Full text of "History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8;"

See other formats

INDIAN MUTINY

1857-8.

KAYE'S AND MALLESON'S HISTORY

OF THE

INDIAN MUTINY

1857-8

Edited by COLONEL MALLESON, CS.I.

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. I.
By SIR JOHN KAYE, K.C.S.I., F.R.S.

NEW IMPRESSION

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

FOURTH AVENUE & 30th STREET, NEW YORK

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND MADRAS

I9I4

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Transferred from W. H. Allen &* Co. to
Longmans , Green &* Co., February 1896.

Re-issued in Silver Library , August 1897.

Reprinted June 1898.

Re-issued in new style, July 1898.

Reprinted January 1906, March 1909, and
August 1 9 14.

I SHOULD HAVE DEDICATED
THESE VOLUMES

LOBD CANNING,

HAD HE LIVED;

I NOW INSCRIBE THEM REVERENTIALLY
TO HIS MEMOKY.

. . . Fob to think that an handful of people can, ■with tub

GREATEST COURAGE AND POLICY IN THE WORLD, EMBRACE TOO LARGE EXTENT
OF DOMINION, IT MAT HOLD FOR A TIME, BUT IT WILL FAIL SUDDENLY. —

Bacon.

... AS FOB MERCENAEY FORCES (WHICH IS THE HELP IN THIS CASE),
ALL EXAMPLES SHOW THAT, WHATSOEVEB ESTATE, OR PRINCE, DOTH REST
UPON' THEM, HE MAY SPREAD HIS FEATHERS FOB A TIME, BUT HE WILL MEW
THEM SOON AFTEB. — BaCOtl.

IF THEBE BE FUEL PREPARED, IT IS HARD TO TELL WHENCE THE SPARK
SHALL COME THAT SHALL SET IT ON FIRE. THE MATTER OF SEDITIONS IS OF
TWO KINDS, MUCH POVERTY AND MUCH DISCONTENTMENT. It IS CERTAIN, SO
MANY OVERTHROWN ESTATES, SO MANY VOTES FOR TROUBLES. . . . THE
CAUSES AND MOTIVES FOR SEDITION ABE, INNOVATIONS IN EELIGION, TAXES,
ALTERATION OF LAWS AND CUSTOMS, BREAKING OF PRIVILEGES, GENERAL
OPPRESSION, ADVANCEMENT OF UNWORTHY PERSONS, STRANGERS, DEATHS,
DISBANDED SOLDIERS, FACTIONS GROWN DESPERATE; AND WHATSOEVER IN
OFFENDING PEOPLE JOINETH AND KNITTBTH THEM IN A COMMON CAUSE. —

Bacon

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

In preparing a new, and, if I may so call it, a consolidated,
edition of the History of the Indian Mutiny — that is, an edition
in which Colonel Malleson's three volumes of continuation are
blended with the two initiatory volumes of Sir John Kaye —
I have had to encounter few difficulties beyond those of form.
By difficulties of form I mean differences of arrangement, and
differences in the spelling of Indian proper names. It seemed
to me absolutely essential that in both these respects the two
works should be brought into complete accord. I have, there-
fore, met the first difficulty by substituting, in Sir John Kaye's
volumes, an initial " Table of Contents " for the chapter head-
ings. Such a table, apart from other considerations, is more
useful to a reader who may desire to refer to a particular
incident. "With respect to the other difference it was impossible
to hesitate. The spelling of the past, based upon the impres-
sions made upon men, ignorant of the Native languages, by the
utterances of the Natives, a spelling based upon no system, and
therefore absolutely fortuitous, has in these latter days given
place to a spelling founded upon the actual letters which repre-
sent the jdaces indicated. In its General Orders and in its
Gazettes the Government of India of the present day adopts
the enlightened system of spelling drawn up by Dr. Hunter,
and this system has been adopted generally by the Indian
Press, and by residents in India. Between the alternative of
adhering to a barbarous system, fast dying if not already dead,
and the more enlightened system of the present and of the
future, there could not be a moment's hesitation. I have
adapted, then, Sir John Kaye's spelling of Indian proper names
to one more in accordance with modern usage, and in every
respect more correct. In the text, I need scarcely say, I have
not changed even a comma. That text remains, in these
volumes, as he wrote and published it. Some of the indices,

vih EDITOR'S PREFACE.

the interest in which has waned, if not altogether died out,
have been omitted ; some have been abridged ; and in one
instance the salient part has been transferred to the note to
which it properly belonged. Colonel Malleson's three volumes
have naturally met with far less indulgence at my hands.
When these shall be published the reader will find that the
severest critic of a work may be its author.

The work, when completed, will consist of Sir John Kaye's
first and second volumes and of Colonel Malleson's three. These,
with the index, will make six volumes. It is needless to
discuss all the reasons why Colonel Malleson's first volume has
been preferred to Sir John Kaye's third, for one will suffice.
Kaye's third volume would not fit in with Malleson's second
volume, as it concludes with the story of the storming of Dehli,
which forms the first chapter of Malleson's second volume,
whilst it omits the relief of Lakhnao, the account of which
concludes Malleson's first volume.

I may add that on the few occasions on which I have deemed
it absolutely necessary to append a note, that note bears the
initials of the Editor.

G. B. M.

Ut October, 1888.

PREFACE
By Sir JOHN KAYE.

It was not without muck hesitation that I undertook to write
this narrative of the events, which have imparted so painful
a celebrity to the years 1857-58, and left behind them such
terrible remembrances. Publicly and privately I had been
frequently urged to do so, before I could consent to take upon
myself a responsibility, which could not sit lightly on any one
capable of appreciating the magnitude of the events themselves
and of the many grave questions which they suggested. If,
indeed, it had not been that, in course of time, I found, either
actually in my hands or within my reach, materials of history
such as it was at least improbable that any other writer could
obtain, I should not have ventured upon so difficult a task.
But having many important collections of papers in my posses-
sion, and having received promises of further assistance from
surviving actors in the scenes to be described, I felt that,
though many might write a better history of the Sipahi War,
no one could write a more truthful one.

So, relying on these external advantages to compensate all
inherent deficiencies, I commenced what I knew must be a
labour of years, but what I felt would be also a labour of love.
My materials were too ample to be otherwise than most
sparingly displayed. The prodigal citation of authorities has
its advantages ; but it encumbers the text, it impedes the
narrative, and swells to inordinate dimensions the record of
historical events. On a former occasion, when I laid before
the public an account of a series of important transactions,
mainly derived from original documents, public and private,
I quoted those documents freely both in the text and in the
notes. As I was at that time wholly unknown to the public,
it was necessary that I should cite chapter and verse to obtain
credence for my statements. There was no ostensible reason

a 2

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

why I should have known more about those transactions than
any other writer (for it was merely the accident of private
friendships and associations that placed such profuse materials
in my possession), and it seemed to be imperative upon me
therefore to produce my credentials. But, believing that this
necessity no longer exists, I have in the present work abstained
from adducing my authorities, for the mere purpose of sub-
stantiating my statements. I have quoted the voluminous
correspondence in my possession only where there is some
dramatic force and propriety in the words cited, or when they
appear calculated, without impeding the narrative, to give
colour and vitality to the story.

And here I may observe that, as on former occasions, the
historical materials which I have moulded into this narrative
are rather of a private than of a public character. I have
made but little use of recorded official documents. I do not
mean that access to such documents has not been extremely
serviceable to me ; but that it has rather afforded the means of
verifying or correcting statements received from other sources
than it has supplied me with original materials. So far as
respects the accumulation of facts, this History would have
differed but slightly from what it is, if I had never passed the
door of a public office ; and, generally, the same may be said of
the opinions which I have expressed. Those opinions, whether
sound or unsound, are entirely my own personal opinions-
opinions in many instances formed long ago, and confirmed by
later events and more mature consideration. No one but myself
is responsible for them ; no one else is in any way identified
with them. In the wide range of inquiry embraced by the
consideration of the manifold causes of the great convulsion of
1857, almost every grave question of Indian government and
administration presses forward, with more or less importunity,
for notice. Where, on many points, opinions widely differ, and
the policy, which is the practical expression of them, takes
various shapes, it is a necessity that the writer of cotemporary
history, in the exercise of independent thought, should find
himself dissenting from the doctrines and disapproving the
actions of some authorities, living and dead, who are worthy of
all admiration and respect. It is fortunate, when, as in the
present instance, this difference of opinion involves no diminu-
tion of esteem, and the historian can discern worthy motives, and
benevolent designs, and generous strivings after good, in those

AUTHOR'S PREFACE. xi

whose ways he may think erroneous, and whose course of action
he may deem unwise.

Indeed, the errors of which I have freely spoken were, for
the most part, strivings after good. It was in the over-eager
pursuit of Humanity and Civilisation that Indian statesmen of
the new school were betrayed into the excesses which have
been so grievously visited upon the nation. The story of the
Indian Rebellion of 1857 is, perhaps, the most signal illustration
of our great national character ever yet recorded in the annals
of our country. It was the vehement self-assertion of the
Englishman that produced this conflagration ; it was the same
vehement self-assertion that enabled him, by God's blessing, to
trample it out. It was a noble egotism, mighty alike in
doing and in suffering, and it showed itself grandly capable of
steadfastly confronting the dangers which it had brought down
upon itself. If I have any predominant theory it is this :
Because we were too English the great crisis arose ; but it was
only because we were English that, when it arose, it did not
utterly overwhelm us.

It is my endeavour, also, to show how much both of the
dangers which threatened British dominion in the East, and of
the success with which they were encountered, is assignable to
the individual characters of a few eminent men. With this
object I have sought to bring the reader face to face with the
principal actors in the events of the Sipahi War, and to take a
personal interest in them. If it be true that the best history
is that which most nearly resembles a bundle of biographies, it
is especially true when said with reference to Indian history ;
for nowhere do the characters of individual Englishmen impress
themselves with a more vital reality upon the annals of the
country in which they live ; nowhere are there such great
opportunities of independent action ; nowhere are developed
such capacities for evil or for good, as in our great Anglo-Indian
Empire. If, then, in such a work as this, the biographical
element were not prominently represented — if the individualities
of such men as Dalhousie and Canning, as Henry and John
Lawrence, as James Outram, as John Nicholson, and Herbert
Edwardes, were not duly illustrated, there would be not only
a cold and colourless, but also an unfaithful, picture of the
origin and progress of the War. But it is to be remarked that,
in proportion as the individuality of the English leaders is
distinct and strongly marked, that of the chiefs of the insurrec-

xii AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

tionary movement is faint and undecided. In the fact of this
contrast we see the whole history of the success which, by God's
providence, crowned the efforts of our countrymen. If the
individual energies of the leaders of the revolt had been com-
mensurate with the power of the masses, we might have failed
to extinguish such a conflagration. But the whole tendency of
the English system had been to crush out those energies ; so
again, I say, we found in the very circumstances which had
excited the rebellion the very elements of our success in sup-
pressing it. Over the Indian Dead Level which that system had
created, the English heroes marched triumphantly to victory.

In conclusion, I have only to express my obligations to those
who have enabled me to write this History by supplying me
with the materials of which it is composed. To the executors
of the late Lord Canning, who placed in my hands the private
and demi-official correspondence of the deceased statesman,
extending over the whole term of his Indian administration, I
am especially indebted. To Sir John Lawrence and Sir Herbert
Edwardes, wdio have furnished me with the most valuable
materials for my narrative of the rising in the Panjab and the
measures taken in that province for the re-capture of Dehli ; to
the family of the late Colonel Baird Smith, for many interesting
papers illustrative of the operations of the great siege ; to Sir
James Outram, who gave me before his death his correspondence
relating to the brilliant operations in Oudh ; to Sir Bobert
Hamilton, for much valuable matter in elucidation of the
history of the Central Indian Campaign; and to Mr. E. A.
Beade, whose comprehensive knowledge of the progress of
events in the North- Western Provinces has been of material
service to me, my warmest acknowledgments are due. But to
no one am I more indebted than to Sir Charles Wood, Secretary
of State for India, who has permitted me to consult the official
records of his Department — a privilege wmich has ennabled me
to make much better use of the more private materials in my
possession. No one, however, can know better or feel more
strongly than myself, that much matter of interest contained in
the multitudinous papers before me is unrepresented in my
narrative. But such omissions are the necessities of a history
so full of incident as this. If I had yielded to the temptation
to use my illustrative materials more freely, I should, have
expanded this work beyond all acceptable limits.

London, October, 1864.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

Editor's Preface
Author's Preface

PAGB

vii

BOOK I.— INTRODUCTORY.

CHAPTER L

Administration of Lord Dalhousie .

First Occupation of the Panjab

Sir Henry Lawrence and the Council of Regency

Character of Sir Henry Lawrence .

Work of Lawrence and his School .

Sir Frederick Currie succeeds Lawrence .

The Marquess of Dalhousie .

Mulraj and Multan ....

The Attack on Vans Agnew and Anderson
The second Sikh War ....

Herbert Edwardes ....

Siege of Multan .....

Defection of Sher Singh
Chatar Singh rises in the Hazarah .
Emphatic Declaration of Lord Dalhousie
Lord Gough .....

Combat of Ramnagar ....

Sir Henry Lawrence returns to India .
Capture of Multan ....

Chilianwala ......

The Afghans join the Sikhs .

Decisive Battle of Gujrat

Annexation of the Panjab, and reasons for the same

Dhulip Singh .....

The Board of Administration .

" They found much to do, little to undo "

The Panjab System ....

The Board of Administration superseded by Mr. John Lawrence
Conquest and Annexation of Pegu ......

1
2

5
6
8
11
12
13
14
15
19
23
24
24
25
26
26
28
29
30
31
31
33
33
34
39
41
44
47

S.1T

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

CHAPTER II.

The Question of " Adoption " . . . . ,

Satarah aud the Right of Lapse ....

Satarah is Annexed ......

Annexation of Nagpiir ......

Jhansi .........

Annexation of Jhansi ....

Karauli ........

Lord Dalhousie is refused permission to annex Karauli
Sambhalpur is annexed ......

Treatment of the Peshwa .....

Of his Heir ........

The Nana appeals to England ....

His Appeal is rejected ......

Azim-ullah Khan .......

Empty Titular Dignities dangerous Possessions .

rxnn

50
51

53
58
64
66
66
68
71
71
74
75
78
79
80

CHAPTER IIL

Oudh .........

Early connection with Oudh .....

Misrule of the Kings of Oudh ....

Problem before the Government of India . .

Lord William Bentinck's Scheme rejected

Views of Sir John Low ......

A fresh Treaty is signed with a new King

The new Treaty foolishly disallowed by the Court of Directors

Lord Hardinge warns Wajid Ali .....

Misrule of Wajid Ali

Colonel Sleeman's Report ......

His Advice not to interfere with the Revenues of the Country
Sir James Outram is sent to Oudh . ...

Outrarn reports in favour of virtual Annexation . .

Lord Dalhousie supports Outram's Views ....

The Court of Directors approve . . •

Outram is directed to enter and take possession of Oudh .
Details of the annexation of Oudh .....

101

102

104

106

107

108

CHAPTER TV

Destruction of the Territorial Nobility of India

Settlement Operations .

The Talukdar ....

The Administrative Agency . .

The Thomason System .

Treatment of the Native Gentry .

Rent-free Tenures ....

Resumption Operations .

The Bombay Inam Commission .

Depression of the Upper Classes .

113
115
117
119
120
121
123
127
129

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

The Priesthood . .
Brahmanism

Progress of enlightenment
Education
Female Education.
Re-marriage of Hindu Widows
The Railway and the Telegraph
Caste .....
Prison Discipline .
Muhammadan Alarms .
The Hindu and the Lotah
Inflammability of the Native Mind

PAGE

131
132
135
135
136
136
138
141
142
142
144
145

BOOK II.— THE SIPAHI ARMY.

CHAPTER I.

India was won by the Sword .....

The Fidelity of the Native Army an accepted Theory

Lord Dalhousie's Minute on the Sipahi Army

First Sipahi Levies

The first Mutiny in Bengal .

Clive atid the Bengal Officers .

Degradation of the Native Officer

Effect of Caste on Discipline .

The Sipahi Officer

The Reorganisation of 1796 ,and its consequences

Effect on the Sipahi of a Period of Peace .

Mutiny at Velliir, and its Causes .

Excitement at Haidarabad ....

Conduct of the Nizam .....

Conspiracy at Nandidriig ....

Is baffled by the Vigilance of Captain Baynes .

Alarms at Paliamkotta ....

And at Walajahabad .....

The Government disavow in a Proclamation the Plans attributed to

them by the Natives ....
Afterthoughts on the Causes of the Excitement
Views of the Home Government

146
147

147
148
150
152
153
154
155
157
158
162
170
171
172
173
174
176

177

178
182

CHAPTER H.

Mutiny of the Madras Officers, 1809

Contrast between the English Soldier and the Sip&hi

Civil Privileges of the Sipahi .

The Sipahi and his Officer ....

The Policy of Centralisation, and its Consequences

The Transfer of Officers to the Staff

Grievances of the Soldiery . .

184

185
186
187
188
190
192

xvi

CONTENTS OF VOL. L

The Reorganisation of 1824, and its Results

The Dislike of the Bengal Sipahis to Shipboard

The Mutiny at Barrackpur ......

The Half-Batta Order

The Abolition of Corporal Punishment and its Reintroduction

PAGB

193

193
195
198
199

CHAPTER III.

The effect of the Afghan War on the Sipahis
Sindh and the Reduction of Extra-Batta
Mutinies of the 34th N. I., the 7th L

the 69th N. I

Mutiny of the 6th Madras Cavalry .

And of the 47th Madras N. I. .

Penal Measures for Mutinous Regiments

Disbandment simply an Expedient — and Ineffective .

O, the 4th, the 64th, and

201

202

203
213
215
218
220

CHAPTER IV.

The Patna Conspiracy .... , 222

Mutiny of the 22nd N. I. at Rawalpindi 227

Suppressed by Colin Campbell ....... 228

Sir C. Napier makes a Tour of Inspection in the Panjab . . . 228

Colonel Hearsey represses Incipient Mutiny at Wazirabad . . . 229
The 66th N. I. Mutiny ; are baffled by the Gallantry of Macdonald ;

and disbanded ......... 230

Sir Charles Napier's Action is condemned by Lord Dalhousie . . 232

Dalhousie is Supported by the Duke of Wellington, and Napier resigns 233

Evil Effect of the Controversy on the Native Mind .... 234

The just Grievances of the Sipahi are not recognised by the

Authorities 236

CHAPTER V.

Moral Deterioration of the Sipahi .

His Character ......

The Dangerous Feature of his Character .

Its Better Side ......

Defects in the Military System affecting him .

The Question of Caste considered .

And of Nationalities .....

Of Separation from his Family

Of the different Systems of Promotion

Of the European Officers ....

Of the Intermixture of European Troops .
The Proportion of the Latter dangerously small
Rumours current during the Crimean War
Some Effects of the Annexation of Oudh .
Summary of Deteriorating Influences

238
239
240
241
241
242
244
245
246
247
249
250
251,252
253
255

CONTENTS OF VOL. L

xvii

BOOK III.— THE OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY.

CHAPTER I.

PAOR

Lord Dalhousie leaves India ........ 259

Character of Lord Dalhousie ....

. 259

His great Error based upon Benign Intentions

. 263

Antecedents of Lord Canning ....

264

Succeeds Lord Dalhousie as Governor-General

274

Speech of, at the Farewell Banquet

. 276

Reaches Egypt ......

280

Disembarks at Calcutta .

i •

. 282

His Initiation

, ,

. 282

Sir John Low

i •

. 283

Mr. Dorin and Mr. J. P. Grant

• t

. 284

Mr. Barnes Peacock

• i

285

General Anson

CHA

PTER II.

, 287

The Administration of Oudh .......

Question of Successor to Sir James Outram Debated . . .
Mr. Coverley Jackson is Appointed .....

Quarrels between the New Commissioner and Mr. Gubbins

The Ex-King of Oudh takes up his abode at Garden Reach

The Queen- Mother proceeds to England to make a Personal Appeal

She dies in Paris .........

Grievances of the Ex-King .......

Discontent of Lord Canning with Mr. Coverley Jackson, and its
Cause ..........

Rupture with Persia .....

The Question of Herat Stated ......

The British Minister quits Teheran .....

Feeling of Dost Muhammad respecting Herat ....

Lord Canning's Views on the Crisis. . . .

War declared with Persia .......

Question of Command — Lord Canning's Views .

Lord Elphinstone's Views .......

Sir James Outram is nominated to Command ....

Central Asian Policy ........

The Amir Dost Muhammad .... . .

Herbert Edwardes .........

Suggests the Advisability of a Personal Conference with the Amir
The Amir accepts the Invitation ......

Interview between John Lawrence and the Amir at Peshawar
Results in a Cordial Understanding ......

An English Mission sent to Kandahar .....

Merms of Agreement with the Amir .....

John Lawrence doubts his good Faith .....

The Future of Herat

290
291
292
293
295
295
296
296

298
300
301
302
303
304
306
306
309
310
312
314
316
317
318
318
322
323
324
327
327

XVI 11

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

Lord Canning appoints Sir Henry Lawrence to be Chief Commissioner

ofOudh 329

Sir Henry Lawrence takes up his Office 332

CHAPTEK III.

Retrospect of 1856 .

Policy regarding the Native Army

Evils of Extended Dominion .

Lord Dalhousie and the 38th N. I.

How to send Reliefs to Pegu .

The Duty to devolve temporarily on the Madras Army

Lord Canning alters the Enlistment Act

Effect of the Alteration on the Mind of the Sipahi

Enlistment of more Sikhs ....

Apprehensions and Alarms in the Native Mind

Lord Canning and the Religious Societies

Progress of Social Reform ....

Excess of Zeal in propagating Christianity

The King of Dehli and Persia ....

Rumours of coming Absorptions of Hindu States

The Century since Plassey ....

334
335
337
339
340
340
342
344
345
346
348
349
352
353
354
356

CHAPTER IV.

The rising Storm .........

The old-fashioned Musket to be replaced by an improved "Weapon
Story of the greased Cartridges

Spread of evil Tidings

Disseminators of Evil .....
The Barrackpiir Brigade ....

General Hearscy reports an Ill-feeling in the Brigade
Incendiarism and Excitement at Barrackpiir
The 19th N. I., at Barhampiir. mutinies .
Details of the earlv History of their Mutiny
Story of the Mutiny of the 19th N. I.
A Court of Inquiry assembles

358
359
359
360
361
363
364
365
368
369
369
373

CHAPTER V.

The Military Hierarchy in India considered 374

Delays thereby Caused ......... 375

Inquiry proves that but few greased Cartridges had been issued . 377

Orders are transmitted not to use those issued ..... 378

Composition of the Cartridges 379

Causes of Alarm among the Sipahis 382

General Hearsey realises the Danger 384

The Sipahis are asked to state their Grievances before a Court of

Inquiry ... ....... 385

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

xi x

General Hearsey addresses them in Hindustani

But does not convince them .....

The 84th arrives from Kangun ....

Circumstances connected with Sindhia's Visit to Calcutta

Rumours of Intended Revolt .....

Hearsey again addresses the Brigade

And again fails to make a permanent Impression

The Story of Manghal Pandi

Disbandment of the 19th N. I.

Hearsey addresses the Brigade for the third time

PAGE

386
387
388
389
390
392
394
395
400
401

CHAPTER VI.

Sentence executed on Manghal Pandi

Discontent of the 34th N. I. .

Delay versus Prompt Action .

Retrospect of Events at Ambalah .

Alarm at that Station .

The Commander-in-Chief addresses the Men

The Native Officers express their Opinions on the Crisis .

Views of the Commander-in-Chief .....

And of Lord Canning .......

The general Excitement finds a vent in general Incendiarism

Views of Sir Henry Barnard on the Crisis

Events at Mirath .... .

The Story of the Ground Bones .....

And of the Chapatis .......

Political Intrigues .......

Nana Sahib . . . .

Sir Henry Lawrence at Lakhnao .....

Intrigues of Nana Sdhib ......

402
403
403
405
406
407
408
409
410
412
413
414
416
418
421
422
423
424

CHAPTER VII.

Return of Confidence at Calcutta and elsewhere

The 34th N. I. is Disbanded ....

Sir H. Lawrence reports the 48th N. I. to be shaky

The 7th Oudh Irregulars mutiny at Lakhnao .

Sir Henry Lawrence quells the Revolt

Reports Interesting Conversation with a Native Officer

Lord Canning in favour of Disbandment as a Punishment

The Mutiny begins at Mirath 10th May, 1857 .

Tlio Week of exciting Telegrams

Tho Mutineers seize Dehli ....

Measures taken by Lord Canning .

Is cheered by the Conclusion of the Persian War

Calls upon Lord Elgin and General Ashburnhamto divert

Troops destined for China ....

Sends for Troops from Burmah and Madras

to India the

427
430
431
432
433
435
436
437
438
438
439
440

441
442

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

General Measures of Defence taken at the Moment
Communication with Lord Elgin
And with General Ashburnham
Issues a Proclamation declaring the Purity of the
Government ......

Confers large Powers upon Kesponsible Officers

Lords Harris and Elphinstone

The Lawrences ......

Movements and Views of John Lawrence. .

Sir Henry Lawrence's Suggestions .

Was it Mutiny or Rebellion ? . . . .

PAOR

• * * *

443

444

• • ■ •

445

Intentions of the

• . • .

446

447

• • • •

449

• • •

450

■ ■ • •

451

• • ■ •

452

• ■ •

452

Appendix

454

HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY.

BOOK I.— INTRODUCTORY.
[13T6— 1856.]

CHAPTEE I.

Broken in bodily health, but not enfeebled in spirit, by eight
years of anxious toil beneath an Indian sun, Lord Dalhousie
laid down the reins of government and returned to his native
country to die. Since the reign of Lord Wellesley, so great in
written history, so momentous in practical results, there had
been no such administration as that of Lord Dalhousie ; there
had been no period in the annals of the Anglo-Indian Empire
surcharged with such great political events, none which nearly
approached it in the rapidity of its administrative progress.
Peace and War had yielded their fruits with equal profusion.

On the eve of resigning his high trust to the hands of another,
Lord Dalhousie drew up an elaborate state-paper reviewing the
eventful years of his government. He had reason to rejoice in
the retrospect ; for he had acted in accordance with the faith
that was within him, honestly and earnestly working out his
cherished principles, and there was a bright flush of success
over all the apparent result. Peace and prosperity smiled upon
the empire. That empire he had vastly extended, and by its
extension he believed that he had consolidated our rule and
imparted additional security to our tenure of the country.

Of these great successes some account should be given at the
outset of such a narrative as this : for it is only by under-
standing and appreciating them that we can rightly estimate
the subsequent crisis. It was in the Panjab and in Oudh that
many of the most important incidents of that crisis occurred.

VOL. I. B

2 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1845-46.

Lord Dalhousie found them Foreign States ; be left them
British Provinces.

Lord Hardin ge conquered the Sikhs; but he spared the
Panjab. Moderate in victory as resolute in war.
Stoelwjlb.011 ^e left ^ empire of Eanjit Singh, shorn only of
its outlying provinces, to be governed by his
successors, and strove to protect the boy-prince against the
lawlessness of his own soldiers. But it was felt that this
forbearance was only an experimental forbearance ; and the
proclamation which announced the restoration of the Panjab to
the Maharajah Dhulip Singh sounded also a note of warning
to the great military autocracy which had well-nigh overthrown
the State. " If this opportunity," said the victor, " of rescuing
the Sikh nation from military anarchy and misrule be neglected,
and hostile opposition to the British army be renewed, the
Government of India will make such other arrangements fur
the future government of the Panjab as the interests and
security of the British power may render just and expedient."
Thus was the doubt expressed ; thus were the consequences
foreshadowed. It did not seem likely that the experiment
would succeed ; but it was not less right to make it. It left
the future destiny of the empire, under Providence, for the
Sikhs themselves to determine. It taught them how to pre-
serve their national independence, and left them to work out
the problem with their own hands.

But Hardinge did more than this. He did not interfere with
the internal administration, but he established a powerful
military protectorate in the Panjab. He left the Durbar to
govern the country after its own fashion, but he protected the
Government against the lawless domination of its soldiery.
The Sikh army was overawed by the presence of the British
■battalions ; and if the hour had produced the man — if there had
been any wisdom, any love of country, in the councils of the
nation — the Sikh Empire might have survived the great peril of
the British military protectorate. But there was no one worthy
to rule ; no one able to govern. The mother of the young
Maharajah was nominally the Eegent. There have been great
queens in the East as in the West — women who have done for
their people what men have been incapable of doing. But the
mother of Dhulip Singh was not one of these. To say that she
loved herself better than her country is to use in courtesy the
mildest words, which do not actually violate truth. She was.

1846 J LAL SINGH. 3

indeed, an evil presence in the nation. It rested with her to
choose a minister, and the choice which she made was another
great suicidal blow struck at the life of the Sikh Empire. It
may have been difficult in this emergency to select the right
man, for, in truth, there were not many wise men from whom a
selection could be made. The Queen- Mother cut through the
difficulty by selecting her paramour.

Lai Singh was unpopular with the Durbar ; unpopular with
the people ; and he failed. He might have been an able and an
honest man, and yet have been found wanting in such a con-
juncture. But he was probably the worst man in the Panjab
on whom the duty of reconstructing a strong Sikh Government
could have devolved. To do him justice, there were great
difficulties in his way. He had to replenish an exhausted
treasury by a course of unpopular retrenchments. Troops were
to be disbanded and Jaghirs resumed. Lai Singh was not the
man to do this, as one bowing to a painful necessity, and
sacrificing himself to the exigencies of the State. Even in a
countiy where political virtue was but little understood, a
course of duty consistently pursued for the benefit of the nation
might have ensured for him some sort of respect. But whilst
he was impoverishing others, he was enriching himself. It was
not the public treasury, but the private purse, that he sought
to replenish, and better men were despoiled to satisfy the greed
of his hungry relatives and friends. Vicious among the vicious,
he lived but for the indulgence of his own appetites, and ruled
but for his own aggrandisement. The favourite of the Queen, he
was the oppressor of the People. And though he tried to dazzle
his British guests by rare displays of courtesy towards them,
and made himself immensely popular among all ranks of the
Army of Occupation by his incessant efforts to gratify them, he
could not hide the one great patent fact, that a strong Sikh
Government could never be established under the wazirat of
Lai Singh.

But the British were not reponsible for the failure. The
Regent chose him ; and, bound by treaty not to exercise any
interference in the internal administration of the Lahor State,
the British Government had only passively to ratify the choice.
But it was a state of things burdened with evils of the most
obtrusive kind. We were upholding an unprincipled ruler and
an unprincipled minister at the point of our British bayonets,
and thus aiding them to commit iniquities which, without such

B 2

4 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1846.

external support, they would not have long been suffered to
perpetrate. The compact, however, was but for the current
year ; and even for that brief period there seemed but little
probability of Lai Singh tiding over the difficulties and dangers
which beset his position.

Very soon his treachery undid him. False to his own
country, he was false also to the British Government. The
province of Kashmir, which was one of the outlying depen-
dencies taken by the British in payment of the war-charges,
had been made over to Gulab Singh, chief of the great Jainu
family, who had paid a million of money for the cession. But
the transfer had been resisted by the local governor, who had
ruled the province under the Sikh Bajahs, and covertly Lai
Singh had encouraged the resistance. The nominal offender was
brought to public trial, but it was felt that the
real criminal was Lai Singh, and that upon the
issue of the inquiry depended the fate of the minister. It was
soon apparent that he was a traitor, and that the other, though,
for intelligible reasons of his own, reluctant to render an
account of his stewardship, was little more than a tool in his
hands. The disgrace of the minister was the immediate result
of the investigation. He left the Durbar tent a prisoner under
a guard, an hour before his own body-guard, of Sikh soldiers ;
and the great seal of the Maharajah was placed in the hands of
the British Besident. So fell Lai Singh ; and so fell also the
first experiment to reconstruct a strong Sikh Government on a
basis of national independence.

Another experiment was then to be tried. There was not a
native of the country to whose hands the destinies of the empire
could be safely entrusted. If the power of the English
conqueror were demanded to overawe the turbulent military
element, English wisdom and English integrity were no less
needed, in that conjuncture, to quicken and to purify the corrupt
councils of the State. Sikh statesmanship, protected against the
armed violence of the Praetorian bands, which had overthrown
so many ministries, had been fairly tried, and had been found
miserably wanting. A purely native Government was not to
be hazarded again. Averse as Hardinge had been, and still
wan, to sanction British interference in the internal adminis-
tration of the Panjab, there was that in the complications
before him which compelled bim to overcome his reluctance.
The choice, indeed, lay between a half measure, which might

1846.] HENRY LAWRENCE. 5

succeed, though truly there was small hope of success,
aud the total abandonment of the country to its own vices
which would have been sj)eedily followed, in self-defence,
by our direct assumption of the Government on our own
account. Importuned by the Sikh Durbar, in the name of the
Maharajah, Hardinge tried the former course. The next effort,
therefore, to save the Sikh Empire from self-destruction em-
braced the idea of a native Government, presided over by a
British statesman. A Council of Regency was instituted, to be
composed of Sikh chiefs, under the superintendence and. con-
trol of the Resident ; or, in other words, the British Resident
became the virtual ruler of the country.

And this time the choice, or rather the accident, of the man
was as propitious, as before it had been untoward and perverse.
The English officer possessed well-nigh all the qualities which
the Sikh Sirdar so deplorably lacked. A captain of the
Bengal Artillery, holding the higher rank of colonel by brevet
for good service, Henry Lawrence had graduated in Panjabi
diplomacy under George Clerk, and had accompanied to Kabul
the Sikh Contingent, attached to Pollock's retributory force,
combating its dubious fidelity, and controlling its predatory
excesses on the way. After the return of the expedition to the
British provinces, he had been appointed to represent our
interests in Nipal; and there — for there was a lull in the
sanguinary intrigues of that semi-barbarous Court — immersed
in his books, and turning to good literary purpose his hours
of leisure, he received at Katmandu intelligence of the Sikh
invasion, and of the death of George Broadfoot, and was sum-
moned to take the place of that lamented officer as the agent
of the Governor-General on the frontier. In the negotiations
which followed the conquest of the Khalsa army, he had taken
the leading part, and, on the restoration of peace, had been
appointed to the office of British Resident, or Minister, at
Labor, under the first experiment of a pure Sikh Government
hedged in by British troons.

If the character of the man thus placed at the head of affairs
could have secured the success of this great compromise, it
would have been successful far beyond the expectations of its
projectors. For no man ever undertook a high and important
trust with a more solemn sense of his responsibility, or ever,
with more singleness of purpose and more steadfast sincerity of
heart, set himself to work, with God:s blessing, to turn a great

6 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOED DALHOUSIE. [1846.

opportunity to great account for the benefit of his fellows. In
Henry Lawrence a pure transparent nature, a simple manliness
and truthfulness of character, were combined with high intel-
lectual powers, and personal energies which nothing earthly
could subdue. I may say it here, once for all, at the very
outset of my story, that nowhere does this natural simplicity
and truthfulness of character so often as in India survive a
long career of public service. In that country public men are
happily not exposed to the pernicious influences which in
England shrivel them so fast into party leaders and parlia-
mentary chiefs. With perfect singleness of aim and pure
sincerity of purpose, they go, with level eyes, straight at the
public good, never looking up in fear at the suspended sword
of a parliamentary majority, and never turned aside by that
fear into devious paths of trickery and finesse. It may be that
ever since the days of Clive and Omichund an unsavoury odour
has pervaded the reputation of Oriental diplomacy ; but the
fact is, that our greatest successes have been achieved by men
incapable of deceit, and by means which have invited scrutiny.
When we have opposed craft to craft, and have sought to out-
juggle our opponents, the end has been commonly disastrous.
It is only by consummate honesty and transparent truthfulness
that the Talleyrands of the East have been beaten by such
mere children in the world's ways as Mountstuart Elphinstone,
Charles Metcalfe, James Outram, and Henry Lawrence.

Henry Lawrence, indeed, was wholly without guile. He had
great shrewdness and sagacity of character, and he could read
and understand motives, to which his own breast was a stranger,
for he had studied well the Oriental character. But he was
singularly open and unreserved in all his dealings, and would
rather have given his antagonist an advantage than have
condescended to any small arts and petty trickeries to secure
success. All men, indeed, trusted him ; for they knew that
there was nothing selfish or sordid about him ; that the one
desire of his heart was to benefit the people of the country in
which it had pleased God to cast his lot. But he never suffered
this plea of beneficence to prevail against his sense of justice.
He was eminently, indeed, a just man, and altogether incapable
of that casuistry which gives a gloss of humanity to self-
seeking, and robs people for their own good. He did not look
upon the misgovernment of a native State as a valid reason for
the absorption of its revenues, but thought that British power

1816-47.] HENRY LAWRENCE. 7

might be exercised for the protection of the oppressed, and
British wisdom for the instruction and reformation of their
oppressors, without adding a few more thousand square miles
to the area of our British possessions, and a few more millions
of people to the great muster-roll of British subjects in the
East.

Above the middle height, of a spare, gaunt frame, and a
worn face bearing upon it the traces of mental toil and bodily
suffering, he impressed you, at first sight, rather with a sense
of masculine energy and resolution than of any milder and
more endearing qualities. But when you came to know him,
you saw at once that beneath that rugged exterior there was a
heart gentle as a woman's, and you recognised in his words and
in his manner the kindliness of nature, which won the affection
of all who came within its reach, and by its large and liberal
manifestations made his name a very household word with
thousands who had never felt the pressure of his hand or stood
in his living presence. But, with all this, though that name
was in men's mouths and spoken in many languages, no un-
known subaltern had a more lowly mind or a more unassuming-
deportment.

Such was the man who now found himself the virtual
sovereign of the empire of Eanjit Singh. The new protec-
torate, established at the end of 1846, gave to Henry Lawrence
" unlimited authority," " to direct and control every depart-
ment of the State." He was to be assisted in this great work
by an efficient establishment of subordinates, but it was no
part of the design to confer upon them the executive manage-
ment of affairs. The old officers of the Sikh Government were
left to carry on the administration, guided and directed by
their British allies. Under such a system corruption and
oppression could no longer run riot over the face of the land.
It was a protectorate for the many, not for the few ; and for a,
while it seemed that all classes were pleased with the arrange-
ment. Outwardly, indeed, it did not seem that feelings of
resentment against the British Government were cherished by
any persons but the Queen-Mother and her degraded paramour.

And so, in the spring of 1847, the political horizon was
almost unclouded. The Council of Regency, under the control
of Henry Lawrence, seemed to be carrying on the government
with a sincere desire to secure a successful result. Tranquillity
had been restored ; confidence and order were fast returning.

8 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1847

The Sikh soldiery appeared to he contented with their lot, and
to he gradually acquiring- hahits of discipline and ohedience,
under a system which rendered them dependent on the British
officers for whatever most promoted their interests and con-
tributed to their comforts. But it did not escape the sagacious
mind of the Besident, that serene as was the aspect of affairs,
and promising as were the indications of continued repose,
there were, beneath all this surface-calm, dangerous elements
at work, waiting only for time and circumstance to call them
into full activity. The memory of frequent defeat was still too
fresh in the minds of the humbled Khalsa to suffer them to
indulge in visions of fvt once re-acquiring their lost supremacy.
But as time passed and the impression waxed fainter and
fainter, it was well-nigh certain that the old hopes would
revive, and that outbursts of desperate Asiatic zeal might be
looked for in quarters where such paroxj-sms had long seemed
to be necessary to the very existence of a lawless and tumul-
tuous class. It is a trick of our self-love — of our national
vanity — to make us too often delude ourselves with the belief
that British supremacy must be welcome wheresoever it
obtrudes itself. But Henry Lawence did not deceive himself
in this wise. He frankly admitted that, however benevolent
our motives, and however conciliatory our demeanour, a British
army could not garrison Lahor, and a British functionary
supersede the Sikh Durbar, without exciting bitter discontents
and perilous resentments. He saw around him, struggling for
existence, so many high officers of the old Sikh armies, so many
favourites of the old line of Wazfrs now cast adrift upon the
world, without resources and without hope under the existing
system, that when he remembered their lawless habits, their
headstrong folly, their desperate suicidal zeal, he could but
wonder at the perfect peace which then pervaded the land.

But whatsoever might be taking shape in the future, the
present was a season of prosperity — a time of promise — and
the best uses were made by the British functionaries of the
continued calm. Interference in the civil administration of
the country was exercised only when it could be turned to the
very apparent advantage of the people. British authority and
British integrity were then employed in the settlement of long-
unsettled districts, and in the development of the resources of
long-neglected tracts of country. The subordinate officers thus
employed under the Besident were few, but they were men of

1847.] F1KST ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORTS. 9

no common ability and energy of character — soldiers such ae
Edwardes, Nicholson, Eeynell Taylor, Lake, Lumsden, Becher,
George Lawrence, and James Abbott ; civilians such as Vans
Agnew and Arthur Cocks — men, for the most part, whose deeds
will find ample record in these pages. They had unbounded
confidence in their chief, and their chief had equal confidence
in them. Acting, with but few exceptions, for the majority
were soldiers, in a mixed civil and military character, they
associated with all classes of the community; and alike by
their courage and their integrity they sustained the high
character of the nation they represented. One common spirit
of humanity seemed to animate the Governor-General, the
Resident, and his Assistants. A well-aimed blow was struck
at infanticide, at Sati, and at the odious traffic in female slaves.
In the agricultural districts, a system of enforced labour, which
had pressed heavily on the ryots, was soon also in course of
abolition. The weak were everywhere protected against the
strong. An entire revision of the judicial and revenue systems
of the country — if systems they can be called, where system
there was none — was attempted, and with good success. New
customs rules were prepared, by which the people were greatly
gainers. Every legitimate means of increasing the revenue,
and of controlling unnecessary expenditure, were resorted to,
and large savings were effected at no loss of efficiency in any
department of the State. The cultivators were encouraged to
sink wells, to irrigate their lands, and otherwise to increase the
productiveness of the soil, alike to their own advantage and the
profit of the State. And whilst everything was thus being-
done to advance the general prosperity of the people, and to
ensure the popularity of British occupation among the indus-
trial classes, the Army was propitiated by the introduction of
new and improved systems of pay and pension, and taught to
believe that what they had lost in opportunities of plunder, and
in irregular largesses, had been more than made up to tbem
by certainty and punctuality of payment, and the interest
taken by the British officers in the general welfare of their
class.

As the year advanced, these favourable appearances rather
improved than deteriorated. In June, the Besident reported
that a large majority of the disbanded soldiers had returned
to the plough or to trade, and that the advantages of British
influence to the cultivating classes were every day becomino-

10 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1847

more apparent. But still Lawrence clearly discerned the fact
that although the spirit of insurrection was at rest in the
Panjab, it was not yet dead. There were sparks flying about
here and there, which, alighting on combustible materials,
might speedily excite a blaze. " If every Sirdar and Sikh in
the Panjab," he wrote, with the candour and good sense which
are so conspicuous in all his communications, " were to avow
himself satisfied with the humbled position of his country, it
would be the extreme of infatuation to believe him, or to doubt
for a moment that among the crowd who are loudest in our
praise there are many who cannot forgive our victory, or even
our forbearance, and who chafe at their own loss of power in
exact proportion as they submit to ours." People were not
wanting even then, in our camp, to talk with ominous head-
shakings of the " Kabul Catastrophe," and to predict all sorts
of massacres and misfortunes. But there was no parallel to
be drawn between the two cases, for an overweening sense of
security had not taken possession of the British functionaries
at Lahor. They had not brought themselves to believe that
the country was " settled," or that British occupation was
" popular " among the chiefs and people of the Panjab. With
God's blessing they were doing their best to deserve success,
but they knew well that they might some day see the ruin
of their hopes, the failure of their experiments, and they were
prepared, in the midst of prosperity, at any hour to confront
disaster.

Even then, fair as was the prospect before us, there was one
great blot upon the landscape ; for whilst the restless nature
of the Queen-Mother was solacing itself with dark intrigues,
there was a continual source of disquietude to disturb the mind
of the Resident with apprehensions of probable outbreaks and
seditions. She hated the British with a deadly hatred. They
had deprived her of power. They had torn her lover from her
arms. They were training her son to become a puppet in their
hands. To foment hostility against them, wheresoever there
seemed to be any hope of successful revolt, and to devise a plot
for the murder of the Resident, were among the cherished
objects by which she sought to gratify her malice. But she
could not thus labour in secret. Her schemes were detected,
and it was determined to remove her from Lahor. The place
of banishment was Shekhopur, in a quiet part of the country,
and in the midst of a Musulman population. When the decision

1847-48. J LORD HARDIXGE. 1]

was communicated to her by her brother, she received it with
apparent indifference. She was not one to give her enemies an
advantage by confessing her wounds and bewailing her lot.
She uttered no cry of pain, but said that she was ready for any-
thing, and at once prepared for the journey.

The autumn passed quietly away. But an important change
was impending. Lord Hardinge was about to lay down the
reins of government, and Colonel Lawrence to leave the Panjab
for a time. The health of the latter had long been failing.
He had tried in August and September the effect of the bracing
hill air of Simla. It had revived him for a while, but his
medical attendants urged him to resort to the only remedy
which could arrest the progress of the disease ; and so, with
extreme reluctance, he consented to quit his post, and to accom-
pany Lord Hardinge to England. He went ; and Sir Frederick
Currie, a public servant of approved talent and integrity, who,
in the capacity of Political Secretary, had accompanied the
Governor-General to the banks of the Satlaj, and who had been
subsequently created a baronet and appointed a member of the
Supreme Council of India, was nominated to act as Eesident in
his place.

Meeting the stream of European revolution as they journeyed
homewards, Hardinge and Lawrence came overland to England
in the early spring of 1848. Brief space is allowed to me for
comment ; but before I cease to write Lord Hardinge's name
in connection with Sikh politics and history, I must give ex-
pression, if only in a single sentence, to the admiration with
which I regard his entire policy towards the Panjab. It was
worthy of a Christian warrior : it was worthy of a Christian
statesman. It is in no wise to be judged by results, still less
by accidents not assignable to errors inherent in the original
design. "What Hardinge did, he did because it was right to
do it. His forbearance under provocation, his moderation in
the hour of victory foreshadowed the humanity of his subse-
quent measures. It was his one desire to render British con-
nection with the Panjab a blessing to the Sikhs, without
destroying their national independence. The spirit of Christian
philanthropy moved at his bidding over the whole face of the
country — not the mere image of a specious benevolence dis-
guising the designs of our ambition and the impulses of our
greed, but an honest, hearty desire to do good without gain,
to save an Empire, to reform a people, and to leave behind us

12 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. L1848.

the marks of a hand at once gentle and powerful — gentle to
cherish and powerful only to sustain.

Conquest of the The portfolio of the Indian Government now

anjd' passed into the hands of Lord Dalhousie, a young

statesman of high promise, who, in the divisions of part}-
politics at home, had been ranged among the followers of Sir
Kobert Peel, and professed the newly-developed liberalism of
that great parliamentary chief. Held in esteem as a man of
moderate views, of considerable administrative ability, and
more than common assiduity in the public service, his brief
career as an English statesman seemed to afford good hope
that, in the great descriptive roll of Ind ian Viceroys, his name
would be recorded as that of a ruler distinguished rather for
the utility than for the brilliancy of his administration. And
so, doubtless, it seemed to himself. What India most wanted
at that time was Peace. Left to her repose, even without
external aid, she might soon have recovered from the effects
of a succession of wasting wars. But, cherished and fostered
by an unambitious and enlightened ruler, there was good
prospect of a future of unexampled prosperity — of great mate-
rial and moral advancement — of that oft-promised, ever realis-
able, but still unrealised blessing, the " development of the
resources of the country." The country wanted railroads, and
the people education, and there was good hope that Dalhousie
would give them both.

When he looked beyond the frontier he saw that everything
was quiet. The new year had dawned auspiciously on the
Pan jab. The attention of the British functionaries, ever
earnest and active in well-doing — for the disciples of Henry
Lawrence had caught much of the zealous humanity of their
master — was mainly directed to the settlement of the Land
Eevenue and the improvement of the judicial system of the
country. They had begun codifying in good earnest, and laws,
civil and criminal, grew apace under their hands. In a state
of things so satisfactory as this there was little to call for
special remark, and the Governor-General, in his letters to the
Home Government, contented himself with the simple observa-
tion, that he " forwarded papers relating to the Panjab." But
early in May intelligence had reached Calcutta which impelled
him to indite a more stirring epistle. The Panjab was on the
eve of another crisis.

1848] AFFAIRS OF MULT AN. 13

In September, 1844, Sawan Mall, the able and energetic
Governor * of Multan, was shot to death by an assassin. He
was succeeded by his son Mulraj, who also had earned for him-
self the reputation of a chief with just and enlightened views
of government, and considerable administrative ability. But
he had also a reputation very dangerous in that country : he
was reputed to be very rich. Sawan Mall was believed to have
amassed immense treasures in Multan ; and on the instalment of
his son in the government, the Labor Durbar demanded from
him a succession duty f of a million of money. The exorbitant
claim was not complied with ; but a compromise was effected,
by which Mulraj became bound to pay to Labor less than a fifth
of the required amount. And this sum would have been paid,
but for the convulsions which soon began to rend the country,
and the disasters which befell the Durbar.

On the re-establishment of the Sikh Government the claim was
renewed. It was intimated to the Diwan that if the stipulated
eighteen lakhs, with certain amounts due for arrears, were paid
into the Lahor Treasury, he would be allowed to continue in
charge of Multan ; but that if he demurred, troops would be
sent to coerce him. He refused payment of the money, and
troops were accordingly sent against him. Thus threatened,
he besought the British Government to interfere in his favour,
and consented to adjust the matter through the arbitration of
the Eesident. The result was, that he went to Lahor in the
autumn of 1846 ; promised to pay by instalments the money
claimed ; and was mulcted in a portion of the territories from
which he had drawn his revenue. The remainder was farmed
out to him for a term of three years. With this arrangement
he appeared to be satisfied. He was anxious to obtain the
guarantee of the British Government ; but his request was
refused, and he returned to Multan without it.

For the space of more than a year, Mulraj remained in peace-
ful occupation of the country which had been leased out to him.
There was no attempt, on the part of the British functionaries,
to interfere with the affairs of Multan. That territory was
especially exempted from the operation of the revenue settle-

* I have used the word most intelligible to ordinary English readers, but
it dot s not fitly represent the office held by the " Diwan," who was financial
manager or revenue- farmer of the district, with the control of the internal
administration.

t Nazuraua.

14 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848.

meet, which had taken effect elsewhere, and of the new customs
regulations which had been established in other parts of the
Panjab. But the compact which had been entered into with the
Lahor Durbar did not sit easily upon him. He thought, or
affected to think, that its terms were too rigorous ; and accord-
ingly, about the close of 1847, he repaired to the capital to seek
some remission of them. He soon began intriguing with the
Durbar for the reduction of the stipulated rents ; and not
coming to any satisfactory arrangement, intimated his wish to
resign a charge which he had fnund so little profitable. He
was told that his resignation, when formally tendered, would
be accepted ; but was recommended to reflect upon the subject
before finally coming to a determination, which could not be
subsequently revoked. Mulraj quitted Lahor ; and sent in first
a somewhat vague, and afterwards a more distinct, resignation
of his office ; and the Durbar at once appointed a successor.
Sirdar Khan Singh, who was described as a " brave soldier and
intelligent man," was nominated to the Governorship ofMultan,
on a fixed annual salary. At the same time, Mr. Vans Agnew,
a civil servant of the Company, and Lieutenant Anderson, of the
Bombay army, were despatched to Multan with the new
Governor, and an escort of five hundred men, to receive charge
of the place. On their arrival before the city there were no
symptoms of any hostile intentions on the part of its occupants.
Mulraj himself waited on the British officers on the 18th of
April, and was peremptorily called upon to give in his accounts.
Disconcerted and annoyed, he quitted their presence, but next
morning he met them with a calm aspect, and conducted them
through the fort. Two companies of Gurkhas and some horse-
men of the escort were placed in possession of one of the fort-
gates. The crisis was now at hand. Mulraj formally gave
over charge of the fort ; and as the party retired through the
gate, the British officers were suddenly attacked and severely
wounded. Mulraj, who was riding with them at the time,
offered no assistance, but, setting spurs to his horse, galloped off
in the direction of his garden-house, whilst the wounded officers
were carried to their own camp by Khan Singh and a party of
the Gurkhas.

In the course of the following day all the Multani troops
were in a state of open insurrection. Mulraj himself, who may
hot have been guilty in the first instance of an act of premedi-
tated treachery, and who subsequently pleaded that he was

1848.] SECOND SIKH WAR. 15

coerced by his troops, sent excuses to Vans Agnew, -who, with
the generous confidence of youth, acquitted him of all partici-
pation in the outrage. But he was soon heart and soul in the
work ; and his emissaries plied their trade of corruption with
unerring effect. Before nightfall, the commandant of the escort,
with all his men, went over to the enemy. The building in
which the wounded officers lay was surrounded. A motley crew
of ruffians — soldiers and citizens — men of all classes, young and
old, moved by one common impulse, one great thirst of blood,
came yelling and shouting around the abode of the doomed
Faringhis. In they rushed, with a savage cry, and surrounded
their victims. The wounded officers lay armed on their beds,
and helpless, hopeless as they were, put on the bold front of
intrepid Englishmen, and were heroes to the last. Having
shaken hands, and bade each other a last farewell, they turned
upon their assailants as best they could ; but, overpowered by
numbers, they fell, declaring in the prophetic language of death,
that thousands of their countrymen would come to avenge them.
The slaughter thoroughly accomplished, the two bodies were
dragged out of the mosque, and barbarously mutilated by the
murderers, with every indignity that malice could devise.

Irretrievably committed in the eyes both of our countrymen
and his own, Mulraj now saw that there was no going back ; he
had entered, whether designedly or not, on a course which
admitted of no pause, and left no time for reflection. All the
dormant energies of his nature were now called into full
activity. He took command of the insurgents — identified him-
self with their cause — bestowed largesses upon the men who
had been most active in the assault upon the British officers,
retained all who would take service with him, laid in stores,
collected money, and addressed letters to other chiefs urging
them to resistance. He had never been looked upon by others
— never regarded himself — as a man to become the leader of a
great national movement ; but now circumstances had done for
him what he would never willingly have shaped out for him-
self ; so he bowed to fate, and became a hero.

Thus was the second Sikh War commenced. Outwardly, it
was but the revolt of a local government — the rebellion of* an
officer of the Sikh State against the sovereign power of the land.
But, rightly considered, it was of far deeper significance.
Whether Mulraj had been incited to resistance by the prompt-
ings of a spirit far more bitter in its resentments, and more

16 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848

active in its malignity than his own, is not very apparent.
But it is certain that when he raised the standard of rebellion
at Multan, he did but anticipate a movement for which the
whole country was ripe. Already had ominous reports of ill-
concealed disaffection come in from some of the outlying dis-
tricts, and though the mortifying fact was very reluctantly
believed, it is certain that the state of things which Henry
Lawrence had predicted was already a present reality, and
that the Sikhs, chafing under the irritating interference of the
European stranger, were about to make a common effort to
expel him. A finer body of officers than those employed under
the British Resident in the Panjab seldom laboured for the good
of a people. That they worked, earnestly and assiduously,
animated by the purest spirit of Christian benevolence, is not
to be doubted. But it was not in the nature of things that
even if the thing done had been palatable to the Sikhs, they
would have reconciled themselves to the doers of it. Habituated
to rule in all parts of the world, and to interfere in the affairs
of people of all colours and creeds, Englishmen are slow to
familiarise themselves with the idea of the too probable unpopu-
larity of their interference. They think that if they mean
well they must secure confidence. They do not consider that
our beneficent ways may not be more in accordance with the
national taste than our round hats and stiff neckcloths ; and
that even if they were, alien interference must in itself be
utterly distasteful to them. It is not to be doubted, I sa_y, that
the young Englishmen first employed in the Panjab laboured
earnestly for the good of the people ; but their very presence
was a sore in the flesh of the nation, and if they had been
endowed with superhuman wisdom and angelic benevolence, it
would have made no difference in the sum total of popular dis-
content.

But it is probable that some mistakes were committed — the
inevitable growth of benevolent ignorance and energetic inex-
perience— at the outset of our career as Panjabi administrators.
The interference appears to have been greater than was con-
templated in the original design of the Second Protectorate.
At that time the God Terminus was held by many of our ad-
ministrators in especial veneration. The Theodolite, the Recon-
noitring Compass, and the Measuring Chain were the great
emblems of British rule. And now these mysterious instru-
ments began to make their appearance in the Panjab. We were

1848.] FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORTS. 17

taking sights and measuring angles on the outskirts of civilisa-
tion ; and neither the chiefs nor the people could readily
persuade themselves that we were doing all this for their good ;
there was an appearance in it of ulterior design. And, as I have
hinted, the agents employed were sometimes wholly inexperi-
enced in business of this kind. " My present rule," wrote a
young ensign * of two years' standing in the service, whose
later exploits will be recorded in these pages, " is to survey a
part of the country lying along the left bank of the Bavi and
below the hills, and I am daily and all day at work with com-
passes and chain, pen and pencil, following streams, diving into
valleys, burrowing into hills, to complete my work. I need
hardly remark, that having never attempted anything of the
kind, it is bothering at first. I should not be surprised any day
to be told to build a ship, compose a code of laws, or hold
assizes. In fact, 'tis the way in India; every one has to teach
himself his work, and to do it at the same time." Training of
this kind has made the finest race of officers that the world has
ever seen. But the novitiate of these men may have teemed
with blunders fatal to the people among whom they were sent,
in all the self-confidence of youth, to learn their diversities of
work. As they advance in years, and every year know better
how difficult a thing it is to administer the affairs of a foreign
people, such public servants often shudder to think of the errors
committed, of the wrong done, when they served their appren-
ticeship in government without a master, and taught themselves
at the expense of thousands. The most experienced adminis-
trators in the present case might have failed from the want of
a right understanding of the temper of the people. But it was
the necessity of our position that some who were set over the
officers of the Sikh Government knew little of the people and
little of administration. They were able, indefatigable, and
conscientious. They erred only because they saw too much and
did too much, and had not come to understand the wise policy
of shutting their eyes and leaving alone.

And so, although the rebellion of Mulraj was at first only a
local outbreak, and the British authorities were well disposed
to regard it as a movement against the Sikh Government, not

W. R. Hndson ("Hodson of Hodson's Horse"), January, 1818. This
young officer narrowly escaped the fate of Anderson at Multan, for he hail
keen selected in the first instance to accompany Vans Agnew.

VOL. I. c

18 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848.

as an outrage especially directed against ourselves, that fiction
could not be long maintained — for every day it became more
and more apparent that the whole country was ripe for another
war with the intruding Faringhi. The Durbar officers did not
hesitate to express their conviction that to send Sikh troops to
act against Mulraj would only be to swell the number of his
adherents. To have despatched with them a small English
force would have been to risk its safety and precipitate the con-
flict. An overwhelming display of force, on the part of the
British Government, might have crushed the rebellion at
Multan and retarded the general rising of the country. But
the season was far advanced; the responsibility was a great
one. The Commander-in-Chief of the British army in India was
not far distant. Currie, therefore, though his own judgment
inclined to the commencement of immediate hostilities, rightly
referred the momentous question to the military chief. Lord
Gough was against immediate action ; and the head of the
Indian Government unreservedly endorsed the decision.

The remnant of the old Khalsa army eagerly watched the
result, and were not slow to attribute our inactivity, at such
a moment, to hesitation — to fear — to paralysis. I am not
writing a military history of the Second Sikh War, and the
question now suggested is one which 1 am not called upon to
discuss. But I think that promptitude of action is often of
more importance than completeness of preparation, and that
to show ourselves confident of success is in most cases to attain
it. The British power in India cannot afford to be quiescent
under insult and outrage. Delay is held to be a sign of weak-
ness. It encourages enmity and confirms vacillation. It is a
disaster in itself — more serious, often, than any that can arise
from insufficient preparation, and that great bugbear the in-
clemency of the season. On the other hand, it is not to be
forgotten that to despise our enemies is a common national
mistake, and that sometimes it has been a fatal one. We have
brought calamities on ourselves by our rashness as we have by
our indecision. The History of India teems with examples of
both results ; the most profitable lesson to be learnt from which
is, that, however wise we may be after the event, criticism in
such a case ought to be diffident and forbearing.

But whilst the Commander-in-Chief, in the cool mountain air
of Simla, was deciding on the impossibility of commencing
military operations, a young lieutenant of the Bengal army, who

1848.] HERBERT EDWARDES. 19

had been engaged in the Revenue settlement of the country
about Banu, was marching down upon Multan with a small
body of troops, to render assistance to his brother-officers in
their perilous position, and to support the authority of the
Labor Durbar. A letter from Vans Agnew, dictated by the
wounded man, had providentially fallen into his hands. He
saw at once the emergency of the case ; he never hesitated ;
but abandoning all other considerations, improvised the best
force that could be got together, and, with fifteen hundred men
and two pieces of artillery, marched forth in all the eager
confidence of youth, hoping that it might be his privilege to
rescue his countrymen from the danger that beset them.

The name of this young officer was Herbert Edwardes. A
native of Frodley, in Shropshire, the son of a country clergy-
man, educated at King's College, London, he had entered the
Company's service as a cadet of infantry, at an age somewhat
more advanced than that which sees the initiation into military
life of the majority of young officers. But at an age much
earlier than that which commonly places them in possession of
the most superficial knowledge of the history and politics of the
East, young Edwardes had acquired a stock of information,
and a capacity for judging rightly of passing events, which
would have done no discredit to a veteran soldier and diplomatist.
He had served but a few years, when his name became familiar
to English readers throughout the Presidency to which he
belonged, as one of the ablest anonymous writers in the country.
His literary talents, like his military qualities, were of a bold,
earnest, impulsive character. Whatever he did, he did rapidly
and well. He was precisely the kind of man to attract the
attention and retain the favour of such an officer as Henry
Lawrence, who, with the same quiet love of literature, com-
bined a keen appreciation of that energy and fire of character
which shrinks from no responsibility, and are ever seeking to
find an outlet in dashing exploits. In one of the earliest and
most striking scenes of the Panjabi drama, Edwardes had acted
a distinguished part. When the insurrection broke out in
Kashmir, he was despatched to Jamu, to awaken Gulab Singh
to a sense of his duty in that conjuncture; and there are few
more memorable and impressive incidents in Sikh history than
that which exhibited a handful of British officers controlling: the
movements of large bodies of foreign troops, — the very men,
and under the very leaders, who, so short a time before, had

c 2

20 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUS1E. [1848.

contested with us on the banks of the Satlaj the sovereignty of
Hindustan.

On the reconstruction of the Sikh Government, after the
deposition of Lai Singh, Herbert Edwardes was one of the
officers selected to superintend the internal administration of
the country ; and he had just completed the Eevenue settle-
ment of Banu, when the startling intelligence of the Multan
outbreak reached his camp. He marched at once to succour his
brother-officers ; crossed the Indus, and took possession of Leia,
the chief city in the Sindh Sagar Duab. But tidings by this
time had reached him of the melancholv fate of Aa;new and
Anderson, and there was then no profit in the immediate
movement on Multan to compensate for its certain danger. But
the demonstration still had its uses. It was something that
there was a force in the field with a British officer at the head
of it to assert the cause of order and authority in the name of
the Maharajah of the Pan jab. Such a force might, for a time at
least, hold rebellion in check in that part of the country. But
Edwardes dreamt of higher services than this. To the south of
Multan, some fifty miles, lies Bahawalpur, in the chief of which
place we believed, that we had a staunch ally. In the name of
the British Government, Edwardes called upon him to move an
auxiliary force upon Multan ; and he bad little doubt that,
after forming a junction with these troops, he could capture
the rebel stronghold. The confidence of the young soldier,
stimulated by a victory which he gained over a large body of
rebels on the great anniversary of Waterloo, saw no obstacle to
this enterprise which could not be overcome if the Resident
would only send him a few heavy guns and mortars, and
Major Napier, of the Engineers, to direct the operations of the
siege. He knew the worth of such a man in such a conjuncture,
and every year that has since ]3assed has made him prouder of
the youthful forecast which he then evinced.

The Bahawalpur troops were sent, the junction was formed,
and the force marched down upon Multan. Placing himself at
the head of a considerable body of men, the rebel chief went
out to give them battle, but was beaten by Edwardes, aided
by Yan Cortlandt, a European officer in Sikh employ, who
bas since done good service to the British Government, and
Edward Lake, a gallant young officer of Bengal Engineers,
directing the Bahawalpur column, who has abundantly fulfilled,
on the same theatre of action, the high promise of his youth.

1848.] THE REBELLION OF MULRAj. 21

But much as irregular levies, so led, might do in the open field,
they were powerless against the walls of Multan. Again,
therefore, Edwardes urged upon the Resident the expediency of
strengthening his hands, especially in respect of the ordnance
branches of the service. Only send a siege train, some Sappers
and Miners, with Eobert Napier to direct the siege, and — this
time, for the difficulties of the work had assumed larger
proportions in his eyes — a few regular regiments, under a
young brigadier, and we shall "close," he said, "Mulraj's
account in a fortnight, and obviate the necessity of assembling
fifty thousand men in October."

In the early part of July this requisition was received at
Lahor. The interval which had elapsed, since the disastrous
tidings of the rebellion of Mulraj had reached the Residency,
had not been an uneventful one at the capital. Early in May,
discovery was made of an attempt to corrupt the fidelity of our
British Sipahis. The first intimation of the plot was received
from some troopers of the 7th Irregular Cavalry, who commu-
nicated the circumstance to their commanding officer. The
principal conspirators were one Khan Singh, an unemployed
general of the Sikh army, and Ganga Ram, the confidential
Vakil of the Maharani. These men, and two others, were
seized, tried, and convicted. The two chief conspirators were
publicly hanged, and their less guilty associates transported.
That they were instruments of the Maharani was sufficiently
proved. The conspirators acknowledged that she was the
prime instigator of the treacherous attempt, and her letters
were found in their possession. With this knowledge, it could
no longer be a question with the Resident as to what course
it behoved him to adopt. The mother of the Maharajah and
the widow of Ranjit Singh could no longer be suffered to
dwell among the Sikhs. She had already been removed from
Lahor to Shekkopur. It now became necessary to remove her
from the Panjab. Accordingly, certain accredited agents of
the Lahor Durbar, accompanied by two British officers, Captain
Lumsden and Lieutenant Hodson, were despatched to She-
khopur, with a mandate under the seal of the Maharajah,
directing her removal from that place. Without offering any
resistance, or expressing any dissatisfaction, she placed herself
under the charge of the deputation ; and, when it became
clear to her that she was on her way to the British frontier,
she desired — not improbably with that blended irony and

22 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848.

bravado which she so well knew how to employ — that her
thanks might be conveyed to the Eesident for removing her
to the Company's dominions, out of the reach of the enemies
who would destroy her. With a considerable retinue of female
attendants, she was conveyed to Firuzpur, and eventually to
Banaras, where she was placed under the charge of Major
George Macgregor, an Artillery officer of high personal character
and great diplomatic experience, who had well sustained in
the Panjab the brilliant reputation which he had earned at
Jalalabad.

Such was the apparent growth visible at the British Resi-
dency, recognised in our State-papers, of those three months in
the Panjab. But in the hands of a Sikh historian these incidents
would form but a small part of the national annals, for all over
the country the great chiefs were actively maturing the plan
of their emancipation, calling upon all true Sikhs, in the name
of the great Founder of their Faith, to exterminate the Christian
usurpers, and even those nearest to the throne were among the
arch promoters of the movement. The daughter of Chatar
Singh and the sister of Sher Singh was the betrothed wife of
the Maharajah ; but these Sirdars, though anxious to veil their
designs until the whole country was ripe for a simultaneous
rising, were intriguing and plotting for our overthrow. The
former was in the Hazarah, where his fidelity had been for
some time suspected by James Abbott — another officer of the
Bengal Artillery, friend and comrade of Henry Lawrence, who
had been settling that part of the country — one of those men
whose lot in life it is never to be believed, 'never to be appre-
ciated, never to be rewarded ; of the true salt of the earth, but
of an unrecognised savour ; chivalrous, heroic, but somehow or
other never thoroughly emerging from the shade. He was not
one to estimate highly the force of the maxim that " speech is
silver, silence is gold ;" and his suspicions are said not to have
been acceptable at Labor. But though it may be good to
suspect, it is doubtless good, also, not to appear to suspect.
And if Currie, in that conjuncture, had betrayed a want of
confidence in the Sikh Sirdars, he would have precipitated the
collision which it was sound policy to retard. So, whatever
may have been his genuine convictions, he still appeared to
trust the chiefs of the Regency ; and Sher Singh, with a strong
body of Sikh troops, was sent down to Multan. It was wise to
maintain, as long as possible, the semblance of the authority of

1848.] THE DEFECTION OF SHER SINGH. 23

the Sikh Durbar — wise to keep up the show of suppressing a
rebellion by the hand of the native Government. To send
down that undeveloped traitor to the great centre of revolt
may have been a hazardous experiment, but it was hazardous
also to keep him where he was ; and the master-passion of the
Sikh soldiery for plunder might have kept his battalions nomi-
nally on the side of authority, until they had glutted themselves
with the spoils of Multan, and preparations had, meanwhile,
been made in the British provinces for the commencement of
military operations on a scale befitting the occasion. But the
repeated requisitions of Edwardes for British aid at last wrought
upon the Besident, and Currie determined to send a force to
Multan, with a siege-train for the reduction of the fortress. In
General Samson Whish, of the Artillery, under whose command
the force was despatched, there was not literally what Edwardes
had asked for — "a young brigadier " — but there was a general
officer of unwonted youthfulness of aspect and activity of body,
who could sit a horse well, could ride any distance at a stretch,
and was generally esteemed to be one of the best artillery
officers in the service. This forward movement was not counte-
nanced in high places. The Commander-in-Chief shook his
head. The Governor-General shook his head. But the Besident
had ordered it, and it could not be countermanded without
encouraging a belief that there was a want of unanimity in
British councils.

So the besieging force marched upon Multan, and arrived
before the city in high health and excellent spirits. On the
5th of September, in the name of the Maharajah and Queen
Victoria, the British General summoned the garrison to sur-
render. No answer was returned to the summons, and the
siege commenced. But on the 14th, when our guns were within
breaching distance of the walls of the town, Whish, to his bitter
mortification, was compelled to abandon the siege. The Sikh
force under Sher Singh had gone over to the enemy.

This event had long been matter of anxious speculation in
the British camp, and now took no one by surprise. It was
known that the hearts of the soldiery were with Mulraj ; but
there was something of a more doubtful character in the conduct
of the Bajah himself, who had on more than one occasion
testified his zeal and loyalty by voluntary acts of service in our
cause. In his own camp, the Khalsa troops said contemptuously,
that he was a Musulman. With Edwardes he was outwardly

24 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848.

on the best possible terms ; spoke freely of the conduct of his
father, Chatar Singh; declared that he washed his hands of
all the old man's rebellions projects ; and candidly avowed his
mistrust of the Sikh troops. But in all this be was playing
a part. He had written to his brother to say that he intended
to go over to the enemy on that very 14th of September, and
he kept his word to the letter. On the morning of that day,
the whole Durbar force sought entrance into the city. Doubtful
of the real nature of the movement, Mulraj at first refused them
admittance ; but soon satisfied of their intentions, he opened
the gates; the long dreaded and fatal junction was effected;
and the British General was under the mortifying necessity of
raising the siege of Multan.

The whole truth was now visible before the world. It was im-
possible any longer to maintain the fiction of a local rebellion,
to pretend that the Lahor Government, assisted by British
troops, was endeavouring to coerce a refractory subject. The
Arery heads of that Government were in open hostility to the
Britisb, raising the standard of nationality in the name of the
Maharajah. It was obvious that the war now about to be
waged, was between the British and the Sikhs. Some hope
was at one time to be drawn from the fact of long-standing
feuds among the different Sikh families. Then there was the
not unreasonable conviction that the Muhammadan population
of the Panjab might easily be kept in a state of enmity with
the Sikhs. But these assurances soon melted away. Hostile
families and hostile reKgions were content to unite for the
nonce against the Faringhis ; and the Commander-in-Chief, as
the cold weather approached, was gratified by finding that
there had been no premature birth of victory — that the work
was yet to be done — and that an army of twenty thousand
men. under his personal command, was required to take the
field.

And from that time Multan ceased to be the focus of rebellion
and the head-quarters of the war. In the Hazarah country
Chatar Singh had thrown off all vestments of disguise, and
plunged boldly into the troubled waters -that lay before him.
The thoughts of Sher Singh soon began to turn towards that
quarter — indeed, such had been his desire from the first — and
before the second week of October had passed away, he had
marched out of Multan to join his father. The whole country
was now rising against us. Having used the name of the

1848] MOVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. 25

Maharajah, the Sikh leaders were eager to possess themselves
of the person of the boy-King, and but for the vigilance of the
Resident they would have achieved an object which would
have added a new element of strength to the national cause.
Dhulfp Singh remained in our hands virtually a prisoner at
Labor.

All this time the Governor-General was at Calcutta, watching
from a distance the progress of events, and betraying no eager-
ness to seize a favourable opportunity for the conquest of the
Panjab. Indeed, it has been imputed to him, as a grave political
error, that he did not at an earlier period make due preparation
for the inevitable war. But, it would seem that in the summer
of 1848, his desire was to recognise as long as possible only
internal rebellion in the Sikh country — to see, not the rising of
a nation against a foreign intruder, but the revolt of a few
unloyal chiefs against their own lawful sovereign. But with
the first breath of the cool season there came a truer conception
of the crisis, and Lord Dalhousie prepared himself for the
conflict. " I have wished for peace," he said, at a public enter-
tainment, early in October ; " I have longed for it ; I have
striven for it. But if the enemies of India determine to have
Avar, war they shall have, and on my word they shall have it
Avith a vengeance." A few days afterwards he turned his back
upon Calcutta, and set his face towards the north-west. All
the energies of his mind were then given to the prosecution of
the war.

The British army destined for the re-conquest of the Panjab
assembled at Firuzpur, and crossed the Satlaj in different detach-
ments. On the 13th of November the head-quarters reached
Lahor. At that time it could hardly be said that British influ-
ence extended a rood beyond the Residency walls. In all parts
of the country the Sikhs had risen against the great reproach
of the English occupation. In many outlying places, on the
confines of civilisation, our English officers were holding out, in
the face of every conceivable difficulty and danger, with con-
stancy and resolution most chivalrous, most heroic, hoping only
to maintain, by their own personal gallantry, the character of
the nation they represented. There was, indeed, nothing more
to be done. We had ceased to be regarded as allies. So eager
and so general was the desire to expel the intruding Faringhi,
that the followers of Govind sank for a time all feelings of
national and religious animosity against their Afghan neigh-

26 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848.

bours, and invoked Muhammadan aid from the regions beyond
the passes of the Khaibar.

On the 21st of November, Lord Gough joined the army on
the left bank of the Satlaj. A veteran commander, who within
the space of a few years had fought more battles in different
parts of the world than were crowded into the lives of most
living warriors — a general whose uniform good fortune had
glossed over his want of forecast and science, and whose
repeated successes had silenced criticism — he was now about to
engage in military operations greater than those of his ante-
cedent campaigns, with, perhaps, even less knowledge of the
country and less consideration of the probable contingencies
of the war. But all men had confidence in him. India had
been won by a series of military mistakes that would have dis-
graced an ensign before the examination period, and, perhaps,
would not have been won at all if we had infused into our
operations more of the pedantry of military science. He was a
soldier, and all who fought under him honoured his grey hairs,
and loved him for his manly bearing, his fine frank character,
and even for the impetuosity which so often entangled his
legions in difficulties, and enhanced the cost of the victories he
gained.

The arrival of the Commander-in-Chief was the signal for the
immediate commencement of hostilities. The force then under
his personal command consisted of upwards of twenty thousand
men, with nearly a hundred pieces of artillery, and Gough was
in no temper for delay. On the day after his arrival in camp
was fought the battle of Eamnagar, the first of those disastrous
successes which have given so gloomy a character to the cam-
paign. The enemy had a strong masked battery on the other
side of the river, and very cleverly contrived to draw the
British troops into an ambuscade. The operations of the
Commander-in-Chief, commenced with the object of driving a
party of the rebels, who were on his side of the Chinab, across
the river, had the effect of bringing his cavalry and artillery
within reach of these concealed guns ; and twenty-eight pieces
of ordnance opened upon our advancing columns. The cavalry
were ordered to move forward to the attack as soon as an
opportunity presented itself. They found an opportunity, and
charged a large body of the enemy, the Sikh batteries pouring
in their deadly showers all the while. Many fell under the
fire of the guns, many under the sabre-cuts of the Sikh swords-

1848.] RETURN OF HENRY LAWRENCE. 27

men, many under the withering fire of a body of matchlockmen,
who, taking advantage of the nature of the ground, harassed
our horsemen sorely. Nothing was gained by our " victory ;"
but we lost many brave and some good soldiers ; and our troops
returned to camp weary and dispirited, asking what end they
had accomplished, and sighing over the cost.

Some days afterwards a force under General Thackwell was
sent out to cross the river, but being scantily supplied with in-
formation, and grievously hampered by instructions, it succeeded
only in losing a few men and killing several of the enemy. No
great object was gained, but great opportunities were sacrificed.
The Commander-in-Chief pompously declared that " it had
pleased Almighty God to vouchsafe to the British arms the
most successful issue to the extensive combinations rendered
necessary for the purpose of effecting the passage of the Chinab,
the defeat and dispersion of the Sikh force under the insurgent
Rajah Sher Singh and the numerous Sikh Sirdars who had the
temerity to set at defiance the British power." These " events,
so fraught with importance," were to " tend to most momentous
results." The results were, that the field of battle was shifted
from the banks of the Chinab to the banks of the Jhilam. The
enemy, who might have been taken in rear, and whose batteries
might have been seized, if Thackwell had been free to carry
out the most obvious tactics, escaped with all their guns;
and on the 13th of January bore bloody witness to the little
they had suffered, by fighting one of the greatest and most
sanguinary battles in the whole chronicle of Indian warfare.*

By this time Henry Lawrence had returned to the Panjab.
The news of the outbreak at Multan had reached him in
England, whilst still in broken health, and had raised within
him an incontrollable desire, at any hazard, to return to his
post. He had won his spurs, and he was eager to prove that
he was worthy of them, even at the risk of life itself. It has
been said that he ought uot to have quitted the Panjab, and
that if he had been at Labor in the spring of 1848, the war
would not then have been precipitated by the rebellion of
Mulraj, for " any one but a civilian would have foreseen that to
send Vans Agnew and Anderson down to Multan at the time

* A critical account of this campaign, based on the most accurate informa-
tion, is to be found in ' The Decisive Battles of India,' published by Messrs.
Allen & Co. -G. B. M.

28 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848-49.

and in the manner selected was almost sure to produce an
ebullition of feeling and violence." But if Lawrence
JKto£ had no.t gone to England at the time, he would, in all
probability, have died ; and though he might not have
sent the same men to Multan, he would have sent a mission
there for the same purpose. " I meant to have sent Arthur
Cocks," was his remark to the present writer, when the dis-
astrous news reached us in London. He saw at once that the
Multani revolt was but the prelude to a great national outbreak,
and though his friends trembled for his safety and counselled
delay, his strong sense of duty to the State overruled all per-
sonal considerations, and so he carried back his shattered frame
and his inexhaustible energies to the scene of the coming
conflict. Leaving London at the end of October, he reached
Bombay early in December, and pushing up the Indus with
characteristic rapidity of movement, joined the camp of General
Whish, before the walls of Multan, two days after the great
festival of Christmas.

On the second day of the new year, Whish, reinforced from
Bombay, carried the city of Multan. Long and obstinate had
been the resistance of the besieged ; and now that our storming
columns entered the breach, the garrison still, at the bayonet'^
point, showed the stuff of which they were made. Frightful
had been the carnage during the siege. Heaps of mangled
bodies about the battered town bore ghastly witness to the
terrible effects of the British ordnance. But many yet stood to
be shot down or bayoneted in the streets ; and the work of the
besieging force was yet far from its close. Mulraj was in the
citadel with some thousands of his best fighting-men ; and the
fort guns were plied as vigorously as before the capture of the
town. The strength of this formidable fortress seemed to
laugh our breaching batteries to scorn. Mining operations
were, therefore, commenced; but carried on, as they were,
beneath a constant discharge from our mortars, it seemed little
likely that the enemy would wait to test the skill of the engi-
neers. The terrible shelling to which the fortress was exposed
dismayed the pent-up garrison. By the 21st of January they
were reduced to the last extremity. Mulraj vainly endeavoured
to rally his followers. Their spirit was broken. There was
nothing left for them but to make a desperate sally and cut
their way through the besiegers, or to surrender at once. The
nobler alternative was rejected. Asking only for his own life

1849.] chiliInwAla. 29

and the honour of his women, Mulraj tendered on that day his
submission to the British General. Whish refused to guarantee
the first, but promised to protect the women ; and on the fol-
lowing morning the garrison marched out of Multan, and Diwan
Mulraj threw himself on the mercy of the British Government.

Meanwhile, Henry Lawrence, having witnessed the fall of
the city of Multan, hastened upwards to Firuzpur, conveyed to
Lord Dalhousie the first welcome tidings of that event, took
counsel with the Governor-General, made himself master of the
great man's views, then hurried on to Lahor, communicated
with the Besident, and on the same evening pushed on to the
camp of the Commander-in-Chief, which he reached on the
10th of January. He was there in no recognised official
position, for Currie's tenure of office did not expire until the
beginning of the ensuing month ; but he was ready for any
kind of service, and he placed himself at Lord Gough's disposal,
as an honorary aide-de-camp, or any other subordinate officer, in
the fine army which was now stretching out before him.

Three days after Lawrence's arrival in camp the battle of
Chilianwala was fought. The time had arrived when a far less
impetuous general than Gough might have deemed it incumbent
on him to force the Sikh army into a general action. It is true
that the final reduction of the fortress of Multan would have
liberated a large portion of "Whish's column, and greatly have
added to the strength of the British army on the banks of the
Jhilam. But the Sikh Sirdars, on this very account, were eager
to begin the battle, and would not have suffered us to wait for
our reinforcements. Gough already had a noble force under
him, equal to any service. It was panting for action. There
had been a lull of more than a month's duration, and all through
India there was a feeling of impatience at the protracted delay.
Gough, therefore, prepared for action. Ascertaining the nature
of the country occupied by the Sikh army, and the position of
their troops, he planned his attack upon sound tactical principles,
and fully instructed his generals in the several parts which
they were called upon to play. On the afternoon of the 13th
everything was ready, and the battle was to have been com-
menced early on the following morning. But, unwilling to
give the British General the long hours of the morrow's light,
from daybreak to sunset, that he wanted, to fight his battle
according to approved principles of modern warfare, the Sikh
leaders, when the day was far spent, determined, if possible, to

30 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1849-

aggravate him into an immediate encounter. They knew their
man. So they advanced a few guns, and sent some round-shot
booming in the direction of the British camp. The bait took.
The warm Hibernian temperament of the British leader could
not brook the insult. He moved up his heavy guns, responded
with some chance shots at the invisible enemy, and then, there
being little of the day left for his operations, gave the command
for his line to advance.

The story of what followed has been often told, and it is not
so gratifying a page of history that I need care to repeat it,
Night closed upon the fearful carnage of that terrible engage-
ment, and both armies claimed the victory. What it cost us is
written in the Gazette. Never was an official bulletin received
in England with a wilder outcry of pain and passion. The
past services, the intrepid personal courage, the open honest
character, the many noble qualities of the veteran Commander
were forgotten in that burst of popular indignation, and
hundreds of English families turned from the angry past to the
fearful future, and trembled as they thought that the crowning
action with that formidable enemy had yet to be fought by a
General so rash, so headstrong, and so incompetent.

In the high places of Government there was universal dis-
composure, and the greatest military authority in the country
shook his head with an ominous gesture of reproach. Then
arose a wild cry for Napier. The conqueror of the Biluchis
was sent out in hot haste to India to repair the mischief that
had been done by Gough, and to finish off the war with the
Sikhs in a proper workmanlike manner. But the hottest haste
could not wholly annihilate time and space, and though this
sudden supersession of the brave old chief, who had fought so
many battles and won so many victories, might shame his grey
hairs, it could not bring the war to a more rapid or a more
honourable close. The carnage of Chilian wala shook for a time
the confidence of the army in their chief, but it did not shake
the courage of our fighting-men, or destroy their inherent
capacity for conquest. It was a lesson, too, that must have
scored itself into the very heart of the British chief, and made
him a sadder man and a wiser commander. The errors of the
13th of January were to be atoned for by a victory which any
leader might contemplate with pride, and any nation with
gratitude. Scarcely had his appointed successor turned his
back upon England when Gough fought another great battle,

1849.] THE AFGHAN ALLIANCE. 31

which neither Napier, nor Wellington himself, who talked of
going in his place, could have surpassed in vigour of execution
or completeness of effect.

Anxiously was the intelligence of the surrender of Mulraj
looked for in the camp of the Commander-in-Chief. Since that
disastrous action at Chilianwala, Gough had been intrenching
his position, and waiting reinforcements from Multan. The
surrender of that fortress set free some twelve thousand men,
and Whish, with unlooked-for rapidity, marched to the banks
of the Jhilam to swell the ranks of the grand army. A great
crisis was now approaching. Thrice had the British and Sikh
forces met each other on the banks of those classical rivers
which had seen the triumphs of the Macedonian — thrice had
they met each other only to leave the issue of the contest yet
undecided. A great battle was now about to be fought — one
differing from all that had yet been fought since the Sikhs first
crossed the Satlaj, for a strange but not unlooked-for spectacle
was about to present itself — Sikhs and Afghans, those old
hereditary enemies, fighting side by side against a common foe.
The Sikh Sirdars, I have said, had been intriguing to secure
the assistance of the Amir of Kabul. For some time there
appeared little likelihood that old Dost Muhammad, whose
experience ought to have brought wisdom with it, would lend
himself to a cause which, in spite of temporary successes, was
so sure to prove hopeless in the end. But neither years, nor
experience, nor adversity had taught him to profit by the
lessons he had learned. The desire of repossessing himself of
Peshawar was the madness of a life. The bait was thrown
out to him, and he could not resist it. He came through the
Khaibar with an Afghan force, marched upon the Indus, and
threatened Atak, which fell at his approach ; despatched one of
his sons to the camp of Sher Singh, and sent a body of Durani
troops to fight against his old Faringhi enemy, who for years had
been the arbiter of his fate. How deplorable an act of senile
fatuity it was, the events of the 21st of February must have
deeply impressed upon his mind. On that day was fought an
action — was gained a victory, in the emphatic words of the
Governor-General, " memorable alike from the greatness of the
occasion, and from the brilliant and decisive issue of the
encounter. For the first time, Sikh and Afghan were banded
together against the British power. It was an occasion which
demanded the putting forth of all the means at our disposal,

32 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1849.

and so conspicuous a manifestation of the superiority of our
arms as should appal each enemy, and dissolve at once their
compact by fatal proof of its futility. The completeness of the
victory which has been won equals the highest hopes enter-
tained." And there was no official exaggeration in this ; none
of the vain boasting of the interested despatch-writer. At
Gujrat, to which place the enemy had unexpectedly moved
their camp, Lord Gough fought a great battle as a great battle
ought to be fought, coolly and deliberately, by a British Com-
mander. Every arm of his fine force was brought effectively into
play ; each in its proper place, each supporting and assisting the
others, and each covering itself with glory. From the early dawn
of that clear bright morning the cannonade commenced. Never
had the Bengal Artillery made a nobler display : never had it
been worked with more terrible effect. Besolute and well
handled as was the Sikh army, it could not stand up against
the steady fire of our guns. By noon the enemy were retreating
in terrible disorder, " their position carried, their guns, ammuni-
tion, camp equipage, and baggage captured, their flying masses
driven before their victorious pursuers, from mid-day receiving
most severe punishment in their flight." And all this was
accomplished with but little loss of life on the side of the
victorious army. It pleased the Almighty that the bloody
lessons of the Chinab and the Jhilam should not be thrown
away.

A division under Sir Walter Gilbert, an officer of great
personal activity, unequalled in the saddle, was ordered to
follow up the successes of Gujrat, and to drive the Afghans
from the Pan jab. And well did he justify the choice of his
chief. By a series of rapid marches, scarcely excelled by any
recorded in history, he convinced the enemy of the hopelessness
of all further resistance. The Barukzai force fled before our
advancing columns, and secured the passage of the Khaibar
before British influence could avail to close it against the
fugitives. By the Sikhs themselves the game had clearly been
played out. The Khalsa was now quite broken. There was
nothing left for Sher Singh and his associates but to trust
themselves to the clemency of the British Government. On
the 5th of March, the Bajah sent the British prisoners safely
into Gilbert's camp. On the 8th, he appeared in person to
make arrangements for the surrender of his followers ; and on
the 14th, the remnant of the Sikh army, some sixteen thousand

1849.] THE FATE OF DHULIP SINGH. 33

men, including thirteen Sirdars of note, laid down their arms
at the feet of the British General.

The military chief had now done his work, and it was time
for the appearance of the Civil Governor on the scene. Lord
Dalhousie was on the spot prepared for immediate action.
Already was his portfolio weighty with a proclamation which
was to determine the fate of the empire of Banjit Singh. I do
not suppose that a moment's doubt ever obscured the clear,
unsullied surface of the Governor-General's resolution. It was
a case which suggested no misgivings and prompted no hesita-
tion. The Sikhs had staked everything on the issue of the war,
and they had lost it in fair fight. They had repaid by acts of
treachery and violence the forbearance and moderation of the
British Government. We had tried to spare them ; but they
would not be spared. First one course, then another, had been
adopted in the hope that eventually a strong native Govern-
ment might be established, able to control its own subjects, and
willing to live on terms of friendly alliance with its neighbours.
Our policy had from the first been wholly unaggressive. There
was no taint of avarice or ambition in it. But it had not
been appreciated ; it had not been successful. The whole
system had collapsed. And now that again a British ruler was
called upon to solve the great problem of the Future of the
Panjab, he felt that there was no longer any middle course open
to him ; that there was but one measure applicable to the crisis
that had arisen ; and that measure was the annexation of the
country to the territories of the British Empire. So a pro-
clamation was issued announcing that the kingdom founded by
Ranjit Singh had passed under British rule ; and the wisdom
and righteousness of the edict few men are disposed to cpuestion.

The last Sikh Durbar was held at Lahor. The fiat of the
British conqueror was read aloud, in the presence of
the young Maharajah, to the remnant of the chiefs who
had not committed themselves by open rebellion ; and
a paper of Terms was then produced by which the British
Government bound themselves to pay the annual sum of forty
or fifty thousand pounds to the boy-Prince and his family,* so
long as he should remain faithful to his new master and abide

* This is not the loose diction of doubt. The agreement was, that tbo
British Government should pay not less than four, or more than five, lakhs o(
rupees.

VOL. I. D

March 29.
1849.

34 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1849.

by his sovereign will. It was a happy change for Dhuh'p
Singh, born as he was for the Sikh shambles ; for in his new
state he had abundant wealth, perfect safety, freedom from all
care, and the unsurpassable blessing of a saving faith. Be-
coming, in his twelfth year, the ward of the Governor-General,
he was placed under the immediate tutelage of an Assistant-
Surgeon of the Bengal Army,* who was so fit a man for the
office, so worthy of the confidence reposed in him, that the
little Sikh Prince, under his wise ministrations, developed into
a Christian gentleman, an English courtier, and a Scotch laird.
And it may be recorded here, before I pass on to the history of
British rule in the Panjab, that the mother of Dhulip Singh,
the widow of old Eanjit, that restless, turbulent Chand Kaur,
whose intrigues did so much to precipitate the fall of the Sikh
Empire, after a series of strange romantic vicissitudes, prema-
turely old, well-nigh blind, broken and subdued in spirit, found
a resting-place at last under the roof of her son, in a
quiet corner of an English castle, and died in a London
suburb, t

The proclamation which turned the Panjab into a British
province was no^ tne 0Dty weighty State-paper
Administration in the portfolio of the Governor-General. "Whilst
of tbe Panjab. Gough had been preparing to strike the last
crushing blow at the military power of the Khalsa, Dalhousie,
with Henry Elliot at his elbow, never doubting the issue, was
mapping out the scheme of administration under which it

* Afterwards Sir John Login.

f In the presence of the subsequent action of Dhulip Singh, of his abnega-
tion of the Christian faith, and of the position of " an English courtier
and a Scotch laird," it is impossible to allow this passage to pass without
remark. When Lord Dalhousie annexed the Panjab Dhulip Singh was the
•ward of the British Government. The British troops combated for him, and
on his behalf. The rebellion which culminated in the victory of Gujrat was
"brought about by the incompetence, not of Dhulip Singh, but of the British
■officials by whom he was surrounded, notably by that of the acting Resident,
Sir F. Currie. It is difficult, then, to see the moral grounds upon which it
was decided that Dhulip Singh should bear the brunt of the punishment.
Sir Henry Lawrence could not see them, neither can I. Having annexed his
oountry for no fault of his, mere child as he was, we were bound to assure to
him something more than a mere personal provision, to lapse upon his death.
i. am far from defending the recent action of Dhulip Singh, but it is most
certain that he had a very just cause for discontent.— G. B. M.

1849.] THE PANJAB AND ITS PEOPLE. 35

seemed good to him to govern the country which was about
to pass under our rule. The crowning victory of Gujrat found
everything devised and prepared to the minutest detail. The
men were ready ; the measures were defined. There was no
hurry, therefore — no confusion. Every one fell into his ap-
pointed place, and knew what he had to do. And never had
any Governor better reason to place unbounded confidence in
the men whom he employed ; never was any Governor more
worthily served.

The country which had thus fallen by right of conquest into
our hands embraced an area of fifty thousand square miles, and
contained a population of four millions of inhabitants. These
inhabitants were Hindus, Muhammadans, and Sikhs. The last
were a new people — a sect of reformed Hindus, of a purer faith
than the followers of the Brahminical superstitions. It was a
Sikh Government that we had supplanted ; and mainly a Sikh
army that we had conquered ; but it must not be supposed that
Panjabi is synonymous with Sikh, that the country was peopled
from one end to the other with the followers of Nanak and
Govind, or that they were the ancient dwellers on the banks
of those five legendary rivers. The cities of the Pan jab were
Muhammad an cities ; cities founded, perhaps, ere Muhammad
arose, enlarged and beautified by the followers of the Ghaznivite.
The monuments were mainly Muhammadan monuments, with
traces here and there of Grecian occupation and Bactrian rule.
Before Dehli had risen into the imperial city of the Mughuls,
Labor had been the home of Indian kings. But the rise of the
Sikh power was contemporaneous with our own, and the apostles
of the new Beformation had not numbered among their converts
more than a section of the people. And as was the population,
so was the country itself, of a varied character. Tracts of rich
cultivated lands, the cornfield and the rose-garden, alternated
with the scorched plain and the sandy desert. Here, as far as
the eye could reach, a dreary level of jungle and brushwood ;
there, a magnificent panorama, bounded by the blue ranges and
the snowy peaks of the Himalayah. And ever the great rivers
as they flowed suggested to the cultured mind of the English
scholar thoughts of that grand old traditionary age, when Porus
fought, and Alexander conquered, and Megasthenes wrote, and
the home-sick Argive, on the banks of those fabulous streams,
sighed for the pleasant country he had left, and rebelled against
his leader and his fate. It was a country full of interest and

D 2

36 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [184ft.

full of opportunity ; and it grew at once into the pet province
of the British Viceroy, the youngest and the most hopeful
of all.

That a country so situated, so circumstanced, and so peopled,
should not he brought under the system of administration pre-
vailing in our long-settled provinces was a mere matter of
course. But Dalhousie had no disposition to rush into the
opposite extreme of a purely military government. He had
at no time of his career any class prejudices, and he did not
see why soldiers and civilians should not work harmoniously
together in the administrative agency of the province. He had
faith in both ; each in his appointed place ; for there was rough
soldiers' work to be done, and much also that needed the calm
judgment and the tutored eye of the experienced civilian. So
he called in the aid of a mixed Staff of civil and military officers,
and at the head of this he placed a Board of Administration,
presided over by Henry Lawrence.*

The Board was to consist of three members, with secretaries
to do the pen-work of the administration, and to scatter its
instructions among the subordinate functionaries of the pro-
vince. It was not a controlling authority which a man of
Dalhousie's stamp was likely to affect ; scarcely, indeed, could
he be supposed to tolerate it. But he could not set aside the
great claims of Henry Lawrence, nor, indeed, could he safely
dispense with his services in such a conjuncture ; yet he was
unwilling to trust to that honest, pure-minded, soldier-states-
man the sole direction of affairs. The fact is that, with a
refinement of the justice and moderation which were such
conspicuous features of Henry's character, he dissented from
the policy of annexation. He thought that another effort might
have been made to save the Sikh Empire from destruction.
Out of this difficulty arose the project of the Board. It was
natural that Dalhousie should have desired to associate with
one thus minded some other statesman whose views were more
in harmony with his own. A Board of two is, under no cir-
cumstances, a practicable institution ; so a Triumvirate was
established. But sentence of death was written down against
it from the very hour of its birth.

* Sir Frederick Currie had by this time resumed his seat in the Supreme
Council of India.

1849.] JOHN LAWRENCE. 37

The second seat at the Board was given to the President's
brother, John Lawrence. An officer of the Company's Civil
Service, he had achieved a high reputation as an administrator ;
as one of those hard-working, energetic, conscientious servants
of the State, who live ever with the harness on their hack,
to whom labour is at once a duty and a delight, who do every-
thing in a large unstinting way, the Ironsides of the Public
Service. He had taken, in the earlier stages of his career, an
active part in the Eevenue Settlement of the North- Western
Provinces, and had subsequently been appointed Magistrate
of the great imperial city of Delhi, with its crowded, turbulent
population, and its constant under-current of hostile intrigue.
In this post, winning the confidence of men of all classes and
all creeds, Lord Hardinge found him when, in 1845, he jour-
neyed upwards to join the army of the Satlaj, There was an
openness, a frankness about him that pleased the old soldier,
and a large-hearted zeal and courage which proclaimed him a
man to be employed in a post of more than common difficulty,
beyond the circle of ordinary routine. So, after the campaign
on the Satlaj, when the Jalandhar Duab was taken in part pay-
ment of the charges of the war, John Lawrence was appointed
to superintend the administration of that tract of country ; and
on more than one occasion, during the enforced absence of
Henry from Lahor, in the first two years of the British
Protectorate, he had occupied his brother's seat at the capital,
and done his work with unvaried success. That there were
great characteristic differences between the two Lawrences
will be clearly indicated as I proceed ; but in unsullied honesty
and intrepid manliness, they were the counterparts of each
other. Both were equally without a stain.

The third member of the Lahor Board of Administration was
Mr. Charles Grenville Mansel, also a covenanted civilian, who
had earned a high reputation as one of the ablest financiers in
India, and who supplied much of the knowledge and experience
which his colleagues most lacked. His honesty was of as fine
a temper as theirs, but he was a man rather of thought than
of action, and wanted the constitutional robustness of his asso-
ciates in office. Perhaps his very peculiarities, rendering him,
as it were, the complement of the other two, especially marked
him out as the third of that remarkable triumvirate. Eegarded
as a whole, with reference to the time and circumstances of its
creation, the Board could not have been better constituted. It

38 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. (.1849.

did honour to the sagacity of Lord Dalhousie, and fully justified
the choice of agents he had made.

The system was one of divided labour and common respon-
sibility. On Heniy Lawrence devolved what was technically
called the " political" work of the Government. The disarming
of the country, the negotiations with the chiefs, the organisation
of the new Panjabi regiments, the arrangements for the educa-
tion of the young Maharajah, who had now become the ward
of the British Government, were among the immediate duties
to which he personally devoted himself; the chief care of John
Lawrence was the civil administration, especially the settlement
of the Land Revenue ; whilst Mansel superintended the general
judicial management of the province ; each, however, aiding
the others with his advice, and having a potential voice in the
general Council. Under these chief officers were a number of
subordinate administrators of different ranks, drawn partly from
the civil and partly from the military service of the Company.
The province was divided into seven divisions, and to each of
these divisions a Commissioner was appointed. Under each of
these Commissioners were certain Deputy-Commissioners, vary-
ing in number according to the amount of business to be done ;
whilst under them again were Assistant-Commissioners and
Extra Assistants, drawn from the uncovenanted servants of
Government — Europeans, Indo-Britons, or natives of pure
descent.

The officers selected for the principal posts under the Lahor
Board of administration were the very flower of the Indian
services. Dalhousie had thrown his whole heart into the work
which lay before him. Besolved that it should not be marred
by the inefficiency of his agents, he looked about him for men
of mark and likelihood, men in the vigour of their years, men
of good performance for the higher posts, and sturdy, eager-
spirited youths of good promise for the lower. It mattered not
to him whether the good stuff were draped in civil black or
military red. Far above all petty prejudices of that kind, the
Governor-General swept up his men with an eye only to the
work that was in them, and sent them forth to do his bidding.
Some had already graduated in Panjabi administration under
the Protectorate ; others crossed the Satlaj for the first time
with honours taken under Thomason and his predecessors in the
North- West Provinces. And among them were such men as
George Edmonstone, Donald Macleod, and Robert Montgomery

1849.1 THE PUNJAB SYSTEM. 39

from the one service ; Frederick Mackeson and George Alac-
gregor from the other ; such men, besides those already named, *
as Richard Temple, Edward Thornton, Neville Chamberlain,
George Barnes, Lewin Bowring, Philip Goldney, and Charles
Saunders ; soldiers and civilians working side by side, without
a feeling of class jealousy, in the great work of reconstructing
the administration of the Panjab and carrying out the executive
details ; whilst at the head of the department of Public Works
was Robert Napier, in whom the soldier and the man of science
met together to make one of the finest Engineer officers in the
world.

They found much to do, but little to undo. The Govern-
ment of Ranjit Singh had been of a rude, simple, elementary
character ; out of all rule ; informal ; unconstitutional ; un-
principled ! one great despotism and a number of petty
despotisms; according to our English notions, reeking with
the most " frightful injustice." But somehow or other it had
answered the purpose. The injustice was intelligible injustice,
for it was simply that of the strong will and the strong hand
crushed down in turn by one still stronger. Petty governors,
revenue-farmers, or kardars, might oppress the people and
defraud the State, but they knew that, sooner or later, a day
of reckoning would come when their accounts would be audited
by the process of compulsory disgorgement, or in some parts of
the country settled in the noose of the proconsular gibbet. No
niceties of conscience and no intricacies of law opposed an
obstacle to these summary adjustments. During the existence
of that great fiction, the Council of Regency, we had begun to
systematise and to complicate affairs ; and as we had found — at
least, as far as we understood the matter — a clear field for our
experiments, we now, on assuming undisguisedly the adminis-
tration of the country, had a certain basis of our own to
operate upon, and little or nothing to clear away.

The system of administration now introduced into the
Panjab, formal and precise as it may have been when com-
pared with the rude simplicity of the old Sikh Government,
was loose and irregular in comparison with the strict procedure
of the Regulation Provinces. The administrators, whether

* Ante, p. 12. I have here named only those distinguished during the
earlier deriod of our Panjabi career. Others there were, appointed at a later
period, equally entitled to honourable; mention.

40 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1849.

soldiers or civilians, were limited to the discharge of no par-
ticular departmental functions. They were judges, revenue-
collectors, thief-catchers, diplomatists, conservancy officers, and
sometimes recruiting Serjeants and chaplains, all in one. Men
trained in such a school as this, and under such masters as the
Lawrences, became equal to any fortune, and in no conjuncture,
however critical, were ever likely to fail. There was hardly
one among them who did not throw his whole heart into his
work ; who ever thought of ease, or leisure, or any personal
enjoyment beyond that which comes from an honest sense of '
duty done. They lived among the people of the countiy, their
tents open to all the points of the compass ; * and won by their
personal bearing the confidence and the admiration of all who
came within their reach.

And so, far sooner than even sanguine men ventured to
predict, the Pan jab began to settle down under its new rulers.
Even the old Jvhalsa fighting-men accepted their position, and
with a manly resignation looking cheerfully at the inevitable,
confessed that they had been beaten in fair fight, and sub-
mitted themselves to the English conqueror. Some were
enlisted into the new Panjabi Irregular Regiments, which were
raised for the internal defence of the province. Others betook
themselves, with the pensions or gratuities which were bestowed
upon them, to their fields, and merged themselves into the
agricultural population. There was no fear of any resurrection
of the old national cause. For whilst the people were forced
to surrender all their weapons of war — their guns, their
muskets, their bayonets, their sabres, their spears — the whole
province was bristling with British arms. An immense

* Sir John Malcolm used to say that the only way to govern the people of
a newly-acquired country was by means of char durwaseh kolah, or four doors
open. That the Panjabi officials well understood this, here is a pleasant
illustrative proof, from a paper written by one of them : — " For eight months
in the year the tent is the proper home of him who loves his duties and his
people. Thus he comes to know and be known of them ; thus personal in-
fluence and local knowledge give him a power not to be won by bribes or
upheld by bayonets. The notables of the neighbourhood meet their friend
and ruler on his morning march ; greybeards throng round his unguarded
door with presents of the best fruits of the land, or a little sugar, spices, and
almonds, according to the fashion of their country, and are never so happy as
when allowed to seat themselves on the carpet and talk over old times and
new events — the promise of the harvest and the last orders of the rulers." —
Calcutta Review, vol. xxxiii.

1849J THE SIKH SIRDARS. 41

military force was maintained in the Panjab. It was a happy
circumstance that, as the Indus had now become our boundary
and the country of the Sikhs our frontier province, it was
necessary for purposes of external defence, after the apparent
settling down of our newly-acquired territories, still to keep
our regular troops, European and native, at a strength more
than sufficient to render utterly harmless all the turbulent
elements of Panjabi society. Had the British army been with-
drawn from the Panjab, as at a latter period it was from Oudh,
it is hard to say what might not have resulted from our con-
fidence and incaution.

On the acquisition of a new country and the extinction of an
old dynasty, it has commonly happened that the chief sufferers
by the revolution have been found among the aristocracy of the
land. The great masses of the people have been considerately,
indeed generously treated, but the upper classes have been
commonly prostrated by the annexing hand, and have never
recovered from the blow. This may be partly attributed to
what is so often described as the " inevitable tendency " of such
a change from a bad to a good government. It has been
assumed that the men whom we have found in the enjoyment
of all the privileges of wealth and social position, have risen to
this eminence by spoliation and fraud, and maintained it by
cruelty and oppression. And it is true that the antecedents of
many of them would not bear a very jealous scrutiny. Now, so
far as the substitution of a strong and pure for a weak and
corrupt government must necessarily have checked the pros-
perous career of those who were living on illicit gains and
tyrannous exactions, it was, doubtless, the inevitable tendency
of the change to injure, if not to ruin them, as the leaf must
perish when the stem dies. But it must be admitted that for
some years past the idea of a native aristocracy had been an
abomination in the eyes of English statesmen in India; that
we had desired to see nothing between the Sarkar, or Govern-
ment, and the great masses of the people ; and that, however
little we might have designed it, we had done some great
wrongs to men, whose misfortune, rather than whose fault, it
was that they were the growth of a corrupt system. There
was at the bottom of this a strong desire for the welfare of the
people — an eager and a generous longing to protect the weak
against the tyranny of the strong; but benevolence, like
ambition, sometimes overleaps itself, and falls prostrate on the

42 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. |_1849.

other side, and out of our very love of justice come sometimes
unjust deeds.

To the great chiefs of the Pan jab the annexation of the
country to the British Empire was a source of sore disquietude.*
Mercy to the vanquished in the hour of victory was not one of
the weaknesses they had been accustomed to contemplate.
They had played for a great stake, and they had lost. They
had brought their losses on themselves. They had invited by
their own acts the conflict which had ruined them. In no one
instance had our policy been aggressive. We had not coveted
the possession of the Panjab. We had not invited either the first
or the second great conflict between the British and the Sikh
armies. A brave nation fighting for its independence is one of
the noblest spectacles of humanity ; and the leaders of such a
movement have just claim to sympathy and respect. But these
men had risen against us whilst they pretended to be our
friends. They had soiled their patriotism by treachery, and
forfeited their honour by falsehood and deceit. Still, to a man
of large mind and catholic spirit like Henry Lawrence, it could
not seem right to judge these Sirdars as he would the flower of
European chivalry. So he dealt gently with their offences ;
and when he came to consider their position under the new
Government, he respected their fallen fortunes, and laid a
lighter hand upon their tenures than higher authority was
altogether willing to sanction. That a large portion of the
revenue would be alienated by grants to military chiefs and to
priestly sinecurists was certain ; not less certain did it appear
that the money might be better bestowed. Still, it might be
politic, even in a financial aspect, to tolerate for a time abuses
of this kind, as not the most expensive means of reconciling the
influential classes to our rule. Thus argued Henry Lawrence.
So these privileged classes received from him, in many
instances, though not all that he wished to give, more perhaps

* This was admitted in the first Panjab Report, the following passage of
which may be advantageously quoted : — " A great revolution cannot happen
without injuring some classes. When a State falls, its nobility and its sup-
porters must to some extent suffer with it ; a dominant sect and party once
moved by political ambition and religious enthusiasm, cannot return to the
ordinary "level of society and the common occupations of life without feeling
some discontent and some enmity against their powerful but humane con-
querors. But it is probable that the mass of the people will advance in
material prosperity and in moral elevation under the influence of British rule."

1849.] JAGHIRS AND PENSIONS. 43

than they had dared to expect. Existing incumbents were
generally respected ; and the privileges enjoyed by one genera-
tion were to be only partially resumed in the next.

Thus, by a well-apportioned mixture of vigour and clemency,
the submission, if not the acquiescence, of the more dangerous
classes was secured ; and our administrators were left, un-
disturbed by the fear of internal revolt, to prosecute their
ameliorative measures. It would be beyond the scope of such a
narrative as this to write in detail of the operations which
were carried out, under the Labor Board, at once to render
British rule a blessing to the people, and the possession of the
Panjab an element of strength and security to the British
Empire. These great victories of peace are reserved for others
to record. Tbat the measures were excellent, that the men
were even better than the measures, that the administration of
the Panjab was a great fact, at which Englishmen pointed with
pride and on which foreigners dwelt with commendation, is
freely admitted, even by those who are not wont to see much
that is good in the achievements of the British Government in
India. Under the fostering care of the Governor-General, who
traversed the country from one end to the other, and saw every-
thing with his own eyes, the " Panjab system " became the
fashion, and men came to speak and to write of it as though it
were a great experiment in government originated by Lord Dal-
housie. But it was not a new system. It had been tried long
years before, with marked success, and was still in force in other
parts of India, though it had never been carried out on so large
a scale, or in so fine a country, or been the darling of a viceroy.
The only novelty in the construction of the administration was
the Labor Board, and that was abandoned as a failure.

I do not say that it ivas a failure ; but it was so regarded by
Lord Dalhousie, who, in 1853, remorselessly signed its death-
warrant. A delicate operation, indeed, was the breaking up of
the Panjabi Cabinet and the erection of an autocracy in its
place. It was the will of the Governor-General that the chief
direction of affairs should be consigned to the hands, not of
many, but of one. And when the rumour of this resolution
went abroad, there was scarcely a house, or a bungalow, or a
single-poled tent occupied by an English officer, in which the
future of the Panjab — the question of the Lawrences — was not
eagerly discussed. Was Henry or was John Lawrence to remain
supreme director of affairs ? So much was to be said in favour

44 THE ADMINISTEATION OF LOED DALHOUSIE. [1853.

of the great qualities of each brother, that it was difficult to
arrive at any anticipatory solution of the question. But it was
in the character of the Governor-General himself that the key
to the difficulty should have been sought. Lord Hardinge
would have chosen Henry Lawrence. Lord Dalhousie chose
John. No surprise is now expressed that it was so ; for, in
these days, the character and policy of Dalhousie are read by
the broad light of history. No regret is now felt that it was
so; for, when the great hurricane of which I am about to
write swept over India, each of those two great brothers was,
by God's providence, found in his right place. But there were
many at the time who grieved that the name of Henry Law-
rence, who had been for so many years associated with all their
thoughts of British influence in the Sikh country, and who had
paved the way to all our after successes, was to be expunged
from the list of Panjabi administrators. It was said that he
sympathised overmuch with the fallen state of Sikhdom, and
sacrificed the revenue to an idea; that he was too enger to
provide for those who suffered by our usurpation ; whilst Dal-
housie, deeming that the balance-sheet would be regarded as
the great test and touchstone of success, was eager to make the
Panjab pay. John Lawrence, it was said, better understood the
art of raising a revenue. He was willing, in his good brotherly
heart, to withdraw from the scene in favour of Henry ; but the
Governor-General needed his services. So he was appointed
Chief-Commissioner of the Panjab, and anew theatre was found
for the exercise of Henry Lawrence's more chivalrous bene-
volence amoDg the ancient states of Eajputana.

Outwardly, authoritatively, and not untruthfully, the ex-
planation was, that the work of the soldier-statesman was done,
that the transition-period in which Henry Lawrence's services
were so especially needed had passed ; that the business of
internal administration was principally such as comes within
the range of the civil officer's duties ; and that a civilian with
large experience, especially in revenue matters, was needed to
direct all the numerous details of the Executive Government.
Dalhousie never liked the Board. It was not a description of
administrative agency likely to find favour in his eyes ; and it
is not impossible that he placed, with some reluctance, at the
head of it a man who had not approved the original policy of
annexation. But he could not have read Henry Lawrence's
character so badly as to believe for a moment that, on that

1853.] HENRY AND JOHN LAWRENCE. 45

account, the policy once accomplished, he could have heen less
eager for its success, or less zealous in working it out. There
was the indication, however, of a fundamental difference of
opinion, which as time advanced hecame more and more appa-
rent, for Henry's generous treatment of his fallen enemies came
from that very source of enlarged sympathy which rendered the
policy of annexation distasteful to him. It was natural, there-
fore, that the Governor- General, who had resolved to rid himself
of the Board on the first fitting opportunity, should have selected
as the agent of his pet policy, the administrator of his pet pro-
vince, the civilian who concurred with, rather than the soldier
who dissented from, his views. The fitting opportunity came
at last, for there was a redistribution of some of the higher
political offices ; * and Dalhousie then swept away the obnoxious
institution, and placed the administration of the Panjab in the
hands of a single man.

Henry Lawrence bowed to the decision, but was not reconciled
to it. He betook himself to his new duties a sadder and a
wiser man. He did not slacken in good service to the State ;
but he never again had the same zest for his work. Believing
that he had been unfairly and ungratefully treated, he had no
longer his old confidence in his master, and as the Dalhousie
policy developed itself, under the ripening influence of time, he
saw more clearly that he was not one to find favour in the eyes
of the Governor-General. Much that he had before but dimly
seen and partly understood now became fully revealed to him
in the clear light of day. Once, and once only, there was any
official conflict ; but Henry Lawrence saw much that whilst he
deplored he could not avert, and he sighed to think that his prin-
ciples were out of date and his politics out of fashion.

In the meanwhile, John Lawrence reigned in the Panjab.
The capacity for administration, which he had evinced as a
Member of the Board, had now free scope for exercise, and was
soon fully developed. His name became great throughout the
land, and he deserved the praise that was lavished upon him.
Eight or wrong he did all in accordance with the faith that was

* The Haidarabad Residency was about to be vacated. It was an office
that had been held by Sir Charles Metcalfe and other eminent men. I
believe that Henry Lawrence suggested (for the days of the Board had been
for some time numbered) that either he or his brother should be sent to
Haidarabad. Lord Dalhousie, however, sent General Low to the Court of the
Nizam, and gave Henry Lawrence the scarcely less honourable appointment
of Governor-General's agent in Rajpiitana.

46 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1853.

in him. He was a fitting agent of Dalhousie's policy, only because
he believed in that policy. And happily the greater part of his
work lay along the straight road of undebatable beneficence.
How he worked, day after day, early and late, and how all men
worked under him, is a history now well known. He was em-
phatically a man without a weakness. Strong himself, bone
and muscle, head and heart, of adamantine strength, that would
neither bend nor break, he expected others to be equally strong.
They sighed, perhaps they inwardly protested, but they knew
that the work he exacted from them he gave, in his own
person, unstintingly to the State ; and they could not regard as
a hard task-master one who tasked himself hardest of all. From
moral infirmities of all kinds he appeared to be equally free.
He did not even seem to be ambitious. Men said that he had
no sentiment, no romance. We so often judge our neighbours
wrongly in this, that I hesitate to adopt the opinion ; but there
was an intense reality about him such as I have never seen
equalled. He seemed to be continually toiling onwards, up-
wards, as if life were not meant for repose, with the grand
princely motto, " I serve," inscribed in characters of light on his
forehead. He served God as unceasingly as he served the State;
and set before all his countrymen in the Panjab the true pattern
of a Christian gentleman.

And it was not thrown away. The Christian character of the
British administration in the Panjab has ever been one of its
most distinguishing features. It is not merely that great
humanising measures were pushed forward with an alacrity
most honourable to a Christian nation — that the moral elevation
of the people was continually in the thoughts of our adminis-
trators ; but that in their own personal characters they sought
to illustrate the religion which they professed. Wherever two
or three were gathered together, the voice of praise and prayer
went up from the white man's tent. It had been so during the
Protectorate, when, in the wildest regions and in the most
stirring times, men like the Lawrences, Eeynell Taylor, and
Herbert Edwardes, never forgot the Christian Sabbath.* And

* Many will remember that delightful little story, so pleasantly told in
Edwardes's " Year on the Panjab frontier," of Reynell Taylor's invitation to
prayer on a Sunday morning in February, 1848, and of the question whether
the half-caste colonel, " John Holmes," who had " always attended prayers at
Peshawar " in George Lawrence's house, was sufficiently a Christian to be
admitted to swell the two or three into three or four.

