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B.C. 145 TO A. D. 1864 








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Foreign Intervention. — Battle of Navarin. 

Conduct of Russia ..... 

Conduct of Great Britain .... 

Congress of Verona ..... 

Russian memoir relating to the pacification of Greece 

Effects of this memoir .... 

Turkey complains of the conduct of Great Britain . 

Greece seeks the protection of Great Britain 

Protocol of 4th April 1826 . 

Destruction of the janissaries 

Treaty of 6th July 1827 for the pacification of Greece 

State of Greece in 1827 

Victory of Hastings at Salona 

Battle of Navarin 

Greek slaves carried to Alexandria . 

Greek troops cross into Acarnania . 

Hastings takes Vasiladi 

Death of Hastings . 

Russia declares war with Turkey 

French troops compel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea 









Presidency of Count Capodistrias. — January 1828 to October 1831. 

Character of Count John Capodistrias 

First administrative measures of the president 

His opinions and policy 

Organisation of the army 

Fabvier's resignation 

Operations in Eastern and Western Greece 

Termination of hostilities . 

Civil administration . 

Viaro Capodistrias . 

Financial administration 

Judicial administration 




Public instruction 

National assembly of Argos 

Protocols of the three protecting powers 

Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg sovereign of Greece 

Prince Leopold's resignation 

Capodistrias becomes a tyrant 

Hostility to the liberty of the press 

Tyranny of Capodistrias 

Affair of Poros 

Destruction of the Greek fleet 

Sack of Poros 

Family of Mavromichales . 

Assassination of Capodistrias 












Anarchy.— 9tli October 1831 to 1st February 1833. 

The governing commission refuses to grant a general amnesty after the 

murder of Capodistrias 
Second national assembly of Argos . 
Romeliot military opposition 
Agostino Capodistrias president of Greece 
Romeliots expelled from Argos 
Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum 
Romeliots invade the Morea 
Conduct of the residents 
Agostino ejected from the presidency 
New governing commission . 
State of Greece 

Anarchy .... 
French troops garrison Nauplia 
Djavellas occupies Patras 
Kolokotrones rallies the Capodistrians 
National assembly of Pronia 
Constitutional liberty in abeyance . 
Intrigues of the Senate 

Municipal institutions arrest the progress of anarchy in the Morea 
Condition of Messenia 
Position of Kolokotrones and Kolettes 
True nature of the municipal institutions of Greece under the Turks not 

generally understood 
Attack on the French troops at Argos 
Establishment of the Bavarian dynasty 













Bavarian Despotism and Constitutional Kevolution. — February 1833 

to September 1843. 

Landing of Kmg Olho 

The regency, its members and duties 



VI 1 


Royal proclamation — administrative measures 

Military organization 

Civil administration — municipal institutions 

Financial administration — monetary system 

Judicial organization 

The Greek church — reforms of the regency 

Synodal Tomos .... 

Monasteries ..... 

Public instruction .... 

Restrictions on the liberty of the press 

Roads . . . • . 

Quarrels in the regency 

Kolokotrones' plot and Armansperg's intrigue 

Armansperg's administration 

Bavarian influence .... 

Disputes with England 

Alarming increase of brigandage 

Insurrections in Maina and Messenia 

Brigandage in 1835 . 

General Gordon's expedition 

Insurrection in Acarnania . 

Opinions of Lord Lyons and General Gordon on the state 

Brigandage continues 

King Otho's personal government . 

Attacks on King Otho in the English newspapers 

Causes of the Revolution in 1843 . 

Revolution . • . . . 

Observations on the constitution 

General Remarks .... 

of Greece 












Constitutional Monarcliy. — 1844-1862. 

Alexander Mavrocordatos prime minister 

French policy 

Elections in 1844 

Misconduct of the Mavrocordatos cabinet 

An anomalous election 

Kolettes ptime minister, 1 844-1 847 

Organization of the Church in the kingdom 

Diplomatic disputes 

Quarrel with Turkey 1847 . 

Financial administration 

Revolts and brigandage 

Changes of ministry 1848 . 

Rupture with Great Britain 1850 

Final arrangement of the British claims 

Complaint of Russia 

of Greece 













Affairs of Montenegro 1853 

Russian demands on Turkey 1853 '. 

State of Greece in 1853 and 1854 . 

Greeks invade Turkey 

Defeat of the Greeks 

Occupation of the Piraeus by French and English troops . 

Demoralized condition of Greece 1854-1857 

Termination of the political career of Alexander Mavrocordatos 

Violation of the constitution .... 

Brigandage, 1855-1856 ..... 

Financial commission of the protecting powers 

Land tax ....... 

Communal administration ..... 

The Miaoulis ministry ..... 

The state of Greece 1859 ..... 

Dissolution of the chamber of deputies i860 

Illegal elections 1861 

Attempt to assassinate Queen Amalia 

Negotiations with Admiral Kanares for the formation of a ministry 











Change of Dynasty. — Establishment of new Constitution; 1862-1864. 

Revolt of the garrison of Nauplia . 

State of public opinion 

Question of the succession to the throne of Greece 

The Hon. Henry Elliot's first mission to Greece ■ 

Revolution of 1862 . 

Negotiations relating to the election of Prince Alfred to be King of 

Results of the Revolution . 
Election of Prince Alfred . 
Mr. Elliot's second mission . 
Election of George I. King of the Hellenes 
Military disorders and civil war at Athens 
Position of the new king 
Union of the Ionian Islands . 
National Assembly . 
Constitution of 1864 . , 

Abolition of the Senate 
Creation and abolition of a Council of State 
Conclusion ..... 
Appendix — 

I. Hastings' memorandum on the use of steamers armed with heavy guns 

II. Napier's memorandum on military operations against Ibrahim Pasha 

III. Hastings' letter to Mavrocordatos .... 

IV. Hastings' letter to Sir Richard Church 

V. Constitution of 1864 ...... 

Index ........ 










Foreign Intervention. — Battle of Navarin, 


Conduct of Russia. — Conduct of Great Britain. — Congress of Verona. — Russian 
memoir on the pacification of Greece in 1823. — Effect of this memoir. — 
Turkey complains of the conduct of the British government. — Greece places 
herself under the protection of England. — Protocol of the 4th April, 1826, 
for the pacification of Greece. — Destruction of the Janissaries. — Treaty of the 
6th July, 1S27, for the pacification of Greece. — State of Greece in 1827. — 
Victory of Hastings at Salona. — Battle of Navarin. — Greek slaves carried off 
to Alexandria. — Greek troops cross into Acarnania. — Hastings takes Vasiladi. 
— Death of Hastings. — Russia declares war with Turkey. — French troops 
compel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea. 

When the Greeks commenced the Revolution, they were 
firmly persuaded that Russia would immediately assist them. 
Many acts of the Emperor Alexander I. authorized this 
opinion, which was shared by numbers of well-educated men 
/ in Western Europe. But whatever might have been the wish 
of the emperor personally, policy prevailed over feeling. The 
sovereigns of Europe feared a general rising of nations. 
Monarchs were alarmed by a panic fear of popular move- 
ments, and the judgment of statesmen was disturbed by the 
conviction that cabinets and nations were pursuing adverse 
objects. There was a strong desire among a part of the 
Russian population to take up arms against the sultan in 
order to protect the Greeks, because they belonged to the 



[Bk.V. Ch.I. 

same Oriental Church. But the conservative policy of the 
emperor, the selfishness of his ministers, and the power of his 
police, prevented any active display of Philhellenism in 

Time rolled on. Year after year the Greeks talked with 
laudable perseverance of the great aid which Russia was soon 
to send them. Philhellencs from other nations arrived and 
fought by their side ; large pecuniary contributions were 
made to their cause by Catholics and Protestants, but their 
co-religionaries of orthodox Russia failed them in the hour 
of trial. (The cabinet of St. Petersburg coolly surveyed the 
struggle, weighed the effect of exhaustion on the powers of 
both the combatants, and watched for a favourable occasion to 
extend the influence of Russia towards the south, and add 
new provinces to the empireT^ 

The conduct of Great Britain was very different. The 
British cabinet was more surprised by the Greek Revolution, 
and viewed the outbreak with more aversion, than any other 
Christian government. The events in Vallachia, and the 
assertions of the Hetairists in the Morea, made the rising 
appear to be the result of Russian intrigue. The immediate 
suppression of the revolt seemed therefore to be the only 
way of preventing Greece from falling under the protection of 
the Emperor Alexander, and of hindering Russia from 
acquiring naval stations in the Mediterranean. The British 
government consequently opposed the Revolution ; but it 
had not, like that of Russia, the power to coerce the sympa- 
thies of Britons. British Philhellencs were among the first to 
join the cause, and in merit they were second to none. The 
names of Gordon, Hastings, and Byron will be honoured in 
Greece as long as disinterested service is rewarded by national 

The habits of the English, long accustomed to think and 
act for themselves in public affairs, enabled public opinion to 
judge the conduct of the Greeks without prejudice, and to 
separate the crimes which stained the outbreak from the 
cause which consecrated, the strusfSfle. 

It is necessary, however, to look beyond the East in order 
to form a correct judgment of the policy of the cabinets of 
Europe with regard to the Greek Revolution. The equili- 
brium of the European powers was threatened with disturbance 


A.D. 1827.] 

by a war of opinion. Two camps were gradually forming in 
hostile array, under the banners of despotism and liberty. 
The Greek question was brought prominently forward by the 
continental press, because it afforded the means of indulging 
in political discussion without allusion to domestic admini- 
stration, and of proclaiming that principles of political justice 
were applicable to Greeks and Turks which they dared not 
affirm to be applicable to subjects and rulers in Christian 

The affairs of Greece were brought under discussion at the 
Congress of Verona in 1822. A declaration of the Russian 
emperor, and the protocols of the conferences, proclaimed 
that the subject interested all Europe ; but the view which 
the Congress took of the war showed more kingcraft than 
statesmanship. It was identified too closely with the demo- 
cratic revolutions of Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. Yet so 
great was the fear of any extension of Russian influence in the 
East, that even the members of the Holy Alliance preferred 
the success of the sultan to the interference of the czar ^ 

In the mean time, Russia persuaded France to undertake 
the task of suppressing constitutional liberty in Spain, as 
a step to a general concession of the right of one nation to 
interfere in the internal affairs of another when it suspects 
danger from political opinions. 

The march of the French armies beyond the Pyrenees 
placed the cabinets of France and England in direct opposi- 
tion. England replied to the destruction of constitutional 
liberty in Spain by acknowledging the right of the revolted 
Spanish colonies in America to establish independent states. 
George Canning delighted the liberals and alarmed the 
despots on the continent by boasting in parliament that he 
had called a new political world into existence to redress the 
balance of the old. The phrase, though somewhat inflated, 
has truth as well as buoyancy enough to float down the stream 
of time. At the same time the British government adopted 
the energetic step of repealing the prohibition to export arms 
and ammunition, in order to afford the Spanish patriots the 

* [A detailed account of the negotiations of the various European states in 
the course of the Greek RevoUition v/ill be found in Mendelssohn Bartholdy's 
Geschichte Griechenlands, vol. i. pp. 287 foil., and 3 Si foil. Ed.] 

B 2 


[Bk. V. Ch. I. 

means of obtaining supplies and of resisting the French 
invasion ^ 

While the English cabinet was thus incurring the danger of 
war in the West, it exerted itself to prevent hostilities in the 
East. The ambassadors of England and Austria induced the 
sultan to take some measures to conciliate Russia in 1823. A 
note of the reis-effendi was addressed to the Russian govern- 
ment, announcing the speedy evacuation of the trans-Danubian 
Principalities, and a desire to renew direct diplomatic rela- 
tions between the sultan and the czar. After much tergiver- 
sation in the usual style of Othoman diplomacy, the Porte 
opened the navigation of the Bosphorus to the Russian 
flag, and the Emperor Alexander sent a consul-general to 
Constantinople ^. 

From this time Russia began to take a more active part 
than she had hitherto taken in the negotiations relating to 
Greece. The activity of the Philhellenic committees alarmed 
the Holy Alliance. The success of the French in Spain 
encouraged the despotic party throughout Europe. Russia, 
availing herself adroitly of these feelings, seized the opportu- 
nity of resuming her relations with Turkey, and of laying 
before the European cabinets a memoir on the pacification of 

The principal object of this document was the dismember- 
ment of Greece, in order to prevent the Greek Revolution 
from founding an independent state. The statesmen of 
Russia, having watched dispassionately the progress of public 
opinion in the West, had arrived at the conclusion that if 
monarchs delayed much longer assuming the initiative in the 
establishment of peace between the Greeks and Turks, 
Christian nations might take the matter into their own hands. 
Russia naturally wished to preserve her position as protector 
of the Greeks, and to retain the honour of being the first 

^ By an order in council, 26th February, 1823. The exportation of arms and 
munitions of war to Spain was proliibited in consequence of the war with the 
revolted colonies in South America, in virtue of arrangements arising out of the 
treaty with Spain, 5th July, 1814. and the foreign enlistment act of 1819 (sg George 
III.c. 69). It became necessary, when hostilities broke out between France and 
Spain in 1823, either to extend the prohibition to France or allow exportation to 
Spain. Mr. Canning chose the latter, and said in the House of Commons, ' by 
this measure His Majesty's government afforded a guarantee of their bona fide 
neutrality.' Hamard's Debates, New Series, viii. p. 1050. 

The notes relating to these negotiations are printed in Archives Diplomatiques, 
vi. 31, and Lesur, Annuaire Historiqtie, 1823. 


A,D. 1S27.] 

Christian government that covered her co-religionaries with 
her orthodox aegis. 

The Russian plan of pacification was calculated to win 
the assent of the Holy Alliance, by suppressing everything in 
Greece that appeared to have a revolutionary tendency. It 
proposed to retain the Greeks in such a degree of subjection 
to Turkey that they would always stand in need of Russian 
protection. It contemplated annihilating their political im- 
portance as a nation, by dividing their country into three 
separate governments. By creating powerful classes in each 
of these governments with adverse interests, it hoped to 
render any future national union impossible ; and by allowing 
the sultan to keep Othoman garrisons in the Greek fortresses, 
the hostile feelings of the Greeks would be kept in a state of 
irritation, and they would continue to be subservient to Russia 
in all her ambitious schemes in the Turkish empire. The three 
governments into which Russia proposed to divide Greece, 
were to be ruled by native hospodars, and administered by 
native officials chosen by the sultan. The islands of the 
Aegean Sea were to be separated from the rest of their 
countrymen, and placed under the direct protection of the 
Porte, with such a guarantee for their local good government 
as could be obtained by the extension of a municipal system 
similar to that which had existed at Chios, at Hydra, or 
at Psara^. 

As a lure to gain the assent of the members of the Holy 
Alliance to these arrangements, Russia urged the necessity 
of preventing Greece from becoming a nest of democrats and 
revolutionists, by paralyzing the political energy of the nation, 
which could easily be effected by gratifying the selfish ambi- 
tion of the leading Greeks. Personal interest would extinguish 
national patriotism in Greece, as it had done at the Phanar, 
and in Vallachia and Moldavia ^. 

^ An extract from this memoir was published in 1824, and this extract is trans- 
lated by Tricoupi (iii. 385) ; but a complete copy was printed in the Courrier de 
Smyrne, 1828, Nos. 37 and 38. The hospodarats were — i. Thessaly, with Eastern 
Greece ; 2. Epirus and Western Greece ; 3. The Morea with Crete. The islands 
which were to ejnoy municipal governments are not enumerated. 

^ The expressions deserve to be quoted: — 'Paralyser I'influence des revolution- 
naires dans toute la Grece ; ' and ' que la creation de trois principautes Grecques, 
en diminuant Fetendue et les forces respectives de chacune de ces provinces, offre 
une nouvelle garantie a la Porte: qu'elle offre enfin un puissant appat aux principales 
families de la Grece; et qu'elle pourra servir a les detacher des interets de I'insurrec- 


[Bk. V. Ch. L 

When the contents of this memoir became known, they 
caused great dissatisfaction both in Greece and Turkey, 

The sultan was indi^t^nant that a foreign sovereign should 
interfere to regulate the internal government of his empire, 
and propose the dismemberment of his dominions as a 
subject of discussion for other powers. He naturally asked 
in what manner the Emperor Alexander would treat the 
interference of any Catholic sovereign in favour of Polish 
independence, or of the sultan himself in favour of Tartar 

The Greeks were astonished to find the Emperor Alexander, 
whom they had always believed to be a firm friend, coolly 
aiming a mortal blow at their national independence. Their 
own confused notions of politics and religion had led them 
to infer that the orthodoxy of the czar v/as a sure guarantee 
for his support in all measures tending to throw off the 
Othoman yoke both in their civil and ecclesiastical go- 
vernment. They were appalled at the Machiavellism of a 
cabinet that sought to ruin their cause under the pretext of 
assisting it ^. 

Great Britain was now the only European power that 
openly supported the cause of liberty, and her counsels bore 
a character of vigour that commanded the admiration of 
her enemies. To the British government the Greeks turned 
for support when they saw that Russia had abandoned their 
cause. In a communication addressed to the British Foreign 
Secretary, dated the 24th August 1824, they protested against 
the arrangements proposed in the memoir, and adjured Eng- 
land to defend the independence of Greece and frustrate the 
schemes of Russia. This letter did not reach George Canning, 
who was then at the Foreign Office, until the 4th November, 
and he replied on the 1st of December. By the mere fact of 
replying to a communication of the Greek government, he 
recognized the right of the Greeks to secure their independ- 
ence, and form a new Christian state. 

Mr. Canning's answer contained a distinct and candid 
statement of the views of the British cabinet. Mediation 

The unpopularity of Russia was greatly increased by the expulsion of many 
Wek families from the dominions of the Emperor Alexander at this time. Some 
of these families were conveyed to Greece at a considerable expense by the Phil- 
hellenic committees of Switzerland. Gordon, ii. 83. 


A.D. 1827.] 

appeared for the moment impossible, for the sultan insisted 
on the unconditional submission of the Greeks, and the 
Greeks demanded the immediate recognition of their political 
independence. Nevertheless, the English minister declared 
that, if at a future period Greece should demand the mediation 
of Great Britain, and the sultan should accept that mediation, 
the British government would willingly co-operate with the 
other powers of Europe to facilitate a treaty of peace, and 
guarantee its duration. In the mean time Great Britain 
engaged to observe the strictest neutrality, adding, however, 
that as the king of England was united in alliance with 
Turkey by ancient treaties, which the sultan had not 
violated, it could not be expected that the British government 
should involve itself in a war in which Great Britain had no 
concern ^. 

The moderate tone of this state-paper directed public 
opinion to the question of establishing peace between the 
Greeks and the sultan. It also convinced most thinking 
men that the object of Russian policy was to increase the 
sultan's difficulties, not to establish tranquillity in Turkey. 
The British Parliament, in particular, began to feel that the 
English ambassador at Constantinople must cease to support 
many of the demands of Russia. The memoir of 1823, 
therefore, though able and well devised as a document 
addressed to cabinets and diplomatists, became a false step 
by being subjected to the ordeal of public opinion. The 
morality of nations was already better than that of emperors 
and kings. For a time all went on smoothly, and meetings 
of the ambassadors of the great powers were held at St. 
Petersburg in the month of June 1834, to concert measures 
for the pacification of the East. 

Early in the year 1824, the influence of England at Con- 
stantinople diminished greatly, in consequence of the public 
manifestations of Philhellenism. The sultan heard with 
surprise that the Lord Mayor of London had subscribed a 
large sum to support the cause of the Greeks ; that Lord 
Byron, an English peer, and Colonel the Honourable Leicester 

* For the letter of the Greek government, and Canning's answer, see Lesur, 
-Atm. Hist. 1824, p. 627. Tricoupi gives Canning's letter a wrong date (iii. 390). 


[Dk.V. Ch.I. 

Stanhope (Earl of Harrington), an officer in the king's service, 
had openly joined the Greeks ; that the British authorities in 
the Ionian Islands granted refuge to the rebellious armatoli ; 
and that English bankers supplied the insurgents with money. 
The sultan attributed these acts to the hostile disposition of 
the government. Neither Sultan Mahmud nor his divan could 
be persuaded that in a free country public opinion had a 
power to control the action of the executive administration 
in enforcing the law. The sultan could not be expected to 
appreciate what continental despots refuse to understand 
— that Englishmen legally enjoy and habitually exercise a 
right of political action for which they are responsible to 
society and not to government. In the year 1823, the sym- 
pathies of Englishmen, with all those engaged in defending 
the inalienable rights of citizens, were so strong, that the 
British government feared to act in strict accordance with 
the recognized law of nations. The people considered that 
the duties of humanity were more binding than national 
treaties. But as the ambassador at Constantinople could not 
urge popular feelings as an excuse for violating national 
engagements, the sultan had the best of the argument when 
he formally complained to the cabinets of Europe of the 
conduct of England to Turkey. 

On the 9th April 1824, a strong remonstrance v/as pre- 
sented to Lord Strangford, the English ambassador at 
Constantinople. The reis-efifendi remarked, 'that it was 
absurd to suppose that any government, whatever might be 
its form of administration, did not possess the power of 
preventing its subjects from carrying on war at their own 
good pleasure, and of punishing them for violating existing 
treaties between their own country and foreign governments.' 
And the Othoman minister argued that, if such were the 
case, the peace of Europe, which the English government 
protested its anxiety to maintain, would be left dependent 
on the caprice of private individuals, for one state might say 
to another, ' I am your sincere and loyal friend, but I beg you 
to rest satisfied with this assurance, and not to feel dissatisfied 
if some of my subjects sally out and cut the throats of yours.' 
This candid and just remonstrance concluded by demanding 
categorically that British subjects should be prohibited from 


A.D. 1827.] 

carrying arms against Turkey, and prevented from supplying 
the Greeks with arms, money, and ammunition ^. 

The British government was not insensible to the truth 
contained in this document. Colonel Stanhope was ordered 
home, and the Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands 
issued a proclamation prohibiting the deposit of arms, military 
stores, and money, destined for the prosecution of the war in 
Greece, in any part of the Ionian territory. 

While diplomacy advanced with cautious steps towards 
foreign intervention, the events of the war moved rapidly 
in the same direction. The disastrous defeats of the Greek 
armies by the Egyptian regulars paralyzed the government^ 
and overwhelmed the nation with despair^. The navies of 
France and Austria assumed a hostile attitude. The Emperor 
Alexander treated the independence of Greece as a mere 
political chimaera, the delusion of some idle brain ^. On 
the other hand, the recognition of all blockades established 
by the naval forces of Greece, the Philhellenic sentiments 
of Hamilton, the British commodore in the Levant, and the 
fame of George Canning's policy, all combined to make 
the Greeks fix their hopes of safety on England. A decree 
of the legislative body, passed at a secret sitting on the 
ist August 1825, declared that the Greek nation placed 
the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political 
existence under the absolute protection of Great Britain; 
and an act was publicly signed by a large majority of the 
clergy, deputies, primates, and naval and military chiefs of 
the Greek nation, placing Greece under the protection of the 
British government ^. The British cabinet was empowered 
by these documents to treat concerning the pacification of 
Greece with a degree of authority which it had not previously 
possessed ; and George Canning now proposed the establish- 
ment of a Greek state, as the surest means of pacifying the 

^ This curious document is printed in Lesur, Ann. Hist. 1826, p. 649. 

^ Tricoupi, iii. 262. 

^ 'O 'AKe^avSpos X'Va'po"' aneKaXfi Tijv dfe^apTtjcriau rrjs 'EWaSos. Tricoupi, 
iii. 270. 

* Compare Gordon, who gives a translation of the decree (ii. 283). Tricoupi 
mentions previous endeavours to obtain the crown of Greece for a French prince 
(iii, 261, 272, 397). But a more complete account of the intrigues and negotia- 
tions that were carried on in Greece will be found in the work of Speliades, 
' hnoixyrjuovivixara, vol. iL p. 375.. 


[Bk.V. Ch.I. 

East. He, like many other friends of Greece, believed that 
liberty would engender the love of justice, that the Greeks 
would become the allies of England from national sympathies, 
as well as from interest, and that, under a free and enlightened 
administration, the Greeks would enable political liberty and 
Christian civilization to find a home among the population of 
Eastern Europe and Western Asia. Russia would lose the 
power of making religious fanaticism an engine for producing 
anarchy in Turkey as a step to conquest, and perhaps the 
Greeks would emulate the career of English colonies, and, by 
rapid advances in population and industry, repeople and 
regenerate the desolate regions of European Turkey. Reason- 
able as these hopes were in the year 1825, the Greeks have 
allowed thirty-five years to elapse without doing much to 
fulfil them. 

Death arrested the vacillating career of Alexander I. in 
November 1825. For a moment Russia was threatened with 
internal revolution, but Nicholas was soon firmly seated on 
the throne by his energetic conduct. His stern and arrogant 
disposition soon displayed itself in his foreign policy ; but 
his personal presumption and despotic pretensions encountered 
the petulant boldness and liberal opinions of George Canning, 
and an estrangement ensued between the Russian and British 
cabinets, greater than would have resulted solely from the 
divergency of their national interests ^. 

Mr. Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redclifife), one 
of England's ablest diplomatists, arrived at Constantinople, 
as ambassador to the Porte, early in 1826, with the delicate 
mission of inducing the sultan to put an end to the war in 
Greece, and of preventing war from breaking out between 
Russia and Turkey. On his way to the Dardanelles he 
conferred with Mavrocordatos concerning the basis of an 
effectual mediation between the belligerents'^. The result 
of this interview was that the National Assembly of Epidaurus 
passed a decree, dated 24th April 1826, authorizing the 
British ambassador at Constantinople to treat concerning 
peace, on the basis of independent self-government for Greece, 

' An instance of the haughty tone assumed by the Emperor Nicholas towards 
the British government, will be found in a despatch from Nesselrode to Lieven, 
dated 9th January, 1827, printed in the Portfolio, iv. 267. 

* The meeting took place at Hydra, 9th January, 1826. 


A.D. 1827.] 

with a recognition of the sultan's suzerainty, and the payment 
of a fixed tribute ^. 

The pacification of Greece was now the leading object * 
of British policy in the Levant. The Emperor Nicholas 
rejected all mediation in his differences with Turkey, but 
the British cabinet was still anxious to secure unity of action 
between England and Russia on the Greek question. The 
Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg for this 
purpose, and on the 4th April 1836 a protocol was signed, 
stating the terms agreed on by the two powers as a basis 
for the pacification of Greece. This protocol acknowledged 
the right of the Greeks to obtain from the Porte a solemn 
recognition of their independent political existence, so far 
as to secure them a guarantee for liberty of conscience, 
freedom of commerce, and the exclusive regulation of their 
internal government. This was a considerable step towards 
the establishment of national independence on a solid 
foundation ^. 

Unfortunately, the relations of the British government with 
the members of the Holy Alliance, and the continental 
princes under their influence, were far from amicable during 
the year 1826. No progress could therefore be made in a 
negotiation in which the Porte could only be induced to 
make concessions by fear of a coalition of the Christian 
powers, and their determination to act with unity and vigour. 

The royalists in Spain, under the protection of the French 
army of occupation, began to aid the despotic party in 
Portugal. The princess-regent at Lisbon, alarmed at the 
prospect of a civil war, claimed the assistance which England 
was bound to give to Portugal by ancient treaties. The 
occupation of Spain by foreign troops threatened Portugal 
with war ; foreign assistance could alone prevent hostilities. 
A French army had destroyed liberty in Spain ; an English 
army could alone preserve it in Portugal. Canning did not 
hesitate, and in December 1826 he announced in Parliament 
that six thousand British troops were ordered to Lisbon. 
All Europe was taken by surprise. The Emperor Nicholas, 
who had placed himself at the head of the despotic party 

* The decree and instructions to the committee of the Assembly are given by 
Mamouka, iv. 94 ; the letter to Canning, iv. 132. 
^ Parliamentary Papers ; and Portfolio, iv. 546. 


[Bk. V. Ch. I. 

on the continent was extremely irritated at this bold step 
in favour of constitutional liberty. A coolness ensued between 
the English and Russian cabinets, and the negotiations for 
the pacification of Greece were allowed to lag. On the other 
hand, the attitude assumed by the czar towards Turkey had 
previously become so menacing, that Sultan Mahmud yielded 
the points he had hitherto contested, and concluded the 
convention of Akermann on the 7th October 1826 \ 

But Sultan Mahmud had not trifled away his time during 
the year 1826. In the month of May he promulgated an 
ordinance reforming the corps of janissaries. His reforms 
were so indispensable for the establishment of order, that 
the great body of the Mohammedans supported them. But 
in the capital several powerful classes were interested in the 
continuance of the existing abuses. The janissaries took up 
arms to defend their privileges, which could only be main- 
tained by dethroning the sultan. A furious contest ensued 
on the 14th June, but it was quickly terminated. Sultan 
Mahmud had foreseen the insurrection, and was prepared 
to suppress it. The sacred banner of Mohammed was unfurled, 
the grand mufti excommunicated the janissaries as traitors 
to their sovereign and their religion, and an overwhelming 
force was collected to crush them. Their barracks were 
stormed, the whole quarter they inhabited was laid in ashes, 
their corps dissolved, and the very name of janissary abolished. 
On the 13th of September 1826, tranquillity being completely 
restored at Constantinople, the sandjak-sherif was furled and 
replaced in its usual sanctuary. 

The convention of Akermann re-established Russian in- 
fluence at the Porte. On the 5th of February 1827, Great 
Britain and Russia made formal offers of their mediation 
in the affairs of Greece, and proposed a suspension of hostili- 
ties. After many tedious conferences, the reis-efifendi, in 
order to terminate the discussion, delivered to the repre- 
sentatives of the European powers at Constantinople a 
statement of the reasons which induced the sultan to reject 
the interference of foreign states in a question which related 
to the internal government of his empire ^. 

* Lesur, Aim. Hist. 1S26, p. 100. 

* This document, dated 9th and loth June, 1827, is given m Lesur, Ann. Hist. 
X827, p. 99. 


A.D. 1827.] 

France was at this time engaged in a dispute with the 
dey of Algiers, which led to the conquest of that dependency 
of the sultan's empire. She now joined Great Britain and 
Russia in common measures for the pacification of Greece, 
and a treaty between the three powers was signed at London 
on the 6th July 1827. 

This treaty proposed to enforce an armistice between the 
Greeks and Turks by an armed intervention, and contemplated 
securing to the Greeks a virtual independence under the 
suzerainty of the sultan \ An armistice was notified to both 
the belligerents. The Greeks accepted it as a boon which 
they had solicited ; but the sultan rejected all intervention, 
and referred the Allies to the note of the reis-efifendi already 

After the disastrous battle of Phalerum, it required no 
armistice to prevent the Greeks from prosecuting hostilities 
by land. Their army was broken up, and no military oper- 
ations were attempted during the summer of 1827. Sir 
Richard Church moved about at the head of fewer troops 
than some chieftains, and many captains paid not the slightest 
attention to his orders. Fabvier shut himself up in Methana, 
sulky and discontented. The greater part of the Greek chiefs, 
imitating the example of Kolokotrones, occupied themselves 
in collecting the public revenues in order to pay the personal 
followers they collected under their standard. The efforts of 
the different leaders to extend their territory and profits 
caused frequent civil broils, and the whole mihtary strength 
of the nation was, by this system of brigandage and anarchy, 
diverted from opposing the Turks. While Greece was sup- 
porting about twenty thousand troops, she could not move 
two thousand to oppose either the Egyptians or the Turks 
in the field. The best soldiers were dispersed over the country 
collecting the means of subsistence, and the frontiers and the 
fortresses were alike neglected. Famine was beginning to 
be felt, and the soldiery, accustomed to waste, acted towards 
the peasantry in the most inhuman manner. The beasts 
of burden were carried off, and the labouring oxen devoured 
before the eyes of starving families ^. Some districts of the 

^ For the treaty, see Parliamentary Papers 

r or lue ireaiy, see i^aruamenairy i^uptn. 

Admiral de Rigny tells us that the peasants were ' chasses, depouilles, pilles 



[Bk.V Ch. I. 

Peloponnesus had submitted to Ibrahim Pasha during the 

winter of 1836, and one of the chiefs in the vicinity of Patras, 

named Demetrios Nenekos, now served actively against his 

countrymen ^. 

The exploits of the Greek seamen were not more patriotic 
than those of the Greek soldiers. Only a few, following the 
example of Miaoulis and Kanaris, remained indefatigable in 
serving their country ; but the best ships and the best sailors 
of the naval islands were more frequently employed scouring 
the sea as pirates than cruising with the national fleet ^. 
Lord Cochrane kept the sea with a small force. On the 
16th of June he made an ineffectual attempt to destroy 
the Egyptian fleet at Alexandria. On the ist of August, 
the high-admiral in the Hellas, and Captain Thomas in 
the brig Soter, took a fine corvette and a large Tunisian 
schooner after a short engagement, and brought their prizes 
in safety to Poros, though pursued by the whole Egyptian 
fleet. On the i8th of September Lord Cochrane anchored 
off Mesolonghi with a fleet of twenty-three sail ; but after 
some feeble and unsuccessful attempts to take Vasiladi, he 
sailed away, leaving Hastings to enter the Gulf of Corinth 
with a small squadron. 

On the 29th of September Hastings stood into the Bay 
of Salona to attack a Turkish squadron anchored at the 
Scala, under the protection of two batteries and a body of 
troops. The Greek force consisted of the steam-corvette 
Karteria, the brig Soter, under the gallant Captain Thomas, 
and two gunboats, mounting each a long 32-pounder, The 
Turkish force consisted of an Algerine schooner^ mounting 
twenty long brass guns^ six brigs and schooners, and two 
transports. The Turks were so confident of victory that 
they prepared to capture the whole Greek force, and did 
not fire until the Karteria came to an anchor, fearing lest 
the attack might be abandoned if they opened their de- 
structive fire too soon. Hastings anchored about five hundred 

altemativement par les Turcs et par les palikares ; ' and he mentions ' ces iles de 
I'Arcliipel, ou, dans chacnne, nne band de pirates de terre et de mer font la loi.' 
Parlinmeritary Papers, B, Protocols at Constaniitiople, p. 37. 

* Compare Tricoupi, iv. 182. 

^ For the extent to which piracy was carried on, see Gordon, ii. 475 ; and 
Tricoupi confesses (iv. 248) that it was ixovaSiKov kqI acax^'^To'' 'paivu^nvov iv tt) 
iaropia Twv eOvaiv, 


A.D. 1827.] 

yards from the enemy's vessels. While the Karteria was 
bringing her broadside to bear, the batteries on shore and 
the vessels at anchor saluted her with a heavy cannonade. 
When the Soter and the gunboats came up, they were com- 
pelled to anchor about three hundred yards further out than 
the Karteria. Hastings commenced the action on the part 
of the Greeks by firing his guns loaded with round-shot, 
in slow succession, in order to make sure of the range. He 
then fired hot shells from his long guns, and carcass-shells 
from his carronades. The effect was terrific^. One of the 
shells penetrated to the magazine of the Turkish commodore, 
who blew up. A carcass-shell exploded in the bows of the 
brig anchored astern the commodore, and she settled down 
forward. The next broadside lodged a shell in the Algerine, 
which exploded between her decks, and she was immediately 
abandoned by her crew. Another schooner burst out in 
flames at the same time, and a hot shell lodging in the stern 
of the brig which had sunk forward, she also was soon on 
fire. Thus, before the guns of the batteries on shore could 
inflict any serious loss on the Karteria, she had destroyed 
the four largest ships of the enemy. Captain Thomas and 
the gunboats soon silenced the batteries, and took possession 
of the Algerine schooner, which, however, the Greeks were 
unable to carry off, as she was discovered to be aground, 
and her deck was within the range of the Albanian riflemen 
on shore. Hastings steamed up, and endeavoured to tow 
her out to sea, but his hawsers snapped. The crews of the 
Soter and the gunboats succeeded by great exertion, and 
with some loss, in carrying off her brass guns, and in setting 
her and the remaining brig on fire. The other vessels, being 
aground close to the rocks which concealed the Albanian 
riflemen, could not be boarded, but they were destroyed with 
shells '^. 

This victory at Salona afforded fresh proof of the value of 
steam and large guns in naval warfare. The terrific effect 

' Hot shells were used, though liable to greater deviation than shot, because 
it was feared that solid 68-lb. shot might pass through both sides of the enemy's 

^ [Mr. David Urquhart, the well-known author of The Spirit of the East, took 
part in this engagement, and lias given an account of it, and of the circumstances 
preceding it, in that work (vol. i. pp. 22-31), in his own peculiarly brilliant style 
of narrative. Ed.] 


[Bk. V. Ch. I. 

of hot projectiles, and the ease with which they were 
managed, astonished both friends and foes. 

Ibrahim Pasha was at Navarin when he heard of the 
destruction of the squadron at Salona. He considered it a 
violation of the armistice proposed by the AlHes and accepted 
by the Greeks, and he resolved to take instant vengeance 
on Hastings and Thomas, whose small force he hoped to 
annihilate with superior numbers. 

Mohammed AH was not less averse to an armistice than 
the sultan, but Ibrahim could not refuse, when the Allied 
admirals appeared in the Levant, to consent to an armistice 
at sea. Hastings' victory at Salona now, in his opinion, 
absolved him from his engagement, for it could not be 
supposed that the Allies would allow one party to carry 
on hostilities and hinder the other. Ibrahim therefore 
sent a squadron from Navarin with orders to enter the 
Gulf of Corinth and attack Hastings, who had fortified him- 
self in the little port of Strava, near Perakhova. Sir Edward 
Codrington, the English admiral, compelled this squadron 
to return, and accused Ibrahim of violating the armistice. 
Candour, however, forbids us to overlook the fact that 
Ibrahim gave his consent to a suspension of hostilities 
by sea under the persuasion that the Greeks would not be 
allowed to carry on hostile operations any more than the 

The measures adopted by the AlHes to establish an 
armistice were, during the whole period of their negotiations, 
remarkable for incongruity. The Greeks accepted the 
armistice, and were allowed to carry on hostilities both by 
sea and land. The Turks refused, and were prevented from 
prosecuting the war by sea. Ibrahim avenged himself by 
burning down the olive-groves and destroying the fig-trees in 
Messenia. The Allied admirals kept his fleet closely block- 
aded in Navarin, where it had been joined by the capitan- 
pasha with the Othoman fleet. Winter was approaching, and 
the Allies might be blown off the coast, which would afl"ord 
the Turkish naval forces in Navarin an opportunity of 
slipping out and inflicting on Hydra the fate which had 
overwhelmed Galaxidhi, Kasos, and Psara. To prevent so 
great a calamity, the Allied admirals resolved to bring their 
fleets to anchor in the great bay of Navarin, alongside the 


A.D. 1827.] 

Egyptian and Othoman fleets. This resolution rendered a 
collision inevitable. 

The bay of Navarin is about three miles long and two 
broad. It is protected from the west by the rocky island of 
Sphakteria, but is open to the south-west by an entrance 
three-quarters of a mile broad. The northern end of Sphak- 
teria is separated from the cape of the mainland, crowned 
with the ruins of Pylos, by a channel only navigable for 
boats \ A small island called Chelonaki is situated near the 
middle of the port, about a mile from the shore. 

The Turkish fleets were anchored in a line of battle 
forming two-thirds of a circle, facing the entrance of the 
port, and with the extremities resting on and protected by 
the fortress of Navarin and the batteries on Sphakteria. The 
ships were stationed three deep, so as to command every 
interval in the first line by the guns of the ships in the 
second and third lines. The first consisted of twenty-two 
heavy ships, with three fire-ships at each extremity. The 
second of twenty-six ships, including the smaller frigates 
and the corvettes. The third consisted of a few corvettes, 
and of the brigs and schooners which were ordered to assist 
any of the larger ships that might require aid. The whole 
force ranged in line of battle to receive the Allies amounted 
to eighty-two sail, and in this number there were three 
line-of-battle ships and five double-banked frigates ^. 

The Allied force consisted of twenty-seven sail, and of 

^ Old Navarin, built on the ruins of Pylos, and called Avarinos, is said to have 
been built by the Avars when they ruled the Sclavonians, who colonized the 
Morea in the seventh century. For the ancient and modern topography of this 
district, see Leake's Travels in the Morea, Arnold's Thucydides (vol. ii. p. 444), and 
the article Pylos, in Smith's Diciiouary of Greek and Roinan Geography. [The 
name Navarino is not derived from the Avars, as has commonly been supposed, 
but from the Navarrese. See Hopf s Griechische Geschichte, irf Brockhaus' Griech- 
enland, vol. vi. p. 212. Ed.] 

" Tlie Othoman and Egyptian fleets united comprised — 
3 line-of-battle ships. 

5 double-banked frigates. 
22 frigates. 

33 corvettes. 

13 brigs and schooners. 

6 fire-ships. 

82 sail, mounting about 2000 guns. 
A Tunisian squadron of three frigates and a brig anchored behind Chelonaki, 
but neither it nor the armed transports in the upper part of the bay took any 
share in the battle. 



[Bk.V. Ch.I. 

these ten were line-of-battle ships and one a double-banked 
frigate ^ 

About half-past one o'clock, on the afternoon of the 20th 
October 1827, Sir Edward Codrington entered the harbour of 
Navarin, leading the van of the Allies in his flag-ship the 
Asia. A favourable breeze wafted the Allied ships slowly- 
forward ; while twenty thousand Turkish troops, encamped 
without the fortress of Navarin, were ranged on the slopes 
overlooking the port, like spectators in a theatre. The 
Turkish admirals, seeing the Allies advancing in hostile array, 
made their preparations for the battle, which they knew was 
inevitable. Their great superiority in number gave them 
a degree of confidence in victory, which the relative force 
of the , two fleets, in the character of the ships, did not 
entirely warrant. The greatest disadvantage of the Allies 
was that they were compelled to enter the port in succession, 
exposed to a cross-fire of the Turkish ships and the batteries 
of Sphakteria and Navarin. Fortunately for them, the guns 
on shore did not open their fire until the English and French 
admirals had taken up their positions. The imperfect 
artillery of the Turkish fleet, and the superiority of the Allies 
in the number of line-of-battle ships, as well as in discipline 
and science, were the grounds which were supposed to 
authorize the bold enterprise of the admirals. But there 
can be no doubt that a well-directed fire from the Turkish 

^ The Allied fleet was thus composed — 


English Division, ii sail 

. . 


, , 





Sloops of war. 

Asia . . .84 





Genoa . . 74 

Cambrian . 




Albion . . 74 

Dartmouth . 






Stag (tender to 
Asia) . 


French Division, 7 sail . 





Scipion . . 74 



Alcyone . 


Breslau . . 74 



Daphne . 


Trident , . 74 


Russian Division, 8 sail . 




Azof . . -74 



Hanhoute . . 74 
Ezekiel . . 74 

Provonay . 


Alexander Nevsky 74 



Total guns 



A.D. 1827.] 

iguns on shore might have destroyed the EngHsh and French 
:flag-ships before the great body of the Alhed fleet arrived 
to their assistance. 

The first shot was fired by the Turks. The Alhed admirals 
would willingly have delayed the commencement of the 
engagement until all their ships had entered the port, and 
ranged themselves in line of battle. But the breeze died 
away after a part of their squadrons anchored, and it was 
more than an hour before the first ship of the Russian 
division could reach its station. The battle was remarkable 
for nothing but hard fighting, which allowed a display of 
good discipline, but not of naval science. The fire of the 
Allies was steady and well directed ; that of the Othomans 
and Egyptians irregular and ill directed, but kept up with 
great perseverance. The most difficult operation of the day 
was taking possession of and turning aside the Turkish 
fire-ships stationed at the extremities of the line. When 
the English and French admirals anchored, these fire-ships 
were to windward, and a favourable opportunity was offered 
for using them with effect. The attempt was made to bear 
down on the flag-ships of the Allies, but it was frustrated by 
the skill and courage of Sir Thomas Fellowes of the Dartmouth, 
and of the officers and men of the brigs which were ordered 
on this duty. This battle, therefore, confirms the experience 
of the Othoman and Egyptian fleets in 1824, that fire-ships 
constructed on the Greek model require favourable circum- 
stances and great skill on the part of their crews, as well as 
some mismanagement or ignorance on the part of those 
assailed, to render them very efficient engines in naval 

For about two hours the capitan-bey and the Egyptian 
admiral, Moharrem Bey, sustained the fire of the Asia and 
Sirene, but they then cut their cables and drifted to leeward. 
The victory was soon after secured by the Russian division 
under Count Heyden engaging the capitan-pasha, Tahir, 
whose squadron formed the starboard division of the Turkish 
line. The fire of the Allies now became greatly superior to 
that of their enemies, and the Turks abandoned several 
of their ships, and set them on fire. As evening approached, 
the scene of destruction extended over the whole port. 

The Allies took every precaution to insure the safety of 

C 2 



their ships during the night, which they were compelled to 
pass in the port amidst burning vessels drifting about in 
every direction. Every now and then fresh ships burst out 
into a mass of flames, and cast a lurid light over the water. 
The crews who had been fighting all day to destroy the ships 
of their enemies were compelled to labour all night to save 
their own. 

Of the eighty-two sail of Turkish ships anchored in line of 
battle at noon, on the 20th of October 1827, only twenty-nine 
remained afloat at daylight on the following morning ^ 

The loss of the Allies amounted to 173 killed, and 470 
wounded. Several ships suffered so severely in their hulls 
and rigging as to be unfit to keep the sea. The greatest 
loss was sustained on board the flag-ships of the three 

The English and Russian line-of-battle ships sailed to 
Malta to refit. The French returned to Toulon. Only the 
smaller vessels remained in the Levant to watch the pro- 
ceedings of Ibrahim, whose courage was not depressed by 
his defeat^. 

Ibrahim resolved not to abandon his position in the Morea. 
In order to relieve his force of the wounded, the super- 
numerary sailors, and the invalided soldiers, as well as to 
remove the Turkish families and Greek slaves who encumbered 
the fortresses, he embarked all these classes in the ships which 
escaped destruction. A fleet of fifty-two sail was prepared 
for sea, of which twenty-four were men-of-war present at the 
battle of Navarin. This fleet quitted Greece on the 22nd 
December, and arrived safely at Alexandria, where it also 
landed two thousand Greek slaves captured in the Morea. 

Sir Edward Codrington was severely blamed for allowing 
this deportation of Christians, as he had been warned that 

* An Austrian officer, who visited Navarin shortly after the battle, reported 
the vessels then afloat to be — two line-of-battle ships, one double-banked frigate, 
five frigates, nine corvettes, and twelve brigs. 

^ The best accounts of the battle of Navarin are the official reports of the 
three admirals, published in the London Gazette, Le Monitew. and the Gazette of 
St. Petersburg. They may be compared with one another, and with a complete 
account of the battle, published at Naples, with a good plan — Memoria intonio 
alia Battaglia di Navariiio. Napoli. 1833. There is an account of what was seen 
by an officer on board the Talbot, in the United Service Journal, 1829, pt. i. 117. 
There is a plan of the port of Navarin, by Sir Thomas Fellowes. A manuscript 
plan of the battle, prepared by an English officer, was frequently copied in the 
Levant : it agrees very nearly with that published at Naples. 


A.D. 1827.] 

Ibrahim contemplated the gradual removal of the whole 
Greek population from the Peloponnesus, and its colonization 
by Mussulman Albanians and Arabs. This was indeed the 
only way in which the Egyptian pasha could complete and 
maintain his conquest. Sir Edward Codrington, considering 
that it was his duty to accelerate the evacuation of the Morea, 
did not think that his instructions warranted his assuming 
the responsibility of searching Turkish men-of-war as they 
were returning home. This, indeed, could not be done 
without a declaration of war ; and even after the battle of 
Navarin, England did not declare war with the sultan, nor 
the sultan with England. The truth seems to be, that the 
naval force of the admiral was inadequate both to blockade 
the Egyptians and to protect British ships from the Greek 
pirates, who now attacked every merchantman that passed 
to the eastward of Cape Matapan. But it was the general 
opinion that Sir Edward Codrington fell into a very usual 
error of commanders-in-chief in the Mediterranean at that 
timcj and both remained too much at Malta himself, and 
kept too many of his ships there. His judgment appears 
to have been misled by the severe censure cast on his con- 
duct at Navarin, in the king's speech at the opening of 
parliament, in which his victory was termed ' an untoward 
event ^.' 

The destruction of the Othoman fleet made no change in 
the determination of Sultan Mahmud. The ambassadors at 
Constantinople again offered their mediation in vain, and, after 
reiterated conferences, they quitted the Turkish capital in 
December 1827. 

The Greeks were allowed by the Allies to make every 
effort in their power to regain possession of the territory 
conquered by Reshid since the year 1825. But anarchy 
had reached such a pitch that the Greek government was 
powerless, and no army could be assembled. Sir Richard 
Church resolved, however, to establish himself at some 

* Sir Edward Codrington was recalled for misapprehending his instructions, and 
for not disposing of his force so as to watch the movements of the Egyptian ships 
in Greece from the 21st November, 1827, to 26th February, 1828. See the Earl 
of Aberdeen's Letter, May, 1828, with P.S., 4th June, in Parliamentary Papers, and 
Documents relating to the Recall 0/ Sir Edward Codrington in June, 1828, printed for 
private distribution, p. 21. See also the Instructions addressed to the admirals, 
annexed to the protocol of 15th October, 1827, particularly the separate Instruc- 
tions relative to the Egyptian forces, in the Parliamentary Papers. 


[Bk.V. Ch. I. 

harbour on the coast of Acarnania with the small body of 
men he could assemble, trusting to his being joined by the 
armatoli in continental Greece, whom the hostile demonstra- 
tions of the Allied powers might induce to throw off the 
Turkish yoke. At Church's invitation^ Hastings sailed out of 
the Gulf of Corinth in the daytime, exposing the Karteria 
to the fire of the castles commanding the straits of Lepanto, 
that he might transport the Greek troops to Acarnania. 
When he reached Cape Papas, after having exposed his 
ship to great danger in order to be in time at the rendezvous, 
he was obliged to wait ten days before the generalissimo 
made his appearance^. Church's movements had been re- 
tarded by the news that Achmet Pasha was on his march 
from Navarin to Patras with a reinforcement of two thousand 
men. The army of the generalissimo did not exceed fourteen 
hundred men, and it reached the coast in a state of destitution. 
The embarkation of this phantom of a military force was 
effected under the immediate superintendence of the officers 
of the Karteria, without any assistance from those of 
the army. The Greek troops were landed at Dragomestre, 
where they remained inactive, drawing their supplies from 

Shortly after, another body of Greek troops crossed the 
Gulf of Corinth, and occupied the site of a Hellenic fortress 
on the mainland opposite the island of Trisognia, but 
remained as inactive as the division at Dragomestre. The 
peasantry showed themselves in general to be hostile to 
the Greek soldiery, and kept the Turks well informed 
concerning every movement of the land and naval forces of 

Hastings had no sooner transported the troops to Drago- 
mestre than he resolved to attack the fort of Vasiladi, hoping 
that its conquest would enable the Greek army to besiege 
Mesolonghi. Ever since Lord Cochrane's failure in September, 
he had sought in his mind the best means of gaining posses- 
sion of this key of the lagoons of Mesolonghi. Vasiladi is 
not more than one hundred yards in circumference, and its 

^ Hastings lost two men killed and two wounded in passing the castles, but he 
succeeded in sinking an Austrian brig laden with flour, which had just broken the 
blockade, and was already under the guns of the batteries at Patras. Hastin-rs 
passed the castles on the i8th of November, and Church arrived at Cape Papas 
on the 28th. ^ 



A.D. 1827.] 

works rose only six feet above the water. The Karteria 
could not approach nearer than a mile and a quarter. Two 
attempts to throw shells into the place on different days 
failed, but on the 29th December 1827, the day being 
perfectly calm, the firing was renewed. The long guns of 
the Karteria threw shells at an elevation of 23°, and the 
third gun, pointed by Hastings himself, pitched its shell into 
the Turkish powder-magazine \ The explosion rendered the 
place untenable, and the boats of the Karteria arrived before 
the Turks could offer any resistance. The bodies of twelve 
men were found in the fort, and thirty-nine were taken 

These prisoners were taken on board the Karteria, but 
Hastings, who had been feeding his crew at his own expense 
for some time, resolved to put them on shore as soon as 
possible. He therefore informed the commandant of Vasiladi 
that a monoxylon (canoe of the lagoon) would convey him to 
Mesolonghi, to enable him to make arrangements for sending 
off flat-bottomed boats to land the prisoners without loss of 
time. The Mussulman, remembering the manner in which 
both Turks and Greeks had generally disposed of their 
captives, considered this to be a sentence to an honourable 
death. He supposed that he was to be taken to the nearest 
shore where he could receive burial after being shot, and 
he thanked Hastings like a brave man, saying that he was 
ready to meet death in any way his victor might order. The 
conversation passed through an interpreter, and Hastings 
being the last man on the quarter-deck to perceive that it 
was supposed to be his intention to murder his prisoner, the 
scene began at last to assume a comic aspect. The Turk 
was conducted to the gangway, where, seeing only a 
monoxylon, with one of his own men to receive him, he 
became conscious of his misunderstanding. He then turned 
back to Hastings, and uttered a few expressions of gratitude 
in the most dignified and graceful manner. The rest of the 
prisoners were landed on the following morning, and an 
interchange of presents took place, the Turk sending some 
fresh provisions on board the Karteria, and Hastings sending 
back some coffee and sugar. 

1 Memoir on the use of Shells, Hot Shot, and Carcass-Shells, from Ship Artillery, by 
Frank Abney Hastings, published by Ridgway in 1828, p. 18, 


[Bk. V. Ch. I. 

Shortly after the battle of Navarin, Fabvier undertook an 
expedition to Chios, which ended in total failure^. The 
Greeks also made an effort to renew the war in Crete, but 
without success ^. 

After the arrival of Capodistrias in Greece, an attempt was 
made to revive the spirit of the irregular troops, but even 
the camp of Sir Richard Church continued to be a scene 
of disorganization. The chieftains w^ere everywhere intent 
on drawing as many rations as possible, and several of them 
made illicit gains by selling the supplies, which were furnished 
to Greece by Philhellenic societies, to men in the Turkish 
service. Sir Richard Church, having imprudently given 
passports to boats engaged in carrying on this trade in 
provisions with the districts in the vicinity of Patras, occupied 
by the troops of Ibrahim, became involved in an acrimonious 
correspondence with Captain Hastings, who, as the naval 
commander on the station, considered the proceeding a gross 
violation of the rules of service, as well as of a naval 
blockade^. It induced Hastings to get himself removed 
from the station, in order to make room for somebody who 
could agree better with the generalissimo. But in the month 
of May, Capodistrias induced him to accept the command of 
a small squadron in Western Greece, and he immediately 
resumed his former activity. His career was soon cut short. 
On the 25th of May 1828 he Avas mortally wounded in an 
attack on Anatolikon, and expired on board the Karteria. 
No man ever served a foreign cause more disinterestedly ^ 

* Fabvier left Methana in October, 1827, and raised the siege of Chios in March, 
1828. Gordon, ii. 450-473. 

^ The termination of the insurrection in Crete, and the gallant death of Hadji 
Mikhali on the 28th May, 1828, are well recounted by Gordon, ii. 499. 
^ See Appendix IV. 

* The difficulties under which Hastings laboured during his career in Greece, 
belong rather to his biography than to Greek history; but a few words may be 
extracted from his correspondence to show how great they were. On the 7th 
January, 1828, he wrote, 'I am full of misery. I have not a dollar. I owe my 
people three months' pay, and five dollars a-head gratuity for the taking of 
Vasiladi. I have no provisions, and I have lost an anchor and chain.' On the 
16th he wrote again: 'It has become an established maxim to leave this vessel 
without supplies. Dr. Goss (agent of the Swiss committees) has just been at 
Zante, and has left three hundred dollars for the gunboat Helvetia, now serving 
under my orders, but not one farthing, no provisions, and not even a single word 
for me. Five months ago I was eight thousand dollars in advance for the pay of 
my crew, and since that time I have only received a thousand dollars from the 
naval chest of Lord Cochrane, and six hundred dollars from the military chest of 
Sir Richard Church, and this last sum is not even sufficient to pay the expenses 
incurred by the detention of our prizes to serve as transports for his army.' See 


A.D. 1828.] 

Before delivering up the command of the Mediterranean 
fleet to his successor, Sir Pulteney Malcolm, Sir Edward 
Codrington concluded a convention with Mohammed Ali 
for the evacuation of the Morea by Ibrahim Pasha \ Before 
that convention was executed, the alliance of the three powers 
was threatened with dissolution. England and France wished 
to preserve the sultan's throne, as well as to establish the 
independence of Greece. Russia was even more eager to 
destroy the Othoman empire than to save Greece, Nicholas 
proposed to employ coercive measures by land, as the battle 
of Navarin had produced no effect. He wished to occupy 
Moldavia and Vallachia, and to invade Bulgaria, while the 
English and French fleets forced the Dardanelles. England 
and France rejected this proposal on the ground that it was 
more likely to involve Europe in a general war than to 
establish peace in the Levant. Russia then took advantage 
of some arbitrary conduct on the part of the sultan's govern- 
ment relative to the Black Sea trade, and of some violent 
expressions in an imperial proclamation of the Porte, to 
declare war with Turkey on the :i6th April 1828 2. 

The alliance would have been dissolved had the Emperor 
Nicholas not retracted so much of his separate action as 
to consent to lay aside his character of a belligerent in the 
Mediterranean, and engage to act in that sea only as a 
member of the alliance, and within the limits traced by the 
treaty of the 6th July 1827. 

The death of George Canning deprived British counsels 
of all their energy, and the measures adopted to coerce the 
sultan were timid, desultory, and dilatory^. A bold and 
prompt declaration of the concessions which the Allies were 

' Biographical Sketch of Frank Abney Hastings ' in Blackwood's Magazine, October, 
1845. Both Gordon and Tricoupi have done justice to the memory of Hastings, 
who was as distinguished for sincerity and truth in private life, as for ability and 
daring in war. 

^ Parliamentary Papers, C, Convention of Alexandria, 6th August, 1828. 

^ The Hatti-sherif, dated 20th December, 1827, announcing sentiments of bitter 
animosity against Russia, is given in the ParliaiJientary Papers, annex D, No. 2, to 
the protocol of the 12th March, 1828. 

^ In the protocol of the 15th June, 1828, Lord Aberdeen, with the diplomatic 
inaptitude which characterizes the proceedings of Great Britain at this period, 
allowed the clauses to be inverted, and by this inversion the claim of Russia to 
an exceptional position with regard to Turkey was in some measure ratified. 
England, as protector of a Greek population in the Ionian Islands, ought to have 
insisted on equal rights. Russia was not driven from the claim she set up to an 
exceptional position until Sevastopol fell. 


[Bk. V. Ch. I. 

determined to exact in favour of the Greeks, would have been 
the most effectual mediation. When Russia declared war 
with Turkey, England ought instantly to have recognized 
the independence of Greece, and proceeded to carry the 
treaty of the 6tli July into execution by force. As France 
would in all probability have acted in the same manner, 
the consent of the sultan would have been gained, and a 
check might have been placed on the ambition of Russia by 
occupying the Black Sea with an English and French fleet. 

The weakness of the British cabinet allowed Russia to 
assume a decided political superiority in the East. On the 
Danube, where discipline gave her armies an immense ad- 
vantage, and in the Black Sea, where the battle of Navarin 
had left the sultan without a fleet, she acted as a belligerent. 
But in the Mediterranean, where she was weak, and where 
she could only carry on hostilities at an enormous expense, 
she was allowed to conceal her weakness and economize her 
treasure by acting as a mediator. 

With all the diplomatic successes of the Russian cabinet, 
the war of 1828-29 reflected little honour on the armies of 
the Emperor Nicholas. Though Turkey was suffering from 
a long series of rebellions and revolutions, which had in 
turn desolated almost every province of the Othoman empire ; 
though the sultan had destroyed the janissaries, and had not 
yet formed a regular army ; though his fleet had been anni- 
hilated at Navarin, and his finances ruined by the blockade 
of the Dardanelles, still under all these disadvantages Sultan 
Mahmud displayed an unexpected fertility of resources, and 
the Mussulmans in European Turkey something of their 
ancient energy. The desperate resistance the Russians met 
with at Silistria and Varna covered the Turks with glory. 
Two campaigns were necessary to enable the Russian armies 
to advance to Adrianople ; and they reached that city so 
weak in number that they did not venture to push on to 
Constantinople and dictate peace to Sultan Mahmud before 
the walls of his capital. Nevertheless, the victories of the 
Russians in Asia, and their complete command of the Black 
Sea, convinced the sultan that an attack on his capital \yould 
not be long delayed ; and as Constantinople was inadequately 
supplied with provisions, and no troops could be assembled 
to fight a battle for its defence, Sultan Mahmud submitted to 


A.D. 1828.] 

the terms of peace imposed on him. The treaty was signed 
on the 14th September 1829^. 

The army of Ibrahim Pasha suffered great privations during 
the winter of 1827-38. Though no regular blockade of the 
ports in his possession was maintained either by the Greeks 
or the Allies, his army would have starved, or he would have 
evacuated the Morea, had he not succeeded in obtaining large 
supplies of provisions from the Ionian Islands, and particu- 
larly from Zante. About fifty Ionian boats, entirely manned 
by Greeks, were almost constantly employed for several 
months in carrying provisions to Ibrahim's troops in Greece ^. 
But even with all the assistance supplied by the lonians, the 
price of provisions was high, and the sufferings of the soldiers 
were great in the fortresses of Navarin, Modon, and Coron. 
At last these sufferings became intolerable. 

In June 1828 about two thousand Albanians in garrison at 
Coron broke out into open mutiny, and after plundering the 
place marched out to return home. They concluded a con- 
vention with the Greek government, and Capodistrias ordered 
a body of Greek troops to escort them to the Isthmus of 
Corinth, from whence they marched along the coast of the 
Morea to the castle of Rhion. On entering that fort they 
murdered the governor, and after resting a few days crossed 
the straits, marched hastily through the desolate plains of 
Aetolia, and reached the frontier of Turkey in safety. 

The utter exhaustion of Greece prevented the government 
of Capodistrias from making any effort to expel the Egyptians 
from the Peloponnesus. The direct agency of the Allies 
was required to deliver the country. 

The French government undertook to send an army to 
expel Ibrahim, for the mutual jealousies of England and 
Russia threatened otherwise to retard the pacification of 
Greece indefinitely. On the 19th July 1828 a protocol was 
signed, accepting the offer of France; and on the 30th August 
an army of fourteen thousand men, under the command of 
General Maison, landed at Petalidi in the Gulf of Coron, 
The convention concluded by Codrington at Alexandria had 
been ineffectual. It required the imposing force of the French 

* 'Lsswr, An?iuaire Historique, 1829. 

^ Codrington's despatch, in Documents relating to the Recall o/V. A. Codrington, 
P- 35- 


general to compel Ibrahim to sign a new convention for the 
immediate evacuation of the Morea. This convention was 
signed on the 7th of September 1828, and the first division of 
the Egyptian army, consisting of five thousand five hundred 
men, sailed from Navarin on the i6th. Ibrahim Pasha fol- 
lowed with the remainder on the 5th October ; but he refused 
to deliver up the fortresses to the French, alleging that he 
had found them occupied by Turkish garrisons on his arrival 
in Greece, and that it was his duty to leave them in the 
hands of the sultan's officers. 

After Ibrahim's departure, the Turks refused to surrender 
the fortresses, and General Maison indulged their pride by 
allowing them to close the gates. The French troops then 
planted their ladders, scaled the walls, and opened the gates 
without any opposition. In this way Navarin, Modon, and 
Coron fell into the hands of the French. But the castle of 
Rhion offered some resistance, and it was found necessary to 
lay siege to it in regular form. On the 30th October the 
French batteries opened their fire, and the garrison surrendered 
at discretion. 

France thus gained the honour of delivering Greece from 
the last of her conquerors, and she increased the debt of 
gratitude by the admirable conduct of the French soldiers. 
The fortresses surrendered by the Turks were in a ruinous 
condition, and the streets were encumbered with filth accumu- 
lated during seven years. All within the walls was a mass 
of putridity. Malignant fevers and plague were endemic, 
and had every year carried off numbers of the garrisons. 
The French troops transformed themselves into an army 
of pioneers ; and these pestilential mediaeval castles were 
converted into habitable towns. The principal buildings were 
repaired, the fortifications improved, the ditches of Modon 
were purified, the citadel of Patras reconstructed, and a road 
for wheeled carriages formed from Modon to Navarin. The 
activity of the French troops exhibited how an army raised 
by conscription ought to be employed in time of peace, in 
order to prevent the labour of the men from being lost to 
their country. But like most lessons that inculcated order 
and system, the lesson was not studied by the rulers of 


Presidency of Count Capodistrias, January 1828 

TO October 1831. 

Character of Count John Capodistrias. — First administrative measures as presi- 
dent. — His opinions and policy. — Organization of the army. — Fabvier's 
resignation. — Operations in Eastern and Western Greece. — Termination of 
hostilities. — Civil administration. — Viaro Capodistrias. — Financial admini- 
stration. — Judicial administration. — Public instruction. — National Assembly of 
Argos. — Protocols of the three protecting powers. — Prince Leopold of Saxe- 
Coburg sovereign of Greece. — His resignation. — Capodistrias becomes a 
tyrant. — Hostility to the liberty of the press.— Tyranny of Capodistrias. — 
Affair of Poros. — Destruction of the Greek fleet. — Sack of Poros. — Family of 
Mavromichales. — Assassination of Capodistrias. 

The struggle for independence unfolded some virtues in 
the breasts of the Greeks which they were not previously- 
supposed to possess. But a few years of a liberty that was 
mingled with lawlessness could not be expected to efface 
the effects of old habits and a vicious nurture. National 
energies were awakened, but no national responsibility was 
felt by individuals, so that the vices of modern Greek society 
were in each class stronger than the popular virtues which 
liberty was endeavouring to nourish. The mass of the people 
had behaved well ; but the conduct of political and military 
leaders, of primates and statesmen, had been selfish and 
incapable. This was deliberately proclaimed by the National 
Assembly of Troezene in 1837, when public opinion rejected 
all the actors in the Revolution as unworthy of the nation's 
confidence, and elected Count Capodistrias president of Greece 
on the 14th April 1827 for a period of seven years ^. 

^ Mamouka, vii. 132, and ix. 97. The decree is sometimes dated 3rd (15th) 
April, which was Easter Sunday, It was adopted on Saturday, but signed by 
many members on Sunday. 


[Bk. V. Ch.II. 

The decree which conferred the presidency on Capodistrias 
declared that he was elected because he possessed a degree 
of political experience which the Othoman domination had pre- 
vented any native Greek from acquiring. Much was therefore 
expected at his hands. It is the duty of the historian not 
only to record his acts, but to explain why his performances 
fell short of the expectations of the nation. 

Capodistrias was fifty-one years of age when he arrived in 
Greece. He was born at Corfu. His ancestors had received 
a title of nobility from the Venetian republic, but the family 
was not wealthy, and the young count, like many Corfiot 
nobles, was sent to Italy to study medicine, in order to gain 
his livelihood ^. In 1803 he commenced his political career, 
being appointed secretary to the newly created republic of 
the Ionian Islands; in 1807, when Napoleon I. annexed the 
Ionian Islands to the French empire, he transferred his ser- 
vices to Russia, where accident gained him the favour of the 
Emperor Alexander I.; and in 1815 he was employed in the 
negotiations relating to the treaty of Paris. At that time he 
exerted himself, and was allowed to employ all the influence 
of the Russian cabinet, to re-establish the Ionian republic ; 
but Great Britain insisted on retaining possession of these 
islands, and of holding complete command over their govern- 
ment, as a check on Russian intrigues among the orthodox 
population of the Othoman empire. Capodistrias was conse- 
quently obliged to rest satisfied with the concession that the 
Ionian Islands were to be formed into a separate, but not an 
independent, state under the British crown, instead of being, 
like Malta, declared a dependency of the British empire. 
Capodistrias hoped that even this might be rendered sub- 
servient to his ambitious schemes. He affected great contempt 
for English dulness, and he hoped that English dullards might 
be inveigled into favouring his views in the East. He never 
forgave English ministers for foiling his diplomatic projects, 
and the rancorous malevolence of his nature led him into 
several grave political errors. He hated England like an 
Ionian, but he indulged and exhibited his hatred in a way 
that was very unlike a statesman. 

The patriotism of Capodistrias was identified with orthodoxy 

^ Kolettes, Glarakes, Zographos, Rhodios, and many other Greeks who acted 
a prominent part during the Revohition, were doctors. 



and nationality, not with civil liberty and political indepen- 
dence. To the social progress of the bulk of the population 
in Western Europe during his own lifetime he paid little 
attention, and this neglect prevented his observing the influ- 
ence which public opinion already exercised on the general 
conduct of most cabinets. He overrated the influence of 
orthodoxy in the Othoman empire, and the power of Russia 
in the international system of Europe. All this was quite 
natural, for his experience of mankind had been acquired 
either in the confined and corrupt society of Corfu, or in the 
artificial atmosphere of Russian diplomacy. 

Yet with all his defects and prejudices, Capodistrias was 
immeasurably superior to every Greek whom the Revolution 
had hitherto raised to power. He had many virtues and 
great abilities. His conduct was firm and disinterested ; his 
manners simple and dignified. His personal feelings were 
warm, and, as a consequence of this virtue, they were some- 
times so strong as to warp his judgment. He wanted the 
equanimity and impartiality of mind and the elevation of soul 
necessary to make a great man. 

The father of Capodistrias was a bigoted aristocrat, and his 
own youthful education was partly Venetian and partly Greek. 
His instruction was not accurate, nor was his reading extensive, 
so that, through the cosmopolite intellectual cultivation of his 
later years, his provincial ideas often peeped out. He 
generally used the French language in writing as well as 
speaking. He was indeed unable to write Greek, though he 
spoke it fluently. Italian was of course his mother tongue. 
For a statesman he was far too loquacious ^ He allowed 
everybody who approached him to perceive that on many 
great political questions of importance in Greece, his opinions 
were vague and unsettled. At times he spoke as a warm 
panegyrist of Russian absolutism, and at times as an 
enthusiastic admirer of American democracy. 

Before accepting the presidency, Capodistrias visited Russia, 
and obtained the approbation of the Emperor Nicholas. He 
arrived in Greece in the month of January i8a8^ and found 

^ General Pellion says, ' Tons ceux qui ont connu particulierement Capodistrias 
savent que, parlant avec une etonnante facilite et parlant beaucoup, il se laissait 
parfois aller a des indiscretions fort extraordinaires.' La Gre.ce et les Capodistrias 
pendant V Occupatioii Fran^.aise de 1828 a 1834. Tricoupi, who was the president's 
secretary, says, 'EA-aAet akXa 5iv eypacpfv 'EWrjVKXTi {i\. 247). 



the country in a state of anarchy. The government had been 
compelled to wander from one place to another, and had 
rendered itself contemptible wherever it appeared. In Novem- 
ber i<S26 it fled from Nauplia, and soon after established itself 
at Aegina. In 1827 it removed to Poros. In consequence of 
a decree of the National Assembly of Troezene, it returned to 
Nauplia, but its presence caused a civil war, and it went back 
to Aegina. 

/The first measures of Capodistrias were prompt and judi- 
cious. He could not put an immediate stop to some of the 
grossest abuses in the army, navy, and financial administra- 
tion, without assuming dictatorial power. The necessity of 
this dictatorship was admitted ; and the manner by which he 
sought its ratification from the existing government and the 
representative body, was generally approved. To give his 
administrative changes a national sanction without creating 
any check on his own power, he established a council of state, 
called Panhellenion, consisting of twenty-seven members, 
divided into three sections, for the consideration of admini- 
strative, financial, and judicial business. Decrees of the 
president were to be promulgated on reports of the whole 
Panhellenion, or of the section to which the business of the 
decree related. Capodistrias announced that he would con- 
voke a national assembly in the month of April, and the 
warmest partizans of representative institutions allowed that 
the state of the country rendered an earlier convocation 
impracticable V 

But after making these concessions to public opinion, 
Capodistrias began to display his aversion to any systematic 
restraint on his arbitrary powers. He violated the provisions 
of the constitution of Troezene without necessity, and by his 
proceedings soon taught the liberal party to regard him as 
the representative of force and not of law. Yet a clear per- 
ception of his position and his interest would have shown him 
that his power could have no firm foundation unless it was 
based on the supremacy of right. 

The opinions and the policy of Capodistrias during his 
presidency are revealed by Count Bulgari, another Greek, 
who was Russian minister in Greece, and who was understood 

' Proclamation, dated 20th January, 1828. V^vik^^i 'E(pr]iJifpis, 25th January, 


A.D. 1828.] 

to echo the president's sentiments, even if he did not, as was 
i generally reported, write under his dictation. In a memoir on 
the state of Greece in 1828, the views of Capodistrias are 
thus stated : ' It would be a strange delusion to believe 
seriously in the possibility of organizing any government 
whatever in Greece upon purely constitutional principles, 
which require a general tendency of the people to political 
forms, as well as elements of civilization which exist only in 
a few individuals. The president of Greece thought that it 
was the duty of the three powers to destroy the Greek Revo- 
; lution by establishing a monarchical government, in order to 
put an end to the scandalous and sanguinary scenes which 
made humanity shudder^.' These sentiments were repeated 
by the president both to foreigners and Greeks, and showed 
on many occasions his want of sympathy with the cause of 
national independence, as well as his aversion to political 
liberty. His language constantly insinuated, though he 
perhaps never directly asserted, that he was the only fit 
sovereign for Greece. He harped incessantly on the theme, 
that all the men previously engaged in public business were 
demoralized either by the Turkish yoke, or by revolutionary 
anarchy ; and he asserted that no permanent improvement 
could take place in the condition of the Greeks until the 
living generation had passed away. He called the primates, 
Christian Turks ; the military chiefs, robbers ; the men of 
letters, fools ; and the Phanariots, children of Satan ; and he 
habitually concluded such diatribes by adding, that the good 
of the suffering people required that he should be allowed to 
govern with absolute power. And perhaps nothing better 
could have happened to Greece, had it been possible for him 
to forget that he was a Corfiot, and that he had two or three 
stupid brothers at Corfu ^. 

/The presidency of Capodistrias lasted more than three 
years and a half. It was not, therefore^ want of time which 
prevented his laying the foundations of an administrative 
system and a judicial organization. The Greeks possessed 
local institutions of great administrative value ; but instead 
of making use of these institutions, he wasted much time in 
striving to undermine them. He argued that no political 

1 Parliamentary Papers — Protocol of 22nd March, 1829, enclosure in annex C. 
"^ Compare Tricoupi, iv, 285. 



[Bk. V. Ch. II. 

good could rest on a democratic foundation. To the reign 
of law he had a passionate antipathy. He sometimes spoke 
of the law as a kind of personal enemy to his dictatorship. 
He insisted that, to govern Greece well, his power must be 
exercised without limit or restraint, and that the law which 
subjected his arbitrary authority to systematic rules was in 
some degree a mere constitutional delusion. He forgot that 
he required the assistance of the law to prevent his own 
creatures from robbing him of the power he had assumed. 
Unfortunately for Greece, Capodistrias was a diplomatist and 
not a statesman. His plans of government were vaguely 
sketched in provisional laws. He never framed a precise code 
of administrative procedure, and, as a natural consequence 
of the provisional nature of his government, his ordinances 
were nullified by the agents charged to carry them into 
execution. While he ridiculed the liberal theories of the 
constitutions of Epidaurus and Troezene, he did not perceive 
that his own acts were those of an administrative sciolist. 

The president's attention was early directed to the anarchy 
that prevailed in the military forces of Greece. The extor- 
tions of the soldiery were ruining all those districts into which 
the Egyptians had not penetrated. The agricultural popula- 
tion was in danger of extermination. The armed men Vt^ho 
extorted pay and provisions from the country were now the 
followers of military chiefs, not the soldiers of the Greek 
government. In order to form an army, it was necessary to | 
break the connection between the soldiers and their leaders, 
and to form corps in which both the inferior and superior 
officers should depend directly on the president for their 
authority, and in which the soldiers should look to him for their 
pay, subsistence, reward, and punishment. Of military affairs 
Capodistrias w^as utterly ignorant, and, as usual, he allowed 
his suspicious nature to neutralize the effect of his sagacity. 
From excessive jealousy of his personal authority he refused 
to employ experienced soldiers in organizing his army, and he 
made a vain attempt to direct the enterprise himself. 

Demetrius Hypsilantes had proved his inability for or- 
ganizing an army, and Sir Richard Church had never been 
able to introduce any discipline in his camps. Capodistrias 
appointed the first to command an army destined to reconquer 
Eastern Greece, and left the second at the head of the 


A.D.I 8 28.] 

disorganized bands in Western Greece, Fabvier, who had 
proved himself a good disciplinarian, and had formed regular 
battalions under circumstances of great difficulty, was neg- 
lected and driven from Greece. Capodistrias had the weakness 
or the misfortune to name always the wrong man for every 
important place. His enemies accused him of fearing the 
right man in any office. 

The consequence of the unmilitary president attempting 
to regulate the details of military organization, was that 
the Greek army remained without either order or discipline. 
A few reforms were introduced, tending to enable the 
president to know how many men Greece had in the field, 
and to diminish the frauds committed in the distribution of 
rations ; and this introduction of a regular system of mustering, 
paying, and provisioning the troops by the central government 
deserves praise, though it was a very small step towards the 
formation of a Greek army. 

The circumstances in which the Greek soldiery were placed 
at this epoch of the Revolution afforded great facilities for 
the introduction of military discipline, and for the formation 
of an efficient national army of veteran troops. The soldiers 
had eaten up the substance of the agricultural population, 
and were themselves in danger of starvation. Capodistrias, 
holding in his hands the absolute disposal of all the supplies 
from abroad on which the troops were dependent for pay 
and rations, could command their obedience to any terms 
he might impose. The most powerful chieftains only main- 
tained a few followers by seizing the public revenues. They 
were hated by the people for their extortions, envied by 
the mass of the soldiery for the benefits they conferred on 
a few, and in open hostility with the public interests. The 
arrival of Capodistrias annihilated their usurped power, and 
the chieftains who kept possession of the fortresses of Corinth, 
Nauplia, and Monemvasia, in defiance of the preceding 
government, were compelled to surrender those places into his 

A camp was formed at Troezene, to which all the troops 
of continental Greece in the Morea were summoned, in order 
that they might receive their new organization. The president 
appeared and promulgated his scheme for the formation of a 
national army. About eight thousand men, consisting in 

D 2 

q6 presidency of capodistrias. 

^ [Bk.V.Ch.II. 

great part of the armatoH who had remained faithful to the 
Greek cause, were divided into eight regiments or chiharchies. 
The chiharchs or colonels, and the other officers of these 
regiments, were named by the president. Paymasters were 
also appointed, and a regular commissariat formed, so that 
an end was put to the previous system of trading in rations. 
The facility with which every reform was adopted by the 
soldiers, and their alacrity in preferring the position of 
government troops to that of personal followers of individual 
chieftains, proved that the president might easily have effected 
much more than he attempted. 

The new regiments were inspected by the president at 
Troezene in February 1828. The men had the aspect of 
veteran soldiers ; still the review presented a very unmilitary 
spectacle. The chiliarchies were only distinguished by being 
separate groups of companies. The different companies were 
ranged in various forms and figures, according to the fancies 
of their captains — some were spun out in single files, some 
were drawn up four deep, some seemed to form circles, and 
some attempted to form squares. At last the whole army 
was ranged in lines, straggling in disorder, and undulating 
in unmeaning restlessness. The review, if such a spectacle 
can be called by a military term, was a parade for the pur- 
pose of enabling the inexperienced eye of the president to 
count the companies and examine the men of whom they 
were composed. 

At a later period Capodistrias attempted to carry his 
organization a step farther. In the autumn of 1829, after 
the termination of the war against the Turks in continental 
Greece, he again mustered the chiliarchies at Salamis. His 
military counsellor was Colonel Gerard, a French officer, 
whom he had appointed inspector of the Greek army. The 
troops present did not exceed five thousand men, who were 
divided into twenty battalions, and each battalion was 
composed of four companies. The commanders of the new 
battalions were called taxiarchs, and the chiliarchs were 
ranked as generals. Paymasters were appointed to each 
battalion, and commanders were deprived of all control over 
the military chests. Had Capodistrias, when he introduced 
this new organization, settled the supernumerary officers who 
were willing to become agriculturists on national lands, he 



A.D. 1828.] 

might have broken up the system of farming the revenues 
of the country to military men, which the chieftains had 
introduced, and saved Greece from the calamity of nourishing 
in her breast a second generation of these vipers. 

Demetrius Hypsilantes was appointed to command the 
chiliarchies formed at Troezene, and he established a camp 
at Megara. But though he was at the head of eight thousand 
armatoli, and the Turks had not four thousand men in 
Eastern Greece, he remained for seven months in utter 
idleness. No attempt was made to drill the men, to instruct 
the companies in the manoeuvres of light infantry, nor to 
teach the chiliarchies the tactics of an army. Capodistrias 
justly reproached Hypsilantes with his inactivity and in- 
capacity ; but he forgot that it was his own duty to frame 
systematic regulations for the discipline of the whole Greek 
army, and to transmit both to Hypsilantes and Church precise 
orders to carry these regulations into effect. 

Amidst the military reforms of Capodistrias he neglected 
the regular troops. Yet he was well aware that this body 
formed the only corps on which the government could always 
rely. Indeed this fact contains the true explanation of his 
neglect. The regular corps was a body that from its per- 
manent nature would identify itself with the executive 
government of Greece. The semi-organized battalions of 
regulars were held in direct dependence on the personal 
will and favour of Count Capodistrias. The president wished 
everything in Greece to be provisional until he should be 
appointed president for life, or sovereign of the country. But 
that he might have it in his power to strengthen the regular 
corps when he required its services, he revived the law of 
conscription passed by the Greek government in 1825. The 
pay of Fabvier's corps had fallen ten months into arrear after 
the unfortunate expedition to Chios. Instead of paying these 
arrears and retaining Fabvier's veterans under arms, he 
allowed them to disband themselves. These men were 
attached to Fabvier, and Capodistrias was jealous of Fabvier's 
influence. But as it was necessary to gain credit in Western 
Europe for a wish to form a regular army, the president 
pretended that it was impossible to obtain men without the 
conscription, and he commenced enforcing the law in some 
of the islands of the Archipelago. In this case his conduct 


[Bk.V. Chll. 

was marked by excessive duplicity, for he knew well that ||| 
it would have been more economical to retain the veterans 
of the regular corps by paying the ten months' arrears which 
were due to them, than to enrol new recruits ; and he was not 
insensible to the folly of withdrawing active labourers from 
the cultivation of the soil in the only part of Greece where 
agriculture was pursued in security and with profit. As soon 
as Fabvier perceived that the military plans of the president 
were subordinated to personal schemes of ambition, he resigned 
his command, as has been already mentioned, and quitted 
Greece in May 1828 ^ 

Hypsilantes, as has been said, passed the summer of 1828 
at Megara. The Russian war compelled Reshid Pasha to 
leave continental Greece and Epirus almost destitute of 
troops, and he was threatened with an insurrection of the 
Albanian chieftains in his own pashalik of Joannina. In 
autumn the Greeks advanced to Lombotina, famous for its 
apples, and drove the Turks into Lepanto. Hypsilantes 
about the same time occupied Boeotia and Phocis, and on 
the 29th of November the Turks in Salona capitulated, 
and the capitulation was faithfully observed by the Greeks. 
On the 5th of December Karpenisi was evacuated. A few 
insignificant skirmishes took place during the winter. The 
Turks were too weak to attempt anything, and the anarchy 
that still prevailed among the Greek chiefs prevented the 
numerical superiority of the Greek forces from being 
available '^. 

The army of Western Greece was not more active than 

* The law of conscription was put in operation by a circular addressed to 
the municipalities; ViviKj] "E<pi]fj.(pls, 25th April, 1828; yet in March, 1830, the 
number of Capodistrias' regulars only amounted to two thousand two hundred 
and fifty. 

^ Two examples of the condition of the Greek army may be cited : — ' Dr. Howe 
gave 1 2,000 lb. of beans to the Megarians to sow their fields. To-day a deputa- 
tion informed him that the troops who had returned to Megara were cutting down 
all the young plants for salad, and the officers were feeding their horses on them. 
They solicited Howe to use his influence with the president to prevent the entire 
destruction of their crop.' MS. Journal, 20th February, 1829. Captain Hane 
reports that a regular trade in provisions was carried on by some men with the 
Turks, and the supplies were drawn from Sir Richard Church's camp. Fabricius, 
who commanded the Helvetia, stopped a vessel laden with provisions attempting 
to reach Prevesa, and as she had a passport signed by the generalissimo, he sent 
her to Dragomestre, where Sir Richard Church released her without waiting for 
a decision of the Admiralty Court. Hastings, on returning from Western Greece 
in 1828, complained of similar conduct. He wrote: 'To conciliate the unprin- 
cipled chieftains, Church ruins the army.' 


A.D. 1829.] 

that of Eastern during the summer of 1828. Capodistrias 
visited the camp of Sir Richard Church near Mytika, and 
he declared that, on inspecting the troops in Acarnania, he 
found less order than in those he had reviewed at Troezene. 
This visit gave the president a very unfavourable opinion 
of the generalissimo's talents for organization. In September 
the Greeks advanced to the Gulf of Arta, and occupied 
Loutraki, where they gained possession of a few boats. 
Capodistrias named Pasano, a Corsican adventurer, to succeed 
Hastings as commander of the naval forces in Western 
Greece. Pasano made an unsuccessful attempt to force the 
passage into the Gulf of Arta, but some of the Greek officers 
under his command, considering that he had shown both 
cowardice and incapacity in the affair, renewed the enterprise 
without his order, and passed gallantly under the batteries of 
Prevesa^. This exploit secured to the Greeks the command 
of the Gulf of Arta. Pasano was recalled, and Admiral 
Kriezes, a Hydriot officer of ability and courage, succeeded 
him. The town of Vonitza, a ruinous spot; was occupied 
by the Greek troops on the 27th December 1828 ; but the 
almost defenceless Venetian castle did not capitulate until 
the 17th March 1829. The passes of Makronoros were 
occupied in April. 

Capodistrias, who had blamed both Hypsilantes and 
Church for incapacity, now astonished the world by making 
his brother Agostino a general ^. 

Count Agostino Capodistrias, besides not being a military 
man, was really little better than a fool ; yet the president, 
blinded by fraternal affection, named this miserable creature 
his plenipotentiary in Western Greece, and empowered him 
to direct all military and civil business. The plenipotentiary 
arrived in the Hellas. On the 30th April 1829, the garrison 
of Naupaktos (Lepanto) capitulated, and was transported to 
Prevesa. On the 14th May, Mesolonghi and Anatolikon 
were evacuated by the Turks. 

Reshid Pasha escaped the mortification of witnessing the 
loss of all his conquests in Greece. His prudence and 
valour were rewarded with the rank of grand-vizier, and he 

^ The Greeks lost one killed and three wounded. 

^ Tricoupi says, 'O icvPepvrjTjjs k^kixcptro rov dpxt'^i'pa.TTjyov ical tov arpaTapxqv 
ws dva^iovs t^s viI^tjXtjs Oiotws tojv, iv, 342. 



qviitted Joannina to assume the command of the Othoman 

army at Shumla before the Turks evacuated continental 


The war terminated in 1829. The Alhed powers fixed 
the frontier of Greece by a protocol in the month of March. 
Yet the Turks would not yield possession of the places they 
still held in Eastern Greece, and some skirmishes ensued, in 
which a great deal of powder was wasted, and very little 
blood was shed ^ A body of Albanians, under Asian Bey, 
marched from Zeituni by Thermopylae, Livadea, and Thebes, 
and reached Athens without encountering opposition. After 
leaving a small and select garrison in the Acropolis, Asian 
Bey collected all the Turks in Attica and Boeotia, and 
commenced his retreat. But on arriving at the pass of 
Petra, between Thebes and Livadea, he found a body of 
Greek troops strongly posted to dispute the passage. The 
Turks, unable to advance, concluded a capitulation on the 
25th of September 1829, by which they engaged to evacuate 
all Eastern Greece, except the Acropolis of Athens and the 
fort of Karababa on the Euripus. Thus Prince Demetrius 
Hypsilantes had the honour of terminating the war which his 
brother had commenced on the banks of the Pruth ; and 
this action cherished in his mind the delusion that, as the 
representative of his brother Alexander, he was the right 
sovereign for Greece. As a military man, he was deficient in 
tactical knowledge and strategic capacity ; as a statesman, 
he w^as utterly destitute of judgment ; but his personal 
courage and private virtues command respect. 

Capodistrias did not seek to establish his civil administra- 
tion on any organized system. He found the Greeks enjoying 
a greater degree of individual liberty, and exercising in their 
municipalities more independent political action than he 
had supposed existed on the continent of Europe ; for his 
opinions concerning the internal administration of Switzerland, 
though he had resided there for some time, and laboured as 
a Russian diplomatist to secure its existence as an inde- 
pendent state, were very crude. In Greece he mistook the 
liberty he found existing for the cause of the anarchy that 
desolated the country, and this anarchy he considered to be a 

* Tricoupi, iv. 365 : IloAX?) nvpoKoyis tKa-q, dA\' oXiyov afjua hx^&H- 


A.T). 1829.] 

necessary consequence of a municipal system, which in his 
opinion, estabhshed the sovereignty of the people. He 
determined to eradicate every germ of a power which 
appeared to him to have transfused the elements of revolu- 
tionary action into the frame of society ; and he began to 
weaken the municipalities by converting the demogeronts 
into agents of the executive authority. To eradicate revolu- 
tionary principles, he created a governmental police, and 
rendered its members responsible to him alone for the 
exercise of their powers. His plan of government was very 
simple, but really impracticable. He retained in his own 
hands the absolute direction of every branch of the public 
administration, declaring that nothing could be permanently 
settled concerning the internal organization of the country 
until the three powers had decided its external position as 
an independent state. The real object was to render his ser- 
vices indispensable either as prime minister, hospodar, prince, 

/ Capodistrias divided the Morea into seven provinces, and 
tW islands into six. These provinces were governed pro- 
visionally by thirteen extraordinary commissioners, to whom 
he entrusted great and ill-defined authority^. Immemorial 
usages, and old as well as new political institutions, were 
suspended, and the despotism of these Greek pashas was 
restrained by no published instructions, no fixed forms of 
proceeding, and no judicial authority, j 

The evil effects of arbitrary power jyei'e soon visible. Ibra- 
him's conquests, the financial corruption of Konduriottes' 
government, and the military anarchy that succeeded, had 
paralyzed the action of the municipalities. Instead of re- 
moving abuses and restoring their vigour, they were robbed 
of all independent action, even in the direction of their local 
affairs. The commissioners of Capodistrias presided at the 
election of new demogeronts ; and these newly-elected muni- 
cipal magistrates were converted into subordinate agents of 
the president's Minister of the Interior. By this change in 
the local institutions of Greece, the way was prepared for 
their complete nullification by the Bavarians. 

The operation of Capodistrias' government may be ex- 

* reri/c^ 'E(l>rifxepis, 1 8th and 21st April, 1828. 


[Bk.V.Ch. II. 

cmplificd by citing the proceedings of Viaro Capodistrias, 
who was considered the most energetic of the extraordinary 
commissioners, and who governed the Western Sporades, which 
was the most important province in the islands. Viaro was 
the president's elder brother : he was a Corfiot lawyer, and in 
him the confined experience gained in a corrupt semi-Venetian 
society was not counteracted by good sense and a benevolent 
heart : he was sulky, obstinate, and insolent. Capodistrias 
cannot have been entirely blind to his brother's defects, for 
he drove him away from Russia, though he invited him to 

While Capodistrias was a favourite minister of the Emperor 
Alexander, Viaro visited Russia, where he met with a very 
kind reception. For a moment the Corfiot lawyer indulged 
in visions of wealth and splendour, which were very soon 
dispelled by his diplomatic brother. One evening, after 
Capodistrias had waited on some members of the imperial 
family, he came back to Viaro, and addressed him to the 
following purport : ' I have seen the emperor to-day, and 
I have just quitted several members of the imperial family. 
The emperor is ready to appoint you to an honourable 
place in his service ; but I must tell you beforehand, that 
if you accept the offer, I shall immediately resign my place 
and return to Corfu. We are foreigners, and we could not 
both long retain office here. It is for you to decide which of 
us ought to remain ^.' Viaro believed that he was capable 
of ruhng an empire, but he felt that he could not instantly 
move with an unembarrassed step among the statesmen and 
princes of Russia if deprived of his brother's countenance. 
He therefore returned to Corfu. 

A more confined sphere of action was opened to him in 
1828, but he was entrusted with absolute power over the 
islands of Hydra, Spetzas, Poros, and Aegina. The elevation 
was sufficient to turn his head. He arrogated to himself 
both legislative and judicial, as well as merely administrative, 
authority, within the bounds of his province, and he exercised 
the sovereign power he assumed in a very capricious manner. 
In virtue of his legislative power he fixed the rate of interest, 
and in virtue of his judicial he inflicted the penalty of 

^ This well-known anecdote will be found in Memoires Biographiques Historiques 
sur le Comte Jean Capodistrias, by A. Papadopoulos Vretos, vol. i. p. 37. 


A.D. 1S29.] 

confiscation for the violation of this provincial law. He 
arrested Greek citizens, and retained them in prison, without 
accusing them of any offence except dissatisfaction with his 
conduct. He appointed demogeronts without even going 
through the formality of a popular election ; he superseded 
those elected by the people whenever they opposed his 
measures, and replaced them by his own nominees. He 
named judges without any warrant from the president ; and 
when a primate of Livadea refused to obey a decision of 
these judges, he sent the primate to prison. He imposed 
taxes when he was in want of money, without any vote 
of the municipalities, or any authority from the central 
government. He ordered private letters to be stopped and 
opened ; and he carried his imprudence and folly so far as 
to break open and read despatches addressed to the En- 
glish naval officer on the station, though he was assured 
by Mr. Gropius, the Austrian consul, that these despatches 
Avere official orders passing from one ship on the station 
to another, and which ought not to be passed through the 

The friends of Capodistrias declared that many of the 
arbitrary acts of Viaro's administration proceeded from the 
misconduct of his subordinates. The inhabitants of Aegina, 
believing this, appealed to the sense of justice of their 
extraordinary commissioner. They transmitted to him a 
petition complaining of the oppressive and corrupt conduct 
of the health-officer he had appointed. Viaro received the 
document at Poros, and immediately ordered his secretary, 
who remained at Aegina, to call a meeting of the inhabitants 
to receive his answer. When the Aeginetans were assembled, 
the secretary produced the petition, and asked them if that 
was the paper they had signed and transmitted to Viaro. 
They replied that it was. The secretary then announced to 
them that they were convoked to see their petition burned by 
order of Count Viaro Capodistrias, extraordinary commis- 
sioner of the president of Greece in the Western Sporades ; 
and when the document was consumed, they were told that 
they had received a milder reply than they merited. 

The acts of Viaro rendered him unpopular ; his proclama- 
tions rendered him ridiculous. The Hydriots resisted some 
of his quarantine regulations, and when the quarantine to 


[Bk.V. Ch.II. 

which he had subjected them expired, he addressed them 
thus — ' Place your confidence in the providence of God and 
the forethought of your government ; but beware of examining 
the acts or criticising the conduct of your rulers, for you may 
be led into error, and error may bring down calamity on your 

The folly of Agostino, and the tyranny of Viaro, would 
have ruined the president without the assistance of any 
other Corfiots, but he brought over Mustoxidi, a literary man 
of some merit, and Gennatas, a lawyer in good practice, to 
aid in exciting the jealousy of the Greeks, who had borne an 
active part in the Revolution, and considered themselves 
entitled to all the spoils of official employment. 

Public opinion generally verifies the value of modern 
governments by the touchstone of finance. The presidency 
of Capodistrias was not re'markable either for the ability or 
the honesty of its financial administration. He found the 
collection and expenditure of the public revenues a mass 
of fraud and peculation. His overweening self-sufificiency 
prompted him to assume the whole task of cleansing the 
Augean stable, and he retained the supreme direction of the 
finance department in his own hands. His hostility to all 
constitutional forms prevented him from making use of 
publicity as a means of controlling subordinate and distant 
officials, over whose proceedings he could exercise no direct 
inspection. His admiration of the autocratic system of 
administration blinded him to the impossibility of applying 
it without a well-organized body of officials. His want of 
practical acquaintance with the details of financial business 
rendered all his schemes for reforming abuses unavailing ; 
and, as in every other department, his extreme jealousy pre- 
vented him from employing men who possessed the practical 
knowledge in which he was deficient. The general conduct 
of the finance department was entrusted to a board composed 
of three members. But they were men who possessed little 
knowledge beyond that of experienced accountants. No 
payments were made for the service of any ministerial de- 
partment without an order under the president's sign- 
manual. He reserved to himself the task of framing a 
new financial system for Greece, The consequence of this 
determination to do everything was, that he neither effected 


A.D. 1829.] 

any improvement, nor allowed others to propose any extensive 

The principal branch of the Greek revenues was the tenth 
of the annual produce of all cultivated land, and an additional 
rent of fifteen per cent, on all Turkish property which had 
been declared national \ The Othoman system of farming 
the taxes was adhered to, and the revolutionary practice of 
letting large districts to primates and military chiefs, instead 
of committing the collection to the municipal authorities. 

Capodistrias did not restrain the abuses of the farmers of 
the tenths^. He even employed the farming system as a 
means of strengthening his power. He favoured the chieftains 
whom he considered to be his personal partizans, and increased 
their influence by allowing them to farm large districts. By 
this means they maintained large bodies of military followers 
as tax-collectors, and the president considered these men as 
more completely under his personal influence than the soldiers 
of the government. This policy often led him to sacrifice 
national advantages to tortuous schemes of personal ambition. 

The receipts of the year 1829 exceeded 4,000,000 drachms, 
and the expense of three thousand regular troops amounted 
to only about 1,000,000. The sum of 3,000,000 would have 
been amply sufficient to maintain an army of five thousand 
regulars, with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery. Now, 
as the expenditure of the civil government was only estimated 
at 300,000 drachms, it is evident that an able and honest 
administration might have laid the foundations of order in the 
army, and secured an impartial administration of justice by 
appointing well-paid judges. A man less occupied with 
diplomatic intrigues, Holy-Alliance policy, and foreign pro- 
tocols, than Capodistrias, even though of far inferior ability, 
might, by giving his principal attention to the improvement 

^ The Greek revenues at this time were derived from the following sources : — 

1°. The tenth of cultivated land, and 25 per cent, on national property. 

2°. The custom duties. 

3°. The farming of salt-works and fisheries. 

4°. Cattle-tax. 

5°. Duties on houses, shops, and mills, on passports, and from quarantines. 
^ The island of Aegina enjoyed more direct protection from Capodistrias than 
any part of Greece, yet the proprietors were often forced to leave ripe figs and 
grapes ungathered until they bribed the farmer of the ta.xes for permission to 
gather them. Cases often occurred in which a part of the crop was lost, because 
the tax-gatherer delayed visiting any garden of which the proprietor refused to pay 
the composition which was demanded. 


[Bk.V. Ch.II. 

of the condition of the agricultural population, have soon 
raised Greece to a flourishing position, and secured to himself 
a great historic name. 

The administration of the customs was greatly improved. 
Under the inspection of Colonel Heideck, those of the Gulf of 
Argolis were raised from 20,000 to 336,000 drachms annually, 
without any additional duties being imposed, and the revenue 
derived from the port of Syra was also greatly increased. 

A new monetary system was introduced, but it was unfor- 
tunately based on an erroneous theory, and carried into 
execution with a defective assay. The monetary relations of 
Greece indicated that the currency either of France or Austria 
ought to have been adopted as the standard of the Greek 
coinage, and there were strong theoretic and practical reasons 
for preferring the franc as the unit. Capodistrias, influenced 
by old commercial associations of Levant merchants, struck 
a new coin called a phoenix (which was afterwards termed a 
drachma by the Bavarian regency), as the unit of the Greek 
monetary system ; but in place of making it equal in value to 
a franc, he made it one-sixth of the metallic value of a Spanish 
pillar dollar. Now, as the Spanish pillar dollar was a coin 
circulating in the Levant for commercial purposes at an agio, 
it was clearly an error to base the monetary system on such 
a standard. A defective assay also caused an error in the 
metallic value of the coinage issued by Capodistrias, and the 
phoenix was issued in small quantity. 

A national bank was also established in name, but the 
title was intended to deceive Western Europe, not to facilitate 
banking operations in Greece. The so-called national bank 
was nothing more than a loan, opened at first by voluntary 
subscription. The misapplication of the name caused distrust 
in a mercantile society like that of Greece ; and the president, 
finding his persuasion insufficient to induce many wealthy 
Greeks to deposit money in the national bank, used his 
political power to compel them to advance mor^ey to it. 
Government took possession of all the sums received ; and 
before two months elapsed, Capodistrias himself candidly 
admitted to Captain Hastings that for the time the national 
bank was only a forced loan. 

At a later period the president proposed an excellent finan- 
cial measure to the national assembly of Argos, but, like too 



A.D. 1829.] 

many of his good intentions, it was never carried into execu- 
tion. All public accounts were ordered to be submitted to 
the supervision of a court of control at the end of every 

The absence of any systematic administration of justice 
was the cause of great national demoralization during the 
course of the Greek Revolution. Honest men ruined them- 
selves by fulfilling their obligations ; dishonest men repudiated 
even those pecuniary debts which they could have paid without 
inconvenience. To the people it appeared that honesty was 
not the best policy in pecuniary affairs, and the general ten- 
dency to financial dishonesty is, as the preceding pages have 
shown, deeply marked on the history of the Greeks. When 
Capodistrias arrived, the insecurity of life and property among 
the agricultural classes threatened the dissolution of society, 
and the Greeks seemed in danger of becoming a nation of 
traders in towns and cities like the Jews. The desire to see 
the supremacy of justice firmly established was one cause of 
the election of Capodistrias to the presidency, and of the 
fervour with which he was welcomed on his arrival. He was 
selected by the almost unanimous voice of his countrymen 
as the only Greek capable of putting an end to the reign of 
injustice. Nothing in his political career exhibits his defi- 
ciencies as a statesman so strikingly as his failure to appreciate 
the value of a firm and impartial administration of justice. 
The career of a legislator lay before him. Had he seized the 
sword of justice and walked boldly forward, he would have 
soon marched at the head of the Greek nation ; and courts, 
cabinets, and protocols would have found some difiiculty in 
contesting his right to be the ruler of Greece. But he loved 
power more than justice ; and yet by not loving justice he lost 
his hold on power. 

The indifference of Capodistrias to the establishment of 
legal tribunals can only be explained by his love of absolute 
power. Soon after his arrival, he created a few justices and 
some minor courts to decide trifling questions. But no legal 
tribunals were established, and his extraordinary commissioners 
were allowed to exercise an exceptional and extensive legal 
jurisdiction, of which his brother Viaro took every possible 
advantage, and used it with unrestricted licence. A decree 
organizing civil and criminal tribunals, and establishing a 


[Bk. V. Ch. II. 

court of review, at last appeared on the 27th August 1830^. 
Capodistrias attempted to excuse his delay by declaring that 
he had avoided doing anything to circumscribe the authority 
of the future sovereign of Greece — a futile assertion ; for he 
well knew that by prolonging anarchy he increased the 
difficulties in the way of establishing order. As long as 
Capodistrias had any prospect of retaining the government 
of Greece in his own hands, he wished to retain all judiciary 
authority in direct subordination to the executive, as in 
Russia ; and he was adverse to the promulgation of fixed 
rules of procedure, and to the constitution of independent 
courts of law. The Corfiot lawyer, Gennatas, whom he ap-- 
pointed minister of justice, and to whom he entrusted the task 
of preparing the judicial organization, was the instrument of 
his views rather from defective judgment than from malevolent 
intentions. The assembly of Argos declared that the pre- 
sident ought to render the judges irremovable, but neither 
Capodistrias nor Gennatas were of this opinion ^ This good 
advice was rejected by Capodistrias, as it has been for more 
than a quarter of a century by King Otho. But Capodistrias, 
in the true spirit of despotism, conferred arbitrary powers on 
the police authorities, and created exceptional tribunals to 
judge political offences^. 

/ Capodistrias made a great show of promoting education, 
fbut he did very little for facilitating public instruction, and 
nothing for improving the intellectual condition of the Greek 
clergy. Yet he affected to be a friend to knowledge, and he 
was sincerely devout. Political intrigue seems to have occu- 
pied all his thoughts, absorbed his time, and inspired all his 
actions during his presidency. 

He built an immense orphan asylum at Aegina, which was 
filled with children delivered from slavery and brought back 
from Egypt. It was from no fault of Capodistrias, perhaps, 
but the internal management of this establishment was ill- 
regulated, and it did not prosper. The president ordered 
many schoolhouses to be built in different parts of Greece, but 
he had shown so little forethought in the business, that many 

Supplement to No. 73 of the V^vik^ 'E^rj/xfois, loth September, 1830. 
^ iJecrees of the Assembly of Argos, No. 11, art. 7, 22nd June, 1829. 
bee noKiTLKT) nai 'EyK\7]fxaTiicTi AiadtKaGia, published at Aegina in 1830, pp. 11 


,\.D. 1829.] 

vere soon converted into barracks for soldiers. In the towns, 
government did very little to promote public education, and 
:he governors named by the president more than once pre- 
sented teachers from opening private schools. The education 
3f the clergy was utterly neglected, and a race of priests 
remained, whose ignorance was a disgrace to the Orthodox 
Church, and who increased the national corruption. Capo- 
distrias succeeded in deceiving the Liberals in France, 
Germany, and Switzerland, into a belief that he was labouring 
sincerely to improve public instruction, but his personal views 
are exemplified by two acts. He ordered the professor of 
Greek literature at Aegina not to read the Gorgias of Plato 
with his pupils, and he made war on the press at Nauplia ^ 

The arbitrary conduct of the president created a constitu- 
tional opposition to his administration, and he found himself 
obliged to convoke a national assembly, in order to give a 
sanction to his dictatorial power. His popularity with the 
people in the Morea was very great, for his government had 
delivered them from the Egyptians, and established some 
better guarantees for the protection of life and property than 
had previously existed. In a freely elected chamber of 
ideputies he would have been sure of a large majority, but he 
wished to silence all opposition, and he adopted many violent 
land illegal measures to exclude every man whom he deemed 
a Liberal. In a number of districts where the character of 
his opponents seemed likely to insure their election, he pro- 
posed himself as a candidate ; and after securing his own 
election, it was generally not difficult to obtain the nomination 
of one of his own partizans in his place. 

The national assembly of Argos was opened by Capodis- 
trias in a Russian uniform on the 23rd July 1829. The 
assembly ratified everything the president had done, and 
entrusted him with all the additional power he desired. Only 
the laws which he approved and recommended were passed. 
He did not venture to obtain his nomination to the presidency 
for life, for it would have been imprudent to take so important 
a step in the settlement of the government of Greece without 
the previous consent of the three Allied powers. But he ob- 
tained an act of the assembly, declaring that the decisions of 

' Thiersch, De r£iat actuel de la Grece, i. 22 and 54; Tricoupi, iv. 291. 


[Bk. V. Ch. II, j 

the conferences of London should not be held to be binding' 
on Greece until they were ratified by the Greek legislature ^ 
He trusted to his own diplomatic skill for rendering this 
law subservient to his schemes concerning the sovereignty 
of Greece. 

The Panhellenion was replaced by a senate, but the organi- 
zation of this senate was left by the assembly entirely in the 
hands of the president. It was a consultative and not a 
legislative council, and its consent was not indispensable to 
any laws except those relating to the permanent disposition 
of the national lands. 

Capodistrias was also empowered to name a regency in 
case of his death, which was to conduct the government until 
the meeting of a national assembly. 

The proceedings of the national assembly of Argos were 
opposed to the free spirit of the national assemblies of the j 
earlier period of the Greek Revolution. The principle of| 
government nomination too often replaced the old usage of j 
popular election, and tortuous ways were adopted instead of i 
direct courses. Thus, in appointing the senate, sixty-eight 
names were submitted by the assembly to the president, who { 
selected twenty-one of these candidates to be senators. The 
.senate was then completed by the addition of six members 
named by the president. 

The establishment of two chambers to share the legislative 
power was contemplated by the assembly, but the president 
was entrusted with the arrangements necessary for calling the 
legislature into existence^. 

The excessive confidence of the deputies misled Capo- ■ 
distrias into the conviction that his power was irresistible, 
and from this time his conduct became more arbitrary, and 
his personal partizans more insolent. 

The proceedings of the three protecting powers gave him ; 
great anxiety. He detested England, mistrusted France, and i 
doubted the sentiments of the Russian cabinet, for he felt j 
that he was not admitted to its secrets. The nomination of i 
Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (Leopold, king of the | 
Belgians) to be sovereign of Greece, disappointed his hopes | 
and irritated his feelings. He had laboured to convince 

J r.i;/<:^ 'E<pT]fifpis, No. 53, 30th July, 1829. 

= Ibid. No. 53. The decree is dated 22nd July (3rd August), 1829. 


j A.D. 1829.] 

