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HISTORY OF GREECE.

FINLAF.

VOL. VII.

2rOut)on

MACMILLAN AND CO.

PUBLISHERS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF

©xforO

A •^^C=>

<^ HISTORY OF GREECE?/

FROM ITS

CONQUEST BY THE ROMANS TO THE PRESENT TIME

B.C. 145 TO A. D. 1864

GEORGE 'pINLAVf LL.D.

A NEW EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT, AND IN PART RE-WRITTEN,
WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS, BY THE AUTHOR,

AND EDITED BY THE

REV. H. F. TOZER, M.A.

TUTOR AND LATE FELLOW OF EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD

IN SEVEN VOLUMES

X ■

VOL. VII '

THE GREEK REVOLUTION. PART II
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GREEK KINGDOM

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
MDCCCLXXVII

75 7

CONTENTS.

BOOK FIFTH.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GREEK KINGDOM.

CHAPTER I.

Foreign Intervention. — Battle of Navarin.

Conduct of Russia .....

Conduct of Great Britain ....

Congress of Verona .....

Russian memoir relating to the pacification of Greece

Effects of this memoir ....

Turkey complains of the conduct of Great Britain .

Greece seeks the protection of Great Britain

Protocol of 4th April 1826 .

Destruction of the janissaries

Treaty of 6th July 1827 for the pacification of Greece

State of Greece in 1827

Victory of Hastings at Salona

Battle of Navarin

Greek slaves carried to Alexandria .

Greek troops cross into Acarnania .

Hastings takes Vasiladi

Death of Hastings .

Russia declares war with Turkey

French troops compel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea

PAGE

I
2
3

4
6
8

9
II
12
13
13
14
17
20
22

25
27

CHAPTER II.

Presidency of Count Capodistrias. — January 1828 to October 1831.

Character of Count John Capodistrias

First administrative measures of the president

His opinions and policy

Organisation of the army

Fabvier's resignation

Operations in Eastern and Western Greece

Termination of hostilities .

Civil administration .

Viaro Capodistrias .

Financial administration

Judicial administration

30
32
32
34
38
38
40
40
42
44
47

CONTENTS.

Public instruction

National assembly of Argos

Protocols of the three protecting powers

Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg sovereign of Greece

Prince Leopold's resignation

Capodistrias becomes a tyrant

Hostility to the liberty of the press

Tyranny of Capodistrias

Affair of Poros

Destruction of the Greek fleet

Sack of Poros

Family of Mavromichales .

Assassination of Capodistrias

PAGE
48

49
51

59
60

63
67

CHAPTER IIL

Anarchy.— 9tli October 1831 to 1st February 1833.

The governing commission refuses to grant a general amnesty after the

murder of Capodistrias
Second national assembly of Argos .
Romeliot military opposition
Agostino Capodistrias president of Greece
Romeliots expelled from Argos
Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum
Romeliots invade the Morea
Conduct of the residents
Agostino ejected from the presidency
New governing commission .
State of Greece

Anarchy ....
French troops garrison Nauplia
Djavellas occupies Patras
Kolokotrones rallies the Capodistrians
National assembly of Pronia
Constitutional liberty in abeyance .
Intrigues of the Senate

Municipal institutions arrest the progress of anarchy in the Morea
Condition of Messenia
Position of Kolokotrones and Kolettes
True nature of the municipal institutions of Greece under the Turks not

generally understood
Attack on the French troops at Argos
Establishment of the Bavarian dynasty

74
74
76

78
78

82
83
85
86
88
89
90

91
93

95
96

98
99

lOI

102

103
105

CHAPTER IV.

Bavarian Despotism and Constitutional Kevolution. — February 1833

to September 1843.

Landing of Kmg Olho

The regency, its members and duties

107
no

CONTENTS.

VI 1

PAGE

Royal proclamation — administrative measures

Military organization

Civil administration — municipal institutions

Financial administration — monetary system

Judicial organization

The Greek church — reforms of the regency

Synodal Tomos ....

Monasteries .....

Public instruction ....

Restrictions on the liberty of the press

Roads . . . • .

Quarrels in the regency

Kolokotrones' plot and Armansperg's intrigue

Armansperg's administration

Bavarian influence ....

Disputes with England

Alarming increase of brigandage

Insurrections in Maina and Messenia

Brigandage in 1835 .

General Gordon's expedition

Insurrection in Acarnania .

Opinions of Lord Lyons and General Gordon on the state

Brigandage continues

King Otho's personal government .

Attacks on King Otho in the English newspapers

Causes of the Revolution in 1843 .

Revolution . • . . .

Observations on the constitution

General Remarks ....

of Greece

130

133

135
136

142

145
148

149

156
158
162
164
166
168
169
171

174

178

180

CHAPTER V.
[supplementary]
Constitutional Monarcliy. — 1844-1862.

Alexander Mavrocordatos prime minister

French policy

Elections in 1844

Misconduct of the Mavrocordatos cabinet

An anomalous election

Kolettes ptime minister, 1 844-1 847

Organization of the Church in the kingdom

Diplomatic disputes

Quarrel with Turkey 1847 .

Financial administration

Revolts and brigandage

Changes of ministry 1848 .

Rupture with Great Britain 1850

Final arrangement of the British claims

Complaint of Russia

of Greece

186
188
189
191

194

197
200

201

203

206

207

208

213

214

Vlll

CONTENTS.

Affairs of Montenegro 1853

Russian demands on Turkey 1853 '.

State of Greece in 1853 and 1854 .

Greeks invade Turkey

Defeat of the Greeks

Occupation of the Piraeus by French and English troops .

Demoralized condition of Greece 1854-1857

Termination of the political career of Alexander Mavrocordatos

Violation of the constitution ....

Brigandage, 1855-1856 .....

Financial commission of the protecting powers

Land tax .......

Communal administration .....

The Miaoulis ministry .....

The state of Greece 1859 .....

Dissolution of the chamber of deputies i860

Illegal elections 1861

Attempt to assassinate Queen Amalia

Negotiations with Admiral Kanares for the formation of a ministry

PAGE

215
218
219
225
227
227
230
232

233

235
238

243
247

248

252

254
255

CHAPTER VI.

[supplementary.]

Change of Dynasty. — Establishment of new Constitution; 1862-1864.

Revolt of the garrison of Nauplia .

State of public opinion

Question of the succession to the throne of Greece

The Hon. Henry Elliot's first mission to Greece ■

Revolution of 1862 .

Negotiations relating to the election of Prince Alfred to be King of

Greece
Results of the Revolution .
Election of Prince Alfred .
Mr. Elliot's second mission .
Election of George I. King of the Hellenes
Military disorders and civil war at Athens
Position of the new king
Union of the Ionian Islands .
National Assembly .
Constitution of 1864 . ,

Abolition of the Senate
Creation and abolition of a Council of State
Conclusion .....
Appendix —

I. Hastings' memorandum on the use of steamers armed with heavy guns

II. Napier's memorandum on military operations against Ibrahim Pasha

III. Hastings' letter to Mavrocordatos ....

IV. Hastings' letter to Sir Richard Church

V. Constitution of 1864 ......

Index ........

262

265
269
271

276
281
284
289
291

293
301

304
313
321
328
330
332

335
340
343
344
345
359

BOOK FIFTH.

FOUNDATION OF THE GREEK KINGDOM.

CHAPTER L

Foreign Intervention. — Battle of Navarin,

Conduct of Russia. — Conduct of Great Britain. — Congress of Verona. — Russian
memoir on the pacification of Greece in 1823. — Effect of this memoir. —
Turkey complains of the conduct of the British government. — Greece places
herself under the protection of England. — Protocol of the 4th April, 1826,
for the pacification of Greece. — Destruction of the Janissaries. — Treaty of the
6th July, 1S27, for the pacification of Greece. — State of Greece in 1827. —
Victory of Hastings at Salona. — Battle of Navarin. — Greek slaves carried off
to Alexandria. — Greek troops cross into Acarnania. — Hastings takes Vasiladi.
— Death of Hastings. — Russia declares war with Turkey. — French troops
compel Ibrahim to evacuate the Morea.

When the Greeks commenced the Revolution, they were
firmly persuaded that Russia would immediately assist them.
Many acts of the Emperor Alexander I. authorized this
opinion, which was shared by numbers of well-educated men
/ in Western Europe. But whatever might have been the wish
of the emperor personally, policy prevailed over feeling. The
sovereigns of Europe feared a general rising of nations.
Monarchs were alarmed by a panic fear of popular move-
ments, and the judgment of statesmen was disturbed by the
conviction that cabinets and nations were pursuing adverse
objects. There was a strong desire among a part of the
Russian population to take up arms against the sultan in
order to protect the Greeks, because they belonged to the

VOL. VII. B

2 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk.V. Ch.I.

same Oriental Church. But the conservative policy of the
emperor, the selfishness of his ministers, and the power of his
police, prevented any active display of Philhellenism in
Russia.

Time rolled on. Year after year the Greeks talked with
laudable perseverance of the great aid which Russia was soon
to send them. Philhellencs from other nations arrived and
fought by their side ; large pecuniary contributions were
made to their cause by Catholics and Protestants, but their
co-religionaries of orthodox Russia failed them in the hour
of trial. (The cabinet of St. Petersburg coolly surveyed the
struggle, weighed the effect of exhaustion on the powers of
both the combatants, and watched for a favourable occasion to
extend the influence of Russia towards the south, and add
new provinces to the empireT^

The conduct of Great Britain was very different. The
British cabinet was more surprised by the Greek Revolution,
and viewed the outbreak with more aversion, than any other
Christian government. The events in Vallachia, and the
assertions of the Hetairists in the Morea, made the rising
appear to be the result of Russian intrigue. The immediate
suppression of the revolt seemed therefore to be the only
way of preventing Greece from falling under the protection of
the Emperor Alexander, and of hindering Russia from
acquiring naval stations in the Mediterranean. The British
government consequently opposed the Revolution ; but it
had not, like that of Russia, the power to coerce the sympa-
thies of Britons. British Philhellencs were among the first to
join the cause, and in merit they were second to none. The
names of Gordon, Hastings, and Byron will be honoured in
Greece as long as disinterested service is rewarded by national
gratitude.

The habits of the English, long accustomed to think and
act for themselves in public affairs, enabled public opinion to
judge the conduct of the Greeks without prejudice, and to
separate the crimes which stained the outbreak from the
cause which consecrated, the strusfSfle.

It is necessary, however, to look beyond the East in order
to form a correct judgment of the policy of the cabinets of
Europe with regard to the Greek Revolution. The equili-
brium of the European powers was threatened with disturbance

CONGRESS OF VERONA. 3

A.D. 1827.]

by a war of opinion. Two camps were gradually forming in
hostile array, under the banners of despotism and liberty.
The Greek question was brought prominently forward by the
continental press, because it afforded the means of indulging
in political discussion without allusion to domestic admini-
stration, and of proclaiming that principles of political justice
were applicable to Greeks and Turks which they dared not
affirm to be applicable to subjects and rulers in Christian
nations.

The affairs of Greece were brought under discussion at the
Congress of Verona in 1822. A declaration of the Russian
emperor, and the protocols of the conferences, proclaimed
that the subject interested all Europe ; but the view which
the Congress took of the war showed more kingcraft than
statesmanship. It was identified too closely with the demo-
cratic revolutions of Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. Yet so
great was the fear of any extension of Russian influence in the
East, that even the members of the Holy Alliance preferred
the success of the sultan to the interference of the czar ^

In the mean time, Russia persuaded France to undertake
the task of suppressing constitutional liberty in Spain, as
a step to a general concession of the right of one nation to
interfere in the internal affairs of another when it suspects
danger from political opinions.

The march of the French armies beyond the Pyrenees
placed the cabinets of France and England in direct opposi-
tion. England replied to the destruction of constitutional
liberty in Spain by acknowledging the right of the revolted
Spanish colonies in America to establish independent states.
George Canning delighted the liberals and alarmed the
despots on the continent by boasting in parliament that he
had called a new political world into existence to redress the
balance of the old. The phrase, though somewhat inflated,
has truth as well as buoyancy enough to float down the stream
of time. At the same time the British government adopted
the energetic step of repealing the prohibition to export arms
and ammunition, in order to afford the Spanish patriots the

* [A detailed account of the negotiations of the various European states in
the course of the Greek RevoUition v/ill be found in Mendelssohn Bartholdy's
Geschichte Griechenlands, vol. i. pp. 287 foil., and 3 Si foil. Ed.]

B 2

4 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk. V. Ch. I.

means of obtaining supplies and of resisting the French
invasion ^

While the English cabinet was thus incurring the danger of
war in the West, it exerted itself to prevent hostilities in the
East. The ambassadors of England and Austria induced the
sultan to take some measures to conciliate Russia in 1823. A
note of the reis-effendi was addressed to the Russian govern-
ment, announcing the speedy evacuation of the trans-Danubian
Principalities, and a desire to renew direct diplomatic rela-
tions between the sultan and the czar. After much tergiver-
sation in the usual style of Othoman diplomacy, the Porte
opened the navigation of the Bosphorus to the Russian
flag, and the Emperor Alexander sent a consul-general to
Constantinople ^.

From this time Russia began to take a more active part
than she had hitherto taken in the negotiations relating to
Greece. The activity of the Philhellenic committees alarmed
the Holy Alliance. The success of the French in Spain
encouraged the despotic party throughout Europe. Russia,
availing herself adroitly of these feelings, seized the opportu-
nity of resuming her relations with Turkey, and of laying
before the European cabinets a memoir on the pacification of
Greece.

The principal object of this document was the dismember-
ment of Greece, in order to prevent the Greek Revolution
from founding an independent state. The statesmen of
Russia, having watched dispassionately the progress of public
opinion in the West, had arrived at the conclusion that if
monarchs delayed much longer assuming the initiative in the
establishment of peace between the Greeks and Turks,
Christian nations might take the matter into their own hands.
Russia naturally wished to preserve her position as protector
of the Greeks, and to retain the honour of being the first

^ By an order in council, 26th February, 1823. The exportation of arms and
munitions of war to Spain was proliibited in consequence of the war with the
revolted colonies in South America, in virtue of arrangements arising out of the
treaty with Spain, 5th July, 1814. and the foreign enlistment act of 1819 (sg George
III.c. 69). It became necessary, when hostilities broke out between France and
Spain in 1823, either to extend the prohibition to France or allow exportation to
Spain. Mr. Canning chose the latter, and said in the House of Commons, ' by
this measure His Majesty's government afforded a guarantee of their bona fide
neutrality.' Hamard's Debates, New Series, viii. p. 1050.

The notes relating to these negotiations are printed in Archives Diplomatiques,
vi. 31, and Lesur, Annuaire Historiqtie, 1823.

RUSSIAN MEMOIR OF 1833. 5

A,D. 1S27.]

Christian government that covered her co-religionaries with
her orthodox aegis.

The Russian plan of pacification was calculated to win
the assent of the Holy Alliance, by suppressing everything in
Greece that appeared to have a revolutionary tendency. It
proposed to retain the Greeks in such a degree of subjection
to Turkey that they would always stand in need of Russian
protection. It contemplated annihilating their political im-
portance as a nation, by dividing their country into three
separate governments. By creating powerful classes in each
of these governments with adverse interests, it hoped to
render any future national union impossible ; and by allowing
the sultan to keep Othoman garrisons in the Greek fortresses,
the hostile feelings of the Greeks would be kept in a state of
irritation, and they would continue to be subservient to Russia
in all her ambitious schemes in the Turkish empire. The three
governments into which Russia proposed to divide Greece,
were to be ruled by native hospodars, and administered by
native officials chosen by the sultan. The islands of the
Aegean Sea were to be separated from the rest of their
countrymen, and placed under the direct protection of the
Porte, with such a guarantee for their local good government
as could be obtained by the extension of a municipal system
similar to that which had existed at Chios, at Hydra, or
at Psara^.

As a lure to gain the assent of the members of the Holy
Alliance to these arrangements, Russia urged the necessity
of preventing Greece from becoming a nest of democrats and
revolutionists, by paralyzing the political energy of the nation,
which could easily be effected by gratifying the selfish ambi-
tion of the leading Greeks. Personal interest would extinguish
national patriotism in Greece, as it had done at the Phanar,
and in Vallachia and Moldavia ^.

^ An extract from this memoir was published in 1824, and this extract is trans-
lated by Tricoupi (iii. 385) ; but a complete copy was printed in the Courrier de
Smyrne, 1828, Nos. 37 and 38. The hospodarats were — i. Thessaly, with Eastern
Greece ; 2. Epirus and Western Greece ; 3. The Morea with Crete. The islands
which were to ejnoy municipal governments are not enumerated.

^ The expressions deserve to be quoted: — 'Paralyser I'influence des revolution-
naires dans toute la Grece ; ' and ' que la creation de trois principautes Grecques,
en diminuant Fetendue et les forces respectives de chacune de ces provinces, offre
une nouvelle garantie a la Porte: qu'elle offre enfin un puissant appat aux principales
families de la Grece; et qu'elle pourra servir a les detacher des interets de I'insurrec-
tion.'

5 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk. V. Ch. L

When the contents of this memoir became known, they
caused great dissatisfaction both in Greece and Turkey,

The sultan was indi^t^nant that a foreign sovereign should
interfere to regulate the internal government of his empire,
and propose the dismemberment of his dominions as a
subject of discussion for other powers. He naturally asked
in what manner the Emperor Alexander would treat the
interference of any Catholic sovereign in favour of Polish
independence, or of the sultan himself in favour of Tartar
Mohammedanism.

The Greeks were astonished to find the Emperor Alexander,
whom they had always believed to be a firm friend, coolly
aiming a mortal blow at their national independence. Their
own confused notions of politics and religion had led them
to infer that the orthodoxy of the czar v/as a sure guarantee
for his support in all measures tending to throw off the
Othoman yoke both in their civil and ecclesiastical go-
vernment. They were appalled at the Machiavellism of a
cabinet that sought to ruin their cause under the pretext of
assisting it ^.

Great Britain was now the only European power that
openly supported the cause of liberty, and her counsels bore
a character of vigour that commanded the admiration of
her enemies. To the British government the Greeks turned
for support when they saw that Russia had abandoned their
cause. In a communication addressed to the British Foreign
Secretary, dated the 24th August 1824, they protested against
the arrangements proposed in the memoir, and adjured Eng-
land to defend the independence of Greece and frustrate the
schemes of Russia. This letter did not reach George Canning,
who was then at the Foreign Office, until the 4th November,
and he replied on the 1st of December. By the mere fact of
replying to a communication of the Greek government, he
recognized the right of the Greeks to secure their independ-
ence, and form a new Christian state.

Mr. Canning's answer contained a distinct and candid
statement of the views of the British cabinet. Mediation

The unpopularity of Russia was greatly increased by the expulsion of many
Wek families from the dominions of the Emperor Alexander at this time. Some
of these families were conveyed to Greece at a considerable expense by the Phil-
hellenic committees of Switzerland. Gordon, ii. 83.

VJEIVS OF THE BRITISH CABINET. ^

A.D. 1827.]

appeared for the moment impossible, for the sultan insisted
on the unconditional submission of the Greeks, and the
Greeks demanded the immediate recognition of their political
independence. Nevertheless, the English minister declared
that, if at a future period Greece should demand the mediation
of Great Britain, and the sultan should accept that mediation,
the British government would willingly co-operate with the
other powers of Europe to facilitate a treaty of peace, and
guarantee its duration. In the mean time Great Britain
engaged to observe the strictest neutrality, adding, however,
that as the king of England was united in alliance with
Turkey by ancient treaties, which the sultan had not
violated, it could not be expected that the British government
should involve itself in a war in which Great Britain had no
concern ^.

The moderate tone of this state-paper directed public
opinion to the question of establishing peace between the
Greeks and the sultan. It also convinced most thinking
men that the object of Russian policy was to increase the
sultan's difficulties, not to establish tranquillity in Turkey.
The British Parliament, in particular, began to feel that the
English ambassador at Constantinople must cease to support
many of the demands of Russia. The memoir of 1823,
therefore, though able and well devised as a document
addressed to cabinets and diplomatists, became a false step
by being subjected to the ordeal of public opinion. The
morality of nations was already better than that of emperors
and kings. For a time all went on smoothly, and meetings
of the ambassadors of the great powers were held at St.
Petersburg in the month of June 1834, to concert measures
for the pacification of the East.

Early in the year 1824, the influence of England at Con-
stantinople diminished greatly, in consequence of the public
manifestations of Philhellenism. The sultan heard with
surprise that the Lord Mayor of London had subscribed a
large sum to support the cause of the Greeks ; that Lord
Byron, an English peer, and Colonel the Honourable Leicester

* For the letter of the Greek government, and Canning's answer, see Lesur,
-Atm. Hist. 1824, p. 627. Tricoupi gives Canning's letter a wrong date (iii. 390).

^ FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Dk.V. Ch.I.

Stanhope (Earl of Harrington), an officer in the king's service,
had openly joined the Greeks ; that the British authorities in
the Ionian Islands granted refuge to the rebellious armatoli ;
and that English bankers supplied the insurgents with money.
The sultan attributed these acts to the hostile disposition of
the government. Neither Sultan Mahmud nor his divan could
be persuaded that in a free country public opinion had a
power to control the action of the executive administration
in enforcing the law. The sultan could not be expected to
appreciate what continental despots refuse to understand
— that Englishmen legally enjoy and habitually exercise a
right of political action for which they are responsible to
society and not to government. In the year 1823, the sym-
pathies of Englishmen, with all those engaged in defending
the inalienable rights of citizens, were so strong, that the
British government feared to act in strict accordance with
the recognized law of nations. The people considered that
the duties of humanity were more binding than national
treaties. But as the ambassador at Constantinople could not
urge popular feelings as an excuse for violating national
engagements, the sultan had the best of the argument when
he formally complained to the cabinets of Europe of the
conduct of England to Turkey.

On the 9th April 1824, a strong remonstrance v/as pre-
sented to Lord Strangford, the English ambassador at
Constantinople. The reis-efifendi remarked, 'that it was
absurd to suppose that any government, whatever might be
its form of administration, did not possess the power of
preventing its subjects from carrying on war at their own
good pleasure, and of punishing them for violating existing
treaties between their own country and foreign governments.'
And the Othoman minister argued that, if such were the
case, the peace of Europe, which the English government
protested its anxiety to maintain, would be left dependent
on the caprice of private individuals, for one state might say
to another, ' I am your sincere and loyal friend, but I beg you
to rest satisfied with this assurance, and not to feel dissatisfied
if some of my subjects sally out and cut the throats of yours.'
This candid and just remonstrance concluded by demanding
categorically that British subjects should be prohibited from

ENGLISH PROTECTION. 9

A.D. 1827.]

carrying arms against Turkey, and prevented from supplying
the Greeks with arms, money, and ammunition ^.

The British government was not insensible to the truth
contained in this document. Colonel Stanhope was ordered
home, and the Lord High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands
issued a proclamation prohibiting the deposit of arms, military
stores, and money, destined for the prosecution of the war in
Greece, in any part of the Ionian territory.

While diplomacy advanced with cautious steps towards
foreign intervention, the events of the war moved rapidly
in the same direction. The disastrous defeats of the Greek
armies by the Egyptian regulars paralyzed the government^
and overwhelmed the nation with despair^. The navies of
France and Austria assumed a hostile attitude. The Emperor
Alexander treated the independence of Greece as a mere
political chimaera, the delusion of some idle brain ^. On
the other hand, the recognition of all blockades established
by the naval forces of Greece, the Philhellenic sentiments
of Hamilton, the British commodore in the Levant, and the
fame of George Canning's policy, all combined to make
the Greeks fix their hopes of safety on England. A decree
of the legislative body, passed at a secret sitting on the
ist August 1825, declared that the Greek nation placed
the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political
existence under the absolute protection of Great Britain;
and an act was publicly signed by a large majority of the
clergy, deputies, primates, and naval and military chiefs of
the Greek nation, placing Greece under the protection of the
British government ^. The British cabinet was empowered
by these documents to treat concerning the pacification of
Greece with a degree of authority which it had not previously
possessed ; and George Canning now proposed the establish-
ment of a Greek state, as the surest means of pacifying the

^ This curious document is printed in Lesur, Ann. Hist. 1826, p. 649.

^ Tricoupi, iii. 262.

^ 'O 'AKe^avSpos X'Va'po"' aneKaXfi Tijv dfe^apTtjcriau rrjs 'EWaSos. Tricoupi,
iii. 270.

* Compare Gordon, who gives a translation of the decree (ii. 283). Tricoupi
mentions previous endeavours to obtain the crown of Greece for a French prince
(iii, 261, 272, 397). But a more complete account of the intrigues and negotia-
tions that were carried on in Greece will be found in the work of Speliades,
' hnoixyrjuovivixara, vol. iL p. 375..

10 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk.V. Ch.I.

East. He, like many other friends of Greece, believed that
liberty would engender the love of justice, that the Greeks
would become the allies of England from national sympathies,
as well as from interest, and that, under a free and enlightened
administration, the Greeks would enable political liberty and
Christian civilization to find a home among the population of
Eastern Europe and Western Asia. Russia would lose the
power of making religious fanaticism an engine for producing
anarchy in Turkey as a step to conquest, and perhaps the
Greeks would emulate the career of English colonies, and, by
rapid advances in population and industry, repeople and
regenerate the desolate regions of European Turkey. Reason-
able as these hopes were in the year 1825, the Greeks have
allowed thirty-five years to elapse without doing much to
fulfil them.

Death arrested the vacillating career of Alexander I. in
November 1825. For a moment Russia was threatened with
internal revolution, but Nicholas was soon firmly seated on
the throne by his energetic conduct. His stern and arrogant
disposition soon displayed itself in his foreign policy ; but
his personal presumption and despotic pretensions encountered
the petulant boldness and liberal opinions of George Canning,
and an estrangement ensued between the Russian and British
cabinets, greater than would have resulted solely from the
divergency of their national interests ^.

Mr. Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redclifife), one
of England's ablest diplomatists, arrived at Constantinople,
as ambassador to the Porte, early in 1826, with the delicate
mission of inducing the sultan to put an end to the war in
Greece, and of preventing war from breaking out between
Russia and Turkey. On his way to the Dardanelles he
conferred with Mavrocordatos concerning the basis of an
effectual mediation between the belligerents'^. The result
of this interview was that the National Assembly of Epidaurus
passed a decree, dated 24th April 1826, authorizing the
British ambassador at Constantinople to treat concerning
peace, on the basis of independent self-government for Greece,

' An instance of the haughty tone assumed by the Emperor Nicholas towards
the British government, will be found in a despatch from Nesselrode to Lieven,
dated 9th January, 1827, printed in the Portfolio, iv. 267.

* The meeting took place at Hydra, 9th January, 1826.

PROTOCOL OF 4TH APRIL 1826. Il

A.D. 1827.]

with a recognition of the sultan's suzerainty, and the payment
of a fixed tribute ^.

The pacification of Greece was now the leading object *
of British policy in the Levant. The Emperor Nicholas
rejected all mediation in his differences with Turkey, but
the British cabinet was still anxious to secure unity of action
between England and Russia on the Greek question. The
Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg for this
purpose, and on the 4th April 1836 a protocol was signed,
stating the terms agreed on by the two powers as a basis
for the pacification of Greece. This protocol acknowledged
the right of the Greeks to obtain from the Porte a solemn
recognition of their independent political existence, so far
as to secure them a guarantee for liberty of conscience,
freedom of commerce, and the exclusive regulation of their
internal government. This was a considerable step towards
the establishment of national independence on a solid
foundation ^.

Unfortunately, the relations of the British government with
the members of the Holy Alliance, and the continental
princes under their influence, were far from amicable during
the year 1826. No progress could therefore be made in a
negotiation in which the Porte could only be induced to
make concessions by fear of a coalition of the Christian
powers, and their determination to act with unity and vigour.

The royalists in Spain, under the protection of the French
army of occupation, began to aid the despotic party in
Portugal. The princess-regent at Lisbon, alarmed at the
prospect of a civil war, claimed the assistance which England
was bound to give to Portugal by ancient treaties. The
occupation of Spain by foreign troops threatened Portugal
with war ; foreign assistance could alone prevent hostilities.
A French army had destroyed liberty in Spain ; an English
army could alone preserve it in Portugal. Canning did not
hesitate, and in December 1826 he announced in Parliament
that six thousand British troops were ordered to Lisbon.
All Europe was taken by surprise. The Emperor Nicholas,
who had placed himself at the head of the despotic party

* The decree and instructions to the committee of the Assembly are given by
Mamouka, iv. 94 ; the letter to Canning, iv. 132.
^ Parliamentary Papers ; and Portfolio, iv. 546.

13 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk. V. Ch. I.

on the continent was extremely irritated at this bold step
in favour of constitutional liberty. A coolness ensued between
the English and Russian cabinets, and the negotiations for
the pacification of Greece were allowed to lag. On the other
hand, the attitude assumed by the czar towards Turkey had
previously become so menacing, that Sultan Mahmud yielded
the points he had hitherto contested, and concluded the
convention of Akermann on the 7th October 1826 \

But Sultan Mahmud had not trifled away his time during
the year 1826. In the month of May he promulgated an
ordinance reforming the corps of janissaries. His reforms
were so indispensable for the establishment of order, that
the great body of the Mohammedans supported them. But
in the capital several powerful classes were interested in the
continuance of the existing abuses. The janissaries took up
arms to defend their privileges, which could only be main-
tained by dethroning the sultan. A furious contest ensued
on the 14th June, but it was quickly terminated. Sultan
Mahmud had foreseen the insurrection, and was prepared
to suppress it. The sacred banner of Mohammed was unfurled,
the grand mufti excommunicated the janissaries as traitors
to their sovereign and their religion, and an overwhelming
force was collected to crush them. Their barracks were
stormed, the whole quarter they inhabited was laid in ashes,
their corps dissolved, and the very name of janissary abolished.
On the 13th of September 1826, tranquillity being completely
restored at Constantinople, the sandjak-sherif was furled and
replaced in its usual sanctuary.

The convention of Akermann re-established Russian in-
fluence at the Porte. On the 5th of February 1827, Great
Britain and Russia made formal offers of their mediation
in the affairs of Greece, and proposed a suspension of hostili-
ties. After many tedious conferences, the reis-efifendi, in
order to terminate the discussion, delivered to the repre-
sentatives of the European powers at Constantinople a
statement of the reasons which induced the sultan to reject
the interference of foreign states in a question which related
to the internal government of his empire ^.

* Lesur, Aim. Hist. 1S26, p. 100.

* This document, dated 9th and loth June, 1827, is given m Lesur, Ann. Hist.
X827, p. 99.

STATE OF GREECE IN 1827. 13

A.D. 1827.]

France was at this time engaged in a dispute with the
dey of Algiers, which led to the conquest of that dependency
of the sultan's empire. She now joined Great Britain and
Russia in common measures for the pacification of Greece,
and a treaty between the three powers was signed at London
on the 6th July 1827.

This treaty proposed to enforce an armistice between the
Greeks and Turks by an armed intervention, and contemplated
securing to the Greeks a virtual independence under the
suzerainty of the sultan \ An armistice was notified to both
the belligerents. The Greeks accepted it as a boon which
they had solicited ; but the sultan rejected all intervention,
and referred the Allies to the note of the reis-efifendi already
mentioned.

After the disastrous battle of Phalerum, it required no
armistice to prevent the Greeks from prosecuting hostilities
by land. Their army was broken up, and no military oper-
ations were attempted during the summer of 1827. Sir
Richard Church moved about at the head of fewer troops
than some chieftains, and many captains paid not the slightest
attention to his orders. Fabvier shut himself up in Methana,
sulky and discontented. The greater part of the Greek chiefs,
imitating the example of Kolokotrones, occupied themselves
in collecting the public revenues in order to pay the personal
followers they collected under their standard. The efforts of
the different leaders to extend their territory and profits
caused frequent civil broils, and the whole mihtary strength
of the nation was, by this system of brigandage and anarchy,
diverted from opposing the Turks. While Greece was sup-
porting about twenty thousand troops, she could not move
two thousand to oppose either the Egyptians or the Turks
in the field. The best soldiers were dispersed over the country
collecting the means of subsistence, and the frontiers and the
fortresses were alike neglected. Famine was beginning to
be felt, and the soldiery, accustomed to waste, acted towards
the peasantry in the most inhuman manner. The beasts
of burden were carried off, and the labouring oxen devoured
before the eyes of starving families ^. Some districts of the

^ For the treaty, see Parliamentary Papers

r or lue ireaiy, see i^aruamenairy i^uptn.

Admiral de Rigny tells us that the peasants were ' chasses, depouilles, pilles

14 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk.V Ch. I.

Peloponnesus had submitted to Ibrahim Pasha during the

winter of 1836, and one of the chiefs in the vicinity of Patras,

named Demetrios Nenekos, now served actively against his

countrymen ^.

The exploits of the Greek seamen were not more patriotic
than those of the Greek soldiers. Only a few, following the
example of Miaoulis and Kanaris, remained indefatigable in
serving their country ; but the best ships and the best sailors
of the naval islands were more frequently employed scouring
the sea as pirates than cruising with the national fleet ^.
Lord Cochrane kept the sea with a small force. On the
16th of June he made an ineffectual attempt to destroy
the Egyptian fleet at Alexandria. On the ist of August,
the high-admiral in the Hellas, and Captain Thomas in
the brig Soter, took a fine corvette and a large Tunisian
schooner after a short engagement, and brought their prizes
in safety to Poros, though pursued by the whole Egyptian
fleet. On the i8th of September Lord Cochrane anchored
off Mesolonghi with a fleet of twenty-three sail ; but after
some feeble and unsuccessful attempts to take Vasiladi, he
sailed away, leaving Hastings to enter the Gulf of Corinth
with a small squadron.

On the 29th of September Hastings stood into the Bay
of Salona to attack a Turkish squadron anchored at the
Scala, under the protection of two batteries and a body of
troops. The Greek force consisted of the steam-corvette
Karteria, the brig Soter, under the gallant Captain Thomas,
and two gunboats, mounting each a long 32-pounder, The
Turkish force consisted of an Algerine schooner^ mounting
twenty long brass guns^ six brigs and schooners, and two
transports. The Turks were so confident of victory that
they prepared to capture the whole Greek force, and did
not fire until the Karteria came to an anchor, fearing lest
the attack might be abandoned if they opened their de-
structive fire too soon. Hastings anchored about five hundred

altemativement par les Turcs et par les palikares ; ' and he mentions ' ces iles de
I'Arcliipel, ou, dans chacnne, nne band de pirates de terre et de mer font la loi.'
Parlinmeritary Papers, B, Protocols at Constaniitiople, p. 37.

* Compare Tricoupi, iv. 182.

^ For the extent to which piracy was carried on, see Gordon, ii. 475 ; and
Tricoupi confesses (iv. 248) that it was ixovaSiKov kqI acax^'^To'' 'paivu^nvov iv tt)
iaropia Twv eOvaiv,

HASTINGS' VICTORY AT SALON A. \$

A.D. 1827.]

yards from the enemy's vessels. While the Karteria was
bringing her broadside to bear, the batteries on shore and
the vessels at anchor saluted her with a heavy cannonade.
When the Soter and the gunboats came up, they were com-
pelled to anchor about three hundred yards further out than
the Karteria. Hastings commenced the action on the part
of the Greeks by firing his guns loaded with round-shot,
in slow succession, in order to make sure of the range. He
then fired hot shells from his long guns, and carcass-shells
from his carronades. The effect was terrific^. One of the
shells penetrated to the magazine of the Turkish commodore,
who blew up. A carcass-shell exploded in the bows of the
brig anchored astern the commodore, and she settled down
forward. The next broadside lodged a shell in the Algerine,
which exploded between her decks, and she was immediately
abandoned by her crew. Another schooner burst out in
flames at the same time, and a hot shell lodging in the stern
of the brig which had sunk forward, she also was soon on
fire. Thus, before the guns of the batteries on shore could
inflict any serious loss on the Karteria, she had destroyed
the four largest ships of the enemy. Captain Thomas and
the gunboats soon silenced the batteries, and took possession
of the Algerine schooner, which, however, the Greeks were
unable to carry off, as she was discovered to be aground,
and her deck was within the range of the Albanian riflemen
on shore. Hastings steamed up, and endeavoured to tow
her out to sea, but his hawsers snapped. The crews of the
Soter and the gunboats succeeded by great exertion, and
with some loss, in carrying off her brass guns, and in setting
her and the remaining brig on fire. The other vessels, being
aground close to the rocks which concealed the Albanian
riflemen, could not be boarded, but they were destroyed with
shells '^.

This victory at Salona afforded fresh proof of the value of
steam and large guns in naval warfare. The terrific effect

' Hot shells were used, though liable to greater deviation than shot, because
it was feared that solid 68-lb. shot might pass through both sides of the enemy's
ships.

^ [Mr. David Urquhart, the well-known author of The Spirit of the East, took
part in this engagement, and lias given an account of it, and of the circumstances
preceding it, in that work (vol. i. pp. 22-31), in his own peculiarly brilliant style
of narrative. Ed.]

l6 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk. V. Ch. I.

of hot projectiles, and the ease with which they were
managed, astonished both friends and foes.

Ibrahim Pasha was at Navarin when he heard of the
destruction of the squadron at Salona. He considered it a
violation of the armistice proposed by the AlHes and accepted
by the Greeks, and he resolved to take instant vengeance
on Hastings and Thomas, whose small force he hoped to
annihilate with superior numbers.

Mohammed AH was not less averse to an armistice than
the sultan, but Ibrahim could not refuse, when the Allied
admirals appeared in the Levant, to consent to an armistice
at sea. Hastings' victory at Salona now, in his opinion,
absolved him from his engagement, for it could not be
supposed that the Allies would allow one party to carry
on hostilities and hinder the other. Ibrahim therefore
sent a squadron from Navarin with orders to enter the
Gulf of Corinth and attack Hastings, who had fortified him-
self in the little port of Strava, near Perakhova. Sir Edward
Codrington, the English admiral, compelled this squadron
to return, and accused Ibrahim of violating the armistice.
Candour, however, forbids us to overlook the fact that
Ibrahim gave his consent to a suspension of hostilities
by sea under the persuasion that the Greeks would not be
allowed to carry on hostile operations any more than the
Turks.

The measures adopted by the AlHes to establish an
armistice were, during the whole period of their negotiations,
remarkable for incongruity. The Greeks accepted the
armistice, and were allowed to carry on hostilities both by
sea and land. The Turks refused, and were prevented from
prosecuting the war by sea. Ibrahim avenged himself by
burning down the olive-groves and destroying the fig-trees in
Messenia. The Allied admirals kept his fleet closely block-
aded in Navarin, where it had been joined by the capitan-
pasha with the Othoman fleet. Winter was approaching, and
the Allies might be blown off the coast, which would afl"ord
the Turkish naval forces in Navarin an opportunity of
slipping out and inflicting on Hydra the fate which had
overwhelmed Galaxidhi, Kasos, and Psara. To prevent so
great a calamity, the Allied admirals resolved to bring their
fleets to anchor in the great bay of Navarin, alongside the

BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 17

A.D. 1827.]

Egyptian and Othoman fleets. This resolution rendered a
collision inevitable.

The bay of Navarin is about three miles long and two
broad. It is protected from the west by the rocky island of
Sphakteria, but is open to the south-west by an entrance
three-quarters of a mile broad. The northern end of Sphak-
teria is separated from the cape of the mainland, crowned
with the ruins of Pylos, by a channel only navigable for
boats \ A small island called Chelonaki is situated near the
middle of the port, about a mile from the shore.

The Turkish fleets were anchored in a line of battle
forming two-thirds of a circle, facing the entrance of the
port, and with the extremities resting on and protected by
the fortress of Navarin and the batteries on Sphakteria. The
ships were stationed three deep, so as to command every
interval in the first line by the guns of the ships in the
second and third lines. The first consisted of twenty-two
heavy ships, with three fire-ships at each extremity. The
second of twenty-six ships, including the smaller frigates
and the corvettes. The third consisted of a few corvettes,
and of the brigs and schooners which were ordered to assist
any of the larger ships that might require aid. The whole
force ranged in line of battle to receive the Allies amounted
to eighty-two sail, and in this number there were three
line-of-battle ships and five double-banked frigates ^.

The Allied force consisted of twenty-seven sail, and of

^ Old Navarin, built on the ruins of Pylos, and called Avarinos, is said to have
been built by the Avars when they ruled the Sclavonians, who colonized the
Morea in the seventh century. For the ancient and modern topography of this
district, see Leake's Travels in the Morea, Arnold's Thucydides (vol. ii. p. 444), and
the article Pylos, in Smith's Diciiouary of Greek and Roinan Geography. [The
name Navarino is not derived from the Avars, as has commonly been supposed,
but from the Navarrese. See Hopf s Griechische Geschichte, irf Brockhaus' Griech-
enland, vol. vi. p. 212. Ed.]

" Tlie Othoman and Egyptian fleets united comprised —
3 line-of-battle ships.

5 double-banked frigates.
22 frigates.

33 corvettes.

13 brigs and schooners.

6 fire-ships.

82 sail, mounting about 2000 guns.
A Tunisian squadron of three frigates and a brig anchored behind Chelonaki,
but neither it nor the armed transports in the upper part of the bay took any
share in the battle.

VOL. VIL

]8 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk.V. Ch.I.

these ten were line-of-battle ships and one a double-banked
frigate ^

About half-past one o'clock, on the afternoon of the 20th
October 1827, Sir Edward Codrington entered the harbour of
Navarin, leading the van of the Allies in his flag-ship the
Asia. A favourable breeze wafted the Allied ships slowly-
forward ; while twenty thousand Turkish troops, encamped
without the fortress of Navarin, were ranged on the slopes
overlooking the port, like spectators in a theatre. The
Turkish admirals, seeing the Allies advancing in hostile array,
made their preparations for the battle, which they knew was
inevitable. Their great superiority in number gave them
a degree of confidence in victory, which the relative force
of the , two fleets, in the character of the ships, did not
entirely warrant. The greatest disadvantage of the Allies
was that they were compelled to enter the port in succession,
exposed to a cross-fire of the Turkish ships and the batteries
of Sphakteria and Navarin. Fortunately for them, the guns
on shore did not open their fire until the English and French
admirals had taken up their positions. The imperfect
artillery of the Turkish fleet, and the superiority of the Allies
in the number of line-of-battle ships, as well as in discipline
and science, were the grounds which were supposed to
authorize the bold enterprise of the admirals. But there
can be no doubt that a well-directed fire from the Turkish

^ The Allied fleet was thus composed —

Guns.

English Division, ii sail

. .

, ,

456

Line-of-battle.

Frigates.

Sloops of war.

Asia . . .84

Glasgow

Rose

Genoa . . 74

Cambrian .

Brisk

Albion . . 74

Dartmouth .

Philomel

Talbot

Mosquito
Stag (tender to
Asia) .

10
6

French Division, 7 sail .

362

Scipion . . 74

Sirene

Alcyone .

Breslau . . 74

Armide

Daphne .

Trident , . 74

Russian Division, 8 sail .

452

Azof . . -74

Constantine

Hanhoute . . 74
Ezekiel . . 74

Provonay .
Elene

44
33

Alexander Nevsky 74

Castor

Total guns

1270

BATTLE OF NAVARIN. 19

A.D. 1827.]

iguns on shore might have destroyed the EngHsh and French
:flag-ships before the great body of the Alhed fleet arrived
to their assistance.

The first shot was fired by the Turks. The Alhed admirals
would willingly have delayed the commencement of the
engagement until all their ships had entered the port, and
ranged themselves in line of battle. But the breeze died
away after a part of their squadrons anchored, and it was
more than an hour before the first ship of the Russian
division could reach its station. The battle was remarkable
for nothing but hard fighting, which allowed a display of
good discipline, but not of naval science. The fire of the
Allies was steady and well directed ; that of the Othomans
and Egyptians irregular and ill directed, but kept up with
great perseverance. The most difficult operation of the day
was taking possession of and turning aside the Turkish
fire-ships stationed at the extremities of the line. When
the English and French admirals anchored, these fire-ships
were to windward, and a favourable opportunity was offered
for using them with effect. The attempt was made to bear
down on the flag-ships of the Allies, but it was frustrated by
the skill and courage of Sir Thomas Fellowes of the Dartmouth,
and of the officers and men of the brigs which were ordered
on this duty. This battle, therefore, confirms the experience
of the Othoman and Egyptian fleets in 1824, that fire-ships
constructed on the Greek model require favourable circum-
stances and great skill on the part of their crews, as well as
some mismanagement or ignorance on the part of those
assailed, to render them very efficient engines in naval
warfare.

For about two hours the capitan-bey and the Egyptian
admiral, Moharrem Bey, sustained the fire of the Asia and
Sirene, but they then cut their cables and drifted to leeward.
The victory was soon after secured by the Russian division
under Count Heyden engaging the capitan-pasha, Tahir,
whose squadron formed the starboard division of the Turkish
line. The fire of the Allies now became greatly superior to
that of their enemies, and the Turks abandoned several
of their ships, and set them on fire. As evening approached,
the scene of destruction extended over the whole port.

The Allies took every precaution to insure the safety of

C 2

ao FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk.V.Ch.I,

their ships during the night, which they were compelled to
pass in the port amidst burning vessels drifting about in
every direction. Every now and then fresh ships burst out
into a mass of flames, and cast a lurid light over the water.
The crews who had been fighting all day to destroy the ships
of their enemies were compelled to labour all night to save
their own.

Of the eighty-two sail of Turkish ships anchored in line of
battle at noon, on the 20th of October 1827, only twenty-nine
remained afloat at daylight on the following morning ^

The loss of the Allies amounted to 173 killed, and 470
wounded. Several ships suffered so severely in their hulls
and rigging as to be unfit to keep the sea. The greatest
loss was sustained on board the flag-ships of the three
admirals.

The English and Russian line-of-battle ships sailed to
Malta to refit. The French returned to Toulon. Only the
smaller vessels remained in the Levant to watch the pro-
ceedings of Ibrahim, whose courage was not depressed by
his defeat^.

Ibrahim resolved not to abandon his position in the Morea.
In order to relieve his force of the wounded, the super-
numerary sailors, and the invalided soldiers, as well as to
remove the Turkish families and Greek slaves who encumbered
the fortresses, he embarked all these classes in the ships which
escaped destruction. A fleet of fifty-two sail was prepared
for sea, of which twenty-four were men-of-war present at the
battle of Navarin. This fleet quitted Greece on the 22nd
December, and arrived safely at Alexandria, where it also
landed two thousand Greek slaves captured in the Morea.

Sir Edward Codrington was severely blamed for allowing
this deportation of Christians, as he had been warned that

* An Austrian officer, who visited Navarin shortly after the battle, reported
the vessels then afloat to be — two line-of-battle ships, one double-banked frigate,
five frigates, nine corvettes, and twelve brigs.

^ The best accounts of the battle of Navarin are the official reports of the
three admirals, published in the London Gazette, Le Monitew. and the Gazette of
St. Petersburg. They may be compared with one another, and with a complete
account of the battle, published at Naples, with a good plan — Memoria intonio
alia Battaglia di Navariiio. Napoli. 1833. There is an account of what was seen
by an officer on board the Talbot, in the United Service Journal, 1829, pt. i. 117.
There is a plan of the port of Navarin, by Sir Thomas Fellowes. A manuscript
plan of the battle, prepared by an English officer, was frequently copied in the
Levant : it agrees very nearly with that published at Naples.

^/;? E. CODRTNGTON CENSURED. %\

A.D. 1827.]

Ibrahim contemplated the gradual removal of the whole
Greek population from the Peloponnesus, and its colonization
by Mussulman Albanians and Arabs. This was indeed the
only way in which the Egyptian pasha could complete and
maintain his conquest. Sir Edward Codrington, considering
that it was his duty to accelerate the evacuation of the Morea,
did not think that his instructions warranted his assuming
the responsibility of searching Turkish men-of-war as they
were returning home. This, indeed, could not be done
without a declaration of war ; and even after the battle of
Navarin, England did not declare war with the sultan, nor
the sultan with England. The truth seems to be, that the
naval force of the admiral was inadequate both to blockade
the Egyptians and to protect British ships from the Greek
pirates, who now attacked every merchantman that passed
to the eastward of Cape Matapan. But it was the general
opinion that Sir Edward Codrington fell into a very usual
error of commanders-in-chief in the Mediterranean at that
timcj and both remained too much at Malta himself, and
kept too many of his ships there. His judgment appears
to have been misled by the severe censure cast on his con-
duct at Navarin, in the king's speech at the opening of
parliament, in which his victory was termed ' an untoward
event ^.'

The destruction of the Othoman fleet made no change in
the determination of Sultan Mahmud. The ambassadors at
Constantinople again offered their mediation in vain, and, after
reiterated conferences, they quitted the Turkish capital in
December 1827.

The Greeks were allowed by the Allies to make every
effort in their power to regain possession of the territory
conquered by Reshid since the year 1825. But anarchy
had reached such a pitch that the Greek government was
powerless, and no army could be assembled. Sir Richard
Church resolved, however, to establish himself at some

* Sir Edward Codrington was recalled for misapprehending his instructions, and
for not disposing of his force so as to watch the movements of the Egyptian ships
in Greece from the 21st November, 1827, to 26th February, 1828. See the Earl
of Aberdeen's Letter, May, 1828, with P.S., 4th June, in Parliamentary Papers, and
Documents relating to the Recall 0/ Sir Edward Codrington in June, 1828, printed for
private distribution, p. 21. See also the Instructions addressed to the admirals,
annexed to the protocol of 15th October, 1827, particularly the separate Instruc-
tions relative to the Egyptian forces, in the Parliamentary Papers.

3 a FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk.V. Ch. I.

harbour on the coast of Acarnania with the small body of
men he could assemble, trusting to his being joined by the
armatoli in continental Greece, whom the hostile demonstra-
tions of the Allied powers might induce to throw off the
Turkish yoke. At Church's invitation^ Hastings sailed out of
the Gulf of Corinth in the daytime, exposing the Karteria
to the fire of the castles commanding the straits of Lepanto,
that he might transport the Greek troops to Acarnania.
When he reached Cape Papas, after having exposed his
ship to great danger in order to be in time at the rendezvous,
he was obliged to wait ten days before the generalissimo
made his appearance^. Church's movements had been re-
tarded by the news that Achmet Pasha was on his march
from Navarin to Patras with a reinforcement of two thousand
men. The army of the generalissimo did not exceed fourteen
hundred men, and it reached the coast in a state of destitution.
The embarkation of this phantom of a military force was
effected under the immediate superintendence of the officers
of the Karteria, without any assistance from those of
the army. The Greek troops were landed at Dragomestre,
where they remained inactive, drawing their supplies from
abroad.

Shortly after, another body of Greek troops crossed the
Gulf of Corinth, and occupied the site of a Hellenic fortress
on the mainland opposite the island of Trisognia, but
remained as inactive as the division at Dragomestre. The
peasantry showed themselves in general to be hostile to
the Greek soldiery, and kept the Turks well informed
concerning every movement of the land and naval forces of
Greece.

Hastings had no sooner transported the troops to Drago-
mestre than he resolved to attack the fort of Vasiladi, hoping
that its conquest would enable the Greek army to besiege
Mesolonghi. Ever since Lord Cochrane's failure in September,
he had sought in his mind the best means of gaining posses-
sion of this key of the lagoons of Mesolonghi. Vasiladi is
not more than one hundred yards in circumference, and its

^ Hastings lost two men killed and two wounded in passing the castles, but he
succeeded in sinking an Austrian brig laden with flour, which had just broken the
blockade, and was already under the guns of the batteries at Patras. Hastin-rs
passed the castles on the i8th of November, and Church arrived at Cape Papas
on the 28th. ^

HASTINGS TAKES VASILADI. 23

A.D. 1827.]

works rose only six feet above the water. The Karteria
could not approach nearer than a mile and a quarter. Two
attempts to throw shells into the place on different days
failed, but on the 29th December 1827, the day being
perfectly calm, the firing was renewed. The long guns of
the Karteria threw shells at an elevation of 23°, and the
third gun, pointed by Hastings himself, pitched its shell into
the Turkish powder-magazine \ The explosion rendered the
place untenable, and the boats of the Karteria arrived before
the Turks could offer any resistance. The bodies of twelve
men were found in the fort, and thirty-nine were taken
prisoners.

These prisoners were taken on board the Karteria, but
Hastings, who had been feeding his crew at his own expense
for some time, resolved to put them on shore as soon as
possible. He therefore informed the commandant of Vasiladi
that a monoxylon (canoe of the lagoon) would convey him to
Mesolonghi, to enable him to make arrangements for sending
off flat-bottomed boats to land the prisoners without loss of
time. The Mussulman, remembering the manner in which
both Turks and Greeks had generally disposed of their
captives, considered this to be a sentence to an honourable
death. He supposed that he was to be taken to the nearest
shore where he could receive burial after being shot, and
he thanked Hastings like a brave man, saying that he was
ready to meet death in any way his victor might order. The
conversation passed through an interpreter, and Hastings
being the last man on the quarter-deck to perceive that it
was supposed to be his intention to murder his prisoner, the
scene began at last to assume a comic aspect. The Turk
was conducted to the gangway, where, seeing only a
monoxylon, with one of his own men to receive him, he
became conscious of his misunderstanding. He then turned
back to Hastings, and uttered a few expressions of gratitude
in the most dignified and graceful manner. The rest of the
prisoners were landed on the following morning, and an
interchange of presents took place, the Turk sending some
fresh provisions on board the Karteria, and Hastings sending
back some coffee and sugar.

1 Memoir on the use of Shells, Hot Shot, and Carcass-Shells, from Ship Artillery, by
Frank Abney Hastings, published by Ridgway in 1828, p. 18,

24 . FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk. V. Ch. I.

Shortly after the battle of Navarin, Fabvier undertook an
expedition to Chios, which ended in total failure^. The
Greeks also made an effort to renew the war in Crete, but
without success ^.

After the arrival of Capodistrias in Greece, an attempt was
made to revive the spirit of the irregular troops, but even
the camp of Sir Richard Church continued to be a scene
of disorganization. The chieftains w^ere everywhere intent
on drawing as many rations as possible, and several of them
made illicit gains by selling the supplies, which were furnished
to Greece by Philhellenic societies, to men in the Turkish
service. Sir Richard Church, having imprudently given
passports to boats engaged in carrying on this trade in
provisions with the districts in the vicinity of Patras, occupied
by the troops of Ibrahim, became involved in an acrimonious
correspondence with Captain Hastings, who, as the naval
commander on the station, considered the proceeding a gross
violation of the rules of service, as well as of a naval
blockade^. It induced Hastings to get himself removed
from the station, in order to make room for somebody who
could agree better with the generalissimo. But in the month
of May, Capodistrias induced him to accept the command of
a small squadron in Western Greece, and he immediately
resumed his former activity. His career was soon cut short.
On the 25th of May 1828 he Avas mortally wounded in an
attack on Anatolikon, and expired on board the Karteria.
No man ever served a foreign cause more disinterestedly ^

* Fabvier left Methana in October, 1827, and raised the siege of Chios in March,
1828. Gordon, ii. 450-473.

^ The termination of the insurrection in Crete, and the gallant death of Hadji
Mikhali on the 28th May, 1828, are well recounted by Gordon, ii. 499.
^ See Appendix IV.

* The difficulties under which Hastings laboured during his career in Greece,
belong rather to his biography than to Greek history; but a few words may be
extracted from his correspondence to show how great they were. On the 7th
January, 1828, he wrote, 'I am full of misery. I have not a dollar. I owe my
people three months' pay, and five dollars a-head gratuity for the taking of
Vasiladi. I have no provisions, and I have lost an anchor and chain.' On the
16th he wrote again: 'It has become an established maxim to leave this vessel
without supplies. Dr. Goss (agent of the Swiss committees) has just been at
Zante, and has left three hundred dollars for the gunboat Helvetia, now serving
under my orders, but not one farthing, no provisions, and not even a single word
for me. Five months ago I was eight thousand dollars in advance for the pay of
my crew, and since that time I have only received a thousand dollars from the
naval chest of Lord Cochrane, and six hundred dollars from the military chest of
Sir Richard Church, and this last sum is not even sufficient to pay the expenses
incurred by the detention of our prizes to serve as transports for his army.' See

RUSSIA DECLARES WAR. 25

A.D. 1828.]

Before delivering up the command of the Mediterranean
fleet to his successor, Sir Pulteney Malcolm, Sir Edward
Codrington concluded a convention with Mohammed Ali
for the evacuation of the Morea by Ibrahim Pasha \ Before
that convention was executed, the alliance of the three powers
was threatened with dissolution. England and France wished
to preserve the sultan's throne, as well as to establish the
independence of Greece. Russia was even more eager to
destroy the Othoman empire than to save Greece, Nicholas
proposed to employ coercive measures by land, as the battle
of Navarin had produced no effect. He wished to occupy
Moldavia and Vallachia, and to invade Bulgaria, while the
English and French fleets forced the Dardanelles. England
and France rejected this proposal on the ground that it was
more likely to involve Europe in a general war than to
establish peace in the Levant. Russia then took advantage
of some arbitrary conduct on the part of the sultan's govern-
ment relative to the Black Sea trade, and of some violent
expressions in an imperial proclamation of the Porte, to
declare war with Turkey on the :i6th April 1828 2.

The alliance would have been dissolved had the Emperor
Nicholas not retracted so much of his separate action as
to consent to lay aside his character of a belligerent in the
Mediterranean, and engage to act in that sea only as a
member of the alliance, and within the limits traced by the
treaty of the 6th July 1827.

The death of George Canning deprived British counsels
of all their energy, and the measures adopted to coerce the
sultan were timid, desultory, and dilatory^. A bold and
prompt declaration of the concessions which the Allies were

' Biographical Sketch of Frank Abney Hastings ' in Blackwood's Magazine, October,
1845. Both Gordon and Tricoupi have done justice to the memory of Hastings,
who was as distinguished for sincerity and truth in private life, as for ability and
daring in war.

^ Parliamentary Papers, C, Convention of Alexandria, 6th August, 1828.

^ The Hatti-sherif, dated 20th December, 1827, announcing sentiments of bitter
animosity against Russia, is given in the ParliaiJientary Papers, annex D, No. 2, to
the protocol of the 12th March, 1828.

^ In the protocol of the 15th June, 1828, Lord Aberdeen, with the diplomatic
inaptitude which characterizes the proceedings of Great Britain at this period,
allowed the clauses to be inverted, and by this inversion the claim of Russia to
an exceptional position with regard to Turkey was in some measure ratified.
England, as protector of a Greek population in the Ionian Islands, ought to have
insisted on equal rights. Russia was not driven from the claim she set up to an
exceptional position until Sevastopol fell.

a6 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

[Bk. V. Ch. I.

determined to exact in favour of the Greeks, would have been
the most effectual mediation. When Russia declared war
with Turkey, England ought instantly to have recognized
the independence of Greece, and proceeded to carry the
treaty of the 6tli July into execution by force. As France
would in all probability have acted in the same manner,
the consent of the sultan would have been gained, and a
check might have been placed on the ambition of Russia by
occupying the Black Sea with an English and French fleet.

The weakness of the British cabinet allowed Russia to
assume a decided political superiority in the East. On the
Danube, where discipline gave her armies an immense ad-
vantage, and in the Black Sea, where the battle of Navarin
had left the sultan without a fleet, she acted as a belligerent.
But in the Mediterranean, where she was weak, and where
she could only carry on hostilities at an enormous expense,
she was allowed to conceal her weakness and economize her
treasure by acting as a mediator.

With all the diplomatic successes of the Russian cabinet,
the war of 1828-29 reflected little honour on the armies of
the Emperor Nicholas. Though Turkey was suffering from
a long series of rebellions and revolutions, which had in
turn desolated almost every province of the Othoman empire ;
though the sultan had destroyed the janissaries, and had not
yet formed a regular army ; though his fleet had been anni-
hilated at Navarin, and his finances ruined by the blockade
of the Dardanelles, still under all these disadvantages Sultan
Mahmud displayed an unexpected fertility of resources, and
the Mussulmans in European Turkey something of their
ancient energy. The desperate resistance the Russians met
with at Silistria and Varna covered the Turks with glory.
Two campaigns were necessary to enable the Russian armies
to advance to Adrianople ; and they reached that city so
weak in number that they did not venture to push on to
Constantinople and dictate peace to Sultan Mahmud before
the walls of his capital. Nevertheless, the victories of the
Russians in Asia, and their complete command of the Black
Sea, convinced the sultan that an attack on his capital \yould
not be long delayed ; and as Constantinople was inadequately
supplied with provisions, and no troops could be assembled
to fight a battle for its defence, Sultan Mahmud submitted to

FRENCH TROOPS IN THE MO RE A. 27

A.D. 1828.]

the terms of peace imposed on him. The treaty was signed
on the 14th September 1829^.

The army of Ibrahim Pasha suffered great privations during
the winter of 1827-38. Though no regular blockade of the
ports in his possession was maintained either by the Greeks
or the Allies, his army would have starved, or he would have
evacuated the Morea, had he not succeeded in obtaining large
supplies of provisions from the Ionian Islands, and particu-
larly from Zante. About fifty Ionian boats, entirely manned
by Greeks, were almost constantly employed for several
months in carrying provisions to Ibrahim's troops in Greece ^.
But even with all the assistance supplied by the lonians, the
price of provisions was high, and the sufferings of the soldiers
were great in the fortresses of Navarin, Modon, and Coron.
At last these sufferings became intolerable.

In June 1828 about two thousand Albanians in garrison at
Coron broke out into open mutiny, and after plundering the
place marched out to return home. They concluded a con-
vention with the Greek government, and Capodistrias ordered
a body of Greek troops to escort them to the Isthmus of
Corinth, from whence they marched along the coast of the
Morea to the castle of Rhion. On entering that fort they
murdered the governor, and after resting a few days crossed
the straits, marched hastily through the desolate plains of
Aetolia, and reached the frontier of Turkey in safety.

The utter exhaustion of Greece prevented the government
of Capodistrias from making any effort to expel the Egyptians
from the Peloponnesus. The direct agency of the Allies
was required to deliver the country.

The French government undertook to send an army to
expel Ibrahim, for the mutual jealousies of England and
Russia threatened otherwise to retard the pacification of
Greece indefinitely. On the 19th July 1828 a protocol was
signed, accepting the offer of France; and on the 30th August
an army of fourteen thousand men, under the command of
General Maison, landed at Petalidi in the Gulf of Coron,
The convention concluded by Codrington at Alexandria had
been ineffectual. It required the imposing force of the French

* 'Lsswr, An?iuaire Historique, 1829.

^ Codrington's despatch, in Documents relating to the Recall o/V. A. Codrington,
P- 35-

28 FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

general to compel Ibrahim to sign a new convention for the
immediate evacuation of the Morea. This convention was
signed on the 7th of September 1828, and the first division of
the Egyptian army, consisting of five thousand five hundred
men, sailed from Navarin on the i6th. Ibrahim Pasha fol-
lowed with the remainder on the 5th October ; but he refused
to deliver up the fortresses to the French, alleging that he
had found them occupied by Turkish garrisons on his arrival
in Greece, and that it was his duty to leave them in the
hands of the sultan's officers.

After Ibrahim's departure, the Turks refused to surrender
the fortresses, and General Maison indulged their pride by
allowing them to close the gates. The French troops then
planted their ladders, scaled the walls, and opened the gates
without any opposition. In this way Navarin, Modon, and
Coron fell into the hands of the French. But the castle of
Rhion offered some resistance, and it was found necessary to
lay siege to it in regular form. On the 30th October the
French batteries opened their fire, and the garrison surrendered
at discretion.

France thus gained the honour of delivering Greece from
the last of her conquerors, and she increased the debt of
gratitude by the admirable conduct of the French soldiers.
The fortresses surrendered by the Turks were in a ruinous
condition, and the streets were encumbered with filth accumu-
lated during seven years. All within the walls was a mass
of putridity. Malignant fevers and plague were endemic,
and had every year carried off numbers of the garrisons.
The French troops transformed themselves into an army
of pioneers ; and these pestilential mediaeval castles were
converted into habitable towns. The principal buildings were
repaired, the fortifications improved, the ditches of Modon
were purified, the citadel of Patras reconstructed, and a road
for wheeled carriages formed from Modon to Navarin. The
activity of the French troops exhibited how an army raised
by conscription ought to be employed in time of peace, in
order to prevent the labour of the men from being lost to
their country. But like most lessons that inculcated order
and system, the lesson was not studied by the rulers of
Greece.

CHAPTER II.

Presidency of Count Capodistrias, January 1828

TO October 1831.

Character of Count John Capodistrias. — First administrative measures as presi-
dent. — His opinions and policy. — Organization of the army. — Fabvier's
resignation. — Operations in Eastern and Western Greece. — Termination of
hostilities. — Civil administration. — Viaro Capodistrias. — Financial admini-
stration.— Judicial administration. — Public instruction. — National Assembly of
Argos. — Protocols of the three protecting powers. — Prince Leopold of Saxe-
Coburg sovereign of Greece. — His resignation. — Capodistrias becomes a
tyrant. — Hostility to the liberty of the press.— Tyranny of Capodistrias. —
Affair of Poros. — Destruction of the Greek fleet. — Sack of Poros. — Family of
Mavromichales. — Assassination of Capodistrias.

The struggle for independence unfolded some virtues in
the breasts of the Greeks which they were not previously-
supposed to possess. But a few years of a liberty that was
mingled with lawlessness could not be expected to efface
the effects of old habits and a vicious nurture. National
energies were awakened, but no national responsibility was
felt by individuals, so that the vices of modern Greek society
were in each class stronger than the popular virtues which
liberty was endeavouring to nourish. The mass of the people
had behaved well ; but the conduct of political and military
leaders, of primates and statesmen, had been selfish and
incapable. This was deliberately proclaimed by the National
Assembly of Troezene in 1837, when public opinion rejected
all the actors in the Revolution as unworthy of the nation's
confidence, and elected Count Capodistrias president of Greece
on the 14th April 1827 for a period of seven years ^.

^ Mamouka, vii. 132, and ix. 97. The decree is sometimes dated 3rd (15th)
April, which was Easter Sunday, It was adopted on Saturday, but signed by
many members on Sunday.

<^o PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk. V. Ch.II.

The decree which conferred the presidency on Capodistrias
declared that he was elected because he possessed a degree
of political experience which the Othoman domination had pre-
vented any native Greek from acquiring. Much was therefore
expected at his hands. It is the duty of the historian not
only to record his acts, but to explain why his performances
fell short of the expectations of the nation.

Capodistrias was fifty-one years of age when he arrived in
Greece. He was born at Corfu. His ancestors had received
a title of nobility from the Venetian republic, but the family
was not wealthy, and the young count, like many Corfiot
nobles, was sent to Italy to study medicine, in order to gain
his livelihood ^. In 1803 he commenced his political career,
being appointed secretary to the newly created republic of
the Ionian Islands; in 1807, when Napoleon I. annexed the
Ionian Islands to the French empire, he transferred his ser-
vices to Russia, where accident gained him the favour of the
Emperor Alexander I.; and in 1815 he was employed in the
negotiations relating to the treaty of Paris. At that time he
exerted himself, and was allowed to employ all the influence
of the Russian cabinet, to re-establish the Ionian republic ;
but Great Britain insisted on retaining possession of these
islands, and of holding complete command over their govern-
ment, as a check on Russian intrigues among the orthodox
population of the Othoman empire. Capodistrias was conse-
quently obliged to rest satisfied with the concession that the
Ionian Islands were to be formed into a separate, but not an
independent, state under the British crown, instead of being,
like Malta, declared a dependency of the British empire.
Capodistrias hoped that even this might be rendered sub-
servient to his ambitious schemes. He affected great contempt
for English dulness, and he hoped that English dullards might
be inveigled into favouring his views in the East. He never
forgave English ministers for foiling his diplomatic projects,
and the rancorous malevolence of his nature led him into
several grave political errors. He hated England like an
Ionian, but he indulged and exhibited his hatred in a way
that was very unlike a statesman.

The patriotism of Capodistrias was identified with orthodoxy

^ Kolettes, Glarakes, Zographos, Rhodios, and many other Greeks who acted
a prominent part during the Revohition, were doctors.

CHARACTER OF CAPODISTRIAS. 31

A.D.182S.]

and nationality, not with civil liberty and political indepen-
dence. To the social progress of the bulk of the population
in Western Europe during his own lifetime he paid little
attention, and this neglect prevented his observing the influ-
ence which public opinion already exercised on the general
conduct of most cabinets. He overrated the influence of
orthodoxy in the Othoman empire, and the power of Russia
in the international system of Europe. All this was quite
natural, for his experience of mankind had been acquired
either in the confined and corrupt society of Corfu, or in the
artificial atmosphere of Russian diplomacy.

Yet with all his defects and prejudices, Capodistrias was
immeasurably superior to every Greek whom the Revolution
had hitherto raised to power. He had many virtues and
great abilities. His conduct was firm and disinterested ; his
manners simple and dignified. His personal feelings were
warm, and, as a consequence of this virtue, they were some-
times so strong as to warp his judgment. He wanted the
equanimity and impartiality of mind and the elevation of soul
necessary to make a great man.

The father of Capodistrias was a bigoted aristocrat, and his
own youthful education was partly Venetian and partly Greek.
His instruction was not accurate, nor was his reading extensive,
so that, through the cosmopolite intellectual cultivation of his
later years, his provincial ideas often peeped out. He
generally used the French language in writing as well as
speaking. He was indeed unable to write Greek, though he
spoke it fluently. Italian was of course his mother tongue.
For a statesman he was far too loquacious ^ He allowed
everybody who approached him to perceive that on many
great political questions of importance in Greece, his opinions
were vague and unsettled. At times he spoke as a warm
panegyrist of Russian absolutism, and at times as an
enthusiastic admirer of American democracy.

Before accepting the presidency, Capodistrias visited Russia,
and obtained the approbation of the Emperor Nicholas. He
arrived in Greece in the month of January i8a8^ and found

^ General Pellion says, ' Tons ceux qui ont connu particulierement Capodistrias
savent que, parlant avec une etonnante facilite et parlant beaucoup, il se laissait
parfois aller a des indiscretions fort extraordinaires.' La Gre.ce et les Capodistrias
pendant V Occupatioii Fran^.aise de 1828 a 1834. Tricoupi, who was the president's
secretary, says, 'EA-aAet akXa 5iv eypacpfv 'EWrjVKXTi {i\. 247).

02 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V. Ch.ir.

the country in a state of anarchy. The government had been
compelled to wander from one place to another, and had
rendered itself contemptible wherever it appeared. In Novem-
ber i<S26 it fled from Nauplia, and soon after established itself
at Aegina. In 1827 it removed to Poros. In consequence of
a decree of the National Assembly of Troezene, it returned to
Nauplia, but its presence caused a civil war, and it went back
to Aegina.

/The first measures of Capodistrias were prompt and judi-
cious. He could not put an immediate stop to some of the
grossest abuses in the army, navy, and financial administra-
tion, without assuming dictatorial power. The necessity of
this dictatorship was admitted ; and the manner by which he
sought its ratification from the existing government and the
representative body, was generally approved. To give his
administrative changes a national sanction without creating
any check on his own power, he established a council of state,
called Panhellenion, consisting of twenty-seven members,
divided into three sections, for the consideration of admini-
strative, financial, and judicial business. Decrees of the
president were to be promulgated on reports of the whole
Panhellenion, or of the section to which the business of the
decree related. Capodistrias announced that he would con-
voke a national assembly in the month of April, and the
warmest partizans of representative institutions allowed that
the state of the country rendered an earlier convocation
impracticable V

But after making these concessions to public opinion,
Capodistrias began to display his aversion to any systematic
restraint on his arbitrary powers. He violated the provisions
of the constitution of Troezene without necessity, and by his
proceedings soon taught the liberal party to regard him as
the representative of force and not of law. Yet a clear per-
ception of his position and his interest would have shown him
that his power could have no firm foundation unless it was
based on the supremacy of right.

The opinions and the policy of Capodistrias during his
presidency are revealed by Count Bulgari, another Greek,
who was Russian minister in Greece, and who was understood

' Proclamation, dated 20th January, 1828. V^vik^^i 'E(pr]iJifpis, 25th January,
1828.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESIDENT. 33

A.D. 1828.]

to echo the president's sentiments, even if he did not, as was
i generally reported, write under his dictation. In a memoir on
the state of Greece in 1828, the views of Capodistrias are
thus stated : ' It would be a strange delusion to believe
seriously in the possibility of organizing any government
whatever in Greece upon purely constitutional principles,
which require a general tendency of the people to political
forms, as well as elements of civilization which exist only in
a few individuals. The president of Greece thought that it
was the duty of the three powers to destroy the Greek Revo-
; lution by establishing a monarchical government, in order to
put an end to the scandalous and sanguinary scenes which
made humanity shudder^.' These sentiments were repeated
by the president both to foreigners and Greeks, and showed
on many occasions his want of sympathy with the cause of
national independence, as well as his aversion to political
liberty. His language constantly insinuated, though he
perhaps never directly asserted, that he was the only fit
sovereign for Greece. He harped incessantly on the theme,
that all the men previously engaged in public business were
demoralized either by the Turkish yoke, or by revolutionary
anarchy ; and he asserted that no permanent improvement
could take place in the condition of the Greeks until the
living generation had passed away. He called the primates,
Christian Turks ; the military chiefs, robbers ; the men of
letters, fools ; and the Phanariots, children of Satan ; and he
habitually concluded such diatribes by adding, that the good
of the suffering people required that he should be allowed to
govern with absolute power. And perhaps nothing better
could have happened to Greece, had it been possible for him
to forget that he was a Corfiot, and that he had two or three
stupid brothers at Corfu ^.

/The presidency of Capodistrias lasted more than three
years and a half. It was not, therefore^ want of time which
prevented his laying the foundations of an administrative
system and a judicial organization. The Greeks possessed
local institutions of great administrative value ; but instead
of making use of these institutions, he wasted much time in
striving to undermine them. He argued that no political

1 Parliamentary Papers — Protocol of 22nd March, 1829, enclosure in annex C.
"^ Compare Tricoupi, iv, 285.

VOL. VII. D

54 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk. V. Ch. II.

good could rest on a democratic foundation. To the reign
of law he had a passionate antipathy. He sometimes spoke
of the law as a kind of personal enemy to his dictatorship.
He insisted that, to govern Greece well, his power must be
exercised without limit or restraint, and that the law which
subjected his arbitrary authority to systematic rules was in
some degree a mere constitutional delusion. He forgot that
he required the assistance of the law to prevent his own
creatures from robbing him of the power he had assumed.
Unfortunately for Greece, Capodistrias was a diplomatist and
not a statesman. His plans of government were vaguely
sketched in provisional laws. He never framed a precise code
of administrative procedure, and, as a natural consequence
of the provisional nature of his government, his ordinances
were nullified by the agents charged to carry them into
execution. While he ridiculed the liberal theories of the
constitutions of Epidaurus and Troezene, he did not perceive
that his own acts were those of an administrative sciolist.

The president's attention was early directed to the anarchy
that prevailed in the military forces of Greece. The extor-
tions of the soldiery were ruining all those districts into which
the Egyptians had not penetrated. The agricultural popula-
tion was in danger of extermination. The armed men Vt^ho
extorted pay and provisions from the country were now the
followers of military chiefs, not the soldiers of the Greek
government. In order to form an army, it was necessary to |
break the connection between the soldiers and their leaders,
and to form corps in which both the inferior and superior
officers should depend directly on the president for their
authority, and in which the soldiers should look to him for their
pay, subsistence, reward, and punishment. Of military affairs
Capodistrias w^as utterly ignorant, and, as usual, he allowed
his suspicious nature to neutralize the effect of his sagacity.
From excessive jealousy of his personal authority he refused
to employ experienced soldiers in organizing his army, and he
made a vain attempt to direct the enterprise himself.

Demetrius Hypsilantes had proved his inability for or-
ganizing an army, and Sir Richard Church had never been
able to introduce any discipline in his camps. Capodistrias
appointed the first to command an army destined to reconquer
Eastern Greece, and left the second at the head of the

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY. o^$

A.D.I 8 28.]

disorganized bands in Western Greece, Fabvier, who had
proved himself a good disciplinarian, and had formed regular
battalions under circumstances of great difficulty, was neg-
lected and driven from Greece. Capodistrias had the weakness
or the misfortune to name always the wrong man for every
important place. His enemies accused him of fearing the
right man in any office.

The consequence of the unmilitary president attempting
to regulate the details of military organization, was that
the Greek army remained without either order or discipline.
A few reforms were introduced, tending to enable the
president to know how many men Greece had in the field,
and to diminish the frauds committed in the distribution of
rations ; and this introduction of a regular system of mustering,
paying, and provisioning the troops by the central government
deserves praise, though it was a very small step towards the
formation of a Greek army.

The circumstances in which the Greek soldiery were placed
at this epoch of the Revolution afforded great facilities for
the introduction of military discipline, and for the formation
of an efficient national army of veteran troops. The soldiers
had eaten up the substance of the agricultural population,
and were themselves in danger of starvation. Capodistrias,
holding in his hands the absolute disposal of all the supplies
from abroad on which the troops were dependent for pay
and rations, could command their obedience to any terms
he might impose. The most powerful chieftains only main-
tained a few followers by seizing the public revenues. They
were hated by the people for their extortions, envied by
the mass of the soldiery for the benefits they conferred on
a few, and in open hostility with the public interests. The
arrival of Capodistrias annihilated their usurped power, and
the chieftains who kept possession of the fortresses of Corinth,
Nauplia, and Monemvasia, in defiance of the preceding
government, were compelled to surrender those places into his
hands.

A camp was formed at Troezene, to which all the troops
of continental Greece in the Morea were summoned, in order
that they might receive their new organization. The president
appeared and promulgated his scheme for the formation of a
national army. About eight thousand men, consisting in

D 2

q6 presidency of capodistrias.

^ [Bk.V.Ch.II.

great part of the armatoH who had remained faithful to the
Greek cause, were divided into eight regiments or chiharchies.
The chiharchs or colonels, and the other officers of these
regiments, were named by the president. Paymasters were
also appointed, and a regular commissariat formed, so that
an end was put to the previous system of trading in rations.
The facility with which every reform was adopted by the
soldiers, and their alacrity in preferring the position of
government troops to that of personal followers of individual
chieftains, proved that the president might easily have effected
much more than he attempted.

The new regiments were inspected by the president at
Troezene in February 1828. The men had the aspect of
veteran soldiers ; still the review presented a very unmilitary
spectacle. The chiliarchies were only distinguished by being
separate groups of companies. The different companies were
ranged in various forms and figures, according to the fancies
of their captains — some were spun out in single files, some
were drawn up four deep, some seemed to form circles, and
some attempted to form squares. At last the whole army
was ranged in lines, straggling in disorder, and undulating
in unmeaning restlessness. The review, if such a spectacle
can be called by a military term, was a parade for the pur-
pose of enabling the inexperienced eye of the president to
count the companies and examine the men of whom they
were composed.

At a later period Capodistrias attempted to carry his
organization a step farther. In the autumn of 1829, after
the termination of the war against the Turks in continental
Greece, he again mustered the chiliarchies at Salamis. His
military counsellor was Colonel Gerard, a French officer,
whom he had appointed inspector of the Greek army. The
troops present did not exceed five thousand men, who were
divided into twenty battalions, and each battalion was
composed of four companies. The commanders of the new
battalions were called taxiarchs, and the chiliarchs were
ranked as generals. Paymasters were appointed to each
battalion, and commanders were deprived of all control over
the military chests. Had Capodistrias, when he introduced
this new organization, settled the supernumerary officers who
were willing to become agriculturists on national lands, he

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY. 37

A.D. 1828.]

might have broken up the system of farming the revenues
of the country to military men, which the chieftains had
introduced, and saved Greece from the calamity of nourishing
in her breast a second generation of these vipers.

Demetrius Hypsilantes was appointed to command the
chiliarchies formed at Troezene, and he established a camp
at Megara. But though he was at the head of eight thousand
armatoli, and the Turks had not four thousand men in
Eastern Greece, he remained for seven months in utter
idleness. No attempt was made to drill the men, to instruct
the companies in the manoeuvres of light infantry, nor to
teach the chiliarchies the tactics of an army. Capodistrias
justly reproached Hypsilantes with his inactivity and in-
capacity ; but he forgot that it was his own duty to frame
systematic regulations for the discipline of the whole Greek
army, and to transmit both to Hypsilantes and Church precise
orders to carry these regulations into effect.

Amidst the military reforms of Capodistrias he neglected
the regular troops. Yet he was well aware that this body
formed the only corps on which the government could always
rely. Indeed this fact contains the true explanation of his
neglect. The regular corps was a body that from its per-
manent nature would identify itself with the executive
government of Greece. The semi-organized battalions of
regulars were held in direct dependence on the personal
will and favour of Count Capodistrias. The president wished
everything in Greece to be provisional until he should be
appointed president for life, or sovereign of the country. But
that he might have it in his power to strengthen the regular
corps when he required its services, he revived the law of
conscription passed by the Greek government in 1825. The
pay of Fabvier's corps had fallen ten months into arrear after
the unfortunate expedition to Chios. Instead of paying these
arrears and retaining Fabvier's veterans under arms, he
allowed them to disband themselves. These men were
attached to Fabvier, and Capodistrias was jealous of Fabvier's
influence. But as it was necessary to gain credit in Western
Europe for a wish to form a regular army, the president
pretended that it was impossible to obtain men without the
conscription, and he commenced enforcing the law in some
of the islands of the Archipelago. In this case his conduct

38 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V. Chll.

was marked by excessive duplicity, for he knew well that |||
it would have been more economical to retain the veterans
of the regular corps by paying the ten months' arrears which
were due to them, than to enrol new recruits ; and he was not
insensible to the folly of withdrawing active labourers from
the cultivation of the soil in the only part of Greece where
agriculture was pursued in security and with profit. As soon
as Fabvier perceived that the military plans of the president
were subordinated to personal schemes of ambition, he resigned
his command, as has been already mentioned, and quitted
Greece in May 1828 ^

Hypsilantes, as has been said, passed the summer of 1828
at Megara. The Russian war compelled Reshid Pasha to
leave continental Greece and Epirus almost destitute of
troops, and he was threatened with an insurrection of the
Albanian chieftains in his own pashalik of Joannina. In
autumn the Greeks advanced to Lombotina, famous for its
apples, and drove the Turks into Lepanto. Hypsilantes
about the same time occupied Boeotia and Phocis, and on
the 29th of November the Turks in Salona capitulated,
and the capitulation was faithfully observed by the Greeks.
On the 5th of December Karpenisi was evacuated. A few
insignificant skirmishes took place during the winter. The
Turks were too weak to attempt anything, and the anarchy
that still prevailed among the Greek chiefs prevented the
numerical superiority of the Greek forces from being
available '^.

The army of Western Greece was not more active than

* The law of conscription was put in operation by a circular addressed to
the municipalities; ViviKj] "E<pi]fj.(pls, 25th April, 1828; yet in March, 1830, the
number of Capodistrias' regulars only amounted to two thousand two hundred
and fifty.

^ Two examples of the condition of the Greek army may be cited : — ' Dr. Howe
gave 1 2,000 lb. of beans to the Megarians to sow their fields. To-day a deputa-
tion informed him that the troops who had returned to Megara were cutting down
all the young plants for salad, and the officers were feeding their horses on them.
They solicited Howe to use his influence with the president to prevent the entire
destruction of their crop.' MS. Journal, 20th February, 1829. Captain Hane
reports that a regular trade in provisions was carried on by some men with the
Turks, and the supplies were drawn from Sir Richard Church's camp. Fabricius,
who commanded the Helvetia, stopped a vessel laden with provisions attempting
to reach Prevesa, and as she had a passport signed by the generalissimo, he sent
her to Dragomestre, where Sir Richard Church released her without waiting for
a decision of the Admiralty Court. Hastings, on returning from Western Greece
in 1828, complained of similar conduct. He wrote: 'To conciliate the unprin-
cipled chieftains, Church ruins the army.'

OPERATIONS IN WESTERN GREECE. 39

A.D. 1829.]

that of Eastern during the summer of 1828. Capodistrias
visited the camp of Sir Richard Church near Mytika, and
he declared that, on inspecting the troops in Acarnania, he
found less order than in those he had reviewed at Troezene.
This visit gave the president a very unfavourable opinion
of the generalissimo's talents for organization. In September
the Greeks advanced to the Gulf of Arta, and occupied
Loutraki, where they gained possession of a few boats.
Capodistrias named Pasano, a Corsican adventurer, to succeed
Hastings as commander of the naval forces in Western
Greece. Pasano made an unsuccessful attempt to force the
passage into the Gulf of Arta, but some of the Greek officers
under his command, considering that he had shown both
cowardice and incapacity in the affair, renewed the enterprise
without his order, and passed gallantly under the batteries of
Prevesa^. This exploit secured to the Greeks the command
of the Gulf of Arta. Pasano was recalled, and Admiral
Kriezes, a Hydriot officer of ability and courage, succeeded
him. The town of Vonitza, a ruinous spot; was occupied
by the Greek troops on the 27th December 1828 ; but the
almost defenceless Venetian castle did not capitulate until
the 17th March 1829. The passes of Makronoros were
occupied in April.

Capodistrias, who had blamed both Hypsilantes and
Church for incapacity, now astonished the world by making
his brother Agostino a general ^.

Count Agostino Capodistrias, besides not being a military
man, was really little better than a fool ; yet the president,
blinded by fraternal affection, named this miserable creature
his plenipotentiary in Western Greece, and empowered him
to direct all military and civil business. The plenipotentiary
arrived in the Hellas. On the 30th April 1829, the garrison
of Naupaktos (Lepanto) capitulated, and was transported to
Prevesa. On the 14th May, Mesolonghi and Anatolikon
were evacuated by the Turks.

Reshid Pasha escaped the mortification of witnessing the
loss of all his conquests in Greece. His prudence and
valour were rewarded with the rank of grand-vizier, and he

^ The Greeks lost one killed and three wounded.

^ Tricoupi says, 'O icvPepvrjTjjs k^kixcptro rov dpxt'^i'pa.TTjyov ical tov arpaTapxqv
ws dva^iovs t^s viI^tjXtjs Oiotws tojv, iv, 342.

40 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch.II.

qviitted Joannina to assume the command of the Othoman

army at Shumla before the Turks evacuated continental

Greece.

The war terminated in 1829. The Alhed powers fixed
the frontier of Greece by a protocol in the month of March.
Yet the Turks would not yield possession of the places they
still held in Eastern Greece, and some skirmishes ensued, in
which a great deal of powder was wasted, and very little
blood was shed ^ A body of Albanians, under Asian Bey,
marched from Zeituni by Thermopylae, Livadea, and Thebes,
and reached Athens without encountering opposition. After
leaving a small and select garrison in the Acropolis, Asian
Bey collected all the Turks in Attica and Boeotia, and
commenced his retreat. But on arriving at the pass of
Petra, between Thebes and Livadea, he found a body of
Greek troops strongly posted to dispute the passage. The
Turks, unable to advance, concluded a capitulation on the
25th of September 1829, by which they engaged to evacuate
all Eastern Greece, except the Acropolis of Athens and the
fort of Karababa on the Euripus. Thus Prince Demetrius
Hypsilantes had the honour of terminating the war which his
brother had commenced on the banks of the Pruth ; and
this action cherished in his mind the delusion that, as the
representative of his brother Alexander, he was the right
sovereign for Greece. As a military man, he was deficient in
tactical knowledge and strategic capacity ; as a statesman,
he w^as utterly destitute of judgment ; but his personal
courage and private virtues command respect.

Capodistrias did not seek to establish his civil administra-
tion on any organized system. He found the Greeks enjoying
a greater degree of individual liberty, and exercising in their
municipalities more independent political action than he
had supposed existed on the continent of Europe ; for his
opinions concerning the internal administration of Switzerland,
though he had resided there for some time, and laboured as
a Russian diplomatist to secure its existence as an inde-
pendent state, were very crude. In Greece he mistook the
liberty he found existing for the cause of the anarchy that
desolated the country, and this anarchy he considered to be a

* Tricoupi, iv. 365 : IloAX?) nvpoKoyis tKa-q, dA\' oXiyov afjua hx^&H-

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. 41

A.T). 1829.]

necessary consequence of a municipal system, which in his
opinion, estabhshed the sovereignty of the people. He
determined to eradicate every germ of a power which
appeared to him to have transfused the elements of revolu-
tionary action into the frame of society ; and he began to
weaken the municipalities by converting the demogeronts
into agents of the executive authority. To eradicate revolu-
tionary principles, he created a governmental police, and
rendered its members responsible to him alone for the
exercise of their powers. His plan of government was very
simple, but really impracticable. He retained in his own
hands the absolute direction of every branch of the public
administration, declaring that nothing could be permanently
settled concerning the internal organization of the country
until the three powers had decided its external position as
an independent state. The real object was to render his ser-
vices indispensable either as prime minister, hospodar, prince,
or^king.

/ Capodistrias divided the Morea into seven provinces, and
tW islands into six. These provinces were governed pro-
visionally by thirteen extraordinary commissioners, to whom
he entrusted great and ill-defined authority^. Immemorial
usages, and old as well as new political institutions, were
suspended, and the despotism of these Greek pashas was
restrained by no published instructions, no fixed forms of
proceeding, and no judicial authority, j

The evil effects of arbitrary power jyei'e soon visible. Ibra-
him's conquests, the financial corruption of Konduriottes'
government, and the military anarchy that succeeded, had
paralyzed the action of the municipalities. Instead of re-
moving abuses and restoring their vigour, they were robbed
of all independent action, even in the direction of their local
affairs. The commissioners of Capodistrias presided at the
election of new demogeronts ; and these newly-elected muni-
cipal magistrates were converted into subordinate agents of
the president's Minister of the Interior. By this change in
the local institutions of Greece, the way was prepared for
their complete nullification by the Bavarians.

The operation of Capodistrias' government may be ex-

* reri/c^ 'E(l>rifxepis, 1 8th and 21st April, 1828.

42 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch. II.

cmplificd by citing the proceedings of Viaro Capodistrias,
who was considered the most energetic of the extraordinary
commissioners, and who governed the Western Sporades, which
was the most important province in the islands. Viaro was
the president's elder brother : he was a Corfiot lawyer, and in
him the confined experience gained in a corrupt semi-Venetian
society was not counteracted by good sense and a benevolent
heart : he was sulky, obstinate, and insolent. Capodistrias
cannot have been entirely blind to his brother's defects, for
he drove him away from Russia, though he invited him to
Greece.

While Capodistrias was a favourite minister of the Emperor
Alexander, Viaro visited Russia, where he met with a very
kind reception. For a moment the Corfiot lawyer indulged
in visions of wealth and splendour, which were very soon
dispelled by his diplomatic brother. One evening, after
Capodistrias had waited on some members of the imperial
family, he came back to Viaro, and addressed him to the
following purport : ' I have seen the emperor to-day, and
I have just quitted several members of the imperial family.
The emperor is ready to appoint you to an honourable
place in his service ; but I must tell you beforehand, that
if you accept the offer, I shall immediately resign my place
and return to Corfu. We are foreigners, and we could not
both long retain office here. It is for you to decide which of
us ought to remain ^.' Viaro believed that he was capable
of ruhng an empire, but he felt that he could not instantly
move with an unembarrassed step among the statesmen and
princes of Russia if deprived of his brother's countenance.
He therefore returned to Corfu.

A more confined sphere of action was opened to him in
1828, but he was entrusted with absolute power over the
islands of Hydra, Spetzas, Poros, and Aegina. The elevation
was sufficient to turn his head. He arrogated to himself
both legislative and judicial, as well as merely administrative,
authority, within the bounds of his province, and he exercised
the sovereign power he assumed in a very capricious manner.
In virtue of his legislative power he fixed the rate of interest,
and in virtue of his judicial he inflicted the penalty of

^ This well-known anecdote will be found in Memoires Biographiques Historiques
sur le Comte Jean Capodistrias, by A. Papadopoulos Vretos, vol. i. p. 37.

VIARO CAPODISTRIAS. 43

A.D. 1S29.]

confiscation for the violation of this provincial law. He
arrested Greek citizens, and retained them in prison, without
accusing them of any offence except dissatisfaction with his
conduct. He appointed demogeronts without even going
through the formality of a popular election ; he superseded
those elected by the people whenever they opposed his
measures, and replaced them by his own nominees. He
named judges without any warrant from the president ; and
when a primate of Livadea refused to obey a decision of
these judges, he sent the primate to prison. He imposed
taxes when he was in want of money, without any vote
of the municipalities, or any authority from the central
government. He ordered private letters to be stopped and
opened ; and he carried his imprudence and folly so far as
to break open and read despatches addressed to the En-
glish naval officer on the station, though he was assured
by Mr. Gropius, the Austrian consul, that these despatches
Avere official orders passing from one ship on the station
to another, and which ought not to be passed through the
health-office.

The friends of Capodistrias declared that many of the
arbitrary acts of Viaro's administration proceeded from the
misconduct of his subordinates. The inhabitants of Aegina,
believing this, appealed to the sense of justice of their
extraordinary commissioner. They transmitted to him a
petition complaining of the oppressive and corrupt conduct
of the health-officer he had appointed. Viaro received the
document at Poros, and immediately ordered his secretary,
who remained at Aegina, to call a meeting of the inhabitants
to receive his answer. When the Aeginetans were assembled,
the secretary produced the petition, and asked them if that
was the paper they had signed and transmitted to Viaro.
They replied that it was. The secretary then announced to
them that they were convoked to see their petition burned by
order of Count Viaro Capodistrias, extraordinary commis-
sioner of the president of Greece in the Western Sporades ;
and when the document was consumed, they were told that
they had received a milder reply than they merited.

The acts of Viaro rendered him unpopular ; his proclama-
tions rendered him ridiculous. The Hydriots resisted some
of his quarantine regulations, and when the quarantine to

44 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V. Ch.II.

which he had subjected them expired, he addressed them
thus — ' Place your confidence in the providence of God and
the forethought of your government ; but beware of examining
the acts or criticising the conduct of your rulers, for you may
be led into error, and error may bring down calamity on your
heads.'

The folly of Agostino, and the tyranny of Viaro, would
have ruined the president without the assistance of any
other Corfiots, but he brought over Mustoxidi, a literary man
of some merit, and Gennatas, a lawyer in good practice, to
aid in exciting the jealousy of the Greeks, who had borne an
active part in the Revolution, and considered themselves
entitled to all the spoils of official employment.

Public opinion generally verifies the value of modern
governments by the touchstone of finance. The presidency
of Capodistrias was not re'markable either for the ability or
the honesty of its financial administration. He found the
collection and expenditure of the public revenues a mass
of fraud and peculation. His overweening self-sufificiency
prompted him to assume the whole task of cleansing the
Augean stable, and he retained the supreme direction of the
finance department in his own hands. His hostility to all
constitutional forms prevented him from making use of
publicity as a means of controlling subordinate and distant
officials, over whose proceedings he could exercise no direct
inspection. His admiration of the autocratic system of
administration blinded him to the impossibility of applying
it without a well-organized body of officials. His want of
practical acquaintance with the details of financial business
rendered all his schemes for reforming abuses unavailing ;
and, as in every other department, his extreme jealousy pre-
vented him from employing men who possessed the practical
knowledge in which he was deficient. The general conduct
of the finance department was entrusted to a board composed
of three members. But they were men who possessed little
knowledge beyond that of experienced accountants. No
payments were made for the service of any ministerial de-
partment without an order under the president's sign-
manual. He reserved to himself the task of framing a
new financial system for Greece, The consequence of this
determination to do everything was, that he neither effected

FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 45

A.D. 1829.]

any improvement, nor allowed others to propose any extensive
reform.

The principal branch of the Greek revenues was the tenth
of the annual produce of all cultivated land, and an additional
rent of fifteen per cent, on all Turkish property which had
been declared national \ The Othoman system of farming
the taxes was adhered to, and the revolutionary practice of
letting large districts to primates and military chiefs, instead
of committing the collection to the municipal authorities.

Capodistrias did not restrain the abuses of the farmers of
the tenths^. He even employed the farming system as a
means of strengthening his power. He favoured the chieftains
whom he considered to be his personal partizans, and increased
their influence by allowing them to farm large districts. By
this means they maintained large bodies of military followers
as tax-collectors, and the president considered these men as
more completely under his personal influence than the soldiers
of the government. This policy often led him to sacrifice
national advantages to tortuous schemes of personal ambition.

The receipts of the year 1829 exceeded 4,000,000 drachms,
and the expense of three thousand regular troops amounted
to only about 1,000,000. The sum of 3,000,000 would have
been amply sufficient to maintain an army of five thousand
regulars, with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery. Now,
as the expenditure of the civil government was only estimated
at 300,000 drachms, it is evident that an able and honest
administration might have laid the foundations of order in the
army, and secured an impartial administration of justice by
appointing well-paid judges. A man less occupied with
diplomatic intrigues, Holy-Alliance policy, and foreign pro-
tocols, than Capodistrias, even though of far inferior ability,
might, by giving his principal attention to the improvement

^ The Greek revenues at this time were derived from the following sources : —

1°. The tenth of cultivated land, and 25 per cent, on national property.

2°. The custom duties.

3°. The farming of salt-works and fisheries.

4°. Cattle-tax.

5°. Duties on houses, shops, and mills, on passports, and from quarantines.
^ The island of Aegina enjoyed more direct protection from Capodistrias than
any part of Greece, yet the proprietors were often forced to leave ripe figs and
grapes ungathered until they bribed the farmer of the ta.xes for permission to
gather them. Cases often occurred in which a part of the crop was lost, because
the tax-gatherer delayed visiting any garden of which the proprietor refused to pay
the composition which was demanded.

46 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V. Ch.II.

of the condition of the agricultural population, have soon
raised Greece to a flourishing position, and secured to himself
a great historic name.

The administration of the customs was greatly improved.
Under the inspection of Colonel Heideck, those of the Gulf of
Argolis were raised from 20,000 to 336,000 drachms annually,
without any additional duties being imposed, and the revenue
derived from the port of Syra was also greatly increased.

A new monetary system was introduced, but it was unfor-
tunately based on an erroneous theory, and carried into
execution with a defective assay. The monetary relations of
Greece indicated that the currency either of France or Austria
ought to have been adopted as the standard of the Greek
coinage, and there were strong theoretic and practical reasons
for preferring the franc as the unit. Capodistrias, influenced
by old commercial associations of Levant merchants, struck
a new coin called a phoenix (which was afterwards termed a
drachma by the Bavarian regency), as the unit of the Greek
monetary system ; but in place of making it equal in value to
a franc, he made it one-sixth of the metallic value of a Spanish
pillar dollar. Now, as the Spanish pillar dollar was a coin
circulating in the Levant for commercial purposes at an agio,
it was clearly an error to base the monetary system on such
a standard. A defective assay also caused an error in the
metallic value of the coinage issued by Capodistrias, and the
phoenix was issued in small quantity.

A national bank was also established in name, but the
title was intended to deceive Western Europe, not to facilitate
banking operations in Greece. The so-called national bank
was nothing more than a loan, opened at first by voluntary
subscription. The misapplication of the name caused distrust
in a mercantile society like that of Greece ; and the president,
finding his persuasion insufficient to induce many wealthy
Greeks to deposit money in the national bank, used his
political power to compel them to advance mor^ey to it.
Government took possession of all the sums received ; and
before two months elapsed, Capodistrias himself candidly
admitted to Captain Hastings that for the time the national
bank was only a forced loan.

At a later period the president proposed an excellent finan-
cial measure to the national assembly of Argos, but, like too

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 47

A.D. 1829.]

many of his good intentions, it was never carried into execu-
tion. All public accounts were ordered to be submitted to
the supervision of a court of control at the end of every
quarter.

The absence of any systematic administration of justice
was the cause of great national demoralization during the
course of the Greek Revolution. Honest men ruined them-
selves by fulfilling their obligations ; dishonest men repudiated
even those pecuniary debts which they could have paid without
inconvenience. To the people it appeared that honesty was
not the best policy in pecuniary affairs, and the general ten-
dency to financial dishonesty is, as the preceding pages have
shown, deeply marked on the history of the Greeks. When
Capodistrias arrived, the insecurity of life and property among
the agricultural classes threatened the dissolution of society,
and the Greeks seemed in danger of becoming a nation of
traders in towns and cities like the Jews. The desire to see
the supremacy of justice firmly established was one cause of
the election of Capodistrias to the presidency, and of the
fervour with which he was welcomed on his arrival. He was
selected by the almost unanimous voice of his countrymen
as the only Greek capable of putting an end to the reign of
injustice. Nothing in his political career exhibits his defi-
ciencies as a statesman so strikingly as his failure to appreciate
the value of a firm and impartial administration of justice.
The career of a legislator lay before him. Had he seized the
sword of justice and walked boldly forward, he would have
soon marched at the head of the Greek nation ; and courts,
cabinets, and protocols would have found some difiiculty in
contesting his right to be the ruler of Greece. But he loved
power more than justice ; and yet by not loving justice he lost
his hold on power.

The indifference of Capodistrias to the establishment of
legal tribunals can only be explained by his love of absolute
power. Soon after his arrival, he created a few justices and
some minor courts to decide trifling questions. But no legal
tribunals were established, and his extraordinary commissioners
were allowed to exercise an exceptional and extensive legal
jurisdiction, of which his brother Viaro took every possible
advantage, and used it with unrestricted licence. A decree
organizing civil and criminal tribunals, and establishing a

48 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk. V. Ch. II.

court of review, at last appeared on the 27th August 1830^.
Capodistrias attempted to excuse his delay by declaring that
he had avoided doing anything to circumscribe the authority
of the future sovereign of Greece — a futile assertion ; for he
well knew that by prolonging anarchy he increased the
difficulties in the way of establishing order. As long as
Capodistrias had any prospect of retaining the government
of Greece in his own hands, he wished to retain all judiciary
authority in direct subordination to the executive, as in
Russia ; and he was adverse to the promulgation of fixed
rules of procedure, and to the constitution of independent
courts of law. The Corfiot lawyer, Gennatas, whom he ap--
pointed minister of justice, and to whom he entrusted the task
of preparing the judicial organization, was the instrument of
his views rather from defective judgment than from malevolent
intentions. The assembly of Argos declared that the pre-
sident ought to render the judges irremovable, but neither
Capodistrias nor Gennatas were of this opinion ^ This good
advice was rejected by Capodistrias, as it has been for more
than a quarter of a century by King Otho. But Capodistrias,
in the true spirit of despotism, conferred arbitrary powers on
the police authorities, and created exceptional tribunals to
judge political offences^.

/ Capodistrias made a great show of promoting education,
fbut he did very little for facilitating public instruction, and
nothing for improving the intellectual condition of the Greek
clergy. Yet he affected to be a friend to knowledge, and he
was sincerely devout. Political intrigue seems to have occu-
pied all his thoughts, absorbed his time, and inspired all his
actions during his presidency.

He built an immense orphan asylum at Aegina, which was
filled with children delivered from slavery and brought back
from Egypt. It was from no fault of Capodistrias, perhaps,
but the internal management of this establishment was ill-
regulated, and it did not prosper. The president ordered
many schoolhouses to be built in different parts of Greece, but
he had shown so little forethought in the business, that many

Supplement to No. 73 of the V^vik^ 'E^rj/xfois, loth September, 1830.
^ iJecrees of the Assembly of Argos, No. 11, art. 7, 22nd June, 1829.
bee noKiTLKT) nai 'EyK\7]fxaTiicTi AiadtKaGia, published at Aegina in 1830, pp. 11

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF ARGOS. 49

,\.D. 1829.]

vere soon converted into barracks for soldiers. In the towns,
government did very little to promote public education, and
:he governors named by the president more than once pre-
sented teachers from opening private schools. The education
3f the clergy was utterly neglected, and a race of priests
remained, whose ignorance was a disgrace to the Orthodox
Church, and who increased the national corruption. Capo-
distrias succeeded in deceiving the Liberals in France,
Germany, and Switzerland, into a belief that he was labouring
sincerely to improve public instruction, but his personal views
are exemplified by two acts. He ordered the professor of
Greek literature at Aegina not to read the Gorgias of Plato
with his pupils, and he made war on the press at Nauplia ^

The arbitrary conduct of the president created a constitu-
tional opposition to his administration, and he found himself
obliged to convoke a national assembly, in order to give a
sanction to his dictatorial power. His popularity with the
people in the Morea was very great, for his government had
delivered them from the Egyptians, and established some
better guarantees for the protection of life and property than
had previously existed. In a freely elected chamber of
ideputies he would have been sure of a large majority, but he
wished to silence all opposition, and he adopted many violent
land illegal measures to exclude every man whom he deemed
a Liberal. In a number of districts where the character of
his opponents seemed likely to insure their election, he pro-
posed himself as a candidate ; and after securing his own
election, it was generally not difficult to obtain the nomination
of one of his own partizans in his place.

The national assembly of Argos was opened by Capodis-
trias in a Russian uniform on the 23rd July 1829. The
assembly ratified everything the president had done, and
entrusted him with all the additional power he desired. Only
the laws which he approved and recommended were passed.
He did not venture to obtain his nomination to the presidency
for life, for it would have been imprudent to take so important
a step in the settlement of the government of Greece without
the previous consent of the three Allied powers. But he ob-
tained an act of the assembly, declaring that the decisions of

' Thiersch, De r£iat actuel de la Grece, i. 22 and 54; Tricoupi, iv. 291.
VOL. VII. E

50 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk. V. Ch. II, j

the conferences of London should not be held to be binding'
on Greece until they were ratified by the Greek legislature ^
He trusted to his own diplomatic skill for rendering this
law subservient to his schemes concerning the sovereignty
of Greece.

The Panhellenion was replaced by a senate, but the organi-
zation of this senate was left by the assembly entirely in the
hands of the president. It was a consultative and not a
legislative council, and its consent was not indispensable to
any laws except those relating to the permanent disposition
of the national lands.

Capodistrias was also empowered to name a regency in
case of his death, which was to conduct the government until
the meeting of a national assembly.

The proceedings of the national assembly of Argos were
opposed to the free spirit of the national assemblies of the j
earlier period of the Greek Revolution. The principle of|
government nomination too often replaced the old usage of j
popular election, and tortuous ways were adopted instead of i
direct courses. Thus, in appointing the senate, sixty-eight
names were submitted by the assembly to the president, who {
selected twenty-one of these candidates to be senators. The
.senate was then completed by the addition of six members
named by the president.

The establishment of two chambers to share the legislative
power was contemplated by the assembly, but the president
was entrusted with the arrangements necessary for calling the
legislature into existence^.

The excessive confidence of the deputies misled Capo- ■
distrias into the conviction that his power was irresistible,
and from this time his conduct became more arbitrary, and
his personal partizans more insolent.

The proceedings of the three protecting powers gave him ;
great anxiety. He detested England, mistrusted France, and i
doubted the sentiments of the Russian cabinet, for he felt j
that he was not admitted to its secrets. The nomination of i
Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (Leopold, king of the |
Belgians) to be sovereign of Greece, disappointed his hopes |
and irritated his feelings. He had laboured to convince

J r.i;/<:^ 'E<pT]fifpis, No. 53, 30th July, 1829.

= Ibid. No. 53. The decree is dated 22nd July (3rd August), 1829.

j PROTOCOLS. 51

j A.D. 1829.]

Europe that he was the only man capable of organizing
I Greece. His ambition was legitimate. But his own double-
I dealing had prevented even Russia from assuming the respon-
sibility of advocating his cause. Had his conduct not been
marked by duplicity, and had he sought to attain his object
by honest and legal measures, it is probable that he would
have succeeded. Diplomacy is not in the habit of working
miracles or producing patriots, and neither an Epaminondas
nor a Washington was likely to arise among the semi-
Venetian aristocracy of Corfu.
I The three powers conducted their conferences at London
j in a slow and vacillating manner, and their protocols, fixing
the frontier of the Greek state, were remarkable for ignorance
of geography and infirmity of purpose. The principles which
ought to have regulated their proceedings were lucidly
announced in a report drawn up by their representatives at
Poros, on the i2th December 1828^. The measures then
recommended were embodied in a protocol signed at London
on the 22nd March 1829, and were not very dissimilar from
those which were ultimately adopted when Greece was
declared a kingdom in 1832^ The frontier of the Greek
state was drawn from the Gulf of Volo to the Gulf of Arta.
The annual tribute to the sultan was fixed at about ;!^30,ooo.
The Turks who had possessed land in Greece were allowed to
sell their property. An hereditary sovereign was to be
chosen by the three protecting powers, who, though he
acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte, was to enjoy
complete independence in legislation, and in all business
relating to political government and internal administration.
This plan, warmly supported by Sir Stratford Canning
(Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), might have been carried into
execution without delay, had the Earl of Aberdeen, who was
then Foreign Secretary, been as well acquainted with the
state of Turkey and Greece as Sir Stratford. Unfortunately
the Earl of Aberdeen treated the question with diplomatic
pedantry. While Capodistrias was intriguing, while Sultan
Mahmud was fuming with rage, and while the population of

' Parliamentary Papers — Protocol of a conference of the representatives of Great
Britain, France, and Russia, held at Poros 12th December, 1828.

* Compare the protocol of the 22nd March, 1829, with Annex A to the protocol
of the 26th April, 1832.

E 2

K2 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk. V. Ch. II.

Greece was perishing from want, the English Foreign Secre-
tary insisted on reserving to each of the Allied courts the
right of weighing separately the objections which the indignant
sultan might make to the proposed arrangements ; and
England and France sent ambassadors to Constantinople to
open negotiations with the Othoman government.

While the British government was undecided as to the
manner in which it would be most prudent to carry the
protocol of the 22nd March into execution, the French gov-
ernment offered to complete the pacification of Greece by
taking possession of all that part of northern Greece assigned
to the new state with the troops in the Morea. The Turks
who occupied the country were so few and so ill-provided
with military, that it was not in their power to offer any
serious resistance. But the English ministers were so averse
to any further acts of hostility against Turkey, that they
opposed this arrangement, and France yielded to Lord
Aberdeen's objections.

Russia soon took advantage of the scruples and half
measures of the British cabinet. As soon as the Russian
army had crossed the Balkan, and Constantinople lay open
to attack, the sultan felt that England and France
could alone arrest the progress of his enemy and save his
capital. To conciliate their good-will he yielded every point
in dispute concerning Greece. On the 9th of September
1829 the reis-effendi notified to the English and French
ambassadors that the Porte acceded to the treaty of the 6th
of July 1827, and that the Othoman government pledged
itself to accept all the arrangements which the Allies might
consider it necessary to adopt for carrying it into execution \

The Greek question might now be considered as termi-
nated. But Russia was unwilling to see any cause of dispute
with Turkey ended, and she was extremely jealous of the
influence which the Western powers were acquiring in the
East. She therefore suddenly gave a new turn to the
negotiations by attempting to appropriate the merit of the
final settlement to the emperor's government. The treaty of
Adrianople, which terminated the Russian war, was signed on
the 14th September, and the Russian plenipotentiaries, taking

^ Parliamentary Papers — Annex B to protocol of 3rd February, 1830.

RIVALRY OF THE ALLIED POWERS. ^o

A.O. 1829.]

I advantage of the vague manner in which the reis-effendi had
notified the sultan's adhesion to the measures for carrying the

I treaty of the 6th of July 1827 into execution, exacted from
the Porte a precise recognition of the protocol of the 22nd
March 1829, and, to prevent the Othoman government from
making use of its habits of delay, the Porte was expressly
bound to name a plenipotentiary for the purpose of carrying
the arrangements into effect conjointly with commissioners
appointed by the Allied powers ^.

This display of Russian zeal for the freedom of Greece was
a severe rebuke to the irresolute policy of the British cabinet,
and both France and England felt humiliated by the sub-
ordinate position in which Russia had placed them with
reference to the final settlement of the Greek question. The
emperor Nicholas, with his usual arrogance, assumed that
Greece owed her recognition solely to the victories of his
armies, and the recent policy of the British government gave
a sanction to this pretension. The sultan immediately
became ostentatiously obsequious to Russia, and Greece
extremely grateful. Capodistrias, observing the apparent
increase of Russian influence, had some reason to expect that
he might eventually succeed in being selected as the
sovereign prince of Greece, if Greece could be retained in
a state of vassalage, and not rendered too extensive.

But England and France were not so easily foiled by
Moscovite diplomacy as the czar expected, and they took
effectual measures to prevent Russia from enjoying a long
triumph in the success of her separate action. By conferring
new favours on the Greeks they diluted the gratitude due to
the Emperor Nicholas. A protocol signed on the 3rd of Febru-
ary 1 830 abolished the suzerainty of the sultan and declared
Greece an independent state. Unfortunately, little gratitude
was earned from the Greeks, for the boon of independence
was conferred imperfectly and ungraciously. The statesmen
who framed this unlucky protocol showed too plainly that
their attention was fixed on the secondary object of relieving
England and France from the reproach of having been
overreached by Russia, and not on the primary object of the
alliance, the pacification of Greece on a permanent and

* The treaty of Adrianople, art. 10. Lesur, Annuaire Hhtorique, 1829.

• Yet Colonel Leake, who had acted as diplomatic agent at Joannina during the
government of Ali Pasha, and who was known to be better acquainted with the
proposed frontier than any man in Europe, was then residing in London. He
was the person from whom accurate and official information could have been
obtained, but he was not consulted.

2 Parliamentary Papers. Prince Leopold accepted the sovereignty on the nth
February, 1830.

';4 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch.II.

equitable basis. Nominal independence was conceded, but
it was to be purchased by the loss of a considerable territory
inhabited by a warlike population whose constancy and
courage had contributed much to deliver Greece from the
Turkish yoke. A considerable number of the troops who
had been constantly in arms against the sultan was subjected
to his government, and a frontier which offered no security
either to Turkey or Greece was traced.

This new frontier was drawn from the mouth of the
Achelous to the mouth of the Spercheus. Diplomatic igno-
rance could hardly have traced a more unsuitable line of
demarcation. All Acarnania and a considerable part of
Aetolia were surrendered to the sultan. That part of the
continent in which Greek is the language of the people was
annexed to Turkey, and that part in which the agricultural
population speaks the Albanian language was attached to
Greece ^ With such a frontier it was certain that peace
could only be established by force ; yet the protocol de-
clared that no power should send troops to Greece without
the unanimous consent of the Allies. This injudicious proto-
col concluded with a foolish paragraph, congratulating the
Allied courts on having reached the close of a long and
difficult negotiation.

The sovereignty of the diminished state was offered to
and accepted by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg ^. The
Porte immediately accepted these arrangements. It was not
blind to the advantage of retaining possession of Acarnania
and great part of Aetolia. On the other hand, Capodistrias
availed himself of the unsuitable frontier to thwart Prince
Leopold's election. He was so sure of the nation's support
that he did not give himself any trouble to conceal his
duplicity. He declared that the decree of the national
assembly of Argos deprived him of the power of giving a
legal sanction to the provisions of the protocol signed by the
Allied powers. He pretended that he was placed in a

LEOPOLD SOVEREIGN OF GREECE. e^^

A.D. 1830.]

position of great difficulty ; that he feared to convoke a
national assembly, as the deputies would either protest
against the proceedings of the Allies, or violate their duty
to their country and their instructions from their electors ;
but that he would accept the protocol on his own responsi-
bility \ The ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia
knew that he had drawn up the instructions of the electors to
the deputies with his own hand, and they could not overlook
the fact, that while he manifested extreme tenderness for the
consciences of the deputies, he showed no hesitation in
violating his own duty as president of Greece by setting
aside a national decree, and accepting the protocol in an
illegal manner. His object was clearly to prepare for its
repudiation, if it suited his convenience, at a later period.

Greece was so tortured by her provisional condition that
the nomination of Prince Leopold was accepted by the people
as a boon. Addresses of congratulation were spontaneously
prepared. There was an outbreak of national enthusiasm ;
and many officials, believing that Capodistrias was sincere
in the declaration which he made in public, that he was
anxious to give the new sovereign a cordial reception, signed
these addresses. At first the president did not venture to
oppose the general feeling, but he announced that the previous
approval of the government was necessary in order to give the
addresses a legitimate character. Shortly after, he ventured
to proclaim that every address which had not been submitted
to the revision of the agents of his government previous to
signature, emanated from obscure emissaries of the opposition.
He was seriously alarmed at the eagerness which was exhi-
bited to welcome the new sovereign, and put an end to his
own provisional administration. His devoted partizans alone
knew his private wishes, and they endeavoured to prevent
the spontaneous addresses from being signed, and delayed
as much as lay in their power their transmission to the
prince^. After the resignation of Prince Leopold, Capodistrias
treated the signature of the spontaneous addresses as an act
of hostility to his government, and dismissed many officials

^ Parliamentary Papers, Annex F, protocol, 14th May, 1830; Lesur. A7in. Hist.
1829, Documents, p. iij.

^ Parliamentary Papers, Annex C, protocol, 26th July, 1830; Circular to Civil
Governors of Greece, dated 2nd June, 1830.

k6 presidency of capodistrias.

[Bk. V. Ch. II.

who were innocent of any wish to join the opposition, but
who had been misled by his own assurance into a belief
that he wished the prince to receive a hearty welcome. In
order to neutralize the effect of the popular demonstrations
in the prince's favour, the civil governors in the provinces
were ordered to prepare other addresses. Many of these
were not circulated for signature until the resignation of
Prince Leopold was known to Capodistrias, and several of
them were antedated ^

From this period, the secret police, which had been
gradually formed under the direction of Viaro and Gennatas,
acquired additional power. It became, as in many countries
on the continent of Europe, a terrible social scourge^. The
preference which the great body of the people had shown
for a foreign sovereign filled the heart of Capodistrias with
rage. He could not repress his feelings, and even to strangers
he often inveighed bitterly against the ingratitude of his
countrymen.

Yet he endeavoured to persuade the world that the Greeks
viewed the nomination of Prince Leopold with dissatisfaction,
if not with absolute aversion, and he succeeded so far as to
create an impression that the Greeks wxre at least divided
in opinion. He alarmed Prince Leopold with the fear of
meeting an unfavourable reception. He attempted to disgust
him by suggesting the necessity of his changing his religion,
though it was well known that the Greek clergy were then
as eager to welcome a Protestant sovereign as the laity.

The condition of Greece at the time of Prince Leopold's
nomination explains the proceedings of Capodistrias. Most
of the ablest and most influential men had been driven from
the public service, and excluded from the assembly of Argos.
The senate was composed of the president's creatures. The
government had not received a permanent organization. No
administration of justice gave a sure guarantee for life and
property to private individuals. The people suspected that
the country was retained in this provisional state to further
the president's schemes of personal ambition. The nomi-

1 The address of the Psarians was signed at Aegina on the 20th July, but it was
dated 7th June. Capodistrias did not inform the prince that the addresses were
ready to be transmitted to England until the 26th of July. He was then aware
that the prince had resigned on the 21st of May.

* Thiersch, i. 27; Pellion, 177.

LEOPOLD SOVEREIGN OF GREECE. ^J

A.D. 1830.]

nation of Prince Leopold took Capodistrias by surprise, while
he was preparing to convince Europe that the Greeks would
not accept a foreign sovereign, and to persuade Liberals that
the constitutional governments of England and France ought
to admit the principle of popular election. He knew how
to manage that universal suffrage should elect him sovereign
of Greece. When he found his hopes baffled, and saw himself
without any national support, he acted like a diplomatist, and
not like a statesman. Instead of convoking a national assembly
and adopting a national policy, he played a game of personal
intrigue. He accepted the protocol to thwart its execution.
He violated the law of Greece to keep the conduct of the
negotiations in his own hands, and he deceived the prince
with false representations.

Prince Leopold, on the other hand, acted imprudently in
accepting the sovereignty of Greece before he had made up his
mind to assume the immediate direction of the government.
And his resignation, after having accepted the sovereignty,
deserves severe reprobation. Princes can only be punished
for trifling with the fortunes of nations by the judgment of
history. The British government also acted most injudi-
ciously, both in pressing him to accept, and in permitting
him to double about after accepting. The objections he
made to the arrangements of the protocol ought to have
warned Lord Aberdeen that he was not the man suitable
for the contingency. Indeed, it seems strange that the un-
friendly correspondence which preceded Prince Leopold's
nomination did not awaken a deeper sense of the responsibility
due to the suffering inhabitants of Greece in the breasts both
of the prince and of the British ministers.

If Prince Leopold really believed, as he wrote to Lord
Aberdeen on the 3rd February 1830, 'that he could imagine
no effectual mode of pacifying Greece without including
Candia in the new state,' it was his duty to refuse the
government of Greece until Candia formed part of his sove-
reignty. Yet he was content to give up Candia and accept
the sovereignty on the nth of the month. The Allies were
fairly warned not to permit ulterior negotiations on questions
concerning which they were determined to make no conces-
sions, but they neglected the warning. In the correspond-
ence between the British government and Prince Leopold,

58 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch.II.

which was laid before parHament, the prince appears as a
rhetorician and not a statesman, and as a diplomatist and
not an administrator ^.

Even the dark picture Capodistrias drew of the state of
Greece, and the difficulties likely to await the prince on
his arrival, did not warrant Prince Leopold's retiring from
his engagement. But Prince Leopold all along trifled with
the awful responsibility he had assumed. It was his duty,
the moment he accepted the sovereignty of Greece, to invite
some Greek who had acquired practical experience in public
business during the Revolution, to attend his person and
act as secretary of state. He ought immediately to have sum-
moned a council of state, of which he might have invited
Capodistrias to name a few members. With constitutional
advisers, Prince Leopold would have found all his difficulties
vanish. The bad faith of Capodistrias in his dealings with
the prince is proved by the simple fact that he did not
immediately send to London such men as Glarakes, Rizos,
PsyllaSj and Tricoupi, for he had employed them all in high
office, and knew that, whatever might be their deficiencies,
they were men of education and personal integrity. The
president may be excused for not trusting party leaders like
Mavrocordatos, Metaxas, or Kolettes ; but when the prince
asked for a confidential adviser, it was insulting Greece to
send Prince Wrede, a young Bavarian, who had arrived in
the country after the termination of the war, and who knew
very little more of the social and political condition of Greece
than the Greeks knew of his existence. Indeed, Capodistrias
himself knew only that the man he sent was called Prince
Wrede, and had been recommended to General Heideck.
It would have been almost impossible, among the foreigners
then in Greece, to have selected a person so utterly incom-
petent to furnish Prince Leopold either with information
or counsel. Jealousy and duplicity, as usual, were too strong
in the breast of Capodistrias to admit of his concealing
them.

Prince Leopold, after wearying the Allies and tormenting
the English ministers with his negotiations, resigned the

* Parliamentary Papers. Communications with Prince Leopold relating to the
sovereignty of Greece, particularly letters of Lord Aberdeen to Prince Leopold,
31st January, 1830, and Prince Leopold to Lord Aberdeen, 3rd February, 1830.

PRINCE LEOPOLD'S RESIGNATION. 59

A.D. 1830.]

sovereignty of Greece on the 17th May 1830. Whether he
would have gained in Greece the honour he has won as a
wise ruler on the throne of Belgium, cannot be known ; but
when we reflect how many years of anarchy he would have
saved the Greeks, it must be owned that he would have
served humanity well by estimating more accurately than
he did estimate it the responsibilities he incurred when he
accepted the sovereignty of Greece.

The position of Capodistrias was changed, and his power
was shaken, by the nomination of Prince Leopold, nor did
he recover either his influence or his equanimity on the
prince's resignation. As often happens to successful intriguers,
he found himself embarrassed by his false pretences and pro-
visional measures. He had told the Greeks that it was
necessary to put an end to the Revolution. They re-echoed
his own phrases, and clamoured for the establishment of
permanent institutions, and, above all, for legal tribunals.
Capodistrias was puzzled to find that the people to whom
he looked for support^ were thwarting his measures when they
believed they were assisting him to gain popularity. The
president's firmness was further shaken by the French Revo-
lution of July 1830, which placed Louis Philippe on the
throne of France. This event encouraged the members of
the constitutional opposition in Greece to commence an open
and systematic hostility to his arbitrary measures. Shortly
after this, he was still further alarmed by the insurrection
in Poland, which he feared would prevent Russia from sup-
porting the principles of the Holy Alliance against England
and France. He was now compelled to hear his conduct
arraigned. He was reproached with perpetuating anarchy
in Greece, and with calumniating the Greeks by representing
them as enemies of order. His administrative capacity was
called in question, and his misgovernment was pointed out.
But the mass of the nation wished reform, not change of
government ; and even his illegal proceedings were submitted
to with patience. Viaro, it is true, became every day more
hateful on account of his insolence ; Agostino every day more
ridiculous on account of his vanity.

Henceforward the government of the president became
rapidly more tyrannical. Arrests were made without legal
warrants. Spies were generally employed by men in office.

6o PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch.II.

Viaro, Mustoxidi, and Gennatas, collected round them a herd
of Ionian satellites, who made a parade of the influence they
exerted in the public administration. The partizans of Capo-
distrias began to believe that he would succeed in obtaining
the presidency for life. Agostino, his younger brother, pre-
tended to be his political heir. He acted the generalissimo,
and formed a body-guard of personal dependants, who were
better clothed and paid than the rest of the army. This
conduct excited indignation among the veteran armatoli,
who conceived a deep-rooted resentment against the whole
Capodistrian family.

The Revolution established the liberty of the press, of
which the Greeks had made a moderate and intelligent use.
As early as 1824, political newspapers of different parties
were published simultaneously at Mesolonghi, Athens, and
Hydra. In 1B25 the government found it necessary to
establish an official gazette (Pei'tK?) 'Ei^j/juept?) at Nauplia.
Capodistrias silenced the press, and the Greeks, unable to
discuss their grievances, resorted to force as the only means of
removing them.

Polyzoides, a man of moderate opinions, a lawyer, and a
Liberal, deemed the time favourable for the establishment
of a political and literary newspaper of a higher character
than any which had survived the hostility of the president's
government. There is no doubt that he contemplated
strengthening the Liberal party, and gaining proselytes to
the constitution. His conduct was strictly legal. By the
law of Greece the press was free ; but to comply with the
police exigencies of a suspicious government, copies of
the prospectus of the new paper, which was called the
Apollo, were sent to the minister of public instruction, and
to the president. Viaro, who acted as minister of justice, sent
to inform the editor, that as no law existed regulating the
publication of newspapers, the power of licensing their
publication belonged to the government. The pretension was
very Venetian, and in direct opposition to the law declaring
the press to be free. Polyzoides resolved to obey the law ;
Viaro was determined to enforce his authority.

Early on the morning fixed for the publication of the
Apollo, the chief of the police of Nauplia, followed by a
strong guard, entered the printing-office and seized the press,

TYRANNY OF CAPODISTRIAS. 6l

A.D. 183I.]

then at work, without presenting any warrant. The editor
sought redress from Viaro, and presented a petition to the
senate, but his demands were neglected. It was evident that
the will of Count Capodistrias was more powerful than the
law of Greece. The president had himself inaugurated a
new period of revolution. Men's minds were excited, and
the Liberal party was irritated. The state of public affairs,
both in Greece and on the continent of Europe, caused
information to be eagerly sought after from other sources
than the government papers^ and the Greeks waited anxiously
for the result of the contest between Capodistrias and the
Apollo. A law circumscribing the liberty of the press was
passed hurriedly through the senate. But while Viaro was
pluming himself on his victory, the Apollo made its appear-
ance at Hydra on the 31st March 1831, and its publication
was continued under the protection of the Albanian munici-
pality of that island until the assassination of Capodistrias \

Maina had already resisted the president's authority.
Hydra now called the legality of his proceedings in question.
The president attempted to apologize for his arbitrary acts,
by pleading the provisional nature of his government. His
greatest fear was publicity. He felt that his motives would
not bear investigation better than his deeds. He had suc-
ceeded in silencing the press abroad, and it now braved him
at home. The CouriHer of Smyrna had criticised his measures
with freedom, and published his edicts with severe comments.
By the intervention of the Russian minister at Constanti-
nople, he obtained from the Othoman government an order
to the editor to abstain from criticising the conduct of the
president of Greece^.

Capodistrias advanced in the path of tyranny; the Greeks
prepared for open insurrection. Many persons were arrested
on suspicion, and remained in prison without being accused
of any offence or brought to trial ^. Some just and more
unjust accusations were made against men who disapproved

' The Apollo was published twice a-week. While revising these pages, I have
turned over the numbers of this paper, and 1 am surprised to find so much modera-
tion and good sense in political articles written amidst the storm of party passions
that then prevailed.

'■^ Courrier de Smyrne, 28th November, 1830.

^ Compare the picture of Greece drawn by Sir Stratford Canning in a Memoran-
dum dated 28th December, 1831, Annex A to protocol of 7th March, 1S32.

62 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch.II.

of the president's conduct. Actions before provisional courts
of judicature were commenced for official acts performed
during the Revolution ; yet no private individual was allowed
to seek redress in the same courts for recent acts committed
in violation of the president's own laws by the president's
officials. Lazaros Konduriottes of Hydra, one of the most
patriotic men in Greece, and one of the few whose public
and private character was alike irreproachable, was accused
of complicity with pirates. Several eminent men were exiled,
and others only escaped the vexations of the police by
seeking a voluntary banishment ^ Judges were dismissed
from office because they refused to transcribe and pronounce
illegal sentences at the suggestion of Viaro. Klonares, a
man of some legal knowledge, and of an independent
character, was dismissed for signing one of the addresses
to Prince Leopold which had not been submitted to the
president's revision. Another judge publicly declared that
he was driven from the bench because he refused to give
an unjust decision in conformity with the desire of the Corfiot
minister of justice. Sessines of Gastuni, the president of the
senate, who had been raised to his high office on account of
his servility, at last hesitated to support the tyranny of the
president, and was instantly dismissed.

Extraordinary tribunals, which acted without fixed rules of
procedure, whose members were destitute of legal knowledge,
and removable at pleasure, and from whose judgments there
was no appeal, were multiplied.

Insurrections followed. The president was particularly
irritated by prolonged disturbances on the part of the students
of Aegina, because these disorders drew attention to his
vicious system of public education, and demonstrated the
falsehood of the reports he had caused to be circulated in
Western Europe.

His difficulties were increased by the disorder in his finan-
cial administration. Many of his partizans in the Morea
were alienated by his allowing Kolokotrones to enrol an
armed band of personal followers, as in the worst times of
the Revolution, and collect the cattle-tax. Kolokotrones,

* Men of different parties and discordant opinions were united in opposition to
Capodistrias at this time: Hypsilantes, Mavrocordatos, Miaoulis, Konduriottes,
Tombazes, Tricoupi, Klonares, Zographos, Pharmakides, Church, and Gordon.

AFFAIR OF POROS. e'>,

A.D. 1 83 1.]

as might have been foreseen, acted the part of a military
tyrant. He not only persecuted his own personal enemies,
but allowed a similar licence to the brigands who followed his
banner. Greece was relapsing into a state of anarchy, and
several provinces were at last in open revolt.

Maina paid no taxes, and the Mainates were only prevented
from plundering Messenia by the presence of the French
troops. Hydra constituted itself an independent state,
governed by its municipal magistrates. It collected the
national revenues in several islands of the Archipelago,
and maintained a part of the Greek fleet which espoused
its cause. Syra, the centre of Greek commerce, made
common cause with Hydra. Capodistrias had driven its
merchants into open opposition, by attempting to fetter
their trade with the restrictions of the Russian commercial
system. A general cry was raised for the convocation of
a national assembly, and the president perceived that he
must either make concessions to regain his popularity, lay
down his authority, or employ force to keep possession of
his power. He chose the last alternative, and instead of
assembling the deputies of the nation, he commenced a civil
war, trusting to the assistance of Russia for the means of
crushing Hydra.

Some management was necessary to prevent the diplomatic
agents of England and France in Greece from protesting
against any employment of force. The greater part of the
Greek fleet lay disarmed in the port of Poros ; but a few
ships whose captains remained faithful to Capodistrias were
still in commission ; and these, when assisted by a force
which the Russian admiral promised to supply, would easily
re-establish the president's authority in Syra. The loss of
Syra would undermine the power of Hydra ; for its revenues
were the principal resource for the payment of the insurgent
fleet. The plan of attacking Syra, apparently with Greek
ships, but in reality with Russian forces, was well devised,
but it was betrayed to the Hydriots by one of the pre-
sident's confidants. The Hydriots determined to anticipate
the attack.

Kanares, who was a devoted partizan of the president,
commanded the corvette Spetzas, which was fully manned,
and lay at anchor in the port of Poros. The municipal

6 A PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch.II.

government of Hydra ordered MiaouHs with two hundred
sailors to hasten to Poros, and take possession of the ships
and arsenal. The brave old admiral departed immediately
with only about fifty men, accompanied by Antonios Kriezes
as his flag-captain, and by Mavrocordatos as his political
counsellor. On the night of the 27th July 1831 he seized
the arsenal and the disarmed ships, and, hoisting his flag
in the Hellas, summoned Kanares on board. That officer,
refusing to surrender the corvette to an order of the munici-
pality of Hydra, was put under arrest, and a party of Hydriots
took possession of his ship.

The character of Capodistrias seemed to undergo a revolu-
tion when he heard that he had lost his fleet and arsenal.
He no longer talked of the blessings of peace, of his own
philanthropic feelings, and of the duties of humanity. He
declared that he would wash out the stain of rebellion in
the blood of his enemies. He called the Hydriots a band
of barbarians and pirates, who assailed his authority because
it had arrested them in a career of crime and pillage. He
now spoke of law, to implore its vengeance, and of justice,
to assert that the leaders of the opposition ought all to die the
death of traitors. His expressions and his manner breathed a
fierce desire to gratify his personal revenge.

The news of Miaoulis' success reached Nauplia while the
ministers of France and England, and the commanders of
their naval forces, were absent. The Russian admiral, Ricord,
who was at anchor in the port, was induced by Capodistrias
to sail i,mmediately to Poros with the ships under his com-
mand. At the same time, the president sent a battalion of
infantry, two hundred regular cavalry, and a strong body
of irregulars;, by land, to assist in regaining possession of the
town.

Admiral Ricord arrived and summoned Miaoulis to sur-
render the arsenal and the ships in the port to the Greek
government ; but Miaoulis replied that the municipality of
Hydra was the only legally constituted authority to which he
owed obedience until the meeting of the national assembly.
He therefore referred the Russian admiral to the authorities
at Hydra, adding that he was resolved to retain possession
of the fleet and arsenal as long as the municipality of Hydra
left him in command. Ricord threatened to use force ;

AFFAIR OF POROS. 65

A.D. 183I.]

Miaoulis retorted that he knew his duty as well as the
Russian admiral.

Affairs remained in this position for several days, when the
commanders of the French and English naval forces entered
the port accidentally before returning to Nauplia^. They
were consequently ignorant of the resolutions which might
have been adopted by the residents of the Allied powers at
Nauplia, and to prevent bloodshed they arranged with Ricord
and Miaoulis that matters should remain in their actual con-
dition until they should visit Nauplia and return with the
decision of the Allies. It seemed at the time a strange pro-
ceeding, that both commanders should go to search for this
decision, when the presence of one at least was required at
Poros to watch the Russian admiral, who was guarding both
the entrances into the port with a superior force, and could
close them at any moment.

In the mean time, the residents of England and France,
having returned to Nauplia, gave the president written assur-
ances of the desire of their courts to maintain tranquillity in
Greece under the existing government. But they excited the
president's distrust by speaking of conciliation, by recom-
mending the convocation of a national assembly, and by
refusing to order their naval forces to co-operate with Admiral
Ricord in attacking the Hydriots.

The Russian admiral did not wait the return of the French
and English commanders to commence hostilities. On the
6th of August a boat of the Russian brig Telemachus, which
was guarding the smaller entrance, prevented a vessel bring-
ing provisions from Hydra from entering the port. An en-
gagement took place, in which both parties lost a few men,
but the Russians succeeded in compelling the vessel to return
to Hydra.

As soon as Capodistrias found that the English and French
residents declined countenancing his schemes of vengeance,
he sent off pressing solicitations to the Russian admiral to
lose no time in recovering possession of the Greek fleet ; and
to the officers of the troops on shore to occupy Poros at every
risk. He then pretended to listen to the counsels of the resi-
dents, and promised to convoke a national assembly. Some

1 The French officer was Captain, afterwards Admiral, Lalande; the English^
Captain, afterwards Admiral, Lord Lyons.

VOL. VII. F

66 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch.lI.

days later a proclamation was issued, dated ist(i3th) August,
convoking the assembly on the 8th (20th) September ^

The message of Capodistrias was received by Admiral
Ricord as an order to attack Miaoulis, and his operations, in a
military point of view, were extremely judicious. He formed
a battery to command the town and the smaller entrance ;
and having by this cut off the communications of Miaoulis
with a part of the Greek fleet, he ordered the Russians to take
possession of the corvette Spetzas and a brig, which were
anchored in Monastery Bay. At the same time the Greek-
troops attacked Fort Heideck, which was occupied by
Hydriots. The Russians and the president's troops were
completely victorious. The corvette Spetzas Vv^as blown
up, the brig was taken, and Fort Heideck was deserted by
its garrison.

Miaoulis had now only thirty men on board the Hellas, and
the other vessels under his orders were as ill manned.