1849.1 THE BURMESE. 47

now that peace and order reigned over the country, Christianity
asserted itself more demonstratively, and Christian churches
rose at our bidding. There was little or none, too, of that great
scandal which had made our names a hissing and a reproach in
Afghanistan. Our English officers, for the most part, lived
pure lives in that heathen land ; and private immorality under
the administration of John Lawrence grew into a grave public
offence.

And so the Panjab administration floui'ished under the Chief-
Commissioner and his assistants ; * and the active
mind of Lord Dalhousie was enabled to direct itself c°nquest of

. Pegu*

to new objects. Already, far down on the south-
eastern boundary of our empire — at the point farthest removed
of all from the great country whose destinies we have been
considering — the seeds of war had been sown broad-cast. Ever
since 1826, when the first contest with Ava had been brought
to a close by the surrender to the English of certain tracts of
country in which no Englishman could live, our relations with
the Burmese had been on an unsatisfactory footing. In truth,
they were altogether a very unsatisfactory people ; arrogant
and pretentious, blind to reason, and by no means anxious to
manifest their appreciation of the nice courtesies of diplomatic
intercourse. To find just cause, according to European notions
for chastising these people would at any time have been easy.
But their insolence did us very little harm. We could tolerate,
without loss of credit or of prestige, the discourtesies of a
barbarian Government on the outskirts of civilisation. An
insult on the banks of the Ira wad i was very different from an
insult on the banks of the Jamna. The Princes and chiefs of
India knew nothing and cared nothing about our doings far
out beyond the black waters of the Bay of Bengal. But at last
these discourtesies culminated in an outrage which Lord Dal-
housie thought it became the British Government to resent.
Whether, under more discreet management, redress might have
been obtained and war averted, it is now of little moment to
inquire. A sea-captain was appointed to conduct our diplomacy
at Ban gun, and he conducted it successfully to a rupture. A

* On the abolition of the Board, Mr. Montgomery, who had succeeded Mr
Mansel as third member, became Judicial Commissioner, and Mr. Macleod
was appointed Financial Commissioner.

48 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [18*9.

war ensued, to which the future historian of India may'devote
a not very inviting chapter, but its details have nothing to do
with the story of this book. English arms were triumphant,
and the province of Pegu lay at our feet. Dalhousie annexed
it to the British Empire, " in order that the Government of
India might hold from the Burmese State both adequate com-
pensation for past injury, and the best security against future
danger." Thus did the British Empire, which had so recently been
extended to the north-west, stretch itself out to the south-east ;
and the white man sat himself down on the banks of the Irawadi
as he had seated himself on the banks of the Indus. There were
not wanting those who predicted that the whole of Burmah would
soon become British territory, and that then the " uncontrol-
able principle," by reference to which a great English statesman
justified the seizure of Sindh, would send the English conqueror
to grope his way through the Shan States and Siam to Cochin-
China. But these apprehensions were groundless. The ad-
ministrator began his work in Pegu, as he had begun his work
in the Panjab, and there was no looking beyond the frontier ;
but, on the other hand, a desire to avoid border disputes, or, if
they could not be avoided, to treat them as matters of light
account, inevitable and soon to be forgotten. There was a
military officer, admirably fitted for the work, why had served
long and successfully, as a civil administrator, in Arakan ; who
knew the Burmese language and the Burmese people, and had
a great name along the eastern coast. Those isolated regions
beyond the Bay of Bengal are the grave of all catholic fame.
Whilst the name of Lawrence was in all men's mouths,
Phayre was pursuing the even tenor of his way, content with a
merely local reputation. But the first, and as I write the only
commissioner of Pegu, is fairly entitled to a place in the very
foremost rank of those English administrators who have striven
to make our rule a blessing to the people of India, and have
not failed in the attempt.

In India the native mind readily pervades vast distances, and
takes little account of space that the foot can travel. But it is
bewildered and confused by the thought of the " black water."
The unknown is the illimitable. On the continent of India,
therefore, neither our war-successes nor our peace-successes in
the Burmese country stirred the heart of Indian society. In
the lines of the Sipahi and the shops of the money-changer they
were not matters of eager interest and voluble discourse. We

1849.J THE ANNEXATION OF PEGU. 49

might have sacked the cities of Ava and Amarapura, and
caused their sovereign lord to be trodden to death by one of his
white elephants without exciting half the interest engendered
by a petty outbreak in Central India, or the capture of a small
fort in Bundelkhand. The Princes and chiefs of the great
continent of Hindostan knew little and cared less about a
potentate, however magnificent in his own dominions, who
neither worshipped their gods nor spoke their language, and
who was cut off from their brotherhood by the intervention of
the great dark sea. We gained no honour, and we lost no
confidence, by the annexation of this outlying province ; but it
opened to our Native Soldiery a new field of service, and
unfortunately it was beyond the seas.

TOL L.

50 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848-56.

CHAPTER II.

So, three years after his arrival in India, Dalhousie had
brought to a close two great military campaigns, and had
captured two great provinces. He had then done with foreign
wars; his after- career was one of peaceful invasion. Erelong
there was a word which came to be more dreaded than that of
Conquest. The native mind is readily convinced by the inex-
orable logic of the sword. There is no appeal from such
arbitration. To be invaded and to be conquered is a state of
things appreciable by the inhabitant of India. It is his
" kismat ; " his fate ; God's will. One stronger than he cometh
and taketk all that he hath. There are, however, manifest
compensations. His religion is not invaded ; his institutions
are not violated. Life is short, and the weak man, patient aud
philosophical, is strong to endure and mighty to wait. But
Lapse is a dreadful and an appalling word ; for it pursues the
victim beyond the grave. Its significance in his eyes is nothing
short of eternal condemnation.

" The son," says the great Hindu lawgiver, " delivers his
father from the hell called Pat." There are, he tells us, different
kinds of sons ; there is the son begotten ; the son given ; the
son by adoption ; and other filial varieties. It is the duty of
the son to perform the funeral obsequies of the father. If they
be not performed, it is believed that there is no resurrection to
eternal bliss. The right of adoption is, therefore, one of the
most cherished doctrines of Hinduism. In a country where
polygamy is the rule, it might be supposed that the necessity
of adopting another man's offspring, for the sake of these cere-
monial ministrations, or for the continuance of an ancestral
name, would be one of rare occurrence. But all theory on the
subject is belied by the fact that the Princes and chiefs of India
more frequently find themselves, at the close of their lives,
without the solace of male offspring than with it. The Zenana

1848.] THE SATARAH LAPSE. 51

is not an institution calculated to lengthen out a direct line of
Princes. The alternative of adoption is one, therefore, to
which there is frequent resort ; it is a source of unspeakable
comfort in life and in death ; and politically it is as dear to the
heart of a nation as it is personally to the individual it affects.

It is with the question of Adoption only in its political
aspects that I have to do in this place. There is a private and
personal, as there is a public and political, side to it. No
power on earth beyond a man's own will can prevent him from
adopting a son, or can render that adoption illegal if it be
legally performed. But to adopt a son as a successor to private
property is one thing, to adopt an heir to titular dignities and
territorial sovereignty is another. Without the consent of the
Paramount State no adoption of the latter kind can be valid.
Whether in this case of a titular Prince or a possessor of
territorial rights, dependent upon the will of the Government,
Hinduism is satisfied by the private adoption and the penalties
of the sonless state averted, is a question for the pundits to
determine ; but no titular chief thinks the adoption complete
unless he can thereby transmit his name, his dignities, his
rights and privileges to his successor, and it can in no wise be
said that the son takes the place of his adoptive father if he
does not inherit the most cherished parts of that father's
possessions.

But whether the religious element does or does not rightly
enter into the question of political adoptions, nothing is
more certain than that the right, in this larger political
sense, was ever dearly prized by the Hindus, and was not alien
ated from them by the Lords-Paramount who had preceded us.
The imperial recognition was required, and it was commonly
paid for by a heavy "nazarana," or succession-duty, but in this
the Mughul rulers were tolerant. It was reserved for the British
to substitute for the right of adoption what was called " the
right of lapse," and in default of male heirs of the body law-
fully begotten to absorb native principalities into the great
amalgam of our British possessions. " In 18-49," wrote Lord
Dalhousie, in his elaborate farewell minute, " the principality
of Satarah was included in the British dominions by right of
lapse, the Eajah having died without male heir." The Princes
of Satarah were the descendants of Sivaji, the founder and the
head of the Maratha Empire. Their power and their glory had
alike departed. But they were still great in tradition, and

e 2

52 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. tl848.

were looked up to with respect by the Marathas of Western
India. In April, 1848, the last Eajah died; * and a question
arose as to whether, no direct male heir of the body having been
left by the deceased, a son by adoption, or a collateral member
of the family, should be permitted to succeed him, or whether
the rights and titles of the principality should be declared to be
extinct. Sir George Clerk was then Governor of Bombay. He
looked at the Treaty of 1819; saw that "the British Govern-
ment agreed to cede in perpetual sovereignty to the Rajah of
Satarah, his heirs and successors," the territories which he had
held, and at once declared himself in favour of the continuance
of the native Raj. The members of his Council looked upon
the question as purely one of expediency, and considered it the
duty of the British Government to decide it in the manner
most advantageous to ourselves. But the Governor refused to
admit any secondary considerations, saying, "If it be incon-
sistent with justice to refuse confirmation to the act of adoption,
it is useless to inquire whether it is better for the interests of
the people or of the empire at large to govern the Satarah terri-
tories through the medium of a native Rajah, or by means of
our own administration." The trumpet of that statesman was
not likely to give an uncertain sound.

When this question first arose, the Governor-General was in
his novitiate. But new as he was to the consideration of such
subjects, he does not appear to have faltered or hesitated. The
opinions, the practical expression of which came subsequently
to be called the " policy of annexation," were farmed at the
very outset of his career, and rigidly maintained to its close.
Eight months after his first assumption of the Government of
India, he placed on record a confession of faith elicited by this agi-
tation of the Satarah question. Subsequent events of far greater
magnitude dwarfed that question in the public mind, and later
utterances of the great minute-writer caused this first manifesto
to be comparatively forgotten ; but a peculiar interest must
ever be associated with this earliest exposition of Dalhousie's
political creed, and therefore I give it in the words of the

* Appa Sahib. He had succeeded his brother, who in 1839 was deposed,
and, as I think, very rightly, on account of a series of intrigues against the
British Government, equally foolish and discreditable. It is worthy of remark,
that Sir Robert Grant, being satisfied of the Rajah's guilt, proposed to punish
him in the manner least likely to be advantageous to ourselves.

1848.] THE POLICY OF ANNEXATION. 53

statesman himself : " The Government," he wrote on the 30th
August, 1848, "is bound in duty, as well as policy, to act on
every such occasion with the purest integrity, and in the most
scrupulous observance of good faith. Where even a shadow of
doubt can be shown, the claim should at once be abandoned. But
where the right to territory by lapse is clear, the Government
is bound to take that which is justly and legally its due, and to
extend to that territory the benefits of our sovereignty, present
and prospective. In like manner, while I would not seek to lay
down any inflexible rule with respect to adoption, I hold that,
on all occasions, where heirs natural shall fail, the territory should
be made to lapse, and adoption should not be permitted, except-
ing in those cases in which some strong political reason may
render it expedient to depart from this general rule. There
may be conflict of opinion as to the advantage or the propriety
of extending our already vast possessions beyond their present
limits. No man can more sincerely deprecate than I do any
extension of the frontiers of our territory which can be avoided,
or which may not become indispensably necessary from con-
siderations of our own safety, and of the maintenance of the
tranquillity of our provinces. But I cannot conceive it possible
for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every
just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the
territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of
States that may lapse in the midst of them ; for thus getting
rid of these petty intervening principalities, which may be
made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to
think, be a source of strength, for adding to the resources of the
public Treasury, and for extending the uniform application of
our system of government to those whose best interests we sin-
cerely believe will be promoted thereby. Such is the general
principle that, in our humble opinion, ought to guide the con-
duct of the British Government in its disposal of independent
States, where there has been a total failure of heirs whatsoever,
or where permission is asked to continue by adoption a succession
which fails in the natural line."

The Court of Directors of the East India Company confirmed
the decision of the Governor-General, and Satarah was annexed.
There were men, however, in the Direction who protested
against the measure as an act of unrighteous usurpation, " We
are called upon," said Mr. Tucker, ever an opponent of wrong,
"to consider and decide upon a claim of right, and I have

54 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1849.

always felt that our best policy is that which most closely
adheres to the dictates of justice." " We ought not to forget,"
said Mr. Shepherd, who, on great questions of this kind, wag
commonly to be found side by side with his veteran friend,
contending for the rights of the native Princes of India, " that
during the rise and progress of our empire in the East, our
Governments have continued to announce and proclaim to the
people of India that not only should all their rights and privi-
leges which existed under preceding Governments be preserved
and maintained, but that their laws, habits, customs, and pre-
judices should be respected." * And what right more cherished,
what custom more honoured, than the right and custom of
adoption ? But the majority of the Court of Directors supported
the views of the Governor-General. They had heard the voice
of the charmer. And from that time the policy of Dalhousie
became the policy of Leadenhall-street, and the " Eight of
Lapse " was formally acknowledged.

And it was not, for reasons which I have already given,
likely long to remain a dead letter. Soon another of the

agpur' great Maratha chiefs was said to be dying, and in a few
days news came to Calcutta that he was dead. It was the
height of the cold season of 1853 — a few days before Christmas
— when the slow booming of minute guns from the Saluting
Battery of Fort William announced the death of Baguji Bhonsla,
Bajah of Nagpur. At the age of forty -seven he succumbed to a
complication of disorders, of which debauchery, cowardice, and
obstinacy were the chief. There have been worse specimens of
royalty, both in Eastern and Western Palaces, than this poor,
worn-out, impotent sot ; for although he was immoderately
addicted to brandy and dancing-girls, he rather liked his people
to be happy, and was not incapable of kindness that caused no
trouble to himself. He had no son to succeed him ; a posthu-
mous son was an impossibility; and he had not adopted an
heir.

It may seem strange and contradictory that if the right of
adoption as sanctioned by religion and prescribed by ancestral
usage be so dear to the people of India, they should ever fail to
adopt in default of heirs of their body. But we know that they
often do ; and the omission is readily explicable by a reference

* Colonel Oliphaut and Mr. Leslie Melville recorded minutes on the same
side.

1853.] THE NAGPUR SUCCESSION. 55

to the ordinary weaknesses of humanity. We know that even
in this country, with all the lights of civilisation and Christi-
anity to keep us from going astray, thousands of reasoning
creatures are restrained from making their wills by a vague
feeling of apprehension that there is something " unlucky " in
such a procedure ; that death will come the sooner for such a
provision against its inevitable occurrence. What wonder,
then, that in a country which is the very hotbed of superstition,
men should be restrained by a kindred feeling from providing
against the event of their dissolution? But in this case there
is not only the hope of life, but the hope of offspring, to cause
the postponement of the anticipatory ceremony. Men, under
the most discouraging circumstances, still cling to the belief
that by some favourable reaction of nature they may, even when
stricken in years, beget an heir to their titles and possessions.
In this sense, too, adoption is held to be unlucky, because it is
irreligious. It is like a surrender of all hope, and a betrayal of
want of faith in the power and goodness of the Almighty. No
man expects to beget a son after he has adopted one.

In the case, too, of this Maratha Prince, there were special
reasons why he should have abstained from making such a pro-
vision for the continuance of his House. According to the law
and usage of his country, an adoption by his widow would have
been as valid as an adoption by himself. It was natural, there-
fore, and assuredly it was in accordance with the character of
the man, who was gormandising and dallying with the hand of
death upon him, that he should have left the ceremony to be
performed by others, Whether it was thus vicariously per-
formed is not very clearly ascertainable. But it is certain that
the British Eesident reported that there had been no adoption.
The Eesident was Mr. Mansel, who had been one of the first
members of the Labor Board of Administration — a man with a
keen sense of justice, favourable to the maintenance of native
dynasties, and therefore, in those days, held to be crotchety and
unsound. He had several times pressed the Rajah on the sub-
ject of adoption, but had elicited no satisfactory response. He
reported unequivocally that nothing had been done, and asked
for the instructions of the Supreme Government.

Lord Dalhousie was then absent from Calcutta. He was
making one of his cold-weather tours of inspection — seeing with
his own eyes the outlying province of Pegu, which had fallen
by right of conquest into his hands. The Council, in hia

56 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1853.

absence, hesitated to act, and all the instructions, therefore,
which they could send were to the effect that the Resident
should provide for the peace of the country, and keep things
quiet until further orders. There was no doubt about Dal-
housie's decision in such a case. Had the Rajah adopted a son,
there was little likelihood of the Governor- General's sanction of
the adoption ; but as he had wilfully failed to perform the
ceremony, it appeared to be as clear as noon-day that the great
organ of the Paramount State would jn'onounce the fatal sen-
tence of Lapse.

Dalhousie returned to Calcutta, and with characteristic
energy addressed himself to the masteiy of the whole question.
Before the first month of the new year had worn to a
Ji8'548' cl°se» ne attached his signature to an elaborate minute,
in which he exhausted all the arguments which could be
adduced in favour of the annexation of the country. Printed
at full length, it would occupy fifty pages of this book. It was
distinguished by infinite research and unrivalled powers of
special pleading. It contended that there had been no adoption,
and that if there had been, it would be the duty of the British
Government to refuse to recognise it. " I am well aware," he
said, "that the continuance of the Raj of Nagpur under some
Maratha rule, as an act of grace and favour on the part of the
British Government, would be highly acceptable to native
sovereigns and nobles in India ; and there are, doubtless, many
of high authority who would advocate the policy on that special
ground. I understand the sentiment and respect it ; but re-
membering the responsibility that is upon me, I cannot bring
my judgment to admit that a kind and generous sentiment
should outweigh a just and prudent policy."

Among the members of the Supreme Council at that time was
Colonel John Low. An old officer of the Madras army, who
long years before, when the Peshwa and the Bhonsla were in
arms against the British, had sate at the feet of John Malcolm,
and had graduated in diplomacy under him ; he had never for-
gotten the lessons which he had learnt from his beloved chief;
he had never ceased to cherish those " kind and generous senti-
ments " of which the Governor-General had spoken in his minute.
His whole life had been spent at the Courts of the native Princes
of India. He had represented British interests long and faithfully
at the profligate Court of Lakhnao. He had contended with
the pride, the obstinacy, and the superstition of the effete

1854.] JOHN LOW. 67

Princes of Kajputana. He had played, and won, a difficult
game, with the bankrupt State of Haidarabad. He knew what
were the vices of Indian Princes and the evils of native mis-
rule. But he had not so learnt the lesson presented to him by
the spectacle of improvident rulers and profligate Courts ; of
responsibilities ignored and opportunities wasted ; as to believe
it to be either the duty or the policy of the Paramount Govern-
ment to seek " just occasions " for converting every misgoverned
principality into a British province. Nor had he, knowing as
he did, better perhaps than any of his countrymen, the real
character of such misgovernment, ever cherished the conviction
that the inhabitants of every native State were yearning for
the blessings of this conversion. There were few such States
left — Hindu or Muhammadan — but what remained from the
wreck of Indian dynasties he believed it to be equally just and
politic to preserve. And entertaining these opinions he spoke
them out ; not arrogantly or offensively, but with what I believe
may be described as the calm resolution of despair. He knew
that he might speak with the tongue of angels, and yet that his
speech would no more affect the practical result than a sounding
brass or a tinkling cymbal. " What am I against so many ? he
said ; nay, what am I against one ? Who will listen to the
utterance of my ideas when opposed to the " deliberately-
formed opinion of a statesman like the Marquis of Dalhousie, in
whose well-proved ability and judgment and integrity of pur-
pose they have entire confidence ?"* But great statesmen in
times past had thought that the extension of British rule in
India was, for our own sakes, to be arrested rather than
accelerated ; that the native States were a source to us of
strength rather than of weakness, and that it would go ill with
us when there were none left.j

Strong in this belief, Colonel Low recorded two minutes, pro-

* Minute of Colonel John Low. February 10, 1854.

t " If Great Britain shall retain her present powerful position among the
States of Europe, it seems highly probable that, owing to the infringement of
their treaties on the part of native Princes and other causes, the whole of
India will, in the course of time, become one British province ; but many
eminent statesmen have been of opinion that we ought most carefully to
avoid unnecessarily accelerating the arrival of that great change ; and it is
within my own knowledge that the following five great men were of that
number — namely, Lord Hastings, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, the
Hon. Mountstuart Elphinatone, and Lord Metcalfe." — Minute, Feb. 10, 1854.

58 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1834.

testing against the impolicy and the injustice of the proposed
annexation of Nagpur. He said that already the annexation of
Satarah had in many parts of India had a bad moral effect ; *
that it had shaken the confidence of the people in the justice
and good faith of the British Government ; that people had
asked what crime Satarah had committed that sentence of
political death should thus have been pronounced against it ;
that throughout India acquisition by conquest was well under-
stood, and in many cases admitted to be right ; that the annexa-
tion of the Panjab, for example, had not been regarded as a wrong,
because the chiefs and people had brought it on themselves, but
that the extinction of a loyal native State, in default of heirs,
was not appreciable in any part of India, and that the exercise
of the alleged right of lapse would create a common feeling of
uncertainty and distrust at every Durbar in the country. He
dwelt upon the levelling effects of British dominion, and urged
that, as in our own provinces, the upper classes were invariably
trodden down, it was sound policy to maintain the native States,
if only as a means of providing an outlet for the energies of men
of good birth and aspiring natures, who could never rise under
British rule. He contended that our system of administration
might be far better than the native system, but that the people
did not like it better ; they clung to their old institutions, how-
ever defective, and were averse to change, even though a change
for the better. " In one respect," he said, " the natives of
India are exactly like the inhabitants of all parts of the known
world ; they like their own habits and customs better than
those of foreigners."

Having thus in unmeasured opposition to the Dalhousie
theory flung down the gauntlet of the old school at the feet of
the Governor-General, Low ceased from the enunciation of
general principles, and turned to the discussion of the particular

* " When I went to Malwa, in 1850, where I met many old acquaintances,
whom I had known when a very young man, and over whom I held no autho-
rity, I found these old acquaintances speak out much more distinctly as to
their opinion of the Satarah case ; so much so, that I was on several occa-
sions obliged to check thein. It is remarkable that every native who ever
spoke to me respecting the annexation of Satarah, asked precisely the same
question : ' What crime did the late Rajah commit that his country should
be seized by the Company ? ' Thus clearly indicating their notions, that if
any crime had been committed our act would have been justifiable, and not
otherwise." — Minute of Colonel Low, Feb. 1 0, 1854.

1854.] LOW'S MINUTES. 59

case before him. He contended that the treaty between the
British Government and the late Eajah did not limit the suc-
cession to heirs of his body, and that, therefore, there was a
clear title to succession in the Bhonsla family by means of a son
adopted by either the Eajah himself or by his eldest widow, in
accordance with law and usage. The conduct, he said, of the
last Prince of Nagpur had not been such as to alienate this
right; he had been loyal to the Paramount State, and his
country had not been misgoverned ; there had been nothing to
call for military interference on our part, and little to compel
o-rave remonstrance and rebuke. For what crime, then, was
his line to be cut off and the honours of his House extinguished
for ever ? To refuse the right of adoption in such a case would,
he alleged, be entirely contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter,
of the treaty. But how was it to be conceded when it was not
claimed ; when no adoption had been reported ; when it was
certain that the Eajah had not exercised his right, and there
had been no tidings of such a movement on the part of his
widow? The answer to this was, that the Government had
been somewhat in a hurry to extinguish the Eaj without wait-
ing for the appearance of claimants, and that if they desired to
perpetuate it, it was easy to find a fitting successor.

Of such opinions as these Low expected no support in the
Council-chamber of Calcutta — no support from the authorities
at home. It little mattered, indeed, what the latter might
think, for the annexation of Nagpur was decreed and to be
accomplished without reference to England. As the extinction
of the Satarah State had been approved by the Company, in the
face of an undisputed adoption asserted at the right time, Dal-
housie rightly judged that there would be no straining at a
gnat in the Nagpur case, where there had been no adoption at all.
Indeed, the general principles upon which he had based his pro-
ceedings towards Satarah, in the first year of his administration
having been accepted in Leaden hall-street, there could be no
stickling about so mild an illustration of them as that afforded
by the treatment of Nagpur. The justification of the policy in
the latter instance is to be found in the fact that there was no
assertion of an adoption — no claim put forward on behalf of any
individual — at the time when the British Government was
called upon to determine the course to be pursued. It is true
that the provisional Government might, for a time, have been
vested in the eldest widow of the deceased Prince, adoption by

60 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1854.

whom would have been recognised by Hindu law and Maratha
usage ; but it was not probable that the British Government
would have thus gone out of its way to bolster up a decayed
Maratha dynasty, when the head of that Government con-
scientiously believed that it was the duty of the Paramount
State to consolidate its dominions by recognising only among
these effete Princes succession by direct heirship of the body.
Cherishing the faith which he did, Dalhousie would have gone
grievously wrong, and he would have stood convicted of a
glaring inconsistency, if he had adopted any other course ; so
the kingdom of Barar was declared to have lapsed to the British
Government, and the family of the Bhonsla was extinct.

The country passed under British rule, and the people be-
came British subjects, without an audible murmur of discontent
except from the recesses of the palace. There the wretched
ladies of the royal household, at first dismayed and paralysed
by the blow which had fallen upon them, began, after a little
space, to bestir themselves and to clamour for their asserted
rights. Liberal pensions had been settled upon them ; but their
family was without a head, and that which might soon have
faded into an idea was rendered a galling and oppressive reality
by the spoliation of the palace, which followed closely upon the
extinction of the Kaj. The live stock and dead stock of the
Bhonsla were sent to the hammer. It must have been a great
day for speculative cattle-dealers at Sitabaldi when the royal
elephants, horses, and bullocks were sold off at the price of car-
rion ; * and a sad day, indeed, in the royal household, when the
venerable Bankha Bai,f with all the wisdom and moderation
of fourscore well-spent years upon her, was so stung by a sense
of the indignity offered to her, that she threatened to fire the
palace if the furniture were removed. But the furniture was
removed, and the jewels of the Bhonsla family, with a few pro-
pitiatory exceptions, were sent to the Calcutta market. And I
have heard it said that these seizures, these sales, created a

* Between five and six hundred elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks
were sold for 1300Z. The Ham's sent a protest to the Commissioner, and
memorialised the Governor-General, alleging, in the best English that the
Palace could furnish, that "on the 4th instant (Sept.) the sale of animals, viz.
bullocks, horses, camels, and elephants, commenced to sell by public auction
and resolution — a pair her hackery bullocks, valued 100 rupees, sold in the
above sale for 5 rupees."

t The Bankha Baf was a widow of the deceased Rajah's grandfather.

J854] EXTINCTION OF THE BHONSLA" FAMILY. 61

worse impression, not only in Barar, but in the surrounding
provinces, than the seiziire of the kingdom itself. *

But even in the midst of their degradation, these unfortunate
ladies clung to the belief that the Bhonsla family would some
day be restored and rehabilitated. The Governor-General had
argued that the widow, knowing that her husband was dis-
inclined to adopt, had, for like reasons, abstained from adoption.
He admitted the right according to Maratha usage, but declared
that she was unwilling to exercise it. He contended, too, that
the Bankha Bai, the most influential of the royal ladies, would
naturally be averse to a measure which would weaken her own
authority in the palace. But his logic halted, and his prophecy
failed. Both the elder and the younger lady were equally
eager to perpetuate the regal dignities of their House. Mr.
Mansel had suggested a compromise, in the shape of an arrange-
ment somewhat similar to that which had been made with the
Nawabs of the Karnatik, by which the title might be main-
tained, and a certain fixed share of the revenue set apart for
its dotation. But he had been severely censured for his indis-
cretion, and had left Nagpiir in disgrace. He was, perhaps, the
best friend that the Banis had in that conjuncture ; but — such
is the value of opinion — they accused him, in the quaint Palace-
English of their scribe, of " endeavouring to gain baronetage
and exaltation of rank by reporting to the Governor-General
that the late Bajah was destitute of heirs to succeed him, with
a view to his Lordship being pleased to order the annexation
of the territory." | But there was not a man in the country

* I know that the question of public and private property, in such cases, is
a very difficult one, and I shall not attempt to decide it here. I only speak
of the intense mortification which these sales create in the family itself, and
the bad impression which they produce throughout the country. Eightly or
wrongly, they cast great discredit on our name ; and the gain of money is not
worth the loss of character.

t Lord Dalhousie, in his Nagpiir Minute, says that the Rajah did not
adopt, partly because he did not like to acknowledge his inability to beget a
son, and partly because he feared that the existence of an adopted son might
some day be used as a pretext for deposing him. He then observes : " The
dislike of the late Rajah to the adoption of a successor, was of course known
to his widow ; and although the custom of the Marathas exempts her from that
necessity for having the concurrence of her husband in adoption, which general
Hindu law imperatively requires, in order to render the act of adoption valid,
still the known disinclination of the Rajah to all adoption could not fail to
disincline his widow to have recourse to adoption after his decease." It will

62 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1854.

less disposed to annex provinces and to humour Governors than
Charles Mansel, and instead of being exalted in rank, he sacri-
ficed his prospects to his principles and retired from the
Service.

Failing altogether to move the Governor-General, the Ranis
sent agents to London, but with no better result. After the
manner of native emissaries from Indian Courts, they spent
large sums of money in feeing lawyers and printing pamphlets,
without making any impression on Leadenhall -street or Cannon-
row, and at last, being recalled by their employers, and having
nothing wherewith to pay their debts, they flung themselves
on the generosity of their opponents, and were sent home by
the help of the great Corporation whom they had reviled.
Meanwhile, the elder widow of the late Rajah died, and a
boy, of another branch, whom the Ranis called Janoji Bhonsla,
and in whose person they desired to prolong the Nagpur dynasty,
was formally adopted by the dying lady. Clutching at any
chance, however desperate, an attempt was made to revive the
question of the political adoption; but the sagacity of the
Bankha Bai must have seen that it was too late, and that
nothing but the private property of the deceased Princess
could be thus secured to the adopted heir. The country of
the Bhonslas had become as inalienably a part of the Company's
possessions as the opium go-downs of Patna, or the gun-factory
at Kasipur.

Thus, within a few years of each other, the names of two of
the great rulers of the Maratha Empire ceased from off the roll
of Indian Princes ; and the territories of the Company were
largely increased. Great in historical dignity as was the
Satarah Raj, it was comparatively limited in geographical
extent, whilst the Bhonsla, though but a servant in rank,
owned rich and productive lands, yielding in profusion, among
other good gifts, the great staple of our English manufactures.*
Whilst the annexation of the Paujab and of Pegu extended the
British Empire at its two extreme ends, these Maratha acquisi-

be seen at once that the ordinary logical acumen of the Governor-General
failed him in this instance, for the very reasons given by the writer himself
for the failure of adoption by the Rajah ceased altogether to be operative,
ipso facto, " after his decease."

* Lord Dalhousie put forth the cotton-growing qualities of the Barar
country as one of the many arguments which he adduced in favour of the
annexation of the territory.

1854.] SATARAH AND NAGPtJR. (?3

tions helped to consolidate it. Some unseemly patches, breaking
the great rose-hued surface, which spoke of British supremacy
in the East, were thus effaced from the map ; and the Eight
of Lapse was proclaimed to the furthermost ends of our Indian
dominions.

There is a circumstantial difference between these two cases,
inasmuch as that, in the one, there was an actual and undis-
puted adoption by the deceased Eajah, and in the other there
was none ; but as Dalhousie had frankly stated that he woiild
not have recognised a Nagpur adoption had there been one, the
two resumptions were governed by the same principle. And
this was not a mere arbitrary assertion of the power of the
strong over the weak, but was based, at all events, on a plausible
substratum of something that simulated reason and justice. It
was contended that, whenever a native Prince owed his exist-
ence as a sovereign ruler to the British Government, that
Government had the right, on failure of direct heirs, to resume,
at his death, the territories of which it had originally placed
him in possession. The power that rightly gives, it was
argued, may also rightfully take away. Now, in the cases
both of Satarah and Nagpur, the Princes, whom the British
Government found in possession of those States, had forfeited
their rights : the one by hidden treachery and rebellion, the
other by open hostility. The one, after full inquiry, had been
deposed ; the other, many years before, had been driven into
the jungle, and had perished in obscurity, a fugitive and an
outcast.* In both cases, therefore, the " crime " had been
committed which the natives of India are so willing to recog-
nise as a legitimate reason for the punishment of the weaker
State by the stronger. But the offence had been condoned, and
the sovereignty had been suffered to survive ; another member
of the reigning family being set up by the Paramount State
in place of the offending Prince. Both Partab Singh and
Baguji Bhonsla, as individuals, owed their sovereign power

* It is to be observed, too, with respect to Satarah, that not only had the
XaBt Rajah been elevated by the British Government, but that the Raj itself
had been resuscitated by us in the person of bis predecessor. We had found
the Rajah prostrate and a prisoner, almost, it may be said, at his last gasp;
we had rescued bim from his enemies, and set him up in a principality of his
own; a fact which, assuming tbe validity of the argument against adoption,
necessarily imparted additional force to it. The same may be said of the
Nagpur Raj. It was "resuscitated" by the British Government.

64 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [185*.

to the grace and favour of the British Government. All this
is historical fact. It may be admitted, too, that when the
crimes of which I have spoken were committed by the heads
of the Satarah and Nagpur families, the British Government
would have been justified in imposing conditions upon the
restoration of the Baj, to the extent of limiting the succession
to heirs of the body, or even in making a personal treaty with
the favoured Prince conferring no absolute right of sovereignty
upon his successors. But the question is whether, these restric-
tions, not having been penally imposed, at the time of forfeiture,
the right which then might have been exercised could be justly
asserted on the occurrence of a subsequent vacancy created by
death ? Lord Dalhousie thought that it could — that the circum-
stances under which the Satarah and Nagpur Princes had
received their principalities as free gifts from the British
Government conferred certain rights of suzerainty on that
Government, which otherwise they could not have properly
asserted. But, on the other hand, it is contended that both
principalities, whatsoever might have been the offences com-
mitted years before by their rulers, had been re-established in
their integrity — that no restrictions as to their continuance
had then been imposed — that treaties had been concluded
containing the usual expressions with respect to succession —
in a word, that the condonation had been complete, and that
both the Satarah and the Nagpur Houses really possessed all
the rights and privileges which had belonged to them before
the representative of the one compromised himself by a silly
intrigue, and the head of the other, with equal fatuity, plunged
into hostilities which could result only in his ruin.

This justificatory plea, based upon the alleged right of the
British Government to resume, in default of direct heirs,
tenures derived from the favour of the Lord Paramount, was
again asserted about the same time, but with some diversity of
application. Comparatively insignificant in itself, the case
claims especial attention on account of results to be hereafter
recorded in these pages. In the centre of India, among the
small principalities of Bundelkhand, was the state of

jh&nsi. jk£ngi} keici "by a Maratha chief, originally a vassal
of the Peshwa. But on the transfer to the British Govern-
ment of that Prince's possessions in Bundelkhand, the former
had resolved " to declare the territory of Jhansi to be hereditary
in the family of the late SheoBao Bhao, and to perpetuate with

1854.J JHANSI. 65

his heirs the treaty concluded with the late Bhao ; " and,
accordingly, a treaty was concluded with the ruling chief, Ram
Chand, then only a Subahdar, constituting " him, his heirs,
and successors," hereditary rulers of the territory. Loyal and
well disposed, he won the favour of the British Government, who,
fifteen years after the conclusion of the treaty, conferred upon
him the title of Rajah, which he only lived three years to enjoy.

For all purposes of succession he was a childless man ; and
so various claimants to the chiefship appeared. The British
agent believed that the most valid claim was that of the late
Rajah's uncle, who was at all events a direct lineal descendant
of one of the former Subahdars. He was a leper, and might
have been rejected ; but, incapable as he was, the people accepted
him, and, for three years, the administration of Jhansi wa9
carried on in his name. At the end of those three years
he died, also without heirs of the body, and various 183
claimants as before came forward to dispute the succession.
Having no thought of absorbing the State into our British
territories, Lord Auckland appointed a commission of British
officers to investigate and report upon the pretensions of the
several claimants ; and the result was, that Government, rightly
considering that if the deceased Rajah had any title to the
succession, his brother had now an equally good title, acknow-
ledged Gangadhar Rao's right to succeed to the hereditary
chiefship.

Under the administration of Ragunath the Leper the country
had been grossly mismanaged, and as his successor was scarcely
more competent, the British Government undertook to manage
the State for him, and soon revived the revenue, which had
dwindled down under the native rulers. But, in 1843, after
the amputation of a limb of the territory for the support of the
Bundelkhand Legion, the administration was restored to Gan-
gadhar Rao, who carried on the government for ten years, and
then, like his predecessors, died childless.

Then again arose the question of succession ; but the claims
of the different aspirants to the Raj were regarded with far
other eyes than those which had scrutinised them in times past.
The Governor-General recorded another fatal minute, by which
the death-warrant of the State was signed. It was ruled that
Jhansi was a dependent State, held by the favour of the Peshwa,
as Lord Paramount, and that his powers had devolved upon
the British Government. A famous minute recorded, in 1837,

vol. L F

66 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1853.

by Sir Charles Metcalfe, was cited to show the difference
between Hindu sovereign Princes and " chiefs who hold grants
of land or public revenue by gift from a sovereign or paramount
Power," and to prove that, in the latter case, " the Power which
made the grant, or that which by conquest or otherwise has
succeeded to its rights, is entitled to limit succession," and to
" resume on failure of direct heirs of the body."* To demon-
strate the right to resume was in those days tantamount to
exercising it. So Jhansi was resumed. In vain the widow of
the late Eajah, whom the Political Agent described as " a lady
bearing a high character, and much respected by every one at
Jhansi," protested that her husband's House had ever been
faithful to the British Government — in vain she dwelt upon
services rendered in former days to that Government, and the
acknowledgments which they had elicited from our rulers — in
vain she pointed to the terms of the treaty, which did not, to
her simple understanding, bar succession in accordance with
the laws and usages of her country — in vain she quoted prece-
dents to show that the grace and favour sought for Jhansi had
been yielded to other States. The fiat was irrevocable. It had
been ruled that the interests both of the Jhansi State and the
British Government imperatively demanded annexation. " As
it lies in the midst of other British districts," said Lord
Dalhousie, " the possession of it as our own will tend to the
improvement of the general internal administration of our
possessions in Bundelkhand. That its incorporation with the
British territories will be greatly for the benefit of the people
of Jhansi a reference to the results of experience will suffice to
show." The results of experience have since shown to what
extent the people of Jhansi appreciated the benefits of that
incorporation.

Whilst this question was being disposed of by Lord Dalhousie
,, and his colleagues, another lapse was under considera-
tion, which had occurred some time before, but re-
garding which no final decision had been passed. In the

* But what Sir Charles Metcalfe really said was, that the paramount
Power was "entitled to limit succession according to the limitations of the
grant, which in general confirms it to heirs male of the body, and conse-
quently precludes adoption. In such cases, therefore, the Power which
granted, or the Power standing in its place, wouhl have a right to resume on
failure of heirs male of the body." This passage is very fairly quoted in
Lord Dalhousie's Minute.

1852.] KARAULI. 67

summer of 1852, the young chief of Karauli, one of the smaller
Bajput States, had died, after adopting another hoy, connected
with him by ties of kindred. At that time Colonel Low repre-
sented the British Government in Eajputana, and he at once
pronounced his opinion that the adoption ought immediately
to he recognised.

The Governor-General hesitated. It appeared to him that
Karauli might, rightly and expediently, he declared to have
lapsed. But his Council was divided ; his Agent in Eajputana
had declared unequivocally for the adoption ; and the case
differed in some respects from the Satarah question, which had
already been decided with the sanction and approval of the
Home Government. How great the difference really was
appeared far more clearly to the experienced eye of Sir
Frederick Currie than to the vision of the Governor-General,
clouded as it was by the film of a foregone conclusion.* The
name of Satarah had, by the force of accidental circumstances,
become great throughout the land, both in India and in England ;
it was a familiar name to thousands and tens of thousands who
had never heard of Karauli. With the Marathas, too, the House
of Sivaji had been held in high veneration ; but the Marathas
could only boast of recent sovereignty ; their high estate was
one of modern usurpation. Their power had risen side by side
with our own, and had been crushed down by our greater
weight and greater vigour. But the houses of Eajputana had
flourished centuries before the establishment of British rule;
and the least of them had an ancestral dignity respected through-
out the whole length and breadth of Hindustan, and treaty
rights not less valid than any possessed by the greatest of
territorial Princes. To men who had graduated, from boyhood
upwards, in Indian statesmanship, there was something almost
sacrilegious in the idea of laying a destroying hand even upon
the least of the ancient Houses of Eajputana — of destroying
titles that had been honoured long years before the face of the
white man had been seen in the country. But impressions of
this kind are the growth of long intercourse with the people
themselves, and we cannot be surprised that, after a year or
two of Indian government, Lord Dalhousie, with all his on-

* Sir Frederick Currie's Minute on the Karauli question ia an admirable
state-paper — accurate in its facts, clear in its logic, and unexceptionable in
its political morality.

F 2

68 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1852.

rivalled quickness of perception, should not have thoroughly
understood the vital differences between the various races in-
habiting the great continent of India. Had he done so, he would
at once have sanctioned the proposed adoption ; as it was, he
referred the question to the final decision of the Home
Government.

Eager as they were at that time to support the policy of
Lord Dalhousie, and entire as was the faith of many of them in
his wisdom, the Directors could not look with favour upon a

proposal to commence the gradual extinction of the ancient
Ji8536' Principalities of Kajputana. " It appears to us," they said,

" that there is a marked distinction in fact between the
case of Karauli and Satarah, which is not sufficiently adverted to
in the Minute of the Governor-General. The Satarah State was
one of recent origin, derived altogether from the creation and
gift of the British Government, whilst Karauli is one of the
oldest of the Rajput States, which has been under the rule of
its native princes from a period long anterior to the British
power in India. It stands to us only in the relation of pro-
tected ally, and probably there is no part of India into which
it is less desirable, except upon the strongest grounds, to sub-
stitute our government for that of the native rulers. In our
opinion, such grounds do not exist in the present case, and
we have, therefore, determined to sanction the succession of
Bharat Pal."

But before the arrival of the despatch expressing these just
sentiments and weighty opinions, all chance of the succession of
Bharat Pal had passed away. Had the adoption been granted
at once, it would, in all probability, have been accepted by the
members of the late Rajah's family, by the principal chiefs, and
by the people of the country. But it is the inevitable tendency
of delay in such a case to unsettle the public mind, to raise
questions which but for this suspense would not have been
born, and to excite hopes and stimulate ambitions which other-
wise would have lain dormant. So it happened that whilst
London and Calcutta were corresponding about the rights of
Bharat Pal, another claimant to the sovereignty of Karauli was
asserting his pretensions in the most demonstrative manner.
Another and a nearer kinsman of the late Prince — older, and,
therefore, of a more pronounced personal character— stood for-
ward to proclaim his rights, and to maintain them by arms.
The ladies of the royal family, the chiefs, and the people, sup-

IS53J KARAULI. 69

ported his claims ; and the representative of the British Govern-
ment in Eajputana recognised their validity. That representa-
tive was Sir Henry Lawrence. Succeeding General Low in the
Agency, he cherished the same principles as those which bad
ever been so consistently maintained by that veteran statesman ;
but circumstances had arisen which moved him to give them
a different application. This new pretender to the throne had
better claims on the score of consanguinity than Bharat Pal,
but Adoption overrides all claims of relationship, and, if the
adoption were valid, the latter was legally the son and heir of
the deceased. In this view, as consonant with the customs of
the country, Henry Lawrence would have supported the succes-
sion of Bharat Pal ; but, on investigation, it appeared that all
the requirements and conditions of law and usage had not been
fulfilled, and that the people themselves doubted the validity
of the adoption. It appeared to him, therefore, that the British
Government would best discharge its duty to Karauli by allow-
ing the succession of Madan Pal. Even on the score of adoption
his claims were good, for he had been adopted by the eldest of
the late Eajah's widows, which, in default of adoption by the
Rajah himself, would have been good against all claimants.
But, in addition to this, it was to be said of the pretensions of
this man that he was older than the other ; that a minority
would thus be avoided altogether ; that he had some personal
claims to consideration ; and that the voice of the chiefs and
the people had decided in his favour. As the succession, there-
fore, of Bharat Pal had not been sanctioned, and as the decision
of the Home Government in his favour had not been published,
there would be no wrong to him in this preference of his rival,
so Henry Lawrence recommended, and. the Government of
Lord Dalhousie approved, the succession of Madan Pal to the
sovereignty of Karauli.

So Lapse, in this instance, did not triumph ; and the ancient
Houses of Eajputana, which, during these two years of suspense,
had awaited the issue with the deepest interest, felt some tem-
porary relief when it was known that the wedge of annexation
had not been driven into the time-honoured circle of the States.
But it is not to be supposed that because no wrong was done at
last no injury was done by the delay. Public rumour recognises
no Secret Department. It was well known at every native
Court, in every native bazaar, that the British Government
were discussing the policy of annexing or not annexing Karauli.

70 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1853.

The mere fact that there was a question to be discussed, in such
a case, was sufficient to fill the minds of the people with
anxiety and alarm. For two years Karauli was without any
other ruler than the Political Agent of the British Government ;
and this was a significant fact, the impression of which was
not to be removed by the subsequent decision. The Rajput
Princes lost their confidence in the good faith of the British
Government. Karauli had been spared, they scarcely knew
how ; some were fain to attribute it to the well-known justice
and liberality of Heniy Lawrence. But the same moderation
might not be displayed again ; there were childless men amongst
them; and from that time a restless, uneasy feeling took pos-
session of them, and no man felt sure that his House would not
perish with him. It was not strange, indeed, that a year or
two afterwards there should have been in circulation all over
the country ominous reports to the effect that the policy of
Lord Dalhousie had eventually triumphed, and that the gradual
absorption of all the Rajput States had been sanctioned by the
Home Government. It was a dangerous lie; and even the
habitual reticence of the Court of Directors was not proof
against the grossness of the calumny ; so it was authori-
tatively contradicted. But not before it had worked its
way in India, and done much to undermine the foundations
of that confidence which is one of the main pillars of our
strength.

There is one other story of territorial annexation yet to be

told — briefly, for it was not thought at the time to
SaHi849lp,ir ^e °f milcn political importance, and now is held but

little in remembrance. Beyond the south-western
frontier of Bengal was the territory of Sambhalpur. It had
formerly been an outlying district of the Nagpiir principality,
but had been ceded by the Bonslah family, and had been
bestowed by the British on a defendant of the old Sambhalpur
Rajahs, under terms which would have warranted the resump-
tion of the estate on the death of the first incumbent. But
twice the sovereign rights had been bestowed anew upon
members of the family, and not until 1849, when Narain Singh
lay at the pomt of death, was it determined to annex the
territory to the British dominions. There were no heirs of
the body; no ne^r relatives of the Rajah. No adoption had
been declared. The country was said to have been grievously
misgoverned. And so there seemed to be a general agreement

1849.] THE ANNEXATION OF SAMBHALPtfR. 71

that the Lapse was perfect, and that annexation might be
righteously proclaimed. Dalhousie was absent from the Presi-
dency; but the case was clear, and the Government neither
in India nor in England hesitated for a moment. And, perhaps,
though it was not without its own bitter fruit, there is less to
be said against it, on the score of abstract justice, than against
anything of which I have written in this division of my
work.

But there were lapses of another kind, lapses which involved
no gain of territory to the British Government, for the terri-
tory had been gained before. There were several deposed
princes in the land, representatives of ancient Houses, whose
sceptres had passed by conquest or by treaty into the white
man's hand, but who still enjoyed the possession of considerable
revenues, and maintained some semblance of their former dignity
and state. It happened that, whilst Dalhousie reigned in India,
three of these pensioned princes died. Of the story of one of
them I must write in detail. There had once been
three great Maratha Houses : the Houses of Satarah, ™e f e°hwf
of Nagpur, and of Puna. It has been told how
Dalhousie extinguished the two first ; the third had been for
some thirty years territorially extinct when he was sent out
to govern India. In 1818, at the close of the second great
Maratha war, the Peshwa, Baji Eao, surrendered to Sir John
Malcolm. He had been betrayed into hostility, and treacherous
hostility ; he had appealed to the sword, and he had been fairly
beaten ; and there was nothing left for him but to end his days
as an outcast and a fugitive, or to fling himself upon the mercy
of the British Government. He chose the latter course ; and
when he gave himself to the English General, he knew that he
was in the hands of one who sympathised with him in his fallen
fortunes, and would be a generous friend to him in adversity.
Malcolm pledged the Government to bestow upon the Peshwa,
for the support of himself and family, an annual pension of not
less than eight lakhs of rupees. The promise was said to be an
over-liberal one ; and there were those who at the time con-
demned Malcolm for his profuseness. But he replied, that " it
had been the policy of the British Government, since its first
establishment in India, to act towards princes, whose bad faith
and treachery had compelled it to divest them of all power and
dominion, with a generosity which almost lost sight of their
offences. The effect of this course of proceeding in reconciling

72 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1818.

all classes to its rule had been great. The liberality and the
humanity which it had displayed on such occasions had, I was
satisfied, done more than its arms towards the firm establishment
of its power. It was, in fact, a conquest over mind, and among
men so riveted in their habits and prejudices as the natives of
their country, the effect, though unseen, was great beyond calcu-
lation." It was a solace to him to think that these sentiments
were shared by such men as Mountstuart Elphinstone, David
Ochterlony, and Thomas Munro.

So Baji Kao went into honourable seclusion, and an asylum
was found for him at Bithur, distant some twelve miles from
the great military station of Kanhpur, in the North- Western
Provinces of India. He was not then an old man, as age is
calculated by years, but he was said to be of debauched habits
and feeble constitution ; and no one believed that he would very
long survive to be a burden upon the Company. But he out-
lived his power for a third part of a century, living resignedly,
if not contentedly, in his new home, with a large body of fol-
lowers and dependents, mostly of his own race, and many others
of the outward insignia of state. From the assemblage, under
such circumstances, of so large a body of Marathas, some feeling
of apprehension and alarm might have arisen in the mind of
the British Government, especially in troubled times ; but the
fidelity of the ex-Peshwa himself was as conspicuous as the
good conduct and the orderly behaviour of his people. Nor
was it onlj- a passive loyalty that he manifested ; for twice, in
critical conjunctures, when the English were sore-pressed, he
came forward with offers of assistance. When the War in
Afghanistan had drained our Treasury, and money was
grievously wanted, he lent the Company five lakhs of rupees ;
and when, afterwards, our dominions were threatened with an
invasion from the Panjab, and there was much talk all over
the country of a hostile alliance between the Sikhs and the
Marathas, the steadfastness of his fidelity was evidenced by an
offer made to the British Government to raise and to maintain
at his own cost a thousand Horse and a thousand Foot. As
he had the disposition, so also had he the means to serve us.
His ample pension more than sufficed for the wants even of a
retired monarch ; and as years passed, people said that he had
laid by a great store of wealth, and asked who was to be its
inheritor ? For it was with him, as it was with other Maratha
princes, he was going down to the grave leaving no son to

1818-51.] THE FALL OF THE PESHWA. 73

succeed hiin. So be adopted a son, from his own family stock,*
and, some years before bis deatb, sought the recognition of the
British Government for an adoption embracing more than the
right of succession to his savings (for this needed no sovereign
sanction), the privilege of succeeding to the title and the pension
of the Peshwa. The prayer was not granted ; but the Companjr
did not shut out all hope that, after the death of Baji Eao, some
provision might be made for his family. The question was
reserved for future consideration — that is, until the contingency
of the ex-Peshwa's death should become an accomplished reality ;
and as at this time the old man was feeble, paralytic, and nearly
blind, it was not expected that his pension would much longer
remain a burden on the Indian revenues.

But not until the 28th of January, 1851, when there was
the weight of seventy-seven years upon him, did
the last of the Peshwas close his eyes upon the DeathofBaji
world for ever. He left behind him a will, exe-
cuted in 1839, in which he named as his adopted son, "to
inherit and be the sole master of the Gadi of the Peshwa, tht.
dominions, wealth, family possessions, treasure, and all his real
and personal property," a youth known as Dundu Pant, Nana
Sahib. When Baji Eao died, the heir was twenty-
seven years old ; described as " a quiet, unosten- Tbs^KU&
tatious young man, not at all addicted to any ex-
travagant habits, and invariably showing a ready disposition
to attend to the advice of the British Commissioner." What
he was safe to inherit was about £300,000, more than one-half
of which was invested in Government securities ; "j" but there
was an immense body of dependents to be provided for, and it
was thought that the British Government might appropriate
a portion of the ex-Peshwa's stipend to the support of the
family at Bithur. The management of affairs was in the hands
of the Subahdar Bamchandar Pant, a faithful friend and

* Strictly it should be said that he adopted three sons and a grandson
His will says : " That Diiudu Pant Nana, my eldest son, and Gangadhar
Eao, my youngest and third son, and Sada-She'o Pant Dada, son of my second
sun, Pundii Rang Eao, my grandson ; these three are my sons and grandson.
After me Dundu Pant Nana, my eldest son, Miikh Pardan, shall inherit and
be the sole master of the Gadi of the Peshwa, &c." — MS. Records.

t The official report of the Commissioner said, 16 lakhs of Government
paper, 10 lakhs of jewels, 3 lakhs of gold coins, 80,000 rupees gold ornaments,
20,000 rupees silver plate.

74 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1851.

adherent of Bdji Kao, who counselled his master with wisdom,
and controlled his followers with vigour ; and he now, with
all due respect for the British Government, pleaded the cause
of the adopted son of the Peshwa. "Nana Sahib," he said,
" considering the Honourable Company in the room of the late
Maharajah as his protector and supporter, is full of hopes and
free of care on this subject. His dependence in every way
is on the kindness and liberality of the British Government,
for the increase of whose power and prosperity he has ever
been, and will continue to be, desirous." The British Com-
missioner at Bithur * supported the appeal on behalf of the
family, but it met with no favour in high places. Mr. Thomason
was then Lieutenant-Governor of the North- Western Provinces.
He was a good man, an able man, a man of high reputation,
but he was one of the leaders of the New School, and was no
friend to the princes and nobles of the land ; and he told the
Commissioner to discourage all hopes of further assistance in
the breasts of the family, and to " strive to induce the numerous
retainers of the Peshwa speedily to disperse and return to the
Dakhin." Lord Dalhousie was Governor-General ; and, in such
a case, his views were little likely to differ from those of his
Lieutenant. So he declared his opinion that the recommenda-
tions of the Commissioner were " uncalled for and unreasonable."
" The Governor-General," it was added, " concurs in opinion
with his Honour (Mr. Thomason) in thinking that, under any
circumstances, the Family have no claim upon the Government ;
and he will by no means consent to any portion of the public
revenues being conferred on them. His Lordship requests that
the determination of the Government of India may be explicitly
declared to the Family without delay." And it was so declared ;
but with some small alleviation of the harshness of the sentence,
for the Jaghir, or rent-free estate, of Bithur was to be continued
to the Nana Sahib, but without the exclusive jurisdiction which
had been enjoyed by the ex-Peshwa.

When Dundu Pant learnt that there was no hope of any
Memorial of further assistance to the family at Bithur from the
the Nana, liberality of the Government of India, he determined

* It should rather be said, " two British Commissioners." Colonel Manson
was Commissioner when the Peshwa died, but he left Bithur shortly after-
wards, and Mr. Morland, then magistrate at Kanhpiir, took his place, and on
him devolved the principal business of the settlement of the ex-Peshwa' a
affairs.

1852.J MEMORIAL OF THE NANA SAHIB. 75

to appeal to the Court of Directors of the East India Company.
It had been in contemplation during the lifetime of Baji Rao to
adopt such a course, and a son of the Subahdar Eamchandar had
been selected as the agent who was to prosecute the appeal. But,
discouraged by the Commissioner, the project had been aban-
doned, and was not revived until all other hope had failed after
the ex-Peshwa's death. Then it was thought that a reversal of
the adverse decision might be obtained by memorialising the
authorities in England, and a memorial was accordingly drawn
up and despatched, in the usual manner, through the Govern-
ment in India. " The course pursued by the local governments,"
it was said, " is not only an unfeeling one towards the numerous
family of the deceased prince, left almost entirely dependent
upon the promises of the East India Company, but inconsistent
with what is due to the representative of a long line of sove-
reigns. Your memorialist, therefore, deems it expedient at
once to appeal to your Honourable Court, not merely on the
ground of the faith of treaties, but of a bare regard to the
advantages the East India Company have derived from the last

of the Maratha Empire It would be contrary to the

spirit of all treaties hitherto concluded to attach a special
meaning to an article of the stipulations entered into, whilst
another is interpreted and acted upon in its most liberal sense."
And then the memorialist proceeded to argue, that as the
Peshwa, on behalf of his heirs and successors, had ceded his
territories to the Company, the Company were bound to pay
the price of such cession to the Peshwa and his heirs and
successors. If the compact were lasting on one side, so also
should it be on the other. " Your memorialist submits that a
cession of a perpetual revenue of thirty -four lakhs of rupees in
consideration of an annual pension of eight lakhs establishes a
de facto presumption that the payment of one is contingent
upon the receipt of the other, and hence that, as long as those
receipts continue, the payment of the pension is to follow." It
was then argued that the mention, in the treaty, of the
" Family " of the Peshwa indicated the hereditary character of
the stipulation, on the part of the Company, as such mention
would be unnecessary and unmeaning in its application to a
mere life-grant, " for a provision for the support of the prince
necessarily included the maintenance of his family ; " and after
this, from special arguments, the Nana Sahib turned to a
general assertion of his rights, as based on precedent and

76 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1852

analogy. "Your memorialist," it was said, "is at a loss to
account for the difference between the treatment, by the Com-
pany, of the descendants of other princes and that experienced
by the family of the Peshwa, represented by him. The ruler of
Maisur evinced the most implacable hostility towards the
Company's government; and your memorialist's father was
one of the princes whose aid was invoked by the Company to
crush a relentless enemy. When that chieftain fell, sword in
hand, the Company, far from abandoning his progeny to their
fate, have afforded an asylum and a liberal support to more
than one generation of his descendants, without distinction
between the legitimate and the illegitimate. With equal or
even greater liberality the Company delivered the dethroned
Emperor of Delhi from a dungeon, re-invested him with the
insignia of sovereignty, and assigned to him a munificent
revenue, which is continued to his descendants to the present
day. Wherein is your memorialist's case different ? It is true
that the Peshwa, after years of amity with the British Indian
Government, during which he assigned to them revenue to the
amount of half a crore of rupees, was unhappily engaged in
war with them, by which he perilled his throne. But as he
was not reduced to extremities, and even if reduced, closed
with the terms proposed to him by the British Commander,
and ceded his rich domains to place himself and his family
under the fostering care of the Company, and as the Company
still profit by the revenues of his hereditary possessions, on
what principle are his descendants deprived of the pension
included in those terms and the vestiges of sovereignty?
Wherein are the claims of his family to the favour and con-
sideration of the Company less than those of the conquered
Maisurean or the captive Mughul ? " Then the Nana Sahib
began to set forth his own personal claims as founded on the
adoption in his favour ; he quoted the best authorities on Hindu
law to prove that the son by adoption has all the rights of the
son by birth ; and he cited numerous instances, drawn from the
recent history of Hindustan and the Dakhin, to show how
such adoptions had before been recognised by the British
Government. " The same fact," he added, " is evinced in the
daily practice of the Company's Courts all over India, in
decreeing to the adopted sons of princes, of zamindars, and
persons of every grade, the estates of those persons to the
exclusion of other heirs of the blood. Indeed, unless the

1852.] MEMORIAL OF THE NANA SAHIB. 77

British Indian Government is prepared to abrogate the Hindu
Sacred Code, and to interdict the practice of the Hindu religion,
of both of which adoption is a fundamental feature, your
memorialist cannot understand with what consistency his claim
to the pension of the late Peshwa can be denied, merely on the
ground of his being an adopted son."

Another plea for refusal might be, nay, had been, based upon
the fact that Baji Bao, from the savings of his pension, had
accumulated and left behind him a large amount of private
property, which no one could alienate from his heirs. Upon
this the Nana Sahib, with not unreasonable indignation, said :
" That if the withholding of the pension proceeded from the
supposition that the late Peshwa had left a sufficient provision for
his family, it would be altogether foreign to the question, and
unprecedented in the annals of the History of British India.
The pension of eight lakhs of rupees per annum has been
agreed upon on the part of the British Government, to enable
his Highness the late Baji Bao to support himself and family ;
it is immaterial to the British Government what portion of
that sum the late prince actually expended, nor has there been
any agreement entered into to the effect that his Highness the
late Baji Bao should be compelled to expend every fraction of
an annual allowance accorded to him by a special treaty, in
consideration of his ceding to the British Government terri-
tories yielding an annual and perpetual revenue of thirty-four
lakhs of rupees. Nobody on earth had a right to control the ex-
penditure of that pension, and if his Highness the late Baji Bao
had saved every fraction of it, he would have been perfectly
justified in doing so. Your memorialist would venture to ask,
whether the British Government ever deigned to ask in what
manner the pension granted to any of its numerous retired
servants is expended ? or whether any of them saves a portion,
or what portion, of his pension ? and, furthermore, in the event
of its being proved that the incumbents of such pensions
had saved a large portion thereof, it would be considered a
sufficient reason for withholding the pension from the children
in the proportions stipulated by the covenant entered into with
its servant ? And yet is a native prince, the descendant of
an ancient scion of Boyalty, who relies upon the justice and
liberality of the British Government, deserving of less con-
sideration than its covenanted servants ? To disperse, however,
any erroneous impression that may exist on the part of the

78 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1852-3.

British Government on that score, your memorialist would
respectfully beg to observe that the pension of eight lakhs of
rupees, stipulated for by the treaty of" 1818, was not exclusively
for the support of his Highness the late Baji Rao and his family,
but also for the maintenance of a large retinue of faithful
adherents, who preferred following the ex-Peshwa in his volun-
tary exile. Their large number, fully known to the British
Government, caused no inconsiderable call upon the reduced
resources of his Highness ; and, furthermore, if it be taken into
consideration the appearance which Native princes, though
rendered powerless, are still obliged to keep up to ensure respect,
it may be easily imagined that the savings from a pension of
eight lakhs of rupees, granted out of an annual revenue of
thirty-four lakhs, could not have been large. But notwith-
standing this heavy call upon the limited resources of the late
Peshwa, his Highness husbanded his resources with much care,
so as to be enabled to invest a portion of his annual income in
public securities, which, at the time of his death, yielded an
income of about eighty thousand rupees. Is then the foresight
and the economy on the part of his Highness the late Baji Rao
to be regarded as an offence deserving to be visited with the
punishment of stopping the pension for the support

MS. Records. rf,. , .-, u, Bi i 1p . , „. o >>

of his family guaranteed by a formal treaty i
But neither the rhetoric nor the reasoning of the Nana Sahib
had any effect upon the Home Government. The Court of
Directors of the East India Company were hard as a rock, and
by no means to be moved to compassion. They had already ex-
pressed an opinion that the savings of the Peshwa were sufficient
Decision of f°r the maintenance of his heirs and dependents ; *
the company. an(j when the memorial came before them, they
summarily rejected it, writing out to the Government to " in-
form the memorialist that the pension of his adoptive father
was not hereditary, that he has no claim whatever to it, and
that his application is wholly inadmissible." Such
May 4, 1353. & repjy. as fins must have crashed out all hope from

* "May 19, 1852. — We entirely approve of the decision of the Governor-
General that the adopted son and dependents on Baji Rao have no claim upon
the British Government. The large pension which the ex-Peshwa enjoyed
• luring thirty-three years afforded him the means of making an abundant
provision for his family and dependents, and the property, which he is known
to have left, is amply sufficient for their support." — The Court of Directors to
the Government of India. — MS.

1853.] AZIM-ULLAH KHAN. 79

the Bithiir Family, and shown the futility of further action ;
but it happened that, before this answer was received, the
Nana Sahib had sent an agent to England to prosecute his
claims. This agent was not the son of the old Maratha Subah-
dar, to whom the mission first contemplated was to have been
entrusted, but a young and astute Muhammadan, with a good
presence, a plausible address, and a knowledge of the English
language. His name was Azim-ullah Khan. In the summer
of 1853 he appeared in England, and in conjunction with an
Englishman named Biddle, prosecuted the claims of the Nana,
but with no success. Judgment had already been recorded, and
nothing that these agents could say or do was likely to cause
its reversal.

So Azim-ullah Khan, finding that little or nothing could be
done in the way of business for his employer, devoted his
energies to the pursuit of pleasure on his own account. Pass-
ing by reason of his fine clothes for a person of high station, he
made his way into good society, and is said to have boasted of
favours received from English ladies. Outwardly he was a gay,
smiling, voluptuous sort of person ; and even a shrewd observer
might have thought that he was intent always upon the amuse-
ment of the hour. There was one man, however, in England at
that time, who, perhaps, knew that the desires of the plausible
Muhammadan were not bounded by the enjoyment of the
present. For it happened that the agent, who had been sent
to England by the deposed Satarah Family, in the hope of
obtaining for them the restoration of their principality, was
still resident in the English metropolis. This man was a
Maratha named Eangu Bapuji. Able and energetic, he had
pushed his suit with a laborious, untiring conscientiousness
rarely seen in a Native envoy ; but though aided by much
soundness of argument and much fluency of rhetoric expended
by others than hired advocates, upon the case of the Satarah
Princes, he had failed to make an impression on their judges.
Though of different race and different religion, these two men
were knit together by common sympathies and kindred tasks,
and in that autumn of 1853, by like failures and disappoint
ments to brood over, and the same bitter animosities to cherish.
What was said and what was done between them no Historian
can relate. They were adepts in the art of dissimulation. So
the crafty Maratha made such a good impression even upon
those whom his suit had so greatly troubled, that his debts

80 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1853

were paid for him, and he was sent back at the public expense
to Bombay with money in his pocket from the Treasury of the
India House ; * whilst the gay Muhammadan floated about the
surface of society and made a conspicuous figure at crowded
watering-places, as if he dearly loved England and the English,
and could not persuade himself to return to his own dreary and
benighted land.

So little material are they to this History that I need not

Kamatikand write in detail of the circumstances attending the

Tanjur. extinction of the titular sovereignties of the Karnatik

and Tanjur, two ancient Houses, one Muhammadan, the other

Hindu, that had once flourished in the Southern Peninsula.

Lord Wellesley had stripped them of territorial power. It

remained, therefore, only for Lord Dalhousie, when

the Nawab of the Karnatik and the Baiah of Taniur

1855 • v o

died without heirs of the body, to abolish the titular
dignities of the two Families and " to resume the large stipends
they had enjoyed, as Lapses to Government." Pensions were
settled upon the surviving members of the two Families ; but
in each case, the head of the House made vehement remonstrance
against the extinction of its honours, and long and loudly
clamoured for restitution. There were many, doubtless, in
Southern India who still clung with feelings of veneration to
these shadowy pageants, and deplored the obliteration of the
royal names that they had long honoured ; and as a part of the
great system of demolition these resumptions made a bad im-
pression in more remote places. But empty titular dignities
are dangerous possessions, and it may be, after all, only mis-
taken kindness to perpetuate them when the substance of
royalty is gone.

%* In this chapter might have been included other cases of Lapse, as
ihose of the Pargannah, of Udaipur, on the South-Western Frontier, and of
Jaitpur, in Bundelkhand ; but, although every additional absorption of
territory tended to increase, in some measure, the feeling of insecurity in
men's minds, they were comparatively of little political importance ; and Lord
Dalhousie did not think them worth a paragraph in Lis Farewell Minute.

* Ransru Bapuji returned to India in December, 1853 The East India
Company gave him 2500Z. and a free passage.

1856.1 (81 \

CHAPTER III.

There was still another province to be absorbed into the
British Empire under the administration of Lord Dalhousie ;
not by conquest, for its rulers had ever been our friends, and
its people had recruited our armies ; not by lapse, for there had
always been a son or a brother, or some member of the royal
house, to fulfil, according to the Muhammadan law of succes-
sion, the conditions of heirship, and there was still a king, the
son of a king, upon the throne ; but by a simple assertion of
the dominant will of the British Government. This was the
great province of Oudh, in the very heart of Hindustan, which
had long tempted us, alike by its local situation and the reputed
wealth of its natural resources.

It is a story not to be lightly told in a few sentences. Its
close connexion with some of the more important passages of
this history fully warrants some amplitude of narration. Before
the British settler had established himself on the peninsula of
India, Oudh was a province of the Mughul Empire. When
that empire was distracted and weakened by the invasion of
Nadir Shah, the treachery of the servant was turned against
the master, and little by little the Governor began to govern
for himself. But holding only an official, though an hereditary
title, he still acknowledged his vassalage ; and long after the
Great Mughul had shrivelled into a pensioner and a pageant,
the Nawab- Wazir of Oudh was nominally his minister.

Of the earliest history of British connexion with the Court of
the Wazir, it is not necessary to write in detail. There is
nothing less creditable in the annals of the rise and progress of
the British power in the East. The Nawab had territory ; the
Nawab had subjects; the Nawab had neighbours; more than
all, the Nawab had money. But although he possessed in
abundance the raw material of soldiers, he had not been able
to organise an army sufficient for all the external and internal
requirements of the State, and so he was fain to avail himself

vol. I. o

82 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1756-9S.

of the superior military skill and discipline of the white men,
and to hire British battalions to do his work. At first this was
done in an irregular, desultory kind of way, job-work, as in the
infamous case of the Rohilla massacre ; but afterwards it as-
sumed a more formal and recognised shape, and solemn engage-
ments were entered into with the Nawab, by which we under-
took, in consideration of certain money-payments, known as
the Subsidy, to provide a certain number of British troops for
the internal and external defence of his Excellency's dominions.
In truth it was a vicious system, one that can hardly be too
severely condemned. By it we established a Double Govern-
ment of the worst kind. The Political and Military government
was in the hands of the Compan}T ; the internal administration
of the Oudh territories still rested with the Nawab- Wazir. In
other words, hedged in and protected by the British battalions,
a bad race of Eastern Princes were suffered to do, or not to do,
what they liked. Under such influences it is not strange that
disorder of every kind ran riot over the whole length and
breadth of the land. Never were the evils of misrule more
horribly apparent ; never were the vices of an indolent and
rapacious Government productive of a greater sum of misery.
The extravagance and profligac}^ of the Court were written in
hideous characters on the desolated face of the countiy. It
was left to the Nawab's Government to dispense justice : justice
was not dispensed. It was left to the Nawab's Government to
collect the revenue ; it was wrung from the people at the point
of the bayonet. The Court was sumptuous and profligate ; the
people poor and wretched. The expenses of the royal household
were enormous. Hundreds of richly-caparisoned voracious
elephants ate up the wealth of whole districts, or carried it
in glittering apparel on their backs. A multitudinous throng
of unserviceable attendants ; bands of dancing-girls ; flocks of
parasites ; costly feasts^ and ceremonies ; folly and pomp and
profligacy of every conceivable description, drained the coffers
of the State. A vicious and extravagant Government soon
beget a poor and a suffering people ; a poor and a suffering
people, in turn, perpetuate the curse of a bankrupt Government.
The process of retaliation is sure. To support the lavish ex-
penditure of the Court the mass of the people were persecuted
and outraged. Bands of armed mercenaries were let loose upon
the ryots in support of the rapacity of the Amils, or Eevenue-
farmers, whose appearance was a terror to the people. Under

1798.] INTERVENTION OF LORD WELLESLEY. 83

such a system of cruelty and extortion, the country soon became
a desert, and the Government then learnt by hard experience
that the prosperity of the people is the only true source of
wealth. The lesson was thrown away. The decrease of the
revenue was not accompanied by a corresponding diminution of
the profligate expenditure of the Court, or by any effort to
introduce a better administrative system. Instead of this, every
new year saw the unhappy country lapsing into worse disorder,
with less disposition, as time advanced, on the part of the local
Government to remedy the evils beneath which it was groan-
ing. Advice, protestation, remonstrance were in vain. Lord
Cornwallis advised, protested, remonstrated : Sir John Shore
advised, protested, remonstrated. At last a statesman of a very
different temper appeared upon the scene.

Lord Wellesley was a despot in every pulse of his heart.
But he was a despot of the right kind ; for he was a man of
consummate vigour and ability, and he seldom made a mistake.
The condition of Oudh soon attracted his attention ; not because
its government was bad and its people were wretched, but be-
cause that country might either be a bulwark of safety to our own
dominions, or a sea of danger which might overflow and destroy
us. That poor old blind ex-King, Shah Zainan, of the Saduzai
family of Kabul, known to the present generation as the feeble
appendage of a feeble puppet, had been, a little while before
the advent of Lord Wellesley, in the heyday of his pride and
power, meditating great deeds which he had not the ability to
accomplish, and keeping the British power in India in a chronic
state of unrest. If ever there had been any real peril, it had
passed away before the new century was a year old. But it
might arise again. Doubtless the military strength of the
Afghans was marvellously overrated in those days : but still
there was the fact of a minacious Muhammadan power beyond
the frontier, not only meditating invasion, but stirring up the
Muhammadan Princes of India to combine in a religious war
against the usurping Faringhi. Saadat Ali was then on the
musnud of Oudh ; he was the creature and the friend of the
English, but Wazir Ali, whom he had supplanted, had intri-
gued with Zaman Shah, and would not only have welcomed,
but have subsidised also an Afghan force in his own dominions.
At the bottom of all our alarm, at that time, were some not
unreasonable apprehensions of the ambitious designs of the first
Napoleon. At all events, it was sound policy to render Oudb

g 2

84 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. (.1800.

powerful for good and powerless for evil. To the accomplish-
ment of this it was necessary that large bodies of ill-disciplined
and irregularly paid native troops in the service of the Nawab-
Wazir — lawless bands that had been a terror alike to him and
to his people — should be forthwith disbanded, and that British
troops should occupy their place. Now, already the Wazir was
paying seventjr-six lakhs of rupees, or more than three-quarters
of a million of money, for his subsidised British troops, and
though he was willing to disband his own levies, and thereby
to secure some saving to the State, it was but small in propor-
tion to the expense of the more costly machinery of British
military defence now to be substituted for them. The addi-
tional burden to be imposed upon Oudh was little less than
half a million of money, and the unfortunate Wazir, whose
resources had been strained to the utmost to pay the previous
subsidy, declared his inability to meet any further demands on
his treasury. This was what Lord Wellesley expected — nay,
more, it was what he wanted. If the Wazir could not pay in
money, he could pay in money's worth. He had rich lands
that might be ceded in perpetuity to the Company for the
punctual payment of the subsidy. So the Governor-Genera]
prepared a treaty ceding the required provinces, and with a
formidable array of British troops at his call, dragooned the
Wazir into sullen submission to the will of the English Sultan.
The new treaty was signed ; and districts then yielding a
million and a half of money, and now nearly double that
amount of annual revenue, passed under the administration of
the British Government.

Now, this treaty — the last ever ratified between the two
Governments — bound the Nawab- Wazir to " establish in his
reserved dominions such a system of administration, to be
carried on by his own officers, as should be conducive to the
prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives
and properties of the inhabitants," and he undertook at the
same time " always to advise with and to act in conformity
to the counsels of the officers of the East India Company."
But the English ruler knew well that there was small hope of
these conditions being fulfilled. " I am satisfied," he said, " that
no effectual security can be provided against the ruin of the
province of Oudh until the exclusive management of the civil
and military government of that country shall be transferred
to the Company under suitable provisions for the maintenance

1801-17.] THE TREATY OF 1801 85

of his Excellency and his family." He saw plainly before him
the breakdown of the whole system, and believed that in the
course of a few years the entire administration of the province
would be transferred to the hands of our British officers. There
was one thing, however, on which he did not calculate — the
moderation of his successors. He lived nearly half a century
after these words were written, and yet the treaty outlived him
by many years.

If there was, at any time, hope for Oudh, under purely
native administration, it was during the wazirship of Saadat
Ali, for he was not a bad man, and he appears to have had
rather enlightened views with respect to some important ad-
ministrative questions.* But the opportunity was lost; and
whilst the counsels of our British officers did nothing for the
people, the bayonets of our British soldiers restrained them
from doing anything for themselves. Thus matters grew from
bad to worse, and from worse to worst. One Governor-General
followed another ; one Kesident followed another ; one Wazir
followed another : but still the great tide of evil increased in
volume, in darkness, and in depth.

But, although the Nawab-Wazirs of Oudh were, doubtless,
bad rulers and bad men, it must be admitted that they were
good allies. False to their people — false to their own manhood —
they were true to the British Government. They were never
known to break out into open hostility, or to smoulder in hidden
treachery against us ; and they rendered good service, when
they could, to the Power to which they owed so little. They
supplied our armies, in time of war, with grain ; they supplied
us with carriage-cattle ; better still, they supplied us with cash.
There was money in the Treasury of Lakhnao, when there
was none in the Treasury of Calcutta ; and the time came when
the Wazir's cash was needed by the British ruler. Engaged in
an extensive and costly war, Lord Hastings wanted two

* Sir Henry Lawrence says that he was "in advance of the Bengal
Government of the day on revenue arrangements," and gives two striking
instances of the fact. With characteristic candour and impartiality, Law-
rence adds that Saadat Ali's mal-administiation was " mainly attributable to
English interference, to the resentment he felt for his own wrongs, and the
bitterness of soul with which lie must have received all advice from hia
oppressors, no less than to the impunity with which they enabled him to play
the tyrant." — Calcutta Review, vol. iii. See also Lawrence's Essays, in
which this paper is printed.

86 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1817.

millions for the prosecution of his great enterprises. They
were forthcoming at the right time; and the British Govern-
ment were not unwilling in exchange to hestow both titles and
territories on the W'azir. The times were propitious. The
successful close of the Nipal war placed at our disposal an
unhealthy and impracticable tract of country at the foot of the
Hills. This "terai" ceded to us by the Nipalese was sold for
a million of money to the Wazir, to whose domains it was
contiguous, and he himself expanded and bloomed into a King
under the fostering sun of British favour and affection.* The
interest of the other million was paid away by our Government
to a tribe of Oudh pensioners, who were not sorry to exchange
for a British guarantee the erratic benevolence of their native
masters.

It would take long to trace the history of the progressive
misrule of the Oudh dominions under a succession of sovereigns
all of the same class — passive permitters of evil rather than
active perpetrators of iniquity, careless of, but not rejoicing in,
the sufferings of their people. The rulers of Oudh, whether
Wazirs or Kings, had not the energy to be tyrants. They
simply allowed things to take their course. Sunk in volup-
tuousness and pollution, often too horribly revolting to be
described, they gave themselves up to the guidance of panders
and parasites, and cared not so long as these wretched creatures
administered to their sensual appetites. Affairs of State were
pushed aside as painful intrusions. Corruption stalked openly
abroad. Every one had his price. Place, honour, justice —
eveiything was to be bought. Fiddlers and barbers, pimps
and mountebanks, became great functionaries. There were
high revels at the capital, whilst, in the interior of the country,
every kind of enormity was being exercised to wring from the
helpless people the money which supplied the indulgences of
the Court. Much of the land was farmed out to large con-

* Sir John Malcolm said that the very mention of "his Majesty of Oudh "
made him sick. " Would I make," he said, "a golden calf, and suffer him to
throw off his subordinate title, and assume equality with the degraded repre-
sentative of a line of monarchs to whom his ancestors have been for ages
really or nominally subject ? " Sir Henry Lawrence seems to have thought
that this was precisely what was intended. '"The Nawab Ghazi-mi-din
Haidar," he wrote, " was encouraged to assume the title of King ; Lord
Hastings calculated on this exciting a rivalry between the Oudh and Dehh
Families.'' — Calcutta Review, vol. iii. ; and Essays, page 119.

1831.] LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK. 87

tractors, who exacted every possible farthing from the cnlti-
vators; and were not seldom, upon complaint of extortion,
made, unless inquiry were silenced by corruption, to disgorge
into the royal treasury a large portion of their gains. Murders
of the most revolting type, gang-robberies of the most out-
rageous character, were committed in open day. There were
no Courts of Justice except at Lakhnao ; no Police but at the
capital and on the frontier. The British troops were con-
tinually called out to coerce refractory landholders, and to
stimulate revenue-collection at the point of the bayonet. The
sovereign — Wazir or King — knew that they would do their
duty ; knew that, under the obligations of the treaty, his
authority would be supported; and so he lay secure in his
Zenana, and fiddled whilst his country was in flames.

And so years passed ; and ever went there from the Eesidency
to the Council-chamber of the Supreme Government the same
unvarying story of frightful misrule. Eesidents expostulated,
Governors-General protested against it. The protests in due
course became threats. Time after time it was announced to
the rulers of Oudh that, unless some great and immediate reforms
were introduced into the system of administration, the British
Government, as lords-paramount, would have no course left to
them but to assume the direction of affairs, and to reduce the
sovereign of Oudh to a pensioner and a pageant.

By no man was the principle of non-interference supported
more strenuously, both in theory and in practice, than by Lord
William Bentinck. But in the affairs of this Oudh State he
considered that he was under a righteous necessity to interfere.
In April, 1831, he visited Lakhnao ; and there, distinctly and
emphatically told the King that "unless his territories were
governed upon other principles than those hitherto followed, and
the prosperity of the people made the principal object of his
administration, the precedents afforded by the principalities of
the Karnatik and Tanjiir would be applied to the kingdom of
Oudh, and to the entire management of the country, and the
King would be transmuted into a State prisoner." This was
no mere formal harangue, but the deliberate enunciation of the
Government of India ; and to increase the impression which it
was calculated to make on the mind of the King, the warning
was afterwards communicated to him in writing, But, spoken
or written, the words w ere of no avail. He threw himself more
than ever into the arms of parasites and panders ; plunged more

38 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1831.

deeply into debauchery than before, and openly violated all
decency by appearing drunk in the public streets of Lakhnao.*
With the corruption of the Court the disorders of the country
increased. The crisis seemed now to have arrived. A com-
munication was made to the Court of Oudh, that " instructions
to assume the government of the country, if circumstances
should render such a measure necessary, had arrived, and that
their execution was suspended merely in the hope that the
necessity of enforcing them might be obviated."

But in what manner was the administration to be assumed —
in what manner was the improvement of the country to be
brought about by the intervention of the British Government ?
There were different courses open to us, and they were all dili-
gently considered. We might appoint a Minister of our own
selection, and rule through him by the agency of the Eesident.
We might depose the ruling sovereign, and set up another and
more hopeful specimen of royalty in his place. We might place
the country under European administration, giving all the
surplus revenues to the King. We might assume the entire
government, reducing the King to a mere titular dignitary, and
giving him a fixed share of the annual revenues. Or we might
annex the country outright, giving him so many lakhs of rupees
a year, without reference to the revenues of the principality.
The ablest and most experienced Indian statesmen of the day
had been invited to give their opinions. Malcolm and Metcalfe
spoke freely out. The first of the above schemes seemed to
represent the mildest form of interference ; but both the soldier
and the civilian unhesitatingly rejected it as the most odious,
and. in practice, the most ruinous of all interposition. Far
better, they said, to set up a new King, or even to assume the
government for ourselves. But those were days when native
dynasties were not considered unmixed evils, and native ^ insti-
tutions were not pure abominations in our eyes. And it was
thought that we might assume the administration of Oudh, but
not for ourselves. It was thought that the British Government
might become the guardian and trustee of the King of Oudh,
administer his affairs through native agency and in accordance

* This was Nasar-ud-din Haidar— the second of the Oudh kings, and
perhaps the worst. I speak dubiously, however, of their comparative merits.
Colonel Sleeman seems to have thought that he might have extracted more
good out of Nasar-ud-din than out of any of the rest.

1832.] MODERATION OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY. 89

with native institutions, and pay every single rupee into the
royal treasury.

This was the scheme of Lord William Bentinck, a man of
unsurpassed honesty and justice ; and it met with favourable
acceptance in Leadenhall-street. The Court of Directors at
that time, true to the old traditions of the Company, were slow
to encourage their agents to seek pretexts for the extension of
their dominions. The despatches which they sent out to India
were for the most part distinguished by a praiseworthy modera-
tion ; sometimes, indeed, by a noble frankness and sincerity,
which shewed that the authors of them were above all disguises
and pretences. They now looked the Oudh business fairly in
the face, but hoping still against hope that there might be some
amelioration, they suffered, after the receipt of Lord William
Bentinck's report, a year to pass away, and then another year,
before issuing authoritative orders, and then they sent forth a
despatch, which was intended to bring the whole July 16
question to a final issue. They spoke of the feelings 1834. '
which the deplorable situation of a country so long and so
nearly connected with them had excited in their minds — of the
obligations which such a state of things imposed upon them —
of the necessity of finding means of effecting a great altera-
tion. They acknowledged, as they had acknowledged before,
that our connexion with the country had largely contributed
to the sufferings of the people, inasmuch as it had afforded
protection to tyranny, and rendered hopeless the resistance of
the oppressed.* This made it the more incumbent upon them
to adopt measures for the mitigation, if not the removal, of
the existing evil. They could not look on whilst the ruin
of the country was consummated. It was certain that some-
thing must be done. But what was that something to be?
Then they set in array before them, somewhat as I have
done above, the different measures which might be resorted to,
and, dwelling upon the course which Bentinck had recom-
mended, placed in the hands of the Governor-General a discre-
tionary power to carry the proposed measure into effect at such

* For a long time, as we have said, our troops were employed by the Kin^s
officers to aid them in the collection of the revenue ; thereby active, as the
Court frankly described it, as " instruments of extortion and vengeance."
This scandal no longer existed; but our battalions were still stationed in the
country, ready to dragoon down any open insurrection that might result from
the misgovemment of Oudh.

90 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1835.

period, and in such a manner as might seem advisable, but
with the utmost possible consideration for the King, whose
consent to the proposed arrangement was, if possible, to be
obtained. It was suggested that all the titles and honours of
sovereignty should remain with his Majesty as before ; that the
revenues should be mainly expended in the administration and
the improvement of the country, and that either the surplus, or
a fixed stipend, should be assigned to the King. But, at the
same time, the Government were instructed, in the event of
their proceeding to assume the administration of the country,
distinctly to announce that, so soon as the necessary reforms
should have been effected, the administration of the country, as
in the case of Nagpur, would be restored to its native rulers.

Colonel John Low, of whose character and career I have
already spoken, was then Eesident at Lakhnao. The despatch
of the Court of Directors, authorizing the temporary assumption
of the Government of Oudh, was communicated to him, and he
pondered over its contents. The scheme appeared in his eyes
to be distinguished by its moderation and humanity, and to be
one of a singularly disinterested character. But he was con-
vinced that it would be misunderstood. He said that, however
pure the motives of the British Government might be, the
natives of India would surely believe that we had taken the
country for ourselves. So he recommended the adoption of
another method of obtaining the same end. Fully impressed
with the necessity of removing the reigning King, Nasar-ud-
din, he advised the Government to set up another ruler in his
place ; and in order that the measure might be above all sus-
picion, to abstain from receiving a single rupee, or a single acre
of ground, as the price of his elevation. " What I recommend
is this," he said, " that the next heir should be invested with
the full powers of sovereignty ; and that the people of Oudh
should continue to live under their own institutions." He had
faith in the character of that next heir ; he believed that a
change of men would produce a change of measures ; and, at all
events, it was but bare justice to try the experiment.

But, before anything had been done by the Government of
India, in accordance with the discretion delegated to them by
the Court of Directoi s, the experiment which Low had suggested
inaugurated itself. Not without suspicion of poison, but really,
I believe, killed only by strong drink, Nasar-ud-din Haidar died
on a memorable July night. It was a crisis of no common

(837.] LORD AUCKLAND. 91

magnitude, for there was a disputed succession ; and large
bodies of lawless native troops in Lakhnao were ready to strike
at a moment's notice. The cool courage of Low and his assis-
tants saved the city from a deluge of blood. An uncle of the
deceased Prince — an old man and a cripple, respectable in his
feebleness — was declared King, with the consent of the British
Government ; and the independence of Oudh had another lease
of existence.

Lord Auckland was, at that time, Governor-General of India.
The new King, who could not but feel that he was a creature
of the British, pledged himself to sign a new treaty. And soon
it was laid before him. That the engagements of the old treaty
had been violated, day after day, year after year, for more than
a third part of the century, was a fact too patent to be ques-
tioned. The misgovernment of the country was a chronic
breach of treaty. Whether the British or the Oudh Govern-
ment were more responsible for it was somewhat doubtful to
every clear understanding and every unprejudiced mind. The
source of the failure was in the treaty itself, which the author
of it well knew from the first was one of impossible fulfilment.
But it was still a breach of treaty, and there was another in the
entertainment of vast numbers of soldiers over and above the
stipulated allowance. Those native levies had gradually swollen,
according to Eesident Low's calculations, to the bulk of seventy
thousand men. Here was an evil not to be longer permitted ;
wonder, indeed, was it that it should have been permitted so
long. This the new treaty was to remedy; no less than the
continued mal-administration of the country by native agency.
It provided, therefore, that in the event of any further-pro-
tracted misrule, the British Government should be entitled to
appoint its own officers to the management of any part, small
or great, of the province ; that the old native levies should be
abandoned, and a new force, commanded by British officers,
organised in its place, at the cost of the Oudh Government.
But there was no idea of touching, in any other way, the
revenues of the country. An account was to be rendered of
every rupee received and expended, and the balance was to be
paid punctually into the Oudh Treasury.

This was the abortion, often cited in later years as the Oudh
Treaty of 1837. Authentic history recites that the Government
of India were in throes with it, but the strangling hand of
higher authority crushed all life out of the thing before it had

92 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1837-3a

become a fact. The treaty was wholly and absolutely dis-
allowed by the Home Government.* They took especial excep-
tion to the establishment of the new auxiliary force, which was
to cost the Oudh Treasury sixteen lakhs of rupees a year ; for,
with all the pure logic of honesty, they said that the treaty of
1801 had made it compulsory on the British Government to
provide for the defence of the country, and that a large tract of
territory had been ceded with the express object of securing
the payment of the troops necessary for this purpose. If, then,
it were expedient to organise a fresh force under British officers,
it was for the Company, not for the Oudh Government, to
defray the expenses of the new levy. But not only on these
grounds did they object to the treaty. It is true that, a few
years before, they had given the Governor-General discre-
tionary power to deal, as he thought best, with the disorders of
Oudh, even to the extent of a temporary assumption of the
government ; but this authority had been issued at a time when
Nasar-ud-din, of whose vicious incapacity they had had many
.years' experience, sat upon the throne ; and the Home Govern-
ment were strongly of opinion that the new King, of whose
character they had received a favourable account, ought to be
allowed a fair trial, under the provisions of the treaty existing
at the time of his accession to the throne. They therefore
directed the abrogation, not of any one article, but of the entire
treaty. Wishing, however, the annulment of the treaty to
appear rather as an act of grace from the Government of India
than as the result of positive and unconditional instructions
from England, they gave a large discretion to the Governor-
General as to the mode of announcing this abrogation to the
Court of Lakhnao.

The receipt of these orders disturbed and perplexed the
Governor-General. Arrangements for the organisation of the
Oudh auxiliary force had already advanced too far to admit of
the suspension of the measure. It was a season, however, of diffi-
culty and supposed danger, for the seeds of the Afghan war had
been sown. Some, at least, of our regular troops in Oudh were
wanted to do our own work ; so, in any view of the case, it was
necessary to fill their places. The Auxiliary Force, therefore,
was not to be arrested in its formation, but it was to be main-

* That is to say, by the Secret Committee, who had, by Act of Parliament
special powers in this matter of Treaty-making.

1838.] ABROGATION OF THE TREATY. 93

tained at the Company's expense. Intimation to this effect was
given to the King in a letter from the Governor-General, which,
after acquainting his Majesty that the British Government had
determined to relieve him of a burden which, in the existing
state of the country, might have imposed heavier exactions on
the people than the}* well were able to bear, expressed a strong
hope that the King would see, in the relaxation of this demand,
good reason for applying his surplus revenues firstly to the relief
of oppressive taxation, and, secondly, to the prosecution of useful
public works. But nothing was said, in this letter, about the
abrogation of the entire treaty, nor was it desired that the
Besident, in his conferences with the King or his minister,
should say anything on that subject. The Governor-General,
still hoping that the Home Government might be induced to
consent to the terms of the treaty (the condition of the auxiliary
force alone excluded), abstained from an acknowledgment which,
he believed, would weaken the authority of his Government.
But this was a mistake, and worse than a mistake. It betrayed
an absence of moral courage not easily to be justified or
forgiven. The Home Government never acknowledged the
validity of any later treaty than that which Lord Wellesley
had negotiated at the commencement of the century.
' Such is the history of the treaty of 1837. It was never
carried out in a single particular, and seldom heard of agaic
until after a lapse of nearly twenty years, except in a collection
of treaties into which it crept by mistake.* And, for some

* Much was attempted to be made out of this circumstance — but the mis-
take of an under Secretary cannot give validity to a treaty which the highest
authorities refused to ratify. If Lord Auckland was unwilling to declare the
nullity of the treaty because its nullification hurt the pride of his Government,
the Home Government showed no such unwillingness, for, in 1838, the
following return was made to Parliament, under the signature of one of the
Secretaries of the Board of Control :

" There has been no treaty concluded with the present King of Oudh,
which has been ratified by the Court of Directors, with the approbation or
the Commissioners for the affairs of India. (Signed) " R. Gordon.

"India Board, 3rd .July, 1838."

It must, however be admitted, on the other hand, that, years after this
date, even in the Lakhnao Residency, the treaty was held to be valid. In
October, 1853, Colonel Sleeman wrote to Sir James Ho»g : " The treaty of
1837 gives our Government ample authority to take the whole administration
on ourselves." And again, in 1854, to Colonel Low : " Our Government would
be fully authorised at anytime to enforce the penalty prescribed in your treaty
of 1837." This was doubly a mistake. The treaty was certainly not Low's.

94 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [.1838-16

time, indeed, little was heard of Oudh itself. A Native State
is never so near to death, but that it may become quite hale and
lusty again when the energies and activities of the British are
engrossed by a foreign war. Now, it happened that, for some
time to come, the British had quite a crop of foreign wars.
First, the great Afghanistan war of Auckland, which made him
wholly forgetful of Oudh — her People and her King — her
sorrows and her sensualities. Then there was the Sindh war
of Ellenborough, intended to wash out by a small victory the
stain of a great defeat, but fixing a still deeper stain upon the
character of the nation ; and next the fierce Maratha onslaught,
which followed closely upon it. Then there was the invasion
from beyoud the Satlaj, and the first Sikh war, in which
Hardinge was most reluctantly immersed. Altogether, some
eight years of incessant war, with a prospect of further strife,
kept the sword out of the scabbard and the portfolio out of the
hand. Then Oudh was safe in its insignificance and obscurity.
Moreover, Oudh was, as before, loyal and sympathising, and,
although the hoardings of Saadat Ali had long since been
squandered, there was still money in the Treasure-chests of
Lakhnao. But peace came, and with it a new birth of danger
to the rulers of that misruled pioviuce. There had been no
chauge for the better; nay, rather there had been change for
the worse, during the years of our conflicts beyond the frontier.
One Prince had succeeded another only to emulate the vices of
his ancestors with certain special variations of his own. And
when Lord Hardinge, in the quiet interval between the two
Sikh wars, turned his thoughts towards the kingdom of Oudh,
he found Wajid Ali Shah, then a young man in the first year
of his reign, giving foul promise of sustaining the character of
the Eoyal House.*

With the same moderation as had been shown by Lord
William Bentinck, but also with the same strong sense of the
paramount duty of the British Government to arrest the dis-

* There was something in the number seven fatal to the Princes of Oudh
Ghazi-ud-dih Haidar died in 1827; Nasar-ud-dfn in 1837; and Umjid Ali
Shah in 1847. The last named succeeded, in 1842, the old King, whom we
had set up, and from whose better character there appeared at one time to be
some hope of an improved administration. But, capax imperii nisi imper-
asset, he was, for all purposes of government, as incompetent as his prede-
cessors. His besetting infirmity was avarice, and he seemed to care for
nothing so long as the treasure-chest was full.

1847.] LORD HARDINGE'S WARNING. 95

orders which had so long heen preying upon the vitals of the
country, Lord Hardinge lifted up his voice in earnest remon-
strance and solemn warning ; and the young King cowered
beneath the keen glance of the clear bine eyes that were turned
upon him. There were no vague words in that admonition ; no
uncertain sound in their utterance. Wajid Ali Shah was dis-
tinctly told that the clemency of the British Government would
allow him two years of grace ; but that if at the end of that
period of probation there were no manifest signs of improvement,
the British Government could, in the interests of humanity,
no longer righteously abstain from interfering peremptorily
and absolutely for the introduction of a system of administration
calculated to restore order and prosperity to the kingdom of
Oudh. The discretionary power had years before been placed
in the hands of the Governor-General, and these admonitions
failing, it would assuredly be exercised. A general outline of
the means, by which the administration might be reformed, was
laid down in a memorandum read aloud to the King ; and it was
added that, if his Majesty cordially entered into the plan, he
might have the satisfaction, within the specified period of two
years, of checking and eradicating the worst abuses, and, at the
same time, of maintaining his own authority and the native
institutions of his kingdom unimpaired — but that if he should
adhere to his old evil ways, he must be prepared for the alter-
native and its consequences.

Nervous and excitable at all times, and greatly affected by
these words, the Kin^; essayed to speak ; bnt the power of utter-
ance had gone from him. So he took a sheet of paper and wrote
upon it, that he thanked the Governor-General, and would
regard his counsels as though they had been addressed by a
father to his son. There are no counsels so habitually disre-
garded ; the King, therefore, kept his word, Believed from the
presence of the Governor-General his agitation subsided, and he
betook himself, without a thought of the future, to his old
courses. Fiddlers and dancers, singing men and eunuchs, were
suffered to usurp the government and to absorb the revenues of
the country. The evil influence of these vile panders and para-
sites was felt throughout all conditions of society and in all
parts of the country. Sunk in the uttermost abysses of en-
feebling debauchery, the King pushed aside the business which
he felt himself incapable of transacting, and went in search of
new pleasures. Stimulated to the utmost by unnatural excite-

96 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. U849-50.

ments, his appetites were satiated by the debaucheries of the
Zenana, and, with an understanding emasculated to the point
of childishness, he turned to the more harmless delights of
dancing, and drumming, and drawing, and manufacturing
small rhymes. Had he devoted himself to these pursuits in
private life, there would have been small harm in them, but
overjoyed with his success as a musician, he went about the
crowded streets of Lakhnao with a big drum round his neck,
striking as much noise out of it as he could, with all the
extravagance of childish delight.

The two years of probation had passed away, and the British
Resident reported that " the King had not, since the Governor-
General's visit in October, 1847, shown any signs of being fully
aware of the responsibility he incurred." " In fact," he added,
" I do not think that his Majesty can ever be brought to feel
the responsibilities of sovereignty strungly enough to be in-
duced to bear that portion of the burden of its duties that must
necessarily devolve upon him ; he will always confide it to the
worthless minions who are kept for his amusements, and enjoy
exclusively his society and his confidence." So the time had
arrived when the British Government might have righteously
assumed the administration of Oudh. The King had justly
incurred the penalty, but the paramount power was in no haste
to inflict it. Lord Dalhousie was Governor-General of India;
but again the external conflicts of the British were the salva-
tion of the sovereignty of Oudh. The Panjab was in flames,
and once more Lakhnao was forgotten. The conquest of the
Sikhs ; the annexation of their country ; the new Burmese war
and its results ; the lapses of which I have spoken in my last
chapter ; and many important affairs of internal administration
of which I have yet to speak, occupied the ever-active mind of
Lord Dalhousie until the last year of his reign ; but it was felt
by every one, who knew and pondered over the wretched state
of the country, that the day of reckoning was approaching, and
that the British Government could not much longer shrink
from the performance of a duty imposed upon it by every
consideration of humanity.

Colonel Sleeman was then Resident at Lakhnao. He was a
man of a liberal and humane nature, thoroughly acquainted
with the character and feelings, the institutions and usages of
the people of India. No man had a larger toleration for the
short-comings of native Governments, because no one knew

1849-50.] COLONEL SLEEMAN. 97

better how much our own political system had aggravated, if
it had not produced, the evils of which we most complained.
But he sympathised at the same time acutely with the suffer-
ings of the people living under those native Governments ; and
his sympathy overcame his toleration. Having lived all his
adult life in India— the greater part of it in, or on the borders
of, the Native States — he was destitute of all overweening pre-
possessions in favour of European institutions and the "blessings
of British rule." But the more he saw, on the spot, of the ter-
rible effects of the misgovernment of Oudh, the more convinced
he was of the paramount duty of the British Government to
step in and arrest the atrocities which were converting one of
the finest provinces of India into a moral pest-house. In 1849
and 1850 he made a tour through the interior of the country.
He carried with him the prestige of a name second to none in
India, as that of a friend of the poor, a protector of the weak,
and a redresser of their wrongs. Conversing freely and
familiarly in the native languages, and knowing well the
character and the feelings of the people, he had a manner that
inspired confidence, and the art of extracting from every man
the information which he was best able to afford. During this
tour in the interior, he noted down, from day to day, all the
most striking facts which were brought to his notice, with the
reflections which were suggested by them ; and the whole pre-
sented a revolting picture of the worst type of misrule— of a
feebleness worse than despotism, of an apathy more productive
of human suffering than the worst forms of tyrannous activit}'.
In the absence of all controlling authority, the strong carried
on everywhere a war of extermination against the weak. Power-
ful families, waxing gross on outrage and rapine, built forts,
collected followers, and pillaged and murdered at discretion,
without fear of justice overtaking their crimes. Nay, indeed,
the greater the criminal the more sure he was of protection, for
he could purchase immunity with his spoil. There was hardly,
indeed, an atrocity committed, from one end of the country to
the other, that was not, directly or indirectly, the result of the
profligacy and corruption of the Court.*

* " The Taliikdars keep the country in a perpetual state of disturbance,

and render life, property, and industry everywhere insecure. Whenever they

quarrel with each other, or with the local authorities of the Government, from

whatever cause, they take to indiscriminate plunder and murder — over all

VOL. I. H

98 THE ADMINISTRATION OP LORD DALHOUSIE. [1852.

Such was Colonel Sleeinan's report of the state of the Oudh
country ; such was his account of what he had seen with his
own eyes or heard with his own ears. There was not a man
in the Two Services who was more distressed by the fury for
annexation which was at that time breaking out in the most
influential public prints and the highest official circles. He
saw clearly the danger into which this grievous lust of dominion
was hurrying us, and he made a great effort to arrest the evil ;*
but he lifted up a warning voice in vain. The letters which he
addressed to the Governor-General and to the Chairman of the
East India Company appear to have produced no effect. He
did not see clearly, at that time, that the principles which he
held in such abhorrence were cherished by Lord Dalhousie him-

lands not held by men of the same class — no road, town, village, or hamlet
is secure from their merciless attacks — robbery and murder become their
diversion, their sport, and they think no more of taking the lives of men,
women, and children, who never offended them, than those of deer and wild
hogs. They not only rob and murder, but seize, confine, and torture all whom
they seize, and suppose to have money or credit, till they ransom themselves
with all they have, or can beg or borrow. Hardly a day has passed since I
left Lakhnao, in which I have not had abundant proof of numerous atrocities
of this kind committed by landholders within the district through which I was
passing, year by year, up to the present day." And again : " It is worthy of
remark that these great landholders, who have recently acquired their posses-
sions by the plunder and the murder of their weaker neighbours, and who
continue their system of plunder in order to acquire the means to maintain
their gangs and add to their possessions, are those who are most favoured at
Court, and most conciliated by the local rulers, because they are more able
and more willing to pay for the favour of the one and set at defiance the
authority of the other." — Sleeman's Diary.

* See Sleeman 's Correspondence, passim. Exempli gratia : " In September,
1818, 1 took the liberty to mention to your Lordship my fears that the system
of annexing and absorbing Native States — so popular with our Indian
Services, and so much advocated by a certain class of writers in public
journals — might some day render us too visibly dependent upon our Native
Army ; that they might see it, and that accidents might occur to unite them,
or too great a portion of them, in some desperate act." — Colonel Sleeman to
Lord Dalhousie, April, 1852. And again: "I deem such doctrines to be
dangerous to our rule in India, and prejudicial to the best interests of the
country. The people see that these annexations and confiscations go on, and
that rewards and honorary distinctions are given for them and for the
victories which lead to them, and for little else ; and they are too apt to infer
that they are systematic and encouraged and prescribed from home. The
Native States I consider to be breakwaters, and when they are all swept away
we shall be left to the mercy of our Native Army, which may not always be
sufficiently under our control." — Colonel Sleeman to Sir James Hogg, January,
1853.

1852.] SLEEMAN'S WARNINGS. 99

self, and he did not know that the Court of Directors had such
faith in their Governor-General that they were content to sub-
stitute his principles for their own. But, utterly distasteful to
him as were the then prevailing sentiments in favour of ab-
sorption and confiscation, Sleeman never closed his eyes against
the fact that interference in the affairs of Oudh, even to the
extent of the direct assumption of the government, would be a
righteous interference. Year after year he had pressed upon the
Governor-General the urgent necessity of the measure. But,
perhaps, had he known in what manner his advice was destined
to be followed, and how his authority would be asserted in
justification of an act which he could never countenance, he
would rather have suffered the feeble-minded debauchee who
was called King of Oudh still to remain in undisturbed pos-
session of the throne, than have uttered a word that might
hasten a measure so at variance with his sense of justice, and
so injurious as he thought to our best interests, as that of
which the interference of Government eventually took the
shape.

Sleeman's advice had been clear, consistent, unmistakable.
"Assume the administration," he said, "but do not grasp the
revenues of the country." Some years before the same advice
had been given by Henry Lawrence,* between whom and
Sleeman there was much concord of opinion and some simili-
tude of character. The private letters of the latter, addressed
to the highest Indian functionaries, and, therefore, having all
the weight and authority of public documents, were as distinct
upon this point as the most emphatic words could make them.
" What the people want, and most earnestly pray for," he wrote
to the Governor-General, " is that our Government should take
upon itself the responsibility of governing them well and
permanently. All classes, save the knaves, who now surround
and govern the King, earnestly pray for this — the educated
classes, because they would then have a chance of respectable
employment, which none of them now have ; the middle classes,
because they find no protection or encouragement, and no hope

* " Let the management," he said, " be assumed under some such rules as
those which were laid down by Lord William Bentinck. Let the adminis-
tration of the country, as far as possible, be native. Let not a rupee come
into the Company's coffers." (The italics are Lawrence's.) " Let Oudh be at
last governed,* not for one man, the King, but for him and his people." —
Calcutta Review, vol. iii. (1S45); and Lawrence's Essays, p. 132.

* 2

100 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1853.

that their children will be permitted to inherit the property
they leave, not invested in our Government Securities ; and the
humbler classes, because they are now abandoned to the merci-
less rapacity of the starving troops and other public establish-
ments, and of the landholders driven or invited to rebellion by
the present state of misrule." But he added : " I believe that
it is your Lordship's wish that the whole of the revenues of
Oudh should be expended for the benefit of the Eoyal Faniily
and People of Oudh, and that the British Government should
disclaim any wish to derive any pecuniary advantage from
assuming to itself the administration." And again, about the
same time, he had written to the Chairman of the Court of
Directors, urging the expediency of assuming the administra-
tion, but adding : " If we do this, we must, in order to stand
well with the rest of India, honestly and distinctly disclaim all
interested motives, and appropriate the whole of the revenues
for the benefit of the People and Eoyal Family of Oudh. If
we do this, all India will think us right." And again, a few
months later, writing to the same high authority, he said,
mournfully and prophetically, that to annex and confiscate the
country, and to appropriate the revenues to ourselves, would
" be most profitable in a pecuniary view, but most injurious in
a political one. It would tend to accelerate the crisis which
the doctrines of the absorbing school must sooner or later bring
upon us." *

Such was the counsel Sleeman gave ; such were the warnings
he uttered. But he did not remain in India, nay, indeed, he
did not live, to see his advice ignored, his cautions disregarded.
After long years of arduous and honourable service, compelled
to retire in broken health from his post, he died on his home-
ward voyage, leaving behind him a name second to none upon
the roll of the benefactors and civilisers of India, for he had

grappled with her greatest abomination, and had

effectually subdued it. Some solace had it been to
him when he turned his back upon the country to know that

his place would be well and worthily filled.
Sepi854ber " ^a<^ y°ur Lordship left the choice of a successor

to me," he wrote to the Governor-General, " I
should have pointed out Colonel Outram ; and I feel very much

* Private correspondence of Sir W. H. Sleeman, printed at the end of the
English edition of his " Diary in Oudh."

1854.] JAMES OUTKAM. 101

rejoiced thai he has been selected for the office, and I hope he
will come as soon as possible."

An officer of the Company's army on the Bombay establish-
ment, James Outrain had done good service to his country,
good service to the people of India, on many different fields of
adventure ; and had risen, not without much sore travail and
sharp contention, to a place in the estimation of his Govern-
ment and the affections of his comrades, from which he could
afford to look down upon the conflicts of the Past with measure-
less calmness and contentment. Versed alike in the stern
severities of war and the civilising humanities of peace, he was
ready at a moment's notice to lead an army into the field or to
superintend the government of a province. But it was in rough
soldier's work, or in that still rougher work of mingled war
and diplomacy which falls to the share of the Political officer in
India, that Outram's great and good qualities were most con-
spicuously displayed. For in him, with courage of the highest
order, with masculine energy and resolution, were combined
the gentleness of a woman and the simplicity of a child. No
man knew better how to temper power with mercy and forbear-
ance, and to combat intrigue and perfidy with pure sincerity
and stainless truth. This truthfulness was, indeed, perhaps
the most prominent, as it was the most perilous, feature of his
character. Whatsoever he might do, whatsoever he might say,
the whole was there before you in its full proportions. He
wore his heart upon his sleeve, and was incapable of conceal-
ment or disguise. A pure sense of honour, a strong sense of
justice, the vehement assertions of which no self-interested
discretion could hold in restraint, brought him sometimes into
collision with others, and immersed him in a sea of controversy.
But although, perhaps, in his reverential love of truth, he was
over-eager to fight down what he might have been well content
to live down, and in after life he may have felt that these
wordy battles were very little worth fighting, he had still no
cause to regret them, for he came unhurt from the conflict. It
was after one of these great conflicts, the growth of serious
official strife, which had sent him from an honourable post into
still more honourable retirement, that, returning to India with
strong credentials from his masters in Leadenhall-street, Lord
Dalhousie selected him to succeed Sleeman as Resident at
Lakhnao.

The choice was a wise one. There was work to be done

102 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1854-55.

which required a hand at once gentle and strong. The fame of
Outram was not the fame of a spoliator, but of a just man
friendly to the native Princes and chiefs of India, who had
lilted up his voice against wrongs done to them in his time,
and who would rather have closed his public career than have
been the agent of an unrighteous policy. But a measure which
Low, and Sleeman, and Henry Lawrence had approved, nay,
which in the interests of humanity they had strenuously recom-
mended, was little likely to be an unrighteous one, and Outram,
whilst rejoicing that his past career had thus been stamped by
his Government with the highest practical approval, accepted
the offer in the full assurance that he could fulfil its duties
without a stain upon his honour or a burden upon his con-
science.*

Making all haste to join his appointment, Outram quitted
Aden, where the summons reached him, and took ship for
Calcutta, where he arrived in the first month of the cold season.
His instructions were soon prepared for him ; they
°i854. er' were brief, but they suggested the settled resolution
of Government to wait no longer for impossible im-
provements from within, but at once to shape their measures for
the assertion, in accordance with Treaty, of the authority of
the Paramount State. But it was not a thin<r to be done in a
hurry. The measure itself was to be deliberately carried out
after certain preliminary formalities of inquiry and reference.
It was Outram's part to inquire. A report upon the existing
state of Oudh was called for from the new Eesident, and before
the end of March it was forwarded to Calcutta. It was an
elaborate history of the misgovernment of Oudh from the com-
mencement of the century, a dark catalogue of crime and suffer-
ing "caused by the culpable apathy of the Sovereign and the
Lurbar." " I have shown," said the new Eesident, in con-
clusion, " that the affairs of Oudh still continue in the same
state, if not worse, in which Colonel Sleeman from time to time
described them to be, and that the improvement which Lord
Hardinge peremptorily demanded, seven years ago, at the hands
of the King, in pursuance of the Treaty of 1801, has not, in
any degree, been effected. And I have no hesitation in declar-
ing my opinion, therefore, that the duty imposed on the British

* I speak, of course, of the mere fact of the assumption of the administra-
tion. The manner of carrying out the measure had not then been decided.

1855.] OUTRAM'S REPORT. 103

Government by that treaty cannot any longer admit of our
• honestly indulging the reluctance which the Government of
India has felt heretofore to have recourse to those extreme
measures which alone can be of any real efficiency in remedying
the evils from which the state of Oudh has suffered so long.' '

To this report, and to much earlier information of the same
kind with which the archives of Government were laden,
the Governor-General gave earnest and sustained attention
amidst the refreshing quiet of the Blue Mountains of Madras.
The weighty document had picked up, on its road through
Calcutta, another still more weighty, in the shape of
a minute written by General Low. Few as were the M"^s'
words, they exhausted all the arguments in favour of
intervention, and clothed them with the authority of a great
name. No other name could have invested them with this
authority, for no other man had seen so much of the evils of
native rule in Oudh, and no man was on principle more averse
to the extinction of the native dynasties of India. All men
must have felt the case to be very bad when John Low, who
had spoken the brave words in defence of the Princes and chiefs
of India which I have cited in the last chapter, was driven to
the forcible expression of his conviction, that it was the para-
mount duty of the British Government to interfere at once for
the protection of the people of Oudh.*

It was not possible to add much in the way of fact to what
Outram had compiled, or much in the way of argument to what
Low had written. But Dalhousie, to whom the fine bracing

* Low said that he was in favour of interference, " because the public and
shameful oppressions committed on the people by Government officers in
Oudh have of late years been constant and extreme ; because the King of
Oudh has continually, during many years, broken the Treaty by syste-
matically disregarding our advice, instead of following it, or even endeavour-
ing to follow it; because we are bound by Treaty (quite different in that
respect from our position relatively to most of the great Native States) to
prevent serious interior misrule in Oudh ; because it has been fully proved
that we have not prevented it, and that we cannot prevent it by the present
mode of conducting our relations with that State ; and because no man of
common sense can entertain the smallest expectation that the present King
of Oudh can ever become an efficient ruler of his country.'* And he added
to these pungent sentences an expression of opinion that the unfulfilled
threats of Lord Hardinge had increased the evil, inasmuch as that they had
produced an impression in Oudh that the Indian Government were restrained
from interference by the orders of higher authority at home.

104 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1855.

air of the Nilgiris had imparted a new-born capacity for
sustained labour, sat himself down to review the whole ques-
tion in a gigantic minute. He signed it on the 18th June ;
and, indeed, it was his Waterloo — the crowning victory of
annexation. It is not necessary to repeat the facts, for I have
stated them, or the arguments, for I have suggested them. No
reader can have followed me thus far, without a strong assur-
ance on his mind, that it would have been a grievous wrong
done to humanity to have any longer abstained from inter-
ference. But what was the interference to be ? Here was a
question for the ^Governor-General to solve in the invigorating
atmosphere of Utakamand — a question, the solution of which
was to yield the crowning measure of his long vice-regal career.

There may have been many ways of working out the practical
details of this measure ; but there was only one uncertain point
which was of much substantial importance. All men agreed
that the Treaty of 1801 might rightfully be declared to have
ceased by reason of repeated violations, and that with the con-
sent of the King, if attainable, or without it, if unattainable, the
Government of the country might be transferred to the hands
of European administrators. That the King must be reduced
to a mere cypher was certain ; it was certain that all possible
respect ought to be shown to him in his fallen fortunes, and
that he and all his family ought to be splendidly endowed ; no
question could well be raised upon these points. The question
was, what was to be done with the surplus revenue after paying
all the expenses of administration ? Just and wise men, as has
been shown, had protested against the absorption of a single
rupee into the British Treasury. They said that it would be as
politic as it would be righteous, to demonstrate to all the States
and Nations of India, that we had not deposed the King of Oudh
for our own benefit — that we had done a righteous act on broad
princijDles of humanity, b}^ which we had gained nothing. But
Lord Dalhousie, though he proposed not to annex the country,
determined to take the revenues.

It is not very easy to arrive at a just conception of his views :
" The reform of the administration," he said, " may be wrought,
and the prosperity of the people may be secured, without
resorting to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the
territory and the abolition of the throne. I, for my part, there-
fore, do not recommend that tin province of Oudh should be
declared to be British territory." But he proposed that the

1855.] DALHOUSIE'S VIEWS. 105

King of Oudh, whilst retaining the sovereignty of his dominions,
should "vest all power, jurisdiction, rights and claims thereto
belonging in the hands of the East India Company," and that
the surplus revenues should be at the disposal of the Company.
What this territorial sovereignty was to be, without territorial
rights or territorial revenues, it is not easy to see. When the
Nawab of the Karnatik and the Bajah of Tanjur were deprived
of their rights and revenues, they were held to be not terri-
torial, but titular sovereigns. The Nizam, on the other hand,
might properly be described as " territorial sovereign " of the
Assigned Districts, although the administration had been taken
from him, because an account of the revenue was to be rendered
to him, and the surplus was to be paid into his hands. But the
King of Oudh, in Dalhousie's scheme, was to have bad no more
to do with his territories than the titular sovereigns of the
Karnatik and Tanjur ; and yet he was to be told that he was
" to retain the sovereignty of all the territories " of which he
was then in possession.