Europe that he was the only man capable of organizing 
I Greece. His ambition was legitimate. But his own double- 
I dealing had prevented even Russia from assuming the respon- 
sibility of advocating his cause. Had his conduct not been 
marked by duplicity, and had he sought to attain his object 
by honest and legal measures, it is probable that he would 
have succeeded. Diplomacy is not in the habit of working 
miracles or producing patriots, and neither an Epaminondas 
nor a Washington was likely to arise among the semi- 
Venetian aristocracy of Corfu. 
I The three powers conducted their conferences at London 
j in a slow and vacillating manner, and their protocols, fixing 
the frontier of the Greek state, were remarkable for ignorance 
of geography and infirmity of purpose. The principles which 
ought to have regulated their proceedings were lucidly 
announced in a report drawn up by their representatives at 
Poros, on the i2th December 1828^. The measures then 
recommended were embodied in a protocol signed at London 
on the 22nd March 1829, and were not very dissimilar from 
those which were ultimately adopted when Greece was 
declared a kingdom in 1832^ The frontier of the Greek 
state was drawn from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta. 
The annual tribute to the sultan was fixed at about ;!^30,ooo. 
The Turks who had possessed land in Greece were allowed to 
sell their property. An hereditary sovereign was to be 
chosen by the three protecting powers, who, though he 
acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte, was to enjoy 
complete independence in legislation, and in all business 
relating to political government and internal administration. 
This plan, warmly supported by Sir Stratford Canning 
(Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), might have been carried into 
execution without delay, had the Earl of Aberdeen, who was 
then Foreign Secretary, been as well acquainted with the 
state of Turkey and Greece as Sir Stratford. Unfortunately 
the Earl of Aberdeen treated the question with diplomatic 
pedantry. While Capodistrias was intriguing, while Sultan 
Mahmud was fuming with rage, and while the population of 

' Parliamentary Papers — Protocol of a conference of the representatives of Great 
Britain, France, and Russia, held at Poros 12th December, 1828. 

* Compare the protocol of the 22nd March, 1829, with Annex A to the protocol 
of the 26th April, 1832. 

E 2 



[Bk. V. Ch. II. 

Greece was perishing from want, the English Foreign Secre- 
tary insisted on reserving to each of the Allied courts the 
right of weighing separately the objections which the indignant 
sultan might make to the proposed arrangements ; and 
England and France sent ambassadors to Constantinople to 
open negotiations with the Othoman government. 

While the British government was undecided as to the 
manner in which it would be most prudent to carry the 
protocol of the 22nd March into execution, the French gov- 
ernment offered to complete the pacification of Greece by 
taking possession of all that part of northern Greece assigned 
to the new state with the troops in the Morea. The Turks 
who occupied the country were so few and so ill-provided 
with military, that it was not in their power to offer any 
serious resistance. But the English ministers were so averse 
to any further acts of hostility against Turkey, that they 
opposed this arrangement, and France yielded to Lord 
Aberdeen's objections. 

Russia soon took advantage of the scruples and half 
measures of the British cabinet. As soon as the Russian 
army had crossed the Balkan, and Constantinople lay open 
to attack, the sultan felt that England and France 
could alone arrest the progress of his enemy and save his 
capital. To conciliate their good-will he yielded every point 
in dispute concerning Greece. On the 9th of September 
1829 the reis-effendi notified to the English and French 
ambassadors that the Porte acceded to the treaty of the 6th 
of July 1827, and that the Othoman government pledged 
itself to accept all the arrangements which the Allies might 
consider it necessary to adopt for carrying it into execution \ 

The Greek question might now be considered as termi- 
nated. But Russia was unwilling to see any cause of dispute 
with Turkey ended, and she was extremely jealous of the 
influence which the Western powers were acquiring in the 
East. She therefore suddenly gave a new turn to the 
negotiations by attempting to appropriate the merit of the 
final settlement to the emperor's government. The treaty of 
Adrianople, which terminated the Russian war, was signed on 
the 14th September, and the Russian plenipotentiaries, taking 

^ Parliamentary Papers — Annex B to protocol of 3rd February, 1830. 


A.O. 1829.] 

I advantage of the vague manner in which the reis-effendi had 
notified the sultan's adhesion to the measures for carrying the 

I treaty of the 6th of July 1827 into execution, exacted from 
the Porte a precise recognition of the protocol of the 22nd 
March 1829, and, to prevent the Othoman government from 
making use of its habits of delay, the Porte was expressly 
bound to name a plenipotentiary for the purpose of carrying 
the arrangements into effect conjointly with commissioners 
appointed by the Allied powers ^. 

This display of Russian zeal for the freedom of Greece was 
a severe rebuke to the irresolute policy of the British cabinet, 
and both France and England felt humiliated by the sub- 
ordinate position in which Russia had placed them with 
reference to the final settlement of the Greek question. The 
emperor Nicholas, with his usual arrogance, assumed that 
Greece owed her recognition solely to the victories of his 
armies, and the recent policy of the British government gave 
a sanction to this pretension. The sultan immediately 
became ostentatiously obsequious to Russia, and Greece 
extremely grateful. Capodistrias, observing the apparent 
increase of Russian influence, had some reason to expect that 
he might eventually succeed in being selected as the 
sovereign prince of Greece, if Greece could be retained in 
a state of vassalage, and not rendered too extensive. 

But England and France were not so easily foiled by 
Moscovite diplomacy as the czar expected, and they took 
effectual measures to prevent Russia from enjoying a long 
triumph in the success of her separate action. By conferring 
new favours on the Greeks they diluted the gratitude due to 
the Emperor Nicholas. A protocol signed on the 3rd of Febru- 
ary 1 830 abolished the suzerainty of the sultan and declared 
Greece an independent state. Unfortunately, little gratitude 
was earned from the Greeks, for the boon of independence 
was conferred imperfectly and ungraciously. The statesmen 
who framed this unlucky protocol showed too plainly that 
their attention was fixed on the secondary object of relieving 
England and France from the reproach of having been 
overreached by Russia, and not on the primary object of the 
alliance, the pacification of Greece on a permanent and 

* The treaty of Adrianople, art. 10. Lesur, Annuaire Hhtorique, 1829. 

• Yet Colonel Leake, who had acted as diplomatic agent at Joannina during the 
government of Ali Pasha, and who was known to be better acquainted with the 
proposed frontier than any man in Europe, was then residing in London. He 
was the person from whom accurate and official information could have been 
obtained, but he was not consulted. 

2 Parliamentary Papers. Prince Leopold accepted the sovereignty on the nth 
February, 1830. 



equitable basis. Nominal independence was conceded, but 
it was to be purchased by the loss of a considerable territory 
inhabited by a warlike population whose constancy and 
courage had contributed much to deliver Greece from the 
Turkish yoke. A considerable number of the troops who 
had been constantly in arms against the sultan was subjected 
to his government, and a frontier which offered no security 
either to Turkey or Greece was traced. 

This new frontier was drawn from the mouth of the 
Achelous to the mouth of the Spercheus. Diplomatic igno- 
rance could hardly have traced a more unsuitable line of 
demarcation. All Acarnania and a considerable part of 
Aetolia were surrendered to the sultan. That part of the 
continent in which Greek is the language of the people was 
annexed to Turkey, and that part in which the agricultural 
population speaks the Albanian language was attached to 
Greece ^ With such a frontier it was certain that peace 
could only be established by force ; yet the protocol de- 
clared that no power should send troops to Greece without 
the unanimous consent of the Allies. This injudicious proto- 
col concluded with a foolish paragraph, congratulating the 
Allied courts on having reached the close of a long and 
difficult negotiation. 

The sovereignty of the diminished state was offered to 
and accepted by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg ^. The 
Porte immediately accepted these arrangements. It was not 
blind to the advantage of retaining possession of Acarnania 
and great part of Aetolia. On the other hand, Capodistrias 
availed himself of the unsuitable frontier to thwart Prince 
Leopold's election. He was so sure of the nation's support 
that he did not give himself any trouble to conceal his 
duplicity. He declared that the decree of the national 
assembly of Argos deprived him of the power of giving a 
legal sanction to the provisions of the protocol signed by the 
Allied powers. He pretended that he was placed in a 


A.D. 1830.] 

position of great difficulty ; that he feared to convoke a 
national assembly, as the deputies would either protest 
against the proceedings of the Allies, or violate their duty 
to their country and their instructions from their electors ; 
but that he would accept the protocol on his own responsi- 
bility \ The ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia 
knew that he had drawn up the instructions of the electors to 
the deputies with his own hand, and they could not overlook 
the fact, that while he manifested extreme tenderness for the 
consciences of the deputies, he showed no hesitation in 
violating his own duty as president of Greece by setting 
aside a national decree, and accepting the protocol in an 
illegal manner. His object was clearly to prepare for its 
repudiation, if it suited his convenience, at a later period. 

Greece was so tortured by her provisional condition that 
the nomination of Prince Leopold was accepted by the people 
as a boon. Addresses of congratulation were spontaneously 
prepared. There was an outbreak of national enthusiasm ; 
and many officials, believing that Capodistrias was sincere 
in the declaration which he made in public, that he was 
anxious to give the new sovereign a cordial reception, signed 
these addresses. At first the president did not venture to 
oppose the general feeling, but he announced that the previous 
approval of the government was necessary in order to give the 
addresses a legitimate character. Shortly after, he ventured 
to proclaim that every address which had not been submitted 
to the revision of the agents of his government previous to 
signature, emanated from obscure emissaries of the opposition. 
He was seriously alarmed at the eagerness which was exhi- 
bited to welcome the new sovereign, and put an end to his 
own provisional administration. His devoted partizans alone 
knew his private wishes, and they endeavoured to prevent 
the spontaneous addresses from being signed, and delayed 
as much as lay in their power their transmission to the 
prince^. After the resignation of Prince Leopold, Capodistrias 
treated the signature of the spontaneous addresses as an act 
of hostility to his government, and dismissed many officials 

^ Parliamentary Papers, Annex F, protocol, 14th May, 1830; Lesur. A7in. Hist. 
1829, Documents, p. iij. 

^ Parliamentary Papers, Annex C, protocol, 26th July, 1830; Circular to Civil 
Governors of Greece, dated 2nd June, 1830. 

k6 presidency of capodistrias. 

[Bk. V. Ch. II. 

who were innocent of any wish to join the opposition, but 
who had been misled by his own assurance into a belief 
that he wished the prince to receive a hearty welcome. In 
order to neutralize the effect of the popular demonstrations 
in the prince's favour, the civil governors in the provinces 
were ordered to prepare other addresses. Many of these 
were not circulated for signature until the resignation of 
Prince Leopold was known to Capodistrias, and several of 
them were antedated ^ 

From this period, the secret police, which had been 
gradually formed under the direction of Viaro and Gennatas, 
acquired additional power. It became, as in many countries 
on the continent of Europe, a terrible social scourge^. The 
preference which the great body of the people had shown 
for a foreign sovereign filled the heart of Capodistrias with 
rage. He could not repress his feelings, and even to strangers 
he often inveighed bitterly against the ingratitude of his 

Yet he endeavoured to persuade the world that the Greeks 
viewed the nomination of Prince Leopold with dissatisfaction, 
if not with absolute aversion, and he succeeded so far as to 
create an impression that the Greeks wxre at least divided 
in opinion. He alarmed Prince Leopold with the fear of 
meeting an unfavourable reception. He attempted to disgust 
him by suggesting the necessity of his changing his religion, 
though it was well known that the Greek clergy were then 
as eager to welcome a Protestant sovereign as the laity. 

The condition of Greece at the time of Prince Leopold's 
nomination explains the proceedings of Capodistrias. Most 
of the ablest and most influential men had been driven from 
the public service, and excluded from the assembly of Argos. 
The senate was composed of the president's creatures. The 
government had not received a permanent organization. No 
administration of justice gave a sure guarantee for life and 
property to private individuals. The people suspected that 
the country was retained in this provisional state to further 
the president's schemes of personal ambition. The nomi- 

1 The address of the Psarians was signed at Aegina on the 20th July, but it was 
dated 7th June. Capodistrias did not inform the prince that the addresses were 
ready to be transmitted to England until the 26th of July. He was then aware 
that the prince had resigned on the 21st of May. 

* Thiersch, i. 27; Pellion, 177. 


A.D. 1830.] 

nation of Prince Leopold took Capodistrias by surprise, while 
he was preparing to convince Europe that the Greeks would 
not accept a foreign sovereign, and to persuade Liberals that 
the constitutional governments of England and France ought 
to admit the principle of popular election. He knew how 
to manage that universal suffrage should elect him sovereign 
of Greece. When he found his hopes baffled, and saw himself 
without any national support, he acted like a diplomatist, and 
not like a statesman. Instead of convoking a national assembly 
and adopting a national policy, he played a game of personal 
intrigue. He accepted the protocol to thwart its execution. 
He violated the law of Greece to keep the conduct of the 
negotiations in his own hands, and he deceived the prince 
with false representations. 

Prince Leopold, on the other hand, acted imprudently in 
accepting the sovereignty of Greece before he had made up his 
mind to assume the immediate direction of the government. 
And his resignation, after having accepted the sovereignty, 
deserves severe reprobation. Princes can only be punished 
for trifling with the fortunes of nations by the judgment of 
history. The British government also acted most injudi- 
ciously, both in pressing him to accept, and in permitting 
him to double about after accepting. The objections he 
made to the arrangements of the protocol ought to have 
warned Lord Aberdeen that he was not the man suitable 
for the contingency. Indeed, it seems strange that the un- 
friendly correspondence which preceded Prince Leopold's 
nomination did not awaken a deeper sense of the responsibility 
due to the suffering inhabitants of Greece in the breasts both 
of the prince and of the British ministers. 

If Prince Leopold really believed, as he wrote to Lord 
Aberdeen on the 3rd February 1830, 'that he could imagine 
no effectual mode of pacifying Greece without including 
Candia in the new state,' it was his duty to refuse the 
government of Greece until Candia formed part of his sove- 
reignty. Yet he was content to give up Candia and accept 
the sovereignty on the nth of the month. The Allies were 
fairly warned not to permit ulterior negotiations on questions 
concerning which they were determined to make no conces- 
sions, but they neglected the warning. In the correspond- 
ence between the British government and Prince Leopold, 



which was laid before parHament, the prince appears as a 
rhetorician and not a statesman, and as a diplomatist and 
not an administrator ^. 

Even the dark picture Capodistrias drew of the state of 
Greece, and the difficulties likely to await the prince on 
his arrival, did not warrant Prince Leopold's retiring from 
his engagement. But Prince Leopold all along trifled with 
the awful responsibility he had assumed. It was his duty, 
the moment he accepted the sovereignty of Greece, to invite 
some Greek who had acquired practical experience in public 
business during the Revolution, to attend his person and 
act as secretary of state. He ought immediately to have sum- 
moned a council of state, of which he might have invited 
Capodistrias to name a few members. With constitutional 
advisers, Prince Leopold would have found all his difficulties 
vanish. The bad faith of Capodistrias in his dealings with 
the prince is proved by the simple fact that he did not 
immediately send to London such men as Glarakes, Rizos, 
PsyllaSj and Tricoupi, for he had employed them all in high 
office, and knew that, whatever might be their deficiencies, 
they were men of education and personal integrity. The 
president may be excused for not trusting party leaders like 
Mavrocordatos, Metaxas, or Kolettes ; but when the prince 
asked for a confidential adviser, it was insulting Greece to 
send Prince Wrede, a young Bavarian, who had arrived in 
the country after the termination of the war, and who knew 
very little more of the social and political condition of Greece 
than the Greeks knew of his existence. Indeed, Capodistrias 
himself knew only that the man he sent was called Prince 
Wrede, and had been recommended to General Heideck. 
It would have been almost impossible, among the foreigners 
then in Greece, to have selected a person so utterly incom- 
petent to furnish Prince Leopold either with information 
or counsel. Jealousy and duplicity, as usual, were too strong 
in the breast of Capodistrias to admit of his concealing 

Prince Leopold, after wearying the Allies and tormenting 
the English ministers with his negotiations, resigned the 

* Parliamentary Papers. Communications with Prince Leopold relating to the 
sovereignty of Greece, particularly letters of Lord Aberdeen to Prince Leopold, 
31st January, 1830, and Prince Leopold to Lord Aberdeen, 3rd February, 1830. 


A.D. 1830.] 

sovereignty of Greece on the 17th May 1830. Whether he 
would have gained in Greece the honour he has won as a 
wise ruler on the throne of Belgium, cannot be known ; but 
when we reflect how many years of anarchy he would have 
saved the Greeks, it must be owned that he would have 
served humanity well by estimating more accurately than 
he did estimate it the responsibilities he incurred when he 
accepted the sovereignty of Greece. 

The position of Capodistrias was changed, and his power 
was shaken, by the nomination of Prince Leopold, nor did 
he recover either his influence or his equanimity on the 
prince's resignation. As often happens to successful intriguers, 
he found himself embarrassed by his false pretences and pro- 
visional measures. He had told the Greeks that it was 
necessary to put an end to the Revolution. They re-echoed 
his own phrases, and clamoured for the establishment of 
permanent institutions, and, above all, for legal tribunals. 
Capodistrias was puzzled to find that the people to whom 
he looked for support^ were thwarting his measures when they 
believed they were assisting him to gain popularity. The 
president's firmness was further shaken by the French Revo- 
lution of July 1830, which placed Louis Philippe on the 
throne of France. This event encouraged the members of 
the constitutional opposition in Greece to commence an open 
and systematic hostility to his arbitrary measures. Shortly 
after this, he was still further alarmed by the insurrection 
in Poland, which he feared would prevent Russia from sup- 
porting the principles of the Holy Alliance against England 
and France. He was now compelled to hear his conduct 
arraigned. He was reproached with perpetuating anarchy 
in Greece, and with calumniating the Greeks by representing 
them as enemies of order. His administrative capacity was 
called in question, and his misgovernment was pointed out. 
But the mass of the nation wished reform, not change of 
government ; and even his illegal proceedings were submitted 
to with patience. Viaro, it is true, became every day more 
hateful on account of his insolence ; Agostino every day more 
ridiculous on account of his vanity. 

Henceforward the government of the president became 
rapidly more tyrannical. Arrests were made without legal 
warrants. Spies were generally employed by men in office. 



Viaro, Mustoxidi, and Gennatas, collected round them a herd 
of Ionian satellites, who made a parade of the influence they 
exerted in the public administration. The partizans of Capo- 
distrias began to believe that he would succeed in obtaining 
the presidency for life. Agostino, his younger brother, pre- 
tended to be his political heir. He acted the generalissimo, 
and formed a body-guard of personal dependants, who were 
better clothed and paid than the rest of the army. This 
conduct excited indignation among the veteran armatoli, 
who conceived a deep-rooted resentment against the whole 
Capodistrian family. 

The Revolution established the liberty of the press, of 
which the Greeks had made a moderate and intelligent use. 
As early as 1824, political newspapers of different parties 
were published simultaneously at Mesolonghi, Athens, and 
Hydra. In 1B25 the government found it necessary to 
establish an official gazette (Pei'tK?) 'Ei^j/juept?) at Nauplia. 
Capodistrias silenced the press, and the Greeks, unable to 
discuss their grievances, resorted to force as the only means of 
removing them. 

Polyzoides, a man of moderate opinions, a lawyer, and a 
Liberal, deemed the time favourable for the establishment 
of a political and literary newspaper of a higher character 
than any which had survived the hostility of the president's 
government. There is no doubt that he contemplated 
strengthening the Liberal party, and gaining proselytes to 
the constitution. His conduct was strictly legal. By the 
law of Greece the press was free ; but to comply with the 
police exigencies of a suspicious government, copies of 
the prospectus of the new paper, which was called the 
Apollo, were sent to the minister of public instruction, and 
to the president. Viaro, who acted as minister of justice, sent 
to inform the editor, that as no law existed regulating the 
publication of newspapers, the power of licensing their 
publication belonged to the government. The pretension was 
very Venetian, and in direct opposition to the law declaring 
the press to be free. Polyzoides resolved to obey the law ; 
Viaro was determined to enforce his authority. 

Early on the morning fixed for the publication of the 
Apollo, the chief of the police of Nauplia, followed by a 
strong guard, entered the printing-office and seized the press, 


A.D. 183I.] 

then at work, without presenting any warrant. The editor 
sought redress from Viaro, and presented a petition to the 
senate, but his demands were neglected. It was evident that 
the will of Count Capodistrias was more powerful than the 
law of Greece. The president had himself inaugurated a 
new period of revolution. Men's minds were excited, and 
the Liberal party was irritated. The state of public affairs, 
both in Greece and on the continent of Europe, caused 
information to be eagerly sought after from other sources 
than the government papers^ and the Greeks waited anxiously 
for the result of the contest between Capodistrias and the 
Apollo. A law circumscribing the liberty of the press was 
passed hurriedly through the senate. But while Viaro was 
pluming himself on his victory, the Apollo made its appear- 
ance at Hydra on the 31st March 1831, and its publication 
was continued under the protection of the Albanian munici- 
pality of that island until the assassination of Capodistrias \ 

Maina had already resisted the president's authority. 
Hydra now called the legality of his proceedings in question. 
The president attempted to apologize for his arbitrary acts, 
by pleading the provisional nature of his government. His 
greatest fear was publicity. He felt that his motives would 
not bear investigation better than his deeds. He had suc- 
ceeded in silencing the press abroad, and it now braved him 
at home. The CouriHer of Smyrna had criticised his measures 
with freedom, and published his edicts with severe comments. 
By the intervention of the Russian minister at Constanti- 
nople, he obtained from the Othoman government an order 
to the editor to abstain from criticising the conduct of the 
president of Greece^. 

Capodistrias advanced in the path of tyranny; the Greeks 
prepared for open insurrection. Many persons were arrested 
on suspicion, and remained in prison without being accused 
of any offence or brought to trial ^. Some just and more 
unjust accusations were made against men who disapproved 

' The Apollo was published twice a-week. While revising these pages, I have 
turned over the numbers of this paper, and 1 am surprised to find so much modera- 
tion and good sense in political articles written amidst the storm of party passions 
that then prevailed. 

'■^ Courrier de Smyrne, 28th November, 1830. 

^ Compare the picture of Greece drawn by Sir Stratford Canning in a Memoran- 
dum dated 28th December, 1831, Annex A to protocol of 7th March, 1S32. 



of the president's conduct. Actions before provisional courts 
of judicature were commenced for official acts performed 
during the Revolution ; yet no private individual was allowed 
to seek redress in the same courts for recent acts committed 
in violation of the president's own laws by the president's 
officials. Lazaros Konduriottes of Hydra, one of the most 
patriotic men in Greece, and one of the few whose public 
and private character was alike irreproachable, was accused 
of complicity with pirates. Several eminent men were exiled, 
and others only escaped the vexations of the police by 
seeking a voluntary banishment ^ Judges were dismissed 
from office because they refused to transcribe and pronounce 
illegal sentences at the suggestion of Viaro. Klonares, a 
man of some legal knowledge, and of an independent 
character, was dismissed for signing one of the addresses 
to Prince Leopold which had not been submitted to the 
president's revision. Another judge publicly declared that 
he was driven from the bench because he refused to give 
an unjust decision in conformity with the desire of the Corfiot 
minister of justice. Sessines of Gastuni, the president of the 
senate, who had been raised to his high office on account of 
his servility, at last hesitated to support the tyranny of the 
president, and was instantly dismissed. 

Extraordinary tribunals, which acted without fixed rules of 
procedure, whose members were destitute of legal knowledge, 
and removable at pleasure, and from whose judgments there 
was no appeal, were multiplied. 

Insurrections followed. The president was particularly 
irritated by prolonged disturbances on the part of the students 
of Aegina, because these disorders drew attention to his 
vicious system of public education, and demonstrated the 
falsehood of the reports he had caused to be circulated in 
Western Europe. 

His difficulties were increased by the disorder in his finan- 
cial administration. Many of his partizans in the Morea 
were alienated by his allowing Kolokotrones to enrol an 
armed band of personal followers, as in the worst times of 
the Revolution, and collect the cattle-tax. Kolokotrones, 

* Men of different parties and discordant opinions were united in opposition to 
Capodistrias at this time: Hypsilantes, Mavrocordatos, Miaoulis, Konduriottes, 
Tombazes, Tricoupi, Klonares, Zographos, Pharmakides, Church, and Gordon. 


A.D. 1 83 1.] 

as might have been foreseen, acted the part of a military 
tyrant. He not only persecuted his own personal enemies, 
but allowed a similar licence to the brigands who followed his 
banner. Greece was relapsing into a state of anarchy, and 
several provinces were at last in open revolt. 

Maina paid no taxes, and the Mainates were only prevented 
from plundering Messenia by the presence of the French 
troops. Hydra constituted itself an independent state, 
governed by its municipal magistrates. It collected the 
national revenues in several islands of the Archipelago, 
and maintained a part of the Greek fleet which espoused 
its cause. Syra, the centre of Greek commerce, made 
common cause with Hydra. Capodistrias had driven its 
merchants into open opposition, by attempting to fetter 
their trade with the restrictions of the Russian commercial 
system. A general cry was raised for the convocation of 
a national assembly, and the president perceived that he 
must either make concessions to regain his popularity, lay 
down his authority, or employ force to keep possession of 
his power. He chose the last alternative, and instead of 
assembling the deputies of the nation, he commenced a civil 
war, trusting to the assistance of Russia for the means of 
crushing Hydra. 

Some management was necessary to prevent the diplomatic 
agents of England and France in Greece from protesting 
against any employment of force. The greater part of the 
Greek fleet lay disarmed in the port of Poros ; but a few 
ships whose captains remained faithful to Capodistrias were 
still in commission ; and these, when assisted by a force 
which the Russian admiral promised to supply, would easily 
re-establish the president's authority in Syra. The loss of 
Syra would undermine the power of Hydra ; for its revenues 
were the principal resource for the payment of the insurgent 
fleet. The plan of attacking Syra, apparently with Greek 
ships, but in reality with Russian forces, was well devised, 
but it was betrayed to the Hydriots by one of the pre- 
sident's confidants. The Hydriots determined to anticipate 
the attack. 

Kanares, who was a devoted partizan of the president, 
commanded the corvette Spetzas, which was fully manned, 
and lay at anchor in the port of Poros. The municipal 



government of Hydra ordered MiaouHs with two hundred 
sailors to hasten to Poros, and take possession of the ships 
and arsenal. The brave old admiral departed immediately 
with only about fifty men, accompanied by Antonios Kriezes 
as his flag-captain, and by Mavrocordatos as his political 
counsellor. On the night of the 27th July 1831 he seized 
the arsenal and the disarmed ships, and, hoisting his flag 
in the Hellas, summoned Kanares on board. That officer, 
refusing to surrender the corvette to an order of the munici- 
pality of Hydra, was put under arrest, and a party of Hydriots 
took possession of his ship. 

The character of Capodistrias seemed to undergo a revolu- 
tion when he heard that he had lost his fleet and arsenal. 
He no longer talked of the blessings of peace, of his own 
philanthropic feelings, and of the duties of humanity. He 
declared that he would wash out the stain of rebellion in 
the blood of his enemies. He called the Hydriots a band 
of barbarians and pirates, who assailed his authority because 
it had arrested them in a career of crime and pillage. He 
now spoke of law, to implore its vengeance, and of justice, 
to assert that the leaders of the opposition ought all to die the 
death of traitors. His expressions and his manner breathed a 
fierce desire to gratify his personal revenge. 

The news of Miaoulis' success reached Nauplia while the 
ministers of France and England, and the commanders of 
their naval forces, were absent. The Russian admiral, Ricord, 
who was at anchor in the port, was induced by Capodistrias 
to sail i,mmediately to Poros with the ships under his com- 
mand. At the same time, the president sent a battalion of 
infantry, two hundred regular cavalry, and a strong body 
of irregulars;, by land, to assist in regaining possession of the 

Admiral Ricord arrived and summoned Miaoulis to sur- 
render the arsenal and the ships in the port to the Greek 
government ; but Miaoulis replied that the municipality of 
Hydra was the only legally constituted authority to which he 
owed obedience until the meeting of the national assembly. 
He therefore referred the Russian admiral to the authorities 
at Hydra, adding that he was resolved to retain possession 
of the fleet and arsenal as long as the municipality of Hydra 
left him in command. Ricord threatened to use force ; 


A.D. 183I.] 

Miaoulis retorted that he knew his duty as well as the 
Russian admiral. 

Affairs remained in this position for several days, when the 
commanders of the French and English naval forces entered 
the port accidentally before returning to Nauplia^. They 
were consequently ignorant of the resolutions which might 
have been adopted by the residents of the Allied powers at 
Nauplia, and to prevent bloodshed they arranged with Ricord 
and Miaoulis that matters should remain in their actual con- 
dition until they should visit Nauplia and return with the 
decision of the Allies. It seemed at the time a strange pro- 
ceeding, that both commanders should go to search for this 
decision, when the presence of one at least was required at 
Poros to watch the Russian admiral, who was guarding both 
the entrances into the port with a superior force, and could 
close them at any moment. 

In the mean time, the residents of England and France, 
having returned to Nauplia, gave the president written assur- 
ances of the desire of their courts to maintain tranquillity in 
Greece under the existing government. But they excited the 
president's distrust by speaking of conciliation, by recom- 
mending the convocation of a national assembly, and by 
refusing to order their naval forces to co-operate with Admiral 
Ricord in attacking the Hydriots. 

The Russian admiral did not wait the return of the French 
and English commanders to commence hostilities. On the 
6th of August a boat of the Russian brig Telemachus, which 
was guarding the smaller entrance, prevented a vessel bring- 
ing provisions from Hydra from entering the port. An en- 
gagement took place, in which both parties lost a few men, 
but the Russians succeeded in compelling the vessel to return 
to Hydra. 

As soon as Capodistrias found that the English and French 
residents declined countenancing his schemes of vengeance, 
he sent off pressing solicitations to the Russian admiral to 
lose no time in recovering possession of the Greek fleet ; and 
to the officers of the troops on shore to occupy Poros at every 
risk. He then pretended to listen to the counsels of the resi- 
dents, and promised to convoke a national assembly. Some 

1 The French officer was Captain, afterwards Admiral, Lalande; the English^ 
Captain, afterwards Admiral, Lord Lyons. 




days later a proclamation was issued, dated ist(i3th) August, 
convoking the assembly on the 8th (20th) September ^ 

The message of Capodistrias was received by Admiral 
Ricord as an order to attack Miaoulis, and his operations, in a 
military point of view, were extremely judicious. He formed 
a battery to command the town and the smaller entrance ; 
and having by this cut off the communications of Miaoulis 
with a part of the Greek fleet, he ordered the Russians to take 
possession of the corvette Spetzas and a brig, which were 
anchored in Monastery Bay. At the same time the Greek- 
troops attacked Fort Heideck, which was occupied by 
Hydriots. The Russians and the president's troops were 
completely victorious. The corvette Spetzas Vv^as blown 
up, the brig was taken, and Fort Heideck was deserted by 
its garrison. 

Miaoulis had now only thirty men on board the Hellas, and 
the other vessels under his orders were as ill manned. 

On the day after the victory of the Russians, the inhabit- 
ants of Poros offered to capitulate, and it was arranged with 
Admiral Ricord that a hundred and fifty Greek regular 
troops should occupy the town, in order to save it from being 
plundered by the irregulars. During the night several vessels 
filled with the families of those who feared the vengeance of 
Capodistrias were allowed to pass the Russian squadron un- 
molested. On the 13th of August a hundred and fifty Greek 
regulars entered the town of Poros. 

Admiral Ricord had promised to wait the return of Cap- 
tains Lalande and Lyons. The Allied powers were bound 
by protocol to take every step relating to the pacification of 
Greece in concert. Miaoulis reposed perfect confidence in 
this arrangement until he was awakened from his security by 
the operations in Monastery Bay. And on the morning of 
the 13th August he observed that the Russian ships removed 
to stations which placed his ships under their guns. He sent 
an officer on board the Russian flag-ship to request Admiral 
Ricord to retain his previous position until the return of the 
French and English naval commanders, according to his 

* The existence of this proclamation, however, was not known even at Naiiplia 
until after the events of Poros. A translation will be found in Lettres et Docu- 
tnents Officieh relatifs ati Derniers Evenetnetits de la Grece, 1 23. This work was 
distributed in Paris by order of Mr. Eynard of Geneva. 


A.D. 1S3I.] 

promise ; and he instructed the officer, in case the Russian 
admiral persisted in taking up a hostile position, to add that 
Miaoulis, though his crews were insufficient for defence, would 
destroy his ships rather than surrender them. Captain Pha- 
langas was ordered to make a similar communication to 
Captain Levaillant of a French brig-of-war which had just 
entered the port. Levaillant urged the Russian admiral to 
wait the return of Lalande and Lyons, but without success. 
Miaoulis inferred that something extraordinary, and not 
favourable to the views of Capodistrias, must have occurred 
to induce Ricord to violate his promise. He knew that the 
president's object in getting possession of the Greek fleet was 
to enable the Russians to re-establish his power at Syra and 
Hydra under cover of the Greek flag. To save his country, 
he resolved to destroy the ships which might serve as cover 
for attacking it. At half-past ten, just as the Russian admiral 
had taken up his new position, a terrific explosion was heard, 
which was almost instantaneously followed by a second. 
Thick columns of smoke covered the Greek ships, and when 
they cleared away, the magnificent frigate Hellas, and her 
prize, the corvette Hydra, were seen floating as wrecks on the 
water\ Miaoulis and their crews escaped in their boats to 

The troops of Capodistrias rushed into the town of Poros 
in defiance of the capitulation, and immediately took posses- 
sion of the arsenal. They then commenced plundering the 
houses, as if the place had been a hostile city taken by assault 
after the most obstinate resistance. The inhabitants most 
hostile to the government of the president having carried off 
their movables to Hydra, only the innocent who trusted to 
Admiral Ricord's assurance of protection remained. They 
were pillaged of all they possessed, and treated with inhuman 
cruelty. On this occasion, both officers and men behaved in 
the most disgraceful manner ; and the sack of Poros is an 
indelible stain on the conduct of the Greek army, on the 
character of Capodistrias, and on the honour of Admiral 
Ricord. The Russian admiral might easily have put a stop 

' The letter of Capodistrias, printed in Mr. Eynard's Lettres et Donnnenls (p. 125) 
gives a correct account of the events at Poros, until he cuts short the narrative, on 
arriving at the catastrophe, by inserting a letter of Kanares. This is one of the 
president's usual artifices of composition. He thus communicates the catastrophe 
without the necessity of alluding to the cause of the conduct of Miaoulis. 

F 3 



to the cruelties which were perpetrated under his eyes, yet fori 
twenty-four hours he permitted every crime to be committed 
with impunity. Justice was powerless, unless when some 
Poriot slew a soldier to defend the honour of his family. The 
historian is not required to sully his pages with a record of the 
deeds of lust and rapine which were committed by the Greek 
troops, but his verdict must be pronounced, as a warning to 
evil-doers. There is no scene more disgraceful to the Greek 
character in the history of the Revolution ; and horrible tales 
of pillage, rape, and murder, then perpetrated, long circulated 
among the people. Anecdotes of cruel extortion and base 
avidity were told of several officers. When all was over, the 
troops returned to Nauplia and Argos with horses stolen from 
the peasants of Damala, which were heavily laden with the 
plunder of Poros. 

The sack of Poros sowed the seeds of disorder in the Greek 
regular corps, and ruined the reputation of Capodistrias. 
General Gerard endeavoured in vain to bring back the army 
to a sense of duty, by blaming the conduct of the troops 
at Poros with great severity. Rhodios, the minister of war, 
who was a creature of Capodistrias, protected the worst 
criminals, and deprived the reproaches of the French general 
of their influence. This conduct increased the insubordination 
which the licence at Poros had created \ 

Capodistrias was soon alarmed to find that even his own 
partizans spoke with indignation of the conduct of the 
Russian admiral and of the Greek troops. His enemies pro- 
claimed that, in his eagerness to revenge himself on Miaoulis, 
he had given up the innocent inhabitants of a Greek town 
to pillage and slaughter. To withdraw public attention 
from the sack of Poros, he was now anxious to talk of 
a national assembly. The meeting of that assembly was 
inevitable, but the elections were not likely to be effected 
without some fierce contests. The president openly acted 
as the unscrupulous chief of an unprincipled party ; but an 
avenging fate was at hand. He had indulged his appetite 
for a bloody vengeance ; he was now sacrificed as a victim to 
private revenge. 

The distinguished part which several members of the 

' Pellion, 214. 


A.D, 1831.] 

family of Mavromichales acted at the commencement of the 
Revolution, has been recorded in the earher pages of this 
work. The best men of the house fell in battle. Kyriakules 
and Elias are names which Greece will always honour, Petro- 
bey, the chief of the family, though a man of no political 
capacity, was viewed by Capodistrias with ignoble jealousy. 
He enjoyed considerable influence in Maina, and Maina pos- 
sessed a considerable degree of political independence. Capodi- 
strias believed that centralization was the direct path to order, 
and it was certainly the quickest way of increasing his per- 
sonal authority. The influence of the family of Mavromichales 
appeared to be the principal obstacle to the success of his 
plans in Maina, and he removed its members from every officia'l 
position which they occupied at his arrival in Greece. His 
persecutions constituted them the natural champions of the 
provincial franchises and fiscal immunities of the Mainates. 

The lawless liberty that reigned in Maina was extremely 
offensive to the despotic principles of Capodistrias. He found 
both bad habits and criminal practices more powerful than 
either the local or the national government. Murder was 
legalized by written contracts. Bonds signed by living 
individuals were shown to the president, in which the penalty, 
in case of non-fulfilment, was a clause authorizing the holder 
to murder the obligant, or two of his nearest relations. 
Capodistrias considered it to be his duty to put an end to 
a state of society so disgraceful to orthodox Christians in 
the nineteenth century. He imagined that the people of 
Maina would aid him in his honourable enterprise, not 
reflecting that the deeds of vengeance which excited his 
indignation were considered by the native population as a 
necessary restraint on a ferocious and faithless race, in a 
region and among a class where the law was powerless. 
Murder in Maina answered the same purpose as duelling in 
other countries where the state of society was less barbarous, 
and assassination was a privilege of Mainate gentility. 

Personal jealousy made Capodistrias select the family of 
Petrobey as the scapegoats for the sins of Maina. The acts 
of rapine on shore and of piracy at sea which other Mainates 
committed were overlooked, and all the strength of the 
Greek government was employed to crush the detested house 
of Mavromichales. 


[Bk.V Ch. II. 

During the celebration of Easter 1830, Janni, the brother 
of Petrobey, commonly termed the King of Maina, in com- 
pany with one of the bey's sons, excited the people of 
Tzimova to revolt against the president's government. Many 
complaints had been laid before the Greek government against 
the acts of violence and extortion committed by this king 
of misrule, which he found it no easy matter to explain. 
He therefore declared himself the champion of the privileges 
of Maina, in order to evade answering for his own misdeeds. 
The people were in this way induced to make his cause 
their own. Janni Mavromichales seized the custom-house, 
and collected the public revenues in order to pay the men 
who took up arms. But this revolt was soon suppressed 
by the president, who persuaded George Mavromichales, the 
second son of Petrobey, to hasten from Argos to Maina, 
with the assurance that all the disputes between the Greek 
government and the family of Mavromichales should be 
promptly and satisfactorily arranged if Janni would come 
in person to Nauplia. George believed Capodistrias ; Janni 
believed George, and accompanied his nephew to the seat 
of government. The president soon violated his word. He 
put Janni under arrest, and ordered prosecutions to be com- 
menced against both him and his son Katzakos, who had 
attempted to assassinate his own cousin Pierakos. 

In the month of January 1831, Katzakos escaped from 
Argos, and about the same time Petrobey left Nauplia to 
return to Maina in General Gordon's yacht, which happened 
to sail for Zante. An insurrection had already broken out 
under the leading of Constantine, one of the bey's brothers. 
The yacht, not being able to touch at Maina, landed the 
bey at Katakolo, where he was immediately arrested, and 
sent back to Nauplia as a state prisoner. He was now 
detained on a charge of treason, and a committee of the 
senate, with Viaro for chairman, prosecuted the action against 
him. He was accused of inciting a rebellion in Maina, 
and of deserting his duty as a senator ^. An extraordinary 
tribunal, with his prosecutor Viaro as president, was created 
to try him, and he was imprisoned as a criminal in Itch-kale. 
About the same time Constantine Mavromichales was decoyed 

* The report of the committee is given in Eynard's Lettres et Documents, 127. 
It forms a general act of impeachment against the whole family. 


A.D. 1831.] 

on board ship by Kanares and carried to Nauplia, where he 
and George were placed under arrest. 

Public sympathy was now strongly awakened in favour 
of the Mavromichales family. It was thought that Petrobey 
was severely treated, Constantine unfairly entrapped, and 
George unjustly detained. Constantine and George were 
allowed to walk about freely within the fortress of Nauplia, 
attended by two guards during the day. They were loud 
in their complaints. The mother of Petrobey, an old lady 
approaching her ninetieth year, petitioned the president to 
release the bey, who remained in prison untried. No proof 
could be found of his complicity in his brother's insurrection, 
and it was not a crime for a senator to quit Nauplia without a 
passport. It was reported that both the Russian minister 
Baron Riickmann and Admiral Ricord advised the president 
to release Petrobey. It is certain that Capodistrias consented 
to allow the prisoner to dine on board the Russian flag-ship 
at Admiral Ricord's invitation. It was generally supposed 
that this permission implied a pardon for past offences ; and 
when Petrobey, on quitting Admiral Ricord's table, was con- 
ducted back to prison, even the partizans of the president 
were astonished at his conduct. It seems that Admiral 
Ricord had assured several persons that he would persuade 
the president to release the bey, and that his interference 
irritated Capodistrias, who became frequently peevish and 
changeable after the affair of Poros. Constantine and George 
were exasperated and alarmed by what they supposed to be 
a sudden and unfavourable change in the president's views. 

On the 9th of October at early dawn, three days after 
Petrobey's visit to Admiral Ricord, Capodistrias walked as 
usual to hear mass in the church of St, Spiridion. As he 
approached the low door of the small church, he saw Constan- 
tine Mavromichales standing on one side and George on the 
other. He hesitated for a moment, as if he suspected that 
they wished to address him, and would willingly have avoided 
the meeting. But after a momentary pause, he moved on to 
enter the church. Before he reached the door he fell on the 
pavement mortally wounded by a pistol-ball in the back of 
the head. In the act of falling he received the stab of a 
yataghan through the lungs, and he expired without uttering 
a word. 


Two guards were in attendance on the Mavromichales, and 
two orderlies accompanied the president. The assassins 
attempted to save themselves by flight. The pistol of one 
of the orderlies wounded Constantine, who was overtaken 
and slain. His body was carried to the square, where it 
remained exposed naked to the insults of the populace for 
several hours. It was then dragged through the streets and 
thrown into the sea. 

The whole town was alarmed by the report of the pistols ; 
the news of the president's assassination spread instantane- 
ously, and the whole population poured into the streets. .| 
Yet George Mavromichales succeeded in escaping into the 
house of the French resident, though at a considerable 
distance from the scene of the murder. A furious mob 
followed close at his heels, and demanded that he should 
be delivered up. His pursuers proclaimed themselves the 
avengers of blood, and threatened to force open the doors 
of the French residency and tear the assassin to pieces. 
Baron Rouen informed them that France must protect the 
refugee until a formal demand was made for his surrender 
to justice by the lawful authorities. In a few hours the 
demand was made ; but to save the criminal from the ven- 
geance of the people, it was found necessary to convey him 
to the insular fort of Burdje. His guilt was unquestionable, 
the proof was incontestable. He was condemned by a council 
of war, and executed on the 22nd of October. 

Greece had been depraved by the tyranny of Capodistrias ; 
she was utterly demoralized by his assassination. She ex- 
changed the sufferings of illegality for the tortures of anarchy. 

The name of Capodistrias remained for some time a party 
spell, but time has proved the avenger of truth. His talents, 
his eloquent state papers, and his private virtues, receive their 
merited praise ; but with all his sophistry, his cunning insi- 
nuations, and false pretences, they proved insufficient to 
conceal the wrongs which his vicious system of administration 
inflicted on Greece. 


Anarchy — 9TH October 1831 to ist February 1833. 

Governing commission refuses to grant a general amnesty. — Second national 
assembly at Argos. — Romeliot military opposition. — Agostino president of 
Greece. — Romeliots expelled from Argos. — Sir Stratford Canning's memo- 
randum. — Romeliots invade the Morea. — Conduct of the residents. — Agostino 
ejected from the presidency. — Governing commission. — State of Greece. — 
Anarchy. — French troops garrison Nauplia. — Djavellas occupies Patras. — 
Kolokotrones rallies the Capodistrians. — National assembly at Pronia. — Con- 
stitutional liberty in abeyance. — Intrigues of the senate. — Municipal institu- 
tions arrest the progress of anarchy in the Morea. — Condition of Messenia. — 
Positioa of Kolokotrones and Kolettes. — True nature of the municipal institu- 
tions in Greece not generally understood. — Attack on the French troops at 
Argos. — Establishment of the Bavarian dynasty. 

(JThe assassination of Capodistrias destroyed the whole 
edifice of his government, which for some time had derived 
an appearance of stability from nothing but his talents and 
personal influence. The persons whom he had selected to 
act as his ministers and official instruments employed his 
name as their aegis, and rallied round his brother Agostino, 
who had been treated as the president's heir, from motives of 
flattery, at a time when no one contemplated the possibility of 
his ever succeeding to power. 

The senate was filled with the most daring and unprin- 
cipled partizans of the Capodistrian policy. A few hours 
after the president's murder it appointed a governing com- 
mission to exercise the executive power until the meeting 
of the national a.ssembly. This commission consisted of 
three members — Count Agostino Capodistrias, Kolokotrones, 
and Kolettes. Agostino was named president. His incapa- 
city, joined to the irreconcileable hostility between the other 
two members, induced the senate to believe that it could 





[Bk.V. Ch.III. 

retain the powers of government in its own hands. The 
people judged more correctly, and prognosticated an ap- 
proaching civil war. A general amnesty for political offences 
was instinctively felt to be the only means of preserving any 
degree of order. A few political leaders and military chief- 
tains, who desired to fish in troubled waters, determined to 
frustrate all attempts at pacification. A large body of well- 
paid Moreot troops looked to Kolokotrones as their leader ; 
a still larger number of the veteran soldiers of continental 
Greece, wdiose pay was in arrear, considered Kolettes as their 
political advocate. 

The municipality of Syra made a vain endeavour to consign 
past contentions to oblivion by acknowledging the authority 
of the governing commission. The constitutionalists at Hydra 
made conciliatory proposals to the new executive. They 
asked for a general amnesty for all political offences except 
the assassination of the president, and they required that the 
governing commission should be increased to five members 
by the aggregation of two persons chosen from among the 
constitutionalists. These proposals were rejected with dis- 
dain. Count Agostino pretended that a national assembly 
could alone grant a general amnesty, and the members of the 
commission, in order to avoid receiving two colleagues, declared 
that they had no power to enlarge the executive body. The 
reply was evasive, and felt to be insulting. The exiles only 
wished a guarantee against governmental prosecutions until the 
meeting of the national assembly, and they knew that the 
senate had the power to add to the body it had created. 

The contest for absolute power by the Capodistrians, and 
for life and property as well as liberty by the constitutionalists, 
was now resumed with embittered animosity. Both parties 
saw that their safety could only be secured by the command 
of a devoted majority in the national assembly, and both 
prepared to secure success in the coming elections by force of 
arms. Hydra was kept closely blockaded by the Russian 

The influence of the Capodistrians in the Morea gave them 
a considerable majority in the second national assembly at 
Argos ; but they derived much of their authority as a party 
from the open support of the Russian admiral, Ricord. In 
some places, the Capodistrians, though they formed a mino- 


V.D. 1S3I.] 

rity, obtained the assistance of a military force, and held a 
meeting, in which they elected a deputy, in violation of every 
legal and constitutional form. Yet these deputies were 
received into the assembly, and their elections were declared 
valid. Both parties circulated atrocious calumnies against 
their opponents. The Capodistrians accused the French and 
English of being privy to the assassination of the president. 
Agostino boasted of his hatred to the French. He dismissed 
General Gerard from his command in the Greek army, and he 
intimated to General Gueheneuc, who commanded the French 
army of occupation in the Morea, that the financial condition 
of the country imposed on the Greek government the obliga- 
tion of observing the strictest economy in paying foreigners. 
On receiving this intimation the French general immediately 
recalled all the French officers in the Greek service, in order 
to prevent their being dismissed in the same manner as 
General Gerard. The constitutionalists at Hydra spread a 
report that the murdered president had bribed six Hydriot 
traitors to assassinate the leaders of the opposition ; and it 
was generally believed that Agostino and Admiral Ricord had 
sworn to send Miaoulis, and all the sailors who had taken part 
in the-affair of Poros, to Siberia. 

The proximity of Argos to the garrison of Nauplia and to 
the Russian fleet gave the Capodistrians the command of 
the town. The deputies of Hydra were not even allowed to 
land at Lerna, for it was considered to be the safest way 
to exclude opposition. Those of Maina were stopped at 
Astros. To prevent even a murmur of dissatisfaction with 
the actual government from being heard in the assembly, the 
senate named a commission, which was ordered to verify the 
election of each deputy before he was allowed to take his seat 
in the assembly. This unconstitutional proceeding was sup- 
posed to have been counselled by Russia, and awakened very 
general dissatisfaction even in the Capodistrian party. 

;The military chiefs of continental Greece came to the 
assembly as deputies from the districts in which they pos- 
sessed local influence, or to which the majority of their 
followers belonged. They cared little for constitutional 
liberty, but they were now ready to join any opposition, 
unless they were allowed to receive the high pay and ample 
rations which were enjoyed by the followers of Kolokotrones 


[Bk.V. Ch.III. 

and the other Capodlstrian chiefs. Kolettes was in a position 
to assist them in their object, and they had not forgotten the 
hberaUty with which he had poured the proceeds of the 
Enghsh loans into their hands. Kolettes was not a babbler, 
like most Greek statesmen. The astute Vallachian could 
assume an oracular look and remain silent when he wished 
to conceal his thoughts. In the present case, his prudence 
led Agostino and his counsellors to suppose that he was 
intent on retaining his place in the executive body. But 
it was evident that a number of the continental chiefs would 
openly oppose the election of Agostino to the presidency of 
Greece, even though Kolettes might remain neutral. It was 
resolved to crush this opposition before it could make common 
cause with the constitutionalists. Several Romeliot captains 
belonged to the Capodistrian party; of these the most influ- 
ential were the Suliot chief Kitzos Djavellas, and Rhangos, 
a captain of armatoli, who on one occasion, as has been 
already mentioned, joined the Turks. 

The Romeliot chiefs came to Argos attended by bands 
of followers, who. according to the established usage of 
Greece, were supplied with rations by the government. In 
this way the partizans of Kolettes assembled about five 
hundred good soldiers at Argos. All these men had claims 
for arrears of pay, and most of them had individual grievances, 
which Capodistrias had neglected to redress. Kolettes warmly 
supported their claims, and assured them that he would do 
everything in his power to obtain justice. He was aware that 
he must unite his cause with theirs, for without their support 
his political influence would be annihilated. He was distrusted 
by Agostino, disliked by Admiral Ricord, and hated by 

For some days before the opening of the assembly, the 
diff'erent factions employed their time in arranging their plans. 
Some individuals doubtless acted from patriotic motives, but 
the conduct of the majority of the Romeliots, as well as of 
the Capodistrians, was guided by self-interest and personal 

The Romeliot chiefs, finding themselves in a minority, 
demanded that the constitutional deputies who had met at 
Hydra should be allowed to take their seats in the assembly. 
This demand was rejected, on the ground that new deputies 


I A.D.I 83 1.] 

had been elected, and that these new elections had received 
the sanction of the commission named by the senate. The 
! Romeliots then drew up a protest containing a declaration 
I of their principles ^ They characterized the nomination of 
! the governing commission by the senate as an illegal act ; 
J they objected to the appointment of the commission to verify 
; the elections of deputies by the senate as an unconstitutional 
; infringement of the right of the national assembly ; and they 
proclaimed their adhesion to the following principles and 
resolutions : That national union ought to precede the meet- 
ing of a national assembly ; that the national assembly ought 
to verify the elections of its members, and appoint its own 
guard, as on former occasions. The order in which the con- 
stitutional rights of the nation were to be discussed was also 
fixed, and resolutions were proposed, relative to the choice of 
a sovereign and to the nature of the provisional government 
which was to act until his arrival. The attempt to interfere 
with the proceedings of the Allied cabinets displeased their 
diplomatic agents at Nauplia, and inclined them to favour 
Agostino and the Capodistrians. 

The rival parties trusted more to force than to right. Each 
assumed that it was the national party, and two hostile as- 
semblies were opened on the same day. 

The deputies of the Capodistrian party, to the number of a 
hundred and fifty, met on the 17th of December 1831 in the 
church of the Panaghia, and, after taking the prescribed oath, 
walked in procession to the schoolhouse, which had been 
fitted up as the place of meeting for the national assembly. 
A strong guard, under the command of Kitzos Djavellas, and 
an escort of cavalry, under Kalergi, insured a public triumph 
to the Capodistrians. They met in security, elected their 
president, issued a proclamation, and proceeded to business. 

The Romeliots were not strong enough to make any public 
display ; but they also held their meeting, elected their pre- 
sident, and issued their proclamation. They called upon the 
residents of the Allied powers, as protectors of Greece, to 
enforce a general amnesty, and they invited the French troops 
in the Morea to occupy Argos in order to preserve order. 
The residents, knowing that neither party was disposed to 

1 Dated i8th (30th) November, 1831. 


[Bk.V. Ch.IlI. 

obey the law or listen to the dictates of justice, allowed things 
to take their course. 

On the 20th December, Agostino Capodistrias was elected 
president of Greece, and invested with all the authority which 
had been conferred on his murdered brother. He and Kolo- 
kotrones had already resigned their power as members of the 
governing commission named by the senate, into the hands of 
the national assembly. Kolettes, not recognising the Capo- 
distrian assembly, and not having resigned his power, pre- 
tended to be the only man now entitled to conduct the 
executive government. 

The Capodistrians feared that, if the Romeliots were allowed 
time to summon the deputies from Hydra and Maina to their 
aid, they might be strong enough to overthrow the govern- 
ment. To prevent this, it was resolved to expel the Romeliot 
chiefs from Argos before additional troops could arrive to 
reinforce Kolettes' partizans. Agostino Capodistrias, Admiral 
Ricord, Kolokotrones, Metaxas, and Djavellas all agreed that 
an immediate attack was necessary to insure victory. Once 
driven beyond the Isthmus of Corinth, the Romeliots might 
be treated as lawless bands of brigands intent on plunder. 

A Russian lieutenant named Raikoff, who had been pro- 
moted by Capodistrias to the rank of colonel, was summoned 
from Nauplia, with four guns and a company of artillerymen, 
to assist the government troops already in Argos. Raikoff 
was a warm partizan, and pretended to be a confidential agent 
of Russian policy. Strengthened by this reinforcement, the 
troops of Agostino attacked the Romeliots. A fierce civil 
war was carried on in the streets of Argos for two days, before 
the Romeliots, though inferior in number and ill supplied with 
ammunition and provisions, were expelled from the town and 
compelled to retreat to Corinth. 

Sir Stratford Canning arrived at Nauplia to be a witness to 
these proceedings. The three powers had at last come to an 
agreement on Greek affairs, and selected a Bavarian prince to 
be king. Sir Stratford was on his way to Constantinople as 
English ambassador to obtain the sultan's recognition of the 
Greek kingdom, and he visited Nauplia to announce to the 
Greeks the arrangements which had been adopted by the 
Allies, and to prepare them to receive their king with order 
and unanimity. Sir Stratford found that Agostino was a fool 


A.D. I S3!.] 

utterly incapable of appreciating either his own position or 
that of Greece, and he counselled conciliatory measures, and 
urged the necessity of moderation, in vain. The empty head 
of the Corfiot was inflated with presumption. Before quitting 
Greece, Sir Stratford communicated to Agostino a memor- 
andum on the state of the country, urging him in strong terms 
to terminate the civil war he had commenced ^ Though the 
observations in this document produced no effect on the 
Greek government, and very little on the ulterior conduct of 
Mr. Dawkins, Baron Rouen, and Baron de Riickmann, the 
residents of the three Allied powers at Nauplia, yet they were 
so judicious that they made a deep impression on the min- 
isters in conference at London. The anarchy in Greece 
threatened to render Sir Stratford's mission to the sultan use- 
less ; and he warned Agostino that, by destroying the houses 
of the peaceful inhabitants of Argos, and plundering their 
shops, as a prelude to a bloody intestine war, Greece pro- 
claimed herself in the face of Europe to be unworthy of the 
independent position as a nation to which the Allied powers 
were endeavouring to elevate her. This memorandum was 
supported by formal notes of the residents, recommending 
Agostino to publi-sh a general amnesty and convoke a free 
national assembly. But shortly after the departure of Sir 
Stratford from Greece, the residents ceased to insist on the 
measures they had advised ; and Admiral Ricord, who had 
never moderated the violence of his language, continued to 
encourage the Capodistrians to push their attacks on the con- 
stitutionalists with vigour. He gave them hopes of being able 
to expel the French army of occupation from the Morea, and 
he pointed out to them the necessity of perpetuating their 
authority by forcing themselves on the new sovereign as 
ministers and senators. The position of the French troops 
who were protecting Messenia from being plundered by the 
Mainates was rendered so confined, that they were obliged 
to drive the Capodistrian troops out of the town of Nisi, 
in order to keep open their communications with their head- 
quarters at Modon, and secure a safe passage to the peasantry 
who brought provisions to their camp. 

The political atmosphere of Europe was too troubled during 

1 Parliamefitary Papers, Annex A to the Fiotocol of 7th March, 1832. The 
memorandum is dated 28th December, 1831. 


[Bk. V. Ch. Ill 

the year 1831 to enable the Allies to bestow more than a! 
casual glance at the affairs of Greece, whose unsettled con-; 
dition was gradually destroying the importance of the country 
in the solution of what statesmen called the Eastern question. 
The attention of Great Britain and France was absorbed by 
the creation of the kingdom of Belgium ; Russia was occupied 
with the insurrection of Poland. But during the winter the 
condition of Europe became more tranquil, and the fate of 
Greece was again taken into consideration. On the 7th 
January 1832 a protocol was signed, authorizing the residents 
at Nauplia to recognise the provisional government named- 
by the national assemlDly, which, it was supposed, was a free 
meeting. On receiving this protocol, the residents, who knew 
that Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum was on its way 
to London, thought fit to recognise Agostino Capodistrias 
as president of Greece. On the 13th of February another 
protocol was signed, offering the throne of Greece to Prince 
Otho, a boy seventeen years old, the second son of the King 
of Bavaria ^. 

In the mean time the Romeliots were preparing to avenge 
their defeat at Argos. Their preparations went on slowly, 
until they heard that the Allies had chosen a king for Greece. 
They saw immediately that it was necessary to overthrow 
the government of Agostino, in order to have a share in 
welcoming the new monarch, and a claim to participate in 
the distribution of wealth and honours which would take place 
on the king's arrival. 

After their retreat from Argos, the Romeliots formed a 
camp at Megara. The meeting, which arrogated to itself the 
'title of a national assembly, met at Perachora, where it was 
strengthened by the arrival of the deputies from Hydra and 
Maina. Kolettes was supported by most of the eminent 
men in Greece. Konduriottes, Miaoulis, Mavromichales, and 
Mavrocordatos, and a respectable body of constitutional 
deputies, sanctioned his proceedings. But the Romeliots 
looked to arms and not to justice for victory. Constitu- 
tional liberty was a good war-cry, but military force could 

^ Everything that can be urged in favour of this unfortunate choice will be 
found in Thiersch, De Vtltat actml de la Grece, i. 308-314. Before the election, 
Thiersch, who was one of the prince's teachers, considered that it would be abso- 
lutely necessary for King Otho to join the Greek Church, i. 313. 


A.D. 1832.] /""l 

alone open the road to power. The numbers of armed men 
collected at Megara at last rendered an advance on Nauplia 
necessary to procure subsistence. Every effort that revenge, 
party zeal, and sincere patriotism could suggest, was employed 
to urge on the soldiers. Commissions were distributed with 
a lavish hand among the bravest veterans. Civilians were 
suddenly made captains. Kolettes and the military chieftains 
cared nothing for moral and political responsibility ; their 
sole object was to conquer power, and about the means they 
were quite indifferent. Mavrocordatos and the constitution- 
alists felt that the recognition of Agostino's government by 
the residents cut off all hope of a general amnesty, a free 
national assembly, or a legal administration, without a decided 
victory of the Romeliots. It was thought that the residents 
would not venture to employ the forces of the Allies to 
support a government which had rejected their own advice 
as well as the warnings of Sir Stratford Canning. The 
Greek leaders knew that none of the residents possessed 
the firm character, any more than the enlightened views, of 
Sir Stratford, and it was inferred with diplomatic sagacity 
that the instructions received with the protocols of the 13th 
and 14th February 1H32 would place the residents in a false 
position with their cabinets ^. Their recognition of a govern- 
ment illegally constituted had rendered the pacification of 
Greece impossible without further violence. Agostino, less 
sagacious than the constitutionalists, believed that his recog- 
nition by the residents was equivalent to a guarantee on the 
part of the Allied powers ; and he expected to see the 
troops of France support him at the Isthmus of Corinth as 
decidedly as the fleet of Russia had supported his brother 
at Poros. 

At this late hour the residents made a feeble attempt to 
avert a civil war. They invited the general commanding 
the French army of occupation to occupy the Isthmus of 
Corinth, and authorized Professor Thiersch, who had visited 
Greece as an unrecognized agent of the Bavarian court, to 
negotiate with the deputies and military chiefs at Perachora 
and Megara. Thiersch favoured the constitutional party. He 

' Thiersch has published a letter in which Mavrocordatos examines the state of 
public affairs in Greece at this time with ability and moderation ; vol. i. p 327. 



[Bk.V. Ch.IlI. : 

had been long in communication with the Philhellenic com- ; 
mittees on the continent. In the year 1829 he had advocated L 
the election of Prince Otho to the sovereignty of Greece, | 
and he had communicated with the Bavarian court on the 
subject. The object of his present tour was understood to | 
be, to prepare the minds of the Greeks for the choice of a * 
Bavarian prince ; and now, when Otho was elected king, he 
stepped forward as a diplomatic agent of Bavaria, and was 
treated as such both by the residents and by the leaders of 
all parties among the Greeks. 

The prudence of the constitutionalists, and the passions - 
of the military chiefs, rejected every arrangement based on 
the continuance of the presidency of Agostino and the rati- 
fication of the acts of the assembly by which he had been 
elected. The mission of Thiersch failed, and its failure ren- 
dered the position of Agostino untenable. Those who had 
hitherto supported him perceived that they had ruined their 
cause by placing too much power in his hands, and by 
attempting to prolong his authority beyond the legal majority 
of the king chosen by the protecting powers ^. Agostino 
determined to cling to power, but the rapid advance of the 
Romeliots soon dispelled his hopes of Russian support and 
hi^visions of future greatness. 

(fOw the 6th of April the government troops stationed at 
the Isthmus of Corinth fled before the constitutionalists 
without offering any resistance. The heroes of the sack of 
Poros, the cavalry of Kalergi, knd the generalship of Kolo- 
kotrones, the veteran commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian 
army, were unable to retard the advance of the invaders, who 
marched straight to Argos. The residents were now in an 
awkward and not very honourable position. By an extra- 
ordinary piece of good luck they were relieved from the 
foolish part they were acting. On the very day the Romeliot 
troops entered Argos, the protocol of the 7th March 1832 
arrived at Nauplia, and they were instructed to carry out 
the principles of Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum. It 
was easy for them to treat their recognition of Agostino's 
presidency as a temporary expedient, adopted to avoid a 

1 Thiersch records the arguments used by the Capodistrian party for investing 
Agostino with the regency and deferring the majority of King Otho to the age of 
35; De TEtat achiel de la Grcce, i. 84. 



jA.D. 1832.] 

icivil war, until they received the definitive instructions now 
placed in their hands. The memorandum declared 'that the 
interests of the Greeks, and the honour of the Allies, required 
a system of provisional government calculated to preserve 
the country from anarchy.' This could, in the present crisis 
of affairs, only be attained by ejecting Agostino from the 

On the 8th of April they addressed a vague diplomatic 
note to the president they had recognized, inviting him to 
contribute to the execution of the protocol of the 7th of 
March. Agostino, trusting to the secret aid of Admiral 
Ricord, replied with a request for a copy of the document 

I to which they alluded, and which had not yet been officially 
communicated to the Greek government. The residents were 
alarmed at his endeavour to gain time, and, their own interests 
being at stake, they proceeded with great promptitude to 
eject him from office. His incapacity secured them an easy 
victory in a personal interview. Without wasting their time 

I in composing diplomatic notes, they walked to the govern- 

I ment-house, while Agostino was still chuckling at his supposed 
victory over the diplomatists, entered his presence, and informed 
him without ceremony that he must immediately send his 

I resignation to the senate. So far their conduct was extremely 
judicious, but they had not the clear heads which enable 
men to stop short in action at the precise limit of justice 
and prudence. In the spirit of diplomatic meddling, which 
involves nations in as much embarrassment as military am- 
bition, they made the ejected president add a recommendation 
to the senate to appoint a commission of five persons to 
govern Greece until the king's arrival. Agostino was rendered 
amenable to their orders by a hint that any delay would 
produce a decree of the senate deposing him from the presi- 
dency. Convinced that his cause was hopeless, he wrote 
his resignation in the manner they desired, and quitted 
Greece, with the body of his murdered brother, in a Russian 

The expedient of establishing peace by a diplomatic com- 
promise, after allowing every passion which civil war excites 
to rage for three months, was a violation of common sense 
that could not prove successful. The same diplomatists had 
refused to prevent a civil war by enforcing a compromise 

G 3 


[Bk. V. Ch. Ill, 

before the opening of the assembly at Argos ; yet they now 
imagined that their interference would avert anarchy. As 
a little foresight might have predicted, the Romeliot troops 
paid very little attention to these manoeuvres. They were 
resolved to reap the fruits of their victory, and it was not 
by naming a commission in which a hostile senate would 
be able to secure a majority that this end could be attained. 
Foreign interference rarely saves a nation from the direct 
consequences of its own vices, and anarchy was the natural 
result of the repeated illegalities which every party in Greece 
had committed. 

The conduct of the residents deserves reprehension. They 
evidently thought more of concealing their own incapacity 
and inconsistency than of serving the cause of the Greeks, 
in the measures they adopted for carrying the protocol of 
the 7th of March into execution. They established a phantom 
of government, which they knew would be unable to pacify 
the country, because it appeared to them to offer the political 
combination least at variance with their own proceedings. 
Had they endeavoured to act in accordance with the laws 
and institutions of Greece, it is possible that they might 
have failed in preventing the Greeks from falling into a 
state of anarchy, but they would have saved themselves from 
all reproach. When the senate first assumed illegal powers, 
it was the duty of the residents to refuse to recognize its 
illegal acts. In the present crisis, had they paid any attention 
to the constitution of Greece, even as established by Capo- 
distrias, they would have recommended the representation of 
both parties in the senate, and avoided the incongruity of 
composing an executive government of two hostile factions. 
The Russian resident wished the senate to remain unaltered, 
as it consisted entirely of Russian partizans, and was com- 
pletely under the guidance of Admiral Ricord. But the 
English and French residents knew that its composition 
rendered the pacification of Greece impossible. The English 
resident, however, moved partly by jealousy of French in- 
fluence, and partly by distrust of Kolettes' character, adopted 
the Russian policy concerning the immutability of the senate, 
and consented to transfer the contest of the hostile parties 
from the legislative assembly, where it might elicit argument, 
to the executive power, where it could only produce anarchy. 


AD. T832.I ^ 

In conformity with the suggestion conveyed in the resig- 
nation of the presidency by Agostino, the senate named five 
persons whom the residents indicated as a governing com- 
mission. When the RomcHots heard the names that were 
pleasing to the diplomatists, they treated the election with 
contempt, and marched forward to attack Nauplia. The 
fortress was impregnable, but they had many staunch partizans 
within its walls, and expected to enter without much difificulty. 
The senate was terrified ; the residents had again thrust 
themselves into a false position. It was necessary to effect 
a new diplomatic compromise, and for this purpose Kolettes 
was invited to confer with the diplomatists at the house of 
the French resident. 

On the loth of April Kolettes rode into Nauplia in 
triumph. He had now the nation, the army, the senate, and 
the three protecting powers at his feet. Unfortunately for 
the Greeks, with all his talents as an intriguer, he had neither 
the views of a statesman nor the principles of a patriot. He 
had climbed to the elevation of a Cromwell or a Washington, 
and he stood in his high position utterly incompetent to act 
with decision, and prevented by his own absolute incapacity 
from serving either the constitutional cause or the interests 
of the Romeliot troops who had raised him to power. 

Fourteen days were consumed in diplomatic shuffling and 
personal intrigues before the names of a new governing com- 
mission were finally settled. It was then composed of seven 
members, and not of five, as recommended by the residents. 
The constitution of Greece was grossly violated by this 
election ; for the senate, at the instigation of the diplomatists, 
invested this governing commission with the executive power 
until the king's arrival, though both by law and invariable 
practice it was only entitled to confer that power until the 
meeting of a national assembly, when it required to be ratified 
or reconstituted by a decree of the representatives of the 
nation. The object of the Capodistrians was to prevent the 
national assembly electing a president of the constitutional 
party. They even succeeded in paralyzing the action of the 
constitutionalists in the governing commission, by enacting 
that the presence of five members was necessary to give 
validity to its decisions. Now, as there were two staunch 
Capodistrians in the commission, and one constitutional 

86 ANARCHY. ^ 


member, who was too ill to attend, it was evident that the 
two Capodistrians could arrest the action of the executive 
authority at any crisis by preventing a decision. Three 
members of the commission, Kolettes, Konduriottes, and 
Zaimes, were supposed to represent the constitutional oppo- 
sition to the Capodistrian system ; but the residents and 
the leading Capodistrians were aware that Zaimes was 
already a renegade. Two members were recognized to be the 
representatives of the Romeliot troops — Prince Demetrius 
Hypsilantes and Kosta Botzaris^. Two members, as has been 
said, were staunch Capodistrians — Metaxas and Koliopulos or 
Plapoutas. This executive commission had a cabinet com- 
posed of seven ministers, who were all constitutionalists ; 
but with the exception of Mavrocordatos, they w^ere men 
without administrative knowledge, mere rhetoricians, who 
could clothe commonplace thoughts in official Greek. Even 
Mavrocordatos was misplaced as minister of finance. These 
ministers were severely blamed for accepting office without 
fixing a day for the meeting of the national assembly, and 
without insisting that the power of the governing commission 
should terminate when the assembly met. Their friends 
excused their neglect of constitutional principles by pleading 
the power of the residents ; but those who scanned their 
political lives with attention, observed that they frequently 
contrived to advance their own interests by sacrificing the 
cause they adopted ^. 

Public opinion demanded the immediate convocation of a 
national assembly. To save the country from anarchy it 
was necessary to reconstitute the senate, according to the 
principles of conciliation laid down in Sir Stratford Canning's 
memorandum, and it might have been found necessary to 
throw the responsibility of maintaining order on Kolettes by 
creating him dictator. But the residents, the Russian admiral. 

1 Hypsilantes expressed his repugnance to become a member of this commission 
in strong terms, and his observations exhibit good sense and patriotism, but he was 
persuaded by his friends to withdraw his objections. He was aheady suffering 
from the disease which soon after terminated his life. His letter is given by 
Thiersch (i. 369). In mentioning the nomination of Kosta Botzaris, Thiersch 
observes (i. 381) that the Romeliot Greeks still regarded the Albanian tribe of 
isuliots with jealousy. 

'-' Christides was Minister of the Interior, and General Secretary of State; 
Mavrocordatos. of Finance ; Tricoupi, of Foreign Affairs ; Zographos, of War ;' 
Bulgares, of the Marine; Klonares, of Justice; and Rizos Neroulos, of Eccle- 
siastical Afiairs and Public Instruction. 


A.D. 1 83 J.] 

the senate, and the ministers in office, were all opposed to the 
meeting of a national assembly. 

The Capodistrian party soon recovered from its defeat. 
It succeeded in retaining possession of a considerable portion 
of the revenues of the Morea, and received active support 
from Admiral Ricord. The Romeliots, after overthrowing 
Agostino s government, daily lost ground. The commission 
of seven was either unable or unwilling to reward their 
services, and the soldiers soon determined to reward them- 
selves. They treated the election of the commission as a 
temporary compromise, not as a definitive treaty of peace, 
and they marched into different districts in the Morea, to 
take possession of the national revenues as a security for 
their pay and rations. Wherever they established themselves, 
they lived at free quarters in the houses of the inhabitants. 

The financial administration of Mavrocordatos was not 
calculated to moderate the rapacity of the troops. The 
governing commission raised money by private bargains for 
the sale of the tenths, and the proceeds of these anticipated 
and frequently illegal sales were employed to reward personal 
[)artizans, and not to discharge the just debts due to the 
soldiers for arrears of pay. A small sum judiciously expended 
would have sent many of the Romeliot troops to their native 
mountains, where, as peace was now restored, they would 
have willingly returned, had they been able to procure the 
means of cultivating their property. The troops were neg- 
lected, while favoured chieftains were allowed to become 
farmers of taxes, or were authorized to collect arrears due 
by preceding farmers. These proceedings gave rise to in- 
tolerable exactions. The chieftains often defrauded their 
followers of their pay, but they retained partizans by allowing 
the soldiers to extort money and double rations from the 
peasantry. Some drew pay and rations for a hundred men 
without having twenty under arms. Numbers of soldiers 
were disbanded, and roved backwards and forwards, plunder- 
ing the villages, and devouring the sheep and oxen of the 
peasants. Professor Thiersch informs us that the bands of 
Theodore Grivas on the side of the constitutionalists, and 
of Thanasopulos on the side of the Capodistrians, spread 
terror wherever they appeared by their exactions and cruelty ^ 

' Grivas had taken into his pay a body of Mussulman Albanians. Compare 

88 ' ANARCHY. 

[Bk. V. Ch. III. 

Eight thousand Romeliots were at this time Hving at free iplit* 
quarters in the Morea, and it was said that they levied daily \W 
from the population upwards of twenty thousand rations. 
The governing commission solicited pecuniary advances from 
the three protecting powers, pretending that they would 
employ them for alleviating the misery of the people ; but i 
the Allies wisely refused to advance money, which they 
saw, by the misconduct of the government, would have been 
wasted in maintaining lawless bands of personal followers 
in utter idleness. 

The position of the two hostile parties soon became clearly 
defined. The greater part of the Morea adhered to the 
Capodistrian party, as the surest means of obtaining defence 
against the exactions of the Romeliot soldiery. Several 
Moreot primates and deputies, who had hitherto acted with 
the constitutionalists, now abandoned the cause of the govern- 
ing commission. Even in Romelia the Capodistrians possessed 
a rallying-point at Salona, where Mamoures maintained him- 
self with a strong garrison. In the Archipelago, Tinos con- 
tinued faithful to the Capodistrians, and served as a refuge 
for the officials of the party who were expelled from the other 
islands. Spetzas and Aegina were also prevented from 
acknowledging the authority of the governing commission 
by ships of war commanded by Andrutzos and Kanares. 

All liberated Greece was now desolated by anarchy. Long 
periods of mal-administration on the part of the government, 
and a cynical contempt for justice and good faith on the part 
of the civil and military leaders, had paralyzed the nation. 
The Revolution, to all appearance, had been crowned with 
success. The Turks were expelled from the country, and 
Greece formed an independent state. Yet Greece was cer- 
tainly not free, for the people were groaning under the most 
cruel oppression. The whole substance of the land was 
devoured by hosts of soldiers, sailors, captains, generals, 
policemen, government officials, tax-gatherers, secretaries, and 

Thiersch i. 71, 121, 123, 182. 'Les capitaines presque sans exception gardaient 
I'argent pour eux, et les troupes resterent dans I'ancien etat d'exinanition' (p 123). 
*Les plus grands desordres apparurent a la vente des dimes, oil il y eut un 
commerage de capitaines, de primats, de hauts eniplo)-es. et pour ainsi dire des com- 
pagnies organisees qui penetrerent meme dans quelques minisleres et jusqu'au 
milieu du gouvernement ' (p. 182). It must be remembered that Professor 
Thiersch is the panegyrist of Kolettes and a partizan of the Romeliots. 


A.D. 1832.] 

political adventurers, all living idly at the public expense, 
while the agricultural population was perishing from starvation. 

Evil habits, and the difficulty of procuring the means of 
subsistence, may form some excuse for the rapine of the 
soldiery, but no apology can be offered for the conduct of 
the members of the governing commission and of the 
ministry, who increased the miseries of the people by their 
malversations, or countenanced the dishonesty of their col- 
' leagues by retaining office. Honour as well as patriotism 
conmianded every man who had a sense of duty, either to 
put a stop to the devastation of the country or resign his 
place as a ruler or a minister. The tenacity with which those 
■ who called themselves constitutionalists clung to office has 
fixed an indelible stain on their political character, and 
destroyed the confidence of the Greek people in the honesty 
of public men. When Mavrocordatos, Tricoupi, Klonares, 
and Zographos, abandoned the cause of civil liberty, they 
destroyed all trust in the good faith of the statesmen of the 
Greek Revolution. The immediate effect of their misconduct 
was to constitute Theodore Kolokotrones, the veteran klepht, 
the champion of the people's rights \ 

Before the constitutional ministers had been a month in 
office, their weakness had increased the insubordination of the 
military classes, and their misconduct had alienated their own 
partizans to such a degree, that they found it necessary to 
invite the French troops to occupy Nauplia and Patras, as 
the only means- of securing their personal safety and the 
prolongation of their power. 

On the 19th of May 1H32 General Corbet entered Nauplia ; 
but at Patras the governing commission was not so fortunate 

^ Alexander Soutzos echoes the popular feeling in a poem writ' en in August, 

Ba);Uots «Js T^v hi\6voiav 'ara nddrj raiv vipcjvovv 
ual Toiis Siairoras rwv fi alaxpas fJicvfiLas SiKaiwvovv. 
aTrjv Se^tdv r-qs (pipnvaa to avvrayfj-a Kal vufxovs 
Tj Avapxia fxl Kpavyds TrepnTaTii arovs 8pupiovs, 
TloXiTiKol, TloXepuKol /x' dvaiSaav p.cynKrji' 
wadv ol \vKot xaipovrai fis ttjv dvepiv^dXrjv, 
dpird^ovv T(xs itpoaubovs pias, yvfivdivow jov Kaov fias, 
teal d-neiOis Kal draKTOv to aTpaTicuTiKuv fias 
adv dippiajxfvo d\oyov ttov ^aoTayfidv 8iv iX^'-< f-^A. 
He also satirizes the high officials for their desertion of the cause of consti- 
tutional liberty. One of them speaks thus : — 
^ T<j (xwrayixd fias Kvpie ; — -to crvvTaypia as xopfvr). 

B' fxrjnojs TO TravSpevdrjKapLe ; ds Tt /J.ds XPW-P'-^^^'' > 


[Bk. V. Ch. III. 

as to obtain French assistance, and that place fell into the 
hands of the Capodistrians. 

The loss of Patras was caused by gross negligence on the 
part of Zographos, the minister of war. Ignorant of official 
business, and absorbed in personal intrigues, he left the 
Greek troops without instructions concerning their future 
conduct. The regular troops in garrison at Patras had sup- 
ported the Capodistrians while in power, but they were 
disposed to obey the government, and not to follow the 
personal fortunes of any president. The hostility of Kolettes 
to the regular corps was notorious, and, through the neglect . 
of Zographos, both the officers and men at Patras were easily 
persuaded by the partizans of Russian influence that it was 
the intention of the governing commission to disband the 
regular troops. While brooding over this report, which 
threatened them with the loss of a large amount of arrears 
of pay, they heard that French troops were invited to garrison 
Patras. They concluded that they were cheated by the 
minister of war, and betrayed by the governing commission. 
As long as they remained in garrison at Patras they were 
sure of being regularly supplied with rations and clothing, and 
of obtaining from time to time advances of pay; but once 
expelled from the town, they believed that they would be 
allowed to starve. The Capodistrians formed a strong party 
in the town, and they availed themselves of the excited feel- 
ings of the soldiers to declare, that regular troops who 
delivered a fortress like Patras to foreigners would render 
themselves guilty of treason. The constitutionalists had 
accused Capodistrias of selling Greece to the Russians ; the 
Capodistrians now accused the constitutionalists of selling 
Nauplia and Patras to the French. The regular troops 
mutinied^ deposed their commanding officer, who refused to 
sign a manifesto justifying their revolt, and invited Kitzos 
Djavellas, who was then at Vostitza, to assume the chief 
command at Patras. 

Djavellas, who had retreated from the Romeliots, was at 
the head of about five hundred irregulars, and he was looking 
out for a position in which he could maintain his followers^ 
and defend himself against the attacks of the Kolettists. 
He hastened to Patras, and entered it before the arrival of 
the French, When they made their appearance, Djavellas 


.D. 1832.] 

ransmitted to their commanding officer a formal protest 
igainst the authority of the governing commission^ and 

cfused to admit the French troops into the fortress. The 
l^'rench commander, considering that it was the object of 
die Alhes to maintain order and not to enforce the authority 
jf any party, immediately retired, and the residents, who 
wished to avoid bloodshed, left Djavellas in peaceable pos- 
session of Patras ^ Thus, by the incapacity of Zographos 
and the decision of Djavellas, the Capodistrians remained in 
[possession of the commercial town of Patras, and of the 
fortresses of Rhion and Antirrhion, with the command of 
the entrance into the Gulf of Corinth, until the arrival of 
King Otho. 

This success emboldened the enemies of Kolettes. A 
[^rcat part of the Morea, and several districts of continental 
( ireece, refused to admit the officials named by the governing 
commission. The demogeronts, wherever they were sup- 
ported by the people, assumed the management of public 
as well as local business. They had been appointed by 
Capodistrias. They feared anarchy more than despotism, 

I ad they naturally sought protection from the military leaders 
r the Capodistrian party. The greater part of Arcadia and 
Achaia resisted the authority of the governing commission, 
while Argolis, Corinthia, and Laconia, generally acknowledged 
its power. Messenia and Elis were the scenes of frequent 
civil broils. In Phocis the Capodistrians maintained their 

Kolokotrones, who held the rank of commander-in-chief of 
the Peloponnesian militia, stepped forward as the defender 
of the local authorities against the central government. His 
personal interest, his party-connections, and his hatred of 
Kolettes, determined his conduct. Had he acted from 
patriotic motives he would have caught inspiration from the 
high national position into which accident now thrust him. 
The agricultural population was alarmed, and the astute old 
klepht seized the favourable moment for uniting his cause 
with the cause of the people, but his confined views and innate 

' Thiersch has printed the correspondence of Djavellas. It must not be sup- 
posed that the letters were really written by the Suliot chief, who could hardly 
write a common note. Like most of the military documents of the Revolution, 
they were composed by a secretary. Nothing has falsified the history of the Greek 
Revolution more than the ambitious eloquence of pedantic secretaries. 


[Bk.v. ch.m. 
selfishness prevented his employing the power thus placed at 
his disposal for the general good. 

Kolokotrones called the Peloponnesians to arms, and pro- 
nounced the proceedings of the governing commission to be 
illegal, in a proclamation dated the 22nd of June 1832 \ 
Metaxas and Plapoutas had informed him that they had 
secured the co-operation of Zaimes in paralyzing the action 
of the executive government. The Russian admiral prompted 
him to proclaim that the senate was the only legitimate 
authority in existence. The residents remained silent. Griva, 
the most lawless of the Romeliot chiefs, advanced without 
orders from the governing commission, and occupied Tri- 
politza at the head of a thousand men. The Capodistrians 
were already prepared to encounter the invaders of the Morea, 
and Gennaios Kolokotrones, who had more military courao-e 
though less political sagacity than his father, had already 
formed a camp at Valtetzi. 

The tide of success now flowed in favour of the Capodis- 
trians. The advance of Griva was stopped. Elias Mavro- 
michales was repulsed in his attempts to gain a footing in 
the rich plain of Messenia. The Capodistrians under Kalergi 
made a bold attempt to seize the mills at Lerna, but the 
attempt was defeated, though it was openly favoured by the 
Russian admiral. Civil war recommenced in many districts, 
and bands of troops, who recognized no government, plundered 
wherever they could penetrate. 

The prudence of Kolokotrones, whom age had rendered 
more of a politician than a warrior, might have led him to 
avoid engaging in open hostilities against a government 
acknowledged by the protecting powers, on the eve of the 
king's arrival, had he been allowed to remain in undisturbed 
possession of the profits which he drew from his ofifice as 
commander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus. But the members 
of the governing commission forced him into resisting their 
authority by appointing Theodore Griva to the chief command 
in the districts of Leondari and Phanari. The occupation 
of these places by the Kolettists would have rendered j \. 
Kolokotrones little better than a prisoner in Karitena. ' ' 

1 The original proclamation is printed by Gennaios Kolokotrones, in a work 
entitled Aia</.opa iyypi,pa Knl kmaroKal dfopwuTa ras Kara to 18^2 avix^daas Hard 
rrji' EWaSa wwjxaKias ical dvapx'ias, p. 214. Thiersch gives a translation, i. 395. 


\X). 1832.] 

Amidst these scenes of anarchy a national assembly met 
lit Pronia. The members of the governing commission, the 
ministers in office, the senators, the residents of the AIHed 
:)0vvers, and the Russian admiral, were all hostile to the 
meeting. But a general amnesty before the king's arrival 
was necessary for pacifying the country, and a general amnesty 
rould not be proclaimed without the sanction of a national 
assembly. It was also indispensable to obtain the assent of 
'the nation to the election of the king chosen by the Allies. 
A national assembly could not therefore be entirely dispensed 
with, though it was feared that a national assembly would 
abolish the senate and choose a new executive g^overnment. 
Had a national assembly met immediately after the nomina- 
tion of the governing commission, a civil war might have 
been avoided by the election of a senate, in which both the 
constitutionalists and Capodistrians, the Romeliots and the 
Moreots, the Hyd riots, the Spetziots, and the Psarians, might 
have been duly represented, and in which local interests might 
have moderated factious passions. But the intrigues of Greek 
politicians and foreign diplomatists delayed the meeting for 
three months, and when it took place, old passions had been 
rekindled with fiercer animosity by fresh injuries. The 
\iolence of faction now exposed the corruption of political 
society in Greece, without a veil, to the examination of 
strangers. All ties were torn asunder in the struggle to 
gratify individual selfishness. The Suliots, Djavellas and 
Botzaris, fought on different sides. Hydriot primates were 
found who deserted the cause of Hydra. The only great 
political body into which patriotism was likely to find an 
entrance, was the national assembly, and even there its voice 
was in great danger of being overpowered by party zeal. 
The illegal position and arrogant assumptions of the senate 
caused much animosity, and the residents of the three powers 
were distrusted, because they appeared in league to support 
the illegal powers of the senate. 

As soon as the assembly of Pronia met, a majority deter- 
mined to abolish the senate, in spite of the open support 
given to it by the residents. Many members believed that, 
as the residents had tamely submitted to the armed opposition 
of Djavellas at Patras, and had regarded with indifference the 
renewal of the civil war by Griva, Kolokotrones, and Kalergi, 


[Bk. V. Ch. III. 

they would ofifer no opposition to the abolition of the senate. 

The diplomatists, however, regarded the senate with peculiar 

favour. They had made use of it to eject Agostino from 

the presidency, and to create a new government. Its very 

illegality made it a useful instrument, should it be necessary 

to employ force to establish King Otho's authority, for its 

abolition would always be a popular measure, and might serve 

as a pretext for the assumption of absolute power. On the 

other hand, the national assembly was considered to be doubly 

dangerous, because it was legally invested with great power, 

and not likely to be guided by the suggestions of foreign 

diplomatists in making use of that power. 

Such was the state of Greece and the condition of parties 
when the national assembly of Pronia commenced its sittings. 
Nothing presaged that it would be able to establish order in 
the country ^ 

The assembly commenced its sittings on the 26th of July 
1832. On the 1st of August it passed a decree proclaiming 
a general amnesty, and on the 8th it ratified the election of 
King Otho ; but on the same day it abolished the senate. 
Of the legality of this measure there was no doubt, and had it 
occurred immediately after the expulsion of Agostino, it 
might have tranquillized Greece. Prudence now suggested 
that its abolition had become impolitic, since the residents 
had become its advocates ; and the majority of the assembly 
would have acted judiciously, had it merely proposed to 
remodel the existing senate on the principle of Sir Stratford 
Canning's memorandum. But the constitutionalists formed a 
large majority in the assembly, and they were irritated by 
the conduct of the Greek ministers who had deserted the 
constitutional cause. The senate was composed of Capodis- 
trians, and it was adopting active measures to increase the 
violence of the civil war which was desolating the country. 
The governing commission and the Greek ministers took part 
with the senate against the representatives of the nation ; 

1 Professor Thiersch asserts that he could have restored order h.-id he been 
furnished with 100,000 dollars. The assertion only proves that he knew very 
little of arithmetic. It would not have sufficed to obtain the evacuation of the 
Morea by one-half of the Romeliot irregulars who were plundering the peasantry. 
He says, ' II y avait bien un moyen de sortir encore d'embarras. Je devais me 
mettre a la tete des affaires, et commencer le gouvernement du roi,' vol. i. p. 167. 
Had the worthy professor done so, in all probability he would have prevented 
King Otho from coming to Greece. 


A.D. 1832.] 

and the residents, taking advantage of this conduct on the 
part of the executive, protested against the decree of the 
national assembly, asserting that it was a violation of 
the principles of the pacification they pretended to have 

Large bodies of Romeliot troops were quartered in the 
village of Aria, at a short distance beyond Pronia. The 
soldiers beset the gates of Nauplia and the doors of the 
assembly every morning clamouring for pay. The governing 
commission promised to pay their arrears ; but it failed to 
keep its promise. The ministers were accused of deliberately 
violating the promise of the government, in order to produce 
the catastrophe which ensued, and their friends and the 
senators were reported to have treacherously incited the 
soldiers to demand payment from the national assembly. 
On the 26th August the soldiers of Grigiottes burst into the 
hall of the assembly, dragged the president from his seat, 
insulted and ill-treated many deputies, and carried off the 
president and several deputies, as hostages for the payment 
of their arrears, to their quarters at Aria. This disgraceful 
riot put an end to the last national assembly in revolutionary 
Greece ^. 

This scene of military violence forms an important event 
in the history of Greece. It prolonged the revolutionary state 
of the country for eleven years, by placing constitutional 
liberty in abeyance. It threw the people into an unquiet 

^ Papadopulos Vretos, an Ionian, was then Baron de Riickmann's doctor. He 
tells us that he dined with the Russian resident the day after the dissolution of 
the assembly. After dinner, the English resident, Mr. Dawkins, called and narra- 
ted the following occurrence, which- makes the Ionian infer that the British cabinet 
destroyed the liberty of Greece. He makes the English resident say, ' As I was 
riding out yesterday with Griffith ' (his secretary, who spoke Greek well), ' we 
were surrounded by a crowd of filthy palikaria, shouting and gesticulating like 
demons. All spoke at the same time, and all appeared to be delivering set 
speeches, so that the road was an oratorical pandemonium. When I could find an 
opportunity to make myself heard, I asked Griffith what was the play they were 
acting for our private edification. After many vain efforts he obtained a partial 
hearing. The soldiers declared they had no bread, no clothes, and no money. It 
would have been superfluous for them to have told any one who looked at them 
that they were without credit. I saw that instantly. They wished my Excellency 
to take their case into consideration and provide for their wants. I stated to them 
that my functions did not allow me to become their commissary : but, pointing 
with my whip to the hall of the national assembly, I said, that I believed there 
were many persons in that bujlding who possessed great experience as com- 
missaries and paymasters. They seized my hint with wonderful alacrity, and set 
off running and whooping like wild Indians. Griffith and I took a long ride, 
and when we returned in the evening we heard of the great event of the day.' 
Melanges Politiques, p. 33. 

q5 anarchy. 

^ , [Bk.V. Ch.III. 

and dangerous temper, by sweeping away those free insti- 
tutions which had infused energy into the nation during its 
struggle for independence. The executive power was made 
the prize of a successful faction. The central government 
was not established on a legal basis, and the military chiefs 
ceased to acknowledge its control. Eleven years of Bavarian 
domination was the expiation of the violence committed at 

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes died in the month of August. 
About the same time, a deputation, consisting of three mem- 
bers, two of whom were members of the governing commission, 
was sent to Munich with addresses of congratulation to the 
kines of Greece and Bavaria ^ The commission was thus left 
incomplete, for the presence of five members was required 
to give validity to its acts. Yet on this occasion the residents 
did not protest against the virtual dissolution of the executive 
government of Greece. Greece surely stood in greater want 
of a legal executive than of an illegal senate ; but the diplo- 
matists looked on with indifference, while the governing 
commission committed suicide. 

Greece was now without any legal central authority. The 
executive body was incompetent to act. The senate had been 
abolished by the national assembly, and the national assembly 
had been dissolved by the soldiery. The senate made the 
protest of the foreign diplomatists a ground for prolonging 
its existence. Three places in the governing commission 
were vacant ; two had been occupied by constitutionalists, 
one by a Capodistrian. The senate attempted to violate the 
terms of the pacification sanctioned by the residents, and 
named three Capodistrians. George Konduriottes, the pre- 
sident, resisted this pretension, but, possessing neither the 
talents nor the energy necessary for carrying on a contest 
with the senate, he withdrew to Hydra. Only three mem- 
bers of the government now remained at Nauplia — Kolettes, 
Zaimes, and Metaxas — and they claimed the whole executive 
power. It was generally felt that chance had made as good 
a selection as it was possible to make under the circum- 
stances. The senate yielded at last to public opinion, and 
passed a decree investing these three men with the whole 
executive power. 

* Kosta Botzaris, Plapoutas, and Admiral Miaoulis. 


A.D. 1832.] 

But the intrigues of Admiral Ricord soon determined 
a majority of the senators to repudiate this decree, and all 
Greece was astonished by the strange intelligence that seven 
senators had secretly quitted Nauplia. On the 21st Novem- 
ber these scceders were joined at Astros by the president, 
Tsamados, and two additional members, and met by Koloko- 
trones with a body of Moreot troops. Ten of the thirteen 
senators who had signed the address to the King of Bavaria 
were now present. They had carried with them the govern- 
ment printing-press, and they issued proclamations annulling 
the decree which had invested Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas 
with the executive power until the king's arrival. Trusting to 
the military force of the Capodistrian party under Koloko- 
trones, and to the support of the Russian admiral, the seceders 
cissumed the executive authority. 

On this occasion, Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas acted with 
sense and courage. They took prompt measures to secure 
urder and maintain their authority within the walls of Nauplia. 
Beyond the fortress they were powerless. The residents 
recognized them as the legal government, and the French 
i garrison placed their persons in security. 

The senate, having failed to produce a revolution, sought 
revenge by increasing the existing anarchy. It appointed 
a military commission to govern Greece, consisting of several 
powerful chiefs. Kolokotrones, Grigiottes, Djavellas, and 
Hadgi Christos, Moreots and Romeliots, Albanians and Bul- 
garians, formed an alliance, and leagued together. Anarchy 
reached such a pitch, that the minister of war, Zographos, 
informed the minister of finance, Mavrocordatos, that it was 
impossible to obtain an exact account of the numbers of the 
soldiers who were drawing pay and rations. Of the number 
of men actually under arms he had no idea^. 

At first sight the conduct of the seceding senators looks 
like the proceedings of maniacs ; but the Capodistrians had 
never abandoned the scheme of Agostino, and they still 
hoped, by seizing the forcible direction of the administration 
in the greater part of the Morea, to compel the regency which 
would govern Greece during the king's minority, to purchase 
their support by appointing them senators for life. The 

1 Rapport den Mmhtres, 2Sth November, 1832 ; Thiersch, i. 448. 

q8 anarchy. 

^ [Bk. V. Ch. III. 

Russian admiral supported them in their desperate schemes, 
while the Russian resident, remaining passive, was at liberty 
to disavow their proceedings in case of failure. It is needless 
to follow these abo^rtive intrigues further. The senators, 
finding that they had no chance of obtaining effectual support 
from the Greeks, adopted the extraordinary expedient of 
endeavouring to procure assistance from. Russia, by naming 
Admiral Ricord president of Greece. This act of treason and 
folly proves the justice with which Capodistrias had been, 
reproached for selecting his senators from the most ignorant 
and unprincipled political adventurers. Some persons have ■ 
supposed that there was malice as well as folly in the conduct 
of the senators ; and that, though they were eager to proclaim 
that they preferred Russian protection to Greek independence, 
they also intended to hint to Admiral Ricord that it was his - 
interest and the interest of other Russian agents to purchase 
their silence in order to throw a veil over many intrigues. 

Amidst the general anarchy, the commission of seven 
generals was unable to place any restraint on the soldiery. 
The men under arms no longer obeyed their officers, but 
formed bands like wolves, hunting for their prey under the 
boldest plunderer. A veil may be dropped on their pro- 
ceedings. But it is of some importance to explain in what 
manner a part of the Morea escaped their ravages. 

The revival of the municipal institutions of the Morea at 
this period has been already mentioned. The weakness of 
the government relieved the local authorities from the incubus 
of a tyrannical central administration, which had been imposed 
on them by Capodistrias. The exigencies of the time forced 
them to act without waiting for the initiative of ministers 
and the orders of prefects. The condition of the country 
and the agitation of the people again made the municipal 
authorities feel that they were responsible to their fellow- 
citizens, by whom they were supposed to be elected. They 
were often called upon to make arrangements for quartering 
and feeding troops, who came to defend or plunder the 
country, as circumstances might determine. They were com- 
pelled to collect the public revenues to meet these demands ; 
to arm strong bodies of peasantry, and to form alliances with 
neighbouring municipalities, in order to check the rapacity 
of the soldiery. Their difficulties induced them to look to 


A.D. 1S32.] 

Kolokotrones for assistance, whose military force was so far 
inferior to that of the Romeliots as to render it imperative 
on him to form an alliance with the people. His office as 
commander-in-chief in the Morea, and his personal relations 
with most of the local magistrates chosen during the adminis- 
tration of Capodistrias, pointed him out as the natural 
defender of the agricultural population. The difficulty was 
to make the old klepht feel that it was his interest to protect 
and not to plunder ; that his robberies must be confined to 
the central administration ; and that he must aid and not 
command the local authorities. The end was partially 
attained, and in many districts the demogeronts acquired 
sufficient power to protect their municipalities against the 
military chiefs of the Capodistrian faction, and to repulse the 
attacks of the Romeliot troops. 

The governing commission and the constitutional ministers 
forfeited their claim to the allegiance of the Greeks, by their 
neglect to restrain the exactions of the Romeliots, who had 
raised them to power. Strangers had a better opportunity 
if observing the evil effects of their misconduct in Messenia 
than in other parts of the country, as the presence of the 
French army of occupation enforced neutrality within certain 
limits, and yet left free action to the rival factions in its 
immediate vicinity 

Great part of the rich plain which extends from Taygetus 
to Ithome was national property. Statesmen and chieftains, 
Romeliots and Moreots, were eager to become the farmers 
of the public revenues. The bey of Maina and the whole 
of his ambitious and needy family aspired to quarter them- 
selves, with all their Mainate adherents, in this rich province. 
The native peasantry and the opponents of the Mavromichales 
were alike hostile to the pretensions of the Mainates. Party 
intrigues were carried on in every village, and no province 
was more tormented by the incessant strife which makes the 
municipal administration of the Greeks a field for the exhi- 
bition of strange paroxysms of selfishness. Some of the 
demogeronts allied themselves with Kolokotrones ; some 
discontented citizens formed connections with the family of 

The presence of a French garrison at Kalamata com- 
plicated the politics of the municipal authorities in Messenia. 

H % 


[Bk. V. Ch. Ill, 

Their local interests and personal feelings favoured the French, 
who had protected them from being plundered by the Mai- 
nates, and who afforded them a profitable market for their 
produce. But the Capodistrian faction, excited by Koloko- 
trones and Admiral Ricord, were indefatigable in calumniating 
and intriguing against the French. The officers commanding 
at Kalamata sought to tranquillize the people by inviting 
the peasantry to pursue their labours, and by assuring the 
demogeronts of their readiness to assist in maintaining order 
in the neighbourhood of their encampment. But the partizans 
of Kolokotrones pointed to the neutrality proclaimed by the . 
residents at Nauplia, and to the retreat of the French troops 
from Patras, as proofs that the French could not interfere 
in the internal administration of Messenia. The French were 
accused of being constitutionalists like the Mainates, and the 
agricultural population feared the lawless conduct of the 
adherents of the family of Mavromichales. Kolokotrones 
had already convinced many that he was acting sincerely 
as the protector of the people. To him, therefore, the 
demogeronts of most of the villages in Messenia turned for 

Niketas came with a small body of chosen troops to protect 
the agricultural population from invasion. The Mavromi- 
chales were not deterred by these preparations for defence. 
They had claims on the governing commission for their long 
opposition to Capodistrias, which they did not think were 
entirely cancelled by the assassination of the president. They 
pretended that they were entitled to be the tax-gatherers 
of Messenia, and their followers were eager to exchange the 
black bread of lupin meal which formed their hard fare in 
Kakovouli, for wheaten cakes and roast lambs ^ 

Elias Mavromichales, called Katzakos, invaded the district 
between the lower ridges of Taygetus and the Pamisus more 
than once at the head of three or four hundred men. But 
his progress was always arrested by Niketas, who was a 
better soldier, and who, in addition to his superior skill in 
partizan warfare, was supported by the whole population 
in the plain capable of bearing arms. The approach of the 

1 Kakovouli, or the land of evil counsel. The lupins are ground after the pulse 
has been long steeped in water to extract some injurious matter. The bread is 
black, hard, and bitter. 















A.D. 1832.] 

Mainates caused excessive terror, and the alarm was justified 
by their conduct. The French troops at Kalamata saw more 
than one Greek village suddenly attacked and plundered by 
the modern Spartans, as the Mainates termed themselves. 
The armed men descended from their mountains attended 
by numbers of women, whose duty it was to carry ofif the 
booty. These women were seen by the French returning, 
carrying on their backs bundles of linen, bedding, and house- 
hold utensils, and driving before them asses laden with doors, 
windows, and small rafters ^ Niketas, however, invariably 
succeeded in driving Elias and his Spartans back into the 

Arrangements were ultimately adopted which put an end 
to these devastating forays. Niketas placed himself at the 
head of a band of veterans, and moved about from village 
to village watching the slopes of Taygetus, and taking care 
that the armed peasantry should always be informed where 
they were to join him in case of any attack. The demoge- 
lonts were in this way enabled to provide the supplies of money 
and provisions necessary for the defence of the district, and 
the agricultural population was not prevented from cultivating 
the land. 

Kolokotrones and Kolettes were the two great party leaders 
at fhis time, but neither possessed the talents necessary to 
frame, nor the character necessary to pursue, a fixed line of 
policy. Accident alone determined their political position, 
and made the first, though a partizan of despotic power, 
the defender of liberal institutions, and the second, though 
calling himself a constitutionalist, a tyrant, and the enemy 
of a national assembly. Like their partizans, they had no 
honest convictions, and they drifted up and down with the 
current of faction without an effort to steer their course 
according to the interest of Greece. Kolettes came into 
the Morea to establish constitutional liberty. His followers 
plundered the country, and dispersed the national assembly. 
Kolokotrones was the instrument of the Capodistrians and 
the Russians to perpetuate despotic power. His position 
compelled him to become the champion of order and liberty. 

There is no doubt that though many arbitrary and unjust 

Pellion, 316. 



[Bk. V. Ch. III. I 

acts could be cited against Kolokotrones and Djavellas, yet 
greater security for life and property existed in the provinces 
over which their authority extended, than in the provinces 
which submitted to the governing commission. But it is 
certain that this result was obtained by the accidental revival 
of national institutions, and not by the patriotism or the 
wisdom of the leaders of the Capodistrians. The military 
chiefs on both sides were equally rapacious ; the political 
leaders equally ignorant, selfish, and corrupt. Honest men 
of both parties kept aloof from the public administration. 

Both Greeks and foreigners have praised the municipal 
organization of Greece which existed under the Turkish 
domination ; and it undoubtedly tended to check in some 
degree the evils which resulted from the excessive fiscal 
rapacity of the Othoman government. Yet it could do but 
little to protect the people from injustice ; for the municipal 
magistrates were responsible to their Othoman rulers, not 
to those who elected them, or to the law of the land, for 
the exercise of their authority. It made Greeks the instru- 
ments of Othoman oppression, and in this way it introduced 
a degree of demoralization into the local administrations, 
which the Revolution failed to eradicate. It may be truly 
said that this vaunted institution protected the liberties of 
the people by accident. The law had no power to restrain 
the selfishness of the local magistrates. The primates and 
the captains had appropriated to themselves much of the 
authority which ought to have been vested in the demo- 
geronts chosen by the people. The primates, like the Turks 
before the Revolution, employed the municipalities as fiscal 
engines for their own convenience. The military chiefs were 
the enemies of every species of order and organization. The 
torpid ministers, the literary enthusiasts, and the intriguing 
politicians, who acted an important part during the Revo- 
lution, allowed the local institutions to be destroyed, while 
they had not the capacity necessary for organizing an efficient 
central administration. 

At the end of the year 1833 Greece was in a state of 
almost universal anarchy. The government acknowledged 
by the three powers exercised little authority beyond the 
walls of Nauplia. The senate was in open rebellion. The 
Capodistrians under Kolokotrones and Djavellas had never 



A.D. 1833.] 

recognized the governing commission. A confederation of 
military chiefs attempted to rule the country, and blockaded 
the existing government. 

The commission of three members, which exercised the 
executive power, alarmed at the prospect of being excluded 
from power before the king's arrival, implored the residents 
to invite the French troops to garrison Argos. Four com- 
panies of infantry and a detachment of artillery were sent 
from Messenia by General Gueheneuc to effect this object. 
In the mean time, General Corbet, who commanded at Nauplia, 
detached two companies and two mountain guns to take 
possession of the cavalry barracks at Argos, in order to 
secure quarters for the troops from Messenia. The town 
was filled with irregular Greek soldiery, under the nominal 
command of Grigiottes and Tzokres. These men boasted 
that they would drive the French back to Nauplia, and that 
Kolokotrones would exterminate those who were advancing 
from Messenia. The prudent precautions of the French 
officers prevented the troops being attacked on their march, 
and the whole force united at Argos on the 15th of January 

On the following day the French were suddenly attacked. 
The Greeks commenced their hostilities so unexpectedly, 
that the colonel of the troops, who had arrived on the pre- 
ceding evening, was on his way to Nauplia to make his 
report to General Corbet when the attack commenced. The 
French soldiers who went to market unarmed were driven 
back into the barracks, and a few were killed and wounded. 
But the hostile conduct of the Greek soldiery had prepared 
the French for any sudden outbreak, and a few minutes 
sufficed to put their whole force under arms in the square 
before their quarters. The Greek troops, trusting to their 
numbers, attempted to occupy the houses which commanded 
this square. They were promptly driven back, and the 
streets were cleared by grape-shot from the French guns. 
The Greeks then intrenched themselves in several houses, 
and fired from the windows of the upper storeys on the 
French who advanced to dislodge them. This species of 
warfare could not long arrest the progress of regular troops. 
The French succeeded in approaching every house in suc- 
cession with little loss. They then burst open the doors 


[Bk.V. Ch.IlI. 

and windows of the lower storey, and, rushing up-stairs, forced 
the armatoli and klephts to jump out of the windows, or 
finished their career with the bayonet. In less than three 
hours every house was taken, and the fugitives who had 
sought a refuge in the ruined citadel of Larissa^ were pursued 
and driven even from that stronghold. 

Never was victory more complete. The French lost only forty 
killed and wounded, while the Greeks, who fought chiefly 
under cover, had a hundred and sixty killed, and in all 
probability a much greater number wounded. Grigiottes was 
taken prisoner, but was soon released. A Greek officer and a 
soldier accused of an attempt at assassination, were tried, 
condemned, and shot\ 

While the Greek troops were plundering their countrymen 
and murdering their allies, the three protecting powers were 
labouring to secure to Greece every advantage of political 
independence and external peace. 

A treaty was signed at Constantinople on the 2ist July 
1832, by which the sultan recognized the kingdom of Greece, 
and ceded to it the districts within its limits still occupied by 
his troops, on receiving an indemnity of forty millions of 
piastres, a sum then equal to ^462,480 ^. The Allied powers 
also furnished the king's government with ample funds, by 
guaranteeing a loan of sixty millions of francs. The indemnity 
to Turkey was paid out of this loan ^. 

The Allied powers also secured for the Greek monarchy 
an official admission among the sovereigns of Europe, by 
inviting the Germanic Confederation to recognize Prince 
Otho of Bavaria king of Greece, a recognition which took 
place on the 4th October 1832^. The protectors of Greece 
have often been reproached for the slowness of their proceed- 
ings in establishing the independence of Greece ; yet when we 
reflect on the anarchy that prevailed among the Greeks, the 
difficulties thrown in their way by Capodistrias, the desertion 

* Compare Pellion, 363 ; Lacour, Excursions eti Grcce, 260. Both had access to 
official accounts, and yet they differ in their statements of the French loss. 