On the day after the victory of the Russians, the inhabit-
ants of Poros offered to capitulate, and it was arranged with
Admiral Ricord that a hundred and fifty Greek regular
troops should occupy the town, in order to save it from being
plundered by the irregulars. During the night several vessels
filled with the families of those who feared the vengeance of
Capodistrias were allowed to pass the Russian squadron un-
molested. On the 13th of August a hundred and fifty Greek
regulars entered the town of Poros.

Admiral Ricord had promised to wait the return of Cap-
tains Lalande and Lyons. The Allied powers were bound
by protocol to take every step relating to the pacification of
Greece in concert. Miaoulis reposed perfect confidence in
this arrangement until he was awakened from his security by
the operations in Monastery Bay. And on the morning of
the 13th August he observed that the Russian ships removed
to stations which placed his ships under their guns. He sent
an officer on board the Russian flag-ship to request Admiral
Ricord to retain his previous position until the return of the
French and English naval commanders, according to his

* The existence of this proclamation, however, was not known even at Naiiplia
until after the events of Poros. A translation will be found in Lettres et Docu-
tnents Officieh relatifs ati Derniers Evenetnetits de la Grece, 1 23. This work was
distributed in Paris by order of Mr. Eynard of Geneva.

SACK OF POROS. 6y

A.D. 1S3I.]

promise ; and he instructed the officer, in case the Russian
admiral persisted in taking up a hostile position, to add that
Miaoulis, though his crews were insufficient for defence, would
destroy his ships rather than surrender them. Captain Pha-
langas was ordered to make a similar communication to
Captain Levaillant of a French brig-of-war which had just
entered the port. Levaillant urged the Russian admiral to
wait the return of Lalande and Lyons, but without success.
Miaoulis inferred that something extraordinary, and not
favourable to the views of Capodistrias, must have occurred
to induce Ricord to violate his promise. He knew that the
president's object in getting possession of the Greek fleet was
to enable the Russians to re-establish his power at Syra and
Hydra under cover of the Greek flag. To save his country,
he resolved to destroy the ships which might serve as cover
for attacking it. At half-past ten, just as the Russian admiral
had taken up his new position, a terrific explosion was heard,
which was almost instantaneously followed by a second.
Thick columns of smoke covered the Greek ships, and when
they cleared away, the magnificent frigate Hellas, and her
prize, the corvette Hydra, were seen floating as wrecks on the
water\ Miaoulis and their crews escaped in their boats to
Hydra.

The troops of Capodistrias rushed into the town of Poros
in defiance of the capitulation, and immediately took posses-
sion of the arsenal. They then commenced plundering the
houses, as if the place had been a hostile city taken by assault
after the most obstinate resistance. The inhabitants most
hostile to the government of the president having carried off
their movables to Hydra, only the innocent who trusted to
Admiral Ricord's assurance of protection remained. They
were pillaged of all they possessed, and treated with inhuman
cruelty. On this occasion, both officers and men behaved in
the most disgraceful manner ; and the sack of Poros is an
indelible stain on the conduct of the Greek army, on the
character of Capodistrias, and on the honour of Admiral
Ricord. The Russian admiral might easily have put a stop

' The letter of Capodistrias, printed in Mr. Eynard's Lettres et Donnnenls (p. 125)
gives a correct account of the events at Poros, until he cuts short the narrative, on
arriving at the catastrophe, by inserting a letter of Kanares. This is one of the
president's usual artifices of composition. He thus communicates the catastrophe
without the necessity of alluding to the cause of the conduct of Miaoulis.

F 3

68 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V.Ch.II.

to the cruelties which were perpetrated under his eyes, yet fori
twenty-four hours he permitted every crime to be committed
with impunity. Justice was powerless, unless when some
Poriot slew a soldier to defend the honour of his family. The
historian is not required to sully his pages with a record of the
deeds of lust and rapine which were committed by the Greek
troops, but his verdict must be pronounced, as a warning to
evil-doers. There is no scene more disgraceful to the Greek
character in the history of the Revolution ; and horrible tales
of pillage, rape, and murder, then perpetrated, long circulated
among the people. Anecdotes of cruel extortion and base
avidity were told of several officers. When all was over, the
troops returned to Nauplia and Argos with horses stolen from
the peasants of Damala, which were heavily laden with the
plunder of Poros.

The sack of Poros sowed the seeds of disorder in the Greek
regular corps, and ruined the reputation of Capodistrias.
General Gerard endeavoured in vain to bring back the army
to a sense of duty, by blaming the conduct of the troops
at Poros with great severity. Rhodios, the minister of war,
who was a creature of Capodistrias, protected the worst
criminals, and deprived the reproaches of the French general
of their influence. This conduct increased the insubordination
which the licence at Poros had created \

Capodistrias was soon alarmed to find that even his own
partizans spoke with indignation of the conduct of the
Russian admiral and of the Greek troops. His enemies pro-
claimed that, in his eagerness to revenge himself on Miaoulis,
he had given up the innocent inhabitants of a Greek town
to pillage and slaughter. To withdraw public attention
from the sack of Poros, he was now anxious to talk of
a national assembly. The meeting of that assembly was
inevitable, but the elections were not likely to be effected
without some fierce contests. The president openly acted
as the unscrupulous chief of an unprincipled party ; but an
avenging fate was at hand. He had indulged his appetite
for a bloody vengeance ; he was now sacrificed as a victim to
private revenge.

The distinguished part which several members of the

' Pellion, 214.

FAMILY OF MAVROMICHALES. 69

A.D, 1831.]

family of Mavromichales acted at the commencement of the
Revolution, has been recorded in the earher pages of this
work. The best men of the house fell in battle. Kyriakules
and Elias are names which Greece will always honour, Petro-
bey, the chief of the family, though a man of no political
capacity, was viewed by Capodistrias with ignoble jealousy.
He enjoyed considerable influence in Maina, and Maina pos-
sessed a considerable degree of political independence. Capodi-
strias believed that centralization was the direct path to order,
and it was certainly the quickest way of increasing his per-
sonal authority. The influence of the family of Mavromichales
appeared to be the principal obstacle to the success of his
plans in Maina, and he removed its members from every officia'l
position which they occupied at his arrival in Greece. His
persecutions constituted them the natural champions of the
provincial franchises and fiscal immunities of the Mainates.

The lawless liberty that reigned in Maina was extremely
offensive to the despotic principles of Capodistrias. He found
both bad habits and criminal practices more powerful than
either the local or the national government. Murder was
legalized by written contracts. Bonds signed by living
individuals were shown to the president, in which the penalty,
in case of non-fulfilment, was a clause authorizing the holder
to murder the obligant, or two of his nearest relations.
Capodistrias considered it to be his duty to put an end to
a state of society so disgraceful to orthodox Christians in
the nineteenth century. He imagined that the people of
Maina would aid him in his honourable enterprise, not
reflecting that the deeds of vengeance which excited his
indignation were considered by the native population as a
necessary restraint on a ferocious and faithless race, in a
region and among a class where the law was powerless.
Murder in Maina answered the same purpose as duelling in
other countries where the state of society was less barbarous,
and assassination was a privilege of Mainate gentility.

Personal jealousy made Capodistrias select the family of
Petrobey as the scapegoats for the sins of Maina. The acts
of rapine on shore and of piracy at sea which other Mainates
committed were overlooked, and all the strength of the
Greek government was employed to crush the detested house
of Mavromichales.

70 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

[Bk.V Ch. II.

During the celebration of Easter 1830, Janni, the brother
of Petrobey, commonly termed the King of Maina, in com-
pany with one of the bey's sons, excited the people of
Tzimova to revolt against the president's government. Many
complaints had been laid before the Greek government against
the acts of violence and extortion committed by this king
of misrule, which he found it no easy matter to explain.
He therefore declared himself the champion of the privileges
of Maina, in order to evade answering for his own misdeeds.
The people were in this way induced to make his cause
their own. Janni Mavromichales seized the custom-house,
and collected the public revenues in order to pay the men
who took up arms. But this revolt was soon suppressed
by the president, who persuaded George Mavromichales, the
second son of Petrobey, to hasten from Argos to Maina,
with the assurance that all the disputes between the Greek
government and the family of Mavromichales should be
promptly and satisfactorily arranged if Janni would come
in person to Nauplia. George believed Capodistrias ; Janni
believed George, and accompanied his nephew to the seat
of government. The president soon violated his word. He
put Janni under arrest, and ordered prosecutions to be com-
menced against both him and his son Katzakos, who had
attempted to assassinate his own cousin Pierakos.

In the month of January 1831, Katzakos escaped from
Argos, and about the same time Petrobey left Nauplia to
return to Maina in General Gordon's yacht, which happened
to sail for Zante. An insurrection had already broken out
under the leading of Constantine, one of the bey's brothers.
The yacht, not being able to touch at Maina, landed the
bey at Katakolo, where he was immediately arrested, and
sent back to Nauplia as a state prisoner. He was now
detained on a charge of treason, and a committee of the
senate, with Viaro for chairman, prosecuted the action against
him. He was accused of inciting a rebellion in Maina,
and of deserting his duty as a senator ^. An extraordinary
tribunal, with his prosecutor Viaro as president, was created
to try him, and he was imprisoned as a criminal in Itch-kale.
About the same time Constantine Mavromichales was decoyed

* The report of the committee is given in Eynard's Lettres et Documents, 127.
It forms a general act of impeachment against the whole family.

ASSASSINA TION OF CAPODISTRIAS. 7 1

A.D. 1831.]

on board ship by Kanares and carried to Nauplia, where he
and George were placed under arrest.

Public sympathy was now strongly awakened in favour
of the Mavromichales family. It was thought that Petrobey
was severely treated, Constantine unfairly entrapped, and
George unjustly detained. Constantine and George were
allowed to walk about freely within the fortress of Nauplia,
attended by two guards during the day. They were loud
in their complaints. The mother of Petrobey, an old lady
approaching her ninetieth year, petitioned the president to
release the bey, who remained in prison untried. No proof
could be found of his complicity in his brother's insurrection,
and it was not a crime for a senator to quit Nauplia without a
passport. It was reported that both the Russian minister
Baron Riickmann and Admiral Ricord advised the president
to release Petrobey. It is certain that Capodistrias consented
to allow the prisoner to dine on board the Russian flag-ship
at Admiral Ricord's invitation. It was generally supposed
that this permission implied a pardon for past offences ; and
when Petrobey, on quitting Admiral Ricord's table, was con-
ducted back to prison, even the partizans of the president
were astonished at his conduct. It seems that Admiral
Ricord had assured several persons that he would persuade
the president to release the bey, and that his interference
irritated Capodistrias, who became frequently peevish and
changeable after the affair of Poros. Constantine and George
were exasperated and alarmed by what they supposed to be
a sudden and unfavourable change in the president's views.

On the 9th of October at early dawn, three days after
Petrobey's visit to Admiral Ricord, Capodistrias walked as
usual to hear mass in the church of St, Spiridion. As he
approached the low door of the small church, he saw Constan-
tine Mavromichales standing on one side and George on the
other. He hesitated for a moment, as if he suspected that
they wished to address him, and would willingly have avoided
the meeting. But after a momentary pause, he moved on to
enter the church. Before he reached the door he fell on the
pavement mortally wounded by a pistol-ball in the back of
the head. In the act of falling he received the stab of a
yataghan through the lungs, and he expired without uttering
a word.

72 PRESIDENCY OF CAPODISTRIAS.

Two guards were in attendance on the Mavromichales, and
two orderlies accompanied the president. The assassins
attempted to save themselves by flight. The pistol of one
of the orderlies wounded Constantine, who was overtaken
and slain. His body was carried to the square, where it
remained exposed naked to the insults of the populace for
several hours. It was then dragged through the streets and
thrown into the sea.

The whole town was alarmed by the report of the pistols ;
the news of the president's assassination spread instantane-
ously, and the whole population poured into the streets. .|
Yet George Mavromichales succeeded in escaping into the
house of the French resident, though at a considerable
distance from the scene of the murder. A furious mob
followed close at his heels, and demanded that he should
be delivered up. His pursuers proclaimed themselves the
avengers of blood, and threatened to force open the doors
of the French residency and tear the assassin to pieces.
Baron Rouen informed them that France must protect the
refugee until a formal demand was made for his surrender
to justice by the lawful authorities. In a few hours the
demand was made ; but to save the criminal from the ven-
geance of the people, it was found necessary to convey him
to the insular fort of Burdje. His guilt was unquestionable,
the proof was incontestable. He was condemned by a council
of war, and executed on the 22nd of October.

Greece had been depraved by the tyranny of Capodistrias ;
she was utterly demoralized by his assassination. She ex-
changed the sufferings of illegality for the tortures of anarchy.

The name of Capodistrias remained for some time a party
spell, but time has proved the avenger of truth. His talents,
his eloquent state papers, and his private virtues, receive their
merited praise ; but with all his sophistry, his cunning insi-
nuations, and false pretences, they proved insufficient to
conceal the wrongs which his vicious system of administration
inflicted on Greece.

CHAPTER III.

Anarchy — 9TH October 1831 to ist February 1833.

Governing commission refuses to grant a general amnesty. — Second national
assembly at Argos. — Romeliot military opposition. — Agostino president of
Greece. — Romeliots expelled from Argos. — Sir Stratford Canning's memo-
randum.— Romeliots invade the Morea. — Conduct of the residents. — Agostino
ejected from the presidency. — Governing commission. — State of Greece. —
Anarchy. — French troops garrison Nauplia. — Djavellas occupies Patras. —
Kolokotrones rallies the Capodistrians. — National assembly at Pronia. — Con-
stitutional liberty in abeyance. — Intrigues of the senate. — Municipal institu-
tions arrest the progress of anarchy in the Morea. — Condition of Messenia. —
Positioa of Kolokotrones and Kolettes. — True nature of the municipal institu-
tions in Greece not generally understood. — Attack on the French troops at
Argos. — Establishment of the Bavarian dynasty.

(JThe assassination of Capodistrias destroyed the whole
edifice of his government, which for some time had derived
an appearance of stability from nothing but his talents and
personal influence. The persons whom he had selected to
act as his ministers and official instruments employed his
name as their aegis, and rallied round his brother Agostino,
who had been treated as the president's heir, from motives of
flattery, at a time when no one contemplated the possibility of
his ever succeeding to power.

The senate was filled with the most daring and unprin-
cipled partizans of the Capodistrian policy. A few hours
after the president's murder it appointed a governing com-
mission to exercise the executive power until the meeting
of the national a.ssembly. This commission consisted of
three members — Count Agostino Capodistrias, Kolokotrones,
and Kolettes. Agostino was named president. His incapa-
city, joined to the irreconcileable hostility between the other
two members, induced the senate to believe that it could

74 ANARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.III.

retain the powers of government in its own hands. The
people judged more correctly, and prognosticated an ap-
proaching civil war. A general amnesty for political offences
was instinctively felt to be the only means of preserving any
degree of order. A few political leaders and military chief-
tains, who desired to fish in troubled waters, determined to
frustrate all attempts at pacification. A large body of well-
paid Moreot troops looked to Kolokotrones as their leader ;
a still larger number of the veteran soldiers of continental
Greece, wdiose pay was in arrear, considered Kolettes as their
political advocate.

The municipality of Syra made a vain endeavour to consign
past contentions to oblivion by acknowledging the authority
of the governing commission. The constitutionalists at Hydra
made conciliatory proposals to the new executive. They
asked for a general amnesty for all political offences except
the assassination of the president, and they required that the
governing commission should be increased to five members
by the aggregation of two persons chosen from among the
constitutionalists. These proposals were rejected with dis-
dain. Count Agostino pretended that a national assembly
could alone grant a general amnesty, and the members of the
commission, in order to avoid receiving two colleagues, declared
that they had no power to enlarge the executive body. The
reply was evasive, and felt to be insulting. The exiles only
wished a guarantee against governmental prosecutions until the
meeting of the national assembly, and they knew that the
senate had the power to add to the body it had created.

The contest for absolute power by the Capodistrians, and
for life and property as well as liberty by the constitutionalists,
was now resumed with embittered animosity. Both parties
saw that their safety could only be secured by the command
of a devoted majority in the national assembly, and both
prepared to secure success in the coming elections by force of
arms. Hydra was kept closely blockaded by the Russian
fleet.

The influence of the Capodistrians in the Morea gave them
a considerable majority in the second national assembly at
Argos ; but they derived much of their authority as a party
from the open support of the Russian admiral, Ricord. In
some places, the Capodistrians, though they formed a mino-

SECOND ASSEMBL V OF ARGOS. 75

V.D. 1S3I.]

rity, obtained the assistance of a military force, and held a
meeting, in which they elected a deputy, in violation of every
legal and constitutional form. Yet these deputies were
received into the assembly, and their elections were declared
valid. Both parties circulated atrocious calumnies against
their opponents. The Capodistrians accused the French and
English of being privy to the assassination of the president.
Agostino boasted of his hatred to the French. He dismissed
General Gerard from his command in the Greek army, and he
intimated to General Gueheneuc, who commanded the French
army of occupation in the Morea, that the financial condition
of the country imposed on the Greek government the obliga-
tion of observing the strictest economy in paying foreigners.
On receiving this intimation the French general immediately
recalled all the French officers in the Greek service, in order
to prevent their being dismissed in the same manner as
General Gerard. The constitutionalists at Hydra spread a
report that the murdered president had bribed six Hydriot
traitors to assassinate the leaders of the opposition ; and it
was generally believed that Agostino and Admiral Ricord had
sworn to send Miaoulis, and all the sailors who had taken part
in the-affair of Poros, to Siberia.

The proximity of Argos to the garrison of Nauplia and to
the Russian fleet gave the Capodistrians the command of
the town. The deputies of Hydra were not even allowed to
land at Lerna, for it was considered to be the safest way
to exclude opposition. Those of Maina were stopped at
Astros. To prevent even a murmur of dissatisfaction with
the actual government from being heard in the assembly, the
senate named a commission, which was ordered to verify the
election of each deputy before he was allowed to take his seat
in the assembly. This unconstitutional proceeding was sup-
posed to have been counselled by Russia, and awakened very
general dissatisfaction even in the Capodistrian party.

;The military chiefs of continental Greece came to the
assembly as deputies from the districts in which they pos-
sessed local influence, or to which the majority of their
followers belonged. They cared little for constitutional
liberty, but they were now ready to join any opposition,
unless they were allowed to receive the high pay and ample
rations which were enjoyed by the followers of Kolokotrones

76 ANARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.III.

and the other Capodlstrian chiefs. Kolettes was in a position
to assist them in their object, and they had not forgotten the
hberaUty with which he had poured the proceeds of the
Enghsh loans into their hands. Kolettes was not a babbler,
like most Greek statesmen. The astute Vallachian could
assume an oracular look and remain silent when he wished
to conceal his thoughts. In the present case, his prudence
led Agostino and his counsellors to suppose that he was
intent on retaining his place in the executive body. But
it was evident that a number of the continental chiefs would
openly oppose the election of Agostino to the presidency of
Greece, even though Kolettes might remain neutral. It was
resolved to crush this opposition before it could make common
cause with the constitutionalists. Several Romeliot captains
belonged to the Capodistrian party; of these the most influ-
ential were the Suliot chief Kitzos Djavellas, and Rhangos,
a captain of armatoli, who on one occasion, as has been
already mentioned, joined the Turks.

The Romeliot chiefs came to Argos attended by bands
of followers, who. according to the established usage of
Greece, were supplied with rations by the government. In
this way the partizans of Kolettes assembled about five
hundred good soldiers at Argos. All these men had claims
for arrears of pay, and most of them had individual grievances,
which Capodistrias had neglected to redress. Kolettes warmly
supported their claims, and assured them that he would do
everything in his power to obtain justice. He was aware that
he must unite his cause with theirs, for without their support
his political influence would be annihilated. He was distrusted
by Agostino, disliked by Admiral Ricord, and hated by
Kolokotrones.

For some days before the opening of the assembly, the
diff'erent factions employed their time in arranging their plans.
Some individuals doubtless acted from patriotic motives, but
the conduct of the majority of the Romeliots, as well as of
the Capodistrians, was guided by self-interest and personal
ambition.

The Romeliot chiefs, finding themselves in a minority,
demanded that the constitutional deputies who had met at
Hydra should be allowed to take their seats in the assembly.
This demand was rejected, on the ground that new deputies

ROM ELIOT OPPOSITION. 77

I A.D.I 83 1.]

had been elected, and that these new elections had received
the sanction of the commission named by the senate. The
! Romeliots then drew up a protest containing a declaration
I of their principles ^ They characterized the nomination of
! the governing commission by the senate as an illegal act ;
J they objected to the appointment of the commission to verify
; the elections of deputies by the senate as an unconstitutional
; infringement of the right of the national assembly ; and they
proclaimed their adhesion to the following principles and
resolutions : That national union ought to precede the meet-
ing of a national assembly ; that the national assembly ought
to verify the elections of its members, and appoint its own
guard, as on former occasions. The order in which the con-
stitutional rights of the nation were to be discussed was also
fixed, and resolutions were proposed, relative to the choice of
a sovereign and to the nature of the provisional government
which was to act until his arrival. The attempt to interfere
with the proceedings of the Allied cabinets displeased their
diplomatic agents at Nauplia, and inclined them to favour
Agostino and the Capodistrians.

The rival parties trusted more to force than to right. Each
assumed that it was the national party, and two hostile as-
semblies were opened on the same day.

The deputies of the Capodistrian party, to the number of a
hundred and fifty, met on the 17th of December 1831 in the
church of the Panaghia, and, after taking the prescribed oath,
walked in procession to the schoolhouse, which had been
fitted up as the place of meeting for the national assembly.
A strong guard, under the command of Kitzos Djavellas, and
an escort of cavalry, under Kalergi, insured a public triumph
to the Capodistrians. They met in security, elected their
president, issued a proclamation, and proceeded to business.

The Romeliots were not strong enough to make any public
display ; but they also held their meeting, elected their pre-
sident, and issued their proclamation. They called upon the
residents of the Allied powers, as protectors of Greece, to
enforce a general amnesty, and they invited the French troops
in the Morea to occupy Argos in order to preserve order.
The residents, knowing that neither party was disposed to

1 Dated i8th (30th) November, 1831.

78 ANARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.IlI.

obey the law or listen to the dictates of justice, allowed things
to take their course.

On the 20th December, Agostino Capodistrias was elected
president of Greece, and invested with all the authority which
had been conferred on his murdered brother. He and Kolo-
kotrones had already resigned their power as members of the
governing commission named by the senate, into the hands of
the national assembly. Kolettes, not recognising the Capo-
distrian assembly, and not having resigned his power, pre-
tended to be the only man now entitled to conduct the
executive government.

The Capodistrians feared that, if the Romeliots were allowed
time to summon the deputies from Hydra and Maina to their
aid, they might be strong enough to overthrow the govern-
ment. To prevent this, it was resolved to expel the Romeliot
chiefs from Argos before additional troops could arrive to
reinforce Kolettes' partizans. Agostino Capodistrias, Admiral
Ricord, Kolokotrones, Metaxas, and Djavellas all agreed that
an immediate attack was necessary to insure victory. Once
driven beyond the Isthmus of Corinth, the Romeliots might
be treated as lawless bands of brigands intent on plunder.

A Russian lieutenant named Raikoff, who had been pro-
moted by Capodistrias to the rank of colonel, was summoned
from Nauplia, with four guns and a company of artillerymen,
to assist the government troops already in Argos. Raikoff
was a warm partizan, and pretended to be a confidential agent
of Russian policy. Strengthened by this reinforcement, the
troops of Agostino attacked the Romeliots. A fierce civil
war was carried on in the streets of Argos for two days, before
the Romeliots, though inferior in number and ill supplied with
ammunition and provisions, were expelled from the town and
compelled to retreat to Corinth.

Sir Stratford Canning arrived at Nauplia to be a witness to
these proceedings. The three powers had at last come to an
agreement on Greek affairs, and selected a Bavarian prince to
be king. Sir Stratford was on his way to Constantinople as
English ambassador to obtain the sultan's recognition of the
Greek kingdom, and he visited Nauplia to announce to the
Greeks the arrangements which had been adopted by the
Allies, and to prepare them to receive their king with order
and unanimity. Sir Stratford found that Agostino was a fool

SIR STRATFORD CANNING. 79

A.D. I S3!.]

utterly incapable of appreciating either his own position or
that of Greece, and he counselled conciliatory measures, and
urged the necessity of moderation, in vain. The empty head
of the Corfiot was inflated with presumption. Before quitting
Greece, Sir Stratford communicated to Agostino a memor-
andum on the state of the country, urging him in strong terms
to terminate the civil war he had commenced ^ Though the
observations in this document produced no effect on the
Greek government, and very little on the ulterior conduct of
Mr. Dawkins, Baron Rouen, and Baron de Riickmann, the
residents of the three Allied powers at Nauplia, yet they were
so judicious that they made a deep impression on the min-
isters in conference at London. The anarchy in Greece
threatened to render Sir Stratford's mission to the sultan use-
less ; and he warned Agostino that, by destroying the houses
of the peaceful inhabitants of Argos, and plundering their
shops, as a prelude to a bloody intestine war, Greece pro-
claimed herself in the face of Europe to be unworthy of the
independent position as a nation to which the Allied powers
were endeavouring to elevate her. This memorandum was
supported by formal notes of the residents, recommending
Agostino to publi-sh a general amnesty and convoke a free
national assembly. But shortly after the departure of Sir
Stratford from Greece, the residents ceased to insist on the
measures they had advised ; and Admiral Ricord, who had
never moderated the violence of his language, continued to
encourage the Capodistrians to push their attacks on the con-
stitutionalists with vigour. He gave them hopes of being able
to expel the French army of occupation from the Morea, and
he pointed out to them the necessity of perpetuating their
authority by forcing themselves on the new sovereign as
ministers and senators. The position of the French troops
who were protecting Messenia from being plundered by the
Mainates was rendered so confined, that they were obliged
to drive the Capodistrian troops out of the town of Nisi,
in order to keep open their communications with their head-
quarters at Modon, and secure a safe passage to the peasantry
who brought provisions to their camp.

The political atmosphere of Europe was too troubled during

1 Parliamefitary Papers, Annex A to the Fiotocol of 7th March, 1832. The
memorandum is dated 28th December, 1831.

8o ANARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. Ill

the year 1831 to enable the Allies to bestow more than a!
casual glance at the affairs of Greece, whose unsettled con-;
dition was gradually destroying the importance of the country
in the solution of what statesmen called the Eastern question.
The attention of Great Britain and France was absorbed by
the creation of the kingdom of Belgium ; Russia was occupied
with the insurrection of Poland. But during the winter the
condition of Europe became more tranquil, and the fate of
Greece was again taken into consideration. On the 7th
January 1832 a protocol was signed, authorizing the residents
at Nauplia to recognise the provisional government named-
by the national assemlDly, which, it was supposed, was a free
meeting. On receiving this protocol, the residents, who knew
that Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum was on its way
to London, thought fit to recognise Agostino Capodistrias
as president of Greece. On the 13th of February another
protocol was signed, offering the throne of Greece to Prince
Otho, a boy seventeen years old, the second son of the King
of Bavaria ^.

In the mean time the Romeliots were preparing to avenge
their defeat at Argos. Their preparations went on slowly,
until they heard that the Allies had chosen a king for Greece.
They saw immediately that it was necessary to overthrow
the government of Agostino, in order to have a share in
welcoming the new monarch, and a claim to participate in
the distribution of wealth and honours which would take place
on the king's arrival.

After their retreat from Argos, the Romeliots formed a
camp at Megara. The meeting, which arrogated to itself the
'title of a national assembly, met at Perachora, where it was
strengthened by the arrival of the deputies from Hydra and
Maina. Kolettes was supported by most of the eminent
men in Greece. Konduriottes, Miaoulis, Mavromichales, and
Mavrocordatos, and a respectable body of constitutional
deputies, sanctioned his proceedings. But the Romeliots
looked to arms and not to justice for victory. Constitu-
tional liberty was a good war-cry, but military force could

^ Everything that can be urged in favour of this unfortunate choice will be
found in Thiersch, De Vtltat actml de la Grece, i. 308-314. Before the election,
Thiersch, who was one of the prince's teachers, considered that it would be abso-
lutely necessary for King Otho to join the Greek Church, i. 313.

CONDUCT OF THE RESIDENTS. 8 1

A.D. 1832.] /""l

alone open the road to power. The numbers of armed men
collected at Megara at last rendered an advance on Nauplia
necessary to procure subsistence. Every effort that revenge,
party zeal, and sincere patriotism could suggest, was employed
to urge on the soldiers. Commissions were distributed with
a lavish hand among the bravest veterans. Civilians were
suddenly made captains. Kolettes and the military chieftains
cared nothing for moral and political responsibility ; their
sole object was to conquer power, and about the means they
were quite indifferent. Mavrocordatos and the constitution-
alists felt that the recognition of Agostino's government by
the residents cut off all hope of a general amnesty, a free
national assembly, or a legal administration, without a decided
victory of the Romeliots. It was thought that the residents
would not venture to employ the forces of the Allies to
support a government which had rejected their own advice
as well as the warnings of Sir Stratford Canning. The
Greek leaders knew that none of the residents possessed
the firm character, any more than the enlightened views, of
Sir Stratford, and it was inferred with diplomatic sagacity
that the instructions received with the protocols of the 13th
and 14th February 1H32 would place the residents in a false
position with their cabinets ^. Their recognition of a govern-
ment illegally constituted had rendered the pacification of
Greece impossible without further violence. Agostino, less
sagacious than the constitutionalists, believed that his recog-
nition by the residents was equivalent to a guarantee on the
part of the Allied powers ; and he expected to see the
troops of France support him at the Isthmus of Corinth as
decidedly as the fleet of Russia had supported his brother
at Poros.

At this late hour the residents made a feeble attempt to
avert a civil war. They invited the general commanding
the French army of occupation to occupy the Isthmus of
Corinth, and authorized Professor Thiersch, who had visited
Greece as an unrecognized agent of the Bavarian court, to
negotiate with the deputies and military chiefs at Perachora
and Megara. Thiersch favoured the constitutional party. He

' Thiersch has published a letter in which Mavrocordatos examines the state of
public affairs in Greece at this time with ability and moderation ; vol. i. p 327.

VOL. VII. G

8a ANARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.IlI. :

had been long in communication with the Philhellenic com- ;
mittees on the continent. In the year 1829 he had advocated L
the election of Prince Otho to the sovereignty of Greece, |
and he had communicated with the Bavarian court on the
subject. The object of his present tour was understood to |
be, to prepare the minds of the Greeks for the choice of a *
Bavarian prince ; and now, when Otho was elected king, he
stepped forward as a diplomatic agent of Bavaria, and was
treated as such both by the residents and by the leaders of
all parties among the Greeks.

The prudence of the constitutionalists, and the passions -
of the military chiefs, rejected every arrangement based on
the continuance of the presidency of Agostino and the rati-
fication of the acts of the assembly by which he had been
elected. The mission of Thiersch failed, and its failure ren-
dered the position of Agostino untenable. Those who had
hitherto supported him perceived that they had ruined their
cause by placing too much power in his hands, and by
attempting to prolong his authority beyond the legal majority
of the king chosen by the protecting powers ^. Agostino
determined to cling to power, but the rapid advance of the
Romeliots soon dispelled his hopes of Russian support and
hi^visions of future greatness.

(fOw the 6th of April the government troops stationed at
the Isthmus of Corinth fled before the constitutionalists
without offering any resistance. The heroes of the sack of
Poros, the cavalry of Kalergi, knd the generalship of Kolo-
kotrones, the veteran commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian
army, were unable to retard the advance of the invaders, who
marched straight to Argos. The residents were now in an
awkward and not very honourable position. By an extra-
ordinary piece of good luck they were relieved from the
foolish part they were acting. On the very day the Romeliot
troops entered Argos, the protocol of the 7th March 1832
arrived at Nauplia, and they were instructed to carry out
the principles of Sir Stratford Canning's memorandum. It
was easy for them to treat their recognition of Agostino's
presidency as a temporary expedient, adopted to avoid a

1 Thiersch records the arguments used by the Capodistrian party for investing
Agostino with the regency and deferring the majority of King Otho to the age of
35; De TEtat achiel de la Grcce, i. 84.

ie:

AGOSTINO EJECTED. 83

jA.D. 1832.]

icivil war, until they received the definitive instructions now
placed in their hands. The memorandum declared 'that the
interests of the Greeks, and the honour of the Allies, required
a system of provisional government calculated to preserve
the country from anarchy.' This could, in the present crisis
of affairs, only be attained by ejecting Agostino from the
presidency.

On the 8th of April they addressed a vague diplomatic
note to the president they had recognized, inviting him to
contribute to the execution of the protocol of the 7th of
March. Agostino, trusting to the secret aid of Admiral
Ricord, replied with a request for a copy of the document

I to which they alluded, and which had not yet been officially
communicated to the Greek government. The residents were
alarmed at his endeavour to gain time, and, their own interests
being at stake, they proceeded with great promptitude to
eject him from office. His incapacity secured them an easy
victory in a personal interview. Without wasting their time

I in composing diplomatic notes, they walked to the govern-

I ment-house, while Agostino was still chuckling at his supposed
victory over the diplomatists, entered his presence, and informed
him without ceremony that he must immediately send his

I resignation to the senate. So far their conduct was extremely
judicious, but they had not the clear heads which enable
men to stop short in action at the precise limit of justice
and prudence. In the spirit of diplomatic meddling, which
involves nations in as much embarrassment as military am-
bition, they made the ejected president add a recommendation
to the senate to appoint a commission of five persons to
govern Greece until the king's arrival. Agostino was rendered
amenable to their orders by a hint that any delay would
produce a decree of the senate deposing him from the presi-
dency. Convinced that his cause was hopeless, he wrote
his resignation in the manner they desired, and quitted
Greece, with the body of his murdered brother, in a Russian
ship.

The expedient of establishing peace by a diplomatic com-
promise, after allowing every passion which civil war excites
to rage for three months, was a violation of common sense
that could not prove successful. The same diplomatists had
refused to prevent a civil war by enforcing a compromise

G 3

84 ANARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. Ill,

before the opening of the assembly at Argos ; yet they now
imagined that their interference would avert anarchy. As
a little foresight might have predicted, the Romeliot troops
paid very little attention to these manoeuvres. They were
resolved to reap the fruits of their victory, and it was not
by naming a commission in which a hostile senate would
be able to secure a majority that this end could be attained.
Foreign interference rarely saves a nation from the direct
consequences of its own vices, and anarchy was the natural
result of the repeated illegalities which every party in Greece
had committed.

The conduct of the residents deserves reprehension. They
evidently thought more of concealing their own incapacity
and inconsistency than of serving the cause of the Greeks,
in the measures they adopted for carrying the protocol of
the 7th of March into execution. They established a phantom
of government, which they knew would be unable to pacify
the country, because it appeared to them to offer the political
combination least at variance with their own proceedings.
Had they endeavoured to act in accordance with the laws
and institutions of Greece, it is possible that they might
have failed in preventing the Greeks from falling into a
state of anarchy, but they would have saved themselves from
all reproach. When the senate first assumed illegal powers,
it was the duty of the residents to refuse to recognize its
illegal acts. In the present crisis, had they paid any attention
to the constitution of Greece, even as established by Capo-
distrias, they would have recommended the representation of
both parties in the senate, and avoided the incongruity of
composing an executive government of two hostile factions.
The Russian resident wished the senate to remain unaltered,
as it consisted entirely of Russian partizans, and was com-
pletely under the guidance of Admiral Ricord. But the
English and French residents knew that its composition
rendered the pacification of Greece impossible. The English
resident, however, moved partly by jealousy of French in-
fluence, and partly by distrust of Kolettes' character, adopted
the Russian policy concerning the immutability of the senate,
and consented to transfer the contest of the hostile parties
from the legislative assembly, where it might elicit argument,
to the executive power, where it could only produce anarchy.

STATE OF GREECE. ^t

AD. T832.I ^

In conformity with the suggestion conveyed in the resig-
nation of the presidency by Agostino, the senate named five
persons whom the residents indicated as a governing com-
mission. When the RomcHots heard the names that were
pleasing to the diplomatists, they treated the election with
contempt, and marched forward to attack Nauplia. The
fortress was impregnable, but they had many staunch partizans
within its walls, and expected to enter without much difificulty.
The senate was terrified ; the residents had again thrust
themselves into a false position. It was necessary to effect
a new diplomatic compromise, and for this purpose Kolettes
was invited to confer with the diplomatists at the house of
the French resident.

On the loth of April Kolettes rode into Nauplia in
triumph. He had now the nation, the army, the senate, and
the three protecting powers at his feet. Unfortunately for
the Greeks, with all his talents as an intriguer, he had neither
the views of a statesman nor the principles of a patriot. He
had climbed to the elevation of a Cromwell or a Washington,
and he stood in his high position utterly incompetent to act
with decision, and prevented by his own absolute incapacity
from serving either the constitutional cause or the interests
of the Romeliot troops who had raised him to power.

Fourteen days were consumed in diplomatic shuffling and
personal intrigues before the names of a new governing com-
mission were finally settled. It was then composed of seven
members, and not of five, as recommended by the residents.
The constitution of Greece was grossly violated by this
election ; for the senate, at the instigation of the diplomatists,
invested this governing commission with the executive power
until the king's arrival, though both by law and invariable
practice it was only entitled to confer that power until the
meeting of a national assembly, when it required to be ratified
or reconstituted by a decree of the representatives of the
nation. The object of the Capodistrians was to prevent the
national assembly electing a president of the constitutional
party. They even succeeded in paralyzing the action of the
constitutionalists in the governing commission, by enacting
that the presence of five members was necessary to give
validity to its decisions. Now, as there were two staunch
Capodistrians in the commission, and one constitutional

86 ANARCHY. ^

[Bk.V.Ch.III;

member, who was too ill to attend, it was evident that the
two Capodistrians could arrest the action of the executive
authority at any crisis by preventing a decision. Three
members of the commission, Kolettes, Konduriottes, and
Zaimes, were supposed to represent the constitutional oppo-
sition to the Capodistrian system ; but the residents and
the leading Capodistrians were aware that Zaimes was
already a renegade. Two members were recognized to be the
representatives of the Romeliot troops — Prince Demetrius
Hypsilantes and Kosta Botzaris^. Two members, as has been
said, were staunch Capodistrians — Metaxas and Koliopulos or
Plapoutas. This executive commission had a cabinet com-
posed of seven ministers, who were all constitutionalists ;
but with the exception of Mavrocordatos, they w^ere men
without administrative knowledge, mere rhetoricians, who
could clothe commonplace thoughts in official Greek. Even
Mavrocordatos was misplaced as minister of finance. These
ministers were severely blamed for accepting office without
fixing a day for the meeting of the national assembly, and
without insisting that the power of the governing commission
should terminate when the assembly met. Their friends
excused their neglect of constitutional principles by pleading
the power of the residents ; but those who scanned their
political lives with attention, observed that they frequently
contrived to advance their own interests by sacrificing the
cause they adopted ^.

Public opinion demanded the immediate convocation of a
national assembly. To save the country from anarchy it
was necessary to reconstitute the senate, according to the
principles of conciliation laid down in Sir Stratford Canning's
memorandum, and it might have been found necessary to
throw the responsibility of maintaining order on Kolettes by
creating him dictator. But the residents, the Russian admiral.

1 Hypsilantes expressed his repugnance to become a member of this commission
in strong terms, and his observations exhibit good sense and patriotism, but he was
persuaded by his friends to withdraw his objections. He was aheady suffering
from the disease which soon after terminated his life. His letter is given by
Thiersch (i. 369). In mentioning the nomination of Kosta Botzaris, Thiersch
observes (i. 381) that the Romeliot Greeks still regarded the Albanian tribe of
isuliots with jealousy.

'-' Christides was Minister of the Interior, and General Secretary of State;
Mavrocordatos. of Finance ; Tricoupi, of Foreign Affairs ; Zographos, of War ;'
Bulgares, of the Marine; Klonares, of Justice; and Rizos Neroulos, of Eccle-
siastical Afiairs and Public Instruction.

STATE OF GREECE. 87

A.D. 1 83 J.]

the senate, and the ministers in office, were all opposed to the
meeting of a national assembly.

The Capodistrian party soon recovered from its defeat.
It succeeded in retaining possession of a considerable portion
of the revenues of the Morea, and received active support
from Admiral Ricord. The Romeliots, after overthrowing
Agostino s government, daily lost ground. The commission
of seven was either unable or unwilling to reward their
services, and the soldiers soon determined to reward them-
selves. They treated the election of the commission as a
temporary compromise, not as a definitive treaty of peace,
and they marched into different districts in the Morea, to
take possession of the national revenues as a security for
their pay and rations. Wherever they established themselves,
they lived at free quarters in the houses of the inhabitants.

The financial administration of Mavrocordatos was not
calculated to moderate the rapacity of the troops. The
governing commission raised money by private bargains for
the sale of the tenths, and the proceeds of these anticipated
and frequently illegal sales were employed to reward personal
[)artizans, and not to discharge the just debts due to the
soldiers for arrears of pay. A small sum judiciously expended
would have sent many of the Romeliot troops to their native
mountains, where, as peace was now restored, they would
have willingly returned, had they been able to procure the
means of cultivating their property. The troops were neg-
lected, while favoured chieftains were allowed to become
farmers of taxes, or were authorized to collect arrears due
by preceding farmers. These proceedings gave rise to in-
tolerable exactions. The chieftains often defrauded their
followers of their pay, but they retained partizans by allowing
the soldiers to extort money and double rations from the
peasantry. Some drew pay and rations for a hundred men
without having twenty under arms. Numbers of soldiers
were disbanded, and roved backwards and forwards, plunder-
ing the villages, and devouring the sheep and oxen of the
peasants. Professor Thiersch informs us that the bands of
Theodore Grivas on the side of the constitutionalists, and
of Thanasopulos on the side of the Capodistrians, spread
terror wherever they appeared by their exactions and cruelty ^

' Grivas had taken into his pay a body of Mussulman Albanians. Compare

88 ' ANARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. III.

Eight thousand Romeliots were at this time Hving at free iplit*
quarters in the Morea, and it was said that they levied daily \W
from the population upwards of twenty thousand rations.
The governing commission solicited pecuniary advances from
the three protecting powers, pretending that they would
employ them for alleviating the misery of the people ; but i
the Allies wisely refused to advance money, which they
saw, by the misconduct of the government, would have been
wasted in maintaining lawless bands of personal followers
in utter idleness.

The position of the two hostile parties soon became clearly
defined. The greater part of the Morea adhered to the
Capodistrian party, as the surest means of obtaining defence
against the exactions of the Romeliot soldiery. Several
Moreot primates and deputies, who had hitherto acted with
the constitutionalists, now abandoned the cause of the govern-
ing commission. Even in Romelia the Capodistrians possessed
a rallying-point at Salona, where Mamoures maintained him-
self with a strong garrison. In the Archipelago, Tinos con-
tinued faithful to the Capodistrians, and served as a refuge
for the officials of the party who were expelled from the other
islands. Spetzas and Aegina were also prevented from
acknowledging the authority of the governing commission
by ships of war commanded by Andrutzos and Kanares.

All liberated Greece was now desolated by anarchy. Long
periods of mal-administration on the part of the government,
and a cynical contempt for justice and good faith on the part
of the civil and military leaders, had paralyzed the nation.
The Revolution, to all appearance, had been crowned with
success. The Turks were expelled from the country, and
Greece formed an independent state. Yet Greece was cer-
tainly not free, for the people were groaning under the most
cruel oppression. The whole substance of the land was
devoured by hosts of soldiers, sailors, captains, generals,
policemen, government officials, tax-gatherers, secretaries, and

Thiersch i. 71, 121, 123, 182. 'Les capitaines presque sans exception gardaient
I'argent pour eux, et les troupes resterent dans I'ancien etat d'exinanition' (p 123).
*Les plus grands desordres apparurent a la vente des dimes, oil il y eut un
commerage de capitaines, de primats, de hauts eniplo)-es. et pour ainsi dire des com-
pagnies organisees qui penetrerent meme dans quelques minisleres et jusqu'au
milieu du gouvernement ' (p. 182). It must be remembered that Professor
Thiersch is the panegyrist of Kolettes and a partizan of the Romeliots.

FRENCH GARRISON NAUPLIA. 89

A.D. 1832.]

political adventurers, all living idly at the public expense,
while the agricultural population was perishing from starvation.

Evil habits, and the difficulty of procuring the means of
subsistence, may form some excuse for the rapine of the
soldiery, but no apology can be offered for the conduct of
the members of the governing commission and of the
ministry, who increased the miseries of the people by their
malversations, or countenanced the dishonesty of their col-
' leagues by retaining office. Honour as well as patriotism
conmianded every man who had a sense of duty, either to
put a stop to the devastation of the country or resign his
place as a ruler or a minister. The tenacity with which those
■ who called themselves constitutionalists clung to office has
fixed an indelible stain on their political character, and
destroyed the confidence of the Greek people in the honesty
of public men. When Mavrocordatos, Tricoupi, Klonares,
and Zographos, abandoned the cause of civil liberty, they
destroyed all trust in the good faith of the statesmen of the
Greek Revolution. The immediate effect of their misconduct
was to constitute Theodore Kolokotrones, the veteran klepht,
the champion of the people's rights \

Before the constitutional ministers had been a month in
office, their weakness had increased the insubordination of the
military classes, and their misconduct had alienated their own
partizans to such a degree, that they found it necessary to
invite the French troops to occupy Nauplia and Patras, as
the only means- of securing their personal safety and the
prolongation of their power.

On the 19th of May 1H32 General Corbet entered Nauplia ;
but at Patras the governing commission was not so fortunate

^ Alexander Soutzos echoes the popular feeling in a poem writ' en in August,
1S32:—

Ba);Uots «Js T^v hi\6voiav 'ara nddrj raiv vipcjvovv
ual Toiis Siairoras rwv fi alaxpas fJicvfiLas SiKaiwvovv.
aTrjv Se^tdv r-qs (pipnvaa to avvrayfj-a Kal vufxovs
Tj Avapxia fxl Kpavyds TrepnTaTii arovs 8pupiovs,
TloXiTiKol, TloXepuKol /x' dvaiSaav p.cynKrji'
wadv ol \vKot xaipovrai fis ttjv dvepiv^dXrjv,
dpird^ovv T(xs itpoaubovs pias, yvfivdivow jov Kaov fias,
teal d-neiOis Kal draKTOv to aTpaTicuTiKuv fias
adv dippiajxfvo d\oyov ttov ^aoTayfidv 8iv iX^'-< f-^A.
He also satirizes the high officials for their desertion of the cause of consti-
tutional liberty. One of them speaks thus : —
^ T<j (xwrayixd fias Kvpie ; — -to crvvTaypia as xopfvr).

B' fxrjnojs TO TravSpevdrjKapLe ; ds Tt /J.ds XPW-P'-^^^'' >

06 ANARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. III.

as to obtain French assistance, and that place fell into the
hands of the Capodistrians.

The loss of Patras was caused by gross negligence on the
part of Zographos, the minister of war. Ignorant of official
business, and absorbed in personal intrigues, he left the
Greek troops without instructions concerning their future
conduct. The regular troops in garrison at Patras had sup-
ported the Capodistrians while in power, but they were
disposed to obey the government, and not to follow the
personal fortunes of any president. The hostility of Kolettes
to the regular corps was notorious, and, through the neglect .
of Zographos, both the officers and men at Patras were easily
persuaded by the partizans of Russian influence that it was
the intention of the governing commission to disband the
regular troops. While brooding over this report, which
threatened them with the loss of a large amount of arrears
of pay, they heard that French troops were invited to garrison
Patras. They concluded that they were cheated by the
minister of war, and betrayed by the governing commission.
As long as they remained in garrison at Patras they were
sure of being regularly supplied with rations and clothing, and
of obtaining from time to time advances of pay; but once
expelled from the town, they believed that they would be
allowed to starve. The Capodistrians formed a strong party
in the town, and they availed themselves of the excited feel-
ings of the soldiers to declare, that regular troops who
delivered a fortress like Patras to foreigners would render
themselves guilty of treason. The constitutionalists had
accused Capodistrias of selling Greece to the Russians ; the
Capodistrians now accused the constitutionalists of selling
Nauplia and Patras to the French. The regular troops
mutinied^ deposed their commanding officer, who refused to
sign a manifesto justifying their revolt, and invited Kitzos
Djavellas, who was then at Vostitza, to assume the chief
command at Patras.

Djavellas, who had retreated from the Romeliots, was at
the head of about five hundred irregulars, and he was looking
out for a position in which he could maintain his followers^
and defend himself against the attacks of the Kolettists.
He hastened to Patras, and entered it before the arrival of
the French, When they made their appearance, Djavellas

DJAVELLAS OCCUPIES PATRAS. 9!

.D. 1832.]

ransmitted to their commanding officer a formal protest
igainst the authority of the governing commission^ and

cfused to admit the French troops into the fortress. The
l^'rench commander, considering that it was the object of
die Alhes to maintain order and not to enforce the authority
jf any party, immediately retired, and the residents, who
wished to avoid bloodshed, left Djavellas in peaceable pos-
session of Patras ^ Thus, by the incapacity of Zographos
and the decision of Djavellas, the Capodistrians remained in
[possession of the commercial town of Patras, and of the
fortresses of Rhion and Antirrhion, with the command of
the entrance into the Gulf of Corinth, until the arrival of
King Otho.

This success emboldened the enemies of Kolettes. A
[^rcat part of the Morea, and several districts of continental
( ireece, refused to admit the officials named by the governing
commission. The demogeronts, wherever they were sup-
ported by the people, assumed the management of public
as well as local business. They had been appointed by
Capodistrias. They feared anarchy more than despotism,

I ad they naturally sought protection from the military leaders
r the Capodistrian party. The greater part of Arcadia and
Achaia resisted the authority of the governing commission,
while Argolis, Corinthia, and Laconia, generally acknowledged
its power. Messenia and Elis were the scenes of frequent
civil broils. In Phocis the Capodistrians maintained their
ascendancy.

Kolokotrones, who held the rank of commander-in-chief of
the Peloponnesian militia, stepped forward as the defender
of the local authorities against the central government. His
personal interest, his party-connections, and his hatred of
Kolettes, determined his conduct. Had he acted from
patriotic motives he would have caught inspiration from the
high national position into which accident now thrust him.
The agricultural population was alarmed, and the astute old
klepht seized the favourable moment for uniting his cause
with the cause of the people, but his confined views and innate

' Thiersch has printed the correspondence of Djavellas. It must not be sup-
posed that the letters were really written by the Suliot chief, who could hardly
write a common note. Like most of the military documents of the Revolution,
they were composed by a secretary. Nothing has falsified the history of the Greek
Revolution more than the ambitious eloquence of pedantic secretaries.

92 ANARCHY.

[Bk.v. ch.m.
selfishness prevented his employing the power thus placed at
his disposal for the general good.

Kolokotrones called the Peloponnesians to arms, and pro-
nounced the proceedings of the governing commission to be
illegal, in a proclamation dated the 22nd of June 1832 \
Metaxas and Plapoutas had informed him that they had
secured the co-operation of Zaimes in paralyzing the action
of the executive government. The Russian admiral prompted
him to proclaim that the senate was the only legitimate
authority in existence. The residents remained silent. Griva,
the most lawless of the Romeliot chiefs, advanced without
orders from the governing commission, and occupied Tri-
politza at the head of a thousand men. The Capodistrians
were already prepared to encounter the invaders of the Morea,
and Gennaios Kolokotrones, who had more military courao-e
though less political sagacity than his father, had already
formed a camp at Valtetzi.

The tide of success now flowed in favour of the Capodis-
trians. The advance of Griva was stopped. Elias Mavro-
michales was repulsed in his attempts to gain a footing in
the rich plain of Messenia. The Capodistrians under Kalergi
made a bold attempt to seize the mills at Lerna, but the
attempt was defeated, though it was openly favoured by the
Russian admiral. Civil war recommenced in many districts,
and bands of troops, who recognized no government, plundered
wherever they could penetrate.

The prudence of Kolokotrones, whom age had rendered
more of a politician than a warrior, might have led him to
avoid engaging in open hostilities against a government
acknowledged by the protecting powers, on the eve of the
king's arrival, had he been allowed to remain in undisturbed
possession of the profits which he drew from his ofifice as
commander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus. But the members
of the governing commission forced him into resisting their
authority by appointing Theodore Griva to the chief command
in the districts of Leondari and Phanari. The occupation
of these places by the Kolettists would have rendered j \.
Kolokotrones little better than a prisoner in Karitena. ' '

1 The original proclamation is printed by Gennaios Kolokotrones, in a work
entitled Aia</.opa iyypi,pa Knl kmaroKal dfopwuTa ras Kara to 18^2 avix^daas Hard
rrji' EWaSa wwjxaKias ical dvapx'ias, p. 214. Thiersch gives a translation, i. 395.

ASSEMBLY OF PRONIA. 93

\X). 1832.]

Amidst these scenes of anarchy a national assembly met
lit Pronia. The members of the governing commission, the
ministers in office, the senators, the residents of the AIHed
:)0vvers, and the Russian admiral, were all hostile to the
meeting. But a general amnesty before the king's arrival
was necessary for pacifying the country, and a general amnesty
rould not be proclaimed without the sanction of a national
assembly. It was also indispensable to obtain the assent of
'the nation to the election of the king chosen by the Allies.
A national assembly could not therefore be entirely dispensed
with, though it was feared that a national assembly would
abolish the senate and choose a new executive g^overnment.
Had a national assembly met immediately after the nomina-
tion of the governing commission, a civil war might have
been avoided by the election of a senate, in which both the
constitutionalists and Capodistrians, the Romeliots and the
Moreots, the Hyd riots, the Spetziots, and the Psarians, might
have been duly represented, and in which local interests might
have moderated factious passions. But the intrigues of Greek
politicians and foreign diplomatists delayed the meeting for
three months, and when it took place, old passions had been
rekindled with fiercer animosity by fresh injuries. The
\iolence of faction now exposed the corruption of political
society in Greece, without a veil, to the examination of
strangers. All ties were torn asunder in the struggle to
gratify individual selfishness. The Suliots, Djavellas and
Botzaris, fought on different sides. Hydriot primates were
found who deserted the cause of Hydra. The only great
political body into which patriotism was likely to find an
entrance, was the national assembly, and even there its voice
was in great danger of being overpowered by party zeal.
The illegal position and arrogant assumptions of the senate
caused much animosity, and the residents of the three powers
were distrusted, because they appeared in league to support
the illegal powers of the senate.

As soon as the assembly of Pronia met, a majority deter-
mined to abolish the senate, in spite of the open support
given to it by the residents. Many members believed that,
as the residents had tamely submitted to the armed opposition
of Djavellas at Patras, and had regarded with indifference the
renewal of the civil war by Griva, Kolokotrones, and Kalergi,

94 ANARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. III.

they would ofifer no opposition to the abolition of the senate.

The diplomatists, however, regarded the senate with peculiar

favour. They had made use of it to eject Agostino from

the presidency, and to create a new government. Its very

illegality made it a useful instrument, should it be necessary

to employ force to establish King Otho's authority, for its

abolition would always be a popular measure, and might serve

as a pretext for the assumption of absolute power. On the

other hand, the national assembly was considered to be doubly

dangerous, because it was legally invested with great power,

and not likely to be guided by the suggestions of foreign

diplomatists in making use of that power.

Such was the state of Greece and the condition of parties
when the national assembly of Pronia commenced its sittings.
Nothing presaged that it would be able to establish order in
the country ^

The assembly commenced its sittings on the 26th of July
1832. On the 1st of August it passed a decree proclaiming
a general amnesty, and on the 8th it ratified the election of
King Otho ; but on the same day it abolished the senate.
Of the legality of this measure there was no doubt, and had it
occurred immediately after the expulsion of Agostino, it
might have tranquillized Greece. Prudence now suggested
that its abolition had become impolitic, since the residents
had become its advocates ; and the majority of the assembly
would have acted judiciously, had it merely proposed to
remodel the existing senate on the principle of Sir Stratford
Canning's memorandum. But the constitutionalists formed a
large majority in the assembly, and they were irritated by
the conduct of the Greek ministers who had deserted the
constitutional cause. The senate was composed of Capodis-
trians, and it was adopting active measures to increase the
violence of the civil war which was desolating the country.
The governing commission and the Greek ministers took part
with the senate against the representatives of the nation ;

1 Professor Thiersch asserts that he could have restored order h.-id he been
furnished with 100,000 dollars. The assertion only proves that he knew very
little of arithmetic. It would not have sufficed to obtain the evacuation of the
Morea by one-half of the Romeliot irregulars who were plundering the peasantry.
He says, ' II y avait bien un moyen de sortir encore d'embarras. Je devais me
mettre a la tete des affaires, et commencer le gouvernement du roi,' vol. i. p. 167.
Had the worthy professor done so, in all probability he would have prevented
King Otho from coming to Greece.

ASSEMBLY OF PRONIA. 95

A.D. 1832.]

and the residents, taking advantage of this conduct on the
part of the executive, protested against the decree of the
national assembly, asserting that it was a violation of
the principles of the pacification they pretended to have
established.

Large bodies of Romeliot troops were quartered in the
village of Aria, at a short distance beyond Pronia. The
soldiers beset the gates of Nauplia and the doors of the
assembly every morning clamouring for pay. The governing
commission promised to pay their arrears ; but it failed to
keep its promise. The ministers were accused of deliberately
violating the promise of the government, in order to produce
the catastrophe which ensued, and their friends and the
senators were reported to have treacherously incited the
soldiers to demand payment from the national assembly.
On the 26th August the soldiers of Grigiottes burst into the
hall of the assembly, dragged the president from his seat,
insulted and ill-treated many deputies, and carried off the
president and several deputies, as hostages for the payment
of their arrears, to their quarters at Aria. This disgraceful
riot put an end to the last national assembly in revolutionary
Greece ^.

This scene of military violence forms an important event
in the history of Greece. It prolonged the revolutionary state
of the country for eleven years, by placing constitutional
liberty in abeyance. It threw the people into an unquiet

^ Papadopulos Vretos, an Ionian, was then Baron de Riickmann's doctor. He
tells us that he dined with the Russian resident the day after the dissolution of
the assembly. After dinner, the English resident, Mr. Dawkins, called and narra-
ted the following occurrence, which- makes the Ionian infer that the British cabinet
destroyed the liberty of Greece. He makes the English resident say, ' As I was
riding out yesterday with Griffith ' (his secretary, who spoke Greek well), ' we
were surrounded by a crowd of filthy palikaria, shouting and gesticulating like
demons. All spoke at the same time, and all appeared to be delivering set
speeches, so that the road was an oratorical pandemonium. When I could find an
opportunity to make myself heard, I asked Griffith what was the play they were
acting for our private edification. After many vain efforts he obtained a partial
hearing. The soldiers declared they had no bread, no clothes, and no money. It
would have been superfluous for them to have told any one who looked at them
that they were without credit. I saw that instantly. They wished my Excellency
to take their case into consideration and provide for their wants. I stated to them
that my functions did not allow me to become their commissary : but, pointing
with my whip to the hall of the national assembly, I said, that I believed there
were many persons in that bujlding who possessed great experience as com-
missaries and paymasters. They seized my hint with wonderful alacrity, and set
off running and whooping like wild Indians. Griffith and I took a long ride,
and when we returned in the evening we heard of the great event of the day.'
Melanges Politiques, p. 33.

q5 anarchy.

^ , [Bk.V. Ch.III.

and dangerous temper, by sweeping away those free insti-
tutions which had infused energy into the nation during its
struggle for independence. The executive power was made
the prize of a successful faction. The central government
was not established on a legal basis, and the military chiefs
ceased to acknowledge its control. Eleven years of Bavarian
domination was the expiation of the violence committed at
Pronia.

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes died in the month of August.
About the same time, a deputation, consisting of three mem-
bers, two of whom were members of the governing commission,
was sent to Munich with addresses of congratulation to the
kines of Greece and Bavaria ^ The commission was thus left
incomplete, for the presence of five members was required
to give validity to its acts. Yet on this occasion the residents
did not protest against the virtual dissolution of the executive
government of Greece. Greece surely stood in greater want
of a legal executive than of an illegal senate ; but the diplo-
matists looked on with indifference, while the governing
commission committed suicide.

Greece was now without any legal central authority. The
executive body was incompetent to act. The senate had been
abolished by the national assembly, and the national assembly
had been dissolved by the soldiery. The senate made the
protest of the foreign diplomatists a ground for prolonging
its existence. Three places in the governing commission
were vacant ; two had been occupied by constitutionalists,
one by a Capodistrian. The senate attempted to violate the
terms of the pacification sanctioned by the residents, and
named three Capodistrians. George Konduriottes, the pre-
sident, resisted this pretension, but, possessing neither the
talents nor the energy necessary for carrying on a contest
with the senate, he withdrew to Hydra. Only three mem-
bers of the government now remained at Nauplia — Kolettes,
Zaimes, and Metaxas — and they claimed the whole executive
power. It was generally felt that chance had made as good
a selection as it was possible to make under the circum-
stances. The senate yielded at last to public opinion, and
passed a decree investing these three men with the whole
executive power.

* Kosta Botzaris, Plapoutas, and Admiral Miaoulis.

INTRIGUES OF THE SENATE. 97

A.D. 1832.]

But the intrigues of Admiral Ricord soon determined
a majority of the senators to repudiate this decree, and all
Greece was astonished by the strange intelligence that seven
senators had secretly quitted Nauplia. On the 21st Novem-
ber these scceders were joined at Astros by the president,
Tsamados, and two additional members, and met by Koloko-
trones with a body of Moreot troops. Ten of the thirteen
senators who had signed the address to the King of Bavaria
were now present. They had carried with them the govern-
ment printing-press, and they issued proclamations annulling
the decree which had invested Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas
with the executive power until the king's arrival. Trusting to
the military force of the Capodistrian party under Koloko-
trones, and to the support of the Russian admiral, the seceders
cissumed the executive authority.

On this occasion, Kolettes, Zaimes, and Metaxas acted with
sense and courage. They took prompt measures to secure
urder and maintain their authority within the walls of Nauplia.
Beyond the fortress they were powerless. The residents
recognized them as the legal government, and the French
i garrison placed their persons in security.

The senate, having failed to produce a revolution, sought
revenge by increasing the existing anarchy. It appointed
a military commission to govern Greece, consisting of several
powerful chiefs. Kolokotrones, Grigiottes, Djavellas, and
Hadgi Christos, Moreots and Romeliots, Albanians and Bul-
garians, formed an alliance, and leagued together. Anarchy
reached such a pitch, that the minister of war, Zographos,
informed the minister of finance, Mavrocordatos, that it was
impossible to obtain an exact account of the numbers of the
soldiers who were drawing pay and rations. Of the number
of men actually under arms he had no idea^.

At first sight the conduct of the seceding senators looks
like the proceedings of maniacs ; but the Capodistrians had
never abandoned the scheme of Agostino, and they still
hoped, by seizing the forcible direction of the administration
in the greater part of the Morea, to compel the regency which
would govern Greece during the king's minority, to purchase
their support by appointing them senators for life. The

1 Rapport den Mmhtres, 2Sth November, 1832 ; Thiersch, i. 448.
VOL. VII. H

q8 anarchy.

^ [Bk. V. Ch. III.

Russian admiral supported them in their desperate schemes,
while the Russian resident, remaining passive, was at liberty
to disavow their proceedings in case of failure. It is needless
to follow these abo^rtive intrigues further. The senators,
finding that they had no chance of obtaining effectual support
from the Greeks, adopted the extraordinary expedient of
endeavouring to procure assistance from. Russia, by naming
Admiral Ricord president of Greece. This act of treason and
folly proves the justice with which Capodistrias had been,
reproached for selecting his senators from the most ignorant
and unprincipled political adventurers. Some persons have ■
supposed that there was malice as well as folly in the conduct
of the senators ; and that, though they were eager to proclaim
that they preferred Russian protection to Greek independence,
they also intended to hint to Admiral Ricord that it was his -
interest and the interest of other Russian agents to purchase
their silence in order to throw a veil over many intrigues.

Amidst the general anarchy, the commission of seven
generals was unable to place any restraint on the soldiery.
The men under arms no longer obeyed their officers, but
formed bands like wolves, hunting for their prey under the
boldest plunderer. A veil may be dropped on their pro-
ceedings. But it is of some importance to explain in what
manner a part of the Morea escaped their ravages.

The revival of the municipal institutions of the Morea at
this period has been already mentioned. The weakness of
the government relieved the local authorities from the incubus
of a tyrannical central administration, which had been imposed
on them by Capodistrias. The exigencies of the time forced
them to act without waiting for the initiative of ministers
and the orders of prefects. The condition of the country
and the agitation of the people again made the municipal
authorities feel that they were responsible to their fellow-
citizens, by whom they were supposed to be elected. They
were often called upon to make arrangements for quartering
and feeding troops, who came to defend or plunder the
country, as circumstances might determine. They were com-
pelled to collect the public revenues to meet these demands ;
to arm strong bodies of peasantry, and to form alliances with
neighbouring municipalities, in order to check the rapacity
of the soldiery. Their difficulties induced them to look to

MESSENIA. 99

A.D. 1S32.]

Kolokotrones for assistance, whose military force was so far
inferior to that of the Romeliots as to render it imperative
on him to form an alliance with the people. His office as
commander-in-chief in the Morea, and his personal relations
with most of the local magistrates chosen during the adminis-
tration of Capodistrias, pointed him out as the natural
defender of the agricultural population. The difficulty was
to make the old klepht feel that it was his interest to protect
and not to plunder ; that his robberies must be confined to
the central administration ; and that he must aid and not
command the local authorities. The end was partially
attained, and in many districts the demogeronts acquired
sufficient power to protect their municipalities against the
military chiefs of the Capodistrian faction, and to repulse the
attacks of the Romeliot troops.

The governing commission and the constitutional ministers
forfeited their claim to the allegiance of the Greeks, by their
neglect to restrain the exactions of the Romeliots, who had
raised them to power. Strangers had a better opportunity
if observing the evil effects of their misconduct in Messenia
than in other parts of the country, as the presence of the
French army of occupation enforced neutrality within certain
limits, and yet left free action to the rival factions in its
immediate vicinity

Great part of the rich plain which extends from Taygetus
to Ithome was national property. Statesmen and chieftains,
Romeliots and Moreots, were eager to become the farmers
of the public revenues. The bey of Maina and the whole
of his ambitious and needy family aspired to quarter them-
selves, with all their Mainate adherents, in this rich province.
The native peasantry and the opponents of the Mavromichales
were alike hostile to the pretensions of the Mainates. Party
intrigues were carried on in every village, and no province
was more tormented by the incessant strife which makes the
municipal administration of the Greeks a field for the exhi-
bition of strange paroxysms of selfishness. Some of the
demogeronts allied themselves with Kolokotrones ; some
discontented citizens formed connections with the family of
Mavromichales.

The presence of a French garrison at Kalamata com-
plicated the politics of the municipal authorities in Messenia.

H %

lOO ANARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. Ill,

Their local interests and personal feelings favoured the French,
who had protected them from being plundered by the Mai-
nates, and who afforded them a profitable market for their
produce. But the Capodistrian faction, excited by Koloko-
trones and Admiral Ricord, were indefatigable in calumniating
and intriguing against the French. The officers commanding
at Kalamata sought to tranquillize the people by inviting
the peasantry to pursue their labours, and by assuring the
demogeronts of their readiness to assist in maintaining order
in the neighbourhood of their encampment. But the partizans
of Kolokotrones pointed to the neutrality proclaimed by the .
residents at Nauplia, and to the retreat of the French troops
from Patras, as proofs that the French could not interfere
in the internal administration of Messenia. The French were
accused of being constitutionalists like the Mainates, and the
agricultural population feared the lawless conduct of the
adherents of the family of Mavromichales. Kolokotrones
had already convinced many that he was acting sincerely
as the protector of the people. To him, therefore, the
demogeronts of most of the villages in Messenia turned for
support.

Niketas came with a small body of chosen troops to protect
the agricultural population from invasion. The Mavromi-
chales were not deterred by these preparations for defence.
They had claims on the governing commission for their long
opposition to Capodistrias, which they did not think were
entirely cancelled by the assassination of the president. They
pretended that they were entitled to be the tax-gatherers
of Messenia, and their followers were eager to exchange the
black bread of lupin meal which formed their hard fare in
Kakovouli, for wheaten cakes and roast lambs ^

Elias Mavromichales, called Katzakos, invaded the district
between the lower ridges of Taygetus and the Pamisus more
than once at the head of three or four hundred men. But
his progress was always arrested by Niketas, who was a
better soldier, and who, in addition to his superior skill in
partizan warfare, was supported by the whole population
in the plain capable of bearing arms. The approach of the

1 Kakovouli, or the land of evil counsel. The lupins are ground after the pulse
has been long steeped in water to extract some injurious matter. The bread is
black, hard, and bitter.

laia

tie?
Ik

tarn'
itinii

toll

lau

lant
and

c;i„

i'ii;

ipp

KOLOKOTRONES AND KOLETTES. lOI

A.D. 1832.]

Mainates caused excessive terror, and the alarm was justified
by their conduct. The French troops at Kalamata saw more
than one Greek village suddenly attacked and plundered by
the modern Spartans, as the Mainates termed themselves.
The armed men descended from their mountains attended
by numbers of women, whose duty it was to carry ofif the
booty. These women were seen by the French returning,
carrying on their backs bundles of linen, bedding, and house-
hold utensils, and driving before them asses laden with doors,
windows, and small rafters ^ Niketas, however, invariably
succeeded in driving Elias and his Spartans back into the
mountains.

Arrangements were ultimately adopted which put an end
to these devastating forays. Niketas placed himself at the
head of a band of veterans, and moved about from village
to village watching the slopes of Taygetus, and taking care
that the armed peasantry should always be informed where
they were to join him in case of any attack. The demoge-
lonts were in this way enabled to provide the supplies of money
and provisions necessary for the defence of the district, and
the agricultural population was not prevented from cultivating
the land.

Kolokotrones and Kolettes were the two great party leaders
at fhis time, but neither possessed the talents necessary to
frame, nor the character necessary to pursue, a fixed line of
policy. Accident alone determined their political position,
and made the first, though a partizan of despotic power,
the defender of liberal institutions, and the second, though
calling himself a constitutionalist, a tyrant, and the enemy
of a national assembly. Like their partizans, they had no
honest convictions, and they drifted up and down with the
current of faction without an effort to steer their course
according to the interest of Greece. Kolettes came into
the Morea to establish constitutional liberty. His followers
plundered the country, and dispersed the national assembly.
Kolokotrones was the instrument of the Capodistrians and
the Russians to perpetuate despotic power. His position
compelled him to become the champion of order and liberty.

There is no doubt that though many arbitrary and unjust

Pellion, 316.

103 ANARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. III. I

acts could be cited against Kolokotrones and Djavellas, yet
greater security for life and property existed in the provinces
over which their authority extended, than in the provinces
which submitted to the governing commission. But it is
certain that this result was obtained by the accidental revival
of national institutions, and not by the patriotism or the
wisdom of the leaders of the Capodistrians. The military
chiefs on both sides were equally rapacious ; the political
leaders equally ignorant, selfish, and corrupt. Honest men
of both parties kept aloof from the public administration.

Both Greeks and foreigners have praised the municipal
organization of Greece which existed under the Turkish
domination ; and it undoubtedly tended to check in some
degree the evils which resulted from the excessive fiscal
rapacity of the Othoman government. Yet it could do but
little to protect the people from injustice ; for the municipal
magistrates were responsible to their Othoman rulers, not
to those who elected them, or to the law of the land, for
the exercise of their authority. It made Greeks the instru-
ments of Othoman oppression, and in this way it introduced
a degree of demoralization into the local administrations,
which the Revolution failed to eradicate. It may be truly
said that this vaunted institution protected the liberties of
the people by accident. The law had no power to restrain
the selfishness of the local magistrates. The primates and
the captains had appropriated to themselves much of the
authority which ought to have been vested in the demo-
geronts chosen by the people. The primates, like the Turks
before the Revolution, employed the municipalities as fiscal
engines for their own convenience. The military chiefs were
the enemies of every species of order and organization. The
torpid ministers, the literary enthusiasts, and the intriguing
politicians, who acted an important part during the Revo-
lution, allowed the local institutions to be destroyed, while
they had not the capacity necessary for organizing an efficient
central administration.

At the end of the year 1833 Greece was in a state of
almost universal anarchy. The government acknowledged
by the three powers exercised little authority beyond the
walls of Nauplia. The senate was in open rebellion. The
Capodistrians under Kolokotrones and Djavellas had never

\i^

ATTACK ON THE FRENCH. 103

A.D. 1833.]

recognized the governing commission. A confederation of
military chiefs attempted to rule the country, and blockaded
the existing government.

The commission of three members, which exercised the
executive power, alarmed at the prospect of being excluded
from power before the king's arrival, implored the residents
to invite the French troops to garrison Argos. Four com-
panies of infantry and a detachment of artillery were sent
from Messenia by General Gueheneuc to effect this object.
In the mean time, General Corbet, who commanded at Nauplia,
detached two companies and two mountain guns to take
possession of the cavalry barracks at Argos, in order to
secure quarters for the troops from Messenia. The town
was filled with irregular Greek soldiery, under the nominal
command of Grigiottes and Tzokres. These men boasted
that they would drive the French back to Nauplia, and that
Kolokotrones would exterminate those who were advancing
from Messenia. The prudent precautions of the French
officers prevented the troops being attacked on their march,
and the whole force united at Argos on the 15th of January

On the following day the French were suddenly attacked.
The Greeks commenced their hostilities so unexpectedly,
that the colonel of the troops, who had arrived on the pre-
ceding evening, was on his way to Nauplia to make his
report to General Corbet when the attack commenced. The
French soldiers who went to market unarmed were driven
back into the barracks, and a few were killed and wounded.
But the hostile conduct of the Greek soldiery had prepared
the French for any sudden outbreak, and a few minutes
sufficed to put their whole force under arms in the square
before their quarters. The Greek troops, trusting to their
numbers, attempted to occupy the houses which commanded
this square. They were promptly driven back, and the
streets were cleared by grape-shot from the French guns.
The Greeks then intrenched themselves in several houses,
and fired from the windows of the upper storeys on the
French who advanced to dislodge them. This species of
warfare could not long arrest the progress of regular troops.
The French succeeded in approaching every house in suc-
cession with little loss. They then burst open the doors

104 ANARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.IlI.

and windows of the lower storey, and, rushing up-stairs, forced
the armatoli and klephts to jump out of the windows, or
finished their career with the bayonet. In less than three
hours every house was taken, and the fugitives who had
sought a refuge in the ruined citadel of Larissa^ were pursued
and driven even from that stronghold.

Never was victory more complete. The French lost only forty
killed and wounded, while the Greeks, who fought chiefly
under cover, had a hundred and sixty killed, and in all
probability a much greater number wounded. Grigiottes was
taken prisoner, but was soon released. A Greek officer and a
soldier accused of an attempt at assassination, were tried,
condemned, and shot\

While the Greek troops were plundering their countrymen
and murdering their allies, the three protecting powers were
labouring to secure to Greece every advantage of political
independence and external peace.

A treaty was signed at Constantinople on the 2ist July
1832, by which the sultan recognized the kingdom of Greece,
and ceded to it the districts within its limits still occupied by
his troops, on receiving an indemnity of forty millions of
piastres, a sum then equal to ^462,480 ^. The Allied powers
also furnished the king's government with ample funds, by
guaranteeing a loan of sixty millions of francs. The indemnity
to Turkey was paid out of this loan ^.

The Allied powers also secured for the Greek monarchy
an official admission among the sovereigns of Europe, by
inviting the Germanic Confederation to recognize Prince
Otho of Bavaria king of Greece, a recognition which took
place on the 4th October 1832^. The protectors of Greece
have often been reproached for the slowness of their proceed-
ings in establishing the independence of Greece ; yet when we
reflect on the anarchy that prevailed among the Greeks, the
difficulties thrown in their way by Capodistrias, the desertion

* Compare Pellion, 363 ; Lacour, Excursions eti Grcce, 260. Both had access to
official accounts, and yet they differ in their statements of the French loss.

^ Parliamentary Papers, Annex A to Protocol of 30th August, 1833.

^ Each of the three powers guaranteed a separate series of bonds for twenty
miUions of francs, or £781,273 6s. 8rf. sterling. The contract between the Greek
government and the house of Rothschild was signed 12th January, 1833. The
loan was effected at 94, interest at 5 per cent.

* Kliiber's Quellensammhmg zu dent offetttlichen Recht des Teutschen Bundes ;
Fortsetzung, 1832, p. 75.

THE BAVARIAN DYNASTY. 105

A.D. 1833.]

of Prince Leopold, and the small assistance they received
from Bavaria, we ought rather to feel surprise that they
succeeded at last in establishing the Greek kingdom.

The King of Bavaria concluded a treaty of alliance between
Bavaria and Greece on the ist November 1832. He engaged
I to send 3500 Bavarian troops to support his son's throne, and
t relieve the French army of occupation. This subsidiary force
' was paid from the proceeds of the Allied loan ; for Bavaria
I had neither the resources, nor, to speak the truth, the gene-
rosity of France^. A convention was signed at the same
time, authorizing Greece to recruit volunteers in Bavaria, in
order that the subsidiary force might be replaced by German
mercenaries in King Otho's service ^,

On the 1 6th January 1833, the veterans of the Greek
Revolution fled before a few companies of French troops ;
on the 1st of February King Otho arrived in Nauplia, accom-
panied by a small army of Bavarians, composed of a due
proportion of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers^. As
experience had proved that there were no statesmen in Greece
capable of governing the country, it was absolutely necessary
to send a regency composed of foreigners to administer the
government during King Otho's minority. The persons
chosen were Count Armansperg, M. de Maurer, and General
Heideck.

The Bavarian troops landed before the king. Their tall
persons, bright uniforms, and fine music, contrasted greatly
to their advantage with the small figures and well-worn
clothing of the French. The numerous mounted officers, the
splendid plumes, the prancing horses, and the numerous
decorations, crosses, and ornaments of the new-comers, pro-
duced a powerful effect on the minds of the Greeks, taught by

' The French government was desirous of obtaining the joint guarantee of King
Louis of Bavaria to the loan, in order to facilitate the progress of the measure
through the French Chambers. But King Louis refused, alleging that neither the
state of his finances nor the interests of Bavaria allowed him to aid his son in
raising money for Greece. Yet he took care that his son should expend large
sums of Greek money in Bavaria without any advantage to Greece. Kliiber's
Pragmathche Geschichte der nationalen und politischen Wiedergebwts Griechenlands,
p. 509. ^ ^ ^

^ The treaty is printed in the Greek Government Gazette, E(p7]/xepis ttjs Kv/iep-
vrjofccs. No. 18; the convention in No. 20, 1833.

^ King Otho embarked at Brindisi on board the English frigate Madagascar,
commanded by Captain (Lord) Lyons, on the 15th January, 1833, and was joined
at Corfu by a fleet of transports bringing the Bavarian troops from Trieste.

To5 ANARCHY.

the castigation they had received at Argos to appreciate the
value of military discipline.

The people welcomed the king as their saviour from anarchy.
Even the members of the government, the military chiefs, and
the high officials, who had been devouring the resources of the
country, hailed the king's arrival with pleasure ; for they felt
that they could no longer extort any profit from the starving
population. The title, however, which the Bavarian prince
assumed — Otho, by the grace of God, King of Greece —
excited a few sneers even among those who were not re-
publicans ; for it seemed a claim to divine right in the throne
on the part of the house of Wittelspach. But every objection
passed unheeded ; and it may be safely asserted that few
kings have mounted their thrones amidst more general
satisfaction than King Otho.

CHAPTER IV.

Bavarian Despotism and Constitutional Revolu-
tion— February 1833 to September 1843.

Landing of King Otho. — The regency, ils members and duties. — Royal proclama-
tion.— Administrative measures. — Military organization. — Civil administra-
tion.— Municipal institutions. — Financial administration. — Monetary system. —
Judicial organization. — The Greek Church, reforms introduced by the regency.
— Synodal Tomos. — Monasteries. — Public instruction. — Restrictions on the
press. — Roads. — Order of the Redeemer. — Quarrels in the regency. — Koloko-
trones' plot. — Armansperg intrigue. — Armansperg's administration. — Bavarian
influence. — Disputes with England. — Alarming increase of brigandage. — In-
surrections in Maina and Messenia. — Brigandage in 1835. — General Gordon's
expedition. — Insurrection in Acarnania. — Opinions of Lord Lyons and General
Gordon on the state of Greece. — Brigandage continues. — King Otho's personal
government. — Attacks on King Otho in the English newspapers. — Causes of
the Revolution of 1843. — Revolution. — Observations on the constitution. —
General remarks.

King Otho quitted the English frigate which conveyed
him to Greece on the 6th February 1833. His entry into
NaupHa was a spectacle well calculated to inspire the Greeks
with enthusiasm.

The three most powerful governments in Europe combined
to establish him on his throne. He arrived escorted by a
numerous fleet, and he landed surrounded by a powerful
army^ King Otho was then seventeen years old ^. Though
not handsome, he was well grown, and of an engaging appear-
ance. His countrymen spoke favourably of his disposition.
His youthful grace, as he rode towards his residence in the
midst of a brilliant retinue, called forth the blessings of a
delighted population, and many sincere prayers were uttered

' Twenty-five ships of war and forty-eight transports were anchored in the bay
of Nauplia. and three thousand Bavarian troops had already landed.
' King Otho was born on the ist of June, 1815.

lo8 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

for his long and happy reign. The day formed an era in the

history of Greece, nor is it without some importance in the

records of European civiHzation. A new Christian kingdom

was incorporated in the international system of the West, at

a critical period for the maintenance of the balance of power

in the East.

The scene itself formed a splendid picture. Anarchy and
order shook hands. Greeks and Albanians, mountaineers
and islanders, soldiers, sailors, and peasants, in their varied
and picturesque dresses, hailed the young monarch as their
deliverer from a state of society as intolerable as Turkish
tyranny. Families in bright attire glided in boats over the
calm sea amidst the gaily decorated frigates of the Allied
squadrons. The music of many bands in the ships and on
shore enlivened the scene, and the roar of artillery in every
direction gave an imposing pomp to the ceremony. The
uniforms of many armies and navies, and the sounds of many
languages, testified that most civilized nations had sent
deputies to inaugurate the festival of the regeneration of
Greece.

Nature was in perfect harmony. The sun was warm, and
the air balmy with the breath of spring, while a light breeze
wafted freshness from the sea. The landscape was beautiful,
and it recalled memories of a glorious past. The white build-
ings of the Turkish town of Nauplia clustered at the foot of
the Venetian fortifications and cyclopean foundations that
crown its rocky promontory. The mountain citadel of Pala-
medes frowned over both, and the island fort of Burdje,
memorable in the history of the Revolution, stood like a
sentinel in the harbour. The king landed and mounted his
horse under the cyclopean walls of Tiryns, which were covered
with spectators. The modern town of Argos looked smiling
even in ruin, with the Pelasgic foundations and mediaeval
battlements of the Larissa above. The Mycenae of Homer
was seen on one side, while on the other the blue tints and
snowy tops of the Arcadian and Laconian mountains mingled
in the distance with the bluer waters of the Aegean.

Enthusiasts, who thought of the poetic glories of Homer's
Greece, and the historic greatness of the Greece of Thucy-
dides, might be pardoned if they then indulged a hope that
a third Greece was emerging into life, which would again

LANDING OF KING OTHO. 109

A.D. 1833.]

occupy a brilliant position in the world's annals. Political
independence was secured : peace was guaranteed : domestic
faction would be allayed by the equity of impartial foreigners,
and all ranks would be taught, by the presence of a settled
government, to efface the ravages of war, and cultivate the
virtues which the nation had lost under Othoman domination.
The task did not appear to be very difficult. The greater
part of Greece was uninhabited. The progress of many
British colonies, and of the United States of America, testify
that land capable of cultivation forms the surest foundation
for national prosperity. To insure a rapid increase of popula-
tion where there is an abundant supply of waste land, nothing
is required but domestic virtue and public order. And in
a free country, the rapid increase of a population enjoying the
privilege of self-government in local affairs, and of stern
justice in the central administration, is the surest means of
extending a nation's power. The dreamer, therefore, who
allowed visions of the increase of the Greek race, and of its
peaceful conquests over uncultivated lands far beyond the
limits of the new kingdom, to pass through his mind as King
Otho rode forward to mount his throne, might have seen
what was soon to happen, had the members of the regency
possessed a little common-sense. The rapid growth of popu-
lation in the Greek kingdom would have solved the Eastern
question. The example of a well-governed Christian popu-
lation, the aspect of its moral improvement, material prosperity,
and constant overflow into European Turkey, would have
relieved European cabinets from many political embarrass-
ments, by producing the euthanasia of the Othoman empire.

Prince Otho of Bavaria had been proposed as a candidate
for the sovereignty of Greece before the election of Prince
Leopold. It was then urged that, being young, he would
become completely identified with his subjects in language
and religion \ But the Allies rejected him, thinking that
a man of experience was more likely to govern Greece well,
than an inexperienced boy of the purest accent and the most
unequivocal orthodoxy. Eloquent and orthodox Greeks had
not distinguished themselves as statesmen ; and though they
might be excellent teachers of their language and ecclesiastical

1 Thiersch, i. 308-313. See above, p. 80, note.

no BA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

doctrines, they had given no proof of their being able to
educate a good sovereign.

The resignation of Prince Leopold, and the refusal of other
princes, at last opened the way for King Otho's election, and
he became King of Greece under extremely favourable cir-
cumstances. King Louis of Bavaria was authorized to appoint
a regency to govern the kingdom until his son's majority,
which was fixed to be on the ist June 1835, at the completion
of his twentieth year \ The liberality of the three protecting
powers supplied the Bavarians with an overflowing treasury.
/The regency was invested with unlimited power, partly
through the misconduct of the Greeks, and partly in conse-
quence of the despotic views of King Louis. It has been
already stated that the regency was composed of three mem-
bers. Count Armansperg, M. de Maurer, and General Heideck.
Count Armansperg was named president. Mr. Abel, the
secretary, was invested with a consultative voice, and ap-
pointed supplemental member, to fill any vacancy that might
occur. Mr. Greiner was joined to the regency as treasurer,
and director of the finance department. Not one of these
men, with the exception of General Heideck, had the slightest
knowledge of the condition of Greece.

Count Armansperg enjoyed the reputation of being a very
liberal man for a Bavarian nobleman at that time. He had
been'minister of finance, and he filled the ofiice of minister
of foreign affairs when the first attempt was made to obtain
the sovereignty of Greece for King Otho. His ministerial
experience and his rank rendered him well suited for the
presidency of the regency, which gave him the direction of
the foreign relations of the kingdom, and, what both he and
the countess particularly enjoyed, the duty of holding public
receptions and giving private entertainments. The count's
own tact, aided by the presence of the countess and three
accomplished daughters, rendered his house the centre of
polished society and of political intrigue at Nauplia. It was
the only place where the young king could see something of
the world, and meet his subjects and strangers without feeling
the restraint of royalty, for M. de Maurer lived like a niggard,
and General Heideck like a recluse.

1 Treaty of 7th May, 1832, Art. ix. x.

THE REGENCY. Hi

A, p. 1833.]

M. de Maurer and Mr. Abel were selected for their offices
on account of their sharing the poHtical opinions of Count
Armansperg^ Maurer was an able jurist, but he was desti-
tute both of the talents and the temper required to form a
statesman. He knew well how to frame laws, but he knew
not how to apply the principles of legislation to social
exigencies which he met with for the first time. On the
whole, he was a more useful and an honester man than
Count Armansperg, but he was not so well suited by the
flexibility of his character to move among Greeks and
diplomatists, or to steer a prudent course in a high political
sphere.

Both Armansperg and Maurer took especial care of their
own personal interests before they gave their services to
Greece. They bargained with King Louis for large pensions
on quitting the regency, and they secured to themselves ample
salaries during their stay in Greece. Count Armansperg ex-
pended his salary like a gentleman, but the sordid household
of M. de Maurer amused even the Greeks.

General Heideck was the member of the regency first
selected. He had resided in the country, and had been long
treated as a personal friend by the King of Bavaria. King
Louis was well aware that, though Heideck was inferior to
his colleagues in political knowledge, he was more sincerely
attached to the Bavarian dynasty, and his majesty always
entertained some misgivings concerning the personal prudence
or the political integrity of the other members. Heideck,
during his first visit to Greece, had acquired the reputation
of an able and disinterested administrator. As a member
of the regency, he paid little attention to anything but the
organization of the army ; and he rendered himself unpopular
by the partiality he showed to the Bavarians, on whom he
lavished rapid promotion and high pay, while he left the
veterans of the Revolution without reward and without em-
ployment. He was accused of purchasing popularity at
Munich by wasteful expenditure in Greece, and of doing
very little to organize a native army when he had ample

* Mr. Abel, after his return to Bavaria, became a violent partizan of the ultra-
montane party, fought a duel with Prince Oettingen-Wallerstein, and succeeded
his adversary as Minister of the Interior. He held that office from 1838 to 1847,
when Lola Montes caused the ultramontane party to be ejected from power.

112 BA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

means at his disposal, though the moment was extremely
favourable, for the success of the French at Argos had ren-
dered the Greeks sensible of the value of discipline.

The members of the regency were men of experience and
strangers. It was natural to count on their cordial co-operation
during their short period of power. Yet the two leading
members, though they had been previously supposed to be
political friends, were hardly installed in office before they
began to dispute about personal trifles. Mean jealousy on
one side, and inflated presumption on the other, sowed the
seeds of dissension. Count Armansperg, as a noble, looked
down on Maurer as a pedant and a law-professor. Maurer
sneered at the count as an idler, fit only to be a diplomatist or
a master of ceremonies. Both soon engaged in intrigues to
eject their colleagues. Maurer expected that, by securing
a majority of votes, he should be able to induce the King
of Bavaria to support his authority. Armansperg, with more
experience of courts, endeavoured to make sure of the support
of the three protecting powers, whose influence, he knew,
would easily mould the unsteady mind of King Louis to
their wish. The cause of Greece and the opinions of the
Greeks were of no account to either of the intriguers, for
Greek interests could not decide the question at issue. It
would probably have been the wisest course at the beginning
to have sent a single regent to Greece, and to have given him
a council, the members of which might have been charged
with the civil, military, financial, and judicial organization
of the kingdom ; though it must be confessed that no wisdom
could have foreseen that two Bavarian statesmen would
surpass the Greeks in ' envy, hatred, and malice, and all
uncharitableness.'

Count Armansperg galled the pride of Maurer by an air of
superiority, which the jurist had not the tact to rebuke with
polite contempt. Maurer was impatient to proclaim publicly
that the title of president only conferred on the count the
first place in processions and the upper seat at board meetings,
and he could not conceal that these things were the objects of
his jealousy. The count understood society better than his
rival. When strangers, misled by the fine figure and expres-
sive countenance of Maurer, addressed him as the chief of
the regency, the lawyer had not the tact to transfer the

THE REGENCY. IT^

.D. 1S33.]

:ompliments to their true destination, and win the flatterers
)y his manner in doing so, but he left time for the president
o thrust forward his common-looking physiognomy with
)olished ease, vindicate his own rights, and extract from the
bashed strangers some additional outpouring of adulation,
fhe Countess of Armansperg increased the discord of the
egents by her extreme haughtiness, which was seldom re-
trained by good sense, and sometimes not even by good
nanners. She was so imprudent as to offend Heideck and
\.bel as much as she irritated Maurer. It is necessary to
lotice this conduct of the lady, for she was her husband's
vil genius in Greece. Her influence increased the animosity
if the Bavarians, and prolonged the misfortunes of the
■rreeks.
The position of the regency was delicate, but not difficult

0 men of talent and resolution. A moderate share of
agacity sufficed to guide their conduct. Anarchy had pre-
lared an open field of action. It was necessary to create
n army, a navy, a civil and judicial administration, and to
weep away the rude fiscal system of the Turkish land-tax.
Ve shall see how the Bavarian regency performed these
utie^

S'The first step was to put an end to the provisional system

1 expedients by which Capodistrias and his successors had
•rolonged the state of revolution. It was necessary to make
he Greeks feel that the royal authority gave personal security
nd protection for property, since their loyalty reposed on
o national and religious traditions and sympathies. It
squired no philosopher in Greece, when King Otho arrived,
3 proclaim ' that all the vast apparatus of government has
Itimately no other object or purpose but the distribution
f justice ; and that kings and parliaments, fleets and armies,
fficers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers, and
rivy councillors, were all subordinate in their end to this
art of the administration ^.' The reign of anarchy coming
fter the despotism of Capodistrias, had enabled the people to
iel instinctively that good government could only be secured
y rendering the laws and institutions of the kingdom more
owerful than the will of the king and the action of govern-

' Hume's Essay of the Origin of Government. _

VOL. VII. I

!i:

114 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk.V.Ch.lV. '

ment. To consolidate a wise system of local government,
and to render the administration of justice pure and inde-
pendent, were evidently the first measures to be adopted in
order to give the monarchy a national character.

The second step was to prepare the way for national pros-
perity, by removing the obstacles which prevented the people
from bettering its condition. There was no difficulty in
effecting this, since uncultivated land was abundant, and the
Allied loan supplied the regency with ample funds. The
system of exacting a tenth of the agricultural produce of
the country kept society beyond the walls of towns in a
stationary condition. Its immediate abolition was the most
certain method of eradicating the evils it produced. Relief 1
from the oppression of the tax-collector, even more than from
the burden of the tax, would enable the peasantry to cultivate
additional land, and to pay wages to agricultural labourers; i^
An immediate influx of labourers would arrive from Turkey,
and the increase of the population of Greece would be certain
and rapid. One-tenth would every year be added to the
national capital. The regency required to do nothing but
make roads. The government of the country could have been
carried on from the customs, and the rent of national pro-
perty. The extraordinary expenses of organizing the kingdom
would have been paid for out of the loan. The regency
did nothing of the kind ; it retained the Turkish land-tax,
neglected to make roads, spent the Allied loan in a manner
that both weakened and corrupted the Greek nation, and left
the great question of its increase in population and agricultural
prosperity unsolved.

The members of the regency complained that the want
of labour and capital impeded the success of their plans of
improvement ; yet they seemed to have overlooked the fact
that if they had abolished the tenths, the people would easily
have procured both labour and capital for themselves. Labour
was then abundant and cheap in Turkey ; capital in the
hands of Greeks was abundant in every commercial mart in
the Mediterranean. Yet the Bavarians talked of establishing
agricultural colonies of Swiss or Germans, and of inviting
foreign capitalists to found banks. It may be confidently
asserted that the Greek monarchy would have realized the
boast of Themistocles, and rapidly expanded from a petty

ROYAL PROCLAMATION. II5

^.D. 1833.]

kingdom to a great state, had the regency swept away the
Turkish land-tax, and left the agricultural industry of Greece
iVee to fashion its own career in the East.

On the day of the king's landing, a royal proclamation was
-sued, addressed to the Greek nation ; the ministers in office
ere confirmed in their places, and the senate was allowed to
t.xpire, without any notice^ of the wounds it had inflicted both
:L-i$6elf and its country.
The royal proclamation was nothing more than a collection
f empty phrases, and it disappointed public expectation by
aking no allusion to representative institutions nor to the
constitution. It revealed clearly that the views of the Bava-
■ an government were not in accordance with the sentiments
.1 the Greeks. The silence of the regency on the subject
rf the Greek constitution was regarded as a claim on the
irt of King Otho to absolute power. The omission was
-nerally blamed; but the acknowledged necessity of in-
c sting the regency with unrestricted legislative power, in order
enable it to introduce organic changes in the administration,
prevented any public complaint. It caused the Greeks, how-
ever, to scrutinize the measures of the Bavarians with severity,
and to regard the members of the regency with distrust. The
King of Bavaria had solemnly declared to the protecting
powers that the individuals selected to govern Greece during
his son's minority ' ought to hold moderate and constitutional
opinions ; ' the Greek people had therefore an undoubted
right to receive from these foreign statesmen a distinct pledge
that they did not intend to establish an arbitrarj'- govern-
ment ^ The distrust of the Greeks was increased, because
the omission in the royal proclamation was a deliberate
violation of a pledge given by the Bavarian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, when the object of King Louis was to win
over the Greeks to accept his son as their king. The Baron
de Gise then declared that it would be one of the first cares
of the regency to convoke a national assembly to assist in
preparing a definitive constitution for the kingdom -. The
royal word, thus pledged, was guaranteed by a proclamation

' Parliamentary Papers, Annex A to Protocol of 26th April, 1832.

* The letter of Baron de Gise, dated 31st July. 1832, is printed in RecueS des
Traites, A des, et Pieces concernants la Fondaiion de la Royauie en Grece et le Trace de
ie% Limiies (Xauplie, 1833), p. 62,

I Z

1 1 6 BA VARIAN DESPO TISM,

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

of the three protecting powers, published at Nauplia^ to

announce the election of King Otho. In this document the

Greeks were invited to aid their sovereign in giving their

country a definitive constitution ^. They answered the appeal

of the Allies on the 15th of September 1843.

The oath of allegiance demanded from the Greeks was
simple. They swore fidelity to King Otho, and obedience to
the laws of their country.

The first measures of the regency had been prepared at
Munich, under the eye of King Louis. In these measures too
much deference was paid to the administrative arrangements
introduced by Capodistrias, which he himself had always
regarded as of a provisional nature; and the modifications
made on the Capodistrian legislation were too exclusively
based on German theories, without a practical adaptation'
to the state of Greece. The King of Bavaria had little
knowledge of financial and economical questions, and he had
no knowledge of the Social and fiscal wants of the Greek
people. He thought of nothing but the means of carrying j
on the central administration, and in that sphere he en-'
deavoured honestly to introduce a well-organized and clearly
defined system. The laws and ordinances which the regency
brought from Bavaria would have required only a few modi-
fications to have engrafted them advantageously on the
existing institutions. Their great object was to establisli
order and give power to the executive government.

The armed bands of personal followers which had enabled
the military chiefs to place themselves above the law, to
defy the government, and plunder the people, were disbanded.
A national army was created. The scenes of tumultuous}
violence and gross peculation which General Heideck had'
witnessed in the Greek armies, had made a deep impression
on his mind. Warned by his experience, the regency arrived,
with an army capable of enforcing order; and it fortunately!
found the Greek irregulars so cowed by the punishment they
had received from the French at Argos, that they submitted!
to be disbanded without offering any resistance. It must
not, however, be concealed, that the regency abused the
power it acquired by its success. Bavarian officers, who

1 Parliamentary Papers, Annex D to Protocol of 26th April, 1832,

MILITARY ORGANIZATION. 1 17

A.D. 1833.]

possessed neither experience nor merit, were suddenly pro-
moted to high military commands, many of whom made a
short stay in Greece, and hardly one of whom bestowed a
single thought on the future condition of the country.

The national army soon received a good organization in
prints In numbers it was unnecessarily strong. Upwards
of five thousand Bavarian volunteers were enrolled in the
Greek service before the end of the year 1834, and almost
as many Greek troops were kept under arms. This nume-
rous force was never brought into a very efficient condition.
Faction and jobbing soon vitiated its organization. The
regency was ashamed to publish an army-list. Promotion
was conferred too lavishly on young Bavarians, while Greeks
and Philhellenes of long service were left unemployed. It
was a grievous error on the part of General Heideck to
omit fixing the rank and verifying the position and service
of the Greek officers who had served during the Revolution,
by the publication of an official army-list, while the personal
identity of the actors in every engagement was well known.

The bold measure of disbanding the irregular army was
a blow which required to be struck with promptitude and
followed up with vigour in order to insure success. It is
idle to accuse the regency of precipitancy and severity, for
something like a thunderbolt could alone prevent an organized
resistance, and a hurricane was necessary to dissipate oppo-
sition. The whole military power created by the revolutionary
war, and all the fiscal interests cherished by factious ad-
ministrations, were opposed to the formation of a regular
army. Chieftains, primates, ministers, and farmers of the
taxes were all deprived of their bands of armed retainers
before they could combine to thwart the Bavarians as they
had leagued to attack the French.

The war had been terminated in the Morea by the arms
of the French ; in Romelia by the negotiations with the
Porte : but the Greek soldiers, instead of resuming the occu-
pations of citizens, insisted on being fed and paid by the
people. When not engaged in civil war they lived in utter
idleness. The whole revenues of Greece were insufficient
to maintain these armed bands, and during the anarchy that

^ 'E(pr]fifpis TTJs Kvpfpvi^criws, 1833, Nos. 5, 6, and 7.

1 1 8 BA VARTAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk.V.Ch.IV.

preceded the king's arrival they had been rapidly consuming
the capital of the agricultural population. In many villages
they had devoured the labouring oxen and the seed-corn.
Nevertheless, the wisest reform could not fail to cause great
irritation in several powerful bodies of men. Unemployed
Capodistrians, discontented constitutionalists, displaced Cor-
fiots, and Russian partizans, all raised an angry cry of
dissatisfaction. Sir Richard Church committed the political
blunder of joining the cause of the anarchists. His past
position misled him into the belief that the irregulars were
an element of military strength. His own influence over
the military depended entirely on personal combinations.
His declared opposition to the military reforms of the regency
persuaded Count Armansperg that the difficulty of trans-
forming the personal followers of chiefs into a national army
was much greater than it was in reality. Count Armansperg
had approved of disbanding the irregulars, when that measure
was decided on at Munich, and he concurred in the necessity
of its immediate execution after the regency arrived at
Nauplia. Yet, when he listened to the observations of Sir
Richard Church, and counted the persons of influence opposed
to reform, he became anxious to gain them to be his political
partizans. He was sufificiently adroit as a party tactician
to perceive that the Greeks were in that social and moral
condition which leads men to make persons of more account
than principles, and he saw that intriguers of all factions
were looking out for a leader. His ambition led him to make
his first false step in Greece on this occasion. He listened
with aff"ected approval to interested declamations against the
military policy which put an end to the reign of anarchy.
And, from his imprudent revival of the semi-irregular bands
at a subsequent period, it seems probable that in his eager-
ness to gain partizans he gave promises at this time which
he found himself obliged to fulfil when he was entrusted j
with the sole direction of the government. The opposition i
of Sir Richard Church to measures which were necessary in
order to put an end to anarchy, and the selfish countenance \
given to this opposition by Count Armansperg, entailed many \
years of military disorder on Greece, and were a principal j
cause of perpetuating the fearful scourge of brigandage, which
is its inevitable attendant.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. II9

A.D. 1833.]

The sluggishness of the Bavarian troops formed a marked
contrast with the activity of the French during their stay
in Greece. Tiiough the French soldiers were in a foreign
land, with which they had only an accidental and temporary
connection, they laboured industriously at many public works
for the benefit of the Greeks, without fee or the expectation
of reward. At Modon they repaired the fortifications, and
built large and commodious barracks. At Navarin they
reconstructed great part of the fortifications. They formed
a good carriage-road from Modon to Navarin, and they built
a bridge over the Pamisos to enable the cultivators of the
rich plain of Messenia to bring their produce at every season
to the markets of Kalamata, Coron, Modon, and Navarin^.
The Bavarians remained longer in Greece than the French ;
they were in the Greek service, and well paid out of the
Greek treasury, but they left no similar claims on the
gratitude of the nation.

^The civil organization of the kingdom was based on the
principle of complete centralization. Without contesting the
advantages of this system, it may be remarked that in a
country in which roads do not yet exist it is impracticable.
The decree establishing the ministry of the interior embraced
so wide a field of attributions, some necessary and some
useful, others superfluous and others impracticable, that it
looks like a summary for an abridgment of the laws and
ordinances of the monarchy ^. A royal ordinance, not unlike
a table of contents to a comprehensive treatise on political
economy, subsequently annexed a department of public
economy to this ministry^. These two decrees, when read
with a knowledge of their practical results, form a keen satire
on the skill of the Bavarians in the art of government.

The kingdom was divided into ten provinces or nom-
archies, whose limits corresponded with ancient or natural

' Maurer, Das Griecliische Vollt in offentlicher, kircklicher nnd privat-rechtlicher
Beziehunsc, ii. 11. This work, written by the ablest member of the regency, is the
best authority for the acts of the Greek government during 1833 and 1834, but it
is full of personal prejudice and spite.

^ Governmetit Gazette, 1833, No. 14, dated 15th April, 1833.

^ Government Gazette, 1834, No. 18, dated iith May, 1834. Maurer gives us,
very unnecessarily, the information that this ordinance was copied from the legisla-
tion of other countries. It speaks of introducing a system of canalization in a
country where wells are often wanting, and of rendering the rivers, which flow
only ' by the muses' skill,' navigable. Das Griechische Volk, ii. 98.

120 BA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

geographical boundaries. It is not necessary to notice the
details of this division, for, hke most arrangements in Greece,
it underwent several modifications \ Persons capable of per-
forming the part of nomarchs and eparchs had been already-
trained to the service by Capodistrias, and no difficulty was
found in introducing the outward appearance of a regular and
systematic action of the central government over the whole

country V

With all their bureaucratic experience, the members of the

regency were deficient in the sagacity necessary for carrying
theory into practice where the social circumstances of the
people required new administrative forms. Their invention
was so limited that when they were unable to copy the laws
of Bavaria or France they adopted the measures of Capo-
distrias. In no case were these measures more at variance
with the political and social habits of the Greeks than in the
modifications he made in their municipal system. This
system, whatever might have been its imperfections, was
a national institution. It had enabled the people to employ
their whole strength against the Turks, and it contained
within itself the germs of improvement and reform. Its
vitality and its close connection with the actions and wants
of the people had persuaded Capodistrias that it was a
revolutionary institution. He struck a mortal blow at its
existence, by drawing it within the vortex of the central
administration.

The regency virtually abolished the old popular municipal
system, and replaced it by a communal organization, which
permitted the people only a small share in naming the lowest
officials of government in the provinces. The people were
deprived of the power of directly electing their chief magis-
trate or demarch. An oligarchical elective college was formed
to name three candidates, and the king selected one of these
to be demarch. The minister of the interior was invested
with the power of suspending the demarchs from office, as an
administrative punishment. In this way, the person who
appeared to be a popular and municipal officer was in reality

1 Governmetit Gazette, 1833, No. 12. A new division was established by Count
Armansperg (^Government Gazette, 1836, No. 28); and this division was again
changed by King Otho {Government Gazette, 1838, No. 24).

2 A nomarch corresponds to a prefect under the French system, and an eparch
to a sub-prefect.

MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS. 121

A.D. 1833.] I

transformed into an organ of the central government. De-
marchs were henceforth compelled to perform the duties of
incompetent and corrupt prefects, and serve as scapegoats
for their misdeeds. The system introduced by the regency
may have its merits, but it is a misnomer to call it a municipal
system \

To render municipal institutions a truly national institution
and a part of the active life of the people, it is not only
necessary that the local chief magistrate should be directly
elected by the men of the municipality ; but also that the
authority which he receives by this popular election should
only be revoked or suspended by the decision of a court of
law, and not by the order of a minister or king. To render
the people's defender a dependent on the will of the central
administration, is to destroy the essence of municipal insti-
tutions. The mayor or demarch must be responsible only
to the law ; and the control which the minister of the interior
must exercise over his conduct must be confined to accusing
him before the legal tribunals when he neglects his duty.

The decrees organizing the ministry of the interior and the
department of public economy, proved that the regency was
theoretically acquainted with all the objects to which enlight-
ened statesmen can be called upon to direct their attention ;
but its financial administration displayed great inability to
employ this multifarious knowledge to any good practical
purpose. The fiscal system of the Turks was allowed to
remain the basis of internal taxation in the Greek kingdom.
Indeed, as has been already observed, whenever the Bavarians

' Government Gazette, 1834, No. 3. Maurer boasts that the object of the muni-
cipal law was to constitute the demarchies as moral beings. He ought to have
foreseen that it would render the demarchs very immoral subjects (ii. 117)- In
the Parliamentary Papers relative to Greece in 1836, there is a despatch of Sir
Edmund Lyons claiming for Armansperg the authorship of the law, which it
described as ' founded on very liberal principles, and placing the administration of
the affairs of the municipalities entirely in their own hands, and establishing the
principle of election on the most liberal and extended scale.' It is evident that
Lyons was grossly deceived, and this despatch is valuable as illustrating the bold-
ness and the falsehood of Armansperg's assertions. Abel was the principal author
of the law, and Parish asserts that Armansperg opposed it as too republican. It
deprived the people of the right of electing their chief magistrate. It rendered
that chief magistrate dependent on the minister of the day, and not responsible for
the due execution of his functions to the law alone. Compare Additional Papers
relative to the Third Instalment of the Greek Loan, p. ,:; 7, and Diplomatic History of the
Monarchy of Greece, by H. H. Parish, Esq., late Secretary of Legation to Greece,
pp. 314 and 326.

122 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

entered on a field of administration, in which neither admini-
strative manuals nor Capodistrias' practice served them as
guides, they were unable to discover new paths. This
administrative inaptitude, more than financial ignorance, must
have been the cause of their not replacing the Turkish land-
tax by some source of revenue less hostile to national progress.
Where a bad financial system exists, reform is difficult, and its
results doubtful. Entire abolition is the only way in which
all the evils it has engendered in society can be completely
eradicated. So many persons derive a profit from old abuses,
that no partial reform can prevent bad practices from finding
a new lodgment, and in new positions old evil-doers can
generally continue to intimidate or cheat the people. To
make sure of success in extensive financial changes, it is
necessary to gain the active co-operation of the great body
of the people, and this must be purchased by lightening the
popular burdens. The greatest difficulty of statesmen is not
in preparing good laws, but in creating the machinery neces-
sary to carry any financial laws into execution without
oppression.

It is always difficult to levy a large amount of direct
taxation from the agricultural population without arresting
improvement and turning capital away from the cultivation
of the land. The decline of the agricultural population in
the richest lands of the Othoman empire, and, indeed, in
every country between the Adriatic and the Ganges, may
be traced to the oppressive manner in which direct taxation
is applied to cultivated land. The Roman empire, in spite
of its admirable survey, and the constant endeavours of its
legislators to protect agriculture, was impoverished and de-
populated by the operation of a direct land-tax, and the
oppressive fiscal laws it rendered necessary. The regency
perhaps did not fully appreciate the evil effects on agriculture
of the Turkish system ; it was also too ignorant of the financial
resources of Greece to find new taxes ; and it was not dis-
posed to purchase the future prosperity of the monarchy by
a few years of strict economy ^.

' Without entering on the question of the comparative advantages of direct and
indirect taxation, which often depend more on national circumstances than political
science, it must be mentioned that the Greek peasantry and small proprietors
were averse to commuting the tenths paid in kind for a fixed annual rate in money.
They feared that they would be obliged to borrow money, and thus subject them-

FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION. 1 23

A.D. 1833.]

The fiscal measures of the regency which had any pretension
to originahty were impolitic and unjust. They were adopted
at the suggestion of Mavrocordatos, who had the fiscal pre-
judices and the arbitrary principles of his Phanariot education
as a Turkish official.

Salt was declared a government monopoly; and in order
to make this monopoly more profitable, several salt-works
which had previously been farmed were now closed. This
measure produced great inconvenience in a country where
the difficulties of transport presented an insuperable barrier
to the formation of a sufficient number of depots in the moun-
tains. The evils of the monopoly soon became intolerable, —
sheep died of diseases caused by the want of salt, the shep-
herds turned brigands, and, at last, even the rapacious
Bavarians were convinced that the monopoly required to be
modified ^

The evils resulting from the salt monopoly were far ex-
ceeded by an attempt of the regency to seize all the pasture-
lands belonging to private individuals as national property.
In a ministerial circular, Mavrocordatos ordered the officials
of the finance department to take possession of all pasture-
lands in the kingdom, declaring 'that every spot where wild
herbage grows which is suitable for the pasturage of cattle is
national property,'' and that the Greek government, like the
Othoman, maintained the principle ' that no property in the
soil, except the exclusive right of cultivation, could be legally
vested in a private individual.' This attempt to found the
Bavarian monarchy in Greece on the legislative theories of
Asiatic barbarians, whom the Greeks had expelled from their
country, could not succeed. But the property of so many
persons was arbitrarily confiscated by this ministerial circular,
that measures for resisting it were promptly taken. A wide-
spread conspiracy was formed, and several military chiefs
were incited to take advantage of the prevalent discontent,
and plan a general insurrection. Government was warned of

selves to the evil of debt, and become serfs of the money lenders. The produce
was always ready when it could be demanded ; the money, they said, would always
be demanded by the government officials when it was not ready, and then some
ally of the official would appear to lend the sum demanded by the state at an
exorbitant interest. Here we see how direct taxation in an agricultural com-
munity produces the evil of debts, which forms a political feature in ancient
history.

' Maurer, T)as Grieckiscke Volk, ii. 290.

124 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk.V.Ch.IV.

the danger, and saw the necessity of cancelling Mavrocor-
datos' circular. But many landed proprietors were deprived
of the use of their pasture-lands by the farmers of the revenue
for more than a year. The cultivation of several large estates
was abandoned, and much capital was driven away from
Greece \

Though Mavrocordatos made an exhibition of extra-
ordinary fiscal zeal at the expense of the people, he is
accused by M. de Maurer of dissipating the national
property, by granting titles to houses, buildings, shops, mills,
and gardens, to his political allies and partizans, after the
king's arrival, without any legal warrant from the regency,
and without any purchase-money being paid into the Greek
treasury — in short, of continuing the abuses which had
disgraced the administration of the constitutionalists, while
they were in league with Kolettes and acting under the
governing commission ^.

It would be a waste of time to enumerate the financial
abuses which the regency overlooked or tolerated. They
allowed the frauds to commence which have ended in rob-
bing the nation of the most valuable portion of the national
property, the English bondholders of the lands which were
given them in security, and the greater part of those who
fought for the independence of their country, of all reward.
The regency showed itself as insensible to the value of
national honesty as the Greek statesmen of the Revolution,
and the progress of the country has been naturally arrested in
this age of credit by the dishonesty of its rulers. By the
repudiation of her just debts, Greece has been thrown
entirely on her internal resources^ and, after nearly thirty
years of peace, she remains without roads, without manu-
factures, and without agricultural improvements.

The monetary system of the Greek kingdom was a con-
tinuance of that introduced by Capodistrias, but the phoenix
was now called a drachma. The radical defect of this plan

* It is remarkable that Maurer, in his work on the admhiistration of the regency,
omits all mention of this important measure. The suppres-io veri fixes a large
share of its responsibility on him and his colleagues. There is no doubt that
it created the aversion which has ever since been shown by wealthy Greeks in
England, France, and Germany to making purchases of land in the Greek
kingdom. Parish, Diplomatic History, p. 231 ; The Hellenic Kingdom and the Greek
Nation, a pamphlet, 1836, p. 64.

^ Maurer, Das Griechische Volk, ii. 286.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. 125

A.D. 183^]

has been already pointed out, and the value of the Spanish
pillar dollar, on which it had been originally based, was
daily increasing throughout the Levant. An accurate assay
of these dollars at the Bavarian mint had proved that their
metallic value exceeded the calculation of Capodistrias, and
the drachma was consequently coined of somewhat more
value than the phoenix, in order to render it equal to one
sixth of the dollar. The metal employed in the Greek
coinage was of the same standard of purity as that employed
in the French mint. It seems strange that the regency
overlooked the innumerable advantages which would have
resulted to Greece from making the coinage of the country
correspond exactly with that of France, Sardinia, and
Belgium, instead of creating a new monetary system ^.
, "TTie highest duty the regency was called upon to fulfil was
to introduce an effective administration of justice. M. de
Maurer was a learned and laborious lawyer, and he devoted
his attention with honourable zeal to framing the laws and
organizing the tribunals necessary to secure to all ranks an
equitable administration of justice. Had he confined himself
to organizing the judicial business, and preparing a code of
laws for Greece, he would have gained immortal honour.

The criminal code and the codes of civil and criminal
procedure promulgated by the regency are excellent. In
general, the measures adopted for carrying the judicial
system into immediate execution exhibited a thorough
knowledge of legal administration. By Maurer's ability and
energy the law was promptly invested with supreme authority
in a country where arbitrary power had known no law for
ages. His merit in this respect ought to cancel many of his
political blunders, and obtain for him the gratitude of the
Greeks ^. It has been the melancholy task of this work to
record the errors and the crimes of those who governed )

* i-ii68 drachmas equal a franc, and 28 12 drachmas an English sovereign.
The drachma is divided into 100 lepta ; and the Greek coins are— two of gold,
40 and 20 drachmas; four of silver, 5, 1, |, and \ drachma: and four of copper,
10, 5, 2, and I lepton. For observations on the system of Capodistrias, &ee above,
p. 46.

^ For the criminal code, see Government Gazette, 1834, No. 3 ; it bears date the
30th December, r833; for the organization of the tribunals and notarial offices.
No. 13; for the code of criminal procedure. No. 16; and for the code of civil
procedure, No. 22. The German originals of these laws are printed in Maurer's
worlv, Das Griechische Volk, iii. 304, 849.

136 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

Greece much oftener than their merits or their virtues. It is
gratifying to find an opportunity of uttering well-merited
praise.

Some objections have been taken to the manner in which
primary jurisdictions were adapted to the social requirements
of a rural population living in a very rude condition, and
thinly scattered over mountainous districts ; but the examina-
tion of these objections belongs to the province of politics,
and not of history.

It is necessary to point out one serious violation of the
principles of equity in the judicial organization introduced by
the regency. In compliance with the spirit of administrative
despotism prevalent in Europe, the sources of justice were
vitiated whenever the fiscal interests of the government were
concerned, by the creation of exceptional tribunals to decide
questions between the state and private individuals ; and
these tribunals were exempted from the ordinary rules of
judicial procedure. Thus the citizens were deprived of the
protection of the law precisely in those cases where that
protection was most wanted, and the officials of the govern-
ment were raised above the law. The proceedings of these
exceptional tribunals caused such general dissatisfaction, that
they were abolished after the Revolution of 1843, and an
article was inserted in the constitution of Greece prohibiting
the establishment of such courts in future ^

The Greek Revolution broke off the relations of the clergy
with the patriarch and synod of Constantinople. This was
unavoidable, since the patriarch was in some degree a
minister of the sultan for the civil as well as the ecclesiastical
affairs of the orthodox. It was therefore impossible for a
people at war with the sultan to recognize the patriarch's
authority. The clergy in Greece ceased to mention the
patriarch's name in public worship, and adopted the form of
prayer for the whole orthodox Church used in those dioceses
of the Eastern Church which are not comprised within the
limits of the patriarchate of Constantinople.

When Capodistrias assumed the presidency, an attempt
was made by the patriarch and synod of Constantinople to
bring the clergy in Greece again under their immediate

* Art. 101.

I THE GREEK CHURCH. 1 37

1a.d. 1833.]

I jurisdiction. Letters were addressed to the president and to
the clergy, and a deputation of prelates was sent to renew
the former ties of dependency. But Capodistrias was too
sensible of the danger which would result to the civil power
from allowing the clergy to become dependent on foreign
patronage, to permit any ecclesiastical relations to exist with
the patriarch. He replied to the demands of the Church of
Constantinople by stating that the murder of the Patriarch
Gregorios, joined to other executions of bishops and laymen,
having forced the Greeks to throw off the sultan's government
in order to escape extermination, it was impossible for
liberated Greece to recognize an ecclesiastical chief subject
to the sultan's power ^.

Capodistrias found the clergy of Greece in a deplorable
condition, and he did very little for their improvement. The
lower ranks of the priesthood were extremely ignorant, the
higher extremely venal. Money was sought with shameless
rapacity ; and Mustoxidi, who enjoyed the president's con-
fidence, and who held an official situation in the department
of ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction, asserts that
simony was generally practised ^. The bishops annulled
marriages, made and cancelled wills, and gave judicial
decisions in most civil causes. They leagued with the
primates in opposing the establishment of courts of laws
during the Revolution ; for they derived a considerable
revenue by trading in judicial business ; while the primates
supported this jurisdiction, because the ecclesiastics were ■
generally under their influence. Capodistrias, in spite of ■/
this opposition^ deprived the bishops of their jurisdiction in
civil causes, except in those cases relating to marriage and
divorce, where it is conceded to them by the canons of the
Greek Church. Against this reform the mitred judges raised
indignant complaints, and endeavoured to persuade their
flocks that the orthodox clergy was suffering a persecution
equal to that inflicted on the chosen people in the old time
by Pharaoh.

Capodistrias also endeavoured to obtain from the bishops and

^ Correspojidance du Comte Capodistrias, President de la Grece, publiee par E. A.
Betant, I'un de ses Secretaires. Geneve, 1839 : ii. 153.

^ Renseignemenls sur la Grece et sur radtninistration du Comle Capodistrias, par tin
Grec temoin oculaire desfaits qu'il rapporte, Paris, 1833, p. 30.

1^8 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk.V.Ch.IV.

abbots, inventories of the movable and immovable property j
of the churches and monasteries under their control, but !
without success. Even his orders, that diocesan and parish j
registers should be kept of marriages, baptisms, and deaths,
were disobeyed, though not openly resisted. Mustoxidi ex-
pressly declares that the opposition to these beneficial measures
proceeded from the selfishness and corruption of the Greek
clergy, who would not resign the means of illicit gain. They
knew that if regular registers of marriages, births, and deaths
were established, the fabrication of certificates to meet con-
tingencies would cease, and the delivery of such certificates
was a very lucrative branch of ecclesiastical profits. Bigamy
and the admission of minors into the priesthood would no
longer be possible ; and it was said that they were sources
of great gain to venal bishops. Capodistrias failed to eradicate
these abuses from the Church in Greece ; for Mustoxidi
declares, that if he had amputated the gangrened members
of the priesthood, very little of the clerical body would have
remained ^.

The ecclesiastical reforms of the regency were temperately
conducted. An assembly of bishops was convoked at Nauplia
to make a report on the ecclesiastical affairs of the kingdom.
Its advice was in conformity with the wishes of those in
power, rather than with the sentiments of a majority of the
bishops ; for political subserviency has been for ages a feature
of the Eastern clergy. On the 4th August 1833, a decree
proclaimed the National Church of Greece independent of
the patriarch and synod of Constantinople, and established
an ecclesiastical synod for the kingdom^. In doctrine, the
Church of liberated Greece remained as closely united to
the Church at Constantinople as the patriarchates of Jeru-
salem or Alexandria ; but in temporal affairs it was subject
to a Cathc/lic king instead of a Mohammedan sultan. King
Otho was invested with the power of appointing annually
the members of the synod ^. This synod was formed on j

* Renseignements sttr la Grece et snr V adminhtration du Comte Capodis/rias. 35.

2 Governmenl Gazette, 1833, No. 23. Thirty-four bishops signed the Declaration
of Independence.

' Maurer, with the candour which confers value on his vainglorious volumes,
tells us, that King Otho succeeded, in ecclesiastical affairs, as in all other authority,
to the rights of the sultan. This information explains one of the causes of his
arbitrary proceedings, and the oblivion of the Revolution. Das Griechische Volk,
ii. 160.

REFORMS. I2Q

|.D. 1833.]

he model of that of Russia ; but in accordance with the

Iree institutions of the Greeks, it received more freedom of

miction.

; When the important consequences which may result from

i:he independence of a church in Greece filled with a learned

ind enlightened clergy are considered, the success of the

-egency in consummating this great work is really wonderful.

The influence of Russia and the prejudices of a large body

f the Greeks were hostile to reform ; but the necessity of

*^*Bi great change in order to sweep away the existing eccle-

^'jsiastical corruption was so strongly felt by the enlightened

en in liberated Greece, that they were determined not to

bavil at the quarter from which reform came, nor to criticise

the details of a measure whose general scope they approved.

[Those, however, who had thwarted the moderate reforms of

Capodistrias were not likely to submit in silence to the more

^extensive reforms of the Bavarians. An opposition was

quickly formed. Several bishops were sent from Turkey

into Greece as missionaries to support the claims of the

patriarch to ecclesiastical supremacy. They were assisted

by monks from Mount Athos, who wandered about as

emissaries of superstition and bigotry. Russian diplomacy

echoed the outcries of these zealots, and patronized the most

intriguing of the discontented priests. Yet the Greek people

remained passive amidst all the endeavours made to incite

it to violence.

In the month of December 1833, the regency published

an ordinance, declaring that the number of bishoprics in

Greece was to be ultimately reduced to ten, making them

correspond in extent with the nomarchies into which the

kingdom was divided. This measure was adopted at the

recommendation of the synod. In the mean time, forty

bishops were named by royal authority to act in the old

dioceses^, and when these died the sees were to be gradually

united, until ten only remained ^. The synod was reproached

with subserviency for proposing this law, which was generally

disapproved.

A reaction in favour of renewing ecclesiastical relations

with Constantinople soon manifested itself. Death diminished

' Governnunt Gazette, 1833, No 38.
VOL. VII. K

joo BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk.V.Ch.IVB^fo

the number of the bishops, and the synod named by Kingl,g[!i
Otho had not the power of consecrating an orthodox bishop|||t'r.
so that when the Revolution of 1843 occurred, many see
were vacant. The constitutional system did as little for somej
years to improve the Church as preceding governments. But|jL;i
the Greek people did not remain indifferent to the revival o
religious feeling, which manifested itself in every Christianlj,}^
country about this period. Among the Greeks the ideas ofj
nationality and Oriental orthodoxy are closely entwined. Thel,o£nc
revival of religious feeling strengthened the desire for nationali|jSj
union, and a strong wish was felt to put an end to the kind of
schism which separated the free Greeks from the flock of thep^]
patriarch of Constantinople.

Secret negotiations were opened, which, in the year 1850,
led to the renewal of amicable relations. The patriarch andi^k
synod of Constantinople published a decretal of the Oriental
Churchy called a Synodal Tomos, which recognized the inde
pendence of the Greek Church, under certain restrictions and
obligations, which it imposed on the clergy. Much objection 1™
was made to the form of this document, particularly to the
assumption that the liberties of the National Church required
the confirmation of a body of priests notoriously dependent
on the Othoman government, and which might soon be filled
with members aliens to the Greek race. Two years were
allowed to pass before the Greek government accepted the
terms of peace offered by the Church of Constantinople. In
1852 a law was adopted by the Greek Chambers, enacting all
the provisions of the Synodal Tomos, without, however,
making any mention of that document. By this arrangement
the independence of the Church of Greece was established on
a national basis, and its orthodoxy fully recognized by the
patriarch and synod of Constantinople ^.

The re-establishment of monastic discipline, and the admi-
nistration of the property belonging to ecclesiastical founda-
tions, called for legislation. War had destroyed the buildings
and dispersed the monks of four hundred monasteries. Many
monks had served as soldiers against the infidels ; but

* A volume hostile to the Synodal Tomos, which contains much sound reasoning,
with some unnecessary theological violence, was published by a learned eccle>'i-
astic, the archimandrite Pharmakides. It is entitled, 'O 2wo5(«6s lop-os, rj ntpl
d\i]6eias. For the Tomos, see p. 37.

■»■

[

MONASTERIES. 1 3 1

D.1833.]

much greater number lived on public charity, mixini^

dth the world as mere beggars and idlers. The respect for

lonachism had declined. It was neither possible nor de-

irable to rebuild the greater part of the ruined monasteries ;

lut it was necessary to compel the monks to retire from

he world and return to a monastic life. It was also the

luty of the government to prevent the large revenues of

he ruined monasteries from being misappropriated. The

egency suppressed all those monasteries of which there were

ess than six monks, or of which the buildings were com-

)letely destroyed, by a royal ordinance of the 7th October

833^. The number thus dissolved amounted to four hundred

ind twelve, and the property which fell into the hands of

ifthe government was very great. One hundred and forty-

ight monasteries were re-established, and two thousand

onks were recalled to a regular monastic life. The surviving

uns were collected into four convents. The lands of the

[suppressed monasteries were farmed like other national

roperty, and they were so much worse cultivated by the

[farmers of the revenue than they had been formerly by the

onks, that the measure created much dissatisfaction. The

••ecclesiastical policy of the regency in this case received the

i^ijblame due to its financial administration. As far as regards

Ithe treatment of the monasteries, no conduct of foreigners,

however prudent, could have escaped censure.

Much has been done in Greece for public instruction since

the arrival of King Otho. The regency, however, did little

but copy German institutions, and so many changes have

been subsequently made, that the subject does not fall within

the limits of this work. The regeneration of Greek society,

by a wiser system of family education than seems at present

to be practised, will doubtless one day supply the materials

* The ordinance of 1833 was framed on the report of the synod, and a catalogue
of the 412 monasteries suppressed was annexed to the report, which is dated icjth
(31st) August, 1833. This document, which would be of great historical and
topographical interest, has not been printed, and it is said not to exist in the
archives of the ministry of ecclesiastical affairs. A work entitled Td MomCT?;-
piaKa, published in 1859 by Mr. Mamouka, under-secretary of state in the ecclesi-
astical department, and editor of the Acts of the Greek National Assemblies, contains
the measures adopted with regard to the existing monasteries. There is a third
class of monasteries, which possess considerable estates in Greece, concerning
which it is difficult to procure information : — viz., those of Mount Athos, of the
Holy Sepulchre, and of Mount Sinai.

K 2

132 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk V.Ch.IV.

for an interesting chapter to some future historian of Greek
civiHzation.

The regency did not estabHsh an university, and King
Otho never showed any love for learning. Much dissatis-
faction was manifested at the delay; and in the year 1837
the Greeks took the business into their own hands, with a
degree of zeal which it would be for their honour to display
more frequently in other good causes. A public meeting was
held, and all parties united to raise the funds necessary for
building an university by public subscription. The court
yielded slowly and sullenly to the force of public opinion.
The royal assent was extorted rather than given to the
measure, but after an interval the king himself became a
subscriber, and sycophants called the university by his name.

In a country divided as Greece had long been by fierce
party quarrels, it was natural that every measure of the
government should meet a body of men ready to oppose it.
The liberty of the press could not fail to give a vent to much
animosity, and the restoration of legal order by the regency
resuscitated the liberty of the press, which Capodistrias had
almost strangled. Four newspapers were established at
Nauplia, and the measures of the regency were examined
with a good deal of freedom. Many of the criticisms of the
press might have been useful to the regency from their intelli-
gence and moderation, and from the intimate knowledge they
displayed concerning the internal condition of the country.
Though the regency paid little attention to these articles,
it allowed those in which ignorance and violence were exhi-
bited to ruffle its equanimity. The liberty of the press was
declared by the two liberals, Armansperg and Maurer, to be of
little value to the Greeks, unless the press could be prevented
from blaming the conduct and criticising the measures of
their rulers. Most of the Bavarians were galled by frequent
allusions to the magnitude of their pay, and the trifling nature
of their service. They demanded that the press should be
silenced. The wishes of the members of the regency coincided
with these demands. The spirit of Viaro Capodistrias again
animated the Greek government ^

* The four newspapers published at Nauplia were Athena, Helios, Chronos, ar.d
Triptolemos. The Greek press did not then use more violent language concerning
any member of the regency than Maurer afterwards used against his colleague,

I THE PRESS. 133

The regency did not venture to establish a censorship. It
jwas, however, determined to suppress the newspapers most
'opposed to the government by indirect legislation. In the
imonth of September 1833 several laws were promulgated
[regulating the press, and police regulations were introduced
worthy of the Inquisition in the sixteenth century \ Printers,
i lithographers, and booksellers were treated as men suspected
!of criminal designs against the state, and placed under
i numerous restrictions. The editors of newspapers and pe-
jriodicals were compelled to deposit the sum of five thousand
drachmas in the public treasury, to serve as a security in case
they should be condemned to pay fines or damages in actions
of libel. As the interest of money at Nauplia was then one
and a half per cent, per month, it was supposed that nobody
would be found who would make the deposit. The end of
the law was attained, and all the four political newspapers
immediately ceased. By this law another liberal ministry in
Greece became bankrupt in reputation. The want of public
principle and conscientious opinions among Greek statesmen
is manifested by the names of the ministers which appear
attached to these ordinances against the liberty of the press.
j They are Mavrocordatos, Kolettes, Tricoupi^ Psyllas, and
' Praides.

To counteract the bad impression produced by the restraints
j put on the liberty of the press, the Greek government pre-
tended to be seriously occupied in improving the material
j condition of the people. Starving the mind and feasting the
j body is a favourite system with tyrants. The Bavarians,
■ however, only feasted the Greeks with printed paper. A
royal proclamation was published announcing that the regency
was about to construct a net-work of roads'^. A plan was
adopted by which every part of the kingdom would have
found ready access to the Ionian and Aegean seas, and its

Armanspeig. But 'it is one of the conditions of bad governors tagive heed to
what they hear said of them, and to take ill that which, if it had been said, they
had better not have heard,' as Ferdinand the Catholic told other regents. See
Helps, The Spanish Conquest of America, i. 182.

^ Government Gazelle, 1833, No. 29. I. Concerning printers, lithographers, and
booksellers. 2. Concerning the press. 3. Concerning criminal abuses of the
press.

2 Government Gazette, 1833, No. 29. More than a quarter of a century has now
elapsed, yet the roads from Athens to Chalcis and from Athens to Corinth are
unfinished, and many roads are in a worse condition than they were under the
Turks.

1 ^4 SA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV^

execution was absolutely necessary to improve the country.
The whole of the roads proposed might easily have been!
completed in about ten years, had the Bavarian volunteers!
and the Greek conscripts worked at road-making with asj
much industry as the French had done while they remained
in Greece, King Louis of Bavaria declared that the Bava-
rians would confer benefits on Greece without being a burden j
on the country. The greatest benefit they could have con-
ferred would have been to construct good roads and stone I
bridges. They neglected to do this, and, in direct violation
of their king's engagement to the protecting powers, theyl
rendered themselves an intolerable burden \

Enough has now been said of the legislative and administra^
tive measures of the regency.

On the Tst of June 1833 they decorated the monarchy with
an order of knighthood, called the Order of the Redeemer, in
commemoration of the providential deliverance of Greece ^.
The order was divided into five classes. From an official
list, published a few weeks before the termination of Count
Armansperg's administration as arch-chancellor, it appears!
that the grand cross had been conferred on forty-nine per-
sons, exclusive of kings and members of reigning families.
Among these there were only three Greeks and one Phil-"
hellene. The names of Kenares, Mavrocordatos, Gordon, and
Fabvier, are not in the list, which it is impossible to read
without a feeling of contempt for those who prepared it.
The subsequent destiny of the order has not been more
brilliant than its commencement. French ministers have
obtained crosses in great numbers for unknown writers, and
Bavarian courtiers and German apothecaries have been as
lucky as French savants. While it was lavished on foreigners
who had rendered Greece no seivice, it was not bestowed on
several Greeks who had distinguished themselves in their
country's service ^.

' Parliameniary Papers, Annex A to Protocol of 26th April, 1832.

■^ Government Gazette, 1 833, No. 29. The following number contains patterns
for the embroidery of the uniforms of civil officials. Ministers and nomarchs were
forced to send to Munich and Paris for their coats, and when they first made
their appearance ia their new clothes, it was evident that they had sent very bad
measures. Most of them looked as if they had starved since their coats were
ordered.

■' The Greek Alman.ac of 1837 gives a list of 594 Knights of the Redeemer.
Of these 374 are Bavarians and foreigners, 154 Greeks, and 24 Philhellenes. The
lest are emperors, kings, princes; &c.

QUARRELS IN THE REGENCY. 135

|v.D. 1833.]

Before recounting the quarrels of the regency, it is neces-
sary to say a few words more concerning the characters of the
jmen who composed it.

Count Armansperg came to Greece with the expectation of

[being able to act the viceroy. He aspired to hold a position

jsimilar to that of Capodistrias, but neither his feeble character

Inor his moderate abilities enabled him to master the position.

I He might have given up the idea had he not been pushed

jforward by the countess, who possessed more ambition and

less wisdom than her husband \ Armansperg selected Maurer

and Abel as his colleagues, knowing them to be able and

I hard-working men, and believing that he should find them

grateful and docile. Armansperg never displayed much

sagacity in selecting his subordinates, and he soon found

to his dismay that Maurer and Abel were men so ambitious

that he could neither lead nor drive them. Without losing

time he set about undermining their authority.

The merits of Maurer are displayed in his legislative mea-
sures ; his defects are exposed in his book on Greece. His
natural disposition was sensitive and touchy ; his sudden
elevation to high rank turned his head. He could never move
in his new sphere without a feeling of restraint that often
amounted to awkwardness. He wished to save money, and
he did so ; but he felt that his penuriousness rendered him
ridiculous. His want of knowledge of the world was dis-
played by the foolish manner in which he attempted to obtain
the recall of Mr. Dawkins, the British resident in Greece,
because Mr. Dawkins thought Count Armansperg the better
statesman. His ignorance of Greece is certified by his
informing the world that it produces dates, sugar, and
coffee ^.

Mr. Abel was an active and able man of business, but of
limited bureaucratic views ; rude, bold, and sincere.

The opinions of General Heideck were not considered to be
of much value, but his support was important, for it was
known that his conduct was regulated by what he conceived
to be the wish of the King of Bavaria.