Strictly interpreted to the letter, the scheme did not suggest
the annexation of Oudh. The province was not to be incor-
porated with the British dominions. The revenues were to be
kept distinct from those of the empire ; there was to be a sepa-
rate balance-sheet ; and thus far the province was to have a sort
of integrity of its own. This is sufficiently intelligible in itself;
and, if the balance being struck, the available surplus had been
payable to the King of Oudh, the rest of the scheme would have
been intelligible also, for there would have been a quasi-sove-
reign ty of the territories thus administered still remaining with
the King. But the balance being payable into the British
Treasury, it appears that Oudh, in this state of financial isola-
tion, would still have substantially been British territory, as
much as if it had become a component part of the empire.
Again, under the proposed system, Oudh would have been
beyond the circle of our ordinary legislation, in which respect
it would not have differed much from other " Non-Begulation
Provinces " ; and if it had, even this Legislative segregation
superadded to the Financial isolation of which I have spoken,
would not have made it any the less British territory. The
Channel Islands have a separate Budget and distinct laws of
their own, but still they are component parts of the British
Empire, although they do not pay their surplus into the British
Treasury. But in everything that really constitutes Kingship,

1 06 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1855.

the Bailiff of Jersey is as much the territorial sovereign of that
island as Wajid Ali would have been territorial sovereign of
Oudh under Lord Dalhousie's programme of non-annexation.

But this transparent disguise was not to be worn ; this dis-
tinction without a difference was not to be asserted, anywhere
out of Lord Dalhousie's great Minute. The thing that was to
be done soon came to take its proper place in the Councils of
the Indian Empire as the Annexation of Oudh ; and it was as
the annexation of Oudh that the measure was considered by the
Government at home. The Court of Directors consented to the
annexation of Oudh. The Board of Control consented to the
annexation of Oudh. The British Cabinet consented to the an-
nexation of Oudh. The word was not then, as it since has been,
freely used in official documents, but it was in all men's minds,
and many spoke it out bluntly instead of talking delicately
about "assuming the Government of the Country." And, whether
right or wrong, the responsibility of the measure rested as
much with the Queen's Ministers as with the Merchant Com-
pany* That the Company had for long years shown great for-
bearance is certain. They had hoped against hope, and acted
against all experience. So eager, indeed, had they been to
give the Native Princes of India a fair trial, that they had dis-
allowed the proposed treaty of 1837, and had pronounced an
authoritative opinion in favour of the maintenance of the then
existing Native States of India. But twenty more years of
misrule and anarchy had raised in their minds a feeling of
wondering self-reproach at the thought of their own patience ;
and when they responded to the reference from Calcutta, they
said that the doubt raised by a survey of the facts before them,
was not whether it was then incumbent upon them to free
themselves from the responsibility of any longer upholding
such a Government, but whether they could excuse themselves
for not having, many years before, performed so imperative a
duty.

The despatch of the Court of Directors was signed
November 19, jn ^he middle of November. At midnight on the
2nd of January, the Governor-General mastered its
contents. Had he thought of himself more than of his country,
he would not have been there at that time. The energies of
his mind were undimmed ; but climate, and much toil, and a
heavy sorrow weighing on his heart, had shattered a frame
never constitutionally robust, and all men said that he was

1855-56.] ORDERS FROM HOME. 107

" breaking." Without any failure of duty, without any im-
putation on his zeal, he might have left to his successor the
ungrateful task of turning into stern realities the oft-repeated
menaces of the British rulers who had gone before him. But
he was not one to shrink from the performance of such a task
because it was a painful and unpopular one. He believed that,
by no one could the duty of bringing the Oudh Government to
solemn account be so fitly discharged as by one who had watched
for seven years the accumulation of its offences, and seen the
measure of its guilt filled to the brim. He had intimated, there-
fore, to the Court of Directors his willingness to remain at his
post to discharge this duty, and in the despatch, which he read
in the quiet of that January night, he saw on official record the
alacrity with which his offer was accepted, and he girded him-
self for the closing act of his long and eventful administration.*

Next morning he summoned a Council. It was little more
than a form. Dalhousie had waited for the authoritative sanction
of the Home Government ; but he knew that sanction was
coming, and he was prepared for its arrival. The greater
part of the work had, indeed, been already done. The instruc-
tions to be sent to the Eesident ; the treaty to be proposed to
the King ; the proclamation to be issued to the people had all
been drafted. The whole scheme of internal government had
been matured, and the agency to be employed had been carefully
considered. The muster-roll of the new administration was
ready, and the machinery was complete. The system was very
closely to resemble that which had been tried with such good
success in the Panjab, and its agents were, as in that province,
to be a mixed body of civil and military officers, under a Chief
Commissioner. All the weighty documents, by which the
revolution was to be effected, were in the portfolio of the
Foreign Secretary ; and now, at this meeting of the Council,
they were formally let loose to do their work.

The task which Outram was commissioned to perform was a
difficult, a delicate, and a painful one. He was to endeavour to
persuade the King of Oudh formally to abdicate his sovereign
functions, and to make over, by a solemn treaty, the govern-
ment of his territories to the East India Company. In the
event of his refusal, a proclamation was to be issued, declaring

* The Court of Directors to the Government of India, November 19, 1855,
Paragraph 19.

108 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1856.

the whole of Oudh to be British territory. By a man of Outram's
humane and generous nature no counsel from his Government was
needed to induce him to do the work entrusted to him in the
manner least likely to wound the feelings of the King- But it
was right that such counsel should be given. It was given ; but
the decree of the Paramount State, tempered as it might be by out
ward courtesy of manner, was still to be carried out, with stern
and resolute action. No protests, no remonstrances, no promises,
no prayers were to be suffered to arrest the retributive measure
for a day. It need not be added that no resistance could avert
it. A body of British troops, sufficient to trample down all
possible opposition, had been moved up into a position to over-
awe Lakhnao, and for the doomed Government of Oudh to
attempt to save itself by a display of force would have been
only to court a most useless butchery.

Outram received his instructions at the end of January. On
the last day of the month he placed himself in communication
with the Oudh Minister, clearly stated the orders of the British
Government, and said that they were final and decisive. Four
days were spent in preliminary formalities and negotiations.
In true Oriental fashion, the Court endeavoured to gain time,
and, appealing to Outram, through the aged Queen Mother — a
woman with far more of masculine energy and resolution than
her son — importuned him to persuade his Government to give
the King another trial, to wait for the arrival of the new
Governor-General, to dictate to Wajid Ali any reforms to be
carried out in his name. All this had been expected ; all this
provided for. Outram had but one answer ; the day of trial,
the day of forbearance, was past. All that he could now do was
to deliver his message to the King.

On the 4th of February, Wajid Ali announced his willingness
to receive the British Besident ; and Outram, accompanied by
his lieutenants, Hayes and Weston, proceeded to tne palace.
Strange and significant symptoms greeted them as they went.
The guns at the palace-gates were dismounted. The palace-
guards were unarmed. The guard of honour, who should have
presented arms to the Besident, saluted him only with their
hands. Attended by his brother and a few of his confidential
Ministers, the King received the English gentlemen at the
usual spot ; and after the wonted ceremonies, the business com-
menced. Outram presented to the King a letter from the
Governor-General, which contained, in terms of courteous ex-

1856.] ANNEXATION. 109

planation, the sentence that had been passed upon him, and
urged him not to resist it. A draft of the proposed treaty was
then placed in his hands. He received it with a passionate
burst of grief, declared that treaties were only between equals ;
that there was no need for him to sign it, as the British would
do with him and his possessions as they pleased ; they had
taken his honour and his country, and he would not ask them
for the means of maintaining his life. All that he sought was
permission to proceed to England, and cast himself and his
sorrows at the foot of the Throne. Nothing could move him
from his resolution not to sign the treaty. He uncovered his
head ; placed bis turban in the hands of the Eesident, and
sorrowfully declared that title, rank, honour, everything were
gone ; and that now the British Government, which had made
his grandfather a King, might reduce him to nothing, and
consign him to obscurity.

In this exaggerated display of helplessness there was some-
thing too characteristically Oriental for any part of it to be
assigned to European prompting. But if the scene had been
got up expressly for an English audience, it could not have
been more cunningly contrived to increase the appearance of
harshness and cruelty with which the friends of the King were
prepared to invest the act of dethronement. No man was more
likely than Outram to have been doubly pained, in the midst
of all bis painful duties, by the unmanly prostration of the
King. To deal harshly with one who declared himself so feeble
and defenceless, was like striking a woman or a cripple. But
five millions of people were not to be given up, from generation
to generation, to suffering and sorrow, because an effeminate
Prince, when told he was no longer to have the power of
inflicting measureless wrongs on his country, burst into tears,
said that he was a miserable wretch, and took off his turban
instead of taking out his sword.

There was nothing now left for Outram but to issue a pro-
clamation, prepared for him in Calcutta, declaring the province
of Oudh to be thenceforth, for ever, a component part of the
British Indian Empire. It went forth to the people of Oudh ;
and the people of Oudh, without a murmur, accepted their
new masters. There were no popular risings. Not a blow
was struck in defence of the native dynasty of Oudh. The
whole population went over quietly to their new rulers, and
the country, for a time, was outwardly more tranquil than before.

110 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1856.

This was the last act of Lord Dalhousie's Ministry. When
he placed the Portfolio of Government in the hands of Lord
Canning, the British officers to whom had been entrusted the
work of reforming the administration of Oudh were dis-
charging their prescribed duties with an energy which seemed
to promise the happiest results. The King was still obstinate
and sullen. He persisted in refusing to sign the treaty or to
accept the proposed stipend of twelve lakhs ; and
though he had thought better of the idea of casting
himself at the foot of the British Throne, he had made arrange-
ments to send his nearest kindred — his mother, his brother, and
his son — to England to perform a vicarious act of obeisance,
and to clamour for his lights.

With what result the administration, as copied closely from
the Panjabi system, was wrought out in detail, will be shown
at a subsequent stage of this narrative. It was thought, as the
work proceeded in quietude and in seeming prosperity, that it
was a great success ; and it gladdened the heart of the Govern-
ment in Leadenhall-street, to think of the accomplishment of
this peaceful revolution. But that the measure itself made a
very bad impression on the minds of the people of India, is not
to be doubted; not because of the deposition of a King who
had abused his powers ; not because of the introduction of a
new system of administration for the benefit of the people ;
but tecause the humanity of the act was soiled by the profit
which we derived from it; and to the comprehension of the
multitude it appeared that the good of the people, which we
had vaunted whilst serving ourselves, was nothing more than
a pretext and a sham ; and that we had simply extinguished
one of the few remaining Muhammadan States of India that
we might add so many thousands of square miles to our British
territories, and so many millions of rupees to the revenues of
the British Empire in the East. And who, it was asked, could
be safe, if we thus treated one who had ever been the most
faithful of our allies?

1806-56.1 EXTINCTION OF THE ARISTOCRACY. 1JJ

CHAPTER IV.

Whilst great principalities were thus being absorbed and
ancient sovereignties extinguished, a war of extermination no
less fatal in its effects, but more noiseless in its operations, was
being waged against the nobility and gentry of the country.
The original proclamation of this war did not emanate from
Lord Dathousie. The measures by which the native aristocracy
were destroyed were not primarily his measures. It was the
policy of the times to recognise nothing between the Prince and
the Peasant ; a policy which owed its birth not to one but to
many ; a policy, the greatest practical exposition of which was
the Settlement of the North- West Provinces. It was adopted
in pure good faith and with the most benevolent intentions. It
had the sanction of many wise and good men. It was not the
policy by which such statesmen as John Malcolm, George
Clerk, and Henry Lawrence sought to govern the people ; but
it was sanctified by the genius of John Lawrence, and of the
Gamaliel at whose feet he had sat, the virtuous, pure-minded
James Thomason.

To bring the direct authority of the British Government to
bear upon the great masses of the people, without the interven-
tion of any powerful section of their own countrymen — to
ignore, indeed, the existence of all governing classes but the
European officers, who carried out the behests of that Govern-
ment— seemed to be a wise and humane system of protection.
It was intended to shelter the many from the injurious action
of the interests and the passions of the few. The utter worth-
lessness of the upper classes was assumed to be a fact ; and it
was honestly believed that the obliteration of the aristocracy of
the land was the greatest benefit that could be conferred on the
people. And thus it happened that whilst the native sove-
reigns of India were one by one being extinguished, the native
aristocracy had become well-nigh extinct.

Doubtless, we started upon a theory sound in the abstract,
intent only on promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest

112 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. U806-56.

number; but if we had allowed ourselves to understand the
genius and the institutions of the people, we should have re-
spected the rights, natural and acquired, of all classes of the
community, instead of working out any abstract theory of our
own. It was in the very nature of things necessary, inevitable,
that the extension of British rule, followed always by a recon-
struction of the administration, and a substitution of civil and
military establishments fashioned upon our own models and
composed of our own people, should have deprived many of the
chief people of their official rank and official emoluments, and
cast them adrift upon the world, either to seek new fields of
adventure in the unabsorbed Native States, or to fester into a
disaffected and dangerous class sullenly biding their time. This
is old story ; an old complaint. Half a century before the time
of which I am now writing, it had been alleged to be one of
the main causes of that national outburst in Southern India
known as the mutiny of Vellur. But this very necessity for
the extinction of the old race of high native functionaries, often
hereditary office-bearers, ought to have rendered us all the more
desirous to perpetuate the nobility whose greatness was derived
from the Land. It is true that the titles of the landed gentry
whom we found in possession were, in some cases, neither of
very ancient date nor of very unquestionable origin. But, what-
soever the nature of their tenures, we found them in the posses-
sion of certain rights or privileges allowed to them by the
Governments which we had supplanted, and our first care should
have been to confirm and secure their enjoyment of them. We
might have done this without sacrificing the rights of others.
Indeed, we might have done it to the full contentment of the
inferior agricultural classes. But many able English states-
men, especially in Upper India, had no toleration for any one
who might properly be described as a Native Gentleman. They
had large sympathies and a comprehensive humanity, but still
they could not embrace any other idea of the Native Gentry of
India than that of an institution to be righteously obliterated
for the benefit of the great mass of the people.

There were two processes by which this depression of the
privileged classes was effected. The one was known by the
name of a Settlement, the other was called Besumption. It
would be out of place here, if I had the ability, to enter minutely
into the difficult question of landed tenures in India. It is an
old story now, that when that clever coxcomb, Victor Jacque-

1806-56.] SETTLEMENT OF THE EEVENUE. 113

mont, asked Holt Mackenzie to explain to him in a five minutes'
conversation the various systems of Land Eevenue obtaining in
different parts of the country, the experienced civilian replied
that he had been for twenty years endeavouring to understand
the subject and had not mastered it yet. Such a rebuke ought
to be remembered. The little that I have to say on the subject
shall be said with the least possible use of technical terms, and
with the one object of making the general reader acquainted
with the process by which the substance of the great land-
holders in Upper India was diminished by the action of the
British Government.

In the Literature of India the word " Settlement " is one of
such frequent occurrence, and to the Indian resident
it conveys such a distinct idea, that there is some Settlement
danger of forgetting that the general reader may not
be equally conversant with the exact meaning of the term. It
may therefore, perhaps, be advantageously explained that as the
Indian Eevenue is mainly derived from the land, it is of the
first importance, on the acquisition of new territory, clearly to
ascertain the persons from whom the Government dues are to be
exacted, and the amount that is payable by each. We may call
it Eent or we may call it Eevenue, it little matters. The ad-
justment of the mutual relations between the Government and
the agriculturists was known as the Settlement of the Eevenue.
It was an affair of as much vital interest and concernment to
the one as to the other, for to be charged with the payment of
the Eevenue was to be acknowledged as the proprietor of the
land.

When we first took possession of the country ceded by the
Nawab-Wazir of Oudh, or conquered from the Marathas, all
sorts of proprietors presented themselves, and our officers,
having no special theories and no overriding prejudices, were
willing to consider the claims of all, whether small or great
holders, whom they found in actual possession ; and brief settle-
ments or engagements were made with them, pending a more
thorough investigation of their rights. There was, doubtless,
at first a good deal of ignorance on our part, and a good deal of*
wrong-doing and usurpation on the part of those with whom
we were called upon to deal. But the landed gentry of these
Ceded and Conquered Provinces, though they suffered by the
extension of the British Baj, were not deliberately destroyed by
a theory. It was the inevitable tendency of our EegulatioDS,

VOL. i. i

114 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1806-56.

especially of that great Mystery of Iniquity, the Sale Law, and
of the immigration of astute native functionaries from the
Lower Provinces, which inaugurated our rule, to subvert the
supremacy of the old landholders. Under the system, which
we introduced, men who had been proprietors of vast tracts of
country as far as tli6 eye could reach, shrivelled into tenants of
mud-huts and possessors only of a few cooking-pots. The pro-
cess, though certain in its results, was gradual in its operation ;
and the ruin which it entailed was incidental, not systematic.
It was ignorantly suffered, not deliberately decreed. But, at a
later period, when a new political creed had grown up among
our British functionaries in India, and upon officers of this new
school devolved the duty of fixing the relations of the agricul-
tural classes with the British Government, the great besom of
the Settlement swept out the remnant of the landed gentry
from their baronial possessions, and a race of peasant- proprietors
were recognised as the legitimate inheritors of the soil.

How this happened may be briefly stated. A Permanent
Settlement on the Bengal model had been talked of, ordered
and counter-ordered ; but for nearly a third part of a century,
under a series of brief engagements with holders of different
kinds, uncertainty and confusion prevailed, injurious both to
the Government and to the People. But in the time of Lord
William Bentinck an order went forth for the revision of
this system or no-system, based upon a detailed survey and
a clearly recorded definition of rights, and what is known in
History as the Settlement of the North- West Provinces was
then formally commenced.

That it was benevolently designed and conscientiously exe-
cuted, is not to be doubted. But it was marred by a Theory.
In the pursuit of right, the framers of the settlement fell into
wrong. Striving after justice, they perpetrated injustice.
Nothing could be sounder than the declared principle, that
" it was the duty of the Government to ascertain and pro-
tect all existing rights, those of the poor and humble villager
as well as those of the rich and influential Talukdar."* It
was said that this principle had been not only asserted, but

* See letter of Mr. John Thornton, Secretary to Government, North-West
Provinces, to Mr. H. M. Elliot, Secretary to Board of Revenue, April 30,
1845. It is added, with undeniable truth, that "in so far as this is done
with care and diligence, will the measure be successful in placing property on
a Lealthy and sound footing."

1836-46.] SETTLEMENT OF NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES. 115

acted upon. But the fact is, that the practice halted a long
way behind the principle. Such were the feelings with which
many of our officers regarded the great landholders, that equal
justice between the conflicting claims and interests of the two
classes was too often ignored. There were scales over the eyes
of commonly clear-sighted men when they came to look at
this question in the face, and therefore the " poor and humble
villager " had a full measure of justice, pressed down and
running over, whilst the " rich and influential Talukdar " had
little or none.

There are few who have not become familiar with this word
Talukdar ; who do not know that an influential class of men so
styled in virtue of certain rights or interests in the land, were
dispossessed of those rights or interests and reduced to absolute
ruin. It must be understood, however, that the proprietary
rights of which I speak were very different from the rights of
landed property in England. The Talukdar was little more
than an hereditary revenue-contractor. His right was the right
to all the just rents paid by the actual occupants, after satisfac-
tion of the Government claims. His property was the rent
minus the revenue of a particular estate. This Talukdari
right, or right of collection, was distinct from the Zamindari
right, or proprietary right in the soil. The Talukdar. who
paid to Government the revenue of a large cluster of villages,
had, perhaps, a proprietary right in some of these small estates ;
perhaps, in none. The proprietary right, in most instances,
lay with the village communities. And it was the main effort
of the English officers, engaged in the Settlement of the North-
West Provinces, to bring these village occupants into direct
relations with the Government, and to receive from them the
amount of the assessment fixed upon their several estates.

Now it was a just and fitting thing that the rights of these
village proprietors should be clearly defined. But it was not
always just that the Government should enter into direct
engagements with them and drive out the intervening Talukdar.
The actual occupants might, in a former generation, have been
a consequence only of a pre-existing Talukdari right, as in cases
where cultivators had been located on waste lands by a con-
tractor or grantee of the State ; or the Talukdar might have
acquired his position by purchase, by favour, perhaps by fraud,
after the location of the actual occupants ; still it was a pro-
prietary interest, perhaps centuries old. Let us explain their

I 2

116 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOKD DALHOUSIE. [1836-46.

position as we may, these Talukdars constituted the landed
aristocracy of the country ; they had recognised manorial rights ;
they had, in many instances, all the dignity and power of great
feudal barons, and, doubtless, often turned that power to bad
account. But whether for good or for evil, in past years, we
found them existing as a recognised institution ; and it was at
the same time a cruel wrong and a grievous error to sweep it
away as though it were an encumbrance and an usurpation.

The theorv of the Settlement officers was that the village
Zamindars bad an inalienable right in the soil, and that the
Talukdar was little better than an upstart and an impostor.
All the defects in his tenure were rigidly scanned ; all the
vices of his character were violently exaggerated. He was
written down as a fraudulent upstart and an unscrupulous
oppressor. To oust a Talukdar was held by some young Settle-
ment officers to be as great an achievement as to shoot a tiger ;
and it was done, too, with just as clear a conviction of the
benefit conferred upon the district in which the animal prowled
and marauded. It was done honestly, conscientiously, labor-
iously, as a deed entitling the doer to the gratitude of mankind.
There was something thorough in it that wrung an unwilling
admiration even from those who least approved. It was a grand
levelling system, reducing everything to first principles and a
delving Adam. Who was a gentleman and a Talukdar, they
asked, when these time-honoured Village Communities were
first established on the soil? So the Settlement Officer, in pur-
suit of the great scheme of restitution, was fain to sweep out
the Landed Gentry and to applaud the good thing he had
done.*

And if one, by happy chance, was brought back bj a saving
hand, it was a mercy and a miracle ; and the exception which
proved the rule. The chances against him were many and
great, for he had divers ordeals to pass through, and he seldom
survived them all. It was the wont of many Settlement officers
to assist the solution of knotty questions of proprietary right
by a reference to personal character and conduct, so that when
the claims of a great Talukdar could not be altogether ignored,

* In sober official language, described by Lieutenant-Governor Robertson
as "the prevailing, and perhaps excessive, readiness to reduce extensive
properties into minute portions, and to substitute, whenever there was an
opportunity, a village community for an individual landholder."

1836-46.] TREATMENT OF THE TALUKDAES. 117

it was declared that he was a rogue or a fool — perhaps an
atrocious compound of both — and that he had forfeited, by
oppressions and cruelties, or by neglects scarcely less cruel, all
claim to the compassion of the State. They gave the man a
bad name, and straightway they went out to ruin him. A
single illustration will suffice. One of the great landholders
thus consigned to perdition was the Rajah of Mainpuri. Of
an old and honoured family, distinguished for loyalty and good
service to the British Government, he was the Talukdar of a
large estate comprising nearly two hundred villages, and was
amongst the most influential of the landed aristocracy of that
part of the country. The Settlement officer was one of the
ablest and best of his class. Fulfilling the great
promise of his youth, he afterwards attained to the *Ir- G- Edmon-

| . , . J , t-i • • stone.

highest post m those very rrovmces, an eminence
from which he might serenely contemplate the fact, that the
theory of the Dead-Level is against nature, and cannot be
enforced without a convulsion. But, in the early days of
which I am speaking, a great Talukdar was to him what it
was to others of the same school ; and he represented that the
Rajah, himself incompetent almost to the point of imbecility,
was surrounded by agents of the worst character, who in his
name had been guilty of all kinds of cruelty and oppression.
Unfit as he was said to be for the management of so large an
estate, it would, according to the prevailing creed, have been
a righteous act to exclude him from it; but it was necessary,
according to rule, to espy also a flaw in his tenure ; so it was
found that he had a just proprietary right in only about a
fourth of the two hundred villages.* It was proposed, there-
fore, that his territorial greatness should to this extent be
shorn down in the future Settlement, and that the bulk of the
property should be settled with the village communities, whose
rights, whatever they might originally have been, had lain for
a century in abeyance.

Above the Settlement officer, in the ascending scale of our
Administrative Agency, was the Commissioner ; above the
Commissioner, the Board of Revenue ; above the Board of
Revenue, the Lieutenant-Governor. In this cluster of gra-

* The exact number was 189, of which it was ruled that the Rajah could
justly be recorded as proprietor only of 51. A money-compensation, in the
shape of a percentage, was to be given him for the loss of the reat.

118 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOKD DALHOUSIE. [1836-46.

duated authorities the Old and New School alternated like the
Black and White of a chess-board. The recommendations of
George Edmonstone were stoutly opposed by Robert Hamilton.
The sharp, incisive logic of the Commissioner cut through the
fallacious reasoning of the Settlement officer. " He was of
opinion that the value of landed possessions and the import-
ance attached to them could never be made up by a money
allowance; that the imbecility of the Rajah, if affording a
justification for his being relieved from the management of his
estate, could be none for depriving his family of their inherit-
ance ; and that it was inconsistent to denounce as oppressive
in a native ruler the same measures of sale and dispossession
which were adopted by our own Government towards Revenue
defaulters."* But the Board, of which the living principle was
Robert Bird, dissented from the views of the Commissioner,
and upheld the levelling processes of the Settlement officer.
Then Lieutenant-Governor Robertson appeared upon the scene,
and the decision of the Board was flung back upon them as
the unjust growth of a vicious, generalising system, which
would break up every large estate in the country into minute
fractions, and destroy the whole aristocracy of the country.
He could not see that, on the score either of invalidity of
tenure or of administrative incapacity, it would be just to pare
down the Rajah's estate to one-fourth of its ancestral dimen-
sions ; so he ruled that the settlement of the whole ought
rightly to be made with the Talukdar.f But the vicissitudes
of the case were not even then at an end. The opposition of

* Despatch of Court of Directors, August 13, 1851.

t The Lieutenant-Governor recorded his opinion, that no proof of the
Rajah's mismanagement, such as could justify his exclusion, had been adduced ;
that the evidence in support of the proprietary claims of the Zamindars was
insufficient and inconclusive ; that if the Zamindars ever possessed the rights
attributed to them, they had not been in the active enjoyment of them for
upwards of a century, while the Rajah's claims had been admitted for more
than four generations; that, admitting the inconvenience which might some-
times result from the recognition of the superior malgoosar, it would not be
reconcilable with good feeling or justice to deal as the Board proposed to do,
with one found in actual and long-acknowledged possession. He condemned
the practice of deciding cases of this nature on one invariable and generalising
principle ; stated that he could discover no sufficient reason for excluding the
Rajah of Mainpuri from the management of any of the villages composing the
Taluk of Minchanah ; and finally withheld his confirmation of the settlement
concluded with the village Zamindars. directing the engagements to betakeo
from the Talukdar." — Despatch of Court of Directors, August 13, 1851.

1836-46.] TREATMENT OF THE TALUKDARS. 119

the Board caused some delay in the issue of the formal instruc-
tions of Government for the recognition of the Talukdar, and
before the settlement had been made with the Eajah, Kobertson
had resigned his post to another. That other was
a man of the same school, with no greater passion £*r> George
than his predecessor for the subversion of the landed
gentry ; but sickness rendered his tenure of office too brief,
and, before the close of the year, he was succeeded
by one whose name is not to be mentioned without
respect — the honoured son of an honoured father — the much-
praised, much-lamented Thomason. He was as ,r mi.

x -, , , .-, t t t Hr. Thomason.

earnest and as honest as the men who had gone
before him ; but his strong and sincere convictions lay all in
the other way. He was one of the chief teachers in the New
School, and so strong was his faith in its doctrines that he
regarded, with feelings akin to wondering compassion, as men
whom God had given over to a strong delusion that they
should believe a lie, all who still cherished the opinions which
he had done so much to explode.* Supreme in the North-
West Provinces, he found the case of the Mainpuri Eajah
still formally before the Government. No final orders had
been issued, so he issued them. The besom of the Settlement
swept the great Talukdar out of three-fourths of the estate, and
the village proprietors were left to engage with Government
for all the rest in his stead.

It is admitted now, even by men who were personally con-
cerned in this great work of the Settlement of Northern India,
that it involved a grave political error. It was, undoubtedly,
to convert into bitter enemies those whom sound policy would
have made the friends and supporters of the State. Men of the
Old School had seen plainly from the first that by these measures

* See, for example, his reflections on the contumacy of Mr. Boulderson, of
whom Mr. Thomason says : " With much honesty of principle he is possessed
of a constitution of mind which prevents him from readily adopting the prin-
ciples of others, or acting upon their rules. A great part of his Indian career
has heeu passed in opposition to the prevailing maxims of the day, and he
finds himself conscientiously adverse to what has been done." With respect to
these prevailing maxims, Mr. F. H. Robinson, of the Civil Service, in a pamphlet
published in 1855, quotes the significant observation of an old Rasaldar of
Gardener's Horse, who said to him : " No doubt the wisdom of the new gentle-
men had shown them the folly and the ignorance of the gentlemen of the old
time, on whom it pleased God, nevertheless, to bestow the government of
India."

120 THE ADMINISTKATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1836-46.

we were sowing broadcast the seeds of future trouble. Fore-
most among these was the veteran Director Tucker, who had
been engaged in the first settlement of the Ceded and Con-
quered Provinces, and who knew as well as any man what
rights existed on our original assumption of the government of
those territories. " The way to conciliate the pea-
santry," he wrote, " or to improve their condition,
is not, I think, by dissolving the connection between them and
the superior Talukdars, or village Zamindars. The one we
have, I fear, entirely displaced ; but we cannot destroy the
memory of their past or the consciousness of their present state.
They were once prosperous, and their descendants must feel
that they are no longer so. They are silent, because the natives
of India are accustomed to endure and to submit to the will of
their rulers ; but if an enemy appear on our Western frontier,
or if an insurrection unhappily take place, we shall find these
Talukdars, I apprehend, in the adverse ranks, and their ryots
and retainers ranged under the same standard." And a quarter
of a century later, one who had received the traditions of this
school unbroken from Thomas Campbell Eobertson, at whose feet
he had sat, wrote that he had long been pointing out that,
" although the old families were being displaced fast, we could
not destroy the memory of the past, or dissolve the ancient
connexion between them and their people ; and said distinctly
that, in the event of any insurrection occurring, we should find
this great and influential body, through whom we can alone
hope to keep under and control the rural masses, ranged against
us on the side of the enemy, with their hereditary followers and
retainers rallying around them, in spite of our attempts to
separate their interests." " My warnings," he added, " were
unheeded, and I was treated as an alarmist, who, having hitherto
served only in the political department of the State, and being
totally inexperienced in Revenue matters, could give no sound
opinion on the subject." *

Warnings of this kind were, indeed, habitually disregarded ;
Treatment of the and the system, harsh in itself, was carried out, in
native gentry. some cases harshly and uncompromisingly, almost
indeed as though there were a pleasure in doing it. It is true

* Personal Adventures during the Indian Rebellion. By William Ed-
wards, B.C.S., Judge of Banaras, and late Magistrate and Collector of
Badaon, in Rokilkhand.

1835-46.] RENT-FREE TENURES. 121

that men deprived of their vested interests in great estates
were recommended for money-payments direct from the Trea-
sury ; but this was no compensation for the loss of the land,
with all the dignity derived from manorial rights and baronial
privileges, and it was sometimes felt to be an insult. It was
not even the fashion in those days to treat the Native Gentry
with personal courtesy and conciliation. Some of the great
masters of the school, men of the highest probity and benevo-
lence, are said to have failed in this with a great failure, as
lamentable as it was surprising. " In the matter of discourtesy
to the native gentry," wrote Colonel Sleeman to John Colvin,
" I can only say that Eobert Mertins Bird insulted them, when-
ever he had an opportunity of doing so ; and that Mr. T ho mason
was too apt to imitate him in this as iu other things. Of
course their example was followed by too many of their
followers and admirers." *

"" And whilst all this was going on, there was another process in
active operation by which the position of the privi-
leged classes was still further reduced. There is not
one of the many difficulties, which the acquisition of a
new country entails upon us, more serious than that which arises
from the multiplicity of privileges and prescriptions, territorial,
and official, which, undetermined by any fixed principle, have
existed under the Native Government which we have supplanted.
Even at the outset of our administrative career it is difficult to
deal with these irregular claims, but the difficulty is multiplied
tenfold by delay. The action of our Government in all such
cases should be prompt and unvarying. Justice or Injustice
should be quick in its operation and equal in its effects. Ac-
customed to revolutions of empire and mutations of fortune, the
native mind readily comprehends the idea of confiscation as the
immediate result of conquest. Mercy and forbearance at such
time are not expected, and are little understood. The descent
of the strong hand of the conqueror upon all existing rights
and privileges is looked for with a feeling of submission to
inevitable fate ; and at such a time no one wonders, scarcely
any one complains, when the acts of a former Government
are ignored, and its gifts are violently resumed.

Rent-free
tenures.

* See Correspondence annexed to published edition of Sleeman's Oudh
Diary. I have been told by men whose authority is entitled to respect, that
the statement is to be received with caution.

122 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1836-46.

Under former Governments, and, indeed, in the earlier days
of our own, there had been large alienations of revenue in favour
of persons who had rendered good service to the State, or had
otherwise acquired the favour of the rulers of the land. These
rent-free tenures were of many different kinds. A volume
might be filled with an account of them. Some were burdened
with conditions ; some were not. Some were personal life-
grants ; some were hereditary and perpetual. Some were of
old standing ; some were of recent origin. Some had been
fairly earned or justly acquired ; others were the vile growth of
fraud and corruption. They varied no less in the circumstances
of their acquisition than in their intrinsic character and inhe-
rent conditions. But anyhow they were for some time a part
of our system, and had come to be regarded as the rights of the
occupants. Every year which saw men in undisturbed posses-
sion seemed to strengthen those rights. An inquiry, at the
outset of our career of administration, into the validity of all
such tenures would have been an intelligible proceeding.
Doubtless, indeed, it was expected. But years passed, and the
danger seemed to have passed with them. Nay, more, the in-
activity, seemingly the indifference, of the British Government,
with respect to those whom we found in possession, emboldened
others to fabricate similar rights, and to lay claim to immunities
which they had never enjoyed under their native masters.
In Bengal this manufacture of rent-free tenures was carried
on to an extent that largely diminished the legiti-
mate revenue of the country. A very considerable
portion of these tenures was the growth of the transition-period
immediately before and immediately after our assumption of the
Diwani, or Bevenue- Administration, of Bengal, Bihar, and Orisa.
At the time of the great Permanent Settlement
the rent-free holders were called upon to register
their claims to exemption from the payment of the Govern-
ment dues, and their grounds of exemption ; and as they still
remained in possession they believed that their rights and privi-
leges had been confirmed to them. The Permanent Settlement,
indeed, was held to be the Magna Charta of the privileged
classes ; and for more than forty years men rejoiced in their
freeholds, undisturbed by any thoughts of invalidity of title or
insecurity of tenure.

But after this lapse of years, when Fraud itself
operation. might reasonably have pleaded a statute of limita-

1836-46.] RESUMPTION OPERATIONS 123

tions, the English revenue- officer awoke to a sense of the wrongs
endured by his Government. So much revenue alienated : so
many worthless sinecurists living in indolent contentment at
the cost of the State, enjoying vast privileges and immunities,
to the injury of the great mass of the People. Surely it was a
scandal and a reproach ! Then well-read, clever secretaries,
with a turn for historical illustration, discovered a parallel
between this grievous state of things in Bengal and that which
preceded the great revolution in France, when the privileges of
the old nobility pressed out the very life of the nation, until
the day of reckoning and retribution came, with a more dire
tyranny of its own. Viewed in this light, it was held to be an
imperative duty to Colbertise the Lakhirajdars of the Lower
Provinces.* So the resumption-officer was let loose upon the
land. Titles were called for ; proofs of validity were to be estab-
lished, to the satisfaction of the Government functionary. But
in families, which seldom last a generation without seeing their
houses burnt down, and in a climate which during some months
of the year is made up of incessant rains, and during others of
steamy exhalations — where the devouring damp, and the still
more devouring insect, consume all kinds of perishable property,
even in stout-walled houses, it would have been strange if
genuine documentary evidence had been forthcoming at the
right time. It was an awful thing, after so many years of un-
disturbed possession, to be called upon to establish proofs, when
the only proof was actual incumbenc}'. A reign of terror then
commenced. And if, when thus threatened, the weak Bengali
had not sometimes betaken himself in self-defence to the ready
weapons of forgery, he must have changed his nature under
the influence of his fears. That what ensued may properly be
described as wholesale confiscation is not to be doubted. Expert

* " In a memoir of the Great Colbert I read the following words, which
are exactly descriptive of the nature of the pretensions of the great mass of
the Lakhirajdars, and of the present measures of the Government: 'Under
the pernicious system which exempted the nobility from payment of direct
taxes, a great number of persons had fraudulently assumed titles and claimed
rank, while another class had obtained immunity from taxation by the
prostitution of Court favour, or the abuse of official privileges. These cases
Colbert caused to be investigated, and those who failed in making out a
legal claim to immunity were compelled to pay their share of the public
burdens, to the relief of the labouring classes, on whom nearly the whole
weight of taxation fell.' " — See Letters of Gauntlet, addressed to the Calcutta
Papers of 1838.

124 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOED DALHOUSIE. [1836-46.

young revenue-officers settled scores of cases in a day ; and
families, who had held possession of inherited estates for long
years, and never doubted the security of their tenure, found
themselves suddenly deprived of their freeholds and compelled
to pay or to go. That the State had been largely defrauded, at
some time or other, is more than probable. Many, it is admitted,
were in possession who had originally no good title to the
exemption they enjoyed. But many also, whose titles were
originally valid, could produce no satisfactory evidence of their
validity : so the fraudulent usurper and the rightful possessor
were involved in one common ruin.

— The success of these operations was loudly vaunted at the
time. A social revolution had been accomplished, to the mani-
fest advantage of the State, and at no cost, it was said, of
popular discontent. The Bengali is proverbially timid, patient,
and long-suffering. But there were far-seeing men who said,
even at that time, that though a strong Government might
do this with impunity in those lower provinces, they must
beware how they attempt similar spoliation in other parts of
India, especially in those from which the Native Army was
recruited. If you do, it was prophetically said, you will some
day find yourselves holding India only with European troops.
The probability of alienating by such measures the loyalty of
the military classes was earnestly discussed in the European
journals of Calcutta ; * and it was said, by those who defended

* The following, written a quarter of a century ago, affords a curious
glimpse of the apprehensions even then entertained by far-seeing men :
" We would just hint by the way to those who have planned this very
extraordinary attack upon vested rights, that the Sipahis are almost all
landholders, many of them Brahmans, whose families are supported by the
charitable foundations which it is now sought to confiscate and destroy.
The alarm has not yet, we believe, spread to the Army, but it has not been
without its causes of complaints; and we would very calmly and respectfully
put it to our rulers, whether it is wise or prudent to run the risk to which
this Resumption measure would sooner or later infallibly lead. The native
soldier has long been in the habit of placing implicit reliance upon British
faith and honour ; but let the charm once be broken, let the confiscation of
rent-free land spread to those provinces out of which our Army is recruited,
and the consequences may be that we shall very soon have to trust for our
security to British troops alone. The Government may then learn rather
late that revenue is not the only thing needful, and that their financial
arithmetic, instead of making twice two equal to one, as Swift says was the
case in Ireland, may end by extracting from the same process of multiplica-
tion just nothing at all." — Englishman, November 2, 1838.

1836-46.] RESUMPTION OPERATIONS. 125

the measure, that it was not intended to extend these resump-
tion operations to other parts of the country. But scarcely any
part of the country escaped ; scarcely any race of men, holding
rent-free estates of any kind, felt secure in the possession of
rights and privileges which they had enjoyed under Mughul
and Maratha rule, and had believed that they could still
enjoy under the Raj of the Christian ruler.

Jn the North- West Provinces it was part of the duty of
the Settlement officer to inquire into rent-free
tenures, and to resume or to release from assessment pr00^inclsest
the lands thus held. The feelings with which the
task imposed upon him was regarded varied with the character
and the opinions of the functionary thus employed ; but whilst
those who were disposed to look compassionately upon doubtful
claims, or believed that it would be sound policy to leave men
in undisturbed possession even of what might have been in the
first instance unrighteously acquired, were few, the disciples of
Bird and Thomason, who viewed all such alienations of revenue
as unmixed evils, and considered that any respect shown to
men who were described as " drones who do no good in the
public hive " was an injury done to the tax-paying community
at large, were many and powerful, and left their impression on
the land. Eejoicing in the great principle of the Dead-Level,
the Board commonly supported the views of the resumptionist ;
and but for the intervention of Mr. Robertson, the Lieutenant-
Governor, there would scarcely, at the end of the Settlement
operations, have been a rent-free tenure in the land. There
was sometimes a show of justice on the side of resumption, for
the immunity had been granted, in the first instance, as pay-
ment for service no longer demanded, or what had been
originally merely a life-grant had assumed the character of an
hereditary assignment. Perhaps there was sometimes more
than suspicion that in unsettled times, when there was a sort
of scramble for empire, privileges of this kind had been fabri-
cated or usurped; but in other instances strong proofs of
validity were ignored, and it has been freely stated, even by
men of their own order, that these earnest-minded civilians
" rejected royal firmans and other authentic documents," and
brought upon the great rent-roll of the Company lands which
had been for many generations free from assessment. Nay,
even the highest authority, in the great Settlement epoch,
declared that " the Settlement officer swept up, without inquiry,

126 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1836-46.

every patch of unregistered land ; even those exempted by a
subsequent order, which did not come out until five-sixths of
the tenures had been resumed." In one district, that of Farru-
khabad, " the obligations of a treaty and the direct orders of
Government were but lightly dealt with ; and in all, a total
disregard was evinced for the acts even of such men as Warren
Hastings and Lord Lake." * In every case what was done was
done conscientiously, in the assured belief that it was for the
general good of the people ; but the very knowledge that was
most vaunted, a knowledge of the institutions and the temper
of the natives, was that which they most lacked. They were
wrecked upon the dangerous coast of Little Learning.

There were, however, it has been said, some men engaged in
those great Settlement operations who were not smitten with
this unappeasable earth-hunger, and who took altogether an-
other view both of the duty and of the policy of the State.
Mr. Mansel, of whose eager desire, so honourably evinced at a
later period, to uphold the Native States of India I have already
spoken, was the principal exponent of these exceptional opin-
ions. " If it be of importance," he wrote, in his Report on the
Settlement of the Agra District, "to conciliate the affections of
the people, as well as to govern by the action of naked penal
laws ; if it be important that the natural tendency of every
part of native society in these provinces, to sink into one
wretched level of poverty and ignorance, should, as a principle,
be checked as far as possible by the acts of Government ; if it
be important that the pride of ancestry and nobility, the valour
of past times, and the national character of a country, should be
cherished in recollection, as ennobling feelings to the human
mind, I know of no act to which I could point with more
satisfaction, as a zealous servant of Government, than the
generous manner in which the restoration of the family of the
Badawar Rajah to rank and fortune was made by the Lieuten-
ant-Governor of Agra ; and I cannot refrain from allowing
myself to echo, for the inhabitants of this part of the country,
that feeling, in a report of necessity, largely connected with the
welfare and happiness of the district of Agra." Mr. Robert-on
had granted the Badawar Jaghir to the adopted son of the
deceased Rajah, and it was the recognition of this adoption

* Minute of Mr. Robertson, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West
Provinces, quoted in Dispatch of the Court of Directors, August 13, 1851.

1817-52.] RESUMPTION OPERATIONS. 127

which so rejoiced the heart of the sympathising Settlement
officer.

As the events of which I am about to write occurred, for the
most part, in Northern India, it is to the disturbing causes in
that part of the country that the introductory section of this
book is mainly devoted. But before it passes altogether away
from the subject of Resumption, something should be said about
the operations of that great confiscatory Tribunal known as the
Inam Commission of Bombay. This was but the
supplement of a series of measures, of which it Theinam

rx, - , , .. t , .n » Commission of

would take a long time to write in detail. A great Bombay,
part of the territory, now constituting the Presidency
of Bombay, was in 1817 conquered from the Peshwa. With
conquest came the old difficulty, of which I have spoken * —
the difficulty of dealing with the privileges and prescriptions,
the vested interests of all kinds, territorial and official, derived
from the Maratha Government. As in Bengal and in the
North- Western Provinces, these difficulties were greatly aggra-
vated by delay. Had we instituted a searching inquiry at once,
and resumed every doubtful tenure ; had we cancelled even the
undoubted grants of former governments, and suddenly annulled
all existing privileges, such proceedings in the eyes of the
people would have been the intelligible tyranny of the con-
queror, and, at all events, in accordance with the custom of the
country. But our very desire to deal justly and generously
with these privileged classes generated delayed and unequal
action. At different times, and in different parts of Western
India, these old alienations of Eevenue were dealt with after
different fashions ; and it was a source of bitter discontent that,
under like circumstances, claims were settled by Government
with far greater rigour in one part of the country than in
another.

Years passed, various regulations were framed, for the most
part of restricted operation ; and still, after the country had
been for more than a third of a century under British rule, the
great question of alienated revenue had only been partially
adjusted. So in 1852 an Act was passed, which empowered a
little body of English officers, principally of the military pro-
fession— men, it was truly said, " not well versed in the prin-
ciples of law, and wholly unpractised in the conduct of judicial

* Ante, page 121.

128 THE ADMINISTRATION OP LOKD DALHOUSIE. [1852.

inquiries " — to exercise arbitrary jurisdiction over thousands of
estates, many of them held by men of high family, proud of their
lineage, proud of their ancestral privileges, who had won what
they held by the sword, and had no thought by any other means
of maintaining possession. In the Southern Maratha country
there were large numbers of these Jaghirdars, who had never
troubled themselves about title-deeds, who knew nothing about
rules of evidence, and who had believed that long years of
possession were more cogent than any intricacies of law. If they
had ever held written proofs of the validity of their tenures,
they had seldom been so provident as to preserve them. But,
perhaps, they had never had better proof than the memory of
a fierce contest, in the great gardi-ki-waJct, or time of trouble,
which had preluded the dissolution of the Maratha power in
Western India, and placed the white man on the Throne of the
Peshwa.* Year after year had passed, one generation had
followed another in undisturbed possession, and the great seal
of Time stood them in stead of the elaborate technicalities of the
Conveyancer. But the Inam Commission was established.
The fame of it went abroad throughout the Southern Maratha
country. From one village to another passed the appalling
news that the Commissioner had appeared, had called for titles
that could not be produced, and that nothing but a general
confiscation of property was likely to result from the operations
of this mysterious Tribunal. " Each day," it has been said,
" produced its list of victims ; and the good fortunes of those
who escaped but added to the pangs of the crowd who came
forth from the shearing-house shorn to the skin, unable to

* See the admirably-written memorial of Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr : " Chiefs,
who had won their estates by the sword, had not been careful to fence them
in with a paper barrier, which they felt the next successful adventurer wonld
sweep away as unceremoniously as themselves. Instead of parchments, they
transmitted arms and retainers, with whose aid they had learnt to consider
mere titles superfluous, as without it they were contemptible. In other in-
stances, men of local influence and energetic character having grasped at the
lands which lay within their reach in the general scramble which preceded
the downfall of the Peshwd's Government, had transmitted their acquisitions
to the children, fortified by no better titles than entries in the village account-
books, which a closer examination showed to be recent or spurious. Housed
from the dreams of thirty years, these proprietors of precarious title, or of no
title at all, found themselves suddenly brought face to face with an apparatus,
which, at successive strokes, peeled away their possessions with the harsh,
precision of the planing machine."

1836-56.] THE INAM COMMISSION OF BOMBAY. 129

work, ashamed to beg, condemned to penury." * The titles of
no less than thirty -five thousand estates, great and small, were
called for by the Commission, and during the first 1852_57
five years of its operations, three-fifths of them were
confiscated.!

Whilst the operations of the Eevenue Department were thus
spreading alarm among the privileged classes in all
parts of the country, the Judicial Department was Pj^vT of
doing its duty as a serviceable ally in the great Courts.
war of extermination. Many of the old landed
proprietors were stripped to the skin by the decrees of our
civil courts. The sale of land in satisfaction of these decrees
was a process to which recourse was often had among a people
inordinately addicted to litigation. We must not regard it
altogether with English eyes ; for the Law had often nothing
else to take. There was many a small landed proprietor whose
family might have been established for centuries on a particular
estate, with much pride of birth and affection for his ancestral
lands, but possessing movable goods and chattels not worth
more than a few rupees. He might have owned a pair of small
bullocks and a rude country cart consisting of two wheels and
a few bamboos, but beyond such aids to busbandrj' as these, he
had nothing but a drinking-vessel, a few cooking-pots, and the
blankets which kept the dews off at night. Justice in his case
might not be satisfied without a surrender of his interests in
the land, which constituted the main portion of his wealth.^
So a large number of estates every year were put iip to sale,
under the decrees of the courts, in satisfaction of debts some-
times only of a few shillings, and bought by new men, perhaps
from different parts of the country, not improbably the agents

* Memorial of G. B. Setou-Karr.

t Ibid.

X I have stated here the principle upon -which the law was based. But I
believe that in many cases no pains were taken to ascertain in the first instance
what were the movable goods of the debtor. Recourse was had to the register
of landed property, even when the debt amounted to no more than four or
five rupees. " I have seen," says an officer of the Bengal Civil Service, in a
Memorandum before me, "estates put up for sale for four rupees (eight
shillings), which appears to me just the same as if an English grocer, getting
a decree in a small-debt court against a squire for half a sovereign, put up
his estate in Cheshire for the same, instead of realising the debt by the sale
of his silk umbrella."

VOL. I. K

.1 30 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1836-56

or representatives of astute native functionaries from the lower
provinces ; whilst the ancient proprietors, still rooted to the
soil, shrank into small farmers or under-tenants on their old
ancestral domains. Thus a revolution of landed property was
gradually brought about by means of English application,
which, acting coincidentally with the other agencies of which I
have spoken, swelled the number of the disaffected, dangerous
classes, who traced their downfall to the operations of British
rule, and sullenly bided their time for the recovery of what
they had lost, in some new revolutionary epoch.

This general system of depression, which, thus assuming-
many different forms and exercising itself in many different ways,
struck with uniform precision at the most cherished privileges
of the upper classes, had not its origin in the fertile brain of
Lord Dalhousie. He only confirmed and extended it ; confirmed
it in our older provinces, and extended it to those which he had
himself acquired.. In the Panjab it sorely disquieted some few
of our more chivalrous English officers connected with the Admin-
istration,* and it was carried into the Oudh dominions, as will
hereafter be shown, with a recklessness which in time brought
down upon us a terrible retribution. Every new acquisition of
territory made the matter much worse. Not merely because
the privileged classes were in those territories struck down, but
because the extension of the British Eaj gradually so contracted
the area on which men of high social position, expelled by our
system from the Company's provinces, could find profitable and
honourable employment, that it seemed as though every outlet
for native enterprise and ambition were about to be closed
against them. It was this, indeed, that made the great dif-
ference between resumptions of rent-free estates under the
Native Governments and under our own. It has been said that
under the former there was no security of tenure ; and it is

* Sir Herbert EJwardes, in a Memorandum quoted by Mr. Charles Raikes
in his graphic "Notes of the Revolt of the North-West Provinces of India,"
says of Arthur Cocks, that he " imbibed Sir Henry Lawrence's feelings, and
became greatly attached to the chiefs and people. He hardly stayed a year
after annexation, and left the Panjab because he could not bear to see the
fallen state of the old officials and Sirdars.'' Of Henry Lawrence himself,
Mr. Raikes says : " He fought every losing battle for the old chiefs and
Jaghirdars with entire disregard for his own interest, and at last left the
Panjab, to use Colonel Edwardes's words, dented all over with defeat* and
disappointments, honourable scars in the eyes of the bystanders."

1836-56.] BRAHMANISM. 131

true that the Native Princes did not consider themselves bound
to maintain the grants of their predecessors, and often arbitrarily
resumed them. But the door of honourable and lucrative
employment was not closed against the sufferers. All the great
offices of the State, civil and military, were open to the children
of the soil. But it was not so in our British territories. There
the dispossessed holder, no longer suffered to be an unprofitable
drone, was not permitted to take a place among the working bees
of the hive. And what place was there left for him, in which
he could serve under other masters ? We had no room for him
under us, and we left no place for him away from us. And so
we made dangerous enemies of a large number of influential
persons, amongst whom were not only many nobles of royal
or princely descent, many military chiefs, with large bodies of
retainers, and many ancient landholders for whom a strong
feudal veneration still remained among the agricultural classes,
but numbers of the Brahmanical, or priestly order, who had
been supported by the alienated revenue which we resumed, and
who turned the power which they exercised over the minds of
others to fatal account in fomenting popular discontent, and
instilling into the minds of the people the poison of religious
fear.

Other measures were in operation at the same time, the ten-
dency of which was to disturb the minds and to
inflame the hatred of the Priesthood. It seemed as J0b0edPriest"
though a great flood of innovation were about to
sweep away all their powers and their privileges. The pale-
faced Christian knight, with the great Excalibar of Truth in
his hand, was cleaving right through all the most cherished
fictions and superstitions of Brahmanism. A new generation
was springing up, without faith, without veneration ; an in-
quiring, doubting, reasoning race, not to be satisfied with
absurd doctrines or captivated by grotesque fables. The
literature of Bacon and Milton was exciting a new appetite for
Truth and Beauty ; and the exact sciences of the West, with
their clear, demonstrable facts and inevitable deductions, were
putting to shame the physical errors of Hinduism. A spirit of
inquiry had been excited, and it was little likely ever to be
allayed. It was plain that the inquirers were exaltiug the
Professor above the Pandit, and that the new teacher was fast
displacing the old.

it 2

132 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOED DALHOUSIE. [1848-56

Rightly to understand the stake for which the Brahman was
playing, and with the loss of which he was now threatened, the
reader must keep before him the fact that Brahmanism is the
most monstrous system of interference and oppression that the
world has ever yet seen, and that it could be maintained only by
ignorance and superstition of the grossest kind. The people
had been taught to believe that in all the daily concerns of life
Brahmanical ministrations were essential to worldly success.
The Deity, it was believed, could be propitiated only by money-
payments to this favoured race of holy men. " Every form and
ceremony of religion," it has been said ; " all the public festi-
vals ; all the accidents and concerns of life ; the revolutions of
the heavenly bodies ; the superstitious fears of the people ; births,
sicknesses, marriages, misfortunes ; death ; a future state — have
all been seized as sources of revenue to the Brahmans." " The
farmer does not reap his harvest without paying a Brahman
to perform some ceremony ; a tradesman cannot begin business
without a fee to a Brahman ; a fisherman cannot build a
new boat, nor begin to fish in a spot which he has farmed,
without a ceremony and a fee."* " The Brahman," says another
and more recent writer, " does not only stand in a hierarchical,
but also in the highest aristocratical position ; and he has an
authoritative voice in all pursuits of industry. All processes
in other arts, as well as agriculture, are supposed to have been
prescribed and imparted through the Brahmans. Every newly-
commenced process of business, every new machine, or even re-
pair of an old one, has to go through the ceremony of ' pujah,'
with a feeing of the Brahman."f And as the Brahman was
thus the controller of all the ordinary business concerns of his
countrymen, so also was he the depositary of all the learning of
the country, and the regulator of all the intellectual pursuits of
the people. There was, indeed, no such thing among them as
purely secular education. " It is a marked and peculiar feature
in the character of Hinduism," says another writer, himself by
birth a Hindu, " that instead of confining itself within the
proper and lawful bounds prescribed to every theological
system, it interferes with and treats of every department of
secular knowledge which human genius has ever invented ; so

* Ward on the Hindus.

t Jeffreys on the " British Army in India," Appendix, in which there is
much interesting and valuable matter-

1848-56.] PROGRESS OF ENLIGHTENMENT. 133

that grammar, geography, physics, law, medicine, metaphysics,
&c, do each form as essential a part of Hinduism as any reli-
gious topic with which it is concerned. ... In their religious
works they have treated of all the branches of secular know-
ledge known among them, in a regular, systematic manner ; and
have given them out to the world in a tone of absolute autho-
rity from which there could be no appeal."* But the English
had established a Court of Appeal of the highest order, and
Brahmanism was being continually cast in it. In a word, the
whole hierarchy of India saw their power, their privileges, and
their perquisites rapidly crumbling away from them, and they
girded themselves up to arrest the devastation.

All this had been going on for years; but the progress of
enlightenment had been too slow, and its manifestations too
little obtrusive, greatly to alarm the sacerdotal mind. As long
as the receptacles of this new wisdom were merely a few clever
boys in the great towns, and the manhood of the nation was
still saturated and sodden with the old superstition, Brahmanism
might yet flourish. But when these boys grew up in time to be
heads of families, rejoicing in what they called their freedom
from prejudice, laughing to scorn their ancestral faith as a
bundle of old wives' fables, eating meat and drinking wine, and
assuming some at least of the distinguishing articles of Chris-
tian apparel, it was clear that a very serious peril was beginning
to threaten the ascendency of the Priesthood. They saw that a
reformation of this kind, once commenced, would work its way
in time through all the strata of society. They saw that, as
new provinces were one after another brought under British
rule, the new light must diffuse itself more and more, until
there would scarcely be a place for Hinduism to lurk un-
molested. And some at least, confounding cause and effect,
began to argue, that all this annexation and absorption was
brought about for the express purpose of overthrowing the
ancient faiths of the country, and establishing a new religion in
their place.

Every monstrous lie exploded, every abominable practice
suppressed, was a blow struck at the Priesthood ; .

for all these monstrosities and abominations had
their root in Hinduism, and could not be eradicated without
sore disturbance and confusion of the soil. The murder of

* Calcutta Review, vol. xi. Article : " Physical Errors of Hinduism."

134 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOKD DALHOUSIE. [1848-56,

women on the funeral pile, the murder of little children in
the Zenana, the murder of the sick and the aged on the banks
of the river, the murder of human victims, reared and fattened
for the sacrifice, were all religious institutions, from which the
Priesthood derived either profit, power, or both. Nay, even the
wholesale strangling of unsuspecting travellers was sanctified
and ceremonialised by religion. Now all these cruel rites had
been suppressed, and, what was still worse in the eyes of the
Brahmans, the foul superstitions which nurtured them were
fast disappearing from the land. Authority might declare their
wickedness, and still they might exist as part and parcel of the
faith of the people. But when Beason demonstrated their ab-
surdity, and struck conviction into the very heart of the nation,
there was an end of both the folly and the crime. The Law
might do much, but Education would assuredly do much more
to sweep away all these time-honoured superstitions. Educa-
tion, pure and simple in its secularity, was quite enough in
itself to hew down this dense jungle of Hinduism ; but when
it was seen that the functions of the English schoolmaster and
of the Christian priest were often united in the same person,
and that high officers of the State were present at examinations
conducted by chaplains or missionaries, a fear arose lest even
secular education might be the mask of proselytism, and so the
Brahmans began to alarm the minds of the elder members of the
Hindu community, who abstained, under priestly influence,
from openly countenancing what they had not the energy
boldly to resist.*

-- And every year the danger increased. Every year were
there manifestations of a continually increasing desire to eman-
cipate the natives of India from the gross superstitions which
enchained them. One common feeling moved alike the English
Government and the English community. In other matters of
State-policy there might be essential changes, but in this there
was no change. One Governor might replace another, but only
to evince an increased hostility to the great Baal of Hinduism.
And in no man was there less regard for time-honoured abomi-
nations and venerable absurdities — in no man did the zeal of

* The English journalists sometimes remarked in their reports of these
school-examinations upon the absence of the native gentry — e.g. : "We cannot
help expressing great surprise at the absence of natives of influence."—
Bengal Hurkaru, March 14, 1S53.

1848-56.] PROGRESS OF ENLIGHTENMENT. 135

iconoclasm work more mightily than in Lord Dalhousie. During
no former administration had the vested interests of Brahmanism
in moral and material error been more ruthlessly assailed. There
was nothing systematic in all this. Almost, indeed, might it bo
said that it was unconscious. It was simply the manifestation
of such love as any clear-sighted, strong-headed man may be
supposed to have for truth above error, for intelligent progress
above ignorant stagnation. From love of this kind, from the
assured conviction that it was equally humane and politic to
substitute the strength and justice of British administration for
what he regarded as the effete tyrannies of the East, had
emanated the annexations which had distinguished his rule.
And as he desired for the good of the people to extend the
territorial rule of Great Britain, so he was eager also to extend
her moral rule, and to make those people subject to the powers
of light rather than of darkness. And so he strove mightily to
extend among them the blessings of European civilisation, and
the Priesthood stood aghast at the sight of the new things, moral
and material, by which they were threatened.

Many and portentous were these menaces. Not only was
Government Education, in a more systematised and portentous
shape than before, rapidly extending its network over the whole
male population of the country, but even the fastnesses of the
female apartments were not secure against the intrusion of the
new learning and new philosophy of the West. England had
begun to take account of its shortcomings, and among all the
reproaches heaped upon the Company, none had been so loud or
so general as the cry that, whilst they spent millions on War,
they grudged hundreds for purposes of Education. So, in
obedience to this cry, instructions had been sent out to India,
directing larger, more comprehensive, more systematic measures
for the instruction of the people, and authorising increased ex-
penditure upon them. Whilst great Universities were to be
established, under the immediate charge of the Government,
the more humble missionary institutions were to be aided by
grants of public money, and no effort was to be spared that
could conduce to the spread of European knowledge. It was
plain to the comprehension of the guardians of Eastern learning,
that what had been done to unlock the floodgates of the West
would soon appear to be as nothing in comparison with the
great tide of European civilisation which was about to be
poured out upon them.

136 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848-56

Most alarming of all were the endeavours made, during Lord
Dalhousie's administration, to penetrate the Zenana
Female with our new learning and our new customs. The

English at the large Presidency towns began to
systematise their efforts for the emancipation of the female mind
from the utter ignorance which had been its birthright, and the
wives and daughters of the white men began to aid in the work,
cheered and encouraged by the sympathies of their sisters at
home. For the first time, the education of Hindu and Muham-
madan females took, during the administration of Lord Dal-
housie, a substantial recognised shape. Before it had been
merely a manifestation of missionary zeal addressed to the con-
version of a few orphans and castaways. But now, if not the
immediate work of the Government in its corporate capacity, it
was the pet project and the especial charge of a

Mr. Bethune. mem^er 0f ^ Government, and, on his death, passed
into the hands of the Governor- General himself, and afterwards
was adopted by the Company's Government. Some years before,
the Priesthood, secure in the bigotry and intolerance of the heads
of families, might have laughed these efforts to scorn. But now
young men, trained under English Professors, were becoming
fathers and masters, sensible of the great want of enlightened
female companionship, and ill-disposed to yield obedience to the
dogmas of the Priests. So great, indeed, was this yearning
after something more attractive and more satisfying than the
inanity of the Zenana, that the courtesans of the Calcutta
Bazaars taught themselves to play on instruments, to sing songs,
and to read poetry, that thereby they might lure from the
dreary environments of their vapid homes the very flower of
Young Bengal.

About the same time the wedge of another startling in-
novation was being driven into the very heart of

Re-marriage Hindu Society. Among the many cruel wrongs to

Widows! which the womanhood of the nation was subjected
was the institution which forbade a bereaved wife
ever to re-marry. The widow who did not burn was con-
demned to perpetual chastity. Nay, it has been surmised that
the burning inculcated in the old religious writings of the
Hindus was no other than that which, centuries afterwards, the
great Christian teacher forbade, saying that it is better to
marry than to burn. Be this as it may, the re-marriage of Hindu
widows was opposed both to the creeds and the customs of the

1855-56.] PROGKESS OF ENLIGHTENMENT. 137

land. It was an evil and a cruel thing itself, and the prolific
source of other evils. Evil and cruel would it have been in any
country and under any institutions, but where mere children
are married, often to men advanced in years, and are left
widows, in tender youth, when they have scarcely looked upon
their | husbands, its cruelty is past counting. To the more en-
lightened Hindus, trained in our English colleges and schools,
the evils of this prohibition were so patent and so distressing,
that they were fain to see it abrogated by law. One of their
number wrote a clever treatise in defence of the re-marriage of
widows, and thousands signed a petition, in which a belief was
expressed that perpetual widowhood was not enjoined by the
Hindu scriptures. But the orthodox party, strong in texts,
greatly outnumbered, and, judged by the standard of Hinduism,
greatly outargued them. The Law and the Prophets were on
their side. It was plain that the innovation would inflict
another deadly blow on the old Hindu law of inheritance.
Already had dire offence been given to the orthodoxy of the
land by the removal of those disabilities which forbade all who
had forsaken their ancestral faith to inherit ancestral property.
A law had been passed, declaring the abolition of " so much of
the old law or usage as inflicted on any person forfeiture of
rights or property, by reason of his or her renouncing, or having
been excluded from, the communion of any religion." Against
this the old Hindus had vehemently protested, not without
threats, as a violation of the pledges given by the British
Government to the natives of India ; pledges, they said, issued
in an hour of weakness and revoked in an hour of strength.*
But Lord Dalhousie had emphatically recorded his opinion, " that
it is the duty of the State to keep in its own hands the right of
regulating succession to property," and the Act had been passed.
And now there was further authoritative interference on the

* The Bengal Memorial said : " Your memorialists will not conceal that
from the moment the proposed Act becomes a part of the law applicable to
Hindus, that confidence which they hitherto felt in the paternal character of
their British rulers will he most materially shaken. No outbreak, of course,
is to be dreaded ; but the active spirit of fervent loyalty to their sovereign
will be changed into sullen submission to their will, and obedience to their
power." The Madras Memorial was couched in much stronger language. It
denounced the measure as a direct act of tyranny, and said that the British
Government, " treading the path of oppression," " would well deserve what it
will assuredly obtain — the hatred and detestation of the oppressed."

138 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOKD DALHOUSIE. [1855-56,

part of the State, for it was proposed to bestow equal rights of
inheritance on the offspring of what the old-school Hindus
declared to be an illicit, God-proscribed connection. This, how-
ever, was but a part of the evil. Here was another step towards
the complete emancipation of woman ; and Hindu orthodoxy
believed, or professed to believe, that if widows were encouraged
to marry new husbands instead of burning with the corpses of
the old, wives would be induced to make themselves widows by
poisoning or otherwise destroying their lords. It was appre-
hended, too — and not altogether without reason* — that the re-
marriage of Hindu widows would soon be followed by a blow
struck at Hindu polygamy, especially in its worst but most
honoured form of Kulinism ; and so the Brahmans, discomfited
and alarmed by these innovations, past, present, and prospective,
strove mightily to resist the tide, and to turn the torrent of
destruction back upon their enemies, f

Nor was it only by the innovations of moral progress that

the hierarchy of India were alarmed and offended.

Thf,^ai^y The inroads and encroachments of physical science

andthelele- nl n. _. -,-,. . r . J . ..

graph. were equally distasteful and disquieting. A privi-

leged race of men, who had been held in veneration as
the depositaries of all human knowledge, were suddenly shown
to be as feeble and impotent as babes and sucklings. It was no
mere verbal demonstration ; the arrogant self-assertion of the
white man, which the Hindu Priesthood could contradict or
explain away. There were no means of contradicting or ex-
plaining away the railway cars, which travelled, without horses

* See the following passage of a speech delivered by Mr. Barnes Peacock,
in the Legislative Council, July 19, 1S56 : "There was a great distinction
between preventing a man from doing that which his religion directed him to
do, and preventing him from doing that which his religion merely allowed him
to do. If a man were to say that his religion did not forbid polygamy, and
therefore that he might marry as many wives as he pleased, when it was im-
possible for him to carry out the contract of marriage, it would be no interfer-
ence with his religion for the Legislature to say that the marrying of a hundred
wives, and the subsequent desertion of them, was an injury to society, and
therefore that it should be illegal to do so. He " (Islx. Peacock) " maintained
that it was the duty of the Legislature, in such a case, to prevent him from
doing that which his religion merely permitted, but did not command him
to do."

f The " Bill to remove all legal obstacles to the marriage of Hindu widows,"
though introduced and discussed during the administration of Lord Dalhousie,
was not finally passed till after his retirement. It received the assent of Lord
Canning in July, 1856.

1848-56.] MATERIAL PROGRESS. lcJ!>

or "bullocks, at the rate of thirty miles an hour, or the electric
wires, which in a few minutes carried a message across the
breadth of a whole province.

These were facts that there was no gainsaying. He who ran
might read. The prodigious triumphs over time and space
achieved by these "fire-carriages" and "lightning-posts" put
to shame the wisdom of the Brahmans, and seemed to indicate
a command over the supernatural agencies of the Unseen World,
such as the Pandits of the East could never attain or simulate.
They, who for their own ends had imparted a sacred character
to new inventions, and had taught their disciples that all im-
provements in art and science were derived from the Deity
through their especial intercession, and were to be inaugurated
with religious ceremonies attended with the usual distribution
of largesses to the priests, now found that the white men could
make the very elements their slaves, and call to their aid
miraculous powers undreamt of in the Brahmanical philosophy.
Of what use was it any longer to endeavour to persuade the
people that the new knowledge of the West was only a bundle
of shams and impostures, when any man might see the train
come in at a given moment, and learn at Banaras how many
pounds of flour were sold for the rupee that morning in the
bazaars of Dehli and Calcutta ?

To the introduction into India of these mysterious agencies
the Hour and the Man were alike propitious. When Lord
Dalhousie went out to India, England was just recovering from
the effects of that over-activity of speculation which had gene-
rated such a disturbance of the whole financial system of the
country. She had ceased to project lines of Railway between
towns without Traffic, and through countries without Popula-
tion, and had subsided, after much suffering, into a healthy
state of reasonable enterprise, carefully estimating both her
wants and her resources. As President of the Board of Trade,
Dalhousie had enjoyed the best opportunities of acquainting
himself with the principles and with the details of the great
question of the day, at the one central point to which all infor-
mation converged, and he had left England with the full deter-
mination, God willing, not to leave the country of his adoption
until he had initiated the construction of great trunk-roads of iron
between all the great centres of Government and of Commerce,
and had traversed, at railway speed, some at least of their first
stages. A little while before, the idea of an Indian railway

140 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1848-5$

had, in the estimation of the greater number of English resi-
dents, been something speculative and chimerical, encouraged
only by visionaries and enthusiasts. A few far-seeing men,
foremost among whom was Macdonald Stephenson, predicted
their speedy establishment, and with the general acceptance of
the nation ; but even after Dalhousie had put his hand to the
work, and the Company had responded to his efforts, it was the
more general belief that railway communication in India would
be rather a concern of Government, useful in the extreme for
military purposes, than a popular institution supplying a na-
tional want. It was thought that Indolence, Avarice, and
Superstition would keep the natives of the country from flock-
ing to the Eailway Station. But with a keener appreciation of
the inherent power of so demonstrable a benefit to make its
own way, even against these moral obstructions, Dalhousie had
full faith in the result. He was right. The people now learnt
to estimate at its full worth the great truth that Time is Money ;
and having so learned, they were not to be deterred from
profiting by it by any tenderness of respect for the feelings of
their spiritual guides.

That the fire-carriage on the iron road was a heavy blow to
the Brahmanical Priesthood is not to be doubted. The light-
ning post, which sent invisible letters through the air and
brought back answers, from incredible distances, in less time
than an ordinary messenger could bring them from the next
street, was a still greater marvel and a still greater disturbance.
But it was less patent and obtrusive. The one is the natural
complement of the other ; and Dalhousie, aided by the genius
of O'Shaughnessy, had soon spread a network of electric wires
across the whole length and breadth of the country. It was a
wise thing to do ; a right thing to do ; but it was alarming and
offensive to the Brahmanical mind. It has been said, that as
soon as we had demonstrated that the earth is a sphere revolving
on its axis, there was an end to the superstitions of Hinduism.
And so there was — in argument, but not in fact. The Brah-
manical teachers insisted that the new doctrines of Western
civilisation were mere specious inventions, with no groundwork
of eternal truth, and as their disciples could not bring the test
of their senses to such inquiries as these, they succumbed to
authority rather than to reason, or perhaps lapsed into a state
of bewildering doubt. But material experiments, so palpable
and portentous that they might be seen at a distance of many

1848-56.] MATEKIAL PROGRESS. 141

miles, convinced whilst they astounded. The most ignorant
and unreasoning of men could see that the thing was done.
They knew that Brahmanism had never done it. They saw
plainly the fact, that there were wonderful things in the world
which their own Priests could not teach them — of which,
indeed, with all their boasted wisdom, they had never dreamt ;
and from that time the Hindu Hierarchy lost half its power, for
the People lost half their faith.

But clear as was all this, and alarming as were the prospects
thus unfolded to the Pandits, there was something c
more than this needed to disturb the popular mind.
Hinduism might be assailed ; Hinduism might be disproved ;
and still men might go about their daily business without a
fear for the future or a regret for the past. But there was
something about which they disturbed themselves much more
than about the abstract truths of their religion. The great
institution of Caste was an ever-present reality. It entered
into the commonest concerns of life. It was intelligible to the
meanest understanding. Every man, woman, and child knew
what a terrible thing it would be to be cast out from the com-
munity of the brotherhood, and condemned to live apart, ab-
horred of men and forsaken by God. If, then, the people could
be taught that the English by some insidious means purposed
to defile the Hindus, and to bring them all to a dead level of
one-caste or of no-caste, a great rising of the Natives might
sweep the Foreigners into the sea. This was an obvious line of
policy ; but it was not a policy for all times. It needed oppor-
tunity for its successful development. Equally patient and
astute, the Brahman was content to bide his time rather than
to risk anything by an inopportune demonstration. The Eng-
lish were loud in their professions of toleration, and commonly
cautious in their practice. Still it was only in the nature of
things that they should some day make a false step.

As the Brahman thus lay in wait, eager for his opportunity
to strike, he thought he espied, perhaps in an unexpected
quarter, a safe point of attack. It required some
monstrous invention, very suitable to troubled times, Jii,;^1^ing

-i -t • n f* 1 oy SlGIH in

but only to be circulated with success alter the Gaols.
popular mind, by previous excitement, had been
prepared to receive it, to give any colour of probability to a
report that the Government had laid a plot for the defilement
of the whole mass of the people. But there were certain classes

142 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1845-56

with which Government had a direct connection, and whose
bodies and souls were in the immediate keeping of the State.
Among these were the inmates of our gaols. As these people
were necessarily dependent upon Government for their daily
food, it appeared to be easy, by a well-devised system of Prison
Discipline, either to destroy the caste of the convicts or to
starve them to death. The old tolerant regulations allowed
every man to cater and to cook for himself. A money-allow-
ance was granted to him, and he turned it into food after his
own fashion. But this system was very injurious to prison
discipline. Men loitered over their cooking and their eating
and made excuses to escape work. So the prisoners were
divided into messes, according to their several castes ; rations
were issued to them, and cooks were appointed to prepare the
daily meals at a stated hour of the day. If the cook were of a
lower caste than the eaters, the necessary result was the con-
tamination of the food and loss of caste by the whole mess.
The new system, therefore, was one likely to be misunderstood
and easily to be misinterpreted. Here, then, was one of those
openings which designing men were continually on the alert to
detect, and in a fitting hour it was turned to account. Not
merely the inmates of the gaols, but the inhabitants of the
towns in which prisons were located, were readily made to
believe that it was the intention of the British Government to
destroy the caste of the prisoners, and forcibly to convert them
to Christianity. It mattered not whether Brahman cooks had
or had not, in the first instance, been appointed. There might
be a Brahman cook to-day ; and a low-caste man in his place
to-morrow. So the lie had some plausibility about it ; and it
went abroad that this assault upon the gaol-birds was but the
beginning of the end, and that by a variety of different means
the religions of the country would soon be destnryed by the
Government of the Faring-his.

Eeports of this kind commonly appear to be of Hindu origin ;
for they are calculated primarily to alarm the minds of the
people on the score of the destruction of caste. But it seldom
happens that they are not followed by some auxiliary lies
expressly designed for Muhammadan reception. The Muham-
madans had some especial grievances of their own. The ten-
dency of our educational measures, and the all-pervading
Englishism with which the country was threatened, was to
lower the dignity of Muhammadanism, and to deprive of their

1845-56.] MUHAMMADAN ALARMS. 143

emoluments many influential people of that intolerant faith.
The Maulavis were scarcely less alarmed hy our innovations than
the Pandits. The Arabic of the one fared no better than the
Sanskrit of the other. The use of the Persian language in our
law courts was abolished; new tests for admission into the
Public Service cut down, if they did not wholly destroy, their
chances of official employment. There was a general inclina-
tion to pare away the privileges and the perquisites of the
principal Muhammadan seats of learning. All the religious
endowments of the great Calcutta Madrasa were annihilated ;
and the prevalence of the English language, English learning,
and English law, made the Muhammadan doctors shrink into
insignificance, whilst the resumption of rent-free tenures, which,
in many instances, grievously affected old Musulman families,
roused their resentments more than all the rest, and made them
ripe for sedition. A more active, a more enterprising, and a
more intriguing race than the Hindus, the latter knew well the
importance of associating them in any design against the State.*
So their animosities were stimulated, and their sympathies were
enlisted, by a report, sedulously disseminated, to the effect that
the British Government were about to issue an edict prohibiting
circumcision, and compelling Muhammadan women to go abroad
unveiled.

Small chance would there have been of such a lie as this find-
ing a score of credulous Musulmans to believe it, if it had not
been for the little grain of truth that there was in the story of
the messing system in the gaols. The innovation had been

* It must be admitted, however, that it is a moot question, in many
instances, whether the first movement were made by the Hindus or the
Muhainmadans. Good authorities sometimes incline to the latter sup-
position. Take, for example, the following, which has reference to a sedi-
tious movement at Patna in the cold season of 1845-46 : " From inquiries I
have made," wrote Mr. Dampier, Superintendent of Police in the Lower Pro-
vinces, " in every quarter, I am of opinion that the Muhammadans of these
parts, amongst whom the resumption of the Maafi Tenures, the new educa-
tional system, and the encouragement given to the English language, have
produced the greatest discontent and the bitterest animosity against our
government, finding that the enforcement of the messing system in the gaols
had produced a considerable sensation amongst the people, were determined
to improve the opportunity, especially as our troops were weak in numbers,
and we were supposed to be pressed "in the North-West." Of the event to
which this refers, more detailed mention will be found in a subsequent
chapter of this work, in connection with the attempt then made to corrupt
the regiments of Danapiir.

144 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. [1845-46.

originated some years before Lord Dalhousie appeared upon the
scene. At first it had been introduced with a discretion signify-
ing a full knowledge of the lurking danger : * but, as time
advanced, one experiment followed another, and some of the old
caution was perhaps relaxed. So in many places the prisoners
broke into rebellion and violently resisted the proposed change.
Eager and excited, under the influence of a common alarm, the
townspeople cheered them on, and were ready to aid them, with
all their might, in what they believed to be the defence of their
religion. At Shahabad, Saran, Bihar, and Patna, there were
serious disturbances, and at a later period, Banaras, the very
nursery and hotbed of Hinduism, the cherished home of the
Pandits, was saved only by prudential concessions from becom-
ing the scene of a sanguinary outbreak.

The experience thus gained of the extreme sensitiveness of

the native mind, given up as it was to gross delu-
and hhTLotah si0BS> does not appear to have borne the fruit of

increased caution and forbearance. For not long
afterwards another improvement in prison discipline again
stirred up revolt in gaols ; and, for the same reason as before,
the people sided with the convicts. A Hindu, or a Hinduised
Muhammadan, is nothing without his Lotah. A Lotah is a
metal drinking-vessel, which he religiously guards against
defilement, and which he holds as a cherished possession when
he has nothing else belonging to him in the world. But a brass
vessel may be put to other uses than that of holding water. It
may brain a magistrate,! or flatten the face of a gaoler, and truly
it was a formidable weapon in the hands of a desperate man.
So an attempt was made in some places to deprive the prisoners
of their lotahs, and to substitute earthenware vessels in their
place. Here, then, in the eyes of the people, was another
insidious attempt to convert prison discipline into a means of
religious persecution — another attempt covertly to reduce them
all to one caste. So the prisoners resisted the experiment, and

* See Circular Orders of Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Pro-
vinces, July, 1841 : — "Government are of opinion that these measures ought
not to be compulsorily enforced, if there be any good ground to believe that
they will violate or offend the religious prejudices of the people, or injure the
future prospects of those who may be subjected to temporary imprisonment."

t My earliest recollection of India is associated with the sensation created
in Calcutta, in April, 1834, when Mr. Richardson, magistrate of the 24 Par-
ganahs, was killed in Alipur gaol by a blow from a brass lotah.

!«55-56.] PRISON OUTBREAKS. 145

in more than one place manifested their resentment with a fury
which was shared by the population of the towns. At Arah
the excitement was so great that the guards were ordered to fire
upon the prisoners, and at Muzaffarpur, in Tirhut, so formidable
was the outburst of popular indignation, that the magistrate, in
grave official language, described it as " a furious and altogether
unexpected outbreak on the part of the people of the town and
district in support and sympathy with the prisoners." The
rioters, it was said, " included almost all the inhabitants of the
town, as well as a vast number of ryots, who declared that they
would not go away until the lotahs were restored ; " and so
great was the danger of the prisoners escaping, of their plunder-
ing the Treasury and pillaging the town, before the troops
which had been sent for could be brought up, that the civil
authorities deemed it expedient to pacify the insurgents by
restoring the lotahs to the people in the gaols. And this was
not held at the time to be a sudden outburst of rash and mis-
guided ignorance, but the deliberate work of some of the rich
native inhabitants of the town, and some of the higher native
functionaries of our Civil Courts.

It was clear, indeed, that the inflammability of the native
mind was continually increasing ; and that there were many
influential persons, both Hindu and Muhammadan, running
over with bitter resentments against the English, who were
eagerly awaiting a favourable opportunity to set all these com-
bustible materials in a blaze. The gaol-business was an experi-
ment, and, as far as it went, a successful one. But it was not
by an outbreak of the convict population that the overthrow of
the English was to be accomplished. There was another class
of men, equally under the control of the Government, whose
corruption would far better repay the labours of the Maulavis
and the Pandits.

346 THE SIPAHI ARMY— ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. (ifi*6

BOOK II.— THE SIPAHI ARMY,
[1756-1856.]

CHAPTEE I.

Whilst the hearts of the Aristocracy and of the Priesthood of
the country were thus turned against the government of the
English, there was a third great class, esteemed to be more
powerful than all, whom it was believed that our policy had
propitiated. There was security in the thought that the
Soldiery were with us. It was the creed of English statesmen
that India had been won by the Sword, and must be retained
by the Sword. And so long as we held the sword firmly in our
hands, there was but little apprehension of any internal danger.
The British power in the East was fenced in and fortified by
an army of three hundred thousand men.

A small part only of this Army was composed of our own
countrymen. Neither the manhood of England nor the
revenues of India could supply the means of defending the
country only with British troops. A large majority of our
fighting-men were, therefore, natives of India, trained, disci-
plined, and equipped after the English fashion. We had first
learnt from the French the readiness with which the " Moors "
and the " Gentus " could be made to adapt themselves to the
habits and forms of European warfare, and, for a hundred
years, we had been improving on the lesson. Little by little,
the handful of Blacks which had helped Eobert Clive to win
the battle of Plassey had swollen into the dimensions of a
gigantic army. It had not grown with the growth of the
territory which it was intended to defend ; but still, nerved and
strengthened by such Eui'opean regiments as the exigencies of
the parent state could spare for the service of the outlying

1756-1856.] DALHOUSIE ON THE SIPAHI ARMY. 147

dependency, it was deemed to be of sufficient extent to support
the Government which maintained it against all foreign enmity
and all intestine revolt.

It was, doubtless, a strange and hazardous experiment upon
the forbearance of these disciplined native fighting-men, held
only by the bondage of the Salt in allegiance to a trading
Company which had usurped the authority of their Princes
and reduced their countrymen to subjection. But it was an
experiment which, at the date of the commencement of this
history, had stood the test of more than a century of probation.
The fidelity of the Native Army of India was an established
article of our faith. Tried in many severe conjunctures, it had
seldom been found wanting. The British Sipahi had faced
death without a fear, and encountered every kind of suffering
and privation without a murmur. Commanded by officers
whom he trusted and loved, though of another colour and
another creed, there was nothing, it was said, which he would
not do, there was nothing which he would not endure. In an
extremity of hunger, he had spontaneously offered his scanty
food to sustain the robuster energies of his English comrade.
He had planted the colours of his regiment on a spot which
European valour and perseverance had failed to reach. He
had subscribed from his slender earnings to the support of our
European wars. He had cheerfully consented, when he knew
that his Government was in need, to forego that regular receipt
of pay which is the very life-blood of foreign service. History
for a hundred years had sparkled with examples of his noble
fidelity ; and there were few who did not believe, in spite of
some transitory aberrations, that he would be true to the last
line of the chapter.

If there were anything, therefore, to disturb the mind of
Lord Dalhousie when he laid down the reins of govern-
ment on that memorable spring morning, the trouble 1856'
which oppressed him was not the growth of any mistrust of
the fidelity of the Sipahi. " Hardly any circumstance of his
condition," he said, in his Farewell Minute, " is in need of
improvement." And there were few who, reading this passage,
the very slenderness of which indicated a more settled faith in
the Sipahi than the most turgid sentences could have expressed,
did not feel the same assurance that in that direction there was
promise only of continued repose. It was true that Asiatic
armies were ever prone to revolt — that we had seen Maratha

l 2

]48 THE SIPAHI ARMY— ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1856

armies and Sikh armies, Arab armies and Gurkha armies, all

the military races of India indeed, at some time or other rising

in mutiny against their Government, and perhaps overthrowing

it. But fifty years had passed away since the minds of our

British rulers had "been seriously disturbed by a fear of military

revolt, and that half century, it was believed, had brought full

conviction home to the understanding of the Sipahi that the

Company was a good and generous master, whose colours it

was a privilege to bear. Outwardly, there was only a great calm ;

and it was not thought that beneath that smooth surface there

were any latent dangers peculiar to the times. The Sipahi

was esteemed to be " faithful to a proverb "; and his fidelity

was the right arm of our strength.

Our first Sipahi levies were raised in the Southern Peninsula,

o: * c- ^u- 1 • when the English and French powers were con-
First Sipdhi levies , . t- .-i i • , • n • i n

in Bombay and tending lor the dominant influence m that part of
Madras. ^e country. They were few in number, and at
the outset commonly held in reserve to support our European
fighting-men. But, little by little, they proved that they were
worthy to be entrusted with higher duties, and, once trusted,
they went boldly to the front. Under native commandants,
for the most part Muhammadan or high-caste Bajput Hindus,
but disciplined and directed by the English captain, their pride
was flattered and their energies stimulated by the victories
they gained. How they fought in the attack of Madura, how
they fought in the defence of Arkat, how they crossed bayonets,
foot to foot, with the best French troops at Gudalur, historians
have delighted to tell. All the power and all the responsibility,
all the honours and rewards, were not then monopolised by the
English captains. Large bodies of troops were sometimes
despatched, on hazardous enterprises, under the independent
command of a native leader, and it was not thought an offence
to a European soldier to send him to fight under a black
commandant. That black commandant was then a great man,
in spite of his colour. He rode on horseback at the head of his
men, and a mounted staff-officer, a native adjutant, carried his
commands to the Subakdars of the respective companies. And
a brave man or a skilful leader was honoured for his bravery
or his skill as much under the folds of a turban as under a
round hat.

When the great outrage of the Black Hole called Olive's
The Bengal Army, retributory army to Bengal, the English had no

1756-57.] BIRTH OF THE BENGAL ARMY. 149

Sipahi troops on the banks of the Hugli. But there were
fourteen native battalions in Madras, numbering in all ten
thousand men, and Clive took two of these with him, across
the black water, to Calcutta. Arrived there, and the first blow
struck, he began to raise native levies in the neighbourhood,
and a battalion of Bengal Sipahis fought at Plassey side by side
with their comrades from Madras. Eight years after this
victory, which placed the great province of Bengal at our feet,
the one battalion had swollen into nineteen, each of a thousand
strong. To each battalion three English officers were appointed
— picked men from the English regiments.* The native
element was not so strong as in the Southern Army ; but a good
deal of substantive authority still remained with the black
officers.

And that the Bengal Sipahi was an excellent soldier, was
freely declared by men who had seen the best troops of the
European powers. Drilled and disciplined in all essential
points after the English model, the native soldier was not
called upon to divest himself of all the distinctive attributes
of his race. Nothing that his creed abhorred or his caste
rejected was forced upon him by his Christian masters.
He lived apart, cooked apart, ate apart, after the fashion
of his tribe. No one grudged him his necklace, his earrings,
the caste-marks on his forehead, or the beard which lay upon
his breast. He had no fear of being forcibly converted to
the religion of the white men, for he could not see that the
white men had any religion to which they could convert him.
There was no interference from the Adjutant-General's office,
no paper government, no perpetual reference to order-books
bristling with innovations ; and so he was happy and contented,
obedient to the officers who commanded him, and faithful to
the Government he served.

His predominant sentiment, indeed, was fidelity to his Salt,
or, in other words, to the hand that fed him. But if he thought
that the hand was unrighteously closed to withhold from him
what he believed his due, he showed himself to be most
tenacious of his rights, and he resolutely asserted them. This
temper very soon manifested itself. The Bengal Army was
but seven years old, when it first began to evince some symptoms

* In 17ti5, the number was increased to five. There were then a nativa
-commandant and ten Subahdars to each battalion. — Broome.

150 THE SIPAHI ARMY— ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1757-64.

of a mutinous spirit. But in this instance the contagion
came from the Europeans. The white troops had

The First mutinied because the promise of a donation to

MBengL.in the Army from Mir J'afar had halted on the way
to performance ; and when the money came, the
Sipahis followed their example, because they thought that they
were denied their rightful share of the prize. They had just
ground of complaint in this instance, and they were soothed by
a reasonable concession.* But the fire had not burnt itself
out; and before the close of the year some regiments were
again in rebellion. One battalion seized and imprisoned its
English officers, and vowed that it would serve no more. It
was one of those childish ebullitions, of which we have since
seen so many in the Bengal Army. But it was plain that the
evil was a growing one, and to be arrested with a strong hand.
So twenty-four Sipahis were tried, at Chapra, by a drum-head
Court-Martial, for mutiny and desertion, found guilty, and
ordered to be blown away from the guns.

A century has passed since the order was carried into execu-
tion, and many strange and terrible scenes have been witnessed
by the Sipahi Army ; but none stranger or more terrible than
this. The troops were drawn up, European and Native, the
guns were loaded, and the prisoners led forth to suffer. Major
Hector Munro, the chief of the Bengal Army, superintended
that dreadful punishment parade, and gave the word of com-
mand for the first four of the criminals to be tied up to the
guns. The order was being obeyed; the men were being
bound ; when four tall, stately Grenadiers stepped forward
from among the condemned, and represented that as they had
always held the post of honour in life, it was due to them that
they should take precedence in death. The request was
granted ; a brief reprieve was given to the men first led to exe-
cution ; the Grenadiers were tied to the guns, and blown to
pieces at the word of command.

Then all through the Sipahi battalions on that ghastly
parade there ran a murmur and a movement, and it_ seemed
that the black troops, who greatly outnumbered the white, were
about to strike for the rescue of their comrades. There wero

* Whilst a private of the European Army was to receive forty rupees, it
was proposed to give a Sipahi six. The share of the latter was afterward*
fixed at twenty rupees.

1764-6.] BLOWN FROM THE GUNS. 151

signs and sounds not to be misunderstood ; so the officers of the
native regiments went to the front and told Munro that their
men were not to be trusted ; that the Sipahis had resolved not
to suffer the execution to proceed. On the issue of that
reference depended the fate of the Bengal Army. The English
troops on that parade were few. There was scarcely a man
among them not moved to tears by what he had seen ; but
Munro knew that they could be trusted, and that they could
defend the guns, which once turned upon the natives would
have rendered victory certain. So he closed the Europeans on
to the battery ; the Grenadiers upon one side, the Marines on
the other, loaded the pieces with grape, and sent the Sipahi
officers back to their battalions. This done, he gave the word
of command to the native regiments to ground arms. In the
presence of those loaded guns, and of the two lines of white
troops ready to fire upon them, to have disobeyed would have
been madness. They moved to the word of command, laid
down their arms, and when another word of command was
given, which sent the Sipahis to a distance from their grounded
muskets, and the Europeans with the guns took ground on the
intervening space, the danger had passed away. The native
troops were now completely at Munro's mercy, and the execu-
tion went on in their presence to its dreadful close. Twenty
men were blown away from the guns at that parade. Four
were reserved for execution at another station, as a warning to
other regiments, which appeared to be mutinously disposed, and
six more, tried and sentenced at Bankipur, were blown away at
that place. Terrible as was this example, it was the act of a
merciful and humane man, and Mercy and Humanity smiled
sorrowfully, but approvingly, upon it. It tatight the Sipahi
Army that no British soldier, black or white, can rebel against
the State without bringing down upon himself fearful retribu-
tion, and by the sacrifice of a few guilty forfeited lives checked
the progress of a disease which, if weakly suffered to run its
course, might have resulted in the slaughter of thousands.

The lesson was not thrown away. The Sipahi learnt to
respect the stern authority of the law, and felt that the Nemesis
of this new Government of the British was certain in its opera-
tions, and not to be escaped. And the time soon came when his
constancy was tested, and found to have the ring of the true
metal. The European officers broke into rebellion ; but thH
natives did not falter in their allegiance. Conceiving them-

152 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1766

selves aggrieved by the withdrawal of the extraordinary allow-
ances which they had enjoyed in the field, the
itengliyofflceres. f°rmer determined to remonstrate against the
reduction, and to clamour for what they called
their rights. In each brigade meetings were called, con-
sultations were held, and secret committees were formed,
under the disguise of Freemasons' Lodges. Headstrong
and obstinate, the officers swore to recover the double batta
which had been taken from them, or to resign the service
in a body. Large sums of money were subscribed, and the
Company's civilians contributed to the fund, which was to
enable their military brethren to resist the authority of their
common masters. It was a formidable conjuncture, and one to
try the courage even of a Clive. The orders of the Company
were peremptory ; and he was not a man to lower the authority
of Government by yielding to a threat. But he could not dis-
guise from himself that there were contingencies which might
compel him to make a temporary concession to the insubordi-
nates ; one was an incursion of the Marathas,* the other the
defection of the Sipahis. Had the native soldiers sympathised
with and supported the English officers, the impetus thus given
to the movement would have overborne all power of resistance,
and Government must have succumbed to the crisis. In this
emergency, Clive saw clearly the importance of securing " the
fidelity and attachment of the Subahdars, or commanding
officers of the black troops," and he wrote urgently to his lieu-
tenants, Smith and Fletcher, instructing them to attain this
end. But the Sipahis had never wavered. True to their
colours, they were ready at the word of command to fire on the
white mutineers. Assured of this, Clive felt that the danger
was over — felt that he could hold out against the mutiny of the
English officers, even though the European troops should break
into revolt, f

* " In case the Marathas should still appear to intend an invasion, or in
case you apprehend a mutiny among the troops, but in no other case, you
have authority to make terms with the officers of your brigade."— Lord Clive
to Col. Smith, May 11, 1766. [See also following note.]

t " The black Sipahi officers, as well as men, have given great proofs of
fidelity and steadiness upon this occasion, and so long as they remain so,
nothing is to be apprehended from the European soldierv, even if they should
be mutinously inclined."— Clive to Smith, May 15, 1760* MS. Records.— They
had just afforded a striking proof that they were prepared, if necessary, to

1784.] DEGRADATION OF THE NATIVE OFFICER. 153

The founders of the Native Army had conceived the idea of a
force recruited from among the people of the country, and com-
manded for the most part by men of their own race, but of
higher social position — men, in a word, of the master-class,
accustomed to exact obedience from their inferiors. But it was
the inevitable tendency of our increasing power in India to oust
the native functionary from his seat, or to lift him from his
saddle, that the white man might fix himself there, with all the
remarkable tenacity of his race. An Englishman believes that
he can do all things better than his neighbours, and, therefore,
it was doubtless with the sincere conviction of the good we
were doing that we gradually took into our own hands the reins
of office, civil and military, and left only the drudgeiy and the
dirty work to be done by the people of the soil. Whether, if
we had fairly debated the question, it would have appeared to
us a safer and a wiser course to leave real military power in the
hands of men who might turn it against us, than to cast upon
the country a dangerous class of malcontents identifying the
rise of the British power with their own degradation, it may
now be difficult to determine. But any other result than that
before us would have been utterly at variance with the genius
of the English nation, and, theorise as we might, was not to be
expected. So it happened, in due course, that the native
officers, who had exercised real authority in their battalions,
who had enjoyed opportunities of personal distinction, who had
felt an honourable pride in their position, were pushed aside by
an incursion of English gentlemen, who took all the substantive
power into their hands, and left scarcely more than the shadow
of rank to the men whom they had supplanted.
An English subaltern was appointed to every com- increase of
pany, and the native officer then began to collapse officers.
into something little better than a name.

As the degradation of the native officer was thus accom-
plished, the whole character of the Sipahi army was changed.
It ceased to be a profession in which men of high position,

fire upon the Europeans. See Broome's "History of the Bengal Army," vol. i.
589 : " The European battalion had got under arms, and were preparing to
leave the fort and follow their officers, and the artillery were about to do the
same, but the unexpected appearance of this firm line of Sipahis, with thoir
bayonets fixed and arms loaded, threw them into some confusion, of which
Captain Smith took advantage, and warned them, that if they did not retire
peaceably into their barracks, he would fire upon them at once."

154 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1784-96.

accustomed to command, might satisfy the aspirations and
expend the energies of their lives. All distinctions were
effaced. The native service of the Company came down to a
dead level of common soldiering, and rising from the ranks by
a painfully slow progress to merely nominal command. There
was employment for the many ; there was no longer a career for
the few. Thenceforth, therefore, we dug out the materials of
our army from the lower strata of society, and the gentry of
the land, seeking military service, carried their ambitions
beyond the red line of the British frontier, and offered their
swords to the Princes of the Native States.

But in those lower strata there were elementary diversities
of which in England we know nothing. The lower orders
amongst us are simply the lower orders — all standing together
on a common level of social equality ; we recognise no distinc-
tions among them except in respect of the callings which they
follow. Thus one common soldier differs only from another
common soldier in the height of his stature, or the breadth of
his shoulders, or the steadiness of his drill. But in India the
great institution of Caste — at once the most exclusive
and the most levelling system in the world — may
clothe the filthiest, feeblest mendicant with all the dignities and
powers of the proudest lord. So, in our Native Army, a Sipahi
was not merely a Sipahi. He might be a Brahman, or he might
be a Pariah ; and though they might stand beside each other
shoulder to shoulder, foot to foot, on the parade-ground, there
was as wide a gulf between them in the Lines as in our own
country yawns between a dustman and a duke.

In the Bengal Army the Sipahis were chiefly of high Caste.
Deriving its name from the country in which it was first raised,
not from the people composing it, it was recruited in th9 first
instance from among the floating population which the Muham-
madan conquest had brought from the northern provinces—
from Bohilkhand, from Oudh, from the country between the
two rivers ; men of migratory habits, and martial instincts, and
sturdy frames, differing in all respects, mind and body, from
the timid, feeble denizens of Bengal. The Jat, the Bajput, and
the priestly Brahman, took service, with the Patan, under the
great white chief, who had humbled the pride of Siraju'd
daulah. And as time advanced, and the little local militia
swelled into the bulk of a magnificent army, the aristocratic
element was still dominant in the Bengal Army. But the

1784-96.] CASTE IN THE ARMY. 155

native troops of Madras and Bombay were made up from more
mixed and less dainty materials. There were men in the ranks
of those armies of all nations and of all castes, and the more ex-
elusive soon ceased from their exelusiveness, doing things which
their brethren in the Bengal Army shrunk from doing, and
solacing their pride with the reflection that it was the " custom
of the country." Each system had its advocates. The Bengal
Sipahi, to the outward eye, was the finest soldier ; tallest, best-
formed, and of the noblest presence. But he was less docile
and serviceable than the Sipahi of the Southern and the Western
Armies. In the right mood there was no better soldier in the
world, but he was not always in the right mood ; and the
humours which he displayed were ever a source of trouble to
his commanders, and sometimes of danger to the State.

In an army so constituted, the transfer of all substantive
authority to a handful of alien officers might have
been followed by a fatal collapse of the whole system, The Sipahi
but for one fortunate circumstance, which sustained
its vitality. The officers appointed to command the Sipahi
battalions were picked men; men chosen from the European
regiments, not merely as good soldiers, skilled in their pro-
fessional duties, but as gentlemen of sound judgment and
good temper, acquainted with the languages and the habits
of the people of the country, and prone to respect the pre-
judices of the soldiery. The command of a native battalion
was one of the highest objects of ambition. It conferred
large powers and often great wealth upon the Sipahi officer ;
and though the system was one pregnant with abuses, which
we see clearly in these days, it contained that great prin-
ciple of cohesion which attached the English officer and the
native soldier to each other — cohesion, which the refinements
of a later civilisation were doomed rapidly to dissolve.

It lasted out the century, but scarcely survived it.* The

* That the national basis, which, had originally distinguished the founda-
tion of the Madras Army, did not very long survive the establishment of the
reformed system of Bengal, and that the native officers soon lost the power
and the dignity in which they had once rejoiced, may be gathered from an
sarly incident in the Life of Sir John Malcolm. It was in 1784, when an
exchange of prisoners with Tipu had been negotiated, that a detachment of
two companies of Sipahis was sent out from our side of the Maisur frontier to
meet the escort under Major Dallas conveying the English prisoners from
Seringapatam. " In command of this party,'' says the biographer, " went
Ensign John Malcolm. This was his first service ; and it was long reinem-

156 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1796.

English Sipahi officer having become a great substantive fact,
not a mere excrescence upon the general body of the English
Army, it became necessary to define his position. He had
many great advantages, but he had not rank ; and the Com-
pany's officer found himself continually superseded by younger
men in the King's army. Very reasonably, if not always very
temperately, he began then to assert his rights ; and the result
was an entire reorganisation of the Company's army, which
greatly improved the status of its old officers and opened a
door for the employment of a large numbers of others. By the
regulations thus framed, two battalions of Sipahis were formed
into one regiment, to which the same number of officers were
posted as to a regiment in the King's army, and all took rank
according to the date of their commissions. It was believed
that the increased number of European officers would add to
the efficiency of the Native Army. But it was admitted, even
by those who had been most active in working out the new
scheme, that it did not develop all the good results with which
it was believed to be laden. The little authority, the little
dignity, which still clung to the position of the native officers
was then altogether effaced by this new incursion of English
gentlemen ; * and the discontent, which had been growing up
in the minds of the soldiery, began then to bear bitter fruit.

But this was not all. The new regulations, which so greatly
improved the position of the Company's officers, and in no
respect more than in that of the pensions which they were then
permitted to enjoy, held out great inducements to the older
officers of the Company's army to retire from active service, and
to spend the remainder of their days at home. Many of the
old commandants then prepared to leave the battalions over
which they had so long exercised paternal authority, and to
give up their jilaces to strangers. Not only was there a change
of men, but a change also of system. The English officer rose

bered by others than the youthful hero himself. When the detachment met
the prisoners' escort, a bright-faced healthy English boy was seen by the
latter riding up to them on a rough pony. Dallas asked him after his com-
manding officer. ' I am the commanding officer,' said young Malcolm." As
Malcolm was born in 1769, he must at this time have been a boy of fifteen ;
yet he commanded a detachment of two companies of Sipahis, and all the
old native officers attached to them.

* It was alleged to be an advantage of the new system that the increased
number of English officers would obviate the necessity of ever sending out a
detachment uuder native command.

1796-1805.] THE REORGANIZATION OF 1796. 157

by seniority to command. The principle of selection was
abandoned. And men, who could scarcely call for a glass of
water in the language of the country, or define the difference
between a Hindu and a Muhammadan, found themselves in-
vested with responsibilities which ought to have devolved only
on men of large local experience and approved good judgment
and temper.

But the evil results of the change were not immediately
apparent. The last years of the eighteenth, and the
first years of the nineteenth century were years of Mwith^Wars*1
active Indian warfare. In the Maisur and in the
Maratha countries the Sipahi had constant work, under great
generals whom he honoured and trusted ; he had strong faith
in the destiny of the Company ; and his pride was flattered
by a succession of brilliant victories. But it is after such wars
as those of Harris, Lake, and Wellesley, when a season of stag-
nation succeeds a protracted period of excitement, that the
discipline of an army, whether in the East or in the West, is
subjected to its severest trials. All the physical and moral
properties which have so long sustained it in high health and
perfect efficiency then seem to collapse ; and the soldier, nerve-
less and languid, readily succumbs to the deteriorating in-
fluences by which he is surrounded. And so it was with the
Sipahi after those exhausting wars. He was in the state which,
of all others, is most susceptible of deleterious impressions.
And, unhappily, there was one especial source of annoyance
and alarm to irritate and disquiet him in the hour of peace.
Amidst the stern realities of active warfare, the European
officer abjures the pedantries of the drill-sergeant and the
fopperies of the regimental tailor. He has no time for small
things ; no heart for trifles. It is enough for him that his men
are in a condition to fight battles and to win them. But in
Peace he sometimes shrivels into an Arbiter of Drill and Dress,
and worries in time the best of soldiers into malcontents and
mutineers.

And so it was that, after the fierce excitement of the Maisur
and Maratha wars, there arose among our English officers an
ardour for military improvement ; and the Sipahi, who had
endured for years, without a murmur, all kinds of hardships
and privations, under canvas and on the line of march, felt that
life was less endurable in cantonments than it had been in the
field, and was continually disturbing himself, in his matted

L58 Tin: sirAin AitiMY its immk ani> PROGRESS. [UN

hut, about the now things thatwere being foroed upon him.
All iorti of novelties were bristling up In bit path. I In wan to
be drilled aftei b new English i > i > i< >n . tie was to be drei ed
; 1 1 1 < • i ■ a new Hmglish fashion tie was i" be ihavod after a new

ICnglish i . 1 1 1 1 1 i < .11. He was not smart e igh i"i the Martinets

who had taken him In hand to polish him up into an ICnglish
soldier. They were stripping him, Indeed, of hii distinctive
Oriental obaraoter and Itwai long before he began to §ee in
I In . .•■ i ii"i i i" Aiij'Iicim' iii iii Mn i it 'i 1 1 i 1 1 ; • 1 1 ih m than ill" vexatious
innovations and orndnnxpnriiuontsof ISuropoan military roiorm.

To Illi'Cn 11.11 III »_VM IK'I'M :MhI \ '§ \ :i I inllll tllO Mlldl'MN A I I II \ Wi'l'n

especially subjected. Oompoied an were Iti batts
Mutiny 'of tiio |ionn of men of different oastos. and not In anT ":,\

I ■■ml \iiiiv ' .' •'

govornod by oasto | n i mi plin, tlmy worn liold to be
peouliarly nuoossible i" innovation ; and, little by little, all the
"Id outward characteristics of the native soldier wore offaood,
and new things! upon the muni, approved Ruropoan pnttorn,
substituted in their place, ai Last the Bipahi, Forbidden to
wear ilm distinguishing marks of Caste on his forehond,
stripped <>i iiiw oarringH, in whioh, by ties alike of vanity and
superstition, he "mi fondly attached,* and ordered i" shave
IniiiM'll according to a regulation mil, I was put into ■>■ stifl
round hat, like u Pariah drummer's, with a flat top, a leather
uookade, and a standing feather. li was no longer oalled b
" i mi band " . li was a hat or cap j In the language oi the natives,
n injn ; .Mini ii lo/n wallah, or hat wearer, was In ihcir phrasou-
logj a synonym for a ITaringhi or Christian.

The Sipahi Is not logical, but lm in nimlnlouH and suspioioui.
li w.'iii not difficult in persuade him that there were hidden
meanings and oeoult designs In all this assimilation of the
imiivn iiuiiiim'H dniHH to that of the European ii".iiiiti", man
J he new ha1 was nol moroly an omblom of Christianity, and

* lly Hi. IM iilntiiiiiiniliiii ; ijmIii HlO .iii i i m ■ ■ wini "III ii wiiin hi ii rlnuiii. II.

wiin f, i vi ii in inin ni imi inllll, mill iiiiiiriiii ii in M patron mini

| Boo the fallow in,"., i 'nni in, Si I- 1 1 . : i.hhIiii - <inii in n| IVTitclrni \im\
" li in or* fared by the Itnuulnl i i lm i n nnttvti ikoMfar nhit.ll uol L lili

I in-' In iii I ml.' Inn i -ii. :li-, or Wi HI I'll ■■;• fthni ■ I ■ ■ , . I in III i mill iiml |l

i I in I In i ilm rli i|, I Imi, nl nil 1 1 1 1 in I, ii, mill mi nil 1 1 ii I ir, i, , \,i v ni ill 1 1 it nl I lm
I.iiIIiiImii nliiill lm rliiin .lm vi il mi Ilic ohin. II i:i ilii.il.il. iiIm.i, lli.l

uniformity ihftll, ni Pttr ni In prftotfaubfa, lie pronorvotl In regard fa thu qumil Itj

iiml iiliii|n< nl tin' limr mi tln> ii|i|n'i Up/'

IM6-&] THH iiiM'i'nsMi) mmiAiMMADAM. LBfl

there fo to p<>nN0NMed of a grave moral signifloanoe, but materially,
mIsd, It was discovered to be an abomination. It was made in
part uC i< ;ii In r | ii<- 1 i.i t «■< l from the skin « > I" the unolean bog, oi
.of the saored oow, and was, therefore, an offence and dosei
ihiH alike in Muhammadan and Hindu. The former bad no
(liHtiii^iiiHliiii", marks of oaite l«» be rubbed off on parade willi a
dirty ■tiok, but be venerated 1 1 i m beard and iii:< earrings, and,
under the foroe of oontaol and example, he bad developed many
trong generic rosoinblanoei to the oaste observing Hindu. The
M 1 1 1 ■ :i 1 1 1 ii in 1 1 :« 1 1 of [ndia differs great ly in bii babita and bis feelings

from the Muhai adun of Central Asia or Arabia ; be aooommo

datei himself, In some sort, to the usages of the oountry, and
being thus readily acclimatised, he strikes strong root in the
soil. Christianity does not differ more than Muhammadanism,
dootrinally or ethically, from the religion of the Hindus; but
in the one oaso there may be sooial fusion, In the other It Li
impossible. Evon In the former instanoe, the fusion Liimperfeot,
and there Is In thiB partial assimilation of raoei one of tho ohief
olements of our seourity In [ndia. But the seourity derived
Irora this souroe is alio Lmperfuot; and oiroumstanoes maj &1

any time, by an ti n I'ml ii na Ii- OOlnoidenOO, appeal to the 'I I) n ii'ii I

nililaiii'i'M ami tho ooiiiinon iiiNtiuctN of dill'oreut nationalities,
in luoh a manner an to excite in both tho same fears and to
raise llm Haunt aspirations, and no to eaiiHo nil diversities to be
tor a time forgotten. Ami wmli a ooinoidenoe appears now to
have arisen. Different raoes, moved by the sense <>l a oommon
danger, and rouied by 0 oommon hope, forgot their differences,
ami oombined against ■••■ oommon foe.

And hii It happoned that In the ipring of 1806, the Hindu
mil Muhammadan Bipahi in the Southern Peninsula of [ndia
■MIC talking together, Like oaste-brothers, about their grie^
anoes, and weaving | >li >i h for their deliveranoe. Ii Li partly by
aooident, partly by design, that suoh plots ripen In the spring,
By aooident, beoause relieved from oohl weather oxorei •
parades, field days, and Lnipeotioni, the soldier has more leisure
<u ruminate bii wrongs, and more time bo diiouss them. By

di 1 "ii, beoause 1 ii iming heati and rains paralyse the activities

of the white man, and are great gain i" the Dative mutineor.
In \|iul and May the English ofHoer sees little of his men ; Id*
visits to the Lines are few j few are his appearances on parade,
tie is languid and prostrate. The morning and evening ride
are as muoh as his mini ■ i< - nan eoinpaHN. The SipAhi then, disen*

160 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806.

cumbered of dress and dismissed from drill, can afford to snatch
some hours from sleep to listen to any strange stories, told by
wandering mendicants, with the odour of sanctified filth about
them, and to discuss the most incredible fables with all the
gravity of settled belief. There is always more or less of this
vain talk. It amuses the Sipahi, and for a while excites him
with a visionary prospect of higher rank and better pay, under
some new dispensation. But he is commonly content to regard
this promised time as a far-off Hegaira, and, as he turns him-
self round on his charpai for another nap, he philosophically
resolves in the meanwhile to eat the Company's salt in peace,
and to wait God's pleasure in quietude and patience.

But there was at this time something more to excite the
imagination of the Sipahi in Southern India than the ordinary
vain talk of the Bazaars and the Lines. The travelling fakirs
were more busy with their inventions ; the rumours which they
carried from place to place were more ominous ; the prophecies
which they recited were more significant of speedy fulfilment.
There was more point in the grotesque performances of
the puppet-shows — more meaning in the rude ballads which
were sung and the scraps of verse which were cited. Strange
writings were dropped by unseen hands, and strange placards
posted on the walls. At all the large military stations in the
Karnatik and the Dakhin there was an uneasy feeling as of some-
thing coming. There were manifold signs which seemed to
indicate that the time to strike had arrived, and so the Sipahi
began to take stock of his grievances and to set before him all
the benefits of change.

The complaints of the Sipahi were many. If he were to pass
his whole life in the Company's service, and do what he might,
he could not rise higher than the rank of Subahdar ; there had
been times when distinguished native soldiers had been ap-
pointed to high and lucrative commands, and had faithfully
done their duty ; but those times had passed, and, instead of
being exalted, native officers were habitually degraded. A
Sipahi on duty always presented or carried arms to an English
officer, but an English soldier suffered a native officer to pass
by without a salute. Even an English Sergeant commanded
native officers of the highest rank. On parade, the English
officers made mistakes, used the wrong words of command, then
threw the blame upon the Sipahis and reviled them. Even
native officers, who had grown grey in the service, were publicly

1806.] GRIEVANCES OP THE SIPAHIS. 161

abused by European striplings. On the line of march the
native officers were compelled to live in the same tents with the
common Sipahis, and had not, as in the armies of native poten-
tates, elephants or palanquins assigned to them for their con-
veyance, how great soever the distance which they were obliged
to traverse. And if they rode horses or ponies, purchased from
their savings, the English officer frowned at them as upstarts.
" The Sipahis of the Nizam and the Maratha chiefs," they said,
" are better off than our Subahdars and Jamadars." Then it
was urged that the Company's officers took the Sipahis vast dis-
tances from their homes, where they died in strange places, and
that their wives and children were left to beg their bread ; that
native Princes, when they conquered new countries, gave grants
of lands to distinguished soldiers, but that the Company only
gave them sweet words ; that the concubines of the English
gentlemen were better paid than the native officers, and their
grooms and grass-cutters better than the native soldiers ; that
the English officers could import into their Zenanas the most
beautiful women in the country, whilst the natives hardly
dared to look at the slave-girls ; and, to crown all, it was
declared that General Arthur Wellesley had ordered his wounded
Sipahis to be mercilessly shot to death.

Preposterous as were some of the fables with which this bill
of indictment was crusted over, there was doubtless beneath it
a large substratum of truth. But the alleged grievances were,
for the most part, chronic ailments which the Sipahi had been
long enduring, and might have endured still longer, patiently
and silently, had they not culminated in the great outrage of
the round hat, with its auxiliary vexations of the shorn beard,
the effaced caste-marks, and the despoiled earrings. Then, it
was not difficult to teach him that this aggregation of wrongs
had become intolerable, and that the time had come for him to
strike a blow in defence of his rights. And the teacher was
not far distant. The great Muhammadan usurpation of Maisur
had been overthrown, but the representatives of the usurper
were still in the country. The family of the slain Sultan were
living in the fort of Vellur, as the clients rather than the cap-
tives of the English, with abundant wealth at their command,
and a numerous body of Musulman attendants. But generous
as was the treatment they had received, and utterly at variance
with their own manner of dealing with fallen enemies, they had
not ceased to bewail the loss- of the sovereign power which had

VOL. 1. M

162 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806.

passed from their House, or to hate the conquerors who had un-
kinged them. In the luxurious idleness of Vellur they dreamed
of the recovery of their lost empire. There was but one way
to the attainment of that cherished object, and that way was
through the corruption of the Sipahi. The time was propitious,
and the work commenced.

It ought not to have been easy work, but so it was. If there
had been relations of confidence between the English officer and
the native soldier, the corruption of the latter would have been
a task of sore difficulty and danger ; but those relations were
not what they had been a few years before. It was not that
the officers themselves had deteriorated, but that a new system
had been introduced, which, greatly improving their state and
prospects, and, it may be said, permanently increasing their
efficiency as a body, still caused some temporary relaxation of
the ties which bound them to the soldiery of the country. The
new regulations of 1796, it has been said, opened out to the
elder generation of officers a door by which they might retire
on advantageous terms from the service. Some took their pen-
sions at once ; but a period of active warfare supervened, and
many veteran officers waited for the restoration of peace to take
advantage of the boon that was offered. They went ; and a new
race of men, young and inexperienced, took their places. And
so, for a time, the Sipahi did not know his officer, nor the officer
his men ; they met almost as strangers on parade, and there was
little or no communion between them. It was a transition
period of most untoward occurrence, when so many other ad-
verse influences were destroying the discipline of the army ;
and, therefore, again I say the hour was propitious, and the
work of corruption commenced.