^ Parliamentary Papers, Annex A to Protocol of 30th August, 1833. 

^ Each of the three powers guaranteed a separate series of bonds for twenty 
miUions of francs, or £781,273 6s. 8rf. sterling. The contract between the Greek 
government and the house of Rothschild was signed 12th January, 1833. The 
loan was effected at 94, interest at 5 per cent. 

* Kliiber's Quellensammhmg zu dent offetttlichen Recht des Teutschen Bundes ; 
Fortsetzung, 1832, p. 75. 


A.D. 1833.] 

of Prince Leopold, and the small assistance they received 
from Bavaria, we ought rather to feel surprise that they 
succeeded at last in establishing the Greek kingdom. 

The King of Bavaria concluded a treaty of alliance between 
Bavaria and Greece on the ist November 1832. He engaged 
I to send 3500 Bavarian troops to support his son's throne, and 
t relieve the French army of occupation. This subsidiary force 
' was paid from the proceeds of the Allied loan ; for Bavaria 
I had neither the resources, nor, to speak the truth, the gene- 
rosity of France^. A convention was signed at the same 
time, authorizing Greece to recruit volunteers in Bavaria, in 
order that the subsidiary force might be replaced by German 
mercenaries in King Otho's service ^, 

On the 1 6th January 1833, the veterans of the Greek 
Revolution fled before a few companies of French troops ; 
on the 1st of February King Otho arrived in Nauplia, accom- 
panied by a small army of Bavarians, composed of a due 
proportion of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers^. As 
experience had proved that there were no statesmen in Greece 
capable of governing the country, it was absolutely necessary 
to send a regency composed of foreigners to administer the 
government during King Otho's minority. The persons 
chosen were Count Armansperg, M. de Maurer, and General 

The Bavarian troops landed before the king. Their tall 
persons, bright uniforms, and fine music, contrasted greatly 
to their advantage with the small figures and well-worn 
clothing of the French. The numerous mounted officers, the 
splendid plumes, the prancing horses, and the numerous 
decorations, crosses, and ornaments of the new-comers, pro- 
duced a powerful effect on the minds of the Greeks, taught by 

' The French government was desirous of obtaining the joint guarantee of King 
Louis of Bavaria to the loan, in order to facilitate the progress of the measure 
through the French Chambers. But King Louis refused, alleging that neither the 
state of his finances nor the interests of Bavaria allowed him to aid his son in 
raising money for Greece. Yet he took care that his son should expend large 
sums of Greek money in Bavaria without any advantage to Greece. Kliiber's 
Pragmathche Geschichte der nationalen und politischen Wiedergebwts Griechenlands, 
p. 509. ^ ^ ^ 

^ The treaty is printed in the Greek Government Gazette, E(p7]/xepis ttjs Kv/iep- 
vrjofccs. No. 18; the convention in No. 20, 1833. 

^ King Otho embarked at Brindisi on board the English frigate Madagascar, 
commanded by Captain (Lord) Lyons, on the 15th January, 1833, and was joined 
at Corfu by a fleet of transports bringing the Bavarian troops from Trieste. 


the castigation they had received at Argos to appreciate the 
value of military discipline. 

The people welcomed the king as their saviour from anarchy. 
Even the members of the government, the military chiefs, and 
the high officials, who had been devouring the resources of the 
country, hailed the king's arrival with pleasure ; for they felt 
that they could no longer extort any profit from the starving 
population. The title, however, which the Bavarian prince 
assumed — Otho, by the grace of God, King of Greece — 
excited a few sneers even among those who were not re- 
publicans ; for it seemed a claim to divine right in the throne 
on the part of the house of Wittelspach. But every objection 
passed unheeded ; and it may be safely asserted that few 
kings have mounted their thrones amidst more general 
satisfaction than King Otho. 


Bavarian Despotism and Constitutional Revolu- 
tion — February 1833 to September 1843. 

Landing of King Otho. — The regency, ils members and duties. — Royal proclama- 
tion. — Administrative measures. — Military organization. — Civil administra- 
tion. — Municipal institutions. — Financial administration. — Monetary system. — 
Judicial organization. — The Greek Church, reforms introduced by the regency. 
— Synodal Tomos. — Monasteries. — Public instruction. — Restrictions on the 
press. — Roads. — Order of the Redeemer. — Quarrels in the regency. — Koloko- 
trones' plot. — Armansperg intrigue. — Armansperg's administration. — Bavarian 
influence. — Disputes with England. — Alarming increase of brigandage. — In- 
surrections in Maina and Messenia. — Brigandage in 1835. — General Gordon's 
expedition. — Insurrection in Acarnania. — Opinions of Lord Lyons and General 
Gordon on the state of Greece. — Brigandage continues. — King Otho's personal 
government. — Attacks on King Otho in the English newspapers. — Causes of 
the Revolution of 1843. — Revolution. — Observations on the constitution. — 
General remarks. 

King Otho quitted the English frigate which conveyed 
him to Greece on the 6th February 1833. His entry into 
NaupHa was a spectacle well calculated to inspire the Greeks 
with enthusiasm. 

The three most powerful governments in Europe combined 
to establish him on his throne. He arrived escorted by a 
numerous fleet, and he landed surrounded by a powerful 
army^ King Otho was then seventeen years old ^. Though 
not handsome, he was well grown, and of an engaging appear- 
ance. His countrymen spoke favourably of his disposition. 
His youthful grace, as he rode towards his residence in the 
midst of a brilliant retinue, called forth the blessings of a 
delighted population, and many sincere prayers were uttered 

' Twenty-five ships of war and forty-eight transports were anchored in the bay 
of Nauplia. and three thousand Bavarian troops had already landed. 
' King Otho was born on the ist of June, 1815. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

for his long and happy reign. The day formed an era in the 

history of Greece, nor is it without some importance in the 

records of European civiHzation. A new Christian kingdom 

was incorporated in the international system of the West, at 

a critical period for the maintenance of the balance of power 

in the East. 

The scene itself formed a splendid picture. Anarchy and 
order shook hands. Greeks and Albanians, mountaineers 
and islanders, soldiers, sailors, and peasants, in their varied 
and picturesque dresses, hailed the young monarch as their 
deliverer from a state of society as intolerable as Turkish 
tyranny. Families in bright attire glided in boats over the 
calm sea amidst the gaily decorated frigates of the Allied 
squadrons. The music of many bands in the ships and on 
shore enlivened the scene, and the roar of artillery in every 
direction gave an imposing pomp to the ceremony. The 
uniforms of many armies and navies, and the sounds of many 
languages, testified that most civilized nations had sent 
deputies to inaugurate the festival of the regeneration of 

Nature was in perfect harmony. The sun was warm, and 
the air balmy with the breath of spring, while a light breeze 
wafted freshness from the sea. The landscape was beautiful, 
and it recalled memories of a glorious past. The white build- 
ings of the Turkish town of Nauplia clustered at the foot of 
the Venetian fortifications and cyclopean foundations that 
crown its rocky promontory. The mountain citadel of Pala- 
medes frowned over both, and the island fort of Burdje, 
memorable in the history of the Revolution, stood like a 
sentinel in the harbour. The king landed and mounted his 
horse under the cyclopean walls of Tiryns, which were covered 
with spectators. The modern town of Argos looked smiling 
even in ruin, with the Pelasgic foundations and mediaeval 
battlements of the Larissa above. The Mycenae of Homer 
was seen on one side, while on the other the blue tints and 
snowy tops of the Arcadian and Laconian mountains mingled 
in the distance with the bluer waters of the Aegean. 

Enthusiasts, who thought of the poetic glories of Homer's 
Greece, and the historic greatness of the Greece of Thucy- 
dides, might be pardoned if they then indulged a hope that 
a third Greece was emerging into life, which would again 


A.D. 1833.] 

occupy a brilliant position in the world's annals. Political 
independence was secured : peace was guaranteed : domestic 
faction would be allayed by the equity of impartial foreigners, 
and all ranks would be taught, by the presence of a settled 
government, to efface the ravages of war, and cultivate the 
virtues which the nation had lost under Othoman domination. 
The task did not appear to be very difficult. The greater 
part of Greece was uninhabited. The progress of many 
British colonies, and of the United States of America, testify 
that land capable of cultivation forms the surest foundation 
for national prosperity. To insure a rapid increase of popula- 
tion where there is an abundant supply of waste land, nothing 
is required but domestic virtue and public order. And in 
a free country, the rapid increase of a population enjoying the 
privilege of self-government in local affairs, and of stern 
justice in the central administration, is the surest means of 
extending a nation's power. The dreamer, therefore, who 
allowed visions of the increase of the Greek race, and of its 
peaceful conquests over uncultivated lands far beyond the 
limits of the new kingdom, to pass through his mind as King 
Otho rode forward to mount his throne, might have seen 
what was soon to happen, had the members of the regency 
possessed a little common-sense. The rapid growth of popu- 
lation in the Greek kingdom would have solved the Eastern 
question. The example of a well-governed Christian popu- 
lation, the aspect of its moral improvement, material prosperity, 
and constant overflow into European Turkey, would have 
relieved European cabinets from many political embarrass- 
ments, by producing the euthanasia of the Othoman empire. 

Prince Otho of Bavaria had been proposed as a candidate 
for the sovereignty of Greece before the election of Prince 
Leopold. It was then urged that, being young, he would 
become completely identified with his subjects in language 
and religion \ But the Allies rejected him, thinking that 
a man of experience was more likely to govern Greece well, 
than an inexperienced boy of the purest accent and the most 
unequivocal orthodoxy. Eloquent and orthodox Greeks had 
not distinguished themselves as statesmen ; and though they 
might be excellent teachers of their language and ecclesiastical 

1 Thiersch, i. 308-313. See above, p. 80, note. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

doctrines, they had given no proof of their being able to 
educate a good sovereign. 

The resignation of Prince Leopold, and the refusal of other 
princes, at last opened the way for King Otho's election, and 
he became King of Greece under extremely favourable cir- 
cumstances. King Louis of Bavaria was authorized to appoint 
a regency to govern the kingdom until his son's majority, 
which was fixed to be on the ist June 1835, at the completion 
of his twentieth year \ The liberality of the three protecting 
powers supplied the Bavarians with an overflowing treasury. 
/The regency was invested with unlimited power, partly 
through the misconduct of the Greeks, and partly in conse- 
quence of the despotic views of King Louis. It has been 
already stated that the regency was composed of three mem- 
bers. Count Armansperg, M. de Maurer, and General Heideck. 
Count Armansperg was named president. Mr. Abel, the 
secretary, was invested with a consultative voice, and ap- 
pointed supplemental member, to fill any vacancy that might 
occur. Mr. Greiner was joined to the regency as treasurer, 
and director of the finance department. Not one of these 
men, with the exception of General Heideck, had the slightest 
knowledge of the condition of Greece. 

Count Armansperg enjoyed the reputation of being a very 
liberal man for a Bavarian nobleman at that time. He had 
been'minister of finance, and he filled the ofiice of minister 
of foreign affairs when the first attempt was made to obtain 
the sovereignty of Greece for King Otho. His ministerial 
experience and his rank rendered him well suited for the 
presidency of the regency, which gave him the direction of 
the foreign relations of the kingdom, and, what both he and 
the countess particularly enjoyed, the duty of holding public 
receptions and giving private entertainments. The count's 
own tact, aided by the presence of the countess and three 
accomplished daughters, rendered his house the centre of 
polished society and of political intrigue at Nauplia. It was 
the only place where the young king could see something of 
the world, and meet his subjects and strangers without feeling 
the restraint of royalty, for M. de Maurer lived like a niggard, 
and General Heideck like a recluse. 

1 Treaty of 7th May, 1832, Art. ix. x. 


A, p. 1833.] 

M. de Maurer and Mr. Abel were selected for their offices 
on account of their sharing the poHtical opinions of Count 
Armansperg^ Maurer was an able jurist, but he was desti- 
tute both of the talents and the temper required to form a 
statesman. He knew well how to frame laws, but he knew 
not how to apply the principles of legislation to social 
exigencies which he met with for the first time. On the 
whole, he was a more useful and an honester man than 
Count Armansperg, but he was not so well suited by the 
flexibility of his character to move among Greeks and 
diplomatists, or to steer a prudent course in a high political 

Both Armansperg and Maurer took especial care of their 
own personal interests before they gave their services to 
Greece. They bargained with King Louis for large pensions 
on quitting the regency, and they secured to themselves ample 
salaries during their stay in Greece. Count Armansperg ex- 
pended his salary like a gentleman, but the sordid household 
of M. de Maurer amused even the Greeks. 

General Heideck was the member of the regency first 
selected. He had resided in the country, and had been long 
treated as a personal friend by the King of Bavaria. King 
Louis was well aware that, though Heideck was inferior to 
his colleagues in political knowledge, he was more sincerely 
attached to the Bavarian dynasty, and his majesty always 
entertained some misgivings concerning the personal prudence 
or the political integrity of the other members. Heideck, 
during his first visit to Greece, had acquired the reputation 
of an able and disinterested administrator. As a member 
of the regency, he paid little attention to anything but the 
organization of the army ; and he rendered himself unpopular 
by the partiality he showed to the Bavarians, on whom he 
lavished rapid promotion and high pay, while he left the 
veterans of the Revolution without reward and without em- 
ployment. He was accused of purchasing popularity at 
Munich by wasteful expenditure in Greece, and of doing 
very little to organize a native army when he had ample 

* Mr. Abel, after his return to Bavaria, became a violent partizan of the ultra- 
montane party, fought a duel with Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein, and succeeded 
his adversary as Minister of the Interior. He held that office from 1838 to 1847, 
when Lola Montes caused the ultramontane party to be ejected from power. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

means at his disposal, though the moment was extremely 
favourable, for the success of the French at Argos had ren- 
dered the Greeks sensible of the value of discipline. 

The members of the regency were men of experience and 
strangers. It was natural to count on their cordial co-operation 
during their short period of power. Yet the two leading 
members, though they had been previously supposed to be 
political friends, were hardly installed in office before they 
began to dispute about personal trifles. Mean jealousy on 
one side, and inflated presumption on the other, sowed the 
seeds of dissension. Count Armansperg, as a noble, looked 
down on Maurer as a pedant and a law-professor. Maurer 
sneered at the count as an idler, fit only to be a diplomatist or 
a master of ceremonies. Both soon engaged in intrigues to 
eject their colleagues. Maurer expected that, by securing 
a majority of votes, he should be able to induce the King 
of Bavaria to support his authority. Armansperg, with more 
experience of courts, endeavoured to make sure of the support 
of the three protecting powers, whose influence, he knew, 
would easily mould the unsteady mind of King Louis to 
their wish. The cause of Greece and the opinions of the 
Greeks were of no account to either of the intriguers, for 
Greek interests could not decide the question at issue. It 
would probably have been the wisest course at the beginning 
to have sent a single regent to Greece, and to have given him 
a council, the members of which might have been charged 
with the civil, military, financial, and judicial organization 
of the kingdom ; though it must be confessed that no wisdom 
could have foreseen that two Bavarian statesmen would 
surpass the Greeks in ' envy, hatred, and malice, and all 

Count Armansperg galled the pride of Maurer by an air of 
superiority, which the jurist had not the tact to rebuke with 
polite contempt. Maurer was impatient to proclaim publicly 
that the title of president only conferred on the count the 
first place in processions and the upper seat at board meetings, 
and he could not conceal that these things were the objects of 
his jealousy. The count understood society better than his 
rival. When strangers, misled by the fine figure and expres- 
sive countenance of Maurer, addressed him as the chief of 
the regency, the lawyer had not the tact to transfer the 


.D. 1S33.] 

:ompliments to their true destination, and win the flatterers 
)y his manner in doing so, but he left time for the president 
o thrust forward his common-looking physiognomy with 
)olished ease, vindicate his own rights, and extract from the 
bashed strangers some additional outpouring of adulation, 
fhe Countess of Armansperg increased the discord of the 
egents by her extreme haughtiness, which was seldom re- 
trained by good sense, and sometimes not even by good 
nanners. She was so imprudent as to offend Heideck and 
\.bel as much as she irritated Maurer. It is necessary to 
lotice this conduct of the lady, for she was her husband's 
vil genius in Greece. Her influence increased the animosity 
if the Bavarians, and prolonged the misfortunes of the 
The position of the regency was delicate, but not difficult 

men of talent and resolution. A moderate share of 
agacity sufficed to guide their conduct. Anarchy had pre- 
lared an open field of action. It was necessary to create 
n army, a navy, a civil and judicial administration, and to 
weep away the rude fiscal system of the Turkish land-tax. 
Ve shall see how the Bavarian regency performed these 

S'The first step was to put an end to the provisional system 

1 expedients by which Capodistrias and his successors had 
•rolonged the state of revolution. It was necessary to make 
he Greeks feel that the royal authority gave personal security 
nd protection for property, since their loyalty reposed on 
o national and religious traditions and sympathies. It 
squired no philosopher in Greece, when King Otho arrived, 
3 proclaim ' that all the vast apparatus of government has 
Itimately no other object or purpose but the distribution 
f justice ; and that kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, 
fficers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers, and 
rivy councillors, were all subordinate in their end to this 
art of the administration ^.' The reign of anarchy coming 
fter the despotism of Capodistrias, had enabled the people to 
iel instinctively that good government could only be secured 
y rendering the laws and institutions of the kingdom more 
owerful than the will of the king and the action of govern- 

' Hume's Essay of the Origin of Government. _ 




[Bk.V.Ch.lV. ' 

ment. To consolidate a wise system of local government, 
and to render the administration of justice pure and inde- 
pendent, were evidently the first measures to be adopted in 
order to give the monarchy a national character. 

The second step was to prepare the way for national pros- 
perity, by removing the obstacles which prevented the people 
from bettering its condition. There was no difficulty in 
effecting this, since uncultivated land was abundant, and the 
Allied loan supplied the regency with ample funds. The 
system of exacting a tenth of the agricultural produce of 
the country kept society beyond the walls of towns in a 
stationary condition. Its immediate abolition was the most 
certain method of eradicating the evils it produced. Relief 1 
from the oppression of the tax-collector, even more than from 
the burden of the tax, would enable the peasantry to cultivate 
additional land, and to pay wages to agricultural labourers; i^ 
An immediate influx of labourers would arrive from Turkey, 
and the increase of the population of Greece would be certain 
and rapid. One-tenth would every year be added to the 
national capital. The regency required to do nothing but 
make roads. The government of the country could have been 
carried on from the customs, and the rent of national pro- 
perty. The extraordinary expenses of organizing the kingdom 
would have been paid for out of the loan. The regency 
did nothing of the kind ; it retained the Turkish land-tax, 
neglected to make roads, spent the Allied loan in a manner 
that both weakened and corrupted the Greek nation, and left 
the great question of its increase in population and agricultural 
prosperity unsolved. 

The members of the regency complained that the want 
of labour and capital impeded the success of their plans of 
improvement ; yet they seemed to have overlooked the fact 
that if they had abolished the tenths, the people would easily 
have procured both labour and capital for themselves. Labour 
was then abundant and cheap in Turkey ; capital in the 
hands of Greeks was abundant in every commercial mart in 
the Mediterranean. Yet the Bavarians talked of establishing 
agricultural colonies of Swiss or Germans, and of inviting 
foreign capitalists to found banks. It may be confidently 
asserted that the Greek monarchy would have realized the 
boast of Themistocles, and rapidly expanded from a petty 


^.D. 1833.] 

kingdom to a great state, had the regency swept away the 
Turkish land-tax, and left the agricultural industry of Greece 
iVee to fashion its own career in the East. 

On the day of the king's landing, a royal proclamation was 
-sued, addressed to the Greek nation ; the ministers in office 
ere confirmed in their places, and the senate was allowed to 
t.xpire, without any notice^ of the wounds it had inflicted both 
:L-i$6elf and its country. 
The royal proclamation was nothing more than a collection 
f empty phrases, and it disappointed public expectation by 
aking no allusion to representative institutions nor to the 
constitution. It revealed clearly that the views of the Bava- 
■ an government were not in accordance with the sentiments 
.1 the Greeks. The silence of the regency on the subject 
rf the Greek constitution was regarded as a claim on the 
irt of King Otho to absolute power. The omission was 
-nerally blamed; but the acknowledged necessity of in- 
c sting the regency with unrestricted legislative power, in order 
enable it to introduce organic changes in the administration, 
prevented any public complaint. It caused the Greeks, how- 
ever, to scrutinize the measures of the Bavarians with severity, 
and to regard the members of the regency with distrust. The 
King of Bavaria had solemnly declared to the protecting 
powers that the individuals selected to govern Greece during 
his son's minority ' ought to hold moderate and constitutional 
opinions ; ' the Greek people had therefore an undoubted 
right to receive from these foreign statesmen a distinct pledge 
that they did not intend to establish an arbitrarj'- govern- 
ment ^ The distrust of the Greeks was increased, because 
the omission in the royal proclamation was a deliberate 
violation of a pledge given by the Bavarian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, when the object of King Louis was to win 
over the Greeks to accept his son as their king. The Baron 
de Gise then declared that it would be one of the first cares 
of the regency to convoke a national assembly to assist in 
preparing a definitive constitution for the kingdom -. The 
royal word, thus pledged, was guaranteed by a proclamation 

' Parliamentary Papers, Annex A to Protocol of 26th April, 1832. 

* The letter of Baron de Gise, dated 31st July. 1832, is printed in RecueS des 
Traites, A des, et Pieces concernants la Fondaiion de la Royauie en Grece et le Trace de 
ie% Limiies (Xauplie, 1833), p. 62, 

I Z 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

of the three protecting powers, published at Nauplia^ to 

announce the election of King Otho. In this document the 

Greeks were invited to aid their sovereign in giving their 

country a definitive constitution ^. They answered the appeal 

of the Allies on the 15th of September 1843. 

The oath of allegiance demanded from the Greeks was 
simple. They swore fidelity to King Otho, and obedience to 
the laws of their country. 

The first measures of the regency had been prepared at 
Munich, under the eye of King Louis. In these measures too 
much deference was paid to the administrative arrangements 
introduced by Capodistrias, which he himself had always 
regarded as of a provisional nature; and the modifications 
made on the Capodistrian legislation were too exclusively 
based on German theories, without a practical adaptation' 
to the state of Greece. The King of Bavaria had little 
knowledge of financial and economical questions, and he had 
no knowledge of the Social and fiscal wants of the Greek 
people. He thought of nothing but the means of carrying j 
on the central administration, and in that sphere he en-' 
deavoured honestly to introduce a well-organized and clearly 
defined system. The laws and ordinances which the regency 
brought from Bavaria would have required only a few modi- 
fications to have engrafted them advantageously on the 
existing institutions. Their great object was to establisli 
order and give power to the executive government. 

The armed bands of personal followers which had enabled 
the military chiefs to place themselves above the law, to 
defy the government, and plunder the people, were disbanded. 
A national army was created. The scenes of tumultuous} 
violence and gross peculation which General Heideck had' 
witnessed in the Greek armies, had made a deep impression 
on his mind. Warned by his experience, the regency arrived, 
with an army capable of enforcing order; and it fortunately! 
found the Greek irregulars so cowed by the punishment they 
had received from the French at Argos, that they submitted! 
to be disbanded without offering any resistance. It must 
not, however, be concealed, that the regency abused the 
power it acquired by its success. Bavarian officers, who 

1 Parliamentary Papers, Annex D to Protocol of 26th April, 1832, 


A.D. 1833.] 

possessed neither experience nor merit, were suddenly pro- 
moted to high military commands, many of whom made a 
short stay in Greece, and hardly one of whom bestowed a 
single thought on the future condition of the country. 

The national army soon received a good organization in 
prints In numbers it was unnecessarily strong. Upwards 
of five thousand Bavarian volunteers were enrolled in the 
Greek service before the end of the year 1834, and almost 
as many Greek troops were kept under arms. This nume- 
rous force was never brought into a very efficient condition. 
Faction and jobbing soon vitiated its organization. The 
regency was ashamed to publish an army-list. Promotion 
was conferred too lavishly on young Bavarians, while Greeks 
and Philhellenes of long service were left unemployed. It 
was a grievous error on the part of General Heideck to 
omit fixing the rank and verifying the position and service 
of the Greek officers who had served during the Revolution, 
by the publication of an official army-list, while the personal 
identity of the actors in every engagement was well known. 

The bold measure of disbanding the irregular army was 
a blow which required to be struck with promptitude and 
followed up with vigour in order to insure success. It is 
idle to accuse the regency of precipitancy and severity, for 
something like a thunderbolt could alone prevent an organized 
resistance, and a hurricane was necessary to dissipate oppo- 
sition. The whole military power created by the revolutionary 
war, and all the fiscal interests cherished by factious ad- 
ministrations, were opposed to the formation of a regular 
army. Chieftains, primates, ministers, and farmers of the 
taxes were all deprived of their bands of armed retainers 
before they could combine to thwart the Bavarians as they 
had leagued to attack the French. 

The war had been terminated in the Morea by the arms 
of the French ; in Romelia by the negotiations with the 
Porte : but the Greek soldiers, instead of resuming the occu- 
pations of citizens, insisted on being fed and paid by the 
people. When not engaged in civil war they lived in utter 
idleness. The whole revenues of Greece were insufficient 
to maintain these armed bands, and during the anarchy that 

^ 'E(pr]fifpis TTJs Kvpfpvi^criws, 1833, Nos. 5, 6, and 7. 



preceded the king's arrival they had been rapidly consuming 
the capital of the agricultural population. In many villages 
they had devoured the labouring oxen and the seed-corn. 
Nevertheless, the wisest reform could not fail to cause great 
irritation in several powerful bodies of men. Unemployed 
Capodistrians, discontented constitutionalists, displaced Cor- 
fiots, and Russian partizans, all raised an angry cry of 
dissatisfaction. Sir Richard Church committed the political 
blunder of joining the cause of the anarchists. His past 
position misled him into the belief that the irregulars were 
an element of military strength. His own influence over 
the military depended entirely on personal combinations. 
His declared opposition to the military reforms of the regency 
persuaded Count Armansperg that the difficulty of trans- 
forming the personal followers of chiefs into a national army 
was much greater than it was in reality. Count Armansperg 
had approved of disbanding the irregulars, when that measure 
was decided on at Munich, and he concurred in the necessity 
of its immediate execution after the regency arrived at 
Nauplia. Yet, when he listened to the observations of Sir 
Richard Church, and counted the persons of influence opposed 
to reform, he became anxious to gain them to be his political 
partizans. He was sufificiently adroit as a party tactician 
to perceive that the Greeks were in that social and moral 
condition which leads men to make persons of more account 
than principles, and he saw that intriguers of all factions 
were looking out for a leader. His ambition led him to make 
his first false step in Greece on this occasion. He listened 
with aff"ected approval to interested declamations against the 
military policy which put an end to the reign of anarchy. 
And, from his imprudent revival of the semi-irregular bands 
at a subsequent period, it seems probable that in his eager- 
ness to gain partizans he gave promises at this time which 
he found himself obliged to fulfil when he was entrusted j 
with the sole direction of the government. The opposition i 
of Sir Richard Church to measures which were necessary in 
order to put an end to anarchy, and the selfish countenance \ 
given to this opposition by Count Armansperg, entailed many \ 
years of military disorder on Greece, and were a principal j 
cause of perpetuating the fearful scourge of brigandage, which 
is its inevitable attendant. 


A.D. 1833.] 

The sluggishness of the Bavarian troops formed a marked 
contrast with the activity of the French during their stay 
in Greece. Tiiough the French soldiers were in a foreign 
land, with which they had only an accidental and temporary 
connection, they laboured industriously at many public works 
for the benefit of the Greeks, without fee or the expectation 
of reward. At Modon they repaired the fortifications, and 
built large and commodious barracks. At Navarin they 
reconstructed great part of the fortifications. They formed 
a good carriage-road from Modon to Navarin, and they built 
a bridge over the Pamisos to enable the cultivators of the 
rich plain of Messenia to bring their produce at every season 
to the markets of Kalamata, Coron, Modon, and Navarin^. 
The Bavarians remained longer in Greece than the French ; 
they were in the Greek service, and well paid out of the 
Greek treasury, but they left no similar claims on the 
gratitude of the nation. 

^The civil organization of the kingdom was based on the 
principle of complete centralization. Without contesting the 
advantages of this system, it may be remarked that in a 
country in which roads do not yet exist it is impracticable. 
The decree establishing the ministry of the interior embraced 
so wide a field of attributions, some necessary and some 
useful, others superfluous and others impracticable, that it 
looks like a summary for an abridgment of the laws and 
ordinances of the monarchy ^. A royal ordinance, not unlike 
a table of contents to a comprehensive treatise on political 
economy, subsequently annexed a department of public 
economy to this ministry^. These two decrees, when read 
with a knowledge of their practical results, form a keen satire 
on the skill of the Bavarians in the art of government. 

The kingdom was divided into ten provinces or nom- 
archies, whose limits corresponded with ancient or natural 

' Maurer, Das Griecliische Vollt in offentlicher, kircklicher nnd privat-rechtlicher 
Beziehunsc, ii. 11. This work, written by the ablest member of the regency, is the 
best authority for the acts of the Greek government during 1833 and 1834, but it 
is full of personal prejudice and spite. 

^ Governmetit Gazette, 1833, No. 14, dated 15th April, 1833. 

^ Government Gazette, 1834, No. 18, dated iith May, 1834. Maurer gives us, 
very unnecessarily, the information that this ordinance was copied from the legisla- 
tion of other countries. It speaks of introducing a system of canalization in a 
country where wells are often wanting, and of rendering the rivers, which flow 
only ' by the muses' skill,' navigable. Das Griechische Volk, ii. 98. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

geographical boundaries. It is not necessary to notice the 
details of this division, for, hke most arrangements in Greece, 
it underwent several modifications \ Persons capable of per- 
forming the part of nomarchs and eparchs had been already- 
trained to the service by Capodistrias, and no difficulty was 
found in introducing the outward appearance of a regular and 
systematic action of the central government over the whole 

country V 

With all their bureaucratic experience, the members of the 

regency were deficient in the sagacity necessary for carrying 
theory into practice where the social circumstances of the 
people required new administrative forms. Their invention 
was so limited that when they were unable to copy the laws 
of Bavaria or France they adopted the measures of Capo- 
distrias. In no case were these measures more at variance 
with the political and social habits of the Greeks than in the 
modifications he made in their municipal system. This 
system, whatever might have been its imperfections, was 
a national institution. It had enabled the people to employ 
their whole strength against the Turks, and it contained 
within itself the germs of improvement and reform. Its 
vitality and its close connection with the actions and wants 
of the people had persuaded Capodistrias that it was a 
revolutionary institution. He struck a mortal blow at its 
existence, by drawing it within the vortex of the central 

The regency virtually abolished the old popular municipal 
system, and replaced it by a communal organization, which 
permitted the people only a small share in naming the lowest 
officials of government in the provinces. The people were 
deprived of the power of directly electing their chief magis- 
trate or demarch. An oligarchical elective college was formed 
to name three candidates, and the king selected one of these 
to be demarch. The minister of the interior was invested 
with the power of suspending the demarchs from office, as an 
administrative punishment. In this way, the person who 
appeared to be a popular and municipal officer was in reality 

1 Governmetit Gazette, 1833, No. 12. A new division was established by Count 
Armansperg (^Government Gazette, 1836, No. 28); and this division was again 
changed by King Otho {Government Gazette, 1838, No. 24). 

2 A nomarch corresponds to a prefect under the French system, and an eparch 
to a sub-prefect. 


A.D. 1833.] I 

transformed into an organ of the central government. De- 
marchs were henceforth compelled to perform the duties of 
incompetent and corrupt prefects, and serve as scapegoats 
for their misdeeds. The system introduced by the regency 
may have its merits, but it is a misnomer to call it a municipal 
system \ 

To render municipal institutions a truly national institution 
and a part of the active life of the people, it is not only 
necessary that the local chief magistrate should be directly 
elected by the men of the municipality ; but also that the 
authority which he receives by this popular election should 
only be revoked or suspended by the decision of a court of 
law, and not by the order of a minister or king. To render 
the people's defender a dependent on the will of the central 
administration, is to destroy the essence of municipal insti- 
tutions. The mayor or demarch must be responsible only 
to the law ; and the control which the minister of the interior 
must exercise over his conduct must be confined to accusing 
him before the legal tribunals when he neglects his duty. 

The decrees organizing the ministry of the interior and the 
department of public economy, proved that the regency was 
theoretically acquainted with all the objects to which enlight- 
ened statesmen can be called upon to direct their attention ; 
but its financial administration displayed great inability to 
employ this multifarious knowledge to any good practical 
purpose. The fiscal system of the Turks was allowed to 
remain the basis of internal taxation in the Greek kingdom. 
Indeed, as has been already observed, whenever the Bavarians 

' Government Gazette, 1834, No. 3. Maurer boasts that the object of the muni- 
cipal law was to constitute the demarchies as moral beings. He ought to have 
foreseen that it would render the demarchs very immoral subjects (ii. 117)- In 
the Parliamentary Papers relative to Greece in 1836, there is a despatch of Sir 
Edmund Lyons claiming for Armansperg the authorship of the law, which it 
described as ' founded on very liberal principles, and placing the administration of 
the affairs of the municipalities entirely in their own hands, and establishing the 
principle of election on the most liberal and extended scale.' It is evident that 
Lyons was grossly deceived, and this despatch is valuable as illustrating the bold- 
ness and the falsehood of Armansperg's assertions. Abel was the principal author 
of the law, and Parish asserts that Armansperg opposed it as too republican. It 
deprived the people of the right of electing their chief magistrate. It rendered 
that chief magistrate dependent on the minister of the day, and not responsible for 
the due execution of his functions to the law alone. Compare Additional Papers 
relative to the Third Instalment of the Greek Loan, p. ,:; 7, and Diplomatic History of the 
Monarchy of Greece, by H. H. Parish, Esq., late Secretary of Legation to Greece, 
pp. 314 and 326. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

entered on a field of administration, in which neither admini- 
strative manuals nor Capodistrias' practice served them as 
guides, they were unable to discover new paths. This 
administrative inaptitude, more than financial ignorance, must 
have been the cause of their not replacing the Turkish land- 
tax by some source of revenue less hostile to national progress. 
Where a bad financial system exists, reform is difficult, and its 
results doubtful. Entire abolition is the only way in which 
all the evils it has engendered in society can be completely 
eradicated. So many persons derive a profit from old abuses, 
that no partial reform can prevent bad practices from finding 
a new lodgment, and in new positions old evil-doers can 
generally continue to intimidate or cheat the people. To 
make sure of success in extensive financial changes, it is 
necessary to gain the active co-operation of the great body 
of the people, and this must be purchased by lightening the 
popular burdens. The greatest difficulty of statesmen is not 
in preparing good laws, but in creating the machinery neces- 
sary to carry any financial laws into execution without 

It is always difficult to levy a large amount of direct 
taxation from the agricultural population without arresting 
improvement and turning capital away from the cultivation 
of the land. The decline of the agricultural population in 
the richest lands of the Othoman empire, and, indeed, in 
every country between the Adriatic and the Ganges, may 
be traced to the oppressive manner in which direct taxation 
is applied to cultivated land. The Roman empire, in spite 
of its admirable survey, and the constant endeavours of its 
legislators to protect agriculture, was impoverished and de- 
populated by the operation of a direct land-tax, and the 
oppressive fiscal laws it rendered necessary. The regency 
perhaps did not fully appreciate the evil effects on agriculture 
of the Turkish system ; it was also too ignorant of the financial 
resources of Greece to find new taxes ; and it was not dis- 
posed to purchase the future prosperity of the monarchy by 
a few years of strict economy ^. 

' Without entering on the question of the comparative advantages of direct and 
indirect taxation, which often depend more on national circumstances than political 
science, it must be mentioned that the Greek peasantry and small proprietors 
were averse to commuting the tenths paid in kind for a fixed annual rate in money. 
They feared that they would be obliged to borrow money, and thus subject them- 


A.D. 1833.] 

The fiscal measures of the regency which had any pretension 
to originahty were impolitic and unjust. They were adopted 
at the suggestion of Mavrocordatos, who had the fiscal pre- 
judices and the arbitrary principles of his Phanariot education 
as a Turkish official. 

Salt was declared a government monopoly; and in order 
to make this monopoly more profitable, several salt-works 
which had previously been farmed were now closed. This 
measure produced great inconvenience in a country where 
the difficulties of transport presented an insuperable barrier 
to the formation of a sufficient number of depots in the moun- 
tains. The evils of the monopoly soon became intolerable, — 
sheep died of diseases caused by the want of salt, the shep- 
herds turned brigands, and, at last, even the rapacious 
Bavarians were convinced that the monopoly required to be 
modified ^ 

The evils resulting from the salt monopoly were far ex- 
ceeded by an attempt of the regency to seize all the pasture- 
lands belonging to private individuals as national property. 
In a ministerial circular, Mavrocordatos ordered the officials 
of the finance department to take possession of all pasture- 
lands in the kingdom, declaring 'that every spot where wild 
herbage grows which is suitable for the pasturage of cattle is 
national property,'' and that the Greek government, like the 
Othoman, maintained the principle ' that no property in the 
soil, except the exclusive right of cultivation, could be legally 
vested in a private individual.' This attempt to found the 
Bavarian monarchy in Greece on the legislative theories of 
Asiatic barbarians, whom the Greeks had expelled from their 
country, could not succeed. But the property of so many 
persons was arbitrarily confiscated by this ministerial circular, 
that measures for resisting it were promptly taken. A wide- 
spread conspiracy was formed, and several military chiefs 
were incited to take advantage of the prevalent discontent, 
and plan a general insurrection. Government was warned of 

selves to the evil of debt, and become serfs of the money lenders. The produce 
was always ready when it could be demanded ; the money, they said, would always 
be demanded by the government officials when it was not ready, and then some 
ally of the official would appear to lend the sum demanded by the state at an 
exorbitant interest. Here we see how direct taxation in an agricultural com- 
munity produces the evil of debts, which forms a political feature in ancient 

' Maurer, T)as Grieckiscke Volk, ii. 290. 



the danger, and saw the necessity of cancelling Mavrocor- 
datos' circular. But many landed proprietors were deprived 
of the use of their pasture-lands by the farmers of the revenue 
for more than a year. The cultivation of several large estates 
was abandoned, and much capital was driven away from 
Greece \ 

Though Mavrocordatos made an exhibition of extra- 
ordinary fiscal zeal at the expense of the people, he is 
accused by M. de Maurer of dissipating the national 
property, by granting titles to houses, buildings, shops, mills, 
and gardens, to his political allies and partizans, after the 
king's arrival, without any legal warrant from the regency, 
and without any purchase-money being paid into the Greek 
treasury — in short, of continuing the abuses which had 
disgraced the administration of the constitutionalists, while 
they were in league with Kolettes and acting under the 
governing commission ^. 

It would be a waste of time to enumerate the financial 
abuses which the regency overlooked or tolerated. They 
allowed the frauds to commence which have ended in rob- 
bing the nation of the most valuable portion of the national 
property, the English bondholders of the lands which were 
given them in security, and the greater part of those who 
fought for the independence of their country, of all reward. 
The regency showed itself as insensible to the value of 
national honesty as the Greek statesmen of the Revolution, 
and the progress of the country has been naturally arrested in 
this age of credit by the dishonesty of its rulers. By the 
repudiation of her just debts, Greece has been thrown 
entirely on her internal resources^ and, after nearly thirty 
years of peace, she remains without roads, without manu- 
factures, and without agricultural improvements. 

The monetary system of the Greek kingdom was a con- 
tinuance of that introduced by Capodistrias, but the phoenix 
was now called a drachma. The radical defect of this plan 

* It is remarkable that Maurer, in his work on the admhiistration of the regency, 
omits all mention of this important measure. The suppres-io veri fixes a large 
share of its responsibility on him and his colleagues. There is no doubt that 
it created the aversion which has ever since been shown by wealthy Greeks in 
England, France, and Germany to making purchases of land in the Greek 
kingdom. Parish, Diplomatic History, p. 231 ; The Hellenic Kingdom and the Greek 
Nation, a pamphlet, 1836, p. 64. 

^ Maurer, Das Griechische Volk, ii. 286. 


A.D. 183^] 

has been already pointed out, and the value of the Spanish 
pillar dollar, on which it had been originally based, was 
daily increasing throughout the Levant. An accurate assay 
of these dollars at the Bavarian mint had proved that their 
metallic value exceeded the calculation of Capodistrias, and 
the drachma was consequently coined of somewhat more 
value than the phoenix, in order to render it equal to one 
sixth of the dollar. The metal employed in the Greek 
coinage was of the same standard of purity as that employed 
in the French mint. It seems strange that the regency 
overlooked the innumerable advantages which would have 
resulted to Greece from making the coinage of the country 
correspond exactly with that of France, Sardinia, and 
Belgium, instead of creating a new monetary system ^. 
, "TTie highest duty the regency was called upon to fulfil was 
to introduce an effective administration of justice. M. de 
Maurer was a learned and laborious lawyer, and he devoted 
his attention with honourable zeal to framing the laws and 
organizing the tribunals necessary to secure to all ranks an 
equitable administration of justice. Had he confined himself 
to organizing the judicial business, and preparing a code of 
laws for Greece, he would have gained immortal honour. 

The criminal code and the codes of civil and criminal 
procedure promulgated by the regency are excellent. In 
general, the measures adopted for carrying the judicial 
system into immediate execution exhibited a thorough 
knowledge of legal administration. By Maurer's ability and 
energy the law was promptly invested with supreme authority 
in a country where arbitrary power had known no law for 
ages. His merit in this respect ought to cancel many of his 
political blunders, and obtain for him the gratitude of the 
Greeks ^. It has been the melancholy task of this work to 
record the errors and the crimes of those who governed ) 

* i-ii68 drachmas equal a franc, and 28 12 drachmas an English sovereign. 
The drachma is divided into 100 lepta ; and the Greek coins are— two of gold, 
40 and 20 drachmas; four of silver, 5, 1, |, and \ drachma: and four of copper, 
10, 5, 2, and I lepton. For observations on the system of Capodistrias, &ee above, 
p. 46. 

^ For the criminal code, see Government Gazette, 1834, No. 3 ; it bears date the 
30th December, r833; for the organization of the tribunals and notarial offices. 
No. 13; for the code of criminal procedure. No. 16; and for the code of civil 
procedure, No. 22. The German originals of these laws are printed in Maurer's 
worlv, Das Griechische Volk, iii. 304, 849. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

Greece much oftener than their merits or their virtues. It is 
gratifying to find an opportunity of uttering well-merited 

Some objections have been taken to the manner in which 
primary jurisdictions were adapted to the social requirements 
of a rural population living in a very rude condition, and 
thinly scattered over mountainous districts ; but the examina- 
tion of these objections belongs to the province of politics, 
and not of history. 

It is necessary to point out one serious violation of the 
principles of equity in the judicial organization introduced by 
the regency. In compliance with the spirit of administrative 
despotism prevalent in Europe, the sources of justice were 
vitiated whenever the fiscal interests of the government were 
concerned, by the creation of exceptional tribunals to decide 
questions between the state and private individuals ; and 
these tribunals were exempted from the ordinary rules of 
judicial procedure. Thus the citizens were deprived of the 
protection of the law precisely in those cases where that 
protection was most wanted, and the officials of the govern- 
ment were raised above the law. The proceedings of these 
exceptional tribunals caused such general dissatisfaction, that 
they were abolished after the Revolution of 1843, and an 
article was inserted in the constitution of Greece prohibiting 
the establishment of such courts in future ^ 

The Greek Revolution broke off the relations of the clergy 
with the patriarch and synod of Constantinople. This was 
unavoidable, since the patriarch was in some degree a 
minister of the sultan for the civil as well as the ecclesiastical 
affairs of the orthodox. It was therefore impossible for a 
people at war with the sultan to recognize the patriarch's 
authority. The clergy in Greece ceased to mention the 
patriarch's name in public worship, and adopted the form of 
prayer for the whole orthodox Church used in those dioceses 
of the Eastern Church which are not comprised within the 
limits of the patriarchate of Constantinople. 

When Capodistrias assumed the presidency, an attempt 
was made by the patriarch and synod of Constantinople to 
bring the clergy in Greece again under their immediate 

* Art. 101. 


1a.d. 1833.] 

I jurisdiction. Letters were addressed to the president and to 
the clergy, and a deputation of prelates was sent to renew 
the former ties of dependency. But Capodistrias was too 
sensible of the danger which would result to the civil power 
from allowing the clergy to become dependent on foreign 
patronage, to permit any ecclesiastical relations to exist with 
the patriarch. He replied to the demands of the Church of 
Constantinople by stating that the murder of the Patriarch 
Gregorios, joined to other executions of bishops and laymen, 
having forced the Greeks to throw off the sultan's government 
in order to escape extermination, it was impossible for 
liberated Greece to recognize an ecclesiastical chief subject 
to the sultan's power ^. 

Capodistrias found the clergy of Greece in a deplorable 
condition, and he did very little for their improvement. The 
lower ranks of the priesthood were extremely ignorant, the 
higher extremely venal. Money was sought with shameless 
rapacity ; and Mustoxidi, who enjoyed the president's con- 
fidence, and who held an official situation in the department 
of ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction, asserts that 
simony was generally practised ^. The bishops annulled 
marriages, made and cancelled wills, and gave judicial 
decisions in most civil causes. They leagued with the 
primates in opposing the establishment of courts of laws 
during the Revolution ; for they derived a considerable 
revenue by trading in judicial business ; while the primates 
supported this jurisdiction, because the ecclesiastics were ■ 
generally under their influence. Capodistrias, in spite of ■/ 
this opposition^ deprived the bishops of their jurisdiction in 
civil causes, except in those cases relating to marriage and 
divorce, where it is conceded to them by the canons of the 
Greek Church. Against this reform the mitred judges raised 
indignant complaints, and endeavoured to persuade their 
flocks that the orthodox clergy was suffering a persecution 
equal to that inflicted on the chosen people in the old time 
by Pharaoh. 

Capodistrias also endeavoured to obtain from the bishops and 

^ Correspojidance du Comte Capodistrias, President de la Grece, publiee par E. A. 
Betant, I'un de ses Secretaires. Geneve, 1839 : ii. 153. 

^ Renseignemenls sur la Grece et sur radtninistration du Comle Capodistrias, par tin 
Grec temoin oculaire desfaits qu'il rapporte, Paris, 1833, p. 30. 



abbots, inventories of the movable and immovable property j 
of the churches and monasteries under their control, but ! 
without success. Even his orders, that diocesan and parish j 
registers should be kept of marriages, baptisms, and deaths, 
were disobeyed, though not openly resisted. Mustoxidi ex- 
pressly declares that the opposition to these beneficial measures 
proceeded from the selfishness and corruption of the Greek 
clergy, who would not resign the means of illicit gain. They 
knew that if regular registers of marriages, births, and deaths 
were established, the fabrication of certificates to meet con- 
tingencies would cease, and the delivery of such certificates 
was a very lucrative branch of ecclesiastical profits. Bigamy 
and the admission of minors into the priesthood would no 
longer be possible ; and it was said that they were sources 
of great gain to venal bishops. Capodistrias failed to eradicate 
these abuses from the Church in Greece ; for Mustoxidi 
declares, that if he had amputated the gangrened members 
of the priesthood, very little of the clerical body would have 
remained ^. 

The ecclesiastical reforms of the regency were temperately 
conducted. An assembly of bishops was convoked at Nauplia 
to make a report on the ecclesiastical affairs of the kingdom. 
Its advice was in conformity with the wishes of those in 
power, rather than with the sentiments of a majority of the 
bishops ; for political subserviency has been for ages a feature 
of the Eastern clergy. On the 4th August 1833, a decree 
proclaimed the National Church of Greece independent of 
the patriarch and synod of Constantinople, and established 
an ecclesiastical synod for the kingdom^. In doctrine, the 
Church of liberated Greece remained as closely united to 
the Church at Constantinople as the patriarchates of Jeru- 
salem or Alexandria ; but in temporal affairs it was subject 
to a Cathc/lic king instead of a Mohammedan sultan. King 
Otho was invested with the power of appointing annually 
the members of the synod ^. This synod was formed on j 

* Renseignements sttr la Grece et snr V adminhtration du Comte Capodis/rias. 35. 

2 Governmenl Gazette, 1833, No. 23. Thirty-four bishops signed the Declaration 
of Independence. 

' Maurer, with the candour which confers value on his vainglorious volumes, 
tells us, that King Otho succeeded, in ecclesiastical affairs, as in all other authority, 
to the rights of the sultan. This information explains one of the causes of his 
arbitrary proceedings, and the oblivion of the Revolution. Das Griechische Volk, 
ii. 160. 


|.D. 1833.] 

he model of that of Russia ; but in accordance with the 

Iree institutions of the Greeks, it received more freedom of 


; When the important consequences which may result from 

i:he independence of a church in Greece filled with a learned 

ind enlightened clergy are considered, the success of the 

-egency in consummating this great work is really wonderful. 

The influence of Russia and the prejudices of a large body 

f the Greeks were hostile to reform ; but the necessity of 

*^*Bi great change in order to sweep away the existing eccle- 

^'jsiastical corruption was so strongly felt by the enlightened 

en in liberated Greece, that they were determined not to 

bavil at the quarter from which reform came, nor to criticise 

the details of a measure whose general scope they approved. 

[Those, however, who had thwarted the moderate reforms of 

Capodistrias were not likely to submit in silence to the more 

^extensive reforms of the Bavarians. An opposition was 

quickly formed. Several bishops were sent from Turkey 

into Greece as missionaries to support the claims of the 

patriarch to ecclesiastical supremacy. They were assisted 

by monks from Mount Athos, who wandered about as 

emissaries of superstition and bigotry. Russian diplomacy 

echoed the outcries of these zealots, and patronized the most 

intriguing of the discontented priests. Yet the Greek people 

remained passive amidst all the endeavours made to incite 

it to violence. 

In the month of December 1833, the regency published 

an ordinance, declaring that the number of bishoprics in 

Greece was to be ultimately reduced to ten, making them 

correspond in extent with the nomarchies into which the 

kingdom was divided. This measure was adopted at the 

recommendation of the synod. In the mean time, forty 

bishops were named by royal authority to act in the old 

dioceses^, and when these died the sees were to be gradually 

united, until ten only remained ^. The synod was reproached 

with subserviency for proposing this law, which was generally 


A reaction in favour of renewing ecclesiastical relations 

with Constantinople soon manifested itself. Death diminished 

' Governnunt Gazette, 1833, No 38. 



the number of the bishops, and the synod named by Kingl,g[!i 
Otho had not the power of consecrating an orthodox bishop|||t'r. 
so that when the Revolution of 1843 occurred, many see 
were vacant. The constitutional system did as little for somej 
years to improve the Church as preceding governments. But|jL;i 
the Greek people did not remain indifferent to the revival o 
religious feeling, which manifested itself in every Christianlj,}^ 
country about this period. Among the Greeks the ideas ofj 
nationality and Oriental orthodoxy are closely entwined. Thel,o£nc 
revival of religious feeling strengthened the desire for nationali|jSj 
union, and a strong wish was felt to put an end to the kind of 
schism which separated the free Greeks from the flock of thep^] 
patriarch of Constantinople. 

Secret negotiations were opened, which, in the year 1850, 
led to the renewal of amicable relations. The patriarch andi^k 
synod of Constantinople published a decretal of the Oriental 
Churchy called a Synodal Tomos, which recognized the inde 
pendence of the Greek Church, under certain restrictions and 
obligations, which it imposed on the clergy. Much objection 1™ 
was made to the form of this document, particularly to the 
assumption that the liberties of the National Church required 
the confirmation of a body of priests notoriously dependent 
on the Othoman government, and which might soon be filled 
with members aliens to the Greek race. Two years were 
allowed to pass before the Greek government accepted the 
terms of peace offered by the Church of Constantinople. In 
1852 a law was adopted by the Greek Chambers, enacting all 
the provisions of the Synodal Tomos, without, however, 
making any mention of that document. By this arrangement 
the independence of the Church of Greece was established on 
a national basis, and its orthodoxy fully recognized by the 
patriarch and synod of Constantinople ^. 

The re-establishment of monastic discipline, and the admi- 
nistration of the property belonging to ecclesiastical founda- 
tions, called for legislation. War had destroyed the buildings 
and dispersed the monks of four hundred monasteries. Many 
monks had served as soldiers against the infidels ; but 


* A volume hostile to the Synodal Tomos, which contains much sound reasoning, 
with some unnecessary theological violence, was published by a learned eccle>'i- 
astic, the archimandrite Pharmakides. It is entitled, 'O 2wo5(«6s lop-os, rj ntpl 
d\i]6eias. For the Tomos, see p. 37. 





much greater number lived on public charity, mixini^ 

dth the world as mere beggars and idlers. The respect for 

lonachism had declined. It was neither possible nor de- 

irable to rebuild the greater part of the ruined monasteries ; 

lut it was necessary to compel the monks to retire from 

he world and return to a monastic life. It was also the 

luty of the government to prevent the large revenues of 

he ruined monasteries from being misappropriated. The 

egency suppressed all those monasteries of which there were 

ess than six monks, or of which the buildings were com- 

)letely destroyed, by a royal ordinance of the 7th October 

833^. The number thus dissolved amounted to four hundred 

ind twelve, and the property which fell into the hands of 

ifthe government was very great. One hundred and forty- 

ight monasteries were re-established, and two thousand 

onks were recalled to a regular monastic life. The surviving 

uns were collected into four convents. The lands of the 

[suppressed monasteries were farmed like other national 

roperty, and they were so much worse cultivated by the 

[farmers of the revenue than they had been formerly by the 

onks, that the measure created much dissatisfaction. The 

••ecclesiastical policy of the regency in this case received the 

i^ijblame due to its financial administration. As far as regards 

Ithe treatment of the monasteries, no conduct of foreigners, 

however prudent, could have escaped censure. 

Much has been done in Greece for public instruction since 

the arrival of King Otho. The regency, however, did little 

but copy German institutions, and so many changes have 

been subsequently made, that the subject does not fall within 

the limits of this work. The regeneration of Greek society, 

by a wiser system of family education than seems at present 

to be practised, will doubtless one day supply the materials 

* The ordinance of 1833 was framed on the report of the synod, and a catalogue 
of the 412 monasteries suppressed was annexed to the report, which is dated icjth 
(31st) August, 1833. This document, which would be of great historical and 
topographical interest, has not been printed, and it is said not to exist in the 
archives of the ministry of ecclesiastical affairs. A work entitled Td MomCT?;- 
piaKa, published in 1859 by Mr. Mamouka, under-secretary of state in the ecclesi- 
astical department, and editor of the Acts of the Greek National Assemblies, contains 
the measures adopted with regard to the existing monasteries. There is a third 
class of monasteries, which possess considerable estates in Greece, concerning 
which it is difficult to procure information : — viz., those of Mount Athos, of the 
Holy Sepulchre, and of Mount Sinai. 

K 2 


[Bk V.Ch.IV. 

for an interesting chapter to some future historian of Greek 

The regency did not estabHsh an university, and King 
Otho never showed any love for learning. Much dissatis- 
faction was manifested at the delay; and in the year 1837 
the Greeks took the business into their own hands, with a 
degree of zeal which it would be for their honour to display 
more frequently in other good causes. A public meeting was 
held, and all parties united to raise the funds necessary for 
building an university by public subscription. The court 
yielded slowly and sullenly to the force of public opinion. 
The royal assent was extorted rather than given to the 
measure, but after an interval the king himself became a 
subscriber, and sycophants called the university by his name. 

In a country divided as Greece had long been by fierce 
party quarrels, it was natural that every measure of the 
government should meet a body of men ready to oppose it. 
The liberty of the press could not fail to give a vent to much 
animosity, and the restoration of legal order by the regency 
resuscitated the liberty of the press, which Capodistrias had 
almost strangled. Four newspapers were established at 
Nauplia, and the measures of the regency were examined 
with a good deal of freedom. Many of the criticisms of the 
press might have been useful to the regency from their intelli- 
gence and moderation, and from the intimate knowledge they 
displayed concerning the internal condition of the country. 
Though the regency paid little attention to these articles, 
it allowed those in which ignorance and violence were exhi- 
bited to ruffle its equanimity. The liberty of the press was 
declared by the two liberals, Armansperg and Maurer, to be of 
little value to the Greeks, unless the press could be prevented 
from blaming the conduct and criticising the measures of 
their rulers. Most of the Bavarians were galled by frequent 
allusions to the magnitude of their pay, and the trifling nature 
of their service. They demanded that the press should be 
silenced. The wishes of the members of the regency coincided 
with these demands. The spirit of Viaro Capodistrias again 
animated the Greek government ^ 

* The four newspapers published at Nauplia were Athena, Helios, Chronos, ar.d 
Triptolemos. The Greek press did not then use more violent language concerning 
any member of the regency than Maurer afterwards used against his colleague, 


The regency did not venture to establish a censorship. It 
jwas, however, determined to suppress the newspapers most 
'opposed to the government by indirect legislation. In the 
imonth of September 1833 several laws were promulgated 
[regulating the press, and police regulations were introduced 
worthy of the Inquisition in the sixteenth century \ Printers, 
i lithographers, and booksellers were treated as men suspected 
!of criminal designs against the state, and placed under 
i numerous restrictions. The editors of newspapers and pe- 
jriodicals were compelled to deposit the sum of five thousand 
drachmas in the public treasury, to serve as a security in case 
they should be condemned to pay fines or damages in actions 
of libel. As the interest of money at Nauplia was then one 
and a half per cent, per month, it was supposed that nobody 
would be found who would make the deposit. The end of 
the law was attained, and all the four political newspapers 
immediately ceased. By this law another liberal ministry in 
Greece became bankrupt in reputation. The want of public 
principle and conscientious opinions among Greek statesmen 
is manifested by the names of the ministers which appear 
attached to these ordinances against the liberty of the press. 
j They are Mavrocordatos, Kolettes, Tricoupi^ Psyllas, and 
' Praides. 

To counteract the bad impression produced by the restraints 
j put on the liberty of the press, the Greek government pre- 
tended to be seriously occupied in improving the material 
j condition of the people. Starving the mind and feasting the 
j body is a favourite system with tyrants. The Bavarians, 
■ however, only feasted the Greeks with printed paper. A 
royal proclamation was published announcing that the regency 
was about to construct a net-work of roads'^. A plan was 
adopted by which every part of the kingdom would have 
found ready access to the Ionian and Aegean seas, and its 

Armanspeig. But 'it is one of the conditions of bad governors tagive heed to 
what they hear said of them, and to take ill that which, if it had been said, they 
had better not have heard,' as Ferdinand the Catholic told other regents. See 
Helps, The Spanish Conquest of America, i. 182. 

^ Government Gazelle, 1833, No. 29. I. Concerning printers, lithographers, and 
booksellers. 2. Concerning the press. 3. Concerning criminal abuses of the 

2 Government Gazette, 1833, No. 29. More than a quarter of a century has now 
elapsed, yet the roads from Athens to Chalcis and from Athens to Corinth are 
unfinished, and many roads are in a worse condition than they were under the 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV^ 

execution was absolutely necessary to improve the country. 
The whole of the roads proposed might easily have been! 
completed in about ten years, had the Bavarian volunteers! 
and the Greek conscripts worked at road-making with asj 
much industry as the French had done while they remained 
in Greece, King Louis of Bavaria declared that the Bava- 
rians would confer benefits on Greece without being a burden j 
on the country. The greatest benefit they could have con- 
ferred would have been to construct good roads and stone I 
bridges. They neglected to do this, and, in direct violation 
of their king's engagement to the protecting powers, theyl 
rendered themselves an intolerable burden \ 

Enough has now been said of the legislative and administra^ 
tive measures of the regency. 

On the Tst of June 1833 they decorated the monarchy with 
an order of knighthood, called the Order of the Redeemer, in 
commemoration of the providential deliverance of Greece ^. 
The order was divided into five classes. From an official 
list, published a few weeks before the termination of Count 
Armansperg's administration as arch-chancellor, it appears! 
that the grand cross had been conferred on forty-nine per- 
sons, exclusive of kings and members of reigning families. 
Among these there were only three Greeks and one Phil-" 
hellene. The names of Kenares, Mavrocordatos, Gordon, and 
Fabvier, are not in the list, which it is impossible to read 
without a feeling of contempt for those who prepared it. 
The subsequent destiny of the order has not been more 
brilliant than its commencement. French ministers have 
obtained crosses in great numbers for unknown writers, and 
Bavarian courtiers and German apothecaries have been as 
lucky as French savants. While it was lavished on foreigners 
who had rendered Greece no seivice, it was not bestowed on 
several Greeks who had distinguished themselves in their 
country's service ^. 

' Parliameniary Papers, Annex A to Protocol of 26th April, 1832. 

■^ Government Gazette, 1 833, No. 29. The following number contains patterns 
for the embroidery of the uniforms of civil officials. Ministers and nomarchs were 
forced to send to Munich and Paris for their coats, and when they first made 
their appearance ia their new clothes, it was evident that they had sent very bad 
measures. Most of them looked as if they had starved since their coats were 

■' The Greek of 1837 gives a list of 594 Knights of the Redeemer. 
Of these 374 are Bavarians and foreigners, 154 Greeks, and 24 Philhellenes. The 
lest are emperors, kings, princes; &c. 


|v.D. 1833.] 

Before recounting the quarrels of the regency, it is neces- 
sary to say a few words more concerning the characters of the 
jmen who composed it. 

Count Armansperg came to Greece with the expectation of 

[being able to act the viceroy. He aspired to hold a position 

jsimilar to that of Capodistrias, but neither his feeble character 

Inor his moderate abilities enabled him to master the position. 

I He might have given up the idea had he not been pushed 

jforward by the countess, who possessed more ambition and 

less wisdom than her husband \ Armansperg selected Maurer 

and Abel as his colleagues, knowing them to be able and 

I hard-working men, and believing that he should find them 

grateful and docile. Armansperg never displayed much 

sagacity in selecting his subordinates, and he soon found 

to his dismay that Maurer and Abel were men so ambitious 

that he could neither lead nor drive them. Without losing 

time he set about undermining their authority. 

The merits of Maurer are displayed in his legislative mea- 
sures ; his defects are exposed in his book on Greece. His 
natural disposition was sensitive and touchy ; his sudden 
elevation to high rank turned his head. He could never move 
in his new sphere without a feeling of restraint that often 
amounted to awkwardness. He wished to save money, and 
he did so ; but he felt that his penuriousness rendered him 
ridiculous. His want of knowledge of the world was dis- 
played by the foolish manner in which he attempted to obtain 
the recall of Mr. Dawkins, the British resident in Greece, 
because Mr. Dawkins thought Count Armansperg the better 
statesman. His ignorance of Greece is certified by his 
informing the world that it produces dates, sugar, and 
coffee ^. 

Mr. Abel was an active and able man of business, but of 
limited bureaucratic views ; rude, bold, and sincere. 

The opinions of General Heideck were not considered to be 
of much value, but his support was important, for it was 
known that his conduct was regulated by what he conceived 
to be the wish of the King of Bavaria. 

The merits of the different members of the regency may be 
correctly estimated by the condition in which they placed the 

^ Maurer, ii 56. , . _ ^ Ibid. ii. 310. 


^ [Bk.V.Ch.IV.jl"'^'' 

departments of the state under their especial superintendence. 
Until the 31st of July 1834, the departments of justice, mili- 
tary affairs, and civil administration, were directed by Maurer, 
Heideck, and Abel ; and they laid the foundations of an 
organization which has outlived the Bavarian domination, 
and forms a portion of the scaffolding of the constitutional 
monarchy of Greece, as established after the Revolution of| 
1843. The department of finance was entrusted to Arman- 
spcrg, and he retained his authority for four years, yet he 
effected no radical improvements. He found and left the- 
department a source of political and social corruption. It 
was not until the end of the year 1836, and then only when 
forced by the protecting powers and the King of Bavaria, that 
he published any accounts of the revenue and expenditure 
of his government, and the accounts published were both 
imperfect and inaccurate ^. 

The policy of the regency did little to extinguish party 
spirit and personal animosity among the Greeks. Indeed, 
both the members of the regency and the foreign ministers 
at Nauplia did much to nourish the evil passions excited by 
the reign of anarchy. Armansperg was a partizan of English 
influence ; Maurer and Abel, strong partizans of France. 
Russia, having no avowed partizan among the Bavarians, 
maintained her influence among the Greeks by countenancing 
the Capodistrian opposition, protecting the monks and clergy 
from Turkey, and the adventurers from the Ionian Islands, 
and flattering the ambition of Kolokotrones. The French 
m.inister protected Kolettes and the most rapacious of his 
friends, because they were supposed to be devoted to the 
interests of France. England made a pretence of supporting 
a constitutional party, but her friends were chiefly remarkable 
for their frequent desertion of the cause of the constitution. 

The regency excluded Kolokotrones and the senators, who 
had attempted to welcome King Otho with a civil war, from 
all official employment. But the unpopularity of several 

* Maurer, who. it must be owned, is a prejudiced witness, says, that as long as 
Armansperg could make Greiner work at official details, he did notliing but loll on 
his sofa and read the chapter on the French Revolution in Rotteck's Universal 
History, or ride out and then take his siesta. His colleagues, who could not 
obtain from him a budget, reproached him at their board meetings with his 
inactivity. Das Griechhche Volk, ii. 319, 519; Parish, Diplomatic History, 296; 
Government Gazette, 1836, Nos. 61, 65, 88, 89, 93, 91, 92. 



measures enabled these excluded Capodistrians to raise a loud 
if not a dangerous opposition, and they availed themselves 
with considerable skill of the liberty of the press, as long as 
the regency allowed them to enjoy it, for the purpose of 
engaging the feelings and prejudices of a numerous class, 
whose attachment to orthodoxy rendered them distrustful 
of a government that was not orthodox, in direct hostility 
to the regency. At the same time they formed a secret 
society called the Phoenix, to imitate the Philike Hetairia, 
and pretended to be sure of Russian support. Kolokotrones 
had addressed a letter to Count Nesselrode, the Russian 
minister of foreign affairs, on the state of Greece, while re- 
siding on board Admiral Ricord's flag-ship, just after King 
Otho's arrival. Count Nesselrode replied to that letter on 
the 11th July 1B33, and numerous copies of this reply were 
now circulated among the discontented ^ It was appealed 
to as a proof that the Russian cabinet would support a Capo- 
distrian insurrection, and cover the insurgents with its powerful 
protection as heretofore. A petition to the Emperor Nicholas 
was signed, praying his Imperial Majesty to employ his 
powerful influence to obtain the immediate recall of the 
regency, and the declaration of King Otho's majority. The 
proposal showed great boldness in a party which, when it 
elected Agostino president of Greece, had proposed that King 
Otho should be considered a minor until he completed his 
twenty-fourth year. A cry was raised in favour of orthodoxy 
and liberty in many parts of Greece, and brigandage began 
simultaneously to revive. Measures were concerted for a 
general outbreak, and the Capodistrians, with Kolokotrones 
as their leader, expected to play over again the drama which 
the constitutionalists, with Kolettes at their head, had enacted 
in 1832. They miscalculated the state of public opinion. 
They had no longer the municipalities and the people in their 

Simultaneously with this conspiracy, a minor plot was going 
on, called the Armansperg intrigue ; and in the end this little 
snake swallowed up the great serpent. The conspirators in 
the minor plot only wished to get quit of Maurer and Hei- 
deck, and to make Armansperg sole regent. Dr. Franz, an 

' Count Nesselrode's letter is printed iu Parish's Diplomauc Hulory, p. 274. 


[Bk.V. Ch.lV. 

interpreter of the regency, who had allied himself closely with 
the partizans of Count Armansperg, circulated petitions to the 
King of Bavaria, praying for the recall of the other members 
of the regency. The existence of these petitions was revealed 
to Maurer, Heideck, and Abel, by a Greek named Nikolaides, 
and by the Prince Wrede, whom Capodistrias had formerly 
selected as a fit person to lay the state of Greece before Prince 
Leopold. Wrede was admitted to the councils of the Capo- 
distrians. though it is not probable that he was treated with 
implicit confidence. He appears, however, to have obtained 
some knowledge of their plans for a general insurrection. Dr. 
Franz was arrested, but, to prevent the necessity of publishing 
Count Armansperg's connection with his intrigues, and re- 
vealing the dissensions in the regency, he was shipped off to 
Trieste without trial ^. It was soon ascertained that several 
persons of the Armansperg faction were connected both with 
the minor plot and the great conspiracy. 

Maurer was easily persuaded that the two were identical. 
He was so infatuated as to believe that Armansperg was privy 
to a conspiracy for obtaining his own exile. The papers of 
Franz proved Armansperg's participation in a shameful in- 
trigue ; the revelations of spies afforded satisfactory evidence 
that many of the intriguers were also conspirators. In the 
mean time a trifling disturbance in Tinos frightened the re- 
gency into proclaiming martial law". 

The general insurrection of the Capodistrians was pre- 
vented by the arrest of Kolokotrones, Plapoutas, Djavellas, 
and several other influential men of the party, in different 
places on the T9th September 1^33^. Maurer now displayed 
the rage of a tyrant : he forgot both law and reason in his 
eagerness to inflict the severest punishment on Kolokotrones. 
Those who spoke with him were reminded of the fury of 
Capodistrias when he heard that Miaoulis had seized the 
Greek fleet at Poros. The Greeks did not consider an abor- 
tive conspiracy a very serious offence. Violence had been so 
often resorted to by all parties, that it was regarded as a 
natural manner of acquiring and defending power. No poli- 
tical party had paid much respect either to law or justice, but 

' 'AOtjvS., No. 141, 23id August, 1833. 

^ Government Gazette. 1833. Nos 28 and 3I. 

* 'Mrjvd, No. 146, 9th September, 1833. 


A.D. 1833.] 

very different conduct was expected from M. Maurer. The 
worst aspect of the conspiracy was the revival of brigandage, 
which was evidently systematic. But it was not easy to pro- 
cure evidence of the complicity of the leading conspirators 
with the crimes of the brigands. Kolokotrones and Plapoutas 
were tried for treason, and, by a strained application of the 
law, and an unbecoming interference of the executive power 
with the course of justice, they were found guilty and con- 
demned to death. The sentence was commuted to imprison- 
ment for life ; but a complete pardon was granted to both 
criminals on King Otho's majority ^ 

The quarrels in the regency now became the leading feature 
of the Greek question, not only in Greece, but at the courts of 
Munich, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg^. The improve- 
ment of Greece was utterly forgotten. There can be no doubt 
that Armansperg's vanity persuaded him that Dr. Franz, in 
the petitions circulated among the Greeks, had given the 
King of Bavaria excellent advice. He now saw the advantage 
which Maurer's violent persecution of Kolokotrones afforded 
him, and he profited by it. Maurer was as ambitious as Ar- 
mansperg, but less prudent. In vain the Greek ministers, 
who respected his talents, endeavoured to moderate his vehe- 
mence. Several resigned rather than sanction the trial of 
Kolokotrones on evidence, which appeared to them insuffi- 
cient. It may be mentioned, in order to convey some idea of 
the manner in which public business was carried on at this 
time, and the contempt with which the Greek ministers 
allowed themselves to be treated by the Bavarians, that the 
arrests, which took place on the 19th September ^'^'^% were 
made by order of the regency, without a cabinet council being 
held, and without the knowledge of the ministers of the inte- 
rior and of justice. When Psyllas, the minister of the interior, 
remonstrated with Maurer on the arbitrary manner in which 
he was proceeding, Maurer became so indignant that he 
threatened the minister with a legal prosecution for neglect- 
ing his duty in not discovering a conspiracy known to so 
many Greeks, The ministry was modified by the infusion 
of additional servility. Mavrocordatos was removed to the 

' The act of accusation against Kolokotrones and Plapoutas is given by Parish, 
270. It is more like a party statement than a legal document. 
^ See Maurer's notice of these quarrels, ii. 53, 56, 93. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

foreign office, and a young Greek recently arrived from Ger- 
many, Theochares, was appointed minister of finance, in which 
office he was a mere cipher. Schinas, an able and intriguing 
sycophant of the Phanariot race, became Maurer's minister of 
ecclesiastical affairs. Kolettes was now all-powerful in the 
ministry ^ 

Maurer, Heideck, Abel, and Gasser, the Bavarian minister 
at the Greek court, formed an alliance with M. Rouen, the 
French minister, and prepared for a direct attack on Arman- 
sperg, in which they felt sure of a signal victory. Armansperg, 
on the other hand, was vigorously supported by Mr. Dawkins, 
and still more energetically by Captain (Lord) Lyons, who 
commanded H.M.S. Madagascar. The count had a not in- 
considerable party among the Greeks and Bavarians. The 
Russian minister, Catacazy, and the whole body of the Capo- 
distrians, assisted his cause by their hostility to Maurer and 
Kolettes. In general the Greeks watched the proceedings of 
both parties with anxiety and aversion, fearing a renewal of 
civil war and anarchy. 

Armansperg laid his statement of the nature of the dissen- 
sions in the regency before the King of Bavaria. Maurer 
wasted time in attacking Dawkins, who had roused his 
personal animosity as much by satirical observations as by 
thwarting the policy of the regency ^. Dawkins was accused 
of representing the proceedings of Maurer and his friends as 
being too aristocratic, too revolutionary, and too Russian, all 
in a breath. People said that, though the accusation looked 
absurd, it might be true enough ; and they expressed a wish 
to hear how Dawkins applied his epithets to the measures 
he criticised. An envoy was sent to persuade Lord Palmer- 
ston to recall Dawkins : a worse pedant, and a man less 
likely to succeed than Michael Schinas, could not have been 
selected. He soon found that he had travelled to London on 
a fool's errand. 

The great attack on Count Armansperg was directed 
against what Maurer probably supposed was the most 
vulnerable part of a man's feelings. No disputes had 
occurred among the members of the regency while they 

' Government Gazette, 18.^3, No. 34. 

* Maurer supplies ample evidence of his own readiness to listen to spies and 
talebearers. The phrases, es ging die Rede, es ging die Sage, eines Tages kam, wie 
ich aus iehr guter Quelle weiss, and such eavesdropping, abound in his work. 


A.D. 1833.] 

were carving their salaries and allowances out of the Greek 
loan. No one then suggested that both political prudence 
and common honesty demanded the most rigid economy of 
money which Greece would be one day called upon to repay. 
On the loth October 1832, Armansperg, Maurer, and 
Heideck, held a meeting at Munich, at which, among other 
shameful misappropriations of Greek funds, they added 
nearly ^4500 to Count Armansperg's salary, in order to 
enable him to give dinners and balls to foreigners and 
Phanariots ^. Nemesis followed close on their crime. The 
count's dinners and balls destroyed Maurer's peace of mind, 
and to regain it he sought to deprive the count of his table- 
money. At last, in the month of May 1834, the majority of 
the regency deprived the president of what was called the 
representation fund, and reduced his extra pay to a sum 
which, if it had been originally granted, would have been 
considered amply sufficient, but now the conduct of the 
majority was so evidently the result of personal vengeance, 
that its meanness created a strong feeling in Armansperg's 

Both parties awaited a decision from Munich. The state 
of Greece was assuming an alarming aspect ; brigandage was 
reviving in continental Greece on an alarming scale ; and the 
protecting powers felt the necessity of putting an end to the 
unseemly squabbling which threatened to produce serious 
disturbances. The British government advised the King of 
Bavaria to recall Maurer and Abel. The Russian cabinet 
gave the same advice. The King of Bavaria adopted their 
opinion, and resolved to leave Count Armansperg virtually 
sole regent. His decision arrived in Greece on the 31st July 
1834, and it fell on Maurer and Abel like a thunderbolt. 
They were ordered to return instantly to Bavaria ; and in 
case they showed any disposition to delay their departure, 
authority was given to Count Armansperg to ship them off in 
the same summary manner in which Dr. Franz had been 
sent to Trieste. Maurer was replaced by M. Von Kobell, 
a mere nullity, whose name only requires to be mentioned, 

^ We must not forget that the Bavarians were dividing the spoil of Greece 
before the loan contract was signed. The signature did not take place until 
ist March, 1S33. Maurer's explanation of his conduct is given in his work, 
ii- 529- 


[Bk.V. Ch.IV. 

because it appears signed to many ordinances affecting the 
welfare of the Greeks ^ Heideck was allowed to remain, but 
he was ordered to sign every document presented to him 
by the president of the regency. During the remainder of 
his stay in Greece he occupied himself with nothing but 
painting. The Greeks saw Maurer and Abel depart with 
pleasure, for they feared their violence ; but at a later period, 
when they discovered that Count Armansperg was neither as 
active an administrator nor as honest a statesman as they 
had expected, they became sensible of the merits of the men 
they had lost ^. 

Count Armansperg governed Greece with absolute power 
from August 1834 to February 1837. He held the title of 
president of the regency until King Otho's majority on the 
1st June 1835, when it was changed to that of arch-chancellor 
which he held until his dismissal from office ^. His long 
administration was characterized by a pretence of feverish 
activity that was to produce a great result at a period always 
said to be very near, but which never arrived. Like Capodis- 
trias, he was jealous of men of business, and insisted on retain- 
ing the direction of departments about which he knew nothing, 
in his own hands. He wasted his time in manoeuvres to 
conceal his ignorance, and in talking to foreign ministers con- 
cerning his financial schemes and his projects of improvement. 
On looking back at his administration, it presents a succession 
of temporary expedients carried into execution in a very im- 
perfect manner. He had no permanent plan and no consistent 
policy. In one district the Capodistrians were allowed to 
persecute the con.stitutionalists, and in another the Kolettists 
domineered over the Capodistrians. Brigandage increased 
until it attained the magnitude of civil war, and the whole 
internal organization of the kingdom, introduced by the early 
regency, was unsettled. 

^ Government Gazette, 1834, No. 25. Maurer gives the following account of his 
successor : ' Herr von Kobell. nachdem er denn auf einmal wieder Credit gefunden, 
seine bedeutenden Schulden bezahlt, eine Lotterie-coUecte fiir seine beide Tochter 

erhalten, einen seiner Sohne im Cadetten-corps untergebracht hatte, u. s. -vf., 

eilte nach Griechenland, nicht um dort zu arbeiten und dem Lande nutzlich zu 
seyn.' Das Griechlsche Volk, ii. 535. It may be doubted whether any of the 
Greek newspapers suppressed by Maurer ever equalled the ribaldry of this passage, 
deliberately penned and published with malice aforethought. 

^ Maurer gives instances of Armansperg's political dishonesty, ii. 60, 61. 

3 Government Gazette, 1835, June, No. i ; 1837, No 4. 


A.D. 1834.] 

The nomarchies and eparchies were called governments 
and sub-governments (dioikeses) The army was disorganized, 
and the rights of property were disturbed and violated. 
Public buildings were constructed on land belonging to 
private individuals, without the formality of informing the 
owner that his land was required for the public service. 
Ground was seized for a royal palace and garden, and some 
of the proprietors were not offered any indemnification, until 
the British government exacted payment to a British subject 
in the year 1850, In order to prevent the members of the 
Greek cabinet from intriguing against his authority, like 
Maurer and Abel, the arch-chancellor took care that all 
the ministers should never be able to speak the same 
language ; and he deprived the cabinet of all control over 
the finance department, by keeping the place of minister of 
finance vacant for a whole year ^. His lavish expenditure at 
last filled all Greece with complaints, and alarmed the King 
of Bavaria. 

Count Armansperg's inconsiderate proceedings forced him 
to solicit from the protecting powers the advance of the 
third series of the Allied loan. Russia and France demanded 
some explanation concerning the expenditure of that part of 
the first and second series which had been paid into the 
Greek treasury. The accounts presented by Count Arman- 
sperg were not considered satisfactory. The British govern- 
ment took a different view of the count's explanations. Lord 
Palmerston supported his administration warmly, and applied 
to Parliament, in 1836, for power to enable the British govern- 
ment to guarantee its proportion of the third instalment of 
the loan without the concurrence of the other powers ^. 

Sir Edmund (Lord) Lyons had succeeded Mr. Dawkins as 
English minister at the Greek court. He supported Count 
Armansperg with great zeal and activity. But the Greek 
government was pursuing a course which every day rendered 
the count more unpopular. 

In the month of May 1836, King Otho left Greece in 
search of a wife, and during his absence, which lasted until 
the beginning of the following year. Count Armansperg was 

1 The Hellenic Kingdom and the Greek Nation, a pamphlet (London, 1836), p 76. 
^ Parliamentary Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, 1836; 
Parish, Diplomatic History, p. 301 ; Parliamentary Debates ; and Annual Register. 


[Bk, V. Ch. IV. 

viceroy with absolute power ^ His authority was supported 
by an army of 11,500 men, of whom 4000 were Bavarians. 
Money had now become more abundant in Greece, and 
several editors of newspapers, having made the necessary 
deposit in the treasury, resumed the publication of their 
journals. The opposition of the press again alarmed the 
Bavarians, and the count resolved to intimidate the editors 
by government prosecutions. The Soter was selected as the 
first victim, and very iniquitous preparations were made to 
insure its condemnation. Two judges were removed from 
the bench, in the tribunal before which the cause was brought, ' 
immediately before the trial. This tampering with the 
course of justice created vehement discontent, but it secured 
the condemnation of the editor. The punishment inflicted on 
the delinquent, however, was not likely to silence the patriotic, 
for it enabled them to gain the honours of martyrdom at a 
very cheap rate. The editor was fined two thousand drach- 
mas, and condemned to a year's imprisonment. The arch- 
chancellor's triumph was short. An appeal was made to the 
Areopagus, and the sentence of the criminal court was 
annulled '^. As might have been expected, the attacks of the 
press became more violent and more personal. 

Count Armansperg's recall was caused by the complete 
failure of his financial administration. The King of Bavaria 
selected the Chevalier Rudhart to replace him, still believing 
that the Greeks were not yet competent to manage their own 
affairs. On the 14th of February 1837, King Otho returned 
to Greece with Queen Amalia, the beautiful daughter of the 
Grand Duke Oldenburg^. M. Rudhart accompanied him as 
prime minister. The views of Rudhart were those of an 
honest Bavarian. He had studied European politics in the 
proceedings of the Germanic diet, and he contemplated eman- 
cipating King Otho from the tutelage of the three protecting 
powers by Austrian influence. Had the thing been feasible, he 

' The ordinance investing Armansperg and his motley cabinet with power is 
dated , May. Government Gazette, 1836. No. 18. 

•* For the sentence condemning the editor, see supplement to the Covrrier Grec, 
6th September, 1836; and for the decision of the Areopagus, the 'XO-qva, loth 
October. 1836. 

3 Grwrnment Gazette, 1837, No. 4. King Otho was married on the 22nd 
November, 1836. 


A.D. 1833.] 

possessed neither the knowledge nor the talents required 
for so bold an enterprise. The Greeks and Bavarians were 
already ranged against one another in hostile parties. Sir 
Edmund Lyons seized the opportunity of avenging the slight 
put upon his mission, by keeping him in ignorance of Arman- 
sperg's recall. He connected the opposition of the British 
cabinet to the nomination of Rudhart with the hostility of 
the Greeks to the Bavarians, and animated them to talk 
again of constitutional liberty. Rudhart claimed as a right 
the absolute power which Maurer and Armansperg had 
silently assumed. In one of his communications to the 
British minister, he declared that he exercised arbitrary 
power by the express order of King Otho, and that the 
King of Greece, in placing the royal authority above the 
law, exercised a right for which he was responsible to no 
one^. This assertion was so directly at variance with the 
promises of the King of Bavaria, and the assurances which 
the three protecting powers had given to the Greeks, that 
Sir Edmund Lyons was furnished with good ground for at- 
tacking the policy of the Bavarians. He pushed his attacks 
to the utmost verge of diplomatic license ; and Rudhart, 
who defended a bad cause without vigour and promptitude, 

' soon found it necessary to resign ^. He held office for ten 
months, and was succeeded by Zographos, who was then 
Greek minister at Constantinople. 

From this time the nominal prime minister was always a 
Greek ; the war department was the only ministry henceforth 
occupied by a Bavarian; but Bavarian influence continued to 
direct the whole administration until the revolution in 1843. 
From 1833 to 1838, during a period of five years, the Greeks 
had exercised no control over their government, which received 
its guiding impulse from Munich. Those who ruled Greece 

I were responsible to the King of Bavaria alone for their con- 
duct in office. It is not surprising, therefore, that Greece 

I was ill-governed ; yet something was done for the good of 

! the country. The early period of the regency was marked 
by the introduction of a system of administration which put 

* Parish, Diplomatic History, 402. 

^ See a letter of Sir E. Lyons to Chevalier Rudhart ; Parish, Diplomatic History, 
Appendix, 218 ; 'Lasm, Arumaire Historique, Documents. Rudhart resigned on the 
20th December, 1837. 



[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

an end, as if by enchantment, to the most frightful anarchy 
that ever desolated any Christian country in modern times. 
Many wise laws were enacted, and some useful measures were 
carried into execution promptly and thoroughly. The errors 
committed were probably fewer, and the good results pro 
duced much greater, than could have been obtained by any 
cabinet composed solely of Greeks. Deficient as Maurer, 
Armansperg, and Rudhart might be in the qualities of states- 
men, as administrators they were far superior to any Greeks 
who could have been placed in the position they held. It 
is certain that they erred greatly from ignorance of the 
institutions of Greece, and it must be acknowledged that 
they often sacrificed the interests of the Greeks to the interests 
of the Bavarians in Greece; but Kolokotrones, Mavrocor- 
datos, Konduriottes, and Kolettes, had all proved themselves 
more unprincipled, and more incapable of governing the 

In considering what the Bavarians did, it is well to reflect 
on what they might have done. The three powers had 
guaranteed the inviolability of the Greek territory ; there 
was therefore no need of any military force to defend the 
country against the Turks. Greece only required the troops 
necessary to repress brigandage and enforce order. The navy 
of Greece had almost entirely disappeared, and the only 
maritime force required was a few vessels to prevent piracy. 
On the other hand, a very great expenditure on roads, ports, 
packet-boats, and other means of facilitating and cheapening 
communications, was absolutely necessary to improve the 
condition of the agricultural population, and give strength 
to the new kingdom. The population was scanty, and the 
produce of agricultural labour was small, even when compared 
with the scanty population. At the same time the demand 
for agricultural labour was so partial and irregular, that at 
some short periods of the year it was extremely dear ; and 
though good land was abundant, extensive districts remained 
uncultivated, because the expense of bringing the produce 
to market would have consumed all profit. Something would 
have been done for the improvement of the country by con- 
structing the roads indicated by the government as necessary, 
when the regency destroyed the liberty of the press ; but 
instead of carrying this wise plan into execution, the resources 


10. 1833.] 
f Greece were consumed in equipping a regiment of lancers, 
I military and court pageantry, in building royal yachts 
id a monster palace. The consequence of neglecting roads 
id packets was that brigandage and piracy revived. The 
.Hied loan was wasted in unnecessary expenditure. The 
hole surplus labour and revenue of Greece were consumed 
ir many years in unproductive employments. A consider- 
jle army was maintained, merely because Greece was called 
kingdom ; and a navy was formed for no purpose apparently 
at that the ships might be allowed to rot. 
The state of the Levant from 1833 to 1843 was extremely 
vourable to the progress of Greece. The affairs of the 
thoman empire were in a very unsettled state, and the 
hristian population had not yet obtained the direct inter- 
...rence of the Western powers in its favour. Thousands of 
Greeks were ready to emigrate into the new kingdom, had 
they seen a hope of being able to employ their labour with 
profit, and invest their savings with security. The incapacity 
of the rulers of Greece, and the rude social condition of the 
agricultural population^ which was perpetuated by retaining 
the Othoman system of taxing land, allowed this favourable 
opportunity for rapid improvement to escape. 

The three protecting powers have been blamed for not 
appropriating the proceeds of the loan to special objects, 
and for not enforcing the construction of some works of 
public utility. But this was perhaps impossible. Neither 
King Louis of Bavaria nor the Emperor Nicholas would 
have consented to submit the public expenditure to the 
control of a representative assembly in Greece ; and neither 
France nor England could have made special appropriation 
of funds for the benefit of the country, without requiring 
the existence of some constitutional control over the Bavarians 
on the part of the Greek people. It is, however, extremely 
probable that all parties, taking into consideration the manner 
in which the previous English loans had been expended, 
considered the members of the regency more competent and 
more inclined to check malversation than any Greeks who 
could have been found. Examples of activity, intelligence, 
eloquence, courage, and patriotism, were not wanting among 
the Greeks; but the Revolution produced no individual uniting 
calm judgment and profound sagacity with unwearied industry 

L 1 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

and administrative experience. It did not produce a single 
man deserving to be called a statesman. 

After M. Rudhart's resignation, the office of president of 
the council of ministers was filled by a Greek ; but the 
president was only nominally prime minister, for King Otho 
really governed by means of a private cabinet. The Greek 
ministers were controlled by Bavarian secretaries attached 
to each department with the title of referendaries. Greeks 
were found servile enough to submit to this control, and 
to act the part of pageant ministers. The proceedings of 
the government grew every year more arbitrary. The king 
was a man of a weak mind, and not of a generous disposition. 
The flatterers who surrounded him appear to have persuaded 
him that the Greek kingdom was created for his personal use, 
and his political vision rarely extended beyond his capital. 
In the greater part of the kingdom the creatures of the court 
ruled despotically. The police kept men in prison without 
legal warrants ; and torture was inflicted both on men and 
women merely because they were suspected of having fur- 
nished brigands with food. The press was prosecuted for 
complaining that Greece was deprived of her constitutional 

The English minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, complained of 
Injuries inflicted on British and Ionian subjects. His recla- 
mations were left long unanswered, and remained for years 
unredressed. Attempts were made to obtain his recall ; and 
when they failed, he was personally and publicly insulted at 
the Greek court in a manner that compelled him to exact 
ample satisfaction. 

During a theatrical representation at the palace, the British 
minister was left, by an oversight of the master of the cere- 
monies, without a seat in the court circle, and allowed to 
stand during the whole performance in a position directly 
in view of the king and queen, who seemed rather to enjoy 
the sight as the most amusing scene in the court comedy. 
Such conduct could not be overlooked. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was compelled to make a very humble apology 
by express order of the king, and the Bavarian baron who 
acted as master of the ceremonies was shipped off to Trieste 
In the same summary manner as Dr. Franz and M. Maurer 
had been. This severe lesson prevented open acts of insult 


I AD. 1833.] 

'in future; but the animosity of the court to the person of 
Sir Edmund Lyons was shown in minor acts of impertinence. 
On one occasion his groom was carried off by the gendarmes 
from his residence, and kept all night in prison on a charge 
of squirting water on a passer-by. These miserable disputes 
, gradually alienated England and Greece, and victory over 
f the court of Athens in such contests certainly reflected little 
' honour on the diplomacy of Great Britain. A tithe of the 
! energy displayed by Sir Edmund Lyons and Lord Palmerston 
in humiliating King Otho, and in adjusting questions of 
etiquette, would have settled every pending demand for justice 
on the part of British and Ionian subjects. Years of wrangling 
between the two courts might have been spared^. Greece 
would not have been rendered contemptible by her deter- 
mined denial of justice, and England would not have been 
rendered ridiculous by employing a powerful fleet to collect 
a small debt from the Greek nation, when it was only due 
by the Greek government ^. France also would not have 
exhibited her jealousy of England, by advising the Greek 
government to resist demands which, when her protection 
was solicited, she compelled Greece to pay as just, and also 
to record the fact in a solemn convention that she had for 
years resisted these just demands ^. 

While the quarrels with the English minister kept the 
Greek court in a state of irritation, the nation was suffering 
from brigandage, and secret societies and orthodox plots were 
again exciting the people to revolt. 

The disbanding of the irregular troops, and the refusal 
of the regency to pay the armed followers of the chieftains 
who assembled round Nauplia at the king's arrival for the 
purpose of intimidating his government, suddenly deprived 
many soldiers of the means of subsistence. Great disorder 
naturally ensued. The transition from anarchy to order could 
not be effected in a day by human strength or human 

' On the nth May, 1839, the Greek government delivered to all the foreign 
missions at Athens, except the British, a lithographed exposition in reply to the 
reclamations of the British government. 

^ The British fleet seized private ships and cargoes at sea without a declaration 
of w^ar. This may be internationally legal, but is unquestionably unjust. 

^ M. Thouvenel counselled resistance in February. Baron Gros, in April, 1850, 
recommended the Greek government to acknowledge its injustice. Parliamentary 
Papers respecting the Demands made upon the Greek Government — Farther Corre- 
spondence, p 346. 



wisdom. Bands of irregulars;, who had lived for several 
years at free quarters and in absolute idleness, were neither 
disposed to submit to any discipline nor to engage in any 
useful employment. Severe treatment was unavoidable, but 
prudence was necessary in enforcing measures of severity. 
During the latter years of the Revolution the armed bands 
had separated their cause from that of the people. They 
pretended to have rights more extensive than the rest of 
the nation, and they exercised these rights by plundering 
their fellow-citizens. During the anarchy that followed the. 
assassination of Capodistrias, Mussulman Albanians had been 
introduced into the Peloponnesus as allies of the Romeliot 
armatoli, and many villages had been sacked by these 
mercenaries ^. 

The early regency carried the disbanding of the irregulars 
into effect with so much vigour that the whole of these dis- 
orderly bands were expelled from the Peloponnesus^ and 
during the summer of 1833 the greater part was driven to 
choose between entering the regular army or crossing the 
frontier into Turkey. 

' The state of the Othoman empire was singularly favourable 
to the project of relieving Greece from her disorderly troops. 
The sultan's army had been defeated at Konieh by the 
Egyptians under Ibrahim Pasha on the 21st of December 
1832^ and a Russian army arrived at Constantinople soon 
after to protect Sultan Mahmud's throne. The Christians in 
European Turkey expected to witness the immediate dissolu- 
tion of the Othoman empire. The Mussulman population in 
Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia was extremely discontented 
with the fiscal arrangements and measures of centralization 
adopted by the sultan, and several districts were in open re- 
bellion. A large portion of the irregular troops who quitted 
Greece found employment in consequence of the local dis- 
turbances in Turkey, and they laid waste a considerable part 

* Thiersch, i. 71. Almost every traveller who ventured to make even the 
smallest excursion in Greece during the winter of 1832-3 was plundered. Pro- 
fessor Ross was robbed near Marathon, and Mr. Wordsworth fell into the hands 
of brigands on Mount Parnes, was wounded, and only escaped being detained for 
ransom in consequence of a severe snow-storm. He says : ' For several months 
the entrance into the Peloponnesus from continental Greece has been rendered 
impassable for travellers by the violence of the military bandits.' Athens and 
Attica, p. 254; compare pp. 22, 49, 227, 242, and 255 (ist edit.) 



of Epirus and Thessaly, as they had previously ravaged a part 
of the Peloponnesus. 

As early as the month of May 1833, a strong body of 
Greeks, having crossed the frontier, joined a number of unpaid 
Albanian soldiers in the pashalik of Joannina, and surprised 
the town of Arta, which had successfully resisted the attacks 
of the Greeks during the Revolution. For three days these 
lawless bands remained masters of the town, which they plun- 
dered without mercy. Neither age, sex, nor religion served to 
protect the inhabitants. Every act of cruelty and brutality 
of which man can be the perpetrator or the sufferer was 
inflicted on persons of both sexes and of every class. Torture, 
too sickening to describe, was employed to compel women 
and children to reveal where money and jewels were con- 
cealed. When gorged with booty, lust, and cruelty, these 
bandits quitted Arta, gained the mountains, and separated 
into small bands in order to evade pursuit and obtain the 
means of subsistence until they could plan some fresh exploit. 
The fame of the sack of Arta allured the greater part of the 
disbanded irregulars across the frontier, and relieved the 
Bavarians from a dangerous struggle. 

The state of Albania became still more disturbed towards 
the end of the year 1834, and many of the Greek armatoli 
and irregulars formed alliances with the municipalities of 
Christian districts, which secured to them permanent employ- 
ment. Had Count Armansperg employed the respite thus 
obtained with prudence, order might have been firmly estab- 
lished in Northern Greece ; but his frequent changes of policy 
and indecisive measures produced a series of political insur- 
rections, and revived brigandage as an element of society in 

Piracy was suppressed at sea by the assistance of the Allies. 
In the spring of 1833 upwards of one hundred and fifty 
pirates were captured and brought to Nauplia for judgment. 
Many of these were irregular troops, who had seized large 
boats and commenced the trade of piracy. 

In 1834 an insurrection occurred in Maina, which assumed 
the character of a civil war. It was caused by a rash and 
foolish measure of the regency. Ages of insecurity had com- 
pelled the landlords in the greater part of Greece to dwell in 
towers capable of defence against brigands. These towers 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

were nothing more than stone houses without windows in the 
lower storey, and to which the only access was by a stone stair 
detached from the building, and connected, by a movable 
wooden platform, with the door in the upper storey. In Maina 
these towers were numerous. The members of the regency 
attributed the feuds and bloodshed prevalent in that rude 
district to the towers, instead of regarding the towers as a 
necessary consequence of the feuds. They imagined that the 
destruction of all the towers in Greece would insure the 
establishment of order in the country. In the plains this was j 
easily effected. Peaceful landlords were compelled to employ 
workmen to destroy their houses instead of employing work- 
men to repair them. The consequence was, that fear of the 
attacks of disbanded soldiers and avowed brigands drove 
most wealthy landlords into the nearest towns, and many 
abandoned the agricultural improvements they had com- 

In Maina the orders of the regency were openly opposed. 
Every possessor of a tower, indeed, declared that he had no 
objections to its destruction, but he invited the government to 
destroy every tower in Maina at the same time, otherwise no 
man's life and property would be secure. Some chiefs affected 
to be very loyal, and very eager for the destruction of towers. 
Bavarian troops were marched into the country to assist these 
chiefs in destroying their own and their enemies' towers. 
The appearance of the Bavarians induced the majority of the 
Mainate chiefs to form a league, in order to resist the in- 
vaders. The people were told that the foreigners came into 
the mountains to destroy the monasteries, imprison the native 
monks in distant monasteries^ and seize the ecclesiastical re- 
venues for the king's government. Several skirmishes took 
place. A Bavarian officer, who advanced rashly into the 
defiles with part of a battalion, was surrounded, cut off from 
water, and compelled to surrender at discretion. The victo- 
rious Mainates stripped their prisoners of their clothing, and 
then compelled the Greek government to ransom them at a 
small sum per man. This defeat dissolved the belief in the 
invincibility of regular troops, which had been established by 
the daring conduct of the French at Argos. 

The regency could not allow the war to terminate with 
such a defeat. Fresh troops were poured into Maina, strong 


A.D. 1834,] 

positions were occupied, the hostile districts were cut off from 
communications with the sea, and money was employed to 
gain over a party among the chiefs. A few towers belonging 
to the chiefs most hostile to the government were destroyed 
by force, and some were dismantled with the consent of the 
proprietors, who were previously indemnified. Partly by con- 
cessions, partly by corruption, and partly by force, tranquillity 
was restored. But the submission of Maina to the regency 
was only secured by withdrawing the Bavarian troops, and 
forming a battalion of Mainates to preserve order in the 
country. Maurer asserts that the Mainates converted their 
towers into ordinary dwellings : anybody who visits Maina, 
even though a quarter of a century has elapsed, will see that 
his assertion is inaccurate^. 

Other insurrections occurred in various parts of Greece ; 
but those of Messenia and Arcadia in 1834, and of Acarnania 
in 1836, alone deserve to be mentioned on account of their 
political importance. 

The insurrection in Messenia occurred immediately after 
the recall of Maurer and Abel, but would have broken out 
had they remained. Count Armansperg was so helpless as 
an administrator, in spite of his eagerness to govern Greece, 
that he was at a loss to know what measures he ought to 
adopt, and allowed himself to be persuaded by Kolettes to 
call in the services of bands of irregulars. Large bodies of 
men, who had just begun to acquire habits of industry, were 
allured to resume arms, with the hope that Kolettes would 
again be able to distribute commissions conferring high mili- 
tary rank, as in the civil wars under Konduriottes and against 
Agostino. Years of military disorganization, and its conco- 
mitant — an increase of brigandage — were the immediate 
results of Count Armansperg's imprudence. 

The leaders of the insurrection in Messenia and Arcadia 
were friends of Kolokotrones and Plapoutas, men who had 
been connected with the Russian plot, and who were in some 
degree encouraged to take up arms by the supposed favour 
with which Count Armansperg had viewed the intrigues of 
Dr. Franz. Their project was to extort from the regency the 
instant release of Kolokotrones and Plapoutas, and to secure 

' Das Griechische Volk, ii. 509. 



for themselves concessions similar to those accorded to the 


The commencement of the insurrection was in Arcadia. 
In the month of August 1834, considerable bodies of men 
assembled in arms at different places. Kolias Plapoutas, a 
man without either influence or capacity, presuming on his 
relationship with the two imprisoned klephtic chiefs, assumed 
the title of director of the kingdom, and issued a proclama- 
tion demanding the convocation of a national assembly. 
Other leaders proclaimed the abolition of the regency and the. 
majority of King Otho. 

Kolias Plapoutas, at the head of four hundred men, at- 
tempted to arrest the eparch of Arcadia at Andritzena without 
success. Captain Gritzales, who had collected about three 
hundred men in the villages round Soulima, was more suc- 
cessful at the commencement of his operations. He made 
prisoners both the nomarch of Messenia and the commandant 
of the gendarmerie in the town of Kyparissia^. A third body 
of insurgents, consisting of the mountaineers from the southern 
slopes of Mount Tetrazi, defeated a small body of regulars, 
and entered the plain of Stenyclerus as victors. 

Kolettesj into whose hands Armansperg, in his panic, had 
thrust the conduct of government, even though he had been a 
staunch partizan of Maurer^ resolved to use his power in such a 
way as to have little to fear from the count's enmity when the 
insurrection was suppressed. He determined, therefore, to 
restore some of his old political allies, the chiefs of the irre- 
gular bands of Northern Greece, again to power. Had he 
allowed the Bavarian troops and the Greek regulars to sup- 
press the insurrection, which they could have effected without 
difficulty, he would have strengthened the arbitrary authority 
of Armansperg, who he well knew was at heart his implacable 
enemy. Kolettes was himself under the dominion of many 
rude prejudices. To his dying day he considered the military 
system of Ali of Joannina as the best adapted for maintaining 
order in Greece. On this occasion, therefore, he repeated, as 
far as lay in his power, the measures by which he had over- 
powered the Moreot primates and the Moreot klephts under 
Kolokotrones in 1H34. Several Romeliot chiefs of his party 

' Kyparissia is called by the modern Greeks Arkadia, but the ancient name has 
been revived in the official nomenclature of the kingdom to avoid confusion. 


|a.d. 1S34.] 

[were authorized to enrol bands of veterans, and with these 
personal followers, who required no preparation and no maga- 
zines, as they lived everywhere by the plunder which they 
[extorted from the Greek peasantry, Kolettes expected to 
[crush the insurrection before the regular troops could arrive. 
iThe irregulars were, however, as usual, too slow in their 

General Schmaltz, a gallant Bavarian colonel of cavalry, 
was appointed commander-in-chief of the royal army. He 
soon encompassed the insurgents with a force of two thousand 
regulars and about three thousand irregulars. The rebels, 
who never succeeded in assembling five hundred men at any 
one point, fought several well-contested skirmishes, but they 
were soon dispersed and their leaders taken prisoners ^. Count 
Armansperg did not treat the rebels with severity. He knew 
that they were more likely to join his party than the Kolettists 
by whom they had been defeated. Perhaps he also feared 
that a close examination of their conduct might throw more 
light than was desirable on the connection that had grown 
up between the Capodistrian conspiracy and the Armansperg 
intrigue. In six weeks tranquillity was completely re-estab- 
lished. But for many months bands of irregular soldiery 
continued to live at free quarters in the plain of Messenia. 
Kolettes felt himself so strongly supported by the Romeliot 
chiefs, and by French influence, that he conceived great hopes 
of being named prime minister on King Otho's majority. 
These hopes were frustrated by the influence of Great Britain 
at the court of Bavaria. Armansperg, as has been already 
mentioned, was named arch-chancellor, and Kolettes was sent 
to Paris as Greek minister. 

The insurrection of 1834 was no sooner suppressed than the 
Bavarians became alarmed at the power which Kolettes had 
acquired. The irregular bands which had been recalled into 
activity were slowly disbanded, and the chiefs saw that fear 
alone had compelled Count Armansperg to resort to their 
services. The policy of suddenly recalling men to a life of 
adventure and pillage, who were just beginning to acquire 
habits of order, could not fail to produce evil consequences. 
Hopes of promotion, perfect idleness, and liberal pay, were 

^ The Soter newspaper, during the month of August, 1834, O.S., notices the 
principal events of this insurrection. 



suddenly offered to them ; and when they fancied that, by 
a Httle fighting and a few weeks' marching, they had attained 
the object of their desire, they found that they were again to 
be disbanded and sent back to learn the hard lessons of 
honest industry. Many of them determined that Greece 
should soon require their services. It was not possible to 
produce a popular insurrection at any moment, but there 
was no difficulty in organizing a widespread system of bri- 
gandage. A project of the kind was quickly carried into 

During the winter of 1834 and the spring of 1835 brigand- 
age assumed a very alarming aspect. Several Bavarians 
were waylaid and murdered \ Government money was cap- 
tured, even when transmitted under strong escorts ; and 
government magazines, in which the produce of the land-tax 
was stored, were plundered. In the month of April the 
intrigues of the military chiefs alarmed the agricultural popu- 
lation to such a degree that several districts in Western Greece 
petitioned the prefects to be allowed to enrol national guards, 
to whom they engaged to guarantee three months' pay from 
the municipal funds. By this means they expected to retain 
the irregulars in their native districts, and to insure their pro- 
tection in case of attacks by strangers. To this anomalous and 
temporary expedient Count Armansperg gave his consent. 

But as the summer of 1835 advanced, the disorders in con- 
tinental Greece increased. Numerous bands of brigands, after 
laying a number of villages under contribution, from the 
mouth of the Spercheus to the banks of the Achelous, con- 
centrated upwards of two hundred men in the district of 
Venetiko, within six miles of Lepanto. A Bavarian officer 
of engineers was taken prisoner with the pioneer who accom- 
panied him, and both were murdered in cold blood. The 
house of Captain Prapas, an active officer of irregular troops 
and a chief of the national guards in Artotina, was burned to 
the ground during his absence, and his flocks were carried off. 
In the month of May, the house of Captain Makryiannes, 
near Simou, was destroyed, and seven members of his family, 
including his wife and two girls, were cruelly murdered. An 
attack was shortly after made on the house of Captain 

^ Fiedler, Rehe durch alle Theile des Konigreiches Griechenland in 1834-1835, 
vol. i pp. 146, 159. 

BRIGANDAGE IN 1835. 157 

A,D. 1835.] 

Pharmaki, an officer of irregulars of distinguished ability 
and courage, who was living within a few hundred yards of 
the walls of Lepanto. Pharmaki was severely wounded, and 
one of his servants was killed ; but he beat off the brigands, 
and prevented them from setting fire to his house. For six 
weeks every day brought news of some new outrage, but 
Count Armansperg turned a deaf ear to all complaints. He 
assured the foreign ministers that the accounts which reached 
them were greatly exaggerated, and that he had adopted 
effectual measures for restoring order. In reality, he neglected 
the commonest precautions, and left entirely to the nomarchs 
and commanders of troops in the disturbed districts the care 
of taking such measures as they might think necessary. The 
count was absorbed with the intrigues which ended in per- 
suading King Otho, whose majority occurred on the ist June 
1835, to prolong the absolute power which he had exercised as 
regent with the title of arch-chancellor. 

The first step of the arch-chancellor was to send Kolettes to 
Paris as Greek minister. While Kolettes remained minister of 
the interior, it was thought that he encouraged, or at least 
tolerated, the extension of brigandage, and looked with secret 
satisfaction at the supineness of the regency. General Lesuire, 
the Bavarian minister of war, was also accused of regarding 
the disorders that prevailed with indifference, though from 
very different motives. Brigandage furnished Kolettes with 
arguments for reviving the system of chieftains with personal 
followers, and to Lesuire it supplied arguments against en- 
trusting the Greeks with arms, and for increasing the number 
of Bavarian mercenaries in the king's service. The accounts 
which the Greek government received of the conduct of the 
irregulars enrolled by Kolettes' authority during the insurrec- 
tion of Messenia, persuaded the minister of war that these 
troops differed from the brigands only in name. It is certain 
that he kept both the Greek and German regular battalions in 
high order ; but he neglected the irregular corps in a way that 
afforded them some excuse for the exactions they committed. 
A battalion of irregulars, under Gardikiotes Grivas, was left 
without pay and clothing at a moment when it was disposed 
to take the field against the brigands, and might have pre- 
vented their incursion to the walls of Lepanto. The scanty 
pensions of the Suliots at Mesolonghi were allowed to fall 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

into arrear. A number of veteran armatoli, to whom pen- 
sions had been assigned on condition of their residing at 
Lepanto and Vrachori, were completely neglected, and were 
so discontented with the conduct of the government, that 
when the house of Pharmaki was attacked, and the firing was 
heard in the whole town of Lepanto, not one would move 
from the walls to assist that gallant chief. The landed pro- 
prietors and the peasantry were almost as much irritated 
at the neglect shown by the government as the starving 
soldiers. Loud complaints were made that the population 
in the provinces was left without defence, while Armansperg 
was lavishing crosses of the Redeemer on diplomats, and pay 
and promotion on Bavarians whose service in Greece had been 
confined to marching from Nauplia to Athens, when the 
king removed his capital from the first of these cities to the 

As soon as Armansperg's intrigues were crowned with 
success, he got rid of Lesuire as well as Kolettes, and 
General Schmaltz became minister of war. About the same 
time Mr. Dawkins was recalled, and Sir Edmund Lyons was 
named British minister at King Otho's court. At the recom- 
mendation of Sir Edmund, Armansperg named General 
Gordon to the command of an expedition which was sent 
to clear Northern Greece of brigands. Gordon, who was the 
earliest Philhellene, was not attached to any political party : 
he distrusted Kolettes, and had little confidence in Arman- 
sperg ; but he knew the country, the people, and the irregular 
troops, as well as any man in Greece. 

