes are counted at elections ; and
how the corporations have dictated the election or ap-
pointment of main- of the very judges whose decisions
have been so oppressive to the working class. In par-
ticular, lie tells at length how Governor Peabody was
fraudulently declared elected in 1905, and how Peabody
had bargained to appoint to Supreme Court judgeships
certain men named by the corporations. Lindsey goes
on:
Does this seem incredible? Read then the Colorado Supreme
Court Reports, Vol. 35, page 325 and thereabouts. You will find
it charged that the Colorado and Southern Railway Com
pany, the Denver and Rio Grande Railway Company, and
the public service corporations of Denver had an agreement
with Governor Peabody whereby these corporations were to
be allowed to -elect the judges to be appointed to the
Supreme Bench. You will rind it charged that Luther M.
Goddard had been selected a- a proper judge by the public
utility corporations, but that the two railroad companies ob-
jected to him as "too closely allied with the interims of the
Denver City Tramway Company and the Denver I'm'on Water
Company." "As a last resort." the statement continues, "the
agent and representative of the said Colorado and Southern
Railway Company was induced to, and did, after midnight on
Sunday, the eighth day of January, and at about one o'clock
in the morning on Monday, the ninth day of January, repair
to the home of the said Luther M. Goddard, in a carriage, call
ing him out of bed. having then and there Mich conversation
with the said Goddard that the said railway corporations,
through their agents, withdrew their opposition to hi- eonfirma
t:-''n, ai (1 they did on .-aid ni"rning at about throe oViock thereof
announce to the remainder of the said corporations through
ihcir said agents and representatives, that their opposition had
been withdrawn, and the withdrawal of the said opposition
having been announced, the said senate of the Fifteenth Gen-
eral Assembly did. almost immediately upon its convening on
the morning of Monday, the ninth day of January, confirm the
said nomination of the said Goddard."
The brief containing these charges is signed by Henry M.
Teller, Ex-Cabinet member and United States Senator, and by
Ex-Governor Thomas acting as counsel for Senator T. M. Pat-
terson, who had made the charges in his paper, The l{<>cky
Mountain Xczcs. These gentlemen offered to prove the charges
before the Court, but the Court, in a most amazing decision, re-
fused the offer, held that no matter how true such charges might
be, it was "contempt of court" to make them, and lined Sena-
tor Patterson Si.ooo! . . /
And so it seem-, if such charges a? these are true,
that the present Goulds are continuing the methods of
their lather. It may aLo be well assumed that these
public revelations are only indications of extensive under-
ground practices and transactions many of which are
never publicly discio.-ed.
Slowly sliding downward, as it is. to a relinquishing
place in the ranks of wealth when compared with such
fortunes and power as Rockefeller's, the Gould family
is nevertheless prodigiously rich. Forty years ago Jay
Gould was doing his best to keep out of prison ; to-day
his children and grandchildren live in gorgeous palace?.
Georgian Court at Lakewood, X. J., one of the homes
< f George Gould, is emblematic of their splendor. Built
in the Georgian style of architecture, the main part is
two hundred feet long and fifty wide. The great main
I'KKSKNT STATUS OF Til 1-1 lluL'LD FORTUNE 1OI
hall is thirty feet wide and fifty long; at one end is a
massive elliptical staircase of marble and bronze, sup-
ported by marble columns, and at the other end a superb
marble fireplace. Around three sides of the hall is a
mural painting sixteen feet high and eighty feet long
a depiction of the " Canterbury Pilgrims " from
Chaucer. A hundred and fifty pendants of cut glass
radiate prisms from the chandelier. The furniture in
this hall is of Louis XIV. style, blazing with powdered
gold and covered with dee]) crimson velvet. This palace
contains thirtv rooms for the use of George Gould's
family and guests. The very bedstead in which George
Gould sleeps cost $25.000. And all around this gray
and white mansion, gray stucco covering brick walls,
are fairy-like Italian sunken gardens filled with statuary
and magnificent fountains. Connected with the man-
sion is a court, built at a cost of 8250,000, wherein is a
great tanbark hippodrome, a gymnasium, bowling alleys
and lounging rooms, a shooting gallery, a large swim-
ming poo! and Turkish and Russian baths.
And this is only one of the many palaces of the mem-
bers of the Gould family. Whence all of this wealth
and splendor came is now an open book ; no enigma are
its sources, but a prolonged tale of fraud and theft,
whereof the most vital facts only have been herein
brought out.
CHAPTER V
THE BLAIR AND THE GARRET! FORTUNES
Of John I. Blair little is now heard, yet when he died
in 1899, at the age of ninety-seven, he left a great per-
sonal fortune, estimated variously at from $60,000,000
to $90.000.000 ; his wealth, descending largely to his
son, De \Yitt C. Blair, forms one of the notable estates
in the United States. Here, according to the purveyors
of public opinion, was an honest man ; here incontestably
was a capitalist of '' rare business instinct," whose for-
tune came from pure, legitimate and upright methods.
I ; <T more than half a century." said one newspaper
editorial 1 at his death, "he has been one of the leading
business men in the countrv, and for more than a quar-
ter of a century one of the richest men in the world,
his fortune being estimated at from $50,000,000 to $100,-
ooo.ooo. every farthing of which came to him through
legitimate channel:-, creating other wealth on its way to
him. as well as after it had reached his hands." This
was TK.it an isolated eulogy; round and round the col-
umns of the press went these pagans with never a dis-
sent or demurring.
AX INQUIRY INTO lil.AIR's CAREER.
Through all of these weary pages have we searched
afar with infinitesimal s cru tiny for a fortune acquire- 1
bv hnne-t means. Xor have ihc methods been measured
JOHN I. BLAIR.
T11K BLAJU ,'.?ilv (i. \KKi.Il I ( )K I I N KS 1OJ
by the test of a r.o;le of advanced elhics, but solely by
the laws as they stood in the respective times. At no
time has the discovery of an " honest fortune " rewarded
our determined quest. Often we thought that we had
come across a specimen, only to find distressing disap-
pointment , through all fortunes, large and small, runs
the same heavy streak of fraud and theft, the little
trader, with his misrepresentation and swindling, differ-
ing from the great frauds in degree only. Have we. at
last, in Blair's, stumbled upon one fortune unblemished
by any taint whatsoever? Can we now exclaim,
Eureka! So it would seem if current comment is to be
swallowed as the fact. But inasmuch as we have dog-
gedly developed an exploring, if not a perversely skep-
tical turn of mir.d, let us gratify it to the full by investi-
gating the career of this paragon of commercial virtue.
Xow it does so happen that whatever the reserved.
sequestered Jife lilair led in his dotage, basking in the
titular glory of wonderful business man and philanthro-
pist, he left a large, resounding impress upon industrial
events of fifty and sixty years ago. The surviving rec-
ords, buried in obscurity, emerge from their forgotten
shelves to confound the fairv tales of present-day eulo-
gists. Me was contemporaneous with Commodore Yan-
lerbilt, the first John Jacob Astor, and Kiis-ell Sage; and
he was as excellent a business man as any of them,
tvhich is to sav. his methods were relatively the same
HS theirs. While Aslor was proving hi> talent as ;i suc-
cessful business man by debauching, swindling and mur-
dering Indian tribes, and while Yandcrbilv was black-
mailing, and Sage was bribing and embezzling, Blair
was demonstrating in his mvn wav that he. too, had all
the necessan qualifications ol "a leading business man."
I'orn near I'elvidere. X. |., in iSnj. Ins parents were
IO4 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
farming folk; and his biographers relate with a blissful
smack of appreciation that when he was a very young
boy he annouiu-jJ to his mother that, " I could go in
for education, but I intend to get rich." Like Sage, he
started as a clerk in a country store, and he then wid-
ened into being the owner of a general merchandise
store, at what is now Blairstown, New Jersey. Years
passed and he prospered, his panegyrists tell, and he then
opened a number of branch stores. But this part of
his career is shrouded in mere tradition ; nothing au-
thentic is known of his methods at the time.
BLAIR AS A RAILROAD BUILDER.
Blair next turned up as the owner of an iron foundry
at Oxford Furnace, N. J., and it is from this point of
his career that definite facts are embodied in official
records. '' The necessity for transporting the metal to
the seaboard," says one biographer, " led Air. Blair and
others to organize the Lackawanna Coal and Iron Com-
pany, out of which has grown the great system of the
Delaware, Lackawanna and AYestern Railroad." With
this all-inclusive sentence the biographer airily dismisses
this part of the subject. Hut there are weighty reasons
whv we should dwell upon it, with brief, yet sufficient
explanation, for it was in this operation that Blair made
his first millions; it was here that he gave the first scin-
tillating demonstrations of his " rare business instincts."
I fad it not been for an acrimonious falling out be-
tween him and his associates in this railroad business,
the truth would be beyond reach. As it is. these men
made the huge error of perpetuating their quarrel in
print; an unpardonable blunder if the good opinion of
posterity is to he held. This quarrel arose over such a
TI1K r.LAIR AND liARRKTT FORTUNES 105
sordid matter as the allotment of graft; it was a bitter,
ungentlemanly row, as is all too clearly evidenced in the
biting denunciations of one another that were put in the
reports by the disputants themselves. From these re-
ports it appears that l>lair was, indeed, doing- business
in the accustomed style; he was selling, at excessive
prices, the products of his mill to a railroad corporation
of which he was a director, and individually building
branch lines which he foisted at enormous profit upon
the corporation.
The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad,
now one of the very richest in the land, was organized
in 1850 by the grouping of a number of small, separate
lines. To secure franchises and special rights and aid,
the usual procedure of bribery was resorted to, and with
unfailing success. The men at the head of it knew their
slippery trade well ; they were the same rich merchants
who were involved in many another fraud. Some ot
them we have accosted before in these chapters -
(ieorge 1). 1 'helps, John J. ! 'helps, William K. Hodge.
Moses Taylor and others. With ]ohn I. 1'lair these men
formed the board of directors of the Delaware, Lacka-
wanna and Western Railroad Companv.
One of the separate lines incorporated in this railroad
was the Warren line, crossing Xew Jersey into Pennsyl-
vania. The building of this road, as nearlv as can be
made out Irom the law record-. wa- attended with some
very peculiar circumstances. Two set'- of capitalists
were competing" for a fnuichi.-c to extend their railroads
through the mountains to ihe Delaware Water dap:
one wa- the Morris and Kssex Railroad (/ompanv. the
''ther the \\arren Railr. >ad Companv, headed by Hlair
and D-.'dge. !>oth. <;i 1851, obtained charters from the
Xew [ersev I e'>i-latr.re within ; few da\> of each
io6
other's grant. In those years scandal after scandal wa^
developed in successive Xe\v Jersey legislatures; it \va>
no secret that the railroad magnates not only debauched
the Legislature and the common councils of the citie-
with bribes, but regularly, in true business-like style,
corrupted the elections of the State. In 1851, for in-
stance, the only candidates balloted for by the Legislature
for the post of United States Senator were rival rail-
road nabobs ; the very same men who, it was notorious
had for years been bribing and corrupting.
Which of the two sets would succeed in building it-
railroad extension first ? The Legislature had accommo-
dated both with charters for the same route: in that re-
spect they were on an equal footing. Hut Blair and
Dodge completely outwitted the Morris and Essex set.
and went on to claim prior rights for their lines. '1 he
Morris and Hssex Railroad Company charged fraud and
went hotfooted into court after an injunction, which
temporarily it obtained. The case came up for final
adjudication in the New Jersey Court of Chancery in
1854. The Morris and Essex group asserted that thev
had bought the right of way through the Van Xess Gap,
and charged Blair with taking fraudulent possession of
these lands for the purpose of '' fraudulently frustrating
the complainants in the extension of their road": tha:
the survey made by Blair and Dodge was fraudulent.
and that there were other frauds. In his answer Blaiv
put in a general denial, although he admitted that tli
Morris and Essex Railroad Company had bought the
I and received deeds for it. but averred that thi
Junk place after the lands had been conveved to the \V;< :
ren Railroad ( umpany. Each side charged tlu nth
\\itli fraud: undoubtedly the a-sertions of both were cor-
Till: iiL.UK' AND GAKUMTT FOU '1 I" N MS 1O7
rect. Judge Green decided in favor of Blair and dis-
solved the injunction.- Subsequently the Warren rail-
road was unloaded upon the D., L. & \Y. at a great
profit.
CHARGES OF JOl'.IiERY AND GRAFTING.
At first, the relations among Blair, the Phelpses and
Dodge must have been of that brotherly unity springing
from the satisfactory apportioning of good things. Pre-
vious to 1856, the annual reports of the board of mana-
gers of the Delaware, Lackawanna and \Yestern Rail-
road Company breathed the most splendid harmony,
with never a ripple of discord. As president of the
company, Phelps had appointed Blair the land agent
for the Warren division of the railroad. 3 Very evi-
dentlv a joyous, comfortable spirit of satisfaction with
the way things were progressing pervaded this stalwart
group of worthies.
Suddenly the tenor of their private and public com-
munications changed. Peppery statements, growing into
broadsides, were issued, filled with charges and coun-
ter charges, and a caustic quarrel set in over the
question of graft, especially in connection with the \Yar-
ren railroad. On September <), 1856, Phelps resigned
from the pre.-idcncv. and in doing so, practicallv charged
others of the directors with carrving on a profuse sys-
- Nc\v Jersey Kqir.ty Reports, ix : 635-049.
The chief owner of the Morris ai:l F.ssex Railroad wa? Ed-
'.vard A. S'cvei.^ \vlio. for many year-, blackmailed a 0"nipeiiii;j
lire, the Xe\v J;-i>oy Tran.-portali<>n Company, and \vho, \vhcn
that company fnaliy refused to continue to pay Hackniai!,
bribed, it \vas charycd, the Xe\v Jersey f.epislatnrc to pass rc-
ry inca-n-i - .- See (.'liaj.ur \:i oi present volinne.
"Second Anr.r: 1 Report of the Board of Alanat^rs of tlv
Delaware. Laekauan:ia ur,d \Vesu-rn Rai'n\';ifl Comj anv, 185^'':^.
IO8 HISTORY OF Till-: GRliAT AA1ER1CAX 1'OKTL'MiS
tern of grafting in the purchase of land, supplies and
branch lines.
Did Phelps resign as a protest? More probably, the
actual situation was that the internal fight sprang up
over difficult}' in adjusting the division of the spoils,
and the anti-Phelps faction had proved itself the
stronger. Phelps set forth his case in published confi-
dential statements accompanying the annual reports. He
boasted that after the franchises of the Delaware, Lack-
awanna and Western Railroad had been forfeited for
non-compliance, that it was he who had got through
an act on April 2, 1885, " restoring all franchises and
granting other important privileges." He complained
of the exorbitant expenditures the directors were mak-
ing, and significantly pointed out that when he had
wanted to get an auditor, Blair and other directors re-
fused to vote for one. Referring to the process of
graft Phelps wrote that "one of our managers [BlairJ
is a director and large stockholder in the Lackawanna
iron and Coal Company; one-eighth owner in the Lehigh
and Tobyanna Land Company ; largely interested in real
estate along the line of the road and president of the
Warren railroad, of which his son is a principal contrac-
tor. Another son is director and very large owner in
the Lackawanna Iron and Coal Company,'' etc. 4 In
another confidential circular, dated January 17, 1857,
! 'helps criticized Blair as "one of the parties more par-
ticularly referred to " and as " systematically opposed
to my measures." If this much came out in cold type,
what must have been the whole story? The frag-
mentary visions we get in lhe>e reports are undon k s dly
but an index In the elaborate miscellanies of graft carried
on by .Blair in every available direction. 5
P.LAIR'S RAILROADS i.\ THE WEST.
Blair's loot in tbese transactions appears to have been
very large. His operations were so successful that he
went into railroad founding as a regular pursuit ; and,
as did Sage, he combined professional politics and busi-
ness. His greatest opportunities came when the Union
Pacific and other railroad charters, subsidies and land
grants were bribed through Congress.
" In the early days of the settlement of the great
West," wrote one of his puffers, " Mr. Blair found am-
ple opportunity for the exercise of his rare judgment
and untiring energy, and his name was connected, either
as a builder or director, with not less than twenty-five
different lines." What a symmetrical and appealing de-
scription ! All that it lacks to complete it are certain
trivial details, which will here be supplied.
As one of the original directors of the Union Pacific
Railroad, Blair shared in its continuous and stupendous
frauds. But it was in Jowa.that he plundered the most
of his tens of millions Iowa with its fine pristine agri-
cultural lands, among the richest in the United States.
^ Grossly pliable as the law has been, where capitalist inter-
ests have been concerned, nevertheless the law has Ions? professed
tu recognize the fundamental principle that it was against pub-
lic policy to let contracts for the construction of a railroad to
a director or officer of the company. "All such contracts," says
Elliott, "are regarded with keen suspicion, and, at least in the
absence of good taith, are voidable, or, according to some au-
thorities, void, upon the clearest principles of public policy."
( See Elliott on Railroads, ii : 830-840 ) This sounds well in
theory, but in practice the courts have invariably found grounds
to sanction these framK
IIO HISTORY OK Till-: OKI-; AT AMKRICAX KORTUXKS
\\'hilc Sage was busily engaged in thefts and expropria-
tions in "Wisconsin and Minnesota, he was also, as was
Blair, pursuing precisely the same methods in Iowa.
There was the same bribery of Congress and of Legis-
lature ; the same story of immense subsidies and land
grants corruptly secured; 6 the same outcome of thiev-
ing- construction companies, looted railroads, the cheat-
ing of investors, bankruptcies and fraudulent receiver-
ships. Not less than $50.000.000 in subsidies in one
form or another were obtained by the railway com-
panies in Iowa; their land grants reached almost 5,000,-
ooo acres. In the projection of the railroads in that
State, Blair was the predominating almost, excepting
Sage, the exclusive figure ; he seemed to direct every-
thing; and he certainly allowed no one else to pocket
what he could yet awav with himself.
One of a number of his railroads was the Sioux City
and Pacific a line with a very ambitious name but of
modest length. Its charter, subsidies and land grant
were obtained by Blair at the auspicious and precise time
fl " The first land grants made by Congress," wrote Governor
J. G. Xewbold of Iowa, in his annual message in 1878, "were
turned over to the companies absolutely, although the act of
Congress contemplated the .-ale of the lands by the State as
earned, and the devotion of the proceeds to the construction of
the railroads; the companies uere permitted to select the lands
regardless of their line of road; and they were allowed, virtu
ally, their own time to complete the work, notwithstanding that
one main object of the grams was to secure this completion at an
THK HI. AIR AXI) GAKKKTT I-'oKTI N KS Til
when the I'tiion Pacific measures were passed 1>v hrib-
erv.
Whether, however, lilair used money in corrupting
Congress is not to be determined from the official rec-
ords. Hut if he did not, he, at any rate, employed an
wen more subtle and effective mode of corruption. The
Congressional investigations reveal that it was his system
to debauch members of Congress with gifts of stock
in his corporations; 7 these honorable members, of
course, mightily protested that they had paid for it, but
nobody believed their excuses. Poor's Railroad Manual
for 1872-73 additionally reveals that among the direc-
tors and stockholders of Blair's railroads were some of
the identical members of Congress, both of the House
and Senate, who had advocated and voted for the char-
ters, subsidies and land grants for these railroads.
For the Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Blair secured
a land grant of one hundred sections, and .$16,000 of
Government bonds, for each mile of railroad. What
happened next ? Act two was the organization of a
7 See Credit Mobilier Reports. These are full of testimony
attesting the buying up of members of Congress by this method.
His chief accomplices in this work in Congress were William
B. Allison and (Jakes Ames. As Representative, and later
I'nited Stales Senator, from fowa, Allison was long a powerful
Republican politician. Ames (as \vc have seen) was one of the
principal originators and manipulators ot the great Credit
Mobilier swindle (see Chapter xii. Vol. ii). The fact that Alli-
son and Ames were both officers of the Sioux City and Pacific
Railroad Company at the same time that they were members
of Congress was well known before the act of 1868 was passed.
On December 15, 1X07, Blair certified to Hugh McCulloch,
United States Secretary of the Treasury, that the following
officers of the company had been elected on August 7, 18(17:
John T. Blair, president; William 15. Allison, vice-president;
John M. S. William- of Boston, treasurer, etc. The Executive.
Committee elected on thai date \vas composed of Blair. AUK-,
Charles A. Lambard, D. C. Blair, and William B. Allison. See
Kx. Documents. Xos. iSi to 252, Second Session, Fortieth Con-
yresS, 18(17-68, Doc. Xo. .03.
112 HISTORY OK TIIK GKKAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
construction company modeled on exactly the same lines
as the Credit Alobilier. As the head of this company,
I '.lair extorted large sums for building the railroad.
On the prairies of Iowa, with almost no grading neces-
sary, railroad building called for comparatively little ex-
penditure. Expert testimony before the Pacific Railroad
Commission, in 1887. estimated that the road could have
been built at a cost of $2,600,000, with the supple-
mentary statement (and what a commentary it formed
upon the business standards of the times!) that if hon-
estly done the entire cost ought not to have exceeded
$1,000,000.
A LITTLE ITEM OF A $4,OOO,OOO THEFT.
What did Blair's company (which was mainly himself
and his sons) charge? It awarded itself $49,865 a mile,
or a total of more than $5,000,000. Then having bled
the railroad into insolvency, Blair enriched himself fur-
ther by selling it to the Chicago and Northwestern Rail-
road Company. Jf there be any doubt of the cool delib-
eration with which those " eminent capitalists " set out
to swindle the Government, it must, perforce, be dissi-
pated by consideration of the following fact: "When
the negotiations were pending for the transfer of the
stock of the Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Company
to the Chicago and Northwestern," reads the report of
the Pacific Railroad Commission, ''John T. Blair offered
a resolution, which appears on the minutes, setting forth
that the Chicago and Northwestern must bind itself to
protect every obligation of the companv except that to
the United States Government." 8 This was ^ refresh-
ing! v candid wav of arransjincr swindles in advance.
THK m.AlK AM) (1AKRKTT FORTl'NKS L J ^
And, in fact, the final swindling of the Government oi
much of the funds that it had advanced was accom-
plished in 1900. By an act then lobbied tli rough Con-
gress, the company was virtually released from pa vim;
back more than one-tenth of the sum it still owed the
Government. ''
AXOTIIF.R RAILROAD Pr.fNDERF.D.
But Blair's frauds in the inception and construction
of the Sioux City and Pacific and some of his other
roads were surpassed in degree, at least by those he
put through in another of his Iowa railroad projects
the Dubuque and Sioux City line. The charter and land
grants of this railroad, and those of the Iowa Falls and
Sioux City Railroad, were given by an act passed by
Congress on May 15, 1856. \Ye have seen what indis-
criminate corruption was going on in Congress in 1856
and accompanying years ; how the Des Moines River
and Navigation Company's land grant was obtained by
briber}', and how committees were reporting the ex-
istence of corrupt combinations in Congress. There is
no definite official evidence that the charter and land
grants of the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Com-
pany and those of the Iowa Falls and Sioux City were
secured bv bribery, but judging by the collateral circum-
stances attending the passage of other bills at the same
time, the probabilities are strong that they were. l>y
the act of 1856 these two companies received as a gift
about i .200,000 acres of public land in Iowa. 10 Despite
"Allison, who, as a prominent member of the House, had
been implicated in Illair's briberies nearly forty years before,
was now nne of the leaders in the United States Senate. This
was the man at whose death the newspapers eulogized as a
"great constructive statesman."
"'The aet of May r;, iS;o, gave a total of 1.233,4X1.70 aeres
this lavish present, the incorporators made little or no
attempt to build the entire railroad ; they occupied them-
selves almost solely with stockjobbing, and with the
business of profitably disposing of the land to settlers.
Congress was compelled under pressure of public opin-
i"ii to forfeit much of their land grant.
CORRUPTING OF CONGRESS.
Blair >aw what glorious opportunities had been lost
by the act of forfeiture. But the mischief could be
undone. If one set of capitalists were obtuse enough
not to know how a restoration could be brought about.
he knew. So he came forward, took up the companies
as his own. and applied to Congress and to the Legisla-
ture of Iowa for a re-umption of the rights and grants
of which the\- had been shorn.
He succeeded; both Congress and the Iowa Legis-
lature passed acts in 1868 restoring the rights and land
grant. How came it that he encountered no obstacle-
in his plan? \\ by were these legislative bodies so tract-
abler Of course, they could plead that they simply
acted in deference to memorials from the citizens of
Iowa ; but memorials were transparent affairs, easily
manufactured. And the " \\ ilson Committee " { tin-
Credit Mobilier Investigation) of 1872 could make it-
whitewashing report that " no evidence could be found "
of money having been Used for "improper purposes."
to tht- Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company and the
I own Falls and Sioux City Railroad Company. By the same
act the Iowa Central Air Line and the Cedar Rapids and Mi-
-ouri River Railroad Company received a total of 783,096.33
acre-, supplement!. d by 347.317.64 acres by act of June 2. 1864.
The acts of May 15, 1850, and June j, 1804, al>o gave extensive
'and .a rants to the Chicago. Rock Island and Pacific Railroad
Company.
Till-: IJLA1K AM) GAKKETT FORT L N MS 115
either in Congress or in the Iowa Legislature. But the
testimony before this very committee flatly contra-
dicted its conclusions. It was revealed that a whole
string of conspicuous members of Congress had suddenly
become large stockholders in the Dubuque and Sioux
City Railroad. 1011 Upon getting the restoration of the
land grant, Blair organized a construction company,
called the Sioux City Railroad Contracting Company, and
by the usual cumulative system of frauds in construc-
tion work, made immense " profits,'' reaching many mil-
lions of dollars. Some of the railroads that Blair plun-
dered are now parts of the Illinois Central system, of
which Harriman became dictator.
It must not be thought, however, that outright bribery
was always resorted to in order to secure subsidies, 'spe-
cial rights and immunities. In the first stages of rail-
road history direct bribery was the usual means; but as
time wore on. the passing of monty in direct forms
became less frequent, and a less crude, finer and more
insidious system of bribery was generally substituted.
The Western magnates began to follow the advice of
that Eastern magnate who declared that it was easier to
elect, than to buy. a legislature.
The newer system as it was carried on in Iowa and
uther states was succinctly described in 1805 by William
Larrabee, erstwhile Governor of Towa. " Outright brib-
er}-." he wrote, with a long and keen knowledge of the
facts.
lib
- pribably the means lo;<s! often employed by corporation- i.,
carry their measures. ... It is the policy of the political
.rruption committees of corporations to ascertain the weak-
ness and wants of every man whose -ervices they arc likely to
need, and to attack him, if his surrender -hould be essential
to their victory, at his weakest point. Men with political am-
bition are encouraged to aspire to preferment, and are assured
of corporate support to bring it about. Briefless lawyers are
promised corporate business or salaried attorneyships. Those
in financial straits are accommodated with loan-. Vain men
are flattered and given new-paper notoriety. Others are given
passes for their families and their friends. Shippers are given
advantages in rates over their competitors. The idea is that
every legislator shall receive for his vote and influence some
compensation which combines the maximum of desirability to
him with the minimum of violence to his self-respect. . . .
The lobby which represents the railroad companies at legisla-
tive sessions i:- u-na'.ly the large-t, the most sagacious and
the mo.-t unscrupulous of all. In extreme cases influential
constituents of doubtful members are sent for at the last mo-
ment to labor with their representatives, and to assure them
that the sentiment of their districts is in favor of the measure
advocated by the railroad:-. . Telegrams pour in upon the unsus-
pecting member.-. Petitions in favor of the propo.-ed measure
are also hastily circulated among the more unsophisticated con-
stituents of members sensitive to public opinion, and are then
presented to them as an unmistakable indication of the popu-
lar will Another powerful reinforcement of the rail-
road lobby is not infrequently a subsidized press and its cor-
r< -pondent.-.
I hit the robbery by means of construction companies
hi- numerous railroad projects formed only a part oi
wealth gra-ped by Plair. One-eighth of the entire
d main of the richly fertile State of Iowa wa- granted
to railroad^, most of which i'dair owned. Thi- reached
an area almost as large as the Slate of Massachusetts.
Settler- were compelled to pav an exorbitant price for
farm land-, and very often were tinder mortgage to tr..-
railroad companies. A detailed description of Pilair'.-
methods would be simply a repetition of those described
in previous chapters in the case of other magnates.
I'Lill.A.XTIIKOI'Y COMI'ARKD WITH. FACT.
Although incurably stingy in personal expenditures
the meanest of men Blair donated just enough money
to procure the award of being an extremely pious phi-
lanthropist. I le founded one hundred churches in the
West; lie established a Presbyterian Academy at a cost
of 8150,000, and gave several hundred thousand more
dollar.-, to the Presbyterian Church. 1'ut what were the
effects of his frauds and oppressions and those of his
successors upon the very people to whom he so de-
voutly contributed pulpits and gospels? Writing of the
Iowa railroads, Dr. Frank II. Dixon, a conservative
writer, says :
The roads had it in their power lo make and unmake cities.
In de-troy the businesses of individuals, or to force their re-
moval to favored points. 'I lie people were quickly up in arms
against this policy. The flame of opposition was fanned by
the hitter feelings aroused through absentee owner-hip, so
prevalent in the Western States at this time. A well-settled
conviction possessed the people that the owner- of capital, di-
rccting their operations ;';; ahscnlui and through intermediaries
d their interest in Western affairs to the amount of divi-
d' n'.Is which they could squeeze from the shippers. 11
And, of course, the large amounts of watered stock,
upon which these dividends had to be paid, were i--ued
to cover the gigantic fraud- of the railroad constructors
and of succeeding groups of manipulators.
This, in outline, was the course of Blair, so eminent
and exalted a capilali-t; here i- rut elucidation of the
Il8 HISTORY 01- THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
line textures of his " rare business instincts " ; and
knowing it, the mystery of where his sixty or ninety
millions came from is quite apparent, if not entirely
clear.
What Blair and others were doing in the North and
West before, during, and after the Civil \Yar, John \V.
Garrett and Johns Hopkins were doing in Maryland.
Scarcely referred to now. Garrett was extolled in his day
as a " famous railroad king " ; and in this case it is
not the man so much nor the Garrett fortune which
commands interest as is the story of the railway line
that he and Hopkins largely owned; this property forms
to-day one of the great transportation systems of the
country.
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO 1ST1ET .BY Pl'BLlC MONEY.
As were other railroads, the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road was built almost wholly with funds granted by
State, counties and municipalities. In 1827 the State
of Maryland granted a subscription of 8500.000 as first
aid, and the city of Baltimore the same sum. At the
outset the projectors lot til v disclaimed any intention ot
asking any further grants of public aid; private capita!.
said they, would construct the road. But seven year-
later they made another inroad upon the public treasury;
the State of Maryland was induced to subscribe $3,000,-
ooo more in 1835. and the city of Baltimore $3.000.000
in fB^C). In 1838 they obtained $1,000.000 from the city
- f Wheeling. 12 For a while they were discreet enough
ui refrain fr^m again attacking the public treasury; but
to the Balii-
F,H. 1^4, etc
ll'J
when, in 1850, they applied to the Common Council of
Baltimore for $5,000,000 more, and obtained die amount,
there was some questioning" as to what had become of
the many million.-, contributed from the public ex-
chequer. A considerable part, it was evident, had been
used in constructing the railroad, but opinions were
freely expressed that the directors had been enriching
themselves by the customarv grafting device.-- of the day
--such as, for instance, those used by Blair in Xcw
Jersey. Pennsylvania and Xew York.
Whenever, however, opposition to additional appro-
priations sprang up and embarrassing questions were
asked, the director.-- would have their glittering arguments
ready. " See what a great work we have been carrying
on. Is this not an enterprise of the greatest importance
to the whole community, to the farmer, the mechanic
and the business man? Now, when we are on the high
road to completion, shall we have to suspend because of
lack of funds? \Yould not this be a great public ca-
lamity? " Such arguments told with the public: and the
legislatures and common councils, corruptly influenced,
could always base their explanations upon them.
Plundered by the original cli<|ue. the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad went into financial ruin. N'olwilhstand-
mg the great bounties that it had received, it was in a
demoralized condition in i-v>. and its treasury was
emuiy. Carrel I and [ fopkin>, who hail long been asso-
< : lei! with it and who had prohr.bly shared in the loot
I2O
rett was the son of a rich shipping merchant ; Hopkins
had made money in the grocery business.
Garrett and Hopkins not only continued the long pre-
vailing frauds, but put through many other fraudulent
and corrupt acts. Here, for example, is one of the
-mailer frauds: The millions of stock subscriptions do-
nated by the State of Maryland for the building of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad had been to a large ex-
tent floated in London among British capitalists. The
interest had to be paid by Maryland to these financiers
in gold. Did the company, on its part, reimburse the
State in coin? By no means. It claimed, by force of
certain judicial decisions, that it was not required to pay
interest to the State otherwise than in currency. Un-
der the prevailing money conditions, and estimating the
difference in rates of exchange, this form of payment
meant a constant loss to the State of Maryland a loss
reaching more than a total' of $400,000, of which amount
the Baltimore and Ohio cheated the State.
Far greater were the amounts of which the State of
Maryland was cheated in the fraudulent manipulation
of what was called the \Yashmgton Branch of the Bal-
timore and Ohio Railroad. In return for franchises
and aid. the company agreed to pay the State one-fifth
of the pa->enger receipts. After the branch was in suc-
cessful operation, its treasury was constantly represented
as so -icklv that there was no money in hand with
pay the State. Time after time inquiries were
honest legislators as to where the great profits
, Xo satisfactory answer was ever given: the
~ absolutely rhealed : and, finallv, a corrupt act
: prnrticallv abandoning all of iK. -'.'
121
and C )hio Railroad Company caused a scries of measures
to be passed exceeding in corruption, in some respects,
those put through by Commodore Yanderbilt in New
York. Repeatedly the legislatures of Maryland, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and other States, and
the common councils of many cities, were bought up.
and the courts were thoroughly subverted. Franchises
of inestimable value were given away ; the public treas-
ury was cheated out of the sums advanced, and was
drawn upon to pay the expense of improvements; large
stock watering issues were authorized, and the company
was virtually relieved from taxation. By 1876 fully
$88,000,000 of its property went untaxed.
The militant object of Garrett and Hopkins was the
destruction of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal as a com-
petitor. As Commodore Yanderbilt in Xcw York found
the Erie Canal to be a competitor of his lines, so Gar-
rett and Hopkins decided that they could not get a
monopoly of transportation in Maryland until the Ches-
apeake and Ohio Canal had been extinguished as a com-
petitor. The obstacles in their way were great, for the
State of Maryland had expended many millions of pub-
lic money in the construction of the canal, and owned
it. and the public was not disposed to see its usefulness
impaired. This was especially true of the merchant
class, which demanded competition and insisted that
monopoly would be ruinous.
DKSTROVI'XC; CANAL COMPETITION.
Beginning in 1860, Garrett and Hopkins corrupted
the Maryland Legislature, until by one act piled upon
another, they were gradually able to wrest away its
< '\\ner-hip from the Stair. P.ti! they did not merely de-
pcnd upon tlie bribing of legislators after they were in
office. With money supplied by Garrett and Hopkins.
the political bosses of .Maryland engaged in packing
of primaries, indiscriminate bribery of voters and stuffing
of ballot boxes, thus insuring the election of subservient
official-. Once the canal was practically in their hands,
(.jarrett and Hopkins made it useless as a competitor.
Having a complete monopoly they now exacted extor-
tionate charges for transportation, and they likewise
increased their profits bv cutting the pay of their em-
ployes. In desperation, the railroad workers declared a
strike in 1877. False reports of the violence of the
strikers were immediately dispatched broadcast. Using
these charges as a pretext, the military was called out.
At Martinsburg, \V. \"a.. the State militia refused to lire
upon the strikers, but a company of militia, recruited
from a class hostile to the strikers, opened fire, killing
manv of the strikers and wounding others.
Roth (jarrett and Hopkins extorted out large sum>
from their control and manipulations of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad. Hopkins' fortune, at his death,
amounted to nominally Si 0.000,000. At the time of hi-
demise, in 1^73. he was " the wealthiest citizen of Balti-
more.'' The most clo-etisted of men. he relaxed in at
least one respect during the last year of his life. Fol-
lowing the example of so many other multimillionaires
of the period, he made certain of the perpetuation of hi-
memory a< a "great philanthropist." To this end, in
March. 1^73, he gave properly valued at 84.500.000 with
which to found a ho-phal in Baltimore : he presented
ith a public park, and he donated $3,500,000
Till': ULAiK AND GAKKETT FORTUNES 123
as an initial benefaction for the founding of the Johns
Hopkins University. Here it is pertinent to inquire
what was the form of property given in these bounties.
Very largely, it consisted of Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road stock ; it was property representing the corruption
of public life, the abasement of the workers and the gen-
eral spoliation of the entire community.
And what was Garrett' s share of the proceeds of the
joint control? At his death, in 1884, it was said to be
$15,000.000, but it was undoubtedly much more. This
wealth descended to his son Robert, who went through
a series of personal excesses, to wind up in melancholia
and softening of the brain. Obviously enough, he was
no match for those abler capitalists, the Yanderbilts,
Goulds and Scott ; 1:; they pounced upon him and ruth-
lessly despoiled him as his father had despoiled others ;
his autocratic power and sway gradually vanished. When
he died, in 1896, his wealth had shrunk to about $5,000,-
ooo. and the Baltimore and Ohio system had passed
under the control of the Pennsylvania railroad group of
magnates.
Ki A current siory, frequently published, was to this effect:
That Robert Garrett had secretly consummated negotiations for
the purchase of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore
Railroad, and the night before the final arrangements were to
be made invited a friend to celebrate the occasion. When
bibulous from champagne, (iarrctt revealed the secret. The friend
excused himself, went immediately to Scott, of the Pennsylvania
Railroad, and informed that magnate. Scott at once filled a
satchel full of bonds, and hurried away to make an offer to the
capitalists controlling the Philadelphia. Wilmington and Balti-
more Railroad, outbid Garrett, and had secured the ownership
of that railroad for the Pennsylvania system almost before Gar-
rett had awakened from his drunken stupor.