At the end of the first week of May, as Adjutant-General

M » Agnew was rising from his work, in the white heat

Progress of of Fort St. George, there came tidings to his office

the Mutiny. 0f genera| disaffection among the native troops at

Vellur. One battalion, at least, already had broken into open

mutiny. The chief of the Madras army, Sir John Cradock, had

retired for the evening to his garden house in the pleasant

suburbs of Madras, so Agnew drove out to see him with the

important missive in his hand. A few days afterwards, Cradock

was posting to Vellur. Arrived there, he found that there had

been no exaggeration in the reports which had been furnished

to him, but that more judicious treatment at the outset might

1806.] INCAUTION OF GOVERNMENT. 163

have allayed the excitement among the troops, and restored the
confidence of the Sipahi. So said a Court of Inquiry ; so said
the Commander-in-Chief. A gentle sudorific, almost insensibly
expelling the pent-up humours, may suffice at the beginning,
though only much blood-letting can cure at the end. But ail-
ments of this kind, in the military body, seldom reveal them-
selves in their full significance until the time for gentle
treatment is past. When Cradock went to Vellur no mere
explanations could repair the mischief that had been done. The
mutinous troops were sent down to the Presidency, and others
substituted for them. Military discipline was vindicated for
the time by a court-martial, and two of the ringleaders were
sentenced to be — flogged. But the infection still clung to
Vellur. The whole native garrison was tainted and corrupted.

Nor was it a mere local epidemic. At other military stations
in the Karnatik there was similar excitement. Midnight meet-
ings were being held in the Lines ; oaths of secresy were being
administered to the Sipahis ; threats of the most terrible
vengeance were fulminated against any one daring to betray
them. The native officers took the lead, the men followed, some
roused to feelings of resentment, others huddling together like
sheep, under the influence of a vague fear. In the bungalows
of the English captains there was but small knowledge of what
was passing in the Sipahis' Lines, and if there had been more,
discretion would probably have whispered that in such a case
" silence is gold." For when in the high places of Government
there is a general disinclination to believe in the existence of
danger, it is scarcely safe for men of lowlier station to say or to
do anything indicating suspicion and alarm.

At Vellur, after the first immature demonstration, there was
a lull ; and the quietude had just the effect that it was intended
to have ; it disarmed the suspicion and suspended the vigilance
of the English. The most obvious precautions were neglected.
Even the significant fact that the first open manifestation of
disaffection had appeared under the shadow of the asylum of
the Maisur Princes, had not suggested any special associations,
or indicated the direction in which the watchful eye of the
British Government should be turned. Nothing was done to
strengthen the European garrison of Vellur.* No pains were

* "That neither the Government nor the Commander-in-Chief entertained
any serious apprehensions from the agitation having first occurred at Vellur,

M 2

164 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806.

taken to cut off the perilous intercourse which existed between
the native soldiery and the occupants of the Palace. So the
latter weut about the Fort jeering the Sipahis, and telling them
that they would soon be made Christians to a man. The dif-
ferent parts of their uniform were curiously examined, amidst
shrugs and other expressive gestures, and significant " Wah-
wahs ! " and vague hints that everything about them in some
way portended Christianity. They looked at the Sipahi's stock ,
and said, " What is this? It is leather ! Well ! " Then they
would look at his belt, and tell him that it made a cross on his
breast, and at the little implements of his calling, the turu-
screw and worm, suspended from it, and say that they also were
designed to fix the Christian's cross upon his person. But it
was the round hat that most of all was the object of the taunts
and warnings of the people from the Palace. " It only needed
this," they said, " to make you altogether a Faringhi. Take
care, or we shall soon all be made Christians — Bazaar-people,
Ryots, every one will be compelled to wear the hat; and then
the whole country will be ruined." Within the Fort, and out-
side the Fort, men of all kinds were talking about the forcible
conversion to Christianity which threatened them ; and every-
where the round hat was spoken of as an instrument by which
the Caste of the Hindu was to be destroyed, and the faith of
the Musulman desecrated and demolished.

But all this was little known to the officers of the Vellur
garrison, or, if known, was little heeded. So unwilling, indeed,
were they to believe that any danger was brewing, that a iSipahi
who told his English officer that the regiments were on the eve
of revolt was put in irons- as a madman. The native officers
declared that he deserved condign punishment for blackening
the faces of his corps, and they were readily believed. But the
time soon came when the prophecy of evil was verified, and the
prophet was exalted and rewarded. Deeply implicated as he
was said to be in the plot — a traitor first to the English, and
then to his own people — his name became an offence and an
abomination to the Army, and the favour shown to him a source

ie obvious. The battalion that most opposed the innovation was, indeed,
ordered to Madras, but nothing was directed indicative of any jealousy of the
Princes. No precautions seem to have been taken within the Fort, and not-
withstanding the discontent manifested by the native troops, the garrison
was still left with only four companies of Europeans." — Barry Clone to John
Malcolm. Poonah, Aug. 12, 1806. MS. Correspondence.

1806.] OUTBREAK OF MUTINY. 165

of the bitterest resentment. " The disposition of the gentlemen
of the Company's service," they said, " and the nature of their
government, make a thief happy, and an honest man afflicted." *
On the 10th of July the mine suddenly exploded. It was
remembered afterwards that on the preceding
afternoon an unusual number of people had July fo.'woe.
passed into the Fort, some mounted and some
on foot, seemingly on no especial business ; all with an inso-
lent, braggart air, laughing and rollicking, making mimic
battle among themselves, and otherwise expressing a general
expectancy of something coming. It was remembered, too,
that on that evening there Lad been more than the common
tendency of the times to speak abusively of the English. The
Adjutant of a Sipahi regiment had been called, to his face, by
the vilest term of reproach contained in the language of the
country.f But it has been doubted whether the day and hour
of the outburst were those fixed for the development of the plot.
The conspirators, it is said, were not ripe for action. Two or
three days later, the first blow was to have been struck, but
that a Jamadar, inflamed with strong drink, could not control
the passionate haste within him, and he precipitated the colli-
sion which it was the policy of his party to defer.! Numbers

* From a paper in Hindustani, transmitted to Adjutant-General Agnew
from the Haidarabad Subsidiary Force : " In the affair at Velliir," said the
Sipahis, " when the mutiny first commenced, it was on account of Mustafa
Beg ; and the gentlemen of the Company's Government have bestowed upon
him a reward of two thousand pagodas from the public treasury, with the
rank of Subahdar. The same Mustafa Beg, Sipahi, was the man who gave
the signal for revolt to the people at Velliir, and this is the man whom the
Company have distinguished by their favour."

f Unhappily it is one of the first words which the Englishman in India
learns to speak, and by which many young officers, when displeased, habitually
call their native servants. (Very few, I think. — G. B. M.)

% In the private correspondence of the time, it is stated that the day fixed
for the outbreak was the 14th. It appeared, however, in the evidence of the
first Committee of Inquiry assembled at Velliir, that it was agreed that the
first blow should be struck fifteen days after the Maisur standard, prepared in
the Piilace, was ready to be hoisted, and that thirteen days had then passed.
The story of the drunken Jamadar appears in Madras Secret Letter, Sept.
30, 1806. It happened, too, that the European officer commanding the native
guard fell sick, that the Subahdar was also indisposed, and that Jamadar
Kasim Khan, one of the most active of the mutineers, was eager to go the
grand rounds ; and it is possible that this accident helped to precipitate the
crisis. On the other hand, it is to be observed that Major Armstrong, who had
been absent from Velliir, and who returned on the night of the 1 0th, was warned
by people outside the Fort not to enter, as sonit thing was about to happen.

166 THE SIPAHI ARMY— ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [180fi.

thus suddenly roused to action were unprepared to play their
parts ; and letters which had been written to disaffected polygars
and others in Maisur had not yet been despatched. It was
confidently believed that in a few days ten thousand faithful
adherents of the House of Haidar would rally round the standard
of the Musulman Princes. All that was required of the Sipahis
was, that they should hold Yelliir for a week. At the end of
that time it was believed that the whole country would be in
the hands of the insurgents.

The European garrison of Vellur, at this time, consisted only

of four companies of a Line regiment. To fall
ms 69thSty'8 suddenly, in the dead of the night, on all who

might happen to be on guard, to overpower them
by numbers, and then to murder the rest in their beds, was
apparently an easy task. Two hours after midnight the work
commenced. The sentries were shot down. The soldiers on
main guard were killed as they lay on their cots, and the white
men in the hospital were ruthlessly butchered. There was
then a scene of unexampled confusion. Roused from their beds
by the unaccustomed sound of firing in the Fort, the English
officers went out to learn the cause of the commotion, and many
of them were shot down by the mutineers in the first bewilder-
ment of surprise. The two senior officers of the garrison were
among the first who fell. On the threshold of his house, Fan-
court, who commanded the garrison, was warned, for dear life's
sake, not to come out, but answering with the Englishman's
favourite formula of " Never mind," he made for the Main
Guard, and was shot with the " Fall in ! " on his lips. Of the
survivors two or three made their way to the barracks, and
took command of such of the Europeans as had escaped the
first murderous onslaught of the Sipahis. But it was little that
the most desperate resolution could do in this extremity to
stem the continually increasing tide of furious hostility which
threatened to overwhelm them. It was no mere military revolt.
The inmates of the Palace were fraternising with the Sipahis.
From the apartments of the Princes went forth food to refresh
the weary bodies of the insurgents, and vast promises to stimu-
late and sustain the energies of their minds. One of the Princes,

the third son of Tipu, personally encouraged the
Prince Moisu'd ieaaers of the revolt. With his own hands he

gave them the significant bhital-nut. With his
own lips he proclaimed the rewards to be lavished upon the

1806.] THE MASSACRE OF VELI.tht. 167

restorers of the Muhamniadan dynasty. And from his apart-
ments a confidential servant was seen to bring the tiger-ntriped
standard of Maisur, which, amidst vociferous cries of " Din !
Din !" was hoisted above the walls of the Palace. But the
family of the Sultan were soon forgotten. There was no com-
bination to aid their escape. The Sipahis at first gave them-
selves up to the work of massacre. The people from the Palace,
following in their wake, gorged themselves with the plunder of
the white men, and aided the mutineers without sharing their
danger. After a time the Sipahis betook themselves also to
plunder; and the common object was forgotten under the ex-
citement of personal greed. The white women in the Fort
were spared. The tender mercies of the wicked, with a refined
cruelty, preserved them for a worse fate than death. The people
from the Palace told the Sipahis not to kill them, as all the
English would be destroyed, and the Moormen might then take
them for wives.*

But whilst these terrible scenes were being enacted, and the
sons of Tipu were swelling with the proud certainty of seeing
the rule of the Sultan again established in Maisur, retribution
swift and certain was overtaking the enterprise.
An officer of the English regiment, who happened Major Coats.
to be on duty outside the Fort, heard the firing,
thoroughly apprehended the crisis, and, through the darkness of
the early morning made his way to Arkat, to carry thither the
tidings of insurrection, and to summon succours to the aid of
the imperilled garrison. There was a regiment of British
Dragoons at Arkat, under the command of Colonel
Gillespie. By seven o'clock Coats had told his p™^
story. Fifteen minutes afterwards, Gillespie, with
a squadron of his regiment, was on his way to Velliir. The
rest were saddling and mounting ; the galloper-guns were being
horsed and limbered ; and a squadron of Native Cavalry was
responding to the trumpet-call with as much alacrity as the
British Dragoons. The saving virtues of promptitude and pre-
paration were never more conspicuously manifested. A little
vacillation, a little blundering, a little delay, the result of
nothing being ready when wanted, and all might have been

* The massacre included fourteen officers and ninety-nine soldiers killed.
There were, moreover, several officers and men wounded, some of the latter
mortally.

168 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806.

lost. Never had the sage precept of Haidar Ali, that the
English should keep their white soldiers like hunting-
leopards in cages, and slip them suddenly and fiercely at
the enemy, been wrought into practice with more terrible
effect, than now against the followers and supporters of his
descendants.

Once under the walls of Vellur, Gillespie was eager to make
his way into the Fort, that he might rally the remnant of the
European garrison and secure the safe admission of his men.
The outer gates were open, but the last was closed, and in pos-
session of the enemy. There was no hope of forcing it without
the aid of the guns. But these were now rapidly approaching.
There were good officers with the relieving force, to whom the
conduct of external operations might be safely entrusted ; and
Gillespie longed to find himself with the people whom he had
come to save. So, whilst preparations were being made for the
attack, he determined to ascend alone the walls of the Fort. In
default of ladders, the men of the 69th let down a rope, and,
amidst the shouts of the delighted Europeans, he was drawn up,
unhurt, to the crest of the ramparts, and took command of the sur-
vivors of the unhappy force. Quickly forming at the word of
command, they came down eagerly to the charge, and, cheered by
the welcome sound of the guns, which were now clamouring for
admission, and not to be denied, they kept the mutineers at a
distance till the gates were forced ; and then the cavalry
streamed in, and victory was easy. The retribution was
terrible, and just. Hundreds fell beneath the sabres of the
Dragoons and of the native horsemen, who emulated the ardour

of their European comrades. Hundreds escaped over the walls
of the Fort, or threw down their arms and cried for mercy. But
the excited troopers, who had seen Tipii's tiger-standard floating
over the citadel of Vellur, could not, after that hot morning-
ride, believe that they had done their work until they had des-
troyed the " cubs." They were eager to be led into the Palace,
and there to inflict condign punishment on those whom they
believed to be the real instigators of the butchery of their
countrymen. For a moment there was a doubt in Gillespie's
mind ; but an appeal from Colonel Marriott, in whose charge
was the Maisur family, removed it ; and he put forth a restrain-
ing hand. He would not soil his victory with any cruel
reprisals. The members of Tipu's family were now at his
mercy, and the mercy which he showed them was that which

W06.] PROGRESS OF DISAFFECTION. 169

the Christian soldier delights to rain down upon the fallen and
the helpless.*

But the storm had not expended itself in this fierce convul-
sion. Taught by so stern a lesson, the Government resolved
that " all orders which might be liable to the objection of affect-
ing the usages of the troops " should be abandoned. But the
obnoxious hats might have been burnt before the eyes of the
troops, and the caste-marks and earrings restored on parade, in
the presence of the Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and all
the magnates of the land ; and still a rettirn to quietude and
contentment might have been far distant. Individual causes of
anger and bitterness might be removed, but still there would
remain, together with the mistrust they had engendered, all the
vague anxieties on the one side, and the indefinite expectations
on the other, which designing men had excited in the minds of
the soldiery, f Rebellion had been crushed for a time at its
Head-Quarters. The British flag floated again over Vellur ; but
there were other strong posts, which it had been intended to

* For all the facts given in the text, I have the authority of a mass of
official, semi-official, ami private contemporary correspondence, which I have
very carefully collated. In doing so, I have been compelled to reject some
personal incidents which have hitherto generally formed part of the narrative
of the "Massacre of Vellur," but which, however serviceable they may be
for purposes of effective historical writing, are, I am sorry to say, at best
apocryphal. It has been ^aid that the officer who carried the tidings to Arkat
escaped through a sally-port, and swam the ditch of the Fort so famous for
the number and size of its alligators. Sober official correspondence states
that Major Coats, who was bearer of the news, was outside the Fort at the
time of the outbreak. It is very generally stated, too, that when Gillespie
wished to enter the Fort in advance of the men, as there were no ladders and
no ropes, the survivors of the 69th fastened their belts together, and thus drew
him up the walls. But I have before me two letters, signed "R. Gillespie,"
which state that he was drawn up by a rope. Among the fictitious incidents
of the mutiny may be mentioned the whole of the stories which tell of the
foul murder of English women, and the braining of little children before
their mothers' eyes.

t " The subversion of the British Empire in Tndia by foreign invasion and
domestic revolt, seem to have been the common theme of discourse all over
the country, and opinions have generally prevailed that such a revolution was
neither an enterprise of great difficulty, nor that the accomplishment of it

was far distant A mot-t extraordinary and unaccountable impression

has been made upon the Sipahis, which has been fomented by prophecies and
predictions inducing a belief that wonderful changes are about to take place,
and that the Europeans are to be expelled from India." — General Hay Mao-
dowall. Naudidriig, Oct. 31. MS. Correspondence.

170 THE SIP Am ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806.

seize, and efforts might yet be made to establish revolt in other
parts of the Southern Peninsula.

Nor was it only in Maisur and the Karnatik that the spirit of
disaffection was rife. In the Dakhin, also, it was mani-
ai ara a . feg.j.jng itself in a manner which, for a while, created
serious alarm. At Haidarabad, the capital of the Nizam's
dominions, there was a high tide of excitement. It was appre-
hended that the native troops of the Subsidiary Force,
encouraged and aided by some of the chief people of this
Muhammadan State, if not by the Nizam himself, would break
out into revolt. They were wrought upon by nearly the same
influences as had destroyed the loyalty of the troops in Maisur,
with some peculiar aggravations of their own. A new com-
manding officer had recently been placed over
Colonel them — a smart disciplinarian of the most approved
European pattern. They had been worried and
alarmed before his arrival. Montresor's appearance soon made
matters worse. Knowing little or nothing of the habits and
feelings of the country, he enforced the new orders with more
than common strictness, and supplemented them with some
obnoxious regulations of his own. An order had been issued
just before his arrival forbidding the Sipahi to leave his Guard
and to divest himself of his uniform during his period of duty ;
and now the new English commandant prohibited the beating
of tam-tams in the bazaars. It was not seen that these pro-
hibitions were, in effect, orders that the Hindu Sipahi should
take no sustenance on duty, and that there should be no
marriage and no funeral processions. When the discovery was
made, the new local regulations were rescinded ; but it was not
possible to rescind the mischief that was done. There was a
profound conviction among the Sipahis that it was the intention
of the English to destroy their caste, to break down their
religion, and forcibly to convert them to Christianity. And all
through the long straggling lines of Haidarabad there was a
continual buzz of alarm, and the Sipahis were asking each other
if they had heard how the English General, Weinyss Sahib, at
Colombo, had marched his native soldiers to church.*

* " It is astonishing how strong and how general the impression was of a
systematic design to enforce the conversion of the Sipahis to Christianity.
1'he men here heard, and talked of the late arrival of some clergymen from
England, and of the story of General Wemyss marching the Sipahi9 to
church at Colombo." — Captain Thomas Sydenham (Resident at Haidarabad)
to Mr. Edmonstone, July 27, 1806. MS. Correspondence.

1806] CONDUCT OF THE NIZAM. 171

That the feeling of mingled fear and resentment, which had
taken possession of the minds of the soldiery, was much
fomented by emissaries from the city of Haidarabad, is not to
be doubted. Many leading men, discontented and desperate, at
all times prone to intrigue and ripe for rebellion, looked eagerly
for a crisis out of which might have come some profit to them-
selves. It is probable that they were in communication with
dependents of the House of Tipu. It is certain that they
fostered the resentments and stimulated the ambition of the
native officers, and that a programme of action had been agreed
upon, of which murder and massacre were the prelude.* But
happily the Nizam and his minister, Mir A'lam — the one in word,
the other in spirit — were true to the English alliance. Wisely,
in that conjuncture, did Sydenham confide all his troubles to
them. It is a sad necessity to be compelled to communicate to
a native Prince the belief of the English Government that their
troops are not to be trusted. But concealment in such a case is
impossible, and any attempt to diguise the truth helps others to
exaggerate and to distort it. The Nizam knew all that had
been going on, perhaps before the British Resident had even a
suspicion of it. Eager for his support, and willing to raise the
standard of revolt in his name, the conspirators had conveyed to
him a written paper signifying their wishes. He did not answer
it. He did not give it to the Resident. He simply waited and
did nothing. It was not in the nature of the man to do more.
He knew the power of the English ; but he secretly hated them,
and naturally shrank from opposing or betraying a cause which
appealed to him in the name of his religion. Perhaps it is
hardly fair to expect from a native Prince, under such conflict-
ing circumstances, more than this negative support.

The feeling among the native troops was so strong, the
danger appeared to be so imminent, that Montresor was
besought by some old Sipahi officers not to enforce the
obnoxious regulations. But he replied that he had been

* Captain Sydenham wrote that, from the best information he could obtain
at Haidarabad, it appeared that " the native troops had been invited to desert
their colours, to break out in open mutiny, and to murder their officers. It
was intended that a commotion should have taken place in the city at the
moment of the insurrection in cantonments; that Mir A'lam, and all those in
the interests of the English, were to be destroyed ; that the Subahdar
(Nizam) was to be confined, and Earidiim Jah either made Diwan or placed
on the masnad, as circumstances might suggest." — MS. Correspondence.

172 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806

selected for that especial command as a fitting agent for their
enforcement, and how could he turn his back upon his duty?
But when tidings of the massacre at Vellur reached Haidarabad,
he saw at once that concession must be made to the prejudices
of the Sipahi, and the orders were revoked in anticipation of

instructions from the Madras Government. Still
uy22, 1806. ^e ^.ro0pS were not satisfied. Having gained one
victory they determined to attempt another. So they fell back
upon the old grievance of the leather stock, and the men of
some of the battalions, encouraged by their native officers, were
seen disencumbering themselves of this article of their uniform
on parade, and casting it contemptuously on the ground. A
display of vigour at the right time crushed the mutiny ere it
was matured. On the 14th of August, the troops at Haidarabad

were ordered under arms. The English regiment
H.M.'8 33rd was posted near the park of artillery, and the

cavalry were drawn up en potence on both flanks.
Then four Subahdars of Native Infantry, who were believed
to be the ringleaders in the mutinous movement, were called to
the front and marched off under a guard of thirty Europeans
and a company of Sipahis. Under this escort they were sent to
Machlipatan. This movement had the best possible effect both
in the cantonment and in the city. Mutiny was awe-struck ;
sedition was paralysed ; conciliatory explanations and addresses,
which had before failed, were now crowned with success, and
early in the following month Sydenham wrote from Haiderabad
that everything was " perfectly tranquil, both in the city and
the cantonments." " The Sipahis," it added, " appear cheerful
and contented, and the Government goes on with considerable
vigour and regularity."

But ere long the anxieties of the Government again turned
towards the old quarter. It was clear that, in the former
domains of the Sultan, the fire, though suppressed fur a time,
had not been extinguished. At Nandidrug, in the heart of the
Maisur territory, there had been symptoms of uneasiness from the
commencement of the year. The native troops were
Nandidrug. ^ew . ^^ ^)e for^resSj built upon a high scarped rock,

was one of uncommon strength, and, well defended, might have
defied attack. In itself, therefore, a coveted possession for the
rebel force, it was rendered doubly important by its position.
For it was within a night's march of the great station of
Bangalur, and the mutineers from that post would have flocked

1806.] ALARM AT NANDIDEUG. 173

to it as a rallying-point and a stronghold, admirably suited for
the Head-Quarters of Rebellion.* The influences, therefore, of
which I have spoken — the fakirs, the conjurors, the puppet-
showmen, the propagators of strange prophecies — were more
than commonly operative in that direction, and had success
attended the first outbreak at Velliir, the Nandidrug garrison
would then have turned upon their officers, hoisted the rebel flag
on the walls of the Fort, and displayed signals which might
have been seen at Bangalur. But a season of suspended
activity naturally followed this failure ; and it was not until
the mouth of October that they ventured to resolve on any open
demonstration. Then the Muhammadan and Hindu Sipahis
feasted together, bound themselves by solemn engagements to
act as brethren in a common cause, and swore that they would
rise against and massacre their English officers.

The day and the hour of the butchery were fixed. The
native soldiery had quietly sent their families out
of the Fort, and otherwise prepared for the struggle.f Oct°sb0e6r_ 18>
Two hours before midnight on the 18th of October
the Sipahis were to have rushed upon their English officers,
and not left a white man living in the place. But about eight
o'clock on that evening an English officer galloped t Ba „ s
up to the house of the Commandant Cuppage, and
told him that no time was to be lost ; that the Sipahis were on
the point of rising, and that means of safety must at once be
sought. Scarce had the story been told, when an old and
distinguished native officer came breathless with the same
intelligence. There was no room for doubt ; no time for delay.
An express, calling for reinforcements, was despatched to
Bangalur ; and the officers, selecting one of their houses in the
Pagoda-square, which seemed best adapted to purposes of
defence, took post together and waited the issue. The night

* Mark Wilks wrote to Barry Close, with reference to this movement at
Nandidrug: "I do not know what to make of all this; men who had any
great combination in view could scarcely have any design to act on so small
a scale." But Bany Close, taking a more comprehensive view, replied:
" The great object of the Insurgents at Vellure seems to have been to secure
to themselves a strong post on which to assemble in force. Cuppage's
garrison, though small, may have liad it in view to seize on Nandidrug.
Possessed of this strong post, the conspirators would have probably assembled
upon it in force, and proceeded to act against us openly." — MS. Correspond-
ence.

f Colonel Cuppage to Barry Close. — MS. Correspondence.

174 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806.

passed without an attack ; and on the morrow afternoon safety
came in the shape of a squadron of Dragoons from Bangalur.
Colonel Davis had received the tidings soon after daybreak,
and by three o'clock his troopers were clattering into
Nandidrug.

November came, and with it came new troubles. Far down
the coast, not many leagues removed from the
southernmost part of the Peninsula, lies the station
of Paliamkotta. There Major Welsh, with six European officers
under him, commanded a Sipahi battalion, in which many
relatives of the mutineers cut up at Vellur were brooding over
their loss of kindred. Towai'ds the end of the third week
of the month, it was believed that the Muhammadan Sipahis
were about to rise and massacre all the Europeans in the place.
The story ran that, rejecting with contempt the idea of banding
themselves with the Hindus, they had met at a mosque and
concerted their murderous plans. Some buildings were to be
fired in the cantoment to draw the English officers from theii
homes. In the confusion, the whole were to be slain, the Port
was to be seized, and the rebel flag hoisted on the ramparts.
Scenting the plot, a Malabar-man went to the mosque in
disguise, and carried tidings of it to the English Commandant.
The danger appeared to be imminent, and Welsh at once took
his measures to avert it. Whatever may have been the
judgment and discretion of the man, his courage and determina-
tion were conspicuous ; and his comrades were of the same
temper. Assuming the bold, intrepid front, which has so
often been known to overawe multitudes, this little handful of
undaunted Englishmen seized and confined thirteen native
officers, and turned five hundred Musulman Sipahis out of the
Fort. That they were able to accomplish this, even with the
support of the Hindus, was declared to be a proof that no
desperate measures had really been designed. But the prema-
ture explosion of a plot of this kind always creates a panic.
In a state of fear and surprise, men are not capable of reasoning.
There is a vague impression that boldness presages power;
that there is something behind the imposing front. A single
man has ere now routed a whole garrison. I am not sure,
therefore, that there was no danger, because it was so easily
trodden oitt.

Two days afterwards Colonel Dyce, who commanded the
district of Tinniveli, threw himself into Paliamkotta ; assembled

1806.] FATE OF MAJOR WELSH. 175

the Hindu troops ; told them that he had come there to maintain
the authority of the Company, or to die in the defence of the
colours which he had sworn to protect. He then called upon
those who were of the same mind to approach the British flag
for the same purpose, but if not to depart in peace. They went
up and took the oath to a man, presented arms to the colours,
gave three unbidden cheers in earnest of their unshaken
loyalty, and fell in as on a muster-parade.

On the first appearance of danger, Welsh had despatched a
letter by a country-boat to Ceylon, calling for European troops,
and the call was responded to with an alacrity beyond all
praise. But so effectual were the measures which had been
already adopted, or so little of real danger had there been, that
when the succour which had been sent for arrived from
Trichinapali, the alarm had passed, and the work was done.

Told as I have told this story — a simple recital of facts, as
written down in contemporary correspondence — it would appear
to afford an instructive example of promptitude and vigour.
But this is not the only lesson to be learnt from it. It is more
instructive still to note that Major Welsh was severely con-
demned as an alarmist, the tendency of whose precipitate action
was to destroy confidence and to create irritation. Another
officer,* who, apprehending danger, had disarmed his regiment
as a precaution, was denounced with still greater veheinence.j
Apprehensions of this kind were described as "disgraceful and
groundless panics "; and political officers chuckled to think that
it was proposed at Madras to remove from their commands and
to bring to Courts-Martial the officers who had considered it
their duty not to wait to be attacked.^ With these lessons

* Lieutenant-Colonel Grant.

t I find this fact recorded in the correspondence of the day with three
notes of exclamation : " "With regard to Colonel Grant," wrote Major Wilks
from Maisur, " it appears that he disarmed his troops simply as a measure of
precaution ! ! ! Whether we are in danger from our own misconduct, or from
worse causes, the danger is great. ... I conclude that Chalmers will be
sent to supersede Grant, and Vesey to Paliamkotta, and my best hope is
that there will be found sufficient grounds for turning Welsh and Grant out
of the service, but this will not restore the confidence of the Sipahis." —
MS. Correspondence. Grant's conduct was at once repudiated in a general
order, and he and Welsh ordered for Court-Martial. Both were honourably
acquitted.

X Many years after the occurrence of these events, Major, then Colonel
Welsh, published two volumes of Military Reminiscences. Turning to these

176 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806.

before us, we cannot wonder that men, in such conjunctures,
should hesitate to strike the blow which any one may declare
uncalled-for, and the wisdom of which no one can prove — should
pause to consider whether they are more likely to develop the
evil by an assertion of strength, or to encourage its growth by
the feebleness of inaction.*

But it was plain that, whatsoever might be the wisest course
w i • h'MH *n sucn a conjuncture, the Government of Lord
William Bentinck was all in favour of the milder
and more sedative mode of treatment. In remarkable contrast
to the manner in which the symptoms of coming mutiny were
grappled with at Paliamkotta stands the story of Walajahabad.
borne of the earliest signs of disaffection, on the score of the
turban, had manifested themselves at that place ; and Gillespie,
with his dragoons, had been despatched thither at the end of
July, not without a murmur of discontent at the thought of his
" poor hard-worked fellows " being sent to counteract what,
appeared to him a doubtful danger. It was believed, however,
that the uneasiness had passed away, and for some months
there had been apparent tranquillity. But in November the
alarm began to revive ; and a detailed statement of various
indications of a coming outbreak, drawn up by Major Hazlewood,
was sent to the authorities. On the morning of the 2nd of
December the members of the Madras Government met in

for some account of the affair at Paliamkotta, I was disappointed to find only
the following scanty notice of it : " Towards the end of the year an event
took place, which, although injurious to my own prospects and fortune,
under the signal blessing of Providence terminated fortunately. Time has
now spread his oblivious wings over the whole occurrence, and I will not
attempt to remove the veil."

* The difficulties of the English officer at that time were thus described
by a contemporary writer, in a passage which I have chanced upon since the
above was written : "The massacre at Vellur had naturally created a great
degree of mistrust between the European officers and the Sipahis throughout
the Army; and the indecision of measures at Head -Quarters seemed further
to strengthen this mistrust. If an officer took no precautionary measures on
receiving information of an intended plot, he was liable to the severest
censure, as well as responsible for his own and the lives of his European
officers. On the contrary, if he took precautionary measures he was accused
of creating unnecessary distrust ; and equally censured for being premature
and not allowing the mutiny to go on till satisfactorily proved, when it would
have been too late to prevent." — Strictures on the present Government of
India, &c. In a Letter from an Officer resident on the spot. Trichimipali,
1807; London, 1808.

1806.] GOVEKNMENT MEASUEES. 177

Council. Hazlewood's statement was laid before them and
gravely discussed ; but with, no definite result. The Council
broke up without a decision, but only to meet again, refreshed
by the sea-breeze and the evening ride. Then it was resolved
that a discreet officer, in the confidence of Government,
should be sent to Walajahabad to inquire into and report on
the state of affairs ; and on the same evening Colonel Munro,
the Quarterma.ster-General, received his instructions, and pre-
pared to depart. The event appeared to justify this cautious
line of aclion ; but one shudders to think what might have
happened at Walajahabad whilst Government were deliberating
over written statements of danger, and drafting instructions
for a Staff Officer in the Council-Chamber of Madras.

Six months had now passed since the Madras Government
had been made acquainted with the state of feeling
in the Native Army, and understood that a vague
apprehension of the destruction of caste and of " forcible con-
version to Christianity " had been one of the chief causes of the
prevailing disquietude. The obnoxious regulations had been
abandoned, but this was a concession obviously extorted from
fear ; and nothing had yet been done to reassure the minds of
the soldiery by a kindly paternal address to them from the
fountain-head of the local Government. But at last Bentinck
and his colleagues awoke to a sense of the plain and palpable
duty which lay before them ; and at this Council of the 2nd
of December a Proclamation was agreed upon, and on the
following day issued, which, translated into the Hindustani,
the Tamil, and Telugu dialects, was sent to every native
battalion in the Army, with orders to commanding officers to
make its contents known to every native officer and Sipahi
under their command. After adverting to the extraordinary
agitation that had for some time prevailed in the Coast Army,
and the reports spread for malicious purposes, by persons of
evil intention, that it was the design of the British Government
to convert the troops by forcible means to Christianity, the
Proclamation proceeded to declare that the constant kindness
and liberality at all times shown to the Sipahi should convince
him of the happiness of his situation, " greater than what the
troops of any other part of the world enjoy," and induce him to
return to the good conduct for which he had been distinguished
in the days of Lawrence and Coote, and " other renowned
heroes." If they would not, they would learn that the British

vol. i. »

178 THE SlPXffl ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1806-7.

Government " is not less prepared to punish the guilty than to
protect and distinguish those who are deserving of its favour."
But this was something more than the truth. The British
Government did not show itself, in this conjuncture, to he
" prepared to punish the guilty " in a manner proportionate
to the measure of their offences. Lord AVilliam Bentinck and
his Councillors were all for clemency. Sir John Cradock
counselled the adoption of more vigorous punitory measures,
and the Supreme Government were disposed to support the
military chief. Something of a compromise then ensued, the
result of which was a very moderate instalment of the retribu-
tion which was justly due. A few only of the most guilty of
the murderers were executed ; whilst others, clearly convicted
of taking part in the sanguinary revolt, were merely dismissed
the service. And if it had not heen for the overruling authority
of the Government at Calcutta — that is, of Sir George Barlow,
with Mr. Edmonstone at his elbow* — the numbers of the
assassin-battalions would not have been erased from the Army
List. But penal measures did not end here. The higher
tribunals of the Home Government condemned the chief
authorities of Madras, and, justly or unjustly, the Governor,
the Commander-in-Chief, and the Adjutant-General were
summarily removed from office.

The mutiny died out with the old year ; the active danger

was passed ; but it left behind it a flood of bitter

Alleged causts controversy which did not readily subside. What

of the was the cause of the revolt ? Whose fault was it ?

Was it a mere military mutiny, the growth of
internal irritation, or was it a political movement fomented by
agitators from without? The controversialists on both sides
were partly wrong and partly right — wrong in their denials,
right in their assertions. It is difficult in such a case to put
together in proper sequence all the links of a great chain of

* Many years afterwards, Sir George Barlow gracefully acknowledged the
valuable assistance which, in this conjuncture, Mr. Edmonstone had ren-
dered to him, saying that his "unshaken firmness and resolution in times of
internal difficulty and danger'' were "signally displayed on the discovery of
the conspiracy formed at Vellur." " His wise and steady counsel," added
Barlow, " afforded me important aid and support in carrying into effect the
measures necessary for counteracting the impressions made by that alarming
event, which threatened the most serious consequences to the security of our
power." — MS. Document*.

1807.] CAUSES OP THE MUTINY. 179

events terminating even in an incident of yesterday, so little do
we know of what is stirring in the occult heart of native
society. After a lapse of half a century it is impossible.
There is often in the Simultaneous, the Coincidental, an
apparent uniformity of tendency, which simulates design, but
which, so far as human agency is concerned, is wholly for-
tuitous. We see this in the commonest concerns of life. We
see it in events affecting mightily the destinies of empires.
Under a pressure of concurrent annoyances and vexations, men
often cry out that there is a conspiracy against them, and the
historical inquirer often sees a conspiracy when in reality there
is only a coincidence. A great disaster, like the massacre at
Vellur, acts like iodine upon hidden writings in rice-water.
Suddenly is proclaimed to us in all its significance what has
long been written down on the page of the Past, but which,
for want of the revealing agent, has hitherto lain illegibly
before us. Doubtless, many hidden things were disclosed to us
at this time ; but whether they were peculiar to the crisis or of
a normal character, at any period discernible had we taken
proper steps to develop them, was matter of grave dispute.
The political officers, headed by Mark Wilks, the historian of
Southern India, who was then representing British interests
in Maisur, laughed to scorn the discoveries of the military
officers, and said that the things which they spoke of as so
portentous were in reality only phenomena of every-day
appearance, familiar to men acquainted with the feelings and
habits of the people. He derided all that had been said about
seditious conversations in the Bazaars and the Lines, the wild
prophecies and mysterious hints of wandering Fakirs, and the
suggestive devices of the puppet-shows.* There was nothing
in all this, he contended, of an exceptional character, to be
regarded as the harbingers of mutiny and massacre. And his
arguments culminated in the chuckling assertion that the
military authorities had discovered a cabalistic document of a
most treasonable character, which appeared to their excited
imaginations to be a plan for partitioning the territory to be
wrested from the English, but which, in reality, was nothing

* There were two subjects which the Kutputli- Wdlas extremely delighted
to illustrate— the degradation of the Mughul, and the victories of the French
over the English, the one intended to excite hatred, the other contempt, in
the minds of the spectators.

N 2

180 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1807.

more portentous than the scribblentent of the Dervesh Bazi, or
" royal game of goose."

With equal confidence on the other hand, the military
authorities protested that the new regulations had nothing to
do with the mutiny — that it was altogether a political move-
ment. The new cap, they said, had been accepted and worn
by the Sipahis. Three representative men, types of the prin-
cipal nationalities composing the Coast Army, had signified
their satisfaction with the new head-dress, and one or two
regiments en masse had been paraded in it without a murmur.
The fact, they alleged, was that the movement had emanated
solely from the deposed family of Tipu Sultan; that its object
was to restore, in the first instance, the Muhammadan dynasty
in Southern India, and eventually to recover the imperial
throne for the Mughul. If proper precautions had been taken
by Government — if Tipu's family, eager for a taste of blood,
had not been left to disport themselves at will in Vellur — if
they had not been gorged with money, and attended by count-
less Musulman followers eager to recover the posts and the
privileges which they had lost, there would, said the military
leaders, have been no massacre and no mutiny and, some said,
not even a murmur of discontent. But the military critic was
as wrong as the political, and for the same reason. Each was
blinded by professional interests and professional prejudices.
Each argued in self-defence. The truth, as it commonly does
in such cases, lay midway between the two extremes. But for
the intrigues of Tipu's family there would have been no out-
break at that time, and but for the new military regulations
they might have intrigued in vain. It so happened that the
political and military influences were adverse to us at the same
moment, and that from the conjuncture arose the event known
in history as the Massacre of Vellur, but which was in reality
a much more extensive military combination, prevented only
by repeated local failures from swelling into the dimensions of
a general revolt of the Coast Army.

Nor is it to be forgotten that there was a third party, which
attributed the calamity less to political and to military causes
than to the general uneasiness which had taken possession of
the native mind in consequence of the supposed activity of
Christian missionaries and of certain " missionary chaplains."
The dread of a general destruction of Caste and forcible con-
version to Christianity was not confined to the Sipahis. The

1807.] LYING RUMOUKS. 181

most preposterous stories were current in the Bazaars. Among
other wild fables, which took firm hold of the popular mind,
was one to the effect that the Company's officers had collected
all the newly-manufactured salt, had divided it into two great
heaps, and over one had sprinkled the blood of hogs, and over
the other the blood of cows ; that they had then sent it to be
sold throughout the country for the pollution and the desecra-
tion of Muhammadans and Hindus, that all might be brought
to one caste and to one religion like the English. When this
absurd story was circulated, some ceased altogether to eat salt,
and some purchased, at high prices, and carefully stored away,
supplies of the necessary article, guaranteed to have been in
the Bazaars before the atrocious act of the Faringhis had been
committed. Another story was that the Collector of Trinkomali
had, under the orders of Government, laid the foundation of a
Christian Church in his district close to the great Pagoda of
the Hindus; that he had collected all the stone-cutters and
builders in the neighbourhood ; that he was taxing every
household for the payment of the cost of the building ; that he
had forbidden all ingress to the Pagoda, and all worshipping of
idols; and that to all complaints on the subject he had replied
that there was nothing extraordinary in what he was doing, as
Government had ordered a similar building to be erected in
every town and every village in the country. In India, stories
of this kind are readily believed. The grosser the lie, the more
eagerly it is devoured.* They are circulated by designing
persons with a certainty that they will not be lost. That the
excitement of religious alarm was the principal means by which
the enemies of the British Government hoped to accomplish

* Not immediately illustrating this point of inquiry, but even more pre-
posterous in itself than the rumours cited in the text, was a story which was
circulated at Haidarabad. It was stated that an oraclp in the neighbouring
Pagoda had declared that there was considerable treasure at the bottom of a
well in the European barracks, which was destined not to be discovered until
a certain number of human heads had been offered up to the tutelar deity of
the place ; and that accordingly the European soldiers were sacrificing the
necessary number of victims with all possible dispatch. It happened that the
dead body of a native without a head was found near the Resiliency, and that
a drunken European artilleryman, about the same time, attacked a native
sentry at his post. These facts gave new wings to the report, and such was
the alarm that the natives would not leave their homes or work after dark,
and it was reported both to the Nizam and his minister that a hundred bodies
without heads were lying on the banks of the Masai River. — Captain Syden-
ham to the Government of India. MS. Records.

182 THE SIPAHI AKMY — ITS RISE AND PROGRESS. [1807.

their objects is certain ; but, if there had not been a foregone
determination to excite this alarm, nothing in the actual
progress of Christianity at that time would have done it. A
comparison, indeed, between the religious status of the English
in India and the wild stories of forcible conversion which were
then circulated, seemed openly to give the lie to the malignant
inventions of the enemy. There were no indications on the
part of Government of any especial concern for the interests of
Christianity, and among the officers of the Army there were so
few external signs of religion, that the Sipahis scarcely knew
whether they owned any faith at all.* But in a state of ] anic
men do not pause to reason ; and, if at any time the doubt had
been suggested, it would have been astutely answered that the
English gentlemen cared only to destroy the religions of the
country, and to make the people all of one or of no caste, in
order that they might make their soldiers and servants do
everything they wished.

The authoritative judgment of a Special Commission ap-
pointed to investigate the causes of the out-
Views of the break confirmed the views of the more moderate
Government, section of the community, which recognised, not
one, but many disturbing agencies ; and the Home
Government accepted the interpretation in a candid and im-
partial spirit. That " the late innovations as to the dress
and appearance of the Sipahis were the leading cause of the
mutiny, and the other was the residence of the family of the late
Tipu Sultan at Vellur," was, doubtless, true as far as it went.
But the merchant-rulers of Leadenhall-street were disposed to
sound the lower depths of the difficulty. Those were not days
when the numerous urgent claims of the Present imperatively
forbade the elaborate investigation of the Past. So the Directors
began seriously to consider what had been the more remote
predisposing causes of the almost general disaffection of the
Coast Army. And the " Chairs," in a masterly letter to Mr.
Dundas, freighted with the solid intelligence of Charles Grant,
declared their conviction that the general decline of the fidelity

* Sir John Cradoek said, after the occurrence of these events, that "from
the total absence of religious establishments in the interior of the country,
from the habits of life prevalent among military men, it is a mela icholy
truth, that so unfrequent are the religious observances of officers doing duty
with battalions, that the Sipahis have not, until very lately, discovered the
nature of the religion professed by the English."

1807.] VIEWS OF THE COUET OF DIRECTORS. 183

of the Army and of the attachment of the People to British
rule, was to be traced to the fact that a new class of men, with
little knowledge of India, little interest in its inhabitants, and
little toleration for their prejudices, had begun to monopolise the
chief seats in the Government and the chief posts in the Army ;
that the annexations of Lord Wellesley had beggared the old
Muhammadau families, and had shaken the belief of the people
in British moderation and good faith ; and that the whole
tendency of the existing system was to promote the intrusion of
a rampant Englishism, and thus to widen the gulf between the
Rulers and the Ruled.*

* The Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the East India Comrnny
(Mr. Parry and Mr. Grant) to the President of the Board of Control (Mr,
Dundas).— May 18, 1S07. MS. Records.

184 THE SIPAHI ARMY— ITS DECLINE. [1807-9.

CHAPTEE II.

It was not strange that, for some time after the occurrence of
these events in the Coast Army, the English in Southern
India should have been possessed by a common sense of an^er,
and that this feeling should have spread to some other parts
of the country. For a while the white man saw a conspirator
beneath the folds of every turban, and a conspiracy in every
group of people talking by tlie wayside. In every laugh there
was an insult, and in every shrug there was a menace. English
officers pillowed their heads on loaded fire-arms, and fondled
the hilts of their swords as they slept. But gradually they
lived down the sensitiveness that so distressed them. Other
thoughts and feelings took possession of the bungalow ; other
subjects were dominant in the mess-room. And ere long a

new grievance came to supersede an old danger ;

Mutiny of and the officers of the Madras Army forgot the re-

a ri«o9. te's'bellion of the Sipabis as they incubated a rebellion

of their own. How the mutiny of the officers grew
out of the mutiny of the men of the Coast Army, it would not be
difficult to show; but the chapter of Indian history which
includes the former need not be re-written here. The objects
for which the officers contended were altogether remote from
the interests and sympathies of the Sipahis ; and although the
latter, in ignorance, might at first have followed their com-
manders, it is not probable tbat they would have continued to
cast in their lot with the mutineers, after the true character of
the movement had been explained to them, and an appeal made
to their fidelity by the State. But they were not unobservant
spectators of that unseemly strife ; and the impression made
upon the Sipahi's mind by this spectacle of disunion must have
been of a most injurious kind. There is nothing so essential to
the permanence of that Opinion, on which we so much rely, as
a prevailing sense tbat the English in India are not Many but
One.

IS07-9.] RENEWAL OF CONFIDENCE. 185

Nor was it strange that, after these unfortunate events, the
fame of which went abroad throughout the whole country,
there should have been for a little space less eagerness than
before to enlist into the service of the Company. But the re-
luctance passed away under the soothing influence of time. In
the prompt and regular issue of pay, and in the pensions,
which had all the security of funded property, there were
attractions, unknown to Asiatic armies, not easily to be resisted.
And there were other privileges, equally dear to the people of the
country, which lured them by thousands into the ranks of the
Company's Army. As soon as his name was on the muster-roll,
the Sipahi, and through him all the members of his family,
passed under the special protection of the State.

It is difficult to conceive two conditions of life more dissimilar
in their social aspects than soldiering in India and
soldiering in England. In England few men enlist Thseold°frlish
into the Army as an honourable profession, or
seek it as an advantageous source of subsistence. Few men
enter it with any high hopes or any pleasurable emotions.
The recruit has commonly broken down as a civilian. Of
ruined fortune and bankrupt reputation, he is tempted,
cheated, snared into the Army. Lying placards on the walls,
lying words in the pot-house, the gaudy ribbons of Sergeant
Kite, the drum and the fife and the strong drink, captivate
and enthral him when he is not master of himself. He has
quarrelled with his sweetheart or robbed his employer. He
has exhausted the patience of his own people, and the outer
world has turned its back upon him. And so he goes for a
soldier. As soon as he has taken the shilling, he has gone right
out of the family circle and out of the circle of civil life. He is
a thousandth part of a regiment of the Line. Perhaps he has
changed his name and stripped himself of his personal identity.
Anyhow, he is as one dead. Little more is heard of him ; and
unless it be some doting old mother, who best loves the blackest
sheep of the flock, nobody much wishes to hear. It is often,
indeed, no greater source of pride to an English family to know
that one of its members is serving the Queen, in the ranks of
her Army, than to know that one is provided for, as a convict,
at the national expense.

But the native soldier of India was altogether Tge,l"dian
of a different kind. When he became a soldier,
he did not cease to be a civilian. He severed no family

186 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1807-9.

ties ; he abandoned no civil rights. He was not the outcast,
but the stay and pride of his house. He visited his home at
stated times. He remitted to it a large part of his pay. It was
a decorous boast in many families that generation after genera-
tion had eaten the Company's salt. Often, indeed, in one
household you might see the Past, the Present, and the Future
of this coveted military service. There was the ancient pen-
sioner under the shade of the banyan-tree in his native village,
who had stories to tell of Lawrence, Coote, and Medows ; of
battles fought with the French ; of the long war with Haidar
and the later struggles with his son. There was the Sipahi, on
furlough from active service, in the prime of his life, who had
lii's stories also to tell of " the great Lord's brother," the younger
Wellesley, of Harris and Baird, perhaps of " Bikrum
Abercrombie gdllib " and Egypt, and how "Lick Sahib," the

and Lake. »«' f ' . .

fine old man, when provisions were scarce in
the camp, had ridden through the lines, eating dried pulse
for his dinner. And there was the bright-eyed, supple-
limbed, quick-witted boy, who looked forward with eager ex-
pectancy to the time when he would be permitted to take
his father's place, and serve under some noted leader. It
was no fond delusion, no trick of our self-love, to believe in
such pictures as this. The Company's Sipahis had a genuine
pride in their colours, and the classes from which they
were drawn rejoiced in their connection with the paramount
State. It was honourable service, sought by the very flower of
the people, and to be dismissed from it was a heavy punishment
and a sore disgrace.

Strong as were these ties, the people were bound to the mili-
tary service of the Company by the still stronger ties of self-
interest. For not only were the Sipahis, as has been
a'u hprj,Tu^.es said, well cared for as soldiers — well paid and well
pensioned — but, as civilians, they had large privi-
leges which others did not enjoy. Many of them, belonging to
the lesser yeomanry of the country, were possessors of, or share-
holders in, small landed estates ; and, thus endowed, they re-
joiced greatly in a regulation which gave the Sipahi on furlough
a right to be heard before other suitors in our civil courts.*

* This was a part only of the civil privileges enjoyed by the native soldier.
Sir Jasper Nicolls, in his evidence before the Parliamentary Committee of
1832, said that the withdrawal of these privileges had been regarded as an
especial grievance by the Sipahis — but I have failed to discover that they

1S07-9.] HEREDITARY SOLDIERS. 187

In a country whose people are inordinately given to liti-
gation, and where justice is commonly slow-paced, this was
so prodigious a boon, that entrance to the service was often
sought for the express purpose of securing this valuable
precedence, and the soldier-member of the family thus became
the representative of his whole house. In this connection of the
si ildiery with hereditary rights in the soil, there was an
additional guarantee for his loyalty and good conduct. He was
not merely a soldier— a component unit of number two company,
third file from the right; he was an important member of
society, a distinct individuality in his native village no less than
in his cantonment Lines. He retained his self-respect and the
respect of others; and had a personal interest in the stability
of the Government under which his rights were secured.

And whilst these extraneous advantages were attached to his
position as a soldier of the Company, there was nothing inherent
in the service itself to render it distasteful to him.
His officers were aliens of another colour and another T¥.Sl/?£hi and

_.. . his Officer.

creed ; but the Hindu was accustomed to foreign
supremacy, and the Muhammadan, profoundly impressed with
the mutabilities of fortune, bowed himself to the stern neces-
sities of fate. As long as the Sipahi respected the personal
qualities of the English officer, and the English officer felt a
personal attachment for the Sipahi, the relations between them
were in no degree marred by any considerations of difference of
race. There was a strong sense of comradeship between them,
which atoned for the absence of other ties. The accidental
severance of which I have spoken was but short-lived.* In that
first quarter of the present century, which saw so much hard
fighting in the field, the heart of the Sipahi officer again turned

ever were withdrawn. [Note by Editor. — They were withdrawn from the
regulation provinces, but not from Oudh, the home of the great majority of
the Sipahis, until after the annexation of that country by the British. It "was
this very withdrawal that tended greatly to incense the Sipahis against their
masters. — G. B. M.]

* There had certainly been, before the mutiny in Southern India, a very
culpable want of kindly consideration on the part of our English officers for
the native officers and men of the Sipahi army. In the letter, written by the
Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the East India Company, to Mr. Dundas,
referred to above, this is alleged to have been one of the remote causes of the
mutiny. It is stated that the English had ceased to offer chairs to their
native officers when visited by them. A favourable reaction, however, seems
afterwards to have set in.

188 THE SIPlHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1809-22.

towards his men, and the men looked up and clung to him with
a childlike confidence and affection. To command a company,
and in due course, a regiment of Sipahis, was still held to be a
worthy object of professional ambition. The regiment, in those
days, was the officer's home, whether in camp, or cantonment,
or on the line of march. There was but little looking beyond ;
little hankering to leave it. To interest himself in the daily
concerns of the Sipahis, to converse with them off parade, to enter
into their feelings, to contribute to their comforts, were duties,
the performance of which occupied his time, amused his mind,
and yielded as much happiness to himself as it imparted to.
others. There was, in truth, little to divert hi in from the
business of his profession or to raise up a barrier between him
and his men. Intercourse with Europe was rare and difficult.
Neither the charms of English literature nor the attractions of
English womanhood alienated his affections from the routine of
military life, and made its details dull and dreary in his sight.
He had subdued his habits, and very much his way of thinking,
to the Orientalism by which he was surrounded. He was glad
to welcome the native officer to his bungalow, to learn from him
the news of the Lines and the gossip of the Bazaar, and to tell
bim, in turn, what were the chances of another campaign and
to what new station the regiment was likely to be moved at the
approaching annual Belief. If there were any complaints in
the regiments, the grievance was stated with freedom on the
one side, and listened to with interest on the other. If tbe
men were right, there was a remedy ; if they were wrong,
there was an explanation. The Sipahi looked to his officer as
to one who had both the power and the will to dispense ample
justice to him. In every battalion, indeed, the men turned to
their commandant as the depository of all their griefs, and
the redresser of all their wrongs They called him their father,
and he rejoiced to describe them as his " baba-log" — his babes.
But in time the power was taken from him, und with the
power went also the will. A variety of deterio-
Progressof rating circumstances occurred — some the inevi-
entra ma ion. ^^e growth of British progress in the East, and
gome the results of ignorance, thoughtlessness, or miscalculation
on the part of the governing body. The power of the English
officer was curtailed and his influence declined. The command
of a regiment had once been something more than a name.
The commanding officer could promote his men, could punish

1822-35.] RELAXATION OF OLD TIES. 189

his men, could dress thern and discipline them as he pleased.
The different battalions were called after the commander who
had first led them to victory, and they rejoiced to be so dis-
tinguished. But, little by little, this power, by the absorbing
action of progressive centralisation, was taken out of his hands ;
and he who, supreme in his own little circle, had been now a
patriarch and now a despot, shrivelled into the mouthpiece of
the Adjutant-General's office and the instrument of Head-
quarters. The decisions of the commanding officer were appealed
against, and frequently set aside. In the emphatic language of
the East, he was made to eat dirt in the presence of his men.
The Sipahi, then, ceased to look up to him as the centre of his
hopes and fears, and the commanding officer lost much of the
interest which he before took in his men, when he know how
much their happiness and comfort depended upon his individual
acts, and how the discipline and good conduct of the corps were
the reflection of his personal efficiency.

And it happened that, about the same time, new objects of
interest sprung up to render more complete the
severance of the ties which had once bound the ^j^a ™
English officer to the native soldier. The second
quarter of the nineteenth century in India was a period of pro-
gressive reform. We reformed our Government and we reformed
ourselves. Increased facilities of intercourse with Europe gave
a more European complexion to Society. Knglish news, English
books, above all, English gentlewomen, made their way freely
and rapidly to India. The Overland Mail bringing news scarcely
more than a month old of the last new European revolution ;
the book-club yielding its stores of light literature as fresh as is
coinmonhy obtained from circulating libraries at home ; and an
avatar of fair young English maidens, with the bloom of the
Western summer on their cheeks, yielded attractions beside
which the gossip of the lines and the feeble garrulity of the
old Subahdar were very dreary and fatiguing. Little by little
the Sipahi officer shook out the loose folds of his Orientalism.
Many had been wont, in the absence of other female society, to
solace themselves with the charms of a dusky mate, and to
spend much time in the recesses of the Zenana. Bad as it was,
when tried in the crucible of Christian ethics, it was not without
its military advantages. The English officer, so mated, learnt
to speak the languages of the country, and to understand the
habits and feelings of the people ; and he cherished a kindlier

190 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1822-35.

feeling for the native races than he would have done if no such
alliances had been formed. But this custom passed away with
the cause that produced it. The English wife displaced the
native mistress. A new code of morals was recognised ; and
the Zenana was proscribed. With the appearance of the English
gentlewoman in the military cantonment there grew up a host
of new interests and new excitements, and the regiment became
a bore.

Whilst these influences were sensibly weakening the attach-
ment which had existed between the native soldier
foment an<^ kis English officer, another deteriorating agent
was at work with still more fatal effect. The Staff
was carrying off all the best officers, and unsettling the rest.
As the red line of British Empire extended itself around new
provinces, and the administrative business of the State was thus
largely increased, there was a demand for more workmen than
the Civil Service could supply, and the military establishment
of the Company was, therefore, indented upon for officers to fill
the numerous civil and political posts thus opened out before
them. Extensive surveys were to be conducted, great public
works were to be executed, new irregular regiments were to
be raised, and territories not made subject to the " regulations "
were, for the most part, to be administered by military men.
More lucrative, and held to be more honourable than common
regimental duty, these appointments were eagerly coveted by
the officers of the Company's army. The temptation, indeed,
was great. The means of marrying, of providing for a family,
of securing a retreat to Europe before enfeebled by years or
broken down by disease, were presented to the officer by this
detached employment. And if these natural feelings were not
paramount, there was the strong incentive of ambition or the
purer desire to enter upon a career of more active utility. The
number of officers with a regiment was thus reduced ; but
numbers are not strength, and still fewer might have sufficed,
if they had been a chosen few. But of those who remained
some lived in a state of restless expectancy, others were sunk in
sullen despair. It was not easy to find a Sipahi officer, pure
and simple, with no aspirations beyond his regiment, cheerful,
content, indeed proud of his position. All that was gone. The
officer ceased to rejoice in his work, and the men saw his heart
was not with them.

There were some special circumstances, too, which at this

1822-35.] ATTEMPTED CORRUPTION OF THE SIPAHIS. 191

time — during the administrations of Lord Amherst and Lord
William Bentinck— tended to aggravate these deteriorating
influences both upon the officers and the men of the Sipahi
regiments. Since the subsidence of the spirit of disaffection,
which had pervaded the Coast Army in 1806, there had been
no obtrusive manifestations of discontent in the Sipahi's mind.
He had done his duty faithfully and gallantly in the great wars,
which Lord Hastings had conducted to a triumphant issue; but,
when peace came again, he again, after a while, began to take
stock of his troubles and to listen to strange reports. One more
illustration may be drawn from Madras, before the Bengal Army
claims a monopoly of the record. In the early spring of 1822,
a paper was dropped in the Cavalry Lines of Arkat, setting
forth that the followers of Muhammad, having
been subjected to the power of the English, suffered Muhammadan

J _ . . i i • -i • i i grievances.

great hardships — that, being so subjected, then-
prayers were not acceptable to the Almighty, and that, there-
fore, in great numbers they were dying of cholera morbus — that
the curse of God was upon them ; and that, therefore, it behoved
them to make a great effort for the sake of their religion. There
were countless Hindus and Musulmans between Arkat and
Delhi. But the Europeans being few, it would be easy to slay
the whole in one day. Let them but combine, and the result
would be certain. There was no time, it said, to be lost. The
English had taken all the Jaghirs and Inams of the people of
the soil, and now they were about to deprive them of employ-
ment. A number of European regiments had been called fur,
and in the course of six months all the native battalions would
be disbanded. Let, then, the senior Subakdar of each regi-
ment instruct the other Subahdars, and let them instruct the
Jamadars, and so on, till all the Sipahis were instructed, and
the same being done at Arellur, at Chitiir, at Madras, and other
places, then, on a given signal, the whole should rise on one
day. The day fixed was Sunday, the 17th of March. A Naik
and ten Sipahis were to proceed at midnight to the house of
each European, and kill him, without remorse, in his bed. This
done, the regiments would be placed under the command of the
native officers, and the Subahdars should have the pay of
Colonels. It was always thus. It is always thus. A little
for the Faith, and all for the Pocket.

From whomsoever this paper may have emanated, the attempt
to corrupt the Sipahis was a failure. It was picked up in the

192 THE SIPlHI AKMY — ITS DECLINE. [1822.

Lines of the 6th Cavalry, and another nearly resembling it
was dropped in the Lines of the 8th —but both were carried
at once to the commanding officer of the station. Colonel Foulis
took his measures with promptitude and vigour. He assembled
the regimental commanders, imparted to them the contents of
the paper, and desired them to place themselves in communica-
tion with the native officers whom they most trusted. Having
done this, he wrote to the commandants of the several stations
named in the paper. But they could see no signs of disaffection,
and the appointed day passed by without even an audible
murmur of discontent. But not many days afterwards, the
Governor of Madras received by the post a letter
^Munro1*8 *n Hindustani, purporting to come from the prin-
cipal native officers and Sipahis of the Army,
setting forth the grievances under which they suffered as a
body. The complaint was that all the wealth and all the
honour went to the white Sirdars, especially to the civilians,
whilst for the soldier there was nothing but labour and grief.
" If we Sipahis take a country," they said, " by the sword, these
whore-son cowardly civil Siidars enter that country and rule
over it, and in a short time fill their coffers with money and go
to Europe — but, if a Sipahi labour all his life, he is not five
kaoris the better." Under the Muhammadan Government it
had been different, for, when victories were gained, Jaghirs were
given to the soldiers, and high offices distributed among them.
But, under the Company, everything was given to the Civil
Service. " A single Collector's peon has an authority and great-
ness in the country which cannot be expressed. But that peon
does not fight like a Sipahi." Such, in effect, was the plaint of
the native soldiery, as conveyed to Governor Munro. It may
have been the work of an individual, as might have been also
the papers picked up in the lines of Arkat ; but it is certain
that both documents expressed sentiments which may be sup-
posed at all times to lie embedded in the Sipahi mind, and
which need but little to bring them, fully developed, above the
surface.*

The relations between the English officer and the native
soldier were better then than they had been sixteen years
before. But these relations were sadly weakened, and a heavy

* It was to this event that Sir Thomas Munro alfuded iu his remarkable
minute on the dangers of a Free Press in India.

1822-4.] WAR WITH BTJRMAH. 192

blow was given to the discipline and efficiency of the Indian
army, when, two years later, the military establishment of the
Three Presidencies were reorganised. Then every
regiment of two battalions became two separate The I^°Ir1ga"isa'
regiments, and the officers attached to the original
corps were told off alternately to its two parts — " all the odd
or uneven numbers," said the General Order, " to
the first, and the even numbers to the second ; "
by which process it happened that a large number of officers
were detached from the men with whom they had been
associated throughout many years of active service. The evil
of this was clearly seen at the time, and a feeble compromise
was attempted. " It is not intended," said the General Order,
" that in carrying the present orders into effect, officers should
be permanently removed from the particular battalion in which
they may long have served and wished to remain, provided
that by an interchange between officers standing the same
number of removes from promotion, each could be retained in
his particular battalion, and both are willing to make the
exchange." In effect, this amounted to little or nothing, and
a large number of officers drifted away from the battalions in
which they had been /cared from boyhood, and strangers glided
into their place.

Bad as at any time must have been such a change as this, in
its influence upon the morale of the Sipahi army,
the evil was greatly enhanced by falling upon The Burmese
evil times. The best preservative, and the best
restorative of military spirit and discipline, is commonly a good
stirring war. But the Sipahi, though not unwilling to fight,
was somewhat dainty and capricious about his fighting ground.
A battle-field in Hindustan or the Dakhin was to his taste ; but
he was disquieted by the thought of serving in strange regions,
of which he had heard only vague fables, beyond inaccessible
mountain-ranges, or still more dreaded wildernesses of water.
With the high-caste, fastidious Bengal Sipahi the war with
Burmah was not, therefore, a popular war. The Madras
Sipahi, more cosmopolitan and less nice, took readily to the
transport vessel ; and a large part of the native force was
drawn from the Coast Army. But some Bengal regiments
were also needed to take part in the operations of the war, and
then the system began to fail us. To transport troops by sea
from Calcutta to Kan gun would have been an easy process.

VOL. i. 0

194 THE SIPAHI ARMY- -ITS DECLINE. [1824.

But the Bengal Sipahi had enlisted only for service in countries
to which he could march ; to take ship was not in his bond.
The regiments, therefore, were marched to the frontier station
of Chatgaon, and there assembled for the landward invasion of
the Burmese country.

Without any apparent symptoms of discontent, some corps
had already marched, when, in October, the in-

The Mutiny at cident occurred of which I am about to write, an

Barrackpur. ... . . . , „ . .

incident which created a most powerful sensation
from one end of India to the other, and tended greatly to impair
the loyalty and discipline of the Bengal Sipahi. The 47th
Regiment had been warned for foreign service, and was waiting
at Barrackpur, a few miles from the Presidency, whilst
preparations were being made for its march in the cold weather.
To wait is often to repent. Inactive in cantonments during
the rainy season, and in daily intercourse with the men of
other regiments, who had been warned for the same service, the
47th, uninfluenced by any other external causes, would have
lost any ardour which might have possessed them when first
ordered to march against a barbarous enemy who had insulted
their flag. But it happened that ominous tidings of disaster
came to them from the theatre of war. The British troops had
sustained a disaster at Bamu, the proportions of which had
been grossly exaggerated in the recital, and it was believed
that the Burmese, having cut up our battalions, or driven them
into the sea, were sweeping on to the invasion of Bengal. The
native newspapers bristled with alarming announcements of
how the Commander-in-Chief had been killed in action and
the Governor-General had poisoned himself in despair ; and
1here was a belief throughout all the lower provinces of India
that the rule of the Company was coming to an end. The
fidelity of the Sipahi army requires the stimulus of continued
success. Nothing tries it so fatally as disaster. When, there-
fore, news came that the war had opened with a great failure,
humilating to the British power, and all kinds of strange
stories relating to the difficulties of the country to be traversed,
the deadliness of the climate to be endured, and the prowess
of the enemy to be encountered, forced their way into cir-
culation in the Bazaars and in the Lines, the willingness which
the Si pah is bad once shown to take part in the operations
beyond the frontier began to subside, and they were eager to
find a pretext for refusing to march on such hazardous service.

1826.] THE TROOPS AT BARRACKPUR. 195

And, unhappily, one was soon found. There was a scarcity of
available carriage-cattle for the movement of the troops.
Neither bullocks nor drivers were to be hired, and fabulous
prices were demanded from purchasers for wretched starvelings
not equal to a day's journey. For the use of the regiments
which had already marched, Bengal had been well-nigh swept
out, and the reports which had since arrived rendered it
difficult to persuade men voluntarily to accompany as camp-
followers an expedition fraught with such peculiar perils. All
the efforts of the Commissariat failed to obtain the required
supply of cattle ; and so the Sipahis were told to supply
themselves. In this conjuncture, it would seem that a new lie
was circulated through the Lines of Barrackpur. It was said
that as the Bengal regiments could not, for want of cattle, be
marched to Ckatgaon, they would be put on board ship and
carried to Ban gun across the Bay of Bengal. Murmurs of
discontent then developed into oaths of resistance. The
regiments warned for service in Burmah met in nightly
conclave, and vowed not to cross the sea.

Still foremost in this movement, the 47th Begiment was
commanded by Colonel Cartwright. Rightly measuring the
difficulty, and moved with compassion for the Sipahi, who
really had just ground for complaint, he offered to provide
cattle from his private funds ; and all the refuse animals, either
too old or too young for service, were got together, and the
Government offered to advance money for their purchase. But
the terrible ban of " Too Late " was written across these con-
ciliatory measures. The regiment was already tainted with the
ineradicable virus of mutiny, which soon broke out on parade.
The Sipahis declared that they would not proceed to Burmah
by sea, and that they would not march unless they were
guaranteed the increased allowances known in the jargon of
the East as " double batta." This was on the 30th of October.
On the 1st of November, another parade was summoned. The
behaviour of the Sipahis was worse than before — violent,
outrageous, not to be forgiven ; and they remained masters of
the situation throughout both the day and night. Then the
Commander-in-Chief appeared on the scene. A hard, strict
disciplinarian, with no knowledge of the native army, and a
bitter prejudice against it, Sir Edward Paget was a man of the
very metal to tread down insurrection with an iron heel,
regardless both of causes and of consequences. He carried

o 2

196 THE SIP Alii ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1824.

with him to Barrackpur two European regiments, a battery of
European artillery, and a troop of the Governor- General's
Body-guard. Next morning the native regiments found them-
selves in the presence of the English troops ; but still they did
not know the peril that awaited them, and, with a childlike
obstinacy, they were not to be moved from their purpose of
resistance. Some attempt was made at explanation — some
attempt at conciliation. But it was feeble and ineffectual ;
perhaps not understood. They were told, then, that they must
consent to march, or to ground their arms. Still not seeing the
danger, for they were not told that the artillery guns were
loaded with grape, and the gunners ready to fire,* they refused
to obey the word ; and so the signal for slaughter was given.
The guns opened upon them. The mutineers were soon in
panic flight. Throwing away their arms and accoutrements,
they made for the river. Some were shot down ; some wero
drowned. There was no attempt at battle. None had been
contemplated. The muskets with which the ground was
strewn were found to be unloaded.

Then the formalities of the military law were called in to aid
the stern decisions of the grape-shot. Some of the leading-
mutineers were convicted, and hanged ; and the regiment was
struck out of the Army List. But this display of vigour,
though it checked mutiny for the time, tended only to sow
broadcast the seeds of future insubordinations. It created a
bad moral effect throughout the whole of the Bengal army.
From Bazaar to Bazaar the news of the massacre ran with a
speed almost telegraphic. The regiments, which had already
marched to the frontier, were discussing the evil tidings with
mingled dismay and disgust before the intelligence, sent by
special express, had reached the ears of the British chiefs. " They
are your own men whom you have been destroying," said an
old native officer ; and he could not trust himself to say more.t

* It is doubtful, indeed, whether they knew that the guns were in the
rear of the European regiments. [The account of this mutiny might have
been written by one of the mutinous Sipahis. In point of fact, all means
were exhausted before force was resorted to. Tlie Sipahis knew thoroughly
well their position, and they counted on the weakness and forbearance of
their masters. But for the prompt action of Sir Edward Paget the whole
army would have revolted. — G. B. M.]

t " Political Incidents of the first Burmese War." By T. C. Robertson, to
whom was entrusted the political conduct of the war. [I can only affirm that

1825.] MUTINY AVERTED. 197

The Bengal regiments, with the expeditionary force, had
soon a grievance of their own, and the remembrance of this
dark tragedy increased the bitterness with which they dis-
cussed it. The high- caste men were writhing under an order
which, on the occupation of Arakan, condemned the whole
body of the soldiery to work, as labourers, in the construction
of their barracks and lines. The English soldier fell to with a
will ; the Madras Sipahi cheerfully followed his example. But
the Bengal soldier asked if Brahmans and Eajputs were to be
treated like Kulis, and, for a while, there was an apprehension
that it might become necessary to make another terrible
example after the Barrackpur pattern. But this was fortunately
averted. General Morrison called a parade, and addressed the
recusants. The speech, sensible and to the point, was translated
by Captain Phillips ; and so admirable was his free rendering
of it, so perfect the manner in which he clothed it with familiar
language, making every word carry a meaning, every sentence
strike some chord of sympathy in the Sipahi's breast, that when
he had done, the high-caste Hindustanis looked at each other,
understood what they read in their comrades' faces, and
forthwith stripped to their work.

Thus was an incipient mutiny checked by a few telling words.
And the sad event which had gone before might have been
averted also if there had been as much tact and address as
" promptitude and decision." A few sentences of well-chosen,
well-delivered Hindustani, on that fatal November morning,
might have brought the 8ipahis back to reason and to loyalty.*
But they had the benefit of neither wise counsel from within nor
kindly exhortation from without. Deprived, by the reconstruc-
tion of the Army, of the officers whom they had long known
and trusted, they were more than ever in need of external aid
to bring them back to a right state of feeling. They wanted a

the crushing of the mutiny had the effect exactly contrary to that here
recorded. It crushed the incipient feeling of disobedience which would
otherwise have led to the worst results. None more rejoiced at it, none more
admitted its justice, than the loyal Sipahis. — G. B. M.]

[* When one recollects how many sentences of " well-chosen, well-delivered
Hindustani,' were used in vain in 1857, one marvels the more at this con-
demnation of the one remedy which proved successful in 1825. Mutiny caa
never be crushed out by smooth words. The soul that will not nerve itself
to have recourse to heroic measures will never successfully cope with revolt. —
G. B. M.]

198 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1825-35.

General of Division, such as Malcolm or Ochterlony, to re-
awaken their soldierly instincts — their pride in their colours,
their loyalty to their Salt. But, instead of such judicious treat-
ment as would have shown them their own folly, as in a glass,
the martinets of the Horse Guards, stern in their un sympathising
ignorance, their ruthless prejudices, had, in our own territories,
at the very seat of government, in the presence of no pressing
danger, no other lessons to teach, no other remedies to apply,
than those which were to be administered at the bayonet's
point and the cannon's mouth.*

With the return of peace came new disquietudes. A reign

of Eetrenchment commenced. Alarmed by the ex-
TheHaif-Battaperises 0f t heir military establishments, the Company

sent out imperative orders for their reduction —
orders more than once issued before, more than once disobeyed.
Blows of this kind commonly fall upon the weakest — upon
those least able to endure them. So it happened that the con-
dition of the regimental officer having, by a variety of ante-
cedent circumstances, been shorn of well-nigh all its advantages,
was rendered still more grievous and intolerable by the curtail-
ment of his pecuniary alio wances. An order, known in military
history as the Half-Batta Order, was passed, by which all offi-
cers stationed within a certain distance from the Presidency
were deprived of a large percentage of their pay.f The order
excited the utmost dismay throughout the Army ; but the dis-
content which it engendered vented itself in words. Twice
before the officers of the Company's army had resented similar
encroachments, and had been prepared to strike in defence of
their asserted rights. But this last blow did not rouse them to
rebellion. Never before had justice and reason been so clearly
upon their side ; but, keenly as they felt their wrongs, they did

[* In 1857, the Sipahis had generals of division like Hearsey, who knew
them well, who spoke their language as well as they did, and who did all
in his power " to awaken their soldierly instincts, their pride in their colours,
their loyalty to their Salt." The result was general mutiny. And the same
result would have followed the application of a similar remedy in 1825. I
ask the intelligent reader to compare the two circumstances — 1825 and 1857 :
the two remedies : the two results : and to draw his own conclusions. —
G. B. M.]

f Or, in strict professional language, his allowances. The gross salary of
an Indian officer was known as his " pay and allowances." The former,
which was small, was enhanced by several substantial accessories, as tentage,
house-rent, and batta, or field allowance

1825-35.] CORPORAL PUNISHMENT ABOLISHED. 199

not threaten the Government they served, but loyally protested
against the treatment to which the}'' had been subjected. The
humours of which their memorials could not wholly relieve
them, a Press, virtually free, carried off like a great conduit.
The excitement expended itself in newspaper paragraphs, and
gradually subsided. But it left behind it an after-growth of
unanticipated evils. The little zeal that was left in the regi-
mental officer was thus crushed out of him, and the Sipahi, who
had watclied the decline, little by little, of the power once
vested in the English captain, now saw him injured and humi-
liated by his Government, without any power of resistance ; saw
that he was no longer under the special protection of the State,
and so lost all respect for an instrument so feeble and so despised.

And as though it were a laudable achievement thus to divest
the native soldier of all fear of his European officer,
another order went forth during the same interval Abolition of
of peace, abolishing the punishment of the lash punishment,
throughout the Sipahi army in India. So little was
he a drunkard and a ruffian, that it was a rare spectacle to see
a black soldier writhing under the drummer's cat. But when
the penalty, though still retained in the European army, became
illegal and impossible among them, the native soldiery felt that
another blow was struck at military authority — another tie of
restraint unloosed. It was looked upon less as a boon than as a
concession — less as the growth of our humanity than of our
fear. So the Sipahi did not love us better, but held us a little
more in contempt.

There were great diversities of sentiment upon this point,
and some, whose opinions were entitled to respect, believed in
the wisdom of the measure. But the weight of authority was
against it,* and, some ten years afterwards, Hardinge revived

* Numerous illustrations might be cited, but none more significant than
the following anecdote, told by Mr. Charles Raikes : "I recollect a con-
versation which I had in 1839 with an old pensioned Subahdar. I inquired
of him how the measure would work. He replied, that the abolition of the
punishment woidd induce some classes to enter the Army who had not done
so before. 'But, Sahib,' said the old man, ' Fauj be-dar hogya.' (The Army
has ceased to fear.)" Another native officer said : "The English, to manage
us rightly, should hold the whip in one hand and the mehtais (sweetmeats) in
the other. You have dropped the whip, and now hold out sweets to us in
both hands." [On this I cannot help remarking that if the Army had ceased
to fear, and that cessation of corporal punishment had caused it to deteriorate,
no appeals to its loyalty in words of will-chosen Hindustani, spoken even by
" a Malcolm or an Ochterlony," would have remedied the evil. — G. B. M.]

200 THE SIPAHI AEMY — ITS DECLINE. [1832.

what Bentinck had abolished. But even before the act of
abolition, by a variety of concurrent causes, the character and
the conduct of the Sipahi Army were so impaired, that an officer
who had served long with them, and knew them well, declared,
in his evidence before a Committee of Parliament, that " in all
the higher qualifications of soldiers, in devotedness to the
service, readiness for any dtity they may be called upon to
perform, cheerfulness under privations, confidence and attach-
ment to their officers, unhesitating and uncalculating bravery
in the field, without regard either to the number or the cha-
racter of the enemy, the native soldier is allowed by all the
best-informed officers of the service, by those who have most
experience, and are best acquainted with their character, to
have infinitely deteriorated."*

* Evidence of Captain Macau in 1834.

1838.] THE AFGHAN WAK. 201

CHAPTEE III.

Peace is never long-lived in India, and the Army was soon
again in the hustle and excitement of active service.
There was a long war ; and, if it had heen a J*"- w?r in
glorious one, it might have had a salutary effect
upon the disposition of the Sipahi. But when all his soldierly
qualities were thus, as it were, at the last gasp, the War in
Afghanistan came to teach him a new lesson, and the worst, at
that time, which he could have heen taught. He learnt then,
for the first time, that a British army is not invincible in the
field; that the great " Ikhbal," or Fortune, of the Company,
which had carried us gloriously through so many great enter-
prises, might sometimes disastrously fail us; he saw the proud
colours of the British nation defiled in the bloody snows of
Afghanistan, and he believed that our reign was hastening to
a close. The charm of a century of conquest was then broken.
In all parts of Upper India it was the talk of the Bazaars that
the tide of victory had turned against the Faringhis, and that
they would soon be driven into the sea. Then the Sikh arose
and the Maratha bestirred himself, rejoicing in our humiliation,
and eagerly watching the next move. Then it was that those
amongst us, who knew best what was seething in the heart of
Indian society, were " ashamed to look a native in the face."
The crisis was a perilous one, and the most experienced Indian
statesmen regarded it with dismay, not knowing what a day
might produce. They had no faith in our allies, no faith in our
soldiery. An Army of Betribution, under a wise and trusted
leader, went forth to restore the tarnished lustre of the British
name ; but ominous whispers soon came from his camp that
that Army was tainted — that the Sipahi regiments, no longer
assured and fortified by the sight of that ascendant Star of
Fortune which once had shone with so bright and steady a
light, shrunk from entering the passes which had been the grave
of so many of their comrades. It was too true. The Sikhs

202 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1842.

were tampering with their fidelity. Brahman emissaries were
endeavouring to swear them on the Holy Water not to advance
at the word of the English commander. Nightly meetings of
delegates from the different regiments were being held ; and,
perhaps, we do not even now know how great was the danger.
But the sound discretion and excellent tact of Pollock, aided
by the energies of Henry Lawrence and Richmond Shakespear,
brought the Sipahis to a better temper, and, when the word
was given, they entered the dreaded passes, and, confiding in
their leader, carried victory with them up to the walls of the
Afghan capital.

The Sipahi did his duty well under Pollock. He had done
his duty well under Nott, who spoke with admiration of his
" beautiful regiments," and manfully resented any imputation
cast upon them. And when, after the British Army had been
disentangled from the defiles of Afghanistan, war was made
against the Amirs of Sindh, the Sipahi went gallantly to the
encounter with the fierce Biluchi fighting-man, and Napier
covered him with praise. Then there was another war, and the
native regiments of the Company went bravely up the slopes of
Maharajpiir, and turned not aside from the well-planted, well-
manned batteries of the turbulent Marathas. But peace came,
and with peace its dangers. Sindh had become a British pro-
vince, and the Sipahi, who had helped to conquer, had no wish
to garrison the country.

The direct and immediate result of well-nigh every annexa •
tion of Territory, by which our Indian empire

Results of the has been extended, may be clearly discernecf in
' the shattered discipline of the Sipahi Army.
To extend our empire without increasing our means of de-
fence was not theoretically unreasonable ; for it might have
been supposed that as the number of our enemies was reduced
by conquest and subjection, the necessity for the main-
tenance of a great standing army was diminished rather
than increased. These annexations, it was said, consolidated
our own territories by eradicating some native principality in
the midst of them, or else substituted one frontier, and perhaps
a securer one, for another. But the security of our empire lay
in the fidelity of our soldiery. To diminish the number of our
enemies, and to extend the area of the country to be occupied
by our troops, was at the same time to diminish the importance
of the Sipahi, and to render his service more irksome to him ;

1843-44.] DIFFICULTIES OF ANNEXATION. 203

for it sent him to strange places far away from his home, to do
the work of military Police. It frittered away in small de-
tached bodies the limited European force at the disposal of the
Indian Government, or massed large ones on a distant frontier.
This extension of territory, indeed, whilst it made us more
dependent upon our native troops, made that dependence more
hazardous. The conversion of Sindh into a British province,
by which our long line of annexations was commenced, had
burnt this truth into our history before Lord Dalhousie ap-
peared upon the scene. For indeed it was a sore trial to
tbe Sipahi to be posted in a dreary outlying graveyard of this
kind, far away from his home and his people — far beyond the
limits of the empire in which he had enlisted to serve. And
when it was proposed to take from him the additional allowances,
which had been issued to the troops, on active service in an
enemy's country, on the plea that they had subsided into the
occupation of British cantonments, he resented this severe
logic, and rose against the retrenchment. He did not see why,
standing upon the same ground, he should not receive the same
pay, because the red line of the British boundary had been
extended by a flourish of the pen, and the population of the
country had by the same magic process been converted into
British subjects ; and still less easily could he reconcile him-
self to the decision when he thought that the Sipahi himself
had contributed to bring about the result that was so injurious
to him ; that he had helped to win a province for his employers,
and, in return for this good service, had been deprived of part
of his pay. In the old time, when the Company's troops con-
quered a country, they had profited in many ways by the
achievement, but now they were condemned to suffer as though
gallantry were a crime.

In more than a camel-load of documents the story lies re-
corded, but it must be briefly narrated here.
In the month of February, 1844, Governor- Muttoyofthe
General Ellenborough, being then absent from
his Council in the Upper Provinces, received the dishearten-
ing intelligence that the 34th Sipahi .Regiment of Bengal,
which had been warned for service in Sindh, had been
halted at Firuzpur. It had refused to enter our newly-
acquired province, unless its services were purchased by the
grant of the additional allowances given to the soldiery beyond
the Indus in time of war. The distressing character of the

204 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1844.

intelligence was aggravated by many circumstances of time
and place. In a moment, Ellenborough's quick perceptions
had grappled the whole portentous truth. Our troops were
mutinying for pay, on the Panjab frontier, almost in the
presence of the disorderly masses of Sikh troops, who,
gorged with the donatives they had forced from a weak
Government, were then dominating the empire. Other regi-
ments were coming up, on the same service, who might be
expected to follow the rebellious lead of the 34th; and so
Ellenborough and Napier might have found themselves with
the province they had just conquered on their hands, and no
means of securing its military occupation, without destroying
the authority of Government by humiliating concessions.

In this conjuncture, the first thing that Ellenborough did
was the best that could have been done. He delegated to the
Commander-in-Chief the full powers of the Governor-General
in Council for the suppression of mutiny in the Army. But
how were those powers to be exercised? Doubt and per-
plexity, and something nearly approaching consternation,
pervaded Army Head-Quarters. The 7th Bengal Cavalry, on
the line of march to the frontier, had broken into open mutiny,
and in spite of all the efforts of their officers, who had
guaranteed to pay them from their own funds the allowances
they demanded, the troopers had refused to obey the trumpet-
call to march, and were halted, therefore, sullen and obstinate,
in the neighbourhood of Firuzpur. Some companies of Native
Artillery had already refused to march, and there were rumours
of other regiments being on the eve of declaring their refusal.
The most obvious course, under such circumstances, was to
march the recusant regiments back to one or more of the large
stations, as Lodiana and Mirath, where European troops were
posted, and there to disband them. But sinister whispers were
abroad that the sympathies of the Europeans, in this instance,
were with the native soldiery. One regiment of the Line, it
was reported, had openly declared that it would not act against
the Sipahis, who were demanding no more than their rights.
There were Sikh emissaries from beyond the Satlaj doing their
best to debauch the Sipahis by offering both their sympathy
and their assistance. Dick, the General of Division, declared
his belief that an order to the mutineers to march back for
disbandment would not be obeyed ; and a violent collision at
such a time would have set the whole frontier in a blaze. The

1844.] PROGRESS OF MUTINY. 205

project of disbandment was, therefore, suspended ; and all the
more readily, as even at Head-Quarters there was a belief that,
although the recusant troops might have had no reasonable
ground of complaint, the actual state of the case with respect
to the Sindh pay and allowances had not been properly ex-
plained to them.*

Uncondemned, the mutinous regiments were ordered back to
the stations from which they had marched, to await the result
of a reference to the Governor-General ; and other corps,
warned for the Sindh service, came up to the frontier. Dick's
first and wisest impulse had been to halt the regiments
marching to Firuzpur, in order that they might not run the
risk of contamination by the tainted corps, or the corrupting
influence of the Sikhs. But, by some strange fatality, this
judicious measure had been revoked ; the regiments marched
to the frontier; and Dick's difficulties increased. The 69th
refused to embark, unless the old Indus allowances
were guaranteed to them. By the exertions of The 69th and the
the officers, one-half of the regiment was after-
wards brought round to a sense of their duty ; they loaded
their carriage cattle, marched to the banks of the river, and
declared their willingness to embark on the boats. They ought
to have been embarkt d at once with the colours of their
regiment. Their comrades would then have followed them ;
and other regiments, moved by the good example, might also
have asserted their fidelity. But the golden opportunity was
lost ; and all example was in tlie way of evil. The 4th Eegi-
ment, trusted overmuch by its commanders, followed the 69th
into mutiny at Firuzpur, and such was the conduct of the
Sipahis, that Philip Goldney, a man of equal courage and
capacity, suddenly called to the scene of tumult, drew upon one
the foremost of the mutineers, and a younger officer, moved to
passion by their violence, struck out with a bayonet, and
wounded two soldiers in the face. Those were days when

* The extraordinary allowances — the withdrawal of which had created all
this ill-feeling — were originally granted when the troops crossed the Indus
in 1838, on their march to Kandahar and Kabul. They were withdrawn
from the troops in Sindh early in 1840, when there seemed to be no longer
any extraordinary duties to be performed by them. When the insurrection
broke out in Afghanistan, and retributory operations were commenced, tlie
allowances were restored; but they were again reduced from the 1st of July
1843, after the close of the war in Afghanistan and the conquest of Siudh.

206 THE SlPlm AKMY — ITS DECLINE. [1844.

mutiny did not mean massacre, and the Sipahi did not turn upon
his officer. But neither regiment would march. On many hard-
fought fields Sir Robert Dick had proved himself to he a good
soldier, hut he was not equal to such a crisis as this : so Ellen-
borough at once ordered him to be cushioned in some safer place.

In the meanwhile, aid to the embarrassed Government was

coming from an unexpected quarter. The 64th Regiment of

Sipahis had formed part of that unfortunate detachment

e 64 ' known in history as Wilde's Brigade, which had been
sent, before Pollock's arrival at Peshawar, to carry the Khaibar
Pass, without guns and without provisions. It had afterwards
served with credit during the second Afghan campaign, since
the close of which it had been cantoned at the frontier station
of Lodiana. The Sipahis had manifested a strong reluctance to
serve in Sindh, and had addressed to the Adjutant-General
more than one arzi, or pe+ition, couched in language of com-
plaint almost akin to mutiny. From Lodiana the regiment
had been ordered down to Banaras. On the 15th of February
it reached Ambalah, then become the Head-Quarters of ihe
Sirhind division of the Army, which General Fast, an old
officer of the Company's service, commanded. Well able to
converse in the language of the country, and knowing, from
long intercourse with them, the character and feelings of the
native soldiery, Fast believed that something might still be
done to bring the regiment back to its allegiance. So he halted
the 64th at Ambalah, and summoned the native officers to his
presence. Questioned as to the disposition of the regiment,
they one and all declared that the men had never refused to
march to Sindh ; that they were still willing to march ; that
only on the evening before the native officers had severally
ascertained the fact from their respective companies ; that the
matter of the allowances would not influence the Sipahis; and
that the mutinous arzis had emanated only from a few bad
characters in the regiment; perhaps, it was added, from a
Sipahi who had been already dismissed. From these and other
representations, it appeared to the General that the 64th really
desired to wipe out the stain, which the arzis had fixed
upon their character, and, believing in this, he recommended
that they should be permitted to march to Sindh. Under
certain stringent conditions, the Commander-in-Chief adopted
the recommendation; and so Moseley, with his Sipahis, again
turned his face towards the Indus.

1844.] COLONEL MOSELEY AND THE 64TH. 207

The disposition of the regiment now seemed to be so good, it
was inarching with such apparent cheerfulness towards the
dreaded regions, and setting so good an example to others, that
the Commander-in-Chief was minded to stimulate its alacrity,
and to reward its returning fidelity, by a volui tary tender
of special pay and pension, and relaxations of the terms of
service.* The language of these instructions was somewhat
vague, and Moseley, eager to convey glad tidings to his
men, turned the vagueness to account by exaggerating the
boon that was offered to them. And so the error of Head-
quarters was made doubly erroneous, and the Governor-
general was driven wild by the blunder of the ( 'ommauder-in-
Chief.

Whatsoever Head-Quarters might have intended to grant,
was contingent upon the good conduct of the regiment. But
before the letter had been received by Moseley, on the line of
inarch, mutiny had again broken out in the ranks of the 64th.
At Miidki, now so famous in the annals of Indian warfare, the
regiment, not liking the route that had been taken, assumed a
threatening front, and attempted to seize the colours. j The
petulance of the hour was suppressed, and next day the regi-
ment resumed its march. But transitory as was the outbreak,
it was mutiny in one of its worst forms. On the second day,
the Colonel received, at Tibi, the letter from Head-Quarters, on
the subject of the additional allowances. The outbreak at Miidki
had converted it into an historical document, to be quietly put
aside for purposes of future record. It was, indeed, a dead
letter. The fatal words " too late " were already written across

* " In addition to the full or marching batta always allowed to regiments
serving in Sindh, still higher advantages in regard to pay, together with the
benefits of the regulated family pension to the heirs of those who may die
from disease contracted on service." The commanding officer was also in-
structed " to make known to the corps that it shall be brought back to a
station in the provinces in one year in the event of the ensuing season
proving unhealthy, and under no circumstances be kept in Sindh beyond two
years, while the indulgence of furlough to visit their homes will, in the latter
case, be extended to the men in the proportion enjoyed by corps located at
stations within the British frontier." — [The Adjutant-General to Colonel
Moseley, March 15, 1844.] Sindh, however, had become a British "province,"
and was "within the British frontier."

t It was advisable to march the troops proceeding to Sindh along a route
which would not bring them into contact with other regiments, either coming
from that province or stationed on the frontier; and it was specially desirable
to mask Finizpur.

208 THE SIPjChI AEMY — ITS DECLINE. [1844.

the page. But Moseley laid eager hands upon it, as a living
reality, for present uses. The 64th was plainly in an excitable
state. It had mutinied once on the march, and, without the
application of some very powerful sedative, it might mutiny
again. The outbreak at Mudki had not been reported to Head-
Quarters. It might pass into oblivion as an ugly dream of the
past; and the future might be rendered peaceful and prosperous
by the letter of the Adjutant-General. So Moseley, having
caused it to be translated into Hindustani, summoned a parade,
and ordered it to be read aloud to his men.

Tremendous as was this error — for it tendered to the mutinous
the reward intended only for the faithful — its proportions were
dwarfed by the after-conduct of the infatuated Colonel. He
put a gloss of his own on the Head-Quarters' letter, and told
the regiment that they would receive the old Indus allow-
ances given to Pollock's Army.* Upon which they set up a
shout of exultation. And then the 64th pursued its journey
to Sindh.

The horrible mistake which had thus been committed soon
began to bear bitter fruit. The inevitable pay-day came ; and
Moseley, like a man who has silenced the clamorous demands
of the Present by drawing a forged bill upon the Future,
now saw his gigantic folly staring him in the face. The crisis
came at Shikarpur. The Indus war-allowances were not forth-
coming, and the 64th refused in a body to receive their legiti-
mate pay.

There was then, under Governor Napier, commanding the
troops in Sindh, an old Sipahi officer, familiarly and

George affectionately known throughout the Army as George
Hunter. Of a fine presence, of a kindly nature, and
of a lively temperament, he led all men captive by the sunny
influence of his warm heart and his flowing spirits ; whilst his
manly courage and resolution commanded a wider admiration
and respect. Of his conspicuous gallantly in action he carried
about with him the honourable insignia in an arm maimed and
mutilated by the crashing downward blow of a Jat swordsman,
as he was forcing one of the gates of Bharatpur. In the
whole wide circle of the Army, there was scarcely one man
whom the Sipahi more loved and honoured ; scarcely one whose

* This was known among the Sipahis as " Pollock's Batta." It made up
the soldier's pay to twelve rupees a month.

1844.] GEOEGE HUNTER. 209

appearance on the scene at this moment could have had a
more auspicious aspect. But there are moods in which we turn
most angrily against those whom we most love ; and General
Hunter in this emergency was as powerless as Colonel
Moseley.

George Hunter was not a man to coquet with mutiny. He
saw at a glance the magnitude of the occasion, and he
was resolute not to encourage its further growth bv Mutiny of
an y inopportune delay. The short twilight of the
Indian summer was already nearly spent when news reached
him that the regiment had refused to receive its pay. Instantly
calling a parade, he declared his intention of himself paying the
troops. Darkness had now fallen upon the scene ; but lamps
were lit, and the General commenced his work. The light
company, as the one that had evinced the most turbulent spirit,
was called up first; the Sipahis took their pay to a man, and
were dismissed to their Lines. Of the company next called,
four men had refused to receive their pay, when Moseley went
up to the General, and told him that the whole regiment would
take their money quietly,, if disbursed to them by their own
officers. Hunter had once refused this, but now he consented,
and again the effort to flatter the corps into discipline was
miserably unsuccessful. No sooner was this reluctant consent
wrung from the General, than the parade was broken up with a
tumultuous roar. Filling the air with shouts, sometimes shaped
into words of derision and abuse, the Sipahis flocked to their
Lines. In vain Hunter ordered them to fall in ; in vain he im-
plored them to remember that they were soldiers. They turned
upon him with the declaration that they had been lured to
Sindh by a lie ; and when he still endeavoured to restore order
and discipline to the scattered rabbin into which the regiment
had suddenly crumbled, they threw stones and bricks at the fine
old soldier and the other officers who had gone to his aid.

Nothing more could be done on that night ; so Hunter went
to his quarters, and waited anxiously for the dawn. A morning-
parade had been previously ordered, and when the General went
to the ground, he saw, to his exceeding joy, that the 64th were
already drawn up — "as fine-looking and steady a body of men,"
he said, "as he could wish to see." No signs of disorder greeted
him; and as he inspected company after company, calling upon
all who had complaints to make to come forward, the regiment
preserved its staid and orderly demeanour, and it seemed as if a

vol. i. p

210 THE SIPlHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1844.

great shame held them all in inactivity and silence.* Keturn-
ing then to the head of the column, drawn up left in front,
Hunter proceeded to resume the work which had been broken
off so uproariously on the preceding evening. Ten men of one
company refused their pay, but none others followed their
example. All now seemed to be proceeding to a favourable
issue ; and Hunter believed that the favourable disposition
which had begun to show itself might be confirmed by a suit-
able address. So he prepared himself to harangue them.

The ways of the Sipahi are as unaccountable as the ways of a
child. It is impossible to fix the limits of his anger, or rightly
to discern the point at which his good temper has really
returned. Unstable and inconsistent, his conduct baffles all
powers of human comprehension. So it happened that just on
the seeming verge of success the ground crumbled away under
Hunter's feet. As each company had been called up to receive
its pay, the men had piled their arms to the word of command.
But when the word was given to un-pile, there was an im-
mediate shudder of hesitation, which seemed to be caught by
one company from another, until it pervaded the whole regi-
ment. Each man seemed to read what was in his neighbour's
heart, and without any previous concert, therefore, they clung
to each other in their disobedience. Three Grenadier Sipahis
took their muskets, and were promoted on the spot ; but not an-
other man followed their example. The regiment had again
become a rabble. Nothing now could reduce them to order.

Until the blazing June sun was rising high in the heavens,
Hunter and the regimental officers remained on the parade-
ground, vainly endeavouring to persuade the Sipahis to return
to their duty. They had only one answer to give — their
Colonel and their Adjutant had promised them what they had
not received. If the General would guarantee them the old
Indus war-allowances, they would serve as good soldiers; if not,
they wished to be discharged, and return to their homes. All
through the day, and all through the night, without divesting
themselves of their uniform, without going to their lines to cook
or to eat, the mutineers remained on the ground, sauntering
about in the neighbourhood of their piled arms, and discussing
their wrongs.

* Only one man came forward, and his complaint waa that he lind been
passed over in promotion.

1844.] MUTINY OF THE 64TH. 211

Day broke, and found them still on the ground. But hunger
and fatigue had begun to exhaust the energies of their resist-
ance, and when Hunter appeared again on the scene, accom-
panied only by his aide-de-camp, and beat to arms, the men fell
in, took their muskets, and evinced some signs of contrition.
Then the General spoke to them, saying that he would receive
at his quarters a man from each company, and hear what be had
to say on the part of his comrades. Satisfied with this promise,
and being no longer irritated by the presence of the officers who
had deceived them, the 64th allowed the parade to be quietly
dismissed, and went to their Lines. At the appointed hour, the
delegates from the several regiments waited on the General, and
each man told the same story of the deception that had been
practised upon the regiment. They had been promised
" General Pollock's Batta," and the twelve rupees which they
had expected had dwindled down into eight.

With this evidence before him, the General removed Colonel
Moseley from the command of the station and from the command
of the regiment,* and ordered the 64tb to march to Sukkhar, on
their way back to our older provinces. It was an anxious time ;
a hazardous march. So Hunter went with them. But the hot
stage of the fever bad passed, and the paroxysm seemed to have
left them feeble and sore-spent. Unresistingly they
went to Sukkhar, and encamped in the presence of June 25,
European troops ; and George Hunter, thankiug God
that the peril was over, and that not a drop of blood had been
shed, then took upon himself the responsibility of pardoning the
regiment as a body, and bringing to punishment only the worst
of the individual offenders.f Such moderation could hardly be
misunderstood at a time when there was present power to
enforce the decrees of a sterner justice. So he addressed the
regiment on parade, told them that he pardoned all but the
leading mutineers, who would be tried by Court-martial ; and
he trusted that the mercy thus shown to them would not be
thrown away, that they would repent of their misconduct and
return to their allegiance. And perhaps the provocation which

* Colonel Moseley was afterwards tried by court-martial, and cashiered.

t Thirty-nine prisoners were sent to trial, of whom one only was acquitted.
Six were ordered for capital punishment, and the sentence of death passed
upon the others was commuted to imprisonment and hard labour for various
terms.

p 2

212 THE SIP Affl ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1844.

they had received was ample warrant for the leniency of their
treatment.*

But the embarrassments of the Government did not end here.
Whatsoever might he the punishment of the offence, it could not
afford a remedy for the evil. The mutinous regiments might
he disbanded, and their ringleaders might be hanged by the
neck, or blown to atoms from the guns ; but still there would
be no answer to the question of how was Sindh to be garrisoned
with British troops ? It had been the design of the Government
to employ only Bengal regiments on that service, seeking aid in
other quarters from Madras. But the Bengal Army had broken
down under the experiment ; and there was small hope, after
what had passed, of its ever being induced, except by humiliat-
ing concessions, to look that hated province in the face. There
were, however, two other Presidencies, and two other Armies,
not so nice as Bengal ; and the defence of Sindh might be en-
trusted to Bombay or Madras regiments. If such had been the
design in the first instance, it might, under judicious manage-
ment, have been successfully carried into effect. But after such
an example as had been set by the Bengal regiments, there was
small consolation to be drawn from the prospect of loyal service
to be rendered by their comrades. Already, indeed, were there
signs that the disposition to strike for higher pay which had
manifested itself among the Bengal troops was not confined to
the Sipahis of that " pampered and petted " Army. The
Bombay regiments were untainted ;f but a mutinous spirit had
again displayed itself among the native soldiery of the Coast
Army 4

* There is something very touching in the humility which pervades the
letters written at this time by George Hunter to Lord Ellenborough and
Sir Charles Napier. He asks to be pardoned for all shortcomings, in con-
sideration of the difficulty of the circumstances. " I never could write,'' he
says at the end of one letter, " and old age does not improve a man in any
way, except, I trust, in seeing his own failings and praying for mercy."

t The Bombay Army was said at that time to have more duty on its hands
than it could perform without a severe strain, and the Bombay Government
were clamouring for an augmentation.

% There had been several recent instances of extreme insubordination,
amounting, indeed, to mutiny, in the Madras Army. The 52nd Native
Infantry had mutinied at Asigarh and Maligaon ; there had been a mutiny
of the Madras troops at Sikandarabad ; and the 2nd and 41st Regiments had
shown a bad spirit, when ordered to embark for China. The 3rd and 4th
Native Cavalry regiments had also mutinied ; the former in 1838, the latter
In 1842.

1843.] MUTINY OF THE MADRAS TROOPS. 213

The first symptom of this was in a Cavalry regiment at
Jabalpur. Among the results of an extension of Mutinyofthe
empire without a corresponding augmentation of eth Madras
our military force, are frequent violations of old Pre- ava ry'

sidential limits in the location of our troops, which, however un-
objectionable they may appear at the Adjutant-General's office,
are seldom carried out without some disturbance of our military
system. It might seem to be of small consequence whether the
station at which a regiment was posted were within the limits
of one Presidency or another ; but if a Madras regiment were
called upon to serve in the Bengal Presidency, or a Bombay
regiment in Madras, or any other departure from ordinary rule
was decreed, the Government was fortunate if it were not
seriously perplexed and embarrassed by the results. Now, the
Madras Army, though, as has been said, more cosmopolitan and
less nice than that of Bengal, and not deterred by caste pre-
judices from proceeding to strange places, suffered even more
than the Bengal troops from being ordered to distant stations,
because the family of the Madras soldier followed his regiment,
whilst the belongings of his Bengal comrade remained in their
native village. The removal of the family from one station to
another was a sore trouble and a heavy expense to the Madras
Sipahi ; and whatever increased the distance to be traversed was,
therefore, a grievance to him.

To the Cavalry it was especially a grievance, for the troopers
were principally well-born Muhammadans, and the rigid seclu-
sion in which their women were kept greatly increased the cost
of their conveyance from one station to another. The 6th
Cavalry had been more than commonly harassed in this respect,
when, towards the close of 1843, just as they were expecting to
get their route for the favourite cavalry station of Arkat, they
received orders to inarch from Kampati to Jabalpur, in the
valley of the Narbada, which, in consequence of the demand for
Bengal troops on the Indus, it had been necessary to occupy
with regiments from Madras. The sharp disappointment,
however, was in some measure mitigated by the assurance that
the service on which they were required was but temporary,
and that they would soon return within the proper limits of
their own Presidency. They went, therefore, leaving their
families behind them ; but when they reached Jabalpur, they
found that they were to be permanently located there upon
lower allowances than they had expected, that they must send

214 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1843.

for their families from Kampati, and that their next march
would be nine hundred miles southward to Arkat.

Only by savings from their pay at the higher rates could the
troopers hope to defray these extraordinary expenses. On the
lower rates of pay it was impossible ; for the greater part of
their earnings was remitted for the support of their absent
families, and what remained was barely enough to keep together
body and soul. When, therefore, they found that they were to
receive these lower rates at Jabalpur, they broke into open
manifestations of discontent, and bound themselves by oaths
to stand by each other whilst they resisted the unjust decree.
The first few days of December were, therefore, days of sore
vexation and disturbance to the officers of the 6th, and most of

Major Litch- aU to the Commandant, Major Litchfield, to whose
field. want of personal sympathy with their sufferings the
Sipahis, reasonably or unreasonably, attributed a great part of
their affliction. The conduct of the men was violent and
outrageous. They were with difficulty induced to saddle and
mount for exercise ; and when the trumpet sounded for the canter,
they loosened rein, urged their horses forward at a dangerous
pace, and raising the religious war-cry of " Din ! din ! " broke into
tumultuous disorder. Brought back to something like discipline,
the regiment was dismissed ; but throughout the day the
greatest excitement prevailed among them, and a large body of
troopers marched in a defiant manner through the lines to the
tent of a favourite officer, declaring that they would

ap ' yn| ' obey his orders, and serve under him, and beseeching
him to place himself at their head. On the following day the
excitement had increased. The troop-officers went among their
men, endeavouring to pacify them. But they could report
nothing more satisfactory than that the troops were in a frantic
state, and that if Litchfield ventured on parade next morning
the result would be fatal to him.

Undeterred b}T this, the Major would have held the parade,
Imt the Brigadier commanding the station, to whom, in due
course, all the circumstances were reported, caused it to be
countermanded, and an Inspection Parade under his own
command ordered in its stead. To this the regiment sullenly
responded ; and when the Brigadier addressed them, saying that
he was willing to hear their complaints, many of the men
stepped forward and presented him with petitions, which were
given over to the troop-officers, to be forwarded to him through

1843-4.] MUTINY OF THE MADRAS INFANTRY. 215

the regular official channels. But, although it was plain that
there was a hitter feeling of resentment against Litchfield, no
act of violence was committed at that parade. Ami it happened
that before its dismissal a letter reached the Brigadier an-
nouncing that the higher allowances were to be given to the
men ; and so the active danger was passed. But the disturb-
ance which had been engendered did not soou pass away ; the
Sipahis remained sullen and discontented, and for some days
it appeared to the Brigadier not improbable that he would be
compelled to call the Infantry and Artillery to his assistance.
But the Madras Army was spared this calamity of bloodshed ;
and after a little while the regiment returned to the quiet and
orderly performance of its duty.

As the old year closed upon the scene of mutiny in the
Madras Cavalry, so, very soon, the new year opened upon a
kindred incident in the Madras Infantry. When it was found
that the Bengal troops were reluctant to serve, under the pro-
posed terms, in the Sindh province, and serious embarrass-
ment was, thereby, likely to be occasioned to the Supreme
Government, the Madras authorities, believing that the crisis
was one in which it behoved every one to do his best, promptly
and vigorously, for the salvation of the State, determined, on a
requisition from the Government of Bombay, to send two
infantry regiments to Sindh.* The Sipahis were to embark
on board transport vessels at Madras, to touch at Bombay, and
thence to proceed to Karachi. One of these regiments, the
47th, was in orders for Moulmein, on the eastern coast of the
Bay of Bengal — a station at which, being beyond Presidential
limits, extra allowances, known as field-batta and rations, were
paid to the troops. Ignorant, it would appear, of the Bengal
regulations, the Madras Government, represented by the
Marquis of Tweedale, who held the double office of Governor
and Commander-in-Chief, guaranteed to the regiments ordered
to Sindh the allowances received at Moulmein ; and under these
conditions the 47th embarked for B mibay.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Goverment had been advised of the
unauthorised measures of the Madras authorities Mutiny of the
Chafing under such usurpation of the powers and Madras 47th.
prerogatives of the Governor-General, Ellenborough sent orders

* Sir Charles Napier had made an urgent call on Bombay, which, Bombay
not being able to comply with it, passed on to Madras.

216 ■ THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1843-44.

for the detention of the Madras regiment at Bombay, and it was
disembarked on its arrival.* There the Madras Sipahis learnt
that the advantages of foreign service, promised to them at
Madras, and on the faith of which they had set their faces towards
Sindh, were disallowed. The greater part of their pay up to
the end of March had already been disbursed to them, for the
benefit of their families whom they left behind, and now they
found, in the middle of February, that the scanty residue, on
which they had relied for their own support, was by these
retrenchments taken from them, and that, far away from their
homes, starvation stared them in the face. It was not strange
that they should have regarded this as a cruel breach of faith ;
and that they should have resented it. They had been promised
rations, and they asked for them, and when they found they
were not likely to be supplied, they manifested their discontent,
after the wonted fashion, by breaking; out on

Feb. 19 1844. 'J &

parade. When the word of command was given for
them to march to their Lines, by fours from the left, they stood
fast. The word was repeated, but still they stood fast ; and when
the Adjutant rode up to the leading section and asked the men if
they had not heard the word of command, they answered sullenly
that they had heard it ; and when a Native officer asked them
why they did not move, they told him that they wanted food,
and that they would not stir without it.

When the order to advance was again given, the regiment
moved off; but only to renew on the following morning the
exhibition of disobedience and discontent. Paraded before the
General commanding the garrison, the regiment soon evinced
signs of being in the same mood. After inspection, when the
order was given to march by companies to their respective
Lines, the Grenadiers stepped off, but presently wavered and
halted ; and when their captain, having ordered their arms,
went off to report their conduct to the commanding officer, they
insisted on following him in a body, declaring that if they then
lost their chance of representing their hard case to the General,
they might never find it again. Another company was even
more violent in its demands. When the word of command was

* Intelligence of the change of destination was communicated to the
officers during the voyage. It should be stated that one detachment of the
regiment mutinied on board the John Line transport vessel ; but the dis-
content then manifested arose from circumstances unconnected with the
after-causes of disaffection.

1844.] RESTORATION OF ORDER. 217

given to advance at the quick march, a man from the ranks
cried out " Eight about face," and the whole company stood
fast, as did other parts of the column. Taken in the act of
flagrant mutiny, the Sipahi was disarmed, and sent to the
guard, whither the greater part of the company followed,
declaring that they also would go to the guard, that they
wanted rice, and must have it.

After a while order was restored. The General addressed the
European and Native officers, and told them to assure the men,
that any complaints advanced in a soldierly manner would be
inquired into and any grievances redressed, but that such
conduct as had been displayed on parade could not be over-
looked. The regiment was then moved off to its Lines, some of
the ringleaders being carried off as prisoners ; and an advance
of money, at first reluctantly received, stifled the further
progress of mutiny. Here, then, the story may end. The
Madras Army was not destined to supply the want accruing
from the defective loyalty of Bengal. It broke down at a
critical time ; but only under such a weight of mismanagement
as might have crushed out the fidelity of the best mercenaries
in the world.

In these, as in instances above cited, by conflicts of authority
and variations of system, the Sipahi was not unreasonably
alarmed for the integrity of his pay ; and although we may
condemn the manner in which he manifested his discontent, we
must not think too harshly of the tenacity with which he
asserted his rights. If an English soldier strikes for more pay,
it is in most cases only another name for more drink. He
seeks it, too often, as a means of personal indulgence. There is
nothing to render less greedy his greed. But the avarice of the
Sipahi was purified by domestic affection, by a tender regard
for the interests of others, and that strong feeling of family
honour which in India renders Poor Laws an useless institution.
He had so many dependents with whom to divide his slender
earnings, that any unexpected diminution of his pay excited
alarm lest those who were nearest and dearest to him should in
his absence be reduced to want. The honour of his family was
threatened ; he chafed under the thought ; and if he took un-
soldierly means of asserting his rights, we must remember the
provocation, and not forget those peculiarities of national senti-
ment which lighten the dark colours in which all such resistance
of authority presents itself to European eyes.

218 THE SIPAHI AEMY — ITS DECLINE. [1844.

Eventually Bombay troops were sent to garrison Sindh, and
the province became a part of the Bombay Presi-
Metres dency- But it is hard to say how much these first
abortive attempts to provide for its defence shook
the discipline of the Sipahi Army. For the evil was one to
which it was difficult to apply a remedy ; and the authorities
were greatly perplexed and at variance one with another. The
disbandment of a mutinous regiment is, in such a case, the most
obvious, as it is the easiest, measure to which Government can
resort ; but it may often be unjust in itself and dangerous in
its results. It falls alike on the innocent and on the guilty.
It fills the country with the materials of which rebellions are
made, or sends hundreds of our best fighting-men, with all the
lessons we have taught them, into the enemy's ranks. To be
effective, it should follow closely on the commission of the
crime which it is intended to punish; but it can rarely be
accomplished with this essential promptitude, for it is only
under certain favouring circumstances that an order to reduce
to penury and disgrace a thousand trained soldiers can be
carried out with safety to the State. To delay the execution of
the punishment is outwardly to condone the offence. It was
not strange, therefore, that when the 34th Infantry and the
7th Cavalry of Bengal mutinied on the frontier, almost in the
presence of the Sikh Army, there should have been obstinate
cpiestionings at Head-Quarters as to the expediency of disband-
ment on the spot, or at some safer place remote from the scene
of their crimes. It was the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, at
the time, that a regiment of Europeans and a troop of European
artillery should have been summoned with all haste from
Lodiana to Firuzpur, and that, in presence of this force, the
mutinous corps should have been at once disbanded. But a
reference, it has been said, was made to Government, and
the mutinous regiments were marched down, unsentenced, to
Lodiana and Mirath, there to await the decision of supreme
authority. The orders given left some discretion with the
Commander-in-Chief. The 7th Cavalry had not mutinied in a
body. The native officers and nearly two hundred troopers
were true to their Salt. Discipline might, therefore, be vin-
dicated by ordinary processes of law without involving the
innocent and the guilty alike in one common ruin. But the
34th, Native officers and Sipahis, were all tainted ; so, with
every mark of infamy, in the presence of all the troops, Euro-

1844.] DISBANDMENT. 219

pean arid Native, at Mirath, the regiment was broken up, the
British uniform was stripped from the backs of the mutineers,
and the number of the regiment was erased from the Army
List.*

Propinquity to an overawing European force removes the
chief difficulties which oppose themselves to the sudden dis-
solution of a Native regiment. But under no other circum-
stances is it to be counselled. The question of disbandment,
therefore, perplexed the Madras authorities even more than
those of Bengal. To march a regiment, with arms in its hands,
some hundreds of miles across the country, to receive its ser-
vices, and perhaps to witness its repentance during a period of
many weeks, all that time concealing the fate that is in store
for it, and then, having caged it in a safe place, pinioned it, as
it were, beyond all hope of resistance, to visit it with all the
terrors of a long-hidden, long-delayed retribution, is altogether
abhorrent to the generous nature of an English officer. To
have disbanded, for example, the 6th Madras Cavalry at Jabal-
pur would have been cruel and dangerous. To have marched it
to Arkat in ignorance of its fate, would have been cruel and
dastardly. To have broken it up at Kampati would have been
to incur, only in a less degree, the evil of both courses. And
nothing else appeared possible ; for it was not to be supposed
that all those indignant Muhammadans, men with whom revenge
is a virtue, would have quietly gone down, mounted on good
horses, and with sharpened sabres at their sides, in full know-
ledge of their destiny, to the disgraceful punishment awaiting
them. With these considerations before them, it was not
strange the Madras authorities hesitated to carry out the com-
prehensive penalty of disbandment, and that, as a choice
of difficulties, it should have suffered many guilty men to
escape.

In this instance, Lord Ellenborough was eager for disband-
ment. He said that the conduct of the regiment had been
equally bad in itself and pernicious in its results, for that the
disturbed state of Bundelkhand rendered it little short of
mutiny before the enemy, and it had disconcerted all the

* Two or three years afterwards the gap was filled up by the raising of a
new regiment, in no degree better than the old. [It was a rose-water measure
which inflicted but little real punishment, and failed entirely to stop the
plague.— G. B. M.]

220 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1844.

arrangements of his Government for the general defence of the
country. But it was not his, either on principle or in practice,
to deal harshly with the errors and delusions of the Native
Army, and there were few men living who had a more kindly
appreciation of the good qualities of the Sip;ihi, or who could
more readily sympathise with him. If he did not know pre-
cisely how to deal with a mutiny of that Army ; if he could
not, with accurate calculation of the results, so apportion the
just measures of leniency and severity as in no case to encourage
by the one or to exasperate by the other, he only failed where
no one had yet succeeded, and need not have blushed to find
himself mortal. He often said that a general mutiny of the
Native Army was the only real danger with which our empire
in India was threatened ; and he believed that the surest means
of maintaining the fidelity of the Sipahi was by continually
feeding his passion for military glory. In this he was right.
But the passion for military glory cannot always be fed without
injustice, and the evils of conquest may be greater than its
gains. He had much faith, too, in the good effect of stirring
addresses, appealing to the imaginations of the soldiery, and in
the application of donatives promptly following good service.
And, although in working out his theory he was sometimes
impelled to practical expressions of it, which caused people to
smile, as in the famous Somnat Proclamation, and in the dis-
tribution of the " favourite mihtais " to the Sipahis
after the battle of Maharajpur, there was, doubtless,
sound philosophy at the bottom of it. But such light as this
only served to show more clearly the many and great difficulties
with which the whole question of the Sipahi Army was beset,
and to convince reflecting minds that, though human folly
might accelerate the break-down of the whole system, human
wisdom could not so fence it around with safeguards as to give
it permanent vitality and strength.

