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f^nt       7i#       ^m: 


A  HISTORY 

OF 

INDIAN  PHILOSOPHY 


May  He,  who  links  the  minds  of  all  people, 
through  the  apertures  of  time,  with  new  threads 
of  knowledge  like  a  garland  of  flowers,  be  pleased 
to  accept  this  my  thread  of  Eastern  thought,  offered, 
though  it  be  small,  with  the  greatest  devotion. 


A  HISTORY 

OF 

INDIAN   PHILOSOPHY 

BY 
SURENDRANATH  DASGUPTA,  M.A.,  Ph.D., 

PROFESSOR  OF  SANSKRIT,  GOVERNMENT  COLLEGE,  CHITTAGONG,  BENGAL, 
LECTURER  IN  BENGALI  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CAMBRIDGE 


VOLUME  I 


CAMBRIDGE 

AT  THE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1922 

100838 


CAMBRIDGE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

C.  F.  CLAY,  Manager 

LONDON   :  FETTER  LANE,  E.G.  4 


NEW  YORK  :  THE  MACMILLAN  CO. 

BOMBAY       1 

CALCUTTA  I  MACMILLAN  AND  CO.,  Ltd. 

MADRAS      j 

TORONTO    :   THE  MACMILLAN  CO.   OF 

CANADA,  Ltd. 
TOKYO:  MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA 


ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 


3131 

V.  I 

TO 

HIS  EXCELLENCY 

LAWRENCE   JOHN    LUMLEY   DUNDAS,   G.C.I.E., 

EARL  OF  RONALDSHAY,  CHANCELLOR  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALCUTTA  AND  THE  GOVERNOR  OF  BENGAL. 

May  it  please  your  Excellency, 

The  idea  of  writing  this  work  was  first  suggested  to 
me  by  the  Rectorial  address  which  your  Excellency  delivered 
some  years  ago  at  a  Convocation  of  the  University  of  Calcutta, 
in  which  you  emphasised  the  special  need  of  the  study  of  Indian 
philosophy  by  Indian  students.  I  shall  ever  remember  with 
gratitude  the  encouragement  that  I  received  from  the  kind 
interest  that  you  showed  in  my  work  by  going  through  the 
manuscript,  in  the  conversations  that  I  had  the  honour  of  holding 
with  you  on  various  occasions,  and  in  your  subsequent  letters  to 
me.  Your  Excellency's  honoured  name  has  thus  already  become 
peculiarly  connected  with  the  composition  of  this  work.  With 
your  Excellency's  kind  permission,  I  therefore  wish  to  take 
advantage  of  this  opportunity  in  associating  your  Excellency's 
name  with  this  volume  as  a  mark  of  deepest  respect  and  esteem. 
The  present  work  is  an  attempt  to  present  the  thought  of 
Ancient  India  at  its  best.  This  thought  still  holds  the  spirit  of 
India,  and  the  more  it  is  studied  the  more  do  we  see  that  the 
problems  are  often  identical  with  those  of  European  thinkers. 
That  both  East  and  West  should  realise  each  other's  tasks 
and  find  that  they  are  often  identical  is  an  auspicious  omen  for 
the  future.  The  great  work  of  uniting  India  with  Europe  can 
only  be  gradually  accomplished  through  mutual  appreciation  of 
what  is  best  in  each  country.  I  shall  be  very  happy  if  this 
humble  volume  may  even  in  a  very  small  measure  aid  this 
process  which  is  already  begun  in  various  ways  and  may  repre- 
sent to  your  Excellency  after  your  return  to  this  country  some- 
thing of  the  ancient  ideals  of  India. 

I  remain,  your  Excellency, 

Loyally  and  sincerely  yours, 

SURENDRANATH  DASGUPTA. 


NOTE  ON  THE  PRONUNCIATION  OF 

TRANSLITERATED  SANSKRIT 

AND  PALI  WORDS 

The  vowels  are  pronounced  almost  in  the  same  way 
as  in  Italian,  except  that  the  sound  of  a  approaches 
that  of  o  in  bond  or  u  in  but,  and  a  that  of  a  as  in  army. 
The  consonants  are  as  in  English,  except  c,  ch  in  church ; 
/,  d,  n  are  cerebrals,  to  which  English  /,  d,  n  almost 
correspond;  /,  d,  n  are  pure  dentals;  kh,  gh,  ch,  jh, 
tk,  dh,  th,  dh,  ph,  bh  are  the  simple  sounds  plus  an 
aspiration;  h  is  the  French  gn\  r  is  usually  pronounced 
as  ri,  and  L  s  as  s/i. 


PREFACE 

THE  old  civilisation  of  India  was  a  concrete  unity  of  many- 
sided  developments  in  art,  architecture,  literature,  religion, 
morals,  and  science  so  far  as  it  was  understood  in  those  days. 
But  the  most  important  achievement  of  Indian  thought  was 
philosophy.  It  was  regarded  as  the  goal  of  all  the  highest 
practical  and  theoretical  activities,  and  it  indicated  the  point  of 
unity  amidst  all  the  apparent  diversities  which  the  complex 
growth  of  culture  over  a  vast  area  inhabited  by  different  peoples 
produced.  It  is  not  in  the  history  of  foreign  invasions,  in  the 
rise  of  independent  kingdoms  at  different  times,  in  the  empires 
of  this  or  that  great  monarch  that  the  unity  of  India  is  to  be 
sought.  It  is  essentially  one  of  spiritual  aspirations  and  obedience 
to  the  law  of  the  spirit,  which  were  regarded  as  superior  to  every- 
thing else,  and  it  has  outlived  all  the  political  changes  through 
which  India  passed. 

The  Greeks,  the  Huns,  the  Scythians,  the  Pathans  and  the 
Moguls  who  occupied  the  land  and  controlled  the  political 
machinery  never  ruled  the  minds  of  the  people,  for  these  political 
events  were  like  hurricanes  or  the  changes  of  season,  mere 
phenomena  of  a  natural  or  physical  order  which  never  affected 
the  spiritual  integrity  of  Hindu  culture.  If  after  a  passivity  of 
some  centuries  India  is  again  going  to  become  creative  it  is 
mainly  on  account  of  this  fundamental  unity  of  her  progress  and 
civilisation  and  not  for  anything  that  she  may  borrow  from  other 
countries.  It  is  therefore  indispensably  necessary  for  all  those 
who  wish  to  appreciate  the  significance  and  potentialities  of 
Indian  culture  that  they  should  properly  understand  the  history 
of  Indian  philosophical  thought  which  is  the  nucleus  round 
which  all  that  is  best  and  highest  in  India  has  grown.  Much  harm 
has  already  been  done  by  the  circulation  of  opinions  that  the 
culture  and  philosophy  of  India  was  dreamy  and  abstract.  It  is 
therefore  very  necessary  that  Indians  as  well  as  other  peoples 
should  become  more  and  more  acquainted  with  the  true  charac- 
teristics of  the  past  history  of  Indian  thought  and  form  a  correct 
estimate  of  its  special  features. 

But  it  is  not  only  for  the  sake  of  the  right  understanding  of 


viii  Preface 

India  that  Indian  philosophy  should  be  read,  or  only  as  a  record 
of  the  past  thoughts  of  India.  For  most  of  the  problems  that 
are  still  debated  in  modern  philosophical  thought  occurred  in 
more  or  less  divergent  forms  to  the  philosophers  of  India,  Their 
discussions,  difficulties  and  solutions  when  properly  grasped  in 
connection  with  the  problems  of  our  own  times  may  throw  light 
on  the  course  of  the  process  of  the  future  reconstruction  of  modern 
thought.  The  discovery  of  the  important  features  of  Indian 
philosophical  thought,  and  a  due  appreciation  of  their  full  signi- 
ficance, may  turn  out  to  be  as  important  to  modern  philosophy 
as  the  discovery  of  Sanskrit  has  been  to  the  investigation  of 
modern  philological  researches.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  task 
of  re-interpretation  and  re-valuation  of  Indian  thought  has  not 
yet  been  undertaken  on  a  comprehensive  scale.  Sanskritists 
also  with  very  few  exceptions  have  neglected  this  important 
field  of  study,  for  most  of  these  scholars  have  been  interested 
more  in  mythology,  philology,  and  history  than  in  philosophy. 
Much  work  however  has  already  been  done  in  the  way  of  the 
publication  of  a  large  number  of  important  texts,  and  translations 
of  some  of  them  have  also  been  attempted.  But  owing  to  the 
presence  of  many  technical  terms  in  advanced  Sanskrit  philo- 
sophical literature,  the  translations  in  most  cases  are  hardly  in- 
telligible to  those  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  texts  themselves. 
A  work  containing  some  general  account  of  the  mutual  rela- 
tions of  the  chief  systems  is  necessary  for  those  who  intend  to 
pursue  the  study  of  a  particular  school.  This  is  also  necessary 
for  lay  readers  interested  in  philosophy  and  students  of  Western 
philosophy  who  have  no  inclination  or  time  to  specialise  in  any 
Indian  system,  but  who  are  at  the  same  time  interested  to  know 
what  they  can  about  Indian  philosophy.  In  my  two  books  The 
Study  of  Patanjali  and  Yoga  Philosophy  in  relation  to  other  Indian 
Systems  of  Thought  I  have  attempted  to  interpret  the  Samkhya 
and  Yoga  systems  both  from  their  inner  point  of  view  and  from 
the  point  of  view  of  their  relation  to  other  Indian  systems.  The 
present  attempt  deals  with  the  important  features  of  these  as  also 
of  all  the  other  systems  and  seeks  to  show  some  of  their  inner 
philosophical  relations  especially  in  regard  to  the  history  of  their 
development.  I  have  tried  to  be  as  faithful  to  the  original  texts 
as  I  could  and  have  always  given  the  Sanskrit  or  Pali  technical 
terms  for  the  help  of  those  who  want  to  make  this  book  a  guide 


Preface  ix 

for  further  study.  To  understand  something  of  these  terms  is 
indeed  essential  for  anyone  who  wishes  to  be  sure  that  he  is 
following  the  actual  course  of  the  thoughts. 

In  Sanskrit  treatises  the  style  of  argument  and  methods  of 
treating  the  different  topics  are  altogether  different  from  what 
we  find  in  any  modern  work  of  philosophy.   Materials  had  there- 
fore to  be  collected  from  a  large  number  of  works  on  each  system 
and  these  have  been  knit  together  and  given  a  shape  which 
is  likely  to  be  more  intelligible  to  people  unacquainted  with 
Sanskritic  ways  of  thought.    But  at  the  same  time  I  considered 
it  quite  undesirable  to  put  any  pressure  on  Indian  thoughts  in 
order  to  make  them   appear  as  European.    This  will  explain 
much  of  what  might  appear  quaint  to  a  European  reader.    But 
while  keeping  all  the  thoughts  and  expressions  of  the  Indian 
thinkers  I  have  tried  to  arrange  them  in  a  systematic  whole  in  a 
manner  which  appeared   to  me  strictly  faithful  to  their  clear 
indications  and  suggestions.    It  is  only  in  very  few  places  that  I 
have  translated  some  of  the  Indian  terms  by  terms  of  English 
philosophy,  and  this  I  did  because  it  appeared  to  me  that  those 
were  approximately  the  nearest  approach  to  the  Indian  sense  of 
the  term.   In  all  other  places  I  have  tried  to  choose  words  which 
have  not  been  made  dangerous  by  the  acquirement  of  technical 
senses.  This  however  is  difficult,  for  the  words  which  are  used  in 
philosophy  always  acquire  some  sort  of  technical  sense.   I  would 
therefore  request  my  readers  to  take  those  words  in  an  unsophisti- 
cated   sense  and  associate  them   with   such    meanings   as   are 
justified  by  the  passages  and  contexts  in  which  they  are  used. 
Some  of  what  will  appear  as  obscure  in  any  system  may  I  hope  be 
removed  if  it  is  re-read  with  care  and  attention,  for  unfamiliarity 
sometimes  stands  in  the  way  of  right  comprehension.    But  I 
may  have  also  missed  giving  the  proper  suggestive  links  in 
many  places  where  condensation  was  inevitable  and  the  systems 
themselves   have  also  sometimes  insoluble   difficulties,  for   no 
system  of  philosophy  is  without  its  dark  and  uncomfortable 
corners. 

Though  I  have  begun  my  work  from  the  Vedic  and  Brah- 
manic  stage,  my  treatment  of  this  period  has  been  very  slight. 
The  beginnings  of  the  evolution  of  philosophical  thought,  though 
they  can  be  traced  in  the  later  Vedic  hymns,  are  neither  connected 
nor  systematic. 


X  Preface 

More  is  found  in  the  Brahmanas,  but  I  do  not  think  it  worth 
while  to  elaborate  the  broken  shreds  of  thought  of  this  epoch. 
I  could  have  dealt  with  the  Upanisad  period  more  fully,  but 
many  works  on  the  subject  have  already  been  published  in 
Europe  and  those  who  wish  to  go  into  details  will  certainly  go 
to  them.  I  have  therefore  limited  myself  to  the  dominant  current 
flowing  through  the  earlier  Upanisads.  Notices  of  other  currents 
of  thought  will  be  given  in  connection  with  the  treatment  of  other 
systems  in  the  second  volume  with  which  they  are  more  intimately 
connected.  It  will  be  noticed  that  my  treatment  of  early  Bud- 
dhism is  in  some  places  of  an  inconclusive  character.  This  is 
largely  due  to  the  inconclusive  character  of  the  texts  which  were 
put  into  writing  long  after  Buddha  in  the  form  of  dialogues  and 
where  the  precision  and  directness  required  in  philosophy  were 
not  contemplated.  This  has  given  rise  to  a  number  of  theories 
about  the  interpretations  of  the  philosophical  problems  of  early 
Buddhism  among  modern  Buddhist  scholars  and  it  is  not  always 
easy  to  decide  one  way  or  the  other  without  running  the  risk  of 
being  dogmatic ;  and  the  scope  of  my  work  was  also  too  limited 
to  allow  me  to  indulge  in  very  elaborate  discussions  of  textual 
difficulties.  But  still  I  also  have  in  many  places  formed  theories 
of  my  own,  whether  they  are  right  or  wrong  it  will  be  for  scholars 
to  judge.  I  had  no  space  for  entering  into  any  polemic,  but  it 
will  be  found  that  my  interpretations  of  the  systems  are  different 
in  some  cases  from  those  offered  by  some  European  scholars  who 
have  worked  on  them  and  I  leave  it  to  those  who  are  acquainted 
with  the  literature  of  the  subject  to  decide  which  of  us  may  be 
in  the  right.  I  have  not  dealt  elaborately  with  the  new  school  of 
Logic  (Navya-Nyaya)  of  Bengal,  for  the  simple  reason  that  most 
of  the  contributions  of  this  school  consist  in  the  invention  of 
technical  expressions  and  the  emphasis  put  on  the  necessity  of 
strict  exactitude  and  absolute  preciseness  of  logical  definitions 
and  discussions  and  these  are  almost  untranslatable  in  intelligible 
English.  I  have  however  incorporated  what  important  differences 
of  philosophical  points  of  view  I  could  find  in  it.  Discussions  of 
a  purely  technical  character  could  not  be  very  fruitful  in  a  work 
like  this.  The  bibliography  given  of  the  different  Indian  systems 
in  the  last  six  chapters  is  not  exhaustive  but  consists  mostly  of 
books  which  have  been  actually  studied  or  consulted  in  the 
writing  of  those  chapters.    Exact  references  to  the  pages  of  the 


Preface  xi 

texts  have  generally  been  given  in  footnotes  in  those  cases  where 
a  difference  of  interpretation  was  anticipated  or  where  it  was  felt 
that  a  reference  to  the  text  would  make  the  matter  clearer,  or 
where  the  opinions  of  modern  writers  have  been  incorporated. 

It  gives  me  the  greatest  pleasure  to  acknowledge  my  deepest 
gratefulness  to  the  Hon'ble  Maharaja  Sir  Manindrachandra 
Nundy,  K.C.I.E.  Kashimbazar,  Bengal,  who  has  kindly  promised 
to  bear  the  entire  expense  of  the  publication  of  both  volumes 
of  the  present  work. 

The  name  of  this  noble  man  is  almost  a  household  word  in 
Bengal  for  the  magnanimous  gifts  that  he  has  made  to  educational 
and  other  causes.  Up  till  now  he  has  made  a  total  gift  of  about 
;^300,ooo,  of  which  those  devoted  to  education  come  to  about 
;^20o,ooo.  But  the  man  himself  is  far  above  the  gifts  he  has 
made.  His  sterling  character,  universal  sympathy  and  friendship, 
his  kindness  and  amiability  make  him  a  veritable  Bodhisattva — 
one  of  the  noblest  of  men  that  I  have  ever  seen.  Like  many 
other  scholars  of  Bengal,  I  am  deeply  indebted  to  him  for  the 
encouragement  that  he  has  given  me  in  the  pursuit  of  my  studies 
and  researches,  and  my  feelings  of  attachment  and  gratefulness 
for  him  are  too  deep  for  utterance. 

I  am  much  indebted  to  my  esteemed  friends  Dr  E.  J.  Thomas 
of  the  Cambridge  University  Library  and  Mr  Douglas  Ainslie 
for  their  kindly  revising  the  proofs  of  this  work,  in  the  course 
of  which  they  improved  my  English  in  many  places.  To  the 
former  I  am  also  indebted  for  his  attention  to  the  translitera- 
tion of  a  large  number  of  Sanskrit  words,  and  also  for  the 
whole-hearted  sympathy  and  great  friendliness  with  which  he 
assisted  me  with  his  advice  on  many  points  of  detail,  in  par- 
ticular the  exposition  of  the  Buddhist  doctrine  of  the  cause  of 
rebirth  owes  something  of  its  treatment  to  repeated  discussions 
with  him. 

I  also  wish  to  express  my  gratefulness  to  my  friend  Mr 
N.  K.  Siddhanta,  M.A.,  late  of  the  Scottish  Churches  College,  and 
Mademoiselle  Paule  Povie  for  the  kind  assistance  they  have 
rendered  in  preparing  the  index.  My  obligations  are  also  due  to 
the  Syndics  of  the  Cambridge  University  Press  for  the  honour 
they  have  done  me  in  publishing  this  work. 

To  the  Hon'ble  Sir  Asutosh  Mookerjee,  Kt,  C.S.L,  M.A.,  D.L., 
D.Sc,  Ph.D.,  the  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  University  of  Calcutta, 


xii  Preface 

I  owe  a  debt  which  is  far  greater  than  I  can  express  here,  especially 
for  the  generous  enthusiasm  with  which  he  had  kindly  agreed  to 
accept  this  work  for  publication  by  the  Calcutta  University,  which 
would  have  materialised  if  other  circumstances  had  not  changed 
this  arrangement. 

To  scholars  of  Indian  philosophy  who  may  do  me  the  honour 
of  reading  my  book  and  who  may  be  impressed  with  its  inevit- 
able shortcomings  and  defects,  I  can  only  pray  in  the  words  of 
Hemacandra: 

Pramdnasiddhdntaviruddham  atra 

Yatkihciduktam  tnatimdndyadosdt 

Mdtsaryyam  utsdryya  taddryyacittdh 

Prasddam  ddhdya  visodhayantii^. 

1  May  the  noble-minded  scholars  instead  of  cherishing  ill  feeling  kindly  correct 
whatever  errors  have  been  here  committed  through  the  dullness  of  my  intellect  in  the 
way  of  wrong  interpretations  and  misstatements. 

S.  D. 

Trinity  College, 
Cambridge. 

February^  1922. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY  i 

CHAPTER  II 
THE  VEDAS,  BRAHMANAS  AND  THEIR  PHILOSOPHY 

1  The  Vedas  and  their  antiquity lo 

2  The  place  of  the  Vedas  in  the  Hindu  mind lo 

3  Classification  of  the  Vedic  literature li 

4  The  Samhitas I2 

5  The  Brahmanas 13 

6  The  Aranyakas  . 14 

7  The  ^g-Veda,  its  civilization 14 

8  The  Vedic  gods 16 

9  Polytheism,  Henotheism,  and  Monotheism 17 

10  Growth  of  a  Monotheistic  tendency ;  Prajapati,  Visvakarma   .        .  19 

11  Brahma 20 

12  Sacrifice  ;  the  First  Rudiments  of  the  Law  of  Karma       .         .         .21 

13  Cosmogony — Mythological  and_  Philosophical 23 

14  Eschatology;  the  Doctrine  of  Atman 25 

15  Conclusion          . 26 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  EARLIER  UPANISADS  (700  B.C.— 600  B.C.) 

1  The  place  of  the  Upanisads  in  Vedic  literature         ....  28 

2  The  names  of  the  Upanisads ;  Non-Brahmanic  influence         .         .  30 

3  Brahmanas  and  the  Early  Upanisads 31 

4  The  meaning  of  the  word  Upanisad 38 

5  The  composition  and  growth  of  diverse  Upanisads  ....  38 

6  Revival  of  Upanisad  studies  in  modern  times 39 

7  The  Upanisads  and  their  interpretations 41 

8  The  quest  after  Brahman :  the  struggle  and  the  failures  ...  42 

9  Unknowability  of  Brahman  and  the  Negative  Method     ...  44 

10  The  Atman  doctrine 45 

1 1  Place  of  Brahman  in  the  Upanisads 48 

12  The  World 51 

13  The  World-Soul 52 

14  The  Theory  of  Causation   . 52 

15  Doctrine  of  Transmigration 53 

16  Emancipation 58 

CHAPTER  IV 

GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  SYSTEMS 
OF  INDIAN  PHILOSOPHY 

1  In  what  sense  is  a  History  of  Indian  Philosophy  possible.''      .         .  62 

2  Growth  of  the  Philosophic  Literature 65 

3  The  Indian  systems  of  Philosophy 67 

4  Some  fundamental  points  of  agreement 71 

1  The  Karma  theory      .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         -71 

2  The  Doctrine  of  Mukti 74 

3  The  Doctrine  of  Soul 75 

5  The  Pessimistic  Attitude  towards  the  World  and  the  Optimistic 
Faith  in  the  end 75 

6  Unity  in    Indian   Sadhana    (philosophical,   religious   and   ethical 
endeavours) ^^ 


xiv  Contents 

CHAPTER  V 
BUDDHIST  PHILOSOPHY 

PAGE 

1  The  State  of  Philosophy  in  India  before  Buddha     ....  78 

2  Buddha  :  his  Life 81 

3  Early  Buddhist  Literature 82 

4  The  Doctrine  of  Causal  Connection  of  early  Buddhism    ...  84 

5  The  Khandhas 93 

6  Avijja  and  Asava 99 

7  Slla  and  Samadhi 100 

8  Kamma 106 

9  Upanisads  and  Buddhism          . 109 

10  The  Schools  of  Theravada  Buddhism 112 

11  Mahayanism 125 

12  The  Tathata  Philosophy  of  Asvaghosa  (80  A.D.)        .         .         .         .129 

13  The  Madhyamika  or  the  Sunyavada  school — Nihilism     .         .         .     138 

14  Uncompromising  Idealism  or  the  School  of  Vijiianavada  Buddhism     145 

15  Sautrantika  theory  of  Perception       .         .         .         .         .         .         -151 

16  Sautrantika  theory  of  Inference         .......     155 

17  The  Doctrine  of  Momentariness       .         .         .         .         .         .         .158 

18  The    Doctrine   of    Momentariness   and    the    Doctrine   of   Causal 
Efficiency  (Arthakriyakaritva) .163 

19  Some  Ontological  Problems  on  which  the  Different  Indian  Systems 
diverged 164 

20  Brief  Survey  of  the  Evolution  of  Buddhist  Thought         .        .         .     166 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  JAINA  PHILOSOPHY 

1  The  Origin  of  Jainism 169 

2  Two  Sects  of  Jainism 170 

3  The  Canonical  and  other  Literature  of  the  Jains       ....  171 

4  Some  General  Characteristics  of  the  Jains 172 

5  Life  of  MahavTra 173 

6  The  Fundamental  Ideas  of  Jaina  Ontology 173 

7  The  Doctrine  of  Relative  Pluralism  (Anekantavada)         .         .         -175 

8  The  Doctrine  of  Nayas 176 

9  The  Doctrine  of  Syadvada 179 

10  Knowledge,  its  value  for  us 181 

1 1  Theory  of  Perception 183 

12  Non-Perceptual  knowledge 185 

13  Knowledge  as  Revelation 186 

14  Thejlvas 188 

15  Karma  Theory 190 

16  Karma,  Asrava  and  Nirjara 192 

17  Pudgala igj 

18  Dharma,  Adharma,  Akasa 197 

19  Kala  and  Samaya 198 

20  Jaina  Cosmography 199 

21  Jaina  Yoga 199 

""    Jaina  Atheism 203 


22 


23    Moksa  (emancipation) 207 


Contents 


XV 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  KAPILA  AND  THE  PATANJALA  SAMKHYA  (YOGA) 


1  A  Review • 

2  The  Germs  of  Sarnkhya  in  the  Upanisads 

3  Sarnkhya  and  Yoga  Literature ...... 

4  An  Early  School  of  Sarnkhya    ...... 

5  Sarnkhya  karika,  Sarnkhya  sutra,  Vacaspati    Misra  and  V 
Bhiksu 

6  Yoga  and  Patanjali    ........ 

7  The  Sarnkhya  and  the  Yoga  doctrine  of  Soul  or  Purusa  . 

8  Thought  and  Matter 

9  Feelings,  the  Ultimate  Substances 

10  The  Gunas         ......... 

11  Prakrti  and  its  evolution    ....... 

12  Pralaya  and  the  disturbance  of  the  Prakrti  Equilibrium  . 

13  Mahat  and  Aharnkara        ....... 

14  The  Tanmatras  and  the  Paramanus  .... 

15  Principle  of  Causation  and  Conservation  of  Energy 

16  Change  as  the  formation  of  new  collocations    . 

17  Causation  as  Satkaryavada  (the  theory  that  the  effect  potentially 
exists  before  it  is  generated  by  the  movement  of  the  cause) 

18  Sarnkhya  Atheism  and  Yoga  Theism         .... 

19  Buddhi  and  Purusa 

20  The  Cognitive  Process  and  some  characteristics  of  Citta 

21  Sorrow  and  its  Dissolution         ...... 

22  Citta 

23  Yoga  Purificatory  Practices  (Parikarma)  .... 

24  The  Yoga  Meditation         ....... 


PAGE 

208 
211 
212 
2n 


222 
226 
238 
241 
242 

243 

245 
247 
248 
251 
254 
255 


257 
258 
259 
261 
264 
268 
270 
271 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  NYAYA-VAISESIKA  PHILOSOPHY 

1  Criticism  of  Buddhism  and  Sarnkhya  from  the  Nyaya  standpoint 

2  Nyaya  and  Vaisesika  sutras      ..... 

3  Does  Vaisesika  represent  an  old  school  of  Mimamsa  ? 

4  Philosophy  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras    .... 

5  Philosophy  in  the  Nyaya  sutras         .... 

6  Philosophy  of  Nyaya  siitras  and  Vaisesika  siitras 

7  The  Vaisesika  and  Nyaya  Literature 

8  The  main  doctrine  of  the  Nyaya- Vaisesika  Philosophy 

9  The  six  Padarthas  :  Dravya,  Guna,  Karma,  Samanya,  Visesa,  Sama 
vaya   .......... 

10  The  Theory  of  Causation  ...... 

1 1  Dissolution  (Pralaya)  andCreation  (Srsti) 

12  Proof  of  the  Existence  of  Iisvara        .  '      . 

13  The  Nyaya-Vai^esika  Physics   ..... 

14  The  Origin  of  Knowledge  (Pramana) 

15  The  four  Pramanas  of  Nyaya    .     *    . 

16  Perception  (Pratyaksa) 

17  Inference    .       ^ 

18  Upamana  and  Sabda 

19  Negation  in  Nyaya- Vaisesika 

20  The  necessity  of  the  Acquirement  of  debating  devices  for 
of  Salvation        ........ 

21  The  Doctrine  of  Soul 

22  Is  vara  and  Salvation 


the  seeker 


274 
276 
280 
285 
294 
301 

305 
310 

313 
319 
323 
325 
326 

330 

332 
333 
343 
354 
355 

360 
362 
363 


XVI 


Contents 


CHAPTER  IX 
mImAmsA  philosophy 

PAGE 

1  A  Comparative  Review 3^7 

2  The  Mimamsa  Literature  .         . 369 

3  The  Paratah-pramanya  doctrine  of  Nyaya  and  the  Svatah-pramanya 
doctrine  of  Mimarnsa 372 

4  The  place  of  Sense-organs  in  Perception 375 

5  Indeterminate  and  Determinate  Perception 378 

6  Some  Ontological  Problems  connected  with  the  Doctrine  of  Per- 
ception          379 

7  The  Nature  of  Knowledge 382 

8  The  Psychology  of  Illusion 3^4 

9  Inference 1^1 

10  Upamana,  Arthapatti 39^ 

1 1  Sabda-pramana 394 

12  The  Pramana  of  Non-perception  (anupalabdhi)        ....  397 

13  Self,  Salvation,  and  God   .         .        .        ...        .         .        -399 

14  Mimarpsa  as  Philosophy  and  Mimamsa  as  Ritualism       .        .        •  4^3 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  SANKARA  SCHOOL  OF  VEDANTA 


1  Comprehension  of  the  Philosophical  Issues  more  essential  than 
Dialectic  of  Controversy    . 

2  The  philosophical  situation  :  a  Review 

3  Vedanta  Literature    . 

4  Vedanta  in  Gaudapada 

5  Vedanta  and  Sankara  (788 — 820  A.D.) 

6  The  main  idea  of  the  Vedanta  philosophy 

7  In  what  sense  is  the  world-appearance  false? 

8  The  nature  of  the  world-appearance,  phenomena 
The  Definition  of  Ajnana  (nescience)       .... 

Ajnana  established  by  Perception  and  Inference 

Locus  and  Object  of  Ajfiana,  Ahamkara  and  Antahkarana 

Anirvacyavada  and  the  Vedanta  dialectic 

The  Theory  of  Causation  ....... 