CHAPTER VI
THE PACIFIC QUARTET
During the range of years when the Yanderbilts,
Gould, Sage, Blair and various other railroad magnates
were hurling themselves upward into the realms of mas-
terful wealth, four other noted capitalists whose careers
were interjoined, were doing likewise in the Far \Yest.
This group was o imposed of Collis P. Huntington,
Leland Stanford, Charles Crocker and Mark Hopkins.
It was an unusual brotherhood in that, for a long time,
they hung together with a tenacious fidelity not often
found among railroad capitalists. In fact, it was so rare
a phenomenon that the mention of it deserves a place of
supreme precedence. Such magnates as Commodore
Yanderbilt and William H. Yanderbilt, Gould and Sage,
preferred to go it alone, not merely satisfied with the
lion's share, but determined to bag it all. if they could;
they were disirustful and intolerant of partners except
as expediency demanded, and then they acted with them
only to fleece them eventually. The Pacific quartet were
also starkly individualistic, each for himself, but they
moderated their propensities enough to fuse their
interests in a common harmony of aim. Even more:
they >agaciously weighed the >pecial fitness of each, as-
signed tlie duties according to this
mem. and divided the >poil< with
fairness.
124
COLLIS P. HUNTINGTON.
TI1K PACIFIC <Ji:. \UTET 125
So far as railroad magnate.-.-, were concerned, this was
a remarkable feature of their lime.
FOUR MEN WHO COl/LD ACT TOGETHER.
In fine, this group was distinguished by a method of
intelligent cooperation. To this fact \vas due, in a
measure, their rapid success in obtaining great wealth
without the necessity of dragging through intermediate
stages. They were among the first of the magnates to
prove the superiority of the principle of systematic
organization a lesson which the Standard Oil group
took up a little later, amplified, improved, and developed
into a superfine system. Mere was not a case of where
one man doniinatingly insisted that he alone was en-
dowed with all of the functions required in successful
business. The Pacific quartet recognized the value of
specialization. In a general way, Huntington was in-
trusted with the supervision of the financial affairs :
Stanford of the plans for the manipulation of law and
politics ; Crocker was placed in charge of the construc-
tion work, and Hopkins was the commandant of office
details. The particular useful qualifications of each of
the four were mutually appreciated and availed of. [n
addition to this divi>ion of overseership, all joined to-
gether as a unit in the promotion and consummation of
their plans.
Circumstances did not compel these four men to be
:>f quite the same revolutionary type of capitalists as the
Yanderbilts and ( loulds. They did not have to do much
pummeling of smaller capitalists, nor expend much effort
in beating down the sacred doctrine of " free and unre-
stricted competition." Their territory was largely one
v. Irich had not been taken up by companies of small cap-
italists, building in piecemeal fashion. They had the
opportunity of bringing forth great railroad systems out
of what had been a void. At a bound they sprang from
an obscure position to that of great capitalists; the
transformation from petty dealers in merchandise or law
to multimillionaires was a quick, sudden one. Within a
lew years thev took their place among the industrial dic-
tators of flic United States; owners of great railroad
and steamship lines and of many other forms of prop-
erty, and of an immense domain of land not less than
30,000,000 acres in all. All of these men have passed
away, but the wealth that they became possessed of re-
mains ; and even if their personal careers are of no lin-
gering interest, their fortunes are still active, and the
history of their properties is of very pertinent present
importance.
TIIF.Y BKGIX \VITJI SCAXT CAPITAL.
All four had migrated from the Hast to California
after the discovery of gold on the Pacific Coast. There
Iluntington carried on a hardware and miners'
supply store at Sacramento, and Hopkins became his
partner; Crocker was likewise a small merchant, and
Stanford was a lawyer. The four were not able to
scrape together a pool of more than an insignificant sum
with which to execute what was then considered one ol
the greatest and most difficult railroad projects of modern
times.
The phrase monger is addicted to rhapsodizing upon
the marvelous self-confidence which could initiate a huge
railroad line with only a trivial sum as a starter. This
may be a romantic \vav of describing their prowess and
Till-". I'ACli'IC OUAKTF.T 1 2/
ingenuity. But neither was the project itself of their
conception, nor did they have to supply the funds.
Years before they took hold of the work as a definite
undertaking, the building of Pacific lines had been agi-
tated and urged, and the Government had surveyed feasi-
ble routes. 1 Not one of the quartet knew anything of
railroad construction, nor had the least fundamental
knowledge of how to equip and operate a railroad.
In what direction, then, lay their ability? Purely and
wholly in the line of promoting. The capitalist system
was of such a fantastically inverted nature that to grasp
the ownership of anything did not imply or require the
ability of supervision. Railroads, factories, mines and
public utility systems were generally owned by men
otten bv absentees who knew nothing of any aspect ol
them except the one all-important phase the budget of
profit or loss.
The ability of the promoter was the most necessary
consideration, although not the foremost in insuring the
title of ownership. Very frequently, in the case of fac-
tories and mines, promoters had to get funds from bank-
ing houses, which usually, by skillful law work, suc-
ceeded in getting those promoters into a legal snare, forc-
ing them out. and expropriating their property. Rail-
road promoters, however, did not have to depend so
much upon private bankers. They could draw upon
Government, State and cities for advances of money.
If a man, or a >et of men. could succeed in bribing Con-
gress and the legislatures to donate land grants and ad-
\ ance the funds, it was a very simple matter to hire
highly competent civil engineers to survey and build the
routes, and employ good executives to run them
they were built.
The first and prime necessity was the purchase of legis-
lation with its corollaries franchises, gifts and free
access to the public treasuries. This done, the remain-
der of the program was easy. In this regard it was
that Huntington and his partners showed their finesse
not an unusual finesse, by any means ; its caliber was
neither more nor less than that of many another capi-
talist, who also had been adroit in bribing legislation
through.
L'pon organizing the Central Pacific Railroad Company
in i8(')i, the Huntington group could not privately raise
more than about $1(^5.000. of which amount they, them-
selves, put in about $50.000. This sum. ridiculously
inadequate to build a railroad estimated to cost $25.000.-
ooo, was, however, enough and more than enough, for
certain well-understood primary operations.
With it expenses could be defrayed at the centers of
legislation: petitions and memorials concocted; advo-
cates paid, and newspapers subsidized. If the trick were
well turned, a whole succession of franchises, special
laws, land grants and money subsidies would follow.
Thus we see that the original capital needed in many cap-
italist enterprises was not for the actual prosecution of
the work, but for the purpose of bribery. In fact,
money, as an absolute requirement, could be dispensed
with. For their vote-, legislators (being wily, tactful
and practical men ) much preferred cash, but when cash
could not be fingered, they conveniently took whatever
" inducements " \vere offered. We have come across in-
-tance after instance in which embryo capitalist- or-
ganizcd corporations, rolled off stocks and bonds (which
Till. P. \ClKiC <jl. \K1KT 12<)
cost the expense of engraving only) and used them, in
lien of eash, as payment for legislative votes.
If the average railroad corporation, argued the Pa-
cific quartet, could so easily, by the simple media of
bought laws, annex itself to public treasuries, what could
not they do? A far more telling and impressive public
argument the Huntington group had than most of their
lellow railroad promoters. Already " in the fifties "
there was an insistent, genuinely enthusiastic popular
demand, reaching almost the proportions of a clamor,
for railroad connections between coast and coast. Upon
the strength of this eagerness, much bounty and booty
could be extracted. At the outbreak of the Civil War
the demand became irresistibly intensified by the lack of
speedy intercoastal communications, both railroad and
telegraph. Moreover, the popular imagination was cap-
tivated and dazzled by the immensity of the undertaking.
\\~ith prevailing opinion in so favorably an assenting
state, matters could be pliably molded.
TltKY C,KT TIIKIK LAWS.
Yet while the people, as a whole, were desirous of Pa-
cific railroads, considerable sections of them were by no
means reconciled to the corrupt legislative methods of
presenting large area.-- of land and large advances of
money for private enrichment.
The farmer, burdened by the price that he had to pay
for his small farm, and often blanketed by a mortgage,
did not quite approve of the squandering of the public
domain fur the benefit of a law-created handful of
grandee.-. The small traders, resenting the very idea of
any class above them, bitterly objected, as a class, to
great capitalists being created by virtual edict of law.
T3O HISTORY ()] T11K C.KKAT AMKKICAX FORTTXKS
The alert and organized sections of the working class
saw in this constant manipulation of legislative bodies
another perversion of governmental power for the ag-
grandizement of a small and hostile class, and the rapid
impetus to an overshadowing plutocracy. Aware of this
general feeling, legislative assemblies had to be " in-
duced " ; they might themselves use fine-sounding and
seemingly solid arguments in explaining to constituencies ;
but a very different incentive appealed to them ; settle-
ments had to be made in cash or its equivalent. -
A more temptingly opportune time for spoliative meas-
- The California Legislature was frequently charged with cor-
ruption, hut its farcical investigations of itself always resulted
in whitewashing reports.
One of these scandals was that of April, 1861, when John F.
McCauley charged that legislators had sought bribes from him
to pass a claim that he held against the State of California.
The Legislature appointed an investigating committee on April
18, 1861. (See Appendix to Journal of California Assembly,
Twelfth Session, 1861. Doc. No. 15). .McCauley testified that
one Wittgenstein, a go-between for Chairman VValden of the
Assembly Committee on Claims, approached him and told him
that for a favorable report Walden wanted $400 or $500
(pp. 2-4). In his testimony Wittgenstein admitted telling Mc-
Cauley that Walden had made $7,000 or $8,000 in that way : he
also admitted saying that Walden had made a large amount of
money during the session. Wittgenstein substantially admitted
the truth of McCauley's charges (pp. 5-11). The report, how-
ever, was a whitewashing one.
Another scandal was when the editor of the newspaper, the
'' American Flag.'' specifically charged, in 1866. that a fund of
$108,000 had been expended in the Legislature by local bankers.
commission merchants and importers to prevent the repeal of a
law called the Specific Contract Act. lie accused seven Sen
ators of having sold their votes for Su.ooo each. An investi-
gating committee of the California Senate was appointed. One
it the witnesses examined was Darius O. Mills, then a San
Francisco banker, and later a prominent New York multi-
millionaire. He and other witnesses denied knowing anything
of a corruption fund. The committee's report exonerated the
accused. '' Report of Senate Committee of Investigation on
Certain Charges Made by the F.ditor of the ' American Flau,' "
Appendix to Journal of Senate and Assembly of the Legislature
of California. 7866. Vol. ii.
THE PACIFIC Ol'AUTtT 131
ures than the period of the Civil War could hardly have
been found. Kngrossed in the tumultuous upheavals of
those convulsive years, the people had neither the pa-
tience nor disposition to keep close track of routine en-
actments in Congress or in the legislatures. At the very
beginning of that \var the Pluntington group organized
the Central Pacific Railroad Company, with a capital
stock of $8,500.000, nearly the whole of which capital was
fictitious so far as actual investment of money was con-
cerned. At once they directed their energies right to
the core of things, lluntington betook himself to Wash-
ington to lobby in Congress, while Stanford, elected Gov-
ernor of California, busied himself with similar ends at
home. Xo visionaries were they, but practical men who
knew how to proceed straightway.
Stanford's work quickly bore fruit in California: the
city of Sacramento was authorized to donate $400,000;
Placer County to loan $550,000, and the State of Califor-
nia to hand over $2,100,000. At the same time, llunt-
ington was doing surpassing missionary dutv in Con-
gress. An act was passed in 1862 by which about $25,-
000,000 in Government six-per-cent. bond- and about
4,500,000 acres of public lands were placed at the dis-
posal of the quartet. The few protects against these
great gifts were immediately silenced. " Is not the Gov-
ernment fully protected?" the promoter- innocentlv in-
quired. " Are not it- loans covered bv a first mortgage?
If the company default-, cannot the Government step in
and recover?" Thi- sounded plausible. Two years
later, however, at the very time when I as we have seen )
the Union Pacific coterie were corrupting Congress to get
greater land grants and altered law--, Huntington again
debauched Congress. An act wn- passed doubling the
Central Pacific'^ land grant and relegating the Govern-
l$2 HISTORY OF Till-: GkHAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
mem':- claim on the Central Pacific to the under position
"I a second mortgage. And. as it turned out later, the
contract with the Government was so deftly drawn that,
according to a decision of the Supreme Court of the
I nited States subsequently, the Government's lien cov-
ered the main lines only, and not the branch lines.
Whether this contract, as drawn, was a result of collu-
sion with Government officials was never determined.
" Whence came the means," asks Bancroft, ' : by which
four men with only moderate fortunes were enabled to
build, buy. own and operate all the roads belonging to
the Central and Southern Pacific systems? In 1869, be-
fore the last spike had been driven at Promontory, the
railroad quartet, besides owning the road, had received
as a loan $24,000,000 of Government bonds forming
a second mortgage on the road, together with 8400.000
of San Francisco bonds as an unconditional gift. $550.-
ooo of county bond-, and $2,100.000 paid, or to be paid,
by the State of California in return for services to be
rendered by the company.'" 3
The operations of the quartet were simple enough.
Once they had obtained the requisite loans and gilts,
they threw aside all pretenses, and openly and vigor-
ously set out to defraud all within reach, not only the
Federal Government, but also States, counties, cities and
investors. First, they organized a construction com-
pnny, called the Credit and Finance Company. Then
they made a contract with themselves to build the Cen-
tral Pacific. With the aid of the loans given by Sacra-
m .-nto and Placer Countv, they built enough road to
draw $^48.000 from the Government as the subsidy of
the fir<t section. ~P>y repeating the process they had the
entire road constructed, with scarcely the expenditure of
3 " History of the Pacific States." xix:62.
Till: PACIFIC (JUAKTET 1J3
a single dollar of their own. The next step was to load
it down with a capitalization of $139,000,000 4 which was
the beginning of still more stock inflation.
A THEFT OF $5O,OOO,OOO.
What was the total of their frauds? The report of
the Pacific Railroad Commission gives no adequate idea
of the immensely valuable rights and possessions of all
kinds that they secured by bribery and fraud. Rut it
does give a comprehensive account of their money and
stock plundering^. " In the accounts of the Central Pa-
cific Railroad Company," the report of the Pacific Rail-
road Commission of 1887 states, "the division of earn-
ings for improper purposes amounted to many millions,
through contracts made by Messrs. Stanford, Hunting-
ton, Hopkins and Crocker with themselves." According
to this report, the cost of building 1.171 miles of road
was $27,217.000, but they fraudulently charged three
times that sum. Here was a theft of more than fiftv
millions in one grand haul. Tn addition to stolen cash,
they issued to themselves $33,722,000 in bonds and $49.-
005.000 of stock. T'ut these sums were only part of the
total thefts. The Pacific Railroad Commission's report
goes on to say :
'Then as directors of the Central Pacific, they took
leases of their own lines for the Central Pacific for
$3.400,000 per annum ; which was at the rate of nearly
thirteen per cent. Fifteen months ago (in i88(>) three
of these directors (Stanford, Huntington and Crocker)
contracted with them-elve< to build an extension of one
hundred and three miles. In payment tliev issued stock
to the amount of $8.000,000, and bomP to the- amount
134 HISTORY 01' THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
of $4,500,000, the market value of the stock and bonds
being at the time $8,340,000. The actual cost of con-
struction was $3,505,000, so that they personally profited
by their own votes by that single transaction to the ex-
tent of $4,834,000," etc., etc.
GROSS CORRUPTION OF CONGRESS.
The process of corruption and theft was continued in
the building of the Southern Pacific Railroad.
In 1871 Congress chartered the Texas and Pacific Rail-
road to run from .Marshall, Texas, to San Diego, Cal.,
and presented the company with approximately 18,000,-
ooo acres of public lands on condition that the road was
to be completed in ten years; otherwise the land grant
was to be declared forfeited. At the same time, Congress
chartered the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to
build a line from El Paso. Texas, to San Francisco, and
gave it a gift of about 5.000,000 acres of public land-.
The Texas and Pacific project was owned by a group
of capitalists headed by Scott, of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road ; the 1 luntington men were at the head of the South-
ern Pacific Railroad Company.
These two groups of capitalists soon came into col-
li-ion : each fiercely sought to oust the other, and gain
an undisputed monopoly of transportation in the terri-
tory in question. The fight was carried into Congress
each side caused the introduction of bills aimed at crip-
pling the other. The contest then narrowed to a ques-
tion of \\hich group could corrupt Congress the more
effectually.
"Scot!." wrote 1 Tuntington on January 2(), 1876. "is
making a terrible effort to pass his bill, and he has many
advantage- with hi- railroad running out from Washing-
TI1K I'.U'llTC (H'AUTKT 135
tun in almost every direction, on which he gives l-Yee
Passes to everyone \vho can help him ever so little.
It has cost money to fix things, so 1 know his
bill would not pass. 1 believe with $200,000 we can pass
our bill." 5
On March 6, 1876, Huntington wrote that "the Rail-
road Committee of the House was set up for Scott, and it
has been a very difficult matter to switch a majority of
the Committee from him, but 1 think it has been done."
On November 11, 1876, Huntington wrote further to one
of his associates, " I am glad to learn that you will send
to this office $2,000,000 by the first of January." On
May 3, 1878, he notified his partners: ' The T. and P.
folks are working hard on their bill and say they are
sure to pass it, but 1 do not believe it. They offered one
member of Congress $ 1,000 cash down, $5,000 when the
bill was passed and Si 0,000 of the bonds when they got
them if he would vote for the bill." 6
Huntington came out victorious. 'There is no room
for doubt," reported the Pacific Railroads Commission
5 We have seen, in the narration of the Gould fortune, how
Scott hail been placed in charge of the Government supervision
of railroad transportation during the Civil War, and how a Con-
gressional committee had exposed the immense extortions in
conveying soldiers, equipment and supplies that some of the
Northern railroads ,-,uccess fully carried on immediately folli wing
Ins appointment.
'' Flu re were 1 many 01 these letters; we have already given a
glimpse of one of them in Chapter iii. Vol. iii. They came to
liyht (as noted in that chapter) in a lawsuit between two fac-
tions. They were published in full in "Driven from Sea to
Sea." by C." C. Post.
"It is impo>Ml)ie. " n ported the 1'aciiie Railroad Commission
in 1887. "to read the evidence of C. P. Huntington and Leland
Stanford and the Collon letters without reaching ihe coiiclu
sion that very large sums of money have been improperly used
in connection with 1< ui 'ation." Vol. i: i .: i . llumingion was
accustomed to boa>iiii'4' of his method of bribery, "Whenever
possible 1 always try to pav in check-', for ihe men who take
them are ever afterward mv slaves."
of 1887, "that a large portion of $4,818,535 was used
for the purpose of influencing legislation, and prcventin;.;
the passage o, measures deemed hostile to the interests
of the company, and for the purpose of influencing elec-
iii >ns. v T
The next thing- the Huntington group did was to force
the Eastern capitalists out of the Texas and Pacific Rail-
read, absorb that line into their own system, and illegally
grab the eighteen million-acre land grant of the Texas
and Pacific. Even under the law, as it stood, the Texas
and Pacific was not entitled to the land grant. The
House Committee on Judiciary on August 3, 1882, after
an investigation, declared that the Texas and Pacific Rail-
road Company had never completed any part of the
route for which the land grant in Xew Mexico. Arizona
and California was given ; that it " had never earned the
grant " ; that it did not purpose to build the road for
which it was chartered and endowed, and that it was
transferring to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company
"all of the rights and titles to the land in question." 8
The Committee on Judiciary prepared a resolution de-
claring ihc forfeiture of the land grant, and urged its
passage by Congress as a joint resolution. It did not
pass.
Presenting the general results as nearly as official
investigations could ascertain them, this is what ilnnt-
ington and hi< associates did: They had received hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in the form ot money, bond-
and land- from ( lovernment. Slates, counties and mu-
;IIK I'Aciric gi'AKTi-rr 137
nicipalitiex As controllers of the Contract and Finance
Company and oilier construction companies, they had
turned over to themselves $142,000,000 in all for ostensi-
ble construction work. They had expended at least five
millions for corrupt political purposes. They had stu-
pendously watered the stock of their railroads, and with
the cumulative proceeds of their thefts had secured
control of nineteen distinct railway systems and of steam-
ship lines, also. They had, by fraud, robbed the Gov-
ernment of many millions of acres of land ; thev had
defrauded the Government of the bulk of the funds that
it had advanced ; they refused to pay more than the
merest nominal taxation, and they extorted onerous rates
for transportation.
This is the general summarv of their acts as set forth
in the report of the Pacific Railroads Commission.
" From the evils of subsidy-giving," says Bancroft,
the country suffered for many years. The population wa.-
shifting, the available resources of the State [California] feu- :
but notwithstanding, there was hardly a county in it that by
1870 had not bunU'iied itself with a debt of from Smo.ooo to
^oo.coo at a high rate of interest, to run in some instance-;
Mxiy years. Companies incorporated under a general law be-
sieged the Legislature annually to pass acts authorizing the
people to vote on incurring this indebtedness; newspapers pa-
rad'.-d tile benefits to be rcceuvd from every railroad scheme.
often without knowing whether it had any merit. Thus, urged
by the Legislature and the press, the people passed under the
rod with the greatest equanimity/'
inn
138
railroads were " apt to fix the rates on a given
article ' all it would bear.' " 10 This description ap-
plied not only to California but to every State and Ter-
ritory reached directly or indirectly by railroads. The
very people whose representatives had given public prop-
erty so lavishly to a few, were robbed in every manner
that ingenuity could formulate. Not only was the pub-
lic plundered ; Huntingdon and his associates ground out
their own lesser stockholders by the same fraudulent
methods that Gould and Sage used, and also, like Gould
and Sage, they cheated out a horde of confiding in-
vestors.
The disillusioning of the people of the Pacific States
was reflected in the messages of the various Governors.
Only a few years previously, the Governors of Califor-
nia and other States had urged the Legislatures to be
extremely generous in donating large bounties to rail-
road projectors and other capitalists. They wrote rap-
turouslv of the great public benefits certain to come from
the construction of railroads, and praised the railroad
promoters as men of the loftiest public spirit. Soon a
decided change came over the spirit of these message-.
Hitter complaints of extortion and robbery succeeded
glowing encomiums. In his message to the California
Legislature, in 1860,, Governor 11. Tl. Haight had thi-
1' > say :
Our land system seems to be mainly formed to ta
ciiitate ihc acquisition of lar^e bodies of land by capitalist.- or
[ 'rations, either a.- donations, or at nominal prices. . . .
rs who pnrcha.-ed from the State lands sold as swamp
or overflowed, find their farms claimed under the railroad
grants, and themselves involved in expensive contests before
Registers of [.and Office-;. 1 '
Tin: PACIFIC QUARTET I3<j
In his inaugural address, delivered on December 8.
1871, Governor Xewton Booth of California expressed
himself :
The undue political influence and financial control that many
corporations have assumed, is not the only evil presented by
them. In their internal administration, between majorities and
minorities, directors and stockholders, cases of the grossest in-
justice are constantly arising. It is not uncommon to find one
class of stockholders enriching themselves from a company
which impoverishes another. . . . The organization of cor-
porations within corporations is a refinement of subtlety and
fraud which should be positively prevented by law. 12
After describing the Central Pacific Railroad's system
of discrimination in fares and freights, " a grievous bur-
den, so long and patiently endured by our people," Gov-
ernor John H. Kinkhead of Xevada wrote to the Leg-
islature of that State in 1879:
Crave, and f believe well-grounded, complaint is made con-
cerning the valuation of railroad property for taxation. The
owners of this species of property are granted exceptional priv-
ileges, and should be made to bear their equal part of all of
the expenses of Government.
Xot one of thc>e messages had any vital result. In
some instances they were sincere, but, as a rule, they
were intended to be nothing more than wordy sops to
appease middle-class public opinion. 1 " Some of the very
'-Inaugural Address of Go\ . Xewton Booth, etc., 10-11.
13 The merchants, manufacturers and importers who had ap-
plauded and banqueted Huutington and his associates only a
few years previously, were now caustically denouncing them,
not for their direct thefts, but for their extortions. For ex-
ample, see "A Petition of the Citizen-; of San Francisco Rela-
tive to the Arbitrary Exactions And lniu>tice v ; of Railroad
Companies." Nearly all of the signers were business firms.
They complained, in this peii'i'>n, of the "arbitrary exactions
and injustice of railroad companies," and demanded State regu-
lations. Appendix to California Senate and Assembly Journal.
Twentieth Session, 1874, Vol. iv. Doc. No. 8.
I4O HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
Governors who wrote them with ^uch a display of ear-
nestness were put in power and controlled by the very
corporations of which they complained. The legisla-
tures were wholly under the domination of the great
private corporations, and the judiciary almost wholly so.
Year after year, the different Governors denounced cor-
porate practices, and demanded corrective legislation,
which never came. Two and three decades after Gov-
ernor Xewton Booth's denunciation, Governors were still
writing similar futile messages.
Acclaimed at first as public benefactors, Huntington
and his associates were subjected to the fiercest de-
nunciation when the people realized the enormous frauds
that they had committed. For the frauds, of which an
epitome has been here given, were only a portion of the
total. It is hardly necessary to plunge into the tortu-
ous mass and maze of detail : how they resorted to nim-
ble subterfuges to escape their obligations, and de-
frauded the Government ; how they corrupted and ruled
States and Territories, and seized hold of one possession
after another; and how, through their control of political
machinery, they sent Representatives and Senators to
Washington as though they were so many errand boy-.
The Pacific quartet were among the first of the mag-
nates to come out into the open and exercise political
power directly, instead of intrusting it to retainers. To
have one of their own members in the United State^
Senate, there to keep alert for their interests, they caused
the California Legislature, in 1887, to elect Stanford to
that body.
Hopkins died in 1876, Crocker in 1888. Very charac-
t eristic <f the peculiarities of prevailing society was one
<if the ways in which [!<>;>kin.-' million- were used. Ili-
\vidow inherited hi- wealth and remarried, and part of
T11K PACIFIC 01. \KTK1 1 _; i
her inheritance went toward the purchase of an old-e-
tablished Xew York newspaper. Thus was witnessed,
as in the case of Gould, a newspaper being financed
by the proceeds of theft, and the inheritors of those pro-
ceeds giving' directions as to what should constitute the
moral and political pabulum fed out to the public. A
splendid country mansion, costing $2,000,000, at Great
Barrington, Mass., is a standing explanation of how
some more of Hopkins' millions were applied. Crocker
left a fortune nominally estimated at $40,000,000.
Stanford's wealth was so great that he, like the As-
tors, the Yanderbilts, Goulds and other magnates, was
forced to the necessity of investing the surplus. Part
of the many millions stolen from the Government and
expropriated from the people, w r as put into San Fran-
cisco street railways, 14 of which system he owned a one-
fourth share, and from which he derived ten per cent, a
year. Other millions were invested in other forms of
property. He became a great landed proprietor. He
owned the immense Vina vineyard, comprising 100,000
acres of land ; the Palo Alto ranch, with its extensive
breeding establishment and its great vineyards, and he
owned much other real estate in San Francisco and else-
where. From his stocks and lands he received, it was
estimated, an income of Si. 000,000 a year.
Up to 1885 he had been merely a financier, so-called,
praised by some as a great railroad builder, by others as
a colossal thief. Xow lie became a full-fledged philan-
thropist by giving property worth many millions for the
establishment of the Leland Stanford, Jr., University.
14 Recent developments in San Francisco showing how brib-
ery was used in getting street railway franchises are but an indi-
cation of the corrupt methods long prevailing.
142 HISTORY OF THE GREAT. AMERICAN FORTV-NI>-
Thus \vas another " scat of learning ;< established jo
be subjected to the censorship of money.
STANFORD IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE.
As a United States Senator. Stanford's salary was
$5,000 a year; he spent 875,000 every session; it was a
pastime of this man to throw twenty-dollar gold pieces to
the newsboys. His chief business in Washington was
to prevent the Government from taking' genuine action
compelling him and his band to disgorge ; to stifle all hos-
tile proceedings, and to get through laws giving more
franchises, land, waterway rights and special privileges,
and to secure license for extortions. On the who!'.-.
he succeeded. This ponderous magnate, weighing two
hundred and thirty-four pounds, was the political wire-
puller of the quartet, while Hunting-ton was the crafty
financier, full of sharp tricks and devious contrivances.
\Yhen Stanford died, in 1893. his estate was appraised
a> nominally worth about $18,000.000. but its size wa-
considerably greater. lie had given large sums for the
Leland Stanford, Jr.. University, and in his will he pro-
vided more millions. The remainder of his estate went
to his widow, who likewise gave donations to this uni-
versity: in all. Air. and Mrs. Stanford pre>ented fully
$30.000,000 for the establishment, expansion and per-
petuation of the institution named after their son.
The fortune plucked by Huntington was greater than
that of any of the other- of the quartet. At his death,
in igoo. it was estimated at from $50.000.000 to $80,-
000,000. Tt embraced interests in a va-t number of rail-
road, -tram-hip and other corporations inU-re-t- which
he had bought with his share of the Pacific railroad-'
LELAND STANFORD.
143
loot, or engineered into his control by fraud. A favorite
boast of bis at one time was that lie could travel from
the Atlantic to the Pacific in his own cars and over his
own rails, and that he could also, if he chose, sail in his
own steamships from Brazil to New York, from thence
to Colon, from Panama to San Francisco, and from
there to Yokohama and Hongkong. His power was
gigantic; he controlled the economic life of millions of
workers, and dictated the government of a half dozen
States. His plunder was intact. In 1894 he was quoted
as saying in answer to a report : "1 never made any
exhibition of $44,000,0(30 of bonds, although 1 could
have displayed twice as much in amount."
THEY IlKCOMi: ARISTOCRATS.
No intelligent person was unaware of the long and
great series of frauds and thefts that Huntington, Stan-
ford, Crocker and Hopkins had plowed through to
squeeze their wealth. Yet, while severely denounced,
they did not have to meet the same taunts and revilings
constantly cast at Jay Could. Essentially they were of
the same stripe as Could, but Could was held up to popu-
lar maledictions as a railroad wrecker, while criticism of
the Huntington group was always tempered with the
remark. " Well, if they stole colossal sums, they at least
constructed great railways and were big factors in the
development of the country." And they had no diffi-
culty in getting instant entree into what was represented
as the " best society." Xo question was raised as to
their eligibility. I>y power of money they at once be-
came a part of the financial aristocracy. Also, by this
same power of money, 1 luntington's adopted daughter
144 HISTORY OK THE CREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
entered with ease the fine circle: of European titled aris-
tocracy ; she married Prince Ilaztfeld, in 1889, and re-
ceived a paternal present of several million dollars.
Huntington lived like a grandee at least residen-
tially. Fie had a mansion in San Francisco ; a superb
place in the Adirondacks, for which he paid $250,000; a
palatial country home at Throgg's Xeck, X. Y. ; and he
built, at an expense of millions, an impressive pile at
1-ifth avenue and Fifty-seventh street, Xew York City. 15
that aristocratic avenue whither so many magnates,
after a career of fraud and theft, came to ensconce
themselves in befitting grandeur. Eight years were spent
in building, at a cost of $250,000, a mausoleum in Wood-
lawn Cemetery a classic, capacious tomb of marble.
THEIR LINES TAKEN OVER BY HARRIMAN.
And there his remains now lie. After his death the
inventory of his estate showed that his wealth was ap-
parently about $60,000,000 ; unquestionably it totalled a
much larger sum. His widow, who still lives, inherited
the greater part of it. But what became of the control
of the railroad and steamship lines which he dominated?
His death occurred at about the very time the Standard
Oil oligarch}', acting through Harriman and its banking
houses, was prepared, in its gradual reaching out for
railroad ownership, to buy in the ownership of the Pa-
cific railroad and steamship lines. The great surplus of
the Standard Oil treasury easily furnished the many
millions needed to buy over the shares held by Mrs.
Huntington ; and the control of the Southern Pacific
and other extensive line?, both railroad and steamship,
'"Hut after ii wns cnnn>!eft d lie could never be persuaded to
live in it. His reason was n belief in the superstition that men
build houses only to die in them.
TT1F. I'.U'I !!(' nUARTKT T.| '
built and sustained by fraud and theft, was taken over l:y
the all-powerful Standard Oil magnates, thus markir, v,
one more aggressive step in the assumption of a central-
ized ownership of the productive and distributing re-
sources of the United States.
CHAPTER VII
J. PIERPONT MORGAN'S GENESIS
Did ever a man of-wealth lave more in panegyrics than
that conquering money hero of these present times. J.
Pierpont Morgan? Long since, his fame was trumpeted
to the four quarters of the earth. His copious praises
have been chanted with an extravagance that in the case
of anyone else would have been rejected as turgid.
Most mighty patriot and unexcelled public-spirited citi-
zen, great financier and noble philanthropist, marvelou.-
" captain of industry " and conservator of the social
structure, friend of kings, and king among men - these
are but a .-elected few of the apotheoses too often seri-
ously accepted by the people at large. One writer in
particular, raptly reaching up for a large expression of
homage, has touched almost the climax of adoration in
emblazoning him. " Morgan the Magnificent.'' 1
Many a hired or acquiescent scribe, plying well his
trade, has reeled out his effusions; and the total of these
lias produced a certain -ettled. aggregate public opinion
which look- up to Morgan with unabated awe and ad-
miration. In the firmament of wealth no man shines out
more dazzlingby than he.
1 f ever there thrived a money potentate whose for-
,46
J. I'IKRPOXT MOKOAXS ( IK X KSJS 147
tune had been preeminently eulogized as having been
ac([uired by pnrilv of method, that man is J. I'ierpont
Morgan. Xot once has he been subjected to strictures
of " tainted wealth," nor at any time has he had to
fight an inimical public opinion such as Jay ( iould had to
in his day, and as Rockefeller has encountered throughout
his career. For the last thirty years Morgan has been
overwhelmed with laudations of every character. Spo-
radically, perhaps, some unshackled spirit in Congress
or on the public platform might rise to break abruptly
in upon this outpouring of ilatterv bv venturing criti-
cisms or revelations. Hut these irruptions passed idly
by, hardly noticed in the general, continuous deluge of
encomiums.
The praises, abundant enough, bestowed upon other
magnates, have paled beside those heaped upon Morgan.
Without question, he has been held aloft as the most ex-
traordinary financier of all. His feats in this regard
have been recounted as though they bordered upon tin-
miraculous. As a railroad and industrial magnate he
has been interminably glorified. But fully as much so
has he been held up to the world's admiration as a philan-
thropist and a man of versatile parts and benevolence-- :
an cncourager and patron of Art, a lover of Literature,
a Cntsus with a mind capable of at once grasping the
most intricate detail- of finance and reveling" in the beau-
ties and understanding of the Fine Arts.
fn all of the mass of reiterated, embellished ac-
counts turned out about Morgan's career, there is no
particle of truth save one undisputed fact. I ndeniably
he is one of the towering, aggressive money monarch--
of the I "nited States. What does he not own or con-
trol? Scan the conglomeration of properties owned
exclusivelv bv him. or jointlv with others. What a
148
bewildering list! The mind is taxed at inventorying
them, and forbears enumeration. Banking institutions
and railroads, industrial plants and mines, land, public
utility systems and shares, steamships, publishing houses
and newspapers all his, or partially so. Morgan is
supereminently one of the '' Christian men to whom
God in His infinite wisdom has confided the property
interests of the country."
Let us scrutinize the career of this man whom God is
alleged to have chosen as a trustee for the steward-
ship of the nation's property, and for the guidance of
its Government.
Foulest of all foul blasphemies would it be to in-
terrogate the divine choice of lieutenants or derogate
from them. Yet inasmuch as those who make such
emphatic claims of heavenly appointment have not as
yet been able to produce their credentials (although
earnestly beseeched to do so), we fallible mortals shall
have to fall back upon mere human standards of judg-
ment. What (by way of analogy), if the people of
the United States should forthwith conclude to confis-
cate all private property, and declare collective owner-
ship upon the ground that the good Lord God had au-
thorized it so what would the present legal owner.-
say? Would they not resist, and demand written docu-
ments, attesting the fact of divine sanction, signed and
sealed by celestial notaries? And even if, let us fancy,
such documents were forthcoming, would not our mag-
nates have the Supreme Court of the United State-
denounce them a< stupid forgeries, issue a mandate for
the arrest of their contumacious Author, and again
-i/'rnlv declare, for the twentieth thousand time, that iv
power was superior to that of the Supreme Court of the
V-;t,-d States?
J. riKKl'ONT MORGAN S GKNJiSIS l^J
All other criteria failing, we shall have to consider
Morgan by the light of terrestrial evidence perhaps a
poor method, but the only one within our horizon.
NOT OTITK A " SELl'-MADK MAX."
Morgan is not one of those magnates coming wholly
under the classification of being a " self-made man."
This phrase, used with so unctuous an effect in
contemporaneous descriptions of rich men's careers, has
never been applied to Morgan. For once, there is a
break-off in the almost unvarying run of similitudes.
Of the early careers of nearly all other multimillion-
aires the same story has been mechanically written by
glorifying writers ; how these men started out as poor
boys, opened a little store somewhere, saved money
and gradually worked up to wealth. In the nineteenth
century the term " ^elf-made man*' was invested with
an inordinate importance as signifying great personal
energy and ability ; so much credit was supposed to at-
tach to it that it was always mentioned with praise and
received with pride. The object of its application was
pointed out as a man who, possessing no original ad-
vantages, overcame all obstacles by sheer force of skill
and determination, and achieved wealth.
Thi>. however, could not be said of J. Pierpont Mor-
gan. His father, Junius S. Morgan, was q millionaire.
Ascending by successive .-tcps from the positions of
farmer bov. dry goods clerk, bank clerk and commer-
i-ial man, Junius S. Morgan bec;une a partner of George
IVabodv in the bankinir business. When the Civil War
15O HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
ment tlieir wealth suddenly began to pile up ; where
hitherto they had amassed riches by stages not remark-
ably rapid, they now added many millions within a
very few years.
ins FATHER'S CAREER.