On the nth of July he left Athens with his staff; and after 
visiting Chalcis, in order to make himself fully acquainted 
with the state of the troops of which he had assumed the 
command, he formed his plan of operations. His measures 
were judicious, and they were executed with energy. A body 
of regular troops was sent forward from Chalcis by Thebes, 
Livadea, and Salona, to Lidoriki, whither Gordon proceeded, 
following the shore of the channel of Euboea to the mouth of 
the Spercheus. He stopped a couple of days at Patradjik 
(Hypate) to post the troops necessary to guard the passes on 
the frontier, and then descended by the defiles of Oeta and 
Korax to Lidoriki, where he was joined by the regulars from 
Chalcis. By this rapid march he effectually cleared all 


,.D. 1835.] 

Eastern Greece of brigands. They all moved westward, for 
they saw that if any of them remained in Phocis they would 
have been hunted down without a chance of escape. 

At Lidoriki, Gordon divided the force under his orders into 
three divisions. It was much more difficult to drive the 
brigands westward from the Aetolian mountains than it had 
been to clear the more open districts in Eastern Greece. One 
division of the army kept along the ridge of the mountains 
which bound the Gulf of Corinth to the north. The centre, 
\vith the general, marched into the heart of the country, 
through districts cut by nature into a labyrinth of deep 
ravines, and descended to Lepanto from the north-east, after 
passing by Lombotina and Simou. The right division moved 
up northward to Artotina, in order, if possible, to cut off the 
brigands from gaining the Turkish frontier. 

The principal body of the brigands, consisting of one hun- 
dred and thirty, maintained its position in the immediate 
\icinity of Lepanto for six weeks, and it continued to levy 
contributions from the country round until the general arrived 
at Lidoriki. It then broke up into several small bands, and, 
l)icking up its outlying associates, gained the Turkish frontier 
by following secluded sheep-tracks over the Aetolian moun- 
tains. The national guards, which the communities in the 
provinces of Apokura and Zygos had taken into their pay, 
as soon as they were sure of effectual support from the troops 
under Gordon, commenced dislodging the brigands from their 
positions between the Phidari (Evenus) and the Achelous. 

From Lepanto, Gordon marched to Mesolonghi and Vra- 
chori. The officers under his orders found no difficulty in 
clearing the plains of Acarnania, and when this was effected, 
he followed the rugged valley of Prousos to Karpenisi, where 
he arrived on the nth of August. The arrangements he 
had adopted for securing to the Suliots and the veterans at 
Lepanto and Vrachori the regular payment of their pensions, 
and the good conduct of the detachments of regulars which he 
sent to support the local magistrates, insured active co-opera- 
tion on the part of the native population. The spirit of 
order, which the neglect of the royal government had almost 
extinguished, again revived. 

In one month after quitting Athens, tranquillity was re- 
stored in the whole of continental Greece. But as about 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

three hundred brigands had assembled within the Turkish 
territory, and marched along the frontier with military music, 
it seemed that the difficulty of protecting the country would 
be greater than that of delivering it. The general's Oriental 
studies now proved of as great value to Greece as his military 
activity and geographical knowledge. He opened a cor- 
respondence with the pasha at Larissa ; and the circumstance 
of an Englishman commanding the Greek forces, and of that 
Englishman not only speaking Turkish fluently, but also 
writing it like a divan-effendi, contributed more than a sense 
of sound policy, to secure the co-operation of the Turkish 
authorities in dispersing the brigands. 

In the month of October Gordon's mission was terminated, 
and he was ordered to resume his duties at Argos, as com- 
mander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus. The brigands in Turkey 
had dispersed, but it was known that many had retired to 
Agrapha, where they were protected by Tzatzos, the captain of 
armatoli, and it was supposed that Tzatzos had not taken this 
step without the connivance of the derven-pasha. Gordon 
warned the Greek government that brigandage would soon 
recommence, unless very different measures were adopted 
from those which Count Armansperg had hitherto pursued, 
both in his civil and financial administration. And he com- 
pletely lost the count's favour by the truths which he told in 
a memoir he drew up on the means of suppressing brigandage 
and maintaining tranquillity on the frontier. 

The insecurity which prevailed near the Turkish frontier, 
even though brigandage had for a moment ceased, is strongly 
illustrated by the closing scene of Gordon's sojourn in the 
vicinity. Before quitting Northern Greece he wished to enjoy 
a day's shooting. On the 5th October he went with a party 
of friends to Aghia Marina. The brigands, who lay con- 
cealed on both sides of the frontier, had official friends, and 
were well informed of all that happened at Lamia. They 
were soon aware of Gordon's project. A band lay concealed 
in the thick brushwood that covered the plain, but did not find 
an opportunity of attacking him on the road. Soon after 
sunset the house he occupied was surrounded while the party 
was at dinner, but the alarm was given in time to allow the 
sportsmen to throw down their knives and forks, seize their 
fowling-pieces, and run to the garden wall in front of the 



A.D. 1836.] 

building. By this they prevented the brigands from approach- 
ing near enough to set fire to the house. A skirmish ensued, 
in which the assailants displayed very httle courage. The 
firing brought a party of royal troops from Stylidha to the 
general's assistance, but the obscurity of the night favoured the 
escape of the brigands, and on the following morning all traces 
of them had disappeared ^. 

The lavish expenditure of Count Armansperg brought on 
financial difficulties at the end of 1B35, and both Russia and 
France considered his accounts and his explanations so un- 
satisfactory, that they refused to entrust him with the expen- 
diture of the third series of the loan^. The state of Greece 
was represented in a very different manner by the foreign 
jministers at the court of Athens. The King of Bavaria, 
•hoping to learn the truth by personal observation, paid his 
.son a visit. He little knew the difficulty which exists in 
Greece of acquiring accurate information, or of forming correct 
conclusions, from such partial information as it is in the power 
: of a passing visitor to obtain, even when that visitor is a king. 
Truth is always rare in the East, and Greece was divided into 
-everal hostile factions, who were the irreconcileable enemies 

r truth. On the 7th of December 1835, the King of Bavaria 
arrived at Athens, where he was welcomed by the council 
of state with the assurance that his son's dominions were in 
a state of profound tranquillity, and extremely prosperous. 
His majesty was not long in Greece before he perceived that 
the councillors of state were not in the habit of speaking the 

In the month of January 1836, the brigands, who had 
remained quiet for a short time, reappeared from their places 
of concealment, and those who had found an asylum in Turkey 
began to cross the frontier in small bands. Not a week passed 
\\ithout their plundering some village. Accounts reached 
Athens of the unheard-of cruelties they were daily commit- 
ting to extort money, or to avenge the defeats they suffered 
during the preceding year. Party spirit and official avidity 

^ General Gordon gave the following account of this affair in a private letter : — 
' Drosos Mansolas (afterwards minister of the interior) showed a degree of courage 
and coolness very uncommon in a Greek logiotatos. He behaved much better 
than liis gun, which burst at the first discharge.' 

^ Compare Parish, Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece, p. 296, ar.d 
Lesur, Anmmire Historiqiie Universelle pour 1835, p. 480, 




[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

had at this time so benumbed pubHc spirit in the capital of 
Greece, that even the Liberal press paid little attention to the 
miseries of the agricultural population. The peasantry were 
neglected, for they had no influence in the distribution of 
places, honours, or profits. In the month of February, how- 
ever, the evil increased so rapidly, and reached such an 
alarming extent, that it could no longer be overlooked even 
by Count Armansperg. Six hundred brigands established 
themselves within the Greek kingdom, ravaging the whole 
valley of the Spercheus with fire and sword ^. 

An insurrection broke out at this time in Acarnania, which 
had its sources in the same political and social evils as bri- 
gandage. It is peculiarly interesting, however^ from affording ! 
some insight into the political history of Great Britain as well |j 
as Greece. Lord Palmerston persuaded the British govern- 
ment that it was for the interest of Great Britain to support 
the administration of Count Armansperg. This could only 
be done effectually by furnishing him with money ; and to 
induce Parliament to authorize the issue of the third instal- 
ment of the loan, papers were presented to both Houses, 
proving that the Greek government was in great need of money. 
But when the want of money was clearly proved, it was 
objected that the want complained of was caused by lavish 
expenditure and gross corruption ; and it was even said that 
Count Armansperg's mal-administration was plunging Greece 
back into the state of anarchy from which the early regency 
had delivered the country. Additional papers were then pre- 
sented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary (which had 
been all along in his hands), to prove that Greece was in a 
most flourishing condition, and that the prosperity she was 
enjoying was the direct result of the Count's administration ^. 
The history of the insurrection is the best comment on these 
adverse statements. 

The leaders of the insurrection in Acarnania were officers 
of the irregular troops who had distinguished themselves in 
the revolutionary war. Demo Tzelios, who commanded one 
body of insurgents, proclaimed that the people took up arms 


» "AOr^va (Greek newspaper\ 4th (i6th) Februaiy, 1836. 

2 Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, 1836; and Addi- 
tional Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, presented to both 
Houses, August, 1836. 


|a.d. 1836.] 

gainst Count Armansperg and the Bavarians, not against the 
■king and the government. Nicholas Zeivas, another leader, 
demanded the convocation of a national assembly. A third 
[party displayed the phoenix on its standard, and talked of 
orthodoxy as being the surest way to collect the Capodistrians 
!i|and lonians in arms against the government at Athens. All 
united in proclaiming the constitution, and demanding the 
expulsion of the Bavarians. The people took no part in the 

Demo Tzelios entered Mytika without opposition, but was 
defeated at Dragomestre. Mesolonghi had been left almost 
without a garrison. The folly of the government was so 
flagrant, in the actual condition of the country, that the 
proceeding looked like treachery. The insurgents made a 
bold attempt to gain possession of that important fortress 
by surprise, but they were bravely repulsed by the few troops 
who remained in the place, and by the inhabitants, who re- 
garded the insurgents as mere brigands. The rebels, though 
repulsed from the walls of Mesolonghi, were nevertheless 
strong enough to remain encamped before the place, and to 
ravage the plain for several days ^ 

These events produced a panic at Athens. Men spoke of 
the pillage of the Morea in 1824, when Konduriottes was pre- 
sident, of the sack of Poros by the troops of Capodistrias, and 
of the anarchy caused by Kolettes and the constitutionalists 
in 1832. Fortunately for Greece, the presence of the King of 
Bavaria prevented a renewal of these calamities. His Majesty 
enabled the Greek government to procure money. Count 
Armansperg, having rejected the plans proposed by General 
Gordon for averting a renewal of brigandage, was in this 
emergency again induced to practise the lessons he had learned 
from Kolettes in suppressing the insurrection of Messenia. 
Chieftains were allowed to enrol irregular troops, and reconsti- 
tute bands of personal followers, Kitzos Djavellas, Theodore 
Griva, Vassos, Mamoures, and Zongas were empowered to raise 
two thousand men, and to march against the insurgents. 
These bands of irregulars were followed by large bodies of 
regular troops. With these forces the country was cleared of 

1 'AOrjva, 1 2th (24lh) February, 1836. See also an account of this attack on 
Mesolonghi in Dr. Fiedler's Reise durch alle Theile des Konigreickes Griechenland, 

M 2 


[Bk.V. Ch.IV. 

insurgents and brigands without difficulty. Gordon had 
pointed out the operations by which Northern Greece can 
always be swept of enemies by a superior force in about a 
month. Before the end of May the last remains of the 
insurrection were trodden out in Acarnania, and all the large 
bands of brigands were again driven into Turkey. Sir Richard 
Church then made a tour of military inspection, to establish 
order, redress grievances, and pacify the people. On the 30th 
May Sir Edmund Lyons wrote from Athens to Lord Pal- 
merston : ' No inroads have been made on the frontier since 
the end of April, and tranquillity has prevailed throughout the 
country. General Church is still in Western Greece, and his 
reports of the loyal feelings of the inhabitants are extremely 

Others, however, took a very different view of the state of 
the country. The accounts given of the condition of Greece 
were so discordant, and the reports published in Western 
Europe were so variously coloured by personal feelings and 
party spirit, that some notice of this discordance is necessary, 
in order to show the reader how the streams of politics 
meander into the river of history. 

The late Lord Lyons was a warm supporter of Count 
Armansperg, and appears to have received all the statements 
of the count with implicit confidence. On the 24th February 
1836, Lyons wrote to Lord Palmerston that 'the communes 
in Greece have the entire direction of their own affairs ; the 
press is unshackled ; the tribunals are completely independent ; 
private property is scrupulously respected ; the personal and 
religious liberty of the subject is inviolable ^.' Yet not one of 
these assertions was true. While Sir E. Lyons was writing 
this despatch, the people of Athens were reading in the 
Greek newspaper of the morning an account of the attack on 
Mesolonghi, and an announcement that the insurgents re- 
mained unmolested in their camps in Western Greece, 
while on the frontier brigandage was making gigantic pro- 
gress^. In the month of May, General Gordon, who took 
a view of the state of Greece totally different from that 
taken by Lord Lyons, resigned his command in the Pelopon- 

1 Parliatnenfary Papers — Additional Papers, 1836, p. 39. 

* 'Mrjva, 12th (24th) February, 1836. 'H Kijariia av^dvei /xe yiyavriaia P'fjfMra. 




Inesus, and before returning to England wrote to a friend at 
lAthens : ' From what I know of the state of the Pelopon- 
nesus, and the rapid and alarming increase of organized 
brigandage, I fear this will be but a melancholy summer. 
I am assured, and believe, that lately several captive robbers 
have bought themselves off. Faction is extremely busy, and 
crime enjoys impunity. Add to this Church and his heroes 
{hoc est olaim adde cainind), and we have a pretty picture. 
The bandits are now plundering in Romelia with crowns in 
their caps^' Many brigands were enrolled in the bands 
which the irregular chieftains were authorized to form in the 
spring of 1 836 ; and after the dismissal of Count Armansperg, 
Lord Lyons himself complained that one of these amnestied 
robbers had been seen at a ball, given by a foreign minister 
at Athens to the King and Queen of Greece ^. 

The disturbed state of Greece can be proved by better 
evidence than that of a British minister at King Otho's court, 
or of a British officer in his service. It can be proved by 
facts which no party prejudices can distort. From the year 
1833 to the year 1838, military tribunals were constantly 
sitting to deal out punishment to insurgents or brigands. To 
strangers who visited Greece, and who examined the events 
that occurred, instead of trusting to the reports they heard, 
it seemed that martial law was the only law by which King 
Otho was able to dispense even a modicum of justice to a 
great number of his unfortunate subjects ", 

During the interval between the dismissal of Count Arman- 
sperg and the final expulsion of the Bavarians in 1843, 

• This last observation alludes to Count Armansperg having granted an amnesty 
to several of the chiefs of brigands whom Gordon had driven out of Greece in 
183.S, and to one who had taken part in the attack made on the General at Aghia 

^ An example of the different aspect which Greece presented to the British 
minister, and to an observant British traveller, will be found by comparing the 
Parliamentary Papers of 1836 with Colonel Mure's Journal of a Tour in Greece in 
1838. Lord Lyons writes in 1836 — ' I denied that the peasantry were impoverished, 
or that they wo:e sheep-skins.' Yet Colonel Mure in 1838, even in the town of 
Livadea, remarks that the students ' reclined, squatted, romped, and reposed upon 
their shaggy goat-skin cloaks or hairy capotes, which protected them from the 
storm by day, and formed their mattress and bedding by night.' 

^ The following proclamations of martial law will be found in the Government 
Gazette, 1833, No. 28; 1834, No. 28; 1835, first series, No. 12; second series, 
No. 3; 1836, No. 6. This last military tribunal was established in February, 
1836, and sat until June, 1837. Various amnesties were granted by Count 
Armansperg, which furnished a supply of criminals for tribunals of a more regular 
kind at a later period. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

several trifling insurrections broke out in the Peloponnesus ; 
and continental Greece continued to be tormented by bands 
of brigands, who committed horrid atrocities. In a single 
year more than one hundred persons presented themselves 
to the public prosecutors, who had been tortured or mutilated 
by brigands and pirates. Men had lost their noses and ears ; 
women and children had been tortured with indescribable 
cruelty, in order to force them to reveal where their husbands 
and their fathers were concealed \ No traveller passed 
through the country without seeing traces of their misdeeds. 
Colonel Mure found brigandage the subject of conversation 
at every khan he visited in 1838, and he fell in with victims | 
of the brigands, with gendarmes pursuing brigands, or with 
brigands themselves, in every part of Greece ^. Even Attica 
suffered severely from their ravages ; shepherds were re- 
peatedly murdered, and the landed proprietors feared to visit 
their estates. 

Several chiefs of robbers maintained themselves in the 
vicinity of Athens for years, and it was naturally supposed 
that they had found the means of obtaining powerful political 
protection ^ A singular scene, which occurred when two 
famous brigands were led out to be executed, confirmed the 
general belief in some official complicity. 

On the 5th of August 1 839, Bibisi and Trakadha, who had 
been tried and condemned to death, were ordered to be 
executed in the vicinity of Athens. The executioner was 
assassinated at the Piraeus a few days before, and a new I 
executioner was engaged to decapitate the criminals. An 
immense crowd was assembled to witness the death of men 
who were as much admired for their daring as they were 
feared and hated for their cruelty. The two brigands were 
surrounded by a strong guard of soldiers. The executioner 
ascended the scaffold on which the guillotine was placed. 

* Dr. Fiedler says (ii. 46) : ' Die Landriiuber sind schon keine Menschen mehr, 
aber die Seeriiuber sind noch vitl teuflischer. Es wiirde zu emporend sein ihre 
Schandthaten zu beschreiben.' 

2 Mure, Journal of a Tour in Greece, vol. i. p. 24I ; vol. ii. pp. 2, 137, 144, 147, 
186, 209, 257, 259, 274, 286, and 291. Compare also Fiedler, Reis,e diirch alle 
Tkeile des Kijnigreiches Griechenlaiid in den Jahren 1834 his 1837, vol. i. 146, 159, 
165, 182, 192, 193, 198; ii. 45. 

^ The first of these local brigands who gained distinction in Attica was named 
Burduba. After committing several atrocious murders, he was pardoned and 
enrolled in the municipal guard, but he was soon slain by the relations of one 
of his victims. 


A.D. 1839.] 

After waiting long for orders, he slowly commenced his 
work, but after some further delay, he fainted, or pretended 
to faint, and his powers of action could not be sufficiently 
restored to enable him to stand. The prefect wished to find 
another executioner, but the municipal authorities would give 
him no assistance. The populace began to enjoy the comedy 
they witnessed, instead of the tragedy they had expected to 
see. A reprieve was called for, and from the foot of the 
gallows the prefect was persuaded to despatch a message to 
King Otho asking for a reprieve, which, under the circum- 
stances, it was impossible for his majesty to refuse ^. Bibisi 
was condemned to imprisonment for life. As usually happens 
in Greece, both he and Trakadha were soon allowed to 
escape. They recommenced their robberies in the neighbour- 
hood of Athens. At last they ventured to rob within sight 
of the royal palace. The court and the Greek ministers were 
roused from their habitual lethargy. A price was put on 
Bibisi's head, and he was soon shot by a gendarme, who had 
himself been a brigand. Trakadha perished even sooner. 
But brigandage continued to exist in Attica, and to flourish 
in the greater part of Greece for many years ; and pages 
might be filled with accounts of robberies, murders, torturing, 
mutilation, and worse atrocities committed in every part of 
Greece ^. 

The evils of brigandage fell chiefly on the agricultural 
population, and neither the court, the Bavarians, nor the 
Greek ministers, appear to have paid any attention to the 
condition and the sufferings of the agricultural classes. The 
want of roads confined intercourse and material improvement 
to the sea-coast and the neighbourhood of commercial towns. 
The greater part of Greece, cut off from all hope of bettering 
its circumstances, remained in a barbarous and stationary 

King Otho returned to Greece after his marriage with 
Queen Amalia ^ accompanied by M. Rudhart, whom King 
Louis had selected to act as his son's political guide and 
prime minister. Count Armansperg was ordered to return 

^ 'k9-qva., 26th July, 1839. 

2 The recent work of Mr. Senior gives some account of the extent to which 
brigandage continued in 1855. 

» Maria Frederica Amalia, born 21st December, i8i8, was the eldest daughter 
of Augustus, Grand Duke of Oldenburg. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

to Bavaria, the office of arcli-chancellor was abolished, and 
Rudhart was appointed minister of the royal household and 
of foreign affairs on the 14th February 1837. He was an 
upright and perhaps an able man, but neither his previous 
experience nor his personal character fitted him for the 
position which he was called upon to occupy in Greece, and 
he displayed such ignorance of the administrative wants of 
the country, that he was compelled to resign before he had 
held office for a year. His mismanagement rendered it 
impossible for King Otho to entrust the direction of the j 
government any longer to foreigners, and on the 20th Decem- 
ber 1837 M. Zographos, who was then Greek minister at 
Constantinople, was recalled to lill the offices which M. 
Rudhart had resigned. 

King Otho became his own prime minister after the 
resignation of M. Rudhart. His majesty possessed neither 
ability, experience, energy, nor generosity ; consequently he 
was neither respected, obeyed, feared, nor loved ; and the 
government grew gradually weaker and more disorganized. 
Yet he pursued one of the phantoms by which abler despots 
are often deluded. He strove to concentrate all power in his 
own hands. It never occurred to him that it was more 
politic to perform the duty of a king well, than to perform 
the business of half-a-dozen government officials with mecha- 
nical exactitude. King Otho observed but a very small 
portion of the facts which were placed directly before him ; 
he was slow at drawing inferences even from the few facts 
he observed, and he was utterly incapable of finding the 
means of reforming any abuse from his own administrative 
knowledge or the resources of his own mind. 

The king counted on his sincere desire to be the monarch 
of a prosperous and powerful nation for supplying him with 
every qualification necessary for governing the Greeks, and he 
expected that his personal popularity and his king-craft 
would prevent insurrections and suppress brigandage. Un- 
fortunately he took no measures to root out the social evils 
that caused the one, or the political evils that produced the 
other. The king could form no firm resolutions himself, and 
he reposed no confidence in his ministers. They were indeed 
not worthy of much, for both Bavarians and Greeks displayed 
far more eagerness to obtain ministerial portfolios, than zeal 



A.D. 1839.] 

in performing the duties of the offices with which they were 
entrusted. King Otho observed the meanness of their 
intrigues and the selfishness of their conduct. He distrusted 
the Bavarians, because he perceived that they looked to 
Munich for their ultimate reward ; and he despised the 
Greeks, because they were always ready to abandon the 
principles they avowed when he offered them either place or 
profit. With these feelings he attempted to govern without 
the advice of his ministers ; and he only assembled cabinet 
councils in order to obtain the formal ratification of measures 
already prepared in his own closet. Even his majesty's 
commands were often communicated to his ministers by 
private secretaries. To insure complete subserviency, no 
minister was allowed to remain very long in office, and men 
were usually selected without influence or ability, and fre- 
quently without education ^. 

During the personal government of King Otho, a singular 
event envenomed the disputes which had arisen between 
Lord Lyons and the Greek court during M. Rudhart's 
administration. The affair has always remained enveloped 
in mystery, but its effects were so important that the fact 
requires notice, though it eludes explanation. It placed the 
British minister in direct personal hostility to the sovereign 
at whose court he was accredited, and it was the principal 
cause of the bitter animosity that King Otho ever since 
showed to England. 

A Greek newspaper which King Otho was said to read 
with particular pleasure, thought fit, in an unlucky hour, to 
insert extracts from an English pamphlet ridiculing the 
servile condition of a nation that was governed by a young 
queen. A reply appeared in the Morning Chro7iicle, observing 
that it was fortunate for Great Britain that the only reproach 
which could be made to the sovereign was that she was 

' Count Armansperg taught King Otho to form cabinets of ministers who could 
not commimicate in a common language. He had often two ministers who could 
only speak Greek, and one who could speak nothing but German. But King 
Otho carried many things farther in the wrong direction than his arch-chancellor. 
The following is the copy of a letter written by a minister of foreign affairs, who 
held office during delicate negotiations with Lord Palmerston. It may be said to 
consist of eighteen words, twelve of which are strangely mis-spelt : — 

Kvpii, eras eSojrio icara vxpiMv kmrayiv tis. A. M tis BaaiXiais otoi a^piov rpiriv 
€is ras 7| /*, /i. diXoi ads Sex^iJ' »; A. M 17 ISaaiKiaa. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV, 

young. Time would too soon remove the reproach, but the! 
article in the Greek newspaper was in very bad taste in aj 
country where the sovereign was reproached with being in-j 
competent to govern. The Morning Chronicle then asserted! 
that a certificate had been signed by several Bavarians, Bi*' 
members of King Otho's household, declaring that his majesty 
was incapable of governing his little kingdom. The Bavarian 
consul at Athens was an Englishman, and he considered iti 
his duty to step forward and contradict the correspondent 
of the Morning Chronicle. The anonymous writer defended' 
his veracity, reiterated his assertion, and added that the 
document was dated in the year 1H35, and was signed by 
Dr. Wibmer, King Otho's physician, Count Saporta, the marshal | 
of the royal household, Baron Stengel and M. Lehmaier, 
private secretaries to the king, and members of his private 
council or camarilla. This rejoinder was widely circulated, 
and caused a loud outcry at Athens. The Greek newspapers 
declared that their king had been grossly insulted and calum- 
niated, either by the English or the Bavarians, or by both. 
In order to tranquillize the public, and throw the whole 
odium on the English, Dr. Wibmer, Baron Stengel, and M. 
Lehmaier published a declaration, asserting that they had 
never signed any such certificated But in the mean time 
it was reported that an indirect communication had been 
made to the courts of Greece and Bavaria that, in case of 
further discussion, the document would be published in the 
Morning CJiroJiicle. It is certain that a short time after 
publishing their declaration, Wibmer, Stengel, and Lehmaier 
suddenly resigned their offices, and returned to Bavaria. 
The precise nature of the mysterious certificate remained 
a secret. 

But whatever the document might be, since it was signed 
in 1835, during Count Armansperg's administration, it was 
inferred that it could only have become known to foreigners 
by having been treacherously communicated to the count's 
friend, Lord Lyons, and having, through the imprudence of 
Lord Lyons, fallen into the hands of some person who made 
use of it to gratify a private spite. The wound given was 
severe, and the press never allowed it to heal. Even English 

' 'A9i]va, 1839, No. 632. The declaration is dated 23rd July, 1839. 


A.D. 1843.] 

diplomatists and officials were so imprudent as to be con- 
stantly harping on the question of the mysterious certificate. 

As years rolled on, the misgovernment of King Otho became 
more intolerable. The agricultural population remained in 
a stationary condition. They were plundered by brigands, 
pillaged by gendarmes, and robbed by tax-collectors. They 
had to bear the whole burden of the conscription, and pay 
heavy municipal taxes ; yet their property was insecure, and 
no roads were made. The Bavarians reproached Capodistrias 
with having neglected to improve the Turkish system of 
levying the land-tax, to construct roads and bridges, and 
to establish security for persons and property ^ The Greeks 
now reproached the Bavarians with similar neglect. A remedy 
was required, and the people, having long patiently submitted 
to the despotic authority of the Bavarians, now began to 
clamour for a constitutional government. The first step to 
a free government was the expulsion of the Bavarians, and 
all parties in Greece agreed to unite their strength for this 
object. The administrative incapacity of King Otho's coun- 
cillors disgusted the three protecting powers as much as their 
arbitrary conduct irritated the Greeks. 

England and Russia supported the parties who demanded 
constitutional government. Nationality was so interwoven 
with orthodoxy, and orthodoxy appeared to be so com- 
pletely under Russian control, that the establishment of a 
constitutional and national government was supposed by the 
cabinet of St. Petersburg to be the surest means of rendering 
Greece subservient to the schemes of the Emperor Nicholas 
in the East. The Capodistrians carried their designs further 
than the Russian cabinet, for they proposed dethroning King 
Otho. For several years great exertions had been made to 
arouse the orthodox prejudices of the Greeks, and hopes were 
entertained that a revolution would afford an opportunity of 
placing the crown of Greece on the head of an orthodox 
prince. But when the time came, no orthodox prince fitter to 
govern Greece than King Otho could be found. 

The English party acted under the guidance of Lord Lyons, 
who for several years had been the firm advocate of liberal 
measures^ and a return to a constitutional system. 

* Thiersch, i. 57. 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

France still proposed what Louis Philippe and his minis- 
ters called a policy of moderation. The French minister in 
Greece v/as instructed to recommend the Greek government 
to improve the provincial councils and the municipal adminis- 
tration. The evils against which the people complained were 
defects in the central administration, consequently the advice 
of France was futile. 

The destruction of the representative system, the anni- 
hilation of independent action in the municipal authorities, 
the low state of political civilization, the still lower state of 
political morality, and the general lassitude which follows 
after a great national exertion, would in all probability have 
enabled King Otho and the Bavarians to rule Greece de- 
spotically for some years more, had not Great Britain and 
Russia publicly called upon the king's government to remedy 
the financial embarrassments in which it was involved. The 
Russian minister warned King Otho that he must prepare 
to pay the interest of the Allied loan. The king determined 
to augment his revenues in order to meet the demands of 
the Allies, and in the year 1842 he made some administrative 
changes which rendered his government more oppressive. A 
law regulating the custom duties was adopted, which caused 
so much discontent among the mercantile classes, and so 
many complaints, that the government was compelled to 
modify it by a new law before it had been many months 
in operation ^ 

The Russian cabinet expected that King Otho, when 
threatened with a constitution, would have thrown himself 
on its support ; but finding that its counsels were neglected, 
the emperor made a peremptory demand for immediate pay- 
ment of the interest due on the Allied loan ^. The menacing 
tone of this demand was interpreted by the orthodox party 
to authorize the friends of Russia to adopt revolutionary 
measures. But to insure the approbation of the Emperor 
Nicholas, the partizans of Russian influence considered it ne- 
cessary to give the movement as much as possible a religious 
character, and they made it their object to replace the Catholic 

. * This law is translated in Lesur, Annuaire Historiqne, 1842. The modification 
took place in 1843. 

* An extract from the Russian note is given in Lesur, Atinnaire Historique, 1843. 
It was dated 23rd February (7th March), 1843. See Documents. 



A.D. 1843.] 

Otho by an orthodox prince. As orthodoxy was in no 

danger, and no orthodox king was forthcoming, the direction 

of the revolution passed into the hands of the constitutionalists, 

who demanded a definite political object, the convocation of a 

national assembly. 

The union of the orthodox and constitutional factions was 
absolutely necessary, in order to give a popular movement 
any chance of success. This was easily effected, for both 
desired the immediate expulsion of the Bavarians ; the ortho- 
dox party was not unfavourable to the convocation of a 
national assembly, and the constitutional party felt no dis- 
position to defend King Otho, had a better sovereign been 
proposed as his successor. It may be observed that both 
parties were destitute of leaders possessing any political 

The British government had long advocated liberal in- 
stitutions, but Lord Palmerston was no longer in office, and 
some doubt was entertained whether the Tories would not 
openly oppose a revolutionary movement. The friends of 
constitutional liberty brought on a discussion in the House 
of Commons on the 15th August 1843, which proved that 
all parties in England considered the Greeks entitled to 
representative institutions. Lord Palmerston said : ' I hope 
that her Majesty's ministers will urge strongly upon the King 
of Greece the necessity of his giving a constitution to his 
people in redemption of the pledge given by the three powers 
in 1832, and repeated by Baron Gise, his father's counsellor.' 
And Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, after alluding to 
the financial condition of Greece, continued : ' Russia, France, 
and England have made strong representations likewise on 
other matters, connected with the necessity of giving satis- 
faction to the just wishes of the people. I must abstain at 
present from any more direct allusion on this subject, but 
I can assure the house that many points alluded to by the 
noble lord have not been overlooked.' These were solemn 
warnings given in the face of all Europe ; but King Otho 
refused to listen to the voice of nations, and remained loitering 
with fatuity on the brink of a precipice ^. 

^ That a revolution was considered inevitable both in England and Greece is 
proved by an article in Blachvood's Magazine for September, 1843, 'The Bank- 
ruptcy of Greece ; ' and a letter from Athens, dated 5th September, and published 


[Bk. V. Ch. IV. 

A revolution being inevitable, all parties agreed that it 
ought to commence at Athens, and that King Otho should 
be compelled to dismiss all the Bavarians in the Greek 
service, to acknowledge the constitution, and to convoke a 
national assembly for its revision. The orthodox party con- 
sented that these points should be those mooted at the 
commencement of the revolution, being convinced that the 
king's pride would induce him to reject the first. But, at 
all events, they felt so sure of commanding a majority in 
a national assembly, that they believed it would be in their 
power to declare the throne vacant, and to proceed to elect a 
new king the moment they could find a suitable orthodox 

On the day preceding the revolution, the court obtained 
authentic information of the conspiracy. Orders were given 
to arrest General Makryiannes and many of the leaders ; but 
it was already too late. The gendarmes who surrounded 
Makryiannes' house did not invest it until after dark, and 
they did not attempt to make the arrest until midnight, 
hoping to surprise several leaders at the same time. Their 
movements had been watched, and a strong body of con- 
spirators had introduced themselves unobserved into the 
house. When the gendarmes approached they were warned 
off, and when they summoned the general to surrender, and 
attempted to force an entry, they found everything prepared 
for defence. A few shots were exchanged, and the gen- 
darmes were repulsed, carrying off one man killed and another 

The garrison of Athens had been drawn up to support the 
gendarmes. General Vlachopulos, once a staunch adherent of 
Mavrocordatos, now a devoted courtier, was minister of war. 
He had been trained by the camarilla to do nothing without 
orders, and he was not a man to seize the moment for inde- 
pendent action. He did not put himself at the head of the 
troops, and thus the only chance of stemming the torrent of 
the revolution was lost. 

As soon as the shots which proclaimed that General 

in the Morning Post of the 23rd, announces the approaching revolution in terms 
which indicate that its information was derived from the Russian party. It says, 
that ' the Greeks have so fully made up their minds to put an end to tire Bavarian 
dynasty as to be resolved not even to accept a constitution at the hands of King 

REVOLUTION OF 1 843. 175 

'.,D. 1843.] 

Makryiannes' house was attacked were heard, General Kalergi, 
the inspector of cavahy, rode into the barracks where the 
troops were drawn up. On his arrival a preconcerted shout 
was raised, 'Long live the constitution!' — C'/^co ro ^vvrayixa. 
Kalergi immediately assumed the command, and marched 
the whole garrison to the royal palace. And at the same 
time, with the prudence which he constantly displayed in 
o-reat emergencies, and which contrasted with his extreme 
imprudence on ordinary occasions, he sent out strong pa- 
trols to maintain order, and stop the cry of 'Death to the 
Bavarians!' which the friends of orthodoxy and brigandage 
attempted to raise. 

King Otho was waiting in his palace with his usual 
apathetic patience to receive the news that the numerous 
arrests ordered by the minister of war had been made. That 
of Makryiannes was to have served as a signal for the others ; 
and his majesty had hardly received the information that the 
gendarmes had been defeated, when the garrison of the 
capital, with Kalergi at its head, appeared under the palace 
windows. General Hess, who was the Bavarian military 
counsellor in the camarilla, was by the king's side. A Bava- 
rian aide-de-camp was despatched to bring up the artillery 
and drive the rebellious troops from the square before the 
palace with grape-shot. The king counted on the devotion 
of Captain Botzaris, a son of the brave Marko, who had been 
educated in Bavaria. The guns soon arrived, but they gal- 
loped to the position assigned them by Kalergi amidst shouts 
of ' Long live the constitution ! ' The question now lay be- 
tween Greek liberty and Bavarian despotism. 

The king showed himself at one of the lower windows of 
the palace. Kalergi informed his majesty that all Greece 
appealed to him to fulfil the promises given when he was 
elected King of Greece, that the people should be governed 
constitutionally. A low conversation ensued, which was in- 
distinct to those nearest, but the attitude of Kalergi indicated 
dissent. The king turned to the troops, and exclaimed in a 
loud voice, ' Retire to your quarters.' Kalergi swamped the 
royal order by calling 'Attention!' and, with a deferential 
air, veiling a tone of satire, observed to the king, ' The troops 
expect your majesty's orders through me, and they will wait 
patiently for your royal decision in their present position.' 


[Bk.V. Ch.IV. 

It was now announced that deputies from the council of state 
were appointed to lay the wishes of the nation before his 

The council of state was a creation of Count Armansperg. 
It was an imitation of the senate of Capodistrias, and it had 
no more claim to be regarded as a representation of the Greek 
people than that body. Many of the membei's were insignifi- 
cant and ignorant men, but all were eager to retain the high 
place into which fortune had intruded them. They met, at 
the requisition of the conspirators, when Kalergi marched to 
the palace. The Phanariots and courtiers in the body en- 
deavoured to gain time, and tried to raise a long discussion. 
They knew that the constitution would send them back to 
their former nullity. The murmurs of the constitutionalists 
assembled outside the place of meeting at last put an end to 
all discussion, and the council of state pledged itself to sup- 
port the constitution. Andreas Londos, Rhigas Palamedes, 
and Andreas Metaxas, were deputed to wait on the king and 
advise his majesty to dismiss the Bavarians, appoint a new 
ministry, and convoke a national assembly. 

Morning dawned before this deputation reached the palace. 
King Otho was in no hurry to receive the men who composed 
it. He still counted on effectual support from the German 
ministers at his court, and his immediate object was to afford 
them time to take some step in his favour. The deputation 
was at last received, but while the king was treating with its 
members, he was endeavouring to open a communication with 
his own creatures in the council of state, who, he thought, 
might now be sufficiently numerous to pass a new resolution 
in his favour. 

His Majesty's delay was beginning to exhaust the patience 
of the constitutionalists, and those most hostile to his person 
began to display their feelings. The greater part of the 
population of Athens was assembled in the extensive square 
before the palace. The troops occupied only a small space 
near the building. Children were playing, boys were shout- 
ing, and apprentices were exclaiming that the king was acting 
with Bavarian precipitancy, which had long been a byword 
with the Greeks for doing nothing. Men were exhibiting 
signs of dissatisfaction, and talking of the departure of Agos- 
tino from Nauplia under circumstances not very dissimilar. 

REVOLUTION OF 1843. 177 

A.D. 1843.] 

Suddenly a few carnages arrived in quick succession : they 
contained the foreign ministers^. A faint cheer was raised as 
the Russian and Enghsh ministers appeared ; but in general 
the people displayed alarm, remained silent, or formed small 
groups of whisperers. At this moment it was fortunate for 
Greece that Kalergi was at the head of the troops. On that 
important day he was the only leading man of the movement 
who was in his right place. He had the good sense to de- 
clare to the foreign ministers that they could not enter the 
palace until the deputation of the council of state had ter- 
minated its interview and received a final answer from his 
majesty. The representatives of the three Allied powers 
being made acquainted with the demands of the deputation, 
acquiesced in this arrangement on receiving from Kalergi the 
assurance that his majesty's person should be treated with the 
greatest respect. The ministers of Russia, England, and 
France departed, deeming that their presence might tend to 
prolong the crisis and increase the king's personal danger. 
The Austrian and Prussian ministers thought the field was 
clear for action on their part, and they resolved to act ener- 
getically. They insisted on seeing the king. They used 
strong language, and made an attempt to bully Kalergi, who 
listened with coolness, and then quaintly observed that he 
believed diplomatic etiquette required them to follow the ex- 
ample of their doyen, the Russian envoy, and that common 
sense suggested to him that it would be prudent for them to 
act like the representatives of the three protecting powers. 

When King Otho learned that the German diplomatists 
had been unable to penetrate into his palace, he saw that it 
was necessary to abandon absolute power in order to preserve 
the crown. Without any further observation he signed all the 
ordinances presented to him ; and on the 15th of September 
1843, Greece became a constitutional monarchy. The Bava- 
rians were dismissed from his service ; a new ministry was 
appointed, and a national assembly was convoked. 

That national assembly met on the 20th of November 1843, 
and terminated its work on the 30th of March 1844, when 

* The doyen of the corps diplomatique was M. Catacazi, the Russian envoy ; Lord 
Lyons (then Sir Edmund) was English minister, M. Piscatory was French minister. 
Baron Proliesch d'Osten was Austrian minister, and Count Brassier de St. Simoa 
was Prussian minister. 



[Bk. V. Ch. l\\ 

King Otho swore obedience to the constitution which it hac 


It is not the business of the historian of Greece under 
foreign domination to judge this constitution. It is onlyl 
necessary for him to record the fact that it put an end tol 
the government of ahen rulers, under which the Greeks hadf 
lived for two thousand years. Its merits and defects belonglj 
to the history of Greece as a constitutional state ; and perhaps y 
more than one generation must be allowed to elapse beforej 
they can be examined with the light of experience. Still, 
before closing this record of the deeds by which the Greeks 
established their national independence, it is necessary to 
notice some shortcomings in this charter of their political' 

The constitution of 1844 is a compilation from foreign 1 
sources, and not the production of the national mind. Greece 
had no Lycurgus to make laws for the attainment of theoretic 
excellence, nor any Solon to devise remedies for existing evils. 
National wants and national institutions were alike over- 
looked. The municipal system which Capodistrias had de- 
faced, and which Maurer had converted into an engine for 
rivetting the fetters of centralization on the local magistrates, 
was neither revived as a defence for the people's rights, 
nor adapted to aid the progress of Greek society. 

The section of the constitution which determines the public 
rights of the Greek citizen, omits all reference to those rights 
in his position as an inhabitant of a parish, and as a member 
of a municipality and provincial district. Indeed, the in- 
terests of the citizen, in so far as they were directly connected 
with his locality and his property, were completely neglected, 
and only his relations with the legislature and the central 
government were determined. 

The spirit of imitation also introduced some contradictions 
into the constitution of Greece extremely injurious to the 
cause of liberty. Universal suffrage was adopted for choosing 
members of the legislature, while the chief magistrates in the 
municipalities were selected by the king from three candi- 
dates chosen by an oligarchical elective body. As far as the 
rights of the citizens in municipalities were concerned, all 
the evils of the Capodistrian and Bavarian systems were 
left without reform. The municipalities remained in servile 




' ' |iependcnce on the king, the ministers of the day, and the 
prefects of the hour. The demarch was not directly elected 
J Wc; jjy the people, and the minister of the crown exercised a 
"^ '^'i; jjirect control over the budget of the demarchy. Yet the 
^^ ' JDeople, though not allowed to elect their own local chief, were 
nevertheless entrusted with the election of deputies to the 
lower legislative chamber. And this introduction of universal 
r- ; puffrage in the institutions of Greece was completely excep- 
r'-^ belli: jtional, for a property qualification was retained for the electors 
•^ ^tk jwho appointed provincial councillors. A system tending more 
^^wfe idirectly to perpetuate mal-administration in the municipalities, 
nullity in the provincial councils, and corruption in the cham- 
ber of deputies, could not have been devised. Individual 
responsibility was destroyed, the influence of the court was 
extended, and the power of faction increased. 

The constitution of Greece opens the section of the public 
tiieoreti! jrights of citizens with an article which figures in most modern 

it over'l 



^ne t'oiji 

e publii'f 

e right 


the Id- 




to the 
as tie 



constitutions since the French constitution of 1793 ^ ^^ 
declares that all Greeks are equal in the eye of the law. 
In many of the constitutions in which a similar article ap- 
pears, it is a direct falsehood : in the constitution of Greece 
it is not strictly true. The Greeks who framed the constitu- 
tion knew that the phrase was introduced in France originally 
to enable the people to boast of an equality which the French, 
at least, have never enjoyed. To render all the citizens equal 
before the law, something more is necessary than to say that 
they are so. The legislation which would insure equality 
must render every individual, whatever be his rank or official 
station, responsible for all his acts to the persons whom those 
acts affect. The law must be equal for all, and superior to all. 
Neither a minister of police, a general, nor an admiral, any 
more than a prefect, must be permitted to plead official duty 
for any act as an excuse for not answering before the ordinary 
tribunals of the country. No officer of government must be 
allowed to escape personal responsibility by the plea of supe- 
rior orders. The sovereign alone can do no wrong. There 
can be no true liberty in any country where administrative 
privileges exempt officials from the direct operation of the 
law, as it affects every other citizen of the state, and as it 

^ A translation of the Greek constitution is given in Parliamentary Papers, 1 844, 
' Correspondence relative to recent events in Greece.' 

N % 


[Bk. V. Ch. IVj 

is administered by the ordinary tribunals of the country. The- 
Greeks did not lay down this principle in their constitution | 
they preferred the nominal equality of France to the lega; 
equality of English law. 

The two most influential leaders in the national assembi 
were Mavrocordatos and Kolettes. Both endeavoured to pre-j 
serve every official privilege introduced by Capodistrias and 
the Bavarians, for the purpose of placing the agents of th 
government above the law of the land. It was only through] 
the support which Lord Lyons gave to a small party olj 
deputies, that Mavrocordatos was induced to insert an articl 
in the constitution expressly forbidding the re-establish men' 
of the exceptional tribunals which Capodistrias, the regency,] 
and King Otho, had used as instruments of fiscal extortion! 
and illegal oppression. The abolition of the exceptional 
tribunals then in existence was declared in another article] 
of the constitution ^. The opposition which the leading] 
statesmen of Greece made even to this tame protest agains 
the illegal and unconstitutional proceedings of past govern 
ments, presaged that they were not likely to prove either 
active or intelligent artificers of the institutions still required 
in order to establish the civil and political liberties of the 
Greeks on a firm foundation. But the living generation had 
accomplished a great achievement. The future destinies of 
the Greek race were now in the hands of the citizens of 
liberated Greece. 


tj the it 


I J ■■ 




Before finally releasing the reader who has followed the] 
Author through the preceding pages, it may not be altogether'; 
unnecessary to look back at the origin of the Greek Revo- 
lution, and examine how far it has been crowned with success, 
or in what it has failed to fulfil the expectations of reflecting I 
men. A generation has already passed away ; most of the j 
actors in the drama are dead ; the political position of Greece 
itself has changed ; so that a contemporary may now view the 
events without passion, and weigh their consequences with 

The Greek Revolution was not an insurrectional movement, f 
originating solely in Turkish oppression. The first aspirations 

' Compare Articles 89 and loi. 




'for the delivery of the orthodox church from the sultan's yoke 

tie I '^^^''^ inspired by Russia ; the projects for national independ- 

lence by the French Revolution. The Greeks, it is true, were 

1 ,,, jprepared to receive these ideas by a wave in the element 
^ ■ lof human progress that had previously spread civilization 
;„• ' among the inhabitants of the Othoman empire, whether 
., ," 'Mussulman or Christian. 

The origin of the ideas that produced the Greek Revolution 
explain why it was pre-eminently the movement of the people ; 
and that its success was owing to their perseverance, is proved 
by its whole history. To live or die free was the firm resolve 
of the native peasantry of Greece when they took up arms ; 
and no sufferings ever shook that resolution. They never had 
the good fortune to find a leader worthy of their cause. No 
eminent man stands forward as a type of the nation's virtues ; 
too many are famous as representatives of the nation's vices. 
From this circumstance, the records of the Greek Revolution 
are destitute of one of history's most attractive characteristics : 
it loses the charm of a hero's biography. But it possesses its 
own distinction. Never in the records of states did a nation's 
success depend more entirely on the conduct of the mass of 
the population ; never was there a more clear manifestation of 
God's providence in the progress of human society. No one 
can regard its success as the result of the military and naval 
exploits of the insurgents ; and even the Allied powers, in 
creating a Greek kingdom, only modified the political results 
of a revolution which had irrevocably separated the present 
from the past. 

Let us now examine how far the Greek Revolution has 
succeeded. It has established the independence of Greece 
on a firm basis, and created a free government in regions 
. where civil liberty was unknown for two thousand years. It 
has secured popular institutions to a considerable portion of 
the Greek nation, and given to the people the power of 
infusing national life and national feelings into the admini- 
stration of King Otho's kingdom. These may be justly 
considered by the Greeks as glorious achievements for one 

But yet it must be confessed that in many things the Greek 
Revolution has failed. It has not created a growing popu- 
lation and an expanding nation. Diplomacy has formed 

:Iiiies i 


[Rk. V. Ch, 

a diminutive kingdom, and no Themistocles has known ho^ 
to form a great state out of so small a community. Yet thi 
task was not difficult : the lesson was taught in the Unit© 
States of America and in the colonial empire of Great Britain 
But in the Greek kingdom, with every element of social am 
political improvement at hand, the agricultural populationj 
and the native industry of the country have remained almosi 
stationary. The towns, it is true, are increasing, and merchant 
are gaining money; but the brave peasantry who formed thi 
nation's strength grows neither richer nor more numerous 
the produce of their labour is of the rudest kind ; whoL 
districts remain uncultivated ; the wealthy Greeks who pick! 
up money in foreign traffic do not invest the capital they] 
accumulate in the land which they pretend to call their coun^ 
try; and no stream of Greek emigrants flows from the millions] 
who live enslaved in Turkey, to enjoy liberty by settling in 
liberated Greece. 

There can be no doubt that the inhabitants of Greece may, 
even in spite of past failures, look with hope to the future. 
When a few years of liberty have purged society from the 
traditional corruption of servitude, wise counsels may enablei 
them to resume their progress. 

But the friends of Greece, who believed that the Revolution 
would be immediately followed by the multiplication of the 
Greek race, and by the transfusion of Christian civilization and 
political liberty throughout all the regions that surround the 
Aegean Sea, cannot help regretting that a generation has 
been allowed to pass away unprofitably. The political posi- 
tion of the Othoman empire in the international system of 
Europe is already changed, and the condition of the Christian 
population in Turkey is even more changed than the position 
of the empire. The kingdom of Greece has lost the oppor- 
tunity of alluring emigrants by good government. Feelings 
of nationality are awakened in other Oriental Christians under 
Othoman domination. The Greeks can henceforth only repose 
their hopes of power on an admission of their intellectual and 
moral superiority. The Albanians are more warlike ; the 
Sclavonians are more laborious ; the Roumans dwell in a more 
fertile land ; and the Turks may become again a powerful 
nation, by being delivered from the lethargic influence of the 
Othoman sultans. 



I ^.D. 1843.] 
I The Othoman empire may soon be dismembered, or it may 
iong drag on a contemptible existence, like the Greek empire 
bf Constantinople under the Palaeologues. Its military re- 
j50urces, however, render its condition not dissimilar to that 
!of the Roman empire in the time of Gallienus, and there may 
be a possibility of finding a Diocletian to reorganize the 
administration, and a Constantine to reform the religion. 
:But should it be dismembered to-morrow, it may be asked, 
Iwhat measures the free Greeks have adopted to govern any 
[portion better than the officers of the sultan ? On the other 
hand, several powerful states and more populous nations are 
well prepared to seize the fragments of the disjointed empire. 
They will easily find legitimate pretexts for their intervention, 
and they will certainly obtain a tacit recognition of the justice 
of their proceedings from the public opinion of civilized 
Europe, if they succeed in saving Turkey from anarchy, and 
in averting such scenes of slaughter as Greece witnessed during 
her Revolution, or as have recently occurred in Syria. 

It is never too late to commence the task of improvement. 
The inheritance may not be open for many years, and the 
heirs may be called to the succession by their merit. What, 
then, are the merits which give a nation the best claim to 
greatness? Personal dignity, domestic virtue, truth in the 
intercourse of society, and respect for justice, command re- 
verence and insure authority to individuals. Let the Greeks 
make them the first objects of all family education, until they 
become national characteristics, and then liberated Greece 
will have no reason to envy either the glory of ancient Greece, 
or the power which was conferred on the ancient Greeks by 
the conquests of the Macedonians. But I wander too far 
from my subject ; so, instead of moralizing further, I shall 
conclude with the words of the old English song^ — 

' Only the actions of the just 
Smell sweet and blossom in the dust.' 

' [At this point the original work ended ; but the two following chapters were 
left in manuscript by the Author at the time of his death, and are intended to form 
a continuation of the history up to the year 1864, when the constitution of Greece 
was established on a more definitive basis. Ed.] 



Constitutional Monarchy — 1844 to 1862. 

Alexander Mavrocordatos prime minister. — French policy. — Elections in 1844. — | 
Misconduct of the Mavrocordatos cabinet. — An anomalous election. — Kolettesj 
prime minister. — Organization of the Church. — Diplomatic disputes. — | 
Quarrel with Turkey. — Financial administration. — Revolts and brigandage. 
— Changes of ministry. — Rupture with Great Britain. — Arrangement of the I 
British claims. — Affairs of Montenegro. — Russian demands on Turkey. — l 
State of Greece in 1853 and 1854 — Greeks invade Turkey. — Defeat of the] 
Greeks. — Occupation of the Piraeus by French and English troops. — Demo- 
ralized condition of Greece. — Violation of the constitution. — Brigandage in ' 
1855 and 1856. — Financial commission of the protecting powers. — Land- 
tax. — Communal administration. — The Miaoulis ministry. — Dissolution of | 
the Chamber of Deputies. — Attempt to assassinate Queen Amalia. — Negotia- 
tions with Admiral Kanares for the formation of a ministry. 

When the Author revised the preceding chapters of this 
work in retirement at Kephisia during the summer of i860, 
King Otho seemed to be as securely seated on his throne as 
any sovereign in Europe. The ungrateful task of recording 
the misfortunes of Greece is resumed in order to complete a 
contemporary view of the course of events and of the changes of 
opinion which caused the King of Greece to be driven from 
his throne, without an effort being made to support his 
authority by those whom his favour had raised to wealth 
and power. A political revolution has now opened to the 
Greeks new roads to improvement, and placed in their own 
hands the means of self-government. A constitution better 
adapted to the social condition of the population, and an 
augmentation of territory due to the generosity of the British 
government, have modified the condition of the Greek kingdom, 
and they render the Revolution which established the new 


STATE OF GREECE, 1844. 185 


order of things the natural termination of this work. Time 
may not yet have purified the Author's mind from the 
i disturbing influences and prejudices of the passing day, but 
i he cannot resist the desire to make his history of the Greek 
I Revolution, though it must be imperfect, as complete as 
i lies in his power ; and age will not allow him to delay 
I the work in the hope of being able to survey the events 
more calmly. 

The attempt which the Greeks made in 1844 to lay the 
J j foundations of good government on constitutional theories was 
unsuccessful ; it was rendered abortive by the want of national 
institutions for local administration, or what is now generally 
called self-government. The people remained powerless to 
correct local abuses or to execute measures of local improve- 
ment. The corruption of the central government and the 
OTtall contracted views of King Otho rendered the period from the 
ripii(!jj I adoption of the constitution in 1844 to his expulsion from 
;::ofii , Greece in 1862 a period of comparative stagnation for a 
^, .. people who, like the population of the Greek kingdom, 
._DeiK possessed two unfailing elements of prosperity and national 
i;^ei increase, when they are wisely employed, freedom of com- 
'~^ merce and a considerable extent of fertile and uncultivated 

The harmony that prevailed among the party leaders in the 
National Assembly of 1843 ceased at its dissolution. The old 
iftliiffl parties under Mavrocordatos, Kolettes, and Metaxas, again 
\Mm recommenced their old intrigues and their former struggles 
Mm for the power of conferring places and salaries on their 
)rrfiiii partizans. The interference of the protecting powers was 
letel openly exercised. For a short time the ministers of Great 
^esH Britain and France, Sir Edmund Lyons and M. Piscatory, 
frooiP acted in concord, and endeavoured to induce Mavrocordatos 
and Kolettes to unite in forming a ministry, believing that this 
coalition afforded the surest means of giving Greece good 
government. But the ambition of these leaders was irrecon- 
ovil cileable, and the avidity of their partizans to gain possession 
ettfl| of the whole patronage of government soon showed that a 
coalition of what was called the English and French parties was 
itisli| impossible. The question was, whether a struggle for power was 
to be carried on in a divided cabinet or in a divided nation. 
After a cautious examination of the circumstances in which 



[Bk. V. Ch. V. 

he was placed, King Otho selected Mavrocordatos to form theij 
first constitutional ministry. The power of consolidating a 
system of administration founded on free institutions and local \ ! 
self-government was thus, in the year 1H44, placed in the 
hands of the man who had taken the most prominent part^j 
in framing the first constitution of the Greek state in 1821. 
Success in the task of securing to Greece administrative order jj 
as well as national independence would have conferred on 
Mavrocordatos the highest glory to which a statesman can 
aspire, while his failure obscured the merits of his previous j 
service. Success evidently depended on the power of rendering 
the law the supreme authority in the government, and on the 
ministry winning the support of the people by giving practical 
energy to a municipal system calculated to carry into im- 
mediate execution profitable schemes of local improvement. 
Mavrocordatos commenced his administration on the 29th of 
March 1844, and in less than five months he was driven from 
office by public opinion for having violated the constitution 
and neglected to perform any of the duties imposed on the 
first constitutional cabinet. His leading error arose from the 
ordinary delusion of weak statesmen in believing that they 
increase their power by concentrating all executive business in 
their own hands, not knowing that the strength of a govern- 
ment depends far more on ministers taking care that officials 
do their duty, than on their interfering with the duties of 
officials, and thereby assuming a responsibility from which 
they might remain free. Mavrocordatos persuaded himself 
that it was for the interest of Greece that he should govern 
absolutely, and this infatuation caused him to pay little 
attention to the strict letter of the constitution, and even 
less to the opinions and feelings of the people, whenever they 
impeded his projects for the centralization of power in his 
own hands. 

Sound policy as well as duty commanded the ministry 
to reform those administrative abuses of which the people 
complained with justice, and to establish that degree of 
publicity which enables public opinion to fix responsibility 
where blame accrues. But the new ministry left old abuses 
unreformed, and Mavrocordatos was too much engaged in 
accumulating authority to think of increasing the means 
of fixing responsibility. To maintain the ministry in office 







A.D. 1844.] 

it was necessary to secure the election of a majority of their 
partizans to the chamber of deputies, that was about to meet. 
In the senate a majority was obtained without difficulty, for 
King Otho adopted all the ministerial nominations. 

In the year 1844 the state of European politics was 

particularly favourable to the prolongation of English influence 

in Greece. The Emperor Nicholas, who disliked Louis Philippe 

and his government, visited England. For some time previous 

it was known that he desired to prevent a close alliance 

j between the governments of France and England, and to 

|J establish a common line of policy for the British and Russian 

^"«l governments in the East, The Emperor Nicholas professed 

J himself ready to adopt the views concerning the integrity 

""fl of the Othoman empire which guided the policy of Great 

.Britain, and declared that he sought no object tending to 

"r^m. aggrandize Russia at the sultan's expense. The British 

ministers listened to these assurances with pleasure, and 

perhaps they attached more importance to them than they 

merited ; but they could not forget, even while giving the 

emperor credit for perfect sincerity, that the Russian empire 

•/J had a traditional policy which could undergo no permanent 

change, though it might receive temporary modification from 

pera-i the views of the reigning emperor. The governments of Great 

Britain and Russia certainly for a short time appeared to agree 

Aic) vilj generally in their views concerning the affairs of Turkey, and 

niiidii this agreement caused both of them to neglect the affairs of 

"" 'n Greece. The Emperor Nicholas believed that a constitutional 

; " ij government could not be established in Greece under King 

■ Mel Otho, and even if it w^ere established, that it would do no 

' ™l good. The British government took a very different view 

rtieyl of the effect likely to be produced by the constitution. They 

ialiisl believed that if the Greeks were left to themselves to adapt 

i their political institutions to their own wants, the constitutional 

n;5in| form of government would not only be successful, but would 

also greatly accelerate the progress of the country both 

politically and in material prosperity. Mavrocordatos was 

from the causes mentioned left to himself, and received less 

direct support from British influence than, as head of the 

d in I 'English party, he expected to receive. It is true that Sir 

Edmund Lyons accorded him as much support as was 

gee Ij consistent with the duty of refraining from express interference 



i of 




with the business of government. The principle of non- 
interference was the policy which the British government 
was desirous of imposing on the protecting powers, as the 
surest means of enabling the Greeks to profit by the adoption 
of constitutional government. 

M. Piscatory, the French minister at Athens, was a man of ,' 
sense and judgment, liberal in his views and well acquainted 
with the men who composed the French party in Greece, whose 
true moral and political value he estimated fairly enough. 
During the National Assembly he showed a sincere desire that' 
England and France should act harmoniously. But when the 
National Assembly was dissolved, M. Guizot became intent on 
obtaining a victory over English diplomacy at Athens, as 
a counter-check to the general agreement of Russia and 
England in the East. It was deemed a matter of great 
importance by that pedantic statesman to make French 
influence manifest to all Europe by establishing Kolettes 
(whom the French called General Kolettes) as prime minister 
of Greece in the place of Mavrocordatos, and Piscatory received 
imperative orders to make that end the chief object of his 
diplomacy. It is not too much to assert that Guizot, Piscatory, 
and Kolettes would have laboured in vain, had Mavrocordatos 
not offended King Otho by his grasping ambition, and lost 
the support of the Greek nation by his administrative incapacity 
and his violations of the constitution. 

The chamber of deputies was the court of appeal that 
possessed the power of deciding on the rival claims to govern 
the country, and both Mavrocordatos and Kolettes directed 
their whole energy to secure a majority; the one as much as 
the other throwing off every restraint imposed by law and 
equity. The conduct of Mavrocordatos attracted more 
reprobation than that of his rival, for as prime minister of 
a constitutional king and leader of the English party, it 
was considered to be more especially his duty to uphold the 
cause of constitutional procedure. One of the manoeuvres of 
Capodistrias during the election of deputies to the National 
Assembly of Argos, which had caused loud complaints on the 
part of those who then stood forward as the partizans of 
constitutional government (and no one was louder in his 
complaints than Mavrocordatos and some of the men who were 
now his colleagues in the ministry) was, that Capodistrias had 



A.D. 1S44.] 

used his authority as president to exclude several members 
of the opposition from the Assembly, by offering himself 
as candidate for the places where they were likely to be 
elected, Mavrocordatos now adopted this manoeuvre, which 
he had formerly stigmatized as dishonourable and uncon- 

The first election that took place was that of the University 
) of Athens. Only the professors had votes \ Mavrocordatos 
i presented himself as candidate and was elected. He sup- 
j posed that his success would deceive public opinion in 
Western Europe, and propagate the belief that his govern- 
ment was popular. He was disappointed. All who took any 
interest in Greek politics knew that the professors of the 
body which was proud to call itself 'the Othonian University' 
had been selected for their political docility as much as for 
their professional distinction. Learning has never been the 
beaten road to independence of character ; and, as a body, 
the professors in Greece, as elsewhere, have generally inclined 
to obsequiousness. A question arose concerning the legality 
of this election, and when Mavrocordatos was driven from 
power Kolettes found no difficulty in convincing the pro- 
fessors of its illegality, on the ground that the University 
could only be represented by a member of the body. The 
election of Mavrocordatos was declared void, and a new 
election took place. Whether the election of Mavrocordatos 
when he was not a member of the University, was legal or 
illegal, might be doubtful, but in the minds of the great 
majority of the liberal party which did not blindly follow the 
opinions of the ministry, there was no doubt about its being 
a political blunder, and the prime minister was urged in vain 
by some of his ablest friends to bring fonvard a professor 
of high literary and legal knowledge, closely connected with 
the constitutional party, as the ministerial candidate. Unfor- 
tunately the results of the early Phanariot education of 
Mavrocordatos in the Turkish service and the Vallachian 
administration were never completely eradicated, and he was 

^ The petition of the University to the National Assembly of 1843, asking for 
the right to elect a representative, is printed in the TIpaKTiKo., p. 531. The right 
was conceded in the law for the election of deputies, Art. 30. This privilege was 
abolished by the National Assembly of 1862, and professors, being paid func- 
tionaries, cannot be elected deputies. 


[Bk. V. Ch. V. 

always deficient in the power of appreciating the force and 
value of constitutional principles in Greece. 

The election of the University displeased many liberals, 
and subsequent elections soon turned the tide of public 
opinion strongly against Mavrocordatos personally. He was 
accused in the press and in the coffee-houses of centralizing 
all power in his own hands, like a Turkish pasha or a 
Vallachian voivode. His Phanariot birth, Turkish education, 
and Vallachian experience were referred to as evidences of his 
despotic principles of government. He was reproached with 
habitually employing illegal means to obtain power, and 
invariably misusing power when attained. This expression 
of popular dissatisfaction ought to have warned the ministry 
of their danger. That danger was observed by Kolettes and 
King Otho, but it was either overlooked or despised by 

The partizans of Kolettes and Metaxas, and a considerable 
number of the officials who looked to the king for their 
rewardj now united to oppose the election of the ministerial 
candidates in many electoral districts. They opened private 
communications with the court, and King Otho was per- 
suaded to allow the royal influence to be used in opposition 
to his constitutional ministers. The influence of the sovereign 
in a strictly centralized administration must always be very 
great, particularly in an imperfectly constituted state of 
society, and it cannot be taken away by any constitution, if 
the sovereign strive to render it effective. King Otho derived 
great gratification from employing this influence to control 
his ministers, and he plunged actively into the intrigues that 
were carried on to undermine the power of Mavrocordatos. 
He did not appear to be sensible that there was both im- 
morality and impolicy in these underhand dealings, nor that 
the sight of a king engaged in weakening the authority of his 
government, and of the men whom he allowed to act in his 
name, must tend to make the royal authority contemptible. 

The question by what combination of parties Mavrocor- 
datos was to be replaced in office, soon occupied the attention 
of the Greeks to the exclusion of everything relating to good 
government. It became generally known to the electors 
during the heat of the election contests that King Otho 


[i.D. 18^4.] 

desired to change his ministers, and that unless the majority 
I lin favour of Mavrocordatos' cabinet should be considerable, 
the fall of the ministry was certain. The feelings of the 
great body of his subjects were now in sympathy with those 
of King Otho, and his popularity revived as that of Mavro- 
;:ordatos declined. Yet, if Mavrocordatos had shown more 
jdeference to constitutional principles in his own conduct, and 
iobserved the rules of fair play in his electioneering proceed- 
ings, it is not impossible that he might have very soon 





• per- 





■on, J 



'■ *'^' r [regained his influence. The success of Kolettes might have 
ibeen reduced to an ordinary party victory, and the partizans 
of Mavrocordatos Avould have formed a respectable minority 
in the chamber, where, by acting as the advocates of legality, 
and as the defenders of the constitution, they would have 
soon secured the support of a powerful party among the 
people. But the grasping and unconstitutional conduct of 
the ministry so completely alienated the liberals, that Ko- 
lettes seized the opportunity of annihilating the party of 
Mavrocordatos by a series of illegal measures, to which no 
men could have been subjected who had a right to appeal to 
a sense of justice in a nation. 

The coalition of hostile parties made it evident that, if the 
elections proceeded freely, the majority of the ministerial 
candidates would be rejected. The alternative presented 
itself of violating the principles of the constitution or of 
resigning office after carrying out the elections in the most 
impartial manner. The reputation of Mavrocordatos as a 
statesman commanded the one, the power which centralized 
authority in the hands of ministers offered temptations to try 
the other. In an evil hour Mavrocordatos forgot that his high 
position as a party leader had been made for him by his 
supposed attachment to constitutional government, that his 
most powerful support was derived from those who wished 
that Greece should be governed by the law, and that his 

e. II political strength was in a great degree dependent on the 

cof-|j strength of the constitution. Nobody expected Kolettes to 
act on any system but that of governing by force, whether he 
was the prime minister of an absolute or a constitutional 
king. His practical ideas concerning government had been 

tbol learned at Joannina in the school of Ali Pasha, and his 
residence as Greek minister at the court of Louis Philippe 


[Bk. V. Ch. V. 

had only taught him the language of diplomacy in discussing 
political questions, not how to conduct a government on 
constitutional principles, nor even to direct the progress of 
administrative business. 

The arbitrary measures by which the members of Mavro- 
cordatos' cabinet attempted to secure their own elections 
produced several disturbances. An insurrection occurred in 
Acarnania. In order to conceal the political nature of this 
movement and make it appear to be connected with the 
prevalence of brigandage, a general amnesty was proclaimed 
for the brigands in Northern Greece. Over the whole country 
the elections were marked by the same deeds of violence and 
illegality which had disgraced the government of Capodistrias 
in 1829. Capodistrias, as president of Greece, had procured 
his own election as representative in the National Assembly 
of Argos by twenty electoral districts. Mavrocordatos, as 
prime minister, presented himself as candidate in several 
places where he desired to exclude an able opponent ^. But 
the power of the ministry was paralyzed by persons in 
official positions, who declared that King Otho would see the 
defeat of his ministers with pleasure, and would not overlook 
the services of those who assisted in defeating them. All the 
warm supporters of the French and Russian parties in the 
provinces held the same language. Every faction conducted 
itself with the same lawlessness. Bands of armed men 
moved about living at free quarters in the villages, and 
exacting from the peasants promises to vote for the party 
that employed them. Brigandage was used by influential 
men as an instrument to intimidate whole districts, and a 
shameless misappropriation of municipal funds was then 
authorized and subsequently overlooked. 

Londos, the minister of justice, sent a secret order to the 
gendarmes at Patras to employ every means in their power to 
obtain a majority of votes in his favour. The order was 
made public by some of those to whom it was communicated, 
and the outbreak of general indignation was so violent that 
Mavrocordatos advised the king to accept the resignation of 
Londos. Rhodios, the minister of war, sought to gain votes 
for himself and his colleagues by a lavish distribution of 

* He was a candidate in seven electoral districts. 


A.D. 1844.] 

decorations and medals for service during the War of In- 
dependence. Diplomas and certificates of service, entitling 
the holders to dotations of national land, were sent to the 
prefects with the space for the name blank, ready to be filled 
up as a reward for votes ^ In spite of this corruption the 
government candidates were generally unsuccessful. At 
Mesolonghi Mavrocordatos failed, though at that place his 
name had been highly honoured until he sullied it by the 
illegal proceedings of his cabinet. General Kalergi, who 
was military commandant of Athens, offered himself as 
ministerial candidate in violation of the constitution, which 
declared that no officer could be elected deputy in the 
province where he held a command until six months after its 
termination. The cabinet gave its own gloss on the constitu- 
tion. The first elections were said to be exceptional, and it 
was sufficient that Kalergi resigned his command eight days 
before the promulgation of the election. The people con- 
sidered that the express enactments of the constitution were 
entitled to more respect^ and Kalergi was rejected by the 
electors of Athens^. 

The election of Athens caused the downfall of Mavro- 
cordatos. The people made a violent tumult, demanding 
a change of ministers ; and the cabinet had so often violated 
the law that the law had lost its power to protect the 
ministers. An appeal to force, in order to support a career 
of illegality, offered no chance of success, and in this help- 
less condition Mavrocordatos carried the resignation of the 
ministry to the king, who accepted it with pleasure. 

The manner in which one of the leading politicians con- 
ducted himself during the election of 1844 affords a curious 
illustration of the public morality of the period. Successful 
fraud in Greece was viewed very much as successful bribery 
is viewed in England when it secures a seat in parliament. 
The politician alluded to was a man who had always been 
ready to join any party, whether English or French, that 
would give him a place in the cabinet ; and it cannot be said 

^ Two of these diplomas were exhibited in the Chamber of Deputies during 

^ The law of election is annexed to the printed copies of the constitution of 
1844. See Tit. iv. Art. 28. It was argued that 0, decree of the National Assembly, 
viz. No. 13 (17th = 29th March, 1844), having conferred on General Kalergi the 
citizenship of all Greece, he was exempt from the provisions of the election law. 


i ■■^' 


: m 



[Bk.V.Ch.V. I 

that he was either much better or much worse than the , 

majority of the ministers who held office during King Otho's ! 

reign. In this case he exhibited more dexterity, but not \ 

more immorahty, than other candidates. Though he pos- \ 

sessed considerable local influence, he saw that party violence i 

w^ould in all probability prevent his election, unless he joined \ 

one of the rival factions. Both were ready to welcome him, * #^^ 

but his difficulty lay in ascertaining which of the two was j fF' 

likely to remain for any length of time in power. He there 

fore set about devising a plan for securing his election which j \ 

ever party might prevail. He felt so much confidence in his • 1 

own political value, that he had no doubt the ultimate victors 

would be ready to purchase his services, by annulling any 

election that might take place, and by securing his return. 

All he had to do was to create a pretext for declaring the | i 

election of anybody else void. 1 

When the election took place he presented himself as a j 
candidate, and boasted that he relied solely on his past j 
services to his country, and came before the electors free j 
from all party ties. He spoke of his own independence, and I 
blamed the proceedings of others in galling phrases, well j 
calculated to irritate opponents ; and whether by the violence j 
of those who supported the other candidates, or by the '■ 
preconcerted behaviour of his friends, a disturbance was 
created. At the first appearance of disorder, he declared that ; 
his patriotic feelings would not allow him to be the cause of \ 
a tumult in his native city during the first constitutional 
election. Abandoning the field to his rivals, he marched off i 
with his supporters to the office of a notary public, who at | 
his demand drew up an act declaring that he had been i 
prevented from going to the vote by intimidation, and that ; 
a thousand citizens were present ready to record their votes ■ 
in^^his favour. The business of the notary was to record the : 
statement, not to verify the fact. 

In due time the case came before the chamber of deputies. • 
Mavrocordatos had been driven from power, and Kolettes 
was prime minister. The election of a partizan of Mavro- 
cordatos was annulled, and the astute politician having joined 
the adherents of Kolettes was declared duly elected, without i 
the formality of a new election, on the faith of the notarial i 
act, which Kolettes persuaded the chamber to accept as : 


A.D. 1844.] 

! evidence of an election that never took place. This anecdote, 
which was current at the time, and of which the leading facts 
are true, may not be perfectly correct in all its details, but it 
is typical of the public men whom Greece was compelled to 
entrust with the duty of laying the foundations of constitu- 
tional liberty in 1844. It may be asked, what would have 
been the fate of Greece had such men been entrusted with 
irresponsible power as the ministers of an absolute and weak 
i king ? 

; A better feeling prevailed among the people than among 

j the public men, and if Mavrocordatos had fully understood 

1 the power of a stainless cause, he would have quitted office 

I rather than commit illegalities to retain office. As an oppo- 

! sition leader he might have constituted himself the champion 

of constitutional procedure. He deserted the honourable 

post which he had won by his services during the Revolution, 

: implanted the seeds of corruption in the constitutional system, 

: and prepared his country to submit with apathy to the long 

administration of Kolettes. A better man and an abler 

j statesman than Mavrocordatos might have impressed a 

' different character on the constitutional history of his country, 

i and saved Greece from the Revolution of 1863 by rendering it 

: unnecessary. 

There were other errors in the administration of Mavro- 
i cordatos, which proved that he did not possess the capacity 
: necessary to direct the executive government. A single 
, example may be recorded, because it relates to the subject 
! which forms the darkest stain on society in liberated Greece, 
and retains the agricultural districts in a state of insecurity 
I which precludes improvement. On the 31st July 1844 Mavro- 
I cordatos granted an amnesty to the brigands in Acarnania 
I for the purpose of gaining his own party ends ; but as politi- 
I cal causes were at the root of the prevailing brigandage, this 
I amnesty did less to create security, than the impunity granted 
j to criminals did to perpetuate deeds of violence. 
' Kolettes became prime minister on the i6th of August 
! 1844 and held that office until his death on the i6th of 
! September 1847. His power was increased by a coalition 
I with the Russian party. But King Otho, who justly sus- 
i pected the phil-orthodox section of that party of a design 
: to dethrone him at the Revolution in 1843, would not consent 
; 0% 


[Bk. V. Ch. Vl 

to the entry of its ablest members into the cabinet, an 

Kolettes had no alternative left for maintaining himself i 

office but to secure a majority of his own personal supporter: 

in the chamber of deputies. This he effected by usin 

every means at his disposal. He was not troubled wit 

many scruples, and both bribery and violence were employe 

without stint. The constitution and the law of election wen 

equally disregarded. Months were devoted to the exami 

nation of election questions, because by this delay he avoide 

driving any but the followers of Mavrocordatos into ope 

opposition. It was not until February 1845 that the chambe 

of deputies declared itself legally constituted so as to procee 

to business, and it then took into consideration the addrea 

to the crown. Kolettes had secured a decided majority, 

and the feeling of the country was strongly in his favour,] 

Backed by this support, he indulged a long cherished an 

ill-suppressed rancour against what he termed the Englis] 

party. The cabinet of Mavrocordatos was declared in th 

address to have exercised illegal intervention in the elections, 

Their friends who retained seats in the chamber demande 

that this passage should be omitted, or else that the ex 

ministers should be put on their trial for the alleged crimina 

conduct, in order that an opportunity might be afforded t 

them of refuting the accusation. But as they would in thei 

own defence have adduced proofs that the friends of Kolette 

had acted Avith as much illegality, and that many of th 

deputies of his party had obtained their seats by acts 01 

fraud and violence, no notice was taken of this demand 

and the passage blaming the conduct of the cabinet o 

Mavrocordatos was retained. The public indignation againsi 

the late ministers was still so strong that Kolettes w; 

excused for every infraction of the constitution which hej 

thought fit to perpetrate in persecuting them. 

Kolettes at last brought forward in a long speech the 

measures which he considered necessary to insure the good 

government and rapid progress of Greece. This discourse 

was addressed much more to public opinion in France than 

to the deputies who listened to it or to the Greek people 

whom it most nearly concerned \ It is filled with declamation 

* This speech was translated into French, and printed in many continental news- 
papers. See Lesur, Annuaire Historiqiie, 1845, p. 342. 

ygipf^^m^^mim^l^^^m^m^^m^^^^mm^ iB>_iBin i i ■■BHMiHBainnB^BHBWUua 


A.D. 1845.] 

concerning the glories of the Hellenic race, past and present, 
and there was something that bordered on the ridiculous 
in hearing this Zinzar Vallachian, who in mind and appear- 
ance was a type of his own race, appealing to the names 
of men in whom there was not one drop of Hellenic blood, 
like Miaoulis, Botzaris, Tombazes, and Konduriottes, as types 
of the Greek race. Yet this flattery pleased the national 
vanity if it did not deceive the ignorance of the people in 

avoiii the Greek kingdom. These men were certainly the most 
efficient supporters of Greek liberty, but they were no more 
Greeks than Simon de Montfort, to whom English liberty 
is so deeply indebted, was an Englishman. Kolettes also 
said much in his usual vague manner, whenever principles 
and practice were concerned, about moral improvement and 
material progress. Rewards, wealth, and lands were promised 
to the veterans of the Revolution, as they had been from 
the time of Capodistrias, and continue to be in the time of 
King George ; and the chamber of deputies was warned 
against the danger of faction and discord. Even Kolettes 
himself was alarmed at the revengeful passions which the 
virulence of the electioneering contests had awakened in the 
breasts of a majority of the deputies, and he thought it 
necessary to warn them publicly that he intended to com- 
mand them and not receive their orders. Among his many 
defects Kolettes had one important quality of a statesman ; 
[he could hear the first whispers of public opinion, and he 
[knew how to avail himself of its support as soon as it made 
its voice heard. It must however be observed that he was 
so far from being a statesman, that though he remained three 
ears in office, he did nothing of importance to give practical 
[effect to the measures which he announced were necessary for 

l(j] jijthe improvement of Greece. 

There was one important measure which Kolettes could 
Jneither avoid nor adjourn. The 105th article of the con- 
stitution of 1844 required that the government should organize 
the church in accordance with constitutional monarchy. The 
king, Kolettes, and the constitutional party which had sepa- 

^ rated from Mavrocordatos, proposed investing the crown with 

'^ the power of nominating the President of the Holy Synod, 
both to prevent the evils which might arise from the influence 

"•'"* of the patriarch of Constantinople over a president elected 



■lid tt 
V senat 




by ecclesiastics, and to avert the danger of the church placing 
itself above the law of the country. It was absolutely neces- 
sary to close the door of advancement in the sultan's dominions 
to all ecclesiastics in the church of liberated Greece. The 
phil-orthodox party, which looked to foreign influence and j j 
native bigotry for increasing its ecclesiastical power, advocated L 
the plan of rendering the church of Greece as independent 
as possible of the civil power, and as closely connected as 
possible with the church of Constantinople. It wished to 
declare the President of the Holy Synod the head of the 
church, and the church itself independent of the temporal 
power, investing it by virtue of this independence with the 
right of electing its own president. 

The discussion of this question caused Metaxas to separate 
from the constitutional party with which he had acted since 
the Revolution in 1843. Metaxas, being an Ionian, could i.-y'^'''^ 
only retain his political influence by fidelity to the phil- 
orthodox party, yet, though party interest coincided in this 
instance with the impulse of his own feelings, his conduct 
deserves praise, since he sacrificed those personal advantages 
which most Greek politicians sacrificed their character to gain. 
He was ofl"ered high office, and an ample share of government 
patronage, to give him the means of forming a body of 
personal followers in the administration, if he would join 
the government. Metaxas followed the dictates of his con- *. Bi 
science; the friends of Mavrocordatos, and those who called .dwhic 
themselves the English party, were not so honest ; they acted 
in direct opposition to the political principles which they had loreijn 
previously avowed, and endeavoured to thwart measures which i :,: Gretl 
they must have supported had they been themselves in office, .;v<ifip„ 
by forming a coalition with the phil-orthodox party. The first , laegoi 
trial of the strength of this coalition was an attempt to exclude ; ' :;jaor(i 
M. Balbes, the minister of justice, from the chamber of deputies, i /deali 
under the pretext that he belonged to the clergy. He had -■'-.-. 
received deacon's orders, though early in life he had quitted 
the study of theology for that of jurisprudence, had been i 
called to the bar, and practised for many years as a lawyer. '■ 
Public opinion was again off'ended by the meanness which 
the friends of Mavrocordatos showed on this occasion, for 
their personal animosity against M. Balbes arose from his : ' • at^Ji 
having been elected deputy for Mesolonghi in opposition to ' ie ' 



i the £ 

Kikan' ; 

Mt reach 


i( annua 


hy. Bi 




'"; officer 




A.T). 1845.] 

Mavrocordatos by a large majority. The unfair attempt to 
give a retroactive force to the clause of the law which forbade 
all who entered the church from holding any civil office, 
revived the popular feeling in favour of Kolettes as the 
supporter of liberal opinions, and the proposal of the English 
and phil-orthodox coalition was rejected. 

In the senate the party of Mavrocordatos possessed a 
large majority. Kolettes advised King Otho to create fifteen 
new senators in order to give his cabinet a majority. The 
qualifications imposed by the constitution compelled him to 
select illiterate veterans and servile officials to complete the 
number, and the moral influence of the body declined from 

j year to year in consequence of the ignorance and avidity of 

I its members. 

i Kolettes was accused, and not without justice, of using 

i every kind of corruption in order to retain office. Yet his 
administration was neither lavish nor unpopular. Indeed 
the expenditure of his government contrasts not unfavourably 
with the extravagance and jobbing of later cabinets. The 
ordinary governmental expenditure of the year 1845 did 
not reach 12 millions of drachmas. It was evident that 
Greece was in a condition to pay the three protecting powers 
the annual interest due on the loan of 1H32, which they 
guaranteed to insure the establishment of the Greek mon- 
archy. But no Greek statesman at the time understood the 
effect which the fulfilment of its financial engagements would 
exercise in accelerating the progress of the country by means 
of foreign credit. Even now, while I write in the year t866, 
the Greeks are not yet persuaded of the national value of 
a good financial character. 

The government of Kolettes was not successful in estab- 
lishing order, nor did it show much respect for law and equity 
in its dealings. An insurrection took place in Maina headed 
by a fanatic named Petropoulakes. A Mainate chief named 
Pierakos was arrested for forming a plot to gain possession 
of the fortress of Modon. Conspiracies were discovered among 
the officers and soldiers of the garrison of Nauplia, and among 
the sailors at Hydra. The object of these plots was neither 
to overthrow the government of King Otho, nor to bring 
about a change of ministers, it was either to increase the pay 
of the soldier, to accelerate the promotion of the officers, or 



to force the government to grant the demands of men who 
set a hitih value on their services. These evils were chronic 
in the Greek service, and they have rendered the army and 
navy not only useless for the defence of the country, but also 
the greatest impediments to its improvement. 

The sultan's government regarded the administration of 
Kolettes with distrust. Kolettes had always flattered the 
national hopes of re-establishing the Byzantine empire. He 
was therefore suspected, and not without good grounds, of 
adopting measures calculated to nourish discontent and pro- 
jects of revolt among the orthodox subjects of the sultan in 
European Turkey. On the 17th of March 1845 Chekib 
Efifendi, the Othoman minister of foreign affairs, complained 
to the ambassadors of the three protecting powers that the 
press in Greece systematically incited the Christian subjects of 
the sultan to revolt, and declared that the Othoman government 
considered it necessary to put a stop to the free circulation of 
Greek newspapers and pamphlets in the empire. He accused 
the Greek government of exciting revolutionary intrigues in 
Thessaly and Epirus, and informed the protecting powers 
that if this conduct was persisted in the sultan's government 
would be compelled to use strong measures of repression. 
These complaints obliged Kolettes to warn his friends in 
Turkey to behave with more caution ; and Russia made it 
known to the agents who laboured for ' the great idea,' that 
they must conduct their propaganda in future with more 
prudence and secrecy. 

In the following year several diplomatic disputes proved 
that even with all the counsel and assistance which Kolettes 
received from the French minister at Athens, the business 
of Greek diplomacy was conducted with very little wisdom. 
Unfortunately British diplomacy in Greece was then not 
much behind it in want of judgment. Lord Palmerston was 
induced by the information transmitted to him by Sir Edmund 
Lyons concerning the prevalence of brigandage, to address 
a severe note to the Greek government^ charging it with 
encouraging disorder by granting impunity to bands of brig- 
ands. Kolettes, with more courage than truth, boldly con- 
tradicted the assertion that brigandage existed in Greece ; 
he declared that life and property were perfectly secure 
among the labouring classes, a fact which he said was 



A.D. 1847.] 

proved by the great progress made both by agriculture and 
commerce. He availed himself of the occasion also to give 
Lord Palmerston a lecture on diplomacy, warning the British 
government in the name of its most serious interests not to 
be too credulous in listening to inconsiderate allegations ^. 

1 (0 It was only by the direct interference of the three protect- 
ing powers that Greece was saved in 1847 from having her 

Hi commerce ruined by a quarrel with the Othoman government, 
which was brought on by the folly and obstinacy of King 
Otho, and the ignorance and duplicity of Kolettes. 

Tzames Karatassos, the son of an old klephtic chief of 
Mount Olympus and lieutenant-colonel in the Greek army, 
joined a band of insurgents and robbers who plundered Thes- 
saly in 1841. The Turks destroyed this band, and Karatassos 
escaped over the frontier into Greece. He was placed under 
arrest by the Greek government, but was allowed to escape to 
Cerigo. Subsequently, being a partizan of Kolettes, he was 
reinstated in his military rank and appointed one of King 
Otho's aides-de-camp. In January 1847, he applied to the 
Othoman minister at Athens for a visa to his passport in 
order to enable him to visit Constantinople. M. Musurus 
refused, and gave as the reason of his refusal the conduct of 
Karatassos in Thessaly. A few days after there was a court- 
ball at the palace, and at this ball King Otho addressed the 
Othoman minister in an unusually loud voice and with an air 
of offended dignity, saying that he thought the Othoman min- 
ister might have shown more respect to the guarantee which 
personal service in his court offered, than to refuse a passport 
to one of his aides-de-camp. M. Musurus could not at the 
time make any observation on the puerility of supposing that 
violations of national law and the consequences of personal 
crimes in Thessaly were to be effaced by the subsequent grant 
of a court title at Athens'-. But on the following day he 

^ The diplomatic animosity of the English and French governments was at this 
time very violent, and it was strong in the breasts of their representatives in 
Greece. The reply of Kolettes was published at Paris in a French translation, 
which was generally supposed to be the original, prepared for the use of Kolettes. 
The French press called it a dignified and able state-paper. On reading it over at 
this distance of time, it appears to be a very impertinent and impolitic communi- 
cation, but it is a clever tissue of truth and falsehood. Lesur, Ammaire Historique, 
1846; Documents., p. 204. 

^ In 1859 Karatassos made an abortive attempt to incite an insurrection in 
Turkey, which King Otho was suspected of promoting in secret. 



demanded an explanation of the king's words from Kolettes 
as president of the cabinet and minister of foreign affairs. All 
endeavours to obtain any satisfactory explanation proved 
vain, and the Othoman government ordered M. Musurus to 
leave Athens. Before his departure a remarkable correspond- 
ence was carried on between Kolettes and Aali Effendi, the 
Othoman minister of foreign affairs, in which the superiority of 
the Turk over the Greek in both diplomatic knowledge and 
civility is very strongly marked ^ The interruption of diplo- 
matic relations was followed by an order of the Porte ex- 
pelling the Greek consuls from Turkey. Greek merchants and 
Greek trade were placed under the protection of the Othoman 
authorities, and the protection of the sultan was found to be 
so satisfactory that the Greeks generally became indifferent 
about the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two 
courts. The Greek government remained obstinate in refusing 
satisfaction. The sultan therefore advanced another step and 
issued orders to exclude Greek vessels from the coasting trade 
in Turkey which they had hitherto been allowed to carry on, 
and the Othoman consuls were ordered to leave Greece. 
These measures affected the interests of trade, and Kolettes, 
seeing the danger of his government becoming unpopular, 
immediately made King Otho sensible of the false position in 
which he had placed Greece. A letter of apology written by 
Kolettes in King Otho's name was delivered to the Russian 
minister at Athens to be transmitted to the Othoman minister 
of foreign affairs, in which regret was expressed that anything 
should have occurred to cause M. Musurus to leave Athens, 
and the Sublime Porte was assured that if His Excellency 
should return he would be received with all the honour due 
to a distinguished representative of a friendly power. The 
phrases of this letter were carefully weighed in order to afford 
King Otho the pitiful satisfaction of offering the smallest 
measure of apology with which the sultan could be concili- 
ated. On receiving this communication, the Porte addressed 
a note to the ambassadors of the three protecting powers, de- 
claring that the sultan was satisfied with the explanations in 
the name of the King of Greece, and had ordered M. Musurus 
to return to Athens. 

1 Lesur, Annuaire Historljue, 1847 ; Documents, p. 75. 



A.D. 1847.] 

The ministry of Kolettes made an attempt to establish one 
good principle in the financial administration. It declared 
that it was the duty of government to collect all taxes by its 
own agents, whether they were paid in kind or in money, that 
the cultivators of the soil mJght be saved from the exactions 
to which they were exposed when the tenths due to govern- 
ment were sold to farmers. Metaxas was minister of finance 
when this resolution was adopted. The objection which was 
urged against its adoption was, that it placed great patronage 
in the hands of ministers who might employ it for the sole 
purpose of strengthening their own party, and not for relieving 
agriculture from oppression. For a time the revenues were 
collected by government agents, and the opposition asserted 
that the manner in which Kolettes made use of the patronage 
placed in the hands of the government caused more dissatis- 
faction than the system of farming the revenues. In many 
instances it appeared that the change of system had not 
diminished the exactions from which the cultivators of the 
soil suffered. It was resolved therefore by the opposition to 
force the government to return to the old plan. But a majority 
of the agricultural classes understood that in the long run it 
would be easier to check the injustice of permanent govern- 
ment agents than the exactions of annual farmers, and the 
dealings of the opposition to gain political support from mili- 
tary chiefs and farmers of the revenues of the state again 
revived the popularity of Kolettes. 

The opposition in the chamber of deputies, consisting of the 
coalition of the English and Russian parties, seized an oppor- 
tunity afforded by the absence of many ministerial members 
immediately after the Easter recess in 1847 to thwart the 
government by reversing one of its best acts. An endeavour 
was made to carry a resolution without discussion that the 
revenues of the state were to be farmed by the government. 
If the resolution had been put to the vote, the ministry would 
have been in a minority ; but the president of the chamber 
refused to put the question at the time, in order to give the 
absent ministerial members, who were daily expected at 
Athens, time to arrive. When the next meeting of the 
chamber took place, the coalition was still so strong, in con- 
sequence of the support it derived from the friends of those 
who had profited by farming the revenues, that all the 


[Bk. V. Ch. V. 

exertions of Kolettes only enabled the ministry to carry a 
resolution for continuing the collection of the land-tax by 
government agents by the smallest possible majority. The 
votes were ^^ to 54. 

Several members of the English party, seeing that the 
conduct of the coalition was loudly blamed by the liberals 
out of the chamber and by the public generally, abandoned 
the opposition, and attached themselves to the faction under 
the immediate orders of the court. Unfortunately for their 
reputation they did not act so disinterestedly as Metaxas. 
The chief of the deserters was Tricoupi, who had been a 
member of the cabinet of Mavrocordatos, and he was re- 
warded by King Otho with the post of Greek mhiister at the 
British court. 

Kolettes dissolved the chamber, in which he could no longer 
count on a majority, and introduced M. Glarakes, one of the 
leading members of the phil-orthodox party, into the ministry. 
The connection of Glarakes with the intrigues of his party in 
1837 caused considerable alarm to King Otho at that time, 
but the king felt no longer any fear of the phil-orthodox party, 
being persuaded that Kolettes was able to keep every mem- 
ber of his cabinet in order. It may be remarked that no 
minister, either before or after, enjoyed the confidence of 
King Otho so fully as Kolettes did at this time. 

The British government sought to create difficulties for 
Kolettes by demanding payment of the interest due on the 
portion of the Allied loan guaranteed by Great Britain. It 
would have conduced greatly to the good government of 
Greece and to the future prosperity of the country, had all 
the three powers insisted that the Greek government should 
so arrange its expenditure as to fulfil her financial obligations. 
But it was considered an unfriendly act on the part of the 
British government that it took this step in opposition to the 
desire both of France and Russia. The Greek government 
was relieved from any embarrassment which might have arisen 
from this demand by Mr. Eynard of Geneva, who advanced 
500,000 francs to satisfy the British claim. The conduct of 
Mr. Eynard v/as generous, and his motive was a sincere desire 
to advance the progress of Greece, yet it cannot be doubted 
that this advance was productive of bad consequences by 
perpetuating financial mal-administration. In a note which 


A.D. 1847.] 

the Greek government addressed to the governments of Great 
Britain, France and Russia on the 30th August 1847, it was 
urged as a reason for failing to pay the interest due on the 
loan guaranteed by the protecting powers, that on the one 
hand the chamber of deputies struggled to reduce taxation, 
and on the other hand individual deputies and senators en- 
deavoured to increase the public expenditure in their own 
provinces by every means in their power. As no reduction of 
taxation was made, and as by the constitution only a minister 
of the crown could propose an increase of expenditure, this 
excuse for want of money and for a misappropriation of funds 
was a proof that the government was both weak and corrupt. 
Kolettes offered to raise money by the sale of national lands, 
which were hypothecated to the English bondholders, who" 
advanced money to the Greeks at their sorest need in 1824 
and 1825. He promised also to commence paying one third 
of the interest on the Allied loan in the year 1848, and en- 
gaged to increase the payment annually until the year i860, 
when he declared that Greece would be prepared to pay the 
whole amount of annual interest due by the treaty. Little 
attention was paid to this note, for the Allied powers felt no 
confidence either in the sincerity or the honesty of Kolettes' 

Kolettes, as has been already mentioned, died in office on 
the 6th of September 1847. No minister possessing equal 
knowledge of the people and of the circumstances in which 
the country was placed has succeeded him. He had a clear 
insight into the character of the society he governed, and of 
the agents he employed in governing it. He availed himself 
with discrimination and without conscientious scruples of 
men's passions and vices to gain his own objects. He was 
not personally courageous, yet he could shew a firm character 
when there was no immediate personal danger to affect his 
mind. He wore a lion's skin, and he wore it with dignity, 
for he knew how to use power boldly when he felt that he 
possessed it securely. In his political conduct, he trusted 
more to his astuteness in guiding his course through dififi- 
culties as they occurred, than to his foresight in averting 
danger, and he rarely attempted to form combinations for 
creating opportunities of success. His qualities enabled him 
to lead a party in a state of society where violence and 


[Bk. V. Ch. V. 

corruption were more prevalent than respect for law and 
justice ; but he was deficient in capacity of organization, 
and he conducted the government without any administrative 
system, by a series of spasmodic acts, making his long 
ministerial career a succession of temporary expedients. His 
success was chiefly due to the errors of his opponents, and 
to the progress which comparative tranquillity and order 
enabled the population to make, while land of good quality 
was abundant, and a rapid extension of commerce offered 
profitable employment to all who engaged in agriculture and 

Kitzos Djavellas, a Suliot chief without education, who was 
now a general and an aide-de-camp of King Otho, became 
prime minister after Kolettes' death. Brigandage, which had 
assumed the character of insurrection during the life of 
Kolettes, continued to disturb the country. Grigiottes, who 
had fled from Euboea into Turkey, and generally resided 
at Chios or Smyrna, and Theodore Griva, who had sought 
refuge at Prevesa after the failure of attempts at insurrection, 
again fomented disorders. At Naupaktos, Pharmakes and 
several officers of the phalanx took up arms and occupied 
positions in the Aetolian mountains^ where they maintained 
themselves with bands of armed men by plundering the 
magazines of the collectors of the tenths, and by levying 
contributions of sheep and goats from the shepherds of the 
neighbouring districts. Pappakostas, an officer of some dis- 
tinction, who was originally a priest, escaped from Salona 
(Amphissa), where he had been ordered to reside for par- 
ticipating in previous disorders, and seized the position of 
Mavrolithari ; and Valentzas, an old offender, plundered the 
population of the valley of the Spercheus at the head of a 
band of brigands. Merendites, an officer of the irregular 
troops, known for his atrocities and exactions, who had always 
been attached to Theodore Griva, revolted with a part of the 
garrison of Patras in December 1847, and obtained possession 
of 130,000 drachmas of government money. He held the 
castle, and threatened to burn the town, unless the inhabitants 
consented to ransom their property by paying a sum of money, 
and allowing him to embark on board the vessels in the port 
and escape from the forces which were marching against him. 
The citizens were so alarmed lest Merendites should execute 



A.D. 1848.] 

his threat, that they did everything in their power to get quit 
of him and his band. By their intermediation and the aid of 
the foreign consuls, the robbers embarked on board an Eng- 
lish schooner, and escaped to Malta. As soon as the Greek 
authorities regained possession of Patras a demand was made 
on the English government for the restoration of 36,000 
drachmas which the robbers had succeeded in carrying on 
board the English vessel, and for the extradition of the 
criminals. The British minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, was 
accused by King Otho of fomenting these disturbances by the 
language he held, and of endeavouring to throw Greece into 
a state of anarchy by allowing the British flag to protect an 
act of revolt and brigandage like that of Merendites. The 
animosity against the British government, which had been 
hitherto confined to the court and the officials of the Greek 
government, now spread widely among the people. The 
other bands which have been mentioned were not subdued 
until Gardikiottes Griva, the brother of Theodore, who was one 
of the king's aides-de-camp, took the command of the royal 
troops. Gardikiottes routed Pappakostas and the other 
leaders who had collected considerable bands of insurgents, 
and pursued them so vigorously that they were all compelled 
to seek safety either in Turkey or in the Ionian Islands. 
Some disturbances took place in the Peloponnesus, and an 
attempt was made to incite an insurrection by Perotes, a 
noted intriguer and farmer of taxes, but the disorders that 
occurred whether in Messenia, Pyrgos, or Corinth, were sup- 
pressed promptly and without difficulty. The Greek govern- 
ment attributed all its troubles to the intrigues of the English 
party ; but the Russian government, Avhich is generally pos- 
sessed of the best information on the state of Greece and 
Turkey, ascribed them, probably with more justice, to the 
political effervescence that was then strong over great part 
of the continent of Europe^. 

The instability of the government weakened the authority 
of the ministers. The cabinet of General Djavellas was dis- 
placed by a ministry nominally presided over by George 
Konduriottes in March 1848, and the cabinet of the weak 
and incapable Konduriottes was displaced in October by a 

^ Lesur, Anmiaire Historiqtce, 1848; Documents, p. 177; Circular of M. Persiany, 
the Russian minister in Greece. 


[Bk. V. Ch. V, 

cabinet formed by the Admiral Kanares. Kanares remaineH^ 
prime minister until December 1H49, when a new ministry- 
was formed under the presidency of Admiral Kriezes, which 
held office until May 1854. The people despised their rulers, 
and their rulers violated the constitution. Whenever any law 
thwarted the interests of powerful men, it was, if it were 
possible, set aside without reference to justice or patriotism. 
A law was passed authorizing the king to appoint a greater 
number of senators than the constitution allowed, though the 
chambers had no legal authority to legislate on the subject,'] 
since the constitution declared expressly that no modification 
could be made in any of the provisions of the constitution, 
except by convoking a National Assembly. Very little saga- 
city might have sufficed to convince King Otho and his 
senators that their position could not be strengthened by 
weakening the power of the law, but that it might be greatly 
improved by creating habits of deference to the letter of the 
constitution, and feelings of respect for established institu- 
tions. In a society where anarchy and democracy were 
striving for dominion, neglect of the constitution by the king, 
the senate, and the ministers was a first step towards revo- 
lution. The influence of the crown was so powerful, and the 
corruption of the legislative chambers rendered these bodies 
so servile, that the revolutionary act of adding thirty-seven 
members to the senate was carried by a majority of seventy 
votes to two in the chamber of deputies. 

Another violation of the constitution took place soon after, 
merely to suit the convenience of the ministry. According to 
law the chambers ought to have met for business on the 13th 
of November. They were prorogued in 1848 to the 23nd of 
December, while Admiral Kanares was prime minister, ap- 
parently only for the purpose of accustoming the Greeks to 
see their constitution violated with impunity. 

An attempt to assassinate M. Musurus, the Turkish minister 
In Greece, and the demand of the sultan's government for the 
extradition of the assassin, would have again caused a rupture 
of relations with Turkey, had the three protecting powers not 
intervened to arrange the difficulty. 

In 1850 disputes with the British government diverted the 
attention of the Greeks from the internal condition of their 
country. The measures adopted by Lord Palmerston offended 









A,D. 1S5O.] 

the national pride so much as to render King Otho extremely 
popular on account of the obstinate resistance he offered to 
the English demands. The whole affair reflects very little 
credit on any of the governments which took part in it. King 
Otho brought on the rupture by his injustice, and by the 
obstinacy with which he persisted in defending, his illegalities. 
The British government acted with violence, and strained the 
authority of international law to enforce a blockade. The 
French government interfered rashly to protect King Otho 
in his misconduct, and ended by compelling him to sign a 
convention, the stipulations of which implied that he had 
acted from the first with injustice. All the foreign ministers 
at Athens did everything that lay in their power to foment 
^ "' the quarrel instead of honestly using their influence to show 
each party how far it was wrong. 

The subjects of the dispute between the British and Greek 
governments were, first, a claim by George Finlay for the price 
of land purchased from a Turkish proprietor in 1830, when 
a protocol of the three protecting powers allowed the Turks 
to sell their property before Greece was put in possession of 
Attica. This land King Otho had enclosed in the royal 
garden without any communication with the proprietor ; and 
in 1837 the Greek government had stated in an official com- 
munication to the British minister, that ' Mr. Finlay's land 
was not wanted for any purpose of public utility,' and con- 
sequently he had no claim on the Greek government for 
indemnity. At that time it was impossible to sue King Otho 
in the law courts of his kingdom, for his government was 
absolute. The second claim was for indemnity to M. Pacifico 
for the plunder of his house and the destruction of his property 
by a mob, while the police remained inactive. This happened 
in 1847. The third, fourth, and fifth claims were caused by 
ill-treatment and denial of justice to Ionian subjects. The 
sixth was a claim for the possession of the islands of Cervi 
and Sapienza, on the ground that they belonged to the Ionian 
Islands. Of these two islands the Greeks had been in pos- 
session ever since the expulsion of the Turks from the 

Sir Thomas Wyse, who succeeded Sir Edmund Lyons as 
British minister in Greece, vainly endeavoured to persuade 
the government of King Otho to arrange the five private 



[Bk.V. Ch.V. 

claims by an amicable arbitration. But he met with the 
same tergiversation which had characterized the conduct of 
King Otho in his relations with England for many years. 
Lord Palmerston persuaded the British cabinet to order the 
Mediterranean fleet under Sir William Parker to visit Greece, 
in order to enforce a settlement of these demands. On the 
17th of January 1850 immediate redress and complete satis- 
faction of all pending claims was demanded, with a threat 
that coercive measures would be employed if justice was 
denied. The Greek minister of foreign affairs replied with 
statements which were in part evasive and in part false. The 
British fleet established a blockade of the Piraeus. The 
Greek man-of-war ' Otho ' and several merchantmen were 
seized and detained as security, or in diplomatic language, 
as material guarantees for the satisfaction of the claims. The 
foreign ministers at the Greek court agreed in counselling 
King Otho to offer a passive resistance to the acts of the 
British government^ and M. Thouvenel, the French minister, 
availed himself of the opportunity to display the influence 
of France, and win credit on the continent among emperors 
and kings by opposing England. M. Thouvenel made an 
offer of what he called his ' good oflices,' which was declined 
by Sir Thomas Wyse. 

In the mean time the republican government of France, 
which was inspired by a feeling of restlessness to make a 
display of its power in Europe, seized the opportunity of 
engaging in a violent altercation with Lord Palmerston. The 
affair could lead to no important consequences, though it was 
well suited to make a great noise in Europe, and furnish a 
pretext for contrasting the daring policy of the Napoleon who 
was president of the republic, with what was called the sub- 
serviency of Louis Philippe's government to British policy in 
the East. Explanations were demanded from the British 
government, and Lord Palmerston stated in his answer that 
the British government had adopted the plan of seizing 
material guarantees in Greece, because that step appeared to 
afford the only means of obtaining justice. This answer looks 
like a covert allusion to the proceedings of Russia in the 
Rouman Principalities ; and it was singular that the British 
government should justify its conduct towards Greece by 
a reference to proceedings which it blamed when adopted 



I A.D. 1S5O.] 

towards Turkey. The demand which Russia made for the 
extradition of the Hungarian and PoHsh refugees, and the 
concessions which the Othoman government was forced to 
make, humbled the power of the sultan. The seizure of 
private ships and the hostile action of one of the protecting 
powers inflicted a serious wound on King Otho's government. 
It has been the usage to seize private property in the shape of 
ships and cargoes for the purpose of enforcing national claims, 
but though the practice appears to be authorized by inter- 
national law, the common sense of mankind regards it as a 
violation of natural justice, which ought not to be tolerated 
till a declaration of war has taken place. No government in 
a civilized state of society ought to have a right to seize 
private property belonging to the subjects of another state 
lying beyond its jurisdiction, or to blockade a foreign port, 
without taking upon itself the responsibility of declaring war. 
Any material guarantee which it may be entitled to seize 
ought to be strictly confined to national and public property ; 
and if the Greek government had been authorized by its pre- 
vious conduct to make an appeal to the principles of truth 
and justice, by placing its case in this point of view, it might 
have awakened general sympathy. But France, whose pro- 
tection Greece was eager to secure, would have objected to an 
argument, which questioned the legality of proceedings which 
powerful governments wish to exercise at their own discre- 
tion. The British government in this particular instance found 
a difficulty in seizing public property of any value, for the 
custom duties at the ports of the Piraeus, Syra, and Patras 
being by the treaty of 1832 hypothecated for the payment of 
the Allied loan, the interest of which was constituted to be 
a first claim on the revenues of the state, any interference 
with them required the consent of the other two protecting 
powers. Lord Palmerston's measures of coercion were there- 
fore perforce guided by the necessity of avoiding a direct 
dispute with France and Russia, and of keeping within the 
sanction of acknowledged precedents. 