That the treatment to which the mutinies arising out of the
annexation of Sindh were subjected by the Government of the
day was nothing more than a series of expedients is a fact, but
one which may be recorded without censure. The disbandment
of one regiment, the punishment of a few ringleaders in others,
the forgiveness of the rest ; the dismissal of an officer or two for
culpable mismanagement, and a liberal issue of donatives to all
who during the preceding year had either done well, or suffered
much, in the service of the State, were so many palliatives,

1844.] DIFFICULTIES OF GOVERNMENT. 221

born of the moment, which did not touch the seat of the disease,
or contribute to the future healthy action of the system. But
there were circumstances, both intrinsic and extrinsic, which
seemed to forbid, on grounds alike of justice and of policy, the
application of more vigorous remedies. The fact, indeed, that
the misconduct of the soldiery had, in a great measure, been the
direct growth of the injuries which they had sustained at the
hands of the Government, would have made severity a crime.
But it was no less certain that leniency was a blunder. If an
Army once finds that it can dictate to Government the amount
of its pay, there is an end to the controlling power of the latter.
What the State ought to have learnt from this lesson was the
paramount obligation which rested upon it of clearly explaining
to its troops all regulations affecting their pay and allow-
ances, and especially such as entailed upon them any loss of
privileges antecedently enjoyed. Under any circumstances a
reduction of pay is a delicate and hazardous operation. Even
the loyalty of European officers is not always proof against
such a trial. But the absence of explanation aggravates it, in
the Sipahi's eyes, into a breach of faith ; he believes that he is
only asserting his rights when he strikes for the restoration of
that of which he has been, in his own eyes unjustly, deprived •.
and the Government then, perplexed in the extreme, has only a
choice of evils before it, and either on the side of leniency or
severity is too likely to go lamentably wrong.

222 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [184ft.

CHAPTEE IV.

It was fortunate, perhaps, for the rulers of that day that Peace
was but of short duration, and that the " passion for military
glory " had again something to feed upon. The Sikh Army,
having risen against its own leaders, was vapouring on the
hanks of the Satlaj, and threatening to cross the British
frontier. No war could have been more welcome to the Sipahi
than a war with the Sikhs. For they were an insolent and
minacious race, and it was known that they had talked of
overrunning Hindustan, and pouring on to the sack of Delhi
and the pillage of Calcutta. They took the first step, and the
war commenced.

Whilst the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief
were at the head of the Army on the frontier, and
TbePatna a]j[ eyes were turned towards the scene of that
sanguinary conflict on the batlaj, lower down, on
the banks of the Ganges, four hundred miles from Calcutta, an
incident was occurring, which, in quiet times, might have made
itself heard all over the country, but which, lost in the din of
battle in that momentous winter, gave only a local sound.
Discovery was made of an organised attempt to corrupt the
soldiery in the Lower Provinces. On Christmas-eve the Magis-
trate of Patna received a letter from Major Eowcroft, informing
him that the Munshi of his regiment — the 1st N.I. — was in
treasonable correspondence with a rich and influential land-
owner in the neighbourhood, who had been tampering with the
allegiance of the Native officers and Sipahis in the contiguous
station of Danapur.

Of the truth of the story there was no doubt. To what
dimensions the conspiracy really extended, and from what
central point it radiated, is not known, and now never will be
known. It was a season of considerable popular excitement,
aggravated in the neighbourhood of Patna by local causes, and
eager efforts had been made to prepare the people for revolt.

1845-6.] EXCITEMENT AT PATNA. 223

Reports had been for some time current to the effect that the
British Government purposed to destroy the caste of the
Hindus, and to abolish Muharumadanism by forbidding the initial
ceremonj- through which admission is obtained to the number
of the Faithful. And to this was added another lie, scarcely
less alarming, that the Pardah was also to be prohibited, and that
Muhammadan females of all ranks were to be compelled to go
about unveiled. Stories of this kind, it has been observed,
however monstrous in themselves, are readily believed, if there
be but only a very little truth to give them currency. The
truth may be from within or it may be from without. It may
be direct proof or indirect confirmation. It little matters so
lung as there is something which men may see and judge for
themselves. There had been many exciting causes at this time,
to rouse the resentments and to stimulate the activities of the
Maulvis and the Pandits, such as the new law of inheritance
and the new educational measures ; and now the introduction of
the messing system in the gaols was a patent fact which all
might understand. It was an incident, moreover, of untoward
occurrence, that about this time, when designing men were
eagerly looking out for some false move on the part of the
Government, the Magistrate of Patna, at the request of the
Principal of the College, alarmed the inhabitants of the city by
instituting inquiries enabling him to form something of a census
of the population, showing their different castes, professions, and
employments — a movement which was at once declared to be
a part of the great scheme of the Government for the forcible
conversion of the people.

But it was necessary that the soldiery should be gained over
by some alarming fiction of especial application to the Sipahi
himself. Already had indirect agency been set at work for his
corruption. He found the lie in full leaf in his native village.
When he went on furlough, his relatives told him that if he did
not make a stand for his religion he would soon have to fight
against his brethren and kinsmen.* When he returned to his
regiment he found that every one was talking on the same
subject, and that it was currently believed that the introduction
of the messing system into the gaols was to be followed by its

* Some of the men of the 1st Regiment told Major Eowcroft that the
villagers had said, "Our village furnishes 500 men to your Army; but if you
will not listen to us, we will send 2000 jawans (young men) to oppose you."

224 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1845-6

introduction into the Army, and that the Sipahi was not much
longer to he allowed to have uncontrolled dominion over his own
cooking-pot.

If, then, there had been nothing more than this, the time
would have been propitious, and plotters might reasonably have
thought that the opportunity was ripe. But in that winter of
1845—46 a seditious enterprise of this kind in the Lower
Provinces was favoured by the circumstances of the great war
with the Sikhs, which was drawing all the resources of the
Government to the North-Western frontier. There was a vague
belief that lakhs of Panjabi fighting-men would soon be streaming
over the country, and that the English would be driven into the
sea. Many, then, with eager cupidity, bethought themselves of
gutting the opium godowns of Patna, where a million and a half
of Government property lay stored ; and all the dangerous
classes of the city were ripe and ready for pillage and for
slaughter. A rising of the Sipahis at such a time, or their
acquiescence in a rising of the people, might have been fatal to
the continued supremacy of Government in that part of the
country. The plotters scarcely hoped to accomplish more than
the latter of these two means of overthrowing the English. At
all events, it was safer to begin with the milder experiment on
the fidelity of the Sipahi. bo delegates went about in the Lines
saying that the great King of Dehli had sent a confidential
agent to give a month's pay to every Native officer and soldier
in the regiments in order that if any outbreak should occur iu
their part of the country they should not lift a hand in support
of the Government. All the landowners, and the cultivators,
and the townspeople were ready, it was said, to rise ; and if the
soldiery would only remain inactive, the British power might be
destroyed before it could perpetrate the outrages by which it
sought to overturn the religions of the country.

A Jamadar of the 1st Eegiinent heard this story, gravely
listened to all that was urged by the emissary of sedition, and
said that he would consider of the matter.* Then he repeated
all that had happened to his commanding officer, and measm-es
were soon taken to test the reality of the plot. There was
at all events one substantial proof that the story was no fiction.

* The Jamadar was a Brahman, by name Moti-Misr. He had been pay-
havililar to Roweroft, when the latter was adjutant of the regiment, and was
greatly attached to him.

1845-6.] CONSPIRACY DETECTED. 225

There was money counted out for the work of corruption, and
tied up in bags ready for immediate delivery. It was agreed that
the Jamadar and another officer in Eowcroft's confidence should
take the money, and matters were soon conveniently arranged so
as to bring about the disclosure. A detachment of the regiment
was about to proceed to Gaya; with, this went the two faithful
Jamadars. On the way they met or were overtaken by two
well-dressed Muhammadans in an ekka, or native wheeled-
carriage, who gave tbem the money, saying that others had
taken it, and that larger supplies were forthcoming for the same
purpose. Nothing could stamp the reality of the design more
surely than this. Men are in earnest when they part with their
money.

Another Native officer of the 1st traitorously took the cor-
rupting coin, and a Munshi of the regiment Avas found to be
deeply implicated in the plot. But Eowcroft's opportune
discovery of the attempt to debauch his men, and the measures
which he wisely adopted, rendered the further efforts of the
conspirators utterly futile and hopeless. The military offenders
were soon in confinement; the civil magistrate was tracking
down the instigators of sedition ; and if no great success then
attended the attempt to bring the necks of the most guilty to
the gallows, it was sufficient for the public peace that the plot
was discovered. What the amount of real danger then was it
is difficult to determine. Two other Native regiments at
Danapiir were tampered with in like manner, but the dis-
covery of the plot in Eowcroft's corps rendered other efforts
abortive. Many great names were used by the agents of
sedition, but upon what authority can only be conjectured. It
was stated that a royal mandate had come from the King of
Dehli ; that the Bajah of Nipal was ready to send a great
army sweeping down to the plains ; and again it was said that
the Sikhs were the prime movers of the plot.* All this can be
only obscurely shadowed on the page of history. But it is

* The principal aetor in the Patna conspiracy was one Khojah Hasan Ali
Khan. It seems that at the Sdnpur Fair, a short time before, he had
appeared in great state, and received a considerable number of influential
people in his tent, with the object of instilling: into them a fear of religious
conversion, and encouraging their determination to resist. He escaped for
want of evidence. There was also a wandering bookseller, who, on the plea
of selling Persian volumes to the Munshis of regiments, readily gained
access to them without exciting suspicion.

vol. I. Q

226 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1845-6.

certain that a scroll was found, described by a witness as being
many dibits long, on which the names of some hundred of
respectable inhabitants of Patna, Hindus and Muhammadans,
were attached to a solemn declaration binding them to die in
defence of their religion, and that it was honestly believed by
large numbers of the educated no less than the ignorant people
of that part of the country, that the one cherished object of
the British Government was to reduce all the people of India
to the no-caste state of the Faringhis. Of the reality of this
belief there is no doubt ; so a Proclamation was put forth by
the Governor of Bengal, declaring that as the British Govern-
ment never had interfered, so the people might be assured thai
it never would interfere in any way with the religions of the
country.

The Jamadar and the Munshi of the 1st Regiment, who had
been seduced into traitorous courses, were tried by court-martial,
and sentenced to death, with the usual reluctance manifested
by a tribunal composed only of Native officers.* But it was nol
necessary to strike terror into the minds of an army hovering
on the brink of general mutiny ; so the sentence was not carried
out. Whatever danger there may have been had passed away.1
The victories of Hardin ge and Gough had a grand moral effecl
from one end of the country to the other, for it had been
believed that the British were sore pressed, and that their powei
would be shaken to the centre by this collision with the Sikhs.
Victory made all things right again, and for a while we heard
nothing more of mutiny or sedition. With intervals of com-
parative repose, distinguished by an occupation of the Sikt
country, very flattering to the Sipahi's pride, and very profitable
to his purse, the operations which resulted in the fall of the

* Not long after the discovery of this plot, Major Rowcroft was seized witt
severe illness, not without suspicion of poison, and obliged to proceed to
England. Jamadar Moti-Misr told him that on his return to Iudia, he would,
doubtless, be able to lay before the Major further facts illustrative of the
extent of the conspiracy. But when Rowcroft rejoined the regiment both
Moti-Misr and the other faithful Jamadar were dead.

t It is stated in an interesting pamphlet, published by Mr. Stocqueler, iD
1857, that it was said at Danapur, after the discovery of this conspiracy, that
although the English had then escaped, there would be, in 1S57, when they
had ruled a hundred years, such a tomdaha as the country had never seen.
I can find no trace of this in any contemporary documents, nor have rny
inquiries from officers who were then at Danapur enabled me to confirm the
truth of the story.

1S45-6.] CONQUEST OF THE PANJAB. 227

Sikh empire then lasted for more than three years. The story
has been told in the first chapter of this work. The Panjab,
like Sindh, was turned by a stroke of the pen into a British
province, and the same difficulties bristled up in the path of the
Annexer. The Sipahi, called to serve in the Panjab, had no
longer the privileges of foreign service ; and, in spite of the
lesson taught by the Sindh annexation, he could not understand
why the conquest of the country should be inaugurated by the
reduction of his pay.

And so the regiments in the Panjab at that time, and those
which were moved across the Satlaj from our
older provinces, determined to refuse the reduced Mutiny in the
rates, and to stand out boldly for the higher Panjab.
allowances. All the regiments, suffering or soon to suffer from
the incidence of the reduction, took counsel with each other,
and promised mutual support. Delegates from the several corps
went about from station to station, and letters were exchanged
between those at a distance. The first manifestation of open
discontent was at Eawalpindi. There, one morning in July,
Sir Colin Campbell, a soldier of the highest promise, already
budding into fame — the " war-bred Sir Colin," as Napier then
called him — received the significant intelligence
that the 22nd Eegiment had refused to receive
their pay. Outwardly, the Sipahis were calm and respectful ,
but their calmness indicated a sense of strength, and Campbell
felt that all the other Native regiments in the Panjab would
probably follow their example. Such a combination at any
time and in any place would have been dangerous and alarming ;
but the peril was greatly aggravated by the peculiar circum-
stances of the times. For it had grown up in a newly-con-
quered country, swarming with the disbanded fighting-men of
the old Sikh Army, and it was believed that our discontented
Sipahis, if they had once broken into rebellion, would have soon
found their ranks swollen by recruits from the Khalsa soldiery,
eager to profit by the crisis, and again to strike for the recovery
of their lost dominion. We had just seen the downfall of an
empire precipitated by the lawlessness of an army, driven
onward by the impulses of its greed ; and now it seemed as
though our own soldiery, having caught the contagion, were
clamouring for donatives, and that it required very careful
steering to save us from being wrecked upon the same rock.

Sir Charles Napier had, at that time, just appeared upon the

Q 2

228 THE SIPi-HI AKMY — ITS DECLINE. [1849.

stase. He had hastened from Calcutta to Simla to meet the
Governor-General, who was refreshing himself with the cool
mountain air ; and there the news reached him, not that one,
but that two regiments at Eawalpindi had refused to take their
pay, and that there was every prospect of four more regiments
at Wazirabad, and two at the intermediate station of Jhilam,
following their example. Then Dalhousie and Napier took
counsel together, with some of their staff-officers, and it was
debated whether it would not be wise to strike a vigorous blow
at the incipient mutiny by disbanding the regiments which
had already refused to accept their pay. To this course, pro-
posed by Colonel Benson, an old officer of the Company's service,
held in deserved regard by many successive Governors-General,
Napier resolutely objected, and Dalhousie concurred with the
Chief. Hoping for the best, but still prepared for the worst,
the old soldier instructed Campbell to point out to the recusant
regiments the folly and wickedness of their course ; but he
wrote privately to him that in the event of their obduracy, he
and other commanding officers must bring the power of the
European regiments in the Panjab to bear upon the coercion of
the mutinous Sipahis. But before these letters arrived, Camp-
bell had tided over the difficulty. " The combination amongst
the men of the 13th and 22nd Kegiments," he wrote to Napier,
on the 26th of July, " gave way to fear on the 18th, the day
before your prescription for bringing them to their senses was
despatched from Simla." The fact is that, at that time, they
were not ready ; they were not strong enough for the resistance
of authority ; and they were not prepared to be the protomartyrs
in such a cause. There was a European regiment at Eawalpindi ;
there were European regiments at other stations not far removed ;
and so it was held to be a wiser course to wait until the new
regiments should arrive from the older provinces and unite with
them in the dangerous work of military rebellion.

That these regiments were prepared to resist was soon too
apparent. From Simla, Napier proceeded on a tour of inspection
to the principal military stations in the Northern Provinces of
India ; and at Delhi he found unmistakable signs of a confedera-
tion of many regiments determined not to serve in the Panjab
except on the higher pay. One regiment there, warned for
service beyond the Satlaj, declared its intention not to march;
but it was conciliated by a liberal grant of furloughs, which
had before been withheld; and it went on to its destination.

1849.] COLONEL HEARSEY. 229

Napier believed that the spirit of disaffection was wide-spread.
He had heard ominous reports of twenty-four regiments pre-
pared to strike, and when he entered the Panjab, he was not
surprised to find that mutiny was there only in a state of sus-
pended activity, and that at any moment it might burst out,
all the more furiously for this temporary suppression.

At Wazirabad it soon openly manifested itself. In command
of that station was one of the best soldiers of the Company's
service. At an early age John Hearsey had earned a name in
History, as one of the heroes of Sitabaldi, and thirty years of
subsequent service had thoroughly ripened his experience, so
that at this time he had perhaps as large a knowledge of the
Sipahi, of his temper, of his habits, of his language, as any
officer in the Native Army. With this large knowledge dwelt
also in him a large sympathy. It commonly happened in those
days that the man who best knew the Sipahi best loved him ;
and Hearsey, who had seen how good a soldier he could be
before the enemy, respected his good qualities, and looked
leniently on his bad. He believed that, with good management,
a Sipahi regiment might be kept, under almost any circum-
stances, in the right temper, and he had great faith in the magic
efficacy of a good speech. When, therefore, one of the regiments
at Wazirabad openly refused its pay, Hearsey drew up the men
on parade, and addressed them in language so touching, so
forcible, and so much to the point, that many hung down their
heads, ashamed of what they had done, and some even shed
tears of penitence. The pay was then offered to them again.
The first four men who refused were tried at once, and sentenced
to imprisonment with hard labour. The whole brigade was
then turned out to see the sentence carried into effect. There
were four Native regiments at Wazirabad ; but there was also
a Eegiment of the Line and detachments of European Artillery,
Horse and Foot. In the presence of this force, the convicted
Sipahis were manacled as felons and sent off to work on the
roads. After this, there were no more refusals ; the men took
their pay and did their work.

But discipline had not yet been fully vindicated. Three
ringleaders, who had been known to go from company to com-
pany, instigating and fomenting rebellion, were tried by court-
martial, and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. But
Napier, who regarded in a far stronger light both the enormity
of the offence and the magnitude of the danger, ordered a

230 THE SIPiHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1849-50.

revision of the sentence, and death was recorded against the
culprits ; and against two others who were tried for the same
offence by the same Court.* Then justice was satisfied, and
mercy might stretch forth its hand. The sentence was com-
muted to transportation for life. " In eternal exile," said Napier,
in his general order to the troops, "they will
Jan,u„aJ7 25' expiate their crimes. For ever separated from

1850. -., *i -t • ~t • •

their country and their relations, m a strange
land beyond the seas, they will linger out their miserable lives.
It is a change, but I do not consider it an amelioration of their
punishment. They will remain living examples of the miserable
fate which awaits traitors to their colours."

But the spirit of disaffection was not suppressed, though
locally for a time it was subdued. It was declared that the
Post-office runners laboured under the weight of the Sipahis'
letters, which were then passing from cantonment to canton-
ment ; but a large number of these letters were seized and
examined, and they were found to contain nothing on the
subject of the allowances. f Napier, however, anticipated a
crisis, and was prepared for it. Taking post at Peshawar, the
extremest comer of our new Panjab territory, where was a
strong European force, he believed that he would ere long be
compelled to sweep down with the English regiments, picking
up reinforcements as he went from station to station, and to
crush a general rising of the Sipahi troops. And soon it
appeared to him that the crisis had come. The 66th Eegiment
broke into mutiny at Govindgarh. Bursting out, on parade,
with vehement shouts of disapprobation, they attempted to
seize the gates of the Fort, so as to cut off all communication
with the loyal troops outside the walls. There was no European
regiment at Grovindgarh, but the 1st Native Cavalry, under
Bradford, were faithful among the faithless, and, aided by the
cool courage of Macdonald of the 66th, they made good their
entrance through the gate.| The Fort was saved. The European

* Sir Charles Napier, in his Indian Misgoverninent, says that four were
tried at first, and one afterwards ; but the fact is as stated in the text.

f Sir Henry Lawrence, in Calcutta Review, vol. xxii. The statement is
made on the authority of Major W. Mayne, President of the Goviudgarh
Court of Enquiry.

% An opportune blow from Macdonald's sword appears to have caused the
gate to be opened. See statement published by Sir H. Lawrence in Calcutta
Review, vol. xxiL

1850] DISBANDMENT OF THE 66TH. 231

officers were saved. And the guilty regiment was doomed to a
moral death. The 66th was struck out of the Army List. The
men were disbanded in a body, and their colours given to a
corps of Gurkhas, from the hill-tracts of Nipal, who were known
to be good soldiers, with no Brahman leal daintiness about them,
and a general fidelity to their Salt.

" When the 66th was disbanded," says Sir Charles Napier,
" the mutiny ceased entirely. Why ? The Brahmans saw that
the Gurkhas, another race, could be brought into the ranks of
the Company's Army — a race dreaded, as more warlike than
their own. Their religious combination was by that one stroke
rendered abortive." But, far other causes than this helped to
subdue the spirit of disaffection which was then ripening in
the Panjab. The Sipahis had struck for higher allowances than
those which had been granted to them by the strict letter of
the Eegulations ; but Napier thought, that however unsoldierly,
however culpable their conduct might be, some grounds of
dissatisfaction existed. The change, which the Sipahis re-
sented, was declared by the Chief to be " impolitic and unjust" ;
and, pending a reference to Government, orders were issued for
the payment of compensation to the troops, on a higher scale
than that sanctioned by the latest regulations.*

* The bare statement in the text will suffice for the general reader, but
not, perhaps, for the professional one. It may be stated, therefore, that it had
been for many years the rule of the Indian Government, "whenever the prices
of the common articles of consumption used by the Native soldiery exceeded
a certain fixed price, to grant them compensation proportionate to the ad-
ditional cost of supplies. This bounty seems first to have been bestowed in
the year 1821 on the Native troops serving in the Western Provinces, and
was limited to the single article of attah, or flour. Whenever attah was
selling at less than fifteen sirs (or thirty pounds) the rupee, a proportionate
compensation was granted. But, subsequently, in 1844, the application of
this order was extended by Lord Ellenborough, and compensation also was
granted to the Native troops serving in Sindh, when certain minor articles
of consumption were selling at a high price. In the following year a new
order relative to this same subject of compensation-money was issued by
Lord Hardinge, who had by this time succeeded to the government. Instead
of granting a separate money-compensation for each particular high-priced
article of consumption, all the several articles were massed, and some being
cheaper than elsewhere, a general average was struck. It was then officially
announced that thenceforth compensation would be granted to the Sipahis
" whenever the price of provisions, forming the Native soldier's diet, should
exceed 3 rupees and 8 annas, the aggregate of the rates for the several articles
laid down in the General Orders of the 26th of February, 1844." Whenever,
in other words, the Sipahi was unable to obtain his daily rations at a cost of

232 THE SIPAhI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1850.

Then arose that memorable conflict between Napier and
Dalhousie, which ended in the resignation by the

Daihousie and former of an office which many had predicted that
he conld not long continue to hold. Both were
men of imperious temper, and a collision between them was,
from the first, clearly foreseen. When the Military Chief took
upon himself to readjust the allowances of the troops in the
Panjab, the Civil Governor was at sea beyond the reach of an
official reference. He returned to find what had been done, and
he resented such an encroachment upon the prerogative of the
Government. Napier had justified the exercise of an authority
not constitutionally belonging to his office, by the assertion
that the danger was pressing, and that action, in such an
emergency, did not admit delay. Dalhousie denied the
premises ; he insisted that there had been no danger. " I
cannot sufficiently express," he wrote, in an elaborate Minute
on Napier's proceedings, " the astonishment with which I read,
on the 26th of May, the intimation then made to the Govern-
ment by the Commander-in-Chief, that in the month of January
last a mutinous spirit pervaded the army in the Panjab, and
that insubordination had risen so high and spread so wide, as
to impress his Excellency with the belief that the Government
of the country was placed at that time in a position of ' great
peril.' I have carefully weighed the statements which his
Excellency has advanced. I have examined anew the records
that bear on the state of public affairs at that period, and I
have well reflected upon all that has passed. While I do not
seek to question in any way the sincerity of the convictions by
which Sir Charles Napier has been led to declare that the army
was in ■ mutiny and the empire in clanger, I, on my part, am
bound to say that my examination and reflection have not lessened
in any degree the incredulity with which I first read the
statements to which I have referred." " There is no justi-
fication," continued his Lordship, " for the cry that India was
in danger. Free from all threat of hostilities from without,

3 rupees 8 annas a month (which cost was calculated in accordance with the
aggregate fixed rates of the prices of provisions, beyond which compensation,
under the old regulations, was granted for each article), the excess was to be
defrayed by the Government. The regulation of 1845 was not so favourable
to the troops as that of 184-1, and Sir Charles Napier, believing that the
application of the former rule to the troops in the Panjab was a mistake,
directed the regulation of 1844 again to be brought into force.

1850.] NAPIER'S RESIGNATION. 233

and secure, through the submission of its new subjects, from
insurrection within, the safety of India has never for one
moment been imperilled by the partial insubordination in the
ranks of its army. I have confronted the assertions of the
Commander-in-Chief on this head with undisputed facts, and
with the authority of recorded documents, and my convictions
strengthened by the information which the Government
commands, I desire to record my entire dissent from the
statement that the army has been in mutiny, and the empire in
danger."

This was, doubtless, the popular view of the matter ; and it
was readily accepted at the time. What amount of danger
really existed was never known, and now never will be known.
Whatever it may have been, it was tided over; and the
quietude that followed this temporary explosion seemed to
warrant the confidence which the Governor-General had ex-
pressed. But Napier held to his opinion with as much tenacity
as Dalhousie. Nothing could shake the belief of the old soldier
that the exceptional course he had adopted was justified by
the exceptional circumstances of the times. Still he knew the
duty of obedience ; he knew that in a conflict between two
authorities the lower must yield to the higher, and that he had
no right to complain if the latter asserted the power vested in
him by the Law. " And I do not complain," he emphatically
added. But strong in his conviction of right, and master of
himself, though not of the situation, he felt that he could
retire with dignity from a position which he could not hold
with profit to the State. And he did retire. On the 22nd of
May, he addressed a letter to the Horse-Guards, requesting that
the Duke of Wellington would obtain her gracious Majesty's
permission for him to resign the chief command of the Indian
Army. " And the more so," he added, " as being now nearly
seventy years of age — during the last ten years of which I have
gone through considerable fatigue of body and mind, especially
during the • last year — my health requires that relief from
climate and business which public service in India does not
admit."

But there is no blame, in such a case, to be recorded against
the Governor-General. When an old and distinguished soldier
— a warrior of high repute, and a man of consummate ability —
deliberately declares that he regards the system under which
he has been called upon to command an army as a system at

234 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1850.

once faulty and dangerous; that lie conceives the power of the
civil magistrate to be so absolute that the arm of the chief
soldier is paralysed ; and that, so enervated and emasculated bv
restrictions imposed upon him by law, he cannot wield the
sword with honour to himself or advantage to the State, and
that, therefore, he desires to lay it down, he utters words
which, whether he be right or wrong in his estimate of what
ought to be the just balance between the civil and the military
j)ower, are honest, manly, dignified words, and outrht every-
where to be received with respect. Few men had a better
right than Sir Charles Napier to criticise an Act of Parliament.
He had a right to think that the law was a bad law ; and he
had a right to say that it was bad. But the law, whether good
or bad, was not made by Lord Dalhousie, but by the British
Parliament. It was Dalhousie's business to administer that
law, and to maintain the authority vested in him by the
Imperial Legislature. Of this Napier had no right to complain,
and he declared that he did not complain. But the contest was
on every account an unseemly and an unfortunate one. It was
another and a culminating instance of that excessive central-
isation which weakened the authority and degraded the character
of the military arm, and taught the soldiery that the greatest
chief whom England could send them was as much a subaltern
of the civil governor as the youngest ensign on the Army List.
And it taught even more than this. It taught thinking
men, not for the first time, that even the chief members of the
Government were at war among themselves, and the lesson
shook their faith in the stability of a power thus disunited,
thus incoherent. " I am now sixty years of age," wrote an
intelligent native official to Sir George Clerk. " I have heard
three sayings repeated by wise men, and I myself have also
found out, from my own experience, that the sovereignty of
the British Government will not be overthrown save by the
occurrence of three objectionable circumstances." And the first
of these circumstances he thus stated : " Formerly the high,
dignified Sahibs had no enmity among themselves, or at least
the people of India never came to know that they had enmity.
Now enmity exists among them, and it is as well seen as the
sun at noonday that they calumniate and bear malice against
each other." * Such conflicts of authority are keenly watched and

* MS. Correspondence, translated from the Persian.

1850.] CONFLICTS OF AUTHORITY. 235

volubly discussed ; and a significance is attached to them out of
all proportion to the importance with which amongst us like
contentions are invested. The natives of India know that we
are few ; hut they feel that union makes us many. Seen to he
at discord among ourselves, we shrivel into our true pro-
portions, and it is believed that our power is beginning to
crumble and decay.

During the administration of Lord Ellenborough there had
been disunion among the higher authorities, arising out of
nearly similar causes. The unauthorised promises given by
the Commander-in-Chief to the Native troops proceeding to
Sindh had stirred the resentment of the Governor-General, and
his grave displeasure was excited by the zealous indiscretions
of the Madras Government. But he had studiously veiled
from the public eye the differences that had arisen. There was
nothing to which he was more keenly alive than to the
necessity, especially in troubled times, of maintaining a show of
union and co-operation in the high places of Government. It
was his hard fate at last to be compelled, by the fiat of a
higher power, to exhibit to the people of India, in his own
person, the very spectacle which he had striven to conceal from
them, and to declare, trumpet-tongued, that the English were
vehemently contending among themselves. But so long as
he exercised the supreme control he was careful not to reveal
the local dissensions of the Government, lest he should weaken
the authority it was so essential to uphold ; and little even is
now known of the strife that raged at the time, when the
great difficulty of garrisoning Sindh was filling the minds of
the rulers of the land. But the strife between Dalhousie and
Napier was proclaimed, almost as it were by beat of drum, in
all the Lines and Bazaars of the country ; and all men knew
that the English, who used so to cling to one another, that it
seemed that they thought with one strong brain and struck
with one strong arm, were now wasting their vigour by
warring among themselves, and in their disunion ceasing to
be formidable.

This was apparent to all men's eyes ; but the Sipahi had his
own particular lesson to learn, and did not neglect it. How
it happened that the bitter experience which the English
Government had gained, on the annexation of Sindh, made
no impression upon the minds of those whose duty it was
to provide against the recurrence of similar disasters, it, is

236 THE SIPAHI ARMY — ITS DECLINE. [1850

impossible to explain. All we know is, that five years after a
misunderstanding between the Government and the Army
with respect to the rates of pay and allowance to be disbursed
to the Sipahi, in a newly-acquired country, had driven into
mutiny a large number of Native regiments, and greatly per-
plexed the rulers of the day, a similar conjuncture arose, and
there was a similar misunderstanding, with similar results.*
The Sipahi had not learnt to reconcile himself to the British
theory of Annexation, and so he resented it in the Panjab as
he had before resented it in Sindh. In the latter country the
excitement was far greater, and the danger more serious, than
in the former ; but in both there was an outburst on the one
side, and a concession on the other. That was given to the
mutinous soldier, not without loss of character by Government,
which might before have been given to the loyal one with
befitting dignity and grace. When the emergency arises, it is
hard to say whether there be greater evil in concession or in
resistance. Napier thought the one thing, Dalhousie thought
the other ; and each had strong argument on his side. But
both must have bitterly regretted that the contingency was
ever suffered to arise, that no one in authority, warned by the
lessons of the Past, had learnt to look at the consequences of
Annexation with a Sipahi's eyes, and anticipated, by small
concessions, the not irrational expectations which, at a later
stage developing into demands, had all the force and signifi-
cance of mutiny. Had this been done ; had the Sipahi been

* This uncertainty with respect to the pay and allowances of different
branches and different ranks of the Indian Army was emphatically com-
mented upon by Sir Henry Lawrence in an article bearing his name in the
Calcutta Bevieiv : " Of all the wants of the Army, perhaps the greatest want
is a simple pay-code, unmistakably showing the pay of every rank, in each
branch, under all circumstances. At present there are not three officers in
the Bengal Army who could, with certainty, tell what they and the people
under them are entitled to in every position in which they are liable to be
placed. The Audit-office seldom affords help. It is considered an enemy
ready to take advantage of difficulties, not an umpire between man and man.
During the last thirty years I have seen much hardship on officers in matters
■of accounts, and of the several instances of discontent that I have witnessed
in the Native Army, all were more or less connected with pay. and in almost
every instance the men only asked for what they were by existing rules
entitled to. Half a sheet of paper ought to show every soldier his rate of
pay, by sea, by land, on leave, on the staff', in hospital, on duty, &c. There
ought to be no doubt on the matter. At present there is great doubt,
though there are volumes of Pay and Audit Regulations."

1850.] DISREGARDED WARNINGS. 237

told that in consideration of increased distance from home, and
other circumstances rendering service in Sindh and the Panjab
more irksome to him than in our older provinces, certain
especial advantages would be conferred upon him — advantages
which might have been bestowed at small cost to the State —
he would have received the boon with gratitude, and applauded
the justice of his masters ; but after he had struck for it, he
saw not their justice, but their fear, in the concession, and he
hugged the feeling of power, which lessons such as these could
not fail to engender.

238 THE MILITAKY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-6.

CHAPTEK V.

After this, there was again a season of quiet. The remaining
years of Lord Dalhousie's administration passed away without
any further military outbreaks to disturb his rooted conviction
of the fidelity of the Sipahi. There were not wanting those who
declared that there was an ineradicable taint in the constitu-
tion of the Bengal Arniy, that it was rotten to the very core.
But the angry controversies which arose — the solemn warnings
on the one side, and the indignant denials on the other —
proved nothing more than that among men entitled to speak
with authority on the subject there were vast diversities of
opinion. Much of this was attributed to class prejudices and
professional jealousies. One voice, very loud and very earnest,
pealing from the West, sustained for years a continual remon-
strance against the laxities of the Bengal system. But Bengal
resented the outrage. A genuine man, above all pettiness,
John Jacob, was declared to be the exponent only of small
Presidential envyings and heart-burnings. The voice of
Truth was proclaimed to be the voice of Bombay. And
when officers of the Bengal Army wrote, as some did most
wisely, of the evil symptoms which were manifesting them-
selves, and of the clangers which appeared to be looming
in the distance, they were denounced as defilers of their
own nest, and as feeble-minded alarmists, to whose utterances
no heed should be given. There was a general unwilling-
ness to believe in the decay of discipline throughout one
of the finest armies of the world ; and in the absence of
any outward signs of mischief, we willingly consented not
to look beneath the surface for the virus of undeveloped
disease.

There is nothing that is strange, and little that is blamable
in this. The Bengal Sipahi had evinced signs of a fro ward,
petulant nature, and he had, on several occasions, broken out

1851-6.] STATE OF THE BENGAL AKMY. 239

after a fashion which, viewed by European military eyes, is
criminality of the deepest dye. But these aberrations were
merely a few dark spots upon a century of good service. It
was not right that rare exceptions of this kind should cancel in
our minds all the noble acts of fidelity which were chronicled
in the history of our Empire. Nor was it to be forgotten that,
in most instances, the criminality of the Sipahi had been the
direct growth of some mismanagement on the part either of the
officers whom he followed or the Government which he served.
To have looked with suspicion on the Sipahi, because from
time to time some component parts of our Army had done that
which the Armies of every Native State had done with their
whole accumulated strength, would have been equally unwise
and unjust. For although it might be said that the examples
which those Natives States afforded ought to have taught us
to beware of the destroying power of a lawless soldiery, the
English were justified in believing that there were special
reasons why their own mercenaries should not tread in the
footsteps of the Maratha and Sikh Armies. They did not
believe in the love of the Sipahi ; but they believed in his
fidelity to his Pay.

Whilst it was natural, and indeed commendable, that the
remembrance of all the good service which the
Native soldiery had done for their English Char|J/h?fthe
masters, should have sustained our confidence in
them as a body, there was nothing in the individual character
of the Sipahi to subvert it. Even his outbreaks of rebellion
had recently partaken more of the naughtiness of the child than
of the stern resolution of manhood. He had evinced a dis-
position, indeed, rather to injure himself than to injure others ;
and it was not easy for those who knew him to believe that he
was capable of any violent and sanguinary excesses. His
character was made up of inconsistencies, but the weaker and
less dangerous qualities appeared to have the preponderance ;
and though we knew that they made him a very difficult
person to manage, we did not think that they made him a
dangerous one. From the time when, in the very infancy of
the Sipahi Army, a Madras soldier cut down Mr. Haliburton,
and was immediately put to death by his own comrades, to the
day when Colin Mackenzie was well-nigh butchered at Bolarani
by troopers of his own brigade, there had been ever and anon
some murderous incidents to disfigure the Military History of

240 THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-6.

our Indian Empire.* But outrages of this kind are common to
all armies ; and. there was no reason to regard them in any-
other light than that of exceptional aberrations. It was not to
be said that the Sipahi was a ruffian because he had done
some ruffianly deeds.

He was, indeed, altogether a paradox. He was made up of
inconsistencies and contradictions. In his character, qualities
so adverse as to be apparently irreconcilable with each other
met together and embraced. He was simple and yet designing;
credulous and easily deceived by others, and yet obstinately
tenacious of his own inbred convictions ; now docile as a child,
and now hard and immovable in the stubbornness of his man-
hood. Abstemious and yet self-indulgent, calm and yet im-
petuous, gentle and yet cruel, he was indolent even to languor
in his daily life, and yet capable of being roused to acts of the
most desperate energy. Sometimes sportive, and sometimes
sullen, he was easily elevated and easily depressed ; but he was
for the most part of a cheerful nature, and if you came suddenly
upon him in the Lines you were more likely to see him with a
broad grin upon his face than with any expression of moroseness
or discontent. But light-hearted as was his general tempera-
ment, he would sometimes brood over imaginary wrongs, and
when a delusion once entered his soul it clung to it with the
subtle malevolence of an ineradicable poison.

And this, as we now understand the matter, was the most
dangerous feature of his character. For his gentler, more genial
qualities sparkled upon the surface and were readily appreciated,
whilst all the harsher and more forbidding traits lay dark and
disguised, and were not discernible in our ordinary intercourse
with him. There was outwardly, indeed, very much to rivet
the confidence of the European officer, and very little to disturb
it. It is true that if we reasoned about it, it did not seem to be
altogether reasonable to expect from the Sipahi any strong
affection for the alien officer who had usurped all the high places
of the Army, and who kept him down in the dead level of the
dust. But Englishmen never reason about their position in the
midst of a community of strangers ; they take their popularity
for granted, and look for homage as a thing of course. And that

* See Williams's Bengal Army and Mackenzie's Narrative of the Mutiny
at Bolarara ; compare also section on the Sipahi Army in Sutherland's Sketches
of the Native States of India.

1S51-6.] CHARACTER OF THE BENGAL SIPAHI. 241

homage was yielded to the British officer, not for his own sake,
for the Sipahi hated his colour and his creed, his unclean ways,
and his domineering manners ; but because he was an embodi-
ment of Success. It was one of the many inconsistencies of
which I have spoken, that though boastful and vainglorious
beyond all example, the Native soldier of India inwardly
acknowledged that he owed to the English officer the aliment
which fed his passion for glory and sustained his military pride.
This, indeed, was the link that bound class to class, and resisted
the dissolving power of many adverse influences. It was this
that moved the Sipahi to light up the tomb of his old command-
ing officer ; it was this that moved the veteran to salute the
picture of the General under whom he had fought. But there
was a show also of other and gentler feelings, and there were
instances of strong personal attachment, of unsurpassed fidelity
and devotion, manifested in acts of charity and love. You might
see the Sipahi of many fights, watchful and tender as a woman,
beside the sick-bed of the English officer, or playing with the
pale-faced children beneath the verandah of his captain's
bungalow. There was not an English gentlewoman in the
country who did not feel measureless security in the thought
that a guard of Sipahis watched her house, or who would not
have travelled, under such an escort, across the whole length
and breadth of the land. What was lurking beneath the fair
surface we knew not. We saw only the softer side of the
Sipahi's nature ; and there was nothing to make us believe that
there was danger in the confidence which we reposed in those
outward signs of attachment to our rule.

But whilst cherishing this not unreasonable confidence in
the general good character of the Sipahi, the British
Government might still have suffered some doubts Defects in
and misgivings to arise when they looked into the
details of the System. They might, it has been urged, have be-
lieved in the soundness of the whole, but admitted the defective-
ness of parts, and addressed themselves earnestly and deliberately
to the details of the great work of Army Beform. Instead of
boasting that the condition of the Native soldier left nothing to
be desired, Lord Dalhousie, it is said, ought to have looked
beneath the surface, to have probed all the vices of the existing
system, and to have striven with all his might to eradicate them.
Information was not wanting. " Officers of experience " were at
all times ready to tell him what it behoved him to do. But in

VOL. I. R

242 THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF INDIA. ["1851-6.

the multitude of counsellors there was inextricable confusion.
As with the whole, so with the parts. The forty years'
experience of one greybeard belied the forty years' experience
of another. And when the responsible ruler had been almost
persuaded to see a blot and to promise to erase it, another
adviser came, straightway declared it to be a beauty, and
besought him to leave it as it was. Thus distracted by the con-
flicting judgments of the best military critics, Dalhousie did, as
others had done before him ; he admitted that if he had then for
the first time to construct a Native Army it would in some
respects differ from that which he saw before him, the growth
not of systems and theories but of circumstances ; but that as it
had grown up, so on the whole it was better to leave it, as
chauge is sometimes dangerous, and almost always misunder-
stood.

That, indeed, there was no more difficult question to under-
stand than that of the Sipahi Army, was a fact which must have
been continually forced upon the mind of the Governor-General,
by the discordant opinions which were pronounced on points
vitally affecting its fidelity and efficiency. Even on the great
question of Caste, men differed. Some said it was
desirable that Native regiments should be composed
mainly of high-caste men ; because in such men were combined
many of the best qualities, moral and physical, which contribute
to the formation of an accomplished soldier. The high-caste
man had a bolder spirit, a purer professional pride, a finer frame,
and a more military bearing, than his countrymen of lower social
rank. Other authorities contended that the Native soldiery
should be enlisted indiscriminately, that no account should be
taken of Caste distinctions, and that the smaller the proportion
of Brahmans and Eajputs in the service the better for the disci-
pline of the Army. Comparisons were drawn between the
Bengal and the Bombay Armies. There was a strong and not
unnatural prejudice in favour of the Bengal Sipahi ; for he was
a fine, noble-looking fellow, and in comparison with his
comrades from the Southern and Western Presidencies, was said
to be quite a gentleman ; but there were those who alleged that
he was more a gentleman than a soldier ; and it was urged that
the normal state of the Bengal Army was Mutiny, because in an
Army so constituted caste was ever stronger than discipline ;
and the social institutions of the Sipahi domineered over the
necessities of the State.

1851-6.] HIGH CASTE AND LOW CASTE. 243

It was contended, for this reason, that the Bengal Army
required a larger infusion of low-caste men. But it was alleged,
on the other hand, that this very mixture of castes tended to
destroy the discipline of which it was proposed to mate it the
preservative ; for that military rank was held to be nothing in
comparison with Brahmanical Elevation, and that the Sipahi
was often the " master of the officer." * To this it was replied
that the presumption of Caste was favoured and fostered by the
weakness and indulgence of the officers of the Bengal Army ;
that, in the armies of Madras and Bombay, Caste had found its
level ; that it had neither been antagonistic to good service, nor
injurious to internal discipline ; that high-caste men in those
armies did cheerfully what they refused to do in Bengal, and
that low-caste native officers met with all the respect from
their social superiors due to their superior military rank. It
was asserted, indeed, that Brahmanism was arrogant and exact-
ing in Bengal, because it saw that it could play upon the
fears of the English officers. To this it was replied, that disre-
gard caste as we might, we could never induce the natives to
disregard it. And then again the rejoinder was, that in the
other Presidencies we had taught them to disregard it, why,
then, might not the same lesson be taught in Bengal ? The
answer to this was, that men will often do in other countries
what they cannot be persuaded to do in their own ; that high-
caste Hindustanis enlisting into the Bombay or Madras Armies
were, to a great extent, cut off from the brotherhood, that they
were greatly outnumbered in their several regiments, that it
was convenient to conform to the custom of the country, and
that what he did in a foreign country amongst strangers was
little known at home. In a word, when he took service in the
Bombay Army, he did what was done in Bombay; just as
among ourselves, men who, fearful of losing caste, would on no
account be seen to enter a London hell, think nothing of spend-
ing whole days in the gambling-rooms of Homburg or Baden-
Baden.

Of a kindred nature was the question hotly discussed, whether
it were wiser to compose each regiment of men of the same race,

* " I cannot conceive the possibility of maintaining discipline in a corps
where a low-caste non-commissioned officer will, when he meets off duty a
Brahman Sipahi, crouch down to him with his forehead on the ground. I
have seen this done. The Sipahi thus treated is the master of the officer." —
Evidence of Major-Oeneral Birch.

R 2

244 THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-6.

or to mix up different races in the same corps. On the one hand,
it was alleged that the fusion of different nation-

Nationalities. -i... ijxt j. i • ^ 1 *■

alines nad a tendency to keep internal combina-
tions in check ; but that if men of one tribe were formed into
separate regiments ; if we had Patan regiments and Gurkha
regiments, Sikh regiments and Maratha regiments, facilities
for mutinous combinations would be greatly increased. On
the other hand, it was contended that the fusion of different
tribes and castes in the several regiments encouraged external
combinations by imparting common interests to the whole
Army ; that if safety were to be sought in the antagonism of
nationalities, it was more likely to be attained by keeping them
apart than by fusing them into a heterogeneous mass ; that it
was easier to keep one regiment from following the example
of another composed of different materials, raised and stationed
in a different part of the country, than to keep one half of a
regiment from following the example of the other; easier to
make men fight against those whom they had never seen, than
against those with whom they had long lived, if not in brother-
hood of caste, at least in brotherhood of service.

Again, men discussed, with reference to this question of
combination, the relative advantages and dis-

Generai advantages of localisation and distribution.

service. Whilst some contended that the different Sipahi
regiments should serve respectively only in certain parts
of the country, except under any peculiar exigencies of war
— in other words, that they should be assimilated as much
as possible to a sort of local militia — others were in favour
of the existing system, under which there were periodical
reliefs, and regiments marched from one station to another,
often many hundreds of miles apart. On the one hand, it was
argued that there was much danger in the local influence
which would be acquired by men long resident in the same
place, and that intrigues and plots, rendered perilous by the
fusion of the civil and military classes, might result from this
localisation ; and, on the other, it was urged that it was far
more dangerous to suffer the Sipahi regiments to become
extensively acquainted with each other, for the men to form
friendships, and therefore to have correspondents in other corps,
and thus to afford them the means, in times of excitement, of
forming extensive combinations, and spreading, as it were, a
network of conspiracy over the whole face of the country. Thus,

1851-6.] POINTS OF CONTROVERSY. 245

again, men of wisdom and experience neutralised one another's
judgments, and from amongst so many conflicting opinions it
was impossible to evolve the truth.

It was a question also much debated whether the fidelity and
efficiency of the Sipahi were best maintained by
keeping him apart from his family, or by suffering
the wives, the children, and the dependents of the soldier to attach
themselves to his regiment, and to follow his fortunes. The
former was the system in the Bengal Army ; the latter, in the
Army of Madras, and partially in that of Bombay. Each
system had its advocates ; each its special advantages. The
Bengal Sipahi visited his family at stated times, and remitted to
them a large part of his pay. If he failed to do this he was a
marked man in his regiment ; and it was said that the know-
ledge that if he failed in his duty as a soldier, a report of his
misconduct would surely reach his native village, and that his
face would be blackened before his kindred, kept him in the
strict path of his duty. The presence of the Family led to
much inconvenience and embarrassment, and the necessity of
moving it from one station to another, when the regiments were
relieved, strained the scanty resources of the Sipahi, and
developed grievances out of which mutiny might arise.* It was
said, indeed, that there was " hardly a Native regiment in the
Bengal Army in which the twenty drummers, who were
Christians, and had their families with them, did not cause
more trouble to their officers than the whole eight hundred
Sipahis." t On the other hand, it was urged that the presence
of the Family afforded the best guarantee for the fidelity and
good conduct of the Sipahi. His children were hostages in our
hands ; tbe honour of his women was in our keeping. These
were held to be safeguards against mutiny and massacre. It
was urged, too, that the system tended more to keep them, as a
race, apart from the general mass of their countrymen ; that the
ties which bound them to the country were thus weakened, and
their interests more indissolubly associated with the State.
They were less representative men than their brethren of the
Bengal Army, and more a part of the machinery of Government.
And so each system had its advocates, and each was left to work
itself out and develop its own results.

* See the case of the 6th Madras Cavalry, ante, p. 213.
t Sleeman on the Spirit of Discipline in the Native Army.

246 THE MILITAKY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-6.

Great, also, was the difference of opinion with respect to
Promotion. Some said that the Bengal Army was

omo on. destroyed by the Seniority system, which gave to
every Sipahi in the service an equal chance of rising to the rank
of a Commissioned Officer.* Others maintained that this was
the very sheet-anchor which enabled it to resist all adverse
influences. Strong arguments were adduced, and great names
were quoted upon both sides. It was said that under such a
system there was no incentive to exertion ; that the men were
independent of their officers, that they had no motive to earn the
good opinion of their superiors, that it was enough for them to
drowse through a certain number of years of service, to slide
quietly into a commission, and then to end their military lives
in a state of senile somnolence and apathy. The Native officers
of the Bengal Army were, therefore, for the most part, respect-
able, worn-out, feeble-minded old men, with no influence in their
regiments, and no desire beyond that of saving themselves as
much trouble as possible, and keeping things as quiet as they
could. On the other hand, it was alleged that the seniority
system was the very prop and support of the Sipahi service ;
that all men were happy and contented, and had some aliment
of hope, so long as they felt that nothing but their own mis-
conduct could deprive them of the right of succession to the
highest grades of the Native Army. It was said that to pass
over a man at the head of the list, and to give promotion to
others of shorter service, would be to flood the regiments with
desperate malcontents, or else with sullen, broken-spirited idlers.
Whilst Henry Lawrence and John Jacob were descanting on the
evil of filling the commissioned ranks of the Sipahi Army with
" poor old wretches, feeble in body and imbecile in mind,"|
Charles Napier was peremptorily commanding that " the fullest
attention and consideration should invariably be given to the
claim of seniority in every grade " of the Native Army, and
William Sleeman was asserting, not less emphatically, in his
published writings, that " though we might have in every
regiment a few smarter Native officers, by disregarding the rule
of promotion than by adhering to it, we should, in the diminu-

* To every regiment of Native infantry were attached one Subahdar-major,
ten Subahdars, and ten Jamadars.

t Views and Opinions of General John Jacob, p. 120 ; compare also Sir
Henry Lawrence's Essays, Military and Political, p. 24 et seq.

1851-6.] OFFICERING OF THE ARMY. 247

tion of good feeling towards the European officers and the
Government, lose a thousand times more than we gained."*
What wonder, then, that Governor-General after Governor-
General was perplexed and bewildered, and left things, when he
passed away from the scene, as he found them on his first
arrival.

Then, again, there were wide diversities of opinion with
respect to the European officering of regiments.
There were those who contended for the Irregular European officers.
and those who were loud in their praises of the
Eegular system ; some who thought it better to attach
to each regiment a few select officers, as in the old times,
giving them some power and authority over their men ; and
others who believed it to be wiser to officer the regiments
after the later English system, like regiments of the Line,
with a large available surplus for purposes of the General
Staff, and to leave all the centralised power and authority in
the hand of the Adjutant-General of the Army, j There was a
continual cry, not always, it must be admitted, of the most un-
selfish character, for " more officers " ; and yet it was plain that
the Irregular regiments, to which only three or four picked
officers were attached, were in a perfect state of discipline in
peace, and capable of performing admirable service in war. It
was said that in action the Sipahis, losing their officers, killed
or carried wounded to the rear, lost heart, and were soon panic-

* Sleeman relates, that " an old Subahdar, who had been at the taking of
the Isle of France, mentioned that when he was the senior Jamadar of his
regiment, and a vacancy had occurred to bring him in as Subahdar, he was
sent for by his commanding officer, and told that by orders from Head-
Quarters he was to be passed over, on account of his advanced age and sup-
posed infirmity. ' I felt,' said the old man, ' as if I had been struck by light-
ning, and fell down dead. The Colonel was a good man, and had seen much
service. He had me taken into the open air, and when I recovered he told
me that he would write to the Commander-in-Chief and represent my case.
He did so immediately, and I was promoted, and I have since done my duty
as Subahdar for ten years.' " But, it may be asked, hoiv ? It must be borne
in mind, too, that Sleeman speaks here of the effect of supercession under a
Seniority system. Under a system of selection such results would not be
apparent, because there would not be the same disgrace in being passed
over.

f A regiment of Native Infantry in March, 1856, was officered by 1 colonel,
1 lieutenant- colonel, 1 major, 6 captains, 10 lieutenants, and 5 ensigns. A
few months afterwards another captain and another lieutenant were added to
each regiment.

248 THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-6.

struck ; and that if officers were so few, this contingency must
often happen. To this, however, it was replied, that if
the Native officers were of the right class, they would keep
their men together, and still do good service ; but if they were
worn-out imbeciles, or over-corpulent and scant of breath, of
course disorder and ruin must follow the fall of the English
officers. Then, hearing this, the disputant on the other side
would triumphantly ask how many years' purchase our empire
in India were worth, if our Native officers were as efficient as
ourselves. It was often argued, indeed, that our instructions
might some day return to plague the inventor ; that to make men
qualified to lead our battalions to battle against our enemies is
to qualify them to command troops to fight against ourselves.
Btit there were others, and chief among them Henry Lawrence,
who, taking a larger and more liberal view of the question,
contended that it was sound policy to give every man, European
and Native, a motive for exertion ; who declared that it was one
of the crying wants of our system that it afforded no outlet for
the energies of Native soldiers of superior courage and ability,
and urged that we could not expect to have an efficient Native
Army so long as we rigidly maintained in it the theory of the
Dead Level, and purposely excluded every possible inducement
to superior exertion.

Nor less curious were the fundamental diversities of opinion
which manifested themselves, when thinking men began to
consider whether the English in India carried into their daily
lives too much or two little of their nationality. It was asserted
on the one side, that the English officer was too stiff-necked and
exclusive, that he dwelt apart too much, and subdued himself
too little to surrounding influence ; and on the other side, that
he fell too rapidly into Oriental habits, and soon ceased to be,
what it should have been his ambition to remain to the last, a
model of an English Gentleman. It was urged by some that
increased facilities of intercourse with Europe rendered men
more dissatisfied with the ordinary environments of Eastern
life and professional duty, whilst others declared that one of
the most serious defects in the Indian Military System was the
difficulty with which the English officer obtained furlough to
Europe.* The stringency of the Furlough Regulations had, how-
ever, been greatly relaxed during the administration of Lord

* Views and Opinions of Brigadier-General John Jacob.

1851-6.] DIVERSITIES OF OPINION. 249

Dalhousie, and the establishment of regular steam-communi-
cation between the two countries had made the new rules
practical realities. But whatsoever increased intercourse with
Europe may have done to promote the application of Western
science to our Indian Military System, it did not improve the
regimental officer. It was contended that he commonly re-
turned to his duty with increased distaste for cantonment life ;
and that he obeyed the mandate, " Let it be the fashion to be
English," by suffering a still greater estrangement to grow up
between him and the Native soldier.

Indeed, there was scarcely a single point, in the whole wide
range of topics connected with the great subject of the efficiency
of the Native Indian Army, which did not raise a doubt and
suggest a controversy. And there was so much of demonstrable
truth in the assertions, and so much cogency in the arguments
adduced, on both sides, that in the eyes of the looker-on it was
commonly a drawn battle between the two contending parties ;
and so, as it was the easier and perhaps the safer course to leave
things as they were, tbe changes which Army Keformers so
earnestly advocated were practically rejected, and we clung to
evils which had grown up in the system rather than we would
incur the risk of instituting others of our own.

But perplexing as were these practical details, there was
nothing so difficult of solution as the great doubt
which arose as to the amount of confidence in the intermixture of

-i . 1 . t . ,, European 1 roops.

Sipahi Army which it was expedient outwardly
to manifest. It was said, upon the one hand, that any
diminution of our confidence would be fatal to our rule, and,
on the other, that our confidence was leading us onward to
destruction. Some said that the Native Army should be
narrowly watched, and held in control by sufficient bodies of
European soldiery ; other contended that we could commit no
more fatal mistake than that of betraying the least suspicion of
the Sipahi, and suggesting even a remote possibility of one part
of our Army ever being thrown into antagonism to the other.
This controversy was half a century old. When, after the
massacre of Velliir, the Madras Government urged upon the
Supreme Authority in Bengal the expediency of sending some
reinforcements of European troops to the Coast, the latter
refused to respond to the call, on the ground that such a move-
ment would betray a general want of confidence in the Native
Army, and might drive regiments still loyal into rebellion

250 THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-6.

under an impulse of fear. There was force in this argument,
which will be readily appreciated by all who understand
the character of the Sipahi Army ; and its cogency was not
diminished by the fact put forth by the Madras Government
that the European troops under their command were fewer by
two thousand men than they had been before the recent large
extension of territory. But a great lesson was to be learnt
from the embarrassment which then arose ; a lesson which ought
to have been taken to the hearts of our rulers from one genera-
tion to another. It was then clearly revealed, not merely that
" prevention is better than cure," but that prevention may be
possible when cure is not ; that we may hold danger in check
by quietly anticipating it, but that, when it has arisen, the
measures, to which we might have resorted before the fact,
cannot be pursued, after it, without increasing the evil. If
anything should teach us the wisdom of never suffering our
European force, even in the most tranquil times, to decline
below what we may call " the athletic standard," it is the fact
that, when the times cease to be tranquil, we cannot suddenly
raise it to that standard without exciting alarm and creating
danger.

But this lesson was not learnt. Or, if Indian statesmen ever
took it to their hearts, it was remorselessly repudiated in the
Councils of the English nation. Other considerations than
those of the actual requirements of our Indian empire were
suffered to determine the amount of European strength to be
maintained on the Company's establishment. Stated in round
numbers, it may be said that the normal state of things, for
some years, had been that of an Army of 300,000 men, of which
40,000 were European troops. Of these, roughly calculated,
about one-third were the local European troops of the Country,
raised exclusively for Indian service ; the rest were the men
of Boyal regiments, Horse and Foot, periodically relieved
according to the will of the Imperial Government, but paid out
of the Kevenues of India. In the five years preceding the de-
parture of Lord Dalhousie from India, the strength of the
Company's European troops had been somewhat increased, but
the force which England lent to India was considerably reduced.
In 1852, there were twenty -nine Koyal regiments in the three
Presidencies of India, mustering 28,000 men ; in 1856, there
were twenty-four Koyal regiments, mustering 23,000 men.
During those five years there had been a vast extension of

The Crimean
War.

1851-6.T DEFICIENCY OF EUROPEAN FORCE. 251

empire; but the aggregate European strength was lower in
1856 than in 1852 by nearly three thousand men. Between
those two dates England had been engaged in a great war, and
she wanted her troops for European service.

We deceive ourselves, when we think that European politics
make no impression on the Indian Public. The
impression may be very vague and indistinct ; but
ignorance is a magnifier of high power, and there
are never wanting a few designing men, with clearer knowledge
of the real state of things, to work upon the haziness of popular
conceptions, and to turn a little grain of truth to account in
generating a harvest of lies. That a number of very pre-
posterous stories were industriously circulated, and greedily
swallowed, during the Crimean War, and that these stories all
pointed to the downfall of the British power, is not to be doubted.
It was freely declared that Russia had conquered and annexed
England, and that Queen Victoria had fled and taken refuge
with the Governor-General of India. The fact that the war
was with Russia gave increased significance to these rumours ;
for there had long been a chronic belief that the Russlog
would some day or other contend with us for the mastery of
India ; that, coming down in immense hordes from the North, and
carrying with them the intervening Muhammadan States, they
would sweep us, broken and humbled, into the sea. And it
required no great acuteness to perceive that if a popular in-
surrection in India were ever to be successful, it was when the
military resources of the empire were absorbed by a great
European war. It is at such times as these, therefore, when
there is always some disturbance of the public mind, that
especial care should be taken to keep the European strength in
India up to the right athletic standard. But, in these very
times, the dependency is called upon to aid the empire, and
her European regiments are reluctantly given up at the critical
moment when she most desires to retain them. " The idea
broached in Parliament," said a Native gentleman, " of drawing
troops from India for the Crimean War, took intelligent natives
of India by surprise." They saw plainly the folly of thus
revealing our weakness to the subject races ; for we could not
more loudly proclaim the inadequacy of our resources than by
denuding ourselves in one quarter of the world in order that
we might clothe ourselves more sufficiently in another.

Nor was it this alone that, during the last years of Lord

252 THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-6.

Dalhousie's administration, " took intelligent natives of India
by surprise." They saw us increasing our territory, in all
directions, without increasing our European force. There were
those who argued that territorial increase did not necessarily
demand increased means of defence, as it might be a change,
not an extension, of frontier ; indeed, that the consolidation of
our empire, by diminishing the numbers of our enemies, ought
rather to be regarded as a reason for the diminution of our
military strength. And this, in respect to our external enemies,
it has already been observed, was not untrue.* But our
dangers were from within, not from without ; and it was for-
gotten that false friends might be more dangerous than open
enemies. The English in India were, indeed, continually in a
state of siege, and the conquest of their external enemies
increased the perils of their position, for it deprived them of
those safety-valves which had often before arrested a ruinous
explosion. We were far too sanguine in our estimates of the
results of conquest or annexation. We saw everything as we
wished to see it. We saw contentment in submission, loyalty
in quiescence ; and took our estimate of national sentiment
from the feelings of a few interested individuals who were
making money by the change. But " intelligent natives "
seeing clearly our delusion, knowing that we believed a lie,
wondered greatly at our want of wisdom in suffering vast tracts
of territory, perhaps only recently brought under British rule,
to lie naked and defenceless, without even a detachment of
English fighting-men to guard the lives of the new masters of
the country. And little as we gave them credit for sagacity in
such matters, they touched the very kernel of our danger with
a needle's point, and predicted that our confidence would
destroy us.

It was fortunate that, when we conquered the Panjab, it was
impossible to forget that Afghanistan, still festering with
animosities and resentments born of the recent invasion, lay
contiguous to the frontier of our new province. It was
fortunate, too, that Henry Lawrence, being a man of a quick
imagination, could feel as a Sikh chief or a Sikh soldier would
feel under the new yoke of the Faringhi, and could therefore
believe that we were not welcomed as deliverers from one end
of the country to the other. But it was not fortunate that the

* Ante, p. 202.

1851-6.] THE ANNEXATION OF OUDH. 253

obvious necessity of garrisoning this frontier Province with a
strong European force should have been practically regarded as
a reason for denuding all the rest of India of English troops.
Acting in accordance with the old traditions, that the only
danger with which our position in India is threatened, is
danger coming from the North- West, we massed a large body
of Europeans in the Panjab, and scattered, at wide intervals,
the few remaining regiments at our disposal over other parts of
our extended dominions. Thus we visibly became more and
more dependent on our Native Army ; and it needed only the
declaration of weakness made, when England called on India
for regiments to take part in the Crimean War, to assiire " intel-
ligent natives " that the boasted resources of England were
wholly insufficient to meet the demands made upon them from
different quarters, and that we could only confront danger
in one part of the world by exposing ourselves to it in
another.*

And this impression was strengthened by the fact that when
Oudh was annexed to our British territories,
although the province was thereby filled with Annexation of
the disbanded soldiery of the destroyed Native 0udh'
Government, and with a dangerous race of discontented nobles,
whom the revolution had stripped of their privileges and
despoiled of their wealth, the English appeared not to possess
the means of garrisoning with European troops the country
which they had thus -seized. As Oudh was not a frontier
province, there was no necessity to mass troops there, as in
the Panjab, for purposes of external defence ; and the English,
emboldened by success, were stronger than ever in their
national egotism, and believed that, as they could not be
regarded in Oudh in any other light than that of deliverers,
there was small need to make provision against the possibility
of internal disturbance. They left the province, therefore,
after annexation had been proclaimed, with only a small
handful of European fighting-men ; and " intelligent natives "
were again surprised to see that the English gentlemen were
carrying out their new scheme of administration, to the ruin of
almost every pre-existing interest in the country, with as much

* It has been alleged, too, that the subscriptions raised towards tbe support
of the Patriotic Fund during the Crimean War, impressed intelligent natives
•with the belief that we were as short of money as we were of men.

254 THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-6.

confidence as if every district of Oudh were bristling with
British bayonets. They saw, too, that the English had absorbed
one of the last remaining Muhammadan States of India ; and
they felt that not only would this prodigious appropriation
be regarded from one end of India to the other as the pre-
cursor of new seizures, and that it would thus greatly
disturb the public mind, but that the very class of men on
whom we appeared to rely for the continued security of our
position were, of all others, most likely to resent this act of
aggression.

For the annexation of Oudh had some results injurious to the
Sipahi. A very large portion of the Bengal Army was drawn
from that province. In every village were the families of men
who wore the uniform and bore the arms of the English. Being
for the most part high-caste Hindus, they might not have
regarded the peaceful revolution by which a Muhammadan
monarchy was destroyed with any strong feelings of national
resentment; and it is certain that this extension of territory
was not provocative of the feelings of aversion and alarm with
which they regarded those other seizures which had sent them
to rot in the charnel-house of Sindh, or to perish in exile on the
frontiers of Afghanistan. Their griefs were of another kind.
The old state of things had suited them better. They had
little sympathy, perhaps, with Wajid Ali, and service in Oudh
brought them nearer to their homes. But so long as it was a
foreign province, they derived certain special privileges and
advantages from their position as the servants of the Company,
and increased importance in the eyes of the people of the
province. They had, indeed, been a favoured race, and as such
the Sipahi families had held up their heads above those of their
countrymen who had no such bonds of privilege and protection
to unite them to the Paramount State. " The Sipahi," wrote
the man who had studied the character and probed the feelings
of the Native more deeply and philosophically perhaps than
any of his contemporaries — " the Sipahi is not the man of
consequence he was. He dislikes annexations ; among other
reasons, because each new province added to the Empire widens
his sphere of service, and at the same time decreases our foreign

enemies and thereby the Sipahi's importance The

other day, an Oudh Sipahi of the Bombay Cavalry at Niinach,
being asked if he liked annexation, replied, ' No ; I used to be a
great man when I went home. The best in my village rose as

1851-6.] PRIVILEGES OF THE OUDH SIPAHIS. 255

I approached. Now the lowest puff their pipes in my face.' " *
Under the all-prevailing lawlessness and misrule, which had so
long overridden the province, the English Sipahi, whatever
might be the wrongs of others, was always sure of a full
measure of justice on appeal to the British Eesident. If he
himself were not, some member of his family was, a small
yeoman, with certain rights in the land — rights which
commonly among his countrymen were as much a source of
trouble as a source of pride — and in all the disputes and con-
tentions in which these interests involved him, he had the
protection and assistance of the Eesident, and right or wrong
carried his point. In the abstract it was, doubtless, an evil
state of things, for the Sipahi' s privileges were often used as
instruments of oppression, and were sometimes counterfeited
with the help of an old regimental jacket and pair of boots, by
men who had. never gone right-face to the word of command.
But for this very reason they were dearly valued ; and when
the Sipahis were thus brought down by annexation to the dead
level of British subjects, when the Besidency ceased to be, and
all men were equally under the protection of the Commissioner,
the Sipahi families, like all the other privileged classes in
Oudh, learnt what the revolution had cost them, and, wide
apart as their several grievances lay from each other, they
joined hands with other sufferers over a common grief.

Looking, then, at the condition of the Native Army of India,
and especially at the state of the Bengal regi-
ments, as it was in the spring: of 1856, we see that Summary of

. c -i • i i'i* • deteriorating

a series ot adverse circumstances, culminating in influences.
the annexation of Oudh, some influencing him
from without and some from within, had weakened the attach-
ment of the Sipahi to his colours. We see that, whilst the
bonds of internal discipline were being relaxed, external events,
directly or indirectly affecting his position, were exciting within

* Sir Henry Lawrence to Lord Canning, MS. Correspondence. I may
give here in a note the words omitted in the text, as bearing, though not im-
mediately, upon the Oudh question, and upon the general subject of annexa-
tion : " Ten years ago, a Sipahi in the Panjab asked an officer what we would
do without them. Another said, ' Now you have got the Panjab, you will
reduce the Army.' A third remarked, when he heard that Sindh was to be
joined to the Bengal Presidency, ' Perhaps there will be an order to join
London to Bengal.' "

256 THE MILITARY SYSTEM OP INDIA. [1851-6.

him animosities and discontents. We see that as he grew less
faithful and obedient, he grew also more presuming ; that
whilst he was less under the control of his officers and the
dominion of the State, he was more sensible of the extent to
which we were dependent upon his fidelity, and therefore more
capricious and exacting. He had been neglected ou the one
hand, and pampered on the other. As a soldier, he had in many
ways deteriorated, but he was not to be regarded only as a
soldier. He was a representative man, the embodiment of
feelings and opinions shared by large classes of his countrymen,
and circumstances might render him one day their exponent.
He had many opportunities of becoming acquainted with
passing events and public opinion. He mixed in cantonments,
or on the line of march, with men of different classes and
different countries ; he corresponded with friends at a distance ;
he heard all the gossip of the Bazaars, and he read, or heard
others read, the strange mixture of truth and falsehood con-
tained in the Native newspapers. He knew what were the
measures of the British Government, sometimes even what were
its intentions, and he interpreted their meanings, as men are
wont to do, who, credulous and suspicious, see insidious designs
and covert dangers in the most beneficent acts. He had not
the faculty to conceive that the English were continually
originating great changes for the good of the people ; our
theories of government were beyond his understanding, and as
he had ceased to take counsel with his English officer, he was
given over to strange delusions, and believed the most dangerous
lies.

But in taking account of the effect produced upon the
Sipahi's mind by the political and social measures of the British
Government, we must not think only of the direct action of
these measures — of the soldier's own reading of distant events,
which might have had no bearing upon his daily happiness, and
which, therefore, in his selfishness he might have been content-
to disregard. For he often read these things with other men's
eyes, and discerned them with other men's understandings. If
the political and social revolutions, of which I have written, did
not affect him, they affected others, wiser in their generation,
more astute, more designing, who put upon everything we did
the gloss best calculated to debauch the Sipahi's mind, and to
prepare him, at a given signal, for an outburst of sudden
madness. Childish, as he was, in his faith, there was nothing

1851-6.] CORRUPTING INFLUENCES. 257

easier than to make him believe all kinds and conditions of
fictions, not only wild and grotesque in themselves, but in
violent contradiction of each other. He was as ready to believe
that the extension of our territory would throw him out of
employment, as that it would inflict upon him double work.
He did not choose between these two extremes ; he accepted
both, and took the one or the other, as the humour pleased him.
There were never wanting men to feed his imagination with the
kind of aliment which pleased it best, and reason never came to
his aid to purge him of the results of this gross feeding.

Many were the strange glosses which were given to the acts
of the British Government ; various were the ingenious fictions
woven with the purpose of unsettling the mind and uprooting
the fidelity of the Sipahi. But diverse as they were in many
respects, there was a certain unity about them, for they all
tended to persuade him that our measures were directed to one
common end, the destruction of Caste, and the general in-
troduction of Christianity into the land. If we annexed a
province, it was to facilitate our proselytising operations, and
to increase the number of onr converts. Our resumption
operations were instituted for the purpose of destroying all the
religious endowments of the country. Our legislative enact-
ments were all tending to the same result, the subversion of
Hinduism and Muhammadanism. Our educational measures
were so many direct assaults upon the religions of the country.
Our penal system, according to their showing, disguised a
monstrous attempt to annihilate caste, by compelling men of
all denominations to feed together in the gaols. In the Lines
of eveiy regiment there were men eager to tell lies of this kind
to the Sipahi, mingled with assurances that the time was
coming when the Faringhis would be destroyed to a man ;
when a new empire would be established, and a new military
system inaugurated, under which the high rank and the
higher pay monopolised by the English would be transferred
to the people of the country. We know so little of what is
stirring in the depths of Indian society; we dwell so much
apart from the people ; we see so little of them, except in full
dress and on their best behaviour, that perilous intrigues and
desperate plots might be woven, under the very shadow of our
bungalows, without our perceiving any symptoms of danger.
But still less can we discern that quiet under-current of
hostility which is continually flowing on without any im-

VOL. I. S

258 THE M1LITAKY SYSTEM OF INDIA. [1851-&.

mediate or definite object, and which, if we could discern it,
would baffle all our efforts to trace it to its soiirce. But it does
not the less exist because we are ignorant of the form which it
assumes, or the fount from which it springs. The men, whose
business it was to corrupt the minds of our Sipahis, were, per-
haps, the agents of some of the old princely houses, which we
had destroyed ,* or members of old baronial families which we

had brought to poverty and disgrace. They were, perhaps, the
emissaries of Brahmanical Societies, whose precepts we were
turning into folly, and whose power we were setting at naught.
They were, perhaps, mere visionaries and enthusiasts, moved
only by their own disordered imaginations to proclaim the
coming of some new prophet or some fresh avatar of the Deity,
and the consequent downfall of Christian supremacy in the
East. But whatsoever the nature of their mission, and what-
soever the guise they assumed, whether they appeared in the
Lines as passing travellers, as journeying hawkers, as religious
mendicants, or as wandering puppet-showmen, the seed of
sedition which they scattered struck root in a soil well pre-
pared to receive it, and waited only for the ripening sun of
circumstance to develop a harvest of revolt.

* It was asserted at the time of the " Mutiny of Vellilr," that not only were
agents of the House of Tipu busy in all the lines of Southern India, but that
there was scarcely a regiment into which they had not enlisted.

1856.] DEPARTURE OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 259

BOOK III.— THE OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY.
[1856—1857.]

CHAPTER I.

When, on the last day of February, 1856, "the Most Noble"
the Marquis of Dalhousie placed the Portfolio of the Indian
Empire in the hands of his successor, all men said that a great
statesman and a great ruler was about to depart from the land.
The praises that were bestowed upon him had been well earned.
He had given his life to the public service ; and many feared,
as they sorrowfully bade him farewell, that he had given it up
for the public good.

He stood before men at that time as the very embodiment of
Success. Whatsoever he had attempted to do he had done with
his whole heart, and he had perfected it without a failure or a
flaw. The policy which during those eventful eight years had
been so consistently, maintained was emphatically his policy.
The success, therefore, was fairly his. No man had ever
stamped his individuality more clearly upon the public measures
of his times. There are periods when the Government fades
into an impersonality ; when men cease to associate its measures
with the idea of one dominant will. But during the reign
then ended we heard little of " the Government " ; in every
one's mouth was the name of the individual Man.

And in this remarkable individual manhood there was the very
essence and concentration of the great national
manhood ; there was an intense Englishism in him Character 0f Lord
such as has seldom been equalled. It was the
Englishism, too, of the nineteenth century, and of that par-
ticular epoch of the nineteenth century when well-nigh every
one had the word " progress " on his lips, and stagnation was

260 OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY. 1.185&

both disaster and disgrace. A man of strong convictions and
extraordinary activity of mind, he laid fast hold of the one
abstract truth that English government, English laws, English
learning, English customs, and English manners, are better
than the government, the laws, the learning, the customs, and
the manners of India ; and with all the earnestness of his nature
and all the strength of his understanding he wrought out this
great theory in practice. He never doubted that it was good
alike for England and for India that the map of the country
which he had been sent to govern should present one surface of
Red. He was so sure of this, he believed it so honestly, so con-
scientiously, that, courageous and self-reliant as he was, he
would have carried out this policy to the end, if all the chief
officers and agents of his government had been arrayed against
him. But he commenced his career at a time when the ablest
of our public functionaries in India, with a few notable excep-
tions, had forsaken the traditions of the old school — the school
of Malcolm, of Elphinstone, and of Metcalfe — and stood eager
and open-armed to embrace and press closely to them the very
doctrines of which they perceived in Dalhousie so vigorous an
exponent. He did not found the school; neither were his
opinions moulded in accordance with its tenets. He appeared
among them and placed himself at their head, just at the very
time when such a coming was needed to give consistency to
their faith, and uniformity to their works. The coincidence had
all the force of a dispensation. No prophet ever had more
devoted followers. No king was ever more loyally served. For
the strong faith of his disciples made them strive mightily to
accomplish his will ; and he had in a rare degree the faculty of
developing in his agents the very powers which were most
essential to the fitting accomplishment of his work. He did not
create those powers, for he found in his chief agents the instincts
and energies most essential to his purpose ; but he fostered, he
strengthened and directed them, so that what might have run
to weed and waste without his cherishing care, yielded under
his culture, in ripe profusion, a harvest of desired results.

As his workmen were admirably suited to his work, so also
was the field, to which he was called, the one best adapted to
the exercise of his peculiar powers. In no other part of our
empire could his rare administrative capacity have found such
scope for development. For he was of an imperious and des-
potic nature, not submitting to control, and resenting opposition ;

1856.] CHARACTER OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 261

and in no situation could he hare exercised a larger measure of
power in the face of so few constitutional checks. His capacities
required free exercise, and it may be doubted whether they
would have been fully developed by anything short of this
absolute supremacy. But sustained and invigorated by a sense
of enormous power, he worked with all the energies of a giant.
And he was successful beyond all examj^le, so far as success is
the full accomplishment of one's own desires and intentions.
But one fatal defect in his character tainted the stream of his
policy at the source, and converted into brilliant errors some of
the most renowned of his achievements. No man who is not
endowed with a comprehensive imagination can govern India
with success. Dalhousie had no imagination. Lacking the
imaginative faculty, men, after long years of experience, may
come to understand the national character ; and a man of lively
imagination, without such experience, may readily apprehend it
after the intercourse of a few weeks. But in neither way did
Dalhousie ever come to understand the genius of the people
among whom his lot was cast. He had but one idea of them —
an idea of a people habituated to the despotism of a dominant
race. He could not understand the tenacity of affection with
which they clung to their old traditions. He could not sym-
pathise with the veneration which they felt for their ancient
dynasties. He could not appreciate their fidelity to the time-
honoured institutions and the immemorial usages of the land. He
had not the faculty to conceive that men might like their own
old ways of government, with all their imperfections and cor-
ruptions about them, better than our more refined systems.
Arguing all points with the preciseness of a Scotch logician, he
made no allowance for inveterate habits and ingrained prejudices,
and the scales of ignorance before men's eyes which will not
suffer them rightly to discern between the good and the bad.
He could not form a true dramatic conception of the feelings
with which the representative of a long line of kings may be
supposed to regard the sudden extinction of his royal house by
the decree of a stranger and an infidel, or the bitterness of spirit
in which a greybeard chief, whose family from generation to
generation had enjoyed ancestral powers and privileges, might
contemplate his lot when suddenly reduced to poverty and
humiliation by an incursion of aliens of another colour and
another creed. He could not see with other men's eyes; or
think with other men's brains ; or feel with other men's hearts.

262 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

With the characteristic unimaginativeness of his race he could
not for a moment divest himself of his individuality, or conceive
the growth of ancestral pride and national honour in other
breasts than than those of the Campbells and the Barosays.

And this egotism was cherished and sustained by the pre-
vailing sentiments of the new school of Indian politicians, who,
as I have said, laughed to scorn the doctrines of the men who
had built up the great structure of our Indian Empire, and by
the utterances of a Press, which, with rare ability, expounded
the views of this school, and insisted upon the duty of universal
usurpation. Such, indeed, was the prevailing tone of the
majority, in all ranks from the highest to the lowest, that any
one who meekly ventured to ask, " How would you like it
yourself?" was reproached in language little short of that
which might be fitly applied to a renegade or a traitor. To
suggest that in an Asiatic race there might be a spirit of in-
dependence and a love of country, the manifestations of which
were honourable in themselves, however inconvenient to us,
was commonly to evoke as the very mildest result the imputa-
tion of being " Anti-British," whilst sometimes the " true
British feeling " asserted itself in a less refined choice of epithets,
and those who ventured to sympathise in any way with the
people of the East were at once denounced as " white niggers."
Yet among these very men, so intolerant of anything approach-
ing the assertion of a spirit of liberty by an Asiatic people,
there were some who could well appreciate and sympathise
with the aspirations of European bondsmen, and could regard
with admiration the struggles of the Italian, the Switzer, or the
Pole to liberate himself, by a sanguinary contest, from the yoke
of the usurper. But the sight of the dark skin sealed up their
sympathies. They contended not merely that the love of country,
that the spirit of liberty, as cherished by European races, is in
India wholly unknown, but that Asiatic nations, and especially
the nations of India, have no right to judge what is best for
themselves ; no right to revolt against the beneficence of a more
civilised race of white men, who would think and act for them,
and deprive them, for their own good, of all their most cherished
rights and their most valued possessions.

So it happened that Lord Dalhousie's was a strong Govern-
ment ; strong in everything but its conformity to the genius of
the people. It was a Government admirably conducted in
accordance with the most approved principles of European

1856.] CHARACTER OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 263

civilisation, by men whose progressive tendencies carried them
hundreds of years in advance of the sluggish Asiatics, whom
they vainly endeavoured to bind to the chariot-wheels of their
refined systems. There was everything to give it complete
success but the stubbornness of the national mind. It failed,
perhaps, only because the people preferred darkness to light,
folly to wisdom. Of course the English gentlemen were right
and the Asiatics lamentably wrong. But the grand scriptural
warning about putting new wine into old bottles was disre-
garded. The wine was good wine, strong wine; wine to
gladden the heart of man. But poured into those old bottles
it was sure, sooner or later, to create a general explosion. They
forgot that there were two things necessary to successful gov-
ernment ; one, that the measures should be good in themselves ;
and the other, that they should be suited to the condition of the
recipients. Intent upon the one, they forgot the other, and
erred upon the side of a progress too rapid and an Englishism
too refined.

But at the bottom of this great error were benign intentions.
Dalhousie and his lieutenants had a strong and steadfast faith in
the wisdom and benevolence of their measures, and strove alike
for the glory of the English nation and the welfare of the
Indian people. There was something grand and even good in
the very errors of such a man. For there was no taint of base-
ness in them ; no sign of anything sordid or self-seeking. He
had given himself up to the public service, resolute to do a
great work, and he rejoiced with a noble pride in the thought
that he left behind a mightier empire than he had found, that
he had brought new countries and strange nations under the
sway of the British sceptre, and sown the seeds of a great
civilisation. To do this, he had made unstinting sacrifice of
leisure, ease, comfort, health, and the dear love of wedded life,,
and he carried home with him, in a shattered frame and a torn
heart, in the wreck of a manhood at its very prime, mortal
wounds nobly received in a great and heroic encounter.

Great always is the interest which attaches to the question of
succession ; greatest of all when such a ruler as Dalhousie
retires from the scene. Who was to take the place of this great
and successful statesman ? Who was to carry out to its final
issue the grand policy which he had so brilliantly inaugurated ?
This was the question in all men's mouths as the old year
passed away and the new year dawned upon India ; in some

264 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

sort a remarkable year, for was it not the centenary of the great
disaster of the Black Hole which had brought Olive's avenging
army to Bengal ? Ever at such times is there much talk of the
expected advent of some member of the English Cabinet, some
successful Colonial Governor, or some great Lord little ex-
perienced in statesmanship, of high lineage and dilapidated
fortune. And so now there was the wonted high tide of
speculation and conjecture, wild guesses and moonshine rumours
of all kinds, from dim possibilities to gigantic nonsenses, until
at last there came authentic tidings to India that the choice had
fallen on Her Majesty's Postmaster-General, one of the younger
members of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet.

Scarcely within bounds of possibility was it, that, in the
midst of so great an epidemic of faith in Lord

LorTcannto? Lalhousie, England could send forth a statesmen
to succeed him, whom her Anglo-Indian sons would
not receive with ominous head-shakings, denoting grave doubts
and anxious misgivings. Another great man, it was said, was
needed to understand, to appreciate, to maintain, the policy of
the hero whom they so glorified. But they knew little or
nothing of Viscount Canning, except that he was the bearer of a
great name. Thirty-four years before, all England
had been talking about the acceptance of the
Governor-Generalship by this man's father. There were a
few, then, who, looking at the matter solely from an Indian
point of view, exulted in the thought that one who had done
such good service at the Board of Control, and whose abilities
were known to be of the very highest order, was about to
devote some of the best years of his life to the government of
our great Eastern empire. There was another and a baser few,
who, festering with jealousies, and animosities, and dishonourable
fears, joyed most of all that they should see his face no more for
years, or perhaps for ever. But the bulk of the English people
deplored his approaching departure from among them, because
they felt that the country had need of his services, and could
ill bear the loss of such a man. And it was a relief to them
when the sad close of Lord Castlereagh's career brought George
Canning back from the visit, which was to have been his fare-
well, to Liverpool, to take his place again in the great Council
of the nation.

Great, also, was the relief to George Canning himself — great

1856.] EARLY CAREER OF LORD CANNING. 265

for many reasons ; the greatest, perhaps, of all, that he was
very happy in his family. In the first year of the century he
had married a lady, endowed with a considerable share of the
world's wealth, but with more of that better wealth which the
world cannot give ; the daughter and co-heiress of an old
general officer named Scott. No man could have been happier
in his domestic life ; and domestic happiness is domestic virtue.
Blind to the attractions of that Society in which he was so pre-
eminently formed to shine, he found measureless delight in the
companionship of his wife and children. And as an Indian life
is more or less a life of separation, it was now a joy to him to
think that the brief vision of Government House, Calcutta, had
been replaced by the returning realities of the English fireside.*
At this time the great statesmen had a son in his tenth year,
at school with Mr. Carmalt, of Putney, on the
banks of the Thames. He was the third son Gloucester Lodge,
born to George Canning ; f born during what was
perhaps the happiest period of his father's life, his residence at
Gloucester Lodge. This was the boy's birthplace. Lying
between Brompton and Kensington, it was at that time
almost in the country. There was not, perhaps, a pleasanter
place near Town. It had a strange, memorable history,
too, and it was among the notabilities of suburban London.
In the days of Eanelagh, it had been, under the name
of the Florida Gardens, a lesser rival to that fashionable
haunt ; and from this state, after an interval of desertion and
decay, it had developed into a royal residence.:}: The Duchess
of Gloucester bought the Gardens, built there a handsome
Italian villa, lived and died there, and, passing away, bequeathed
her interest in the estate to the Princess Sophia, who sold it
to Mr. Canning. And there, in this pleasant umbrageous retreat,

* " The unsullied purity of Mr. Canning's domestic life," says his last and
pleasantest biographer, " and his love of domestic pleasures (for after his
marriage he seldom extended his intercourse with general society beyond
those occasions -which his station rendered unavoidable), were rewarded by as
much virtue and devotion as ever graced the home of an English statesman."
— BelVs Life of Canning.

f At this time Charles was the second surviving son. The eldest, George
Charles, born in April, 1801, died in March, 1820. The second brother was
in the navy.

% See Bell's Life of Canning, chapter x., which contains an animated
sketch of the early history of Gloucester Lodge, and of the social and
domestic environments of the great statesman's residence there.

266 OUTBEEAK OP THE MUTINY. [1856.

on the 14th December, 1812, was born the third son of George
Canning, who, in due course, was christened Charles John.
In 1822, as I have said, when George Canning woke from
his brief dream of Indian vice-regal power to
ThschoUainey take tne seals of the Foreign Office, this boy
Charles was under the scholastic care of Mr.
Carmalt, of Putney. In those days his establishment enjoyed
a great reputation. It was one of the largest and best private
schools in the neighbourhood of London, perhaps in the whole
kingdom, and, as the sons of our highest noblemen mingled
there with those of our middle-class gentry, not a bad half-way
house to the microcosm of Eton or Harrow. The impression
which Charles Canning made upon the minds of his school-
fellows was, on the whole, a favourable one. He was not a boy
of brilliant parts, or of any large popularity ; but he was re-
membered long afterwards as one who, in a quiet, unostentatious
way, made it manifest to ordinary observers that there was, in
schoolboy language, " something in him." One, whose letter is
now before me, and who was with him for nearly two years in
the same room at the Putney school, remembered, after a
lapse of more than a third part of a century, the admiration
with which he then regarded young Canning's "youthful
indications of talent, and amiable and attractive manners." b>
Two years after George Canning's surrender of the Governor-
Generalship, his son Charles left Mr. Carmalt's
and went to Eton. Eton was very proud of the
father's great reputation, and eager to embrace the son ; for,
verily, George Canning had been an Etonian of Etonians, and
had done as much, as a scholar and wit, to make Eton
flourish as any man of his age. It was, perhaps, therefore,
in a spirit of pure gratitude and veneration, and with no
'hope of future favours," that worthy Provost Goodall, than
whom perhaps no man ever had a keener appreciation both
of scholarship and of wit, on intimation made to him that
George Canning wished his son to be entered as an oppidan,
sent Mr. Chapman, one of the masters of the school,* who
had been selected as the boy's tutor, to examine him at
Gloucester Lodge. These examinations, which determine the
place in the school which the boy is to take, are commonly held
in the tutor's house at Eton, not beneath the parental roof. But

> ■ ■ ' '" '" ' ' ' ...

* Afterwards Bishop of Colombo ; now retired.

1856.] EAELY CAREER OF LORD CANNING. 267

the Minister's son was examined in his father's library and in
his father's presence at Gloucester Lodge ; a double trial, it
may be thought, of the young student's nerve, and not pro-
vocative of a successful display of scholarship. But it was
successful.* Charles Canning was declared to be fit for the
fourth form, and on the 4th of September, 1824, he commenced
his career. It is on record that he was " sent up for good " for
his proficiency in Latin verse. It is on record, also, if the re-
cording minister at Eton does not kindly blot out such traces
of boyish error, tbat he was also sent up for bad ; in more
correct Etonian phraseology, "in the bill," marked for the
flogging block. And it is traditional that the avenging hand
of Head-master Keate was sometimes stayed by a tender re-
luctance to apply the birch to the person of Secretary Canning's
son. On the whole, perhaps, it is historically true that, at Eton,.
he bad no very marked reputation of any kind. He was good-
looking, and a gentleman, which goes for something ; but I do-
not know that he was a great rower, a great cricketer, or a great
swimmer, or was in any sense an athlete of the first water and
the admiration of his companions; and, scholastically, it is
remembered of him that he had " a reputation rather for in-
telligence, accuracy, and painstaking, than for refined scholar-
ship, or any remarkable powers of composition."

But on passing away from Eton, the stature of his mind was
soon greatly enlarged. At the close of 1827, having risen to the
Upper division of the fifth form, he received the parting gifts
of his schoolfellows; and soon afterwards became the private
pupil of the Eev. John Shore, a nephew of Sir John Shore,
Governor-General of India, and known to a later generation as
Lord Teignmouth. This worthy Christian gentleman and ripe
scholar lived, but without church preferment, at Potton, a
quiet little market-town in Bedfordshire, receiving pupils there
of the better sort. Among the inmates of his house was the
grandson of the first Lord Harris, with whom Charles Canning

* I am indebted for this incident to Sir Robert Phillimore, Queen's
Advocate. The memorandum from which it is taken adds : " The well-
known description of the storm in the first JSneid, ' Interea magno miscerl
murmure pontum,' &c, was the passage chosen for the trial of his proficiency,,
and the Bishop now remembers the anxiety with which the father watched
the essay of his son, and the smile of approval which greeted his reading of
the rather difficult transition, ' Quos ego — sed raotos,' &c, and the %al ' Not
so bad,' which followed at the close of the whole translation."

268 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

entered into bonds of friendship, riveted at Oxford, strength-
ened in public life at home, and again by strange coincidence
in India, and broken only by death. Here, doubtless, he

made great progress in scholarship. Perhaps
August sth, the death of his father, and the after-honours

which were conferred on the family, and, more
than all, the subsequent calamitous end of his elder brother,*
awakened within him a sense of the responsibilities of
his position, and roused him to new exertions. Though born
the third in succession of George Canning's sons, he was now
the eldest, the only one. He and his sister alone survived.
He was now the heir to a peerage, sufficiently, though not
splendidly, endowed, and there was a public career before him.
He applied himself to his books.!

His next step was to the University. In December, 1828, he

was entered on the Roll as a Student of Christ
oxford. Church, Oxford, as his father had been entered just
forty years before. Among the foremost of his fellow-students
were Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Bruce, and Mr. Robert Phillimore,^
all of whom lived to take parts, more or less prominent, in
public affairs. Among other members of the same distinguished
house, at that time, was the young Lord Lincoln, heir to the
Dukedom of Newcastle, and the representative of the great
Scotch House of Ramsay, ennobled by the Earldom of Dalhousie.
But the most intimate of all his associates was the present
Lord De Tabley, with whom he lived in the closest bonds of
friendship to the latest day of his life. By him, and a few
other chosen companions, he was dearly loved and much
respected ; but neither achieving nor seeking extensive popu-
larity among his cotemporaries, he was regarded by the outer
University world as a man of a reserved and distant manner,
and of a somewhat cold and unimpulsive temperament. The
few in the inner circle knew that he was not cold ; knew that
he had a true loving heart, very loyal and constant in its
affections ; knew that in the society of his familiar friends he
had a pleasant, a genial, and sometimes a playful manner, that

* William Pitt Canning, then a Captain in the Royal Navy, was drowned
while bathing at Madeira, in September, 1828.

+ It need scarcely be indicated that the widow of George Canning, on his
death was created a Viscountess, with remainder to his eldest son.

t The present (1861) Chancellor of the Exchequer; the late Lord Elgin,
Governor-General of India ; and the present Queen's Advocate.

1856.] EARLY CAREER OF LORD CANNING. 269

he had a fine scholarly taste, a fund of quiet humour, a keen,
appreciation of character, and that he was, all in all, a delightful
companion. They had great hope, too, of his future career,
though he did not seem to be ambitious ; nay, rather, it appeared
to those who closely observed him, that he was haunted and
held back by the thought of his father's renown, and a diffidence
of his own capacity to maintain the glories of the name. But,
although he did not care to take part in the proceedings of
debating societies, and, apparently, took small interest in the
politics of the great world, he was anxious that at least his
University career should do no dishonour to his lineage, and
that if he could not be a great statesman, he might not stain
the scholarly reputation enjoyed by two generations of Cannings
before him. He strove, therefore, and with good results, to
perfect himself in the classic languages ; and even more as-
siduous were his endeavours to obtain a mastery over his own
language. At an early age he acquired a thoroughly good
English style ; not resonant or pretentious ; not splintery or
smart; but pure, fluent, transparent, with the meaning ever
visible beneath it, as pebbles beneath the clearest stream.

His efforts bore good fruit. In 1831 he wrote a Latin Prize
Poem, on the " Captivity of Caractacus " ; and recited it in the
great hall of Christ Church, standing beneath his father's
picture.* And in the Easter term of 1833 he took his degree,
with high honours : a first class in Classics, and a second in
Mathematics. He was then in his twenty-first year, and
Parliament would soon be open to him. But he was in no

* I am indebted for this to Sir Robert Pliillimore. I give the incident in
his own words : " In the year 1831, he won the Christ Church prize for Latin
verse. The subject was ' Caractacus Captivus Romarn ingreditur.' The
verses were, as usual, recited in the hall. It was a remarkable scene. In
that magnificent banquetin^-room are hung the portraits of students who
have reflected honour upon the House which reared them by the distinctions
which they have won in after life. Underneath the portrait of George
Canning, the recollection of whose brilliant career and untimely end was still
fre&h in the memory of men, stood the son, in the prime of youth, recalling
by his eminently handsome countenance the noble features of the portrait,
while repeating the classical prize poem, which would have gladdened his
father's heart. Generally speaking, the resident members of Christ Church
alone compose the audience when the prize poem is recited. But on this
occasion there was a stranger present — the old faithful friend of Mr. Canning,
his staunch political adherent through life — Mr. Sturges Bourne. He had
travelled from Loudon for the purpose of witnessing the first considerable
achievement of the younger Canning." — MS. Memorandum.

270 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1836-56.

hurry to enter upon the realities of public life. He was
diffident of his oratorical powers ; he was constitutionally sby ;
and it did not appear to him that the House of Commons was a
theatre in which he was ever likely to make a successful
appearance. Moreover, he had other work in hand at that
time ; other yearnings to keep down any young ambitions that
might be mounting within him. Love and courtship filled up
a sweet interlude in his life, as they do in the lives of most
men whose story is worth telling ; and, in due course, they
bore the rich fruit of happy wedlock. On the 5th of September,
1835, the Honourable Charles John Canning espoused the
Honourable Charlotte Stuart, eldest daughter of Lord Stuart
He Eothesay, a lady of a serene and gentle beauty, and many
rare gifts of mind.

But, after a year of wedded life, he was prevailed upon to
enter Parliament, and in August, 1836, he was returned foi
Warwick. In that month, however, Parliament was prorogued,
and on its reassembling at the commencement of the following
year, he was content to be a silent member. His opportunities,
indeed, were very few, for his whole career in the House of
Commons extended over a period of little more than six weeks.
During the month of February and the early part of March he
attended in his place with praiseworthy regularity.* But, on the
15th of the latter month, his mother, Viscountess Canning, died ;
and, on the 24th of April, he took his seat in the House of Lords.

For nearly twenty years he sate in that House, taking no
very prominent part in the debates, but doing his duty in a
quiet, unostentatious way, and gradually making for himself a
reputation as a conscientious, painstaking young statesman,
who might some day do good service to his country and honour
to his great name. His political opinions, which were shared
by most of his distinguished cotemporaries at Christ Church,
were characterised by that chastened Liberalism which had
found its chief exponent in Sir Eobert Peel ; and when, in
1841, that great Parliamentary leader was invited to form a
Ministry, Lord Canning, Lord Lincoln, and Mr. Gladstone were
offered, and accepted, official seats. The seals of the Foreign
Office had been placed in the hands of Lord Aberdeen. He had

* His name is to be found in all the principal division lists. He voted
sometimes against Lord Melbourne's Government, but more frequently
with it.

1836-56.] EARLY CAREER OF LORD CANNING. 271

a high opinion of, and a personal regard for, Lord Canning,
and there was no one whom the veteran statesman wished so
much to associate with himself in office as George Canning's
son. About the same time another distinguished member of
the House of Lords was also moved by a strong desire to have
the benefit of the young statesman's official co-operation and
personal companionship. This was Lord Ellenborough, who.
on the formation of the Peel Ministry, had been appointed
President of the Board of Control, but who had subsequently
been selected to succeed Lord Auckland as Governor-General of
India. He offered to take Canning with him in the capacity of
Private Secretary.

Creditable as this offer was to the discernment of Lord
Ellenborongh, and made in perfect sincerity, it was one little
Likely to be accepted by a man of high social position, good
political prospects, and a sufficient supply of the world's wealth.
Lord Canning elected to remain in England, and entered official
life as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He liked
his work ; he did it well, and he had the entire confidence of
his chief. But he did not take an active part in the debates
and discussions of the House of Lords. The presence, in the
same Chamber, of the Chief of his Department, relieved him
from the responsibility of ministerial explanations and replies,
and his constitutional reserve forbade all unnecessary displays.
It was not, indeed, until the Session of 1846 found him in the
office of Chief Commissioner of Woods and Forests, that he
took any prominent part in the business of the House. If the
position which he then held afforded no opportunity for the
development of his powers either as an orator or a debater, it
kept him continually in Parliamentary harness, and the train-
ing was of service to him. It lasted, however, but a little time.
At the end of June, 1846, Sir Eobert Peel and his colleagues
resigned, and a Whig Cabinet was formed under the leadership
of Lord John Russell.

Lord Canning was then " in opposition," but in heart he was
a Liberal, and willing to support liberal measures, without
reference to the distinctions of party. When, therefore, in
May, 1848, Lord Lansdowne moved the second reading of the
Jewish Disabilities Bill, Lord Canning was the first to speak in
support of it. He answered Lord Ellenborough, who had
moved the amendment, and he voted against all his old col-
leagues then in the Upper House, with the exception of Lord

272 OUTBKEAK OF THE MUTINY. [1836-5&

Hardinge. But in 1850 he supported, in a speech displaying an
entire mastery of the subject, the resolution of Lord Derby con-
demnatory of the Foreign Policy of Lord Palmerston ; and he
spoke against the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, introduced by Lord
John Bussell. So little, indeed, was he considered to be pledged
to any party, that when the Bussell Cabinet resigned in the
spring of 1851, and Lord Derby was invited to form an ad-
ministration, the great Conservative leader saw no reason why
he should not invite Canning to become a member of it. The
offer then made was a tempting one, for it was the offer of a
seat in the Cabinet second in importance only to that of the
First Minister. To the son of George Canning it was especially
tempting, for it was the offer of the seals of the Foreign Office.
In that office the father had built up his reputation, and the son
had already laid the foundation of an honourable career of
statesmanship. It was the department which, above all others,
Lord Canning best knew and most desired. He had served a
long apprenticeship in it, and if his humility suggested any
doubts of his capacity to direct its affairs, they must have been
removed by the manner in which he was invited to take their
direction.

The offer now made to him was made through his old official
chief, Lord Aberdeen, who pressed him to accept it. But there
were many grave considerations which caused him to hesitate.
He had sat for some years on the same ministerial bench with
Lord Derby, but the latter had separated himself from his
party, and the cause of the disruption was the liberal commercial
policy of Sir Bobert Peel, in favour of which Canning had
freely declared his opinions. He had condemned the foreign
policy of the Whig party ; but, on the other hand, there were
matters of home government in which his liberality was far
in advance of the opinions of Lord Derby and his colleagues ;
and, on the whole, he felt that he could not honestly and con-
sistently support the Administration which he was invited to
enter. He judged rightly, and in such a case he judged wisely.
Lord Derby failed to construct a Ministry, and the Whigs
resumed office for another year. This was the turning-point of
Lord Canning's career, and it is impossible to say how different
might have been the story which I am now about to write, if
these overtures had been accepted.

In the following year, Lord Derby again endeavoured, and
with better success, to form a Ministry, but its career was of

1836-56.] EAELY CAREER OF LORD CANNING. 273

brief duration. In November, its place was filled by an Ad-
ministration under the premiership of Lord Aberdeen, composed
of the leading members of the Governments both of Sir Eobert
Peel and Lord John Russell. In this Coalition Ministry Lord
Canning held the office of Postmaster-General. Though held
by many a distinguished man, the post was not one to satisfy
the desires of an ambitious one. But he was not disappointed
or discouraged. He knew the difficulties which lay in the path
of his leader,* and he addressed himself cheerfully and assidu-
ously to his work, with a steadfast resolution to elevate the
importance of the appointment he held, by doing in it the largest
possible amount of public good. In this office he had first an
opportunity of displaying that high conscientious courage which
bears up and steers right on, in spite of the penalties and morti-
fications of temporary unpopularity. What was wrong he
endeavoured to set right ; and knowing how much depended on
the personal exertions of individual men, he strove, even at the
expense of certain very clamorous vested interests, to obtain the
utmost possible amount of competency for the performance of
all the higher departmental duties. During his administration
of the Post-office many important reforms were instituted, and
much progress made in good work already commenced. So
effectually, indeed, had he mastered all the complicated details
of the department, that when the Coalition Ministry was dis-
solved and a new Government formed under Lord Palmerston,
the public interests required that there should be no change at
the Post-office ; so Lord Canning was reappointed to his old
office, but with further acknowledgment of his good services in
the shape of a seat in the Cabinet. But it was not ordered that
he should hold the office much longer. There was more stirring
work in store for him. His old friend and contemporary,
Lord Dalhousie, was coming home from India, and it was
necessary that a new Governor-General should be appointed in
his place. Practically the selection, in such cases, was made
by the Imperial Government, but constitutionally the appoint-
ment emanated from the East India Company. The President
of the Board of Control and the Chairman of the Court of
Directors commonly took counsel together, when the Cabinet

* In a " coalition ministry " there is necessarily an exceptional nunibt-j: of
claimants for the higher offices with seats in the Cabinet. In the arrange-
ments then made the seals of the Foreign Office fell, in the first instance, to
Lord John Russell.

"PL. I. T

274 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTEST. [1836-56.

had chosen their man ; and then the nomination was formally
submitted to the Court. There is always, in such cases, much
internal doubt and conflict among those with whom the selec-
tion rests, and much speculation and discussion in the outer
world. It was believed in this instance, that some member of
the Ministry would be appointed ; but people said in England,
as they said in India, that it would be no easy thing to find a
fit successor for Lord Dalhousie ; and when at last it transpired
that the choice had fallen on Lord Canning, men shook their
heads and asked each other whether there was anything great
about him but his name. In Parliament the propriety of the
appointment was questioned by some noisy speakers, and there
was a general feeling in society that the appointment was rather
a mistake. But those who knew Lord Canning — those especially
who had worked with him — knew that it was no mistake. They
knew that there was the stuff in him of which great adminis-
trators are made.

On the first day of August a Court of Directors was held at

the India House, and Lord Canning was introduced
theuov^rnor-0 to take the accustomed oath. On the evening
Geni85-ship' °f *hat *^ay ^he Company gave, in honour of their

new servant, one of those magnificent entertain-
ments at which it was their wont to bid God-speed to those
who were going forth to do their work. Those banquets were
great facts and great opportunities. It was discovered soon
afterwards that the expenditure upon them was a profligate
waste of the public money. But the Government of a great
empire, spending nothing upon the splendid foppery of a Court,
was justified in thinking that, without offence, it might thus do
honour to its more distinguished servants, and that, not the
turtle and the venison, but the hospitality and the courtesy of
the Directors, thus publicly bestowed upon the men who had
done their work well in civil or military life, would find ample
recompense in increased loyalty and devotion, and more
energetic service. Many a gallant soldier and many a wise
administrator carried back with him to India the big card of the
East India Company inviting him to dinner at the London
Tavern, and religiously preserved it as one of the most cherished
records of an honourable career. There were niany> too, who
hoarded among their dearest recollections the memory of the
evening when they saw, perhaps for the first and the last time,
England's greatest statesmen and warriors, and heard them

1855-6.] THE FAREWELL BANQUET. 275

gravely discoui'se on the marvel and the miracle of our Indian
Empire. Nor was it a small thing that a man selected to
govern a magnificent dependency beyond the seas, should thus,
in the presence of his old and his new masters, and many of
his coadjutors in the great work before him, publicly accept his
commission, and declare to the people in the West and in the
East the principles which were to regulate his conduct and to
shape his career. The words uttered on these occasions rose far
above the ordinary convivial level of after-dinner speeches.
There was a gravity and a solemnity in them, appreciated not
merely by those who heard them spoken, but by thousands also,
to whom the Press conveyed them, in the country which they
most concerned ; and on the minds of the more intelligent
Natives the fact of this great ceremonial of departure made a
deep impression, and elevated in their imaginations the dignity
of the coming ruler.

Seldom or never had this ceremonial assumed a more impos-
ing character than that which celebrated the appointment of
Lord Canning to the Governor-Generalship of India. In the
great Banqueting Hall of the London Tavern were assembled
on that 1st of August many members of the Cabinet, including
among them some of Canning's dearest friends ; others besides
of his old companions and fellow-students ; and all the most
distinguished of the servants of the Company at that time in
the country. Mr. Elliot Macnaghten, Chairman of the East
India Company, presided, and after dinner proposed the accus-
tomed toasts. It was natural and right that, when doing
honour to the newly-appointed Governor-General, the speaker
should pay a fitting tribute to the distinguished statesman who
was then bringing his work to a close ; it was natural and
graceful that tribute should be paid also to the worth of the
elder Canning, who had done India good service at home, and
had been selected to hold the great office abroad which his son
was proceeding to fill ; but there was something to a compara-
tively untried man perilous in such associations, and the younger
Canning, with instinctive modesty, shrunk from the invidious
suggestion. Perhaps there were some present who drew com-
parisons, unfavourable to the son, between the early careers of
the two Cannings, which had entitled them to this great dis-
tinction ; but when the younger stood up to speak, every one
was struck — the many judging by busts and pictures, and the
few recalling the living likeness of George Canning — by hi?

T 2

276 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1855-6.

great resemblance to his father. The singularly handsome face,
the intellectual countenance, and, above all, the noble " Canning
brow," like a block of white marble, bespoke no common
capacity for empire, and gave emphatic force to the words he
uttered. He said, after the usual expression of thanks for the
kind words spoken, and the kind reception accorded to them,
that the kindness which he had received had not created any
delusion in his mind, for whether he contemplated the magni-
tude of the task that awaited him, or the great achievements of
the distinguished men who had preceded him, he was painfully
sensible that the labourer was unequal to the great work that
had been entrusted to his hands. He was not ashamed to con-
fess that there were times when he was tempted to shrink from
the responsibility that awaited him. But this feeling, he added,
was not inconsistent with his determination to devote all the
energies of his mind, every hour, nay, every minute of his time,
every thought and every inspiration, to the discharge of the
duties which he had that day accepted from the hands of the
Company. There were, however, other considerations, which
had greatly reassured and encouraged him ; " You have," he
said, turning to the Chairman, " assured me, this day, of what
you rightly describe as the generous confidence and co-opera-
tion of the Court of Directors. I thank you for that assurance,
and I rely on it implicitly, for I know the body of which you
are the head are, wherever they bestow their confidence, no
niggards in supporting those who honestly and faithfully serve
them." And then, not perhaps without a knowledge of what,
more than a quarter of a century before, his father had said on
a similar occasion,* he added, " I feel that I can also rely on the
cordial support and sympathy of my noble friend at the head
of the Government, and of all those colleagues with whom I
have had the proud satisfaction of serving as a Minister of the
Crown, but, above all, I delight in the co-operation — for on that
I must daily and hourly rely— of those two admirable bodies,
the Civil Service and the Army of India. I hardly know

* The occasion alluded to -was the farewell banquet given by the East
India Company to Sir John Malcolm, on his appointment to the government
of Bombay. Then it was that George Canning said : " There cannot be
found in the history of Europe the existence of any monarchy which, within
a given time, has produced so many men of the first talents, in civil and
military life, as India has first trained for herself, and then given to thei?
native country."

1S55-6.] THE FAREWELL BANQUET. 277

whether there is any feature of our Government, any portion of
our institutions, upon which Englishmen may look with more
honest exultation than those two noble branches of our Public
Service. The men of those branches have done much for the
advancement of India, and have sent forth from their ranks
men who were efficient in war and peace, in numbers of which
any monarchy in Europe might be proud, and who have
rescued their countrymen from charges formerly, and not
unjustly, levelled against them of dealing sometimes too harshly
with those whom they were bound to succour and protect.
Sir, it is the possession of such men which enables you to
exhibit a spectacle unequalled in the world's history — that of
a hundred and fifty millions of people submitting in peace and
contentment, in a country teeming with wealth, to the govern-
ment of strangers and aliens."

Then, after a few more words on the high character of the
Services, and a brief declaration of the fact that he assumed
office " without a single promise or pledge to any expectant,"
he proceeded with increased gravity and solemnity of utterance,
almost, indeed, as one under the spell of prophecy : " I know
not what course events may take. I hope and pray that we
may not reach the extremity of war. I wish for a peaceful time
of office, but 1 cannot forget that in our Indian Empire that
greatest of all blessings depends upon a greater variety of
chances and a more precarious tenure than in any other quarter
of the globe. We must not forget that in the sky of India,
serene as it is, a small cloud may arise, at first no bigger than a
man's hand, but which, growing larger and larger, may at last
threaten to burst, and overwhelm us with ruin. What has hap-
pened once may happen again. The disturbing causes have
diminished certainly, but they are not dispelled. We have still
discontented and heterogeneous peoples united under our sway ;
we have still neighbours before whom we cannot altogether lay
aside our watchfulness ; and we have a frontier configuration
that renders it possible that in any quarter, at any moment,
causes of collision may arise. Besides, so intricate are our rela-
tions with some subsidiary states, that I doubt whether in an
empire so vast and so situated it is in the power of the wisest
Government, the most peaceful and the most forbearing, to
command peace. But if we cannot command, we can at least
deserve it, by taking care that honour, good faith, and fair
dealing are on our side ; and then if, in spite of us, it should

278 OUTBEEAK OF THE MUTINY. [1855-6

become necessary to strike a blow, we can strike with a clear
conscience. With blows so dealt the struggle must be short and
the issue not doubtful. But I gladly dismiss from my mind
apprehensions that may not be realised, and joyfully recognise
a large arena of peaceful usefulness, in which I hope for your
kind assistance and co-operation."

Equally surprised were the few then present, who were
familiar with Lord Canning's parliamentary utterances, and the
many, who had never heard him speak, but had been told that
he was " no orator " ; for the speech which they now heard from
his lips was all that such a speech ought to have been. It was
impressive rather than impassioned ; slowly spoken, with a
deliberate gravity, every sentence making itself felt, and every
word making itself heard in the farthest corners of that great
Banqueting Hall. There were few present in whose estimation
the speaker had not risen before he resumed his seat; few
present who did not, years afterwards, remember with strong
emotion that picture of the little cloud rising in an unexpected
quarter, and in time obscuring the firmament and overshadowing
the land. Some, perhaps, thought also of another speech, then
delivered by a more practised speaker ; for the First Minister of
the Crown, on that August evening, let fall some memorable
words. It was only in common course that he should spfeak of
the qualifications of his colleague for the high office to which
he had been appointed ; only in common course that he should
express his gratitude to the Company who so materially lightened
the cares of the Sovereign and her ministers. But when Lord
Palmerston dwelt on "the significant fact that, whereas of old
all civilisation came from India, through Egypt, now we, who
were then barbarians, were carrying back civilisation and en-
lightenment to the parent source," and added, " perhaps it might
be our lot to confer on the countless millions of India a higher
and a holier gift than any real human knowledge ; but that
must be left to the hands of time and the gradual improve-
ment of the people," he supplemented Lord Canning's prophecy,
though he knew it not, and pointed to the quarter from which
the little cloud was to arise.

But although Lord Canning had been sworn in at the India
House, and had stood before the magnates of the land as
Governor-General elect, he was still a member of the Cabinet
and her Majesty's Postmaster-General. Parliament was pro-
rogued on the 14th of August, and in accordance with that wise

1855-6.] THE DATE OF SUCCESSION. 279

official usage, which recognises the necessity of holidays no less
for statesmen than for schoolboys, the Queen's Ministers dis-
persed themselves over the country, and Lord Canning went to
Scotland. It had been settled that he should receive from the
hands of Lord Dalhousie the reins of Indian Government on the
1st of February, 1856, and his arrangements, involving a short
sojourn in Egypt, and visits to Ceylon, Bombay, and Madras,
had been made with a view to his arrival at Calcutta on that
day. But at Dalhousie's own request, his resignation was sub-
sequently deferred to the 1st of March. When this request was
first made to him, Canning thought that the intention of the
change was simply to allow the old Governor-General more time
not only to consummate the annexation of Oudh, but to confront
the first difficulties of the revolution ; and it appeared to him,
thinking this, that the postponement might be interpreted alike
to his own and to his predecessor's disadvantage. It might
have been said that the new Governor-General shrank from
encountering the dangers of the position, or that the measure
was so distasteful to him, on the score of its injustice, that he
could not bring himself to put his hand to the work. Both
assumptions would have been utterly erroneous. The question
of the annexation of Oudh had been a Cabinet question, and as
a member of the Cabinet, Lord Canning had given his assent
to the policy, which after much discussion in Leadenhall and in
Downing-street, found final expression in the Court's despatch
of the 19th of November. The policy itself had been already
determined, although the precise terms of the instructions to
be sent to the Government of India were still under con-
sideration, when Dalhousie's proposal reached him ; and he was
willing to accept all the responsibilities of the measure. The
proposed delay, therefore, did not at first sight please him ; but
when, from a later letter, he learnt that Dalhousie required a few
more weeks of office, not for special, but for general purposes ;
that he needed time to gather up the ends of a large number of
administrative details, the case was altered, and he assented,
with the concuri'ence of the Court of Directors, to the change.*

* " As long," he wrote to the Chairman, " as it turned upon Oudh alone,
I felt that there was some difficulty in making the change proposed by Lord
Dalhousie, and some risk of its intention being misrepresented to the disad-
vantage of both of us. But it is now clear that for other reasons, apart from
Oudh, and for the general winding up of the work on his hands, it will be a
great help to him to have a month more time. These are his very words to

280 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1855-6.

A few days afterwards, Lord Canning turned his face again
towards the South, to superintend the final arrangements for
his departure, and to take leave of his friends. Thus the month
of October and the greater part of November were passed ; but
not without some study of Indian questions, some useful training
for the great work upon -which he was about to enter. On the
21st of November he went by command to Windsor, accom-
panied by Lady Canning, who was among her Majesty's cherished
friends, and on the 23rd returned to London, after taking final
leave of the Queen. Another day or two, and he had commenced
his overland journey to the East. From the Erench capital he
wrote, on the last day of November : "I intended to leave
Paris this afternoon, but I received notice in the morning that
the Emperor wished to see me to-morrow, so that it will be
Tuesday morning (December 4th) before we embark at Mar-
seilles. We still hope to reach Alexandria on the 10th." He
arrived there, however, not before the 12th, and after a day's
halt pushed on to Cairo, where he was received and entertained
magnificently by orders of the Pacha, who was at that time
absent from his capital.