How did they contrive to do it? Biographical nar-
ratives aver that it was done by legitimate banking meth-
ods, although what those methods were is not explained.
But if we are to believe the comments and criticisms
appearing in the American newspapers of the time, their
methods were not only very far from being legitimate,
but were within the pale of the most active treason.
The Constitution of the United States defines treason
as consisting in citizens levying war upon the nation,
or in giving aid and comfort to the enemy. According
to writers of the day. the methods of George Peabody
and Company were of such a character as to be not
only treasonable, but double treason, in that, while in
the very act of giving insidious aid to the enemy, George
Peabody and Company were the financial plenipoten-
tiaries of the United States Government, and were being
well paid to advance its interests.
An article for example, published in the Springfield
Republican- in October, 1866, asserted: "For all
who know anything of the subject know very well that
he [Peabody] and his partners in London gave us no
faith and no help in our struggle for national existence.
They participated to the full in the common English
distrust of our cause and our success, and talked and
: i d f r i!jc South r.'ithrr lli'in tor the nation."
Evidently, it was the sight of the large benefactions
which I'eabody was then giving that prompted the re-
marks upon the origin of his fortune.
MILLION'S FKO.H ALLEGED TUKASOX.
The writer of this article went on to say ihat George
Peabody and Company swelled the feeling of doubt
abroad, and speculated upon it. " Xo individuals," he
continued, " contributed so much to Hooding our money
markets with the evidences of our debt in Kurope, and
breaking down their prices and weakening financial con-
fidence in our nationality than George I'eabody and
Company, and none made more money by the operation.
All the money, and more, we presume, that Mr. I'eabody
is giving away so' lavishly among our institutions of
learning was gained by the speculations of his house in
our misfortunes." 3 A writer in the New York Evening
Post, issue of October 26, 1866, also made the same state-
ments, accusing Peabody and Junius S. Morgan of using
their positions as United States financial representatives
to undermine the very cause that they were paid to rep-
resent, and profiting heavily from their teacher}-.
These are a few of the newspaper comments then
current. \Yhether they were all true, or partially true,
or not true at all, we do not know: no confirmation of
them can be found in official records. The statements
'This article \vas al>o published in the Xe\v York '"Times."
is.-ue of October 31. 1866.
" \Ye ha\e in ibis country," wrote Cloud in his ''Monopolies
and the People," published in 1873, "a moneyed aristocracy, e>>m-
posed mainly of men who speculated in t!ie;r country's in i-- for-
tunes during the late Civil YYar. ami \vho under pretense of
aiding the (iovenimem. made their i \veniy. fifty and one hundred
PIT cent, and ama-sed larije for ,:;, - l,y takim: a d vantage of ihe
ride of u-ar a-' it submerged a nation'- hopes" p. j2~.
152 HISTORY OF Till-: GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
are given here for what they may be worth. 4 But ii
should he remembered that not the one-thousandth part
of what was going on in the world of capitalism ever
found its way into official documents. Reasoning from
conditions prevailing at the time, it is more than likely
that the accusations were by no means ill-founded.
YOL'NG MORGAN'S ENVIRONMENT.
In the chapters on the Yanderbilt and the Gould for-
tunes an abundance of facts from the Government rec-
ords have been presented, depicting how every part of
ihe capitalist class was engaged in the most gigantic
frauds and swindles upon the Government during the
Civil War. To add to this collocation would be super-
fluous were it not necessary to bring out clearly in each
case the prevailing methods, influences and conditions,
and to show that particular acts were not those of in-
dividuals so much as of a class. Peabody and the elder
Morgan were but following the standards of their class,
the capitalist order of society, and the lessons which
4 Regarding another of Peabody's transactions, however, cer-
tain definite facts are embodied in official documents. From
these documents it would conclusively appear that Peabody had
been long carrying on methods somewhat similar to those thai
he was accused of profiting by during the Civil War.
In 1839 the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company found oc-
casion to complain bitterly of Peabody's methods as its finan-
cial representative in London. The stock of this company was
secured by bonds issued by the State of Maryland as pledge for
its debt. Peabody sold these bonds in Kurpe at ruinous dis-
counts, and with large sums of money belonging" to the com-
pany in his possession, refused to honor its bills. By this
pmce>s he made large profits. His excuse was the critical con-
dition of tlu- European money markets. The directors of the
company formally approved his action, probably to let him out
eracrfully. but were glad to accept his resignation. U. S. Sen-
a'c Documents, First Session. Twenty-sixth Congress, 1839-40,
Vol. viii. Doc. Xo. oio. This document contains the full cor-
!"<.-'! 'H.'u'nce between the company arc! Peabody.
j. 1'iiiki'uXT MORGANS ciiXKSis 153
young J. i'ierpont Morgan imbibed were those taught in
exemplary fasliion by the whole of the class. To de-
scribe his transactions with a precipitate abruptness of
treatment, while omitting a perspective upon his times,
would afford no understanding of the molding forces in
operation, and would be prejudicial and without aim.
In every department of business the most persistent
and gigantic frauds had long been committed by capital-
ists, and grew to enormous proportions during the Civil
War. Xot only were those rich bribers and defrauders
secure from punishment, but they had little difficulty in
keeping all, or nearly all, of the wealth thus fraudulently
acquired, and investing much of it in other channels. It
is advisable to advert here again to the practices of that
large body of importers who had already acquired con-
sequential fortunes, and who, when Morgan was just
starting out, occupied a superior position as respectable,
conspicuous and patriotic " leading citizens."
In- the one prolific field of defrauding the Government
of customs dues, large private fortunes had already been
amassed by the year 1860. In preceding volumes we
have given instance after instance, particularly the enor-
mous frauds of Phelps, Dodge and Company. But those
instances were only a few of an immense total.
A Congressional report in 1850 (Ex. Documents, Sec-
ond Session, Thirt\-fir<t Congress. 1850-51. Vol. V, Ex.
Doc. Xo. 441 specified 2.002 different cases of fraudu-
lent undervaluations on the part of nearly as many im-
porters at Boston. Philadelphia, Xew York and Xew Or-
leans. Replying to a resolution of the I'nited States
Senate calling for a statement of measures adopted to
prevent frauds upon the revenue, I*. S. Sccretarv of the
I reasurv Corwin reported i I . S. Senate Document?.
r'irsi Session. Thirty-first Congress. [(840-50. Vol. XI\ .
154 UIM'ORV OF THE GREAT AMERICAN l-'ORTfNEs
Doc. Xo. 79 j that the honest trader had no opportunity
in business. " All the frauds," he wrote, " which can
be perpetrated by double invoices and false valuations
continue without abatement. Honest merchants and fair
traders have been driven from the business of importing
foreign merchandise, being unable to compete with the
dishonest practices that prevail and which our present
system favors. . . . The means at the disposal of
this department are entirely inadequate to such an exam-
ination of imports as will effectually suppress the sys-
tematic frauds known to be extensively perpetrated."
Thirteen years later lulwin Jordan, Solicitor for the
United States Treasury Department, reported the same
state of affairs. Describing the custom house frauds at
Xe\v York, he reported, on January 25, 1803, to Chase,
Secretary of the Treasury ( House Miscellaneous Doc-
uments, Third Session, Thirty-seventh Congress, 1862-
63, Vol. I, Doc. Xo. 18), " that frauds in the importation
of foreign merchandise are extensively, constantly and
systematically carried on. They are effected in various
ways." One method. Jordan wrote, was that of consid-
erable direct smuggling of jewelry, laces, rich silks and
other costly goods carried on the person, often with the
connivance of the revenue officers. Jordan continued:
Hut probably, the usual mode in which frauds arc committed
is by the use of invoices, in which the goods to which they
P. Sate are falsely described, or undervalued. Sometimes the
importer relie> upon the inability of the revenue officers to
detect such false description or undervaluation, and sometimes
upon his own power by corruption, to induce them to pas? the
poods, with a full knowledge of the fraud. Experience has
proven that in neither ca-e is his expectation disappointed by
the result.
As to the ,'u-ce^ibility i ninny of those employed in the
J. I'lEKl'O.Vl MORGANS GENESIS 155
custom house to corrupt intluenees, the evidence is, I regret
to say, conclusive and startling.
The facts developed in connection with the particular frauds
before referred to show that money, in large sums, was received
by officials as the undisguised reward of fraudulent acts or
connivance. But, in addition to this, the statements herewith
M'.bmitted seem to justify the belief that nearly the entire body
of subordinate officers in and about the custom house are, in
one way or another, in the habitual receipt of emoluments from
importers or their agents.
Jordan reported (page 6 of the report) that one lawyer
declared that he had paid to a single cnstom-house record
clerk the stun of $1800 in a period of fifteen months.
" Entries from the hooks of an importing house, doing
Imt a moderate husiness, are discovered, showing that
about a thousand dollars had been paid by it to an ex-
aminer within a period of a year. It is shown that a
bond clerk, with a salary of $1000 per annum, enters
upon a term of eight years with nothing, and leaves it
with a fortune of thirty thousand dollars." Jordan re-
ported that he thought the amount and extent of bribes
were much larger than the custom-house orncials were
willing to admit.
\Yhat wa^ set forth in official reports as " the notoriou>
Williams case." was characteristic of the methods by
which fortunes had been thus acquired. In these official
reports, the firm of J. D. and M. Williams, wine im-
porters of Boston, was described as one of the " olde.-t
established " in that cits' ; its members had grown verv
rich, and occupied a preeminent station of superior ele-
gance and prestige. They professed to be deeply shocked
and wronged when, in 1865, Collector Goodrich of the
i 'on of Boston specifically charged them with long-con-
tinned defrauding of the (lovernment in the importation
of sherry and champagne. The Government examiners
and officials presented calculations showing that, by
undervaluations, the firm had cheated the Government
out of at least $150,000 in duties ; that the interest would
make the amount nearly $200,000; and that the value of
the wines, since 1846, liable to forfeiture, would reach
about $2,000,000. (See Reports of Committees, Second
Session, Thirty-ninth Congress, 1866-67, Report Xo.
150
Collector Goodrich demanded of the firm that it pay
$500,000 restitution to the Government a sum equiva-
lent to double the duties and interest. Confronted with
the most positive evidences of its guilt, the firm dropped
its arrogant and injured attitude. It offered the Gov-
ernment $350,000 in lull satisfaction of all duties, fines
and forfeitures. This offer was declined. Suddenly, a
singular change came over the custom-house officials ;
thev consented to revise their calculations and recom-
mend the settlement of the Government's claim for the
payment of $100.000, and that sum was accepted.
The result was a loud public scandal ; impatient curi-
osity was popularly expressed as to why, after declining
an offer of $350,000. the Government had accepted $100.-
ooo. The House Committee on I'ublic Expenditures in-
vestigated. Thi- committee, on February 11, 186".
li.'iiuled in t\vo reports. Both reports, agreed upon thi-
fact : That during the firm's negotiations with the ( iov-
i-rnment, Samuel A. \Yav, a prominent Boston banker,
i Stained $31.200 from the Williams firm, whom he rep-
resented in the case. What did he do with that sum?
['he three majority members of the committee reported
that there were strong indications that he had bribed
custom-house officials to agree to the settlement so fa-
vorable to the William- firm. Rut as for the complicity
J. PIKRl'OXT MORGAN S C.KXKSl.S 157
of the \\ 'i11ianu-e>. ill-:- majonh could not entertain the
suspicion, it reported, that a firm of such " long-unblcni-
ished reputation and wealth" (sic) could be a party to
i raud and bribery.
The minority report of two members ridiculed that
of the majority. " According to Messrs. \Yilliams' o-.vn
testimony," it reported,
Way, their agent, represented to them that he must have
money with which to brihe Government officials into a more
favorable compromise. . . . And how did these honorable
and persecuted wine importers receive the proposition? Were
they shocked at it? . . . Nothing of the kind. . . . They
did precisely what might be expected of men, who, for a long
series of years, had systematically defrauded the Government
by putting false invoices through the custom house by as long
a continued a series of perjuries. They handed to their agent,
Mr. Way, at his request during the negotiation, the nice little
<um of $31,200 ... to have it used in the bribery and
corruption of United States officers (page 28 of the report).
The minority, however, thought that Way had " pock-
eted the money himself." In reading these reports one
is inclined to conclude that the majority sought to white-
wash the firm, and the minority to clear the custom-house
officials. The firm had, it was clear, testified to its guilt,
and considerable testimony showed that the custom-house
official- were generally corrupt. The minority report
ended by severely denouncing the firm, and spoke of
" the immense interest which the foreign importers have
in breaking down every hone>t official who stands be-
tween them and the Treasury." The practice on the part
of capitali>ts in causing the removal of honest officials
who sought to thwart their frauds had been long-prevail-
ing, as we have seen in the cases ot John Jacob Astor
and others.
\o criminal action wa- brought ajiainst the William-
158 HISTORY OF TIIK GKKAT AMERICAN" FORTUNES
linn ; the scandal was >oon forgotten ; and they, like many
another importing house profiting by such methods, re-
tained their rank and wealth. Of the $100,000,000 or
thereabouts invested in railroads by Massachusetts capi-
talists at that time, a considerable part of the investment
was doubtless made by men who had obtained their
wealth by defrauding the Government in customs dues.
l.i recurring charges are any indication of corruption,
the officials of the I'niled States courts were constantly
corruptly influenced or bribed to bring no criminal ac-
tions against men of wealth, or to cause cases finally to
be dismissed, if actions were brought. Even slave trad-
ers, the abominations and horrors of whose traffic shocked
the whole civilized world, seem to have bought immunity,
and this, too. after the Civil War had begun. Accord-
ing to the Duke de Rochefoucault Liancourt, who trav-
eled in the L nited States in 1/95. " nearly twenty vessels
from the harbors of the United States are employed in
the importation of negroes to Georgia and the West India
Isles." In his " Travels " (Vol. II. p. 292, English trans-
lation) the Duke further told how the merchants of
Rhode Island were the conductors of what he described
as the "accursed traffic." I nited States law prohibited
die importation of slaves after the year 1808, and out-
lawed the traffic as piracy. I'm the slave traffic contin-
ued, and large sums of Northern capital, particularly of
Xew York, Spanish and Cuban capital, were invested in
it. Slaves snatched from Africa were sold in the Span-
ish colonies in America. " Spain," wrote Secretary of
State Seward to Minister to Spain Koerner. in 1864, " is
believed to ],c the only Christian country in whose do-
minions African negroes are now introduced as >laves."
Spain, added Seward, bad a treat v with Great llritain
i m the subiect. but disregarded it.
J. I'iMKI'OXT .M< )I<c;.\.\ S GKXKSIS 1 5'J
From May i, 1852, to May i, 1802, twenty-six Arner-
lean schooners and brigs were libelled by the Govern-
ment at the Port of New York, charged with being en-
gaged in the slave traffic. Some were seized at New
York, and others on the coast of Africa. Many of these
vessels were condemned. (Senate Doc. No. 53, Vol. V,
U. S. Senate Documents, Second Session, 1861-62.) On
November 28, 1863, Seward wrote officially to Lord
Lyons that a steamship had recently landed more than
one thousand African negroes near Cardenas or Sagua.
Cuba ; that " very prominent and wealth}' persons are said
to be implicated in the business " ; and that it was be-
lieved the steamer went to Nassau after landing the ne-
groes. Under Spanish law, it was provided that all Af-
rican negroes captured by the Spanish Government should
be declared emancipadoes, and distributed among the
planters and others for a monthly compensation, part of
which accrued to the Government. Put Thomas Savage.
U. S. Vice Consul-General at Havana, in describing the
system, wrote to Seward: ". . . A little gold ju-
diciously distributed among the cur a, captains of the
district, etc., will establish the fact | of the negro's alleged
decease] and the cinancipado, so reported a> dead, re-
mains a slave for life." ( U. S. Senate Fx. Docs., First
Session, Thirty-eighth Congress, 1 863-4 14. Part II, Doc.
No. 48.)
On June 19, 1861. the bark .-liu/nsta was seized bv
I nited Stales Marshal Robert Murray at Greenpoint.
Long Island, on the charge of being Titled out as a
-laver to go in Africa, and was condemned. A party of
capitalists, headed by Appleton ( >ake> Smith and hi-
brother, scions of a well-known family, were financing
the expedition. To Murray':- amazement, the U. S. Di--
trict Attorney's office at New York then allowed the ves-
i6o
-el to be bonded for an in-igniiicant ,-um, and licen.-ed
her to clear the port. Hastening after her. Murray
again seized the .hiyusta at Fire Island. lie then for-
mally and circumstantially charged collusion between the
slave trade interests and certain officers of the Federal
judiciary at Xe\v York. The Secretary of the Interior
subsequently decided that collusion had not been proved.
i ['. S. Senate Docs., Second Session, 1861-62, Vol. V,
Doc. Xo. 40. I Horace Greeley's editorials of the day ex-
press the greatest indignation at this attempted cheating
of justice ; the case \vas only one of numerous such cases ;
main' a time slave traders had succeeded in having actions
against them dropped or dismissed.
\Ye have now seen how the most successful capitalists,
the founders of great fortunes, piled up their wealth
by unrestrained careers of fraud and theft. \Ye have
noted how Commodore Vanderbilt pocketed millions by
blackmailing competitors, and by lea.-ing or selling worth-
less vessel*- to the Government during the Civil War for
exorbitant sums. The facts have been set forth how
a host of other capitali.-ts swindled the l.'nited State-
Treasury out nf hundred- of millions of dollar-, and
hazarded the lives of the very armies righting for their
cause by bribing Government officials to accept army
and navy supplies of shoddy clothing, worthless tents and
blanket-, good-for-nothing .shoe.-., adulterated, deleterious
food, and gun- which were frequently more dangerou-
to the men u-ing them than to the enemy.
I-' ven if the supplies and equipment contracted for
were of payable quality, the Government was mulcted
out of extortionate -urns.
In previous chapters we have had repeated occasion -
to refer to the huge Dwindles which Mar-hall ( ). Robert-,
one of the foremo-t and highly prized capitalists of
j. I'IKKPOXT MoR;:\:\'s r.KNKSJS l6l
those years, successfully worked upon the Government.
Some of the vessels that he sold for transport service
were so bad that one of them foundered a day or two
after leaving port. The erew of this ship the i'nion
was alone saved, and barely so, at that ; the ship
and all her armv stores were a total loss. Another ship
sold by Roberts was so badly damaged on her first voy-
age as to be hardly able to reach port, although not
without much loss of freight. ]'>ut to give a succinct
idea of the greater sums squeezed out of the Govern-
ment for vessels for which some fair degree of effi-
ciency could be claimed, the case of the steamship
Illinois need only be cited. For a few years' lease of
this vessel Roberts succeeded in getting a total rental of
$3/0.700, yet it was appraised by a naval board as worth,
all told, cost of construction and equipment included,
$257,187. After the Civil War it was returned to him
in a much better condition than when he had leased it.
The transaction was one of man}- such scandals that
Congress deemed it wise to investigate/"'
Xeed it be* said, however, that Vanderbilt and Roberts
were far from being exceptions? One of the greatest
frauds of all in the extortion of large sums from the
Government was Thomas Clyde, the founder of the
C'lvde Steamship Line and commonly described in bio-
graphical account^ as a capitalist of the greatest probity.
According to the court records, Clyde, bv fraudulent
representations, succeeded in obtaining exorbitant rates
for the lea-ing of vessels for transport service. The
Government discovered his fraud- in time, and despite
his urgent remonstrances, declined to pay the full amount
that he claimed.
hi the >uit tliat followed in the case of the steamer
7 allaca, the Government claimed that Clyde was guilty
of a fraud ; that in dealing with Quartermaster Fergu-
son he had fraudulently suppressed certain facts which,
had they been known, would have prevented Ferguson
from contracting to pay $115 a day for the vessel. In
this case the Court of Claims decided in favor of Clyde. 6
Cut in the case of the steamer Rebecca Clyde, also be-
fore the Court of Claims in December. 1869, the court
severely denounced Clyde's claim as fraudulent, referred
to the " unconscionable and exorbitant rates of trans-
portation." and to the " injustice and extortion " of
Clyde's claim, and dismissed his petition. 7 In the ap-
peals in both cases the Supreme Court of the United
State- reversed both decisions.
Such of the successful capitalists as were not defraud-
ing in many directions were concentrating schemes of
fraud in some one -pecial direction.
The Stevens family, of Hoboken. X. J.. was one of
the notable examples. Thev were millionaires lie fore j.
Pierpont Morgan had outgrown boyhood; they ranked
high among the leading capitalists of the country; and
by donations of a part of their fortunes they became
celebrated as philanthropists. The}' were the principal
owners of the Camden and Amboy railroad, then called
in Xew jersey the " Railroad Monopoly."
In the fifteen years before ]$(io they were the mo>t
notorious corrupters of the Xcw fersey Legislature;
lime after time they bribed bills through, corrupted the
election- and the courts, ignored or evaded the laws.
41 Gum -if rinim>. v : 1.^4-140. T Tliirl.. 140-155.
J. I'IKUI'O.V! MORGAN'S GKNKSLS l6^
and bled the public by an illegal system of transportation
charges. That they and Blair and other railroad mag-
nates were continually debauching the Xew Jersey Leg-
islature was common understanding, but it was not to be
expected that the Legislature would seriously investigate
itself. In 1855 a specific bribery scandal inadvertently
happened to become public ; the Legislature hurriedly
appointed a catechizing committee which made a pre-
tense of investigation, and then turned in a report which
harmed no one. 8
The Stevenses not only had their direct, but also their
indirect, sources of tribute. One of them, Edward A.
Stevens, a philanthropist par excellence, was carrying
on, it seems, a species of blackmailing akin to that Van-
derbilt employed. As the owner of the Hoboken Land
and Improvement Company, Stevens had secured a fran-
chise for a branch railroad line from Hoboken to Xew-
ark. For many years, up to 1860, he compelled the Xew
Jersey Transportation Company, a competitor in that one
section of the State, to pay him an annual subsidy of
$18,000. in order to buy him off from building the branch
line.
The Xew Jersey Transportation Company decided,
in 1860, that it would no longer pay this blackmail
money. In retaliation. Stevens bribed the Xew Jersey
Legislature to give him a franchise to connect his line
with the Morris and Lssex Railroad in which he held
a large proprietorship. A turbulent scene en>ued when
the bill was pas>ed on March i, iSbo. Assemblyman
Slaight, of Hudson County, charged that an offer of
briberv had been made to him to vote for Stevens' bill.
Hi-! HISTORY OF Till-: CiKL-:.\'J AMERICAN L'ORTVNES
\\'hercupon Peckbam, of the same county, rose and an-
nounced he had hcen offered by Stevens' opponent? as
high as $3,000 to oppose the bill.
These are but a very few of the many examples
of succcs>ful capitalists whom the young- men were
taught to look up to and, if possible, emulate. And
what were the business methods of the most conspicuous
factory owners " J . To get an even more correct focu>
upon the youthful career of J. Pierpont Morgan, it is de-
sirable to consider some of the ways in which the large
industrial concerns were rushing into great wealth.
Asa \\ "hitney was one of the important all-round capi-
talists of the United States ; he was a railroad projector,
and his firm, Asa Whitney and Sons, owned the largest
carwheel factorv in the land, lie was a verv enthusi-
astic patriot ; so were they all. those commercial men.
brave in patriotic talk. The quality of their patriotism
was particularly evidenced after John Brown's raid at
Harper's Ferry.
War between Xortli and South was generally regarded
as unavoidable. The South was busily preparing.
What were the Xorthern factory owners doing? Work-
ing their plants day and night to supply the South with
equipment. In the first months of [860 the Whitney
works were run to their fullest capacity to provide wheeK
largely for Southern railroads. In the same months
the Baldwin Locomotive Works of Philadelphia turned
rut fifty-eight locomotives, all but four of which were
for Southern railroads. Bcment and Dougherty and the
firm of William Setters and Company, machine tool
builders in Philadelphia, were filling heavy orders for
Southern railway and machine shops.
These capitalists, and all who were doing as they were,
knew that every indication threatened that this equip-
J. I' IKK I'D XT MOKUAX'S GEXESIS 165
ment would soon be used in war against the very sec-
tion to which they belonged, and for the interests and
principles of which they professed to be such staunch
adherents. In fact, some of them made declamatory
patriotic speeches at the very time when they were
profiting from equipping what they knew would shortly
develop into an openly hostile people, intent upon sus-
taining their purposes by armed force.
Till-: DKFR.U'DIXG OF IXVENTORS.
The Northern gun manufacturers did the same; not
one of them scrupled to fill Southern orders. They also
refused, for the most part, to adopt any improvements
or utilize any of the numerous new inventions. In plead-
ing for the establishment of more Government armories,
and foundries, Representative Wallace of Pennsylvania,
in a speech in Congress, on February 28, 1863, said:
. . . When we look at the manner in which our army and
Government have been defrauded by peculators, we must shrink
from the idea of trusting to private contractors to furnish the
necessary means for our national defence. Dependence upon
private contractors for arms and munitions of war is too pre-
cariou.- and uncertain in all respects, as well as too costly, upon
\\liicli to re>t such an important and vital interest of the na-
tion The improvements made of late yea'-- in the power and
destruetivene.ss of all arm> have rendered comparatively u-e!e-<
weapons that were deenu-d the \ cry hot, perhaps not more than
a quarter of a century ago. . . . | lu 1 interest of the p-iv^tc
contractor i> to discoura.ee all change in the character of arms
which his machinery is prepared to make, a- machinery i^ co-tly,
and every matt-rial change nece>>itates a corresponding change in
hi--, machinery . . .''
1 66 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
patriotism was not involved; that it was simply " a case
of business."
Doubtless it was this acute business instinct which led
them to steal outright the patents for breech-loading
gun.-. According to the conclusions of a Congressional
committee on patents, the inventor of mechanical devices
for breech-loading small arms and machine guns was
George YY. Morse, who took out patents in 1856. The
gun manufacturers appropriated his inventions. As in
the cases of Goodyear and many another inventor, Morse
was cheated out. Thrown into the deepest poverty, he
applied, in r8~8. to the Government for payment on the
score of his invention. In favoring his petition, the
Committee on Patents reported, " He is ignored and
poor in his declining years, and those who have adopted
his inventions without remunerating him are rolling in
wealth:' ] "
In the case of another inventor, C. D. Schubarth, a
foreigner residing at Providence, K. 1., a Government
Commission reported these facts: that he had invented
a new type of gun: that in order to raise the funds he
had to take in several capitalists as partners ; that he
was informed that to get a contract from the War De-
partment, it was necessary to bribe one of the United
States Senators from Rhode Island; that he was then
given a letter of introduction to United States Senator
j. F. Simmons by the Providence firm of A. D. and
[. Y. Smith " a business house of great wealth and re-
ability ": and that he arranged to give Simmons
five per cent, of the amount of the contract. Schubarth
thus obtained a contract for 50,000 Springfield rifles;
according to tho evidence before the Government
-
j. PiKKPovr MORGAN'S GENESIS 167
Commission, Simmons' graft amounted to $5O,oou.'" a
Kverywhcre in the struggle for commercial success
obtruded fraud, theft and murder; one or more or a
combination of these methods constituted the means by
which wealth was largely piled up. Overwork and
criminal accidents joined with disease and want and
worry and unsanitary housing killed off myriads of
workers by sudden or lingering death. Yet not alone
in the factories and mines, on the sea and in the tene-
ments did this scourge of death go on as an accompani-
ment of the rapid growth of private wealth. Out on
the primitive plains and in the mountain fastnesses whole
tribes of Indians were ruthlessly despoiled, driven off,
and then, on some pretext or other, slaughtered so that
their lands and the resources on them could be gratui-
tously seized."
1 "<' 1 Report of Commissioners Joseph Holt and Robert Dak-
Owen to Secretary of War Stanton, June 21. 1862. U. S. Senate
Documents, Second Session, Thirty-seventh Congress, 1861-62,
Vol. i. Doc. Xo. 64.
11 These are a few extracts from the annual report of the
United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1851):
" \Ye have substantially taken possession of the country Ithc
Western Territories] and deprived them (the Indian-] of their
accustomed means of support.
" Xumbers of them are compelled to sustain life by using for
food reptiles, insects, grass, seeds and roots.
"They have at time- been compelled to either steal or -tarve.
"Many of the numerous depredation- have doubtless been
committed by them in consequence of their destitute and des-
perate condition."
Report after report of ihe I'niied Stale- Commissioner of
Indian Affairs showed that many Indian tribe- were in a state
of absolute destitution, and Congress was called upon to pa--
appropriations for their -upport. 'Ihe 1'awnees and other tribes
that Astor had debauched and swindled for so long a period,
were in a starving condition. Document Xo. .7. United State-
on! Session. 1875. reveals that UritiMi
had long since introduced among the
IT Indian tribes in Alaska, the me'hod-
v A.-tor of getting the Indians drunk
l68 HISTORY UF Tiili GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
The outbreak of the Civil War gave the mercantile
class unsurpassed opportunities for profiting from what
amounted to crganized murder. However severe thi-
statement seems, it is in reality quite mild in describing
the prevailing practices of capitalists.
PROFITING FROM ORGANIZED MURDER.
It would be quite puerile and a poor extenuation to
say that they were not fully conscious of the disastrous
consequences to the nation flowing from their acts.
They knew the baleful results to the soldiery of impos-
ing fraudulent army and navy supplies upon the Govern-
ment. Yet, spurred by the certainty of extortionate
profits, they went eagerly ahead, and when their frauds
were discovered, sought to block every attempt at investi-
gation. In the one item of shoes alone, the shoe man-
ufacturers sold to the Government from 1861 to 1862
five million pairs of shoes for the army, as to which
transaction a Government commission reported that at
least $3,000,000 had been defrauded ; that supplies of
shoes which were so bad that thev could not be sold
privately had been palmed off upon the Government. 12
But the one equipment which the army most urgently
needed wa> rifles. \Ve have already, in a previous chap-
ter, related how Marcellus Hartley and other prominent
capitalists swindled the Government, and imperiled the-
I'nion Army, bv importing the refuse of Fuin>pean ann,-
and unloading them upon the I'nited States Government.
Also, we have adverted to the fact that it was greatly
becau-e of the great profits made in these transactions
that flartk-v was able to build enormous factorie- at
j. I'lEuroxT MORGAN s GENESIS iy
Bridgeport. Conn. factories that his descendants now
own.
J. Fierpont Morgan \vas profiting from the same meth-
ods at the same time, lie was, in 1861, a robust young
man. just turned twenty-four years old. " He inherited
from his parents." says one of his biographers, " their
purity of character and exceptional abilities." 1:; Those
attributed lofty virtues were not in evidence. At a crit-
ical juncture when the Union Government was most in
need of soldiers. Morgan chose not onlv to stay at home,
but to profit from the sale of worthless rifles for the arm-
ing of the men who responded to the call to arms.
Abraham Lincoln was sending out his proclamations
calling for volunteers. The contest was a momentous
struggle not merely between sections, but between two
kinds of conflicting capitalist institutions. The so-called
common people the factory and shop workers, the
slum dwellers, the professionals and the farmers he-
roically poured in for enlistment. Hundreds of thou-
sands went forth to the camp< and battlefields, never to
return.
Although well qualified physically and mentally for
military .-ervice, Morgan avoided any kind of duty inter-
fering with monev making and comfort. He differed in
nowise from almost all the men of position and prop-
erty. They restricted their exuberant patriotism ti> talk
and the waving of bunting, but took great care to keep
away from the /one- of personal danger. The rich. 1i>r
who>e interests the Northern armies were at basis fight-
ing, not onlv a- a clas< evaded enlistment, but proceeded
tn demoralize, spread disahihtv and sow death among
their own armies. While dning this, and at the same
HIT'- the (!<>vi.ri .:.'. State- and cities out of
I7O iilSTOKV OF Till-: GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
vast sums in army contracts, they caused the Draft Act
to be so amended that it gave men of property the easy
opportunity of escaping conscription by permitting them
to hire substitutes.
MORGAN' S FIRST STROKE OF BUSINESS.
J. Pierpont Morgan's first ascertainable business trans-
action was in one of these army contracts ; and while it
was not on so large a scale as those of older capitalists,
it was (judged by prevailing capitalist standards) a very
able stroke for a young man of twenty-four. Its success
gave promise of much greater things to come, in which
respect Morgan's admirer- were not disappointed.
In 1857 the army inspecting officers condemned a
large number of Hall's carbines as thoroughly unservice-
able, and as of obsolete and dangerous pattern. The
Government thereupon auctioned off quantities of them
from time to time at prices ranging from between Si ami
82 each. Five thousand of them, however, still remained
in the army arsenal in Xew York City and were there
when the Civil War broke out.
On May 28, 1861, one Arthur M. Eastman, of Man-
chester, Xew Hampshire, made an offer to the Govern-
ment to buy these riiles at $3 each. Knowing the great
frauds going on in the furnishing of army supplies, the
Government officials might well have been .suspicious of
ihis offer, but apparently did not question its good faith.
The riiles were sold to Eastman at $3.50 each. Rut
either Eastman lacked the money for payment, or had
been thrust forward to act as a dummy for a principal
in the background. One Simon Stevens 11 then -topped
j. I'lEKi'o.vr .MORGAN'S GENESIS 171
on the scene, agreeing to back Eastman to the extent of
$20,000, which sum \vas to be applied for payment for the
rifles ; as collateral security Stevens took a lien upon the
ritles. But from whom did Stevens get the funds?
The official and legal records show that it was from J.
1'ierpont Morgan.
A GREAT SCANDAL OF THK TIME.
i'he next step in this transaction was in Stevens' tele-
graphing, on August 5, 1861, a notification to General
Fremont, commanding at St. Louis, that he had five thou-
sand new carbines, in perfect condition, and inquiring
whether Fremont would take them. From Fremont's
headquarters came word to ship them to the army head-
quarters at St. Louis at once. During all of this time
the carbines had remained at the arsenal in New York
City. Upon receiving Fremont's order, Morgan paid the
Government the sum of $17,486 at the rate of $3.50
a carbine. The ritles were shipped direct from the
arsenal to St. Louis. And what was the sum charged
upon the Government for them? The bill made out to
tract- in iSoj reported to Congress that Simon Steven-- was one
of a clique involved in custom-house fraud-. Hefore 1850. the
New York Collector of the Port had employed the laborers and
eartmen in the appraiser's -tore to haul good- to the Govern-
ment honded warehouses. In Augu-t. 1850. Collector Schell (a
corrupt Tammany politician) made a contract by which the haul-
ing was turned over to some of hi- political a.-sociates. They
were paid. !?i -'.3,000 a year. " I'pon this contract." reported
Chairman Van \\yck. "the parties made from fifty to seventy-
five thousand dollars yearly." "I'he committee showed how the
contract had been corruptly ordained, and stated that Stevens
had a one-eighth -hare of the profit-. Stevens also caused any
of the custom-house clerk- who -aid anything against the con
tract to he remo\ ed from office.- The Congressional Globe,
Third Session. Thirty-seventh Congress, iS6_'-o^. Part II, Appen-
dix : U.S.
172 HISTORY OF THE CHEAT AMERICAN FORTIM.S
Fremont called for the payment of $22 apiece for the
consignment. 15
This was one of the many army contracts popularly
and officially regarded as scandalous in the highest de-
gree ; one of the select Congressional Committees of 1862
lost no time in the investigating of it. After making a
full inquiry this committee reported :
Thus the proposal actually was to sell to the Government at
$22 each 5. OCK> of its own arms, the intention being, if the offer
\vas accepted, to obtain these arms from the Government at $3.50
each. It i< verv evident that the verv innds with which
15 Reports of Committees, Second Session, Thirty-seventh
Congress. 1861-62. Vol. ii : Ixiv-lxxli.
The frauds at Fremont's headquarters, at St. Louis, were
particularly enormous. Major McKinstry, quartermaster of the
L T . S. army at that place, was tried by a conrtmartial on sixty-
one specifications of corrupt practices, and was found guilty on
twenty-six. The testimony showed the gros.-e.-t frauds, by col-
lusion, in all kinds of army supplies. The Morgan rifle trans-
action, however, was not brought out in the specifications. Mc-
Kinstry was discharged from the army. House Reports. Com-
mittees and Court of Claims, Third Session, Thirty-seventh Con-
gress, 1862-63, Report No. 49: 1-24.
That the bribery of certain Union officers was a fact wa- re
vealed by this communication sent by Major-General Frederick
Steele, on July 26, 1864, from Little Rock. Ark., to Major-
General F. R. S. Canby, commanding the Military Division of
West Mississippi:
"General: Your communication in regard to bribery among
the officers of my command is just received. If bribe.- had been
taken it must have been by agents. I am satisfied that the of-
ficers know nothing about it. General Marcy. Inspector-General,
i- at Fort Smith investigating the matter. Carr is chief-quar-
termaster of my corps and a lieutenant-colonel. Krig.-Gen. J
W. Davidson has slandered Carr on all occasions. . . . lie
could have had affidavits in regard to the corruption of his own
di-hui>ing officers if he had wished them. I have seen such
affidavit-.' House Miscellaneous Documents. Second Session,
Fifty-.-econd Congress, iS<;j <>i (Rebellion Record Series 1, Vol.
xli>" p. 4 i-
Lo
The committee further reported that the rifles were
so bad that it was found that they would shoot off the
thumbs of the very soldiers using them. But not only
did the Government condemn the transaction as a bare-
faced swindle; .Marccllus Hartley, himself a dealer in
arms and a self-confessed swindler," had declared before
the committee, " 1 think the worst thing this Govern-
ment has been swindled upon has been these confounded
Mail's carbines." lt; The Government refused to pay
Morgan the $22 demanded for each of the five thousand
carbines, whereupon Morgan pressed his claim. Thus
it was that the case of J. Pierpont Morgan vs. The United
States Government came into the public records. It
figured as case Xo. (;/.'" To adjudicate this claim, as
well as man}' other similar claims, the Secretary of War
appointed a Commission composed of J. Holt and Rob-
ert Dale Owen, son of the famous Robert Owen.