The merits of the different members of the regency may be
correctly estimated by the condition in which they placed the

^ Maurer, ii 56. , . _ ^ Ibid. ii. 310.

jo6 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM. I .

^ [Bk.V.Ch.IV.jl"'^''

departments of the state under their especial superintendence.
Until the 31st of July 1834, the departments of justice, mili-
tary affairs, and civil administration, were directed by Maurer,
Heideck, and Abel ; and they laid the foundations of an
organization which has outlived the Bavarian domination,
and forms a portion of the scaffolding of the constitutional
monarchy of Greece, as established after the Revolution of|
1843. The department of finance was entrusted to Arman-
spcrg, and he retained his authority for four years, yet he
effected no radical improvements. He found and left the-
department a source of political and social corruption. It
was not until the end of the year 1836, and then only when
forced by the protecting powers and the King of Bavaria, that
he published any accounts of the revenue and expenditure
of his government, and the accounts published were both
imperfect and inaccurate ^.

The policy of the regency did little to extinguish party
spirit and personal animosity among the Greeks. Indeed,
both the members of the regency and the foreign ministers
at Nauplia did much to nourish the evil passions excited by
the reign of anarchy. Armansperg was a partizan of English
influence ; Maurer and Abel, strong partizans of France.
Russia, having no avowed partizan among the Bavarians,
maintained her influence among the Greeks by countenancing
the Capodistrian opposition, protecting the monks and clergy
from Turkey, and the adventurers from the Ionian Islands,
and flattering the ambition of Kolokotrones. The French
m.inister protected Kolettes and the most rapacious of his
friends, because they were supposed to be devoted to the
interests of France. England made a pretence of supporting
a constitutional party, but her friends were chiefly remarkable
for their frequent desertion of the cause of the constitution.

The regency excluded Kolokotrones and the senators, who
had attempted to welcome King Otho with a civil war, from
all official employment. But the unpopularity of several

* Maurer, who. it must be owned, is a prejudiced witness, says, that as long as
Armansperg could make Greiner work at official details, he did notliing but loll on
his sofa and read the chapter on the French Revolution in Rotteck's Universal
History, or ride out and then take his siesta. His colleagues, who could not
obtain from him a budget, reproached him at their board meetings with his
inactivity. Das Griechhche Volk, ii. 319, 519; Parish, Diplomatic History, 296;
Government Gazette, 1836, Nos. 61, 65, 88, 89, 93, 91, 92.

KOLOKOTRONES' PLOT. 137

A.D.1833.]

measures enabled these excluded Capodistrians to raise a loud
if not a dangerous opposition, and they availed themselves
with considerable skill of the liberty of the press, as long as
the regency allowed them to enjoy it, for the purpose of
engaging the feelings and prejudices of a numerous class,
whose attachment to orthodoxy rendered them distrustful
of a government that was not orthodox, in direct hostility
to the regency. At the same time they formed a secret
society called the Phoenix, to imitate the Philike Hetairia,
and pretended to be sure of Russian support. Kolokotrones
had addressed a letter to Count Nesselrode, the Russian
minister of foreign affairs, on the state of Greece, while re-
siding on board Admiral Ricord's flag-ship, just after King
Otho's arrival. Count Nesselrode replied to that letter on
the 11th July 1B33, and numerous copies of this reply were
now circulated among the discontented ^ It was appealed
to as a proof that the Russian cabinet would support a Capo-
distrian insurrection, and cover the insurgents with its powerful
protection as heretofore. A petition to the Emperor Nicholas
was signed, praying his Imperial Majesty to employ his
powerful influence to obtain the immediate recall of the
regency, and the declaration of King Otho's majority. The
proposal showed great boldness in a party which, when it
elected Agostino president of Greece, had proposed that King
Otho should be considered a minor until he completed his
twenty-fourth year. A cry was raised in favour of orthodoxy
and liberty in many parts of Greece, and brigandage began
simultaneously to revive. Measures were concerted for a
general outbreak, and the Capodistrians, with Kolokotrones
as their leader, expected to play over again the drama which
the constitutionalists, with Kolettes at their head, had enacted
in 1832. They miscalculated the state of public opinion.
They had no longer the municipalities and the people in their
favour.

Simultaneously with this conspiracy, a minor plot was going
on, called the Armansperg intrigue ; and in the end this little
snake swallowed up the great serpent. The conspirators in
the minor plot only wished to get quit of Maurer and Hei-
deck, and to make Armansperg sole regent. Dr. Franz, an

' Count Nesselrode's letter is printed iu Parish's Diplomauc Hulory, p. 274.

138 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk.V. Ch.lV.

interpreter of the regency, who had allied himself closely with
the partizans of Count Armansperg, circulated petitions to the
King of Bavaria, praying for the recall of the other members
of the regency. The existence of these petitions was revealed
to Maurer, Heideck, and Abel, by a Greek named Nikolaides,
and by the Prince Wrede, whom Capodistrias had formerly
selected as a fit person to lay the state of Greece before Prince
Leopold. Wrede was admitted to the councils of the Capo-
distrians. though it is not probable that he was treated with
implicit confidence. He appears, however, to have obtained
some knowledge of their plans for a general insurrection. Dr.
Franz was arrested, but, to prevent the necessity of publishing
Count Armansperg's connection with his intrigues, and re-
vealing the dissensions in the regency, he was shipped off to
Trieste without trial ^. It was soon ascertained that several
persons of the Armansperg faction were connected both with
the minor plot and the great conspiracy.

Maurer was easily persuaded that the two were identical.
He was so infatuated as to believe that Armansperg was privy
to a conspiracy for obtaining his own exile. The papers of
Franz proved Armansperg's participation in a shameful in-
trigue ; the revelations of spies afforded satisfactory evidence
that many of the intriguers were also conspirators. In the
mean time a trifling disturbance in Tinos frightened the re-
gency into proclaiming martial law".

The general insurrection of the Capodistrians was pre-
vented by the arrest of Kolokotrones, Plapoutas, Djavellas,
and several other influential men of the party, in different
places on the T9th September 1^33^. Maurer now displayed
the rage of a tyrant : he forgot both law and reason in his
eagerness to inflict the severest punishment on Kolokotrones.
Those who spoke with him were reminded of the fury of
Capodistrias when he heard that Miaoulis had seized the
Greek fleet at Poros. The Greeks did not consider an abor-
tive conspiracy a very serious offence. Violence had been so
often resorted to by all parties, that it was regarded as a
natural manner of acquiring and defending power. No poli-
tical party had paid much respect either to law or justice, but

' 'AOtjvS., No. 141, 23id August, 1833.

^ Government Gazette. 1833. Nos 28 and 3I.

* 'Mrjvd, No. 146, 9th September, 1833.

TRIAL OF KOLOKOTRONES. 139

A.D. 1833.]

very different conduct was expected from M. Maurer. The
worst aspect of the conspiracy was the revival of brigandage,
which was evidently systematic. But it was not easy to pro-
cure evidence of the complicity of the leading conspirators
with the crimes of the brigands. Kolokotrones and Plapoutas
were tried for treason, and, by a strained application of the
law, and an unbecoming interference of the executive power
with the course of justice, they were found guilty and con-
demned to death. The sentence was commuted to imprison-
ment for life ; but a complete pardon was granted to both
criminals on King Otho's majority ^

The quarrels in the regency now became the leading feature
of the Greek question, not only in Greece, but at the courts of
Munich, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg^. The improve-
ment of Greece was utterly forgotten. There can be no doubt
that Armansperg's vanity persuaded him that Dr. Franz, in
the petitions circulated among the Greeks, had given the
King of Bavaria excellent advice. He now saw the advantage
which Maurer's violent persecution of Kolokotrones afforded
him, and he profited by it. Maurer was as ambitious as Ar-
mansperg, but less prudent. In vain the Greek ministers,
who respected his talents, endeavoured to moderate his vehe-
mence. Several resigned rather than sanction the trial of
Kolokotrones on evidence, which appeared to them insuffi-
cient. It may be mentioned, in order to convey some idea of
the manner in which public business was carried on at this
time, and the contempt with which the Greek ministers
allowed themselves to be treated by the Bavarians, that the
arrests, which took place on the 19th September ^'^'^% were
made by order of the regency, without a cabinet council being
held, and without the knowledge of the ministers of the inte-
rior and of justice. When Psyllas, the minister of the interior,
remonstrated with Maurer on the arbitrary manner in which
he was proceeding, Maurer became so indignant that he
threatened the minister with a legal prosecution for neglect-
ing his duty in not discovering a conspiracy known to so
many Greeks, The ministry was modified by the infusion
of additional servility. Mavrocordatos was removed to the

' The act of accusation against Kolokotrones and Plapoutas is given by Parish,
270. It is more like a party statement than a legal document.
^ See Maurer's notice of these quarrels, ii. 53, 56, 93.

I40 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

foreign office, and a young Greek recently arrived from Ger-
many, Theochares, was appointed minister of finance, in which
office he was a mere cipher. Schinas, an able and intriguing
sycophant of the Phanariot race, became Maurer's minister of
ecclesiastical affairs. Kolettes was now all-powerful in the
ministry ^

Maurer, Heideck, Abel, and Gasser, the Bavarian minister
at the Greek court, formed an alliance with M. Rouen, the
French minister, and prepared for a direct attack on Arman-
sperg, in which they felt sure of a signal victory. Armansperg,
on the other hand, was vigorously supported by Mr. Dawkins,
and still more energetically by Captain (Lord) Lyons, who
commanded H.M.S. Madagascar. The count had a not in-
considerable party among the Greeks and Bavarians. The
Russian minister, Catacazy, and the whole body of the Capo-
distrians, assisted his cause by their hostility to Maurer and
Kolettes. In general the Greeks watched the proceedings of
both parties with anxiety and aversion, fearing a renewal of
civil war and anarchy.

Armansperg laid his statement of the nature of the dissen-
sions in the regency before the King of Bavaria. Maurer
wasted time in attacking Dawkins, who had roused his
personal animosity as much by satirical observations as by
thwarting the policy of the regency ^. Dawkins was accused
of representing the proceedings of Maurer and his friends as
being too aristocratic, too revolutionary, and too Russian, all
in a breath. People said that, though the accusation looked
absurd, it might be true enough ; and they expressed a wish
to hear how Dawkins applied his epithets to the measures
he criticised. An envoy was sent to persuade Lord Palmer-
ston to recall Dawkins : a worse pedant, and a man less
likely to succeed than Michael Schinas, could not have been
selected. He soon found that he had travelled to London on
a fool's errand.

The great attack on Count Armansperg was directed
against what Maurer probably supposed was the most
vulnerable part of a man's feelings. No disputes had
occurred among the members of the regency while they

' Government Gazette, 18.^3, No. 34.

* Maurer supplies ample evidence of his own readiness to listen to spies and
talebearers. The phrases, es ging die Rede, es ging die Sage, eines Tages kam, wie
ich aus iehr guter Quelle weiss, and such eavesdropping, abound in his work.

ARMANSPERG'S ADMINISTRATION. 141

A.D. 1833.]

were carving their salaries and allowances out of the Greek
loan. No one then suggested that both political prudence
and common honesty demanded the most rigid economy of
money which Greece would be one day called upon to repay.
On the loth October 1832, Armansperg, Maurer, and
Heideck, held a meeting at Munich, at which, among other
shameful misappropriations of Greek funds, they added
nearly ^4500 to Count Armansperg's salary, in order to
enable him to give dinners and balls to foreigners and
Phanariots ^. Nemesis followed close on their crime. The
count's dinners and balls destroyed Maurer's peace of mind,
and to regain it he sought to deprive the count of his table-
money. At last, in the month of May 1834, the majority of
the regency deprived the president of what was called the
representation fund, and reduced his extra pay to a sum
which, if it had been originally granted, would have been
considered amply sufficient, but now the conduct of the
majority was so evidently the result of personal vengeance,
that its meanness created a strong feeling in Armansperg's
favour.

Both parties awaited a decision from Munich. The state
of Greece was assuming an alarming aspect ; brigandage was
reviving in continental Greece on an alarming scale ; and the
protecting powers felt the necessity of putting an end to the
unseemly squabbling which threatened to produce serious
disturbances. The British government advised the King of
Bavaria to recall Maurer and Abel. The Russian cabinet
gave the same advice. The King of Bavaria adopted their
opinion, and resolved to leave Count Armansperg virtually
sole regent. His decision arrived in Greece on the 31st July
1834, and it fell on Maurer and Abel like a thunderbolt.
They were ordered to return instantly to Bavaria ; and in
case they showed any disposition to delay their departure,
authority was given to Count Armansperg to ship them off in
the same summary manner in which Dr. Franz had been
sent to Trieste. Maurer was replaced by M. Von Kobell,
a mere nullity, whose name only requires to be mentioned,

^ We must not forget that the Bavarians were dividing the spoil of Greece
before the loan contract was signed. The signature did not take place until
ist March, 1S33. Maurer's explanation of his conduct is given in his work,
ii- 529-

142 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk.V. Ch.IV.

because it appears signed to many ordinances affecting the
welfare of the Greeks ^ Heideck was allowed to remain, but
he was ordered to sign every document presented to him
by the president of the regency. During the remainder of
his stay in Greece he occupied himself with nothing but
painting. The Greeks saw Maurer and Abel depart with
pleasure, for they feared their violence ; but at a later period,
when they discovered that Count Armansperg was neither as
active an administrator nor as honest a statesman as they
had expected, they became sensible of the merits of the men
they had lost ^.

Count Armansperg governed Greece with absolute power
from August 1834 to February 1837. He held the title of
president of the regency until King Otho's majority on the
1st June 1835, when it was changed to that of arch-chancellor
which he held until his dismissal from office ^. His long
administration was characterized by a pretence of feverish
activity that was to produce a great result at a period always
said to be very near, but which never arrived. Like Capodis-
trias, he was jealous of men of business, and insisted on retain-
ing the direction of departments about which he knew nothing,
in his own hands. He wasted his time in manoeuvres to
conceal his ignorance, and in talking to foreign ministers con-
cerning his financial schemes and his projects of improvement.
On looking back at his administration, it presents a succession
of temporary expedients carried into execution in a very im-
perfect manner. He had no permanent plan and no consistent
policy. In one district the Capodistrians were allowed to
persecute the con.stitutionalists, and in another the Kolettists
domineered over the Capodistrians. Brigandage increased
until it attained the magnitude of civil war, and the whole
internal organization of the kingdom, introduced by the early
regency, was unsettled.

^ Government Gazette, 1834, No. 25. Maurer gives the following account of his
successor : ' Herr von Kobell. nachdem er denn auf einmal wieder Credit gefunden,
seine bedeutenden Schulden bezahlt, eine Lotterie-coUecte fiir seine beide Tochter

erhalten, einen seiner Sohne im Cadetten-corps untergebracht hatte, u. s. -vf.,

eilte nach Griechenland, nicht um dort zu arbeiten und dem Lande nutzlich zu
seyn.' Das Griechlsche Volk, ii. 535. It may be doubted whether any of the
Greek newspapers suppressed by Maurer ever equalled the ribaldry of this passage,
deliberately penned and published with malice aforethought.

^ Maurer gives instances of Armansperg's political dishonesty, ii. 60, 61.

3 Government Gazette, 1835, June, No. i ; 1837, No 4.

ARM A NSP ERG'S ADMINISTRATION. 143

A.D. 1834.]

The nomarchies and eparchies were called governments
and sub-governments (dioikeses) The army was disorganized,
and the rights of property were disturbed and violated.
Public buildings were constructed on land belonging to
private individuals, without the formality of informing the
owner that his land was required for the public service.
Ground was seized for a royal palace and garden, and some
of the proprietors were not offered any indemnification, until
the British government exacted payment to a British subject
in the year 1850, In order to prevent the members of the
Greek cabinet from intriguing against his authority, like
Maurer and Abel, the arch-chancellor took care that all
the ministers should never be able to speak the same
language ; and he deprived the cabinet of all control over
the finance department, by keeping the place of minister of
finance vacant for a whole year ^. His lavish expenditure at
last filled all Greece with complaints, and alarmed the King
of Bavaria.

Count Armansperg's inconsiderate proceedings forced him
to solicit from the protecting powers the advance of the
third series of the Allied loan. Russia and France demanded
some explanation concerning the expenditure of that part of
the first and second series which had been paid into the
Greek treasury. The accounts presented by Count Arman-
sperg were not considered satisfactory. The British govern-
ment took a different view of the count's explanations. Lord
Palmerston supported his administration warmly, and applied
to Parliament, in 1836, for power to enable the British govern-
ment to guarantee its proportion of the third instalment of
the loan without the concurrence of the other powers ^.

Sir Edmund (Lord) Lyons had succeeded Mr. Dawkins as
English minister at the Greek court. He supported Count
Armansperg with great zeal and activity. But the Greek
government was pursuing a course which every day rendered
the count more unpopular.

In the month of May 1836, King Otho left Greece in
search of a wife, and during his absence, which lasted until
the beginning of the following year. Count Armansperg was

1 The Hellenic Kingdom and the Greek Nation, a pamphlet (London, 1836), p 76.
^ Parliamentary Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, 1836;
Parish, Diplomatic History, p. 301 ; Parliamentary Debates ; and Annual Register.

144 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk, V. Ch. IV.

viceroy with absolute power ^ His authority was supported
by an army of 11,500 men, of whom 4000 were Bavarians.
Money had now become more abundant in Greece, and
several editors of newspapers, having made the necessary
deposit in the treasury, resumed the publication of their
journals. The opposition of the press again alarmed the
Bavarians, and the count resolved to intimidate the editors
by government prosecutions. The Soter was selected as the
first victim, and very iniquitous preparations were made to
insure its condemnation. Two judges were removed from
the bench, in the tribunal before which the cause was brought, '
immediately before the trial. This tampering with the
course of justice created vehement discontent, but it secured
the condemnation of the editor. The punishment inflicted on
the delinquent, however, was not likely to silence the patriotic,
for it enabled them to gain the honours of martyrdom at a
very cheap rate. The editor was fined two thousand drach-
mas, and condemned to a year's imprisonment. The arch-
chancellor's triumph was short. An appeal was made to the
Areopagus, and the sentence of the criminal court was
annulled '^. As might have been expected, the attacks of the
press became more violent and more personal.

Count Armansperg's recall was caused by the complete
failure of his financial administration. The King of Bavaria
selected the Chevalier Rudhart to replace him, still believing
that the Greeks were not yet competent to manage their own
affairs. On the 14th of February 1837, King Otho returned
to Greece with Queen Amalia, the beautiful daughter of the
Grand Duke Oldenburg^. M. Rudhart accompanied him as
prime minister. The views of Rudhart were those of an
honest Bavarian. He had studied European politics in the
proceedings of the Germanic diet, and he contemplated eman-
cipating King Otho from the tutelage of the three protecting
powers by Austrian influence. Had the thing been feasible, he

' The ordinance investing Armansperg and his motley cabinet with power is
dated ,:.th May. Government Gazette, 1836. No. 18.

•* For the sentence condemning the editor, see supplement to the Covrrier Grec,
6th September, 1836; and for the decision of the Areopagus, the 'XO-qva, loth
October. 1836.

3 Grwrnment Gazette, 1837, No. 4. King Otho was married on the 22nd
November, 1836.

BAVARIAN INFLUENCE. 145

A.D. 1833.]

possessed neither the knowledge nor the talents required
for so bold an enterprise. The Greeks and Bavarians were
already ranged against one another in hostile parties. Sir
Edmund Lyons seized the opportunity of avenging the slight
put upon his mission, by keeping him in ignorance of Arman-
sperg's recall. He connected the opposition of the British
cabinet to the nomination of Rudhart with the hostility of
the Greeks to the Bavarians, and animated them to talk
again of constitutional liberty. Rudhart claimed as a right
the absolute power which Maurer and Armansperg had
silently assumed. In one of his communications to the
British minister, he declared that he exercised arbitrary
power by the express order of King Otho, and that the
King of Greece, in placing the royal authority above the
law, exercised a right for which he was responsible to no
one^. This assertion was so directly at variance with the
promises of the King of Bavaria, and the assurances which
the three protecting powers had given to the Greeks, that
Sir Edmund Lyons was furnished with good ground for at-
tacking the policy of the Bavarians. He pushed his attacks
to the utmost verge of diplomatic license ; and Rudhart,
who defended a bad cause without vigour and promptitude,

' soon found it necessary to resign ^. He held office for ten
months, and was succeeded by Zographos, who was then
Greek minister at Constantinople.

From this time the nominal prime minister was always a
Greek ; the war department was the only ministry henceforth
occupied by a Bavarian; but Bavarian influence continued to
direct the whole administration until the revolution in 1843.
From 1833 to 1838, during a period of five years, the Greeks
had exercised no control over their government, which received
its guiding impulse from Munich. Those who ruled Greece

I were responsible to the King of Bavaria alone for their con-
duct in office. It is not surprising, therefore, that Greece

I was ill-governed ; yet something was done for the good of

! the country. The early period of the regency was marked
by the introduction of a system of administration which put

* Parish, Diplomatic History, 402.

^ See a letter of Sir E. Lyons to Chevalier Rudhart ; Parish, Diplomatic History,
Appendix, 218 ; 'Lasm, Arumaire Historique, Documents. Rudhart resigned on the
20th December, 1837.

VOL. VII. L

146 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

an end, as if by enchantment, to the most frightful anarchy
that ever desolated any Christian country in modern times.
Many wise laws were enacted, and some useful measures were
carried into execution promptly and thoroughly. The errors
committed were probably fewer, and the good results pro
duced much greater, than could have been obtained by any
cabinet composed solely of Greeks. Deficient as Maurer,
Armansperg, and Rudhart might be in the qualities of states-
men, as administrators they were far superior to any Greeks
who could have been placed in the position they held. It
is certain that they erred greatly from ignorance of the
institutions of Greece, and it must be acknowledged that
they often sacrificed the interests of the Greeks to the interests
of the Bavarians in Greece; but Kolokotrones, Mavrocor-
datos, Konduriottes, and Kolettes, had all proved themselves
more unprincipled, and more incapable of governing the
country.

In considering what the Bavarians did, it is well to reflect
on what they might have done. The three powers had
guaranteed the inviolability of the Greek territory ; there
was therefore no need of any military force to defend the
country against the Turks. Greece only required the troops
necessary to repress brigandage and enforce order. The navy
of Greece had almost entirely disappeared, and the only
maritime force required was a few vessels to prevent piracy.
On the other hand, a very great expenditure on roads, ports,
packet-boats, and other means of facilitating and cheapening
communications, was absolutely necessary to improve the
condition of the agricultural population, and give strength
to the new kingdom. The population was scanty, and the
produce of agricultural labour was small, even when compared
with the scanty population. At the same time the demand
for agricultural labour was so partial and irregular, that at
some short periods of the year it was extremely dear ; and
though good land was abundant, extensive districts remained
uncultivated, because the expense of bringing the produce
to market would have consumed all profit. Something would
have been done for the improvement of the country by con-
structing the roads indicated by the government as necessary,
when the regency destroyed the liberty of the press ; but
instead of carrying this wise plan into execution, the resources

ADMINISTRATIVE NEGLECT. T47

10. 1833.]
f Greece were consumed in equipping a regiment of lancers,
I military and court pageantry, in building royal yachts
id a monster palace. The consequence of neglecting roads
id packets was that brigandage and piracy revived. The
.Hied loan was wasted in unnecessary expenditure. The
hole surplus labour and revenue of Greece were consumed
ir many years in unproductive employments. A consider-
jle army was maintained, merely because Greece was called
kingdom ; and a navy was formed for no purpose apparently
at that the ships might be allowed to rot.
The state of the Levant from 1833 to 1843 was extremely
vourable to the progress of Greece. The affairs of the
thoman empire were in a very unsettled state, and the
hristian population had not yet obtained the direct inter-
...rence of the Western powers in its favour. Thousands of
Greeks were ready to emigrate into the new kingdom, had
they seen a hope of being able to employ their labour with
profit, and invest their savings with security. The incapacity
of the rulers of Greece, and the rude social condition of the
agricultural population^ which was perpetuated by retaining
the Othoman system of taxing land, allowed this favourable
opportunity for rapid improvement to escape.

The three protecting powers have been blamed for not
appropriating the proceeds of the loan to special objects,
and for not enforcing the construction of some works of
public utility. But this was perhaps impossible. Neither
King Louis of Bavaria nor the Emperor Nicholas would
have consented to submit the public expenditure to the
control of a representative assembly in Greece ; and neither
France nor England could have made special appropriation
of funds for the benefit of the country, without requiring
the existence of some constitutional control over the Bavarians
on the part of the Greek people. It is, however, extremely
probable that all parties, taking into consideration the manner
in which the previous English loans had been expended,
considered the members of the regency more competent and
more inclined to check malversation than any Greeks who
could have been found. Examples of activity, intelligence,
eloquence, courage, and patriotism, were not wanting among
the Greeks; but the Revolution produced no individual uniting
calm judgment and profound sagacity with unwearied industry

L 1

148 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

and administrative experience. It did not produce a single
man deserving to be called a statesman.

After M. Rudhart's resignation, the office of president of
the council of ministers was filled by a Greek ; but the
president was only nominally prime minister, for King Otho
really governed by means of a private cabinet. The Greek
ministers were controlled by Bavarian secretaries attached
to each department with the title of referendaries. Greeks
were found servile enough to submit to this control, and
to act the part of pageant ministers. The proceedings of
the government grew every year more arbitrary. The king
was a man of a weak mind, and not of a generous disposition.
The flatterers who surrounded him appear to have persuaded
him that the Greek kingdom was created for his personal use,
and his political vision rarely extended beyond his capital.
In the greater part of the kingdom the creatures of the court
ruled despotically. The police kept men in prison without
legal warrants ; and torture was inflicted both on men and
women merely because they were suspected of having fur-
nished brigands with food. The press was prosecuted for
complaining that Greece was deprived of her constitutional
liberties.

The English minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, complained of
Injuries inflicted on British and Ionian subjects. His recla-
mations were left long unanswered, and remained for years
unredressed. Attempts were made to obtain his recall ; and
when they failed, he was personally and publicly insulted at
the Greek court in a manner that compelled him to exact
ample satisfaction.

During a theatrical representation at the palace, the British
minister was left, by an oversight of the master of the cere-
monies, without a seat in the court circle, and allowed to
stand during the whole performance in a position directly
in view of the king and queen, who seemed rather to enjoy
the sight as the most amusing scene in the court comedy.
Such conduct could not be overlooked. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs was compelled to make a very humble apology
by express order of the king, and the Bavarian baron who
acted as master of the ceremonies was shipped off to Trieste
In the same summary manner as Dr. Franz and M. Maurer
had been. This severe lesson prevented open acts of insult

DISPUTES WITH ENGLAND. 1 49

I AD. 1833.]

'in future; but the animosity of the court to the person of
Sir Edmund Lyons was shown in minor acts of impertinence.
On one occasion his groom was carried off by the gendarmes
from his residence, and kept all night in prison on a charge
of squirting water on a passer-by. These miserable disputes
, gradually alienated England and Greece, and victory over
f the court of Athens in such contests certainly reflected little
' honour on the diplomacy of Great Britain. A tithe of the
! energy displayed by Sir Edmund Lyons and Lord Palmerston
in humiliating King Otho, and in adjusting questions of
etiquette, would have settled every pending demand for justice
on the part of British and Ionian subjects. Years of wrangling
between the two courts might have been spared^. Greece
would not have been rendered contemptible by her deter-
mined denial of justice, and England would not have been
rendered ridiculous by employing a powerful fleet to collect
a small debt from the Greek nation, when it was only due
by the Greek government ^. France also would not have
exhibited her jealousy of England, by advising the Greek
government to resist demands which, when her protection
was solicited, she compelled Greece to pay as just, and also
to record the fact in a solemn convention that she had for
years resisted these just demands ^.

While the quarrels with the English minister kept the
Greek court in a state of irritation, the nation was suffering
from brigandage, and secret societies and orthodox plots were
again exciting the people to revolt.

The disbanding of the irregular troops, and the refusal
of the regency to pay the armed followers of the chieftains
who assembled round Nauplia at the king's arrival for the
purpose of intimidating his government, suddenly deprived
many soldiers of the means of subsistence. Great disorder
naturally ensued. The transition from anarchy to order could
not be effected in a day by human strength or human

' On the nth May, 1839, the Greek government delivered to all the foreign
missions at Athens, except the British, a lithographed exposition in reply to the
reclamations of the British government.

^ The British fleet seized private ships and cargoes at sea without a declaration
of w^ar. This may be internationally legal, but is unquestionably unjust.

^ M. Thouvenel counselled resistance in February. Baron Gros, in April, 1850,
recommended the Greek government to acknowledge its injustice. Parliamentary
Papers respecting the Demands made upon the Greek Government — Farther Corre-
spondence, p 346.

I pto BA V ART AN DESPO TISM.

[Bk.V.Ch.IV.

wisdom. Bands of irregulars;, who had lived for several
years at free quarters and in absolute idleness, were neither
disposed to submit to any discipline nor to engage in any
useful employment. Severe treatment was unavoidable, but
prudence was necessary in enforcing measures of severity.
During the latter years of the Revolution the armed bands
had separated their cause from that of the people. They
pretended to have rights more extensive than the rest of
the nation, and they exercised these rights by plundering
their fellow-citizens. During the anarchy that followed the.
assassination of Capodistrias, Mussulman Albanians had been
introduced into the Peloponnesus as allies of the Romeliot
armatoli, and many villages had been sacked by these
mercenaries ^.

The early regency carried the disbanding of the irregulars
into effect with so much vigour that the whole of these dis-
orderly bands were expelled from the Peloponnesus^ and
during the summer of 1833 the greater part was driven to
choose between entering the regular army or crossing the
frontier into Turkey.

' The state of the Othoman empire was singularly favourable
to the project of relieving Greece from her disorderly troops.
The sultan's army had been defeated at Konieh by the
Egyptians under Ibrahim Pasha on the 21st of December
1832^ and a Russian army arrived at Constantinople soon
after to protect Sultan Mahmud's throne. The Christians in
European Turkey expected to witness the immediate dissolu-
tion of the Othoman empire. The Mussulman population in
Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia was extremely discontented
with the fiscal arrangements and measures of centralization
adopted by the sultan, and several districts were in open re-
bellion. A large portion of the irregular troops who quitted
Greece found employment in consequence of the local dis-
turbances in Turkey, and they laid waste a considerable part

* Thiersch, i. 71. Almost every traveller who ventured to make even the
smallest excursion in Greece during the winter of 1832-3 was plundered. Pro-
fessor Ross was robbed near Marathon, and Mr. Wordsworth fell into the hands
of brigands on Mount Parnes, was wounded, and only escaped being detained for
ransom in consequence of a severe snow-storm. He says : ' For several months
the entrance into the Peloponnesus from continental Greece has been rendered
impassable for travellers by the violence of the military bandits.' Athens and
Attica, p. 254; compare pp. 22, 49, 227, 242, and 255 (ist edit.)

BRIGANDAGE. 151

A.D.1834.]

of Epirus and Thessaly, as they had previously ravaged a part
of the Peloponnesus.

As early as the month of May 1833, a strong body of
Greeks, having crossed the frontier, joined a number of unpaid
Albanian soldiers in the pashalik of Joannina, and surprised
the town of Arta, which had successfully resisted the attacks
of the Greeks during the Revolution. For three days these
lawless bands remained masters of the town, which they plun-
dered without mercy. Neither age, sex, nor religion served to
protect the inhabitants. Every act of cruelty and brutality
of which man can be the perpetrator or the sufferer was
inflicted on persons of both sexes and of every class. Torture,
too sickening to describe, was employed to compel women
and children to reveal where money and jewels were con-
cealed. When gorged with booty, lust, and cruelty, these
bandits quitted Arta, gained the mountains, and separated
into small bands in order to evade pursuit and obtain the
means of subsistence until they could plan some fresh exploit.
The fame of the sack of Arta allured the greater part of the
disbanded irregulars across the frontier, and relieved the
Bavarians from a dangerous struggle.

The state of Albania became still more disturbed towards
the end of the year 1834, and many of the Greek armatoli
and irregulars formed alliances with the municipalities of
Christian districts, which secured to them permanent employ-
ment. Had Count Armansperg employed the respite thus
obtained with prudence, order might have been firmly estab-
lished in Northern Greece ; but his frequent changes of policy
and indecisive measures produced a series of political insur-
rections, and revived brigandage as an element of society in
Greece.

Piracy was suppressed at sea by the assistance of the Allies.
In the spring of 1833 upwards of one hundred and fifty
pirates were captured and brought to Nauplia for judgment.
Many of these were irregular troops, who had seized large
boats and commenced the trade of piracy.

In 1834 an insurrection occurred in Maina, which assumed
the character of a civil war. It was caused by a rash and
foolish measure of the regency. Ages of insecurity had com-
pelled the landlords in the greater part of Greece to dwell in
towers capable of defence against brigands. These towers

irJCJ BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

were nothing more than stone houses without windows in the
lower storey, and to which the only access was by a stone stair
detached from the building, and connected, by a movable
wooden platform, with the door in the upper storey. In Maina
these towers were numerous. The members of the regency
attributed the feuds and bloodshed prevalent in that rude
district to the towers, instead of regarding the towers as a
necessary consequence of the feuds. They imagined that the
destruction of all the towers in Greece would insure the
establishment of order in the country. In the plains this was j
easily effected. Peaceful landlords were compelled to employ
workmen to destroy their houses instead of employing work-
men to repair them. The consequence was, that fear of the
attacks of disbanded soldiers and avowed brigands drove
most wealthy landlords into the nearest towns, and many
abandoned the agricultural improvements they had com-
menced.

In Maina the orders of the regency were openly opposed.
Every possessor of a tower, indeed, declared that he had no
objections to its destruction, but he invited the government to
destroy every tower in Maina at the same time, otherwise no
man's life and property would be secure. Some chiefs affected
to be very loyal, and very eager for the destruction of towers.
Bavarian troops were marched into the country to assist these
chiefs in destroying their own and their enemies' towers.
The appearance of the Bavarians induced the majority of the
Mainate chiefs to form a league, in order to resist the in-
vaders. The people were told that the foreigners came into
the mountains to destroy the monasteries, imprison the native
monks in distant monasteries^ and seize the ecclesiastical re-
venues for the king's government. Several skirmishes took
place. A Bavarian officer, who advanced rashly into the
defiles with part of a battalion, was surrounded, cut off from
water, and compelled to surrender at discretion. The victo-
rious Mainates stripped their prisoners of their clothing, and
then compelled the Greek government to ransom them at a
small sum per man. This defeat dissolved the belief in the
invincibility of regular troops, which had been established by
the daring conduct of the French at Argos.

The regency could not allow the war to terminate with
such a defeat. Fresh troops were poured into Maina, strong

INSURRECTION IN MAIN A. 153

A.D. 1834,]

positions were occupied, the hostile districts were cut off from
communications with the sea, and money was employed to
gain over a party among the chiefs. A few towers belonging
to the chiefs most hostile to the government were destroyed
by force, and some were dismantled with the consent of the
proprietors, who were previously indemnified. Partly by con-
cessions, partly by corruption, and partly by force, tranquillity
was restored. But the submission of Maina to the regency
was only secured by withdrawing the Bavarian troops, and
forming a battalion of Mainates to preserve order in the
country. Maurer asserts that the Mainates converted their
towers into ordinary dwellings : anybody who visits Maina,
even though a quarter of a century has elapsed, will see that
his assertion is inaccurate^.

Other insurrections occurred in various parts of Greece ;
but those of Messenia and Arcadia in 1834, and of Acarnania
in 1836, alone deserve to be mentioned on account of their
political importance.

The insurrection in Messenia occurred immediately after
the recall of Maurer and Abel, but would have broken out
had they remained. Count Armansperg was so helpless as
an administrator, in spite of his eagerness to govern Greece,
that he was at a loss to know what measures he ought to
adopt, and allowed himself to be persuaded by Kolettes to
call in the services of bands of irregulars. Large bodies of
men, who had just begun to acquire habits of industry, were
allured to resume arms, with the hope that Kolettes would
again be able to distribute commissions conferring high mili-
tary rank, as in the civil wars under Konduriottes and against
Agostino. Years of military disorganization, and its conco-
mitant — an increase of brigandage — were the immediate
results of Count Armansperg's imprudence.

The leaders of the insurrection in Messenia and Arcadia
were friends of Kolokotrones and Plapoutas, men who had
been connected with the Russian plot, and who were in some
degree encouraged to take up arms by the supposed favour
with which Count Armansperg had viewed the intrigues of
Dr. Franz. Their project was to extort from the regency the
instant release of Kolokotrones and Plapoutas, and to secure

' Das Griechische Volk, ii. 509.

1 54 BA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk.V.Ch.IV.

for themselves concessions similar to those accorded to the

Mainates.

The commencement of the insurrection was in Arcadia.
In the month of August 1834, considerable bodies of men
assembled in arms at different places. Kolias Plapoutas, a
man without either influence or capacity, presuming on his
relationship with the two imprisoned klephtic chiefs, assumed
the title of director of the kingdom, and issued a proclama-
tion demanding the convocation of a national assembly.
Other leaders proclaimed the abolition of the regency and the.
majority of King Otho.

Kolias Plapoutas, at the head of four hundred men, at-
tempted to arrest the eparch of Arcadia at Andritzena without
success. Captain Gritzales, who had collected about three
hundred men in the villages round Soulima, was more suc-
cessful at the commencement of his operations. He made
prisoners both the nomarch of Messenia and the commandant
of the gendarmerie in the town of Kyparissia^. A third body
of insurgents, consisting of the mountaineers from the southern
slopes of Mount Tetrazi, defeated a small body of regulars,
and entered the plain of Stenyclerus as victors.

Kolettesj into whose hands Armansperg, in his panic, had
thrust the conduct of government, even though he had been a
staunch partizan of Maurer^ resolved to use his power in such a
way as to have little to fear from the count's enmity when the
insurrection was suppressed. He determined, therefore, to
restore some of his old political allies, the chiefs of the irre-
gular bands of Northern Greece, again to power. Had he
allowed the Bavarian troops and the Greek regulars to sup-
press the insurrection, which they could have effected without
difficulty, he would have strengthened the arbitrary authority
of Armansperg, who he well knew was at heart his implacable
enemy. Kolettes was himself under the dominion of many
rude prejudices. To his dying day he considered the military
system of Ali of Joannina as the best adapted for maintaining
order in Greece. On this occasion, therefore, he repeated, as
far as lay in his power, the measures by which he had over-
powered the Moreot primates and the Moreot klephts under
Kolokotrones in 1H34. Several Romeliot chiefs of his party

' Kyparissia is called by the modern Greeks Arkadia, but the ancient name has
been revived in the official nomenclature of the kingdom to avoid confusion.

INSURRECTION IN MESS EN I A. 155

|a.d. 1S34.]

[were authorized to enrol bands of veterans, and with these
personal followers, who required no preparation and no maga-
zines, as they lived everywhere by the plunder which they
[extorted from the Greek peasantry, Kolettes expected to
[crush the insurrection before the regular troops could arrive.
iThe irregulars were, however, as usual, too slow in their
movements.

General Schmaltz, a gallant Bavarian colonel of cavalry,
was appointed commander-in-chief of the royal army. He
soon encompassed the insurgents with a force of two thousand
regulars and about three thousand irregulars. The rebels,
who never succeeded in assembling five hundred men at any
one point, fought several well-contested skirmishes, but they
were soon dispersed and their leaders taken prisoners ^. Count
Armansperg did not treat the rebels with severity. He knew
that they were more likely to join his party than the Kolettists
by whom they had been defeated. Perhaps he also feared
that a close examination of their conduct might throw more
light than was desirable on the connection that had grown
up between the Capodistrian conspiracy and the Armansperg
intrigue. In six weeks tranquillity was completely re-estab-
lished. But for many months bands of irregular soldiery
continued to live at free quarters in the plain of Messenia.
Kolettes felt himself so strongly supported by the Romeliot
chiefs, and by French influence, that he conceived great hopes
of being named prime minister on King Otho's majority.
These hopes were frustrated by the influence of Great Britain
at the court of Bavaria. Armansperg, as has been already
mentioned, was named arch-chancellor, and Kolettes was sent
to Paris as Greek minister.

The insurrection of 1834 was no sooner suppressed than the
Bavarians became alarmed at the power which Kolettes had
acquired. The irregular bands which had been recalled into
activity were slowly disbanded, and the chiefs saw that fear
alone had compelled Count Armansperg to resort to their
services. The policy of suddenly recalling men to a life of
adventure and pillage, who were just beginning to acquire
habits of order, could not fail to produce evil consequences.
Hopes of promotion, perfect idleness, and liberal pay, were

^ The Soter newspaper, during the month of August, 1834, O.S., notices the
principal events of this insurrection.

1 r^6 BA VARIA N DESPO TISM>

[Bk.V.Ch.lV.

suddenly offered to them ; and when they fancied that, by
a Httle fighting and a few weeks' marching, they had attained
the object of their desire, they found that they were again to
be disbanded and sent back to learn the hard lessons of
honest industry. Many of them determined that Greece
should soon require their services. It was not possible to
produce a popular insurrection at any moment, but there
was no difficulty in organizing a widespread system of bri-
gandage. A project of the kind was quickly carried into
execution.

During the winter of 1834 and the spring of 1835 brigand-
age assumed a very alarming aspect. Several Bavarians
were waylaid and murdered \ Government money was cap-
tured, even when transmitted under strong escorts ; and
government magazines, in which the produce of the land-tax
was stored, were plundered. In the month of April the
intrigues of the military chiefs alarmed the agricultural popu-
lation to such a degree that several districts in Western Greece
petitioned the prefects to be allowed to enrol national guards,
to whom they engaged to guarantee three months' pay from
the municipal funds. By this means they expected to retain
the irregulars in their native districts, and to insure their pro-
tection in case of attacks by strangers. To this anomalous and
temporary expedient Count Armansperg gave his consent.

But as the summer of 1835 advanced, the disorders in con-
tinental Greece increased. Numerous bands of brigands, after
laying a number of villages under contribution, from the
mouth of the Spercheus to the banks of the Achelous, con-
centrated upwards of two hundred men in the district of
Venetiko, within six miles of Lepanto. A Bavarian officer
of engineers was taken prisoner with the pioneer who accom-
panied him, and both were murdered in cold blood. The
house of Captain Prapas, an active officer of irregular troops
and a chief of the national guards in Artotina, was burned to
the ground during his absence, and his flocks were carried off.
In the month of May, the house of Captain Makryiannes,
near Simou, was destroyed, and seven members of his family,
including his wife and two girls, were cruelly murdered. An
attack was shortly after made on the house of Captain

^ Fiedler, Rehe durch alle Theile des Konigreiches Griechenland in 1834-1835,
vol. i pp. 146, 159.

BRIGANDAGE IN 1835. 157

A,D. 1835.]

Pharmaki, an officer of irregulars of distinguished ability
and courage, who was living within a few hundred yards of
the walls of Lepanto. Pharmaki was severely wounded, and
one of his servants was killed ; but he beat off the brigands,
and prevented them from setting fire to his house. For six
weeks every day brought news of some new outrage, but
Count Armansperg turned a deaf ear to all complaints. He
assured the foreign ministers that the accounts which reached
them were greatly exaggerated, and that he had adopted
effectual measures for restoring order. In reality, he neglected
the commonest precautions, and left entirely to the nomarchs
and commanders of troops in the disturbed districts the care
of taking such measures as they might think necessary. The
count was absorbed with the intrigues which ended in per-
suading King Otho, whose majority occurred on the ist June
1835, to prolong the absolute power which he had exercised as
regent with the title of arch-chancellor.

The first step of the arch-chancellor was to send Kolettes to
Paris as Greek minister. While Kolettes remained minister of
the interior, it was thought that he encouraged, or at least
tolerated, the extension of brigandage, and looked with secret
satisfaction at the supineness of the regency. General Lesuire,
the Bavarian minister of war, was also accused of regarding
the disorders that prevailed with indifference, though from
very different motives. Brigandage furnished Kolettes with
arguments for reviving the system of chieftains with personal
followers, and to Lesuire it supplied arguments against en-
trusting the Greeks with arms, and for increasing the number
of Bavarian mercenaries in the king's service. The accounts
which the Greek government received of the conduct of the
irregulars enrolled by Kolettes' authority during the insurrec-
tion of Messenia, persuaded the minister of war that these
troops differed from the brigands only in name. It is certain
that he kept both the Greek and German regular battalions in
high order ; but he neglected the irregular corps in a way that
afforded them some excuse for the exactions they committed.
A battalion of irregulars, under Gardikiotes Grivas, was left
without pay and clothing at a moment when it was disposed
to take the field against the brigands, and might have pre-
vented their incursion to the walls of Lepanto. The scanty
pensions of the Suliots at Mesolonghi were allowed to fall

I 58 BA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

into arrear. A number of veteran armatoli, to whom pen-
sions had been assigned on condition of their residing at
Lepanto and Vrachori, were completely neglected, and were
so discontented with the conduct of the government, that
when the house of Pharmaki was attacked, and the firing was
heard in the whole town of Lepanto, not one would move
from the walls to assist that gallant chief. The landed pro-
prietors and the peasantry were almost as much irritated
at the neglect shown by the government as the starving
soldiers. Loud complaints were made that the population
in the provinces was left without defence, while Armansperg
was lavishing crosses of the Redeemer on diplomats, and pay
and promotion on Bavarians whose service in Greece had been
confined to marching from Nauplia to Athens, when the
king removed his capital from the first of these cities to the
second.

As soon as Armansperg's intrigues were crowned with
success, he got rid of Lesuire as well as Kolettes, and
General Schmaltz became minister of war. About the same
time Mr. Dawkins was recalled, and Sir Edmund Lyons was
named British minister at King Otho's court. At the recom-
mendation of Sir Edmund, Armansperg named General
Gordon to the command of an expedition which was sent
to clear Northern Greece of brigands. Gordon, who was the
earliest Philhellene, was not attached to any political party :
he distrusted Kolettes, and had little confidence in Arman-
sperg ; but he knew the country, the people, and the irregular
troops, as well as any man in Greece.

On the nth of July he left Athens with his staff; and after
visiting Chalcis, in order to make himself fully acquainted
with the state of the troops of which he had assumed the
command, he formed his plan of operations. His measures
were judicious, and they were executed with energy. A body
of regular troops was sent forward from Chalcis by Thebes,
Livadea, and Salona, to Lidoriki, whither Gordon proceeded,
following the shore of the channel of Euboea to the mouth of
the Spercheus. He stopped a couple of days at Patradjik
(Hypate) to post the troops necessary to guard the passes on
the frontier, and then descended by the defiles of Oeta and
Korax to Lidoriki, where he was joined by the regulars from
Chalcis. By this rapid march he effectually cleared all

GORDON'S EXPEDITION. 159

,.D. 1835.]

Eastern Greece of brigands. They all moved westward, for
they saw that if any of them remained in Phocis they would
have been hunted down without a chance of escape.

At Lidoriki, Gordon divided the force under his orders into
three divisions. It was much more difficult to drive the
brigands westward from the Aetolian mountains than it had
been to clear the more open districts in Eastern Greece. One
division of the army kept along the ridge of the mountains
which bound the Gulf of Corinth to the north. The centre,
\vith the general, marched into the heart of the country,
through districts cut by nature into a labyrinth of deep
ravines, and descended to Lepanto from the north-east, after
passing by Lombotina and Simou. The right division moved
up northward to Artotina, in order, if possible, to cut off the
brigands from gaining the Turkish frontier.

The principal body of the brigands, consisting of one hun-
dred and thirty, maintained its position in the immediate
\icinity of Lepanto for six weeks, and it continued to levy
contributions from the country round until the general arrived
at Lidoriki. It then broke up into several small bands, and,
l)icking up its outlying associates, gained the Turkish frontier
by following secluded sheep-tracks over the Aetolian moun-
tains. The national guards, which the communities in the
provinces of Apokura and Zygos had taken into their pay,
as soon as they were sure of effectual support from the troops
under Gordon, commenced dislodging the brigands from their
positions between the Phidari (Evenus) and the Achelous.

From Lepanto, Gordon marched to Mesolonghi and Vra-
chori. The officers under his orders found no difficulty in
clearing the plains of Acarnania, and when this was effected,
he followed the rugged valley of Prousos to Karpenisi, where
he arrived on the nth of August. The arrangements he
had adopted for securing to the Suliots and the veterans at
Lepanto and Vrachori the regular payment of their pensions,
and the good conduct of the detachments of regulars which he
sent to support the local magistrates, insured active co-opera-
tion on the part of the native population. The spirit of
order, which the neglect of the royal government had almost
extinguished, again revived.

In one month after quitting Athens, tranquillity was re-
stored in the whole of continental Greece. But as about

l6o BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

three hundred brigands had assembled within the Turkish
territory, and marched along the frontier with military music,
it seemed that the difficulty of protecting the country would
be greater than that of delivering it. The general's Oriental
studies now proved of as great value to Greece as his military
activity and geographical knowledge. He opened a cor-
respondence with the pasha at Larissa ; and the circumstance
of an Englishman commanding the Greek forces, and of that
Englishman not only speaking Turkish fluently, but also
writing it like a divan-effendi, contributed more than a sense
of sound policy, to secure the co-operation of the Turkish
authorities in dispersing the brigands.

In the month of October Gordon's mission was terminated,
and he was ordered to resume his duties at Argos, as com-
mander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus. The brigands in Turkey
had dispersed, but it was known that many had retired to
Agrapha, where they were protected by Tzatzos, the captain of
armatoli, and it was supposed that Tzatzos had not taken this
step without the connivance of the derven-pasha. Gordon
warned the Greek government that brigandage would soon
recommence, unless very different measures were adopted
from those which Count Armansperg had hitherto pursued,
both in his civil and financial administration. And he com-
pletely lost the count's favour by the truths which he told in
a memoir he drew up on the means of suppressing brigandage
and maintaining tranquillity on the frontier.

The insecurity which prevailed near the Turkish frontier,
even though brigandage had for a moment ceased, is strongly
illustrated by the closing scene of Gordon's sojourn in the
vicinity. Before quitting Northern Greece he wished to enjoy
a day's shooting. On the 5th October he went with a party
of friends to Aghia Marina. The brigands, who lay con-
cealed on both sides of the frontier, had official friends, and
were well informed of all that happened at Lamia. They
were soon aware of Gordon's project. A band lay concealed
in the thick brushwood that covered the plain, but did not find
an opportunity of attacking him on the road. Soon after
sunset the house he occupied was surrounded while the party
was at dinner, but the alarm was given in time to allow the
sportsmen to throw down their knives and forks, seize their
fowling-pieces, and run to the garden wall in front of the

KING OF BAVARIA VISITS ATHENS. i6l

A.D. 1836.]

building. By this they prevented the brigands from approach-
ing near enough to set fire to the house. A skirmish ensued,
in which the assailants displayed very httle courage. The
firing brought a party of royal troops from Stylidha to the
general's assistance, but the obscurity of the night favoured the
escape of the brigands, and on the following morning all traces
of them had disappeared ^.

The lavish expenditure of Count Armansperg brought on
financial difficulties at the end of 1B35, and both Russia and
France considered his accounts and his explanations so un-
satisfactory, that they refused to entrust him with the expen-
diture of the third series of the loan^. The state of Greece
was represented in a very different manner by the foreign
jministers at the court of Athens. The King of Bavaria,
•hoping to learn the truth by personal observation, paid his
.son a visit. He little knew the difficulty which exists in
Greece of acquiring accurate information, or of forming correct
conclusions, from such partial information as it is in the power
: of a passing visitor to obtain, even when that visitor is a king.
Truth is always rare in the East, and Greece was divided into
-everal hostile factions, who were the irreconcileable enemies

r truth. On the 7th of December 1835, the King of Bavaria
arrived at Athens, where he was welcomed by the council
of state with the assurance that his son's dominions were in
a state of profound tranquillity, and extremely prosperous.
His majesty was not long in Greece before he perceived that
the councillors of state were not in the habit of speaking the
truth.

In the month of January 1836, the brigands, who had
remained quiet for a short time, reappeared from their places
of concealment, and those who had found an asylum in Turkey
began to cross the frontier in small bands. Not a week passed
\\ithout their plundering some village. Accounts reached
Athens of the unheard-of cruelties they were daily commit-
ting to extort money, or to avenge the defeats they suffered
during the preceding year. Party spirit and official avidity

^ General Gordon gave the following account of this affair in a private letter : —
' Drosos Mansolas (afterwards minister of the interior) showed a degree of courage
and coolness very uncommon in a Greek logiotatos. He behaved much better
than liis gun, which burst at the first discharge.'

^ Compare Parish, Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece, p. 296, ar.d
Lesur, Anmmire Historiqiie Universelle pour 1835, p. 480,

VOL. VII. M

l6a BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

had at this time so benumbed pubHc spirit in the capital of
Greece, that even the Liberal press paid little attention to the
miseries of the agricultural population. The peasantry were
neglected, for they had no influence in the distribution of
places, honours, or profits. In the month of February, how-
ever, the evil increased so rapidly, and reached such an
alarming extent, that it could no longer be overlooked even
by Count Armansperg. Six hundred brigands established
themselves within the Greek kingdom, ravaging the whole
valley of the Spercheus with fire and sword ^.

An insurrection broke out at this time in Acarnania, which
had its sources in the same political and social evils as bri-
gandage. It is peculiarly interesting, however^ from affording !
some insight into the political history of Great Britain as well |j
as Greece. Lord Palmerston persuaded the British govern-
ment that it was for the interest of Great Britain to support
the administration of Count Armansperg. This could only
be done effectually by furnishing him with money ; and to
induce Parliament to authorize the issue of the third instal-
ment of the loan, papers were presented to both Houses,
proving that the Greek government was in great need of money.
But when the want of money was clearly proved, it was
objected that the want complained of was caused by lavish
expenditure and gross corruption ; and it was even said that
Count Armansperg's mal-administration was plunging Greece
back into the state of anarchy from which the early regency
had delivered the country. Additional papers were then pre-
sented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary (which had
been all along in his hands), to prove that Greece was in a
most flourishing condition, and that the prosperity she was
enjoying was the direct result of the Count's administration ^.
The history of the insurrection is the best comment on these
adverse statements.

The leaders of the insurrection in Acarnania were officers
of the irregular troops who had distinguished themselves in
the revolutionary war. Demo Tzelios, who commanded one
body of insurgents, proclaimed that the people took up arms

» "AOr^va (Greek newspaper\ 4th (i6th) Februaiy, 1836.

2 Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, 1836; and Addi-
tional Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, presented to both
Houses, August, 1836.

INSURRECTION IN ACARNANIA. 163

|a.d. 1836.]

gainst Count Armansperg and the Bavarians, not against the
■king and the government. Nicholas Zeivas, another leader,
demanded the convocation of a national assembly. A third
[party displayed the phoenix on its standard, and talked of
orthodoxy as being the surest way to collect the Capodistrians
!i|and lonians in arms against the government at Athens. All
united in proclaiming the constitution, and demanding the
expulsion of the Bavarians. The people took no part in the
movement.

Demo Tzelios entered Mytika without opposition, but was
defeated at Dragomestre. Mesolonghi had been left almost
without a garrison. The folly of the government was so
flagrant, in the actual condition of the country, that the
proceeding looked like treachery. The insurgents made a
bold attempt to gain possession of that important fortress
by surprise, but they were bravely repulsed by the few troops
who remained in the place, and by the inhabitants, who re-
garded the insurgents as mere brigands. The rebels, though
repulsed from the walls of Mesolonghi, were nevertheless
strong enough to remain encamped before the place, and to
ravage the plain for several days ^

These events produced a panic at Athens. Men spoke of
the pillage of the Morea in 1824, when Konduriottes was pre-
sident, of the sack of Poros by the troops of Capodistrias, and
of the anarchy caused by Kolettes and the constitutionalists
in 1832. Fortunately for Greece, the presence of the King of
Bavaria prevented a renewal of these calamities. His Majesty
enabled the Greek government to procure money. Count
Armansperg, having rejected the plans proposed by General
Gordon for averting a renewal of brigandage, was in this
emergency again induced to practise the lessons he had learned
from Kolettes in suppressing the insurrection of Messenia.
Chieftains were allowed to enrol irregular troops, and reconsti-
tute bands of personal followers, Kitzos Djavellas, Theodore
Griva, Vassos, Mamoures, and Zongas were empowered to raise
two thousand men, and to march against the insurgents.
These bands of irregulars were followed by large bodies of
regular troops. With these forces the country was cleared of

1 'AOrjva, 1 2th (24lh) February, 1836. See also an account of this attack on
Mesolonghi in Dr. Fiedler's Reise durch alle Theile des Konigreickes Griechenland,
i.JSO.

M 2

1 64 BA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk.V. Ch.IV.

insurgents and brigands without difficulty. Gordon had
pointed out the operations by which Northern Greece can
always be swept of enemies by a superior force in about a
month. Before the end of May the last remains of the
insurrection were trodden out in Acarnania, and all the large
bands of brigands were again driven into Turkey. Sir Richard
Church then made a tour of military inspection, to establish
order, redress grievances, and pacify the people. On the 30th
May Sir Edmund Lyons wrote from Athens to Lord Pal-
merston : ' No inroads have been made on the frontier since
the end of April, and tranquillity has prevailed throughout the
country. General Church is still in Western Greece, and his
reports of the loyal feelings of the inhabitants are extremely
satisfactory.'

Others, however, took a very different view of the state of
the country. The accounts given of the condition of Greece
were so discordant, and the reports published in Western
Europe were so variously coloured by personal feelings and
party spirit, that some notice of this discordance is necessary,
in order to show the reader how the streams of politics
meander into the river of history.

The late Lord Lyons was a warm supporter of Count
Armansperg, and appears to have received all the statements
of the count with implicit confidence. On the 24th February
1836, Lyons wrote to Lord Palmerston that 'the communes
in Greece have the entire direction of their own affairs ; the
press is unshackled ; the tribunals are completely independent ;
private property is scrupulously respected ; the personal and
religious liberty of the subject is inviolable ^.' Yet not one of
these assertions was true. While Sir E. Lyons was writing
this despatch, the people of Athens were reading in the
Greek newspaper of the morning an account of the attack on
Mesolonghi, and an announcement that the insurgents re-
mained unmolested in their camps in Western Greece,
while on the frontier brigandage was making gigantic pro-
gress^. In the month of May, General Gordon, who took
a view of the state of Greece totally different from that
taken by Lord Lyons, resigned his command in the Pelopon-

1 Parliatnenfary Papers — Additional Papers, 1836, p. 39.

* 'Mrjva, 12th (24th) February, 1836. 'H Kijariia av^dvei /xe yiyavriaia P'fjfMra.

!j,i:

STATE OF GREECE. 3 6(5

..D.:836.]

Inesus, and before returning to England wrote to a friend at
lAthens : ' From what I know of the state of the Pelopon-
nesus, and the rapid and alarming increase of organized
brigandage, I fear this will be but a melancholy summer.
I am assured, and believe, that lately several captive robbers
have bought themselves off. Faction is extremely busy, and
crime enjoys impunity. Add to this Church and his heroes
{hoc est olaim adde cainind), and we have a pretty picture.
The bandits are now plundering in Romelia with crowns in
their caps^' Many brigands were enrolled in the bands
which the irregular chieftains were authorized to form in the
spring of 1 836 ; and after the dismissal of Count Armansperg,
Lord Lyons himself complained that one of these amnestied
robbers had been seen at a ball, given by a foreign minister
at Athens to the King and Queen of Greece ^.

The disturbed state of Greece can be proved by better
evidence than that of a British minister at King Otho's court,
or of a British officer in his service. It can be proved by
facts which no party prejudices can distort. From the year
1833 to the year 1838, military tribunals were constantly
sitting to deal out punishment to insurgents or brigands. To
strangers who visited Greece, and who examined the events
that occurred, instead of trusting to the reports they heard,
it seemed that martial law was the only law by which King
Otho was able to dispense even a modicum of justice to a
great number of his unfortunate subjects ",

During the interval between the dismissal of Count Arman-
sperg and the final expulsion of the Bavarians in 1843,

• This last observation alludes to Count Armansperg having granted an amnesty
to several of the chiefs of brigands whom Gordon had driven out of Greece in
183.S, and to one who had taken part in the attack made on the General at Aghia
Marina.

^ An example of the different aspect which Greece presented to the British
minister, and to an observant British traveller, will be found by comparing the
Parliamentary Papers of 1836 with Colonel Mure's Journal of a Tour in Greece in
1838. Lord Lyons writes in 1836 — ' I denied that the peasantry were impoverished,
or that they wo:e sheep-skins.' Yet Colonel Mure in 1838, even in the town of
Livadea, remarks that the students ' reclined, squatted, romped, and reposed upon
their shaggy goat-skin cloaks or hairy capotes, which protected them from the
storm by day, and formed their mattress and bedding by night.'

^ The following proclamations of martial law will be found in the Government
Gazette, 1833, No. 28; 1834, No. 28; 1835, first series, No. 12; second series,
No. 3; 1836, No. 6. This last military tribunal was established in February,
1836, and sat until June, 1837. Various amnesties were granted by Count
Armansperg, which furnished a supply of criminals for tribunals of a more regular
kind at a later period.

l66 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

several trifling insurrections broke out in the Peloponnesus ;
and continental Greece continued to be tormented by bands
of brigands, who committed horrid atrocities. In a single
year more than one hundred persons presented themselves
to the public prosecutors, who had been tortured or mutilated
by brigands and pirates. Men had lost their noses and ears ;
women and children had been tortured with indescribable
cruelty, in order to force them to reveal where their husbands
and their fathers were concealed \ No traveller passed
through the country without seeing traces of their misdeeds.
Colonel Mure found brigandage the subject of conversation
at every khan he visited in 1838, and he fell in with victims |
of the brigands, with gendarmes pursuing brigands, or with
brigands themselves, in every part of Greece ^. Even Attica
suffered severely from their ravages ; shepherds were re-
peatedly murdered, and the landed proprietors feared to visit
their estates.

Several chiefs of robbers maintained themselves in the
vicinity of Athens for years, and it was naturally supposed
that they had found the means of obtaining powerful political
protection ^ A singular scene, which occurred when two
famous brigands were led out to be executed, confirmed the
general belief in some official complicity.

On the 5th of August 1 839, Bibisi and Trakadha, who had
been tried and condemned to death, were ordered to be
executed in the vicinity of Athens. The executioner was
assassinated at the Piraeus a few days before, and a new I
executioner was engaged to decapitate the criminals. An
immense crowd was assembled to witness the death of men
who were as much admired for their daring as they were
feared and hated for their cruelty. The two brigands were
surrounded by a strong guard of soldiers. The executioner
ascended the scaffold on which the guillotine was placed.

* Dr. Fiedler says (ii. 46) : ' Die Landriiuber sind schon keine Menschen mehr,
aber die Seeriiuber sind noch vitl teuflischer. Es wiirde zu emporend sein ihre
Schandthaten zu beschreiben.'

2 Mure, Journal of a Tour in Greece, vol. i. p. 24I ; vol. ii. pp. 2, 137, 144, 147,
186, 209, 257, 259, 274, 286, and 291. Compare also Fiedler, Reis,e diirch alle
Tkeile des Kijnigreiches Griechenlaiid in den Jahren 1834 his 1837, vol. i. 146, 159,
165, 182, 192, 193, 198; ii. 45.

^ The first of these local brigands who gained distinction in Attica was named
Burduba. After committing several atrocious murders, he was pardoned and
enrolled in the municipal guard, but he was soon slain by the relations of one
of his victims.

BRIGANDAGE, 1 67

A.D. 1839.]

After waiting long for orders, he slowly commenced his
work, but after some further delay, he fainted, or pretended
to faint, and his powers of action could not be sufficiently
restored to enable him to stand. The prefect wished to find
another executioner, but the municipal authorities would give
him no assistance. The populace began to enjoy the comedy
they witnessed, instead of the tragedy they had expected to
see. A reprieve was called for, and from the foot of the
gallows the prefect was persuaded to despatch a message to
King Otho asking for a reprieve, which, under the circum-
stances, it was impossible for his majesty to refuse ^. Bibisi
was condemned to imprisonment for life. As usually happens
in Greece, both he and Trakadha were soon allowed to
escape. They recommenced their robberies in the neighbour-
hood of Athens. At last they ventured to rob within sight
of the royal palace. The court and the Greek ministers were
roused from their habitual lethargy. A price was put on
Bibisi's head, and he was soon shot by a gendarme, who had
himself been a brigand. Trakadha perished even sooner.
But brigandage continued to exist in Attica, and to flourish
in the greater part of Greece for many years ; and pages
might be filled with accounts of robberies, murders, torturing,
mutilation, and worse atrocities committed in every part of
Greece ^.

The evils of brigandage fell chiefly on the agricultural
population, and neither the court, the Bavarians, nor the
Greek ministers, appear to have paid any attention to the
condition and the sufferings of the agricultural classes. The
want of roads confined intercourse and material improvement
to the sea-coast and the neighbourhood of commercial towns.
The greater part of Greece, cut off from all hope of bettering
its circumstances, remained in a barbarous and stationary
condition.

King Otho returned to Greece after his marriage with
Queen Amalia ^ accompanied by M. Rudhart, whom King
Louis had selected to act as his son's political guide and
prime minister. Count Armansperg was ordered to return

^ 'k9-qva., 26th July, 1839.

2 The recent work of Mr. Senior gives some account of the extent to which
brigandage continued in 1855.

» Maria Frederica Amalia, born 21st December, i8i8, was the eldest daughter
of Augustus, Grand Duke of Oldenburg.

1 68 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

to Bavaria, the office of arcli-chancellor was abolished, and
Rudhart was appointed minister of the royal household and
of foreign affairs on the 14th February 1837. He was an
upright and perhaps an able man, but neither his previous
experience nor his personal character fitted him for the
position which he was called upon to occupy in Greece, and
he displayed such ignorance of the administrative wants of
the country, that he was compelled to resign before he had
held office for a year. His mismanagement rendered it
impossible for King Otho to entrust the direction of the j
government any longer to foreigners, and on the 20th Decem-
ber 1837 M. Zographos, who was then Greek minister at
Constantinople, was recalled to lill the offices which M.
Rudhart had resigned.

King Otho became his own prime minister after the
resignation of M. Rudhart. His majesty possessed neither
ability, experience, energy, nor generosity ; consequently he
was neither respected, obeyed, feared, nor loved ; and the
government grew gradually weaker and more disorganized.
Yet he pursued one of the phantoms by which abler despots
are often deluded. He strove to concentrate all power in his
own hands. It never occurred to him that it was more
politic to perform the duty of a king well, than to perform
the business of half-a-dozen government officials with mecha-
nical exactitude. King Otho observed but a very small
portion of the facts which were placed directly before him ;
he was slow at drawing inferences even from the few facts
he observed, and he was utterly incapable of finding the
means of reforming any abuse from his own administrative
knowledge or the resources of his own mind.

The king counted on his sincere desire to be the monarch
of a prosperous and powerful nation for supplying him with
every qualification necessary for governing the Greeks, and he
expected that his personal popularity and his king-craft
would prevent insurrections and suppress brigandage. Un-
fortunately he took no measures to root out the social evils
that caused the one, or the political evils that produced the
other. The king could form no firm resolutions himself, and
he reposed no confidence in his ministers. They were indeed
not worthy of much, for both Bavarians and Greeks displayed
far more eagerness to obtain ministerial portfolios, than zeal

KING OTHO GOVERNS. 169

A.D. 1839.]

in performing the duties of the offices with which they were
entrusted. King Otho observed the meanness of their
intrigues and the selfishness of their conduct. He distrusted
the Bavarians, because he perceived that they looked to
Munich for their ultimate reward ; and he despised the
Greeks, because they were always ready to abandon the
principles they avowed when he offered them either place or
profit. With these feelings he attempted to govern without
the advice of his ministers ; and he only assembled cabinet
councils in order to obtain the formal ratification of measures
already prepared in his own closet. Even his majesty's
commands were often communicated to his ministers by
private secretaries. To insure complete subserviency, no
minister was allowed to remain very long in office, and men
were usually selected without influence or ability, and fre-
quently without education ^.

During the personal government of King Otho, a singular
event envenomed the disputes which had arisen between
Lord Lyons and the Greek court during M. Rudhart's
administration. The affair has always remained enveloped
in mystery, but its effects were so important that the fact
requires notice, though it eludes explanation. It placed the
British minister in direct personal hostility to the sovereign
at whose court he was accredited, and it was the principal
cause of the bitter animosity that King Otho ever since
showed to England.

A Greek newspaper which King Otho was said to read
with particular pleasure, thought fit, in an unlucky hour, to
insert extracts from an English pamphlet ridiculing the
servile condition of a nation that was governed by a young
queen. A reply appeared in the Morning Chro7iicle, observing
that it was fortunate for Great Britain that the only reproach
which could be made to the sovereign was that she was

' Count Armansperg taught King Otho to form cabinets of ministers who could
not commimicate in a common language. He had often two ministers who could
only speak Greek, and one who could speak nothing but German. But King
Otho carried many things farther in the wrong direction than his arch-chancellor.
The following is the copy of a letter written by a minister of foreign affairs, who
held office during delicate negotiations with Lord Palmerston. It may be said to
consist of eighteen words, twelve of which are strangely mis-spelt : —

Kvpii, eras eSojrio icara vxpiMv kmrayiv tis. A. M tis BaaiXiais otoi a^piov rpiriv
€is ras 7| /*, /i. diXoi ads Sex^iJ' »; A. M 17 ISaaiKiaa.

I JO BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV,

young. Time would too soon remove the reproach, but the!
article in the Greek newspaper was in very bad taste in aj
country where the sovereign was reproached with being in-j
competent to govern. The Morning Chronicle then asserted!
that a certificate had been signed by several Bavarians, Bi*'
members of King Otho's household, declaring that his majesty
was incapable of governing his little kingdom. The Bavarian
consul at Athens was an Englishman, and he considered iti
his duty to step forward and contradict the correspondent
of the Morning Chronicle. The anonymous writer defended'
his veracity, reiterated his assertion, and added that the
document was dated in the year 1H35, and was signed by
Dr. Wibmer, King Otho's physician, Count Saporta, the marshal |
of the royal household, Baron Stengel and M. Lehmaier,
private secretaries to the king, and members of his private
council or camarilla. This rejoinder was widely circulated,
and caused a loud outcry at Athens. The Greek newspapers
declared that their king had been grossly insulted and calum-
niated, either by the English or the Bavarians, or by both.
In order to tranquillize the public, and throw the whole
odium on the English, Dr. Wibmer, Baron Stengel, and M.
Lehmaier published a declaration, asserting that they had
never signed any such certificated But in the mean time
it was reported that an indirect communication had been
made to the courts of Greece and Bavaria that, in case of
further discussion, the document would be published in the
Morning CJiroJiicle. It is certain that a short time after
publishing their declaration, Wibmer, Stengel, and Lehmaier
suddenly resigned their offices, and returned to Bavaria.
The precise nature of the mysterious certificate remained
a secret.

But whatever the document might be, since it was signed
in 1835, during Count Armansperg's administration, it was
inferred that it could only have become known to foreigners
by having been treacherously communicated to the count's
friend, Lord Lyons, and having, through the imprudence of
Lord Lyons, fallen into the hands of some person who made
use of it to gratify a private spite. The wound given was
severe, and the press never allowed it to heal. Even English

' 'A9i]va, 1839, No. 632. The declaration is dated 23rd July, 1839.

CAUSES OF REVOLUTION C7^ 1843. 171

A.D. 1843.]

diplomatists and officials were so imprudent as to be con-
stantly harping on the question of the mysterious certificate.

As years rolled on, the misgovernment of King Otho became
more intolerable. The agricultural population remained in
a stationary condition. They were plundered by brigands,
pillaged by gendarmes, and robbed by tax-collectors. They
had to bear the whole burden of the conscription, and pay
heavy municipal taxes ; yet their property was insecure, and
no roads were made. The Bavarians reproached Capodistrias
with having neglected to improve the Turkish system of
levying the land-tax, to construct roads and bridges, and
to establish security for persons and property ^ The Greeks
now reproached the Bavarians with similar neglect. A remedy
was required, and the people, having long patiently submitted
to the despotic authority of the Bavarians, now began to
clamour for a constitutional government. The first step to
a free government was the expulsion of the Bavarians, and
all parties in Greece agreed to unite their strength for this
object. The administrative incapacity of King Otho's coun-
cillors disgusted the three protecting powers as much as their
arbitrary conduct irritated the Greeks.

England and Russia supported the parties who demanded
constitutional government. Nationality was so interwoven
with orthodoxy, and orthodoxy appeared to be so com-
pletely under Russian control, that the establishment of a
constitutional and national government was supposed by the
cabinet of St. Petersburg to be the surest means of rendering
Greece subservient to the schemes of the Emperor Nicholas
in the East. The Capodistrians carried their designs further
than the Russian cabinet, for they proposed dethroning King
Otho. For several years great exertions had been made to
arouse the orthodox prejudices of the Greeks, and hopes were
entertained that a revolution would afford an opportunity of
placing the crown of Greece on the head of an orthodox
prince. But when the time came, no orthodox prince fitter to
govern Greece than King Otho could be found.

The English party acted under the guidance of Lord Lyons,
who for several years had been the firm advocate of liberal
measures^ and a return to a constitutional system.

* Thiersch, i. 57.

172 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

France still proposed what Louis Philippe and his minis-
ters called a policy of moderation. The French minister in
Greece v/as instructed to recommend the Greek government
to improve the provincial councils and the municipal adminis-
tration. The evils against which the people complained were
defects in the central administration, consequently the advice
of France was futile.

The destruction of the representative system, the anni-
hilation of independent action in the municipal authorities,
the low state of political civilization, the still lower state of
political morality, and the general lassitude which follows
after a great national exertion, would in all probability have
enabled King Otho and the Bavarians to rule Greece de-
spotically for some years more, had not Great Britain and
Russia publicly called upon the king's government to remedy
the financial embarrassments in which it was involved. The
Russian minister warned King Otho that he must prepare
to pay the interest of the Allied loan. The king determined
to augment his revenues in order to meet the demands of
the Allies, and in the year 1842 he made some administrative
changes which rendered his government more oppressive. A
law regulating the custom duties was adopted, which caused
so much discontent among the mercantile classes, and so
many complaints, that the government was compelled to
modify it by a new law before it had been many months
in operation ^

The Russian cabinet expected that King Otho, when
threatened with a constitution, would have thrown himself
on its support ; but finding that its counsels were neglected,
the emperor made a peremptory demand for immediate pay-
ment of the interest due on the Allied loan ^. The menacing
tone of this demand was interpreted by the orthodox party
to authorize the friends of Russia to adopt revolutionary
measures. But to insure the approbation of the Emperor
Nicholas, the partizans of Russian influence considered it ne-
cessary to give the movement as much as possible a religious
character, and they made it their object to replace the Catholic

. * This law is translated in Lesur, Annuaire Historiqne, 1842. The modification
took place in 1843.

* An extract from the Russian note is given in Lesur, Atinnaire Historique, 1843.
It was dated 23rd February (7th March), 1843. See Documents.

HIT"

CAUSES OF REVOLUTION OF 1843, 173

A.D. 1843.]

Otho by an orthodox prince. As orthodoxy was in no

danger, and no orthodox king was forthcoming, the direction

of the revolution passed into the hands of the constitutionalists,

who demanded a definite political object, the convocation of a

national assembly.

The union of the orthodox and constitutional factions was
absolutely necessary, in order to give a popular movement
any chance of success. This was easily effected, for both
desired the immediate expulsion of the Bavarians ; the ortho-
dox party was not unfavourable to the convocation of a
national assembly, and the constitutional party felt no dis-
position to defend King Otho, had a better sovereign been
proposed as his successor. It may be observed that both
parties were destitute of leaders possessing any political
talent.

The British government had long advocated liberal in-
stitutions, but Lord Palmerston was no longer in office, and
some doubt was entertained whether the Tories would not
openly oppose a revolutionary movement. The friends of
constitutional liberty brought on a discussion in the House
of Commons on the 15th August 1843, which proved that
all parties in England considered the Greeks entitled to
representative institutions. Lord Palmerston said : ' I hope
that her Majesty's ministers will urge strongly upon the King
of Greece the necessity of his giving a constitution to his
people in redemption of the pledge given by the three powers
in 1832, and repeated by Baron Gise, his father's counsellor.'
And Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, after alluding to
the financial condition of Greece, continued : ' Russia, France,
and England have made strong representations likewise on
other matters, connected with the necessity of giving satis-
faction to the just wishes of the people. I must abstain at
present from any more direct allusion on this subject, but
I can assure the house that many points alluded to by the
noble lord have not been overlooked.' These were solemn
warnings given in the face of all Europe ; but King Otho
refused to listen to the voice of nations, and remained loitering
with fatuity on the brink of a precipice ^.

^ That a revolution was considered inevitable both in England and Greece is
proved by an article in Blachvood's Magazine for September, 1843, 'The Bank-
ruptcy of Greece ; ' and a letter from Athens, dated 5th September, and published

174 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IV.

A revolution being inevitable, all parties agreed that it
ought to commence at Athens, and that King Otho should
be compelled to dismiss all the Bavarians in the Greek
service, to acknowledge the constitution, and to convoke a
national assembly for its revision. The orthodox party con-
sented that these points should be those mooted at the
commencement of the revolution, being convinced that the
king's pride would induce him to reject the first. But, at
all events, they felt so sure of commanding a majority in
a national assembly, that they believed it would be in their
power to declare the throne vacant, and to proceed to elect a
new king the moment they could find a suitable orthodox
candidate.

On the day preceding the revolution, the court obtained
authentic information of the conspiracy. Orders were given
to arrest General Makryiannes and many of the leaders ; but
it was already too late. The gendarmes who surrounded
Makryiannes' house did not invest it until after dark, and
they did not attempt to make the arrest until midnight,
hoping to surprise several leaders at the same time. Their
movements had been watched, and a strong body of con-
spirators had introduced themselves unobserved into the
house. When the gendarmes approached they were warned
off, and when they summoned the general to surrender, and
attempted to force an entry, they found everything prepared
for defence. A few shots were exchanged, and the gen-
darmes were repulsed, carrying off one man killed and another
wounded.

The garrison of Athens had been drawn up to support the
gendarmes. General Vlachopulos, once a staunch adherent of
Mavrocordatos, now a devoted courtier, was minister of war.
He had been trained by the camarilla to do nothing without
orders, and he was not a man to seize the moment for inde-
pendent action. He did not put himself at the head of the
troops, and thus the only chance of stemming the torrent of
the revolution was lost.

As soon as the shots which proclaimed that General

in the Morning Post of the 23rd, announces the approaching revolution in terms
which indicate that its information was derived from the Russian party. It says,
that ' the Greeks have so fully made up their minds to put an end to tire Bavarian
dynasty as to be resolved not even to accept a constitution at the hands of King
Otho."

REVOLUTION OF 1 843. 175

'.,D. 1843.]

Makryiannes' house was attacked were heard, General Kalergi,
the inspector of cavahy, rode into the barracks where the
troops were drawn up. On his arrival a preconcerted shout
was raised, 'Long live the constitution!' — C'/^co ro ^vvrayixa.
Kalergi immediately assumed the command, and marched
the whole garrison to the royal palace. And at the same
time, with the prudence which he constantly displayed in
o-reat emergencies, and which contrasted with his extreme
imprudence on ordinary occasions, he sent out strong pa-
trols to maintain order, and stop the cry of 'Death to the
Bavarians!' which the friends of orthodoxy and brigandage
attempted to raise.

King Otho was waiting in his palace with his usual
apathetic patience to receive the news that the numerous
arrests ordered by the minister of war had been made. That
of Makryiannes was to have served as a signal for the others ;
and his majesty had hardly received the information that the
gendarmes had been defeated, when the garrison of the
capital, with Kalergi at its head, appeared under the palace
windows. General Hess, who was the Bavarian military
counsellor in the camarilla, was by the king's side. A Bava-
rian aide-de-camp was despatched to bring up the artillery
and drive the rebellious troops from the square before the
palace with grape-shot. The king counted on the devotion
of Captain Botzaris, a son of the brave Marko, who had been
educated in Bavaria. The guns soon arrived, but they gal-
loped to the position assigned them by Kalergi amidst shouts
of ' Long live the constitution ! ' The question now lay be-
tween Greek liberty and Bavarian despotism.

The king showed himself at one of the lower windows of
the palace. Kalergi informed his majesty that all Greece
appealed to him to fulfil the promises given when he was
elected King of Greece, that the people should be governed
constitutionally. A low conversation ensued, which was in-
distinct to those nearest, but the attitude of Kalergi indicated
dissent. The king turned to the troops, and exclaimed in a
loud voice, ' Retire to your quarters.' Kalergi swamped the
royal order by calling 'Attention!' and, with a deferential
air, veiling a tone of satire, observed to the king, ' The troops
expect your majesty's orders through me, and they will wait
patiently for your royal decision in their present position.'

176 BA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk.V. Ch.IV.

It was now announced that deputies from the council of state
were appointed to lay the wishes of the nation before his
majesty.

The council of state was a creation of Count Armansperg.
It was an imitation of the senate of Capodistrias, and it had
no more claim to be regarded as a representation of the Greek
people than that body. Many of the membei's were insignifi-
cant and ignorant men, but all were eager to retain the high
place into which fortune had intruded them. They met, at
the requisition of the conspirators, when Kalergi marched to
the palace. The Phanariots and courtiers in the body en-
deavoured to gain time, and tried to raise a long discussion.
They knew that the constitution would send them back to
their former nullity. The murmurs of the constitutionalists
assembled outside the place of meeting at last put an end to
all discussion, and the council of state pledged itself to sup-
port the constitution. Andreas Londos, Rhigas Palamedes,
and Andreas Metaxas, were deputed to wait on the king and
advise his majesty to dismiss the Bavarians, appoint a new
ministry, and convoke a national assembly.

Morning dawned before this deputation reached the palace.
King Otho was in no hurry to receive the men who composed
it. He still counted on effectual support from the German
ministers at his court, and his immediate object was to afford
them time to take some step in his favour. The deputation
was at last received, but while the king was treating with its
members, he was endeavouring to open a communication with
his own creatures in the council of state, who, he thought,
might now be sufficiently numerous to pass a new resolution
in his favour.

His Majesty's delay was beginning to exhaust the patience
of the constitutionalists, and those most hostile to his person
began to display their feelings. The greater part of the
population of Athens was assembled in the extensive square
before the palace. The troops occupied only a small space
near the building. Children were playing, boys were shout-
ing, and apprentices were exclaiming that the king was acting
with Bavarian precipitancy, which had long been a byword
with the Greeks for doing nothing. Men were exhibiting
signs of dissatisfaction, and talking of the departure of Agos-
tino from Nauplia under circumstances not very dissimilar.

REVOLUTION OF 1843. 177

A.D. 1843.]

Suddenly a few carnages arrived in quick succession : they
contained the foreign ministers^. A faint cheer was raised as
the Russian and Enghsh ministers appeared ; but in general
the people displayed alarm, remained silent, or formed small
groups of whisperers. At this moment it was fortunate for
Greece that Kalergi was at the head of the troops. On that
important day he was the only leading man of the movement
who was in his right place. He had the good sense to de-
clare to the foreign ministers that they could not enter the
palace until the deputation of the council of state had ter-
minated its interview and received a final answer from his
majesty. The representatives of the three Allied powers
being made acquainted with the demands of the deputation,
acquiesced in this arrangement on receiving from Kalergi the
assurance that his majesty's person should be treated with the
greatest respect. The ministers of Russia, England, and
France departed, deeming that their presence might tend to
prolong the crisis and increase the king's personal danger.
The Austrian and Prussian ministers thought the field was
clear for action on their part, and they resolved to act ener-
getically. They insisted on seeing the king. They used
strong language, and made an attempt to bully Kalergi, who
listened with coolness, and then quaintly observed that he
believed diplomatic etiquette required them to follow the ex-
ample of their doyen, the Russian envoy, and that common
sense suggested to him that it would be prudent for them to
act like the representatives of the three protecting powers.

When King Otho learned that the German diplomatists
had been unable to penetrate into his palace, he saw that it
was necessary to abandon absolute power in order to preserve
the crown. Without any further observation he signed all the
ordinances presented to him ; and on the 15th of September
1843, Greece became a constitutional monarchy. The Bava-
rians were dismissed from his service ; a new ministry was
appointed, and a national assembly was convoked.

That national assembly met on the 20th of November 1843,
and terminated its work on the 30th of March 1844, when

* The doyen of the corps diplomatique was M. Catacazi, the Russian envoy ; Lord
Lyons (then Sir Edmund) was English minister, M. Piscatory was French minister.
Baron Proliesch d'Osten was Austrian minister, and Count Brassier de St. Simoa
was Prussian minister.

VOL. VIL N

178 BA VARIAN DESPO TISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. l\\

King Otho swore obedience to the constitution which it hac

prepared.

It is not the business of the historian of Greece under
foreign domination to judge this constitution. It is onlyl
necessary for him to record the fact that it put an end tol
the government of ahen rulers, under which the Greeks hadf
lived for two thousand years. Its merits and defects belonglj
to the history of Greece as a constitutional state ; and perhaps y
more than one generation must be allowed to elapse beforej
they can be examined with the light of experience. Still,
before closing this record of the deeds by which the Greeks
established their national independence, it is necessary to
notice some shortcomings in this charter of their political'
liberty.

The constitution of 1844 is a compilation from foreign 1
sources, and not the production of the national mind. Greece
had no Lycurgus to make laws for the attainment of theoretic
excellence, nor any Solon to devise remedies for existing evils.
National wants and national institutions were alike over-
looked. The municipal system which Capodistrias had de-
faced, and which Maurer had converted into an engine for
rivetting the fetters of centralization on the local magistrates,
was neither revived as a defence for the people's rights,
nor adapted to aid the progress of Greek society.

The section of the constitution which determines the public
rights of the Greek citizen, omits all reference to those rights
in his position as an inhabitant of a parish, and as a member
of a municipality and provincial district. Indeed, the in-
terests of the citizen, in so far as they were directly connected
with his locality and his property, were completely neglected,
and only his relations with the legislature and the central
government were determined.

The spirit of imitation also introduced some contradictions
into the constitution of Greece extremely injurious to the
cause of liberty. Universal suffrage was adopted for choosing
members of the legislature, while the chief magistrates in the
municipalities were selected by the king from three candi-
dates chosen by an oligarchical elective body. As far as the
rights of the citizens in municipalities were concerned, all
the evils of the Capodistrian and Bavarian systems were
left without reform. The municipalities remained in servile

^Vf

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION. 179

.D.1843.]

' ' |iependcnce on the king, the ministers of the day, and the
prefects of the hour. The demarch was not directly elected
J Wc; jjy the people, and the minister of the crown exercised a
"^ '^'i; jjirect control over the budget of the demarchy. Yet the
^^ ' JDeople, though not allowed to elect their own local chief, were
nevertheless entrusted with the election of deputies to the
lower legislative chamber. And this introduction of universal
r- ; puffrage in the institutions of Greece was completely excep-
r'-^ belli: jtional, for a property qualification was retained for the electors
•^ ^tk jwho appointed provincial councillors. A system tending more
^^wfe idirectly to perpetuate mal-administration in the municipalities,
nullity in the provincial councils, and corruption in the cham-
ber of deputies, could not have been devised. Individual
responsibility was destroyed, the influence of the court was
extended, and the power of faction increased.

The constitution of Greece opens the section of the public
tiieoreti! jrights of citizens with an article which figures in most modern

it over'l

politic!

Greec)

^ne t'oiji

e publii'f

e right

[member

the Id-

MKted

;kii

cenbi

lictioffi
to the
:mi
inthf
candi-
as tie

were
feni'e

constitutions since the French constitution of 1793 ^ ^^
declares that all Greeks are equal in the eye of the law.
In many of the constitutions in which a similar article ap-
pears, it is a direct falsehood : in the constitution of Greece
it is not strictly true. The Greeks who framed the constitu-
tion knew that the phrase was introduced in France originally
to enable the people to boast of an equality which the French,
at least, have never enjoyed. To render all the citizens equal
before the law, something more is necessary than to say that
they are so. The legislation which would insure equality
must render every individual, whatever be his rank or official
station, responsible for all his acts to the persons whom those
acts affect. The law must be equal for all, and superior to all.
Neither a minister of police, a general, nor an admiral, any
more than a prefect, must be permitted to plead official duty
for any act as an excuse for not answering before the ordinary
tribunals of the country. No officer of government must be
allowed to escape personal responsibility by the plea of supe-
rior orders. The sovereign alone can do no wrong. There
can be no true liberty in any country where administrative
privileges exempt officials from the direct operation of the
law, as it affects every other citizen of the state, and as it

^ A translation of the Greek constitution is given in Parliamentary Papers, 1 844,
' Correspondence relative to recent events in Greece.'

N %

i8o BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Bk. V. Ch. IVj

is administered by the ordinary tribunals of the country. The-
Greeks did not lay down this principle in their constitution |
they preferred the nominal equality of France to the lega;
equality of English law.

The two most influential leaders in the national assembi
were Mavrocordatos and Kolettes. Both endeavoured to pre-j
serve every official privilege introduced by Capodistrias and
the Bavarians, for the purpose of placing the agents of th
government above the law of the land. It was only through]
the support which Lord Lyons gave to a small party olj
deputies, that Mavrocordatos was induced to insert an articl
in the constitution expressly forbidding the re-establish men'
of the exceptional tribunals which Capodistrias, the regency,]
and King Otho, had used as instruments of fiscal extortion!
and illegal oppression. The abolition of the exceptional
tribunals then in existence was declared in another article]
of the constitution ^. The opposition which the leading]
statesmen of Greece made even to this tame protest agains
the illegal and unconstitutional proceedings of past govern
ments, presaged that they were not likely to prove either
active or intelligent artificers of the institutions still required
in order to establish the civil and political liberties of the
Greeks on a firm foundation. But the living generation had
accomplished a great achievement. The future destinies of
the Greek race were now in the hands of the citizens of
liberated Greece.

pre

tj the it

liptu.

I J ■■

Ifteiitnii!
Minyir
itiisi

Vm^^

Before finally releasing the reader who has followed the]
Author through the preceding pages, it may not be altogether';
unnecessary to look back at the origin of the Greek Revo-
lution, and examine how far it has been crowned with success,
or in what it has failed to fulfil the expectations of reflecting I
men. A generation has already passed away ; most of the j
actors in the drama are dead ; the political position of Greece
itself has changed ; so that a contemporary may now view the
events without passion, and weigh their consequences with
impartiality.

The Greek Revolution was not an insurrectional movement, f
originating solely in Turkish oppression. The first aspirations

' Compare Articles 89 and loi.

[Hv.p

GENERAL REMARKS. i8i

11.0,1843,]

'for the delivery of the orthodox church from the sultan's yoke

0 tie I '^^^''^ inspired by Russia ; the projects for national independ-

lence by the French Revolution. The Greeks, it is true, were

1 ,,, jprepared to receive these ideas by a wave in the element
^ ■ lof human progress that had previously spread civilization
;„• ' among the inhabitants of the Othoman empire, whether
., ," 'Mussulman or Christian.

The origin of the ideas that produced the Greek Revolution
explain why it was pre-eminently the movement of the people ;
and that its success was owing to their perseverance, is proved
by its whole history. To live or die free was the firm resolve
of the native peasantry of Greece when they took up arms ;
and no sufferings ever shook that resolution. They never had
the good fortune to find a leader worthy of their cause. No
eminent man stands forward as a type of the nation's virtues ;
too many are famous as representatives of the nation's vices.
From this circumstance, the records of the Greek Revolution
are destitute of one of history's most attractive characteristics :
it loses the charm of a hero's biography. But it possesses its
own distinction. Never in the records of states did a nation's
success depend more entirely on the conduct of the mass of
the population ; never was there a more clear manifestation of
God's providence in the progress of human society. No one
can regard its success as the result of the military and naval
exploits of the insurgents ; and even the Allied powers, in
creating a Greek kingdom, only modified the political results
of a revolution which had irrevocably separated the present
from the past.

Let us now examine how far the Greek Revolution has
succeeded. It has established the independence of Greece
on a firm basis, and created a free government in regions
. where civil liberty was unknown for two thousand years. It
has secured popular institutions to a considerable portion of
the Greek nation, and given to the people the power of
infusing national life and national feelings into the admini-
stration of King Otho's kingdom. These may be justly
considered by the Greeks as glorious achievements for one
generation.

But yet it must be confessed that in many things the Greek
Revolution has failed. It has not created a growing popu-
lation and an expanding nation. Diplomacy has formed

:Iiiies i

l82 BAVARIAN DESPOTISM.

[Rk. V. Ch,

a diminutive kingdom, and no Themistocles has known ho^
to form a great state out of so small a community. Yet thi
task was not difficult : the lesson was taught in the Unit©
States of America and in the colonial empire of Great Britain
But in the Greek kingdom, with every element of social am
political improvement at hand, the agricultural populationj
and the native industry of the country have remained almosi
stationary. The towns, it is true, are increasing, and merchant
are gaining money; but the brave peasantry who formed thi
nation's strength grows neither richer nor more numerous
the produce of their labour is of the rudest kind ; whoL
districts remain uncultivated ; the wealthy Greeks who pick!
up money in foreign traffic do not invest the capital they]
accumulate in the land which they pretend to call their coun^
try; and no stream of Greek emigrants flows from the millions]
who live enslaved in Turkey, to enjoy liberty by settling in
liberated Greece.

There can be no doubt that the inhabitants of Greece may,
even in spite of past failures, look with hope to the future.
When a few years of liberty have purged society from the
traditional corruption of servitude, wise counsels may enablei
them to resume their progress.

But the friends of Greece, who believed that the Revolution
would be immediately followed by the multiplication of the
Greek race, and by the transfusion of Christian civilization and
political liberty throughout all the regions that surround the
Aegean Sea, cannot help regretting that a generation has
been allowed to pass away unprofitably. The political posi-
tion of the Othoman empire in the international system of
Europe is already changed, and the condition of the Christian
population in Turkey is even more changed than the position
of the empire. The kingdom of Greece has lost the oppor-
tunity of alluring emigrants by good government. Feelings
of nationality are awakened in other Oriental Christians under
Othoman domination. The Greeks can henceforth only repose
their hopes of power on an admission of their intellectual and
moral superiority. The Albanians are more warlike ; the
Sclavonians are more laborious ; the Roumans dwell in a more
fertile land ; and the Turks may become again a powerful
nation, by being delivered from the lethargic influence of the
Othoman sultans.

I GENERAL REMARKS. 183

I ^.D. 1843.]
I The Othoman empire may soon be dismembered, or it may
iong drag on a contemptible existence, like the Greek empire
bf Constantinople under the Palaeologues. Its military re-
j50urces, however, render its condition not dissimilar to that
!of the Roman empire in the time of Gallienus, and there may
be a possibility of finding a Diocletian to reorganize the
administration, and a Constantine to reform the religion.
:But should it be dismembered to-morrow, it may be asked,
Iwhat measures the free Greeks have adopted to govern any
[portion better than the officers of the sultan ? On the other
hand, several powerful states and more populous nations are
well prepared to seize the fragments of the disjointed empire.
They will easily find legitimate pretexts for their intervention,
and they will certainly obtain a tacit recognition of the justice
of their proceedings from the public opinion of civilized
Europe, if they succeed in saving Turkey from anarchy, and
in averting such scenes of slaughter as Greece witnessed during
her Revolution, or as have recently occurred in Syria.

It is never too late to commence the task of improvement.
The inheritance may not be open for many years, and the
heirs may be called to the succession by their merit. What,
then, are the merits which give a nation the best claim to
greatness? Personal dignity, domestic virtue, truth in the
intercourse of society, and respect for justice, command re-
verence and insure authority to individuals. Let the Greeks
make them the first objects of all family education, until they
become national characteristics, and then liberated Greece
will have no reason to envy either the glory of ancient Greece,
or the power which was conferred on the ancient Greeks by
the conquests of the Macedonians. But I wander too far
from my subject ; so, instead of moralizing further, I shall
conclude with the words of the old English song^ —

' Only the actions of the just
Smell sweet and blossom in the dust.'

' [At this point the original work ended ; but the two following chapters were
left in manuscript by the Author at the time of his death, and are intended to form
a continuation of the history up to the year 1864, when the constitution of Greece
was established on a more definitive basis. Ed.]

CHAPTER V.

[SUPPLEMEIfTART.]

Constitutional Monarchy — 1844 to 1862.

Alexander Mavrocordatos prime minister. — French policy. — Elections in 1844. — |
Misconduct of the Mavrocordatos cabinet. — An anomalous election. — Kolettesj
prime minister. — Organization of the Church. — Diplomatic disputes. — |
Quarrel with Turkey. — Financial administration. — Revolts and brigandage.
— Changes of ministry. — Rupture with Great Britain. — Arrangement of the I
British claims. — Affairs of Montenegro. — Russian demands on Turkey. — l
State of Greece in 1853 and 1854 — Greeks invade Turkey. — Defeat of the]
Greeks. — Occupation of the Piraeus by French and English troops. — Demo-
ralized condition of Greece. — Violation of the constitution. — Brigandage in '
1855 and 1856. — Financial commission of the protecting powers. — Land-
tax. — Communal administration. — The Miaoulis ministry. — Dissolution of |
the Chamber of Deputies. — Attempt to assassinate Queen Amalia. — Negotia-
tions with Admiral Kanares for the formation of a ministry.

When the Author revised the preceding chapters of this
work in retirement at Kephisia during the summer of i860,
King Otho seemed to be as securely seated on his throne as
any sovereign in Europe. The ungrateful task of recording
the misfortunes of Greece is resumed in order to complete a
contemporary view of the course of events and of the changes of
opinion which caused the King of Greece to be driven from
his throne, without an effort being made to support his
authority by those whom his favour had raised to wealth
and power. A political revolution has now opened to the
Greeks new roads to improvement, and placed in their own
hands the means of self-government. A constitution better
adapted to the social condition of the population, and an
augmentation of territory due to the generosity of the British
government, have modified the condition of the Greek kingdom,
and they render the Revolution which established the new

STATE OF GREECE, 1844. 185

order of things the natural termination of this work. Time
may not yet have purified the Author's mind from the
i disturbing influences and prejudices of the passing day, but
i he cannot resist the desire to make his history of the Greek
I Revolution, though it must be imperfect, as complete as
i lies in his power ; and age will not allow him to delay
I the work in the hope of being able to survey the events
more calmly.

The attempt which the Greeks made in 1844 to lay the
J j foundations of good government on constitutional theories was
unsuccessful ; it was rendered abortive by the want of national
institutions for local administration, or what is now generally
called self-government. The people remained powerless to
correct local abuses or to execute measures of local improve-
ment. The corruption of the central government and the
OTtall contracted views of King Otho rendered the period from the
ripii(!jj I adoption of the constitution in 1844 to his expulsion from
;::ofii , Greece in 1862 a period of comparative stagnation for a
^, .. people who, like the population of the Greek kingdom,
._DeiK possessed two unfailing elements of prosperity and national
i;^ei increase, when they are wisely employed, freedom of com-
'~^ merce and a considerable extent of fertile and uncultivated
land.

The harmony that prevailed among the party leaders in the
National Assembly of 1843 ceased at its dissolution. The old
iftliiffl parties under Mavrocordatos, Kolettes, and Metaxas, again
\Mm recommenced their old intrigues and their former struggles
Mm for the power of conferring places and salaries on their
)rrfiiii partizans. The interference of the protecting powers was
letel openly exercised. For a short time the ministers of Great
^esH Britain and France, Sir Edmund Lyons and M. Piscatory,
frooiP acted in concord, and endeavoured to induce Mavrocordatos
and Kolettes to unite in forming a ministry, believing that this
coalition afforded the surest means of giving Greece good
government. But the ambition of these leaders was irrecon-
ovil cileable, and the avidity of their partizans to gain possession
ettfl| of the whole patronage of government soon showed that a
coalition of what was called the English and French parties was
itisli| impossible. The question was, whether a struggle for power was
to be carried on in a divided cabinet or in a divided nation.
After a cautious examination of the circumstances in which

1 85 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V.

he was placed, King Otho selected Mavrocordatos to form theij
first constitutional ministry. The power of consolidating a
system of administration founded on free institutions and local \ !
self-government was thus, in the year 1H44, placed in the
hands of the man who had taken the most prominent part^j
in framing the first constitution of the Greek state in 1821.
Success in the task of securing to Greece administrative order jj
as well as national independence would have conferred on
Mavrocordatos the highest glory to which a statesman can
aspire, while his failure obscured the merits of his previous j
service. Success evidently depended on the power of rendering
the law the supreme authority in the government, and on the
ministry winning the support of the people by giving practical
energy to a municipal system calculated to carry into im-
mediate execution profitable schemes of local improvement.
Mavrocordatos commenced his administration on the 29th of
March 1844, and in less than five months he was driven from
office by public opinion for having violated the constitution
and neglected to perform any of the duties imposed on the
first constitutional cabinet. His leading error arose from the
ordinary delusion of weak statesmen in believing that they
increase their power by concentrating all executive business in
their own hands, not knowing that the strength of a govern-
ment depends far more on ministers taking care that officials
do their duty, than on their interfering with the duties of
officials, and thereby assuming a responsibility from which
they might remain free. Mavrocordatos persuaded himself
that it was for the interest of Greece that he should govern
absolutely, and this infatuation caused him to pay little
attention to the strict letter of the constitution, and even
less to the opinions and feelings of the people, whenever they
impeded his projects for the centralization of power in his
own hands.

Sound policy as well as duty commanded the ministry
to reform those administrative abuses of which the people
complained with justice, and to establish that degree of
publicity which enables public opinion to fix responsibility
where blame accrues. But the new ministry left old abuses
unreformed, and Mavrocordatos was too much engaged in
accumulating authority to think of increasing the means
of fixing responsibility. To maintain the ministry in office

■n--

W-

tec.

MAVROCORDATOS PRIME MINISTER. 187

A.D. 1844.]

it was necessary to secure the election of a majority of their
partizans to the chamber of deputies, that was about to meet.
In the senate a majority was obtained without difficulty, for
King Otho adopted all the ministerial nominations.

In the year 1844 the state of European politics was

particularly favourable to the prolongation of English influence

in Greece. The Emperor Nicholas, who disliked Louis Philippe

and his government, visited England. For some time previous

it was known that he desired to prevent a close alliance

j between the governments of France and England, and to

|J establish a common line of policy for the British and Russian

^"«l governments in the East, The Emperor Nicholas professed

J himself ready to adopt the views concerning the integrity

""fl of the Othoman empire which guided the policy of Great

.Britain, and declared that he sought no object tending to

"r^m. aggrandize Russia at the sultan's expense. The British

ministers listened to these assurances with pleasure, and

perhaps they attached more importance to them than they

merited ; but they could not forget, even while giving the

emperor credit for perfect sincerity, that the Russian empire

•/J had a traditional policy which could undergo no permanent

change, though it might receive temporary modification from

pera-i the views of the reigning emperor. The governments of Great

Britain and Russia certainly for a short time appeared to agree

Aic) vilj generally in their views concerning the affairs of Turkey, and

niiidii this agreement caused both of them to neglect the affairs of

"" 'n Greece. The Emperor Nicholas believed that a constitutional

; " ij government could not be established in Greece under King

■ Mel Otho, and even if it w^ere established, that it would do no

' ™l good. The British government took a very different view

rtieyl of the effect likely to be produced by the constitution. They

ialiisl believed that if the Greeks were left to themselves to adapt

i their political institutions to their own wants, the constitutional

n;5in| form of government would not only be successful, but would

also greatly accelerate the progress of the country both

politically and in material prosperity. Mavrocordatos was

from the causes mentioned left to himself, and received less

direct support from British influence than, as head of the

d in I 'English party, he expected to receive. It is true that Sir

Edmund Lyons accorded him as much support as was

gee Ij consistent with the duty of refraining from express interference

uttiej
inessin

(»ole

i of

Wity
)i«es

l88 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V.Ch.V.

with the business of government. The principle of non-
interference was the policy which the British government
was desirous of imposing on the protecting powers, as the
surest means of enabling the Greeks to profit by the adoption
of constitutional government.

M. Piscatory, the French minister at Athens, was a man of ,'
sense and judgment, liberal in his views and well acquainted
with the men who composed the French party in Greece, whose
true moral and political value he estimated fairly enough.
During the National Assembly he showed a sincere desire that'
England and France should act harmoniously. But when the
National Assembly was dissolved, M. Guizot became intent on
obtaining a victory over English diplomacy at Athens, as
a counter-check to the general agreement of Russia and
England in the East. It was deemed a matter of great
importance by that pedantic statesman to make French
influence manifest to all Europe by establishing Kolettes
(whom the French called General Kolettes) as prime minister
of Greece in the place of Mavrocordatos, and Piscatory received
imperative orders to make that end the chief object of his
diplomacy. It is not too much to assert that Guizot, Piscatory,
and Kolettes would have laboured in vain, had Mavrocordatos
not offended King Otho by his grasping ambition, and lost
the support of the Greek nation by his administrative incapacity
and his violations of the constitution.

The chamber of deputies was the court of appeal that
possessed the power of deciding on the rival claims to govern
the country, and both Mavrocordatos and Kolettes directed
their whole energy to secure a majority; the one as much as
the other throwing off every restraint imposed by law and
equity. The conduct of Mavrocordatos attracted more
reprobation than that of his rival, for as prime minister of
a constitutional king and leader of the English party, it
was considered to be more especially his duty to uphold the
cause of constitutional procedure. One of the manoeuvres of
Capodistrias during the election of deputies to the National
Assembly of Argos, which had caused loud complaints on the
part of those who then stood forward as the partizans of
constitutional government (and no one was louder in his
complaints than Mavrocordatos and some of the men who were
now his colleagues in the ministry) was, that Capodistrias had

ELECTIONS. 189

A.D. 1S44.]

used his authority as president to exclude several members
of the opposition from the Assembly, by offering himself
as candidate for the places where they were likely to be
elected, Mavrocordatos now adopted this manoeuvre, which
he had formerly stigmatized as dishonourable and uncon-
stitutional.

The first election that took place was that of the University
) of Athens. Only the professors had votes \ Mavrocordatos
i presented himself as candidate and was elected. He sup-
j posed that his success would deceive public opinion in
Western Europe, and propagate the belief that his govern-
ment was popular. He was disappointed. All who took any
interest in Greek politics knew that the professors of the
body which was proud to call itself 'the Othonian University'
had been selected for their political docility as much as for
their professional distinction. Learning has never been the
beaten road to independence of character ; and, as a body,
the professors in Greece, as elsewhere, have generally inclined
to obsequiousness. A question arose concerning the legality
of this election, and when Mavrocordatos was driven from
power Kolettes found no difficulty in convincing the pro-
fessors of its illegality, on the ground that the University
could only be represented by a member of the body. The
election of Mavrocordatos was declared void, and a new
election took place. Whether the election of Mavrocordatos
when he was not a member of the University, was legal or
illegal, might be doubtful, but in the minds of the great
majority of the liberal party which did not blindly follow the
opinions of the ministry, there was no doubt about its being
a political blunder, and the prime minister was urged in vain
by some of his ablest friends to bring fonvard a professor
of high literary and legal knowledge, closely connected with
the constitutional party, as the ministerial candidate. Unfor-
tunately the results of the early Phanariot education of
Mavrocordatos in the Turkish service and the Vallachian
administration were never completely eradicated, and he was

^ The petition of the University to the National Assembly of 1843, asking for
the right to elect a representative, is printed in the TIpaKTiKo., p. 531. The right
was conceded in the law for the election of deputies, Art. 30. This privilege was
abolished by the National Assembly of 1862, and professors, being paid func-
tionaries, cannot be elected deputies.

IQO CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V.

always deficient in the power of appreciating the force and
value of constitutional principles in Greece.

The election of the University displeased many liberals,
and subsequent elections soon turned the tide of public
opinion strongly against Mavrocordatos personally. He was
accused in the press and in the coffee-houses of centralizing
all power in his own hands, like a Turkish pasha or a
Vallachian voivode. His Phanariot birth, Turkish education,
and Vallachian experience were referred to as evidences of his
despotic principles of government. He was reproached with
habitually employing illegal means to obtain power, and
invariably misusing power when attained. This expression
of popular dissatisfaction ought to have warned the ministry
of their danger. That danger was observed by Kolettes and
King Otho, but it was either overlooked or despised by
Mavrocordatos.

The partizans of Kolettes and Metaxas, and a considerable
number of the officials who looked to the king for their
rewardj now united to oppose the election of the ministerial
candidates in many electoral districts. They opened private
communications with the court, and King Otho was per-
suaded to allow the royal influence to be used in opposition
to his constitutional ministers. The influence of the sovereign
in a strictly centralized administration must always be very
great, particularly in an imperfectly constituted state of
society, and it cannot be taken away by any constitution, if
the sovereign strive to render it effective. King Otho derived
great gratification from employing this influence to control
his ministers, and he plunged actively into the intrigues that
were carried on to undermine the power of Mavrocordatos.
He did not appear to be sensible that there was both im-
morality and impolicy in these underhand dealings, nor that
the sight of a king engaged in weakening the authority of his
government, and of the men whom he allowed to act in his
name, must tend to make the royal authority contemptible.

The question by what combination of parties Mavrocor-
datos was to be replaced in office, soon occupied the attention
of the Greeks to the exclusion of everything relating to good
government. It became generally known to the electors
during the heat of the election contests that King Otho

ELECTIONS. 191

[i.D. 18^4.]

desired to change his ministers, and that unless the majority
I lin favour of Mavrocordatos' cabinet should be considerable,
the fall of the ministry was certain. The feelings of the
great body of his subjects were now in sympathy with those
of King Otho, and his popularity revived as that of Mavro-
;:ordatos declined. Yet, if Mavrocordatos had shown more
jdeference to constitutional principles in his own conduct, and
iobserved the rules of fair play in his electioneering proceed-
ings, it is not impossible that he might have very soon

uiiiiinjjb

■tiaii

jteriij

mvatsi

• per-

liitioii.

:reigi|

vetj

■on, J

tiat
atos.
ini-
that
fliis
ibis

ucatii
soil

'■ *'^' r [regained his influence. The success of Kolettes might have
ibeen reduced to an ordinary party victory, and the partizans
of Mavrocordatos Avould have formed a respectable minority
in the chamber, where, by acting as the advocates of legality,
and as the defenders of the constitution, they would have
soon secured the support of a powerful party among the
people. But the grasping and unconstitutional conduct of
the ministry so completely alienated the liberals, that Ko-
lettes seized the opportunity of annihilating the party of
Mavrocordatos by a series of illegal measures, to which no
men could have been subjected who had a right to appeal to
a sense of justice in a nation.

The coalition of hostile parties made it evident that, if the
elections proceeded freely, the majority of the ministerial
candidates would be rejected. The alternative presented
itself of violating the principles of the constitution or of
resigning office after carrying out the elections in the most
impartial manner. The reputation of Mavrocordatos as a
statesman commanded the one, the power which centralized
authority in the hands of ministers offered temptations to try
the other. In an evil hour Mavrocordatos forgot that his high
position as a party leader had been made for him by his
supposed attachment to constitutional government, that his
most powerful support was derived from those who wished
that Greece should be governed by the law, and that his

e. II political strength was in a great degree dependent on the

cof-|j strength of the constitution. Nobody expected Kolettes to
act on any system but that of governing by force, whether he
was the prime minister of an absolute or a constitutional
king. His practical ideas concerning government had been

tbol learned at Joannina in the school of Ali Pasha, and his
residence as Greek minister at the court of Louis Philippe

102 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V.

had only taught him the language of diplomacy in discussing
political questions, not how to conduct a government on
constitutional principles, nor even to direct the progress of
administrative business.

The arbitrary measures by which the members of Mavro-
cordatos' cabinet attempted to secure their own elections
produced several disturbances. An insurrection occurred in
Acarnania. In order to conceal the political nature of this
movement and make it appear to be connected with the
prevalence of brigandage, a general amnesty was proclaimed
for the brigands in Northern Greece. Over the whole country
the elections were marked by the same deeds of violence and
illegality which had disgraced the government of Capodistrias
in 1829. Capodistrias, as president of Greece, had procured
his own election as representative in the National Assembly
of Argos by twenty electoral districts. Mavrocordatos, as
prime minister, presented himself as candidate in several
places where he desired to exclude an able opponent ^. But
the power of the ministry was paralyzed by persons in
official positions, who declared that King Otho would see the
defeat of his ministers with pleasure, and would not overlook
the services of those who assisted in defeating them. All the
warm supporters of the French and Russian parties in the
provinces held the same language. Every faction conducted
itself with the same lawlessness. Bands of armed men
moved about living at free quarters in the villages, and
exacting from the peasants promises to vote for the party
that employed them. Brigandage was used by influential
men as an instrument to intimidate whole districts, and a
shameless misappropriation of municipal funds was then
authorized and subsequently overlooked.

Londos, the minister of justice, sent a secret order to the
gendarmes at Patras to employ every means in their power to
obtain a majority of votes in his favour. The order was
made public by some of those to whom it was communicated,
and the outbreak of general indignation was so violent that
Mavrocordatos advised the king to accept the resignation of
Londos. Rhodios, the minister of war, sought to gain votes
for himself and his colleagues by a lavish distribution of

* He was a candidate in seven electoral districts.

MISCONDUCT OF THE CABINET. 193

A.D. 1844.]

decorations and medals for service during the War of In-
dependence. Diplomas and certificates of service, entitling
the holders to dotations of national land, were sent to the
prefects with the space for the name blank, ready to be filled
up as a reward for votes ^ In spite of this corruption the
government candidates were generally unsuccessful. At
Mesolonghi Mavrocordatos failed, though at that place his
name had been highly honoured until he sullied it by the
illegal proceedings of his cabinet. General Kalergi, who
was military commandant of Athens, offered himself as
ministerial candidate in violation of the constitution, which
declared that no officer could be elected deputy in the
province where he held a command until six months after its
termination. The cabinet gave its own gloss on the constitu-
tion. The first elections were said to be exceptional, and it
was sufficient that Kalergi resigned his command eight days
before the promulgation of the election. The people con-
sidered that the express enactments of the constitution were
entitled to more respect^ and Kalergi was rejected by the
electors of Athens^.

The election of Athens caused the downfall of Mavro-
cordatos. The people made a violent tumult, demanding
a change of ministers ; and the cabinet had so often violated
the law that the law had lost its power to protect the
ministers. An appeal to force, in order to support a career
of illegality, offered no chance of success, and in this help-
less condition Mavrocordatos carried the resignation of the
ministry to the king, who accepted it with pleasure.

The manner in which one of the leading politicians con-
ducted himself during the election of 1844 affords a curious
illustration of the public morality of the period. Successful
fraud in Greece was viewed very much as successful bribery
is viewed in England when it secures a seat in parliament.
The politician alluded to was a man who had always been
ready to join any party, whether English or French, that
would give him a place in the cabinet ; and it cannot be said

^ Two of these diplomas were exhibited in the Chamber of Deputies during
1845.

^ The law of election is annexed to the printed copies of the constitution of
1844. See Tit. iv. Art. 28. It was argued that 0, decree of the National Assembly,
viz. No. 13 (17th = 29th March, 1844), having conferred on General Kalergi the
citizenship of all Greece, he was exempt from the provisions of the election law.

VOL. VII. O

i ■■^'

Ibette

: m

Imted

194 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V.Ch.V. I

that he was either much better or much worse than the ,

majority of the ministers who held office during King Otho's !

reign. In this case he exhibited more dexterity, but not \

more immorahty, than other candidates. Though he pos- \

sessed considerable local influence, he saw that party violence i

w^ould in all probability prevent his election, unless he joined \

one of the rival factions. Both were ready to welcome him, * #^^

but his difficulty lay in ascertaining which of the two was j fF'

likely to remain for any length of time in power. He there

fore set about devising a plan for securing his election which j \

ever party might prevail. He felt so much confidence in his • 1

own political value, that he had no doubt the ultimate victors

would be ready to purchase his services, by annulling any

election that might take place, and by securing his return.

All he had to do was to create a pretext for declaring the | i

election of anybody else void. 1

When the election took place he presented himself as a j
candidate, and boasted that he relied solely on his past j
services to his country, and came before the electors free j
from all party ties. He spoke of his own independence, and I
blamed the proceedings of others in galling phrases, well j
calculated to irritate opponents ; and whether by the violence j
of those who supported the other candidates, or by the '■
preconcerted behaviour of his friends, a disturbance was
created. At the first appearance of disorder, he declared that ;
his patriotic feelings would not allow him to be the cause of \
a tumult in his native city during the first constitutional
election. Abandoning the field to his rivals, he marched off i
with his supporters to the office of a notary public, who at |
his demand drew up an act declaring that he had been i
prevented from going to the vote by intimidation, and that ;
a thousand citizens were present ready to record their votes ■
in^^his favour. The business of the notary was to record the :
statement, not to verify the fact.

In due time the case came before the chamber of deputies. •
Mavrocordatos had been driven from power, and Kolettes
was prime minister. The election of a partizan of Mavro-
cordatos was annulled, and the astute politician having joined
the adherents of Kolettes was declared duly elected, without i
the formality of a new election, on the faith of the notarial i
act, which Kolettes persuaded the chamber to accept as :

FALL OF MAVROCORDATOS. 1 95

A.D. 1844.]

! evidence of an election that never took place. This anecdote,
which was current at the time, and of which the leading facts
are true, may not be perfectly correct in all its details, but it
is typical of the public men whom Greece was compelled to
entrust with the duty of laying the foundations of constitu-
tional liberty in 1844. It may be asked, what would have
been the fate of Greece had such men been entrusted with
irresponsible power as the ministers of an absolute and weak
i king ?

; A better feeling prevailed among the people than among

j the public men, and if Mavrocordatos had fully understood

1 the power of a stainless cause, he would have quitted office

I rather than commit illegalities to retain office. As an oppo-

! sition leader he might have constituted himself the champion

of constitutional procedure. He deserted the honourable

post which he had won by his services during the Revolution,

: implanted the seeds of corruption in the constitutional system,

: and prepared his country to submit with apathy to the long

administration of Kolettes. A better man and an abler

j statesman than Mavrocordatos might have impressed a

' different character on the constitutional history of his country,

i and saved Greece from the Revolution of 1863 by rendering it

: unnecessary.

There were other errors in the administration of Mavro-
i cordatos, which proved that he did not possess the capacity
: necessary to direct the executive government. A single
, example may be recorded, because it relates to the subject
! which forms the darkest stain on society in liberated Greece,
and retains the agricultural districts in a state of insecurity
I which precludes improvement. On the 31st July 1844 Mavro-
I cordatos granted an amnesty to the brigands in Acarnania
I for the purpose of gaining his own party ends ; but as politi-
I cal causes were at the root of the prevailing brigandage, this
I amnesty did less to create security, than the impunity granted
j to criminals did to perpetuate deeds of violence.
' Kolettes became prime minister on the i6th of August
! 1844 and held that office until his death on the i6th of
! September 1847. His power was increased by a coalition
I with the Russian party. But King Otho, who justly sus-
i pected the phil-orthodox section of that party of a design
: to dethrone him at the Revolution in 1843, would not consent
; 0%

ig6 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. Vl

to the entry of its ablest members into the cabinet, an

Kolettes had no alternative left for maintaining himself i

office but to secure a majority of his own personal supporter:

in the chamber of deputies. This he effected by usin

every means at his disposal. He was not troubled wit

many scruples, and both bribery and violence were employe

without stint. The constitution and the law of election wen

equally disregarded. Months were devoted to the exami

nation of election questions, because by this delay he avoide

driving any but the followers of Mavrocordatos into ope

opposition. It was not until February 1845 that the chambe

of deputies declared itself legally constituted so as to procee

to business, and it then took into consideration the addrea

to the crown. Kolettes had secured a decided majority,

and the feeling of the country was strongly in his favour,]

Backed by this support, he indulged a long cherished an

ill-suppressed rancour against what he termed the Englis]

party. The cabinet of Mavrocordatos was declared in th

address to have exercised illegal intervention in the elections,

Their friends who retained seats in the chamber demande

that this passage should be omitted, or else that the ex

ministers should be put on their trial for the alleged crimina

conduct, in order that an opportunity might be afforded t

them of refuting the accusation. But as they would in thei

own defence have adduced proofs that the friends of Kolette

had acted Avith as much illegality, and that many of th

deputies of his party had obtained their seats by acts 01

fraud and violence, no notice was taken of this demand

and the passage blaming the conduct of the cabinet o

Mavrocordatos was retained. The public indignation againsi

the late ministers was still so strong that Kolettes w;

excused for every infraction of the constitution which hej

thought fit to perpetrate in persecuting them.

Kolettes at last brought forward in a long speech the

measures which he considered necessary to insure the good

government and rapid progress of Greece. This discourse

was addressed much more to public opinion in France than

to the deputies who listened to it or to the Greek people

whom it most nearly concerned \ It is filled with declamation

* This speech was translated into French, and printed in many continental news-
papers. See Lesur, Annuaire Historiqiie, 1845, p. 342.

ygipf^^m^^mim^l^^^m^m^^m^^^^mm^ iB>_iBin i i ■■BHMiHBainnB^BHBWUua

KOLETTES PRIME MINISTER. 197

A.D. 1845.]

concerning the glories of the Hellenic race, past and present,
and there was something that bordered on the ridiculous
in hearing this Zinzar Vallachian, who in mind and appear-
ance was a type of his own race, appealing to the names
of men in whom there was not one drop of Hellenic blood,
like Miaoulis, Botzaris, Tombazes, and Konduriottes, as types
of the Greek race. Yet this flattery pleased the national
vanity if it did not deceive the ignorance of the people in

avoiii the Greek kingdom. These men were certainly the most
efficient supporters of Greek liberty, but they were no more
Greeks than Simon de Montfort, to whom English liberty
is so deeply indebted, was an Englishman. Kolettes also
said much in his usual vague manner, whenever principles
and practice were concerned, about moral improvement and
material progress. Rewards, wealth, and lands were promised
to the veterans of the Revolution, as they had been from
the time of Capodistrias, and continue to be in the time of
King George ; and the chamber of deputies was warned
against the danger of faction and discord. Even Kolettes
himself was alarmed at the revengeful passions which the
virulence of the electioneering contests had awakened in the
breasts of a majority of the deputies, and he thought it
necessary to warn them publicly that he intended to com-
mand them and not receive their orders. Among his many
defects Kolettes had one important quality of a statesman ;
[he could hear the first whispers of public opinion, and he
[knew how to avail himself of its support as soon as it made
its voice heard. It must however be observed that he was
so far from being a statesman, that though he remained three
ears in office, he did nothing of importance to give practical
[effect to the measures which he announced were necessary for

l(j] jijthe improvement of Greece.

There was one important measure which Kolettes could
Jneither avoid nor adjourn. The 105th article of the con-
stitution of 1844 required that the government should organize
the church in accordance with constitutional monarchy. The
king, Kolettes, and the constitutional party which had sepa-

^ rated from Mavrocordatos, proposed investing the crown with

'^ the power of nominating the President of the Holy Synod,
both to prevent the evils which might arise from the influence

"•'"* of the patriarch of Constantinople over a president elected

I
,.,prearetr(

J*e

■lid tt
ipporten
iJpkii-o!
lathe
Itreinajo
V senat

i]iiil)er,ai
jortoye;

198 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.Y.Ch.V.
by ecclesiastics, and to avert the danger of the church placing
itself above the law of the country. It was absolutely neces-
sary to close the door of advancement in the sultan's dominions
to all ecclesiastics in the church of liberated Greece. The
phil-orthodox party, which looked to foreign influence and j j
native bigotry for increasing its ecclesiastical power, advocated L
the plan of rendering the church of Greece as independent
as possible of the civil power, and as closely connected as
possible with the church of Constantinople. It wished to
declare the President of the Holy Synod the head of the
church, and the church itself independent of the temporal
power, investing it by virtue of this independence with the
right of electing its own president.

The discussion of this question caused Metaxas to separate
from the constitutional party with which he had acted since
the Revolution in 1843. Metaxas, being an Ionian, could i.-y'^'''^
only retain his political influence by fidelity to the phil-
orthodox party, yet, though party interest coincided in this
instance with the impulse of his own feelings, his conduct
deserves praise, since he sacrificed those personal advantages
which most Greek politicians sacrificed their character to gain.
He was ofl"ered high office, and an ample share of government
patronage, to give him the means of forming a body of
personal followers in the administration, if he would join
the government. Metaxas followed the dictates of his con- *. Bi
science; the friends of Mavrocordatos, and those who called .dwhic
themselves the English party, were not so honest ; they acted
in direct opposition to the political principles which they had loreijn
previously avowed, and endeavoured to thwart measures which i :,: Gretl
they must have supported had they been themselves in office, .;v<ifip„
by forming a coalition with the phil-orthodox party. The first , laegoi
trial of the strength of this coalition was an attempt to exclude ; ' :;jaor(i
M. Balbes, the minister of justice, from the chamber of deputies, i /deali
under the pretext that he belonged to the clergy. He had -■'-.-.
received deacon's orders, though early in life he had quitted
the study of theology for that of jurisprudence, had been i
called to the bar, and practised for many years as a lawyer. '■
Public opinion was again off'ended by the meanness which
the friends of Mavrocordatos showed on this occasion, for
their personal animosity against M. Balbes arose from his : ' • at^Ji
having been elected deputy for Mesolonghi in opposition to ' ie '

Kolettes
kinc

istra

i the £

Kikan' ;

Mt reach

facewi

i( annua

fiiranteec

hy. Bi

itwhic

"isein

Ktllefortr

'"; officer
"■ailon

'WOff

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION. 1 99

A.T). 1845.]

Mavrocordatos by a large majority. The unfair attempt to
give a retroactive force to the clause of the law which forbade
all who entered the church from holding any civil office,
revived the popular feeling in favour of Kolettes as the
supporter of liberal opinions, and the proposal of the English
and phil-orthodox coalition was rejected.

In the senate the party of Mavrocordatos possessed a
large majority. Kolettes advised King Otho to create fifteen
new senators in order to give his cabinet a majority. The
qualifications imposed by the constitution compelled him to
select illiterate veterans and servile officials to complete the
number, and the moral influence of the body declined from

j year to year in consequence of the ignorance and avidity of

I its members.

i Kolettes was accused, and not without justice, of using

i every kind of corruption in order to retain office. Yet his
administration was neither lavish nor unpopular. Indeed
the expenditure of his government contrasts not unfavourably
with the extravagance and jobbing of later cabinets. The
ordinary governmental expenditure of the year 1845 did
not reach 12 millions of drachmas. It was evident that
Greece was in a condition to pay the three protecting powers
the annual interest due on the loan of 1H32, which they
guaranteed to insure the establishment of the Greek mon-
archy. But no Greek statesman at the time understood the
effect which the fulfilment of its financial engagements would
exercise in accelerating the progress of the country by means
of foreign credit. Even now, while I write in the year t866,
the Greeks are not yet persuaded of the national value of
a good financial character.

The government of Kolettes was not successful in estab-
lishing order, nor did it show much respect for law and equity
in its dealings. An insurrection took place in Maina headed
by a fanatic named Petropoulakes. A Mainate chief named
Pierakos was arrested for forming a plot to gain possession
of the fortress of Modon. Conspiracies were discovered among
the officers and soldiers of the garrison of Nauplia, and among
the sailors at Hydra. The object of these plots was neither
to overthrow the government of King Otho, nor to bring
about a change of ministers, it was either to increase the pay
of the soldier, to accelerate the promotion of the officers, or

200 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V.Ch.V.

to force the government to grant the demands of men who
set a hitih value on their services. These evils were chronic
in the Greek service, and they have rendered the army and
navy not only useless for the defence of the country, but also
the greatest impediments to its improvement.

The sultan's government regarded the administration of
Kolettes with distrust. Kolettes had always flattered the
national hopes of re-establishing the Byzantine empire. He
was therefore suspected, and not without good grounds, of
adopting measures calculated to nourish discontent and pro-
jects of revolt among the orthodox subjects of the sultan in
European Turkey. On the 17th of March 1845 Chekib
Efifendi, the Othoman minister of foreign affairs, complained
to the ambassadors of the three protecting powers that the
press in Greece systematically incited the Christian subjects of
the sultan to revolt, and declared that the Othoman government
considered it necessary to put a stop to the free circulation of
Greek newspapers and pamphlets in the empire. He accused
the Greek government of exciting revolutionary intrigues in
Thessaly and Epirus, and informed the protecting powers
that if this conduct was persisted in the sultan's government
would be compelled to use strong measures of repression.
These complaints obliged Kolettes to warn his friends in
Turkey to behave with more caution ; and Russia made it
known to the agents who laboured for ' the great idea,' that
they must conduct their propaganda in future with more
prudence and secrecy.

In the following year several diplomatic disputes proved
that even with all the counsel and assistance which Kolettes
received from the French minister at Athens, the business
of Greek diplomacy was conducted with very little wisdom.
Unfortunately British diplomacy in Greece was then not
much behind it in want of judgment. Lord Palmerston was
induced by the information transmitted to him by Sir Edmund
Lyons concerning the prevalence of brigandage, to address
a severe note to the Greek government^ charging it with
encouraging disorder by granting impunity to bands of brig-
ands. Kolettes, with more courage than truth, boldly con-
tradicted the assertion that brigandage existed in Greece ;
he declared that life and property were perfectly secure
among the labouring classes, a fact which he said was

«Ef"

DIPLOMATIC DISPUTES. 201

A.D. 1847.]

proved by the great progress made both by agriculture and
commerce. He availed himself of the occasion also to give
Lord Palmerston a lecture on diplomacy, warning the British
government in the name of its most serious interests not to
be too credulous in listening to inconsiderate allegations ^.

1 (0 It was only by the direct interference of the three protect-
ing powers that Greece was saved in 1847 from having her

Hi commerce ruined by a quarrel with the Othoman government,
which was brought on by the folly and obstinacy of King
Otho, and the ignorance and duplicity of Kolettes.

Tzames Karatassos, the son of an old klephtic chief of
Mount Olympus and lieutenant-colonel in the Greek army,
joined a band of insurgents and robbers who plundered Thes-
saly in 1841. The Turks destroyed this band, and Karatassos
escaped over the frontier into Greece. He was placed under
arrest by the Greek government, but was allowed to escape to
Cerigo. Subsequently, being a partizan of Kolettes, he was
reinstated in his military rank and appointed one of King
Otho's aides-de-camp. In January 1847, he applied to the
Othoman minister at Athens for a visa to his passport in
order to enable him to visit Constantinople. M. Musurus
refused, and gave as the reason of his refusal the conduct of
Karatassos in Thessaly. A few days after there was a court-
ball at the palace, and at this ball King Otho addressed the
Othoman minister in an unusually loud voice and with an air
of offended dignity, saying that he thought the Othoman min-
ister might have shown more respect to the guarantee which
personal service in his court offered, than to refuse a passport
to one of his aides-de-camp. M. Musurus could not at the
time make any observation on the puerility of supposing that
violations of national law and the consequences of personal
crimes in Thessaly were to be effaced by the subsequent grant
of a court title at Athens'-. But on the following day he

^ The diplomatic animosity of the English and French governments was at this
time very violent, and it was strong in the breasts of their representatives in
Greece. The reply of Kolettes was published at Paris in a French translation,
which was generally supposed to be the original, prepared for the use of Kolettes.
The French press called it a dignified and able state-paper. On reading it over at
this distance of time, it appears to be a very impertinent and impolitic communi-
cation, but it is a clever tissue of truth and falsehood. Lesur, Ammaire Historique,
1846; Documents., p. 204.

^ In 1859 Karatassos made an abortive attempt to incite an insurrection in
Turkey, which King Otho was suspected of promoting in secret.

202 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY,

[Bk.V.Ch.V.

demanded an explanation of the king's words from Kolettes
as president of the cabinet and minister of foreign affairs. All
endeavours to obtain any satisfactory explanation proved
vain, and the Othoman government ordered M. Musurus to
leave Athens. Before his departure a remarkable correspond-
ence was carried on between Kolettes and Aali Effendi, the
Othoman minister of foreign affairs, in which the superiority of
the Turk over the Greek in both diplomatic knowledge and
civility is very strongly marked ^ The interruption of diplo-
matic relations was followed by an order of the Porte ex-
pelling the Greek consuls from Turkey. Greek merchants and
Greek trade were placed under the protection of the Othoman
authorities, and the protection of the sultan was found to be
so satisfactory that the Greeks generally became indifferent
about the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two
courts. The Greek government remained obstinate in refusing
satisfaction. The sultan therefore advanced another step and
issued orders to exclude Greek vessels from the coasting trade
in Turkey which they had hitherto been allowed to carry on,
and the Othoman consuls were ordered to leave Greece.
These measures affected the interests of trade, and Kolettes,
seeing the danger of his government becoming unpopular,
immediately made King Otho sensible of the false position in
which he had placed Greece. A letter of apology written by
Kolettes in King Otho's name was delivered to the Russian
minister at Athens to be transmitted to the Othoman minister
of foreign affairs, in which regret was expressed that anything
should have occurred to cause M. Musurus to leave Athens,
and the Sublime Porte was assured that if His Excellency
should return he would be received with all the honour due
to a distinguished representative of a friendly power. The
phrases of this letter were carefully weighed in order to afford
King Otho the pitiful satisfaction of offering the smallest
measure of apology with which the sultan could be concili-
ated. On receiving this communication, the Porte addressed
a note to the ambassadors of the three protecting powers, de-
claring that the sultan was satisfied with the explanations in
the name of the King of Greece, and had ordered M. Musurus
to return to Athens.

1 Lesur, Annuaire Historljue, 1847 ; Documents, p. 75.

i»r"

FINANCIAL MEASURES. 203

A.D. 1847.]

The ministry of Kolettes made an attempt to establish one
good principle in the financial administration. It declared
that it was the duty of government to collect all taxes by its
own agents, whether they were paid in kind or in money, that
the cultivators of the soil mJght be saved from the exactions
to which they were exposed when the tenths due to govern-
ment were sold to farmers. Metaxas was minister of finance
when this resolution was adopted. The objection which was
urged against its adoption was, that it placed great patronage
in the hands of ministers who might employ it for the sole
purpose of strengthening their own party, and not for relieving
agriculture from oppression. For a time the revenues were
collected by government agents, and the opposition asserted
that the manner in which Kolettes made use of the patronage
placed in the hands of the government caused more dissatis-
faction than the system of farming the revenues. In many
instances it appeared that the change of system had not
diminished the exactions from which the cultivators of the
soil suffered. It was resolved therefore by the opposition to
force the government to return to the old plan. But a majority
of the agricultural classes understood that in the long run it
would be easier to check the injustice of permanent govern-
ment agents than the exactions of annual farmers, and the
dealings of the opposition to gain political support from mili-
tary chiefs and farmers of the revenues of the state again
revived the popularity of Kolettes.

The opposition in the chamber of deputies, consisting of the
coalition of the English and Russian parties, seized an oppor-
tunity afforded by the absence of many ministerial members
immediately after the Easter recess in 1847 to thwart the
government by reversing one of its best acts. An endeavour
was made to carry a resolution without discussion that the
revenues of the state were to be farmed by the government.
If the resolution had been put to the vote, the ministry would
have been in a minority ; but the president of the chamber
refused to put the question at the time, in order to give the
absent ministerial members, who were daily expected at
Athens, time to arrive. When the next meeting of the
chamber took place, the coalition was still so strong, in con-
sequence of the support it derived from the friends of those
who had profited by farming the revenues, that all the

a04 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V.

exertions of Kolettes only enabled the ministry to carry a
resolution for continuing the collection of the land-tax by
government agents by the smallest possible majority. The
votes were ^^ to 54.

Several members of the English party, seeing that the
conduct of the coalition was loudly blamed by the liberals
out of the chamber and by the public generally, abandoned
the opposition, and attached themselves to the faction under
the immediate orders of the court. Unfortunately for their
reputation they did not act so disinterestedly as Metaxas.
The chief of the deserters was Tricoupi, who had been a
member of the cabinet of Mavrocordatos, and he was re-
warded by King Otho with the post of Greek mhiister at the
British court.

Kolettes dissolved the chamber, in which he could no longer
count on a majority, and introduced M. Glarakes, one of the
leading members of the phil-orthodox party, into the ministry.
The connection of Glarakes with the intrigues of his party in
1837 caused considerable alarm to King Otho at that time,
but the king felt no longer any fear of the phil-orthodox party,
being persuaded that Kolettes was able to keep every mem-
ber of his cabinet in order. It may be remarked that no
minister, either before or after, enjoyed the confidence of
King Otho so fully as Kolettes did at this time.