A patriotic opposition to the measures adopted to enforce 
the British claims was easily excited among the people by the 
united influence of King Otho and the foreign diplomatists ; 
and the strength of this feeling induced Lord Palmerston, 
who was confident in the justice of his claims, to accept the 

P 2 


[Bk. V. Ch. V. 

good offices of the French government on the I2th February 
1850. France then virtually abandoned the only ground of 
resistance which could have authorized King Otho's obstinacy. 
Baron Gros, the French plenipotentiary, was sent to Greece, 
not to question the right of Great Britain to establish a 
blockade, but to ascertain the amount of satisfaction due to 
the British government, in order to relieve Greece from the 
blockade that had already been established. The British 
government voluntarily declared that if any of its demands 
were unfounded, it would withdraw them as a matter of 

The manner in which Baron Gros conducted his mission 
was so partial that it prevented his establishing the same 
amicable relations with the British legation which he formed 
with the Greek court. He acted the part of a court of 
review, but he sought for evidence only from the agents 
of King Otho and the Greek government, without making 
any attempt to procure proofs of the facts from the agents 
of the claimants. These proofs he received when they were 
thrust upon him by the British legation, as in the case of 
Finlay. Sir Thomas Wyse requested Mr. Finlay to see 
Baron Gros and state his case. An account of the interview 
was transmitted to the British minister, and Sir Thomas 
Wyse writes that Mr. Finlay 's statement of his case is 
substantially correct. The statements of King Otho's agents 
had persuaded Baron Gros to believe that the case was still 
under arbitration. The fact was concealed from him that 
the deed of arbitration had been signed on the i8th October 
1849, and the Greek law requires that if a decision be not 
given by the arbiters named in a deed of arbitration, before 
the expiry of three months the arbitration ceases, so that 
to obtain a valid decision by arbiters it would be necessary 
to sign a new deed of arbitration before a notary public. 
The Greek minister of foreign affairs, M. Londos, stated in 
the chambers, and the Greek court repeatedly asserted, that 
Mr. Finlay 's claim had been settled before the blockade 
commenced, though King Otho, by retaining the papers 
relating to the arbitration, to which his majesty had been 
always opposed, had prevented a decision and allowed the 
deed of arbitration to expire ^. 

^ Parliameniary Papers. Further correspondence respecting the demands made 



A.C. 1850.] 

Baron Gros assessed the amount of indemnity due on all 
the British claims at 150,000 drachmas. Sir Thomas Wyse 
rejected his proposal and demanded 180,000 drachmas. The 
blockade was then renewed in a hasty manner, without any 
regard to the good offices of the French government. This 
violent proceeding produced the desired effect and received 
the approbation of Lord Palmerston. King Otho yielded 
on the 26th April 1850, and accepted the terms dictated 
by the British minister, who was so annoyed by the animosity 
displayed by M. Thouvenel and the partiality of Baron Gros, 
that he considered it necessary for the honour of England to 
terminate the business without foreign intervention. He was 
rash in drawing this conclusion, for after all the British 
government was compelled to make concessions to the pre- 
tensions of France. But when France obtained the required 
deference on the part of England, she immediately compelled 
King Otho to sign a convention, recognizing his denial of 
justice, and ratifying the rights of coercion exercised against 
his government. 

An arrangement was concluded in London between Lord 
Palmerston and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French ambassador 
in London, before the arrangement forced on King Otho by 
Sir Thomas Wyse was known. The indemnity to be paid 
by Greece was fixed at the sum of 230,000 francs. This was 
signed on the 19th April and reached the French legation 
at Athens on the ist May; but Sir Thomas Wyse had 
received information that the arrangement was about to be 
concluded on the 24th of April, and the French government 
was offended at his resorting to coercive measures, in order to 
deprive France of the honour of arranging the affair by her 
good offices. On the 14th May Lord Palmerston informed 
the French government that Great Britain was resolved to 
abide by the arrangement concluded in Greece, and this being 
regarded as a premeditated slight, M. Drouyn de Lhuys was 
ordered to quit London. The conduct of Lord Palmerston 
was generally considered to have been wanting in conciliation, 
but it must not be forgotten that there was at the time a 
violent struggle for influence going on in the East between 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, and that the feelings of 

upon the Greek government, 17th May, 1850, p. 248. Baron Gros persisted in 
his ignorance of the fact that the arbitration had expired, 22nd April, p. 323. 



Lord Palmerston were irritated by the fact that Enghsh 
influence was on the wane at Constantinople. His conduct 
was said not to have pleased several members of the cabinet, 
and it certainly endangered the existence of the ministry. 
On the 1 8th June the government was in a minority of thirty- 
seven in the House of Lords, on the question of their conduct 
in this affair ; but the resignation of the ministry was pre- 
vented by a vote of the House of Commons on the 29th June 
1850, in which there was a majority of forty-six in favour of the 
ministry. Immediately after the condemnation of his conduct 
in the House of Lords, Lord Palmerston communicated to the 
French government that Great Britain was willing to accept 
the convention signed at London on the 19th April as a 
definitive arrangement of the claims on Greece, and thus 
succeeded in terminating an affair on which no party can 
look back with satisfaction. A comparison of the sums 
awarded under the two arrangements shows that Sir Thomas 
Wyse was not disposed to bear heavily on the Greek govern- 
ment in a pecuniary point of view ^. 

On the 19th February 1850, Count Nesselrode addressed 
a despatch to Baron Brunnow, the Russian minister in 
London, complaining of the conduct of the British govern- 
ment in violating treaties. The treaty of 15th July 1851, 
forbade the entrance of armed vessels within the Dardanelles, 
yet an English fleet passed the castles in violation of that 
treaty. The treaty of 1832, establishing the kingdom of 
Greece under the joint protection of Russia, France, and 
England, was disregarded by the assumption of the right 
to blockade Greek ports without the consent of the other 
protecting powers. The question which had been raised 
relative to the islands of Cervi and Sapienza was one which 
could not be decided by the action of Great Britain without 
the intervention and consent of Russia and France. This 

^ The Author received 30,000 drachmas under the convention of Sir Thomas 
Wyse as the estimated value of his property. The affair was definitively termi- 
nated before the London convention was adopted, under which he would have 
received 45,000 francs. The claim of M. Pacifico for the value of Portuguese 
documents destroyed in his house was referred to an English and French commis- 
sion which sat at Lisbon. It was reduced from 26,618/. i6s. 8rf. sterling to 5,750 
francs. The affair was closed on the 5th May, 1851. The sum of 120,000 
drachmas was paid to M. Pacifico for the plunder of his house, and 500/. sterling 
as indemnity for his personal sufferings. The Ionian claimants received 12,530 



A.D. 1852.] 

\ able despatch made some impression on the British cabinet 
by the justice of many of the observations it contained, and 
the futihty of the demand for the islands of Cervi and Sapi- 
enza as belonging to the Ionian Islands, caused the claim 
to be dropped and nothing more was heard on the subject^. 

The diplomatic complications which led to the Crimean 
war began to exert an influence on the minds of the Greeks 
as early as the year 1852. The bold resistance which the 
Porte offered to the extradition of the Polish and Hungarian 
refugees when demanded by Austria and Russia after the 
termination of the war in Hungary, rankled in the breasts 
of the Emperor Nicholas and the statesmen of Vienna. The 
Austrian government was so eager for revenge that it rushed 
inconsiderately into a path which conducted to a revolu- 
tionary highway. In his eagerness to punish the sultan for 
protecting Hungarian patriots, the Emperor of Austria 
made religion and the rights of nationalities pretexts for 
protecting Montenegrin patriots and for Austrian interference 
in Turkey. 

Tzernagora, the ' Black Mountain,' called by the Venetians 
Montenegro, is inhabited by about 130,000 souls who find 
scanty means of subsistence in the greater part of the 
territory they possess. They are cut off from the magnificent 
Gulf of Cattaro, which seems intended by nature to afford an 
occupation for their activity, by a strip of Austrian territory 
and by the commercial jealousy and troublesome police of 
the Austrian empire. They must either live in poverty 
among their rocks, or seek plenty by plundering their richer 
neighbours in the plains, who are ill-protected by the dis- 
orderly administration of the Othoman empire. For more 
than a century the sultans allowed the Montenegrins to enjoy 
a degree of local freedom that amounted to virtual independ- 
ence. Excited by their poverty and the long periods of 
idleness which occur where agriculture is in a rude state, 
and where a large part of the population is engaged in 
pastoral occupations, they found plenty of time to make 
plundering incursions into the rich districts in their neigh- 
bourhood. The Austrian government repressed these inroads 

* See the Russian despatch in the Parliamentary Papers. Further correspond- 
ence, pp. 122, 127, 168. Also a pamphlet by Col. Wm. Martin Leake, On the 
Claim to the Islands of Cervi and Sapienza, 1850. 


[Bk.V. Ch.V. 

with promptitude and vigour, and the Montenegrins learned 
by severe lessons that Austrian troops and Austrian custom- 
houses presented an impenetrable barrier to cattle stealing 
and contraband trade. The Othoman government was 
weaker and more negligent. Religious hatred was strong 
between the Christians and Mussulmans, and immemorial 
hostility existed between the Sclavonian and Albanian races. 
Their mutual hatred was inflamed by incessant forays of the 
poverty-stricken Sclavonian Christians of Montenegro into 
the fruitful territory of the Mussulman Albanians in the 
district of Skodra. 

The Montenegrins were long governed by their bishop who 
was called Vladika. The government was transmitted to the 
nephew whom the Vladika selected as his successor. This 
successor, if not already a priest, whether he was a monk or a 
layman, entered the clergy on being called to the sovereignty. 
At one period he received episcopal consecration from the 
orthodox metropolitan of Carlovitz in Austrian Servia ; for 
the free mountaineers were always averse to any direct 
dependence on the patriarch of Constantinople, both because 
he was an Othoman official in the exercise of his temporal 
power, and because some degree of Sclavonic prejudice existed 
as a tradition of Byzantine times against his Greek nationality. 
But when the power of the czar made itself felt in the 
Othoman empire the Montenegrins sought episcopal conse- 
cration in Moscow. 

In the year 1851 the Vladika, Peter II., was succeeded by 
his nephew Daniel, who was formally recognized by the 
people as their sovereign without exacting from him the 
obligation to enter the priesthood. The sovereignty of 
Montenegro was declared hereditary in his family, and Prince 
Daniel visited Saint Petersburg accompanied by a deputation 
from the senate, and asked investiture as a temporal prince 
from the Emperor of Russia, on the ground that the Vladika 
had received the investiture both of the temporal and spiritual 
power from the church of Russia. The Emperor Nicholas 
ratified the assumption of princely rank by Daniel, though 
the act was sure to alarm the Porte as an unauthorized 
endeavour to transfer the suzerainty of a district at the 
farthest limits of the Othoman empire from the sultan to 
the czar, merely because it was orthodox and Sclavonic. The 



It n 


A.c. 1853.] 

of tin 


event derived additional importance from the excitement it 
caused in the minds of the Sclavonians, who form the largest 
part of the sultan's Christian subjects in Europe, and which 
was supposed to be fomented by Russian agents in order to 
produce a movement in favour of national independence. 

The Porte considered the transformation of the ecclesiastical 
authority of the Vladika into the temporal sovereignty of a 
hereditary prince as a revolutionary act. The Montenegrins 
intended to make it the foundation of their complete inde- 

1 tlij pendence, and they reckoned for support on both Austria and 
Russia, which manifested the most unfriendly sentiments 
towards Turkey on account of the protection accorded to the 
Polish and Hungarian refugees. This state of things induced 
the sultan to enforce his rights of sovereignty over the Monte- 
negrin territory as the surest means of arresting the aspira- 
tions for independence among his other Sclavonic subjects. 
The Montenegrins believed that they should obtain some 
protection, if not direct assistance, from France as well as 

liretfl from Austria and Russia. 

They commenced hostilities by seizing the fort of Zabliak 
on the lake of Skodra. The Othoman army under the 
command of Omer Pasha, an Austrian renegade, invaded 
Montenegro. Austria then stepped forward to do a small 
political stroke of business for Russia and protect Sclavonian 
nationality. Her interference must have amused Russian 
statesmen, and it excited little jealousy on the part of the 
French and English governments, who saw her error. Fear 
of war on her frontier, revenge on the supporters of the 
revolutionists in Hungary, a wish to punish Turkey and 
to show gratitude to Russia for her recent services in the 
Hungarian war, deluded Austria into supporting rebellion 
and orthodoxy in Montenegro in 1853, as a similar want 
of political foresight induced her to support revolution and 
nationality in the Schleswig-Holstein war in 1863. 

An Austrian envoy. Count Leiningen, was sent to Con- 
stantinople, who presented a note containing numerous de- 
mands for satisfaction. The principal complaints of Austria 
were that Turkey had commenced war near the frontier 
of the Austrian empire without obtaining the previous con- 
sent of a power which had always been friendly to the 

'kl Porte. That this war had been made a religious war, and 


[Bk.V. Ch.VJ 

that the obligation was thereby imposed on the Emperor 

of Austria; as a Christian sovereign, to protect his Christian 

neighbours. It was said also that the presence of Hungarian 

and Polish exiles in the Othoman army was a manifestation 

of an unfriendly feeling on the part of the Porte. The reply j 

was dignified and prudent. The sultan yielded the desired 

satisfaction to all the Austrian demands, declaring that it I 

afforded the Porte great pleasure to meet the wishes ofj 

an old ally and a tried friend of conservatism. The Austrian 

envoy, having terminated his mission successfully, quitted 

Constantinople on the 17th February 1853^ 

Before the cabinet of Vienna had time to enjoy its triumph 
it became evident to all Europe that Austria had unwittingly 
smoothed a path for Russian diplomacy. Austria accused 
the sultan's government of rousing the religious bigotry of 
the Mussulman population, and asserted that it was her duty 
as a neighbouring and Christian power to protect the Mon- 
tenegrins. Russia stepped forward as the natural protector of 
the whole orthodox population of the Othoman empire 
without any reference to geographical contiguity. Russia 
was as desirous of punishing the sultan for resisting the 
extradition of the Hungarian and Polish refugees as Austria, 
and the assumption of a right of suzerainty in the case 
of the Prince of Montenegro warned the sultan that the 
time had arrived for resisting encroachments on his authority. 

At this time a pending dispute about the guardianship of 
the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem involved France and 
Russia in a contest for influence in the East, which em- 
barrassed the Turkish government, and distracted the judg- 
ment of other nations on the line of policy to be pursued with 
reference to their rivality. 

Shortly after the departure of the Austrian envoy from 
Constantinople Prince Menshikoff arrived as ambassador 
extraordinary from the Emperor Nicholas, with demands 
that, if conceded, would have authorized a constant inter- 
ference on the part of Russia in the internal affairs of the 
Othoman empire, by constituting the czar protector of the 
sultan's orthodox subjects. The Porte replied to these 

> The notes of the Austrian envoy, dated 3rd February, 1853, and the reply of ■'« 
the Othoman government, dated loth February, were published in the Augsburg mk 
Gazette, 28th April, 1855. 



demands by offering to secure the rights of the orthodox 
hristians by charter, but decHned to do so by treaty. Prince 
VIenshikoff, who had negotiated haughtily^ withdrew ab- 
-uptly ^ The Russian then occupied Moldavia and Vallachia 
is a means of compelling the sultan to yield. France and 
England supported Turkey, and the Crimean war ensued ^. 

The Greeks thought the time favourable for attacking 
Turkey. They hoped to annex Thessaly and Epirus to 
:he Hellenic kingdom. They overrated their own military 
strength and political importance ; they mistook the violence 
3f Christian hostility to Mohammedanism among the population 
3f European Turkey, and they magnified the power of Russia 
Decause it is orthodox and their ally against the Turks. The 
:ounsels of France and England were despised because their 
power was not duly appreciated when compared with the 
xtent and population of Russia. In open violation of the 
treaties which created the Greek kingdom, King Otho, the 
2[overnment, and the people attacked Turkey, and forfeited 

empii| the guarantee of foreign protection. The ' great idea,' which 
means the establishment of Greek domination on the ruins of 
the Othoman empire, appeared to the men who governed 
Greece a practicable scheme. King Otho allied himself 
closely with the party, which in 1838 had formed the phil- 

3t tl( orthodox society, and in 1 840 had plotted to place an orthodox 
sovereign on his throne ^. The persistence of Lord Palmerston 

hipo and Sir Edmund Lyons in their endeavours to impose what 
was regarded as an English line of policy on the Greek 
government, ended in alienating both the king and the 
people. The manner in which France had used her good 
offices, after encouraging the Greeks to resist the demands 
jof England in 1850, convinced them that the French govern- 
jment was on that occasion more intent on injuring England 

^^5[Hthan on serving Greece. And the discussions relating to the 

^ Prince Menshikoff arrived at Constantinople on the 28th February, 1853, and 
quitted it on the 2ist May. 

" The Russian army entered Moldavia on the 3rd July, and Turkey commenced 
hostilities on the 23rd October, 1853. 

^ M. Glarakes, when minister of the interior, of ecclesiastical aifairs, and of 
public instruction, was dismissed from office on the nth January, 1840, by King 
Otho in great alarm, because he was suspected of connivance with the plot, and 
Count George Capodistrias, who was at Athens under the pretext of soliciting a 
pension on account of his brother's services, was arrested as a conspirator. Greek 
Gazette, 1840, No. 2 ; Revue des Deux Mondes, October, 1844, p. 210. 




■e repii 





: Hoi- 






Holy Sepulchre revived the orthodox prejudices of the Greeks 

against Catholic France. 

Hatred of the Turks, combined with religious bigotry and 

national enthusiasm, was so strong that the Greeks invaded 

the sultan's territory as soon as the disposable forces of 

Turkey were sent to the North to oppose the Russians. The 

sympathies of the Greek people were all on the side of Russia. 

The French and English were heterodox and unprepared 

for war. The Russians were the irreconcileable enemies of the 

sultan ; they were orthodox, near at hand, and had prepared 

numerous armies and powerful fleets for the enterprise which 

they were commencing. The Greeks believed that the 

European provinces of the Othoman empire would become 

an easy conquest, long before the allies of Turkey could take 

any measures to prevent the catastrophe. Russia laboured to 

persuade the world, and the Greeks firmly believed, that all 

the orthodox subjects of the sultan would rise in rebellion the 

moment the Greeks crossed the frontier and displayed the 

ensign of the Cross at the head of a few armed men in Thessaly 

and Epirus. Indeed both the Russians and the Greeks asserted 

that these provinces were in a state of insurrection early in 

1854^ Austria and Prussia attempted In vain to arrest King 

Otho in his unprovoked attack on his neighbour ; but he 

adopted all the ambitious projects of his people and when he 

had made up his mind he clung to his opinions with his usual 

obstinacy. He delighted in his unwonted popularity, and 

Queen Amalia, who really shared the feelings and prejudices 

of the Greeks, was idolized by them. King, court, ministers, 

and people rushed blindly forward to attack the Othoman 

* Despatch of Count Nesselrode, 2nd March, 1854; Ammaire des Deux Mondes, 
1854, p. 731 ; East and West, by Stefanos Xenos, p. 13. This author, writing in 
1864, says: 'To say that nine-tenths of the Greek nation did not at that time 
sincerely sympathize with Russia, would be to utter an untruth. To say that 
King Otho urged the Greeks to take up arms against the Allies would be equally 
false ; nor could I, consistently with truth, deny that Russia was implicated in our 
revolution of Epirus ; neither can I hide the fact, that the Greeks desired the 
defeat of the Allies, and were profoundly grieved at the fall of SebastopoL' At 
p. 15 he adds: 'This movement (i.e. the invasion of Thessaly and Epirus) on the 
part of the Greeks was obviously a great advantage to Russia, and it was her 
interest to promote it. Of this the Greeks were fully aware, and when they 
accepted pecuniary aid from Russia they understood its exact value. Russia 
assisted — slightly, it is true, but still she did assist them — because she knew that 
an insurrectionary movement among the Greeks of Turkey would make a powerful 
diversion in her favour.' M. Xenos, the writer of East and West, was named 
Consul in London by the Greek government of King George, but could not obtain 
an exequatur from the British government. 


'a.d. 1854.] 

'power and trample on the treaties which insured them the 

protection of Great Britain and France. Count Nesselrode 

! spoke of the Othoman empire falHng into pieces, as if a storm 

(from Russia could blow it off the face of the earth. The 

Emperor Nicholas called the sultan a dying man, and proposed 

to constitute anybody who would join him in taking possession 

I of the sick man's property one of the heirs and executors of 

, the Othoman empire. The Greeks rushed prematurely into 

' the sick man's house. 

\ There must have been gross mismanagement on the part 
i of those who planned and directed the invasion of Thessaly 
and Epirus in 1854, and the conduct of King Otho's ministers 
I and troops was marked by extreme incapacity as well as 
I timidity in the field. The feelings that prompted the people 
to incite their countrymen to aspire at independence, deserve 
praise, but the manner in which the military operations were 
conducted was cowardly, and the brigandage of the armed 
bands that invaded Turkey brought disgrace on the Greek 
kingdom^. The entrance of the Russian army into the 
trans-Danubian provinces, though it was not made the ground 
of an immediate declaration of war against Russia on the 
part of the Sultan, served as a signal to the Greeks for 
preparing to invade Turkey. The Russians crossed the Pruth 
on the 3rd of July 1853^ and from that time the English and 
French ministers at Athens exerted themselves in vain to 
prevent the Greek government from taking part in the war. 
During the winter, bands of adventurers were formed at Athens 
under the avowed protection of the queen, and money for their 
equipment was collected publicly^. 

In the month of February 1854 the minister of war per- 
mitted the army to aid the armed bands that had entered 

' The Greek government pretended that it took no part in the invasion of Turkey, 
but Colonel Skarlatos Soutzos, who had been marshal of the court, was sent as 
commander-in-chief of the forces on the frontier, and when everything was pre- 
pared, he returned to Athens and was appointed minister of war. Now whether 
the object of the Greek government was to prevent the violation of treaties and 
maintain a strict neutrality, or to prepare for an efficient attack on Turkey, the 
measures adopted were equally ill-judged and inefficient. Either might have been 
carried out with better results. The people acted openly, decidedly, and with 
energy in their animosity to Turkey. They plunged boldly into the war, and 
showed that they were ready to perform their part. But those who allowed the 
war to commence and employed money to carry it on, neither formed magazines 
nor maintained discipline among the Greek troops even in the Greek territory. 

^ Parliamentary Papers ; correspondence respecting the relations between Greece 
and Turkey, 1854, p. 3. 


[Bk. V. Ch. V 

Turkey during the winter ^ But in spite of Greek an^ 
Russian encouragement the Christian subjects of the sultai^* 
refused to take up arms. The pubhc administration wa 
so bad in Greece, that independence offered few attraction 
when the result would be subjection to Greek misgovernmentj' 
The patriots that entered Thessaly and Epirus, both volunteer 
and Greek troops, plundered the cattle and property of th 
Christians and Mussulmans alike, and the rayahs soon dis 
covered that the lawless rapacity of those who pretended toj'fe 
deliver them from oppression was more ruinous than the 
systematic extortion of the Othoman officials. Never indeed 
was a more open violation of national treaties accompanied 
with such wanton robbery of private property. The GreekB 
government employed direct falsehood to conceal from the,] 
English and French ministers at Athens the proceedings 
which it employed to encourage these disorders. The Greek 
minister in London, M. Tricoupi, attempted to deceive the 
British government by assurances that King Otho was making 
the greatest exertions to maintain neutrality, when he was 
perfectly aware from Greek newspapers and private letters 
that these assurances were false. King Otho and Queen |« 
Amalia were, at the time, making a parade of patronizing 
those who fitted out the volunteers. The jails were opened 
with the connivance of the government, to allow all the 
prisoners able to bear arms to escape, on condition that they 
enlisted in the irregular bands on the frontier and invaded 
Turkey. Armed men were enrolled by the municipalities 
under the direction of the prefects, and permitted to march 
from one end of Greece to the other, proclaiming openly that 
they were going to attack the Turks. The troops placed to 
guard the frontier found no impediment to their joining 
these bodies of invaders with their arms and ammunition, 
and it was said at Athens that fifty men deserted in one 

A tent with the royal colours was put in the vicinity of 
the palace garden, camp equipage was ordered for the court, 
and the courtiers announced that the king and queen would 

^ A list of six generals, five colonels, and three majors, who were allowed to 
resign their rank in the Greek army to invade Turkey, is given in the Panhellenion, 
a French newspaper published at Athens, 14th April, 1854. They were all rein- 
stated soon after as a matter of course, and received their pay as if they had never 
sent in their resignations. 






A.D. 1854.] 

^ ai soon quit Athens for the frontier. Proclamations were printed 
sultj and circulated, which pretended to be issued by subjects of 
the sultan, but which were prepared by Greek officials ; and 
copies of these papers were distributed among the Greeks 
in Western Europe to stimulate their enthusiasm and induce 
intea them to send money for the deliverance of their countrymen. 
Sir Thomas Wyse the English minister at Athens was not 
deceived even at the commencement of the movement by 
ledt the language of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He reported 
til to the British government that King Otho and the members 
of his cabinet were preparing to invade Turkey, and deter- 
mined to violate all their promises on the slightest chance 
jreellof aggrandizement; and by the early information which he 
Dti gave concerning the disposition and conduct of the Greek 
diii| government he prevented the false statements of the Greek 
minister at London from gaining any credence. It would 
probably convey a false impression of the character of the 
population and of the state of society in the Hellenic king- 
dom to record in detail the proceedings of the Greeks who 
invaded Turkey in 1854. They never encountered any body 
of Othoman troops nearly equal in number without suffering 
a defeat, and their only victories were over bands of Turkish 
peasants who resisted their plundering incursions, and over 
scattered detachments of Albanian police guards. They 
plundered friends and foes. Christians and Mussulmans in- 
discriminately ; and this invasion of Turkey did more to 
strengthen the sultan's government in Thessaly and Epirus 
than the occupation of the Piraeus by French and English 
troops. About 6500 men are believed to have crossed the 
frontier from Greece, including volunteers, criminals released 
from jails, prisoners who were allowed to escape, and soldiers 
who were invited to desert ; and all these men lived at free 
quarters in the southern parts of Thessaly and Epirus, which 
are chiefly inhabited by Christians, for about four months. 
In addition to what they consumed they sent over the fron- 
iiit,|tier to be sold for their profit upwards of 10,000 cattle and 
50,000 sheep \ Good meat had not for many years been so 





^ Parliamentary Papers : Correspondence relating to Greece and Turkey, 1854, 

I pp. 253, 254. Besides cattle, large quantities of grain and salt which belonged to 

Greek subjects of the Porte were sent over the frontier as plunder. The Christian 

population suffered severely, but fewer oxen were delivered from the Turkish yoke 

than from the Christian. 



abundant nor so cheap in the markets of Greece. The conduct 
of the armed men who invaded Turkey is not surprising, 
when we know the manner in which they were brought 
together, and the measures adopted to escape poHtical re- 
sponsibility by leaving them without control ; but it is almost 
incredible that the members of the Greek government and 
the military men who commanded the Greek force on the 
frontier could expect either success or honour from counte- 
nancing such proceedings^. ) 
In the month of February 250 criminals from the prison 
of Chalcis in Euboea accompanied by 150 soldiers of the 
garrison, left that fortress, and dividing themselves into several 
bands marched openly to the frontier, part passing through 
Euboea, and part proceeding through Boeotia and Locris, 
both bands exacting provisions of the best kind and often 
contributions in money from the peasants where they stopped. 
The government authorities welcomed them, but no where 
attempted to check their disorders. On the western side 
of Greece, at Patras and other places where there were prisons, 
the prisoners were allowed to escape and the soldiers were 
encouraged to desert. Even from the prison of Kalamata 
in Messenia no criminals were allowed to depart and march 
through the whole Peloponnesus, exacting provisions from 
the villages when they did not receive rations from the 
authorities. A considerable body of troops was placed at 
Vonitza and Karavasera by the government under the pretext 


^ The accounts of the numbers who invaded Turkey were generally exaggerated 
at the time. The account published in the Augsburg Gazette in April requires to be 
controlled by consular reports and the information of volunteers present in different 
places. In the Augsburg Gazette — • 
Theodore Griva is stated to have 1500 men. He was at Mctzovo with . . 250 

General Djavellas 6000 ,, „ Petta ,, . . 3000 

The Suliotes are stated as . . 500 „ They were at Pentepegadia with 100 
Zervas is stated to have . . .1500 „ He was at Dramisi with . . 300 

Kosta Nika 1000 „ „ Ratziko „ . . ico? 

Georgios Tjames 600 „ „ Kalamo „ . . 50 " 

Georgios Vaias 400 „ „ Gramena „ . . 50 

Lambros Veikos 2000 „ He was near Paramythia with . 100 

In Epirus 13.500 In Epirus 395° 

In Thessaly report said . 10,000 In Thessaly 3000 

23,500 6950 

It is not probable, however, that the number at any time exceeded 6000, though it 
is possible that considerably more than 7000 may have crossed the frontier at 
different times. 



A.D. 1854.] 

of enforcing neutrality, but in reality to facilitate their deser- 
tion with their arms and ammunition, and several young 
officers went off with the men under their command and 
joined the bands already in Turkey. 

During the negotiations which preceded the rupture of 
diplomatic relations with the Porte, and during the hostilities 
that were carried on, the good faith and strict observance 
of treaties by the Mussulmans formed a strong contrast to 
the conduct of the orthodox Christians. The justice and 
priso candour of Fuad Pasha rendered the falsehood of M. Paikos, 
fti the Greek minister of foreign affairs, more conspicuous, and 
the parliamentary papers furnish a record of their conduct 
in their own writings ^ When the invasion of Epirus com- 
menced, the Othoman troops on the frontier amounted to 
1300 men. Prevesa, Domoko, and Volo were almost without 
garrisons, and the few troops that occupied them were in 
want of ammunition, stores, and money ^. The court of 
Athens and the Greek war department, having resolved to 
break loose from the restraints of international treaties and 
good faith, might with a little determination and military 
courage have gained possession of these fortresses by simul- 
taneous attacks without any very serious loss ; and it may 
be doubted whether either Turkey or her allies would have 
been disposed to send immediately a force to reconquer them. 
Greece might then have treated with a material guarantee 
in her hands like other powers. The indecision of a timid 
king, the want of capacity to execute any plan on the part 
of the Greek ministers, the neglect of discipline in the Greek 
army, and the disorderly and cowardly behaviour of the 
soldiers, criminals, and brigands who invaded Turkey, rendered 
the treachery of the Greek government abortive ^ 

The Porte, exasperated by the false statements of the 
Greek government that it was exerting all its authority to 









' Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence respecting the relations of Greece and 
Turkey, 1854, p. 210, &c. 

^ The garrison of Arta consisted of only 400 regular troops sent from Joannina 
when the Greeks were about to attack it. The soldiers previously in the place 
were 700 Albanian irregulars and 200 police guards. 

^ The Augsburg Gazette was at this time the organ of Bavarian and Greek 
ambitious hopes, and it is curious to read over the accounts it contains of 
imaginary insurrections among the Christian subjects of the sultan. The German 
correspondents at Athens put more absurd exaggerations in circulation than can 
be found in the Greek newspapers published at Athens. 



[Bk.V. Ch.V. 

maintain neutrality, broke off all communications with Greece, 

and ordered all Greek subjects to quit the Othoman empire 

in fifteen days. This caused a great scramble among Greek 

merchants and traders to divest themselves of Greek passports 

and other marks of Hellenism. The protection of the Allied 

powers was eagerly sought after ; many Hellenes contrived 

to become lonians, and even the much vilified condition of 

rayah was in many cases thankfully accepted. Neither the 

sultan's government nor the Turkish people bore hard on 

the trading classes on this occasion, and many Greek citizens 

remained in the Othoman empire, and enriched themselves 

by supplying the wants of the enemies of orthodox Russia. 

The Allies at last interfered to put a stop to the devastation 
of Epirus and Thessaly. The resources of the sultan were 
diminished by the ruin of these provinces, and he was com- 
pelled to detach troops for their defence, which were sorely 
wanted on the banks of the Danube to resist the Russians. 
Piracy also began to appear in the waters of the Archipelago. 
Two English vessels were found at sea among the Greek 
islands without a soul on board and with their decks covered 
with blood. The Allies feared that there might be a renewal 
of the atrocities of 1828 and 1829, and the state of Greece 
made it their duty as well as their interest to put an end 
to the aggression on Turkey and arrest piracy. 

On the 22nd April 1854 the British government threatened 
King Otho that, in case the Greek government persisted in 
employing the revenues of Greece to attack Turkey in vio- 
lation of treaties, it would enforce the engagements of the 
treaty which, in placing King Otho on the throne of Greece, 
stipulated that the first revenues of the kingdom should be 
.ippropriated to paying the interest due to the protecting 
powers \ If this threat had been carried into execution, and 
effectual measures taken to enforce publicity and enable the 
Greek people to know the exact amount of money that was 
annually received by the treasury with every detail relating 
to its expenditure, a great boon would have been conferred 
on Greece, and the Greeks might have been saved from years 
of political misconduct, financial dishonesty, anarchy, and 
revolution. The time however was ill suited for proposing 
any financial measure or using a financial threat. 

^ Parliamentary Papers^ 1854, Greece and Turkey, p. 301. 



A.D. 1854.] 

' The invasion of Epirus and Thessaly was defeated by the 

Turks before any direct assistance arrived from the AlHes, 

I and the Greeks were driven back into their own territory 

iwith greater ease than could have been expected. Only two 

engagements of any importance occurred, one at Petta and 

the other at Domoko, and in both the Greek troops fled 

I after offering a very feeble resistance to the attack of the 

, Turks. At Petta the number of the Greeks amounted to 

' 3000 men, who were intrenched in a position which they had 

carefully selected. The Turkish force consisted of 3000 

j regulars and 1000 Albanian irregulars, who marched out of 

Arta to attack the Greek position on the 26th of April. 

I The Greek intrenchments were stormed after a single volley 

j of musketry, and the whole Greek army fled in utter con- 

! fusion, abandoning two pieces of artillery after the first 

discharge. Numbers threw away their arms, and the Turks 

collected the trophies of this almost bloodless battle, and 

• exhibited them in triumph at Arta the same evening. The 

few prisoners captured were released by the Turks very soon 

after at the intercession of the English consul. At Domoko 

the Greeks were the assailants. They invested the place 

and made preparations for attacking it ; but the contest 

was terminated by a vigorous sortie of the garrison, which 

completely routed the besieging force and drove the Greeks 

from all their positions. These two victories compelled the 

main bodies of the invaders to retreat over the frontier. The 

bands that remained in Turkey sought to evade pursuit, and 

endeavoured to carry on a war of plunder, until their final 

expulsion from the Othoman territory, which was effected 

1 during the summer. 

In the month of May French and English troops were 
landed at the Piraeus, and King Otho was compelled to 
abandon the Russian alliance and cease from further attempts 
to disturb the frontier provinces of Turkey. Tranquillity 
was easily restored both in Epirus and Thessaly by the 
Othoman authorities. The armed bands of criminals and 
brigands, when driven back into Greece, carried on the same 
system of plundering the agricultural population which the 
Greeks had dignified with the name of war when it was 
pursued in Turkey ; and for the next two years the Christian 
subjects of the sultan in Epirus and Thessaly enjoyed a 



[Bk.V. Ch.V 

far greater degree of security for life and property than the 
subjects of King Otho in the northern provinces of the Hellenic 
kingdom. The clandestine manner in which the Greek court 
encouraged the invasion of Turkey destroyed all discipline 
in the Greek army by making secret service the surest claim 
to advancement and special favour ; it corrupted the political 
administration by tolerating illegal conduct on the part ol 
subordinate officials ; it subjected the government of the 
country to the fluctuating interests of the court, and it flattered 
while it disappointed the passions of the mob. It also in- 
flicted a serious injury on the Greek nation by exhibiting 
the strongest evidence of its military weakness and political 
incapacity \ 

The occupation of the Piraeus by the Allied troops lasted 
from May 1854 to February 1857. On their arrival, the. 
English and French ministers presented themselves to King 
Otho and required from him a promise that the Greekj 
government would obsei"ve strict neutrality during the 
Russian war. He was informed that in case he refused to| 
give this promise, Athens would be immediately occupied by» 
French and English troops, and the revenues of the sea-ports 
would be sequestrated to defray the expenses of the army ol 
occupation. King Otho felt no disposition to risk the loss of 
his throne. It appears that he had acted all along without 
any definite plan, so that he found no great difficulty ir 
promising everything which the Allies required. The minis- 
try which had pursued a line of conduct hostile to the AlliesJ 
was replaced by a ministry which accepted a policy ofj 
subserviency to their views. As soon as King Otho was! 
made fully sensible that there was no alternative between] 
absolute submission or a degree of restraint which might havej 
quickly compelled him to abdicate, he accepted the resigna-j 
tion of the partizans of Russia and named a new ministry! 
agreeable to the Allies, pledging himself and his governmentj 
in a solemn manner to maintain neutrality-. Queen Amaliaj 

* King Otho's ministers during the invasion of Turkey were. Admiral Krizes^l 
president; Paikos, foreign affairs; Skarlatos Soutzos, war ; Vlachos, public instruc- 
tion ; Ambrosiades. interior ; Provelegios, finance ; and Pilikas. justice. 

^ The declaration made by King Otho to the ministers of Great Britain and I 
France on the 6th May. 1854, was in the following terms: — ' I declare that I will 
observe faithfully a strict and complete neutrality with regard to Turkey, that 
I will immediately take all the measures necessary for making this neutrality 
effectual, ana for this object I will call to my counsels new ministers who by their 



|uD. 1854.] 

pn this as on many other occasions showed more sincerity 

han good sense. She made an open display of her dislike 

o the Allies and of her unavailing wishes for the success of 

Ihe Russians. She encouraged opposition to her husband's 

inisters by holding out hopes of a speedy reaction, and by 

liinting that the influence of the court would always be 

ible to secure rewards for its devoted servants in spite of the 

:onstitutional ministers and the influence of the Allies. 

A.lexander Mavrocordatos, who had conducted himself with 

nore candour at Paris than Tricoupi at London, was recalled 

o become president of the council of ministers. Mavrocor- 

atos had not recovered the popularity he had lost when he 

as prime minister in 1844; he had been long absent from 

reece, and the country had undergone considerable change 

uring his absence. He had always been a bad leader of the 

arty and an unsuccessful administrator, and his want of 

[intimate acquaintance with the new men and new circum- 

tances brought these deficiencies into greater prominence. 

The only man of action in the new cabinet was General 

jKalergi, but he was deficient in administrative capacity and 

as disliked both bv King Otho and Oueen Amalia. The 

arshal of the palace, four of the king's aides-de-camp, and 

ithe chief of the police of Athens, who had all taken an active 

part in the violation of neutrality, were removed from their 

places. Public opinion was adverse to the new ministry ;, and 

its members sought in vain for able officials to support them 

n their endeavours to conduct the government with order and 

[justice. The animosity of the court and the prejudices of the 

people could not be immediately allayed, so that the only 

strength of this ministry lay in the power of the Allies ^. 

The opposition of the people existed, but it was not active, 

and if the new ministers had pursued a well-digested system 

Icharacter and ability are the most competent to carry this engagement of mine 

linto execution.' Sir Thomas Wyse, the British minister, replied: — 'We (the 

Iministers of France and England) will hasten to inform our governments of the 

[•words of your Majesty, and we do not doubt that your Majesty, by giving your 

support to the new councillors, whom you have been pleased to call to your 

cabinet, will leave to us only the duty of transmitting to our courts the most 

satisfactory information concerning the state of Greece.' 

* The cabinet was composed of seven members: Alexander Mavrocordatos, 

[president of the council and minister of foreign affairs; General Kalergi, war; 

Rhigas Palamedes, interior ; Perikles Argyropoulos, finance ; Admiral Kanares, 

marine; George Psyllas, ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction; and L. 

Londinos, justice. 



of administrative reform, and sought the aid of public opinion 
by adopting measures to enforce economy and financial 
publicity, they would have won personal respect even if they 
had failed to obtain decided support. Measures of improve- 
ment from which the mass of the people would have derived 
immediate benefit presented themselves in number ; but the 
weakness of most of the members of this ministry paralyzed 
its activity, and the disorders caused by the escaped criminals 
and the undisciplined bands driven back from Turkey were so 
great that life and property became more insecure in many 
parts of the kingdom than they had been at any periodi 
during King Otho's reign. The ministry was unpopular! 
because it was regarded as an instrument of an anti-nationalj 
policy ; it was weak because it was both incapable and un- 
popular ; and it was thwarted in its action by the court| 
because it was weak and unpopular. 

The condition of the people was little better than that of j 
the government. The Greeks could not conceal from them- 
selves that they had failed to strike an effectual blow at] 
Turkey by their own misconduct. They had violated every 
principle of honour and policy by suddenly assailing an] 
unprepared neighbour, and they had conducted their attack so 
disgracefully as to draw down the contempt of their Russian 
friends as well as of their allied enemies. Success might 
have been accepted, as it generally is, as an apology for an 
international assault, but failure augments the crime of bad 
faith with nations and especially with statesmen. Greece! 
really lost very little either in money or men by her attack 
on Turkey; but she lost greatly in moral character and 
political organization. She unveiled her administrative and 
military weakness to the Othoman government and to the 
Christian races in European Turkey, and forfeited her claim | 
to lead the Albanians and Bulgarians in a war of independ- 
ence. The ' great idea ' and the revival of a Byzantine 
empire became for some years a subject of ridicule. The 
Russians, finding that the Greeks could do little for them, 
became less disposed to do anything for the Greeks, and they 
did not conceal their contempt for men who received money 
to fight their own national battle, and after being paid 
fought only to enable them to ask for another payment. 
The Porte discovered that the Greek nation had less power 



A.D. 1855.] 

to injure the Othoman empire than was previously believed 
to be the case ; the attacks of the Greeks were less feared 
and their friendship was less valued. In Western Europe it 
was seen that the literary and commercial activity of a small 
number had produced a false estimate of the national 
strength and of the military and political importance of the 
Greek kingdom. A general suspicion was awakened that 
Greece might eventually become a secondary power in the 
ultimate arrangement of the affairs of the Othoman empire. 
The Greeks themselves were forced to feel that they were no 
longer the only Christian nationality in European Turkey 
that possessed a 'great idea.' The Roumans, the Bulgarians, 
and the Sclavonians are more numerous, and the Albanians 
are more warlike. The inhabitants of the Ionian Islands 
alone called loudly for union with the Hellenic kingdom, 
little thinking that their clamour would induce Great Britain 
to be so generous as to grant their demand. 

The disasters of the Allies during the siege of Sebastopol 
revived the hopes of King Otho and of the Greeks that 
Russia would prove victorious in the war. An impropriety 
in a matter of court etiquette and the rights of society on 
the part of General Kalergi offended Queen Amalia, and the 
v/eakness of Mavrocordatos in not immediately settling the 
political difficulty which arose from this impropriety by 
exacting the resignation of Kalergi or resigning himself, 
enabled the court to get rid of the ' occupation cabinet ' with 
very little credit to its members. On the 15th September 
1855 a new ministry under the presidency of Demetrius Bul- 
gares was appointed. Bulgares was an Albanian of Hydra ; 
he was a man of honesty and firmness^ but destitute of admin- 
istrative knowledge and the capacity to govern men. His 
obstinate character and personal pride were well displayed in 
his persisting to wear the long robes formerly worn by his 
father, when he bore the title of bey in Hydra as representing 
the Othoman authority. His arrogant self-importance ob- 
tained for him from Queen Amalia the nickname of Arta- 
xerxes. The ministry of Bulgares entered on office without 
any political principle to guide its conduct ; its bond of union 
was blind devotion to the interests of the court and the pre- 
judices of nationality. The interests of Greece and the cause 
of good government were left in abeyance. Its administration 



was marked by the extension of brigandage to such a degree 
that in some districts the agricultural population threatened 
to abandon the cultivation of the soil, and the chief merit 
it possessed was that it adopted vigorous measures for 
destroying the brigands. 

The long political career of Alexander Mavrocordatos ter- 
minated with the resignation of his cabinet in 1855. His 
last administration was characterized by the same want of 
political convictions and administrative capacity which had 
led to the failure of his government on former occasions. 
He displayed the same disposition to meddle with men, and 
the same incompetency to direct measures. Never perhaps 
was there a man whose talents and virtues were so generally 
considered to entitle him to high office in the government of 
his country, who failed so ignominiously when entrusted with 
power. Alexander Mavrocordatos, like King Otho, sought 
to control and direct everything ; and the system of constant 
interference proved as injurious to good government when 
practised by an able as by a weak man. Prefects, justices 
of the peace, and demarchs were subjected to ministerial 
interference, instead of being taught to fear administrative 
responsibility. On the other hand the difficulties under 
which the government of Mavrocordatos laboured ought 
not to be overlooked before condemning his conduct. The 
centralization of the powers of government in the hands of 
the ministers of the crown centralized the whole discontent of 
the people against the person of the prime minister, and tJiat 
discontent was caused in part by circumstances over which 
he had no control, and was increased by the encouragement 
which all who opposed his measures received from the Russian 
party, the court faction, and a number of influential Greeks 
who pretended to be personally devoted to the interests of 
King Otho. The difficulties of governing well were also 
augmented by the absence of local institutions enabling the 
people to carry on self-government in that lower sphere of 
administrative business, which a central authority, whether it 
be representative or autocratic, cannot find time to perform ^. 

This last administration of Mavrocordatos, if it had been 

* Self-government ought, I presume, to be applied to those cases of local or 
general administration, in which the people elect directly their executive officers 
and financial officials as well as their legislaiors and councillors. 


A.D. 1855.] 

ably and prudently conducted, might have done something 
to improve the morality of the Greek government, but from 
want of political principle to guide its action, it strengthened 
the vices of a system that was preparing the Greeks for a 
revolution. The support of the classes possessing political 
influence was purchased by violating the constitution in the 
most offensive manner. The salaries of the senators and 
deputies were illegally increased, and the dishonesty of Greek 
statesmen was so openly displayed that a deep stain was 
fixed on the national character. The constitution of 1844, 
which Mavrocordatos had taken an active part in framing, 
declared that the deputies and senators who exercised their 
functions were to receive from the public treasury, respec- 
tively, 250 drachmas for deputies and 500 drachmas monthly 
for senators, while the session lasted \ The legislative session 
of 1854 ought, according to the express enactment of the 
constitution, to have commenced on the ist (13th) Novem- 
ber^; but from that inattention to duty which characterizes 
Greek society, the deputies neglected to assemble at Athens 
in sufficient numbers to form a house for business, and the 
king could not open the chambers until December. Even 
then the number of deputies was insufficient to transact busi- 
ness, and the president could not be elected until February 
1855. Yet, though the deputies and senators neglected to 
meet for the affairs of their country, they insisted on receiving 
their monthly salaries from the ist November 1854. Mavro- 
cordatos and his colleagues preferred retaining power and 
purchasing parliamentary support by violating the constitution 
to preserving their political honour unsullied and resigning 
office. In an evil hour for himself and for the senate 
Mavrocordatos gave his sanction to this iniquity, which he 
might have prevented, for he had only to remind the chamber 
of deputies that the initiative of every grant of salary be- 
longed neither to the chamber of deputies nor to the senate, 
but to the crown alone ; and to declare that, as long as he 
remained a minister of the crown, he was determined not to 
allow money to be voted in violation of the constitution ''• 
By speaking this language he would have secured the support 
of public opinion, and on such a question King Otho could 

' Articles 67 and 79. * Article 47. ^ Article 17. 


[Bk.V. Ch.V. 

not have forced him to resign. Whether he could have 
averted the Revolution of 1862, saved the throne of King Otho, 
and prolonged the existence of a senate in Greece, may 
remain doubtful. Neither Mavrocordatos nor any of his col- 
leagueSj living as they did in an impure political atmosphere 
which dulled their moral perception, perceived the abyss that 
their neglect of the constitution opened in the road along 
which their government was travelling. 

The first method that the deputies and senators invented 
for increasing their salaries in violation of the constitution 
which they had sworn to observe, was by prolonging the 
sessions. This abuse caused so much inconvenience, that to 
remove it, and at the same time to satisfy the cupidity of the 
legislators, the cabinet of Mavrocordatos proposed a law to 
increase their salaries, and this violation of the constitution 
passed through both chambers almost without opposition and 
received the royal assent. It was enacted that the deputies 
were to receive an annual salary of 2500 drachmas, and the 
senators an annual salary of 5000 drachmas each. But the 
breach once opened in the constitution for the pecuniary profit 
of the legislators was soon widened, and a considerable addi- 
tion was subsequently made to their wages ^. The chamber 
of deputies, being a body in a state of constant change, and 
which could be rendered at any time a true representation of 
the people, incurred no direct responsibility by the misconduct 
of its members, for a new election could give it a new char- 
acter and new life. But the members of the senate, being 
nominated for life, fixed the responsibility of their perjury 
and cupidity on the body they composed, so that when the 
Revolution of 1862 expelled King Otho from his throne, it 
also abolished the senate. 

As far as the Allies were concerned the ministry of Mavro- 
cordatos answered its purpose, for it maintained Greece in 
a state of neutrality, but the internal government of the 
country was weak, and the manner in which the executive 

^ The National Assembly of 1864 has endeavoured to guard against a repetition 
of similar illegalities. The 47th article of the Constitution of 1S44 enacted that 
the chambers met of right on the ist November, and that the sessions could 
not last more than two months. The Constitution of 1864 enacts that the dura- 
tion of each session cannot be less than three months nor more than six months, 
and fixes 2000 drachmas as the payment to be made to each deputy for the 


A.D. 1855.] 

administration was conducted was a subject of complaint even 
among those who were incHned to support the ministry \ 

The outrages committed by bands of brigands in the year 
1855 were viewed with indifference or applauded as outbreaks 
of a patriotic spirit as long as the ' occupation ministry ' 
remained in office ^. But the crimes and devastations of these 
robbers became a subject of serious alarm, when the formation 
of a ministry devoted to the court under the presidency of 
M. Bulgares brought the responsibility of the disorganized 
condition of the state home to those who had ordered the 
prisons to be opened, and hundreds of criminals to be turned 
loose on society ^. A series of daring acts of brigandage on 
the road between Athens and the Piraeus drew the attention 
of all Europe to the insecurity that prevailed in Greece. Two 
French officers were robbed. A captain of artillery was car- 
ried off to the mountains and detained a prisoner until the 
Greek government paid 30,000 drachmas as his ransom. It 
was openly asserted at the time, that the court displayed 
unusual promptitude in obtaining the release of this officer, 
in order to escape from a too close investigation of its connec- 
tion with brigandage during the previous months, and from 

1 See the Greek newspapers, and particularly the 'hOrjva, in 1855. 

^ There was a remarkable passage testifying the alarming amount of brigandage 
in Greece in the king's speech on the opening of the chambers on the 1 6th Dec, 
1854: 'The brigandage which continues to desolate many parts of the country, 
not only destroys the labours of honest and industrious citizens, and places life, 
property, and honour in danger ; but also gives occasion for condemning unjustly 
the nation, whicli rejects with abhorrence the iniquitous deeds of the numerous 

3 A writer in the Edhihurgh Revieiu (No. 210, April, 1856) says, 'Instead of 
those habits of industry which ought to flourish among a free peasantry, the 
tendency to atrocious agrarian outrages, called by the Greeks brigandage, has 
lamentably increased, and prevails to an extent which is deeply disgraceful to the 
government and to the community. The excesses committed within the last few 
months by these bands of robbers, murderers, and extortioners, are so abominable 
that all personal security is at an end in many districts, and nothing but the 
presence of a certain number of foreign troops appears to save the kingdom from 
the horrors of social dissolution. The weak and profligate government of King 
Otho is responsible not only for the impunity which attends these crimes, but for 
the cause which has mainly produced them. Hundreds of adventurers and ruffians, 
encouraged by the king and queen, and stimulated by the hope of plunder and by 
Russian intrigues, flocked to the frontier at the outset of the war. They were soon 
driven back by the forces of the Porte, though not before they had inflicted atro- 
cious wrongs on the Turkish subjects of Thessaly. Yet these marauders were 
immediately amnestied by the Greek government.' 

This article was written by Mr. Freeman, whose History of Federal Government 
from the foundation of the Achaian League places him in a high rank as a scholar 
and historian, and whose History of the Norman Conquest of England sheds new light 
on one of the most important periods in the history of the English nation. 


[Bk. V. Ch. V. 

a not ill-grounded fear that the necessity of providing for 
their own security might cause the Allies to interfere directly 
with the internal government of the country. The suppression 
of brigandage became the first object of King Otho's govern- 
ment, and as soon as the agricultural population was convinced 
that the agents of the government were sincere in their endea- 
vours to extirpate the brigands, the peasants joined the troops 
and gendarmes in hunting them down, and with this assistance 
the criminals were quickly exterminated. A circular of the 
minister of foreign affairs, addressed to the diplomatic agents 
of Greece at the European courts, dated 28th July (loth 
August) 1856, amidst a great deal of self-congratulation at 
the progress which the country had made under King Otho's 
government, a large allowance of inaccurate statements, and 
much misrepresentation, declared that ' during the first three 
months of 1856, ninety-nine brigands were brought before the 
courts of justice, and of these thirty were condemned to death 
and executed, nine were condemned to labour for life, twelve 
to labour for terms of years, and twenty-five to various terms 
of imprisonment \' Yet even in this document it is admitted 
that about thirty brigands continued to ravage Attica and 
Boeotia in the immediate vicinity of King Otho's palace. In 
Acarnania alone forty persons were killed by brigands on the 
principal road since the year 1853'-^. The general administrative 
disorder, of which brigandage was one of the most striking 
features, caused the Allies to prolong the occupation of the 
Piraeus for some time after the treaty of peace was signed 
on the 30th March 1856. During the congress at Paris, both 
the representatives of Great Britain and France stated that 
the deplorable condition of Greece rendered the continuance 
of the occupation necessary, to avoid anarchy and prevent the 
repetition of the disorders in the army and the prisons which 
preceded the occupation. The Russian plenipotentiary also 

^ This document is printed in Le Moniteur Grec, 21 December, 1857. 

^ A convention for the suppression of brigandage was concluded between the 
Greek government and the Porte on the 20th April, 1856, which aided the Greeks 
in destroying the bands of brigands by cutting off their retreat into Turkey. The 
Greeks, nevertheless, continued to inveigh against the Turks, and tried to persuade 
the world that brigandage would be unknown in Greece if brigands could be 
prevented from passing the frontier from Turkey. They neglected, however, to 
take proper precautions against the frequent escapes of their own criminals, after 
their condemnation even for the most atrocious crimes, and they persisted in grant- 
ing amnesties to brigands who became tired of a life of hardship in the mountains. 


A.n. 1856.] 

ofifered to concert with Great Britain and France the measures 
necessary for improving the condition of a country which the 
three powers had undertaken to protect. 

The ministry of Bulgares displayed great confidence in the 
policy of conducting public business by false pretences. The 
delusion that deceit is the surest road to success is not un- 
common with Greek statesmen. The Bulgares ministry 
boasted that it was liberal, yet it prosecuted the 'Athena,' 
the oldest and most independent newspaper in Greece, for 
publishing ofificial documents proving that the ministers had 
adopted various subterfuges to delude Mr. Smith O^Brien, the 
Irish rebel, who was travelling in Greece, into a belief that per- 
fect security for life and property existed in the agricultural 
districts and along the roads he travelled. Advertisements 
were inserted in the newspapers of Western Europe, to create 
a belief that public improvements were an object of attention, 
and that great public works were about to commence ^. Pre- 
tences of economy in the financial administration were put 
forward as an inducement to the protecting powers to accept 
a composition in lieu of the full payment of the interest due 
on the Allied loan. The acts of this ministry did not cor- 
respond with its promises, and if it succeeded in cheating 
public opinion, it was only for a short time. 

When the brigands were deprived of secret protection they 
were soon destroyed. The feeling of the peasantry was shown 
by their endeavouring to kill the brigands and not to make 
any prisoners. The fear was still strong that any brigands 
who might be taken would be ultimately allowed to escape, 
or only subjected to a light punishment or a short imprison- 
ment. Even in the case of condemnation to labour for life, 
the peasants believed that the criminals would soon be released 
by an amnesty, obtained by the political influence of the men 
in power who were supposed to employ brigandage as a means 
of intimidating their opponents ; and the rural population felt 

^ An advertisement was inserted in The Times, 24th October, 1856, by the Greek 
consul-general in London, addressed to contractors, engineers, and others in which 
the minister of foreign affairs invited capitalists to drain marshes and lakes, con- 
struct roads, and form harbours. The real object of the Greek minister was 
revealed in the concluding sentence of his communication to the consul general : 
' Please to give the desirable publicity to this circular.' Publicity now proves that 
the object of the ministry was to make a great display of activity without any 
intention of acting. 


[Bk. V. Ch. V, 

great dread that a captured brigand might return and inflict 
cruel vengeance on his captors \ 

The measures that the three protecting powers adopted for 
improving the condition of Greece, in the affairs of which they 
recognized the necessity of interfering during the conferences 
at Paris, were confined to the estabhshment of a financial 
commission. This commission, composed of their diplomatic 
representatives at Athens, commenced its examination of the 
financial administration in February 1857. That it proved of 
no avail in improving the condition of Greece, was a natural 
consequence of the circumstances which induced the powers 
to establish a commission to examine only the finances, when 
a commission to examine into the condition of the whole 
executive administration was required^ in order to ascertain 
how the acknowledged defects of the government were to be 
reformed. The financial imperfections of the Greek govern- 
ment were one of the consequences of the general mal- 
administration, and could only be effectually removed by a 
reform in the system of government. But the discordance 
that existed in the views of the cabinets of Great Britain, 
France, and Russia, on the most important political questions 
at issue in the internal policy of nations, prevented their 
entering into any examination of the political condition of 
Greece that could prove advantageous to the country, lest 
it should reveal their difference of opinion. The British 
government considers that personal liberty, and the power 
of self-government created by the existence of free local 
institutions, forms the surest means of attaining national 
progress and good government. France and Russia believe, 
on the other hand, that a powerful central executive and a 

^ The following passage is extracted from a pamphlet entitled Le goiwemement 
et r administration en Grece depiiis 1833 par un ternoin oculaire, 1863 (p. 18) : 'Nous 
avons ete temoin oculaire du fait suivant. Un premier aide-de-camp du Roi entra 
un jour dans le cabinet du redacteur d'un journal de I'extreme opposition, bien 
etonne de cette visite inattendue. " Je viens vous prier " lui dit I'aide-de-camp " de 
me rendre un grand seivice ; vous etes membre du jury et vous aurez demain a vous 
occuper d'une affaire de brigandage; je m'interesse au chef de la bande et a huit de 
ses co-accuses; ils sont de nos enfants, c'est a dire, ils sont de mes proteges. 
Faites moi le plaisir de me promettre le concours de votre vote pour les faire 
acquitter." Nous devons ajouter qu'il s'agissait d'une bande de brigands qui avait 
commis les crimes les plus atroces.' The pamphlet is attributed to a writer of 
authority, and the circumstance is believed to be true. Even while I write, in 
1866, public opinion persists in believing that the band of Kitzos, which now 
infests Attica, finds protectors as highly placed as those who protected brigands in 
the time of King Otho. 


A.D. 1857.] 

well-organized administrative police are necessary to control 
the movements of nations and to secure order. These adverse 
views had each their partizans in Greece. It was therefore 
impossible to enlist the cordial support of all the three powers 
to any definite scheme of administrative reform, and they 
found their action paralyzed except in financial matters, 
over which the treaty of 1832, which conferred the crown 
on King Otho, furnished them with a right of interference. 
Article xii. section 6 of that treaty is in these words — 'The 
sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be bound to 
appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of 
such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under 
the guarantee of the three courts, the first revenues of the 
state, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek 
treasury shall be devoted, /rj/ of all, to the payment of the 
said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for 
any other purpose, until those payments on account of the in- 
stalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three 
courts shall have been completely secured for the current 

' The diplomatic representatives of the three courts in Greece 
shall be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the 
last mentioned stipulation V 

This article is an interesting example of the cynical views 
that actuated European statesmen in the year 1832. It seems 
strange that British diplomatists could so recently take part 
in a treaty which invested foreign powers with a right to 
deprive Greece of funds that might be necessary for main- 
taining the administration of justice, preserving order in 
society, and paying the interest of the national debt previously 
contracted without any authority from the Greek nation, or 
any clause for obtaining the ratification of a Greek house of 
representatives. The Swedish chancellor Oxenstiern observed 
to his son that a little intercourse with the greatest diplo- 
matists would show him with how little wisdom the world was 
governed, and two centuries have not done much to assimilate 
the courtly practices and embroidered coats of diplomatists 
to the honest usages and plain habits of the nineteenth 
century. In 1832 an English minister consented to make 

' Parliamentary Papers : Convention relative to the sovereignty of Greece, signed 
at London May 7th, 1832. 


[Bk.V. Ch.V. 

the administration of justice and social order a matter of 
less importance than the power of enforcing payment of a loan 
forced on the Greeks to secure the acceptance of the throne 
by a king, whom they found it necessary to dethrone after 
he had reigned for nearly thirty years. This is an impor- 
tant fact in the diplomatic history of Europe. 

The abuses of the administration in Greece, when the 
protecting powers established the financial commission, were 
great, and they were constantly increasing. Financial reforms, 
enforced by a well-regulated system of publicity of all finan- 
cial accounts at short intervals, would have gone far towards 
extirpating one class of abuses. But to root out the evils 
that were corrupting political society, the protecting powers 
might have perceived that it was necessary to base their right 
of interference on grounds sanctioned by reason and the 
interests of the Greek people, not on stipulations imposed 
on Greece by a treaty, of which the Greeks heard nothing 
until long after it had been signed, and which encouraged them 
to repudiate their previous debts. 

The financial commission held its first sitting at Athens on 
the 1 8th February 1857, and it drew up its report on the 24th 
May 1859, which appears however not to have been officially 
communicated to the Greek government until October \ 
During the two years which the commission devoted to the 
examination of the financial condition of the government, it 
collected much valuable information concerning the amount 
of taxation paid by the people, the manner in which the 
public and municipal revenues were collected and adminis- 
tered, the extent to which the resources of the country were 
dilapidated, and the means by which the progress of the 
people was impeded through the neglect and mal-administration 
of the government. This mass of papers and documents was 
not published, and even the report of the commission was not 
generally known until it was printed among the parliamentary 
papers of i860. This report is of little value by itself, as it 
only repeats what had been often said and was well known. 
After stating ' that the national property was neither marked 
out, nor known to the government ; that it was constantly 

^ King OUio, on opening Ihe Chambers on the loth November, 1859, noticed 
the lebult of the commission. 


A.D. 1S59.] 

lessened by encroachments ; that the law entrusted the govern- 
ment with a supervision over the funds of the communes ; 
that the government neglected this duty; that the manner of 
collecting the land-tax impeded the progress of agriculture ; 
that the ministers of finance since the year 1845 had scarcely 
verified the resources and accounts of the public treasury; 
that of the accounts of the years 1850, 1851 and 1852, only the 
accounts of 1850 had been submitted to the chambers; that 
ithe court of accounts had not proved by the reports which it 
lis bound to publish the official regularity of the accounts of 
ministers, nor that they are such as they ought to be ; that 
the chambers have not remedied this state of things, and the 
legislative control has been no more exercised than the judi- 
cial ; that the accounts produced by the Greek government 
did not off"er the legal guarantees required for exactitude and 
authenticity; and that the publicity and the control of the 
administration, which are the guarantees to the country, did 
jnot exist.' After this strong condemnation of the conduct of 
'the government, the commission came to the impotent con- 
jClusion, that the attention of the Greek government should be 
seriously called to this state of things, and that Greece 
should be compelled to pay annually the sum of 900,000 francs to 
the three protecting powers in lieu of the interest and sinking 
fund due on the Allied loan, this sum being liable to be 
increased as the resources of Greece improved \ 

The financial commission by this recommendation assisted 
King Otho in maintaining the state of things which they 
reprobated. For after ascertaining and proclaiming that 
no dependence could be placed on the financial administration 
of the Greek government, and that the true position of the 
public treasury was systematically concealed from the people, 
the commission kept the knowledge it collected concerning 
the resources of the country, and the proofs it obtained of the 
mal-administration of the government, concealed from the 
Greeks, for whose benefit it was said that the commission had 
been established. Even when the members were convinced 
that King Otho would adopt no financial reforms until 
compelled either by public opinion or the direct interference 

* The Allied loan, amounting to 2,400.000/. sterling, was contracted with the 
house of Rothschild in January, 1833, and was guaranteed by Great Britain, France, 
and Russia. 




of the protecting powers, the commission did nothing to formi 
pubhc opinion or to enforce better administration. Theyi 
agreed to abstain from reforming abuses, if the Greek govern-| 
ment would promise to pay the protecting powers a small surnj 
on account. When the protecting powers ascertained the] 
impossibility of direct interference to enforce the literalj 
execution of the twelfth article of the treaty of 1832, they con- 
tented themselves with such a modicum of protection to their] 
own interests as they found practicable. Past mal-admini- 
stration received their condonation, and they relinquished their j 
authority to demand a reform of abuses, for the sum of 900,0001 
francs (^40,000), with hopes of increase at a future period, to 
be paid in lieu of the interest and sinking fund on the sum of j 
;;^2,40o,ooo guaranteed by Great Britain, France and Russia \ 

This result of the financial commission diminished the! 
respect felt for the protecting powers. Indeed there is no 
transaction in the history of the Greek Revolution which places 
the cabinets of Europe in so contemptible a position. Whether 
the neglect of the interests of the Greek people arose from an 
obtuse sense of moral obligations, hostility to popular liberty,! 
or aversion to aid constitutional government in enforcing 
financial reforms on an unwilling sovereign, cannot be certainly 
known until the secret diplomatic correspondence of the timej 
shall become public ^. The report itself is remarkable for the 1 
confused manner in which its most important recommenda- 
tions are mixed with vague statements ; and its most striking j 
result was the contempt with which King Otho treated the I 
advice it contained. Two clauses deserve especial notice. 
The commission reported that the attention of the Greek 
government should be directed ' to the advantage that would 
result from the modification of certain laws on taxation, 
particularly of the law on the land-tax, and finally to the 
imperious necessity of insuring publicity to the acts of the 
administration, and their control by the judicial and legislative 

^ Parliamentary Papers, Greece, No. 2, 1864. Papers relating to the arrange- 
ment concluded at Athens in June, 1S60, respecting the Greek loan. 

2 Count Sponneck, in a letter to General Kalergi {see the Greek newspaper 
naA.i77€!/e(jia, 21st Dec, 1865) says, 'The three protecting powers, or, as you 
Greeks are in the habit of calling them, the Powers, the benefactors of Greece.' 
This sarcasm is amusing, when we remember that it comes from the most ignorant 
statesman, and the greatest political nuisance, which the influence of the three 
protecting powers ever brought into Greece. 


A.D. 1859.] 

powers created by special laws and by the constitution/ 
Surely a commission which pronounced that one of the 
characteristics of the Greek government was financial in- 
experience as well as administrative incapacity and fiscal 
dishonesty, ought not to have stopped short at a general 
recommendation to act ably and honestly. When the pro- 
tecting powers interfered with the financial administration, 
they assumed the obligation to improve it, and were bound 
to lay before the Greeks a scheme of administration better 
adapted to develope the resources of the country than the 
system they condemned, and to point • out the details 
necessary for giving it efficiency. When they declared that 
publicity was an imperious necessity, they imposed on 
themselves the duty of enforcing it, of giving publicity to 
their own labours, and of submitting the statistical and 
financial information they had collected to a deliberate ex- 
amination, in order to hear the voice of public opinion, which 
they acknowledged to be the true ordeal for determining 
the soundness of financial measures. But though the three 
powers might agree on a verbal report, it was more diffi- 
cult for them to agree on a practical measure, and King 
Otho was fully aware of the discordance of their views 
concerning the manner of giving practical efficacy to their 
opinions. The Greek government therefore persevered in 
its course of irresponsible expenditure and mal-administration. 
If the twelfth article of the treaty of 1832 had any value, it 
authorized Great Britain, France, and Russia to insist that 
the Greek government should carry into execution the special 
laws and constitutional enactments which controlled the 
financial administration, and that the general report of the 
court of accounts on the annual expenditure of the government 
should be published at the same time that it was delivered 
to their legations at Athens. Had the protecting powers 
performed this duty Greece would have been deeply indebted 
to their interference. 

The financial commission declared that a modification in 
the manner of collecting the land-tax would be advantageous 
to the country. It is therefore important to understand how 
it is that the land-tax retains the agriculture of Greece in 
a stationary condition. Greece is essentially an agricultural 
country. Her commerce is great, but while her commerce 

R 2 


[Bk.V. Ch.V.I 

supports hundreds, her agriculture nourishes thousands. She 
has comparatively a much greater extent of sea coast than] 
any country with the same amount of population ; her faci- 
lities of maritime transport are great and her coasting vessels 
are numerous. But two-thirds of her population live byj 
agriculture and pasturage, and about one-third of her arable 
land remains uncultivated ^. An acre of land sowed with 
the samQ kind of grain does not yield a larger return in 
1865 than it did 50 years ago. While everything around 
improves, there has been no improvement in agriculture for 
the last two thousand years. The best proof that civilization 
has pervaded a whole nation is the fact that man's labour 
extracts more produce from each acre of the soil which he 
cultivates than could previously be obtained, that the labour 
employed in agriculture is better remunerated, and that capital 
seeks investment in land and in agricultural improvements. 
These signs of social civilization and national progress are 
wanting in Greece, and the importance of relieving agricul- 
tural industry from the trammels that impede improvement 
cannot therefore be doubted. National independence and 
civil liberty have been enjoyed by the Greeks for the lapse 
of a whole generation without producing any change in the 
material condition of the agricultural population. 

The manner of levying the land-tax by taking a tenth, 
or since the year 1863 a smaller proportion, of the produce 
of the soil, impedes the improvement of agriculture by the 
habits which it forces the cultivator of the soil to adopt. 
Ten per cent, of the produce of the land may in many 
circumstances be an equitable proportion of the income of 
the cultivator to be set apart for supporting a good govern- 
ment. But the manner in which a tenth of the annual 
produce of an exhausted soil, cultivated in the rudest manner, 
has been hitherto collected in Greece, has proved an insur- 
mountable obstacle to the improvement and extension of 
the cultivation of grain of every kind. The obstructive effects 
are the same, whether the tax be sold to farmers of the 

* Some statistical information was published by the Bureau d'£co7tomie Puhlique 
in 1 861 and 1862, but implicit reliance cannot be placed on the printed details. At 
p. 17 it is said, 'au brigandage et a la piraterie dont la Gr^ce est delivree depuis 
de longues annees.' The Greeks seem to suppose that strangers are deceived by 
official falsehoods more easily than is now the case, or thev would not so wantonly 
deviate from truth. 

LAND-TAX. 245 

A.D. 1859.] 

revenue or collected by agents of the government. From 
the nature of the tax, it is necessary to confer great power 
on those who collect it, and in a thinly peopled country 
inhabited by a rude agricultural population, that power must 
remain without any efficient control. 

When the harvest time approaches, the collector of the 
tenths is constituted by law the lord of the soil, and every 
agricultural operation is subjected to his control. The cul- 
tivator cannot reap his field when the corn is ripe for the 
sickle, until he obtains the permission of the collector. It 
often happens that the permission is delayed to the serious 
injury of an early crop, because it does not suit the farmer 
or collector to visit the district until a larger portion of the 
crop be ready. The contest of interest between the cultivator 
and the tax-gatherer has engendered mutual suspicion ; so 
dishonesty on the one hand and extortion on the other are 
perpetrated almost as duties by each class from the traditional 
habits of ages. The tax-gatherer becomes the real proprietor 
of the crop as soon as the grain is ripe ; he fixes the day 
on which the cultivator commences the harvest, the time 
when the grain is trodden out on the threshing-floors, and 
when the winnowing and separation of his portion is .to take 
place. The profit of the cultivator is diminished, for the 
tax-gatherer can always forestall the producer in the market, 
and reap the benefit of the high price which defective means 
of communication create during the period immediately pre- 
ceding the new harvest. The gains of the proprietors of 
nine-tenths of the produce of the country are subordinated 
to the gains of the government, which has a claim to a tenth. 
A considerable loss is incurred annually by the overripeness 
of a part of the crop, by the compulsory transport of the 
sheaves from distant fields to traditionary threshing-floors, and 
by the necessity of allowing the crop to remain in the open 
air awaiting the permission for threshing and winnowing. 

The peasant cannot, unless he live in the vicinity of a large 
market, be certain that he will increase his gains by devoting 
additional labour to the cultivation of produce that comes 
earlier into the market, or which is of superior quality. The 
tax-gatherer is sure to be the first and the largest seller in 
the market. The miller and the merchant can secure a large 
and regular supply with greater ease by dealing with him 


[Bk.V. Ch.V.| 

than with indivadual cultivators, and as the stock of thj 
tax-gatherer is of an average quality, formed by the mixture| 
of the grain of many soils, the producer cannot generallj 
obtain a higher price for a crop of superior quality, unless| 
the quantity be considerable. To expect extraordinary in- 
dustry or scientific agriculture, when industry and science] 
afford no prospect of additional gain, is unreasonable. 

There seems to be only one way by which the agricultural] 
classes of Greece can be conducted from the stationary con- 
dition of the present time to an improving future, and thati 
.is by the total abolition of the land-tax. Perfect freedom 
from all interference with agricultural operations would be 
the surest and the quickest way of promoting the increase 
of agricultural industry, for it would immediately increase] 
the profits of agricultural labour. It would open a door to; 
the employment of capital in land, and produce an aug- 
:mentation in the number of the agricultural population. The ; 
uncultivated land of Greece would offer as rich a field fori 
profitable industry as land in other countries that attracts 
emigrants and capital. The marshes at the mouths of the 
Eurotas and the Alpheus would furnish larger harvests than 
the marshes that are drained in England and Holland. Little 
change can be wrought in the traditional habits of a rude 
population by direct legislative enactments, but the greatest 
changes may be spontaneously brought about, as soon as the 
people discover that they gain by adopting new habits and 

The system of the land-tax in Greece has formed old 
habits and bad practices, which oppose obstacles to the 
improvement of agriculture and to the employment of capital 
in the production of grain. The most effectual and speedy 
manner of removing them is the best. The culture of the 
vine, the olive, and the mulberry-tree may prosper and yield 
profitable employment for capital, because the cultivator is in 
a great degree emancipated from the thraldom that paralyzes 
the industry of the ploughman. Grain, which constitutes the 
principal food of the people, and in the purchase of which 
the greater part of the nation's income is annually em- 
ployed, is produced in the most wasteful manner, and any 
improvement in that manner is hopeless without a total change 
of system. 


A.D. 1859.] 

The objection urged against the total abolition of the 
system of tenths is the difficulty of replacing it by another 
tax of equal amount, and the necessity which the government 
feels of getting the money. It is not necessary to examine 
the financial question, for an improving and prosperous agri- 
cultural population would easily supply the government with 
an increased revenue. 

The want of communal administration was noticed by the 
financial commission, but self-government was not a subject 
which France and Russia were disposed to promote. The 
commission nevertheless stated in its report, and the British 
minister repeated in a communication to the Greek govern- 
ment, that the general prosperity of the nation must flow 
from the good administration of the communes ; that the 
amount of the revenue and expenditure of the communes 
in Greece was unknown both to the government and the 
people, and that the government of King Otho had neglected 
systematically the duty imposed on it by law of superintending 
the communal administration ^. 

On communicating to the Greek government the results 
of the commission of i860, Lord John Russell boasted that 
the unanimity of the commission ' must impress on the Greek 
government the necessity of those reforms in the financial ad- 
ministration of the country which the Greek government are 
recommended to effect-.' Experience proved that advice was 
wasted on King Otho's government, which soon ascertained 
that the protection of the three powers would not be withdrawn 
if their sermons were listened to patiently, and if the 900,000 
francs which were asked were paid regularly. 

The protecting powers, having allowed the Greek govern- 
ment to evade publicity and escape responsibility, and having 
conferred on the people the boon of re-establishing their 
commercial relations with Turkey, left both King Otho and 
the Greeks to forget the past and to enjoy the present. The 
king strove to extend his personal authority, the people 
sought to make money. The impulse of the time, to make 
everything a subject of gain, did not escape the observation 

^ Compare the Report of the Financial Commission with the communication of 
its results by the British minister, Sir Thomas Wyse, to the Greek government. 
Parliamentary Papers, Greece, No. 2, 1864. 

^ Parliamentary Papers, Greece, No. 2, 1864. Lord John Russell to Sir Thomas 
Wyse, 22nd August, 1859. 


[Bk.V. Ch.V. 

of King Otho ; indeed, it was forced on his attention by 
senators and deputies, and he resolved to profit by it. His 
first care was to form a ministry whose members should be 
the servile instruments of his policy. He selected Athanasios 
Miaoulis, a younger son of the great admiral, to be prime 
minister. Athanasios Miaoulis possessed neither official ex- 
perience nor administrative capacity, but he was a man ofj, 
excellent private character, a member of the court faction, 
and sincerely attached to the Bavarian dynasty. He remained 
prime minister until June 1862, but during his unusually long 
administration several changes were made in the composition 
of his cabinet. The greatest names in Greece (and the only 
aristocracy of the country is in mere names) and the ablest 
men were at different times members of this ministry. The 
names of Miaoulis, Botzaris, Konduriottes and Zaimes could 
not replace their want of talent and independent character, 
and the ability of Koumoundouros and Christopoulos could 
not make them respected by the nation ^, 

The Miaoulis ministry adopted measures to conceal the 
financial abuses of their predecessors, but no effort was made 
to place their administration in accordance either with the 
financial laws of the state or the recommendations of the 
protecting powers. No accounts of revenue and expenditure 
had been presented to the chambers since the year 1850. 
The accounts of several years were now presented, but in such 
a condition that the formalities imposed by the organic law of 
1853 were completely neglected. Though no faith could be 
placed in these accounts, the ministers, backed by the in- 
fluence of the court, persuaded the servile chambers to accept 
them as satisfactory and ratify them with all their illegalities. 

A considerable social change had been unconsciously 
effected in Greece by the lapse of time. The military chiefs, 
whose influence long formed an obstacle to many improve- 
ments, had almost died out. The interests of commerce were 

' Athanasios Miaoulis became prime minister in November, 1857. Rhiga 
Palamedes, Koumoundouros, Rhangabes, Konduriottes, Botzaris, Zaimes, Spero 
Melios, Christopoulos, Ralles, and Simos — men, in short, of all parties — were at 
different times members of his cabinet. When it resigned in June, 1S62, it was 
composed of the following members, who were stigmatized by the National 
Assembly as the ' ministers of blood ' on account of the bloodshed that occurred in 
suppressing the revolt of the garrison of Nauplia : — Athanasios Miaoulis, President 
and Marine; Konduriottes, Foreign Aflairs ; Botzaris, War; Potles, Justice; 
Simos, Finance ; Christopoulos, Interior and Public Instruction. 


A.D. 1859.] 

no longer neglected. Some reforms were made in the 

custom- duties. The passage of the Euripus was open for 

navigation. Brigandage was repressed with vigour on both 

sides of the frontier. The predominant influence of the 

crown, even in the weak hands of King Otho, neutralized the 

power of the old parties which contended for places and 

salaries, for King Otho made it generally felt that he was 

the sole dispenser of places and rewards. The occupation of 

the Piraeus taught Queen Amalia how roads between rows of 

houses in a town could be converted into streets. The 

labour of the French troops was not lost. She sent to 

France for an engineer, and exerted herself not ineffectually 

to give her husband's capital the appearance of a prosperous 

little city. 

The celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of King 
Otho's reign occurred in the year 1857, while the state of 
Greece and of public opinion smiled on the Bavarian dynasty. 
Emperors and kings sent embassies to congratulate King 
Otho as the founder of a new throne in Europe ; foreigners 
and Greeks vied in their assurances of respect and devotion, 
so that stronger minds than those of King Otho and Queen 
Amalia might have been deceived by the semblance of 
personal attachment which every class exhibited ^. 

In the year 1859 public opinion began to change. The 
Greek court did not conceal its attachment to Austria when 
war broke out in Italy; and the Greek people sympathized 
strongly with the Italians, moved by the revolutionary 
traditions of their own war of independence. King Otho 
desired to afford Austrian vessels the protection of the 
Greek flag, in order to invest them with the privileges of 
neutrality. A protest from France prevented his taking this 
imprudent step, which would have involved Greece in war 
both with Italy and France. The feeling in favour of the 
Italian cause was strongly displayed by the Greek people ; 
a spirit of discontent spread ; quarrels broke out between the 
students of the university and the police. The professors, 
who were appointed by favour, often neglected their duty, 

' Prince Adalbert, brother of King Otho, represented Bavaria and the hopes of 
the Bavarian dynasty; one of the aides-de-camp of the Emperor Nicholas came 
from Russia, and a special mission, consisting of General Count de Paer with two 
aides-de-camp, was sent by Austria. England and France sent ships of war to the 


[Bk. V. Ch. V. 

and students, who had very Httle respect for some of them, 
behaved with unrestrained Hcense. Yet instead of reforming 
the abuses in the university and enforcing discipKne, the 
government dismissed the prefect of poHce, left the disorders 
of the students unpunished, and the neglect of the professors 
without a remedy. 

There exists in Greece a numerous body of men who are 
always striving to make themselves of importance by urging 
their countrymen to take up arms against the sultan. These 
men believe that if by any means the appearance of an 
insurrection of the Greeks in Turkey can be produced, the 
Christian powers of Europe will be compelled to annex the 
insurgent provinces to the Hellenic kingdom. Both the 
French and English governments obtained proofs that King 
Otho fomented the excitement caused by this feeling, to 
divert public attention from his Austrian sympathies. But 
the people of Greece were at this time generally opposed to 
any invasion of Turkey. They wished to live in peace with 
the Turks, and to enjoy the advantages which their trade 
with Turkey afforded, and not to enrich themselves by 
plundering the Christians in Thessaly and Epirus. It was 
rumoured that the Greek court had received counsels and 
warnings from the protecting powers, and questions concern- 
ing this interference and its causes were asked in the chamber 
of deputies. A foolish statement of M. Rhangabes, the 
minister of foreign affairs, revealed more than was previously 
known to the public. He admitted that France had commu- 
nicated to the Greek government that the Emperor Napoleon 
was prepared to repress promptly any act of hostility against 
Turkey, and he confessed that this communication had been 
supported by observations on the part of England and Russia. 
The minister, with an unfortunate fluency of phrases, went on 
to say, that under such pressure Greece felt it a duty to 
observe a strict neutrality. The word neutrality seemed to 
imply that Greece had contemplated taking part with Austria 
in the war with Italy, for the invasion of Turkey, though it 
would have been a violation of treaties, had no relation to 
neutrality. The obstinacy of King Otho and the ambition of 
Queen Amalia were so well known, that when Karatassos 
(the royal aide-de-camp who caused the rupture with Turkey 
in 1847) published a proclamation calling the Greek subjects 


A.D. 1S60.] 

of the sultan to rebel, the king and queen were suspected 
of favouring the movement ^ 

The discordant views of the king and the great body of 
the nation were revealed by events which attracted the 
attention of all who were interested in the maintenance of 
tranquillity in Greece. A new chamber of deputies met in 
November 1859, composed almost entirely of candidates 
who had received the support of the government authorities. 
The system of selecting government candidates began to 
cause dissatisfaction, for though the people were not disposed 
to reject the persons recommended by official authority, 
which had it in its power to confer favours, they were desirous 
of selecting their own men without opposing the government. 
Kanares expressed this feeling in the senate, and gained 
great popularity by his observations. He demanded that 
the ministry should distinctly repudiate the system of 
recommending government candidates to the constituencies, 
and alluded to the dissatisfaction that arose from the use of 
the King's name and the influence of the court at elections. 

The second session of the sixth chamber under the constitu- 
tion of 1844 was opened on the 12th November i860. The 
success of the Italian war roused the spirit of liberty in 
Greece, and created an unusual opposition to the Bavarian 
dynasty. The president of the chamber was elected on the 
27th November, and although the court and the ministry 
exerted all their powers of intimidation and corruption to 
secure the election of Kalliphronas, the opposition succeeded 
in electing Zaimes by a majority of 62 to 50. This unex- 
pected check disconcerted both the ministry and the court. 
The Miaoulis ministry tendered their resignation, but King 
Otho preferred dissolving the chamber. 

By this dissolution the government involved itself in a 
conflict with the nation. The first signs of the collision were 
the seizure of newspapers and attempts to intimidate the 
press. In a single day five newspapers were seized at Athens, 
but the cause of the editors was popular^ so that they treated 
the prosecution with contempt, and used it as an advertise- 
ment of their political principles and a means of increasing 
the sale of their papers ^. While Garibaldi was conquering 

1 See p. 201. 

^ Av7r7, Novembei" 21, 28, and 30, December 19 and 21, i860. 



the kingdom of Naples, there was little chance of the liberty 
of the press in Greece succumbing to King Otho. On the 
1 6th January 1861 the ministry issued a proclamation 
reprobating the conduct of the opposition in electing a 
president who was not agreeable to the government and 
inviting the people to avenge the dignity of the crown. At 
the same time it yielded so far to public opinion as to declare 
that the government would abstain from proposing ministerial 
candidates at the coming elections^. The partizans of the 
ministry, the agents of the court, the officials of the central 
administration, and the officers of the municipalities, paid no 
attention to this proclamation, and on no occasion were 
violence and corruption more generally employed to insure 
the election of the candidates favoured by ministers. 
Nomarchs, eparchs, officers and men of the gendarmerie, 
collectors of taxes, custom-house officers, judges, justices of 
the peace, schoolmasters, demarchs, forest guards, and rural 
policemen, were ordered either openly or secretly to support 
particular candidates. The principal object of the govern- 
ment, and more especially of Queen Amalia, was to exclude 
from the new chamber every one of the sixty-two deputies 
who had voted against the government candidate for the 
presidency of the chamber in the preceding session. The 
municipal system had been falsified and perverted into an 
agency of the central administration, by making the demarchs 
nominees of the minister of the interior and instruments of ■ 
the nomarchs. An attempt was now made to reduce the 
chamber of deputies to complete subserviency by filling it 
with demarchs. From the Peloponnesus alone, twenty-nine 
demarchs were returned as deputies, and in other parts of the 
kingdom the proportion was not less. This phalanx of 
servility was headed by the demarch of Athens, and the fact 
was so striking that the people gave the chamber the name of 
the chamber of demarchs ^. In order to render the senate as 
subservient as the representatives, eighteen new senators were 
appointed from men of inferior rank, and the organic law of i 
the senate was violated by intruding men not legally 
qualified into the body ^. 

* AV777, 5th (lyth) January, 1S61. 

2 Au-yij, 25th February, iS6i. 

^ Among these was Tjpaldos Kotzakos, chief librarian of the University, who 

I CHAMBER OF i86i. 353 

A.D. 1 86 1.] 

The seventh parh'ament of King Otho's constitutional 
reign was opened by the king in person on the 27th 
February 1861. Nearly two months were employed in 
.reviewing the elections, and the chambers then voted replies 
to the royal speech, expressing servile devotion to the policy 
of the ministers. The English minister. Sir Thomas Wyse, 
warned the government of the danger of acting thus openly 
in defiance of the general feeling of the people. He pointed 
out the imprudence of committing the control of the legisla- 
ture to men notoriously elected by corrupt influence, and who 
were despised by the people, whom they pretended to repre- 
sent, for their poverty and avidity as well as for their 
ignorance and servility. But King Otho and Queen Amalia 
were reminded in vain that political corruption only increases 
the power of government for a time, while it invariably 
diminishes the strength of the nation. It was impossible to 
make them perceive that the royal authority was weakened 
by the contempt the people imbibed for their rulers. 

General discontent and military disorganization made great 
progress during 1861. The spirit of the country became more 
liberal, and the ministry became more violent and arbitrary. 
It also became more unpopular even among the official class 
by the resignation of Koumoundouros, the minister of finance, 
who was succeeded by Simos, a member of the English party, 
which has supplied a succession of deserters to the court 
faction. A plot against the king and the Bavarians was 
discovered with extensive ramifications among the officers 
of the army, and in this many were engaged who owed their 
advancement to the favour of the court and not to their 
merit or their seniority. Even this symptom of moral cor- 
ruption made very little impression on the mind of King 

The health of King Otho rendered a visit to the baths of 
Carlsbad advisable ; and it was said that he desired to arrive 
at some definite arrangement with his family on the subject 
of the succession to the throne of Greece. The regency of 
Queen Amalia was not agreeable to the house of Bavaria, and 
the Greek court was divided into two parties ; one remained 
devoted to the king and the house of Bavaria ; the other 

had made a short apparition in Greece among the followers of Prince Demetrius 
Hypsilantes in 1S21. His case is noticed in the hv^i], 7th March, 1861. 


[Bk.V. Ch.V. 

desired a change of dynasty and an orthodox successor, and 
this party sought support by attaching itself to the queen. 
These intrigues and the general discontent of the country 
threatened to cause a revolution, or at least an insurrection, ■ \ 
when an attempt to assassinate Queen Amalia on the iSth, 
September 1861 suddenly revived the feeling of loyalty 
throughout Greece and restored to the queen all her former 
popularity. Aristides Dosios was the name of the assassin. 
He was a young man of eighteen, and his father had held 
several official appointments under the ministers of King 
Otho. This youth fired a pistol at the queen in the streets 
of Athens as she was returning from her evening ride on 
horseback. He was immediately arrested. His crime 
excited universal indignation, for whatever might be the 
political errors of Queen Amalia she was respected for her 
private virtues, and even those who blamed her conduct 
acknowledged that she possessed many estimable qualities. 
The sincere but often exaggerated assurances of devotion 
which she received on this occasion were calculated to 
mislead her into a belief that her government was extremely 
popular and her person universally beloved. Young Dosios, 
crazy with political fanaticism, boasted of his patriotism as a 
sufficient excuse for his crime, and argued that if he had 
succeeded in assassinating the queen-regent his country 
would have been delivered from foreign tyrants, since a 
provisional government must have been created which would 
have prevented the return of King Otho and insured the 
expulsion of the Bavarian dynasty. During his imprison- 
ment he never showed any marks of fear, nor appeared to 
be shaken for a moment in the conviction that his crime was 
a meritorious act of patriotism. The vitiated state of public 
opinion was revealed by the popularity of his crime with 
a large portion of the youth of Athens. Several conspiracies 
were formed to deliver him from prison, in which many 
military men took part. 

The chambers met on the 2nd October 1861. King Otho 
returned from Germany on the 30th, and though he was well 
received by his subjects, every day furnished proof that the 
' chamber of demarchs ' was extremely unpopular, and that 
a hostile feeling against the corrupt senate, the servile minis- 
ters, and the incapable king, who supported every abuse and 



A.D. 1862.] 

made his crown and not the nation the object of his care, was 
rapidly increasing. 

The year 1862 opened with gloomy forebodings. The 
prime minister, Miaoulis, could not overlook the national 
discontent, and he at last warned King Otho that the state 
of the public mind afforded cause of alarm ; he offered the 
resignation of his ministry and advised the king to make 
some concessions to public opinion. Admiral Kanares was 
the most popular man in Greece at the time. His services, 
his fame, his position as a senator which he had not abused, 
and his declared opposition to the system of falsifying consti- 
tutional government by corrupt chambers, had made him the 
idol of the people. His great influence, if wisely used, 
might enable him to unite the best men in the country as 
members of a ministry under his presidency. He had kept 
aloof from the court, when servility was the only path to 
court favour, and he was universally respected for the sim- 
plicity of his private life. Greece was proud of having one 
distinguished man of the Hellenic race who was neither a 
sycophant nor a place-hunter. But unfortunately Kanares 
possessed neither the sagacity nor the experience necessary 
to hold a steady course in the midst of the political intrigues 
of his friends ; so that with all the inherent greatness of his 
character, he was utterly unfit to be a prime minister. King 
Otho understood his deficiencies perfectly and resolved to 
profit by them. 

King Otho acted under the strange delusion that he was 
himself an honest statesman, and he believed that it was his 
honesty which rendered him superior to the ablest politicians 
in Greece. He could not understand, for his mental percep- 
tions were very circumscribed, that what appeared to him to 
be fair in a king, must appear to be something very like 
trickery in a private person. One of the leading features of 
his policy was to exhibit the public men in Greece in an 
unfavourable light, either as seeking and receiving unmerited 
favours, or as voluntarily exhibiting themselves as venal in- 
struments of his power. It forms a remarkable trait in King 
Otho's dull intellect, that he knew how to conduct a game 
of personal intrigue with patient sagacity and to foil the 
restless activity of the acutest Greek. His caution in con- 
cealing his combinations, and his inert watchfulness in 


[Bk.V. Ch. V. 

observing the errors of others, enabled him to profit by 
every event that conduced to the success of his schemes. 
The facihty with which he won over deserters from the 
hberal party, Hke Tricoupi and Simos, destroyed both his 
own and the people's confidence in political honesty. Ka- 
nares was still a man whom neither the king nor the people 
believed could be gained by any bribe, either of wealth, rank, 
or honours, so that King Otho schemed to make Kanares 
himself the pilot of his own political shipwreck. 

In January 1862 Admiral Kanares was invited by the king 
to form a ministry. Before accepting the charge he presented 
to his Majesty a memoir stating the principles on which he 
proposed to act, and asked for the royal sanction of these 
principles and the king's promise of support, as the only 1 
grounds on which he could rest any hope of success. Kanares 
was a man destitute of education, and King Otho knew that 
the memoir must be the work of some person under whose 
guidance the admiral was acting. The important point was 
to ascertain whether Kanares could secure the assistance of 
able and influential colleagues, or would fall entirely into the 
hands of a cabinet of personal followers. Before offering the 
premiership to Kanares, King Otho had already taken mea- 
sures to deter the ablest senators and deputies from accepting 
office in a ministry which was likely to prove of short 
duration, and he allured the ambitious with hopes of be- 
coming members of a more permanent cabinet. When the 
admiral sought the co-operation of several members of the 
opposition whose official assistance he considered valuable, 
he met with a refusal from every senator or deputy of political 
influence to whom he applied. This threw him entirely into 
the hands of a few intriguers, who used his name as a means 
for furthering their own advancement. 

The memoir presented by Kanares to the king was pre- 
pared by one of the admiral's followers who hoped to force 
himself into a cabinet office. It was an able document, but 
all its demands were not suited to the actual condition of 
public affairs, nor to the character of Greek politicians. It 
attempted to give the ministry stability in office, but it 
neglected to insure a better conduct of ministerial business, 
and to enforce responsibility in financial matters by greater 
publicity. The maxim that the king as a constitutional 



A.D. 1862.] 

sovereign must reign and not govern, was crudely stated, 
though it is a principle to which the Greek people are 
decidedly opposed, for the Greeks look to the governing 
power of the king as their best defence against ministerial 
oppression and party jobbing. It appears to them also to 
be the best guarantee for the equitable administration of 
justice. The king alone in the corrupt political society of 
Greece has, in their opinion, no interest to cheat and op- 
press the people, and he has, they think, the same interest 
as the people to prevent injustice. The phrase, moreover, 
that the king should reign and not govern, with Kanares for 
prime minister, could only signify that the personal ad- 
visers of Kanares were to direct all political business and 
govern Greece, while King Otho was to confine himself 
to pageantry and court ceremonial. There could be no 
doubt that the country would gain nothing by substituting 
the camarilla of Admiral Kanares for the camarilla of King 

The memoir stated that the formation of the cabinet was to 
be entrusted to the prime minister, and that the cabinet was 
to conduct the government on its responsibility without direct 
interference on the part of the crown. But it omitted to state 
by what means the king was to exercise his constitutional 
control over his ministers, and enforce responsibility both to 
himself and his people in the conduct of the different minis- 
terial departments. It contemplated establishing parliamentary 
government without parliamentary control. The king was 
required, after taking a reasonable time for examining the 
measures submitted to him, either to adopt them, when they 
had received the approval of a formal cabinet council, or dis- 
miss the ministry. The existing anaktoboidion, of which M. 
Wendland, the king's secretary, was a member, and which was 
called the camarilla, was to cease ; the members of the royal 
household, the aularch and staularch, were to be expressly 
prohibited from influencing the votes of the senators and 
deputies by promises of court favour, and the influence of the 
court was not to be again employed to encourage opposition 
to the ministry. The existing chamber of deputies was to be 
dissolved, and the senate, which the intrusion of eighteen 
servile members had degraded, v/as to be reformed. The 
laws relative to the press were to be equitably administered, 



[Bk.V. Ch.V.Hii* 

and public credit was to be restored by enforcing economy in! 
the public expenditure. jBi' 

Doubtless King Otho read this memoir with the greatest Bill 
astonishment as well as indignation ; unfortunately he directed | 
his attention so entirely to its defects, that he neglected toj 
observe its importance as an echo of national feeling. Hel 
regarded it as an attempt of designing men to rob him ofl 
his sacred rights as a king, and to use Kanares as a stepping-! 
stone for concentrating power in their own hands. Animosity 
sharpened his intelligence, and he soon devised a plan for 
frustrating what he viewed as a conspiracy for robbing royalty | 
of its lawful authority in the state. Otho had no clear con- 
ception of what patriotism really was, and no settled conviction | 
that the Greek people had a better right to good government 
than a foreign king could have to occupy the Greek throne. ] 
He looked round with his usual cunning for the means ofl 
placing his conduct as a constitutional sovereign in advan-j 
tageous contrast with the ambitious demands of Kanares as 
prime minister. To deny the leading principles of the memoir 1 
was dangerous, and King Otho knew enough of Greece to fear i 
that any hesitation might place him in such violent opposition 
to his people as to cause a revolution. The danger he had 
encountered in 1^43 was not forgotten at this crisis. He 
accepted the principles of the memoir without offering any 
objections, and authorized Kanares to form a ministry, re- 
solved to seek for a chance of overthrowing the schemes of] 
the admiral's advisers. 

The king's intrigues, as has been noticed already, prevented' 
Kanares from obtaining the support of the men best suited for 
giving efficiency to his ministry. He was consequently com- 
pelled to select as his colleagues men in the secondary rank of* 
Greek politicians. Instead of choosing men of official expe- 
rience and honourable character in this class, he formed his 
cabinet of personal adherents and political adventurers.- 
Kanares presented the list of his colleagues to King Otho, 
who read it with satisfaction, for the names proved that the- 
royal policy had triumphed and forced Kanares into bad 
company \ The king dismissed Kanares from his last 

' This ill-famed list was, Admiral Kanares, President of the Council and Minister 
of the Marine; D. Kalliphronas, Interior; P. Soutzos, Foreign Affairs; Petzales, 


■ ■'•'^1 A.D. 1862.] 




audience as soon as he had read the list, observing that 
the royal decision would be communicated to the admiral 
in a few hours. Copies of the list were immediately dis- 
tributed among the people, and when the names were read aloud 
they were received with shouts of derision. Noisy politicians 
and students of the university had filled the square before the 
royal palace from sunrise to sunset for two days, while the 
negotiations with Kanares were going on. Each day the 
admiral had walked through admiring crowds attended by 
enthusiastic followers, who hailed him as a hero and the 
saviour of his country. The names of the colleagues he had 
selected to form his cabinet, produced an instantaneous 
revulsion of public opinion. The saviour of his country 
showed himself as a tool in the hands of selfish place- 
hunters. Patriotism was declared to be in a state of bank- 
ruptcy. The crowds that filled the square slunk away to 
their homes, every man grievously disappointed, and many in 
the frame of mind that fits men for revolutions. 

King Otho thoroughly enjoyed this victory, which he 
)fei| regarded as a proof of his ability in king-craft ; he had no 
doubt of the righteousness of his cause, nor of the justice 
of the means by which he obtained success. Indeed, he 
was one of those who hardly believed that a king, who 
was seeking to increase or defend the royal power, could 
rf| go wrong in politics. He informed Kanares in a written 
communication, that the persons proposed as ministers were 
so unsuited to the exigencies of public affairs, that he thanked 
ntfl the admiral for his zeal in endeavouring to form a ministry 
if»| and would relieve him from all further exertions. The news 
of this step was received with cynic indifference, for public 
kn opinion unhesitatingly pronounced the cabinet proposed by 
;p« Kanares to be a very bad substitute for the Miaoulis ministry. 
liii King Otho suddenly became the popular hero of the hour 
«is to the people of Athens, who still take great delight in 
'ii^ any intellectual contest, and who were doubly pleased by 
til! I the unexpected acuteness with which their stolid monarch 
had won the game of intrigue when the odds were deci- 
dedly against him. His cunning in frustrating the scheme 

Justice ; M. Schinas, Public Instruction and Religion ; Anastasios Mavromichales, 
War; the Finance department remained vacant. 

S 2 




[Bk.V. Ch.V. 

of the political adventurers who believed they could force 
their way into the ministry by making use of the fame of 
Kanares, struck a responsive chord in the hearts of his 
subjects. For a few days the Greeks lost sight of the ulti- 
mate result, overlooked the national degradation, and forgot 
that if a revolution was at hand nothing had been done to 
avert it. 

On the evening of the day on which Kanares made ship- 
wreck of his political influence, King Otho and Queen Amalia 
rode out of their palace gates amidst the acclamations of an 
admiring crowd. The royal pair flattered themselves that 
they listened to the voice of the nation proclaiming its 
devotion to royalty, when they really heard only the applause 
of spectators gratified by a peep behind the scenes at a 
political comedy. 

Had Kanares possessed any political sagacity, or had his 
advisers possessed a fair amount of political honesty, the 
personal defeat of the admiral might have been converted 
into a victory of constitutional principles and a step to good 
government. The contents of the memoir were known to 
few, but it had received the king's approbation. By pub- 
lishing it immediately, and appealing to public opinion 
concerning measures, the names of his colleagues would have 
soon become a thing of the past, and the policy he recom- 
mended might have served as a permanent guide. It was 
a duty he owed to himself and his country, to make public 
the conditions on which he proposed to accept ofiice, and 
to which he had vainly solicited the co-operation of the most 
eminent senators and deputies of the opposition. His contest 
with the court would then have been transferred from a 
question of a few insignificant politicians to a question of 
principles of government ; and to recover his lost popularity, 
it would only have been necessary for Kanares to declare 
in his place in the senate, that as a senator and a citizen 
he was ready to support any ministry that adopted the 
principles of his memoir. The question of the practical 
application of administrative reform would have been fairly 
brought forward, and Greece might have made a step towards 
good government without being under the necessity of making 
a revolution. If the reports circulated at the time were 
correct, either King Otho or the camarilla gained over some 


A.D. 1862.] 

adviser of Kanares, who had sufficient influence to prevent 
the publication until it ceased to be of any political im- 
portance. The report, whether true or false, shows the 
estimation in which the admiral's advisers were held by 
their countrymen. 



Change of Dynasty. — Establishment of New 
Constitution — 1862 to 1864. 

Revolt of the garrison of Nauplia. — Question of the succession to the throne of 
Greece. — The Hon. Henry Elliot's first mission to Greece. — Revolution of 
1862. — Negotiations relating to the election of Prince Alfred to be King 
of Greece. — Results of the revolution. — Election of Prince Alfred. — Mr. 
Elliot's second mission. — Election of George I. — Military disorders and civil 
war at Athens. — Position of the new King. — Union of the Ionian Islands. — 
National Assembly. — Constitution of 1864. — Abolition of the Senate. — Crea- 
tion and abolition of a council of state. — Conclusion. 

The storm that swept the Bavarian dynasty from Greece 
began now to burst on the country. In less than a month 
after the failure of the negotiations with Kanares the first 
thunderbolt fell. On the 13th February 1862 the garrison 
of Nauplia, which consisted of 900 men, broke out in open 
rebellion. It was a mere military revolt, caused by the 
demoralized and disorganized condition of the Greek army, 
not by political conviction or patriotism ; and it received 
no support from the nation. In vain the leaders published 
proclamations calling on the people to take up arms. The 
names of those who headed the movement inspired no con- 
fidence that they sought anything but promotion and the 
gratification of personal ambition. For some time previous, 
it had been evident that the army was in a state of anarchy. 
Plots had been discovered, in which officers who had received 
unmerited favour from the court were prominent conspirators. 
Several had been tried and condemned to imprisonment. 
Most of these were confined at Nauplia. Others suspected 


of discontent were ordered to reside in that fortress. Military 
\ honour and personal gratitude to the king for favours conferred 
were alike forgotten. In the undisciplined, ill-commanded, 
I and ill-organized army of a badly governed country, doubtless 
i treachery must exist, but as Milton says of tyranny, ' to the 
\ traitor thereby no excuse.' 

i The government took prompt measures to suppress the 
I revolt. Troops were assembled at the Isthmus of Corinth, 
, where they were harangued by King Otho. But the com- 
position of the force revealed the fact that the government 
did not place implicit reliance on the regular army, on which 
millions of drachmas had been lavished to no good purpose. 
Irregular bands of armed men who carried old fire-locks 
were placed under the command of miHtary chiefs who called 
themselves generals. The abbot of the monastery of Phane- 
romene in Salamis was allowed to place himself at the head 
of a body of Albanian peasants ^. The generals in fustanella 
were spies on the colonels in uniform, and the clerical soldier 
was a spy on all. Both Greece and King Otho were fortunate 
in having in their service a foreign officer who could be 
entrusted with the chief command without awakening new 
jealousies. General Hahn, a Swiss Philhellene who came to 
Greece as a volunteer during the Revolution, and in thirty-five 
years of constant service had risen to the highest rank, free 
from all political and party ties, was a gentleman and a 
soldier. He possessed the character as well as the experience 
required for repressing the disorders and intrigues of the 
irregular officers, who sought to prolong the civil war for the 
purpose of reorganizing bands of personal followers, reviving 
military chieftainships, and wreaking vengeance on private 

On the 13th of March the royal troops carried all the 
outworks of the rebels by assault after a feeble defence^ in 
which Colonel Koronaios one of their leaders was wounded 
and taken prisoner. The insurgents were then shut up within 
the walls of Nauplia, and from that moment their cause 
was desperate ; still the younger officers, both commissioned 
and non-commissioned, rejected all offers of capitulation. 
King Otho also delayed the termination of the revolt by 

* The name of this monastery is connected with a local tradition, and is not 
derived from the ' manifestation ' {ipavepcoais). 


[Bk V.Ch.VI 

refusing for some time to grant a comprehensive amnesty; 
but he was warned that his own troops would not allow 
the insurgents to be severely punished ; and slowly and 
reluctantly he was persuaded to place full power for arranging! 
a capitulation in the hands of General Hahn. The king's; 
concessions were made so ungraciously that the promises of| 
amnesty were received with distrust. More confidence was 
placed in the honour of General Hahn than in the word of' 
King Otho. At last a capitulation was concluded, allowing 
the officers and men who were excepted from the amnesty, 
or who refused to accept it, to quit Greece. The number 
was 220, and of these 200 asked to be embarked under the 
guarantee of the English flag, and were carried to Smyrna 
by H. M. S. 'Pelican.' This was one of the first indications 
of the revived popularity of England in Greece. The others 
were embarked in a French corvette. On the 20th April 
1862 the royal troops entered Nauplia, but the victory caused 
no joy in Greece. 

The revolt at Nauplia was not an isolated act of rebellion. 
Other revolutionary movements were commenced at Syra, 
Chalcis, and Kythnos, but they were quickly suppressed, 
though not without bloodshed. Nor could the fact be con- 
cealed that the victory of government had neither increased 
its strength nor decreased the popular discontent. 

The court made an effort to regain popularity by affecting 
to patronize a scheme for invading Turkey. A ministerial 
paper, when noticing what it called ' the glorious victory of 
the royal army over the bravest rebels who ever fought in 
a bad cause,' proceeded to boast that if the king could unite 
such heroes in propagating the 'great idea' with the sword, 
he would have it in his power to change the condition of the 
East. The conquest of the kingdom of the two Sicilies by a 
handful of volunteers under Garibaldi was assumed to be 
an irrefragable proof that a brigade of Greeks under some 
cattle-lifting general who had plundered the Turkish frontier 
in J 854 could march to Constantinople and establish a new 
Byzantine empire. On this occasion public opinion was not 
misled, and no Greek believed that either the king or the 
court party had any serious intention of committing such an 
act of folly as openly to attack Turkey. Otho knew well 
that a rupture with the sultan would annihilate the commerce 


A.D. 1862.] 

of Greece, produce an occupation of his capital by foreign 
troops, and in all probability put an end to his reign ; while 
the people saw that the loss of a national government, at 
least for a time, would be the immediate consequence of 
foreign interference. 

The invasion of Turkey was not thought sufficient to gratify 
the ambition of the Hellenic race. The triumph of the union 
party in the Ionian Islands was also the subject of articles in 
newspapers devoted to the interests of the court. Loyalty 
to King Otho was supposed to be best indicated by expressing 
hatred of England ; and some of the organs of the continental 
press countenanced the opinion that hatred of England in- 
sured the support of a numerous party in France and Germany. 
Neither King Otho nor Queen Amalia perceived what others 
saw clearly, that they were forfeiting their self-respect by 
their hypocritical hostility to Turkey, and making themselves 
contemptible by their vain animosity against England. 

The question of the succession to the Greek throne occupied 
more of public attention than either the invasion of Turkey 
or the union of the Ionian Islands ; yet the servility of the 
senators and deputies prevented the question from being 
discussed in the chambers, and settled by a clear and definite 
decision. It is well known that King Otho from the habit 
of his mind and the nature of his position was averse to a 
solution of the question. Even the Greek newspapers, for 
they generally represent place-hunting parties much more 
than public feeling, said comparatively little on a subject 
concerning which it was difficult to publish.anything impressive 
without drawing down the vengeance of the court. But the 
question was so constantly discussed and so thoroughly sifted 
in private society and in the Athenian coffee-houses, that it 
exercised no inconsiderable influence in determining the 
course of events. 