Vedanta  theory  of  Perception  and  Inference     . 

15  Atman,  Jiva,  Isvara,  Ekajlvavada  and  Drstisrstivada 

16  Vedanta  theory  of  Illusion 

17  Vedanta  Ethics  and  Vedanta  Emancipation 

18  Vedanta  and  other  Indian  systems    ..... 


the 


406 
408 
418 
420 
429 
439 
443 
445 
452 

454 
457 
461 
465 
470 
474 
485 
489 
492 


INDEX 495 


CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

The  achievements  of  the  ancient  Indians  in  the  field  of  philosophy 
are  but  very  imperfectly  known  to  the  world  at  large,  and  it  is 
unfortunate  that  the  condition  is  no  better  even  in  India.  There 
is  a  small  body  of  Hindu  scholars  and  ascetics  living  a  retired 
life  in  solitude,  who  are  well  acquainted  with  the  subject,  but  they 
do  not  know  English  and  are  not  used  to  modern  ways  of  thinking, 
and  the  idea  that  they  ought  to  write  books  in  vernaculars  in 
order  to  popularize  the  subject  does  not  appeal  to  them.  Through 
the  activity  of  various  learned  bodies  and  private  individuals  both 
in  Europe  and  in  India  large  numbers  of  philosophical  works  in 
Sanskrit  and  Pali  have  been  published,  as  well  as  translations  of 
a  few  of  them,  but  there  has  been  as  yet  little  systematic  attempt 
on  the  part  of  scholars  to  study  them  and  judge  their  value.  There 
are  hundreds  of  Sanskrit  works  on  most  of  the  systems  of  Indian 
thought  and  scarcely  a  hundredth  part  of  them  has  been  trans- 
lated. Indian  modes  of  expression,  entailing  difficult  technical 
philosophical  terms  are  so  different  from  those  of  European 
thought,  that  they  can  hardly  ever  be  accurately  translated.  It 
is  therefore  very  difficult  for  a  person  unacquainted  with  Sanskrit 
to  understand  Indian  philosophical  thought  in  its  true  bearing 
from  translations.  Pali  is  a  much  easier  language  than  Sanskrit, 
but  a  knowledge  of  Pali  is  helpful  in  understanding  only  the 
earliest  school  of  Buddhism,  when  it  was  in  its  semi-philosophical 
stage.  Sanskrit  is  generally  regarded  as  a  difficult  language.  But 
no  one  from  an  acquaintance  with  Vedic  or  ordinary  literary 
Sanskrit  can  have  any  idea  of  the  difficulty  of  the  logical  and 
abstruse  parts  of  Sanskrit  philosophical  literature.  A  man  who 
can  easily  understand  the  Vedas,  the  Upanisads,  the  Puranas,  the 
Law  Books  and  the  literary  works,  and  is  also  well  acquainted  with 
European  philosophical  thought,  may  find  it  literally  impossible 
to  understand  even  small  portions  of  a  work  of  advanced  Indian 
logic,  or  the  dialectical  Vedanta.  This  is  due  to  two  reasons,  the 
use  of  technical  terms  and  of  great  condensation  in  expression, 
and  the  hidden  allusions  to  doctrines  of  other  systems.    The 

D.  I 


2  Introductory  [ch. 

tendency  to  conceiving  philosophical  problems  in  a  clear  and  un- 
ambiguous manner  is  an  important  feature  of  Sanskrit  thought,but 
from  the  ninth  century  onwards,  the  habit  of  using  clear,  definite, 
and  precise  expressions, began  to  develop  inavery  striking  manner, 
and  as  a  result  of  that  a  large  number  of  technical  terms  began  to  be 
invented.  These  terms  are  seldom  properly  explained,  and  it  is 
presupposed  that  the  reader  who  wants  to  read  the  works  should 
have  a  knowledge  of  them.  Any  one  in  olden  times  who  took  to  the 
study  of  any  system  of  philosophy,  had  to  do  so  with  a  teacher,  who 
explained  those  terms  to  him.  The  teacher  himself  had  got  it  from 
his  teacher,  and  he  from  his.  There  was  no  tendency  to  popularize 
philosophy,  for  the  idea  then  prevalent  was  that  only  the  chosen 
few  who  had  otherwise  shown  their  fitness,  deserved  to  become 
fit  students  {adhikdri)  of  philosophy,  under  the  direction  of  a 
teacher.  Only  those  who  had  the  grit  and  high  moral  strength 
to  devote  their  whole  life  to  the  true  understanding  of  philosophy 
and  the  rebuilding  of  life  in  accordance  with  the  high  truths  of 
philosophy  were  allowed  to  study  it. 

Another  difficulty  which  a  beginner  will  meet  is  this,  that 
sometimes  the  same  technical  terms  are  used  in  extremely 
different  senses  in  different  systems.  The  student  must  know  the 
meaning  of  each  technical  term  with  reference  to  the  system  in 
which  it  occurs,  and  no  dictionary  will  enlighten  him  much  about 
the  matter^  He  will  have  to  pick  them  up  as  he  advances  and 
finds  them  used.  Allusions  to  the  doctrines  of  other  systems  and 
their  refutations  during  the  discussions  of  similar  doctrines  in  any 
particular  system  of  thought  are  often  very  puzzling  even  to  a 
well-equipped  reader;  for  he  cannot  be  expected  to  know  all  the 
doctrines  of  other  systems  without  going  through  them,  and  so 
it  often  becomes  difficult  to  follow  the  series  of  answers  and 
refutations  which  are  poured  forth  in  the  course  of  these  discus- 
sions. There  are  two  important  compendiums  in  Sanskrit  giving 
a  summary  of  some  of  the  principal  systems  of  Indian  thought, 
viz.  the  Sarvadarsanasaingraha,  and  the  Saddarsanasamuccaya  of 
Haribhadra  with  the  commentary  of  Gunaratna;  but  the  former  is 
very  sketchy  and  can  throw  very  little  light  on  the  understanding 
of  the  ontological  or  epistemological  doctrines  of  any  of  the 
systems.    It  has  been  translated  by  Cowell  and  Gough,  but  I 

^  Recently  a  very  able  Sanskrit:  dictionary  of  technical  philosophical  terms  called 
Nyayako^a  has  been  prepared  by  M.  M.  Bhimacarya  Jhalkikar,  Bombay,  Govt.  Press. 


i]  Introductory  3 

am  afraid  the  translation  may  not  be  found  very  intelligible. 
Gunaratna'scommentary  isexcellentso  far  as  Jainism  is  concerned, 
and  it  sometimes  gives  interesting  information  about  other 
systems,  and  also  supplies  us  with  some  short  bibliographical 
notices,  but  it  seldom  goes  on  to  explain  the  epistemological  or 
ontological  doctrines  or  discussions  which  are  so  necessary  for  the 
right  understanding  of  any  of  the  advanced  systems  of  Indian 
thought.  Thus  in  the  absence  of  a  book  which  could  give  us  in 
brief  the  main  epistemological,  ontological,  and  psychological 
positions  of  the  Indian  thinkers,  it  is  difficult  even  for  a  good 
Sanskrit  scholar  to  follow  the  advanced  philosophical  literature, 
even  though  he  may  be  acquainted  with  many  of  the  technical 
philosophical  terms.  I  have  spoken  enough  about  the  difficulties 
of  studying  Indian  philosophy,  but  if  once  a  person  can  get  him- 
self used  to  the  technical  terms  and  the  general  positions  of  the 
different  Indian  thinkers  and  their  modes  of  expression,  he  can 
master  the  whole  by  patient  toil.  The  technical  terms,  which  are 
a  source  of  difficulty  at  the  beginning,  are  of  inestimable  value  in 
helping  us  to  understand  the  precise  and  definite  meaning  of  the 
writers  who  used  them,  and  the  chances  of  misinterpreting  or 
misunderstanding  them  are  reduced  to  a  minimum.  It  is  I  think 
well-known  that  avoidance  of  technical  terms  has  often  rendered 
philosophical  works  unduly  verbose,  and  liable  to  misinterpre- 
tation. The  art  of  clear  writing  is  indeed  a  rare  virtue  and  every 
philosopher  cannot  expect  to  have  it.  But  when  technical  ex- 
pressions are  properly  formed,  even  a  bad  writer  can  make  himself 
understood.  In  the  early  days  of  Buddhist  philosophy  in  the 
Pali  literature,  this  difficulty  is  greatly  felt.  There  are  some 
technical  terms  here  which  are  still  very  elastic  and  their  repeti- 
tion in  different  places  in  more  or  less  different  senses  heighten 
the  difficulty  of  understanding  the  real  meaning  intended  to  be 
conveyed. 

But  is  it  necessary  that  a  history  of  Indian  philosophy  should 
be  written?  There  are  some  people  who  think  that  the  Indians 
never  rose  beyond  the  stage  of  simple  faith  and  that  therefore  they 
cannot  have  any  philosophy  at  all  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term. 
Thus  Professor  Frank  Thilly  of  the  Cornell  University  says  in 
his  Historyof  Philosophy'^"  A  universal  history  of  philosophy  would 
include  the  philosophies  of  all  peoples.    Not  all  peoples,  however 

^  New  York,  19 14,  p.  3. 

I — 2 


4  Introductory  [ch. 

have  produced  real  systems  of  thought,  and  the  speculations  of 
only  a  few  can  be  said  to  have  had  a  history.  Many  do  not  rise 
beyond  the  mythological  stage.  Even  the  theories  of  Oriental 
peoples,  the  Hindus,  Egyptians,  Chinese,  consist,  in  the  main,  of 
mythological  and  ethical  doctrines,  and  are  not  thoroughgoing 
systems  of  thought:  they  are  shot  through  with  poetry  and  faith. 
We  shall,  therefore,  limit  ourselves  to  the  study  of  the  Western 
countries,  and  begin  with  the  philosophy  of  the  ancient  Greeks, 
on  whose  culture  our  own  civilization  in  part,  rests."  There  are 
doubtless  many  other  people  who  hold  such  uninformed  and 
untrue  beliefs,  which  only  show  their  ignorance  of  Indian  matters. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  say  anything  in  order  to  refute  these  views, 
for  what  follows  will  I  hope  show  the  falsity  of  their  beliefs.  If 
they  are  not  satisfied,  and  want  to  know  more  definitely  and 
elaborately  about  the  contents  of  the  different  systems,  I  am  afraid 
they  will  have  to  go  to  the  originals  referred  to  in  the  biblio- 
graphical notices  of  the  chapters. 

There  is  another  opinion,  that  the  time  has  not  yet  come  for 
an    attempt   to    write   a   history   of    Indian    philosophy.     Two 
different  reasons  are  given  from  two  different  points  of  view.    It 
is  said  that  the  field  of  Indian  philosophy  is  so  vast,  and  such  a 
vast  literature  exists  on  each  of  the  systems,  that  it  is  not  possible 
for  anyone  to  collect  his  materials  directly  from  the  original 
sources,  before  separate  accounts   are   prepared  by  specialists 
working  in  each  of  the  particular  systems.    There  is  some  truth 
in  this  objection,  but  although  in  some  of  the  important  systems 
the  literature  that  exists  is  exceedingly  vast,  yet  many  of  them 
are  more  or  less  repetitions  of  the  same  subjects,  and  a  judicious 
selection  of  twenty  or  thirty  important  works  on   each  of  the 
systems  could  certainly  be  made,  which  would  give  a  fairly  correct 
exposition.     In   my  own   undertaking  in  this  direction    I   have 
always  drawn  directly  from  the  original  texts,  and  have  always 
tried  to  collect  my  materials  from  those  sources  in  which  they 
appear  at  their  best.   My  space  has  been  very  limited  and  I  have 
chosen    the   features   which    appeared   to   me   to   be  the    most 
important.     I   had   to  leave   out   many  discussions  of  difficult 
problems  and  diverse  important  bearings  of  each  of  the  systems 
to  many  interesting  aspects  of  philosophy.    This  I  hope  may  be 
excused  in  a  history  of  philosophy  which  does  not  aim  at  com- 
pleteness.   There  are  indeed  many  defects  and  shortcomings,  and 


i]  Introductory  5 

these  would  have  been  much  less  in  the  case  of  a  writer  abler 
than  the  present  one.  At  any  rate  it  may  be  hoped  that  the 
imperfections  of  the  present  attempt  will  be  a  stimulus  to  those 
whose  better  and  more  competent  efforts  will  supersede  it.  No 
attempt  ought  to  be  called  impossible  on  account  of  its  imper- 
fections. 

In  the  second  place  it  is  said  that  the  Indians  had  no  proper 
and  accurate  historical  records  and  biographies  and  it  is  therefore 
impossible  to  write  a  history  of  Indian  philosophy.  This  objection 
is  also  partially  valid.  But  this  defect  does  not  affect  us  so  much 
as  one  would  at  first  sight  suppose;  for,  though  the  dates  of  the 
earlier  beginnings  are  very  obscure,  yet,  in  later  times,  we  are  in 
a  position  to  affirm  some  dates  and  to  point  out  priority  and 
posteriority  in  the  case  of  other  thinkers.  As  most  of  the  systems 
developed  side  by  side  through  many  centuries  their  mutual 
relations  also  developed,  and  these  could  be  well  observed.  The 
special  nature  of  this  development  has  been  touched  on  in  the 
fourth  chapter.  Most  of  the  systems  had  very  early  beginnings 
and  a  continuous  course  of  development  through  the  succeeding 
centuries,  and  it  is  not  possible  to  take  the  state  of  the  philosophy 
of  a  particular  system  at  a  particular  time  and  contrast  it  with 
the  state  of  that  system  at  a  later  time;  for  the  later  state  did  not 
supersede  the  previous  state,  but  only  showed  a  more  coherent 
form  of  it,  which  was  generally  true  to  the  original  system  but 
was  more  determinate.  Evolution  through  history  has  in  Western 
countries  often  brought  forth  the  development  of  more  coherent 
types  of  philosophic  thought,  but  in  India,  though  the  types 
remained  the  same,  their  development  through  history  made  them 
more  and  more  coherent  and  determinate.  Most  of  the  parts 
were  probably  existent  in  the  earlier  stages,  but  they  were  in  an 
undifferentiated  state;  through  the  criticism  and  conflict  of  the 
different  schools  existing  side  by  side  the  parts  of  each  of  the 
systems  of  thought  became  more  and  more  differentiated,  deter- 
minate, and  coherent.  In  some  cases  this  development  has  been 
almost  imperceptible,  and  in  many  cases  the  earlier  forms  have 
been  lost,  or  so  inadequately  expressed  that  nothing  definite 
could  be  made  out  of  them.  Wherever  such  a  differentiation 
could  be  made  in  the  interests  of  philosophy,  I  have  tried  to  do 
it.  But  I  have  never  considered  it  desirable  that  the  philosophical 
interest  should  be  subordinated  to  the  chronolosfical.    It  is  no 


6  Introductory  [cH. 

doubt  true  that  more  definite  chronological  information  would  be 
a  very  desirable  thing,  yet  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  little 
chronological  data  we  have  give  us  a  fair  amount  of  help  in  form- 
ing a  general  notion  about  the  growth  and  development  of  the 
different  systems  by  mutual  association  and  conflict.  If  the  con- 
dition of  the  development  of  philosophy  in  India  had  been  the 
same  as  in  Europe,  definite  chronological  knowledge  would  be 
considered  much  more  indispensable.  For,  when  one  system 
supersedes  another,  it  is  indispensably  necessary  that  we  should 
know  which  preceded  and  which  succeeded.  But  when  the  systems 
are  developing  side  by  side,  and  when  we  are  getting  them  in 
their  richer  and  better  forms,  the  interest  with  regard  to  the 
conditions,  nature  and  environment  of  their  early  origin  has  rather 
a  historical  than  a  philosophical  interest.  I  have  tried  as  best 
I  could  to  form  certain  general  notions  as  regards  the  earlier 
stages  of  some  of  the  systems,  but  though  the  various  features  of 
these  systems  at  these  stages  in  detail  may  not  be  ascertainable, 
yet  this,  I  think,  could  never  be  considered  as  invalidating  the 
whole  programme.  Moreover,  even  if  we  knew  definitely  the 
correct  dates  of  the  thinkers  of  the  same  system  we  could  not 
treat  them  separately,  as  is  done  in  European  philosophy,  without 
unnecessarily  repeating  the  same  thing  twenty  times  over;  for 
they  all  dealt  with  the  same  system,  and  tried  to  bring  out  the 
same  type  of  thought  in  more  and  more  determinate  forms. 

The  earliest  literature  of  India  is  the  Vedas.  These  consist 
mostly  of  hymns  in  praise  of  nature  gods,  such  as  fire,  wind,  etc. 
Excepting  in  some  of  the  hymns  of  the  later  parts  of  the  work 
(probably  about  lOOO  B.C.),  there  is  not  much  philosophy  in  them 
in  our  sense  of  the  term.  It  is  here  that  we  first  find  intensely 
interesting  philosophical  questions  of  a  more  or  less  cosmological 
character  expressed  in  terms  of  poetry  and  imagination.  In  the 
later  Vedic  works  called  the  Brahmanas  and  the  Aranyakas  written 
mostly  in  prose,  which  followed  the  Vedic  hymns,  there  are  two 
tendencies,  viz.  one  that  sought  to  establish  the  magical  forms  of 
ritualistic  worship,  and  the  other  which  indulged  in  speculative 
thinking  through  crude  generalizations.  This  latter  tendency  was 
indeed  much  feebler  than  the  former,  and  it  might  appear  that 
the  ritualistic  tendency  had  actually  swallowed  up  what  little  of 
philosophy  the  later  parts  of  the  Vedic  hymns  were  trying  to 
express,  but  there  are  unmistakable  marks  that  this  tendency 


i]  Introductory  7 

existed  and  worked.  Next  to  this  come  certain  treatises  written 
in  prose  and  verse  called  the  Upanisads,  which  contain  various 
sorts  of  philosophical  thoughts  mostly  monistic  or  singularistic 
but  also  some  pluralistic  and  dualistic  ones.  These  are  not 
reasoned  statements,  but  utterances  of  truths  intuitively  perceived 
or  felt  as  unquestionably  real  and  indubitable,  and  carrying  great 
force,  vigour,  and  persuasiveness  with  them.  It  is  very  probable 
that  many  of  the  earliest  parts  of  this  literature  are  as  old  as 
500  B.C.  to  700  B.C.  Buddhist  philosophy  began  with  the  Buddha 
from  some  time  about  500  B.C.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that 
Buddhist  philosophy  continued  to  develop  in  India  in  one  or 
other  of  its  vigorous  forms  till  some  time  about  the  tenth  or 
eleventh  century  A.D.  The  earliest  beginnings  of  the  other  Indian 
systems  of  thought  are  also  to  be  sought  chiefly  between  the  age 
of  the  Buddha  to  about  200  B.C.  Jaina  philosophy  was  probably 
prior  to  the  Buddha.  But  except  in  its  earlier  days,  when  it  came 
in  conflict  with  the  doctrines  of  the  Buddha,  it  does  not  seem  to 
me  that  the  Jaina  thought  came  much  in  contact  with  other 
systems  of  Hindu  thought.  Excepting  in  some  forms  of  Vaisnava 
thought  in  later  times,  Jaina  thought  is  seldom  alluded  to  by 
the  Hindu  writers  or  later  Buddhists,  though  some  Jains  like 
Haribhadra  and  Gunaratna  tried  to  refute  the  Hindu  and  Buddhist 
systems.  The  non-aggressive  nature  of  their  religion  and  ideal 
may  to  a  certain  extent  explain  it,  but  there  may  be  other 
reasons  too  which  it  is  difficult  for  us  to  guess.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that,  though  there  have  been  some  dissensions  amongst 
the  Jains  about  dogmas  and  creeds,  Jaina  philosophy  has  not 
split  into  many  schools  of  thought  more  or  less  differing  from  one 
another  as  Buddhist  thought  did. 

The  first  volume  of  this  work  will  contain  Buddhist  and  Jaina 
philosophy  and  the  six  systems  of  Hindu  thought.  These  six  sys- 
tems of  orthodox  Hindu  thought  are  the  Sarnkhya,  the  Yoga,  the 
Nyaya,  the  Vaisesika,  the  Mimarnsa  (generally  known  as  Purva 
Mimarnsa),  and  the  Vedanta  (known  also  as  Uttara  Mimarnsa). 
Of  these  what  is  differently  known  as  Sarnkhya  and  Yoga  are  but 
different  schools  of  one  system.  The  Vaisesika  and  the  Nyaya  in 
later  times  became  so  mixed  up  that,  though  in  early  times  the 
similarity  of  the  former  with  Mimarnsa  was  greater  than  that  with 
Nyaya,  they  came  to  be  regarded  as  fundamentally  almost  the 
same  systems.   Nyaya  and  Vaisesika  have  therefore  been  treated 


8  Introductory  [ch. 

together.  In  addition  to  these  systems  some  theistic  systems  began 
to  grow  prominent  from  the  ninth  century  A.D.  They  also  probably 
had  their  early  beginnings  at  the  time  of  the  Upanisads.  But  at 
that  time  their  interest  was  probably  concentrated  on  problems 
of  morality  and  religion.  It  is  not  improbable  that  these  were 
associated  with  certain  metaphysical  theories  also,  but  no  works 
treating  them  in  a  systematic  way  are  now  available.  One  of 
their  most  important  early  works  is  the  Bhagavadgitd.  This  book 
is  rightly  regarded  as  one  of  the  greatest  masterpieces  of  Hindu 
thought.  It  is  written  in  verse,  and  deals  with  moral,  religious, 
and  metaphysical  problems,  in  a  loose  form.  It  is  its  lack  of 
system  and  method  which  gives  it  its  peculiar  charm  more  akin 
to  the  poetry  of  the  Upanisads  than  to  the  dialectical  and  syste- 
matic Hindu  thought.  From  the  ninth  century  onwards  attempts 
were  made  to  supplement  these  loose  theistic  ideas  which  were 
floating  about  and  forming  integral  parts  of  religious  creeds,  by 
metaphysical  theories.  Theism  is  often  dualistic  and  pluralistic, 
and  so  are  all  these  systems,  which  are  known  as  different  schools 
of  Vaisnava  philosophy.  Most  of  the  Vaisnava  thinkers  wished 
to  show  that  their  systems  were  taught  in  the  Upanisads,  and  thus 
wrote  commentaries  thereon  to  prove  their  interpretations,  and 
also  wrote  commentaries  on  the  Brahmasutra,  the  classical  ex- 
position of  the  philosophy  of  the  Upanisads,  In  addition  to  the 
works  of  these  Vaisnava  thinkers  there  sprang  up  another  class 
of  theistic  works  which  were  of  a  more  eclectic  nature.  These 
also  had  their  beginnings  in  periods  as  old  as  the  Upanisads. 
They  are  known  as  the  Saiva  and  Tantra  thought,  and  are  dealt 
with  in  the  second  volume  of  this  work. 

We  thus  see  that  the  earliest  beginnings  of  most  systems  of 
Hindu  thought  can  be  traced  to  some  time  between  600  B.C.  to 
100  or  200  B.C.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  say  anything  about 
the  relative  priority  of  the  systems  with  any  degree  of  certainty. 
Some  conjectural  attempts  have  been  made  in  this  work  with 
regard  to  some  of  the  systems,  but  how  far  they  are  correct,  it 
will  be  for  our  readers  to  judge.  Moreover  during  the  earliest 
manifestation  of  a  system  some  crude  outlines  only  are  traceable. 
As  time  went  on  the  systems  of  thought  began  to  develop  side 
by  side.  Most  of  them  were  taught  from  the  time  in  which  they 
were  first  conceived  to  about  the  seventeenth  century  A.D.  in  an 
unbroken  chain  of  teachers  and  pupils.  Even  now  each  system 
of  Hindu  thought  has  its  own  adherents,  though  few  people  now 


i]  Introductory  9 

care  to  write  any  new  works  upon  them.  In  the  history  of  the 
growth  of  any  system  of  Hindu  thought  we  find  that  as  time  went 
on,  and  as  new  problems  were  suggested,  each  system  tried  to 
answer  them  consistently  with  its  own  doctrines.  The  order  in 
which  we  have  taken  the  philosophical  systems  could  not  be 
strictly  a  chronological  one.  Thus  though  it  is  possible  that  the 
earliest  speculations  of  some  form  of  Sarnkhya,  Yoga,  and 
Mimamsa  were  prior  to  Buddhism  yet  they  have  been  treated 
after  Buddhism  and  Jainism,  because  the  elaborate  works  of  these 
systems  which  we  now  possess  are  later  than  Buddhism,  In  my 
opinion  the  Vaisesika  system  is  also  probably  pre-Buddhistic, 
but  it  has  been  treated  later,  partly  on  account  of  its  association 
with  Nyaya,  and  partly  on  account  of  the  fact  that  all  its  com- 
mentaries are  of  a  much  later  date.  It  seems  to  me  almost  certain 
that  enormous  quantities  of  old  philosophical  literature  have  been 
lost,  which  if  found  could  have  been  of  use  to  us  in  showing  the 
stages  of  the  early  growth  of  the  systems  and  their  mutual 
relations.  But  as  they  are  not  available  we  have  to  be  satisfied 
with  what  remains.  The  original  sources  from  which  I  have  drawn 
my  materials  have  all  been  indicated  in  the  brief  accounts  of  the 
literature  of  each  system  which  I  have  put  in  before  beginning 
the  study  of  any  particular  system  of  thought. 

In  my  interpretations  I  have  always  tried  to  follow  the  original 
sources  as  accurately  as  I  could.  This  has  sometimes  led  to  old 
and  unfamiliar  modes  of  expression,  but  this  course  seemed  to  me 
to  be  preferable  to  the  adoption  of  European  modes  of  thought 
for  the  expression  of  Indian  ideas.  But  even  in  spite  of  this 
striking  similarities  to  many  of  the  modern  philosophical  doctrines 
and  ideas  will  doubtless  be  noticed.  This  only  proves  that  the 
human  mind  follows  more  or  less  the  same  modes  of  rational 
thought.  I  have  never  tried  to  compare  any  phase  of  Indian 
thought  with  European,  for  this  is  beyond  the  scope  of  my  present 
attempt,  but  if  I  may  be  allowed  to  express  my  own  conviction, 
I  might  say  that  many  of  the  philosophical  doctrines  of  European 
philosophy  are  essentially  the  same  as  those  found  in  Indian 
philosophy.  The  main  difference  is  often  the  difference  of  the 
point  of  view  from  which  the  same  problems  appeared  in  such  a 
variety  of  forms  in  the  two  countries.  My  own  view  with  regard 
to  the  net  value  of  Indian  philosophical  development  will  be  ex- 
pressed in  the  concluding  chapter  of  the  second  volume  of  the 
present  work. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  VEDAS,  BRAHMANAS  AND  THEIR  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Vedas  and  their  antiquity. 