Reporting on July i, i86j, this commission stated that
one hundred and four cases, involving demands upon
the National Treasury to the extent of 850.000,000 had
been referred to it, and that it had cut out $17,000.000
of claims as extravagant and fraudulent. 1V In passing
upon Morgan's claim it declared that General Fremont
had no authority to contract for the rifles, but that it.
the committee, recognized a legal obligation on the part
oi the Government arising from the fact that the arms
passed into the service of the armv. As the best wav
out of a bad bargain it decided to pay Morgan at the
T/4 HISTORY OK THIC, r.KKAT AMF.KH'.NX KOKi I'Xl.S
rate of $13.31 a carbine, and it pointed out that even at
this price Morgan and Stevens stood to make $49,000
above the price at which the rifles had been sold to them
by the United States. iy Under this ruling a total of
$55,550 was paid to Morgan by the Government, which
sum was accepted on account only.
This settlement, however, was not satisfactory to the
claimants; the full pound of blood was demanded. Suit
was brought in the Court of Claims at Washington for
$58,000 more. This time the case was entitled Simon
Stevens vs. The United States Government. 20 In the
statement of the case before the court the fact wa.-^
emphasized that, according to the Government, the car-
bines had been inspected and pronounce:! unserviceable
by the Government ordnance officer. In delivering his
decision Judge Peck said: " By an arrangement between
Stevens and one J. Pierpont Morgan the voucher for the
first two thousand and five hundred carbines delivered
was to be made out in the name of Morgan, which was
done ; the said voucher was signed by 1 ; . I.). Cadwallader,
Captain of Ordnance, United States Army, and was for
the sum of $55,550. By further arrangement this
voucher went into the hands of Messrs. Ketclmm, Son
and Company." This voucher was paid on or about
September ro, 1861. The other twenty-five hundred
rifles, the court said, had also been received by Fre-
mont." 1
''' Ibid., ]xxv. The Commission Mated ilial there \vas a le.ual
obligation on the part of the Government to pay, but that this
obligation arose not from Fremont's contract, hui because the
arms did pa'-s into army service.
20 Court of Claims Reports ii : 08, etc.
- 1 Ibid., no. In ur.iniiny for the Government the \\ S. Assi-t-
ant Solicitor -aid to the court :
"The arnir- \vere pnrrbri- '1 !>v Arthur M. F.aMman, from the
United States, at //.<nv <:m! <>u/'-'nili tlnllars cucli. because they
had been inspected aid pronounced unserviceable by the ord-
175
1 hese arc the lacts as set forth in unimpassioned court
records.
COTRTS MAKE THE GOVERNMENT PAY.
Did Morgan and his associates get their full demands
from the Government ? They did. Judge Peck held that
when Fremont had agreed to buy the rifles lie had en-
tered into a contract which hound the Government, and
that a contract was a contract. The court took no
cognizance of the fact that the worthless, condemned
rifles had been represented as new, nor did it consider
the fact that the money with which they had been
bought from the Government was virtually Government
money. It gave Stevens a judgment against the Govern-
ment for $58,1.75.
Jt was this particular decision which assured the open
sesame for the holders of what were then cynically called
" deadhorse claims " to collect the full amount of their
swindling operations. The Government could now
plead itself defenseless against the horde of contractors
who had bribed officials to accept decayed ships and de-
fective armor, worthless arms and shoddy clothing, flimsy
tents, blankets and shoes, and haversacks which came
to pieces, adulterated lood and similar equipment and
supplies. As for criminal action, not a single one of
these defrauders went to prison, or stood any danger of
it; the courts throughout the land were perennially busy
rushing off petty defrauders to imprisonment and em-
nance officer. They \verc sold by Ka-tnian to the claimant for
twelve anil cine-half d<>llar> each, and the clni:n:mt at once sold
to (ieneral Fremont at t:ci'itty-i:\.'<> dollars each. The ("lovcrn-
nient price for ncic arms <>t~ this pattern, of i;ood <]na'i'y and
fit for service, was seventeen and one-half dollars." [bid.. <>S.
i/o HISTORY OK Tiir: (,R;-:.\T AMERICAN* FORTUNES
ploying the full punitive power of their machinery
against poor, unintluential offenders. 22
This was the real beginning of J. Pierpont Morgan's
business career; the facts are there immovable and un-
a-sailable in the public records. This was the brand of
"patriot" he and his fellow capitalists were; yet ever
since, and especially so to-day, clergy and politicians and
-hallow, obsequious writers saturate the public with myths
all designed to prove Morgan's measureless benevolence
and lofty patriotism. 23
-- In reporting to Congress, on March 3, 1863, the House Se-
lect Committee on Government Contracts, after submitting its
great amount of testimony regarding the frauds on every hand,
concluded :
" Many frauds have been exposed, the Government relieved
from many unconscionable contracts, and millions of dollars
saved to the treasury. Yet it is a matter of regret that punish-
ment has not been meted out to the basest class of transgressors.
They to whom this duty belonged seemed sadly to have neglected
it. ll'orse tl:an traitors in arms are the men pretending loyalty
to the flan, iclio feast and fatten on the misfortune of the na-
tion, li'Jiile /\/.'nV'/ blood is crimsoning the plains of the South,
and bodies of their countrymen are mouldering in the dust.
The leniency of the Government toward- these men is a marvel
which the present cannot appreciate, and history never explain."
House Reports, Committees and Courts of Claims. Third Ses-
sion, Thirty-seventh Congress, 1862-63. Report No. 50:47. But
history can explain. It was not to be expected that the very
class controlling Government the capitalist class was to be
proceeded against by it- creature.
- :: For example, an article entitled "Cleveland's Opinion of
in " McClure's Magazine," i-sue of April. 1900. The
of this article quotes Cleveland, for several terms Presi-
thc United State-, as saying of Morgan's conduct when
issue was under way in 1894:
iw. to... that v. ith him it was not merely a matter of
an 'it clear sighted, far-seeing patriotism. He was
^ 1"
bankc r. c mo
avert a peril
crisis."
f. PIERPCNT MORGAN.
CHAPTER VIII
THE FLOWERLM; OF THE MORGAN FORTUNE
" Great is Mr. Morgan's power, greater in some re-
spects even than that of President or kings," wrote a sea-
soned British observer some years ago 1 which fact,
patent to even the casual onlooker, easily passes uncon-
tradicted. Who, indeed, can gainsay its truth? Above
all forms of law and functionaries of office, above the
highest representative bodies and tribunals, above enact-
ments and Constitutions, supreme above eighty-five mil-
lions of American people, this one man towers with a
hold and grasp of power as tremendous as it is por-
tentous. And what has awarded him this mighty-
power? Has it come by vote or wish of the people or
by some incongruous provision of Governmental ma-
chinery ?
Xay, none of these things are responsible for it;
despite them all it has come about, and it persists in
mockery of them all. Then, wherein lies the explana-
tion: Xeed it be told anew? The cause and substance
of it all are Morgan's wealth and his dictatorship,
>hared with a few others, of the resources of the nation,
which ownership carries with it the real ruling power,
for whoso own the mean- by which the people must live
owns the people.
1 \. Maurice Ln\v in " I hr Independent,'' issue of October
30. UK*- 1 .
T 77
And A [organ to-day controls billions of dollars of the
country's resources.
MORGAN THEN AND NOW.
Can this Morgan be the same \vho started out by
.successfully palming off upon the Government during
the Civil War five thousand of its own condemned rifles,
and at extortionate prices? Is it possible that the man
who profited from arming the nation's soldiers with self-
slaughtering guns can be the same Morgan whose
power to-day " is greater than that of President or
kings"? Is the great, sublime patriot of these days, J.
Pierpont Morgan, the same Morgan who came into col-
lision with investigating committees during the Civil
War, and who was practically denounced in the severest
language? Verily, he is the same man. the identical
same, ik'hold him in the budding of his career, and
observe how he began it: and behold him now. glutted
with wealth and power, covered with honors, august dis-
penser of benevolence, the incarnate source of all wis-
dom, financial and otherwise, the mightv man of com-
merce and of the arts, the idol of capitalist ideals.
Hetwecn that Civil War transaction and his present
sway, necessarily there lies a long category of deeds.
I ndi~putably he began his career with proofs of excep-
tional brilliance 1 . Had his first business achievement
that of the condemned rifles been judged by the
-tandards of the "lower classes," lie would have been
thrown into prison, or had the soldiers who had to use
the gun- come within his proximitv. the 1 life, perad-
vcntnrc, might have been shot out of him then and
there. l>ut his o\vn Hass. far from having a remote
thought of abhorrence or o-tracism. admired his busi-
FLOWKRIXG OF Till': .MORGAN" FORTL'A' K I/O,
tics.- skill, mettle and audacity, and regarded him a^ an
extraordinarily promising young man. (ireat things
were predicted for so astute an novitiate ; yet novitiate
was not the word : the most experienced business man
could hardly have done better than did Morgan in that
famous ride sale.
Moreover, Morgan had other advantages which as-
sured a notable future. He had a millionaire father,
which was a relationship to be trebly prized at a time
when millionaire progenitors were not so very numer-
ous. The paternal advice and guidance, based upon a
protracted career in the serpentine channels of wealth
getting, could unfailingly be drawn upon. Additionally,
J. Pierpont Morgan had the backing of the old man's
millions and prestige, and what was more important
would some day inherit those millions. All of these
factors were infallibly the prelude to a glorious career.
HE ATTAINS " CXIVKRSAL RKSPKCT."
The respect of the mercantile and financial classes
for Morgan's proved ability grew proportionately with
each new display of his capacity. Presently we find a
contemporary biographer saying of him: "Mr. Mor-
gan made himself universally respected as an able finan-
cier in iSi'V), when he came out victorious in a memora-
ble struggle for the control of the Albany and Susque-
hanna Railroad, which had fallen into the clutches of
Messrs. Fisk and Gould. The contest was waged not
< inly by litigation, but also bv force 1 of arms, and Gov-
ernor Hoffman called out the militia. Fi-k was eventu-
al! v dislodged."
It had not taken long for Morgan to arrive at the
point where he was " universally respected." By "uni-
i8o
vcrsally " the writer of tlwt eulogy meant among Mor-
gan s class, the opinion (A which was held to be all-
inclusive; that of the workers was considered of little
or no account, and could always he ignored or ridi-
culed. But what was the real nature of this railroad
business which made Morgan so " universally re-
spected''? What great public service, if any, did he
render? What was the special merit involved in his
overthrowing of Gould and Fisk, and his getting control
of the railroad in question? 5
Eulogistic writers fail to give enlightenment on this
point. But what they omit, public records supply to
some extent.
Had either (iould and Fisk, on the one hand, or Mor-
gan, on the other, built the Albany and Susquehanna
Railroad or provided the funds for its construction?
Not a mother's son of them. This line, now a part of
the Delaware and 1 ludson Railroad, had been built with
public funds drawn from the treasuries of Xew York
State and of various counties and municipalities in that
State. At least Si .01:0.000 of the $45.000.000 drained
from the public treasury in Xew York State for the
building of railroads, had gone into the construction of
the Albany and Susquehanna Railroad. 2
The usual pilfering processes marked its building:
large sums were stolen in various forms of graft ; and,
as in the case of the Eric Railroad and other railroads.
the State was cheated out of much of its loans. Then
ihe group of capitalists in control watered the Albany
c\i id Susquehanna's stuck aiul manipulated it for specula-
tive purpose- until tlic\ were ousted by other capitalists
who repealed their manipulating methods on a larger
scale. This railroad's chief value, lay in the fact that it
had direct connections with the coal minin reions of
aiul Ki.-k. the other bv f. Pierponi Morgan. The older
capitalists were amaxed at the sight of these young
men audaciously struggling for the possession of a val-
uable railroad system, in the construction of which
neither set had had any part whatever. Old Commodore
Yanderbilt looked on with a blended admiration and
envy. ( jonld was but thirty-three years old. and Mor-
gan thirty-one. Kadi side bought all of the stock that
it could; (iould \\ith the proceeds of his thefts, and Mor-
gan possibly with the proceeds of such transactions as
the rillc sale, for instance. Stockholders' elections were
held amid scenes of the greatest disorder, and each
parly churned the election of its own board of directors,
and accused the other of the grossest frauds.
(.June appropriately the contest went into the courts,
twenty-one separate suits were brought by (iould and
Kisk. and a sheaf of injunctions obtained. The Morgan
partv fought back vigorously. Hut so lonj.
contest was confined to the Xew V>rk
i iould and Ki-k had the surely of victory,
was that such Supreme Court
(. 'ard< '/(
chatlels
Verv soon an edi lying Una
liercely determined was each -ide
that ihe railroad was thrown int.
182
disorganization and could not be operated. After
spending a million dollar.- of public money on its con-
strnction, the people were forced to look on while the
two parties, neither of whom had invested a dollar in its
building, claimed to be its owners, and estopped the other
with judicial orders and injunctions.
\\hich of the two would come out ahead? The out-
come was doubtful. Hut it did not continue so very
long. Gould and Fisk were cleverly entrapped into mak-
ing an agreement which led to their utter eventual de-
feat. The agreement was to this purport : That inas-
much as the conflicting parties could not agree, they had
arrived at a mutual understanding by which they would
write to Governor 1 'oilman setting forth that it had be-
come impracticable to run the railroad, and therefore
requesting the appointment of a Stale official to operate
it pending a new election of directors. This communi-
cation was sent to Governor Hoffman on August II,
1869, and its provisions were accepted.
HOTII SIDES CIIAKGF.D WITH FRAUD.
In less than a month after this, separate elections were
held ; each side again claimed that its directors were
elected. More suits followed. Gould and Fisk charged
that Ramsey, president of the road, had illegally issued
three thousand shares of stock to the Morgan party, and
demanded that this issue be declared invalid. Morgan,
Samuel Sloan and others of the opposition retaliated
charges diat Gould and Fisk had used force and
"rnud. The Stale of N'cw York now stepped in, and
hi nigh ihe \tlornev General, brought an action against
' parties. The State charged that both stockholder-'
'- \vere illegal, irregular and void; that spurious
votes !i;nl been counted in, and that otherwise they were
full of fraud/' 1 The State a>kcd for an injunction re-
straining both boards from taking possession.
1 he ca>e came up again in November. i8(Hj, be fore-
judge Danvin Smith in the Supreme Court at R<>che>-
ter, X. Y. Gould and Fisk found themselves ;:; a great
disadvantage. .In Xc\v York City, with their bought
judges on hand, thev could arrange for decisions in ad-
vance, but in Rochester they were in a territory where
the power of competitive magnates was strongly in-
trenched. Judge Smith's decision was wholly favorable
to the group of capitalists led by J. Pierpont Morgan,
and the Albany and Susquehanna Railroad passed into
their control.' 1
This seems to have been J. Pierpont Morgan's first
entry into the railroad business in which later he was to
become so powerful a factor. Thenceforth, for nearly
thirty years, until the period of organizing industrial
trusts began, his chief undertakings were his banking
business and what was called " the reorganization of rail-
road^."
The two things worked well together. By means of
financial laws, corruptly passed, the bankers, both in-
ternatii.nal and national, compelled the people of the
I nited States, through their Government, to present
them with the fund- with which t<> buy up railroads and
iither forms of property." \\ e have already described
'' [.;m -IMJ'- Reports, X"e\v York Supreme Court, i : j;oS. eie.
T! . . :' ti ca.-e i;i ilu- tleei~i"',i frn;uentl.v refers to
" i !: ]>;irt v iu-.'iiK-il i-v I. ! "ierp< 'in MI iri.:;i : "
Sre. i !: iV . '< '' ill. -t:iU- of >, \\ '. .r! \>. The Al])any
1 8 4
the financial system prevailing in the L niied Staler dur-
ing and immediately following the Civil War ; henv the
people were taxed from Si 8.000.000 to 820,000,000 a
year to pay interest annually to the bankers and other
bondholders. \Ye have also showed how the banker?
had laws passed by which they could deposit their Gov-
ernment bonds in the United States Treasury and receive
back the full amount in currency, less ten per cent.
Thus the banks received a double interest ; often as
much as six per cent, in gold in annual interest from the
Government, and a far greater amount in interest for the
public use of the currency which they were gratuitously
allowed to issue on the strength of the deposited bonds. 6
At the same time, they were relieved from paying taxes
on Government bonds. Their profits, obviously, were
enormou>. averaging twenty, fifty, and often one hun-
dred per cent, in the course of a year. The law.- also
were so devised as to insure them a virtual monopoly
of the currencv supply an incalculable power in manip-
ulating industry and the markets, and in controlling spec-
ulation in stocks.
In its resolutions passed at Militarv Hall. Xew York
City, on October 19. 1829. the YYorkingmen's Party
had denounced the banker- as " the greatest knaves, im-
postors and paupers of the age." A violent tirade this
seemed on its face. but. in point of fact, there wa--
hardly a banker in the country who was not c^n-tantlv
p pres.e.ntatives. In 1873 it \va> estimated that $375.000.000
of American railroad -counties were held abroad, chiefly by for-
hankers. The Final Report of the Indu-tria! Commission
in ;</jj estimated (see page ^04 of ihai report i tlu- amount of
ihe-e securities held by foreign banking house- rind others abroad
: - 1,000,000.
been broui' I ' In a previous ohapicr ho\v th>'
f'jovi-nimer.t from iSd.} to 1878 had paid out to national banks
M.I L'i of S25J, 8.5.7, 550. 77 as interest on bonds. House
incnt. No ~-\. 1870.
KLOWKUING OF Till: MORGAN FORTL'NIi 185
ami criminally violating the law by committing- some
-pecies of fraud or other. Year after year the courts
were full of lawsuits in which this or that banker \vas
charged with fraudulent transactions. There is little
scientific use in describing Morgan's career without ad-
verting to an illuminative mention of what other con-
spicuous bankers were doing, both before, and during,
his time, liver and ever anew it will be seen that Mor-
gan was doing nothing more than emulating the tradi-
tional practices of his class.
Perhaps the foremost banker in the United States in
the first lour decades of the nineteenth century was
Nicholas Riddle, that proud aristocrat and founder of
a familv of aristocrats. I le was long president of the
once all-powerful Hank of the United States, and was
held up to the whole country as an illustrious example of
die position to which any able and well-regulated youth
could attain.
Vet he was accused of being a thief, an embezzler, a
malefactor in law. After his retirement from the presi-
dency of the Hank of the United States, that institution
brought a civil action against him and the cashier. John
Andrews, fur the restitution of $400.000 winch they
were charged with stealing from the bank in iS^i. 1 !i -
theft, it was further specifically charged, was o .<>...'. 1
bv fraudulent entries, burning of vouchers and by oilier
methods. 1'v the time the suit came up in court in iS.i ;.
Middle had died, but the action was pressed against An-
drews, lii- answer was a genera! denial, but fudge Par-
sons decided that he was convinced that the claim for
recovery wa- one \\hich con! '. he enforced, and he over-
:.vr AMKKICAX i-~oi<Ti:xi-;s
ruled Andrews' demurrer. 7 And to give merely one in-
>lance of many instances of the methods of powerful
bankers during Morgan's early career, let us consider
the case of Bischoftsheim and Goldschmidt. Thev it \vas
who loaned Jay Gould the money to pay fraudulent in-
terest on fraudulent bonds in his Erie Railroad thefts ;
they supplied the money to pay fictitious dividends, and
when they saw more profit in betraying him, they quickly
changed front and poured out the 8750.000 with which
Gould's directors of the Erie Railroad were bribed to
resign. * By such methods they heaped up great for-
tunes ; when Goldschmidt died a quarter of a century
ago he left an estate of $30.000.000.
LAWS DRAFTED FOR PLl'XDEK.
But the extraordinary financial laws passed during the
Givil War were only the forerunners of other laws
which the bankers and the creditor class in general
caused to be passed in following years, and by which
they instantly and vastly increased their wealth and
power, and were enabled far more effectually than ever
before to put the screws upon the producing class.
The most noted of these laws was that passed by Con-
gresj "H Eebruary 12. 1^73. practically accomplish-
ing the demonitization of silver as a coin. This was
the same Gongre-.- which, a- we have seen in one of the
chapters on the Sage fortune, was bribed with a million
7 Parson's Stlcct Fruity Cases nf the First Judicial District
of IVnn-ylvanin. 1^.44. ii : 31-63. Also, Pennsylvania llou-e
Journal. 1^42, Vol. ii. Appendix : 182. Middle's theft has hee;i
incidentally refcmd to in a previous chapter, but it stands a
I' ire extended notice here.
- !:::': ,"i Investigation of the State of Xe\v York. 1870.
S- :'-.. >'".'. Y '. S'a ; ' Assembly nr.rr.nifnt-:. 1X7?.
' : , M^c \"o. 08.
KLOWEKINc; OK T II K .MORGAN KOKTl.'Mi 1 o/
dollars to pass an act granting an additional subsidy of
85,000,000 to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company.
The demonitization act went through by evasion ; not a
word was directly mentioned in it of the demonitization
of silver; few knew of its purport; even the advocates of
bimetallism voted for it. It was one of the most adroit
bills ever put through Congress, and it was only after it
had become a law that its concealed provisions began
to be understood.
Then a terrific cry of rage went up from the middle
class from one end of the country to the other; the ex-
citement was intense. In this excitement atid indigna-
tion the working class was persuaded into joining, al-
though at basis, the workers were not affected by this
law ; their exploitation and despoilment had gone on
under bimetallism, and would continue without cessation
under monometallism.
It was the middle class which was struck at hard ; the
supply of money was at once contracted, the purchas-
ing power of gold was enhanced, and the power of the
large creditor capitalists and banking institutions over
the small property owning class was greatly augmented.
This law was passed at about the same time that the
first trust, the Standard Oil Company, was rising to give
the death blow to the doctrine of free competition in
trade, and to crush out the middleman in business. The
day was a sorry one for the long-dominant middle class.
The middle class representatives in Congress and else-
where now began an agitation which lasted many years.' 1 '
They charged that the demonitization of silver had been
brought about by the conspiracy of John Sherman and a
1 88
few other prominent men in Congress, with the financiers
of Wall street and Europe. In fact, the successive vol-
umes of the " Congressional Record " of those years are
full of speeches in which this charge is brought out over
and over again. But the law stood : and what was more
galling to the middle class. John Sherman, denounced so
bitterly as a traitor, and as a mercenary of the bankers,
was appointed, a few years later, to be Secretary of the
United States Treasury. From that time on, the bank-
ers, national and international, came out more and more
in the open in direct dictatorship of the financial law>
and policy of the United States. Circumlocution became
less necessary.
The great Government bond issue of 1877, by which
the bankers made colossal profits, followed Sherman's
appointment. Before, however, referring to this memor-
able sell-out, it will be well to give a passing glimpse of
Morgan's varied activities and the nature of them.
Morgan's first partnership was as a member of the firm of
Dabney, Morgan and Company, which firm, it will be re-
called, was one of the banking houses participating in
that noted Kansas Pacific Railway loan of 1869. This
loan was asked for from investors largely on the
>trength of a three-million-acre land grant in Kansa>
and Colorado, which had been corruptly secured "by the
Kansas Pacific Railway Company from Congress, and
which was the beginning of not one series, but man}'
-erics, of fraud and plunder. 11 '' Morgan could claim, and
with justice so far as current standards went, that the
floating of this loan was a " legitimate banking transac-
tion " ; but the fact that no banker declined to profit from
the financing of enterprises which he knew began and
I-'LOUKKIXG OF Til 1C MOKGAX FoRTCXK l8<)
continued in corruption anl Dwindling, gives a very clear
idea of tlie (|tialitv of the assumed morals and ethics of
the capitalist class.
THI-: GRF\T r.oxo issrr. OF 1877.
Morgan's next partnership was as a member of the
firm of Drcxel, Morgan and Company. lie began to be
conspicuous in very large transactions. One of these
was the floating of the $260,000,000 L. S. Government
bond issue of 1877. Avoiding plunging into detail,
which would be intricate at be>t, suffice it to say that this
bond issue was generally regarded, and not without full
reason, as one of the verv worst cases that had ever
been known of the people being betrayed over to a few
bankers. The selling of the bonds was apportioned
among these banking houses : August Belmont. the
Rothschilds, J. and \Y. Seligman Brothers, and Drexel.
Morgan and Company, the last named acting for them-
selves and for the firm of J. S. Morgan and Company
in London. This syndicate at once sold the bonds at an
advance of from one to four per cent, above the price
which they had paid to the Government. The profits
of the syndicate reached into the tens of millions of dol-
lar.-. Drexel, Morgan and Company alone were credited
with "making" a clear profit of $5,0x30.000. Their
function consisted in nothing more or less than acting
as licensed speculative middlemen for a Government
which could have disposed of the bonds without inter-
mediaries. Moreover, the participating bankers were
able to get the bonds for them>el\vs at " bargain prices."
and then through associated national banks, carry on the
familiar practice of exacting double interest one in-
F 90
tcrest from the Government, and another for the u>e ot
currency issued on the basis of those same bond-. 11
These transactions comprised obviously but a few of
Morgan's varied activities in the decades following the
Civil War ; it can be well understood that he was, at the
.-ame time, engaged in a mass of purely private btisine--
dealing?, of which, no details ever became public. Even
of his public trail:"- actions the fact- as set forth in the
public records are more indications, than actual and
complete account.-, of the underlying circumstances.
The financiers and business men had everv motive for en-
shrouding their affairs in the greatest secrecy, particu-
larly when tho-e affair- in any way related to the divert-
ing of Government functions for their ends, or had
to do with the suspicious passage of partial laws or the
violation of laws. The motto of the whole commercial
class was to keep the public in the dark as much as
possible: and even when the usual legislative investigat-
ing committees, fortified by summary power- of la\v.
mildly -ought to ascertain the surface facts onlv, with-
out probing too dee]), they were, as a rule, obstructed
at every turn.
Such facts as did become public came out adventi-
tiously despite every effort of the magnates concerned
to hu.-h them up. Sometimes embittered competitor-
would supply revelations to investigating committee- :
m other occasions the magnates would seek to cheat
M Thf scandalous circumstances of this bond i.ue made a
lively stir throughout the country and aroused warm dehatr>
in Oingre??. On January 24. 1870. the l.nitvd Stat>\- Sena'e
pa-sed a resolution calling upon Sherman. Secretary of the
Treasury, for information as to tin- alleged payment? of double
interest in regard to moneys rcceiv d by bank- and sy:v i: :!' -
for bond- lr, i<i<, r a!l<>\ved to remain < :\ depo-it uith national
bank- pending the call f < >r 'lie bond-. Ste Senate E\ccutivt*
iment. \"o. <., i ^'t.
10.1
one another in the division of the spoils or overreach at
the other's expense, and then the quarrel would be
thrown into the courts and some salient facts, at least,
revealed. The point cannot be too strongly emphasized
that for every one charge of crookedness and corrup-
tion that investigating committees and public officials
made against capitalists, a hundred such charges were
specifically brought by capitalists themselves against their
own kind ; a fact overabundant!}- attested in the vol-
uminous court records from the very beginning of the
United States Government down to the present.
Had it not been for a row between various magnate-
in a transaction in which William H. Yanderbilt. j. Pier-
pont Morgan and other capitalists were engaged, and
the consequent wrangling in the courts, certain facts per-
taining to another of Morgan's feats could not be now
ascertained. In one of the chapters on the Yanderbilt
fortune 1 - it has been brought out how. in 1870,, Morg;.n
formed a svndicate to buy two hundred and fifty thou-
sand shares of Xew York Central stock from William
11. Yanderbilt. and how further, this stock, bought at
120. was, after a magical process of manipulation in the
Xew York and London stock markets, sold at I ^o.
thereby yielding the syndicate an immense profit.
"Thi<," wrote a biographer, "gained for Mr. Morgan
the confidence of Mr. Yanderbilt. who intrusted him
in 1X85 with the task of adjusting the difficulties be-
tween the Central and West Shore roads."
Morgan, however, did not need to solicit anybody's
" confidence " ; he was a truculent, aggressive financier.
10,2 HISTORY OF THE r.UEAT AMERICAN FORTl'XES
with a dominating, even fierce, personality, and wit',
great power in his own field, that of banking. His min<;
was of that resolute, masterful order declining to be
balked by any man or set of circumstances, and his
methods were not distinguished by delicacy. "His
method of treatment is drastic," wrote this same bi-
ographer of his railroad organizations, " and the holders
of junior securities have made many a wry face, but the
method has seemed to be efficacious. From Si. 000,000
to 83.000.000 is generally put down as the commission
for reorganization going to the. house of ]. P. Morgan
and l'ompany, i:; for knowing how to do it and doing it."
Between these lines can be legibly read the nature of
Morgan's "efficacious " methods; they will be still more
illuminated, by force of his own words and acts, further
on in this narrative.
Contrary to the description so widely and continu-
ously disseminated, many capitalists are not men of
personal courage, in the sense of standing up. man to
man, and verbally " having it out." as the vulgar phrase
goes. The cunning, cupidity, turpitude and treachery
so impregnated in business, and. in fact, the foundation
of successful business, breed both a physical and moral
cowardice. Well able, as they are. to fight their combats
through lawyers, most capitalists, by reason of a certain
degeneracy, lack the faculty of exercising a strong, di-
rect, personal, virile influence over men, such as a fight-
ing pirate captain of the old days held over his band.
Morgan has been one of the few exceptions, t nited
v, ith his wealth there has been in him a powerful belli-
cose personality, a tremendous vitality both of mind and
phv-ique : a man who could impose his will by sheer
brute strength a> well as by reasoning: who could con-
vince by argument, and if necessary, bulldoze and ter-
rorize.
Such a combination allied with wealth and education
(for he was college bred) and a complete knowledge of
all the tricks of the trade, was bound to prove invincible,
or almost so. His very appearance, arising from an un-
fortunate facial disfigurement, added to his forceful ap-
pearance, and to the terror which he inspired. Xot inap-
propriately did he name his yacht The Corsair: he
was a modern embodiment, in a present-day guise, of
some antique corsair, the qualities simply being trans-
posed for adaption to new conditions.
r.RKAT MAC.X. \TF.S VIF.I.D TO HIM.
Instead of having to squirm himself into Yanderbilt's
confidence, he compelled that haughty magnate to come
to terms. This fact Morgan himself testified to in
the suit arising from Yanderbilt's South Pennsylvania
railroad project a transaction which has been de-
scribed heretofore. This litigation, it will be recalled,
sprang from Vanderbilt's building a parallel line to com-
pete with the I'enn-ylvania Railroad. Morgan, it was
true, had acted as \ anderbilt's financial agent, but he
also had heavy interests in the Pennsylvania Railroad.
and his banking hou-e represented large foreign holding
interests in that line. Above all. he was on the sharp
lookout for tlie interests of |. Pierpont Morgan.
How did he force Yandcrhilt to .-ell hi- South Penn-
sylvania !nu- to the Pennsvlvama Railroad.' In an ex-
amination, on ! Vcembcr 13. iSS;. before Kxaminer John
II. Weiss in the federal Court at Philadelphia, he re-
lated that when he returned from Kurope in |nne. iSS;,
194 HISTORY 01-' THF, CRKAT AMF.KU'AX FORTl'XF.S
lie " became satisfied that something should be done to
bring more harmony among the trunk lines." and he
added that he believed that " sufficient pressure could be
brought on Mr. Vanderbilt to induce him to sell out."
Of the specific nature of this "pressure," no explana-
tion was given, but those familiar with the immense co-
ercive power of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and the
power of Morgan's bank, and that of his correlated
banks, were not in doubt as to its significance. The
treaty of peace between the warring magnates was
finally made aboard Morgan's yacht. \Yhat was Mor-
gan's part? To use his own language, he " bought from
the South Pennsylvania and sold to the Pennsylvania."
What his rewards as arbiter were was a fact not made
public: we can conjecture that his bill was no slight
one. This treaty, like all such agreements, was made
only to be broken ; the Reading Railroad which, under
the pact, was to be indemnified for certain property,
claimed that it was cheated ; hence the suit.
Up to this time, that is to say. 1886, Morgan had
figured little as a railroad magnate; his conspicuousness
was more that of a powerful banker who made a spe-
cialty of reorganizing railroads. Let it. not be supposed
that the term "reorganizing" comprehended the under-
taking of expensive improvements in the physical layout
and operation of railroads ; the introduction ol safer ap-
pliances and equipment, and the minimi/ing of danger
id pas>engers and 1o railroad workmen.
Reorganization included none' of these things; there
\vas not a railroad corporation in the country which did
not violently contest the passage of laws requiring safety
apparatus, and which did not violate such laws as were
finally parsed ; progressively, the yearly death rate of
FLO\\ i.Ki \<; OF -I'm-: M OKI, AN FOKTI NIC n^
passengers and railroad employes increased." Tlic
profits, in the form of dividends, came not only from a
series of extortions, but from the slaughter of a greater
number of men, women and children than were killed
in the worst wars that the civilized (or rather, uncivil-
ized,) world has known. The " reorganizations," so
called, were not intended to change these condition- ;
their sole purpose was to put the railroads in a position
where profits would be assured, no matter at what pub-
lic expense or at what cost of life. After a railroad
had been grabbed and thrown into bankruptcy by succes-
sive crews of capitalists, a reorganize!", such as Mor-
gan, would step in, compel the creditors to settle at his
own terms, force the small stockholders to consent t<>
some new arrangement of stock, and issue new securities
to be sold in Furope or America. In brief, a "reor-
ganization " consisted in scaling down the debts, or sum-
marily expunging them, and in devising new plans bv
which the profit < would be greater.
For doing this. Morgan was hailed a< a man of won-
derful constructive acumen a financier <>i tir>t-rate or-
der. Frequently, however, as we >hall see, the small
stockholders did not share this opinion; and occasion-
ally they forgot their expected gratitude so far as to
1 ' The mimher of railroad employes killed nr injured in-
creased from jj.noo out of a t<aal of 704,7.4.; in service in iKx).
to <)J. i/tf of a total of i.<>7_M>74 employed in 11)07 an in
croa.se from 3,u per cent, in iS8<) to 5.51 per c. t. in 1-107. From
iS8S to KKJ7 not less than 5^.040 euijiloyi. > were ki-'ed while at
work, and mure than Sc.o.i'o.i employes were either maimed or
crippled. These figures have been compiled from the annual
reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
I (JO
charge him in court with fraud.'-"' This was Morgan's
great role for many years : as a reorgani/xT. not as a
proprietary railroad magnate. The great railroad po-
tentates of the period np to i88<) were the Yanderbilts,
< ionlds, Sage, Blair and Iluntington. They were the
men recognized in Congress as the lords of the railroad
systems, which fact is patent from a scrutiny of the
Congressional Record." in which, with great abun-
dance, recur word}' denunciations of them for gross cor-
ruption and for consecutive violation of laws. Mor-
gan's name was not mentioned in the-e accusations.
Cut it was not long before Morgan came to the front
as one of the foremost railroad magnates in the I nited
States. His aggressiveness of character and action, his
truculent boldness in smashing down obstacles, his con-
tempt for artificial restraints of law. his disregard of
public opinion, and hi- knowledge of how to applv power
where it would produce the best results all of the<e
qualities and capacities were the very ones needed at
that precise time.
Till-: CAMPAIGN AOAINST THE MAGNATES.
A troublous time the railroad and industrial magnate-
were having. It was the period when the middle clas>.
in its fury at being on the verge of overthrow, was most
active in having all sorts of anti-trust legislation passed
ir ' For example: In the case of the Toledo Railway and
I'en inal Company, the Ohio Savings Bank and Trust Com-
pany :':lrd a petition in the i-Yderal Court at Toledo. Ohio, on
August 5, 1007. averting that fraud had been used in connection
with the -ale of that road, and charging collusion between
Morgan and other railroad magnates. By this collusion, it \va-
alleged, an agreement had been reached by which the property
\va- sold at a low figure through (he smothering of competitive
bidding, and that this had been done to defraud unsecured cred-
itors. The petition was overruled.
This cla;-s was obdurately determined to keep things as
they were. On the other hand, the. great magnates, in
line with the momentum of modern economic forces,
were being forced into effacing the middleman in every
direction, and in centralizing ownership. The middle
class had the number and traditions ; the magnates had
the money and the power; as for the working class,
despite its strikes, it was merely, in the long run, a
pawn in the combat. The Standard Oil Company had
built tip its power largely by reason of the secret railroad
rebates and discriminations. If a drastic law could 1:^
passed against the railroads, the middle class argued,
the rising trusts would receive a fatal quietus a futile
kind of reasoning, but one .sincerely believed in at the
time and for a long time afterward. The great aim
of the middle class, therefore, was to get through Con-
gress a strict interstate commerce law, such as would,
under heavy penalties, forbid rebate giving and railroad
pooling.
The Congressional sessions of 1884. 1885 and 1886
were, to a great extent, occupied with long debates over
this proposed law. The middle class was quite sure that
it was the victor. Senator followed Senator, Represent-
ative followed Representative, in arraigning the railroad
magnates. ]f speeches signified anvthing these mag-
nates were alreadv on the highroad to defeat and to
prison. Senator Van \Vyck, of Xebraska. thundered
for days at a stretch. " [-"or years/' said he, "capital
has been organi/ed. b< >ld. im>crupulous, rapacious, law-
defving, moving as did Could, according to Ins sworn
testimony, in Xew N t ork, and
deuce of hi- own written ' ~
lai ure -. upon the conn s. up' ) i l
Slates, unblu-dnnglv purchasin
ly8 HISTORY OF Till-: GREAT AMERICA X FORTl'XES
. . . In a republic they despise the people and control
its representatives." 1<s " The time has come," put in
Senator Conger, " when generalities, glittering and other-
wise, will not satisfy the demands of the people. They
demand a positive, incisive, direct and plain law." 1T
Senator Call, of Florida, had his say, and it was a long
one, none of which is worth quoting except his assertion
that the railroads had issued $3,000,000,000 of bogus
bonds, and that they were assessing the people of the
United States to pay an actual taxation of $300,000,000
yearly. 1S More than one Senator and Representative
dwelt indignantly upon that $300,000,000 of annual en-
forced taxation extorted by the railroads. And so the
debate went wearily on, tiring out everyone but the
talkers themselves, whose stock-in-trade was talk.