The treaty that placed the Bavarian dynasty on the throne 
of Greece in 1833 provided that 'in the event of the decease 
of King Otho without lawful issue, the crown should pass 
to his younger brothers and their lawful descendants in the 
order of primogeniture.' But the 40th article of the con- 
stitution of 1844 modified this provision by declaring 'that 
the successor to the throne of Greece must profess the religion 
of the orthodox Eastern Church.' And further, a decree 


[Bk.V. Ch.VI. 

of the national assembly of 1844, ratified by the king, con- 
ferred the regency on Queen Amalia during her widowhood, 
in case the successor to the throne should be a minor. This 
decree was particularly displeasing to the court of Bavaria. 
The article of the constitution and the decree were never- 
theless embodied in a treaty between the three protecting 
powers, Bavaria, and Greece in 1852. But the Bavarian 
plenipotentiary, before signing this treaty, delivered to thej 
protecting powers a declaration that the court of Bavaria i 
did not consider it incumbent on the princes who might bei 
called to the throne of Greece after King Otho's decease 
to fulfil the condition of the 40th article of the Greek con- 
stitution before the succession opened to the heir, and that 
the prince of the house of Bavaria who fulfilled the condition 
should then ascend the throne of Greece. And he protested 
that the regency of Queen Amalia could not prejudice any 
rights of succession which the princes of the house of Bavaria 
had acquired by treaties. The declaration of the Bavarian 
plenipotentiary implied in addition, that the three protecting 
powers were bound by the explanatory convention of 1833 
to guarantee the throne of Greece to the two younger brothers; 
of King Otho and their descendants. This declaration caused 
the Greek plenipotentiary to deliver to the powers a statement 
that the Greek constitution only referred to the conditions 
in the 8th article of the treaty of 1833, and that he was not 
authorized by the Greek government to recognize any inference 
not expressly indicated in the words of the treaty and of the 
40th article of the .Greek constitution. This solemn warning 
did not open the eyes of the house of Bavaria to the true 
position in which it stood with reference to the throne of 
Greece. The members of the royal family of Bavaria imagined 
that King Otho would be both able and willing to persuade 
the Greeks to modify the application of the 40th article of 
their constitution, and supposed that they had a right to 
claim the support of the three protecting powers under the 
stipulations in the treaty of 1833 and the convention of 1833, 
without reference to the change of religion imposed on the suc- 
cessor to the throne of Greece by the constitution of 1844. 

Queen Amalia adopted the views of the constitutionalists 
on the question of the succession, for their support was to 
her indispensable, since her right to the regency was derived 


A.D, 1862.] 

solely from the constitution. Her interest was therefore 
opposed to the views of the Bavarian court ; and the un- 
decided mind of King Otho was subjected to the adverse 
influences of his wife and his family. A coldness arose 
between Queen Amalia and the house of Bavaria, and little 
pains were taken to conceal this from the Greeks, Rumours 
were from time to time disseminated at Athens, that a 
younger brother of the queen was about to enter the Greek 
Church, and that every member of the house of Bavaria 
having refused to embrace the orthodox faith, he was to be 
proposed as the successor to the Greek throne by King Otho 
with the consent of the three protecting powers. It was 
believed both in Greece and Bavaria that these reports were 
countenanced and perhaps originated by Queen Amalia. The 
interests of the Greek people required that the question of 
the succession should not be allowed to remain indefinitely 
a cause of disturbance and intrigue. No prince of Bavaria 
having entered the orthodox church, the throne had remained 
without a constitutional heir ever since the year 1844. This 
fact was recognized by the treaty of 1852, but only in an 
indirect and diplomatic way. The case which was foreseen 
by the 39th article of the Greek constitution had occurred. 
That article declared that in the absence of an heir to the 
throne, the king was authorized to name his successor with 
the consent of two-thirds of the chamber of deputies and 
senate. The constitution and the three protecting powers 
consequently favoured the views of Queen Amalia and of 
those who wished to exclude the Bavarian dynasty from the 
throne without a revolution. The Bavarian court would not 
recognize the illegality, and was ignorant of the danger of 
its position. King Otho could not make up his mind to 
demand that a prince of his house should undergo the offensive 
ceremony of rebaptism, which Greek bigotry considers neces- 
sary to efface the stain of heresy from a Catholic or 
Protestant who desires to become a member of the orthodox 
Eastern Church. Certainly it would have been difficult for 
a prince of the Catholic house of Bavaria to conceal even 
under a royal title the disgrace which apostasy would fix 
on any member of the house of Wittelsbach. If Queen 
Amalia survived her husband, she would adopt the inter- 
pretation of the constitution generally adopted by the Greeks, 


[Bk.V. Ch.VI.i, "t'^'J 

and a Bavarian prince according to that interpretation couldj) jO'''* 
only mount the throne of Greece in virtue of an election i W' 
according to the form indicated by the constitution. A' J*™ 
Catholic who offered to embrace the orthodox faith after a| P 
vacancy of the throne occurred, could have no legal claimwl'^''' 
to the crown, since he had not complied with the terms||l!«i- 
required by the constitution. The delay on the part ofjlbt''^ 
King Otho was natural. He had no desire to recognize anj|*'i'^' 





orthodox successor, with whom his orthodox subjects might 
feel a disposition to carry on orthodox intrigues, which had| 
often caused him serious alarm when there was no orthodox 
successor in existence. 

Though the principles of Queen Amalia on the question 
of the succession were constitutional, her proceedings were 
impolitic. Had she survived King Otho, her position as 
regent would have rendered her the arbitress of the question ; 
but her partizans, the votaries of the great idea, and all the 
phil-orthodox faction, urged the necessity of naming a successor 
during King Otho's life ; and all the political adventurers 
who desired a revolution aided in keeping the subject before llilii 
the public. The Greek nation never had any sympathy withi||i!tl 
the house of Bavaria, and these discussions concerning the 
succession persuaded them that the three protecting powers 
were not disinclined to a dynastic change. Little did Queen f i|pi 
Amalia think that the question with which she trifled from 
a want of any rational occupation and of all cultivated society, l| 
was supplying arguments for a revolution. Neither she nor gjtc 
most of those who advocated her views were aware that they 
were nourishing opinions the most adverse to the success of 
their projects. The public at Athens, seeing the want of 
unity in the policy of the court, often repeated with a 
sneer ' if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot 

When a nation desires to reform its own abuses, and feels 
reproaches of conscience for not enforcing the principles it 
advocates, discontent becomes dangerous, and the government 
is generally made responsible for the national faults, even 
though it has only acted as the agent of the nation. The 
Greek government had to answer for many errors of its own, 
and it was now held responsible for the national faults also. 
The British government saw that Greece was in a dangerous 

3 afti!; 


l.D. 1862.] 

position. Sir Thomas Wyse, the British minister, died at 
lis post, and the Hon. Henry Elhot, who had fulfilled a 
somewhat similar special mission to Naples, was sent on a 
special mission to warn King Otho. The instructions of 
Mr. Elliot have not been published, but it is probable that 
jhe was charged to point out the dangerous position of the 
Bavarian dynasty in consequence of there being no con- 
stitutional heir to the Greek crown^ and the critical position 
f King Otho from the discontent caused by the manner 
in which the chamber of deputies had been elected. The 
British government may have thought it prudent to relieve 
itself from all responsibility arising out of the treaty of 1832, 
in case fresh insurrections should occur in Greece, for it can 
hardly have entertained any hope that either the king or 
queen, the Bavarian court, or the Greek ministers would 
«ti(^pay the slightest attention to its remonstrances. The mission 
of Mr. Elliot proved useless. King Otho would not dissolve 
his obsequious chamber of demarchs, nor change his policy. 
He only changed his ministers, and the names of the members 
of his new cabinet inspired even less confidence than those 
of their predecessors in every one except Lord John RusselP. 
Before leaving Athens Mr. Elliot communicated to King 
w(fl Otho's government a despatch of the British foreign secretary 
^utfl approving of the change of ministry, and this result of the 
fitfl special mission, like the result of the finance commission, 
ciell afforded the enemies of Great Britain plausible ground for 
eiij declaiming against English hypocrisy. Lord John Russell 
could know very little about the merits or demerits of the 
new cabinet, and there were strong reasons for his not giving 
any opinion on the subject. There was something inane 
in the British government offering a voluntary approval of 
a ministry in which Spiro Melios, the champion of the great 
idea and the organ of steady hostility to British policy, was 
a prominent member. The disturbed state of the country 
was certainly not quieted by the acts of this new ministry. , 
It endeavoured vainly to divert the attention of the people 
from their own business to the affairs of Turkey and the 

' The members of this ministry were, General John Kolokotrones, President 
and Minister of the Interior; General Spiro Melios, War; Mexes, Marine; Chat- 
ziskos, Public Instruction ; Levides, Finance ; Eliopoulos, Justice ; Theochares, 
Foreign Affairs, replaced by Dragoumes. 



[Bk.V. Ch.VI. 

succession to the crown. The visit of an orthodox prince 
of the house of Oldenburg suppHed the occasion for the 
one, and hostiUties against Montenegro a pretext for the 
other. Subscriptions were set on foot in Greece to aid the 
orthodox Montenegrins to resist the sultan, and articles 
appeared in the Greek newspapers, foretelling that the Greeks 
would soon be in possession of Constantinople. In the 
meantime, there were constant rumours of plots and ap- 
proaching insurrections, but Kolokotrones and Spiro Melios, 
relying on their own servile informants, assured King Otho 
that there was no cause for serious alarm '. 

Information that the people of Acarnania were going to 
take up arms was transmitted to Mr. Scarlett, the British 
minister at Athens, by Mr. Black the vice-consul at Mesolonghi. 
But the report of the nomarch made no mention of any danger, 
and Oueen Amalia ridiculed the warning because it came 
from an English source. She could see so little into the upright 
and honourable character of Mr. Scarlett, that she supposed he 
made the communication merely to frighten the Greek court 
into adopting measures agreeable to British policy. The in- 
surrection in Acarnania was to take place in the beginning of 

^ The state of Greece at this time is described by a French writer (Francois 
Lenormant) who has written much on the subject, but who often confounds 
rumours with facts. ' Depuis que Tinsurrection de Nauplie s'etait terminee sans 
amener aucun changement, I'imminence d'une crise encore phis grave ne pouvait 
etre meconnue de personne. Ainsi les intrigues les plus contradictoires se crois- 
aient, poussees avec une inconcevable activite. Le Roi lui-nieme conspirait avec 
le parti d'action italien, pour detourner vers une entreprise exterieure I'agitation 
des esprits, et pour eviter ainsi la necessite d'accorder des reformes liberales. Des 
agents parcouraient la Turquie afin d'y preparer un soulevement, tandis qu'une 
correspondance suivie s'echangeait entre Caprera et le palais d'Athenes. Une 
autre intrigue, ourdie aussi dans le palais meme, tendait a faire passer le sceptre 
de la maison de Wittelsbach dans celle d'Oldenburg, a laquelle appartenait la 
reine Amalie. En revanche, la legation de Baviere etait en relations etroites avec 
les revolutionn aires : elle les flattait, les encourageait, s'efforjait de leur servir de 
centre, esperant sauver la dynastie en sacrifiant le Roi, elle poussait a un mouve- 
ment qui contraignit Othon a abdiquer en faveur d'un de ses neveux, fils du Prince 
Luitpold. Les aulres ambassades, au lieu de chercher a detourner la crise, tra- 
vaillaient a en tirer parti. La Turquie fomentait le desordre uniquement pour le 
desordre, son interet etant d'entraver le progres, qui, en se developpant en Grece, 
devient un danger pour elle ; la legation d'ltalie accueillait les mecontents qui 
parlaient d'appeler au trone un prince de la maison de Savoie. Quant a la Russie, 
elle intriguait en faveur du Due de Leuchtenberg, un pretendant de la religion 
Grecque, neveu du roi Othon, proche parent du Czar et de I'empereur des Fran9ais ; 
et la legation de France, si elle ne s'associait pas activement a toutes ces intrigues, 
les voyait du moins d'un ceil favorable. Enfin I'Angleterre ne s'endormait pas 
non plus ; inactive en apparence, elle ourdissait une trame encore plus serree, et 
preparait sous main la candidature du Prince Alfred. Partis interieurs et gouveme- 
ments etrangers, tous etaient d'accord pour porter le dernier coup a une monarchic 
qui se mourrait.' 


A.D. 1862.] 

October ; circumstances delayed the outbreak until assurances 
arrived that it would be supported by a movement at Patras. 

King Otho and Queen Amalia had made preparations for 
a tour in their kingdom, designed to encourage the court party 
in different parts of the country. The time fixed for the 
insurrection in Acarnania passed without any disturbance. 
It was then supposed that the information received by Mr. 
Scarlett was false, and there appeared to the king and his 
ministers no reason for delaying the royal tour. Queen 
Amalia was so firmly persuaded of her own popularity that 
she thought it a duty to make large purchases of jewellery 
to reward her faithful subjects. The royal pair left Athens 
on the 13th October 1862, and the feelings of the people 
were so effectually concealed by the manceuvres of the 
government officials, central and municipal, that their majesties 
were received at every place they visited with loud demon- 
strations of loyalty. 

Nearly about the time the king quitted Athens, the 
garrison of Vonitza, a small and useless fortress on the gulf 
of Arta, revolted. The insurrection spread rapidly in 
Acarnania and Aetolia. Theodore Griva, ever ready to 
take part in any movement that held out a prospect of 
anarchy and pillage, placed himself at the head of the 
insurgents and entered Mesolonghi, when the garrison and 
the people immediately joined the insurrection. On the 
20th October a provisional government was formed at Patras 
with M. Rouphos at its head. On the night of the 22nd 
October the garrison of Athens, which had been prepared 
by agents who worked unnoticed by the ministers, broke 
out in open revolt. The minister of war, Spiro Melios, had 
assured King Otho on the eve of his quitting Athens that 
the spirit of the troops was excellent, and that his majesty 
might place the greatest confidence in the loyalty of the 
officers and men. But when the garrison took up arms, 
the ministers either from incapacity or cowardice deserted 
their duty, and made no effort to uphold the royal authority, 
nor to assemble a band of faithful adherents to protect the 
palace. The disorder was unchecked at Athens, where it was 
greater than in any other part of Greece, and at Athens it was 
greatest among the troops. The soldiers rushed out of their 
barracks with their pouches filled with ball cartridges, and 


[Bk. V.Ch.VI. 

paraded through the streets in small bands during the whole 

night, keeping up an incessant fire of musketry^ which sent 

the balls in every direction, breaking tiles, chimney pots, and 

windows, entering rooms, and killing several of the peaceful 


Several discarded ministers of King Otho and a few young 

patriots assembled as soon as the troops had frightened the 

members of the government and the local authorities into 

places of concealment. A provisional government consisting 

of three members, and a ministry composed of eight persons, 

were invested with the executive power ^. In the morning the 

troops were joined by the populace, who rivalled the disorderly 

conduct of the soldiery. Many of the leading revolutionists 

obtained arms and ammunition for men devoted to their 

party interests. The wine-shops were filled with armed men, 

some in military uniforms and some in plain clothes, who 

drank revolutionary toasts, screamed revolutionary songs, 

and fired rifles loaded with conical balls at every conspicuous 

sign board ^. The public prison w^as broken open and the 

worst criminals were released. Several shops were plundered ; 

a few persons were killed and v/ounded by stray bullets, and 

one or two individuals were murdered from motives of private 

hatred. Many disgraceful scenes occurred. The houses of 

several Germans were pillaged, and a number of valuable 

objects from the royal palace and from the collection of 

antiquities in the Acropolis were stolen by those who ought 

to have guarded them. The shop of an English watchmaker 

was broken open, and watches to the value of from £'^^0 

to £^^0 were stolen ^. The shops remained shut and the 

streets remained insecure for two days. 

^ The members of the provisional government were, D. Bulgaris, President, 
K. Kanares, and B. Rouphos. The ministers were, T. Manghinas. Finance; 
T. Zaimes, Interior; A. Koumoundouros, Justice; D. Mavromicliales, War; Ep. 
Deligeorges, Public Instruction; B. Nikolopoulos, Religion; A. Diamantopoulos, 
Foreign Affairs ; and D. Kalliphronas, Marine. 

^ The arms over the American consulate were pierced by a dozen bullets. Two 
conical balls entered the house of the Author, and several fell in the garden and 

^ Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece, 
October, 1862. Vice-Consul Merlin to Mr. Scarlett, p. 14. The valuable vase 
from Tenia, published by Ross, was stolen from the museum and purchased by 
Mr. Merlin, who restored it to the Archaeological Society. Other consuls who 
purchased stolen antiquities were not so conscientious, and Greece lost one or two 
curious objects. The antiquities which belonged to Queen Amalia were sold in 
the streets, and a terra-cotta of great interest was purchased by a Greek officer, 


A.D. 1862.] 

The provisional government circulated printed papers 
during the night of the 22nd of October, and issued a 
proclamation on the morning of the 23rd, declaring that 
the reign of King Otho was at an end, that the regency 
of Queen Amalia was abolished, and that a national assembly 
would be immediately convoked to choose a new king and 
frame a new constitution. 

The first information of a revolution in their capital 
recalled King Otho and Queen Amalia back towards Athens, 
which they were not allowed to enter. As soon as the 
guards on the look-out in the Acropolis and on the hill 
of the Museion signalled that the frigate bearing the royal 
standard was in sight, the self-disbanded soldiery and the 
people rushed down to the Piraeus determined to oppose 
the landing of the king. The commandant of the Piraeus 
was murdered by his own soldiers when he attempted to 
prepare for receiving King Otho with royal honours. His 
body was dragged through the streets and then cast into 
the sea. The frigate had not been many hours at anchor 
before the crew declared in favour of the provisional govern- 
ment, and King Otho was obliged to appeal to the ministers 
of the three protecting powers to enforce the treaty which 
thirty years before had placed the crown of Greece on his head 
and guaranteed the throne to the house of Bavaria. The 
declaration of the powers 'that the election of King Otho 
had been made in virtue of a formal authorization on the part 
of the Greek nation, and that the three courts are all strictly 
obliged and firmly resolved to maintain it,'' was of no avail, for 
their representatives at Athens saw clearly that the Greek 
nation had resumed its inherent right of sovereignty, and they 
knew that King Otho had himself annulled many articles of 
the treaty. The protecting powers refusing to support the 
king against the nation, there remained nothing for King Otho 
but to quit Greece. He preferred embarking on board H. M. S. 
Scylla, which was the only British ship on the station, though 
it was a small vessel and afforded little accommodation to 
the royal passengers. King Otho, in spite of his dislike 
to the British government, preferred departing, as he came, 

who afterwards presented it to King George, and it is now in the collection of the 
Archaeological Society. Soldiers and policemen continued for some time to offer 
valuable objects from the Acropolis for sale in the streets. 



[Bk.V. Ch.VI.I 

under the protection of the Enghsh flag. Before quittmgl 
the bay of Salamis he issued a proclamation dated on| 
board the 'Scylla' 24th of October 1862, announcing thati 
he left Greece for a time in order to avoid plunging the 
country in civil war. He has not abdicated his pretensions 
to the throne ^. 

This revolution cannot have taken any of the three pro- 
tecting powers by surprise, though the events that followed 
greatly astonished both the French and Russian governments 
and were quite unexpected by the English. The opinion 
that King Otho's conduct and refusal to dissolve the chamber 
of demarchs would cause a civil war, if it failed to produce 
a revolution, was general. Neither Bavaria nor Austria 
ventured to appeal publicly to the treaty of 1832, and make 
a formal demand that the protecting powers should uphold 
the rights of the Bavarian dynasty. The right of the Greeks 
to expel King Otho for failing to establish good government, 
first as an absolute monarch and afterwards as a constitutional 
sovereign, was recognized by all Europe. The Greeks justified 
their revolution by the necessity of putting an end to a system 
of government that impeded their industrial progress and 
corrupted the public administration. Every day's continuance 
of King Otho's power increased the number and the influence 
of those who derived personal profit from misgovernment, 
and consequently delay in dethroning him tended to make 
the difficulties of reform grow hourly greater. The people 
were advancing in honesty and intelligence more rapidly than 
their government. 

A generation had grown up since King Otho accepted 
the constitution. The wants and opinions of the people 
had undergone a great change, and the influence of the 
industrious classes had increased considerably. But, on the 
other hand, the class that furnished political leaders, military 
chiefs, and courtiers had undergone less change. The old 
men in the senate had the moral defects of an education 
among Turkish officials ; the younger men had entered 
the senate by political subserviency ; the chamber of deputies 
was filled with hunters of places and pensions. Neither the 
king, the senators, nor the officials appear to have observed 

^ King Otho died at Bamberg on the 26th July, 1867. 


\.D. 1862.] 

the alteration in the national feeling. All classes among the 
people were impelled by a strong desire to better their 
condition ; the strict centralization of power in the hands 
of the executive often thwarted progress. The liberty of 
the press enabled discontent to make its voice heard. The 
opinion prevailed generally that constitutional government 
ind municipal administration, if fairly carried out in practice, 
Avould improve the condition of the country, and the people 
isaw that they were not fairly carried out in practice, so that 
the nation and the ruling class were sure, sooner or later, to be 
involved in a political contest. The administrative mis- 
management of King Otho disorganized the army, paralyzed 
ithe public service, and wasted the financial resources of the 
country, when the events that have been narrated concen- 
trated against his person all the resentment of his subjects, 
and he was expelled from Greece as a scape-goat for his own 
and for the nation's sins, with the vain hope that his absence 
would alone suffice to make those who remained behind do 
their duty. Unfortunately for Greece, the errors and vices 
of ministers, senators, deputies, and officials, who had 
corrupted the public administration by creating places and 
appropriating money, could not be eradicated merely by the 
expulsion of the king. 

The position of Greece was certainly improved by the 
revolution. The people showed a determination to correct 
the imperfections of their constitution and elect their new 
king themselves. The opinion which the British government 
gave on the question of the revolution and the conduct of 
the Greeks deserves to be recorded, because the promptitude 
with which it was given and the first mission of Mr. Elliot 
testify that it was the result of previous reflection. It is 
dated the 6th of November 1862. 

'During a long course of years the British government 
endeavoured to impress on King Otho the mistaken nature 
of the system of government which he pursued, and the 
necessity of adopting a system better calculated to conciliate 
the affection and confidence of his subjects and to promote 
the prosperity of Greece. 

'The kingdom of Greece having by the transactions of 
1832 been acknowledged as an independent state, the people 
of Greece are entitled to exercise the rights of national 

T 2 


[Bk. V. Ch. VI, 

independence ; and one of the rights which belong to an 

independent nation is that of changing its governing dynasty 

upon good and sufficient cause. 

' Her Majesty's government cannot deny that the Greeks 
have had good and sufficient cause for the steps they have 

' Her Majesty's government have no desire to influence the 
decision which the Greeks may come to as to the choice of 
their new sovereign, except to remind them that, by the 
agreements and engagements concluded in 1832 between 
England, France, and Russia, no person connected with the 
royal and imperial families of the three powers can be placed fsesi 
on the throne of Greece V 

The British government was accused both by foreign states- 
men and French pamphleteers of having secretly and perfidi 
ously cajoled and bribed the Greeks to elect Prince Alfred for 
their king. Foreign ministers perhaps believed the accusa- 
tion, for they repeated it I The fact that the Russian 
government, which has many Greeks of talent and education 
employed in its diplomatic and consular services, and innu- 
merable Greek priests and monks sincerely attached to its 
interests and eager to furnish it with information, was 
uninformed on the subject, might have taught the Russian 
foreign secretary that there was great improbability in the 
supposition that the British government had been sufficiently 
clever to mould the opinions of the Greek nation and suffici 
ently unprincipled to deceive its alHes. The truth is, that 
the whole Greek nation simultaneously and in the most 
distant quarters of the East proclaimed the candidature of 
Prince Alfred, before either Greek politicians or British 
consuls had time to act^ The writer of this work remembers 

1 Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece in 
October, 1862. Earl Russell to Mr. Scarlett, 6th November, 1862. 

2 Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, said to Lord 
Napier, the English ambassador at St. Petersburg, that 'the English consular 
authorities were perhaps not idle in the matter, and influences of the same kind 
proceeded from the Ionian Islands.' And Lord Napier mentioned that His Excel- 
lency would see in the official newspaper of Russia of the preceding Thursday! 
among the telegrams that the British government had ' agahi taken up the candi- 
dature ' of Prmce Alfred. Parliamentary Papers, 1862 ; Correspondence, p. 66. 

' Duvcrgier de Hauranne in an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes, October, 
1844, & ria situation actuelle de la Grece (p. 207), says, with Parisian naivete,^ S'i\ 
existe en Grece quelque chose dmexplicable. c'est I'existence d'un parti Anglais.' 
And frenchmen held the same opinion in 1862. It is not worth while recording 
the falsehoods reiterated with obstinacy by the French press. A single example 




i alt 




lit 01 




11 F 





y t' 




,D. 1862.] 

hat Englishmen well acquainted with Greece were as much 
)■* .stonished by the sudden enthusiasm of the whole Greek 
lation in favour of England as Frenchmen and Russians were, 
t is true that some Ionian politicians had framed one of 
hose plans for partitioning Turkey which are periodically 
)ut forward by Greek intriguers, and the name of Prince 
Mfred was introduced as a means of forming a kingdom to 
;e composed of the Ionian Islands, Epirus, and Albania. 
y ti The name of Prince Alfred became known to the Greeks 
herefore as early as 1859 when he was only fifteen years old, 
ind after the revolution, when a strong desire was felt to 
jossess free institutions, it was natural to seek in a son of 
3ueen Victoria a king who could both govern constitutionally 
ind make the law respected. 
The British government, far from endeavouring to obtain 
'h\ iny advantage from the popular enthusiasm in favour of 
cus Prince Alfred, only felt alarm lest any interference on the 
\m part of England should insure the success of a Russian 
'th ;andidate. This fear was warranted by the conduct of the 
inm inhabitants of the Ionian Islands, by past events in Greece, 
il ind by the policy of Great Britain with regard to the Otho- 
m man empire. Two recent circumstances however proved that 
vij 1 sincere respect for the English character existed in all 
: :i; classes. The rebel garrison of Nauplia preferred the pro- 
tection of the English flag, and King Otho declined the offer 
of a French frigate which Admiral Touchard placed at his 
disposal in order to embark in a small English ship like the 
' Scylla.' During the diplomatic negotiations which ensued 
after the Rev^olution, the primary object of the British govern- 
ment throughout was to exclude a Russian prince from the 
throne of Greece, not to promote the election either of an 


will suffice. M. Fran9ois Lenormant, who has written much on the political 
affairs and the archaeology of Greece, speaks of the candidature of Prince Alfred 
thus : ' Son succes tient a I'espoir qu'entretient soigneusement la-bas le gouverne- 
ment britannique.^que le Prince Alfred apporterait en dot a la Grece, en montant 
sur le trone, les lies loniennes, et procurerait ainsi r'agrandissement dont le pays 
a besoin. Depuis plus de trois ans des intrigues poussees par Lord John Russell 
ont pris pour foyer Corfou. et avant la revolution d'Athenes elles excitaient les 
Grecs de Texterieur \ se detacher du royaume hellenique pour former sous le 
sceptre du second fils de la reine Victoria un etat compose des lies loniennes, de 
la Thessalie et de Candie, lequel s'annexerait un jour les etats du Roi Othon.' He 
says also — ' Au reste. le cabinet britannique a montre dans toute cette affaire une 
etrange duplicite,' and adds, 'nous doutons done encore si le Prince Alfred est elu 
par les Grecs.' La Revolution de Grece, ses causes et ses consequences, extrait du 
Conespondant. Paris, 1S62. 



[Bk. V. Ch.VI 

English prince or an English candidate. Their first act was 
to invite the courts of Russia and France to concur in a|. 
joint declaration ' that the treaties and protocols binding the 
governments of England, France, and Russia not to allow a 
member of their reigning families to accept the crown of! 
Greece remained in force.' And without waiting for answers 
to this invitation Earl Russell informed Mr. Scarlett, rather 
prematurely as it turned out, in a despatch dated 6th Novem- 
ber 1862, 'that in virtue of the protocols His Imperial 
Highness the Duke of Leuchtenberg and His Royal High- 
ness Prince Alfred, who were mentioned as possible candi- 
dates, would be excluded from the Greek throne.' They 
were excluded ; but the exclusion did not receive the 
adherence of Russia and France until it was certain that 
Prince Alfred would be elected almost unanimously to fillj 
the Greek throne, and it was certainly not caused by any 
respect for treaties on the part of the Emperor Napoleon HI 
or the Emperor of all the Russias ^ 

When the proposal of the British government reached 
Paris and St. Petersburg, neither the French nor the Russian 
governments could persuade themselves that an English 
prince had the smallest chance of success, and neither would 
give a candid and immediate answer. The French govern- 
ment waited till the 20th November, when it declared its 
readiness to join in the declaration, but qualified its promise 
by adding that it would not think itself authorized to refuse 
indefinitely the recognition of a prince whom the Hellenic 
nation should elect by free suffrage ; perhaps, had it uttered 
all its thought, it would have added, unless the prince elected 
by the free suffrage of the Greeks should be an English 
prince ^. ' 

The communications with Russia merit more attention 
than those with France, on account of the light they throw 
on the views of the Russian cabinet, and on the extent to 
which diplomatists can blunder in estimating national feelings. 
On the 4th November 1862, when Prince Gortschakoff received 
telegraphic information that the British government proposed 
a joint declaration excluding every member of the reigning 

1 Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece, 
p. 18. 

" Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence, 1862, note verbale, p. 47. 


A.D. 1862] 

families of the three protecting powers, he laid considerable 
stress on 'the right of the Greek people to determine their 
own destinies, and on the injustice of which the protecting 
powers would be guilty in exercising any constraint in this 
matter^.' At this time all Russians believed that the Duke 
of Leuchtenberg was the candidate preferred by the Greeks. 
The British government inclined to the same opinion, and on 
the 15th November Earl Russell disclaimed any desire to 
interfere with the rights of the Greek people, but at the same 
time pointed out that the object of a joint declaration was, 
like the original stipulation, to prevent any exclusive influ- 
ence arising in Greece to foster international jealousies and 
create political dissensions which might become a cause of 
danger to the peace of Europe. On the 17th November 
the British government became aware that Prince Alfred 
had a firmer hold on the minds of the Greeks than any other 
candidate, and the refusal of Russia to take part in a joint 
declaration induced Earl Russell to instruct Mr. Scarlett 
to take no steps in regard to the election of the sovereign 
of Greece without direct instructions from Her Majesty's 
government^. While the public voice in favour of Prince 
Alfred's candidature was swelling from a murmur of appro- 
bation into an universal shout of enthusiasm, Mr. Scarlett 
declared on the 4th November to the Greek minister of 
foreign affairs, ' that he could not perceive at that moment 
any chance whatever of the acceptance of the throne by 
Prince Alfred ^.' During the whole of the proceedings which 
took place in Greece the conduct of Mr. Scarlett was so 
candid that he obtained the confidence of his colleagues as 
well as of the Greeks. 

The British government suspected the Russian cabinet of 
being not disinclined to set aside the engagements of 1827 
and 1830, if the Duke of Leuchtenberg could have obtained 
the votes of the Greeks. It might then have been asserted 
that he was not a member of the imperial family of Russia, 
and against that contingency it was necessary to provide. 
Two important despatches of Lord Napier from St. Peters- 

* Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence, Lord Napier to Earl Russell, p. 30. 
^ Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence, 1862, Earl Russell to Mr. Scarlett, 
p. 34. 

2 Parliamentary Papers ; Mr. Scarlett to Earl Russell, p. 50. 



burg, dated the 19th and 20th November 1862, which were! 
received by Earl Russell on the 26th November, confirmed 
the suspicions of the British government. Prince Gortschakoff, 
who was both minister of foreign affairs and vice-chancellor of | 
the empire, declined to give a categorical answer to the 
inquiry whether Russia considered the Duke of Leuchtenberg 
a member of the imperial family, and as such excluded from 
the throne of Greece by the stipulations of 1830. Prince: 
Gortschakoff declared that the question was susceptible of 
juridical discussion ; and when the English ambassador asked 
for the official construction placed upon the treaties and 
protocols by the Russian government, he could obtain no 
other answer than that the vice-chancellor could give no 
premature and uncalled-for explanation in the case ^. On the 
28th November the British government determined to bring 
the question to a decision. It resolved that England having 
excluded Prince Alfred, Russia must step forward and 
exclude Prince Romanoffsky, as the Duke of Leuchtenberg 
was termed on being admitted into the imperial family of 
Russia. The ambassador was instructed to inform the 
Russian government that the British government having 
insurmountable objections to seeing a Russian prince on the 
throne of Greece, the election of the Duke of Leuchtenberg 
would lead to serious differences, and would in fact endanger 
the peace of Europe ^. 

The telegram from England informing Russia of the 
nature of this despatch, and announcing that it was on its 
way, reached St. Petersburg when a telegram arrived from 
another direction, bringing the unwelcome news that the 
Duke of Leuchtenberg had not the slightest chance of being 
elected King of Greece, and that the almost unanimous 
election of Prince Alfred no longer admitted of any doubt. 
Russia instantaneously and unhesitatingly changed her lan- 
guage and conduct. On the 3rd December the Russian 
government determined to concede everything that England 
asked in order to make sure of the exclusion of Prince 
Alfred. On the 4th December the Russian ambassador in 
London, in consequence of telegraphic instructions which he 
received from St. Petersburg, presented a note to the British 

* Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence, p. 53. 

- Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence, Earl Russell to Lord Napier, p. 58. 

wimii iiMJii 


A.D. 1862.] 

government, in which it was stated ' that the imperial court of 
Russia maintains in all its force and value the engagement 
by which the members of the reigning families in France, 
England^ and Russia are excluded from the Hellenic throne, 
and in virtue of this engagement the imperial government 
agrees to declare as null and void the election of his Imperial 
Highness Prince Romanoffsky, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, 
nephew of H. M. the Emperor of all the Russias, in case he 
should be called to the Hellenic throne by the vote of the 
Greek nation \' No time was lost in transmitting the 
decision of the three protecting powers to Greece ; and on the 
13th December 1862 a joint declaration was delivered by 
their ministers to the provisional government, stating that 
on the 4th instant their courts had signed an engagement, 
declaring that no member of the imperial and royal families 
reigning in France, Great Britain, and Russia could accept 
the crown of Greece, and that in consequence of this declara- 
tion neither His Royal Highness Prince Alfred, member of 
the royal family of England, nor His Imperial Highness 
Prince Romanoffsky, Duke of Leuchtenberg, member of the 
imperial family of Russia, could accept the crown of Greece 
if it should be offered by the Greek nation ^. 

The Greek people was in the mean time waiting patiently 
to receive the benefits which were expected to flow from the 
Revolution, and which too many believed could be secured 
by the election of an English prince, without any exertion 
on their part to reform the evils of King Otho's adminis- 
tration. Much required to be done in order to improve the 
government, and those who possessed power in the central 
and municipal administrations showed little disposition to 
commence the task. The people soon perceived that they 
were themselves almost helpless, and they consequently 
demanded everything from their government. Patriotism 
and self-denial were supposed to be the principal virtues 
required to constitute a good as well as an honest govern- 
ment ; and these words were for several months in every 
mouth. Neither wisdom nor honesty appear nevertheless 
to have guided the conduct of those who acted as the 
leaders of the nation. The people waited vainly for the 

^ Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence, Baron Brunnow to Earl Russell, p. 84. 
* La Grece, a newspaper published at Athens in French, iSth December, 1862. 



provisional government to establish order and adopt measures 
of economy. Too many even of the people who had taken 
an active part in the Revolution considered that it was the 
duty of the new government to provide every partizan with a 
place, a salary, or a pension, and at the same time to cure the 
disease of place-hunting in Greek society, fill the public 
treasury with money, and place the crown on the head of 
a rich prince, so able that he should find the means of 
creating resources, so just that he should only promote merit, 
and so powerful that he should extend the frontiers of Greece 
without increasing the burdens of the people. The popular 
Utopia consisted of irreconcileable incompatibilities, but the 
impossibility of attaining it did not render the delusive halo 
less attractive to the Greek mind. 

The provisional government was composed of men who 
had learned what they knew of administration in King 
Otho's service. Bulgaris, Kanares, and Rouphos had been 
ministers of King Otho, and had not shown any administra- 
tive talent while they held office. Bulgaris was a man of 
some natural ability and of great ambition, but of a jealous 
disposition, and incapable of acting cordially with men of 
superior capacity. As prime minister of King Otho, and 
subsequently of King George, he upheld the maxim that 
a constitutional king should reign and not govern ; but while 
he exercised supreme power as head of the provisional 
government, he attempted both to reign and govern, and 
if his capacity had equalled his ambition, he would have 
made himself dictator and compelled the ministers to act 
as his secretaries. The eight members of the revolutionary 
ministry were equally divided into two classes : four had 
been ministers of King Otho, and four were now introduced 
into the cabinet for the first time ^ It was a heterogeneous 
assemblage^, and some of the members were so insignificant 
that it was matter for wonder how they were thought of 
for ministers. The ministry contained two men of recognized 
talent. Koumoundouros, the minister of justice, had been 

^ ' Manghinas, Zaimes, Koumoundouros, and Kalliphronas had been ministers of 
King Otho, and were imbued with the principles of his administrative system. 
Kalhphronas and Zaimes were the rival candidates for the presidency of the 
Chamber of Deputies in 1861, when the rejection of Kalliphronas, the court can- 
didate, caused a dissolution. The new men in the ministry were Deligeorges, 
D.Mavromichales, Nikolopoulos, and Diamantopoulos. 

I fJ B B MIi T WIB iilHIW WiWWiil 


A.D. 1862.] 

minister of finance during the earlier part of the MiaouHs 
ministry, but had quitted office in 1861, when the government 
was compelled to stop in its career of wasteful expenditure. 
He had a thorough knowledge of the system, the men, and 
the expedients, by which King Otho had manipulated the 
government ; but he was deficient in the administrative 
talent that makes a statesman. His capacity lay in dealing 
with personal interests and party combinations. If he felt 
the necessity of large measures of reform, which may be 
doubted, he knew not how to frame them so as to accelerate 
the progress of the nation. The other man of talent in the 
ministry was Epaminondas Deligeorges, the minister of public 
instruction. In him were concentrated the hopes of young 
Greece. He was younger than Koumoundouros, and having 
entered public life as an opponent of King Otho's system 
of government, he had escaped the corruptive influence 
of official service \ He was convinced that Greece required 
large measures of reform in its whole administrative system. 
He was eloquent, and his legal knowledge gave precision 
to his public oratory. His want of official experience, which 
was not replaced by intuitive administrative capacity, prevented 
his attacking with practical effect the corrupt system of 
governing by patronage, which was supported by all the 
older members of the government. He was more successful 
as a legislative reformer in the National Assembly than 
as an administrative reformer in the cabinet. Deligeorges 
as a reformer, and Koumoundouros as a conservative, were 
soon placed in direct rivalry, and became the leaders of 
adverse parties. The policy of Koumoundouros was to 
make things as easy as possible for the ruling class, and 
he sought to persuade his countrymen that he was the 
safest minister because he was the most moderate reformer. 
In fact he was more hostile to reform than to change. 

The revolution failed because it left too much power 
in the hands of the old place-holders. Otho was weak-headed. 
Bulgaris, Kanares, and Rouphos were all three wrong-headed, 
and they allowed the public administration to remain in 

' King Otho and the Miaoulis ministry made it a matter of state to exclude 
Deligeorges from the new chamber after the dissolution in 1861. His house at 
Mesolonghi was surrounded by gendarmes, and he was cut off from all communi- 
cation with his friends by violence during the week that preceded the election. 


[Bk. V. Ch. VI. 

a corrupt and disorganized condition, without seeking any 
aid from public opinion to enforce responsibility. Never- 
theless, though the revolution failed to destroy the system 
it attacked, it weakened the power on which that system 
rested, and it gave effect to the wishes of the people by 
two important acts. A national assembly was convoked, 
which gave Greece a better constitution and laid the foun- 
dation of free municipal institutions ; and the national guard 
received an active organization in many parts of the country. 
The prompt organization of the national guard in the capital 
proved to be a most valuable measure, for it saved the 
government from falling into the hands of the military,, 
The citizens performed military service with a degree of 
steadiness and energy which rendered their force imposing, . 
enabled the government to expel the soldiery from Athens 
when they commenced a civil war, and maintained order in 
the capital until the arrival of the new king. 

After a short period of deliberation the Greeks considered 
the election of their king to be a matter of too much 
importance to be entrusted even to the National Assembly. 
The conduct of the senate and the houses of representatives 
elected under the constitution of 1844 had destroyed their 
confidence in public men. Every Greek statesman who 
attained power had deserted the cause of the people ; and 
during King Otho's reign more than eighty persons had 
held office as constitutional ministers. The Greeks resolved 
therefore to elect their sovereign themselves, and with won- 
derful unanimity they chose Prince Alfred. For a few 
days the candidature of Prince Alfred was a subject of 
ridicule to French and Russian diplomatists, but their 
merriment was soon changed into anger. The determina- 
tion of the whole nation to elect an English prince took 
all Europe by surprise. The French, who appealed to 
universal suffrage as the only touchstone of national truth, 
suddenly announced the discovery that the gold of England 
was more powerful than patriotic feeling in determining 
the votes of Greeks: they lost their faith in their own 
touchstone. Russia, never having felt as much confidence 
in the votes of nations as in the power of bayonets, devoured 
her disgust in silence, trusting that feelings of orthodoxy 
and hatred of Turkey would eventually revive the attach- 


^yifM^l^ii > mm nm i m mum i ww m m m mmwwtMmvwwfmv m^maam^a^mmK^KII*KUIiaam mmSV aiSm 


A.D. 1862,] 

ment of the Greeks to their old religious and political ally. 
The feeling in favour of an English prince was so sudden, 
that the members of the provisional government remained 
ignorant of the rapidity with which it embraced the whole 
nation, and believed for some days that the election of the 
new king would be left to the National Assembly. Visions 
of ambition floated through the minds of different members 
of the ministry, and projects for securing the election of 
different candidates were mooted by Greek political intriguers 
and foreign diplomatists for a short time. The popular 
enthusiasm in favour of an English prince gained all ranks 
so rapidly, that opposition was soon seen to be hopeless, 
and the provisional government, finding itself unable to 
direct the choice of the people, issued a decree on the ist 
of December 1862, inviting the Greeks to give their votes 
for the election of their king by universal suffrage at every 
municipality in the kingdom and every consulate abroad, 
commencing on the third day after the publication of the 
decree at each locality where the voting was to take place. 
The places of voting were ordered to be kept open for ten 
days, and the examination of the votes was to be made by 
the National Assembly, which would announce the result 
of the elections. 

Public meetings were held both in Greece and in many 
towns in Turkey, at which it was proclaimed that the Greeks 
desired Prince Alfred for their king. Municipal councils, 
regiments of national guards, lawyers, doctors, and professors 
of the university, publicly advocated his election. On the 
3rd of December a proclamation was issued at Athens, 
signed by the nomarch, the commander of the national guard, 
the military governor, and a number of influential inhabitants, 
announcing that the people had assumed the responsibility 
of electing their king, because the destiny of Greece and 
the progress of civilization in the East depended on the 
proper selection of the sovereign ; and that the nation had 
fixed upon Prince Alfred for the king of Greece, because his 
country, his family, and his education offered those guarantees 
which gave assurance that he would govern constitutionally, 
and would render his reign glorious to himself and prosperous 
to the nation. 

The voting commenced at Athens on the 6th Decernber. 



Something was done to allay the public enthusiasm by 
the communication of the decision of the protecting powers 
that neither Prince Alfred nor the Duke of Leuchtenberg 
would be allowed to accept the crown. This communication 
was made on the 13th December, and the voting did not 
close until the evening of the 15th, so that its influence 
was not likely to have produced any serious change. But 
the Greeks in general attached less importance to it than 
it really merited. They had seen protocols set aside and 
treaties annulled so recently in the case of the Bavarian 
dynasty and the Danubian principalities, that they counted 
on the unanimity of their vote by universal suffrage to 
annul even the political jealousies of the three protecting 
powers. The Greeks frequently deceive themselves and 
commit great political errors by overrating their national 
importance. When the votes were counted it was found 
that 241^202 Greek citizens had voted : of these 230,016 
voted for Prince Alfred^ and only 2400 for the Duke of 

On the 3rd of February 1H63 the National Assembly 
ratified the election, without taking any notice of the com- 
munication of the protecting powers that both Prince Alfred 
and the Duke of Leuchtenberg were excluded from the Greek 
throne. An unanimous decree was passed declaring that 
Prince Alfred, having been elected by the people, was 
proclaimed constitutional king of Greece, and instructing 
the president of the provisional government to notify the 
election to His Royal Highness without delay, and invite 
him to take possession of the throne. The Greeks allow 
themselves to be easily deluded into a conviction that they 
are able by their ability and by their political importance 
in the solution of the Eastern question to guide the policy 

* The published lists of votes differ slightly. The numbers are sometimes 
prmted inaccurately, and the voting papers arrived from some consulates after the 
official list of the National Assembly was completed. It is— 

Prince Alfred 
Duke of Leuchtenberg 
An orthodox King . . 
The Emperor of Russia 

A King 

Prince Napoleon . . 
Prince Imperial of France 




A republic 93 

Prince Amadeo of Italy . . 15 

Count of Flanders .... 7 
Prince William of Denmark 

(now King George) ... 6 

Prince Hypsilantes .... 6 

Fifteen other names appear in some lists, and the votes sometimes slightly exceed 
the 241,202, as given m the official list. 



A. D. 1863.] 

of other nations according to their wish. They never gave 
a stronger proof of their sincerity in this persuasion, that 
every international arrangement ought to be set aside for 
their convenience and pleasure, than on this occasion. 

The acceptance of the Greek crown by Prince Alfred 
having been rendered impossible by the three protecting 
powers, diplomacy undertook to fill the vacant throne, and 
in an evil hour for the reputation of British statesmanship, 
England engaged to select a king^. Nothing could be more 
perverse, injudicious, and in more direct opposition to the 
principles they had previously announced, than the conduct 
of the British government in this affair. On the 29th 
November 1862 the British minister of foreign affairs stated 
in a despatch to the minister in Greece that, ' with regard 
to Greece, it appeared to Her Majesty's government that 
her first interest was to elect a prince to rule over her who 
should be generally accepted. That he ought not to be 
a prince under twenty years of age, but rather a prince 
of mature years and of some experience in the world ^.' 

Before narrating the adventures of Earl Russell in search 
of a king, the reason that induced the Greeks to prefer a 
foreigner to a native statesman must be noticed. Without 
attaching too much weight to the saying ouine ignotum pro 
magiiifico est, it must be conceded that it was not without 
influence. But there were strong objections to a native king. 
No public man in Greece possessed either the moral influence 

* There were stronger reasons than those publicly stated that ought to have 
prevented an English prince from accepting the throne of Greece. The King of 
Greece v^'ould have been bound to forget both his country and his religion, to 
abjure his patriotism and his family traditions, and embrace the interests of 
Hellenism and orthodoxy. The following passage is contained in a despatch of 
Earl Russell to Mr. Scarlett, dated 29th November, 1862, nor was the view it 
contained generally overlooked by Englishmen acquainted with the East before the 
despatch was known. ' There are other considerations, besides those which I 
thought it proper to communicate to the charge d'affaires of Greece, which influ- 
ence Her Majesty's resolution on this subject. It is Her Majesty's duty to look to 
the due succession to the crown. Prince Alfred stands next to the Prince of 
Wales in the order of succession, and is heir-presumptive to the duchy of Saxe- 
Coburg and Gotha. Among the contingencies which are far from being impos- 
sible, it might happen that the sons of Prince Alfred, after being brought up as 
members of the Greek church, might be called to ascend the throne of England. 
It is necessary to provide against chances of this kind, and you will therefore not 
be surprised to learn that it is Her Majesty's fixed determination not to give her 
consent to the acceptance by H. R. H. Prince Alfred, or any other of Her 
Majesty's sons, of the crown of Greece.' Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence 
respecting the Revolution in Greece, October, 1862, p. 65. 

'■^ Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence, Earl Russell to Mr. Scarlett, p. 64. 




[Bk.V. Ch.VI. i 

or the talents, which offered a guarantee for his being able to 
govern otherwise than as a party leader. The country re- 
quired above all things administrative organization, and the \ lEngH 
people were not inclined to trust the task of organizing the i 
administration to a party. No Greek statesman could form i 
a cabinet composed of the ablest and most upright men in j 
the country, and a foreign prince seemed likely to do this, 
because it was clearly his interest to do it, in order not to 1 
govern by means of one party, but to govern all parties 
with the support of public opinion. The Greeks wanted a 
foreign king to command his ministers and watch over the 
whole body of officers and officials, to prevent their looking 
more to their own interests and the interest of their party 
than to the service of the commonwealth. Public opinion 
declared emphatically that Greece wanted a foreign king who 
could' govern as well as reign, for they expected him to 
control the executive administration, and prevent every officer 
of the government from abusing the power with which he 
was entrusted, and from conniving at the abuse of power by his 
partizans. The Greeks resolved also, that their king should 
be selected from a royal family, or at least from a reigning 
house, in order to insure the respect which is willingly 
accorded to high station. It may not be easy to decide 
whether the Greeks were right in preferring impartiality to 
local knowledge and personal experience, but there can be 
no doubt that they attached too much importance to high 
hereditary station, and sacrificed the great advantage they 
might have derived from raising some eminent statesman and 
experienced administrator to their throne. 

The national enthusiasm in favour of Prince Alfred was 
recognized as giving the Greeks an especial claim on the aid 
and support of England. France and Russia could not avoid 
feeling the humiliation of an unexpected defeat, and to con-: 
ceal their mortification they left England to select the new 
king, and gave a passive approbation to all the blunders of 
the British government. It required very little foresight to 
divine that the sympathy of the Greeks for British policy 
would be allayed by the unavoidable course of diplomacy, 
even had the negotiations been conducted by a warmer 
heart and more piercing judgment than England employed. 
When the Greeks elected Prince Alfred they knew nothing 





ti.D. 1862.] 

bf his character, nor of his personal quahfications to act as 

me head of a disorganized government. A vague hope that 

[in Enghsh prince would give Greece some of the advantages 

enjoyed by England, would extend the limits of his kingdom 

lit the expense of Turkey, and would obtain large loans, con- 

rributed greatly to Prince Alfred's popularity. When Great 

[Britain stepped forward to select a king, it was not surprising 

pat many Greeks inferred that the British government tacitly 

)ledged itself to promote the views of the nation. 

The British government, on the other hand, appears to 

lave plunged into the business without any very clear idea 

)f how it was to be conducted in order to insure a good 

result. It acted as if nothing was to be done but to look 

)ut among the cadets of friendly reigning houses for any 

)rince who would agree to accept the vacant throne. In 

the month of December 1862, the Hon. Henry Elliot was 

sent to Greece a second time on an extraordinary mission. 

[e communicated to the provisional government that, if the 

rreeks maintained constitutional monarchy as their form of 

government, refrained from all aggressive acts against Turkey, 

md chose a king agreeable to the British government, the 

jqueen would bestow the Ionian Islands on Greece. Mr. 

Llliot also informed the Greeks that the British government 

{expected the National Assembly would choose a king from 

/horn a regard for religious liberty, a respect for constitutional 

freedom, and a sincere love of peace might be expected. It 

fdid not escape the observation of the friends of Greece, that 

)nly those qualities advantageous to British policy in the 

lEast were enumerated, and that no mention was made of 

the qualities most necessary for securing the election of a 

dng possessing a knowledge of the art of government, and 

las Earl Russell had expressed it ' mature years and some 

[experience of the world.' 

The British government marred the effect of Mr. Elliot's 

[second mission by the precipitancy with which it announced 

[two abortive attempts to find a king. The first was a 

[peculiarly ill-judged selection. The crown of Greece was 

joffered to King Ferdinand of Portugal, a prince of Saxe- 

Coburg Kohany, who married Donna Maria Queen of 

Portugal, and received the title of king. The reigning king 

lof Portugal was his son. The consent of France and Russia 




[Bk.V. Ch.VI. \ 

was given promptly but coldly. France disliked a Coburg, { 
and Russia disliked a Catholic. Singular as it may appear, j 
Mr. Elliot was instructed to inform the Greeks of the selection \ 
of this candidate before the British government was in posses- \ 
sion of King Ferdinand's promise to accept the crown. When j 
the leading men in Greece were informed that King Ferdinand | 
was the candidate recommended by England, ' they expressed 1 
neither approval nor disapproval, but observed that he was j 
a Catholic, and that the crown would continue without an \ 
heir ^.' Whatever might be the virtues and talents of this 1 
king, the Greeks knew nothing about him, and they could i 
only learn from the envoy of the British government that 
he was a Coburg, a Catholic, and a constitutionalist. In their : 
revolutionary enthusiasm the Greeks believed that they 
could themselves take care of their constitution, but they felt . 
and owned that they were averse to receive a Catholic king 
even at the recommendation of England. Fortunately King 
Ferdinand refused the crown, peremptorily and without . 

Some negotiations took place which were never made 
public, and some princely candidates were spoken of whose 
names the Greeks never heard of before, and may probably 
never hear again. After a short interval a second choice 
was announced, which was more judicious though not more 
successful than the first. Mr. Elliot informed many members 
of the National Assembly that the British government ex- , 
pected to be soon able to announce that Ernest, Duke of 
Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, had accepted the candidature. 
The news was received with satisfaction, for the Greeks had 
learned that Prince Alfred was heir -presumptive to the 
duchy of Saxe-Coburg, and they believed that the three 
protecting powers had agreed to an arrangement which would 
ultimately place Prince Alfred on the throne of Greece and 
realize all their hopes. They were not aware that the crown > 
of Greece possessed fewer attractions for foreign princes than 
they supposed. Duke Ernest required conditions that Eng- 
land had no power to grant, and the Parliament of Saxe- 

' Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence, Mr. Elliot to Earl Russell, 25th 
December, 1862, p. 125. M. Francois Lenormant observes, 'par una dispensation 
particuliere de la Providence, cette heureuse famille de Cobourg a des candidats 
pour tous les trones et de toutes les religions.' 



A.D. 1863.] 

Coburg objected to his absence from his hereditary states. 
He had no children, and as Prince Alfred was excluded from 
the throne, the British government had to search for an heir 
as well as for a king, and British diplomacy was again foiled. 
A young prince of Coburg Kohany was found in Austria, 
and to him the succession was offered ; but he was a Catholic, 
and he refused to quit his religion for an orthodox crown. 
Duke Ernest showed no eagerness to obtain the throne, 
and the states of Coburg refusing to consent to his absence, 
he at last informed the British government that he declined 
the honour of becoming a candidate for the throne of Greece^. 
In utter oblivion of the opinion of her Majesty^s govern- 
ment that ripe years and mature judgment were necessary 
qualities in a king of Greece, and in a fit of desperation 
lest no English candidate should be found, the British 
government offered the crown to the second son of Prince 
Christian of Holstein-Glucksburg, who succeeded to the 
throne of Denmark on the 15th November 1863, as King 
Christian IX, in virtue of a family arrangement. Prince 
William George of Denmark is the brother of the Princess 
of Wales, and was then only seventeen years of age. The 
Greek government was informed that the guardians of the 
young prince were disposed to accept the crown in his name, 
if an offer of it should be made by the National Assembly. 
The affair was delicate, but the Greeks were docile. They 
had reposed their trust in England, and they felt no wish 
to withdraw it. Nations are in some respects easier to deal 
with than courts and cabinets. The president of the execu- 
tive government, M. Balbes, proposed the vote suddenly, in 
order to avert intrigues and party opposition. On the 30tli 
March 1863, Prince Christian Ferdinand Adolphus George, 
second son of Prince Christian of Denmark, was unanimously 
elected King of Greece with the title of George the First, 
King of the Hellenes, and it was declared in the decree of 
election that his lawful heirs should profess the faith of the 
Eastern Orthodox Church^. 

* The candidature of the duke was communicated to the National Assembly on 
the 1 2th February, 1863. ''Eniarjfj.os 'E(pT)p.(pis rfjs 'S.vveXtvatws, i. 458. After the 
refusal of the duke was announced, a long debate ensued on the 5th and 6th of 
March, but the National Assembly did not venture to assume the responsibility of 
choosing a king. 

^ Prince Christian of Sleswig-Holstein-Glucksburg, though a younger son, was 

U % 



Negotiations then commenced between the British govern- 
ment and the court of Denmark, to settle the conditions on 
which the King of Denmark and Prince Christian would give 
their consent as guardians to the acceptance of the crown 
offered to the young prince. The manner in which the 
haggling was carried on reflects no honour on the parties 
concerned, and the correspondence and the protocols which 
resulted from this election having been laid before Parlia- 
ment, will enable the world to judge whether the cause 
of the people was not neglected from exclusive attention 
to the interests of the prince. While the family of Den- 
mark was negotiating for a larger civil list than the Greeks 
had paid to King Otho, the political parties at Athens 
were left at liberty to commit acts of violence, which threat- 
ened to plunge the country into a state of anarchy, and renew 
the disorders and the desolation of 1832. The election of a 
king, so young that he must be placed under the guidance 
of others, naturally roused the ambition of all the leading 
politicians and factions to obtain the direction of the govern- 
ment before the young king's arrival. This state of party 
feeling made the election an immediate cause of disorder. 

A deputation from the National Assembly, consisting of 
Admiral Kanares, Captain Grivas, and M. Zaimes^ was sent 
to Copenhagen to offer the crown to the Danish prince. The 
return of this deputation in the month of June, with the 
assurance that the crown was accepted, brought the struggle 
of rival parties for the possession of power to an open civil 
war. The ultimate design of each party was to secure to 
itself the means of exercising the royal authority in the king's 
name until he arrived in Greece ; official position at that time, 
it was supposed, would entail the possession of power for a 
considerable time after his arrival. A decree was passed in 
the National Assembly declaring the majority of King 
George, and the principle which Greek statesmen had adopted 
that a constitutional king must reign and not govern insured 
his docility \ 

The army had remained in a state of disorganization ever 
since the revolt of Nauplia, and after the expulsion of King 

selected as heir to the throne of Denmark by a protocol signed at London, 
8th May, 1852, and mounted the throne at the death of Frederic VII, 15th Novem- 
ber, 1863. 

' Decree XLIV, 27th June, 1863. 

MI M 8W tW H lMl l i m«a B«BWBIWnniW i lW i H l llM I IW iWWI W IIW I Mi ] IIIIMiWIIWI lllllllWIWM 



A.D. 1863.] 

jOtho it had fallen into complete disorder. Each party in 
bhe National Assembly sought by favour and flattery to 
^ain over as large a number as possible of officers and men 
to support their intrigues and further their schemes. Officers 
und men were allowed to quit their duty in the provinces 
land remain in the capital, whenever it was thought that 
l;heir services could be useful for strengthening the party of 
|men in office. Discipline was relaxed, promotions were made 
'so lavishly by each successive government and ministry, that 
the number of officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, 
in Athens was said to exceed greatly the number of privates. 
jThe insubordination of the troops was allowed to go on in- 
creasing, without any effort on the part of the members of 
the government or of the officers to restore discipline. Great 
alarm prevailed among the citizens lest the soldiers should unite 
with the armed men whom various party leaders and military 
chiefs had brought to the capital from different parts of the 
country to support their claims for rank and pay. These men 
might easily be excited by the rabble of the city to begin 
plundering the shops and levying contributions on the wealthy 
inhabitants. This fear had the good effect of causing all 
classes who had anything to lose, to pay great attention to 
the efficiency of the national guard, which was brought into a 
much better state of discipline than the regular army. Its 
imposing strength saved Greece in all probability from a 
series of military revolutions and disorders, like those which 
jhave of late years occurred so frequently in Spain and 

During the month of April 1863 repeated acts of violence 
were committed. Officers and soldiers were seen at all 
hours driving about in carriages, singing or shouting voci- 
ferously. Peaceful persons were frequently insulted ; respect- 
able women could not walk from one house to another 
without fear, and squads of soldiers went from house to 
house demanding money ^. At last the abduction of a 

' Sanipoulos, professor and member of the National Assembly for the University 
of Athens, published a pamphlet, in which he describes the condition of the army in 
the following terms : ' C'etait un ramassis d'hommesd'une moralite tres equivoque, que 
recrutaient les officiers appartenant a I'un ou a I'autre des parties politiques. Ces 
hommes gorges d'argent et du vin parcouraient en voiture la ville et ses environs 
avec des filles de joie a leurs cotes, commettant toutes especes d'horreurs non 
seulement sur les regnicoles mais sur des etrangers aussi.' Le passe, le present et 
I'avenir de la Grece, Trieste, 1866. But when it was proposed to establish a court- 






foreign actress, accompanied with circumstances of publicity 
which rendered its infamy doubly atrocious, compelled th^ \^^'^' 
ministers of France and England to demand that the govern^ 
ment should adopt effectual measures for repressing the! 
disorders and crimes of the military, and preventing thdjs'^'; 
recurrence of 'acts disgraceful to a civilized nation.' Th^ 
previous neglect of the ministry of war and of the military! 
authorities had fomented the insolence of the troops. When) 
twenty were guilty, one was arrested, and he was either 
released after a short confinement or forcibly set at liberty 
by his comrades. The denial of justice was systematic and 
notorious, and the foreign ministers became so indignant at 
the false answers and false assurances they received from 
the members of the government, that they announced their 
intention to quit Athens unless measures were adopted to 
establish personal security. The worst feature of these 
disorders was that the authorities were always ready to 
seize every occasion of boldly denying their existence, 
whenever they could find an opportunity of doing so in 
writing ; calling their dishonesty patriotism, and hoping by 
their effrontery to conceal the truth. While the government 
was lavish of assurances to the foreign ministers that those 
criminals who had been seized should be severely punished, 
it generally facilitated their escape. The protests of the 
French and English ministers after the public outrage on 
the actress produced a temporary cessation of the disorders 
of the soldiery during the month of May, but no change; 
for the better took place in the conduct of the government ^. 

At last the state of parties in the National Assembly 
brought about a civil war in the streets of Athens between 
their adherents in the army. 

On the 29th of June 1863 the National Assembly elected 
Lieutenant-Colonel Koronaios minister of war in place of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Botzaris, who had been minister since 

martial extraordinary to enforce discipline by punishing the crimes of the military 
which the civil tribunals could not judge, Mr. Sanipoulos opposed the measure in 
the National Assembly. He asked whether the army was to be dishonoured 
because it contained ten or even a hundred criminals, and said that a criminal is a 
man and not an instrument set apart for the benefit of the community. 'Eiriar}iios 
'E(pi]fjitpis rfjs 'SvvfKevafws, vol. ii. No. 65, p. 19, 1863. 

' Parliamentary Papers, 1863; Correspondence relating to the election of Prince 
William of Denmark and to the state of Greece. Mr. Scarlett's despatches in 
May, 1863, p. 0. 

raiwMa i iu H Ma i w ii iM iiiiMHWiiaMW 


A.D. 1863.] 

the month of April. The faction of which Koronaios was 
an active member, considered the time favourable for seizing 
the executive power and excluding all rivals from any share 
in the government. Koronaios was bold enough to attempt 
making use of the disorderly army as an instrument for 
effecting this object : but he possessed neither the influence 
nor the judgment for executing a successful coiip-iVetat. 
His party trusted to his energy for securing their permanent 
ascendancy, but his violence did more harm to their cause 
than the weakness of his predecessors had done to the cause 
of their opponents. 

After the revolution of October 1862 Leotzakos, then only a 
lieutenant, was raised by the suffrages of the officers and 
men of the 6th battalion to be its commanding officer. By 
his good management and good conduct this battalion was 
now the strongest and most efficient in the army. It was 
stationed in the villa built by the Duchess of Plaisance 
near Athens, called Ilissia, beyond the royal garden on 
the road to Kephisia and Marathon. The influence of 
Leotzakos rendered it a matter of importance that he 
should be removed from his command, for he belonged to 
one faction of the revolutionists and Koronaios to another. 
Both parties in the National Assembly knew that they were 
on the eve of a civil war, and both prepared for an appeal 
to arms. A brigand chief, Kyriakos, who was suspected 
of being in connivance with the partizans of Bulgaris, made 
his appearance with his band close to Athens at this crisis. 
Pappadiamantopoulos, the commandant de place, and Leo- 
tzakos were accused of neglecting to seize him with his band 
when he posted himself in the buildings of Aghios Asomatos. 
Leotzakos was invited by the minister of war to a council 
of war, and when he arrived he was arrested and hurried 
down to the Piraeus, where he was placed on board a man- 
of-war in the port. At the same time orders were issued 
superseding Pappadiamantopoulos both as commandant de 
place and commanding officer of the artillery, and Colonel 
Artemes Michos as commander-in-chief of the gendarmerie. 
Both the artillery and the gendarmerie refused to receive 
the officers named by Koronaios to command them, and 
continued to obey their old commanders. As soon as the 
6th battalion heard that Leotzakos had been arrested and 

2q6 change of dynasty. 

^ [Bk.V. Ch.VI, 

sent to the Piraeus it broke out in open revolt. Mr. Koumoun- 
douros, the minister of finance, and Mr. Kalhphronas, the 
minister of pubHc instruction, happening to pass in a carriage 
before their barracks at Ihssia, were recognized and detained 
as hostages for the release of their commanding officer. The ip^^' 
leaders on both sides were now eager to commence hostilities, |j 
confident in the strength of their armed partizans, and per- - 
suaded that the young king would find it necessary on his 
arrival to confirm any party in office whom he should find 
in possession of power. The civil war that ensued in the 
streets of Athens was a party fight for place. 

The combatants on both sides consisted of several factious 
leaders linked together by no political principle but only 
by projects of personal interest. Koronaios was the represen- 
tative of those in power, and he had at his disposal a much 
larger force than his opponents. His infantry consisted of 
the 1st, 2nd, 8th and 9th battalions, but they were incomplete 
and without either discipline or order. He was also sup- 
ported by the cavalry, the corps of pompiers, and a number 
of armed men who were collected at Athens as personal 
followers by members of the National Assembly, and who 
received pay either from municipal or national funds \ 
Admiral Kanares and Captain GrivaSj who had recently 
returned from Copenhagen, were both warm partizans of 
the ministry, and increased its authority by their supposed 
favour at the Danish court, and the inference that they 
would become influential persons after the king's arrival. 

The military force of the opposition was less numerous 
but in a better state of discipline. It consisted of the 6th 
battalion, the artillery, the gendarmerie, and a corps of 
armed police. The royal palace, which commands the town, 
was occupied by the troops of the ministry. The royal 
stables were occupied by the artillery, and the villa of the 
Duchess of Plaisance by the battalion of Leotzakos. The 
fighting commenced at daylight on the 1st of July^. The 

1 La Grece, a French newspaper published at Athens (9th July, 1863), states 
the number of the troops under Koronaios to have been 6000 men. Perhaps the 
party were then paying for the services of that number, but half that number did not 
take part in the fight. There were then not more than 3000 regulars in Athens, 
and of these 1000 fought against Koronaios. 

^ Prince Napoleon and Princess Clotilde visited the Acropolis on the 30th June, 
while the rival parties were preparing for action. 

^"^IP^B^i^Bi^Bg^MlWWBlWWBWiaaiWIIIliaMlBWIIIMB W BI I B Brawai l WB BIiaMBIi nnW IB IHMlWMIffHWWlWl W II Wii W I tW iillH W I^^ 


A.D. 1863.] 

Operations of the ministerial forces were directed by Koro- 
naios, who expected by his coup-d'ctat to become master 
of the government. The ministerial party, in spite of its 
numerical superiority, failed to cut off the communications 
between the artillery and the 6th battalion, and was vigor- 
ously assailed by these bodies, who kept the palace closely 
invested. Aristides Kanares, son of the admiral and brother 
of the minister of the marine, was killed, and about forty 
of those who were with him in the palace were either killed 
or wounded, so that the garrison considered its position 

The National Assembly held a meeting while the fighting 
was going on, and sent a deputation to establish an armistice 
between the combatants. The first attempt failed, and a 
member of the assembly was wounded. But a second attempt 
succeeded, and the terms of an armistice were arranged. The 
palace was evacuated, and a truce was established for twenty- 
four hours, but both parties employed their leisure in making 
preparations for renewing the combat. 

M. Rouphos, the president of the government, and two 
members of the ministry who disapproved of the appeal 
to arms, resigned office when the fighting commenced \ 
The National Assembly on receiving these resignations charged 
its president, Diomedes Kyriakos, to act as president of 
the executive government, dismissed Koronaios from the 
ministry of war, and Miltiades Kanares from the ministry 
of the marine ; and ordered the immediate release of Leot- 
zakos by the one party, and of Koumoundouros and Kalli- 
phronas by the other. But according to the rules of the 
assembly, the number of deputies present when these decrees 
were adopted, was insufficient to constitute a house, for 
many deputies absented themselves from an inherent spirit 
of personal intrigue, in order to make sure of joining the 
victorious party. In consequence of this irregularity, the 
party that supported Koronaios treated these acts of the 
assembly as null. 

The night was spent by Koronaios in bringing up artillery 

* The ministry of Rouphos was elected by the National Assembly on the 1 2th 
May, iis63, and was composed of B. Rouphos, President ; Koumoundouros, Finance ; 
Kalliphronas, Public Instruction ; P. Deliyannes, Foreign Affairs ; Londos, Interior ; 
Platys, Justice; D. Botzaris, who was Minister of War until the 22nd June, was 
then replaced by Koronaios ; Miltiades Kanares, Marine. 



and additional forces from the Piraeus. He concentrated 
a strong body of troops in the north-west quarter of Athens, 
and it was feared that he designed to make himself master 
of the National Bank, where it was known that a large 
sum in specie was kept in reserve. He had ordered a 
part of the guard to be withdrawn from the bank on the 
day before hostilities commenced. Grivas occupied the 
Acropolis with armed irregulars and a few soldiers. On 
the morning of the 2nd July both parties were ready to 
renew the fight, and not disposed to respect the armistice 
established by the National Assembly. Koronaios, surrounded 
by his staff, approached the bank on horseback, and was 
fired at by the guard to whom he was an object of suspicion. 
The bank was immediately attacked with some vigour but 
very little military judgment, and it was bravely defended 
by its small garrison, which repulsed its assailants until a 
detachment of artillery arrived and placed it in security. 
The attempt to carry the building was renewed with ad- 
ditional troops, and fighting went on round the bank during 
the whole day and in many streets of the city. At last 
the national guard and the citizens began to take part in 
the combat, and all communications between distant quarters 
were interrupted ^. 

The ministers of the protecting powers, finding that the 
authority of the President of the National Assembly was not 
recognized by the party of Koronaios, and that the forces of 
the belligerent factions were too nearly balanced to promise 
a speedy victory to either party, determined to interfere. 
They were guided by a wish to place the National Bank 
in security and avert the pillage of the city, not by a desire 
to favour either party. The passions of the soldiers on both 
sides were inflamed by the losses they had sustained from 

^ An account of the civil war by a partizan of the president of the National 
Assembly says, — ' La fureur cles bourgeois contre les defensenrs de la baiique avait 
quelque chose de hideux et de barbare ; et pourtant cet etablissment, comme renfer- 
niant des capitaux considerables tant nationaux qu'etrangers, pent etre considere 
comme la vraie representation de la propriete en Grece.' Another account by a 
partizan of Koronaios says. ' Les gardes nationaux ont pris part ^ la lutte, mais 
toutefois seulement contre les gendarmes et les huissiers de la police. lis tiraient 
sur tous ceux qu'ils rencontraient ; ils les epiaient, les traquaient partout comme 
des betes fauves. Ceux-ci, de leur cote, tiraient sur les gardes nationaux : de sorte 
que dans toutes les rues, dans tous les quartiers de la ville, on faisait le coup de 
fusil, et on voyait tomber quelques victimes.' There is truth in these accounts, 
though with some exaggeration, as the Author saw with his own eyes. 

wKi i mmumi mim u mim m mHmmi 


A.D. 1863.] 

the national guards and citizens, and both sides threatened to 
set fire to the buildings occupied by their enemies. In the 
evening of the 2nd of July the foreign ministers sent their 
secretaries of legation to the rival leaders, and succeeded in 
establishing an armistice for forty-eight hours, to afford time 
for the National Assembly to take measures for restoring 
peace. This armistice was not adopted until the foreign 
ministers threatened to retire on board their ships in the 
Piraeus, if hostilities were renewed. Everybody was now 
anxious for the re-establishment of order, except the ambi- 
tious leaders who had planned the conp-d\'tat. About two 
hundred men had been killed and wounded without producing 
any decisive result. For the purpose of placing the bank in 
security, the ministers of the three protecting powers, moved 
by the anxious solicitations of the governor, sent a garrison 
composed of detachments of marines from their ships in 
the Piraeus to guard the buildings. There were many 
foreign shareholders, and it was suspected that the hope of 
plundering the specie which the bank contained was a 
principal object with its assailants. Koronaios opposed the 
occupation with such vehemence, that the foreign ministers 
addressed him a note, declaring that they would hold him 
personally responsible for any act of aggression against the 
Allied force which they thought it necessary to land ^. 

The National Assembly met during the night at the 
Varvakeion, whence Koronaios had directed his unsuccessful 
operations against the bank. The national guard of Athens 
declared in favour of peace, and engaged to protect the 
Assembly wherever it might hold its meetings, but its usual 
place of meeting was in the immediate vicinity of the royal 
stables, which were occupied by the artillery, and those who 
planned the coup-cTctat insisted that some other place of 
meeting should be found. Considerable difficulty was en- 
countered in adopting the measures required to insure order, 
for the military leaders were at heart adverse to a peaceful 
arrangement, knowing from the state of public opinion that 
all power would be taken out of their hands as soon as the 

^ Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence relating to the election of Prince 
William of Denmark and to the state of Greece, i 863, Mr. Scarlett's despatches, 
2nd and 4th July, i'^6^. with their annexes. Documents and statements published 
by Diomedes Kyriakos, the president of the National Assembly, and by Colonel 
Koronaios, in French and Greek, give the views of their parties. 


[Bk. V. Ch. VI. 

supremacy of the National Assembly should be again 
restored. And this was the case, for the moment the 
National Assembly found itself invested with the power of 
enforcing obedience, it decreed that all the regular troops 
in Athens were to march out of the capital and occupy the 
stations indicated by the government. It was declared that 
the presence of the army was required in the provinces for 
the purpose of maintaining order and collecting the revenues 
of the state ^. News had already reached Athens that a 
revolutionary movement was commenced in Laccnia, and 
that the civil war in the capital was serving as a signal for 
disorder everywhere. The offices of commandant-in-chief of 
the gendarmerie, of commandant superior of the garrisons 
of Athens and the Piraeus, and of director of the administra- 
tive police, were abolished ; and the chief command of the 
national guard, instead of being concentrated in the hands of 
one officer, was divided, and vested in the demarchs of 
Athens and the Piraeus ^. A new ministry was elected by 
the Assembly, consisting of men of secondary importance, 
selected from different parties, and destitute alike of com- 
manding influence and distinguished talent. The object of 
the Assembly was to prevent the rival factions from recom- 
mencing a civil war, and by no means to establish a strong 
government before the arrival of the young king ^ This 
ministry was formed to neutralize the intrigues of ambitious 
men without inciting them to strong measures of opposition, 
and perhaps the plan was the best the National Assembly 
could adopt considering the materials with which it had to 
operate. There was no party and no statesman in Greece 
possessing the confidence of the country. The mediocrity of 
the new ministry allayed opposition. It was certain that it 


^ The disorganization and indiscipline of the army was not less in the provinces 
than it had been in the capital, but it was hidden from strangers. Even after the 
arrival of King George, the Greek newspapers mention that the minister of war 
was left for several weeks without any report concerning the movements of a com- 
pany of infantry, which marched about the country and took up its quarters 
wherever it thought fit. It was at last surrounded and disarmed. 

^ Decree of the National Assembly, XLVI, 1863. 

^ The members were, Rouphos, President ; A. Petimezas, Interior ; Kalligas, 
Foreign Affairs ; Nikolopoulos, Public Instruction ; Kehayas, Finance; all these had 
been members of previous ministries. Klimakas, an officer of irregulars without 
civil or military capacity of any kind, was made minister of war ; Bouboules, who 
had commanded a steamer of the Greek Steam Navigation Company, was the 
minister of the marine; and P. Mavromichales, a young lawyer, minister of justice. 
These were new men in ministerial offices. 


A,D. 1863.] 

would carry no great measure of administrative reform, and it 
seemed impossible for it to retain office after the king's 
arrival. These circumstances combined to leave Greece 
almost without a government for four months. 

On the 5th July 1863 the Greek army quitted Athens, 
and its absence from the capital was a benefit not too 
dearly purchased even by a few days of civil war, for it had 
kept the inhabitants in constant fear of pillage, and had 
committed a series of disgraceful crimes in quick succession 
since the 22nd October 1862. The national guard performed 
the ordinary military duty, and displayed so much zeal and 
discipline that a feeling of security was soon established. It 
is possible that Koronaios, had he commenced by restoring 
discipline in the army and creating a feeling of confidence 
in the people, might subsequently have succeeded in his 
ambitious projects. But his measures were precipitate, his 
military plans ill-conceived and feebly executed, and his 
arrest of Leotzakos an injudicious and premature exhibition 
of arbitrary power. He was driven out of the palace, 
defeated at the National Bank, expelled from the ministry, 
and deprived of the chief command of the national guard, 
without being considered dangerous by his opponents when 
out of office, so completely had his failure revealed his want 
of capacity to execute his schemes. 

While the leading men in Greece were throwing the 
government into a state of anarchy, the three protecting 
powers were making protocols which were to secure good 
government at some future period. On the 27th May 1863 
they declared, that the Bavarian dynasty having lost its 
rights to the throne of Greece by events over which the 
protecting powers exercised no control, they were released 
from the guarantees to King Otho and his heirs contained in 
the treaty of 1832 ; but, considering that they were bound to 
uphold the monarchical principle, they announced their firm 
resolution to watch over the maintenance of tranquillity in 
the Hellenic kingdom, which they contributed to found in the 
general interest of civilization, order, and peace ^. On the 
5th June they signed a protocol recognizing George I. King 
of the Hellenes as the elected sovereign of the people, and 

^ Parlia?nentnry Papers relating to Greece, No. 2, 1863; Protocol, May 27, 1863. 



[Bk. V. Ch. VI. 

regulated their relations with him as an European monarch. 
The resolutions embodied in that protocol afford a remark- 
able example of the manner in which the protecting powers 
carried into execution their ' firm resolution to maintain 
tranquillity in Greece, and watch over the general interests of 
civilization.' They made the position of the sovereign as 
agreeable to him as possible, and they made not one single 
effort to improve the public administration for the benefit of 
the people \ 

The acceptance of the crown having been communicated 
to the protecting powers by the King of Denmark under the 
express condition that the Ionian Islands should be united to 
Greece, the following resolutions were inserted in the protocol 
recording the election of the new king : — 

1. Great Britain engaged to recommend the Ionian state, 
before it voted the annexation to Greece, to appropriate from 
the Ionian revenues a sum of iJ"i 0,000 sterling to increase 
the civil list of King George. 

2. Each of the three protecting powers engaged to bestow 
on King George a sum of ^4000 annually, making a total of 
i^ 1 2,000 a year for his private expenditure, in addition to the 
civil list voted by the Greek chamber. This sum they 
resolved to deduct from the million of drachmas which the 
Greek government was bound by the convention of i860 
to pay as a composition for the interest due on the Allied 
loan of 1832. 

3. The legitimate successors of the crown of Greece must 
profess the tenets of the Orthodox Church of the East. 

4. In no case can the crowns of Greece and Denmark be 
united on the same head. 

5. The protecting powers engaged to use their influence to 
procure the recognition of King George by all the sovereigns 
and states with whom they had political relations. 

The first and second of these resolutions were both unjust 
and impolitic, and the British government ought to have 
known that they were unconstitutional. It was impolitic to 
invest an inexperienced youth with more wealth than his 
people deemed that his situation required. It was unjust to 
allure the Greeks to believe that wealth in the opinion of 

1 Parliamentary Papers relating to Greece, No. 2, 1863; Protocol, June 5, 1863, 
and annexes. 



A.D. 1863.] 

European statesmen was the first essential of royalty. And 
it was a violation of those constitutional principles which 
English diplomatists were constantly obtruding- on the 
attention of foreigners, to invest a sovereign with a revenue 
derived from the national income, but placed by a foreign 
treaty beyond the control of the representatives of the 
nation. No act of the Ionian state could legally increase 
the civil list of the sovereign of the Hellenic kingdom by 
any appropriation of Ionian revenue to take effect after the 
Ionian state had ceased to exist, and there was something 
undignified in creating treaty rights securing ;^io,ooo a year 
from Greece in case the new king should meet with the 
fate of King Otho. The vote of the Ionian parliament 
could have no practical value unless enforced by Great 
Britain, and to enforce it would be an act of unconstitutional 
violence. The proceedings of the three protecting powers 
in endowing King George with a larger civil list than the 
Greek nation accorded will be judged by the use the king 
makes of his wealth rather than by the justice and policy of 
their conduct. 

The third resolution, that the legitimate successors of 
King- Georsre must be members of the Eastern Orthodox 

o o 

Church, was also an obtrusion of foreign opinion on a question 
of constitutional law that concerned the Greeks alone, and 
which they were entitled to set aside if they thought fit. 
The British government certainly could not pretend that 
the powers possessed any right to prevent the Greeks from 
changing their constitution and recognizing a Protestant or a 
Catholic as heir to their crown, if they should think fit to do 
so, at any future period. They could not have less right 
to change their constitution than to change their king. It 
may indeed be questioned whether a British minister was 
warranted by the policy of Great Britain to enter into any 
engagements relating to the Greek crown beyond — ist. The 
recognition of Prince George as King of the Hellenes. 2nd. 
A stipulation engaging the British government to use every 
means for accomplishing the union of the Ionian Islands with 
the Hellenic kingdom. 3rd. A provision against the union 
of the crown of Greece and Denmark. 4th. An engagement 
to solicit the recognition of King George as constitutional 
king of Greece by friendly powers; and 5th, A declaration 

I I 


[ y^a^k 

in favour of constitutional government, and a recommenda- ! #"'1 
tion that the government of Greece should establish some . '%^^ 
guarantee for publicity in its financial and administrative 1 Mf- 
proceedings. ||B^in5 

For some years it had been evident to those who studied ; ns^st, 
the progress of events in Greece that the union of the \ » t^ 
Ionian Islands was a measure which the British government hifee 
had many reasons for accomplishing and little interest to "jifcstat 
prevent. A change had taken place in the relative position i ^te o 
of the powers bordering on the Mediterranean since the i jwdgc 
islands had been placed under the protection of Great Britain. ; imi 
The fortress of Corfu had lost much of its importance to , amai 
England, while the importance of Malta had been greatly Vi<k^. 
increased. The British government had honestly, though i rili s; 
perhaps not always judiciously, and certainly most unsuc- 
cessfully, endeavoured to train the Greeks of the islands 
to become a constitutional people. The lonians had used 
their liberty not to improve their condition, but to excite 
the animosity of the Greek race against the English as 
heretics and tyrants. The leaders of the people declared 
that British protection impeded the progress of the Greek 
nation, and that the first step towards the improvement of 
the country must be to get rid of all connection with England. 
The British government desired to reform abuses and improve 
the administration ; but, when it found that all its measures 
were thwarted, and learned by experience that the Ionian 
parliament was determined to reject every improvement, 
it resigned the hope of doing good, and being resolved not 
to suspend the constitution for the purpose of forcing im- 
provements on an unwilling people, it became indifferent 
to the proceedings of the Ionian legislature. The British 
government in the Ionian Islands was exposed for years 
to a system of calumnious attacks in the Greek and French 
press. The French propagated the opinion that the English 
governed the Ionian Islands with greater severity and in 
a less liberal spirit than they governed Algeria, and they 
kept carefully out of sight that the British government had 
given the lonians a free press and a representative assembly. 
The liberty which the lonians enjoyed, of declaiming against 
English oppression under English protection, might have ^^^ 
afforded Frenchmen a point of comparison with the repres- Ji 



to tl 













wammimm m Hiwm mt 


A.D. 1858.] 

sion of public opinion in every French possession and with 
the silence imposed on the French press. The systematic 
misrepresentation of the Greeks and French ended in per- 
suading the whole continent that the Ionian government 
was a stain on the character of England, and caused English- 
men to view Ionian politics with disgust and the affairs 
of Greece generally with repugnance. The fact was, that 
the state of society in the Ionian Islands presented complex 
rights of property and political anomalies which obstructed 
I good government, and could only be removed by the power 
I of an enlightened despot, or the ability of a popular minister 
I commanding the support of an honest house of represen- 
i tatives. Unfortunately the educated classes were tainted 
with sycophancy and other moral defects that destroyed 
their influence, while traditionary habits retained the cul- 
tivators of the soil in a state of bigotry, poverty, and 
ignorance. These evils were increased by temporary cir- 
cumstances. The protectorate threw the executive authority 
into the hands of a governing class, while the constitution 
which the British government gave to the islands in 1849 
invested the popular representatives with a licence to attack 
the protectorate that paralyzed the progress of administra- 
tive reform. 

The relations of the Greeks to the British protectorate 
became at last the means of creating feelings of deep-rooted 
aversion. Ionian patriots denied the validity of the treaty 
of Paris to override Ionian nationality, and maintained that 
230,000 inhabitants dispersed in seven small islands possessed 
an inherent right to determine their own condition as an 
independent state. Demagogues gained popularity by de- 
claiming against the tyrannical conduct of Great Britain, 
perfectly aware that the British government would protect 
them in their exercise of the freedom of speech. 

In 1858 a change of ministry in England placed the 
Ionian Islands under Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton (Lord 
Lytton), who wished to connect his eminence in English 
literature with the memory of benefits conferred on the 
Greeks. He selected Mr. Gladstone, one of the ablest states- 
men in England, to visit the Ionian Islands, with the vain 
hope that the eloquence and candour which gave power 
in England would charm the subtle demagogues of Greece, 



and establish harmony between the British government and 
the Ionian people for the period that the protectorate might 
still endure. Mr. Gladstone was appointed High Com- 
missioner Extraordinary, and was directed * to examine all 
matters affecting the contentment, well-being, and good 
government of the lonians, so far as those objects were 
connected with the protection exercised by the British go- 
vernment ^.' 

Unfortunately, neither the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies nor Mr. Gladstone possessed any previous know- 
ledge of Ionian politics to aid their good intentions. They 
directed their attention to the means of applying sound 
theories of government to a state of things where a change 
in the social relations of the inhabitants and modifications 
in the tenure and rights of property were the real evils 
that required remedy, and over these the British government 
could exercise very little influence, if opposed by the Ionian 
representatives. The deputies to the Ionian parliament 
were by the constitution of 1849 elected by a constituency 
approaching universal suffrage. They were highly paid, 
and declamations in favour of the greatness of the Greek 
race and of union with the Greek kingdom were the surest 
means of securing their re-election and the continuance of 
their salaries. 

On the 25th of January 1 859 Mr. Gladstone, having com- 
pleted his examination of the islands as High Commissioner 
Extraordinary and succeeded Sir John Young as Lord High 
Commissioner, commenced carrying his theories into practice. 
An extraordinary session of the Ionian parliament was con- 
voked to consider his proposals for political and admini- 
strative reform. This assembly commenced its proceedings 
by voting that it was the unanimous will of the Ionian 
people of whom it was the mouth-piece that the seven 
islands should be united with the kingdom of Greece. This 
contemptuous treatment of a well-meant desire for improve- 
ment enabled Mr. Gladstone to see, what others had already 
observed, that the Ionian assembly and the British govern- 
ment were separated by irreconcileable differences. Mr. 

1 Parliamentary Papers, i86l. Papers relative to the mission of the Right Hon. 
W. E. Gladstone to the Ionian Islands in the year 1858. Despatch of the Right 
Hon. Sir E. B. Lytton to the Right Hon. Sir John Young, Bart., p. 37. 



A.D. 1859.] 

Gladstone passed over this attack on the protectorate 
without taking offence, and fixed all his attention on the 
word ^e'A?7(n9, which, he endeavoured to persuade himself, 
signified disposition, and not ivill. It would have been 
more consonant with fact to accept it as it was intended 
by those who used it, simply to mean determination ^. 
Mr. Gladstone, therefore, overlooked the fact that the lonians 
appealed to the right of nationality against the treaty 
which placed the islands under British protection ; he sent 
a message to the chamber stating that it could have no 
will in direct opposition to the constitution from which 
it derived its existence, and instead of telling the members 
that they had violated the constitution, dissolving the 
chamber, and declaring that no deputy should receive a 
salary from the public treasury, he only hinted that if they 
really entertained a will hostile to the constitution and 
the protectorate^ they must give their treasonable wishes 
the form of a petition to the Queen of England as pro- 
tecting sovereign. The plan of recording their hostility 
to British protection in a petition to the protecting sovereign 
delighted all parties in the Ionian Islands. No party at 
that time considered the withdrawal of British protection 
as likely to occur for many years ; all were therefore ready 
to join in a cry against it. The democratic party gained 
a legal status for agitating the question of union with Greece 
at every change of circumstances, and the oligarchical party 
considered that the agitation by increasing the aversion 
of the protectorate to the democrats, secured to the members 
of the oligarchy a larger share in the power and patronage 
at the disposal of the executive ^. 

A petition to the queen was forwarded by Mr. Gladstone, 
It argued that the treaty of Paris in 18 15 placed the islands 
under British protection for the purpose of perpetuating 
their existence as a free and independent state. But that 
treaty was contracted without the participation of the Ionian 
people, and the establishment of the Greek kingdom rendered 

' Papers relative to the mission of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone to the 
Ionian Islands in the year 1858. The Right Hon, W. E. Gladstone to the Right 
Hon. Sir E. B. Lytton,'3ist Jan. 1859, and ist February, 1859, PP- ^^ ^""^ ^4- 

^ The question of union was again brought forward in the Ionian chamber in 
1861. Parliamentary Papers; Ionian Islands, 1861. Sir H. Storks to the Duke of 
Newcastle, nth March, 1861. 

X % 



British protection now superfluous. Moved by these con- 
siderations the Ionian parhament on the 20th of June 1857 
expressed the unanimous desire of the lonians in favour of 
union with Greece, which was again proclaimed by the vote 
of the 27th of January 1859, that ' the single and unanimous 
will of the Ionian people has been and is for their union 
with the kingdom of Greece.' The chamber submitted these 
representations to Her Majesty, and prayed the queen to 
communicate this declaration to the other powers of Europe, 
and co-operate with them to give effect to the sacred and 
just desire of the lonians. It may be doubted whether the 
Lord High Con^missioner acted constitutionally in trans- 
mitting this petition to the queen, who having no power 
to grant its prayer, was unnecessarily forced to give a negative 
answer, which Mr. Gladstone ought to have given in the 
strongest terms instead of transmitting it. He might have 
added that he would avail himself of constitutional means 
to put an end to attempts to overthrow the protectorate 
by the votes of paid deputies. The queen replied that she 
would neither abandon the protectorate nor permit any 
application to a foreign power for that object. Neverthe- 
less, the transmission of a petition against her authority 
by her Lord High Commissioner produced a conviction 
that the retention of the Ionian Islands was regarded by 
British statesmen as no longer a question of much political 
importance, and that it was the position of the Othoman 
empire and the conduct of King Otho, rather than the 
policy of Great Britain, which rendered the immediate union 
unadvisable. A despatch of Lord John Russell to the British 
minister at Turin, dated the 27th of October i860, was 
cited by the Greeks as a confirmation of this opinion. It 
was stated therein, that the British government recognized 
the right of the Italians to judge of what was most suitable 
for their interests. The Greeks argued that Lord John 
Russell could no't have written this passage without thinking 
of- the mission of his colleague Mr. Gladstone to the Ionian 
Islands ^. 

When the question of union was negatived by the queen's 
reply, Mr. Gladstone stated his plans of reform, and submitted 

' Parliamentary Papers ; Ionian Islands, 1861. Sir Henry Storks to the Duke 
of Newcastle, 1 8th January, 1861. 



A.D. 1859.] 

to the Ionian parliament a series of resolutions extending 
the constitutional powers of the representatives of the people, 
and establishing a more effectual control over the public 
expenditure. It was then proved that both the democratic 
and oligarchical parties were opposed to reform. The demo- 
crats feared lest reform should retard the union and keep 
them excluded from power, and the oligarchs feared a 
diminution of their influence in the public administration. 
The chamber voted that Mr. Gladstone's resolutions were 
inadmissible, and appointed a committee to draw up an 
answer. Nearly half the majority in this vote consisted 
of men who ranked as belonging to the oligarchical section, 
and who at heart desired that the British protectorate should 
not cease in their days. The British government was sup- 
posed to have secured their support by the senatorial and 
other places of profit conferred on members of their families, 
so that their desertion of the cause of the protectorate on 
this occasion convinced many Englishmen that it would 
be wise to seize the first favourable opportunity of getting 
rid of all political connection with the lonians, since no party 
would give British protection sincere support. 

Mr. Gladstone quitted Corfu before the rejection of his pro- 
posals was formally announced, and left to his successor, Sir 
Henry Storks, the task of recording the total failure of his 
mission. The sudden departure of Mr. Gladstone on the 
19th Feb., without waiting to receive the reply of the Ionian 
parliament to his communications, w^as caused by the dis- 
covery that he had disqualified himself from sitting in the 
House of Commons by holding the office of Lord High Com- 
missioner, since it brought him under the provisions of the 
act which excludes governors of plantations. At all events 
his seat was vacated by acceptance of a place under the 
Crown, even if he could be legally re-elected^. The discovery 
of this oversight on the part of a great statesman who had 
gone forth to improve a foreign constitution created some 
ridicule. The disagreeable shock Mr. Gladstone received by 
finding that he had heedlessly exposed himself to the danger 

1 Stat. 6 Ann. c. 7. The letters patent, dated 12th January, 1859, appointing 
Mr. Gladstone to be Lord High Commissioner, are printed in the Parliamentary 
Papers relative to his mission, presented to both Houses of Parliament in iS6i, 
p. 79. 



of losing his seat as a legislator at home, awakened him from 
his dream of gaining immortal honour as a legislator in 
Greece. It was necessary for him to get quit of his Lord 
High Commissionership and appear in his place in parlia- 
ment, before any member could move for a new writ for 
the University of Oxford, on the ground that its representa- 
tive had accepted an office under the Crown which excluded 
him from the House of Commons. To escape such an event, 
Sir Henry Storks was hurried out to Corfu as Lord High 
Commissioner, and Mr. Gladstone returned to England in the 
precipitate manner that astonished the Greeks. 

In 1 86 1 the lonians again attacked the British protectorate. 
The parliament met, and proposals were placed on the order 
of the day for discussion, that an address to the representa- 
tives of the peoples, to the governments, and to the philan- 
thropists of Christian Europe against British protection should 
be drawn up. Mr. Gladstone was accused of persuading the 
Ionian parliament to send a petition to the Queen of England 
with the expectation of settling the question of union by a 
final negative. But it was asserted that union with Greece 
could alone save the Ionian Islands from ruin. The seven 
islands, ' the first star in the regeneration of the East,' were 
decaying and falling to ruin civilly, politically, and economi- 
cally, in consequence of the opposition of the British govern- 
ment to their union with Greece. The question of union, it 
was triumphantly asserted, was not a question. This revo- 
lutionary act of inviting foreign intervention was not punished. 
Sir Henry Storks, 'carrying,' as he said, 'forbearance to the 
utmost limits of his duty,' sent a message requiring the repre- 
sentatives to expunge the proposals from the order of the 
day. The majority determined to discuss them in contempt 
of this message, and the Lord High Commissioner to prevent 
the debate prorogued the parliament for six months \ The 
proposals implied an act of rebellion against British protec- 
tion, and they were filled with foolish and false assertions, but 
they stated one truth which no Englishman was disposed to 

^ A Greek writer says, ' If ever a state was prosperous, free, and progressing 
under the dominion of another, that state was Ionia under the protection of Great 
Britain ; and yet no people could be more restless in their position, and more 
anxious to escape from the shelter afforded by the patron power than the lonians.' 
Eait and West, a diplomatic History of the Annexation of the Ionian Islands to the 
Kingdom of Greece, by Stefanos Xenos, p. 26. 





I contest. The seven islands were placed under the protection 
iof the sovereign of Great Britain as a sacred deposit which 
■ ought to be restored to a regenerated nation. The question 
was whether Greece was entitled to receive the deposit. It 
was evident that things were brought to a crisis. In vain 
Mr. Gladstone, speaking as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
the House of Commons, on the 7th of May declared that the 
abandonment of the protectorate by Great Britain would be 
j nothing less than a crime against the safety of Europe. Facts 
' were stronger than his eloquence, and it was evident that the 
I British government must either permit its protectorate to be 
; rendered contemptible by a parliament that insulted it annu- 
ally, or else the islands must be governed without a repre- 
sentative assembly. From this alternative there was no escape 
I except by uniting the islands with Greece^. 
I The revolution of 1862 afforded an opportunity of which 
the British government took advantage, and in the month of 
I December, as has been already mentioned, the provisional 
government was informed that, if the king whom the Greeks 
elected should be a person against whom no well-founded 
objection could be raised, Queen Victoria would take mea- 
sures for uniting the Ionian Islands with the Hellenic kingdom. 
The election of King George fulfilled every condition required, 
and on the 14th November 1863 a treaty was signed by 
France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, regulating the 
conditions of the annexation. The three protecting powers 
undertook to conclude a treaty with the Greek kingdom for 
completing the union, because Austria and Prussia had not 
acknowledged the Danish prince as King of the Hellenes. 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, as protecting powers, con- 
cluded a treaty with Greece for carrying into effect the stipu- 
lations of the treaty signed by the five powers, and bound 
themselves to communicate this treaty to Austria and Prussia. 
The Ionian Islands were transferred to Greece under the con- 
dition of neutrality, the dismantling of the fortifications, and 
the maintenance of the commercial privileges enjoyed by 
foreigners. The neutrality and the dismantling of the forti- 
fications, instead of being regarded as an advantage by a 
weak state dependent on the protection of the great powers, 

* Parliamentary Papers; Ionian Islands, 1861. Sir Henry Storks to the Duke 
of Newcastle, with enclosures, nth March, 1861. 


[Bk. V. Ch. VI. 

caused great dissatisfaction in Greece, where all classes in- 
dujcfed in visions of new annexations^. 

The Greek plenipotentiary sent to London to conclude the 
treaty was instructed to protest against the destruction of the 
fortifications as unjust to Greece, and the neutrality as useless 
and impracticable, and in case his representations should 
prove of no avail, he was ordered to decline signing the 
treaty-. Negotiations were carried on at London for four 
months. The Russian ambassador. Baron Brunnow, an able 
and experienced diplomatist, told the Greek plenipotentiary 
that ' the alleging of impossibilities was a bad and dangerous 
weapon,' but the bold and inexperienced Greek replied that 
the impossibility was a matter of fact. The three protecting 
powers made as many concessions to Greek susceptibility as 
they thought consistent with their duty to the other powers 
interested. They restricted the neutrality to Corfu and 
Paxos^. and the dismantling of the fortifications to the de- 
struction of some of the most important works at Corfu. 
They were finally compelled to put an end to further ob- 
jections on the part of the Greek government by declaring 
that the great powers were the proper judges of what the 
general interest of Europe required, and that the Greek 
plenipotentiary must sign the treaty prepared by the three 
guaranteeing powers, or else the Greeks must accept the 
responsibility of delaying the union. In the mean time the 
dismantling of the fortifications of Corfu was completed, and 

^ Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence respecting the revolution in Greece, 
October, 1S62. Earl Russell to Mr. Elliot, 12th December, Xo. 3, 1863. De- 
spatch respecting the union of the Ionian Islands with Greece ; Earl Russell to 
Lord Bloomfield, loth June, 1863. This last document is a circular which reads 
like a caricature of Earl Russell's diplomatic style. He informs the British ambas- 
sadors and ministers to whom it is addressed, ' that the Ionian Islands are not, as 
some persons appear to suppose, a part of the possessions of the British crown. 
They form the republic of the seven islands, placed by treaty under the protection 
of the sovereign of the United Kingdom.' It is curious to find a British statesman 
supposing so much ignorance in British ambassadors as to require to be reminded 
of this, had it been true. But it is a strange display of ignorance, for the first 
article of the treaty of 1815, which is cited in the despatch, says that the Ionian 
Islands were, not as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs appears to have 
supposed, a republic, but ' that they form a state, under the denomination of the 
United States of the Ionian Isles.' In the year 1815 they had long ceased to be a 

'' ''E-fypi<pi kmcTTji/ji d<popMVTa ras eirl tov ''E-mavqaiaKov Z-qT-q^aros Aiavpayfxa- 
reiKjfts. Iv 'A&TjvaLS, 1S64. 'Odrj-fiai, p. 3. These documents are translated in the 
work of Mr. Stefanos Xenos, East and West; Correspondence relating to the 
union, presented to the Greek National Assembly, Instruction to M. Charilaos 
Tricoupi, p. i. 



A.D. 1864.] 

at last the treaty was signed on the 29th March 1864; and 
a protocol on the same day recorded the engagement of 
King George to maintain the conditions of his election, in 
virtue of which his legitimate heirs and successors must 
profess the tenets of the Orthodox Church of the East ^ 

On the 2nd June 1864 the Lord High Commissioner 
delivered up the government of the Ionian Islands to a 
Greek commissioner, the English forces left Corfu, and the 
United States of the Ionian Islands ceased to exist, and its 
territory became a part of the Greek kingdom. The poli- 
tical connection between Greeks and Englishmen, which 
had existed ever since 18 15 with little satisfaction to 
either nation, was terminated without any regret. Instead of 
creating feelings of mutual esteem, it had produced con- 
stantly increasing divergences of views, which had ended in 
dislike, if not in positive aversion. 

In destroying the monarchy of 1832 the Greeks abolished 
the constitution of 1844. They preferred making a new 
constitution to the slower method of improving what was 
imperfect in their institutions, and reforming what was vicious 
in their social habits. They imagined that it would be easier 
to create a perfect government from theorj^ than to improve 
the existing administration with the aid of experience. 
National servitude has prevented them from looking to their 
past with feelings of attachment and respect, and they have 
not yet enjoyed the adv^antages of a regular administration 
for a sufficient length of time to understand that the per- 
manence of institutions is one of the best defences against 
arbitrary power, whether it be exercised by kings, ministers^ 
or mobs. In 1862 the people did not perceive that the 
evils of their government proceeded more directly from the 
corruption of their administrative system than from the 
imperfections of the constitution of 1844. Administrative 

^ The Russian ambassador at London insisted on King George giving this 
engagement. Confidence in the honour of princes and sovereigns had been greatly 
diminished by late events in Europe. And the Russian ambassador observed that, 
although the matter was decided by a decree of the National Assembly, and that 
decree was accepted by the three protecting powers and the King of Denmark, 
who acted as tutor of King George, there was not yet a direct engagement and 
acceptance on the part of the King of the Hellenes. Such acceptance it appeared 
was deemed necessary, in consequence of the conduct of the Prince of Augusten- 
burg, which showed the inefficacy of obligations undertaken by parents and tutors. 
Xenos, East and West; Correspondence, p. 146. 


[Bk.V. Ch.VI. 

reform lies beyond the direct sphere of popular action, and 
the officials of King Otho's government who crept into power 
as revolutionary leaders, administered public affairs under the 
new constitution as badly as under the old. The evil of 
place-hunting which degraded the character of the educated \^ 
classes was not diminished, and the progress of the nation 
continued to be obstructed by the wasteful manner in which. 
the revenues of the state were expended. 

The National Assembly met on the 22nd December 1862, 
and was dissolved on the 28th November 1864. Its merits 
and defects arose from the nature of its composition, which 
explains why it frequently allowed its proceedings to be 
guided by theory instead of practice. Within the limits of 
the Greek kingdom, the members were elected in the same 
manner as the deputies had been elected to the chamber of 
representatives under the constitution of 1844, only the 
number was doubled. The reaction against King Otho's 
system and revolutionary influences caused a large majority 
of new men to obtain seats, and these men were often 
inexperienced in parliamentary business. A new principle 
of representation was also introduced, in order to give this 
assembly a national character, and add to its moral as well 
as its political influence by making it embrace a wider 
sphere of opinions and interests. Every community of Greek 
citizens resident in foreign countries was authorized to send a 
representative to the assembly, if its number exceeded 100 
souls ; if it exceeded 1000 souls it was authorized to send 
two representatives, and if it exceeded 10,000 souls three 
representatives. The elections were to take place in 
the consulates ^ The decree of the provisional government 
that established this principle of representation was illogical 
and unjust, and it was carried into execution in a way 
directly at variance with the reasons urged for its adoption. 
The electoral districts of Greece generally elected a represen- 
tative for every 7500 souls. The Greek citizens abroad, who 
paid no taxes to the Greek state, and suffered nothing from 
bad fiscal laws and the misapplication of the public expendi- 
ture, whose families were not liable to the conscription, and 
whose chief national object was to attack the Othoman 

^ Decree of the' Provisional Government, dated 23rd October (5th November), 



V.D. 1863.] 

empire, were privileged to elect two deputies in many cases 
where native communities were only entitled to elect one. 
This anomaly was justified by the argument that small 
Greek communities in England or Palestine could send men 
of high character and varied experience as merchants and 
capitalists, whose knowledge of the world would add dignity 
to the grand council of the nation. A wider sphere would 
secure the services of higher intellectual powers, diminish 
the influences of party passions, and command more general 
respect. But the privilege was exercised in direct opposition 
to the reasons employed for its justification. The commu- 
nities abroad, instead of electing experienced merchants and 
great capitalists of independent character, in most cases 
elected government officials trained up under the administra- 
tive system which it was the principal object of the Revolution 
to destroy. These consular elections introduced into the 
^National Assembly a number of ex-ministers, foreign office 
clerks, and other officials, who were mere party organs or 
political adventurers ^. Comparatively few foreign communi- 
ties elected members of their own societies. 

The decree of the people published during the night of 
the Revolution declared, that a National Assembly was to be 
convoked in order to elect a king and organize the state ; 
this was interpreted as meaning that it was to reform the 
executive government and frame a new constitution-. The 
assembly spent a month in examining the credentials of its 
members, and on the 23rd January 1H63 began to prepare its 
rules of procedure. On the 3rd February it decreed that 
Prince Alfred had been elected by universal suffrage constitu- 
tional King of Greece. Experience soon made it apparent 
that the assembly was incapable of reforming the executive 
government, and various circumstances created delay in 
adopting a new constitution. On the 30th March 1863 it 

* M. Tricoupi, the historian of the revolution, who had been long Greek 
minister in England, was elected representative by the Greeks of the mercantile 
community at Manchester, because he failed to obtain the votes of his fellow- 
citizens in his native town of Mesolonghi. A Greek merchant was for a short 
time representative of the community in London, but he resigned to make way for 
M. Charilaos Tricoupi, who had been his father's secretary of legation in England. 
M. Chrestides, a veteran minister of King Otho, was elected by the community of 
Cairo. M. D. Mavrocordatos, minister of foreign affairs in the Balbes cabinet, 
was the representative of the community of Leghorn. 

"^ Revolutionary Decree, loth (22nd) October, 1862. 



was announced that the British government recommended 

candidate, and on the same day King George I. was electedl 

by the National Assembly constitutional King of the HelTJ 

lenes. The union of the Ionian Islands then became a cause 

of delay. At length the annexation was completed, andl 

eighty-four Ionian representatives having taken their seats ini 

the assembly, the discussion of the draft of the constitutionl 

prepared by a committee commenced on the loth Augustj 


During the year which elapsed from the Revolution to thel 

arrival of King George at Athens on the 30th October 1863,! 

the leading men in the National Assembly were invested^"' 

with all the powers of the executive government. The 

assembly was much occupied in choosing a president andl 

ministers, rewarding the partizans of revolutionary opinions,! 

and voting salaries. To create patronage had been a vice ofl 

King Otho's government, and it continued to exist in thej 

National Assembly. The administration of the assemblyJ 

instead of improving the finances and organizing the navy,| 

army, and civil service, wasted the national revenues, anc 

allowed every branch of the government to fall into a degree 

of disorder approaching anarchy ^. In the month of June,] 

the army on paper amounted to upward of 9000 men, and offci 

this number 4000 were receiving pay as commissioned orj 

non-commissioned officers, and of the 5000 privates not morelito 

than 2600 were with their regiments. It was subsequently™ 

stated that pay was drawn for 1160 in a battalion, when J 

it could not muster more than 400 men ^. Things were[ 

worse in the navy, for the number of officers exceeded the] 

number of seamen, half the seamen were not afloat, and som#l 

— ^ — "^j 

^ The population of the Ionian Islands was estimated at 235,000. They hidj 
consequently a larger share of the national representation than the Greeks of the! 
kingdom, since they had a deputy to every 2500 souls of the Ionian population, 
and in the Peloponnesus in the most favoured districts there was only a deputy to. 
double that number. [ 

- During the year that preceded the arrival of King George, there were seven 
cabinets, including modifications, and forty-two changes of ministerial portfolios; 
twelve ministers, including all the presidents of the government, had been ministers 
of King Otho, and twenty-three new ministers were introduced into the cabinet by 
the National Assembly. 