The British government sought to create difficulties for
Kolettes by demanding payment of the interest due on the
portion of the Allied loan guaranteed by Great Britain. It
would have conduced greatly to the good government of
Greece and to the future prosperity of the country, had all
the three powers insisted that the Greek government should
so arrange its expenditure as to fulfil her financial obligations.
But it was considered an unfriendly act on the part of the
British government that it took this step in opposition to the
desire both of France and Russia. The Greek government
was relieved from any embarrassment which might have arisen
from this demand by Mr. Eynard of Geneva, who advanced
500,000 francs to satisfy the British claim. The conduct of
Mr. Eynard v/as generous, and his motive was a sincere desire
to advance the progress of Greece, yet it cannot be doubted
that this advance was productive of bad consequences by
perpetuating financial mal-administration. In a note which

DEATH OF KOLETTES. - 205

A.D. 1847.]

the Greek government addressed to the governments of Great
Britain, France and Russia on the 30th August 1847, it was
urged as a reason for failing to pay the interest due on the
loan guaranteed by the protecting powers, that on the one
hand the chamber of deputies struggled to reduce taxation,
and on the other hand individual deputies and senators en-
deavoured to increase the public expenditure in their own
provinces by every means in their power. As no reduction of
taxation was made, and as by the constitution only a minister
of the crown could propose an increase of expenditure, this
excuse for want of money and for a misappropriation of funds
was a proof that the government was both weak and corrupt.
Kolettes offered to raise money by the sale of national lands,
which were hypothecated to the English bondholders, who"
advanced money to the Greeks at their sorest need in 1824
and 1825. He promised also to commence paying one third
of the interest on the Allied loan in the year 1848, and en-
gaged to increase the payment annually until the year i860,
when he declared that Greece would be prepared to pay the
whole amount of annual interest due by the treaty. Little
attention was paid to this note, for the Allied powers felt no
confidence either in the sincerity or the honesty of Kolettes'
statements.

Kolettes, as has been already mentioned, died in office on
the 6th of September 1847. No minister possessing equal
knowledge of the people and of the circumstances in which
the country was placed has succeeded him. He had a clear
insight into the character of the society he governed, and of
the agents he employed in governing it. He availed himself
with discrimination and without conscientious scruples of
men's passions and vices to gain his own objects. He was
not personally courageous, yet he could shew a firm character
when there was no immediate personal danger to affect his
mind. He wore a lion's skin, and he wore it with dignity,
for he knew how to use power boldly when he felt that he
possessed it securely. In his political conduct, he trusted
more to his astuteness in guiding his course through dififi-
culties as they occurred, than to his foresight in averting
danger, and he rarely attempted to form combinations for
creating opportunities of success. His qualities enabled him
to lead a party in a state of society where violence and

2o6 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V.

corruption were more prevalent than respect for law and
justice ; but he was deficient in capacity of organization,
and he conducted the government without any administrative
system, by a series of spasmodic acts, making his long
ministerial career a succession of temporary expedients. His
success was chiefly due to the errors of his opponents, and
to the progress which comparative tranquillity and order
enabled the population to make, while land of good quality
was abundant, and a rapid extension of commerce offered
profitable employment to all who engaged in agriculture and
trade.

Kitzos Djavellas, a Suliot chief without education, who was
now a general and an aide-de-camp of King Otho, became
prime minister after Kolettes' death. Brigandage, which had
assumed the character of insurrection during the life of
Kolettes, continued to disturb the country. Grigiottes, who
had fled from Euboea into Turkey, and generally resided
at Chios or Smyrna, and Theodore Griva, who had sought
refuge at Prevesa after the failure of attempts at insurrection,
again fomented disorders. At Naupaktos, Pharmakes and
several officers of the phalanx took up arms and occupied
positions in the Aetolian mountains^ where they maintained
themselves with bands of armed men by plundering the
magazines of the collectors of the tenths, and by levying
contributions of sheep and goats from the shepherds of the
neighbouring districts. Pappakostas, an officer of some dis-
tinction, who was originally a priest, escaped from Salona
(Amphissa), where he had been ordered to reside for par-
ticipating in previous disorders, and seized the position of
Mavrolithari ; and Valentzas, an old offender, plundered the
population of the valley of the Spercheus at the head of a
band of brigands. Merendites, an officer of the irregular
troops, known for his atrocities and exactions, who had always
been attached to Theodore Griva, revolted with a part of the
garrison of Patras in December 1847, and obtained possession
of 130,000 drachmas of government money. He held the
castle, and threatened to burn the town, unless the inhabitants
consented to ransom their property by paying a sum of money,
and allowing him to embark on board the vessels in the port
and escape from the forces which were marching against him.
The citizens were so alarmed lest Merendites should execute

CHANGES OF MINISTRY. 207

A.D. 1848.]

his threat, that they did everything in their power to get quit
of him and his band. By their intermediation and the aid of
the foreign consuls, the robbers embarked on board an Eng-
lish schooner, and escaped to Malta. As soon as the Greek
authorities regained possession of Patras a demand was made
on the English government for the restoration of 36,000
drachmas which the robbers had succeeded in carrying on
board the English vessel, and for the extradition of the
criminals. The British minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, was
accused by King Otho of fomenting these disturbances by the
language he held, and of endeavouring to throw Greece into
a state of anarchy by allowing the British flag to protect an
act of revolt and brigandage like that of Merendites. The
animosity against the British government, which had been
hitherto confined to the court and the officials of the Greek
government, now spread widely among the people. The
other bands which have been mentioned were not subdued
until Gardikiottes Griva, the brother of Theodore, who was one
of the king's aides-de-camp, took the command of the royal
troops. Gardikiottes routed Pappakostas and the other
leaders who had collected considerable bands of insurgents,
and pursued them so vigorously that they were all compelled
to seek safety either in Turkey or in the Ionian Islands.
Some disturbances took place in the Peloponnesus, and an
attempt was made to incite an insurrection by Perotes, a
noted intriguer and farmer of taxes, but the disorders that
occurred whether in Messenia, Pyrgos, or Corinth, were sup-
pressed promptly and without difficulty. The Greek govern-
ment attributed all its troubles to the intrigues of the English
party ; but the Russian government, Avhich is generally pos-
sessed of the best information on the state of Greece and
Turkey, ascribed them, probably with more justice, to the
political effervescence that was then strong over great part
of the continent of Europe^.

The instability of the government weakened the authority
of the ministers. The cabinet of General Djavellas was dis-
placed by a ministry nominally presided over by George
Konduriottes in March 1848, and the cabinet of the weak
and incapable Konduriottes was displaced in October by a

^ Lesur, Anmiaire Historiqtce, 1848; Documents, p. 177; Circular of M. Persiany,
the Russian minister in Greece.

208 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V,

cabinet formed by the Admiral Kanares. Kanares remaineH^
prime minister until December 1H49, when a new ministry-
was formed under the presidency of Admiral Kriezes, which
held office until May 1854. The people despised their rulers,
and their rulers violated the constitution. Whenever any law
thwarted the interests of powerful men, it was, if it were
possible, set aside without reference to justice or patriotism.
A law was passed authorizing the king to appoint a greater
number of senators than the constitution allowed, though the
chambers had no legal authority to legislate on the subject,']
since the constitution declared expressly that no modification
could be made in any of the provisions of the constitution,
except by convoking a National Assembly. Very little saga-
city might have sufficed to convince King Otho and his
senators that their position could not be strengthened by
weakening the power of the law, but that it might be greatly
improved by creating habits of deference to the letter of the
constitution, and feelings of respect for established institu-
tions. In a society where anarchy and democracy were
striving for dominion, neglect of the constitution by the king,
the senate, and the ministers was a first step towards revo-
lution. The influence of the crown was so powerful, and the
corruption of the legislative chambers rendered these bodies
so servile, that the revolutionary act of adding thirty-seven
members to the senate was carried by a majority of seventy
votes to two in the chamber of deputies.

Another violation of the constitution took place soon after,
merely to suit the convenience of the ministry. According to
law the chambers ought to have met for business on the 13th
of November. They were prorogued in 1848 to the 23nd of
December, while Admiral Kanares was prime minister, ap-
parently only for the purpose of accustoming the Greeks to
see their constitution violated with impunity.

An attempt to assassinate M. Musurus, the Turkish minister
In Greece, and the demand of the sultan's government for the
extradition of the assassin, would have again caused a rupture
of relations with Turkey, had the three protecting powers not
intervened to arrange the difficulty.

In 1850 disputes with the British government diverted the
attention of the Greeks from the internal condition of their
country. The measures adopted by Lord Palmerston offended

ivliii

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:reat(

eati

RUPTURE WITH ENGLAND. 209

A,D. 1S5O.]

the national pride so much as to render King Otho extremely
popular on account of the obstinate resistance he offered to
the English demands. The whole affair reflects very little
credit on any of the governments which took part in it. King
Otho brought on the rupture by his injustice, and by the
obstinacy with which he persisted in defending, his illegalities.
The British government acted with violence, and strained the
authority of international law to enforce a blockade. The
French government interfered rashly to protect King Otho
in his misconduct, and ended by compelling him to sign a
convention, the stipulations of which implied that he had
acted from the first with injustice. All the foreign ministers
at Athens did everything that lay in their power to foment
^ "' the quarrel instead of honestly using their influence to show
each party how far it was wrong.

The subjects of the dispute between the British and Greek
governments were, first, a claim by George Finlay for the price
of land purchased from a Turkish proprietor in 1830, when
a protocol of the three protecting powers allowed the Turks
to sell their property before Greece was put in possession of
Attica. This land King Otho had enclosed in the royal
garden without any communication with the proprietor ; and
in 1837 the Greek government had stated in an official com-
munication to the British minister, that ' Mr. Finlay's land
was not wanted for any purpose of public utility,' and con-
sequently he had no claim on the Greek government for
indemnity. At that time it was impossible to sue King Otho
in the law courts of his kingdom, for his government was
absolute. The second claim was for indemnity to M. Pacifico
for the plunder of his house and the destruction of his property
by a mob, while the police remained inactive. This happened
in 1847. The third, fourth, and fifth claims were caused by
ill-treatment and denial of justice to Ionian subjects. The
sixth was a claim for the possession of the islands of Cervi
and Sapienza, on the ground that they belonged to the Ionian
Islands. Of these two islands the Greeks had been in pos-
session ever since the expulsion of the Turks from the
Peloponnesus.

Sir Thomas Wyse, who succeeded Sir Edmund Lyons as
British minister in Greece, vainly endeavoured to persuade
the government of King Otho to arrange the five private

VOL. VII. P

310 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.

claims by an amicable arbitration. But he met with the
same tergiversation which had characterized the conduct of
King Otho in his relations with England for many years.
Lord Palmerston persuaded the British cabinet to order the
Mediterranean fleet under Sir William Parker to visit Greece,
in order to enforce a settlement of these demands. On the
17th of January 1850 immediate redress and complete satis-
faction of all pending claims was demanded, with a threat
that coercive measures would be employed if justice was
denied. The Greek minister of foreign affairs replied with
statements which were in part evasive and in part false. The
British fleet established a blockade of the Piraeus. The
Greek man-of-war ' Otho ' and several merchantmen were
seized and detained as security, or in diplomatic language,
as material guarantees for the satisfaction of the claims. The
foreign ministers at the Greek court agreed in counselling
King Otho to offer a passive resistance to the acts of the
British government^ and M. Thouvenel, the French minister,
availed himself of the opportunity to display the influence
of France, and win credit on the continent among emperors
and kings by opposing England. M. Thouvenel made an
offer of what he called his ' good oflices,' which was declined
by Sir Thomas Wyse.

In the mean time the republican government of France,
which was inspired by a feeling of restlessness to make a
display of its power in Europe, seized the opportunity of
engaging in a violent altercation with Lord Palmerston. The
affair could lead to no important consequences, though it was
well suited to make a great noise in Europe, and furnish a
pretext for contrasting the daring policy of the Napoleon who
was president of the republic, with what was called the sub-
serviency of Louis Philippe's government to British policy in
the East. Explanations were demanded from the British
government, and Lord Palmerston stated in his answer that
the British government had adopted the plan of seizing
material guarantees in Greece, because that step appeared to
afford the only means of obtaining justice. This answer looks
like a covert allusion to the proceedings of Russia in the
Rouman Principalities ; and it was singular that the British
government should justify its conduct towards Greece by
a reference to proceedings which it blamed when adopted

TBfim

RUPTURE WITH ENGLAND. 211

I A.D. 1S5O.]

towards Turkey. The demand which Russia made for the
extradition of the Hungarian and PoHsh refugees, and the
concessions which the Othoman government was forced to
make, humbled the power of the sultan. The seizure of
private ships and the hostile action of one of the protecting
powers inflicted a serious wound on King Otho's government.
It has been the usage to seize private property in the shape of
ships and cargoes for the purpose of enforcing national claims,
but though the practice appears to be authorized by inter-
national law, the common sense of mankind regards it as a
violation of natural justice, which ought not to be tolerated
till a declaration of war has taken place. No government in
a civilized state of society ought to have a right to seize
private property belonging to the subjects of another state
lying beyond its jurisdiction, or to blockade a foreign port,
without taking upon itself the responsibility of declaring war.
Any material guarantee which it may be entitled to seize
ought to be strictly confined to national and public property ;
and if the Greek government had been authorized by its pre-
vious conduct to make an appeal to the principles of truth
and justice, by placing its case in this point of view, it might
have awakened general sympathy. But France, whose pro-
tection Greece was eager to secure, would have objected to an
argument, which questioned the legality of proceedings which
powerful governments wish to exercise at their own discre-
tion. The British government in this particular instance found
a difficulty in seizing public property of any value, for the
custom duties at the ports of the Piraeus, Syra, and Patras
being by the treaty of 1832 hypothecated for the payment of
the Allied loan, the interest of which was constituted to be
a first claim on the revenues of the state, any interference
with them required the consent of the other two protecting
powers. Lord Palmerston's measures of coercion were there-
fore perforce guided by the necessity of avoiding a direct
dispute with France and Russia, and of keeping within the
sanction of acknowledged precedents.

A patriotic opposition to the measures adopted to enforce
the British claims was easily excited among the people by the
united influence of King Otho and the foreign diplomatists ;
and the strength of this feeling induced Lord Palmerston,
who was confident in the justice of his claims, to accept the

P 2

212 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V.

good offices of the French government on the I2th February
1850. France then virtually abandoned the only ground of
resistance which could have authorized King Otho's obstinacy.
Baron Gros, the French plenipotentiary, was sent to Greece,
not to question the right of Great Britain to establish a
blockade, but to ascertain the amount of satisfaction due to
the British government, in order to relieve Greece from the
blockade that had already been established. The British
government voluntarily declared that if any of its demands
were unfounded, it would withdraw them as a matter of
course.

The manner in which Baron Gros conducted his mission
was so partial that it prevented his establishing the same
amicable relations with the British legation which he formed
with the Greek court. He acted the part of a court of
review, but he sought for evidence only from the agents
of King Otho and the Greek government, without making
any attempt to procure proofs of the facts from the agents
of the claimants. These proofs he received when they were
thrust upon him by the British legation, as in the case of
Finlay. Sir Thomas Wyse requested Mr. Finlay to see
Baron Gros and state his case. An account of the interview
was transmitted to the British minister, and Sir Thomas
Wyse writes that Mr. Finlay 's statement of his case is
substantially correct. The statements of King Otho's agents
had persuaded Baron Gros to believe that the case was still
under arbitration. The fact was concealed from him that
the deed of arbitration had been signed on the i8th October
1849, and the Greek law requires that if a decision be not
given by the arbiters named in a deed of arbitration, before
the expiry of three months the arbitration ceases, so that
to obtain a valid decision by arbiters it would be necessary
to sign a new deed of arbitration before a notary public.
The Greek minister of foreign affairs, M. Londos, stated in
the chambers, and the Greek court repeatedly asserted, that
Mr. Finlay 's claim had been settled before the blockade
commenced, though King Otho, by retaining the papers
relating to the arbitration, to which his majesty had been
always opposed, had prevented a decision and allowed the
deed of arbitration to expire ^.

^ Parliameniary Papers. Further correspondence respecting the demands made

BARON GROS AT ATHENS. 213

A.C. 1850.]

Baron Gros assessed the amount of indemnity due on all
the British claims at 150,000 drachmas. Sir Thomas Wyse
rejected his proposal and demanded 180,000 drachmas. The
blockade was then renewed in a hasty manner, without any
regard to the good offices of the French government. This
violent proceeding produced the desired effect and received
the approbation of Lord Palmerston. King Otho yielded
on the 26th April 1850, and accepted the terms dictated
by the British minister, who was so annoyed by the animosity
displayed by M. Thouvenel and the partiality of Baron Gros,
that he considered it necessary for the honour of England to
terminate the business without foreign intervention. He was
rash in drawing this conclusion, for after all the British
government was compelled to make concessions to the pre-
tensions of France. But when France obtained the required
deference on the part of England, she immediately compelled
King Otho to sign a convention, recognizing his denial of
justice, and ratifying the rights of coercion exercised against
his government.

An arrangement was concluded in London between Lord
Palmerston and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French ambassador
in London, before the arrangement forced on King Otho by
Sir Thomas Wyse was known. The indemnity to be paid
by Greece was fixed at the sum of 230,000 francs. This was
signed on the 19th April and reached the French legation
at Athens on the ist May; but Sir Thomas Wyse had
received information that the arrangement was about to be
concluded on the 24th of April, and the French government
was offended at his resorting to coercive measures, in order to
deprive France of the honour of arranging the affair by her
good offices. On the 14th May Lord Palmerston informed
the French government that Great Britain was resolved to
abide by the arrangement concluded in Greece, and this being
regarded as a premeditated slight, M. Drouyn de Lhuys was
ordered to quit London. The conduct of Lord Palmerston
was generally considered to have been wanting in conciliation,
but it must not be forgotten that there was at the time a
violent struggle for influence going on in the East between
Great Britain, France, and Russia, and that the feelings of

upon the Greek government, 17th May, 1850, p. 248. Baron Gros persisted in
his ignorance of the fact that the arbitration had expired, 22nd April, p. 323.

314 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V.Ch.V.

Lord Palmerston were irritated by the fact that Enghsh
influence was on the wane at Constantinople. His conduct
was said not to have pleased several members of the cabinet,
and it certainly endangered the existence of the ministry.
On the 1 8th June the government was in a minority of thirty-
seven in the House of Lords, on the question of their conduct
in this affair ; but the resignation of the ministry was pre-
vented by a vote of the House of Commons on the 29th June
1850, in which there was a majority of forty-six in favour of the
ministry. Immediately after the condemnation of his conduct
in the House of Lords, Lord Palmerston communicated to the
French government that Great Britain was willing to accept
the convention signed at London on the 19th April as a
definitive arrangement of the claims on Greece, and thus
succeeded in terminating an affair on which no party can
look back with satisfaction. A comparison of the sums
awarded under the two arrangements shows that Sir Thomas
Wyse was not disposed to bear heavily on the Greek govern-
ment in a pecuniary point of view ^.

On the 19th February 1850, Count Nesselrode addressed
a despatch to Baron Brunnow, the Russian minister in
London, complaining of the conduct of the British govern-
ment in violating treaties. The treaty of 15th July 1851,
forbade the entrance of armed vessels within the Dardanelles,
yet an English fleet passed the castles in violation of that
treaty. The treaty of 1832, establishing the kingdom of
Greece under the joint protection of Russia, France, and
England, was disregarded by the assumption of the right
to blockade Greek ports without the consent of the other
protecting powers. The question which had been raised
relative to the islands of Cervi and Sapienza was one which
could not be decided by the action of Great Britain without
the intervention and consent of Russia and France. This

^ The Author received 30,000 drachmas under the convention of Sir Thomas
Wyse as the estimated value of his property. The affair was definitively termi-
nated before the London convention was adopted, under which he would have
received 45,000 francs. The claim of M. Pacifico for the value of Portuguese
documents destroyed in his house was referred to an English and French commis-
sion which sat at Lisbon. It was reduced from 26,618/. i6s. 8rf. sterling to 5,750
francs. The affair was closed on the 5th May, 1851. The sum of 120,000
drachmas was paid to M. Pacifico for the plunder of his house, and 500/. sterling
as indemnity for his personal sufferings. The Ionian claimants received 12,530
drachmas.

MONTENEGRO. % \ 5

A.D. 1852.]

\ able despatch made some impression on the British cabinet
by the justice of many of the observations it contained, and
the futihty of the demand for the islands of Cervi and Sapi-
enza as belonging to the Ionian Islands, caused the claim
to be dropped and nothing more was heard on the subject^.

The diplomatic complications which led to the Crimean
war began to exert an influence on the minds of the Greeks
as early as the year 1852. The bold resistance which the
Porte offered to the extradition of the Polish and Hungarian
refugees when demanded by Austria and Russia after the
termination of the war in Hungary, rankled in the breasts
of the Emperor Nicholas and the statesmen of Vienna. The
Austrian government was so eager for revenge that it rushed
inconsiderately into a path which conducted to a revolu-
tionary highway. In his eagerness to punish the sultan for
protecting Hungarian patriots, the Emperor of Austria
made religion and the rights of nationalities pretexts for
protecting Montenegrin patriots and for Austrian interference
in Turkey.

Tzernagora, the ' Black Mountain,' called by the Venetians
Montenegro, is inhabited by about 130,000 souls who find
scanty means of subsistence in the greater part of the
territory they possess. They are cut off from the magnificent
Gulf of Cattaro, which seems intended by nature to afford an
occupation for their activity, by a strip of Austrian territory
and by the commercial jealousy and troublesome police of
the Austrian empire. They must either live in poverty
among their rocks, or seek plenty by plundering their richer
neighbours in the plains, who are ill-protected by the dis-
orderly administration of the Othoman empire. For more
than a century the sultans allowed the Montenegrins to enjoy
a degree of local freedom that amounted to virtual independ-
ence. Excited by their poverty and the long periods of
idleness which occur where agriculture is in a rude state,
and where a large part of the population is engaged in
pastoral occupations, they found plenty of time to make
plundering incursions into the rich districts in their neigh-
bourhood. The Austrian government repressed these inroads

* See the Russian despatch in the Parliamentary Papers. Further correspond-
ence, pp. 122, 127, 168. Also a pamphlet by Col. Wm. Martin Leake, On the
Claim to the Islands of Cervi and Sapienza, 1850.

2i6 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.

with promptitude and vigour, and the Montenegrins learned
by severe lessons that Austrian troops and Austrian custom-
houses presented an impenetrable barrier to cattle stealing
and contraband trade. The Othoman government was
weaker and more negligent. Religious hatred was strong
between the Christians and Mussulmans, and immemorial
hostility existed between the Sclavonian and Albanian races.
Their mutual hatred was inflamed by incessant forays of the
poverty-stricken Sclavonian Christians of Montenegro into
the fruitful territory of the Mussulman Albanians in the
district of Skodra.

The Montenegrins were long governed by their bishop who
was called Vladika. The government was transmitted to the
nephew whom the Vladika selected as his successor. This
successor, if not already a priest, whether he was a monk or a
layman, entered the clergy on being called to the sovereignty.
At one period he received episcopal consecration from the
orthodox metropolitan of Carlovitz in Austrian Servia ; for
the free mountaineers were always averse to any direct
dependence on the patriarch of Constantinople, both because
he was an Othoman official in the exercise of his temporal
power, and because some degree of Sclavonic prejudice existed
as a tradition of Byzantine times against his Greek nationality.
But when the power of the czar made itself felt in the
Othoman empire the Montenegrins sought episcopal conse-
cration in Moscow.

In the year 1851 the Vladika, Peter II., was succeeded by
his nephew Daniel, who was formally recognized by the
people as their sovereign without exacting from him the
obligation to enter the priesthood. The sovereignty of
Montenegro was declared hereditary in his family, and Prince
Daniel visited Saint Petersburg accompanied by a deputation
from the senate, and asked investiture as a temporal prince
from the Emperor of Russia, on the ground that the Vladika
had received the investiture both of the temporal and spiritual
power from the church of Russia. The Emperor Nicholas
ratified the assumption of princely rank by Daniel, though
the act was sure to alarm the Porte as an unauthorized
endeavour to transfer the suzerainty of a district at the
farthest limits of the Othoman empire from the sultan to
the czar, merely because it was orthodox and Sclavonic. The

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event derived additional importance from the excitement it
caused in the minds of the Sclavonians, who form the largest
part of the sultan's Christian subjects in Europe, and which
was supposed to be fomented by Russian agents in order to
produce a movement in favour of national independence.

The Porte considered the transformation of the ecclesiastical
authority of the Vladika into the temporal sovereignty of a
hereditary prince as a revolutionary act. The Montenegrins
intended to make it the foundation of their complete inde-

1 tlij pendence, and they reckoned for support on both Austria and
Russia, which manifested the most unfriendly sentiments
towards Turkey on account of the protection accorded to the
Polish and Hungarian refugees. This state of things induced
the sultan to enforce his rights of sovereignty over the Monte-
negrin territory as the surest means of arresting the aspira-
tions for independence among his other Sclavonic subjects.
The Montenegrins believed that they should obtain some
protection, if not direct assistance, from France as well as

liretfl from Austria and Russia.

They commenced hostilities by seizing the fort of Zabliak
on the lake of Skodra. The Othoman army under the
command of Omer Pasha, an Austrian renegade, invaded
Montenegro. Austria then stepped forward to do a small
political stroke of business for Russia and protect Sclavonian
nationality. Her interference must have amused Russian
statesmen, and it excited little jealousy on the part of the
French and English governments, who saw her error. Fear
of war on her frontier, revenge on the supporters of the
revolutionists in Hungary, a wish to punish Turkey and
to show gratitude to Russia for her recent services in the
Hungarian war, deluded Austria into supporting rebellion
and orthodoxy in Montenegro in 1853, as a similar want
of political foresight induced her to support revolution and
nationality in the Schleswig-Holstein war in 1863.

An Austrian envoy. Count Leiningen, was sent to Con-
stantinople, who presented a note containing numerous de-
mands for satisfaction. The principal complaints of Austria
were that Turkey had commenced war near the frontier
of the Austrian empire without obtaining the previous con-
sent of a power which had always been friendly to the

'kl Porte. That this war had been made a religious war, and

3l8 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VJ

that the obligation was thereby imposed on the Emperor

of Austria; as a Christian sovereign, to protect his Christian

neighbours. It was said also that the presence of Hungarian

and Polish exiles in the Othoman army was a manifestation

of an unfriendly feeling on the part of the Porte. The reply j

was dignified and prudent. The sultan yielded the desired

satisfaction to all the Austrian demands, declaring that it I

afforded the Porte great pleasure to meet the wishes ofj

an old ally and a tried friend of conservatism. The Austrian

envoy, having terminated his mission successfully, quitted

Constantinople on the 17th February 1853^

Before the cabinet of Vienna had time to enjoy its triumph
it became evident to all Europe that Austria had unwittingly
smoothed a path for Russian diplomacy. Austria accused
the sultan's government of rousing the religious bigotry of
the Mussulman population, and asserted that it was her duty
as a neighbouring and Christian power to protect the Mon-
tenegrins. Russia stepped forward as the natural protector of
the whole orthodox population of the Othoman empire
without any reference to geographical contiguity. Russia
was as desirous of punishing the sultan for resisting the
extradition of the Hungarian and Polish refugees as Austria,
and the assumption of a right of suzerainty in the case
of the Prince of Montenegro warned the sultan that the
time had arrived for resisting encroachments on his authority.

At this time a pending dispute about the guardianship of
the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem involved France and
Russia in a contest for influence in the East, which em-
barrassed the Turkish government, and distracted the judg-
ment of other nations on the line of policy to be pursued with
reference to their rivality.

Shortly after the departure of the Austrian envoy from
Constantinople Prince Menshikoff arrived as ambassador
extraordinary from the Emperor Nicholas, with demands
that, if conceded, would have authorized a constant inter-
ference on the part of Russia in the internal affairs of the
Othoman empire, by constituting the czar protector of the
sultan's orthodox subjects. The Porte replied to these

> The notes of the Austrian envoy, dated 3rd February, 1853, and the reply of ■'«
the Othoman government, dated loth February, were published in the Augsburg mk
Gazette, 28th April, 1855.

RUSSIAN DEMANDS ON TURKEY. 21 9

A.D.1853.]

demands by offering to secure the rights of the orthodox
hristians by charter, but decHned to do so by treaty. Prince
VIenshikoff, who had negotiated haughtily^ withdrew ab-
-uptly ^ The Russian then occupied Moldavia and Vallachia
is a means of compelling the sultan to yield. France and
England supported Turkey, and the Crimean war ensued ^.

The Greeks thought the time favourable for attacking
Turkey. They hoped to annex Thessaly and Epirus to
:he Hellenic kingdom. They overrated their own military
strength and political importance ; they mistook the violence
3f Christian hostility to Mohammedanism among the population
3f European Turkey, and they magnified the power of Russia
Decause it is orthodox and their ally against the Turks. The
:ounsels of France and England were despised because their
power was not duly appreciated when compared with the
xtent and population of Russia. In open violation of the
treaties which created the Greek kingdom, King Otho, the
2[overnment, and the people attacked Turkey, and forfeited

empii| the guarantee of foreign protection. The ' great idea,' which
means the establishment of Greek domination on the ruins of
the Othoman empire, appeared to the men who governed
Greece a practicable scheme. King Otho allied himself
closely with the party, which in 1838 had formed the phil-

3t tl( orthodox society, and in 1 840 had plotted to place an orthodox
sovereign on his throne ^. The persistence of Lord Palmerston

hipo and Sir Edmund Lyons in their endeavours to impose what
was regarded as an English line of policy on the Greek
government, ended in alienating both the king and the
people. The manner in which France had used her good
offices, after encouraging the Greeks to resist the demands
jof England in 1850, convinced them that the French govern-
jment was on that occasion more intent on injuring England

^^5[Hthan on serving Greece. And the discussions relating to the

^ Prince Menshikoff arrived at Constantinople on the 28th February, 1853, and
quitted it on the 2ist May.

" The Russian army entered Moldavia on the 3rd July, and Turkey commenced
hostilities on the 23rd October, 1853.

^ M. Glarakes, when minister of the interior, of ecclesiastical aifairs, and of
public instruction, was dismissed from office on the nth January, 1840, by King
Otho in great alarm, because he was suspected of connivance with the plot, and
Count George Capodistrias, who was at Athens under the pretext of soliciting a
pension on account of his brother's services, was arrested as a conspirator. Greek
Gazette, 1840, No. 2 ; Revue des Deux Mondes, October, 1844, p. 210.

•nristEi

^li

statK

■e repii

desire

tliat

ouittft

rijoip

'H
iccusa
3ti)' 0
.■rdut;
: Hoi-
uor

Russii

>'jstra

1
i

220 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V.CLV.

Holy Sepulchre revived the orthodox prejudices of the Greeks

against Catholic France.

Hatred of the Turks, combined with religious bigotry and

national enthusiasm, was so strong that the Greeks invaded

the sultan's territory as soon as the disposable forces of

Turkey were sent to the North to oppose the Russians. The

sympathies of the Greek people were all on the side of Russia.

The French and English were heterodox and unprepared

for war. The Russians were the irreconcileable enemies of the

sultan ; they were orthodox, near at hand, and had prepared

numerous armies and powerful fleets for the enterprise which

they were commencing. The Greeks believed that the

European provinces of the Othoman empire would become

an easy conquest, long before the allies of Turkey could take

any measures to prevent the catastrophe. Russia laboured to

persuade the world, and the Greeks firmly believed, that all

the orthodox subjects of the sultan would rise in rebellion the

moment the Greeks crossed the frontier and displayed the

ensign of the Cross at the head of a few armed men in Thessaly

and Epirus. Indeed both the Russians and the Greeks asserted

that these provinces were in a state of insurrection early in

1854^ Austria and Prussia attempted In vain to arrest King

Otho in his unprovoked attack on his neighbour ; but he

adopted all the ambitious projects of his people and when he

had made up his mind he clung to his opinions with his usual

obstinacy. He delighted in his unwonted popularity, and

Queen Amalia, who really shared the feelings and prejudices

of the Greeks, was idolized by them. King, court, ministers,

and people rushed blindly forward to attack the Othoman

* Despatch of Count Nesselrode, 2nd March, 1854; Ammaire des Deux Mondes,
1854, p. 731 ; East and West, by Stefanos Xenos, p. 13. This author, writing in
1864, says: 'To say that nine-tenths of the Greek nation did not at that time
sincerely sympathize with Russia, would be to utter an untruth. To say that
King Otho urged the Greeks to take up arms against the Allies would be equally
false ; nor could I, consistently with truth, deny that Russia was implicated in our
revolution of Epirus ; neither can I hide the fact, that the Greeks desired the
defeat of the Allies, and were profoundly grieved at the fall of SebastopoL' At
p. 15 he adds: 'This movement (i.e. the invasion of Thessaly and Epirus) on the
part of the Greeks was obviously a great advantage to Russia, and it was her
interest to promote it. Of this the Greeks were fully aware, and when they
accepted pecuniary aid from Russia they understood its exact value. Russia
assisted — slightly, it is true, but still she did assist them — because she knew that
an insurrectionary movement among the Greeks of Turkey would make a powerful
diversion in her favour.' M. Xenos, the writer of East and West, was named
Consul in London by the Greek government of King George, but could not obtain
an exequatur from the British government.

I GREEKS INVADE TURKEY. 221

'a.d. 1854.]

'power and trample on the treaties which insured them the

protection of Great Britain and France. Count Nesselrode

! spoke of the Othoman empire falHng into pieces, as if a storm

(from Russia could blow it off the face of the earth. The

Emperor Nicholas called the sultan a dying man, and proposed

to constitute anybody who would join him in taking possession

I of the sick man's property one of the heirs and executors of

, the Othoman empire. The Greeks rushed prematurely into

' the sick man's house.

\ There must have been gross mismanagement on the part
i of those who planned and directed the invasion of Thessaly
and Epirus in 1854, and the conduct of King Otho's ministers
I and troops was marked by extreme incapacity as well as
I timidity in the field. The feelings that prompted the people
to incite their countrymen to aspire at independence, deserve
praise, but the manner in which the military operations were
conducted was cowardly, and the brigandage of the armed
bands that invaded Turkey brought disgrace on the Greek
kingdom^. The entrance of the Russian army into the
trans-Danubian provinces, though it was not made the ground
of an immediate declaration of war against Russia on the
part of the Sultan, served as a signal to the Greeks for
preparing to invade Turkey. The Russians crossed the Pruth
on the 3rd of July 1853^ and from that time the English and
French ministers at Athens exerted themselves in vain to
prevent the Greek government from taking part in the war.
During the winter, bands of adventurers were formed at Athens
under the avowed protection of the queen, and money for their
equipment was collected publicly^.

In the month of February 1854 the minister of war per-
mitted the army to aid the armed bands that had entered

' The Greek government pretended that it took no part in the invasion of Turkey,
but Colonel Skarlatos Soutzos, who had been marshal of the court, was sent as
commander-in-chief of the forces on the frontier, and when everything was pre-
pared, he returned to Athens and was appointed minister of war. Now whether
the object of the Greek government was to prevent the violation of treaties and
maintain a strict neutrality, or to prepare for an efficient attack on Turkey, the
measures adopted were equally ill-judged and inefficient. Either might have been
carried out with better results. The people acted openly, decidedly, and with
energy in their animosity to Turkey. They plunged boldly into the war, and
showed that they were ready to perform their part. But those who allowed the
war to commence and employed money to carry it on, neither formed magazines
nor maintained discipline among the Greek troops even in the Greek territory.

^ Parliamentary Papers ; correspondence respecting the relations between Greece
and Turkey, 1854, p. 3.

%22 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V

Turkey during the winter ^ But in spite of Greek an^
Russian encouragement the Christian subjects of the sultai^*
refused to take up arms. The pubhc administration wa
so bad in Greece, that independence offered few attraction
when the result would be subjection to Greek misgovernmentj'
The patriots that entered Thessaly and Epirus, both volunteer
and Greek troops, plundered the cattle and property of th
Christians and Mussulmans alike, and the rayahs soon dis
covered that the lawless rapacity of those who pretended toj'fe
deliver them from oppression was more ruinous than the
systematic extortion of the Othoman officials. Never indeed
was a more open violation of national treaties accompanied
with such wanton robbery of private property. The GreekB
government employed direct falsehood to conceal from the,]
English and French ministers at Athens the proceedings
which it employed to encourage these disorders. The Greek
minister in London, M. Tricoupi, attempted to deceive the
British government by assurances that King Otho was making
the greatest exertions to maintain neutrality, when he was
perfectly aware from Greek newspapers and private letters
that these assurances were false. King Otho and Queen |«
Amalia were, at the time, making a parade of patronizing
those who fitted out the volunteers. The jails were opened
with the connivance of the government, to allow all the
prisoners able to bear arms to escape, on condition that they
enlisted in the irregular bands on the frontier and invaded
Turkey. Armed men were enrolled by the municipalities
under the direction of the prefects, and permitted to march
from one end of Greece to the other, proclaiming openly that
they were going to attack the Turks. The troops placed to
guard the frontier found no impediment to their joining
these bodies of invaders with their arms and ammunition,
and it was said at Athens that fifty men deserted in one
day.

A tent with the royal colours was put in the vicinity of
the palace garden, camp equipage was ordered for the court,
and the courtiers announced that the king and queen would

^ A list of six generals, five colonels, and three majors, who were allowed to
resign their rank in the Greek army to invade Turkey, is given in the Panhellenion,
a French newspaper published at Athens, 14th April, 1854. They were all rein-
stated soon after as a matter of course, and received their pay as if they had never
sent in their resignations.

'JMIP'.'

inieii

'tl
dis

ndei

CREEKS INVADE TURKEY. 323

A.D. 1854.]

^ ai soon quit Athens for the frontier. Proclamations were printed
sultj and circulated, which pretended to be issued by subjects of
the sultan, but which were prepared by Greek officials ; and
copies of these papers were distributed among the Greeks
in Western Europe to stimulate their enthusiasm and induce
intea them to send money for the deliverance of their countrymen.
Sir Thomas Wyse the English minister at Athens was not
deceived even at the commencement of the movement by
ledt the language of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He reported
til to the British government that King Otho and the members
of his cabinet were preparing to invade Turkey, and deter-
mined to violate all their promises on the slightest chance
jreellof aggrandizement; and by the early information which he
Dti gave concerning the disposition and conduct of the Greek
diii| government he prevented the false statements of the Greek
minister at London from gaining any credence. It would
probably convey a false impression of the character of the
population and of the state of society in the Hellenic king-
dom to record in detail the proceedings of the Greeks who
invaded Turkey in 1854. They never encountered any body
of Othoman troops nearly equal in number without suffering
a defeat, and their only victories were over bands of Turkish
peasants who resisted their plundering incursions, and over
scattered detachments of Albanian police guards. They
plundered friends and foes. Christians and Mussulmans in-
discriminately ; and this invasion of Turkey did more to
strengthen the sultan's government in Thessaly and Epirus
than the occupation of the Piraeus by French and English
troops. About 6500 men are believed to have crossed the
frontier from Greece, including volunteers, criminals released
from jails, prisoners who were allowed to escape, and soldiers
who were invited to desert ; and all these men lived at free
quarters in the southern parts of Thessaly and Epirus, which
are chiefly inhabited by Christians, for about four months.
In addition to what they consumed they sent over the fron-
iiit,|tier to be sold for their profit upwards of 10,000 cattle and
50,000 sheep \ Good meat had not for many years been so

jree
e

'was
:ttei!

izin«
m

ada

^ Parliamentary Papers : Correspondence relating to Greece and Turkey, 1854,

I pp. 253, 254. Besides cattle, large quantities of grain and salt which belonged to

Greek subjects of the Porte were sent over the frontier as plunder. The Christian

population suffered severely, but fewer oxen were delivered from the Turkish yoke

than from the Christian.

224 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V.Ch.V.

abundant nor so cheap in the markets of Greece. The conduct
of the armed men who invaded Turkey is not surprising,
when we know the manner in which they were brought
together, and the measures adopted to escape poHtical re-
sponsibility by leaving them without control ; but it is almost
incredible that the members of the Greek government and
the military men who commanded the Greek force on the
frontier could expect either success or honour from counte-
nancing such proceedings^. )
In the month of February 250 criminals from the prison
of Chalcis in Euboea accompanied by 150 soldiers of the
garrison, left that fortress, and dividing themselves into several
bands marched openly to the frontier, part passing through
Euboea, and part proceeding through Boeotia and Locris,
both bands exacting provisions of the best kind and often
contributions in money from the peasants where they stopped.
The government authorities welcomed them, but no where
attempted to check their disorders. On the western side
of Greece, at Patras and other places where there were prisons,
the prisoners were allowed to escape and the soldiers were
encouraged to desert. Even from the prison of Kalamata
in Messenia no criminals were allowed to depart and march
through the whole Peloponnesus, exacting provisions from
the villages when they did not receive rations from the
authorities. A considerable body of troops was placed at
Vonitza and Karavasera by the government under the pretext

ai;

^ The accounts of the numbers who invaded Turkey were generally exaggerated
at the time. The account published in the Augsburg Gazette in April requires to be
controlled by consular reports and the information of volunteers present in different
places. In the Augsburg Gazette — •
Theodore Griva is stated to have 1500 men. He was at Mctzovo with . . 250

General Djavellas 6000 ,, „ Petta ,, . . 3000

The Suliotes are stated as . . 500 „ They were at Pentepegadia with 100
Zervas is stated to have . . .1500 „ He was at Dramisi with . . 300

Kosta Nika 1000 „ „ Ratziko „ . . ico?

Georgios Tjames 600 „ „ Kalamo „ . . 50 "

Georgios Vaias 400 „ „ Gramena „ . . 50

Lambros Veikos 2000 „ He was near Paramythia with . 100

In Epirus 13.500 In Epirus 395°

In Thessaly report said . 10,000 In Thessaly 3000

23,500 6950

It is not probable, however, that the number at any time exceeded 6000, though it
is possible that considerably more than 7000 may have crossed the frontier at
different times.

)U0t8

' GREEKS INVADE TURKEY. 225

A.D. 1854.]

of enforcing neutrality, but in reality to facilitate their deser-
tion with their arms and ammunition, and several young
officers went off with the men under their command and
joined the bands already in Turkey.

During the negotiations which preceded the rupture of
diplomatic relations with the Porte, and during the hostilities
that were carried on, the good faith and strict observance
of treaties by the Mussulmans formed a strong contrast to
the conduct of the orthodox Christians. The justice and
priso candour of Fuad Pasha rendered the falsehood of M. Paikos,
fti the Greek minister of foreign affairs, more conspicuous, and
the parliamentary papers furnish a record of their conduct
in their own writings ^ When the invasion of Epirus com-
menced, the Othoman troops on the frontier amounted to
1300 men. Prevesa, Domoko, and Volo were almost without
garrisons, and the few troops that occupied them were in
want of ammunition, stores, and money ^. The court of
Athens and the Greek war department, having resolved to
break loose from the restraints of international treaties and
good faith, might with a little determination and military
courage have gained possession of these fortresses by simul-
taneous attacks without any very serious loss ; and it may
be doubted whether either Turkey or her allies would have
been disposed to send immediately a force to reconquer them.
Greece might then have treated with a material guarantee
in her hands like other powers. The indecision of a timid
king, the want of capacity to execute any plan on the part
of the Greek ministers, the neglect of discipline in the Greek
army, and the disorderly and cowardly behaviour of the
soldiers, criminals, and brigands who invaded Turkey, rendered
the treachery of the Greek government abortive ^

The Porte, exasperated by the false statements of the
Greek government that it was exerting all its authority to

evei
roug
-ocri
oft(

'ppd
ivhen

nard

from

■eta

■eraie

flffl

' Parliamentary Papers: Correspondence respecting the relations of Greece and
Turkey, 1854, p. 210, &c.

^ The garrison of Arta consisted of only 400 regular troops sent from Joannina
when the Greeks were about to attack it. The soldiers previously in the place
were 700 Albanian irregulars and 200 police guards.

^ The Augsburg Gazette was at this time the organ of Bavarian and Greek
ambitious hopes, and it is curious to read over the accounts it contains of
imaginary insurrections among the Christian subjects of the sultan. The German
correspondents at Athens put more absurd exaggerations in circulation than can
be found in the Greek newspapers published at Athens.

VOL. VII. Q

325 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.

maintain neutrality, broke off all communications with Greece,

and ordered all Greek subjects to quit the Othoman empire

in fifteen days. This caused a great scramble among Greek

merchants and traders to divest themselves of Greek passports

and other marks of Hellenism. The protection of the Allied

powers was eagerly sought after ; many Hellenes contrived

to become lonians, and even the much vilified condition of

rayah was in many cases thankfully accepted. Neither the

sultan's government nor the Turkish people bore hard on

the trading classes on this occasion, and many Greek citizens

remained in the Othoman empire, and enriched themselves

by supplying the wants of the enemies of orthodox Russia.

The Allies at last interfered to put a stop to the devastation
of Epirus and Thessaly. The resources of the sultan were
diminished by the ruin of these provinces, and he was com-
pelled to detach troops for their defence, which were sorely
wanted on the banks of the Danube to resist the Russians.
Piracy also began to appear in the waters of the Archipelago.
Two English vessels were found at sea among the Greek
islands without a soul on board and with their decks covered
with blood. The Allies feared that there might be a renewal
of the atrocities of 1828 and 1829, and the state of Greece
made it their duty as well as their interest to put an end
to the aggression on Turkey and arrest piracy.

On the 22nd April 1854 the British government threatened
King Otho that, in case the Greek government persisted in
employing the revenues of Greece to attack Turkey in vio-
lation of treaties, it would enforce the engagements of the
treaty which, in placing King Otho on the throne of Greece,
stipulated that the first revenues of the kingdom should be
.ippropriated to paying the interest due to the protecting
powers \ If this threat had been carried into execution, and
effectual measures taken to enforce publicity and enable the
Greek people to know the exact amount of money that was
annually received by the treasury with every detail relating
to its expenditure, a great boon would have been conferred
on Greece, and the Greeks might have been saved from years
of political misconduct, financial dishonesty, anarchy, and
revolution. The time however was ill suited for proposing
any financial measure or using a financial threat.

^ Parliamentary Papers^ 1854, Greece and Turkey, p. 301.

iap>

DEFEAT OF THE GREEKS. 227

A.D. 1854.]

' The invasion of Epirus and Thessaly was defeated by the

Turks before any direct assistance arrived from the AlHes,

I and the Greeks were driven back into their own territory

iwith greater ease than could have been expected. Only two

engagements of any importance occurred, one at Petta and

the other at Domoko, and in both the Greek troops fled

I after offering a very feeble resistance to the attack of the

, Turks. At Petta the number of the Greeks amounted to

' 3000 men, who were intrenched in a position which they had

carefully selected. The Turkish force consisted of 3000

j regulars and 1000 Albanian irregulars, who marched out of

Arta to attack the Greek position on the 26th of April.

I The Greek intrenchments were stormed after a single volley

j of musketry, and the whole Greek army fled in utter con-

! fusion, abandoning two pieces of artillery after the first

discharge. Numbers threw away their arms, and the Turks

collected the trophies of this almost bloodless battle, and

• exhibited them in triumph at Arta the same evening. The

few prisoners captured were released by the Turks very soon

after at the intercession of the English consul. At Domoko

the Greeks were the assailants. They invested the place

and made preparations for attacking it ; but the contest

was terminated by a vigorous sortie of the garrison, which

completely routed the besieging force and drove the Greeks

from all their positions. These two victories compelled the

main bodies of the invaders to retreat over the frontier. The

bands that remained in Turkey sought to evade pursuit, and

endeavoured to carry on a war of plunder, until their final

expulsion from the Othoman territory, which was effected

1 during the summer.

In the month of May French and English troops were
landed at the Piraeus, and King Otho was compelled to
abandon the Russian alliance and cease from further attempts
to disturb the frontier provinces of Turkey. Tranquillity
was easily restored both in Epirus and Thessaly by the
Othoman authorities. The armed bands of criminals and
brigands, when driven back into Greece, carried on the same
system of plundering the agricultural population which the
Greeks had dignified with the name of war when it was
pursued in Turkey ; and for the next two years the Christian
subjects of the sultan in Epirus and Thessaly enjoyed a

328 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V

far greater degree of security for life and property than the
subjects of King Otho in the northern provinces of the Hellenic
kingdom. The clandestine manner in which the Greek court
encouraged the invasion of Turkey destroyed all discipline
in the Greek army by making secret service the surest claim
to advancement and special favour ; it corrupted the political
administration by tolerating illegal conduct on the part ol
subordinate officials ; it subjected the government of the
country to the fluctuating interests of the court, and it flattered
while it disappointed the passions of the mob. It also in-
flicted a serious injury on the Greek nation by exhibiting
the strongest evidence of its military weakness and political
incapacity \

The occupation of the Piraeus by the Allied troops lasted
from May 1854 to February 1857. On their arrival, the.
English and French ministers presented themselves to King
Otho and required from him a promise that the Greekj
government would obsei"ve strict neutrality during the
Russian war. He was informed that in case he refused to|
give this promise, Athens would be immediately occupied by»
French and English troops, and the revenues of the sea-ports
would be sequestrated to defray the expenses of the army ol
occupation. King Otho felt no disposition to risk the loss of
his throne. It appears that he had acted all along without
any definite plan, so that he found no great difficulty ir
promising everything which the Allies required. The minis-
try which had pursued a line of conduct hostile to the AlliesJ
was replaced by a ministry which accepted a policy ofj
subserviency to their views. As soon as King Otho was!
made fully sensible that there was no alternative between]
absolute submission or a degree of restraint which might havej
quickly compelled him to abdicate, he accepted the resigna-j
tion of the partizans of Russia and named a new ministry!
agreeable to the Allies, pledging himself and his governmentj
in a solemn manner to maintain neutrality-. Queen Amaliaj

* King Otho's ministers during the invasion of Turkey were. Admiral Krizes^l
president; Paikos, foreign affairs; Skarlatos Soutzos, war ; Vlachos, public instruc-
tion ; Ambrosiades. interior ; Provelegios, finance ; and Pilikas. justice.

^ The declaration made by King Otho to the ministers of Great Britain and I
France on the 6th May. 1854, was in the following terms: — ' I declare that I will
observe faithfully a strict and complete neutrality with regard to Turkey, that
I will immediately take all the measures necessary for making this neutrality
effectual, ana for this object I will call to my counsels new ministers who by their

SB^

I OCCUPATION OF THE PIRAEUS. 229

|uD. 1854.]

pn this as on many other occasions showed more sincerity

han good sense. She made an open display of her dislike

o the Allies and of her unavailing wishes for the success of

Ihe Russians. She encouraged opposition to her husband's

inisters by holding out hopes of a speedy reaction, and by

liinting that the influence of the court would always be

ible to secure rewards for its devoted servants in spite of the

:onstitutional ministers and the influence of the Allies.

A.lexander Mavrocordatos, who had conducted himself with

nore candour at Paris than Tricoupi at London, was recalled

o become president of the council of ministers. Mavrocor-

atos had not recovered the popularity he had lost when he

as prime minister in 1844; he had been long absent from

reece, and the country had undergone considerable change

uring his absence. He had always been a bad leader of the

arty and an unsuccessful administrator, and his want of

[intimate acquaintance with the new men and new circum-

tances brought these deficiencies into greater prominence.

The only man of action in the new cabinet was General

jKalergi, but he was deficient in administrative capacity and

as disliked both bv King Otho and Oueen Amalia. The

arshal of the palace, four of the king's aides-de-camp, and

ithe chief of the police of Athens, who had all taken an active

part in the violation of neutrality, were removed from their

places. Public opinion was adverse to the new ministry ;, and

its members sought in vain for able officials to support them

n their endeavours to conduct the government with order and

[justice. The animosity of the court and the prejudices of the

people could not be immediately allayed, so that the only

strength of this ministry lay in the power of the Allies ^.

The opposition of the people existed, but it was not active,

and if the new ministers had pursued a well-digested system

Icharacter and ability are the most competent to carry this engagement of mine

linto execution.' Sir Thomas Wyse, the British minister, replied: — 'We (the

Iministers of France and England) will hasten to inform our governments of the

[•words of your Majesty, and we do not doubt that your Majesty, by giving your

support to the new councillors, whom you have been pleased to call to your

cabinet, will leave to us only the duty of transmitting to our courts the most

satisfactory information concerning the state of Greece.'

* The cabinet was composed of seven members: Alexander Mavrocordatos,

[president of the council and minister of foreign affairs; General Kalergi, war;

Rhigas Palamedes, interior ; Perikles Argyropoulos, finance ; Admiral Kanares,

marine; George Psyllas, ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction; and L.

Londinos, justice.

230 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V.Ch.V

of administrative reform, and sought the aid of public opinion
by adopting measures to enforce economy and financial
publicity, they would have won personal respect even if they
had failed to obtain decided support. Measures of improve-
ment from which the mass of the people would have derived
immediate benefit presented themselves in number ; but the
weakness of most of the members of this ministry paralyzed
its activity, and the disorders caused by the escaped criminals
and the undisciplined bands driven back from Turkey were so
great that life and property became more insecure in many
parts of the kingdom than they had been at any periodi
during King Otho's reign. The ministry was unpopular!
because it was regarded as an instrument of an anti-nationalj
policy ; it was weak because it was both incapable and un-
popular ; and it was thwarted in its action by the court|
because it was weak and unpopular.

The condition of the people was little better than that of j
the government. The Greeks could not conceal from them-
selves that they had failed to strike an effectual blow at]
Turkey by their own misconduct. They had violated every
principle of honour and policy by suddenly assailing an]
unprepared neighbour, and they had conducted their attack so
disgracefully as to draw down the contempt of their Russian
friends as well as of their allied enemies. Success might
have been accepted, as it generally is, as an apology for an
international assault, but failure augments the crime of bad
faith with nations and especially with statesmen. Greece!
really lost very little either in money or men by her attack
on Turkey; but she lost greatly in moral character and
political organization. She unveiled her administrative and
military weakness to the Othoman government and to the
Christian races in European Turkey, and forfeited her claim |
to lead the Albanians and Bulgarians in a war of independ-
ence. The ' great idea ' and the revival of a Byzantine
empire became for some years a subject of ridicule. The
Russians, finding that the Greeks could do little for them,
became less disposed to do anything for the Greeks, and they
did not conceal their contempt for men who received money
to fight their own national battle, and after being paid
fought only to enable them to ask for another payment.
The Porte discovered that the Greek nation had less power

GREECE DURING THE OCCUPATION. 23 1

A.D. 1855.]

to injure the Othoman empire than was previously believed
to be the case ; the attacks of the Greeks were less feared
and their friendship was less valued. In Western Europe it
was seen that the literary and commercial activity of a small
number had produced a false estimate of the national
strength and of the military and political importance of the
Greek kingdom. A general suspicion was awakened that
Greece might eventually become a secondary power in the
ultimate arrangement of the affairs of the Othoman empire.
The Greeks themselves were forced to feel that they were no
longer the only Christian nationality in European Turkey
that possessed a 'great idea.' The Roumans, the Bulgarians,
and the Sclavonians are more numerous, and the Albanians
are more warlike. The inhabitants of the Ionian Islands
alone called loudly for union with the Hellenic kingdom,
little thinking that their clamour would induce Great Britain
to be so generous as to grant their demand.

The disasters of the Allies during the siege of Sebastopol
revived the hopes of King Otho and of the Greeks that
Russia would prove victorious in the war. An impropriety
in a matter of court etiquette and the rights of society on
the part of General Kalergi offended Queen Amalia, and the
v/eakness of Mavrocordatos in not immediately settling the
political difficulty which arose from this impropriety by
exacting the resignation of Kalergi or resigning himself,
enabled the court to get rid of the ' occupation cabinet ' with
very little credit to its members. On the 15th September
1855 a new ministry under the presidency of Demetrius Bul-
gares was appointed. Bulgares was an Albanian of Hydra ;
he was a man of honesty and firmness^ but destitute of admin-
istrative knowledge and the capacity to govern men. His
obstinate character and personal pride were well displayed in
his persisting to wear the long robes formerly worn by his
father, when he bore the title of bey in Hydra as representing
the Othoman authority. His arrogant self-importance ob-
tained for him from Queen Amalia the nickname of Arta-
xerxes. The ministry of Bulgares entered on office without
any political principle to guide its conduct ; its bond of union
was blind devotion to the interests of the court and the pre-
judices of nationality. The interests of Greece and the cause
of good government were left in abeyance. Its administration

23 a CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY. '•

[Bk.V.Ch.V.

was marked by the extension of brigandage to such a degree
that in some districts the agricultural population threatened
to abandon the cultivation of the soil, and the chief merit
it possessed was that it adopted vigorous measures for
destroying the brigands.

The long political career of Alexander Mavrocordatos ter-
minated with the resignation of his cabinet in 1855. His
last administration was characterized by the same want of
political convictions and administrative capacity which had
led to the failure of his government on former occasions.
He displayed the same disposition to meddle with men, and
the same incompetency to direct measures. Never perhaps
was there a man whose talents and virtues were so generally
considered to entitle him to high office in the government of
his country, who failed so ignominiously when entrusted with
power. Alexander Mavrocordatos, like King Otho, sought
to control and direct everything ; and the system of constant
interference proved as injurious to good government when
practised by an able as by a weak man. Prefects, justices
of the peace, and demarchs were subjected to ministerial
interference, instead of being taught to fear administrative
responsibility. On the other hand the difficulties under
which the government of Mavrocordatos laboured ought
not to be overlooked before condemning his conduct. The
centralization of the powers of government in the hands of
the ministers of the crown centralized the whole discontent of
the people against the person of the prime minister, and tJiat
discontent was caused in part by circumstances over which
he had no control, and was increased by the encouragement
which all who opposed his measures received from the Russian
party, the court faction, and a number of influential Greeks
who pretended to be personally devoted to the interests of
King Otho. The difficulties of governing well were also
augmented by the absence of local institutions enabling the
people to carry on self-government in that lower sphere of
administrative business, which a central authority, whether it
be representative or autocratic, cannot find time to perform ^.

This last administration of Mavrocordatos, if it had been

* Self-government ought, I presume, to be applied to those cases of local or
general administration, in which the people elect directly their executive officers
and financial officials as well as their legislaiors and councillors.

VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 233

A.D. 1855.]

ably and prudently conducted, might have done something
to improve the morality of the Greek government, but from
want of political principle to guide its action, it strengthened
the vices of a system that was preparing the Greeks for a
revolution. The support of the classes possessing political
influence was purchased by violating the constitution in the
most offensive manner. The salaries of the senators and
deputies were illegally increased, and the dishonesty of Greek
statesmen was so openly displayed that a deep stain was
fixed on the national character. The constitution of 1844,
which Mavrocordatos had taken an active part in framing,
declared that the deputies and senators who exercised their
functions were to receive from the public treasury, respec-
tively, 250 drachmas for deputies and 500 drachmas monthly
for senators, while the session lasted \ The legislative session
of 1854 ought, according to the express enactment of the
constitution, to have commenced on the ist (13th) Novem-
ber^; but from that inattention to duty which characterizes
Greek society, the deputies neglected to assemble at Athens
in sufficient numbers to form a house for business, and the
king could not open the chambers until December. Even
then the number of deputies was insufficient to transact busi-
ness, and the president could not be elected until February
1855. Yet, though the deputies and senators neglected to
meet for the affairs of their country, they insisted on receiving
their monthly salaries from the ist November 1854. Mavro-
cordatos and his colleagues preferred retaining power and
purchasing parliamentary support by violating the constitution
to preserving their political honour unsullied and resigning
office. In an evil hour for himself and for the senate
Mavrocordatos gave his sanction to this iniquity, which he
might have prevented, for he had only to remind the chamber
of deputies that the initiative of every grant of salary be-
longed neither to the chamber of deputies nor to the senate,
but to the crown alone ; and to declare that, as long as he
remained a minister of the crown, he was determined not to
allow money to be voted in violation of the constitution ''•
By speaking this language he would have secured the support
of public opinion, and on such a question King Otho could

' Articles 67 and 79. * Article 47. ^ Article 17.

234 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.

not have forced him to resign. Whether he could have
averted the Revolution of 1862, saved the throne of King Otho,
and prolonged the existence of a senate in Greece, may
remain doubtful. Neither Mavrocordatos nor any of his col-
leagueSj living as they did in an impure political atmosphere
which dulled their moral perception, perceived the abyss that
their neglect of the constitution opened in the road along
which their government was travelling.

The first method that the deputies and senators invented
for increasing their salaries in violation of the constitution
which they had sworn to observe, was by prolonging the
sessions. This abuse caused so much inconvenience, that to
remove it, and at the same time to satisfy the cupidity of the
legislators, the cabinet of Mavrocordatos proposed a law to
increase their salaries, and this violation of the constitution
passed through both chambers almost without opposition and
received the royal assent. It was enacted that the deputies
were to receive an annual salary of 2500 drachmas, and the
senators an annual salary of 5000 drachmas each. But the
breach once opened in the constitution for the pecuniary profit
of the legislators was soon widened, and a considerable addi-
tion was subsequently made to their wages ^. The chamber
of deputies, being a body in a state of constant change, and
which could be rendered at any time a true representation of
the people, incurred no direct responsibility by the misconduct
of its members, for a new election could give it a new char-
acter and new life. But the members of the senate, being
nominated for life, fixed the responsibility of their perjury
and cupidity on the body they composed, so that when the
Revolution of 1862 expelled King Otho from his throne, it
also abolished the senate.

As far as the Allies were concerned the ministry of Mavro-
cordatos answered its purpose, for it maintained Greece in
a state of neutrality, but the internal government of the
country was weak, and the manner in which the executive

^ The National Assembly of 1864 has endeavoured to guard against a repetition
of similar illegalities. The 47th article of the Constitution of 1S44 enacted that
the chambers met of right on the ist November, and that the sessions could
not last more than two months. The Constitution of 1864 enacts that the dura-
tion of each session cannot be less than three months nor more than six months,
and fixes 2000 drachmas as the payment to be made to each deputy for the
session.

BRIGANDAGE. 2$^

A.D. 1855.]

administration was conducted was a subject of complaint even
among those who were incHned to support the ministry \

The outrages committed by bands of brigands in the year
1855 were viewed with indifference or applauded as outbreaks
of a patriotic spirit as long as the ' occupation ministry '
remained in office ^. But the crimes and devastations of these
robbers became a subject of serious alarm, when the formation
of a ministry devoted to the court under the presidency of
M. Bulgares brought the responsibility of the disorganized
condition of the state home to those who had ordered the
prisons to be opened, and hundreds of criminals to be turned
loose on society ^. A series of daring acts of brigandage on
the road between Athens and the Piraeus drew the attention
of all Europe to the insecurity that prevailed in Greece. Two
French officers were robbed. A captain of artillery was car-
ried off to the mountains and detained a prisoner until the
Greek government paid 30,000 drachmas as his ransom. It
was openly asserted at the time, that the court displayed
unusual promptitude in obtaining the release of this officer,
in order to escape from a too close investigation of its connec-
tion with brigandage during the previous months, and from

1 See the Greek newspapers, and particularly the 'hOrjva, in 1855.

^ There was a remarkable passage testifying the alarming amount of brigandage
in Greece in the king's speech on the opening of the chambers on the 1 6th Dec,
1854: 'The brigandage which continues to desolate many parts of the country,
not only destroys the labours of honest and industrious citizens, and places life,
property, and honour in danger ; but also gives occasion for condemning unjustly
the nation, whicli rejects with abhorrence the iniquitous deeds of the numerous
criminals.'

3 A writer in the Edhihurgh Revieiu (No. 210, April, 1856) says, 'Instead of
those habits of industry which ought to flourish among a free peasantry, the
tendency to atrocious agrarian outrages, called by the Greeks brigandage, has
lamentably increased, and prevails to an extent which is deeply disgraceful to the
government and to the community. The excesses committed within the last few
months by these bands of robbers, murderers, and extortioners, are so abominable
that all personal security is at an end in many districts, and nothing but the
presence of a certain number of foreign troops appears to save the kingdom from
the horrors of social dissolution. The weak and profligate government of King
Otho is responsible not only for the impunity which attends these crimes, but for
the cause which has mainly produced them. Hundreds of adventurers and ruffians,
encouraged by the king and queen, and stimulated by the hope of plunder and by
Russian intrigues, flocked to the frontier at the outset of the war. They were soon
driven back by the forces of the Porte, though not before they had inflicted atro-
cious wrongs on the Turkish subjects of Thessaly. Yet these marauders were
immediately amnestied by the Greek government.'

This article was written by Mr. Freeman, whose History of Federal Government
from the foundation of the Achaian League places him in a high rank as a scholar
and historian, and whose History of the Norman Conquest of England sheds new light
on one of the most important periods in the history of the English nation.

2^6 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V.

a not ill-grounded fear that the necessity of providing for
their own security might cause the Allies to interfere directly
with the internal government of the country. The suppression
of brigandage became the first object of King Otho's govern-
ment, and as soon as the agricultural population was convinced
that the agents of the government were sincere in their endea-
vours to extirpate the brigands, the peasants joined the troops
and gendarmes in hunting them down, and with this assistance
the criminals were quickly exterminated. A circular of the
minister of foreign affairs, addressed to the diplomatic agents
of Greece at the European courts, dated 28th July (loth
August) 1856, amidst a great deal of self-congratulation at
the progress which the country had made under King Otho's
government, a large allowance of inaccurate statements, and
much misrepresentation, declared that ' during the first three
months of 1856, ninety-nine brigands were brought before the
courts of justice, and of these thirty were condemned to death
and executed, nine were condemned to labour for life, twelve
to labour for terms of years, and twenty-five to various terms
of imprisonment \' Yet even in this document it is admitted
that about thirty brigands continued to ravage Attica and
Boeotia in the immediate vicinity of King Otho's palace. In
Acarnania alone forty persons were killed by brigands on the
principal road since the year 1853'-^. The general administrative
disorder, of which brigandage was one of the most striking
features, caused the Allies to prolong the occupation of the
Piraeus for some time after the treaty of peace was signed
on the 30th March 1856. During the congress at Paris, both
the representatives of Great Britain and France stated that
the deplorable condition of Greece rendered the continuance
of the occupation necessary, to avoid anarchy and prevent the
repetition of the disorders in the army and the prisons which
preceded the occupation. The Russian plenipotentiary also

^ This document is printed in Le Moniteur Grec, 21 December, 1857.

^ A convention for the suppression of brigandage was concluded between the
Greek government and the Porte on the 20th April, 1856, which aided the Greeks
in destroying the bands of brigands by cutting off their retreat into Turkey. The
Greeks, nevertheless, continued to inveigh against the Turks, and tried to persuade
the world that brigandage would be unknown in Greece if brigands could be
prevented from passing the frontier from Turkey. They neglected, however, to
take proper precautions against the frequent escapes of their own criminals, after
their condemnation even for the most atrocious crimes, and they persisted in grant-
ing amnesties to brigands who became tired of a life of hardship in the mountains.

BRIGANDAGE. 237

A.n. 1856.]

ofifered to concert with Great Britain and France the measures
necessary for improving the condition of a country which the
three powers had undertaken to protect.

The ministry of Bulgares displayed great confidence in the
policy of conducting public business by false pretences. The
delusion that deceit is the surest road to success is not un-
common with Greek statesmen. The Bulgares ministry
boasted that it was liberal, yet it prosecuted the 'Athena,'
the oldest and most independent newspaper in Greece, for
publishing ofificial documents proving that the ministers had
adopted various subterfuges to delude Mr. Smith O^Brien, the
Irish rebel, who was travelling in Greece, into a belief that per-
fect security for life and property existed in the agricultural
districts and along the roads he travelled. Advertisements
were inserted in the newspapers of Western Europe, to create
a belief that public improvements were an object of attention,
and that great public works were about to commence ^. Pre-
tences of economy in the financial administration were put
forward as an inducement to the protecting powers to accept
a composition in lieu of the full payment of the interest due
on the Allied loan. The acts of this ministry did not cor-
respond with its promises, and if it succeeded in cheating
public opinion, it was only for a short time.

When the brigands were deprived of secret protection they
were soon destroyed. The feeling of the peasantry was shown
by their endeavouring to kill the brigands and not to make
any prisoners. The fear was still strong that any brigands
who might be taken would be ultimately allowed to escape,
or only subjected to a light punishment or a short imprison-
ment. Even in the case of condemnation to labour for life,
the peasants believed that the criminals would soon be released
by an amnesty, obtained by the political influence of the men
in power who were supposed to employ brigandage as a means
of intimidating their opponents ; and the rural population felt

^ An advertisement was inserted in The Times, 24th October, 1856, by the Greek
consul-general in London, addressed to contractors, engineers, and others in which
the minister of foreign affairs invited capitalists to drain marshes and lakes, con-
struct roads, and form harbours. The real object of the Greek minister was
revealed in the concluding sentence of his communication to the consul general :
' Please to give the desirable publicity to this circular.' Publicity now proves that
the object of the ministry was to make a great display of activity without any
intention of acting.

238 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V,

great dread that a captured brigand might return and inflict
cruel vengeance on his captors \

The measures that the three protecting powers adopted for
improving the condition of Greece, in the affairs of which they
recognized the necessity of interfering during the conferences
at Paris, were confined to the estabhshment of a financial
commission. This commission, composed of their diplomatic
representatives at Athens, commenced its examination of the
financial administration in February 1857. That it proved of
no avail in improving the condition of Greece, was a natural
consequence of the circumstances which induced the powers
to establish a commission to examine only the finances, when
a commission to examine into the condition of the whole
executive administration was required^ in order to ascertain
how the acknowledged defects of the government were to be
reformed. The financial imperfections of the Greek govern-
ment were one of the consequences of the general mal-
administration, and could only be effectually removed by a
reform in the system of government. But the discordance
that existed in the views of the cabinets of Great Britain,
France, and Russia, on the most important political questions
at issue in the internal policy of nations, prevented their
entering into any examination of the political condition of
Greece that could prove advantageous to the country, lest
it should reveal their difference of opinion. The British
government considers that personal liberty, and the power
of self-government created by the existence of free local
institutions, forms the surest means of attaining national
progress and good government. France and Russia believe,
on the other hand, that a powerful central executive and a

^ The following passage is extracted from a pamphlet entitled Le goiwemement
et r administration en Grece depiiis 1833 par un ternoin oculaire, 1863 (p. 18) : 'Nous
avons ete temoin oculaire du fait suivant. Un premier aide-de-camp du Roi entra
un jour dans le cabinet du redacteur d'un journal de I'extreme opposition, bien
etonne de cette visite inattendue. " Je viens vous prier " lui dit I'aide-de-camp " de
me rendre un grand seivice ; vous etes membre du jury et vous aurez demain a vous
occuper d'une affaire de brigandage; je m'interesse au chef de la bande et a huit de
ses co-accuses; ils sont de nos enfants, c'est a dire, ils sont de mes proteges.
Faites moi le plaisir de me promettre le concours de votre vote pour les faire
acquitter." Nous devons ajouter qu'il s'agissait d'une bande de brigands qui avait
commis les crimes les plus atroces.' The pamphlet is attributed to a writer of
authority, and the circumstance is believed to be true. Even while I write, in
1866, public opinion persists in believing that the band of Kitzos, which now
infests Attica, finds protectors as highly placed as those who protected brigands in
the time of King Otho.

FINANCIAL COMMISSION. 239

A.D. 1857.]

well-organized administrative police are necessary to control
the movements of nations and to secure order. These adverse
views had each their partizans in Greece. It was therefore
impossible to enlist the cordial support of all the three powers
to any definite scheme of administrative reform, and they
found their action paralyzed except in financial matters,
over which the treaty of 1832, which conferred the crown
on King Otho, furnished them with a right of interference.
Article xii. section 6 of that treaty is in these words — 'The
sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be bound to
appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of
such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under
the guarantee of the three courts, the first revenues of the
state, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek
treasury shall be devoted, /rj/ of all, to the payment of the
said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for
any other purpose, until those payments on account of the in-
stalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three
courts shall have been completely secured for the current
year.'

' The diplomatic representatives of the three courts in Greece
shall be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the
last mentioned stipulation V

This article is an interesting example of the cynical views
that actuated European statesmen in the year 1832. It seems
strange that British diplomatists could so recently take part
in a treaty which invested foreign powers with a right to
deprive Greece of funds that might be necessary for main-
taining the administration of justice, preserving order in
society, and paying the interest of the national debt previously
contracted without any authority from the Greek nation, or
any clause for obtaining the ratification of a Greek house of
representatives. The Swedish chancellor Oxenstiern observed
to his son that a little intercourse with the greatest diplo-
matists would show him with how little wisdom the world was
governed, and two centuries have not done much to assimilate
the courtly practices and embroidered coats of diplomatists
to the honest usages and plain habits of the nineteenth
century. In 1832 an English minister consented to make

' Parliamentary Papers : Convention relative to the sovereignty of Greece, signed
at London May 7th, 1832.

340 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.

the administration of justice and social order a matter of
less importance than the power of enforcing payment of a loan
forced on the Greeks to secure the acceptance of the throne
by a king, whom they found it necessary to dethrone after
he had reigned for nearly thirty years. This is an impor-
tant fact in the diplomatic history of Europe.

The abuses of the administration in Greece, when the
protecting powers established the financial commission, were
great, and they were constantly increasing. Financial reforms,
enforced by a well-regulated system of publicity of all finan-
cial accounts at short intervals, would have gone far towards
extirpating one class of abuses. But to root out the evils
that were corrupting political society, the protecting powers
might have perceived that it was necessary to base their right
of interference on grounds sanctioned by reason and the
interests of the Greek people, not on stipulations imposed
on Greece by a treaty, of which the Greeks heard nothing
until long after it had been signed, and which encouraged them
to repudiate their previous debts.

The financial commission held its first sitting at Athens on
the 1 8th February 1857, and it drew up its report on the 24th
May 1859, which appears however not to have been officially
communicated to the Greek government until October \
During the two years which the commission devoted to the
examination of the financial condition of the government, it
collected much valuable information concerning the amount
of taxation paid by the people, the manner in which the
public and municipal revenues were collected and adminis-
tered, the extent to which the resources of the country were
dilapidated, and the means by which the progress of the
people was impeded through the neglect and mal-administration
of the government. This mass of papers and documents was
not published, and even the report of the commission was not
generally known until it was printed among the parliamentary
papers of i860. This report is of little value by itself, as it
only repeats what had been often said and was well known.
After stating ' that the national property was neither marked
out, nor known to the government ; that it was constantly

^ King OUio, on opening Ihe Chambers on the loth November, 1859, noticed
the lebult of the commission.

' FINANCIAL COMMISSION. %^\

A.D. 1S59.]

lessened by encroachments ; that the law entrusted the govern-
ment with a supervision over the funds of the communes ;
that the government neglected this duty; that the manner of
collecting the land-tax impeded the progress of agriculture ;
that the ministers of finance since the year 1845 had scarcely
verified the resources and accounts of the public treasury;
that of the accounts of the years 1850, 1851 and 1852, only the
accounts of 1850 had been submitted to the chambers; that
ithe court of accounts had not proved by the reports which it
lis bound to publish the official regularity of the accounts of
ministers, nor that they are such as they ought to be ; that
the chambers have not remedied this state of things, and the
legislative control has been no more exercised than the judi-
cial ; that the accounts produced by the Greek government
did not off"er the legal guarantees required for exactitude and
authenticity; and that the publicity and the control of the
administration, which are the guarantees to the country, did
jnot exist.' After this strong condemnation of the conduct of
'the government, the commission came to the impotent con-
jClusion, that the attention of the Greek government should be
seriously called to this state of things, and that Greece
should be compelled to pay annually the sum of 900,000 francs to
the three protecting powers in lieu of the interest and sinking
fund due on the Allied loan, this sum being liable to be
increased as the resources of Greece improved \

The financial commission by this recommendation assisted
King Otho in maintaining the state of things which they
reprobated. For after ascertaining and proclaiming that
no dependence could be placed on the financial administration
of the Greek government, and that the true position of the
public treasury was systematically concealed from the people,
the commission kept the knowledge it collected concerning
the resources of the country, and the proofs it obtained of the
mal-administration of the government, concealed from the
Greeks, for whose benefit it was said that the commission had
been established. Even when the members were convinced
that King Otho would adopt no financial reforms until
compelled either by public opinion or the direct interference

* The Allied loan, amounting to 2,400.000/. sterling, was contracted with the
house of Rothschild in January, 1833, and was guaranteed by Great Britain, France,
and Russia.

VOL. VIL R

243 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V.Ch.V.j

of the protecting powers, the commission did nothing to formi
pubhc opinion or to enforce better administration. Theyi
agreed to abstain from reforming abuses, if the Greek govern-|
ment would promise to pay the protecting powers a small surnj
on account. When the protecting powers ascertained the]
impossibility of direct interference to enforce the literalj
execution of the twelfth article of the treaty of 1832, they con-
tented themselves with such a modicum of protection to their]
own interests as they found practicable. Past mal-admini-
stration received their condonation, and they relinquished their j
authority to demand a reform of abuses, for the sum of 900,0001
francs (^40,000), with hopes of increase at a future period, to
be paid in lieu of the interest and sinking fund on the sum of j
;;^2,40o,ooo guaranteed by Great Britain, France and Russia \

This result of the financial commission diminished the!
respect felt for the protecting powers. Indeed there is no
transaction in the history of the Greek Revolution which places
the cabinets of Europe in so contemptible a position. Whether
the neglect of the interests of the Greek people arose from an
obtuse sense of moral obligations, hostility to popular liberty,!
or aversion to aid constitutional government in enforcing
financial reforms on an unwilling sovereign, cannot be certainly
known until the secret diplomatic correspondence of the timej
shall become public ^. The report itself is remarkable for the 1
confused manner in which its most important recommenda-
tions are mixed with vague statements ; and its most striking j
result was the contempt with which King Otho treated the I
advice it contained. Two clauses deserve especial notice.
The commission reported that the attention of the Greek
government should be directed ' to the advantage that would
result from the modification of certain laws on taxation,
particularly of the law on the land-tax, and finally to the
imperious necessity of insuring publicity to the acts of the
administration, and their control by the judicial and legislative

^ Parliamentary Papers, Greece, No. 2, 1864. Papers relating to the arrange-
ment concluded at Athens in June, 1S60, respecting the Greek loan.

2 Count Sponneck, in a letter to General Kalergi {see the Greek newspaper
naA.i77€!/e(jia, 21st Dec, 1865) says, 'The three protecting powers, or, as you
Greeks are in the habit of calling them, the Powers, the benefactors of Greece.'
This sarcasm is amusing, when we remember that it comes from the most ignorant
statesman, and the greatest political nuisance, which the influence of the three
protecting powers ever brought into Greece.

FINANCIAL COMMISSION. 243

A.D. 1859.]

powers created by special laws and by the constitution/
Surely a commission which pronounced that one of the
characteristics of the Greek government was financial in-
experience as well as administrative incapacity and fiscal
dishonesty, ought not to have stopped short at a general
recommendation to act ably and honestly. When the pro-
tecting powers interfered with the financial administration,
they assumed the obligation to improve it, and were bound
to lay before the Greeks a scheme of administration better
adapted to develope the resources of the country than the
system they condemned, and to point • out the details
necessary for giving it efficiency. When they declared that
publicity was an imperious necessity, they imposed on
themselves the duty of enforcing it, of giving publicity to
their own labours, and of submitting the statistical and
financial information they had collected to a deliberate ex-
amination, in order to hear the voice of public opinion, which
they acknowledged to be the true ordeal for determining
the soundness of financial measures. But though the three
powers might agree on a verbal report, it was more diffi-
cult for them to agree on a practical measure, and King
Otho was fully aware of the discordance of their views
concerning the manner of giving practical efficacy to their
opinions. The Greek government therefore persevered in
its course of irresponsible expenditure and mal-administration.
If the twelfth article of the treaty of 1832 had any value, it
authorized Great Britain, France, and Russia to insist that
the Greek government should carry into execution the special
laws and constitutional enactments which controlled the
financial administration, and that the general report of the
court of accounts on the annual expenditure of the government
should be published at the same time that it was delivered
to their legations at Athens. Had the protecting powers
performed this duty Greece would have been deeply indebted
to their interference.

The financial commission declared that a modification in
the manner of collecting the land-tax would be advantageous
to the country. It is therefore important to understand how
it is that the land-tax retains the agriculture of Greece in
a stationary condition. Greece is essentially an agricultural
country. Her commerce is great, but while her commerce

R 2

244 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.I

supports hundreds, her agriculture nourishes thousands. She
has comparatively a much greater extent of sea coast than]
any country with the same amount of population ; her faci-
lities of maritime transport are great and her coasting vessels
are numerous. But two-thirds of her population live byj
agriculture and pasturage, and about one-third of her arable
land remains uncultivated ^. An acre of land sowed with
the samQ kind of grain does not yield a larger return in
1865 than it did 50 years ago. While everything around
improves, there has been no improvement in agriculture for
the last two thousand years. The best proof that civilization
has pervaded a whole nation is the fact that man's labour
extracts more produce from each acre of the soil which he
cultivates than could previously be obtained, that the labour
employed in agriculture is better remunerated, and that capital
seeks investment in land and in agricultural improvements.
These signs of social civilization and national progress are
wanting in Greece, and the importance of relieving agricul-
tural industry from the trammels that impede improvement
cannot therefore be doubted. National independence and
civil liberty have been enjoyed by the Greeks for the lapse
of a whole generation without producing any change in the
material condition of the agricultural population.

The manner of levying the land-tax by taking a tenth,
or since the year 1863 a smaller proportion, of the produce
of the soil, impedes the improvement of agriculture by the
habits which it forces the cultivator of the soil to adopt.
Ten per cent, of the produce of the land may in many
circumstances be an equitable proportion of the income of
the cultivator to be set apart for supporting a good govern-
ment. But the manner in which a tenth of the annual
produce of an exhausted soil, cultivated in the rudest manner,
has been hitherto collected in Greece, has proved an insur-
mountable obstacle to the improvement and extension of
the cultivation of grain of every kind. The obstructive effects
are the same, whether the tax be sold to farmers of the

* Some statistical information was published by the Bureau d'£co7tomie Puhlique
in 1 861 and 1862, but implicit reliance cannot be placed on the printed details. At
p. 17 it is said, 'au brigandage et a la piraterie dont la Gr^ce est delivree depuis
de longues annees.' The Greeks seem to suppose that strangers are deceived by
official falsehoods more easily than is now the case, or thev would not so wantonly
deviate from truth.

LAND-TAX. 245

A.D. 1859.]

revenue or collected by agents of the government. From
the nature of the tax, it is necessary to confer great power
on those who collect it, and in a thinly peopled country
inhabited by a rude agricultural population, that power must
remain without any efficient control.

When the harvest time approaches, the collector of the
tenths is constituted by law the lord of the soil, and every
agricultural operation is subjected to his control. The cul-
tivator cannot reap his field when the corn is ripe for the
sickle, until he obtains the permission of the collector. It
often happens that the permission is delayed to the serious
injury of an early crop, because it does not suit the farmer
or collector to visit the district until a larger portion of the
crop be ready. The contest of interest between the cultivator
and the tax-gatherer has engendered mutual suspicion ; so
dishonesty on the one hand and extortion on the other are
perpetrated almost as duties by each class from the traditional
habits of ages. The tax-gatherer becomes the real proprietor
of the crop as soon as the grain is ripe ; he fixes the day
on which the cultivator commences the harvest, the time
when the grain is trodden out on the threshing-floors, and
when the winnowing and separation of his portion is .to take
place. The profit of the cultivator is diminished, for the
tax-gatherer can always forestall the producer in the market,
and reap the benefit of the high price which defective means
of communication create during the period immediately pre-
ceding the new harvest. The gains of the proprietors of
nine-tenths of the produce of the country are subordinated
to the gains of the government, which has a claim to a tenth.
A considerable loss is incurred annually by the overripeness
of a part of the crop, by the compulsory transport of the
sheaves from distant fields to traditionary threshing-floors, and
by the necessity of allowing the crop to remain in the open
air awaiting the permission for threshing and winnowing.

The peasant cannot, unless he live in the vicinity of a large
market, be certain that he will increase his gains by devoting
additional labour to the cultivation of produce that comes
earlier into the market, or which is of superior quality. The
tax-gatherer is sure to be the first and the largest seller in
the market. The miller and the merchant can secure a large
and regular supply with greater ease by dealing with him

246 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.|

than with indivadual cultivators, and as the stock of thj
tax-gatherer is of an average quality, formed by the mixture|
of the grain of many soils, the producer cannot generallj
obtain a higher price for a crop of superior quality, unless|
the quantity be considerable. To expect extraordinary in-
dustry or scientific agriculture, when industry and science]
afford no prospect of additional gain, is unreasonable.

There seems to be only one way by which the agricultural]
classes of Greece can be conducted from the stationary con-
dition of the present time to an improving future, and thati
.is by the total abolition of the land-tax. Perfect freedom
from all interference with agricultural operations would be
the surest and the quickest way of promoting the increase
of agricultural industry, for it would immediately increase]
the profits of agricultural labour. It would open a door to;
the employment of capital in land, and produce an aug-
:mentation in the number of the agricultural population. The ;
uncultivated land of Greece would offer as rich a field fori
profitable industry as land in other countries that attracts
emigrants and capital. The marshes at the mouths of the
Eurotas and the Alpheus would furnish larger harvests than
the marshes that are drained in England and Holland. Little
change can be wrought in the traditional habits of a rude
population by direct legislative enactments, but the greatest
changes may be spontaneously brought about, as soon as the
people discover that they gain by adopting new habits and
practices.

The system of the land-tax in Greece has formed old
habits and bad practices, which oppose obstacles to the
improvement of agriculture and to the employment of capital
in the production of grain. The most effectual and speedy
manner of removing them is the best. The culture of the
vine, the olive, and the mulberry-tree may prosper and yield
profitable employment for capital, because the cultivator is in
a great degree emancipated from the thraldom that paralyzes
the industry of the ploughman. Grain, which constitutes the
principal food of the people, and in the purchase of which
the greater part of the nation's income is annually em-
ployed, is produced in the most wasteful manner, and any
improvement in that manner is hopeless without a total change
of system.

COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATION. 247

A.D. 1859.]

The objection urged against the total abolition of the
system of tenths is the difficulty of replacing it by another
tax of equal amount, and the necessity which the government
feels of getting the money. It is not necessary to examine
the financial question, for an improving and prosperous agri-
cultural population would easily supply the government with
an increased revenue.

The want of communal administration was noticed by the
financial commission, but self-government was not a subject
which France and Russia were disposed to promote. The
commission nevertheless stated in its report, and the British
minister repeated in a communication to the Greek govern-
ment, that the general prosperity of the nation must flow
from the good administration of the communes ; that the
amount of the revenue and expenditure of the communes
in Greece was unknown both to the government and the
people, and that the government of King Otho had neglected
systematically the duty imposed on it by law of superintending
the communal administration ^.

On communicating to the Greek government the results
of the commission of i860, Lord John Russell boasted that
the unanimity of the commission ' must impress on the Greek
government the necessity of those reforms in the financial ad-
ministration of the country which the Greek government are
recommended to effect-.' Experience proved that advice was
wasted on King Otho's government, which soon ascertained
that the protection of the three powers would not be withdrawn
if their sermons were listened to patiently, and if the 900,000
francs which were asked were paid regularly.

The protecting powers, having allowed the Greek govern-
ment to evade publicity and escape responsibility, and having
conferred on the people the boon of re-establishing their
commercial relations with Turkey, left both King Otho and
the Greeks to forget the past and to enjoy the present. The
king strove to extend his personal authority, the people
sought to make money. The impulse of the time, to make
everything a subject of gain, did not escape the observation

^ Compare the Report of the Financial Commission with the communication of
its results by the British minister, Sir Thomas Wyse, to the Greek government.
Parliamentary Papers, Greece, No. 2, 1864.

^ Parliamentary Papers, Greece, No. 2, 1864. Lord John Russell to Sir Thomas
Wyse, 22nd August, 1859.

248 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.

of King Otho ; indeed, it was forced on his attention by
senators and deputies, and he resolved to profit by it. His
first care was to form a ministry whose members should be
the servile instruments of his policy. He selected Athanasios
Miaoulis, a younger son of the great admiral, to be prime
minister. Athanasios Miaoulis possessed neither official ex-
perience nor administrative capacity, but he was a man ofj,
excellent private character, a member of the court faction,
and sincerely attached to the Bavarian dynasty. He remained
prime minister until June 1862, but during his unusually long
administration several changes were made in the composition
of his cabinet. The greatest names in Greece (and the only
aristocracy of the country is in mere names) and the ablest
men were at different times members of this ministry. The
names of Miaoulis, Botzaris, Konduriottes and Zaimes could
not replace their want of talent and independent character,
and the ability of Koumoundouros and Christopoulos could
not make them respected by the nation ^,

The Miaoulis ministry adopted measures to conceal the
financial abuses of their predecessors, but no effort was made
to place their administration in accordance either with the
financial laws of the state or the recommendations of the
protecting powers. No accounts of revenue and expenditure
had been presented to the chambers since the year 1850.
The accounts of several years were now presented, but in such
a condition that the formalities imposed by the organic law of
1853 were completely neglected. Though no faith could be
placed in these accounts, the ministers, backed by the in-
fluence of the court, persuaded the servile chambers to accept
them as satisfactory and ratify them with all their illegalities.

A considerable social change had been unconsciously
effected in Greece by the lapse of time. The military chiefs,
whose influence long formed an obstacle to many improve-
ments, had almost died out. The interests of commerce were

' Athanasios Miaoulis became prime minister in November, 1857. Rhiga
Palamedes, Koumoundouros, Rhangabes, Konduriottes, Botzaris, Zaimes, Spero
Melios, Christopoulos, Ralles, and Simos — men, in short, of all parties — were at
different times members of his cabinet. When it resigned in June, 1S62, it was
composed of the following members, who were stigmatized by the National
Assembly as the ' ministers of blood ' on account of the bloodshed that occurred in
suppressing the revolt of the garrison of Nauplia : — Athanasios Miaoulis, President
and Marine; Konduriottes, Foreign Aflairs ; Botzaris, War; Potles, Justice;
Simos, Finance ; Christopoulos, Interior and Public Instruction.

STATE OF GREECE. 249

A.D. 1859.]

no longer neglected. Some reforms were made in the

custom- duties. The passage of the Euripus was open for

navigation. Brigandage was repressed with vigour on both

sides of the frontier. The predominant influence of the

crown, even in the weak hands of King Otho, neutralized the

power of the old parties which contended for places and

salaries, for King Otho made it generally felt that he was

the sole dispenser of places and rewards. The occupation of

the Piraeus taught Queen Amalia how roads between rows of

houses in a town could be converted into streets. The

labour of the French troops was not lost. She sent to

France for an engineer, and exerted herself not ineffectually

to give her husband's capital the appearance of a prosperous

little city.

The celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of King
Otho's reign occurred in the year 1857, while the state of
Greece and of public opinion smiled on the Bavarian dynasty.
Emperors and kings sent embassies to congratulate King
Otho as the founder of a new throne in Europe ; foreigners
and Greeks vied in their assurances of respect and devotion,
so that stronger minds than those of King Otho and Queen
Amalia might have been deceived by the semblance of
personal attachment which every class exhibited ^.

In the year 1859 public opinion began to change. The
Greek court did not conceal its attachment to Austria when
war broke out in Italy; and the Greek people sympathized
strongly with the Italians, moved by the revolutionary
traditions of their own war of independence. King Otho
desired to afford Austrian vessels the protection of the
Greek flag, in order to invest them with the privileges of
neutrality. A protest from France prevented his taking this
imprudent step, which would have involved Greece in war
both with Italy and France. The feeling in favour of the
Italian cause was strongly displayed by the Greek people ;
a spirit of discontent spread ; quarrels broke out between the
students of the university and the police. The professors,
who were appointed by favour, often neglected their duty,

' Prince Adalbert, brother of King Otho, represented Bavaria and the hopes of
the Bavarian dynasty; one of the aides-de-camp of the Emperor Nicholas came
from Russia, and a special mission, consisting of General Count de Paer with two
aides-de-camp, was sent by Austria. England and France sent ships of war to the
Piraeus.

250 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk. V. Ch. V.

and students, who had very Httle respect for some of them,
behaved with unrestrained Hcense. Yet instead of reforming
the abuses in the university and enforcing discipKne, the
government dismissed the prefect of poHce, left the disorders
of the students unpunished, and the neglect of the professors
without a remedy.

There exists in Greece a numerous body of men who are
always striving to make themselves of importance by urging
their countrymen to take up arms against the sultan. These
men believe that if by any means the appearance of an
insurrection of the Greeks in Turkey can be produced, the
Christian powers of Europe will be compelled to annex the
insurgent provinces to the Hellenic kingdom. Both the
French and English governments obtained proofs that King
Otho fomented the excitement caused by this feeling, to
divert public attention from his Austrian sympathies. But
the people of Greece were at this time generally opposed to
any invasion of Turkey. They wished to live in peace with
the Turks, and to enjoy the advantages which their trade
with Turkey afforded, and not to enrich themselves by
plundering the Christians in Thessaly and Epirus. It was
rumoured that the Greek court had received counsels and
warnings from the protecting powers, and questions concern-
ing this interference and its causes were asked in the chamber
of deputies. A foolish statement of M. Rhangabes, the
minister of foreign affairs, revealed more than was previously
known to the public. He admitted that France had commu-
nicated to the Greek government that the Emperor Napoleon
was prepared to repress promptly any act of hostility against
Turkey, and he confessed that this communication had been
supported by observations on the part of England and Russia.
The minister, with an unfortunate fluency of phrases, went on
to say, that under such pressure Greece felt it a duty to
observe a strict neutrality. The word neutrality seemed to
imply that Greece had contemplated taking part with Austria
in the war with Italy, for the invasion of Turkey, though it
would have been a violation of treaties, had no relation to
neutrality. The obstinacy of King Otho and the ambition of
Queen Amalia were so well known, that when Karatassos
(the royal aide-de-camp who caused the rupture with Turkey
in 1847) published a proclamation calling the Greek subjects

DISSOLUTION OF THE CHAMBER. 251

A.D. 1S60.]

of the sultan to rebel, the king and queen were suspected
of favouring the movement ^

The discordant views of the king and the great body of
the nation were revealed by events which attracted the
attention of all who were interested in the maintenance of
tranquillity in Greece. A new chamber of deputies met in
November 1859, composed almost entirely of candidates
who had received the support of the government authorities.
The system of selecting government candidates began to
cause dissatisfaction, for though the people were not disposed
to reject the persons recommended by official authority,
which had it in its power to confer favours, they were desirous
of selecting their own men without opposing the government.
Kanares expressed this feeling in the senate, and gained
great popularity by his observations. He demanded that
the ministry should distinctly repudiate the system of
recommending government candidates to the constituencies,
and alluded to the dissatisfaction that arose from the use of
the King's name and the influence of the court at elections.

The second session of the sixth chamber under the constitu-
tion of 1844 was opened on the 12th November i860. The
success of the Italian war roused the spirit of liberty in
Greece, and created an unusual opposition to the Bavarian
dynasty. The president of the chamber was elected on the
27th November, and although the court and the ministry
exerted all their powers of intimidation and corruption to
secure the election of Kalliphronas, the opposition succeeded
in electing Zaimes by a majority of 62 to 50. This unex-
pected check disconcerted both the ministry and the court.
The Miaoulis ministry tendered their resignation, but King
Otho preferred dissolving the chamber.

By this dissolution the government involved itself in a
conflict with the nation. The first signs of the collision were
the seizure of newspapers and attempts to intimidate the
press. In a single day five newspapers were seized at Athens,
but the cause of the editors was popular^ so that they treated
the prosecution with contempt, and used it as an advertise-
ment of their political principles and a means of increasing
the sale of their papers ^. While Garibaldi was conquering

1 See p. 201.

^ Av7r7, Novembei" 21, 28, and 30, December 19 and 21, i860.

252, CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY. '

[Bk.V.Ch.V

the kingdom of Naples, there was little chance of the liberty
of the press in Greece succumbing to King Otho. On the
1 6th January 1861 the ministry issued a proclamation
reprobating the conduct of the opposition in electing a
president who was not agreeable to the government and
inviting the people to avenge the dignity of the crown. At
the same time it yielded so far to public opinion as to declare
that the government would abstain from proposing ministerial
candidates at the coming elections^. The partizans of the
ministry, the agents of the court, the officials of the central
administration, and the officers of the municipalities, paid no
attention to this proclamation, and on no occasion were
violence and corruption more generally employed to insure
the election of the candidates favoured by ministers.
Nomarchs, eparchs, officers and men of the gendarmerie,
collectors of taxes, custom-house officers, judges, justices of
the peace, schoolmasters, demarchs, forest guards, and rural
policemen, were ordered either openly or secretly to support
particular candidates. The principal object of the govern-
ment, and more especially of Queen Amalia, was to exclude
from the new chamber every one of the sixty-two deputies
who had voted against the government candidate for the
presidency of the chamber in the preceding session. The
municipal system had been falsified and perverted into an
agency of the central administration, by making the demarchs
nominees of the minister of the interior and instruments of ■
the nomarchs. An attempt was now made to reduce the
chamber of deputies to complete subserviency by filling it
with demarchs. From the Peloponnesus alone, twenty-nine
demarchs were returned as deputies, and in other parts of the
kingdom the proportion was not less. This phalanx of
servility was headed by the demarch of Athens, and the fact
was so striking that the people gave the chamber the name of
the chamber of demarchs ^. In order to render the senate as
subservient as the representatives, eighteen new senators were
appointed from men of inferior rank, and the organic law of i
the senate was violated by intruding men not legally
qualified into the body ^.

* AV777, 5th (lyth) January, 1S61.

2 Au-yij, 25th February, iS6i.

^ Among these was Tjpaldos Kotzakos, chief librarian of the University, who

I CHAMBER OF i86i. 353

A.D. 1 86 1.]

The seventh parh'ament of King Otho's constitutional
reign was opened by the king in person on the 27th
February 1861. Nearly two months were employed in
.reviewing the elections, and the chambers then voted replies
to the royal speech, expressing servile devotion to the policy
of the ministers. The English minister. Sir Thomas Wyse,
warned the government of the danger of acting thus openly
in defiance of the general feeling of the people. He pointed
out the imprudence of committing the control of the legisla-
ture to men notoriously elected by corrupt influence, and who
were despised by the people, whom they pretended to repre-
sent, for their poverty and avidity as well as for their
ignorance and servility. But King Otho and Queen Amalia
were reminded in vain that political corruption only increases
the power of government for a time, while it invariably
diminishes the strength of the nation. It was impossible to
make them perceive that the royal authority was weakened
by the contempt the people imbibed for their rulers.

General discontent and military disorganization made great
progress during 1861. The spirit of the country became more
liberal, and the ministry became more violent and arbitrary.
It also became more unpopular even among the official class
by the resignation of Koumoundouros, the minister of finance,
who was succeeded by Simos, a member of the English party,
which has supplied a succession of deserters to the court
faction. A plot against the king and the Bavarians was
discovered with extensive ramifications among the officers
of the army, and in this many were engaged who owed their
advancement to the favour of the court and not to their
merit or their seniority. Even this symptom of moral cor-
ruption made very little impression on the mind of King
Otho.

The health of King Otho rendered a visit to the baths of
Carlsbad advisable ; and it was said that he desired to arrive
at some definite arrangement with his family on the subject
of the succession to the throne of Greece. The regency of
Queen Amalia was not agreeable to the house of Bavaria, and
the Greek court was divided into two parties ; one remained
devoted to the king and the house of Bavaria ; the other

had made a short apparition in Greece among the followers of Prince Demetrius
Hypsilantes in 1S21. His case is noticed in the hv^i], 7th March, 1861.

354 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.

desired a change of dynasty and an orthodox successor, and
this party sought support by attaching itself to the queen.
These intrigues and the general discontent of the country
threatened to cause a revolution, or at least an insurrection, ■ \
when an attempt to assassinate Queen Amalia on the iSth,
September 1861 suddenly revived the feeling of loyalty
throughout Greece and restored to the queen all her former
popularity. Aristides Dosios was the name of the assassin.
He was a young man of eighteen, and his father had held
several official appointments under the ministers of King
Otho. This youth fired a pistol at the queen in the streets
of Athens as she was returning from her evening ride on
horseback. He was immediately arrested. His crime
excited universal indignation, for whatever might be the
political errors of Queen Amalia she was respected for her
private virtues, and even those who blamed her conduct
acknowledged that she possessed many estimable qualities.
The sincere but often exaggerated assurances of devotion
which she received on this occasion were calculated to
mislead her into a belief that her government was extremely
popular and her person universally beloved. Young Dosios,
crazy with political fanaticism, boasted of his patriotism as a
sufficient excuse for his crime, and argued that if he had
succeeded in assassinating the queen-regent his country
would have been delivered from foreign tyrants, since a
provisional government must have been created which would
have prevented the return of King Otho and insured the
expulsion of the Bavarian dynasty. During his imprison-
ment he never showed any marks of fear, nor appeared to
be shaken for a moment in the conviction that his crime was
a meritorious act of patriotism. The vitiated state of public
opinion was revealed by the popularity of his crime with
a large portion of the youth of Athens. Several conspiracies
were formed to deliver him from prison, in which many
military men took part.

The chambers met on the 2nd October 1861. King Otho
returned from Germany on the 30th, and though he was well
received by his subjects, every day furnished proof that the
' chamber of demarchs ' was extremely unpopular, and that
a hostile feeling against the corrupt senate, the servile minis-
ters, and the incapable king, who supported every abuse and

■t
*>■'

NEGOTIATIONS WITH KAN ARES. 255

A.D. 1862.]

made his crown and not the nation the object of his care, was
rapidly increasing.

The year 1862 opened with gloomy forebodings. The
prime minister, Miaoulis, could not overlook the national
discontent, and he at last warned King Otho that the state
of the public mind afforded cause of alarm ; he offered the
resignation of his ministry and advised the king to make
some concessions to public opinion. Admiral Kanares was
the most popular man in Greece at the time. His services,
his fame, his position as a senator which he had not abused,
and his declared opposition to the system of falsifying consti-
tutional government by corrupt chambers, had made him the
idol of the people. His great influence, if wisely used,
might enable him to unite the best men in the country as
members of a ministry under his presidency. He had kept
aloof from the court, when servility was the only path to
court favour, and he was universally respected for the sim-
plicity of his private life. Greece was proud of having one
distinguished man of the Hellenic race who was neither a
sycophant nor a place-hunter. But unfortunately Kanares
possessed neither the sagacity nor the experience necessary
to hold a steady course in the midst of the political intrigues
of his friends ; so that with all the inherent greatness of his
character, he was utterly unfit to be a prime minister. King
Otho understood his deficiencies perfectly and resolved to
profit by them.

King Otho acted under the strange delusion that he was
himself an honest statesman, and he believed that it was his
honesty which rendered him superior to the ablest politicians
in Greece. He could not understand, for his mental percep-
tions were very circumscribed, that what appeared to him to
be fair in a king, must appear to be something very like
trickery in a private person. One of the leading features of
his policy was to exhibit the public men in Greece in an
unfavourable light, either as seeking and receiving unmerited
favours, or as voluntarily exhibiting themselves as venal in-
struments of his power. It forms a remarkable trait in King
Otho's dull intellect, that he knew how to conduct a game
of personal intrigue with patient sagacity and to foil the
restless activity of the acutest Greek. His caution in con-
cealing his combinations, and his inert watchfulness in

256 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch. V.

observing the errors of others, enabled him to profit by
every event that conduced to the success of his schemes.
The facihty with which he won over deserters from the
hberal party, Hke Tricoupi and Simos, destroyed both his
own and the people's confidence in political honesty. Ka-
nares was still a man whom neither the king nor the people
believed could be gained by any bribe, either of wealth, rank,
or honours, so that King Otho schemed to make Kanares
himself the pilot of his own political shipwreck.

In January 1862 Admiral Kanares was invited by the king
to form a ministry. Before accepting the charge he presented
to his Majesty a memoir stating the principles on which he
proposed to act, and asked for the royal sanction of these
principles and the king's promise of support, as the only 1
grounds on which he could rest any hope of success. Kanares
was a man destitute of education, and King Otho knew that
the memoir must be the work of some person under whose
guidance the admiral was acting. The important point was
to ascertain whether Kanares could secure the assistance of
able and influential colleagues, or would fall entirely into the
hands of a cabinet of personal followers. Before offering the
premiership to Kanares, King Otho had already taken mea-
sures to deter the ablest senators and deputies from accepting
office in a ministry which was likely to prove of short
duration, and he allured the ambitious with hopes of be-
coming members of a more permanent cabinet. When the
admiral sought the co-operation of several members of the
opposition whose official assistance he considered valuable,
he met with a refusal from every senator or deputy of political
influence to whom he applied. This threw him entirely into
the hands of a few intriguers, who used his name as a means
for furthering their own advancement.

The memoir presented by Kanares to the king was pre-
pared by one of the admiral's followers who hoped to force
himself into a cabinet office. It was an able document, but
all its demands were not suited to the actual condition of
public affairs, nor to the character of Greek politicians. It
attempted to give the ministry stability in office, but it
neglected to insure a better conduct of ministerial business,
and to enforce responsibility in financial matters by greater
publicity. The maxim that the king as a constitutional

I NEGOTIATIONS WITH KAN ARES. 257

A.D. 1862.]

sovereign must reign and not govern, was crudely stated,
though it is a principle to which the Greek people are
decidedly opposed, for the Greeks look to the governing
power of the king as their best defence against ministerial
oppression and party jobbing. It appears to them also to
be the best guarantee for the equitable administration of
justice. The king alone in the corrupt political society of
Greece has, in their opinion, no interest to cheat and op-
press the people, and he has, they think, the same interest
as the people to prevent injustice. The phrase, moreover,
that the king should reign and not govern, with Kanares for
prime minister, could only signify that the personal ad-
visers of Kanares were to direct all political business and
govern Greece, while King Otho was to confine himself
to pageantry and court ceremonial. There could be no
doubt that the country would gain nothing by substituting
the camarilla of Admiral Kanares for the camarilla of King
Otho.

The memoir stated that the formation of the cabinet was to
be entrusted to the prime minister, and that the cabinet was
to conduct the government on its responsibility without direct
interference on the part of the crown. But it omitted to state
by what means the king was to exercise his constitutional
control over his ministers, and enforce responsibility both to
himself and his people in the conduct of the different minis-
terial departments. It contemplated establishing parliamentary
government without parliamentary control. The king was
required, after taking a reasonable time for examining the
measures submitted to him, either to adopt them, when they
had received the approval of a formal cabinet council, or dis-
miss the ministry. The existing anaktoboidion, of which M.
Wendland, the king's secretary, was a member, and which was
called the camarilla, was to cease ; the members of the royal
household, the aularch and staularch, were to be expressly
prohibited from influencing the votes of the senators and
deputies by promises of court favour, and the influence of the
court was not to be again employed to encourage opposition
to the ministry. The existing chamber of deputies was to be
dissolved, and the senate, which the intrusion of eighteen
servile members had degraded, v/as to be reformed. The
laws relative to the press were to be equitably administered,

VOL. VII. S

258 CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.Hii*

and public credit was to be restored by enforcing economy in!
the public expenditure. jBi'

Doubtless King Otho read this memoir with the greatest Bill
astonishment as well as indignation ; unfortunately he directed |
his attention so entirely to its defects, that he neglected toj
observe its importance as an echo of national feeling. Hel
regarded it as an attempt of designing men to rob him ofl
his sacred rights as a king, and to use Kanares as a stepping-!
stone for concentrating power in their own hands. Animosity
sharpened his intelligence, and he soon devised a plan for
frustrating what he viewed as a conspiracy for robbing royalty |
of its lawful authority in the state. Otho had no clear con-
ception of what patriotism really was, and no settled conviction |
that the Greek people had a better right to good government
than a foreign king could have to occupy the Greek throne. ]
He looked round with his usual cunning for the means ofl
placing his conduct as a constitutional sovereign in advan-j
tageous contrast with the ambitious demands of Kanares as
prime minister. To deny the leading principles of the memoir 1
was dangerous, and King Otho knew enough of Greece to fear i
that any hesitation might place him in such violent opposition
to his people as to cause a revolution. The danger he had
encountered in 1^43 was not forgotten at this crisis. He
accepted the principles of the memoir without offering any
objections, and authorized Kanares to form a ministry, re-
solved to seek for a chance of overthrowing the schemes of]
the admiral's advisers.

The king's intrigues, as has been noticed already, prevented'
Kanares from obtaining the support of the men best suited for
giving efficiency to his ministry. He was consequently com-
pelled to select as his colleagues men in the secondary rank of*
Greek politicians. Instead of choosing men of official expe-
rience and honourable character in this class, he formed his
cabinet of personal adherents and political adventurers.-
Kanares presented the list of his colleagues to King Otho,
who read it with satisfaction, for the names proved that the-
royal policy had triumphed and forced Kanares into bad
company \ The king dismissed Kanares from his last

' This ill-famed list was, Admiral Kanares, President of the Council and Minister
of the Marine; D. Kalliphronas, Interior; P. Soutzos, Foreign Affairs; Petzales,

^,. i NEGOTIATIONS WITH KANARES. 259

■ ■'•'^1 A.D. 1862.]

^onij

liini

oyall
rcoi
rictio
[una
lirom

audience as soon as he had read the list, observing that
the royal decision would be communicated to the admiral
in a few hours. Copies of the list were immediately dis-
tributed among the people, and when the names were read aloud
they were received with shouts of derision. Noisy politicians
and students of the university had filled the square before the
royal palace from sunrise to sunset for two days, while the
negotiations with Kanares were going on. Each day the
admiral had walked through admiring crowds attended by
enthusiastic followers, who hailed him as a hero and the
saviour of his country. The names of the colleagues he had
selected to form his cabinet, produced an instantaneous
revulsion of public opinion. The saviour of his country
showed himself as a tool in the hands of selfish place-
hunters. Patriotism was declared to be in a state of bank-
ruptcy. The crowds that filled the square slunk away to
their homes, every man grievously disappointed, and many in
the frame of mind that fits men for revolutions.

King Otho thoroughly enjoyed this victory, which he
)fei| regarded as a proof of his ability in king-craft ; he had no
doubt of the righteousness of his cause, nor of the justice
of the means by which he obtained success. Indeed, he
was one of those who hardly believed that a king, who
was seeking to increase or defend the royal power, could
rf| go wrong in politics. He informed Kanares in a written
communication, that the persons proposed as ministers were
so unsuited to the exigencies of public affairs, that he thanked
ntfl the admiral for his zeal in endeavouring to form a ministry
if»| and would relieve him from all further exertions. The news
of this step was received with cynic indifference, for public
kn opinion unhesitatingly pronounced the cabinet proposed by
;p« Kanares to be a very bad substitute for the Miaoulis ministry.
liii King Otho suddenly became the popular hero of the hour
«is to the people of Athens, who still take great delight in
'ii^ any intellectual contest, and who were doubly pleased by
til! I the unexpected acuteness with which their stolid monarch
had won the game of intrigue when the odds were deci-
dedly against him. His cunning in frustrating the scheme

Justice ; M. Schinas, Public Instruction and Religion ; Anastasios Mavromichales,
War; the Finance department remained vacant.

S 2

iitil

26o CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.

[Bk.V. Ch.V.

of the political adventurers who believed they could force
their way into the ministry by making use of the fame of
Kanares, struck a responsive chord in the hearts of his
subjects. For a few days the Greeks lost sight of the ulti-
mate result, overlooked the national degradation, and forgot
that if a revolution was at hand nothing had been done to
avert it.

On the evening of the day on which Kanares made ship-
wreck of his political influence, King Otho and Queen Amalia
rode out of their palace gates amidst the acclamations of an
admiring crowd. The royal pair flattered themselves that
they listened to the voice of the nation proclaiming its
devotion to royalty, when they really heard only the applause
of spectators gratified by a peep behind the scenes at a
political comedy.

Had Kanares possessed any political sagacity, or had his
advisers possessed a fair amount of political honesty, the
personal defeat of the admiral might have been converted
into a victory of constitutional principles and a step to good
government. The contents of the memoir were known to
few, but it had received the king's approbation. By pub-
lishing it immediately, and appealing to public opinion
concerning measures, the names of his colleagues would have
soon become a thing of the past, and the policy he recom-
mended might have served as a permanent guide. It was
a duty he owed to himself and his country, to make public
the conditions on which he proposed to accept ofiice, and
to which he had vainly solicited the co-operation of the most
eminent senators and deputies of the opposition. His contest
with the court would then have been transferred from a
question of a few insignificant politicians to a question of
principles of government ; and to recover his lost popularity,
it would only have been necessary for Kanares to declare
in his place in the senate, that as a senator and a citizen
he was ready to support any ministry that adopted the
principles of his memoir. The question of the practical
application of administrative reform would have been fairly
brought forward, and Greece might have made a step towards
good government without being under the necessity of making
a revolution. If the reports circulated at the time were
correct, either King Otho or the camarilla gained over some

NEGOTIATIONS WITH KAN ARES. %6i

A.D. 1862.]

adviser of Kanares, who had sufficient influence to prevent
the publication until it ceased to be of any political im-
portance. The report, whether true or false, shows the
estimation in which the admiral's advisers were held by
their countrymen.

CHAPTER VI.

[SUPPLEMENTARY.]

Change of Dynasty. — Establishment of New
Constitution — 1862 to 1864.

Revolt of the garrison of Nauplia. — Question of the succession to the throne of
Greece. — The Hon. Henry Elliot's first mission to Greece. — Revolution of
1862. — Negotiations relating to the election of Prince Alfred to be King
of Greece. — Results of the revolution. — Election of Prince Alfred. — Mr.
Elliot's second mission. — Election of George I. — Military disorders and civil
war at Athens. — Position of the new King. — Union of the Ionian Islands. —
National Assembly. — Constitution of 1864. — Abolition of the Senate. — Crea-
tion and abolition of a council of state. — Conclusion.

The storm that swept the Bavarian dynasty from Greece
began now to burst on the country. In less than a month
after the failure of the negotiations with Kanares the first
thunderbolt fell. On the 13th February 1862 the garrison
of Nauplia, which consisted of 900 men, broke out in open
rebellion. It was a mere military revolt, caused by the
demoralized and disorganized condition of the Greek army,
not by political conviction or patriotism ; and it received
no support from the nation. In vain the leaders published
proclamations calling on the people to take up arms. The
names of those who headed the movement inspired no con-
fidence that they sought anything but promotion and the
gratification of personal ambition. For some time previous,
it had been evident that the army was in a state of anarchy.
Plots had been discovered, in which officers who had received
unmerited favour from the court were prominent conspirators.
Several had been tried and condemned to imprisonment.
Most of these were confined at Nauplia. Others suspected

REVOLT OF NAUPLIA. 263

of discontent were ordered to reside in that fortress. Military
\ honour and personal gratitude to the king for favours conferred
were alike forgotten. In the undisciplined, ill-commanded,
I and ill-organized army of a badly governed country, doubtless
i treachery must exist, but as Milton says of tyranny, ' to the
\ traitor thereby no excuse.'

i The government took prompt measures to suppress the
I revolt. Troops were assembled at the Isthmus of Corinth,
, where they were harangued by King Otho. But the com-
position of the force revealed the fact that the government
did not place implicit reliance on the regular army, on which
millions of drachmas had been lavished to no good purpose.
Irregular bands of armed men who carried old fire-locks
were placed under the command of miHtary chiefs who called
themselves generals. The abbot of the monastery of Phane-
romene in Salamis was allowed to place himself at the head
of a body of Albanian peasants ^. The generals in fustanella
were spies on the colonels in uniform, and the clerical soldier
was a spy on all. Both Greece and King Otho were fortunate
in having in their service a foreign officer who could be
entrusted with the chief command without awakening new
jealousies. General Hahn, a Swiss Philhellene who came to
Greece as a volunteer during the Revolution, and in thirty-five
years of constant service had risen to the highest rank, free
from all political and party ties, was a gentleman and a
soldier. He possessed the character as well as the experience
required for repressing the disorders and intrigues of the
irregular officers, who sought to prolong the civil war for the
purpose of reorganizing bands of personal followers, reviving
military chieftainships, and wreaking vengeance on private
enemies.

On the 13th of March the royal troops carried all the
outworks of the rebels by assault after a feeble defence^ in
which Colonel Koronaios one of their leaders was wounded
and taken prisoner. The insurgents were then shut up within
the walls of Nauplia, and from that moment their cause
was desperate ; still the younger officers, both commissioned
and non-commissioned, rejected all offers of capitulation.
King Otho also delayed the termination of the revolt by

* The name of this monastery is connected with a local tradition, and is not
derived from the ' manifestation ' {ipavepcoais).

264 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk V.Ch.VI

refusing for some time to grant a comprehensive amnesty;
but he was warned that his own troops would not allow
the insurgents to be severely punished ; and slowly and
reluctantly he was persuaded to place full power for arranging!
a capitulation in the hands of General Hahn. The king's;
concessions were made so ungraciously that the promises of|
amnesty were received with distrust. More confidence was
placed in the honour of General Hahn than in the word of'
King Otho. At last a capitulation was concluded, allowing
the officers and men who were excepted from the amnesty,
or who refused to accept it, to quit Greece. The number
was 220, and of these 200 asked to be embarked under the
guarantee of the English flag, and were carried to Smyrna
by H. M. S. 'Pelican.' This was one of the first indications
of the revived popularity of England in Greece. The others
were embarked in a French corvette. On the 20th April
1862 the royal troops entered Nauplia, but the victory caused
no joy in Greece.

The revolt at Nauplia was not an isolated act of rebellion.
Other revolutionary movements were commenced at Syra,
Chalcis, and Kythnos, but they were quickly suppressed,
though not without bloodshed. Nor could the fact be con-
cealed that the victory of government had neither increased
its strength nor decreased the popular discontent.

The court made an effort to regain popularity by affecting
to patronize a scheme for invading Turkey. A ministerial
paper, when noticing what it called ' the glorious victory of
the royal army over the bravest rebels who ever fought in
a bad cause,' proceeded to boast that if the king could unite
such heroes in propagating the 'great idea' with the sword,
he would have it in his power to change the condition of the
East. The conquest of the kingdom of the two Sicilies by a
handful of volunteers under Garibaldi was assumed to be
an irrefragable proof that a brigade of Greeks under some
cattle-lifting general who had plundered the Turkish frontier
in J 854 could march to Constantinople and establish a new
Byzantine empire. On this occasion public opinion was not
misled, and no Greek believed that either the king or the
court party had any serious intention of committing such an
act of folly as openly to attack Turkey. Otho knew well
that a rupture with the sultan would annihilate the commerce

QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION. , 265

A.D. 1862.]

of Greece, produce an occupation of his capital by foreign
troops, and in all probability put an end to his reign ; while
the people saw that the loss of a national government, at
least for a time, would be the immediate consequence of
foreign interference.

The invasion of Turkey was not thought sufficient to gratify
the ambition of the Hellenic race. The triumph of the union
party in the Ionian Islands was also the subject of articles in
newspapers devoted to the interests of the court. Loyalty
to King Otho was supposed to be best indicated by expressing
hatred of England ; and some of the organs of the continental
press countenanced the opinion that hatred of England in-
sured the support of a numerous party in France and Germany.
Neither King Otho nor Queen Amalia perceived what others
saw clearly, that they were forfeiting their self-respect by
their hypocritical hostility to Turkey, and making themselves
contemptible by their vain animosity against England.

The question of the succession to the Greek throne occupied
more of public attention than either the invasion of Turkey
or the union of the Ionian Islands ; yet the servility of the
senators and deputies prevented the question from being
discussed in the chambers, and settled by a clear and definite
decision. It is well known that King Otho from the habit
of his mind and the nature of his position was averse to a
solution of the question. Even the Greek newspapers, for
they generally represent place-hunting parties much more
than public feeling, said comparatively little on a subject
concerning which it was difficult to publish.anything impressive
without drawing down the vengeance of the court. But the
question was so constantly discussed and so thoroughly sifted
in private society and in the Athenian coffee-houses, that it
exercised no inconsiderable influence in determining the
course of events.

The treaty that placed the Bavarian dynasty on the throne
of Greece in 1833 provided that 'in the event of the decease
of King Otho without lawful issue, the crown should pass
to his younger brothers and their lawful descendants in the
order of primogeniture.' But the 40th article of the con-
stitution of 1844 modified this provision by declaring 'that
the successor to the throne of Greece must profess the religion
of the orthodox Eastern Church.' And further, a decree

266 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VI.

of the national assembly of 1844, ratified by the king, con-
ferred the regency on Queen Amalia during her widowhood,
in case the successor to the throne should be a minor. This
decree was particularly displeasing to the court of Bavaria.
The article of the constitution and the decree were never-
theless embodied in a treaty between the three protecting
powers, Bavaria, and Greece in 1852. But the Bavarian
plenipotentiary, before signing this treaty, delivered to thej
protecting powers a declaration that the court of Bavaria i
did not consider it incumbent on the princes who might bei
called to the throne of Greece after King Otho's decease
to fulfil the condition of the 40th article of the Greek con-
stitution before the succession opened to the heir, and that
the prince of the house of Bavaria who fulfilled the condition
should then ascend the throne of Greece. And he protested
that the regency of Queen Amalia could not prejudice any
rights of succession which the princes of the house of Bavaria
had acquired by treaties. The declaration of the Bavarian
plenipotentiary implied in addition, that the three protecting
powers were bound by the explanatory convention of 1833
to guarantee the throne of Greece to the two younger brothers;
of King Otho and their descendants. This declaration caused
the Greek plenipotentiary to deliver to the powers a statement
that the Greek constitution only referred to the conditions
in the 8th article of the treaty of 1833, and that he was not
authorized by the Greek government to recognize any inference
not expressly indicated in the words of the treaty and of the
40th article of the .Greek constitution. This solemn warning
did not open the eyes of the house of Bavaria to the true
position in which it stood with reference to the throne of
Greece. The members of the royal family of Bavaria imagined
that King Otho would be both able and willing to persuade
the Greeks to modify the application of the 40th article of
their constitution, and supposed that they had a right to
claim the support of the three protecting powers under the
stipulations in the treaty of 1833 and the convention of 1833,
without reference to the change of religion imposed on the suc-
cessor to the throne of Greece by the constitution of 1844.

Queen Amalia adopted the views of the constitutionalists
on the question of the succession, for their support was to
her indispensable, since her right to the regency was derived

QUESTION OF THE SUCCESSION. 267

A.D, 1862.]

solely from the constitution. Her interest was therefore
opposed to the views of the Bavarian court ; and the un-
decided mind of King Otho was subjected to the adverse
influences of his wife and his family. A coldness arose
between Queen Amalia and the house of Bavaria, and little
pains were taken to conceal this from the Greeks, Rumours
were from time to time disseminated at Athens, that a
younger brother of the queen was about to enter the Greek
Church, and that every member of the house of Bavaria
having refused to embrace the orthodox faith, he was to be
proposed as the successor to the Greek throne by King Otho
with the consent of the three protecting powers. It was
believed both in Greece and Bavaria that these reports were
countenanced and perhaps originated by Queen Amalia. The
interests of the Greek people required that the question of
the succession should not be allowed to remain indefinitely
a cause of disturbance and intrigue. No prince of Bavaria
having entered the orthodox church, the throne had remained
without a constitutional heir ever since the year 1844. This
fact was recognized by the treaty of 1852, but only in an
indirect and diplomatic way. The case which was foreseen
by the 39th article of the Greek constitution had occurred.
That article declared that in the absence of an heir to the
throne, the king was authorized to name his successor with
the consent of two-thirds of the chamber of deputies and
senate. The constitution and the three protecting powers
consequently favoured the views of Queen Amalia and of
those who wished to exclude the Bavarian dynasty from the
throne without a revolution. The Bavarian court would not
recognize the illegality, and was ignorant of the danger of
its position. King Otho could not make up his mind to
demand that a prince of his house should undergo the offensive
ceremony of rebaptism, which Greek bigotry considers neces-
sary to efface the stain of heresy from a Catholic or
Protestant who desires to become a member of the orthodox
Eastern Church. Certainly it would have been difficult for
a prince of the Catholic house of Bavaria to conceal even
under a royal title the disgrace which apostasy would fix
on any member of the house of Wittelsbach. If Queen
Amalia survived her husband, she would adopt the inter-
pretation of the constitution generally adopted by the Greeks,

268 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VI.i, "t'^'J

and a Bavarian prince according to that interpretation couldj) jO'''*
only mount the throne of Greece in virtue of an election i W'
according to the form indicated by the constitution. A' J*™
Catholic who offered to embrace the orthodox faith after a| P
vacancy of the throne occurred, could have no legal claimwl'^'''
to the crown, since he had not complied with the terms||l!«i-
required by the constitution. The delay on the part ofjlbt''^
King Otho was natural. He had no desire to recognize anj|*'i'^'

ii\

iteh

kltfi

orthodox successor, with whom his orthodox subjects might
feel a disposition to carry on orthodox intrigues, which had|
often caused him serious alarm when there was no orthodox
successor in existence.

Though the principles of Queen Amalia on the question
of the succession were constitutional, her proceedings were
impolitic. Had she survived King Otho, her position as
regent would have rendered her the arbitress of the question ;
but her partizans, the votaries of the great idea, and all the
phil-orthodox faction, urged the necessity of naming a successor
during King Otho's life ; and all the political adventurers
who desired a revolution aided in keeping the subject before llilii
the public. The Greek nation never had any sympathy withi||i!tl
the house of Bavaria, and these discussions concerning the
succession persuaded them that the three protecting powers
were not disinclined to a dynastic change. Little did Queen f i|pi
Amalia think that the question with which she trifled from
a want of any rational occupation and of all cultivated society, l|
was supplying arguments for a revolution. Neither she nor gjtc
most of those who advocated her views were aware that they
were nourishing opinions the most adverse to the success of
their projects. The public at Athens, seeing the want of
unity in the policy of the court, often repeated with a
sneer ' if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot
stand.'

When a nation desires to reform its own abuses, and feels
reproaches of conscience for not enforcing the principles it
advocates, discontent becomes dangerous, and the government
is generally made responsible for the national faults, even
though it has only acted as the agent of the nation. The
Greek government had to answer for many errors of its own,
and it was now held responsible for the national faults also.
The British government saw that Greece was in a dangerous

ion
ele(
'on,
3 afti!;
alci

FIRST MISSION OF MR. ELLIOT. 269

l.D. 1862.]

position. Sir Thomas Wyse, the British minister, died at
lis post, and the Hon. Henry Elhot, who had fulfilled a
somewhat similar special mission to Naples, was sent on a
special mission to warn King Otho. The instructions of
Mr. Elliot have not been published, but it is probable that
jhe was charged to point out the dangerous position of the
Bavarian dynasty in consequence of there being no con-
stitutional heir to the Greek crown^ and the critical position
f King Otho from the discontent caused by the manner
in which the chamber of deputies had been elected. The
British government may have thought it prudent to relieve
itself from all responsibility arising out of the treaty of 1832,
in case fresh insurrections should occur in Greece, for it can
hardly have entertained any hope that either the king or
queen, the Bavarian court, or the Greek ministers would
«ti(^pay the slightest attention to its remonstrances. The mission
of Mr. Elliot proved useless. King Otho would not dissolve
his obsequious chamber of demarchs, nor change his policy.
He only changed his ministers, and the names of the members
of his new cabinet inspired even less confidence than those
of their predecessors in every one except Lord John RusselP.
Before leaving Athens Mr. Elliot communicated to King
w(fl Otho's government a despatch of the British foreign secretary
^utfl approving of the change of ministry, and this result of the
fitfl special mission, like the result of the finance commission,
ciell afforded the enemies of Great Britain plausible ground for
eiij declaiming against English hypocrisy. Lord John Russell
could know very little about the merits or demerits of the
new cabinet, and there were strong reasons for his not giving
any opinion on the subject. There was something inane
in the British government offering a voluntary approval of
a ministry in which Spiro Melios, the champion of the great
idea and the organ of steady hostility to British policy, was
a prominent member. The disturbed state of the country
was certainly not quieted by the acts of this new ministry. ,
It endeavoured vainly to divert the attention of the people
from their own business to the affairs of Turkey and the

' The members of this ministry were, General John Kolokotrones, President
and Minister of the Interior; General Spiro Melios, War; Mexes, Marine; Chat-
ziskos, Public Instruction ; Levides, Finance ; Eliopoulos, Justice ; Theochares,
Foreign Affairs, replaced by Dragoumes.

bell

270 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VI.

succession to the crown. The visit of an orthodox prince
of the house of Oldenburg suppHed the occasion for the
one, and hostiUties against Montenegro a pretext for the
other. Subscriptions were set on foot in Greece to aid the
orthodox Montenegrins to resist the sultan, and articles
appeared in the Greek newspapers, foretelling that the Greeks
would soon be in possession of Constantinople. In the
meantime, there were constant rumours of plots and ap-
proaching insurrections, but Kolokotrones and Spiro Melios,
relying on their own servile informants, assured King Otho
that there was no cause for serious alarm '.

Information that the people of Acarnania were going to
take up arms was transmitted to Mr. Scarlett, the British
minister at Athens, by Mr. Black the vice-consul at Mesolonghi.
But the report of the nomarch made no mention of any danger,
and Oueen Amalia ridiculed the warning because it came
from an English source. She could see so little into the upright
and honourable character of Mr. Scarlett, that she supposed he
made the communication merely to frighten the Greek court
into adopting measures agreeable to British policy. The in-
surrection in Acarnania was to take place in the beginning of

^ The state of Greece at this time is described by a French writer (Francois
Lenormant) who has written much on the subject, but who often confounds
rumours with facts. ' Depuis que Tinsurrection de Nauplie s'etait terminee sans
amener aucun changement, I'imminence d'une crise encore phis grave ne pouvait
etre meconnue de personne. Ainsi les intrigues les plus contradictoires se crois-
aient, poussees avec une inconcevable activite. Le Roi lui-nieme conspirait avec
le parti d'action italien, pour detourner vers une entreprise exterieure I'agitation
des esprits, et pour eviter ainsi la necessite d'accorder des reformes liberales. Des
agents parcouraient la Turquie afin d'y preparer un soulevement, tandis qu'une
correspondance suivie s'echangeait entre Caprera et le palais d'Athenes. Une
autre intrigue, ourdie aussi dans le palais meme, tendait a faire passer le sceptre
de la maison de Wittelsbach dans celle d'Oldenburg, a laquelle appartenait la
reine Amalie. En revanche, la legation de Baviere etait en relations etroites avec
les revolutionn aires : elle les flattait, les encourageait, s'efforjait de leur servir de
centre, esperant sauver la dynastie en sacrifiant le Roi, elle poussait a un mouve-
ment qui contraignit Othon a abdiquer en faveur d'un de ses neveux, fils du Prince
Luitpold. Les aulres ambassades, au lieu de chercher a detourner la crise, tra-
vaillaient a en tirer parti. La Turquie fomentait le desordre uniquement pour le
desordre, son interet etant d'entraver le progres, qui, en se developpant en Grece,
devient un danger pour elle ; la legation d'ltalie accueillait les mecontents qui
parlaient d'appeler au trone un prince de la maison de Savoie. Quant a la Russie,
elle intriguait en faveur du Due de Leuchtenberg, un pretendant de la religion
Grecque, neveu du roi Othon, proche parent du Czar et de I'empereur des Fran9ais ;
et la legation de France, si elle ne s'associait pas activement a toutes ces intrigues,
les voyait du moins d'un ceil favorable. Enfin I'Angleterre ne s'endormait pas
non plus ; inactive en apparence, elle ourdissait une trame encore plus serree, et
preparait sous main la candidature du Prince Alfred. Partis interieurs et gouveme-
ments etrangers, tous etaient d'accord pour porter le dernier coup a une monarchic
qui se mourrait.'

REVOLUTION. 271

A.D. 1862.]

October ; circumstances delayed the outbreak until assurances
arrived that it would be supported by a movement at Patras.

King Otho and Queen Amalia had made preparations for
a tour in their kingdom, designed to encourage the court party
in different parts of the country. The time fixed for the
insurrection in Acarnania passed without any disturbance.
It was then supposed that the information received by Mr.
Scarlett was false, and there appeared to the king and his
ministers no reason for delaying the royal tour. Queen
Amalia was so firmly persuaded of her own popularity that
she thought it a duty to make large purchases of jewellery
to reward her faithful subjects. The royal pair left Athens
on the 13th October 1862, and the feelings of the people
were so effectually concealed by the manceuvres of the
government officials, central and municipal, that their majesties
were received at every place they visited with loud demon-
strations of loyalty.

Nearly about the time the king quitted Athens, the
garrison of Vonitza, a small and useless fortress on the gulf
of Arta, revolted. The insurrection spread rapidly in
Acarnania and Aetolia. Theodore Griva, ever ready to
take part in any movement that held out a prospect of
anarchy and pillage, placed himself at the head of the
insurgents and entered Mesolonghi, when the garrison and
the people immediately joined the insurrection. On the
20th October a provisional government was formed at Patras
with M. Rouphos at its head. On the night of the 22nd
October the garrison of Athens, which had been prepared
by agents who worked unnoticed by the ministers, broke
out in open revolt. The minister of war, Spiro Melios, had
assured King Otho on the eve of his quitting Athens that
the spirit of the troops was excellent, and that his majesty
might place the greatest confidence in the loyalty of the
officers and men. But when the garrison took up arms,
the ministers either from incapacity or cowardice deserted
their duty, and made no effort to uphold the royal authority,
nor to assemble a band of faithful adherents to protect the
palace. The disorder was unchecked at Athens, where it was
greater than in any other part of Greece, and at Athens it was
greatest among the troops. The soldiers rushed out of their
barracks with their pouches filled with ball cartridges, and

272 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V.Ch.VI.

paraded through the streets in small bands during the whole

night, keeping up an incessant fire of musketry^ which sent

the balls in every direction, breaking tiles, chimney pots, and

windows, entering rooms, and killing several of the peaceful

inhabitants.

Several discarded ministers of King Otho and a few young

patriots assembled as soon as the troops had frightened the

members of the government and the local authorities into

places of concealment. A provisional government consisting

of three members, and a ministry composed of eight persons,

were invested with the executive power ^. In the morning the

troops were joined by the populace, who rivalled the disorderly

conduct of the soldiery. Many of the leading revolutionists

obtained arms and ammunition for men devoted to their

party interests. The wine-shops were filled with armed men,

some in military uniforms and some in plain clothes, who

drank revolutionary toasts, screamed revolutionary songs,

and fired rifles loaded with conical balls at every conspicuous

sign board ^. The public prison w^as broken open and the

worst criminals were released. Several shops were plundered ;

a few persons were killed and v/ounded by stray bullets, and

one or two individuals were murdered from motives of private

hatred. Many disgraceful scenes occurred. The houses of

several Germans were pillaged, and a number of valuable

objects from the royal palace and from the collection of

antiquities in the Acropolis were stolen by those who ought

to have guarded them. The shop of an English watchmaker

was broken open, and watches to the value of from £'^^0

to £^^0 were stolen ^. The shops remained shut and the

streets remained insecure for two days.

^ The members of the provisional government were, D. Bulgaris, President,
K. Kanares, and B. Rouphos. The ministers were, T. Manghinas. Finance;
T. Zaimes, Interior; A. Koumoundouros, Justice; D. Mavromicliales, War; Ep.
Deligeorges, Public Instruction; B. Nikolopoulos, Religion; A. Diamantopoulos,
Foreign Affairs ; and D. Kalliphronas, Marine.

^ The arms over the American consulate were pierced by a dozen bullets. Two
conical balls entered the house of the Author, and several fell in the garden and
yard.

^ Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece,
October, 1862. Vice-Consul Merlin to Mr. Scarlett, p. 14. The valuable vase
from Tenia, published by Ross, was stolen from the museum and purchased by
Mr. Merlin, who restored it to the Archaeological Society. Other consuls who
purchased stolen antiquities were not so conscientious, and Greece lost one or two
curious objects. The antiquities which belonged to Queen Amalia were sold in
the streets, and a terra-cotta of great interest was purchased by a Greek officer,

DEPARTURE OF KING OTHO. 273

A.D. 1862.]

The provisional government circulated printed papers
during the night of the 22nd of October, and issued a
proclamation on the morning of the 23rd, declaring that
the reign of King Otho was at an end, that the regency
of Queen Amalia was abolished, and that a national assembly
would be immediately convoked to choose a new king and
frame a new constitution.

The first information of a revolution in their capital
recalled King Otho and Queen Amalia back towards Athens,
which they were not allowed to enter. As soon as the
guards on the look-out in the Acropolis and on the hill
of the Museion signalled that the frigate bearing the royal
standard was in sight, the self-disbanded soldiery and the
people rushed down to the Piraeus determined to oppose
the landing of the king. The commandant of the Piraeus
was murdered by his own soldiers when he attempted to
prepare for receiving King Otho with royal honours. His
body was dragged through the streets and then cast into
the sea. The frigate had not been many hours at anchor
before the crew declared in favour of the provisional govern-
ment, and King Otho was obliged to appeal to the ministers
of the three protecting powers to enforce the treaty which
thirty years before had placed the crown of Greece on his head
and guaranteed the throne to the house of Bavaria. The
declaration of the powers 'that the election of King Otho
had been made in virtue of a formal authorization on the part
of the Greek nation, and that the three courts are all strictly
obliged and firmly resolved to maintain it,'' was of no avail, for
their representatives at Athens saw clearly that the Greek
nation had resumed its inherent right of sovereignty, and they
knew that King Otho had himself annulled many articles of
the treaty. The protecting powers refusing to support the
king against the nation, there remained nothing for King Otho
but to quit Greece. He preferred embarking on board H. M. S.
Scylla, which was the only British ship on the station, though
it was a small vessel and afforded little accommodation to
the royal passengers. King Otho, in spite of his dislike
to the British government, preferred departing, as he came,

who afterwards presented it to King George, and it is now in the collection of the
Archaeological Society. Soldiers and policemen continued for some time to offer
valuable objects from the Acropolis for sale in the streets.