The  sacred  books  of  India,  the  Vedas,  are  generally  believed 
to  be  the  earliest  literary  record  of  the  Indo-European  race.  It 
is  indeed  difficult  to  say  when  the  earliest  portions  of  these  com- 
positions came  into  existence.  Many  shrewd  guesses  have  been 
offered,  but  none  of  them  can  be  proved  to  be  incontestably  true. 
Max  Miiller  supposed  the  date  to  be  1200  B.C.,  Haug  2400  B.C. 
and  Bal  Garigadhar  Tilak  4000  B.C.  The  ancient  Hindus  seldom 
kept  any  historical  record  of  their  literary,  religious  or  political 
achievements.  The  Vedas  were  handed  down  from  mouth  to 
mouth  from  a  period  of  unknown  antiquity ;  and  the  Hindus 
generally  believed  that  they  were  never  composed  by  men.  It  was 
therefore  generally  supposed  that  either  they  were  taught  by  God 
to  the  sages,  or  that  they  were  of  themselves  revealed  to  the  sages 
who  were  the  "seers"  {mantradrastd)  of  the  hymns.  Thus  we  find 
that  when  some  time  had  elapsed  after  the  composition  of  the 
Vedas,  people  had  come  to  look  upon  them  not  only  as  very  old, 
but  so  old  that  they  had,  theoretically  at  least,  no  beginning  in 
time,  though  they  were  believed  to  have  been  revealed  at  some 
unknown  remote  period  at  the  beginning  of  each  creation. 

The  place  of  the  Vedas  in  the  Hindu  mind. 

When  the  Vedas  were  composed,  there  was  probably  no 
system  of  writing  prevalent  in  India.  But  such  was  the  scrupulous 
zeal  of  the  Brahmins,  who  got  the  whole  Vedic  literature  by 
heart  by  hearing  it  from  their  preceptors,  that  it  has  been  trans- 
mitted most  faithfully  to  us  through  the  course  of  the  last  3000 
years  or  more  with  little  or  no  interpolations  at  all.  The  religious 
history  of  India  had  suffered  considerable  changes  in  the  latter 
periods,  since  the  time  of  the  Vedic  civilization,  but  such  was 
the  reverence  paid  to  the  Vedas  that  they  had  ever  remained  as 
the  highest  religious  authority  for  all  sections  of  the  Hindus  at 
all  times.  Even  at  this  day  all  the  obligatory  duties  of  the  Hindus 
at  birth,  marriage,  death,  etc.,  are  performed  according  to  the  old 


CH.  ii]         Classification  of  the  Vedic  literature  1 1 

Vedic  ritual.  The  prayers  that  a  Brahmin  now  says  three  times 
a  day  are  the  same  selections  of  Vedic  verses  as  were  used  as 
prayer  verses  two  or  three  thousand  years  ago.  A  little  insight 
into  the  life  of  an  ordinary  Hindu  of  the  present  day  will  show 
that  the  system  of  image-worship  is  one  that  has  been  grafted 
upon  his  life,  the  regular  obligatory  duties  of  which  are  ordered 
according  to  the  old  Vedic  rites.  Thus  an  orthodox  Brahmin 
can  dispense  with  image-worship  if  he  likes,  but  not  so  with  his 
daily  Vedic  prayers  or  other  obligatory  ceremonies.  Even  at 
this  day  there  are  persons  who  bestow  immense  sums  of  money 
for  the  performance  and  teaching  of  Vedic  sacrifices  and  rituals. 
Most  of  the  Sanskrit  literatures  that  flourished  after  the  Vedas 
base  upon  them  their  own  validity,  and  appeal  to  them  as 
authority.  Systems  of  Hindu  philosophy  not  only  own  their  alle- 
giance to  the  Vedas,  but  the  adherents  of  each  one  of  them  would 
often  quarrel  with  others  and  maintain  its  superiority  by  trying 
to  prove  that  it  and  it  alone  was  the  faithful  follower  of  the 
Vedas  and  represented  correctly  their  views.  The  laws  which 
regulate  the  social,  legal,  domestic  and  religious  customs  and 
rites  of  the  Hindus  even  to  the  present  day  are  said  to  be  but 
mere  systematized  memories  of  old  Vedic  teachings,  and  are 
held  to  be  obligatory  on  their  authority.  Even  under  British 
administration,  in  the  inheritance  of  property,  adoption,  and  in 
such  other  legal  transactions,  Hindu  Law  is  followed,  and  this 
claims  to  draw  its  authority  from  the  Vedas.  To  enter  into 
details  is  unnecessary.  But  suffice  it  to  say  that  the  Vedas,  far 
from  being  regarded  as  a  dead  literature  of  the  past,  are  still 
looked  upon  as  the  origin  and  source  of  almost  all  literatures 
except  purely  secular  poetry  and  drama.  Thus  in  short  we  may 
say  that  in  spite  of  the  many  changes  that  time  has  wrought, 
the  orthodox  Hindu  life  may  still  be  regarded  in  the  main  as  an 
adumbration  of  the  Vedic  life,  which  had  never  ceased  to  shed 
its  light  all  through  the  past. 

Classification  of  the  Vedic  literature. 

A  beginner  who  is  introduced  for  the  first  time  to  the  study 
of  later  Sanskrit  literature  is  likely  to  appear  somewhat  confused 
when  he  meets  with  authoritative  texts  of  diverse  purport  and 
subjects  having  the  same  generic  name  "  Veda  "  or  "  Sruti  "  (from 
sru  to  hear) ;  for  Veda  in  its  wider  sense  is  not  the  name  of  any 


1 2        The  Vedas,  Brahmanas  and  their  Philosophy     [ch. 

particular  book,  but  of  the  literature  of  a  particular  epoch  ex- 
tending over  a  long  period,  say  two  thousand  years  or  so.  As 
this  literature  represents  the  total  achievements  of  the  Indian 
people  in  different  directions  for  such  a  long  period,  it  must  of 
necessity  be  of  a  diversified  character.  If  we  roughly  classify 
this  huge  literature  from  the  points  of  view  of  age,  language,  and 
subject  matter,  we  can  point  out  four  different  types,  namely  the 
Sarnhita  or  collection  of  verses  {sani  together,  hita  put),  Brah- 
manas, Aranyakas  ("  forest  treatises  ")  and  the  Upanisads.  All 
these  literatures,  both  prose  and  verse,  were  looked  upon  as  so 
holy  that  in  early  times  it  was  thought  almost  a  sacrilege  to  write 
them;  they  were  therefore  learnt  by  heart  by  the  Brahmins  from 
the  mouth  of  their  preceptors  and  were  hence  called  sruti  (liter- 
ally anything  heard)^ 

The  Samhitas. 

There  are  four  collections  or  Samhitas,  namely  Rg-Veda, 
Sama-Veda,  Yajur-Veda  and  Atharva-Veda.  Of  these  the  Rg- 
Veda  is  probably  the  earliest.  The  Sama-Veda  has  practically 
no  independent  value,  for  it  consists  of  stanzas  taken  (excepting 
only  75)  entirely  from  the  Rg-Veda,  which  were  meant  to  be 
sung  to  certain  fixed  melodies,  and  may  thus  be  called  the  book 
of  chants.  The  Yajur-Veda  however  contains  in  addition  to  the 
verses  taken  from  the  Rg-Veda  many  original  prose  formulas. 
The  arrangement  of  the  verses  of  the  Sama-Veda  is  solely  with 
reference  to  their  place  and  use  in  the  Soma  sacrifice;  the  con- 
tents of  the  Yajur-Veda  are  arranged  in  the  order  in  which  the 
verses  were  actually  employed  in  the  various  religious  sacrifices. 
It  is  therefore  called  the  Veda  of  Yajus — sacrificial  prayers.  These 
may  be  contrasted  with  the  arrangement  in  the  Rg-Veda  in  this, 
that  there  the  verses  are  generally  arranged  in  accordance  with 
the  gods  who  are  adored  in  them.  Thus,  for  example,  first  we  get 
all  the  poems  addressed  to  Agni  or  the  Fire-god,  then  all  those 
to  the  god  Indra  and  so  on.  The  fourth  collection,  the  Atharva- 
Veda,  probably  attained  its  present  form  considerably  later  than 
the  Rg-Veda.  In  spirit,  however,  as  Professor  Macdonell  says, 
"  it  is  not  only  entirely  different  from  the  Rigveda  but  represents  a 
much  more  primitive  stage  of  thought.  While  the  Rigveda  deals 
almost  exclusively  with  the  higher  gods  as  conceived  by  a  com- 

^  Panini,  III.  iii.  94. 


ii]  The  Brahmanas  13 

paratively  advanced  and  refined  sacerdotal  c\'a.s,^,\}[\^Atharva-Veda 
is,  in  the  main  a  book  of  spells  and  incantations  appealing  to  the 
demon  world,  and  teems  with  notions  about  witchcraft  current 
among  the  lower  grades  of  the  population,  and  derived  from  an 
immemorial  antiquity.  These  two,  thus  complementary  to  each 
other  in  contents  are  obviously  the  most  important  of  the  four 
Vedas\" 

The  Brahmanas^ 

After  the  Samhitas  there  grew  up  the  theological  treatises 
called  the  Brahmanas,  which  were  of  a  distinctly  different  literary 
type.  They  are  written  in  prose,  and  explain  the  sacred  signi- 
ficance of  the  different  rituals  to  those  who  are  not  already 
familiar  with  them.  "  They  reflect,"  says  Professor  Macdonell, 
"the  spirit  of  an  age  in  which  all  intellectual  activity  is  concen- 
trated on  the  sacrifice,  describing  its  ceremonies,  discussing  its 
value,  speculating  on  its  origin  and  significance."  These  works 
are  full  of  dogmatic  assertions,  fanciful  symbolism  and  specu- 
lations of  an  unbounded  imagination  in  the  field  of  sacrificial 
details.  The  sacrificial  ceremonials  were  probably  never  so 
elaborate  at  the  time  when  the  early  hymns  were  composed. 
But  when  the  collections  of  hymns  were  being  handed  down  from 
generation  to  generation  the  ceremonials  became  more  and  more 
complicated.  Thus  there  came  about  the  necessity  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  different  sacrificial  functions  among  several  distinct 
classes  of  priests.  We  may  assume  that  this  was  a  period  when 
the  caste  system  was  becoming  established,  and  when  the  only 
thing  which  could  engage  wise  and  religious  minds  was  sacrifice 
and  its  elaborate  rituals.  Free  speculative  thinking  was  thus 
subordinated  to  the  service  of  the  sacrifice,  and  the  result  was 
the  production  of  the  most  fanciful  sacramental  and  symbolic 

^  A.  A.  Macdonell's  History  of  Sanskrit  Literature,  p-  31- 

^  Weber  {Hist.  Ind.  Lit.,  p.  11,  note)  says  that  the  word  Brahmana signifies  "that 
which  relates  to  prayer  brahman.''''  Max  Mliller  {S.B.  E.  I.  p.  Ixvi)  says  that  Brah- 
mana meant  "originally  the  sayings  of  Brahmans,  whether  in  the  general  sense  of 
priests,  or  in  the  more  special  sense  of  Brahman-priests."  Eggeling  (5.  ^5  E.y.\\.  Introd. 
p.  xxii)  says  that  the  Brahmanas  were  so  called  "probably  either  because  they  were 
intended  for  the  instruction  and  guidance  of  priests  (brahman)  generally ;  or  because 
they  were,  for  the  most  part,  the  authoritative  utterances  of  such  as  were  thoroughly 
versed  in  Vedic  and  sacrificial  lore  and  competent  to  act  as  Brahmans  or  superintend- 
ing priests. "  But  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Brahmanas  were  also  supposed  to  be  as 
much  revealed  as  the  Vedas,  the  present  writer  thinks  that  Weber's  view  is  the  correct 
one. 


14       The  Vedas,  Brahmanas  and  their  Philosophy     [ch. 

system,  unparalleled  anywhere  but  among  the  Gnostics.  It  is 
now  generally  believed  that  the  close  of  the  Brahmana  period 
was  not  later  than  500  B.C. 

The  Aranyakas. 

As  a  further  development  of  the  Brahmanas  however  we  get 
the  Aranyakas  or  forest  treatises.  These  works  were  probably 
composed  for  old  men  who  had  retired  into  the  forest  and  were 
thus  unable  to  perform  elaborate  sacrifices  requiring  a  multitude 
of  accessories  and  articles  which  could  not  be  procured  in  forests. 
In  these,  meditations  on  certain  symbols  were  supposed  to  be  of 
great  merit,  and  they  gradually  began  to  supplant  the  sacrifices 
as  being  of  a  superior  order.  It  is  here  that  we  find  that  amongst 
a  certain  section  of  intelligent  people  the  ritualistic  ideas  began 
to  give  way,  and  philosophic  speculations  about  the  nature  of 
truth  became  gradually  substituted  in  their  place.  To  take  an 
illustration  from  the  beginning  of  the  Brhadaranyaka  we  find 
that  instead  of  the  actual  performance  of  the  horse  sacrifice 
{asvamedhd)  there  are  directions  for  meditating  upon  the  dawn 
( Usas)  as  the  head  of  the  horse,  the  sun  as  the  eye  of  the  horse, 
the  air  as  its  life,  and  so  on.  This  is  indeed  a  distinct  advance- 
ment of  the  claims  of  speculation  or  meditation  over  the  actual 
performance  of  the  complicated  ceremonials  of  sacrifice.  The 
growth  of  the  subjective  speculation,  as  being  capable  of  bringing 
the  highest  good,  gradually  resulted  in  the  supersession  of  Vedic 
ritualism  and  the  establishment  of  the  claims  of  philosophic 
meditation  and  self-knowledge  as  the  highest  goal  of  life.  Thus 
we  find  that  the  Aranyaka  age  was  a  period  during  which  free 
thinking  tried  gradually  to  shake  off  the  shackles  of  ritualism 
which  had  fettered  it  for  a  long  time.  It  was  thus  that  the 
Aranyakas  could  pave  the  way  for  the  Upanisads,  revive  the 
germs  of  philosophic  speculation  in  the  Vedas,  and  develop  them 
in  a  manner  which  made  the  Upanisads  the  source  of  all  philo- 
sophy that  arose  in  the  world  of  Hindu  thought. 

The  Rg-Veda,  its  civilization. 

The  hymns  of  the  Rg-Veda  are  neither  the  productions  of  a 
single  hand  nor  do  they  probably  belong  to  any  single  age.  They 
were  composed  probably  at  different  periods  by  different  sages, 
and  it  is   not   improbable  that  some  of  them  were  composed 


ii]  The  J^g-  Veda,  its  civilization  1 5 

before  the  Aryan  people  entered  the  plains  of  India.  They  were 
handed  down  from  mouth  to  mouth  and  gradually  swelled  through 
the  new  additions  that  were  made  by  the  poets  of  succeeding 
generations.  It  was  when  the  collection  had  increased  to  a  very 
considerable  extent  that  it  was  probably  arranged  in  the  present 
form,  or  in  some  other  previous  forms  to  which  the  present 
arrangement  owes  its  origin.  They  therefore  reflect  the  civilization 
of  the  Aryan  people  at  different  periods  of  antiquity  before  and 
after  they  had  come  to  India.  This  unique  monument  of  a  long 
vanished  age  is  of  great  aesthetic  value,  and  contains  much  that  is 
genuine  poetry.  It  enables  us  to  get  an  estimate  of  the  primitive 
society  which  produced  it — the  oldest  book  of  the  Aryan  race. 
The  principal  means  of  sustenance  were  cattle-keeping  and  the 
cultivation  of  the  soil  with  plough  and  harrow,  mattock  and  hoe, 
and  watering  the  ground  when  necessary  with  artificial  canals. 
"The  chief  food  consists,"  as  Kaegi  says,  "together  with  bread, 
of  various  preparations  of  milk,  cakes  of  flour  and  butter,  many 
sorts  of  vegetables  and  fruits;  meat  cooked  on  the  spits  or  in  pots, 
is  little  used,  and  was  probably  eaten  only  at  the  great  feasts  and 
family  gatherings.  Drinking  plays  throughout  a  much  more  im- 
portant part  than  eating  ^"  The  wood-worker  built  war-chariots 
and  wagons,  as  also  more  delicate  carved  works  and  artistic  cups. 
Metal-workers,  smiths  and  potters  continued  their  trade.  The 
women  understood  the  plaiting  of  mats,  weaving  and  sewing ; 
they  manufactured  the  wool  of  the  sheep  into  clothing  for  men 
and  covering  for  animals.  The  group  of  individuals  forming  a 
tribe  was  the  highest  political  unit;  each  of  the  different  families 
forming  a  tribe  was  under  the  sway  of  the  father  or  the  head  of 
the  family.  Kingship  was  probably  hereditary  and  in  some  cases 
electoral.  Kingship  was  nowhere  absolute,  but  limited  by  the 
will  of  the  people.  Most  developed  ideas  of  justice,  right  and 
law,  were  present  in  the  country.  Thus  Kaegi  says,  "the  hymns 
strongly  prove  how  deeply  the  prominent  minds  in  the  people 
were  persuaded  that  the  eternal  ordinances  of  the  rulers  of  the 
world  were  as  inviolable  in  mental  and  moral  matters  as  in  the 
realm  of  nature,  and  that  every  wrong  act,  even  the  unconscious, 
was  punished  and  the  sin  expiatedl"  Thus  it  is  only  right  and 
proper  to  think  that  the  Aryans  had  attained  a  pretty  high  degree 

^   The  Rigveda,  by  Kaegi,  1886  edition,  p.  13.  ^  Ibid.  p.  18. 


1 6        The  VedaSy  Brahmanas  and  their  Philosophy     [ch. 

of  civilization,  but  nowhere  was  the  sincere  spirit  of  the  Aryans 
more  manifested  than  in  religion,  which  was  the  most  essential  and 
dominant  feature  of  almost  all  the  hymns,  except  a  few  secular 
ones.  Thus  Kaegi  says,  "  The  whole  significance  of  the  Rigveda 
in  reference  to  the  general  history  of  religion,  as  has  repeatedly 
been  pointed  out  in  modern  times,  rests  upon  this,  that  it  presents 
to  us  the  development  of  religious  conceptions  from  the  earliest 
beginnings  to  the  deepest  apprehension  of  the  godhead  and  its 
relation  to  man\" 

The  Vedic  Gods. 

The  hymns  of  the  Rg-Veda  were  almost  all  composed  in 
praise  of  the  gods.  The  social  and  other  materials  are  of  secondary 
importance,  as  these  references  had  only  to  be  mentioned  inci- 
dentally in  giving  vent  to  their  feelings  of  devotion  to  the  god. 
The  gods  here  are  however  personalities  presiding  over  the  diverse 
powers  of  nature  or  forming  their  very  essence.  They  have 
therefore  no  definite,  systematic  and  separate  characters  like  the 
Greek  gods  or  the  gods  of  the  later  Indian  mythical  works,  the 
Puranas.  The  powers  of  nature  such  as  the  storm,  the  rain,  the 
thunder,  are  closely  associated  with  one  another,  and  the  gods 
associated  with  them  are  also  similar  in  character.  The  same 
epithets  are  attributed  to  different  gods  and  it  is  only  in  a  few 
specific  qualities  that  they  differ  from  one  another.  In  the  later 
mythological  compositions  of  the  Puranas  the  gods  lost  their 
character  as  hypostatic  powers  of  nature,  and  thus  became  actual 
personalities  and  characters  having  their  tales  of  joy  and  sorrow 
like  the  mortal  here  below.  The  Vedic  gods  may  be  contrasted 
with  them  in  this,  that  they  are  of  an  impersonal  nature,  as  the 
characters  they  display  are  mostly  but  expressions  of  the  powers 
of  nature.  To  take  an  example,  the  fire  or  Agni  is  described,  as 
Kaegi  has  it,  as  one  that  "  lies  concealed  in  the  softer  wood,  as 
in  a  chamber,  until,  called  forth  by  the  rubbing  in  the  early 
morning  hour,  he  suddenly  springs  forth  in  gleaming  brightness. 
The  sacrificer  takes  and  lays  him  on  the  wood.  When  the  priests 
pour  melted  butter  upon  him,  he  leaps  up  crackling  and  neighing 
like  a  horse — he  whom  men  love  to  see  increasing  like  their  own 
prosperity.    They  wonder  at  him,  when,  decking  himself  with 

'    The  Rigveda,  by  Kaegi,  p.  26. 


ii]  Polytheism,  Henotheism  and  Monotheism  1 7 

changing  colors  like  a  suitor,  equally  beautiful  on  all  sides,  he 

presents  to  all  sides  his  front. 

All-searching  is  his  beam,  the  gleaming  of  his  light, 
His,  the  all-beautiful,  of  beauteous  face  and  glance, 
The  changing  shimmer  like  that  floats  upon  the  stream, 
So  Agni's  rays  gleam  over  bright  and  never  cease  ^." 

R.  V.  T.  143.  3. 

They  would  describe  the  wind  (Vata)  and  adore  him  and  say 

"  In  what  place  was  he  born,  and  from  whence  comes  he  ? 
The  vital  breath  of  gods,  the  world's  great  offspring, 
The  God  where'er  he  will  moves  at  his  pleasure : 
His  rushing  sound  we  hear — what  his  appearance,  no  one^." 

R.  V.  X.  168.  3,  4. 

It  was  the  forces  of  nature  and  her  manifestations,  on  earth 
here,  the  atmosphere  around  and  above  us,  or  in  the  Heaven 
beyond  the  vault  of  the  sky  that  excited  the  devotion  and 
imagination  of  the  Vedic  poets.  Thus  with  the  exception  of  a 
few  abstract  gods  of  whom  we  shall  presently  speak  and  some 
dual  divinities,  the  gods  may  be  roughly  classified  as  the  terres- 
trial, atmospheric,  and  celestial. 

Polytheism,  Henotheism  and  Monotheism. 

The  plurality  of  the  Vedic  gods  may  lead  a  superficial  enquirer 
to  think  the  faith  of  the  Vedic  people  polytheistic.  But  an  in- 
telligent reader  will  find  here  neither  polytheism  nor  monotheism 
but  a  simple  primitive  stage  of  belief  to  which  both  of  these  may 
be  said  to  owe  their  origin.  The  gods  here  do  not  preserve  their 
proper  places  as  in  a  polytheistic  faith,  but  each  one  of  them 
shrinks  into  insignificance  or  shines  as  supreme  according  as  it  is 
the  object  of  adoration  or  not.  The  Vedic  poets  were  the  children 
of  nature.  Every  natural  phenomenon  excited  their  wonder, 
admiration  or  veneration.  The  poet  is  struck  with  wonder  that 
"  the  rough  red  cow  gives  soft  white  milk."  The  appearance  or 
the  setting  of  the  sun  sends  a  thrill  into  the  minds  of  the  Vedic 
sage  and  with  wonder-gazing  eyes  he  exclaims: 

"  Undropped  beneath,  not  fastened  firm,  how  comes  it 
That  downward  turned  he  falls  not  downward  ? 
The  guide  of  his  ascending  path, — who  saw  it*?"    R.  V.  iv.  13.  5. 

The  sages  wonder  how  "  the  sparkling  waters  of  all  rivers  flow 
into  one  ocean  without  ever  filling  it."    The  minds  of  the  Vedic 

'   The  Rigveda,  by  Kaegi,  p.  35.  ^  Ibid.  p.  38. 

D.  2 


1 8        The  Vedas,  Brahmanas  and  their  Philosophy     [ch. 

people  as  we  find  in  the  hymns  were  highly  impressionable  and 
fresh.  At  this  stage  the  time  was  not  ripe  enough  for  them  to 
accord  a  consistent  and  well-defined  existence  to  the  multitude 
of  gods  nor  to  universalize  them  in  a  monotheistic  creed.  They 
hypostatized  unconsciously  any  force  of  nature  that  overawed 
them  or  filled  them  with  gratefulness  and  joy  by  its  beneficent  or 
aesthetic  character,  and  adored  it.  The  deity  which  moved  the  de- 
votion or  admiration  of  their  mind  was  the  most  supreme  for  the 
time.  This  peculiar  trait  of  the  Vedic  hymns  Max  Miiller  has  called 
Henotheism  or  Kathenotheism :  "  a  belief  in  single  gods,  each  in  turn 
standing  out  as  the  highest.  And  since  the  gods  are  thought  of 
as  specially  ruling  in  their  own  spheres,  the  singers,  in  their  special 
concerns  and  desires,  call  most  of  all  on  that  god  to  whom  they 
ascribe  the  most  power  in  the  matter, — to  whose  department  if  I 
may  say  so,  their  wish  belongs.  This  god  alone  is  present  to  the  mind 
of  the  suppliant ;  with  him  for  the  time  being  is  associated  every- 
thing that  can  be  said  of  a  divine  being; — he  is  the  highest,  the  only 
god,  before  whom  all  others  disappear,  there  being  in  this,  however, 
no  offence  or  depreciation  of  any  other  god  \"  "  Against  this  theory 
it  has  been  urged,"  as  Macdonell  rightly  says  in  his  Vedic  Myth- 
ology"^,  "that  Vedic  deities  are  not  represented  *  as  independent  of 
all  the  rest,'  since  no  religion  brings  its  gods  into  more  frequent 
and  varied  juxtaposition  and  combination,  and  that  even  the 
mightiest  gods  of  the  Veda  are  made  dependent  on  others.  Thus 
Varuna  and  Surya  are  subordinate  to  Indra  (i.  loi),  Varuna  and 
the  A^vins  submit  to  the  power  of  Visnu  (i.  156).... Even  when  a 
god  is  spoken  of  as  unique  or  chief  {ekd),  as  is  natural  enough  in 
laudations,  such  statements  lose  their  temporarily  monotheistic 
force,  through  the  modifications  or  corrections  supplied  by  the  con- 
text or  even  by  the  same  versed"  "  Henotheism  is  therefore  an 
appearance,"  says  Macdonell,  "rather  than  a  reality,  an  appearance 
produced  by  the  indefiniteness  due  to  undeveloped  anthropo- 
morphism, by  the  lack  of  any  Vedic  god  occupying  the  position 
of  a  Zeus  as  the  constant  head  of  the  pantheon,  by  the  natural 
tendency  of  the  priest  or  singer  in  extolling  a  particular  god  to 
exaggerate  his  greatness  and  to  ignore  other  gods,  and  by  the 

^   The  Rigveda,  by  Kaegi,  p.  27. 

'  See  Ibid.  p.  33.    See  also  Arrowsmith's  note  on  it  for  other  references  to  Heno- 
theism. 

'  Macdonell's  Vedic  Mythology,  pp.  16,  17. 


ii]  Growth  of  a  Monotheistic  tendency  19 

growing  belief  in  the  unity  of  the  gods  (cf  the  refrain  of  3,  35) 
each  of  whom  might  be  regarded  as  a  type  of  the  divineV  But 
whether  we  call  it  Henotheism  or  the  mere  temporary  exaggera- 
tion of  the  powers  of  the  deity  in  question,  it  is  evident  that  this 
stage  can  neither  be  properly  called  polytheistic  nor  monotheistic, 
but  one  which  had  a  tendency  towards  them  both,  although  it 
was  not  sufficiently  developed  to  be  identified  with  either  of  them. 
The  tendency  towards  extreme  exaggeration  could  be  called  a 
monotheistic  bias  in  germ,  whereas  the  correlation  of  different 
deities  as  independent  of  one  another  and  yet  existing  side  by  side 
was  a  tendency  towards  polytheism. 

Growth  of  a  Monotheistic  tendency;  Prajapati,  Visvakarma. 
This  tendency  towards  extolling  a  god  as  the  greatest  and 
highest  gradually  brought  forth  the  conception  of  a  supreme 
Lord  of  all  beings  (Prajapati),  not  by  a  process  of  conscious 
generalization  but  as  a  necessary  stage  of  development  of  the  mind, 
able  to  imagine  a  deity  as  the  repository  of  the  highest  moral  and 
physical  power,  though  its  direct  manifestation  cannot  be  per- 
ceived. Thus  the  epithet  Prajapati  or  the  Lord  of  beings,  which 
was  originally  an  epithet  for  other  deities,  came  to  be  recognized 
as  a  separate  deity,  the  highest  and  the  greatest.  Thus  it  is  said 
in  R.  V.  x.  1212; 

In  the  beginning  rose  Hiranyagarbha, 

Born  as  the  only  lord  of  all  existence. 

This  earth  he  settled  firm  and  heaven  established  : 

What  god  shall  we  adore  with  our  oblations  ? 