^ Discussions in the National Assembly, 15th (27th) May, 1863. One of the 
battalions that took part in the civil war in the streets of Athens was only forty- 
five strong, viz., five officers, ten sergeants-major, twelve sergeants, eleven corporals, 
and seven privates. It had disbanded itself after the revolution, and all the con- 
scripts returned home. See the statement of Lieut.-Col. Pappadiamaiitopoulos, 
La Grece, 5th February, 1864, 


.D. 1863.] 

)f the officers as well as the seamen were landsmen who 
cnew nothing of the service. 
i Partly from the inaptitude of a representative body to 
,nanage executive business, and partly from the desire of 
^■ihe members of the assembly to prolong their power, their 
Droceedings were very dilatory. Subjects were discussed of 
hich the assembly ought not to have taken cognizance, 
he national disposition to get business out of the way when 
t presented difficulties was observable, and little practical 
bility was shown in carrying good measures into immediate 
xecution. Sometimes the meetings took place only once 
I week, and both in the manner of attending and in the 
Liabit of preventing the formation of a house, there was a 
isplay of that want of a sense of duty which is one of the 
preat social defects of the Greeks. The people desired the 
:stablishment of a strong and responsible government, in 
rder that the laws might be executed with vigour and 
mpartiality; and they left it entirely to the assembly to 
judge what laws were required and how they were to be 
jCarried into effect. Unfortunately for Greece neither the 
ivil nor military services produced a single man capable of 
aking the lead as an organizer, and the country produced 
.0 man with the talents that constitute a statesman and a 
ruler. These evils were increased by the docility of the 
people in politics, who, habituated to obedience by the 
centralization of action in the hands of the government, 
looked to the National Assembly for all practical measures of 
improvement. Little was done towards ameliorating the 
condition of the agricultural population ; the labour question 
and the obstacles that prevented the employment of capital 
in land were not examined ; no effort was made for diminish- 
ing the expense of transport, and no system was adopted 
for giving security to life and property and suppressing 
brigandage. The representatives of the Greek people and of 
the foreign communities, after voting salaries to themselves 
for performing public business, absented themselves from the 
assembly to attend to their own private affairs. Their con- 
duct caused many of their countrymen to consider Greek 
I society as not yet prepared for representative assemblies and 
constitutional government. Despotic power may be the most 
certain means of enforcing responsibility on government 


[Bk. V. Ch. VI. 
officials, but the best despot cannot in the end prevent so 
much evil as a moderately good representative system. 
Public opinion is the safest mode of enforcing responsibility, 
because it is the surest mode of creating a sense of duty; 
but the value of public opinion is in proportion to the 
morality of the people. 

A detailed account of the party contests in the National 
Assembly would add little to a knowledge of Greek history. 
Similar conduct will, in all probability, be repeated, when- 
ever men under similar circumstances find themselves 
invested with almost unlimited power, even if it be allowed 
that the modern Greeks excel in intellectual acuteness and 
moral insensibility. Yet, in spite of the evils which resulted 
from power falling into the hands of politicians already 
corrupted by a bad administrative system, still the National 
Assembly of 1862 will occupy an important place in the 
history of the political institutions of Greece. Its bad 
executive administration will be forgotten, and its legislation 
will obtain for it an honourable position. Its character will 
be judged by the constitution of 1864, and by the municipal 
law it enacted. Few will read the records of its administra- 
tive errors and its long debates on party measures, but its 
legislation will be studied as reflecting the national opinions 
on many questions connected with the general progress of 
European society. The abolition of an upper chamber of 
aged officials to represent aristocracy, the restriction of the 
previous exemption of officials of the central government 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, and the relief of 
the municipal administration from its subordination to minis- 
ters and nomarchs, were important improvements, and they 
were in opposition to the principles of the French system, 
which the Greeks had hitherto taken as the model for their 
government. Unlike the previous assemblies, which adopted 
Western theories and transcribed foreign constitutions, the 
National Assembly of 1862 endeavoured to frame a constitu- 
tion capable of remedying past evils and preventing future 
abuses. It sought to adapt the action of the executive to the 
existing state of society in the Hellenic population, and it is 
deserving of study, because it forms an authentic record 
of the wants and opinions of a people differing in many 
respects from the nations of Western Europe. 



A.D. 1864.] 

Even after the National Assembly commenced its proper 
work, it advanced very slowly in framing the constitution. 
Instead of devoting every hour to the completion of the 
special business for which it existed, and making every 
effort to terminate the provisional and revolutionary position 
of the supreme power in the state which the assembly had 
assumed, and hastening by every means in its power the 
convocation of an ordinary legislature, it wasted day after 
day in stormy discussions on questions it ought not to have 
entertained. These questions were often selected to try 
the strength of the parties into which the assembly was 
split, and the delays created by the party which feared 
defeat ultimately caused much dissatisfaction. The respect 
with which the people regarded the assembly was in danger 
of being changed into disrespect- 
Count Sponneck, a Danish ex-minister, who accompanied 
King George to Greece as a private political counsellor, 
took advantage of the misconduct of the members of the 
assembly to hasten its dissolution. Unfortunately Count 
Sponneck did not possess the talents of a statesman, and 
was deficient in the political discrimination that might have 
served as a substitute for experience in Greek politics. His 
position was one which required a cool judgment and 
great tact, and he possessed very little judgment and was 
utterly wanting in tact. He was entrusted with the delicate 
duty of directing the exercise of the authority of the crown 
in a country where revolutionary measures, without daring 
to dispute constitutional principles, held them in abeyance. 
On the 18th of October 1864, by the advice of Count 
Sponneck, the king sent a message to the National Assembly, 
reminding it that His Majesty had been a year in Greece, and 
that the union of the Ionian Islands was accomplished. The 
king invited the assembly to hasten its work and vote the 
remaining articles of the constitution during the next ten 
days, in accordance with the draft which the ministers of 
the crown would present, promising to ratify all the articles 
already discussed in the form in which they had been voted 
by the assembly. 

This royal message was extremely displeasing to a ma- 
jority of the members of the assembly, but it was in accordance 
with the feelings of the people, and the assembly found that 


[Bk. V. Ch. VI. 

public opinion was strongly in favour of the action of the 1 
crown. The government project, or, to speak correctly, the pro- ' 
ject of Count Sponneck, was voted without any essential modi- 
fication, and sent to the king on the 31st of October 1864. 

The law of election and the municipal law became pretexts 
for new delays, and on the 14th of November the king 
sent a second message to the assembly. The success 
of his first message, which forced the assembly to create a 
council of state, induced Count Sponneck to risk an unwise 
manoeuvre. The pressure of public opinion quite as much as 
the influence of the crown had enforced obedience to the 
first royal message, but the second was not supported by 
public opinion, and a minority of the assembly found 
means to render the count's manoeuvre abortive. In the 
second message his majesty announced that he accepted 
the constitution as voted, and invited the assembly to vote 
the budget of 18(55, and to modify the provisions relative 
to a revision of the constitution. Both these proposals 
were negatived \ 

The demand on the part of the crown that the National 
Assembly, after it had completed the constitution, should 
vote the supplies of the coming year, was a gross violation 
of constitutional principles, and was condemned by the 
voice of public opinion. The work of the assembly was 
completed, and there was ample time to convoke a regular 
chamber for voting the supplies. Moreover the assembly 
contained a number of representatives who were elected 
by constituencies which paid no taxes and possessed no 
constitutional right to vote the supplies. The proposal 
was made for the convenience of Count Sponneck, to dis- 
pense with the necessity of convoking the chamber of 
deputies until the 1st of November 1865, when its meeting 
became obligatory by the constitution. The Greeks were 
offended by this transparent endeavour to avoid meeting 
the representatives of the country on the question of public 
expenditure. The proceeding traced out in the second 
royal message was so adverse to sound policy, that the 
assembly prevented ministers from forming a house to dis- 

' The Assembly was a] so invited to make a verbal change in the second article, 
as far as related to the Catholic clergy, in consequence of a demand on the part of 
the P'rench government, and this change was made. 


A.D. 1864.] 

CUSS the budget of 1865. The opposition rapidly regained 
the popularity it had lost, and the government found it 
necessary to abandon the project. 

On the 28th of November 1864 King George ratified 
the constitution in the hall of the assembly, took the oath 
' it prescribed, and dissolved the National Assembly after it 
had sat nearly two years. 

The constitution of 1864 forms a record of the state 
of public opinion among the educated classes in Greece, 
and of the legislation which they deemed necessary to 
! secure good government. The revolution of 1862 was a 
I national protest against the manner in which the executive 
government had been conducted under the constitution of 
1844, The merits of the new constitution must therefore 
\ be estimated by its efficiency in protecting the people 
against the evils that caused the discontent which ended 
in the dethronement of King Otho, and not exclusively 
i by political theories. Centralization invested the crown 
with a degree of power which ministers and courtiers used 
j for party purposes. Corruption became an instrument for 
carrying on the government, and place-hunting became the 
principal employment of politicians. One great object of 
the Greeks in the Revolution of 1862 was to diminish the 
; sources of corruption, to form honest administrators, and 
to organize a system of national control. Such an under- 
taking requires time for its success, and perhaps more than 
one generation must elapse before the vices of the modern 
Greeks can be ' burnt and purged away.' 
' One of the worst evils of King Otho's reign was the 
destruction of self-government in the municipalities of Greece, 
j and the conversion of the municipal administration into an 
I agency for executing the orders of the central authority. 
I This rendered the demarchies nests of ministerial, courtly, 
I and party patronage. If self-government mean, that the 
i people in their municipalities elect their executive officers, 
j like mayors, as well as their legislators, like common-council- 
' men, and that when the people elect to any office the 
law alone can remove or suspend their nominee from the 
. exercise of his functions, then Greece had no such thing 
' as self-government during Otho's reign. He had so com- 
: pletely nullified municipal institutions that the local revenues 


[Bk.V. Ch.VI. 

of the covmtry were diverted from objects of improvement 
to paying officials. An example was often cited of two 
municipalities having raised funds for making a road, and 
the minister of the interior having compelled each of them 
to expend the whole sum it had raised in paying an en- 
gineer named by the central government, who was selected 
not for his engineering knowledge, but for his ability in 
electioneering. Truly or falsely, similar conduct was very 
generally ascribed to King Otho's government, and it had 
the effect of smothering every attempt at local improve- 

The abuse of patronage in the municipalities by the 
central government revived the local feelings and prejudices 
which it was King Otho's policy to eradicate. When Capo- 
distrias arrived in Greece, he found the action of the central 
government impeded by the strength of the spirit of local 
patriotism. In striving to correct the evil, he curtailed 
the just powers of the local authorities, because he found 
it difficult to restrain their abuses, and he destroyed in 
some degree the vitality which gives a nation energy. 
During King Otho's reign all local activity was sternly 
repressed, and there was never a country in possession of 
so large a share of political liberty as Greece after 1844 
which had so little control over its internal administration. 
The system attained its most vicious form when the Revo- 
lution of 1862 destroyed the chamber of demarchs. The 
constitution of 1864 bears traces that a conflict has com- 
menced between the people and the classes who uphold 
corruption. The new municipal law contains many enactments 
calculated to give independence to local activity, without 
diminishing the necessary control which the central govern- 
ment must always exercise in order to enforce the equitable 
application of the law. 

The first object of the constitution of 1864 was to give 
additional securities to the liberty of the subject and defend 
private property against the power of the government. King 
Otho was not prevented by the constitution of 1844 from 
keeping men in prison for more than a year without bringing 
them to trial. When he had ruined them, he turned them 
loose, knowing that the law would afford them no redress, \ 
if their imprisonment had taken place in virtue of a formal 


A.D. 1864,] 

official order. This exemption of the acts of officials from 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals, unless government 
consented to their prosecution, was a principle of King 
Otho's constitutional administration which relieved tyranny 
from legal restraint. The constitution of 1844 declared 
that all Greeks were equal in the eye of the law, but 
the law in the case of government officials could take no 
cognizance of the violation of this principle, unless with 
the consent of those who had ordered the wrong to be 
committed. Those who ought to have been peculiarly 
amenable to the authority of the courts of justice were 
able to obtain exemption from the law of the land. King 
Otho had often seized private property, both for objects 
of public utility and for his own private use, and left the 
proprietors unpaid for years. The constitution of 1864 en- 
deavoured to prevent the recurrence of these acts of injustice, 
and its provisions relative to the protection of personal 
liberty and the rights of property are wise and liberal. 
No one can be detained in prison beyond three months 
without a public trial, and the detention of a citizen by 
an officer of justice without a legal warrant is punishable 
ias illegal imprisonment. The right of petition, of public 
meeting, and of association, and the freedom of the press, 
are fully recognized and well defined. No man can be 
deprived of his property except for public objects, and 
then only after previous indemnification. 

Those who frame constitutions, being generally lawyers, 
have adopted some legal fictions which they repeat without 
hesitation, though they themselves treat them as conven- 
tional falsehoods. This practice of saying one thing and 
thinking another has made men despicable ever since the 
time of Homer \ The constitution of 1864 commences 
its provisions for securing personal liberty by declaring that 
all Greeks are equal in the eye of the law, and it terminates 
them by a contradiction of this declaration, saying that 
for illegalities specially ordered by ministers, no govern- 
ment official can be prosecuted without a permission from 
government. The administrative power is left in the king's 
hands above the law, and a door is opened to every abuse 

* "Os x' 'i'Tfpov liiv KsvOri ivl fptaiv, dKKo §€ e^rrj?, 
Y 2 


[Bk.V. Ch.VI. 

of authority by the central government. The people desired 
to enforce the supremacy of the law, but there were too 
many members of the National Assembly who were in- 
terested in escaping from legal responsibility, to allow com- 
mon sense to get the better of administrative logic. Had 
pubhc opinion been fully enlightened on this subject, the 
constitution would have declared the supremacy of the 
law and not the fictitious equality of the Greeks. If it be 
considered necessary to exempt ministers and other govern- 
ment officials from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, 
it would be honest to omit the false assertion concerning 
the equality of all Greeks in the eye of the law. It was 
notorious in Greece^, even while the National Assembly 
was sitting, that the military were exempt from the law 
as applied to other Greek subjects. Proofs of this privi- 
leged position of the military are contained in the consti- 
tution itself. Excessive exemptions are conceded to officers 
who may seek to be elected deputies to the legislative 
chamber ^. 

The constitution omitted all notice of the rights conferred 
and the obligations imposed on citizens by the national 
organization which forms them into a state. Civil liberty 
can have no active life without national institutions based 
on a system of self-government in local affairs. It was 
therefore a great neglect not to indicate clearly the basis 
on which the national organization of political society must 

' Art. Ixxi. A case occurred which shows how far the military were removed 
from equality with the other Greeks in the eye of the law. While the National 
Assembly was sitting, an officer entered the office or house of the editor of a news- 
paper at Athens, and assaulted him, because he had published something offensive 
to the marshal of the court, who was the officer's father. The civil tribunals, in 
spite of the declaration which existed in the constitution of 1844, that the Greeks 
are equal in the eye of the law, declared that they were incompetent to redress the 
wrong and punish the violence, because military men are amenable only to military 
tribunals. Of course military tribunals everywhere regard beating a civilian, and 
especially a newspaper writer, as a very venial offence, even if they do not in the 
particular case consider it a very meritorious act. 

In place of vague assertions about equality, which seem to be made as a conso- 
lation to the vanity of nations who raise their governments above the law, it 
would be v/iser to guarantee personal liberty by an article conceived in some such 
terms as the following : — 

All Greeks are equally subject to the law, and amenable in similar cases to the 
same tribunals. Neither rank, official positioji, nor the command of a superior, 
whether civil, military, or ecclesiastical, can exempt any person under any circum- 
stances from answering before the competent tribunal for an act affecting the 
position or interests of another person. The law in Greece knows no distinction 
of persons, where a wrong has been done or an interest affected. 


A.D. 1864.] 

rest. The social duties which the citizen is bound to perform 
in his parish ought to be noticed in the constitution of a 
free state, as well as the rights he is called to exercise in 
order to protect liberty against centralization '. 

The powers conferred on the crown by the constitution 
of 1864 were ample, and well adapted to the position of 
a foreign king in an imperfectly organized country, where 
an efficient head of the executive government is required 
to control the administrative power of ministers and enforce 
responsibility on the leaders of parties. It is the general belief 
[in Greece that good government is only attainable by a 
co-ordinate action of the king and the people in arraigning 
government officials before the great tribunal of public opinion. 
This leads many to think that the best method of preventing 
ministers and officials from abusing the powers with which 
they are invested by a party majority is to invest the king 
with despotic power. Whether collectors of taxes, gen- 
darmes, and irregular troops, who are sent out to pursue 
brigands, would oppress the people less, if an ill-organized 
administration be controlled by a careless king or by a 
corrupt faction, may be a matter of doubt. The consti- 
tution of Greece has proclaimed the sovereignty of the 
people, which is perhaps as unpractical as the despotism of 
a foreign king. 

With that spirit of indecision which marks political opinion 

1 The following provisions might perhaps have been inserted in the constitution 
as a guarantee for the national institutions. The municipal law is only the com- 
plement of one branch of this subject. 

All Greeks have public duties to perform, local rights to exercise, and national 
institutions to defend. Some of these duties and rights are inherent in citizenship 
in a free country ; others are created and defined by express laws. 

All citizens have duties to perform as residents in a parish, a ward, a demos, and 

I a province. . . 

I Their duties in a parish refer to local charity and primary education. 

' Their duties in a ward to sanitary regulations, measures of pohce, and the 

; maintenance of public order. , ^ , . , , , ,. 

' Their duties in their demos and province are defined in the laws relative to 

I municipal and provincial institutions which secure self-government to the Greeks. 

i The citizens of each ward in a demos have a right to elect a paredros to repre- 

|Sent them in the municipal council by the majority of the votes of the resident 

! citizens. .,, , , , c ^x, 

'< The citizens of each province elect provincial councillors by the votes ot tne 
' citizens who pay at least 50 drachmas annually of direct taxes. 
I Neither a paredros, demarch. nor provincial nor municipal councillor, can be 
(suspended or removed from his functions except by the decision of a court ot 
Ijustice. For in Greece, where the people elect to an office, the law alone can 
' terminate its exercise. 


[Bk. V. Ch. VI. 
in Greece, the constitution declares that the king is irre- 
sponsible, and then it renders him responsible by exactino- 
from him an oath. It cannot mean that he is not to be 
held responsible in case he deliberately violates this oath. 
It is astonishing that modern statesmen should persist in 
repeating the philosophic and feudal nonsense they are 
in the habit of inserting in the constitutions they frame. 
It is difficult to see what is precisely meant by royal irre- 
sponsibility in a constitution which proclaims the sovereignty 
of the people, and it would be wiser to say nothing about 
it when drawing up a contract between the king and the 
people. The fiction of royal irresponsibility or divine rio-ht, 
and the phrase ' the king can do no wrong,' are incitements 
to the destruction of constitutions by what are called coiips 
d'etat. The person of a king may be declared sacred to 
save him from the penalty of his crimes ; but to say that 
it is a constitutional maxim that a king can do no wrono- 
is simply nonsense. Even in England it never had any 
reason for existing, except as a rule of law to show that 
the king could not be sued in a court of justice. The 
sovereign of England can do wrong constitutionally and 
be punished personally. He can marry a Catholic, and 
the law punishes him for that act by the forfeiture of 
the crown ; or he may himself become a Catholic, and 
he ceases to be sovereign and is dethroned without a revo- 

The Greek constitution contains a wise provision for 
upholding the proper authority of the executive. The 
crown alone can propose to the legislature a vote relatin«- 
to the appropriation of money for the public expenditure. 

The king is also invested with governing power to control 
his prime minister and his cabinet. He is not called to the 
throne to reign only, he must also govern. The prime 
minister is selected by the king: he chooses the members 
of his cabinet, and presides in the council of ministers. 
But the king controls the powers of his prime minister 
by the necessity of holding regular ministerial councils, 
which create systematic responsibility in the record of their 
proceedings that must be laid before the king. The power 
of organizing the procedure of the council of ministers 
is placed by the constitution in the hands of the crown, 


A. D. 1864.] 

since it contains enactments requiring that many acts of 
the executive government should be countersigned by all 
the members of the ministry. 

One of the greatest defects of the constitution of 1864 
is that it confers on the king a civil list out of all proportion 
with the revenues of the country and with the private 
fortunes of his subjects. 

While the constitution enforces constitutional forms on 
the crown, by providing that no act of the king is valid 
until it be countersigned by a minister who, by his signature, 
renders himself responsible for the consequences of its exe- 
cution, it contains no stipulations for enforcing ministerial 
responsibility. The influence of the official classes in the 
National Assembly was strong enough to prevent the in- 
sertion of any such provisions ; and it was only enacted 
that a special law, determining ministerial responsibility, 
the punishments to be imposed, and the forms of procedure 
to be followed, was to be submitted to the house of repre- 
sentatives and voted in the first legislative session ^ This 
stipulation imposed on the ministers of the crown the duty 
of presenting this law. They neglected to perform their 
duty, and already one of the articles of the constitution of 
1864 has been deliberately violated. 

How far a constitutional king ought to govern personally, 
j is a question that in every constitutional country must be 
determined by the character of the monarch and the cir- 
cumstances of the time. The Greek constitution can hardly 
' be said to adopt the maxim of many liberals, that the 
1 king must reign and not govern. The Greeks, generally, be- 
lieved that the state of their country required the king 
I to exercise the governing power by controlling the v/hole 
! central administration ; they wished him to act the part 
in the Greek government which is performed in the British 
government by the authority of the prime minister indepen- 
dent of any special office. The Greeks have an instinctive 
feeling that the constitutional prerogatives of the crown 
ought to invest the sovereign with the power of checking 
the authority of his cabinet, for the prime minister must 
be the leader, and in some degree the instrument, of a 

1 Art. Ixxx. 


[Bk. V. Ch. VI. 

party majority in a single chamber. The existence of only 
one chamber, and the great power which the union of 
parliamentary and governmental patronage confers on the 
leader of a powerful party in a place-hunting community, 
require that the royal authority should be strong in order 
to adjust the political balance. The king has the same 
interest in moderating party supremacy as the people, and 
the people look to the king for preserving the administration 
of justice free from the influence of faction, and for com- 
pelling the ministers and the majority of the house of re- 
presentatives to act in strict conformity with the constitution. 
Publicity is perhaps the most efficient means for enabling 
the crown to prevent the ministers and the chamber from 
abusing their powers, but the people in Greece are not yet 
fully aware of the action of public opinion^. 

The senate created by the constitution of 1844 consisted 
of about fifty officials of high rank in the civil and military 
service. No independent man could enter the senate 
by his position in the country alone, even if he united in 
his person the possession of large landed property, great 
talents, and general esteem. The place of senator was 
reserved for those who had occupied certain offices^ been 
deputies during two parliaments, or held for several years 
municipal positions over which the government then exercised 
direct control. The consequence was that the senate became 
both an obstructive body, and a servile instrument of King 
Otho's administrative system. Almost every member was 
accused of participating in some scheme for promoting his 
own pecuniary advantage or extending his personal patron- 

' It is interesting to note what .ire considered to be the prerogatives of a prime 
minister in England. 'The power of the first minister is supreme in his cabinet; 
if he ceases to be first minister, the ministry is, ipso facto, dissolved ; individual 
ministers may retain their offices, and may form part of a fresh combination with 
another head ; but it is a new ministry, and the colleagues of the new premier 
must make a fresh agreement with him. If a cabinet minister desire any recasting 
of the parts, he must go to the first minister to make known his desire ; if he wish 
to resign, in the first instance he must communicate his wish to the premier to be 
laid before his sovereign. It is the first minister who, of his own choice, can 
make changes in the administration, subject of course to the pleasure of the 
sovereign. It is not that the premier is primus inter pares, but that he is primus, 
and the next is the next longo i?iteruallo. The substantive power which he 
possesses in his cabinet is very great.' This passage is extracted from George 
Canning and his Times, by A, G. Stapleton, who was for many years Canning's 
pi ivate secretary. 


A,D. 1864.] 

age, and many notorious cases were made public. The 
corruption of tlie senate at last destroyed it. By the 79th 
article of the constitution of 1844 the senators were to receive 
500 drachmas monthly during the legislative sessions. They 
prolonged their sessions to ten months, and at length, em- 
boldened by the general neglect of the constitution, both the 
senate and the chamber of deputies concurred to increase the 
salaries of their members, in direct violation of their oaths to 
preserve the constitution inviolate. The senators took to 
themselves 700 drachmas a month all the year round. This 
act of dishonesty was neither forgotten nor forgiven. The 
Revolution of 1862 dissolved the chamber of deputies and 
abolished the senate. Every senator had rendered himself 
liable to a criminal prosecution for perjury, and to a civil 
action for the repayment of the sums he had received over 
and above the sum accorded by the constitution of 1844. 
But the three members of the provisional government 
established by the Revolution of 1863 had been senators, 
and the violation of the constitution of 1844 had been so 
general, that it was deemed prudent to escape from many 
difficulties by abolishing that constitution as well as the 
senate it created. There was a necessity for framing a new 
constitution, that it might serve* as an act of oblivion and of 
tacit indemnity. 

The question concerning the existence of a senate in 
Greece presents itself in a different form from that which 
it assumes in other countries. It is not so much whether a 
senate be necessary, as whether it be possible, from the state 
of society, to form one. No class exists from which unpaid 
senators can be taken, and experience has proved that a paid 
senate, composed of servile notabilities or superannuated 
officials, can only become a house of retreat for corrupt 
politicians. The committee of the National Assembly of 
1862, being in great part composed of officials, and being 
under the influence of the constitutional theories prevalent in 
western Europe, proposed to re-establish a senate. But the 
sound sense of the nation declared itself decidedly hostile to 
the existence of such a body. There was an evident im- 
possibility of constituting any senate that did not include 
many individuals of the old body, who had been guilty 
of perjury and proved themselves unfit to be entrusted with 



the duty of guarding the constitution. A new senate, there- 
fore, could not fail to become a counterpart of that which the 
nation had abolished. When the question of re-establishing 
a senate was discussed in the National Assembly, Count 
Sponneck, who, like the foreign diplomatists at Athens, 
believed that a senate ought to be established as a necessary 
part of a constitutional monarchy, announced on the part of 
the king, that the existence of a senate would nevertheless not 
be made a government question, Bulgaris, the leader of the 
opposition, declared that he considered a senate composed of 
members nominated by the king for life, to be a necessary 
element in a monarchical constitution. Koumoundouros, 
the leader of the ministerial party, advocated the formation 
of an elective senate, to be chosen for a longer period, and by 
a different constituency from that which elected the chamber 
of deputies. The National Assembly, however, echoing the 
general feeling of the country, consigned the senate to 
oblivion, and made no mention of any such body in the 

A single representative chamber, consisting of not less 
than 150 members, having completed thirty years of age, 
chosen by universal suffrage and secret voting, was estab- 
lished. Paid officials and demarchs are expressly excluded 
from seats in this chamber, but officers of the army and 
navy are granted great privileges and facilities for present- 
ing themselves as candidates. The salaries of represen- 
tatives are reduced to 2000 drachmas for each legislative 
session ^. 

As soon as the National Assembly had decided to estab- 
lish a single legislative chamber. Count Sponneck became 
alarmed at the danger of democracy. He may have feared 
that it would be more difficult for the government to manage 
one chamber which reflected the opinions of the nation, than 
two chambers where more avenues would exist for the 
admission of royal influence. Indeed the greater number 
of the foreigners in Greece agreed with him in believing 
that a nominated senate was necessary, in order to smooth 

' The representatives of the people elected under the constitution of 1864 
attempted to violate this article and vote more money to themselves in their first 
legislative session, reminding us of what Polybius (vi. 56. 13) says of the Greeks, 
whenever they have any control over public money. 


A.D. 1864.] 

j the working of constitutional government by lubricating it 
with the oil of corruption. The royal message of the i8th 
October 1864 made an effort to supply the want of a senate, 
by recommending the creation of a council of state^ under 
circumstances which, as has been already noticed, compelled 
the assembly to adopt the recommendation. A consultative 
body called a council of state was constituted, to which all 
projects of laws introduced into the chamber were to be 
referred for revision. The members of this council were not 
to be fewer in number than fifteen, nor more than twenty. 
They were named for ten years, and were to receive an 
annual salary of 7000 drachmas. The duty of a councillor 
of state was declared to be incompatible with any other 
public office except that of minister. But the duties of 
minister and councillor of state could not be exercised at 
the same time. It was acknowledged that, if it had been 
possible for King George to have selected fifteen able legis- 
lators of high character from among the politicians of Greece, 
the institution of a council of state would have formed a 
valuable addition to the organization of the Hellenic king- 
dom ; but it was felt that, as it was impossible to find men 
fit for the place of senators, the same difficulty existed in 
selecting councillors of state. The names of the men who 
were nominated proved that the public had formed a correct 
opinion. The National Assembly, in order to mark its dissent 
from the policy of establishing a council of state, inserted in 
the constitution an article authorizing the chamber of depu- 
ties to reconsider the measure during the first legislative 
period at the demand of three quarters of the members. 
This article caused no misgivings, for it was supposed that 
the king's ministers would be always opposed to the abolition 
of the council of state, and always able to command the 
adherence of more than a quarter of the deputies to the 
views of the court. 

The council of state was, from the first, extremely un- 
popular in the country. It was looked upon with aversion 
as the revival of a mitigated senate ; and neither the cha- 
racter nor the talents of its members tended to lessen the 
general dislike. Its existence was short. On the ist Decem- 
ber (19th November) 1865, the chamber of deputies in its 
first legislative period decided that it should be abolished by 



1 20 votes to 26. And on the 6th December a royal message 
communicated the king's assent to the chamber ^ 

Whatever may be the defects of the constitution of 1864, 
it affords decisive evidence that the Greeks see some of the 
imperfections of their government and desire to reform them. 
It proves also, that Greece wants something more than the 
rules of political procedure that are embodied in written 
constitutions, in order to infuse better moral principles among 
her people, whose social system has been corrupted by long 
ages of national servitude. 

It would be an idle occupation to conjecture in what 
manner this last Revolution of the Greeks and their new 
constitution will affect the national progress, for both the 
political condition of the Hellenic kingdom and the moral 
condition of the Greek race are in a state of transition. 
Neither is clearly defined. The constitution of 1864 may 
become an instrument for strengthening the sense of duty 
in the king, the feeling of responsibility in the servants of the 
state, and the love of justice in the hearts of the people. 
Those who have long studied the condition of Greece never 
fail to observe that, until the people undergo a moral change 
as well as the government, national progress must be slow, 
and the surest pledges for the enjoyment of true liberty will 
be wanting. 

I now close this work with a hope that the labour of a long 
life, spent in studying the Greek Revolution, and recording 
its history, will not be entirely labour in vain. Greece may 
soon enter on happier years than those of which I have been 
the historian, or than she has enjoyed in my lifetime. Con- 
temporary events have cast dark shadows around me and 
perhaps obscured my view, but even an imperfect sketch of 
great national and social convulsions by an eye-witness, 
though traced by a feeble hand, may prove valuable, if it 
preserve a true outline. Two thousand years of the life of 
the Greek nation have been passed in Roman subjection, 
Byzantine servitude, and Turkish slavery. During this long 
period Greek history is uninviting, even when it is most 
instructive. The efforts the Greeks are now making to 
emerge from their state of degradation will supply the 

* 'Ei^j;/i€/)ts Twv Xv^TjTTjaiwv TJjs BovKrjs, 1865, vol. ii. 450, 460. 


A.D. 1864.] 

materials for a valuable chapter in the history of civilization. 
I conclude with a sincere wish that these efforts may not be 
in vain, and that their complete success may find an able 

Athens, May, 1866. 



The two papers which follow have been added to show the 
manner in which able officers urged the Greeks to avail themselves 
of naval and military science. Captain Hastings, the author of the 
first paper, never obtained any important command; and though 
he introduced great practical changes in naval warfare, and fell, 
' dying in Greece and in a cause so glorious,' he has missed gaining 
a name. 

Sir Charles Napier, who gave the second paper to the writer of 
this work, has won imperishable fame on a wider and more glorious 
field than the Greek Revolution. The name of Hastings hardly 
finds a place in the history of Greece; that of Napier will live for 
ever in the history of England. 

Memorandum by Frank Abney Hastings, Esq., on the use of 
Steamers armed with heavy guns against the Turkish Fleet. 
Communicated to Lord Byron in 1823, and laid before the Greek 
Government, with some modification, in 1824. 

Firstly, I lay down as an axiom that Greece cannot obtain any 
decisive advantage over the Turks without a decided maritime supe- 
riority; for it is necessary to prevent them from relieving their 
fortresses and supplying their armies by sea. 

To prove this it is only necessary to view the state of the Greek 
armies, and that of their finances. 

They are destitute of a corps of artillery, of a park of artillery, 
of a corps of engineers, and of a regular army. With all these 
wants, I ask, how is it possible to take a fortress but by famine? 
This, however, is difficult, even if the sea was shut against the 
Turks ; for, from the state of the Greek finances, and the formation 


of the army, troops can scarcely remain long enough before a place 
furnished with a formidable garrison, and tolerably supplied with 
provisions, to reduce it. However, famine is the only resource, and 
it is by that alone that the fortresses now in the hands of the Greeks 
have been reduced. 

The localities of the country are also such, and the difficulty of 
moving troops so great, that, without the aid of a fleet, all the efforts 
of an invading army would prove fruitless. But on the contrary, 
were an invading army followed by a fleet, I fear that all the efforts 
of the Greeks to oppose it would be ineffectual. The question stands 
thus. Has the Greek fleet hitherto prevented the Turks from supply- 
ing their fortresses, and is it likely to succeed in preventing them ? 
I reply, that Patras, Negrepont, Modon, and Coron have been 
regularly supplied, and Mesolonghi twice blockaded. 

Is it likely that the Greek marine will improve, or that the Turkish 
will retrograde } The contrary is to be feared. We have seen the 
Greek fleet diminish in numbers every year since the commencement 
of the war, while that of the Turks has undeniably improved, from 
the experience they have gained in each campaign. Witness the 
unsuccessful attempts with fire-ships this year (1823). The Turks 
begin to find fire-ships only formidable to those unprepared to receive 

Is the Greek fleet likely to become more formidable? On the 
contrary, the sails, rigging, and hulls are all getting out of repair ; 
and in two years' time thirty sail could hardly be sent to sea without 
an expense which the Greeks would not probably incur ^ 

We now come to the question, How can the Greeks obtain a de- 
cisive superiority over the Turks at sea ? I reply. By a steam-vessel 
armed as I shall describe. But how is Greece to obtain such a vessel ? 
The means of Greece are much more than amply sufficient to meet 
this expenditure. However, there are various reasons which it is not 
necessary to detail, but which would probably prevent the Greek 
government from adopting the plan. It therefore becomes necessary 
to ascertain how such a vessel might be equipped without calling on 
the Greek government to contribute directly. If proper statements 
were made to the Greek committee in England, I think it might be 
induced to bear some part of the expense. I will contribute £1000 
on the condition that I have the command, and that the vessel is 
armed in the manner I propose. If this does not form a sufficient 
fund, I think that the deficiency may be made up by a loan; a 
guarantee being given that a certain portion — say one-half t)f all 

• — , __ 

* The English loan had not yet been obtained. 


prizes — shall be applied to the payment of the interest and the 
extinction of the debt. The same proportion would be set apart 
to meet the expenses of the vessel, so that the Greek government 
might be called upon to bear no other expenses but the wages of 
the crew. 

I shall now explain the details of the proposed armament, and the 
advantages which I think would result from it. It would be neces- 
sary to build or purchase the vessel in England, and send her out 
complete. She should be from 150 to 200 tons burden, of a con- 
struction sufficiently strong to bear two long 32-pounders, one for- 
ward and one aft, and two 68-pounder guns of seven inches bore, 
one on each side. The weight of shot appears to me of the greatest 
importance, for I think I can prove that half a dozen shot or shells 
of these calibres, and employed as I propose, would more than 
suffice to destroy the largest ship. In this case it is not the num- 
ber of projectiles, but their nature and proper application that is 

In order that the vessel should present less surface to the wind 
and less mark to the enemy, combined with a greater range of point- 
ing and more facility for the use of red-hot shot, the bulwark should 
be sufficiently low to admit of the guns being fired over it. From 
the long 32-pounders I propose launching red-hot shot, because, 
though perhaps not more destructive than shells, they give a longer 
range ; and the fuel required to impel the vessel could easily be made 
to heat the shot. The idea being rather novel, startles people at 
first, because, as it has never been put in practice, they imagine 
there must be some extraordinary danger to which it subjects your 
own vessel. But this is not the case. The real reason why it has 
never been adopted hitherto is, that on board a ship you cannot lay 
your guns before you introduce your red-hot shot, as on shore. 
This arises, of course, from the motion of the vessel. In other 
words, the danger arises from the possibility of fire communicating 
to the cartridge during the operation of running-out and pointing 
the gun. If, however, it be proved by experience that, with proper 
precautions, the shot may be allowed to remain any length of time 
in the gun without setting fire to the cartridge, this difficulty (and 
it is the only difficulty) vanishes. In fact, during the siege of Gib- 
raltar the guns were pointed against the block-ships after being 
loaded, it being found that one wet wad alone was sufficient security, 
and that with it the shot might absolutely be left to get cold in the 
gun. It may, however, be thought necessary to cast iron bottoms 
for the hot shot, of the same form as those of wood which I propose 
to make use of in loading the guns with shells. These may be 


338 APPENDIX. i 

placed over the wad, and then the gun may be well sponged, to 
drown any particles of powder that might by accident escape from , 
the cartridge. With this precaution the shot might be left to cool i 
in the gun, and there could therefore be no want of time to run 
out and point it. But this would be unnecessary if the gun worked 
over the bulwark, for it could then be loaded with its muzzle just 
outside the vessel, having been previously laid to its elevation, the 
direction being obtained by a slight movement of the helm. Thus 
there would be no necessity for touching the gun after the shot 
was once introduced. Perhaps the precautions I propose are in 
part superfluous, as hot shot are fired on shore without observing j 

Of the destructive effect of hot shot on an enemy's ship it is 
scarcely necessary for me to speak. The destruction of the Spanish 
fleet before Gibraltar is wefl known. But if I may be permitted 
to relate an example which came under my proper observation, 
it will perhaps tend to corroborate others. At New Orleans the 
Americans had a ship and schooner in the Mississippi that flanked 
our lines. In the commencement we had no cannon. However, 
after a couple of days, two field-pieces of 4 or 6 lb. and a howitzer 
were erected in battery. In ten minutes the schooner was on fire, 
and her comrade, seeing the effect of the hot shot, cut her cable, 
and escaped under favour of a light wind. If such was the result 
of light shot imperfectly heated — for we had no forge — what would 
be the eff"ect of such a volume as a 32-pounder? A single shot 
would set a ship in flames. 

Having treated the subject of hot shot, I shall now pass to the 
use of shells. It has long been well known that ships are more 
alarmed at shells than at other projectiles. However, they rarely 
do the mischief apprehended from them, in consequence of the 
difficulty of hitting so small an object as a ship with a projectile 
thrown vertically. This uncertainty prevents bomb-vessels being 
employed against ships. If, however, shells be thrown horizontally, , 
their effect would be equally great, and the chance of hitting the j 
object aimed at reduced to the same certainty as if shot were used 
within a certain range. If the shell passed inside the vessel and 
exploded, the result would be the same as if it had been thrown 
vertically. My object, however, would be, to arrange it so as to 
make the shell stick in the ship's side and explode there. The result 
in this case would be much more decisive, and it would tear away 
a part of her side, and might send her instantly to the bottom. In 
both cases it would probably destroy a number of the crew and set 
fire to the ship. 


It remains, therefore, to ascertain whether shells can be thrown to 
a sufficient distance with precision from guns and carronades, and 
without any danger to your own vessel. The danger of transporting 
shells is considerably less than the danger of passing powder. It 
is, therefore, only necessary to prove how they may be fired without 
danger. The danger of firing a shell from a gun longer than 
a howitzer or a carronade is, that it might, by rolling in the bore, 
destroy the fusee and explode in the gun ; also, that the fusee might 
break from the successive blows it would receive before it quitted 
the muzzle. Now, both these objections are obviated by attaching 
the shell to a wooden bottom, hollowed out to receive its convexity. 
Each shell would be kept in a separate box. 

We now come to the plan of attack. In executing this, I should 
go directly for the vessel most detached from the enemy's fleet, and 
when at the distance of one mile, open with red-hot shot from the 
3 2 -pounder forward. The gun laid at point blank, with a reduced 
charge, would carry on board en ricochetant. I would then wheel 
round and give the enemy one of the 68-pounders with shell laid at 
the line of metal, which would also ricochet on board him. Then 
the stern 32-pounder with a hot shot, and again the 68-pounder 
of the other side with a shell. By this time the bow-gun would 
be again loaded, and a succession of fire might be kept up as brisk 
as from a vessel having four guns on a side. Here the importance of 
steam is evident. 

With good locks, tubes, Congreve's sights, and other improvements 
in artillery, I really see almost as much difficulty in missing a ship of 
any size in tolerably smooth water as in hitting her. In firing from 
a ship, the great difficulty is in the elevation; but when my guns 
were laid at point blank, or two degrees of elevation, neither shot 
nor shells would ricochet over the enemy. 

With regard to any risk of the steam machinery being destroyed 
by the enemy's fire, there is of course some risk, as there always 
must be in military operations of the simplest kind; but when we 
consider the small object a low steamer would present coming head 
on, and the manner in which the Turks have hitherto used their 
guns at sea, this risk really appears very trifling. The surprise 
caused by seeing a vessel moving in a calm, ofi'ering only a breadth 
of about eighteen feet, and opening a fire with heavy guns at a con- 
siderable distance, may also be taken into account. I am persuaded, 
from what I have seen, that in many cases the Turks would run 
their ships ashore and abandon them, perhaps without having the 
presence of mind to set fire to them. 

It would be necessary to have a Greek brig always in company to 

Z 2 


carry coals and to tow the steamer, for the steam would only be used 
in action ^ 


Memorandum by Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., on Military Operations 
in the Morea against Ibrahim Pasha in 1826. 

If my judgment is correct, the following would be the outline of 
operations for a regular military force, and explains why I think 
Napoli di Malvasia (Monemvasia) so important : — 

1. At Napoli di Malvasia I would establish my magazines and 
form the army. I would provision and garrison NapoU di Romania 
(Nauplia) the best way I could, and leave in it the best of the irre- 
gular troops under the command of the most deserving Greek chief 
Having done so, I would leave them and the government (with the 
example of Mesolonghi) to make their defence, and, having cleared 
myself of all intrigues, take post at Malvasia. 

2. When the preparations for the campaign were sufficiently ad- 
vanced to enable me to act, I would advance with my whole force, 
regular and irregular, to Sparta, or near it, according to circum- 
stances of the ground and roads. Then I would prepare a position 
with field-works, to cover the fortress of Napoli di Malvasia against 
a force coming from Kalamata, or Tripolitza, or Leondari. 

3. This done, if the enemy had his head-quarters at Tripolitza, 
with the mass of his force in that town, I would endeavour to cut off 
his communications with Navarin, Modon, and Coron, by occupying 
the position of Leondari, sending one-half of my irregulars into the 
defiles of Mount Chelmos, and the other half to my rear, towards 
the fortresses of Navarin, Modon, and Coron. I would concentrate 
my whole regular force at Leondari, except a small portion left in 
position at Sparta to secure my communications with Napoli di 
Malvasia. In fact, Sparta would be the pivot on which all operations 
would turn, according to the point on which the enemy had assembled 
his force. 

4. In this state I would remain, strengthening Leondari by field- 
works j and the enemy, no longer able to pass his convoys of pro- 
visions from the coast, must attack me in my strong position (and 

^ The remainder of the memorandum is occupied with financial calculations, 
and with accounts relating to the numbers and pay of the crew. The manner in 
which the plan was eventually carried into execution, and some of its results, were 
narrated by Captain Hastings in a pamphlet written a short time before his death. 
Memoir on the use of Shells. Hot Shot, and from Ship- Artillery. By 
Frank Abney Hastings, Captain of the Greek steam-vessel of war Karteria. 
London, 1828. Published by Ridgway. 


such positions cannot fail to be found in such a country at every 
turn). If he defeats me, I retire, and my troops rally on Sparta in 
the prepared position, where another battle may be fought. If again 
defeated, the remains of my beaten force retire into Napoli di Mal- 
vasia, and await a siege. 

5. Suppose that the enemy has begun the siege of Napoli di 
Romania. Then, instead of marching upon Leondari, I would march 
upon the rear of the besieging army, and post my force so as to cut 
off his supplies from Tripolitza ; and I would send all my irregulars 
round that town and along the road to Navarin as far as Leondari 
and Kalamata. I would strengthen my position as before, and the 
enemy must again come and attack me or starve. If he beat me, 
I would (as before) retire to Sparta, and if again beaten, enter Mal- 
vasia and await a siege. 

6. Suppose neither of the above operations could be effected in 
consequence of the enemy's force being too great, or from some 
other cause. Then I would remain at Sparta with my irregulars 
pushed into the defiles along my front, so as to guard the road from 
Leondari into Messenia ; and I would closely observe him, that I 
might be ready to take advantage of any error he might commit, 
or fall with my whole force upon any convoy by a rapid march from 
Sparta, and retire with equal celerity to my position. 

7. It is pretty clear, by such a plan, the enemy could not besiege 
Napoh di Romania, unless he had so large a force that he could 
form two armies — one to besiege the town, and another to cover 
the siege by marching against Sparta ; and, besides, he would require 
a force to protect all his convoys from my irregular troops. This, 
we know, he has not. The real defence of Napoli di Romania 
depends on Napoli di Malvasia. 

8. I have said, that if beaten at Sparta I would go to Malvasia 
and abide a siege. Suppose, then, the enemy attempted this opera- 
tion, he would find it very difficult, as I would leave all the irregular 
troops under an active partizan in the mountains. These would 
terribly infest his supplies. The place itself is, I am told, of great 
strength, and, however closely blockaded by the sea, could be supplied 
by boats at night, and under certain circumstances of weather. If 
not blockaded by sea very closely, the greatest part of the army 
would be transported to Napoli di Romania, from whence the same 
game would be played in favour of Malvasia that she played in favour 
of Romania, supposing the latter besieged. 

Thus, in this sketch, I have endeavoured to show that you may 
always oblige the enemy to attack you in your own position with 



your back to a fortress, thus uniting offensive war with defensive 
positions, which is the secret of mountain warfare — a warfare that 
requires more science and better drilled troops than any other. 

Peasants may maintain a long war in their mountains without 
science, but no results are produced. 

It will be seen in the plan I propose that a single defeat to the 
enemy would be followed by his total destruction, because, as he 
would be driven to fight for want of provisions, his army must starve 
after a defeat, for the victorious army would remain between him and 
Navarin, from whence he received his supplies. It is true that, 
if his defeat took place at Sparta, he might escape by Kalamata, 
though to retreat through a country of defiles exposed to a hostile 
peasantry is very difficult. But let us suppose he accomplished his 
object and reached Navarin. Still great results are produced to the 
Greeks, who would at once besiege him, and the whole country would 
be recovered, and Tripolitza and Leondari fortified. It is much to 
be doubted if the Turks could long resist in Navarin when besieged 
in a scientific manner. I think it certain that ten days or a fortnight 
would oblige Navarin to surrender. 

With the force now under Ibrahim Pasha, I think he could not 
resist five thousand disciplined troops supported by one ihousand\ 
veteran Europeans. With such a force, and twenty pieces of Ught 
artillery, the Morea might be liberated in a month, and great things 

It is evident that my plan is but an outline, which admits of modi- 
ficadons in filling up the details of execution according to accidents 
of roads, mountains, supplies, the enemy's strength, positions, move- 
ments, &c. In the various operations of the foregoing plan, the 
garrison of Corinth would come out and take post in the passes 
commanding the entrance into the plain of Tripolitza from the 

A great advantage of this plan is, that young Greek regulars are 
not required to attack, but to defend positions. Every old soldier 
knows how to estimate this advantage. My own opinion is, that 
neither Greeks nor Turks would succeed in attacking a well-chosen 
position. The first round of cannon-shot would defeat their column, 
and make them refuse to advance. 

C. N. 



Copy of a letter addressed by Frank Hastings, Esq., to Prince Mavro- 

cordatos, President of Greece. 
The original, as copied in Hastings' journal, was in French, which 

Hastings wrote with facility. 

Corinth, 241k April, 1822. 
Monsieur le Prince, 

I have determined to take the liberty of addressing 
your Highness in writing, as I found you occupied when I had the 
honour of presenting myself at your residence yesterday. I shall 
speak with freedom, convinced that your Highness will reply in the 
same manner. 

I will not amuse you with recounting the sacrifices I have made to 
serve Greece, I came without being invited, and have no right 
to complain if my services are not accepted. In that case, I shall 
only regret that I cannot add my name to those of the liberators 
of Greece ; I shall not cease to wish for the triumph of liberty and 
civilization over tyranny and barbarism. But I believe that I may 
say to your Highness without failing in respect, that I have a right 
to have my services either accepted or refused, for (as you may easily 
suppose) I can spend my money quite as agreeably elsewhere. 

It seems that I am a suspected person because I am an English- 
man. Among people without education I expected to meet with 
some prejudice against Englishmen, in consequence of the conduct 
of the British government, but I confess that I was not prepared to 
find such prejudices among men of rank and education. I was far 
from supposing that the Greek government would believe that every 
individual in the country adopted the same political opinions. I am 
the younger son of Sir Charles Hastings, Baronet, general in the 
army, and in possession of a landed estate of nearly £10,000 a year. 
The Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India, was brought 
up by my grandfather along with my father, and they have been 
as brothers. If I were in search of a place I might surely find one 
more lucrative under the British government in India, and less 
dangerous as well as more respectable than that of a spy among 
the Greeks. I venture to say to your Highness, that if the English 
government wished to employ a spy here, it would not address a 
person of my condition, while there are so many strangers in the 
country who would sell the whole of Greece for a bottle of brandy. 
But it would not be either to the one or the other that it would 


address itself; it would apply to a Greek, and with money traitors 
are to be found in all countries. 

I quitted England because I believed that the government treated 
me in an arbitrary and unjust manner, in dismissing me from the 
navy after fifteen years' service, for an affair of honour while I was on 
half-pay, and consequently when the Admiralty had no right to take 
such a step. But in virtue of the Royal prerogative I was dismissed 
without form, the affair having been misrepresented by an Admiral, 
who having had a personal quarrel with the Marquis of Hastings 
whom he conveyed to India, revenged himself on me. 

What I demand of your Highness is only to serve, without having 
the power to injure, your country. What injury can I inflict on 
Greece, being alone in a ship of war .? I must share the fate of the 
ship, and if it sink I shall be drowned with the rest on board. 

I hope therefore your Highness will give me a definitive answer, 
whether you will accept my services or not. 

I have, etc., 



Copy of a letter addressed by Captain Frank Abxey Hastings, com- 
manding the Greek naval force in Eastern Greece, to General Sir 
Richard Church, Commander-in-chief of the Greek army. 

Karteria, Karbousta, i^tk Feb., 1828. 


It is painful to me to recur to the oft repeated subject of your 
interference with naval affairs. I am particularly desirous of quitting 
this station, that I may no longer be subjected either to this inter- 
ference or to the disagreeable alternative of addressing you in a strain 
similar to the present, which has (to my regret) been rendered so 
frequently necessary. 

Our duties are so distinct that I cannot conceive how anybody 
can mistake them, even not having been brought up in the British 

I met at this place a bracciera having your permission to carry 
grain. Had the grain been on board I certainly should have cap- 
tured her. I will capture any loaded boats I meet with your 
passports. Your Excellency will recollect that the blockade of this 
part of the Worea was not undertaken by me without your sanction. 
I represented to you the scandalous traffic carrying on to Patras by 


land, and you concurred in the blockade as the only method to 
remedy it. If you had any exceptions to make, it would have been 
proper for you (I should think) to state the same to me, that I might 
give such passports, if the case should appear to me to require it, 
which I certainly think it does not. But what do you do.? You give 
a monopoly of grain (without my knowledge or approbation) to a 
person here, and when the Helvetia, gun-boat, sent away a boat 
licensed by you, you then inform me and request me to permit the 
traffic. INIy reply is justly, I cannot, now that I am asked, and 
would not, had I been asked in the first instance in the proper 
manner, admit a monopoly near Patras at the moment I have been 
endeavouring to suppress the commerce much further off. It would 
be such a glaring injustice, that I should be subject to the suspicion 
of profiting by the monopoly I was creating, 

I hope this is the last time I shall be obliged to refer to this 
disagreeable topic, for I shall very quickly now quit this station. 
The length of time I have been upon it without receiving any order 
from my commander-in-chief, his temporary absence from Greece, 
the silence of the government, and the discretionary orders with 
which I was left by Lord Cochrane, all sanction my taking a step 
rendered necessary alone by your disapprobation of the manner in 
which I have conducted the naval affairs since I have been on this 

I have, etc., 


The Constitution of Greece, 1864. 

In the name of the Holy, Consubstantial, and Indivisible Trinity, 
the Second National Assembly of the Greeks convoked at Athens 
decrees : — 

Concerning Religion. 

Article I. The estabHshed religion of Greece is the Eastern Ortho- 
dox Church of Christ. Every other recognized religion is tolerated 
under the protection of the law, proselytism and all interference with 
the Established Church being prohibited. 

II. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging for its head 
our Lord Jesus Christ, is indissolubly united in doctrine with the 
great church of Constantinople, and with every other chtuxh of Christ 



holding the same doctrines, observing invariably, as they do, the holy 
apostolic and synodal canons and holy traditions. It is self-governed, 
exercising its governing rights independent of every other church, and 
administering them by a holy synod of bishops. 

The ministers of every recognized religion are subjected to the 
same superintendence on the part of the state as the clergy of the 
Established Church. 

Public rights of the Greeks. 

III. The Greeks are equal in the eye of the law, and contribute 
without distinction to the public burdens in proportion to their 
fortunes. Only Greek citizens are admissible to public employments. 
Citizens are those who have acquired or may acquire the qualifi- 
cations required to constitute citizenship by the laws of the state. 

Titles of nobility or distinction cannot be conferred on Greek 
citizens nor recognized. 

IV. Personal liberty is inviolable. No man can be prosecuted, 
arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise restrained except when and how 
the law provides. 

V. Except when taken in the act, no man can be arrested or 
imprisoned without a judicial warrant specifying the ground of arrest 
or imprisonment." He who is seized in the act or arrested by warrant 
must be carried without delay before the competent examining judge, 
who is bound within a delay not exceeding three days from his 
compearance either to release him or deliver a warrant for his im- 
prisonment. Should three days elapse without the examining judge 
granting a warrant of imprisonment, every jailor or other person, civil 
or military, who may be charged with the detention of the person 
arrested, is bound to release him instantly. Any violation of these 
provisions is punishable as illegal imprisonment. 

VI. The council of the Judges of the Court of Delicts (correctional 
tribunal) in the case of political offences, can, at the demand of the 
person detained, authorize his release under caution to be determined 
by a judicial order against which an appeal is allowed ; nor with a 
judicial order, can this preliminary detention be prolonged beyond 
three months. 

VII. No punishment can be inflicted unless appointed by law. 

VIII. No one can be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the judge 
assigned to him by law. 

IX. The right to address written petitions to public authorities 
may be exercised by a single person or by many on conforming to 
the laws. 



X. Greeks have the right to assemble tranquilly and unarmed. 
The police may be present at all public meetings. Meetings in the 
open air may be prohibited if they offer danger to public security. 

XI. Greeks have the right to form societies in conformity with the 
laws, and in no case can the law require a previous permission on 
the part of the government for the exercise of this right. 

XII. The dwelling is inviolable. Domiciliary visits can only be 
made when and how the law authorizes. 

XIII. In Greece men cannot be sold nor bought. A purchased 
slave or a serf, of every race and religion, is free from the time he 
enters Greece. 

XIV. Every one may publish his opinions by speech, by writing, 
or by printing, conformably to the laws. The press is free. The 
censorship and every other preventive measure is prohibited. The 
seizure of newspapers and other printed communications whether 
before or after publication is prohibited. Exceptionally the seizure 
after publication is permitted in case of insult to the Christian 
religion or the person of the king. But in this case the public 
prosecutor is bound within twenty-four hours after the seizure to 
submit the case to the judicial council, and the judicial council is 
bound to decide whether the seizure is to be maintained or with- 
drawn ; otherwise the seizure ceases to be valid. Appeal is allowed 
only to the publisher of the article seized and not to the public 

Only Greek citizens are allowed to publish newspapers. 

XV. No oath can be imposed except in the form provided by 

XVI. Higher instruction is provided at the expense of the state. 
The state contributes to the schools in the municipalities according to 
the exigencies of the case. 

Every one has the right of establishing private schools in conformity 
with the laws of the state. 

XVII. No one can be deprived of his property except for some 
public necessity duly certified in the manner provided by law and 
always preceded by indemnification. 

XVIII. Torture and general confiscation are prohibited. Civil 
death is abolished. The punishment of death for political crimes 
except in the case of complicated crimes is abolished. 

XIX. No previous permission of the governmental authorities is 
required to prosecute a public or municipal official for illegalities 
committed in the exercise of his functions except for acts specially 
ordered by ministers. 

XX. The secrecy of letters is inviolable. 


The form of Government. 

XXI. All power has its source in the nation, and is exercised in 
the manner appointed by the constitution. 

XXII. The legislative power is exercised by the king and the House 
of Representatives of the people (B0VX17). 

XXIII. The right of proposing laws belongs to the representatives 
of the people and the king who exercises it by his ministers. 

XXIV. No proposal relative to an increase of the public expendi- 
ture by salary or pension or in general for any personal interest can 
originate from the House of Representatives. 

XXV. If a project of a law be rejected by one of the two legisla- 
tive powers it cannot be introduced again in the same legislative 

XXVI. The authentic interpretation of the laws belongs to the 
legislative power. 

XXVII. The executive power belongs to the king, but it is exer- 
cised by responsible ministers appointed by him. 

XXVIII. The judicial power is exercised by courts of law. Judicial 
sentences are executed in the king's name. 

Concerning the King. 

XXIX. The person of the king is irresponsible and inviolate. His 
ministers are responsible. 

XXX. No act of the king is valid, nor can it be executed, unless it 
be countersigned by the competent minister, who renders himself 
responsible for it by his signature alone. In case of a change of 
ministry, if none of the retiring ministers consent to countersign 
the ordinance dismissing the old and appointing the new ministry, the 
new president of the cabinet appointed by the king will sign the 
ordinance after taking the oath of office. 

XXXI. The king appoints and dismisses his ministers. 

XXXII. The king is the highest authority in the state. He com- 
mands the army and navy, declares war and concludes treaties of 
peace, alliance, and commerce, communicating them to the House 
of Representatives with the requisite explanation as soon as the 
interest and security of the state allow of its being done. Commercial 
treaties and all conventions granting concessions, concerning which 
nothing can be determined according to the other provisions of 
the constitution without a special law, or which affect Greeks per- 
sonally, are not valid without the consent of the House of Repre- 


XXXIII. No cession nor exchange of territory can take place 
without a law. No secret articles of a treaty can abrogate the public 

XXXIV". The king confers military and naval rank in accordance 
with the law ; he appoints and dismisses public officials, saving the 
exceptional cases provided for by law. But he cannot appoint to any 
office not already established by law. 

XXXV. The king issues the ordinances for executing the laws, but 
in no case can he delay their execution nor make any exception in 
their operation. 

XXXVI. The king sanctions and publishes the laws. A project 
of law voted by the House of Representatives and not sanctioned 
by the king within two months of the conclusion of the session 
becomes null. 

XXXVII. The king convokes the House of Representatives once a 
year in ordinary session, and in extraordinary session as often as he deems 
necessary. He opens and closes each session either in person or by 
his deputy, and he has the right of dissolving the House of Represen- 
tatives ; but the ordinance dissolving it must be countersigned by the 
ministry, and must at the same time proclaim new elections within 
two months, and convoke the new House of Representatives within 
three months. 

XXXVIII. The king can prorogue the meeting or suspend the 
continuance of a legislative session. The prorogation or suspension 
cannot exceed forty days, nor be renewed during the same session 
without the consent of the House. 

XXXIX. The king has the right to pardon, commute, and diminish 
the punishments awarded by the courts of law, excepting those pro- 
nounced against ministers. He has also the right to grant amnesty, 
but only in case of political crimes under the responsibility of the 

XL. The king has the right of conferring the legal distinctive 
decorations, according to the regulations of the law relative to this 

XLI. The king has the right to coin money in conformity with 

, XLII. The king's civil list is fixed by law. That of George the 
First is one million, one hundred and twenty-five thousand drachmas, 
in which is included the sum voted by the Ionian parliament. The 
amount may be increased after the lapse of ten years. 

XLIII. King George after signing the present constitution will take 
the following oath in presence of the National Assembly. 

' / swear in the name of the Holy, Consuhstantial, and Indivisible 



Trinity to maintain the Established Religion of the Greeks, to observe the 
constitution and laivs of the Greek nation, and to preserve and defend 
the ftational independence and integrity of the Greek state! 

XLIV. The king has no powers but those expressly assigned to 
him by the constitution and the special laws annexed to it. 

The Succession and the Regettcy. 

XLV. The crown of Greece and its constitutional rights are 
hereditary, and are transmitted in direct line to the legitimate and 
lawful descendants of King George by order of primogeniture, giving 
preference to males. 

XLVI. If no direct descendant exist in accordance with the 
preceding article, the king can appoint a successor with the con- 
sent of the House of Representatives convoked for the purpose, 
giving its consent by an open vote comprising two thirds of all its 

XLVII. Every successor to the Greek throne must be a member of 
the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. 

XLVIII. The crown of Greece can never be united with the crown 
of any other kingdom on the same head. 

XLIX. The king attains his majority on completing his eighteenth 
year. Before ascending the throne he takes the oath in Article XLIII 
in presence of the ministers, the Holy Synod, the members of the 
House of Representadves present in the capital, and other high 
functionaries. The king convokes the House of Representatives 
within two months, and repeats the oath in presence of the repre- 
sentatives of the people. 

L. In case of the king's death, if the successor be a minor or 
absent, and there be no regent appointed, the House of Representa- 
tives, whether its session be terminated or it may have been dissolved, 
reassembles without summons within fifteen days after the king's 
death at the latest. The constitutional power of the crown is 
exercised by the council of ministers under their responsibility, until 
the regent takes the oath or until the arrival of the successor. A 
special law will regulate the competency of the regency. 

LI. In case of the king's death, if the successor be a minor, the 
House of Representatives assembles and appoints a guardian. A 
guardian is only appointed when none has been named in the will 
of the deceased king, or when the minor has not a mother remaining 
in widowhood who is called by right to the guardianship of her child. 
The guardian of the minor sovereign, whether named by will or 
chosen by the House of Representatives, must be a Greek citizen. 


LII. In case of a vacancy of the throne, the House of Repre- 
sentatives, even if its session be terminated or it may have been 
dissolved, elects by open voting a Greek citizen to act provisionally 
as regent ; the council of ministers exercising the constitutional 
power of the crown under its responsibility in the name of the 
nation, until the regent takes the oath. Within two months at 
farthest a number of deputies equal to the number of the repre- 
sentatives of the people in the House of Representatives must be 
chosen by the electors, and these deputies, forming one body when 
united with the House of Representatives, choose a king by a 
majority of two thirds of the whole number convoked and by open 

LIII. If the king on account of absence or illness consider it 
necessary to appoint a regent, he convokes the House of Repre- 
sentatives for the purpose and proposes by his ministers a special 
law. If the king be not in a condition to reign, the ministry 
convokes the House of Representatives, and if the House recognizes 
the necessity by a majority of two thirds of its members in an open 
vote, the House of Representatives chooses a regent by open voting, 
and if necessary a guardian. 

The House of Representatives (BovXjj). 

LIV. The House of Representatives assembles annually by in- 
herent right on the ist of November, unless it be convoked earlier by 
the king. The duration of each session cannot be less than three 
months nor more than six months. 

LV. The meetings of the House of Representatives are public, but 
the House may debate with closed doors at the demand of ten 
members ; if the motion be adopted in secret sitting by a majority, it 
must be subsequently decided whether the discussion ought to be 
resumed in a public sitting. 

LVI. The House of Representatives cannot hold a sitting unless 
at least one more than half the whole number of members is present, 
nor can it come to a decision without an absolute majority of the 
members present. In case of an equality of votes, the motion is 

LVII. No project of law is adopted unless it be discussed and 
voted article by article thrice and on three different days. 

LVIII. No one has a right to present himself before the House of 
Representatives to make any statement either verbally or by writing. 
Petitions must be presented by a member, or may be deposited in the 
office. The House has the right to send petitions addressed to it, to 


the ministers, who are bound to give explanations as often as they are 
demanded. The House can appoint committees of its members to 
examine the subjects. 

LIX. No tax can be imposed nor collected, if it has not been 
previously voted by the House of Representatives and sanctioned by 
the king. 

LX. The House of Representatives votes annually the limitation of 
the military and naval forces, the conscription for the army and navy, 
and the budget, and it revises the expenditure of the preceding year. 
The budget must be brought before the House during the first two 
months of each session. The examination is made by a special 
committee, and it is voted as a whole. 

LXI. No pension nor recompense can be issued from the treasury! 
without a law. 

LXII. A representative cannot be prosecuted nor questioned on I 
account of any opinion or vote given in the exercise of his duty as a 

LXIII. A representative cannot be prosecuted, arrested, nor im- 
prisoned during the sessions of the House, except in case of seizure 
in the criminal act. Personal detention cannot be exercised against a 
representative during the session, four weeks previous to its com- 
mencement, nor three weeks after its termination. If a representative 
be in prison, he must be released four weeks before the commence- 
ment of the session. 

LXIV. The representatives before undertaking their duties must 
swear the following oath in a public meeting. 

' / swear in the name of the Holy, Consubstaniial, and Indivisible 
Trinity fidelily to the country, and to the constitution, and io the constitu- 
tional king, obedience to the constitution and to the laws of the state, and 
to fulfil conscientiously my duties! 

Representatives not of the Greek Church instead of the invocation 
' in the name of the Holy, Consubstantial, and Indivisible Trinity,' 
swear according to their own religious formula. 

LXV. The House of Representatives decides on the forms of 
procedure regulating the manner of fulfilling its duties. 

LXVI. The House of Representatives is composed of deputies 
chosen by the citizens having the right to elect, by direct, universal, 
and secret suffrage, the votes being given by ballot according to the 
provisions of the law of election passed by the Assembly, which can 
only be altered in its other provisions. 

LXVII. The deputies represent the nation and not the eparchy by 
which they are chosen. 

LXVIII. The number of deputies from each eparchy is determined 


in proportion to the population. In no case can the whole number 
of representatives be less than 150. 

LXIX. The representatives are elected for four years. 

LXX. To be elected a representative, it is necessary to be a Greek 
citizen of the eparchy, or to have been domiciled and possessed of 
political and civil rights for two years in the eparchy where the elec- 
tion is made ; to have completed thirty years of age ; and also to 
possess the qualifications required by the law of election. 

LXXI. The duties of representative are incompatible with those of 
paid officials and demarchs, but not with those of ofiicers of the army 
and navy in activity. Ofiicers may be elected, but when elected they 
are placed on half-pay during the whole representative period, and 
remain so until recalled into activity. 

Leave of absence must be granted to officers on demand five 
months and a half before the commencement of the elections. 

LXXII. Representatives appointed by the government to paid 
offices whether civil or military, or promoted and accepting the 
: promotion, immediately cease the exercise of their representative 

LXXIII. The House of Representatives examines the qualifications 
of its members and decides on doubtful questions of validity. 

LXXIV. The Flouse of Representatives elects its president, vice- 
presidents, and secretaries at the commencement of each session. 

LXXV. Representatives receive a salary of two thousand drachmas 
from the public treasury for each regular session. In case of extra- 
ordinary sessions they receive only the expenses of their journey. 

LXXVI. Representatives receiving pay as military or civil officials 
or otherwise can receive only the addition necessary to bring their 
receipts to the above amount. 

Co7icerning Ministers. 

LXXVII. No member of the Royal family can be named a 

LXXVIII. Ministers have free entrance to the sittings of the 
House of Representatives, and are listened to whenever they demand 
a hearing. They only vote when they are members. The House 
can require the presence of ministers. 

LXXIX. In no case can an order of the king, whether verbal or 
written, release the ministers from responsibility. 

LXXX, The House of Representatives has the right to impeach 
ministers before a court of justice, presided over by the president 
of the Areiopagus, and composed of twelve more members selected 

VOL. VII. A a 


from all those who have served as presidents or judges of the Areio- 
pagus or Court of Appeal. 

A selection will be made by the president of the House of Repre- 
sentatives at a public sitting. This court of justice will regulate its 
forms of procedure until the publication of a special law. 

A special law will determine ministerial responsibility, the punish- 
ments to be imposed, and the forms of procedure. This law shall 
be submitted to the House of Representatives and voted in the first 
legislative session^. 

LXXXI. Until the publication of the special law relative to the 
responsibility of ministers, the House of Representatives may impeach 
ministers, and the above-mentioned court of justice may condemn 
them for high treason, for abusive employment of the public wealth, 
for illegal collection of money, and for every other violation of the 
constitution and laws in the exercise of their functions. 

LXXXn. The king can only pardon a minister, condemned 
according to the above-mentioned form, with the consent of the 
House of Representatives. 

Concerning the Council of State ^. 

LXXXni. A consultative council is established for preparing and 
revising projects of laws, called the Council of State, which sits at 

LXXXIV. All the projects of laws introduced into the House 
of Representatives by the government and not revised in the Council 
of State, and all projects of laws proposed by representatives after 
their principle has been adopted by the House, shall be remitted 
to the Council of State. 

If the House judge necessary, it may also remit to the Council 
of State projects of laws which it has modified or amended. 

The Council of State, having received the projects of laws sent 
to it by the House, will examine their clauses and give its opinion 
to the House in a detailed report within ten days. 

If the Council of State judge necessary, it may demand an ex- 
tension of time from the House which may be extended to fifteen 

If the Council of State make no report to the House within the 

' This law was not submitted to the house and voted in the first legislative 
session. The Council of State appears not to have prepared or revised any law on 
the subject. The ministers certainly neglected to submit a law to the represen- 
tatives; and when the house assumed the initiative there remained no time to vote 
the law. 

^ The Council of State was abolished in 1865. 


specified period, the House shall proceed without the report to the 
further discussion and voting the project of law. 

LXXXV. The number of the members of the Council of State 
cannot be less than fifteen nor more than twenty. The salary of 
each member is seven thousand drachmas annually. 

LXXXVI. The members of the Council of State are named by 
the king at the recommendation of the council of ministers, which 
countersigns the ordinance of their appointment. Their term of 
service is ten years. Those who have- completed this term may 
nevertheless be reappointed. 

The duty of a councillor of State is incompatible with the duty 
of any other public office except that of minister. But in no case 
can the duties of minister and councillor of State be exercised at the 
.same time. 

Concerning the Judicial Power. 

LXXXVII. Justice is administered by judges named by the king 
according to law. 

LXXXVIII. Judges of the Areiopagus and Courts of Appeal, 
as well as members of the Court of Accounts having votes, shall 
be appointed for life after the lapse of four years from the publication 
of the present constitution, and the members of the primary courts 
after the lapse of six years. From the time the judges and members 
of the Court of Accounts are appointed for life they cannot be 
removed without a judicial sentence. 

LXXXIX. The qualifications of judicial officials and members of 
the Court of Accounts having votes shall be determined by a special 
law within three years from the publication of the present con- 

XC. Public prosecutors, their substitutes, and justices of the peace 
do not obtain the right of appointment for life. 

XCI. Judicial commissions and extraordinary courts of judicature 
cannot be established under any pretext. 

XCII. The sittings of courts of law are public, except when 
publicity would be injurious to good morals or public order, but 
in such cases the courts are bound to pubUsh a decision to that 

XCIII. Every sentence must be founded on reasons assigned and 
announced at a public sitting. 

XCIV. Jury trial is maintained. 

XCV. Political crimes are judged by juries, as well as those 
relating to the press, as often as they do not relate to private 

A a 2 


XCVI. Judges can accept no salaried employment except that| 
of professor of the University. 

XCVII. The establishment of military and naval courts of justice! 
and courts to judge piracy and frauds in navigation shall be regulated] 
by special laws. 

XCVIII. A special law shall regulate the retirement of judges and! 
members of the Court of Accounts named for life, on account of age | 
or chronic disease. 

XCIX. No body of foreign troops can be received into the Greek I 
service, nor remain in nor pass through the state without a law. 

C. Military and naval officers can only be deprived of their rank, 
honours, and pay, when and how the law provides. 

CI. Contested governmental questions must be carried before the 
ordinary tribunals, by which they are to be judged as cases of urgency. 
Conflicting jurisdictions are judged by the Areiopagus. No courts 
of justice, no jurisdiction for contested governmental questions, can 
exist without a special law. Until the publication of special laws 
the existing governmental jurisdiction remains in force. 

CII. Special laws will provide for the disposal and distribution of_ 
the national lands, and for the regulation and extinction of the public 
debts, internal and foreign, at as early a date as possible. 

Special laws will also provide during the first legislative period — 

1. For pensions, regulating the qualifications of officials generally; 

2. For indemnities to be granted to those who fought in the Revolu- 
tion of 182 1. 

cm. All laws and ordinances in opposition to the present con- 
stitution are annulled. 

Special Provisions. 

CIV. The first representative assembly shall be convoked before 
the ist October next year (1865) at latest. 

CV. The election of the municipal authorities is to be made by 
direct, universal, and secret suffrage, by ballot with balls. 

CVI. The national guard is maintained. 

CVII. The revision of the whole constitution cannot take place. 
Particular provisions in it, with the exception of the fundamental 
principles, may be revised after ten years have elapsed from the time 
of its publication, and when the necessity of the revision has been 

The necessity of the revision is to be regarded as verified, when 
the House of Representatives in two successive representative periods, 
by a majority of three quarters of the votes of all the members, 



i demands the revision by a special act determining the provisions 

' to be revised. 

The revision having been adopted, the existing House of Repre- 
sentatives must be dissolved and a new assembly convoked for the 
object, consisting of double the number of representatives, which 
! shall decide on the provisions to be revised. 

I CVIII. The revision of the articles relative to the Council of State 
may take place in the first representative period at the demand of 
three quarters of the members. 

CIX. The present constitution comes into operation as soon as 
it shall have been signed by the king. The council of ministers 
i is bound to publish it in the Government Gazette within twenty-four 
hours after the signature. 

ex. The preservation of the present constitution is entrusted to 
the patriotism of the Greeks. 

Chajige in the Constitution. 

On Saturday 19 November (i December) 1865, the House of 
Representatives decided by 120 votes to 26 that the Council of State 
should be abolished in virtue of the power conferred by Article CVIII. 
of the Constitution, and on Wednesday 24 November (5 December) 
1865, the king signified his assent to the law annulling Articles 
LXXXIII, LXXXIV, LXXXV, and LXXXVI of the Constitution. 


Owing to a want of uniformity in spelling it is feared that there may be some 
confusion in the case of proper names: but an endeavour has been made to 
introduce into the Index as far as possible a uniformity which does not exist in 
the text. In the case of double names of persons the name will be found under 
the last, except in cases where 

(i) the individual is an emperor, king, or the like ; 

(2) the latter name is an epithet rather than a family name. 

Aali Effendi, vii. 202. 

Aaron, King of Bulgaria, ii. 442, 453 
seq., iii. 62. 

Abasges, ii. 166. 

Abasgia, ii. 385. 

Abassides, ii. 20, 152. 

Abbas Pasha, vi. 382, 383. 

Abbas, Tahir, vi. 81, 86, 91 seq. ; visit 
of, to Mesolonghi, vi. 91. 

Abdalmelik, caliph, makes peace with 
Justinian II, i. 386, 387 ; establishes 
haratch, i. 389, ii. 32; conquers Car- 
thage and Africa, i. 392 and note; 
tolerance of, i. 410; coinage of, i. 
389, 419. 

Abderrahman, ii. 152, 214. 

Abdulhamid, Sultan, v. 263, 264, 266, 

Abel, Mr., vii. no, in, 135, 136, 138 ; 
recalled, vii. 141. 

Aberdeen, Earl of, vii. 51, 57. 

Abgarus, portrait of Christ sent to, ii. 
308 ; letter of Christ to, ii. 402, iii. 220. 

Abilkodos, monastery of, i. 360. 

Aboubekr, succeeds Mahomet, i. 358 ; 
besieges Bostra, i. 359 ; pi^oclama- 
tion of, to the Egyptians, i. 372. 

Abou Hafs, ii. 135. 

Aboulabad, Pasha of Saloniki, vi. 206 

Aboulkassim, iii. 91, 92. 

Aboulsewar, ii. 440. 

Abou Said, ii. 159. 

Abu Cab, ii. 413. 

Abu Chazar, ii. 153, 

Abulaphar, ii. 413. 

Abydos, resolution of, i. 20; siege of, 

ii- 365- 
Abyssinia (Ethiopia), relations of Justi- 
nian with, i. 264. 

Academy, i. 277; Platonic, endowment 
of, i. 287. 

Acarnania, resolution of, i. 20 ; depo- 
pulation of under Augustus, i. 54 ; 
joins Caesar, ib. ; revolt of, vi. 90, 
91; affairs of, vi. 273; insurrection 
in, vii. 162 seq.; insurrection of, vii. 271. 

Accent, in Greek, iv. 4, 5. 

Acciaiuoli, family of, at Athens, iv. 156 

Acciaiuoli, Antonio, iv. 159 seq. 

Acciaiuoli, Francesca, iv. 130, 159. 

Acciaiuoli, Franco, duke of Athens, iv. 

Acciaiuoli, Nerio I, conquers Athens, 
iv.155; grant of Amalfi, iv. 157; 
Malta, ib.; Corinth, iv.158; will of'iv. 
159, 168 ; iv. 287. 

Acciaiuoli, Nerio II, duke of Athens, 
iv. 162 seq., 247, 248. 

Acciaiuoli, Nicholas, iv. 157, 287. 

Acerra, Richard d', iii. 214, 223; iv. 58. 

Achaia, Roman province of, i. 21, 33, 
34. 35. 63, 225; ill-treatment of, "i. 
53 ; depopulation of, under Augustus, 
i. 54; Geffrey, prince of, iii. 301, 308, 
iv. 187; William, prince of, iii. 333, 
338.339. 360; iv. 138, 199, 200, 201, 
203, 206, 207 (see Villehardouin and 
de Champlitte) ; principality of, iv. 98, 
109, 137, 138; feudal connexion with 
Athens, iv. 137 ; Nicholas of St. Omer, 
marshal of, iv. 142, 152 ; feudal organi- 
zation of, iv. 181 seq., 186 note; Geffrey 
II, prince of, iv. 190 seq.; ceded to 
Charles of Anjou, iv. 205 ; Florenz of 
Hainault, prince of, iv. 209, 215 ; 
Philip of Savoy, prince of, iv. 215, 
217, 220, 221 ; Matilda of Hainault, 
princess of, iv. 217, 221 ; invaded by 



Fernand of Majorca, iv. 218; John 

of Gravina, prince of, iv. 220, 221 ; 

misgovernment of, iv. 226; extinction 

of principality of, iv. 245; list of 

princes of, iv. 432. 
Achaian League, struggle with Macedon 

and Rome, i. 5, 67. 
Acharnians (Menidhi and Kasia), vi. 

Achelous, battle of, ii. 228, 310 (Aspro- 

potamos), vi. 72 note. 
Acheron, river, vi. 42. 
Achilles, St., ii. 369. 
Achmet Bey, defeat of, vi. 212, 272. 
Achmet Pasha, v. 219, 225, vii. 22. 
Achmet, son of Turakhan, iv. 253. 
Achmet Kueprili.v. 10, 112, 116; death 

of, V. 168, 177, 192, 241. 
Achmet III, sultan, v. 214; firman of, 

V. 238; wars and abdication of, v. 

245, 246. 
Achrida, ii. 371 and note; Patriarch of, 

iii. 308 note; Turkish colonies near, 

iv. 27. 
Achridos, iii. 325. 
Acindynus, prefect of the Orient, story 

of, i. 149. 
Acratus, i. 72. 

Acre, Pasha of, rebellion of, vi. 196. 
Acrocorinth, vi. 321. 
Acroinon, battle of, ii. 20. 
Acropolis, besieged by Venetians, v. 

185 ; capitulation of Turks in, vi. 

283; relieved by Fabvier, vi. 108 seq. ; 

besieged by Reshid Pasha, vi. 402, 

408 seq. ; capitulates, vi. 432. 
Acropolita, George, iii. 321, 322 note, 

327, 328, 338, 339, 370; ambassador 

to Trebizond, iv. 345. 
Actian games, i. 61. 
Adam, LTsle, grand master of knights 

of Rhodes, v. 67. 
Adam, Sir Frederic, mediation of,vi. 388. 
Adana, ii. 330, iii. 35, 36. 
Addawalah, ii. 309. 
Adelard, iii. 183. 
Aden, v. 6. 

Adjnadin, battle of, i. 360. 
Adramyttium, i. 396, iii. 125; council 

of, iii. .:;77. 
Adrianople, battle of, a. d. 398, i. 154; 

sacked, ii. 115; taken by Crumn, ii. 

229, 286, ii. 310; taken by Samuel of 

Bulgaria, ii. 375, iii. 290, 291 ; taken 

by Theodore of Thessalonica, iii. 304, 

iv. 113; revolts from Crusaders, iv. 

99 ; treaty of, v. 216 ; cotton trade of, 

V. 281; Russians at, vii. 26; treaty 

of, vii. 52. 
Aegina, lost by Athens, i. 60 ; ruin of, v. 

68 ; Albanians in, v. 69, vi. 28 ; 

belongs to Venice, v, 195 ; lost by 

Venice, v. 227 ; Greek government 
at, vi. 409 ; orphan asylum at, vii. 
48 ; revolution of students in, vii. 6a. 

Aegium (Vostitza), vi. 143, 144. 

Aelia Capitolina, i. 460. 

Aemilius Paulus, in Epirus, i. 53. 

Aeneas Sylvius (Pope Pius II), iv. 414, 


Aesculapius, enclosure of, near Epidau- 
rus, i. 27. 

Actios, ii. 157-159. 

Aetius, i. 178, 273. 

Aetolia, ill-treatment of, i. 53; depop- 
ulation of, under Augustus, i. 54, 62 ; 
joins Caesar, i. 54; revolt of, vi. 90, 
91, 163; insurrection of, vii. 271. 

Aetos, fortress of, iv. 256, 258. 

Africa, commerce with, i. 7 ; attacked 
by Justinian, i. 228; Vandals in, i. 
228 seq.; Vandal monarchs of, i. 
231 note; reduced by Belisarius, i. 
233 ; taxation of, ih. ; desolation of, 
i. 234 ; rebellion of troops in, i. 237; 
trade of, i. 265 ; Heraclius Exarch 
of, i. 31 r, 318 ; Latin used in, i. 318 ; 
loss of, i. 392 ; prefecture of, ii. 180; 
Arab rule mild in, ii. 134. 

Afshin, ii. 153, 156. 

Agallianos, ii. 37. 

Agatha, daughter of Constantine VII, 
ii. 298. 

Agathias, i. 208, 273. 

Aghia Marina, vi. 279. 

Aghiochristophorites, Stephen, iii. 213, 

Aghionoros, ii. 187; fortifications of, 
vi. 203. {See Athos.) 

Aghios Minas (Chios), massacre at 
monastery of, vi. 255. 

Aghiososti, vi. 294, 295, 366. 

Aghiovasili, v. 274. 

Agis, attempts to restore old Spartan in- 
stitutions, i. II. 

Aglabites, ii. 116. 

Agnes, of France, wife of Alexius II, 
iii. 149, 196, iv. 317; marries An- 
dronicus I, iii. 212, 217. 

Agnes Courtenay, wife of Geffrey II, 
of Achaia, iv. 190. (5ee Courtenay.) 

Ago Besiari, vi. 91. 

Agoranomoi, i. 222. 

Agoulinitza, vi. 385. 

Agoyiates (muleteers), vi. 19. 

Agranes, ii. 246. 

Agrapha, vi. 18, 22 ; charter of Moham- 
med II to, vi. 21 ; Greek insurrection 
in, vi. 198; devastation of vi. 273. 

Agriculture, decay of, at Rome, i. 42, 
43, 89; importance of, ii. 215 ; de- 
gradation of agricultural classes, iv. 
47; burdens of agricultural classes v. 
203 J in Greece, state of, vii. 244. 



Agridha, massacre of Mussulmans at, 
vi. 146. 

Agrimensores, i. 471. 

Aidin, iii. 403, 427. 

Ainos, V. 58. 

Aix la Chapelle, treaty of, ii. 100. 

Akaba, iv. 353. 

Akakios, iv. 366. 

Akerman, treaty of, vi. 410, vii. 12. 

Akhlat, battle of, iv. 336. 

Akominatos, Michael, iv. 135. 

Akova, barony of, iv. 183, \%i^note, 207, 
20S note ; Margaret, lady of, iv. 208, 
218 ; taken by Turks, iv. 233 ; taken 
by Mohammed II, iv. 258. 

Akritas, Digenes, poem, ii. 332 note. 

Alach, ii. 401. , 

Aladdin, iii. 476, v. 33. 

Alaeddin, iii. 382, 385, 386; sultan of 
Roum, iv. 332, 333, 336, 337, 339. 

Alalcomenae, statue of Minerva at, 
plundered by Sulla, i. 72. 

Alans, the, iii. 383, 384, 387, 393, 396, 
400, 402, 404. 

Alaric, i. 156, 157, 169; enters Greece, 
i. 158; occupies Athens, ih.; destroys 
Eleusis, ih., i. 283 ; invades Pelopon- 
nese, i. 159; plunders Argos, Corinth, 
Sparta, ih. ; escapes Stilicho, occupies 
Epirus, i. 160; serves under Arcadius, 
i. 160, 161, 278. 

Alashehr (Philadelphia), iii. 468. 

Albania, language of, i. 187, vi. 34 and 
note ; geography of, vi. 36 ; Christians 
in, vi. 37; state of, in 1834, vii. 151. 

Albanians, rise of, i. 334, iii. 122; re- 
volt of, iii. 364, 430 ; in Peloponnese, 
iii. 486, iv. 31, 233, 239, 254, vi. 29; 
in Greece, iv. 30 seq., 122 ; insurrec- 
tion of, iv. 254; in Morea, subdued 
by Turakhan, iv. 256 ; in Andros, iv. 
301 ; in Aegina, v. 69 ; increase of, 
in Greece, v. 118, 125, 204, 255- 
257; in the Morea, v. 263, 264; in- 
trigues of Russia with, v. 268 ; re- 
volt of, ih. ; allies of Venice, v. 274, 
281, 283, vi. 28 seq.; represent Pelas- 
gians (?), vi. 34 ; language of, vi. 34 
and note ; warlike spirit of, vi. 39 ; 
dress, ih. ; defeated near Tripolitza, 
vi. 40 ; genealogies of, Homeric, vi. 
58; at Tripolitza, vi. 218; mutiny of, 
at Coron, vii. 27. 

Albanon, iv. 124. 

Albanopolis (Elbassan), iv. 31. 

Alberic, ii. 300. 

Alboin, i. 293. 

Aldoin, count, iii. 214, 223, iv. 58. 

Aldruda, iii. 183. 

Aleim, ii. 402. 

Alemen, Mohammed, ii. 109. 

Aleppo (Berrhoea), i. 263 ; Byzantine 

troops at, ii. 265, 309, 331, 385; 
sultan of, iii. 126. 

Alexander, the Great, permanent influ- 
ence of his conquests, i. i ; policy 
towards Asiatics, i. 3 ; influence of 
Aristotle on, i. 3 ; influence of his 
conquests upon commerce, i. 7 ; upon 
Greek literature, i. 8 ; upon morals, 
i. 10; npon religion, i. 12; Roman 
embassy to, i. 7 note ; influence of, i. 
352 ; population of Greece under, i. 

Alexander, son of Alexios IV of Trebi- 
zond, iv. 397. 

Alexander, son of Amyntas, i. 284. 

Alexander, king of Bulgaria, iii. 437. 

Alexander, emperor of Byzantium, reign 
of, ii. 282. 

Alexander, the Logothete, succeeds Be- 
lisarius in Italy, i. 242. 

Alexander I, emperor of Russia, vi. 1 1 a, 
113 ; secret treaty with Napoleon I, 
vi. 112; character and policy of, vi. 
195 ; death of, vii. 10. 

Alexander Severus, i. 50 ; subsidizes 
barbarians, i. 91 ; tries to abolish 
senate, i. 103. 

Alexander of Tralles, i. 273. 

Alexandria, capital of Hellenic world, 
i. 5 ; literature a trade at, i. 9 ; dis- 
tribution of grain at, i. 43, 89, 201 ; 
discontinued, i. 321 ; influence of, i. 75 ; 
illtreated by Augustus, i. 75 ; patri- 
arch of, i. 129, ii. 180; taken by 
Arabs, i. 366 ; regained by Manuel, 
ih. ; destroyed, i. 367, 373 ; university 
of, i. 273, 415; patriarch of, submits to 
Mohammedans, i. 410; Spanish Arabs 
in, ii. 135; taken by Crusaders, iii. 
463 ; trade of Monemvasia with, v. 
200 ; convention of, vii. 25, 27. 

Alexiopolis (Neokastron), iii. 65, 137. 

Alexios I (Grand-Comnenos), of Trebi- 
zond, iii. 285, iv. 308, 317-319, 
321; defeat of, 324; tributary to 
Seljouks, iv. 326, 328, 329. 

Alexios II, of Trebizond, iv. 350 seq.; 
defeats Turkomans, iv. 352; treaty 
with Venice, iv. 355. 

Alexios III, of Trebizond, iv. 372 seq.; 
ecclesiastical endowments of, iv. 383; 
death of, iv. 385. 

Alexios IV, of Trebizond, iv. 393 seq. ; 
murdered, iv. 398. 

Alexios, the Bithynian, iii. 455. 

Alexios, son of Joannes IV, iv. 412, 

Alexios, Mousel, ii 154, 200. 

Alexios, the patriarch, ii. 405, 409, 420, 
424, 428. 

Alexis, Mouselen, ii. 79. 

Alexius I (Comnenus), emperor of Con- 



stantinople, iii. 45, 47, 49 seq., iv. 
313, 316; reign of, iii. 53 seq.; plots 
against, iii. 59 seq. : debases coinage, 
iii. 63 ; superstition of, iii. 70 ; de- 
feated by Guiscard, iii. 78 ; by Patzi- 
naks, iii. 84 ; treaty of, with Crusa- 
ders, iii. 102 seq.; war with Bohe- 
mund, iii. 119 seq.; recovers Asia 
Minor, iii. 124; war with Tancred, 
iii. 125; Tuikish war of, iii. 126; 
treaty with Melek, iii. 127; death of, 
iii. 129; decay of empire under, iii. 
136; charter to Venetians, iv. 75. 

Alexius II (Comnenus), iii. 149, 196; 
reign of, iii. 198 seq. ; deposed, iii. 
201, iv. 316 ; pseudo Alexius, iii. 238. 

Alexius III (Angelos), reign of, iii. 241 
seq. ; piracy of, iii. 246; escape of, iii. 
257, 260, 275, 276, 284, 288, 295; 
treaty with Venice, iv. 81, 321. 

Alexius IV (Angelos), reign of, iii. 257 
seq., iv. 85, 86. 

Alexius V (Dukas Murtzuphlos), iii. 
262, 263 seq.; escape of, iii. 269, 275, 
284, iv. 86. 

Alexius Comnenus, nephew of Alexius 
I, iii. 118. 

Alexius Comnenus, grandson of Alexius 

I, iii. 171. 

Alexius Comnenus, grandson of John 

II, iii. 199, 200. 

Alexius Comnenus, son of Manuel I, 
iii. 214, 237. 

Alexius Comnenus, grand-nephew of 
Manuel I, iii. 214, 

Alfred, Prince, elected king of Greece, 
vii. 276, 284 seq. 

Algarve, i. 317. 

Algiers, conquered by France, vii. 13. 

AlHakem, ii. 135, 155. 

Ali, contest of Moawyah with, i. 37S. 

Ali Benderli, vizier, vi. 187, 189. 

Ali Kara {see Kara), naval exploits of, 
vi. 222 seq. 

Ali Kumurgi, grand-vizier, v. 217, 219, 
221, 222, 224, 227, 285. 

Ali Pasha, of Argos, vi. 286 seq., 296, 

Ali Pasha, of Joannina, v. 269, 274, 275 ; 
reduces Chimariots, v. 274, vi. 4, 23 ; 
Dervendji Pasha, vi. 40 ; policy of, 
vi.^ 41 ; attacks Suliots, vi. 45 ; sur- 
prises Nivitza, vi. 46 ; treachery and 
cruelty of, vi. 50, 51, 60 seq. ; rebel- 
lion of, vi. 63 ; character and history 
of, vi. 57 seq. ; patronizes education, 
vi. 69 ; Pasha of Thessaly and Joan- 
■ nina, vi. 64 ; destroys Khormovo, vi. 
66, 66; attempts to assassinate Ismael 
Pasho Bey, vi. 70 ; pronounced a 
traitor, tb. ; preparations of, vi. 71 ; 
promises the Greeks a constitution, 

yi. 74 ; divan of, vi. 75 ; Christians 
in service of, vi. 76 ; alliance with 
Suliots, vi. 81; end of, vi. 93 seq. ; 
operations against, vi. 141. 

Ali Pharmaki, of Lalla, vi. 155 seq. 

Alim, ii. 169. 

Alkan, ii. 444. 

Allelengyon, ii. 387, 396. 

AUies (England, France, Russia), pro- 
clamation of, vii. 116; suppress pi- 
racy, vii. 151; interfere in Greece, 
vii. 226 ; financial commission of, vii. 
238 seq. ; report of, vii. 240 seq. {see 
Three Powers). 

Almagest, the, of Ptolemy, ii. 227. 

Almamun, ii. 109, 135 ; caliphate of, ii. 
116, 153, 208; translates Greek au- 
thors, ii. 213 ftote; encourages science, 
ii. 224, iv. 300. 

Almanzor (Almansour), ii. 50; closes 
Nile canal, i. 366, ii. 212 ; wealth of, 
ii. 213. 

Almerio, Pietro, iv. 163, 164. 

Almogavars, iii. 402 and note. 

Almutamid, Caliph, ii. 246. 

Alp Arslan, iii. 14, 17, 18, 31, 32 seq. 

Alusianos, ii. 417, 418. 

Alyattes, Nicephorus, iii. 330. 

Amadeus, Prince of Savoy, iv. 223. 

Amalasonta, i. 236, 237. 

Amalia, of Oldenburg, Queen of Greece, 
vii. 144, 167, 220, 222, 228, 231, 249 
seq., 252; attempted assassination of, 
254, 266, 270. 

Amalii, i. 400, 421 ; dukes of, ii. 249, 
250, 278, iii. 82,96, 152, 153; granted 
to Acciaiuoli, iv. 15 7. 

Amanus, Mt., i. 399. 

Amara, ii. 169. 

Amastrianon, ii. 195. 

Amastris, ii. 102, I66; taken by Mo- 
hammed II, iv. 416. 

Amathus (Limisso), iii. 238. 

Amaury I, king of Jerusalem, iii. 186, 
187, 207. 

Ambassadors, Turkish treatment of, v. 
169; at Athens, behaviour of, vii. 177. 

Ambelakia, cotton trade of, v. 281 note. 

Ambracia, plundered by Fulvius, i. 66. 

Ambrose, St., i. 137. 

America, aids Greeks in 1827, vi. 437. 

Amida (Diarbekr), i. 362, ii. 1S6, 368, 
iii. 17. 

Amisos, ii. 187, iii. 289, iv. 322 seq. 

Amiroutzes, V. 118. 

Amorgos, depopulation of, iv. 301 ; 
taken by Turks, v. 69. 

Amorium, i. 380, ii. 6, 14, 47, 48, 12S ; 
siege and capture of, ii. 157, 168, 
363 ; taken hy Seljouks, iii. 28. 

Amour, son of Aidin, iii. 436, 437, 442. 

Amphictyons, in time of Pausanias, i. 67. 



Amphissa (Salona), revolt and capture 

of, vi. 159, 160. 
Amrou, i. 363, 365. 
Amyntas, Alexander, son of, i. 284. 
Aniytzantarants, at Trebizond, civil war 

withScholarians.iv. 362,363, 367,383. 
Anachoutlou, Anna, empress of Trebi- 
zond, iv. 365, 367. 
Anactoropolis (Eion), iii. 454 ; Alexios 

at, iii. 455. 
Anagnostaras, a klepht, vi. 148, 149, 

341. .^62. 
Anaktoboulion (Camarilla), vii. 257. 
Anaphe, taken by Turks, v. 69. 
Anastasios, patriarch, ii. 49, 57, 75- 
Anastasius I, law of, i. 154, 172 ; reign 

of, i. 180; diminishes taxation, i. 181 ; 

reforms curia, ih.\ wall of, i. 181, 210, 

254; abolishes Chrysargyron, i. 182; 

canal of, ih.; wealth of, i. 182, 185; 

patriarch of Constantinople refuses 

to crown, i. 189 ; statue of, i. 192, 

195, 197, 207 ; his concession to He- 

ruls, i. 249 ; damages works of art, 

i. 414. 
Anastasius II, i. 395. 
Anastasius, work by Mr. Hope, v. 65. 
Anatolikon, taken, v. 254, vi. 163 ; siege 

of, vi. 317, 321, 324; capitulates, vi. 

388, vii. 24; evacuation of, vii. 39. 
Anazarba, ii. 186, 309. 
Anchialus, i. 339, ii. 87, no. 
Ancona, rival of Venice, iii. 182; treaty 

with Manuel, iv. 78 ; siege of, iv. 79 ; 

port of, v. 156. 
Ancyra, i. 343, ii. 102 ; taken, iii. 114. 
Andalusia, i. 233 note. 
Andravida, capital of Achaia, iv. 177, 

179, 182 ; siege of, iv. 204, 229. 
Andreas, the Kalybite, ii. 61. 
Andrew, the Slavonian, ii. 246. 
Andrew, St., ii. 104 ; patron of Patrae, 

iv. 14. 
Andrew, son of Thomas, despot of 

Morea, iv. 267. 
Andritzena, vii. 15.4. 
Andronicus I (Comnenus), emperor of 

Constantinople, iii. 147, 148, 174, 

185, 200; i-eign of, 201 seq., 210; 

marries Agnes, iii. 212, 217; de- 
throned iii. 217, iv. 316. 
Andronicus II (Palaeologus), reign of, 

iii. 373 seq.; dethroned, iii. 418; 

state of army under, iii. 383 seq., iv. 

350 seq. 
Andronicus III (Palaeologus), iii. 410 

seq.; rebellion of, iii. 413; takes 

Constantinople, iii. 418; reign of, iii. 

419 seq.; character, iii. 420; death 

of, iii, 431. 
Andronicus, Palaeologus, son of John V, 

rebellion of, iii. 464, 465. 

Andronikos I (Ghidos), of Trebizond, 
iv. 326, 332 seq.; treaty with Alaed- 
din, iv. 332, 336; war with Alaeddin, 
iv. 333 ; ally of Gelaleddin, iv. 336. 

Andronikos II, of Trebizond, iv. 341. 

Andronikos III, of Trebizond, iv. 359. 

Andronikos (see Dukas), ii. 285. 

Andronikos, bishop of Sardes, iii. 377, 


Andros, college at, ii. 224; conquered 
by Marino Dandolo, iv. 282, 283; 
signory of, iv. 289; history of, iv. 300 
seq.; Albanians in, iv. 301 seq., vi. 
28 ; taken by Turks, v. 69. 

Andrutzos, vii. 88. 

Anemas, iii. 61. 

Angelos family, account of, iii. ■221. 

Angelos, Alexius (see Alexius III), reign 
of, iii. 241 seq. 

Angelos, Alexius (see Alexius IV), son 
of Isaac II, iii. 251, 253, 254; reign 
of, iii. 257 seq.,iv. 83 ; coronation of, 
iv. 85. 

Angelos, Andronicus, iii. 209, 221. 

Angelos, Constantino, iii. 171, 210, 221. 

Angelos, Isaac (see Isaac II), iii. 216; 
reign of, iii. 220 seq. ; character, iii. 
221; dethroned, iii. 241, 253, 254; 
reinstated, iii. 257; death, iii. 263; 
treaty with Venice, iv. 80, 316, 317. 

Angelos, John, prince of Vallachia, iii. 

Angora, iii. 247 ; Othomans defeated at, 
iii. 481, iv. 3S9, 390, V. 46. 

Ani, ii. 385, 386, 440; lost, iii. 14; taken 
by Alp Arslan, iii. 18. 

Anjou, Charles of, iii. 353 seq., 357, 
361, 363, iv. 141, 205, 345. 

Anna, daughter of Alexios III of Trebi- 
zond, iv. 385. 

Anna Anachoutlou, empress of Trebi- 
zond, iv. 365, 367. 

Anna, wife of Artavasdos, ii. 47. 

Anna Comnena, work of, iii. 53 note, 
128; conspiracy of, iii. 131. 

Anna, of Epirus, iv. 142. 

Anna, wife ofjohn III (of Nicaea),iii.3i9. 

Anne, of Savoy, empress-regent, iii. 
432 seq. 

Anne, wife of Vladimir, ii. 357. 

Anseau, iii. 340. 

Antes, i. 252. 

Anthedon, razed by Sulla, i. 27, 

Anthimos, Slavonian general, ii. 417. 

Anthimos, palace of, ii. 196, 197. 

Anthimus, patriarch of Jerusalem, v. 285. 

Anthimus, port of, ii. 16. 

Anthusa, ii. 68. 

Antigonenses, Fauces, vi. 73. 

Antioch, distribution of grain at, i. 43, 
89, 201 ; retains its municipal privi- 
leges, i. 75; patriarch of, i. 129,11. 



i8o; arrests Huns, i. 162; earth- 
quake at, i. 179, 183; sacked by 
Chosroes, i. 202, 263, 273; ransomed, 
i. 252; university of, i. 273, 415; 
Eudocia at, i. 285 ; ceases to be 
Greek, i. 402 ; port of, taken, ii. 159, 
331. 332. 358; Niketas, duke of, ii. 
407, 411 ; taken by Suleiman, iii. 91 ; 
Constantine, duke of, ii. 408, 411, 
420; besieged by Crusaders, iii. 110, 
142; war of Manuel I with, iii. 159, 
160; patriarch of, iii. 184; Raymond 
of, iii. 159, 160; Reynold of Chatillon, 
prince of, iii. 184, 185, 207; Maria 
of, wife of Manuel I, iii. 186, 199, 201. 

Antiocheia taken, iii. 295. 

Antiochenus, George, iii. 162. 

Antiochus, proconsul of Achaia, i. 157. 

Antiparos, taken by Turks, v. 69. 

Antipsara, vi. 346, 347. 

Antirrhion, Capodistrians at, vii. 91. 

Antonines, the, Greece under, i. 62 ; 
provincial reforms of, i. 63. 

Antoninus, Pius, i. 65, 66 ; favours Pal- 
lantium, i. 66; employs Herodes At- 
ticus as tutor, i. 66. 

Antonios, patriarch, ii. 337. 

Antonius, C., rapacity of, i. 38 ; at 
Cephallenia, i. 47, ii. 254. 

Antony, his statues destroyed by Au- 
gustus, i. 72. 

Antony, of Syllaeum, ii. 117, 119. 

Aous (Viosa), vi. 72 note. 

Apamea, i. 263. 

Apelates, ii. 196. 

Aphiusa, ii. 109. 

Aplakes, John, ii. 112. 

Apokapes, iii. 21, 

Apokaukos, iii. 412, 427, 433, 435; 
murdered, 438. 

Apollinarius, i. 274. 

Apollo, the, newspaper, vii. 60. 

Apollo, temple of, at Megara, built by 
Hadrian, i. 65 ; temple of, at Daphne, 
i. 121. 

Apollonius of Tyana, at Smyrna, i. 70 ; 
at Pan Ionian assembly, ih. 

Apomerman, ii. 402, 

Aponasar, ii. 452. 

Apostoles, admiral, vi. 321, 377. 

Appanages, iii. 15, 16 seq. 

Apres, ii. 115. 

Apri, John of, patriarch, iii. 421. 

Apros, battle of, iii. 402, 

Apsimar, i. 393, ii. 125. 

Apulia (Longobardic theme), ii. 255, 
279; ravaged by Hungarians, ii. 313; 
Mainates in, v. 117. 

Aqueduct, of Hadrian, at Athens, i. 65 ; 
at Corinth, i. 65, 80 ; at Constanti- 
nople, i. 222; of Valens repaired, ii. 

Arabia, effects of trade on, i. 268 ; com- 
merce of, ii. 211. 

Arabs, neglect Greek literature, i. 8 ; in 
Syria, i. 327, 354 ; effect of wars of 
Heraclius on, i. 354, 358; gain trade 
of Egypt, i. 354 ; conquer Syria, i. 
359; take Jerusalem, a.d. 637, i. 361 ; 
take Alexandria i. 366; destroy old 
civilisation, i. 36S ; amount of tri- 
bute to, i. 374 ; defeated at Samosata, 
i- 393 ; exterminate Greeks, i. 40 1 , 
417; get Greek learning through 
Syriac, i. 418; literature of, ih. ; rule 
mild at first, ii. 134. 

Arachova, vi. 406. 

Arachthus (river of Arta), vi. 72 note. 

Aradus, taken by Saracens, i. 374. 

Aragon, duchy of Athens and Neopa- 

tras, an appanage of the house of, iv. 

Area, ii. 331. 

Arcadia, supposed relation of Rome to, 
i. 66; Ibrahim Pasha in, vi. 370; 
insurrection in, vii. 153 seq. 

ArcadiopoKs, ii. 115, 131, 345 ; iii. 235, 

Arcadius, i. 147, 160, 161. 

Archelaus, defeated by Sulla at Chje- 
ronea, i. 27. 

Archipelago, duchy of, iv. 138, 276; 
transferred to principality of Achaia, 
iv. 282, 283 ; reduced by Othomans, 
iv. 292; extinguished, iv. 294; con- 
dition of under Venetians, iv. 295 
seq. ; Turkish corsairs in, iv. 303 ; 
list of dukes of, iv. 433 ; (see Dalle 
Carceri, Crispo, Sanudo). 

Arenos Ximenes d', iii. 405, 406. 

Areopagus, under Tiberius, i. 27 ; still 
existing, i. 67; of Salona, vi. 237 ; of 
East Greece, vi. 278, 279 ; dissolved, 
vi. 305. 

Arethusa (Restan), i. 361. 

Argaous, ii. 169. 

Argenteus, i. 50, i. 435 {see Coinage). 

Arghyrokastro, vi. 66 ; taken, vi, 79. 

Arghyrokastron, Suleiman of, vi. 20. 

Argos, ravaged by Goths, i. 94, 159 ; a 
fief of Athens, iv. 138, 152,194, 195; 
Venetians at, iv. 235 ; taken by Otho- 
mans, iv. 235, V. 60 ; loss and re- 
covery of, iv. 268 ; Albanians at, v. 
63; national assembly at, vi. 239; 
Dramali at, vi. 287 ; anarchy of 
Greeks at, vi. 290 ; Greeks in Larissa 
of, vi. 291, 292 ; acts of national 
assembly of, vii. 49 seq. ; second 
national assembly at, vii. 74; Rome- 
liots at, attacked, vii. 78; anarchy at, J' 
ih. ; Romeliots enter, vii. 82 ; French 
at, vii. 103; Gen. Gordon at, vii. 160. 

Argyros Eustatliios, ii. 269. 



Argyros, son of Mel, ii. 430, 439 ; iii. 36. 

Ariadne, i. 179, 180. 

Arians, i. 129, 134, 228. 

Ariebes. rebellion of, iii. 59. 

Aristarchos, dragoman of Porte, vi. 

Aristides, i. 280. 

Aristion, strategos at Athens, i. 25, 
{See Athenion.) 

Aristocracy, ruins Rome, i. 138; By- 
zantine, extinction of, v. 122. 

Aristotle, his influence on Alexander, 
i. 3 ; notice of silkworms, i. 270. 

Arkadia, town of, v. 253 (Cyparissia), 
Ibrahim Pasha at, vi. 372. 

Armansperg, Count, vii. 105, no seq., 
135 seq., 138, 140; absolute, 142; 
administration of, 143 seq.; recalled, 
144, 167; imprudence of, 153 seq., 
161, 162. 

Armansperg, Countess, vii. 113. 