VOL. VIL T

274 CHANGE OF DYNASTY. ;

[Bk.V. Ch.VI.I

under the protection of the Enghsh flag. Before quittmgl
the bay of Salamis he issued a proclamation dated on|
board the 'Scylla' 24th of October 1862, announcing thati
he left Greece for a time in order to avoid plunging the
country in civil war. He has not abdicated his pretensions
to the throne ^.

This revolution cannot have taken any of the three pro-
tecting powers by surprise, though the events that followed
greatly astonished both the French and Russian governments
and were quite unexpected by the English. The opinion
that King Otho's conduct and refusal to dissolve the chamber
of demarchs would cause a civil war, if it failed to produce
a revolution, was general. Neither Bavaria nor Austria
ventured to appeal publicly to the treaty of 1832, and make
a formal demand that the protecting powers should uphold
the rights of the Bavarian dynasty. The right of the Greeks
to expel King Otho for failing to establish good government,
first as an absolute monarch and afterwards as a constitutional
sovereign, was recognized by all Europe. The Greeks justified
their revolution by the necessity of putting an end to a system
of government that impeded their industrial progress and
corrupted the public administration. Every day's continuance
of King Otho's power increased the number and the influence
of those who derived personal profit from misgovernment,
and consequently delay in dethroning him tended to make
the difficulties of reform grow hourly greater. The people
were advancing in honesty and intelligence more rapidly than
their government.

A generation had grown up since King Otho accepted
the constitution. The wants and opinions of the people
had undergone a great change, and the influence of the
industrious classes had increased considerably. But, on the
other hand, the class that furnished political leaders, military
chiefs, and courtiers had undergone less change. The old
men in the senate had the moral defects of an education
among Turkish officials ; the younger men had entered
the senate by political subserviency ; the chamber of deputies
was filled with hunters of places and pensions. Neither the
king, the senators, nor the officials appear to have observed

^ King Otho died at Bamberg on the 26th July, 1867.

UNANIMITY OF THE GREEKS. 275

\.D. 1862.]

the alteration in the national feeling. All classes among the
people were impelled by a strong desire to better their
condition ; the strict centralization of power in the hands
of the executive often thwarted progress. The liberty of
the press enabled discontent to make its voice heard. The
opinion prevailed generally that constitutional government
ind municipal administration, if fairly carried out in practice,
Avould improve the condition of the country, and the people
isaw that they were not fairly carried out in practice, so that
the nation and the ruling class were sure, sooner or later, to be
involved in a political contest. The administrative mis-
management of King Otho disorganized the army, paralyzed
ithe public service, and wasted the financial resources of the
country, when the events that have been narrated concen-
trated against his person all the resentment of his subjects,
and he was expelled from Greece as a scape-goat for his own
and for the nation's sins, with the vain hope that his absence
would alone suffice to make those who remained behind do
their duty. Unfortunately for Greece, the errors and vices
of ministers, senators, deputies, and officials, who had
corrupted the public administration by creating places and
appropriating money, could not be eradicated merely by the
expulsion of the king.

The position of Greece was certainly improved by the
revolution. The people showed a determination to correct
the imperfections of their constitution and elect their new
king themselves. The opinion which the British government
gave on the question of the revolution and the conduct of
the Greeks deserves to be recorded, because the promptitude
with which it was given and the first mission of Mr. Elliot
testify that it was the result of previous reflection. It is
dated the 6th of November 1862.

'During a long course of years the British government
endeavoured to impress on King Otho the mistaken nature
of the system of government which he pursued, and the
necessity of adopting a system better calculated to conciliate
the affection and confidence of his subjects and to promote
the prosperity of Greece.

'The kingdom of Greece having by the transactions of
1832 been acknowledged as an independent state, the people
of Greece are entitled to exercise the rights of national

T 2

27^ CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI,

independence ; and one of the rights which belong to an

independent nation is that of changing its governing dynasty

upon good and sufficient cause.

' Her Majesty's government cannot deny that the Greeks
have had good and sufficient cause for the steps they have
taken.

' Her Majesty's government have no desire to influence the
decision which the Greeks may come to as to the choice of
their new sovereign, except to remind them that, by the
agreements and engagements concluded in 1832 between
England, France, and Russia, no person connected with the
royal and imperial families of the three powers can be placed fsesi
on the throne of Greece V

The British government was accused both by foreign states-
men and French pamphleteers of having secretly and perfidi
ously cajoled and bribed the Greeks to elect Prince Alfred for
their king. Foreign ministers perhaps believed the accusa-
tion, for they repeated it I The fact that the Russian
government, which has many Greeks of talent and education
employed in its diplomatic and consular services, and innu-
merable Greek priests and monks sincerely attached to its
interests and eager to furnish it with information, was
uninformed on the subject, might have taught the Russian
foreign secretary that there was great improbability in the
supposition that the British government had been sufficiently
clever to mould the opinions of the Greek nation and suffici
ently unprincipled to deceive its alHes. The truth is, that
the whole Greek nation simultaneously and in the most
distant quarters of the East proclaimed the candidature of
Prince Alfred, before either Greek politicians or British
consuls had time to act^ The writer of this work remembers

1 Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece in
October, 1862. Earl Russell to Mr. Scarlett, 6th November, 1862.

2 Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, said to Lord
Napier, the English ambassador at St. Petersburg, that 'the English consular
authorities were perhaps not idle in the matter, and influences of the same kind
proceeded from the Ionian Islands.' And Lord Napier mentioned that His Excel-
lency would see in the official newspaper of Russia of the preceding Thursday!
among the telegrams that the British government had ' agahi taken up the candi-
dature ' of Prmce Alfred. Parliamentary Papers, 1862 ; Correspondence, p. 66.

' Duvcrgier de Hauranne in an article in the Revue des Deux Mondes, October,
1844, & ria situation actuelle de la Grece (p. 207), says, with Parisian naivete,^ S'i\
existe en Grece quelque chose dmexplicable. c'est I'existence d'un parti Anglais.'
And frenchmen held the same opinion in 1862. It is not worth while recording
the falsehoods reiterated with obstinacy by the French press. A single example

itiit:

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ELECT/ON OF PRINCE ALFRED. 277

,D. 1862.]

hat Englishmen well acquainted with Greece were as much
)■* .stonished by the sudden enthusiasm of the whole Greek
lation in favour of England as Frenchmen and Russians were,
t is true that some Ionian politicians had framed one of
hose plans for partitioning Turkey which are periodically
)ut forward by Greek intriguers, and the name of Prince
Mfred was introduced as a means of forming a kingdom to
;e composed of the Ionian Islands, Epirus, and Albania.
y ti The name of Prince Alfred became known to the Greeks
herefore as early as 1859 when he was only fifteen years old,
ind after the revolution, when a strong desire was felt to
jossess free institutions, it was natural to seek in a son of
3ueen Victoria a king who could both govern constitutionally
ind make the law respected.
The British government, far from endeavouring to obtain
'h\ iny advantage from the popular enthusiasm in favour of
cus Prince Alfred, only felt alarm lest any interference on the
\m part of England should insure the success of a Russian
'th ;andidate. This fear was warranted by the conduct of the
inm inhabitants of the Ionian Islands, by past events in Greece,
0 il ind by the policy of Great Britain with regard to the Otho-
m man empire. Two recent circumstances however proved that
vij 1 sincere respect for the English character existed in all
: :i; classes. The rebel garrison of Nauplia preferred the pro-
tection of the English flag, and King Otho declined the offer
of a French frigate which Admiral Touchard placed at his
disposal in order to embark in a small English ship like the
' Scylla.' During the diplomatic negotiations which ensued
after the Rev^olution, the primary object of the British govern-
ment throughout was to exclude a Russian prince from the
throne of Greece, not to promote the election either of an

enc

will suffice. M. Fran9ois Lenormant, who has written much on the political
affairs and the archaeology of Greece, speaks of the candidature of Prince Alfred
thus : ' Son succes tient a I'espoir qu'entretient soigneusement la-bas le gouverne-
ment britannique.^que le Prince Alfred apporterait en dot a la Grece, en montant
sur le trone, les lies loniennes, et procurerait ainsi r'agrandissement dont le pays
a besoin. Depuis plus de trois ans des intrigues poussees par Lord John Russell
ont pris pour foyer Corfou. et avant la revolution d'Athenes elles excitaient les
Grecs de Texterieur \ se detacher du royaume hellenique pour former sous le
sceptre du second fils de la reine Victoria un etat compose des lies loniennes, de
la Thessalie et de Candie, lequel s'annexerait un jour les etats du Roi Othon.' He
says also — ' Au reste. le cabinet britannique a montre dans toute cette affaire une
etrange duplicite,' and adds, 'nous doutons done encore si le Prince Alfred est elu
par les Grecs.' La Revolution de Grece, ses causes et ses consequences, extrait du
Conespondant. Paris, 1S62.

278 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch.VI

English prince or an English candidate. Their first act was
to invite the courts of Russia and France to concur in a|.
joint declaration ' that the treaties and protocols binding the
governments of England, France, and Russia not to allow a
member of their reigning families to accept the crown of!
Greece remained in force.' And without waiting for answers
to this invitation Earl Russell informed Mr. Scarlett, rather
prematurely as it turned out, in a despatch dated 6th Novem-
ber 1862, 'that in virtue of the protocols His Imperial
Highness the Duke of Leuchtenberg and His Royal High-
ness Prince Alfred, who were mentioned as possible candi-
dates, would be excluded from the Greek throne.' They
were excluded ; but the exclusion did not receive the
adherence of Russia and France until it was certain that
Prince Alfred would be elected almost unanimously to fillj
the Greek throne, and it was certainly not caused by any
respect for treaties on the part of the Emperor Napoleon HI
or the Emperor of all the Russias ^

When the proposal of the British government reached
Paris and St. Petersburg, neither the French nor the Russian
governments could persuade themselves that an English
prince had the smallest chance of success, and neither would
give a candid and immediate answer. The French govern-
ment waited till the 20th November, when it declared its
readiness to join in the declaration, but qualified its promise
by adding that it would not think itself authorized to refuse
indefinitely the recognition of a prince whom the Hellenic
nation should elect by free suffrage ; perhaps, had it uttered
all its thought, it would have added, unless the prince elected
by the free suffrage of the Greeks should be an English
prince ^. '

The communications with Russia merit more attention
than those with France, on account of the light they throw
on the views of the Russian cabinet, and on the extent to
which diplomatists can blunder in estimating national feelings.
On the 4th November 1862, when Prince Gortschakoff received
telegraphic information that the British government proposed
a joint declaration excluding every member of the reigning

1 Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece,
p. 18.

" Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence, 1862, note verbale, p. 47.

VIEWS OF THE RUSSIAN CABINET. 279

A.D. 1862]

families of the three protecting powers, he laid considerable
stress on 'the right of the Greek people to determine their
own destinies, and on the injustice of which the protecting
powers would be guilty in exercising any constraint in this
matter^.' At this time all Russians believed that the Duke
of Leuchtenberg was the candidate preferred by the Greeks.
The British government inclined to the same opinion, and on
the 15th November Earl Russell disclaimed any desire to
interfere with the rights of the Greek people, but at the same
time pointed out that the object of a joint declaration was,
like the original stipulation, to prevent any exclusive influ-
ence arising in Greece to foster international jealousies and
create political dissensions which might become a cause of
danger to the peace of Europe. On the 17th November
the British government became aware that Prince Alfred
had a firmer hold on the minds of the Greeks than any other
candidate, and the refusal of Russia to take part in a joint
declaration induced Earl Russell to instruct Mr. Scarlett
to take no steps in regard to the election of the sovereign
of Greece without direct instructions from Her Majesty's
government^. While the public voice in favour of Prince
Alfred's candidature was swelling from a murmur of appro-
bation into an universal shout of enthusiasm, Mr. Scarlett
declared on the 4th November to the Greek minister of
foreign affairs, ' that he could not perceive at that moment
any chance whatever of the acceptance of the throne by
Prince Alfred ^.' During the whole of the proceedings which
took place in Greece the conduct of Mr. Scarlett was so
candid that he obtained the confidence of his colleagues as
well as of the Greeks.

The British government suspected the Russian cabinet of
being not disinclined to set aside the engagements of 1827
and 1830, if the Duke of Leuchtenberg could have obtained
the votes of the Greeks. It might then have been asserted
that he was not a member of the imperial family of Russia,
and against that contingency it was necessary to provide.
Two important despatches of Lord Napier from St. Peters-

* Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence, Lord Napier to Earl Russell, p. 30.
^ Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence, 1862, Earl Russell to Mr. Scarlett,
p. 34.

2 Parliamentary Papers ; Mr. Scarlett to Earl Russell, p. 50.

a8o CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VI.l

burg, dated the 19th and 20th November 1862, which were!
received by Earl Russell on the 26th November, confirmed
the suspicions of the British government. Prince Gortschakoff,
who was both minister of foreign affairs and vice-chancellor of |
the empire, declined to give a categorical answer to the
inquiry whether Russia considered the Duke of Leuchtenberg
a member of the imperial family, and as such excluded from
the throne of Greece by the stipulations of 1830. Prince:
Gortschakoff declared that the question was susceptible of
juridical discussion ; and when the English ambassador asked
for the official construction placed upon the treaties and
protocols by the Russian government, he could obtain no
other answer than that the vice-chancellor could give no
premature and uncalled-for explanation in the case ^. On the
28th November the British government determined to bring
the question to a decision. It resolved that England having
excluded Prince Alfred, Russia must step forward and
exclude Prince Romanoffsky, as the Duke of Leuchtenberg
was termed on being admitted into the imperial family of
Russia. The ambassador was instructed to inform the
Russian government that the British government having
insurmountable objections to seeing a Russian prince on the
throne of Greece, the election of the Duke of Leuchtenberg
would lead to serious differences, and would in fact endanger
the peace of Europe ^.

The telegram from England informing Russia of the
nature of this despatch, and announcing that it was on its
way, reached St. Petersburg when a telegram arrived from
another direction, bringing the unwelcome news that the
Duke of Leuchtenberg had not the slightest chance of being
elected King of Greece, and that the almost unanimous
election of Prince Alfred no longer admitted of any doubt.
Russia instantaneously and unhesitatingly changed her lan-
guage and conduct. On the 3rd December the Russian
government determined to concede everything that England
asked in order to make sure of the exclusion of Prince
Alfred. On the 4th December the Russian ambassador in
London, in consequence of telegraphic instructions which he
received from St. Petersburg, presented a note to the British

* Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence, p. 53.

- Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence, Earl Russell to Lord Napier, p. 58.

wimii iiMJii

VIEWS OF THE RUSSIAN CABINET. 281

A.D. 1862.]

government, in which it was stated ' that the imperial court of
Russia maintains in all its force and value the engagement
by which the members of the reigning families in France,
England^ and Russia are excluded from the Hellenic throne,
and in virtue of this engagement the imperial government
agrees to declare as null and void the election of his Imperial
Highness Prince Romanoffsky, the Duke of Leuchtenberg,
nephew of H. M. the Emperor of all the Russias, in case he
should be called to the Hellenic throne by the vote of the
Greek nation \' No time was lost in transmitting the
decision of the three protecting powers to Greece ; and on the
13th December 1862 a joint declaration was delivered by
their ministers to the provisional government, stating that
on the 4th instant their courts had signed an engagement,
declaring that no member of the imperial and royal families
reigning in France, Great Britain, and Russia could accept
the crown of Greece, and that in consequence of this declara-
tion neither His Royal Highness Prince Alfred, member of
the royal family of England, nor His Imperial Highness
Prince Romanoffsky, Duke of Leuchtenberg, member of the
imperial family of Russia, could accept the crown of Greece
if it should be offered by the Greek nation ^.

The Greek people was in the mean time waiting patiently
to receive the benefits which were expected to flow from the
Revolution, and which too many believed could be secured
by the election of an English prince, without any exertion
on their part to reform the evils of King Otho's adminis-
tration. Much required to be done in order to improve the
government, and those who possessed power in the central
and municipal administrations showed little disposition to
commence the task. The people soon perceived that they
were themselves almost helpless, and they consequently
demanded everything from their government. Patriotism
and self-denial were supposed to be the principal virtues
required to constitute a good as well as an honest govern-
ment ; and these words were for several months in every
mouth. Neither wisdom nor honesty appear nevertheless
to have guided the conduct of those who acted as the
leaders of the nation. The people waited vainly for the

^ Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence, Baron Brunnow to Earl Russell, p. 84.
* La Grece, a newspaper published at Athens in French, iSth December, 1862.

283 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VI.

provisional government to establish order and adopt measures
of economy. Too many even of the people who had taken
an active part in the Revolution considered that it was the
duty of the new government to provide every partizan with a
place, a salary, or a pension, and at the same time to cure the
disease of place-hunting in Greek society, fill the public
treasury with money, and place the crown on the head of
a rich prince, so able that he should find the means of
creating resources, so just that he should only promote merit,
and so powerful that he should extend the frontiers of Greece
without increasing the burdens of the people. The popular
Utopia consisted of irreconcileable incompatibilities, but the
impossibility of attaining it did not render the delusive halo
less attractive to the Greek mind.

The provisional government was composed of men who
had learned what they knew of administration in King
Otho's service. Bulgaris, Kanares, and Rouphos had been
ministers of King Otho, and had not shown any administra-
tive talent while they held office. Bulgaris was a man of
some natural ability and of great ambition, but of a jealous
disposition, and incapable of acting cordially with men of
superior capacity. As prime minister of King Otho, and
subsequently of King George, he upheld the maxim that
a constitutional king should reign and not govern ; but while
he exercised supreme power as head of the provisional
government, he attempted both to reign and govern, and
if his capacity had equalled his ambition, he would have
made himself dictator and compelled the ministers to act
as his secretaries. The eight members of the revolutionary
ministry were equally divided into two classes : four had
been ministers of King Otho, and four were now introduced
into the cabinet for the first time ^ It was a heterogeneous
assemblage^, and some of the members were so insignificant
that it was matter for wonder how they were thought of
for ministers. The ministry contained two men of recognized
talent. Koumoundouros, the minister of justice, had been

^ ' Manghinas, Zaimes, Koumoundouros, and Kalliphronas had been ministers of
King Otho, and were imbued with the principles of his administrative system.
Kalhphronas and Zaimes were the rival candidates for the presidency of the
Chamber of Deputies in 1861, when the rejection of Kalliphronas, the court can-
didate, caused a dissolution. The new men in the ministry were Deligeorges,
D.Mavromichales, Nikolopoulos, and Diamantopoulos.

IfJBBMIiTWIBiilHIWWiWWiil

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. 283

A.D. 1862.]

minister of finance during the earlier part of the MiaouHs
ministry, but had quitted office in 1861, when the government
was compelled to stop in its career of wasteful expenditure.
He had a thorough knowledge of the system, the men, and
the expedients, by which King Otho had manipulated the
government ; but he was deficient in the administrative
talent that makes a statesman. His capacity lay in dealing
with personal interests and party combinations. If he felt
the necessity of large measures of reform, which may be
doubted, he knew not how to frame them so as to accelerate
the progress of the nation. The other man of talent in the
ministry was Epaminondas Deligeorges, the minister of public
instruction. In him were concentrated the hopes of young
Greece. He was younger than Koumoundouros, and having
entered public life as an opponent of King Otho's system
of government, he had escaped the corruptive influence
of official service \ He was convinced that Greece required
large measures of reform in its whole administrative system.
He was eloquent, and his legal knowledge gave precision
to his public oratory. His want of official experience, which
was not replaced by intuitive administrative capacity, prevented
his attacking with practical effect the corrupt system of
governing by patronage, which was supported by all the
older members of the government. He was more successful
as a legislative reformer in the National Assembly than
as an administrative reformer in the cabinet. Deligeorges
as a reformer, and Koumoundouros as a conservative, were
soon placed in direct rivalry, and became the leaders of
adverse parties. The policy of Koumoundouros was to
make things as easy as possible for the ruling class, and
he sought to persuade his countrymen that he was the
safest minister because he was the most moderate reformer.
In fact he was more hostile to reform than to change.

The revolution failed because it left too much power
in the hands of the old place-holders. Otho was weak-headed.
Bulgaris, Kanares, and Rouphos were all three wrong-headed,
and they allowed the public administration to remain in

' King Otho and the Miaoulis ministry made it a matter of state to exclude
Deligeorges from the new chamber after the dissolution in 1861. His house at
Mesolonghi was surrounded by gendarmes, and he was cut off from all communi-
cation with his friends by violence during the week that preceded the election.

aS4 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI.

a corrupt and disorganized condition, without seeking any
aid from public opinion to enforce responsibility. Never-
theless, though the revolution failed to destroy the system
it attacked, it weakened the power on which that system
rested, and it gave effect to the wishes of the people by
two important acts. A national assembly was convoked,
which gave Greece a better constitution and laid the foun-
dation of free municipal institutions ; and the national guard
received an active organization in many parts of the country.
The prompt organization of the national guard in the capital
proved to be a most valuable measure, for it saved the
government from falling into the hands of the military,,
The citizens performed military service with a degree of
steadiness and energy which rendered their force imposing, .
enabled the government to expel the soldiery from Athens
when they commenced a civil war, and maintained order in
the capital until the arrival of the new king.

After a short period of deliberation the Greeks considered
the election of their king to be a matter of too much
importance to be entrusted even to the National Assembly.
The conduct of the senate and the houses of representatives
elected under the constitution of 1844 had destroyed their
confidence in public men. Every Greek statesman who
attained power had deserted the cause of the people ; and
during King Otho's reign more than eighty persons had
held office as constitutional ministers. The Greeks resolved
therefore to elect their sovereign themselves, and with won-
derful unanimity they chose Prince Alfred. For a few
days the candidature of Prince Alfred was a subject of
ridicule to French and Russian diplomatists, but their
merriment was soon changed into anger. The determina-
tion of the whole nation to elect an English prince took
all Europe by surprise. The French, who appealed to
universal suffrage as the only touchstone of national truth,
suddenly announced the discovery that the gold of England
was more powerful than patriotic feeling in determining
the votes of Greeks: they lost their faith in their own
touchstone. Russia, never having felt as much confidence
in the votes of nations as in the power of bayonets, devoured
her disgust in silence, trusting that feelings of orthodoxy
and hatred of Turkey would eventually revive the attach-

^yifM^l^ii > mmnmimmumiwwmmmmmwwtMmvwwfmvm^maam^a^mmK^KII*KUIiaammmSVaiSm

ELECTION OF PRINCE ALFRED. 285

A.D. 1862,]

ment of the Greeks to their old religious and political ally.
The feeling in favour of an English prince was so sudden,
that the members of the provisional government remained
ignorant of the rapidity with which it embraced the whole
nation, and believed for some days that the election of the
new king would be left to the National Assembly. Visions
of ambition floated through the minds of different members
of the ministry, and projects for securing the election of
different candidates were mooted by Greek political intriguers
and foreign diplomatists for a short time. The popular
enthusiasm in favour of an English prince gained all ranks
so rapidly, that opposition was soon seen to be hopeless,
and the provisional government, finding itself unable to
direct the choice of the people, issued a decree on the ist
of December 1862, inviting the Greeks to give their votes
for the election of their king by universal suffrage at every
municipality in the kingdom and every consulate abroad,
commencing on the third day after the publication of the
decree at each locality where the voting was to take place.
The places of voting were ordered to be kept open for ten
days, and the examination of the votes was to be made by
the National Assembly, which would announce the result
of the elections.

Public meetings were held both in Greece and in many
towns in Turkey, at which it was proclaimed that the Greeks
desired Prince Alfred for their king. Municipal councils,
regiments of national guards, lawyers, doctors, and professors
of the university, publicly advocated his election. On the
3rd of December a proclamation was issued at Athens,
signed by the nomarch, the commander of the national guard,
the military governor, and a number of influential inhabitants,
announcing that the people had assumed the responsibility
of electing their king, because the destiny of Greece and
the progress of civilization in the East depended on the
proper selection of the sovereign ; and that the nation had
fixed upon Prince Alfred for the king of Greece, because his
country, his family, and his education offered those guarantees
which gave assurance that he would govern constitutionally,
and would render his reign glorious to himself and prosperous
to the nation.

The voting commenced at Athens on the 6th Decernber.

286 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VL

Something was done to allay the public enthusiasm by
the communication of the decision of the protecting powers
that neither Prince Alfred nor the Duke of Leuchtenberg
would be allowed to accept the crown. This communication
was made on the 13th December, and the voting did not
close until the evening of the 15th, so that its influence
was not likely to have produced any serious change. But
the Greeks in general attached less importance to it than
it really merited. They had seen protocols set aside and
treaties annulled so recently in the case of the Bavarian
dynasty and the Danubian principalities, that they counted
on the unanimity of their vote by universal suffrage to
annul even the political jealousies of the three protecting
powers. The Greeks frequently deceive themselves and
commit great political errors by overrating their national
importance. When the votes were counted it was found
that 241^202 Greek citizens had voted : of these 230,016
voted for Prince Alfred^ and only 2400 for the Duke of
Leuchtenberg^.

On the 3rd of February 1H63 the National Assembly
ratified the election, without taking any notice of the com-
munication of the protecting powers that both Prince Alfred
and the Duke of Leuchtenberg were excluded from the Greek
throne. An unanimous decree was passed declaring that
Prince Alfred, having been elected by the people, was
proclaimed constitutional king of Greece, and instructing
the president of the provisional government to notify the
election to His Royal Highness without delay, and invite
him to take possession of the throne. The Greeks allow
themselves to be easily deluded into a conviction that they
are able by their ability and by their political importance
in the solution of the Eastern question to guide the policy

* The published lists of votes differ slightly. The numbers are sometimes
prmted inaccurately, and the voting papers arrived from some consulates after the
official list of the National Assembly was completed. It is—

Prince Alfred
Duke of Leuchtenberg
An orthodox King . .
The Emperor of Russia

A King

Prince Napoleon . .
Prince Imperial of France

230,016
2,400

1,917
1,841
1.763

345
246

A republic 93

Prince Amadeo of Italy . . 15

Count of Flanders .... 7
Prince William of Denmark

(now King George) ... 6

Prince Hypsilantes .... 6

Fifteen other names appear in some lists, and the votes sometimes slightly exceed
the 241,202, as given m the official list.

iitnii'~~~'T~™~"~~'"

PREFERENCE FOR A FOREIGN KING. 287

A. D. 1863.]

of other nations according to their wish. They never gave
a stronger proof of their sincerity in this persuasion, that
every international arrangement ought to be set aside for
their convenience and pleasure, than on this occasion.

The acceptance of the Greek crown by Prince Alfred
having been rendered impossible by the three protecting
powers, diplomacy undertook to fill the vacant throne, and
in an evil hour for the reputation of British statesmanship,
England engaged to select a king^. Nothing could be more
perverse, injudicious, and in more direct opposition to the
principles they had previously announced, than the conduct
of the British government in this affair. On the 29th
November 1862 the British minister of foreign affairs stated
in a despatch to the minister in Greece that, ' with regard
to Greece, it appeared to Her Majesty's government that
her first interest was to elect a prince to rule over her who
should be generally accepted. That he ought not to be
a prince under twenty years of age, but rather a prince
of mature years and of some experience in the world ^.'

Before narrating the adventures of Earl Russell in search
of a king, the reason that induced the Greeks to prefer a
foreigner to a native statesman must be noticed. Without
attaching too much weight to the saying ouine ignotum pro
magiiifico est, it must be conceded that it was not without
influence. But there were strong objections to a native king.
No public man in Greece possessed either the moral influence

* There were stronger reasons than those publicly stated that ought to have
prevented an English prince from accepting the throne of Greece. The King of
Greece v^'ould have been bound to forget both his country and his religion, to
abjure his patriotism and his family traditions, and embrace the interests of
Hellenism and orthodoxy. The following passage is contained in a despatch of
Earl Russell to Mr. Scarlett, dated 29th November, 1862, nor was the view it
contained generally overlooked by Englishmen acquainted with the East before the
despatch was known. ' There are other considerations, besides those which I
thought it proper to communicate to the charge d'affaires of Greece, which influ-
ence Her Majesty's resolution on this subject. It is Her Majesty's duty to look to
the due succession to the crown. Prince Alfred stands next to the Prince of
Wales in the order of succession, and is heir-presumptive to the duchy of Saxe-
Coburg and Gotha. Among the contingencies which are far from being impos-
sible, it might happen that the sons of Prince Alfred, after being brought up as
members of the Greek church, might be called to ascend the throne of England.
It is necessary to provide against chances of this kind, and you will therefore not
be surprised to learn that it is Her Majesty's fixed determination not to give her
consent to the acceptance by H. R. H. Prince Alfred, or any other of Her
Majesty's sons, of the crown of Greece.' Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence
respecting the Revolution in Greece, October, 1862, p. 65.

'■^ Parliamentary Papers ; Correspondence, Earl Russell to Mr. Scarlett, p. 64.

ivei

£i

288 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VI. i

or the talents, which offered a guarantee for his being able to
govern otherwise than as a party leader. The country re-
quired above all things administrative organization, and the \ lEngH
people were not inclined to trust the task of organizing the i
administration to a party. No Greek statesman could form i
a cabinet composed of the ablest and most upright men in j
the country, and a foreign prince seemed likely to do this,
because it was clearly his interest to do it, in order not to 1
govern by means of one party, but to govern all parties
with the support of public opinion. The Greeks wanted a
foreign king to command his ministers and watch over the
whole body of officers and officials, to prevent their looking
more to their own interests and the interest of their party
than to the service of the commonwealth. Public opinion
declared emphatically that Greece wanted a foreign king who
could' govern as well as reign, for they expected him to
control the executive administration, and prevent every officer
of the government from abusing the power with which he
was entrusted, and from conniving at the abuse of power by his
partizans. The Greeks resolved also, that their king should
be selected from a royal family, or at least from a reigning
house, in order to insure the respect which is willingly
accorded to high station. It may not be easy to decide
whether the Greeks were right in preferring impartiality to
local knowledge and personal experience, but there can be
no doubt that they attached too much importance to high
hereditary station, and sacrificed the great advantage they
might have derived from raising some eminent statesman and
experienced administrator to their throne.

The national enthusiasm in favour of Prince Alfred was
recognized as giving the Greeks an especial claim on the aid
and support of England. France and Russia could not avoid
feeling the humiliation of an unexpected defeat, and to con-:
ceal their mortification they left England to select the new
king, and gave a passive approbation to all the blunders of
the British government. It required very little foresight to
divine that the sympathy of the Greeks for British policy
would be allayed by the unavoidable course of diplomacy,
even had the negotiations been conducted by a warmer
heart and more piercing judgment than England employed.
When the Greeks elected Prince Alfred they knew nothing

Bur"'^

■WHM

wwmmmmmwn

MR. ELLIOT'S SECOND MISSION. 289

ti.D. 1862.]

bf his character, nor of his personal quahfications to act as

me head of a disorganized government. A vague hope that

[in Enghsh prince would give Greece some of the advantages

enjoyed by England, would extend the limits of his kingdom

lit the expense of Turkey, and would obtain large loans, con-

rributed greatly to Prince Alfred's popularity. When Great

[Britain stepped forward to select a king, it was not surprising

pat many Greeks inferred that the British government tacitly

)ledged itself to promote the views of the nation.

The British government, on the other hand, appears to

lave plunged into the business without any very clear idea

)f how it was to be conducted in order to insure a good

result. It acted as if nothing was to be done but to look

)ut among the cadets of friendly reigning houses for any

)rince who would agree to accept the vacant throne. In

the month of December 1862, the Hon. Henry Elliot was

sent to Greece a second time on an extraordinary mission.

[e communicated to the provisional government that, if the

rreeks maintained constitutional monarchy as their form of

government, refrained from all aggressive acts against Turkey,

md chose a king agreeable to the British government, the

jqueen would bestow the Ionian Islands on Greece. Mr.

Llliot also informed the Greeks that the British government

{expected the National Assembly would choose a king from

/horn a regard for religious liberty, a respect for constitutional

freedom, and a sincere love of peace might be expected. It

fdid not escape the observation of the friends of Greece, that

)nly those qualities advantageous to British policy in the

lEast were enumerated, and that no mention was made of

the qualities most necessary for securing the election of a

dng possessing a knowledge of the art of government, and

las Earl Russell had expressed it ' mature years and some

[experience of the world.'

The British government marred the effect of Mr. Elliot's

[second mission by the precipitancy with which it announced

[two abortive attempts to find a king. The first was a

[peculiarly ill-judged selection. The crown of Greece was

joffered to King Ferdinand of Portugal, a prince of Saxe-

Coburg Kohany, who married Donna Maria Queen of

Portugal, and received the title of king. The reigning king

lof Portugal was his son. The consent of France and Russia

VOL. VII.

2Q0 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VI. \

was given promptly but coldly. France disliked a Coburg, {
and Russia disliked a Catholic. Singular as it may appear, j
Mr. Elliot was instructed to inform the Greeks of the selection \
of this candidate before the British government was in posses- \
sion of King Ferdinand's promise to accept the crown. When j
the leading men in Greece were informed that King Ferdinand |
was the candidate recommended by England, ' they expressed 1
neither approval nor disapproval, but observed that he was j
a Catholic, and that the crown would continue without an \
heir ^.' Whatever might be the virtues and talents of this 1
king, the Greeks knew nothing about him, and they could i
only learn from the envoy of the British government that
he was a Coburg, a Catholic, and a constitutionalist. In their :
revolutionary enthusiasm the Greeks believed that they
could themselves take care of their constitution, but they felt .
and owned that they were averse to receive a Catholic king
even at the recommendation of England. Fortunately King
Ferdinand refused the crown, peremptorily and without .
hesitation.

Some negotiations took place which were never made
public, and some princely candidates were spoken of whose
names the Greeks never heard of before, and may probably
never hear again. After a short interval a second choice
was announced, which was more judicious though not more
successful than the first. Mr. Elliot informed many members
of the National Assembly that the British government ex- ,
pected to be soon able to announce that Ernest, Duke of
Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, had accepted the candidature.
The news was received with satisfaction, for the Greeks had
learned that Prince Alfred was heir -presumptive to the
duchy of Saxe-Coburg, and they believed that the three
protecting powers had agreed to an arrangement which would
ultimately place Prince Alfred on the throne of Greece and
realize all their hopes. They were not aware that the crown >
of Greece possessed fewer attractions for foreign princes than
they supposed. Duke Ernest required conditions that Eng-
land had no power to grant, and the Parliament of Saxe-

' Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence, Mr. Elliot to Earl Russell, 25th
December, 1862, p. 125. M. Francois Lenormant observes, 'par una dispensation
particuliere de la Providence, cette heureuse famille de Cobourg a des candidats
pour tous les trones et de toutes les religions.'

■■■■MnPBWBWWBHlllliWHMWWIUMUIWIWIIllUUMl

ELECTION OF KING GEORGE. 29 1

A.D. 1863.]

Coburg objected to his absence from his hereditary states.
He had no children, and as Prince Alfred was excluded from
the throne, the British government had to search for an heir
as well as for a king, and British diplomacy was again foiled.
A young prince of Coburg Kohany was found in Austria,
and to him the succession was offered ; but he was a Catholic,
and he refused to quit his religion for an orthodox crown.
Duke Ernest showed no eagerness to obtain the throne,
and the states of Coburg refusing to consent to his absence,
he at last informed the British government that he declined
the honour of becoming a candidate for the throne of Greece^.
In utter oblivion of the opinion of her Majesty^s govern-
ment that ripe years and mature judgment were necessary
qualities in a king of Greece, and in a fit of desperation
lest no English candidate should be found, the British
government offered the crown to the second son of Prince
Christian of Holstein-Glucksburg, who succeeded to the
throne of Denmark on the 15th November 1863, as King
Christian IX, in virtue of a family arrangement. Prince
William George of Denmark is the brother of the Princess
of Wales, and was then only seventeen years of age. The
Greek government was informed that the guardians of the
young prince were disposed to accept the crown in his name,
if an offer of it should be made by the National Assembly.
The affair was delicate, but the Greeks were docile. They
had reposed their trust in England, and they felt no wish
to withdraw it. Nations are in some respects easier to deal
with than courts and cabinets. The president of the execu-
tive government, M. Balbes, proposed the vote suddenly, in
order to avert intrigues and party opposition. On the 30tli
March 1863, Prince Christian Ferdinand Adolphus George,
second son of Prince Christian of Denmark, was unanimously
elected King of Greece with the title of George the First,
King of the Hellenes, and it was declared in the decree of
election that his lawful heirs should profess the faith of the
Eastern Orthodox Church^.

* The candidature of the duke was communicated to the National Assembly on
the 1 2th February, 1863. ''Eniarjfj.os 'E(pT)p.(pis rfjs 'S.vveXtvatws, i. 458. After the
refusal of the duke was announced, a long debate ensued on the 5th and 6th of
March, but the National Assembly did not venture to assume the responsibility of
choosing a king.

^ Prince Christian of Sleswig-Holstein-Glucksburg, though a younger son, was

U %

202 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VI.

Negotiations then commenced between the British govern-
ment and the court of Denmark, to settle the conditions on
which the King of Denmark and Prince Christian would give
their consent as guardians to the acceptance of the crown
offered to the young prince. The manner in which the
haggling was carried on reflects no honour on the parties
concerned, and the correspondence and the protocols which
resulted from this election having been laid before Parlia-
ment, will enable the world to judge whether the cause
of the people was not neglected from exclusive attention
to the interests of the prince. While the family of Den-
mark was negotiating for a larger civil list than the Greeks
had paid to King Otho, the political parties at Athens
were left at liberty to commit acts of violence, which threat-
ened to plunge the country into a state of anarchy, and renew
the disorders and the desolation of 1832. The election of a
king, so young that he must be placed under the guidance
of others, naturally roused the ambition of all the leading
politicians and factions to obtain the direction of the govern-
ment before the young king's arrival. This state of party
feeling made the election an immediate cause of disorder.

A deputation from the National Assembly, consisting of
Admiral Kanares, Captain Grivas, and M. Zaimes^ was sent
to Copenhagen to offer the crown to the Danish prince. The
return of this deputation in the month of June, with the
assurance that the crown was accepted, brought the struggle
of rival parties for the possession of power to an open civil
war. The ultimate design of each party was to secure to
itself the means of exercising the royal authority in the king's
name until he arrived in Greece ; official position at that time,
it was supposed, would entail the possession of power for a
considerable time after his arrival. A decree was passed in
the National Assembly declaring the majority of King
George, and the principle which Greek statesmen had adopted
that a constitutional king must reign and not govern insured
his docility \

The army had remained in a state of disorganization ever
since the revolt of Nauplia, and after the expulsion of King

selected as heir to the throne of Denmark by a protocol signed at London,
8th May, 1852, and mounted the throne at the death of Frederic VII, 15th Novem-
ber, 1863.

' Decree XLIV, 27th June, 1863.

MIM8WtWHlMllim«aB«BWBIWnniWilWiHlllMIIWiWWIWIIWIMi]IIIIMiWIIWIlllllllWIWM

MILITARY DISORDERS. 293

A.D. 1863.]

jOtho it had fallen into complete disorder. Each party in
bhe National Assembly sought by favour and flattery to
^ain over as large a number as possible of officers and men
to support their intrigues and further their schemes. Officers
und men were allowed to quit their duty in the provinces
land remain in the capital, whenever it was thought that
l;heir services could be useful for strengthening the party of
|men in office. Discipline was relaxed, promotions were made
'so lavishly by each successive government and ministry, that
the number of officers, commissioned and non-commissioned,
in Athens was said to exceed greatly the number of privates.
jThe insubordination of the troops was allowed to go on in-
creasing, without any effort on the part of the members of
the government or of the officers to restore discipline. Great
alarm prevailed among the citizens lest the soldiers should unite
with the armed men whom various party leaders and military
chiefs had brought to the capital from different parts of the
country to support their claims for rank and pay. These men
might easily be excited by the rabble of the city to begin
plundering the shops and levying contributions on the wealthy
inhabitants. This fear had the good effect of causing all
classes who had anything to lose, to pay great attention to
the efficiency of the national guard, which was brought into a
much better state of discipline than the regular army. Its
imposing strength saved Greece in all probability from a
series of military revolutions and disorders, like those which
jhave of late years occurred so frequently in Spain and
Mexico.

During the month of April 1863 repeated acts of violence
were committed. Officers and soldiers were seen at all
hours driving about in carriages, singing or shouting voci-
ferously. Peaceful persons were frequently insulted ; respect-
able women could not walk from one house to another
without fear, and squads of soldiers went from house to
house demanding money ^. At last the abduction of a

' Sanipoulos, professor and member of the National Assembly for the University
of Athens, published a pamphlet, in which he describes the condition of the army in
the following terms : ' C'etait un ramassis d'hommesd'une moralite tres equivoque, que
recrutaient les officiers appartenant a I'un ou a I'autre des parties politiques. Ces
hommes gorges d'argent et du vin parcouraient en voiture la ville et ses environs
avec des filles de joie a leurs cotes, commettant toutes especes d'horreurs non
seulement sur les regnicoles mais sur des etrangers aussi.' Le passe, le present et
I'avenir de la Grece, Trieste, 1866. But when it was proposed to establish a court-

ttlie

li
t
(ttie

H
m

294 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VI

foreign actress, accompanied with circumstances of publicity
which rendered its infamy doubly atrocious, compelled th^ \^^'^'
ministers of France and England to demand that the govern^
ment should adopt effectual measures for repressing the!
disorders and crimes of the military, and preventing thdjs'^';
recurrence of 'acts disgraceful to a civilized nation.' Th^
previous neglect of the ministry of war and of the military!
authorities had fomented the insolence of the troops. When)
twenty were guilty, one was arrested, and he was either
released after a short confinement or forcibly set at liberty
by his comrades. The denial of justice was systematic and
notorious, and the foreign ministers became so indignant at
the false answers and false assurances they received from
the members of the government, that they announced their
intention to quit Athens unless measures were adopted to
establish personal security. The worst feature of these
disorders was that the authorities were always ready to
seize every occasion of boldly denying their existence,
whenever they could find an opportunity of doing so in
writing ; calling their dishonesty patriotism, and hoping by
their effrontery to conceal the truth. While the government
was lavish of assurances to the foreign ministers that those
criminals who had been seized should be severely punished,
it generally facilitated their escape. The protests of the
French and English ministers after the public outrage on
the actress produced a temporary cessation of the disorders
of the soldiery during the month of May, but no change;
for the better took place in the conduct of the government ^.

At last the state of parties in the National Assembly
brought about a civil war in the streets of Athens between
their adherents in the army.

On the 29th of June 1863 the National Assembly elected
Lieutenant-Colonel Koronaios minister of war in place of
Lieutenant-Colonel Botzaris, who had been minister since

martial extraordinary to enforce discipline by punishing the crimes of the military
which the civil tribunals could not judge, Mr. Sanipoulos opposed the measure in
the National Assembly. He asked whether the army was to be dishonoured
because it contained ten or even a hundred criminals, and said that a criminal is a
man and not an instrument set apart for the benefit of the community. 'Eiriar}iios
'E(pi]fjitpis rfjs 'SvvfKevafws, vol. ii. No. 65, p. 19, 1863.

' Parliamentary Papers, 1863; Correspondence relating to the election of Prince
William of Denmark and to the state of Greece. Mr. Scarlett's despatches in
May, 1863, p. 0.

raiwMaiiuHMaiwiiiMiiiiMHWiiaMW

CIVIL WAR. 295

A.D. 1863.]

the month of April. The faction of which Koronaios was
an active member, considered the time favourable for seizing
the executive power and excluding all rivals from any share
in the government. Koronaios was bold enough to attempt
making use of the disorderly army as an instrument for
effecting this object : but he possessed neither the influence
nor the judgment for executing a successful coiip-iVetat.
His party trusted to his energy for securing their permanent
ascendancy, but his violence did more harm to their cause
than the weakness of his predecessors had done to the cause
of their opponents.

After the revolution of October 1862 Leotzakos, then only a
lieutenant, was raised by the suffrages of the officers and
men of the 6th battalion to be its commanding officer. By
his good management and good conduct this battalion was
now the strongest and most efficient in the army. It was
stationed in the villa built by the Duchess of Plaisance
near Athens, called Ilissia, beyond the royal garden on
the road to Kephisia and Marathon. The influence of
Leotzakos rendered it a matter of importance that he
should be removed from his command, for he belonged to
one faction of the revolutionists and Koronaios to another.
Both parties in the National Assembly knew that they were
on the eve of a civil war, and both prepared for an appeal
to arms. A brigand chief, Kyriakos, who was suspected
of being in connivance with the partizans of Bulgaris, made
his appearance with his band close to Athens at this crisis.
Pappadiamantopoulos, the commandant de place, and Leo-
tzakos were accused of neglecting to seize him with his band
when he posted himself in the buildings of Aghios Asomatos.
Leotzakos was invited by the minister of war to a council
of war, and when he arrived he was arrested and hurried
down to the Piraeus, where he was placed on board a man-
of-war in the port. At the same time orders were issued
superseding Pappadiamantopoulos both as commandant de
place and commanding officer of the artillery, and Colonel
Artemes Michos as commander-in-chief of the gendarmerie.
Both the artillery and the gendarmerie refused to receive
the officers named by Koronaios to command them, and
continued to obey their old commanders. As soon as the
6th battalion heard that Leotzakos had been arrested and

2q6 change of dynasty.

^ [Bk.V. Ch.VI,

sent to the Piraeus it broke out in open revolt. Mr. Koumoun-
douros, the minister of finance, and Mr. Kalhphronas, the
minister of pubHc instruction, happening to pass in a carriage
before their barracks at Ihssia, were recognized and detained
as hostages for the release of their commanding officer. The ip^^'
leaders on both sides were now eager to commence hostilities, |j
confident in the strength of their armed partizans, and per- -
suaded that the young king would find it necessary on his
arrival to confirm any party in office whom he should find
in possession of power. The civil war that ensued in the
streets of Athens was a party fight for place.

The combatants on both sides consisted of several factious
leaders linked together by no political principle but only
by projects of personal interest. Koronaios was the represen-
tative of those in power, and he had at his disposal a much
larger force than his opponents. His infantry consisted of
the 1st, 2nd, 8th and 9th battalions, but they were incomplete
and without either discipline or order. He was also sup-
ported by the cavalry, the corps of pompiers, and a number
of armed men who were collected at Athens as personal
followers by members of the National Assembly, and who
received pay either from municipal or national funds \
Admiral Kanares and Captain GrivaSj who had recently
returned from Copenhagen, were both warm partizans of
the ministry, and increased its authority by their supposed
favour at the Danish court, and the inference that they
would become influential persons after the king's arrival.

The military force of the opposition was less numerous
but in a better state of discipline. It consisted of the 6th
battalion, the artillery, the gendarmerie, and a corps of
armed police. The royal palace, which commands the town,
was occupied by the troops of the ministry. The royal
stables were occupied by the artillery, and the villa of the
Duchess of Plaisance by the battalion of Leotzakos. The
fighting commenced at daylight on the 1st of July^. The

1 La Grece, a French newspaper published at Athens (9th July, 1863), states
the number of the troops under Koronaios to have been 6000 men. Perhaps the
party were then paying for the services of that number, but half that number did not
take part in the fight. There were then not more than 3000 regulars in Athens,
and of these 1000 fought against Koronaios.

^ Prince Napoleon and Princess Clotilde visited the Acropolis on the 30th June,
while the rival parties were preparing for action.

^"^IP^B^i^Bi^Bg^MlWWBlWWBWiaaiWIIIliaMlBWIIIMBWBIIBBrawailWBBIiaMBIinnWIBIHMlWMIffHWWlWlWIIWiiWItWiillHWI^^

FIGHTING AT ATHENS. 297

A.D. 1863.]

Operations of the ministerial forces were directed by Koro-
naios, who expected by his coup-d'ctat to become master
of the government. The ministerial party, in spite of its
numerical superiority, failed to cut off the communications
between the artillery and the 6th battalion, and was vigor-
ously assailed by these bodies, who kept the palace closely
invested. Aristides Kanares, son of the admiral and brother
of the minister of the marine, was killed, and about forty
of those who were with him in the palace were either killed
or wounded, so that the garrison considered its position
untenable.

The National Assembly held a meeting while the fighting
was going on, and sent a deputation to establish an armistice
between the combatants. The first attempt failed, and a
member of the assembly was wounded. But a second attempt
succeeded, and the terms of an armistice were arranged. The
palace was evacuated, and a truce was established for twenty-
four hours, but both parties employed their leisure in making
preparations for renewing the combat.

M. Rouphos, the president of the government, and two
members of the ministry who disapproved of the appeal
to arms, resigned office when the fighting commenced \
The National Assembly on receiving these resignations charged
its president, Diomedes Kyriakos, to act as president of
the executive government, dismissed Koronaios from the
ministry of war, and Miltiades Kanares from the ministry
of the marine ; and ordered the immediate release of Leot-
zakos by the one party, and of Koumoundouros and Kalli-
phronas by the other. But according to the rules of the
assembly, the number of deputies present when these decrees
were adopted, was insufficient to constitute a house, for
many deputies absented themselves from an inherent spirit
of personal intrigue, in order to make sure of joining the
victorious party. In consequence of this irregularity, the
party that supported Koronaios treated these acts of the
assembly as null.

The night was spent by Koronaios in bringing up artillery

* The ministry of Rouphos was elected by the National Assembly on the 1 2th
May, iis63, and was composed of B. Rouphos, President ; Koumoundouros, Finance ;
Kalliphronas, Public Instruction ; P. Deliyannes, Foreign Affairs ; Londos, Interior ;
Platys, Justice; D. Botzaris, who was Minister of War until the 22nd June, was
then replaced by Koronaios ; Miltiades Kanares, Marine.

208 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VL

and additional forces from the Piraeus. He concentrated
a strong body of troops in the north-west quarter of Athens,
and it was feared that he designed to make himself master
of the National Bank, where it was known that a large
sum in specie was kept in reserve. He had ordered a
part of the guard to be withdrawn from the bank on the
day before hostilities commenced. Grivas occupied the
Acropolis with armed irregulars and a few soldiers. On
the morning of the 2nd July both parties were ready to
renew the fight, and not disposed to respect the armistice
established by the National Assembly. Koronaios, surrounded
by his staff, approached the bank on horseback, and was
fired at by the guard to whom he was an object of suspicion.
The bank was immediately attacked with some vigour but
very little military judgment, and it was bravely defended
by its small garrison, which repulsed its assailants until a
detachment of artillery arrived and placed it in security.
The attempt to carry the building was renewed with ad-
ditional troops, and fighting went on round the bank during
the whole day and in many streets of the city. At last
the national guard and the citizens began to take part in
the combat, and all communications between distant quarters
were interrupted ^.

The ministers of the protecting powers, finding that the
authority of the President of the National Assembly was not
recognized by the party of Koronaios, and that the forces of
the belligerent factions were too nearly balanced to promise
a speedy victory to either party, determined to interfere.
They were guided by a wish to place the National Bank
in security and avert the pillage of the city, not by a desire
to favour either party. The passions of the soldiers on both
sides were inflamed by the losses they had sustained from

^ An account of the civil war by a partizan of the president of the National
Assembly says, — ' La fureur cles bourgeois contre les defensenrs de la baiique avait
quelque chose de hideux et de barbare ; et pourtant cet etablissment, comme renfer-
niant des capitaux considerables tant nationaux qu'etrangers, pent etre considere
comme la vraie representation de la propriete en Grece.' Another account by a
partizan of Koronaios says. ' Les gardes nationaux ont pris part ^ la lutte, mais
toutefois seulement contre les gendarmes et les huissiers de la police. lis tiraient
sur tous ceux qu'ils rencontraient ; ils les epiaient, les traquaient partout comme
des betes fauves. Ceux-ci, de leur cote, tiraient sur les gardes nationaux : de sorte
que dans toutes les rues, dans tous les quartiers de la ville, on faisait le coup de
fusil, et on voyait tomber quelques victimes.' There is truth in these accounts,
though with some exaggeration, as the Author saw with his own eyes.

wKiimmumimimumimmmHmmi

FIGHTING AT ATHENS. 299

A.D. 1863.]

the national guards and citizens, and both sides threatened to
set fire to the buildings occupied by their enemies. In the
evening of the 2nd of July the foreign ministers sent their
secretaries of legation to the rival leaders, and succeeded in
establishing an armistice for forty-eight hours, to afford time
for the National Assembly to take measures for restoring
peace. This armistice was not adopted until the foreign
ministers threatened to retire on board their ships in the
Piraeus, if hostilities were renewed. Everybody was now
anxious for the re-establishment of order, except the ambi-
tious leaders who had planned the conp-d\'tat. About two
hundred men had been killed and wounded without producing
any decisive result. For the purpose of placing the bank in
security, the ministers of the three protecting powers, moved
by the anxious solicitations of the governor, sent a garrison
composed of detachments of marines from their ships in
the Piraeus to guard the buildings. There were many
foreign shareholders, and it was suspected that the hope of
plundering the specie which the bank contained was a
principal object with its assailants. Koronaios opposed the
occupation with such vehemence, that the foreign ministers
addressed him a note, declaring that they would hold him
personally responsible for any act of aggression against the
Allied force which they thought it necessary to land ^.

The National Assembly met during the night at the
Varvakeion, whence Koronaios had directed his unsuccessful
operations against the bank. The national guard of Athens
declared in favour of peace, and engaged to protect the
Assembly wherever it might hold its meetings, but its usual
place of meeting was in the immediate vicinity of the royal
stables, which were occupied by the artillery, and those who
planned the coup-cTctat insisted that some other place of
meeting should be found. Considerable difficulty was en-
countered in adopting the measures required to insure order,
for the military leaders were at heart adverse to a peaceful
arrangement, knowing from the state of public opinion that
all power would be taken out of their hands as soon as the

^ Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence relating to the election of Prince
William of Denmark and to the state of Greece, i 863, Mr. Scarlett's despatches,
2nd and 4th July, i'^6^. with their annexes. Documents and statements published
by Diomedes Kyriakos, the president of the National Assembly, and by Colonel
Koronaios, in French and Greek, give the views of their parties.

300 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI.

supremacy of the National Assembly should be again
restored. And this was the case, for the moment the
National Assembly found itself invested with the power of
enforcing obedience, it decreed that all the regular troops
in Athens were to march out of the capital and occupy the
stations indicated by the government. It was declared that
the presence of the army was required in the provinces for
the purpose of maintaining order and collecting the revenues
of the state ^. News had already reached Athens that a
revolutionary movement was commenced in Laccnia, and
that the civil war in the capital was serving as a signal for
disorder everywhere. The offices of commandant-in-chief of
the gendarmerie, of commandant superior of the garrisons
of Athens and the Piraeus, and of director of the administra-
tive police, were abolished ; and the chief command of the
national guard, instead of being concentrated in the hands of
one officer, was divided, and vested in the demarchs of
Athens and the Piraeus ^. A new ministry was elected by
the Assembly, consisting of men of secondary importance,
selected from different parties, and destitute alike of com-
manding influence and distinguished talent. The object of
the Assembly was to prevent the rival factions from recom-
mencing a civil war, and by no means to establish a strong
government before the arrival of the young king ^ This
ministry was formed to neutralize the intrigues of ambitious
men without inciting them to strong measures of opposition,
and perhaps the plan was the best the National Assembly
could adopt considering the materials with which it had to
operate. There was no party and no statesman in Greece
possessing the confidence of the country. The mediocrity of
the new ministry allayed opposition. It was certain that it

^ The disorganization and indiscipline of the army was not less in the provinces
than it had been in the capital, but it was hidden from strangers. Even after the
arrival of King George, the Greek newspapers mention that the minister of war
was left for several weeks without any report concerning the movements of a com-
pany of infantry, which marched about the country and took up its quarters
wherever it thought fit. It was at last surrounded and disarmed.

^ Decree of the National Assembly, XLVI, 1863.

^ The members were, Rouphos, President ; A. Petimezas, Interior ; Kalligas,
Foreign Affairs ; Nikolopoulos, Public Instruction ; Kehayas, Finance; all these had
been members of previous ministries. Klimakas, an officer of irregulars without
civil or military capacity of any kind, was made minister of war ; Bouboules, who
had commanded a steamer of the Greek Steam Navigation Company, was the
minister of the marine; and P. Mavromichales, a young lawyer, minister of justice.
These were new men in ministerial offices.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY, 30 1

A,D. 1863.]

would carry no great measure of administrative reform, and it
seemed impossible for it to retain office after the king's
arrival. These circumstances combined to leave Greece
almost without a government for four months.

On the 5th July 1863 the Greek army quitted Athens,
and its absence from the capital was a benefit not too
dearly purchased even by a few days of civil war, for it had
kept the inhabitants in constant fear of pillage, and had
committed a series of disgraceful crimes in quick succession
since the 22nd October 1862. The national guard performed
the ordinary military duty, and displayed so much zeal and
discipline that a feeling of security was soon established. It
is possible that Koronaios, had he commenced by restoring
discipline in the army and creating a feeling of confidence
in the people, might subsequently have succeeded in his
ambitious projects. But his measures were precipitate, his
military plans ill-conceived and feebly executed, and his
arrest of Leotzakos an injudicious and premature exhibition
of arbitrary power. He was driven out of the palace,
defeated at the National Bank, expelled from the ministry,
and deprived of the chief command of the national guard,
without being considered dangerous by his opponents when
out of office, so completely had his failure revealed his want
of capacity to execute his schemes.

While the leading men in Greece were throwing the
government into a state of anarchy, the three protecting
powers were making protocols which were to secure good
government at some future period. On the 27th May 1863
they declared, that the Bavarian dynasty having lost its
rights to the throne of Greece by events over which the
protecting powers exercised no control, they were released
from the guarantees to King Otho and his heirs contained in
the treaty of 1832 ; but, considering that they were bound to
uphold the monarchical principle, they announced their firm
resolution to watch over the maintenance of tranquillity in
the Hellenic kingdom, which they contributed to found in the
general interest of civilization, order, and peace ^. On the
5th June they signed a protocol recognizing George I. King
of the Hellenes as the elected sovereign of the people, and

^ Parlia?nentnry Papers relating to Greece, No. 2, 1863; Protocol, May 27, 1863.

303 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI.

regulated their relations with him as an European monarch.
The resolutions embodied in that protocol afford a remark-
able example of the manner in which the protecting powers
carried into execution their ' firm resolution to maintain
tranquillity in Greece, and watch over the general interests of
civilization.' They made the position of the sovereign as
agreeable to him as possible, and they made not one single
effort to improve the public administration for the benefit of
the people \

The acceptance of the crown having been communicated
to the protecting powers by the King of Denmark under the
express condition that the Ionian Islands should be united to
Greece, the following resolutions were inserted in the protocol
recording the election of the new king : —

1. Great Britain engaged to recommend the Ionian state,
before it voted the annexation to Greece, to appropriate from
the Ionian revenues a sum of iJ"i 0,000 sterling to increase
the civil list of King George.

2. Each of the three protecting powers engaged to bestow
on King George a sum of ^4000 annually, making a total of
i^ 1 2,000 a year for his private expenditure, in addition to the
civil list voted by the Greek chamber. This sum they
resolved to deduct from the million of drachmas which the
Greek government was bound by the convention of i860
to pay as a composition for the interest due on the Allied
loan of 1832.

3. The legitimate successors of the crown of Greece must
profess the tenets of the Orthodox Church of the East.

4. In no case can the crowns of Greece and Denmark be
united on the same head.

5. The protecting powers engaged to use their influence to
procure the recognition of King George by all the sovereigns
and states with whom they had political relations.

The first and second of these resolutions were both unjust
and impolitic, and the British government ought to have
known that they were unconstitutional. It was impolitic to
invest an inexperienced youth with more wealth than his
people deemed that his situation required. It was unjust to
allure the Greeks to believe that wealth in the opinion of

1 Parliamentary Papers relating to Greece, No. 2, 1863; Protocol, June 5, 1863,
and annexes.

ipnU^^Mliriiwimnnwrami

POSITION OF THE NEW KING. 303

A.D. 1863.]

European statesmen was the first essential of royalty. And
it was a violation of those constitutional principles which
English diplomatists were constantly obtruding- on the
attention of foreigners, to invest a sovereign with a revenue
derived from the national income, but placed by a foreign
treaty beyond the control of the representatives of the
nation. No act of the Ionian state could legally increase
the civil list of the sovereign of the Hellenic kingdom by
any appropriation of Ionian revenue to take effect after the
Ionian state had ceased to exist, and there was something
undignified in creating treaty rights securing ;^io,ooo a year
from Greece in case the new king should meet with the
fate of King Otho. The vote of the Ionian parliament
could have no practical value unless enforced by Great
Britain, and to enforce it would be an act of unconstitutional
violence. The proceedings of the three protecting powers
in endowing King George with a larger civil list than the
Greek nation accorded will be judged by the use the king
makes of his wealth rather than by the justice and policy of
their conduct.

The third resolution, that the legitimate successors of
King- Georsre must be members of the Eastern Orthodox

o o

Church, was also an obtrusion of foreign opinion on a question
of constitutional law that concerned the Greeks alone, and
which they were entitled to set aside if they thought fit.
The British government certainly could not pretend that
the powers possessed any right to prevent the Greeks from
changing their constitution and recognizing a Protestant or a
Catholic as heir to their crown, if they should think fit to do
so, at any future period. They could not have less right
to change their constitution than to change their king. It
may indeed be questioned whether a British minister was
warranted by the policy of Great Britain to enter into any
engagements relating to the Greek crown beyond — ist. The
recognition of Prince George as King of the Hellenes. 2nd.
A stipulation engaging the British government to use every
means for accomplishing the union of the Ionian Islands with
the Hellenic kingdom. 3rd. A provision against the union
of the crown of Greece and Denmark. 4th. An engagement
to solicit the recognition of King George as constitutional
king of Greece by friendly powers; and 5th, A declaration

I I

304 CHANGE OF DYNASTY,

[Bk.v.ch.vi. y^a^k

in favour of constitutional government, and a recommenda- ! #"'1
tion that the government of Greece should establish some . '%^^
guarantee for publicity in its financial and administrative 1 Mf-
proceedings. ||B^in5

For some years it had been evident to those who studied ; ns^st,
the progress of events in Greece that the union of the \ » t^
Ionian Islands was a measure which the British government hifee
had many reasons for accomplishing and little interest to "jifcstat
prevent. A change had taken place in the relative position i ^te o
of the powers bordering on the Mediterranean since the i jwdgc
islands had been placed under the protection of Great Britain. ; imi
The fortress of Corfu had lost much of its importance to , amai
England, while the importance of Malta had been greatly Vi<k^.
increased. The British government had honestly, though i rili s;
perhaps not always judiciously, and certainly most unsuc-
cessfully, endeavoured to train the Greeks of the islands
to become a constitutional people. The lonians had used
their liberty not to improve their condition, but to excite
the animosity of the Greek race against the English as
heretics and tyrants. The leaders of the people declared
that British protection impeded the progress of the Greek
nation, and that the first step towards the improvement of
the country must be to get rid of all connection with England.
The British government desired to reform abuses and improve
the administration ; but, when it found that all its measures
were thwarted, and learned by experience that the Ionian
parliament was determined to reject every improvement,
it resigned the hope of doing good, and being resolved not
to suspend the constitution for the purpose of forcing im-
provements on an unwilling people, it became indifferent
to the proceedings of the Ionian legislature. The British
government in the Ionian Islands was exposed for years
to a system of calumnious attacks in the Greek and French
press. The French propagated the opinion that the English
governed the Ionian Islands with greater severity and in
a less liberal spirit than they governed Algeria, and they
kept carefully out of sight that the British government had
given the lonians a free press and a representative assembly.
The liberty which the lonians enjoyed, of declaiming against
English oppression under English protection, might have ^^^
afforded Frenchmen a point of comparison with the repres- Ji

ijtorar

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wammimmmHiwmmt

THE IONIAN ISLANDS. 305

A.D. 1858.]

sion of public opinion in every French possession and with
the silence imposed on the French press. The systematic
misrepresentation of the Greeks and French ended in per-
suading the whole continent that the Ionian government
was a stain on the character of England, and caused English-
men to view Ionian politics with disgust and the affairs
of Greece generally with repugnance. The fact was, that
the state of society in the Ionian Islands presented complex
rights of property and political anomalies which obstructed
I good government, and could only be removed by the power
I of an enlightened despot, or the ability of a popular minister
I commanding the support of an honest house of represen-
i tatives. Unfortunately the educated classes were tainted
with sycophancy and other moral defects that destroyed
their influence, while traditionary habits retained the cul-
tivators of the soil in a state of bigotry, poverty, and
ignorance. These evils were increased by temporary cir-
cumstances. The protectorate threw the executive authority
into the hands of a governing class, while the constitution
which the British government gave to the islands in 1849
invested the popular representatives with a licence to attack
the protectorate that paralyzed the progress of administra-
tive reform.

The relations of the Greeks to the British protectorate
became at last the means of creating feelings of deep-rooted
aversion. Ionian patriots denied the validity of the treaty
of Paris to override Ionian nationality, and maintained that
230,000 inhabitants dispersed in seven small islands possessed
an inherent right to determine their own condition as an
independent state. Demagogues gained popularity by de-
claiming against the tyrannical conduct of Great Britain,
perfectly aware that the British government would protect
them in their exercise of the freedom of speech.

In 1858 a change of ministry in England placed the
Ionian Islands under Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton (Lord
Lytton), who wished to connect his eminence in English
literature with the memory of benefits conferred on the
Greeks. He selected Mr. Gladstone, one of the ablest states-
men in England, to visit the Ionian Islands, with the vain
hope that the eloquence and candour which gave power
in England would charm the subtle demagogues of Greece,
VOL. VII. X

3o6 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.Vl.

and establish harmony between the British government and
the Ionian people for the period that the protectorate might
still endure. Mr. Gladstone was appointed High Com-
missioner Extraordinary, and was directed * to examine all
matters affecting the contentment, well-being, and good
government of the lonians, so far as those objects were
connected with the protection exercised by the British go-
vernment ^.'

Unfortunately, neither the Secretary of State for the
Colonies nor Mr. Gladstone possessed any previous know-
ledge of Ionian politics to aid their good intentions. They
directed their attention to the means of applying sound
theories of government to a state of things where a change
in the social relations of the inhabitants and modifications
in the tenure and rights of property were the real evils
that required remedy, and over these the British government
could exercise very little influence, if opposed by the Ionian
representatives. The deputies to the Ionian parliament
were by the constitution of 1849 elected by a constituency
approaching universal suffrage. They were highly paid,
and declamations in favour of the greatness of the Greek
race and of union with the Greek kingdom were the surest
means of securing their re-election and the continuance of
their salaries.

On the 25th of January 1 859 Mr. Gladstone, having com-
pleted his examination of the islands as High Commissioner
Extraordinary and succeeded Sir John Young as Lord High
Commissioner, commenced carrying his theories into practice.
An extraordinary session of the Ionian parliament was con-
voked to consider his proposals for political and admini-
strative reform. This assembly commenced its proceedings
by voting that it was the unanimous will of the Ionian
people of whom it was the mouth-piece that the seven
islands should be united with the kingdom of Greece. This
contemptuous treatment of a well-meant desire for improve-
ment enabled Mr. Gladstone to see, what others had already
observed, that the Ionian assembly and the British govern-
ment were separated by irreconcileable differences. Mr.

1 Parliamentary Papers, i86l. Papers relative to the mission of the Right Hon.
W. E. Gladstone to the Ionian Islands in the year 1858. Despatch of the Right
Hon. Sir E. B. Lytton to the Right Hon. Sir John Young, Bart., p. 37.

■•mnnnas^Eia

MR. GLADSTONE'S MISSION. 307

A.D. 1859.]

Gladstone passed over this attack on the protectorate
without taking offence, and fixed all his attention on the
word ^e'A?7(n9, which, he endeavoured to persuade himself,
signified disposition, and not ivill. It would have been
more consonant with fact to accept it as it was intended
by those who used it, simply to mean determination ^.
Mr. Gladstone, therefore, overlooked the fact that the lonians
appealed to the right of nationality against the treaty
which placed the islands under British protection ; he sent
a message to the chamber stating that it could have no
will in direct opposition to the constitution from which
it derived its existence, and instead of telling the members
that they had violated the constitution, dissolving the
chamber, and declaring that no deputy should receive a
salary from the public treasury, he only hinted that if they
really entertained a will hostile to the constitution and
the protectorate^ they must give their treasonable wishes
the form of a petition to the Queen of England as pro-
tecting sovereign. The plan of recording their hostility
to British protection in a petition to the protecting sovereign
delighted all parties in the Ionian Islands. No party at
that time considered the withdrawal of British protection
as likely to occur for many years ; all were therefore ready
to join in a cry against it. The democratic party gained
a legal status for agitating the question of union with Greece
at every change of circumstances, and the oligarchical party
considered that the agitation by increasing the aversion
of the protectorate to the democrats, secured to the members
of the oligarchy a larger share in the power and patronage
at the disposal of the executive ^.

A petition to the queen was forwarded by Mr. Gladstone,
It argued that the treaty of Paris in 18 15 placed the islands
under British protection for the purpose of perpetuating
their existence as a free and independent state. But that
treaty was contracted without the participation of the Ionian
people, and the establishment of the Greek kingdom rendered

' Papers relative to the mission of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone to the
Ionian Islands in the year 1858. The Right Hon, W. E. Gladstone to the Right
Hon. Sir E. B. Lytton,'3ist Jan. 1859, and ist February, 1859, PP- ^^ ^""^ ^4-

^ The question of union was again brought forward in the Ionian chamber in
1861. Parliamentary Papers; Ionian Islands, 1861. Sir H. Storks to the Duke of
Newcastle, nth March, 1861.

X %

30 8 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VI.

British protection now superfluous. Moved by these con-
siderations the Ionian parhament on the 20th of June 1857
expressed the unanimous desire of the lonians in favour of
union with Greece, which was again proclaimed by the vote
of the 27th of January 1859, that ' the single and unanimous
will of the Ionian people has been and is for their union
with the kingdom of Greece.' The chamber submitted these
representations to Her Majesty, and prayed the queen to
communicate this declaration to the other powers of Europe,
and co-operate with them to give effect to the sacred and
just desire of the lonians. It may be doubted whether the
Lord High Con^missioner acted constitutionally in trans-
mitting this petition to the queen, who having no power
to grant its prayer, was unnecessarily forced to give a negative
answer, which Mr. Gladstone ought to have given in the
strongest terms instead of transmitting it. He might have
added that he would avail himself of constitutional means
to put an end to attempts to overthrow the protectorate
by the votes of paid deputies. The queen replied that she
would neither abandon the protectorate nor permit any
application to a foreign power for that object. Neverthe-
less, the transmission of a petition against her authority
by her Lord High Commissioner produced a conviction
that the retention of the Ionian Islands was regarded by
British statesmen as no longer a question of much political
importance, and that it was the position of the Othoman
empire and the conduct of King Otho, rather than the
policy of Great Britain, which rendered the immediate union
unadvisable. A despatch of Lord John Russell to the British
minister at Turin, dated the 27th of October i860, was
cited by the Greeks as a confirmation of this opinion. It
was stated therein, that the British government recognized
the right of the Italians to judge of what was most suitable
for their interests. The Greeks argued that Lord John
Russell could no't have written this passage without thinking
of- the mission of his colleague Mr. Gladstone to the Ionian
Islands ^.

When the question of union was negatived by the queen's
reply, Mr. Gladstone stated his plans of reform, and submitted

' Parliamentary Papers ; Ionian Islands, 1861. Sir Henry Storks to the Duke
of Newcastle, 1 8th January, 1861.

■WNHMMHMWMMHW

MR. GLADSTONE'S MISSION. 309

A.D. 1859.]

to the Ionian parliament a series of resolutions extending
the constitutional powers of the representatives of the people,
and establishing a more effectual control over the public
expenditure. It was then proved that both the democratic
and oligarchical parties were opposed to reform. The demo-
crats feared lest reform should retard the union and keep
them excluded from power, and the oligarchs feared a
diminution of their influence in the public administration.
The chamber voted that Mr. Gladstone's resolutions were
inadmissible, and appointed a committee to draw up an
answer. Nearly half the majority in this vote consisted
of men who ranked as belonging to the oligarchical section,
and who at heart desired that the British protectorate should
not cease in their days. The British government was sup-
posed to have secured their support by the senatorial and
other places of profit conferred on members of their families,
so that their desertion of the cause of the protectorate on
this occasion convinced many Englishmen that it would
be wise to seize the first favourable opportunity of getting
rid of all political connection with the lonians, since no party
would give British protection sincere support.

Mr. Gladstone quitted Corfu before the rejection of his pro-
posals was formally announced, and left to his successor, Sir
Henry Storks, the task of recording the total failure of his
mission. The sudden departure of Mr. Gladstone on the
19th Feb., without waiting to receive the reply of the Ionian
parliament to his communications, w^as caused by the dis-
covery that he had disqualified himself from sitting in the
House of Commons by holding the office of Lord High Com-
missioner, since it brought him under the provisions of the
act which excludes governors of plantations. At all events
his seat was vacated by acceptance of a place under the
Crown, even if he could be legally re-elected^. The discovery
of this oversight on the part of a great statesman who had
gone forth to improve a foreign constitution created some
ridicule. The disagreeable shock Mr. Gladstone received by
finding that he had heedlessly exposed himself to the danger

1 Stat. 6 Ann. c. 7. The letters patent, dated 12th January, 1859, appointing
Mr. Gladstone to be Lord High Commissioner, are printed in the Parliamentary
Papers relative to his mission, presented to both Houses of Parliament in iS6i,
p. 79.

cfio CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VI.

of losing his seat as a legislator at home, awakened him from
his dream of gaining immortal honour as a legislator in
Greece. It was necessary for him to get quit of his Lord
High Commissionership and appear in his place in parlia-
ment, before any member could move for a new writ for
the University of Oxford, on the ground that its representa-
tive had accepted an office under the Crown which excluded
him from the House of Commons. To escape such an event,
Sir Henry Storks was hurried out to Corfu as Lord High
Commissioner, and Mr. Gladstone returned to England in the
precipitate manner that astonished the Greeks.

In 1 86 1 the lonians again attacked the British protectorate.
The parliament met, and proposals were placed on the order
of the day for discussion, that an address to the representa-
tives of the peoples, to the governments, and to the philan-
thropists of Christian Europe against British protection should
be drawn up. Mr. Gladstone was accused of persuading the
Ionian parliament to send a petition to the Queen of England
with the expectation of settling the question of union by a
final negative. But it was asserted that union with Greece
could alone save the Ionian Islands from ruin. The seven
islands, ' the first star in the regeneration of the East,' were
decaying and falling to ruin civilly, politically, and economi-
cally, in consequence of the opposition of the British govern-
ment to their union with Greece. The question of union, it
was triumphantly asserted, was not a question. This revo-
lutionary act of inviting foreign intervention was not punished.
Sir Henry Storks, 'carrying,' as he said, 'forbearance to the
utmost limits of his duty,' sent a message requiring the repre-
sentatives to expunge the proposals from the order of the
day. The majority determined to discuss them in contempt
of this message, and the Lord High Commissioner to prevent
the debate prorogued the parliament for six months \ The
proposals implied an act of rebellion against British protec-
tion, and they were filled with foolish and false assertions, but
they stated one truth which no Englishman was disposed to

^ A Greek writer says, ' If ever a state was prosperous, free, and progressing
under the dominion of another, that state was Ionia under the protection of Great
Britain ; and yet no people could be more restless in their position, and more
anxious to escape from the shelter afforded by the patron power than the lonians.'
Eait and West, a diplomatic History of the Annexation of the Ionian Islands to the
Kingdom of Greece, by Stefanos Xenos, p. 26.

I
)

I CESSION TO GREECE. <?II

!a.d.i863.]

I contest. The seven islands were placed under the protection
iof the sovereign of Great Britain as a sacred deposit which
■ ought to be restored to a regenerated nation. The question
was whether Greece was entitled to receive the deposit. It
was evident that things were brought to a crisis. In vain
Mr. Gladstone, speaking as Chancellor of the Exchequer in
the House of Commons, on the 7th of May declared that the
abandonment of the protectorate by Great Britain would be
j nothing less than a crime against the safety of Europe. Facts
' were stronger than his eloquence, and it was evident that the
I British government must either permit its protectorate to be
; rendered contemptible by a parliament that insulted it annu-
ally, or else the islands must be governed without a repre-
sentative assembly. From this alternative there was no escape
I except by uniting the islands with Greece^.
I The revolution of 1862 afforded an opportunity of which
the British government took advantage, and in the month of
I December, as has been already mentioned, the provisional
government was informed that, if the king whom the Greeks
elected should be a person against whom no well-founded
objection could be raised, Queen Victoria would take mea-
sures for uniting the Ionian Islands with the Hellenic kingdom.
The election of King George fulfilled every condition required,
and on the 14th November 1863 a treaty was signed by
France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England, regulating the
conditions of the annexation. The three protecting powers
undertook to conclude a treaty with the Greek kingdom for
completing the union, because Austria and Prussia had not
acknowledged the Danish prince as King of the Hellenes.
Great Britain, France, and Russia, as protecting powers, con-
cluded a treaty with Greece for carrying into effect the stipu-
lations of the treaty signed by the five powers, and bound
themselves to communicate this treaty to Austria and Prussia.
The Ionian Islands were transferred to Greece under the con-
dition of neutrality, the dismantling of the fortifications, and
the maintenance of the commercial privileges enjoyed by
foreigners. The neutrality and the dismantling of the forti-
fications, instead of being regarded as an advantage by a
weak state dependent on the protection of the great powers,

* Parliamentary Papers; Ionian Islands, 1861. Sir Henry Storks to the Duke
of Newcastle, with enclosures, nth March, 1861.

312 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI.

caused great dissatisfaction in Greece, where all classes in-
dujcfed in visions of new annexations^.

The Greek plenipotentiary sent to London to conclude the
treaty was instructed to protest against the destruction of the
fortifications as unjust to Greece, and the neutrality as useless
and impracticable, and in case his representations should
prove of no avail, he was ordered to decline signing the
treaty-. Negotiations were carried on at London for four
months. The Russian ambassador. Baron Brunnow, an able
and experienced diplomatist, told the Greek plenipotentiary
that ' the alleging of impossibilities was a bad and dangerous
weapon,' but the bold and inexperienced Greek replied that
the impossibility was a matter of fact. The three protecting
powers made as many concessions to Greek susceptibility as
they thought consistent with their duty to the other powers
interested. They restricted the neutrality to Corfu and
Paxos^. and the dismantling of the fortifications to the de-
struction of some of the most important works at Corfu.
They were finally compelled to put an end to further ob-
jections on the part of the Greek government by declaring
that the great powers were the proper judges of what the
general interest of Europe required, and that the Greek
plenipotentiary must sign the treaty prepared by the three
guaranteeing powers, or else the Greeks must accept the
responsibility of delaying the union. In the mean time the
dismantling of the fortifications of Corfu was completed, and

^ Parliamentary Papers; Correspondence respecting the revolution in Greece,
October, 1S62. Earl Russell to Mr. Elliot, 12th December, Xo. 3, 1863. De-
spatch respecting the union of the Ionian Islands with Greece ; Earl Russell to
Lord Bloomfield, loth June, 1863. This last document is a circular which reads
like a caricature of Earl Russell's diplomatic style. He informs the British ambas-
sadors and ministers to whom it is addressed, ' that the Ionian Islands are not, as
some persons appear to suppose, a part of the possessions of the British crown.
They form the republic of the seven islands, placed by treaty under the protection
of the sovereign of the United Kingdom.' It is curious to find a British statesman
supposing so much ignorance in British ambassadors as to require to be reminded
of this, had it been true. But it is a strange display of ignorance, for the first
article of the treaty of 1815, which is cited in the despatch, says that the Ionian
Islands were, not as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs appears to have
supposed, a republic, but ' that they form a state, under the denomination of the
United States of the Ionian Isles.' In the year 1815 they had long ceased to be a
republic.

'' ''E-fypi<pi kmcTTji/ji d<popMVTa ras eirl tov ''E-mavqaiaKov Z-qT-q^aros Aiavpayfxa-
reiKjfts. Iv 'A&TjvaLS, 1S64. 'Odrj-fiai, p. 3. These documents are translated in the
work of Mr. Stefanos Xenos, East and West; Correspondence relating to the
union, presented to the Greek National Assembly, Instruction to M. Charilaos
Tricoupi, p. i.

BMMH

ENGLISH LEAVE CORFU. 313

A.D. 1864.]

at last the treaty was signed on the 29th March 1864; and
a protocol on the same day recorded the engagement of
King George to maintain the conditions of his election, in
virtue of which his legitimate heirs and successors must
profess the tenets of the Orthodox Church of the East ^

On the 2nd June 1864 the Lord High Commissioner
delivered up the government of the Ionian Islands to a
Greek commissioner, the English forces left Corfu, and the
United States of the Ionian Islands ceased to exist, and its
territory became a part of the Greek kingdom. The poli-
tical connection between Greeks and Englishmen, which
had existed ever since 18 15 with little satisfaction to
either nation, was terminated without any regret. Instead of
creating feelings of mutual esteem, it had produced con-
stantly increasing divergences of views, which had ended in
dislike, if not in positive aversion.

In destroying the monarchy of 1832 the Greeks abolished
the constitution of 1844. They preferred making a new
constitution to the slower method of improving what was
imperfect in their institutions, and reforming what was vicious
in their social habits. They imagined that it would be easier
to create a perfect government from theorj^ than to improve
the existing administration with the aid of experience.
National servitude has prevented them from looking to their
past with feelings of attachment and respect, and they have
not yet enjoyed the adv^antages of a regular administration
for a sufficient length of time to understand that the per-
manence of institutions is one of the best defences against
arbitrary power, whether it be exercised by kings, ministers^
or mobs. In 1862 the people did not perceive that the
evils of their government proceeded more directly from the
corruption of their administrative system than from the
imperfections of the constitution of 1844. Administrative

^ The Russian ambassador at London insisted on King George giving this
engagement. Confidence in the honour of princes and sovereigns had been greatly
diminished by late events in Europe. And the Russian ambassador observed that,
although the matter was decided by a decree of the National Assembly, and that
decree was accepted by the three protecting powers and the King of Denmark,
who acted as tutor of King George, there was not yet a direct engagement and
acceptance on the part of the King of the Hellenes. Such acceptance it appeared
was deemed necessary, in consequence of the conduct of the Prince of Augusten-
burg, which showed the inefficacy of obligations undertaken by parents and tutors.
Xenos, East and West; Correspondence, p. 146.

314 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VI.

reform lies beyond the direct sphere of popular action, and
the officials of King Otho's government who crept into power
as revolutionary leaders, administered public affairs under the
new constitution as badly as under the old. The evil of
place-hunting which degraded the character of the educated \^
classes was not diminished, and the progress of the nation
continued to be obstructed by the wasteful manner in which.
the revenues of the state were expended.

The National Assembly met on the 22nd December 1862,
and was dissolved on the 28th November 1864. Its merits
and defects arose from the nature of its composition, which
explains why it frequently allowed its proceedings to be
guided by theory instead of practice. Within the limits of
the Greek kingdom, the members were elected in the same
manner as the deputies had been elected to the chamber of
representatives under the constitution of 1844, only the
number was doubled. The reaction against King Otho's
system and revolutionary influences caused a large majority
of new men to obtain seats, and these men were often
inexperienced in parliamentary business. A new principle
of representation was also introduced, in order to give this
assembly a national character, and add to its moral as well
as its political influence by making it embrace a wider
sphere of opinions and interests. Every community of Greek
citizens resident in foreign countries was authorized to send a
representative to the assembly, if its number exceeded 100
souls ; if it exceeded 1000 souls it was authorized to send
two representatives, and if it exceeded 10,000 souls three
representatives. The elections were to take place in
the consulates ^ The decree of the provisional government
that established this principle of representation was illogical
and unjust, and it was carried into execution in a way
directly at variance with the reasons urged for its adoption.
The electoral districts of Greece generally elected a represen-
tative for every 7500 souls. The Greek citizens abroad, who
paid no taxes to the Greek state, and suffered nothing from
bad fiscal laws and the misapplication of the public expendi-
ture, whose families were not liable to the conscription, and
whose chief national object was to attack the Othoman

^ Decree of the' Provisional Government, dated 23rd October (5th November),
1862.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 315

V.D. 1863.]

empire, were privileged to elect two deputies in many cases
where native communities were only entitled to elect one.
This anomaly was justified by the argument that small
Greek communities in England or Palestine could send men
of high character and varied experience as merchants and
capitalists, whose knowledge of the world would add dignity
to the grand council of the nation. A wider sphere would
secure the services of higher intellectual powers, diminish
the influences of party passions, and command more general
respect. But the privilege was exercised in direct opposition
to the reasons employed for its justification. The commu-
nities abroad, instead of electing experienced merchants and
great capitalists of independent character, in most cases
elected government officials trained up under the administra-
tive system which it was the principal object of the Revolution
to destroy. These consular elections introduced into the
^National Assembly a number of ex-ministers, foreign office
clerks, and other officials, who were mere party organs or
political adventurers ^. Comparatively few foreign communi-
ties elected members of their own societies.

The decree of the people published during the night of
the Revolution declared, that a National Assembly was to be
convoked in order to elect a king and organize the state ;
this was interpreted as meaning that it was to reform the
executive government and frame a new constitution-. The
assembly spent a month in examining the credentials of its
members, and on the 23rd January 1H63 began to prepare its
rules of procedure. On the 3rd February it decreed that
Prince Alfred had been elected by universal suffrage constitu-
tional King of Greece. Experience soon made it apparent
that the assembly was incapable of reforming the executive
government, and various circumstances created delay in
adopting a new constitution. On the 30th March 1863 it

* M. Tricoupi, the historian of the revolution, who had been long Greek
minister in England, was elected representative by the Greeks of the mercantile
community at Manchester, because he failed to obtain the votes of his fellow-
citizens in his native town of Mesolonghi. A Greek merchant was for a short
time representative of the community in London, but he resigned to make way for
M. Charilaos Tricoupi, who had been his father's secretary of legation in England.
M. Chrestides, a veteran minister of King Otho, was elected by the community of
Cairo. M. D. Mavrocordatos, minister of foreign affairs in the Balbes cabinet,
was the representative of the community of Leghorn.

"^ Revolutionary Decree, loth (22nd) October, 1862.

3l6 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.Vl^

was announced that the British government recommended

candidate, and on the same day King George I. was electedl

by the National Assembly constitutional King of the HelTJ

lenes. The union of the Ionian Islands then became a cause

of delay. At length the annexation was completed, andl

eighty-four Ionian representatives having taken their seats ini

the assembly, the discussion of the draft of the constitutionl

prepared by a committee commenced on the loth Augustj

1864^

During the year which elapsed from the Revolution to thel

arrival of King George at Athens on the 30th October 1863,!

the leading men in the National Assembly were invested^"'

with all the powers of the executive government. The

assembly was much occupied in choosing a president andl

ministers, rewarding the partizans of revolutionary opinions,!

and voting salaries. To create patronage had been a vice ofl

King Otho's government, and it continued to exist in thej

National Assembly. The administration of the assemblyJ

instead of improving the finances and organizing the navy,|

army, and civil service, wasted the national revenues, anc

allowed every branch of the government to fall into a degree

of disorder approaching anarchy ^. In the month of June,]

the army on paper amounted to upward of 9000 men, and offci

this number 4000 were receiving pay as commissioned orj

non-commissioned officers, and of the 5000 privates not morelito

than 2600 were with their regiments. It was subsequently™

stated that pay was drawn for 1160 in a battalion, when J

it could not muster more than 400 men ^. Things were[

worse in the navy, for the number of officers exceeded the]

number of seamen, half the seamen were not afloat, and som#l

— ^ — "^j

^ The population of the Ionian Islands was estimated at 235,000. They hidj
consequently a larger share of the national representation than the Greeks of the!
kingdom, since they had a deputy to every 2500 souls of the Ionian population,
and in the Peloponnesus in the most favoured districts there was only a deputy to.
double that number. [

- During the year that preceded the arrival of King George, there were seven
cabinets, including modifications, and forty-two changes of ministerial portfolios;
twelve ministers, including all the presidents of the government, had been ministers
of King Otho, and twenty-three new ministers were introduced into the cabinet by
the National Assembly.

^ Discussions in the National Assembly, 15th (27th) May, 1863. One of the
battalions that took part in the civil war in the streets of Athens was only forty-
five strong, viz., five officers, ten sergeants-major, twelve sergeants, eleven corporals,
and seven privates. It had disbanded itself after the revolution, and all the con-
scripts returned home. See the statement of Lieut.-Col. Pappadiamaiitopoulos,
La Grece, 5th February, 1864,

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. 317

.D. 1863.]

)f the officers as well as the seamen were landsmen who
cnew nothing of the service.
i Partly from the inaptitude of a representative body to
,nanage executive business, and partly from the desire of
^■ihe members of the assembly to prolong their power, their
Droceedings were very dilatory. Subjects were discussed of
hich the assembly ought not to have taken cognizance,
he national disposition to get business out of the way when
t presented difficulties was observable, and little practical
bility was shown in carrying good measures into immediate
xecution. Sometimes the meetings took place only once
I week, and both in the manner of attending and in the
Liabit of preventing the formation of a house, there was a
isplay of that want of a sense of duty which is one of the
preat social defects of the Greeks. The people desired the
:stablishment of a strong and responsible government, in
rder that the laws might be executed with vigour and
mpartiality; and they left it entirely to the assembly to
judge what laws were required and how they were to be
jCarried into effect. Unfortunately for Greece neither the
ivil nor military services produced a single man capable of
aking the lead as an organizer, and the country produced
.0 man with the talents that constitute a statesman and a
ruler. These evils were increased by the docility of the
people in politics, who, habituated to obedience by the
centralization of action in the hands of the government,
looked to the National Assembly for all practical measures of
improvement. Little was done towards ameliorating the
condition of the agricultural population ; the labour question
and the obstacles that prevented the employment of capital
in land were not examined ; no effort was made for diminish-
ing the expense of transport, and no system was adopted
for giving security to life and property and suppressing
brigandage. The representatives of the Greek people and of
the foreign communities, after voting salaries to themselves
for performing public business, absented themselves from the
assembly to attend to their own private affairs. Their con-
duct caused many of their countrymen to consider Greek
I society as not yet prepared for representative assemblies and
constitutional government. Despotic power may be the most
certain means of enforcing responsibility on government

31 8 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI.
officials, but the best despot cannot in the end prevent so
much evil as a moderately good representative system.
Public opinion is the safest mode of enforcing responsibility,
because it is the surest mode of creating a sense of duty;
but the value of public opinion is in proportion to the
morality of the people.

A detailed account of the party contests in the National
Assembly would add little to a knowledge of Greek history.
Similar conduct will, in all probability, be repeated, when-
ever men under similar circumstances find themselves
invested with almost unlimited power, even if it be allowed
that the modern Greeks excel in intellectual acuteness and
moral insensibility. Yet, in spite of the evils which resulted
from power falling into the hands of politicians already
corrupted by a bad administrative system, still the National
Assembly of 1862 will occupy an important place in the
history of the political institutions of Greece. Its bad
executive administration will be forgotten, and its legislation
will obtain for it an honourable position. Its character will
be judged by the constitution of 1864, and by the municipal
law it enacted. Few will read the records of its administra-
tive errors and its long debates on party measures, but its
legislation will be studied as reflecting the national opinions
on many questions connected with the general progress of
European society. The abolition of an upper chamber of
aged officials to represent aristocracy, the restriction of the
previous exemption of officials of the central government
from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, and the relief of
the municipal administration from its subordination to minis-
ters and nomarchs, were important improvements, and they
were in opposition to the principles of the French system,
which the Greeks had hitherto taken as the model for their
government. Unlike the previous assemblies, which adopted
Western theories and transcribed foreign constitutions, the
National Assembly of 1862 endeavoured to frame a constitu-
tion capable of remedying past evils and preventing future
abuses. It sought to adapt the action of the executive to the
existing state of society in the Hellenic population, and it is
deserving of study, because it forms an authentic record
of the wants and opinions of a people differing in many
respects from the nations of Western Europe.

COUNT S PON NECK. 319

A.D. 1864.]

Even after the National Assembly commenced its proper
work, it advanced very slowly in framing the constitution.
Instead of devoting every hour to the completion of the
special business for which it existed, and making every
effort to terminate the provisional and revolutionary position
of the supreme power in the state which the assembly had
assumed, and hastening by every means in its power the
convocation of an ordinary legislature, it wasted day after
day in stormy discussions on questions it ought not to have
entertained. These questions were often selected to try
the strength of the parties into which the assembly was
split, and the delays created by the party which feared
defeat ultimately caused much dissatisfaction. The respect
with which the people regarded the assembly was in danger
of being changed into disrespect-
Count Sponneck, a Danish ex-minister, who accompanied
King George to Greece as a private political counsellor,
took advantage of the misconduct of the members of the
assembly to hasten its dissolution. Unfortunately Count
Sponneck did not possess the talents of a statesman, and
was deficient in the political discrimination that might have
served as a substitute for experience in Greek politics. His
position was one which required a cool judgment and
great tact, and he possessed very little judgment and was
utterly wanting in tact. He was entrusted with the delicate
duty of directing the exercise of the authority of the crown
in a country where revolutionary measures, without daring
to dispute constitutional principles, held them in abeyance.
On the 18th of October 1864, by the advice of Count
Sponneck, the king sent a message to the National Assembly,
reminding it that His Majesty had been a year in Greece, and
that the union of the Ionian Islands was accomplished. The
king invited the assembly to hasten its work and vote the
remaining articles of the constitution during the next ten
days, in accordance with the draft which the ministers of
the crown would present, promising to ratify all the articles
already discussed in the form in which they had been voted
by the assembly.

This royal message was extremely displeasing to a ma-
jority of the members of the assembly, but it was in accordance
with the feelings of the people, and the assembly found that

320 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI.

public opinion was strongly in favour of the action of the 1
crown. The government project, or, to speak correctly, the pro- '
ject of Count Sponneck, was voted without any essential modi-
fication, and sent to the king on the 31st of October 1864.

The law of election and the municipal law became pretexts
for new delays, and on the 14th of November the king
sent a second message to the assembly. The success
of his first message, which forced the assembly to create a
council of state, induced Count Sponneck to risk an unwise
manoeuvre. The pressure of public opinion quite as much as
the influence of the crown had enforced obedience to the
first royal message, but the second was not supported by
public opinion, and a minority of the assembly found
means to render the count's manoeuvre abortive. In the
second message his majesty announced that he accepted
the constitution as voted, and invited the assembly to vote
the budget of 18(55, and to modify the provisions relative
to a revision of the constitution. Both these proposals
were negatived \

The demand on the part of the crown that the National
Assembly, after it had completed the constitution, should
vote the supplies of the coming year, was a gross violation
of constitutional principles, and was condemned by the
voice of public opinion. The work of the assembly was
completed, and there was ample time to convoke a regular
chamber for voting the supplies. Moreover the assembly
contained a number of representatives who were elected
by constituencies which paid no taxes and possessed no
constitutional right to vote the supplies. The proposal
was made for the convenience of Count Sponneck, to dis-
pense with the necessity of convoking the chamber of
deputies until the 1st of November 1865, when its meeting
became obligatory by the constitution. The Greeks were
offended by this transparent endeavour to avoid meeting
the representatives of the country on the question of public
expenditure. The proceeding traced out in the second
royal message was so adverse to sound policy, that the
assembly prevented ministers from forming a house to dis-

' The Assembly was a] so invited to make a verbal change in the second article,
as far as related to the Catholic clergy, in consequence of a demand on the part of
the P'rench government, and this change was made.

' NEW CONSTITUTION. 32 1

A.D. 1864.]

CUSS the budget of 1865. The opposition rapidly regained
the popularity it had lost, and the government found it
necessary to abandon the project.

On the 28th of November 1864 King George ratified
the constitution in the hall of the assembly, took the oath
' it prescribed, and dissolved the National Assembly after it
had sat nearly two years.

The constitution of 1864 forms a record of the state
of public opinion among the educated classes in Greece,
and of the legislation which they deemed necessary to
! secure good government. The revolution of 1862 was a
I national protest against the manner in which the executive
government had been conducted under the constitution of
1844, The merits of the new constitution must therefore
\ be estimated by its efficiency in protecting the people
against the evils that caused the discontent which ended
in the dethronement of King Otho, and not exclusively
i by political theories. Centralization invested the crown
with a degree of power which ministers and courtiers used
j for party purposes. Corruption became an instrument for
carrying on the government, and place-hunting became the
principal employment of politicians. One great object of
the Greeks in the Revolution of 1862 was to diminish the
; sources of corruption, to form honest administrators, and
to organize a system of national control. Such an under-
taking requires time for its success, and perhaps more than
one generation must elapse before the vices of the modern
Greeks can be ' burnt and purged away.'
' One of the worst evils of King Otho's reign was the
destruction of self-government in the municipalities of Greece,
j and the conversion of the municipal administration into an
I agency for executing the orders of the central authority.
I This rendered the demarchies nests of ministerial, courtly,
I and party patronage. If self-government mean, that the
i people in their municipalities elect their executive officers,
j like mayors, as well as their legislators, like common-council-
' men, and that when the people elect to any office the
law alone can remove or suspend their nominee from the
. exercise of his functions, then Greece had no such thing
' as self-government during Otho's reign. He had so com-
: pletely nullified municipal institutions that the local revenues
VOL. VII. Y

322 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VI.

of the covmtry were diverted from objects of improvement
to paying officials. An example was often cited of two
municipalities having raised funds for making a road, and
the minister of the interior having compelled each of them
to expend the whole sum it had raised in paying an en-
gineer named by the central government, who was selected
not for his engineering knowledge, but for his ability in
electioneering. Truly or falsely, similar conduct was very
generally ascribed to King Otho's government, and it had
the effect of smothering every attempt at local improve-
ment.

The abuse of patronage in the municipalities by the
central government revived the local feelings and prejudices
which it was King Otho's policy to eradicate. When Capo-
distrias arrived in Greece, he found the action of the central
government impeded by the strength of the spirit of local
patriotism. In striving to correct the evil, he curtailed
the just powers of the local authorities, because he found
it difficult to restrain their abuses, and he destroyed in
some degree the vitality which gives a nation energy.
During King Otho's reign all local activity was sternly
repressed, and there was never a country in possession of
so large a share of political liberty as Greece after 1844
which had so little control over its internal administration.
The system attained its most vicious form when the Revo-
lution of 1862 destroyed the chamber of demarchs. The
constitution of 1864 bears traces that a conflict has com-
menced between the people and the classes who uphold
corruption. The new municipal law contains many enactments
calculated to give independence to local activity, without
diminishing the necessary control which the central govern-
ment must always exercise in order to enforce the equitable
application of the law.

The first object of the constitution of 1864 was to give
additional securities to the liberty of the subject and defend
private property against the power of the government. King
Otho was not prevented by the constitution of 1844 from
keeping men in prison for more than a year without bringing
them to trial. When he had ruined them, he turned them
loose, knowing that the law would afford them no redress, \
if their imprisonment had taken place in virtue of a formal

LIBERTY OF THE SUBJECT. ^z^

A.D. 1864,]

official order. This exemption of the acts of officials from
the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals, unless government
consented to their prosecution, was a principle of King
Otho's constitutional administration which relieved tyranny
from legal restraint. The constitution of 1844 declared
that all Greeks were equal in the eye of the law, but
the law in the case of government officials could take no
cognizance of the violation of this principle, unless with
the consent of those who had ordered the wrong to be
committed. Those who ought to have been peculiarly
amenable to the authority of the courts of justice were
able to obtain exemption from the law of the land. King
Otho had often seized private property, both for objects
of public utility and for his own private use, and left the
proprietors unpaid for years. The constitution of 1864 en-
deavoured to prevent the recurrence of these acts of injustice,
and its provisions relative to the protection of personal
liberty and the rights of property are wise and liberal.
No one can be detained in prison beyond three months
without a public trial, and the detention of a citizen by
an officer of justice without a legal warrant is punishable
ias illegal imprisonment. The right of petition, of public
meeting, and of association, and the freedom of the press,
are fully recognized and well defined. No man can be
deprived of his property except for public objects, and
then only after previous indemnification.

Those who frame constitutions, being generally lawyers,
have adopted some legal fictions which they repeat without
hesitation, though they themselves treat them as conven-
tional falsehoods. This practice of saying one thing and
thinking another has made men despicable ever since the
time of Homer \ The constitution of 1864 commences
its provisions for securing personal liberty by declaring that
all Greeks are equal in the eye of the law, and it terminates
them by a contradiction of this declaration, saying that
for illegalities specially ordered by ministers, no govern-
ment official can be prosecuted without a permission from
government. The administrative power is left in the king's
hands above the law, and a door is opened to every abuse

* "Os x' 'i'Tfpov liiv KsvOri ivl fptaiv, dKKo §€ e^rrj?,
Y 2

224 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V. Ch.VI.

of authority by the central government. The people desired
to enforce the supremacy of the law, but there were too
many members of the National Assembly who were in-
terested in escaping from legal responsibility, to allow com-
mon sense to get the better of administrative logic. Had
pubhc opinion been fully enlightened on this subject, the
constitution would have declared the supremacy of the
law and not the fictitious equality of the Greeks. If it be
considered necessary to exempt ministers and other govern-
ment officials from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice,
it would be honest to omit the false assertion concerning
the equality of all Greeks in the eye of the law. It was
notorious in Greece^, even while the National Assembly
was sitting, that the military were exempt from the law
as applied to other Greek subjects. Proofs of this privi-
leged position of the military are contained in the consti-
tution itself. Excessive exemptions are conceded to officers
who may seek to be elected deputies to the legislative
chamber ^.

The constitution omitted all notice of the rights conferred
and the obligations imposed on citizens by the national
organization which forms them into a state. Civil liberty
can have no active life without national institutions based
on a system of self-government in local affairs. It was
therefore a great neglect not to indicate clearly the basis
on which the national organization of political society must

' Art. Ixxi. A case occurred which shows how far the military were removed
from equality with the other Greeks in the eye of the law. While the National
Assembly was sitting, an officer entered the office or house of the editor of a news-
paper at Athens, and assaulted him, because he had published something offensive
to the marshal of the court, who was the officer's father. The civil tribunals, in
spite of the declaration which existed in the constitution of 1844, that the Greeks
are equal in the eye of the law, declared that they were incompetent to redress the
wrong and punish the violence, because military men are amenable only to military
tribunals. Of course military tribunals everywhere regard beating a civilian, and
especially a newspaper writer, as a very venial offence, even if they do not in the
particular case consider it a very meritorious act.

In place of vague assertions about equality, which seem to be made as a conso-
lation to the vanity of nations who raise their governments above the law, it
would be v/iser to guarantee personal liberty by an article conceived in some such
terms as the following : —

All Greeks are equally subject to the law, and amenable in similar cases to the
same tribunals. Neither rank, official positioji, nor the command of a superior,
whether civil, military, or ecclesiastical, can exempt any person under any circum-
stances from answering before the competent tribunal for an act affecting the
position or interests of another person. The law in Greece knows no distinction
of persons, where a wrong has been done or an interest affected.

POWERS OF THE CROWN. 3^5

A.D. 1864.]

rest. The social duties which the citizen is bound to perform
in his parish ought to be noticed in the constitution of a
free state, as well as the rights he is called to exercise in
order to protect liberty against centralization '.

The powers conferred on the crown by the constitution
of 1864 were ample, and well adapted to the position of
a foreign king in an imperfectly organized country, where
an efficient head of the executive government is required
to control the administrative power of ministers and enforce
responsibility on the leaders of parties. It is the general belief
[in Greece that good government is only attainable by a
co-ordinate action of the king and the people in arraigning
government officials before the great tribunal of public opinion.
This leads many to think that the best method of preventing
ministers and officials from abusing the powers with which
they are invested by a party majority is to invest the king
with despotic power. Whether collectors of taxes, gen-
darmes, and irregular troops, who are sent out to pursue
brigands, would oppress the people less, if an ill-organized
administration be controlled by a careless king or by a
corrupt faction, may be a matter of doubt. The consti-
tution of Greece has proclaimed the sovereignty of the
people, which is perhaps as unpractical as the despotism of
a foreign king.

With that spirit of indecision which marks political opinion

1 The following provisions might perhaps have been inserted in the constitution
as a guarantee for the national institutions. The municipal law is only the com-
plement of one branch of this subject.

All Greeks have public duties to perform, local rights to exercise, and national
institutions to defend. Some of these duties and rights are inherent in citizenship
in a free country ; others are created and defined by express laws.

All citizens have duties to perform as residents in a parish, a ward, a demos, and

I a province. . .

I Their duties in a parish refer to local charity and primary education.

' Their duties in a ward to sanitary regulations, measures of pohce, and the

; maintenance of public order. , ^ , . , , , ,.

' Their duties in their demos and province are defined in the laws relative to

I municipal and provincial institutions which secure self-government to the Greeks.

i The citizens of each ward in a demos have a right to elect a paredros to repre-

|Sent them in the municipal council by the majority of the votes of the resident

! citizens. .,, , , , c ^x,

'< The citizens of each province elect provincial councillors by the votes ot tne
' citizens who pay at least 50 drachmas annually of direct taxes.
I Neither a paredros, demarch. nor provincial nor municipal councillor, can be
(suspended or removed from his functions except by the decision of a court ot
Ijustice. For in Greece, where the people elect to an office, the law alone can
' terminate its exercise.

326 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI.
in Greece, the constitution declares that the king is irre-
sponsible, and then it renders him responsible by exactino-
from him an oath. It cannot mean that he is not to be
held responsible in case he deliberately violates this oath.
It is astonishing that modern statesmen should persist in
repeating the philosophic and feudal nonsense they are
in the habit of inserting in the constitutions they frame.
It is difficult to see what is precisely meant by royal irre-
sponsibility in a constitution which proclaims the sovereignty
of the people, and it would be wiser to say nothing about
it when drawing up a contract between the king and the
people. The fiction of royal irresponsibility or divine rio-ht,
and the phrase ' the king can do no wrong,' are incitements
to the destruction of constitutions by what are called coiips
d'etat. The person of a king may be declared sacred to
save him from the penalty of his crimes ; but to say that
it is a constitutional maxim that a king can do no wrono-
is simply nonsense. Even in England it never had any
reason for existing, except as a rule of law to show that
the king could not be sued in a court of justice. The
sovereign of England can do wrong constitutionally and
be punished personally. He can marry a Catholic, and
the law punishes him for that act by the forfeiture of
the crown ; or he may himself become a Catholic, and
he ceases to be sovereign and is dethroned without a revo-
lution.

The Greek constitution contains a wise provision for
upholding the proper authority of the executive. The
crown alone can propose to the legislature a vote relatin«-
to the appropriation of money for the public expenditure.

The king is also invested with governing power to control
his prime minister and his cabinet. He is not called to the
throne to reign only, he must also govern. The prime
minister is selected by the king: he chooses the members
of his cabinet, and presides in the council of ministers.
But the king controls the powers of his prime minister
by the necessity of holding regular ministerial councils,
which create systematic responsibility in the record of their
proceedings that must be laid before the king. The power
of organizing the procedure of the council of ministers
is placed by the constitution in the hands of the crown,

POWERS OF THE CROWN. 327

A. D. 1864.]

since it contains enactments requiring that many acts of
the executive government should be countersigned by all
the members of the ministry.

One of the greatest defects of the constitution of 1864
is that it confers on the king a civil list out of all proportion
with the revenues of the country and with the private
fortunes of his subjects.

While the constitution enforces constitutional forms on
the crown, by providing that no act of the king is valid
until it be countersigned by a minister who, by his signature,
renders himself responsible for the consequences of its exe-
cution, it contains no stipulations for enforcing ministerial
responsibility. The influence of the official classes in the
National Assembly was strong enough to prevent the in-
sertion of any such provisions ; and it was only enacted
that a special law, determining ministerial responsibility,
the punishments to be imposed, and the forms of procedure
to be followed, was to be submitted to the house of repre-
sentatives and voted in the first legislative session ^ This
stipulation imposed on the ministers of the crown the duty
of presenting this law. They neglected to perform their
duty, and already one of the articles of the constitution of
1864 has been deliberately violated.

How far a constitutional king ought to govern personally,
j is a question that in every constitutional country must be
determined by the character of the monarch and the cir-
cumstances of the time. The Greek constitution can hardly
' be said to adopt the maxim of many liberals, that the
1 king must reign and not govern. The Greeks, generally, be-
lieved that the state of their country required the king
I to exercise the governing power by controlling the v/hole
! central administration ; they wished him to act the part
in the Greek government which is performed in the British
government by the authority of the prime minister indepen-
dent of any special office. The Greeks have an instinctive
feeling that the constitutional prerogatives of the crown
ought to invest the sovereign with the power of checking
the authority of his cabinet, for the prime minister must
be the leader, and in some degree the instrument, of a

1 Art. Ixxx.

3'28 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk. V. Ch. VI.

party majority in a single chamber. The existence of only
one chamber, and the great power which the union of
parliamentary and governmental patronage confers on the
leader of a powerful party in a place-hunting community,
require that the royal authority should be strong in order
to adjust the political balance. The king has the same
interest in moderating party supremacy as the people, and
the people look to the king for preserving the administration
of justice free from the influence of faction, and for com-
pelling the ministers and the majority of the house of re-
presentatives to act in strict conformity with the constitution.
Publicity is perhaps the most efficient means for enabling
the crown to prevent the ministers and the chamber from
abusing their powers, but the people in Greece are not yet
fully aware of the action of public opinion^.

The senate created by the constitution of 1844 consisted
of about fifty officials of high rank in the civil and military
service. No independent man could enter the senate
by his position in the country alone, even if he united in
his person the possession of large landed property, great
talents, and general esteem. The place of senator was
reserved for those who had occupied certain offices^ been
deputies during two parliaments, or held for several years
municipal positions over which the government then exercised
direct control. The consequence was that the senate became
both an obstructive body, and a servile instrument of King
Otho's administrative system. Almost every member was
accused of participating in some scheme for promoting his
own pecuniary advantage or extending his personal patron-

' It is interesting to note what .ire considered to be the prerogatives of a prime
minister in England. 'The power of the first minister is supreme in his cabinet;
if he ceases to be first minister, the ministry is, ipso facto, dissolved ; individual
ministers may retain their offices, and may form part of a fresh combination with
another head ; but it is a new ministry, and the colleagues of the new premier
must make a fresh agreement with him. If a cabinet minister desire any recasting
of the parts, he must go to the first minister to make known his desire ; if he wish
to resign, in the first instance he must communicate his wish to the premier to be
laid before his sovereign. It is the first minister who, of his own choice, can
make changes in the administration, subject of course to the pleasure of the
sovereign. It is not that the premier is primus inter pares, but that he is primus,
and the next is the next longo i?iteruallo. The substantive power which he
possesses in his cabinet is very great.' This passage is extracted from George
Canning and his Times, by A, G. Stapleton, who was for many years Canning's
pi ivate secretary.

QUESTION OF A SENATE. 339

A,D. 1864.]

age, and many notorious cases were made public. The
corruption of tlie senate at last destroyed it. By the 79th
article of the constitution of 1844 the senators were to receive
500 drachmas monthly during the legislative sessions. They
prolonged their sessions to ten months, and at length, em-
boldened by the general neglect of the constitution, both the
senate and the chamber of deputies concurred to increase the
salaries of their members, in direct violation of their oaths to
preserve the constitution inviolate. The senators took to
themselves 700 drachmas a month all the year round. This
act of dishonesty was neither forgotten nor forgiven. The
Revolution of 1862 dissolved the chamber of deputies and
abolished the senate. Every senator had rendered himself
liable to a criminal prosecution for perjury, and to a civil
action for the repayment of the sums he had received over
and above the sum accorded by the constitution of 1844.
But the three members of the provisional government
established by the Revolution of 1863 had been senators,
and the violation of the constitution of 1844 had been so
general, that it was deemed prudent to escape from many
difficulties by abolishing that constitution as well as the
senate it created. There was a necessity for framing a new
constitution, that it might serve* as an act of oblivion and of
tacit indemnity.

The question concerning the existence of a senate in
Greece presents itself in a different form from that which
it assumes in other countries. It is not so much whether a
senate be necessary, as whether it be possible, from the state
of society, to form one. No class exists from which unpaid
senators can be taken, and experience has proved that a paid
senate, composed of servile notabilities or superannuated
officials, can only become a house of retreat for corrupt
politicians. The committee of the National Assembly of
1862, being in great part composed of officials, and being
under the influence of the constitutional theories prevalent in
western Europe, proposed to re-establish a senate. But the
sound sense of the nation declared itself decidedly hostile to
the existence of such a body. There was an evident im-
possibility of constituting any senate that did not include
many individuals of the old body, who had been guilty
of perjury and proved themselves unfit to be entrusted with

330 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VI.

the duty of guarding the constitution. A new senate, there-
fore, could not fail to become a counterpart of that which the
nation had abolished. When the question of re-establishing
a senate was discussed in the National Assembly, Count
Sponneck, who, like the foreign diplomatists at Athens,
believed that a senate ought to be established as a necessary
part of a constitutional monarchy, announced on the part of
the king, that the existence of a senate would nevertheless not
be made a government question, Bulgaris, the leader of the
opposition, declared that he considered a senate composed of
members nominated by the king for life, to be a necessary
element in a monarchical constitution. Koumoundouros,
the leader of the ministerial party, advocated the formation
of an elective senate, to be chosen for a longer period, and by
a different constituency from that which elected the chamber
of deputies. The National Assembly, however, echoing the
general feeling of the country, consigned the senate to
oblivion, and made no mention of any such body in the
constitution.

A single representative chamber, consisting of not less
than 150 members, having completed thirty years of age,
chosen by universal suffrage and secret voting, was estab-
lished. Paid officials and demarchs are expressly excluded
from seats in this chamber, but officers of the army and
navy are granted great privileges and facilities for present-
ing themselves as candidates. The salaries of represen-
tatives are reduced to 2000 drachmas for each legislative
session ^.

As soon as the National Assembly had decided to estab-
lish a single legislative chamber. Count Sponneck became
alarmed at the danger of democracy. He may have feared
that it would be more difficult for the government to manage
one chamber which reflected the opinions of the nation, than
two chambers where more avenues would exist for the
admission of royal influence. Indeed the greater number
of the foreigners in Greece agreed with him in believing
that a nominated senate was necessary, in order to smooth

' The representatives of the people elected under the constitution of 1864
attempted to violate this article and vote more money to themselves in their first
legislative session, reminding us of what Polybius (vi. 56. 13) says of the Greeks,
whenever they have any control over public money.

COUNCIL OF STATE. 33 1

A.D. 1864.]

j the working of constitutional government by lubricating it
with the oil of corruption. The royal message of the i8th
October 1864 made an effort to supply the want of a senate,
by recommending the creation of a council of state^ under
circumstances which, as has been already noticed, compelled
the assembly to adopt the recommendation. A consultative
body called a council of state was constituted, to which all
projects of laws introduced into the chamber were to be
referred for revision. The members of this council were not
to be fewer in number than fifteen, nor more than twenty.
They were named for ten years, and were to receive an
annual salary of 7000 drachmas. The duty of a councillor
of state was declared to be incompatible with any other
public office except that of minister. But the duties of
minister and councillor of state could not be exercised at
the same time. It was acknowledged that, if it had been
possible for King George to have selected fifteen able legis-
lators of high character from among the politicians of Greece,
the institution of a council of state would have formed a
valuable addition to the organization of the Hellenic king-
dom ; but it was felt that, as it was impossible to find men
fit for the place of senators, the same difficulty existed in
selecting councillors of state. The names of the men who
were nominated proved that the public had formed a correct
opinion. The National Assembly, in order to mark its dissent
from the policy of establishing a council of state, inserted in
the constitution an article authorizing the chamber of depu-
ties to reconsider the measure during the first legislative
period at the demand of three quarters of the members.
This article caused no misgivings, for it was supposed that
the king's ministers would be always opposed to the abolition
of the council of state, and always able to command the
adherence of more than a quarter of the deputies to the
views of the court.

The council of state was, from the first, extremely un-
popular in the country. It was looked upon with aversion
as the revival of a mitigated senate ; and neither the cha-
racter nor the talents of its members tended to lessen the
general dislike. Its existence was short. On the ist Decem-
ber (19th November) 1865, the chamber of deputies in its
first legislative period decided that it should be abolished by

332 CHANGE OF DYNASTY.

[Bk.V.Ch.VI.

1 20 votes to 26. And on the 6th December a royal message
communicated the king's assent to the chamber ^

Whatever may be the defects of the constitution of 1864,
it affords decisive evidence that the Greeks see some of the
imperfections of their government and desire to reform them.
It proves also, that Greece wants something more than the
rules of political procedure that are embodied in written
constitutions, in order to infuse better moral principles among
her people, whose social system has been corrupted by long
ages of national servitude.

It would be an idle occupation to conjecture in what
manner this last Revolution of the Greeks and their new
constitution will affect the national progress, for both the
political condition of the Hellenic kingdom and the moral
condition of the Greek race are in a state of transition.
Neither is clearly defined. The constitution of 1864 may
become an instrument for strengthening the sense of duty
in the king, the feeling of responsibility in the servants of the
state, and the love of justice in the hearts of the people.
Those who have long studied the condition of Greece never
fail to observe that, until the people undergo a moral change
as well as the government, national progress must be slow,
and the surest pledges for the enjoyment of true liberty will
be wanting.

I now close this work with a hope that the labour of a long
life, spent in studying the Greek Revolution, and recording
its history, will not be entirely labour in vain. Greece may
soon enter on happier years than those of which I have been
the historian, or than she has enjoyed in my lifetime. Con-
temporary events have cast dark shadows around me and
perhaps obscured my view, but even an imperfect sketch of
great national and social convulsions by an eye-witness,
though traced by a feeble hand, may prove valuable, if it
preserve a true outline. Two thousand years of the life of
the Greek nation have been passed in Roman subjection,
Byzantine servitude, and Turkish slavery. During this long
period Greek history is uninviting, even when it is most
instructive. The efforts the Greeks are now making to
emerge from their state of degradation will supply the

* 'Ei^j;/i€/)ts Twv Xv^TjTTjaiwv TJjs BovKrjs, 1865, vol. ii. 450, 460.

CONCLUSION. '3^'^^

A.D. 1864.]

materials for a valuable chapter in the history of civilization.
I conclude with a sincere wish that these efforts may not be
in vain, and that their complete success may find an able
historian.

Athens, May, 1866.

APPENDIX.

The two papers which follow have been added to show the
manner in which able officers urged the Greeks to avail themselves
of naval and military science. Captain Hastings, the author of the
first paper, never obtained any important command; and though
he introduced great practical changes in naval warfare, and fell,
' dying in Greece and in a cause so glorious,' he has missed gaining
a name.

Sir Charles Napier, who gave the second paper to the writer of
this work, has won imperishable fame on a wider and more glorious
field than the Greek Revolution. The name of Hastings hardly
finds a place in the history of Greece; that of Napier will live for
ever in the history of England.

Memorandum by Frank Abney Hastings, Esq., on the use of
Steamers armed with heavy guns against the Turkish Fleet.
Communicated to Lord Byron in 1823, and laid before the Greek
Government, with some modification, in 1824.

Firstly, I lay down as an axiom that Greece cannot obtain any
decisive advantage over the Turks without a decided maritime supe-
riority; for it is necessary to prevent them from relieving their
fortresses and supplying their armies by sea.

To prove this it is only necessary to view the state of the Greek
armies, and that of their finances.

They are destitute of a corps of artillery, of a park of artillery,
of a corps of engineers, and of a regular army. With all these
wants, I ask, how is it possible to take a fortress but by famine?
This, however, is difficult, even if the sea was shut against the
Turks ; for, from the state of the Greek finances, and the formation

c^^6 APPENDIX.

of the army, troops can scarcely remain long enough before a place
furnished with a formidable garrison, and tolerably supplied with
provisions, to reduce it. However, famine is the only resource, and
it is by that alone that the fortresses now in the hands of the Greeks
have been reduced.

The localities of the country are also such, and the difficulty of
moving troops so great, that, without the aid of a fleet, all the efforts
of an invading army would prove fruitless. But on the contrary,
were an invading army followed by a fleet, I fear that all the efforts
of the Greeks to oppose it would be ineffectual. The question stands
thus. Has the Greek fleet hitherto prevented the Turks from supply-
ing their fortresses, and is it likely to succeed in preventing them ?
I reply, that Patras, Negrepont, Modon, and Coron have been
regularly supplied, and Mesolonghi twice blockaded.

Is it likely that the Greek marine will improve, or that the Turkish
will retrograde } The contrary is to be feared. We have seen the
Greek fleet diminish in numbers every year since the commencement
of the war, while that of the Turks has undeniably improved, from
the experience they have gained in each campaign. Witness the
unsuccessful attempts with fire-ships this year (1823). The Turks
begin to find fire-ships only formidable to those unprepared to receive
them.

Is the Greek fleet likely to become more formidable? On the
contrary, the sails, rigging, and hulls are all getting out of repair ;
and in two years' time thirty sail could hardly be sent to sea without
an expense which the Greeks would not probably incur ^

We now come to the question, How can the Greeks obtain a de-
cisive superiority over the Turks at sea ? I reply. By a steam-vessel
armed as I shall describe. But how is Greece to obtain such a vessel ?
The means of Greece are much more than amply sufficient to meet
this expenditure. However, there are various reasons which it is not
necessary to detail, but which would probably prevent the Greek
government from adopting the plan. It therefore becomes necessary
to ascertain how such a vessel might be equipped without calling on
the Greek government to contribute directly. If proper statements
were made to the Greek committee in England, I think it might be
induced to bear some part of the expense. I will contribute £1000
on the condition that I have the command, and that the vessel is
armed in the manner I propose. If this does not form a sufficient
fund, I think that the deficiency may be made up by a loan; a
guarantee being given that a certain portion — say one-half t)f all

• — , __

* The English loan had not yet been obtained.

HASTINGS' MEMORANDUM. ^^y

prizes — shall be applied to the payment of the interest and the
extinction of the debt. The same proportion would be set apart
to meet the expenses of the vessel, so that the Greek government
might be called upon to bear no other expenses but the wages of
the crew.

I shall now explain the details of the proposed armament, and the
advantages which I think would result from it. It would be neces-
sary to build or purchase the vessel in England, and send her out
complete. She should be from 150 to 200 tons burden, of a con-
struction sufficiently strong to bear two long 32-pounders, one for-
ward and one aft, and two 68-pounder guns of seven inches bore,
one on each side. The weight of shot appears to me of the greatest
importance, for I think I can prove that half a dozen shot or shells
of these calibres, and employed as I propose, would more than
suffice to destroy the largest ship. In this case it is not the num-
ber of projectiles, but their nature and proper application that is
required.

In order that the vessel should present less surface to the wind
and less mark to the enemy, combined with a greater range of point-
ing and more facility for the use of red-hot shot, the bulwark should
be sufficiently low to admit of the guns being fired over it. From
the long 32-pounders I propose launching red-hot shot, because,
though perhaps not more destructive than shells, they give a longer
range ; and the fuel required to impel the vessel could easily be made
to heat the shot. The idea being rather novel, startles people at
first, because, as it has never been put in practice, they imagine
there must be some extraordinary danger to which it subjects your
own vessel. But this is not the case. The real reason why it has
never been adopted hitherto is, that on board a ship you cannot lay
your guns before you introduce your red-hot shot, as on shore.
This arises, of course, from the motion of the vessel. In other
words, the danger arises from the possibility of fire communicating
to the cartridge during the operation of running-out and pointing
the gun. If, however, it be proved by experience that, with proper
precautions, the shot may be allowed to remain any length of time
in the gun without setting fire to the cartridge, this difficulty (and
it is the only difficulty) vanishes. In fact, during the siege of Gib-
raltar the guns were pointed against the block-ships after being
loaded, it being found that one wet wad alone was sufficient security,
and that with it the shot might absolutely be left to get cold in the
gun. It may, however, be thought necessary to cast iron bottoms
for the hot shot, of the same form as those of wood which I propose
to make use of in loading the guns with shells. These may be

VOL. VII. Z

338 APPENDIX. i

placed over the wad, and then the gun may be well sponged, to
drown any particles of powder that might by accident escape from ,
the cartridge. With this precaution the shot might be left to cool i
in the gun, and there could therefore be no want of time to run
out and point it. But this would be unnecessary if the gun worked
over the bulwark, for it could then be loaded with its muzzle just
outside the vessel, having been previously laid to its elevation, the
direction being obtained by a slight movement of the helm. Thus
there would be no necessity for touching the gun after the shot
was once introduced. Perhaps the precautions I propose are in
part superfluous, as hot shot are fired on shore without observing j
them.

Of the destructive effect of hot shot on an enemy's ship it is
scarcely necessary for me to speak. The destruction of the Spanish
fleet before Gibraltar is wefl known. But if I may be permitted
to relate an example which came under my proper observation,
it will perhaps tend to corroborate others. At New Orleans the
Americans had a ship and schooner in the Mississippi that flanked
our lines. In the commencement we had no cannon. However,
after a couple of days, two field-pieces of 4 or 6 lb. and a howitzer
were erected in battery. In ten minutes the schooner was on fire,
and her comrade, seeing the effect of the hot shot, cut her cable,
and escaped under favour of a light wind. If such was the result
of light shot imperfectly heated — for we had no forge — what would
be the eff"ect of such a volume as a 32-pounder? A single shot
would set a ship in flames.

Having treated the subject of hot shot, I shall now pass to the
use of shells. It has long been well known that ships are more
alarmed at shells than at other projectiles. However, they rarely
do the mischief apprehended from them, in consequence of the
difficulty of hitting so small an object as a ship with a projectile
thrown vertically. This uncertainty prevents bomb-vessels being
employed against ships. If, however, shells be thrown horizontally, ,
their effect would be equally great, and the chance of hitting the j
object aimed at reduced to the same certainty as if shot were used
within a certain range. If the shell passed inside the vessel and
exploded, the result would be the same as if it had been thrown
vertically. My object, however, would be, to arrange it so as to
make the shell stick in the ship's side and explode there. The result
in this case would be much more decisive, and it would tear away
a part of her side, and might send her instantly to the bottom. In
both cases it would probably destroy a number of the crew and set
fire to the ship.

HASTINGS' MEMORANDUM. 339

It remains, therefore, to ascertain whether shells can be thrown to
a sufficient distance with precision from guns and carronades, and
without any danger to your own vessel. The danger of transporting
shells is considerably less than the danger of passing powder. It
is, therefore, only necessary to prove how they may be fired without
danger. The danger of firing a shell from a gun longer than
a howitzer or a carronade is, that it might, by rolling in the bore,
destroy the fusee and explode in the gun ; also, that the fusee might
break from the successive blows it would receive before it quitted
the muzzle. Now, both these objections are obviated by attaching
the shell to a wooden bottom, hollowed out to receive its convexity.
Each shell would be kept in a separate box.

We now come to the plan of attack. In executing this, I should
go directly for the vessel most detached from the enemy's fleet, and
when at the distance of one mile, open with red-hot shot from the
3 2 -pounder forward. The gun laid at point blank, with a reduced
charge, would carry on board en ricochetant. I would then wheel
round and give the enemy one of the 68-pounders with shell laid at
the line of metal, which would also ricochet on board him. Then
the stern 32-pounder with a hot shot, and again the 68-pounder
of the other side with a shell. By this time the bow-gun would
be again loaded, and a succession of fire might be kept up as brisk
as from a vessel having four guns on a side. Here the importance of
steam is evident.

With good locks, tubes, Congreve's sights, and other improvements
in artillery, I really see almost as much difficulty in missing a ship of
any size in tolerably smooth water as in hitting her. In firing from
a ship, the great difficulty is in the elevation; but when my guns
were laid at point blank, or two degrees of elevation, neither shot
nor shells would ricochet over the enemy.

With regard to any risk of the steam machinery being destroyed
by the enemy's fire, there is of course some risk, as there always
must be in military operations of the simplest kind; but when we
consider the small object a low steamer would present coming head
on, and the manner in which the Turks have hitherto used their
guns at sea, this risk really appears very trifling. The surprise
caused by seeing a vessel moving in a calm, ofi'ering only a breadth
of about eighteen feet, and opening a fire with heavy guns at a con-
siderable distance, may also be taken into account. I am persuaded,
from what I have seen, that in many cases the Turks would run
their ships ashore and abandon them, perhaps without having the
presence of mind to set fire to them.

It would be necessary to have a Greek brig always in company to

Z 2

340 APPENDIX.

carry coals and to tow the steamer, for the steam would only be used
in action ^

II.

Memorandum by Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., on Military Operations
in the Morea against Ibrahim Pasha in 1826.

If my judgment is correct, the following would be the outline of
operations for a regular military force, and explains why I think
Napoli di Malvasia (Monemvasia) so important : —

1. At Napoli di Malvasia I would establish my magazines and
form the army. I would provision and garrison NapoU di Romania
(Nauplia) the best way I could, and leave in it the best of the irre-
gular troops under the command of the most deserving Greek chief
Having done so, I would leave them and the government (with the
example of Mesolonghi) to make their defence, and, having cleared
myself of all intrigues, take post at Malvasia.

2. When the preparations for the campaign were sufficiently ad-
vanced to enable me to act, I would advance with my whole force,
regular and irregular, to Sparta, or near it, according to circum-
stances of the ground and roads. Then I would prepare a position
with field-works, to cover the fortress of Napoli di Malvasia against
a force coming from Kalamata, or Tripolitza, or Leondari.

3. This done, if the enemy had his head-quarters at Tripolitza,
with the mass of his force in that town, I would endeavour to cut off
his communications with Navarin, Modon, and Coron, by occupying
the position of Leondari, sending one-half of my irregulars into the
defiles of Mount Chelmos, and the other half to my rear, towards
the fortresses of Navarin, Modon, and Coron. I would concentrate
my whole regular force at Leondari, except a small portion left in
position at Sparta to secure my communications with Napoli di
Malvasia. In fact, Sparta would be the pivot on which all operations
would turn, according to the point on which the enemy had assembled
his force.

4. In this state I would remain, strengthening Leondari by field-
works j and the enemy, no longer able to pass his convoys of pro-
visions from the coast, must attack me in my strong position (and

^ The remainder of the memorandum is occupied with financial calculations,
and with accounts relating to the numbers and pay of the crew. The manner in
which the plan was eventually carried into execution, and some of its results, were
narrated by Captain Hastings in a pamphlet written a short time before his death.
Memoir on the use of Shells. Hot Shot, and Carcass-She.ls from Ship- Artillery. By
Frank Abney Hastings, Captain of the Greek steam-vessel of war Karteria.
London, 1828. Published by Ridgway.

NAPIER'S MEMORANDUM. 341

such positions cannot fail to be found in such a country at every
turn). If he defeats me, I retire, and my troops rally on Sparta in
the prepared position, where another battle may be fought. If again
defeated, the remains of my beaten force retire into Napoli di Mal-
vasia, and await a siege.

5. Suppose that the enemy has begun the siege of Napoli di
Romania. Then, instead of marching upon Leondari, I would march
upon the rear of the besieging army, and post my force so as to cut
off his supplies from Tripolitza ; and I would send all my irregulars
round that town and along the road to Navarin as far as Leondari
and Kalamata. I would strengthen my position as before, and the
enemy must again come and attack me or starve. If he beat me,
I would (as before) retire to Sparta, and if again beaten, enter Mal-
vasia and await a siege.

6. Suppose neither of the above operations could be effected in
consequence of the enemy's force being too great, or from some
other cause. Then I would remain at Sparta with my irregulars
pushed into the defiles along my front, so as to guard the road from
Leondari into Messenia ; and I would closely observe him, that I
might be ready to take advantage of any error he might commit,
or fall with my whole force upon any convoy by a rapid march from
Sparta, and retire with equal celerity to my position.

7. It is pretty clear, by such a plan, the enemy could not besiege
Napoh di Romania, unless he had so large a force that he could
form two armies — one to besiege the town, and another to cover
the siege by marching against Sparta ; and, besides, he would require
a force to protect all his convoys from my irregular troops. This,
we know, he has not. The real defence of Napoli di Romania
depends on Napoli di Malvasia.

8. I have said, that if beaten at Sparta I would go to Malvasia
and abide a siege. Suppose, then, the enemy attempted this opera-
tion, he would find it very difficult, as I would leave all the irregular
troops under an active partizan in the mountains. These would
terribly infest his supplies. The place itself is, I am told, of great
strength, and, however closely blockaded by the sea, could be supplied
by boats at night, and under certain circumstances of weather. If
not blockaded by sea very closely, the greatest part of the army
would be transported to Napoli di Romania, from whence the same
game would be played in favour of Malvasia that she played in favour
of Romania, supposing the latter besieged.

Thus, in this sketch, I have endeavoured to show that you may
always oblige the enemy to attack you in your own position with

34«

APPENDIX.

your back to a fortress, thus uniting offensive war with defensive
positions, which is the secret of mountain warfare — a warfare that
requires more science and better drilled troops than any other.

Peasants may maintain a long war in their mountains without
science, but no results are produced.

It will be seen in the plan I propose that a single defeat to the
enemy would be followed by his total destruction, because, as he
would be driven to fight for want of provisions, his army must starve
after a defeat, for the victorious army would remain between him and
Navarin, from whence he received his supplies. It is true that,
if his defeat took place at Sparta, he might escape by Kalamata,
though to retreat through a country of defiles exposed to a hostile
peasantry is very difficult. But let us suppose he accomplished his
object and reached Navarin. Still great results are produced to the
Greeks, who would at once besiege him, and the whole country would
be recovered, and Tripolitza and Leondari fortified. It is much to
be doubted if the Turks could long resist in Navarin when besieged
in a scientific manner. I think it certain that ten days or a fortnight
would oblige Navarin to surrender.

With the force now under Ibrahim Pasha, I think he could not
resist five thousand disciplined troops supported by one ihousand\
veteran Europeans. With such a force, and twenty pieces of Ught
artillery, the Morea might be liberated in a month, and great things
undertaken.

It is evident that my plan is but an outline, which admits of modi-
ficadons in filling up the details of execution according to accidents
of roads, mountains, supplies, the enemy's strength, positions, move-
ments, &c. In the various operations of the foregoing plan, the
garrison of Corinth would come out and take post in the passes
commanding the entrance into the plain of Tripolitza from the
north-east.

A great advantage of this plan is, that young Greek regulars are
not required to attack, but to defend positions. Every old soldier
knows how to estimate this advantage. My own opinion is, that
neither Greeks nor Turks would succeed in attacking a well-chosen
position. The first round of cannon-shot would defeat their column,
and make them refuse to advance.

C. N.

HASTINGS' LETTERS. 343

III.

Copy of a letter addressed by Frank Hastings, Esq., to Prince Mavro-

cordatos, President of Greece.
The original, as copied in Hastings' journal, was in French, which

Hastings wrote with facility.

Corinth, 241k April, 1822.
Monsieur le Prince,

I have determined to take the liberty of addressing
your Highness in writing, as I found you occupied when I had the
honour of presenting myself at your residence yesterday. I shall
speak with freedom, convinced that your Highness will reply in the
same manner.

I will not amuse you with recounting the sacrifices I have made to
serve Greece, I came without being invited, and have no right
to complain if my services are not accepted. In that case, I shall
only regret that I cannot add my name to those of the liberators
of Greece ; I shall not cease to wish for the triumph of liberty and
civilization over tyranny and barbarism. But I believe that I may
say to your Highness without failing in respect, that I have a right
to have my services either accepted or refused, for (as you may easily
suppose) I can spend my money quite as agreeably elsewhere.

It seems that I am a suspected person because I am an English-
man. Among people without education I expected to meet with
some prejudice against Englishmen, in consequence of the conduct
of the British government, but I confess that I was not prepared to
find such prejudices among men of rank and education. I was far
from supposing that the Greek government would believe that every
individual in the country adopted the same political opinions. I am
the younger son of Sir Charles Hastings, Baronet, general in the
army, and in possession of a landed estate of nearly £10,000 a year.
The Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India, was brought
up by my grandfather along with my father, and they have been
as brothers. If I were in search of a place I might surely find one
more lucrative under the British government in India, and less
dangerous as well as more respectable than that of a spy among
the Greeks. I venture to say to your Highness, that if the English
government wished to employ a spy here, it would not address a
person of my condition, while there are so many strangers in the
country who would sell the whole of Greece for a bottle of brandy.
But it would not be either to the one or the other that it would

344 APPENDIX.

address itself; it would apply to a Greek, and with money traitors
are to be found in all countries.

I quitted England because I believed that the government treated
me in an arbitrary and unjust manner, in dismissing me from the
navy after fifteen years' service, for an affair of honour while I was on
half-pay, and consequently when the Admiralty had no right to take
such a step. But in virtue of the Royal prerogative I was dismissed
without form, the affair having been misrepresented by an Admiral,
who having had a personal quarrel with the Marquis of Hastings
whom he conveyed to India, revenged himself on me.