Who  gives  us  breath,  who  gives  us  strength,  whose  bidding 

All  creatures  naust  obey,  the  bright  gods  even ; 

Whose  shade  is  death,  whose  shadow  life  immortal : 

What  god  shall  we  adore  with  our  oblations  ? 

Who  by  his  might  alone  became  the  monarch 

Of  all  that  breathes,  of  all  that  wakes  or  slumbers, 

Of  all,  both  man  and  beast,  the  lord  eternal  : 

What  god  shall  we  adore  with  our  oblations  ? 

Whose  might  and  majesty  these  snowy  mountains, 

The  ocean  and  the  distant  stream  exhibit ; 

Whose  arms  extended  are  these  spreading  regions : 

What  god  shall  we  adore  with  our  oblations  ? 

Who  made  the  heavens  bright,  the  earth  enduring, 

Who  fixed  the  firmament,  the  heaven  of  heavens ; 

Who  measured  out  the  air's  extended  spaces: 

What  god  shall  we  adore  with  our  oblations  ? 

'  Macdonell's  Vedic  Mythology,  p.  17.         ^  The  Rigveda,  by  Kaegi,  pp.  88,  89. 

2 — 2 


20       The  Vedas,  Brahmanas  and  their  Philosophy     [ch. 

Similar  attributes  are  also  ascribed   to  the  deity  Vi^vakarma 

(All-creator) ^  He  is  said  to  be  father  and  procreator  of  all  beings, 

though  himself  uncreated.    He  generated  the  primitive  waters. 

It  is  to  him  that  the  sage  says, 

Who  is  our  father,  our  creator,  maker. 

Who  every  place  doth  know  and  every  creature, 

By  whom  alone  to  gods  their  names  were  given. 

To  him  all  other  creatures  go  to  ask  him  2.     R.  V.  x.  82.  3. 

Brahma. 

The  conception  of  Brahman  which  has  been  the  highest  glory 
for  the  Vedanta  philosophy  of  later  days  had  hardly  emerged  in 
the  Rg-Veda  from  the  associations  of  the  sacrificial  mind.  The 
meanings  that  Sayana  the  celebrated  commentator  of  the  Vedas 
gives  of  the  word  as  collected  by  Haug  are:  {a)  food,  food  offering, 
{b)  the  chant  of  the  sama-singer,  {c)  magical  formula  or  text, 
(^)  duly  completed  ceremonies,  {e)  the  chant  and  sacrificial  gift 
together,  (/")  the  recitation  of  the  hotr  priest,  {g)  great.  Roth 
says  that  it  also  means  "  the  devotion  which  manifests  itself  as 
longing  and  satisfaction  of  the  soul  and  reaches  forth  to  the 
gods."  But  it  is  only  in  the  Satapatha  Brahmana  that  the  con- 
ception of  Brahman  has  acquired  a  great  significance  as  the 
supreme  principle  which  is  the  moving  force  behind  the  gods. 
Thus  the  Satapatha  says,  "  Verily  in  the  beginning  this  (universe) 
was  the  Brahman  (neut.).  It  created  the  gods;  and,  having 
created  the  gods,  it  made  them  ascend  these  worlds:  Agni  this 
(terrestrial)  world,  Vayu  the  air,  and  Siirya  the  sky.... Then  the 
Brahman  itself  went  up  to  the  sphere  beyond.  Having  gone  up 
to  the  sphere  beyond,  it  considered,  'How  can  I  descend  again 
into  these  worlds?'  It  then  descended  again  by  means  of  these 
two,  Form  and  Name.  Whatever  has  a  name,  that  is  name;  and 
that  again  which  has  no  name  and  which  one  knows  by  its  form, 
'  this  is  (of  a  certain)  form,'  that  is  form  :  as  far  as  there  are  Form 
and  Name  so  far,  indeed,  extends  this  (universe).  These  indeed 
are  the  two  great  forces  of  Brahman;  and,  verily,  he  who  knows 
these  two  great  forces  of  Brahman  becomes  himself  a  great  force*. 
In  another  place  Brahman  is  said  to  be  the  ultimate  thing  in  the 
Universe  and   is  identified  with   Prajapati,  Purusa  and   Prana 

*  See  The Kigveda,  by  Kaegi,  p.  89,  and  also  '^\\\\x'% Sanskrit  Texts,\o\.  iv.  pp.  5-1 1. 
^  Kaegi's  translation. 

*  See  Eggeling's  translation  of  Satapatha  Brahmana  6".  i5.  ^.  vol.  xi.iv.  pp.  27,  28. 


ii]  Sacrifice;  the  First  Rudiments  of  the  Law  of  Karma  2 1 

(the  vital  air').  In  another  place  Brahman  is  described  as  being 
the  Svayambhu  (self-born)  performing  austerities,  who  offered 
his  own  self  in  the  creatures  and  the  creatures  in  his  own  self, 
and  thus  compassed  supremacy,  sovereignty  and  lordship  over 
all  creatures^  The  conception  of  the  supreme  man  (Purusa)  in 
the  Rg-Veda  also  supposes  that  the  supreme  man  pervades  the 
world  with  only  a  fourth  part  of  Himself,  whereas  the  remaining 
three  parts  transcend  to  a  region  beyond.  He  is  at  once  the 
present,  past  and  future^ 

Sacrifice;  the  First  Rudiments  of  the  Law  of  Karma. 

It  will  however  be  wrong  to  suppose  that  these  monotheistic 
tendencies  were  gradually  supplanting  the  polytheistic  sacrifices. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  complications  of  ritualism  were  gradually 
growing  in  their  elaborate  details.  The  direct  result  of  this  growth 
contributed  however  to  relegate  the  gods  to  a  relatively  unim- 
portant position,  and  to  raise  the  dignity  of  the  magical  charac- 
teristics of  the  sacrifice  as  an  institution  which  could  give  the 
desired  fruits  of  themselves.  The  offerings  at  a  sacrifice  were  not 
dictated  by  a  devotion  with  which  we  are  familiar  under  Christian 
or  Vaisnava  influence.  The  sacrifice  taken  as  a  whole  is  con- 
ceived as  Haug  notes  "  to  be  a  kind  of  machinery  in  which  every 
piece  must  tally  with  the  other,"  the  slightest  discrepancy  in  the 
performance  of  even  a  minute  ritualistic  detail,  say  in  the  pouring 
of  the  melted  butter  on  the  fire,  or  the  proper  placing  of  utensils 
employed  in  the  sacrifice,  or  even  the  misplacing  of  a  mere  straw 
contrary  to  the  injunctions  was  sufficient  to  spoil  the  whole 
sacrifice  with  whatsoever  earnestness  it  might  be  performed. 
Even  if  a  word  was  mispronounced  the  most  dreadful  results 
might  follow.  Thus  when  Tvastr  performed  a  sacrifice  for  the 
production  of  a  demon  who  would  be  able  to  kill  his  enemy 
Indra,  owing  to  the  mistaken  accent  of  a  single  word  the  object 
was  reversed  and  the  demon  produced  was  killed  by  Indra.  But  if 
the  sacrifice  could  be  duly  performed  down  to  the  minutest 
detail,  there  was  no  power  which  could  arrest  or  delay  the  fruition 
of  the  object.  Thus  the  objects  of  a  sacrifice  were  fulfilled  not 
by  the  grace  of  the  gods,  but  as  a  natural  result  of  the  sacrifice. 
The  performance  of  the  rituals  invariably  produced  certain 
mystic  or  magical  results  by  virtue  of  which  the  object  desired 

'  See  S.  B.E.  XLiii.  pp.  59,  60,  400  and  xliv.  p.  409. 

2  See  Ibid.  xliv.  p.  418.  3  r^  y.  x.  90,  Purusa  Sukta. 


22       The  Vedas,  Brahmanas  and  their  Philosophy     [ch. 

by  the  sacrificer  was  fulfilled  in  due  course  like  the  fulfilment  of 
a  natural  law  in  the  physical  world.  The  sacrifice  was  believed 
to  have  existed  from  eternity  like  the  Vedas.  The  creation  of 
the  world  itself  was  even  regarded  as  the  fruit  of  a  sacrifice  per- 
formed by  the  supreme  Being.  It  exists  as  Haug  says  "  as  an 
invisible  thing  at  all  times  and  is  like  the  latent  power  of  elec- 
tricity in  an  electrifying  machine,  requiring  only  the  operation 
of  a  suitable  apparatus  in  order  to  be  elicited."  The  sacrifice  is 
not  offered  to  a  god  with  a  view  to  propitiate  him  or  to  obtain 
from  him  welfare  on  earth  or  bliss  in  Heaven;  these  rewards  are 
directly  produced  by  the  sacrifice  itself  through  the  correct  per- 
formance of  complicated  and  interconnected  ceremonies  which 
constitute  the  sacrifice.  Though  in  each  sacrifice  certain  gods 
were  invoked  and  received  the  offerings,  the  gods  themselves 
were  but  instruments  in  bringing  about  the  sacrifice  or  in  com- 
pleting the  course  of  mystical  ceremonies  composing  it.  Sacrifice 
is  thus  regarded  as  possessing  a  mystical  potency  superior  even  to 
the  gods,  who  it  is  sometimes  stated  attained  to  their  divine  rank 
by  means  of  sacrifice.  Sacrifice  was  regarded  as  almost  the  only 
kind  of  duty,  and  it  was  also  called  karma  or  kriyd  (action)  and 
the  unalterable  law  was,  that  these  mystical  ceremonies  for  good 
or  for  bad,  moral  or  immoral  (for  there  were  many  kinds  of 
sacrifices  which  were  performed  for  injuring  one's  enemies  or 
gaining  worldly  prosperity  or  supremacy  at  the  cost  of  others) 
were  destined  to  produce  their  effects.  It  is  well  to  note  here  that 
the  first  recognition  of  a  cosmic  order  or  law  prevailing  in  nature 
under  the  guardianship  of  the  highest  gods  is  to  be  found  in  the 
use  of  the  word  Rta  (literally  the  course  of  things).  This  word 
was  also  used,  as  Macdonell  observes,  to  denote  the  " '  order ' 
in  the  moral  world  as  truth  and  'right'  and  in  the  religious 
world  as  sacrifice  or  '  rite^ '  "  and  its  unalterable  law  of  producing 
effects.  It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this  connection  that  it  is  here 
that  we  find  the  first  germs  of  the  law  of  karma,  which  exercises 
such  a  dominating  control  over  Indian  thought  up  to  the  present 
day.  Thus  we  find  the  simple  faith  and  devotion  of  the  Vedic 
hymns  on  one  hand  being  supplanted  by  the  growth  of  a  complex 
system  of  sacrificial  rites,  and  on  the  other  bending  their  course 
towards  a  monotheistic  or  philosophic  knowledge  of  the  ultimate 
reality  of  the  universe. 

^  Macdonell's  Vedic  Mythology y  p.  ii. 


ii]        Cosmogony — Mythological  and  philosophical         23 

Cosmogony — Mythological  and  philosophical. 

The  cosmogony  of  the  Rg-Veda  may  be  looked  at  from  two 
aspects,  the  mythological  and  the  philosophical.  The  mythological 
aspect  has  in  general  two  currents,  as  Professor  Macdonell  says, 
"  The  one  regards  the  universe  as  the  result  of  mechanical  pro- 
duction, the  work  of  carpenter's  and  joiner's  skill ;  the  other 
represents  it  as  the  result  of  natural  generation \"  Thus  in  the 
Rg-Veda  we  find  that  the  poet  in  one  place  says,  "  what  was 
the  wood  and  what  was  the  tree  out  of  which  they  built  heaven 
and  earth^?"  The  answer  given  to  this  question  in  Taittirlya- 
Brahmana  is  "Brahman  the  wood  and  Brahman  the  tree  from 
which  the  heaven  and  earth  were  made^"  Heaven  and  Earth  are 
sometimes  described  as  having  been  supported  with  posts ^  They 
are  also  sometimes  spoken  of  as  universal  parents,  and  parentage 
is  sometimes  attributed  to  Aditi  and  Daksa. 

Under  this  philosophical  aspect  the  semi-pantheistic  Man- 
hymn"  attracts  our  notice.  The  supreme  man  as  we  have  already 
noticed  above  is  there  said  to  be  the  whole  universe,  whatever 
has  been  and  shall  be ;  he  is  the  lord  of  immortality  who  has  become 
diffused  everywhere  among  things  animate  and  inanimate,  and 
all  beings  came  out  of  him  ;  from  his  navel  came  the  atmosphere; 
from  his  head  arose  the  sky;  from  his  feet  came  the  earth;  from 
his  ear  the  four  quarters.  Again  there  are  other  hymns  in  which 
the  Sun  is  called  the  soul  {atman)  of  all  that  is  movable  and 
all  that  is  immovable^  There  are  also  statements  to  the  effect 
that  the  Being  is  one,  though  it  is  called  by  many  names  by  the 
sages''.  The  supreme  being  is  sometimes  extolled  as  the  supreme 
Lord  of  the  world  called  the  golden  &%^  (Hiranyagarbha^).  In 
some  passages  it  is  said  "  Brahmanaspati  blew  forth  these  births 
like  a  blacksmith.  In  the  earliest  age  of  the  gods,  the  existent 
sprang  from  the  non-existent.  In  the  first  age  of  the  gods,  the 
existent  sprang  from  the  non-existent:  thereafter  the  regions 
sprang,  thereafter,  from  Uttanapada^."  The  most  remarkable  and 
sublime  hymn  in  which  the  first  germs  of  philosophic  speculation 

*  Macdonell's  Vedic  Mythology.,  p.  ii. 

2  R.  V.  X.  81.  4.  3  Taitt.  Br.  ii.  8.  9.  6. 

*  Macdonell's  Vedic  Mythology,  p.  11  ;  also  R.  V.  11.  15  and  iv,  56. 
»  R.V.  X.  90.  «  R.V.  I.  115. 

1    R.V.  I.   164.  46.  8    R.  V.  X.   HI. 

*  Muir's  translation  of  R.  V.  x.  72 ;  Muir's  Sanskrit  Texts,  vol.  V.  p.  48. 


24       The  Vedas,  Brahmanas  and  their  Philosophy     [ch. 

with  regard  to  the  wonderful  mystery  of  the  origin  of  the  world 
are  found  is  the  1 29th  hymn  of  R.  V.  X. 

1.  Then  there  was  neither  being  nor  not-being. 
The  atmosphere  was  not,  nor  sky  above  it. 
What  covered  all .''  and  where  ?  by  what  protected  ? 
Was  there  the  fathomless  abyss  of  waters  ? 

2.  Then  neither  death  nor  deathless  existed; 

Of  day  and  night  there  was  yet  no  distinction. 
Alone  that  one  breathed  calmly,  self-supported, 
Other  than  It  was  none,  nor  aught  above  It. 

3.  Darkness  there  was  at  first  in  darkness  hidden; 
The  universe  was  undistinguished  water. 
That  which  in  void  and  emptiness  lay  hidden 
Alone  by  power  of  fervor  was  developed. 

4.  Then  for  the  first  time  there  arose  desire, 
Which  was  the  primal  germ  of  mind,  within  it. 
And  sages,  searching  in  their  heart,  discovered 
In  Nothing  the  connecting  bond  of  Being. 

6.  Who  is  it  knows  ?  Who  here  can  tell  us  surely 
From  what  and  how  this  universe  has  risen? 
And  whether  not  till  after  it  the  gods  lived  ? 
Who  then  can  know  from  what  it  has  arisen? 

7.  The  source  from  which  this  universe  has  risen, 
And  whether  it  was  made,  or  uncreated, 

He  only  knows,  who  from  the  highest  heaven 
Rules,  the  all-seeing  lord — or  does  not  He  know^? 

The  earliest  commentary  on  this  is  probably  a  passage  in  the 
Satapatha  Brahmana  (X.  5.  3.  i)  which  says  that  "  in  the  beginning 
this  (universe)  was  as  it  were  neither  non-existent  nor  existent; 
in  the  beginning  this  (universe)  was  as  it  were,  existed  and  did 
not  exist:  there  was  then  only  that  Mind.  Wherefore  it  has  been 
declared  by  the  Rishi  (Rg-Veda  X.  1 29,  i ), '  There  was  then  neither 
the  non-existent  nor  the  existent '  for  Mind  was,  as  it  were,  neither 
existent  nor  non-existent.  This  Mind  when  created,  wished  to 
become  manifest, — more  defined,  more  substantial:  it  sought  after 
a  self  (a  body) ;  it  practised  austerity  :  it  acquired  consistency'^." 
In  the  Atharva-Veda  also  we  find  it  stated  that  all  forms  of  the 
universe  were  comprehended  within  the  god  Skambhal 

Thus  we  find  that  even  in  the  period  of  the  Vedas  there  sprang 
forth  such  a  philosophic  yearning,  at  least  among  some  who  could 

'   The  Rigveda,  by  Kaegi,  p.  90.    R.  V.  x.  129. 

^  See  Eggeling's  translation  oi  S.  B.,  S.  B.  E.  vol.  XLin.  pp.  374,  375. 

3  A.  V.  X.  7.  10. 


ii]  Eschatologyi  the  Doctrine  of  Atman  25 

question  whether  this  universe  was  at  all  a  creation  or  not,  which 
could  think  of  the  origin  of  the  world  as  being  enveloped  in  the 
mystery  of  a  primal  non-differentiation  of  being  and  non-being  ; 
and  which  could  think  that  it  was  the  primal  One  which  by  its 
inherent  fervour  gave  rise  to  the  desire  of  a  creation  as  the  first 
manifestation  of  the  germ  of  mind, from  which  the  universe  sprang 
forth  through  a  series  of  mysterious  gradual  processes.  In  the 
Brahmanas,  however,  we  find  that  the  cosmogonic  view  generally 
requires  the  agency  of  a  creator,  who  is  not  however  always  the 
starting  point,  and  we  find  that  the  theory  of  evolution  is  com- 
bined with  the  theory  of  creation,  so  that  Prajapati  is  sometimes 
spoken  of  as  the  creator  while  at  other  times  the  creator  is  said 
to  have  floated  in  the  primeval  water  as  a  cosmic  golden  Qg%. 

Eschatology  ;  the  Doctrine  of  Atman. 
There  seems  to  be  a  belief  in  the  Vedas  that  the  soul  could 
be  separated  from  the  body  in  states  of  swoon,  and  that  it  could 
exist  after  death,  though  we  do  not  find  there  any  trace  of  the 
doctrine  of  transmigration  in  a  developed  form.  In  the  Satapatha 
Brahmana  it  is  said  that  those  who  do  not  perform  rites  with 
correct  knowledge  are  born  again  after  death  and  suffer  death 
again.  In  a  hymn  of  the  Rg-Veda  (X.  58)  the  soul  iinanas)  of  a  man 
apparently  unconscious  is  invited  to  come  back  to  him  from  the 
trees,  herbs,  the  sky,  the  sun,  etc.  In  many  of  the  hymns  there 
is  also  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  another  world,  where  the 
highest  material  joys  are  attained  as  a  result  of  the  performance 
of  the  sacrifices  and  also  in  a  hell  of  darkness  underneath 
where  the  evil-doers  are  punished.  In  the  Satapatha  Brahmana 
we  find  that  the  dead  pass  between  two  fires  which  burn  the  evil- 
doers, but  let  the  good  go  by^ ;  it  is  also  said  there  that  everyone 
is  born  again  after  death,  is  weighed  in  a  balance,  and  receives 
reward  or  punishment  according  as  his  works  are  good  or  bad. 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  scattered  ideas  like  these  with  regard  to 
the  destiny  of  the  soul  of  man  according  to  the  sacrifice  that  he 
performs  or  other  good  or  bad  deeds  form  the  first  rudiments  of 
the  later  doctrine  of  metempsychosis.  The  idea  that  man  enjoys 
or  suffers,  either  in  another  world  or  by  being  born  in  this  world 
according  to  his  good  or  bad  deeds,  is  the  first  beginning  of  the 
moral  idea,  though  in  the  Brahmanic  days  the  good  deeds  were 

1  See  S.  B.  i.  9.  3,  and  also  Macdonell's  Vedk  Mythology,  pp.  166,  167. 


26       The  Vedas,  Brahmanas  and  their  Philosophy     [cH. 

more  often  of  the  nature  of  sacrificial  duties  than  ordinary  good 
works.  These  ideas  of  the  possibilities  of  a  necessary  connection 
of  the  enjoyments  and  sorrows  of  a  man  with  his  good  and  bad 
works  when  combined  with  the  notion  of  an  inviolable  law  or 
order,  which  we  have  already  seen  was  gradually  growing  with 
the  conception  of  rta,  and  the  unalterable  law  which  produces 
the  effects  of  sacrificial  works,  led  to  the  Law  of  Karma  and  the 
doctrine  of  transmigration.  The  words  which  denote  soul  in  the 
Rg-Veda  are  jnanas,  dtman  and  asu.  The  word  dtman  however 
which  became  famous  in  later  Indian  thought  is  generally  used 
to  mean  vital  breath.  Manas  is  regarded  as  the  seat  of  thought 
and  emotion,  and  it  seems  to  be  regarded,  as  Macdonell  says,  as 
dwelling  in  the  heart'.  It  is  however  difficult  to  understand  how 
atman  as  vital  breath,  or  as  a  separable  part  of  man  going  out  of 
the  dead  man  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  ultimate  essence  or 
reality  in  man  and  the  universe.  There  is  however  at  least  one 
passage  in  the  Rg-Veda  where  the  poet  penetrating  deeper  and 
deeper  passes  from  the  vital  breath  {asu)  to  the  blood,  and  thence 
to  atman  as  the  inmost  self  of  the  world  ;  "  Who  has  seen  how 
the  first-born,  being  the  Bone-possessing  (the  shaped  world),  was 
born  from  the  Boneless  (the  shapeless)?  where  was  the  vital 
breath,  the  blood,  the  Self  {atman)  of  the  world  ?  Who  went  to 
ask  him  that  knows  it^?"  In  Taittirlya  Aranyaka  i.  23,  however, 
it  is  said  that  Prajapati  after  having  created  his  self  (as  the  world) 
with  his  own  self  entered  into  it.  In  Taittirlya  Brahmana  the 
atman  is  called  omnipresent,  and  it  is  said  that  he  who  knows 
him  is  no  more  stained  by  evil  deeds.  Thus  we  find  that  in  the 
pre-Upanisad  Vedic  literature  atman  probably  was  first  used  to 
denote  "  vital  breath  "  in  man,  then  the  self  of  the  world,  and  then 
the  self  in  man.  It  is  from  this  last  stage  that  we  find  the  traces 
of  a  growing  tendency  to  looking  at  the  self  of  man  as  the  omni- 
present supreme  principle  of  the  universe,  the  knowledge  of  which 
makes  a  man  sinless  and  pure. 

Conclusion. 

Looking  at  the  advancement  of  thought  in  the  Rg-Veda  we 

find  first  that  a  fabric  of  thought  was  gradually  growing  which 

not  only  looked  upon  the  universe  as  a  correlation  of  parts  or  a 

*  Macdonell's  Vedic  Mythology,  p.  i66  and  R.  V.  vni.  89. 

^  R.  V.  I.  164.  4  and  Deussen's  article  on  Atman  in  Encyclopaedia  of  Religion  and 
Ethics. 


ii]  Conclusion  2  7 

construction  made  of  them,  but  sought  to  explain  it  as  having 
emanated  from  one  great  being  who  is  sometimes  described  as 
one  with  the  universe  and  surpassing  it,  and  at  other  times  as 
being  separate  from  it;  the  agnostic  spirit  which  is  the  mother 
of  philosophic  thought  is  seen  at  times  to  be  so  bold  as  to  express 
doubts  even  on  the  most  fundamental  questions  of  creation — "Who 
knows  whether  this  world  was  ever  created  or  not?"  Secondly, 
the  growth  of  sacrifices  has  helped  to  establish  the  unalterable 
nature  of  the  law  by  which  the  (sacrificial)  actions  produced  their 
effects  of  themselves.  It  also  lessened  the  importance  of  deities 
as  being  the  supreme  masters  of  the  world  and  our  fate,  and  the 
tendency  of  henotheism  gradually  diminished  their  multiple 
character  and  advanced  the  monotheistic  tendency  in  some 
quarters.  Thirdly,  the  soul  of  man  is  described  as  being  separable 
from  his  body  and  subject  to  suffering  and  enjoyment  in  another 
world  according  to  his  good  or  bad  deeds;  the  doctrine  that  the 
soul  of  man  could  go  to  plants,  etc.,  or  that  it  could  again  be  re- 
born on  earth,  is  also  hinted  at  in  certain  passages,  and  this  may 
be  regarded  as  sowing  the  first  seeds  of  the  later  doctrine  of 
transmigration.  The  self  {dtman)  is  spoken  of  in  one  place  as  the 
essence  of  the  world,  and  when  we  trace  the  idea  in  the  Brahmanas 
and  the  Aranyakas  we  see  that  atman  has  begun  to  mean  the 
supreme  essence  in  man  as  well  as  in  the  universe,  and  has  thus 
approached  the  great  Atman  doctrine  of  the  Upanisads.' 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  EARLIER  UPANISADS^.    (700  b.c— 600  b.c.) 

The  place  of  the  Upanisads  in  Vedic  literature. 

Though  it  is  generally  held  that  the  Upanisads  are  usually 
attached  as  appendices  to  the  Aranyakas  which  are  again  attached 
to  the  Brahmanas,  yet  it  cannot  be  said  that  their  distinction  as 
separate  treatises  is  always  observed.  Thus  we  find  in  some  cases 
that  subjects  which  we  should  expect  to  be  discussed  in  a  Brahmana 
are  introduced  into  the  Aranyakas  and  the  Aranyaka  materials 
are  sometimes  fused  into  the  great  bulk  of  Upanisad  teaching. 
This  shows  that  these  three  literatures  gradually  grew  up  in  one 

^  There  are  about  112  Upanisads  which  have  been  published  by  the  "Nirnaya- 
Sagara"  Press,  Bombay,  191 7.  These  are  i  I^a,  2  Kena,  3  Katha,  4  Pra^na,  5  Mun- 
daka,  6  Mandukya,  7  Taittiriya,  8  Aitareya,  9  Chandogya,  10  Brhadaranyaka, 
II  Sveta^vatara,  12  Kausltaki,  13  Maitreyi,  14  Kaivalya,  15  Jabala,  16  Brahma- 
bindu,  17  Harnsa,  18  Arunika,  J9  Garbha,  20  Narayana,  21  Narayana,  22  Para- 
mahamsa,  23  Brahma,  24  Amrtanada,  25  Atharva^iras,  26  Atharva^ikha,  27  Mai- 
trayanl,  28  Brhajjabala,  29  Nrsimhapurvatapini,  30  Nrsimhottaratapini,  31  Kalag- 
nirudra,  32  Subala,  33  Ksurika,  34  Yantrika,  35  Sarvasara,  36  Niralamba,  37  Su- 
karahasya,  38  Vajrasucika,  39  Tejobindu,  40  Nadabindu,  41  Dhyanabindu,  42  Brah- 
mavidya,  43  Yogatattva,  44  Atmabodha,  45  Naradaparivrajaka,  46  Tri^ikhibrahmana, 
47  Sita,  48  Yogacudamani ,  49  Nirvana,  50  Mandalabrahmana,  51  Daksinamurtti, 
52  Sarabha,  53  Skanda,  54  Tripadvibhutimahanarayana,  55  Advayataraka,  56  Rama - 
rahasya,  57  Ramapurvatapini,  58  Ramottaratapini,  59  Vasudeva,  60  Mudgala, 
61  Sandilya,  62  Paingala,  63  Bhiksuka,  64  Maha,  65  Sariraka,  66  Yogaiikha, 
67  Turiyatlta,  68  Samnyasa,  69  Paramahamsaparivrajaka,  70  Aksamala,  71  Avyakta, 
72  Ekaksara,  73  Annapurna,  74  Surya,  75  Aksi,  76  Adhyatma,  77Kundika,  7883.- 
vitri,  79Atman,  80  Pa^upatabrahma,  81  Parabrahma,  82  Avadhiita,  83  Tripuratapini, 
84  Devi,  85  Tripura,  86  Katharudra,  87  Bhavana,  88  Rudrahrdaya,  89  Yogakundall, 
90  Bhasmajabaia,  91  Rudraksajabala,  92  Ganapati,  93  Jabaladar^ana,  94  Tarasara, 
95  Mahavakya,  96  Paiicabrahma,  97  Pranagnihotra,  98  GopalapurvatapinI,  99  Gopa- 
lottaratapini,  100  Krsna,  loi  Yajnavalkya,  102  Varaha,  103  ^athyayanlya,  104  Ha- 
yagrlva,  105  Dattatreya,  106  Garuda,  107  Kalisantarana,  108  Jabali,  109  Sau- 
bhagyalaksmi,    no  Sarasvatirahasya,    iiiBahvrca,    112  Muktika. 