Would the flow of words never end?
THE MIDDLE CLASS TRICKED AXD J5EATEX.
At last an interstate commerce law was passed. Great
was the rejoicing among the middle class. Its compo-
nents exulted in iheir victory, and in visions foresaw
their dominance soon restored and the trusts ruined and
extinguished.
lint after a comparatively brief interval their jubila-
tion became blank dismav. This law, this gre;it. loiig-
;igitated for law, which was to intrench them so effec-
tively, turned out to be an utu-r sham. On its surface
its provisions read fair and smooth: but when it went
io thr courts the perforating began, as its authors in-
D
!'!.( >\\ KK1 Mi OF TI1F. MOiUiAN FOUTl'Nli I 1 /;
tended, and for which contingency thev had expressed
and equivocally drafted it. Due clause after another
was, on this or that ground, declared inoperative by the
courts; the interstate Commerce Commission, which
the law established, had not even the power, it was de-
cided, to compel the attendance of witnesses, and the
courts refused to grant writs of subpiena in aid of its
proceedings. Further mo re, railroad official- ( who were
the only persons whose testimony could secure a con-
viction) were excused from testifying on the ground
that by so doing they might incriminate themselves. In
a word, the Interstate Commerce Commission, on the
establishment of which as a peremptory tribunal the
middle class had built such high hopes, was found to be
nothing more than an inane body which was. allowed
to devote itself to the harmless pastime of collecting
statistics, but was empowered to do nothing more
serious.
Again the bewildered middle class found itself woe-
fully routed. While it had been holding meeting- and
talking and petitioning, tin- magnates had sent a stream
of " silent arguments ' coursing through the exalted
wall of Congre-s. And, in fact, some <>f the verv mem-
bers of Congress who were so vigorously inveighing
against the "high-handed" corruption oi the railroad
magnate^, and demanding punitive law-, were, at tlns
verv time, themselves implicated in a great -caudal.
This wa- what was called the " 1 'an- Klectric Scan-
dal ": and if anv reader de-ire- in acquaint him-elf with
the vast ramifications of corruption in Cnngre-s. in the
courts and in the legi-lature- at the time let him (if
2OO
lie dare) read the 1,284 pages of testimony liken by
a Congressional Investigating Committee. 1 . 1 " The Pan-
hlectric Company was a competitor of the Bell Tele-
phone Company: at least, it energetically attempted to
be. 'j he Bell Company had already established the
validity of its patents in the courts, although not with-
out having to face and fight down charge after charge
on the part of other inventors that it had appropriated
the fruits of their inventions. The testimony before
this particular Congressional Committee was full of
charges, sometimes mere insinuations, at other times
open accusations, that in order to attain its victory, and
to secure favorable decisions, laws and franchises, the
Bell Telephone Company had bribed Congress, the va-
rious legislatures and judges either by mon'cv or by gifts
of stock.
Against the Bell Company the Pan-Klectric Company
seemed powerless; but as a last resort, its promoters
began a campaign of corruption to get the I "nited States
Covernment to move in the courts lor the vacating of the
Bell patents. Large blocks of Mock were distributed
among vanou- influential Senators and Representatives,
some of whom offered no objections to being made direct-
ors oi the Pan-Klectric Company. I "nited State- Attor-
nev-Ccneral ( iarland upon who<e say-so depended
whether the suit for vacating the Bell patent- <hould
be brought or not, held, it was charged, not less than
$10,000,000 o1 stock m the ['an-I'llectric ' ompanv, for
whiVh stock he had not paid a dollar. When the ! 'an-
Klectrir promoters were interrogated as to these methods
they cvm'callv pointed mil tint the Bell Telephone Corn-
had begun its career bv n-ing preeiselv the sn.nie
FLOWKKIXG OF TIM: MORGAN FORTUNE 201
methods. In this light, the Bell Telephone Company
succeeded in completely vanquishing its threatening
competitor, the Tan-Electric Company, which soon
passed into nothingness.-
Such was the majority composition of a Congress
from whom the middle class expected such great and
public-spirited reforms ; this was the Congress which was
to pass laws that would forever check '" the greedy, in-
satiable inroads of the monopolies! " " Monopoly " was
the particular bugbear of those years ; the generic thing
that politicians could always conveniently convert into
personal political capital in their constituencies by flag-
ellating it with roars of denunciation, which was an
exceedingly popular pose. The word " trust," be it
noted, as signifying a complete monopoly, had not then
come into popular usage. Those virtuous outbursts in
Congress against the monopolies, served the purpose
well, but one overshadowing fact neither the middle class
nor the working class seemed to note, namelv, that what-
ever might be said in Congress, nearly every bill
apparently drawn to curtail the power of monopolies
and wealth \vas so ingeniously drafted that its so-called
vital prevision.- failed to stand the te>t of the courts.
Yet the lawyers in Congress who drew these* bills were
ranked as the foremost "Constitutional expert-" in the
land a situation not at all contradictory to those who
understood the double-faced nature of the performances
at Washington.
Man\' State- were passing drastic anti-trust laws.
These laws did not essentiailv arre-t the growth of trusts
but thcv did have the effect of spreading a certain timid-
of wealth, it was true, cunirolled the machinery of Gov-
ernment, and criminal proceedings were little to be
feared. Still, with the public temper in the inflamed
,-tate in which it was. there was never any tellinf what
might break forth.
1 he great railroad magnates, in particular, were tired
of a competition resulting in the cutting of rates, in-
creased expenses, and diminished profits. They were
eager to form a combination effective enough to pre-
vent competition in the respect of undermining one an-
other's freight and passenger rate>. With such an
agreement in force, profits would be immensely increased,
and upon the strength of those increased profits, more
watered stock could be issued.
Hut who \va.- audacious enough to undertake the in-
itiative in forming this combination? In a way. it was
a perilous tiling to do. ]f unbought or unintimidated
public officials should take a notion to prosecute crim-
inally, its promoters and beneficiaries were liable,
upon conviction, to a long sojourn in prison. Van-
derbilt, Gould and Huntington and other magnates, while
caring nothing for law. did not choo-c to take the lead:
moreover, as thev were ]ealou> and di-trustful of one
;; ther, it would not have been iudiciou> for anyone of
them to have done -o.
The ideal leader in this exigency was J. Pierpont Mor-
gan; and how he stepped forward and molded the nebu-
lous plan into a definite, concrete combination, will now
be rdaled.
CHAPTER IX
MORGAN AS A BANKING AND RAILROAD GRANDER
On January 2, 1889, a circular marked '" Private and
Confidential," was issued by the three banking houses
of Drcxel. Morgan and Company, Brown Brothers and
Company, and Kidder, Peabody and Company. The
most painstaking- care was exercised that this document
should not find its way into the press, or otherwise be-
come public. Indeed, extraordinary measures were
taken to surround its contents with every precaution of
secrecy.
Why this fear? Because the circular was an invita-
tion, tacitly understood as a command, to the great rail-
road magnates to as.-emble at Morgan's house. Xo. 210
Madison avenue, and there form, in the phrase of the
day, an iron-clad combination. The plan was to make
a strict compact which would eft ace competition among
certain railroad-, and unite those intere-t- in an agree-
ment by which the people ol tin- I nited Stale- could be
bled even mure effectively than before. For the sake
of appearance, in ca-e the nature of the undertaking
should leak into public print, the promoter- garnished
over their real purpose-- with a string ot diverting
phrases. Their sole aim, so ihcy pleasantly indited it.
was an association "to maintain public, reasonable, uni-
form and -table rate-." and they added that another ob-
iect would be the gathering of -lati-tic- regarding rail
ways.
203
Such subterfuges deceived nobody but the credulous or
uninformed.
A HISTORIC MEETING IX MORGAN'S HOUSE.
That circular is a historic document, well worth more
than passing notice ; and he who is familiar with the
forces then at work will rightly consider it of far greater
importance than Presidents' messages, ordainments of
Congress or Courts' decrees.
At a time when the whole gravamen of law and ju-
ridical precedent was being used to insist upon indus-
trial forces remaining stationary and stagnant, this cir-
cular came as a proclamation of defiance. Common and
statute law sternly declared that the thing called com-
petition in trade must be kept alive, and that if it could
not sustain itself by its own merits, the law should
demand its maintenance. The causes producing and
justifying competition were passing away, but none of
the law-making bodies recognized the newer conditions,
nor made any provisions for them. But the magnates
realized that the old indiscriminate system of competi-
tion was rapidly becoming archaic, and that the time
was ripe for a more systematic organization of indus-
try. And so, while Congress and the legislatures were
busily enacting law after law, supposedly edicts of " the
sovereign people of the I'nited State-," a few magnates
issued a brief circular which intrinsically was of far, far
more binding weight than entire volumes of statutes im-
potent, in the long run. in the face of onrushing eo>
n< >i;nr i< >rces.
llie ideas <>\ the people at large and the self-
poses down, as the magnate.- did. and however harmlcs-
they might represent their aims, the plan of this group
ol. hankers and railroad grandees was certain to arouse
the sharpest suspicions. A restless, sullen state of mind
pervaded the mass of people. Distrustful of any asser-
tions made hy the magnates, they were ever ready to see
sinister projects beneath bland announcements. Fur-
thermore, the magnates' definition of " reasonable " was
diametrically different from that of the people at large.
.\fatters and charges that the magnates honeyed over as
" reasonable adjustments," impressed the popular under-
standing as extremely unreasonable; as gross extortions
of which the law should take condign notice.
\\'RKCKixd TIII-: Minni.K CLASS C.UADL'ALLV.
At the behest of the middle class, laws directed, super-
ficially at least, against the magnates' arbitrary power
and concentration of resources were everywhere being
passed. Since the putting down and dissolution of the
great labor movement of 1886, serious inroads from that
quarter were no longer feared. Putt the work of ex-
tinguishing the middle class had to be proceeded with
slowly and discreetly.
Workers' uprisings, political or other, could be crushed
by force and court decrees and by bribery and fraud at
the polls. In any emergency the whole middle class
would stand with the great propertied interests in sub-
duing the working class. Yet when the fight for su-
premacy was one confined to the middle class and the
plutocracy, the magnates had good reason not to attack
the middle class too openly. The country swarmed with
organizations of manufacturers, jobbers and small trade--
men, and in the XYest and South the Farmers' Alliance,
2O6 HISTORY 01' TIIF. GRKAT AMKRJCAX FOKTUNK.S
an ally, was at its strongest. This middle class arrogated
tn itself the distinction of being " the public." The work-
ing class, whom it used and exploited, had only a few
obscure trade journals to disseminate its views and voice
its demands, and, although comprising the immense bulk
of the voters, had not a single real representative in
political office. But the interests of the middle class were
represented by thousands of newspapers and journals;
by a host of political spokesmen and lawyers and college
professors, and by the force of prevalent law and com-
mercial institutions.
In warring upon the magnates the most persistent argu-
ment that the middle class used in its appeal for sympathy
and support, was that the extortions of the magnates
were immoral. Precisely as, when the \vorkingmen in
previous decades had struck' for a shortening of their
hours of daily labor, the manufacturers had declared the
movement insurrectionary and immoral, so now they
used the same plea against the exactions of the magnates.
When the workers complained that their bosses oppressed
them, the bosses retaliated with the charge that the
workingmen were unruly, and that their demands for
redress were not based on morality. Hut when the mag-
nates squeezed the manufacturers, jobbers and retailers
then these diyisions of the middle class made vehement
lamentations that they were the victims of an immoral
conspiracy.
Nothing could exceed the baseness and hypocrisy of the
middle class, as a class. It demanded the widest latitude
m law in placing no restrictions upon it either in exploit-
ing its employes, or in robbing back from them in variou-
swindling ways the meager wages it paid. It insistently
fought the workers' struggle for a shorter workday and
more wages; it opposed the passage of even slight laws
for the pr< 'lection of the uorkciV labor; ii combated
inovcincnts for factor}' and tenement reionns. At tin-
same time it insisted upon its right to make and sell
shoddy goods and adulterated products, and impose them
upon the workers at extortionate prices.
The manv laws which, after strong agitation on the
part of labor organizations and various other bodies, the
different legislatures were passing at this time, indicate
the widespread practice of manufacturing and selling-
adulterated and often poisonous foods and drug--. The
passage of these laws had long been contested by the
capitalist class, as a whole; and even after they were
enacted, they were not generally enforced, and were so
ineffective that, many years later, during Roosevelt's ad-
ministration, a Xational Pure Food Act was passed by
Congress after the severest and most persistent opposi-
tion on the part of the beneficiaries of the frauds. Tin-
law, also, has been largely ineffective.
In i8/(j, Wisconsin enacted a penal law, providing
penalties for the adulteration of foods and drugs.
Ohio, in 1887, 1800. and r8<)8 passed law< for the pun
ishment of variou^ kind.-- of adulteration. Xew York,
in i8<)3 and [8<j8, passed laws forbidding the fraudulent
sale of certain imitation foods and certain fraudulent
stamped goods. After vears of agitation. Massachusetts.
in 180,7. passed a law (Chap. 3441 prohibiting the man-
ufacture or sale of adulterated food. Missi uri, in i88<>
and 18(^7. passed \:\\\ < against the adulteration of cer-
tain foods. Iowa enacted laws for the punishment of
those selling adulterated milk, cheese, butter and linseed
oil. Illinois, in 1881. passed a law again-t the fraudu-
lent manulacture or srde of imitation butter, and re-
enacted it in 18117. Xe\\ Jersey, in the same year.
pa<>ed an act to prevent the adulteration of food^ and
2O8 HISTORY Ol- Till-'. GRMAT AMERICAN I'ORTL'XKS
drugs, and enacted another law in 1897. Pennsylvania
prohibited the sale of adulterated drugs, and provided
1 enaltics for the adulteration of milk and cream. Michi-
gan, in 1895, passed an act to prohibit and prevent
adulteration, fraud and deception in the manufacture
and sales of articles of food and drink. Nebraska and
Kentucky passed similar laws. South Dakota, in 1885,
enacted penal laws relating to the adulteration of food
and drink, and. in 1897, passed another act increasing
the penalties. These are some examples of the various
State laws. Nearly, all of the States also passed laws
against the sale, by fraudulent weights and measures, of
coal, wheat and various other foods and commodities.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MAGNATES CRITICS.
Not a move, on the other hand, could the magnates
make without the middle class raising the cry of fraud
a not untrue accusation, it is hardly necessary to say,
but one singularly ill-chosen from a class itself gan-
grened with fraud. The Farmers' Alliance and kindred
organizations virtuously fulminated against the extor-
tions and frauds of the magnate class: the cattle dealers
of the Southwest especially were not merely bitter, but
rancorous!}- so, against the railroad kings. Yet all of the
large cattle ranches had been obtained by fraud in more
or less degree. 1 The cattlemen not only practiced cx-
tortions, but in their economic wars with adjacent cattle-
men, forced their cowboys to fight and kill the cowboys
'See House Report?. Forty-eighth Congress, Second Sessinp.
1884-5. Executive Document No. 267 : xxviv. This document
deals with the Texas ranches. In prcvi-ms chapters of this work
many fact- have been Lnven from official documents showing
the illegal, ar.'i 'ten violent, seizure of cattle rancho through
out the \Yest.
of their neighbor-, and risk being killed them cive :
nearly all of those cowboy affrays so romantically de-
scribed in fiction, arose from nothing more or less than
economic disputes between competing rival master caitlv
men.
To say that the entire manufacturing cla-s was de-
frauding and swindling in ever}- conceivable form is but:
to state a truism elaborated upon specifically in many a
public document.
Leaving- a-ide the current stupendous frauds in profit-
ing from misleading semi-worthless merchandise, or
adulterated products sold under fal-e pretense-; a traf-
fic shared in by wholesaler, jobixr and retailer; aside
from this phase and a multitude of other phases, we shall
simply give one typical graphic example of what the man-
ufacturers were doing in one of the largest manufactur-
ing States in the Union. While protesting against the
evasion of taxation by the railroad corporation-, the
manufacturers were defrauding in the one item of tax-
ation alone of a sum gigantic in the aggregate. "It is
a notorious fact," reported Comptroller Morgan, oi Xew
York State, in ujoo. "that hundred.- of manufacturing
companies, whose plants are located in thi- State, who-e
business is chiellv trail-acted here, and which tor all prac-
tical purposes are Xew York enterprises, escape all in-
direct taxation in this Stale, and much local taxation,
by being incorporated in other State-." They paid -ub-
-tantialh- nothing for tire and police protection, Comp-
troller Morgan aided.'-' Yet in case their employe-
struck. the>e manufacturers were ever ready to requisi-
tion the pretext of violence and demand police and mili-
tia to club or shoc.it into submission the ver working
210
class from who.-e labor the entire burden of taxation
came. This had been a long-continuing condition of af-
fairs in every State.
MORGAN" DIRECTS MATTERS.
These facts will give a fairly clear idea of the compo-
sition and pretensions of that middle class which the
news of the meeting in Morgan's house was bound to
excite into convulsions. A momentous gathering it cer-
tainly was that assembled in Morgan's mansion on Jan-
uary 8, 1889. Who are they we note there? Apparently
private citizen-; in reality monarchs of the land: Jay
Gould with his son George, held by the leading strings ;
Stickney. of the Northwest territory; Roberts, of the
Pennsylvania Railroad ; sleek Depew. echoing the Yan-
derbilts ; Sloan, of the Delaware, Lackawanna and West-
ern Railroad, and a half dozen more magnates or their
accredited mouthpieces. The honorable legislatures
could gravel}- discuss the advisability of this or that leg-
islation : the noisy "Congress of the United States"
could solemnly meet and after wearing out months in
rodomontade, profess to make law.-; the high and mighty
Court- could blink austerely and pompously hand down
their decision-, Hut in that room in Morgan's house sat
many of the actual rulers of the United States ; the men
who had the power in the final say of ordering what
-h- >uld be done.
Morgan \va- chairman of the meeting, and with wonted
tie directness went -traight to the point. Thank-
to a stenographic report <f the proceedings which fortu-
nate! v we have been able to get hold of, the work of
that meeting is clear. The name of the organization
wa^ to be the " Interstate Commerce Railway Commis-
-ion"; its essential purpose the cessation of competition
among its members. [Jut how was any magnate to be
prevented from competing- with another, or stopped from
encroaching upon another's domain? What penalties
should there be, and how could they be enforced? Cer-
tainly no law could be invoked to compel the earning out
of such an agreement, for the law explicitly prohibited
combinations, and any legislation would not only be out-
lawed, but would reveal the extent of the whole criminal
compact.
Ill-: DELIVERS A MAXDATK.
There was, however, a far greater power than that of
law. namely, the power of massed money. If any mag-
nate present were inclined to balk at the prepared
program he was brought to an instant realization of the
punishment when Morgan announced:
I am authori/ed to -ay, I think, on behalf f the [banking]
houses represented hen- th;it if an organi/ation can IK formed
practically upon the basis submitted by the committee, and with
an executive committee able to enforce it.- provisions, upon
which the bankers shall be represented, they are prepared to say
that they will not negotiate, and will do everything in their
power to prevent the negotiation of, any securities tor the con-
struction of parallel lines, or the extension of lines not ap-
proved by that executive committee. I wish that distinctly un-
derstood. ;;
The threat, or promise, a- it could be differently inter-
preted, wa- assuredly understood. \ a-t as was the
wealth of the magnates prc-uit or represented, neither
anv one or a combination of them, dared i had thev been
212
so disposed J to defy such ;m ultimatum. To do so meant,
inviting the vindictive, cru-hing wrath of a clique of na-
tional and international bankers whose money and power
could be used with the most destructive results. Xor
was there any possible way of appealing to a higher
power.
What if many of the State legislatures had penalized
combinations in restraint of trade? What if the irate
middle class was frantically clamoring for the enforce-
ment of these laws? What if in both common and stat-
ute law this coercive decree of the bankers was criminal
conspiracy ? Kvery man in that assemblage knew that,
judged by prevailing laws, he was participating in a con-
spiracy, yet no apprehension was acutely felt that the
numerous national and State law> would be strictlv en-
forced against him. So confident of its ground was the
meeting, that the subject of possible prosecution wa< not
given a thought. The -acred doctrine, the "inalienable.
undeprivable right" of competition was. without any
ambiguity or ceremonv, given a deadly blow. For that,
if for no other reason, the meeting was memorable. The
magnates were sure of immunity. To them laws were
instruments not obstacles: the same code of laws which
they lightlv stamped under foot they could always suc-
cc>-fully use against workingmen on strike, as they did.
for example, five years later, in the great railroad strike
of i8;4, when Federal troops were ordered out at their
command to overawe, and, if necessary, mow down the
strikers.
Another pha>e of that meeting (a "conference." as it
\va- called) deserves mention. I Tow much of a vacuitv
mm were considered, magnate 1 - though they were, air!
how all important propertv was held, was shown bv t! .
method of voting. \- each proposition was advanced
it was put to a vote. The names of the magnates were
not mentioned in the roll-call ; it was the corporate rail-
roads which were expected to vote and which did vote.
Thus, instead of Gould's name, the name of his railroad-
was called; the Missouri Pacific and the \Yahash voted,
not Gould. \Yhat could have been more beautifully sim-
ple and direct, so free from cant, so faithful to the spirit
of the human money bags present? If this method were
only adopted in Congress much good in point of popular
understanding would result, for while the old forms there
still persi>t. most of our ''statesmen" would not be
libelled were the roll-call made by corporations instead of
by putative representatives of the people.
If a mere threat of the powerful bankers, led by Mor-
gan, was enough to convince or overawe a group of the
railroad dictators of the I'nited States, what could not
the banking power accomplish when it actively concen-
trated its might of monev upon a given object? Xcither
capitalist foe nor any government could withstand it.
The extreme-- lo which it could go in successfullv execut-
ing its plans and in dissipating all obstacles by its ter-
rorism, was tvpically shown in a noted bond deal, in 1895.
whereby the I'nited States Government was held up by
a syndicate of bankers headed by Morgan, and forced to
give over a virtual gift of many million- of dollars for
the privilcuv of having a nominal and transient claim on
a supply of g>ld which those same bankers had drained
from the I'nited States Treasury only a short time pre-
viouslv.
214 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
reer. His father died in 1890, bequeathing to him a
fortune superficially estimated at $10,000,000. But it is
needless to say that J. Pierpont Morgan was already a
-eignorial multimillionaire. That he was intensely hated
by a large portion of the element in the financial district
was undeniable, but it was a hatred caused not by objec-
tion to his methods, but because he eminently surpassed
in either the brutality or finesse of those methods. All
of his decriers of his own rank had at basis some per-
sonal grievance resolving itself into a rankling enmity at
being outwitted or outdone by Morgan. Had he given
them the slightest opening they would have enmeshed
and swindled him and gloated over the deed.
But with, the exception of one distinguished antagonist,
to whom we will refer later, he anticipated and overcame
them all, and left many of them with the embittered
memory of their collision with him. but with nothing
more substantial. Xo doubt Morgan's personality had
much to do with this current hatred on the part of those
who came into contact with him ; he was at no time to
be suspected of being of the unctuous order of men, full
of blandishments and sweetened guile. Rather, he was
a sort of plug-ugly in the financial purlieus, belligerent
and ruthless, with a rough, dictatorial manner, unsparing
of the feelings or interests of those who in any way
crossed his will or plans.
Those personal details, however, were not known to
the great ma-s of the people the country over. The
popular conception of men in public notice was derived
almost wholly from what the newspapers >aid. and these
orMai t'y, with rare departure-, portrayed Morgan a-
IMVM financier and benevolent gentleman. In MOT-
icial transactions immense number- oi" the mid-
. as well a- people higher in the -eale of the
well-to-do, lost, in the aggregate, great sums of money
torn from them in the stockjobbing operations in Wall
street. P.ut they did not blame Morgan per-onalh ; their
bitterness \vas cast at the generic monster called Wall
street. And yet noi a -ingle one of those thus stripped
had not deliberately set out to enrich himself at
someone else's expense; even those who pu' their fii.r.ds
in stocks for the purpose of " legitimate investment," did
so with the full knowledge that the lower the wages paid
on the railroads and in the factories, and the longer the
daily labor of the workers, the brighter were the chance-
for a larger dividend.
At the same time, while hated in the financial dis-
trict, Morgan was deeply feared for his far-reaching
power, and what were considered his relentless methods
both in accomplishing his ends and in settling scores.
( )bservers usuallv described him, in the slang of Wall
street, as a man who was in business " for all there is
in it." As though anyone else were in Wall street for
a different purpose! His policy was regarded as th;it
of finding a weak spot in a corporation and then " squeez-
ing it for all it was worth"- a very much biased accu-
sation, inasmuch as every other successful financier in-
controvertiblv pursued the same methods, although not
always in the same way. His favorite expression.
when questioned about his transactions was, " 1 am not
in Wall -tree' for my health." His enemies whi-pered
about that he was a " freehootrr in finance ": hi- admir-
ersthose who profited by his bounty -loudly pro-
claimed his "'reatne--.
Railroad from McLeod, in 1893, we have already given
a description. 4 In that account it was shown how, when
.MeLeod pressingly needed funds both to finance his rail-
road's coal combination and to pay for improvements,
he found that the leading banking institutions had im-
paired, and then cut off, his credit. Morgan and Yan-
derbilt were then able to assault and beat down the
price of Reading stock, buy large quantities of it at a
very low figure, and gain control of the system. As a
railroad, the Reading line was not extensive: its great
value lay in its ownership of anthracite coal mines, of
vast unmined deposits, and in its coal-carrying traffic.
To his other manifold powers Morgan now added
that of coal magnate. The Constitution of Pennsylva-
nia, as we have seen, expressly forbade railroad cor-
porations from owning and operating coal mines. But
that law did not exist which the very rich were not able
to evade. Dummy holding companies were organized ;
and. although everybody knew that these companies were
mere subterfuges, the public authorities took no action,
and when, after many years of inactivity, they, with in-
different energy brought suit, the case was appealed by
the magnates to the Supreme Court of the United States,
from which, in 1909. the railroads emerged victorious
with a decision of so equivocal a nature as to be tanta-
mount to one in their favor.
Two immediate re>ults signalized Morgan's entry as
a monarch of the coal fields. To both we have adverted
in a previous chapter, but they will here bear repetition.
Kvery housekeeper using hard coal was taxed to add
more millions to Morgan's fortune: the price of stove
coal was raided from 81.25 t<> Sr.^5 more a ton (ban
had bt-rn chared lie fore. The second result \vas the
more rapid process of crushing < nt the independent coal
operators. Ilv a concatenation of ruthless methods '
these independents were ruined and driven out, not with-
out much wailing against oppression, and shrill charges
of fraud.
Yet the very mines which the}- were virtually coerced
into giving up had been secured by fraud, either by them
or by their predecessors. The law records of the State
of Pennsylvania reveal case after case, before and after
the Civil \\ ar, of fraudulent tax sales of lands contain-
ing coal; and the bribery of the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture by individuals and corporations for coal mining
and other kinds of charters and special rights had been
so admittedly brazen that, in 1847. the Legislature, with
self-righteous display, was constrained to pass an " Act
to Define and Tunish the Offense of 1'ribery." making
the crime of giving or receiving a bribe a felony, pun-
ishable with a hue not exceeding S;.ooo or a sentence
of five years in prison." This law was treated with lev-
ity ; it had no other effect than to refine and obscure the
methods of bribery. Another act was parsed on March
3, 1860, and a third on April 20, 1874. which laws were
likewise facetiously regarded by the seekers of vested
privileges, and the bribery went on per^istentlv. 7 Time
:iy connmiiHis scandals qrou-ir.ir <>'' < :
ennsylvania Legislature \va- that of th" pas
^-(i in the interest of the lunibermin. Ms ;-
after time the Legi-lature ' f i 'enn-ylvania was forced to
appoint investigating committees to report on this or
that charge that bribes had been used ; one of the few
time.- when any of the bribed ever went to prison was in
the Riot Indemnity Hill trial- in 18/9-80.
Some excuse was needed to give the appearance of a
necessity for the great increase in the price of coal. The
coal magnates supplied it beforehand. They inquired
how thev could avoid charging more. Had not the pro-
duction of coal fallen? And were not the freight rates
extremely high' Pun the Government knew that these
claims were fabrications. The House Committee on
Interstate Commerce had unanimously reported that the
coal magnates had deliberately reduced the output of
coal: that although the capacity of the collieries was
5O.ooo.ocjo tons a year, yet only about 40,000,000 tons
were being mined, so as to make a show of scarcity.
And as regard- freight rates for coal the committee re-
ported, " Although coal in freight can be handled cheaper
than almost any cla-s of freight, yet it pays nearly dou-
ble the rate of wheat and cotton."'
Without quibble, this combination was a conspiracy,
criminally ami civilly liable. Hut neither National or
State law was enforced again-t it. The House Commit-
tee reported that the Interstate Commerce Act was too
ineffective a law to proceed under, and that ended talk
;" criminal prosecution. The Government machinery of
e I nitcd State- practically became (as it did in so
many other in-tance- ) an accessory of the coal combina-
tion in allowing it to -queeze more huge extortion- from
the Buffering- of the mass of the people.
The boa-ted Government "of, for and by the people/'
vva- a Government run wholly by the great propertied
.: ; >j
interests as a necessary appendage, based upon force, for
compelling. tlie people to submit without redrew or quar-
ter. Such operations as this explain how Morgan'> for-
tune leaped by millions at a time; every dollar extorted
in that increase of price came very largely from familie-
wlio, already burdened by a thousand and one extor-
tions, were forced to suffer still more keenly ; each new
compression from above drove them deeper into abject
poverty, with all its demoralizing and horrible evils.
The whole edifice of capitalism was built on a vast,
ghastly charnal house, overcrowded with the bones of
numberless victims. Yet the industrial grandees who
thus slaughtered with impunitv in the insidious ways of
trade paraded themselves as very devout men: Morgan
was a vestryman of St. George's Church, Xew York
City, and ostentatiously passed the contribution plate in
the name of Christ.
To this coal transaction of Morgan's there is a sequel,
showing how, and by what methods, he expanded as
a coal dictator, but the recounting of this will be de-
ferred to its proper chronological place, and that famous
bond deal of his in 1895 will be considered.
TRAXSPKRRIXT, ("IKCAT RAILROAD SYSTEMS.
The two Drexcl partners of his, Frank and Anthony
Drexel, passed away, each leaving an estate of $25.000.-
ooo. The}", too, had acquired the glorious name of
philanthropists ; before dying they had together given
away the sum of $8,000,000 to found sundry charitable
institutions in or near Philadelphia. Since their part-
ner>hip with Morgan they bad, of course, shared in all
of hN transaction?. Some of these \ve -hall have to
pa>.- over with only a reference, inasmuch as the fact-
are exceedingly involved. But this one point sticks out:
Great railroad systems, in the building of which neither
Morgan nor his associates had in the slightest partici-
pated, which had been constructed largely with public
f.mcls and gifts of public land, and which they had never
seen until long after they were in operation : these
railroads suddenly passed into the ownership of the
.Morgan combine, which largely meant Morgan.
How did this transformation come about? Shall \ve
have to retell the old story ; the original looting, the
bankruptcies, reorganizations, and tricks of finance,
squeezing out of creditors and small stockholders?
However glib financial writers may attempt to explain
it, or with whatever fine phrases apologists might gloss
it over, the matter reduces itself to this trenchant fact :
That Morgan became possessed of great railroad sys-
tems in the South, with the initiation and operation of
which he had had no more to do than a babe. The
Industrial Commission reported these railroads as being
in the " Morgan group " by 1901 : The Southern Rail-
way, with its 6.807 miles of track; the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad, the Queen and Crescent, the Central of Geor-
gia (later taken over by Harriman), the Georgia South-
ern and Florida, the Macon and Birmingham, the
Philadelphia and Reading, the Lehigh Valley, the Erie
( subsequentlv acquired by Harriman). the Central of
Xew Jersey, and the Atlantic Coast line/' The total ex-
tent of these railroads was j 9.073 miles.
Compared to the tortuous and difficult details of Mor-
gan's " reorganizations,'' the tale of his I nited State-
bond transaction of 1805 is simple enough lo he ea-il\
n imprehended.
As gold \vas the international trade standard of value.
9 Final Report of iht 1 Industrial Commission, 7902, xix : ,308.
221
the I. ir.tC'l States ( lovernnu nl followed tlie ])olicv of
holding a certain amount as a treasury reserve. When,
by reason of some cause or other, this reserve was de-
pleted the Government was compelled to issue bonds to
replenish it.
The powerful junta of leading national and inter-
national bankers definitely and deliberately forced the
United States Government to put out these bond issues.
This the\ - did by draining the treasury of its gold, and
by then going through the empty form of selling back-
that gold in return for bonds. The treasury notes and
greenbacks, comprising much of the currency of the
Un'ted States Government, were redeemable in coin.
This provision was construed as calling for payment in
gold. The bankers would take over to the sub-treasury
in Xew York Citv great stacks of treasury notes and
greenbacks and exchange them for gold. This gold they
would then hoard in their vaults. The Government au-
thorities were fully aware 1 of this proceeding, and knew
quite well that the ulterior purpose was to force a bond
issue. After the banking clique had obtained the bonds,
it could do two things sell large amounts of them,
at enhanced premiums, to smaller banks, savings banks,
insurance companies, estates and investors in general,
and it could use such portion of the issue that is kept
as a basis for issuing new currencv. The large private
bankers, such as Morgan, had their chain of auxiliary
national banks, bv means of which bond issues could
be converted into currencv, and the time-honored ex-
tortion of getting a double interest could be managed.
bankers. Their profits, it is estimated, reached tens of
millions. With the advent of the year 1895 the United
States Treasury \vas again emptied of gold. Where had
the gold, which the Government had purchased only a
short time previously at usurious rates, gone? The re-
ports of the large banks gave the answer. \\y the end
of January, twenty-six banks in Xe\v York City had in
their vaults a 1: >ard of $^5.000,000 in gold. Presently
the amount totaled 8129,000,000, all told. The Govern-
ment shrieked in helplessness; J 'resident Cleveland was
reported as saying privately that " the banks have got the
country by the throat."
At the appropriate moment a syndicate of bankers ap-
peared in the open and magnanimously offered to supply
gold to the Government in exchange for bonds. This
syndicate was composed of J. P. Morgan and Company,
August Belmont and Company, representing the Roths-
childs : James Speycr, the National City Rank and four
other extremely powerful national banks.
In the negotiations with President Cleveland for the
bond issue. Morgan's emissary and clever man of law
was Francis Lynde Stetson, who had been regular coun-
sel for Morgan since 1887. Stetson had been Jacob
Sharp's attorney at the very time when, in 1884, Sharp
had bribed the Xew York Hoard of Aldermen with
$500,000 to give him a franchise for a surface railroad
on I'.roadway. His activities in Sharp's transactions
caused him to be subjected to some severe questioning
in iS8n by the Xew York State Senate Committee on
the i '.roadway Railroad. .After Sharp had successfully
bribed the Xew York Aldermen. F.lkins and \\idener.
who \vcre likewise 1 bribing the Philadelphia Common
Council and the Pennsylvania Legislature, and who be-
came multimillionaire -tnet railway magnates, tried
(although for the time unsuccessfully), t<> lease the
Broadwa\ Railroad lor a term of 999 years, and as an
earnest of good faith, deposited 10,000 shares of Broad-
wav stock, which they had secured, with Drexel, Mor-
gan and Company. 10 Morgan knew that every one of
these shares was the product of bribery, and that the
whole Broadway franchise had been so obtained. Per-
haps Stetson's excellent and adroit work for Sharp
highly commended him to Morgan.
After Cleveland had been defeated in his candidacy
in 1888 for a second term as President of the I'nited
States, he resumed the practice of law, and formed a
partnership with Stetson. Cleveland was reflected
President in 1892; thereafter Stetson was a frequent and
confidential caller at the White House. These various
circumstances were much commented upon, and with
particular animadversion, when Cleveland was virtually
charged in 1895 ^'ith openly selling out the people
of the United States to the Morgan syndicate, repre-
sented bv Stetson.
KICHTF.KN MILLIONS AS A GIFT.
then compelled a bond is-nie. and declared that it alone
could supplv the required gold. This was a transparent
falsehood. Main- members of Congress urged Cleve-
land and John (I. Carlisle. Secretary of the Treasury, to
make the bond issue a "popular" one. By "popular"
was not meant the mass of the people, who had neitlu-v
; i; nor other knid oi money, but trom tiie smaHe;' cap
ila'i '. interests. Cleveland and Carlisle. ho\ve\ er. tuiT.-.C
over t 1 ne 862,000,000 of iour ])cr cent, bonds to il: .
Mi rgan syndicate at the ])rice of 104. The syndicate
immediately resold the bonds to investors in America and.
in Kurope at 118, 119 and 120, clearing, it was estimated,
in direct profits, about Si8.ooo.ooo. 11 This sum repre-
sented the sum that would have gone to the Government
had the sale of bonds been accomplished without this
intermediary operation. The contract with the Govern-
ment entirely dictated by the bankers, headed by Mor-
gan, gave the syndicate, furthermore, an option on all
bond issues tip to October i, following, and allowed it
to choose its own time to deliver one-half of the total
amount in gold.
From every public quarter came the severest denun-
ciations of Cleveland, on the one hand, and Morgan, on
the other. Kvcn partisan newspapers and periodical
supporter.- of Cleveland condemned the bargain as scan-
dalous, and declared that the Government had been
shamelessly " buncoed." if. indeed, no worse charge could
be brought against its chief executive. 1 - His own polit-
: The bond contract made with the Government, on February
X, 1805, v.-as kept secret for some days. After the issuance of
ihe bonds, Morgan personally superintended the receipt of the
bids at his office. 'Ihe rush to buy bonds from him was so
great that twenty-two minutes after the bidding began, he an-
nounced that no more bids would be received; that the whole
-uppiy of bonds bad been .-old.