The party consisted of Lord and Lady Canning, his nephew
Lord Hubert de Burgh,* Captain Bouverie, A.D.C., and Dr.
Leckie. There was abundant time for an exploration of the
wonders of Egypt, and, as the fine climate of the country
invited a protracted sojourn there, it was arranged that some
weeks should be spent in pleasant and profitable excursions,
and that they should embark at Suez about the middle of the
month of January. " The Pacha was in Upper Egypt until
to-day," wrote Lord Canning to Mr. Macnaghten, on the 17th
of December, " when he returned to this neighbourhood. I am
to see him to-morrow, and on the following day we set out on
our expedition up the Nile. Thanks to a steamer, which the
Pacha lends us, we shall be able to accomplish all we wish, and
to embark on the Feroze immediately upon its arrival at Suez,

me ; and I cannot hesitate, so far as I am concerned, to do that which will be
agreeable and convenient to bim, and probably advantageous to the publio
interests. I hope, therefore, that you will feel no difficulty in complying
with Lord Dalhousie's wish, by putting off my succession until the day he
names." — Lord Canning to Mr. Macnaghten, September 20, 1855. — MS. Corre-
spondence.

* Afterwards Lord Hubert Canning. [Now Marquis of Clanrikarde.
— G B. M.]

1856.] ARRIVAL OF LORD CANNING. 281

which, according to a letter from Lord Dalhousie, that met me
at Alexandria, will not be until close upon the 12th of January.

. . The magnificence, not to say extravagance, of our recep-
tion here far exceeds anything that I had expected. I shall
need to be very profuse of my thanks to the Pacha to-morrow."

It would be pleasant to follow Lord Canning and his family
on their river-voyage, the grateful experiences of which he has
himself recorded, but these personal incidents have no connection
with the stern story before me, and the temptation, therefore,
to enlarge upon them must be resisted. The programme of his
movements given in the above letter to the Chairman of the
Company, was realised with but little departure from the
original design. The Governor-General elect halted at Aden,
where, under the guidance of Brigadier Coghlan* — an officer of
the Company's Artillery, one of those excellent public servants
who, partly in a military, partly in a diplomatic capacity,
represent great interests and undertake great responsibilities in
the East — Lord Canning made his first acquaintance with the
Sipahi Army of India. From Aden he steamed to Bombay,
where he arrived on the 28th of January, 1856, and first planted
his foot on Indian soil. " I found," he wrote to Mr. Macnaghten
on the 2nd of February, " that Lord Dalhousie had given orders
that I should be received with the full honours of Governor-
General in possession ; and of course I did nothing to check or
escape from the demonstrations with which we were met,
though I did not desire or expect them. I have been unceasingly
busy for two-thirds of every twenty-four hours since our arrival ;
and by the 5th or 6th I hope to have seen nearly all that
calls for ocular inspection in the city and its neighbourhood.
We shall then embark for Madras; for I have given up all
thoughts of stopping at Ceylon, unless to coal, and hope to
arrive there on the 14th or 15th. I cannot sufficiently con-
gratulate myself on having come round by this Presidency. It
has shown me much that I should not easily have learnt other-
wise." It was a disappointment to him that he had not time to
visit Ceylon, for his old Eton tutor, Chapman, had developed
into Bishop of Colombo, and there would have been a grand
old Etonian pleasure, on both sides, in talking over old times.
But there was consolation in the thought that his friend Lord
Harris, his fellow-pupil in the Bedfordshire market-town, was

* Afterwards Sir "William Coghlan, K.C.B.

282 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

Governor of Madras. In that presidency he spent a few pleasant
days, sojourning at Guindy, and then on the 25th of February
set out to face the realities of Indian Government, and steamed
up the Bay of Bengal.

On the last day of February, Lord Canning disembarked at
Calcutta; and, proceeding to Government House,
Feb™5^29' at once took his oaths of office and his seat in
Council. It is the custom in such cases. No time
is left for any question to arise as to who is Governor-General
of India. So brief did the whole operation appear to him, that
he wrote home that he had been sworn in and installed " within
five minutes after touching land." As his dignities and respon-
sibilities commenced at once, so did his work. At the end of
his first week of office, he wrote that such had been the pressure
of public business, that he had found time only for " one look
out of doors" since he arrived. During that first week Lord
Dalhousie tarried in Calcutta, and the past and future of the
Government of India was discussed with interest, the depths of
which were stirred by varying circumstances, between those
earnest-minded men ; the one all readiness to teach, the other
all eagerness to learn. Dull and prosaic as its details often
appear to Englishmen at a distance, it is difficult to describe the
living interest with which statesmen in India of all classes,
from the highest to the lowest, perpetually regard their work.

No man ever undertook the office of Governor-General of
India under the impression that it would be a

First days^of sinecUre. But it is scarcely less true that no man,
whatever opinion he may have formed in England,
ever entered upon its duties without discovering that he had
greatly underrated the extent of its labours. The current of
work is so strong and so continuous; so many waters meet
together to swell the stream ; that at first even a strong man
trying to breast it may feel that he is in danger of being over-
whelmed. Time lessens the difficulty ; but at the outset, the
multiplicity of unfamiliar details distracts and bewilders even
the sharpest wit and the clearest brain ; and the first result is
apt to be a chaos. Box after box is placed upon the Governor-
G eneral's table ; and each box is crammed with papers rugged
with the names of strange men and stranger places, and
references to unknown events and incomprehensible states of
society. By some means or other, he must master the antecedents
of every case that comes before him for decision ; and there are

1856.] THE SUPKEME COUNCIL. 283

often very intricate cases purposely left for his decision, that
he may not be embarrassed by the judgments of his predecessor.
Week after week goes by and little impression is made upon
this pile of work. " Another fortnight is gone," wrote Lord
Canning towards the end of March, " and I am beginning to
gather up by slow degrees the threads of business, as it passes
before me ; but it is severe work to have to give so much time
to the bygones of almost every question that comes up ; and
some weeks more must pass before I shall feel myself abreast
of current events." There was a strong conscientiousness within
the new Governor-General which would not suffer him to pass
anything lightly over, and he endeavoured to understand all that
came before him even at the risk of some inconvenient delays.

So he did not rush at his work ; but quietly confronted it,
and was in no haste to impress people with a sense of the pro-
fundity of his wisdom and the greatness of his self-reliance.
He knew that he had much to learn, and he adopted the best
means of learning it ; for he invited all the chief agents of his
Government, scattered over the country, especially those who
were representing British interests at the Native Courts, to
correspond confidentially with him on matters relating to their
respective charges ; an invitation which gave to every man thus
addressed full liberty to declare his sentiments and to expound
his views. And thus he escaped the danger on the one hand of
surrendering his own judgment, by succumbing to the influence
of some two or three public functionaries immediately attached
to the Executive Government, and, on the other, of the over-
confident exercise of a dominant self-will rejecting all external
aids, and refusing to walk by other men's experiences. He
knew that there was no royal road to a knowledge of India ,
and he was well content that the first year of his administration
should be unostentatiously devoted to the great duty of learning
his work.

There were able men, too, at his elbow to assist him to a
correct knowledge of facts, and to the formation of TheCo „
sound opinions. The Supreme Council consisted at
that time of General John Low, Mr. Dorin, Mr. John Peter Grant,
and Mr. Barnes Peacock. Of the first I can say little in
this place that has not been already said. The only
charge laid against him by the assailants of the Government was
that he was well stricken in years. But although one who had
fought beside Malcolm at Mehidpur, and then not in his first

284 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856

youth, must have lost some of the physical energy that animated
him in his prime, his intellect was unimpaired. Ceasing to be
a man of action, he had subsided gracefully into the condition
of a councillor, the Nestor of the Political Service, a veteran
without a stain. No man had so large an acquaintance with
the Native Courts of India ; no man knew the temper of the
people better than John Low. He could see with their eyes,
and speak with their tongues, and read with their under-
standings. And, therefore, he looked with some dismay at the
wide-spread Englishism of the Dalhousie school, and sorrow-
fully regarded the gradual dying out of the principles in which
he had been nurtured and trained, and to which, heedless of
their unpopularity, he clung with honest resolution to the last.
Dalhousie had too often disregarded his counsel ; but he had
always respected the man. And now Canning equally admired
the personal character of his colleague, but was not equally
minded to laugh his principles to scorn.

Of the two Bengal civilians who sat in that Council, it may
be said that the one owed his position there appa-
r' onn' rently to chance, the other to his unquestionable
abilities. Mr. Dorm was not a man of great parts ; he was
not a man of high character. If he had any official repu-
tation, it was in the capacity of a financier ; and finance was
at that time the weakest point of our Government. He had
limited acquaintance with the country, and but small knowledge
of the people. He had no earnestness ; no enthusiasm ; no
energy. He had a genius for making himself comfortable, and
he had no superfluous activities of head or heart to mar his
success in that particular direction. He had supported the
policy of Lord Dalhousie, and had recorded in his time a number
of minutes expressing in two emphatic words, which saved
trouble and gained favour, his concurrence with the most noble
the Governor-General ; and now if the new ruler was not likely
to find him a very serviceable colleague, there was no greater
chance of his being found a troublesome one.

In John Grant the Governor-General might have found both.
He was many years younger than his brother

J°hn peter civilian, but he had done infinitely more work. In
him, with an indolent sleepy manner was strangely
combined extraordinary activity of mind. He was one of the
ablest public servants in the country. With some heredi-
tary claim to distinction, he had been marked out from the very

1856.] JOHN PETER GEANT. 285

commencement of his career, no less by a favourable concurrence
of external circumstances than by his own inherent qualifica-
tions, for the highest official success. No young civilian in his
novitiate ever carried upon him so clearly and unmistakably the
stamp of the embryo Councillor, as John Grant. In some
respects this was a misfortune to him. His course was too
easy. He had found his way ; he had not been compelled to
make it. He had not been jostled by the crowd ; he had seen
little or none of the rough work of Indian administration or
Indian diplomacy. It had been his lot, as it had been his
choice, to spend the greater part of his official life in close con-
nection with the Head-Quarters of the Government; and, there-
fore, his opportunities of independent action had been few ; his
personal acquaintance with the country and the people was not
extensive ; and his work had been chiefly upon paper. But as a
member of a powerful bureaucracy his value was conspicuous.
Quick in the mastery of facts, clear and precise in their ana-
lytical arrangement, and gifted with more than common powers
of expression, he was admirably fitted to discharge the duties
of the Secretariat. He was a dead hand at a report; and if
Government were perplexed by any difficult questions, involving;
a tangled mass of disordered financial accounts, or a great con-
flict of authority mystifying the truth, he was the man of all
others to unravel the intricate or to elucidate the obscure. Com-
paratively yoxmg in years, but ripe in bureaucratic experience,
he entered the Supreme Council towards the close of Lord
Dalhousie's administration. But he had sat long enough at the
Board to establish his independence. He expressed his opinions
freely and fearlessly ; and his minutes, when minute-writing
was in vogue, were commonly the best State papers recorded
by the Government of the day. Closely reasoned, forcibly ex-
pressed, with here and there touches of quiet humour or subdued
sarcasm, they cut through any sophistries put forth by his
colleagues, with sharp incisive logic, and clearly stated the
points at issue without disguises and evasions. On the whole,
he was a man of large and liberal views, the natural mani-
festations of which were, perhaps, somewhat straitened by an
acquired official reserve; and no one questioned the honesty of
his intentions or the integrity of his life.

Mr. Barnes Peacock was the fourth, and, as is p^^
commonly called, the "Law Member" of Council.
An English lawyer, appointed to aid the great work of Indian

286 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

legislation, he was a member of the Executive rather by
sufferance than by right. In a limited sense, he was supposed
to represent the popular element in the Council. There was no
very violent conflict of class interests in those days. But so
far as such division existed at all, he was regarded as the
exponent of the views of the non-official Englishman and of the
Europeanised Natives of the large towns, whose interests are
bound, up with our own. For the institution of the Company
he was believed to have no respect, and for the exclusive system
of Government by the Company's servants no toleration. He
had a clear head, an acute understanding, but by no means a
large mind. Assiduous in the work of law-making, he was the
very soul of the Legislative Council ; and had he confined his
efforts to the work of moulding into draft-acts the ideas of other
men, he would have been an invaluable public servant. But
he sometimes went beyond this ; and, when he did so, he com-
monly went wrong. For knowing little of the people of India,
and having only thoroughly English notions of philanthropic
reforms and legislative beneficences, he would have taught the
people better manners with a rapidity for which they were not
prepared, if he had unrestrainedly followed out his own ideas of
social improvement. Indeed, he had already threatened to limit
the polygamies of the Natives of India, and, doubtless, had a
draft-act for the purpose on the legislative anvil, when circum-
stances arrested his career of reform. But, although it was in
the legislative department that his especial strength lay, he did
not confine himself to it. He grappled manfully with all the
varied details of the general administration. There were times
when his legal penetration was of service in the disentangle-
ment of knotty questions of executive government, and he
sometimes recorded minutes distinguished by no common powers
of special pleading. But, on the whole, this laborious addiction
to business was an encumbrance and an embarrassment to the
Ministry ; and Lord Canning had soon reason to complain of
the conscientious excesses of his colleague. A general dis-
inclination to take anything for granted impeded the progress
of business ; and the Governor-General, not without a feeling of
admiration for a defect that had its root in honesty of purpose,
endeavoured, and with good success, to wean the law member
from his habit of mastering details which he was not expected
to understand, and keeping back business which it was desirable
to dispose of, whilst he was working up the past history of a

1856.] GENERAL ANSON. 287

Native State, or calculating grain-bags in a commissariat account.
There must have been some inward promptings of self-knowledge
in Canning's own mind to assure him that this laborious con-
scientiousness was a part of his own nature ; but he felt, at the
same time, that his larger scope of responsibility demanded
from him a larger scope of action, and that what was right in
the Governor-General was not therefore right in his depart-
mental colleague.

Such were the fellow-labourers with whom Lord Canning
was now about to prosecute the work of Government. On the
whole, the Council was not badly constituted for ordinary
purposes of administration in quiet times. It contained, indeed,
many of the essential elements of a good Board. What it most
wanted was military knowledge ; for General Low, though an
old soldier of the Madras Army, had seen more of the Court
than of the Camp ; and it was rather in the diplomacies of the
Native States than in the conduct of warlike operations, or in
the details of military administration, that he had earned, by
hard service, the right to be accepted as an authority.* It
was a constitutional fiction that, in an Indian Council, the
necessary amount of military knowledge was supplied in the
person of the Commander-in-Chief, who had a seat in it. The
seat, though legally occupied, was for the most part practically
empty, for duty might not, and inclination did not, keep the
military chief at the Head-Quarters of the Civil Government.
But it happened that, when Lord Canning arrived in India, he
found General Anson in Calcutta. And it was a pleasure to
him to see in the Indian capital a face that had been familiar to
him in the English.

The appointment of the Honourable George Anson to the
chief command of the Indian Army took by surprise
the English communities in the three Presidencies, G,eneral

iii i • i • i -r-» • /-iin Anson.

who had seen his name only m the Kacing Calendar,
or in other records of the Turf. But there was one thing at
least to be said in hi3 favour : he was not an old man. It was
not in the nature of things, after a long European peace, that
good service should be found in the officers of the Queen's
Army unaccompanied by the weight of years. But the scandal
of imbecility had risen to such a height, the military world had

* Shortly after Lord Canning's arrival, General Low went to England, but
returned at the commencement of the cold weather (1856-57).

288 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [185&

grown so sick of infirmity in high places — of the "blind, the
lame, the deaf, the obesely plethoric — that they were prepared to
welcome almost any one who could sit a horse, who could see from
one end to the other of a regiment in line, and hear the report of
a nine-pounder at a distance of a hundred yards. There was
nothing to be said against George Anson on this score. He
could hear and see ; he could ride and walk. He was of a light
spare figure, well framed for active exercise ; and his aspect
was that of a man who could " stand the climate." But with
all men who first brave that climate in the maturity of life,
there is a risk and an uncertainty ; and appearances belied
Anson's capabilities of resistance. During the hot weather and
rainy season of 1856, the heats and damps of Bengal tried him
severely ; and Lord Canning more than once wrote home that
his military colleague was reduced to a skeleton, and had lost
all his bodily strength and all his buoyancy of spirit. But, at
the same time, he spoke of the Chief as one who had many
excellent points, both as an officer and as a man. The precise
limits of authority vested in the chief civil and military func-
tionaries are so ill defined, that, when the powers of both are
combined in one individual, it is a mercy if he does not quarrel
with himself. When they are divided, as is commonly the case,
a conflict of authority is inevitable. And so at this time, the
Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief soon came into
official collision ; but it never grew into personal strife between
Lord Canning and General Anson. The public prints hinted
that there was a rupture between them ; and the same story
travelled homewards and penetrated Cannon-row. But the
Civilian wrote, that though there had been some special points
of difference between them, the temper of the Soldier was so
charming, and he was so thoroughly a gentleman, that it was
quite impossible to quarrel with him. The inevitable antagonism
of official interests could not weaken the ties of personal regard -t
and when Anson, in the month of September, left Calcutta on a
tour of military inspection in the Upper Provinces, he carried
with him no kindlier wishes than those which attended him
warm from the heart of the Governor-General.*

* What Lord Canning wrote about General Anson is so honourable to both
that it is quite a pleasure to quote it. "We get on admirably together,"
wrote the Governor-General in June. " His temper is chaiming, and I know
no one whom I should not be sorry to see substituted for him." And again*.

1856.] GENEKAL ANSON. 289

in October : " I am not surprised at the report you mention that Anson and I
do not get on well together, because such a rumour was current in Calcutta
two or three months ago, and even found its way into the newspapers. I
believe it originated in a difference between us on two points; one (of much
interest to the Indian Army), the power of the Commander-in-Chief to with-
hold applications for furlough, transmitted through him to the Governor-
General iD Council ; the other, an authority to exercise something very like
a veto upon the Governor-General's selections of officers for civil and political
service. Upon both of which I found it necessary to disallow his pretensions.
But neither these disagreements, nor the report to which they gave rise, have
for a moment caused any misunderstanding or reserve between us. It would
be very difficult to quarrel with any one so imperturbably good-tempered, and
so thoroughly a gentleman." — MS. Correspondence.

TOTj. I.

i#0 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

CHAPTEE II.

With these colleagues in the Council Chamber, and with a staff
of able, well-trained secretaries, of whom I shall speak hereafter,
in the several Departments, the new Governor-General found
the burden of his work, though it pressed heavily upon him, in
no way galling or dispiriting. There are always small vexations
and embarrassments ; incidental details, that will not run
smoothly in the administrative groove, but grind and grate and
have a stubborn obstructiveness about them. But the great
sum-total of the business before him wore an aspect cheerful
and encouraging. There was tranquillity in India. Outwardly,
it seemed that Lord Dalhousie had left only a heritage of Peace.
Even in Oudh, just emerging from a revolution,
Administration there were external signs of general quietude ; of
of oudh. contentment, or at least of submission ; and of the
satisfactory progress of the administration. But a new adminis-
trator was wanted. Outram had done his work. He had been
selected to fill the office of Eesident, and no man could have
more becomingly represented British interests at a corrupt and
profligate Court. In that capacity it had fallen to his lot to
accomplish ministerially the revolution which had been decreed
by the British Government. But it was work that sickened
him ; for although he believed that it was the duty of the
Paramount State to rescue Oudh from the anarchy by which it
had so long been rent, he was one whose political predilections
were in favour of the maintenance of the Native States, and he
knew that much wrong had been done to the Princes and Chiefs
of India under the plea of promoting the interests of the people.
When the Proclamation converted Oudh into a British province,
the Eesident became Chief Commissioner, and the superintend-
ence of the administration was the work that then devolved
upon him. But it was work that Outram was not now destined
to perforin. His health had broker, down ; the hot season was

1856.] HENRY LAWRENCE. 291

corning on apace ; and a voyage to England had been urgently
pressed upon him by his medical advisers. So he sought per-
mission to lay down the Portfolio for a while, and asked the
Governor-General to appoint an officer to act for him in his
absence.

It would have been comparatively easy to find a successor
suited to the work, if the appointment to be disposed
of had been a permanent one. But Lord Canning Question of
had to find a man able to conduct the administra-
tion at its most difficult stage, and yet willing to forsake other
important work for the brief tenure of another's office. Outram
said that there was one man in whom both the ability and the
will were to be found. That man was Henry Eicketts, a Bengal
civilian of high repute, whose appointment was pressed upon
Lord Canning as the best that could be made. But Eicketts
was wanted for other work. The authorities at home were
clamouring for a reduction of expenditure ; and as retrenchment,
public or private, commonly begins in the wrong place, a revision
of official salaries was to be one of the first efforts of our economy.
So Mr. Eicketts had been specially appointed to furnish a
Report on the best means of extracting from the officers of
Government the same amount of good public service for a less
amount of public money. Lord Canning shook his head doubt-
fully at the experiment ; but Cannon-row was urgent, and
nothing was to be suffered to interrupt the labours of the man
who was to suggest the means of increasing the financial
prosperity of the Company by sapping out the energies of those
upon whom that prosperity mainly depended.

Whilst Outram and the Governor-General were corresponding
about this arrangement, another plan for the temporary ad-
ministration of Oudh was suggesting itself; but it never
became more than a suggestion. Ever since the dissolution of
the Lahore Board, Sir Henry Lawrence had held office as chief
of the Political Agency at Rajputana. It was a post of honour
and responsibility ; but there was not in the work to be done
enough to satisfy so ardent and so active a mind, and he had
longed, during that great struggle before Sebastopol, which he
had watched with eager interest from the beginning, to show,
when all the departments were breaking down, what a rough-
and-ready Indian Political might do to help an army floundering
miserably in a strange land. But this field of adventure was
closed against him. Peace was proclaimed : and Henry

u 2

292 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

Lawrence, who had studied well the history and the institu-
tions of Oudh, and who had advocated the assumption of the
government, but not the annexation of the province or the
absorption of its revenues, thought that he might do some good
by superintending the administration during the first year of
our tenure. There were many interests to be dealt with in that
conjuncture, which required a strong but a gentle hand to
accommodate them to the great revolution that had been
accomplished, and he felt some apprehension lest civilian-
government, harsh and precise, should forthwith begin to
systematise, in utter disregard of the institutions and usages
of the country, and should strike at once for a flourishing
balance-sheet. It was too little the fashion to sympathise with
the fallen fortunes of men ruined by the dominant influence of
the White Eace. In the chivalrous benevolence of the out-
going Commissioner, Henry Lawrence had full confidence.
The great-hearted compassion which Outram had shown for
the Arnirs of Sindh, proclaimed the mercy and justice of the
man. But a civilian of the new school from the Eegulation
Provinces might bring with him a colder heart and a sharper
practice, and might overbear all ancient rights and privileges
in pursuit of the favourite theory of the Dead Level. Anxious
to avert this, which he believed would be a calamity alike to the
people of Oudh and to his own government, Henry Lawrence
offered to serve, during the transition-period, in Outram's place ;
and the first misfortune that befell the ministry of Lord Canning
was that the letter, conveying the proposal, arrived a little too
late. A Commissioner had already been appointed.

The choice had fallen on Mr. Coverley Jackson, a civilian
from the North-West Provinces, an expert revenue

The New officer, held in high esteem as a man of abilitv.

Commissioner. . t, ° -in • » . "J

but more than suspected ot some infirmity of
temper. Aware of this notorious failing, but not deeming it
sufficient to disqualify one otherwise so well fitted for the post,
Lord Canning accompanied his offer of the appointment with a
few words of caution, frank but kindly, and Jackson in the
same spirit received the admonition, assuring the Governor-
General that it would be his earnest endeavour to conciliate
the good feelings of all who might be officially connected with
him, so far as might be consistent with the claims of the public
service and the maintenance of the authority entrusted to him.
But he did not accomplish this ; and there is slight evidence

1856.] JACKSON AND GUBBINS. 293

that he resolutely attempted it. It was an untoward occurrence
that the man next in authority, and the one with whom the
circumstances of the province brought him most frequently
into official communication, was as little able to control his
temper as Jackson himself. Mr. Martin Gubbins, of the Bengal
Civil Service, was the Financial Commissioner. Upon him
devolved the immediate superintendence of the revenue ad-
ministration of our new territory, whilst Mr. Ommaney, of the
same service, superintended the department of Justice. A man
of rare intelligence and sagacity, eager and energetic, Martin
Gubbins would have been a first-rate public servant, if his
utility had not been marred by a contentious spirit. His
angularities of temper were continually bringing him in
collision with others, and his pertinacious self-assertion would
not suffer him, when once entangled in a controversy, ever to
detach himself from it. Of all men in the service
he was the one least likely to work harmoniously ^X^
with the Chief Commissioner. So it happened
that, in a very short time, they were in a state of violent
antagonism. Whether, in the first instance, Jackson over-
strained his authority, and unwisely and unkindly expressed
his displeasure in language calculated to excite irritation and
resentment, or whether Gubbins was the first to display an
insubordinate spirit, and to provoke the censure of his chief by
the attempted usurpation of his powers, it is of little im-
portance now to inquire. The sharp contention that grew up
between them was soon made known to the Governor-General,
ivho deplored and endeavoured to arrest it. How wisely and
calmly he conveyed to the Commissioner an expression, less
of his displeasure than of his regret, his correspondence
pleasantly illustrated.* But no kindly counsel from Govern-

* Take, for example, the following : " Judging by my own experience, I
should say that in dealing with public servants who have incurred blame,
everything is to be gained by telling them their faults in unmistakable
language, plainly and nakedly ; but that one's purpose (their amendment) is
rather defeated than otherwise by the use of terms that sting them, or amplify
their offences to them unnecessarily — even though all be done within the
strict limits of truth and fact. T believe that if a man has at bottom a sense
of his duty, and is possessed of the feelings and temper of a gentleman, the
more simply his error is put before him, and the more plain and quiet the
reproof, tlie better chance there is of his correcting himself readily and will-
ingly, and that if we wish to get work done hereafter out of some one whom

294 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

ruent House could smooth down the asperities of Jackson's
temper. As time advanced, the feud between him and Gubbins
grew more bitter and more irreconcilable. In India, a paper
war once commenced lasts out many a military campaign.
There is something so exciting, so absorbing in it, that even
the best public servants sometimes forget the public interests
whilst they are wasting their time and expending their energies
in personal conflicts and criminations. Had Coverley Jackson
taken half as much pains to see that the pledges of the British
Government were fulfilled, and the annexation of Oudh ren-
dered as little ruinous as possible to all the chief people of the
province, as he did to convict his subordinates of official mis-
demeanours, it would have been better both for his own
character and for the character of the nation. But whilst
Jackson and Gubbins were in keen contention with each other,
covering reams of paper with their charges and counter-charges
and their vehement self-assertions, the generous nature of the
Governor- General was grieved by complaints and remonstrances
from the King, who declared, or suffered it to be declared for
him, that the English officers in Lakhnao were inflicting
grievous wrongs and indignities upon him and upon his family,
seizing or destroying his property, and humiliating the members
and dependents of his House.

It has been shown that Wajid Ali, when he saw that all
hope of saving his dominions from the great white

Movements of kand t]lat jjad ^een Jai(i upon faem 1^ titterly
the ex-King. X" «/

gone from him, had talked about travelling to
England and laying his sorrows at the foot of the Throne.
But, in truth, travelling to England, or to any other place, was
a thing rather to be whined about than to be done, by one so
destitute of all activities, physical and mental, and it was
almost certain that he would hitch somewhere ; not improbably
at the first stage. And so he did. Halting not far from
Lakhnao, the King awaited the on-coming of his minister, Ali
Naki Khan, a man not wanting in activities of any kind, who
had been detained at the capital to aid in the " transfer of the
Government," out of which he had been ousted. But after a

it is necessary to rebuke, we ought to give him as little excuse as possible (he
will too often find it where it is not given) for feeling irritated against our-
selves."— Lord Canning to Mr. Coverley Jackson, July 7, 1856. — MS. Correi-
pondence.

1856.J THE KING OF OUDH. 295

while King and Minister, and other regal appendages, male and
female, moved on towards Calcutta — the first . stages by land ;
then afterwards taking the river steamer, at a time of year
when there is ever a scant supply of water for such travelling,
they were constrained to go " round by the Sundarbans," and
make a long and by no means a pleasant voyage to the English
capital ; of which necessity Lord Canning shrewdly observed
that it would give his Majesty such a foretaste of life on board
as would inevitably drive out of him any lingering thought of
the passage across the black water to England.

And so it was. The King arrived at Calcutta when the
month of May had burnt itself half out, and Avas soon domiciled
in a house on the river-side, which had erst been the suburban
villa of an English Chief Justice. It was enough for him to
see the steamers smoking past him seawards, and to keep
steadily before him the conviction that for a man of his tastes
and habits, to take no account of his girth, Garden Eeach was
a more recommendable place than the Bay of Bengal, the Red
Sea, or the Mediterranean. But still the pilgrimage to the foot
of the Throne was to be undertaken, not by but for the last of
the Oudh Kings. Without any sacrifice of his personal ease,
or any abandonment of the delights of the Zenana, he might
enter a vicarious appearance at St. James's by sending the
chief members of his family — the nearest of his kindred, in
each stage and relation, before, beside, and after him — his
mother, his brother, and his son, with agents and ministers,
black and white, to plead against the seizure of his dominions.

There was one of the royal party with some substance of
masculine vigour still left as God had given it;
and that one was not the Heir- Apparent, or the so- ^fj^11
called General, or a born manhood of any kind, but
the Queen-Mother, who set the example of going across the dreary
waste of black water and level sand straight to the feet of the
Queen of England. And they went, not scantily attended
either, those three, like thieves in the night, embarking secretly
in the darkness, and taking Government House by surprise
with the report of the accomplished fact of their departure.
Not that Government House would have opposed any obstacle
to their going in broad daylight, with drums beating and flags
flying ; but that the steam-company, with an eye to business,
thought it better to make a secret of it, such fellow-travellers,
according to European notions, not increasing the comforts of

296 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

the voyage. As to the Governor-General, all he could say was,
" Let them go," pitying the East India Company, thus com-
pelled to take such troublesome visitors, but claiming for them
kindly and courteous treatment at the hands of the magnates
of Leadenhall. And so those representatives of the exploded
kingship of Oudh went westward, with vague but extensive
ideas of a recovery past looking for on this side of eternity,
buoyed up and encouraged by men who well knew the hope-
lessness of the endeavour. The " case " was miserably mis-
managed. There was much internal strife, and scarcely an
attempt to strike out against the common foe. The so-
called " Mission " went to pieces and rotted piecemeal. Not
merely waste of treasure was there, but waste of life. The
Queen-Mother and the Prince-General died, and were buried in
the great cemetery of Pere la Chaise. The Heir-Apparent,
money-bound and helpless, threw himself upon the mercy of
the enemy, borrowed from them half a lakh of rupees, and was
carried homewards, somewhat dazed and bewildered as to the
upshot or no upshot of the whole affair, but with a prevailing
sense of escape and relief that it was all over. And the rest of
the luckless embassy went at last, leaving behind them some
scum of official trouble and mishap, and some legal perplexities
not readily soluble by any " perfection of human reason " known
in our English courts.

Meanwhile, in the name of the King himself, ministerial
activities had not been wanting in India to make
'tteex-Kinff substantial grievance, not so much of the thing done
(for that was left to the " Mission ") as of the
manner of doing it, which had not been all right. In the
Humanities, wherein is included the great art of letting down
easily, good to be learnt alike by Men and by Governments, we
had not taken first-class honours. Not without some redden-
ings of shame is it to be recorded that the wrongs inflicted
upon the Princes of India in the shape of territorial disposses-
sions and titular extinctions had been sometimes supplemented
by lesser wrongs, more grievous to bear upon the one side and
less to be justified on the other. For there is some dignity in
great wrong, doing or suffering ; and a persuasion, in one case,
not without sincerity at the bottom, that wrong is right. But
look at the matter in what light we may, it can be nothing but
miserable wrong to make these dispossessions and extinctions,
which may be for the national good, the forerunners of per-

1856] GRIEVANCES OF THE OUDH FAMILY. 297

sonal distresses and humiliations to individuals thus dispossessed
and extinguished. Yet men and, redder shame still, feeble
Zenana-bred women had brought this charge against the strong
Government of the British, before the kingdom of Oudh was
marked for extinction ; and now again the same complaint of
supplemental cruelties and indignities, more galling than the
one great wrong itself, went up from Wajid Ali, or was uttered
in his name. It was charged against us that our officers had
turned the stately palaces of Lakhnao into stalls and kennels,
that delicate women, the daughters or the companions of kings,
had been sent adrift, homeless and helpless, that treasure-
houses had been violently broken open and despoiled, that the
private property of the royal family had been sent to the
hammer, and that other vile things had been done very
humiliating to the King's people, but far more disgraceful to
our own.

Not only so disgraceful, but so injurious to us, so great a
blunder, indeed, would such conduct have been, that all who
had any hope of the restoration of the Oudh monarchy must
have devoutly wished the story to be true. There were those
who had such hope. How could it be hopeless, when it was
remembered that the Sipahi Army of the Company was full of
men whose homes were in Oudh; when it was believed that
the great flood of English rule was sweeping away all existing
interests, and destroying all the influential classes alike in tbe
great towns and in the rural districts? The ministers and
courtiers of the King of Oudh were at large in Calcutta and
the neighbourhood, and might journey whithersoever they
pleased. Vast fields of intrigue were open before them. The
times were propitious. It was plain that there was a feeling of
inquietude in the native mind, and that fear had engendered
discontent. It was certain that the British Government were
weak, for the country was stripped of European troops. The
good day might yet come. Meanwhile, it might be something
to spread abroad, truly or falsely, a story to the effect that the
English, adding insult to injury, had cruelly humiliated all
the members of the Oudh family left behind in Lakhnao.

In these stories of official cruelty Canning had small faith.
But the honour of his Government demanded that they should
be inquired into and contradicted, and he urged the Chief
Commissioner at once to investigate and report upon the
charges put forth by the creatures of the King. But Jackson,

298 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [185G.

full of his own wrongs, failed to see the importance of the task
assigned to him, and his answers were unsatisfactory and
apparently evasive. Privately as well as publicly he was
urged by the Governor-General to address himself seriously to
the work of effacing from the nation the dishonour with which
the dependents of the old Court of Lakhnao had endeavoured
to besmear the British name. But the result was not what
Lord Canning had sought, not what he had expected. So at
last, bitterly grieved and disappointed by the manner in which
his representative had dealt with a subject, at once of so delicate
and so important a nature, the Governor-General thus becom-
ingly poured forth his indignation : " I will not
°cti°856 19' conceal from you," he wrote to Mr. Jackson, " my
disappointment at the manner in which from first to
last you have treated this matter. Instead of enabling the
Government to answer distinctly and categorically every com-
plaint which the King has preferred, you have passed over
unnoticed some upon which you must have known that the
Government were without materials for reply. Upon placing
your answers, now that all have been received, side by side
with the King's letters, I find myself quite unable to say
whether any buildings such as he describes have been pulled
down, and if so, why? — although one building, the Jelwa
Khana, had been especially mentioned to the King, as in course
of demolition — whether dogs or horses have been quartered in
the Chatar Manzil, and especially whether a stoppage of the
allowances to the King's descendants has been threatened, a
statement to this effect being pointedly made in the King's
letter of the 14th of September. You tell me that you have
delayed your answers in order that they may be more complete.
I can hardly think, therefore, that these matters have escaped
you, and yet I do not know how otherwise to account for their
being passed by. Be this as it may, the result of your course
of proceeding is that the Governor-General is placed in an
unbecoming, not to say humiliating position towards the King
of Oudh. The King brings complaints, which, whether true or
false, are plain enough against the officers of Government, and
the Governor-General, after assuring the King that as soon as
reference shall have been made to the Chief Commissioner,
satisfactory explanation shall be given, and relying, as he has
a right to do, that that officer will obey his instructions and do
his duty, finds himself altogether mistaken, and defeated upon

1856.] SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER. 299

points which, however unworthy of notice they may appear to
the Chief Commissioner at Lakhnao, cannot he slurred over by
the Government in Calcutta. It matters nothing that these
charges are instigated by disreputable hangers-on of the King,
or that they are wholly or partly untrue, or even impossible.
There they are in black and white, and they must be answered.
It is surprising to me that you should have failed to appreciate
the necessity."

And it was surprising ; but Coverley Jackson, at that time,
could scarcely appreciate any necessity save that of riding
roughshod over Gubbins and Ommaney, and keeping them
down to the right subordinate level. How far these charges
of cruel indifference to the feelings of the Oudh family were
true, to what extent the dependents of the late King were
wronged and humiliated and the nobles of the land despoiled
and depressed ; how, indeed, the revolution affected all existing
interests, are subjects reserved for future inquiry. It would
have been well if the Chief Commissioner had done as much to-
mollify these poor people as to exasperate his own colleagues.
But the temper of the man was to the last degree arbitrary and
exacting, and Lord Canning, though with admirable patience
and moderation he strove to control the excesses of his agent,
could not hold them in check. Pointing to the great exemplar
of John Lawrence, the Oudh administration having been con-
structed on the Panjabi model, he showed that the reins of
government might be held with a firm and vigorous hand by
one not grasping at all departmental authority. But these
kindly teachings were in vain. The old strife continued.
Striking with one hand at Gubbins, and with the other at
Ommaney, the Chief Commissioner was continually in an
attitude of offence ; and the administration was likely to be
wrecked altogether upon the lee-shore of these internal con-
tentions. So, at last, the Governor-General was forced upon
the conviction that he had selected the wrong man to preside
in Oudh, and that the sooner he could be removed from it the
better for the province.

The readiest means of effecting this, without any public
scandal or any recorded reproach injurious to Jackson's career,
was by the restoration of James Outram to the post which the
civilian had been holding for him. Very unfit, doubtless, was
the " officiating Chief Commissioner " for that post ; but he had
done good service to the State, he had some commendable points

300 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

of character, and even at the bottom of his proved incapacity
for this particular office there might be nothing worse than a
distempered zeal. So Lord Canning, in the exercise of what is
called a " sound discretion," as well as in obedience to the
dictates of a kind heart, sought to accomplish the end in view
by a return to the status ante in the natural order of things,
rather than by any violent supersession of his unfortunate
nominee. It was doubly a source, therefore, of satisfaction to
him to learn that Outram, whose shattered health at the time
of his departure in the spring had excited sad forebodings in
the mind of the Governor-General, now in the autumn declared
himself convalescent and about to return to his work. But the
work, the very thought of which had breathed into the veins
of the soldier-statesman new health, and revived all his pros-
trate activities, was not administrative business in Oudh. It
was altogether work of another kind and in another place, far
enough away from the scene of all his former endeavours ; work
the account of which must be prefaced by some historical
explanations.

Scarcely had Lord Canning taken his place in Government
House, when the question of a war with Persia began
T^ehrppt1re to assume portentous dimensions. Truly, it was not
his concern. Ever since the days when, nearly half
a century before, there had been a strange mad scramble for
diplomatic supremacy in Persia between the delegates of the
Governor-General and of the Court of St. James's, the position
of the Government of India towards our Persian Mission and
our Persian policy had been very indistinctly defined. The
financial responsibility of the Company had been at all times
assumed, and the executive assistance of the Indian Govern-
ment had been called for,* when our relations with that per-
fidious Court had been beset with difficulties beyond the reach
of diplomatic address. But the political control had been vested
in the Imperial Government, as represented by the Foreign
Office ; * and the officers of the Mission had been nominated by
the Crown. Affairs were still in this state when Lord Canning
assumed the Government of India, and found that Great Britain

* Except during a brief interval ; that is, between the years 1826 and
1835, when the King's Government delegated partially the management of
affairs to the Governor-General, only to resume it wholly again.

1852.] WAR WITH PERSIA. 301

was rapidly drifting into a war with Persia, which it would be
his duty to direct, and the resources for which must be supplied
from the country under his charge.

The difficulties, which now seemed to render war inevitable,
were chronic difficulties, which were fast precipitat-
ing an acute attack of disease. They were an after-
growth of the great convulsion of 1838, which had culminated
in the war in Afghanistan. We had tried to forget that hated
country; but there was a Nemesis that forbade oblivion. It
was an article of our political faith that Herat must be an inde-
pendent principality, and we clung to it as if the very salva-
tion of our Indian Empire depended un the maintenance of this
doctrine. But there was nothing in the whole range of Eastern
politics so certain to engender continual tribulation, and at last
to compel us to apostatise in despair. The independence of
Herat was a shadowy idea ; it never could be a substantial
reality. With an Army of Occupation in Afghanistan, and with
British officers freely disbursing British gold at the " gate of
India," we had for awhile maintained the outward independence
of the principality under Shah Kamran of the Saduzai House
of Kabul ; but even then the minister, Yar Muhammad, was
continually declaring that his heart was with Iran, and threaten-
ing to throw himself into the arms of the Persian King. When
the British Army had evacuated Afghanistan, the bold, un-
scrupulous minister, having soon relieved himself of the nominal
sovereignty of the Saduzai, began to rule the country on his
own account. And he ruled it well : that is, he ruled it with
vigour ; and for some ten years, by astute diplomacy, the soul
of which was a system of small concessions to Persia, which
soothed her pride and averted great demands, he governed the
principality in peace, and maintained its nominal integrity.
But his son, Sai'ud Muhammad, who succeeded him, had none of
the essentials of a great ruler. Plentifully endowed with his
father's wickedness, he lacked all his father's vigour. Trea-
cherous and unscrupulous, but feeble in the extreme, he was
ready, on the first appearance of danger, to become a creature
of the Persian Court. Persia eagerly seized the opportunity ;
and again England appeared upon the scene.

In the course of 1852, a Persian Army marched upon Herat.
Not, indeed, in open defiance ; not with any avowed object of
conquest; but nominally, as a powerful ally, to perform an
office of friendship. On the death of Yar Muhammad the affairs

302 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1853.

of the principality had fallen into confusion, and the Persian
Army went forth with the benevolent design of restoring them
to order and prosperity^. But the mask was soon thrown aside.
The real object of the expedition proclaimed itself. Herat was
declared to be an appendage of the Persian monarchy. This
was not to be borne. To maintain the independence of Herat,
England a few years before had been prepared to send her
legions to the gates of the city. And now Persia was destroy-
ing it by a trick. So, fortified by instructions from Downing-
street, the British minister resisted the outrage. On pain of an
entire forfeiture of the friendship of Great Britain, the Persian
Government were called upon to withdraw their army, and to
enter into a solemn covenant binding them to recognise and
respect the independence of Herat. There were then the usual
displays of trickery and evasiveness ; but overawed at last by
the resolute bearing of the British minister, the required pledge
was given, and Persia bound herself to acknowledge the inde-
pendence which she was so eager to crush. But she was sorely
disturbed and irritated by our interference with her schemes of
ambition ; and thenceforth the British Mission became an object
of dislike and suspicion at Teheran ; and a rupture between the
two Courts was only a question of time.

The war in the Crimea delayed — it did not avert — the inevit-
able crisis. The genius of Persia had then free scope for exer-
cise, and turned to the best account its opportunities of double-
dealing. Waiting the sentence of the great Judge of Battles,
she coquetted both with Bussia and with the Allies, and was ready
to sell her good offices to the stronger party, or in a time of
uncertainty to the higher bidder. But when the war ceased,
her importance was gone ; she had not been able to turn her
position to account during the day of strife, and when peace
dawned again upon Europe, she tried in vain to be admitted to
the great International Council, which made the work of recon-
ciliation complete. Disappointed and offended, perhaps, not
thinking much of our boasted victory, for Bussia had been
successful in Asiatic Turkey, and Persia knew less about
Sebastopol than about Kars, she could see no profit in the
English alliance. The minister who then directed her affairs
had no feeling of affection for the British representative at her
Court. A strong personal prejudice, therefore, came in to
aggravate the national antipathy; and before the end of 1855,
the Mission had been so grievously insulted that Mr. Murray

1855.1 DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN. 303

hauled down the British flag, and set his face towards the
Turkish frontier.

Into the details of this affair it is unnecessary to enter.
Another event occurred about the same time. A rebellion
broke out in Herat. Sai'ud Muhammad was killed. In his
place was installed a member of the old Saduzai House, a
nephew of Shah Kamran, Yusuf Khan by name, who had no
peculiar qualifications for empire, but who could not be worse
than the man whom he had supplanted. A revolution of this
kind is so much in the common course of Afghan history, that
we need not seek to account for it by any other than internal
causes. But it was said that it had been fomented by Persian
intrigue ; and it is certain that the Government of the Shah
were eager to profit by the crisis. The times were propitious.
There was in Central Asia at that time one great man, whose
movements were regarded at the Persian Court with alarm not
altogether feigned, though sometimes exaggerated for a purpose.
Ever since the British had set the seal on their confession of
gigantic failure in Afghanistan by restoring Dost Muhammad
to empire, the energies and activities of the old Amir had ex-
pended themselves on the consolidation of his former dominions ;
and now he was hot to extend them to the westward. It was
not merely an impulse of ambition. In part, at least, it was an
instinct of self-preservation. The pretensions of Persia were
not limited, and her encroachments were not likely to be con-
fined to the principality of Herat. Already she had estab-
lished a dominant influence in Kandahar, and did not scruple
to talk about her rights of dominion. It was impossible for
Dost Muhammad to regard this with unconcern. That Persia
had views of extended influence, if not of actual conquest, in
Afghanistan was certain. She had proposed to the Amir him-
self to reduce the whole country to the condition of a protected
State. The time had now come for him to put forth a mighty
hand and a stretched-out arm for the maintenance of the inde-
pendence of Afghanistan. Kohan-dil-Khan, his half-brother,
the Chief of Kandahar, died in the autumn of 1855. Dost
Muhammad had never trusted him ; and his son was not to be
trusted. So the Amir, who had no love for half-measures,
annexed Kandahar to the kingdom of Kabul ; and the Persian
Government believed, or pretended to believe, that he included
Herat itself in his scheme of conquest.

He had at that time no such design. But it was a favourite

304 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

trick of Persia to justify her own acts of aggression by a refer-
ence to some alleged clanger and the necessity of self-preser-
vation. So, seeing in the internal state of Herat an encouraging
opportunity, and in the movements of Dost Muhammad a
plausible pretext for evading their obligations, the Government
of the Shah tore the convention of 1853 into shreds, and again
marched an army upon Herat. But it met with no welcome
there. Alarmed by the movements of the Kabul Amir, and threat-
ened with a counter-revolution at home, the nominal ruler of
Herat had turned towards the Persians for assistance, but when
he found that the chief people of the place were opposed to such
an alliance, and that a strong national Suni-ism prevailed
among them, he hoisted British colours and invited Dost
Muhammad to come to his aid. The characteristic bad faith of
the Saduzai Princes was conspicuous in this wretched man.
His own people could not trust him. The Persians were in-
vesting the place, and it was feared that Yusuf Khan would
betray the city into their hands. It was easy, therefore, to
raise a party against him. So Isa Khan, the Deputy or
Lieutenant-Governor of the place, caused him to be seized, and
sent him a prisoner into the enemy's camp, with a letter
declaring that he was of no use in Herat, and that the Persians
might do with him as they liked.

To this point events had progressed when Lord Canning was
called upon to address himself seriously to the consideration of
the troubled politics of Central Asia. To the new Governor-
General these complications were a source of no common
anxiety, for he could see clearly that England was drifting
into war, and that, however little he might have to do with it
in its origin and conception, its execution would be entrusted
to him. There was a bitter flavour about the whole affair that
was distasteful in the extreme to the Governor-General. " My
hope of an accommodation," he wrote to the President in
August, "has almost died out, and I contemplate the prospect
of the inglorious and costly operations which lie before us with
more disgust than I can express."* He had gone out, as others
had gone before him, with an avowed and a sincere desire for
peace ; but warned by their cruel disappointments, he had laid
fast hold in India of the resolution which he had formed in
England, and he was not by any adverse or any alluring cir-

* Lord Canning to Mr. Vernon Smith, August 8, 1856. — MS.

1856.] VIEWS OF LORD CANNING. 305

cumstances to be driven or enticed into unnecessary war. " Do
not," he said, " be afraid of my being unduly hasty to punish
Persia. Unless the Shah should steam up the Hugli, with
Murray swinging at his yard-arm, I hope that we shall be able
to keep the peace until your instructions arrive."* And he
was anxious to avoid, not only aggressive measures from the
side of India, but any diplomatic entanglements that might at
some future time be a cause of perplexity to his Government.
The politics of Central Asia he regarded with extreme aversion.
Eemembering the fearful lessons of the Past, he determined
not, of his own free will, to send a single man into Afghanistan ;
and he resisted the promptings of Ministers at home, when it
was suggested to him somewhat prematurely that seasonable
donatives might convert Dost Muhammad into an effective ally,
willing and ready to apply a blister from the side of Kandahar
And when, at a later period, instructions came from
England to supply the Amir with arms and money, and A1u8g5gSt'
authority was given to the Governor-General to send a
British Mission to Herat, he shrunk froin acting upon the latter
suggestion. " I do not purpose," he wrote, " to use the per-
mission to send British officers to Herat. We know much too
little of things there to justify this step, which would for
certain be full of risk. The place is hard pressed by famine as
well as by the enemy. Our officers could take with them no
relief nor any promise of it, for we are not going to march to
Herat ourselves, and we cannot afford to promise on the faith of
the Amir's performances."

But unwilling as was Lord Canning to adopt the measures,
to which reference was made in these letters, he could not
maintain this policy of non-interference in Afghanistan after
the Home Government had determined upon the declaration of
war against Persia. The year had scarcely dawned, when such
an upshot began to be discussed as something of no very remote
reality, and before Parliament had broken up and her Majesty's
Ministers had dispersed for the autumn, the equipment of an
expedition to the Persian Gulf had been decreed. The orders
from Home were that all preparations should be made for the
despatch of a military and naval expedition from Bombay to
the Persian Gulf; but that pending the progress of some further
diplomacies in Europe, which might end in concessions, no

* Lord Canning to Mr. Vernon Smith, April 22, 1856.- MS.
vol. i. x

306 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856

actual start should be made. It was not until the end of
September that Her Majesty's Government, through the legal
channel of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of
the East India Company, sent out final instructions for the
sailing of the expedition and the commencement of the war.*
On the evening of the last day of October, these instructions
reached the Governor-General in Calcutta, and on the following

morning — day of evil omen, for eighteen years before
N°Y™ber ^ nad delivered itself of the sad Afghan manifesto —

a proclamation of war was issued. On the same day
it was sent to Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, and the General in
command was charged with instructions respecting the conduct
of the expedition, and ordered straightway to begin.

The question of the command of the expedition had been one

which Lord Canning by no means found it easy to
o^command" soive- Many names had been suggested to him, and

among them that of General Windham — " Windham
of the Eedan" — who had performed feats of gallantry in the
Crimea, and was ready for hard service in any part of the
world. But Lord Canning, whilst thoroughly appreciating
Windham's gallant services in the field, and knowing well that
his appointment would be " popular in England," saw that
there were strong reasons against it. " In a mixed force of
Queen's and Company's troops," he said, " it is of great import-
ance that there should be a willing and earnest co-operation of
all subordinate officers with the Commander, and it is more
difficult to obtain this for a stranger than for one who is known.
The Commander should have some acquaintance with the
Indian Army, if he has to lead a large force of it into an un-
known and difficult country. He should know something of its
constitution, temper, and details — of what it can and what it

* The orders were, under date July 22, 1856, that measures were to be
"immediately taken at Bombay for the preparation of an expedition suffi-
ciently powerful to occupy the island of Karak in the Persian Gulf, and the
district of Bushir on the mainland ; but the expedition is not to sail until
further orders shall have been received from this country." On the 26th of
September the Secret Committee forwarded to Lord Canning copies of Lord
Clarendon's instructions to the British Consuls in Persia to withdraw from
that country, and of a letter addressed by his Lordship to the Commissioners
for the Affairs of India, " requiring that the expedition, which will have been
prepared, under instructions of the 22nd of July, shall, as soon as it can be
completed, proceed to its destination in the Persian Gulf."

1856.] THE QUESTION OF COMMAND. 307

cannot do. This would not be the case with Windham, fresh
landed from England." And it is not to be doubted that he
was right. If the force had been on a larger scale, the Com-
mander-in-Chief himself might perhaps have been placed at its
head ; but Lord Canning, with the highest possible opinion of
Genera] Anson's fine temper, of the assiduity with which he
had addressed himself to the business of his high office, and the
ability with which he had mastered its details, had still some
misgivings with respect to his prejudices, and doubted whether
he had not formed certain conclusions unjust to the Company's
Army.

On the whole, it was better, in any circumstances, that an
Indian officer should command ; and Lord Canning was resolute
that such should be the arrangement. But he had been some-
what perplexed at first as to the choice to be made, and he had
consulted Sir John Lawrence, as the man of all others who, not
being by profession a soldier, had the finest soldierly instincts
and the keenest appreciation of the essential qualities demanded
for the command of such an expedition. What the great
Panjabi administrator said in reply was an utterance of good
sense and good feeling, the fulness of which, however, was not
then as discernible as it now is, viewed by the light of inter-
vening history. About the answer to be given there was no
doubt; but clearly there was some difficulty. For the man
whom of all men in India he held to be best fitted for the
work in hand was his own brother, Sir Henry Law-
rence ; and if he could go, accompanied by Colonel L^^nce
Sydney Cotton, all would be well. " Cotton," wrote
John Lawrence to the Governor-General, " is one of the best
officers I have seen in India. He is a thorough soldier,
loves his profession, and has considerable administrative talent.
Of all the officers I have noted, with one exception, Sydney
Cotton is the best." But his experiences, great as they were,
had not lain in the line of diplomatic action, and, if it were
uecessary, as Lawrence believed, to unite the political and the
military authority in the same person, Cotton, good soldier as
he was, might clearly lack some of the essential qualifications
for the double office. So John Lawrence proceeded to say : " The
man whom I would name for the command of such an expe-
dition is my brother Henry. I can assure your lordship that I
am not in the slightest degree biased in his favour. He has
seen a good deal of service, having been in the first Burmese

x 2

308 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856

war, in the second Afghan war, and in both the Satlaj cam-
paigns. He is not an officer of much practical knowledge,
except in his own branch (the Artillery), and he is not fond of
details. But, on the other hand, he has great natural ability,
immense force of character, is very popular in his service, has
large political acumen, and much administrative ability. I do
not think that there is a military man in India who is his equal
in these points. He is also in possession of his full vigour,
both of mind and body, and there is not a good soldier of the
Bengal Army in the Panjab, or perhaps in Upper India, but
would volunteer to serve under him. With him as the Com-
mander, and Sydney Cotton as the Second-in-Command, the
arrangement would be complete. Cotton is master of all tech-
nical details of every arm of the service, and devotes his entire
energies and thoughts to the welfare of his soldiers."

All this might have been misunderstood ; and a little man,
in such a case, would perhaps have hesitated to recommend his
brother ; but John Lawrence knew that the advice was good,
and that he was incapable of offering it if it had not been.
" If I know myself," he wrote, " I would revolt against such
conduct." But though strong in the conviction that of all men
living Henry Lawrence was the best suited to the work in
hand, he was loud in his praise of other good officers, and had
various plans to recommend, any one of which might have a
successful issue. If Sydney Cotton were sent in command, it
would be well to associate with him such an officer as Herbert
Edwardes, in the character of political adviser. "But, in such
matters," said John Lawrence, " unity in council and action is
of the highest importance, and a commander who unites the
military and political functions is most desirable. If your
lordship does not take my brother, and Outran) is available, I
would be inclined to recommend him. I never met this officer ;
but he has a high reputation." And John Jacob, as having
much military ability and considerable political experience, was
a man not to be overlooked in the account of available capacity
for such an enterprise.

But not only in Calcutta and in the Panjab was this cpiestion
of the command of the expedition being considered. It was
well pondered at Bombay and in England, taking a shape
eventually to overrule all other decisions. The expedition
was to sail from Bombay, and all the arrangements for its
organisation and equipment were proceeding there. Lord

1856.] LORD ELPHINSTONE AND GENERAL STALKER. 309

Elphinstone was Governor of that Presidency. Twenty years
before he had been Governor of Madras. At that time
he was young, and not so serious and sedate as some Elp^°gtone
people thought the head of a Government ought to be.
" We want a Governor," it was said, somewhat bitterly, " and
they send us a Guardsman ; we want a statesman, and they
send us a dancer." But he had ripened into what these people
wanted, and now with a higher sense of the responsibilities of
office, with a keener pleasure in his work, and a statesmanlike
assiduity, for which the companions of his youth had not given
him credit, he was, a second time, administering the affairs of
an Indian Presidency, and busying himself with our external
relations. The troops to be despatched, in the first instance, to
the Persian Gulf were mainly Bombay troops, and it seemed
fitting that the choice of a Commander should be made from
the Bombay Army. If under stress of circumstance the war
should assume more important dimensions, and the military
force be proportionably extended, another selection might be
made. But meanwhile, Elphinstone was requested to name
some officer attached to his own Presidency, in whom the troops
of all arms would have common confidence. So he named
General Stalker, not without a pang of regret that he could not
select Colonel Hancock — Hancock, the Adjutant-General of the
Bombay Army — whom ill-health was driving to England.
Stalker was the senior of the available officers, so there were no
heart-burnings from supersession ; he had seen much service,
he was experienced in command, and it was believed that the
appointment would be both a popular and a safe one. " I hear
favourable accounts of his good sense and temper," said Lord
Oanning ; " and that is what is wanted for the service before
him, which will require more of patient and enduring than of
brilliant qualities."

So General Stalker was appointed to the command of the
expedition to the Persian Gulf. But whilst these and
other arrangements were being: made in India, in the James

-iTr-T i iii -i-i Outram.

belief that ere long they would be merged into others
of a more comprehensive character, the question of the chief
command was being solved in England in a manner hardly
anticipated by the Governor-General. In the month of May
he had taken leave of Sir James Outram. with painful mis-
givings raised in his mind by the sight of the General's
shattered frame and feeble bearing. He had suspected that

310 OUTBEEAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

the mischief was far greater than Outrain himself acknowledged
or believed, and thought that years must elapse before he would
be fit again for active service. And so thought all his friends
in England. He appeared among them as the wreck only of
the strong man who had left them a short time before; and
they grieved to see the too visible signs of weakness and suffer-
ing which every look and gesture afforded. The summer faded
into autumn ; but there was little change for the better
apparent in his outer aspect, when suddenly they were startled
by the announcement that he was about forthwith to proceed
to the Persian Gulf and take command of the expedition.

Nobody knew, nobody knows, how it happened that suddenly,
in this conjuncture, James Outram shook off the incumbrances
of disease, rose up from the prostration of the sick-room, and
stood erect, active, robust before the world with the harness of
war on his back. It was the autumnal season, when men
scatter and disperse themselves in strange places, and elude in
a vagrant life the rumours of the distant world ; so there were
many friends who, having left him at the summer's close a
feeble invalid, were struck with a strange surprise when,
returned or returning homewards, they were met by the news
that Outram had gone or was going to Persia to take command
of the invading force. The wonder soon gave place to delight ;
for they knew that though he was moved by strong ambitions,
there was ever within him a sense of duty still stronger, and
that on no account would he jeopardise the interests of the
State by taking upon himself responsibilities which he had not
full assurance in his inmost self of his ample competence to dis-
charge. And so it was. The sound of the distant strife had
rekindled all his smouldering energies. There was work to be
done, and he felt that he could do it. On the pleasant Brighton
esplanade, sauntering along meditative, or perhaps in the
stimulating companionship of a stalwart friend and high func-
tionary, the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the

^ykes! East India Company, Master of Masters, new hopes
were wafted upon him with the sea-breezes, and his
step grew firmer, his carriage more erect, as with strong assur-
ance of support from Leadenhall-street, he resolved to tender
his services to her Majesty's Government for employment in
Persia with a joint military and diplomatic command.

This was at the beginning of the last week of October. On
the 26th he wrote to Lord Canning that he purposed returning

i856.] SIK JAMES OUTRAM. 311

to India by the mail of the 20th of December, " having perfectly-
recovered from the illness which drove him home." And he
added, " In the supposition that I may be more usefully
employed with the army about to proceed to Persia than neces-
sary to your lordship in Oudh, where everything is progressing
so satisfactorily, I have offered my services to the President (of
the Board of Control), should it be deemed advisable to entrust
to me diplomatic powers in conjunction with the military
command, and I believe that, should your lordship be disposed
so to employ me, the home authorities would not object. In
that case your lordship's commands would meet me at Aden,
whence I would at once proceed to Bombay." *

This letter reached Calcutta on the 2nd December. By the
outgoing mail of the 8th, Lord Canning wrote to Outram at
Aden, rejoicing in his complete recovery, " on every account,
public and private," but questioning the policy of the Persian
appointment. The expedition, he said, was not likely to
increase in magnitude ; it was not probable that there would
be any operations beyond the seaboard during the winter, or
that any diplomatic action would be .taken to call for the
employment of a high political functionary; if, indeed, over-
tures were to be made, they would most probably be addressed
through some friendly power to London ; there would be little
scope, therefore, for his services with the Persian expedition,
and it would be better, therefore, that he should return to his
old appointment. " Oudh is completely tranquil," wrote Lord
Canning, " and generally prospering. Nevertheless, I shall be
very glad to see you resume your command there." The fact
was that the Administration was by this time plunged into
such a hopeless condition of internecine strife, that the
Governor-General could in no way see any outlet of escape
from the perplexities besetting him except by the removal of
Chief-Commissioner Jackson ; and now here was the opportu-
nity, for which he had been waiting, to accomplish this end in
an easy natural manner, without any official scandal, or the
infliction of any personal pain.

But it was not to be so accomplished. Before the end of
November the question of Outram's command of the Persian

* So full was Outram at this time of the thought of his departure in
December, and so eager for the advent of the happy day of release, that he
dated this letter " December " instead of October.

312 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

expedition had been fully discussed in the English Cabinet.
Downing-street had laid fast hold of the idea, and pronounced
its full satisfaction with it. Her Majesty the Queen had
stamped the commission with the seal of her approbation, and
the public voice, with one accord, had proclaimed that a good
thing had been done, and that the right man would soon be
in the right place. That it was thus virtually settled, past
recall, went out under the President's hand by the mail of the
26th of November, and greeted Lord Canning with the new
year. In official language, however, of Court of Directors, or
Secret Committee thereof, it took the shape not of an announce-
ment of a thing done, but of a recommendation that it should
be clone ; for it was substantially an interference with the
prerogative of the Governor-General, and was to be softened
down so as in no wise to give offence. But Lord Canning was
not a man, in such a case, to raise a question of privilege, or,
assured that it was, actually or presumedly, for the official good,
to shoot out any porcupine-quills from his wounded official
dignity. He took the interference in good part ; thanked the
Chairman for the delicacy with which it had been communi-
cated, and promised to give Outram his best support. He had
doubted, he said, whether Outram's health and strength would
be sufficient to bear the burdens that would be imposed upon
him. " But the Queen's Government," he continued, " and the
Secret Committee have seen him in recovered health, and if
they are satisfied that he is in a condition to undertake the
labour and trial of such a command, without risk to the interest
confided to him, I have no objection to make, nor any wish to
shake myself clear of responsibility." And then, with a refer-
ence to a memorandum on the future conduct of the campaign
which Outram had drawn up in England, the Governor-General
added, "It is a pleasure to me to declare that I have been
greatly struck by all that has proceeded from General Outram
in regard to future operations in Persia. I think his plans
excellent, prudent for the present, and capable of easy expan-
sion hereafter, and the means which he proposes for carrying
them out for the most part well suited. For everything that I
have yet heard of his proposals he shall have my cordial support."
Whilst the first division of the expeditionary force under
1857 Stalker was commencing operations with good success
Central-Asian in the Persian Gulf, the new year found Outram at
Policy. Bombay superintending the despatch of the second.

1856.] CENTRAL-ASIAN POLICY. 313

But it was not only by these movements from the sea-board
that an impression was now to be made on the fears of
the Court of Teheran. Diplomacy was to do its work in the
country which lay between India and Persia. Eeluctant as
he had been, in the earlier part of the year, to commit
himself to any decided course of Central-Asian policy, Lord
Canning now began to discern more clearly the benefits that
might arise from a friendlv alliance with the Amir of Kabul.
There was no longer any chance of a pacific solution of our
difficulties. War had been proclaimed. Herat had fallen.
Dost Muhammad had put forth plentiful indications of a strong
desire for an English alliance ; and the English Government at
home appeared to be not unwilling to meet his wishes. That
some action must now be taken in that direction was certain.
Already had arms and money been sent into Afghanistan ; but
with no specific undertaking on the one side or the other, and
it appeared desirable to put the matter now upon a more secure
and a more dignified footing than that of temporary shifts and
expedients. But there were great diversities of opinion as to
the shape which should be taken by British action in the
Afghan countries. Lord Canning had always had at least one
clear conception about the matter ; that it was better to do
little than to do much, and wise not to do that little a day
sooner than was needed. The terrible lessons which had been
burnt into us fifteen years before had lost none of their signi-
ficance. The warning voice was still sounding in our ears ; the
saving hand was still beckoning us away from those gloomy
passes. It could never again enter into our imaginations to
conceive the idea of turning back the tide of Russo-Persian
invasion by making war against the national will and the
substantive Government of the Afghans. But the monitions of
the Past did not stop there. They cautioned us against ever
sending a single British regiment across the Afghan frontier.
Neither the Princes nor the People of Afghanistan were to be
trusted, if the memories of their wrongs were to be reawakened
within them by the presence of that which had done them such
grievous harm. So, although among the schemes which were
discussed, and in some military quarters advocated, was the
project of an auxiliary British force, acting in close alliance
with the Afghans, it was never for a moment seriously enter-
tained in the Council Chamber. But to assail Persia in some
measure from that side, whilst we were operating upon the sea-

314 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

board ; to recover Herat, and, at the same time, to occupy some
of the littoral provinces of the Persian Empire ; was doubtless
to put enormous pressure upon the Shah, to hold him, as it
were, in a vice, helpless and agonised, and to extort from him
all that we might want. This, peradventure, might be done,
by continuing to send British bayonets into Afghanistan, but
without, as of old, British valour to wield them ; so many
thousands of stands of arms, not so many thousands of soldiers ;
and British money, lakhs upon lakhs, but no British hands to
dispense it. In a word, if we could manage successfully to
subsidise Dost Muhammad, and hold him, by the bonds of self-
interest, to a friendly covenant, whereby whilst aiding us he
would aid himself, we might bring the war much more rapidly
to a conclusion than if no such alliance were formed.

But there were strong doubts of the good faith of Dost
Muhammad. The wily old Amir, it was said, was
Muhammad w^ing upon the shore of circumstance, willing to
sail in the same boat with us, if tide and stream
should be in our favour and a fair wind setting in for success.
For some time there had been going on between the Governor-
General of India and the Ruler of Kabul certain passages of
diplomatic coquetry, which had resulted rather in a promise of
a close alliance, a kind of indefinite betrothal, than in the
actual accomplishment of the fact. We had condoned the
offence committed by the Amir at the close of the last war in
the Panjab, when he had sent some of his best troops, in the
uniforms of our own slaughtered soldiers, to aid the Sikhs in their
efforts to expel us; and whilst Dalhousie was still the ruler of

India, an engagement of general amity had been nego-
Mi855 3°' tiated by John Lawrence on the one side, and Haidar

Khan on the other, between the English and the
Afghans. It was probably intended, with a forecast of the com-
ing rupture with Persia, that this should in time be expanded
into a more definite treaty with Dost Muhammad ; and more
than two years before the occasion actually arose, the subsidising
of the Amir loomed in the distance.* It was an old idea. Mr.

* It was talked of, indeed, before the compact of 1855, but did not form a
part of it. In 1854 (June 19), Sir Henry Lawrence wrote to the author : " I
fancy that we shall have some sort of Treaty with Dost Muhammad, unless
Lord Dalhousie overreach himself by too great anxiety and by agreeing to
pay him a subsidy. If Persia attack Afghanistan the help we should give
the latter should be by attacking Persia from the Gulf. We should not send

1849-56.] DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN. 315

Henry Ellis had entertained it; Sir John M'Neill had enter-
tained, it ; * and if Lord Auckland's Secretaries had allowed
him to entertain it, it is probable that the events of which I am
about to write would never have afforded me a subject of
History. In an hour of miserable infatuation, we had played
the perilous game of King-making, and had forced an unpopular
pageant upon a reluctant people. Now, after bitter experience,
we were reverting to the first conception of our diplomatists ;
but mild as comparatively the interference was, it was held by
some great authorities to be wiser to leave Afghanistan and the
Afghans altogether alone. In spite of the present benefit to
be derived from applying in that quarter a blister to the side
of Persia, it might be better to suffer the old Amir to make the
most of the crisis after his own fashion. He would not fight our
battles for us without substantial help ; but he might fight his
own, and there could be no time, for the extension of his
dominion to Herat, so opportune as that which saw Persia
entangled in a war with England. But Dost Muhammad bad
too clear a knowledge of the English, and Afghan cupidity was
too strong within him, to suffer this gratuitous co operation.
He knew that, if he waited, we should purchase his aid ; so he
magnified the difficulties of the march to Herat, talked of the
deficiency of his resources, and otherwise pretended that he
lacked strength for a successful enterprise without continuous
pecuniary aid from the English. Whether, having received
such assistance from us, he would render effectual service in
return for it, seemed to some of our Indian statesmen extremely
doubtful, for there was the lowest possible estimate in their
minds of Afghan truth and Afghan honour. There was the
fear that the old Amir would set an extravagant price on his
services, and that by disappointing his expectations, if not
scouting his pretensions, we might inopportunely excite his

a rupee or a man into Afghanistan. We should express readiness to forgive
and forget, to cry quits in Afghan matters, and pledge ourselves to live as
good neighbours in future ; but there ought to be no interference beyond the
passes, and no backing of one party or another.'"

* One passage in Sir John M-Neill*s early correspondence I cannot help
quoting. There is rare prescience in it : " Dost Muhammad Khan, with a
little aid from us, could be put in possession of both Kandahar and Herat. I
anxiously hope that aid will not be withheld. A loan of money would pro-
bably enable him to do this, and would give us a great hold upon him

Until Dost Muhammad or some other Afghan shall have got both Kandahar
and Herat into his hands, our position here must continue to be a false one."

316 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856

animosities against us. Some, indeed, thought that he looked
eagerly to the conjuncture as one that might help him to
realise his old day-dream, the recovery of Peshawar. There
was, in truth, no lack of sagacity in these anticipations ; but,
perhaps, at the bottom of them there lay too deep a distrust of
the personal character of the Amir. He had, in all candour it
must be admitted, too much reason to doubt the good faith of
the English. He could fathom the depths of our selfishness as
well as we could fathom the depths of his guile. In truth,
there were causes of mutual suspicion ; and little good was
likely to come from the distant fencing of diplomatic corres-
pondence. So at last it was resolved to test the sincerity of
the Amir by inviting him to a conference on the frontier.
At that time, Herbert Edwardes, he of whose glorious
youthful impulses I have spoken in the first chap-
Herbert ^er 0f ^jg wor]r was Commissioner of Peshawar.

Edwardes. ' .

He had grown, by good-service brevet, rather than
by the slow process of regimental promotion, from Lieutenant
to Lieutenant-Colonel. His career had been a prosperous one,
and its prosperity was well deserved. The great reputation
which he had gained as an ambitious subaltern, brought
down upon him at one time a shower of small jealousies
and detractions. He had been feasted and flattered in Eng-
land, and there were some who, doubtless with a certain self-
consciousness of what would be likely to flow from such
adulations, said that his head was turned, and that he had
been overrated. But one, the noble helpmate of a truly noble

man, wrote to me at this time, as one, however, not
Honoria doubting, for I had like faith, that Herbert Edwardes

was one of Nature's true nobility, and that surely I
should live to know it. It was right. Under the Lawrences,
Henry and John, both of whom he dearly loved, he grew to be
one of the main pillars of the Panjabi Administration ; and
now he was in charge of that part of the old dominions of
Eanjit Singh which lay beyond the Indus ; the Proconsulate of
Peshawar. Planted thus upon the frontier of Afghanistan, it
was one of his special duties to watch the progress of events in
that country, and duly to report upon them to the higher
authorities. Of direct diplomatic action there had been little
or none ; but no one knew what a day might produce, and it
was ever therefore among the responsibilities of the Peshawar
Commissioner to be well versed in the politics of Kabul, and

1857.] INVITATION TO DOST MUHAMMAD. 317

prepared, in any conjuncture, to counsel the course to be taken
by the British Government.

For some time there had been much to observe and much to
report, and now a conjuncture had arisen, which seemed to require
from us that we should act. Persia was doing all that could
be done to enlist the sympathies of Central Asia on her side,
even in the far-off regions of Bokhara and Kokhand, by sending
abroad, as a proof of the dangers of English friendship, copies
of the pro-Christian Firman of the Sultan, which had been
issued at the close of the Eussian war. It was fortunate,
therefore, that at this time the political animosities of the
Afghans were strongly excited against the Persians, for, per-
haps, under such pressure, the chronic sectarian jealousies
which kept the two nations apart might for a while have been
merged in a common religious hatred of the Faringhis. A
very little done, or left undone on our part, to offend the old
Amir, might have lost to us for ever the only serviceable
Muhammadan alliance that could Lave availed us in such a
crisis. To no man was the value of this alliance so apparent
as to Herbert Edwardes ; no man pressed its importance so
earnestly upon the Governor-General. He believed that Dost
Muhammad would respond with pleasure to an invitation to
meet on the frontier of the two States a representative of the
British Government, and to discuss the terms of a friendly
alliance ; and he recommended that this invitation should be
sent to him. Eeluctant as Lord Canning had been in the
earlier part of the year to commit himself to any decided course
of Afghan policy, he now before the close of it, in the altered
circumstances that had arisen, yielded to this suggestion, and
afterwards, with that frankness which sat so becomingly upon
him, gracefully acknowledged its wisdom, and thanked the
suggester.

So Dost Muhammad was invited to a conference at Peshawar.
He was, if willing to meet the representatives of the British
Government, to discuss personally with them the terms of the
alliance. Either Sir John Lawrence, accompanied by Colonel
Edwardes, or Colonel Edwardes alone, as might be determined
between them, was to meet the old Amir on the frontier, to
feel his pulse, and to prescribe accordingly. It would have
been a great opportunity for the younger man ; but Edwardes.
to whom the decision was left by Lawrence, for ever giving
the lie to all that had been charged against him on the score of

318 OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY. [1857.

vanity and self-assertion, strongly urged that the Mission
should be headed by his beloved Chief. Lawrence, much doubt
ing, however, whether the Amir would come, and little expect-
ing a successful issue if he should come, lauded the magnanimity
of his more sanguine friend, and prepared himself with all the
earnestness of his nature to prove the groundlessness of his own
anticipations of failure.

They were groundless. The Amir accepted the invitation,
marched down with two of his sons, some of his chosen coun-
sellors, and a body of picked troops, to the frontier ;

Ja°857J L' an(^ on ^ie first ^ay °f ^ne new year received in the
Khaibar Pass the first visit of the British Commis-
sioners. It was with no common interest that Lawrence,
Edwardes, Sydney Cotton, and the other English officers who
accompanied them, looked into the face of the old Amir,
whose white beard and venerable aspect had, fifteen years
before, been so familiar to the eyes of the dwellers in Cal-
cutta, and who in his fallen fortunes, half prisoner and half
guest, had been a not unworthy object of our sympathies.
When, nearly half a century before, the representatives of
the British Government had been received almost on the same
spot by Shah Sujah, they had found the Kabul ruler arrayed
in gorgeous apparel, his whole person a blaze of jewellery,
with the Koh-i-niir outshining it all; but the EDglish gentle-
men now saw before them only a hale old man, very simply
attired in a garment of the coarse camel-hair of the country.
They found him full of energy, full of sagacity; courteous
and friendly in his outer manner ; glad to welcome them to
his camp. It was only a visit of ceremony ; repaid, two days
later, by the Amir, who was received in the grand English
style near Peshawar. Our troops formed a street more than
a mile long, and after the Durbar marched past the Amir
and his host in review order. More than seven thousand
British fighting-men were assembled there, and among them
were three complete European regiments, whose steady dis-
cipline and soliditj^ and fine soldierly bearing, made a strong
impression on the minds of the Afghan visitors, from the aged
Amir himself to the youngest trooper of his escort.

The formal interviews thus accomplished, the serious business
of the conference commenced on the 5th of January. The Amir
had pitched his Camp at Jamrud, and there Lawrence and
Edwardes visited him, accompanied by Major Lumsden of the

1857.] THE PESHAWAR CONFERENCES. 319

Guides. Dost Muhammad, his sons standing behind him, and a
few chosen Sirdars on his left, opened the discussions with a
long exposition of the recent struggles in Herat, and of the
policy which he had himself pursued. He had entertained no
schemes of conquest embracing that principality. The move-
ments which the Persians had thus pretended to interpret were
directed only towards Kandahar. But he frankly avowed his
eager longing to recover Herat ; and, please God and the
English, he would take it from the Persians. Swearing by
Allah and the Prophet that, from that time, he would be our
friend, let all the world be against him, he declared, as his
enthusiasm kindled, that let the English but make a diversion
in the Persian Gulf and supply him with money and with arms,
he would mine the walls of Herat, blow up the towers, and take
the place at the point of the sword ; or raise such a flame in the
surrounding country as fairly to burn the Persians out of it.
The Turkomans and the Usbegs would rise at his bidding, and
join against a common foe.

From that distant-frontier post, on the very outskirts of our
empire, the telegraphic wires ran right up to the vice-regal
capital, and the Governor-General and the Chief Commissioner
were corresponding by the " lightning post " between Calcutta
and Peshawar. So it happened that whilst John Lawrence
and Dost Muhammad were in conference, a horseman galloped
up with a message from the former, despatched on the pre-
ceding day. In it Lord Canning told Lawrence that a re-
inforcement of five thousand men would be sent as quickly as
possible to the Persian Gulf; and that amongst the conditions
of Peace with Persia would be a stipulation that she should
withdraw her troops from Herat, and renounce for ever her
pretensions to interfere with Afghanistan. The significant
words, " You may make use of this," were included in the
message. But the time had not then come for the best use to
be made of it ; so John Lawrence, reserving the rest for more
opportune disclosure, announced only that the reinforcements
were about to be despatched to the Gulf. It was his design, at
that first meeting, to elicit the views and intentions of the
Amir rather than to disclose those of his own Government,*

* This course, though doubtless the one that would have suggested itself
to John Lawrence's unaided judgment, was expressly dictated by Lord Can-
ning, who had written on the 2nd of December to the Chief Commissioner

320 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

So, making no promises of any kind, he indicated the difficulties
that seemed to lie in the way of the Afghan ruler, and asked
for a recital of the means and resources, by which they were to
be overcome, already at bis disposal, and the extent of the aid
which lie would require from the English. But this was too
momentous a question to be answered, without much thought
and calculation ; so the Amir, seeking time for deliberation, said
that he would unfold his views fully at the next meeting ; and
so the conference broke up for the day.

On the 7th, Dost Muhammad, attended by a few chosen
counsellors, visited the British Camp, and the
conferences were renewed in the Chief Com- JaD!857y 7'
missioner's tent. Pursuing the old process of
drawing-out, John Lawrence, at the outset, reminded the Amir
of his promise to state fully his views and intentions ; but it
required some resolution and perseverance to keep the old
Afghan to this point, and it was not without difficulty that the
promised revelation was extorted from him. At last he
explained that, owing to the state of the season, he could not
commence his march on Herat until after the expiration of a
period of two months ; grass and young grain would then be
springing up, and with the aid of some not very elaborate
commissariat arrangements, he would be able to find provisions
for his troops ; that he proposed to march one column from
Balkh and another from Kandahar. The muster-roll of his
troops showed some thirty-five thousand men and sixty guns.
These, he said, should be raised to fifty thousand men with a
hundred guns ; four-fifths of the men and nearly the whole of
the guns should, he said, be moved upon Herat. " But," he
added, " if you say take more troops, I will take more ; if you say
less will suffice, I will take less. I have given you my own
opinion, but you Sahibs know Persia best." But when pressed
for a statement of the amount of aid he would require, he said
that on the morrow morning his son, Azim Jah, would wait upon
the English gentlemen with all the required information in a
digested form, in order that they might judge for themselves.

Baying, " It is not certain that onr object will continue the same as the Amir's ;
neither is it certain to what extent the Amir can contribute towards it, even
whilst it continues the same. For these reasons it is necessary first that we
should know what he can do ; and next, that we should come to a clear under-
standing as to the conditions upon which lie shall receive aid in doing it. The-
meeting ought to clear up the first point at onee." — MS. Correspondence.

1857.] VIEWS OF THE AMIR. 321

So the conference broke up ; and on the following day tho
Amir's sons, accompanied by a few of his ministers, waited
upon John Lawrence, and laid before him a detailed statement
of the Finances of Afghanistan, and of the military resources
of the empire, together with an estimate of the aid that would
be required from the English to enable the Afghans to drive
the Persians out of Herat, and to hold their own against all
comers. The aid that was thus sought amounted in money to
sixty-four lakhs of rupees a year whilst the war lasted, and in
munitions to more than fifty guns, eight thousand stands of
small arms, and ammunition at discretion. It was more than
the English Government were likely to be willing to give, but
not more than appeared really to be wanted. The largeness of
the demand, however, suggested the idea of a less extensive
enterprise ; and so Lawrence asked what would be required to
enable the Afghans, abandoning all aggressive movements, to
hold their own, without danger of encroachments from the
westward. The question was not a welcome one. The Afghans
were hot for an advance on Herat. If they were to sit down
within their own dominions, the Persians would assuredly
occupy Farah. It was for the English, of course, to decide
upon the course to be pursued, but it was more in accordance
with the genius and temper of the Afghans to take vigorous
action in advance. Still, however, John Lawrence pressed for
a statement of the requirements of the Afghans if a strictly
defensive policy were maintained. The Sirdars could give no
answer without consulting the Amir, so the conference broke
up ; and next day they returned with the statement that, in
addition to what had already been supplied, four thousand
muskets would be required, and money to pay eight thousand
regular troops ; one-half to be employed in tho Kandahar
country, and the other half in Balkh. But still they were
eager for the larger enterprise ; and one of them whispered to
Edwardes that the enmity between the Afghans and the
Persians was not merely an affair of this world, for that Shiahs
and Sunis must always hate each other in the world to come.
There was nothing more now to be said. The Afghans, on
their part, had made known their wishes ; and all the English
gentlemen could say in reply was, that they would at once
communicate with their Government.

So the telegraphic wires were again set in motion, and the
Bubstance of what had passed at the two last meetings was

VOL. I. Y

822 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857

communicated to the Governor-General at Calcutta. Then
there was doubt in the Council Chamber. Would it be better
to await detailed reports from Peshawar by post, or at once to
send telegraphic instructions to Sir John Lawrence ? The
former course was determined upon, and a message to that
effect despatched to Peshawar. Lawrence had sent in detailed
reports of the meetings, and had added to the last an ex-
pression of his own views as to what should be done. He
recommended that assistance on the larger scale, for the siege
of Herat, should not be given to Dost Muhammad, but that we
should give him the four thousand muskets that he required,
and an annual subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees, so long as
England and Persia might be at war with each other. But it
did not seem to him to be wise to await the slow process of
correspondence by letter. The Amir was eager to depart ; and
some time must be necessarily occupied in the negotiation of a
formal agreement. So Lawrence telegraphed the substance of his
recommendation to Calcutta, urged that nothing would be gained
by awaiting his more detailed reports, and asked permission to
communicate to the Amir the proposal which he thought it
best to make. To this a message was promptly returned,
saying : " You may tell the Amir that the terms are agreed to.
Four thousand stand of arms and twelve lakhs a year, whilst
England is at war with Persia. You will proceed to arrange
the articles of agreement and report them by telegraph."

This message was despatched on the 13th of January. On
the following morning Lawrence and Edwardes proceeded to
Dost Muhammad's camp, and unfolded to him the views and
intentions of the British Government. With less appearance
of disappointment than had been expected, the Amir assented
to the abandonment of the expedition to Herat, and accepted
the modified proposal of the English. But the despatch of a
party of British officers to Kabul, which was to form part of
the agreement, appeared to be distasteful to him. When active
offensive warfare against Persia had been contemplated, he
cherished the thought of their presence with his troops ; but
now the state of affairs was altered. The point, however, was
one not to be yielded. If the British were to give the subsidy,
they were entitled to see it rightly appropriated. Then the Amir
lowered his tone, and said that he was ready to do what was
expedient ; and finally he agreed to all that was proposed. But-
next day, when his son, Azim Khan, accompanied by other

1857.J THE MISSION TO KANDAHAR. 323

chiefs, visited, according to agreement, the English Com-
missioners, to settle the precise terms of agreement, the question
of the Mission to Kabul was reopened. It was urged that the
appearance of British officers at the Afghan capital might
compromise the Amir either with his own people or with his
English friends. There would he danger in their path at
Kabul ; but at Kandahar, threatened by the Persians, their
presence would be better understood, and they might abide in
perfect security. Nearly fifteen years had passed since our
retributive Army had set its mark upon the Afghan capital ;
but still the hatred which our usurpation had engendered was
fresh in the minds of the people, and Dost Muhammad knew
that there were those in Kabul whom he could not trust within
reach of an English throat. It was a sad thought ; and
Lawrence could not but ask how the alliance between the two
nations could ever strike deep root when in one country such
suspicions and animosities were never suffered to sleep. What
the English wanted was not a temporary alliance dictated by
an emergency of self-interest, but an enduring friendship based
upon mutual confidence and respect. But Dost Muhammad knew
the Afghans well, and little wisdom would there have been in
disregarding a warning which eveiy Englishman's heart must
have told him was an utterance of the voice of truth. So it
was resolved that, although we should claim, and duly record,
our right to send British officers to Kabul, as to other parts of
Afghanistan, yet that practically the Mission should, in the
first instance, proceed only to Kandahar. It was better than
that our officers should be smuggled into the capital, sur-
rounded by the Amir's troops, virtually prisoners under the
name of protected guests. There was, at all events, some
definite meaning in their proceeding to the more western city,
for it was a better point from which to observe the movements
of the Persians. But what route were they to take ? It was
the Amir's wish that the Mission should proceed by way of the
Bolan Pass ; but this, although the route by which Shah Sujah
and the Army of the Indus had marched into Afghanistan, was
said to be entering the country by a back door. It was,
therefore, finally determined that the Mission should proceed
by way of the Paiwar Pass,* an unexplored road to Kandahar ;

* It was deemed advisable that the Mission should journey to Kanda-
har by the route of the Paiwar Pass, a road that had never before been

Y 2

324 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857

and that Major Henry Lumsden, of the Guide corps, an officer
of great courage and capacity, versed in the politics of Afghan-
istan, who had been marked from the first for the conduct of
this enterprise, should he placed at its head. His brother,
Lieutenant Peter Lumsden, was to accompany him, and Mr.
Henry Bellew was selected to take medical charge of the
Mission ; a post of more importance than it appears to be in an
official gazette, for in such diplomacies as these the Medicine-
chest and the Lancet are often more serviceable than the
Portfolio and the Pen.

On the 26th of January, the Articles of Agreement, having
by the aid of the telegraph been approved by the Government
at Calcutta, were ready for seal and signature; and a meeting
for the conclusion of the compact was held in Dost Muhammad's
tent. In attendance on the Amir were his son Azim Khan and
several of his chief counsellors, whilst Lawrence, Edwardes,
and Lumsden appeared on behalf of the English. Written in
Persian and in English, the Articles of Agreement were read
aloud in Durbar. By these the Amir engaged to maintain a
force of eighteen thousand men ; to allow British officers to be
stationed at Kabul, Kandahar, or Balkh, or wherever Afghan
troops might be posted ; to receive a Wakil at Kabul, and to
send one to Calcutta ; and to communicate to the Government
of India any overtures that he might receive from Persia and
from the Allies of Persia during the war. On their part, the
English undertook, during the continuance of hostilities, to
pay to the Amir a monthly subsidy of a lakh of rupees, to send
him four thousand stands of arms, and, as if the wrong done
had been all against us, to forget and forgive the past. It was
explained that the British officers would in the first instance
proceed to Kandahar ; and with this assurance the Amir was
satisfied. So the Articles of Agreement were signed and sealed.
Then came some discussion and some interchange of compli-
ments. A message from the Governor- General had been received
by telegraph, desiring Sir John Lawrence to express to Dost
Muhammad "the satisfaction which he had derived from his

traversed by Europeans, and was consequently unknown ground, and fall of
interest to the British in a military point of view, as being one of the
approaches by which an invading force from the West might enter andathick
their Indian Empire." — Bellew' s Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan
in 1857.

1857.] THE TREATY CONCLUDED. 325

frank dealing, and from the clear understanding on which
affairs had been placed," together with the best wishes for his
health and long life, and a word of regret that he had not
himself been able to meet the Amir. The message was now
delivered and received with manifest gratification. It would
have delighted him, he said, to meet Lord Canning, but he
could not expect his Lordship to take so long a journey to see
him. He had known two Governor-Generals, Lord Auckland
and Lord Ellenborough, who had been kind to him in old times ;
he remembered also with gratitude the kindness of two other
English gentlemen, Mr. Wilberforce Bird and Mr. Thoby
Prinsep,* who had paid him much attention in Calcutta.
" And now," he said, in conclusion, " I have made an alliance
with the British Government, and come what may, I will keep
it till death." And the promise thus given was never broken.
He was true to the English alliance to the last.

On the following day a Durbar was held in the Camp of the
British Commissioner, and the chief officers of the
Amir's suite attended to take their leave of the Jan^27'
English gentlemen. Dost Muhammad had ex-
cused himself on the plea of age and infirmity. The visit to
Peshawar, with its attendant anxieties and excitements, had
visibly affected the Amir's health. The hale old man, who,
three or four weeks before, had spent hours in the saddle, and
seemed to be full of health and energy, had lost much of his
bodily vigour and his elasticity of spirit. A sharp attack of gout
had prostrated him ; and he seemed to be growing impatient
under his protracted detention in Camp. So the conclusion of
the Terms of Agreement was a manifest relief to him ; and it
was with no common satisfaction that, on the day following the
Farewell Durbar, he set his face towards Jalalabad, carrying
with him, in bills on Kabul, a lakh of rupees and some costly
presents from the British Government, j

Nor was the gratification experienced at this time confined to
the Amir's camp. Lawrence and Edwardes were well pleased

* Then members of the Supreme Council of India.

f The only present made by the Afghan ruler to his allies consisted of a
batch of wretched horses, all of which, John Lawrence wrote, were spavined
or worn out. The whole were sold for not more than 100Z. Perhaps Dost
Muhammad, remembering the " pins and needles " brought by Burne.-t, which
had caused so much disappointment some twenty years before at Kabul, did
uot expect, on this occasion, to be the recipient of anything more valuable.

326 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

to think that all had gone off so smoothly ; that the friendship
of the Afghans had "been secured at no very extravagant cost ;
and that, on the whole, although Dost Muhammad had not
obtained all that he had asked, he had taken his departure
tolerably well satisfied with the favourable issue of the meeting.
Lord Canning, too, was more than well satisfied with the
manner in which the negotiations had been conducted, and
with the apparent result. He was not one stinting in free out-
spoken expressions of praise and gratitude to those who did
good service to his Government ; and, both in public and
private letters, he cordially thanked the Commissioners, even
before their work was done, for the admirable judgment and
good tact which they had displayed at the conferences ; giving
an especial word of thanks to Edwardes as the original suggester
of the meeting,* and, it might have been added, the originator
of the new policy which had more recently been observed
towards the Afghans. To Major Lumsden he wrote, at the
same time, a letter of kindly encouragement and good advice,
cordially approving the selection, " not only from his trust in
Sir John Lawrence's judgment on such matters, but from every-
thing that the Governor-General had been able to hear of
Lumsden from those who knew him." He knew the power of
such words ; as a statesman he felt assured that they would
bear good fruit ; but as a man he uttered them from the kind-
ness of his heart.

So Dost Muhammad set his face towards Kabul, and Sir John
Lawrence, after a month of administrative journeying about
the province, returned to Lahor. It need be no subject of
surprise if the latter, as he went about his work, thinking of
all that had been done at Peshawar, sometimes asked himself,
"What good ? and wished that the monthly lakh of rupees to be

* " I must ask you," wrote Lord Canning to Colonel Edwardes on the 19th
January, " to accept my best thanks for the part you have taken in the recent
negotiations, and for their satisfactory issue. I feel the more bound to do this,
because the first suggestion of a meeting came from you; and so far as I can
judge from the reports as yet received, and from the tone of the discussion
shown in them, I believe that the suggestion has proved a very wise and use-
ful one. • It would be a good thing if all diplomatic couferences were con-
ducted so satisfactorily, and set forth as lucidly as these have been." All
this was well deserved ; for the policy was emphatically Edwardes's policy ;
he had been the first to recommend, in Lord Dalhousie's time, that we should
try the effect of trusting the Afghans, and his recommendations had resulted
in the general compact of 1855.

1 857 J THE FUTURE OF HERAT. 327

expended on the Afghan Army were available for the improve-
ment of the province under his charge ; for he had never liked
the project from the beginning. He had no faith in Dost
Muhammad. He had detected him in at least one palpable
falsehood, and the detection had excited in the Amir no sense
of shame, but rather a feeling of admiration at the clever in-
credulity of the Faringhis. The expulsion of the Persians from
Herat, or even the raising of the Turkoman tribes, was, in
Lawrence's opinion, so far beyond the power of the Amir, that
he believed, on the other hand, that the Persians would have
little difficulty in seizing Kandahar. This belief in the weak-
ness of Dost Muhammad was based upon a somewhat exaggerated
estimate of the disunion among the chief people of the country.
But even if the Amir had the power, Lawrence could not believe
that he had the will to serve the British ; and he doubted,
therefore, whether the subsidy would produce any tangible
results. As to the question of the future of Herat, it had
never even approached a solution. Dost Muhammad had been
assured that the evacuation of the place by the Persians would
be an essential condition of peace ; but he had not been able
to offer, without manifest doubt and hesitation, any suggestion
as to the best means of providing for its future government.
In truth, there was a lack of available capacity in the direction
in which it was most natural that we should look for a new ruler.
When the Amir was asked if there was any member of Yar Mu-
hammad's family to whom the government could be entrusted, he
replied that there was a brother of Sai'ud Muhammad, but that,
if possible, he was a greater reprobate and a greater fool than
that unlucky chief. Sai'ud Muhammad, however, bad left a
son, a boy of some ten years, in whose name a competent Wazir
might administer the affairs of the principality; but a com-
petent Wazir was not to be found more readily than a competent
Prince. The future of Herat was, therefore, left to the de-
velopment of the Chapter of Accidents. In the meanwhile,
Lord Canning, though he had slowly come to this point,
believed that the subsidising of the Amir was not a bad stroke of
policy. It bound the Afghan ruler by strong ties of self-interest
to remain faithful to the British Government. Even neutrality
was great gain at a time when Persia was doing her best to raise
a fervour of religious hatred against the English throughout
all the countries of Central Asia. The very knowledge, indeed,
of the fact that Dost Muhammad had gone down to Peshawar

328 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

to negotiate a closer alliance with the British, must have had
a moral effect at Teheran by no means conducive to an increased
confidence in the Shah's powers of resistance. Altogether, it
was not an inefficacious, whilst comparatively it was an inexpen-
sive, mode of pressing upon Persia from the side of Afghanistan.
But whilst he went thus far, Lord Canning was resolute to go
no farther. He had made up his mind that the independence
of Herat could be written only on sand ; that the waves of cir-
cumstance from one direction or another must utterly efface it
after a while ; and that it would be wiser to abandon an effort
that was so fraught with tribulation, and so sure to result in
failure. Certain he was that nothing would ever induce him
to send a single regiment into Afghanistan to maintain the
integrity of a petty state, which Nature seemed to have intended
to be a part of Persia or a part of Afghanistan, and which, as in
a national and religious sense it assuredly belonged to the
latter, was certain, if left to itself, eventually to fall into the
right hands.*

Whilst thus, in this first month of the new year, Lord Canning
„,, was eagerly watching, the progress of his foreign

The question & J ° 1 & &

oftneoudh policy, he was grappling with tne great difficulty
Commissioners"!?, which beset his internal administration. The ques-
tion of the Persian command had been settled ; but it unsettled,
by its solution, that other question of the Oudh Commissioner-
ship. It was clearer than ever that Jackson must be removed ;
but it was no longer possible that his tenure of office should
come to a natural end and peacefully die out. It was necessary
to lay violent hands upon it, and bring it to an ignominious
close. The necessity was painful to Lord Canning ; but the
interests of the State demanded it, and the Govern or- General,
in such a case, properly overrode the man. Therefore, as Outram

* Dost Muhammad and his counsellors, during the conferences at Pesha-
war, frequently asserted that Persia had, on this as on a former occasion, been
instigated and aided by Russia to occupy Herat. I can discern no evidence
of this. Prince Gortscliakotf assured Lord Granville at Moscow that the
Russian Minister at Teheran had urged the Persian Government to evacuate
Herat, and so to place themselves in a better position to demand from others
a like observance of treaty obligations. It may be noted here, that the Amir
told Lawrence at Peshawar that he would show him the letter which the
unfortunate Russian diplomatist, Viktevitch, had carried with him to Kabul
from the Government of the Czar. But he did not produce it after all.

1857.] THE OUDH COMMISSIONERSHIP. 329

could not quietly resume his old seat, another officer was to be
found to take the place of Commissioner Jackson. Ample
admissions were there of zeal and ability, of assiduous devotion
to public business, of much good work well done in the province ;
but the tone and temper of the man, his contentious spirit, his
insolent treatment of his colleagues, were past bearing ; and
communication to that effect, with notice of appointment of a
successor, was made to him in due course.

The choice was an admirable one. It has been said that in
the spring of 1856 Sir Henry Lawrence had offered his services
to the Governor-General, to officiate as Chief Commissioner of
Outlh, in Outram's absence, and that the first disaster that befell
Lord Canning was that the offer was received too late.* When
Henry Lawrence found that it was so, he saw at once the weak
point of the arrangement, and an idea struck him that if, whilst
the civil administration of the province was placed in Jackson's
hands, he himself were vested with political and military
authority in Oudh, all objects might be advantageously secured.
It was but a passing thought, a fleeting suggestion ; but it
found expression in a letter addressed to the Governor- General,
who said, " Two Consuls and Two Tribunes have worked well
enough in old times, as we all know ; but Two Commissioners
at Lakhnao would have been at a dead lock within a month.
I could not have delayed for a day the sending of a third." A
truth not to be disputed. So Henry Lawrence had fallen back
upon his duties among those intractable Eajputs ; grieving over
their degeneracy, striving mightily, but with no great success,
to evolve something of good out of their transition state, and at
last admitting that the peace and security we had given them
had not yet much improved the race. All through the year he
had gone on, in bis old earnest, unstinting way, doing what he
could, through divers channels of beneficence, alike for the
Ancient Houses and the National Chivalries, whereof History
and Tradition had given such grand accounts. But often had he
turned aside from the thought of the Princes and the people by
whom he was surrounded to consider the general condition of
our empire in the East, and most of all our Military System,
wherein he discerned some rottenness, which needed to be
arrested lest the entire edifice should some day become nothing
but a prostrate ruin.

* Ante, page 292.

330 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

But as the new year approached, certain promptings of failing
health inwardly admonished him that it would be well to turn
his face towards England for a while ; and he had just com-
municated his wishes upon this score to the Governor-General,
when there sprung up a great need for his services on a new
and more hopeful field of action. So the answer that went back
contained the expression of a hope that he would reconsider
his determination to go home and accept the Chief Commissioner-
ship of Oudh. " There is no person in whose hands I would so
gladly and confidently place the charge," wrote Lord
Canning, " and my only scruple in ottering it to you
is, that I am proposing that which will interfere with the im-
mediate recruiting of your health. But I will not for this
refrain from executing my intention to do so, which was
formed many days before I received your letter." And truly a
most wise intention ; formed without any doubts and misgivings
upon his part, for he knew the real character of the man ; but
not without some counsel against it, given in perfect honesty
and good faith by one honest and faithful to the core, but undei
a false impression, an error afterwards frankly admitted. Had
the counsellors been many, and all of the same singleness and
sincerity, and the same ripe experience, they could not have
turned Lord Canning from his good purpose, or shaken his
conviction that he was right.

The invitation reached Henry Lawrence at Nimach. It
came to him, weak and dispirited as he was, with all the
renovating influence of a breath of his native air. It was to
him what the distant sound of the Persian war had been to
James Outrarn. It made the blood course less languidly through
his veins. With such work as lay before him in Oudh, he
could not be an invalid. The head-shakings of the medical
profession were nothing, if the practitioners learned in physical
symptoms took no account of the action of the mind. It was
the spirit, not the flesh, that required rousing. Two great
clouds, coming from opposite directions, had overshadowed his
life, blighting both his honourable ambitions and his domestic
affections; a heavy disappointment followed by a cruel loss.
The black-edged paper on which he wrote still spoke of the
latter; a certain sadness of tone in all his allusions to his public
life told how fresh were the wounds of the former. " Annoy-
ances try me much more than work," he now wrote to Lord
Canning. " Work does not oppress me." He could work at

1857.] HENRY LAWRENCE. 331

his desk, he said, for twelve or fifteen hours at a time. He had
just made a tour of Gujrat, riding thirty or forty miles a day,
sometimes being in the saddle from inorning to night, or from
nio-ht to morning. "But," he added, "ever since I was so
cavalierly elbowed out of the Panjab, I have fretted even to
the injury of my health. Your lordship's handsome letter has
quite relieved my mind on that point ; so I repeat that if, on
this explanation, you think fit to send me to Oudh, I am quite
ready, and can be there within twenty days of receiving your
telegraphic reply."

The substance of this letter was telegraphed to Calcutta, and
it brought back a telegraphic answer. The convictions on both
sides were so strong in favour of the arrangement that it was
not likely to break down under any conditions or reservations
on either part ; and so it was settled that Henry Lawrence
should be Chief Commissioner of Oudh. " I am in great hopes,"
wrote Lord Canning, " that the task being so thoroughly con-
genial to you, it will sit more lightly upon you than, measured
by its labour alone, might be expected ; and as to my support,
you shall have it heartily. The field before you is a noble one,
full of interest and of opportunities for good ; and I look forward
with the greatest confidence to the results of your exertions in
it." So Henry Lawrence prepared himself to proceed to
Lakhnao, and was soon on his way thither by easy stages ; for
it was not desired that he should assume office before the middle
of the following month. Halting at Bharatpur, where he took
counsel with the Political agent and the Engineer officer, and
did much to give a right direction to their energies, he proceeded
thence to Agra, which was then the seat of the Lieutenant-
Governorship of the North- Western Provinces. It was vividly
remembered afterwards by one old friend with whom
he held sweet communion at that time, that though MR'ea<ieA'
his thoughts were pregnant with many grave matters
begotten of the great Condition-of-lndia Question, and though
he conversed of many things and many men, there was nothing
that seemed to press more heavily on his mind than an anxious,
uncertain feeling with respect to the state of the Sipahi Army.
There were few civilians in the service who knew the Native
soldier so well as this friend ; and as they talked over certain
manifest signs and symptoms, and narrated what they had seen
and heard, each saw plainly that there was a painful sense of
comino- danger in the other's mind. For twelve years Henry

332 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

Lawrence had been publicly discoursing of the defects of our
Indian military system, and emphatically indicating the dangers
which might some day overtake the State in the most terrible
of all shapes, an outburst of the Native Soldiery ;* and he now
playfully told his friend, but with more of sadness than of
pleasantry in his speech, that the time was not far distant when
the Sipahis would hold him and the Lieutenant-Governor and
other " big Brahmans," as hostages in the Fort of Agra, until
all their demands were granted.

Still thinking much of this, and mindful that in the province
to which he was proceeding he would stand on vantage-ground
for the clear discernment of the real causes of the malady,
Henry Lawrence passed on to Lakhnao. And before day had
broken on the 20th of March, he had been received, at the
Eesidency, by the man whom he had come to supplant. There
must have been pain and embarrassment on both sides in such a
meeting. But before he had broken his fast, the new Com-
missioner sat down and wrote a letter to Lord Canning, saying
that he had had two hours' friendly conversation with Mr.
Jackson, who had received him altogether " like a gentleman."
He had found a long and encouraging letter from the Governor-
General awaiting him on his arrival ; and now he emphatically
replied, " With your lordship's cordial support I have no fear
of success." His spirit rose as he thought of the work before
him. What that work was, what he found done and what he
found undone in the province, when he assumed charge of his
new office, will be told in a subsequent page of this story.

%* No better opportunity than this may be afforded for a note on the
opinions of Sir Henry Lawrence with respect to the maintenance of the
Native States of India. Having said elsewhere that he was on principle
opposed to the " Annexation Policy," I recently elicited the following reply
from a distinguished writer in the Edinburgh Review: "A writer so well in-
formed as Mr. Kaye need not have thus held on to the skirts of a popular
delusion. The course which Sir Henry Lawrence favoured in respect to
Oudh, by whatever name it may be called, is plain enough. It is a course

* See Lawrence's Essays, reprinted from the Calcutta Review : " How un
mindful we have been that what occurred in the city of Kabul may some day
occur at Dehli, Mirath, or Bareli " (page 51). Again : " What the European
officers have repeatedly done (i.e. mutinied) may surely be expected from
Natives. We shall be unwise to wait for such occasion. Come it will, unless
anticipated. A Clive may not be then at hand." The emphatic italics are
Lawrence's. Other passages to the same effect might be cited.

1857.] HENRY LAWRENCE. 333

tfhich, if submitted to the ' Law Officers of the Crown,' as a question of inter-
national law, would, probably, receive from these authorities some name
harsher than 'annexation.'" To this T think it right to reply, that as any
opinion which I may have formed of the sentiments, on this or any other sub-
ject, of Sir Henry Lawrence, has been derived either from oral communication
with him or from his letters to myself, I ought not to be charged with " hanging
on to the skirts of a popular delusion." That those sentiments were what I
have represented them to be, I have numerous proofs in his own handwriting.
A single extract, however, from his correspondence will suffice for all pur-
poses. Writing to me from Mount Abu on the 16th of July, 1856, with
reference to the office under the Home Government of India which had
recently been conferred on me, he said : " The appointment must be one of
the pleasantest, unless, indeed, you feel as I do, that Government is going too
fast, and that we are losing our good name among the Native States. I con-
fess that I do not like the present system, and that I would gladly give up
salary to change to a purely civil or military berth. When I read the tirades
of the Friend of India, I half think myself (with many better men, including
Elphinstone, Munro, and Clerk) a fool. The doctrine now is that it is
wicked not to knock down and plunder every Native prince. My views are
exactly what they were when I wrote the articles for you on the Marathas
and on Oudh. My paper on Oudh would serve as a guide to present doings
in all points save the disposal of the surplus revenue, which assuredly ought
to be spent in Oudh. Nor, indeed, do I think that we should materially lose, or
fail to gain thereby. Is it nothing that we should make a garden of the nursery
of our Sipahis, and open out the resources of a province bordering for a thou-
sand miles on our old ones ? . . . . But I repeat, that my taste for politics
is gone. There is no confidence left in the country ; and one does not feel
that the people about Government House care one straw about, one's exertions
on behalf of the Native States.' Surely, the trumpet here gives no " uncertain
Bound."

834 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

CHAPTER III.

The anxieties which Henry Lawrence carried with him to
Lakhnao had then, for some weeks, been disquieting
cloud, e the mind of the Governor-General. The old year had
JT857ry' ^e<^ 0U^' aPParently leaving to its successor no
greater troubles than those which were inseparable
from the Persian war ; but before the new year was many days
old, there arose upon the horizon that little cloud, no bigger
than a man's hand, of which Lord Canning, at the great Fare-
well Banquet of the Company, had prophetically spoken. It
might be little ; it might be much. It might be blown away
by a breath of wind ; or it might expand into terrific dimen-
sions, covering the whole heaven as with a pall. Anyhow, it
had an angry threatening aspect ; and the looker-on, being no
alarmist, might well wish it away.

Memorable, and, doubtless, well remembered is it that, when
Lord Dalhousie bade farewell to the cares of Indian
Reti85^Ct' Government, he placed upon record an opinion that
the condition of the Native soldiery left nothing to be
desired. There was no reason why Lord Canning, at the out-
set of his career, should not take this assertion on trust ; no
reason why he should not hold to it for a while. He went out
to India, prepossessed in favour of " the faithful Sipahi." He
had, doubtless, read the noble picture which, nearly forty years
before, his father had drawn of the fidelity of the Native
soldiery of the Company, unshaken by threats, unallured by
temptations.* There were no flutterings of disquiet apparent

* As President of the Board of Control, George Canning had moved, in the
House of Commons, the vote of thauks to Lord Hastings's Army for its ser-
vice in the second Maratha war, and in the course of his speech had paid
this fine tribute to the Native Army : " In doing justice," he said, " to the
bravery of the Native troops, I must nut overlook another virtue, their fidelity

1856] RETROSPECT. 335

on the surface to raise anxious doubts and misgivings. But he
had not long taken up the reins of Government, when the
subject of the Native Army began to occupy his thoughts and
to afford matter for much grave correspondence. The vast
extension of territory which had made famous the career of
Lord Dalhousie had not been followed by any corresponding
extension of the Agency by which all this new country was to
be administered. As so much more civil duty was to be done,
it seemed, in strict logical sequence, that there was an increased
demand for civil servants, and that this demand should have
been supplied. But government by the Civil Service of the
Company was costly ; and to have called for increased agency
of this kind would perhaps have supplied Leadenhall Street
with an argument against the profitableness of annexation.
Moreover, there was much rough work to be done in our newly
acquired provinces, for which, on the whole, perhaps, military
administrators were better suited than civilians. So the
military officer, as has before been said, was taken from his
regimental duties to share in the civil administration of the
country. Great had been, for this purpose, the drain upon the
Native regiments, before the annexation of Oudh. That event
brought the ascendant evil to a climax; and Lord Canning
wrote home that it had become necessary to add two officers to
each Native Infantry regiment and four to the Europeans. " A
request," he wrote, in the early part of April, " for an addition
to the number of officers in each Infantry regiment— European
and Native — goes home by this mail. Four for each European
and two for each Native regiment are asked. The application
comes singly and in a bald shape ; because the necessity of an

Many of the Bombay Army had been recruited in the territories of the Peshwa ;
their property, their friends, their relatives, all that was valuable and dear to
them, were still in that prince's power. Previously to the commencement of
hostilities, the Peshwa had spared no pains to seduce and corrupt these
troops ; he abstained from no threats to force them from their allegiance, but
his utmost arts were vain. The Native officers and soldiers came to the
British Commanders with the proofs of these temptations in their hands, and
renewed the pledges of their attachment. One man, a non-commissioned
officer, brought to his captain the sum of 5000 rupees, which had been pre-
sented to him by the Peshwa in person, as an earnest of reward for desertion.
The vengeance denounced by the Peshwa was not an unmeaning menace ; it
did, in many instances, fall heavily on the relatives of those who resisted his
threats and his entreaties ; but the effect was rather to exasperate than to
repress their ardour in the service to which they had sworn to adhere."

336 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

immediate increase is urgent, and because I have had no time
to go into the complicated questions of our military wants
generally."

There was, indeed, nothing more difficult to understand
aright than these military questions ; difficult to ex-

ot&aen" Pei"ienced statesmen ; altogether embarrassing and
bewildering to a Governor in his novitiate. Even this
matter of " more officers," so smooth as it appeared to be on the
surface, when you came to gauge it, was found to contain a
deposit of doubt and conflict. It was held by some, who had
studied well all the deteriorating influences of which so much
has been said in these pages, that the cry for " more officers "
was one to be responded to with caution ; that, indeed, the
Native Army had already too many officers ; and that now to
increase their number would be to increase one of the evils that
had long been impairing its efficiency. That Lord Canning,
fresh from England, should have taken the more popular view
of this want of officers, was natural ; and, indeed, it may be said
that it was a plain common-sense view, not wanting in a certain
kind of logic. It had become a proverb that the English officer
was the Backbone of the Native regiment; and, assuredly, the
administrative demands of our new provinces had left these
Native regiments, according to the recognized reading, sadly
enfeebled and incapacitated. All that he now sought to do was
to restore them somewhat more nearly to their normal condition.
The remedy seemed to lie on the surface, and straightway he
exerted himself to supply it. But the theory of the Backbone
accepted, it was still possible that the vertebral column might
be weakened by having too many joints ; and therefore it was
said by a few thoughtful and experienced men, emphatically by
Sir George Clerk,* that there was more danger in giving our
Native regiments too many English officers than in giving them
too few ; and for this reason, that being many they formed a
society apart and kept aloof from their men, and became alto-
gether in their ways of life too European. Doubts such as
these, and from such a quarter, brought clearly to Lord
Canning's mind the fact that the Native Army question was a
very difficult one ; that it was almost impossible, indeed, whilst
avoiding one rock, to escape from steering upon another. But
the call for more officers had been made ; and, perhaps, with no

* Then Secretary to the Board of Control.

1856.] THE MILITARY DEFENCE OF PEGU. 337

want of wisdom. For, although there was profound truth in
what was said about the evil of too much Englishism in the Native
Army, the Regular Regiments of the Company had been formed
upon the European model, and the principle of command by
many officers was a vital part of the system. The Irregular
system might have been better than the Regular, but a Regular
Regiment denuded of its officers fulfilled the condition of
neither. So the Home Government recognized the want of
more officers, and responded to the appeal.

Another, and still more important question, soon came up for
solution. The specific evils, which resulted from the „._,,,

, • *■ j • • • n • t Evils of

extension ot our dominions, varied in accordance extended
with the direction in which we had extended them. domiui°n-
The acquisition of new territory on the south-eastern coast had
caused but little political excitement in India; but the very
circumstance to which we owed our exemption from evils of one
kind was the immediate source of another class of evils. It has
been said that the intervention of the black waters of the Bay
of Bengal cut off the sovereigns of Burmah from the brotherhood
of the Princes of the great continent of India, and made it a
matter of small concern whether we gained battles or lost them
in that part of the world.* But that very black water made it
difficult for us to garrison the country which we
had won. The new province of Pegu had been Milita^yde-
bronght administratively under the Supreme
Government of India, and in the first arrangements made for
its military defence, the regiments planted there had been
drawn from the Bengal Army. But the great bulk of that
Army eschewed Foreign Service.! It was not part of the con-
ditions under which they had enlisted, that they should cross
the seas. The Sipahi, on taking service, swore that he would
never forsake or abandon his colours, and that he would march
whithersoever he was directed, whether within or beyond the
territories of the Company. Out of the seventy-four regiments

* Ante, pp. 47-49.

f " The natives of India have, generally speaking, a rooted dislike to tho
sea; and when we consider the great privations and hardships to which
Hindus of high caste are subject on a long voyage, during which some of them,
from prejudices of caste, subsist solely on parched grain, we feel less surprised
at the occasional mutinies, which have been caused by orders for their em-
barkation, than at the zeal and attachment they have often shown upon such
trying occasions." — Sir John Malcolm in the Quarterly Review, vol. xviii. p. 399,
VOL,. I. z

338 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

composing the Native Infantry of the Bengal Army, six only
were recruited for general service. When more Native troops
had been required to take part in operations beyond the seas, it
had been customary to call for volunteers from the
Volunteer limited- service regiments. There had been often a
free response to this invitation, and the volunteer corps
had done their duty well upon Foreign service. In the old
times, indeed, before the new organisation, they had in this
respect shown signal devotion; they had gone willingly to
remote places beyond the seas and cheerfully endured all the
miseries and privations of long and boisterous voyages. In one
year, seven thousand Bengal Sipahis had volunteered
for service against the French in the Mauritius and
in Java ; and had served for many years in those islands with
unvarying fidelity and good conduct.* But, even in those days,
they had been at times capricious ; and their caprices, as time
advanced and their devotion to their officers diminished, had
grown more frequent and more embarrassing, f The mutiny
and massacre at Barrackpur had arisen out of the demands of
the first Burmese war, and the second war in those trans-
marine regions had raised up a new crop of difficulties of the
old type.

A few sentences will tell all that need be told of this last

story : The Native troops employed in the conquest of Pegu

were either Madras troops or the general-service regi-

ments of the Bengal Army. But reinforcements were

needed, and so a call was to be made for volunteers. The

38th Native Begiment was then at the Presidency. It

had served long and fought gallantly in Afghanistan,

and it was believed that it would follow its officers to any part

of the world. But when the day of trial came, the result was a

bitter disappointment. The Sipahis were asked whether they

would embark for Kangun to take part in the war, or for

Arakan, there to relieve a general-service regiment, which in

that case would be sent on to Burmah. Their reply wap, that

they were willing to march anywhere, but that they would

* The battalions thus formed were the basis of the six general-service
regiments, in the later organisation, of which mention is made in the text.

t Sir John Malcolm, writing in 1817-18, says, that all the mutinies in the
Bengal Army up to that time had arisen from the blunders of tl eir command-
ing officers, or from orders given to go beyond the seas. See article, pre-
viously quoted, in Quarterly Review.