The  collection  of  Upanisads  translated  by  Dara  shiko,  Aurangzeb's  brother,  contained 
60  Upanisads.  The  Muktika  Upanisad  gives  a  list  of  108  Upanisads.  With  the  exception 
of  the  first  13  Upanisads  most  of  them  are  of  more  or  less  later  date.  The  Upanisads 
dealt  with  in  this  chapter  are  the  earlier  ones.  Amongst  the  later  ones  there  are  some 
which  repeat  the  purport  of  these,  there  are  others  which  deal  with  the  Saiva,  Sakta, 
the  Yoga  and  the  Vaisnava  doctrines.  These  will  be  referred  to  in  connection  with  the 
consideration  of  those  systems  in  Volume  H.  The  later  Upanisads  which  only  repeat  the 
purport  of  those  dealt  with  in  this  chapter  do  not  require  further  mention.  Some  of 
the  later  Upanisads  were  composed  even  as  late  as  the  fourteenth  or  the  fifteenth  century- 


CH.  Ill]   The  place  of  the  Upanisads  in  Vedic  literature  29 

process  of  development  and  they  were  probably  regarded  as  parts 
of  one  literature,  in  spite  of  the  differences  in  their  subject-matter. 
Deussen  supposes  that  the  principle  of  this  division  was  to  be 
found  in  this,  that  the  Brahmanas  were  intended  for  the  house- 
holders, the  Aranyakas  for  those  who  in  their  old  age  withdrew 
into  the  solitude  of  the  forests  and  the  Upanisads  for  those  who 
renounced  the  world  to  attain  ultimate  salvation  by  meditation. 
Whatever  might  be  said  about  these  literary  classifications  the 
ancient  philosophers  of  India  looked  upon  the  Upanisads  as  being 
of  an  entirely  different  type  from  the  rest  of  the  Vedic  literature 
as  dictating  the  path  of  knowledge  {jndna-mdrga)  as  opposed 
to  the  path  of  works  {karma-mdrga)  which  forms  the  content 
of  the  latter.  It  is  not  out  of  place  here  to  mention  that  the 
orthodox  Hindu  view  holds  that  whatever  may  be  written  in  the 
Veda  is  to  be  interpreted  as  commandments  to  perform  certain 
actions  {vidhi)  or  prohibitions  against  committing  certain  others 
{nisedhd).  Even  the  stories  or  episodes  are  to  be  so  interpreted 
that  the  real  objects  of  their  insertion  might  appear  as  only  to 
praise  the  performance  of  the  commandments  and  to  blame  the 
commission  of  the  prohibitions.  No  person  has  any  right  to  argue 
why  any  particular  Vedic  commandment  is  to  be  followed,  for  no 
reason  can  ever  discover  that,  and  it  is  only  because  reason  fails 
to  find  out  why  a  certain  Vedic  act  leads  to  a  certain  effect  that 
the  Vedas  have  been  revealed  as  commandments  and  prohibitions 
to  show  the  true  path  of  happiness.  The  Vedic  teaching  belongs 
therefore  to  that  of  the  Karma-marga  or  the  performance  of  Vedic 
duties  of  sacrifice,  etc.  The  Upanisads  however  do  not  require 
the  performance  of  any  action,  but  only  reveal  the  ultimate  truth 
and  reality,  a  knowledge  of  which  at  once  emancipates  a  man. 
Readers  of  Hindu  philosophy  are  aware  that  there  is  a  very  strong 
controversy  on  this  point  between  the  adherents  of  the  Vedanta 
{Upanisads)  and  those  of  the  Veda.  For  the  latter  seek  in  analogy 
to  the  other  parts  of  the  Vedic  literature  to  establish  the  principle 
that  the  Upanisads  should  not  be  regarded  as  an  exception,  but 
that  they  should  also  be  so  interpreted  that  they  might  also  be 
held  out  as  commending  the  performance  of  duties ;  but  the 
former  dissociate  the  Upanisads  from  the  rest  of  the  Vedic  litera- 
ture and  assert  that  they  do  not  make  the  slightest  reference  to 
any  Vedic  duties,  but  only  delineate  the  ultimate  reality  which 
reveals  the  highest  knowledge  in  the  minds  of  the  deserving. 


30  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

Sarikara  the  most  eminent  exponent  of  the  Upanisads  holds  that 
they  are  meant  for  such  superior  men  who  are  already  above 
worldly  or  heavenly  prosperities,  and  for  whom  the  Vedic  duties 
have  ceased  to  have  any  attraction.  Wheresoever  there  may  be 
such  a  deserving  person,  be  he  a  student,  a  householder  or  an 
ascetic,  for  him  the  Upanisads  have  been  revealed  for  his  ultimate 
emancipation  and  the  tr^^  .-knbwledge.  Those  who  perform  the 
Vedic  dutig§.<i)eloi^g  to'  a  stage  inferior  to  those  who  no  longer 
care  for  the  fruits  of  the  Vedic  duties  but  are  eager  for  final 
emancipation,  and  it  is  the  latter  who  alone  are  fit  to  hear  the 
Upanisads  \ 

The  names  of  the  Upanisads  ;  Non-Brahmanic  influence. 

The  Upanisads  are  also  known  by  another  name  Vedanta,  as 
they  are  believed  to  be  the  last  portions  of  the  Vedas  {veda-anta, 
end) ;  it  is  by  this  name  that  the  philosophy  of  the  Upanisads, 
the  Vedanta  philosophy,  is  so  familiar  to  us.  A  modern  student 
knows  that  in  language  the  Upanisads  approach  the  classical 
Sanskrit ;  the  ideas  preached  also  show  that  they  are  the  culmina- 
tion of  the  intellectual  achievement  of  a  great  epoch.  As  they 
thus  formed  the  concluding  parts  of  the  Vedas  they  retained  their 
Vedic  names  which  they  took  from  the  name  of  the  different 
schools  or  branches  {sdkhd)  among  which  the  Vedas  were  studied^. 
Thus  the  Upanisads  attached  to  the  Brahmanas  of  the  Aitareya 
and  Kausltaki  schools  are  called  respectively  Aitareya  and 
Kausltaki  Upanisads.  Those  of  the  Tandins  and  Talavakaras  of 
the  Sama-veda  are  called  the  Chandogya  and  Talavakara  (or 
Kena)  Upanisads.  Those  of  the  Taittirlya  school  of  the  Yajurveda 

^  This  is  what  is  called  the  difference  of  fitness  [adhikdribheda).  Those  who  perform 
the  sacrifices  are  not  fit  to  hear  the  Upanisads  and  those  who  are  fit  to  hear  the  Upa- 
nisads have  no  longer  any  necessity  to  perform  the  sacrificial  duties. 

^  When  the  Samhita  texts  had  become  substantially  fixed,  they  were  committed 
to  memory  in  different  parts  of  the  country  and  transmitted  from  teacher  to  pupil 
along  with  directions  for  the  practical  performance  of  sacrificial  duties.  The  latter 
formed  the  matter  of  prose  compositions,  the  Brahmanas.  These  however  were 
gradually  liable  to  diverse  kinds  of  modifications  according  to  the  special  tendencies 
and  needs  of  the  people  among  which  they  were  recited.  Thus  after  a  time  there 
occurred  a  great  divergence  in  the  readings  of  the  texts  of  the  Brahmanas  even  of  the 
same  Veda  among  different  people.  These  different  schools  were  known  by  the  name 
of  particular  Sakhas  (e.g.  Aitareya,  Kausltaki)  with  which  the  Brahmanas  were  asso- 
ciated or  named.  According  to  the  divergence  of  the  Brahmanas  of  the  different 
6akhas  there  occurred  the  divergences  of  content  and  the  length  of  the  Upanisads 
associated  with  them. 


Ill]  Brahmanas  and  the  Early  Upanisads  3 1 

form  the  Taittirlya  and  Mahanarayana,  of  the  Katha  school 
the  Kathaka,  of  the  MaitrayanI  school  the  Maitrayanl.  The 
Brhadaranyaka  Upanisad  forms  part  of  the  Satapatha  Brahmana 
of  the  Vajasaneyi  schools.  The  Isa  Upanisad  also  belongs  to  the 
latter  school.  But  the  school  to  which  the  Svetasvatara  belongs 
cannot  be  traced,  and  has  probably  been  lost.  The  presump- 
tion with  regard  to  these  Upanisads  is  that  they  represent  the 
enlightened  views  of  the  particular  schools  among  which  they 
flourished,  and  under  whose  names  they  passed.  A  large  number 
of  Upanisads  of  a  comparatively  later  age  were  attached  to  the 
Atharva-Veda,  most  of  which  were  named  not  according  to  the 
Vedic  schools  but  according  to  the  subject-matter  with  which 
they  dealt  ^ 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  mention  that  from  the 
frequent  episodes  in  the  Upanisads  in  which  the  Brahmins  are 
described  as  having  gone  to  the  Ksattriyas  for  the  highest  know- 
ledge of  philosophy,  as  well  as  from  the  disparateness  of  the 
Upanisad  teachings  from  that  of  the  general  doctrines  of  the 
Brahmanas  and  from  the  allusions  to  the  existence  of  philo- 
sophical speculations  amongst  the  people  in  Pali  works,  it  may  be 
inferred  that  among  the  Ksattriyas  in  general  there  existed  earnest 
philosophic  enquiries  which  must  be  regarded  as  having  exerted 
an  important  influence  in  the  formation  of  the  Upanisad  doctrines. 
There  is  thus  some  probability  in  the  supposition  that  though  the 
Upanisads  are  found  directly  incorporated  with  the  Brahmanas 
it  was  not  the  production  of  the  growth  of  Brahmanic  dogmas 
alone,  but  that  non-Brahmanic  thought  as  well  must  have  either 
set  the  Upanisad  doctrines  afoot,  or  have  rendered  fruitful  assist- 
ance to  their  formulation  and  cultivation,  though  they  achieved 
their  culmination  in  the  hands  of  the  Brahmins. 

Brahmanas  and  the  Early  Upanisads. 

The  passage  of  the  Indian  mind  from  the  Brahmanic  to  the 
Upanisad  thought  is  probably  the  most  remarkable  event  in  the 
history  of  philosophic  thought.  We  know  that  in  the  later  Vedic 
hymns  some  monotheistic  conceptions  of  great  excellence  were 
developed,  but  these  differ  in  their  nature  from  the  absolutism  of 
the  Upanisads  as  much  as  the  Ptolemaic  and  the  Copernican 

^  Garbha  Upanisad,  Atman  Upanisad,  Praina  Upanisad,  etc.    There  were  however 
some  exceptions  such  as  the  Mandukya,  Jabala,  Paingala,  Saunaka,  etc. 


32  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

systems  in  astronomy.  The  direct  translation  of  Visvakarman  or 
Hiranyagarbha  into  the  atman  and  the  Brahman  of  the  Upani- 
sads seems  to  me  to  be  very  improbable, though  I  am  quite  willing 
to  admit  that  these  conceptions  were  swallowed  up  by  the  atman 
doctrine  when  it  had  developed  to  a  proper  extent.  Throughout 
the  earlier  Upanisads  no  mention  is  to  be  found  of  Visvakarman, 
Hiranyagarbha  or  Brahmanaspati  and  no  reference  of  such  a 
nature  is  to  be  found  as  can  justify  us  in  connecting  the  Upanisad 
ideas  with  those  conceptions^  The  word  purusa  no  doubt  occurs 
frequently  in  the  Upanisads,  but  the  sense  and  the  association 
that  come  along  with  it  are  widely  different  from  that  of  the 
purusa  of  the  Purusasukta  of  the  Rg-Veda. 

When  the  Rg-Veda  describes  Visvakarman  it  describes  him 
as  a  creator  from  outside,  a  controller  of  mundane  events,  to  whom 
they  pray  for  worldly  benefits.  "  What  was  the  position,  which 
and  whence  was  the  principle,  from  which  the  all-seeing  Visvakar- 
man produced  the  earth,  and  disclosed  the  sky  by  his  might .-'  The 
one  god,  who  has  on  every  side  eyes,  on  every  side  a  face,  on  every 
side  arms,  on  every  side  feet,  when  producing  the  sky  and  earth, 
shapes  them  with  his  arms  and  with  his  wings Do  thou,  Visva- 
karman, grant  to  thy  friends  those  thy  abodes  which  are  the  highest, 
and  the  lowest,  and  the  middle... may  a  generous  son  remain  here 
to  us^" ;  again  in  R.V.X.  82  we  find  "Visvakarman  is  wise,  energetic, 

the  creator,  the  disposer,  and  the  highest  object  of  intuition He 

who  is  our  father,  our  creator,  disposer,  who  knows  all  spheres  and 
creatures,  who  alone  assigns  to  the  gods  their, names,  to  him  the 
other  creatures  resort  for  instruction^"  Again  about  Hiranyagarbha 
we  find  in  R.V.  I.  121,  "  Hiranyagarbha  arose  in  the  beginning; 
born,  he  was  the  one  lord  of  things  existing.  He  established  the 
earth  and  this  sky ;  to  what  god  shall  we  offer  our  oblation .''... 
May  he  not  injure  us,  he  who  is  the  generator  of  the  earth,  who 
ruling  by  fixed  ordinances,  produced  the  heavens,  who  produced 
the  great  and  brilliant  waters  ! — to  what  god,  etc.  ?  Prajapati,  no 
other  than  thou  is  lord  over  all  these  created  things  :  may  we 
obtain  that,  through  desire  of  which  we  have  invoked  thee;  may  we 
become  masters  of  richest"    Speaking  of  the  purusa  the  Rg-Veda 

^  The  name  Vi^vakarma  appears  in  Svet.  iv.  17.  Hiranyagarbha  appears  in  Svet. 
in.  4  and  iv.  12,  but  only  as  the  first  created  being.  The  phrase  Sarvahammani  Hiran- 
yagarbha which  Deussen  refers  to  occurs  only  in  the  later  Nrsimh.  9.  The  word  Brah- 
manaspati does  not  occur  at  all  in  the  Upanisads. 

"^  Muir's  Sanskrit  Texts,  vol.  iv.  pp.  6,  7.  ^  Ibid.  p.  7.  *  Ibid.  pp.  16,  17. 


Ill]  How  did  the  Upanisads  originate?  33 

says  "  Purusha  has  a  thousand  heads. .  .a  thousand  eyes,  and  a  thou- 
sand feet.   On  every  side  enveloping  the  earth  he  transcended  [it] 

by  a  space  of  ten  fingers He  formed  those  aerial  creatures,  and 

the  animals,  both  wild  and  tameS"  etc.  Even  that  famous  hymn 
(R.V.  X.  129)  which  begins  with  "There  was  then  neither  being 
nor  non-being,  there  was  no  air  nor  sky  above  "  ends  with  saying 
"  From  whence  this  creation  came  into  being,  whether  it  was 
created  or  not — he  who  is  in  the  highest  sky,  its  ruler,  probably 
knows  or  does  not  know." 

In  the  Upani.sads  however,  the  position  is  entirely  changed, 
and  the  centre  of  interest  there  is  not  in  a  creator  from  outside 
but  in  the  self:  the  natural  development  of  the  monotheistic  posi- 
tion of  the  Vedas  could  have  grown  into  some  form  of  developed 
theism,  but  not  into  the  doctrine  that  the  self  was  the  only  reality 
and  that  everything  else  was  far  below  it.  There  is  no  relation 
here  of  the  worshipper  and  the  worshipped  and  no  prayers  are 
offered  to  it,  but  the  whole  quest  is  of  the  highest  truth,  and  the  true 
self  of  man  is  discovered  as  the  greatest  reality.  This  change  of 
philosophical  position  seems  to  me  to  be  a  matter  of  great  interest. 
This  change  of  the  mind  from  the  objective  to  the  subjective  does 
not  carry  with  it  in  the  Upanisads  any  elaborate  philosophical 
discussions,  or  subtle  analysis  of  mind.  It  comes  there  as  a  matter 
of  direct  perception,  and  the  conviction  with  which  the  truth  has 
been  grasped  cannot  fail  to  impress  the  readers.  That  out  of  the 
apparently  meaningless  speculations  of  the  Brahmanas  this  doc- 
trine could  have  developed,  might  indeed  appear  to  be  too  im- 
probable to  be  believed. 

On  the  strength  of  the  stories  of  Balaki  Gargya  and  Ajata^atru 
(Brh.  II.  i),  Svetaketu  and  Pravahana  Jaibali  (Cha.  V.  3  and  Brh. 
VI.  2)  and  Aruni  and  Asvapati  Kaikeya  (Cha.  v.  11)  Garbe  thinks 
"that  it  can  be  proven  that  the  Brahman's  profoundest  wisdom,  the 
doctrine  of  All-one,  which  has  exercised  an  unmistakable  influence 
on  the  intellectual  life  even  of  our  time,  did  not  have  its  origin 
in  the  circle  of  Brahmans  at  all 2"  and  that  "it  took  its  rise  in 
the  ranks  of  the  warrior  caste^"  This  if  true  would  of  course 
lead  the  development  of  the  Upanisads  away  from  the  influence 
of  the  Veda,  Brahmanas  and  the  Aranyakas.  But  do  the  facts 
prove  this  ?   Let  us  briefly  examine  the  evidences  that  Garbe  him- 

1  Muir's  Sanskrit  Texts,  vol.  V.  pp.  368,  371. 

2  Garbe's  article,  ''Hindu  Monism,"  p.  68.  ^  73/^  p,  -g 


34  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [cH. 

self  has  produced.  In  the  story  of  Balaki  Gargya  and  Ajatasatru 
(Brh.  II.  i)  referred  to  by  him,  Balaki  Gargya  is  a  boastful  man 
who  wants  to  teach  the  Ksattriya  Ajatasatru  the  true  Brahman, 
but  fails  and  then  wants  it  to  be  taught  by  him.  To  this 
Ajatasatru  replies  (following  Garbe's  own  translation)  "  it  is 
contrary  to  the  natural  order  that  a  Brahman  receive  instruction! 
from  a  warrior  and  expect  the  latter  to  declare  the  Brahman  to 
him^"  Does  this  not  imply  that  in  the  natural  order  of  things  a 
Brahmin  always  taught  the  knowledge  of  Brahman  to  the 
Ksattriyas,  and  that  it  was  unusual  to  find  a  Brahmin  asking  a 
Ksattriya  about  the  true  knowledge  of  Brahman  ?  At  the  beginning 
of  the  conversation,  Ajatasatru  had  promised  to  pay  Balaki  one 
thousand  coins  if  he  could  tell  him  about  Brahman,  since  all  people 
used  to  run  to  Janaka  to  speak  about  Brahman^.  The  second 
story  of  Svetaketu  and  Pravahana  Jaibali  seems  to  be  fairly  con- 
clusive with  regard  to  the  fact  that  the  transmigration  doctrines, 
the  way  of  the  gods  {devaydna)  and  the  way  of  the  fathers 
{pitrydnd)  had  originated  among  the  Ksattriyas,  but  it  is  without 
any  relevancy  with  regard  to  the  origin  of  the  superior  knowledge 
of  Brahman  as  the  true  self. 

The  third  story  of  Aruni  and  Asvapati  Kaikeya  (Cha.  V.  ii) 
is  hardly  more  convincing,  for  here  five  Brahmins  wishing  to 
know  what  the  Brahman  and  the  self  were,  went  to  Uddalaka 
Aruni ;  but  as  he  did  not  know  sufficiently  about  it  he  accompanied 
them  to  the  Ksattriya  king  Asvapati  Kaikeya  who  was  studying 
the  subject.  But  Asvapati  ends  the  conversation  by  giving  them 
certain  instructions  about  the  fire  doctrine  {yaisvdnara  agni)  and 
the  import  of  its  sacrifices.  He  does  not  say  anything  about  the 
true  self  as  Brahman.  We  ought  also  to  consider  that  there  are 
only  the  few  exceptional  cases  where  Ksattriya  kings  were  in- 
structing the  Brahmins.  But  in  all  other  cases  the  Brahmins  were 
discussing  and  instructing  the  atman  knowledge.  I  am  thus  led 
to  think  that  Garbe  owing  to  his  bitterness  of  feeling  against  the 
Brahmins  as  expressed  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  essay  had  been 
too  hasty  in  his  judgment.  The  opinion  of  Garbe  seems  to  have 
been  shared  to  some  extent  by  Winternitz  also,  and  the  references 
given  by  him  to  the  Upanisad  passages  are  also  the  same  as  we 

'  Garbe's  article,  "  Hindu  Monism"  p.  74. 

^  Brh.  II.,  compare  also  Brh.  iv.  3,  how  Yajnavalkya  speaks  to  Janaka  about  the 
brahmavidya. 


Ill]  Aranyakas  and  the  Upanisads  35 

just  examined ^  The  truth  seems  to  me  to  be  this,  that  the 
Ksattriyas  and  even  some  women  took  interest  in  the  religio- 
philosophical  quest  manifested  in  the  Upanisads.  The  enquirers 
were  so  eager  that  either  in  receiving  the  instruction  of  Brahman 
or  in  imparting  it  to  others,  they  had  no  considerations  of  sex  and 
birth-;  and  there  seems  to  be  no  definite  evidence  for  thinking 
that  the  Upanisad  philosophy  originated  among  the  Ksattriyas 
or  that  the  germs  of  its  growth  could  not  be  traced  in  the 
Brahmanas  and  the  Aranyakas  which  were  the  productions  of 
the  Brahmins. 

The  change  of  the  Brahmana  into  the  Aranyaka  thought  is 
signified  by  a  transference  of  values  from  the  actual  sacrifices  to 
their  symbolic  representations  and  meditations  which  were  re- 
garded as  being  productive  of  various  earthly  benefits.  Thus  we 
find  in  the  Brhadaranyaka  (l.  i)  that  instead  of  a  horse  sacrifice 
the  visible  universe  is  to  be  conceived  as  a  horse  and  meditated 
upon  as  such.  The  dawn  is  the  head  of  the  horse,  the  sun  is  the 
eye,  wind  is  its  life,  fire  is  its  mouth  and  the  year  is  its  soul,  and  so 
on.  What  is  the  horse  that  grazes  in  the  field  and  to  what  good 
can  its  sacrifice  lead?  This  moving  universe  is  the  horse  which  is 
most  significant  to  the  mind,  and  the  meditation  of  it  as  such  is 
the  most  suitable  substitute  of  the  sacrifice  of  the  horse,  the  mere 
animal.  Thought-activity  as  meditation,  is  here  taking  the  place 
of  an  external  worship  in  the  form  of  sacrifices.  The  material 
substances  and  the  most  elaborate  and  accurate  sacrificial  rituals 
lost  their  value  and  bare  meditations  took  their  place.  Side 
by  side  with  the  ritualistic  sacrifices  of  the  generality  of  the 
Brahmins,  was  springing  up  a  system  where  thinking  and  sym- 
bolic meditations  were  taking  the  place  of  gross  matter  and 
action  involved  in  sacrifices.  These  symbols  were  not  only 
chosen  from  the  external  world  as  the  sun,  the  wind,  etc.,  from 
the  body  of  man,  his  various  vital  functions  and  the  senses,  but 
even  arbitrary  alphabets  were  taken  up  and  it  was  believed  that 
the  meditation  of  these  as  the  highest  and  the  greatest  was  pro- 
ductive of  great  beneficial  results.  Sacrifice  in  itself  was  losing 
value  in  the  eyes  of  these  men  and  diverse  mystical  significances 
and  imports  were  beginning  to  be  considered  as  their  real  truth^. 

1  Winternitz's  Geschichte  der  ittdischen  Litteratur,  I.  pp.  197  ff. 
■^  The  story  of  Maitreyi  and  Yajnavalkya  (Brh.  Ii.  4)  and  that  of  Satyakama  son  of 
Jabala  and  his  teacher  (Cha.  iv.  4).  ^  Cha.  v.  11. 

3—2 


^6  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

The  Uktha  (verse)  of  Rg-Veda  was  identified  in  the  Aitareya 
Aranyaka  under  several  allegorical  forms  with  the  Prana\  the 
Udgitha  of  the  Samaveda  was  identified  with  Om,  Prana,  sun  and 
eye ;  in  Chandogya  II.  the  Saman  was  identified  with  Om,  rain, 
water,  seasons,  Prana,  etc.,  in  Chandogya  III.  16-17  man  was 
identified  with  sacrifice  ;  his  hunger,  thirst,  sorrow,  with  initia- 
tion ;  laughing,  eating,  etc.,  with  the  utterance  of  the  Mantras  ; 
and  asceticism,  gift,  sincerity,  restraint  from  injury,  truth,  with 
sacrificial  fees  {daksina).  The  gifted  mind  of  these  cultured  Vedic 
Indians  was  anxious  to  come  to  some  unity,  but  logical  precision 
of  thought  had  not  developed,  and  as  a  result  of  that  we  find  in  the 
Aranyakas  the  most  grotesque  and  fanciful  unifications  of  things 
which  to  our  eyes  have  little  or  no  connection.  Any  kind  of  instru- 
mentality in  producing  an  effect  was  often  considered  as  pure 
identity.  Thus  in  Ait.  Aran.  II.  i.  3  we  find  "Then  comes  the  origin 
of  food.  The  seed  of  Prajapati  are  the  gods.  The  seed  of  the  gods 
is  rain.  The  seed  of  rain  is  herbs.  The  seed  of  herbs  is  food.  The 
seed  of  food  is  seed.  The  seed  of  seed  is  creatures.  The  seed  of 
creatures  is  the  heart.  The  seed  of  the  heart  is  the  mind.  The  seed 
of  the  mind  is  speech.  The  seed  of  speech  is  action.  The  act  done 
is  this  man  the  abode  of  Brahman ^" 

The  word  Brahman  according  to  Sayana  meant  mantras 
(magical  verses),  the  ceremonies,  the  hotr  priest,  the  great. 
Hillebrandt  points  out  that  it  is  spoken  of  in  R.V.  as  being  new, 
"as  not  having  hitherto  existed,"  and  as  "coming  into  being  from 
the  fathers."  It  originates  from  the  seat  of  the  Rta,  springs  forth 
at  the  sound  of  the  sacrifice,  begins  really  to  exist  when  the  soma 
juice  is  pressed  and  the  hymns  are  recited  at  the  savana  rite, 
endures  with  the  help  of  the  gods  even  in  battle,  and  soma  is  its 
guardian  (R.V.  VIII.  37.  i,  VIII.  69.  9,  VI.  23.  5,  I.  47.  2,  VII.  22.  9, 
VI.  52.  3,  etc.).  On  the  strength  of  these  Hillebrandt  justifies  the 
conjecture  of  Haug  that  it  signifies  a  mysterious  power  which  can 
be  called  forth  by  various  ceremonies,  and  his  definition  of  it,  as 
the  magical  force  which  is  derived  from  the  orderly  cooperation  of 
the  hymns,  the  chants  and  the  sacrificial  gifts ^  I  am  disposed  to 
think  that  this  meaning  is  closely  connected  with  the  meaning  as 
we  find  it  in  many  passages  in  the  Aranyakas  and  the  Upanisads. 
The  meaning  in  many  of  these  seems  to  be  midway  between 

*  Ait.  Aran.  11.  1-3.  **  Keith's  Translation  of  Aitareya  Aranyaka. 

'  Hillebrandt's  article  on  Brahman,  E.  R.  E. 


Ill]  Aranyakas  and  the  Upanisads  ^j 

"magical  force"  and  "great,"  transition  between  which  is 
rather  easy.  Even  when  the  sacrifices  began  to  be  replaced  by 
meditations,  the  old  belief  in  the  power  of  the  sacrifices  still 
remained,  and  as  a  result  of  that  we  find  that  in  many  passages 
of  the  Upanisads  people  are  thinking  of  meditating  upon  this 
great  force  "  Brahman  "  as  being  identified  with  diverse  symbols, 
natural  objects,  parts  and  functions  of  the  body. 