'-Hardly had the gold reserve obtained by this $62,000.000
i.-sue been obtained, than it was again quickly drained by
the banker-. In the latter part of 1X0.5. sinister rumors spread
a new bond issue was under way. These rumor- were con-
hy the is-uance of a private circular by J. Pierpont Mor-
gan and Company, announcing their purpose to form a -yndi
ver an expected additional issue of $200.000.00.)
Government bonds. Morgan ai.d hi- associates anticipated a
profit of $20.000.000. Kvidently. Morgan knew the precise
aniuiuit the Government intended to borrow; when the Govern-
22'
ical party repudiated Cleveland. Iktt a significant in-
sight into the indifference with which the great magnates
viewed storms of criticism was furnished by the fact
that Morgan ignored the denunciation of his acts, yet
deeply and openly resented a published description of
himself as a " ruby-visaged magnate." He was very
sensitive as to his facial deformities.
So far as strictures on his acts went, they soon passed
away, and the very journals which had been foremost
in verbally flaying him. reverted to their old sycophantic
policy of extolling him as an illustrious financier and
philanthropist. Of all the magnates, none had a more
biting contempt for the newspapers than Morgan. None
knew better than he that whatever outbreak they might
occasionally make, their course on the whole could be
easily controlled by the great propertied interests.
NOTHING FOR Tin-: UNEMPLOYED.
To realize, however, the full import of the action of
the Government it] this particular bond sale, by which a
meiH issued its call. it> terms corresponded with those of the
Morgan circular i>-ned one week earlier. Such a public uproar
resulted, that Cleveland and his Cabinet were compelled to
throw over the Morgan syndicate, and the ne\v loan wa^ "pop-
ularly floated," at a ravine to the national treasury of SJO.OOQ.-
ooo.
It need scarcely he remarked, as a typical and memorable
fact, thai in hi> ofticial correspondence and public statements,
Morgan wa< representing liimselt as actuated by "patriotic con-
siderations" and a de.-ire to serve "the best interests of the
(iovernment and the people!'' One Wall Street broker, in a
public statement, cynically described it as " fascinating and lucra-
tive patriotism." When Morgan wa< planning to get hold of
ihe new $j<x;.ooo.coo loan, a barking friend asked whether he
could nol have -onie details of the syndicate's plans before sub-
scribing. "Can't give you any particulars." Morgan was quoted
as re-ponding. " If you want to make some money and have
got the gold, subscribe. If not, au revoir."
226 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
present of fully $18,000,000 was made to a few bankers
already surfeited with wealth, it is necessary to recall
the conditions among the mass of people, especially
after the panic of 1893. In normal times, according to
the estimate of Carroll D. Wright, for some years United
States Labor Commissioner, the number of unemployed
at any one time was about 1.000,000 men. women and
children. After the panic of 1893 the number reached
perhaps 3,000.000. Xot a finger was lifted by the Gov-
ernment in the aid of any of these, nor was the remotest
consideration given to means for alleviating this misery
or to the causes producing it. Repressive measures were
used to suppress street meetings of protest, and leaders
fit labor unions were Hung into prison on the alleged
charge of contempt of the Federal courts. Only the
year before, in 1894. the regular army had been ordered
out by Cleveland against the railroad workingmen on
strike. Xowhere and in no respect did Government do
other than carry out the demands made by the great cap-
italists who dominated all of its functions.
CHAPTER X
MORGAN THE " PEERLESS CAPTAIN OF INDUSTRY "
With the advent of the year 1898 an epochal move-
ment for the consolidation and centralized ownership of
transportation systems, industries, public utility plants
and mines set in. The trust era was now in irresistible
swing. After a warfare of nearly thirty years in the
courts and in the active political and industrial arena,
the middle class found itself completely frustrated.
Eight years previously, in 180,0. what was exuberantly
heralded as a notable triumph had been secured in New
York State. The courts there had declared the Sugar
Trust illegal under the common law provision that no
corporation, through its stockholders or otherwise, had
power to give over its rights, powers and duties to a
board of directors. 1
The middle class jubilantly declared that no trust
could survive so fundamental and sweeping a decision.
l>ut a new surprise was in store for that class. Instead
of showing any trepidation or preparing tor their dissolu-
tion, such trusts as were then in existence received the
decision with most irritating equanimity, and serenely
proceeded to perpetuate their corporate selves by don-
ning a new legal garb. They not only continued to wax
great and powerful, but the Sugar Trust, in particular,
with the llavemeyers at its head, carried on continuously
a colossal system of frauds upon the ( lovernment in the
The North River
_;_'o iilSTuUY OF TIIK GUH.Vi AMERICAN FORTUNES
fraudulent weighing' of imported sugar. These frauds
rxlended over a long series of years, and it was estimated.
\vhen the facts became public in 1909, that the amount
of which the Government had been thus defrauded
readied fully tens of millions of dollars.- In addition to
these monumental swindles, the Sugar Trust continued so
absolutely secure in its monopoly that it was easily able
to crush all competitors, dictate tariff schedules, and
extort, in the course of trade, an annual profit placed by
some authorities at 855,000.000 a year, or a total of
$660.000,000 in profits in the period from its organiza-
tion to 1909.
Speaking- in a large political sense, a last stand was
made by the middle class in the Presidential campaign of
1896. That was its great, although not really final,
attempt to defeat the plutocracy, and conquer the powers
of government for ii- own policies. I nder the leader-
ship of Bryan the Democratic I 'arty declared itself radi-
cal and tremendously and sincerely earnest, but its so-
called radicalism was in essence a reactionary futile ef-
fort to extinguish the trusts and reestablish the old con-
fusing competitive conditions in the production and dis-
tribution of goods. It was a bitterly-contested campaign
in which immense sums of money were corruptly dis-
-. \fter the Government had proved beyond dispute the com-
mission of these great frauds, the American Sugar Refining
Company, as heretofore noted, paid more than $2,000.000 to the
government in April, 1909, as restitution for its swindles. I'.ut
this $ _v<x>.ooo covered only a mere part of the long-continuing
frauds. .None of the beneficiaries of these thefts were punished;
punishment of a few obscure customs weigher.- and some
< '" the trust's employe? was the only action taken. The di-
' 1 irs of the Sugar Trust were also indicted in 1009, it is true.
The indictment, however, wa-- not for the customs frauds, but
for violating the Federal ami-tru-t act a meaningless indict-
ment, cuiiviction upon which carries, in practice, a nominal tine
only.
" PEERLESS CAPTAIN OF INDUSTRY "
tributcd by the money interests of the Republican Party
to defeat Bryan and the middle class.
TIIK PLUTOCRACY IN T FULL POWER.
McKinley's election as President of the United States,
with a Congress the majority of which was of his views,
was a distinct notification that the plutocracy was in full
power a power won in a pitched combat, and there-
fore interpreted as a popular approval of the rule by
great magnates and trusts.
Henceforth, it \vas well understood, the trusts need fear
no governmental antagonism, even of a sham order; for
while mock legal actions at no time impaired the basic
sway of the trusts, yet they caused constant annoyances
and expense.
When McKinley took office magnates of every descrip-
tion knew that the trust movement had full license, con-
firmed by private bargain, to go on unhindered and un-
molested, except, perhaps, with an occasional inroad for
spectacular popular effect. Consequently the business of
organizing trusts flourished in the open ; one trust after
another was formed embracing about every known prod-
uct. The work was carried on with phenomenal celerity
and success. The middle class looked on impotently
while factories, railroads, gas and electric plants, street
railway lines, telephone systems and mine.- were con-
verted from a state of individual or mere corporate owner-
ship into the trust form, owned by great single corpora-
tions with stupendous amounts of capital, and with
dictatorship over vast masses of workingmen.
In this revolutionary work, that of organizing trusts.
]. Pierpnnt Morgan was one oi" the foremost gcncralissi-
mns. Indispensable ;:- : it is in this \vork to describe the
230 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
methods by which he requisitioned his wealth, it is no
less necessary to point out the services that he and his
kind were doing for progress. In the exclusive considera-
tion of progressive movements, it is immaterial what the
motive was ; the thing done is all that counts historically.
Xone can deny that these revolutionary capitalists were
actuated wholly by ambitiously personal ends : greed, pelf
and the lust of power. But after all they were revolu-
tionists without knowing it, and precisely the sort of
capitalist revolutionists needed at that particular time.
Strong, ruthless men, bold in cunning and cunning in
their boldness, were required for the work of crushing
out the old cut-throat, haphazard, individualistic com-
petitive system. That sluggish, money-grabbing, petty-
minded body, the middle class, preoccupied with the com-
fort of its bellv and with its narrow conventions, had set
its self-interest against the demands of progress. It de-
clined to budge ; it hedged itself behind walls of special
laws ; it -ought to make matter- travel backward. Under
these conditions Morgan and his colleagues were the men
for the task: forceful, dominating, arbitrary men, not
scrupling at any means to attain their ends, contemptuous
enough of law when it stood in their way. and powerful
enough to defy it. Very expert destructionists were
they. Hut they were also constructionists. They tore
down to build up. A decayed, archaic industrial system
ihev replaced with one of a far more systematic order,
the forerunner of finer systems to come. Progress often
works through queer instruments.
In the year- closelv following 1898 Morgan was
iall} prominent in many of these trust creation-.
\n ubiquitous magnate he was. pushing his industrial
commest- and overlordship in many variegated direc-
tion-. F.arli arrnniulntinij -ncce-s added millions of dol-
PEERLESS CAPTAIN OF INDUSTRY 23!
lars to his fortune. With a choice list to select from.
what brilliant display of his financial acumen shall we
take up first? Consecutively, the most pertinent is that
noted Pennsylvania Coal Company transaction of his.
THE UNFAILING RECIPE FOR MAKING MONEY.
The plan which he had begun some years before of
gathering in coal mining properties and coal carrying rail-
roads, and of merging them into a combination, he per-
sistently continued. The most important of all of the
remaining independent companies in the Pennsylvania
anthracite region was the Pennsylvania Coal Company.
It controlled some of the most valuable mines in the
center of the richest deposits. While paying wretched
wages to its workers, it had for years been reaping
sixteen per cent, dividends on a capital of $5,000,000.
Stowed away in its treasury it had. in the form of a
surplus, a fund of Sio.ooo.ooo.
Here was a noble opportunity. Could any alert
financier with-tand the temptation? As soon as Morgan
acquainted himself with the attractive facts, a plan of
campaign speedily developed. lie sent agents to scour
the northeastern region of Pennsylvania, with orders to
pav anv price demanded for -hares O f flu- Pennsylvania
Coal Company. I'nobtrnsively these discreet emissaries
went about their mis-ion. l ; or month- they traversed
Pennsylvania, finally getting enough stuck to insure Mor
gan's control, for which stock an average price of $;^j
a share was paid.
\Yhat did Morgan next do? lie sold the property to
the Krie l\ailroad Company for $32.000,000. This pay-
ment was in the form of four per cent, collateral tru-t
bonds -(.-cured bv mortgages on the Pennsylvania Coal
23- IlisTOUY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
Company's property and by the Xe\v York, Susquehanna
and Western Railroad, a line acquired a short time
previously by ti/.- Erie. Xor was this all; an issue of
$5,000,000 of preferred stock was thrown in. But who
controlled the Erie Railroad? The eminent J. Pierpont
Morgan. As an individual he bought the coal property,
and then, as dictator of the Erie Railroad, decided what
he should be paid for it.
" Criticism," observed the Industrial Commission, with
the dainty restraint characteristic of all such euphemistic,
official reports. '' has been directed against this operation
on the ground that the price paid by the Erie Railroad
to J. P. Morgan and Company was excessive. Testi-
mony before the Industrial Commission indicates th\<
was in fact the highest price paid for such properties in the
history of the business.' 3 What this Commission feebly
and so gently dismissed as " criticism '' was, in reality,
a general growl of indignation at Morgan's ease and
audacUy in calmly transferring to himself millions of
dollars in so-called " profits." It was of this kind of
transaction and similar varieties that the Industrial Com-
mission elsewhere relieved itself of this declaration:
" The possibilities of fraudulent profit are something
enormous under such conditions."' For once, in mak-
ing this clear statement, the Industrial Commission almost
overcame its habitual timidity of phraseology, and called
thing:-; by their true names. Vet what availed it to say
that fraud was fraud when the beneficiaries were not even
questioned bv law? The amount pocketed by Morgan in
this performance cannot be learm-d. 'To what extent
profit rose," the Industrial Commission >at-
" PEERLESS CAPTAIN OF INDUSTRY '' 233
testimony before the Commission." 5 We may well judge
that the profit could be estimated in millions.
THWARTED BY A GREATER MAGNATE.
While in control of the Eric Railroad, so rich with
memories of Jay Gould's frauds and thefts, Morgan un-
expectedly, and to his deep mortification, ran plump into
his first great defeat. It came about in his attempt to
put through a railroad juggling operation. Had it been
successful he would have been able to appropriate the
bulk of at lea.st $10,000,000 in '' profits." The plan was
the typically fraudulent one common among the magnates
of buying in a railroad and then unloading it (to use
the financial slang of the day) upon a trunk railroad
system controlled by both buyer and seller.
Morgan had .--ecnred a controlling interest in the Cin-
cinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad. This line was
composed of a number of former separate railroads and
of various leased railroads. On September 20, 1905. the
Erie Railroad bought this interest from a syndicate
headed by J. P. Morgan and Companr. The Erie direc-
tors, all registers of Morgan's orders, authorized the
issuing of $12,000.000 of four per cent, bonds, convert-
ible into Erie common stock at f>o, to pay Morgan for the
Cincinnati. Hamilton and Dayton Railroad. Thus far the
program had slipped on smoothly.
Suddenlv came evidences of the most powerful opposi-
tion from quarters commanding obedience. Xntice was
-erved that the Erie director- must revoke their action.
If they refused, costly reprisals would follow n<>t only in
litigation but by the application nf a pressure that they
resist. l ; rom \vh . /; '. ;hi- mighty edict come ?
'' ' ; ' f ;1 '. : 4(10.
-'34
Who \vas the awe-inspiring magnate that could frighten
.Morgan into retreat?
His identity never came out publicly, but the sur-
misc was rooted in Wall street, that he was none other
than E. II. Harriman. The belief prevailed that llar-
riman, representing the Standard Oil oligarch}', was seek-
ing to get control of the Erie Railroad himself, and that
it was to his interest at that particular juncture to thwart
.Morgan. The sequel has borne out that conviction : the
Eric- Railroarl later passed under Harriman's control. 6
Whatever was the nature of the secret means used to
compel Morgan to face about, and whoever it was that
used them, they were entirely effective. The Erie di-
rector- meekly rescinded their action, and the prospec-
tive $10,000,000 in " profits " vanished like a dream.
What became of Morgan'- Cincinnati, Hamilton and
Dayton Railroad after he was forced to take it back? 7
This system, which he had been on the very point of
-elling to his Erie Railroad at a price so extravagant as
to cause astonishment even among the veteran manipu-
r ' In a li-t ma<le public by the Inter-tate Commerce Commission
ir, fanuary, 10.00., of the lar.u'c railroad stockholders. J. P. ,\lor-
name did not openly appear as a stockholder of the Erie
Railroad. l!tit Walter 1!. Horn, a clerk in hi- office. \va- creditefl
' u $14.502/100 of it.- stock, and the firm of J. S. Mor-
and Co., of London, about $2.000.000 worth. Ilarriman
tin d control of the Hric Railroad in ioov.
" Moody's Mannai" for njoH ( pa. tee 2,50) thus skim 1 - over thi-
affair: "In September, 1905. the Krie Railroad Company ac-
quir-.-d a controlling interest in the stock of thi- company Ithc
('.. II. \- I). R. R. Co | and the juri-diction of the Kr'r nffi
rled to the line- of thi- company; but in Novem
year Mr. J. !'. Martian relieved the F.ric Rail
road ( . of all it- obligations in the matter and the C.,
H. S !) riffiria 1 resumed tiir operation of their lines."
" i'EliULL.SS CAl'TAiX OF 1XUUSTKY 235
lators, was thrown into bankruptcy in about a month
after the attempt had fallen through.
On December 4, 1905, Jucison Harmon, one of cx-
President Cleveland's intimates, was appointed receiver
of the railroad, including its auxiliary lines, the Pere
Marquette Railroad and the Toledo Railway and Ter-
minal Company. Years of litigation followed. One as-
pect of these legal rights was the charge in court that
Morgan had used fraud in getting back, into an owner-
ship more absolute than before, this Toledo Railway and
Terminal when it was sold in bankruptcy. The lesser
stock and bondholders furiously protested against the
species of reorganization that virtually deprived them of
their holdings and struck their bits of wealth from them.
l!ut although they harried Morgan by a series of law-
suits, he swept them inexorably out of his way. And
with what net result? Under his distinguished plan of
reorganization, so >tyled. the new stock issued will be
tight-handedly bound up for seven years in a voting
trust of which Morgan will have dictatorial control to do
as he minds with the Cincinnati. Hamilton and Dayton
Railroad. Moreover, absurd as it mav seem, his com-
mission for " reorganizing " the railroad in such a man-
ner as to force out the small stockholders and concen-
trate ownership largely in himself, will probably be sev-
eral million dollars. He stands, therefore, partially, if
not virtually, recouped for the evaporation of that
$10,000,000 in 1905.
In ciillo(|uia! parlance, this " freezing out '' of small
capitalist stockholders ha< been one of the most conspic-
uous and inevitable accomplishments of the triumphant
progress oJ our magnates. \\ e have remarked how the
Vanderbilts, Jay Could. Sage, lluntington and other
if the
236 HISTORY 01" THE GREAT AMERICAN EORTUXES
small parasites nonentities when compared with the
great grandees would emit a dolorous wail, burst out
into lamentations and accusations of fraud, and appeal
for sympathy and succor. So long as they could defraud
others, and reap wealth out of the sufferings and deg-
radations of the working class, all was properly blissful.
When they profited from fraud it was " good business."
but when fraud was used against them it was denounced
as criminally pernicious.
In disposing of them no magnate was more proficient
than Morgan. In 1903 the stock of the Chicago North-
western Railroad was selling at the market price
of 295x8. and a large number of persons of means mer-
chants, professional people, legatees and others held
shares of that stock as an investment.
The railroad was then put through the usual astring-
ent process of " reorganization.'' In all of these re-
organization devices, reasons are found for levying a
heavy assessment upon the stockholders. These levies
are for the ascribed purposes of paying the expenses
of the " reorganization," legal expenses, advertising,
and millions in commission to the reorganizers. The
assessments are frequently so onerous that the minor
stockholders cannot afford to pay them : consequently. In-
explicit provision, their stock becomes forfeited. From
29.^8 tne ^tock went down to Si (July. 1909) : and what
with declines of price and assessments thousands of in-
dividuals have been forced to part with their stock.
Who got hold of that ,-tock? The question is really
superfluous. The stock was put into a " voting trust."
with autocratic power for five years, and in command
< iver all -tamls Morgan.
Thi- Damping out of crowds of relatively small
stockholders went on so constantly that it iinallv becanu
\vhcn it \vas blended with v;h;it \vevo considered dramatic
cirru mstanc.es. did it call forth uncommon notice. But
\vhile each of :hj magnates was busily flinging out these
hindrances and expropriating their property, he had to
be on ceaseless guard against the incursion of some other
magnate or of a combination of magnates. Incessant
vigilance was imperative.
The warfare was necessarily a complex one, with its
paradoxical aspects. The. magnates fought the working
class, and the working class fought back, sometimes ag-
gressively, at other times on the defensive. Toward the
middle class, however, the magnates were forced to use
a double objective set of tactics. They had to crush the
middle class and take its property away, either by direct
spoliation on the one hand, or on the other, by inveigling
its elements into investing their funds in great stockjob-
bing enterprises which subsequently turned out to be
adroit swindles. In surveying this war of the classes the
most remarkable phase has been the ease with which the
great moneyed interests have traded on the shortsighted
cupidity of the middle class. With the naive expecta-
tion that the magnates would fraternally and benevo-
lent!}- create riches for it. the middle class has poured
its collective wealth into their schemes, only again and
again to find that very wealth wrenched from it, and
used to bring about its extinction as a class.
Surmounting these forms of the conflict in society was
the titanic warfare among the magnates to hold back
one another or to seize from the other spoils each had
seized from the multitude below. When the interests
of these lords of finance and industry clashed, then the
thunderbolts rlew.
2 3 8
Such a battle notably occurred in 1901. From what-
ever point of view it is considered, sociologically, philo-
sophically or historically, it was an event full of curious
instruction. It symbolized a new order of things; be-
tween it and the" times when feudal dukes and barons
and kings rushed to arms to settle their quarrels of self-
interest, lay a long and broadening gap. These modern
battles also carry their wake of ruination and death, but
it is so indirect as not to be outwardly observable. The
weapons are money, reinforced by cunning and fraud;
very powerful weapons which none in these days have
been able to withstand. Under the old system the feudal
lord lost caste if he did not light in person ; success might
often mean his own death. But no bodily risk is entailed
to confronting money monarchs of these present happy
days; they can make wealth fight for them in the stock
markets; and if, perchance, it becomes necessary for
them to determine their quarrels with capitalists of other
countries by force, they can impress, through their gov-
ernments, the working class, led by men trained by those
governments in the art of slaughter, to do their fighting.
Happen what will, their hides are safe.
A MATTLK OK MACNATF.S.
The daily routine budget of news in May, K)Oi. was
suddenly enlivened by the reports that an array of great
magnates had rushed headlong into a fractious conten-
tion. There was unwonted commotion in high places.
Morgan. James J. Hill, the Rockefellers and Harriman,
the Vanderbilts and other superlative eminences were
entangled in warfare. Here was rousing news, indeed.
\\hat was the meaning of this furor among the exalted?
How did il begin and where would it end?
The cause was I fill'- aifcmpt to undermine the in-
terest> of the other magnates concerned. ( Obviously tin-
was an act properly calling for retaliatory measures. h>
his antocracv over the < ireat Xorlhern Railroad, a line
extending through the Xortlnvest and Canada. Mill had
recently added a leading interest in the Xorlhern Pacific
Railroad, which traversed parallel territory. The incep-
tion and construction of the Xorthern 1'aciiic Railroad
were rq)lete with the usual corruption and jobbing, and
with thefts of vast areas of agricultural, timber and
mineral land-. This corruption will lie hereafter dealt
with. I 'hindered by various financiers, the Xorthern
Pacific had been forced into bankruptcy. Hill had then
obtained control.
His vista now widened. Why should he not have a
direct share of the immense traffic converging at Chi-
cago? To get this, he set out to manipulate himself into
control of the Chicago. Burlington and Ouincy Railroad.
This move alarmed competitive magnates ; they at once
saw how the interests of their railroads in the North-
west and West would certainly be jeopardized. How
could they ward it oft. or at least neutralize its results?
The most feasible plan presenting itself was to attack
him on his own ground. With good strategy they be-
gan buying Xorthern Pacific stock. This would give
them a voice in one of his own railroads. While Har-
riman. supported bv the Standard Oil oligarchv, wa-
doing th\<. Hill was straining him-elf to buv in more and
more Xorthern Pacific stock, and Morgan was deep in
the stockjobbing fray to safeguard his own extensive
interests.
limes a.- much as twenty-three points a day, reaching
300 a share, and for a part of one clay, Si.ooo a share.
A " corner " surpassing in magnitude an}- previously
known in railroad stock resulted. " The sacrifices neces-
sary to secure funds for covering contract.--,'' says the
Inch;.-! rial Commission, " precipitated a panic of wide-
spread proportions." s Thousands upon thousands of
lesser stockholders of other railroad securities were
caught in the whirligig and ruined ; as fast as the quo-
tations of Northern Pacific stock went on increasing,
those of other railroad stocks precipitately declined.
The upshot of this warfare might have been expected.
The Standard Oil clique came out of it with augmented
dominancy. and with added power in a region where
previously it had not been so strong. While the country
resounded with the mournful outcries of a scattered host
of petty stock speculators, clawed out of their insignifi-
cant fortunes, the contending magnates amicably decided
to arrange a new understanding. The disputed territory
should be nicely partitioned among them, and affairs
would be made tranquilly satisfactory. A '' gentlemen's
agreement," otherwise phrased " a community of inter-
est," would cement their brotherly relations. Such a
covenant would choke out competition, and simplify and
enlarge the pleasant work of squeezing more tribute
from the people.
Who was lo be chosen as arbiter? Whose was the
fust mind to be entrusted with the selection of the new
director- of the Northern Pacific Railroad? Morgan
was the man chosen for the adjustment. No vague
" gentlemen'- agreement " fur him however, when some-
s Final Report of Imlu-irial Co:r,mi:-sion. xix:3!7.
" L'liKKI.KSS CAPTAIN OF INDUSTRY 24'<
thing better could be substituted. He conceived the ide -\
of a huge holding company, an incorporated body to hold
title to both the Great Northern and the Northern Pa-
cific railroads. The Northern Securities Company was
thereupon organized with a capital of $400,000,000.
Upon the announcement of this, the people of the
Northwest bestirred themselves in vehement protest.
Were they not oppressed enough already? So crushing
a monopoly must not be permitted, they declared ; it
would hold them in absolute thralldom ; suit must be
brought to void it. The United States Government did
bring such a suit and pressed it. The motive for the
great energy and ability shown in its prosecution has
never been made clear. \Yas it to the secret interests of
certain powerful magnates to break up the Northern
Securities Company? The Supreme Court of the
United States decided that it was an illegal corporation,
But and these buts always supervene although the
company formally and decorously disolved, the principle
upon which it was formed practically remained in force
by virtue of another '' gentlemen's agreement." The
court mandate was one thing; its enforcement against
the fundamentals, quite another. Rut the form of dis-
solution had been gone through and the law thereby was
considered satisfied.
Thus, this decision, hailed by the middle class as a
critical defeat for the trusts, was after all nothing but
empty phraseology. Even while these opponents of the
trusts were gleefully praising the Supreme Court of the
United States as " the bulwark of freedom of trade,"
the trusts caused Congress to enact a law which knocked
over the main prop upon which the middle class had beer,
depending in its war upon the great centralized corpora-
tion^.
242 HISTORY 01- Till': OKKAT A M KK1CAX KlKTTNKS
For more than a decade trust organizers had been
confronted with a national law decreeing fine or im-
prisonment or both upon conviction for engaging in any
act in restraint of trade. Xone had gone to prison, nor
controlling the entire functions of government, as they
did, was there any prospect of the visitation of such a
punishment. But the imprisonment clause was a con-
stant irritant : why have it on the statute books when it
could easily be obliterated ? And why not also have a
specific declaration of immunity ': A solitary provision
calling for fine in case of conviction, the magnates did
not mind at all. Lt would give an appearance of defer-
ring to public sentiment and. at the same time, could be
well regarded jocularly by those at whom it was directed.
When trust magnates were gathering in immense sums
from illicit acts, what did a fine of a few thousand dol-
lars matter? It was too trivial to bother over. V'esides.
even if the fine, by some extraordinary possibility were
made heavv. it could be assessed, in turn, upon the con-
sumer.
act passed bv ( 'ongres< in K.K\V Concurrently, ihe same
net reasserted and amplified the principle of granting
immunity to trust officers. \o matter how much or how
often thev violated tin- anti-tru-t laws, they were now
absolutely secure from anv po-sibililv of prison sentence.
'I IH ( iovernment might examine them with the great-
er pretended inquisitivencss. and in the proce draw
out the mo-t self-incriminating admissions, but this evi-
dence a- testimony could not. by the act of 1003. be used
PEERLESS CAPTAIN OK IXDISTKY
against them in the trial of any criminal proceeding.
Not only was the individual exempted; the corporation
itself \vas distinctly relieved from prosecution for any
penalty or forfeiture.
The triumph of the trusts was now intrinsically com-
plete.
CHAPTER XI
MORGAN AT HIS ZENITH
By the end of the year 1902 J. Pierpont Morgan, reck-
oning by appearances, seemed to outrank every other
American magnate; scarcely a day passed that the news-
papers did not report some new achievement of his, or
obsequiously render tribute to his ever-expanding power.
In the public appraisement he bulked as a supervitally
preponderant man, a figure standing out with an im-
mense and peculiar distinction, eclipsing the most obtru-
sive political and industrial functionaries.
Contra>ted with him, ostensible political rulers were
innocuous ephemeral personages. For a time they
might vociferously command attention, but their encumb-
ency was dependent upon the will of the magnates, and
they were pushed up or pulled down as suited the policy
and purposes of the great propertied interests. A long-
array of "eminent statesmen" had shufiled into solemn
view, and for a while had been the cynosure oi the
r.-'tion, and then, like exploded rockets, had disappeared
into obscurity, or into a stale akin to it. Yet, in an-
oilier aspect, brief and borrowed as was their power,
llieirs wa- not the portion of oblivion; conventional his-
tory, which accepts the apparent as the real, document^
nml often perpetuates their names, ignorant of the f:ici
ihal they were only the server^ or servitors of particular
impelling forces and nitere-t--.
244
\.\ AT iMS ZKNITll 245
Behind the nominal political masters stood the real
masters the great magnates.
HISTORICAL OMISSIONS AND MISJUDGEMENTS.
Seeing that this is so, what vitally boots it whether
this or that individual happened to fill the so-called great
elective or appointive offices? In stereotyped historical
textbooks and narratives the names of J. 1'ierpont Mor-
gan and his like do not enter; not even a cursory glimpse
is given of their deeds. Yet, in large part, these are the
significant things that fundamentally have made actual
history. Rulers have been allowed to make formal dec-
laration of wars, but capitalists have commanded them.
When it pleases the interests of capital to have peace,
titular rulers are ordered to arrange it. Should rulers
be so obtuse or stubborn as to stand in the way of capi-
talist interests, revolution follows. If, in a parliamen-
tary countrv laws are somehow enacted contrary to the
interests of the dominant capitalist class, those laws are
effectively voided. All of which proves that, although
presidents, kings and emperors may mightily pose as the
"creators of policies," yet after all the}- are only the
sounding-board creatures of money forces unnoticed bv
i irthodox histories.
An overbearingly potent and heroic "great man"
iv-Hj-evelt appeared; many a descriptive work has been
written of him: and doubtlos, in the curious nature of
ihings, we are likewise fated to see many a statue of bird.
For what ? If history tells the tale aright it will tell how
be begged campaign fnnd< from the very trust magnates
\vhom lie pretended to tlout : how, in a critical moment in
ihe national election of 1904, 'u 1 so despaired of success
246 .HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
that he was forced to appeal to Morgan, Harriman and
their fellow magnates for a fresh and immediate infusion
of funds. The world does not revere a loser, unless he
be a great one, and for a great cause. In considerable
degree, Roosevelt fought the fight of a rapidly-decaying
cau>c, that of the middle-class, a cause doomed to fall
ignobly, and rightly so. On the surface he seemed the
" big man " of the day : in point of fact, he was van-
quished by such magnates as Morgan, Harriman and
Rockefeller. They, to all appearances mere private in-
dividuals, defeated every move of him who was supposed
to be invested with even greater powers than many po-
tentates.
The irresistible progress of the trust movement and
the all-comprehending power of the magnates, can be
better estimated when it is recalled that it was during
Roosevelt's administration that the most antagonistic
campaign thus far essayed against the trusts was carried
on. 1 At least it seemed so if invective and suits at law
counted. But, at basis, Roosevelt, despite his pretenses,
was an instrument of the trust magnates, which fact was
connoted anew bv the circumstance that he was the Presi-
dent who signed the act striking out the imprisonment
clause from the anti-rebating act assuring magnates
and corporations full immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion.'' 1
'That is against the "had" trusts. How even the outward
act^ of officialdom were being made to conform to the interests
of tin- ruling class was shown by the growing tendency to ac-
cept sonic trusts as " good," and so arraign others as "bad,'' al-
thi'Ugh all trusts subsisted in violation of statute law.
( mirage, hnesty and the saving grace of common sense, ac-
' Mr. Roosevelt, are the ilm-e thing> that will make nun
real." . . . wrote A. Maurice Low in "The Independent,"
;u uf October 30, igo.2. While thus humbly imploring the
ates for funds with which to finance his campaign, and
relieving them by law from imprisonment, Roosevelt took spe-
MORGAN AT HIS ZENITH 247
It was proved again during the great coal strike of
1902 when Roosevelt was forced to beseech J. Pierpont
Morgan to consent to some kind of arbitration settlement.
True, indeed. Roosevelt, or those inspired by him. could
darkly intimate that it were well for the coal magnates
to come to terms; othenvise ihey might sutler criminal
prosecution for violation of the act forbidding railroads
from owning coal mines. Hut the magnate-;, well realiz-
ing how often they had luard this chip-trap M>rt of talk,
and how empty and futile it all was, could pass it over
with amused contempt. Then came the sight of the
President of the I nited States, theoretically representing
85,00x5,000 of people, being compelled to parley and treat
with a few magnates on their own terms. ' The one
man who controlled the operators," wrote A. Maurice
Low (who, unquestionably, was one of the best informed
newspaper correspondents at Washington), "was Mr. J.
Pierpont Morgan. Everything else having failed his
services had to be enlisted." Morgan instantly showed
that he had the power of doing what the President of the
United States acknowledged that the highest executive
in the country in his own person could not do a fact
moving Low to exclaim reverentially (as quoted hereto-
fore) : " (Ireat is Mr. Morgan's power, greater in some
respects even than that of Presidents or Kings." Roose-
velt could publicly boast of his having settled that strike.
cial occasion in. 1907 to prejudice public opinion against Mover.
Haywood and Fcttibone, officers of the Western Federation of
Miners, \vhen they were in prison awaiting trial. Thev were
later acquitted of ilie trumped-up charge of murder brought by
pouertul capitalist interests in order to discredit and break up
the pro.ure^ive labor organization of which they were the heads.
(.\nainly, Roosevelt was extremely courag'eotis in attacking the
weak, and tho>e from whom he could expect no support or
funds. A more overestimated mar,, nor one who more -uccess
fully befooled the people by sheer talk, has not lived in recent
iimes.
iiiSTOUV Ol- THE GXCAT AMiiKiCAN FUR'iV N KS
yet, in point of actual fact, Morgan shrewdly used
Roosevelt to bring about a settlement at the time when
the magnates decided it was politic, and with a result the
most favorable that they could hope for in the particular
alarming exigency. 3
Morgan's lofty, surmounting status at this time did not
arise from any misconception that he was the richest man
in the United States. That prepotency John D. Rocke-
feller could easily claim and hold. But Morgan was so
unceasingly before the public in some activity or other,
and was so preeminently conspicuous in the organization
of railroad combinations and industrial trusts, that, con-
sidering all aspects, he was looked upon as perhaps the
most important of the magnates.
This was a popular deception, and was caused by the
difference in tactics between Morgan and the Standard
Oil oligarch}-. The Rockefellers and their associates
systematically discouraged publicity as to their business
transactions ; in all of their operations they cultivated
the profoundest secrecy and took exceeding pains not to
acquaint the people with the real extent of their posses-
sions, nor with the methods by which they were gradually
drawing into their owner-hip the resources of not only
one nation, but of many nations. AYorking through aux-
ilarie- or intermediaries the}- were converting much of
the United States with its assets, including human labor.
peace or war hung in the balance : To permit the
i meant pos-ihilities that no man wanted even to
h ink'ht mean the opening of Pandora'- box. It
and riol and bloodshed in the coal reeion.
en \vor-< i>; Xew Y.,rk city. .Already the po ir
>r ; ng for nul. and winter had not even lightly la'd
the ritv. It might nu-an such a state of affair- that
MORGAN AT IliS XMXiTlI 249
into their private property, but ^o surreptitiously was this
done that they allowed no mention of their conquests to
be either formally or informally given out. The Stand-
ard Oil headquarters was an inaccessible citadel of si-
lence.
On the other hand, Morgan seemed to glory in the
ostentation of publicity. Even if he did not. it was an
indispensable requisite. In his threefold capacity of
banker, railroad magnate and industrial trust organizer
Morgan needed a certain amount of inspired publicity
for the specific purposes of his undertakings. As a
banker he had to advertise his financing of projects in
order to dispose of the stock ; the more power he was
credited with, and the more extraordinary a financier he
\vas extolled, the easier it was to induce a multitude of
investors to put their money in enterprises sponsored by
him.
Uetween Morgan, the precocious young money zealot
of 1861. successfully imposing spurious rifies upon the
I nion army, rind Morgan the incommensurable magnate
of K)O2. lay a long span of some forty years. For four
decades he had- incessantly campaigned for great wealth ;
thousands of Wall street aspirants, ambitious to reach
the same goal, had out-trained themselves during that
time only to go down in abject failure. Everywhere
Morgan could see. as he advanced, the immediate wro:!
upon whose misfortune? much of hi< fortune was built.
And what were the cumulative results of hi< life of
money-seeking? Of the pn>perlie- he owned otherwise,
there is no definite authentic record, but the extent of
hi- railroad possessions can be a-certaincd. Moodv
wrote that in 1902 he was " identified ".;! " ;~,,co ) mi!
250 HISTORY Oi ; Till: GREAT AMKKJCAX I/UKTL'NKS
of railroad. 4 " These," Mood}- explained, '' control rights
of way, coal lands, terminals, competing lines, steamship
connections and the like.''
Further attention need not he given to his methods of
acquiring railroads. His railroad transactions, large as
the}' were, hecame somewhat obscured by his still greater
trust-forming operations. " Mr. Morgan," Moody fur-
ther wrote, " is essentially the inspirer, the creator and
the dominator of current American industrial forces."
A sonorous sentence, but quite exaggerated. Long be-
fore that time. John D. Rockefeller had demonstrated
the principle of the centralization of industry; Morgan
neither exclusively inspired, created nor dominated; he
was but one of the leading practicalists in transforming
industrial conditions from the competitive to the tru-t
form. " lie is unquestionably," went on Mood}', " the
boldest, the ablest and most far-seeing of any of the
modern ' generals of finance ' who stand at the head of
the modern movement for the consolidation idea in the
production and distribution of wealth. This is easily
proven by the fact that the enterprises in which his in-
fluence is paramount to-day are the strongest and most
ably planned of anv of the great combinations or
' tru.-t-.' '" "'
Such eulogies as this have a mechanical ring: ihev nave
!>een manufactured almost automatically. That they
:; nd unchallenged ; .~ sufficient comment uon the
MORGAN AT HIS ZENITH 25!
why he should be brevetted a " general of finance." The
assumption evidently has been fixed that these high-
sounding, all-inclusive, prejudicative assertions would be
swallowed as truth ordained ; and, remarkable as it does
seem, this has been the brand of truck ladled out for
consumption by the American people. Fortunately there
prevails in some quarters a rebellious spirit of free in-
quiry, which same spirit presses us to know more of
what a magnate had to do in order to be ranked as a
" general of finance.''