1856.] RELIEFS FOR PEGU. 339

not volunteer to cross the seas. Perfectly respectful in their
language, they were firm in their refusal. Doubt and suspicion
had taken possession of their minds. How it happened I do not
know, but a belief was afterwards engendered among them that
the English Government had a foul design to entrap them, and
that if they commenced the march to the banks of the Irawadi,
they would at a convenient point be taken to the sea-board and
forcibly compelled to embark. Lord Dalhousie, taking, there-
fore, the prudent rather than the vigorous view of the situation,
and availing himself of the advanced state of the season as a
plea for the adoption of the feebler of the two courses before
him, yielded to these first symptoms of danger, and decreed that
the 38th should be sent neither to Eangun nor to Arakan, but
to the nearer and more inland station of Dhaka. And so nothing
more was heard for a time of the disaffection of the Bengal Army.
The Court of Directors of the East India Company, when
this business was reported to them, saw clearly that it had
become difficult to carry on the concerns of their vastly extended
empire with one-half of their army, and that the more important
half, bound to render them only a restricted obedience ; so tncy
wrote out to the Governor-General that they hoped soon to be
put in possession of the " sentiments of his Govern-
ment on the expediency of adopting such a change ^^g^20'
in the terms of future enlistments as might even-
tually relieve them from similar embarrassments." But no action
was taken during the remaining years of Lord Dalhousie's
administration, and Lord Canning found, on his accession, that
still but a twelfth part of the Bengal Army was available for
service beyond the seas. What then was to be done,
when reliefs were required for Pegu ? Even if the old Repgf8ufor
professional ardour of the Sipahi had been restored,
the occasion was scarcely one on which the Government could
have called for volunteers. The formation of volunteer regi-
ments had been confined to periods of actual warfare ; and
now that we required them merely to garrison our acquisitions
in time of peace, the difficulty that confronted Lord Canning
was one not readily to be overcome. He found at this time that
of the six general-service regiments three were then in Pegu.
They had embarked on a specific understanding that they should
not be called upon to serve there for more than three years, and,
in the rainy season of 1856, two of the three regiments were in
their third year of transmarine service. In the early part of the

2 2

340 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

following year, therefore, a relief would be necessaiy ; but not
one of the other three regiments could be despatched ; for they
had all returned only a year or two before from service in the
same part of the country. It was clear, therefore, that the
Bengal Army could not provide the means of despatching the
required reliefs by water transport to Pegu.

So a question arose as to whether the lelieving regiments
might not, according to their bond, be marched to the Burmese
coast. It was a circuitous and toilsome journey, but it had been
done, under pressure of like difficulty, thirty years before, and
might yet be done again. But although the improvement of
the communications between the Hugh and the Irawadi was
then being urged forward by the Government, there was still a
break on the line from Chatgaon to Akyab, of which our Engi-
neers could not give a sufficiently encouraging account to satisfy
the Governor-General that the relieving regiments could be
sent by land in the ensuing cold season. " A part of the road,"
said Lord Canning, "could not be made passable for wheels by
that time without the addition of eight thousand labourers to
those already employed. If the use of wheeled carriages were
abandoned, there would still remain encamping ground to be
cleared on many parts of it ; the jungle, which is already
choking the tract, to be removed ; preparation to be made for
halting the men on the march ; wells to be dug, or water to be
stored, where none has yet been found ; and stations and store-
houses provided. Simple operations enough in themselves, but
which in this case would have to be begun and completed, on
two hundred miles of road, between the beginning of December,
before which no work on that coast can be attempted, and
February, when the troops must begin to pass over the ground,
the supply of labour, as well as its quality, being very little
trustworthy." " Obstacles of this kind," continued the Governor-
General, "have been overcome again and again by the Sipahis
of Bengal in their marches, whenever it has been necessaiy to
do so ; but I am of opinion that it will be better in the present
instance to seek some other solution of the difficulty. And I believe
that the one most available is a recourse to the Madras Army."

And why not ? The Madras, or, as it was once called, the

Coast Army, was enlisted for general service.

Demands on the posted in the Southern Peninsula, and to a sreat

Madras Army. . . , .. . Ti

extent along the sea- board, it was as readily
available for service on the other side of the Bay as the

1856.] PROTEST OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT. 341

Army in Lower Bengal. If the duty were unpalatable, it
could not, when diffused over fifty regiments, press very
heavily upon any individual soldier. Besides, service of this
kind had some compensations of its own, and was not altogether
to be regarded as a grievance.* So it was thought that the
garrison of Pegu might, for a time at least, be drawn from the
Madras Army. But ready as the solution appeared to be, it
was found that here also there was some hard, gritty, insoluble
matter at the bottom of the scheme. The Madras Government,
though not unwilling to send troops to Pegu as a temporary
arrangement, protested against being called upon to supply a per-
manent garrison to that part of our dominions. Such an arrange-
ment would bring round to every regiment a tour of service
beyond the sea once in every nine years, instead of once in
twelve years ; it would render service in the Madras Army
unpopular ; make recruiting difficult among the better class of
Natives whom it was desired to enlist ; and, inasmuch as every

* It must not be supposed, however, that the Madras Army had always
cheerfully accepted this necessity for going upon foreign service. On several
occasions they had broken into mutiny on the eve of embarkation. Once,
towards the close of the last century, they had risen upon their European
officers, when about to embark at Vizagpatan, and shot all but one or two,
who had contrived to escape on board the ship which was waiting to receive
the regiment. In a former chapter I have given some later instances, and
others might have been cited. But there are some noble examples on record
of another kind, and one adduced by Sir John Mal< olm, in the article previously
quoted, deserves to be recorded here, if only as an illustration of the influence
for good of a trusted commanding officer. Speaking of the services of the 22nd
Madras Regiment, he says : " This fine corps was commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel James Oram, an officer not more distinguished for his personal zeal
and gallantry than for a thorough knowledge of the men under his command,
whose temper he had completely preserved, at the same time that he had
imparted to them the highest perfection in their dress and discipline. When
he proposed to his corps on parade to volunteer for Manilla, they only
requested to know whether Colonel Oram would go with them ? The answer
was, ' He would.' ' Will he stay with us ? ' was the second question. The
reply was in the affirmative. The whole corps exclaimed, ' To Europe ! — to
Kmrope!' And the alacrity and spirit with which they subsequently em-
barked, showed that they would as readily have gone to the shores of the
Atlantic as to an island of the Eastern Ocean. Not a man of the corps
deserted, from the period they volunteered for service until they embarked ;
and such was the contagion of their enthusiasm, that several Sipahis who
were missing from one of the battalions in garrison at Madras, were found,
when the expedition returned, to have deserted to join the 22nd under
Colonel Oram. We state this anecdote," adds Sir John Malcolm, " with a
full impression of the importance of the lesson it conveys. It is through theu
affections alone that such a class of men can well be commanded,"

342 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856

regiment lost much of its morale on Foreign service, and took
two or three years to recover what was lost, the efficiency of
the Madras Army would be permanently deteriorated.

So Lord Canning turned his thoughts in another direction.

Madras troops might be sent for the nonce to Pegu,

The General but the permanent defence of that < >utly ing provi nee

n Ac™en across the Bay must, it appeared to him, be provided

for by drawing, in some way, upon the Bengal
Army. There was then lying, unresponded to, among the
Records of the Military Department, that despatch of the Court
of Directors in which the Government of India had been urged
to devise the means of relieving themselves from all such em-
barrassments by a change in the terms of future enlistments.
After much inward thought and much consultation with others,
he determined, therefore, to institute such a radical change in
the constitution of the Bengal Army as four years before had
been indicated by the Home Government. The reform which
he contemplated was to have only a prospective effect. It was
to touch no existing interests ; but to be applied prospectively
to all who might enlist into the military service of the State.
Thenceforth every recruit was to engage himself for general
service. There might be an alteration in the form of the oath,
or it might simply be left to the European officer to explain to
every recruit that he had been enlisted for general service.
Such had been the custom with respect to the six general-
service regiments of the Bengal Army, and it had been found
to answer every requirement. An explanatory order might be
issued by the Governor-General in Council, and then the
military authorities might follow up, in their own way, the
blow struck at the niceties of the old system. The Governor-
General argued, with irresistible force, that every Government
should be master of its own Army. He was, however, at that
time, fresh from England ; and he might be forgiven for not
knowing how the Government could best make itself the
master of such an Army as that with which he was then dealing.
But he would have had no legitimate claim to forgiveness if he
had failed to take counsel with those among his constitutional
advisers who had spent all their adult lives in India, and who
were presumably familiar with the feelings and opinions of the

people. He did take counsel with them ; and they

w. urge(j kjm |0 pUrsue this course. He who, of all

the Councillors, best knew the Native character, was then in

1856.] THE GENERAL-SERVICE ENLISTMENT ACT. 343

England ; but the ablest man amongst tbem argued that there
was no place like Calcutta for shipping off a large
military force, and that the Bay of Bengal had become MJ- J- p-
an Indian Lake. It does not seem that there was
was any one at Lord Canning's elbow to tell him that, whatsoever
might be the facilities of transport, the Bay of Bengal would
still be the black water, the salt water, in the thoughts of the
people from whom our recruits were to be drawn ; still regarded
with mysterious awe, and recoiled from with unconquerable
aversion.

So, on the 25th July, 1858, a General Order was issued by the
Government of India, declaring that, thenceforth, they would
not accept the service of auy Native recruit who would not,
" at the time of his enlistment, distinctly undertake to serve
beyond the sea, whether within the territories of the Company
or beyond them." In what light Lord Canning regarded this
important change, with what arguments he supported the
measures, may be gathered from his correspondence. " You
will see," he wrote to the President of the India
Board, "that a General Order has been published Au^}9'
putting an end to the long-established, but most im-
politic, embarrassing, and senseless practice of enlisting the
Native Army of Bengal for limited service only ; the sole
exceptions being six regiments of Native Infantry, which are
recruited on the condition of serving anywhere, and the Artil-
ler}\ It is marvellous that this should have continued so long,
and that the Government of India should have tolerated, a»ain
and again, having to beg for volunteers, when other Govern-
ments, including those of Madras and Bombay, would have
ordered their soldiers on their duty. It is the more surprising,
because no one can allege any reason for conceding this un-
reasonable immunity to the Bengal Sipahi. The difficulties of
Caste furnish none whatever, for the Bombay Army is recruited
in great part from the same classes and districts as that of
Bengal ; and even in the latter the best Brahman in the ranks
does not scruple to set aside his prejudices, whenever it suits
him to do so. There seems to have been a dim apprehension
that there might be risk in meddling with the fundamental
conditions upon which the bargain between the Army and the
Government has hitherto rested, and there are some few alarm-
ists on the present occasion, but I have seen no reason to fear
that the order will cause any bad feeling in the Bengal Army.

344 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

As it touches no existing rights, it could only do so by exciting
apprehensions that something more remains behind ; and, pro-
bably, this may prove to be the case, for whenever I can
propose a reduction in the numbers of the Bengal Eegiments,
I shall endeavour to do so upon terms that will give a pre-
ference of remaining in the ranks to such men as may be
willing to accept general service. But this is no part of, and is
not necessarily connected with, the present change ; moreover,
as yet it is only in my own breast." And again, a
Nov*™^er 8* few months later, he wrote, with still greater con-
fidence : " There is no fear of feelings of Caste being
excited by the new enlistment regulations in the Bengal Army.
No one will come under it otherwise than voluntarily ; and the
fact that a vast number of the recruits who join the Bombay
regiments come from the same country, and are of the same
caste, and in every respect of the same condition with the bulk
of the Army in Bengal, proves that they do not, on first enter-
ing the service, hold very closely to Caste privileges. You are
aware that the Bombay Army is enlisted for general service
without exception. The only apprehension I have ever had
(and that has vanished) is, that the Sipahis already enlisted on
the old terms might suspect that it was a first step towards
breaking faith with them, and that on the first necessity they
might be compelled to cross the sea. But there has been no
sign of any such false alarm on their part."

No signs truly apparent at Government House ; but many
and great in the Native villages, and much talk in the Lines
and Bazaars. It was hardly right even to say that there was
no interference with existing interests. For the interest of the
Sipahi in the Bengal Army was an hereditary interest. If the
British Government did not at once assume the right to send
him across the sea, it seemed certain that his sons would be sent.
There was an end, indeed, of the exclusive privileges which the
Bengal Sipahi had so long enjoyed ; the service never could be
hereafter what it had been of old ; and all the old pride, there-
fore, with which the veteran had thought of his boys succeeding
him was now suddenly extinguished. Besides, the effect, he
said, would be, that high-caste men would shrink from entering
the service, and that, therefore, the vacant places of his brethren
would be filled by men with whom he could have no feeling of
comradeship. And this was no imaginary fear. No sooner
had the order made its way through the Provinces, than it

1856.] ENLISTMENT OF SIKHS. 345

became patent to all engaged in the work of enlistment that
the same high-caste men as had before been readily recruited
were no longer pressing forward to enter the British service.*
As it was believed that we had too many Brahmans and
Rajputs in the Bengal Army, this in itself might have been no
great evil. But it was of all things the least likely that such
an order should pass into general circulation without being
ignorantly misunderstood by some, and designedly misinter-
preted by others.

So it was soon said that the English gentlemen were trying
to rid themselves of their old high-caste Sipahis,
and that soon the profession which had been fol- Enlissit^es"t of
lowed, with honourable pride, by generation after
generation of old soldier-families would not be open to them.
And this belief was greatly strengthened by a rumour which
went forth about the same time, to the effect that Government
had determined on enlisting thirty thousand more Sikhs. The
conquest of the Panjab had placed at our disposal the services
of a warlike race, always eager to wear the uniform of a suc-
cessful ruler, for in their eyes success was plunder. Less dainty
in the choice of their battlefields, and not less brave or robust
in battle, they were the very kind of mercenaries that we
wanted to give new bone and sinew to the body of our Native
Army. Whether there were or were not, at this time, a ten-
dency to over-work this new and promising recruiting-ground,
it is certain that the old race of Sipahis believed that we were
designedly working it to their injury and their overthrow.
They gave ready credence, therefore, to exaggerated reports of
Sikh enlistments, and, coupling them with the New General
Service Order, leapt to the conclusion that the English had
done with the old Bengal Army, and were about to substitute
for it another that would go anywhere and do anything, like
coolies and pariahs.

* Take, in proof of this, the following extract from a letter written by Sir
Henry Lawrence to Lord Canning, on the 1st of May, 1857 : "The General
Service Enlistment Oath is most distasteful, keeps many out of the service, and
frightens the old Sipahis, who imagine that the oaths of the young recruits
affect the whole regiment. One of the best captains of the 13th Native
Infantry, in this place, said to me last week that he had clearly ascertained
this fact : Mr. E. A. Keade, of the Sudder Board, who was for years collector
of Gorakhpur, had the General Service Order given to him as a reason last
year, when on his tour, by Rajputs, for not entering the service. The salt
water, he told me, was the universal answer." — MS. Correspondence.

346 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

Moreover, there were not wanting those who were eager to
persuade the Sipahis of the Bengal Army that this
Effects of the new Act was another insidious attempt to destroy
GemeenaAud!r.t" the Caste of the people, and to make men of all
creeds do the bidding of the English, by merging
all into the one faith of the Faringhi. It was another link in
the great chain of evidence which had been artfully employed
to convict the British Government of the charge of aiming at
the compulsory conversion of the people. The season was most
propitious. The coming of Lord Canning had, by some strange
process of association which I find it impossible to trace, been
identified with certain alleged instructions from England, ema-
nating from the Queen herself in Council, for the Christian-
isation, by fair means or by foul, of the great mass of the
people ; and now one of the first acts of his Government was to
issue an order making it compulsory on the Sipahi to take to
the transport vessel, to cross the black water, and to serve in
strange parts of the world, far away, perhaps, from all the
emblems and observances of his religion, among a people sacri-
legious and unclean.

The Native mind was, at this time, in a most sensitive state,
and easily wrought upon by suspicious appearances.
Apprehensions "What these appearances were, has, in some measure,
been shown in former chapters of this narrative.
Even the Bailway and the Electric Telegraph had been ac-
counted as blows struck at the religions of the country. Nor
was this purely a creation of the Native mind, an unaided
conception of the Priests or the People; for the missionaries
themselves had pleaded the recent material progress of the
English as an argument in favour of the adoption by the in-
habitants of India of one universal religion. " The time
appears to have come," they said in an Address which was
extensively circulated in Bengal during the closing years of
Lord Dalhousie's administration, " when earnest consideration
should be given to the question, whether or not all men should
embrace the same system of religion. Bail ways, Steam- vessels,
and the Electric Telegraph are rapidly uniting all the nations
of the earth. The more they are brought together, the more
certain does the conclusion become that all have the same
wants, the same anxieties, and the same sorrows ;" and so on,
with manifest endeavour to prove that European civilization
was the forerunner of an inevitable absorption of all other

1856.] MISSIONARY MANIFESTOES. 347

faiths into the one faith of the White Ruler. This had gone
forth, an egregious Christian manifesto, not wanting in funda-
mental truth, or in certain abstract proprieties of argument and
diction, to " Educated Natives," especially to respectable Mu-
hammadans in Government employment, some of the leading
Native functionaries of Bengal. What might truly be the
purport of it, and whence it came, was not very clear at first ;
but ere long it came to be accepted as a direct emanation from
Government, intended to invite the people to apostatise from
the religions of their fathers. And such was the excitement
that Commissioner Tayler, of the great Patna division, wherein
some disquietudes had before arisen, mainly of the Muham-
madan type, reported to Lieutenant-Governor Halliday that
intelligent natives, especially the better class of Muslims, were
"impressed with a full belief that Government were imme-
diately about to attempt the forcible conversion of its subjects."
It was added, that "a correspondence on this head had for
some time been going on between native gentlemen in various
parts of the Lower Provinces ;" and Lieutenant-Governor Hal-
liday saw so clearly that this was no impalpable mare's-nest,
no idle scum of an alarmist brain, that he forthwith issued
a sedative Proclamation ; which sedative Proclamation was
speedily answered anonymously, but beyond doubt by an " in-
telligent native," or conclave of " intelligent natives," clearly
showing by the inevitable logic of facts that if this notion of a
war against the religions of India had laid hold of the national
mind, the Government had by their own measures given en-
couragement to the dangerous belief.

Very obstinate, indeed, and hard to be removed, was this
belief; so hard, that the very efforts made to efface it might
only fix more ineffaceably the damaging impression on the
native mind. For if the wondering multitude did not think,
there were a crafty few ready to teach them, that if Govern-
ment designed, by foul means, to destroy the caste of the people
and the religions of the country, they would not hesitate to
make the issuing of a lying proclamation a part of the process.
The conviction that it was the deliberate design of the British
Government, by force or fraud, to attain this great object, was
growing stronger and stronger every month, when Lord
Canning arrived in India, and at once became, all unwittingly,
a special object of suspicion and alarm. The lies which
attended, perhaps preceded, his advent, caused all his move-

348 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY [1856

ments to he narrowly watched ; and it began soon to he hruited
abroad that he had subscribed largely to missionary societies,
and that Lady Canning, who was known to be in the especial
confidence of the Queen, was intent on making great personal
exertions for the conversion of the women of the country.

But there was no truth in all this. The Governor-General
I ord Canning ^ad °^orie no more than other Governors-General
and the Religious had done before him. He had sent a donation to
societies. t^e giDie Society, a society for the translation of
the Scriptures into the Oriental languages, and the circulation
of these new versions among the people. But the translation
of the Scriptures had been carried on more than half a century
before, in the College of Fort William, under the especial
patronage of Lord Wellesley ; and Lord Wellesley's successor,
during whose reign the Calcutta Bible Society was established,
headed the list with a large subscription. Lord Hastings, Lord
William Bentinck, and Sir Charles Metcalfe had all contributed
to the funds of the society. But Lord Canning had also given
a donation to the Baptist College at Srirampur. What then ?
It had been established in 1818, under the auspices of Lord
Hastings, whose name had been published as the "First
Patron " of the Institution, and it had received the support of
subsequent Goveimors-General without question or comment.
Besides these donations, he had made a contribution to the
support of the excellent school of the Free Church Mission,
under the management of Dr. Duff, as Lord Dalhousie had done
before him. " I admit," he said, " that the Head of the
Government in India ought to abstain from acts which may
have the appearance of an exercise of power, authority, solicita-
tion, or persuasion towards inducing natives to change their
religion. But if it is contended that a school like this,
thoroughly catholic and liberal, open to students of every creed,
doing violence to none, and so conducted as to disarm hostility
and jealousy (the number of the Hindu and Musulman scholars
shows this), is not to have countenance and support from the
Governor-General because it is managed by missionaries, I join
isstie on that point. I am not prepared to act upon that
doctrine."

And what had Lady Canning done ? She had taken a true
womanly interest in the education of native female children.
She had visited the female schools of Calcutta in a quiet, un-
obtrusive way ; but once only in each case, save with a notable

1856.] PROGRESS OF SOCIAL REFORM. 349

exception in favour of the Bethune Institution, which had been
taken by Lord Dalhousie under the special care of the Govern-
ment.* In this Lady Canning had taken some observable
interest. But as the Managing Committee of the school was
composed of high-caste Hindu gentlemen, there was assuredly
no apparent necessity for restraining her womanly instincts
and shrinking into apathy and indolence, as one regardless of
the happiness and the dignity of her sex. Whatsoever may
have been the zeal for the conversion of the Heathen that
pervaded Government House, there were no indiscreet manifes-
tations of it. There are times, however, when no discretion
can wholly arrest the growth of dangerous lies. A very little
thing, in a season of excitement, will invest a colourable false-
hood with the brightest hues of truth, and carry conviction to
the dazzled understanding of an ignorant people. The sight
of Lady Canning's carriage at the gates of the Bethune school
may have added, therefore, Heaven only knows, some fresh
tints to the picture of a caste-destroying Government, which
active-minded emissaries of evil were so eager to hang up in
the public places of the land.

It was not much; perhaps, indeed, it was simply nothing.
But just at that time there was a movement, urged
on by John Grant and Barnes Peacock, in the ^Sorm.
purest spirit of benevolence, for the rescue of the
women of India from the degradation in which they were sunk.
It happened — truly, it happened, for it was wholly an accident
— that one of the first measures, outwardly, of Lord Canning's
Government was the formal passing of the bill " to remove all
legal obstacles to the marriage of Hindu widows," which had
been introduced, discussed, and virtually carried, during the
administration of his predecessor.! And this done, there was
much said and written about the restraints that were to be
imposed on Hindu polygamy ; and every day the appearance of
a Draft Act, formidable in the extreme to Brahmanism, was
looked for, with doubt and aversion, by the old orthodox
Hindus. For they saw that in this, as in the matter of Re-
Marriage, some of their more free-thinking countrymen, mostly
of the younger generation, moved by the teachings of the
English, or by some hope of gain, were beseeching Government
to relieve the nation from what they called the reproach of

* Ante, page 136. t Ante, page 137.

350 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

Kulinism. And, at such a time, Orthodoxy, staggering under
blows given, and shrinking from blows to come, looked aghast
even at such small manifestations as the visits of the wife of
the Governor-General to the Bethune female school. It was
clear that the English, with their overpowering love of rule,
were about now to regulate in India, after their own fashion,
the relations of the two sexes to each other.*

Lord Canning found this movement afoot ; he in no wise
instituted it. He found that Lord Dalhousie, after an experience
of many years, believed these social reforms to be practicable
and safe ; he found that the ablest member of his Council, who
had spent all his adult life in India, was with all his heart and
soul eager for their promotion, and with all the activity of his
intellect promoting them. As to this movement against Hindu
polygamy, which was intended to prune down the evil, not
wholly to eradicate it, there was something, to his European
understanding, grotesque in the notion of a Christian Legisla-
ture recognising certain forms of polygamy, and addressing
itself only to the abuses of the system, as though to Christian
eyes it were not altogether an abuse. But he could see plainly
enough that only by admitting such a compromise could the
good thing be done at all ; and seeing also the necessity of pro-
ceeding warily with such a delicate operation, he was not
disposed, in the first instance, to do more than to feel the pulse
of the people. It would be wise to delay actual legislation
until public opinion should have been more unmistakably
evoked.f

* Sir Henry Lawrence clearly discerned the danger of this, and in an
article in the Calcutta Review, written in 1856, pointed it out : " Of late
years," he wrote, " the wheels of Government have been moving very fast.
Many native prejudices have been shocked. Natives are now threatened
with the abolition of polygamy. It would not be difficult to twist this into
an attack on Hinduism. At any rate, the. faster the vessel glides, the more
need of caution, of watching the weather, the rocks, and the fhoals."

f Lord Canning's opinions are so clearly expressed in the following passage,
that it is right that his words should be given : " It will no doubt be a little
Btaggering to find ourselves drawing up a law by which, although a horrible
abuse of polygamy will be checked, a very liberal amount of it will be
sanctioned, and which must recognise as justifying it reasons which we believe
to be no justification whatever. It may be said that we shall only be enforc-
ing Hindu law, and that we are constantly doing this in many ways which
abstractedly we should not approve. But I do not know that we have any
examples of laws of our own making and wording, by which anything so con*

1856.] RESTRICTIONS ON POLYGAMY. 351

In the personal action of Lord Canning during this year of
his novitiate, in the promotion either of the religious conver-
sion or the social reformation of the people, I can see no traces
of intemperate zeal. But it is not to be questioned that just- at
this time there was a combination of many untoward circum-
stances to strengthen the belief, which had been growing for
some years, that the English Government were bent upon
bringing, by fair means or by foul, all the nations of India
under the single yoke of the White Man's faith. Nor is it less
certain that at such a time the order for the enlistment of
Native troops for general service appeared to their unaided
comprehensions, and was designedly declared by others, to be a
part of the scheme. There were those, indeed, who saw, or
professed to see, in this matter, the very root of our cherished
desire for the conversion of the people. It was said that we
wished to bring them all to our own faith in order that we
might find them willing to do our bidding in all parts of the
world, that they might shrink from no kind of work by sea or
by land, and even fight our battles in Europe ; for it was plain
that England had sad lack of fighting-men, or she would not
have drawn upon India for them during the Crimean war. In
the art of what is called " putting two and two together," there
were many intelligent natives by no means deficient, and
deeper and deeper the great suspicion struck root in the
popular mind.

There was another ugly symptom, too, at this time, which
greatly, in some particular quarters, strengthened this impres-

trary to our convictions of right and wrong as the taking of a second wife, for
the reasons allowed by Menu (or at least for eight of them out of ten), is
declared lawful. This, however, is a matter of appearance and feeling rather
than of substance. Practically, a monstrous horror would be put an end to,
and we might keep ourselves straight even in appe.irance by making it very
clear in the preamble that the act is passed at the desire of the Hindus to
rescue their own law and custom from a great abuse, and that in no respect

is it proposed to substitute English law for the laws of that people

Upon the whole, I come, without hesitation, to the conclusion that the move-
ment ought to be encouraged to our utmost, and that the existence and strength
of it ought to be made generally known. The presentation of the petitions to
the Legislative Council, and their publication, will effect this. How soon the
introduction of a bill should follow, or how much time should be given to see-
ing whether serious opposition is evoked, I should like to talk over with you
some day, as also the scope of the bill." — Lord Canning to Mr. J. F. Grunt,
June 20, 1856. MS. Correspondence.

352 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856,

sion of coming danger among the Sipahis of the Bengal Army.
There were among the European officers of that army many
earnest-minded, zealous Christians ; men whose hearts were
wrung by the sight of the vast mass of heathendom around
them, and who especially deplored the darkness which brooded
over their companions in arms, their children in the service of
the State, the Sipahis who looked up to and obeyed them.
Some, in their conscientious prudence, grieved in silence, and
rendered unto Caesar the homage of a wise forbearance. Others,
conscientiously imprudent, believed that it was their duty to
render unto God the just tribute of an apostolic activity. It
was the creed of these last that all men were alike to them, as
having souls to be saved, and that no external circumstances
affected their onw inalienable right to do their great Master's
work. If under the pressure of these convictions they had
changed the red coat for the black, and the sword for the
shepherd's crook, they would have fairly earned the admiration
of all good men. But holding fast to the wages of the State,
they went about with the order-book in one hand and the Bible
in the other ; and thus they did a great and grievous wrong to
the Government they professed to serve. To what extent this
missionary zeal pervaded our English officers, it is not easy,
with much precision, to declare. But there were some of whose
missionary zeal there is now no remnant of a doubt — some who
confessed, nay, openly gloried in their proselytising endeavours.
One officer, who in 1857 was commandant of a regiment of
Infantry, said vauntingly in that year : " I beg to state that
during the last twenty years and upwards I have been in the
habit of speaking to natives of all classes, Sipahis and others,
making no distinction, since there is no respect of persons with
God, on the subject of our religion, in the highways, cities,
bazaars, and villages — not in the Lines and regimental Bazaars.
I have done this from a conviction that every converted
Christian is expected, or rather commanded, by the Scriptures
to make known the glad tidings of salvation to his lost fellow-
creatures, Our Saviour having offered Himself up as a sacrifice
for the sins of the whole world, by which alone salvation can
be secured. He has directed that this salvation should be
freely offered to all without exception." Again, in another
letter, he wrote : "As to the question whether I have en-
deavoured to convert Sipahis and others to Christianity, 1
would humbly reply that this has been my object, and I

1856.] COLONEL WHELEE'S MANIFESTO. 353

conceive is the aim and end of every Christian who speaks the
word of God to another — merely that the Lord would make
him the happy instrument of converting his neighbour to God,
or, in other words, of rescuing him from eternal destruction."
" On matters connected with religion," he added, " I feel myself
called upon to act in two capacities — 'to render unto Caesar (or
the Government) the things that are Caesar's, and to render
unto God the things that are God's.' Temporal matters and
spiritual matters are thus kept clearly under their respective
heads. When speaking, therefore, to a native on the subject of
religion, I am then acting in the capacity of a Christian soldier
under the authority of my heavenly superior ; whereas in
temporal matters 1 act as a general officer, under the authority
and order of my earthly superior." * Eeading this, one does
not know whether more to admire the Christian courage of the
writer or to marvel at the strange moral blindness which would
not suffer him to see that he could not serve both God and
Mammon ; that ignoring the known wishes and instructions of
his temporal master, he could not do his duty to his spiritual
Lord ; and that if in such a case the two services were antago-
nistic to each othev, it was his part, as a Christian, to divest
himself of his purchased allegiance to the less worthy Govern-
ment, and to serve the Other and the Higher without hindrance
and without reproach. He was not bound to continue to follow
such a calling, but whilst following it he was bound to do his
duty in that state of life to which it had pleased God to call
him.

Whilst all these disturbing influences were at work, and on
many accounts most actively in the neighbourhood of Calcutta,
there came from afar, across the North- Western frontier, a
current of political agitation, which was met by other streams
of native origin, tui'gid also with troublous rumours. The
Persian Government, in best of times given to treachery and
trickery, even under the fairest outside show of friendship,
were not likely in such a conjuncture as had arisen at the end
of 1856 to let slip any available means of damaging an enemy.
Holding fast to the maxim that " All is fair in war," they
endeavoured, not unwisely after their kind, to raise manifold
excitements on our Northern frontier, and somehow to " create

* Lieutenant-Colonel Wheler to Government, April 15, 1857. — Printed
Papers.

VOL. l. 2 .1

354 OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY. [1856.

a diversion." There might be some inflammable materials
strewn about, to which a firebrand skilfully applied, or even a
spark dropped seemingly haphazard, might produce the desired
result of combustion. Truly it was worth a trial. In spite of
Sectarian differences something perhaps might be done by an
appeal to the common faith of the followers of the Prophet.
The King of Dehli, though not much as a substantial fact, was
a great and potential name ; there was some vitality in the
traditions which were attached to it and the associations by
which it was surrounded. The Mughul himself was a Sum,
and the people < f Dehli and its surroundings were mostly Sums,
and there was doubtless a difficulty in this, but not one that
might not be surmounted. So Persia sent forth her emissaries
noiselessly to the gates of the Imperial City, perhaps with no
very clear conception of what was to be done, but with a
general commission to do mischief to the English. Muhamma-
dans of all sects might be invited to lay aside their doctrinal
differences for a while and to unite against a common enemy.
There might be great promises of the restoration of a magnifi-
cent Muhammadan Empire ; and, as the least result of the
scattering of such seed, the minds of the people might be
unsettled, and something might come of it in good time. A
Proclamation was therefore prepared, and in due course it found
its way to the walls of Dehli, and even displayed itself on the
Jami Masjid, or Great Mosque. There were stories, too, in cir-
culation to the effect that the war on the shores of the Persian
Gulf was going cruelly against us. It was bruited abroad, also,
that though the English thought that they had secured the
friendship of Dost Muhammad, the Amir was really the friend
and vassal of Persia, and that the amity he had outwardly
evinced towards them was only a pretext for beguiling them to
surrender Peshawar to the Afghans.

It was believed in Upper India that this was to be done ; and
it was reported also about the same time that the English
intended to compensate themselves for this concession by annex-
ing the whole of Eajputana. This last story was not one of
merely native acceptance. It had been set forth prominently
in some of the Anglo-Indian newspapers, and unhappily there
had been nothing in our past treatment of the Native States of
India to cause it to be disbelieved In the North- Western
regions of India disturbing rumours commonly assume a
political colour, whilst lower down in Bengal and Bihar, their

1856] POLITICAL INQUIETUDES. 355

complexion is more frequently of a religious cast. The rumour
of the coming absorption of these ancient Hindu principalities
into the great new Empire of the British was well contrived,
not only to excite the anxieties and resentments of the Rajput
races, but to generate further political mistrust throughout all
the remaining states of the country. It was so mischievous a
report that, when it reached England and obtained further
currency in our journals, even the Court of Directors of the
East India Company, the most reticent of all political bodies,
broke, as I have before said, through their habitual reserve, and
authoritatively contradicted it.

Seldom is it that the English themselves discern the effects
of these disquieting rumours upon the minds of the people. In
ordinary official language, at this time, all was quiet in Upper
India. But ever and anon some friendly Muhammadan or
Hindu spoke of certain significant symptoms of the unrest
which was not visible to the English eye j* and vague reports
of some coming danger which no one could define, reached our
functionaries in the North- West ; and some at last began to
awaken slowly to the conviction that there were evil influences
at work to unsettle the national mind. The new year dawned,

* The old Afghan chief, Jan Fishan Khan, who had followed our fortunes
ami received a pension from the British Government, told Mr. Greathed, Com-
missioner at Kanhpiir, in February, 1857, that these rumours had produced a
very bad effect. A private note from that officer to Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-
Governor, is worthy of citation in this place: "Jan Fishan Khan paid me a
visit a few days ago with the special object of communicating his apprehen-
sions on the present state of political affairs in India. He brought several
members of his family, evidently to be witnesses of the interview, and prefaced
his address with a recitation of the fruitless warnings he had given Sir Wm.
MacNaghten of the course affairs were taking in Kabul. His fears for our
safety rested on his belief that we intended to give up Peshawar to Dost
Muhammad and to annex Rajputana. He said our maxim should be ' Pre-
vention better than cure,' and that, with enemies at the gate, we should take
care to keep the inmates of the house our friends. He appeared quite
relieved to receive my assurance that there was no probability of either of the
apprehended events coming to pass. It would hardly have been worth while
to mention this incident, but that we so rarely receive any indication of the
political gossip of the day among the native community; and we may feel
quite sure that Jan Fishan was actuated by fears for our welfare, and not by
hopes of our overthrow, when he gave credence to the reports. I am afraid
tie frequent reports of annexation in Rajputana have agitated the public
mind and bred distrust among the Rajputs. It is a pity so many years have
elapsed since a Governor-General had an opportunity of personally assuring
them of their political safety."

2 a 2

356 OUTBKEAK OF THE MUTINY. [1856.

and there was something suggestive in the number of the year.
In 1757 the English had established their dominion in India by
the conquest of Bengal. For a hundred years they had now,
by the progressive action of continued encroachments, been
spreading their paramount rule over the whole country ; and
there were prophecies, said to be of ancient date, which foretold
the downfall of the English power at the end of this century of
supremacy. Ever in times of popular excitement are strange
prophecies afloat in the social atmosphere. Whether they are
revivals of old predictions, or new inventions designed to meet
the requirements of the moment, it is often difficult even to
conjecture.* But whether old or new, whether uttered in good
faith or fraudulently manufactured, they seldom failed to make
an impression on the credulous minds of the people. Coming
upon them not as the giowth of human intelligence, but as the
mysterious revelations of an unseen power, they excited hopes
and aspirations, perhaps more vital and cogent from their very
vagueness. The religious element mingled largely with the
political, and the aliment which nourished the fanaticism of
believers fed also their ambition and their cupidity. In the
particular prophecy of which men at this time were talking
there was at least something tangible, for it was a fact that the
first century of British rule was fast coming to an end. This
in itself was sufficient to administer largely to the superstition
and credulity of the people, and it was certain, too, that the
prediction based upon it was not now heard for the tirst time.
Lightly heeded, when long years were to intervene before its
possible realisation, now that the date of the prediction had
arrived, it took solemn and significant shape in the memories of
men, and the very excitement that it engendered helped in time
to bring about its fulfilment.!

* It is certain, however, that the most preposterous claims to antiquity are
sometimes advanced on their behalf. For example, it was gravely stated in a
leading Calcutta journal, that a prophecy had been discovered, a thousand
years old, pointing to the downfall of the English at this time ; in other words,
that our destruction had been predicted many hundred years before we had
ever been seen in the country, or ever heard of by the people.

f Whether the prophecy was of Hindu or Muhamrnadan origin is still a
moot question. The following, from a memorandum furnished to me by Mr.
E. A. Reade, throws some light on the subject, and will be read with no little
interest : — " I do not think I ever met one man in a hundred that did not give
the Muhammadans credit for this prediction. I fully believe that the notion

J 856.3 THE CENTENAKY PROPHECY. 357

of change after a century of tenure was general, and I can testify with others
to have heard of the prediction at least a quarter of a century previously. But
call it a prediction or superstition, the credit of it must, I think, be giver to
the Hindus. If we take the Hejra calendar, 1757 a.d. corresponds with 1171
Hejra; 1857 a.d. with 1274 hejra. Whereas by the luni-solar year of the
Sumbut, 1757 a.d, is 1814 Surahut, and 1857 a.d. 1914 Sumbut. 1 remember
on my remarking to a chowvey Brahman, whose loyalty was conspicuous
throughout the period (he was afterwards killed inaction with the rebels), soon
after the battle of Oct. 11, 1857, that the Sumbut 1915 was passing away with-
out the fulfilment of the centenary prophecy, that he replied with some
anxiety, there was yet a remainder of the year, i.e., till March 20, 1858 ; and
before "that time, in 1832, the Subadir, a Tawari, of a cavalry regiment, in his
farewell to a brother of mine leaving the service in that year, coolly telling
him that in another twenty-five years the Company's Raj would be at an end,
and the Hindu Raj restored. It eeitainly does not much matter, but I think
it is the safe view to accept the tradition as of Hindu rather than Muham-
maian origin."

358 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. (.1SS7.

CHAPTEE IV.

The new year dawned upon India with a fair promise of
continued tranquillity. But it was only a few
uary' weeks old when the storm began to arise. It is

in the cold weather that the British officer sees most of the
Sipahi, and best understands his temper. Company
Trfsingrm drills, and regimental parades, arid brigade exercises,
are continually bringing him face to face with his
men, and he roams about Cantonments as he cannot roam in
the midst of the summer heats and autumnal deluges. But this
winter of 1856-57 had nearly passed away, and he had seen no
indications of anything to disturb his settled faith in the
fidelity of the native soldier. There was outward serenity
everywhere, and apparent cheerfulness and content, when
suddenly a cloud arose in an unexpected quarter ; and a tre-
mendous danger, dimly seen at first, began to expand into
gigantic proportions.

For years the enemies of the English, all who had been
alarmed by our encroachments, all who had suffered by our
usurpations, all who had been shorn by our intervention of
privileges and perquisites which they had once enjoyed, and
who saw before them a still deeper degradation and a more
absolute ruin, had been seeking just such an opportunity as
now lose up suddenly before them. They had looked for it in
one direction ; they had looked for it in another ; and more
than once they thought that they had found it. They thought
that they had found something, of which advantage might be
taken to persuade the Native soldiery that their Christian
masters purposed to defile their caste and to destroy their
religion. But the false steps, which we had hitherto taken,
had not been false enough to serve the purposes of those who
had sought to destroy the British Government by means of a
general revolt of the Native Army. For half a century there

1857.] STORY OF THE GREASED CARTRIDGES. 359

had been nothing of a sufficiently palpable and comprehensive
character to alarm the whole Sipahi Army, Muhammadan and
Hindu. But now, suddenly, a story of most terrific import
found its way into circulation. It was stated that Government
had manufactured cartridges, greased with animal fat, for the
use of the Native Army ; and the statement was not a lie.

The old infantry musket, the venerable Brown Bess of the
British soldier, had been condemned as a relic
of barbarism, and it was wisely determined, in the
Indian as in the English Army, to supersede it by the issue of
an improved description of fire-arm, with grooved bores, after
the fashion of a rifle. As a ball from these new rifled muskets
reached the enemy at a much greater distance than the ammu-
nition of the old weapon, the Sipahi rejoiced in the advantage
which would thus be conferred upon him in battle, and lauded the
Government for what he regarded as a sign both of the wisdom
of his rulers and of their solicitude for his welfare. And when
it was learnt that depots had been established at three great
military stations for the instruction of the Sipahi in the use of
the new weapon, there was great talk in the Lines about the
wonderful European musket that was to keep all comers at a
distance. But, unhappily, these rifled barrels could not be
loaded without the lubrication of the cartridge. And the
voice of joy and praise was suddenly changed into a wild cry
of grief and despair when it was bruited abroad that the
cartridge, the end of which was to be bitten off by the Sipahi,
was greased with the fat of the detested swine of the Muham-
madan, or the venerated cow of the Hindu.

How the truth first transpired has been often told. Eight
miles from Calcutta lies the military station of
Damdamah. For many years it had been the gre^caltridges.
head-quarters of the Bengal Artillery. There all
the many distinguished officers of that distinguished corps had
learnt the rudiments of their profession, and many had spent
there the happiest years of their lives. But it was suddenly
discovered that it was not suited to the purpose for which it
was designed. The head-quarters of the Artillery were removed
to Mirath. The red coat displaced the blue. The barracks and
the mess-house, and the officer's bungalows, were given up to
other occupants ; and buildings, which from their very birth
had held nothing but the appliances of ordnance, were de-
graded into manufactories and storehouses of small-arm

360 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

ammunition. Thus, by a mutation of fortune, when the Enfield
Eifle began to supersede Brown Bess, Damdamah became one of
three Cantonments at which the Government established
Schools of Musketry for instruction in the use of the improved
rifled weapon. Now, it happened that, one day in January, a
low-caste Lascar, or magazine-man, meeting a high-caste
Sipahi in the Cantonment, asked him for a drink of water from
his lotah. The Brahman at once replied with an objection on
the score of caste, and was tauntingly told that caste was
nothing, that high-caste and low-caste would soon be all the
same, as cartridges smeared with beef- fat and hog's-lard were
being made for the Sipahis at the depots, and would soon be in
general use throughout the army.*

The Brahman carried this story to his comrades, and it was
soon known to every Sipahi at the depot. A shudder ran
through the Lines. Each man to whom the story was told
caught the great fear from his neighbour, and trembled at the
thought of the pollution that lay before him. The contamina-
tion was to be brought to his very lips ; it was not merely to
be touched, it was to be eaten and absorbed into his very being.
It was so terrible a thing, that, if the most malignant enemies
of the British Government had sat in conclave for years, and
brought an excess of devilish ingenuity to bear upon the
invention of a scheme framed with the design of alarming the
Sipahi mind from one end of India to the other, they could not
have devised a lie better suited to the purpose. But now the
English themselves had placed in the hands of their enemies,
not a fiction, but a fact of tremendous significance, to be turned
against them as a deadly instrument of destruction. It was
the very thing that had been so long sought, and up to this
time sought in vain. It required no explanation. It needed
no ingenious gloss to make the full force of the thing itself
patent to the multitude. It was not a suggestion, an inference,
a probability ; but a demonstrative fact, so complete in its
naked truth, that no exaggeration could have helped it. Like
the case of the leathern head-dresses, which had convulsed
Southern India half a century before, it appealed to the
strongest feelings both of the Mahammadan and the Hindu ;

* No greased cartridges had been issued at Damdamah. The Sipahis in
the mubketry school there were only in the rudiments of their rifle-education,
und hud not come yet to need the application of the grease.

1857.] SPREAD OF EVIL TIDINGS. 361

but though similar in kind, it was incomparably more offensive
in degree ; more insulting, more appalling, more disgusting.

We know so little of Native Indian society beyond its merest
externals, the colour of the people's skins, the form of their
garments, the outer aspects of their houses, that History, whilst
it states broad results, can often only surmise causes. But
there are some surmises which have little less than the force of
gospel. We feel what we cannot see, and have faith in what
we cannot prove. It is a fact, that there is a certain description
of news, which travels in India, from one station to another,
with a rapidity almost electric. Before the days of the
" lightning post," there was sometimes intelligence in the
Bazaars of the Native dealers and the Lines of the Native
soldiers, especially if the news imported something disastrous
to the British, days before it reached, in any official shape, the
high functionaries of Government.* We cannot trace the progress
of these evil-tidings. The Natives of India have an expressive
saying, that "it is in the air." It often happened that an
uneasy feeling — an impression that something had happened,
though they "could not discern the shape thereof" — pervaded
men's minds, in obscure anticipation of the news that was
travelling towards them in all its tangible proportions. All
along the line of road, from town to town, from village to
village, were thousands to whom the feet of those who brought
the ^lad tidings were beautiful and welcome. The British
Magistrate, returning from his evening ride, was perhaps met on
the road near the Bazaar by a venerable Native on an ambling
pony — a Native respectable of aspect, with white beard and whiter
garments, who salaamed to the English gentleman as he passed,
and went on his way freighted with intelligence refreshing to
the souls of those to whom it was to be communicated, to be
used with judgment and sent on with despatch. This was but
one of many costumes worn by the messenger of evil. In
whatsoever shape he passed, there was nothing outwardly to
distinguish him. Next morning there was a sensation in the

* The news of the first outbreak and massacre at Kabul, in 1841, and also
of the subsequent destruction of the British Array in the Pass, reached
Calcutta through the Bazuars of Mirath and Kannil some days before they
found their way to Government House from any official quarter ; and the
mutiny at Barrackpur was known by the Sipsihis of the British force
proceeding to Burniah before it reached the military and political chiefs by
special express.

362 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. 0S57,

Bazaar, and a vague excitement in the Sipahis' Lines. But when
rumours of disaster reached the houses of the chief English
officers, they were commonly discredited. Their own letters
were silent on the subject. It was not likely to be true, they
said, as they had heard nothing about it. But it was true ; and
the news had travelled another hundred miles whilst the white
gentlemen, with bland scepticism, were shaking their heads
over the lies of the Bazaar.

It is difficult, in most cases, to surmise the agency to whose
interested efforts is to be attributed this rapid circulation of
evil tidings. But when the fact of the greased cartridges
became known, there were two great motive powers, close at
hand, to give an immediate impulse to the promulgation of the
story. The political and the religious animosities, excited by
the recent measures of the English, were lying in wait for an
opportunity to vent themselves in action. It happened at this
time, that the enmities which we had most recently provoked
had their head-quarters in Calcutta. It happened, also that
these enmities had their root partly in Hinduism, partly in
Muhammaclanism. There was the great Brahmanical Insti-
tution, the Dharma Sobha of Calcutta, whose special function
it was to preserve Hinduism pure and simple in all its ancestral
integrity, and, therefore, to resist the invasions and encroach-
ments of the English, by which it was continually threatened.
There were bygone injuries to revenge, and there were coming
dangers to repel. On the other side, there was the deposed
kingship of Oudh, with all its perilous surroundings. Sunk
in slothfulness and self-indulgence, with little real care for
anything beyond the enjoyment of the moment, Wajid Ali
himself may have neither done nor suggested anything, in this
crisis, to turn to hostile account the fact of the greased car-
tridges. But there were those about him with keener eyes,
and stronger wills, and more resolute activities, who were not
likely to suffer such an opportunity to escape. It needed no
such special agencies to propagate a story, which would have
travelled, in ordinary course of accidental tale-bearing, to the
different stations in the neighbourhood of the capital. But it was
expedient in the eyes of our enemies that it should at once be
invested with all its terrors, and the desired effect wrought
upon the Sipahi's mind, before any one could be induced, by
timely official explanation, to believe that the outrage was an
accident, an oversight, a mistake. So, from the beginning, the

1857.] THE BARRACKPtJR BRIGADE. 363

story went forth, that the English, in prosecution of a long
cherished design, and under instructions from the Queen in
Council, had greased the Sipahis' cartridges with the fat of
pigs and cows, for the express purpose of defiling both
Muhammad ans and Hindus.

On the banks of the Hugli Eiver, sixteen miles from Calcutta
by land, is the great military station of Barrackpur. It was the
head-quarters of the Presidency division of the Army. There
was assembled the largest body of Native troops cantoned in
that part of India. There, on the green slopes of the river,
stood, in a well-wooded park, the country-seat of the Governor-
General. Both in its social and its military aspects it was the
foremost Cantonment of Bengal. As the sun declined on the
opposite bank, burnishing the stream with gold, and throwing
into dark relief the heavy masses of the native boats, the park
roads were alive with the equipages of the English residents.
There visitors from Calcutta, escaping for a while from the
white glare and dust- laden atmosphere of the metropolis, con-
sorted with the families of the military officers ; and the
neighbouring villas of Titagarh sent forth their retired inmates
to join the throng of " eaters of the evening air." There the
young bride, for it is a rare place for honeymoons, emerging
from her seclusion, often looked out upon the world for the
first time in her new state. There many a young ensign,
scarcely less hopeful and less exultant, wore for the first time
the bridal garments of his profession, and backed the capering
Arab that had consumed a large part of his worldly wealth.
It was a pleasant, a gay, a hospitable station ; and there was
not in all India a Cantonment so largely known and frequented
by the English. There was scarcely an officer of the Bengal
Army to whom the name of Barrackpur did not suggest some
familiar associations, whilst to numbers of the non-military
classes, whose occupations tied them to the capital, it was for
long years, perhaps throughout the whole of their money-
getting career, the extreme point to which their travels
extended.

At Barrackpur, in the early part of 1857, were stationed
four Native Infantry regiments. There were the 2nd
Grenadiers* and the 43rd, two of the "beautiful regiments"
which had helped General Nott to hold Kandahar against all

* A wing of this regiment was at Rdniganj.

364 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

comers, and had afterwards gained new laurels in desperate
conflict with the Marathas and Sikhs. There was the 34th, an
ill-omened number, for a few years before it had been struck
out of the Army List for mutiny,* and a new regiment had
been raised to fill the dishonourable gap. There also was the
70th, which had rendered good service in the second Sikh war.
Three of these regiments had been recently stationed in the
Panjab, or on its frontier, and the 34th had just come down
from Lakhnao. This last regiment was commanded by Colonel
S. G. Wheler, who had but recently been posted to it from
another corps ; the 43rd was under Colonel J. D. Kennedy,
whi'se tenure of command had also been brief; whilst the 70th
and the wing of the 2nd were commanded by officers who had
graduated in those regiments, and were therefore well known
to the men. The station was commanded by Brigadier Charles
Grant; and the General of Division was that brave soldier and
distinguished officer, John Hearsey, of whose services I have
already spoken in a previous chapter of this work. |

On the 28th of January, Hearsey reported officially to the
Adjutant-General's office that an ill-feeling was "said to subsist
in the minds of the Sipahis of the regiments at Barrackpur."
" A report," he said, " has been spread by some designing
persons, most likely Brahmans, or agents of the religious
Hindu party in Calcutta (I believe it is called the ' Dharma
Sobha'), that the Sipahis are to be forced to embrace the
Christian faith." " Perhaps," he added, " those Hindus who
are opposed to the marriage of widows in Calcutta J are using
underhand means to thwart Government in abolishing the
restraints lately removed by law for the marriage of widows,
and conceive if they can make a party of the ignorant classes
in the ranks of the army believe their religion or religious
prejudices are eventually to be abolished by force, and by force
they are all to be made Christians, and thus, by shaking their
faith in Government, lose the confidence of their officers by
inducing Sipahis to commit offences (such as incendiarism), so
difficult to put a stop to or prove, they will gain their object."
The story of the greased cartridges was by this time in every

* Ante, p. 196.

f See Book II. — Account of the Mutiny in the Panjab.
% The General, doubtless, meant to say, " those Hindus in Calcutta who
are opposed to the marriage of widows.''

1857.] EXCITEMENT AT BAKRACKPtlR. 365

mouth. There was not a Sipahi in the Lines of Barrackpur who
was not familiar with it. There were few who did not believe
that it was a deliberate plot, on the part of the English, designed
to break down the caste of the Native soldier. And many were
persuaded that there was an ultimate design to bring all men,
along a common road of pollution, to the Tinclean faith of the
beef-devouring, swine-eating Faringhi, who had conquered
their country and now yearned to extirpate the creeds of their
countrymen.

There was a time, perhaps, when the Sipahi would have
carried the story to his commanding officer, and sought an
explanation of it. Such confidences had ceased to be a part of
the relations between them. But it was not the less manifest
that the Native soldiery at Barrackpur were boiling over with
bitter discontent. They had accepted not only the fact as it
came to them from Damdaraah, but the accompanying lies
which had been launched from Calcutta ; and they soon began,
after the fashion of their kind, to make a public display of
their wrath. It is their wont in such cases to symbolise the
inner fires that are consuming them by acts of material incen-
diarism. No sooner is the Sipahi troubled in his mind, and
bent on resistance, than he begins covertly in the night to set
fire to some of the public buildings of the place. Whether
this is an ebullition of childish anger — an outburst of irrepressi-
ble feeling in men not yet ripe for more reasonable action ; or
whether it be intended as a signal, whether the fires are beacon-
fires lit up to warn others to be stirring, they are seldom or
never wanting in such conjunctures as this. A few days after
the story of the greased cartridges first transpired at Damdamah,
the telegraph station at Barrackpur was burnt down. Then,
night after night, followed other fires. Burning arrows were
shot into the thatched roofs of officers' bungalows. It was a
trick learnt from the Santals, among whom the 2nd Grenadiers
had served ; and the fact that similar fires, brought about by
the same means, were breaking out at Baniganj, more than a
hundred miles away, stamped their complicity in the crime,
for one wing of the regiment was stationed there. These
incendiary fires were soon followed by nocturnal meetings.
Men met each other with muffled faces, and discussed, in
excited language, the intolerable outrage which the British
Government had deliberately committed upon them. It is
probable that they were not all Sipabis who attended these

366 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857

nightly musters. It is probable that they were not all Sipahis
who signed the letters that went forth from the post-offices of
Calcutta and Barrackpur, calling upon the soldiery at all the
principal stations of the Bengal Army to resist the sacrilegious
encroachments of the English. All that is clearly known is,
that the meetings were held, that the letters were sent; and
Cantonment after Cantonment fermented with the story of the
greased cartridges.

A hundred miles from Barrackpur, to the northward, on the
banks of the river, lies the military station of
TBarb&mnflrat Barhampur. It was one well suited, by its position,
for the development of the desired results. For only
a few miles beyond it lay the city of Murshidabad, the home
of the Nawab Nazim of Bengal, the representative of the
line of Subahdars, who, under the Imperial Government,
had once ruled that great province. It was known that the
Nawab, who, though stripped of his ancestral power, lived in a
palace with great wealth and titular dignity and the sur-
roundings of a Court, was rankling under a sense of indignities
put upon him by the British Government, and that there were
thousands in the city who would have risen at the signal of one
who, weak himself, was yet strong in the prestige of a great
name. At Barhampiir, there were no European troops; there
were none anywhere near to it. A regiment of Native Infantry,
the 19th, was stationed there, with a corps of Irregular Cavalry,
and a battery of post guns manned by native gunners. It was
not difficult to see that if these troops were to rise against their
English officers, and the people of Murshidabad were to fra-
ternise with them, in the name of the Nawab, all Bengal would
soon be in a blaze. No thoughts of this kind disturbed the
minds of our people, but the truth was very patent to the
understandings of their enemies.

It happened, too, unfortunately at this time, that the routine-
action of the British Government favoured the growth of the
evil ; for when the excitement was great at Barrackpur, de-
tachments went forth on duty from the most disaffected
regiments of all to spread by personal intercourse the great
contagion of alarm. Firstly, a guard from the 34th went
upwards in charge of stud-horses; and then, a week later,
another detachment from this regiment marched in the same
direction with a party of European convalescents. At Barham-
piir they were to be relieved by men from the regiment there,

1857.] THE 34TH N. I. AT BARHAMPUR, 367

and then to return to their own head -quarters ; so that they
had an opportunity of communicating all that was going on at
Barrackpiir to their comrades of the 19th, of learning their
sentiments and designs, and carrying back to their own station,
far more clearly and unmistakably than could any correspon-
dence by letter, tidings of the state of feeling among the troops
at Barhampur, and the extent to which they were prepared to
resist the outrage of the greased cartridges.

When the men of the 34th reached Barhampur, their com-
rades of the 19th received them open-armed and open-mouthed.
They were old associates, for not long before they had been
stationed together at Lakhnao; and now the 19th asked eagerly
what strange story was this that they had heard from Barrack-
pur about the greasing of the cartridges. It was not then a
new story in the Lines of Barhampur, but was already two
weeks old.* It bad been carried as quickly as the post or
special messenger could carry it from the one station to the
other, and it was soon afterwards in every man's mouth. But
it had wrought no immediate effect upon the outer bearing of
the Sipahis of the 19th. The story was carried to the com-
manding officer, who gave an assuring reply, saying that, if
there were any doubts in their minds, the men might see for
themselves the grease applied to their cartridges ; and so for a
while the excitement was allayed. But when the men of the
34th went up from Barrackpur and spoke of the feeling there
— spoke of the general belief among the Sipahis at the Pre-
sidency that the Government deliberately designed to defile
them, and of the intended resistance to this foul and fraudulent
outrage — the 19th listened to them as to men speaking with
high authority, for they came from the very seat of Govern-
ment, and were not likely to err. So they took in the story as
it was told to them with a comprehensive faith, and were soon
in that state of excitement and alarm which is so often the
prelude of dangerous revolt.

* The first detachment of the 34th reached Barhampur on the 18th of
February, the second on the 25th. Colonel Mitchell, writing on February 16,
Siys, that about a fortnight before a Brahman Pay-Havildar had asked him,
" What is this story that everybody is talking about, that Government intend
to make the Native Army use cow's fat and pig's fat with the ammunition
tor their new rifles?" It must have reached Barhampur, therefore, either
by the post or by Kasid (messenger) at the very beginning of the month of
February.

368 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. fl857.

On the day after the arrival of the detachment from Barrack-
pur, a parade of the 19th was ordered for the
following morning. It was an ordinary parade,
" accidental," meaning nothing. But it was a parade " with
blank ammunition," and a meaning was found. There were
in the morning no apparent signs of disaffection, hut, hefore
the evening had passed away, Adjutant M' Andrew cariied
to the quarters of Colonel Mitchell a disquieting report, to
the effect that there was great excitement in the Lines ;
that when their percussion-caps had been served out to them
for the morning's parade, the men had refused to take them,
and that they had given as the ground of their refusal
the strong suspicion they entertained that the cartridges
had been defiled. It was the custom not to distribute the
cartridges among the men before the morning of the parade ;
but the general supply for the regiment had been served out
from the magazine, and, before being stored aAvay for the night,
had been seen by some of the Sipahis of the corps. Now, it
happened that the paper of which the cartridges were made
was, to the outward eye, of two different kinds, and, as the men
had heard that fresh supplies of ammunition had been received
from Calcutta in the course of the month, they leapt at once to
the conviction that new cartridges of the dreaded kind had
been purposely mixed up with the old, and the panic that had
been growing upon them culminated in this belief.*

Upon receipt of this intelligence, Mitchell at once started
for the Lines, and summoned his native officers to meet him in
the front of the Quarter-Guard. In such a conjuncture, a calm
but resolute demeanour, a few words of kindly explanation and
of solemn warning, as from one not speaking for himself but for
a benignant and a powerful Government, might have done
much to convince those Native officers, and through them the
Sipahis of the regiment, that they had laid hold of a dangerous
delusion. But Mitchell spoke as one under the excitement of
anger, and he threatened rather than he warned. He said that
the cartridges had been made up, a year before, by the regi-
ment that had preceded them in cantonments, that there was
no reason for their alarm, and that if, after this explanation,
they should refuse tc take their ammunition, the regiment

* The fact, however, was, that there were no cartridges among the stores
recently received from Calcutta, which consisted mainly of powder in barrels.

1857.1 MUTINY OF THE 19TH. 369

would be sent to Burmah or to China, where the men would die,*
and that the severest punishment would overtake every man
known to have actively resisted the orders of his Government.
So the Native officers went their way, with no new confidence
derived from the words that had fallen from their Colonel,
but, on the other hand, strengthened in all their old convictions
of imminent danger to their caste and their religion. He would
not have spoken so angrily, they argued, if mischief had not
been intended. They looked upon the irritation he displayed
as a proof that his sinister designs had been inopportunely
discovered. f

Such was the logic of their fears. Colonel Mitchell went to
his home ; but as he drove thither through the darkness of the
night, with the Adjutant beside him, he felt that there was
danger in the air, and that something must be done to meet it.
But what could be done? There were no white troops at
Barhampiir, and the 19th Eegiment composed the bulk of the
black soldiery. But there were a regiment of Irregular Cavalry
and a detachment of Native Ai'tillery, with guns, posted at the
station, and, as these dwelt apart from the Infantry, they might
not be tainted by the same disease. Weaker in numbers, as
compared with the Infantry, they had a countervailing strength
in their guns and horses. A few rounds of grape, and a charge
of Cavalry with drawn sabres, might destroy a regiment of
Foot beyond all further hope of resistance. Mitchell might
not have thought that things would come to this pass; it

* After reading all the evidence that I can find throwing light upon this
scene at the Quarter-Guard, I am forced upon the conviction that Colonel
Mitchell did use some such words as these. Lord Canning was, however,
under an erroneous impression when he wrote in his minute of May 13, ''The
inconsiderate threat, that if the men did not receive their cartridges he would
take them to Burmah or to China, where they would die, which is not denied
by Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell," &c, &c. ; for Mitchell had denied it on the
18th of March, saying, " I certainly did not make use of the expression above
quoted." — Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell to Assistant- Adjutant-General. Pub-
lished Papers. [I was in Calcutta at the time, and in constant communication
with officers of the 19th, aud I am confident that Colonel Mitchell only tolc"
the truth when he said that he did not use the words quoted. Mitchell
simply told the men that those who did not obey his orders would be brought
to a court-martial. He was a good officer, and was treated as a scapegoat. —
G. B. M.]

t "He gave this order so angrily, that we were convinced that the
cartridges were greased, otherwise he would not have spoken so." — Petition
of the Native Officers of the 19th Regiment. Published Papers.

VOL. I. 2 B

370 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

was his object to overawe, and, by overawing, to prevent the
crisis. But, whatsoever his thoughts at that time, he issued
his orders that the Cavalry and Artillery should be prepared to
attend the morning parade.

In India, men retire early to their rest, for they seldom out-
sleep the dawn. It was little past the hour of ten, therefore,
when Mitchell, just having betaken himself to his couch, heavy
with thought of the morrow's work, was startled by the sound
of a strange commotion from the direction of the Lines. There
was a beating of drums, and there were shoutings from many
voices, and a confused uproar, the meaning of which it was
impossible to misinterpret. Plainly the Regiment had risen.
Ever since the Colonel's interview with the Native officers the
excitement had increased. It had transpired that the Cavalry
and Artillery had been ordered out. Suspicion of foul play
then grew into assured convictions, and the Regiment felt, to
a man, that the greased cartridges were to be forced upon them
at the muzzle of our guns. A great panic had taken hold of
them, and it required but little to rouse them, in an impulse
of self-preservation, to resist the premeditated outrage. How
the signal was first given is not clear ; it seldom is clear in
such cases. A very little would have done it. There was a
common feeling of some great danger, approaching through the
darkness of the night. Some raised a cry of " Fire ! " ; some,
again, said that the Cavalry were galloping down upon them ;
others thought that they heard in the distance the clatter of
the Artillery gun- wheels. Then some one sounded the alarm,
and there was a general rush to the bells-of-arms. Men seized
their muskets, took forcible possession of the dreaded ammuni-
tion stored for the morning parade, and loaded their pieces in
a bewilderment of uncertainty and fear.

Mitchell knew that the Regiment had risen, but he did not
know that it was Terror, rather than Revolt, that stirred them ;
and so, hastily dressing himself, he hurried off to bring down
upon his men the very danger the premature fear of which had
generated all this excitement in the Lines. Before any report
of the tumult had reached him from European or from Native
officers, he had made his way to the quarters of the Cavalry
Commandant, and ordered him at once to have his troops in the
saddle. Then like orders were given for the Artillery guns,
with all serviceable ammunition, to be brought down to the
Infantry Lines. There was a considerable space to be traversed,

1857.] MEASURES OP COLONEL MITCHELL. 371

and the extreme darkness of the night rendered the service
difficult. But, after a while, the 19th heard the diu of the
approaching danger, and this time with the fleshly ear ; saw
the light of gleaming torches which was guiding it on to their
destruction. But they stood there not ripe for action, irresolute,
panic-struck, as men waiting their doom. There were many
loaded muskets in their hands, but not one was fired.

It was past midnight when Mitchell, having gathered his
European officers from their beds, came down with the guns to
the parade-ground, where Alexander and his troopers had
already arrived. The Infantry, in undress, but armed and
belted, were drawn up in line, vaguely expectant of something
to come, but in no mood to provoke instant collision. A very
little, at such a time, would have precipitated it, for the excite-
ment of fear, in such circumstances, is more to be dreaded than
the bitterest resentments, and, even if the European officers
had then moved forward in a body, the movement would have
been exaggerated by the darkness into a hostile advance,
and the 19th, under an impulse of self-preservation, would
have fired upon them. What Mitchell did, therefore, in the
unfortunate conjuncture that had arisen, was the best thing
that could be done. He loaded the guns, closed the Cavalry
upon them, and sent the Adjutant forward with instructions to
have the call sounded for an assembly of the Native officers.
The summons was obeyed. Again the Native officers stood
before their Colonel, and again there fell from his lips words
that sounded in their ears as words of anger. What those
words were, it is now impossible to record with any certainty of
their truth. The Native officers believed that he said he would
blow every mutineer from a gun, although he should die for it
himself. They besought him not to be angry and violent, and
urged that the men were ignorant and suspicious ; that they
were impelled only by their fears ; that, believing the Cavalry
and Artillery had been brought down to destroy them, they
were wild with excitement and incapable of reasoning, but that,
if the Colonel would send back the troopers and the guns, the
men of the Regiment would soon lay down their arms and
return to their duty.

Then a great difficulty arose, which, in the darkness and
confusion of that February night, might have perplexed a
calmer brain than Mitchell's. That the 19th were rather
panic-struck than mutinous, was certain. It was plain, too,

2 b 2

372 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

that a mistake had been committed in bringing down the
Cavalry and guns to overawe the Eegiment. It would have
been wiser, in the first instance, to have used them only for
protective purposes, holding them in readiness the while to act
on the offensive in case of necessity. But, as they had been
brought down to the Infantry Lines, it was difficult to with-
draw them, until the 19th had given in their submission.
The men, however, required, as a condition of their submission,
that which Mitchell naturally desired should be regarded only
as a consequence of it. Clinging fast to the belief that violence
was intended, they would not have obeyed the order to lay
down their arms ; and Mitchell could not be certain that the
Native troopers and gunners would fall upon their comrades
at the word of command. There was a dilemma, indeed, from
which it was difficult, if not impossible, to escape with safety
and with honour. As men are wont to do in such extremities,
he caught at a compromise. He would withdraw the guns
and the Cavalry, he said, but he would hold a general parade
in the morning ; he commanded the station, and could order
out all branches of the service. But the Native officers besought
him not to do this, for the Sipahis, in such a case, would believe
only that the violence intended to be done upon them was
deferred for a few hours. So he consented at last to what they
asked ; the Cavalry and the guns were withdrawn, and the
general parade for the morning was countermanded. Whether
the Sipahis of the 19th had shown signs of penitence before
this concession was made, and had or had not begun to lay
down their arms, is a point of history enveloped in doubt.
But it would seem that the Native officers told Colonel Mitchell
that the men were lodging their arms, and that he trusted to
their honour. The real signal for their submission was the
retrocession of the torches. When the Sipahis saw the lights
disappearing from the parade-ground, they knew that they
were safe.

On the following morning the Eegiment fell in, for parade,
without a symptom of insubordination. The excitement of the
hour had expended itself; and they looked back upon their
conduct with regret, and looked forward to its consequences
with alarm. Though moved by nothing worse than idle fear,
they had rebelled against their officers and the State. Assured
of their contrition, and believing in their fidelity, the former
might perhaps have forgiven them ; but it was not probable

1857.] THE COURT OF INQUIRY. 373

that the State would forgive. A Court of Inquiry was assembled,
and during many days the evidence of European and Native
officers was taken respecting the circumstances and causes of
the outbreak; but the men, though clearly demonstrating
their apprehensions by sleeping round the bells-of-arms, con-
tinued to discharge their duties without any new ebullitions ;
and there was no appearance of any hostile combinations, by
which the mutiny of a regiment might have been converted
into the rebellion of a province. Under the guidance of
Colonel George Macgregor, the Nawab Nazim of Bengal threw
the weight of his influence into the scales on the side of order
and peace; and whatsoever might have been stirring in the
hearts of the Musrxlman population of Murshidabad, in the
absence of any signal from their chief, they remained outwardly
quiescent.

374 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

CHAPTER V.

In all countries, and under all forms of government, the dangers
which threaten the State, starting in the darkness, make head-
way towards success before they are clearly discerned by the
rulers of the land. Often so much of time and space is gained,
that the slow and complex action of authority cannot overtake
the mischief and intercept its further progress. The peculiari-
ties of our Anglo-Indian Empire converted a probability into a
certainty. Differences of race, differences of language, differ-
ences of religion, differences of customs, all indeed that could
make a great antagonism of sympathies and of interests, severed
the rulers and the ruled as with a veil of ignorance and obscurity.
We could not see or hear with our own senses what was going
on, and there was seldom any one to tell us. When by some
accident the truth at last transpired, generally in some of the
lower strata of the official soil, much time was lost before it
could make its way upwards to the outer surface of that
authority whence action, which could no longer be preventive,
emanated in some shape of attempted suppression. The great
safeguard of sedition was to be found in the slow processes of
departmental correspondence necessitated by a system of exces-
sive centralisation. When prompt and effectual action was
demanded, Routine called for pens and paper. A letter was
written where a blow ought to have been struck, and the letter
went, not to one who could act, but was passed on to another
stage of helplessness, and then on to another, through all
gradations, from the subaltern's bungalow to the Government
House.

The direction of the military affairs of our Indian Empire
was supposed to be confided to the Commander-in-Chief. But
there was a general power of control in the Governor-Genera*
that made the trust little more than nominal. So little were
the limits of authority prescribed by law, or even by usage,

1857.] THE DEPARTMENTS. 375

that, it has already been observed, there was often a conflict
between the Civil and the Military Chiefs, which in time
ripened into a public scandal, or subsided into a courteous
compromise, according to the particular temper of the litigants.
Sensible of his power, the Governor-General was naturally
anxious to leave all purely military matters in the hands of the
Commander-in-Chief; but in India it was hard to say what
were "purely military" matters, when once the question
emerged out of the circle of administrative detail. As har-
monious action was constitutionally promoted by the bestowal
upon the Commander-in-Chief of a seat in Council, there would
have been little practical inconvenience in the division of
authority if the Civil and the Military Chiefs had always been
in the same place. But it often happened that the Governor-
General, with his official machinery of the Military Secretary's
office, was at one end of the country, and the Commander-in-
Chief, with the Adjutant-General of the Army, at the other.
And so it happened in the early part of 1857. Lord Canning
was at Calcutta. General Anson was officially in the Upper
Provinces ; personally he was somewhere in Lower Bengal.*
The Adjutant-General was at Mirath. The Adjutant-General's
office was in Calcutta. The Inspector-General of Ordnance was
in Fort William. All these authorities had something to do
with the business of the greased cartridges, and it was a
necessity that, out of a system which combined a dispersed
agency with a centralised authority, there should have arisen
some injurious delay.

But the delay, thus doubly inevitable, arose rather in this
instance from the multiplicity of official agencies, than from the
distance at which they were removed from each other. On
the 22nd of January, Lieutenant Wright, who commanded the
detachment of the 70th Sipahis at Damdamah, reported to the
commanding officer of the musketry depot the story of the
greased cartridges, and the excitement it had produced. Major
Bontein, on the following day, reported it to the commanding
officer at Damdamah, who forthwith passed it on to the General

* Just at this time General Anson was coming down to Calcutta to
superintend the embarkation of his wife for England. He must have been
actually in Calcutta when the Sipahis were in the first throes of their
discontent ; but it does not appear that the subject of the greased cartridges
then attracted his attention.

376 OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY. [1857.

commanding the Presidency division at Barrackpur. On the
same day, General Hearsey forwarded the correspondence to
the Deputy-Adjutant- General, who remained in charge of the
office at Calcutta in the absence of his chief. But, though thus
acting in accordance with military regulations, he took the
precaution to add that he forwarded the correspondence " for
immediate submission to the Government of India, through its
Military Secretary," and suggested that the Sipahis at the
Bine Depot should be permitted to grease their own cartridges.
General Hearsey 's letter must have reached the Adjutant-
General's office on the 24th of January ; perhaps not till after
office hours. The following day was the Sabbath. The letter
of " immediate transmission " was dated, therefore, on the
26th.* On the following day, the Government of India,
through its Military Secretary, addressed a letter to the Adju-
tant-General's office sanctioning Hearsey's suggestion. On the
28th, the General received the official sanction, and at once
directed the concession to be made known to all the regiments
in Barrackpur. But it was too late. On the previous day, a
significant question had been put by a Native officer on parade,
as to whether any orders had been received. The reply was
necessarily in the negative. Had it not been for the interven-
tion of the Adjutant-General's office, General Hearsey might
have received his reply four days before. Whilst we were
corresponding, our enemies were acting ; and so the lie went
ahead of us apace.

Onward and onward it went, making its way throughout
Upper India with significant embellishments, aided by the
enemies of the British Government, whilst that Government
looked at the matter in its naked reality, divested of all the
outer crust of lies which it had thus acquired. Confident of
their own good intentions, the English chiefs saw only an
accident, an oversight, to be easily rectified and explained.
There did not seem to be anything dangerously irreparahle in
it. But it was, doubtless, right that they should probe the
matter to its very depths, and do all that could be done to allay
the inquietude in the Sipahi's mind. It was hardly to be
expected that the Governor-General, who at that time had

* It is right that this should bo borne in mind. In all cases of alleged
official delays the almanack of the year should be consulted, that account
may be taken of a dies non.

1857.] COLONEL BIRCH. 377

been less than a year in India, should see at once all the diffi-
culties of the position. But he had men of large experience at
his elbow ; and it was wise to confide in them. In such an
emergency as had then arisen, the Military Secretary to the
Government of India was the functionary whose especial duty
it was to inform and advise the Governor-General. That office
was represented by Colonel Richard Birch, an officer of the
Company's Army, who had served for many years at the head
of the Judge Advocate's department, and was greatly esteemed
as an able, clear-headed man of business, of unstained reputation
in private life. Lord Dalhousie, no mean judge of character,
had selected him for this important office, and Lord Canning
soon recognised the wisdom of the choice. The Military
Secretary had no independent authority, but in such a con-
juncture as this much might be done to aid and accelerate the
movements of Government ; and had he then sat down idly
and wailed the result, or had he suffered any time to be lost
whilst feebly meditating action, a heavy weight of blame would
have descended upon him, past all hope of removal. But, when
he heard that the detachments at Damdamah were in a state
of excitement, his first thought was to ascertain the truth or
the falsehood of the alleged cause of alarm ; so he went at once
to the Chief of the Ordnance Department to learn what had
been done.

At that time, the post of Inspector-General of Ordnance was
held by Colonel Augustus Abbott, an Artillery officer of high
repute, who had earned a name in history as one of the " Illus-
trious Garrison of Jalalabad." His first impression was, that
some greased cartridges had been issued to the Depot at Dam-
damah, and it was admitted that no inquiries had been made
into the natural history of the lubricating material. But he
was relieved from all anxiety on this score by a visit from
Major Bontein, the Instructor, who asked Abbott to show him
a greased cartridge. The fact was, that though large numbers
had been manufactured, none had ever been issued to the
Native troops at Damdamah or any other station in the Presi-
dency Division.* The discovery, it was thought, had been

* It should be stated that much of the laboratory work of the Arsenal of
Fort William was actually carried on at Damdamah ; but that the ammunition
manufactured there was always sent to the Arsenal and issued thence to the
troops.

378 OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY. [1857.

made in time to prevent the dangerous consequences which
might have resulted from the oversight. It would be easy to
cease altogether from the use of the obnoxious fat ; easy to tell
the Sipahis that they might grease the cartridges after their
own fashion. The uneasiness, it was believed, would soon pass
away, under the influence of soothing explanations. It was
plain, however, that what had happened at Damdamah might
happen at the other military stations, where schools of musketry
had been established and the new rifles were being brought
into use. The regiments there would assuredly soon hear the
alarm-note pealing upwards from Bengal. But, though some
time had been lost, the " lightning-post " might still overtake
the letters or messages of the Sipahis before they could reach
Ambalah and Sialkot.

So Birch, having thus clearly ascertained the real fact of the
greased cartridges, went at once to the Governor-General, and
asked his permission to take immediate steps to re-assure the
minds of the Sipahis at all the Musketry Depots. The
' permission was granted, and orders were forthwith sent
to Damdamah ; whilst the Electric Telegraph was set at work to
instruct the Adjutant-General of the Army, at Mirath, to issue
all cartridges free from grease, and to allow the Sipahis to
apply with their own hands whatever suitable mixture they
might prefer. For, at Mirath, a large manufacture of greased
cartridges was going on, without any fear of the results.* At
the same time he telegraphed to the commanding officers of the
Rifle Depots at Ambalah and Sialkot, not to use any of the
greased cartridges that might have been issued for service
with the new rifles. It was recommended, at the same time,
by Birch and Abbott, that a General Order should be pub-
lished by the Commander-in-Chief, setting forth that no greased
cartridges would be issued to the Sipahi troops, but that every
man would be permitted to lubricate his own ammunition with
any materials suitable to the purpose. But plain as all this
seemed to be, and apparently unobjectionable, an objection was
found at Mirath to the course proposed in Calcutta ; and the
Adjutant-General, when he received his message, telegraphed
back to the Military Secretary that Native troops had been

* Materials for 100,000 cartridges, with implements of manufacture and
pattern cartridges, were sent from the Calcutta Arsenal to Mirath in October,
1856. These were for the use of the 60th Rifles.

1857.1 THE GREASED CARTRIDGES. 379

using greased cartridges " for some years," and the grease had
been composed of mutton-fat. " Will not," it was asked, "your
instructions make the Sipahis suspicious about what hitherto
they have not hesitated to handle ? " Further orders were
requested ; and, on the 29th of January, a message went from
Calcutta to the Head-Quarters of the Army, stating that the
existing practice of greasing cartridges might be continued, if
the materials were of mutton-fat and wax.*

Prompt measures having thus been taken to prevent the
issue of greased cartridges prepared in Calcutta or Mirath to
any Native troops — and with such success that from first to
last no such cartridges ever were issued to them f — the authori-
ties, perhaps a little perplexed by this sudden explosion in a
season of all-prevailing quiet, began to inquire how it had all
happened. Not without some difficulty, for there were apparent
contradictions in the statements that reached them, the whole
history of the greased cartridges was at last disentangled.
It was this. In 1853, the authorities in England sent out to
India some boxes of greased cartridges. The lubricating
material was of different kinds ; but tallow entered largely
into the composition of it all. It was sent out, not for service,
but for experiment, in order that the effect of the climate upon
the cartridges thus greased might be ascertained. But it did
not wholly escape our high military functionaries in India,
that these greased cartridges, if care were not taken to exclude
all obnoxious materials from their composition, could not be
served out to Native troops without risk of serious danger.
Colonel Henry Tucker was, at that time, Adjutant-General of
the Bengal Army, and he obtained the permission of the Com-
mander-in-Chief to sound a note of warning on the subject.
There was in those days even a greater complication of military
authority than when Lord Canning presided over the Govern-

* See the telegrams published in the papers laid before Parliament. I
merely s^te the fact that such messages were sent. But I have found it
impossible to reconcile the assertion of the Adjutant-General, that cartridges
smeared with muttou-fat had been in use, with the actual facts of the case,
as given in the following pages on the very highest authority. I am assured
that the only grease used with the ammunition of the old two-grooved rifiee
was a mixture of wax and oil applied to the " patch."

f This was officially declared by Government, and in perfect good faith.
I believe, however, that some greased cartridges were served out to a Gurkha
regiment, at their own request.

380 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

ment. There was an institution called the Military Board,
composed of certain ex-officio members, one special salaried
member, and a Secretary who did the greater part of the work.
The trite adage that " Boards are Screens " was verified in this
instance, if in no other, for responsibility was effectually
obscured. It fell within the range of the Board's multifarious
functions to direct the experiments which were to be made
with the greased cartridges ; so Colonel Tucker, in due official
course, addressed a letter to the Secretary to the Military Board
on the subject of these experiments, adding, "lam at the
I)ec1e™3ier' same time to communicate the Commander-in-Chiefs
opinion, that, unless it be known that the grease
employed in these cartridges is not of a nature to offend or
interfere with the prejudices of caste, it will be expedient not
to issue them for test to Native corps, but to European soldiers
only to be carried in pouch." But it does not seem that this
warning had any effect upon the Military Board.* The ammu-
nition to be tested was served out to Native Guards at Fort
William, Kanhpiir, and Bangun, who carried it in their pouches,
and handed it from man to man every time that the guard was
relieved. After being thus tested for many months, the car-
tridges were reported upon by Committees of European officers
drawn from Native Infantry Begiments, and eventually sent
back to England with these reports. No objection was ever
made by the Sipahis to the handling of the cartridges, and
none were ever started by their regimental officers or by the
Committees.

The 60th (Queen's) Bifles were at this time serving in India,
but the weapon which they used was that known as the two-
grooved rifle ; and the ammunition consisted of a cartridge of
powder only, and, separate from this cartridge, a ball covered

* Colonel Tucker afterwards said in a public journal, " I do not presume
to say with whom specifically the blame of this most culpable neglect may
rest. Only investigation can settle that point ; but I conceive that either
the Military Secretary, or the officer presiding in chief over the Ordnance
Department in Calcutta, is, one or both, the party implicated." Investigation
proves that both officers were blameless. The routine in those days was for
the Commander-in-Chief to address the Military Board, and for the Military
Board to address the Governor-General. In this case, however, the corre-
spondence never went further than the Military Board; and it was not until
after the Mutiny had broken out, and Colonel (then Major- General) Tucker
had publicly referred to his neglected warnings, that the Military Secretary
had any knowledge of the correspondence of 1853.

1857.] MANUFACTURE OF CARTRIDGES. 381

with a " patch " of fine cloth, which was smeared with a mix-
ture of wax and oil. When rifle-companies were raised in some
of the Native regiments, this two-grooved rifle was served out
to them with the ammunition above described, and no kind
of objection was ever raised to its use. The grease was
known to be harmless, and the paper of the cartridge was
never suspected. But, in 1856, these two-grooved rifles were
condemned, and new Enfield rifles issued to the 60th, and also
to some of the Company's European Infantry. The ammunition
then, in the first instance, supplied to them, consisted of the
residue of the greased cartridges sent from England for experi-
ment; and, whilst these were being used up, others of the same
description, in accordance with orders from England, were
being made up by the Ordnance Departments at Calcutta, at
Damdamah, and at Mirath. The mixture of wax and oil,
though it answered the purpose of lubrication at the time of
use, was not applicable to bundled cartridges, because its
greasing properties soon disappeared. So the cartridges manu-
factured for the Enfield rifles were to be smeared with a
mixture of stearine and tallow. The Ordnance Department
then indented for tallow, without any specification of the nature
of the animal fat composing it ; * and, although no hog's-lard
was supplied, there is no question that some btef-fat was used
in the composition of the tallow. This was, doubtless, an

* It was a part of a contract for " Petty Stores," to be supplied to the
Arsenal of Fort William for two years, from the 15th of August, 1856,
entered into by Gangadarh Banerji and Co. The article is described in
the contract as "Grease, Tallow ;" and it was to be supplied at the rate of
two annas (or threepence) a pound. From the Records of the Inspector-
General's ofBce, it appears that after the contract, dated 16th of August,
1856, was concluded, Grease and Tallow were indented for separately at
various times. In an indent on the Contractor, dated September, 1856, the
following entries appear :

Grease For ammunition purposes.

Tallow of the purest) For greasing composition for Minie rifle
kind / ammunition.

In subsequent indents the article is sometimes called " Grease," and some-
times "Tallow" — "Required for Arsenal purposes." A circular was issued
to the Department, dated January 29th, 1857, directing that, when applying
tallow to articles which Native soldiers are required to handle, only the tallow
of sheep or goats is to be employed, that of swine or cows being most carefully
excluded.

382 OUTBEEAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

oversight, for it would have been easy to enter into a contract
for the supply of sheep and goats' fat, to which there would
not have been the same objections ; but it would seem that the
Ordnance authorities had before them the fact that they were
making ammunition, primarily for the use of the 60th Rifles,
in accordance with instructions that had been received from
England.

It was true, then, that cartridges smeared with obnoxious
grease had been in course of manufacture both at Fort William
and at the Head-Quarters of Artillery at Mirath. It was true
that, in October, 1856, large numbers of balled cartridges had
been sent up the country by steamer for the use of the Mus-
ketry Depots at Ambalah and Sialkot.* But it was not true
that any had been issued to the Sipahi regiments; for the time
had not yet come for the detachments at the Musketry Depots
to use any kind of ammunition. These detachments had re-
ceived the Enfield rifle ; but they were merely learning its use ;
learning the construction and the properties of the new weapon ;
learning to take it to pieces and to put it together again ;
learning the mode of taking sight and aim at different distances
— processes which occupied many weeks, and delayed the season
of target practice. Meanwhile, the old two-grooved rifles were
in full service with the rifle-companies ; and cartridges, as
above described, with detached balls greased with oil and wax,
were in constant use for practice-drill.f To these cartridges
the Commander-in-Chief referred, when he telegraphed to Cal-
cutta that greased cartridges had been long in use without
exciting any alarm. It was thought at Head-Quarters that if
attention were once called to the matter of the greased car-
tridges, every Sipahi who had used the old " patches " would
be filled with alarm.

But, whether this surmise were right or whether it were
wrong, it is certain that the minds of the Sipahis, first in one

* The numbers were 22,500 for the Ambalah Depot, and 14,000 for the
Sialkot Depot, sent on the 23rd of October to Dehli, via. Allahabad, by
steamer.

f It may be advantageous to caution the non-professional reader against
confounding the rifle-companies here spoken of with the detachments at the
Rifle Depots. The former were with their regiments, using the old two-
grooved muskets ; the latter were detached from their regiments, learning the
use of the Enfield rifle in the schools of musketry at Damdamah, Ambalah,
and Sialkot.

1857.] CAUSES OF ALARM. 383

station, then in another, were already becoming overwhelmed by
the great fear. The lie had gone ahead of the truth. It is
doubtful whether any orders or proclamations could have
arrested the feeling of alarm, which was rushing, with the
force of an electric current, from cantonment to cantonment,
and turning the hearts of the soldiery against us. It was plain
that a very dangerous delusion had taken possession of them,
and it was right that everything reasonable should have been
done to expel it. But the Sipahis, at a very early stage, were
past all reasoning. It was not grease, animal grease, alone
that disturbed them. Grease of an obnoxious kind, for long
years, had been applied by Native hands to the wheels of gun-
carriages and waggons, and not even a murmur of discontent
had been heard. At Calcutta and at Mirath the greased car-
tridges had been made up by Katives, and, at the latter place,
even Brahman boys had been employed in their manufacture.
So it was thought that the objection might be confined to the
biting off of the end of the cartridge. It was true that the
grease was applied to the part farthest from that which touched
the lips of the soldier ; but in a hot climate grease is rapidly
absorbed, and there was a not unreasonable apprehension that
it would insidiously spread itself from one end to the other of
the cartridge. So, on the recommendation of Major Bontein, a
change was introduced into the system of Rifle drill, by which
the process of pinching off by the hand was substituted for
biting off by the teeth. This was right, as far as it went ; but
it could not go far. The Sipahi was not satisfied. He argued
that he had been accustomed always to bite off the end of the
cartridge, and that the force of this strong habit would often
bring it unwittingly to his lips, especially in the excitement of
active service. There are times, doubtless, when both the
Hindu and the Muhammadan have an elastic conscience. But
there are seasons also when both are obdurate and unyielding.
It might have been easy to persuade the Sipahis that the
British Government desired to place the matter entirely in
their own hands, and to leave them to grease their cartridges
and to use them after their own fashion ; but too many vague
doubts and suspicions had been raised in past times, and too
much was being poisonously instilled into them in the present,
to suffer even a remnant of confidence to cling to them in this
conjuncture. To beat them back at one point was only to
make them take up their ground more tenaciously at another.

384 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

" We have at Barrackpur," wrote General Hearsey in Febru-
ary, "been dwelling upon a mine ready for ex-
Barrackpiir, plosion. I have been watching the feeling of the
ei85*.ry' Sipahis here for some time. Their minds have been
misled by some designing scoundrels, who have
managed to make them believe that their religious prejudices,
their caste, is to be interfered with by Government — that they
are to be ' forced to become Christians.' " But day after day
passed, and though it was manifest that there was an uneasy
feeling in all the regiments, and especially in the 2nd and
34th, there were no overt acts of insubordination. Their com-
manding officers had explained to them that Government had
no such designs as were imputed to them ; but even when the
Sipahis were assured that no greased cartridges would ever be
issued to them, and that they might themselves lubricate their
ammunition with wax and oil, so deeply rooted were the mis-
givings that had taken possession of their minds, that they
began to suspect that animal grease had been used in the com-
position of the cartridge-paper, and that the English were only
abandoning one trick to fall back upon another. There was
a glazed surface on the paper, which gave it a greasy aspect,
and favoured the growth of the suspicion, and, when it was
burnt, it flared " with a fizzing noise, and smelt as if there
was grease in it." So the suspicion soon grew into a cer-
tainty, and the fears of the Sipahi waxed stronger and stronger
every day.

This was especially apparent in the 2nd Grenadiers ; so a
Court of Inquiry was held to investigate the matter. The
paper was examined in Court, and the Sipahis were called upon
to state their objections. This they did, with an obstinate
adherence to their belief that grease had been used in its com-
position. When asked how this suspicion could be removed
from their minds, they answered that they could not remove it
— that there was no means of removing it, except by sub-
stituting another kind of paper. So Government resolved to
submit the obnoxious paper to a chemical test, and the Chemical
Examiner reported, after due investigation, that it had not
been greased or treated with any greasy or oily matter during
or since its manufacture ; that by operating on a large quantity
of paper he had been able to extract as much oil as could be
discovered by the use of a higher power of the microscope, but
that the grease was no more than might be contracted from the

1857.] GENERAL HEAKSEY. 385

hands of the workmen who had packed it.* But there was
little satisfaction even in this, for so obstinate was the con-
viction that the English designed to pollute the Sipahis, that a
belief was gaining ground among them that the paper was
little more than " bladder." The stiffness and transparency of
it favoured this suspicion, and they could not rid themselves of
the impression that it was an animal substance which they
were called upon to use. This was a far greater difficulty than
the other, for it affected not merely the Eifle Depots, but the
whole Native Army ; and there was no possibility of grappling
with it except by ceasing altogether from musketry drill. If
the fear had been only a fear of the fat of cows and swine, it
might have been removed by the substitution of one grease for
another; or if the external application of any kind of animal
grease were objected to, oil and wax might be employed in its
place ; or if the touching of the unclean thing with the lips
were the grievance, the end of the greased cartridge might be
pinched off by the hand, and that objection removed. But to
this fear of the paper used in all the cartridges issued to the
Army, greased or dry, there was practically no antidote that
would not have been both an admission and a concession, very
dangerous for Government to make. It remained only that the
English officer should persuade the Sipahi that he was wrong.

There could hardly, in such a crisis, have been a better man
in command of the Division than General Hearsey ; for he was
one who steered wisely a middle course between the troubled
waters of alarm and the dead calms of a placid sense of security.
He had a large-hearted sympathy with the Sipahis in their
affliction. He understood them thoroughly. He saw that they
were labouring under a great fear ; and he was not one, in such
a case, to think that the " black fellows " had no right to
suspect the designs of their white masters. He saw clearly
what a tremendous significance, in the eyes both of Muham-
madans and Hindus, there was in this incident of the greased
cartridges, and he could not wonder at the mingled feeling of
terror and resentment that it had excited. It was a case that
in his opinion required kindly treatment and delicato handling ;
and he thought that much might be done by considerate ex-
planations to restore confidence to their minds. So, on the

* Dr. M'Namara to the Inspector-General of Ordnance, Feb. 11, 1857.
— Published Papers

VOL. I. 2 0

386 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

afternoon of Monday, the 9th of February, he paraded the
Brigade, and in a loud, manly voice, using good vernacular
Hindustani, addressed the assembled regiments. Earnestly and
emphatically he explained to them that they had laid hold of a
foolish and a dangerous delusion ; that neither the Government
which they served, nor the officers who commanded them, had
ever thought for a moment of interfering with their religious
usages or depriving them of their caste ; and that it was but an
idle absurdity to believe that they could by any means be
forced to be Christians. He told them " that the English were
Christians of the Book — Protestants ; that they admitted no
proselytes but those who, being adults, could read and fully
understand the precepts laid down therein ; that if they came
and threw themselves down at our feet, imploring to be made
Book Christians, it could not be done ; they could not be
baptized until they had been examined in the truths of the
Book, and proved themselves fully conversant with them, and
then they must, of their own good will and accord, desire to
become Christians before they could be made so." He then
asked them if they understood him ; they nodded their assent,
and it appeared both to the English and to the Native officers
that the Sipahis were well pleased with what they had heard,
and that a heaviness had passed away from their minds.*

But the good effect of this address was but transitory ; for
when the troops at Barrackpur heard what had. been
' * done by their comrades of the 19th, there was great
excitement among them, great anxiety to know the result. It
was plain that the game had commenced in earnest, and that
they might soon be called upon to take a part in it. But it
would be well first to see what move would be made by the
Government ; what punishment would be inflicted upon the
mutinous regiment at Barhampur. Days passed, and days grew
into weeks, but still the Government appeared to be inactive.
The 19th were quietly performing their duties, as if nothing
had happened. In the excited imaginations of the Sipahis
there was something ominous in this quietude. They dimly
apprehended the truth, and the obscurity of their conceptions
caused them marvellously to exaggerate it. They believed
that an overwhelming European force, with Cavalry and

* General Hearsey to the Secretary to Government, Feb. 11, 1857. —
Published Papers.

1857.] ARRIVAL OF THE 84TH. 387

Artillery, would come suddenly upon them and destroy
them.*

Their fears were exaggerated ; but they were not wholly base-
less. When the tidings of the mutiny at Barhampur reached
Calcutta, the Governor-General saw at once that a great danger
had been providentially escaped ; but with the sense of present
relief came also a solemn sense of the magnitude of the crisis.
The little cloud was growing larger — growing darker. Here
was an act of overt mutiny, and from the very cause of all the
perilous excitement at Barrackpur. The time had now come
for the Government to do something to assert its authority, and
to strike terror into the minds of the soldiery. But what was
to be done ? It was easy to decree the disbandment of the 19th,
but it was not easy to accomplish it. There was HM.s53rd
but one European regiment along the whole line of
country from Calcutta to Danapur, and one other H^10th
at the latter place, with a large extent of country
to protect. Only in the presence of an overawing European
force could a thousand armed Sipahis be suddenly consigned to
penury and disgrace, and neither of these regiments could be
moved to Barhampur without dangerously laying bare other
parts of the lower provinces. For a while, therefore, the stern
resolution of Government was shrouded from the guilty regiment.
But the punishment was slowly overtaking them, though they
knew it not. A week after the commission of their offence,
Colonel Mitchell had received his orders to bring down the
19th to Barrackpur to be disbanded, and the spacious passenger
vessel Bentinck was steaming across the Bay of Bengal, charged
with a commission to bring back with all possible haste the
84th British regiment from Bangun. The English officers at
Barrackpur, even Hearsey himself, knew nothing of this, and
laughed at the credulity of the Sipahis, who believed, on the
faith of their own news from Calcutta, that this step had been
taken by the Government. But it soon became apparent that
the Native soldiery were better informed than the Division

* Take in illustration the following from the Barrackpur correspondence
of the day : " The Drill Naik of my regiment came to me two days ago
(March 8), and said the report in the Lines was, that there were five thousand
Europeans assembled by the Government at Haurah — that they had arrived
in two ships, and were to come up here during the Hull (festival) — that the
men had not slept the previous night in consequence of this report." — Major
Matthews to Brigadier Grant. — MS. Correspondence.

2 c 2

388 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

Staff, for Dn the 20th March there was a great rejoicing among
the English residents in Calcutta and the neighbourhood at the
thought that the Bentinck had returned, and that succours had
arrived.

In the meanwhile a state of sullen quietude obtained at
March 1857 Barrackpur. Still clinging to the belief that the
Government, detected in their first design to apply
the grease of cows and pigs to the new rifle cartridges, had
purposely employed those materials in the manufacture of the
cartridge-paper, the Sipahis went about their work under a
prevailing sense of an impending danger and the aggravation
of a great wrong.* It, is probable that their fears were stronger
than their discontents. They believed that their lives, and
what was dearer to them even than their lives, were in peril,
and they saw no means of escape except by obtaining the
mastery over those who threatened to bring down such terrible
calamities upon them. To what extent this idea of overpower-
ing the Government had taken possession of the minds of the
soldiery, and how far it was ever shaped into a definite scheme
of action by those who were moved against us by religious or
political animosities, can only be dimly conjectured. There
was a belief in Calcutta that a general rising of the Native
troops had been fixed for a particular night in March. It
happened that, at this time, the Maharajah Sindhia, the greatest
of the remaining Maratha Princes, was on a visit to the Eng-
lish capital. No one then charged, no one has since charged
him, or his sagacious minister, Dinkar Eao, with any complicity
in a plot hostile to the English. They were gratified by the
kind and hospitable reception which had been extended to them
by the Governor-General and all the chief people of the Pre-
sidency, and were pleased with eveiy thing they saw. But it
happened that the Maratha Prince invited all the principal
English gentlemen and ladies in Calcutta to a grand entertain-
ment on the 10th of March. The fete was to have been given
at the Botanical Gardens on the opposite bank of the Hugh'
river. It is said, that when the English were thus occupied

* So great was their uneasiness, and so strong were their suspicions, that
it was believed that Colonel Wheler, who at that time went daily into
Calcutta to attend a general court-martial, of which he was president, was
in close consultation with the Governor-General respecting the forcible or
fraudulent conversion of the Sipahis.

1857.] SINDHlA AT CALCUTTA. 389

with the pleasure of the moment, and the vigilance of the chief
officers of Government was temporarily diverted, the Sipahis,
stimulated by the agents of the King of Oudh, were to have
risen as one man, to have seized the Fort and all the chief
buildings of Calcutta, and proclaimed war against the Faringhi.
That the idea of such a rising found entrance into the active
brains of some enemies of the British can hardly be doubted ;
but there is no proof that it ever took practical shape as an
organised conspiracy, which would have had the result I have
indicated if nothing had occurred to fustrate the plot. But a
circumstance did occur, which some still regard as a special
interposition of Providence for the deliverance of our people.
Most unexpectedly, in the dry season of the year, there was a
heavy storm of rain — one of those mighty tropical down-
pourings which renders all out-of-doors recreation wholly an
impossibility. So the great entertainment, which the Maharajah
of Gwaliar was then to have given to the English society of
Calcutta, was postponed to a more auspicious moment, and the
evening of the 10th of March passed over as quietly as its pre-
decessors.

Of this combination of the Native troops at the Presidency
there were, indeed, no visible signs. Outwardly it appeared
that only the 2nd Grenadiers were implicated in treasonable
schemes. " The 43rd," wrote Lord Canning to the Commander-
in-Chief, " have refused to join in a dinner or feast to which
the 2nd invited them ; and some of the 70th have given up a
Jamadar of the 2nd, who came into their Lines and tried to
persuade the men not to bite the cartridges when the time for
using them should come, and to deter them from finishing their
huts, saying that there would soon be a great stir at Barrackpur,
and that their huts would be burnt down." * Another sign of
this apparent isolation of the 2nd Grenadiers was afforded by
an accident that occurred in Calcutta. The Native Guards for the
Fort and for the public buildings in the city were furnished by
the regiments at Barrackpur. On the evening of the 10th of
March a detachment of the 2nd was in the Fort, and a Subah-

* March 15, 1857. — MS. Correspondence. The 2nd and 43rd had served
together at Kandahar, and were old friends. The proposed dinner was to
be given during the Hull festival, and the officers commanding the two
regiments had agreed that there was no harm in their men dining together.
The refusal of the 43rd was not intelligible to them.

390 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

dar's guard from the 34th was posted over the Calcutta Mint.
In the course of the evening, two Sipahis from the 2nd pre-
sented themselves at the guard-house and sought out the
Subahdar. He was reading an order book by the light of a
lamp when the men appeared before him. One of them then re-
presented that they had come from the Fort ; that the Calcutta
Militia were to join the Fort-Guards at midnight; that the
Governor-General was going up to Barrackpur with all the
Artillery from Damdamah ; and that if the Subahdar would
march his guard into the Fort and join their comrades there, they
might rise successfully against the Government.* This last was
rather implied than expressed ; but the meaning of the men
was sufficiently clear; so the Subahdar ordered them to be
arrested. Next morning he sent them prisoners into Fort
William ; and, a few days afterwards, they were tried by a
Native Court-martial, found guilty, and sentenced to imprison-
ment for fourteen years.

This was a significant incident, but it was one, also, which
might be turned to some account ; so Hearsey determined not
to lose the opportunity. His former speech to the Barrackpur
troops had not accomplished all that was desired ; but it had at
least been partially successful, and he believed that something-
might now be done by another address to the Brigade. So he
suggested to the Governor-General the expediency of such a
course. On the 14th of March they talked the matter over at
Government House, and Lord Canning assented to the proposal.
But before the day had worn out, some misgivings assailed him,
as to whether the General might not be carried away, by the
strength of his feelings and the fluency of his speech, to say a
little too much ; so after Hearsey had returned to Barrackpur,
Lord Canning sent a letter after him, recapitulating the results
of the morning conversation, " in order to prevent all mistakes."
This letter reached Hearsey soon after sunrise on the following
morning (it was Sunday), and he at once replied to it, promising
to take the greatest care not to exceed his instructions. On the
next day the Native officers, who had been warned as members
of the Court-martial ordered to assemble for the trial of the
Sipahis of the 2nd, were to leave Barrackpur for Calcutta ; and
the General thought it advisable not to address the Brigade

Lord Canning to General Anson, March 12, 1857. — MS. Correspondence.

1857.] HEAESEY'S SECOND ADDRESS. 391

until after their departure.* So the order went forth for a
general parade of the troops at Barrackpur on the morning of
Tuesday, the 17th of March.

There was no little tact requisite, in such a conjuncture, for
the exact apportionment of the several parts of the speech that
was to he delivered. The main object of it was to warn the
troops agaiust designing persons, who were endeavouring to
seduce them from their allegiance ; but it was desirable, also, to
endeavour to pacify and reassure them, for it was plain that
they were overridden by a great terror, born of the belief that
the Government had sent for European troops of all arms with
the intent of exterminating the Brigade. In order thus to
remove the dangerous delusion which had taken possession of
them, it was necessary to speak of the designs of the Govern-
ment towards the mutinous 19th — to show that retribution was
sure to overtake all whose guilt had been proved, but that there
was no thought of harming those who had committed no overt
acts of rebellion. But it was not easy in such a case to avoid
saying either too much or too little. " I am afraid," wrote
Lord Canning to the General, " that, however brief your obser-
vations on that regiment (and they should, I think, be very
brief), you will find it a nice matter to steer between exciting
undue alarm and raising hopes which may be disappointed.
But I feel sure that you will master the difficulty, and I leave
the task in your hands with perfect confidence of the result." f
He was thinking mainly of the effect to be produced upon the
minds of the Sipahis of the 19th. He did not wish that the
decision of Government should be announced before the time of
carrying it into effect ; but Hearsey saw plainly that it was
better for the general pacification of the Brigade that the haze
through which the intentions of Government appeared to the
soldiery in such exaggerated dimensions should be dispersed.
" For if the men of this Brigade," he wrote to Lord Canning,
" know beforehand what is to take place, their minds will be
made easy, and they will be disabused of the false rumours now

* " I cannot address the Brigade until Tuesday morning, as the Native
commissioned officers, who are to be members of the General Court-martial
to be convened at Calcutta for the trial of the Sipahis of the 2nd Grenadiers,
must go from hence before I do so. If they heard my address to the men on
parade, it might bias them in their judgment." — General Hearsey to Lord
Canning, March 15, 1857. — MS. Correspondence.

t Lord Canning to General Hearsey, March 14, 1857. — MS. Correspondence,

392 OUTBKEAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

spread about that it is the intention of the Government to
attack and destroy them by European troops and Artillery." *

It was truly a great thing, at that time, to remove from the
minds of the Barrackpur regiments the great terror that held
possession of them; but the 19th had not then commenced its
march from Barhampur, and it is always a hazardous operation
to move a regiment, with sentence of disbandment proclaimed
against it, to the place of execution. These considerations
pressed heavily on Hearsey's mind, when, on the morning of the
17th of March, he rode out to the parade-ground, and saw the
Brigade drawn up before him. There was much, however,
when he prepared to address them, of which there could be no
doubt. Most of all was it necessary to warn them of the evil-
minded and designing men who were leading them astray ; so
he began by telling them to beware of such men, who were
endeavouring to take the bread from the mouths of good Sipahis
by making them the instruments of their schemes of sedition ;
then he spoke of the discontent still prevailing among them
with respect to the cartridge-paper, in which they had never
ceased to believe that animal fat had been used. Then he
began to explain to them, and wisely, too, as he would explain
to children, that the glazed appearance of the paper was pro-
duced by the starch employed in its composition, and that the
very best paper used by the Princes of the land had the same
smooth surface and shiny appearance. In proof of this, he pro-
duced, from a bag of golden tissue, a letter he had received,
whilst serving in the Panjab, from the Maharajah Gulab Singh
of Kashmir, and, giving it to the Native officers, told them to
open it and to show it to their men, that they might see that it
was even more glossy than the paper which they suspected.
Having done this, he asked them if they thought that a Dogra
Brahman or Rajput, ever zealous in the protection of kine,
would use paper made as they suspected, and, after further
illustrations of the absurdity of their suspicions, told them, that
if they did not then believe him, they should go to Srirampur,
and see the paper made for themselves. Then approaching the
more dangerous subject of the 19th, who had been led into open
mutiny by a belief in the falsehood of the defiled paper, he said
that the investigation of their conduct had been laid before him
as General of the Division, and that he had forwarded it to

* General Hearsey to Lord Canrmig, March 15, 1857. — MS. Correspondence.

1857.] HEARSEY'S SECOND ADDRESS. 393

Government, who were exceedingly angry, and would, in his
opinion, order him to disband the regiment. That if he
received orders to that effect, all the troops within two marches
of the place — Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, European and
Native — would he assembled at Barrackpur to witness the dis-
bandment, and that " the ceremony of striking the name and
number of the regiment from the list of the Army woxild be
carried out in exactly the same manner as the old 34th
Regiment were disbanded at Mi rath." " I inform you of this
beforehand," added the General, " because your enemies are
tiding to make you believe that European troops with Cavalry
and Artillery will be sent here suddenly to attack you ; these,
and such lies, are fabricated and rumoured amongst you to
cause trouble. But no European or other troops will come to
Barrackpur without my orders, and I will give you all timely
intelligence of their coming." Then he told them that nothing
had been proved against them, and that therefore they had
nothing to fear ; that all their complaints would be listened to
by their officers ; that their caste and religious prejudices were
safe under his protection, and that any one who attempted to
interfere with them would meet with the severest punishment.
Having thus concluded, Hearsey deployed the Brigade,
opened out the ranks to double distance, and rode through
them, stopping to notice the men who wore medals on their
breasts, and asking them, with kindly interest, for what special
services they had been rewarded. The regiments were then
dismissed, and went quietly to their Lines, pondering all that
they heard from their General. What they had heard was,
perhaps, a little more than the Governor-General had intended
them to hear; and Lord Canning, though he much admired
and much trusted the fine old officer, had not been wholly free
from alarm lest Hearsey should be carried away by his feelings,
and give vent to more than he had authority for declaring.
But, he added, " it will be nothing very mischievous even if
he should do so." And he was right. Hearsey had intimated
that Government would disband the 19th, and in this he ex-
ceeded his instructions. But it is not certain that the Governor-
General lamented the excess. He regarded the disbandment of
the 19th as a necessary, but " an odious business " ; and, perhaps,
in his inmost heart he was not sorry that he had thus escaped
the painful, and to a generous mind the humiliating alternative
of concealing from the regiment the doom in store for it, until

394 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857

he was strong enough to execute the sentence.* Indeed, he
wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, saying, " The 19th are
marching down steadily, and will reach Barrackpur on the
morning of the 31st. They do not know for certain that dis-
bandment is to be their punishment, and, upon the whole, I
think it was better not to tell them. But I admit that there
were two sides to that question." The safer course on one side,
and the manlier course on the other ; and between these two
the ruler and the man might well have oscillated. That there
was danger in the knowledge, is not to be doubted. Hearsey
had sought, by the partial revelations that he had made, to
soothe the troubled spirit of the Barrackpur Brigade ; but it
soon became doubtful whether the knowledge they had gained
would not excite within them more dangerous feelings than
those which he had endeavoured to allay. " The regiments at
Barrackpur, however, know it," wrote Lord Canning, " or, at
least, fully expect it, and to-day it is confidently said in the
Bazaars that the 2nd Grenadiers and the 34th intend to protect
the 19th, and to join them in resisting. This is leading to
alarms and suggestions on all sides. Colonel Abbott, of Ishapiir,
advises the putting a gag upon the Native Press for a time,
Major Bontein recommends bringing the 19th to Calcutta instead
of Barrackpur, and dealing with them under the guns of the
Fort, where they will have no sympathisers within reach.
Even Atkinson suggests that Damdamah would be better than
Barrackpur. I am not in any way moved from my first inten-
tion, and nothing but the opinion of General Hearsey, who has
to execute the orders, that a change of plan or place should be
made, would dispose me to do so. I do not think that he will
give any such opinion, and I hope that he will not."

No such opinion was given ; but it was plain to Hearsey, as
the month of March wore to a close, that the hopes which he
had once entertained of the speedy subsidence of the alarm
which had taken possession of the Sipahis were doomed to be
disappointed. For when the troops at Barrackpur knew that
the 19th were to be disbanded, and that an English regiment
had been brought across the black water to execute the punish-
ment, they believed, more firmly than they had believed at the
beginning of the month, that other white regiments were

* Compare Book II., page 218 et seq. : Considerations on the subject of
disbandment.

1857.] THE STORY OF MANGHAL PANDI. 395

coming, and that the Government would force them to use the
obnoxious cartridges, or treat them like their comrades that were
marching down from Barhampiir to be disgraced. So the great
terror that was driving them into rebellion grew stronger and
stronger, and as from mouth to mouth passed the significant
words, " Gora-16g aya " — " the Europeans have come " — their
excited imaginations beheld vessel after vessel pouring forth its
legions of English fighting-men, under a foregone design to
force them all to apostatise at the point of the bayonet.

Mitchell had started with his doomed corps on the 20th of
March, and was expected to reach Barraekpur at the end of the
month. The behaviour of the men of the 19th, ever since the
outburst that had irretrievably committed them, had been orderly
and respectful, and they were marching steadily down to the
Presidency, obedient to their English officers. On the 30th,
they were at Barsat, eight miles from Barraekpur, awaiting the
orders of Government, when news reached Mitchell to the effect
that the troops at the latter station were in a fever of excite-
ment, and that on the day before an officer had been cut down
on parade.

The story was too true. On the 29th of March — it was a
Sunday afternoon — there was more than common
excitement in the Lines of the 34th, for it was nwThel?t101&0!'1

,. ,. , ,, t, , , . , -,-,.„, Manghal Pandi.

said that the iiiuropeans had arrived, rnty men
of the 53rd had come by water from Calcutta, and were
disembarking at the river-side. The apprehensions of the
Sipahis exaggerated this arrival, and it was believed that the
cantonment would soon be swarming with English soldiers.
On one man especially this impression had fixed itself so strongly,
that, inflamed as he was by bang, which is to the Sipahi what
strong drink is to the European soldier, he was no longer
master of himself. He was a young man, named Manghal
Pandi, a man of good character, but of an excitable disposition,
and seemingly with some religious enthusiasm wrought upon
by the story of the greased cartridges. He had heard of the
arrival of the detachment of Europeans, and he believed that
the dreaded hour had come ; that the caste of the Sipahis was
about to be destroyed. So, putting on his accoutrements and
seizing his musket, he went out from his hut, and, calling upon
his comrades to follow him, if they did not wish to bite the
cartridges and become infidels, he took post in front of the
Quarter-Guard, and ordered a bugler to sound the assembly.

396 OUTBREAK OP THE MUTINY. [1857.

The order was not obeyed ; but, with an insolent and threatening
manner, Manghal Pandi continued to stride up and down, and
when the European sergeant-major went out, fired his piece at
him, and missed.

All this time the Native officer and men of the 34th on duty
at the Quarter-Guard saw what was going on, but did not move
to arrest the drugged fanatic who was so plainly bent upon
mischief. But hastening to the Adjutant's house, a Native
corporal reported what had occurred, and Lieutenant Bauo-h,
without a moment of unnecessary delay, buckled on his sword,
loaded his pistols, mounted his horse, and galloped down to the
Quarter-Guard. He had just tightened rein, when Manghal
Pandi, hidden by the station gun in front of the Guard, took
aim and fired at the Adjutant ; but, missing him, wounded his
charger, and brought both horse and rider to the ground. Baugh
then, disentangling himself, took one of his pistols from the
holsters and fired at the Sipahi. The shot did not take effect,
so he drew his sword and closed with the man, who also had
drawn his tulwar, and then there was a sharp hand-to-hand
confliot, in which the odds were against the Sipahi, for the
sergeant-major came up and took part in the affray. But
Manghal Pandi was a desperate man, and the strokes of his
tulwar fell heavily upon his assailants ; and he might, perhaps,
have despatched them both, if a Muhammadan Sipahi, of the
Grenadier Company, named Shekh Paltu, had not seized the
mutineer and averted his blows.

All this passed at the distance of a few yards only from the
Quarter-Guard of the 34th, where a Jamadar and twenty men
were on duty. The sound of the firing had brought many
others from the Lines, and Sipahis in uniform and out of uniform
crowded around in a state of tumultuous excitement. But with the
exception of this Shekh Paltu, no man moved to assist his officer ;
no man moved to arrest the criminal. Nor was their guilt only
the guilt of inaction. Some of the Sipahis of the Guard struck
the wounded officers on the ground with the butt-ends of their
muskets, and one fired his piece at them ; and when Shekh
Paltu called upon them to arrest the mutineer, they abused him,
and said that if he did not release Manghal Pandi, they would
shoot him. But he held the desperate fanatic until Baugh and
the sergeant-major had escaped, and doubtless to his fidelity
they owed their lives.

Meanwhile, tidings of the tumult had reached the quarters of

1857.] THE SCENE AT THE QUARTER-GUARD 397

General Hearsey. An orderly rushed into the portico of his
house and told him that the Brigade had risen. His two sons,
officers of the Sipahi Army, were with him ; and now the three,
having ordered their horses to be saddled and brought round,
put on their uniform and accoutrements and prepared at once
to proceed to the scene of action. It seemed so probable that
all the regiments had turned out in a frenzy of alarm, that,
whilst the horses were being saddled, Hearsey wrote hasty
notes, to be despatched in case of need to the officers commanding
the Europeans at Chinsurah and Damdamah, calling upon them
to march down at once to his assistance. He had just sealed
them, when first the Adjutant of the 43rd, smeared with the blood
of the wounded officers, and then the Commandant of the Kegi-
ment, came up to report, in detail, what had happened. The
story then told him was a strange one ; for it seemed not that
the Brigade, but that a single Sipahi had risen, and was setting
the State at defiance. It is hard to say whether the surprise
or the indignation of the gallant veteran were greater, when
he asked whether there was no one to shoot or to secure the
madman. But it was plain that no time was to be lost. So
mounting their horses, Hearsey and his sons galloped down
to the parade-ground, and saw for themselves what was
passing.

There was a great crowd of Sipahis, mostly unarmed and
undressed, and there were several European officers, some
mounted and some on foot ; much confusion and some conster-
nation, but apparently no action. Manghal Pandi, still master
of the situation, was pacing up and down, in front of the
Quarter-Guard, calling upon his comrades in vehement tones,
and with excited action, to follow his example, as the Europeans
were coming down upon them, and to die bravely for their
religion. But the crowd of Sipahis, though none remembered
at that moment that they were servants of the State, none came
forward to support discipline and authority, were not ripe for
open mutiny ; and when Manghal Pandi reviled them as
cowards, who had first excited and then deserted him, they
hung irresolutely back, clustering together like sheep, and
wondering what would happen next. The arrival of the
General solved the question. As soon as he saw Manghal
Pandi in front of the Quarter-Guard, he rode towards it,
accompanied by his sons and by his Division-Staff, Major Koss,
and when an officer cried out to him to take care, as the

398 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857

mutineer's musket was loaded, answered, "Damn his musket! ''
and rode on to do his duty.

Little inclination was there on the part of the Jamadar and
the men of the Guard to obey the General's orders ; but the
maimer of Hearsey at that moment was the manner of a man
not to be denied ; and supported by his sons, each of the gallant
Three with his hand upon his revolver, there was instant death
in disobedience. So the Jamadar and the Guard, thus over-
awed, followed Hearsey and his sons to the place where Man-
ghal Pandi was striding about menacingly with his musket in
his hand. As they approached the mutineer, John Hearsey
cried out, " Father, he is taking aim at you." " If I fall, John,"
said the General, " rush upon him and put him to death." But
Manghal Pandi did not fire upon Hearsey; he turned his
weapon upon himself. He saw that the game was up ; and so,
placing the butt of his musket on the ground, and the muzzle
of the piece to his breast, he discharged it by the pressure of
his foot, and fell burnt and wounded to the ground.