When  the  main  interest  of  sacrifice  was  transferred  from  its 
actual  performance  in  the  external  world  to  certain  forms  of 
meditation,  we  find  that  the  understanding  of  particular  allegories 
of  sacrifice  having  a  relation  to  particular  kinds  of  bodily  functions 
was  regarded  as  Brahman,  without  a  knowledge  of  which  nothing 
could  be  obtained.  The  fact  that  these  allegorical  interpretations 
of  the  Pancagnividya  are  so  much  referred  to  in  the  Upanisads 
as  a  secret  doctrine,  shows  that  some  people  came  to  think  that 
the  real  efficacy  of  sacrifices  depended  upon  such  meditations. 
When  the  sages  rose  to  the  culminating  conception,  that  he  is 
really  ignorant  who  thinks  the  gods  to  be  different  from  him,  they 
thought  that  as  each  man  was  nourished  by  many  beasts,  so  the 
gods  were  nourished  by  each  man,  and  as  it  is  unpleasant  for  a 
man  if  any  of  his  beasts  are  taken  away,  so  it  is  unpleasant  for 
the  gods  that  men  should  know  this  great  truths 

In  the  Kena  we  find  it  indicated  that  all  the  powers  of 
the  gods  such  as  that  of  Agni  (fire)  to  burn,  Vayu  (wind)  to 
blow,  depended  upon  Brahman,  and  that  it  is  through  Brahman 
that  all  the  gods  and  all  the  senses  of  man  could  work.  The 
whole  process  of  Upanisad  thought  shows  that  the  magic  power 
of  sacrifices  as  associated  with  Rta  (unalterable  law)  was  being 
abstracted  from  the  sacrifices  and  conceived  as  the  supreme  power. 
There  are  many  stories  in  the  Upanisads  of  the  search  after  the 
nature  of  this  great  power  the  Brahman,  which  was  at  first  only 
imperfectly  realized.  They  identified  it  with  the  dominating  power 
of  the  natural  objects  of  wonder,  the  sun,  the  moon,  etc.  with 
bodily  and  mental  functions  and  with  various  symbolical  re- 
presentations, and  deluded  themselves  for  a  time  with  the  idea 
that  these  were  satisfactory.  But  as  these  were  gradually  found 
inadequate,  they  came  to  the  final  solution,  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  inner  self  of  man  as  being  the  highest  truth  the  Brahman 
originated. 

1  Brh.  I.  4.  10. 


100B38 


38  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

The  meaning  of  the  word  Upanisad. 
The  word  Upanisad  is  derived  from  the  root  sad  with  the  prefix 
«/ (to  sit),  and  Max  Miiller  says  that  the  word  originally  meant  the 
act  of  sitting  down  near  a  teacher  and  of  submissively  listening  to 
him.  In  his  introduction  to  the  Upanisads  he  says,  "The  history 
and  the  genius  of  the  Sanskrit  language  leave  little  doubt  that 
Upanisad  meant  originally  session,  particularly  a  session  consisting 
of  pupils,  assembled  at  a  respectful  distance  round  their  teacher^" 
Deussen  points  out  that  the  word  means'*secret"or"secret  instruc- 
tion," and  this  is  borne  out  by  many  of  the  passages  of  the  Upani- 
sads themselves.  Max  Miiller  also  agrees  that  the  word  was  used 
in  this  sense  in  the  Upanisadsl  There  we  find  that  great  injunc- 
tions of  secrecy  are  to  be  observed  for  the  communication  of  the 
doctrines,  and  it  is  said  that  it  should  only  be  given  to  a  student 
or  pupil  who  by  his  supreme  moral  restraint  and  noble  desires 
proves  himself  deserving  to  hear  them.  Sarikara  however,  the 
great  Indian  exponent  of  the  Upanisads,  derives  the  word  from 
the  root  sad  to  destroy  and  supposes  that  it  is  so  called  because  it 
destroys  inborn  ignorance  and  leads  to  salvation  by  revealing  the 
right  knowledge.  But  if  we  compare  the  many  texts  in  which  the 
word  Upanisad  occurs  in  the  Upanisads  themselves  it  seems  that 
Deussen's  meaning  is  fully  justified^ 

The  composition  and  growth  of  diverse  Upanisads. 

The  oldest  Upanisads  are  written  in  prose.  Next  to  these  we 
have  some  in  verses  very  similar  to  those  that  are  to  be  found  in 
classical  Sanskrit.  As  is  easy  to  see,  the  older  the  Upanisad  the 
more  archaic  is  it  in  its  language.  The  earliest  Upanisads  have 
an  almost  mysterious  forcefulness  in  their  expressions  at  least  to 
Indian  ears.  They  are  simple,  pithy  and  penetrate  to  the  heart. 
We  can  read  and  read  them  over  again  without  getting  tired. 
The  lines  are  always  as  fresh  as  ever.  As  such  they  have  a  charm 
apart  from  the  value  of  the  ideas  they  intend  to  convey.  The  word 
Upanisad  was  used,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  sense  of  "secret 
doctrine  or  instruction";  the  Upanisad  teachings  were  also  in- 
tended to  be  conveyed  in  strictest  secrecy  to  earnest  enquirers  of 
high  morals  and  superior  self-restraint  for  the  purpose  of  achieving 

^  Max  Muller's  Translation  of  the  Upanishads,  S.  B.  E.  vol.  I.  p.  Ixxxi. 

2  S.  B.  E.  vol.  I.  p.  Ixxxiii. 

'  Deussen's  Philosophy  of  the  Upanishads^  pp.  10-15. 


Ill]  Revival  of  Upanisad  studies  39 

emancipation.  It  was  thus  that  the  Upanisad  style  of  expression, 
when  it  once  came  into  use,  came  to  possess  the  greatest  charm  and 
attraction  for  earnest  reHgious  people;  and  as  a  result  of  that  we 
find  that  even  when  other  forms  of  prose  and  verse  had  been 
adapted  for  the  Sanskrit  language,  the  Upanisad  form  of  com- 
position had  not  stopped.  Thus  though  the  earliest  Upanisads 
were  compiled  by  500  B.C.,  they  continued  to  be  written  even  so 
late  as  the  spread  of  Mahommedan  influence  in  India.  The 
earliest  and  most  important  are  probably  those  that  have  been 
commented  upon  bySahkara  namely  Brhadaranyaka,  Chandogya, 
Aitareya,  Taittirlya,  Isa,  Kena,  Katha,  Prasna,  Mundaka  and 
Mandukya\  It  is  important  to  note  in  this  connection  that  the 
separate  Upanisads  differ  much  from  one  another  with  regard  to 
their  content  and  methods  of  exposition.  Thus  while  some  of 
them  are  busy  laying  great  stress  upon  the  monistic  doctrine  of 
the  self  as  the  only  reality,  there  are  others  which  lay  stress  upon 
the  practice  of  Yoga,  asceticism,  the  cult  of  Siva,  of  Visnu  and 
the  philosophy  or  anatomy  of  the  body,  and  may  thus  be 
respectively  called  the  Yoga,  Saiva,  Visnu  and  Sarira  Upanisads. 
These  in  all  make  up  the  number  to  one  hundred  and  eight. 

Revival  of  Upanisad  studies  in  modern  times. 

How  the  Upanisads  came  to  be  introduced  into  Europe  is  an 
interesting  story.  Dara  Shiko  the  eldest  son  of  the  Emperor 
Shah  Jahan  heard  of  the  Upanisads  during  his  stay  in  Kashmir 
in  1640.  He  invited  several  Pandits  from  Benares  to  Delhi,  who 
undertook  the  work  of  translating  them  into  Persian.  In  1775 
Anquetil  Duperron,  the  discoverer  of  the  Zend-Avesta,  received 
a  manuscript  of  it  presented  to  him  by  his  friend  Le  Gentil,  the 
French  resident  in  Faizabad  at  the  court  of  Shuja-uddaulah. 
Anquetil  translated  it  into  Latin  which  was  published  in  1801- 
1802.  This  translation  though  largely  unintelligible  was  read  by 
Schopenhauer  with  great  enthusiasm.  It  had,  as  Schopenhauer 
himself  admits,  profoundly  influenced  his  philosophy.    Thus  he 

^  Deussen  supposes  that  Kausltaki  is  also  one  of  the  earliest.  Max  Miiller  and 
Schroeder  think  that  Maitrayani  also  belongs  to  the  earliest  group,  whereas  Deussen 
counts  it  as  a  comparatively  later  production.  Winternitz  divides  the  Upanisads  into 
four  periods.  In  the  first  period  he  includes  Brhadaranyaka,  Chandogya,  Taittiriya, 
Aitareya,  Kausitaki  and  Kena.  In  the  second  he  includes  Kathaka,  Ka,  Svetadvatara, 
Mundaka,  Mahanarayana,  and  in  the  third  period  he  includes  Prasna,  Maitrayani  and 
Mandijkya.   The  rest  of  the  Upanisads  he  includes  in  the  fourth  period. 


40  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

writes  in  the  preface  to  his  Welt  ah  Wille  imd  Vorstellung^, 
"And  if,  indeed,  in  addition  to  this  he  is  a  partaker  of  the  benefit 
conferred  by  the  Vedas,  the  access  to  which,  opened  to  us  through 
the  Upanishads,  is  in  my  eyes  the  greatest  advantage  which  this 
still  young  century  enjoys  over  previous  ones,  because  I  beHeve 
that  the  influence  of  the  Sanskrit  literature  will  penetrate  not  less 
deeply  than  did  the  revival  of  Greek  literature  in  the  fifteenth 
century:  if,  I  say,  the  reader  has  also  already  received  and 
assimilated  the  sacred,  primitive  Indian  wisdom,  then  is  he  best 
of  all  prepared  to  hear  what  I  have  to  say  to  him.... I  might  ex- 
press the  opinion  that  each  one  of  the  individual  and  disconnected 
aphorisms  which  make  up  the  Upanishads  may  be  deduced  as 
a  consequence  from  the  thought  I  am  going  to  impart,  though 
the  converse,  that  my  thought  is  to  be  found  in  the  Upanishads 
is  by  no  means  the  case."  Again,  "How  does  every  line  display 
its  firm,definite,and  throughout  harmonious  meaning!  From  every 
sentence  deep,  original,  and  sublime  thoughts  arise,  and  the  whole 
is  pervaded  by  a  high  and  holy  and  earnest  spirit... In  the  whole 
world  there  is  no  study,  except  that  of  the  originals,  so  beneficial 
and  so  elevating  as  that  of  the  Oupanikhat  It  has  been  the  solace 
of  my  life,  it  will  be  the  solace  of  my  death! 2"  Through  Schopen- 
hauer the  study  of  the  Upanisads  attracted  much  attention  in 
Germany  and  with  the  growth  of  a  general  interest  in  the  study 
of  Sanskrit,  they  found  their  way  into  other  parts  of  Europe  as 
well. 

The  study  of  the  Upanisads  has  however  gained  a  great 
impetus  by  the  earnest  attempts  of  our  Ram  Mohan  Roy  who 
not  only  translated  them  into  Bengali,  Hindi  and  English  and 
published  them  at  his  own  expense,  but  founded  the  Brahma 
Samaj  in  Bengal,  the  main  religious  doctrines  of  which  were 
derived  directly  from  the  Upanisads. 

*  Translation  by  Haldane  and  Kemp,  vol.  I.  pp.  xii  and  xiii. 

*  Max  Miiller  says  in  his  introduction  to  the  Upanishads  (.S".  B.  E.  I.  p.  Ixii ;  see 
also  pp.  Ix,  Ixi)  "that  Schopenhauer  should  have  spoken  of  the  Upanishads  as  'pro- 
ducts of  the  highest  wisdom '...  that  he  should  have  placed  the  pantheism  there  taught 
high  above  the  pantheism  of  Bruno,  Malebranche,  Spinoza  and  Scotus  Erigena,  as 
brought  to  light  again  at  Oxford  in  1681,  may  perhaps  secure  a  more  considerate 
reception  for  those  relics  of  ancient  wisdom  than  anything  that  I  could  say  in  their 
favour." 


Ill]  The  Upanisads  and  their  interpretations  4 1 

The  Upanisads  and  their  interpretations. 

Before  entering  into  the  philosophy  of  the  Upanisads  it  may- 
be worth  while  to  say  a  few  words  as  to  the  reason  why  diverse 
and  even  contradictory  explanations  as  to  the  real  import  of  the 
Upanisads  had  been  offered  by  the  great  Indian  scholars  of  past 
times.  The  Upanisads,  as  we  have  seen,  formed  the  concluding 
portion  of  the  revealed  Vedic  literature,  and  were  thus  called  the 
Vedanta.  It  was  almost  universally  believed  by  the  Hindus  that 
the  highest  truths  could  only  be  found  in  the  revelation  of  the 
Vedas.  Reason  was  regarded  generally  as  occupying  a  compara- 
tively subservient  place,  and  its  proper  use  was  to  be  found  in  its 
judicious  employment  in  getting  out  the  real  meaning  of  the 
apparently  conflicting  ideas  of  the  Vedas.  The  highest  know- 
ledge of  ultimate  truth  and  reality  was  thus  regarded  as  having 
been  once  for  all  declared  in  the  Upanisads.  Reason  had  only  to 
unravel  it  in  the  light  of  experience.  It  is  important  that  readers 
of  Hindu  philosophy  should  bear  in  mind  the  contrast  that  it 
presents  to  the  ruling  idea  of  the  modern  world  that  new  truths 
are  discovered  by  reason  and  experience  every  day,  and  even  in 
those  cases  where  the  old  truths  remain,  they  change  their  hue 
and  character  every  day,  and  that  in  matters  of  ultimate  truths  no 
finality  can  ever  be  achieved ;  we  are  to  be  content  only  with  as 
much  as  comes  before  the  purview  of  our  reason  and  experience 
at  the  time.  It  was  therefore  thought  to  be  extremely  audacious 
that  any  person  howsoever  learned  and  brilliant  he  might  be 
should  have  any  right  to  say  anything  regarding  the  highest 
truths  simply  on  the  authority  of  his  own  opinion  or  the  reasons 
that  he  might  offer.  In  order  to  make  himself  heard  it  was  neces- 
sary for  him  to  show  from  the  texts  of  the  Upanisads  that  they 
supported  him,  and  that  their  purport  was  also  the  same.  Thus 
it  was  that  most  schools  of  Hindu  philosophy  found  it  one  of  their 
principal  duties  to  interpret  the  Upanisads  in  order  to  show  that 
they  alone  represented  the  true  Vedanta  doctrines.  Any  one 
who  should  feel  himself  persuaded  by  the  interpretations  of  any 
particular  school  might  say  that  in  following  that  school  he  was 
following  the  Vedanta. 

The  difficulty  of  assuring  oneself  that  any  interpretation  is 
absolutely  the  right  one  is  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  germs  of 
diverse  kinds  of  thoughts  are  found  scattered  over  the  Upanisads 


42  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch, 

which  are  not  worked  out  in  a  systematic  manner.  Thus  each 
interpreter  in  his  turn  made  the  texts  favourable  to  his  own 
doctrines  prominent  and  brought  them  to  the  forefront,  and  tried 
to  repress  others  or  explain  them  away.  But  comparing  the 
various  systems  of  Upanisad  interpretation  we  find  that  the  in- 
terpretation offered  by  Sarikara  very  largely  represents  the  view 
of  the  general  body  of  the  earlier  Upanisad  doctrines,  though 
there  are  some  which  distinctly  foreshadow  the  doctrines  of  other 
systems,  but  in  a  crude  and  germinal  form.  It  is  thus  that  Vedanta 
is  generally  associated  with  the  interpretation  of  Sankara  and 
Sarikara's  system  of  thought  is  called  the  Vedanta  system,  though 
there  are  many  other  systems  which  put  forth  their  claim  as  repre- 
senting the  true  Vedanta  doctrines. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  is  necessary  that  a  modern  in- 
terpreter of  the  Upanisads  should  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  the  absolute 
claims  of  these  exponents,  and  look  upon  the  Upanisads  not  as 
a  systematic  treatise  but  as  a  repository  of  diverse  currents  of 
thought — the  melting  pot  in  which  all  later  philosophic  ideas  were 
still  in  a  state  of  fusion,  though  the  monistic  doctrine  of  Sarikara, 
or  rather  an  approach  thereto,  may  be  regarded  as  the  purport  of 
by  far  the  largest  majority  of  the  texts.  It  will  be  better  that  a 
modern  interpreter  should  not  agree  to  the  claims  of  the  ancients 
that  all  the  Upanisads  represent  a  connected  system,  but  take  the 
texts  independently  and  separately  and  determine  their  meanings, 
though  keeping  an  attentive  eye  on  the  context  in  which  they 
appear.  It  is  in  this  way  alone  that  we  can  detect  the  germs  of 
the  thoughts  of  other  Indian  systems  in  the  Upanisads,  and  thus 
find  in  them  the  earliest  records  of  those  tendencies  of  thoughts. 


The  quest  after  Brahman:  the  struggle  and  the  failures. 

The  fundamental  idea  which  runs  through  the  early  Upanisads 
is  that  underlying  the  exterior  world  of  change  there  is  an  un- 
changeable reality  which  is  identical  with  that  which  underlies 
the  essence  in  man\  If  we  look  at  Greek  philosophy  in  Par- 
menides  or  Plato  or  at  modern  philosophy  in  Kant,  we  find  the 
same  tendency  towards  glorifying  one  unspeakable  entity  as  the 
reality  or  the  essence.    I  have  said  above  that  the  Upanisads  are 

^  Brh.  IV.  4.  5,  22. 


Ill]  The  Quest  after  Brahman  43 

no  systematic  treatises  of  a  single  hand,  but  are  rather  collations 
or  compilations  of  floating  monologues,  dialogues  or  anecdotes. 
There  are  no  doubt  here  and  there  simple  discussions  but  there 
is  no  pedantry  or  gymnastics  of  logic.  Even  the  most  casual 
reader  cannot  but  be  struck  with  the  earnestness  and  enthusiasm 
of  the  sages.  They  run  from  place  to  place  with  great  eagerness 
in  search  of  a  teacher  competent  to  instruct  them  about  the  nature 
of  Brahman.    Where  is  Brahman?    What  is  his  nature? 

We  have  noticed  that  during  the  closing  period  of  the  Sarnhita 
there  were  people  who  had  risen  to  the  conception  of  a  single 
creator  and  controller  of  the  universe,  variously  called  Prajapati, 
Visvakarman,  Purusa,  Brahmanaspati  and  Brahman.  But  this 
divine  controller  was  yet  only  a  deity.  The  search  as  to  the 
nature  of  this  deity  began  in  the  Upanisads.  Many  visible  objects 
of  nature  such  as  the  sun  or  the  wind  on  one  hand  and  the  various 
psychological  functions  in  man  were  tried,  but  none  could  render 
satisfaction  to  the  great  ideal  that  had  been  aroused.  The  sages 
in  the  Upanisads  had  already  started  with  the  idea  that  there  was 
a  supreme  controller  or  essence  presiding  over  man  and  the 
universe.  But  what  was  its  nature?  Could  it  be  identified  with 
any  of  the  deities  of  Nature,  was  it  a  new  deity  or  was  it  no  deity 
at  all.''  The  Upanisads  present  to  us  the  history  of  this  quest  and 
the  results  that  were  achieved. 

When  we  look  merely  to  this  quest  we  find  that  we  have  not 
yet  gone  out  of  the  Aranyaka  ideas  and  of  symbolic  {prattka) 
forms  of  worship.  Prdna  (vital  breath)  was  regarded  as  the  most 
essential  function  for  the  life  of  man,  and  many  anecdotes  are 
related  to  show  that  it  is  superior  to  the  other  organs,  such  as  the 
eye  or  ear,  and  that  on  it  all  other  functions  depend.  This 
recognition  of  the  superiority  of  prana  brings  us  to  the  meditations 
on  prana  as  Brahman  as  leading  to  the  most  beneficial  results. 
So  also  we  find  that  owing  to  the  presence  of  the  exalting 
characters  of  omnipresence  and  eternality  dkdsa  (space)  is 
meditated  upon  as  Brahman.  So  also  manas  and  Aditya  (sun) 
are  meditated  upon  as  Brahman.  Again  side  by  side  with  the 
visible  material  representation  of  Brahman  as  the  pervading  Vayu, 
or  the  sun  and  the  immaterial  representation  as  akasa,  manas  or 
prana,  we  find  also  the  various  kinds  of  meditations  as  substitutes 
for  actual  sacrifice.  Thus  it  is  that  there  was  an  earnest  quest 
after  the  discovery  of  Brahman.   We  find  a  stratum  of  thought 


44  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

which  shows  that  the  sages  were  still  blinded  by  the  old  ritualistic 
associations,  and  though  meditation  had  taken  the  place  of  sacrifice 
yet  this  was  hardly  adequate  for  the  highest  attainment  of 
Brahman. 

Next  to  the  failure  of  the  meditations  we  have  to  notice  the 
history  of  the  search  after  Brahman  in  which  the  sages  sought  to 
identify  Brahman  with  the  presiding  deity  of  the  sun,  moon, 
lightning,  ether,  wind,  fire,  water,  etc.,  and  failed;  for  none  of 
these  could  satisfy  the  ideal  they  cherished  of  Brahman.  It  is 
indeed  needless  here  to  multiply  these  examples,  for  they  are 
tiresome  not  only  in  this  summary  treatment  but  in  the  original 
as  well.  They  are  of  value  only  in  this  that  they  indicate  how 
toilsome  was  the  process  by  which  the  old  ritualistic  associations 
could  be  got  rid  of;  what  struggles  and  failures  the  sages  had  to 
undergo  before  they  reached  a  knowledge  of  the  true  nature  of 
Brahman. 

Unknowability  of  Brahman  and  the  Negative  Method. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  the  magical  element  involved  in  the 
discharge  of  sacrificial  duties  lingered  for  a  while  in  the  symbolic 
worship  of  Brahman  in  which  He  was  conceived  almost  as  a  deity. 
The  minds  of  the  Vedic  poets  so  long  accustomed  to  worship 
deities  of  visible  manifestation  could  not  easily  dispense  with  the 
idea  of  seeking  after  a  positive  and  definite  content  of  Brahman. 
They  tried  some  of  the  sublime  powers  of  nature  and  also  many 
symbols,  but  these  could  not  render  ultimate  satisfaction.  They 
did  not  know  what  the  Brahman  was  like,  for  they  had  only  a 
dim  and  dreamy  vision  of  it  in  the  deep  craving  of  their  souls 
which  could  not  be  translated  into  permanent  terms.  But  this 
was  enough  to  lead  them  on  to  the  goal,  for  they  could  not  be 
satisfied  with  anything  short  of  the  highest. 

They  found  that  by  whatever  means  they  tried  to  give  a 
positive  and  definite  content  of  the  ultimate  reality,  the  Brahman, 
they  failed.  Positive  definitions  were  impossible.  They  could  not 
point  out  what  the  Brahman  was  like  in  order  to  give  an  utterance 
to  that  which  was  unutterable,  they  could  only  say  that  it  was  not 
like  aught  that  we  find  in  experience.  Yajnavalkya  said  "He 
the  atman  is  not  this,  nor  this  {neti  neti).  He  is  inconceivable, 
for  he  cannot  be  conceived,  unchangeable,  for  he  is  not  changed, 
untouched,  for  nothing  touches  him  ;  he  cannot  suffer  by  a  stroke 


Ill]      The  Negative  Method  and  the  Atman  doctrine     45 

of  the  sword,  he  cannot  suffer  any  injury ^"  He  is  asat,  non-being, 
for  the  being  which  Brahman  is,  is  not  to  be  understood  as  such 
being  as  is  known  to  us  by  experience ;  yet  he  is  being,  for  he  alone 
is  supremely  real,  for  the  universe  subsists  by  him.  We  ourselves 
are  but  he,  and  yet  we  know  not  what  he  is.  Whatever  we  can 
experience,  whatever  we  can  express,  is  limited,  but  he  is  the 
unlimited,  the  basis  of  all.  "That  which  is  inaudible,  intangible, 
invisible,  indestructible,  which  cannot  be  tasted,  nor  smelt,  eternal, 
without  beginning  or  end,  greater  than  the  great  (;«^//^/),the  fixed. 
He  who  knows  it  is  released  from  the  jaws  of  death^."  Space,  time 
and  causality  do  not  appertain  to  him,  for  he  at  once  forms  their 
essence  and  transcends  them.  He  is  the  infinite  and  the  vast,  yet 
the  smallest  of  the  small,  at  once  here  as  there,  there  as  here;  no 
characterisation  of  him  is  possible,  otherwise  than  by  the  denial 
to  him  of  all  empirical  attributes,  relations  and  definitions.  He 
is  independent  of  all  limitations  of  space,  time,  and  cause  which 
rules  all  that  is  objectively  presented,  and  therefore  the  empirical 
universe.  When  Bahva  was  questioned  by  Vaskali,  he  expounded 
the  nature  of  Brahman  to  him  by  maintaining  silence — "Teach 
me,"  said  Vaskali,  "most  reverent  sir,  the  nature  of  Brahman." 
Bahva  however  remained  silent.  But  when  the  question  was  put 
forth  a  second  or  third  time  he  answered,  "  I  teach  you  indeed  but 
you  do  not  understand;  the  Atman  is  silenced"  The  way  to  in- 
dicate it  is  thus  by  neti  neti^  it  is  not  this,  it  is  not  this.  We 
cannot  describe  it  by  any  positive  content  which  is  always  limited 
by  conceptual  thought. 

The  Atman  doctrine. 

The  sum  and  substance  of  the  Upanisad  teaching  is  involved 
in  the  equation  Atman  =  Brahman.  We  have  already  seen  that  the 
word  Atman  was  used  in  the  Rg-Veda  to  denote  on  the  one  hand 
the  ultimate  essence  of  the  universe,  and  on  the  other  the  vital 
breath  in  man.  Later  on  in  the  Upanisads  we  see  that  the  word 
Brahman  is  generally  used  in  the  former  sense,  while  the  word 
Atman  is  reserved  to  denote  the  inmost  essence  in  man,  and  the 

^  Brh.  IV.  5.  15.  Deussen,  Max  Miiller  and  Roer  have  all  misinterpreted  this 
passage ;  asito  has  been  interpreted  as  an  adjective  or  participle,  though  no  evidence 
has  ever  been  adduced ;  it  is  evidently  the  ablative  of  asi,  a  sword. 

^  Katha  HI.  15. 

*  Sankara  on  Brahmasutra,  \\\.i.  17,  and  also  Deussen,  Philosophy  of  the  Upani- 
shads,  p.  156. 


46  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [cii. 

Upanisads  are  emphatic  in  their  declaration  that  the  two  are  one 
and  the  same.  But  what  is  the  inmost  essence  of  man?  The  self 
of  man  involves  an  ambiguity,  as  it  is  used  in  a  variety  of  senses. 
Thus  so  far  as  man  consists  of  the  essence  of  food  (i.e.  the  physical 
parts  of  man)  he  is  called  annamaya.  But  behind  the  sheath  of 
this  body  there  is  the  other  self  consisting  of  the  vital  breath 
which  is  called  the  self  as  vital  breath  {prdnamaya  dtman). 
Behind  this  again  there  is  the  other  self  "consisting  of  will"  called 
the  vianoniaya  dttnan.  This  again  contains  within  it  the  self 
"consisting  of  consciousness"  called  the  vijiidnamaya  dtman.  But 
behind  it  we  come  to  the  final  essence  the  self  as  pure  bliss  (the 
dnandamaya  dtman).  The  texts  say:  "Truly  he  is  the  rapture; 
for  whoever  gets  this  rapture  becomes  blissful.  For  who  could 
live,  who  could  breathe  if  this  space  {dkdsa)  was  not  bliss?  For 
it  is  he  who  behaves  as  bliss.  For  whoever  in  that  Invisible,  Self- 
surpassing,  Unspeakable,  Supportless  finds  fearless  support,  he 
really  becomes  fearless.  But  whoever  finds  even  a  slight  difference, 
between  himself  and  this  Atman  there  is  fear  for  him^" 

Again  in  another  place  we  find  that  Prajapati  said:  "The  self 
{dtman)  which  is  free  from  sin,  free  from  old  age,  from  death  and 
grief,  from  hunger  and  thirst,  whose  desires  are  true,  whose  cogita- 
tions are  true,  that  is  to  be  searched  for,  that  is  to  be  enquired ; 
he  gets  all  his  desires  and  all  worlds  who  knows  that  selP."  The 
gods  and  the  demons  on  hearing  of  this  sent  Indra  and  Virocana 
respectively  as  their  representatives  to  enquire  of  this  self  from 
Prajapati.  He  agreed  to  teach  them,  and  asked  them  to  look 
into  a  vessel  of  water  and  tell  him  how  much  of  self  they  could 
find.  They  answered:  "We  see,  this  our  whole  self,  even  to  the 
hair,  and  to  the  nails."  And  he  said,  "Well,  that  is  the  self,  that 
is  the  deathless  and  the  fearless,  that  is  the  Brahman."  They  went 
away  pleased,  but  Prajapati  thought,  "There  they  go  away, 
without  having  discovered,  without  having  realized  the  self." 
Virocana  came  away  with  the  conviction  that  the  body  was  the 
self;  but  Indra  did  not  return  back  to  the  gods,  he  was  afraid  and 
pestered  with  doubts  and  came  back  to  Prajapati  and  said,  "just 
as  the  self  becomes  decorated  when  the  body  is  decorated,  well- 
dressed  when  the  body  is  well-dressed,  well-cleaned  when  the 
body  is  well-cleaned,  even  so  that  image  self  will  be  blind  when 
the  body  is  blind,  injured  in  one  eye  when  the  body  is  injured  in 
one  eye,  and  mutilated  when  the  body  is  mutilated,  and  it  perishes 
^  Taitt.  II.  7.  "^  Cha.  viii.  7.  i. 