What I demand of your Highness is only to serve, without having
the power to injure, your country. What injury can I inflict on
Greece, being alone in a ship of war .? I must share the fate of the
ship, and if it sink I shall be drowned with the rest on board.

I hope therefore your Highness will give me a definitive answer,
whether you will accept my services or not.

I have, etc.,

FRANK HASTINGS.

IV.

Copy of a letter addressed by Captain Frank Abxey Hastings, com-
manding the Greek naval force in Eastern Greece, to General Sir
Richard Church, Commander-in-chief of the Greek army.

Karteria, Karbousta, i^tk Feb., 1828.

Sir,

It is painful to me to recur to the oft repeated subject of your
interference with naval affairs. I am particularly desirous of quitting
this station, that I may no longer be subjected either to this inter-
ference or to the disagreeable alternative of addressing you in a strain
similar to the present, which has (to my regret) been rendered so
frequently necessary.

Our duties are so distinct that I cannot conceive how anybody
can mistake them, even not having been brought up in the British
service.

I met at this place a bracciera having your permission to carry
grain. Had the grain been on board I certainly should have cap-
tured her. I will capture any loaded boats I meet with your
passports. Your Excellency will recollect that the blockade of this
part of the Worea was not undertaken by me without your sanction.
I represented to you the scandalous traffic carrying on to Patras by

CONSTITUTION OF GREECE. 345

land, and you concurred in the blockade as the only method to
remedy it. If you had any exceptions to make, it would have been
proper for you (I should think) to state the same to me, that I might
give such passports, if the case should appear to me to require it,
which I certainly think it does not. But what do you do.? You give
a monopoly of grain (without my knowledge or approbation) to a
person here, and when the Helvetia, gun-boat, sent away a boat
licensed by you, you then inform me and request me to permit the
traffic. INIy reply is justly, I cannot, now that I am asked, and
would not, had I been asked in the first instance in the proper
manner, admit a monopoly near Patras at the moment I have been
endeavouring to suppress the commerce much further off. It would
be such a glaring injustice, that I should be subject to the suspicion
of profiting by the monopoly I was creating,

I hope this is the last time I shall be obliged to refer to this
disagreeable topic, for I shall very quickly now quit this station.
The length of time I have been upon it without receiving any order
from my commander-in-chief, his temporary absence from Greece,
the silence of the government, and the discretionary orders with
which I was left by Lord Cochrane, all sanction my taking a step
rendered necessary alone by your disapprobation of the manner in
which I have conducted the naval affairs since I have been on this
station.

I have, etc.,

FRANK ABNEY HASTINGS.

The Constitution of Greece, 1864.

In the name of the Holy, Consubstantial, and Indivisible Trinity,
the Second National Assembly of the Greeks convoked at Athens
decrees : —

Concerning Religion.

Article I. The estabHshed religion of Greece is the Eastern Ortho-
dox Church of Christ. Every other recognized religion is tolerated
under the protection of the law, proselytism and all interference with
the Established Church being prohibited.

II. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging for its head
our Lord Jesus Christ, is indissolubly united in doctrine with the
great church of Constantinople, and with every other chtuxh of Christ

•vy^

34^ APPENDIX.

holding the same doctrines, observing invariably, as they do, the holy
apostolic and synodal canons and holy traditions. It is self-governed,
exercising its governing rights independent of every other church, and
administering them by a holy synod of bishops.

The ministers of every recognized religion are subjected to the
same superintendence on the part of the state as the clergy of the
Established Church.

Public rights of the Greeks.

III. The Greeks are equal in the eye of the law, and contribute
without distinction to the public burdens in proportion to their
fortunes. Only Greek citizens are admissible to public employments.
Citizens are those who have acquired or may acquire the qualifi-
cations required to constitute citizenship by the laws of the state.

Titles of nobility or distinction cannot be conferred on Greek
citizens nor recognized.

IV. Personal liberty is inviolable. No man can be prosecuted,
arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise restrained except when and how
the law provides.

V. Except when taken in the act, no man can be arrested or
imprisoned without a judicial warrant specifying the ground of arrest
or imprisonment." He who is seized in the act or arrested by warrant
must be carried without delay before the competent examining judge,
who is bound within a delay not exceeding three days from his
compearance either to release him or deliver a warrant for his im-
prisonment. Should three days elapse without the examining judge
granting a warrant of imprisonment, every jailor or other person, civil
or military, who may be charged with the detention of the person
arrested, is bound to release him instantly. Any violation of these
provisions is punishable as illegal imprisonment.

VI. The council of the Judges of the Court of Delicts (correctional
tribunal) in the case of political offences, can, at the demand of the
person detained, authorize his release under caution to be determined
by a judicial order against which an appeal is allowed ; nor with a
judicial order, can this preliminary detention be prolonged beyond
three months.

VII. No punishment can be inflicted unless appointed by law.

VIII. No one can be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the judge
assigned to him by law.

IX. The right to address written petitions to public authorities
may be exercised by a single person or by many on conforming to
the laws.

j(ft

CONSTITUTION OF GREECE. 347

X. Greeks have the right to assemble tranquilly and unarmed.
The police may be present at all public meetings. Meetings in the
open air may be prohibited if they offer danger to public security.

XI. Greeks have the right to form societies in conformity with the
laws, and in no case can the law require a previous permission on
the part of the government for the exercise of this right.

XII. The dwelling is inviolable. Domiciliary visits can only be
made when and how the law authorizes.

XIII. In Greece men cannot be sold nor bought. A purchased
slave or a serf, of every race and religion, is free from the time he
enters Greece.

XIV. Every one may publish his opinions by speech, by writing,
or by printing, conformably to the laws. The press is free. The
censorship and every other preventive measure is prohibited. The
seizure of newspapers and other printed communications whether
before or after publication is prohibited. Exceptionally the seizure
after publication is permitted in case of insult to the Christian
religion or the person of the king. But in this case the public
prosecutor is bound within twenty-four hours after the seizure to
submit the case to the judicial council, and the judicial council is
bound to decide whether the seizure is to be maintained or with-
drawn ; otherwise the seizure ceases to be valid. Appeal is allowed
only to the publisher of the article seized and not to the public
prosecutor.

Only Greek citizens are allowed to publish newspapers.

XV. No oath can be imposed except in the form provided by
law.

XVI. Higher instruction is provided at the expense of the state.
The state contributes to the schools in the municipalities according to
the exigencies of the case.

Every one has the right of establishing private schools in conformity
with the laws of the state.

XVII. No one can be deprived of his property except for some
public necessity duly certified in the manner provided by law and
always preceded by indemnification.

XVIII. Torture and general confiscation are prohibited. Civil
death is abolished. The punishment of death for political crimes
except in the case of complicated crimes is abolished.

XIX. No previous permission of the governmental authorities is
required to prosecute a public or municipal official for illegalities
committed in the exercise of his functions except for acts specially
ordered by ministers.

XX. The secrecy of letters is inviolable.

348 APPENDIX.

The form of Government.

XXI. All power has its source in the nation, and is exercised in
the manner appointed by the constitution.

XXII. The legislative power is exercised by the king and the House
of Representatives of the people (B0VX17).

XXIII. The right of proposing laws belongs to the representatives
of the people and the king who exercises it by his ministers.

XXIV. No proposal relative to an increase of the public expendi-
ture by salary or pension or in general for any personal interest can
originate from the House of Representatives.

XXV. If a project of a law be rejected by one of the two legisla-
tive powers it cannot be introduced again in the same legislative
session.

XXVI. The authentic interpretation of the laws belongs to the
legislative power.

XXVII. The executive power belongs to the king, but it is exer-
cised by responsible ministers appointed by him.

XXVIII. The judicial power is exercised by courts of law. Judicial
sentences are executed in the king's name.

Concerning the King.

XXIX. The person of the king is irresponsible and inviolate. His
ministers are responsible.

XXX. No act of the king is valid, nor can it be executed, unless it
be countersigned by the competent minister, who renders himself
responsible for it by his signature alone. In case of a change of
ministry, if none of the retiring ministers consent to countersign
the ordinance dismissing the old and appointing the new ministry, the
new president of the cabinet appointed by the king will sign the
ordinance after taking the oath of office.

XXXI. The king appoints and dismisses his ministers.

XXXII. The king is the highest authority in the state. He com-
mands the army and navy, declares war and concludes treaties of
peace, alliance, and commerce, communicating them to the House
of Representatives with the requisite explanation as soon as the
interest and security of the state allow of its being done. Commercial
treaties and all conventions granting concessions, concerning which
nothing can be determined according to the other provisions of
the constitution without a special law, or which affect Greeks per-
sonally, are not valid without the consent of the House of Repre-
sentatives.

CONSTITUTION OF GREECE. 349

XXXIII. No cession nor exchange of territory can take place
without a law. No secret articles of a treaty can abrogate the public
articles.

XXXIV". The king confers military and naval rank in accordance
with the law ; he appoints and dismisses public officials, saving the
exceptional cases provided for by law. But he cannot appoint to any
office not already established by law.

XXXV. The king issues the ordinances for executing the laws, but
in no case can he delay their execution nor make any exception in
their operation.

XXXVI. The king sanctions and publishes the laws. A project
of law voted by the House of Representatives and not sanctioned
by the king within two months of the conclusion of the session
becomes null.

XXXVII. The king convokes the House of Representatives once a
year in ordinary session, and in extraordinary session as often as he deems
necessary. He opens and closes each session either in person or by
his deputy, and he has the right of dissolving the House of Represen-
tatives ; but the ordinance dissolving it must be countersigned by the
ministry, and must at the same time proclaim new elections within
two months, and convoke the new House of Representatives within
three months.

XXXVIII. The king can prorogue the meeting or suspend the
continuance of a legislative session. The prorogation or suspension
cannot exceed forty days, nor be renewed during the same session
without the consent of the House.

XXXIX. The king has the right to pardon, commute, and diminish
the punishments awarded by the courts of law, excepting those pro-
nounced against ministers. He has also the right to grant amnesty,
but only in case of political crimes under the responsibility of the
ministry.

XL. The king has the right of conferring the legal distinctive
decorations, according to the regulations of the law relative to this
subject.

XLI. The king has the right to coin money in conformity with
law.

, XLII. The king's civil list is fixed by law. That of George the
First is one million, one hundred and twenty-five thousand drachmas,
in which is included the sum voted by the Ionian parliament. The
amount may be increased after the lapse of ten years.

XLIII. King George after signing the present constitution will take
the following oath in presence of the National Assembly.

' / swear in the name of the Holy, Consuhstantial, and Indivisible

350 APPENDIX.

Trinity to maintain the Established Religion of the Greeks, to observe the
constitution and laivs of the Greek nation, and to preserve and defend
the ftational independence and integrity of the Greek state!

XLIV. The king has no powers but those expressly assigned to
him by the constitution and the special laws annexed to it.

The Succession and the Regettcy.

XLV. The crown of Greece and its constitutional rights are
hereditary, and are transmitted in direct line to the legitimate and
lawful descendants of King George by order of primogeniture, giving
preference to males.

XLVI. If no direct descendant exist in accordance with the
preceding article, the king can appoint a successor with the con-
sent of the House of Representatives convoked for the purpose,
giving its consent by an open vote comprising two thirds of all its
members.

XLVII. Every successor to the Greek throne must be a member of
the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ.

XLVIII. The crown of Greece can never be united with the crown
of any other kingdom on the same head.

XLIX. The king attains his majority on completing his eighteenth
year. Before ascending the throne he takes the oath in Article XLIII
in presence of the ministers, the Holy Synod, the members of the
House of Representadves present in the capital, and other high
functionaries. The king convokes the House of Representatives
within two months, and repeats the oath in presence of the repre-
sentatives of the people.

L. In case of the king's death, if the successor be a minor or
absent, and there be no regent appointed, the House of Representa-
tives, whether its session be terminated or it may have been dissolved,
reassembles without summons within fifteen days after the king's
death at the latest. The constitutional power of the crown is
exercised by the council of ministers under their responsibility, until
the regent takes the oath or until the arrival of the successor. A
special law will regulate the competency of the regency.

LI. In case of the king's death, if the successor be a minor, the
House of Representatives assembles and appoints a guardian. A
guardian is only appointed when none has been named in the will
of the deceased king, or when the minor has not a mother remaining
in widowhood who is called by right to the guardianship of her child.
The guardian of the minor sovereign, whether named by will or
chosen by the House of Representatives, must be a Greek citizen.

CONSTITUTION OF GREECE. 35 1

LII. In case of a vacancy of the throne, the House of Repre-
sentatives, even if its session be terminated or it may have been
dissolved, elects by open voting a Greek citizen to act provisionally
as regent ; the council of ministers exercising the constitutional
power of the crown under its responsibility in the name of the
nation, until the regent takes the oath. Within two months at
farthest a number of deputies equal to the number of the repre-
sentatives of the people in the House of Representatives must be
chosen by the electors, and these deputies, forming one body when
united with the House of Representatives, choose a king by a
majority of two thirds of the whole number convoked and by open
voting,

LIII. If the king on account of absence or illness consider it
necessary to appoint a regent, he convokes the House of Repre-
sentatives for the purpose and proposes by his ministers a special
law. If the king be not in a condition to reign, the ministry
convokes the House of Representatives, and if the House recognizes
the necessity by a majority of two thirds of its members in an open
vote, the House of Representatives chooses a regent by open voting,
and if necessary a guardian.

The House of Representatives (BovXjj).

LIV. The House of Representatives assembles annually by in-
herent right on the ist of November, unless it be convoked earlier by
the king. The duration of each session cannot be less than three
months nor more than six months.

LV. The meetings of the House of Representatives are public, but
the House may debate with closed doors at the demand of ten
members ; if the motion be adopted in secret sitting by a majority, it
must be subsequently decided whether the discussion ought to be
resumed in a public sitting.

LVI. The House of Representatives cannot hold a sitting unless
at least one more than half the whole number of members is present,
nor can it come to a decision without an absolute majority of the
members present. In case of an equality of votes, the motion is
rejected.

LVII. No project of law is adopted unless it be discussed and
voted article by article thrice and on three different days.

LVIII. No one has a right to present himself before the House of
Representatives to make any statement either verbally or by writing.
Petitions must be presented by a member, or may be deposited in the
office. The House has the right to send petitions addressed to it, to

^^2, APPENDIX.

the ministers, who are bound to give explanations as often as they are
demanded. The House can appoint committees of its members to
examine the subjects.

LIX. No tax can be imposed nor collected, if it has not been
previously voted by the House of Representatives and sanctioned by
the king.

LX. The House of Representatives votes annually the limitation of
the military and naval forces, the conscription for the army and navy,
and the budget, and it revises the expenditure of the preceding year.
The budget must be brought before the House during the first two
months of each session. The examination is made by a special
committee, and it is voted as a whole.

LXI. No pension nor recompense can be issued from the treasury!
without a law.

LXII. A representative cannot be prosecuted nor questioned on I
account of any opinion or vote given in the exercise of his duty as a
representative.

LXIII. A representative cannot be prosecuted, arrested, nor im-
prisoned during the sessions of the House, except in case of seizure
in the criminal act. Personal detention cannot be exercised against a
representative during the session, four weeks previous to its com-
mencement, nor three weeks after its termination. If a representative
be in prison, he must be released four weeks before the commence-
ment of the session.

LXIV. The representatives before undertaking their duties must
swear the following oath in a public meeting.

' / swear in the name of the Holy, Consubstaniial, and Indivisible
Trinity fidelily to the country, and to the constitution, and io the constitu-
tional king, obedience to the constitution and to the laws of the state, and
to fulfil conscientiously my duties!

Representatives not of the Greek Church instead of the invocation
' in the name of the Holy, Consubstantial, and Indivisible Trinity,'
swear according to their own religious formula.

LXV. The House of Representatives decides on the forms of
procedure regulating the manner of fulfilling its duties.

LXVI. The House of Representatives is composed of deputies
chosen by the citizens having the right to elect, by direct, universal,
and secret suffrage, the votes being given by ballot according to the
provisions of the law of election passed by the Assembly, which can
only be altered in its other provisions.

LXVII. The deputies represent the nation and not the eparchy by
which they are chosen.

LXVIII. The number of deputies from each eparchy is determined

CONSTITUTION OF GREECE. 353

in proportion to the population. In no case can the whole number
of representatives be less than 150.

LXIX. The representatives are elected for four years.

LXX. To be elected a representative, it is necessary to be a Greek
citizen of the eparchy, or to have been domiciled and possessed of
political and civil rights for two years in the eparchy where the elec-
tion is made ; to have completed thirty years of age ; and also to
possess the qualifications required by the law of election.

LXXI. The duties of representative are incompatible with those of
paid officials and demarchs, but not with those of ofiicers of the army
and navy in activity. Ofiicers may be elected, but when elected they
are placed on half-pay during the whole representative period, and
remain so until recalled into activity.

Leave of absence must be granted to officers on demand five
months and a half before the commencement of the elections.

LXXII. Representatives appointed by the government to paid
offices whether civil or military, or promoted and accepting the
: promotion, immediately cease the exercise of their representative
functions.

LXXIII. The House of Representatives examines the qualifications
of its members and decides on doubtful questions of validity.

LXXIV. The Flouse of Representatives elects its president, vice-
presidents, and secretaries at the commencement of each session.

LXXV. Representatives receive a salary of two thousand drachmas
from the public treasury for each regular session. In case of extra-
ordinary sessions they receive only the expenses of their journey.

LXXVI. Representatives receiving pay as military or civil officials
or otherwise can receive only the addition necessary to bring their
receipts to the above amount.

Co7icerning Ministers.

LXXVII. No member of the Royal family can be named a
minister.

LXXVIII. Ministers have free entrance to the sittings of the
House of Representatives, and are listened to whenever they demand
a hearing. They only vote when they are members. The House
can require the presence of ministers.

LXXIX. In no case can an order of the king, whether verbal or
written, release the ministers from responsibility.

LXXX, The House of Representatives has the right to impeach
ministers before a court of justice, presided over by the president
of the Areiopagus, and composed of twelve more members selected

VOL. VII. A a

354 APPENDIX.

from all those who have served as presidents or judges of the Areio-
pagus or Court of Appeal.

A selection will be made by the president of the House of Repre-
sentatives at a public sitting. This court of justice will regulate its
forms of procedure until the publication of a special law.

A special law will determine ministerial responsibility, the punish-
ments to be imposed, and the forms of procedure. This law shall
be submitted to the House of Representatives and voted in the first
legislative session^.

LXXXI. Until the publication of the special law relative to the
responsibility of ministers, the House of Representatives may impeach
ministers, and the above-mentioned court of justice may condemn
them for high treason, for abusive employment of the public wealth,
for illegal collection of money, and for every other violation of the
constitution and laws in the exercise of their functions.

LXXXn. The king can only pardon a minister, condemned
according to the above-mentioned form, with the consent of the
House of Representatives.

Concerning the Council of State ^.

LXXXni. A consultative council is established for preparing and
revising projects of laws, called the Council of State, which sits at
Athens.

LXXXIV. All the projects of laws introduced into the House
of Representatives by the government and not revised in the Council
of State, and all projects of laws proposed by representatives after
their principle has been adopted by the House, shall be remitted
to the Council of State.

If the House judge necessary, it may also remit to the Council
of State projects of laws which it has modified or amended.

The Council of State, having received the projects of laws sent
to it by the House, will examine their clauses and give its opinion
to the House in a detailed report within ten days.

If the Council of State judge necessary, it may demand an ex-
tension of time from the House which may be extended to fifteen
days.

If the Council of State make no report to the House within the

' This law was not submitted to the house and voted in the first legislative
session. The Council of State appears not to have prepared or revised any law on
the subject. The ministers certainly neglected to submit a law to the represen-
tatives; and when the house assumed the initiative there remained no time to vote
the law.

^ The Council of State was abolished in 1865.

CONSTITUTION OF GREECE. ^^^

specified period, the House shall proceed without the report to the
further discussion and voting the project of law.

LXXXV. The number of the members of the Council of State
cannot be less than fifteen nor more than twenty. The salary of
each member is seven thousand drachmas annually.

LXXXVI. The members of the Council of State are named by
the king at the recommendation of the council of ministers, which
countersigns the ordinance of their appointment. Their term of
service is ten years. Those who have- completed this term may
nevertheless be reappointed.

The duty of a councillor of State is incompatible with the duty
of any other public office except that of minister. But in no case
can the duties of minister and councillor of State be exercised at the
.same time.

Concerning the Judicial Power.

LXXXVII. Justice is administered by judges named by the king
according to law.

LXXXVIII. Judges of the Areiopagus and Courts of Appeal,
as well as members of the Court of Accounts having votes, shall
be appointed for life after the lapse of four years from the publication
of the present constitution, and the members of the primary courts
after the lapse of six years. From the time the judges and members
of the Court of Accounts are appointed for life they cannot be
removed without a judicial sentence.

LXXXIX. The qualifications of judicial officials and members of
the Court of Accounts having votes shall be determined by a special
law within three years from the publication of the present con-
stitution.

XC. Public prosecutors, their substitutes, and justices of the peace
do not obtain the right of appointment for life.

XCI. Judicial commissions and extraordinary courts of judicature
cannot be established under any pretext.

XCII. The sittings of courts of law are public, except when
publicity would be injurious to good morals or public order, but
in such cases the courts are bound to pubUsh a decision to that
efi"ect.

XCIII. Every sentence must be founded on reasons assigned and
announced at a public sitting.

XCIV. Jury trial is maintained.

XCV. Political crimes are judged by juries, as well as those
relating to the press, as often as they do not relate to private
life.

A a 2

^^6 APPENDIX.

XCVI. Judges can accept no salaried employment except that|
of professor of the University.

XCVII. The establishment of military and naval courts of justice!
and courts to judge piracy and frauds in navigation shall be regulated]
by special laws.

XCVIII. A special law shall regulate the retirement of judges and!
members of the Court of Accounts named for life, on account of age |
or chronic disease.

XCIX. No body of foreign troops can be received into the Greek I
service, nor remain in nor pass through the state without a law.

C. Military and naval officers can only be deprived of their rank,
honours, and pay, when and how the law provides.

CI. Contested governmental questions must be carried before the
ordinary tribunals, by which they are to be judged as cases of urgency.
Conflicting jurisdictions are judged by the Areiopagus. No courts
of justice, no jurisdiction for contested governmental questions, can
exist without a special law. Until the publication of special laws
the existing governmental jurisdiction remains in force.

CII. Special laws will provide for the disposal and distribution of_
the national lands, and for the regulation and extinction of the public
debts, internal and foreign, at as early a date as possible.

Special laws will also provide during the first legislative period —

1. For pensions, regulating the qualifications of officials generally;

2. For indemnities to be granted to those who fought in the Revolu-
tion of 182 1.

cm. All laws and ordinances in opposition to the present con-
stitution are annulled.

Special Provisions.

CIV. The first representative assembly shall be convoked before
the ist October next year (1865) at latest.

CV. The election of the municipal authorities is to be made by
direct, universal, and secret suffrage, by ballot with balls.

CVI. The national guard is maintained.

CVII. The revision of the whole constitution cannot take place.
Particular provisions in it, with the exception of the fundamental
principles, may be revised after ten years have elapsed from the time
of its publication, and when the necessity of the revision has been
verified.

The necessity of the revision is to be regarded as verified, when
the House of Representatives in two successive representative periods,
by a majority of three quarters of the votes of all the members,

I CONSTITUTION OF GREECE. 357

i demands the revision by a special act determining the provisions

' to be revised.

The revision having been adopted, the existing House of Repre-
sentatives must be dissolved and a new assembly convoked for the
object, consisting of double the number of representatives, which
! shall decide on the provisions to be revised.

I CVIII. The revision of the articles relative to the Council of State
may take place in the first representative period at the demand of
three quarters of the members.

CIX. The present constitution comes into operation as soon as
it shall have been signed by the king. The council of ministers
i is bound to publish it in the Government Gazette within twenty-four
hours after the signature.

ex. The preservation of the present constitution is entrusted to
the patriotism of the Greeks.

Chajige in the Constitution.

On Saturday 19 November (i December) 1865, the House of
Representatives decided by 120 votes to 26 that the Council of State
should be abolished in virtue of the power conferred by Article CVIII.
of the Constitution, and on Wednesday 24 November (5 December)
1865, the king signified his assent to the law annulling Articles
LXXXIII, LXXXIV, LXXXV, and LXXXVI of the Constitution.

INDEX.

Owing to a want of uniformity in spelling it is feared that there may be some
confusion in the case of proper names: but an endeavour has been made to
introduce into the Index as far as possible a uniformity which does not exist in
the text. In the case of double names of persons the name will be found under
the last, except in cases where

(i) the individual is an emperor, king, or the like ;

(2) the latter name is an epithet rather than a family name.

Aali Effendi, vii. 202.

Aaron, King of Bulgaria, ii. 442, 453
seq., iii. 62.

Abasges, ii. 166.

Abasgia, ii. 385.

Abassides, ii. 20, 152.

Abbas Pasha, vi. 382, 383.

Abbas, Tahir, vi. 81, 86, 91 seq. ; visit
of, to Mesolonghi, vi. 91.

Abdalmelik, caliph, makes peace with
Justinian II, i. 386, 387 ; establishes
haratch, i. 389, ii. 32; conquers Car-
thage and Africa, i. 392 and note;
tolerance of, i. 410; coinage of, i.
389, 419.

Abderrahman, ii. 152, 214.

Abdulhamid, Sultan, v. 263, 264, 266,
268.

Abel, Mr., vii. no, in, 135, 136, 138 ;
recalled, vii. 141.

Aberdeen, Earl of, vii. 51, 57.

Abgarus, portrait of Christ sent to, ii.
308 ; letter of Christ to, ii. 402, iii. 220.

Abilkodos, monastery of, i. 360.

Aboubekr, succeeds Mahomet, i. 358 ;
besieges Bostra, i. 359 ; pi^oclama-
tion of, to the Egyptians, i. 372.

Abou Hafs, ii. 135.

Aboulabad, Pasha of Saloniki, vi. 206
seq.

Aboulkassim, iii. 91, 92.

Aboulsewar, ii. 440.

Abou Said, ii. 159.

Abu Cab, ii. 413.

Abu Chazar, ii. 153,

Abulaphar, ii. 413.

Abydos, resolution of, i. 20; siege of,

ii- 365-
Abyssinia (Ethiopia), relations of Justi-
nian with, i. 264.

Academy, i. 277; Platonic, endowment
of, i. 287.

Acarnania, resolution of, i. 20 ; depo-
pulation of under Augustus, i. 54 ;
joins Caesar, ib. ; revolt of, vi. 90,
91; affairs of, vi. 273; insurrection
in, vii. 162 seq.; insurrection of, vii. 271.

Accent, in Greek, iv. 4, 5.

Acciaiuoli, family of, at Athens, iv. 156
seq.

Acciaiuoli, Antonio, iv. 159 seq.

Acciaiuoli, Francesca, iv. 130, 159.

Acciaiuoli, Franco, duke of Athens, iv.
164.

Acciaiuoli, Nerio I, conquers Athens,
iv.155; grant of Amalfi, iv. 157;
Malta, ib.; Corinth, iv.158; will of'iv.
159, 168 ; iv. 287.

Acciaiuoli, Nerio II, duke of Athens,
iv. 162 seq., 247, 248.

Acciaiuoli, Nicholas, iv. 157, 287.

Acerra, Richard d', iii. 214, 223; iv. 58.

Achaia, Roman province of, i. 21, 33,
34. 35. 63, 225; ill-treatment of, "i.
53 ; depopulation of, under Augustus,
i. 54; Geffrey, prince of, iii. 301, 308,
iv. 187; William, prince of, iii. 333,
338.339. 360; iv. 138, 199, 200, 201,
203, 206, 207 (see Villehardouin and
de Champlitte) ; principality of, iv. 98,
109, 137, 138; feudal connexion with
Athens, iv. 137 ; Nicholas of St. Omer,
marshal of, iv. 142, 152 ; feudal organi-
zation of, iv. 181 seq., 186 note; Geffrey
II, prince of, iv. 190 seq.; ceded to
Charles of Anjou, iv. 205 ; Florenz of
Hainault, prince of, iv. 209, 215 ;
Philip of Savoy, prince of, iv. 215,
217, 220, 221 ; Matilda of Hainault,
princess of, iv. 217, 221 ; invaded by

3^0

INDEX.

Fernand of Majorca, iv. 218; John

of Gravina, prince of, iv. 220, 221 ;

misgovernment of, iv. 226; extinction

of principality of, iv. 245; list of

princes of, iv. 432.
Achaian League, struggle with Macedon

and Rome, i. 5, 67.
Acharnians (Menidhi and Kasia), vi.

163.
Achelous, battle of, ii. 228, 310 (Aspro-

potamos), vi. 72 note.
Acheron, river, vi. 42.
Achilles, St., ii. 369.
Achmet Bey, defeat of, vi. 212, 272.
Achmet Pasha, v. 219, 225, vii. 22.
Achmet, son of Turakhan, iv. 253.
Achmet Kueprili.v. 10, 112, 116; death

of, V. 168, 177, 192, 241.
Achmet III, sultan, v. 214; firman of,

V. 238; wars and abdication of, v.

245, 246.
Achrida, ii. 371 and note; Patriarch of,

iii. 308 note; Turkish colonies near,

iv. 27.
Achridos, iii. 325.
Acindynus, prefect of the Orient, story

of, i. 149.
Acratus, i. 72.

Acre, Pasha of, rebellion of, vi. 196.
Acrocorinth, vi. 321.
Acroinon, battle of, ii. 20.
Acropolis, besieged by Venetians, v.

185 ; capitulation of Turks in, vi.

283; relieved by Fabvier, vi. 108 seq. ;

besieged by Reshid Pasha, vi. 402,

408 seq. ; capitulates, vi. 432.
Acropolita, George, iii. 321, 322 note,

327, 328, 338, 339, 370; ambassador

to Trebizond, iv. 345.
Actian games, i. 61.
Adam, LTsle, grand master of knights

of Rhodes, v. 67.
Adam, Sir Frederic, mediation of,vi. 388.
Adana, ii. 330, iii. 35, 36.
Addawalah, ii. 309.
Adelard, iii. 183.
Aden, v. 6.

Adjnadin, battle of, i. 360.
Adramyttium, i. 396, iii. 125; council

of, iii. .:;77.
Adrianople, battle of, a. d. 398, i. 154;

sacked, ii. 115; taken by Crumn, ii.

229, 286, ii. 310; taken by Samuel of

Bulgaria, ii. 375, iii. 290, 291 ; taken

by Theodore of Thessalonica, iii. 304,

iv. 113; revolts from Crusaders, iv.

99 ; treaty of, v. 216 ; cotton trade of,

V. 281; Russians at, vii. 26; treaty

of, vii. 52.
Aegina, lost by Athens, i. 60 ; ruin of, v.

68 ; Albanians in, v. 69, vi. 28 ;

belongs to Venice, v, 195 ; lost by

Venice, v. 227 ; Greek government
at, vi. 409 ; orphan asylum at, vii.
48 ; revolution of students in, vii. 6a.

Aegium (Vostitza), vi. 143, 144.

Aelia Capitolina, i. 460.

Aemilius Paulus, in Epirus, i. 53.

Aeneas Sylvius (Pope Pius II), iv. 414,

415-

Aesculapius, enclosure of, near Epidau-
rus, i. 27.

Actios, ii. 157-159.

Aetius, i. 178, 273.

Aetolia, ill-treatment of, i. 53; depop-
ulation of, under Augustus, i. 54, 62 ;
joins Caesar, i. 54; revolt of, vi. 90,
91, 163; insurrection of, vii. 271.

Aetos, fortress of, iv. 256, 258.

Africa, commerce with, i. 7 ; attacked
by Justinian, i. 228; Vandals in, i.
228 seq.; Vandal monarchs of, i.
231 note; reduced by Belisarius, i.
233 ; taxation of, ih. ; desolation of,
i. 234 ; rebellion of troops in, i. 237;
trade of, i. 265 ; Heraclius Exarch
of, i. 31 r, 318 ; Latin used in, i. 318 ;
loss of, i. 392 ; prefecture of, ii. 180;
Arab rule mild in, ii. 134.

Afshin, ii. 153, 156.

Agallianos, ii. 37.

Agatha, daughter of Constantine VII,
ii. 298.

Agathias, i. 208, 273.

Aghia Marina, vi. 279.

Aghiochristophorites, Stephen, iii. 213,
216.

Aghionoros, ii. 187; fortifications of,
vi. 203. {See Athos.)

Aghios Minas (Chios), massacre at
monastery of, vi. 255.

Aghiososti, vi. 294, 295, 366.

Aghiovasili, v. 274.

Agis, attempts to restore old Spartan in-
stitutions, i. II.

Aglabites, ii. 116.

Agnes, of France, wife of Alexius II,
iii. 149, 196, iv. 317; marries An-
dronicus I, iii. 212, 217.

Agnes Courtenay, wife of Geffrey II,
of Achaia, iv. 190. (5ee Courtenay.)

Ago Besiari, vi. 91.

Agoranomoi, i. 222.

Agoulinitza, vi. 385.

Agoyiates (muleteers), vi. 19.

Agranes, ii. 246.

Agrapha, vi. 18, 22 ; charter of Moham-
med II to, vi. 21 ; Greek insurrection
in, vi. 198; devastation of vi. 273.

Agriculture, decay of, at Rome, i. 42,
43, 89; importance of, ii. 215 ; de-
gradation of agricultural classes, iv.
47; burdens of agricultural classes v.
203 J in Greece, state of, vii. 244.

INDEX.

361

Agridha, massacre of Mussulmans at,
vi. 146.

Agrimensores, i. 471.

Aidin, iii. 403, 427.

Ainos, V. 58.

Aix la Chapelle, treaty of, ii. 100.

Akaba, iv. 353.

Akakios, iv. 366.

Akerman, treaty of, vi. 410, vii. 12.

Akhlat, battle of, iv. 336.

Akominatos, Michael, iv. 135.

Akova, barony of, iv. 183, \%i^note, 207,
20S note ; Margaret, lady of, iv. 208,
218 ; taken by Turks, iv. 233 ; taken
by Mohammed II, iv. 258.

Akritas, Digenes, poem, ii. 332 note.

Alach, ii. 401. ,

Aladdin, iii. 476, v. 33.

Alaeddin, iii. 382, 385, 386; sultan of
Roum, iv. 332, 333, 336, 337, 339.

Alalcomenae, statue of Minerva at,
plundered by Sulla, i. 72.

Alans, the, iii. 383, 384, 387, 393, 396,
400, 402, 404.

Alaric, i. 156, 157, 169; enters Greece,
i. 158; occupies Athens, ih.; destroys
Eleusis, ih., i. 283 ; invades Pelopon-
nese, i. 159; plunders Argos, Corinth,
Sparta, ih. ; escapes Stilicho, occupies
Epirus, i. 160; serves under Arcadius,
i. 160, 161, 278.

Alashehr (Philadelphia), iii. 468.

Albania, language of, i. 187, vi. 34 and
note ; geography of, vi. 36 ; Christians
in, vi. 37; state of, in 1834, vii. 151.

Albanians, rise of, i. 334, iii. 122; re-
volt of, iii. 364, 430 ; in Peloponnese,
iii. 486, iv. 31, 233, 239, 254, vi. 29;
in Greece, iv. 30 seq., 122 ; insurrec-
tion of, iv. 254; in Morea, subdued
by Turakhan, iv. 256 ; in Andros, iv.
301 ; in Aegina, v. 69 ; increase of,
in Greece, v. 118, 125, 204, 255-
257; in the Morea, v. 263, 264; in-
trigues of Russia with, v. 268 ; re-
volt of, ih. ; allies of Venice, v. 274,
281, 283, vi. 28 seq.; represent Pelas-
gians (?), vi. 34 ; language of, vi. 34
and note ; warlike spirit of, vi. 39 ;
dress, ih. ; defeated near Tripolitza,
vi. 40 ; genealogies of, Homeric, vi.
58; at Tripolitza, vi. 218; mutiny of,
at Coron, vii. 27.

Albanon, iv. 124.

Albanopolis (Elbassan), iv. 31.

Alberic, ii. 300.

Alboin, i. 293.

Aldoin, count, iii. 214, 223, iv. 58.

Aldruda, iii. 183.

Aleim, ii. 402.

Alemen, Mohammed, ii. 109.

Aleppo (Berrhoea), i. 263 ; Byzantine

troops at, ii. 265, 309, 331, 385;
sultan of, iii. 126.

Alexander, the Great, permanent influ-
ence of his conquests, i. i ; policy
towards Asiatics, i. 3 ; influence of
Aristotle on, i. 3 ; influence of his
conquests upon commerce, i. 7 ; upon
Greek literature, i. 8 ; upon morals,
i. 10; npon religion, i. 12; Roman
embassy to, i. 7 note ; influence of, i.
352 ; population of Greece under, i.
404.

Alexander, son of Alexios IV of Trebi-
zond, iv. 397.

Alexander, son of Amyntas, i. 284.

Alexander, king of Bulgaria, iii. 437.

Alexander, emperor of Byzantium, reign
of, ii. 282.

Alexander, the Logothete, succeeds Be-
lisarius in Italy, i. 242.

Alexander I, emperor of Russia, vi. 1 1 a,
113 ; secret treaty with Napoleon I,
vi. 112; character and policy of, vi.
195 ; death of, vii. 10.

Alexander Severus, i. 50 ; subsidizes
barbarians, i. 91 ; tries to abolish
senate, i. 103.

Alexander of Tralles, i. 273.

Alexandria, capital of Hellenic world,
i. 5 ; literature a trade at, i. 9 ; dis-
tribution of grain at, i. 43, 89, 201 ;
discontinued, i. 321 ; influence of, i. 75 ;
illtreated by Augustus, i. 75 ; patri-
arch of, i. 129, ii. 180; taken by
Arabs, i. 366 ; regained by Manuel,
ih. ; destroyed, i. 367, 373 ; university
of, i. 273, 415; patriarch of, submits to
Mohammedans, i. 410; Spanish Arabs
in, ii. 135; taken by Crusaders, iii.
463 ; trade of Monemvasia with, v.
200 ; convention of, vii. 25, 27.

Alexiopolis (Neokastron), iii. 65, 137.

Alexios I (Grand-Comnenos), of Trebi-
zond, iii. 285, iv. 308, 317-319,
321; defeat of, 324; tributary to
Seljouks, iv. 326, 328, 329.

Alexios II, of Trebizond, iv. 350 seq.;
defeats Turkomans, iv. 352; treaty
with Venice, iv. 355.

Alexios III, of Trebizond, iv. 372 seq.;
ecclesiastical endowments of, iv. 383;
death of, iv. 385.

Alexios IV, of Trebizond, iv. 393 seq. ;
murdered, iv. 398.

Alexios, the Bithynian, iii. 455.

Alexios, son of Joannes IV, iv. 412,
424.

Alexios, Mousel, ii 154, 200.

Alexios, the patriarch, ii. 405, 409, 420,
424, 428.

Alexis, Mouselen, ii. 79.

Alexius I (Comnenus), emperor of Con-

$62

INDEX.

stantinople, iii. 45, 47, 49 seq., iv.
313, 316; reign of, iii. 53 seq.; plots
against, iii. 59 seq. : debases coinage,
iii. 63 ; superstition of, iii. 70 ; de-
feated by Guiscard, iii. 78 ; by Patzi-
naks, iii. 84 ; treaty of, with Crusa-
ders, iii. 102 seq.; war with Bohe-
mund, iii. 119 seq.; recovers Asia
Minor, iii. 124; war with Tancred,
iii. 125; Tuikish war of, iii. 126;
treaty with Melek, iii. 127; death of,
iii. 129; decay of empire under, iii.
136; charter to Venetians, iv. 75.

Alexius II (Comnenus), iii. 149, 196;
reign of, iii. 198 seq. ; deposed, iii.
201, iv. 316 ; pseudo Alexius, iii. 238.

Alexius III (Angelos), reign of, iii. 241
seq. ; piracy of, iii. 246; escape of, iii.
257, 260, 275, 276, 284, 288, 295;
treaty with Venice, iv. 81, 321.

Alexius IV (Angelos), reign of, iii. 257
seq., iv. 85, 86.

Alexius V (Dukas Murtzuphlos), iii.
262, 263 seq.; escape of, iii. 269, 275,
284, iv. 86.

Alexius Comnenus, nephew of Alexius
I, iii. 118.

Alexius Comnenus, grandson of Alexius

I, iii. 171.

Alexius Comnenus, grandson of John

II, iii. 199, 200.

Alexius Comnenus, son of Manuel I,
iii. 214, 237.

Alexius Comnenus, grand-nephew of
Manuel I, iii. 214,

Alfred, Prince, elected king of Greece,
vii. 276, 284 seq.

Algarve, i. 317.

Algiers, conquered by France, vii. 13.

AlHakem, ii. 135, 155.

Ali, contest of Moawyah with, i. 37S.

Ali Benderli, vizier, vi. 187, 189.

Ali Kara {see Kara), naval exploits of,
vi. 222 seq.

Ali Kumurgi, grand-vizier, v. 217, 219,
221, 222, 224, 227, 285.

Ali Pasha, of Argos, vi. 286 seq., 296,
301.

Ali Pasha, of Joannina, v. 269, 274, 275 ;
reduces Chimariots, v. 274, vi. 4, 23 ;
Dervendji Pasha, vi. 40 ; policy of,
vi.^ 41 ; attacks Suliots, vi. 45 ; sur-
prises Nivitza, vi. 46 ; treachery and
cruelty of, vi. 50, 51, 60 seq. ; rebel-
lion of, vi. 63 ; character and history
of, vi. 57 seq. ; patronizes education,
vi. 69 ; Pasha of Thessaly and Joan-
■ nina, vi. 64 ; destroys Khormovo, vi.
66, 66; attempts to assassinate Ismael
Pasho Bey, vi. 70 ; pronounced a
traitor, tb. ; preparations of, vi. 71 ;
promises the Greeks a constitution,

yi. 74 ; divan of, vi. 75 ; Christians
in service of, vi. 76 ; alliance with
Suliots, vi. 81; end of, vi. 93 seq. ;
operations against, vi. 141.

Ali Pharmaki, of Lalla, vi. 155 seq.

Alim, ii. 169.

Alkan, ii. 444.

Allelengyon, ii. 387, 396.

AUies (England, France, Russia), pro-
clamation of, vii. 116; suppress pi-
racy, vii. 151; interfere in Greece,
vii. 226 ; financial commission of, vii.
238 seq. ; report of, vii. 240 seq. {see
Three Powers).

Almagest, the, of Ptolemy, ii. 227.

Almamun, ii. 109, 135 ; caliphate of, ii.
116, 153, 208; translates Greek au-
thors, ii. 213 ftote; encourages science,
ii. 224, iv. 300.

Almanzor (Almansour), ii. 50; closes
Nile canal, i. 366, ii. 212 ; wealth of,
ii. 213.

Almerio, Pietro, iv. 163, 164.

Almogavars, iii. 402 and note.

Almutamid, Caliph, ii. 246.

Alp Arslan, iii. 14, 17, 18, 31, 32 seq.

Alusianos, ii. 417, 418.

Alyattes, Nicephorus, iii. 330.

Amadeus, Prince of Savoy, iv. 223.

Amalasonta, i. 236, 237.

Amalia, of Oldenburg, Queen of Greece,
vii. 144, 167, 220, 222, 228, 231, 249
seq., 252; attempted assassination of,
254, 266, 270.

Amalii, i. 400, 421 ; dukes of, ii. 249,
250, 278, iii. 82,96, 152, 153; granted
to Acciaiuoli, iv. 15 7.

Amanus, Mt., i. 399.

Amara, ii. 169.

Amastrianon, ii. 195.

Amastris, ii. 102, I66; taken by Mo-
hammed II, iv. 416.

Amathus (Limisso), iii. 238.

Amaury I, king of Jerusalem, iii. 186,
187, 207.

Ambassadors, Turkish treatment of, v.
169; at Athens, behaviour of, vii. 177.

Ambelakia, cotton trade of, v. 281 note.

Ambracia, plundered by Fulvius, i. 66.

Ambrose, St., i. 137.

America, aids Greeks in 1827, vi. 437.

Amida (Diarbekr), i. 362, ii. 1S6, 368,
iii. 17.

Amisos, ii. 187, iii. 289, iv. 322 seq.

Amiroutzes, V. 118.

Amorgos, depopulation of, iv. 301 ;
taken by Turks, v. 69.

Amorium, i. 380, ii. 6, 14, 47, 48, 12S ;
siege and capture of, ii. 157, 168,
363 ; taken hy Seljouks, iii. 28.

Amour, son of Aidin, iii. 436, 437, 442.

Amphictyons, in time of Pausanias, i. 67.

INDEX,

Z^?>

Amphissa (Salona), revolt and capture

of, vi. 159, 160.
Amrou, i. 363, 365.
Amyntas, Alexander, son of, i. 284.
Aniytzantarants, at Trebizond, civil war

withScholarians.iv. 362,363, 367,383.
Anachoutlou, Anna, empress of Trebi-
zond, iv. 365, 367.
Anactoropolis (Eion), iii. 454 ; Alexios

at, iii. 455.
Anagnostaras, a klepht, vi. 148, 149,

341. .^62.
Anaktoboulion (Camarilla), vii. 257.
Anaphe, taken by Turks, v. 69.
Anastasios, patriarch, ii. 49, 57, 75-
Anastasius I, law of, i. 154, 172 ; reign

of, i. 180; diminishes taxation, i. 181 ;

reforms curia, ih.\ wall of, i. 181, 210,

254; abolishes Chrysargyron, i. 182;

canal of, ih.; wealth of, i. 182, 185;

patriarch of Constantinople refuses

to crown, i. 189 ; statue of, i. 192,

195, 197, 207 ; his concession to He-

ruls, i. 249 ; damages works of art,

i. 414.
Anastasius II, i. 395.
Anastasius, work by Mr. Hope, v. 65.
Anatolikon, taken, v. 254, vi. 163 ; siege

of, vi. 317, 321, 324; capitulates, vi.

388, vii. 24; evacuation of, vii. 39.
Anazarba, ii. 186, 309.
Anchialus, i. 339, ii. 87, no.
Ancona, rival of Venice, iii. 182; treaty

with Manuel, iv. 78 ; siege of, iv. 79 ;

port of, v. 156.
Ancyra, i. 343, ii. 102 ; taken, iii. 114.
Andalusia, i. 233 note.
Andravida, capital of Achaia, iv. 177,

179, 182 ; siege of, iv. 204, 229.
Andreas, the Kalybite, ii. 61.
Andrew, the Slavonian, ii. 246.
Andrew, St., ii. 104 ; patron of Patrae,

iv. 14.
Andrew, son of Thomas, despot of

Morea, iv. 267.
Andritzena, vii. 15.4.
Andronicus I (Comnenus), emperor of

Constantinople, iii. 147, 148, 174,

185, 200; i-eign of, 201 seq., 210;

marries Agnes, iii. 212, 217; de-
throned iii. 217, iv. 316.
Andronicus II (Palaeologus), reign of,

iii. 373 seq.; dethroned, iii. 418;

state of army under, iii. 383 seq., iv.

350 seq.
Andronicus III (Palaeologus), iii. 410

seq.; rebellion of, iii. 413; takes

Constantinople, iii. 418; reign of, iii.

419 seq.; character, iii. 420; death

of, iii, 431.
Andronicus, Palaeologus, son of John V,

rebellion of, iii. 464, 465.

Andronikos I (Ghidos), of Trebizond,
iv. 326, 332 seq.; treaty with Alaed-
din, iv. 332, 336; war with Alaeddin,
iv. 333 ; ally of Gelaleddin, iv. 336.

Andronikos II, of Trebizond, iv. 341.

Andronikos III, of Trebizond, iv. 359.

Andronikos (see Dukas), ii. 285.

Andronikos, bishop of Sardes, iii. 377,

378.

Andros, college at, ii. 224; conquered
by Marino Dandolo, iv. 282, 283;
signory of, iv. 289; history of, iv. 300
seq.; Albanians in, iv. 301 seq., vi.
28 ; taken by Turks, v. 69.

Andrutzos, vii. 88.

Anemas, iii. 61.

Angelos family, account of, iii. ■221.

Angelos, Alexius (see Alexius III), reign
of, iii. 241 seq.

Angelos, Alexius (see Alexius IV), son
of Isaac II, iii. 251, 253, 254; reign
of, iii. 257 seq.,iv. 83 ; coronation of,
iv. 85.

Angelos, Andronicus, iii. 209, 221.

Angelos, Constantino, iii. 171, 210, 221.

Angelos, Isaac (see Isaac II), iii. 216;
reign of, iii. 220 seq. ; character, iii.
221; dethroned, iii. 241, 253, 254;
reinstated, iii. 257; death, iii. 263;
treaty with Venice, iv. 80, 316, 317.

Angelos, John, prince of Vallachia, iii.
437.

Angora, iii. 247 ; Othomans defeated at,
iii. 481, iv. 3S9, 390, V. 46.

Ani, ii. 385, 386, 440; lost, iii. 14; taken
by Alp Arslan, iii. 18.

Anjou, Charles of, iii. 353 seq., 357,
361, 363, iv. 141, 205, 345.

Anna, daughter of Alexios III of Trebi-
zond, iv. 385.

Anna Anachoutlou, empress of Trebi-
zond, iv. 365, 367.

Anna, wife of Artavasdos, ii. 47.

Anna Comnena, work of, iii. 53 note,
128; conspiracy of, iii. 131.

Anna, of Epirus, iv. 142.

Anna, wife ofjohn III (of Nicaea),iii.3i9.

Anne, of Savoy, empress-regent, iii.
432 seq.

Anne, wife of Vladimir, ii. 357.

Anseau, iii. 340.

Antes, i. 252.

Anthedon, razed by Sulla, i. 27,

Anthimos, Slavonian general, ii. 417.

Anthimos, palace of, ii. 196, 197.

Anthimus, patriarch of Jerusalem, v. 285.

Anthimus, port of, ii. 16.

Anthusa, ii. 68.

Antigonenses, Fauces, vi. 73.

Antioch, distribution of grain at, i. 43,
89, 201 ; retains its municipal privi-
leges, i. 75; patriarch of, i. 129,11.

3^4

INDEX,

i8o; arrests Huns, i. 162; earth-
quake at, i. 179, 183; sacked by
Chosroes, i. 202, 263, 273; ransomed,
i. 252; university of, i. 273, 415;
Eudocia at, i. 285 ; ceases to be
Greek, i. 402 ; port of, taken, ii. 159,
331. 332. 358; Niketas, duke of, ii.
407, 411 ; taken by Suleiman, iii. 91 ;
Constantine, duke of, ii. 408, 411,
420; besieged by Crusaders, iii. 110,
142; war of Manuel I with, iii. 159,
160; patriarch of, iii. 184; Raymond
of, iii. 159, 160; Reynold of Chatillon,
prince of, iii. 184, 185, 207; Maria
of, wife of Manuel I, iii. 186, 199, 201.

Antiocheia taken, iii. 295.

Antiochenus, George, iii. 162.

Antiochus, proconsul of Achaia, i. 157.

Antiparos, taken by Turks, v. 69.

Antipsara, vi. 346, 347.

Antirrhion, Capodistrians at, vii. 91.

Antonines, the, Greece under, i. 62 ;
provincial reforms of, i. 63.

Antoninus, Pius, i. 65, 66 ; favours Pal-
lantium, i. 66; employs Herodes At-
ticus as tutor, i. 66.

Antonios, patriarch, ii. 337.

Antonius, C., rapacity of, i. 38 ; at
Cephallenia, i. 47, ii. 254.

Antony, his statues destroyed by Au-
gustus, i. 72.

Antony, of Syllaeum, ii. 117, 119.

Aous (Viosa), vi. 72 note.

Apamea, i. 263.

Apelates, ii. 196.

Aphiusa, ii. 109.

Aplakes, John, ii. 112.

Apokapes, iii. 21,

Apokaukos, iii. 412, 427, 433, 435;
murdered, 438.

Apollinarius, i. 274.

Apollo, the, newspaper, vii. 60.

Apollo, temple of, at Megara, built by
Hadrian, i. 65 ; temple of, at Daphne,
i. 121.

Apollonius of Tyana, at Smyrna, i. 70 ;
at Pan Ionian assembly, ih.

Apomerman, ii. 402,

Aponasar, ii. 452.

Apostoles, admiral, vi. 321, 377.

Appanages, iii. 15, 16 seq.

Apres, ii. 115.

Apri, John of, patriarch, iii. 421.

Apros, battle of, iii. 402,

Apsimar, i. 393, ii. 125.

Apulia (Longobardic theme), ii. 255,
279; ravaged by Hungarians, ii. 313;
Mainates in, v. 117.

Aqueduct, of Hadrian, at Athens, i. 65 ;
at Corinth, i. 65, 80 ; at Constanti-
nople, i. 222; of Valens repaired, ii.
56.

Arabia, effects of trade on, i. 268 ; com-
merce of, ii. 211.

Arabs, neglect Greek literature, i. 8 ; in
Syria, i. 327, 354 ; effect of wars of
Heraclius on, i. 354, 358; gain trade
of Egypt, i. 354 ; conquer Syria, i.
359; take Jerusalem, a.d. 637, i. 361 ;
take Alexandria i. 366; destroy old
civilisation, i. 36S ; amount of tri-
bute to, i. 374 ; defeated at Samosata,
i- 393 ; exterminate Greeks, i. 40 1 ,
417; get Greek learning through
Syriac, i. 418; literature of, ih. ; rule
mild at first, ii. 134.

Arachova, vi. 406.

Arachthus (river of Arta), vi. 72 note.

Aradus, taken by Saracens, i. 374.

Aragon, duchy of Athens and Neopa-

tras, an appanage of the house of, iv.

154-
Area, ii. 331.

Arcadia, supposed relation of Rome to,
i. 66; Ibrahim Pasha in, vi. 370;
insurrection in, vii. 153 seq.

ArcadiopoKs, ii. 115, 131, 345 ; iii. 235,
240.

Arcadius, i. 147, 160, 161.

Archelaus, defeated by Sulla at Chje-
ronea, i. 27.

Archipelago, duchy of, iv. 138, 276;
transferred to principality of Achaia,
iv. 282, 283 ; reduced by Othomans,
iv. 292; extinguished, iv. 294; con-
dition of under Venetians, iv. 295
seq. ; Turkish corsairs in, iv. 303 ;
list of dukes of, iv. 433 ; (see Dalle
Carceri, Crispo, Sanudo).

Arenos Ximenes d', iii. 405, 406.

Areopagus, under Tiberius, i. 27 ; still
existing, i. 67; of Salona, vi. 237 ; of
East Greece, vi. 278, 279 ; dissolved,
vi. 305.

Arethusa (Restan), i. 361.

Argaous, ii. 169.

Argenteus, i. 50, i. 435 {see Coinage).

Arghyrokastro, vi. 66 ; taken, vi, 79.

Arghyrokastron, Suleiman of, vi. 20.

Argos, ravaged by Goths, i. 94, 159 ; a
fief of Athens, iv. 138, 152,194, 195;
Venetians at, iv. 235 ; taken by Otho-
mans, iv. 235, V. 60 ; loss and re-
covery of, iv. 268 ; Albanians at, v.
63; national assembly at, vi. 239;
Dramali at, vi. 287 ; anarchy of
Greeks at, vi. 290 ; Greeks in Larissa
of, vi. 291, 292 ; acts of national
assembly of, vii. 49 seq. ; second
national assembly at, vii. 74; Rome-
liots at, attacked, vii. 78; anarchy at, J'
ih. ; Romeliots enter, vii. 82 ; French
at, vii. 103; Gen. Gordon at, vii. 160.

Argyros Eustatliios, ii. 269.

INDEX.

S^S

Argyros, son of Mel, ii. 430, 439 ; iii. 36.

Ariadne, i. 179, 180.

Arians, i. 129, 134, 228.

Ariebes. rebellion of, iii. 59.

Aristarchos, dragoman of Porte, vi.
186.

Aristides, i. 280.

Aristion, strategos at Athens, i. 25,
{See Athenion.)

Aristocracy, ruins Rome, i. 138; By-
zantine, extinction of, v. 122.

Aristotle, his influence on Alexander,
i. 3 ; notice of silkworms, i. 270.

Arkadia, town of, v. 253 (Cyparissia),
Ibrahim Pasha at, vi. 372.

Armansperg, Count, vii. 105, no seq.,
135 seq., 138, 140; absolute, 142;
administration of, 143 seq.; recalled,
144, 167; imprudence of, 153 seq.,
161, 162.

Armansperg, Countess, vii. 113.

Armatoli, v. 192, vi. 14, 18, 19 seq., 23,
26.

Armenia, state of, i. 261 ; partition of,
ih. ; literary energy of, i. 272 ; na-
tional church of, i. 275, 315; state
of, i. 328; tributary to Saracens, i.
374' 377 > visited by Constans, i.
376, i. 387 ; the fourth Armenia, i.
399; Christians of, emigrate, ii. 90 ;
Bulgarians and Slavonians in, ii. 384 ;
reduced, ii. 440 ; taken by Turks,
ii. 442 ; Seljouk Turks in, iii. 14-
16.

Armenians, i. 166; guards, i. 255,271;
the Armenian aera, i. 272; revolt of
under Sapor, i. 380 ; importance of,
ii. 200, 308 ; in Bulgaria, ii. 384 ; at
Philippopohs, iii. 234 ; in Troad, iii.
286, 287.

Armenopoulos, manual of, iv. 95.

Army, Roman, i. 114 and note; under
Justinian, i. 204 ; reformed by Tibe-
rius and Maurice, i. 300 ; state of, ii.
27; deterioration of Byzantine, iii.
158; under Andronicus, II, iii. 383
seq.

Armyros, v. 114, 116, 179, vi. 399.

Arnaout-oglou, attack on, vi. 14-7, 148.

Arnauts, i. 334, v. 191, 192.

Arotras, Krinites, ii. 304, iv. 20.

Arpalik, vi. 3.

Arsaber, ii. 99, 200.

Arsamir, iv. 386, 387.

Arsenios, Patriarch, iii. 321, 331, 333,

334. 348. 367 seq., 378,
Arsinoe (Suez), i. 365.
Arsouran, ii. 443.

Art, Greek, attitude of Romans to, i.
70 ; end of taste for at Rome, i. 72 ;
Christianity hostile to, i. 191 ; de-
struction of works of, i. 192, 414,

iii. 244, iv. 303; decline of, i. 413;
democratic, ii. 58; state of, under the
Iconoclasts, ii. 225.

Arta, iv. 121, 122, 127, 129; attacked
by Genoese, iv. 127; Charles Tocco
at, V. 4, 62 ; attacked by Suliots,
vi. 82 ; relief of, vi. 93 ; Turks at, vi.
264, 266, 268; taken by brigands,
vii. 151.

Artaban, i. 211.

Artabasd, ii. 196.

Artabasdos, ii. 200.

Artanes, colony on, ii. 55.

Artavasdos, revolt of, ii. 46, 47 seq. ;
defeat of, ii. 49.

Artillery, Othoman, iv. 259 {see Cannon).

Artoklinas, Constantine, ii. 424.

Artolina, vii. 159.

Artovalan, Constantine, ii. 438.

Arvanitai (Albanians), iv. 31.

Arzanene, ceded to Persia, i. 143.

Arzen, burnt, ii. 442.

As {see Coinage), i. 432.

Asan, John, King of Bulgaria, conquests
of, iii. 304, 308, 309; death of, 311,
iv. 124, 125; attacks Constantinople,
iv. 193.

Asan, Matthew, iv. 253, 255, 257.

Asan, governor of Morea, iv. 232.

Asan, the Vallachian, iii. 230; assassi-
nated, iii. 248.

Asander (Asandros), patriotism of, ii.

354-

Asanias, ii. 245.

Asemaki, vi. loi.

Asemous, defeat of Attila at, i. 1 70.

Ashnas, ii. 157.

Ashot, ii. 372, 373.

Asia, frigate, destroyed, vi. 349, 365.

Asia, Greek commerce with, i. 7, 87 ;
province of, i. 115 ; invaded by Huns,
i. 162, 252; Seljouk empire of, de-
stroyed by Moguls, iii. 31 2; ravages
of Seljouks in, iv. 312 seq.

Asia Minor, Roman province of, i. 33,
34, 115 ; tribute on levied by Biutus,
i. 54 ; Greek colonies in, i. 75 ; under
Heraclius, i. 329 ; Mohammedans
checked in, i. 350 ; Seljouk Turks in,
iii. 42, 72, 87 seq.; recovered by
Alexius I, iii. 124; Spaniards in, iii.
388. {See Levant.)

Asian Bey, vii. 40.

Asomatos, iv. 360.

Aspar, i. 178, 180.

Asparuch. founds Bulgarian monarchy,
i. 385, iv. 15.

Asper {see Coinage), iii. 490 note ; value
of, iv. 267 note, v. 27, 28 note.

Aspropotamos (Achelous), vi. 72 note.

Aspropotamites, rising of, vi. 199.

Assembly, national, atTripolitza, Argos,

^66

INDEX.

Piada, Epidaurus, vi. 239, 242 ; of
Damala, vi. 420; of Troezen, vi.
420, vii. 29 ; of Epidaurus, decree of,
vii. 10; of Argos, acts of, vii. 49
seq. ; convocation of, vii. 65, 66;
second at Argos, vii. 74 ; action of
Romeliots in, vii. 76 ; at Pronia, vii.
93 seq.; dispersed, vii. 95; convoked,
vii. 177; dissolved, vii. 185 ; ofi862,
vii. 314; dissolved, vii. 321 seq.

Assize of Romania, iv. 95; of Jerusalem,
iv. 106, 181, 182.

Assyria, influence on Greek literature,
i. 9 ; invaded by Heraclius, i. 345.

Astacus, canal to, from Lake Sophon,
i. 182 ; iii. 93.

Astolph, king of the Lombards, takes
Ravenna, ii. 43.

Astrologers, banished from Rome, a. d.
197, i. 10; take place of oracles, i.
84.

Astrology, spread of, in Europe, i. 10;
introduced into Cos by Berosus, ib.

Astynomoi, i. 222.

Astypalaea, taken by Turks, v. 69.

Asylum, right of, in Greece, i. 80 ; in
churches, ii. 222.

Ataki, position of, vi. 353.

Ataulph, king of the Goths, i. 96 note.

Athalaric, i. 236, 237.

Athanagild, i. 247.

Athanasios, patriarch, iii. 378 seq.

Athanasius, St., at Alexandria, i. 137,
ii. 325 7iote.

Athenagoras, i. 280.

Athenais,i. 174,278, 279. (>S'eeEudocia.)

Athenion, i. 26 note. .(See Aristion.)

Athens, an ally of Rome, i. 20, 27;
joins Mithridates, i. 25 ; taken and
plundered by Sulla, i. 26, 54, 68 ;
loses commercial and political im-
portance, i. 27; citizenship of, sold,
i. 27, 60; exempt from taxation, i.
39; distribution of grain at, i. 43
note, 141, 281 ; joins Pompey, i.
54 ; joins Brutus and Cassius, ib. ;
temple of Minerva at, plundered by
Verres, i. 56 ; loses Eretria and
Aegina, i. 60 ; Hadrian completes
temple of Jupiter Olympius at, i. 64 ;
aqueduct of Hadrian at, i. 65 ;
university and schools of, i. 66, 74,
174,226; closed, i. 277; mines of, i.
77 ; walls of, repaired by Valerian, i.
93 ; fortified by Cleodemus, i 94 ;
taken by Goths, i. 94 ; defended by
Dexippus, i. 94; St. Paul at, i. 122 ;
recovery of, after Gothic invasion,
i. 141 ; Constantine strategos at, i.
141 ; courted by Julian, i. 142 ; Alaric
at, i. 158; Greek literature at, perishes,
i. 277; state of, i. 278; visited by

Hadrian, i. 279; Hadrian archon at, I
i. 281; under Antoninus Pius, i. 279;!
imperial (regius) professors at, i. 229 ;|
irnder M. Aurelius, i. 66, 280 ; under!
Constantine, i. 281; Julian, Libanius, I
St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen at, I
i. 2S1, 283 ; Julian forbids Christians!
to lecture at, i. 282, 284 ; a free cityj
under Hadrian and M. Aurelius,!
i. 285; pure morality of, 26. j|
bishop of, i. 286; paganism at, ib.;\
Constans at, i. 378; insurrection at,
ii. 302 ; visited by Basil II, ii. 382 ;
revolt of, ii. 418 note; John de la
Roche duke of, iii. 363, iv. 140;
Walter de Brienne duke of, iii. 407,
iv. 143: duchy of, iii. 447, iv. 139;
Otho de la Roche, signor of, iv. 109,
no, 132 seq., 136, 137; Guy III
duke of, iv. 129, 141 ; a feudal princi-
pality, iv. 132 seq.; attacked by Leo
Sguros, iv. 134; conquered by Franks,
iv. 135; Guy, grandsire of, iv. 137;;
seq., 195, 196,200; feudal connexion j
with Achaia, iv. 137 seq.; Argos and
Nauplia fiefs of, iv. 1 38 ; William de
la Roche, duke of, iv. 141, 209; de-
scription of, by Muntaner, iv. 143 ;
Walter de Brienne II, duke of, iv.
152; taken by Catalans, iv. 152;
Roger Deslau, duke of, iv. 153;
duchy of, an appanage of house of
Aragon, iv. 1 54 ; conquered by Nerio
Acciaiuoli, iv. 155 ; Ladislas, duke of,
iv. 159 ; left to the church of St.
Mary, iv. 160 ; Antonio Acciaiuoli,
duke of, iv. 159 seq.; Nerio II duke
of, iv. 162 seq.; duchy of, tributary
to the Porte, iv. 163; Franco Acci-
aiuoli, duke of, iv. 164; visited by
Mohammed II, iv. 164 ; ducal palace
at, iv. 170 ; described by Dante, 172 ;
Boccaccio, 158, 172 ; Chaucer, iv. 172,
and Shakspeare, iv. 173; taken by
Venetians, iv. 269 ; list of dukes of,
iv. 431 ; true Athenians extinct in
time of Tacitus, V. 123 note; Vene-
tians at, V. 184, 186; Lutheran
church at, v. 186; Athenians migrate
from, V. 187 ; under the Turks, vi. 3;
Vasilike benefactress of, vi. 4 ; state
of, in 19th cent., vi. 162 ; besieged by
Greeks, relieved by Omer Vrioni,
vi. 163 ; siege of Turks at, vi. 246;
massacre of Turks at, vi. 2S3 seq. ;
anarchy at, vi. 304; cruelty of Odys-
seus at, vi. 304, 305 ; provincial
assembly at, vi. 305 ; besieged by
Reshid Pasha, vi. 401, 413, 414 seq.;
visit of King Louis of Bavaria to, vii.
161, 163; Mavrocordatos elected for
university of, vii. 189; revolt of

INDEX.

Z^l

garrison at, vii. 271; revolution at,
vii. 272 ; civil war in, vii. 294 seq. ;
order restored at, vii. 300.

Athingans, ii. 97, 109, 128 and note.

Athos, monasteries of, ii. 164 note, iv.
384 ; charter of, ib. ; fortifications of,
vi. 203 ; monks of, join Greek in-
surrection, vi. 204, 206 ; reduced,
207 ; naval action off, vi. 319. {See
Aghionoros.)

Athyras (Bithyas), river, i. 254, ii. 115.

Attalia, colony of Mardaites at, i. 387 ;
battle of, ii. 88.

Attaliotes, iii. 395.

Attica, insurrection of slaves in, i. 23 ;
ravaged by Philip V, i. 55 ; rebellion
of, i. 57; old dialect preserved in,
i. 68 ; Attic spoken in rural dis-
tricts of, i. 280; conquered by Cata-
lans, iii. 407; annexed to Othoman
empire, iv. 164; Albanians in, vi. 28 ;
revolt of, vi. 159; invaded by Rehshid
Pasha, vi. 401.

Attila, i. 168-170, 177; defeated at
Asemous, i. 170.

Atzypotheodoros, ii. 336.

Aubusson, d', grand master of Knights of
Rhodes, v, 65.

Augustus, government of, i. 34, 39 ; his
survey of the empire, land-tax, capi-
tation-tax, i. '40 ; coinage of, i. 48 ;
military colonies of, i. 54, 88 ; his
policy towards Greece, i. 60 ; stops
sale of Athenian citizenship, ih. ; his
treatment of Lacedaemon, ih. ; colo-
nizes Patrae, ih. ; destroys statues of
Antony, i. 72 ; universal peace under,
i. 88; enforces morals, i. 99; state
of Egypt under, i. 270.

Aurelian, improves coinage, i. 51 ;
victories of, i. 98 ; reforms of, i. 100;
abandons Dacia, i. 156.

Aurelius, M., alters land-tax, i. 40;

, favours Greece, i. 66 ; rebuilds tem-
ple at Eleusis, i. 66 ; improves schools
at Athens, ih. ; taught by Herodes
Atticus, ih. ; persecutes Christians,
i. 90 ; Athens under, i. 279-

Aureus (see Coinage), i. 48 seq., 435.

Austrasia, kingdom of, i. 247 ; Franks
of, i. 296.

Austria, Don John of, v. 86, 102 ;
oppresses Hungary, v. 1 66 ; war with
Turkey, v. 171, 227; treaty with
Venice, v. 227 ; minister of, at Porte,
insulted, v. 251 ; joins Russia, v.
273; coinage of, debased, vi. 106;
Hypsiiantes in, vi. 134; interference
of, in Turkey, vii. 215; supports
Montenegro, vii. 217 ; mission to
Constantinople, vii. 217, 218 ; war
with Italy, how regarded by Greece,

vii. 249 seq. ; gains Belgrade, Temes-
var, and Semendria, v. 228,

Autorianos, Michael, iii. 288.

Auximum, siege of, i. 211.

Avars, first known, i. 258 ; in China, i.
259 ; in Europe, ih. ; war with, i,
292, 293 ; destroy kingdom of Pan-
nonia, i. 293 ; their empire on the
Danube, i. 296 ; defeat Tiberius, i.
297 ; take Sirmium, i. 299 ; war of
Maurice with, i. 302 ; extent of their
empire, i. 302 ; defeat Maurice, i.
304 ; treaty of Maurice with, ih. ;
Phocas makes peace with, i. 310 ;
Chagan of, i. 335 ; empire, extent of
in the time of Heraclius, i. 335 ;
decline of, i. 336 ; in Thrace, ih. ;
peace of Heraclius with, i. 337 ;
attack Constantinople, ih. ; invade
Greece, i. 338 ; obtain shipbuilders
from the Lombards, i. 341 ; defeated
in Aegean, i. 341, ii. 105 ; in Pelo-
ponnese, iv. 11, 13.

Avedik, patriarch of Armenia, v. 239,

Avesnes, James d', iv. 176, 177.

Avidius Cassius, i. 280.

Aximet, vi. 297.

Axios the (Vardar), iii. 249 ; Persian
colony on, iv. 27.

Axiottes, vi. 283.

Axouchos, iii. 131, 146, 170, iv. 338.

Ayleon, ii. 196.

Azan Centurione, iv. 245,

Azaz, ii. 400.

Azeddin Kaikous II, iii. 337, 358,
364, 367 ; takes Sinope, iv. 326-
328.

Azof (Tana), iii. 456, v. 6, 106.

Baalbec (Heliopolis), i. 361.

Babek, ii. 153, 156.

Babylon, destroyed, i. 373-

Babylon (Misr, Cairo), i. 323, 363, 373.

Bachin, iii. 172.

Bagauds, ii. 53.

Bagdad, i. 373 ; caliphate of, ii. 306.

Bagrat, iii. 18.

Bagrat VI, of Georgia, iv, 385.

Bagratians, ii. 440.

Bailly, Dr., agent of Philhellenic com-
mittee, vi. 404.

Bairam, feast of, vi. 350.

Bajazet (see Bayezid), iron cage of, iii.
374 note.

Balbes, vii. 198, 291.

Balbi, v. 217, 223.

Balcan, iii. 87.

Baldwin I, count of Flanders and em-
peror of Romania, iii. 258, 265, 275,
iv. 85, 92 seq.; reign of, iv. 98 seq. ;

368

INDEX.

quarrels with Boniface of Montferrat,
iv. 99.
Baldwin II, emperor of Constantinople,
iii. 306, 308, 310, 313; state of Con-
stantinople under, iii. 337, iv. 114,
115. 205, 280.
Baldwin, brother of Godfrey, iii. 109;

takes Edessa, iii. no.
Baldwin of Hainault, iii. in.
Baldwin III, king of Jerusalem, iii.

165, 168.
Baldwin, brother of empress Maria,

iii. 192.
Balearic Isles, reduced by Belisarius,

i. 233; Greeks in, i. 318.
Balkans {see Haemus), crossed by Rus-
sians, vii. 52.
Balta L.iman, v. 102.
Balta-oglou, v. 102.
Banditti, i. 223, 407 {see Brigands').
Bank, National, of Greece, vii. 46.
Bankers, importance of, iv. 158.
Barbarossa, Frederic, iii. 166, 172, 173,

176, 182, 196, 233 seq.
Barbarossa (Haireddin), Turkish ad-
miral, iv. 292, V. 45, 68 seq., 82, 102.
Barbary, corsairs of, v. 95 ; trade of

Messenia with, v. 200.
Barcelona, eastern trade of, v. 156.
Bardan, ii. 200.
Bardanes (Philippicus), revolt of, i. 394,

ii. 94, 101, 130.
Bardas, ii. 161, 171, 173 seq., 191, 193,

196; legal reforms of, 236, 239.
Bardunia, vi. 29, 30.
Bari, Saracens at, ii. 248 ; taken by
Louis II, ii. 249 ; taken by duke of
Beneventum, ii. 279 ; taken by Robert
Guiscard, iii. 37.
Barlaam, iii. 365.
Barlaamites, iii. 441.
Barletta, i. 414.
Barmecides, ii. 88, 103.
Barozzi, Jacopo, signor of Santorin, iv.

285.
Barrats (exemptions"), v. 282.
Basil I (the Macedonian), emperor, i.
333, ii. 171, 184, 192, 193; history
and reign of, ii. 228 seq., 231, 235;
legislative policy of, 236, 237 ; senate
under, 237 ; new code of, ii. 241 ;
epanagoge of, ii. 242 ; Paulician war
of, ii. 245; invades Cilicia, 246;
death of, ii. 257.
Basil II, ii. 336 ; reign of, ii. 360 seq. ;
Bulgarian war of, ii. 369 ; conquest
of Bulgaria, ii. 381 ; visits Atliens,
ii. 382; in Syria, ii. 385; death of,
ii 386.
Basil, the Bogomilian, iii. 128.
Basil, St., at Athens, i. 281, 283.
Basil, Synnadenos, ii. 416.

Basilakes, rebellion of, iii. 48.

Basili, St., village of, vi. 294, 295.

Basilika, ii. 33 ; code of, ii. 33, 238,
241, 242 ; revised by Leo VI, ii.
264.

Basilios, emperor of Trebizond, iv.
360 seq.

BasiHos, the Bird, natural son of Ro-
manus I, ii. 314, 325, 335, 359, 360,
end of 366.

Basihos, the Bogomilian, iii. 68, 69.

Basilios, patriarch, ii. 337.

Basilios Kamateros, patriarch, iii. 201.

BasiUscus, brother of Verina, i. 178, |
180.

Basiliskian, ii. 196.

Basilitzes, ii. 283.

Baton, king of Dalmatia, his answer]
to Tiberius, i. 41.

Battalion, Sacred, of Greek volunteers, |
vi. 124, 131, 132.

Bavaria, Louis of, embassy to Constan-
tinople, iii. 422; Otho of, King ofj
Greece, vii. So seq.; treaty with]
Greece, vii. 105; Louis of, vii. no,
115, 116, i6r, 163; influence of, in]
Greece, vii. 145 seq.

Bavarians in Greece, selfishness of, vii.

"9; . . ... ,

Bayezid (Bajazet), iron cage of, iii. 3741
note ; sultan, iii. 468 ; takes Phila-
delphia, ih. it1\ ; defeated by Timor,!
iii. 481; death of, iii. 4S2 ; sons of, |
ih. ; Mustapha, pretended son of, iii.
488; empire of iv. 389; Orkhan, great |
grandson of, iv. 409, v. 3.

Bayezid II, v. 18; war with Venice, |
V. 62.

Beaufort, castle of, iv. 214.

Bela III, king of Hungary, iii. i75.|
196, 200, 201.

Belgians, empire of Romania, iv. 117.

Belgrade (Singidunum), i. 249, 339,
346; lost, iii. 14, 20 ; peace of, v. io,l
vi. 20; taken, v. 227, 228; treaty of,]
V. 239, 246; ceded to Porte, v. 246.

Belisarius, his life a type of his age,|
i. 194; jealousy of, i. 207; forces of,l
i. 208 ; suppresses sedition of Nika,l
i. 21 7 ; attacks and reduces Vandals, Ll
231, 232 ; takes Sardinia, Corsica, andj
Balearic Isles, i. 233 ; destroys king-
dom of Ostrogoths, i. 235 ; reduces!
Sicily, i. 237; in Italy, ih.\ takes!
Naples, ih.; enters Rome, i. 238;}
offered empire of West, i. 241 ; re-
called, i. 242 ; Persian war of i. 243 ;l
returns to Italy, at Porto, ih., 245 ;|
character and wealth of ih. ; blind-|
ness of, i. 246, 429 ; at Ciiettoukome,!
i. 256 ; defeat and treatment of Za-|
bergan, i. 257 ; sent to Syria, i. 264 ;|

INDEX.

359

mediaeval Greek poem on, i. 432

note; life of, ii. 194 note.
Beluses of Servia, iii. 173.
, Bembo, v. 221.
Benaki, conspiracy of, v. 249, 252 seq.,

257-

Benderli Ali, vizier, vi. 187, 189.

Benedict III, pope, ii. 176.

Beneventum, attacked by Constans, i.
378; Romuald duke of, i. 379;
duchy of, ii. 248 ; taken by Byzan-
tines, ii. 279.

Benjamin, patriarch of Alexandria, i.

3?3-.

Benjamin of Tudela, iii. 151, 229, iv. 29.

Beranger, d'Entenza, iii. 397 seq., 400,
405, 406.

Beranger de Rocafert, iii. ^97, 405 seq.

Berat, pashalik of, vi. 38, 58; taken,
vi. 79.

Berats (charters of denaturalization),
vi 107.

Berengaria, iii. 238, iv. 71, 72.

Berkoftzali, Yusbuf, vi. 312, 313.

Berosus, introduces astrology into Cos,
i. ID.

Berrhoea (Aleppo\ i. 263.

Berrhoea (Irenopolis), ii, 86, no, iii.
138.

Bersinikia, battle of, ii. 112.

Bersova, massacre of Mussulmans at,
vi. 146.

Bertha (Irene), iii. 148.

Bertrand, grand master of the Templars,
iii. 186.

Bertrandon de la Brocquiere, descrip-
tion of visit of empress to St. So-
phia's, iii. 493.

Berytus, law school of, i. 216; univer-
sity of, i. 273, 415, ii. 359.

Besiari, Ago, vi. oi-

Besiari, Muhurdar, vi. 81, 86.

Bethune, Conon of, iv. 112.

Bibisi, brigand, case of, vii. 166, 167.

Bishops in the Greek Church, i. 128;
power of, i. 152; of Athens, i. 286;
of Rome, i. 294, 347, 375 ; of Con-
stantinople, i. 300, 310; position of,
ii. 21 ; lose power, ii. 238; influence
of, iv. 133; deprived of civil juris-
diction, vii. 127; assembly of, at
Nauplia, vii. 128.

Bithyas (ste AthyrasX

Bithynia, a senatorial province, i. 34 ;
invaded by Crusaders, iii. 290 ; revolt
of, iii. 349; oppression of, iii. 358.

Bizya, iii. 304, 313.

Blachern, gate. ii. 115, 144, 190, iii. 220;
church of, burnt, iii. 29 note; peace
of, iii. 445, 459.

Black, Mr., vice-consul at Mesolonghi,
vii. 270.

Black Death, iii. 448.

Black Sea, Greek colonies on, subdued
by Pontus and Bithynia, 1. 6 ; expe-
ditions of Goths from, i. 94; extinc-
tion of Greek civilization on, i. 251 ;
ports on, i. 268; trade of, i. 422;
closed to foreigners, iii. 154 note;
Genoese trade in, iii. 456 ; first right
of Russians to navigate, v. 6 ; closed
to Christians by Mohammed II, v.
106 ; decay of trade in, v. 107.

Blandrate, count, iv. 107 seq., 118, 136.

Blanka, port of, iii, 353.

Blemmidas, Nicephorus, iii. 319, 321.

Blois, Stephen of, iii. 99, no; Louis
of, iii. 265, 286; death of count of,
iv. 100.

Blondel, M., v. 167.

Bobolina, Spetziot heroine, vi. 218.

Boccaccio, his picture of Athens, iv.
158, 172. _

Boccanegra, iii. 354.

Boccanegra, Simone, doge of Genoa,
V. 73-

Bodin, king of Servia, iii. 76, 87, 104.

Bodinos, iii. 41.

Boeotia, joins Pompey, i. 54 ; federa-
tion of, i. 67 ; Catalans in, iv. 149;
invasion of, iv. 233; Albanians in,
vi. 28 ; revolt of, vi. 159.

Bogislav, Stephen, ii. 415, 429, 434.

Bogomilians, iii. 67 seq.

Bogoris, king of Bulgaria, ii. 184, 280.

Bohemund, iii. 75, 79 seq., 80, 81, 100
seq. III, 115 seq.; prince of Antioch,
iii. Ill ; war with Alexius I, iii. 119
seq., iv. 52 ; treaty with Alexius I,
iv. 122; death of, iv. 124.

Bohemund III of Antioch, iii. 212.

Boilas, revolt of, ii. 292, 433.

Boniface, i. 165, 228.

Boniface, ii. 223.

Boniface, marquis of Montferrat, iii.
259, 263, 265, iv. 90, 97, 107; king
of Saloniki, iv. 116, 117; Macedonia
a fief of, iv. 97 ; quarrels with Bald-
win I, iv. 99, 176, 177.

Boniface III, pope, universal bishop,

i-3ii-
Boniface VIII, pope, iii. 389.
Bono, V. 223.
Borans, i. 92.
Borbotia, taken, iv. 256.
Boris, king of Bulgaria, ii. 344, 347,

350. 369. 375-

Bosnia, i. 333.

Bosphorus, Cossacks in, v. 107 ; opened
to Russians, vii. 4.

Bosporus, Cimmerian town and king-
dom of, i. 145 ; taken by Huns, i.
251 ; by Turks, i. 402, ii. 353, 354-

Bossina, v. 191.

VOL. VII.

370

INDEX.

Bostra, siege of, by Aboubekr, i. 359.
Botaniates, Nicephorus (Nicephorus

III), ii. 452, 454, Hi. 21, 46 seq. ;

coinage of, iii. 47.
Botaniates, Theophylaktos, ii. 377.
Botasses, vi. 331.
Botzaris, Constantine, vi. 359.
Botzaris, George, vi, 47, 51.
Botzaris, Kosta, vii. 86.
Botzaris, Marco, vi. 264, 265, 267, 272,

295; death of, vi. 315.
Botzaris, captain (son of Marco), vii.

175, 248, 294.
Botzaris, Noti, vi. 374, 393.
Boucicault, marshal de, iii. 473.
Boudonitza {see Budonitza).
Boudroun {s,ee Budrun).
Bouillon, Godfrey of iii. loi, 103.
Boulogne, Eustace of, iii. 103.
Boundelmorte, Esau, iv. 130.
Bourbon, Mary de, iv. 222.
Bouz-tepe (Mount Mithrios), iv. 330.
Bowides, ii. 441.

Bowring, Sir John, vi. 327, 434, 435.
Brabant, Miles of, iii. 290.
Brachophagos, battle of, iii. 457.
Bragadino, tortures of, v. 83.
Branas, iii. 65, 177, 221, 223, 230,

232.
Branisova, iii. 174, 202.
Brienne, constable of Apulia, iii. 82.
Brienne, John de, king of Jerusalem

and emperor of Romania, iii. 306

seq.: emperor-regent, iv. 114, 146,

280.
Brienne, Hugh de, iv. 146.
Brienne, Walter de, duke of Athens, iv.

143, 146 seq., 151, 152 {see Athens).
Brienne, Walter de, count of Jaffa, iv.

146.
Briennios, Theoktistos, ii. 166.
Briennios, Nicephorus, ii. 439, 446, 447,

451 seq., iii. 33, 45, 47, 84, 88, 128,

Brigands, i. 223, 407, ii. 53, 134; in
Morea, v. 207, vii. 149 seq.; revival
of vii. 155 seq., 161, vii. 206, 235.

Brindisi {see Brundusium), taken by
Robert Guiscard, iii. 37.

Bringas, Joseph, ii. 314, 316, 322, 327.

Britain, Great {see England), Romans
in, i. 88.

Brotherhood (dSiKtpoTTjs), ii. 230 tiote,
vi. 156.

Broughton, Lord (Mr. Hobhouse), vi.

434-
Brue, M., v. 53.
Brundusium (see Brindisi), captured by

Lombards, i. 379.
Brunnovv', baron, vii. 214.
Brunswick, duke of, alliance with

Venice, v. 176.

Brusa (Prusa), iii. 286; taken by Timor^ j

iii. 482.
Bruso, monastery of, vi. 317.
Bryennios {see Briennios).
Brutus, rapacity of, i. 37 ; his extortion j

in Cyprus, i. 47 ; levies tribute on

Asia Minor, i. 54; his severity to i

Xanthus, ib.
Bryas, ii. 150, 209.
Bucelin, i. 247.
Bucharest, treaty of, vi. iii ; Turks at,-

vi. 129; Hypsilantes at, vi. 123,127.
Budonitza (Boudonitza), iv. 108, 109, 1

132, vi. 406.
Budrun (Boudroun, Halicamassus), v,

66, 349, 351 ; battles off, v. 352 seq.,

.=!54-

Bukoleon, palace of, ii. 289, 334.

Bulgares, Demetrius, ministry of, vii.
231 seq.

Bulgares, Eugenios, literary influence
of, V. 284, 285.

Bulgares, George, vi. 171.

Bulgari, count, vii. 32.

Bulgaria and Bulgarians, Hunnish or
Turkish, i. 250; in Dacia, z6. ; defeat
Constantiolus, i. 252; rise of, i. 337;
monarchy founded by Asparuch, i.
385, iv. 15 ; defeat Constantine Po-
gonatus, i. 385; Varna capital of, ib.;
alliance of with Justinian II, i. 393;
defeated by Justinian II, i. 388 ; Ter-
belis king of, i. 394, ii. 11 ; wars of
Constantine V with, ii. 50 seq. ; defeat
of, ii. 52, 53 ; Cardam king of, ii. 90;
Crumn king of, ii. 105 seq. ; inva-
sion of, ii. 109 ; war of Michael I
with, ii. no; invasions of, ii. 114,
115 ; defeated by Leo V, ii. 115 ; in-
vaded, ii. 116: Mortagon king of,
ii. 116; defeat Thomas and Michael
II, ii. 131 ; become Christians, ii.
184, 185, 223; Bogoris king of ii.
184; war with Michael III, ib.;
armies of, ii. 204 ; controversy as to
Church of, ii. 185, 234; war with
Leo VI, ii. 279 seq. ; Simeon king of,
ii. 280 seq., 303. 310 seq.; trade with
Thessalonica. ii. 281 ; lake Adriano-
ple, ii. 286 ; Church of, independent,
ii. 311, iii. 66, 67; patriarch of, ib.;
Peter king of, ii. 312, 333, 344;
Boris king of ii. 344, 347, 350 ; con-
quered by Swiatoslaf, ii. 345 ; by
John Zimiskes, ii. 350 ; war with
Basil II, ii. 369, 381, iv. 28; .Samuel
king of, ii. 369 seq. ; defeated by
Nicephorus Ouranos, ii. 373; in Ar-
menia, ii. 384; Armenians in Bul-
garia, ii. 384 ; invaded by Patzinaks,
ii. 394; revolt of ii. 416 seq. ; Aaron
king of, ii. 442, 453 seq.; rebellion

INDEX.

of, iii. 41 ; John king of, iii. 248,
250, 260, iv. 99 ; alliance of Theo-
dore with, iii. 290; attack Adiianople,
iii. 290, 291 ; patriarch of, iii. 301 and
note ; alliance with John III, iii. 307;
Caloman king of, iii. 313; Michael
king of, iii. 313, 325, 423; war with
Theodore II, iii. 325; state of, iii.
338 ; Constantine king of, iii. 364 ;
war of Michael VIII with, ih. ; Alex-
ander king of, iii. 437; Sclavonian
origin of, iv. i.!,, 18; in Macedonia,
iv. 18; take Nicopolis, iv. 28; con-
quered by Basil II, ih. ; in Epirus, ih. ;
second kingdom of, iv. 28 ; colonized
by Sclavonians, vi. 22; depopulated
by Russians, vi. 112.

Bulgaris, governor of Hydra, vi. 32,
vii. 282, 330.

Bulgarophygos, ii. 281.

Bulls, Byzantine, ii. 344.

Bulwer, Sir Henry, vi. 328.

Burbaki, colonel, defeat of and death,
vi. 413' 414-

Burdett, Sir Francis, vi. 434.

Burdge, v. 223, vi. 288, 296, 297, 299.

Burgundy, Louis of, iv. 217, 219;
Eudes IV of, iv. 219, 221.

Burial of the dead, i. 1 20.

Burtzes, Constantine, ii. 392.

Burtzes, Michael, ii. 331, 332, 334, 359,

392. 452-

Bussora, i. 373, v. 6.

Butrinto, v. 227.

Butumites, iii. 100, 108, 116.

Buyuk Tchekmedjee lake, i. 254.

Byblos, i. 371.

Byron, Lord, vi. 163, 321, 322, 324
seq. ; character of, vi. 325, 326, 363,
vii. 7.

Byza, ii. 132.

Byzant {&ee Coinage), i. 49, 442 ; worth
of, ii. 146 note, V. 27.

Byzantine Empire, i. 309, 313; com-
mencement of, i. 351 seq.; Greek
the court language of, i. 352 ; an
appropriate term, ih.; meaning of,
ii. 2; periods of, ii. 9; coinage of,
ii. 32, 213. iii. 320, iv. 42, v. 27;
fiscal rapacity of, ii. 202 ; military
strength of, ii. 204 ; commerce of,
ii. 211 ; moral tone of, ii. 218 ; legal
reforms of, ii. 236 ; characteristics of
history of, ii. 235 ; loss of Italy by, iii.
36, 37 ; court of, iii. 56 ; degeneracy
of, iii. 148; end of, iii. 265 seq., 276
seq. ; Greeks of, known as Romaioi,
iv. 19 {&ee Romaioi) ; emperors,
power of, iv. 39; partition of by
Crusaders, iv, 97 ; Peloponnesus re-
united to, iv. 245 ; Greeks of, pas-
si veness of, iv. 273; fall of, iv. 311 ;

aristocracy, extinction of, v. 1 2 2'; pro-
phecies of fall of, vi. 57.

Byzantine historians, carelessness of, i.
340 ; list of, i. 476 seq.

Byzantium {see Constantinople), seized
by the Goths, i. 94 ; effects of change
of government to, i. loi, 140 ; reasons
of that change, i. 139; empire of,
i- 309. 313-

Cadis (inferior judges), v. 18.

Caesar, title of, ii. 186.

Caesar, Julius, reduces grain-largesses,
i. 43 ; depopulates Megara, i. 54 ;
joined by Aetolia and Acarnania, i.
54 ; colonizes Corinth, i. 59 ; sump-
tuary law of, i. 74.

Caesarea, i. 331 ; taken by Moslemah,
ii. 19.

Caffa (Theodosia, Kaffa), war of iii.
456; Genoese at, iv. 352, 353, 370;
ravaged by Othomans, iv. 400, v.
106.

Cairo, i. 323, 363, 373. {See Babylon.)

Calabria, Romans expelled from, i.
379, 400, ii. 178; Saracens expelled
from, ii. 249.

Calamo, English protection of, vi. 374.

Caligula, i. 41, 72.

Callipolis, taken by Suleiman, iii. 461.

Caloman, king of Bulgaria, iii. 313.

Calycadnus, river, iii. 236.

Camarilla (Anaktoboulion), vii. 257.

Cambrian, frigate, vi. 300.

Cameniates, Joannes, ii. 266, 270, 273
seq.

Campo Formio, treaty of, v. 274.

Canal, from Lake Sophon to Gulf of
Astacus, i. 182, iii. 93.

Canal, from Nile to Red Sea, i. 270,
321, 365, 366, ii. 212.

Candia (Chandak), ii. 135, 166, 317,
318 and 7iote\ taken, iv. 279; con-
quered by Othomans, v. 56 ; siege of,
v, 103, III ; captured, v. 165, vii. 57.

Canning, George, Eastern policy of, vi.
195, vii. 3, 6, 9 ; Spanish policy of,
vii. II ; death, vii. 25.

Canning, Sir Stratford (Lord Stratford
de Redcliffe), vi. 309, vii. 10, 51, 78
seq. ; memorandum of 79.

Cannon, used by Othomans, iii. 490,
503, 505, 506 note. {See Artillery.)

Cantacuzenos, family of, hostile to that
of Palaeologus, iii. 449.

Cantacuzenos, John, historian, and
emperor of Constantinople, iii. 412,
413, 420 ; rebeUion, of, iii. 425, 429,
432 seq., iv. 221, 230; alliance of
with Turks, iii. 436 seq., 451 ; em-
peror, iii. 445 ; limits of empire

372

INDEX.

under, iii. 447 ; taxation under, iii.
451 ; war with Genoese, iii. 453 seq. ;
takes Thessalonica, iii. 455 ; in alli-
ance with Venice, iii. 456 ; peace
with Genoa, iii. 457; dethroned, iii.
460, iv. 372.

Cantacuzenos, George, prince, vi. 135,
213.

Cantacuzenos, Helena, iv. 156.

Cantacuzenos, John, iii. 209, 210,
230.

Cantacuzenos, Manuel, despot of Pelo-
ponnese, iv. 230 seq., 255, 258.

Cantacuzenos, Mattliew, proclaimed
emperor, iii. 449, 454, 459; abdi-
cates, iii. 462.

Cantacuzenos, Michael, a merchant,
wealth of, v. 158 seq.

Cantacuzenos, Nicephorus, iv. 373.

Cantacuzenos, Theodora, mother of
John, iii. 435.

Cantacuzenos, Theodora, daughter of
John, iii. 443.

Cantacuzenos, Theodora, daughter of
Nicephorus, iv. 373, 397.

Cantemir, Demetrius, v. 215.

Capellan. Theodore, iii. 170.

Capello, Victor, iv. 269, v. 172.

Capita (hides of land), i. 219.

Capitation-tax of Augustus, i. 40, 109,
I53'_2i9.

Capodistrian faction, contest with Ro-
meliots, vii. 76, 77 seq. ; expelled
from Nisi, vii. 79 ; at Salona, vii. 88;
take Patras, vii. 89 seq. ; intrigues
of, vii. 137, 171 ; electoral manoeu-
vres of, vii. 1S8, 192.

Capodistrias, Agostino, vii. 39, 59, 60,
73 seq. ; president, vii. 78 seq. ;
ejected, vii. 83.

Capodistrias, John, vi. 15, no, 127;
president of Greece, vi. 421, vii. 24,
2g, 30 seq., 34; administration of,
civil, vii. 40 seq ; financial, vii. 44
seq. : judicial, vii. 47 ; in Russia, vii.
42 ; duplicity of, vii 54, 55 seq., 59 ;
tyranny of, ih. ; assassinated, vii.

71. .

Capodistrias, Viaro, vii. 42 seq., 47, 56,
59 seq., 7o._

Caracalla, coinage of, i. 48 seq. ; edict
of, i. 64, 65, 76, 108, 217; Lacedae-
monian phalanx of i. 93.

Carbunopsina {see Zoe), ii. 260 seq.

Carceri, dalle, Giovanni, iv 286.

Carceri, dalle, Nicolo II, duke of Archi-
pelago, iv. 289, 290.

Carceri, dalle, Ravano, iv. no, 276.

Cardam, king of Bulgarians, ii. 90.

Carlovitz, treaty of, v. 28, 193, 194,
227, 242, vi. 43; battle of, v. 227.
{See Peterwardein.)

Carlsbad, king Otho visits, vii. 253.
Caroline Books, ii. 76.
Carthage, early commercial treaty of
Rome with, i. 7 note; destroyed, i.
54,209; taken by Genseric, i. 228,
230; Belisarius at, i. 237; proposed
seat of empire, i. 319, 320, 321;
Mohammedan conquest of, i. 367,
373 ; recovered by Constans II, i.
379; conquered by Abdalmelik, i.
392 and note.

Cassandra, attacked by Goths, i. 97 ;
taken, i. 252.

Cassius at Rliodes, i. 54.

Castel Tornese (Chlomoutzi,Clarentza),
iv. 191, 244; taken by Knights of
Malta, V. 96, 201.

Castriot, George (Scanderbeg), iv. 247,
254, vi. 314.

Catabatala, ii. 246.

Catacazy, Russian minister, vii. 140.

Catalans, The Grand Company, iii.
388, 391 seq., 408 ; at Gallipoli,
iii. 398 ; sack Perinthos, iii. 400 ;
alliance with Turks, iii. 403 ; plunder
Thrace, iii. 404 ; conquer Attica, iii.
407; conquer Neopatras, iv. 129; in
Thessaly, iv. 147, 148 ; in Boeotia,
iv. 149; take Thebes and Athens,
iv. 152, 244, 300; at Livadea, vi.
160.

Cataphracti, cavalry, i. 206.

Catharists, iii. 68.

Catherine, daughter of John IV, iv. 411.

Catherine II of Russia, intrigues in
Greece, v. 247 seq., 267 seq.

Catherine of Valois, iv. 157, 215, 217,
221.

Cattaneo, family of, iii. 429.

Cattle-tax, in provinces, i. 40.

Cavalry, i. 204 and tiote, 206, 239 ;
Othoman, v. 37.

Census, applied to Greece, i. 22 ; re-
vised by Constantine, i. 106; exact-
ness of, i, 469 seq. ; relaxation of,
iii. 5.

Centenionalis {see Coinage), i. 440.

Centralization, evil effects of, i. 198,
199, 412, iv. 297, v. II, 14, 228, vi.

Centumcellae (Civita Vecchia), ii. 77.

Centurione, family of, iv. 236 ; Azan,
iv. 245, 255.

Cephallenia (Cephalonia), C. Ar.tonius
at, i. 47 ; Philippicus exiled to, i.
425, ii. 251 ; taken by Venetians, iv.
77, V. 63; counts of, iv. 127, 128,
130, 131, 273; list of, V. 61 ; taken
by count Maio, iv. 273 ; taken by
Othomans, v. 62 ; Lord Byron, vi.
325, 326; Richard of, iv. 127; John
of, ih.

INDEX.

Cephisia, i. 65.

Cephisus, battle of, iii. 407, iv. 150,

151-

Cerigo, lost by Venetians, v. 226; re-
gained, 228; murders at, vi. 192.
Cervi, island of, claimed by England,

vii. 209, 214, 215.
Ceuta, siege of, i. 247.
Chabdan, ii. 309.
Chaboras, i. 261.
Chaeronea, battle of, i. 27; earthquake

at, i. 225.
Chalandritza, Centurione at, iv. 236.
Chalcedon, plundered by Goths, i. 94;

council of, i. 177, 188.
Chalcidice (Eleutherokhoria), Greek

insurrection in, vi. 202, 204 seq.,

207.
Chalcis, i. 263, (Kinesrin), i. 361, ii.

251 ; insurrection in, vii. 264.
Chalcocondylas of Arachova, insult to,

iv. 214.
Chalcocondylas, father of the historian,

iv. 252.
Chalcocondylas, Laonicus, historian, iv.

22, 161, 162, v. 51.
Chaldaea, state of, i. 327 ; Christians

in Nestorians, i. 328.
Chaldia, John of, ii. 196 ; Trebizond,

capital of, iv. 310.
Chalke, palace of, ii. 285.
Chalybia, lost by Trebizond, iv. 349.
Champlitte, William de, prince of

Achaia, iv. 98, 109, 137, 175 seq.,

186.
Champlitte, Robert de, iv. 187, 188.
Chandak (Candia),ii. 135, 166, 317, 318

and tiote.
Chandos, Lord, v. 171.
Charalambes, vi. 236,
Charax, iii. 290.
Chariopolis, ii. 439.
Charlemagne, ii. 03, 76, 78 ; treaty of

Nicephorus with, ii. 100; treatment

of commerce, ii. 210. (See Caroline

Books.)
Charles of Anjou, iii. 353 seq., 357,

361, 363; Achaia and Morea ceded

to, iv. 14I, 205, 345.
Charles VI of France, iii. 473, 481.
Charles XII, defeat of, v. 214.
Charles II of Naples, iv. 209, 215.
Charles of Valois, pretensions of, to

empire of the East, iii. 389.
Charsiana, ii. 153.
Chases, ii. 302.

Chaucer, his picture of Athens, iv. 172.
Chekib Effendi, vii. 200.
Chelands, ii. 316.
Chelidonia, Cape, ii. 166,
Chelidromi, v. 69.
Chelmos, Mount, vi. 398.

Chelonaki, vii. 17.

Cheriana, iv. 376, 379,

Cherinas, John, ii. 315.

Cherson, in Tauris, a colony of Hera-
clea, commerce of, i. 144, 145 ; an
allied city, ib., i. 250, 251, 269, 376,
425 ; Justinian II banished to, i.
386, 392 seq., 399, 402, 424, 425;
Philippicus exiled to, i. 425, ii. 6, 22,
152 and note, 203 ; insurrection at,
ii. 282, 303 ; history of, ii. 350 seq. ;
taken by Vladimir, ii. 350, 357; under
Diocletian, ii. 353; ruin of, v. 107.

Chersonesus, Thracian, fortified, i. 210;
Huns defeated in, i. 257.

Chersonesus, Tauric, conquered by
Huns, i. 250; merged in empire of
Trebizond, iv. 329.

Chettoukome, Belisarius at, i. 256.

Chilbud (Chilbudius), i. 211, 252.

Chimara, reduced by All Pasha, v. 274,
yi. 52.

China, trade of, i. 266, 269, 316 ; Avars
in, i. 259.

Chios, taken by Venice, iii. 181, iv. 76,
79, v. 80 ; Genoese at, iii. 429, 453,
iv. 287, V. 57, 70 seq.; Maona of,
V. 73, 78 seq. ; commerce of, v. 74,
77 ; Greeks of, v. 75 seq. ; ecclesi-
astical administration of, v. 77 ; tri-
butary to Othomans, v. 78 seq. ;
disavowed by Genoese, v. 78 ; at-
tacked by grand duke of Tuscany,
v. 80 ; attacked by Florentines, v.
99; attack on, v. 193, 194; in i8ih
century, v. 233 seq. ; subject to
haratch, ib. ; products of, ib. ; Gius-
tiniani in, v. 233, 234; charter and
privileges of, v. 234, 235 ; industry
of, V. 237 ; Catholics in, ib. ; French
in, V. 238 ; morality of, v. 242 ;
Tombazes at, vi. 250; Sphakiots of,
v. 263 ; merchants of, vi. 9 ; during
Greek revolution, vi. 2.^0 seq.; Kara
Ali at, vi. 254 seq. ; massacres in, vi.
255 seq., 260 seq. ; attacked by
Fabvier, vii. 24; coinage of, v. 72
note, 77 note.

Chitir Bey, iv. 409,

Chitries, v. 178.

Chlomoutzi {see Caslel Tornese and
Clarentza), iv. 19 1.

Choirobacches, iii. 85.

Chonae, iii. 30, 191, 239.

Chorasan, rebellion in, ii. loi.

Chosroes I (Nushirvan), sacks Antioch,
i. 202, 263, 273; peace of Justinian
with, i. 228, 263, 264; embassy of
Witiges to, i. 241, 259, 262, 263 ;
Greek philosophers fly to, i. 277, 287;
defeated by Tiberius, i. 297 ; takes
Dara, i. 296.

374*

INDEX.

Chosioes II, i. 301, 302 ; war with
Phocas, i. 309 ; murdered, i. 345.

Choumnos, iv. 350,

Chrestos, ii. 353.

Christianity, why persecuted, i. 90;
anticipated by Greeks, i. 100 ; effects
of on social condition of Greeks, i.
119 ; the complement of Greek phi-
losophy, i. 123; influence of on
women, i. 124; established by Ccn-
stantine, i. 126; Greek the ecclesi-
astical language of, i. 127; persecuted
in third century for political rea-
sons, i. 1 29 ; Greek rather than Ro-
man, f 6.; reasons of Roman hostility
to, i. 132 ; orthodox established by
Theodosius, i. 136 ; hostile to litera-
ture, i. 189; to art, i. 191 ; influence
of upon slavery, ii. 220; its effect
upon Greece, iv. 6 ; protected by
Turks, V. 21, 31 ; compared with
Mohammedanism, v. 131 seq. ; width
of, V. 1 36 ; Greek narrowness of,
ib.

Christian tribute children {see Janis-
saries), iii. 476 seq., v. 4, 8, 10, 11,
32, 36 seq. ; Constantinople and
Rhodes exempt from, v. 86, 123;
end of, V. 163 ; effects of, vi. 38.

Christians, why thought inhuman, i.
90, 126, 132 ; calumnies against, i.
126; tolerated by Maxentius, ih.\
policy of Maximin towards, ih. ; early
communities of, ih. ; praised by Julian,
i. 128 ; number of at the Council of
Nice, i. 130 ; forbidden by Julian to
lecture at Athens, i. 282, 284; per-
secuted by Chosroes, i. 357; with-
drawn from Cyprus, i. 388, 4*7 ;
adapt pagan worships, i. 424 note ;
enslaved by Turks, iii. 443 ; position
of under Turks, v. 20, 21, 31 ; vi. 4,
113 ; proposed extermination of, v. 29,
30, vi. 183; persecutions by compared
with persecutions of Mohammedans,
v. 30 note ; in Othoman army, v. 45 ;
expelled from Constantinople, v. 92,
105 ; Latin and Greek hatred of, v.
96 ; in Turkey persecution of, v.
105 ; Black Sea closed to, v. 106 ;
apostasy of, v, 119 ; Greek, moral
degradation of, v. 131 ; Catholics in
Morea, v. 209, 211 ; in Chios, v. 237
seq. ; intrigues of Catholics and ortho-
dox, v. 239 ; cause of espoused by
Russia, v. 268; in Albania, vi. 37;
in service of Ali Pasha, vi. 76 ; mas-
sacres of, vi. 190, 191, 319; ferocity
of, vi. 193; in Turkey protected by
Russia, vii. 218.
Christophoros, ii. 245 seq., 291.
Christopoulos, vii. 248.

Christos, Hadji, vi. 359, vii. 97.
Chronicle, The Morning, on king Otho,

vii. 169, 170.
Chronicon Paschale, i. 416.
Chrysargyron, imposed by Constantine,
i. 108; abolished by Anastasius, i,
182.
Chryses, iii. 249 seq.
Chrysochir, ii. 244 seq.
Chrysokroul, iii. 30.
Chrysopolis (Scutari), seized by Goths,

i. 94, ii. 48, 290, 324.
Chrysostom, St., i. 175, 192, 278, 286, ii.
180.

Church, Sir Richard, vi. 409, 416, 417 ;
character of, vi. 418, 419, 421, 425;
vacillation of, vi. 427, 429; defeated
at Phalerum, vi. 430 seq., 432, vii.
J 3. 21, 24, 34, 39, 118, 164; letter of
Captain Hastings to, vii. 344.

Church, Greek, i. 127; Greek the
language of, i. 152, 215, ii. 200;
Christian, state of, i. 187 seq. ; union
of with State, i. 274; of Syria,
Egypt, Armenia, i. 275, 315; Greek
formed, i. 315; Greek and therefore
popular, i. 410; superstition of, i.
423; constitution of under Leo HI,
ii. 13; Bulgarian, ii. 185, 234, 311,
iii. 66, 67; orthodox Greek, ii. 223;
tendency to divide from Latin, i. 348 ;
separation of Greek from Latin, ii.
445, iv. 59 seq. ; Eastern, constitution
of, iii. 66 ; Greek, conservatism of,
iii. 279; Greek, activity of, under
Palaeologi, iii. 365 seq. ; Greek and
Latin union of, iii. 494, v. 137 ; gifts
of real estate to, forbidden, iv. log,
190; Greek, vices of, iv. 262 ; Greek,
under the Othomans, v. 135; Greek,
simony in, v. 140, 149, vi. 10; Greek,
tolerated by Venice, v. 198; Greek,
Russia champion of, v. 240; purity
of, vi. 7 ; inertness of, vi. 8 ; policy
of Capodistrias to, vii. 127 ; of Greece
independent, vii. 128; synod of, ih.;
recognized by patriarch of Constan-
tinople, vii. 130; organization of, vii.
197 seq.

Chytraeus, David, v. 119.

Cibyra, i. 393 note.

Cicero, on population of Sicily, i. 15
note; on Roman rapacity, i. 24; pro-
consul of Cilicia, i. 37 ; on Cyprus,
i. 44; letter of Sulpicius to, i. 54, 71.

Cid, The, ii. 20 {s,ee Sid-al-Battal).

Cilicia, ravages of pirates of, i. 29 ;
Cicero proconsul of, i. 37 ; invaded
by Basil I, ii. 247 ; Armenian king-
dom of, iii. 19, 89, 141, 185.

Cinnamus, John, iii. 218 note,

Circesium, i. 261.

INDEX.

Cirphis, Mount, vi. 406.

Cius (^Kivotos), iii. 290, 291.

Civita Vecchia (Centumcellae), ii. 77.

Clarence (_Clare) in Suffolk, iv. 192.

Clarentza, Toccos at, iv. 236, 243, 244
(see Castel Tornese).

Clares, oracle of, i. 84.

Classics, education in, effects of, iii. 283;
revival of, in Greece, vi. 16.

Claudius, i. 36, 72 ; defends Thermo-
pylae, i. 93 ; barbarian invasions, i. 97.

Claudius II, victory at Naissus, i. 97, 98.

Clavijo, Gonzalez de, iv. 387.

Clement IV, pope, iii. 361.

Clement V, pope, iv. 217.

Cleodemus fortifies Athens, i. 94 ; naval
victory of, i. 95.

Cleon, a brigand chief, i. 32 note.

Cleomenes attempts to revive old Spar-
tan institutions, i. 11.

Clergy, favoured by Constantine, i. 106 ;
engage in commerce, i. 116; for-
bidden by Valentinian III, i. 117;
systematized under Constantine, i.
151, 152; importance of, i. 202;
opposed to Nicephorus II, ii. 328;
Latin, avarice of, iv. 189; struggle of
Geffrey II with, iv. 190 ; Greek, rivalry
of Rome, v. 128 ; Greek, factions of,
V. 140 ; Greek, organization of, v. 149
seq. ; under Venice, v. 209 ; Papal,
virtues of, v. 212; Greek, loss of
influence by, v. 280, vi. 10 seq.;
Greek, relation to Greek revolution,
vii. 126 seq.; character of, vii. 127,
128.

Clermont, council of, iii. 98,

Clovis, i. 228.

Clubs, French and Greek, vi. 97.

Cochrane, Lord (earl Dundonald), vi.
416, 417, 419-421, 425, 434, 436,
vii. 14, 22.

Coco, iii. 511.

Code, Theodosian, i. iii, 191; value
of, i. 213 ; of Basil I, ii. 241.

Codrington, Sir Edward, vii. 16, 18;
censured, vii. 21, 25.

Coinage, Roman, depreciation of, i. 48
seq.; under Augustus, Caracalla,
Nero, ih. ; Diocletian and Constan-
tine the Great, i. 49 ; Hadrian, i. 50 ;
Maximinus, Gordianus Pius, ih. ; Gal-
lienus ends silver coinage, i. 50 ; at-
tempt of Aurelian to improve, i. 51 ;
of Corinth, i. 59; of Patrae, i. 61;
of Nicopolis, i. 62; copper, i. 117;
gold, of Constantinople, i. 167 ; gold,
in seventh century, i. 414; of Abdal-
melik, i. 389, 419 ; Roman and Greek,
i. 432 seq.; Byzantine, ii. 32, 146
note, 213, 327, iii. 320, iv. 42; of
Romanus I, ii. 294 note; debased by

Nicephorus II, ii. 327; of Isaac I,
iii. 10; of Nicephorus III, iii. 47 ;
debased by Alexius I, iii. 63, 490
note, iv. 210 iiote, 267 note; Othoman,
depreciation of, v. 27 ; Byzantine,
ih.\ of Chios, V. 72 note, ']'] note;
Turkish, depreciation of, vi. 106, 312 ;
Austrian debased, vi. 106 ; of Greek
Republic, vii. 46 ; Greek, under king
Otho, vii. 124.

Colchis (Mingrelia), kingdom of, i. 260,
264 (Lazia), iv. 310.

Collier, Dutch ambassador to Porte,
V. 169.

Coloni, i. 154; ii. 99, iv. 44.

Colonies, Greek, conquered by Rome,
i. 5 ; military, of Augustus, i. 54, 88 ;
Greek, in Egypt, Syria, Asia Minor,
i. 75 ; of Goths in Phrygia and Lydia,
i. 155 ; Servian, i. 332 ; Sclavonian,
in Dalmatia and Illyricum, i. 338 ;
Sclavonian, in Greece, i. 338, ii. 2 ;
in Thrace, ii. 55; Saracen, ii. 136;
Roman, in Greece, iii. 226; Persian,
on Vardar, iv. 27; Asiatic, in Thrace
and Macedonia, iv. 27 ; Turkish, near
Achrida, iv. 27.

Colonna, John, papal legate, iv. 192.

Colossus of Rhodes, destroyed, i. 375 ;
sale of, v. 65.

Coluthus, i. 273.

Comans (see Romans).

Commagene, ii. 50, 155.

Commerce (see Trade), influence of Alex-
ander's conquests on, i. 7 ; change of
centres of, i. 7, 8 ; of India, Asia,
Africa, ib. ; Mediterranean, decline
of, i. 74, 75; Greek, decline of, i. 78;
decline of, under Constantine, i. 117 ;
Greek, revival of, i. 141 seq. ; of
Cherson, i. 145 ; of Constantinople,
i. 167; decline of, under Justinian,
i. 266 ; hostility of Goths to, i. 266 ;
importance of Jews in, i. 267 ; Greek,
i. 418 seq.; under Charlemagne and
Theophilus, ii. 210 ; Arabian, ii. 211 ;
Byzantine, ib. ; in East, ib. ; ruined
by caliphs, ii. 212; Russian, ii. 340,
343; immunities, effect of, iii. 154;
under Manuel I, iii. 152 seq.; decline
of Greek, iii. 173, 174, iv. 206; in-
fluence of, upon the Crusades, iv. 68 ;
Venetian, iv. 296, v. 126, 201 ; of
Amisos and Samsoun, iv. 322 ; of
Turks, iv. 323; Genoese, iv. 352,
354, V. 126; of Mongols, iv. 352,
353 ; eastern, routes of, iv. 353 ; tax
of Turks upon, v. 22; of Chios, v.
74, 77 ; under Mohammed II, v. 126
seq.; Greek and Turkish, v. 156;
Greek, in nineteenth century, v. 280 ;
importance of, vi. 8.

37^

INDEX.

Commodus, end of taste for art at Rome,

i. 72 ; deification of, i. 120.
Communes (see Curia and Municipality),

of Turks, V. 147; in Morea, v. 196;

of Greece, vi. ^^29, 231, vii. 120,

247.
Comnena, Anna, daughter of Alexius I,

iii. 53, 128,131.
Comnena, Maria, daughter of Manuel I,

iii. 175, 196, 200 seq.
Comnenos (Komnenos), family origin

of, iv. 315 ; genealogy of, iv. 43?.
Comnenos, Alexius, nephew of Alexius I,

iii. 118.
Comnenos, Alexius, son of Anna, iii.

171.
Comnenos, Alexius, grandson of John II,

iii. 199, 200.
Comnenos, Alexius, son of Manuel I,

iii. 214, 237.
Comnenos, Alexius, grandnephew of

Manuel I, iii. 214, 237.
Comnenos, Andronicus, son of John II,

iii 147-
Comnenos, David, iii. 214.
Comnenos, David, brother of Alexios I

of Trebizond, iii. 288, 289, iv. 317,

318, 321, 322, 325, 326.
Comnenos, Isaac, son of John, and

brother of Alexius I, iii. 43, 45, 49.
Comnenos, Isaac, son of Alexius I and

brother of Anna, iii. 132, 133 note,

201.
Comnenos, Isaac, son of John II and

brother of Manuel I, iii. 146, 147.
Comnenos, Isaac, nephew of Theodora,

iii. 212; in Cyprus, iii. 213, iv. 70,

7r seq.
Comnenos, John, son of Andronicus and

nephew of Manuel I, iii. 147.
Comnenos, John, brother of Isaac I,

iii. 8.
Comnenos, John, son of Isaac and

nephew of Alexius I, iii. 50, 100.
Comnenos, John, son of Isaac and

brother of Andronicus I, iii. 132,

143, 202.
Comnenos, Manuel, son of Andronicus I,

iv. 317.
Comnenos, Manuel, father of Isaac I,

iii. 8, iv. 315.
Comnenos Manuel, nephew of Isaac I,

iii. 29 seq.
Comnenos, Michael Angelos, iii. 284.
Comnenos, Nicephoros, ii. 392.
Compsa, John, i. 318.
Concubinage, i 57-
Confiscation, a source of Roman revenue,

i. 42, 45, 136, 219.
Conou of Bethune, iv. 112.
Conon (Leo III), ii. 26,
Conrad III of Germany, iii. 148, 165 seq.

Conrad of Montferrat, iii. 231 seq.

Conradin, iv. 206.

Conscription in Greece, vii. 37.

Constantina, iii. 250.

Constans II, i. 373 seq. ; the 'type' ofJ
i 375 ; banishes Pope Martin, i. 376 1
visits Armenia, ih. ; defeats Slavo-
nians, i. 377; makes peace with
Moawyah. i. 378 ; at Athens, ih. \
in Italy, i. 378, 379; defeated, ih.'X
assassinated, i. 380. 1

Constantine I (the Great), coinage of,|
i. 49 ; reforms of, i. 100, 103 seq. ;j
favours clergy, i. 106; land-tax. ih.'X
senatorial tax, i. 108 ; chrysargyron,]
ih.\ military reforms of, i. 112; hill
division of the empire into four pre-j
fectures, i. 114; two humane laws!
of, i. 116 ; decline of commerce under,
i. 117; establishes Christianity, i.
126; plunders temples, i. 130; his
struggle with Licinius, i. 141 ; at
Athens, i. 141, 142, 281 ; systematizes
clergy, i. 151, 152; relations with
the popes, ii. 180.

Constantine III (Heraclius), i. 350, 360, |

Constantine IV (Pogonatus>, 1. 380 seq. ;
peace with Moawyah, ii. 384; de-
feated by Bulgarians, i. 385.

Constantine V (Copronymus), ii. 20, 42,
44, 45 note and seq. ; Saracen wars
of, ii. 50 ; Bulgarian war of, ii. 50
seq. ; death of, ii. 53 ; repairs aque-
duct of Valens, ii. 56 ; tomb of, dese-
crated, ii. 195.

Constantine VI, son of Leo IV, ii. 69 ;
reign of. ii. 79 seq., 84.

Constantine VII (Porphyrogenitus), i.
339, 349, ii. 228, 260, 263, 283;
works of, ii. 294; reign of, ii. 297
seq.

Constantine VIII, son of Romanus II,
ii. 336, 360 seq ; reign of, ii. 390
seq. ; death, ii. 394.

Constantine IX (Monomachus), ii. 424
seq. ; plots against, ii. 433 ; death of,
ii. 446.

Constantine X (Ducas), iii. 12, 13 seq.,

23-

Constantine XI (Palaeologus Dragases),

iii. 406 seq. ; death of iii. 516 ; despot

of Feloponnese, iv. 243, 245-24S,

250-252.
Constantine, duke of Antioch, ii. 408,

411, 420.
Constantine, son of Basil and Maria,

ii. 256.
Constantine, king of Bulgaria, iii. 364.
Constantine, son of Leo V, ii. 114,

120.
Constantine the Libyan, ii. 287 seq.

INDEX.

311

Constantinople {see Byzantium), distri-
bution of grain at, i. 43, 10 1, 118,
201, 319 ; Roman, and Latin its lan-
guage, i. loi, vi. 9 ; immunities of
its citizens, i. loi ; a copy of Rome,
i. 118; why preserved when Rome
fell, i. 138 ; attacked by Alaric, i.
157; gold coinage of, i. 167; com-
merce of, ib. ; university at, i. 173,

■ 190, 273, ii. 36, 225 ; law school of,
i. 216; official nobility of, i. 218;
aqueduct of, i. 222 ; earthquake at,
i. 225, ii. 32, 44; attacked by Zaber-
gan, i. 256; colony of Turks at, i.
268 ; silk brought to, i. 269 ; claims
of bishop of, i. 300, 310; road from,
to Ravenna, i. 3 1 6 ; attacked by
Avars and Persians, i. 337 ; Hera-
clius at, i. 350, 368 ; Saracens defeated
at, i. 383 ; council of i. 385 ; taken by
Theodosius III, i. 396 ; coinage of,
in seventh century, i. 414; besieged
by Moslemah, ii. 16 ; siege of, raised,
ii. 18 ; defeat of Saracens at, ii. 43 ;
revolt of, under Artavasdos, ii. 47 ;
pestilence at, ii. 64 ; influx of Greeks
into, ii. 66 ; synod at, ii. 119 ; council
of ii. 120, 163 ; besieged by Thomas,
ii. 131 ; attacked by Russians, ii. 189,
435 ; opposes Rome, ii. 199 ; influence
of Asiatics at, ii. 201, 216; attacked
by Igor, ii. 341 ; earthquake at, iii.
22; revolution at, iii. 35; taken by
Alexius I, iii. 51 ; threatened by
Crusaders, iii. 61 ; effect of Crusades
on, iii. 93; Venetians at, iii. 179;
murder of Latins at, iii. 200 ; saved
by Conrad of Montferrat, iii. 231
seq. ; besieged by Branas, iii. 232;
quarrel of Greeks and Latins in, iii.
233 ; besieged and taken by Cru-
saders and Venetians, iii. 255 seq.,
iv. 84, 86 seq.; sieges of, iii. 255
note] conflagration at, iii. 261, iv. 85,
86 ; third sack of, iii. 269 seq. ;
Latin empire of, iii. 310; under
Baldwin II, iii. 337 ; attacked by
Michael VIII, iii. 340, 347 ; synod
at, iii. 370, iv. 351 ; ecclesiastical
quarrels at, iii. 374 seq, iv. 103;
Spaniards at, iii. 391 ; taken by An-
dronicus III, iii. 418 ; taken by John
V, iii. 460; marshal de Boucicault,
iii. 473 ; besieged by Mousa, iii. 483 ;
by Murad II, iii. 489, 490 ; pestilence
at, iii. 492 ; attacked by Genoese,
iii. 493 ; besieged by Mohammed II,
iii. 507 seq.; taken, iii. 517; Harald
Hardrada at, iv. 49 ; privileges of
Venetians at, iv. 75 seq. ; Genoese
at, iv. 77; Pisans at, ib.; taken by
Greeks, iv. 116; Belgian empire of,

iv. 117; attacked by John III and
John Asan, iv. 193 ; Venetian settle-
ment at, iv. 270; exempt from pay-
ment of tribute-children, v. 86, 235 ;
unmarried Christians expelled from,
V. 92, 105 ; election of patriarch of,
v. 138 ; influence of patriarch of, in
Morea, v. 209 seq. ; execution of
Greeks at, vi. 185 ; Jews at, vi. 187,
188 ; fire at, vi. 311 ; treaty of 1832,
vii. 104.

Constantinople, patriarchs of : authority
of, ii. 42 ; Sergius, i. 342 ; Paul, i.
375. 376, ii- 72 ; Anastasios, ii. 49,
57> 75; Constantinos, ii. 62, 75;
Niketas, ib. ; Methodios, ii. 141, 150,
163; Ignatius, ii. 173; Photius, ii.
176, 178, 182 seq., iv. 59; contest
with popes as to Bulgarian Church,
ii. 185; Michael Keroularios, ii. 428,
445, 4!; 5, iv. 59 ; Constantine Leichu-
des, iii 10; Theodosius, iii. 201, 210;
Xiphilinos, iii. 244 ; Arsenios, iii. 321,
331 seq., 367 seq., 378; Germanos, iii.
367, 370; Joseph, iii. 370; Vekkos,
iii. 370 seq.; Gregorios, iii. 376 seq.;
John of Apri, iii. 421 ; Kallistos, iii.
450, 459; Gennadios, iii. 522; Ger-
vais, iv. 190; Joasaph, v. 139; Mar-
kos, V. 140.

Constantinopolitans, faction of, v. 140.

Constantinos, patriarch of Constanti-
nople, ii. 62, 75.

Constantinos, revolt of, ii. 292 seq., 298.

Constanliolus, defeated by Bulgarians,
i. 252.

Constantius alters position of clergy,
i. 106, 142.

Constantius II, anti-Christian reaction
under, i. 133 seq.; law of, i. 153,
281.

Consulate, importance of, abolished, i.
201.

Copronymus, ii. 45 note.

Corbet, General, vii. 89, 103.

Corcyra (Corfu), plundered by Totila,
i. 224, 253.

Cordova, insurrection at, ii. 135.

Corduene, ceded to Persia, i. 143.

Corfu (Corcyra), taken by Robert Guis-
card, iii. 74, iv. 51; revolt of, iii.
161 ; recovered by Manuel III, iii.
168 seq. ; conquered by Theodore of
Epirus, iv. 273 ; attacked by Otho-
mans, V. 68, 227, 275, 276: Suliots
at, vi. 52, 78, 83; left by English,

vii. 313-
Corinth, made ager publicus by Mum-
mius, i. 36 ; sacked, i. 54, 59, 71 ; a
Roman colony, i. 58, 59 ; coinage of,
i. 59 ; residence of proconsul of
Achaia, i. 60 ; Hadrian's aqueduct to,

378

INDEX.

i. 65 ; ravaged by Goths, i. 94 ;
Julian at, i. 142; plundered by
Alaric, i. 159; Stilicho at, i. 160;
sacked by Normans, iii. 162, iv. 54 ;
silk trade of, iv. 55 ; granted to
Acciaiuoli, iv. 158 ; besieged by
Geffrey of Achaia, and Otho de la
Roche, iv. 189; conquered by Gef-
frey I of Achaia, iv. 194 note, 195 ;
under despots of Peloponnese, iv.
236 ; taken by Mohammed II, iv.
■259; sacked by Maltese, v. 106;
Venetians at, v. 1 84 ; taken by Turks,
V. 219, 220; behaviour of Janissaries
at, ih. ; capitulation of, vi. 226; Dra-
niali at, vi. 286, 295.

Corinth, isthmus of, fortified, i. 210;
Huns advance to, i. 224, 252 ; tram-
way across, ii. 251 ; fortified, iv.
238 ; forced by Othomans, iv. 249
seq. ; Diolkos across, iv. 238 note.

Corippus, poem of, i. 211, 235.

Corn (see Grain), corn-trade at Rome,

i- 43-
Cornaro, Andrea, iv. 300, v. 191.

Cornaro, Catherine, queen of Cyprus, v.
82.

Corner, captain, vi. 432.

Cornesius, ii. 1 10.

Coron, iv. 195 ; Spaniards at, v. 68 ;
taken by Morosini, v. 177, 201 ;
besieged by Russians, v. 254, vi. 216,
222, 227, 312, 318, vii. 27, 28,

Coronea, earthquake at, i. 225.

Coronello, Francis, v. 81.

Corporations, of moneyers, i. 51 ; i.
110; religious, in Greece, i. 120;
Greek, in Italy, i. 216 ; of Ulema, v.
12,13,18.

Corsairs, Turkish, in Archipelago, iv.
303 ; of Sinope, iv. 358 ; ravages of,
'^- 57> 6.^' 64; Venetian, cruelty of,
V. 93 ; of Barbary, v. 95 (see Piracy).

Corsica, taken by Belisarius, i. 233 ;
Greeks in, v. 117.

Cos, commerce of, i. 74, 265 ; taken by
Saracens, i. 375 ; ravaged by Span-
iards, V. 105 ; naval action off, vi. 352.

Cosmas, Indicopleustes, i. 273.

Cosmas (Kosmas), pretender, ii. 37.

Cosmo I, duke of Plorence, v. 96, 98.

Council of Adramyttium, iii. 377.

Council of Chalcedon,i. 177, 188, ii. 180.

Council of Clermont, iii. 98.

Council of Constantinople, i. 385, ii.
57, 60, 120, 163, 180, 181, 183, 232,

233-
Council of Ephesus. i. 328.
Council of Ferrara, iii. 493,
Council of Florence, iii. 494.
Council of Frankfort, ii. 76, 141.
Council, fourth Lateran, iii. 296.

Council of Lyons, iii. 370.
Council of Nice,|i. 130, 134.
Council, second of Nicaea, ii. 73.
Council of Nymphaeum, iii. 307.
Council of Placentia, iii. 98.
Council of Sardica, a. d. 347, i. 137.
Council in TruUo, i. 389.
Cossacks, V. 107 ; take Sinope, ih, '\

ravages of, v. 107, 108.
Courrier of Smyrna, newspaper, vii. 6o,|

61.
Courtenay, lordship of, iv. 193, 200.
Courtena}', Agnes, of Achaia, iv. 190,
Courtenay, Peter of, iii. 297, 299 seq. ;|

emperor of Romania, iv. 112, 124.
Courtenay, Phihp of, iv. 345.
Creed, Nicene, contentions about, ii.

234-

Crete, a Roman province, i. 22, 33, 34,]
115; conquered by Metellus, i. 30;
pirates in, i. 31, ii. 278; invaded byj
Moawyah, i. 384 ; conquered by |
Saracens, ii. 134,135; Spanish Arabs
in, ii. 135; a slave mart, ii. 276;
expeditions against, ii. 315 ; revolt of,
iii. 60 ; purchased by Venice, iv. 272,
276; Genoese in, iv. 272; attacked
by Sanudo, iv. 279; Venetians in, v.
86, 89 ; number of Greeks in, v. 90 ;
conquest of, v. 103 ; attacked by
Othomans, v. 110; revolt of, v. 252 ;
pashalik of, vi. 4 ; Egyptians in, vi.
355 ; war in, vii. 24.

Cretan guards, iii. 489.

Crevecoeur, castle of, iv. 216. "

Crimea, becomes Russian, v. 267.

Crimean war, diplomatic antecedents of,
vii. 215 seq. ; action of Greece during, ,
vii. 219 seq.

Crispin, revolt of, iii. 28.

Crispo, family of, iv. 290.

Crispo, Francesco I, duke of Archi-
pelago, iv. 290, 291.

Crispo, Francesco II, duke of Archi-
pelago, iv. 291.

Crispo, Francesco III, iv. 292.

Crispo, Giovanni II, duke of Archi-
pelago, iv. 291.

Crispo, Giovanni III, duke of Archi-
pelago, iv. 292.

Crispo, Giovanni IV, duke of Archi-
pelago, iv. 292, 293.

Crispo, Guglielmo II, duke of Archi-
pelago, iv. 291.

Crispo, Jacopo I, duke of Archipelago,
iv. 291.

Crispo, Jacopo II, duke of Archipelago,
iv. 291.

Crispo, Jacopo III, duke of Archipelago,
iv. 291.

Crispo, Jacopo IV, duke of Archipelago,
iv. 293, V. 81.

INDEX.

ii9

|l!nspo, INIarco, of los, iv. 302.
^rispus defeats Licinius, i. 281 ;
treason of, i. 330.

jjCroatians, i. 332, 334.

[Cross, Holy, restored by Heraclius, i.
345. 346 ; taken by Persians, 346 ;
Heraclius retreats to Constantinople
^ with, i. 349, 350, 358, 360.
3rowns, a forced gift, i. 45.
>umn, king of Bulgaria, ii. 105 seq.,
no; negotiates with Michael I, ii.
no, 114; death of, ii. 115; takes
Adrianople, ii. 229.

[Crusaders, with Venetians destroy Eas-
tern empire, a. d. 1204,1. 162; threaten
Constantinople, iii. 61 ; defeated at
Nicaea, iii. 99; treaty of, with Alexius
I, iii. 102 seq. ; besiege Antioch, iii,
no, 112 note; take Iconium, iii.
,236; with Venetians take Constanti-
nople, iii. 255 seq.; occupy Troad,
iii. 286 ; invade Bithynia, iii. 290 ;
take Alexandria, iii. 463 ; in Pelopon-
nese, iv. 20; take Zara, iv. 82 ; treaty
of, with Venetians, iv. 89 ; sack
Constantinople, iv. 90 ; partition of
Byzantine empire among, iv. 97.
[ Crusades, effect on Constantinople, iii.
93 seq ; causes of, 94 ; first, iii. 99 ;
second, iii. 165 seq. ; third, iii. 233 ;
fourth, iii. 252, iv. 81 seq. ; introduce
feudalism into the East, iv. 66 ; in-
fluence of commerce on, iv. 68 ; of
St. Louis joined by William of Achaia,
iv. 199.

Ctesiphon, i. 345 ; destroyed, i. 373.

Cufa, rise of, i. 373.

Culm, battle of, vi. no.

Cuirana, Venetian bailo, v. 169.

Curia, collects land-tax, i. 109, no;
oligarchical, i. 144, 148 ; reformed by
Anastasius, i. 181, ii. 21; abolished,
ii. 237. (See Municipality.)

Curiales, i. 109 note.

Curopalates, ii. 47.

Customs, Roman, how farmed, i. 44.

Cyclades, ravaged by Saracens, ii. 190.

Cynosarges, burnt, i. 55.

Cyparrissia (Arcadia), Ibrahim Pasha
at, vi. 372.

Cyprus, a Roman province, i. 33, 34;
purchases exemption, i. 44 ; tributary
to Saracens, i. 374, 387 ; Christians
withdrawn from, i. 388, 407 ; Sclavo-
nians in, i. 389, 407 ; Saracen fleet
defeated at, ii. 50 ; bishop of, ii. 102 ;
recovered and lost by Basil I,ii. 252;
recovered, ii. 330; sedition in, ii. 429;
revolt of, iii. 60, 213; taken by
Richard of England, iii. 213, 297, iv.
70 seq.; history of, iii. 237 seq.;
Isaac of, iii. 212, 213, 237, iv. 70 seq.;

Guy of Lusignan king of, iii. 238, iv.
72 seq. ; a dependency of Venice, iv.
74; kings of, v. 58; conquered by
Othomans, v. 81 seq. ; tributary to
Egypt, V. 82 ; acquired by Venice, v.
82 ; Catherine Cornaro queen of, v.
82 ; ruin of, v. 84; trade with Man-
chester, v. 157.

Cyrenaica, subject to Ptolemies, i. 6 ;
Mohammedan conquest of, i. 367.

Cyrene, a Roman province, i. 33, 34 ;
decline of, i. 143.

Cyril (see Kyrillos).

Cyrus, patriarch of Alexandria, i. 363.

Cythera, owned by Julius Eurycles, i.

47, 60.

Cyzicus, Goths ravage, i. 94, 383, ii.

48, iii. 23, 290, 291 ; Spaniards at, iii.
392, 393-

Dacia, i. 115, 156; Bulgarians in, i.

250, vi. n5.
Dagobert, i. 326.
Daher, caliph, ii. 397.
Dalassenos, Constantine, ii. 394, 410,

423.

Dalassenos, Damian, iii. 41, 313.

Dalmatia, an imperial province, i. 34;
conquest of, i. 237 ; Serbs in, i. 331,
333' 3385 ii- i°o ; attacked by Sara-
cens, ii. 247, 382 ; belongs to Venice,
iii. 83, 176, 178, i8i,_v. 195.

Damala, assembly at, vi. 420.

Damascenus, John, ii. 36, 59, 222, 227,
V. 283.

Damascius, i. 273.

Damascus, taken by Saracens, i. 360, ii.
331 ; siege of, iii. 168.

Damian, ii. 278, 307.

Damianos, ii. 136.

Damianovich, Elia, v. 192.

Damietta, ii. 170, iii. 187; Greek raid on,
vi. 303.

Dandolo, Andrea, iv. 302.

Dandolo, Henry, iii. 182; doge of
Venice, iii. 252, 256, 265, 266, iv. 82,
84, 90, 93, 100.

Dandolo, Marino, conquers Andros, iv.
282, 283.

Dandolo, ii. 16.

Dania, colonel, vi. 267.

Daniel, prince of Montenegro, vii. 216,

Danielis, ii. 230, 253 seq.

Danishmend, iii. 115.

Dante, his picture of Athens, iv. 172,

Danube, physical features of, ii. 345.

Daphaeon, battle of, iii. 387.

Daphne, oracle of, i. 84, 121.