MORGAN S ORGANIZATION OF THE STEEL TRUST
\Yhat was the exceptionally strong and ably-planned
trust to which Moody thus so airily refers? It was the
great Steel Trust. Xeed it be remarked that this was by
no means Morgan's only such progeny? In the organi-
zation of so many trusts did he participate that the term
" Morganization of Industry '' ran rampant like an ob-
session. \Yith these other trusts, however, it is hardly
necessary to deal ; as a crystalline example of Morgan's
methods, the Steel Trust will doubtless suffice.
This trust, let it be proclaimed at the outset, was no
paltry affair of a few hundred million dollars. It was
an enterprise worthy of the application of a " great
general of finance." The pen may stumble in writing it.
but somehow we will contrive to get the fact into print
that this trust came into being with more than a billion
dollars capital. .And we feel irresistibly constrained to
linger upon that billion dollars. flic ordinary human
mind !- capable of much : it can let it> exuberant imagina-
tion create heavens and helN, enchantments and exor
cUnis, and it can ^trctch illusion to realms without limit:
but to conceive of a billion dollars, or rather to visualize
252 HISTORY 01-' THE C.RLAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
it, is a task to be forsworn. Quite idle is it for the
\vorkers to attempt the visualization ; their sole part is to
produce the billions, not to see them, much less have
the use of them. Contemplating that billion dollars
further, we are driven to note the immense progressions
occurring in the case of a " great general of finance.
As a downy young man, Morgan was probably content
with his profits of thousands in financing the selling
of that batch of condemned rifles to the army ; but then
he was only a mere ambitious fledgling. Yet now.
namely, in the year 1901. when he organized the Steel
Tru.-t, he had become a full-fledged " general." and, as
all men know, no " general of finance " in these days
i- worthy of the name unless he splashes in projects of
the major hundreds of millions, or billions of dollars.
In this Steel Trust (or Lnitcd States Steel Corpora-
tion, as it chose to call itself) a very large number of
important plants were gradually merged : plants in main
parts of the l/nited States, iron plants and steel mills
and factories of tin products every kind and quality
of wares made [rum iron and steel were embraced in
the production of the plants gathered in under this gi-
gantic corporation. It was pleased to style itself not an
owning corporation so much as a "holding company."
All of the existing plants in the United State- it did
nut succeed in taking within its fold, but of thor-e re
maining outside, many were large mills allied with it,
doubtless to give a judicious appearance of competition.
' ithcrs there were of an "independent" order, mills
tic to the trust and actively bent upon o :.
; i iig with it. !"( >r rea-on- to be stated laUr In t'ii-
ehapter the Steel Trust had no fea 1 ' of most of {}< .
There w; - another black prospect for the midrilc-cia--.
Verilv, the once infallible doctrine that "competition i.-
the life of track'," was side unto death, and college pro
fessors were utterly at a loss to know how to inter the
corpse decent! v, when decease finally came.
i'erhaps curiosity may he expressed regarding the
prior history of these individual steel and iron and tin
plants; how they became huge, and their owners multi-
millionaires, before the Steel Trust was organized. Were
their owners honest men who thriftily saved their pen-
nies, amassed capital, toiled hard, invented their own
devices, and were respectable men and legitimate
traders?
Not quite. They were accounted respectable enough,
but their methods were not a scintilla different from
those of the capitalists in all other fields, which is to say
that their respectability was as well founded as that of
any other capitalist group. Yet this is not the appro-
priate place to give a detailed account of their careers
how they and their predecessors thrived on inventions
many of which they got by chicanery or theft ; how they
again and again and again bribed Congress for a high
protective tariff; how they corrupted elections and ruled
cities and partially State and National Governments :
how they defrauded the Government before, during and
after the Civil War; how the armor mill owners charged
their own Government extortionate prices for warship
armor plate which, on at least one specific occasion, was
found to be worthlessly defective' 1 '; and oppressed their
Thi> was in 1804. According to official reports the Carnegie
Steel Company \vus making armor plate at a co>t of le>s thai)
SJCKI a ton, which plate i- M>M t" the Russian go\ eminent a 1
bL'4v,i a ton while charging the 'Cr.ited States Government from
$5 jo to $700 a ton for precisely the same armor plate. Afur
an elaborate investigation, a Congressional Committee reported
(see House Report Xo. 14^18, Fifty-third Congress, Second Ses-
sion 1 :
"The company was hired to make the best possible armor
plate, and \va< paid an enormous price. Resting under the.-e
2^4 HISTORY OF Till'. GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
masses of workers and when those workers struck for
better conditions caused them to be shot down, as hap-
pened in the Carnegie works at Homestead, Pennsyl-
vania, in 1892. All of these factors and conditions will
be fully described in a subsequent part of this work. 7
ROCKEFELLER AND CARNEGIE FALL OUT.
Not with a rythmic placidity did the Steel Trust come
into being. An embittered contest, tinged with much
personal animus, among certain of the great magnates
preceded, and in some degree precipitated, its forma-
tion.
Controlling a large part of the iron ore deposits in
the Mesaba region in the Northwest, Rockefeller had
been aiming to buy out the Carnegie plants for the pur-
pose of organizing a trttst. To compel Carnegie to
yield, he had recourse to the methods he had so often
and successfully used in the oil fields. But he found
Carnegie a hornet of an individual. It did Rockefeller
no good to mass his interests in the ore fields, in Lake
Superior transportation atid in railroads against Car-
obligations the company or its servants perpetrated manifold
frauds, the natural tendency of which was to palm off upon the
(iovcrnmcnt an inferior armor whose inferiority might per-
chance appear only in the shock of battle and with incalculable
damage to the country.
" The efforts of the company, and of its superintendents,
("line, Corey and Schwab, have been to satisfy your committee
ilia! the armor is tip to the requirements of the contract, not-
withstanding the false reports to inspectors, doctoring of speci-
men:-, plugging of plates, fraudulent retreating of test plate-;
;'ud 'jockeying' of the testing-machine The unblushing char-
acter i if the fraud-; to which these men have been parties and
the disregard for truth and honesty which they have shown in
testi lying before your committee rentier them unworthy of cre-
dence."
7 " The (ireat Fortunes From Industries."
M Ol<r. AN AT JIIS /.I'.XITH 255
negie interests. Fvery move was checkmated by Car-
negie; Rockefeller was finally compelled to lower his
rates on iron ore. Finding that he could not crush out
Carnegie as he had crushed small oil producers, Rocke-
feller changed his tactics. He advanced Henry C.
Frick a million dollars as payment to Carnegie for an
option to buy the Carnegie plants for $100,000,000.
Frick had been a partner of Carnegie, but between the
two differences had arisen developing into a festering
antagonism.
If Rockefeller assumed that his plan would go through
without obstacles, he found himself enlightened before
long.
The first hindrance was the unfavorable times. As-
suredly, the great monarch of wealth did not intend to
pay that $100,000,000 out of his own personal resources.
Such a plan, according to approved methods of finance,
would be asinine. The gudgeons were to pav for it ;
the people who could be depended upon to buy slock
issues, which stock could be manipulated so that the
losses of those investors would be equal, and, much
more, to the capital required. But, at that juncture,
it was reckoned thai the anticipated victims were in no
mood or shape to exchange cash for engraved paper.
A propitious occa>ion had to be awaited.
The delay was costly to Rockefeller. The option held
by Frick expired by time limit. And that precious mil-
lion dollars advanced by Rockefeller what became of
that? Carnegie declared it forfeited, and held on to it.
Frick was enraged, and Rockefeller resentful. Hence-
forth, the animosity between Frick and Carnegie
deepened, while Rockefeller contained him-elf till the
dav when he would even matters with Carnegie.
256
I-YickV and Rockefeller's carefully nursed ambitions.
Hi is factor was J. I'ierpont Morgan.
The bridge and the tube trusts, owned largely by
Morgan, 8 had been planning to manufacture their own
billets. As the Carnegie works were flourishing in the
billet trade, the news was of momentous importance to
Carnegie. Tie at once prepared to retaliate. But how
could he effectively do >o ? \Yhat form of reprisal would
be quickest and most telling? Carnegie had grown
seared with experience Sa in the machinations of trade;
he was not the magnate to be taught how to strike at a
competitor's most vital point. The word flew forth that
he intended to go into the bridge and tube business.
Here was an announcement for Morgan to ponder and
scowl over. I.'ut another edict (it is no exaggeration to
speak of the orders issued by magnates as edicts) fol-
lowed in rapid order. Carnegie knew, of course, that
Morgan was an extensive owner of the Pennsylvania
Railroad and its properties. If a railroad were built to
8 Indications of the methods of the companies in the bridge
trust came out in 1910, and cau-cd a considerable public scandal.
State Senator Confer, and other witnesses testified before the
Xe\v York State Senate, sitting as a trial Committee of the
Whole, that a corruption fund of $6.000 had been distributed,
in looi, among three influential members of the Assembly, to
bring about the defeat of a bill considered disadvantageous to
the interests of the bridge trust. J. P. Allds. President pro tern
<>f the Senate, at the time the charges were made, was one of the
licensed. 'I 'ne Senate found him guilty. The revelations before
this committee in February and March, 1910, were of such a
character that it was the general opinion that they only faintly
indicated the vast and continuous corrupting of legi.-lature> by
rations of all kinds. This belief was borne out by the fact
that resolutions introduced in both houses of the Legislature for
a comprehensive self-investigation were at iir>t voted down.
"'- " Seared with experience.'' IraMiirch a? a description of hi<
career i- not strictly relevant to this part of the work, we can-
rot halt here to recount the details, of transactions, in which,
many a time, lie had got the better of panner-. friend-, invent-
or^ and competitors.
MORGAN AT HJs Xl-N'lTll 2$/'
compete with the .Pennsylvania system, Morgan's in-
terests and fortune would be doubly assaulted. Car-
negie allowed the information to get out that he pur-
posed to construct his own railroads from Pittsburg to
the Great Lakes, on the west, and, on the east, to the
Atlantic Ocean. He went on with the plan as though
he were in dead earnest : he rushed surveying parties to
map out the route.
THE RESULTS OF CARNEGIE S RETALIATION.
The effect upon Morgan was galvanic. Perhaps
Carnegie was bluffing in return for bluffs. But the situ-
ation was too serious for trilling. Carnegie might carry
out his threats; there was the danger. Had Morgan
been dealing with the United States Government he
would have felt no great concern at threats that he knew
he could safely ignore; but in contesting with Carnegie,
he was opposed by a magnate of whose power lie had
reason to be grimly apprehensive. How could Carnegie
be placated, or dissuaded, or prevented from carrying
out hi> ominous plan-? ( >ne heroic way there was
to bnv him out. and organize a trust.
Thereupon, it i- related, Morgan betook himself po-t
ha^te to Carnegie, X<> time was lost in unesscntials.
The magnates went straight to tin- point. Morgan in-
miired of Carnegie for what sum he would sell hi- plants.
\Vith a clever expression <>f indifference. Carnegie sen-
tenliously replied, " Three hundred million-;." A silence
ensued: the magnate- looked craftilv at each other.
Whether Morgan was aware that <>n!v a short time pre-
viotisly Carnegie had agreed to sell out to Friek for
$100.000,000 i- not known. Hn his part, Carnegie be-
lieved that he had Morgan in a corner, which convic-
258 HISTORY OK THK ORKAT AMERICAN KORTUXKS
t:on was clearly worth a raise of $200,000,000. Perhaps
Carnegie, in the style of the excellent business man,
asked an exorbitant price so as to compromise on a sum
larger than he really expected. Morgan's next words
must have surprised him. There was no drawn-out
haggling, no comment of any character. " Take it in
mortgage?" asked Morgan brusquely. "Provided it
covers the whole proposed combination." Carnegie re-
plied. The trade was then and there arranged ; the re-
mainder was simply a matter of formalities and ratifica-
tions.
Carnegie was pleased with himself. Two great ob-
jects he had accomplished: he had obtained an immense
purchase price, far beyond his expectations, and he was
now able to carry out a yearning that he had long in-
dulged of divesting himself of active business cares,
and of playing the exclusive role of the retired
and philanthropic captain of industry. Doubtless, lie
felt quite positive that he had outwitted even the great
J. Pierpont Morgan.
But, as time passed, he found good grounds to have
doubts of his astuteness.
Subsequently, after .Morgan had demonstrated how
vast sums could be taken in with facility in jobbery in
the stock issues of the Steel Trust, Carnegie began to
look back and perceive that he, not Morgan, was the
outdone one not a pleasant feeling for a man who
had been self-satisfied that he was as sharp as any of
the other magnate--, \\liile Carnegie was ostentatiously
dispensing millions for public libraries, and preaching
the doctrine that it wa> a disgrace to die rich, he wa>
^ecretly fuming over the fact that he had not held up
Morgan for a hundred million dollars more. This story
was current in Wall street:
MORGAN AT 1 1 IS XKNITH 250
Many months later Carnegie and Morgan were on the same
Atlantic liner bound for recreation in foreign fields. Coming
down late to their morning coffee, there was a few minutes for
reminiscence between them.
" Do you know, Air. Morgan," said Carnegie, " I have been
thinking it over, and I find I made a mistake. I should ha\v
asked you another hundred million for those Carnegie proper-
ties."
" If you had, I should have paid it/' responded Morgan in
his frank, unfeeling truthfulness.
And Carnegie, so the story goes, was so soured in his soul
that he could take no more toast and marmalade. ''
As in the case of the railroads, and of other indus-
trial concerns, the characteristics so typical of altered
economic conditions were seen in the passing of the steel
industry into the control of Morgan, Rockefeller, the
(joulds and their fellow magnates.
Carnegie had grown up in the steel business ; he knew
its details and technique with consummate thoroughness.
fn addition, he had adopted the plan of making partners,
in a measure, of subordinates who had proved their ca-
pacity in both the knowledge of the manufacture of steel
and in methods calculated to increase profits. Neither
Morgan nor Rockefeller nor ( iould had any technical
knowledge of how to run a steel plant : left to them-
selves they could not have managed a factory for a
single minute. But, as the capitalist system went, thev
were not required to have the slightest training in run-
ning railroads, factories, steamships or mines. They
could annex, or engage, men of experience to do this
for them.
How were the great steel plants to be directed, now
that the industry had gone out of the hands of owners
who personally had known how to do that directing? 1
9 '' The Wall Street Journal." issue of August 2, IQOQ.
260 HISTORY OF THK GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
The problem was very simple, or rather, it was no
problem at all. Morgan followed Carnegie's plan of put-
ling skilled men at the directing head, and of allowing
them to share somewhat in the division of stock and
profits. Highly significant of the methods of capitalists
was their selection of directing managers. \Ye have
seen how, when Schwab and Core}- were superintendents
of the Carnegie plants, a Congressional committee, in
1894. had denounced them individually, in a tame
enough report, as being specifically responsible for the
armor-plate frauds. Did Carnegie discontinue their
services? At that very time Carnegie was thrusting
himself forward publicly as a pious benefactor and
a loftv citizen. Did he .-how anv indignation at
* o
Schwab's and Corey's method-: How could he? Had
they not thereby shown what valuable profit producers
the}' were? lie prized their services so much that he
not only bestowed continuous marks of favor upon them,
but he later elevated them to be directors and minor
partners.
They were identically the men whom Morgan also
wanted: from a capitalist point of view they were highly
efficient. \Yhen Morgan organized the Steel Trust, to
whom did he turn a^ hi- -election for executives? To
Schwab and Corey : they successively occupied the po-
-ition of president of the I nited States Steel Corpora-
tion. Indeed. Schwab expanded to IDC somewhat of a
magnate him-elf. and incontrovertiblv proved that he
had learned proficiency in genuine magnate methods.
1 'rganizing the I nited States Shipbuilding Company, on
!; : - own hook, he and his associates issued false pros-
pectuses, decoyed investor-, fraudulently made a gift to
themselves of $55,000.000 in securities, and otherwise
committed r-uch fraud upon fraud, that after the com-
MORGAN AT HIS ZENITH 26l
puny had gone into bankruptcy the receiver denounced
the whole transaction as " an artistic swindle." 10
A TRUST PERFECT IX AEE PARTS.
Apart from the recital of these frauds, there can be
no gainsaying of the fact that the Steel Trust was the
very acme of efficient organization for capitalist pur-
poses. Other trusts might be well organized in the field
of production, and partially that of distribution, and
yet lack control of the supply of raw material. The
Steel Trust controlled all three of these factors. It
had its own plants. With Morgan, the Standard Oil
magnates and the Goulds either dominating, or asso-
ciated with, it, the railroad and steamship lines of the
United States were at its disposal. It owned vast de-
posits of iron ore and coal, some of which had been
turned over to it by Carnegie, and others of which John
I). Rockefeller held. The Steel Trust, in fact, was the
fir-t trust to establi-h a scientific control over tlie-e
10 See report of ex-United States Senator James M. Smith,
receiver of the company, to the United State- Di-trict Court
Newark. X. J. I he report \\ a- submitted to the court on Xo-
vember 2, loo.?. The appended paragraph is only a slight portion
o f the entire report :
"\\lio participated in tin- wholesale plunder? The te-tinionv
now being taken . . . will doubtless di-clo-e the names oi
all the participant.-: but as -ucli testimony \\-ili be submitted
to this court for action, your receiver doe- not deem it proper
to comment upon it here. Certain it is that much of this va- ;
amount of .-lock and bond- wa- taken by persons and cor
poration- who parted witli little or no considerations in exchange
therefor. Block- of the stock \veni to the vendors of the con-
stituent plant- and to the purchasers of bonds, as bonus, ahso
lutelv without benefit to the company; $JO,ooo,OOO of it admit
ledly went to Mr. Charle- M . Scliv.ah in addition to the agreed
price for Bethlehem. Some oi ;t went to the promoter- of tin-
2O2 illblOKY UI ; THE GREAT AMERICAN lOK'il.XLS
three factors. so indispensable to the perfect operation
of a tru.-t. By its ownership of great iron deposits, and
its practical dictatorship over transportation systems, it
at once reduced nearly all of such competitors as it had
to nonenities. Only one competitor, the Tennessee Coal
and Iron Company, owned its own raw supply; and this
competitor was later put out of the way under circum-
stances which will be described further on.
And here, again, enters the familiar factor of the
small frauds being- ousted by the great ; of the property
originally wrested by fraud being taken over by great
magnates whose specialty (and it was a very service-
able specialty ) was the extermination of lesser frauds.
The original seizure of the mineral lands, particularly
the iron ore mines in the Northwest, had been accom-
plished by force anil by grossest frauds. 11
It \vas because it controlled all of the sources of pro-
duction and distribution that the Steel Trust was able
to capitalize itself for more than a billion dollars. What
became of this billion dollars of stock? A huge amount
in common stock" no one knows just ho\v much
Morgan awarded to himself as a reward for promoting
the tru>t. and other quantities of the stock were issued to
his associates. At the same time, Morgan bought large
quantities of preferred ,-tock. A careful appraisement
by expert- established the fact that only about 8300.-
OOO the exact price paid to Carnegie repre-
sented the actual assets of the trust; the remainder of
the stock" was " watered.'' Some of this very stock was
shrewdly sold to a portion of the workers in the steel
is, thus tending to de-troy their resistance to the
MORGAN AT HIS ZKN1T1I 263
FORTY MILLIONS STOCK PRO FITS \VITUIX A YEAR.
The profits made by Morgan were instantaneous and
gigantic. The stock obtained by him he was able to
sell at the market price of about 50. By October, 1902,
Morgan and his immediate partners in the syndicate had
already distributed 840.000,000 in profits. 1 - From
whom did the>e stockjobbing profits come? From a
host of middle class investors throughout the world.
Lured on by the glowing prospectuses of the Steel Trust,
and certain that the money that they put in would pro-
duce large dividends, and the stock would rise in value,
they literally scrambled to pay over their money for the
stock. After the process had been exhaustively worked
by the manipulators, the price of common stock was
gradually beat down, until, in 1004. it sank to 8-^4.
Hordes of middle ela.-s investors were ruined; tin 1 mag-
nates had transferred their money to their own pockets.
This kind of operation has been repeated several times
with great success. When the little fellows parted with
their stocks at low prices, the magnate 1 .- would buy it
hack, and then by forcing declaration of dividends, and
making roseate reports of the -tee! business, would force
up the market quotations, and -ell the stock back again,
with resulting immense profits. l',v -uch methods Mor-
gan and hi- associated clique have taken in hundred:- of
million^ of dollars.
Tf it be asked from whom the-e hundred- of milliou-
in stockjobbing profit- directly came, the answer is sim-
ple. Prom the v !' to-do, not merely in the I nited
264
Stales, but the world over. The involuntary donors
comprised the f;.:reign aristocracy as well as the American
tradesmen, the .-::::dl manufacturers and the professional
moneyed divisions, revealed themselves fully as eager
as the native investors to relieve Morgan of his vast en-
cumbrance of paper supply, otherwise called stock.
They poured in their money, and he distributed his pa-
per : he was swamped with orders.
Was ever such naive and trusting confidence shown
as was displayed by these hosts of investors? Their
simple faith in the excellencies of the magnates could
not be shaken. Repeatedly had they, or other multi-
tudes of individuals in their own classes, been inveigled
into Wall street, and dexterously cheated. But these
frequent experiences, instead of implanting a wisdom
tempered by enduring suspicion, passed over them with-
out leaving a trace. The merchants and petty manu-
facturers, in particular, who prided themselves on being
so adroit in defrauding the working class, responded
every time to the insinuating song of the magnates.
And every time they did so they found themselves rav-
ished of their money. Xo word must be uttered against
their methods of swindling the workers from whom
came the wealth seized from them; such protests were
dangerous agitation. Let them, however, be defrauded
by the Wall street magnates, and curses were not se-
vere enough. I>ut back the shorn would flock to Wall
street, like a dog returning to the master who scourges
it.
Another phenomenon mu-t be significantly noticed.
Kven if considerable sections of this middle class warilv
kepi away from -lock markei adventuring, their money
was nevertheless used by the magnates, as though ii
MOKGAX AT 1I1S ZENITH 2O5
were the assured properly of those magnates. Astonish-
ingly paradoxical as this seems, it was and is, a bitter
joke on the purblind middle class. The profits made by
the small manufacturers and the retailers in swindling
the workers by selling adulterated, inferior and short-
weight products, were deposited in the banks. These
deposits were utilized by the trust organizers to oblit-
erate the very class owning them a class hating the
trusts with a deadly enmity. Such was the incongru-
ous situation to which the middle class was oblivious.
The great magnates controlled vastly powerful New
York banks; 13 these institutions, in turn, held control
over hundreds, if not thousands, of smaller banks
throughout the country. The stock issues of the Steel
Trust, as well as those of many other trusts, were sold
to these banks. The trust magnates lifted out the money
of the middle class, and the banks, in exchange, received
the watered stock and bonds.
T1IK GKKAT [XSTRAXCF, FRAfDS.
Hundreds of millions of dollars more were held bv
the great insurance companies as deposits and surplus
from premiums paid in yearly by immense numbers of
policyholclers, comprising the ultra-rich, the middle class
and the working class. In insurance companies, such
13 The three great New York banks which, it is understood,
Morgan then lon^ controlled, were the First National, the Na-
tional Hank of Commerce and the Hanover National. Their
immense resources may be realized from the<e facts: The First
National has a capital of $10,000,000. deposits of Sli.^ooo.ooo, and
a surplus of $iS.6oo.ooo. The National Hank of Commerce has a
capital of $_'5. 000,000. deposit- of $170.000,000, and a -urplus of
$15,000,000. The Hanover National ha- a capital of $; v ooo.oo .
tli posits of ?S'j.ooo, ' f . i, an ' a nrpiu.- ni Sm.ooo.eoo. Since then,
as we shall sei 1 . Monran ii: : - extended his control over a va.-t
number of oth r banks, virl ly forming a Money Trust.
266 HISTORY OI<" THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
as the Xe\v York, the Equitable and the .Mutual, the
working class was little represented ; the workingmen
could not: afford to pay the large premiums demanded.
Forced to take out policies, on a weekly installment
payment, in the industrial insurance companies, they
were swindled to an even greater extent than were the
policyholders of the " old-line " companies. Their
money, too, was used in providing trusts with adequate
enough funds with which to bribe legislatures for fran-
chises and other laws, and to obtain extensive equip-
ment. The Public Service Corporation, which, for
example, owns the public utility plants and systems (ex-
cept the railroads ) of the entire State of Xew Jersey,
was financed with the money advanced by one of these
large industrial insurance corporations.
Viewing the matter rationally, however, it will be at
once seen that whatever the enormous accompanying
frauds, the necessities of industrial and social progress
demanded two interrelated lines of action. The first
was the superseding of the competitive, by the trust, sys-
tem. Since trusts were the next inevitable stage, the
immense funds needed for their organization and elab-
oration had to come from somewhere. Individually, the
magnates lacked sufficient ca-h. Consequently, they
were forced to take it wherever the}' could find it, irre-
spective of the nature of the methods used.
In the wielding of the colossal funds of the Xew York
Life Insurance Company, Morgan was a chief among
the ruling factors, while also screened behind figure-
heads, he was active in the affairs of the Equitable Life
A-surance Society. 14 Evidences of his power, exercised
MOUGAX AT iilo ZhlMTH 26/
through indirection, were repeatedly brought out in the
remarkable, although fundamentally futile investigation,
made by a Xew York legislative committee in 1905. The
insurance companies had a satiety of cash ; Morgan,
Harriman and other magnates had the stock issues. In-
asmuch as obviously that stock was not issued for
aesthetic exhibitions, the important and immediate con-
sideration was to convert it into revenue. By collusion
with the official.^ of the insurance companies, huge quan-
tities of bonds and stocks were sold to the insurance
companies. 1 '"' Largely with this middle class money, the
magnates were enabled to finance their great railroad
and trust projects. Other portions of the stock issues
were sold directly to the middle class, and were then
manipulated so as to grind out that class still further.
For a long time this looting of the insurance com-
panies went on unhindered, and without attracting public
notice. The causes of this immunity from official action
and exposure were not revealed until K)O5. In that
year the accustomed capitalistic development came about.
A quarrel, at first mere private mutterings. then grow-
ing into an obstreperous conllict, set in among group-;
of magnate,-. And what was the provocation? Was it
one of personal hostility? Not at all. The cause arose
from dissensions as 10 the division of the spoils in the
time, a- an officer of the New York Life Insurance Company.
Perkins'-- method- may be judged by the following incidental
fact: lie took nut policies for SOo.ooo on ln> life, and received
aeeiit>' commissions en hi-; own insurance. Report of the [Xev.
York] Legislative Insurance Committee, lox/i. x : 85.
'" Tlu- Equitable, for instance, owned $;n'j.^64.034 of railroad
and traction company bond-, the Mutual about the same amount
in railroad and mi-cellaneou-- bonds, and the Xe\v York a
umilarlv lame am Hint.
268 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
Equitable Life Assurance Society. Magnate arrayed
himself against magnate, and group opposed group.
The clearer it became that the fight for control of the
stupendous revenues could not be compromised, the more
malignant the magnates became. The stage was soon
reached when ugly charges of fraud, graft and corrup-
tion were allowed to get into the public press. Here
was a spectacle for the gods. Xot from any " labor
agitator/" nor from any '' irresponsible newspaper " did
these charges come ; nay. they came from some of the
lordliest magnates in the land, from men of the most
" unimpeachable respectability." Xow, here they were
vulgarly accusing one another of being liars, frauds and
all-round knaves.
That the matter made a loud sensation can well be
understood ; newspaper writers diligently applied them-
selves to reporting the great event. Quarrels among
magnates were not uncommon, but when a whole array
of the nation's oligarchy of wealth pushed their row
into the open,, and began bedamning one another, it
was a rare opportunity for truths to come out. Xone
but the magnate,- themselves could open the door- of
their holy of holies and reveal the mysteries within.
I 'raises be to the glorious occasion, they were now doing
this verv thing.
I hit when the holy of holies was subjected to scrutiny,
it was found to be a cesspool from which long pent-up
noxious exhalation- burst forth, almost threatening to
-uffocate a nation that had been taught to reverence
the aforesaid holv places. The quarrel became so fierce
lhal a swelling popular demand sprang up for a leg-
i-bitivr committee to do some exhaustive and salubrious
probing. Tin- demand, at least, had every appearance
of being a -pontane ui- popular one; but it can }>' rea-
MORGAN AT HIS ZENITH
sonably surmised that after trying every other means
of ousting the group of magnates in power, the opposi-
tion party cleverly investigated the popular indignation
in order to compel an investigation, and discredit the
clique in control. Subsequent developments proved that
Ilarriman had long been attempting to gain exclusive
control of the massed funds of the Equitable Life As-
surance Society. In addition, his own testimony attested
the fact that Governor Odell of Xew York was his crea-
ture, and that the very Legislature which ordered the
investigation was obedient to his orders.
From the first sessions of that investigating commit-
tee to the last, the story unrolled was one of such appal-
ling fraud and corruption that the very enormity of it
finally deprived it of effect. One after another, the
magnates were haled forth to the light ; and when they
retired they, the " great captains of industry," the su-
premely respectable products of society, the fine mor-
alists of the nation, the supporters and endowers of
charities and churches, the rulers of politics, were re-
vealed as perjurers, bribers and thieves. If magnates
desire to keep up the myth of " sterling honesty," be-
nevolence and patriotism, they must learn not to quarrel
among themselves. Otherwise, they will tell on one an-
other, which is not politic. Kven more seriously.
they will undermine the stanchions and " pillars of so-
ciety," one of which, in the United States, is the popular
belief that the people vote their rulers in and out of
office, and shape the course of legislation.
27O HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
to the magnates to have the secret come out? Over and
over again was that secret disclosed in past investi-
gations, but without instructive results. Yet. behold !
the people once more have the opportunity of getting
an insight into what goes on behind the scenes when the
Legislative Investigating Committee reports in 1906:
The testimony taken by the committee makes it clear that
the large insurance companies systematically attempted (sic)
to control legislation in this [Xe\v York] and other States,
which could affect their interests directly or indirectly. The
three companies divided the country, outside of New York and
a few other States, so as to avoid a waste of effort, each look-
ing after its chosen district and bearing its appropriate part of
the total expenses. 10
Excellent ! even bribery, like industry, becomes sys-
tematized and modernized. In the process, delicate ex-
ternals are preserved. To ledger bribery funds as cor-
ruption money is a gross -hock to fastidious taste, and
is inexcusably unbusinesslike. Hence, so the commit-
tee reported, bribery expenditures were classified as
" legal expenses." The committee described them as ex-
traordinarily large. The Mutual, in 1904. disbursed
$364.254.95: the Equitable. Si 72.698. 42, and the Xew
York, with Morgan's partner, Perkins, practically in
command, $204.01 9. 25. 1T This, according to the simple
rules of arithmetic, made a total of more than three-
quarters of a million dollars spent in one year in the
corrupting of legislature.-, administrative officials and
certain newspaper writers. 18 These " legal expenses,"
the committee redundantly wrote, were " far in excess
16 Report of the [Xew York] Legislative Insurance Commit-
tee, i oof), x : 23
17 Ibid., [6. '
8 The ti>ti:r.ony showed lhat many newspaper writers had
received large sums for the -upprcssion of articles revealing the
methods of tlie.-e companies.
MORGAN AT HIS ZKXITIF 2/1
of the amounts required for legitimate purposes."
For what were these corruption funds employed ?
To get laws under which great frauds could be carried
on. and to prevent the passage of laws interfering with
the graft. And who were the immediate distributers
of the funds? Trained, circumspect lobbyists, thor-
oughly experienced in the business of knowing who,
when and where to bribe. They were never stinted for
money. Andrew C. Fields, long engaged by the Mutual
Life Insurance Company to manipulate legislation at
.Albany, held forth in a sumptuously furnished house
there. This headquarters was jocosely styled the
'' House of Mirth! " The rent and other expenses were
charged to " legal expenses." The Mutual thus ex-
pended more than $2,000,000 in " legal expenses " from
1898 to 1904.- And what were those of the Xew York
Life Insurance Company? From 1895 to 1904. the
total payments to Andrew Hamilton, its principal lobby-
ist, amounted to $1.312,197.16, all of which sum was
soberly entered as "legal expenses."- 1 J. P. Morgan
and Company made advances of money to Hamil-
ton.- 2
Rut the corruption neither began nor ended with the
buying of legislative votes or of administrative conni-
vance. Over and above the politicians in office were the
busses in control of the machinery of both the Repub-
lican and the Democratic parties. Those party machines
could command the votes; and the orders of the men at
19 Report of the I Now York] Legislative Insurance Commit-
tee, 1906, x : 16.
- Ibid.. 16
21 Ibid.. 50.
-- Ibid., 49. For instance, J. I'. .Morgan and Company, in Oc
tober. 1<)O2. advanced $50.310.70 to Hamilton. Tbis sum was
deducted from the profits of the Xew York Life Insurance Com-
pany. Hamilton was not required tu make any accounting.
2J2 HISTORY OF Till: GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
the head called for submission by the underling politi-
cian-. Refusal brought discipline and retirement. By
controlling the . secret workings of the party organiza-
tions, the magnates virtually controlled the platforms of
those parties, their nominees, and the general course of
the men elected to office.
For one more proof of this, another dip into the re-
port of that celebrated insurance investigating committee
of 1905 will suffice. " The insurance companies," it re-
ported. " regularly contributed large sums to the cam-
paign funds of both the Republican and the Demo-
cratic parties." This was no exceptional act, however:
it was the conventional order of the day ; all of the great
corporations did likewise. Had not Jay Gould, thirty-
odd years before, explained the method? And had not
other capitalists long antecedent to Jay Gould shown
how efficacious it was? .-V present of nearly 850,000
was contributed in 1894 ^. v tnc Xew York Life In-
surance Company to the campaign fund of the Repub-
lican National Committee,-" and similar amount- in 1896
and in 1900 for the same purpose. 24 All of the large
insurance companies gave contributions, not only for na-
tional political campaign?, but also for those in the
States.-'"' It was found impossible to trace all of the
direction- of this continuous corruption. " Enormous
sum-." the committee stated, '' have been expended in a
surreptitious manner."
The immen.-e sums thus spent in political corruption
were .-tolen from the proceeds of the policyholders.
- :; Report of the [Xe\v York] Legislative Insurance Committee,
1006. \ : 62.
-* [hid.
lave $;o,ooo in
MORGAN AT 1118 ZENITH 2J $
With this stolen money, mounting into millions of dol
lars, the magnates bought their way into every State
legislature in the Union ; they purchased a way for them-
selves or for their allies into the United States Senate :
and they carried their demands in both the Republican
and the Democratic parties. An arraignment more
destructive to the existing arrangement of society could
not be found than was contained in the facts (and
they were by no means, all of the facts ) reported by that
committee. The substantial conclusion was. although
not set forth in so many plain words, that the adminis-
trative officials, the legislatures. Congress, the courts and
the old political parties were controlled and dominated
by groups of unparalleled frauds and pirates. For the
sums diverted to insure this political control were only
a tithe of the aggregate stupendous thefts. Following
close upon the investigation came suits against the " high
financiers" for the restitution of more than $10.000,-
ooo. and these suits were but indications of still vaster
sums fraudulently taken. The suits were compromised.
DARK DAYS FOR RESPECTABILITY.
It was a period of travail for respectability ; much
explaining had to be done, which (in such a case) is
always a confession. The directors or swayers of those
insurance companies comprised some of the most super-
eminent magnates and exalted philanthropists in the
I'nited States. Elegant society suffered no shock at the
revelations, for it was built and sustained, every part
and woof of it. by theft, fraud, bribery and exploita-
tion.
But the apologists and retainers, whose vocation it
was to strew praise in tlu path of the money monarch^,
274 HISTORY 01' THI-: GREAT AMKRICAX FORTUNES
were egregiously put out of face. What could they say
when such of their heroes as George J. Gould, Alfred
G. Vanderbilt. John Jacob Astor, August Belmont,
Jacob H. Schiff. 2 ' 5 Henry C. Frick, D. O. Mills, and
many others were being shown up either as participants
or as responsible heads? More galling still was the be-
smearing of their great idols, E. H. Harriman, and above
all, the devout and philanthropic J. Pierpont Morgan. 27
All of these money conquerors had been interminably
glorified : nothing had been too extravagant to say of
them ; and now they could be seen twisting and squirm-
ing in the uncomfortable act "of being caught."
Good repute may be. as the poets and philosophers
say. a priceless possession. P>ut these magnates did not
mind the temporary hurt. For temporary it surely was ;
a little time would pass, and then the newspapers, mag-
azines, college presidents and clergy, largely owned or
subsidized by the magnates, would resume their inter-
rupted chorus of prai.-e. and all would be well again. A
bit of the plunder thrown out to universities and churches
would add to the magical effect.
Hence, it was not any loss of reputation that the mag-
nates and their satraps feared. The one and only dis-
26 The Equitable Life Assurance Society "loaned immense
sums " to Kuhn, Loeb and Company, of which SchifT was a lead-
ing member. (Ibid., 118.) These fund-, in large part, were
turned over to Harriman for use in hi- railroad gathering and
centralizing projects. SchitT pa-sed in public a> one of the
benevolent philanthropists of the time.
-~ The extent of Morgan's utilization of insurance money wa-
-ho\vn by the legislative investigating committee. " The evidence
is," it reported, "that while Mr. Perkins has been a member of
J. P. Morgan and Company, the Xew York Life has purchased
from it securities of the par value of $39,286,075 for the price of
$38.804.981.51. (Report of the [Xew York) Legislative Insur-
ance Committee, 1906:811. Superficially, the report suggest ^
that the Xew York Life Insurance Company thus obtained "a
bargain " in the purchase of these securities. In reality, much
of the securities comprised " watered '' stocks.