Ill]  Atman  as  changeless  47 

when  the  body  perishes,  therefore  I  can  see  no  good  in  this  theory." 
Prajapati  then  gave  him  a  higher  instruction  about  the  self,  and 
said,  "He  who  goes  about  enjoying  dreams,  he  is  the  self,  this 
is  the  deathless,  the  fearless,  this  is  Brahman."  Indra  departed 
but  was  again  disturbed  with  doubts,  and  was  afraid  and  came 
back  and  said  "that  though  the  dream  self  does  not  become  blind 
when  the  body  is  blind,  or  injured  in  one  eye  when  the  body  is 
so  injured  and  is  not  affected  by  its  defects,  and  is  not  killed  by 
its  destruction,  but  yet  it  is  as  if  it  was  overwhelmed,  as  if  it  suffered 
and  as  if  it  wept — in  this  I  see  no  good."  Prajapati  gave  a  still 
higher  instruction :  "When  a  man,  fast  asleep,  in  total  contentment, 
does  not  know  any  dreams,  this  is  the  self,  this  is  the  deathless, 
the  fearless,  this  is  Brahman."  Indra  departed  but  was  again 
filled  with  doubts  on  the  way,  and  returned  again  and  said  "the 
self  in  deep  sleep  does  not  know  himself,  that  I  am  this,  nor  does 
he  know  any  other  existing  objects.  He  is  destroyed  and  lost. 
I  see  no  good  in  this."  And  now  Prajapati  after  having  given  a 
course  of  successively  higher  instructions  as  self  as  the  body,  as 
the  self  in  dreams  and  as  the  self  in  deep  dreamless  sleep,  and 
having  found  that  the  enquirer  in  each  case  could  find  out  that  this 
was  not  the  ultimate  truth  about  the  self  that  he  was  seeking, 
ultimately  gave  him  the  ultimate  and  final  instruction  about  the 
full  truth  about  the  self,  and  said  "this  body  is  the  support  of  the 
deathless  and  the  bodiless  self.  The  self  as  embodied  is  affected 
by  pleasure  and  pain,  the  self  when  associated  with  the  body  can- 
not get  rid  of  pleasure  and  pain,  but  pleasure  and  pain  do  not 
touch  the  bodiless  selP." 

As  the  anecdote  shows,  they  sought  such  a  constant  and  un- 
changeable essence  in  man  as  was  beyond  the  limits  of  any  change. 
This  inmost  essence  has  sometimes  been  described  as  pure  subject- 
object-less  consciousness,  the  reality,  and  the  bliss.  He  is  the 
seer  of  all  seeing,  the  hearer  of  all  hearing  and  the  knower  of  all 
knowledge.  He  sees  but  is  not  seen,  hears  but  is  not  heard,  knows 
but  is  not  known.  He  is  the  light  of  all  lights.  He  is  like  a  lump 
of  salt,  with  no  inner  or  outer,  which  consists  through  and  through 
entirely  of  savour;  as  in  truth  this  Atman  has  no  inner  or  outer, 
but  consists  through  and  through  entirely  of  knowledge.  Bliss  is 
not  an  attribute  of  it  but  it  is  bliss  itself.  The  state  of  Brahman 
is  thus  likened  unto  the  state  of  dreamless  sleep.  And  he  who 
has  reached  this  bliss  is  beyond  any  fear.    It  is  dearer  to  us  than 

^  Cha.  VIII.  7-12. 


48  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

son,  brother,  wife,  or  husband,  wealth  or  prosperity.  It  is  for  it 
and  by  it  that  things  appear  dear  to  us.  It  is  the  dearest  par 
excellence,  our  inmost  Atman.  All  limitation  is  fraught  with  pain; 
it  is  the  infinite  alone  that  is  the  highest  bliss.  When  a  man 
receives  this  rapture,  then  is  he  full  of  bliss ;  for  who  could  breathe, 
who  live,  if  that  bliss  had  not  filled  this  void  (akdsd)}  It  is  he 
who  behaves  as  bliss.  For  when  a  man  finds  his  peace,  his  fearless 
support  in  that  invisible,  supportless,  inexpressible,  unspeakable 
one,  then  has  he  attained  peace. 

Place  of  Brahman  in  the  Upanisads. 

There  is  the  atman  not  in  man  alone  but  in  all  objects  of  the 
universe,  the  sun,  the  moon,  the  world ;  and  Brahman  is  this  atman. 
There  is  nothing  outside  the  atman,  and  therefore  there  is  no 
plurality  at  all.  As  from  a  lump  of  clay  all  that  is  made  of  clay 
is  known,  as  from  an  ingot  of  black  iron  all  that  is  made  of 
black  iron  is  known,  so  when  this  atman  the  Brahman  is  known 
everything  else  is  known.  The  essence  in  man  and  the  essence 
of  the  universe  are  one  and  the  same,  and  it  is  Brahman. 

Now  a  question  may  arise  as  to  what  may  be  called  the  nature 
of  the  phenomenal  world  of  colour,  sound,  taste,  and  smell.  But 
we  must  also  remember  that  the  Upanisads  do  not  represent  so 
much  a  conceptional  system  of  philosophy  as  visions  of  the  seers 
who  are  possessed  by  the  spirit  of  this  Brahman.  They  do  not 
notice  even  the  contradiction  between  the  Brahman  as  unity  and 
nature  in  its  diversity.  When  the  empirical  aspect  of  diversity 
attracts  their  notice,  they  affirm  it  and  yet  declare  that  it  is  all 
Brahman.  From  Brahman  it  has  come  forth  and  to  it  will  it 
return.  He  has  himself  created  it  out  of  himself  and  then  entered 
into  it  as  its  inner  controller  (antarydmin).  Here  is  thus  a  glaring 
dualistic  trait  of  the  world  of  matter  and  Brahman  as  its  controller, 
though  in  other  places  we  find  it  asserted  most  emphatically  that 
these  are  but  names  and  forms,  and  when  Brahman  is  known 
everything  else  is  known.  No  attempts  at  reconciliation  are  made 
for  the  sake  of  the  consistency  of  conceptual  utterance,  as 
^ahkara  the  great  professor  of  Vedanta  does  by  explaining  away 
the  dualistic  texts.  The  universe  is  said  to  be  a  reality,  but  the 
real  in  it  is  Brahman  alone.  It  is  on  account  of  Brahman  that 
the  fire  burns  and  the  wind  blows.  He  is  the  active  principle  in 
the  entire  universe,  and  yet  the  most  passive  and  unmoved.    The 


Ill]  Brahman  in  the  Upanisads  49 

world  is  his  body,  yet  he  is  the  soul  within.  "He  creates  all, 
wills  all,  smells  ail,  tastes  all,  he  has  pervaded  all,  silent  and  un- 
affected^". He  is  below,  above,  in  the  back,  in  front,  in  the  south 
and  in  the  north,  he  is  all  this-.  "These  rivers  in  the  east  and 
in  the  west  originating  from  the  ocean,  return  back  into  it  and 
become  the  ocean  themselves,  though  they  do  not  know  that  they 
are  so.  So  also  all  these  people  coming  into  being  from  the  Being 
do  not  know  that  they  have  come  from  the  Being.... That  which 
is  the  subtlest  that  is  the  self,  that  is  all  this,  the  truth,  that  self 
thou  art  O  Svetaketu^."  "Brahman,"  as  Deussen  points  out, 
"was  regarded  as  the  cause  antecedent  in  time,  and  the  universe 
as  the  effect  proceeding  from  it;  the  inner  dependence  of  the 
universe  on  Brahman  and  its  essential  identity  with  him  was 
represented  as  a  creation  of  the  universe  by  and  out  of  Brahman." 
Thus  it  is  said  in  Mund.  i.  i.  7: 

As  a  spider  ejects  and  retracts  (the  threads), 

As  the  plants  shoot  forth  on  the  earth, 

As  the  hairs  on  the  head  and  body  of  the  living  man, 

So  from  the  imperishable  all  that  is  here. 

As  the  sparks  from  the  well-kindled  fire, 

In  nature  akin  to  it,  spring  forth  in  their  thousands, 

So,  my  dear  sir,  from  the  imperishable 

Living  beings  of  many  kinds  go  forth, 

And  again  return  into  him'*. 

Yet  this  world  principle  is  the  dearest  to  us  and  the  highest 
teaching  of  the  Upanisads  is  "That  art  thou." 

Again  the  growth  of  the  doctrine  that  Brahman  is  the  "inner 
controller"  in  all  the  parts  and  forces  of  nature  and  of  mankind  as 
the  atman  thereof,  and  that  all  the  effects  of  the  universe  are  the 
result  of  his  commands  which  no  one  can  outstep,  gave  rise  to  a 
theistic  current  of  thought  in  which  Brahman  is  held  as  standing 
aloof  as  God  and  controlling  the  world.  It  is  by  his  ordaining,  it 
is  said,  that  the  sun  and  moon  are  held  together,  and  the  sky  and 
earth  stand  held  together^  God  and  soul  are  distinguished  again 
in  the  famous  verse  of  Svetasvatara*^: 

Two  bright-feathered  bosom  friends 

Flit  around  one  and  the  same  tree; 

One  of  them  tastes  the  sweet  berries. 

The  other  without  eating  merely  gazes  down. 

*  Cha.  III.  14.  4.       ^  Ibid.  vii.  25.  i ;  also  Mundaka  n.  2.  11.       '  Cha.  vi.  10. 

*  Deussen's  translation  in  Philosophy  of  the  Upanishads,  p.  164.       *  Brh.  in.  8.  i. 
®  Sveta^vatara  IV.  6,  and  Mundaka  ill.  i.  i,  also  Deussen's  translation  in  Philosophy 

of  the  Upanishads,  p.  177. 

D.  4 


50  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

But  in  spite  of  this  apparent  theistic  tendency  and  the  occa- 
sional use  of  the  word  Isa  or  Isdna,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt 
that  theism  in  its  true  sense  was  never  prominent,  and  this  acknow- 
ledgement of  a  supreme  Lord  was  also  an  offshoot  of  the  exalted 
position  of  the  atman  as  the  supreme  principle.  Thus  we  read  in 
Kausitaki  Upanisad  3.  9,  "He  is  not  great  by  good  deeds  nor  low 
by  evil  deeds,  but  it  is  he  makes  one  do  good  deeds  whom  he 
wants  to  raise,  and  makes  him  commit  bad  deeds  whom  he  wants 
to  lower  down.  He  is  the  protector  of  the  universe,  he  is  the 
master  of  the  world  and  the  lord  of  all;  he  is  my  soul  {dtman)." 
Thus  the  lord  in  spite  of  his  greatness  is  still  my  goul.  There  are 
again  other  passages  which  regard  Brahman  as  being  at  once 
immanent  and  transcendent.  Thus  it  is  said  that  there  is  that 
eternally  existing  tree  whose  roots  grow  upward  and  whose 
branches  grow  downward.  All  the  universes  are  supported  in  it 
and  no  one  can  transcend  it.  This  is  that,  " . .  .from  its  fear  the  fire 
burns,  the  sun  shines,  and  from  its  fear  Indra,  Vayu  and  Death 
the  fifth  (with  the  other  two)  run  on\" 

If  we  overlook  the  different  shades  in  the  development  of  the 
conception  of  Brahman  in  the  Upanisads  and  look  to  the  main- 
currents,  we  find  that  the  strongest  current  of  thought  which  has 
found  expression  in  the  majority  of  the  texts  is  this  that  the 
Atman  or  the  Brahman  is  the  only  reality  and  that  besides  this 
everything  else  is  unreal.  The  other  current  of  thought  which  is 
to  be  found  in  many  of  the  texts  is  the  pantheistic  creed  that 
identifies  the  universe  with  the  Atman  or  Brahman.  The  third 
current  is  that  of  theism  which  looks  upon  Brahman  as  the  Lord 
controlling  the  world.  It  is  because  these  ideas  were  still  in  the 
melting  pot,  in  which  none  of  them  were  systematically  worked 
out,  that  the  later  exponents  of  Vedanta,  Safikara,  Ramanuja, 
and  others  quarrelled  over  the  meanings  of  texts  in  order  to 
develop  a  consistent  systematic  philosophy  out  of  them.  Thus  it 
is  that  the  doctrine  of  Maya  which  is  slightly  hinted  at  once  in 
Brhadaranyaka  and  thrice  in  Svetasvatara,  becomes  the  founda- 
tion of  Sankara's  philosophy  of  the  Vedanta  in  which  Brahman 
alone  is  real  and  all  else  beside  him  is  unreal^ 

1  Katha  ii.  6.  i  and  3.  -  Brh.  II.  5.  19,  ^vet.  I.  10,  iv.  9,  10. 


Ill]  The  World  51 

The  World. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  universe  has  come  out  of 
Brahman,  has  its  essence  in  Brahman,  and  will  also  return  back 
to  it.  But  in  spite  of  its  existence  as  Brahman  its  character  as 
represented  to  experience  could  not  be  denied.  Safikara  held 
that  the  Upanisads  referred  to  the  external  world  and  accorded 
a  reality  to  it  consciously  with  the  purpose  of  treating  it  as  merely 
relatively  real,  which  will  eventually  appear  as  unreal  as  soon 
as  the  ultimate  truth,  the  Brahman,  is  known.  This  however 
remains  to  be  modified  to  this  extent  that  the  sages  had  not 
probably  any  conscious  purpose  of  according  a  relative  reality  to 
the  phenomenal  world,  but  in  spite  of  regarding  Brahman  as  the 
highest  reality  they  could  not  ignore  the  claims  of  the  exterior 
world,  and  had  to  accord  a  reality  to  it.  The  inconsistency  of  this 
reality  of  the  phenomenal  world  with  the  ultimate  and  only 
reality  of  Brahman  was  attempted  to  be  reconciled  by  holding 
that  this  world  is  not  beside  him  but  it  has  come  out  of  him,  it 
is  maintained  in  him  and  it  will  return  back  to  him. 

The  world  is  sometimes  spoken  of  in  its  twofold  aspect,  the 
organic  and  the  inorganic.  All  organic  things,  whether  plants, 
animals  or  men,  have  souls\  Brahman  desiring  to  be  many  created 
fire  {tejas),  water  (ap)  and  earth  {ksiti).  Then  the  self-existent 
Brahman  entered  into  these  three,  and  it  is  by  their  combination 
that  all  other  bodies  are  formed  I  So  all  other  things  are  produced 
as  a  result  of  an  alloying  or  compounding  of  the  parts  of  these  three 
together.  In  this  theory  of  the  threefold  division  of  the  primitive 
elements  lies  the  earliest  germ  of  the  later  distinction  (especially 
in  the  Samkhya  school)  of  pure  infinitesimal  s\ihstdiV\CQs{tanmdlra) 
and  gross  elements,  and  the  theory  that  each  gross  substance  is 
composed  of  the  atoms  of  the  primary  elements.  And  in  Prasna 
IV.  8  we  find  the  gross  elements  distinguished  from  their  subtler 
natures,  e.g.  earth  (prtkivi),  and  the  subtler  state  of  earth 
{prthivimdtra).  In  the  Taittirlya,  II.  i,  however,  ether  {akdsd) 
is  also  described  as  proceeding  from  Brahman,  and  the  other 
elements,  air,  fire,  water,  and  earth,  are  described  as  each  pro- 
ceeding directly  from  the  one  which  directly  preceded  it. 

^  Cha.  VI.  II.  -  ibid.  VI.  2,  3,  4. 

4—2 


52  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

The  World-Soul. 

The  conception  of  a  world-soul  related  to  the  universe  as  the 
soul  of  man  to  his  body  is  found  for  the  first  time  in  R.V.  X.  121.  i , 
where  he  is  said  to  have  sprung  forth  as  the  firstborn  of  creation 
from  the  primeval  waters.    This  being  has  twice  been  referred 
to  in  the  Svetasvatara,  in  III.  4  and  IV.  1 2.    It  is  indeed  very  strange 
that  this  being  is  not  referred  to  in  any  of  the  earlier  Upanisads. 
In  the  two  passages  in  which  he  has  been  spoken  of,  his  mythical 
character  is  apparent.     He   is  regarded  as  one  of  the  earlier 
products  in  the  process  of  cosmic  creation,  but  his  importance 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  development  of  the  theory  of 
Brahman  or  Atman  is  alrhost  nothing.   The  fact  that^n either  the 
Purusa,  nor  the  Visvakarma,  nor  the  Hiranyagarbha  played  an 
important  part  in  the  earlier   development  of  the  Upanisads 
leads  me  to  think  that  the  Upanisad  doctrines  were  not  directly 
developed  from  the  monotheistic  tendencies  of  the  later  Rg-Veda 
speculations.  The  passages  in  Svetasvatara  clearly  show  how  from 
tTie  supreme  eminence  that  he  had  in  R.V.  X.  121,  Hiranyagarbha 
had  been  brought  to  the  level  of  one  of  the  created  beings.   Deussen 
in  explaining  the  philosophical  significance  of  the  Hiranyagarbha 
doctrine  of  the  Upanisads  says  that  the  "entire  objective  universe  is 
possible  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  sustained  by  a  knowing  subject.    This 
subject  as  a  sustainer  of  the  objective  universe  is  manifested  in 
all  individual  objects  but  is  by  no  means  identical  with  them.    For 
the  individual  objects  pass  away  but  the  objective  universe  con- 
tinues to  exist  without  them;  there  exists  therefore  the  eternal 
knowing  subject  also  {hiranyagarbha)  by  whom  it  is  sustained. 
Space  and  time  are  derived  from  this  subject.    It  is  itself  accord- 
ingly not  in  space  and  does  not  belong  to  time,  and  therefore 
from  an  empirical  point  of  view  it  is  in  general  non-existent;  it 
has  no  empirical  but  only  a  metaphysical  reality^"    This  however 
seems  to  me  to  be  wholly  irrelevant,  since  the  Hiranyagarbha 
doctrine  cannot  be  supposed  to  have  any  philosophical  importance 
in  the  Upanisads. 

The  Theory  of  Causation. 
There  was  practically  no  systematic  theory  of  causation  in  the 
Upanisads.    Sankara,  the  later  exponent  of  Vedanta  philosophy, 
always  tried  to  show  that  the  Upanisads  looked  upon  the  cause 

*  Deussen's /%//(PJ^//^^  of  the  Upanishads,  p.  201. 


Ill]  Transmigration  53 

as  mere  ground  of  change  which  though  unchanged  in  itself  in 
reaHty  had  only  an  appearance  of  suffering  change.  This  he  did 
on  the  strength  of  a  series  of  examples  in  the  Chandogya 
Upanisad  (VI.  i)  in  which  the  material  cause,  e.g.  the  clay,  is 
spoken  of  as  the  only  reality  in  all  its  transformations  as  the  pot, 
the  jug  or  the  plate.  It  is  said  that  though  there  are  so  many 
diversities  of  appearance  that  one  is  called  the  plate,  the  other  the 
pot,  and  the  other  the  jug,  yet  these  are  only  empty  distinctions  of 
name  and  form,  for  the  only  thing  real  in  them  is  the  earth  which 
in  its  essence  remains  ever  the  same  whether  you  call  it  the  pot, 
plate,  or  jug.  So  it  is  that  the  ultimate  cause,  the  unchangeable 
Brahman,  remains  ever  constant,  though  it  may  appear  to  suffer 
change  as  the  manifold  world  outside.  This  world  is  thus  only 
an  unsubstantial  appearance,  a  mirage  imposed  upon  Brahman, 
the  real  par  excellence. 

It  seems  however  that  though  such  a  view  may  be  regarded 
as  having  been  expounded  in  the  Upanisads  in  an  imperfect 
manner,  there  is  also  side  by  side  the  other  view  which  looks 
upon  the  effect  as  the  product  of  a  real  change  wrought  in  the 
cause  itself  through  the  action  and  combination  of  the  elements 
of  diversity  in  it.  Thus  when  the  different  objects  of  nature  have 
been  spoken  of  in  one  place  as  the  product  of  the  combination 
of  the  three  elements  fire,  water  and  earth,  the  effect  signifies  a  real 
change  produced  by  their  compounding.  This  is  in  germ  (as  we 
shall  see  hereafter)  the  Parinama  theory  of  causation  advocated 
by  the  Samkhya  schools 

Doctrine  of  Transmigration. 

When  the  Vedic  people  witnessed  the  burning  of  a  dead  body 
they  supposed  that  the  eye  of  the  man  went  to  the  sun,  his  breath 
to  the  wind,  his  speech  to  the  fire,  his  limbs  to  the  different  parts 
of  the  universe.  They  also  believed  as  we  have  already  seen  in 
the  recompense  of  good  and  bad  actions  in  worlds  other  than  our 
own,  and  though  we  hear  of  such  things  as  the  passage  of  the 
human  soul  into  trees,  etc.,  the  tendency  towards  transmigration 
had  but  little  developed  at  the  time. 

In  the  Upanisads  however  we  find  a  clear  development  in 
the  direction  of  transmigration  in  two  distinct  stages.  In  the  one 
the  Vedic  idea  of  a  recompense  in  the  other  world  is  combined  with 

^  Cha.  VI.  2-4. 


54  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

the  doctrine  of  transmigration,  whereas  in  the  other  the  doctrine 
of  transmigration  comes  to  the  forefront  in  supersession  of  the 
idea  of  a  recompense  in  the  other  world.  Thus  it  is  said  that 
those  who  performed  charitable  deeds  or  such  public  works  as  the 
digging  of  wells,  etc.,  follow  after  death  the  way  of  the  fathers 
{pitrydna\  in  which  the  soul  after  death  enters  first  into  smoke, 
then  into  night,  the  dark  half  of  the  month,  etc.,  and  at  last  reaches 
•^7  the  moon ;  after  a  residence  there  as  long  as  the  remnant  of  his 

y^'T^  good  deeds  remains  he  descends  again  through  ether,  wind,  smoke, 
r  mist,  cloud,  rain,  herbage,  food  and  seed,  and  through  the  assimi- 
lation of  food  by  man  he  enters  the  womb  of  the  mother  and  is 
born  again.  Here  we  see  that  the  soul  had  not  only  a  recompense 
in  the  world  of  the  moon,  but  was  re-born  again  in  this  worlds 

The  other  way  is  the  way  of  gods  {devaydna),  meant  for  those 
who  cultivate  faith  and  asceticism  {tapas).  These  souls  at  death 
enter  successively  into  flame,  day,  bright  half  of  the  month,  bright 
half  of  the  year,  sun,  moon,  lightning,  and  then  finally  into 
Brahman  never  to  return.  Deussen  says  that  "the  meaning  of 
the  whole  is  that  the  soul  on  the  way  of  the  gods  reaches  regions 
of  ever-increasing  light,  in  which  is  concentrated  all  that  is  bright 
and  radiant  as  stations  on  the  way  to  Brahman  the  'light  of 
lights '  "  {jyotisdm  jyotihy. 

The  other  line  of  thought  is  a  direct  reference  to  the  doctrine 
of  transmigration  unmixed  with  the  idea  of  reaping  the  fruits  of 
his  deeds  {karma)  by  passing  through  the  other  worlds  and  with- 
out reference  to  the  doctrine  of  the  ways  of  the  fathers  and  gods, 
the  Ydnas.  Thus  Yajnavalkya  says,  "when  the  soul  becomes 
weak  (apparent  weakness  owing  to  the  weakness  of  the  body  with 
which  it  is  associated)  and  falls  into  a  swoon  as  it  were,  these  senses 
go  towards  it.  It  (Soul)  takes  these  light  particles  within  itself  and 
centres  itself  only  in  the  heart.  Thus  when  the  person  in  the  eye 
turns  back,  then  the  soul  cannot  know  colour;  (the  senses)  become 
one(with  him);  (people  about  him)say  he  does  not  see;  (the  senses) 
become  one  (with  him),  he  does  not  smell,  (the  senses)  become 
one  (with  him),  he  does  not  taste,  (the  senses)  become  one  (with 
him),  he  does  not  speak,  (the  senses)  become  one  (with  him),  he 
does  not  hear,  (the  senses)  become  one  (with  him),  he  does  not 
think,  (the  senses)  become  one  with  him,  he  does  not  touch,  (the 
senses)  become  one  with  him,  he  does  not  know,  they  say.    The 

^  Cha.  V.  lo.  ^  Deussen's  Philosophy  of  the  Upanishads,  p.  335. 


Ill]  Transmigration  55 

tip  of  his  heart  shines  and  by  that  shining  this  soul  goes  out. 
When  he  goes  out  either  through  the  eye,  the  head,  or  by  any 
other  part  of  the  body,  the  vital  function  {prdnd)  follows  and  all 
the  senses  follow  the  vital  function  {prdna)  in  coming  out.  He 
is  then  with  determinate  consciousness  and  as  such  he  comes 
out.  Knowledge,  the  deeds  as  well  as  previous  experience  {prajna) 
accompany  him.  Just  as  a  caterpillar  going  to  the  end  of  a  blade 
of  grass,  by  undertaking  a  separate  movement  collects  itself,  so 
this  self  after  destroying  this  body,  removing  ignorance,  by  a 
separate  movement  collects  itself.  Just  as  a  goldsmith  taking  a 
small  bit  of  gold,  gives  to  it  a  newer  and  fairer  form,  so  the  soul 
after  destroying  this  body  and  removing  ignorance  fashions  a 
newer  and  fairer  form  as  of  the  Pitrs,  the  Gandharvas,  the  gods, 
of  Prajapati  or  Brahma  or  of  any  other  being.... As  he  acts  and 
behaves  so  he  becomes,  good  by  good  deeds,  bad  by  bad  deeds, 
virtuous  by  virtuous  deeds  and  vicious  by  vice.  The  man  is  full 
of  desires.  As  he  desires  so  he  wills,  as  he  wills  so  he  works,  as 
the  work  is  done  so  it  happens.  There  is  also  a  verse,  being 
attached  to  that  he  wants  to  gain  by  karma  that  to  which  he 
was  attached.  Having  reaped  the  full  fruit  (lit.  gone  to  the 
end)  of  the  karma  that  he  does  here,  he  returns  back  to  this 
world  for  doing  karma^  So  it  is  the  case  with  those  who  have 
desires.  He  who  has  no  desires,  who  had  no  desires,  who  has 
freed  himself  from  all  desires,  is  satisfied  in  his  desires  and  in 
himself,  his  senses  do  not  go  out.  He  being  Brahma  attains 
Brahmahood.  Thus  the  verse  says,  when  all  the  desires  that  are 
in  his  heart  are  got  rid  of,  the  mortal  becomes  immortal  and 
attains  Brahma  here  "  (Brh.  IV.  iv.  1-7). 

A  close  consideration  of  the  above  passage  shows  that  the 
self  itself  destroyed  the  body  and  built  up  a  newer  and  fairer 
frame  by  its  own  activity  when  it  reached  the  end  of  the  present 
life.  At  the  time  of  death,  the  self  collected  within  itself  all 
senses  and  faculties  and  after  death  all  its  previous  knowledge, 
work  and  experience  accompanied  him.  The  falling  off  of  the 
body  at  the  time  of  death  is  only  for  the  building  of  a  newer 
body  either  in  this  world  or  in  the  other  worlds.  The  self  which 
thus  takes  rebirth  is  regarded  as  an  aggregation  of  diverse  cate- 
gories. Thus  it  is  said  that  "he  is  of  the  essence  of  understanding, 

^  It  is  possible  that  there  is  a  vague  and  obscure  reference  here  to  the  doctrine  that 
the  fruits  of  our  deeds  are  reaped  in  other  worlds. 