Daphnus, Genoese at, iv- 354' ST^-

Daphnusia (Sozopolis), iii. 342.

38o

INDEX.

Dara, i. 261 ; taken by Chosroes, i.

296 ; restored, 302.
Dardanelles, battle of, v. 103, 112.
Dardania, i. 171.
Darkness, unnatural, at Constantinople,

ii. 63.
Dastagerd, i. 345.
Dasymon, battle of, ii. 157, 187.
Daulis, Turks at, vi. 407.
David, his coat of armour, iv. 389,
David the Arianite, ii. 379.
David, patriarch of Bulgaria, ii. 380.
David, king of Georgia, ii. 363, 384,

iV; 337. 348-.
David of Lorhi, iii. 17.
David, emperor of Trebizond, iv. 413 ;

death of, iv. 424.
Davidson, William, narrative of, v. 2 70.
Dawkins, Mr., vii. 135, 140.
Deavolis (Devol), iii. 121.
Debeltos, iii. 257, 259.
Debts and revolutions, i. 7Q'
Decargyron, i. 443. (See Coinage.)
Decatrians, i. 334.
Decius killed, i. 92 ; enforces morals, i.

99 ; persecutions of, i. 126,
Decurions, i. 109 note.
Defensor, i. no, 148. {See Curia, Muni-
cipality.)
Defterdars, v. 18.
Degendfeld, General, v. 1 78 seq.
Deism, effects of tendency to, i. 123,
Dekapolitas, ii. 171.
Deleanos, Peter, ii. 416, iv. 28.
Delfino, V. 219, 224.
Deligeorges, Epaminondas, vii. 283.
Deliyani, vi. 236, 275, 336.
Delos, plundered by Sulla, i. 27, 54 and

Mithridates, i. 54 ; a slave mart, i.

32 ; armed guard of Athenians in, i.

67 ; oracle of, i. 84 ; slave insurrec-
tions in, i 23.
Delphi (Kastri), plundered by Sulla, i.

27, 54; robbed by Nero, i. 72;

oracle of, i. 84 ; left independent by

Romans, i. 23, vi. 313.
Demarchs, chamber of, 1861, vii. 252.
Demerize, battle of, iii. 223, iv. 58. '
Demctrias, ii. 265, vi. 422.
Demetrius, St., ii. 269, iii. 230.
Demetrius, despot of Morea, iv. 252,

255> 256, 259, 262, 263, 267.
Demetrius Poliorcetes {see Poliorcetes).
Demetrius I, of Saloniki, iii. 300, iv.

107, 118, 119.
Demetrius II, of Saloniki, iii. 126.
Demirhissar, pass of, ii. 376.
Demogeronts, in Morea, vi. 25.
Demoiannes, iv. 299.
Demosthenes, army of, destroyed, vi.

378.
Denarius, i. 435, (iSee Coinage.)

Depopulation of Greece in time ol.,

Hadrian, i. 56 ; causes of, i. 53.
Dermokaites, iii. 295, 296.
Dervenaki (Tretos), vi. 287.
Dervendji-pasha, vi. 20.
Dervenokhoria, vi. 30 ; revolt of, vi.|

1.59-
Deses, iii. i73.
Deslau, Roger, chief of the Catalans, iv^l

153-
Develtos, taken by Crumn, ii. no, 184.I
Devitzana, vi. 81.
Dexippus, defends Athens, i. 94 seq.,|

280.
Diakophti, pass over, vi. 247.
Diakos, life of, vi. 161 seq.
Dialects, old Greek preserved, i. 68 ;|

Thracian, i. 115 note.
Diamantes, vi. 206.
Diana, Ephesian, temple of, destroyed|

by Goths, i. 95.
Diarbekr (Amida), i. 362.
Didymi, oracle of, i. 84.
Didymoteichos, iii. 235.
Digenes Akritas. {See Akritas.)
Dikaios, Gregorios (Pappa Phlesas), vi.

293 seq., 366, 367.
Dikeration, ii. 32.
Dimitzana, vi. 146.
Diocleans, i. 334.
Diocletian, reforms of, i. 100, 103, 105 ;|

ceases to reside at Rome, i. 139. {See\

Coinage.)
Diocletianopolis (Kastoria), iv. 8.
Diogenes of Cherson, ii. 353.
Diogenes, Constantine, ii. 378, 382, 394;]

conspiracy of, ii. 394, 398.
Diogenes, Nicephorus, iii. 60.
Diogilo, Odo de, iii. 167 7iole.
Dionysius, the Hungarian, iii. 177 seq.
Dionysius, patriarch, v. 148.
Dionysius, St., monastery of, at Athos,

iv. 384.
Dioscorides (Socotra), i. 146.
Diospolis, i. 251.
Dir, ii. 189.
Distomo, vi. 383 ; defeat of Turks at,

vi. 407.
Divination, forbidden, i. 84, 120.
Divreky (Tephrike), ii. 169.
Djaballah, ii. 72.
Djanum, Khodja, v. 217, 227.
Djavella, Photo, vi. 47, 50, 359.
Djavellas, Kitzo, vi. 383, 389, 393, 427,

vii. 76, 77, 90, 91, 97; arrest and j

trial of, vii. 138, 139, 163; prime

minister, vii. 206, 207.
Djebail (Byblos), i. 371.
Djelaleddin, Bey, vi. 315.
Djenderelli, v. 17,
Djihanshah, iv. 394.
Djouncid, revolt of, iv. 405.

INDEX.

381

Doceia, battle of, iii. 35.
! Dodecanesos, province of, iv. 273.
iDodona, oracle of, i. 84, 253.
'Dodwell, vi. 155.
iDolgoruki, prince, v. 253, 255.
Doliche, ii. 50, 309.
! Domestici, i. 254.
jDomoko, engagement at, vii. 227.
, Donalos, St., patron of Suli, vi. 52.
I Doranites, iv. 363, 367, 374.
i Doria, Andrea, v. 68, 102.
r>oria, Fagano, iii. 457.
J ".)rostylon, ii. 311.
Iiiirylaeum, ii.^7, iii. 19I, 195.
I'lrystolon (Silistria), ii. 346, 347.
] 'oiios, Arislides, vii. 254.
I ' ist, Demir, vi. 66, 68.
I'Liukas {see Dukas).
I lachma, i. 4.^2 seq. {See Coinage.)
I'lagashan, battle of, 182 1, vi. 131

seq.
r>iaginas, ii. 414.
I'ragoman of the Fleet, v. 242, 244, vi.

17, 25, 105, 113.
Diagoman of the Porte, v. 241, 244,

vi. 17, 25, 105, 113.
D;agomestrc, Greeks at, vii. 22 ; battle

of, vii. 163.
i Magomoiitzcs, ii. 380.
l>iagotas, iii. 326.
Dragut, Turkish admiral, v. 82.
Drako, ri\er, iii. 90.
Drakos, Suliot, vi. 90.
Drakospelia, vi. 282.
Dramali, Mohammed, iv. 253, vi. 77,

80, 197, 201, 278, 285 ; at Corinth,

vi. 286 ; at Argos, vi. 287 ; imprud-
ence of, vi. 289; retreat of, vi. 293 ;

defeat of, vi. 294, 295 ; death of, vi.

296.
Drin, iii. 172, 173.
Dromon, siege of, ii. 278 note, 316.
Drouyn de Lhuys, M., ordered to quit

London, vii. 213.
Drungarioi, ii. 12.
Druses, insurrection of, vi. 196.
Dugdale, bravery of, v. 260, 261.
Dukas, family of, ii. 286, iii. 13 note.
Dukas, Andronicus, iii. 33, 35, 213.
Dukas, Constantine, ii. 285.
Dukas, pseudo-Constanline, ii. 292.
Dukas, Constantine, iii. 48, 56, 73, 300.
Dukas, John, brother of Constantine X,

iii- 25, 35, 43 seq., 50, 57.
Dukas, John, uncle of JNiichael VIII,

iii. 88.
Dukas, John, brother of wife of Alexius,

iii. 93.
Dukas, John, son of Andronicus, iii.

147.
Dukas, John, uncle of Isaac, iii. 216.
Dukas, John, natural son of despot

Michael, iii. 339 ; prince of the Valla-
chians of Thessaly, iii. 362, 363, 371,
iv. 128, 129.
Dukas, John II of Thessaly, iv. 129,

431-
Dukas, John, general of Manuel I, iii.

177. 179-

Dukas, Manuel, of Thessalonica, iii.
309 seq.

Dukas, Nicephorus, ii. 71.

Dukas, son-in-law of Niketas, ii. 411.

Dulcigniots, v. 254, 256.

Dundonald, Earl of. {See Lord Coch-
rane.)

Dupondius, i. 435. {See Coinage.)

Duquesne, admiral, v. 170.

Durazzo (see Dyrrachium), duchy of,
iv. 221.

Dushan, Stephen, of Servia, iii. 423 ;
victories of iii. 436, 438, 441 ; con-
quers Epirus and Thessaly, iv. 128,
129.

Duumviri, i. 61.

Dyme, colonized by Pompey with
pirates, i. 31.

Dyovuniottes, vi. 400.

Dyrrachium {see Durazzo), surprised by
Theodoric, i. 170, 316; ii. 373, 380;
captured, ii. 417 ; siege of, iii. 74 seq.,
82, 119 seq.; taken, iii. 214, 223, iv.
56.

Earthquakes in Greece, i. 142, 225, iii.
461 ; at Antioch, i. 183; at Constan-
tinople, ii. 32, 44; in Syria, ii. 63, iii.
22.

East, the separation of, from the west,
its influence on the Greeks, i. 147 ;
pestilence in, iv. 16.

East Indies, i. I46 note.

Eastern empire destroyed by Crusaders
A. D. 1204, i. 162; effects of geo-
graphy on, i. 165. {See Empire,
Byzantine.)

Eastern Church, constitution of, iii. 66.
{See Church.)

Ecloga, ii. 33, 236, 239.

Ecclesiastics, morality of, iv. 201 ; liter-
ature of, V. 287.

Ecthesis of Heraclius, i. 347, 375.

Edessa (Vodena), ii. 374, 377, 378.

Edessa, university of, i. 273; Nesto-
rians driven out of, i. 316, 399 ;
church at, rebuilt by Moawyah, i.
384, 410, ii. 308, 402, 411 ; taken by
Baldwin, iii. no; taken by Moham-
medans, iii. t6o.

Education in Greece, vii. 131.

Egnatia, Via, i. 317, ii. 267.

Egriboz, vi. 3.

Egypt, jealous of Phoenicians, i. 7 ;

382

INDEX.

influence of Greek literature on, i. 9 ;
Greek colonies in, i. 75. 87 ; a Ro-
man province, i. 115; rebellion in,
i. 116; conquered by Palmyra, :6. ;
decline of Greeks in, i. 143, 166;
judges in, oath of, i. 214 ; trade route,
i. 267; under Augustus, i. 270;
rational church of, i. 275, 315 ; Per-
sians in, i. 319; importance of, i.
321 ; action of Justinian in, i. 322;
Arabs gain trade of, i. 354, 363 seq. ;
population of, i. 364 ; taxation of, ii.
'J note ; Arabs in, ii. 134; attacked
by Manuel I, iii. 186 ; conquered by
Selim I, V. 82 ; invaded by the
French, vi. 112 ; French and Italians
in, vi. 349.

Egyptians at Budrun, vi. 354 ; in Crete,
vi- 355 ; before Navarin, vi. 357 ;
land on Sphakteria, vi. 361.

Eikasia, ii. 147.

Eion (Anactoropolis), iii. 454.

Ekbolos, Cape, ii. 271.

Eladas, John, ii. 285, 286.

Elatea, independent_under Romans, i.

23-
Elbassan (Albanopolis), iv. 31.
Elesboas, king of Ethiopia, i. 264.
Eleusis, temple at, rebuilt by M. Aure-

lius, i. 66 ; destroyed by Alaric, i.

159.283.
Eleutherinus, i. 318.
Eleutherokhoiia (Chalcidice), vi. 202,

204, 207.
Eleutherolacones, v. 113.
Elez Aga, vi. 255.

Elis, Scythian or Sclavonian, iv. 21.
Elizabeth of Akova, iv. 218.
Ellice, Mr. Edward, his connexion with

the Greek loan, vi. 434, 435.
Elliot, Hon. Henry, first mission to

Greece, vii. 269 ; second mission to

Greece, vii. 289 seq.
Elmas Bey, vi. 93, 217, 225, 406.
Elphinstone, admiral, v. 257 seq., 261.
Elpidios, ii. 71, 88.
Emblakika (Stenyclerian plain), vi.

>55-
Emesa, siege of, i. 360, 362, 371, ii.

331-

Emin, Mehemet, v. 255.

Emo, governor of Morea, v. 93, 199,
208.

Emperor of Rome, a trader, i. 117; his
relation to the army, i. 196 ; supre-
macy of in the church, i. 133, 381,
391, ii. 231, 262.

Empire, Roman, want of hereditary
succession in, i. 290 ; termination of,
i. 353 ; officialism of, i. 198 ; dis-
organization of after Justinian, i. 289.

Empire, Byzantine, commencement of,

i- 353 ; organization of, i. 184 ; froni'
tiers of under Leo HI, i. 399.

Encamping, art of neglected, i. 210.

England and English, trade with Greece
V. i,i7 ; with Turkey, v. 171 ; loniai
republic under, v. 276, 277 ; treat
ment of Parga, v. 276 ; attempts t
coerce the Porte, vi. 112 ; war witl
Turkey, vi. 155 ; takes Zante, vi
157; troubles with Zante, vi. 223
224; benevolence of, vi. 273 ; loam
to Greece, vi. 328, 337 ; Greek
jealous of, vi. 364 ; protects CalamoJ
vi. 374 ; policy of, vii. 2, 6 seq
Philhellenism in, vii. 7 ; complaintsl
of Porte against, vii. 8 ; Greecei
solicits protection of, vii. 9 ; policy of|
towards Spain and Portugal, vii. 11
treaty of 1827 with France and RuS'
sia, vii. 13, 25; hated by Capodis-
trias, vii. 30; policy of, vii. 52, 53,
80, 171 seq., 187 ; fleet at Poros, vii.
65 ; influence of in Greece, vii. 136;
disputes with Greece, vii. 149 ; de-
mands interest on Greek loan, vii,
203 ; unpopularity of, vii. 207 ; rup-
ture with Greece, vii. 208 seq. ; col-
lision with France, vii. 2 10 seq. ;
blockades Piraeus, ib. ; revived popu-
larity of, vii. 264, 276 ; opinion of
upon the Greek revolution, vii. 275;
engages to find a king for Greece
and restore the Ionian Isles, vii. 287,
289 ; representations of to Greece,
vii. 294; leaves Corfu, vii. 313; ac-
cused by Russia of violating treaty
engagements, vii. 214; English built
ships in Turkish service, vi. 349.

Entenza, Beranger d', iii. 397 seq., 400,
405, 406; iv. 147.

Epanagoge of Basil I, ii. 242.

'E(pr]iJifpts FeviK^, The, vii. 60.

Ephesus, temple of Diana at, destroyed,
i. 95 ; council of, i. 328.

Ephors, revival of, vi. 141.

Ephthalite Huns, i. 259.

Epibates, treaty of, iii. 415. %i

Epictetus, i. 273. ^|

Epidamnus. (See Dyrrachium.)

Epidaurus, ravaged by Sulla, i. 27;
assembly of, vi. 239, 242 ; constitu-
tion of, ib. seq. ; decree of, vii. 10.

Epiphanea (Hama\ i. 361.

Epirus, a senatorial province, i. 32 seq.,
53, 115; occupied by Alaric, i. 160;
ravaged by Totila. i. 224, 253 ; over-
run by Normans, iii. 80 ; Theodore
despot of, iii. 300 seq., 328, iv. 112,
118, 124; despotat of, iii. 311, 338,
431. iv. 121 seq. ; Angelos Komnenos
Dukas family name of despots of,
iv. 1 23 ; campaign of John Palaeo-

INDEX.

?>^^

logiis in, iii. 338 seq. ; Bulgarians in,
iv. 28; Michael despot of, iv. in,
121, 123; Michael 11 despot of, iv.
126, 127, 201 ; Nicephorus despot of,
iv. 127; Thomas despot of, iv. 127,
142 ; Nicephorus II, despot of, iv.
128 ; conquered by Stephen Dushan,
iv. 128, 129; timariots in, v. 4;
French driven out of, vi. 47 : endea-
vour of Greece to annex, vii. 219,
221, 223 seq.; list of despots of, iv.
430 ; population of, vi. 35.

Erarich, i. 242.

Erasinus, river, vi. 292.

Eretria, lost by Athens, i. 60.

Erfurt, conferences of, vi. 112.

Erissos, Turkish fleet at, vi. 177 seq.;
bishop of, vi. 202.

Ernest, duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha,
refuses the crown of Greece, vii. 290,
291.

J2rotikos, Theophilos, ii. 429.

Ertebil, iv. 405 seq.

Ertogrul, iii. 360, 469, v. 9.

Erzeroum (Theodosiopolis), i. 261.

i'2thiopia, becomes Christian, i. 147,
264, ii. 272 seq.; missionaries in,
i. 269 ; alliance of Justin with, i.
296.

Euboea (Negrepont), iii. 187, iv. 108
seq., 132; Venetians in, iv. 154;
taken by Turks, v. 61, 102 ; Greek
rebellion in, vi. 247 ; Greeks and
Turks in, vi. 314; Albanian, vi. 28.

Euchaites, ii. 103.

Eudes of Burgundy, iv. 175, 219, 221.

Eudocia (Athenais), wife of Theodo-
sius II, i. 174, 192, 278, 285.

Eudocia, cousin of Andronicus I, iii.
148, 203.

Eudocia, wife of Alexius V, iii. 269,
276.

Eudocia, daughter of Alexius III of
Trebizond, iv 379, 385.

Eudocia, daughter of Dekapolitas, ii.
171.

Eudocia of Georgia, iv. 393.

Eudocia Ingerina, ii. 171, 192, 196,

253-.
Eudocia Makrembolitissa, iii. 23 seq.,

35-
Eudocia, daughter of Michael VIII, iv.

346,.35i-
Eudocia, daughter of Theodore, iii. 297,

299.
Eudocia, daughter of Valentinian III,

i. 231.
Eugene, prince of Savoy, v. 227.
Eugenios Bulgares (see Bulgares).
Eugenics, patriarch, vi. 186.
Eugenios, St., of Trebizond, iv. 330.
Eugenius, pope, ii. 141, 494.

Eulogia, iii. 368, 374.

Eulogios, ii. 196.

Eunapius, i. 287.

Euphemios, ii. 137. '

Euphrosyne, ii. 138, 142, 146, 147.

Euphrosyne, wife of Alexius III, iii.

242 seq., 295.
Euphrosyne, story of, vi. 60.
Eurycles, Julius, owner of Cythera, i.

47, 77, ii. 254.
Eustace of Boulogne, iii. 103.
Eustathios, governor of Calabria, ii.

313- .

Eustathios Maleinos, ii. 364, 367.
Eustathios of Thessalonica, iii. 215, iv.

57. V. 134-

Euthymios, ii. 142.

Euthymios, ii. 263, 300.

Eutropius, ii. 16.

Eutyches, doctrine of, i. 177, 189.

Eutychians, i. 308, 315, 347.

Eutychius, exarch of Ravenna, ii. 40.

Evagrius, i. 308, 338, 339 ; church his-
tory of, i. 416, iv. 12.

Evander, i. 66.

Evenus (Phidari), vii. 159.

Evrenos (Ghazi Gavrinos), iv. 233,
235; invades Peloponnese, v. 4,
vi. 4.

Exarchs, oppression of, i. 318; termina-
tion of exarchate of Ravenna, ii. 43,
100; of Heraclea, ii. 180; exarchate,
extent of, ii. 206 note.

Exchange of prisoners, ii. 54, 89.

Exemptions, failure of system of, v.
202. {See Barrats.)

Eynard, Mr., vi. 411, 437; generosity
of, vii. 203.

Eyoub Mosque, i. 383 note.

Ezerits, ii. 166, 304, iv. 19, 20.

Ezero (Helos), iv. 19.

Fabvier, colonel, vi. 372, 402, 403;
relieves Acropolis, 408 seq., 416, vii.

13. 24. .35' 37- 38. yii- 134-
Faliero, Vital, doge, iii. 83.
Famagosta, siege of, v. 82.
Fatimites, ii. 332, 358.
Fauces Antigonenses, vi. 73.
Fauvel, M., French consul, vi. 284.
Fellahs, cut off thumbs, i. 93.
Fellowes, Sir Thomas, vii. 19.
Ferdinand, king of Portugal, refuses

the crown of Greece, vii. 289, 290.
Ferdinand of Tuscany attacks Chios,

V. 80.
Fergana, ii. 167,
Fernand of Majorca invades Achaia,

iii. 398, 405, 406, iv. 147, 218.
Ferrara, council of, iii. 493.

384

INDEX.

Feudalism in Greece, iii. 486, iv. (^^^
94 seq., 105 seq., 132 seq., 169, 181 ;
compared with that in England, iv.
227; among Turks, v.. 2, 14, 15;
Othoman, v. 34, 41 seq. ; extinguished
by Mahmoud II, v. 15, 44.

Filioque controversy, ii. 233.

Finance, Othoman, imperfection of, v.
21; Greek abuses of, vii. 124; in-
quired into and reported on by a
commission of allies, vii. 238 seq.

Finch, Sir John, v. 171.

Finlay, Mr., in the Greek Revolution,
vi. 428 note, 429 note, 437 note ; claim
against Greek government, vii. 209,
212.

Fiorenza, duchess of Archipelago, iv,
286, 287 seq.

Firmus, rebellion of, i. 116.

Fiscal injustice of Romans, i. ili, 149,
199, 200, 218, ii. 407.

Flamininus defeats Philip V of Mace-
don, vi. 73.

Flanders, Baldwin of, iii. 258, 265, 275,
iv. 85 seq.

Flanders, Henry of, iii. 265, 286, 289
seq., iv. loi seq.

Flanders, fleet of, Venetian, iv. 296.

Florence, council of, iii. 494 ; Acciai-
uoli family from, iv. 157; Greek
colony at, v. 98.

Florentines in the Levant, attack Chios,
V. 99 ; ravages of, v. 106, 108.

Florenz of Hainault, iv. 127, 129, 209
seq., 2(5.

Follis, i. 117, 441. {See Coinage.)

Foscari, Francis, doge, iv. 130.

Fostat, rise of, i. 373, ii. 276.

France (see French).

Francesco I of Florence, v. 98.

Francopulo, iii. 246.

Frangopoulos, iii. 17.

Frankfort, council of, ii. 76, 141.

Franks, summoned by Witiges, i. 241 ;
in Italy, i. 247 ; defeated at Vultur-
nus, ih. ; Justin negotiates with, i.
296 ; empire of, ii. 206, 439, 444 ;
moral character of, ii. 219 ; use of
the term by Byzantines, iv. 63 ; con-
quer Athens and Thebes, iv. 135,
170; conquer Peloponnesus, iv. 174;
evil effects of their rule in Greece,
iv. 228.

Franz, Dr., arrest of, vii. 137, 138.

P'raxinet, ii. 313.

Frederic Barbarossa {see Barbarossa),
iii. 233 seq.

French and France, Arabs in, ii. 134;
influence on the East, iv. 63 ; relations
with Porte, v. 166; in Chios, v. 238;
intrigues of, in the East, v. 238 seq.,
240, 246; attacked by pirates, v. 272 ;

influence on Greece of the Revolution,!
V. 273, 278, vi. 97, vii. 59 ; policy inl
Greece, V. 213, 274; war with Turkey,!
V. 274; protect Ionian Isles, v. 2 74,r
vi. 52 ; expelled from Ionian Isles,!
V, 275 ; driven out of Epirus, vi. 47;!
clubs, vi. 97 ; Turks protected by,j
vi. 284- Philhellenes, policy of, vi.
410; invade Spain, vii. 3; conquer!
Algiers, vii. 13 ; treaty with England!
and Russia, vii. 13, 25; in Morea,!
vii. 27, 28; policy of, vii. 52, 53,]
80 ; fleet at Poros, vii. 65 ; in Mes-
senia, vii. 79 ; at Nauplia, vii. 89 [
seq.; at Kalamata, vii. 99, 100; at
Argos attacked by Greeks, vii. 103 ;
disinterestedness of, vii. 119; influence
in Greece, vii. 136 ; advice to Greece, 1
vii. 149; policy of, vii. 172, 188;
action of, vii. 209 ; offers good offices,
vii. 212, 213; contest with Russia!
about Holy Sepulchre, vii. 218;
representations to Greece, vii. 294.

Friendly societies in Greece, i. 37 note.

Fuad Pasha, vii. 225.

Fulvius Nobilior, i. 56, 72.

Gabalas, John, at Rhodes, ii. 313.
Gabalas, Leo, at Rhodes, iii. 305.
Gabras, Constantine, ii. 363, iv. 314.
Gabras, Gregory, iii. 59. {See Gregory

Taronites.)
Gabras, Michael, iii. 177.
Gabras, Theodore, iii. 59, iv. 313.
Gabrielopoulos, ii. 283.
Gadlianole, v. 88.
Gaeta, i. 400 ; subject to Constantino-^ I

pie, ii. 250.
Gagik, ii. 440, iii. 15, 18.
Gagliano, battle of, iv. 146.
Ga'iaseddin Kaikhosrou I, sultan of

Iconium, iii. 239, 247, 248.
Gaiaseddin Kaikhosrou II, sultan of

Iconium, iii. 276, 288, 293, 294, 337,

iy. 322, 324, 339.
Gaidaronisi, iv. 302,
Galata, Genoese at, iii. 156, 357, 450,

452, 456, iv. 354.
Galatista, vi. 205.
Galatz, Greeks at, vi. 118; massacre

of Turks at, vi. it 9.
Galaxidhi, v. 281, vi. 167 ; destroyed,

vi. 221, 222.
Galerius subjects Italy to land-tax,

i. 40.
Gallienus, puts an end to silver coinage,

i. 51 ; rise of thirty tyrarits against,

ih. ; marches into lUyricum, i. 95.
Gallina, vi. 243.
Gallipoli, i. 379 ; Catalans at, iii. 398

seq.

INDEX.

385

Galloway, Mr., vi. 435.

Gallus Trehonianus {&ee Trebonianus).

Ganas, ii. 1 15.

Gangra, archbishop of, ii. 49.

Ganzaca, 1. 344, 345.

Gardiki, iv. 239; storm of, iv. 263, vi.

66 seq. ; massacre at, vi. 67.
Gargaliano, vi. 372.
Garibaldi, vii. 264.

Gaiidas, Eustratios, patriarch, iii. 64.
Gasmuls (half Greek, half Frank),

iv. 213.
Gasser, Bavarian minister, vii. 140.
Gastouni, vi. 335, 385 ; Sessiiies of,

vii. 62.
Gastria, monastery of, ii. 147.
Gatsos, vi. 207.
Gattilusio, Francesco, iii. 459; family

of, y. 58, 59, 294.
Gaul, i. 88 ; province of, i. 114.
Gauls, invade Greece, b. c. 279, i. 5.
Gazes, Anthimos, vi. 201.
Geffrey of Achaia {^ee Villehardouin).
'^leisa II, king of Hungary, iii. 173, 174.
Gelaleddin, shah, iv. 336.
Gelimer, i. 211, 229, 231, 232.
Geloula (Usula), i. 379.
Gemistos Plethon (see Plethon).
Genesius, ii. 295.
Gengis Khan, iii. 308.
Gennadios, patiiarch, iii. 502, 522, v.

137 seq. (iee George Scholarios).
Gennadios, patriarch, vi. 10.
Gennadius, i. 361.
Gennatas, vii. 44, 48, i,(), 60.
Genoa, treaty of Michael VIII with,

iii- 34i» .^54> 355' 357; contests with
Venice, iii. 340, 354, iv. 354.

Genoese, iii. 96, 98, 117, 125, 152,
155; at Galata, iii. 156, 266; take
Rhodes, iii. 313, 357, 401, 408, 428,
429, 450, 452, 453 seq., 456, iv. 354 ;
at Chios, iii. 429, 453-; war with
Cantacuzenos, iii. 453 seq. ; peace,
iii. 457; gain Tenedos, iii. 466; at-
tack Constantinople, iii. 493 ; at
Constantinople, iv. 77 ; attack Arta,
iv. 127; in Crete, iv. 272; conquer
Chios, iv. 287, v. 57, 70 seq. ; com-
merce of, iv. 352, 354; at Caffa, iv.
352 seq., 370 ; at tana, iv. 353 seq. ;
at Daphnus, iv. 354, 371 ; disputes
with Venetians, iv. 355 ; war with
Trebizond, iv. 370 ; insolence of, iv.
382 ; conquer Phocaea, v. 71 ; give
up Chios, V. 78 ; expelled from
Black Sea, v. 106 ; commerce of, v.
126.

Genseric, i. 170, 224, 228 seq., 233,
236.

Georgaki, vi. 122, 125, 129 seq., 136;
death of, vi. 137.

VOL. VII. C

George the Alan, iii. 404.

George Antiochenus, iii. 162.

George of Cyprus, ii. 59 ; (Gregorios,
patriarch), iii. 376 seq.

George, prince of Denmark, king of
Greece, vii. 291 seq.; royal messages
of, vii. 319, 320.

George of Iberia, ii. 384, 385.

George Pisida, i. 415.

George the protovestiarios, ii 408, 420.

George the protovestiarios, iv. 422.

George Scholarios (Gennadios), patri-
arch, iii. 502, 522, V. 137 seq.

George, St., castle of, iv. 214; village
of, vi. 287, 293.

George Syncellus, ii. 74) 227.

Georgia {see Iberia), i. 261, iii. 17.

Georgians, iv. 326.

Georgios, emperor of Trebizond, iv.

341. 348-

Gepids, independent, i. 249 ; invade
Illyricum, i. 252 ; concession of Mar-
cian to, i. 249, 293.

Geraki, barony of, iv. 185.

Gerard, colonel, vii. 36, 68, 75.

Geranea, i. 159.

Gerasimos, patriarch, iii. 381.

Germanic confederation, king Otho re-
cognized by, vii. 104.

Germanicia, ii. 24, 50.

Germans in Italy, i. 247 ; converted, ii.
223; adventures, v. 175; in Venetian
service in Greece, v. 182, 194.

Germanos, patriarch, i. 381, ii. 36, 38,

59-

Germanos Nauplios, patriarch, 111. 307,

367. 370.
Germanos, bishop of Patras, vi. 142,

146, 151, 226, 236, 239.
Germanus, i. 208.
Germany, v. 172.
Gerontia at Sparta, i. 67.
Gerontius, abandons Thermopylae, i.

158, 159- .
Gervais, patriarch, iv. 190.

Ghassan, i. 261, 327.

Ghazi Gavrinos {see Evrenos).

Ghazi Hassan {see Hassan).

Ghidos {see Andronikos I).

Ghin (Manuel Cantacuzenos), iv, 255,

258- .. ,

Ghiumlek (Kios), taken, iii. 426.

Ghisi, Bartolommeo, iv. 284.

Ghoura, vi. 341, 382, 3S3; exactions

of, vi. 400, 401 ; death of, vi. 403.

Giglio, Greek colony at, v. 98.

Gilpracht, iii. 51.

Gise, baron de, vii. 115, 173.

Giurgevo, vi. 129, 131.

Giustiniani, iii. 466, iv. 423.

Giustiniani, John, iii. 504, 512 seq.,

519-

385

INDEX.

Giustiniani, Maona of, at Chios, v. 70,
73 seq. ; end of, v. 78 seq., 233,

234-
Gladstone, Mr., mission of, to the Ionian

Isles, vii. 305 seq., 311.

Glarakes, vi. 253, vii. 58, 203.

Glykj's, John, patriarch, iii. 381.

Godfrey of Bouillon, iii. loi, 103.

Gogos, vi. 264 seq. ; treachery of, vi.
269, 271, 274, 381.

Golacha, taken, iv. 379.

Gold, value of, i. 167.

Goleshti, vi. 130.

Gondolmieri, cardinal, iii. 495.

Gongyles, ii. 316, 341.

Gontharis, revolt of, i. 209.

Gordian, i. 50.

Gordon, general, statement of, vi. 159,
220, 329, 403, 411 seq., 416, 428; his
history of the Greek Revolution, vi.
102, 412, vii. 134; expedition to N.
Greece, vii. 158 seq.; returns to Ar-
gos, vii. 160; returns to England,
vii. 164, 165.

Gortschakoff, prince, vii. 278 seq.

Goss, Dr., vi. 411, 437.

Gosselin, iii. 30, 37.

Gothia, iv. 329.

Gotho-Greeks, i. 155 note.

Goths, sources of their success against
Rome, i. 90 ; invade Moesia, Thrace,
and Macedonia, i. 92 ; pass Helles-
pont, i. 94 ; ravages of, ih. ; take
Byzantium and Athens, ih. ; de-
stroyed, i. 95 ; plunder Troad, ih. ;
invade Thessaly, i. 97 ; subdued by
Theodosius, i. 143 ; defeat Valens, i.
154; massacred in Asia, ih.; colonies
of, i. 155; occupy Dacia, i. 156; injury
done to Greece by, i. 161 ; Arians, i.
228 ; take Milan, i. 240; defeated at
Sarno, i. 247 ; decline of, i. 248 ;
hostile to commerce, i. 266 ; destroy
temple of Ephesian Diana, i. 95 (see
Ostrogoths, Visigoths).

Goura {see Ghoura).

Gousi, Pylio, vi. 50.

Gozzadini, family of, v. 69.

Gracchus, C., annual distributions of
grain introduced by, i. 88.

Gradenigo, Marc, iii. 342.

Grain-contribution (Istira), Othoman
and Roman compared, vi. 114.

Grain, distribution of at Rome, i. 43,
89, 118, 201 ; reduced by Caesar, i.
43; stopped, i. 236.

Grain, distribution of at Athens, i. 43
note, 141, 281.

Grain, distribution of at Antioch, i. 43,
89, 201.

Grain, distribution of at Alexandria, i.
43, 89, 201 ; stopped, i. 201, 321.

Grain, distribution of at Constantinople,!]
i. 43, loi, 118, 201, 319; stopped,)!

i-.3i9: . J

Grain distributions of derange trade, i.
75 ; introduced by C. Gracchus, i.
88. i«

Grain exported from Egypt, i. 270;:!
price of, ii. 327 ; exported from Otho-
man empire, v. 127; effect of peace
of 1815 on trade in, vi. 168 ; Turkish
embargo on, vi. 194, 195.

Graitzas Palaeologos, iv. 265.

Grand-Komnenos, family, genealogy of,

iv. 435-

Grant, Johann, iii. 503, 512.

Graptos, Theodore, ii. 149.

Gratian, i. 133, 136.

Gravia, Greeks defeated at, vi. 305,
306.

Gravina, John of, prince of Achaia, iv.
220, 221.

Great Britain {see England).

Greece invaded by Gauls, b. c. 279, i. 5 ;
scepticism in, i. 1 2 ; population of in
time of Alexander, i. 14, 15, 404;
Roman conquest of, i. 19 seq. ; status
of landed proprietors in, i. 21, 76 J
census applied to, i. 22 ; in time of
Mithridates, i. 25 ; invaded by Sulla,
ih. ; effects of geography on, i. 29 ;
Roman taxation of, i. 38 ; policy of
Augustus towards, i. 60 ; Strabo's
account of, i. 62 ; revival of under
Hadrian, i. 64 seq., 77, 80; under
M. Aurelius, i. 66 ; Pausanias's ac-
count of, i. 72 ; worst off under Ves-
pasian, i. 80; influence of religion
in, i. 82, 85 ; public opinion in, i. 85 ;
nature of municipal system in, i. no,
III; growth of small properties in, i.
112; toleration in, i. 136; earth-
quakes in, i. 142 ; invaded by Alaric,
i. 158 ; injured by Gothic invasions,
i. 161 ; Roman law introduced into,
i. 213; roads in, i. 222; ravaged by
barbarians, i. 316 ; invaded by Avars,
i. 338 ; slaves in, i. 404 ; Sclavonians
in, i. 403, ii. 5 ; rebels against Leo
III, ii. 37 ; translocation of inhabit-
ants of, ii. 67 ; Sclavonians in, ii.
103 ; Arab nile at first mild in, ii.
135 ; state of in ninth and tenth cen-
turies, ii. 319 ; invaded by Sclavo-
nians, ii. 41 7 ; Norman invasion of,
iii. 161 ; Roman colonies in, iii. 226 ;
demoralization of, iii 474,480 ; effect
of Christianity on, iv. 6 ; of laws of
Justinian on, ih. ; date of Sclavonian
colonization of, iv. 17 ; invaded by
William II, of Sicily, iv. 56 ; Tancred
in, ih.\ feudalism in, iv. 94 seq., 105
seq., 227; slavery in during middle

INDEX.

387

ages, iv. 166 seq. ; Franks in, iv.
1 70 ; under the Turks, v. 2 ; tima-
riot system in, v. 2,4; coast of de-
serted, V. 91, 100; ravaged by Plo-
rentines, v. 106 ; state of rural popu-
lation of, V. 122 seq., 135 ; trade of,
V. 127 note; English trade with, v.
157 ; Protestants in, v. 186 ; northern,
conquered by Venetians, v. 191 ;
recovered by Turks, v. 193; state of
under Venice, v. 203 seq., 206 seq.,
212; policy of France in, v. 213;
intrigues of Catherine II, in, v. 247
seq. ; policy of Russia to, v. 266 seq. ;
influence of French Revolution in, v.
278; influence of Othomans in, v.
290 ; value of municipal institutions
of, V. 287, vi. 13 seq., 229 ; Othoman
divisions of, vi. 3 ; literary culture in,
vi. 15, 16 ; character of Turks in, vi.
41 ; regard of for Russia, vi. 99 ;
massacre of Mussulmans in, vi. 139;
pestilence in, vi. 220, 239 ; anarchy
in, vi. 221 ; laws of under the revo-
lution, vi. 241 ; plans of Mahmud to
reduce, vi. 277; anarchy in, vi. 310,
314; Turkish operations against in
1823, vi. 312 ; English loans to, vi.
328, 337 ; revenues of in 1823, vi.
328 ; civil wars in, vi. 329 seq., 337 ;
government of in 1824, vi. 331 ; de-
stitution of, vi. 437 ; solicits British
protection, vii. 9 ; disorganization of,
vii. 13 ; the conscription in, vii. 37 ;
municipal institutions in crippled,
vii. 41 ; national bank of, vii. 46 ;
declared independent, vii. 53 ; new
frontiers of, vii. 54 ; secret police in,
vii. 56 ; crown resigned by Prince Leo-
pold, vii. 58 ; effect of French Revo-
lution of 1830 on, vii. 59 ; disaffection
in, vii. 68 ; governing commission of,
vii. 73, 77, 83, 85 ; conduct of allied
residents in, vii. 81, 84; anarchy in,
vii. 87 seq. ; renewed civil war in,
vii. 92 ; state of in 1832, vii. 93 seq. ;
kingdom of recognized by Porte, vii.
104 ; treaty of with Bavaria, vii. 105;
under a regency, vii. no seq.; con-
stitution of, vii. 116 ; organization of
kingdom of, vii. 116 seq.; French
and Bavarians in, vii. 119 ; municipal
institutions in, vii. 120, 121 ; finan-
cial administration of, vii. 121 seq.;
judicial, /6., 125 seq. ; church of, vii.
126 seq. ; recognized as independent
by Patriarch of Constantinople, vii.
130; Russian intrigues in, vii. 136;
French and English influence in, vii.
136, 149, 187 seq.; Sir Edmund
Lyons in, vii. 143 seq. ; visit of king
Louis of Bavaria to, vii. 161, 163 ;

martial law in, vii. 165 ; demands
constitutional government, vii* 171 ;
English, French and Russian policy
in, vii. 171 seq.; orthodoxy in, vii.
173; constitution of 1844, vii. 177
seq. ; specimen of elections in, vii.
193, 194 ; organization of church of,
vii. 197 seq. ; rupture of with Turkey,
vii. 200 seq. ; constitution of violated,
vii. 208, 233 ; rupture with England,
vii. 208 seq. ; Sir Thomas Wyse in,
vii. 209, 212, 213, 253, 269; indem-
nity of to England, vii. 213; action
of during Crimean war, vii. 219 seq. ;
endeavours to annex Thessaly and
Epirus, ih. ; English policy to, vii.
219 ; allies interfere in, vii. 226 seq. ;
effects of land-tax in, vii. 243 seq. ;
sympathies of in war of Austria and
Italy, vii. 249 seq. ; popularity of
England in, vii. 264, 276; the Hon.
H. Elliot's mission to, vii. 269, 289
seq.; king Otho leaves, vii. 273;
Prince Alfred elected king of, vii.
276, 284 seq. ; provisional government
of, vii. 282 ; Prince George of Den-
mark elected king of, viL 291 seq. ;
mission of Mr. Gladstone to, vii. 305
seq., 311 ; representation in, vii. 314;
constitution of 1864, vii. 321 seq.,
345; local government in, vii. 321,
322 ; liberty of the subject in, vii.
322 ; powers of the crown in, vii.
325 ; council of state abolished, vii.
331.

Greek art, attitude of Romans to, i. 71
{&ee Art).

Greek church (see Church).

Greek, colonies conquered by Rome, i.
5 ; on Black Sea reduced, i. 6 ; civil-
ization, extent of, i. 15, 75 ; commerce,
decline of, i. 78 ; revival of, i. 141 ;
civilization of Euxine extinguished,
i. 251 ; merchants, i. 268 ; commerce,
i. 418 seq. ; decline of, iii. 173, 174,
iv, 206 ; population, advance of, in
ninth century, iv. 19 ; clergy, aristo-
cracy, monasteries, v. 150 seq. ; rural
and urban population, v. 154, 155,
vi. 1 2 seq. ; architecture in islands,
V. 218; commerce in 19th century,
v. 280, vi. 8 ; society, classes of,
vi. 10 seq. ; taxation, vi. 13, 14;
islanders, character of, vi. 27; revo-
lution of 1 82 1, vi. 82, 87 ; causes of,
vi. 96, 103; outbreak of, vi. 139;
the work of the people, vi. 144, 146 ;
under klepht leaders, vi. 153; volun-
teers, vi. 124, 131, 132; peasantry,
conduct of, vi. 158; revolutionists,
successes of, vi. 165 ; navy, j^iratical
conduct of, vi. 174; insurrections

C C 2

388

INDEX.

suppressed, vi. 197; insurgents, mis-
conduct of, vi. 200 ; insurgents at
Valtetzi, vi. 212; anarchy, vi. 229;
commissariat, vi. 230 ; revolution,
religious not political, ih. ; executive,
■vi- 330 j government, bad faith of,
vi. 387 ; conduct of, vi. 409 ; at
Poros, vi. 420 ; changes of seat of,
vii. 32 ; army, organization of, vii.
35 seq. ; revenues, sources of, vii. 45 ;
republic, coinage of, vii. 46 ; liberty
of the press attacked, vii. 60 seq.,
132) 133, 144; senate, inti-igues of,
vii. 97, 199 ; kingdom, coinage of,
vii. 124; organization of, vii. 125;
monasteries suppressed, vii. 131 ; uni-
versity founded, ih. ; roads neglected,
vii. 1 33 ; regency, dissensions in, vii.
135 seq. ; loan, third instalment of,
vii. 143, 162 ; loan, interest de-
manded on, vii. 172 ; revolution of
1843, vii. 174 seq., 180 seq.; council
of state, vii. 1 76 ; revenues, state of,
vii. 199 ; chamber, vii. 203 ; loan,
security for, vii. 211; sympathy for
Russia, vii. 220 seq.; members, cor-
ruption of, vii. 232, 233; chamber,
elected and dissolved, vii. 251 ; cham-
ber of 1 86 1, vii. 252 ; succession,
question of, vii. 265 seq., 280 ; army
disorganized, vii. 293.

Greek fire, i. 383, ii. 17, iii, 205, 273,
299.

Greek language, official language of
East, i. 1 73 ; the ecclesiastical lan-
guage of Christianity, i. 127, 152,
215, ii. 200 ; modern, i. 187 ; adopted
by Byzantine court, i. 352; corrup-
tion of, i. 406, iv. 4 seq. ; modern,
literary regeneration of, v. 284.

Greek literature, influenced by Alex-
ander's conquests and by Latin, i. 8 ;
perishes at Athens, i. 277 (see Litera-
ture\

Greeks despise foreign literature, i. 8 ;
points of union with Macedonians,
i. 6 ; less demoralized by conquest
than Romans, i. 1 1 ; and Romans, dif-
ferent political ideals of, i. 17; first
contempt of Romans for, i. 22; in
time of Mithridates, i. 25 ; at Rome,
bad character of, i. 69 ; dislike trade,
i. 74 ; luxury of, i. 78 ; fond of poli-
tics, i. 85 ; Romaic formed, i. 108 ;
effects of Christianity on, i. 119;
orthodox, i. 135 ; temples of ruined,
i. 136; in Italy, i. 216; effects of
orthodoxy on, i. 274, 276 ; in Syria,
i. 324 ; modern, nationality of, i. 338,
iv. 2 ; condition of from Justinian I
to Leo IIL i. 3Q8, 401 seq. ; homo-
geneity of, iv. 6 ; exterminated by

Arabs, i. 401, 417; influx of into
Constantinople, ii. 66 ; and Latins at
Constantinople, quarrels of, iii. 233;
in middle ages, prosperity of, iv. 144
seq. ; in Morea, unite with Sclavo-
nians against Franks, iv. 216; in
1 6th century, disorganization of. iv.
298 ; struggle of with Venetians,
iv. 299 ; extinction of, v. 5 ; ec-
clesiastical pride of, v. 7 ; morally
inferior to Turks, v. 28, 75 ; at battle-
of Lepanto, v. 86 ; insurrection of in
Crete, v, 87 seq. ; numbers of in
Crete, v. 90 ; plundered, v. 92 ; in
foreign fleets, v. 100; in 17th cen-
tury, state of, V. 118 ; socially divided,
v. 155 ; demoralization of, v. 162 ;
modern, degeneracy of, v. 188 ; bad
citizens, v. 197 ; suspicion and envy
of, V. 204 ; improved condition of
in i8th century, v. 230 seq., 266 ;
official aristocracy of, anti-national,
V. 245 ; intrigues of Russia with, v.
246 seq. ; affection of for Russia, v.
264 ; in Russia, v. 267 ; desire inde-
pendence, V. 278 ; superior social
condition of in 19th century, v. 279 ;
education of, v. 283 ; numbers of
at beginning of 19th century, vi.
2, 3; privileges of, vi. 5; Russia
protector of, vi. 6 ; in Turkey, con-
dition of, vi. 6, 1 7 ; orthodoxy and
nationality confused, vi. 7 ; in Val-
lachia, vi. 9 ; society, vi. 10 ; law of,
Roman, vi. 105 ; under foreign pro-
tection, vi. 107 ; favoured by Russia,
vi. Ill ; first naval victory of, vi.
170; execution of at Constantinople,
vi. 185 ; treachery of, vi. 215 ; defi-
cient in self-restraint, vi. 232 ; cruelty
of, vi. 254 ; assist Suliots, vi. 263,
264 ; defeated at Petta, vi. 270 ; want
of discipline of, vi. 271, 358; de-
feated at Splanga, vi. 271, 272 ; at
Mesolonghi, vi. 272, 274; blockade
Nauplia, vi. 277; disunion of, vi.
281 ; anarchy of, at Argos, vi. 290;
defeat Dramali, vi. 294 ; defeated at
Gravia, vi. 305, 306 ; torture Turks
at Psara, vi. 319 ; violate neutrality
of Ithaca, vi. 322 ; pay indemnity
for, vi. 324 ; extravagant expenditure
of, vi. 339 ; dishonesty of, vi. 341
seq. ; navy of, badly managed, vi.
341 ; fleet of, vi. 351 ; selfishness of,
vi. 364 ; jealous of England, ih. ; de-
feated at Pentomea, vi. 383 ; fleet of,
defeated before Mesolonghi, vi. 385,
391 ; revived patriotism of, vi. 387;
modem, pedantry of vi. 413.
Greeks defeated at Khaidari, vi. 402 ;
take Salona, vii. 38 ; national as-

INDEX.

389

sembly of, convoked, vii. 65, 66 ;
a second vii. 74 ; another at Pronia,
vii. 93 seq. ; convoked and dissolved,
vii. 177, 185 (see Assembly) ; expelled
from Turkey, vii. 226; invade Turkey,
vii. 223, 227 ; sympathies of in w^ar
of Austria and Italy, vii. 249 seq.

Gregoras, uncle of Heraclius, i. 318.

Gregoras, ii. 138.

Gregorios, patriarch, iii. 376 seq.

Gregorios, patriarch, executed, vi. 89,
186 seq., 193.

Gregorios, Dikaios, vi. 142 (see Dikaios
Pappa Phlesas).

Gregory I, the Great, pope, i. 300, 310,
312.

Gregory II, pope, ii. 36, 38, 40 ; letter
of, ii. 41 ; death of, ih.

Gregory III, pope, ii. 41.

Gregory VII, pope, iii. 73, 74, 97, iv.
62.

Gregory IX, pope, iii. 307, 310.

Gregory X, pope, iii. 370.

Gregory Nazianzen, i. 281.

Gregory, bishop of Syracuse, ii; 176,
182.

Gregory, Taronites, ii. 372, 411, iii. 61,
iv. 313 {see Gabras).

Greig, admiral, v. 258, 259, 269.

Greiner, vii. no.

Grenades, glass, v. 223.

Grevenos, taken, iv. 265.

Grigiottes, vi. 403, 407, 409, vii. 95,
97, 103, 104, 206.

Grimani, family of, v. 69,

Grimoald, king of the Lombards, i.

379-
Gritzales, vii. 154.
Gritzena, barony of, iv. 185.
Grivas, Gardikiottes, vii. 157, 207.
Grivas, Theodore, vii. 87 seq., 92, 163,

206, 271, 292, 296, 298.
Gropius, Mr., Austrian consul, vi. 284,

412, vii. 43.
Gros, baron, vii. 212, 213.
Gryllus, ii. 182.
Guaimar, ii. 439.
' Guarantees, material,' morality of, vii.

211.
Gueghs, vi. 35. 72, 314, 317.
Gueheneuc, general, vii. 75, 103.
Guilleragues, M. de., v. 170.
Guiscard, Robert, ii. 439, iii. 37, 73

seq., 79, 82, iv. 51, 59, 69.
Guiscard, Roger, iii. 37.
Guizot, M., Eastern policy of, vii. 188.
Gulaias, ii. 102.
Guy of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, iii.

238, iv. 72 seq.
Guy de la Roche, duke of Athens

{see De la Roche).
Guy of Tuscany, ii. 300,

Guymer, iii. 113.

Gycia, patriotism of, ii. 354.

Gythium, castle at, iv. 185.

Hadji, Christos, vi. 359.

Hadji, Khalfa, work of, v. 103.

Hadji, Omer, iv. 385.

Hadrian, improves condition of pro-
vincials, i. 36, 38 ; coinage, i. 50 ;
depopulation of Greece in time of, i.
56 ; reforms of, i. 63 seq. ; revival of
Greece under, i. 64, 77, 80; com-
pletes temple of J[upiter Olympius at
Athens, i. 64 ; builds temple to Juno,
i. 65 ; buildings of, ib. ; roads of,
i. 65, 80 ; legal reforms of, i. 65 ; at
Athens, i. 279, 281, 285.

Hadrian, pope, ii. 74, 77, 185.

Haemus, ii. 11 ; passes of, ii. 346 {see
Balkans).

Hahn, general, vii. 263, 264.

Hainault, Florenz of, prince of Achaia,
iv. 127, 129, 209 seq., 215.

Hainault, Matilda of, princess of Achaia,
iv. 208, 217, 220, 221.

Haireddin (Barbarossa), Turkish ad-
miral, V. 68 seq., 82, 102.

Hakem, caliph, ii. 397.

Halae, i. 27.

Halet, Effendi, vi. 102, 184, 189.

Haliacmon (Indji-kara-sou ; or Vis-
tritza), vi. 72 note.

Halicarnassus (Budrun), v. 66,

Halys, i. 344.

Hama (Epiphanea), i. 361.

Hamilton, captain, at Nauplia, vi. 300
seq., 370, 420, 421.

Hamsa, iv. 394.

Hamza, pasha, iv. 266.

Hane, an English volunteer at Nauplia,
vi. 299.

Hankius, work of, iv. 345,

Hannibal, general, v. 254.

Hanover, alliance of, with Venice, v.
1 76 ; Maximilian William, of, v.
178, 190.

Hanoverians in Venetian service, v.
178 seq., 186, 191.

Harald Hardrada, at Constantinople,
iv. 49.

Haratch, imposed by Abdalmelik, i.
389, ii. 32, V. 21, 22, 192, 233;
mode of collecting, vi. 18.

Haroun al Rashid, ii. 87, 88, 101,
102.

Harpasus (Rha), river, iii. 18.

Harrington, Earl of, (Colonel Stanhope),
vi. 327, vii. 7, i).

Hashem, tribe of, ii. 155.

Hassan, i. 392 ; the Deaf, ii. 442, iii.
125.

390

INDEX.

Hassan (Bairaktar), executed, vi. i88.

Hassan (Ghazi), the Algerine, v. 258
seq., 264, 265, 268, vi. 40.

Hastings, captain, vi. 260, 297, 303,
331. 357. 411. 412, 414. 416, 421
seq. ; victory of, at Salona, vii. 14, 15
seq., 16, 22, 23; quarrel with Sir R.
Church, vii. 24; death, ih.; paper of,
on steamers and heavy guns, vii. 335 ;
letter to Mavrocordatos, vii. 343 ; to
Sir R. Church, vii. 344.

Haye, de la, M., v. 167.

Hayton, governor of Sinope, iv. 333,

335-
Heideck, colonel, vi 411, 415, 416, 437,

vii. 46, 58, 105, 110, III, 135 seq.,

142.
Helena of Bulgaria, iii. 318.
Helena, wife of Constantine VII, ii.

290.
Helena, wife of David, iv. 424.
Helena, daughter of Robert Guiscard,

iii. 73 seq., 79, 82.
Helena, St., castle of, iv. 216.
Heliopolis (Baalbec), i. 361.
Helladikoi, i. 405, 409, iv. 19.
Hellas, ship of Lord Cochrane, vi. 425,

436.

Hellenes, i. 405.

Hellenism, extinction of, ii. 68, iv. 303.

Hellespont (Dardanelles), pirates in, i.
468; Li cinius defeated at, i. 281; tolls
at, ii. 98.

Helos (Ezero), iv. 19.

Henry III, of Castile, embassy to Timor,
iv. 387.

Henry of Flanders, iii. 265 ; emperor of
Constantinople, iii. 286, 289 seq.,
293, 294, 296 ; death of, 297, iv. 101
seq., 109, III, 187, 190, 325.

Henry IV of Germany, iii. 74, 82.

Henry VI of Germany, conquers Sicily,
iii. 251.

Henry, count of Malta, iv. 272.

Henry of St. Pol, iii. 265.

Heptaskalon, iii. 459.

Heraclea (Kybistra), in Mt. Taurus, ii.
102, 153, iii. 29.

Heraclea, i. 170; (in Macedonia), ii.
II.

Heraclea (Perinthus), i. 336, ii. 115,
180, iii. 357.

Heraclea (Venice), ii. loi.

'Heracleonas, i. 373.

Heraclius, i. 309, 311 ; reign of, 312
seq. ; persecutions of, i. 316, 326,
357 ; successes of, i- 317 ; treaty with
Sisebut, i. 317, 318, 321, 324, 326,
329. 331. 335 ; transplants Serbs, i.
331 ; makes peace with the Avars, i.
337 ; character of, i. 341 ; Persian
campaigns of, i. 343 seq.; Holy Cross

restored by, i. 345, 346, 349 seq.,
358 ; a monothelite, i. 347 ; death of,
i- 35p. 354. 358 ; statue of, i. 414.

Heraclius, father of emperor, i. 318.

Heraclius Constantine, son of emperor,
i. 350, 360.

Heraclius, brother of Apsimar, i. 393,
394, 408.

Heredia, John de, iv. 223.

Hermione (Kastri), rival Greek govern-
ment at, vi. 409.

Herodes Atticus, i. 66 ; wealth of, i.
77, 80, 279, ii. 254 ; theatre of, vi.
408.

Heruls, i. 92, 94, 209, 249.

Herve, ii. 452.

Hescham, ii. 19.

Hess, general, vii. 175.

Hesse, convention with Venice, v. 182.

Hetairia, Philike, revolutionary society,
vi. 75, 83, 98 seq., 109 seq., 112 ; in
Vallachia, 125; disclaimed by Russia,
vi. 125, 126; in Morea, vi. 141.

Heyden, count, vii. 19.

Hexagram, i. 449 {see Coinage),

Hiera, ii. 43.

Hierapolis, i. 263, (Membig), ii. 309,
331. 358. iii- 28.

Hierarchy, Christian, organization of, i.
127.

Hierocles, i. 273.

Hilderic, i. 231.

Hildibald, i. 242.

Himerios, ii. 278.

Hippo, taken by Genseric, i. 228.

Hira, Arab kingdom of, i. 261, 327.

Historians, iii. 7 note ; Byzantine, list of
{see Byzantine).

Hobhouse Mr. (Lord Broughton), vi.

434-
Holy places, custody of, v. 239, 240.
Holy Sepulchre (see Sepulchre).
Honorius, i. 147.
Honorius III, pope, iii. 300 seq., iv.

118, 190, 192.
Hope, Mr., his Anastasius, v. 6^.
Horace, literary merits of, i. 70.
Hormisdas, i. 299.
Hosameddin, v. 258 seq.
Hospitals founded, ii. 221.
Hospital of St. John, Knights of, iv. 223,

V. 66.
Houlagon, iii. 358, 364.
Houlakou,iv. 352.
Howe, Dr., vi. 437.
Hugh of Provence, ii. 303, 313.
Hume, Mr., vi. 434, 435.
Humbertopoulos, Constantine, iii. c;9,

77-
Hungarians, Hungary, ii. 281, 287,
312, 313, 330 seq., 344, 345, iii. II ;
Solomon, king of, iii. 20, 172;

I I

INDEX.

391

■ wars of Manuel with, iii. 173 seq. ;
war of Russia with, iii. 1 74 ; Stephen
III king of, iii. 173 seq.; oppressed
by Austria, v. 166.

Hunniades, John, iii. 495, 498.

Huns in Asia, i. 162, 252 ; payment to,
i. 168, 169 ; advance as far as Isthmus
of Corinth, i. 224, 250 seq., 257 seq.,
293 {see Ephthalite, Kutigur, Utugurj.

Hussein Aga, vi. 163.

Hussein Bey Djeretli, vi. 345, 360, 361,

39°-.

Hussein, capitan-pasha, v. 272, 283.

Hydra, v. 281, 283; Albanians in, vi.
29 seq.; taxation of, vi. 31, 32; the
revolution at, vi. 166 ; trade of, vi.
16S ; fight of Hydriots and Spetziots,
vi. 319 ; conduct of sailors of, vi. 321
seq. ; meanness of, vi. 349 ; massacre
of Turks at, vi. 354 ; independent,
vii. 63, 74; blockaded by Rus-
sians, vii. 74.

Hydriots seize Greek fleet ,at Poros,
vii. 64,

Hylilas, John, ii. 117 seq., 143 note.

Hypata (_Patradjik), vi. 279, vii. 158,

Hypatros, Demetrius, vi. loi, 207.

Hyperperum, v. 77 note {see Coinage).

Hypsilantes, Prince Alexander, vi. no
seq., 113, 116, 117, 121; at Bucha-
rest, 123, 127 ; disclaimed by Russia,
vi. 125, 126, 128, 132, 133; in Austria,
134; death, ib., vi. 142, 144; excom-
municated, vi. 185.

Hypsilantes, Demetrius, vi. 173, 208,
213, 216, 219, 222 seq.; supreme in
Greece, vi. 234 seq., 239; deserts
popular cause, vi. 240, 251 ; president
of legislative council, vi. 280 ; energy
of, .291 seq., 369, 371, vii. 34, 37, 38,
40, 86 ; death of, vii. 96.

Hypsilantes, Nicolas, vi. 131, 132,

Hysela, taken by Saracens, ii. 265.

Hyskos, Andreas, vi. 76.

latrakos, vi. 364.

Ibatzes, ii. 378, 417, 419.

Iberia (Georgia), i. 261 ; Maurice in, i.
301, 387; ruin of, iii. 17; indepen-
dent, iv. 337.

Ibrahim, grand vizier, v. 233.

Ibrahim Inal, ii. 442, 443.

Ibrahim Pasha, vizier of Morea, vi. 330,
335> 336 ; expedition against Morea,
vi. 350 seq ; 354, 356, 357, 359, 368
seq., 372 ; at Mesolonghi, vi. 385
seq. ; returns to Morea, vi. 398 seq. ;
at Navarin, vii. 16, 20; evacuates
Morea, vii. 27, 28, 340.

Ibrahim, Sultan, of Karaniania, iii. 498.

Ibrahim, Sultan, v. 30.

Ibrail, vi. 116, 117.

Iconium, sultans of, iii. 126, 142 seq.,

187, 188; taken by Crusaders, iii.

236 ; Seljouk empire of, iii. 246 seq.

{see Roum).
Iconoclasm, ii. 36 ; excommunicated, ii.

42, 109; progress of ii. 118 seq.;

termination of the controversy, ii. 161

seq. {see Images).
Ignatius, patriarch, ii. 173, 175, 178

seq., 181, 231, 233.
Ignatius, metropolitan of Arta, vi. 48,

64, 143.
Igor, son ofRurik, ii. 341, 342 ; attacks

Constantinople, ib.
Ildigisal, i. 253 note.
lUyricum, invaded by Gallienus, i. 95 ;

prefecture of, i. 114, 115, 161, 180;

invaded by Gepids and Huns, i. 252;

by Sclavonians, i. 252, 253 ; Serbs

transplanted to by Heraclius, i. 331,

333 ; Sclavonian colonies in, i. 338 ;

inhabitants of, exterminated, iv. 10, 15.
Images, worship of, edicts against, ii.

60; worship of, restored, ii. 75, 117 ;

worship of, authorized, ii. 118 ; wor-
shippers of, excommunicated, ii. 1 20 ;

final victory of worshippers of, ii.

165 ; various elements in the dispute,

ii. 222 {see Iconoclasm).
Imbros, conquered by Mohammed II,

V. 59.
Immortals, guard of, 11. 345.
India, trade with, i. 7, 264, 265, 268,

316, 419 seq.
Indiclion, begins Sept. i, a. d. 312, i.

40, 107, 219, 284, ii. 363 note.
Indji-kara-sou (Haliacmon), vi. 72 note.
Infantry, i. 205 ; Roman, weakness of, i.

239.
Innocent III, pope, iii. 252, 253; his

letter to Theodore, iii. 292 ; policy

of, iv. 82, loi seq., no, 136, 190.
Innocent XI, pope, v. 1 72.
Interest, laws against, ii. 212.
Ionian Islands, under France, v. 274, vi.

52, vii. 30 ; French expelled from,

V. 275; a republic, ib.; under Great

Britain, v. 276, 277; islanders, parti-

zans of Russia, v. 277 ; under Russia

and Turkey, vi. 155; Suliots retire

to. vi. 272 ; neutrality of, violated, vi.

322, 324; given up by England to

Greece, vii. 287, 289, 302 seq. ; pe-
' tition of, to the Queen, vii. 307;

mission of Mr. Gladstone to, vii. 305

seq.
los, colonized by Marco Crispo, iv. 302 ;

taken by Turks, v. 69.
Ireland, famine in, ii. 43.
Irene, wife of Alexius 1, iii. ia8.

392

INDEX.

Irene (Palaeologina), wife of Basilios
of Trebizond, iv. 361 seq., 366, 367.

Irene, wife of John III, iii. 299, 305,
318.

Irene, daughter of the Khan of the
Khazars, ii. 44, 69 seq. ; wife of
Leo IV, ii. 84; dethroned, ii. 85;
wealth of, ii. 93, 200, iv. 17.

Irene, wife of Manuel I, iii. 148 {see
Bertha).

Irene, daughter of Andronicus II, iv.
129.

Irene of Montferrat, iii. 410.

Irene of Trebizond, iv. 362.

Irenopolis (Berrhoea), ii. 86.

Iron Gates, pass of, ii. 346.

Isa, iii. 483.

Isaac I (Comnenus), emperor of Con-
stantinople, ii. 447, 452 seq., 455, iii.
7 seq. ; abdicates, iii. 1 2 ; coinage of,
iii. 10, iv. 312, 315.

Isaac II (Angelos), emperor of Constan-
tinople, iii. 216 seq., 220 seq., 230;
dethroned, iii. 241, 253, 254; rein-
stated, iii. 257; death of, iii. 263;
treaty of, with Venetians, iv. 80, 316,

317-

Isaac of Cyprus, iii. 212, 213, 237, iv.
71 seq. (see Comnenus).

Isabella Villehardouin, iv. 141, 142,
205, 208, 209, 215, 217 {see Villehar-
douin).

Isaiah, patriarch, iii. 381, 417, 418.

Isaurians, i. 166, 255.

Isidore, iii. 501, 504, 520.

Iskender Tchlebi, slaves of, v. 44.

Iskos, Andreas, vi. 273, 274, 276, 400.

Isladi, pass of, ii. 346 ; battle of, iii.
495, iv. 247.

Islanders, Greek, character of, vi. 27.

Ismael of Sinope, iv. 412, 414, 417,
418.

Ismael Pasha, v. 177.

Ismael Pasho Bey, vi. 70, 71, 74, 77
seq.

Ismael Gibraltar, vi. 222, 345, 354.

Isokasios, i. 286.

Isonzo, expedition to, v. 63.

Isthmian games still celebrated, i. 67.

Isthmus of Corinth (see Corinth).

Istira, corn-monopoly, vi. 4, 18, 114
(see Grain-contribution).

Istria, i. 400, ii. 100.

Italians, destroy remnants of Hellenic
art, iv. 303.

Italos, iii. 64.

Italy, Greeks in, conquered by Rome,
B.C. 272, i. 6; subjected to land-tax
by Galerius, i. 40 ; decline of popu-
lation of, i. 89 ; prefecture of, i. 114 ;
Theodoric in, i. 169 ; Greek corpora-
tions in, i 216; Belisarius in, i. 237

seq. ; entered by Theodebert, i. 241 ;
Alexander Logothetes, governor of, ||
i. 242 ; Narses in, i. 246 ; Bucelin in,
i. 247 ; conquered by Lombards, i.
293 ; liberty of cities of, germs of, i.
310; oppression of exarchs in, i. 318;
Constans in, i. 378 ; condition of,
i. 400 ; in 8th cent., ii. 38 ; rebels
from Leo III, ii. 40 ; republics of,
ii. 78 ; Saracens in, ii. 248 seq. ;
under Leo VI, ii. 278; war in, ii.
333 ; lost by Byzantines, iii. 36, 37 ;
Normans in, iv. 50 ; war of, with
Austria, vii. 249.

Ithaca, neutrality of, violated, vi. 322.

Ithamar of Epirus, iv. 127, 215.

Ivan the Bulgarian, iii. 248, 249.

Ivane, iii. 16.

Ivifa, taken by Belisarius, i. 233.

Jacobites in Egypt, i. 322 note, 327, 347,
362, 364.

Jaffa, iv. 146.

Jahja the Barmecid, ii. 88.

Jakoub, iv. 235.

Janissaries, i. 301 note, iii. 476, 477 seq.,
484 ; discipline like that of Jesuits,
iv. 402 seq. ; first formation of,
V. 10, 16; their family relation to
sultan, V. 12 ; number of, v. 33, 35;
change of system and deterioration
of, V. 36, 37, 163 ; behaviour of at
Corinth, v. 220; revolt of, v. 245;
turbulence of, vi. 189; destroyed by
Sultan Mahmud, vii. 12 (see Christian
tribute children).

Janni, Sir, iii. 412, 414, 422.

Janni Katziko, vi. 24.

Jaqueria (see Zaccaria).

Jassy (see Yassi).

Jay me II of Majorca, iv. 218, 221.

Jelisa, iv. 282.

Jeremiah, patriarch, v. 142 seq. ; story
of, V. 148.

Jerusalem, Jews banished from, i. 316;
plundered by Persians, i. 324, 346;
taken by Arabs, a. d. 637, i. 361 ;
patriarch of, i. 410, ii. 180 ; fair at,
iii. 96, iv. 69 ; pilgrimage to, iii. 95 ;
taken by Seljouks, iii. 96 ; by Crusa-
ders, 113; taken by Saladin, iv. 90 ;
assize of, iv. 106, 181, 182 ; John de
Brienne king of, iv. 146 ; Holy Se-
pulchre of, V. 238 seq.

Jews, number of, estimated, i. 14 note;
commercial importance of, i. 267,
270, 271, 276; oppressed by Phocas,
i. 310,326; banished from Jerusalem
by Heraclius, i. 316, 325, 326;
increase in numbers of, ii. 6 note ;
persecuted by Leo III, ii. 34 ; ex-

INDEX.

393

pelled from Spain, v, i6o; massacre
of, at Vrachori, vi. 165; at Constan-
tinople, vi. 187, 188; Spanish, in
Turkey, v. 159.

Joanna of Sicily, iii. 238.

Joannes, king of Bulgaria, iv. 99 {see
Joannice).

Joannes, patriarch, iii. 379.

Joannice, iii. 248, 250, 260, 287.

Joannikios, iv. 338.

Joannina, iii. 79, 80, iv. 121, 127, 129;
taken, v. 62 ; pashalik of, vi. 4, 38 ;
conquered by Murad II, vi. 43 ; siege
of, vi. 78, 197.

Joasaph, patriarch, v. 139.

Johannid, the, i. 211.

Job, patriarch, ii. 130.

John I (Zimiskes), emperor of Con-
stantinople, ii. 324, 334; reign of, ii.
335 seq. ; conquers Bulgaria, ii. 350 ;
Saracen war of, ii. 358 ; poisoned,
ii. 360.

John II (Comnenus), iii. 128 seq., 134;
death of, iii. 144; expels Venetians,
iv. 76, 77 ; invades Paphlagonia, iv.
314. 318.

John III (Vatatzes\ iii. 196, 201, 243,
299 seq. ; victories of, iii. 303 ; al-
liance with Bulgaria, iii. 307, 311 ;
conquers Thrace, iii. 313; retakes
Rhodes, iii. 314; character of, iii.
316; sumptuary laws of, iii. 318, iv.
125 seq., 193, 199; death, iii. 320.

John IV (Lascaris), emperor of Nicaea,
iii. 331 seq. ; dethroned, iii. 348 seq.

John V (Palaeologus), iii. 432, 454;
civil war of, iii. 4.s8; expelled, iii.
459 ; takes Constantinople, iii. 460 ;
visits Rome, iii. 464 ; dethroned, iii.
466; restored, iii. 467; death of,
iii. 469 ; vassal of sultan, iii. 470, iv.
375' 385 (*^^ Palaeologus).

John VI at council of Ferrara, iii. 491,
493 ; death of, iii. 496 ; visits Pelo-
ponnese, iv. 242.

John I (Axouchos), emperor of Trebi-
zond, iv. 338.

John II of Trebizond, iv. 342 seq., 349.

John III of Trebizond, iv. 366, 367,

369-

John IV (Kalojoannes), rebellion of,
iv. 397; reign of, iv. 405 seq.; de-
feated by Mussulmans, iv. 406 ; tribu-
tary to Mohammed II, iv. 410 ; death
of, iv. 412.

John, emperor of Thessalonica, iii. 309,
311, iv. 125, 126.

John, king of Armenia, iii. 15.

John, king of Bulgaria {see Joannice).

John, the Almsgiver, patriarch of Egypt,
i. 322.

John Aplakes {see Aplakes).

John of Apri, iii. 421, 433, 445.

John Asan, king of Bulgaria, iii. 304,
308, 309, 311, 337, iv. 124, 125, 193.

John, Don, of Austria, v. 86, 102.

John of Chaldia {see Chaldia).

John Colonna {see Colonna).

John Compsa {see Compsa).

John Damascenus {see Damascenus).

John the Deacon, i. 396.

John the Eunuch, iv. 364, 368.

John Glykys {see Glykys).

John the Grammarian, ii. 117, 143,
149, 154, 163 ; exhumed, ii. 19.S ;
embassy to Motassem, ii. 207 seq.,
222.

John of Gravina, prince of Achaia, iv.
220, 221 {see Gravina).

John Hunniades, iii. 495, 498.

John Hylilas {see Hylilas).

John Kamytzes {see Kamytzes).

John Kamateros {see Kamateros).

John Kinnamos {see Kinnamos).

John Kurkuas {see Kurkuas).

John Lydus, i. 190.

John Malalas, i. 416, ii. 227.

John Opsaras, ii. 452.

John Orphanotrophos, ii. 404 seq., 428.

John of Parga (Patatuka), vi, 1 78.

John the Patrician, i. 234, 318.

John VIII, pope, ii. 234, 249.

John XI, pope, ii. 300.

John XII, pope, ii. 301.

John XXII, pope, iv. 359.

John Radenos, ii. 307.

John Rector, ii. 310.

John Sebastokrator, iii. 230.

John, St., hospital of, iii. 96 ; knights
of, at Malta, v. 7, 57.

John Syncellus, ii. 398.

John Troglita, i. 211.

John Tzetzes {see Tzetzes).

John of Vlachia, iv. 129.

John the Vallachian, iii. 230.

John Vatatzes {see Vatatzes).

John Xiphilinos {see Xiphilinos).

Joinville, iv. 340.

Jornandes, i. 237 note.

Joscelin, count of Edessa, iii. 142, 143.

Joseph, abbot, ii. 80 seq., 96, 109.

Joseph, patriarch, iii. 369, 371, 374,
376.

Jotaba, island of, i. 167,

Jourdain, colonel, vi. 296, 297.

Jovian treaty with Sapor II, i. 143.

Julian consults oracles, i. 84, 121 ;
praises Christians, i. 128; attempts
to re-establish Hellenic paganism,
i. 131 ; courts the Greeks, i. 142 ;
humanity of his writings, i. 149 ; con-
temporary of St. Basil and Libanius,
i. 281 ; at Athens, ib; forbids Chris-
tians to lecture at Athens, i. 282, 284.

394

INDEX.

Juno, Hadrian builds temple to, i. 65.

Jupiter Ammon, oracle of, i. 84.

Jupiter Olympius, temple of, at Athens,
completed by Hadrian, i. 64 ; chrys-
elephantine statue of, burnt, i. 284.

Jupiter Panhellenius, Hadrian's temple
to, i. 65.

Justice, corruption of, iii. 421, v. 19.

Justin I, i. 182, 183, 297.

Justin H, i. 291, 295; alliance with
Turks and Ethiopians, i. 296; nego-
tiates with Franks, i. 296.

Justinian I, reign of, i. 193 seq. ; muni-
cipal institutions imder, i. 201, 202,
218, 405, 408, 412 ; financial reforms
of, i. 201 ; the army under, i. 204,
208 ; forts of, i. 210; debases coinage,
i. 217 ; venality of, i. 223 ; pestilence
under, i. 224; a demon, i. 225;
makes peace with Chosroes, i. 228,
263, 264 ; attacks Africa, ih. ; re-
duces part of Spain, i. 247, 248 ;
guards of, i. 254; relations of, with
Ethiopia, i. 264 ; decline of com-
merce under, i. 266 ; heterodox, i.
275; closes schools of Athens, i. 277;
unites office of prefect and patriarch
of Egypt, i. 322; closes trade of
Egypt, i. 354; monopolies of, i. 421 ;
laws of, ii. 238 ; translated into Greek,
i. 216, ii. 239; effect of laws of, on
Greece, iv. 6.

Justinian II (Rhinotmetus), last Roman
emperor, i. 353, 386 seq. ; banished
to Cherson, i. 386, 392, 425 ; alliance
with Khazars and Bulgarians, i. 393 ;
murdered, i. 386, 395 ; makes peace
with Abdalmelik, i. 386, 387 ; with-
draws Christians from Cyprus, i. 388,
407 ; defeats Sclavonians and Bul-
garians, i. 388 ; defeated at Sebasto-
polis, i. 389 ; dethroned, i. 391 ; re-
stored, i. 394; conquers Tyana, i.
394, ii. 25.

Justinian the Patrician, i. 381.

Justiniani {see Giustiniani).

Justinianopolis, i. 388.

Kabala, ii. 132 ; family of, iv. 406.

Kabasites, John, iv. 375, 376.

Kabasites, Leo, iv. 387.

Kabasites, Michael, iv. 375.

Kadiaskers, v. 18.

Kaffa (see Caffa).

Kainardji, peace of, 1774, v. 263, vi. 5,

106, 193 seq.
Ka'ires of Andros, iv. 300 note.
Kairowan, i. 373; taken, i. 382 and

note.
Kakavoulia, v. 115 seq.

Kakavouliots, v. 272,

Kakeskala, vi. 375.

Kakoilion, vi. 46.

Kakosuli, vi. 46, 50.

Kalabak, vi. 77.

Kalabrya, battle of, iii. 47.

Kalamata, iv. 142, 178, 183; taken by
Sclavonians, iv. 212, 213; v. 177, 178 ;
taken, vi. 149 ; occupied by Ibrahim
Pasha, vi. 368 ; French garrison at,
vii. 99, 100.

Kalamogdartes, Andreas, vi. 283.

Kalamos, vi. 273, 276, 395, 396,

Kalaphates, Michael, ii. 408 {see Mi-
chael V).

Kalarites, vi. 198, 199.
-Kalavryta, vi. 145 ; massacre of Mus-
sulmans at, vi. 147.

Kalergi, capture of, vi. 431, vii. 77, 82,

9?' 17.S, i77> i93> 229, 231.

Kaliakudi, Mount, skirmish at, vi. 317.

Kalligraphos, nickname of Theodosius
II; i. 173, 176.

Kallimakes, Skarlatos, vi. 123.

Kallimaki, vi. 116.

Kalliphronas, vii. 251, 296, 297.

Kallistos, patriarch, iii. 450, 459.

Kalokyres, ii. 333, 344, 347.

Kalojoannes, iv. 397.

Kalomodios, iii. 246.

Kalos Agros, ii. 17.

Kalothetes, iii. 461.

Kaltetzi, monastery of, vi. 233.

Kaluphes, Nicephorus, iii. 162, iv. 54.

Kamateros, Basilios, patriarch, iii. 201.

Kamateros, John, patriarch, iii. 246, 288.

Kamenietz, v. 6.

Kamytzes, Eustathios, iii. 122.

Kamytzes, John, iii. 304.

Kamytzes, Manuel, iii. 249 seq.

Kanares, Aiistides, vii. 297.

Kanares, Constantine, vi. 167; his fire-
ship, vi. 258, 295 ; exploit of, vi. 301,
410; at Poros, vii. 63, 71, 88, 134;
prime minister, vii. 208, 251, 255,
256 seq., 258, 282, 292, 296.

Kanares, Miltiades, vii. 297.

Kanavos, Nicolas, iii. 263.

Kanavos, Nicolas, vi. 273.

Kanun Name, iii. 476, v. 10, 16.

Kapetron, battle of, iii. 16.

Kapha, ii. 354 {see Kaffa).

Kapou Dervend (Trajan's Gates), ii. 346.

Kara Ali, naval exploits of, vi. 222
seq.; at Chios, vi. 254, 256; death
of, vi. 259.

Kara Khalil, v. 33 {see Khalil).

Kara Mustapha, v. 168, 170, seq., 225,
227.

Kara Osman Oglou, vi. 318.

Kara Yolouk, iv. 389, 415.

Kara Yousouf, iv. 3S9, 393, 395,

INDEX.

395

Karababa, fort of, v. 189.
Kaiadja, vi. 112, 116, 243.
Karaiskaki, vi. 273, 322, 359, 383, 384,

392, 402, 403 ; operations in East

Greece, vi. 406 seq., 424, 427 ; death

of, vi. 429.
Karakorum, iv. 339, 353.
Karantenos, Constantine, ii. 400.
Karantenos, Nicephorus, ii. 403.
Karasi, emirs of, iii. 427.
Karasou (see Rheginas), ii. 115.
Karatassos, vi. 207, 208, 359.
Karatassos, Tzames, vii. 201.
Karavaserai (^Limnaea), vi. 88 (see^Kar-

vaserai).
Karavia, commander of forces of He-

tairia at Dragashan, vi. 119, 131,

Karayanni, Athanasios, vi. 292.

Karbeas, ii. 169, 244.

Karidi, battle of, iv. 139, 200,

Karies, vi. 204.

Karitena, barony of, iv. 184; Greek

insurgents defeated at, vi. 152, 157,

158 {see Skorta).
Kailili {see Aetolia, Arta), v. 62.
Karmathians, ii. 306, 307.
Karpenisi, v. 191, 193; engagement at,

vi. 3^5^ vii. 38, 159.
Karps, i. 92.
Kars, ii. 440, 443.
Karteria, the, steamer, vi. 412, 414,

415, 422, vii. 14.
Karvaserai, vi. 276 (see Karavaserai).
Karykas, iii. 60.
Karystos, vi. 247, 248 ; skirmish at, vi.

314, 318.
Kasiots, ravages of, vi. 303.
Kasos, the Greek revolution at, vi. 166 ;

attack on, vi. 344 seq. ; massacre of

Greeks at, vi. 345.
Kassandra (Pallene), vi. 202, 205.
Kassim, ii. 204.
Kassiteras Theodotos, ii. 118.
Kastamona, seat of the Comneni, iv,
^316.

Kastamonites, Nicetas, iii. 92.
Kastoria (Diocletianopolis), iv. 8; iii.

80, 82.
Kastri (Delphi), vi. 30, 32, 313,
Kastri (Hermione), vi. 409.
Kastritza, iv. 263.
Katakalon, Leo, ii. 265, 281, 415, 421,

442, 451, 453 seq., iii. 8.
Kataleim, ii. 438.
Katharos, Michael, iii. 411.
Katherine (see Catherine).
Kataphygia, iii. 126, 127.
Katzakos, vii. 70.
Katzantoni, vi. 24.
Katzaro, vi. 341.
Katzones Lambro_s, v. 269, 272.

Kaukanos, ii. 417.

Kavasilas, Alexander, iii. 122.

Kazas, vi. 3.

Keghenes, ii. 436 seq.

Kekaumenos, Katakalon, iii. 60.

Kekaumenos, Michael, iii, 122.

Keltizene, ii. 194.

Kenaan, v. 103.

Kenchrina, siege and capture of, iv.

375-
Keos taken by the Turks, v. 69.

Kephalas, Leo, iii. 80, 81.

Kepoi, i. 251.

Kepos, ii. 193.

Kerasunt, iv. 370, 371, 374, 375 ; sur-
render of, iv. 420.

Keration, i. 443 (see Coinage).

Keratsina, vi. 424.

Kerboga, iii. no, in.

Keroularios, Michael, ii. 411, 428, 445,
455 ; iii. 8, 10, iv. 59.

Kezanlik, ii. 346.

Khaidari, defeat of Greeks at, vi. 402.

Khaled, 'the sword of God,' i. 370.

Khalil, iii. 408, 461, v. 17, 18 (see
Kara).

Khasikakhoria, vi. 202.

Khazaria, ii. 379.

Khazars, i. 344 ; alliance of Justinian II
with, i. 393, 402, ii. 69 ; alliance of
Theophilus with, ii. 152, 211.

Khormovo, vi. 65, 66.

Khosref, Mehemet, vi. 311, 318, 346,

347. 351. 354' 377-
Khotshibeg, work of v. 48.
Khurshid Pasha, vi. 82, 87, 88, 93; in

the Morea, vi. 141, 158, 197, 199,

262, 277, 285, 305; death of, vi.

306.
Kiamil Bey, vi. 227.
Kiapha, vi. 50, 52, 79, 81, 272,
Kief, ii. 340.
Kielapha, v. 177, 179, 192, 201 ; taken

by Turks, v. 225.
Kilidj-Ali, V. 86.
Kilidji-Arslan I, iii. 92, 93, 108, 116,

124.
Kilidji-Arslan II, iii. 189, 190 seq., 223.
Kilidji-Arslan IV, iii. 337.
Kimbalongo, ii. 376.
Kimpolunghi, vi. 131.
Kinesrin (see Chalcis), i. 361.
Kinnamos, John, iv. 29.
Kios (Ghiumlek), iii. 426 (see Kivotos).
Kislar-Aga, v. 246, vi. 3 (see Aga).
Kisterna, revolt of, iv. 202, 214.
Kitries, vi. 368.
Kiutayh^ (see Mehemet Reshid Pasha),

vi. 268, 274, 312, 318, 374.
Kivotos (Cius), iii. 290, 291 (see Kios).
Kleidi, pass of, vi. 385.
Kleidion, ii. 376.

39^

INDEX.

Kleisoura (Kleisura), ii. 12, vi. 43.

Kleisourarchs, ii. 187 note, vi. 20.

Klephts, vi. 21, 22 seq. ; character of,
yi. 340.

Klinovo, vi. 199.

Klissova, attack on, vi. 389.

Klonares, vii. 62.

Knights of St. John of Jerusalem (see
St. John).

Knights of Malta (see Malta).

Knights of Rhodes, v. 64 (see Rhodes).

Knights of St. Stefano, v. 96 seq.

Kobell, Von, vii. 141.

Kodjabashis (Greek primates), vi. 11.

Koenigsmark, Otho, v. 179, 181 seq.,
185, 189, 190.

Koering, vi. 4 11, 437.

Kokovila, Nicolas, vi. 171.

Kolandrutzos, vi. 377.

Kolettes, John, vi. 199, 249 ; minister
of war, vi. 281, 289, 293, 295, 313,
314. 33i> 332, 336, 366, 368 ; jealousy
of, vi. 381 ; defeat of, vi. 405, vii. 73,
74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 85, 86, 90, 96, 97,
loi, 133, 136, 140, 153 seq.; minister
at Paris, vii. 157, 180, 185, 188 seq.;
administration of, vii. 195 seq., 200,
203; death of, vii. 205.

Koliopulos (Plapoutas), vii. 86.

Kolodemo, the assassin, vi. 32.

Kolokotrones, Geneas, vi. 264, 268.

Kolokotrones, Gennaios, vii. 92.

Kolokotrones, Theodore, vi. 26, 148, 149,
153; fortunes of, vi. 155 seq.; in
Elnglish service, 157, 216, 218, 221,
225, 226, 235, 291; at Nauplia, vi.
300> 324> 326, 329, 330, 336, 366,
370. 37i> 399 seq., 410; licence of,
vii. 62, 73, 74, 77, 82, 89, 91, 92, 97,
99 seq.; plot of, 136, 137; arrest
and trial of, vii. 138, 139, 153,
269.

Komans, invasion of, iii. 71, 83, 86,
290, 309, 312 ; colonies of, in Thrace,
iv. 27.

Kombotti, vi. 264, 271.

Konduriottes, George, vi. 330, 331, 334,
336, 357. 358, 365. 410, vii. 80, 86,
96 ; prime minister, 207, 248.

Konduriottes, Lazaros, vii. 62.

Konduriottis, family of, at Hydra, vi.
32.

Konieh, battle of, vii. 150.

Koniarides (Iconians), v. 125, vi. 198, v.
125 note.

Kontostephanos, Andronicus, iii. 169,
177 seq., 187, 194, 201, 209.

Kontostephanos, Isaac, iii. 119, 122.

Kontostephanos, John, iii. 237.

Kontoyannes, vi. 400.

Kontritzakes, iii. 343.

Koraes, Adamantios, v. 284, 285.

Koraki, bridge of, vi. 77.
Koralis (lake Pasgusa), iii. 143.
Koran, principles of, anti-social, v. 13.
Korax (Mt. Vardhousi), iii. 489, vi.

161.
Kordyle monastery at, iv. 384, 398,

406.
Koron (see Coron), taken by Saracens,

ii. 265.
Koronaios, vii. 263, 294 seq.
Kortena, vi. 294.
Kosmas, ii. 37, 200, 281.
Kossova, iii. 468.
Kotiaeon, ii. 194.
Kotratzani, vi. 125.
Koumoundouros, vii. 248, 253, 282;

character of, 296, 297, 330.
Koupharas, Theodore, ii. 184.
Kour, ii. 350.
Kousadac, iv. 339.
Koutari, vi. 252.
Koutloubeg, iv. 385.
Koutoulmibh, ii. 441.
Koutouphari, Zanet, v. 265.
Koutzonika, vi. 50, 51.
Kraiova, vi. 131.
Krakras, ii. 375, 380.
Kranidi, vi. 30, 32.
Krasos, ii. 47 ; battle of, ii. loi.
Krateras, ii. 137.
Kravari, vi. 273.
Kravasara, vi. 375.
Krevatas, vi. 292.
Kriezes, vii. 39, 64, 208.
Krinitas, ii. 313.
Krinites, Arotras (see Arotras).
Krioneri, vi. 384, 386.
Krommydi, engagement at, vi. 360.
Ktenas, ii. 260.
Kublai, khan of, iv. 352, 353.
Kueprili, Achmet (see Achmet).
Kueprili, Mustapha, v. 21, 31.
Kuesy, Ali Pasha, v. 116.
Kughni, vi. 50.
Kumi, vi. 424.
Kumurgi, Ali (see Ali).
Kurd Pasha, vi. 21, 58.
Kurkuas, John, ii. 256, 292, 307, 308,

342.
Kurkuas, Romanus, ii. 324, 393,
Kurup, ii. 319.

Kutasion, capital of Georgia, iv. 338.
Kutchuk Hussein, vi. 32.
Kutigur, i. 250, 253. _
Kybistra (see Heracleia), iii. 29.
Kydonies, vi. 179.
Kylindros, ii. 337.
Kynourians, iv. 33.
Kyparissia, vii. 154. j

Kyriakos, vii. 295, 297.
Kyriakoules, vi. 247.
Kyrillos (Cyril), ii. 223. ^

INDEX.

397

Kythnos, taken by the Turks, v. 69, vii.

264.
Kytria, bishop of, executed, vi. 205.

Lacedaemon joins Pompey, i. 54 ; joins
Octavius, i. 55, 56 ; treatment of, by
Augustus, i. 60 ; Caracalla forms a
phalanx from, i. 93 ; decay of, iv.
198 ; city of, iv. 204.

I/acmon (Metzovo), pass of, vi. 72 and
note.

Laconia, rebellion of, i. 47, 56 ; free
Laconians, i. 60 ; old Greek dialects
preserved in, i. 67 ; commerce of, i.
74 ; long pagan, i. 405 ; Sclavonians
in, iv. 19, 21; Mussulmans murdered
in, vi. 151.

Ladislas. John, king of Achrida, ii. 378
seq., iii. 175.

Ladislas, king of Naples, iv. 159 ; and
duke of Athens, ih.

Lakkos, battle in, iv. 178.

Lalakon, river, ii. 187.

Lalande, captain, vii. 65 note, 66.

Lalla, Albanians of, vi. 29 ; Mussul-
mans of, vi. 151, 1 56.

Lalliots, vi. 222, 225.

Lamachos, ii. 354.

Lampedosa, taken by Saracens, ii. 116.

Lampoudios, iv. 231, 233,

Lamus, river, ii. 167.

Land, status of proprietors of, i. 21 ;
large properties in, in Greece, i. 76 ;
ancient conception of property in, i.
79, 109 ; growth of small properties
in Greece, i. 112.

Land-tax of Augustus, i. 40 ; converted
into a money-payment by M. Aurelius,
i. 40 ; extended to Italy by Galerius,
ih. ; under Constantine, i. 106, 200,
204, 219; Sclavonian, ii. 382, 416;
Othoman, v. 24, 25 ; in Greece, vi.
18, vii. 114, 115; Othoman and
Roman, vii. 122; effects of, vii. 243
seq. ; mode of collecting, vii. 245 ;
relaxed in Morea, v. 232.

Langada, vi. 265, 271.

Langres, bishop of iii. 167.

Laodicea, vi'ool trade of, i. 265, ii. 331,
iii. 113, 117, 236.

Lapara, ii. 362.

Lapardas, Andronicus, iii. 210.

Larissa, i. 361 ; siege of, iii. 80, 81, vi.
197, 198, 277, 291, 292 ; (Schizar),
Suleiman pasha of, vi. 76, 77-

Larymna, razed by Sulla, i. 27.

Lascaris, Theodore I (of Nicaea), iii.
256, 270. 276, 284, 285 seq.; founds
empire of Nicaea, 287 seq., 297, 298;
treaty with Yoland, iv. 112, 124,

321,322,325,326; treaty with Henry,
iv. 326.

Lascaris, Theodore II, son of John, iii.
311, 321 seq., 330.331-

Lascaris, John (see John IV).

Lascaris, Alexis, iii. 299, 303.

Lascaris, Constantine, iii. 290.

Lascaris, Isaac, iii. 299, 303.

Lascaris, John, iv. 347.

Lascaris, Manuel, iii. 324, 326.

Lateran, council of, iii. 296.

Latin, Thracian dialect allied to, i. 115
note ; language of court and heretics,
i. 135, 200; language of law, i. 152,
188, 215; in Africa, i. 318; Valla-
chian like, iv. 29.

Latins, murder of, at Constantinople,
iii. 200.

Latin church and clergy {see Church and
Clergy).

Lauria, Roger de, iv. 155, 156, 299.

Lauria, Antonio de, iv. 155.

Laurium, decline of mines at, i. 23.

Law, Roman, in Greece, i. 21 ; in Greece,
reformed by Hadrian, i. 65 ; sump-
tuary, of J. Caesar, i. 74 ; language of,
Latin, i. 152, 215; schools at Berytus,
Rome, Constantinople, i. 216; of
Justinian translated into Greek, i.
216; Roman, benefits of i. 411 ; im-
portance of ii. 23, 24; reformed by
Leo IIL ii. 32 seq., 236, 237 ; loss of in-
fluence of, iii. 40 ; reformed by Bardas,
ii. 239 ; sumptuary, of John III, iii.
318; importance of supremacy of, v.
19; of land, Roman and Othoman, v.
26 ; Greek, vi. 105 ; Turkish, ih. ; Mo-
hammedan, partiality of, v. 20.

Lawyers, systematized under Constan-
tine, i. 151.

Laybach, conference of, vi. 1265 de-
claration of vi. 193.

Lazaros, ii. 149, 225.

Lazes (Tzans), iv. 315, 426.

Lazia (Colchis), iv. 310.

Lazian party, iv. 365, 367, 368.

Leake, colonel, iv. 7 note, 25, 192 note.

Leblanc, captain, vi. 432.

Lebounion, battle of, iii. 86.

Leftro, castle of iv. 198.

Legates, imperial, in provinces, i. 35.

Legions, recruited from barbarians, i.
98, 1 10 ; remodelled by Constantine,
i. 112.

Lehmaier, M., vii. 170.

Leichudes, Constantine, patriarch, iii.
10.

Leiningen, count, vii. 217.

Leka, iv. 361.

Lekanomantis, ii. 117, 118.

Lekhonia, vi. 200, 201 ; massacre of
Turks at, vi. 201.

398

INDEX.

Lekkas, vi. 284, 285.

Lemnos ravaged by Goths, i. 94 ; by
Saracens, ii. 265 ; Venetians in, iv.
277; conquered by Mohammed II,
V. 59,112; besieged by Russians, v,
261, 264.

Lentianes, iii. 295.

Leo I (the Great, the Elder, the
Butcher), fleet of, defeated, i. 168,
178, 179 ; naval expedition of, i. 231.

Leo II, i. 179.

Leo III (Conon), the Isaurian, first By-
zantine emperor, i. 353, 396, 398, ii. 2,
6 ; reign of, ii. 13 seq. ; constitution of
church under, ii. 13 ; crowned, ii. 15 ;
account of, ii. 24 ; reforms army, ii.
29 ; financial policy of, ii. 31 ; legal re-
forms of, ii. 32 seq. ; persecutes Jews
and Montanists, ii. 34 ; ecclesiastical
reforms, ih. ; edict against pictures, ih. ;
rebellion of Greece against, ii. 37 ;
rebellion of Italy, ii. 40 ; defeats Sa-
racens at Constantinople, ii. 43 ;
death of, ii. 44 ; compared with Mil-
tiades, ii. 198; family of, ii. 200;
legislation of, ii. 236, 237 ; Novels of,
ii. 264; reforms of, iii. 135.

Leo IV (the Khazar), reign of, ii. 69.

Leo V (the Armenian), the Chameleon,
ii. 94, 103, 112 seq.; defeats Bulga-
rians, ii. 115, 117 ; murder of, ii. 126,
200.

Leo VI (the Philosopher), ii. 256, 257
seq. ; corruption of, ii. 260 ; death of,
ii. 282 ; state of Italy under, ii. 278 ;
Bulgarian war of, ii. 279 seq. ; Saracen
war of, ii. 308, vi. 14.

Leo III, pope, ii. 78.

Leo IV, pope, ii. 248.

Leo IX, pope, ii. 439, iii. 36, iv. 60,

Leo of Chalcedon, iii. 63.

Leo of Armenian Cilicia, iii. 141.

Leo Diaconus, ii. 370.

Leo, general, ii. 269, 274,

Leo Kabasites {see Kabasites),

Leo Kephalas, iii. 80, 81.

Leo the Mathematician, ii. 222, 224, iv.
300.

Leo, mountain of, ii. 115.

Leo, general of Michael III, ii. 186.

Leo Nikerites, iii. 122,

Leo Sguros {see Sguros).

Leo Strabospondyles, ii. 447.

Leo Tomikios {see Tornikios).

Leo of Tripolis, ii. 267, 271 seq., 277,
278, 307.

Leondari (Veligosti), iv. 234; battle of,
iv. 261.

Leontaris, Demetrius, iii. 483.

Leontios, i. 174, 175, 386, 387, 391 seq.;
reign of, i. 425 ; dethroned, i. 394, ii.
25-

Leontios, author, ii. 295.

Leontokastron, iv. 355, 357, 371.

Leopold, prince of Saxe-Coburg, sove-
reign of Greece, vii. 50, 54 seq. ;
resignation of, vii. 58.

Leotzakos, arrest of, vii. 295. ^

Lepanto (Naupaktos), taken, v. 62 ;
battle of, v. 83, 86, 102 ; Veli, pasha
of. vi. 73, 77, 78; attack on, v. 193,
195; capitulates, vii. 39. :

Lercari, Megollo, iv. 3S0, 381. «

Lerna, vi. 291, 292 ; Ibrahim Pasha
defeated at, vi. 369.

Lesbos {see Mytilene). J

Lesuire, vii. 157, 158.

Leucadia (Santa Maura), iv. 130, 131.

Leuchtenberg, duke of (Prince Roman-
offsky), vii. 278-281.

Levaillant, vii. 67.

Levant, piracy in, v. 90 seq. ; Floren-
tines in, V. 99 ; Russian piracy in, v.
270 seq.

Lex regia and curiata de imperio, i,
290 and note.

Libanius, i. 281, 283. '

Liberaki Yerakari, v. 192, 194.

Libraries, i. 415; at Constantinople,
burnt, ii. 44 and 7iote.

Licario, admiral, iv. 282, 283, 299.

Licinius, struggle of, with Constantine,
i. 141 ; defeated by Crispus, i. 281.

Licinus, rapacity of, i. 41.

Lidoriki, vi. 158-160, 192.

Limisso (Amathus), iii. 238,

Limnaea (Karavaserai), vi. 88.

Limnia, iv. 364, 368, 374, 379.

Liparites, ii. 442, 443, iii. 16.

Literature, Greek, influenced by Eastern
conquests of Alexander, i. 8; influence
of Latin on, i. 8 ; foreign despised by
Greeks, ih. ; a trade at Alexandria, i.
9 ; Christianity hostile to, i. 1S9 ; ex-
tinction of, at Athens, i. 277; decline
of, i. 415; Arabic, i. 418, ii. 226;
Turkish, v. 146; in Greece, vi. 15,
16.

Litharitza, Acropolis of Joannina, vi.
80, 82 ; taken, vi. 91.

Lithi (Chios), ravaged, vi. 319.

Livadea, iv. 155, 159, 160; plundered,
V. 193 ; the Greek revolution at, vi.
160; Catalans at, ih. ; capture of, vi.
161.

Livanates, Odysseus surroimded at, vi.
382.

Locris, vi. 28.

Logothetes, ii. 30.

Lollianus, professor of sophistics, elected
strategos, i. 279.

Lombards in Pannonia, i. 249 ; conquer
Italy, i. 293; on the Danube, ih.\
Alboin, king of, ih. ; overpower Ge-

LoDjiflU:

longoba
tojci.
Lopa&i
LoredaBi
Lorii.di

Rave:

k. i;.

1%, !

I),

INDEX.

399

pids and destroy the kingdom of
Pannonia, ih. ; send shipbuilders to
the Avars, i. 341 ; conquests of, i.
374 ; defeat Constans, i. 379 ; take
Brundusium and Tarentum, i. 379,
ii. 39, 63; defeated, iii. 113, 114;
quarrel with Venetians, iii. 179, 180;
found the kingdom of Saloniki, iv.

"7- .
Lombotina, vii. 38.
London, conferences at and protocols

of, vii. 51.
Londos, Andreas, vi. 303, 334 seq., 366,

372, vii. 176; resignation of, vii.

192, 212.
Longibardopoulos, iii. 41.
Longinus, i. 115.
Longobardia, theme of, ii. 250.
Longos, peninsula of, vi. 202.
Lopadion, battle of, iii. 126,
Loredano, v. 199.

Loria, de {see de Lauria).

Lothaire, ii. 152, 183.

r.oufti Pasha, v. 142, 146.

Louis I (le Debonnaire), ii. 141, 152.

i.ouis II, emperor of the West, ii. 184 ;

takes Bari, ii. 249 ; saves Rome, ii.

248.
Louis VII, of France, iii. 149, 166, 167

seq.
Louis IX, of France, iii. 310, iv. 139,

193. 199-

Louis of Bavaria, iii. 422, vii, no, 115,

116, 161, 163.

Louis of Blois, iii. 265, 286.

Louis of Burgundy, iv. 217, 219.

Louis, count of Salona, iv. 155.

Loukanos, iv. 255.

Loutraki occupied by Greeks, vii. 39,

Loxada burnt, vi. 198.

Lucian, i. 68, 70.

Lucianus, i. 130.

Luidekerke, Walter de, iv. 210 seq.

Luitprand, bishop of Cremona, ii. 329.

Luitprand, king of Lombards, takes
Ravenna, ii. 40.

Lulu, ii. 246, 247.

Lutraki, Turks at, vi. 272.

Lyapides. vi. 35.

Lyceum burnt by Philip V, i. 55, 277.

Lydia, Gothic colonies in, i. 155.

Lydus, John, i. 190.

Lykandos, ii. 157; theme of, ii. 265,
308.

Lykanthos, ii. 453.

Lykostomion (Tempo), iii. 81.
I Lykourgos of Samos, vi. 251 seq. ; ex-
pedition of, to Chios, ih. ; return of,
vi. 254; exile of, vi. 255; restored,
16.

Lyons, council of iii. 370-

Lyons, Lord, vii. 65 note, 66, 140 ;

minister in Greece, vii. 143, 145;

insulted, vii. 148, 149, 158, 164, 165,

171, 185, 187, 207, 219.
Lysicrates, monument of, v. 186.
Lytton, Lord, in Greece, vii. 305.

Macedonia, inferior to Greece in civili-
zation, i. 2 ; ultimately merged in
Greece, i. 4; points of union with
Greece, i. 6 ; Roman tribute from,
i. 19, 21 ; a senatorial province, i. 32
seq. ; united to Moesia, i. 35, 63 ;
ill-treated, i. 53 ; plundered by Piso,
i. 56; invaded by Goths, i. 92; in
prefecture of Illyricum, i. 115 ; plun-
dered by Goths, i. 154; invaded by
Alaric, i. 157 ; Uzes in, iii. 22 ; Scla-
vonians in, iv. 14; Patzinak colonies
in, iv. 27 ; Asiatic colonies in, ih. ;
Bulgarians in, iv. 28 ; a fief of Boni-
face of Montferrat, iv. 97.
Mackenzie, v. 260.
Mademkhoria, vi. 202.
Maeander, battle of, iii. 196.
Maglabites, ii. 292.
Magna Graecia, i. 400.
Magnaura, ii. 72 ; palace of, ii. 254.
Magnesia defeats Roger de Flor, iii.

395.
Magyars, ii. 281, 287, 312, 313.
Mahdy, caliph, ii. 88.
Mahmoud the Gaznevid, ii. 441.
Mahmoud Pasha, iv. 420, v. 18.
Mahmud I, v. 246.

Mahmud II, destroys Seljouk feudalism,
v, 15, 44 ; sultan, vi. 53 seq. ; charac-
ter of, vi. 54, 183 ; jealous of Ali
Pasha, vi. 69 ; prepares to attack
Ali Pasha, vi. 74; preparations of,
vi. 140 ; policy of, vi. 191, 192 ; diffi-
culties of, vi. 196; success of, vi.
209; poHcy of, vi. 309, 310, 329,
343 ; destroys Janissaries, vii. 12.
Mahomet (or Mohammed), i. i note,
348; character and influence of, i.
355 seq. _

Maina, ii. 305; long Greek, iv. 21, 34,
185; reduced, iv. 197, 198; ceded,
iv. 20t, 229; insurrection at, v. 87;
ravaged by Spaniards, v. 105 ; re-
duced by Turks, v. 108, 205 ; people
of, v. 1 13 seq. ; geography of, v. 114;
reduction of, v. 116, 176 seq., 179;
pays haratch, v. 192 ; joins Morosini,
V. 205, 248, 249, 252; government
of, V. 265 ; invaded by Ibrahim Pasha,
vi. 368, 399 ; free from taxes, vii. 63 ;
bad government of, vii. 69 ; insurrec-
tion in, vii. 70, 151 seq., 199.
Mainates, pagans till late, i. 424, ii.
251, 252 note-, revolt of, iv, 202, 229;

400

INDEX.

in Apulia and Corsica, v. 117, vi.
26, 30; plunder Messenia, vii. 99,

lOI.

Mainvaut, iii. 302.

Maio, count, takes Corfu, iv. 273.

Maison, general, occupies the Morea,

vii. 27.
Majorca taken by Belisarius, i. 233.
Majorca, Fernand of, iv. 218.
Majorca, Jayme II, of, iv. 218, 221.
Makhala (Albanian term), vi. 37.
Makri (Stageira), iii. 241.
Makri, gulf of, vi. 350, 351.
Makrinos, iv. 204, 230.
Makriyannes (Makryannes), vi. 369,

407, vii. 156, 174.
Makrodukas, Constantine, iii. 213.
Makronoro, pass of, vi. 77, 271, 272,

274. 374' 375. vii. 39-

Makry, vi. 393.

Makryplagi, Kolokotrones at, vi. 368.

Makryplagia, battle of, iv. 204, 230.

Makrys, vi. 340.

Maktu, a tax, v. 205.

Malalas, John (see John).

Malandrino, vi. 160.

Malatesta, Pandolfo, iv. 243.

Malcolm, Sir Pulteney, vii. 25.

Malekshah, iii. 42, 72, 88, 90, 91.

Mallos, oracle of, i. 84.

Malta granted to Acciaiuoli, iv. 157;
knights of St. John at, v. 7 ; Suleiman
repulsed from, v. 70 ; piracy of knights
of, v. 94, 109 ; they quarrel with
Venice, v. 95 ; take Castel Tomese,
v. 96 ; ravage Patras, v. 105 ; defeat
of, ih. ; sack Corinth, v. 106 ; ravages
of, v. 108 ; siege of, v. iii ; Perellos
master of knights of, v. 216.

Mamas, St., ii. 114.

Mamistra {see Mopsuestia), iii. 117.

Mamlouks, iv. 403.

Mamoures, vii. 88, 163.

Manchester, trade of, with Cj'prus, v.

157.
Manes, defeat of, ii. 42.
Manfred, king of Naples and Sicily,

iii- 333. 338, 339. iv- 205.
Mangana, monastery of, ii. 446.
Mangou, khan of, iv. 352.
Mani, i. 356.
Maniakes, George, ii. 401 seq., 413 seq. ;

rebellion of ii. 429, 430.
Maniaki, Greeks defeated at, vi. 367.
Manichaeans, i. 356; transplanted to

Philippopolis, ii. 339.
Mankaphas, Theodore, rebellion of, iii,

239, 284. 286.
Mansolas Drosos, vi. 279.
Manuel I (_Comnenus), iii. 143 ; reign

of, iii. 145 seq. ; commerce under,

iii. 152 seq.; war of, with Antioch,

iii. 159, 160; recovers Corfu, iii. 168

seq.; makes peace with William the

Bad, iii. 164, 171, iv. 55; invades

Servia, iii. 172; war with Hungary,

iii. 173 seq.; war with Venice, iii.

181 ; peace with Venice, iii. 183, iv,

78; Turkish war of, iii. 189, 190;

death of, iii. 197.
Manuel II (Falaeologus), iii. 464, 470 ;

vassal of sultan, iii. 471 ; visits Italy,

France, and England, iii. 481 ; takes

Thasos, iii. 485 ; visits Peloponnesus,

iii. 486, iv. 236 seq. ; death of, iii.

491.
Manuel I of Trebizond. iv. 338 seq. ;

tributary to Mongols, iv. 339.
Manuel II of Trebizond, iv. 360, 361.
Manuel III of Trebizond, iv. 386 seq.
Manuel, emperor of Thessalonica, iv,

125.
Manuel the Armenian, ii. 113, 154, 157,

161, 163, 201, 207.
Manuel Cantacuzenos {see Cantacu-

zenos).
Manuel, governor of Egypt, i. 363;

regains Alexandria, i. 366.
Manuel, general of Michael III, ii. 187.
Manuel, the last Palaeologus, v. 157.
Manuel, son of despot Thomas, iv.

267.
Manzikert, ii. 444 ; taken by Alp Arslan,

iii. 31 ; battle of, iii. 33, iv. 313.
Maona, iv. 287 note; of the Giustiniani

at Chios, v. 70 seq. ; end of, v. 78

seq.
Maraptika, iii. 217.
Marathonisi, v. 115, vi. 399.
Marcellus takes Syracuse, i. 71.
Marchesina, iii. 319, 324.
Marcian, i. 169, 177; concession to

Gepids, i. 249.
Marcionites, i. 300 Jiote,
Marco Polo, ii. 212.
Mardaites, i. 363, 371, 384, 387 ; colony

of, at Attalia, i. 387, 407, ii. 251,

252 note; transplanted, iv. 27.
Margaret, lady of Akova, iv. 208, 218.
Margaret of Hungary, iii. 230.
Margaret de Neuilly, iv. 207.
Margaret of Saloniki, iv. 107, ill, 118.
Margarites, Constantinos, iii. 326.
Margariti, vi. 43, 44, 79.
Margaritone, iii. 237.
Maria, sister of Alexios III, iv. 385.
Maria, daughter of Christophoros, ii.

312.
Maria, wife of Constantine VI, ii. 79,

80.
Maria of Antioch, wife of Manuel I,

iii. 148, 186, 196, 199, 201.
Maria, daughter of Manuel I, iii. 148,

196, 201.

INDEX.

401

Maria, empress, wife of Michael VII,

iii. 47, 57. 60.
Maria, daughter of Michael VIII, iv.

353-

Maria, wife of Nicephorus of Epirus,
iv. 127.

Maria, stepsister of Sanudo, iv. 289,

Maria, wife of Theodore I, iii. 297.

Marina Aghia, vi. 279.

Marines, brother of Basil, ii. 196.

Marinus, duke of Rome, ii. 40.

Mark, St., lions of, v. 188.

Markelles. ii. 106.

Markos, patriarch, v. 140.

Marmaro, islet, vi. 374, 376.

Marmorice bay of, vi. 356.

Marosia, ii. 300.

Marriage, decline of, i. 57.

Martel, Charles, i. 350, ii. 19, 41, 42,
206.

Martimakes, ii. 171.

Martin, pope, i. 376.

Martin IV, pope, iii. 363, 372.

Martin, William, vi. 317.

Martina, niece of Heraclius, i. 341, 342.

Martyropolis, i. 261, 399, ii. 358, 402.

Maruzzi, v. 249.

Massoud, sultan of Iconium, iii. 124,
127, 132, 141, 188, 189.

Matilda (Maud) of Hainault, iv. 142,
208, 217, 219, 221.

Matzouka taken, iv. 379.

Maura, Santa, (Leucadia), taken by
Venetians, v. 1 79 ; kept by Vene-
tians, V. 195 ; lost and regained by
Venetians, v. 226, 227 ; Sir R. Church
at, vi. 419.

Maurer, M. de, vii. 105, no seq., 125,
135 seq., 139, 141.

Maurice, i. 197 ; character of, i. 299 ;
quarrels with Gregory I, i. 300, 310 ;
reforms army, i. 300 ; in Iberia, i.
301 ; ends war with Persia, ih. ;
war with Avars, i. 302 ; defeated by,
and treaty with. Avars, i. 304 ; death
of i. 306 ; policy of, i. 307, 351.

Maurokatakalon, Nikolaos, iii. 84.

Mauropotamos. battle of ii. 167.

Maurozomes, Manuel, iii. 285, 288.

MavroCordatos, Alexander, dragoman
of the Porte, v. 242 ; in West Greece,
vi. 91 seq., 236, 241, 243; defeated
at Patras, vi. 242, 243 ; president of
Greece, vi. 244 ; character of, vi,
245 seq. ; expedition to West Greece,
vi. 262 seq.; at Petta, vi. 267, 271,
273; at Mesolonghi, vi. 274; con-
duct of, vi. 281, 312, 314, 321, 323,
326, 327, 333, 334, 358, 361, 363,
412, vii. 10, 64, 81, 86, 87, 123, 133,
139, 180, 185, 186, 189; unconstitu-
tional proceedings of, vii. 192 seq..

VOL. VII. D

195 ; resigns, vii. 193, 232 seq. ; at

Paris, vii. 229; letter of Captain

Hastings to, vii. 343.
Mavrocordatos, Constantine, v. 246.
Mavrocordatos, Nicolas, v. 243.
Mavromichalis, family of, vii. 100.
Mavromichalis, v. 254.
Mavromichalis, Constantine, vi. 369

(but see vi. 363"), vii. 70 seq.
Mavromichalis, Elias, vi. 246 seq., vii.

69, 80, 92, ICO, lOI.

Mavromichalis, George, vi. 363, 364,

371, vii. 70 seq.
Mavromichalis, Janni, vii. 70.
Mavromichalis, Kyriakuli, vi. 216, 264,

271, vii. 69.

Mavronoros, iv. 423.

Mavroyeni, v. 265, 266 ; prince of Val-
lachia, vi. 106.

Maxentius tolerates Christians, i. 126.

Maximilian William of Hanover, v. 178,
190.

Maximin, his policy towards the Chris-
tians, i. 126; rescript of, i. 130; re-
volt of, i. 209.

Maximinus, coinage of i. 50.

Maximos. patriarch, v. 141.

Mazara, ii. 138.

Mazaris, his list of Greek races, iv. 33,
234 note, 240.

Mecca relieved by Amrou, i. 365.

Medimnos, ii. 382 note.

Mediterranean, Pompey sent to, i. 30 ;
decline of commerce in, i. 74 ; Sara-
cens in, ii. 250; piracy in, v. 200;
Russian fleet in, v. 251.

Megalopolis, vi. 157.

Megara depopulated by Caesar, i. 54;
temple of Apollo built at, by Hadrian,
i. 65 ; at time of battle of Plataea,
i. 77, 182 note; Greeks of, exter-
minated, V. 63 ; Romeliots at, vii,
80, 81.

Megaris Albanian, vi. 28,

Megaspelaion, miracle at, vi. 399.

Mehemet I'asha, v. 183.

Mehemet. capitan-pasha, vi. 289 ; in-
capacity of, vi. 301. 302. 306.

Mehemet Reshid Pasha (Kiutayh^), vi.
268, 269, 272, 274, 275, 312, 318,

372, 374 seq., 379, 384. 386 seq., 400
seq., 413, 414, 430 seq., 433, vu.

38. 39-
Meizomates, iv. 375.

Melantias, i. 254, 257.

Melchites, i. 322 and note, 362, 384.

Melek, sultan, iii. 124, 125, 127; treaty

with Alexius I, iii. 127.

Melenikon, iii. 326, 417.

Meleona. ii. no.

Meleti Hadji, vi. 159.

Melias, ii, 265, 308.

403

INDEX.

Melik besieges Trebizond, iv. 333 seq. ;

defeat of, iv. 336.
Melingon, Sclavonian canton, iv. 179.
Melings, ii. 166, 304, iv. 20, 22, 202.
Melios, Spire, vii. 269, 271.
Melissenda, iii. 186.
Melissenos, Maria, wife of Nerio Ac-

ciaiuoli, iv. 161, 162.
Melissenos, Michael, ii. 118.
Melissenos, Nicephoros, iii. 48, 50, 57,

78, 86, 88.
Melissenos, Theodotos, ii. 120, 169.
Melissenos, governor of Oinaion, iv.

387.

Melitene, Chosroes defeated in, i. 297,
ii. 50, 155, 169.

Melos, insurrection in, iv. 281, 282.

Meludion, palace of iii. 215.

Melun, William of, iii. 110.

Membig (Hierapolis), ii. 358, iii. 28.

Menander, i. 407, 416.

Menehould, St., iii. 303.

Mentschikoff, prince, v. 168 note, vii.
218, 219.

Merendites, vii. 206.

Meruk, ii. 401.

Mesembria, ii. 24 ; taken, ii. in; defeat
of Bulgarians at, ii. 115.

Mesochaldion, iv. 420.

Mesolonghi, battle of, v. 254; visit of
Tahir Abbas to, vi. 91 ; joins the
Revolution, vi. 163 ; senate at, vi.
237; siege of, vi. 272, 274; Mavro-
cordatos at, vi. 274; defeat of Omer
Vrioni at, vi. 276; siege of, vi. 372;
second siege of, by Reshid Pasha, vi.
373 seq., 384, 386 seq. ; defences of,
vi. 374 ; Djavellas enters, vi. 389,
393 ; Greek fleet defeated at, vi. 385 ;
Ibrahim Pasha at, vi. 385, 386, 388
seq ; Miaoulis at, vi. 377, 390; final
sortie from, vi. 392 ; fall of, vi. 395 ;
evacuated, vii. 39 ; attacked, vii. 163.

Mesopotamia, Mohammedan conquest
of, i. 363.

Mesopotamites, Constantine, iii. 244.

Messene (Vulcano), iv. 158.

Messenia, trade of, with Barbary, v.
200, vi. 7 ; Greek revolution in, vi.

148 ; murder of Mussulmans in, vi.

149 ; French troops in, vii. 79 ; state
of, in 1832, vii. 98 seq. ; plundered
by Mainates, vii. 99, 10 1 ; insurrec-
tion in, vii. 153 seq.

Messina, ii. 138, 139.
Metaxa, Constantine, vi. 326.
Metaxas, vi. 289, vii. 78, 86, 92, 96, 97,

176, 185, 190, 198, 203.
Metellus, conquers Crete, i. 30 ; quarrel

of Pompey with, ih.
Meteris (stone parapets), vi. 50.
Methana, vi. 403.

Methodios, patriarch of Constantinoplell
ii. 141, 150, 163, 176, 223, 225 and,^
note.

Methone, i. 231.

Metrodorus, travels of, i. 146.

Metro phanes, patriarch, v. 158.

Metzovo (see Lacmon), pass of, vi. 72 1
and note.

Meyer, J. J., bravery of, vi. 396,

Mezzomorto, v. 194.

Miaoulis, Andreas, vi. 177, 223; Greekl
admiral, vi. 257, 295, 313, 319, 321, 1
349' 353. 355. 364 ; at Mesolonghi,|
vi. 377. 390.410,415 ; attacks Poros,
vii. 64, 66 seq., 80.

Miaoulis, Athanasios, ministry of, vii. |
248, 255.

Miarfekin, ii. 402.

Michael I (Rhangabe), ii. 94, 107 seq. ; I
Bulgarian war of, ii. no, 112, 113,]
124 seq.; expedition of, to Sicily, ii.
116, 200.

Michael II (the Amorian, the Stam-
merer), reign of, ii. 128; defeats I
Thomas, ii. 131 ; ecclesiastical policy 1
of, ii. 140; negotiates with Louis le
Debonnaire, ii. 14T, 152 ; death of,
ii. 142, 200.

Michael III (the Drunkard), ii. 161 ;
education of, ii. 171 ; reign of, ii. 173
seq., 178 ; Bulgarian war of, ii, 184;
murder of, ii. 184, 196, 197.

Michael IV (the Paphlagonian), ii. 404
seq.; invades Sicily, ii. 413; death
of, ii. 419.

Michael V (Kalaphates), ii. 420 seq. ;
death of, ii. 422.

Michael VI (Stratiotikos), ii. 448 seq.

Michael VII (Parapinakes), iii. 35, 37
seq., 40 ; treaty of, with Seljouk
Turks, iii. 44 ; dethroned, iii. 46.

Michael VIII (Palaeologus), of Nicaea,
iii. 315, 328, 329, 332 seq., 334 seq. ;
attacks Constantinople, iii. 340 ; treaty
of, with Genoa, iii. 341, 354. 355'
357; enters Constantinople, iii. 347;
administration of, iii. 351 ; war in
Thessaly, iii. 362 seq. ; excommuni-
cated, iii. 363 ; war with Bulgaria,
iii. 364; death of, iii. 372, iv. 201,
203, 344 seq. ; treaty with Genoese,
iv. 354 ; recognizes papal supremacy,
v. 128; treaty of Venice with, iii.

355-
Michael IX (Palaeologus), iii. 384, 393,

402 seq.
Michael, emperor of Trebizond, iv. 366,

368; dethroned, 371, 375.
Michael of Bulgaria, ii. 312, iii. 313,

325.423-
Michael I (Angelos), of Epirus, iv.
Ill, 121,123.

INDEX.

403

IV.

Michael II, of Epirus, iii. 314, 327, iv.

126, 127, 201.
Michael, duke of Sclavonia, ii. 303.
Michael of Servia, iii. 41.
Michieli, family of, v. 69.
Michieli, Domenico, doge, iii. 140,
Michieli, Vital II, iii. 181, 182.
Michieli, iv. 288.

Michos, Colonel Artemes, vii. 295.
Miquez, Joa (or Juan), of Naxos, iv.

295, V. 81.
Mikrokhorio, vi. 316.
Milan, conquered by Goths, i. 240 ;

plague of, ii. 66.
Miles of Brabant, iii. 290.
Miletus, i. 265.
Miliaresion {see Coinage), i. 117, 443,

V. 27.
Militia, Turkish, time of service, vi.

383, 384 note.
Millingen, Dr., vi. 163.
Milos, Marco Sanudo, signor of,

290.

Miltems (summer gales), vi. 351.

Miltiades, ii. 198.

Minas Aghios (Chios), massacre
monastery of, vi. 255.

Minerva, temple of, at Athens, plun-
dered by Verres, i. 56 ; statue of, at
Alalcomenae, robbed by Sulla, i. 72 ;
of Phidias, disappears, i. 284.

Mines, exhaustion of, i. 77, ii. 215.

Mingrelia (Colchis), i. 260.

Minorca, i. 233.

Minoto, Giacomo, v. 219 seq.

Mirdites, vi. 35, 72, 314.

Mirza, Halil, iv. 393.

Misithra, despotat of, iii. 448, iv. 197 ;
ceded, iv. 201, 229 ; Byzantines at,
iv. 229, 230 ; sold to Hospitallers, iv.
235 ; lost and taken, v. 253, 256.

Misr (Babylon, Cairo), i. 323, 363,

.37.3-
Missionaries, in China 'and Ethiopia, i.

269 ; in Greece, failure of, vi. 16.

Mithridates, invades Greece, b. c. 86,
i. 25 ; plunders Delos, i. 54, 145.

Mithrios, Mount (Bouz-tepe), iv. 330.

Mizzins, revolt of, i. 411.

Moawyah, naval armament of, i. 377)
383 ; contest with Ali, i. 378 ; makes
peace with Constans, ih. ; defeats
Constans, i. 379 ; invades Crete, i.
384 ; rebuilds church at Edessa, i.

384, 410 ; makes peace with Con-
stantine Pogonatus, i. 384 ; postal
system of, i. 419; besieges Nicaea, ii.
19.

Moawyah II, ii. 26.
Mocenigo, v. 103.
Modena, battle of, i. 374.
Modios, ii. 382 note.

Modon, occupied by Venetians, iv.
175 seq., V. 62, 180, 201 ; taken by
Turks, V. 224 ; Russians defeated at,
V. 256, vi. 216, 222, 227, 312, 318;
Ibrahim Pasha lands at, vi. 357 ;
Greek success at, vi. 365, vii. 28.

Modrina, battle of, ii. 48.

Moeddin of Angora, iii. 247.

Moel^ia, Macedonia and Achaia united
to by Tiberius, i. 35, 63 ; invaded by
Goths, i. 92 ; plundered by Goths, i.
154 ; devastated, i. 253, 333.

Moez, caliph, ii. 332.

Moglena, ii. 378, iii. 137.

Moguls invade Russia, iii. 309 ; invade
Asia Minor, iii. 311 ; destroy Seljouk
empire, iii. 312; invade Thrace, iii.
428.

Mohammed (or Mahomet), i. i note.

Mohammed, Alemen, ii. 109.

Mohammed I, iii. 482 ; death, iii. 488.

Mohammed II, iii. 497 seq., 499 ; be-
sieges Constantinople, iii. 507 seq. ;
naval defeat of, iii. 509 ; visits Athens,
iv. 164, 248, 253, 254; visits Morea,
iv. 257 ; takes Akova, iv. 258 ; takes
Corinth, iv. 259; invades Morea, iv.
263 seq. ; renders Joannes IV tribu-
tary, iv. 410 ; his preparations against
Trebizond, iv. 415 ; takes Amastris,
iv. 416 ; reduces Turkomans, iv. 419 ;
besieges Trebizond, iv. 420 ; makes
Greece timariot, v. 4; Kanun-name
of, V. 10, 16; character of, v. 17;
conquests of, v. 67 seq. ; war of, with
Venice, v. 60, 61 ; reign of, v. 126 ;
commerce under, ih., seq. ; toler-
ation of, V. 129 seq.; ecclesiastical
policy of, V. 137; death of, v. 141 ;
policy of, vi. 11.

Mohammed, pasha of the Morea, vi.

94-
Mohammed Ali, pasha of Egypt; vi.

329, 344, 345, 349 ; attacks Morea,

vi. 349.

Mohammed, son of Bayezid, iv. 388.

Mohammedanism compared with Chris-
tianity, V. 131 seq.

Mohammedans, conquests of i. 357 seq. ;
conquer Egypt, i. 363 ; not fanatics
at first, i. 373 note ; ravages of, iv.
376. {See Arabs, Mussulmans, Otho-
mans, Saracens, Seljouks, Turks.)

Moharrem Bey, vii. 19.

Moieddin, iv. 56.

Mokaukas, i. 323, 363, 370.

Moldavia, voivode of, v. 242 seq.
Greek government of, v. 244 ; Phan-
ariots in, v. 246 ; list of voiyodes ot,
v. 295 ; position of Greeks in, vi. 9 ;
Greek hospodars of, vi. 113 seq.;
state of, vi. 114; invaded by Hetai-

D d 2

404

INDEX.

rists, vi. 117 seq. ; reoccupied by
Turks, vi. 135 ; occupied by Russia,
vii. 219.

Moldavians, i. 335.

Molini, V. 88.

Molino, V. 194.

Momitzilos, iii. 438, 440,

Monachism in Greece, v. 133 seq.

Monastir, vi. 72.

Monastras, iii. 116, 117.

Monasteries forbidden, ii. 328 ; reve-
nues of, curtailed, iii. 9 ; Greek, v.
150; in Morea, v. 210; Greek, sup-
pressed, vii. 131.

Monasticism, ii. 81.

Mone Nea, massacre at monastery of,
vi. 256.

Monemvasia, ii. 64, 250, 321, iii. 222 ;
chronicle of, iv. 13; a metropolitan
see, iv. 14 ; taken, iv. 195 seq. ;
ceded, iv. 201, 229 ; surrenders to
Venetians, iv. 268 ; ceded by Vene-
tians, V. 70 ; attack on, v. 191 ; trade
with Alexandria, v. 200, 201 ; taken
by Turks, v. 226 ; surrenders to
Greek insurgents, vi. 213.

Moneyers, corporation of, i. 51.

Mongols in Asia Minor, iv. 339 ; pro-
tect commerce, iv. 352, 353 j of Tau-
ris, iv. 353.

Monks, i. 132.

Monolykos, iii. 127,

Monophysites, i. 323, 324, 329, 348,
384. ii. 60.

Monothelites, i. 384, 385, 395.

Monoxylon (canoe), vii. 23.

Moors encroach on Roman population
in Africa, i. 230, 234.

Montaldo. Rafaele di, v. 74.

Montanists, ii. 34.

Montenegro, Sclavonian, v. 248 ; insur-
rection of, ih. ; state of, vii. 215 seq. ;
peculiar rule of succession in, vii.
216; Russian influence in, ih.\ sup-
ported by Austria, vii. 217; Monte-
negrins seize Zabliah, ih. ; hostili-
ties against, vii. 270.

Montferrat, Boniface of {see Boniface).

Montferrat, Irene of {^ee Irene).

Montferrat, William of, iv. 119.

Mopsuestia (Mamistra), i. 399, ii. 330,
iii. 117.

Morals, influence of Alexander's con-
quests on. i. 10 ; enforced by Augus-
tus and Decius, i. 99 ; purity of, at
Athens, i. 285.

Morasini, Francesco, duke of Candia,
iv. 288.

Morava, ii. 346.

Morbassan (see Omar and Amour), iv,
225.

Morea {see Peloponnese), a Sclavonian

word, iv 23 ; origin of the word, iv.
24 note ; book of the conquest of, iv.
^37' 177 ; ceded to Charles of Anjou,
iv. 205 ; ravaged by Turks, iv. 225,
.233. 235, 239, 253; Albanians in,
iv. 239, 254, 256, V. 263, 264; tribu-
tary to Mohammed II, iv. 254;
Venetians expelled from, iv. 269 ; list
of despots of, iv. 433 ; Saganos Pasha
governor of, v. 2 ; conquered from
Venetians by Turks, v. 53; attacked -
by Andrea Doria, v. 68 ; lost by
Venetians, v. 70, 227 ; plundered by
Spaniards, v. 68, 104; attacked by
Venice, v. 1 76 ; Saxons in, v. 1 78 ;
evacuated by Turks, v. 184 ; attacked
by Turks, v. 194; devastated by
Turks, V. 195 ; Venetian rule of, v.
196 seq., 201, 207 ; commimal system
in, V. 196 ; population of, v. 197 ;
municipal system in, ih. ; revenue
of, V. 198, 199 ; commerce of, v. 200,
201 ; character of people of, v. 208,
vi. 9, 24 seq. ; Catholics in, v. 209,
211 ; influence of patriarch of Con-
stantinople in, V. 209 seq. ; exarch of,
V. 210; monasteries in, £6. ; attacked
by Othomans, v. 216; castle of, v.
218; taken, v. 225; conquered by
Turks, V. 226; land-tax relaxed in,
V. 232 ; Russians in, v. 252 seq. ;
pashalik of, vi. 3 ; inhabitants of, vi.

24 seq ; municipal institutions of, vi.

25 ; Russian intrigues in, vi. 141 ;
Khurshid Pasha in, vi. 141 ; progress
of Philike Hetairia in, vi. 141 ; exter-
mination of Mussulmans in, vi. 152,
^53 > Ibrahim Pasha vizier of, vi.
330. 33.S. 336, vii. 340 ; attacked by
Mohammed Ali. vi. 349 ; return of
Ibrahim Paslia to, vi. 398 seq.; rav-
aged by Ibrahim Pasha, vi. 399.

Morning Chronicle, the, attack on King

Otho, vii. 169, 170.
Morosini, Venetian bailo, v. 169
Morosini, Francesco, surrenders Candia,

V. 112 ; character of, 173 seq. ;

severity of, v. 181; the Peloponnesian,

V. 183, 191 ; doge, v. 189 ; death of,

V- 193, 197. 205.
Morosini, Thomas, patriarch, iv. 102,

103, no.
Morrah, in Thrace, iii. 438, 447 note,

iv. 24.
Mortagon, king of Bulgaria, ii. 116,

280.
Moses II, patriarch of Armenia, i. 272.
Moslemah. ii. 14. 15, 17 ; besieges Con-
stantinople, ii. 16, 18; takes Caesarea,

ii. 19.
Mosynopolis, ii. 377,379, iii. 65, 223;

battle of, iv. 58.

INDEX.

4O0

Motassem, caliph, ii. 150, 154, 155 ; em-
bassy to, ii. 207 seq.

Motawukel, ii. 168, 169.

Mouchli taken, iv. 258, 259.

Mousa, iii. 483, 484 ; besieges Constan-
tinople, 483.

Mousel, Alexios, ii. 154, 200.

Mouselen, Alexis, ii. 79.

Mousikos, ii. 281.

Moxoene, i. 143.

Mufti, Grand, v. 18.

Muhurdar Besiari, vi. 81 86 (see Besiari).

Mukhtar Bey, vi. 58; pasha, vi. 60, 72,

78- 95-

Muleteers (Agoyiates), class of, vi. 19.

Mummius sacks Corinth, i. 54, 59, 71,
72 note.

Mundi Burnou (Eutropius), ii. 16.

Mundus, i. 211.

Municipalities, municipal privileges re-
tained by Antioch,i. 75 ; constitution
of the curia, i. 109, no; nature of
the municipal system in Greece, i.
no. III ; under Justinian, i. 201,
202, 218; extinguished by Justinian,
i. 405, 408, 412, ii. 238 ; value of, ii.
351, v. 287; in Greece, vi. 13 seq.;
in Morea, vi. 25 ; in Greece, crippled,
vii. 41, 102, 120, 121, 321, 322.

Munich, marshal, plan of, v. 247.

Muntaner, Spanish historian, iii. 392,
406, his description of Athens, iv.
143, 147, 169, 171.

Munychia, v. 187 ; Gen. Gordon at, vi.

413. 414-
Murad I, iii. 462 ; death of, 468 ; naval

expedition of, iv. 400, v. 10, 16.
Murad II, iii. 488 ; besieges Constanti-
nople, iii. 489, 490 ; takes Thessa-
lonica, iii. 493 ; death of, iii. 497 ;
victory of, at Varna, iv. 163, 243,
246, 248 ; invades Thessaly, iv. 248,
251, v, 4; conquers Joannina, vi.

43-

Murad III, death of, v. 91.

Murad, Aga, murder of, vi. 149.

Mure, Colonel, vii. 166.

Murto Tshiali, vi. 81.

Murtzuphlos (see Alexius V).

Murusi, dragoman of the Porte, vi.
186.

Murzinos, v. 265, vi. 149, 157.

Musaeus, i. 273.

Muses, statues of, destroyed, i. 192.

Music, military, i. 211.

Musonius, i. 283.

Mussulmans, decline of, vi. 55 ; in
Greece, massacre of, vi. 1 39 ; massacre
of, at Agridha, vi. 146; at Bersova,
ih. ; at Kalavryta, vi. 147 ; in Morea,
extermination of, vi. 152, 153 ; mas-
sacre of, at Salona, vi. 1 60 ; at Ta-

lanti, vi. 161 seq. ; humanity of, vi.
189, 190; massacre of, vi. 207 (see
Mohammedans).

Mustai, pasha of Skodra, vi, 72, 31 2 ,
314 seq., 318.

Mustapha, pretended son of Bayezid,
iii. 488.

Mustapha Bey, vi. 221, 406.

Mustapha Pasha, cruelty of, v. 83.

Mustoxidi, vii. 44, 60, 127, 128.

Musurus, vii. 201, 202 ; attempted as-
sassination of, vii. 208.

Mutza Yussuf, vi. 58.

Muzalon, Andronicus, iii. 324.

Muzalon, George, iii. 324, 331, 332,
411.

Muzalon, John, ii. 303.

Myndos, ii. 307.

Myriokephalon, battle of, iii. 191 seq.,
221.

Mytika, vii. 163.

Mytilene, signor of, conquered by Mo-
hammed II, V. 58, 59 ; proverb about
inhabitants of, v. 60 note ; list of
signors of, v. 294 ; Khosref Pasha at,
vi- 347. 349 ; action off, vi. 355.

Nadir Dervend, pass, ii. 346.

Naissus (Nisch), victory of Claudius II
at, i. 97, ii. 346.

Namur, Philip of, iv. 102.

Napier, Sir Charles vi. 325, 417 ; paper
of, on operations in Morea, against
Ibrahim Pasha, vii. 340.

Napier, Lord, despatches of, vii. 279.

Naples, taken by Belisarius, i. 237, 400,
ii. 13; dukes of, ii. 249, 278; bishop
of, ih. ; subject to Constantinople, ii.
250 ; war with Sicily, iii. 389.