Armatoli, v. 192, vi. 14, 18, 19 seq., 23, 

Armenia, state of, i. 261 ; partition of, 
ih. ; literary energy of, i. 272 ; na- 
tional church of, i. 275, 315; state 
of, i. 328; tributary to Saracens, i. 
374' 377 > visited by Constans, i. 
376, i. 387 ; the fourth Armenia, i. 
399; Christians of, emigrate, ii. 90 ; 
Bulgarians and Slavonians in, ii. 384 ; 
reduced, ii. 440 ; taken by Turks, 
ii. 442 ; Seljouk Turks in, iii. 14- 

Armenians, i. 166; guards, i. 255,271; 
the Armenian aera, i. 272; revolt of 
under Sapor, i. 380 ; importance of, 
ii. 200, 308 ; in Bulgaria, ii. 384 ; at 
Philippopohs, iii. 234 ; in Troad, iii. 
286, 287. 

Armenopoulos, manual of, iv. 95. 

Army, Roman, i. 114 and note; under 
Justinian, i. 204 ; reformed by Tibe- 
rius and Maurice, i. 300 ; state of, ii. 
27; deterioration of Byzantine, iii. 
158; under Andronicus, II, iii. 383 

Armyros, v. 114, 116, 179, vi. 399. 

Arnaout-oglou, attack on, vi. 14-7, 148. 

Arnauts, i. 334, v. 191, 192. 

Arotras, Krinites, ii. 304, iv. 20. 

Arpalik, vi. 3. 

Arsaber, ii. 99, 200. 

Arsamir, iv. 386, 387. 

Arsenios, Patriarch, iii. 321, 331, 333, 

334. 348. 367 seq., 378, 
Arsinoe (Suez), i. 365. 
Arsouran, ii. 443. 

Art, Greek, attitude of Romans to, i. 
70 ; end of taste for at Rome, i. 72 ; 
Christianity hostile to, i. 191 ; de- 
struction of works of, i. 192, 414, 

iii. 244, iv. 303; decline of, i. 413; 
democratic, ii. 58; state of, under the 
Iconoclasts, ii. 225. 

Arta, iv. 121, 122, 127, 129; attacked 
by Genoese, iv. 127; Charles Tocco 
at, V. 4, 62 ; attacked by Suliots, 
vi. 82 ; relief of, vi. 93 ; Turks at, vi. 
264, 266, 268; taken by brigands, 
vii. 151. 

Artaban, i. 211. 

Artabasd, ii. 196. 

Artabasdos, ii. 200. 

Artanes, colony on, ii. 55. 

Artavasdos, revolt of, ii. 46, 47 seq. ; 
defeat of, ii. 49. 

Artillery, Othoman, iv. 259 {see Cannon). 

Artoklinas, Constantine, ii. 424. 

Artolina, vii. 159. 

Artovalan, Constantine, ii. 438. 

Arvanitai (Albanians), iv. 31. 

Arzanene, ceded to Persia, i. 143. 

Arzen, burnt, ii. 442. 

As {see Coinage), i. 432. 

Asan, John, King of Bulgaria, conquests 
of, iii. 304, 308, 309; death of, 311, 
iv. 124, 125; attacks Constantinople, 
iv. 193. 

Asan, Matthew, iv. 253, 255, 257. 

Asan, governor of Morea, iv. 232. 

Asan, the Vallachian, iii. 230; assassi- 
nated, iii. 248. 

Asander (Asandros), patriotism of, ii. 


Asanias, ii. 245. 

Asemaki, vi. loi. 

Asemous, defeat of Attila at, i. 1 70. 

Ashnas, ii. 157. 

Ashot, ii. 372, 373. 

Asia, frigate, destroyed, vi. 349, 365. 

Asia, Greek commerce with, i. 7, 87 ; 
province of, i. 115 ; invaded by Huns, 
i. 162, 252; Seljouk empire of, de- 
stroyed by Moguls, iii. 31 2; ravages 
of Seljouks in, iv. 312 seq. 

Asia Minor, Roman province of, i. 33, 
34, 115 ; tribute on levied by Biutus, 
i. 54 ; Greek colonies in, i. 75 ; under 
Heraclius, i. 329 ; Mohammedans 
checked in, i. 350 ; Seljouk Turks in, 
iii. 42, 72, 87 seq.; recovered by 
Alexius I, iii. 124; Spaniards in, iii. 
388. {See Levant.) 

Asian Bey, vii. 40. 

Asomatos, iv. 360. 

Aspar, i. 178, 180. 

Asparuch. founds Bulgarian monarchy, 
i. 385, iv. 15. 

Asper {see Coinage), iii. 490 note ; value 
of, iv. 267 note, v. 27, 28 note. 

Aspropotamos (Achelous), vi. 72 note. 

Aspropotamites, rising of, vi. 199. 

Assembly, national, atTripolitza, Argos, 



Piada, Epidaurus, vi. 239, 242 ; of 
Damala, vi. 420; of Troezen, vi. 
420, vii. 29 ; of Epidaurus, decree of, 
vii. 10; of Argos, acts of, vii. 49 
seq. ; convocation of, vii. 65, 66; 
second at Argos, vii. 74 ; action of 
Romeliots in, vii. 76 ; at Pronia, vii. 
93 seq.; dispersed, vii. 95; convoked, 
vii. 177; dissolved, vii. 185 ; ofi862, 
vii. 314; dissolved, vii. 321 seq. 

Assize of Romania, iv. 95; of Jerusalem, 
iv. 106, 181, 182. 

Assyria, influence on Greek literature, 
i. 9 ; invaded by Heraclius, i. 345. 

Astacus, canal to, from Lake Sophon, 
i. 182 ; iii. 93. 

Astolph, king of the Lombards, takes 
Ravenna, ii. 43. 

Astrologers, banished from Rome, a. d. 
197, i. 10; take place of oracles, i. 

Astrology, spread of, in Europe, i. 10; 
introduced into Cos by Berosus, ib. 

Astynomoi, i. 222. 

Astypalaea, taken by Turks, v. 69. 

Asylum, right of, in Greece, i. 80 ; in 
churches, ii. 222. 

Ataki, position of, vi. 353. 

Ataulph, king of the Goths, i. 96 note. 

Athalaric, i. 236, 237. 

Athanagild, i. 247. 

Athanasios, patriarch, iii. 378 seq. 

Athanasius, St., at Alexandria, i. 137, 
ii. 325 7iote. 

Athenagoras, i. 280. 

Athenais,i. 174,278, 279. (>S'eeEudocia.) 

Athenion, i. 26 note. .(See Aristion.) 

Athens, an ally of Rome, i. 20, 27; 
joins Mithridates, i. 25 ; taken and 
plundered by Sulla, i. 26, 54, 68 ; 
loses commercial and political im- 
portance, i. 27; citizenship of, sold, 
i. 27, 60; exempt from taxation, i. 
39; distribution of grain at, i. 43 
note, 141, 281 ; joins Pompey, i. 
54 ; joins Brutus and Cassius, ib. ; 
temple of Minerva at, plundered by 
Verres, i. 56 ; loses Eretria and 
Aegina, i. 60 ; Hadrian completes 
temple of Jupiter Olympius at, i. 64 ; 
aqueduct of Hadrian at, i. 65 ; 
university and schools of, i. 66, 74, 
174,226; closed, i. 277; mines of, i. 
77 ; walls of, repaired by Valerian, i. 
93 ; fortified by Cleodemus, i 94 ; 
taken by Goths, i. 94 ; defended by 
Dexippus, i. 94; St. Paul at, i. 122 ; 
recovery of, after Gothic invasion, 
i. 141 ; Constantine strategos at, i. 
141 ; courted by Julian, i. 142 ; Alaric 
at, i. 158; Greek literature at, perishes, 
i. 277; state of, i. 278; visited by 

Hadrian, i. 279; Hadrian archon at, I 
i. 281; under Antoninus Pius, i. 279;! 
imperial (regius) professors at, i. 229 ;| 
irnder M. Aurelius, i. 66, 280 ; under! 
Constantine, i. 281; Julian, Libanius, I 
St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen at, I 
i. 2S1, 283 ; Julian forbids Christians! 
to lecture at, i. 282, 284 ; a free cityj 
under Hadrian and M. Aurelius,! 
i. 285; pure morality of, 26. j| 
bishop of, i. 286; paganism at, ib.;\ 
Constans at, i. 378; insurrection at, 
ii. 302 ; visited by Basil II, ii. 382 ; 
revolt of, ii. 418 note; John de la 
Roche duke of, iii. 363, iv. 140; 
Walter de Brienne duke of, iii. 407, 
iv. 143: duchy of, iii. 447, iv. 139; 
Otho de la Roche, signor of, iv. 109, 
no, 132 seq., 136, 137; Guy III 
duke of, iv. 129, 141 ; a feudal princi- 
pality, iv. 132 seq.; attacked by Leo 
Sguros, iv. 134; conquered by Franks, 
iv. 135; Guy, grandsire of, iv. 137;; 
seq., 195, 196,200; feudal connexion j 
with Achaia, iv. 137 seq.; Argos and 
Nauplia fiefs of, iv. 1 38 ; William de 
la Roche, duke of, iv. 141, 209; de- 
scription of, by Muntaner, iv. 143 ; 
Walter de Brienne II, duke of, iv. 
152; taken by Catalans, iv. 152; 
Roger Deslau, duke of, iv. 153; 
duchy of, an appanage of house of 
Aragon, iv. 1 54 ; conquered by Nerio 
Acciaiuoli, iv. 155 ; Ladislas, duke of, 
iv. 159 ; left to the church of St. 
Mary, iv. 160 ; Antonio Acciaiuoli, 
duke of, iv. 159 seq.; Nerio II duke 
of, iv. 162 seq.; duchy of, tributary 
to the Porte, iv. 163; Franco Acci- 
aiuoli, duke of, iv. 164; visited by 
Mohammed II, iv. 164 ; ducal palace 
at, iv. 170 ; described by Dante, 172 ; 
Boccaccio, 158, 172 ; Chaucer, iv. 172, 
and Shakspeare, iv. 173; taken by 
Venetians, iv. 269 ; list of dukes of, 
iv. 431 ; true Athenians extinct in 
time of Tacitus, V. 123 note; Vene- 
tians at, V. 184, 186; Lutheran 
church at, v. 186; Athenians migrate 
from, V. 187 ; under the Turks, vi. 3; 
Vasilike benefactress of, vi. 4 ; state 
of, in 19th cent., vi. 162 ; besieged by 
Greeks, relieved by Omer Vrioni, 
vi. 163 ; siege of Turks at, vi. 246; 
massacre of Turks at, vi. 2S3 seq. ; 
anarchy at, vi. 304; cruelty of Odys- 
seus at, vi. 304, 305 ; provincial 
assembly at, vi. 305 ; besieged by 
Reshid Pasha, vi. 401, 413, 414 seq.; 
visit of King Louis of Bavaria to, vii. 
161, 163; Mavrocordatos elected for 
university of, vii. 189; revolt of 




garrison at, vii. 271; revolution at, 
vii. 272 ; civil war in, vii. 294 seq. ; 
order restored at, vii. 300. 

Athingans, ii. 97, 109, 128 and note. 

Athos, monasteries of, ii. 164 note, iv. 
384 ; charter of, ib. ; fortifications of, 
vi. 203 ; monks of, join Greek in- 
surrection, vi. 204, 206 ; reduced, 
207 ; naval action off, vi. 319. {See 

Athyras (Bithyas), river, i. 254, ii. 115. 

Attalia, colony of Mardaites at, i. 387 ; 
battle of, ii. 88. 

Attaliotes, iii. 395. 

Attica, insurrection of slaves in, i. 23 ; 
ravaged by Philip V, i. 55 ; rebellion 
of, i. 57; old dialect preserved in, 
i. 68 ; Attic spoken in rural dis- 
tricts of, i. 280; conquered by Cata- 
lans, iii. 407; annexed to Othoman 
empire, iv. 164; Albanians in, vi. 28 ; 
revolt of, vi. 159; invaded by Rehshid 
Pasha, vi. 401. 

Attila, i. 168-170, 177; defeated at 
Asemous, i. 170. 

Atzypotheodoros, ii. 336. 

Aubusson, d', grand master of Knights of 
Rhodes, v, 65. 

Augustus, government of, i. 34, 39 ; his 
survey of the empire, land-tax, capi- 
tation-tax, i. '40 ; coinage of, i. 48 ; 
military colonies of, i. 54, 88 ; his 
policy towards Greece, i. 60 ; stops 
sale of Athenian citizenship, ih. ; his 
treatment of Lacedaemon, ih. ; colo- 
nizes Patrae, ih. ; destroys statues of 
Antony, i. 72 ; universal peace under, 
i. 88; enforces morals, i. 99; state 
of Egypt under, i. 270. 

Aurelian, improves coinage, i. 51 ; 
victories of, i. 98 ; reforms of, i. 100; 
abandons Dacia, i. 156. 

Aurelius, M., alters land-tax, i. 40; 

, favours Greece, i. 66 ; rebuilds tem- 
ple at Eleusis, i. 66 ; improves schools 
at Athens, ih. ; taught by Herodes 
Atticus, ih. ; persecutes Christians, 
i. 90 ; Athens under, i. 279- 

Aureus (see Coinage), i. 48 seq., 435. 

Austrasia, kingdom of, i. 247 ; Franks 
of, i. 296. 

Austria, Don John of, v. 86, 102 ; 
oppresses Hungary, v. 1 66 ; war with 
Turkey, v. 171, 227; treaty with 
Venice, v. 227 ; minister of, at Porte, 
insulted, v. 251 ; joins Russia, v. 
273; coinage of, debased, vi. 106; 
Hypsiiantes in, vi. 134; interference 
of, in Turkey, vii. 215; supports 
Montenegro, vii. 217 ; mission to 
Constantinople, vii. 217, 218 ; war 
with Italy, how regarded by Greece, 

vii. 249 seq. ; gains Belgrade, Temes- 
var, and Semendria, v. 228, 

Autorianos, Michael, iii. 288. 

Auximum, siege of, i. 211. 

Avars, first known, i. 258 ; in China, i. 
259 ; in Europe, ih. ; war with, i, 
292, 293 ; destroy kingdom of Pan- 
nonia, i. 293 ; their empire on the 
Danube, i. 296 ; defeat Tiberius, i. 
297 ; take Sirmium, i. 299 ; war of 
Maurice with, i. 302 ; extent of their 
empire, i. 302 ; defeat Maurice, i. 
304 ; treaty of Maurice with, ih. ; 
Phocas makes peace with, i. 310 ; 
Chagan of, i. 335 ; empire, extent of 
in the time of Heraclius, i. 335 ; 
decline of, i. 336 ; in Thrace, ih. ; 
peace of Heraclius with, i. 337 ; 
attack Constantinople, ih. ; invade 
Greece, i. 338 ; obtain shipbuilders 
from the Lombards, i. 341 ; defeated 
in Aegean, i. 341, ii. 105 ; in Pelo- 
ponnese, iv. 11, 13. 

Avedik, patriarch of Armenia, v. 239, 

Avesnes, James d', iv. 176, 177. 

Avidius Cassius, i. 280. 

Aximet, vi. 297. 

Axios the (Vardar), iii. 249 ; Persian 
colony on, iv. 27. 

Axiottes, vi. 283. 

Axouchos, iii. 131, 146, 170, iv. 338. 

Ayleon, ii. 196. 

Azan Centurione, iv. 245, 

Azaz, ii. 400. 

Azeddin Kaikous II, iii. 337, 358, 
364, 367 ; takes Sinope, iv. 326- 

Azof (Tana), iii. 456, v. 6, 106. 


Baalbec (Heliopolis), i. 361. 

Babek, ii. 153, 156. 

Babylon, destroyed, i. 373- 

Babylon (Misr, Cairo), i. 323, 363, 373. 

Bachin, iii. 172. 

Bagauds, ii. 53. 

Bagdad, i. 373 ; caliphate of, ii. 306. 

Bagrat, iii. 18. 

Bagrat VI, of Georgia, iv, 385. 

Bagratians, ii. 440. 

Bailly, Dr., agent of Philhellenic com- 
mittee, vi. 404. 

Bairam, feast of, vi. 350. 

Bajazet (see Bayezid), iron cage of, iii. 
374 note. 

Balbes, vii. 198, 291. 

Balbi, v. 217, 223. 

Balcan, iii. 87. 

Baldwin I, count of Flanders and em- 
peror of Romania, iii. 258, 265, 275, 
iv. 85, 92 seq.; reign of, iv. 98 seq. ; 



quarrels with Boniface of Montferrat, 
iv. 99. 
Baldwin II, emperor of Constantinople, 
iii. 306, 308, 310, 313; state of Con- 
stantinople under, iii. 337, iv. 114, 
115. 205, 280. 
Baldwin, brother of Godfrey, iii. 109; 

takes Edessa, iii. no. 
Baldwin of Hainault, iii. in. 
Baldwin III, king of Jerusalem, iii. 

165, 168. 
Baldwin, brother of empress Maria, 

iii. 192. 
Balearic Isles, reduced by Belisarius, 

i. 233; Greeks in, i. 318. 
Balkans {see Haemus), crossed by Rus- 
sians, vii. 52. 
Balta L.iman, v. 102. 
Balta-oglou, v. 102. 
Banditti, i. 223, 407 {see Brigands'). 
Bank, National, of Greece, vii. 46. 
Bankers, importance of, iv. 158. 
Barbarossa, Frederic, iii. 166, 172, 173, 

176, 182, 196, 233 seq. 
Barbarossa (Haireddin), Turkish ad- 
miral, iv. 292, V. 45, 68 seq., 82, 102. 
Barbary, corsairs of, v. 95 ; trade of 

Messenia with, v. 200. 
Barcelona, eastern trade of, v. 156. 
Bardan, ii. 200. 
Bardanes (Philippicus), revolt of, i. 394, 

ii. 94, 101, 130. 
Bardas, ii. 161, 171, 173 seq., 191, 193, 

196; legal reforms of, 236, 239. 
Bardunia, vi. 29, 30. 
Bari, Saracens at, ii. 248 ; taken by 
Louis II, ii. 249 ; taken by duke of 
Beneventum, ii. 279 ; taken by Robert 
Guiscard, iii. 37. 
Barlaam, iii. 365. 
Barlaamites, iii. 441. 
Barletta, i. 414. 
Barmecides, ii. 88, 103. 
Barozzi, Jacopo, signor of Santorin, iv. 

Barrats (exemptions"), v. 282. 
Basil I (the Macedonian), emperor, i. 
333, ii. 171, 184, 192, 193; history 
and reign of, ii. 228 seq., 231, 235; 
legislative policy of, 236, 237 ; senate 
under, 237 ; new code of, ii. 241 ; 
epanagoge of, ii. 242 ; Paulician war 
of, ii. 245; invades Cilicia, 246; 
death of, ii. 257. 
Basil II, ii. 336 ; reign of, ii. 360 seq. ; 
Bulgarian war of, ii. 369 ; conquest 
of Bulgaria, ii. 381 ; visits Atliens, 
ii. 382; in Syria, ii. 385; death of, 
ii 386. 
Basil, the Bogomilian, iii. 128. 
Basil, St., at Athens, i. 281, 283. 
Basil, Synnadenos, ii. 416. 

Basilakes, rebellion of, iii. 48. 

Basili, St., village of, vi. 294, 295. 

Basilika, ii. 33 ; code of, ii. 33, 238, 
241, 242 ; revised by Leo VI, ii. 

Basilios, emperor of Trebizond, iv. 
360 seq. 

BasiHos, the Bird, natural son of Ro- 
manus I, ii. 314, 325, 335, 359, 360, 
end of 366. 

Basihos, the Bogomilian, iii. 68, 69. 

Basilios, patriarch, ii. 337. 

Basilios Kamateros, patriarch, iii. 201. 

BasiUscus, brother of Verina, i. 178, | 

Basiliskian, ii. 196. 

Basilitzes, ii. 283. 

Baton, king of Dalmatia, his answer] 
to Tiberius, i. 41. 

Battalion, Sacred, of Greek volunteers, | 
vi. 124, 131, 132. 

Bavaria, Louis of, embassy to Constan- 
tinople, iii. 422; Otho of, King ofj 
Greece, vii. So seq.; treaty with] 
Greece, vii. 105; Louis of, vii. no, 
115, 116, i6r, 163; influence of, in] 
Greece, vii. 145 seq. 

Bavarians in Greece, selfishness of, vii. 

"9; . . ... , 

Bayezid (Bajazet), iron cage of, iii. 3741 
note ; sultan, iii. 468 ; takes Phila- 
delphia, ih. it1\ ; defeated by Timor,! 
iii. 481; death of, iii. 4S2 ; sons of, | 
ih. ; Mustapha, pretended son of, iii. 
488; empire of iv. 389; Orkhan, great | 
grandson of, iv. 409, v. 3. 

Bayezid II, v. 18; war with Venice, | 
V. 62. 

Beaufort, castle of, iv. 214. 

Bela III, king of Hungary, iii. i75.| 
196, 200, 201. 

Belgians, empire of Romania, iv. 117. 

Belgrade (Singidunum), i. 249, 339, 
346; lost, iii. 14, 20 ; peace of, v. io,l 
vi. 20; taken, v. 227, 228; treaty of,] 
V. 239, 246; ceded to Porte, v. 246. 

Belisarius, his life a type of his age,| 
i. 194; jealousy of, i. 207; forces of,l 
i. 208 ; suppresses sedition of Nika,l 
i. 21 7 ; attacks and reduces Vandals, Ll 
231, 232 ; takes Sardinia, Corsica, andj 
Balearic Isles, i. 233 ; destroys king- 
dom of Ostrogoths, i. 235 ; reduces! 
Sicily, i. 237; in Italy, ih.\ takes! 
Naples, ih.; enters Rome, i. 238;} 
offered empire of West, i. 241 ; re- 
called, i. 242 ; Persian war of i. 243 ;l 
returns to Italy, at Porto, ih., 245 ;| 
character and wealth of ih. ; blind-| 
ness of, i. 246, 429 ; at Ciiettoukome,! 
i. 256 ; defeat and treatment of Za-| 
bergan, i. 257 ; sent to Syria, i. 264 ;| 




mediaeval Greek poem on, i. 432 

note; life of, ii. 194 note. 
Beluses of Servia, iii. 173. 
, Bembo, v. 221. 
Benaki, conspiracy of, v. 249, 252 seq., 


Benderli Ali, vizier, vi. 187, 189. 

Benedict III, pope, ii. 176. 

Beneventum, attacked by Constans, i. 
378; Romuald duke of, i. 379; 
duchy of, ii. 248 ; taken by Byzan- 
tines, ii. 279. 

Benjamin, patriarch of Alexandria, i. 


Benjamin of Tudela, iii. 151, 229, iv. 29. 

Beranger, d'Entenza, iii. 397 seq., 400, 
405, 406. 

Beranger de Rocafert, iii. ^97, 405 seq. 

Berat, pashalik of, vi. 38, 58; taken, 
vi. 79. 

Berats (charters of denaturalization), 
vi 107. 

Berengaria, iii. 238, iv. 71, 72. 

Berkoftzali, Yusbuf, vi. 312, 313. 

Berosus, introduces astrology into Cos, 
i. ID. 

Berrhoea (Aleppo\ i. 263. 

Berrhoea (Irenopolis), ii, 86, no, iii. 

Bersinikia, battle of, ii. 112. 

Bersova, massacre of Mussulmans at, 
vi. 146. 

Bertha (Irene), iii. 148. 

Bertrand, grand master of the Templars, 
iii. 186. 

Bertrandon de la Brocquiere, descrip- 
tion of visit of empress to St. So- 
phia's, iii. 493. 

Berytus, law school of, i. 216; univer- 
sity of, i. 273, 415, ii. 359. 

Besiari, Ago, vi. oi- 

Besiari, Muhurdar, vi. 81, 86. 

Bethune, Conon of, iv. 112. 

Bibisi, brigand, case of, vii. 166, 167. 

Bishops in the Greek Church, i. 128; 
power of, i. 152; of Athens, i. 286; 
of Rome, i. 294, 347, 375 ; of Con- 
stantinople, i. 300, 310; position of, 
ii. 21 ; lose power, ii. 238; influence 
of, iv. 133; deprived of civil juris- 
diction, vii. 127; assembly of, at 
Nauplia, vii. 128. 

Bithyas (ste AthyrasX 

Bithynia, a senatorial province, i. 34 ; 
invaded by Crusaders, iii. 290 ; revolt 
of, iii. 349; oppression of, iii. 358. 

Bizya, iii. 304, 313. 

Blachern, gate. ii. 115, 144, 190, iii. 220; 
church of, burnt, iii. 29 note; peace 
of, iii. 445, 459. 

Black, Mr., vice-consul at Mesolonghi, 
vii. 270. 

Black Death, iii. 448. 

Black Sea, Greek colonies on, subdued 
by Pontus and Bithynia, 1. 6 ; expe- 
ditions of Goths from, i. 94; extinc- 
tion of Greek civilization on, i. 251 ; 
ports on, i. 268; trade of, i. 422; 
closed to foreigners, iii. 154 note; 
Genoese trade in, iii. 456 ; first right 
of Russians to navigate, v. 6 ; closed 
to Christians by Mohammed II, v. 
106 ; decay of trade in, v. 107. 

Blandrate, count, iv. 107 seq., 118, 136. 

Blanka, port of, iii, 353. 

Blemmidas, Nicephorus, iii. 319, 321. 

Blois, Stephen of, iii. 99, no; Louis 
of, iii. 265, 286; death of count of, 
iv. 100. 

Blondel, M., v. 167. 

Bobolina, Spetziot heroine, vi. 218. 

Boccaccio, his picture of Athens, iv. 
158, 172. _ 

Boccanegra, iii. 354. 

Boccanegra, Simone, doge of Genoa, 
V. 73- 

Bodin, king of Servia, iii. 76, 87, 104. 

Bodinos, iii. 41. 

Boeotia, joins Pompey, i. 54 ; federa- 
tion of, i. 67 ; Catalans in, iv. 149; 
invasion of, iv. 233; Albanians in, 
vi. 28 ; revolt of, vi. 159. 

Bogislav, Stephen, ii. 415, 429, 434. 

Bogomilians, iii. 67 seq. 

Bogoris, king of Bulgaria, ii. 184, 280. 

Bohemund, iii. 75, 79 seq., 80, 81, 100 
seq. III, 115 seq.; prince of Antioch, 
iii. Ill ; war with Alexius I, iii. 119 
seq., iv. 52 ; treaty with Alexius I, 
iv. 122; death of, iv. 124. 

Bohemund III of Antioch, iii. 212. 

Boilas, revolt of, ii. 292, 433. 

Boniface, i. 165, 228. 

Boniface, ii. 223. 

Boniface, marquis of Montferrat, iii. 
259, 263, 265, iv. 90, 97, 107; king 
of Saloniki, iv. 116, 117; Macedonia 
a fief of, iv. 97 ; quarrels with Bald- 
win I, iv. 99, 176, 177. 

Boniface III, pope, universal bishop, 

Boniface VIII, pope, iii. 389. 
Bono, V. 223. 
Borans, i. 92. 
Borbotia, taken, iv. 256. 
Boris, king of Bulgaria, ii. 344, 347, 

350. 369. 375- 

Bosnia, i. 333. 

Bosphorus, Cossacks in, v. 107 ; opened 
to Russians, vii. 4. 

Bosporus, Cimmerian town and king- 
dom of, i. 145 ; taken by Huns, i. 
251 ; by Turks, i. 402, ii. 353, 354- 

Bossina, v. 191. 





Bostra, siege of, by Aboubekr, i. 359. 
Botaniates, Nicephorus (Nicephorus 

III), ii. 452, 454, Hi. 21, 46 seq. ; 

coinage of, iii. 47. 
Botaniates, Theophylaktos, ii. 377. 
Botasses, vi. 331. 
Botzaris, Constantine, vi. 359. 
Botzaris, George, vi, 47, 51. 
Botzaris, Kosta, vii. 86. 
Botzaris, Marco, vi. 264, 265, 267, 272, 

295; death of, vi. 315. 
Botzaris, captain (son of Marco), vii. 

175, 248, 294. 
Botzaris, Noti, vi. 374, 393. 
Boucicault, marshal de, iii. 473. 
Boudonitza {see Budonitza). 
Boudroun {s,ee Budrun). 
Bouillon, Godfrey of iii. loi, 103. 
Boulogne, Eustace of, iii. 103. 
Boundelmorte, Esau, iv. 130. 
Bourbon, Mary de, iv. 222. 
Bouz-tepe (Mount Mithrios), iv. 330. 
Bowides, ii. 441. 

Bowring, Sir John, vi. 327, 434, 435. 
Brabant, Miles of, iii. 290. 
Brachophagos, battle of, iii. 457. 
Bragadino, tortures of, v. 83. 
Branas, iii. 65, 177, 221, 223, 230, 

Branisova, iii. 174, 202. 
Brienne, constable of Apulia, iii. 82. 
Brienne, John de, king of Jerusalem 

and emperor of Romania, iii. 306 

seq.: emperor-regent, iv. 114, 146, 

Brienne, Hugh de, iv. 146. 
Brienne, Walter de, duke of Athens, iv. 

143, 146 seq., 151, 152 {see Athens). 
Brienne, Walter de, count of Jaffa, iv. 

Briennios, Theoktistos, ii. 166. 
Briennios, Nicephorus, ii. 439, 446, 447, 

451 seq., iii. 33, 45, 47, 84, 88, 128, 

Brigands, i. 223, 407, ii. 53, 134; in 
Morea, v. 207, vii. 149 seq.; revival 
of vii. 155 seq., 161, vii. 206, 235. 

Brindisi {see Brundusium), taken by 
Robert Guiscard, iii. 37. 

Bringas, Joseph, ii. 314, 316, 322, 327. 

Britain, Great {see England), Romans 
in, i. 88. 

Brotherhood (dSiKtpoTTjs), ii. 230 tiote, 
vi. 156. 

Broughton, Lord (Mr. Hobhouse), vi. 

Brue, M., v. 53. 
Brundusium (see Brindisi), captured by 

Lombards, i. 379. 
Brunnovv', baron, vii. 214. 
Brunswick, duke of, alliance with 

Venice, v. 176. 

Brusa (Prusa), iii. 286; taken by Timor^ j 

iii. 482. 
Bruso, monastery of, vi. 317. 
Bryennios {see Briennios). 
Brutus, rapacity of, i. 37 ; his extortion j 

in Cyprus, i. 47 ; levies tribute on 

Asia Minor, i. 54; his severity to i 

Xanthus, ib. 
Bryas, ii. 150, 209. 
Bucelin, i. 247. 
Bucharest, treaty of, vi. iii ; Turks at,- 

vi. 129; Hypsilantes at, vi. 123,127. 
Budonitza (Boudonitza), iv. 108, 109, 1 

132, vi. 406. 
Budrun (Boudroun, Halicamassus), v, 

66, 349, 351 ; battles off, v. 352 seq., 


Bukoleon, palace of, ii. 289, 334. 

Bulgares, Demetrius, ministry of, vii. 
231 seq. 

Bulgares, Eugenios, literary influence 
of, V. 284, 285. 

Bulgares, George, vi. 171. 

Bulgari, count, vii. 32. 

Bulgaria and Bulgarians, Hunnish or 
Turkish, i. 250; in Dacia, z6. ; defeat 
Constantiolus, i. 252; rise of, i. 337; 
monarchy founded by Asparuch, i. 
385, iv. 15 ; defeat Constantine Po- 
gonatus, i. 385; Varna capital of, ib.; 
alliance of with Justinian II, i. 393; 
defeated by Justinian II, i. 388 ; Ter- 
belis king of, i. 394, ii. 11 ; wars of 
Constantine V with, ii. 50 seq. ; defeat 
of, ii. 52, 53 ; Cardam king of, ii. 90; 
Crumn king of, ii. 105 seq. ; inva- 
sion of, ii. 109 ; war of Michael I 
with, ii. no; invasions of, ii. 114, 
115 ; defeated by Leo V, ii. 115 ; in- 
vaded, ii. 116: Mortagon king of, 
ii. 116; defeat Thomas and Michael 
II, ii. 131 ; become Christians, ii. 
184, 185, 223; Bogoris king of ii. 
184; war with Michael III, ib.; 
armies of, ii. 204 ; controversy as to 
Church of, ii. 185, 234; war with 
Leo VI, ii. 279 seq. ; Simeon king of, 
ii. 280 seq., 303. 310 seq.; trade with 
Thessalonica. ii. 281 ; lake Adriano- 
ple, ii. 286 ; Church of, independent, 
ii. 311, iii. 66, 67; patriarch of, ib.; 
Peter king of, ii. 312, 333, 344; 
Boris king of ii. 344, 347, 350 ; con- 
quered by Swiatoslaf, ii. 345 ; by 
John Zimiskes, ii. 350 ; war with 
Basil II, ii. 369, 381, iv. 28; .Samuel 
king of, ii. 369 seq. ; defeated by 
Nicephorus Ouranos, ii. 373; in Ar- 
menia, ii. 384; Armenians in Bul- 
garia, ii. 384 ; invaded by Patzinaks, 
ii. 394; revolt of ii. 416 seq. ; Aaron 
king of, ii. 442, 453 seq.; rebellion 




of, iii. 41 ; John king of, iii. 248, 
250, 260, iv. 99 ; alliance of Theo- 
dore with, iii. 290; attack Adiianople, 
iii. 290, 291 ; patriarch of, iii. 301 and 
note ; alliance with John III, iii. 307; 
Caloman king of, iii. 313; Michael 
king of, iii. 313, 325, 423; war with 
Theodore II, iii. 325; state of, iii. 
338 ; Constantine king of, iii. 364 ; 
war of Michael VIII with, ih. ; Alex- 
ander king of, iii. 437; Sclavonian 
origin of, iv. i.!,, 18; in Macedonia, 
iv. 18; take Nicopolis, iv. 28; con- 
quered by Basil II, ih. ; in Epirus, ih. ; 
second kingdom of, iv. 28 ; colonized 
by Sclavonians, vi. 22; depopulated 
by Russians, vi. 112. 

Bulgaris, governor of Hydra, vi. 32, 
vii. 282, 330. 

Bulgarophygos, ii. 281. 

Bulls, Byzantine, ii. 344. 

Bulwer, Sir Henry, vi. 328. 

Burbaki, colonel, defeat of and death, 
vi. 413' 414- 

Burdett, Sir Francis, vi. 434. 

Burdge, v. 223, vi. 288, 296, 297, 299. 

Burgundy, Louis of, iv. 217, 219; 
Eudes IV of, iv. 219, 221. 

Burial of the dead, i. 1 20. 

Burtzes, Constantine, ii. 392. 

Burtzes, Michael, ii. 331, 332, 334, 359, 

392. 452- 

Bussora, i. 373, v. 6. 

Butrinto, v. 227. 

Butumites, iii. 100, 108, 116. 

Buyuk Tchekmedjee lake, i. 254. 

Byblos, i. 371. 

Byron, Lord, vi. 163, 321, 322, 324 
seq. ; character of, vi. 325, 326, 363, 
vii. 7. 

Byza, ii. 132. 

Byzant {&ee Coinage), i. 49, 442 ; worth 
of, ii. 146 note, V. 27. 

Byzantine Empire, i. 309, 313; com- 
mencement of, i. 351 seq.; Greek 
the court language of, i. 352 ; an 
appropriate term, ih.; meaning of, 
ii. 2; periods of, ii. 9; coinage of, 
ii. 32, 213. iii. 320, iv. 42, v. 27; 
fiscal rapacity of, ii. 202 ; military 
strength of, ii. 204 ; commerce of, 
ii. 211 ; moral tone of, ii. 218 ; legal 
reforms of, ii. 236 ; characteristics of 
history of, ii. 235 ; loss of Italy by, iii. 
36, 37 ; court of, iii. 56 ; degeneracy 
of, iii. 148; end of, iii. 265 seq., 276 
seq. ; Greeks of, known as Romaioi, 
iv. 19 {&ee Romaioi) ; emperors, 
power of, iv. 39; partition of by 
Crusaders, iv, 97 ; Peloponnesus re- 
united to, iv. 245 ; Greeks of, pas- 
si veness of, iv. 273; fall of, iv. 311 ; 


aristocracy, extinction of, v. 1 2 2'; pro- 
phecies of fall of, vi. 57. 

Byzantine historians, carelessness of, i. 
340 ; list of, i. 476 seq. 

Byzantium {see Constantinople), seized 
by the Goths, i. 94 ; effects of change 
of government to, i. loi, 140 ; reasons 
of that change, i. 139; empire of, 
i- 309. 313- 

Cadis (inferior judges), v. 18. 

Caesar, title of, ii. 186. 

Caesar, Julius, reduces grain-largesses, 
i. 43 ; depopulates Megara, i. 54 ; 
joined by Aetolia and Acarnania, i. 
54 ; colonizes Corinth, i. 59 ; sump- 
tuary law of, i. 74. 

Caesarea, i. 331 ; taken by Moslemah, 
ii. 19. 

Caffa (Theodosia, Kaffa), war of iii. 
456; Genoese at, iv. 352, 353, 370; 
ravaged by Othomans, iv. 400, v. 

Cairo, i. 323, 363, 373. {See Babylon.) 

Calabria, Romans expelled from, i. 
379, 400, ii. 178; Saracens expelled 
from, ii. 249. 

Calamo, English protection of, vi. 374. 

Caligula, i. 41, 72. 

Callipolis, taken by Suleiman, iii. 461. 

Caloman, king of Bulgaria, iii. 313. 

Calycadnus, river, iii. 236. 

Camarilla (Anaktoboulion), vii. 257. 

Cambrian, frigate, vi. 300. 

Cameniates, Joannes, ii. 266, 270, 273 

Campo Formio, treaty of, v. 274. 

Canal, from Lake Sophon to Gulf of 
Astacus, i. 182, iii. 93. 

Canal, from Nile to Red Sea, i. 270, 
321, 365, 366, ii. 212. 

Candia (Chandak), ii. 135, 166, 317, 
318 and 7iote\ taken, iv. 279; con- 
quered by Othomans, v. 56 ; siege of, 
v, 103, III ; captured, v. 165, vii. 57. 

Canning, George, Eastern policy of, vi. 
195, vii. 3, 6, 9 ; Spanish policy of, 
vii. II ; death, vii. 25. 

Canning, Sir Stratford (Lord Stratford 
de Redcliffe), vi. 309, vii. 10, 51, 78 
seq. ; memorandum of 79. 

Cannon, used by Othomans, iii. 490, 
503, 505, 506 note. {See Artillery.) 

Cantacuzenos, family of, hostile to that 
of Palaeologus, iii. 449. 

Cantacuzenos, John, historian, and 
emperor of Constantinople, iii. 412, 
413, 420 ; rebeUion, of, iii. 425, 429, 
432 seq., iv. 221, 230; alliance of 
with Turks, iii. 436 seq., 451 ; em- 
peror, iii. 445 ; limits of empire 




under, iii. 447 ; taxation under, iii. 
451 ; war with Genoese, iii. 453 seq. ; 
takes Thessalonica, iii. 455 ; in alli- 
ance with Venice, iii. 456 ; peace 
with Genoa, iii. 457; dethroned, iii. 
460, iv. 372. 

Cantacuzenos, George, prince, vi. 135, 

Cantacuzenos, Helena, iv. 156. 

Cantacuzenos, John, iii. 209, 210, 

Cantacuzenos, Manuel, despot of Pelo- 
ponnese, iv. 230 seq., 255, 258. 

Cantacuzenos, Mattliew, proclaimed 
emperor, iii. 449, 454, 459; abdi- 
cates, iii. 462. 

Cantacuzenos, Michael, a merchant, 
wealth of, v. 158 seq. 

Cantacuzenos, Nicephorus, iv. 373. 

Cantacuzenos, Theodora, mother of 
John, iii. 435. 

Cantacuzenos, Theodora, daughter of 
John, iii. 443. 

Cantacuzenos, Theodora, daughter of 
Nicephorus, iv. 373, 397. 

Cantemir, Demetrius, v. 215. 

Capellan. Theodore, iii. 170. 

Capello, Victor, iv. 269, v. 172. 

Capita (hides of land), i. 219. 

Capitation-tax of Augustus, i. 40, 109, 

Capodistrian faction, contest with Ro- 
meliots, vii. 76, 77 seq. ; expelled 
from Nisi, vii. 79 ; at Salona, vii. 88; 
take Patras, vii. 89 seq. ; intrigues 
of, vii. 137, 171 ; electoral manoeu- 
vres of, vii. 1S8, 192. 

Capodistrias, Agostino, vii. 39, 59, 60, 
73 seq. ; president, vii. 78 seq. ; 
ejected, vii. 83. 

Capodistrias, John, vi. 15, no, 127; 
president of Greece, vi. 421, vii. 24, 
2g, 30 seq., 34; administration of, 
civil, vii. 40 seq ; financial, vii. 44 
seq. : judicial, vii. 47 ; in Russia, vii. 
42 ; duplicity of, vii 54, 55 seq., 59 ; 
tyranny of, ih. ; assassinated, vii. 

71. . 

Capodistrias, Viaro, vii. 42 seq., 47, 56, 
59 seq., 7o._ 

Caracalla, coinage of, i. 48 seq. ; edict 
of, i. 64, 65, 76, 108, 217; Lacedae- 
monian phalanx of i. 93. 

Carbunopsina {see Zoe), ii. 260 seq. 

Carceri, dalle, Giovanni, iv 286. 

Carceri, dalle, Nicolo II, duke of Archi- 
pelago, iv. 289, 290. 

Carceri, dalle, Ravano, iv. no, 276. 

Cardam, king of Bulgarians, ii. 90. 

Carlovitz, treaty of, v. 28, 193, 194, 
227, 242, vi. 43; battle of, v. 227. 
{See Peterwardein.) 

Carlsbad, king Otho visits, vii. 253. 
Caroline Books, ii. 76. 
Carthage, early commercial treaty of 
Rome with, i. 7 note; destroyed, i. 
54,209; taken by Genseric, i. 228, 
230; Belisarius at, i. 237; proposed 
seat of empire, i. 319, 320, 321; 
Mohammedan conquest of, i. 367, 
373 ; recovered by Constans II, i. 
379; conquered by Abdalmelik, i. 
392 and note. 

Cassandra, attacked by Goths, i. 97 ; 
taken, i. 252. 

Cassius at Rliodes, i. 54. 

Castel Tornese (Chlomoutzi,Clarentza), 
iv. 191, 244; taken by Knights of 
Malta, V. 96, 201. 

Castriot, George (Scanderbeg), iv. 247, 
254, vi. 314. 

Catabatala, ii. 246. 

Catacazy, Russian minister, vii. 140. 

Catalans, The Grand Company, iii. 
388, 391 seq., 408 ; at Gallipoli, 
iii. 398 ; sack Perinthos, iii. 400 ; 
alliance with Turks, iii. 403 ; plunder 
Thrace, iii. 404 ; conquer Attica, iii. 
407; conquer Neopatras, iv. 129; in 
Thessaly, iv. 147, 148 ; in Boeotia, 
iv. 149; take Thebes and Athens, 
iv. 152, 244, 300; at Livadea, vi. 

Cataphracti, cavalry, i. 206. 

Catharists, iii. 68. 

Catherine, daughter of John IV, iv. 411. 

Catherine II of Russia, intrigues in 
Greece, v. 247 seq., 267 seq. 

Catherine of Valois, iv. 157, 215, 217, 

Cattaneo, family of, iii. 429. 

Cattle-tax, in provinces, i. 40. 

Cavalry, i. 204 and tiote, 206, 239 ; 
Othoman, v. 37. 

Census, applied to Greece, i. 22 ; re- 
vised by Constantine, i. 106; exact- 
ness of, i, 469 seq. ; relaxation of, 
iii. 5. 

Centenionalis {see Coinage), i. 440. 

Centralization, evil effects of, i. 198, 
199, 412, iv. 297, v. II, 14, 228, vi. 

Centumcellae (Civita Vecchia), ii. 77. 

Centurione, family of, iv. 236 ; Azan, 
iv. 245, 255. 

Cephallenia (Cephalonia), C. Ar.tonius 
at, i. 47 ; Philippicus exiled to, i. 
425, ii. 251 ; taken by Venetians, iv. 
77, V. 63; counts of, iv. 127, 128, 
130, 131, 273; list of, V. 61 ; taken 
by count Maio, iv. 273 ; taken by 
Othomans, v. 62 ; Lord Byron, vi. 
325, 326; Richard of, iv. 127; John 
of, ih. 




Cephisia, i. 65. 

Cephisus, battle of, iii. 407, iv. 150, 


Cerigo, lost by Venetians, v. 226; re- 
gained, 228; murders at, vi. 192. 
Cervi, island of, claimed by England, 

vii. 209, 214, 215. 
Ceuta, siege of, i. 247. 
Chabdan, ii. 309. 
Chaboras, i. 261. 
Chaeronea, battle of, i. 27; earthquake 

at, i. 225. 
Chalandritza, Centurione at, iv. 236. 
Chalcedon, plundered by Goths, i. 94; 

council of, i. 177, 188. 
Chalcidice (Eleutherokhoria), Greek 

insurrection in, vi. 202, 204 seq., 

Chalcis, i. 263, (Kinesrin), i. 361, ii. 

251 ; insurrection in, vii. 264. 
Chalcocondylas of Arachova, insult to, 

iv. 214. 
Chalcocondylas, father of the historian, 

iv. 252. 
Chalcocondylas, Laonicus, historian, iv. 

22, 161, 162, v. 51. 
Chaldaea, state of, i. 327 ; Christians 

in Nestorians, i. 328. 
Chaldia, John of, ii. 196 ; Trebizond, 

capital of, iv. 310. 
Chalke, palace of, ii. 285. 
Chalybia, lost by Trebizond, iv. 349. 
Champlitte, William de, prince of 

Achaia, iv. 98, 109, 137, 175 seq., 

Champlitte, Robert de, iv. 187, 188. 
Chandak (Candia),ii. 135, 166, 317, 318 

and tiote. 
Chandos, Lord, v. 171. 
Charalambes, vi. 236, 
Charax, iii. 290. 
Chariopolis, ii. 439. 
Charlemagne, ii. 03, 76, 78 ; treaty of 

Nicephorus with, ii. 100; treatment 

of commerce, ii. 210. (See Caroline 

Charles of Anjou, iii. 353 seq., 357, 

361, 363; Achaia and Morea ceded 

to, iv. 14I, 205, 345. 
Charles VI of France, iii. 473, 481. 
Charles XII, defeat of, v. 214. 
Charles II of Naples, iv. 209, 215. 
Charles of Valois, pretensions of, to 

empire of the East, iii. 389. 
Charsiana, ii. 153. 
Chases, ii. 302. 

Chaucer, his picture of Athens, iv. 172. 
Chekib Effendi, vii. 200. 
Chelands, ii. 316. 
Chelidonia, Cape, ii. 166, 
Chelidromi, v. 69. 
Chelmos, Mount, vi. 398. 

Chelonaki, vii. 17. 

Cheriana, iv. 376, 379, 

Cherinas, John, ii. 315. 

Cherson, in Tauris, a colony of Hera- 
clea, commerce of, i. 144, 145 ; an 
allied city, ib., i. 250, 251, 269, 376, 
425 ; Justinian II banished to, i. 
386, 392 seq., 399, 402, 424, 425; 
Philippicus exiled to, i. 425, ii. 6, 22, 
152 and note, 203 ; insurrection at, 
ii. 282, 303 ; history of, ii. 350 seq. ; 
taken by Vladimir, ii. 350, 357; under 
Diocletian, ii. 353; ruin of, v. 107. 

Chersonesus, Thracian, fortified, i. 210; 
Huns defeated in, i. 257. 

Chersonesus, Tauric, conquered by 
Huns, i. 250; merged in empire of 
Trebizond, iv. 329. 

Chettoukome, Belisarius at, i. 256. 

Chilbud (Chilbudius), i. 211, 252. 

Chimara, reduced by All Pasha, v. 274, 
yi. 52. 

China, trade of, i. 266, 269, 316 ; Avars 
in, i. 259. 

Chios, taken by Venice, iii. 181, iv. 76, 
79, v. 80 ; Genoese at, iii. 429, 453, 
iv. 287, V. 57, 70 seq.; Maona of, 
V. 73, 78 seq. ; commerce of, v. 74, 
77 ; Greeks of, v. 75 seq. ; ecclesi- 
astical administration of, v. 77 ; tri- 
butary to Othomans, v. 78 seq. ; 
disavowed by Genoese, v. 78 ; at- 
tacked by grand duke of Tuscany, 
v. 80 ; attacked by Florentines, v. 
99; attack on, v. 193, 194; in i8ih 
century, v. 233 seq. ; subject to 
haratch, ib. ; products of, ib. ; Gius- 
tiniani in, v. 233, 234; charter and 
privileges of, v. 234, 235 ; industry 
of, V. 237 ; Catholics in, ib. ; French 
in, V. 238 ; morality of, v. 242 ; 
Tombazes at, vi. 250; Sphakiots of, 
v. 263 ; merchants of, vi. 9 ; during 
Greek revolution, vi. 2.^0 seq.; Kara 
Ali at, vi. 254 seq. ; massacres in, vi. 
255 seq., 260 seq. ; attacked by 
Fabvier, vii. 24; coinage of, v. 72 
note, 77 note. 

Chitir Bey, iv. 409, 

Chitries, v. 178. 

Chlomoutzi {see Caslel Tornese and 
Clarentza), iv. 19 1. 

Choirobacches, iii. 85. 

Chonae, iii. 30, 191, 239. 

Chorasan, rebellion in, ii. loi. 

Chosroes I (Nushirvan), sacks Antioch, 
i. 202, 263, 273; peace of Justinian 
with, i. 228, 263, 264; embassy of 
Witiges to, i. 241, 259, 262, 263 ; 
Greek philosophers fly to, i. 277, 287; 
defeated by Tiberius, i. 297 ; takes 
Dara, i. 296. 



Chosioes II, i. 301, 302 ; war with 
Phocas, i. 309 ; murdered, i. 345. 

Choumnos, iv. 350, 

Chrestos, ii. 353. 

Christianity, why persecuted, i. 90; 
anticipated by Greeks, i. 100 ; effects 
of on social condition of Greeks, i. 
119 ; the complement of Greek phi- 
losophy, i. 123; influence of on 
women, i. 124; established by Ccn- 
stantine, i. 126; Greek the ecclesi- 
astical language of, i. 127; persecuted 
in third century for political rea- 
sons, i. 1 29 ; Greek rather than Ro- 
man, f 6.; reasons of Roman hostility 
to, i. 132 ; orthodox established by 
Theodosius, i. 136 ; hostile to litera- 
ture, i. 189; to art, i. 191 ; influence 
of upon slavery, ii. 220; its effect 
upon Greece, iv. 6 ; protected by 
Turks, V. 21, 31 ; compared with 
Mohammedanism, v. 131 seq. ; width 
of, V. 1 36 ; Greek narrowness of, 

Christian tribute children {see Janis- 
saries), iii. 476 seq., v. 4, 8, 10, 11, 
32, 36 seq. ; Constantinople and 
Rhodes exempt from, v. 86, 123; 
end of, V. 163 ; effects of, vi. 38. 

Christians, why thought inhuman, i. 
90, 126, 132 ; calumnies against, i. 
126; tolerated by Maxentius, ih.\ 
policy of Maximin towards, ih. ; early 
communities of, ih. ; praised by Julian, 
i. 128 ; number of at the Council of 
Nice, i. 130 ; forbidden by Julian to 
lecture at Athens, i. 282, 284; per- 
secuted by Chosroes, i. 357; with- 
drawn from Cyprus, i. 388, 4*7 ; 
adapt pagan worships, i. 424 note ; 
enslaved by Turks, iii. 443 ; position 
of under Turks, v. 20, 21, 31 ; vi. 4, 
113 ; proposed extermination of, v. 29, 
30, vi. 183; persecutions by compared 
with persecutions of Mohammedans, 
v. 30 note ; in Othoman army, v. 45 ; 
expelled from Constantinople, v. 92, 
105 ; Latin and Greek hatred of, v. 
96 ; in Turkey persecution of, v. 
105 ; Black Sea closed to, v. 106 ; 
apostasy of, v, 119 ; Greek, moral 
degradation of, v. 131 ; Catholics in 
Morea, v. 209, 211 ; in Chios, v. 237 
seq. ; intrigues of Catholics and ortho- 
dox, v. 239 ; cause of espoused by 
Russia, v. 268; in Albania, vi. 37; 
in service of Ali Pasha, vi. 76 ; mas- 
sacres of, vi. 190, 191, 319; ferocity 
of, vi. 193; in Turkey protected by 
Russia, vii. 218. 
Christophoros, ii. 245 seq., 291. 
Christopoulos, vii. 248. 

Christos, Hadji, vi. 359, vii. 97. 
Chronicle, The Morning, on king Otho, 

vii. 169, 170. 
Chronicon Paschale, i. 416. 
Chrysargyron, imposed by Constantine, 
i. 108; abolished by Anastasius, i, 
Chryses, iii. 249 seq. 
Chrysochir, ii. 244 seq. 
Chrysokroul, iii. 30. 
Chrysopolis (Scutari), seized by Goths, 

i. 94, ii. 48, 290, 324. 
Chrysostom, St., i. 175, 192, 278, 286, ii. 

Church, Sir Richard, vi. 409, 416, 417 ; 
character of, vi. 418, 419, 421, 425; 
vacillation of, vi. 427, 429; defeated 
at Phalerum, vi. 430 seq., 432, vii. 
J 3. 21, 24, 34, 39, 118, 164; letter of 
Captain Hastings to, vii. 344. 

Church, Greek, i. 127; Greek the 
language of, i. 152, 215, ii. 200; 
Christian, state of, i. 187 seq. ; union 
of with State, i. 274; of Syria, 
Egypt, Armenia, i. 275, 315; Greek 
formed, i. 315; Greek and therefore 
popular, i. 410; superstition of, i. 
423; constitution of under Leo HI, 
ii. 13; Bulgarian, ii. 185, 234, 311, 
iii. 66, 67; orthodox Greek, ii. 223; 
tendency to divide from Latin, i. 348 ; 
separation of Greek from Latin, ii. 
445, iv. 59 seq. ; Eastern, constitution 
of, iii. 66 ; Greek, conservatism of, 
iii. 279; Greek, activity of, under 
Palaeologi, iii. 365 seq. ; Greek and 
Latin union of, iii. 494, v. 137 ; gifts 
of real estate to, forbidden, iv. log, 
190; Greek, vices of, iv. 262 ; Greek, 
under the Othomans, v. 135; Greek, 
simony in, v. 140, 149, vi. 10; Greek, 
tolerated by Venice, v. 198; Greek, 
Russia champion of, v. 240; purity 
of, vi. 7 ; inertness of, vi. 8 ; policy 
of Capodistrias to, vii. 127 ; of Greece 
independent, vii. 128; synod of, ih.; 
recognized by patriarch of Constan- 
tinople, vii. 130; organization of, vii. 
197 seq. 

Chytraeus, David, v. 119. 

Cibyra, i. 393 note. 

Cicero, on population of Sicily, i. 15 
note; on Roman rapacity, i. 24; pro- 
consul of Cilicia, i. 37 ; on Cyprus, 
i. 44; letter of Sulpicius to, i. 54, 71. 

Cid, The, ii. 20 {s,ee Sid-al-Battal). 

Cilicia, ravages of pirates of, i. 29 ; 
Cicero proconsul of, i. 37 ; invaded 
by Basil I, ii. 247 ; Armenian king- 
dom of, iii. 19, 89, 141, 185. 

Cinnamus, John, iii. 218 note, 

Circesium, i. 261. 



Cirphis, Mount, vi. 406. 

Cius (^Kivotos), iii. 290, 291. 

Civita Vecchia (Centumcellae), ii. 77. 

Clarence (_Clare) in Suffolk, iv. 192. 

Clarentza, Toccos at, iv. 236, 243, 244 
(see Castel Tornese). 

Clares, oracle of, i. 84. 

Classics, education in, effects of, iii. 283; 
revival of, in Greece, vi. 16. 

Claudius, i. 36, 72 ; defends Thermo- 
pylae, i. 93 ; barbarian invasions, i. 97. 

Claudius II, victory at Naissus, i. 97, 98. 

Clavijo, Gonzalez de, iv. 387. 

Clement IV, pope, iii. 361. 

Clement V, pope, iv. 217. 

Cleodemus fortifies Athens, i. 94 ; naval 
victory of, i. 95. 

Cleon, a brigand chief, i. 32 note. 

Cleomenes attempts to revive old Spar- 
tan institutions, i. 11. 

Clergy, favoured by Constantine, i. 106 ; 
engage in commerce, i. 116; for- 
bidden by Valentinian III, i. 117; 
systematized under Constantine, i. 
151, 152; importance of, i. 202; 
opposed to Nicephorus II, ii. 328; 
Latin, avarice of, iv. 189; struggle of 
Geffrey II with, iv. 190 ; Greek, rivalry 
of Rome, v. 128 ; Greek, factions of, 
V. 140 ; Greek, organization of, v. 149 
seq. ; under Venice, v. 209 ; Papal, 
virtues of, v. 212; Greek, loss of 
influence by, v. 280, vi. 10 seq.; 
Greek, relation to Greek revolution, 
vii. 126 seq.; character of, vii. 127, 

Clermont, council of, iii. 98, 

Clovis, i. 228. 

Clubs, French and Greek, vi. 97. 

Cochrane, Lord (earl Dundonald), vi. 
416, 417, 419-421, 425, 434, 436, 
vii. 14, 22. 

Coco, iii. 511. 

Code, Theodosian, i. iii, 191; value 
of, i. 213 ; of Basil I, ii. 241. 

Codrington, Sir Edward, vii. 16, 18; 
censured, vii. 21, 25. 

Coinage, Roman, depreciation of, i. 48 
seq.; under Augustus, Caracalla, 
Nero, ih. ; Diocletian and Constan- 
tine the Great, i. 49 ; Hadrian, i. 50 ; 
Maximinus, Gordianus Pius, ih. ; Gal- 
lienus ends silver coinage, i. 50 ; at- 
tempt of Aurelian to improve, i. 51 ; 
of Corinth, i. 59; of Patrae, i. 61; 
of Nicopolis, i. 62; copper, i. 117; 
gold, of Constantinople, i. 167 ; gold, 
in seventh century, i. 414; of Abdal- 
melik, i. 389, 419 ; Roman and Greek, 
i. 432 seq.; Byzantine, ii. 32, 146 
note, 213, 327, iii. 320, iv. 42; of 
Romanus I, ii. 294 note; debased by 

Nicephorus II, ii. 327; of Isaac I, 
iii. 10; of Nicephorus III, iii. 47 ; 
debased by Alexius I, iii. 63, 490 
note, iv. 210 iiote, 267 note; Othoman, 
depreciation of, v. 27 ; Byzantine, 
ih.\ of Chios, V. 72 note, ']'] note; 
Turkish, depreciation of, vi. 106, 312 ; 
Austrian debased, vi. 106 ; of Greek 
Republic, vii. 46 ; Greek, under king 
Otho, vii. 124. 

Colchis (Mingrelia), kingdom of, i. 260, 
264 (Lazia), iv. 310. 

Collier, Dutch ambassador to Porte, 
V. 169. 

Coloni, i. 154; ii. 99, iv. 44. 

Colonies, Greek, conquered by Rome, 
i. 5 ; military, of Augustus, i. 54, 88 ; 
Greek, in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor, 
i. 75 ; of Goths in Phrygia and Lydia, 
i. 155 ; Servian, i. 332 ; Sclavonian, 
in Dalmatia and Illyricum, i. 338 ; 
Sclavonian, in Greece, i. 338, ii. 2 ; 
in Thrace, ii. 55; Saracen, ii. 136; 
Roman, in Greece, iii. 226; Persian, 
on Vardar, iv. 27; Asiatic, in Thrace 
and Macedonia, iv. 27 ; Turkish, near 
Achrida, iv. 27. 

Colonna, John, papal legate, iv. 192. 

Colossus of Rhodes, destroyed, i. 375 ; 
sale of, v. 65. 

Coluthus, i. 273. 

Comans (see Romans). 

Commagene, ii. 50, 155. 

Commerce (see Trade), influence of Alex- 
ander's conquests on, i. 7 ; change of 
centres of, i. 7, 8 ; of India, Asia, 
Africa, ib. ; Mediterranean, decline 
of, i. 74, 75; Greek, decline of, i. 78; 
decline of, under Constantine, i. 117 ; 
Greek, revival of, i. 141 seq. ; of 
Cherson, i. 145 ; of Constantinople, 
i. 167; decline of, under Justinian, 
i. 266 ; hostility of Goths to, i. 266 ; 
importance of Jews in, i. 267 ; Greek, 
i. 418 seq.; under Charlemagne and 
Theophilus, ii. 210 ; Arabian, ii. 211 ; 
Byzantine, ib. ; in East, ib. ; ruined 
by caliphs, ii. 212; Russian, ii. 340, 
343; immunities, effect of, iii. 154; 
under Manuel I, iii. 152 seq.; decline 
of Greek, iii. 173, 174, iv. 206; in- 
fluence of, upon the Crusades, iv. 68 ; 
Venetian, iv. 296, v. 126, 201 ; of 
Amisos and Samsoun, iv. 322 ; of 
Turks, iv. 323; Genoese, iv. 352, 
354, V. 126; of Mongols, iv. 352, 
353 ; eastern, routes of, iv. 353 ; tax 
of Turks upon, v. 22; of Chios, v. 
74, 77 ; under Mohammed II, v. 126 
seq.; Greek and Turkish, v. 156; 
Greek, in nineteenth century, v. 280 ; 
importance of, vi. 8. 



Commodus, end of taste for art at Rome, 

i. 72 ; deification of, i. 120. 
Communes (see Curia and Municipality), 

of Turks, V. 147; in Morea, v. 196; 

of Greece, vi. ^^29, 231, vii. 120, 

Comnena, Anna, daughter of Alexius I, 

iii. 53, 128,131. 
Comnena, Maria, daughter of Manuel I, 

iii. 175, 196, 200 seq. 
Comnenos (Komnenos), family origin 

of, iv. 315 ; genealogy of, iv. 43?. 
Comnenos, Alexius, nephew of Alexius I, 

iii. 118. 
Comnenos, Alexius, son of Anna, iii. 

Comnenos, Alexius, grandson of John II, 

iii. 199, 200. 
Comnenos, Alexius, son of Manuel I, 

iii. 214, 237. 
Comnenos, Alexius, grandnephew of 

Manuel I, iii. 214, 237. 
Comnenos, Andronicus, son of John II, 

iii 147- 
Comnenos, David, iii. 214. 
Comnenos, David, brother of Alexios I 

of Trebizond, iii. 288, 289, iv. 317, 

318, 321, 322, 325, 326. 
Comnenos, Isaac, son of John, and 

brother of Alexius I, iii. 43, 45, 49. 
Comnenos, Isaac, son of Alexius I and 

brother of Anna, iii. 132, 133 note, 

Comnenos, Isaac, son of John II and 

brother of Manuel I, iii. 146, 147. 
Comnenos, Isaac, nephew of Theodora, 

iii. 212; in Cyprus, iii. 213, iv. 70, 

7r seq. 
Comnenos, John, son of Andronicus and 

nephew of Manuel I, iii. 147. 
Comnenos, John, brother of Isaac I, 

iii. 8. 
Comnenos, John, son of Isaac and 

nephew of Alexius I, iii. 50, 100. 
Comnenos, John, son of Isaac and 

brother of Andronicus I, iii. 132, 

143, 202. 
Comnenos, Manuel, son of Andronicus I, 

iv. 317. 
Comnenos, Manuel, father of Isaac I, 

iii. 8, iv. 315. 
Comnenos Manuel, nephew of Isaac I, 

iii. 29 seq. 
Comnenos, Michael Angelos, iii. 284. 
Comnenos, Nicephoros, ii. 392. 
Compsa, John, i. 318. 
Concubinage, i 57- 
Confiscation, a source of Roman revenue, 

i. 42, 45, 136, 219. 
Conou of Bethune, iv. 112. 
Conon (Leo III), ii. 26, 
Conrad III of Germany, iii. 148, 165 seq. 

Conrad of Montferrat, iii. 231 seq. 

Conradin, iv. 206. 

Conscription in Greece, vii. 37. 

Constantina, iii. 250. 

Constans II, i. 373 seq. ; the 'type' ofJ 
i 375 ; banishes Pope Martin, i. 376 1 
visits Armenia, ih. ; defeats Slavo- 
nians, i. 377; makes peace with 
Moawyah. i. 378 ; at Athens, ih. \ 
in Italy, i. 378, 379; defeated, ih.'X 
assassinated, i. 380. 1 

Constantine I (the Great), coinage of,| 
i. 49 ; reforms of, i. 100, 103 seq. ;j 
favours clergy, i. 106; land-tax. ih.'X 
senatorial tax, i. 108 ; chrysargyron,] 
ih.\ military reforms of, i. 112; hill 
division of the empire into four pre-j 
fectures, i. 114; two humane laws! 
of, i. 116 ; decline of commerce under, 
i. 117; establishes Christianity, i. 
126; plunders temples, i. 130; his 
struggle with Licinius, i. 141 ; at 
Athens, i. 141, 142, 281 ; systematizes 
clergy, i. 151, 152; relations with 
the popes, ii. 180. 

Constantine III (Heraclius), i. 350, 360, | 

Constantine IV (Pogonatus>, 1. 380 seq. ; 
peace with Moawyah, ii. 384; de- 
feated by Bulgarians, i. 385. 

Constantine V (Copronymus), ii. 20, 42, 
44, 45 note and seq. ; Saracen wars 
of, ii. 50 ; Bulgarian war of, ii. 50 
seq. ; death of, ii. 53 ; repairs aque- 
duct of Valens, ii. 56 ; tomb of, dese- 
crated, ii. 195. 

Constantine VI, son of Leo IV, ii. 69 ; 
reign of. ii. 79 seq., 84. 

Constantine VII (Porphyrogenitus), i. 
339, 349, ii. 228, 260, 263, 283; 
works of, ii. 294; reign of, ii. 297 

Constantine VIII, son of Romanus II, 
ii. 336, 360 seq ; reign of, ii. 390 
seq. ; death, ii. 394. 

Constantine IX (Monomachus), ii. 424 
seq. ; plots against, ii. 433 ; death of, 
ii. 446. 

Constantine X (Ducas), iii. 12, 13 seq., 


Constantine XI (Palaeologus Dragases), 

iii. 406 seq. ; death of iii. 516 ; despot 

of Feloponnese, iv. 243, 245-24S, 

Constantine, duke of Antioch, ii. 408, 

411, 420. 
Constantine, son of Basil and Maria, 

ii. 256. 
Constantine, king of Bulgaria, iii. 364. 
Constantine, son of Leo V, ii. 114, 

Constantine the Libyan, ii. 287 seq. 



Constantinople {see Byzantium), distri- 
bution of grain at, i. 43, 10 1, 118, 
201, 319 ; Roman, and Latin its lan- 
guage, i. loi, vi. 9 ; immunities of 
its citizens, i. loi ; a copy of Rome, 
i. 118; why preserved when Rome 
fell, i. 138 ; attacked by Alaric, i. 
157; gold coinage of, i. 167; com- 
merce of, ib. ; university at, i. 173, 

■ 190, 273, ii. 36, 225 ; law school of, 
i. 216; official nobility of, i. 218; 
aqueduct of, i. 222 ; earthquake at, 
i. 225, ii. 32, 44; attacked by Zaber- 
gan, i. 256; colony of Turks at, i. 
268 ; silk brought to, i. 269 ; claims 
of bishop of, i. 300, 310; road from, 
to Ravenna, i. 3 1 6 ; attacked by 
Avars and Persians, i. 337 ; Hera- 
clius at, i. 350, 368 ; Saracens defeated 
at, i. 383 ; council of i. 385 ; taken by 
Theodosius III, i. 396 ; coinage of, 
in seventh century, i. 414; besieged 
by Moslemah, ii. 16 ; siege of, raised, 
ii. 18 ; defeat of Saracens at, ii. 43 ; 
revolt of, under Artavasdos, ii. 47 ; 
pestilence at, ii. 64 ; influx of Greeks 
into, ii. 66 ; synod at, ii. 119 ; council 
of ii. 120, 163 ; besieged by Thomas, 
ii. 131 ; attacked by Russians, ii. 189, 
435 ; opposes Rome, ii. 199 ; influence 
of Asiatics at, ii. 201, 216; attacked 
by Igor, ii. 341 ; earthquake at, iii. 
22; revolution at, iii. 35; taken by 
Alexius I, iii. 51 ; threatened by 
Crusaders, iii. 61 ; effect of Crusades 
on, iii. 93; Venetians at, iii. 179; 
murder of Latins at, iii. 200 ; saved 
by Conrad of Montferrat, iii. 231 
seq. ; besieged by Branas, iii. 232; 
quarrel of Greeks and Latins in, iii. 
233 ; besieged and taken by Cru- 
saders and Venetians, iii. 255 seq., 
iv. 84, 86 seq.; sieges of, iii. 255 
note] conflagration at, iii. 261, iv. 85, 
86 ; third sack of, iii. 269 seq. ; 
Latin empire of, iii. 310; under 
Baldwin II, iii. 337 ; attacked by 
Michael VIII, iii. 340, 347 ; synod 
at, iii. 370, iv. 351 ; ecclesiastical 
quarrels at, iii. 374 seq, iv. 103; 
Spaniards at, iii. 391 ; taken by An- 
dronicus III, iii. 418 ; taken by John 
V, iii. 460; marshal de Boucicault, 
iii. 473 ; besieged by Mousa, iii. 483 ; 
by Murad II, iii. 489, 490 ; pestilence 
at, iii. 492 ; attacked by Genoese, 
iii. 493 ; besieged by Mohammed II, 
iii. 507 seq.; taken, iii. 517; Harald 
Hardrada at, iv. 49 ; privileges of 
Venetians at, iv. 75 seq. ; Genoese 
at, iv. 77; Pisans at, ib.; taken by 
Greeks, iv. 116; Belgian empire of, 

iv. 117; attacked by John III and 
John Asan, iv. 193 ; Venetian settle- 
ment at, iv. 270; exempt from pay- 
ment of tribute-children, v. 86, 235 ; 
unmarried Christians expelled from, 
V. 92, 105 ; election of patriarch of, 
v. 138 ; influence of patriarch of, in 
Morea, v. 209 seq. ; execution of 
Greeks at, vi. 185 ; Jews at, vi. 187, 
188 ; fire at, vi. 311 ; treaty of 1832, 
vii. 104. 

Constantinople, patriarchs of : authority 
of, ii. 42 ; Sergius, i. 342 ; Paul, i. 
375. 376, ii- 72 ; Anastasios, ii. 49, 
57> 75; Constantinos, ii. 62, 75; 
Niketas, ib. ; Methodios, ii. 141, 150, 
163; Ignatius, ii. 173; Photius, ii. 
176, 178, 182 seq., iv. 59; contest 
with popes as to Bulgarian Church, 
ii. 185; Michael Keroularios, ii. 428, 
445, 4!; 5, iv. 59 ; Constantine Leichu- 
des, iii 10; Theodosius, iii. 201, 210; 
Xiphilinos, iii. 244 ; Arsenios, iii. 321, 
331 seq., 367 seq., 378; Germanos, iii. 
367, 370; Joseph, iii. 370; Vekkos, 
iii. 370 seq.; Gregorios, iii. 376 seq.; 
John of Apri, iii. 421 ; Kallistos, iii. 
450, 459; Gennadios, iii. 522; Ger- 
vais, iv. 190; Joasaph, v. 139; Mar- 
kos, V. 140. 

Constantinopolitans, faction of, v. 140. 

Constantinos, patriarch of Constanti- 
nople, ii. 62, 75. 

Constantinos, revolt of, ii. 292 seq., 298. 

Constanliolus, defeated by Bulgarians, 
i. 252. 

Constantius alters position of clergy, 
i. 106, 142. 

Constantius II, anti-Christian reaction 
under, i. 133 seq.; law of, i. 153, 

Consulate, importance of, abolished, i. 

Copronymus, ii. 45 note. 

Corbet, General, vii. 89, 103. 

Corcyra (Corfu), plundered by Totila, 
i. 224, 253. 

Cordova, insurrection at, ii. 135. 

Corduene, ceded to Persia, i. 143. 

Corfu (Corcyra), taken by Robert Guis- 
card, iii. 74, iv. 51; revolt of, iii. 
161 ; recovered by Manuel III, iii. 
168 seq. ; conquered by Theodore of 
Epirus, iv. 273 ; attacked by Otho- 
mans, V. 68, 227, 275, 276: Suliots 
at, vi. 52, 78, 83; left by English, 

vii. 313- 
Corinth, made ager publicus by Mum- 
mius, i. 36 ; sacked, i. 54, 59, 71 ; a 
Roman colony, i. 58, 59 ; coinage of, 
i. 59 ; residence of proconsul of 
Achaia, i. 60 ; Hadrian's aqueduct to, 



i. 65 ; ravaged by Goths, i. 94 ; 
Julian at, i. 142; plundered by 
Alaric, i. 159; Stilicho at, i. 160; 
sacked by Normans, iii. 162, iv. 54 ; 
silk trade of, iv. 55 ; granted to 
Acciaiuoli, iv. 158 ; besieged by 
Geffrey of Achaia, and Otho de la 
Roche, iv. 189; conquered by Gef- 
frey I of Achaia, iv. 194 note, 195 ; 
under despots of Peloponnese, iv. 
236 ; taken by Mohammed II, iv. 
■259; sacked by Maltese, v. 106; 
Venetians at, v. 1 84 ; taken by Turks, 
V. 219, 220; behaviour of Janissaries 
at, ih. ; capitulation of, vi. 226; Dra- 
niali at, vi. 286, 295. 

Corinth, isthmus of, fortified, i. 210; 
Huns advance to, i. 224, 252 ; tram- 
way across, ii. 251 ; fortified, iv. 
238 ; forced by Othomans, iv. 249 
seq. ; Diolkos across, iv. 238 note. 

Corippus, poem of, i. 211, 235. 

Corn (see Grain), corn-trade at Rome, 

i- 43- 
Cornaro, Andrea, iv. 300, v. 191. 

Cornaro, Catherine, queen of Cyprus, v. 

Corner, captain, vi. 432. 

Cornesius, ii. 1 10. 

Coron, iv. 195 ; Spaniards at, v. 68 ; 
taken by Morosini, v. 177, 201 ; 
besieged by Russians, v. 254, vi. 216, 
222, 227, 312, 318, vii. 27, 28, 

Coronea, earthquake at, i. 225. 

Coronello, Francis, v. 81. 

Corporations, of moneyers, i. 51 ; i. 
110; religious, in Greece, i. 120; 
Greek, in Italy, i. 216 ; of Ulema, v. 

Corsairs, Turkish, in Archipelago, iv. 
303 ; of Sinope, iv. 358 ; ravages of, 
'^- 57> 6.^' 64; Venetian, cruelty of, 
V. 93 ; of Barbary, v. 95 (see Piracy). 

Corsica, taken by Belisarius, i. 233 ; 
Greeks in, v. 117. 

Cos, commerce of, i. 74, 265 ; taken by 
Saracens, i. 375 ; ravaged by Span- 
iards, V. 105 ; naval action off, vi. 352. 

Cosmas, Indicopleustes, i. 273. 

Cosmas (Kosmas), pretender, ii. 37. 

Cosmo I, duke of Plorence, v. 96, 98. 

Council of Adramyttium, iii. 377. 

Council of Chalcedon,i. 177, 188, ii. 180. 

Council of Clermont, iii. 98. 

Council of Constantinople, i. 385, ii. 
57, 60, 120, 163, 180, 181, 183, 232, 

Council of Ephesus. i. 328. 
Council of Ferrara, iii. 493, 
Council of Florence, iii. 494. 
Council of Frankfort, ii. 76, 141. 
Council, fourth Lateran, iii. 296. 

Council of Lyons, iii. 370. 
Council of Nice,|i. 130, 134. 
Council, second of Nicaea, ii. 73. 
Council of Nymphaeum, iii. 307. 
Council of Placentia, iii. 98. 
Council of Sardica, a. d. 347, i. 137. 
Council in TruUo, i. 389. 
Cossacks, V. 107 ; take Sinope, ih, '\ 

ravages of, v. 107, 108. 
Courrier of Smyrna, newspaper, vii. 6o,| 

Courtenay, lordship of, iv. 193, 200. 
Courtena}', Agnes, of Achaia, iv. 190, 
Courtenay, Peter of, iii. 297, 299 seq. ;| 

emperor of Romania, iv. 112, 124. 
Courtenay, Phihp of, iv. 345. 
Creed, Nicene, contentions about, ii. 


Crete, a Roman province, i. 22, 33, 34,] 
115; conquered by Metellus, i. 30; 
pirates in, i. 31, ii. 278; invaded byj 
Moawyah, i. 384 ; conquered by | 
Saracens, ii. 134,135; Spanish Arabs 
in, ii. 135; a slave mart, ii. 276; 
expeditions against, ii. 315 ; revolt of, 
iii. 60 ; purchased by Venice, iv. 272, 
276; Genoese in, iv. 272; attacked 
by Sanudo, iv. 279; Venetians in, v. 
86, 89 ; number of Greeks in, v. 90 ; 
conquest of, v. 103 ; attacked by 
Othomans, v. 110; revolt of, v. 252 ; 
pashalik of, vi. 4 ; Egyptians in, vi. 
355 ; war in, vii. 24. 

Cretan guards, iii. 489. 

Crevecoeur, castle of, iv. 216. " 

Crimea, becomes Russian, v. 267. 

Crimean war, diplomatic antecedents of, 
vii. 215 seq. ; action of Greece during, , 
vii. 219 seq. 

Crispin, revolt of, iii. 28. 

Crispo, family of, iv. 290. 

Crispo, Francesco I, duke of Archi- 
pelago, iv. 290, 291. 

Crispo, Francesco II, duke of Archi- 
pelago, iv. 291. 

Crispo, Francesco III, iv. 292. 

Crispo, Giovanni II, duke of Archi- 
pelago, iv. 291. 

Crispo, Giovanni III, duke of Archi- 
pelago, iv. 292. 

Crispo, Giovanni IV, duke of Archi- 
pelago, iv. 292, 293. 

Crispo, Guglielmo II, duke of Archi- 
pelago, iv. 291. 

Crispo, Jacopo I, duke of Archipelago, 
iv. 291. 

Crispo, Jacopo II, duke of Archipelago, 
iv. 291. 

Crispo, Jacopo III, duke of Archipelago, 
iv. 291. 

Crispo, Jacopo IV, duke of Archipelago, 
iv. 293, V. 81. 



|l!nspo, INIarco, of los, iv. 302. 
^rispus defeats Licinius, i. 281 ; 
treason of, i. 330. 

jjCroatians, i. 332, 334. 

[Cross, Holy, restored by Heraclius, i. 
345. 346 ; taken by Persians, 346 ; 
Heraclius retreats to Constantinople 
^ with, i. 349, 350, 358, 360. 
3rowns, a forced gift, i. 45. 
>umn, king of Bulgaria, ii. 105 seq., 
no; negotiates with Michael I, ii. 
no, 114; death of, ii. 115; takes 
Adrianople, ii. 229. 

[Crusaders, with Venetians destroy Eas- 
tern empire, a. d. 1204,1. 162; threaten 
Constantinople, iii. 61 ; defeated at 
Nicaea, iii. 99; treaty of, with Alexius 
I, iii. 102 seq. ; besiege Antioch, iii, 
no, 112 note; take Iconium, iii. 
,236; with Venetians take Constanti- 
nople, iii. 255 seq.; occupy Troad, 
iii. 286 ; invade Bithynia, iii. 290 ; 
take Alexandria, iii. 463 ; in Pelopon- 
nese, iv. 20; take Zara, iv. 82 ; treaty 
of, with Venetians, iv. 89 ; sack 
Constantinople, iv. 90 ; partition of 
Byzantine empire among, iv. 97. 
[ Crusades, effect on Constantinople, iii. 
93 seq ; causes of, 94 ; first, iii. 99 ; 
second, iii. 165 seq. ; third, iii. 233 ; 
fourth, iii. 252, iv. 81 seq. ; introduce 
feudalism into the East, iv. 66 ; in- 
fluence of commerce on, iv. 68 ; of 
St. Louis joined by William of Achaia, 
iv. 199. 

Ctesiphon, i. 345 ; destroyed, i. 373. 

Cufa, rise of, i. 373. 

Culm, battle of, vi. no. 

Cuirana, Venetian bailo, v. 169. 

Curia, collects land-tax, i. 109, no; 
oligarchical, i. 144, 148 ; reformed by 
Anastasius, i. 181, ii. 21; abolished, 
ii. 237. (See Municipality.) 

Curiales, i. 109 note. 

Curopalates, ii. 47. 

Customs, Roman, how farmed, i. 44. 

Cyclades, ravaged by Saracens, ii. 190. 

Cynosarges, burnt, i. 55. 

Cyparrissia (Arcadia), Ibrahim Pasha 
at, vi. 372. 

Cyprus, a Roman province, i. 33, 34; 
purchases exemption, i. 44 ; tributary 
to Saracens, i. 374, 387 ; Christians 
withdrawn from, i. 388, 407 ; Sclavo- 
nians in, i. 389, 407 ; Saracen fleet 
defeated at, ii. 50 ; bishop of, ii. 102 ; 
recovered and lost by Basil I,ii. 252; 
recovered, ii. 330; sedition in, ii. 429; 
revolt of, iii. 60, 213; taken by 
Richard of England, iii. 213, 297, iv. 
70 seq.; history of, iii. 237 seq.; 
Isaac of, iii. 212, 213, 237, iv. 70 seq.; 

Guy of Lusignan king of, iii. 238, iv. 
72 seq. ; a dependency of Venice, iv. 
74; kings of, v. 58; conquered by 
Othomans, v. 81 seq. ; tributary to 
Egypt, V. 82 ; acquired by Venice, v. 
82 ; Catherine Cornaro queen of, v. 
82 ; ruin of, v. 84; trade with Man- 
chester, v. 157. 

Cyrenaica, subject to Ptolemies, i. 6 ; 
Mohammedan conquest of, i. 367. 

Cyrene, a Roman province, i. 33, 34 ; 
decline of, i. 143. 

Cyril (see Kyrillos). 

Cyrus, patriarch of Alexandria, i. 363. 

Cythera, owned by Julius Eurycles, i. 

47, 60. 

Cyzicus, Goths ravage, i. 94, 383, ii. 

48, iii. 23, 290, 291 ; Spaniards at, iii. 
392, 393- 


Dacia, i. 115, 156; Bulgarians in, i. 

250, vi. n5. 
Dagobert, i. 326. 
Daher, caliph, ii. 397. 
Dalassenos, Constantine, ii. 394, 410, 


Dalassenos, Damian, iii. 41, 313. 

Dalmatia, an imperial province, i. 34; 
conquest of, i. 237 ; Serbs in, i. 331, 
333' 3385 ii- i°o ; attacked by Sara- 
cens, ii. 247, 382 ; belongs to Venice, 
iii. 83, 176, 178, i8i,_v. 195. 

Damala, assembly at, vi. 420. 

Damascenus, John, ii. 36, 59, 222, 227, 
V. 283. 

Damascius, i. 273. 

Damascus, taken by Saracens, i. 360, ii. 
331 ; siege of, iii. 168. 

Damian, ii. 278, 307. 

Damianos, ii. 136. 

Damianovich, Elia, v. 192. 

Damietta, ii. 170, iii. 187; Greek raid on, 
vi. 303. 

Dandolo, Andrea, iv. 302. 

Dandolo, Henry, iii. 182; doge of 
Venice, iii. 252, 256, 265, 266, iv. 82, 
84, 90, 93, 100. 

Dandolo, Marino, conquers Andros, iv. 
282, 283. 

Dandolo, ii. 16. 

Dania, colonel, vi. 267. 

Daniel, prince of Montenegro, vii. 216, 

Danielis, ii. 230, 253 seq. 

Danishmend, iii. 115. 

Dante, his picture of Athens, iv. 172, 

Danube, physical features of, ii. 345. 

Daphaeon, battle of, iii. 387. 

Daphne, oracle of, i. 84, 121. 

Daphnus, Genoese at, iv- 354' ST^- 

Daphnusia (Sozopolis), iii. 342. 




Dara, i. 261 ; taken by Chosroes, i. 

296 ; restored, 302. 
Dardanelles, battle of, v. 103, 112. 
Dardania, i. 171. 
Darkness, unnatural, at Constantinople, 

ii. 63. 
Dastagerd, i. 345. 
Dasymon, battle of, ii. 157, 187. 
Daulis, Turks at, vi. 407. 
David, his coat of armour, iv. 389, 
David the Arianite, ii. 379. 
David, patriarch of Bulgaria, ii. 380. 
David, king of Georgia, ii. 363, 384, 

iV; 337. 348-. 
David of Lorhi, iii. 17. 
David, emperor of Trebizond, iv. 413 ; 

death of, iv. 424. 
Davidson, William, narrative of, v. 2 70. 
Dawkins, Mr., vii. 135, 140. 
Deavolis (Devol), iii. 121. 
Debeltos, iii. 257, 259. 
Debts and revolutions, i. 7Q' 
Decargyron, i. 443. (See Coinage.) 
Decatrians, i. 334. 
Decius killed, i. 92 ; enforces morals, i. 

99 ; persecutions of, i. 126, 
Decurions, i. 109 note. 
Defensor, i. no, 148. {See Curia, Muni- 
Defterdars, v. 18. 
Degendfeld, General, v. 1 78 seq. 
Deism, effects of tendency to, i. 123, 
Dekapolitas, ii. 171. 
Deleanos, Peter, ii. 416, iv. 28. 
Delfino, V. 219, 224. 
Deligeorges, Epaminondas, vii. 283. 
Deliyani, vi. 236, 275, 336. 
Delos, plundered by Sulla, i. 27, 54 and 

Mithridates, i. 54 ; a slave mart, i. 

32 ; armed guard of Athenians in, i. 

67 ; oracle of, i. 84 ; slave insurrec- 
tions in, i 23. 
Delphi (Kastri), plundered by Sulla, i. 

27, 54; robbed by Nero, i. 72; 

oracle of, i. 84 ; left independent by 

Romans, i. 23, vi. 313. 
Demarchs, chamber of, 1861, vii. 252. 
Demerize, battle of, iii. 223, iv. 58. ' 
Demctrias, ii. 265, vi. 422. 
Demetrius, St., ii. 269, iii. 230. 
Demetrius, despot of Morea, iv. 252, 

255> 256, 259, 262, 263, 267. 
Demetrius Poliorcetes {see Poliorcetes). 
Demetrius I, of Saloniki, iii. 300, iv. 

107, 118, 119. 
Demetrius II, of Saloniki, iii. 126. 
Demirhissar, pass of, ii. 376. 
Demogeronts, in Morea, vi. 25. 
Demoiannes, iv. 299. 
Demosthenes, army of, destroyed, vi. 

Denarius, i. 435, (iSee Coinage.) 

Depopulation of Greece in time ol., 

Hadrian, i. 56 ; causes of, i. 53. 
Dermokaites, iii. 295, 296. 
Dervenaki (Tretos), vi. 287. 
Dervendji-pasha, vi. 20. 
Dervenokhoria, vi. 30 ; revolt of, vi.| 

Deses, iii. i73. 
Deslau, Roger, chief of the Catalans, iv^l 

Develtos, taken by Crumn, ii. no, 184.I 
Devitzana, vi. 81. 
Dexippus, defends Athens, i. 94 seq.,| 

Diakophti, pass over, vi. 247. 
Diakos, life of, vi. 161 seq. 
Dialects, old Greek preserved, i. 68 ;| 

Thracian, i. 115 note. 
Diamantes, vi. 206. 
Diana, Ephesian, temple of, destroyed| 

by Goths, i. 95. 
Diarbekr (Amida), i. 362. 
Didymi, oracle of, i. 84. 
Didymoteichos, iii. 235. 
Digenes Akritas. {See Akritas.) 
Dikaios, Gregorios (Pappa Phlesas), vi. 

293 seq., 366, 367. 
Dikeration, ii. 32. 
Dimitzana, vi. 146. 
Diocleans, i. 334. 
Diocletian, reforms of, i. 100, 103, 105 ;| 

ceases to reside at Rome, i. 139. {See\ 

Diocletianopolis (Kastoria), iv. 8. 
Diogenes of Cherson, ii. 353. 
Diogenes, Constantine, ii. 378, 382, 394;] 

conspiracy of, ii. 394, 398. 
Diogenes, Nicephorus, iii. 60. 
Diogilo, Odo de, iii. 167 7iole. 
Dionysius, the Hungarian, iii. 177 seq. 
Dionysius, patriarch, v. 148. 
Dionysius, St., monastery of, at Athos, 

iv. 384. 
Dioscorides (Socotra), i. 146. 
Diospolis, i. 251. 
Dir, ii. 189. 
Distomo, vi. 383 ; defeat of Turks at, 

vi. 407. 
Divination, forbidden, i. 84, 120. 
Divreky (Tephrike), ii. 169. 
Djaballah, ii. 72. 
Djanum, Khodja, v. 217, 227. 
Djavella, Photo, vi. 47, 50, 359. 
Djavellas, Kitzo, vi. 383, 389, 393, 427, 

vii. 76, 77, 90, 91, 97; arrest and j 

trial of, vii. 138, 139, 163; prime 

minister, vii. 206, 207. 
Djebail (Byblos), i. 371. 
Djelaleddin, Bey, vi. 315. 
Djenderelli, v. 17, 
Djihanshah, iv. 394. 
Djouncid, revolt of, iv. 405. 



Doceia, battle of, iii. 35. 
! Dodecanesos, province of, iv. 273. 
iDodona, oracle of, i. 84, 253. 
'Dodwell, vi. 155. 
iDolgoruki, prince, v. 253, 255. 
Doliche, ii. 50, 309. 
! Domestici, i. 254. 
jDomoko, engagement at, vii. 227. 
, Donalos, St., patron of Suli, vi. 52. 
I Doranites, iv. 363, 367, 374. 
i Doria, Andrea, v. 68, 102. 
r>oria, Fagano, iii. 457. 
J ".)rostylon, ii. 311. 
Iiiirylaeum, ii.^7, iii. 19I, 195. 
I'lrystolon (Silistria), ii. 346, 347. 
] 'oiios, Arislides, vii. 254. 
I ' ist, Demir, vi. 66, 68. 
I'Liukas {see Dukas). 
I lachma, i. 4.^2 seq. {See Coinage.) 
I'lagashan, battle of, 182 1, vi. 131 

r>iaginas, ii. 414. 
I'ragoman of the Fleet, v. 242, 244, vi. 

17, 25, 105, 113. 
Diagoman of the Porte, v. 241, 244, 

vi. 17, 25, 105, 113. 
D;agomestrc, Greeks at, vii. 22 ; battle 

of, vii. 163. 
i Magomoiitzcs, ii. 380. 
l>iagotas, iii. 326. 
Dragut, Turkish admiral, v. 82. 
Drako, ri\er, iii. 90. 
Drakos, Suliot, vi. 90. 
Drakospelia, vi. 282. 
Dramali, Mohammed, iv. 253, vi. 77, 

80, 197, 201, 278, 285 ; at Corinth, 

vi. 286 ; at Argos, vi. 287 ; imprud- 
ence of, vi. 289; retreat of, vi. 293 ; 

defeat of, vi. 294, 295 ; death of, vi. 

Drin, iii. 172, 173. 
Dromon, siege of, ii. 278 note, 316. 
Drouyn de Lhuys, M., ordered to quit 

London, vii. 213. 
Drungarioi, ii. 12. 
Druses, insurrection of, vi. 196. 
Dugdale, bravery of, v. 260, 261. 
Dukas, family of, ii. 286, iii. 13 note. 
Dukas, Andronicus, iii. 33, 35, 213. 
Dukas, Constantine, ii. 285. 
Dukas, pseudo-Constanline, ii. 292. 
Dukas, Constantine, iii. 48, 56, 73, 300. 
Dukas, John, brother of Constantine X, 

iii- 25, 35, 43 seq., 50, 57. 
Dukas, John, uncle of JNiichael VIII, 

iii. 88. 
Dukas, John, brother of wife of Alexius, 

iii. 93. 
Dukas, John, son of Andronicus, iii. 

Dukas, John, uncle of Isaac, iii. 216. 
Dukas, John, natural son of despot 

Michael, iii. 339 ; prince of the Valla- 
chians of Thessaly, iii. 362, 363, 371, 
iv. 128, 129. 
Dukas, John II of Thessaly, iv. 129, 

Dukas, John, general of Manuel I, iii. 

177. 179- 

Dukas, Manuel, of Thessalonica, iii. 
309 seq. 

Dukas, Nicephorus, ii. 71. 

Dukas, son-in-law of Niketas, ii. 411. 

Dulcigniots, v. 254, 256. 

Dundonald, Earl of. {See Lord Coch- 

Dupondius, i. 435. {See Coinage.) 

Duquesne, admiral, v. 170. 

Durazzo (see Dyrrachium), duchy of, 
iv. 221. 

Dushan, Stephen, of Servia, iii. 423 ; 
victories of iii. 436, 438, 441 ; con- 
quers Epirus and Thessaly, iv. 128, 

Duumviri, i. 61. 

Dyme, colonized by Pompey with 
pirates, i. 31. 

Dyovuniottes, vi. 400. 

Dyrrachium {see Durazzo), surprised by 
Theodoric, i. 170, 316; ii. 373, 380; 
captured, ii. 417 ; siege of, iii. 74 seq., 
82, 119 seq.; taken, iii. 214, 223, iv. 


Earthquakes in Greece, i. 142, 225, iii. 
461 ; at Antioch, i. 183; at Constan- 
tinople, ii. 32, 44; in Syria, ii. 63, iii. 

East, the separation of, from the west, 
its influence on the Greeks, i. 147 ; 
pestilence in, iv. 16. 

East Indies, i. I46 note. 

Eastern empire destroyed by Crusaders 
A. D. 1204, i. 162; effects of geo- 
graphy on, i. 165. {See Empire, 

Eastern Church, constitution of, iii. 66. 
{See Church.) 

Ecloga, ii. 33, 236, 239. 

Ecclesiastics, morality of, iv. 201 ; liter- 
ature of, V. 287. 

Ecthesis of Heraclius, i. 347, 375. 

Edessa (Vodena), ii. 374, 377, 378. 

Edessa, university of, i. 273; Nesto- 
rians driven out of, i. 316, 399 ; 
church at, rebuilt by Moawyah, i. 
384, 410, ii. 308, 402, 411 ; taken by 
Baldwin, iii. no; taken by Moham- 
medans, iii. t6o. 

Education in Greece, vii. 131. 

Egnatia, Via, i. 317, ii. 267. 

Egriboz, vi. 3. 

Egypt, jealous of Phoenicians, i. 7 ; 



influence of Greek literature on, i. 9 ; 
Greek colonies in, i. 75. 87 ; a Ro- 
man province, i. 115; rebellion in, 
i. 116; conquered by Palmyra, :6. ; 
decline of Greeks in, i. 143, 166; 
judges in, oath of, i. 214 ; trade route, 
i. 267; under Augustus, i. 270; 
rational church of, i. 275, 315 ; Per- 
sians in, i. 319; importance of, i. 
321 ; action of Justinian in, i. 322; 
Arabs gain trade of, i. 354, 363 seq. ; 
population of, i. 364 ; taxation of, ii. 
'J note ; Arabs in, ii. 134; attacked 
by Manuel I, iii. 186 ; conquered by 
Selim I, V. 82 ; invaded by the 
French, vi. 112 ; French and Italians 
in, vi. 349. 

Egyptians at Budrun, vi. 354 ; in Crete, 
vi- 355 ; before Navarin, vi. 357 ; 
land on Sphakteria, vi. 361. 

Eikasia, ii. 147. 

Eion (Anactoropolis), iii. 454. 

Ekbolos, Cape, ii. 271. 

Eladas, John, ii. 285, 286. 

Elatea, independent_under Romans, i. 

Elbassan (Albanopolis), iv. 31. 
Elesboas, king of Ethiopia, i. 264. 
Eleusis, temple at, rebuilt by M. Aure- 

lius, i. 66 ; destroyed by Alaric, i. 

Eleutherinus, i. 318. 
Eleutherokhoiia (Chalcidice), vi. 202, 

204, 207. 
Eleutherolacones, v. 113. 
Elez Aga, vi. 255. 

Elis, Scythian or Sclavonian, iv. 21. 
Elizabeth of Akova, iv. 218. 
Ellice, Mr. Edward, his connexion with 

the Greek loan, vi. 434, 435. 
Elliot, Hon. Henry, first mission to 

Greece, vii. 269 ; second mission to 

Greece, vii. 289 seq. 
Elmas Bey, vi. 93, 217, 225, 406. 
Elphinstone, admiral, v. 257 seq., 261. 
Elpidios, ii. 71, 88. 
Emblakika (Stenyclerian plain), vi. 

Emesa, siege of, i. 360, 362, 371, ii. 


Emin, Mehemet, v. 255. 

Emo, governor of Morea, v. 93, 199, 

Emperor of Rome, a trader, i. 117; his 
relation to the army, i. 196 ; supre- 
macy of in the church, i. 133, 381, 
391, ii. 231, 262. 

Empire, Roman, want of hereditary 
succession in, i. 290 ; termination of, 
i. 353 ; officialism of, i. 198 ; dis- 
organization of after Justinian, i. 289. 

Empire, Byzantine, commencement of, 

i- 353 ; organization of, i. 184 ; froni' 
tiers of under Leo HI, i. 399. 

Encamping, art of neglected, i. 210. 

England and English, trade with Greece 
V. i,i7 ; with Turkey, v. 171 ; loniai 
republic under, v. 276, 277 ; treat 
ment of Parga, v. 276 ; attempts t 
coerce the Porte, vi. 112 ; war witl 
Turkey, vi. 155 ; takes Zante, vi 
157; troubles with Zante, vi. 223 
224; benevolence of, vi. 273 ; loam 
to Greece, vi. 328, 337 ; Greek 
jealous of, vi. 364 ; protects CalamoJ 
vi. 374 ; policy of, vii. 2, 6 seq 
Philhellenism in, vii. 7 ; complaintsl 
of Porte against, vii. 8 ; Greecei 
solicits protection of, vii. 9 ; policy of| 
towards Spain and Portugal, vii. 11 
treaty of 1827 with France and RuS' 
sia, vii. 13, 25; hated by Capodis- 
trias, vii. 30; policy of, vii. 52, 53, 
80, 171 seq., 187 ; fleet at Poros, vii. 
65 ; influence of in Greece, vii. 136; 
disputes with Greece, vii. 149 ; de- 
mands interest on Greek loan, vii, 
203 ; unpopularity of, vii. 207 ; rup- 
ture with Greece, vii. 208 seq. ; col- 
lision with France, vii. 2 10 seq. ; 
blockades Piraeus, ib. ; revived popu- 
larity of, vii. 264, 276 ; opinion of 
upon the Greek revolution, vii. 275; 
engages to find a king for Greece 
and restore the Ionian Isles, vii. 287, 
289 ; representations of to Greece, 
vii. 294; leaves Corfu, vii. 313; ac- 
cused by Russia of violating treaty 
engagements, vii. 214; English built 
ships in Turkish service, vi. 349. 

Entenza, Beranger d', iii. 397 seq., 400, 
405, 406; iv. 147. 

Epanagoge of Basil I, ii. 242. 

'E(pr]iJifpts FeviK^, The, vii. 60. 

Ephesus, temple of Diana at, destroyed, 
i. 95 ; council of, i. 328. 

Ephors, revival of, vi. 141. 

Ephthalite Huns, i. 259. 

Epibates, treaty of, iii. 415. %i 

Epictetus, i. 273. ^| 

Epidamnus. (See Dyrrachium.) 

Epidaurus, ravaged by Sulla, i. 27; 
assembly of, vi. 239, 242 ; constitu- 
tion of, ib. seq. ; decree of, vii. 10. 

Epiphanea (Hama\ i. 361. 

Epirus, a senatorial province, i. 32 seq., 
53, 115; occupied by Alaric, i. 160; 
ravaged by Totila. i. 224, 253 ; over- 
run by Normans, iii. 80 ; Theodore 
despot of, iii. 300 seq., 328, iv. 112, 
118, 124; despotat of, iii. 311, 338, 
431. iv. 121 seq. ; Angelos Komnenos 
Dukas family name of despots of, 
iv. 1 23 ; campaign of John Palaeo- 



logiis in, iii. 338 seq. ; Bulgarians in, 
iv. 28; Michael despot of, iv. in, 
121, 123; Michael 11 despot of, iv. 
126, 127, 201 ; Nicephorus despot of, 
iv. 127; Thomas despot of, iv. 127, 
142 ; Nicephorus II, despot of, iv. 
128 ; conquered by Stephen Dushan, 
iv. 128, 129; timariots in, v. 4; 
French driven out of, vi. 47 : endea- 
vour of Greece to annex, vii. 219, 
221, 223 seq.; list of despots of, iv. 
430 ; population of, vi. 35. 

Erarich, i. 242. 

Erasinus, river, vi. 292. 

Eretria, lost by Athens, i. 60. 

Erfurt, conferences of, vi. 112. 

Erissos, Turkish fleet at, vi. 177 seq.; 
bishop of, vi. 202. 

Ernest, duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, 
refuses the crown of Greece, vii. 290, 

J2rotikos, Theophilos, ii. 429. 

Ertebil, iv. 405 seq. 

Ertogrul, iii. 360, 469, v. 9. 

Erzeroum (Theodosiopolis), i. 261. 

i'2thiopia, becomes Christian, i. 147, 
264, ii. 272 seq.; missionaries in, 
i. 269 ; alliance of Justin with, i. 

Euboea (Negrepont), iii. 187, iv. 108 
seq., 132; Venetians in, iv. 154; 
taken by Turks, v. 61, 102 ; Greek 
rebellion in, vi. 247 ; Greeks and 
Turks in, vi. 314; Albanian, vi. 28. 

Euchaites, ii. 103. 

Eudes of Burgundy, iv. 175, 219, 221. 

Eudocia (Athenais), wife of Theodo- 
sius II, i. 174, 192, 278, 285. 

Eudocia, cousin of Andronicus I, iii. 
148, 203. 

Eudocia, wife of Alexius V, iii. 269, 

Eudocia, daughter of Alexius III of 
Trebizond, iv 379, 385. 

Eudocia, daughter of Dekapolitas, ii. 

Eudocia of Georgia, iv. 393. 

Eudocia Ingerina, ii. 171, 192, 196, 

Eudocia Makrembolitissa, iii. 23 seq., 

Eudocia, daughter of Michael VIII, iv. 

Eudocia, daughter of Theodore, iii. 297, 

Eudocia, daughter of Valentinian III, 

i. 231. 
Eugene, prince of Savoy, v. 227. 
Eugenios Bulgares (see Bulgares). 
Eugenics, patriarch, vi. 186. 
Eugenios, St., of Trebizond, iv. 330. 
Eugenius, pope, ii. 141, 494. 

Eulogia, iii. 368, 374. 

Eulogios, ii. 196. 

Eunapius, i. 287. 

Euphemios, ii. 137. ' 

Euphrosyne, ii. 138, 142, 146, 147. 

Euphrosyne, wife of Alexius III, iii. 

242 seq., 295. 
Euphrosyne, story of, vi. 60. 
Eurycles, Julius, owner of Cythera, i. 

47, 77, ii. 254. 
Eustace of Boulogne, iii. 103. 
Eustathios, governor of Calabria, ii. 

313- . 

Eustathios Maleinos, ii. 364, 367. 
Eustathios of Thessalonica, iii. 215, iv. 

57. V. 134- 

Euthymios, ii. 142. 

Euthymios, ii. 263, 300. 

Eutropius, ii. 16. 

Eutyches, doctrine of, i. 177, 189. 

Eutychians, i. 308, 315, 347. 

Eutychius, exarch of Ravenna, ii. 40. 

Evagrius, i. 308, 338, 339 ; church his- 
tory of, i. 416, iv. 12. 

Evander, i. 66. 

Evenus (Phidari), vii. 159. 

Evrenos (Ghazi Gavrinos), iv. 233, 
235; invades Peloponnese, v. 4, 
vi. 4. 

Exarchs, oppression of, i. 318; termina- 
tion of exarchate of Ravenna, ii. 43, 
100; of Heraclea, ii. 180; exarchate, 
extent of, ii. 206 note. 

Exchange of prisoners, ii. 54, 89. 

Exemptions, failure of system of, v. 
202. {See Barrats.) 

Eynard, Mr., vi. 411, 437; generosity 
of, vii. 203. 

Eyoub Mosque, i. 383 note. 

Ezerits, ii. 166, 304, iv. 19, 20. 

Ezero (Helos), iv. 19. 

Fabvier, colonel, vi. 372, 402, 403; 
relieves Acropolis, 408 seq., 416, vii. 

13. 24. .35' 37- 38. yii- 134- 
Faliero, Vital, doge, iii. 83. 
Famagosta, siege of, v. 82. 
Fatimites, ii. 332, 358. 
Fauces Antigonenses, vi. 73. 
Fauvel, M., French consul, vi. 284. 
Fellahs, cut off thumbs, i. 93. 
Fellowes, Sir Thomas, vii. 19. 
Ferdinand, king of Portugal, refuses 

the crown of Greece, vii. 289, 290. 
Ferdinand of Tuscany attacks Chios, 

V. 80. 
Fergana, ii. 167, 
Fernand of Majorca invades Achaia, 

iii. 398, 405, 406, iv. 147, 218. 
Ferrara, council of, iii. 493. 



Feudalism in Greece, iii. 486, iv. (^^^ 
94 seq., 105 seq., 132 seq., 169, 181 ; 
compared with that in England, iv. 
227; among Turks, v.. 2, 14, 15; 
Othoman, v. 34, 41 seq. ; extinguished 
by Mahmoud II, v. 15, 44. 

Filioque controversy, ii. 233. 

Finance, Othoman, imperfection of, v. 
21; Greek abuses of, vii. 124; in- 
quired into and reported on by a 
commission of allies, vii. 238 seq. 

Finch, Sir John, v. 171. 

Finlay, Mr., in the Greek Revolution, 
vi. 428 note, 429 note, 437 note ; claim 
against Greek government, vii. 209, 

Fiorenza, duchess of Archipelago, iv, 
286, 287 seq. 

Firmus, rebellion of, i. 116. 

Fiscal injustice of Romans, i. ili, 149, 
199, 200, 218, ii. 407. 

Flamininus defeats Philip V of Mace- 
don, vi. 73. 

Flanders, Baldwin of, iii. 258, 265, 275, 
iv. 85 seq. 

Flanders, Henry of, iii. 265, 286, 289 
seq., iv. loi seq. 

Flanders, fleet of, Venetian, iv. 296. 

Florence, council of, iii. 494 ; Acciai- 
uoli family from, iv. 157; Greek 
colony at, v. 98. 

Florentines in the Levant, attack Chios, 
V. 99 ; ravages of, v. 106, 108. 

Florenz of Hainault, iv. 127, 129, 209 
seq., 2(5. 

Follis, i. 117, 441. {See Coinage.) 

Foscari, Francis, doge, iv. 130. 

Fostat, rise of, i. 373, ii. 276. 

France (see French). 

Francesco I of Florence, v. 98. 

Francopulo, iii. 246. 

Frangopoulos, iii. 17. 

Frankfort, council of, ii. 76, 141. 

Franks, summoned by Witiges, i. 241 ; 
in Italy, i. 247 ; defeated at Vultur- 
nus, ih. ; Justin negotiates with, i. 
296 ; empire of, ii. 206, 439, 444 ; 
moral character of, ii. 219 ; use of 
the term by Byzantines, iv. 63 ; con- 
quer Athens and Thebes, iv. 135, 
170; conquer Peloponnesus, iv. 174; 
evil effects of their rule in Greece, 
iv. 228. 

Franz, Dr., arrest of, vii. 137, 138. 

P'raxinet, ii. 313. 

Frederic Barbarossa {see Barbarossa), 
iii. 233 seq. 

French and France, Arabs in, ii. 134; 
influence on the East, iv. 63 ; relations 
with Porte, v. 166; in Chios, v. 238; 
intrigues of, in the East, v. 238 seq., 
240, 246; attacked by pirates, v. 272 ; 

influence on Greece of the Revolution,! 
V. 273, 278, vi. 97, vii. 59 ; policy inl 
Greece, V. 213, 274; war with Turkey,! 
V. 274; protect Ionian Isles, v. 2 74,r 
vi. 52 ; expelled from Ionian Isles,! 
V, 275 ; driven out of Epirus, vi. 47;! 
clubs, vi. 97 ; Turks protected by,j 
vi. 284- Philhellenes, policy of, vi. 
410; invade Spain, vii. 3; conquer! 
Algiers, vii. 13 ; treaty with England! 
and Russia, vii. 13, 25; in Morea,! 
vii. 27, 28; policy of, vii. 52, 53,] 
80 ; fleet at Poros, vii. 65 ; in Mes- 
senia, vii. 79 ; at Nauplia, vii. 89 [ 
seq.; at Kalamata, vii. 99, 100; at 
Argos attacked by Greeks, vii. 103 ; 
disinterestedness of, vii. 119; influence 
in Greece, vii. 136 ; advice to Greece, 1 
vii. 149; policy of, vii. 172, 188; 
action of, vii. 209 ; offers good offices, 
vii. 212, 213; contest with Russia! 
about Holy Sepulchre, vii. 218; 
representations to Greece, vii. 294. 

Friendly societies in Greece, i. 37 note. 

Fuad Pasha, vii. 225. 

Fulvius Nobi