MORGAN AT HIS XKXITH 2/5
quieting prospect was that of being shunted away to pris-
ons. Throughout the United States the insurance dis-
closures the outcropping facts as to the vast, long-
continuing corruptions and frauds had called forth a
frenzied demand at first that the guilty be rushed to
trial and imprisoned.
But that demand, if carried out, would have entailed
a unique and unprecedented situation. Should all of the
guilty be jailed, or even a number of them, the nation
would have been deprived of many of its foremost mag-
nates, its greatest philanthropists, its most exemplary
patriots. llo\v could society have survived such a loss?
According to orthodox teachings, these men were im-
perative to the proper administration, and the well-be-
ing, of the whole social and industrial system. Incar-
cerate the great magnates, philanthropists and patriots,
even though they were also the greatest plunderers?
The thought was impossible.
Xo fear of prison, however, need have been entertained
by the implicated. Had not many an investigation been
held before, decade after decade, almost year after year,
sometimes several investigations in a single year? J lad
any of the rich dcfrauders disclosed in those investiga-
tions ever gone to prison? What ground was there for
supposing that tin's investigation would result any differ-
ently? In a society ruled by money, what are court-
for but to be used as a minatory instrument for enforc-
ing the law, made by the rich, against the propcrtyless?
What are judge- for except to con-true that law as the
magnates who put them on the bench demand that it
be construed ? -^
-* It is quite needless to reiterate here facts (already brought
out) regarding the methods by which appointments and elections
to the bench were made by the tfmit property interests. Later
276 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FOKTL'N i:.:>
Xot the law so much a- the interpretation is what es-
sentially counts.
THE MAGNATES ESCAPE THE LAW.
I low the law was interpreted was soon seen. Under
the pressure of public opinion, the District Attorney of
Xew York County, one \Yilliam Travers Jerome (long
renowned as a " reformer ") finally caused the Grand
Jury to take action in proceeding against a few of the
satraps and the figureheads. But, in the case of Per-
kins, for instance, it was decided that if he had com-
mitted grand larceny, it had been done without criminal
intent. The thousands of poor offenders hurried off to
prison were obviously afflicted with an overabundance of
this same criminal intent. Yet for a rich and powerful
man to commit any fraud with criminal intent was a
principal unknown to practical jurisprudence. The farce
dragged out a while: not one of the participants of great
wealth was even incommoded by the formality of a trial. 29
And what was the outcome of that extraordinary in-
vestigation ? Again was >een the operation of that prin-
ciple so often brought out in these chapters ; that every
" reform wave '' of a capitalist order of society is used
by the great capitalists to aggrandize their wealth and
power. Taking advantage of the popular discredit of
the large insurance companies, and making fine asser-
tions of the reforms that he intended to bring about.
on, a full elucidation of this subject will be Riven, as also a de-
scription of the criminal law as applied to the pour.
'' i IK- tacts thus generalized are >o notorious that it is hardly
necessary to specify at length. Although he was much de-
nounced, Jerome did not deviate from the uniform practice (a-
>o often throughout thi- work) of enforcing the laws
vigorously against the poor, while allowing the rich frauds and
t'niever- to go scot free. At one time, a "popular hero," Jtronu
went out of office thoroughly discredited in public opinion.
MORGAN AT 11 IS ZENITH 2/7
Thomas F. Ryan secured control of the Equitable Lile
Assurance Society, completely frustrating Harriman's
efforts to the same end. Ryan's career, and the facts as
to how he obtained his immense wealth, were so generally
known, that his appearance in the role of a " reformer "
was the signal for an instantaneous outburst of public
sarcasm which Ryan did not at all mind, seeing that he
had carried his assault. 30
Enough, however, of the methods by which these vast
insurance funds were manipulated for politico-financial
ends. The sensation caused by the revelations was as
profound as the reaction that followed. For a brief
period the mass were privileged to have a look behind
the scenes, get wrought up at what they saw, and then
the curtains were drawn again and the old comedy was
resumed. The intense popular excitement flattened out
into the sheerest lassitude.
\Yhat noteworthy changes resulted from all that pro-
tracted boring, ten solid volumes of it? Xone. Some
lawyer folk grasped political advancement out of it,
others enriched themselves from a trail of litigation, a
30 In his speech in the United States Senate on March 17. 1907,
Senator La Follette thus referred to Ryan:
" The Metropolitan Interhoroutih Traction Company cleaned
up. at the lowe-t estimate, $100.000.000 by methods which should
have committed many of the participants to the penitentiary.
The public and the stockholders were robbed alike. That divi-
dends were paid with borrowed money purely to stock ioh ihe
public is now known to a certainty. Stock was thus balloonvd to
$j< i'\ per share, which .coes bctrgin.e now at $35. The insider-
robbed the company on construction of upwards of ?4O.oooooo.
Investigation lias disclosed that St.otio.otx) was spent as a ycilow-
do.tr fund ' for corrupting public officials. In 1886 Thomas F.
Ryan was ;i poor man. In K)O5 Henry 1). McDonou^h, his offi-
cial representative, estimated Ryan's fortune at fifty millions.
'I lu- foundation of ail hi.- weahh and poucf wa- the Metropolitan
Street Railway." "Centralization and Community Control of
Industry," etc. (Government Doc.), 24. Ryan's career will be
fully described in thai part of tlii- work comprising "Great
Fortune- Fmm Public Franchises."
HISTORY OF 'I HL GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
few minor laws were passed, and one set of capitalists
was deposed to make place for another. And that was
the finis of this great investigation which was to have
brought such " beneficial reforms."
One of the most remarkable, and at the same time
most comical, features of American political life in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the frequency of
these official investigations. Survey the archives and
you will be bewildered by their number and continuity,
extant in the form of printed testimony and reports.
These were not investigations made by a hostile
officialdom, but by governing authorities, either repre-
senting the very capitalistic interests investigated, or
favorable to them. The numerous investigations may,
therefore, be accepted as those of capitalist society dis-
closing itself. Everyone of them reveals ihe same story
of fraud, corruption and theft, from which not a single
line of business was exempt. The stupendous extent of
the incessant and deliberate lying carried on by capital-
ist expositors may at once be seen by comparing their
fulsome accounts of capitalists and of the capitalistic
system with the facts perpetuated in the reports of the
capitalists' own Government. Xot one of those investi-
gations carried with it any real salutary benefits for the
people; after every such inquisition the mass were plun-
dered and despoiled as effectively as before almost in-
variably more so. Apparently the only inherent virtue
of those investigations seems to have been that of sup-
; lying thi- pre-ent author with facts a not inconsider-
:rii;e, it may be appreciatively added." 1
fore, y.ilii this knowledge, wonder can be expressed
'.. "insurance iniquities " (as they were styled) were not
rri r.atdy viewed. In aanality, j/reat a- they were, they
1 ' ihe merest fragment- of a collossal network of fraud,
ion and graft, covering: every department, branch and
!-:i':d of iiu-ine?? and old-party politics.
MORGAN AT HIS ZKMTH
But what of those virtuous middle-class investors who,
when tricked and defrauded by the magnates, plaintively
put themselves on exhibition as outraged and helpless
victims of a crew of unscrupulous financiers? 1 low, for
example, did the many investors in Steel Trust stock
regard the great Morgan after their disillusioning and
spoliation? They broke out in passionate imprecations.
Throughout the country you met them even-where be-
wailing their lo.-ses ; some of their thousands, others of
their tens of thousands, and still others of their hundreds
of thousands of dollars. In many another \\all street
onslaught, the losers could not specifically blame Mor-
gan ; but in the Steel Trust stock-rigging he was so
palpably the principal moving spirit, that necessarily
this bitterness was directed at him. To the point of
nausea the charge was repeated that fraud had brought
about the stripping or ruin of those innocent, confiding
investors ; :! - fraud did it all, fraud explained the whole
process.
Delicious innocence ! Not an individual was there
among those self-commiserating investors who would not
have been elated to have profited in the stock market at
the expense of other investor.-. Had such been the out-
come. the transaction would have been highly legitimate
and just. The crime consoled in the magnates exclu-
-ively pock-ding the booty. This at once Iran-formed
the operation into one of betrayal, injustice, fraud and
>ppression term.- springing spontaneously from the
niddlc clasr- whenever its pocket i- drained. Then came
"'-'.Many 'if these investors were nut, of course, despoiled of
thi'ir entire Fortune 1 . Thus, a >mail manufacturer mitdit invest
>-'j . <<<> df his fortune in Steel Tru-t stock, ami ln-,e a irreat
part of the investment in -dlin^ on! at a very much lower price
;; ;ha( at which he hnd hou.jlu i . As the market price kept
ending he \\-om 1 d conclude to -eil out licfort hi- losses would
be qreater, The "margin" investor.- -uttered much worse.
280 HISTORY or THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
that old familiarly dolorous plaint of its grievance.- .
And would the terror of law never descend upon the
supersubtle corporate greed that was swindling and de-
vouring the virtuous middle class, " the backbone of the
country " ?
THE SOURCE OF PROFITS.
Agitated over their own misfortunes and expropria-
tion, these investors excoriated Morgan and the other
magnates. And their actuating reason was what? That
of not being allowed to have a hand in the profits. 'Who
has not heard pigs squeal when a hog usurps the trough !
And what, further, were the basic conditions from which
these investors eagerly . strained for profits, either in
-lock gambling or in dividends?
The value of the stock depended at bottom upon the
trade profits of the business. Those profits came from
the labor in the mills and the exploitation of the manu-
factured product, the price of which exploitation was
indirectly taxed upon the working class wherever steel
was sold or used. Were the petty investors, so clamor-
ous for their own security and comfort, uneasy at the
condition.- under which masses of men and boys worked
in the iron and coal mines and in the steel manufacturing
plant.-? Did they experience any qualms at the long
hour- and low pay. and the squalid, often revolting, life
to which those workers were forced? Did the bestial
degradation and frightful destitution so often encount-
ered in -u-rl-mill quarters disturb their thoughts? Or
were they impressed by the gha-tly casualties in the
mills. MI- the diseases rife in the workingmen's quarters,
causing an undiminished slaughter of men. women and
: Did the investor-, whose understanding of in
MORGAN AT lilS ZliNlTH 251
justice was so sensitively acute when they were robbed
or in distress, see any injustice in such conditions?
In this exploitation they saw nothing by a " right-
eous " system of industry from which they eagerly sought
profit. They were not ignorant of the existence of these
conditions; it was with a knowledge, not always full,
but some realization, nevertheless, of them, that they
sophisticatedly bought Steel Trust stock to share in the
profits. When an exposure was made, in 1908, of some
of these conditions, not more than a handful of stock-
holders protested against the horrors ; exceptions among
their class to which we gladly draw attention. In its
long duel with the magnates, the middle class ever and
always insisted that its grievances be heard and respect-
full}- treated. Yet, let the workers make the slightest
move for redress, and that class, with stony rigidity,
would demand their repression as " disturbers of busi-
ness," if for no other reason.
To describe those conditions at length would be an
inappropriate anticipation of another part of this work-
to which the description is more germane. Some glimp-
ses, however, will be to the point. Xor will the facts be
drawn from working-class spokesmen and writers. Do
not the conventions of the day condemn these as un-
worthv of credence and citation? Observe with what
immense respect legislatures. Congress, the courts, edi-
tors and literarv reviewers treat the trashiest utterance-
of capitalists, and swear by their value and authenticitv.
But working-class memorials, protests and statement-
are obviously the productions of "rabid agitators" ;
thev " chronically exaggerate " and are " partial and par-
tisan." Since capitalists (and their retinue of scribes i
alone possess the high virtue of complete veracity, cita-
lions from such source- will perhaps carry weight.
282 J11STUKV OF THE C.REAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
What i> this extraordinary document we hold in our
hand? It is a report entitled "The Pittsburg Survey,"
the same being an exhaustive investigation of the con-
ditions of the working class of Pittsburg. Scrutinizing
further, we find that this investigation was carried on
by means of funds contributed by " The Russell Sage
Endowment." s " That fact enhances its prestige for ci-
tation purposes. What is this further fact we note on
the bottom of the cover? That the report has been
published in a magazine conducted by the Charity Or-
ganization Society of Xew York City, under which title
appears what? The name of J. Pierpont Morgan, as
treasurer of that society. Xo\v we are invulnerably on
safe footing. To a report issued under >uch exalted aus-
pices, who would be so reckless as to impute inaccuracy
or impartiality? More especially so, inasmuch as this
report has been generally commended for its accuracy
an accuracy, it may be added, toned with an extremely
conservative treatment.
On. then, with the quoting. ' The United States
Steel Corporation." the report said..
owns properly on the South Side of Pittsburg just beyond the
Point Bridge. Here is located the old Painter's Mill, which
I- one of the plants of the Carnegie Steel Company, which in
:;,rn is one of the constituent companies of the United States
Sted Corporation; and here. also, stands what remains of
''The Russell Sage F.ndo\vinent " a fund amounting to
ninny millions of dollars, given by Sage's widow for (among
other purposes) the pnrpo.-e of investigating the conditions pro-
poverty. Part of the money robbed by Sage in previous
is ihr,.; tt-ed to find out why so many millions of '
itirui are in destitution. What a grotesque
MORGAN AT 111S ZliNITH 283
Painter's Row, where the company has housed certain of its
employes, mostly immigrants. When the Carnegie Steel Com-
pany took over Painter's Mill, it renovated the plant so as to
turn out the sort and quantity of output which the Carnegie
name stands for. When it took over Painter's Row, it did
nothing. When, a little over a year ago, and several years after
the purchase of the property, I made a detailed investigation
of the place, I found half a thousand people living there under
conditions that were unbelievable back-to-back houses with no
through ventilation ; cellar kitchens ; dark, unsanitary, ill-venti-
lated, over-crowded sleeping rooms, no drinking water supply on
the premises ; and a dearth of sanitary accommodations that was
shameful. 34
The writer hastens to add :
The story of Painter's Row should be considered in its bear-
ings. The United States Steel Corporation is building a re-
markable new town at Gary, Indiana; its subsidiary companies
have- promoted house building along original lines, notably at
Vandergraft, Ambridge and Lorain, and the Carnegie Steel
Company has fair, low-rental houses at Munhall and elsewhere.
On the other hand, other Pittsburg corporations own company
houses which have been equally as bad as Painter's Row; and a
similar story could be written of a shack at one time owned by
one of the foremost Protestant churches of Pittsburg, and razed
to the ground only because the headworker of Kingsley House
had the courage to publish its picture and the name of the
owner.
PainterV Row has been improved, it is reported, since
the publication of the report : the Steel Trust officials
were driven to it by the resulting publicity. But Paint-
er's Row is only a typical incident in a vast accumula-
tion of poverty and misery, to be met with everywhere
in the steel mill towns. That qualifying note regarding
the erection of fine new houses for the workers in (larv
284 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
and other Steel Trust towns has an altruistic touch ; very
melodiously and enthusiastically it rolls along. Yet we
have seen, in the case of the town of Pullman, how these
" model towns " work out : how the workers are reduced
to a state of serfdom, exploited at every turn in the mills
rind out; and such efficiency as comes from fairly decent
living quarters simply redounds, as a " good investment,"
to the profit of the mill owners. Of the conditions noted
further in Pittsburg, one more extract from the volumin-
ous report (which might well be termed a Chamber of
Horrors) will give an additional insight:
. . . Tt is a common opinion in the district that some em-
ployers of labor give the Slavs and Italians preference because
of their docility, their habit of silent submission, their amen-
ability to discipline, and their willingness to work long hours
and overtime without a murmur. Foreigners as a rule earn the
lowest wages and work the full stint of hours. I found them
in the machine shops working sixty hours a week ; at the blast
furnaces working twelve hours a day for seven days in the
week. The common laborer in and around the mills works sev-
enty-two hours a week. The unit of wages is an hour rate for
day labor and a Slav is willing to take the longer hours (twelve
hours a day for men who work fourteen and sixteen in the
fatherland) with extra work on Sundays, especially in connec-
tion with clearing the yards and repairing. Possibly sixty to
seventy per cent, of the laborers in the mills come out Sunday."
and the mechanics and other laborers on occasions work thirty-
six hours in order that the plant may start on time. In one
mill I found Russians (Greek Orthodox) in favor for the rea-
son that they gladly worked on Sundays.
Many work in intense heat, the din of machinery and the
noise of escaping steam. The congested condition of most of
the plants in Pittsburg adds to the physical discomforts for an
out-of-doors people; while their ignorance of the language and
of modern machinery increases the risk. How many of the
Slavs. Lithuanians and Italians arc injured in Pittsburg in one
year is not known. No reliable statistics are compiled. In their
MORGAN AT ins XKXITH 285
absence people guess, and the mischief wrought by contradictory
and biased statements is met on all hands. When I mentioned
a plant that had a bad reputation to a priest, he said, " Oh, that
is the slaughter-house ; they kill them there every day." I quote
him not for his accuracy, but to show how the rumors circu-
late and are real to the people themselves. It is undoubtedly
true, that, exaggerated though the reports may be, the \\aste
in life and limb is great, and if it all fell upon the native born
a cry would long since have gone up which would have stayed
the slaughter. 35
These are but the most cursory views of a few of the
prevailing conditions. All of the bond and stock hold-
ers, large and small," 6 great magnates and little parasites,
not merely have acquiesced in these conditions, but have
insisted upon their continuance, upon the principle (so
often referred to in the course of this work) that the
lower the wages and longer the hours of work, the se-
ductively greater the dividend prospects. Splendid man-
sions, as capacious and ornamental as palaces, arise upon
the tense labor, the suffering and the mortality of those
masses of workers. Carnegie, pompously spreading his
philanthropy, draws his income from the very life blood
of those workers and their families and children,'' 17 and
A I organ, piously dispensing charity, officiating at relig-
ious meetings, and posing as the incarnation of princely
benevolence, allows no such impractical considerations as
""'''The Pittsburg Survey,'' i : 537 and 539. The Carnegie
Steel Company began several decades ago the systematic hiring
of immigrant workers. The average pay of these workers i-
$[.6o a day.
"'But the lew exceptions noted previously,
37 " One-third of all who die in Pittsburg. die without having
anything to say about it. That is. they die under five year-
of age. One- fourth of all who die. die without having any
thing to say about anything. That is, ihey die under one year
of age. MOM of these deaths are preventable, being the out
come of conditions which, humanly -peaking, have no right to
exist." This slaughter is greatly caused by impure milk and bad
housing condition-. "The Pittshurg Survey," ii : 943.
^86 HISTORY OF THK GRKAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
pity or sentiment to make life even a moiety more toler-
able in the roaring hells from which are derived an aver-
age of $145,000,000 net profits a year." 8
38 The American Federation of Labor, at its annual meeting
at Toronto, in November, 1909, declared that the Steel Trust
was actively bent upon destroying labor unions, and that it \vas
the foremost aggressor in this move. The object i- to reduce
the workers to a still greater condition of servitude.
The stock lists of the I'nited Steel Corporation which were
opem-d lor inspection at the animal meeting of the stockholders,
in Hoboken. X. ].. on April 18, 1910, showed that the name of
]. P. Morgan and Company, for the firm and as holders for
others, appeared on the lists for large amounts of stock. Mor-
gan's London house, formerly known as ]. S. Morgan and Com-
pany, but at present Morgan, Grenfell and Company, also held,
it was revealed, large amounts of stock. The holdings in the
name of Luke II . Cutler, amounting to 17-395 shares, were gen-
erally considered to be stock owned by John D. Rockefeller.
Of the foreign stockholders, the " Dutch Syndicate " was shown
to be the largest, its holdings reaching 216.870 shares of common
stock. The Rothchilds were' also disclosed as large stockholders.
A considerable number of conspicuous American individual cap-
italists and banking firms were entered on the books as stock-
holders in varying degrees of ownership, large and small.
CHAPTER XII
MORGAN AS "THE SAVIOR OF THE NATION"
All previous panegyrics lavished upon Morgan became
stale and inadequate compared to the apotheosis of him
during the panic of 1907. What climax of earthly splen-
dor does Morgan reach? He becomes the "Savior of
the Nation."
Around their genesis, methods and characters, the
magnates weave romantic yarns. They supply the in-
spiration ; a host of writers and orators, trained to trans-
fer that romancing into catchwords and phrases, carry
it to the people and popularize it until it becomes an al-
most adamantine tradition. Always it is the same
species of romance ; the toil, the thrift, the integrity, the
wonderful ability by which the magnates reaped their
fortunes ; their heroism in time of war, their saving
philanthropy in all great crises.
The audacity of these " literary " puffers is as great
as the imposture of the magnates whom they cover with
adulation. In the very commission of vast frauds and
thefts, the magnates will pose as public-spirited, patriotic
men. Their puffer> hasten to paint them likewise.
There is no judicious waiting until time has receded, and
the actual facts are more or less forgotten. The very
enormities of the magnates are at once transformed into
acts of the greatest purity, and the people are called upon
t<> applaud. In every conceivable manner the press, or at
287
288 HISTORY OF 'I' III-: GttKAT AMF.R1CAX FORTUNES
lea-t a considerable section of it, is manipulated to coun-
teract the effect of disclosures.
A CIIARACTFRISTIC EL' LOGY OF MORGAN.
Shortly after the panic of 1907 had set in, an article
(and it was one of many such productions) entitled
" Morgan the Magnificent" was published in a "popu-
lar magazine." Its bombastic style, if nothing else,
must provoke a wondering interest, yet it was strictly
in accord with the quality of most of the matter pub-
lished in books ant] magazines. This trash was called
" popular " not because the people wanted it, but because
to a great extent many publishers considered it " safe."
It did not antagonize the vested interests of wealth. The
article began with this lurid introduction :
There were scenes in the saving of Wall street by John
Pierpont Morgan that never can be written ; things said and
done that cannot and should not even be remembered, even in
those days, of excitement, horror and confusion: heroism, crimes,
blunders, treacheries and martyrdoms that spanned the whole
capacity of man for glory or shame; for. until the continent
came, half-crying, half-cursing out of the trembling madness
that threatened to bring down the banking system of the coun-
try into ruins, smash the credit of the nation and smirch its
name, men were in a nameless bewilderment of fear beyond
words to express, as in the presence of some impending and
irresistible convulsion of nature the boldest and keenest become
craven and stupid.
Plain Mr. Morgan, fresh from the dronings of a great Epis-
copal church convention at Richmond, was suddenly aroused by
tin- peril of the financial situation to a demonstration of c<>ur-
age. -tn-n.uth and personal masterfulness that brought order and
confidence nut of chaos and de-pair.
\nd there is a little history to compare to the sight of this
-tout, Decretive American banker nf seventy years withdrawing
MORGAN* AS " THE XATIOX's SAVIOR " 28*)
from the passionless company of bishops and ministers intent
on religious ideals, to take command of the fierce, clashing
money forces of Wall street, gone craxy out of sheer fright
to become the protagonist and hero of the most cynical, sus-
picious, treacherous, cruel, arrogant and cowardly human ele-
ments in the world.
It might well be imagined that Morgan, the " connois-
seur of art," the " lover of literature," the great arbiter
clegantarium, would have sent for the author of this
perpetration and caused him to be the bastinadoed on the
spot. Evidently in the absence of proof to the con-
trary Morgan was pleased with the confection. It
would not be worth notice here were it not for the fact
that the point of it that Morgan was the " Savior of
the Nation " was gravely and repeatedly pressed for-
ward by many other writers and publications.
In scrutinizing Morgan's career, one prodigious vir-
tue is encountered. It is that of consistency. The qual-
ity of his patriotism and heroism never changed from the
time of his introduction into business. That rille sale
at the outbreak of the Civil War was the first exhibition
of his intense patriotism. In 1894 his patriotic nature
was again displayed consistently when he and his clique
squeezed a profit of $18,000,000 or more from the ( lov-
ernment in a time of need. In the panic of i<;o/ his
never-failing patriotism was even more prominently
shown.
While the effusions of the " popular writers " were
wending the rounds of the country, a recalcitrant L'nited
States Senator was boring the august Senate of the
{ nited States with a long, tiresome speech. The bulk
of the august Senate did not care to hear what this Sen-
ator, one La Toilette, of Wisconsin, had to say, but were
compelled to by the rule-. The Senate of the United
290 ms'iORY or THK <;RK.\T AMKKICAX KORTL'XH.-,
Slates was most sen-itively jealous of its prestige and
dignity. Most of its members were multimillionaires.
La Follelte lacked that highly important qualification.
Still more, he was painfully deficient in ca.ste in another
respect. He had not bought his way into the Senate of
the United States, thereby outraging one of its most
sacred canons. Hence he could give no real test of
standing or any guarantee of wise, conservative states-
manship.
But the majority of his colleagues had good reason
to be impatient of La Follette's speech. Ilis was a voice
from the past. They represented the newer order, that
of centralized industry, and a Government run directly
by the magnates themselves. He was a relic of the old
creed, that of the age of competition in industry.
For four long days, on March 17. 19, 24 and 29, 1908,
he delivered his lugubrious wail. " In their strife for
more money, more power more power, more money,"
he explained in describing the great magnates, " there
is no time for thought, for reflection. Government,
society and the individual are swallowed up in the strug-
gle for greater control.'' Thus he stumbled through
mazes of facts the purport and interpretation of which
he did not understand. X'either did he comprehend the
fundamental fact that commercial upheaval- are not the
work of individual-, but of the whole capitalist system ;
that certain powerful individual.-, or interests could ac-
celerate or retard them, but could not be held responsible
tor their causation. According to him, a crowd of con-
-pirators, headed bv the Standard Oil Company and
Morgan had deliberately brought on the panic: he ful-
minated against them and denounced them as arch crim-
inals.
Amid his accusations, lamentations and platitudes.
MORGAN AS " TIII-: NATION s SAVIOR 29 ;
Senator La Folk-tie embodied certain facts of real his-
toric value facts confirmed by the records of what
actually took place, and familiar to all close observers
of events during the panic.
The panic of 1907, like previous panics, supplied the
propitious opportunity to the great magnates to crush
out lesser magnates and seize the control of their prop-
erty.
The requirements of industrial centralization de-
manded the effacement of certain minor magnate groups
which, from the point of view of the great magnates, had
possessed themselves of a rather dangerous degree of
industrial and financial power. These ambitious little
magnates had imitated the methods of the great ; they had
combined fraudulent financial manipulation with the op-
pressive exercise of political power, and thereby had
tricked or forced out the owners of various properties,
and had then vested the ownership of those properties
in themselves. The form was the usual one of organiz-
ing large corporations, with immense amounts of wa-
tered stock. These corporations were built upon the
ruin, extinguishment or buying owt of numbers of former
independent business men.
One of these minor capitalist cliques was what \va-
called the " F leinze-AIorse-Thoma- Group." IT.- control
comprised twelve banks and two trust companies ; a
coastwise steamship company, consolidated by the inclu-
sion of a number of steamship companies; large copper
mine-, a trust in ice, and various other properties. Tin-
control of some of the>e propcrtic- \va- largely secured
by means of the enormous profit- robbed from the poor
: STORY or THK GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
ana this robbery was
of a corrupt alliance
between Moi>e and tin: Tammany administration in Xe\v
York City.
Before organizing the Ice Trust, Morse had been an
inconspicuous banker. In the course of this business,
he had dealings in discounting the notes of various in-
dividuals and firms engaged in the selling of ice. Con-
ceiving the idea of forming a trust in that necessity, he
set about to crush out the small dealers. One of hi>
first steps was to assure himself of the collusion of
powerful politicians ruling the government of Xew York
City.
In its investigation of the administration of Xew York
City, the " Mazet Committee ''- an investigating body
appointed by the Legi^aturc in i8</j exposed the con-
spiracy between the ice Tm : -t, on the one hand, and, on
the other, the Dor!; and other municipal departments, to
create and maintain a monopoly of Xe\v York's ice sup-
ply. Mayor Van \Yyck, a puppet of the big Tammany
leaders, subsequently admitted in his testimony, before
Judge Cuiynor, of the Xew York Supreme Court, that
he had obtained five thousand shares, worth $500.000.
of Ice Trust stock, tie alleged that he had paid 857,000
in cash for them. I'res-ed for proof to substantiate his
statement, he failed to prove that he had actually paid
anything. The testimony lie fore the " Mazet Commit-
'-" conclusively showed that the corrupt arrangement
between the Ice Trust and the city officials was such as
to compel the people to pav .-ixty cent-- a hundred pounds.
and that the trust had stopped the ^ale of five-cent pieces
<>f ice. practically cutting off the supply of the very poor.-
- Sec- " Tin.- Hi.-tory of Tammany Hall."
YVuii .is assured monopoly, the Ice Trust declined to
L,.<ake the slightest concession.
MILLIONS- FROM SUFFERING, DISEASE AND DEATH.
The result \vas a noticeably great increase in the rate
of mortality among the children of the poor. Large
numbers of families, living on the most precarious edge
of destitution, could not afford to pav the extra five cents
demanded for a piece of ice. The milk soured and acted
like poison on the children. The increasing number of
deaths in successive summers when the terrific heat made
ice an absolute necessity, especially in the congested tene-
ments, could be traced, in large part, to the methods of
the Ice Trust. Millions of other people who could ill af-
ford to pay the exactions demanded were compelled to
give up extra tribute or go without ice.
This was not a temporary condition ; it has continued
so ever since the organization of the Ice Trust : the
methods then adopted prevail now. Xeither were the
methods any different from those of capitalism in every
field. The invariable principle upon which capitalist-
acted, and bv which they tremendously augmented their
profits. wa- to sell necessities at the verv highest prkv
when the people needed them most. In the depths of
winter the price of coal \vas always raised to an ex-
orbitant point. While giving hi- bits ot donations for
the founding of hospitals, the succe-sful capitali-t reaped
his million- from condition- productive of vast suffering
and disease on every hand.
The more profit- that he made, the more of a financial
genius he was accounted by ins class, and bv all \vho
were influenced bv the -tandanl- of that class. As soon
294 HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN* FORTUNES
as Morse proved that he could exact immense profits, he
was hailed as a very foremost and successful capitalist.
The newspapers began giving extended notices of him,
the price of Ice Trust -lock went up in Wall street, and
fine men and women in elegant society were only too
eager to get hold of stock paying such rich dividends.
True, charges of violating the law were made against
Morse and his associates, but those charges were not
based upon any concern for the mass of people, nor upon
any indignation at the privations, suffering and deaths
caused by the method- of the Ice Trust ; they were made
solely on behalf of the smaller firms whom Morse had
forced out of business. Jerome, for some years Dis-
trict Attorney for Xew York County, could discover no
criminality in any of Morse's methods, and caused crim-
inal proceedings brought against the Ice Trust officials
to be di.-mi-sed. A suit, however, brought by the At-
torney (j'cneral of Xew York State against the Ice Trust
for violation of the State anti-monopoly act is now pend-
ing.
From tin- process of exaction and indirect murder on
a great scale, the Ice Trust's profits became very great.
The money thus taken in. Morse used to finance other
enterprises. II try ing up the control of a number of
coastwise -team.-hip line-, he consolidated them into
one corporation, with the familiar accompaniments of
-tock watering and juggling. He allied himself with the
1 leinze- who owned large c<>pper mines in Montana, and
who.-e manipulation of the politic- and politicians of that
State \vas somewhat similar to that Morse used in Xew
York City. Also, he made a coalition with Thomas, who
controlled some Xew York bank-.
( 'ii the -urface this seemed a very powerful combina-
tion : not an opportunity was lost by Mor-e and his as^o-
MORGAN AS '' THE NATION'S SAVIOR " 2Q5
ciates to spread abroad the impression that they were
too formidable to be overthrown.
THE GREAT MAGNATES LIE IN AMP.USH.
These men made much noise in the financial world,
and dashed around with prodigious belief in their in-
vincibility. The}- were vaunted as great financiers ;
doubtless inflated bv their own success, they esteemed
themselves so. and judged themselves fully able to cope
with the great magnates. In the meantime, the Morgan
and Rockefeller group was carefully observing their op-
erations, and awaiting the ripe time when they could be
crushed out at one blow. The Standard Oil Company
wanted those copper mines, and the steamship company
organized by Morse was considered a competitive menace
to railroad lines controlled by the Morgan and Rocke-
feller interests.
Senator La toilette's account of events that followed
was accurate as to the facts. In his speech in the I nited
States Senate he gave this narrative :
Suddenly, in the rir-t day> of October, somebody (to use a
Wall street phrase) began ID "smash I'nited Copper on the
curb." The stock broke badly. Standard Oil \vas getting under
way. Doubtless, never -u>pectmg the source, lleiuxe, thr >ugh
his brother, a member ot the Stock Exchange, and through
brokers, bought and bought until Unittd Copper went ou< of
>iglu. carrying d'i\vn ileinxeV brother, * >ne firm of his broker-,
and involving the MorsoHein/.e banks in the crash.
Up to this point the panic had been well in hand, but with
the revelations following hard upon clearing house investiga-
tion:-, it Clipped u- bridle, and the situation assumed a <erioti<
aspect. I'm not for one moment did Morgan or Standard Oil
miss tlii' o|ip.iruimiv ottered. Mor-e and llein/e were forced
out. Thev were compelled to reorgani/e their directorships, and
substitute ^'mi-dependent Standard Oii men as their successors.
296 HISTORY OF T1IK GlUiAT AMERICAN FORTFXKS
They were forced to sell their stocks tor what they could get.
Morgan attacked Morse's Consolidated Steamship Company
slocks and bonds vd Morse was ultimately forced to surrender
his steamship con^any combine, which he did.
They went after the Knickerbocker Trust Company, Charles
T. Barney, president, and close ally of Morse's. It was charged
in Xew York that the interests deliberately started a run on
the Knickerbocker. Morgan was appealed to for aid. Morgan.
whose plaudits have been sounded right here in this Chamber,
was in a position to follow carefully every step and pha^e of
this proceeding. In the first place, Morgan gave out, as re-
ported in Wall street, that the Knickerbocker would be supported
if it met the demands of the depositors who had started a
run upon it. There was nothing in subsequent events to indicate
that there was any sincerity in that promise, but an analysis of
every step is convincing to the contrary. Support was not given :
it was withheld. After the company, relying upon that pledge,
had paid out millions, it was forced to close its doors, and Barney
went to a suicide's grave.
Barney was likewise a director in the Trust Company of
America, a comparatively new institution, with a few System
directors, giving the great groups a semi-interest in the institu-
tion, though they have not yet taken it over. The raid of
Hcinze, Morse, Barney ct a!., and the latter's directorate con-
nections with tlie Trust Company of America, caused public
suspicion to fall upon it. A strong run was started. This was
not on the program, but as the Vanderbilts, allies of the Stand-
ard Oi], were represented on the directorate of the Trust Com-
paiiv oi' America, Standard Oil wa - bound to offer some a>si.-t-
ai.ee. Though gold and bank notes were ostentatiously piled on
the counters to impress depositors, ;,:id young Vanderhilt offered
as an exhibit of resources and placid at the teller'- window, the
excited depositors persisted in demanding their money. :;
!n a dav, as it vrcro, the Morse-Heinze- 1 homa
mashed into nothingness, and its p'ropertie
f Control in Industry.
Phe Panic of October.
Speech of lion. Robert M. La Follettc
MOKC.AX AS "THE NATION'S SAVIOR" 297
had ended there, they would have had cause to rejoice
over their good fortune. But their rout had to be made
complete. The Federal authorities began to take a sud-
den interest in their operations. Where previously the
(Government's prosecuting officials had been wholly un-
aware that Morse, Heinze and Thomas had been commit-
ting fraud in their financial methods, they now spied out
the 'fullest evidences. From certain quarters proofs were
offered of violations of the law by the fallen trio. The
I nited States District Attorney's office in New York-
City became alive with energy. It caused grand jurors
to investigate, and showed striking official zeal in the
prosecution. 1 leinze was indicted, and Morse brought
to trial, convicted, and sentenced to fifteen years in
prison a verdict from which he appealed. The United
States Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict,' 4
and A Torse is now serving his term in the Federal prison
at Atlanta.
Morse and Heinze learned two valuable lessons which
all aspiring little magnates might well take to heart :
First, that it is extremely unwise to cross the interest
of the really big magnates; and, second, that those mag-
nates can use the criminal machinery of the courts against
opponents of their own class, not less than against labor
leaders, labor unions and the propertiless in general.
Hut the grasping of the properties of the ousted com-
bination were not the only seizures during those harvest
4 During hi? commitment in the Xe\v York oily prison the
United State- judges allowed him to fro out every day in order
" that he mi.^ht attend to necessary business." Of the va-t num-
ber ot persons convicted of crime, pot a siiudc in-tapce has ever
been known ot a poor prisoner being a!' >wcd to leave prison
during the day so that he miyln work for hi- family. The conn
- ; ' d !;;!<"' that Mor^c could >: free under hail ['ending the
d cision of his appeal. X<> poor pri-oner \vas allnued this priv-
2 9 8
day- of the panic of 1907. The electric apparatus fac-
tories of the Westinghouse Company had long been in
the way of the Standard Oil Company, which owned
tiie (Jeneral Electric Company. The Standard Oil Com-
pany exercised a financial pressure during the panic that
soon drove the Westinghouse Company into an extrica-
tion, from which it escaped only by becoming a Standard
Oil property. And, in the conferences held by the Wall
street financiers during the early days of the panic. Mor-
gan learned that the control of the Tennessee Coal and
Iron Company, in the form of stock, had been placed
with the Tru-t Company of America by John W. < iates
and hi- associates to secure loans. This was informa-
tion of the highest and most momentous value.
TIIK STF.EL TKl'S/f AJiSOKHS A DAXGEROl'S COMPETITOR.
The Tennessee Coal and Iron Company was the mo-t
dangerous competitor of the Steel Trust. It was the
one great competitor having it- own sources of iron ore
and coal supply. In the fall of 1907 it owned, it was
estimated, from 500.000,000 to 700,000,000 tons of iron
ore, 