Napoleon I, secret treaty of, with Alex-
ander I of Russia, vi. 112 ; annexes
Ionian islands, vii. 30.

Narenta, war with Venice, i. 333, 334.

Narjot de Toucy, iii. 307, iv. 284 (^see
Toucy).

Narses, i. 208 ; a Pers-Armenian, i.
211, 240; succeeds Belisarius, i. 246;
defeats the Franks, i. 246, 247 ;
charge of treason against, i. 293 ;
recalled, i. 294 ; interview of bishop
of Rome with, ih. ; death of, i. 295.

Nasar, ii. 187; Byzantine admiral, ii.
251.

Naser, ii. 1 59.

National assembly of Greece at Tripo-
litza, Argos, Piada, vi. 239, 242 ;
Epidaurus, vi. 242, vii. 10 ; of Argos,
vii. 49 seq. ; convocation of, vii. 65,
66 ; second at Argos, vii. 74 ; at
Pronia, vii. 93, 95 ; convoked, vii.
1 11; dissolved, vii. 185 (see Assembly).

4o6

INDEX.

Naupactus, i. 225, insurrection in, ii.

393-

Nauplia, a fief of Athens, iv. 138, 152,
176, 177 ; conquest of, iv. 194 seq. ;
Albanians at, v. 63 ; ceded by Vene-
tians, V. 70 ; siege of, v. 181, 182 :
Venetian board at, v. 201 ; fortified
by Venetians, v. 218; taken by Turks,
V. 223 ; Russian fleet at, v. 258, vi.
227; blockaded by Greeks, vi. 277,
287, 288 seq. ; capitulation of, vi.
288 ; conduct of Greeks at, ib. ; Ali
of Argos at, vi. 288, 296; bombard-
ment of, vi. 297; naval operations in
gulf of, ib. ; capitulates, 299 ; conduct
of Kolokotrones at. vi. 300; Captain
Hamilton at, vi. 300 seq. ; official
gazette of, vii. 60 ; occupied by
French, vii. 89 ; King Otho at, vii.
105, 107 seq. ; assembly of bishops
at, vii. 128 ; newspapers at, vii. 132;
revolt of garrison of, vii. 262 ; capit-
ulation of, vii. 264.

Nauplios, Germanos, patriarch, iii. 307.

Naussa, harbour of Paros, v. 262.

Navarin, New, v. 179; Venetian board
at, v. 201 ; flight of Orloff from, v.
257, 268; surrender of, vi. 214;
massacre at, vi. 215; Egyptians be-
fore, vi. 357 ; besieged by Ibrahim
Pasha, vi. 359, vii. 16, 20; capitu-
lates, vi. 363 ; Ibrahim Pasha's fleet
blockaded at, vii. 16; battle of, vii.
17 seq., 28.

Navarin, Old (Pylos), taken, v. 1 79, vi.

359- .

Navigajosi, Filocalo, iv. 277.

Navy, Greek, piratical conduct of, vi.

174; bad management of, vi. 341,436.
Naxos, iv. 109 ; conquered by Sanudo,

iv. 277 ; Venetians in, ib.; signory of,

iv. 294, 302 ; list of dukes of, iv.

433 ; duke of, subdued by Turks, v.

69 ; end of duchy of, v. 81 ; Jacopo

IV, duke of, V. 81 ; Don Juan Mi-
quez of, V. 81 ; state of, in 18th cent.,

V. 235, 236 ; murders at, vi. 192.
Nea Mone (Chios), massacre at monas-
tery of, vi. 255, 256.

Neantzes, iii. 84.

Neatokomites, ii. 253.

Neeman, iii. 1 73.

Negrepont attacked by Venetians, iv.

79, 108 seq., 132 ; conquered by

Turks, V. 102, 184, 185; siege of, v.

189.
Negris, Theodore, at Salona, vi. 237,

238, 243, 281 ; library of, vi. 290.
Nematorea, convent of, iii. 243.
Nenekos, vi. 381, vii. 13.
Neocaesarea, archbishop of, ii. 132 ;

bishop of, killed, ii. 243.

Neokastron (Alexiopolis), iii. 65.

Neopatras, conquered by Catalans, iv. (iJ;
129, 153, 154 ; duchy of, an appanage
of house of Aragon, iv. 154.

Neo-Platonism, i. 272, 283.

Neptune, statue of, v. 187.

Nerio, Acciaiuoli (see Acciaiuoli).

Nero gives immunity from tribute to all
Greeks, i. 46, 47, 63 ; coinage of, i.
48 ; crowned at Olympic games, i.
63 ; sends Acratus to Pergamus, i.
72 ; robs Delphi, ib.

NepoKpciTTis, i. 222 }iote.

Neroulos, Rizos, vi. 116.

Nesselrode, vi. 127, 137, 214, 221.

Nestongos, Andronicus, conspiracy of,
iii. 305.

Nestor, a Russian monk, ii. 341, 342 ;
rebellion of, iii. 42.

Nestorians, i. 177, 308, 315 ; driven out
of Edessa, i. 316, 324, 327, 328;
missions of, i. 328, 347.

Neuilly, Margaret de, iv. 207.

Nevers, count of, iii. 115.

Nevropolis, plain of, vi. 315.

Niausta, vi. 207; siege of, vi. 208;
cruelties of Turks at, ib.

Nicaea (Nice\ plundered by Goths, i.
94; council of, i. 130, 134; besieged
by Moawyah, ii. 19 ; second council
of, ii. 73, 1 10 ; taken by Seljouk
Turks, iii. 49, 88, 92 ; defeat of
Crusaders at, iii. 99 ; taken from
Turks, iii. 108 ; empire of, founded,
iii. 287 seq., iv. 321 seq. ; extent of,
iii. 296, 312; besieged, iii. 424;
taken by Othoman Turks, iii. 426
seq., iv. 401. |

Nicephoritzes, iii. 38, 39.

Nicephorus I, emperor, i. 339 ii. 25, 85;
reign of ii. 92 seq. ; taxation under,
ii. 98 ; treaty of, with Charlemagne,
ii. 100 ; relations with Haroun al
Raschid, ii. loi ; tributary to Haroun
al Raschid, ii. 102 ; financial policy
of ii. 105 ; defeated and slain, ii. 107,
200.

Nicephorus II (Phokas), ii. 309, 314,
316 seq., 322, 325, 326 seq.; oppo-
sition of clergy to, ii. 328 ; Saracen
war of ii. 330 ; murder of ii. 334.

Nicephorus III (Botaniates), iii. 46 seq. ;
coinage of iii. 47 ; excommunicated,
iii. 97.

Nicephorus I of Epirus, iii. 314, 315,
327, 371, iv. 127.

Nicephorus II of Epirus, iv. 128.

Nicephorus Alyattes (see Alyattes).

Nicephorus Blemmidas (see Blemmi-
das).

Nicephorus Bryennios (see Bryennios).

Nicephorus Diogenes {see Diogenes).

INDEX.

407

Nicephorus Gregoras {see Gregoras), iii.

.455-

Nicephorus Kaluphes (see Kahiphes).

Nicephorus Melissenos {see Melissenos).

Nicephorus Ouranos, ii. 372 seq. ; de-
feats the Bulgarians, ii. 373.

Nicephorus, patriarch and historian, ii.
46, 62, 73, 75, 95, 108, no, 113, 118
seq.; deposed, 120, 129, 227.

Nicephorus Vasilakes {see Vasilakes).

Nicetas, duke of Antioch, ii. 407, 411.

Nicetas, son of Artavasdos, ii. 47, 48
seq.

Nicetas, grand duke, iv. 366 seq. ; re-
bellion and defeat of, iv. 374, 375.

Nicetas, historian, iii. 191, 234, 272.

Nicetas, duke of Iberia, ii. 391.

Nicetas Kastamonites {see Kastamo-
nites).

Nicetas, vi. 148, 149, 279, 291, 293,
294 ; bravery of, vi. 295, 324, 336, vii.
100, lOI.

Nicetas, i. 311, 319, 322.

Nicetas, ii. 270, 274.

Nicholas I, pope, ii. 1 78 ; excommuni-
cated, ii. 183.

Nicholas III, pope, iii. 363, 371.

Nicholas IV, pope, iv. 349.

Nicholas V, pope, iii. 501.

Nicholas, emperor of Russia, vii. 10 ;
wishes of, vii. 25, 171, 172; in
England, vii. 187.

Nicolaus {see Nikolaus).

Nicomedia, plundered by Goths, i. 94 ;
Nicetas defeated near, ii. 49 ; gained
by Theodore Lascaris, iii. 291.

Nicopolis, i. 54 ; founded by Augustus,
i. 61 ; coinage of, i. 62, 225, 253, ii.
312; battle of, iii. 471 ; taken by
Bulgarians, iv. 28 ; battle of, iv.

235-
Nika, sedition of the^i. 217.

Niketas {see Nicetas).

Nikli (Tegea), iv. 139; barony of, iv.

Nikolaides, vii. 138.

Nikolaus, patriarch of Constantinople,

i- 339-
Nikolaus, patriarch, ii. 260, 263, 283,

285, 289, 300 ; letter of iv. 12.
Nikolaus, the Grammarian, patriarch,

iii. 64.
Nikolaus, patrician, ii. 358.
Nikon, ii. 318.
Nikosia, capital of Cyprus, taken, v.

82.
Nile, value of, i. 364 ; canal from, to

Red sea, i. 365 ; closed by Almansur,

ii. 212.
Nilos, iii. 72.

Niphon, patriarch, iii. 380, v. 141.
Nisch {see Naissos).

Nishandjis (imperial secretaries'', v. 18.

Nisi occupied by Ibrahim Pasha, vi.

368 ; Capodistrians expelled from, vii.

Nisibis, i. 143 ; restored by Chosroes

II, i. 302, 399 ; conquered, ii. 358.
Nisvoro, vi. 202.

Nivitza, surprised by Ali Pasha, vi. 46.
Nizam-djedid (or New System), v. 21,

31-
Nogay, iii. 364.

Nointel, marquis of, v. 167, 168.
Nomisma, i. 442 {see Coinage).
Nermann, general, vi. 265 seq., 269.
Normans, ii. 154, 413; in Italy, ii. 430,

433' 439> iv. 50 ; take Otranto, ii.

439 ; overrun Epirus, iii. 80 ; invade

Greece, iii. 161 ; sack Corinth, iii.

162, iv. 54; conquests of, iv. 49.
Nostimo, vi. 316.
Notaras, iii. 502, 514, 517, 520.
Notaras, vi. 336, 414.
Noureddin, iii. 184, 186.
Nourka, vi. 164.
Noutzas, Alexis, assassination of, vi.

281, 282.
Novells, i. 215, 216.
Novells of Leo, ii. 264.
Novgorod, ii. 189.
Novitza, Bouba, v. 274.
Nubia becomes Mohammedan, i. 368.
Nushirvan {see Chosroes).
Nymphaeum, council of, iii. 307 ; treaty

of, iii. 341, 354.
Nymphaeus, river, i. 261.
Nyssa, taken by Turks, iii. 359.

Obolus, i. 432 {see Coinage).

Ochrida, vi. 314, 318.

Octal Khan, iv. 336, 339.

Octavian, ii. 301.

Octavius joined by Lacedaeraon, i. 55,

56.
Odenathus founds kingdom of Palmyra,

i. 115.
Odessus (Varna), i. 251 ; capital of

Bulgaria, i. 385.
Odoacer conquers Rome, i. 238.
Odysseus, vi. 76, 77, 161 ; character

and conduct of, vi. 248 seq., 278

seq.; at Athens, vi. 304, 305, 314;

treachery of, vi. 380 seq. ; surrender

of, vi. 382 ; m^urder of, ih.
Oeconomos, Antonios, vi. 171 seq., 175,

1 76 ; assassinated.
Oinaion (Unich), iv. 367, 387.
Oiniates, ii. 251.
Oleg, ii. 341.
Olga, ii. 343.
Oligarchies, decline of, i. 58.

4o8

INDEX.

Olympia plundered by Sulla, i. 27;

temple of, destroyed, i. 284.
Olympiads superseded by Indictions,

i. 284.
Olympic games, Nero crowned at, i.

63 ; still celebrated, i. 67 ; a source

of unity, i. 83 ; last celebrated, a.d,

393, i. 284.
Olympius, exarch, 1. 376, 411.
Omar I, caliph, i. 361 ; simplicity of,

i- 372-
Omar II, cahph, n. 19.
Omar, son of Aidin, iv. 225 {see Mor-

bassan and Amour).
Omar, emir of Melitene, ii. 169, 186

seq.
Omar, son of Turakhan, iv. 164, 247,

259-
Omer Bey, vi. 247 seq.
Omer Pasha, vi. 407, 424, vii. 217.
Omer, St., John, iv. 208.
Omer, St., Nicholas, marshal of Achaia,

iv. 142, 152, 170, 208.
Omer Vrioni (.see Vrioni).
Ommiades, ii. 116.
Opsicium, a Sclavonian colony, i. 388,

396 ; theme of, ii. 47, 1 30, 1 33.
Optatus, i. 286.
Oracles in Greece, i. 83; silent after

Theodosius the Great, i. 84.
Oratory, Christian, i. 1 24.
Orbelus, Mount, ii. 11.
Orchomenus (_Skripou), iv. 149.
Ordeal, trial by, iii. 316 note, 329.
Oreatae, iv. 33.

Oreos, battle of, iii. 363, iv. 141.
Orient, prefecture of, i. 114.
Orkhan, iii. 360, 423 seq., 443; takes
Nicomedia, iii. 427; death of, iii.
462 ; laws of, iii. 475, iv. 401, v. 9,
16; conquers Nicaea, iv. 401, 409;
institutions of, v. 10.
Orloff, Alexis, v. 249, 254, 255, 257

seq., 261, 262.
Orloff, Feodor, v. 249, 251 seq., 258.
Orloff, Gregory, v. 247, 248.
Orobiatae, ii. 100.
Oropos, failure of Heideck at, vi. 415,

416.
Orphanides, George, vi. 369.
Orphanotrophos, John (_6ee John).
Orthodoxy and Greek nationality, vi.

99 (see Church).
Orvieto, treaty of, iii. 363. 372.
Oryphas, ii. 137, 181, 189, 247, 248, 251.
Oskold, ii. 189.

Ostrogoths plunder North Greece, i.
169; in Thessaly, i. 179; in Italy,
i. 229 ; kingdom of, destroyed by Be-
lisarius, i. 235; condition of Romans
under, i. 235 ; list of kings of, i. 242
note; end of kingdom of, i. 247.

Ostrovos, ii. 431,

Othman, death of, i. 377, iii. 360, 386

seq. ; father of Orkhan, iv. 401.
Otho the Great, ii. 329, 333 ; marriage

of, ii. 338.
Otho, king, civil list of, iv. 226 ; of ;
Bavaria, throne of Greece offered to,
vii. 80 ; recognised by Germanic
confederation, vii. 104 ; arrives at
Nauplia, vii. 105, 107 seq. ; pro-
clamation of, vii. 115; marriage of,
vii. 144; sole government of, vii.-
167 seq. ; mysterious charge against,
vii. 169, 170; behaviour of, during
Revolution, vii. 175 seq.; impolicy
of, vii. 190; revived popularity of,
vii. 249, 260 ; visits Carlsbad, vii.
253; return of, vii. 254; character
and intrigues of, vii. 255 seq. ; quits
Greece in the Scylla, vii. 273.
Otho de la Roche (see de la Roche.)
Othomans (see Porte, Turks), empire
of, founded, iii. 360 ; rise of, iii. 386
seq. ; besiege Nicaea, iii. 424 ; ravages
of, iii. 427; progress of, iii. 462;
causes of success of, iii. 475 ; empire
of, established, iii. 476; employ can-
non, iii. 493, iv. 259; in Morea, iv.
233. 235 ; take Argos, iv. 235 ; force
isthmus of Corinth, iv. 249 ; ravage
Morea, iv. 253; reduce Duchy of
Archipelago, iv. 292 ; attack Trebi-
zond, iv. 400 ; ravage Caffa, ih. ; rise
of empire of, iv. 401 ; moral strength
of, iv. 402 ; good government of,
V. 5 seq. ; empire, extent of, v. 6 ;
rise of, v. 9 ; chief epochs of, v. 10 ;
different ingredients in, v. 1 2 ; oppo-
sition of Seljouks to, V. 16; based
on imperial household, ih. ; govern-
ment, branches of, v. 18 ; justice, cor-
ruption of, V. 19; finance, imperfec-
tion of, V. 21 ; moral superiority of,
V. 29, 131; legalize murder, v. 32;
financial moderation of, v. 33 ; his-
tory of army of, v. 33 seq. ; feudatory
system of, v. 34, 41 seq. ; military
system, decline of, v. 46 ; officials
among, venal, v. 47 seq. ; empire,
wealth of, v. 50 ; military discipline
of, V. 51 seq. ; take Cephalonia, v.
62; slave-raids of, v. 63; war of,
with Venice, v. 68 ; attack Corfu,
ih. ; reduce Chios, v. 78 seq ; con-
quer Cyprus, v. 81 seq. ; history of
navy of, v. 10 1 seq. ; attack Crete,
V. no ; Greek Church under, v. 135 ;
empire, decay of, v. 214 ; treaty with
Poland, V. 216; attack Morea, ih.\
Othoman institutions destroyed, v.
278; taxation of, vicious, v. 282;
institutions, decay of, v. 288 ; decay

INDEX.

409

of central power among, v. 289 ; in-
fluence of, in Greece, v. 290 ; sultans,
list of, V. 293 ; government like that
of Roman emperors, vi. 6 ; dissolu-
tion of empire thought imminent, vi.
6. 56, 56 ; political wisdom of, vi. 56 ;
theory of government of, vi. 56 ;
moral decline of, vi. 103 ; govern-
ment based on palace rather than
on national sympathies, vi. 104;
centralization of, ib. ; grain contri-
butions of, vi. 114; operations of
fleet of vi. 318.

Otranto, i. 379, 400 ; taken by Nor-
mans, ii. 439 iii. 37.

Oulough, iv. 394.

Ouranos, Michael, ii. 451.

Ouranos, Nicephorus {see Nicephorus).

Uuros, iii. 322, 327.

Oursel, a Frank, iii. 30 seq ; rebellion
of, iii. 43, 88.

Ouzes ^see Uzes).

Ouzoun Hassan, iv. 411, 414, 415, 419,

423-.
Oxenstiern, remark of, vii. 239.

Pachymeres, George, historian, iii. 368.

Pachys, St., of Naxos, iv. 281.

Pacihco, M., claim of, against Greek
government, vii. 209.

Paganism, change in, i. 120; Greek
local, i. 120 ; still lives on. i. 151 ; at
Athens, i. 286; influenced by Chris-
tianity, ih.

Pagasae, vi. 422.

Paikos, M., minister of foreign affairs,
vii. 225.

Pakurian, iii. 76, 78, 80.

Pakuvian, iii. 65.

Palaeochori, vi. 279.

Palaeologus, family, end of, iv. 267, v.
157; family of, iv. 351; hostility
of, to that of Cantacuzenos, iii. 449.

Palaeologus, Andronicus, iii. 295, 296.

Palaeologus Andronicus, iii. 464, 465.

Palaeologus, Constantine {see Constan-
tine XI).

Palaeologus, Demetrius, rebellion of,
iii. 495, 496.

Palaeologus, George, iii. 50, 51, 74 seq.

Palaeologus, John, iii. 338 seq., 359,
362.

Palaeologus, John, despot of Selymbria,
iii. 470 seq. ; emperor, 473 ; deposed,
481 ; restored, 483 {see John V.)

Palaeologus, Manuel, the last, v. 157.

Palaeologus, Martha, iii. 329.

Palaeologus, Michael {see Michael
Vlll).

Palaeologus, Nicephorus, iii. 208.

Palaeologus, Philes, iii. 408.

Palaeologus, Phrantzes, iii. 422.

Palaeologus, Theodore I, despot of Pe-
loponnesus, iii. 471, iv. 233 seq.

Palaeologus, Theodore II, despot of
Peloponnesus, iv. 236, 239, 242, 245
seq.

Palaeovuni, vi. 73, 78.

Palamas, iii. 365, 441.

Palamedes, Rhigas, vii. 176.

Palamedi, citadel of Nauplia, iv. 196, v.
181, 218, 222 seq.

Palamites, iii. 441, 449.

Palasha, vi. 51, 281, 282.

Palermo {see Panormus), ii. 252.

Palestine the third, i. 261 ; under Hera-
clius, i. 324; pilgrimages to, iv. 67 ;
conquered by Seljouks, ih.

Pallantium, favoured by Antoninus, i.
66.

Pallene fortified, i. 210 ; plundered, i.
252 ; (Kassandra), vi. 202, 205.

Palmerston, Loid, appealed to, vii. 140,
143 ; supports Armansperg, vii. 162 ;
Greek policy of, vii, 173, 200, 208,
210, 211, 213, 219; condemned by
House of Lords, vii. 214.

Palmyra, kingdom of, founded by Ode-
nathus, i. 115, 116, 261.

Pamphylia, people of, i. 166.

Panaretos, iv. 343, 374, 377.

Panas, vi. 270.

Panayotaki, v. 241.

Pandulf, ii. 333, 338.

Panhellenion, the, vii. 32, 50.

Panion, ii. 115.

Panionian assembly, ApoUonius of Tyana
at, i. 71.

Pankratakas, ii. 286.

Pannonia, Lombards in, i. 249 ; king-
dom of, destroyed, i. 293.

Panormus {see Palermo), ii. 109.

Panos, vi. 329, 336.

Panourias, vi. 159.

Pantheon, bronze tiles removed from, i.

414-.
Papadiamantopoulos, patriotism of, vi.

396, vii. 295.
Papadopoulos, iv. 346.
Papadopoulos, Gregorios {see Papas-

oglou), V. 248, 249, 257.
Papas, Emanuel, vi. 205.
Papasoglou {see Papadopoulos), v. 248,

249, 257.
Paper, discovery of, i. 417.
Paphlagonia, invaded by John II, iv.

314. 31S.

Pappadiamantopoulos {see Papadiaman-
topoulos).

Pappa Phlesas, vi. 142, 143, 366, 367
^see Gregorios Dikaios.)

Pappakostas, vii. 206, 207.

410

INDEX.

Pappanikolo, vi. 178, 181.

Pappua, Mount, i. 211,

Paramythia, vi. 43, 44, 79.

Paiapinakes, iii. 40.

Parga, V. 275, 276; English treatment

of, V. 276; under Venice, vi. 44, 45, 48.
Paris, synod of, ii. 141.
Parker, Sir William, vii. 210.
Parnassus, Mount, Turks defeated at, vi.

406.
Paroekia (feudal servitude), iv. 169.
Paros, iv. 302, v. 69.
Parthenon, the, robbed by Sulla, i. 26 ;

in the nth cent., iv. 136; destroyed,

V. 182, 185, 187.
Parthia, policy of, i. 401.
Participatio, Petro, ii. 303.
Participatio, Urso, ii. 303.
Pasano succeeds Captain Hastings, vii.

39-

Pascal II, pope, iii. 118.

Paschale, Chronicon, i. 416.

Pasgusa, Lake (^Koralis), iii. 143.

Pashas, v. 1 8 ; increased power of, v.
289.

Pashley, his account of the Venetians,
V. 87.

Passagio taken by Venetians, v. 61.

Passarovitz, peace of, v. 227.

Passava, barony of, iv. 185 ; seized by
William Villehardouin, iv. 207, v.
116, 177, 179, 192.

Pasta, V. 225.

Pasture lands appropriated by Greek
government, vii. 123.

Patatuka {see John of Parga), vi. 1 78.

Patissia, vi. 401.

Patmos, iii. if,"] note.

Patradjik (Hypata), plundered, v. 193 ;
vi. 279, vii. 158.

Patrae (Patras), i. 54; a Roman colony,
i. 58, 60, 61 ; coinage of, i. 61 ; earth-
quake at, i. 225 ; see of, i. 339 ; siege
of ib.; taken by Sclavonians, ii. 104;
metropolitan of, ii. 105, 254, iv, 12 ;
St. Andrew, patron of, iv. 14 ;
attacked by Sclavonians, iv. 14, 18.

Patras (Patrae), taken, iv. 177, 179;
archbishop of, iv. 182 ; taken by
John de Heredia, iv. 223; owned by
the pope, iv. 236 ; siege of, iv. 243 ;
taken by Spaniards, v. 68, 92, 104 ;
ravaged by knights of Malta, v. 105 ;
battle of, v. 183; fiscal board of, v.
201; siege of, v. 256; Germanos,
bishop of, vi. 142, 145, 151 ; outbreak
of Greek revolution at, vi. 151 ;
attacked by Kolokotrones, vi. 225
seq. ; Mavrocordatos defeated at,
vi. 242, 243; Turks at, vi. 275,
312, 318; blockade of, vi. 335;
taken by Capodistrians, vii. 89 seq. ;

mutiny at, vii. 90 ; occupied by
Djavellas, vii. 90 seq. ; revolt of
garrison of, vii. 206 ; provisional
government at, vii. 271.

Patriarchs of Constantinople, authority
of, ii. 42 ; contest of, with popes
over the Bulgarian church, ii. 185 ;
last under Greek empire, v. 136 ;
seal of, v. 149 ; hostile to Venice, v.
196; influence of, in Morea, v. 209
seq.; position of, vi. 8, 17, 104; of
Bulgaria, ii. 311 ; of Antioch, Alex-
andria, Armenia, and Jerusalem {see
Antioch, Alexandria, Armenia, Jeru-
salem).

Patzinaks, ii. 152, 287 seq., 339, 342,

344> 347. 3.50- 379. 394' 41.'^. 436 seq.,
iii. II, 65, 83 seq., 138, 168, 250; in
Macedonia, iv. 27.

Paul the Deacon, i. 293.

Paul, exarch of Ravenna, ii. 40 ; excom-
municated, ii. 41.

Paul, patriarch, i. 375 ; quarrel of, with
Pope Theodore, i. 376, ii. 72.

Paul I, pope, ii. 63.

Paul the Silenliary, i. 273.

Paul, St., notes immorality of Rome, i.
99 ; at Athens, i. 122.

Paulicians, ii. 60, 91, 97, 109 ; persecu-
tion of,, ii. 168, 243; kill bishop of
Neocaesarea, ii. 243 ; doctrines of, ii.
244 ; war of Basil I with, ii. 245, iii.
47 ; rebellion of, iii. 64 seq., 83.

Paulinus, i. 175.

Paulus, Aemilius, in Epirus, i. 53.

Pausanias, state of Thebes in the time
of, i. 27 ; his account of Greece
under the Antonines, i. 62, 67, 72.

Pay, military, scale of, iii. 274, iv. 93,
148.

Pechell, captain, vi. 324.

Peel, Sir Robert, Greek policy of, vii.

173-

Pegae, iii. 286, 289, 303, 304, 307.

Peganes, ii. 194.

Pehlevan Baba, vi. 77, 78, 80, 82.

Pehlevan Pasha, vi. 161.

Pelagius, legate, iii. 295, iv. in.

Pelagonia, ii. 374, 377 seq.; battle of,
iii- 339' 360, iv. 127. 201, 203.

Pelasgians, query Albanians, vi. 34.

Pelekanon, battle of, iii. 108, 424.

Pelion, Mount {see Zagora), Greek in-
surrection in, vi. 200 seq.

Peloponnese {see Morea), invaded by
Alaric, i. 159 ; Sclavonian revolt in,
ii. 166 ; state of, in 9th cent., ii. 255 ;
history of Sclavonians in,ii. 304 seq. ;
ravaged by Turks, iii. 472, iv. 251 ;
Albanians in, iii. 486, iv. 31 ; Avars
and Sclavonians in, iv. 13, 15, 17;
rebellion of Sclavonians in, iv. 19 ;

INDEX.

411

' Crusaders in, iv. 20 ; conquered by
William de Champlitte, iv. 138;
conquered by Franks, iv. 1 74 ; feuda-
lized, iv. 1 78 ; conquered by William
Villehardouin, iv. 194 seq. ; Franks
and Greeks in, iv. 202 seq., 209 ; effects
of geography on, iv. 222 ; colonized
by Albanians, iv. 234, 237 ; Venetian
possessions in, iv. 236, v. 57; Theo-
dore I, despot of {i>ee Palaeologus),
Theodore II {see Palaeologus), reor-
ganized by Manuel II, iv. 236 seq. ;
visited by John VI, iv. 242 ; Con-
stantine, despot of (see Constantine
XI), Thomas, despot of, iv. 242,
243, 245 seq., 250, 255, 256, 260,
261, 263, 267 ; reunited to Byzantine
empire, iv. 245 ; Demetrius, despot
of, iv. 252, 255, 256, 259, 262, 267;
invaded by Evrenos, v. 4 ; retained
by Venice, v. 195 ; Albanians in, vi.
29 ; senate of, formed, vi. 232, 235 ;
disagrees with Hypsilantes, vi. 234 ;
senate reconstituted, vi. 240 seq.

Pelusium taken, i. 363.

Peneius (Salamvria), vi. 72 note.

Pentapolis, ii. 100.

Pentedaktylos (Taygetus), ii. 304 note,
iv. 19.

Pentedekas, vi. 135.

Pentepegadhia, pass of, vi. 77 ; stormed,
vi. 90.

Pentornea, defeat of Greeks at, vi.

383-

Pepin, ii. 63 ; king of Italy, ii. 100,
2c6.

Pera, fire at, vi. 311.

Perachova, Romeliots at, vii. 80, 81.

Perateia, iv. 319 note, 333.

Perellos, Raimond, master of the knights
of Malta, V. 216.

Pergamus, literary fame of, i. 8 ; resists
Acratus, i. 72 ; carpets of, i. 74 ;
manuscripts of, i. 265; taken by Mos-
lemah, ii. 15 ; massacres at, vi. 319.

Perinthus (Heraclea), i. 336 ; sacked
by Catalans, iii. 400.

Perkrin, ii. 402.

Pernikon, ii. 375, 379.

Perotes, vii. 207.

Perper (see Coinage), iv. 210 note.

Persecutions of Christianity, i. 90, 126
seq. ; 274, 357 (see Christianity).

Persia and Persians, wealth of, i. 10 ;
cessions to, i. 143; Magians, ib.\
effect of their bigotry on trade, i.
144; war of Belisarius with, i. 243;
wars of Turks with, i. 260 ; relations
of Rome with, i. 260 seq. ; philo-
sophers exiled to, i. 277; war of
Avars with, i. 292 ; war of Tiberius II
with, i. 297; ended by Maurice, i.

301 ; overrun Egypt, i. 319, 322 ;
plunder Jerusalem, i. 324 ; attack
Constantinople, i. 337 ; campaigns of
Heraclius in, i. 343 seq. ; take cross
from Jerusalem, i. 346 ; becomes
Mohammedan, i. 368 ; colony of, on
Vardar (Axios), iv. 27; war of Tur-
key with, vi. 196 ; treaty of Turkey
with, vi. 310.

Perugia, treaty of, iii. 307.

Pescennius, Niger, i. 115.

Pestilence under Justinian, i. 224; at
Constantinople, a. d. 749, ii. 64 seq.,
iii. 492; at Milan, ii. 66; in East, a. u,
746, iv. 16.

Petala, fugitives at, vi. 395, 396.

Petalidi, vii. 27.

Petasius, Tiberius, ii. 40.

Peter, king of Bulgaria, ii. 312, 333,

344-
Peter the Ceremonious, of Aragon, iii.

456.
Peter of Courtenay (see Courtenay).
Peter the Eunuch, ii. 331, 332.
Peter the Great, war with Turkey, v.

213; intrigues of, in Turkey, v. 214

seq. ; failure of his attack on Turkey,

v. 215 ; defeat of, v. 247.
Peter the Hermit, iii. 96, 98, 99, no.
Peter, patriarch of Armenia, ii. 440.
Peter, a Pers- Armenian, i. 211.
Peter the Vallachian, iii. 230, 233, 235;

assassinated, iii. 248.
Peter III, the pretended, v. 248.
Peterwardein (^see Carlovitz), battle of,

v. 220, 227.
Petra, capitulation of Turks at, vii. 40.
Petraliphas, iii. 310, 314.
Petrion, monastery of, ii. 399.
Petrobey (Petros Mavromichales) of

Maina, vi. 148 seq., 216, 218, 235,

275, 292, 326, vii. 69, 70.
Petronas, ii. 145, 152, 169, 187, 188,

203, 268 seq.
Petropoulakes, insurrection of, vii. 199.
Petrus Siculus, ii. 244.
Petta, vi. 265 seq. ; Greeks defeated

at, 270, 333; battle of, vi. 374; en-
gagement at, vii. 227.
Peuks, i. 92.

Phalangas, captain, vii. 67.
Phalerum, battle of, vi. 430 seq., vii.

13-

Phanagoris, i. 251.

Phanari, castle of, iv. 142.

Phanariots, iv. 252 ; Turkish official
aristocracy, v. 124, 241 seq. ; corrup-
tion of, V. 243, 244 ; anti-national, v.
245 ; in Vallachia and Moldavia, v.
246; system, effect of, v. 280, vi. 9,
II ; distrust of, vi. 102.

Phara, Albanian sept, vi. 37.

412

INDEX,

Pharas, a Herul, i. 211.

Pharmakes, vii. 206.

Pharmaki, vi. 136, 137 {see Ali Phar-

maki).
Pharmaki, captain, \\\. 157.
Phamakos, ii. 354.
Phidari (Evenus), vii. 159.
Philadelphia (Alashehr), besieged by

Turks, iii. 393, 398 ; history of, iii.

468.
Philanthropena, Anna, iv. 593.
Philanthropenos, Alexios, iii. 363, 383,

468.
Philaretos, iii. 29, 41, 90.
Philes, Alexis, iv. 204, 230.
Philes, Theodore, iii. 330.
Philhellenes, corps of, \\. 264, 267 ;

injurious influence of, vi. 433 seq.
Philiellenism in England, vii. 7.
Philiatra, \-i. 372,
Philike Hetairia {see Hetairia).
Philip of Courtenay {see Courtenay).
Philip the Good, iv. 414.
Philip, emperor of Germany, iii. 251.
Philip of Macedon, i. 77.
Philip V, ravages of, in Attica, i. ^^\

defeated by Flamininus, vi. 73 ;

rapid marches of, vi. 88,
Philip of Xamur, iv. 112.
Philip of Savoy, iv. 215; and of Taren-

tum, 216, 217, 220, 221.
Philip II of Spain ruins Eastern trade

of Spain, v. 156.
Philip, son of Isabella ViUehardouin,

iv. 205.
Philippa, iii. 207.
Phihppe I of France, iii. 118.
Philippicus \^see Bardanes), revolt of, i.

394 ; reign of, i. 395, 39S ; exiled to

Cherson and Cephallenia, i. 425, ii.

?5-
Philippopolis, ii. 86, no, 339, 345, iii.

234; exchanged for Sinope, iv. 417,

418.
Philokales, iii. 125.
Philomelium, battle of, iii. 236, 247.
Philomuse society, vi. 98.
Philopation, iii. 213.
Philosophers, Greek, i. 86 ; decline of

schools of, i. 221 ; exiled to Persia,

i. 277; persecuted, i. 287; fly to

Chosroes, ih.
Phlesas {see Pappa Phlesas and Gre-

gorios Dikaios).
Phocaea, Genoese at, iii. 428, 429 ;

alum-works at, v. 58, 72 ; conquered,

V. 58, 71.
Phocas, family of, ii. 325.
Phocas, emperor, a pagan, i. 287, 300,

306 ; reign of, i. 308 seq. ; war of

Chosroes against, i. 309 ; makes

peace with Avars, i. 310; defeat of

ih. ; oppresses Jews, ih., i. 326 ;

dethroned, i. 311 ; death of, i. 312 ;

neglects Nile canal, i. 321.
Phocas, Bardas, ii. 309, 337, 342, 361 ;

revolt of, 362 seq., 364, 365 ; death

of, 366.
Phocas, Leo, ii. 287 seq. ; revolt of,

ii. 290, 337.
Phocas, Manuel, ii. 332.
Phocas, Xicephorus, ii. 249, 265, 385.
Phocas, St., monastery of, at Kordyle,

iv. 384, 398, 406.
Phocis, federation of, i. 67 ; ravaged by

Turks, vi. 313.
Phoenicia, Rhodes and Egj'pt jealous

of, i. 7 ; revolt of, i. 326.
Phoenix, Moimt, in Lycia, naval engage-
ment off, i. 377.
Phoenix, a secret society La Greece, vii.

Phoenix, a coin, ^^i. 46 {see Coinage).
Phokas {see Phocas).
Pholae, Blount, Stilicho at, i. 160.
Phonia, lake, Mussulmans massacred

at, vi. 146.
Photinos, ii. 136, 138.
Photios, iv. 210 seq.
Photius, patriarch, ii. 175, 176, 178 seq.;

excommunicated, ii. 182 ; anti-papal

claims of, ii. 183, 222, 224, 227, 233 ;

deposed, ii. 231 ; reinstated, ii. 233 ;

banished, ii. 234; death of, ii. 234, 260,

262, iv. 59.
Phrantzes, iv. 161, 162, 243, 244, 246;

his account of the massacre at Navarin,

vi. 215. _
Phrygia, Gothic colonies in, i, 155.
Phygela, ii. 316.
Piada, national assembly at, vi. 239,

242.
Piali Pasha, v. 78, 79, 82, 234.
Piastre, value of, v. 28 note, vi. 217.
Pierakos, vii. 70, 199.
Pilate, Pontius, a procurator, i. 36.
Pillalas, vi. 273.
Pindus, vi. 163.
Pinotzi, vi. 174, 321.
Piracy, i. 7 ; Greece suited to, i. 29 seq. ;

of Cilicia, i. 29 ; in Crete, i. 31, ii.

278 ; in Hellespont, a. d. 438, i. 168,

ii. 54, 190, 403 ; in the Levant, v.

90 seq. ; of knights of Malta, v. 94,

109, 200 ; suppressed by Allies, vii.

151 {see Corsairs).
Piraeus, destroyed by Sulla, i. 26, 54 ;

recover)' of, after Gothic invasions, i.

141, 281 ; blockaded by English

fleet, vii. 210; occupied by English

and French, vii. 227, 228.
Piri Pasha, v. 30.
Pisa and Pisans, iii. 96, 97, 116, 125,

J52, 155. 156, 247, iv. 77.

INDEX.

413

Pisani, Nicolas, iii. 456, 457 ; family of,

V. 69.
Piscatory, M., French minister, vii. 185,

187.
Pisistratus, i. 64.

Piso plunders Macedonia, i. 56, 72.
Pitane (Tchanderlik), vi. 318.
Piteshti, vi. 130, 131.
Pityous, i. 251.
Pius II (Aeneas Sylvius), pope, iv. 414,

415-
Placentia, council of, iii. 98.
Plapoutas {iee Koliopulos), vii. 86, 90,

r38> i39> i53> i54-

Plataea, battle of, i. 77.

Platana, ii. 138.

Platanos, Greeks at, vi. 392, 394.

Plato, Abbot, ii. 81 seq., 96.

Plato, the academy of, endowed, i. 287.

Plekjeria, vi. 31.

Plethon, George Gemistos, reforms of,
iii. 486, iv. 240.

Pliny, i. 182.

Pliscova, ii. 374.

Plutarch, population of Greece in time
of, i. 77, 78.

Podandos, river, ii. 247.

Poimanenon, battle of, iii. 126.

Poimanenos, iii. 286, 295 ; battle of,
iv. 113.

Poland, treaty of Venice with, v. 172 ;
Othoman treaty with, v. 216; sup-
ported by Porte, v. 250 ; partition of,
V. 273 ; insurrection in, vii. 59.

Poliani, pass of vi. 368.

Police, secret, in Greece, vii. 56.

Poliorcetes, Demetrius, besieges Rhodes,
i. 72.

Politics, Greeks fond of, i. 85.

Polo, Marco, ii. 212.

Polo (Tzukanion), game of iv. 338 note.

Polybius, social position of, i. 21 ; his
partiality to Rome, i. 24.

Polybotos, iii. 127.

Polyeuktes, ii. 302, 322, 326, 336, 337.

Polygheros, vi. 202, 205.

Polyzoides, vii. 60.

Pompei, count Tomeo, v. 186.

Pompeiopolis (Soli), i. 30.

Pompey sent to Mediterranean against
pirates, i. 30 ; rebuilds Soli, ih. ;
quarrels with Metellus, ih. ; colonizes
Dyme, i. 31 ; joined by Athens,
Lacedaemon, and Boeotia. i. 54.

Poniropoulos. Nikolas, vi. 214.

Pontus in prefecture of Orient i. 115;
gold-mines in, i. 167.

Popes, germs of power of, i. 310;
growth of po-.ver of ii. 39, 178 seq.;
last confirmed by emperors of the
East, ii. 41 ; Rome independent
imder, ii. 42 ; council of Constanti-

nople, ii. 60 ; origin of authority of,
ii. 179; attitude of Constantine to,
ii. 180; contest of, with patriarchs
of Constantinople over the Bulgarian
Church, ii. 185 ; aggression of, ii.
232 ; policy of, in the East, iii. 300
seq., V. 70; increase of power of, iv.
61 ; supremacy of, recognized by
Michael VIII, v. 128; encourage
treachery, v. 132; treaty of Venice
with, v. 172.

Popoff, Aristides, vi. loi.

Population of Greece in time of Alex-
ander uncertain, i. 14, 15, 404; of
Roman empire, i. 14 ; of Sicily, i. 15
note ; of Greece in time of Plutarch,
i. 77 ; of Italy, decline of, i. 89 ; of
Egypt, i. 364; of Greece at the
time of the Othoman conquest, iv. 35 ;
of Greece in 19th cent., vi. 2, 3 ; of
Epirus, vi. 35.

Populonium. ii. 100.

Poros, Venetians at, v. 189; Albanians
of, vi. 30, 32 ; Greek government at,
vi. 420 ; Kanares at, vii. 63 ; Greek
fleet at, seized by Hydriots, vii. 64 ;
victory of Russians at, vii. 64
seq. ; English and French fleets at,
vii. 65 ; capitulation and sack of,
vii. 66, 67 ; Miaoulis at, vii. 66 seq. ;
Greek massacres at, vii. 67, 68.

Porphyrogenitus, i. 339, 349.

Porro, count, vi. 411.

Portais (Trikkala), pass of, vi. 73, 77,
199.

Porte, Sublime, the, meaning of, v. 16;
Venice makes peace with, v. 85 ;
relations of France with, v. 166 seq. ;
war of Venice with, v. 216 ; Belgrade
ceded to, v. 246 ; treaty of Russia
with, v. 246 ; supports Poland, v.
250; war of, with Russia, ih.; com-
mercial treaty of Russia with, v. 267,
280, 281 ; war of, with France, v.
274 ; Venetian possessions ceded to,
V. 275; its treatment of the Greeks,
vi. 17; attempt of Great Britain to
coerce, vi. 112 ; Russian complaints
to, vi. 193; complaint of against
England, vii. 8 ; submits to treaty of
1827, vii. 52 ; recognizes kingdom
of Greece, vii. 104.

Porto, Belisarius at, i. 243.

Portugal, English policy towards, vii.
II ; King Ferdinand of, refuses the
crown of Greece, vii. 289, 290.

Poson, ii. 187.

Potemkin, v. 267.

TioTa\xapx^^ at Athens, i. 222.

Praenetus, ii. 44.

Praetextatus, proconsul of Achaia, i.
282.

414

INDEX.

Praetorian guards, insubordination of, i.

139-
Praides, vii. 133.
Prapas, captain, vii. 156.
Praxiteles, Cupid of, i. 72.
Prefectures of Constantine, i. 114.
Prelubos, Thomas, iv. 129.
Premarini, family of, v. 69.
Premeti, Ibrahim, vi. 198, 199.
Prespa, ii. 369, 370.

Press, liberty of, attacked by Capodis-
trias, vii. 60 seq. ; revived, vii. 132 ;
curtailed, vii. 133.
Presthlava, ii. 344, 347, 374.
Prevesa taken by Venetians, v. 175,
195, 227, 274, vi. 44, 45 ; importance
of, vi. 73, 78, 79 ; attacked by Suliots,
vi. 90 ; Greek flotilla destroyed at,
vi. 266; treaty of, vi. 272.
Prilapos, ii. 376, 377.
Primates, Greek, vi. 11 ; war of the,

vi. 333, 336 {s,ee Kodjabashis).
Primislas of Servia, iii. 1 73.
Prince's Island, ii. 85, 96, 181, 189.
Principalities, trans-Danubian, govern-
ment of, V. 243, vi. 112, 114 seq.;
anti-Greek feeling in, vi. 134; end
of revolt in, vi. 138.
Prinitza, battle of, iv. 204, 229.
Prinokokki, a dye, v. 200 note.
Priscus, general of Maurice, i. 304, 305.
Proaeresius, i. 281, 282.
Probaton, ii. no.
Probus, victories of, i. 98 ; reforms of,

i. 100.
Procheiron, law-manual of Basil, ii.

240.
Proclus, i. 286.
Proconessos ravaged by Saracens, ii.

251.
Proconsuls, power of, i. 33 ; abuse of
power by, i. 34 note, 35, 37 ; rank of,
i- 35; rights of, i. 44; avarice of,
restrained, i. 39.
Procopia, ii. 107 seq., 112.
Procopius. i. 197 note, 202 ; secretary
to Belisarius, i. 203, 211, 216, 223;
works of, i. 226 note, 241, 245, 273;
a pagan, i. 287.
Proesti, the, in the Morea, vi. 25,
Professors made counts, i. 190.
Prokopanistos, vi. 376.
Pronia, national assembly at, vii. 93

seq. ; dispersed, vii. 95.
Propylaea, destruction of, v. 185.
Prosakon, iii. 249.
Proshova Sulu, the klepht, vi. 23.
Prosuch, iii. 159, 165.
Prote island, ii. 94, 112, 293.
Protectores, i. 2 £54.
Protocol of April 4, 1826, vii. 11.
Protocol of Feb. 3, 1830, vii. 53 seq.

Protocol of Jan. 7, 1832, vii. 80.

Protocol of Feb. 13, 1832, vii. 80.

Protocol of March 7, 1832, vii. 82.

Provatas, ii. 415.

Provence, Hugh of, ii. 303, 313.

Provinces, Roman administration of,
i. 32 seq. ; under the empire, i. 38 ;
under Hadrian, i. 36, 38 ; senatorial
and imperial, i. 34, 35 ; land-tax in,
i. 40 ; cattle-tax in, ih. ; numbers of
Roman citizens in, i. 47 ; militia in,
disbanded by Justinian, i. 209.

Prusa plundered by Goths, i. 94 ; (Brusa),
iii. 286 ; taken by Turks, iii. 416.

Prusian (Prusianos), ii. 393, 398, 430.

Pruth, treaty of the, v. 216; Peter the
Great defeated at, v. 247 ; crossed
by Hypsilantes, vi. 116 ; by Russians,
vii. 221.

Psara island, commerce of, v. 281 ;
Greek revolution at, vi. 166 seq.,
170 ; constitution of, vi. 167 ; Greeks
at, vi. 258 ; ravages of people of, vi.
303, 318 ; Turks tortured at, vi. 319 ;
attacked and destroyed, vi. 346 seq. ;
Greeks massacred at, vi. 348.

Psaros, Antonios, v. 253, 255 seq,

Psaros hostile to Samos, vi. 347.

Psellus, Michael, ii. 427 note, 455, iii.

II. 37-
Psyllas, vii. 58, 133, 139.
Pterotes, Gregorios, ii. 131.
Ptolemais, Synesius bishop of, i. 152,

iv. 349.
Ptolemies, power of, i. 5 ; literary fame

of, i. 8.
Ptolemy, Almagest of, ii. 227.
Pulcheria, i. 173, 175, 177, 278.
Pupakes, iii. 169, 205.
Purveyances in England, v. 52, 53.
Pylos (old Navarin), v. 179, vi. 359;

ruins of, vii. 17.
Pyrgos, vi. 385.

Pythian games still celebrated, i. 67.
Pythoness long consulted, i. 83.
Pyxites (Deyirmenderisi), iv. 370 and

7iote.
Pyzanitis, ii. 49.

Quadratus, i. 280.
Quaglio, Porto, v. 116, 117, 272,
Quirini, iv. 279 ; family of, v. 69.
Quirini, Bartolommeo, iv. 289.
Quirini, Nicolo, iv. 282, 283.

Rabia, ii. 88.
Radenos, John, ii. 307.
Radomir, Gabriel, son of Samuel, ii.
376, 378-

INDEX.

415

Rageas, ii. 362.

Ragusa, i. 333, ii. 247, iii. 181 ; treaty
of Othomans with, iii. 463 ; treat-
ment of, V. 168.

Raikoff, vii. 78.

Ralli, expedition of, to Chios, vi. 251
seq.

Ramadan Pasha, v. 93.

Randolph, ii. 454.

Raphael, patriarch, v. 141.

Rascia, i. 333.

Rastadt, treaty of, v. 213.

Ravenika, iii. 81 note; parliament of,
iv. 277.

Ravenna, Stilicho at, i. 160 ; tomb of
Theodoric near, i. 205 note ; taken,
i. 208 ; siege of, i. 241, 394 ; road
from Constantinople to, i. 316; ex-
archate of, i. 400, ii. 6, 22, 39, 42 ;
Paul, exarch of, ii. 40, 41 ; taken by
Luitprand, ii. 40 ; taken by Astolph,
ii. 43 ; termination of exarchate of,
ii. 43, 63, 100; parliament of, iv.
108, 136.

Ray, de {s.ee De la Roche), iv. 137 seq.

Rayahs, compared with serfs, v. 5.

Raybaud, colonel, vi. 148, 163, 219.

Raymond of Antioch, iii. 159, 160.

Raymond of Poitiers, iii. 142, 143, 184.

Raymond of Toulouse, iii. 103, 104,

113. "4-

Raymond of Tripoli, iii. 186.

Rayner of Montferrat, iii. 149, 196, 200,
201.

Recanelli, Pietro, iv. 286, v. 73.

Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de (Mr. Strat-
ford Canning), vi. 309, vii. 10.

Redeemer, order of the, vii. 134.

Red Sea, canal from Nile to {see Nile).

Reforms, social, when possible, iv. 241.

Regency, Greek, illegal proceedings of,
vii. 139.

Rehimene ceded to Persia, i. 143.

Religion, influence of Alexander's con-
quests on, i. 12; influence of, in
Greece, i. 82 ; Greek morally worth-
less, i. 85.

Remata, ii. 413.

Rendina, garrison expelled from, vi.198.

Reshid Pasha {see Kiutayhe and Me-
hemet Reshid Pasha).

Restan {see Arethusa), i. 361.

Reuben of Cilicia, iii. 212.

Reveniko {see Ravenika).

Revolution, French, influence of, vi. 97 ;
P'rench, of 1830, vii. 59.

Revolution, Greek, a political necessity,
V. 290, vi. 82, 87 ; relation of Suliots
to, vi. 83, 84 ; joined by Suliots, vi.
91 ; causes of, vi. 96, 103 ; outbreak
of, vi. 139 seq.; the work of the
people, vi. 144 j in Messenia, vi. 148 ;

at Patras, vi. 151 ; passes under klepht
leaders, vi. 153 ; at Livadea, vi. 160 ;
success of, vi. 165 seq. ; religious not
political, vi. 230; laws of Greece,
under, vi. 241 ; relation of Greek
clergy to, vii. 126 seq.; of 1843, vii.
1 74 seq. ; general remarks on, vii.
180 seq.

Revolutions, cause of, i. 79.

Reynold of Chatillon, prince of Antioch,
iii. 184, 185, 207.

Rha {see Harpasus), iii. 18.

Rhangabe {see Michael I), ii. 107 seq.

Rhangabes, admission of, vii. 250.

Rhangos, vi. 199, 273, 274, 276, 381,
400, vii. 76.

Rhapsomates, revolt of, iii. 60.

Rhedestos, ii. 115; massacre of, iii.
400, 403.

Rheginas, ii. 115 {see Karasou).

Rhegion, treaty of, iii. 414.

Rhiga of Velestinos, plots of, v. 273.

Rhinotmetus, i. 392.

Rhion, vii. 27, 28; Capodistrians at,
vii. 91.

Rhodes, early relations of Rome with,
i. 7 > jealous of Phoenicians, ih. ;
left independent by the Romans, i.
23 ; Rome jealous of, i. 28 ; treat-
ment of, by Cassius, i. 54 ; besieged
by Demetrius Poliorcetes, i. 72 ; taken
by Saracens, i. 375 ; Colossus of,
destroyed, ih. ; laws of, ii. 33 ; Leo
Gabalas at, iii. 305 ; surprised by
Genoese, iii. 313 ; retaken by John III,
iii. 314 ; conquered by the knights of
St. John of Jerusalem, iii. 409 ;
knights of, iii. 429 ; besieged by
John III, iv. 199 ; siege of, v. 62 ;
knights of, v. 64 seq. ; siege of, v. 65,
66 ; sale of Colossus of, v. 65 ; decline
of, v. 66 and note ; knights of St. John
at, V. 66 ; attacked by Suleiman the
Great, v. 67; exempt from tribute of
children, v. 235.

Rhodios, vi. 338, 366; Greek minister
of war, vii. 68, 192.

Rhyndacus, river, iii. 141, 143.

Rialto (Rivalto), ii. loi.

Ricardo, Messrs., vi. 434.

Richard I of England (Coeur de Lion)
takes Cyprus, iii. 213, 237, 238, 297,
iv. 70 seq., 72 ; ransom of, iv. 314.

Ricord, admiral, at Poros, vii. 64 seq.,
71, 74, 75, 78, 79, 83, 87, 97 ; presi-
dent of Greece, vii. 98, 100, 137.

Rigny, admiral de, vi. 432.

Rimnik, vi. 131.

Rizos, vii. 58.

Roads improved by Hadrian {see Ha-
drian) ; neglect of, i. 405.

Robert the Devil, iv. 68.

416

INDEX.

Robert of Flanders, iii. 99, 102.
Robert the Frison, iii. 102.
Robert Guiscard (see Guiscard).
Robert, king of Naples, iv. 220.
Robert II, duke of Normandy, iii. 99,

no.
Robert, emperor of Romania, iii. 297,

300, iv. 112; death of, iii. ,306, iv.

114; vv'ar of, with John III, iii. 303,

iv. 221.
Robert of Tarentum, iv. 1 30.
Roche, de la, Guy I, duke of Athens,

iv. i37» 139' i95> 196, 200.

Roche, de la, Guy II, duke of Athens,
iv. 129, 141.

Roche, de la, John, iii. 363, iv. 140.

Roche, de la, Otho, signor of Athens,
iii. 301, iv. 109, no, 132 seq., 136,
137, 188 seq.

Roche, de la, William, iv. 141, 209.

Rocafert (Rocafort), Beranger de, iii.
397, 405 seq., iv. 148.

Rodoald, ii. 178.

Rodophyles, ii. 274.

Roger, Caesar, iii. 146.

Roger de Flor, romantic history of, iii.
390 seq. ; assassination of, iii. 400,
iv. 147, 300.

Roger, king of Sicily, iii. 160, 161 seq.,
188; ravages Greece, iv. 53; takes
Thebes, iv. 54.

Rokneddin, iii. 246, 247 tiote, 248, 337.

Romaioi, Romaic Greeks, first formed
under Constantine the Great, i. 108 ;
Greeks proud of the name, i. 284,
405, iii. 226, iv. 19, V. 5, 7, 122 7iote.

Romania, ii. 51 ; Frank empire of, ii.
305, iv. 88 seq. ; assize of, iv. 95 ;
Henry of Flanders emperor of, iv.
101 seq. ; Peter of Courtenay em-
peror of, iv. 112, 124; Robert, empe-
ror of, iv. 112; decay of empire of,
iv. 113; John de Brienne emperor
of, iv. 146; Geffrey Villehardouin
seneschal of, iv. 187 ; list of emperors
of, iv. 429.

Romanoffsky, prince, vii. 278 seq. (see
Leuchtenberg).

Romans, demoralized by conquest, i.
1 1 ; Gibbon's estimate of the popula-
tion of their empire, i. 14; their
conquest of Greece not distasteful
to the Greeks, i. 19 ; severe to slaves,
i. 23; provincial administration of,
i. 32 seq. ; causes of their neglect
of agriculture, i. 42 ; Greece imder
the, i. 62 seq. ; attitude of, to Greek
art, i. 71 ; dislike trade, i. 74; extor-
tion of, in the provinces, i. 78 ; in
Spain, Gaul, and Britain, i. 88 ;
large estates of, i. 89 ; fiscal severity
of, i. Ill, 218, 333, ii. 191; empire

of, ruined by aristocratic conservatism,
i. 138; under the Ostrogoths, i. 235 ;
infantry of, w^eak, i. 239 ; castrame-
tation of, revived, i. 301 ; expelled
from Spain, i. 317; title of emperor
of the, i. 351 ; termination of empire
of) i- 353 > expelled from Calabria,
i. 379, 400 ; extinction of Roman
elements in the East, i. 397 ; Otho-
man government like that of empe-
rors of, vi. 6 (see Rome).
Romanus I, ii. 278, 287 seq., 290, 291,

293 ; coins of, ii. 294 note, 310.
Romanus II, son of Constantine Por-
phyrogenitus, i. 349, ii. 297, 298,
313 seq.
Romanus III (Argyros\ ii. 394 seq. ;
Saracen war of, ii. 400 seq.; death
of, ii. 404.
Romanus IV (Diogenes), iii. 24 seq. ;
Turkish war of, iii. 27 seq.; taken
prisoner by Alp Arslan, iii. 34, 36.
Romanus of Bulgaria, ii. 344, 375.
Rome, conquest of Greek states in Italy
by, B.C. 272, i. 6; early relations of,
with Rhodes, i. 7 ; astrologers banished
from, A.D. 1 79, i. 10 ; jealous of Rhodes,
i. 28 ; distributions of grain at, i. 43,
89, 118, 201, 236; decay of agricul-
ture at, i. 43 ; sources of revenue of,
i. 42, 44 seq. ; taxation of, i. 38 seq. ;
fiscal administration of, ih. ; citizens
of, exempt from taxation, i. 45 ;
judges at, i. 46 ; numbers of citizens
of, in provinces, i. 47 ; coinage of,
i. 48 seq. ; bad character of Greeks
at, i. 69 ; not a colonizing state, i.
87, 89 ; effects of war on, i. 88 ; ruin
of agriculture at, i. 89 ; increase of
slaves at, ih. ; immorality of, noted
by St. Paul, i. 99 ; reasons of its fall,
i. 138; emperors cease to reside at,
i. 139; bishop of, i. 188, 294; senate
at, i. 201, 238 ; senate exterminated,
ih.\ law-school of, i. 216; conquered
by Odoacer, i. 238 ; entered by Beli-
sarius, ih. ; besieged by Witiges, i.
238, 239; sieges and captures of,
i. 238 note\ walls of, i. 239 note',
taken by Totila, i. 243, 246 ; rela-
tions with Persia, i. 260 seq. ; Con-
stans at, i. 379 ; stationary society
the aim of, ii. 4, 21, 27; Marinus
duke of, ii. 40 ; independent under
the popes, ii. 42 ; freed from Byzan-
tine influence, ii. 77» ^0° ! synod at,
ii. 182 ; visit of John V to, iii. 464.
(iSee Romans.)
Romeli-Valessi, the, vi. 72.
Romelia (see Roumelia).
Romeliots, action of, in national assem-
bly, vii. 76 ; faction of, vii. 76 seq. ;

INDEX.

4^7

at Argos, attacked, vii. 78 ; at Me-
gara, vii. 80, 81 ; enter Argos, vii.
82.

Romey, colonel, vi. 360.

Romuald, duke of, i. 379.

Ros, ii. 339 note.

Rosa, Santa, vi. 362.

Rossi, Solimon, iii. 364.

Rotrud, ii. 78.

Rouen, baron, vii. 72, 140.

Roukh Shah, son of Timor, iv. 395.

Roum, sultans of, iii. 44 ; why so called,
iv. 322.

Roum (Greek Christians), vi. 7, 8.

Roumelia, beglerbeg of, v. 5 ; people
of, vi. 18 seq.

Roupelion, pass of, iii. 326,

Rouphos, vii. 271, 282, 297.

Roussadan, queen, iv. 337, 349.

Routsos, vi. 376, 377.

Rubruqius, friar, iv. 339.

Riickmann, baron, vii. 71.

Rudhart, chevalier, prime minister, vii.
144; resigns, vii. 145, 167, 168.

Rufinus, minister of Arcadius, i, 156
seq.; assassinated, i. 160.

Rugians, a Gothic tribe, i, 242,

Rurik, ii. 188.

Russ, Dr., vi. 437.

Russell, Lord John, vii. 247 ; policy of,
vii. 269, 278, 279, 287; despatch of,
vii. 308.

Russia and Russians, foundation of em-
pire of, ii. 189; attack Constantino-
ple, ii. 189, 278 ; embassy to, ii. 333;
w^ar of John Zimiskes, ii. 339 seq. ;
state of, in the ninth centurj', ii. 340 ;
commerce of, ii. 340, 343 ; Tartars in,
ii. 343 ; treaty of John Zimiskes with,
ii. 349 ; state of, ii. 434 ; attack
Constantinople, ii. 435 ; war of, with
Hungary, iii. 1 74 ; invaded by Mo-
guls, iii. 309 ; first right of, to navi-
gate Black Sea, v. 6 ; a first-rate
power, V. 213; Sclavonians repre-
sented by, V. 215 ; champion of
orthodox Greek Church, v. 240 ;
treaty with Porte, v. 246 ; intrigues
with Greeks, v. 246 seq. ; fleet of, in
Mediterranean, v. 251 ; war with
Porte, V. 250 ; in Morea, v. 252 seq. ;
besiege Coron, v. 254; fleet of, at
Nauplia, v. 258 ; affection of Greeks
for, V. 264 ; Greek policy of, v. 266
seq. ; Greeks in, v. 267 ; gains Crimea,
26. ; commercial treaty with Porte,
V. 267, 280, 281 ; war with Turkey,
V. 268 ; intrigues of, in Albania, ih. ;
espouses cause of Christians, ih. ; war
with Sweden, v. 269 ; piracy of, in
Levant, v. 2 70 seq. ; joined by Aus-
tria, v. 273; convention with Porte,

VOL. VII. E

v. 275, 276 ; looked up to by lonians,
v. 277; interferes in Turkey, vi. 5;
sole protector of Greek interests, vi.
6 ; Philike Hetairia friendly to, vi.
76 ; looked up to by Greeks, vi. 98,
99; intrigues of, vi. 100; favours
Greeks, vi. iii ; relations of, with
Turkey, vi. 112 seq. ; depopulates
Bulgaria, vi. 112 ; disclaims Hypsi-
lantes, vi. 125, 126 ; and the Hetairia,
vi. 126; intrigues of, in Morea, vi.
141; Greek hopes of, vi. 143; in
Ionian Islands, vi. 155 ; complains
to Porte, vi. 193 ; ultimatum of, to
Turkey, vi. 194; attitude of, vi. 410 ;
policy of, vii. i ; Bosphorus opened
to, vii. 4; memoir of 1823, vii. 4, 5 ;
unpoiDularity of, vii. 6 ; treaty with
France and Great Britain 1827, vii.
I3> 25 ; war with Turkey 1828, 1829,
vii. 25 seq. ; at Adrianople, vii. 26 ;
treaty with Turkey, vii. 2 7 ; John
Capodistrias in, vii. 42 ; cross the
Balkans, vii. 52 ; policy of, vii. 52,
53 ; aids tyranny of Capodistrias, vii.
63 ; victory at Poros, vii. 66 ; blockade
Hydra, vii. 74, 80 ; intrigues in Greece,
vii. 136; policy of, in Greece, vii.
171, 172 ; Eastern policy of, vii. 187 ;
accuses England of violating treaties,
vii. 214; influence of, in Montenegro,
vii. 216; contest with France about
Holy Sepulchre, vii. 218; protects
Christians in Turkey, ih. ; Greek sym-
pathy for, vii. 220; cross the Pruth,
vii. 221 ; policy in Greece, vii. 278
seq. ; negotiations with England on
Greek succession, vii. 280,

Rustem, venality of, v. 48.

Rycaut, v. 51, 52.

Sabas, abbot, ii. 83.

Sabas, governor of Amisos, iii. 289, iv.

323 seq.
Sabbath, laws as to observance of, ii.

262.
Saclavi, ii. 103.

Sachturi (Sakturi), vi. 174, 361, 363.
Sacred battalion, the {&ee Battalion).
Saganos, governor of Morea, iv. 165,

V. 2.
Sagredo, governor of Morea, v. 207.
Sakkoudion, ii. 81.
Saktures, vi. 377.
Saladin, iii. 187, 233; takes Jerusalem,

iv. 90.
Salamis, Albanians in, vi. 28.
Salamvria (Peneius), vi. 72 note,
Salassi, i. 53.

4i8

INDEX.

Salerno, dukes of, ii. 249.

Salik, vi. 79, 95 ; vizier, vi. 189.

Salik, Mehemet, vi. 141.

Salmeniko, siege of, iv. 265, 266.

Salomon, i. 211.

Salomon, senator, iii. 61.

Salona (Soula, Amphissa), iv. 108, 132,
142, 153, 155 note; attack on, v.
193, vi. 159, 160 ; counts of, vi. 160 ;
Theodore Negris at, vi. 237, 238,
243 ; Areopagos of, vi. 237, 305, 306 ;
fugitives at, vi. 395, 396 ; taken by-
Greeks, vii. 38 ; Capodistrians at,
vii. 88, 206.

Saloniki, Boniface of Montferrat king
of, iv. 90, 97, 99, 107, 116, 117, 176,
177; kingdom of, iv. 107 seq., 116;
destroyed, iv. 118; title merged in
Byzantine empire, iv. 119, 120 ; Lom-
bards found kingdom of, iv. 1 1 7 ; list
of kings of, iv. 429 ; Spanish Jews
at, V. 30 note.

Salt, monopoly of, v. 199, vii. 123.

Samaritans exterminated by Justin, i.

297-...
Sami, iii. 223.
Sammet, iii. 162 note.
Samonas, ii. 260, 282.
Samos joins Revolution, vi. 1 76 ; hostile

to Psaros, vi. 347 ; state of, vi. 349 ;

naval action off, vi. 355.
Samosata, Arabs defeated at, i. 393, ii,

155, 186.
Samothrace, v. 59 ; cruelly to, vi. 192.
Samouch, ii. 452, 453.
Sampson, Michael, iv. 375.
Samsoun, Turks of, iv. 322.
Samuel, king of Bulgaria, ii. 364, 369

seq. ; invades Greece, ii. 372 ; takes

Adrianople, ii. 375 ; defeat and death

of, ii. 376, 377.
Samuel, 'the Last Judgment,^ Suliot

hero, vi. 48, 51.
Sandama, bay of, vi. 353.
Sandjak-begs, v. 42, loi and note.
Sandjak-sherif, the standard of Maho-
met, v. 2?o.
Sangredi, family of, v. 69.
Saniana, ii. 132.
Santabaren, Theodores, ii. 256, 257,

262.
Santapace, Ponzio da, iii. 457.
Santa Rosa (see Rosa).
Santimeri, iv. 265.
Santorin (see Thera\ ii. 43 ; seizure of,

iv. 285 ; population of, iv, 292, 302,
Sanudo, Angelo, iv. 280.
Sanudo, Fiorenza, daughter of Giovanni,

iv. 286 seq.
Sanudo, Fiorenza, daughter of Marco

signor of Milos, iv. 290.
Sanudo, Giovanni I, iv. 286.

Sanudo, Guglielmo, iv. 284, 285.

Sanudo, Marco \, duke of Archipelago,
iv. 109, 276 seq.; conquers Naxos,
iv. 277 ; attacks Crete, iv. 279 ; death,
iv. 280.

Sanudo, Marco II, iv. 280 seq.

Sanudo, Marco, signor of Milos, iv.
290.

Sanudo, Nicolo I, iv. 286.

Sanudo, Nicolo II (see Spezzabanda).

Saoudgi, iii. 465.

Saphaka, vi. 382.

SajDienza, island of, vii. 209, 214, 215.

Sapor, revolt of Armenians under, i.
380.

Saporta, count, vii. 170.

Saracens employed by Zenobia, i. 116,
261 ; take Damascus, i. 360 ; subdue
Syria, i. 362 ; defective political or-
ganization of, i. 369 ; reduce Armenia
and Cyprus, i. 374 ; take Aradus, &c.,
ih. ; pope Martin charged with com-
plicity with, i. 376, 411 ; reduce Ar-
menia and Cappadocia, i. 377 > ^^^
Syracuse, i. 382, ii. 242, 250; de-
feated before Constantinople, i. 383 ;
conquer Sardinia, i. 401 ; extent of
empire of, ii. 15 ; defeated by Leo III,
ii. 43 ; incursions of, ii. 47 ; attack
Cyprus, ii, 50 ; war of Constantine V
with, ih.\ wars with, ii. 87; take
Lampedosa, ii. 116; conquer Crete
and Sicily, ii. 134, 135, 137 seq.,
250; colonies of, ii. 136; war with
Michael III, ii. 187; defeated by
Petronas, ii. 188; military forces of,
ii. 204 ; moral character of empire
of, ii. 219 ; war with Basil I, ii. 246 ;
attack Dalmatia, ii. 247 ; at Bari, ii.
248 ; in Italy, ii. 248 seq. ; bought
off by John VIII, ii. 249 ; expelled
from Calabria, ih. ; in Mediterranean,
ii. 250; ravage Proconnesus, ii. 251 ;
corsairs of, ih ; take Hysela, ii. 265 ;
plunder Samos and Lemnos and take
Koron, ih. ; war with Leo VI, ii. 308
seq. ; war with Nicephorus II, ii.
330 ; with John Zimiskes, ii. 358 ;
with Romanus III, ii. 400 seq. ; pi-
racy of, ii. 403. {See Arabs, Mo-
hammedans, Mussulmans.)

Sardica, council of, a.d. 347, i. 137, ii,
105, 370, iii. 240. {See Triaditza.)

Sardinia, taken by Belisarius, i. 233;
conquered by Saracens, i. 401, ii. 13.

Sardis, battle of, ii. 48.

Sari Achmet Pasha, v. 219, 225,

Sarkel, ii. 152.

Sarno, Goths defeated at, i. 247,

Saroukhan, emir of, iii. 427, 443.

Sarpi, V. 87.

Sarrasin, Peter, iv, 155,

INDEX.

419

Sassanides, i. 309.
Sauromatos, ii. 352.
Sauromatos, grandson of, ii. 354.
Savas, vi. 122; character of, vi. 125,

126, 128, 129; joins Othomans, vi.

130; beheaded, vi. 135.
Savoy, prince Eugene of, v. 227.
Saxons in Morea, v. 178.
Scaevola, proconsul of Asia, i. 37.
Scalanova, vi. 214, 251.
Scamars, i. 407, ii. 53.
Scanderbeg (George Castriot), ii. 135,

iv. 247, 254, 260, 416, V. 129, vi. 35,

314-
Scandinavia, pirates of, ii. 190.

Scarlett, Mr., minister at Athens, vii.

270,278,279.

Scepticism in Greece, i. 12.

Schinas, vii. 140.

Schizar (Larissa), i. 361.

Schmaltz, general, vii. 155, 158.

Scholarians, i. 254, 255, iv. 361 seq.,

372, 374> 383-

Scholarios, Georgios (see Gennadios).

Scholasticus, eunuch, i. 253.

Schools, religious, in Greece, vi. 16.

Schulenberg, count, v. 227, vi. 58.

Scio, battle off, v. 194.

Scironian rocks, i. 65.

Sclavesians, ii. 304, 312, iv. 20.

Sclavonians, i. 250 ; invade Illyricum,
i- 252, 253, 293; ravages of, i. 310;
in i)almatia and Illyricum, i. 338 ;
in Greece, i. 338, ii. 5, 103 ; defeated
by Constans, i. 377 ; defeated by
Justinian II, i. 388 ; in Cyprus, i.
3S9, 407 ; in Greece and Pelopon-
nese, i. 403 ; piracy of, ii. 54 ; re-
pressed by Staurakios, ii. 102 ; take
Patrae, ii. 104 ; in Peloponnesus, re-
volt of, ii. 166, 374; in Armenia,
ii. 384 ; land-tax, ii. 382, 416 ; invade
Greece, ii. 417; in Greece, iv. 1, 3,
7 ; military and agricultural, iv. 9 ;
colonists, ih. ; in Thrace, iv. 11; in
Peloponnese, iv. 13, 15, 17 ; in Mace-
donia, iv. 14; seven tribes of, iv. 15 ;
on Strymon, ih. ; colonize Greece, iv.
1 7 ; reduced by Irene, ih. ; attack
Patrae, iv. 14, 18; rebel, iv. 19; in
Laconia, iv. 19, 21 ; in Elis, iv. 21 ;
geographical names in Greece, iv. 23;
fused with Bulgarians, iv. 28 ; of
Taygetus reduced, iv. 197, 212, 229 ;
of Skorta, iv. 202, 216, 229 ; repre-
sented by Russia, v. 215; unite with
Greeks against Franks, iv. 216; num-
bers of, in nineteenth century, vi. 3 ;
colonize Bulgaria, vi. 22.

Scott, Sir Walter, the Talisman, iii. 184
note,

Scutari (Chrysopolis), ii. 48, 290, 324.

Scyphati nummi {see Coinage), i. 452.
Sebaste (Sivas), ii. 169, 385 ; taken by

Seljouks, iii. 17.
Sebastopolis, i. 251 ; battle of, i. 389.
Sebastos, title (Augustus), iii. 57.
Sefer Pasha, v. 180.
Seid Aga, vi. 147.
Seko, monastery of, vi. 137.
Selanik (Thessalonica), pashalik of, vi.

Selefke (Seleucia), v. 221.

Seleucia, i. 4 note.

Seleucidae, power of, i. 5 ; literary in-
fluence of i. 8.

Seliktar Poda, vi. 81, 82.

Selim Pasha, vi. 301.

Selim I, sultan, v. 29, 30 ; conquers
Egypt, V. 82.

Selim II, sultan, v. 81, 234.

Selim III, sultan, v. 268.

Seljouks, ii. 433, 437,440, 441 ; history
of, iii. 14 seq. ; invasions of, iii. 26
seq. ; take Amorium, iii. 28 ; in Asia
Minor, iii. 42, 72, 87 seq. ; take
Nicaea, iii. 49 ; take Jerusalem, iii.
96; state of, iii. 124; empire of
Iconium, iii. 247, 248 ; destroyed by
Moguls, iii. 312; state of, iii. 336;
conquer Palestine, iv. 67 ; piracy of,
iv. 225 ; ravages of, in Asia, iv. 312
seq. ; make Alexios of Trebizond
tribiitary, iv. 326, 328, 329 ; besiege
Trebizond, iv. 333 seq. ; Trebizond
independent of, iv. 336 ; ingredients
in Othoman empire, v. 14; feudalism
of, V. 14, 15 ; opposition of, to Otho-
mans, V. 15 {see Turks),

Selte, iii. 11.

Selymbria, i. 181, ii. 53, 115 ; taken, iii.
340 ; boundary of Greek empire, iii.
492.

Sembat, governor of Armenia, n. 157.

Sembat, Joannes, ii. 385, 440.

Sembat, son of Leo V, ii. 114.

Semendria, gained by Austria, v. 228.

Semlin (see Zeugmin).

Senate, Severus tries to abolish, i. 103 ;
tax imposed on by Constantine, i.
108 ; altar of Victory removed from,
i. 136 ; at Rome, i. 201 ; exterminr.ted,
i. 201, 238; reacquires power, i. 343 ;
in provinces, i. 409 ; under Basil I, ii.
237; Thessalo-Magnesian, vi. 201;
Peloponnesian, vi. 232, 235; disagrees
with Hypsilantes, vi. 234 ; at Meso-
longhi, vi. 237; Peloponnesian recon-
stituted, vi. 240 seq. ; abolished, vii.
94; intrigues of, vii. 97 ; state of, vii.
199, 328.

Senekarim, ii. 385.

Sennacherib of Vasparoukhan; iii, 15,

Septum, i, 233.

e 3

420

INDEX.

Sepulchre, Holy, site of, i. 455 seq. ;

church of, ii. 397 and note, v. 238.
Sequin, v. 27 {lee Coinage).
Serapis, worship of, i. 84, 120.
Serbs, transplanted by Heraclius to

Dalmatia and lUyricum, i. 331.
Serena, wife of Stilicho, i. 157.
Serfs, attached to soil, i. 153; law as to,

i. 200.
Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople, i.

342-

Seriphos, taken by Turks, v. 69.

Serres, battle of, iii. 325 ; capital of
Servia, iii. 442.

Servia and Servians, i. 332 seq.,
338, ii. 135, 311, 382; rebellion of,
ii. 415, 434; Bodin, king of, iii. 76,
87, 104 ; defeat of, iii. 138 ; invaded
by Manuel, iii. 172, 417 ; invasion, iii.
436 ; alliance with Venice, iii. 442 ;
empire of, iii. 447 ; town of, vi. 20,

Sessini, Gastouni, vi. 335, 336.

Sestertius {see Coinage), i. 435.

Setaina, ii. 379.

Severus (see Alexander Severus).

Sguros, Leo, iii. 276, 284, iv, 117, 134,

135' 1 75.. 176, 179-
Sguros, Mailly, iv. 213.
Shakspeare, his picture of Athens, iv.

173-

Shiis, sectaries, massacre of, v. 29, 30.

Shkipetars, i. 335, iv. 30 seq., vi. 34.

Shoumla, ii. 347, v. 268.

Sicilians invade Byzantine empire, iii.
214 seq. ; defeated by Isaac, iii.
222.

Sicily, population of, in time of Cicero,
i. 15 note; Greeks of, during Punic
wars, i. 6 ; Roman government of, i.
21, 32; insurrections of slaves in, i.
23 ; reduced by Belisarius, i. 237 ;
Constans in, i. 379 ; invaded by Sa-
racens, i. 382 ; condition of, i. 400 ;
expedition of Michael I to, ii. 116;
conquered by Saracens, ii. 134, 135,
137 seq., 178, 250; expedition against,
ii. 332 ; invaded by Michael IV, ii.
413 ; attacked by Byzantines, iii. 170;
conquered by Henry VI of Germany,
iii. 251 ; Sicilian, Vespers, iii. 364,
372 ; war with Naples, iii. 389.

Sicyon, at the time of the battle of Pla-
taea, i. 77-

Sid-al-Battal (see Cid), ii. 20.

Sideras, ii. 184.

Sigismund of Hungary, iii. 471.

Silentiarii, i. 254.

Silention, ii. 38, 70, 129.

Silistria, Turks at, vii. 26.

Silk, trade in, with India, i. 264, 268,
269 ; brought to Constantinople, i.
269 ; Aristotle on silkworms, i, 270 j

manufacture of, iii. 162, 164; at
Thebes, iii. 247, iv. 55 ; at Corinth,
ih.
Simeon, ii. 275.
Simeon, king of Bulgaria, ii. 280 seq., 5

286, 303, 310 seq. ; death of, ii. 312.
Simeon the Servian, iv. 129.
Simeon of Thessaly, iv. 155.
Simeon of Trebizond, patriarch, v. I40,
Simocatta, Theophylactus, i. 259, 298,

416.
Simony, v. 140, 149.
Simos, minister of finance, vii. 253.
Simplicius, i. 273, 287 note.
Sinai, Mount, fortress at, i. 261.
Singara, i. 143-

Singidon (see Belgrade), i. 339.
Singidunum (see Belgrade), i. 249.
Sinope, ii. 153, 156, 186; taken by
Azeddin, iv. 326 ; reduced by Tartars,
iv- 339 ; corsairs of, iv. 358 ; ex-
changed for Philippopolis, iv. 417,
418.
Sipahis (see Spahis).
Siphakas, vi. 400 seq.
Siphnos, mines of, i. 77.
Sir Janni (see Janni).
Sirmium, seized by Avars, i. 299, ii.

382.
Siroes, murders Chosroes II, i. 345.
Sisebut, king of Spain, i. 317 ; conquers
Tangiers, ih. ; treaty of Heraclius
with, i. 317, 326.
Sisinios, ii. 315.
Sisinnios, ii. 48 seq.
Sistova, peace of, v. 273.
Sitokrithon, tax, iii. 398.
Sivas (Sebaste), ii. 169.
Skaltzodemos, vi. 161.
Skamars (see Scamars).
Skepes, monastery of, ii. 233.
Skiathos, taken by Turks, v. 69 ; plun-
dered by armatoli, vi. 313.
Skipetars (see Shkipetars).
Skleraina, ii. 425.
Skleros, Bardas, ii. 338, 345 ; revolt of,

361 seq., 364, 365.
Skleros, Basilios, ii. 393.
Skleros, Niketas, ii. 281, 289, 305, 330,

332, 333-
Skleros, Romanes, ii. 362, 430, 452.
Skodra, pashalik of, vi. 38.
Skomius, Mount, ii. 11.
Skopelos, plundered by armatoli, vi.

313-

Skopia, ii. 375.

Skorta (see Karitena), iv. 21, 179, 183,

184, 202, 216, 229.
Skourti, vi. 358, 359.
Skripou (Orchomenos), iv. 149.
Skrophes, the, action off, vi. 321.
Skuleni, battle of, vi. 136.

■ Tut

INDEX.

421

Skyros, ravaged by Goths, i. 94 ; taken
by Turks, v. 69.

Slaves and slavery, severity of Romans
to, i. 23 ; insurrections of, ih. ; seize
Sunium, ih. ; increase of, at Rome, i.
89 ; number of, reduced by Gothic
invasions, i. 97, 153, 194, 200; in
Greece, i. 404, ii. 77, 89, 220, 276,
450; condition of, iii. 277; in Greece,
iv. 3 ; amelioration of, iv. 45, 167 ; in
Greece during middle ages, iv. 166
seq. ; Othoman slave-raids, v. 63 ;
disappearance of, v. 231.

Smolena, revolt of, iii. 250.

Smyrna, Apollonius of Tyana at, i. 70 ;
disorder at, vi. 190 ; naval action off,
vi. 258.

Sobieski, John, v. 172.

Societies, friendly, in Greece, i. 37 note.

Socotra (see Dioscorides), i. 146.

SokoUi, Mohammed, v. 45, 85, 158.

Soli (Pompeiopolis), rebuilt byjPompey,
and filled with pirates, i. 30.

Solidus (see Coinage), i. 49, 442.

Soliotes, insurgent leader, vi. 146.

Solomon, king of Hungary, iii. 20.

Solon, an oil-merchant, i. 125.

Sommaripa, family of, iv. 289, v. 69.

Songs, popular, v. 287.

Sophia, empress, i. 293, 294.

Sophia, St., Church of, i 222, ii. 301,
302 and note ; injured by earthquake,
iii. 446, 450.

Sophia, St., monastery of, at Trebizond,
iv. 340.

Sophon, lake, canal from, i. 182, iii.

9.V

Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem, 1.

361.

Sorrento, i. 400, ii. 250.

Sosander, monastery of, iii. 330, 332.

Sosopetra (see Zapetra), ii. 155.

Sosti, Aghio, vi. 294, 295.

Soula (see Salona).

Soutzos, Alexander, hospodar of Valla-
chia, vi. 118.

Soutzos, John, vi. 334.

Soutzos, Michael, hospodar of Moldavia,
vi. 116, 117, 120, 135; excommuni-
cated, vi. 185, 195.

Sozopolis (see Daphnusia).

Spahis (Sipahis), v. 37 note, 108.

Spain, Romans in, i. 88 ; Visigoths in,
i. 229 ; part of, subdued by Justinian,
i. 247, 248 ; Jews in, i. 271; Romans
expelled from, i. 317; Arabs in, ii.
1 34 ; Arabs from, in Alexandria and
Crete, ii. 135 ; Eastern trade of,
ruined, v. 156; Jews expelled from,
V. 1 60 ; French invasion of, vii. 3 ;
English policy towards, vii. 11.

Spaniards in Asia Minor, iii. 388, 391,

392 ; in the East, iv. 299 ; at Coron,

V. 68 ; plunder Morea, v. 68, 104 ;

take Patras, v. 68, 92, 104 ; ravage

Maina, v. 105, Cos, ih.
Spanish succession, war of, v. 213.
Spany, iv. 214.
Sparta, an ally of Rome, i. 20; and so

exempt from direct taxation, i. 39 ;

Gerontia at, i. 67 ; ravaged by Goths,

i. 94; courted by Julian, i. 142;

plundered by Alaric, i. 159.
Spatharios, ii. 25.
Speliades, vi. 280.

Spercheius, crossed by Turks, vi. 285.
Spetzas, V. 281, 283 ; Albanians in, vi.

29, 30, 33 ; revolution at, vi. 160 seq.,

169 ; meanness of, vi. 349.
Spetziots, fight with Hydriots, vi. 319.
Spezzabanda (Nicolo SanudoII),iv. 287,

288.
Sphakia, vi. 4.
Sphakiots in Crete, v. 263.
Sphakteria, operations against, vi. 360 ;

Egyptians land on, vi. 361, vii. 17.
Sphengelos, ii. 347.
Spinalonga, lost by Venetians, v. 226,

227.
Spinola, v. 169.
Spiridion, St., monastery of, vi. 413;

bombarded, 426; capitulates, 427;

massacre at, th.
Spiritoff, v. 251, 258, 259.
Splanga, Greeks defeated at, vi, 271,

272.
Spondyles, ii. 391, 399, 400.
Sponneck, count, vii. 319, 330.
Stagira (see Makri), iii. 241.
Staichos, vi. 273, 333.
Stamatelopoulos, Nikolas, vi. 291, 293.
Stamati, Gatsu, vi. 198.
Stanhope, colonel (Earl of Harrington),

vi. 327, vii. 7, 9.
Staurakios, ii. 86, 95, 102 ; emperor, ii.

107, 108, 281.
Stefano, St., knights of, created, v. 96

seq.
Steinau, general, v. 194.
Stengel, baron, vii. 170.
Stenyclerian plain (see Emblakika).
Stephanos, revolt of, ii. 292 seq.,

298.
Stephen, abbot, ii. 61.
Stephen, admiral, ii. 408, 414 seq.
Stephen of Blois, iii. 99, no.
Stephen, Dushan (see Dushan).
Stephen, eunuch, rebellion of, ii. 431.
Stephen, general, ii. 107.
Stephen II, king of Hungary, iii. 138,

i39> 175-
Stephen III, king of Hungary, 111. 1 73

seq.
Stephen, patriarch, ii, 234, 262, 300,

422

INDEX.

Stephen, pretended Peter III, v. 248.
Stephen II, pope, appeals to Pepin

against Lombards, ii. 63.
Stephen, regent, ii. 289.
Stilicho, guardian of Honorius, i. 157,

160, 161.
Stoa, i. 277.
Stobaetis, i. 273.
aroix^lov (genius), ii. 283 note.
Storks, Sir Henry, vii. 309, 310.
Stournari, vi. 76.
Stozas, i. 208, 209.
Strabo, his account of Greece under the

Romans, i. 62 ; epitomizer of, iv. 21,

vi. 34.
Strangford, lord, vii. 8.
Strasoldo, count, v. 175.
Strategopoulos, Alexis, iii. 339 seq.,

348.

Strategopoulos. Alexius, iii. 325.

Strategopoulos, Constantine, iii. 330.

Stratonikos, St., i. 257.

Stratophilos, ii. 356.

Strava, vii. 16.

Strobelos (Myndos\ ii. 307.

Strogonoff, baron, vi. 193 seq.

Strongyle, ii. 53.

Strumpitza (Strumbitza), ii. 377, 379,
380, iii. 417.

Strymon, ii. 11; theme of, ii. 270;
Sclavonian colonies on, iv. 15,

Stryphnos, Michael, iii. 245.

Studion, monastery of, ii. 84, 120, 129,
iii. 8, 12.

Studita {s,ee Theodore Studita).

Stura, siege of, vi. 247.

Sturnari, Nicolas, vi. 199.

Stylianos, ii. 264, 279.

Stylida, vi. 279.

Stymphalus, lake, Hadrian's aqueduct
to Corinth from, i. 65.

Stypiotes, ii. 247, 330, iii. 126.

Subleon, iii. 191, 195.

Suda lost by Venetians, v. 227; Ibra-
him Pasha at, vi. 356.

Suez (Arsinoe), i. 365.

Suintilla expels Romans from Spain,

Suleiman, sultan of Roum, iii. 42, 44,

49, 72, 80, 88, 90, 91 ; takes Antioch,

iii. 91.
Suleiman I, son of Orkhan, iii. 454 ;

takes Callipolis, iii. 461 ; death of,

iii. 462 ; laws of, iii. 476, 483, v.

142.
Suleiman II, the Magnificent, iv. 292,

v. 10, 48, 64, 67, 70 ; his charter to

Chios, V. 234.
Suleiman, caliph, ii. 14, 15, 17.
Suleiman Pasha, beheaded, v. 221.
Suleiman Pasha of Larissa, vi. 76, 77.
Suleiman vizier, v. 171.

Suleimanbeg, iv. 380.

Suli, Suliots, revolt of, in Epirus, v.
268, 274, vi. 42 seq.; Suli, position
of, vi. 42, 45, 46 ; conquered by
Ali Pasha, vi. 50 ; at Corfu, vi. 52,
78, 83 ; recalled, vi. 79 ; alliance
with Ali, vi. 81 ; attack Arta, vi. 82 ;
their relation to Greek Revolution, vi.
83, 84 ; disorderly bravery of, vi. 84,
85 ; take Variadhes, vi. 86 ; attack
Prevesa, vi. 90 ; join Revolution, vi,-
91, 93; assisted by Greeks, vi. 263,
264; capitulate, vi. 272; retire to
Ionian Isles, ih.

Sulla, invades Greece, i. 25 ; takes
Athens, i. 26, 54, 68 ; ravages Greece,;
i. 27, 54; his treatment of Thebes,
ih. ; robs statue of Minerva at AlaL
comenae, i. 72.

Sulpicius, letter of, to Cicero, i. 54.

Sultans, Othoman, list of, v. 293.

Sulu Proshova, klepht, vi. 23.

Sunielas, monastery of, iv. 376, 384.

Sunium, seized by slaves, i. 23.

Sweden, war of Russia with, v. 269.

Swiatoslaf, ii. 333, 344, 345, 347 seq.,
350, 369.

Sylvio, Dominic, iii. 75, 82.

Sylvius, Aeneas (Pope Pius II), iv. 414,

415-
Symbatios, ii. 193, 194.

Symmachus, i. 283.

Synadenos, iii. 288, 4i2(?), 4i3(?),
4i7(?), iv.322(?).

Synadenos, iii. 49.

Syncellus, George (see Geoi^ge), ii. 74-

Synesius, i. 152 ; at Athens, i. 277.

Synnada, ii. 102.

Synnadenos, Basil, ii. 416.

Synods, provincial, how composed,, i.
128; of Constantinople, ii. 119, iv.
351 ; at Rome, ii. 182.

Synodal Tomos of 1850, vii.' 130 (see
Tomos).

Syra, siege of, iv. 284 ; commercial
centre of Greece, vii. 63 ; revolt of,
ih. ; proposals of, vii. 74 ; insurrec-
tion at, vii. 264.

Syracuse, subdued by Rome b. c. 212,
i. 6 ; taken by Marcellus, i. 71 ; by
Saracens, i. 382, ii. 138, 139, 242,
250.

Syrako, vi. 198, 199.

Syria, i. 87 ; conquered by Palmyra, i.
115; decline of Greeks in, i. 143;
inhabitants warlike, i. 166; invaded
by Chosroes, i. 263 ; Belisarius sent
to, i. 264 ; national church of, i.
275, 315; under Heraclius, i. 324;
Monophysites and Nestorians in, ih. ;
Greeks in, ih. ; Arabs in, i. 327 ; Mo-
hammedan successes in, i. 349 ; lost,

getGre
Arab I

Tacte
Taijed^
580,;
Taesani
TagiiU'

' Taglia
Tahirt'
Takii,
Taliir,
Talail:
Talanti
161
Ttiia

3JJ
Taiiig
Taicn
will
ij(
Taigi
Taoai
Taras

3^,

Taici

Tare

INDEX.

423

i. 350 ; Mohammedan invasion of, i.
359, 362 ; frontier of, i. 309 ; Arabs
get Greek knowledge through, i. 418 ;
wealth of, ih. ; earthquake in, ii. 63 ;
Arab rule mild in, ii. 134; Basil II
in, ii. 385.

Tabor, light of, iii. 365 note.

Tacitus, V. 123 note.

Tadjeddin, emir of Limnia, iv. 379,

380, 385-

Taenarus, Genseric defeated at, i. 1 70.
Tagina, victory of Narses at, i. 246.
Tagliacozzo, battle of, iv. 206,
Tagliamento, v. 63.
Taharten, iv. 386, 389, 390.
Tahir, Abbas, vi. 81, 86, 91 seq.
Tahir, capitan-pasha, vii. 19.
Talanta, vi. 28.
Talanti, Mussulmans massacred at, vi.

161 ; Kolettes defeated at, vi. 405.
Tana (Azof), iii. 456 ; Genoese at, iv.

353. 354. V. 106.
Tanagra, i. 23.
Tancred, iii. 100, 113, 124, 125; war

with Alexius I, ih.,\\\. 214, 222, 223 ;

in Greece, iv. 56 seq.
Tangiers, i. 317.
Taonion, battle of, iii. 41.
Tarasios, ii. 72 seq., 95, 96, ill ; ex-
communicated, ii. 120.
Taratassos, vii. 250.
Tarchaniotes, Andronicus, revolt of, iii.

362.
Tarchaniotes, Basil, ii. 454.
Tarchaniotes, John, iii. 384.
Tarchaniotes, Nicephorus, iii. 309.
Tarella, vi. 264, 270.
Tarentum, taken by Lombards, i. 379 ;

by Robert Guiscard, iii. 37.
Taron of Vallachia, iv. 128.
Taronites, Gregory {see Gregory).
Taronites, Michael, iii. 60.
Tarsos, capitulates, iv. 258.
Tarsus, ii. 251, 274, 275; siege of, ii.

330-

Tartars in Russia, ii. 343.

Tatikios, iii. 77, 92, 108, no, 116.

Taugast, kingdom of, i. 259.

Tauresiura, i. 182.

Tauris, Mongols of, iv. 353.

Tavia, iv. 239.

Taxation, Roman, i. 38 seq. ; relieved
by Tiberius, i. 41 ; by Trajan, i. 64 ;
by Anastasius, i. 181 ; Roman citi-
zens exempt from, i. 45, 109, 173;
under Nicephorus, ii. 98 ; injurious
system of, v. 22 ; Greek and Turkish,
vi. 13, 14; mode of levying, vi, 24;
direct, evils of, vii. 122.

Taygetus (Pentedaktylos\ ii. 304 7wte,

iv. 19; Sclavonians of, iv. 197,212,

229.
Tchander (Zompi), iii. 43, 127.
Tchamides, vi. 35, 42, 44.
Tchanak-kalesi, vi. 320.
Tchanderlik (Pitane), vi. 318.
Tchesme, bay of, battle at, v. 258 seq.,

vi. 177; Turks at, vi. 253.
Tech, Constantine, iii. 338.
Tegea (Nikli), temple of robbed by

Augustus, i. 72, iv. 139; barony of,

iv. 185.
Teichomenos, ii. 416,
Tekneas, ii. 403.
Telegraph, ii. 151 note, 225.
Telmessus, vi. 350.
Temelek, Melchi, ii. 358.
Temesvar, gained by Augustus, v. 228.
Tempe (Lykostomion\ iii. 81.
Tenedos, ceded to Genoa, iii. 466 ;

seized by Venetians, iii. 466, v. 112.
Tennant, Sir J. E., vii.
Tepelen, Ali of, vi. 12, 52, 57 {see

Ali Pasha).
Tephrike (Divreky), ii. 169, 244, 246,

iii. 64.
Terbelis, king of Bulgaria, i. 394.
Terbounians, i. 334.
Terebinthos, island, ii. 175.
Tergovisht, vi. 129 seq.
Ternovo, patriarch of, iii. 308 note.
Tetarteron, ii. 327 {see Coinage).
Tetraxits, Gothic tribe, i. 248,
Thamar, iv. 318.
Thanasopoulos, vii. 87.
Thasos, battle near, ii. 137, 269, 270;

taken by Manuel II, iii. 485 ; taken

by Mohammed II, v. 59.
Thatoul, ii. 443.
Thebarmes, birthplace of Zoroaster, i.

344. 346-

Thebes, treatment of, by Sulla, i. 27,
54; in time of Pausanias, i. 27, ii.
417 ; sacked, iii. 161 ; silk manufac-
ture at, iii. 247, iv. 55, 144; taken by
Roger of Sicily, iv. 54, 108, 109, 136 ;
taken by Henry of Flanders, iv. no;
a feudal principality, iv. 132 seq.,
135 ; attacked by Leo Sguros, iv.
135 ; conquered by Franks, ih. ; taken
by Catalans, iv. 152 ; Nicholas of St.
Omer at, iv. 208 ; John of St. Omer
at, iv. 208, V. 184, 185.

Theias, i. 247.

Thekla, sister of Michael III, ii. 154
note, 161, 173, 252, 253 note.

Themes, system of, ii. 12 and note, iv.
41.

Themistius, i. 283.

Themistos, ii. 352.

Theobald, king of Austrasia, i. 247.

424

INDEX.

Theochares, vii. 14O.

Theoctista, ii. 147.

Theoctistos, eunuch, ii. 161, 166, 167 ;
murdered, ii. 171, 191.

Theoctistos, commander of mercenaries,
ii. 401.

Theoctistos, master of palace, ii. 107,
III, 112.

Theoctistos, protospatharios, iv. 19,

Theodatus, i. 237.

Theodebert, enters Italy, i. 241.

Tlieodora, sister of Alexios III, iv. 385.

Theodora, wife of Baldwin III, iii. 207.

Theodora, Cantacuzenos (see Cantacu-
zenos).

Theodora, wife of Conrad, iv. 231, 233.

Theodora, daughter of Constantine VII
(Porphyrogenitus), ii. 338.

Theodora, daughter of Constantine
VIII, ii. 394, 398, 399, 421 ; reign of,
422 seq. ; death of, ii. 447, 448.

Theodora, niece of Manuel I, iii. 148.

Theodora, daughter of Manuel I of
Trebizond, iv. 348.

Theodora, wife of Romanus I, ii. 291.

Theodora, wife of Theophilus, ii. 147
seq.; empress-regent, ii. 161, 164,
172, 196.

Theodore I (Lascaris), emperor of
Nicaea, iii. 284 seq. ; ally of Bulga-
ria, iii. 290 ; gains Nicomedia, iii.
291 ; letter of Innocent III to, iii.
292 ; attacked by Turks, iii. 294 ;
peace with Henry, iii. 296 ; marries
Maria, iii. 297 ; death of, iii. 298 ;
treaty with Yoland, iv. 112, 124, 321,
322, 325, 326; treaty with Henry, ih.

Theodore II (Lascaris Vatatzes), of Ni-
caea, w'ar with Michael II of Epirus,
iii. 314, 327; Bulgarian war of, iii.
325, iv. 339.

Theodore I (Palaeologus), despot of
Peloponnesus, iii. 471, 486, iv. 233 seq.
{see Palaeologus).

Theodore II (Palaeologus), despot of
Peloponnesus, iv. 236, 239, 242, 245
seq.

Theodore of Epinis, iii. 300 seq. ;
emperor of Thessalonica (see Thes-
salonica), takes Adrianople, iii. 304,
328, iv. 112, 113, 118, 124 seq., 127 ;
takes Corfu, iv. 273.

Theodore, eunuch, ii. 453, 454.

Theodore, brother of Heraclius, i. 344,
350> 359. 360.

Theodore, governor of Leo, ii. 288 seq.

Theodore, Mankaphas (see Mankaphas).

Theodore, patriarch of Antioch, ii.

339-
Theodore, pope, i. 375, 376.
Theodore, St., ii. 348.
Theodore, Studita, ii. 81 seq., 96, 108,

109, III, 117 seq., 121, 122, 129, 139
seq.; will of, ii. 221, 227.

Theodoric, in Italy, i. 169 ; surprises
Dyrrachium, i. 170; statue of, i. 192
note ; tomb of, i. 205 note ; policy of,
i. 235 ; protects Jews, i. 271.

Theodorides, Achilles, vi. 2 86. ,j

Theodosia (see Caffa), v. 106.

Theodosiopolis (Erzeroum), i. 261, ii.
50, 265.

Theodosius I, the Great, i. 84 ; code of,
i. Ill, 173, 191; anti-pagan legisla-
tion of, i. 133; finally establishes
orthodox Christianity, i. 136; sub-
dues Goths, i. 143, 154, 155 ; death
of, i. 156.

Theodosius II, law of, i. 161, 162 ;
fleet of, i. 168 ; reign of, i. 173, 175,
176, 190 ; restricts education, i. 284.

Theodosius III, i. 396 ; abdication of,
ii. 115.

Theodosius, brother of Constans II, i.

378.
Theodosius, metropolitan of Ephesus,

ii. 57.
Theodosius, Monomachus, ii. 449.
Theodosius, patriarch, iii. 201, 210.
Theodosius, ii. 106.
Theodota, ii. 80, 96.
Theology, Greek in language, oriental

in spirit, ii. 221.
Theopasthites, ii. 60.
Theophanes, abbot and historian, i.

382, 431, ii. c^'^, 74, 227. _
Theophanes, of Fergana, ii. 167, 172

note.
Theophanes, the Patrician, ii. 342.
Theophanes, the Singer, ii. 149.
Theophanes, of Thessalonica, ii. 409.
Theophano, sister of Basil, ii. 338.
Theophano, wife of Romanus II, ii.

297. 323> 326.
Theophilitzes, ii. 229, 253.
Theophilos, Erotikos, ii. 429.
Theophilus, admiral, ii. 88.
Theophilus, patriarch of Alexandria, i.

Theophilus, Indian bishop, i. 147.

Theophilus, son of Michael, ii. 131.

Theophilus, emperor, ii. 137, 140, 142
seq. ; edict of, ii. 148 ; encourages
art, ii. 150; citizenship under, ii.
151 ; Saracen war of, ii. 152 seq. ;
works of, ii. 160; treatment of
commerce, ii. 210 ; wealth of, ii. 214,

239-
Theophobos, the Persian, ii. 152, 153,

156, 157, 160, 201.
Theophylactus, son of Michael I, ii.

112 ; father of Romanus I, ii. 245.
Theophylactus, patriarch, ii. 292, 300

seq.

INDEX.

425

Theophylactus, Simocatta (see Simo-

catta), in Cyprus, ii. 429.
Theoskepastos, Panaghia, monastery of,

iv. 383-

Thera (Santorin), eruption of volcano
at, ii. 43.

Theragia, ii. 43.

Therma, Basilika, ii. 363.

Thermisi, iv. 236 note.

Thermopylae, defended by Claudius, i.
93 ; abandoned by Gerontius, i. 158,
159 ; guard at, i. 201, 209 ; fortified,
i. 210; earthquake at, i. 225; Huns
penetrate to, i. 258.

Thermus (Vlokho),"^ vi. 88.

Thespiae, i, 23 ; Cupid of Praxiteles at,
i. 72.

Thessalo-Magnesian senate, vi. 201.

Thessalonica, attacked by Goths, i. 97,
160, 170, 316, 405, 425 ; archbishop-
ric of, ii. 235 ; siege and sack of, ii.
266 seq. ; centre of Bulgarian trade,
ii. 281 ; taken, iii. 214, 215 ; Theo-
dore of Epirus, emperor of, iii. 302,
303, 309> 3ii> 314. 315 ; takes Adrian-
ople, iii. 304; empire of, iii. 31:2,
iv. 1 24 seq. ; taken by Cantacuzenos,
iii. 455 ; sold to Venetians, iii. 486 ;
taken by Murad, iii. 493 ; taken by
Tancred, iv. 56.

Thessaly, invaded by Goths, i. 97 ; pro-
vince of, i. 115; Ostrogoths in, i.
1 79 ; overrun by Nonnans, iii. 80 ;
recovery of, iii. 430 ; Vallachians in,
iv. 29 ; conquered by Stephen Dushan,
iv. 128, 129; Catalans in, iv. 147,
148 ; invaded by Murad II, iv. 248,
251 ; Turkish feudalism in, v. 3 ;
Turks in, v. 125 ; endeavour of Greece
to annex, vii. 219, 221, 223 seq.

Theudes, i. 247.

Thibaut de Sipoys, iii. 406, 407.

Thierry de Los, iii. 290.

Thiersch, professor, vi. 81, 82, 87.

Thomas of Cephalonia, iv. 128.

Thomas, captain, vii. 14.

Thomas, rebel emperor, ii. 130.

Thomas, despot of Epirus, iv. 127, 142.

Thomas, general, ii. 113; insurrection
of, ii. 130 ; besieges Constantinople,
ii. 131 ; defeat of, ih, ; death of, ii.
132; an Armenian, ii. 200.

Thomas (Palaeologus), despot of Pelo-
ponnesus, iv. 242 seq., 255 seq., 260.

Thomas, the Sclavonian, ii. 94.

Thoros, iii. 142, 185, 202, 206.

Thouvenel, M., French minister at
Athens, vii. 210, 213.

Tnrace, independent till Tiberius, i. 33 ;
made a province by Vespasian, i. 36 ;
invaded by Goths, i. 92 ; province of,
i. 115 ; dialect akin to Latin, i. 115

note, 399 note ; plundered by Goths,
i. 154 ; Alaric in, i. 157 ; inhabitants
of> 165, 335 ; gold mines in, i. 167 ;
Avars in, i. 336 ; people of, disap-
pear before barbarians, i. 399, ii. 1 1 ;
colonies in, ii. 55 ; Thracians, extinc-
tion of, iii. 225 seq., iv. 10; con-
quered by John III, iii. 313; plun-
dered by Catalans, iii. 404 ; Mogul
invasion of, iii. 428; Sclavonians in,
iv. II ; Asiatic colonies in, iv. 27;
Komans in, ih.

Three Powers {see Allies).

Thucydides, vi. 34.

Tiberias, battle of, iii. 233.

Tiberius, Areopagus under, i. 27 ; unites
Macedonia and Achaia to Moesia, i.
33) 35> 63 ; relieves taxation, i. 41 ;
answer of Baton to, ih.

Tiberius II, i. 292 ; defeated by Avars,
i. 297 ; defeats Chosroes, ih. ; reign
of, i. 298 ; death of, i. 299 ; reforms
army, i. 300, 351, 393; dethroned, i.
394 ; army of, iv. 403, v. 39.

Tiberius III {&ee Apsimar).

Tiberius, son of Justinian II, i. 395.

Tiepolo, Venetian governor of Candia,
iv. 279.

Tilsit, peace of, v. 276, vi. 52.

Timariots, feudal tenants, v. 2 ; in
Greece, v. 2, 42, 124; opposed to
sultan, vi. 104.

Timars, Othoman cavalry fiefs, v. 2, 42.

Timor, defeats Bayezid, iii. 481 ; tri-
bute from Manuel II, ih. ; takes
Brusa, iii. 482 ; invasion of, iv. 386 ;
empire of, iv. 388 ; embassy of Henry
HI, iv. 387 ; makes Trebizond tribu-
tary, iv. 390 ; letter to John Palaeo-
logos, iv. 391.

Tinos, chief seat of Venetian power, v.
69, 196; conquered by Turks, v.
217,227; in i8th century, v. 235,
236 ; Capodistrians at, vii. 88 ; dis-
turbances at, vii. 138.

Tithes, system of, bad, v. 198 ; mode of
levying, vi. 13.

Tocco, family of, iv. 130 ; at Clarentza,
iv. 236.

Tocco, Antonio, v. 62.

Tocco, Charles I, duke of Cephalonia,
iv. 130, 243, V. 61.

Tocco, Charles II, iv. 130, v. 62.

Tocco, Charles III, iv. 130.

Tocco, Charles of Arta, despot of Ro-
mania, iv. 130, 159, v. 4.

Tocco, Leonard I, iv. 130, v. 61.

Tocco, Leonard II, iv. 130, v. 62.

Tocco, Leonardo, despot of Arta, v. 57,

Toghra (toura), imperial cipher, v. 19.

Togrul-beg, ii. 437, 441, 443 seq., iii.
17-

426

INDEX.

Toleration, i. 136, ii. 60, 97, 148.

Tolon, Port, v. 181.

Tombazes, Jakomaki, vi. 172, 177, 179,

181 ; at Chios, vi. 250.
Tomos, synodal, vii. 130.
Topal (Khosref Mehemet), vi. 311,

318.
Tophana, arsenal of, burnt, vi. 311.
Topirus, i. 252.

Tomese Castel (see Castel Tornese).
Tornikios, Leo, ii. 431 seq.
Torsello, Marino Sanudo, iv. 284.
Toskides, vi. 35.
Tosks, vi. 35, 314, 317.
Totila, defeat of, i. 208, 242 ; takes

Rome, i. 243 ; recovers Rome, i. 246 ;

defeat and death of, i. 247 ; ravages

Corcyra and Epirus, i. 224, 253.
Tott, baron de, v. 261.
Touchard, admiral, vii. 277-
Toucy, de, Narjot, iii. 307, iv. 284.
Touloun, viceroy of Egypt, ii. 246.
Toulouse, Raymond of {see Raymond).
Toura (see Toghra).
Tourms, ii. 12.
Toutoush, sultan of Damascus, iii. 90,

Toxaras, Constantine, ii. 196.

Trachaniotes, iii. 31, 32.

Trade (see Commerce), Greek and Ro-
man dislike of, i. 74 ; effect of Persian
bigotry on, i. 144 ; of Greeks with
India, i. 265, 316 ; China, ih. ; Africa,
i. 265; Egypt, i. 267; Arabia, i.
268 ; with India, i. 419, 420, 422 ;
northern route of, i. 420 ; of Venice
and Amalfi, i. 42 1 ; dependent on
free institutions, i. 422 ; estimation
of, ii. 215 ; of Turks in hands of
Christians, v. 23, 24; of Greece, v.
1 2*] note; of Barcelona, v. 156 ; Span-
ish ruined by Philip II, v. 156; of
Hydra, vi. 168, 169.

Trakadha, brigand, case of, vii. 166,
167.

Trajan, just to Greeks, i. 63 ; lightens
taxation, i. 64 ; why a persecutor of
Christianity, i. 90 ; religious indiffer-
ence under, i. 120, 182; gates of
(Kapou Dervend), ii. 346.

Tralles, taken by Turks, iii. 359.

Tranakhorio, vi. 316, 317.

Trans-Danubian principalities (see Prin-
cipalities).

Transylvania, i. 335 ; conquered by
kings of Hungary, iv. 61.

Trapezuntines, faction of, v. 140.

Trau, iii. 181.

Trebizond, iii. 59, 62 ; empire of, iii.
285, iv. 307 seq., 329, 347, 348;
Theodore Gabras at, iv. 313; St.
Eugenios of, iv. 330 ; besieged by

Seljouks, iv. 333 seq. ; independent,
iv. 336 ; social state of, in thirteenth
century, iv. 343, 357; George Acro-
polita at, iv. 345 ; besieged by David
of Iberia, iv. 348 ; invaded by Turko-
mans, iv. 360, 370; constitutional
government at, iv. 369 ; plague at,
iv. 370, 410 ; war with Genoese, iv.
370; conflagration at, iv. 373, 406;
tributary to Timor, iv. 390 ; attacked
by Othomans, iv. 400 ; degradation
of Greeks of, iv. 405 ; reduced, iv.
420, 422 seq.; list of emperors of,
iv. 434.

Trebonianus, Gallus, i. 92.

Tretos (Dervenaki), pass of, Turks de-
feated at, iv. 253, vi. 287.

Treuntianus, i. 441 (see Coinage).

Treves, i. 266.

Triaditza, iii. 240.

Tribonian, a pagan, i. 286.

Tribute- children (see Christian tribute-
children. Janissaries).

Tricoupi, M., Greek historian, vi. loi,
273, 341, 412, vii. 58, 133; minister
at London, vii. 204, 222, 229.

Trikeri (Trikheri), vi. 167 ; trade of,
vi. 200; subdued, vi. 202, 312, 347;
Captain Hastings at, vi. 422.

Trikkala (Portals), gates of, vi. 73, 77,
197.

Trikorpha, vi. 213, 219, 236, 370, 371.

Trinity and three emperors, i. 123 note.

Tripoli, battle of, i. 379.

Tripolis, revolt of, i. 229, 231, ii. 331,

359-.

Tripolitza, college of, v. 212; head-
quarters of Turks, V. 255 ; battle of,
V. 256; defeat of Albanians at, vi.
40, 218; biennial meeting of bishops
at, vi. 144 ; besieged by Greeks, vi.
216 seq.; massacre of Turks at, vi.
219; national assembly at, vi. 239;
occupied by Ibrahim Pasha, vi. 369,
370 ; attempt to surprise, vi. 399 ;
occupied by Griva, vii. 92.

Trisognia, vii. 22.

Troad, plundered by Goths, i. 95 ; Ar-
menian colony in, iii. 286, 287 ; occu-
pied by Crusaders, iii. 286.

Troezene, national assembly at, vi. 420,
vii. 29 ; camp at, vii. 35.

Trullo, council in, i. 389, 390 note.

Tryphiodorus, i. 273.

Tryphon, ii. 300.

Tsamados, vi. 361, vii. 97.

Tudela, Benjamin of, iv. 29,

Tunis taken by Turks, v. 86.

Turakhan, iv. 163 ; invades Morea, iv.
239, 248 ; subdues Albanians in, iv.
256.

Turkey, Spanish Jews in, v. 159; the

Twky

^'^
115;

Kith
Pera3

vii.!

3"^'

llOK

Tuikc

Turki

i. ;

1.1

i,i

35
ii,

ti
it
iii
al
al
N

INDEX.

All

Turkey company, v. 1 70 ; English
trade with, v. 171 ! intrigues of Peter
the Great in, v. 214 seq. ; Greeks in,
vi. 6 ; relations with Russia, vi. 112
seq.; treatment of Christians in, vi.
113; Ionian Islands imder, vi. 155;
Russian ultimatum to, vi. 194 ; war
with Persia, vi. 196; treaty with
Persia, vi. 310; war with Russia,
vii. 25 seq. ; treaty with Russia, vii.
27 ; interference of Austria in, vii.
215; invaded by Greeks in 1 854,
vii. 223, 227.

Turkomans defeated by Alexios II, iv.
352 ; invade Trebizond, iv. 360, 370 ;
expedition of Alexios III against, iv.
376 ; progress of, iv. 376 seq. ; the
Black Turkomans, iv. 393 seq. ; re-
duced by Mohammed II, iv. 420 ;
horde of White Sheep, iv. 438.

Turkophagos, vi. 295.

Turkopuls, iii. 114.

Turks first known in Justinian's reign,
i. 258, 260; wars of, with Persians,
i. 260 ; colony of, at Constantinople,
i. 268 ; alliance of Justin with, i. 296,
354, ii. 154, 157; reduce Armenia,
ii. 442 ; in Asia Minor, iii. 72 ; Nicaea
taken from, iii. 108 ; war with Alex-
ius I, iii. 126; war with Manuel I,
iii. 189 seq.; ravages of, iii. 223;
alliance of Henry with, iii. 293, 294 ;
attack Theodore I, iii. 294 ; take
Nyssa, iii. 359 ; and Tralles, ih. ;
progress of, iii. 385 ; alliance with
Catalans, iii. 403 ; allies of Cantacu-
zenos, iii. 436 seq., 451 ; enslave
Christians, iii. 443 ; first established
in Europe, iii. 461 ; take Constanti-
nople, iii. 517; colonies of, near
Achrida, iv. 27; ravage Morea, iv.
225, 251; take Akova, iv. 233; de-
feated at Tretos, iv. 253 ; corsairs of,
in Archipelago, iv. 303 ; commercial,
iv. 323 ; Greece under, v. 2 ; feudal
system of, v. 2, vi. 105 ; taxation of,
V. 22; trade of, v. 23, 24, 156; take
Euboea, v. 61, 102 ; take Tunis, v.
86 ; persecute Christians, v. 105 ;
reduce Maina, v. 108 ; war with
Venice, v. 11 1 ; in Thessaly, v. 125 ;
literature of, v. 146 ; communal sys-
tem of, V. 147 ; tribunals of, corrupt,
ih.; order of, v. 161; treatment of
ambassadors by, v. 169; war with
Austria, v. 171 ; besiege Vienna, v.
172 ; war with Venice, ih. ; evacuate
Morea, v. 1 84 ; recover North Greece,
v. 193 ; attack Morea, v. 194 ; devas-
tate Morea, v. 195 ; war with Peter
the Great, v. 213; conquer Tinos,
V. 217; take Nauplia, v. 223; take

Modon, V. 224; take Monemvasia,
v. 226 ; conquer Morea, ih. ; war with
Austria, v. 227; war with Russia,
V. 268 ; numbers of, at beginning of
nineteenth century, vi. 2 ; Athens
under, vi. 3 ; treatment of Christians
by, vi. 4 ; fiscal arrangements of, vi.
13, 14; in Greece, character of, vi.
44; injustice of, vi. 97; compared
with Greeks, vi. 104 seq. ; deprecia-
tion of coinage, vi. 106, 312; mas-
sacred at Galatz, vi. 119; at Yassi,
vi. 120; occupy Moldavia, vi. 135;
massacred at Vrachori, vi. 165 ; at
Lekhonia, vi. 201 ; cruelties of, vi,
208; at Tripolitza, vi. 219; besieged
at Athens, vi. 246 ; at Arta, vi. 264,
266, 268; at Lutraki, vi. 272; in
Acropolis capitulate, vi. 283 ; mas-
sacred at Athens, vi. 283 seq.; cross
Spercheius, vi. 285; operations against
Greece in 1823, vi. 312 ; tortured Ly
Greeks at Psara, vi. 319; fleet of, in
1824, vi. 351 ; militia, vi. 383, 384
note ; massacre of, at St. Spiridion,
vi. 427 ; at Silistria, vii. 26 ; at Petra
capitulate, vii. 40. [See Othomans,
Porte, Seljouks.)

Turloti, vi. 252.

Tyana conquered by Justinian II, i. 394,
ii. loi.

Type, the, of Constans, i. 375.

Tyrach, ii. 436 seq.

Tzachas, iii. 59, 92 seq.

Tzakones (Laconians), iv. 26, 32 ; re-
volt, iv. 202, 229, vi. 26.

Tzakonia, province of, iv. 196, 197, vi.

370-
Tzamba, iv. 361.

Tzans {&ee Lazes), i. 260, iv. 315, 405.
Tzatzos, vii. 160.
Tzelgu, iii. 84.
Tzelios, Demo, vii. 162,
Tzepaina, iii. 326, 327.
Tzernagora (Montenegro), vii. 215 seq.
Tzetzes, John, i. 431.
Tzimova, v. 115 seq. ; revolt of, vii.

70.
Tzokres, vii. 103.
Tzonga, vi. 164, 165.
Tzourlou, ii. no.
Tzukanion (polo), game of, iii. 309,

310, 313; iv. 338 note.
Tzourulos, iii. 50.
Tzyvritze, pass of, iii. 192.

Uladislas of Bohemia, iii. 176.

Ulema, religious corporation of, v. 12,

13, 18.
Unich (Oinaion), iv. 367.

428

INDEX.

Unitarians, Mohammedans, i. 357.
University of Alexandria, i. 273, 415.
University of Antioch, i. 273, 415.
University of Athens, i. 66 ; modern,

Mavrocordatos elected for, vii. 189.
University of Berytus, i. 273, 415.
University of Constantinople, i. 173,

190, 273, ii. 36, 225.
University of Edessa, i. 273.
University of Greece founded, vii. 131.
University of Nisibis, i. 415.
Uprauda, i. 197 note.
Urban, founder, iii. 506.
Urban II, pope, iii. 98.
Urban IV, pope, iii. 361.
Urban V, pope, iii. 463.
Urquhart, lieutenant, vi. 425, 427.
Ursus, duke of Venice, ii. 40.
Urugunds, i. 92.

Urus, the (Zoumpros), iii. 206 and note.
Uscoques in Adriatic, v. 92.
Usula (Geloula), i. 379.
Utrecht, treaty of, v. 213.
Utugur, i. 250, 259.
Uzes (Ouzes), ii. 436 ; in Greece, iii.

20, 21; in Macedonia, iii. 22, 32,

iv. 27.

Vaias, Athanasios, vi. 67.

Vaillant, M., numismatist, story of, v.
104 note.

Vaktageios, ii. 49.

Valanidiotes, iii. 329.

Velantes, Leo, ii. 336.

Valathista, Mount, ii. 376.

Valens, an Arian, i. 134, 135; Gothic
invasion, i. 154; defeat of, ih.; edict
of, i. 282 ; aqueduct of, ii. 56.

Valentinian I, i. 135, 282.

Valentinian III excludes clergy from
commerce, i. 117, 231.

Valerian repairs walls of Athens, i. 93.

Valiare, khan of, massacred, vi. 67, 68.

Valincourt, iii. 302.

Vallachia and Vallachians, language of,
i. 187; Arab rule mild in, ii. 135,
iii. 80, 81 note; rise of kingdom of,
iii. 224 seq. ; Great Vallachia, ih.;
White Vallachia, ih.; Black Val-
lachia, ih. ; Hungaro- Vallachia, iii.
224, 227 seq.; rebellion of, iii. 229,
240, 248 ; history of, iv. 29 ; lan-
guage like Latin, iv. 29, 122, v. 204;
voivode of, v. 242 seq. ; Greek govern-
ment of,. V. 244 ; Phanariots in, v.
246 ; list of voivodes of, v. 295 ;
numbers of, at beginning of nineteenth
century, vi. 3 ; position of Greeks in,
vi. 9; Greek hospodars of, vi. 113
seq.; state of, vi. 114 seq.; the He-
tairia in, vi, 125; Little Vallachia

occupied by Turks, vi. 1 36 ; rising

of, vi. 198 seq.; occupied by Russia,

vii. 219.
Valois, Catherine of (see Catherine).
Valois, Charles of, pretensions to empire

of East, iii. 389 (see Charles).
Valonia, a dye and astringent, v. 200

note.
Valta, voivode of, vi. 202.
Valtetzi, victory of Greek insurgents

at, vi. 212 ; camp at, vii. 92.
Valtinos, George, vi. 273, 274, 276,

381.
Vambas, Neophytos, vi. 173.
Vandals, i. 92, 168; in Africa, i. 228

seq.; Arians, i. 229; attacked by

Belisarius, i. 231, 232 ; monarchs of,

i. 231 note.
Vandalusia (Andalusia), i. 233 note.
Varangians, ii. 189, 340, 341, 343, 365,

391 note, 439, 444, iii. 14, 25, 51,

78, 138, 333. iv. 42.
Varastad, i. 284.
Varasvatzes, ii. 411.
Vardar (Axios), ii. 346, iii. 249.
Vardariot guards, iii. 324, iv. 27.
Vardhousi (Korax), Mount, vi. 161.
Variadhes, vi. 81, 86.
Varna (Odessus), i. 251 ; Bulgarian

capital, i. 385, iii. 250; battle of,

iii. 495, iv. 163, 248; Turks at, vii.

26.
Varnakioti, vi. 76.
Varnakiotes, vi. 164, 165.
Varnakiottes, vi. 267, 273, 274, 276,

381.
Vartan, i. 359 seq.
Varus, defeat of, i. 93.
Vasiladi stormed, vi. 388 ; attacked by

Lord Cochrane, vii. 14, 22; taken

by Hastings, vii. 23.
Vasilika, vi. 205.

Vasilike, benefactress of Athens, vi, 4.
Vasilikes, Nicejjhorus, iv. 30,
Vasos, vi. 247, 248.
Vassos, vi. 414, vii. 163.
Vasparoukhan, ii. 378, 379, 383, 441

seq., iii. 15.
Vathek, ii. 159, 168.
Vatican fortified by Leo IV, ii. 248.
Vatika, vi. 29,
Vehid Pasha, governor of Chios, vi.

251,
Vekil, vi. 25.
Vekkos, patriarch, iii. 371, 374, 376,

378.
Veil Pasha, vi. 39, 50, 69, 70, 73, 77,

78, 95, 156.
Veligosti (^Leondari), barony of, iv, 184,
Velzetia, ii. 87.
Venetians and Venice, destroy Eastern

empire, a.d, 1204, i. 162; war with

INDEX,

429

Narenta, i. 333 ; 400 ; trade of, i.
421, ii. 13, 152; subject, ii. 100;
rising importance of, ih. ; tributary
to Franks, ii. 100, loi ; independent,
ii. 203, iii. 74, 79, 82, 83, 139; rivals
of Greeks, iii. 140, 152, 153, 169,
1 76 ; at Constantinople, iii. 1 79 ;
quarrel with Lombards, iii. 179, 180;
war with Manuel, iii. 181, iv. 78 ;
take Chios, iii. 181, iv. 78, v. 80;
peace with Manuel, iii. 183, 247, 251
seq. ; take Constantinople, iii. 255
seq., 260 seq., 265 seq., 301, 305,
308, iv. 84, 86 ; contests with Genoa,
iii. 340, 354 ; treaty with Michael
VIII, iii. 355 ; commercial privileges
of, iii. 356, iv. 75 seq. ; alliance with
Servia, iii. 442, ally of Cantacuzenos,
iii. 456 ; seize Tenedos, iii. 466 ;
Thessalonica sold to, iii. 486 ; Cy-
prus dependent on, iv. 74 ; commer-
cial importance of, iv. 75 ; assist
Alexius I, ih. ; expelled and reinstated,
iv. 76, 77 ) take Chios and Cepha-
lonia, iv. 76, 77, 79 ; treaties with
Isaac Angelos and Alexius III, iv.
80, 81 ; take Zara, iv. 82 ; excom-
municated, ih. ; treaty with Crusaders,
iv. 89; occupy Modon, iv. 175, 177,
V. 180 ; occupy Argos, iv. 235 ; in
Peloponnese, iv. 236; take Monem-
vasia, iv. 268 ; war with Othomans,
iv. 268, V. 68 ; possessions of, iv. 268,
269, V. 57 ; take Athens, ih. ; expelled
from Morea, iv. 269 ; at Constanti-
nople, iv. 2 70 ; influence of, in thir-
teenth century, iv. 271 ; purchase
Crete, iv. 272, 276, v. 87 seq., 89;
enterprise of, iv. 273 ; in Naxos, iv.
277 ; war with Suleiman, iv. 292 ;
Archipelago under, iv. 295 seq. ; com-
merce of, iv. 296 ; moral corruption
of, iv. 298 ; struggles with Greeks,
iv. 299 ; disputes with Genoese, iv.
356 ; treaty with Alexios II, iv. 355 ;
war with Mohammed II, v. 60 ; peace
with Mohammed II, v. 61 ; take Pas-
sagio, ih. ; occupy Zante, v. 62, 85 ;
Cephalonia, v. 63 ; war with Bayezid
II, v. 62 ; at Tinos, v. 69, 196, 227 ;
lose Morea, v. 70, 227; acquire Cy-
prus, v. 82 ; peace with Porte, v. 85 ;
Pashley's account of, v. 8 7 ; corsairs,
cruelty of, v. 93 ; quarrel with knights
of Malta, V. 95 ; war with Turks,
V. Ill, 172; commerce of, v. 126;
policy of, V. 166; treaty with pope,
v. 172; resources of, v. i74> take
Santa Maura, v. 175; Prevesa, ih.;
alliances of, v. 1 76 ; attack Morea,
ih.; employ Hanoverians, v. 178 seq.,
186, 191 J convention with Hesse

and Wiirtemberg, v. 182 ; at Corinth,
v. 184; at Athens, v. 184, 186; be-
siege Acropolis, V. 185 ; conquer
North Greece, v. 191 ; Germans in
service of, v. 194; keep Dalmatia,
&c., V. 195 ; in Morea, v. 196 seq. ;
tolerate Greek Church, v. 198 ; state
of Greece under, v. 203 seq, 206,
207 ; ecclesiastical administration of,
v, 209 seq. ; moral influence of, v.
212; neutral in war of Spanish suc-
cession, v. 213; France hostile to,
ih.; war with Porte, v. 216; losses
of, v. 226 seq.; treaty with Austria,
v. 227; demoralized, v. 228; con-
duct of, V. 250; Albanian allies of,
V. 274; continental possessions of,
ceded to Porte, v. 275.

Venieri, v. 179.

Veniero, Antonio, doge, iv. 290.

Verina, i. 180.

Vermandois, Hugh of, iii. 99, 100, iii,

115-
Verona, congress of, vii. 3.
Veronica, St., handkerchief of, ii. 308.
Verres, rapacity of, i. 38,. 56, 72.
Verria, vi. 207, 208.
Vertot, historian of knights of Rhodes,

V. 64.
Verus, L., taught by Herodes Atticus,

i. 66.
Vervena, fair of, iv. 214, vi. 371.
Verzetia, ii. 53.
Vespasian, i. 36, 46, 63 ; Greece badly

off under, i. 80.
Vespers, Sicilian, iii. 364, 372.
Vetrinitza, vi. 383.
Victor III, pope, iii. 97.
Victoriatus, i. 435 {see Coinage).
Victory, altar of, removed from senate-
house, i. 136.
Victory, temple of (Nike Apteros), v.

185 ; chariot of, v. 187.
Vidin, ii. 375, vi. 129, 131.
Vienna besieged by Turks, v. 172;

treaty of, vi. 55.
Vignosi (Vignoso), Simon, iii. 453, v.

70, 72, 73. 75-
Villehardouin, Geffrey I of Achaia, lu.

301, 308, iv. 98, 109.
Villehardouin, Geffrey II, iv. 1 76 seq.,

187, 188 seq., 190 seq., 193.
Villehardouin, Isabella, iv. 141, 142. _
Villehardouin, Margaret of Akova, iv.

208, 218.
Villehardouin, marshal, iii. 290.
Villehardouin, William, prince of Achaia,

iv. 138 seq., 194 seq., 199 seq., 203,

206, 207.
Villeneuve, marquis of, v. 239.
Vinisauf, Walter, v. 65.
Viosa (Aous), vi. 72 note.

430

INDEX,

Virmont, count, v. 238.

Visconti, duke of Milan, iii. 481.

Visigoths in Spain, i. 229.

Vistritza (Haliacmon), vi. 72 note.

Vitalian, i. 180, 181.

Viterbo, treaty of, iii. 361, 369, iv. 140,

205, 209.
Vitylos, V. 114, 116, 179.
Vlachopoulos, vi. 273, 333, 341, vii.

174. .
Vlachs, iii. 86.
Vladika (bishop of Montenegro), vii.

216.
Vladimir, ii. 280 ; takes Cherson, ii.

350, 357, 365.
Vladimiresko, vi. 122, 125, 126, 128,

129; murdered, vi. 130.
Vlakia (see Vallachia).
Vlamides, vi. 99.
Vlochos, province of, vi, 273 ; civil w^ar

in, vi. 333.
Vlokho (Thermus), vi. 88.
Vodena (Edessa), ii. 374, 377, 378, iii.

214, vi. 207.
Voiditzes, ii. 158.
Volo, siege of, vi. 201 ; attacked by

Hastings, vi. 421, 422.
Voltaire, on Byzantine history, ii. 8 ; on

the Greeks, v. 262, 263.
Voluntaries, iii. 342.
Volunteers, foreign, in Greek service,

vi. 263.
Vonitza taken, v. 227, vii. 39; revolt

of, vii. 271.
Vostitza (Aegium), barony of, iv. 186

note ; revolutionary assembly at, vi.

143. I44-
Vrachori, vi. 164; massacre of Jews

and Turks at, vi. 165, 276, 317.
Vranas, Alexius, iv. 58.
Vrioni, Omer, vi. 73, 77, 78, 82; relieves

Athens, vi. 163, 263, 265, 272 seq.,

283, 312, 317.
Vroutza, vi. 268.
Vulcano (Messene), iv. 158.
Vulturnus, Franks defeated by Narses

at, i. 247.
Vyskos, ii. 354.

Wahabites, vi. 196.

Walid, intolerance of, i. 411.

Wallachians {see Vallachians),

Walter do Brienne (see Brienne).

Walter the Pennyless, iii. 98.

Washington, a disciplinarian, vi. 236.

Wassif, ii. 157.

Welid, ii. 19.

Wendland, M., vii. 257.

Western empire, position of, ii, 206

note (see Empire) ; separated from

that of East, i. 147.
Wibner, Dr., vii. 170,
Widin {see Vidin).
William (Villehardouin), prince of

Achaia, iii. 333, 338, 339, 360.
William the Bad, iii. 164, 171.
William de Champlitte, iv. 98, 109, 137,

138, 175 seq., 186.
William of Melun, iii. no.
William, marquis of Montferrat, iii. 233,

iv. 119.
William I, of Sicily, iv. 55.
William II, of Sicily, iii. 214, 237 ; in-
vades Greece, iv. 56.
Willibald, St., iv. 15, 23.
Witiges, king of Goths, i. 209 ; besieges

Rome, i. 238 seq. ; summons Franks,

i. 241 ; embassy to Chosroes, ib., i.

263.
Wrede, prince, vii. 58, 138.
Wiirtemberg, convention with Venice,

V. 182.
Wyse, Sir Thos., British minister in

Greece, vii. 209, 212, 213, 253;

death of, vii, 269.

Xanthus, Brutus severe to, i. 54.
Xerolophon, ii. 44.
Ximenes, Fernand, iv. 143, 147.
Xiphias, Nicephorus, ii. 376, 378, 379,

381 seq.
Xiphilinos, John, patriarch, iii. 23, 25,

244.

Yaroslaf, ii. 435, iii. 206.

Yassi (Jassy), treaty of, v. 273, 278,

281, vi. 45 ; massacre of Turks at, vi.

120; Turks at, vi. 135.
Yermouk, i. 360, 361 noie.
Yezid I, ii. 26.
Yezid II, ii. 19.
Yezid III, ii. 64.
Yolande, empress, iii. 297, 300, iv. 112,

190.
York, i. 266,
Youkinna, i. 370.
Young, Sir John, vii. 306.
Yuruks, V. 125.
Yussuf Bey, vi. 205,
Yussuf Pasha, vi. 222, 225, 27c;, 286,

386.

Zabdicene, i. 143.

Zabergan, king of Huns, i. 210, 253 ;
attacks Constantinople, i. 256; de-
feated by Belisarius, i. 257,

tiariaot

ajani

!!'

INDEX.

431

abliah, seized by Montenegrins, vii.
217.

accaria (Jaqueria), family of, iii. 429.
acharia of Thasos, iii. 363.
acharias, klepht, vi. 26.
acharias, papal legate, ii. 1 78.
acharias, patriarch, i. 324.
iacharias, pope, ii. 43.
achloumians, i. 334.
lagan Pasha, iv. 264, 266.
ragora (Mount Pelion), ii. 1S4, 185

note, vi. 200.
;aimes, Andreas, vi. 226, 275, 303, 329,
333 seq., 366, vii. 96, 97, 248, 251,
292.
'aimes, Asimaki, vi. 147.
Jante and Zantiotes, ii. 251 ; taken, iv.
273 ; occupied by Venice, v. 62, 85,
195; taken by English, vi. 157;
skirmish in, vi. 223; collision of
English with, vi. 223, 224.
Japandu, bravery of people of, vi. 165.
^apetra (Sosopetra), ii. 155.
Zaphiraki, vi. 207, 208.
Zaphyros, vi. loi.
Zara, iii. 252, 253; taken by Venetians,

iv. 82 ; treaty of, iv. 83, 85.
Zarnata, v. 177 seq., 192 ; surrender of,

225.

Zeitounion, ii. 382.
Zeituni, vi. 278, 285; Greeks winter

at, 307, 406.
Zeno, Carlo, iii. 466.

Zeno the Isaurian, reign of, i. 179, 180,

255- .
Zeno, Pietro, doge, iv. 290.
Zeno, Venetian captain general, v. 193,

194.
Zenobia, i. 115, 116.
Zenobios, ii. 255.
Zervas, Nicholas, vii. 162.
Zetho, ii. 354.
Zeu-yd/Jia, i. 2 19 note.
Zeugmin (Semlin), iii. 139, 174, 176 seq.
Ziadet, Allah, ii. 138.
Ziamets, v. 3, 4.
Ziams, v. 42.
Zimiskes (see John I), ii. 256; meaning

.of, ii. 335 «o/e.
Zinkeisen, history of Greece, iv. 2 note.
Zinzar Vallachs, iii. 227 note, vi. 77,

289.
Zoe Carbunopsina, ii. 260, 263, 283,

286, 288, 290.
Zoe, wife of Romanus III, ii. 398, 404,

419 seq. ; reign of, ii. 422 seq. ; death

of, ii. 446.
Zographos, vii. 90, 91, 97; prime min-
ister, 145, 168.
Zoher, ii. 358.
Zompi (Tchander), bridge of, iii. 43,

127.
Zonaras, ii. 428.

Zongas, vi. 76, 336, 381, vii. 163.
Zontarion, ii. 275.
Zosimus, i, 287.

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