As he lay there convulsed and shivering, with his blood-
stained sword beneath him, the officers thought that he was
dying. But medical assistance came promptly, the wound was
examined and found to be only superficial, so the wounded man
was carried to the Hospital ; and then Hearsey rode among the
Sipahis, telling them, as he had often told them before, that
their alarms were groundless, that the Government had no
thought of interfering with their religion, and that he saw
with regret how lamentably they had failed in their duty, in
not arresting or shooting down a man who had thus shown him-
self to be a rebel and a murderer. They answered that he was a
madman, intoxicated to frenzy by bang. " And if so," said
Hearsey, " why not have shot him down as you would have
shot a mad elephant or a mad dog, if he resisted you." Some
answered that he had a loaded musket. " What ! " replied the
General, "are you afraid of a loaded musket?" They were
silent, and he dismissed them with scorn. It was plain that
they had ceased to be soldiers.

Hearsey returned to his quarters that Sabbath evening,
heavy with thought of the work before him. He had received
his orders to execute the sentence that had been passed on the
19th Begiment. That sentence had now been publicly pro-
claimed in a General Order to the whole Army. On Tuesday
morning, in the presence of all the troops, European and Native,

1857.] THE 19TH N. L 399

at the Presidency, the Barhampur mutineers were to be turned
adrift on the world, destitute and degraded ; and it was not to
be doubted that they would carry with them the sympathies of
their comrades in all parts of the country. That there was
prospective danger in this was certain, for every disbanded
Sipahi might have become an emissary of evil ; but there was
a great and present danger, far too formidable in itself to suffer
thoughts of the future to prevail ; for it was probable that the
19th would resist their sentence, and that all the Native troops
at the Presidency would aid them in their resistance. Some
thought that the Barrackpur Brigade would anticipate the
event, and that on Monday there would be a general rising of
the Sipahis, and that the officers and their families would be
butchered by the mutineers. The first blood had been shed.
Manghal Pandi was only the fugleman. So many of the English
ladies in Barrackpur left the cantonment and sought safety for
a while in Calcutta. But there was no place at that time more
secure than that which they had quitted ; and they found that
the inmates of the asylum they had sought were as much
alarmed as themselves.

It has been said that, halted at Barsat on the 30th of March,
the 19th learnt what had happened on the preceding evening.
The 34th had sent out their emissaries to meet their old friends
and comrades of Lakhnao, to prompt them to resistance, and to
promise to cast in their own lot with their brethren and to die
for their religion. And this, too, it is said, with murderous
suggestions of a general massacre of the white officers. But
the 19th shook their heads at the tempters. They had expressed
their sorrow for what had happened, and they had implored
that they might be suffered to prove their loyalty by going on
service to any part of the world. They had never at heart
been mutinous, and they would not now rise against the
Government whose salt they had eaten and whose uniform they
had worn. But the bonds of a great sympathy restrained them
from denouncing their comrades, so they suffered in silence the
tempters to return to their own Lines.

As the morning dawned upon them, obedient to orders, they
commenced the last march that they were ever to M rch
make as soldiers. Heavy-hearted, penitent, and
with the remains of a great fear still clinging to Disbandment of

. the 19th N I

them, they went to their doom. A raile from

Barrackpur Hearsey met them with his final orders, and

400 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

olucing himself in front of the column, rode back with
them to the parade-ground which was to be the scene oi
their disbandment. There all the available troops in the
Presidency division, European and Native, were drawn up to
receive them. Steadily they marched on to the ground which
had been marked out for them, and found themselves face to
face with the guns. If there had been any thought of resistance,
it would have passed away at the first sight of that imposing
array of white troops and the two field-batteries which con-
fronted them. But they had never thought of anything but
submission. Obedient, therefore, to the word of command, up
to the last moment of their military existence, they listened in
silence to the General's brief preliminary address, in silence to
the General Order of Government announcing the sentence of
disbandment ; without a murmur, opened their ranks, piled
their arms at the word of command as though they had been
on a common parade, and then hung their belts upon their
bayonets. The colours of the regiment were then brought to
the front, and laid upon a rest composed of a little pile of
crossed muskets. It was an anxious moment, for though the
19th were penitent and submissive, the temper of some of the
other regiments, and especially of the 34th, was not to be
trusted ; and for a while it was believed that the men, who
two days before had thrown off the mask, were prepared to fire
upon their officers. The rumour ran that many of the Sipahis
of that guilty regiment were on parade with loaded muskets,
and Hearsey was advised to prove them by ordering the
regiment to spring ramrods. But he wisely rejected the
advice, saying that all was going well, and that he would not
mar the effect of the peaceable disbandment of the regiment by
a movement that might excite a collision. He was right. The
work that he had in hand was quietly completed. The men of
the 19th were inarched to a distance from their arms, and the
pay that was due to them brought out for disbursement. They
had now ceased to be soldiers ; but there was no further degra-
dation in store for them. Hearsey addressed them in tones of
kindness, saying that, though the Government had decreed
their summary dismissal, their uniforms would not be stripped
from their backs, and that as a reward for their penitence and
good conduct on the march from Barhampur, they would be
provided at the public cost with carriage to convey them to
their homes. This kindness made a deep impression upon

1857.] DISPERSION OF THE 19'IH N. I. 401

them. Many of them lifted up their voices, bewailing their
fate and loudly declaring that they would revenge themselves
upon the 34th, who had tempted them to their undoing. One
man, apparently spokesman for his comrades, said, " Give us
back our arms for ten minutes before we go ; and leave us alone
with the 34th to settle our account with them." *

Whilst the men of what had once been the 19th were being
paid, Hearsey addressed the other Native regiments on parade,
very much as he had addressed them before; but urging
upon them the consideration of the fact that the 19th, in
which there were four hundred Brahmans and a hundred
and fifty Rajputs, had been sent to their homes, and were at
liberty to visit what shrines they pleased, and to worship where
their fathers had worshipped before them, as a proof that the
report which had been circulated of the intention of Govern-
ment to interfere with their religion was nothing but a base
falsehood. The men listened attentively to what was said ;
and when the time came for their dismissal, they went quietly
to their lines. It was nearly nine o'clock before the men of
the old 19th had been paid up ; and, under an European escort,
were marched out of Barrackpur. As they moved off, they
cheered the fine old soldier, whose duty it had been to disband
them, and wished him a long and a happy life ; and he went to
his house with a heart stirred to its very depths with a com-
passionate sorrow, feeling doubtless that it was the saddest
morning's work he had ever done, but thanking God that it had
been done so peacefully and with such perfect success.

* Lord Canning's reasons for sparing them the deeper degradation are
thus given in a letter to General Anson : " I sent you a copy of the General
Order yesterday. I have determined to omit the words which require that
the men shall be deprived ' of the uniform which they have dishonoured.'
Heavy as has been their crime — none heavier — it is not a mean or abject one :
such as refusing to march to a post of danger ; and the substance of their
punishment is severe enough without being made to gall and rankle. It was
for this reason that I did not originally prescribe that the number of the
regiment should be removed from the Army List, or that the men should be
turned out of cantonment ignominiously, as was done in the case of the 34th
thirteen years ago. The abstaining from stripping their uniforms from them
will be a further relaxation in the same spirit." — MS. Correspondence.

VOL. I. 2d

402 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857

CHAPTEE VI.

Not less thankful was Lord Canning, when tidings were
brought to him at Calcutta that all liad passed off
ApriiCi857' quietly at Barrackpur. He had sent one of his
Aides-de-camp, Captain Baring, to witness the
disbandment of the 19th, and to bring back to him, with all
possible despatch, intelligence of the events of the morning.
And now that good news had come, he telegraphed it at once
to the Commander-in-Chief, and made it known throughout the
city, to the intense relief of many frightened residents, who
had anticipated a general rising of the Native troops, and the
massacre of all the European inhabitants. For the moment, at
least, the danger had passed ; and a little breathing-time was
permitted to Government. Now that the disbandment of the
19th had been effected, and the men were going quietly to their
homes, there was leisure to think of the far greater crime of
the 34th. The case of Manghal Pandi, who had cut down his
officer, was one to raise no questionings. Nor, indeed, could there
be much doubt about the Jamadar of the Guard, who had
suffered such an outrage to be committed before his eyes. The
former was tried by Co'jrt-martial on the 6th of April, and
sentenced to be hanged; and on the 10th and 11th, the latter
was tried, and sentenced to the same ignominious death. On
the 8th, Manghal Pandi paid the penalty of his crime on the
gallows, in the presence of all the troops, at Barrackpur. But
although without loss of time the Jamadar was condemned to
be hanged, the execution lagged behind the sentence in a
manner that must have greatly marred the effect of the example.
A legal difficulty arose, which, for a while, held retribution in
restraint,* and the men of the Brigade began to think that

* " The execution of a Native officer of his rank," wrote Lord Canning
to the President of the Board of Control, " convicted by his brother officers,
will have a most wholesome effect. Such a thing is quite unprecedented

185?.] THE 34th n. l 403

Government lacked the resolution to inflict condign punishment
on the offender.

Nor was this the only apparent symptom of irresolution.
The 34th had "been more guilty than the 19th ; hut punishment
had not overtaken it. The men still went about with their
arms in their hands ; and there was scarcely a European in
Barrackpur who believed that he was safe from their violence.
As officers returned at night from their regimental messes,
they thought that their own Sipahis would fall upon them in
the darkness, and social intercourse after nightfall between the
ladies of the station was suspended.* All this was known
and deplored ; hut it was felt, upon the other hand, that if
there were evil in delay, there was evil also in any appearance
of haste.f Mindful that the disaffection in the Sipahi regi-
ments had its root in fear, and believing that any undue
severity would increase their irritation, the Governor-General
caused all the circumstances of the excitement of the 34th to
be sifted to the bottom, and hoped thereby to elicit information

There has been a delay between the sentence and the execution which has
vexed me, as it may give an appearance of hesitation to the proceedings of
Government, which would be mischievous, and which never has existed for
a moment. The delay was caused by the Commander-in-Chief not having
given authority to General Hearsey, in his warrant, to carry out sentences
against any but non-commissioned officers, and by an opinion utterly erroneous
of the Judge-Advocate, who is with the Commander-in-Chief, that the autho-
rity could not be given. Hence nearly a week was lost, and with it something
of the sharpness of the example." — MS. Correspondence of Lord Canning.

* It does not appear that any outrages were actually committed ; but one
night a Sipahi appeared suddenly in a threatening attitude before a young
officer, as he was on his way home, upon which, being a stalwart and brave
fellow, the English subaltern knocked him down.

f A little later the Governor-General wrote : " The mutinous spirit is not
quelled here, and I feel no confidence of being able to eradicate it very
speedily, although the outbreaks may be repressed easily. The spirit of
disaffection, or rather of mistrust, for it is more that, has spread further than
I thought six weeks ago, but widely rather than deeply, and it requires very
wary walking. A hasty measure of retribution, betraying animosity, or an
unjust act of severity, would confirm, instead of allaying, the temper which
is abroad. It is not possible to say with confidence what the causes are ; but
with the common herd there is a sincere fear for their caste, and a conviction
that this has been in danger from the cartridges and other causes. This
feeling is played upon by others from outside, and, to some extent, with
political objects. But, upon the whole, political animosity does not go for
much in the present movement, and certainly does not actuate the Sipahis
in the mass." — Lord Canning to Lord Elphinstone, May 6, 1857. — MS. Corre-
spondence.

2 d 2

404 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

which might guide him to a right understanding of the matter.
The regiment once disbanded, there would be no hope of
further revelations. So all through the month of April their
doom was unpronounced. Courts of Inquiry were being held
for the purpose of ascertaining the general temper of the
regiment. It appeared that for some time there had been a
want of loyalty and good feeling in the 34th; that Native
officers and Sipahis had been disrespectful in their manner
towards their English officers ; and altogether there had been
such a lack of discipline, that the officers, when questioned,
said that if the regiment had been ordered on service they
would have had little faith in the fidelity of the great bulk of
the soldiery. And at last an opinion was recorded to the effect
that " the Sikhs and Musulmans of the 34th Eegiment of
Native Infantry were trustworthy soldiers of the State, but
that the Hindus generally of that corps were not to be trusted."
So the Government took into deliberate consideration the dis-
bandment of the Eegiment, with the exception of those officers
and soldiers who had been absent from Barrack jiur at the time
of the outrage of the 29th of March, or who had at any time
made practical demonstration of their loyalty and fidelity to
the State.*

But before judgment was pronounced and sentence executed,
there had been much in other parts of the country to disturb
the mind of the Governor-General. He was a man of hopeful
nature, and a courageous heart that never suffered him to
exaggerate the dangers of the Future, or to look gloomily at
the situation of the Present ; but it was plain that the little
cloud which had arisen at the end of January, was now, in the
early part of April, rapidly spreading itself over the entire
firmament. Already the sound of the thunder had been heard

* Three companies of the 34th had been on detachment duty at Chatgaon.
No suspicion of disloyalty had attached to them, and when they heard ol
what had passed at Banackpui-, they sent in a memorial, saying that they
had heard with extreme regret of the disgraceful conduct of Manghal Pandi
and the Guard ; that they well knew that the Government would not interfere
with their religion ; and that they would remain *' faithful for ever." If they
were sincere, their sincerity must be regarded as an additional proof of the
external agency that was, I believe, at the beginning of 1857, employed to
corrupt the Sipahis at the Presidency. It is a circumstance also to be noticed,
that the very Subahdar of the Mint-Guard, who had arrested the Sipahis of
the 2nd Grenadiers, was accused, in the course of the inquiry into the conduct
and temper of the 34th, of being a prime mover of sedition.

1857.] EVENTS AT AMBALAH. 405

from distant stations beneath the shadow of the Himalayas,
and it was little likely that, throughout the intervening
country, there was a single cantonment by which the alarm
had not been caught — a single Native regiment in which the
new rifle and the greased cartridges were not subjects of excited
discussion.

The Head-quarters of the Army were at that time at
Ambalah, at the foot of the great hills, a thousand
miles from Calcutta. There General Anson, having event^at* °
returned from his hasty visit to Calcutta, was AmMiah.

Mill CD 1857

meditating a speedy retreat to Simla, when the
unquiet spirit in the Native regiments forced itself upon his
attention. This station was one of the Depots of Instruction,
at which the use of the new rifle was taught to representative
men from the different regiments in that part of the country.
These men were picked soldiers, of more than common aptitude
and intelligence, under some of the best Native officers in the
service. The explanations of their instructors seemed to have
disarmed their suspicions, and they attended their instruction
parades without any sign of dissatisfaction. They had not
advanced so far in their drill as to require to use the cartridges ;
and, indeed, the new ammunition had not yet been received
from Mirath. But the Commander-in-Chief believed that the
men were satisfied, until a circumstance occurred which loudly
proclaimed, and ought to have struck home to him the con-
viction, that the great fear which had taken possession of men's
minds was too deeply seated to be eradicated by any single
measure of the Government, and too widely spread to be
removed by any local orders. What solace was there in the
assurance that no cartridges lubricated with the obnoxious
grease had been, or ever would be, issued to them, if the
cartridge-paper used by them were unclean ? and even if their
own minds were cleansed of all foul suspicions, what did this
avail, so long as their comrades in the several regiments to
which they belonged believed them to be defiled, and were,
therefore, casting them out from the brotherhood?

The 36th Regiment formed the escort of the Commander-in-
Chief. There was a detachment from it in the Rifle Depot ;
and it happened that one day, at the end of the third week of
March, two non-commissioned officers from this detachment
visited the regimental camp, and were publicly taunted by a
Subahdar with having become Christians. They carried back

406 OUTBKEAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857

this story to the Depot, and one of them, when he told it to
Lieutenant Martineau, the Instructor, cried like a child in his
presence, said that he was an outcast, and that the men of his
regiment had refused to eat with him. A man of more than
common quickness of intelligence and depth of thought,
Martineau saw at once the terrible significance of this, and he
pushed his inquiries further among the men of the Depot. The
result left no doubt upon his mind, that in every detachment
there was the same strong feeling of terror, lest having used
the new greased cartridges, or having been suspected of using
them, they should become outcasts from their regiments, and
shunned by their brethren on returning to their own villages.
This was no mere fancy. Already had the detachments found
their intercourse with their regiments suspended. They had
written letters to their distant comrades and received no
answers ; and now they asked, not without a great show of
reason, " If a Subahdar in the Commander-in-Chiefs camp, and
on duty as his personal escort, can taunt us with loss of caste,
what kind of reception shall we meet on our return to our own
corps ? No reward that Government can offer us is any equiva-
lent for being regarded as outcasts by our own comrades."
Plainly, then, it was Martineau's duty to communicate all that
he knew to the Commander-in-Chief, and being his duty, he
was not a man to shrink from doing it. So he wrote at once to
the Assistant-Adjutant-General, Septimus Becher, and told his
story — privately in the first instance, but afterwards, at
Becher's suggestion, in an official letter. But already had the
Commander-in-Chief learnt also from other sources the feeling
of consternation that was pervading the minds of the men of
the Depot. On the 19th of March the Subahdar had insulted
the men of the detachment ; on the 20th, Martineau wrote his
first letter to Anson's Staff; on the morning of the 23rd the
Commander-in-Chief was to inspect the Rifle Depot ; and on
the previous evening a report reached him that the men of the
detachments wished to .speak to him, through their delegates,
on parade. He determined, therefore, to take the initiative,
and to address them. So, after the Inspection parade, he
formed the detachments into a hollow square, and calling the
Native officers to the front, within a short distance of his Staff,
began his oration to the troops. He had not the advantage,
which Hearsey enjoyed, of being able to address them fluently
in their own langiiage. But, if his discourse was therefore less

1857.] GENERAL ANSON'S ADDRESS. 407

impressive, it was not less clear ; for calling Martin eau to hia
aid, Anson paused at the end of each brief sentence, heard it
translated into Hindustani, and asked if the men understood its
import. It was thus that he spoke to them :

" The Commander-in-Chief is desirous of taking this oppor-
tunity of addressing a few words to the Native
officers assembled at this Depot, which has been Address of the
formed for the instruction of the Army in the use of in-Chief,
the new Eifle. The Native officers have been selected
for this duty on account of their superior intelligence upon all
matters connected with the service to which they belong. The
Commander-in-Chief feels satisfied, therefore, that they will
exercise that intelligence, and employ the influence which their
positions warrant him in supposing they possess, for the good
of the men who are placed under their authority, and for the
advantage of the Army generally. In no way can this be more
beneficially proved than in disabusing their minds of any
mistaken notion which they may have been led to entertain
respecting the intentions and orders of the Government whom
they have engaged to serve. The introduction of a better arm
has rendered it necessary to adopt a different system of loading
it, and an improved description of cartridge. The Commander-
in-Chief finds that, on account of the appearance of the paper
used for the cartridges, and of the material with which they
are made up according to the patterns sent from England,
objections have been raised to their use by Sipahis of various
Religions and Castes, and that endeavours have been made to
induce them to believe that it is the express object of the
Government to subvert their Eeligion and to subject them to
the loss of Caste on which they set so high a value.

"A moment's calm reflection must convince everyone how
utterly groundless and how impossible it is that there can be
the slightest shadow of truth in such a suspicion. In what
manner or degree could the Government gain by such a pro-
ceeding ? Can any one explain what could be the object of it ?
The Commander-in-Chief is sure that all will allow that nothing
has ever occurred to justify a suspicion that the Government
ever wished to coerce the Natives of India in matters of
Eeligion, or to interfere unnecessarily with their Customs, or
even with the ceremonies Avhich belong to their different
Castes.

" The Commander-in-Chief regrets to hear that there have

408 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

been instances in the Army of the disbelief of the Sipahis in
the assurances of their officers that they would not be required
to use cartridges which were made of materials to which they
could reasonably object, and that they have acted in a manner
which must destroy all confidence in them as soldiers, whose
first duty is obedience to the Government whom they serve,
and to their superiors. The Government will know how to deal
with such instances of insubordination, and the Commander-in-
Chief does not hesitate to say that they should be visited with
the severest punishment.

" But the object of the Commander-in-Chief is not to threaten,
and he hopes that it is unnecessary even to point out to those
whose breasts are decorated with proofs of gallantry and good
service, what is their duty. He wishes simply to assure them,
on the honour of a soldier like themselves, that it has never
been, and never will be, the policy of the Government of this
great country to coerce either those serving in the Army or the
Natives of India in their religious feelings, or to interfere with
the customs of their Castes. He trusts to the Native officers
who are present here to make this known to their respective
regiments, and to exert themselves in allaying the fears of
those who may have been momentarily seduced from their duty
by evil-disposed persons. He is satisfied that they will do
everything in their power to prevent the shame which must fall
upon all who are faithless to the colours under which they have
sworn allegiance to the Government, and that they will prove
themselves deserving of the high character which they have
always hitherto maintained in this Army."

The Native officers in front, who alone, perhaps, were enabled
by their position to hear the address of the Chief, listened
attentively and with a respectful demeanour to what was said ;
and when the parade was over, they expressed to Martineau,
through the medium of three of their body acting as spokesmen,
the high sense of the honour that had been done to them by
the condescension of His Excellency in addressing them on
parade. But they urged upon him that, although they did not
themselves attribute to the Government any of the evil designs
referred to in that address, it was true that for one man who
disbelieved the story, there were ten thousand who believed
it; that it was universally credited, not only in their regiments,
but everywhere in their native villages ; and that, therefore,
although the men of the detachments were ready to a man to

1857.] ALARM OF THE DETACHMENTS. 409

use the cartridge when ordered, they desired to represent, for
the paternal consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, the
social consequences to themselves of military obedience. They
•would become outcasts for ever, shunned by their comrades,
and discarded by their families, and would thus surfer for their
obedience the most terrible punishment that could be inflicted
upon them upon this side of the grave.* Martineau promised
to represent all this to the Commander-in-Chief ; and he did so
in an official letter, through the legitimate channel of the
Adjutant-General's office. The matter was weighing heavily
on Anson's mind. He saw clearly what the difficulty was.
" I have no doubt," he wrote on that day to the Governor-
General, "that individually they (the men of the detachments)
are content, and that their own minds will be set at rest ;
but it is the manner in which they will be received by their
comrades, when they regain their regiments, that weighs upon
my mind." But what was to be done ? To remove from their
minds all fear of the greased cartridges was only to drive them
upon an equal fear of the greased paper, which it was still
more difficult to remove.f He had thought at one time of

* Lieutenant Martineau to Captain Septimus Becher. The writer adds :
" Their being telected as men of intelligence and fidelity thus becomes to them
the most fatal curse : they will obey the orders of their military superiors, and
socially perish through their instinct of obedience. That their views are not
exaggerated, some knowledge of the Native character, and of the temper of
the Native mind (non-military as well as military) at this present moment,
tend to convince me. The Asiatic mind is periodically prone to fits of
religious panic; in this state, reasoning that would satisfy us is utterly
thrown away upon them ; their imaginations run riot on preconceived views,
and often the more absurd they are, the more tenaciously do they cling to
them. We are now passing through one of these paroxysms, which we might
safely disregard were not unfortunately the military element mixed up in it.
What the exciting causes are that at this present moment are operating on
the Native mind, to an universal extent throughout these provinces, I cannot
discover; no Native can or will offer any explanation, but I am disposed to
regard the greased cartridges, alleged to be smeared with cows' and pigs' fat,
more as the medium than as the original cause of this widespread feeling of
distrust that is spreading dissatisfaction to our rule, and tending to alienate
the fidelity of the Native Army."

f " I am not so much surprised," wrote General Anson to Lord Canning
on the 23rd of March, " at their objections to the cartridges, having seen
them. I had no idea they contained, or rather are smeared with, such a
quantity of grease, which looks exactly like fat. After ramming down the
ball, the muzzle of the musket is covered with it. This, however, will, I
imagine, not be the case with those prepared according to the late instructions.

410 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857,

breaking up the Depot, and sending back the detachments to
their regiments, on the ground of the advanced state of the
season ; but this would only, he argued on reflection, be a
cowai'dly staving-off of the question, so he determined merely
to direct that the drill instruction should not proceed to the
point of firing until a special report should have been received
from Mirath on the subject of the suspected paper.

To Lord Canning, it appeared that any postponement of
the target practice of the drill detachments would be a mis-
take. It would be a concession to unreasonable fears, which
would look like an admission that there was reason in them ; so,
having first telegraphed to Ambalah the substance of his letter,
„ he wrote to General Anson, saying: " I gather that

pn ' '" you are not decidedly in favour of this course, and
certainly I am much opposed to it myself. The men, it seems,
have no objection of their own to use the cartridges, but dread
the taunts of their comrades after they have rejoined. These
taunts will be founded, not on their having handled unclean
grease, for against that the whole Army has been protected for
many weeks past by the late orders, but upon suspicions re-
specting the paper. Now, although in the matter of grease the
Government was in some degree in the wrong (not having
taken all the precaution that might have been taken to exclude
objectionable ingredients), in the matter of paper it is entirely
in the right. There is nothing offensive to the Caste of the
Sipahis in the paper; they have no pretence for saying so.
The contrary has been proved ; and if we give way upon this
point I do not see where we can take our stand. It may be, as

But there are now misgivings about the paper, and I think it so desirable
that they should be assured that no animal grease is used in its manufacture,
that a special report shall be made to me on that head from Mirath, and
until I receive an answer, and am satisfied that no objectionable matter is
used, no firing at the depots by the Sipahis will take place. It would be
easy to dismiss the detachments to their regiments without any practice, on
the ground that the hot weather is so advanced, and that very little progress
could be made, but I do not think that would be advisable. The question
having been raised, must be settled. It would only be deferred till another
year, and I trust that the measures taken by the Government when the
objection was first made, and the example of the punishment of the 19th
Native Infantry, and of the other delinquents of the 70th, now being tried
by a general court-martial, will have the effect we desire." [It is probable
that "General Anson here referred to the trial of the men of the 2nd
Grenadiers.] — MS. Correspondence.

1S57.7 VIEWS OF LORD CANNING. 411

you hope, that the detachments at Ambalah, being well-
conditioned men, would not consider a compliance with their
request as a giving way on the part of the Government, or as a
victory on their own part. But I fear it would be so with their
comrades in the regiments. When the detachments return to
their Head-quarters, they would give an account of the con-
cession they had obtained, which would inevitably, and not
unreasonably, lead to the suspicion that the Government is
doubtful of the right of its own case. It could hardly be other-
wise ; and if so, we should have increased our difficulties for
hereafter — for I have no faith in this question dying away of
itself during the idleness of the hot season, unless it is grappled
with at once. I would, therefore, make the men proceed to
use the cartridges at practice. It will be no violence to their
own consciences, for they are satisfied that the paper is harm-
less; and it will, in my opinion, much more effectively pave
the way towards bringing their several regiments to reason,
whether the objections thereto felt are sincere or not, than any
postponement. Moreover, I do not think that we can quite
consistently take any other course after what has passed with
the 19th Eegiment ; for, though the climax of their crime was
taking up arms, the refusal of the cartridges has been declared
to be the beginning of the offence. Neither do I like the
thought of countenancing consultations and references between
the men of a regiment upon matters in which they have nothing
to do but to obey ; and I fear that postponement would look
like an acquiescence in such references." So it was determined
that there should be no cowardly postponement of the evil day,
and the detachments in the Musketry Schools were ordered to
proceed, under the new regulations, to the end of their course
of instruction.*

Whilst this letter was maldng its way to the foot of the Hills,
General Anson, whose health had been severely tried, and who

* The orders issued from the Adjutant-General's office, in consequence of
this decision, were, that the detachments should proceed to target practice,
that they should choose and apply their own grease, and that they should
pinch or tear off the end of the cartridge with their fingers. In the event
of the men hesitating to use the cartridges, their officers were to reason with
them, calmly in the first instance, and if the Depot, after such an appeal to
them, were to refuse to use the cartridges, more stringent measures were to
be resorted to for the enforcement of discipline. — Letter from Adjutant-
General to General Hearsey.

412 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY [1857

had long been looking anxiously towards the cool, fresh slopes
of the Himalayas, betook himself hopefully to Simla. That
paradise of invalids, he wrote to the Governor- General, was
" looking beautiful, and the climate now quite perfect." " I
heartily wish," he added, " that you were here to benefit by it."
But it was not a time for the enjoyment of Himalayan delights.
At both ends of that long line of a thousand miles between the
great Presidency town and the foot of the Hills there was that
which, as the month advanced, must have sorely disquieted the
minds of the civil and military chiefs. There was the great
difficulty of the 34th to disturb both the Governor-General and
the Commander-in-Chief; and as time advanced, there came
from other parts of the country tidings which, if they did not
help them to fathom causes, brought more plainly before them
the probable consequences of this great panic in the Sipahi
Army. Those significant fires, which had preluded the out-
break at Barrackpur, were breaking out at other stations.
At Ambalah especially, in the middle of the month of April,
they had become frequent and alarming. The detachments in
the Musketry Schools were now proceeding steadily with their
target practice. They dipped their own cartridges into a mixture
of beeswax and ghee, and seemed to be fully convinced and
assured that no foul play was intended against them. But they
did not escape the taunts of their comrades ; and the nightly
fires indicated the general excitement among the Native soldiery.
The European barracks, the commissariat store-houses, the
hospital, and the huts in the Lines, night after night, burst out
into mysterious conflagration. It was the belief at Head-
Quarters that these fires, made easy by the dry thatched roofs
of the buildings, were the work partly of the Sipahis of the
regiments stationed there, and partly of those attached to the
Musketry Depot. The former still looked askance at the latter,
believing that they had been bought over by promises of pro-
motion to use the obnoxious cartridges, and, as a mark of their
indignation, set fire to the huts of the apostates in their absence
at drill. Upon this the men of the Musketry School retaliated,
by firing the Lines of the regimental Sipahis.* But the Courts

* " The night before last a fireball was found ignited in the hut of a Sipahi
of the 5th Native Infantry. The hut was empty, as the man is attached to
the School of Musketry, and lives with them. On the following night the
Lines of the 00th Native Infantry were fired, and five huts, wilh all the men's

»857.] SIR HENRY BARNARD. 413

of Inquiry which were held to investigate the circumstances of
these incendiary fires foiled to elicit any positive information ;
for no one was willing to give evidence, and nothing was done
to put pressure upon witnesses to reveal the knowlege which
they possessed.

At this time Sir Henry Barnard, an officer of good repute,
who had served with distinction in the Crimea, com-
manded the Sirhind Division of the Army, in which Sj£raaniy
Ambalah was one of the chief stations. He was a
man of high courage and activity, eager for service, and though
he had not heen many months in the country, he had begun to
complain of the dreadful listlessness of Indian life, and the
absence of that constant work and responsibility which, he said,
had become a necessity to him. " Cannot you find some tough
job to put me to ? I will serve you faithfully." Thus he wrote
to Lord Canning in the last week of April, seeing nothing before
him at that time but a retreat to Simla, " when the burning
mania is over." Little thought he then of the tough job in
store for him — a job too tough for his steel, good as was the
temper of it. The Commander-in-Chief wrote from Simla that
Barnard was learning his work. " It will take him some time,"
said Anson, " to understand the Native character and system."
And no reproach to him either ; * for nothing was more beyond
the ordinaiy comprehension of men, trained in schools of European
warfare, than Sipahi character in its normal state, except its
aberrations and eccentricities. Anson had been two years in
India ; but he confessed that what was passing at Ambalah
sorely puzzled him. " Strange," he wrote to Lord Canning,
" that the incendiaries should never be detected. Eveiy one is
on the alert there ; but still no clue to trace the offenders."
And, again, at the end of the month, " We have not been able to
detect any of the incendiaries at Ambalah. This appears to me
extraordinary ; but it shows how close the combination is among
the miscreants who have recourse to this mode of revenging
what they conceive to be their wrongs, and how great the

property, destroyed. This was clearly an act of retaliation, for incendiaries
do not destroy themselves." — General Barnard to Lord Canning, April 24,
1857. — MS. Correspondence.

* That Sir Henry Barnard thought much and wrote very sensibly of the
Sipahi Army, the defects of our Indian military system, and the causes of
the prevailing disaffection, I have ample evidence in letters before me.

414 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

dread of retaliation to any one who would dare to become an
informer." It showed, too, how little power we had of penetrat-
ing beneath the surface, and how great was the mistrust of the
English throughout all classes of the Native soldiery. Let what
might be the hatred and dissension among themselves, a
common feeling still stronger closed their hearts and sealed their
lips against their English officers.

Day after day this fact became more and more apparent. To
the most observant of our people it seemed at first
that, although the ministers and dependents of the
deposed Muhammadan ruler of Oudh might have been insidiously
employed in the corruption of our Native soldiery, the alarm,
and therefore the discontent among the Sipahis, was for the most
part an emanation of Hinduism. The inquiries into the state
of the 34th Kegiment at Barrackpur had resulted in a belief
that the Muhammadan and Sikh soldiers were true to their salt ;
and so strong was the impression that only the Hindus of the
disbanded 19th were really disaffected, that, after the dispersion
of the regiment, it was believed that the whole history of the
mutiny, which had ruined them, might be gathered from the
Musulman Sipahis. But, although a sagacious civil officer was
put upon their track, and every effort was made to elicit the
desired information, the attempt was altogether a failure.
Whether these first impressions were right or wrong, whether
the mutiny was, in its origin and inception, a Hindu or a
Muhammadan movement, will hereafter be a subject of inquiry.
But, before the end of the month of April, it must have been
apparent to Lord Canning that nothing was to be hoped from
that antagonism of the Asiatic races which had ever been
regarded as the main element of our strength and safety.
Muhammadans and Hindus were plainly united against us.

From an unexpected quarter there soon came proof of this
union. As the new Enfield rifle had been the outward and
visible cause of the great fear that had arisen in the minds of
the soldiery, it was natural that the anxieties of the Government
should, in the first instance, have been confined to the Native
Infantry. In the Infantry Eegiments a very large majority of
the men were Hindus ; whilst in the Cavalry the Muhammadan
element was proportionately much stronger.* But now there

* As a rule, the Muhammadans were better horsemen and more adroit
swordsmen than the Hindus, and therefore they made more serviceable

1857.] EVENTS AT MiRATH. 415

came from Mirath strange news to the effect that a Cavalry
regiment had revolted.

To this station many unquiet thoughts had been directed ;
for it was one of the largest and most important in the whole
range of our Indian territories. There, troops of all arms, both
European and Native, were assembled. There, the Head-
Quarters of the Bengal Artillery were established. There, the
Ordnance Commissariat were diligently employed, in the
Expense Magazine, on the manufacture of greased cartridges.
There, the English Riflemen of the 60th, not without some
feelings of disgust, were using the unsavoury things. More
than once there had been reports that the Sipahis had risen at
Mirath, and that the Europeans had been let loose against them.
With vague but eager expectancy, the Native regiments at all
the large stations in Upper India were looking in that direction,
as for a signal which they knew would soon be discerned. Men
asked each other what was the news from Mirath, and looked
into the Native newspapers for the suggestive heading ; for it
was the cradle of all sorts of strange and disturbing stories.
In this month of April its crowded Lines and busy Bazaars
were stirred by indefinite apprehensions of something coming.
Every day the excitement increased, for every day some new
story, intended to confirm the popular belief in the base designs
of the English, found its way into circulation. The emissary
of evil, who, in some shape or other, was stalking across the
country, was at Mirath in the guise of a wandering Fakir, or
religious mendicant, riding on an elephant, with many followers.
That he was greatly disturbing the minds of men was certain ;
so the Police authorities ordered him to depart. He moved ;
but it was believed that he went no farther than the Lines of
one of the Native regiments.*

troopers. It is stated, however, that in the 3rd Regiment of Regular Cavalry
which led off the dance of death at Mirath, there were an unusual number of
Brahmans.

* Compare following passage in the Mirath Narrative of Mr. Williams,
Commissioner First Division : "All the rumours by which the minds of the
Native soldiers were prepared for revolt, were industriously disseminated at
Mirath, especially those regarding the use of polluting grease in the prepara-
tion of the new cartridges, and the mixture of ground bones in flour, by
which, it was said, Government desired to destroy the religion of the people.
One of the many emissaries who were moving about the country appeared
at Mfiath in April, ostensibly as a fakir, riding on an elephant with followers,
and having witn him horses and native carriages. The frequent visits of the

416 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

In no place was the story of the greased cartridges discussed
with greater eagerness than at Mirath ; in no place was there a
more disturbing belief that this was a part of a great scheme for
the defilement of the people. It was of little use to declare to
them that not a single soldier would ever be required to use a
cartridge greased by any one but himself, for the greasing of
the cartridges was in their estimation only one of many fraudu-
lent devices, and every on6 believed that the dry cartridges
contained the obnoxious fat. So, in the beginning of the fourth
week of April, the excitement, which for many weeks had
been growing stronger and stronger, broke out into an act of
open mutiny. The troopers of the 3rd Cavalry were the
first to resist the orders of their officers. They had no new
weapons ; no new ammunition. The only change introduced
into their practice was that which substituted the pinching
or tearing off, for the biting off, the end of the cartridges
which they used with their carbines. This change in the drill
was to be explained to them on a parade of the skirmishers of
the regiment, which was to be held on the morning of the 24th
of April. On the preceding evening a report ran through can-
tonments that the troopers would refuse to touch the cartridges.
The parade was held, and of ninety men, to whom the ammuni-
tion was to have been served out, only five obeyed the orders of
their officers. In vain Colonel Carmichael Smyth explained to
them that the change had been introduced from a kindly regard
for their own scruples. They were dogged and obdurate, and
would not touch the cartridges. So the parade was dismissed, and
the eighty-five troopers of the 3rd were ordered for Court-martial.
All this made it manifest to Lord Canning that the worst

suspicions were deeply rooted in the Sipahi Army ;
TKround bonesbe an(^ though he at all times maintained a calm

and cheerful demeanour, he thought much and
anxiously of the signs and symptoms of the troubled spirit
that was abroad. There were many indications that these
suspicions were not confined to the military classes, but
were disquieting also the general community. Not only in
Mirath, but also in many other parts of the country, there was

men of the Native regiments to him attracted attention, and he was ordered,
through the police, to leave the place ; he apparently complied, but, it is
said, he stayed some time in the Lines of the 20th Native Infantry." —
Unpublished Records.

1857.] THE BONE-DUST FLOUR. 417

a belief that the English designed to defile both Hindus and
Muhammadans, by polluting with unclean matter the daily
food of the people. It has been shown that a suspicion of a
similar character was abroad at the time of the Mutiny at
Vellur.* Now the disturbing rumour, cunningly circulated,
took many portentous shapes. It was said that the officers of
the British Government, under command from the Company
and the Queen, had mixed ground bones with the flour and the
salt sold in the Bazaars ; that they had adulterated all the
ghi f with animal fat ; that bones had been burnt with the
common sugar of the country; and that not only bone-dust
flour, but the flesh of cows and pigs, had been thrown into the
wells to pollute the drinking water of the people. Of this
great imaginary scheme of contamination the matter of the
greased cartridges was but a part, especially addressed to one
part of the community. All classes, it was believed, were to
be defiled at the same time; and the story ran that the " bara
sahibs," or great English lords, had commanded all the princes,
nobles, landholders, merchants, and cultivators of the land, to
feed together upon English bread.

Of these preposterous fables, the one which made the strongest
impression on the public mind was the story of the bone-dust
flour. That it was current in March at Barrackpur is certain. ij:
In the early part of April, a circumstance occurred which
proved that the panic had then spread to the Upper Provinces.
It happened that flour having risen to an exceptionally high
price at Kanhpur, certain dealers at Mirath chartered a number
of Government boats to carry a large supply down the canal to
the former place. When the first instalment arrived, and was
offered for sale at a price considerably below that which had
previously ruled in the Bazaars, it found a ready market ; but

* Ante, p. 181. It was then said that the English had mixed the hlood
of cows and pigs with all the newly manufactured salt.

t This is the ordinary grease used for cooking purposes throughout India.

j It was brought to the notice of General Hearsey by a native anonymous
letter, picked up at the gate of Major Matthews, who commanded the 43rd.
The Major sent it to Hearsey' s staff, describing it as "sad trash"; and
Hearsey, in forwarding it to the Military Secretary, expressed regret that
the contemptible production had not been burnt as soon as it was found. But
History rejoices in the preservation of such contemptible productions.
There are many such in my possession, but this is the earliest in date, and
gives the most comprehensive account of the rumours circulated by our
enemies.

VOL. I. 2l

418 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1893

before the remainder reached Kanhpiir, a story had been cir-
culated to the effect that the grain had been ground in the
canal mills, under European supervision, and that the dust of
a' bmes had been mixed up with it, with the intention of
roving the caste of all who should eat it. Such a story as
circulated in the Lines and the Military Bazaars of
K hpur, at once stopped the sale of the Mirath flour. Not a
:ii would touch it. not a person of any kind would purchase
it. cheap as wa< the price at which it was obtainable in com-
mon with all the other supplies in the market. Kapidly
spread the alarm from one station to another, and as tidings
■: the arrival of imaginary boat-loads or camel-loads of
flour and bone-dust, men threw away the bread that they were
-rating, and believe 1 themselves already defiled.* Whether, as
some said, this was a trick of the Kanhpur grain merchant
keep up the price of flour, or whether the st ry had been set
afloat under the same influences as those which had given so
false a colouring to the accident of the greased cartridges, and
had associated with all the other wild fictions of which I have
spoken, cannot with certainty be declared. But, whatsoever
origin of the fable, it sunk deeply into men's minds, and
fixed there more ineradicably than ever their belief in the stern
ition of the Government to destroy the caste of the people
by fraudulently bringing, in one way or other, the unclean
thing to their lit -

It fixed, too, more firmly than before in the mind of Lord
Canning, the belief that a great fear was spreading
itself among the people, and that there was more

the ch-jpjitis. • -, n T ^ • i

danger in such a feeling than in a great hatred.
Thinking of this, he thought also of another strange story that
had come to him from the North- West, and which even the

st experienced men about him were incompetent to explain.

m village to village, brought by one messenger and sent
onward by another, passed a mysterious token in the shape of
one of those flat cakes made from flour and water, and forming
the common bread of the people, which, in their language, are

* G 1 r.el Baird Smith to Mr. Colvin — Mr. Martin Gubbins to the same.
•• Once a]arr.- Irink in the greatest follies. Bone-

du>t atah alarm has taken hold of men's minds at several of our stations, and
Sipabis, private servants, Zamindars attending Court, have flung away their
roti (tread on hearing that five c^mel-loads of bone-dust atah had reached
the station.'" — .V.v Correspondence.

1S57.] -TORY OF THE CHAPATIS. 419

called Chapatis. All that was known about it was, that a mes-
senger appeared, gave the cake to the head man of one village,
and requested him to despatch it onward to the next ; and that,
in this way. it travelled from place to place ; no one refusing,
no one doubting, few even questioning, in blind obedience to
a necessity felt rather than understood. After a while, this
practice became known to the functionaries of the English
Government, who thought much of it, or thought little of it,
according to their individual dispositions, and interpreted it, in
divers ways, according to the light that was in them.* The
greater number locked upon it as a signal of warning and pre-
paration, designed to tell the people that something great and
portentous was about to happen, and to prompt them to be
ready for the crisis. One great authority wrote to the Governor-
General that he had been told that the chapati was the symbol
of men's food, and that its circulation was intended to alarm
and to influence men's minds bv indicating to them that their
means of subsistence would be taken from them, and to tell
them, therefore, to hold together. Others, laughing to scorn
this notion of the fiery cross, saw in it only a common supersti-
tion of the country. It was said that it was no unwonted thing
for a Hindu, in whose family sickness had broken out. to
institute this transmission of chapatis. in the belief that it would
carry off the disease ; or for a community, when the cholera or
other pestilence was raging, to betake themselves to a similar
practice. Then, again, it was believed by others that the cakes
had been sent abroad by enemies of the British Government, for
the purpose of attaching to their circulation another dangerous
fiction, to the effect that there was bone-dust in them, and that
the English had resorted to this supplementary method of
defiling the people. Some. too. surmised that, by a device some-
times used for other purposes,! seditious letters were in this

* Mr. Ford, Collector of Gurgaon, first brought it to the notice of the
Lieut enant-Govenior of the North- Western Provinces, Mr. Colvin, who issued
circular orders on the subject to all the local officers in charge of districts.
In the trial of the King of Dehli great pains were taken to extract from the
witnesses, both European and Native, some explanation of the ** Chapati
mystery " ; but nothing satisfactory was elicited.

t In this manner communication was sometimes held with the inn-.
of our gaols. See tl.e * Beyelationa of an Orderly." by Fan; kauri Khan:
"Suppose a prisoner is confined under the bayonet of Sipai.is, lie mi;.-
permitted to eat bread. The preparer of food is bribed, and a short note is

2 K 2

420 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

manner forwarded from village to village, read by the village
chief, again crusted over with flour, and sent on in the shape of
a chapati, to be broken by the next recipient. But whatsoever
the real history of the movement, it had doubtless the effect of
producing and keeping alive much popular excitement in the
districts through which the cakes were transmitted ; and it may
be said that its action was too widely diffused, and that it lasted
for too long a time, to admit of a very ready adoption of the
theory that it was of an accidental character, the growth only
of domestic, or even of municipal, anxieties.* Some saw in it
much meaning ; some saw none. Time has thrown no new
light upon it. Opinions still widely differ. And all that History
can record with any certainty is, that the bearers of these

put into a chapati. or a sentence is written on a plate, and when the bread
is taken up the prisoner reads what is written."

* The circulation of the chapatis commenced at the beginning of the year.
" The year 1857," writes Captain Keatinge, " opened in Nimar by a general
distribution of small cakes, which were passed on from village to village.
The same, I am aware, has occurred all over Northern India, and has been
spoken of as having been a signal for the disturbances which took place later
in the year. At the time they appeared in Nimar, they were everywhere
brought from the direction of Iudiir. That city was at the time afflicted
with a severe visitation of cholera, and numbers of inhabitants died daily.
It was at that time understood, by the people in Nimar, and is still believed,
that the cakes of wheat were despatched from Indiir after the performance
over them of incantations that would ensure the pestilence accompanying
them. The cakes did not come straight from North to South, for they were
received at Bajanagar, more than half-way between Iudiir and Gwal'iar, on
the 9th of February, but had been distributed at Mandle'sar on the 12th of
January. This habit of passing on holy and unholy things is not unknown
at Nimar. When smallpox breaks out in a village, a goat is procured, a
cocoa-nut tied to its neck, and it is taken by the chowkeedar to the first
village on the road to Mandata; it is not allowed to enter the town, but is
taken by a villager to the next hamlet, and so passed on without rest to its
destination." This last is the scripturally recorded scapegoat. With respect
to the chapatis, consult also the report of Major Erskine, Commissioner of
the Sagar and Narbada territories : " So far back as January, 1857," he
writes, "small wheaten cakes (chapatis) were passed in a most mysterious
manner from village to village in most of the districts, and, although all
took it as a signal that something was coming, nobody in the division, I
believe, knew what it portended, or whence it came, and it appeared to have
been little thought about except that in the money-market of Sagar it is said
to have had some slight effect in bill transactions. I reported the matter to
Government at the time, but f ven now it is a matter of doubt if the signal
was understood by any one, or if it referred to the coming rebellion, though
such is now the general opinion."

1857.] POLITICAL INTRIGUES. 421

strange missives went from place to place, and that ever as they
went new excitements were engendered, and vague expectations
were raised.

That in all this there was something more than mere military
disaffection was manifest to Lord Canning ; but
neither he nor his confidential advisers could clearly h^gues
discern what it was. He had a general conception
that evil-minded men, with strong resentments to he gratified
by the ruin of the British Government, were sending forth
their emissaries ; but with the exception of the ministers of
the dethroned King of Oudh, whom he had suspected from the
first,* he could not individualist) his suspicions. How was he
to know, how was any Englishman, shut up all day long in his
house, and having no more living intercourse with the people
than if they were clay figures, to know what was passing
beneath the surface of Native society? If anything were
learnt at that time to throw light upon the sources of the great
events that were to happen, it was by merest accident, and the
full force of the revelation was rarely discernible at the time.
It was remembered afterwards that, in the early part of this
year, one man, a Maratha by race, a Brahman by caste, of
whom something has already been recorded in this narrative,

* In my mind there is no doubt of the activity, at this time, of the Oudh
people at Garden Reach. The Sipahis at Barrackpiir were induced to believe
that, if they broke away from the English harness, they would obtain more
lucrative service under the restored kingship of Oudh. I have before me
some letters, original and translated, of a Jamadar of the 34th Regiment,
which contain numerous allusions to the Future of the King's service. Take
the following : "The 2nd Grenadiers said, in the beginning of April, 'Wo
will go to our homes sooner than bite the blank ammunition.' The regiments
were unanimous in joining the King of Oudh." " The Subahdars of the
Quarter-Guard said, 'We have sided with the King of Oudh, but nothing
has come of it.' " "Ramshai Lala said, 'It would have been well for us.' "
This also has its significance: "Subahdar Made' Khan, Sirdar Khan, and
Ramshai Lala said, ' The Faringhi Betichuts ' (a vile term of opprobrium)
' are unequalled in their want of faith. The King of Lakhnao put down his
arms, and the Government have given him no allowance. We advised the
King to put down his arms. The treachery (if the Government is unrivalled.' "
Colonel Wheler said that the writer of these letters appeared to be affected in
the head." It will be remembered that the Native officer who reported the
coming massacre of Velliir was also said to be mad. General Hearsey, send-
ing on the correspondence to Government, said that there was "much method
in his supposed madness " ; and added, that " much important information on
the whole cause and subject of this supposed Cartridge Mutiny might be
elicited from him." — MS. Correspondence.

422 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

was displaying, in his movements, an unwonted activity, Avhich
created surprise, but scarcely aroused suspicion. This man was
Dundu Pant, commonly known as the Nana Sahib, of Bhitur —
the adopted son of the Peshwa, Baji Eao. He was not given to
distant journey in gs ; indeed, he was seldom seen beyond the
limits of his own estate. But in the early months of 1857,
having visited Kalpi, he made a journey to Dehli, and, a little
latter in the year, paid a visit to Lakhnao. It was in the
middle of April that he started on this last journey. On the
17th of that month, Mr. Morland, then one of the Agra Judges,
who shortly after the Peshwa' s death had been Commissioner
at Bhitur, and who had endeavoured to rescue from resumption
a part of his pension, paid a visit to the Nana at that place.
The wily Musulman Agent, Azim-iillah Khan, who had pleaded
his cause in England, was with Dundu Pant when the English
gentleman was announced, and they talked freely together, as
friends talk, no suspicion on the one side, and no appearance of
anything unwonted on the other. All was outwardly smooth
and smiling. The Maratha was as profuse as ever in his
expressions of respect and esteem; and when Morland took his
departure, the Brother of Dundu Pant told him that the Nana
purposed to return the visit of the Sahib next day at Kanhpiir.
The next day happened to be Sunday, and Morland was
anxious, therefore, to decline the visit ; but the Nana Sahib
went to Kanhpiir, and again sent Baba Bhat to the English
gentleman to propose an interview. What he wished to say to
the man who had been kind to him will now never be known,
for Morland declined the meeting, on the plea that it was the
Sabbath, and expressed regret that the Nana Sahib should have
made the journey to no purpose. To this the Brahman replied,
that his brother was on his way to Lakhnao to visit one
of the Nawabs. There was something in all this strange and
surprising. An English nobleman, in the course of three
or four months, might visit all the chief cities of Europe
without anyone taking heed of the occurrence. But the
nobility of India are little given to travelling ; and the Nana
Sahib had rarely gone beyond the limits of Bhitur.* That,

* A different statement has, I know, been made and commonly accepted.
It is the belief that the Nana Sahib was frequently to be seen at Kanhpiir,
riding or driving on the Mall, and mixing freely with the European residents
of the place. But the truth is, he eschewed Kanhpiir, for the reason which

1857.] THE NANA SAHIB. 423

within so short a time, he should make these three journeys,
was a fact to excite speculation ; but he was held to be a quiet,
inoffensive person, good-natured, perhaps somewhat dull, and
manifestly not of that kind of humanity of which con-
spirators are made, so no political significance was attached to
the fact. What likelihood was there, at that time, that such a
man as Dundii Pant, heavy and seemingly impassive, who had
for some years quietly accepted his position, and during that
time done many acts of kindness and hospitality to the English
gentlemen, should suddenly become a plotter against the State ?
Had any one then said that it behoved the Government to mark
the movements of that man, he would have been laughed to
scorn as an alarmist. We never know in India how many are
the waiters and the watchers ; we never know at what moment
our enemies, sluggish in their hatreds as in all else, may exact
the payment of old scores which we have thought were long
ago forgotten.

So Dundii Pant, Nana Sahib, passed on, about some business
known to himself, utterly unknown to European functionaries,
to Kalpi, on the banks of the Jamnah, to the great imperial city
of Dehli, and to Lakhnao, the capital of Oudh. In the last of
these places, when the Nana arrived, Henry Lawrence was
diligently, with his whole good heart, striving to make right all
that had gone wrong during the time of his predecessor. But
again the handwriting on the wall traced those fatal words,
" Too late." If he had but gone to Lakhnao when he had first
offered to go, how different would all have been ! It was on
the 18th April that the Nana Sahib started on his journey to
Lakhnao. On that day Henry Lawrence wrote a long letter to
the Governor-General, telling him that he had dis-
cerned signs of dangerous coalitions between the
regular Sipahi regiments, the irregulars taken into our service
from the old Oudh Army, and the men of the Police battalions ;
symptoms also of intrigues on foot among some of the chief
people of the city. There were many elements of trouble ; and
now they were beginning to develop themselves in a manner

induced his adoptive father, Baji Rao, to eschew it, namely, that a salute was
not given to him on entering the cantonment. The person generally known
in Kauhpiir as the " Nana " was not Dundii Pant, but Nana Narain Rao, the
eldest son of the ex-Pushwa's chief adviser and manager, the Subahdar Ram-
chandar Pant, who, after his master's death, resided at Kauhpiir and was on
terms of social familiarity with many of the principal European residents.

424 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

significant of a general outburst of popular discontent. " This
city," wrote Henry Lawrence on that 18th of April, "is said to
contain some six or seven hundred thousand souls, and does
certainly contain many thousands (twenty thousand, I was told
yesterday) of disbanded soldiers, and of hungry, nay starving
dependents of the late Government. This very morning a
clod was thrown at Mr. Ommaney (the Judicial Commissioner),
and another struck Major Anderson (Chief Engineer) whilst in a
buggy with myself. .... The improvements in the city here
go on very fast — too fast and too roughly. Much discontent has
been caused by demolition of buildings, and still more by threats
of further similar measures ; also regarding the seizure of re-
ligious and other edifices, and plots of ground, as Hazul or
Government property. I have visited many of these places and
pacified parties, and prohibited any seizure or demolition without
competent authority. The Eevenue measures, though not as
sweeping as represented by the writer whose letter your worship
sent me, have been unsatisfactory. The Talukdars have, I fear,
been hardly dealt with ; at least, in the Faizahad division some
have lost half their villages, some have lost all." Such, stated
here in the hurried outline of a letter from the spot, to be dwelt
upon more in detail hereinafter, was the condition of affairs
which, in the third week of April, the Nana Sahib found in
Lakhnao. He could have scarcely wished for any better
materials from which to erect an edifice of rebellion.

By this Diindu Pant, Nana Sahib — by all who were festering
with resentments against the English and malignantly biding
their time, the annexation of Oudh had been welcomed as a
material aid to the success of their machinations. It was no
sudden thought, born of the accident of the greased cartridges,
that took the disappointed Brahman and his Muhammadan
friend to Lakhnao in the spring of this year of trouble. For
months, for years indeed, ever since the failure of the mission
to England had been apparent, they had been quietly spreading
their network of intrigue all over the country. From one
Native Court to another Native Court, from one extremity to
another of the great continent of India, the agents of the Nana
Sahib had passed with overtures and invitations, discreetly,
perhaps mysteriously, worded, to Princes and Chiefs of different
races and religions, but most hopefully of all to the Marathas.
At the three great Maratha families— the families of the Rajah
of Satarah, of the Peshwa, of the Bhonsla — Lord Dalhousie

1857.] INTRIGUES OF NANA SAHIB. 425

had struck deadly blows. In the Southern Maratha coun try,
indeed, it seemed that Princes and Nobles were alike ripe for
rebellion. Jt was a significant fact that the agents of the
great Satarah and Puna families had been doing their master's
work in England about the same time, that both had returned
to India rank rebels, and that the first year of Lord Canning's
administration found Kangu Bapuji as active for evil in the
South as Azini-ullah was in the North ; both able and unscru-
pulous men, and hating the English with a deadlier hatred for
the very kindness that had been shown to them. But it was
not until the crown had been set upon the annexations of Lord
Dalhousie by the seizure of Oudh, that the Nana Sahib and his
accomplices saw much prospect of success. That event was
the turning-point of their career of intrigue. What had before
been difficult was now made easy by this last act of English
usurpation. Not only were the ministers of the King of Oudh
tampering with the troops at the Presidency, and sowing
dangerous lies broadcast over the length and breadth of the
land, but such was the impression made by the last of our
annexations, that men asked each other who was safe, and what
use was there in fidelity, when so faithful a friend and ally as
the King of Oudh was stripped of his dominions by the
Government whom he had aided in its need. It is said that
Princes and Chiefs, who had held back, then came forward, and
that the Nana Sahib began to receive answers to his appeals.*

* By those who systematically reject Native evidence, all this may be
regarded as nothing but unsubstantial surmise. But there is nothing in my
mind more clearly substantiated than the complicity of the Nana Sahib in
wide-spread intrigues before the outbreak of the mutiny. The concurrent
testimony of witnesses examined in parts of the country widely distant from
each other takes this story altogether out of the regions of the conjectural.
I speak only of the broad act itself. With regard to the statement in the
text, that the machinations of the Nana Sahib were much assisted by the
annexation of Oudh, I give the following, quantum valeat, from the evidence
of a Native emissary detained and examined in Maisur in January, 1858.
Afier giving a list of numerous princes and chiefs whom the Nana had
addressed, this man said : " The Nana wrote at intervals, two or three months
previous to the annexation of Oudh. But at first lie got no answers. Nobody
had any hope. After the annexation he wrote still more, and then the Saokars
of Lakhnao joined in his views. Man Singh, who is the Chief of the Prirbiah,
or Furdasi, joined. Then the Sipahis began to make tajwiz (plans) among
themselves, and the Lakhnao Saokars supported them. Until Oudh was
annexed, Nana Sahib did not get answers from any cce; but when that
occurred, many began to take courage and answer him. The plot amou" the

426 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

But whatsoever may have "been its effect in remote places, it
cannot be questioned that in the condition of Oudh itself after
annexation there was that which must have gladdened the
heart of every plotter against the State. Such men as Diindu
Pant and Azim-ullah Khan could not pass through the streets
of Lakhnao without clearly seeing what was coming. What
they saw and what they heard, indeed, pleased them so greatly,
that they assumed a bold and swaggering demeanour, which
attracted the attention of the English functionaries to whom
they were introduced. For they made no secret of their visit ;
but went about openly in the public streets, with numerous
attendants, and even sought the presence of the Commissioner.
The Nana said that he had come only to see the sights of
Lakhnao ; so Henry Lawrence received him kindly, and ordered
every attention to be shown to him by the authorities of the
city. But his sojourn in Lakhnao was brief, and his departure
sudden. He went without taking leave of the English function-
aries, saying that business required his presence at Kanhpur.*

Sipahis first took place— the discontent about the greased cartridges. Then
answers began to pour in. Gulab Sing, of Jarnii, was the first to send an
auswer. He said that he was ready with men, money, and arms, and he sent
money to Nana Sahib, through one of the Lakhnao Saokars." The former
part of this statement may be readily accepted ; the latter must be received
with caution.

* Vide Appendix, p. 454.

1S57.J THE MONTH OF MAY. 427

CHAPTER VII.

The mouth of May, with its fiery heat and glare, and its arid
dust-charged winds, found Lord Canning in Calcutta
watching eagerly, but hopefully, the progress of
events, and the signs and symptoms of the excitement engen-
dered in men's minds by the great lie which had been so
insidiously propagated among them. From the multitude of
conflicting statements and opinions which reached him from
different quarters, it was difficult to extract the truth ; but
taking a comprehensive view of all that was manifest to him,
from the plains of Bengal to the hills of the Himalaya, he could
not discern in those first days of May that the clouds were
gathering around him denser and blacker than before. If there
were any change, indeed, it was rather a change for the brighter
and the better. At Barrackpur there had been no more overt
acts of mutiny. The Native regiments were doing their duty,
sullenly, perhaps, but still quietly. At Damdamah the detach-
ments in the Rifle depot, under the new system of drill, were
proceeding to ball practice without any visible signs of discon-
tent. It was hoped, indeed, that the troops in the immediate
neighbourhood of Calcutta were yielding to the explanations
and assurances which had been given to them, and slowly
returning to reason. At the Rifle depots also in the Upper
Country the drill was quietly proceeding. At Sialkot, the
detachments from the Native regiments in the Pan jab, Regular
and Irregular, were firing the new pieces without a murmur.
Sir John Lawrence went to that station, at the beginning of
the month, " to see the new School of Musketry, as well as to
judge with respect to the feeling among the Sipahis ; " and he
wrote to Lord Canning that all were " highly pleased with the
new musket, and quite ready to adopt it. They already per-
ceive how great an advantage it will give them in mountain
warfare." The officers assured him that no bad feeling had
been shown, and he himself " could perceive no hesitation or

428 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

reluctance on the part of any of the Sipahis." * From Ambalah,
General Barnard wrote on the first day of the month, that he
had reported to Head-Quavters that so far from any insub-
ordinate feeling existing at that place, he had reason to be
satisfied with the patience, zeal, and activity that the men had
shown on the severe night-picket work necessitated by the
incendiary fires. " I have no reason," he added, " to accuse the
Sipahi of causing these fires — no overt act has been elicited,
and no instance of insubordination has occurred. The musket
practice has been resumed with apparent good will and zeal.
I have frequently attended it myself, and I will answer for it
that no ill feeling exists in these detachments." f

Thus it was that, in the first days of May, there was apparent
to the eyes of the Governor-General something like a lull; and
it seemed that at the Rifle depots, which were the great central
points of danger, the difficulty had been tided over. From
Mirath, too, no fresh tidings of disturbance came. The men of
the 3rd Cavalry were being tried by Court-martial ; and it did
not appear that any of their comrades were about to follow
their insubordinate example. There were circumstances that
rendered it probable that the motives which had driven these
men into mutiny were altogether of an exceptional character.
So Lord Canning, in the early part of this month of May, was
able to direct his thoughts to all parts of the country, and to
fix them on many topics of Indian government and administra-
tion, as calmly and as philosophically as in the quietest of
times. He was corresponding with Lord Elphinstone on the
subject of the Treaty with Persia and the Expenses of the War;
with Lieutenant-Governor Colvin on Education Grants and
Female Schools, and the Dehli Succession — little thinking how
that last question would soon settle itself ; with Major Davidson,
the Resident at Haidarabad, about the recognition of a suc-
cessor to the Nizam (his Highness being nigh unto death from
a surfeit of prawns) ; with Sir Richmond Shakespear, Resident
at Barodah, on the Finances of the Gaikwar ; and with Colonel
Durand, the Governor-General's agent at Indiir, about the
large amount of Native deposits in the Residency Treasury.
Indeed, the current business of Government was but little
interrupted. There was no fear in Government House.

Sir John Lawrence to Lord Canning, May 4, 1857.— MS. Correspondence
t Sir H. .Barnard to Lord Canning, May 1, 1857.— MS. Correspondence.

1857.] SYMPTOMS OF A LULL. 429

But, although at this time the Governor-General was cheerful
and hopeful, and believed that the clouds of trouble would soon,
by God's providence, be dispersed, he had some especial causes
of anxiety. The dawn of the month of May found the 34th
Regiment at Barrackpiir still awaiting its sentence. The
Jamadar of the Quarter-Guard, Isri Pandi, had been hanged on
the 22nd of April, in the presence of all the troops, at Barraek-
pur. He had confessed his guilt on the scaffold, and with his
last breath had exhorted his comrades to be warned by his
example.* It was believed that this public execution of a
commissioned officer would have a salutary effect upon the
whole Native Army. But the punishment of one man, though
that punishment were death, could not wipe out the offence of
the regiment, or vindicate the authority of the Government.
The great defect of Lord Canning, as a ruler in troubled times,
was an excess of conscientiousness. The processes by which
he arrived at a resolution were slow, because at every stage
some scruple of honesty arose to impede and obstruct his con-
clusions. On the score both of justice and of policy he doubted
whether the prompt disbandment of the 34th would be right.
It was certain that some companies were true to their colours,
and he did not clearly see that all the rest were faithless. He
had caused a searching inquiry to be made into the condition
of the regiment, and he had hoped, up to the end of the third
week of April, that all the requirements of the case might be
satisfied by the dismissal of some of the more patent offenders.
But the weight of military authority was strongly in favour of
disbandment. General Hearsey, at Barrackpur, was fully con-
vinced that no measure short of this would produce the desired
effect ; and General Anson wrote earnestly from Simla urging
the expediency of such a course. The whole question was fully
and anxiously discussed in Council ; and at last, on the 30th of

* There were many erroneous versions at the time of Isri Pandi's speech
from the scaffold. The words which he uttered, literally translated, were
these : " Listen, Bahadur Sipahis. In such a manner do not let any one act !
I have behaved in such a rascally way to the Government, that I am about to
receive my just punishment. Therefore, let no Bahadur Sipahi behave in
this wretched manner, or he may receive the same punishment." This is
given on the authority of Colonel Mitchell of the 19th, who brought the
prisoner from the Quarter-Guard of the 53rd to the foot of the gallows, and
whose own impressions were confirmed by the three orderlies who accom-
panied him.

430 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

April, Lord Canning recorded a minute declaratory of his
opinion that no penalty less general than disbandment " would
meet the exigencies of the case, or be effectual as an example."
But even then there were doubts with respect to the men who
were to be exempted from punishment, and not until the 4th of
May was the discussion exhausted and the order given for the
disbandment of the regiment.*

Two days afterwards, in the presence of all the troops at

Barrackpur, of the detachments from Damdamah,

Disbandment an£ 0f t£e §4^ CQueen's) from Chinsurah, the seven

of the 34th. . «. 1 ^ n * i i it • i-li

companies 01 the o4tn, who had witnessed, the great
outrage of the 29th of March, were drawn up, before the sun
had risen, to receive their sentence. There was to be no
mitigation of their punishment, as in the case of the 19th ; so
when they laid down their arms, the uniforms which they had
disgraced were stripped from their backs, and they were
marched out of cantonments under an escort of Europeans.
And thus a second time the number of the guilty 34th was
erased from the Army List ; and five hundred more desperate
men, principally Brahmans and Rajputs, were cast adrift upon
the world to work out their own schemes of vengeance.

In the quarter to which a large number of them made their
way, as the 19th had made their way before them — in
Oudh, the signs of approaching trouble increased. To
no place, from one end of India to another, did the mind of the
Governor-General, in this conjuncture, turn with more painful
interest than to this newly-annexed province, the nursery of the
Bengal Army. Henry Lawrence's letters to the Governor-
General were wholly silent on the subject of the Nana's visit to
Lakhnao. But they spoke of much that pressed heavily on his
mind. Recognising so many causes of popular discontent in
Oudh, and knowing well how large a portion of the Native
Army was drawn from that province, he could not, at such a
time, regard without much anxiety the demeanour of the Sipahis
around him. There was one regiment at Lakhnao, whose con-
duct, although it had been betrayed into no overt act of

* It is especially to be noted that a question arose as to whether the
Jamadar of the Mint-Guard, who had apprehended the men of the 2nd
Grenadiers (ante, page 389), should be exempted, as a faithful servant, or,
on account of later revelations, condemned as a traitor. The decision was
ultimately in his favour.

1857.] MUTINY AT LAKHNAO. 431

insubordination, was of a suspicious, almost of a threatening
character, and it seemed desirable that it should be removed
from the province. There was no doubt that some of the chief
people of the city were tampering with its allegiance ; and
much danger might therefore be averted if it could be removed
to another station beyond the limits of the province. The sug-
gestion was made, and Canning responded to it, giving full
authority to Henry Lawrence to move the tainted regiment to
Mirath. " Let the Commander-in-Chief know," wrote the
Governor-General, " if you find it necessary to send it away ;

but do not wait for any further authority If you have

regiments that are really untrustworthv, there must be no
delicacy in the matter." But before the letter sanctioning his
proposal had arrived, Henry Lawrence had thought long and
deeply about the results of such a measure; and on the 1st of
May he wrote to Lord Canning, saying : "Unquestionably we
should feelbetter without the 48th, but I do not feel confident
that the feeling in the other regiments is materially better ; and
there is little doubt that the 48th would not be improved by
a move, which is an important point of consideration in the
present general condition of the Army." He was right; the
removal of a single regiment could not benefit Oudh, but it
might do injury elsewhere by tainting other parts of the Army.
That other components of the Oudh force were equally dis-
affected was presently apparent. On the 2nd of
May, Captain Carnegie, who was Magistrate of the Mutiny in
city of Lakhnao, and who had the superintendence i^uiars.
of the Police — a man described by his immediate
superior as " prudent and active, though so quiet in manner,
and implicitly to be relied upon "—reported to Henry Lawrence
that there had been a strong demonstration against the cart-
ridges in the 7th Regiment of Oudh Irregulars. At first he was
fain to believe that the story might be exaggerated ; but there
was soon undeniable evidence that it was only too true. The
regiment, which had been in the King's service, was posted at
a distance of some seven miles from Lakhnao. A fortnight
before, the recruits of the regiment had commenced practice
with ball-cartridge, and had done their duty without any
manifestations of discontent. But by the end of the month it
was clear that the great fear, which was travelling about the
country, had taken possession of their minds, and that they
were on the very verge of revolt. Whether they had been

432 OUTBKEAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

wrought upon by emissaries from the city, or whether any of
the disbanded men of the 19th had, by tliis time, found their
way to Lakhnao, is matter only of conjecture ; * but as the
month of May dawned upon them, they were ripe for rebellion
— not only themselves prepared to resist, but eager to incite
others to resistance. They had written a letter to the men of
the 48th, urging them to rise for their religion ; and no sooth-
ing explanations from their officers could induce them to shake
off the mistrust which had fastened upon them. On the second
day of the month the Brigadier rode out with his Staff to the
Lines of the 7th, and found them " as obstinate as possible with
regard to the cartridges." f Eeturning at nightfall to Lakhnao,
he wrote at once to Lawrence, telling him the state of the regi-
ment, and adding, " I think myself that this affair has been a
long time brewing." The next morning ± brought
with it nc consolation. The 7th were in a worse
state than before. They had been sullen and obstinate on the
preceding day. Now in a state of feverish excitement, violent,
desperate, they assumed a menacing attitude, and talked openly
of murdering their officers. It was obvious that a crisis was
approaching, and that no time was to be lost ; so Henry
Lawrence, when he heard that the regiment was in this defiant
and dangerous state, determined at once to disarm, and, if
resisted, to destroy it. On that evening he moved up an over-

* It has been stated that both the 19th and 3tth were stationed at
Lakhnao at the time of annexation ; and it was believed that they were there
first infected with rebellion. Henry Lawrence wrote that he had ascertained
that in the 19th there must have been nearly seven hundred Oudh men. By
this time, th^y had mostly found their way back to their native province.

t The official report said that the regiment " refused to bite the cartridges
when ordered by its own officers, aud again by the Brigadier." How it
happened that, after the change introduced into the drill, the Sipahis at
Lakhnao were ordered to bite the cartridge at all, it is impossible to say.
This did not escape Lord Canning, who, in a minute written on the 10th of
May, said : " It appears that the revised instructions for the platoon exercise,
by which the biting of the cartridge is dispensed with, had not come into
operation at Lakhnao. Explanation of this should be asked." But the
time for explanation was past. It was ascertained, however, that the new
drill instructions were sent to the Oudh Irregular force in the middle of
April.

% So difficult is the attainment of perfect accuracy in an historical nar-
rative, that twen Mr. Guhbins, whose work on the Mutinies of Oudh is the
best and safest authority extant, says that these events, which he witnessed
himself, happened on Sunday, the 10th of May.

1357.] DISARMING OF THE 7TH. 483

whelming force of all arms to the parade ground of the 7th.
The day was far spent when he commenced the march. " It
was a ticklish matter," lie wrote to Mr. Colvin, " taking the
48th down on Sunday night ; but I thought that they were
safer in our company than behind in cantonments. We had to
pass for two miles through the city ; indeed, Her Majesty's 32nd
had four miles of it. I therefore hesitated as to moving" after ;
but the moon was in its third quarter; and the first blow is
everything. So off we started; and concentrated from four
points, accomplishing the seven miles in about three hours." *

The moon had risen, bright in an unclouded sky, on that
Sabbath evening, when Henry Lawrence, accompanied by his
Staff, appeared with the Brigade before the lines of the 7th.
The regiment was drawn up on parade, in a state of vague
uncertainty and bewilderment, not knowing what would come
of this strange nocturnal assembly. But when they saw the
Europeans, the Cavalry, and the guns, taking ground in their
front and on their flanks, the Native regiments being so placed
as to destroy all hope of their aiding their comrades, the
mutineers knew that their game was up, and that there would
be death in further resistance. What might then have happened
if the course of events had not been determined by an accident,
cannot be distinctly declared. The mutinous regiment had
obeyed the word of command, and some of the men had
expressed contrition ; but it happened that, by some mistake,
an artilleryman lighted a port-fire. The guns were pointed to-
wards the mutineers, and though Lawrence and his Staff were
posted between them and the Artillery, and would probably
have been swept away by the first round, the Sipahis of the
guilty regiment believed that the battery was about to open
upon them. A panic then seized the 7th. First one man, then
another, broke away from his comrades and fled, throwing down
his arms as he went in the overwhelming consternation of the
moment ; and presently great gaps appeared in the line, and
only a remnant of the regiment was left to obey the orders of
the English officer. To these men, whilst the Cavalry went in
pursuit of the fugitives, Henry Lawrence rode up ; and as they
broke into exclamations of " Jai Kampani Bahadurko ! "—
" Victory to the great Lord Company ! " — ordered them to lay

* Sir Henry Lawrence to Mr. Colvin, Lakhnao. May 6, 1857.— -MS. Corre-
epnndencc.

\OL. I. 2 F

434 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

down their arms, and to strip off their accoutrements. They
obeyed without hesitation ; and, an hour after midnight, the
Brigade had returned to Lakhnao, carrying with it all the arms'
of the 7th, and escorting, under guards of the same force, the
men who had so lately borne them. In the critical state of the
other Native regiments, it was not thought wise to divide the
Europeans.

Next day Henry Lawrence wrote to the Governor-General,
saying, " The coup is stated to have had great effect in the city.
But people go so far as to tell me that the 48th last night abused
the 7th for running away, and said, that if they had stood, the
48th would not have fired. I don't believe one quarter of these
reports." But, although there is always, in seasons of great
popular excitement, a vast amount of exaggeration afloat, and
Henry Lawrence, therefore, received with caution the stories
that were brought to him, he was not one to disregard the signs
of the times, and to close his eyes to the dangers that were sur-
rounding him. As time advanced, these signs increased in sig-
nificance. Some fifty of the ringleaders of the 7th Irregulars
had been seized and confined, and a Court of Inquiry had been
assembled to investigate the causes of the outbreak in that regi-
ment ; but little or nothing had been elicited. As at Ambalah,
and other places, the mouths of the Sipahis were sealed. They
might contend among themselves, but in their reticence, when
the English sought to probe their discontents, they acted as one
man. Words were not forthcoming, but there was one form of
expression, well known to the Native soldiery in times of
trouble, to which they betook themselves, as they had before
betaken themselves elsewhere, and thus gave utterance to the
strong feelings within them. On the 7th of May, the lines of
the 48th were burnt down. The fire commenced in the hut of
the Subahdar who had given up the seditious letter addressed
by the 7th Irregulars to the men of his regiment. There could
be no doubt that it was the work of an incendiary. On the
following day, Lawrence visited the scene of the conflagration,
and found the men outwardly civil and respectful in their
demeanour, but heavy and downcast at the thought of their loss
of property. It was not easy to read the state of feeling which
then existed in the Oudh Army, so vague and varied was it ; but
if any man could have rightly discerned it, Henry Lawrence
was that man. For he had free intercourse with those who
were most likely to be its exponents, and had the gift, so rare

1857.] SYMPTOMS OF DISCONTENT. 435

among our countrymen, of inspiring confidence in the breasts
of the people. After much communing with others and with
himself, he came to the conclusion that the strongest feeling
that held possession of the Sipahi's mind was a great fear,
that this fear had long been growing upon him, and that it
had only culminated in his belief in the story of the greased
cartridges.*

Of one of these conversations a record has been left in
Lawrence's handwriting. It is so significant of the great fear
that was then dominating the Army, that I give the passage as
it stands. " I had a conversation," he wrote to Lord Canning,
on the 9th of May, " with a Jamadar of the Oudh Artillery for
more than an hour, and was startled by the dogged persistence
of the man, a Brahman of about forty years of age, of excellent
character, in the belief that for ten years past Government has
been engaged in measures for the forcible, or rather fraudulent,
conversion of all the Natives. His argument was, that as such
was the case, and that as we had made our way through India,
won Bharatpur, Lahor, &c, by fraud, so might it be possible
that we mixed bone-dust with the grain sold to the Hindus.
When I told him of our power in Europe, how the Eussian war
had quadrupled our Army in a year, and in another it could, if
necessary, have been interminably increased, and that in the
same way, in six months, any required number of Europeans
could be brought to India, and that, therefore, we are not at the
mercy of the Sipahis, he replied that he knew that we had
plenty of men and money, but that Europeans are expensive,
and that, therefore, we wished to take Hindus to sea to conquer
the world for us. On my remarking that the Sipahi, though a
good soldier on shore, is a bad one at sea, by reason of his poor
food, ' That is just it,' was the rejoinder. ' You want us all to
eat what you like that we may be stronger, and go everywhere.'
He often repeated, ' I tell you what everybody says.' But when
I replied, 'Fools and traitors may say so, but honest and
sensible men cannot think so,' he would not say that he himself
did or did not believe, but said, ' I tell you they are like sheep ;

* One of the earliest indications of this alarm appeared at Lakhnao, when
an Assistant-Surgeon in the Hospital of the 48th inadvertently put a phial
of medicine to his lips to test it. This was seen by the Sipahis, and was
believed to be a deliberate scheme to pollute them. Soon afterwards the
house of the doctor was burnt to the ground by the Sipahis of his regiment.

2 F 2

436 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857,

the leading one tumbles down, and all the rest roll over him.'
Such a man is very dangerous. He has his full faculties, is a
Brahman, has served us twenty years, knows our strength and
our weakness, and hates us thoroughly. It may be that he is
only more honest than his neighbours, but he is not the less
dangerous. On one only point did he give us credit. I told
him that in the year 1846, I had rescued a hundred and fifty
Native children, left by our army in Kabul, and that instead of
making them Christians, I had restored them to their relations
and friends. ' Yes,' he replied, ' I remember well. I was at
Lahor.' On the other hand, he told me of our making Christians
of children purchased during famines. I have spoken to many
others, of all ranks, during the last fortnight; most give us
credit for good intentions; but here is a soldier of our own,
selected for promotion over the heads of others, holding opinions
that must make him at heart a traitor." On the same day he
wrote, in a similar strain, to Mr. Colvin, concluding with a
significant hint to look well after the safety of the Forts in
Upper India.*

If these letters from the Chief Commissioner of Oudh had been
read when written, they might suggested grave thoughts of im-
pending danger; but when they reached their destinations, they
came only as commentaries upon the past, faint and feeble as seen
by the glaring light of terrible realities. The Governor-General
and his colleagues in the Supreme Council were discussing the
conduct of the mutinous Oudh regiment, and the measure of
punishment which should be meted out to it. On the 10th of
May Lord Canning and Mr. Dorin recorded minutes on the
subject. The Governor-General declared for disbandment.
Roused to a vigorous expression of opinion by this last manifes-
tation of a growing evil, the senior member of Council wrote — ■
and wrote well — " The sooner this epidemic of mutiny is put a
stop to the better. Mild measures won't do it. A severe

example is wanted I am convinced that timely

severity will be leniency in the long run." On the same day,
General Lowe recorded a minute, in which he expressed an

* In the letter to Mr. Colvin, Sir Henry Lawrence says that the Jamadar
"went over all our anti-Hindu acts of the last ten years, including Gaol-
Messing, the General-Service Oath, &c, and did not conceal not only that he
and all others saw no absurdity in the ground-bones dtah belief, but that he
considered we were quite up to such a dodge." — MS. Correspondence.

1857.] THE OUTBREAK AT MiRATH. 437

opinion that " probably the main body of the regiment, in
refusing to bite the cartridge, did so refuse, not from any feeling
of disloyalty or disaffection towards the Government or their
officers, but from an unfeigned and sincere dread that the act of
biting iliem would involve a serious injury to their caste." On
the 11th, Mr. Grant and Mr. Peacock placed on record their
opiuions, that it might be better to wait for fuller information
before issuing the final orders of Government. On the 12th,
the office boxes were again passing from house to house ; but
with the papers then circulated, there went one, small in size,
scanty in words, but, although perhaps scarcely appreciated at
the time, of tremendous significance. " It is to be hoped,"
wrote Mr. Dorin, " that the news from Mirath (in the tele-
graphic message from Agra in this box) is not true." But it was
true ; yet, with all its terrors, only a small part of the truth.

The little paper, then, on that 12th of May, travelling from
house to house in the office-box, was a telegraphic
message from Lieutenant-Governor Colvin, an- Theoutbreak
nouncing to Lord Canning that the great military May 10, is5i.
station of Mirath was in a blaze, that the Cavalry
had risen in a body, and that every European they had met had
been slain by the insurgents. There was something terribly
significant in the very form of this message. The Government
at Agra had received no official tidings of the events that had
occurred at Mirath. But a lady at the former place, who had
been about to pay a visit to her friends at Mirath, had received
a message from her niece, who was sister of the postmaster there,
warning her not to attempt the journey, as the Cavalry had
risen.* This was the last message despatched. Before the
authorities could send intelligence of what had happened, the
telegraph-wires were cut by the insurgents.

* The following were the words of the message: "May 11, 1857. — Last
night, at nine o'clock, a telegraph message was received here by a lndy from
her niece, sister of the postmaster at Mirath, to the following effect : ' The
Cavalry have risen, setting fire to their own houses and several officers'
houses, besides having killed and wounded all European officers and soldiers
they could find near the Lines. If aunt intends starting to-morrow evening,
please detain her from doing so, as the van has been prevented from leaving
the station.' No later mussage has been received, and the communication by
telegram has been interrupted : how, not known. Any intelligence which
may reach will be sent on immediately." — Published Correspondence. Parlia-
mentary Paper$.

438 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

The news, therefore, which now reached Agra, and was thence
communicated to Calcutta, was of a vague,

™ieEranis0f fragmentar3T character. Scattered facts welled
up from uncertain sources, and were passed
on from one station to another, suggestive rather than
expressive, always indicating something more terrible in the
background than the truth actually revealed. Not till some
time afterwards was the whole truth apparent to the Governor-
General, and therefore not now do I fill up the outlines of the
stor}\ The week that followed the 12th of May was a week of
telegrams. The electric wires were continually flashing preg-
nant messages from North to South, and from South to North.
That the Sipahis at Mirath had risen, was certain from the first.
Then news came that they held some part of the road between
Mirath and Dehli. Then, little by little, it transpired that the
Mirath mutineers had made their way in a body to the Imperial
City, and that the Dehli regiments had fraternised with them.
A message from Agra, despatched on the 14th, stated, on the
authority of a letter from the King of Dehli, that the town and
fort and his own person were in possession of the insurgents;
and it was added that Fraser, the Commissioner, and many
other English gentlemen and ladies, had been murdered. Then,
at last, it became apparent that the King himself had cast in his
lot with the insurgents, that the rebel standard had been hoisted
in the palace of the Mughul, that Englishmen and English-
women had been ruthlessly massacred in the streets of the city,
and that the mutiny of a few regiments, by thus concentring at
Dehli, was beginning to simulate a national rebellion.

Never since, a century before, the foundation of our great
Indian Empire had been laid by the conquest of Bengal, had
such tidings as these been brought to the council-chamber of
the English ruler. The little cloud no bigger than a man's
hand, which had risen in the first month of the new year, and
had been growing in its densit}T and darkness until it had over-
shadowed the heavens, was now discharging its tempestuous
terrors upon us. There was little before the eyes of Lord
Canning but the one naked fact of the junction of the Mirath
and Dehli troops, and the proclamation of the restored empire
of the Mughul. With a feeling of wondering anxiety he
awaited, all through that terrible week in May, the details
which seemed as though they would never come, and the ex-
planations of all that seemed so inexplicable to him. Most of

1857.] MEASURES OP LORD CANNING. 439

all, lie marvelled what our people had been doing, or not doing,
in this conjuncture, that such a post as Dehli, scarcely equalled
in military, wholly unequalled in political importance, should
thus in an hour have been wrested from their grasp. It seemed
incredible that with a regiment of British Cavalry at Mirath,
and the largest body of Artillery in the country gathered there
at its head-quarters, such a catastrophe as this should have
occurred. Was there no one, he asked, to do with the Cara-
bineers and the Horse Artillery what Gillespie, half a century
before, had done with his Dragoons and galloper-guns ? But if
such were the result in places where our English officers had
Cavalry and Artillery to aid them, how would it fare with
them at stations where no such help was to be had ? There was
no hope now that the conflagration would not spread from can-
tonment to cantonment ; no hope now that the whole country
would not soon be in a blaze.

So Canning arose, and with his still, calm face, confronted
the dire calamity. A braver heart than his never
beat in a human breast. Happv was it for the Measiu-esof

-l ii'jru Canning.

nation that m him, to whom its honour was con-
fided in that conjuncture, there was a resolute manhood of the
finest, most enduring temper. Many thoughts pressed upon
him, but dominant over all was a strong sense of the paramount
duty of maintaining before all men a serene aspect and a con-
fident demeanour. There was great work to be done, nothing-
less than the salvation of an empire ; and with a solemn sense
of his responsibility, he girded himself up for the conflict,
knowing in how great a measure the deliverance of his country-
men depended, under God's good providence, upon their faith
in his constancy and courage. He saw clearly that there was
a tremendous danger, and he knew that the resources im-
mediately at his command were wholly insufficient to enable
him to cope with it ; but even those who were nearest to his
person never saw him quail for a moment, as he calculated
the means and appliances of defence that could at once be
brought into action, and those which might be summoned from
a distance.

It was no time for lamentation ; else he might have lamented
that India, by a series of adverse circumstances, had been so
stripped of European troops that now the whole country, with
the exception of the frontier province of the Pan jab, was
lying naked and defenceless, without means of raising any

440 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

barriers of resistance against the flood of rebellion that was
pouring over Hindustan. He had lifted up his voice against
the system, which placed it in the power of England, by givino-
to India either too much or too little of its manhood, to sacrifice
the interests of the dependency.* He had resisted, only a little
time before, an attempt to carry off some of the few English
regiments at his disposal, to take a part in certain military
operations against the Government of China, with which India
had no concern. It had cost him much to send so many regi-
ments to Persia; but that was a call to which he had been
bound to respond, and happily now the emergency was past.
All that he had said by way of warning had been more than
verified by the event ; but it was time for looking forward, not
for looking back, so he began to reckon up his available succours,
and forthwith to summon them to the capital.

In the midst of all his tribulation there were some sources of
unspeakable comfort. Whilst the clouds were thickening above
him, before the great outburst, he had learnt with joy and
gratitude that the war with Persia had been brought to' a close.
Outram had done his work rapidly and well. I cannot now
pause to speak of his successes. What he did on the shores of
the Persian Gulf must be narrated in another place. It is enough
to say that Persia, alarmed by our demonstrations on the coast,
and anticipating an advance into the interior of the country,
thought that negotiation was better than war, acceded to our
demands, and concluded, at Paris, a treaty with the British
Government. The expedition which had gone forth from
Bombay, was, therefore, returning to that Presidency ; and a
word from the Governor-General would summon it, as fast as
steam could bring it, to his aid. This was his first thought,
when the seizure of Dehli confirmed all his worst apprehensions
of the perilous waut of European troops. Then, from these
Persian succours, he turned with joy and gratitude not less
profound, to the thought that English troops were speeding to

* " The interests of India," he wrote on April 22nd, " do not always make
themselves heard in England, when other important matters are uppermost;
and I am opposed to putting into the hands of the Government at home an
increased power to diminish our main strength here for the purpose of
meeting exigencies elsewhere. Such a diminution was made in 1854 by
withholding two regiments which have not yet been given, although six
regiments have been scut out of India to Persia."— Mti. Correspondeitce of
Lord Canning.

1857.] THE CALL FOK SUCCOURS. 441

China; that the arrogance and insolence of the Chinese Govern-
ment having provoked our chastisement, an expedition had
been fitted oat under the conduct of a civil and a military chief,
and was then, perhaps, at the very point of its journey at which
it might most readily be wrested from its original purpose, and
diverted into another and more necessitous channel. Sightly
taking the measure of the two exigencies, and never doubting
for a moment what the great interests of the nation demanded
in that conjuncture, he presently determined to call these troops
to his aid. The chastisement of China could wait ; the salva-
tion of India could not ; * and so he resolved, even at the risk
of frustrating the cherished designs of the Government in
England, to call upon Elgin and Ashburnham to suspend their
operations, and to send him the present help that he so much
needed. It was a great responsibility, but he to >k it without a
moment's hesitation on himself; and he thanked God, from
the very depths of his heart, that by a providential dispensa-
tion this succour, in the veiy crisis of his necessities, had been
placed within his reach.

There were thus, in the peculiar circumstances of the moment,
some sources of consolation, some good promise of relief over
and above that which was to be sought in the normal condition
of the empire under his charge. But it would take time to
gather up the strength of these Persian and Chinese expedi-
tions, and there were some available European troops more
nearly at hand. It was another happy accident that at this
time the 84th Eegiment, which had been summoned from Pegu
in March, was still in the neighbourhood of Calcutta. The
long-delayed disbandment of the guilty companies of the 34th
had not been carried into effect before the 6th of May ; and the
regiment had been detained until after the execution of the

* I did not think, when I wrote these words, that I had done more than
express the natural feeling in Lord Canning's breast at that time ; but I
have since found that he gave utterance almost to the very words: "I have
sent an officer," he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, " to Galle by the mail
to meet Ashburnham, and I hope Elgin, with an earnest request for the first
use of the regiments bound to China, if they can be stopped at Singapore.
Yeh may wait; but Bengal, with its stretch of seven hundred and fifty miles
from Barrackpur to Agra, guarded by nothing hut the 10th Queen's, cannot
wait, if the flame should spread. And who shall say that it will not? No
precaution against such a contingency can be too great." — MIS. Correspondence
of Lord Canning.

442 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

sentence. It seemed then that vthere was no further necessity
for its presence in Bengal, but the arrangements for its return
to Pegu were still incomplete, when the disastrous tidings from
Upper India came to dissipate all thought of its departure.
From the quarter whence it had come another English regiment
might he drawn. The 35th was stationed partly at Kangun,
partly at Moulmein ; and a steamer was despatched to gather
up the detachments and to bring them with all speed to Cal-
cutta. At the same time, the telegraph carried to Madras a
requisition to hold the 43rd Foot and the Madras Fusiliers ready
for immediate embarkation ; and a trusted officer was sent on
board the mail-steamer to Ceylon, with an urgent request to the
Governor to send him all the European troops he could spare.

Whilst thus every effort was strained to bring European
troops from the southern and eastern coasts, the Governor-
General was intent also on the organisation of measures for the
concentration of the strength already at his disposal upon the
points most exposed to danger. With this object, every avail-
able river steamer was taken up for the conveyance of troops to
the Upper Provinces, and the quicker but more limited means
of locomotion afforded by wheeled carriages was resorted to for
the conveyance of small detachments into the interior. But it
was not, in the crisis of this first peril, from the South, but
from the North, that the stream of conquest was to be poured
down upon the great centre of rebellion. It was not to be
doubted that General Anson, whom the news of the rising at
Mirath and the seizure of Dehli must have reached at Simla as
soon as it reached Lord Canning at Calcutta, was doing all that
could be done to despatch troops to the seat of the revolt. The
telegraph, therefore, expressed only the confidence of Govern-
ment that the Commander-in-Chief was bringing down to the
plains the European regiments on the hills. But the main
reliance of the Governor-General in this extremity was upon
the military resources of the Panjab. Though all the rest of
the empire was denuded of European troops, there was no lack
of this material strength in the great frontier province con-
quered from the Sikhs. Moreover, it was believed that the
Sikhs themselves would be eager to follow their English com-
manders to the siege and pillage of the renowned city of the
Mughuls. So, whilst a message went to Karachi, in Sindh,
directing the Commissioner to send an English regiment to the
Panjab to replace any that it might be found necessary to des-

1857.] MEASURES OF DEFENCE. 443

patch from that province to the. Lower Provinces, another went
to Mr. Colvin, at Agra, saying, " Send word as quickly as
possible to Sir John Lawrence that he is to send down such of
the Panjab regiments and European regiments as he can safely
spare. Every exertion must be made to regain Dehli. Every
hour is of importance. General Hewitt has been ordered to press
this on the Commander-in-Chief. If you find it necessary, you
may apply, in the Governor-General's name, to the Rajah of
Patiala and the Rajah of Jhind for troops." And he added, with
that union of kindliness and sagacity which made him at all
times liberal of his encouragement to his Lieutenants, " I thank
you sincerely for what you have so admirably done, and for
your stout heart." * The praise, too, was well deserved. Colvin,
at that time, had done all that could be done to help others at a
distance, and to maintain the confidence of those around him,
and he had strenuously exerted himself to forward to the
Governor-General, by telegraph and by letter, all the tidings
that had made their way to Agra.j " I have fairly taken upon
myself," he wrote to Lord Canning on the 15th of May, " the
position of Commander-in-Chief here. The arrangements are
now on the point of completion, and our position may be re-
garded as safe. There has been a thorough co-operation and the
most excellent spirit amongst us. Sindhia and Bharatpur will be
heartily with us against the new dynasty of the House of
Taimur. I shall rouse the Eajput States to arrest the flight of
the mutineers westward, when they are driven out of Dehli.
The horrible murders, you will see, have been chiefly by
Muhammadan troopers of the 3rd Cavalry. There must be a
fit and fearful expiation for such atrocities."

But for this fit and fearful expiation Lord Canning knew too
well that the time had not yet come. The struggle now was
for bare life. For this he had done all that could be done,

* In a letter to Mr. Vernon Smith of about the same date, Lord Canning
says : " South of Dehli, Colvin at Agra is engaged in keeping the roads quiet,
collecting troops from Gwaliar (Sindhia has come forward loyally), and en-
couraging his own native garrison to fidelity. He is confident of keeping
them straight, and he deserves to succeed. His courage and judgment are
beyond praise." — MS. Correspondence of Lord Canning.

f The importance of this service, at a time when communication both by
Post and Telegraph was so greatly interrupted, can hardly be over-estimated.
The Commander-in-Chief's letters of the 14th and lGth of May did not reach
Calcutta before the 7th of June.

444 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857,

with the scanty means at his own disposal. " The two points
to which I am straining," he wrote to the Indian Minister at
home, " are the hastening of the expulsion of the rebels from
Dehli, and the collection of Europeans here to be pushed up the
country." But not a day was to be lost in summoning that
ulterior aid, by which not only was the safety of the empire
to be secured, but the honour of the nation vindicated by the
infliction of just retribution upon our enemies. The succours
from Bombay he was sure to obtain ; and there was something
exhilarating in the thought, at a time when India had need
of all her heroes, that Outram would come with them. How
different would it have been if those regiments had been still
engaged in the Persian Gulf! But he could not cal-
«ierchina culate witil tne same amount of certainty upon the
expedition, succours from the Eastern seas; he could not be
certain that Lord Elgin would respond to his appeal.
All that he could do was to throw the whole earnestness of his
nature into that appeal, and to take upon himself the full
responsibility of the diversion. So he wrote officially, as the
Governor-General of India, to Lord Elgin, and he wrote
privately to him as an old companion and friend. In the
public letter, after setting forth in emphatic language the
dangers by which our empire in India was surrounded, he con-
tinued : " I place the matter briefly before your Lordship ; but
E hope clearly enough to enable you to come to a ready decision.
I will add, that I am anxious to bear the whole responsibility
of all the consequences of turning aside the troops from China
to India. But I beg your Lordship to believe that, in saying
this, I am not influenced by any thought that whatever may
be the course for which your Lordship's wise judgment shall
decide, you will need any help from me in vindicating it to her
Majesty's Government."

More earnest and emphatic still was his private letter ; not

May 19 185? a W°rd of ** should be omitted : " My dear Elgin —
I wish I could give you a more cheerful and
acceptable greeting than you will find in the letter by
which this is accompanied. As it is, you will not bless
me for it, but the case which I have before me here is
clear and strong. Our hold of Bengal and the Upper Pro-
vinces depends upon the turn of a word — a look. An in-
discreet act or irritating phrase from a foolish commanding
officer at the head of a mutinous or disaffected company, may,

1887.] ARREST OF THE CHINA EXPEDITION. 445

whilst the present condition of things at Dehli lasts, lead to
a general rising of the Native troops in the Lower Provinces,
where we have no European strength, and where an army in
rehellion would have everything its own way for weeks and
months to come. We have seen within the last few days what
that way would he. I cannot shut my eyes to the danger, or
to the urgent necessity under which I lie, to collect every
European that can carry arms and aid to the Government of
India in the event of such a crisis. I do not want aid to put
down the Mirath and Dehli rehels ; that will he done easily, as
soon as the European troops can converge upon Dehli, hut not
sooner. Meanwhile every hour of delay— unavoidable delay —
is an encouragement to the disaffected troops in other parts ;
and if any one of the unwatched regiments on this side of
Agra should take heart and give the word, there is not a fort,
or cantonment, or station in the plains of the Ganges that
would not be in their hands in a fortnight. It would be
exactly the same in Oudh. No help that you could give me
would make us safe against this, because it cannot arrive in
time. The critical moments are now, and for the next ten or
twelve days to come. If we pass through them without a
spread of the outbreak, I believe all will go well. If we do not,
the consequences will be so frightful, that any neglect to
obtain any possible accession of strength whereby to shorten
the duration of the reign of terror which will ensue, would be
a crime. If you send me troops, they shall not be kept one
hour longer than is absolutely needed. If you come Mg
with them yourself, you shall be most heartily spondence.
welcome."

With this letter went another to General Ashburnham, who
commanded the troops of the China expedition ; and the
steamer, which carried the bearer of these important missives
to Galle, bore also letters from the Governor-General to the
Chairman of the Court of Directors and the President of the
Board of Control, calling upon them immediately to send out
reinforcements from England. " Now let me beg your attention
and support," he wrote to Mr. Mangles, " to a proposal which
goes to you by the mail for the immediate raising of three
European regiments for Bengal. No sane man will doubt that
much of increase to our European force is wanted, and that the
want should be supplied with as little delay as possible is
obvious from the present exposure of our weak points. I do

446 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

not ask for an augmentation to the established number of
Queen's troops, because for permanent purposes I much prefer
an addition to the Company's Army ; and fur the exigencies of
the moment no reinforcement, except that of the China regi-
ments, would avail. But I do beg that you will move the
Government to make up the complement of Queen's troops,
irrespectively of those which now or hereafter may come to us
from China. Do not let the supply of the missing regiments
depend upon the turn of affairs in China, but let the gap be
filled up at once." * In the same strain he wrote to Mr. Vernon
Smith, looking rather to any aid that might be sent him from
England, as a means of preventing the recurrence of like
disasters in the future, than of combating those which had
already arisen.

Whilst the first efforts of the Governor-General were thus

directed towards the pressing duty of extinguishing,
Ma™eaisrce ^y sheer animal strength, the fires that had been

kindled in Upper India, he was endeavouring also
to prevent by moral means the flames from spreading to parts
of the country not yet in a blaze. It was plain that a great
fear, born of a terrible misapprehension, was driving the soldiery
to madness. Might not something, then, be done — might not
some authoritative declaration be put forth by Government,
solemn and irresistible in its denials of the imputed treachery, to
pacify men's minds, and to cast out from them the foul suspicions
which were turning loyal soldiers into rebels and murderers?
It was true that they had been told this before by the Governor-
General, by the Commander-in-Chief, by Generals of Division,
and Eegimental Commandants ; but these appeals had been of
local character and limited influence, and it was thought that
something might yet be done by a general Proclamation ad-
dressed to the whole Army, and distributed throughout the
country. It was not doubted that whatsoever might have been
the external agencies employed to keep alive this perilous
excitement, there was at the bottom of it, in the breasts of the
Sipahis, a deeply-rooted fear for the sanctity of their religion
and the purity of their caste. If they could once be persuaded
to believe that the British Government had never meditated
any injury or offence to the religious or social prejudices of the
people, there might be a return to quietude and to reason. It

* Lord Canning to Mr. Mangles, May 19, 1857. — MS. Correspondence.

IS57.] REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 447

was wise, at least, to make one more trial. So a Proclamation
was issued, setting forth that the Governor-General knew that
endeavours had been made to persuade Hindus and Musulmans,
both soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion was openly
as well as secretly threatened by acts of the Government, who
were believed to be seeking by various ways to entrap them into
loss of caste for purposes of their own ; but that they had never
yet deceived their subjects, and they now, therefore, called upon
all men to refuse their belief to the seditious lies of designing
traitors, who were leading good men to their ruin. Translated
into their vernacular, this Proclamation was sent to the mili-
tary authorities to be distributed among the soldiery in all
parts of the country, whilst the words of it were telegraphed to
the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra, with emphatic instructions
to " disseminate it in every town, village, bazaar, and serai."
" It is for the people as well as for the troops." It was yet
hoped that it might bear the good fruit of a return to order and
tranquillity.*

At the same time, it appeared to the Governor-General to be
in the highest degree important to arm the military authorities
with new powers both for the prompt reward of good and loyal
soldiers, and the prompt punishment of mutineers. The first
might be done by a simple order of the Government. The latter
required the interposition of the Legislature. So an Act
was passed to facilitate the trial and punishment of
offences against the articles of war for the Native Army, by
which commanding officers of Divisions, Brigades, and Stations
were authorised to assemble general and other Courts-martial,
and to proceed to carry sentence into effect without reference

* It has been often said that this Proclamation ought to have been issued
at an earlier period. Colonel Birch advised the Governor-General, when the
excited state of the Native soldiery first became apparent, to issuo a pro-
clamation of this kind, and Lord Canning afterwards frankly expressed his
regret that he had not taken the advice of his military secretary. On turning
back to page 177, the reader will perceive that a similar delay in issuing a
sedative proclamation occurred in 1806, after the mutiny in the Madras
Army. It is, however, very doubtful whether such manifestoes have any
effect upon the Native mind, when once any popular belief of the intentions
of Government has taken fast hold of it. I have already observed, that those
who entertain a conviction that the Government have formed a deliberate
design to trick the people out of their religion, are not likely to find any
difficulty in believing that the issue of a lying proclamation is a part of the
plot.

448 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

to Head-Quarters. In such an emergency as had then arisen,
Centralisation could not stand its ground. So whilst increased
power was thus given to commanding officers to overawe re-
bellion, increased power to encourage loyalty and good conduct
was delegated to them and to certain high civil and political
functionaries. They were empowered to promote Native soldiers
and non-commissioned officers on the scene of their good deeds,
and to confer upon them the " Order of Merit,"* "in order that
the reward for eminent gallantry, loyalty, and good conduct
might be prompt, and might be conferred on the soldier in the
sight of his comrades." But no proclamations and general
orders — nothing that the Legislature could decree or
General Executive Government publish— no words that men
Mayri9. could utter, in that extremity, could avail to arrest the
fury of the storm that was bursting over their head.
It was too late for words, for none would hear. It was left to
the English only to strike.

Thus Canning did all that could be done, and waited for the
issue — waited, fearfully and hopefully, for tidings of new dis-
asters in one direction, and of coming succours from another.
As he thus waited and watched, and pondered new details of
the great rising, which every day added something to the
clearness and completeness of the story, there were times when
he felt in his inmost heart that there were no better resources
than a few brave hearts and a few strong heads upon whose
courage and coolness he could rely. It must be said, sorrow-
fully, and I would fain not say it, but History admits of no
such reservations, that Lord Canning felt bitterly that, with
some few honourable exceptions, the English officers at the
Presidency were not giving him the moral support which, in
such a crisis, would have been so grateful and refreshing to
him, and for which truly he had a right to look. It is im-
possible to describe his mortification. Where he had hoped to
see strength he saw only weakness. Men whom he thought to
see sustaining and encouraging others by their own resolute
bearing and their cheerfulness of speech, went about from place
to place infecting their friends with their own despondency,
and chilling the hearts which they should have warmed by

* Authority in this latter respect was confined to the Lieutenant-Governor
of Bengal and the North- Western Provinces, and to the Chief Commissioners
in Oudh and the Panjab.

1857.] DANGEROUS ALARMISTS. 449

their example. Such a spectacle as this was even more painful
than the tidings of disaster and death which came huddling in
from all parts of the country. No one knew better, and no one
more freely acknowledged that the men of whom he complained
were " brave enough with swords by their sides." They would
have faced death for their country's good with the courage of
heroes and the constancy of martyrs ; but strong as they would
have been in deeds, they were weak in words, and they went
about as prophets of evil, giving free utterance to all their
gloomiest anticipations, and thus spreading through all the
strata of English society at the capital the alarm which a more
confident demeanour in the upper places might have arrested.
And so strong was Lord Canning's sense of the evil that had
arisen, and that might arise from this want of reserve, that
he wrote specially to the authorities in England to receive with
caution the stories that were likely to be sent home in the
private letters which the mail was about to carry from Cal-
cutta.*

But the shame with which he beheld the failure of some of
his countrymen at Calcutta, made him turn with the
greater pride and the greater confidence towards ,?aurr'3 aml

o h,lpinristoii6

those who were nobly seconding his efforts from a
distance. The Governors of Madras and of Bombay, Harris
and Elphinstone, had responded to his appeals, and without any
selfish thoughts of their own wants, any heed of dangerous
contingencies at home, were sending him the succours he so
much needed ; and he was profoundly grateful for their aid.
The promptitude with which they responded to the call for
help was something almost marvellous. The electric telegraph
might fail us in some parts, but in others it did its work well.
On the 18th of May, Canning knew that the Madras Fusiliers
were already embarking, and had thanked Harris by telegraph
for his " great expedition." On the 22nd he learnt that the
first instalment of the troops from Persia had reached Bombay,
and that a steamer had already started for Calcutta with a
wing of the 64th Queen's. The fire-ship was doing its work as
well as the lightning-post.

* The author evidently refers here to the officers in high authority whom
he does not mention in the succeeding pages. It seems to me altogether too
sweeping an assertion. The " gloomy anticipations " were the result of want
of confidence in the foresight and energy of the Government. — G. B. 31.

VOL. I. 2 G

450 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1857.

But although there was to the Governor-General great con-
solation in the thought that he would lack no material
Lawrences or moral support that Harris and Elphinstone could
give him, it was, in a conjuncture so imminent, to the
individual characters of men actually confronting the dangers
which threatened the empire, that he looked with the most
eager anxiety. And there were no points to which he turned
his eyes with a keener interest than to those two great pro-
vinces, the history of the annexation of which I have written
in the early part of this hook, the great provinces of the Panjab
and of Oudh. It was from Oudh that so large a part of the
Bengal Army had been drawn ; it was in Oudh, the last of our
acquisitions, that the animosities and resentments born of the
great revolution we had accomplished were festering most
freshly ; it was in Oudh that we had to ■ contend with the
reviving energies of a dynasty scarcely yet extinct, and an
aristocracy in the first throes of its humiliation. All this Lord
Canning distinctly saw. It was in the Panjab that all external
dangers were to be encountered ; it was from the Panjab that
Dehli was to be recovered. There was consolation in the
thought that only a few months before the good offices of Dost
Muhammad had been purchased in the manner most likely to
secure his neutrality. But death might, any day, remove the
old Amir from the scene ; there would, in such a case, be
internal convulsions, out of which would probably arise an
invasion of our frontier by one contending faction or another :
and, therefore, much as troops were needed below, a still greater
danger might be incurred by weakening the force on the
frontier. In other parts of the country there might be merely
a military mutiny ; but in Oudh and the Panjab the Govern-
ment was threatened with the horrors of a popular rebellion,
and the embarrassments of a foreign war.

But if there were much trouble and anxiety in these thoughts,
they had their attendant consolations. Let what might happen
in Oudh and the Panjab, the Lawrences were there. The
Governor-General had abundant faith in them both ; faith in
their courage, their constancy, their capacity for command ; but
most of all, he trusted them because they coveted responsibility.
It is only from an innate sense of strength that this desire
proceeds ; only in obedience to the unerring voice of Nature
that strong men press forward to grasp what weak men shrink
from possessing. Knowing this, when, on the 16th of May,

1857.] THE LAWRENCES. 451

Henry Lawrence telegraphed to the Governor-General, " Give
rne plenary military power in Oudh ; I will not use it un-
necessarily," not a moment was lost in flashing back the
encouraging answer, " You have full military powers. The
Governor-General will support you in everything that you
think necessary."

With John Lawrence it was less easy to communicate. A
short time before the outbreak of the mutiny, the Chief
Commissioner of the Panjab, whose health had been sorely tried
by incessant work, had proposed to the Governor-General to
occupy a part of the approaching hot weather in a tour through
Kashmir, but Lord Canning, on political grounds, had dis-
couraged the proposal ; for Gulab Singh lay dying, and it was
believed that such a visit to the dominions of the Maharajah
would be associated in men's minds with some ulterior project
of their annexation. John Lawrence, therefore, had happily
not gone to Kashmir. When the news of the outbreak at
Mirath reached the Panjab, he was, on his way to the Marri
Hills, at Eawalpindi ; and thence, having first telegraphed to
them both, he wrote, on the 13th of May, to the Governor-
General and the Commander-in-Chief. Nine days afterwards
Lord Canning received the missive which had been addressed
to him, together with a copy of the Commissioner's earnest
appeal to Anson to be up and doing. In the former, Lawrence
urged upon the Governor-General the expediency of raising for
immediate service a large body of Sikh Irregulars. " Our
European force in India," he wrote, "is so small, that it may
gradually be worn down and destroyed. It is of the highest
importance, therefore, that we should increase our Irregular
troops. ... In the event of an emergency, I should like^ to
have power to raise as far as one thousand Horse ; I will not do
this unless absolutely necessary." Five days before this letter
had reached Calcutta, Lord Canning had telegraphed his
consent to the proposal, adding, " You will be supported in
every measure that you think necessary for safety." He was
unstinting in his expressions of confidence to those who
deserved it.

Those were days when the best men stood upon the least
ceremony, and if they had a suggestion to offer to Government,
offered it with the full assurance that they were doing their
duty, and would not be charged with presumption. So General
Hearsey, when he learnt the news that had come from Mirath

452 OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. [1S57

and Dehli, had written to the Military Secretary to urge the
Government to call for troops from Madras and Bombay and
the Persian Gulf, and to arrest the China expedition. So
Henry Lawrence had telegraphed to the Governor-General to
get every available European " from China, Ceylon, and else-
where, also all the Gurkhas from the Hills." So Patrick Grant,
the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, had telegraphed to him to
send a swift steamer at once to intercept the China expedition ;
and John Lawrence had sent a message setting forth these and
other means of meeting the crisis. For all these suggestions
Lord Canning was grateful ; but it was with much satisfaction,
perhaps with some pride, that when the detailed plans of the
Chief Commissioner of the Panjab were laid before him, he
sent back a message, through the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra,
saying, " Every precaution which your message suggests has
been taken long ago."

Then, every effort made, and every precaution taken to save
alike the Christian people and the great empire committed to
his care, there was an interval of reflection ; and with a feeling
of solemn wonder, Canning dwelt upon the causes of all this
tremendous excitement, and asked himself whether it could be
only a military mutiny that he was combating. It did not
seem as though the origin of such a commotion were to be
found only in the unaided instincts of the soldiery. It might
be that the activities then discernible were purely military
activities, but it did not follow that external influences had not
been at work to produce the state of mind that was developing
such terrible results. There were even then some dawning
apprehensions that, with the best possible intentions, grave
mistakes might have been committed in past years, and that the
tree of benignant error was now bearing bitter fruit. He
thought over all that had been done by his great predecessor ;
the countries that had been annexed to the British Empire, the
powerful interests that had suffered so grievously by our
domination, the manifold encroachments, material and moral, of
English muscle and English mind. Not at first did he perceive
all that was afterwards made clear to him, for at the time of
which I am now writing there were many breaks in the great
chain of postal and telegraphic communication, and it was not
easy to form a right conception of the actual situation of affairs
in the Upper Provinces. But he soon ceased to speak of the
mutiny, and called it a " rebellion " — a " revolt." Early in the

1857.] MUTINY OR REBELLION? 453

year, he had felt disposed to attach some importance to the idea
of political causes, but, as he wrote on more than one occasion,
" not much." Now his uncertainty upon this point began to
disappear, and he wrote to the Indian Minister at home that he
had not a doubt that the rebellion had been fomented " by
Brahmans on religious pretences, and by others for political
motives."* He saw, indeed, that for some years preceding the
outbreak the English in India, moved by the strong faith that
was in them, had striven, with a somewhat intemperate zeal, to
assimilate all things to their own modes of thought, and that
the Old Man had risen against the New, and resented his
ceaseless innovations. To this pass had the self-assertions of the
national character brought us. The Indian Empire was in
flames. But, with a proud and noble confidence, Canning felt
that this great national character which had raised the con-
flagration would, by God's blessing, ere long trample it out.
Even those whose despondency had so pained him would, he
knew, when called upon to act, belie the weakness of their
words by the bravery of their deeds. Looking into the future,
he saw the fire spreading ; he saw the heathen raging furiously
against him, and a great army, trained in our own schools of
warfare, turning against us the lessons we had taught them,
stimulated by the Priesthood, encouraged, perhaps aided, by the
nobles of the land, and with all the resources of the country at
their command ; but seeing this, he saw also something beyond,
grand in the distance ; he saw the manhood of England going
out to meet it.

* Writing also to the Chairman of the Court of Directors (Mr. Ross
Mangles), Lord Canning said : " I have learnt unmistakably that the appre-
hension of some attempt upon Caste is growing stronger, or at least is more
sedulously spread. Mr. Colvin has found the same ; and a proclamation,
which goes to you herewith, has been issued with a view of arresting the evil.
But political animosity goes for something among the causes, though it is not,
in my opinion, a chief one." — May 19, 1857. — MS. Correspondence.

454 APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

THE NANA SAHIB AND AZIM-ULLAH KHAN.

[The visit of the Nana Sahib to Lakhnao, in April, 1857, referred to at
page 424, is thus described by Mr. Martin Gubbins in his history of the
Mutinies in Oudh :]

" I must here mention a visit which was made to Lakhnao, in April,
by the Nana of Bithur, whose subsequent treachery and atrocities have
given him a pre-eminence in infamy. He came over on pretence of seeing
the sights at Lakhnao, accompanied by his younger brother and a numerous
retinue, bringing letters of introduction from a former Judge of Kanhpiir to
Captain Hayes and to myself. He visited me, and his manner was arrogant
and presuming. To make a show of dignity and importance, he brought
six or seven followers with him into the room, for whom chairs were
demanded. One of these men was his notorious agent, Azim-iillah. His
younger brother was more pleasing in appearance and demeanour. The
Nana was introduced by me to Sir Henry Lawrence, who received him
kindly, and ordered the authorities of the city to show him every attention.
I subsequently met him parading through Lakhnao with a retinue more
than usually large. He had promised before leaving Lakhnao to make
his final call on the Wednesday. On the Monday, we received a message
from him that urgent business required his attendance at Kanhpiir, arid
he left Lakhnao accordingly. At the time his conduct excited little
attention ; but it was otherwise when affairs had assumed the aspect
which they did at Kanhpiir by the 20th of May. His demeanour at
Lakhnao and sudden departure to Kanhpiir appeared exceedingly suspicious,
and I brought it to the notice of Sir Henry Lawrence. The Chief Commis-
sioner concurred in my suspicions, and by his authority I addressed Sir
Hugh Wheeler, cautioning him against the Nana, and stating Sir Henry's
belief that he was not to be depended on. The warning was unhappily
disregarded, and, on the 22nd of May, a message was received stating that
' two guns and three hundred men, cavalry and infantry, furnished by the
Maharajah of Bithur, came in this morning.' "

Many readers will smile at the statement that the Nana Sahib was in
correspondence with Eus ia, and received an answer to his overtures.
But it is by no means improbable that Azim-iillah Khan entered into
communication with some Russian officers, responsible or irresponsible, and
it is certain that at the time of the Crimean War nothing could have better
served the interests of Russia than a revolt in India. That Azim-iillah
visited the Crimea we know upon the best possible authority — that of
Mr. Russell, who has given, in his " Diary in India," an interesting account
of his meeting with the Nana's agent in the trenches before Sebastopol.

END OF VOL. I.

Printed by Ballantyne, Hanson &* Co,
at Paul's Work, Edinburgh

551

t** am
oo *-s
a

University of Toronto
Library

DO NOT

REMOVE

THE

CARD

FROM

THIS

POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket

Under Pat "Ref . Index File"

Made by LIBRARY BUREAU

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8;"

See other formats