56  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

of  the  vital  function,  of  the  visual  sense,  of  the  auditory  sense,  of 
the  essence  of  the  five  elements  (which  would  make  up  the 
physical  body  in  accordance  with  its  needs)  or  the  essence  of  de- 
sires, of  the  essence  of  restraint  of  desires,  of  the  essence  of  anger,  of 
the  essence  of  turning  off  from  all  anger,  of  the  essence  of  dharma, 
of  the  essence  of  adharma,  of  the  essence  of  all  that  is  this 
(manifest)  and  that  is  that  (unmanifest  or  latent)"  (Brh.  IV.  iv.  5). 
The  self  that  undergoes  rebirth  is  thus  a  unity  not  only  of  moral 
and  psychological  tendencies,  but  also  of  all  the  elements  which 
compose  the  physical  world.  The  whole  process  of  his  changes 
follows  from  this  nature  of  his  ;  for  whatever  he  desires,  he  wills 
and  whatever  he  wills  he  acts,  and  in  accordance  with  his  acts 
the  fruit  happens.  The  whole  logic  of  the  genesis  of  karma  and 
its  fruits  is  held  up  within  him,  for  he  is  a  unity  of  the  moral 
and  psychological  tendencies  on  the  one  hand  and  elements  of 
the  physical  world  on  the  other. 

The  self  that  undergoes  rebirth  being  a  combination  of  diverse 
psychological  and  moral  tendencies  and  the  physical  elements 
holds  within  itself  the  principle  of  all  its  transformations.  The 
root  of  all  this  is  the  desire  of  the  self  and  the  consequent  fruition 
of  it  through  will  and  act.  When  the  self  continues  to  desire  and 
act,  it  reaps  the  fruit  and  comes  again  to  this  world  for  performing 
acts.  This  world  is  generally  regarded  as  the  field  for  perform- 
ing karma,  whereas  other  worlds  are  regarded  as  places  where  the 
fruits  of  karma  are  reaped  by  those  born  as  celestial  beings.  But 
there  is  no  emphasis  in  the  Upanisads  on  this  point.  The  Pitryana 
theory  is  not  indeed  given  up,  but  it  seems  only  to  form  a  part 
in  the  larger  scheme  of  rebirth  in  other  worlds  and  sometimes  in 
this  world  too.  All  the  course  of  these  rebirths  is  effected  by  the 
self  itself  by  its  own  desires,  and  if  it  ceases  to  desire,  it  suffers  no 
rebirth  and  becomes  immortal.  The  most  distinctive  feature  of 
this  doctrine  is  this,  that  it  refers  to  desires  as  the  cause  of  rebirth 
and  not  karma.  Karma  only  comes  as  the  connecting  link  between 
desires  and  rebirth — for  it  is  said  that  whatever  a  man  desires  he 
wills,  and  whatever  he  wills  he  acts. 

Thus  it  is  said  in  another  place  "  he  who  knowingly  desires  is 
born  by  his  desires  in  those  places  (accordingly),  but  for  him  whose 
desires  have  been  fulfilled  and  who  has  realized  himself,  all  his 
desires  vanish  here"  (Mund  III.  2.  2).  This  destruction  of  desires 
is  effected  by  the  right  knowledge  of  the  self    "  He  who  knows 


Ill]  Transmigration  57 

his  self  as  '  I  am  the  person '  for  what  wish  and  for  what  desire 
will  he  trouble  the  body,... even  being  here  if  we  know  it,  well  if 
we  do  not,  what  a  great  destruction"  (Brh.  IV.  iv.  12  and  14).  "  In 
former  times  the  wise  men  did  not  desire  sons,  thinking  what 
shall  we  do  with  sons  since  this  our  self  is  the  universe  "  (Brh.  IV. 
iv.  22).  None  of  the  complexities  of  the  karma  doctrine  which 
we  find  later  on  in  more  recent  developments  of  Hindu  thought 
can  be  found  in  the  Upanisads.  The  whole  scheme  is  worked 
out  on  the  principle  of  desire  {kanid)  and  karma  only  serves  as 
the  link  between  it  and  the  actual  effects  desired  and  willed  by 
the  person. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this  connection  that  consistently 
with  the  idea  that  desires  (kama)  led  to  rebirth,  we  find  that 
in  some  Upanisads  the  discharge  of  the  semen  in  the  womb  of  a 
woman  as  a  result  of  desires  is  considered  as  the  first  birth  of 
man,  and  the  birth  of  the  son  as  the  second  birth  and  the  birth 
elsewhere  after  death  is  regarded  as  the  third  birth.  Thus  it  is 
said,  "It  is  in  man  that  there  comes  first  the  embryo,  which  is 
but  the  semen  which  is  produced  as  the  essence  of  all  parts  of 
his  body  and  which  holds  itself  within  itself,  and  when  it  is  put 
in  a  woman,  that  is  his  first  birth.  That  embryo  then  becomes 
part  of  the  woman's  self  like  any  part  of  her  body ;  it  therefore 
does  not  hurt  her ;  she  protects  and  develops  the  embryo  within 
herself  As  she  protects  (the  embryo)  so  she  also  should  be 
protected.  It  is  the  woman  who  bears  the  embryo  (before  birth) 
but  when  after  birth  the  father  takes  care  of  the  son  always,  he 
is  taking  care  only  of  himself,  for  it  is  through  sons  alone  that 
the  continuity  of  the  existence  of  people  can  be  maintained.  This 
is  his  second  birth.  He  makes  this  self  of  his  a  representative 
for  performing  all  the  virtuous  deeds.  The  other  self  of  his  after 
realizing  himself  and  attaining  age  goes  away  and  when  going 
away  he  is  born  again  that  is  his  third  birth  "  (Aitareya,  II.  I-4)^ 
No  special  emphasis  is  given  in  the  Upanisads  to  the  sex-desire 
or  the  desire  for  a  son ;  for,  being  called  kama,  whatever  was  the 
desire  for  a  son  was  the  same  as  the  desire  for  money  and  the 
desire  for  money  was  the  same  as  any  other  worldly  desire  (Brh. 
IV.  iv.  22),  and  hence  sex-desires  stand  on  the  same  plane  as  any 
other  desire. 

^  See  also  Kausitaki,  u.  15. 


58  The  Earlier  Upanisads  [ch. 

Emancipation. 

The  doctrine  which  next  attracts  our  attention  in  this  connec- 
tion is  that  of  emancipation  {muktt).  Already  we  know  that  the 
doctrine  of  Devayana  held  that  those  who  were  faithful  and  per- 
formed asceticism  {tapas)  went  by  the  way  of  the  gods  through 
successive  stages  never  to  return  to  the  world  and  suffer  rebirth. 
This  could  be  contrasted  with  the  way  of  the  fathers  {pitrydnd) 
where  the  dead  were  for  a  time  recompensed  in  another  world  and 
then  had  to  suffer  rebirth.  Thus  we  find  that  those  who  are  faith- 
ful and  perform  sraddhd  had  a  distinctly  different  type  of  goal  from 
those  who  performed  ordinary  virtues,  such  as  those  of  a  general 
altruistic  nature.  This  distinction  attains  its  fullest  development 
in  the  doctrine  of  emancipation.  Emancipation  or  Mukti  means 
in  the  Upanisads  the  state  of  infiniteness  that  a  man  attains 
when  he  knows  his  own  self  and  thus  becomes  Brahman.  The 
ceaseless  course  of  transmigration  is  only  for  those  who  are 
ignorant.  The  wise  man  however  who  has  divested  himself  of  all 
passions  and  knows  himself  to  be  Brahman,  at  once  becomes 
Brahman  and  no  bondage  of  any  kind  can  ever  affect  him. 

He  who  beholds  that  loftiest  and  deepest, 

For  him  the  fetters  of  the  heart  break  asunder, 

For  him  all  doubts  are  solved, 

And  his  works  become  nothingness  ^ 
The  knowledge  of  the  self  reveals  the  fact  that  all  our  passions 
and  antipathies,  all  our  limitations  of  experience,  all  that  is 
ignoble  and  small  in  us,  all  that  is  transient  and  finite  in  us  is 
false.  We  "  do  not  know  "  but  are  "  pure  knowledge  "  ourselves. 
We  are  not  limited  by  anything,  for  we  are  the  infinite;  we  do 
not  suffer  death,  for  we  are  immortal.  Emancipation  thus  is  not 
a  new  acquisition,  product,  an  effect,  or  result  of  any  action,  but 
it  always  exists  as  the  Truth  of  our  nature.  We  are  always 
emancipated  and  always  free.  We  do  not  seem  to  be  so  and 
seem  to  suffer  rebirth  and  thousands  of  other  troubles  only  because 
we  do  not  know  the  true  nature  of  our  self  Thus  it  is  that  the 
true  knowledge  of  self  does  not  lead  to  emancipation  but  is 
emancipation  itself  All  sufferings  and  limitations  are  true  only 
so  long  as  we  do  not  know  our  self  Emancipation  is  the  natural 
and  only  goal  of  man  simply  because  it  represents  the  true  nature 
and  essence  of  man.    It  is  the  realization  of  our  own  nature  that 

^  Deussen's  Philosophy  of  the  Upanishads,  p.  352. 


Ill]  Emancipation  59 

is  called  emancipation.  Since  we  are  all  already  and  always  in 
our  own  true  nature  and  as  such  emancipated,  the  only  thing 
necessary  for  us  is  to  know  that  we  are  so.  Self-knowledge  is  there- 
fore the  only  desideratum  which  can  wipe  off  all  false  knowledge, 
all  illusions  of  death  and  rebirth.  The  story  is  told  in  the  Katha 
Upanisad  that  Yama,  the  lord  of  death,  promised  Naciketas, 
the  son  of  Gautama,  to  grant  him  three  boons  at  his  choice. 
Naciketas,  knowing  that  his  father  Gautama  was  offended  with 
him,  said,  "  O  death  let  Gautama  be  pleased  in  mind  and  forget 
his  anger  against  me."  This  being  granted  Naciketas  asked  the 
second  boon  that  the  fire  by  which  heaven  is  gained  should  be 
made  known  to  him.  This  also  being  granted  Naciketas  said, 
"  There  is  this  enquiry,  some  say  the  soul  exists  after  the  death 
of  man ;  others  say  it  does  not  exist.  This  I  should  like  to  know 
instructed  by  thee.  This  is  my  third  boon."  Yama  said,  "It  was 
inquired  of  old,  even  by  the  gods  ;  for  it  is  not  easy  to  under- 
stand it.  Subtle  is  its  nature,  choose  another  boon.  Do  not 
compel  me  to  this."  Naciketas  said,  "  Even  by  the  gods  was  it 
inquired  before,  and  even  thou  O  Death  sayest  that  it  is  not  easy 
to  understand  it,  but  there  is  no  other  speaker  to  be  found  like 
thee.  There  is  no  other  boon  like  this."  Yama  said, "  Choose  sons 
and  grandsons  who  may  live  a  hundred  years,  choose  herds  of 
cattle ;  choose  elephants  and  gold  and  horses ;  choose  the  wide 
expanded  earth,  and  live  thyself  as  many  years  as  thou  wishest. 
Or  if  thou  knowest  a  boon  like  this  choose  it  together  with  wealth 
and  far-extending  life.  Be  a  king  on  the  wide  earth.  I  will  make 
thee  the  enjoyer  of  all  desires.  All  those  desires  that  are  difficult 
to  gain  in  the  world  of  mortals,  all  those  ask  thou  at  thy  pleasure; 
those  fair  nymphs  with  their  chariots,  with  their  musical  instru- 
ments; the  like  of  them  are  not  to  be  gained  by  men.  I  will  give 
them  to  thee,  but  do  not  ask  the  question  regarding  death." 
Naciketas  replied,  "  All  those  enjoyments  are  of  to-morrow  and 
they  only  weaken  the  senses.  All  life  is  short,  with  thee  the 
dance  and  song.  Man  cannot  be  satisfied  with  wealth,  we  could 
obtain  wealth,  as  long  as  we  did  not  reach  you  we  live  only  as 
long  as  thou  pleasest.  The  boon  which  I  choose  I  have  said." 
Yama  said,  "  One  thing  is  good,  another  is  pleasant.  Blessed  is 
he  who  takes  the  good,  but  he  who  chooses  the  pleasant  loses 
the  object  of  man.  But  thou  considering  the  objects  of  desire, 
hast  abandoned  them.     These  two,  ignorance  (whose  object  is 


6o  The  Earlier  Upamsads  [ch. 

what  is  pleasant)  and  knowledge  (whose  object  is  what  is  good), 
are  known  to  be  far  asunder,  and  to  lead  to  different  goals. 
Believing  that  this  world  exists  and  not  the  other,  the  careless 
youth  is  subject  to  my  sway.  That  knowledge  which  thou  hast 
asked  is  not  to  be  obtained  by  argument.  I  know  worldly  hap- 
piness is  transient  for  that  firm  one  is  not  to  be  obtained  by  what 
is  not  firm.  The  wise  by  concentrating  on  the  soul,  knowing  him 
whom  it  is  hard  to  behold,  leaves  both  grief  and  joy.  Thee 
O  Naciketas,  I  believe  to  be  like  a  house  whose  door  is  open  to 
Brahman.  Brahman  is  deathless,  whoever  knows  him  obtains 
whatever  he  wishes.  The  wise  man  is  not  born;  he  does  not  die; 
he  is  not  produced  from  anywhere.  Unborn,  eternal,  the  soul  is 
not  slain,  though  the  body  is  slain ;  subtler  than  what  is  subtle, 
greater  than  what  is  great,  sitting  it  goes  far,  lying  it  goes  every- 
where. Thinking  the  soul  as  unbodily  among  bodies,  firm  among 
fleeting  things,  the  wise  man  casts  off  all  grief.  The  soul  cannot 
be  gained  by  eloquence,  by  understanding,  or  by  learning.  It 
can  be  obtained  by  him  alone  whom  it  chooses.  To  him  it  reveals 
its  own  nature^"  So  long  as  the  Self  identifies  itself  with  its  desires, 
he  wills  and  acts  according  to  them  and  reaps  the  fruits  in  the 
present  and  in  future  lives.  But  when  he  comes  to  know  the 
highest  truth  about  himself,  that  he  is  the  highest  essence  and  prin- 
ciple of  the  universe,  the  immortal  and  the  infinite,he  ceases  to  have 
desires,  and  receding  from  all  desires  realizes  the  ultimate  truth 
of  himself  in  his  own  infinitude.  Man  is  as  it  were  the  epitome 
of  the  universe  and  he  holds  within  himself  the  fine  constituents 
of  the  gross  body  {annainaya  kosa),  the  vital  functions  {prana- 
fnaya  kosd)  of  life,  the  will  and  desire  {manomaya)  and  the 
thoughts  and  ideas  {vijhdnamaya),  and  so  long  as  he  keeps  him- 
self in  these  spheres  and  passes  through  a  series  of  experiences 
in  the  present  life  and  in  other  lives  to  come,  these  experiences 
are  willed  by  him  and  in  that  sense  created  by  him.  He  suffers 
pleasures  and  pains,  disease  and  death.  But  if  he  retires  from 
these  into  his  true  unchangeable  being,  he  is  in  a  state  where  he 
is  one  with  his  experience  and  there  is  no  change  and  no  move- 
ment. What  this  state  is  cannot  be  explained  by  the  use  of 
concepts.  One  could  only  indicate  it  by  pointing  out  that  it  is 
not  any  of  those  concepts  found  in  ordinary  knowledge;  it  is  not 

^  Katha  ii.   The  translation  is  not  continuous.  There  are  some  parts  in  the  extract 
which  may  l)e  tlififerently  interpreted. 


Ill]  Emancipation  6 1 

whatever  one  knows  as  this  and  this  {neti  neti).  In  this  infinite 
and  true  self  there  is  no  difference,  no  diversity,  no  mewn  and 
tuum.  It  is  hke  an  ocean  in  which  all  our  phenomenal  existence 
will  dissolve  like  salt  in  water,  "Just  as  a  lump  of  salt  when  put 
in  water  will  disappear  in  it  and  it  cannot  be  taken  out  separately 
but  in  whatever  portion  of  water  we  taste  we  find  the  salt,  so, 
Maitreyl,  does  this  great  reality  infinite  and  limitless  consisting 
onlyof  pure  intelligence  manifesting  itself  in  all  these  (phenomenal 
existences)  vanish  in  them  and  there  is  then  no  phenomenal  know- 
ledge" (Brh.  II.  4.  12).  The  true  self  manifests  itself  in  all  the 
processes  of  our  phenomenal  existences,  but  ultimately  when  it 
retires  back  to  itself,  it  can  no  longer  be  found  in  them.  It  is  a 
state  of  absolute  infinitude  of  pure  intelligence,  pure  being,  and 
pure  blessedness. 


CHAPTER  IV 

GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  SYSTEMS 
OF  INDIAN  PHILOSOPHY 

In  what  Sense  is  a  History  of  Indian  Philosophy  possible  ? 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  attempt  a  history  of  Indian  philosophy 
in  the  manner  in  which  the  histories  of  European  philosophy  have 
been  written.  In  Europe  from  the  earliest  times,  thinkers  came 
one  after  another  and  offered  their  independent  speculations 
on  philosophy.  The  work  of  a  modern  historian  consists  in 
chronologically  arranging  these  views  and  in  commenting  upon 
the  influence  of  one  school  upon  another  or  upon  the  general 
change  from  time  to  time  in  the  tides  and  currents  of  philosophy. 
Here  in  India,  however,  the  principal  systems  of  philosophy  had 
their  beginning  in  times  of  which  we  have  but  scanty  record,  and 
it  is  hardly  possible  to  say  correctly  at  what  time  they  began, 
or  to  compute  the  influence  that  led  to  the  foundation  of  so  many 
divergent  systems  at  so  early  a  period,  for  in  all  probability  these 
were  formulated  just  after  the  earliest  Upanisads  had  been  com- 
posed or  arranged. 

The  systematic  treatises  were  written  in  short  and  pregnant 
half-sentences  {sutras)  which  did  not  elaborate  the  subject  in 
detail,  but  served  only  to  hold  before  the  reader  the  lost  threads 
of  memory  of  elaborate  disquisitions  with  which  he  was  already 
thoroughly  acquainted.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  these  pithy  half- 
sentences  were  like  lecture  hints,  intended  for  those  who  had  had 
direct  elaborate  oral  instructions  on  the  subject.  It  is  indeed 
difficult  to  guess  from  the  sutras  the  extent  of  their  significance, 
or  how  far  the  discussions  which  they  gave  rise  to  in  later  days  were 
originally  intended  by  them.  The  sutras  of  the  Vedanta  system, 
known  as  the  Sarlraka-sutras  or  Brahma-sutras  of  Badarayana 
for  example  were  of  so  ambiguous  a  nature  that  they  gave  rise 
to  more  than  half  a  dozen  divergent  interpretations,  each  one 
of  which  claimed  to  be  the  only  faithful  one.  Such  was  the  high 
esteem  and  respect  in  which  these  writers  of  the  sutras  were  held 
by  later  writers  that  whenever  they  had  any  new  speculations  to 


CH.  iv]  Schools  of  Philosophy  63 

offer,  these  were  reconciled  with  the  doctrines  of  one  or  other  of 
the  existing  systems,  and  put  down  as  faithful  interpretations  of 
the  system  fti  the  form  of  commentaries.  Such  was  the  hold  of 
these  systems  upon  scholars  that  all  the  orthodox  teachers  since 
the  foundation  of  the  systems  of  philosophy  belonged  to  one  or 
other  of  these  schools.  Their  pupils  were  thus  naturally  brought 
up  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  their  teachers.  All  the  in- 
dependence of  their  thinking  was  limited  and  enchained  by  the 
faith  of  the  school  to  which  they  were  attached.  Instead  of 
producing  a  succession  of  free-lance  thinkers  having  their  own 
systems  to  propound  and  establish,  India  had  brought  forth 
schools  of  pupils  who  carried  the  traditionary  views  of  particular 
systems  from  generation  to  generation,  who  explained  and  ex- 
pounded them,  and  defended  them  against  the  attacks  of  other 
rival  schools  which  they  constantly  attacked  in  order  to  establish 
the  superiority  of  the  system  to  which  they  adhered.  To  take  an 
example,  the  Nyaya  system  of  philosophy  consisting  of  a  number 
of  half-sentences  or  sutras  is  attributed  to  Gautama,  also  called 
Aksapada.  The  earliest  commentary  on  these  sutras,  called  the 
Vdtsydyaria  bhdsya,  was  written  by  Vatsyayana.  This  work  was 
sharply  criticized  by  the  Buddhist  Dinnaga,  and  to  answer  these 
criticisms  Udyotakara  wrote  a  commentary  on  this  commentary 
called  the  BMsyavdttika^.  As  time  went  on  the  original  force 
of  this  work  was  lost,  and  it  failed  to  maintain  the  old  dignity  of 
the  school.  At  this  Vacaspati  Misra  wrote  a  commentary  called 
Vdrttika-tdtparyatlkd  on  this  second  commentary,  where  he  tried 
to  refute  all  objections  against  the  Nyaya  system  made  by  other 
rival  schools  and  particularly  by  the  Buddhists.  This  commentary, 
called  Nydya-tdtparyatikd,  had  another  commentary  called  A^^^- 
tdtparyatikd-parisuddhi  written  by  the  great  Udayana.  This 
commentary  had  another  commentary  called  Nydya-nibandha- 
prakdsa  written  by  Varddhamana  the  son  of  the  illustrious 
Gafigesa.  This  again  had  another  commentary  called  Varddha- 
mdnendu  upon  it  by  Padmanabha  Misra,  and  this  again  had 
another  named  Nydya-tdtparyaviandana  by  Sankara  Misra.  The 
names  of  Vatsyayana,  Vacaspati,  and  Udayana  are  indeed  very 
great,  but  even  they  contented  themselves  by  writing  com- 
mentaries on  commentaries,  and  did  not  try  to  formulate  any 

^  I  have  preferred  to  spell  Dinnaga  after  Vacaspati's  Tdtparyatikd  (p.  i)  and  not 
Dignaga  as  it  is  generally  spelt. 


64       Observations  on  Systems  of  Indian  Philosophy    [ch. 

original  system.  Even  Sankara,  probably  the  greatest  man  of 
India  after  Buddha,  spent  his  life  in  writing  commentaries  on  the 
Brahma-sutras,  the  Upanisads,  and  the  Bhagavadgltd. 

As  a  system  passed  on  it  had  to  meet  unexpected  opponents 
and  troublesome  criticisms  for  which  it  was  not  in  the  least  pre- 
pared. Its  adherents  had  therefore  to  use  all  their  ingenuity  and 
subtlety  in  support  of  their  own  positions,  and  to  discover  the 
defects  of  the  rival  schools  that  attacked  them.  A  system  as  it  was 
originally  formulated  in  the  sutras  had  probably  but  few  problems 
to  solve,  but  as  it  fought  its  way  in  the  teeth  of  opposition  of 
other  schools,  it  had  to  offer  consistent  opinions  on  other  problems 
in  which  the  original  views  were  more  or  less  involved  but  to 
which  no  attention  had  been  given  before. 

The  contributions  of  the  successive  commentators  served  to 
make  each  system  more  and  more  complete  in  all  its  parts,  and 
stronger  and  stronger  to  enable  it  to  hold  its  own  successfully 
against  the  opposition  and  attacks  of  the  rival  schools.  A  system 
in  the  sutras  is  weak  and  shapeless  as  a  newborn  babe,  but  if 
we  take  it  along  with  its  developments  down  to  the  beginning 
of  the  seventeenth  century  it  appears  as  a  fully  developed  man 
strong  and  harmonious  in  all  its  limbs.  It  is  therefore  not  possible 
to  write  any  history  of  successive  philosophies  of  India,  but  it  is 
necessary  that  each  system  should  be  studied  and  interpreted  in 
all  the  growth  it  has  acquired  through  the  successive  ages  of 
history  from  its  conflicts  with  the  rival  systems  as  one  wholes 
In  the  history  of  Indian  philosophy  we  have  no  place  for  systems 
which  had  their  importance  only  so  long  as  they  lived  and  were 
then  forgotten  or  remembered  only  as  targets  of  criticism.  Each 
system  grew  and  developed  by  the  untiring  energy  of  its  adherents 
through  all  the  successive  ages  of  history,  and  a  history  of  this 
growth  is  a  history  of  its  conflicts.  No  study  of  any  Indian  system 
is  therefore  adequate  unless  it  is  taken  throughout  all  the  growth 
it  attained  by  the  work  of  its  champions,  the  commentators  whose 
selfless  toil  for  it  had  kept  it  living  through  the  ages  of  history. 

^  In  the  case  of  some  systems  it  is  indeed  possible  to  suggest  one  or  two  earlier 
phases  of  the  system,  but  this  principle  cannot  be  carried  all  through,  for  the  supple- 
mentary information  and  arguments  given  by  the  later  commentators  often  appear  as 
harmonious  elaborations  of  the  earlier  writings  and  are  very  seldom  in  conflict  with  them. 


iv]  Growth  of  the  Philosophic  Literature  65 

Growth  of  the  Philosophic  Literature. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  how  the  systems  were  originally  formulated, 
and  what  were  the  influences  that  led  to  it.  We  know  that  a 
spirit  of  philosophic  enquiry  had  already  begun  in  the  days  of  the 
earliest  Upanisads.  The  spirit  of  that  enquiry  was  that  the  final 
essence  or  truth  was  the  atman,  that  a  search  after  it  was  our 
highest  duty,  and  that  until  we  are  ultimately  merged  in  it  we 
can  only  feel  this  truth  and  remain  uncontented  with  everything 
else  and  say  that  it  is  not  the  truth  we  want,  it  is  not  the  truth  we 
want  {neti  neti).  Philosophical  enquires  were  however  continuing 
in  circles  other  than  those  of  the  Upanisads.  Thus  the  Buddha 
who  closely  followed  the  early  Upanisad  period,  spoke  of  and  enu- 
merated sixty-two  kinds  of  heresies \  and  these  can  hardly  be 
traced  in  the  Upanisads.  The  Jaina  activities  were  also  probably 
going  on  contemporaneously  but  in  the  Upanisads  no  reference 
to  these  can  be  found.  We  may  thus  reasonably  suppose  that  there 
were  different  forms  of  philosophic  enquiry  in  spheres  other  than 
those  of  the  Upanisad  sages,  of  which  we  have  but  scanty  records. 
It  seems  probable  that  the  Hindu  systems  of  thought  originated 
among  the  sages  who  though  attached  chiefly  to  the  Upanisad 
circles  used  to  take  note  of  the  discussions  and  views  of  the  antago- 
nistic and  heretical  philosophic  circles.  In  the  assemblies  of  these 
sages  and  their  pupils,  the  views  of  the  heretical  circles  were  prob- 
ably discussed  and  refuted.  So  it  continued  probably  for  some  time 
when  some  illustrious  member  of  the  assembly  such  as  Gautama 
or  Kanada  collected  the  purport  of  these  discussions  on  various 
topics  and  problems,  filled  up  many  of  the  missing  links,  classified 
and  arranged  these  in  the  form  of  a  system  of  philosophy  and 
recorded  it  in  sutras.  These  sutras  were  intended  probably  for 
people  who  had  attended  the  elaborate  oral  discussions  and  thus 
could  easily  follow  the  meaning  of  the  suggestive  phrases  con- 
tained in  the  aphorisms.  The  sutras  thus  contain  sometimes 
allusions  to  the  views  of  the  rival  schools  and  indicate  the  way  in 
which  they  could  be  refuted.  The  commentators  were  possessed 
of  the  general  drift  of  the  different  discussions  alluded  to  and 
conveyed  from  generation  to  generation  through  an  unbroken 
chain  of  succession  of  teachers  and  pupils.  They  were  however 
free  to  supplement  these  traditionary  explanations  with  their  own 

^  Brahmajala-sutta,  Digha,  i,  p.  12  ff. 


66       Observations  on  Systems  of  Indian  Philosophy    [ch. 

views  or  to  modify  and  even  suppress  such  of  the  traditionary- 
views  with  which  they  did  not  agree  or  which  they  found  it  diffi- 
cult to  maintain.  BrilHant  oppositions  from  the  opposing  schools 
often  made  it  necessary  for  them  to  offer  solutions  to  new  problems 
unthought  of  before,  but  put  forward  by  some  illustrious  adherent 
of  a  rival  school.  In  order  to  reconcile  these  new  solutions  with 
the  other  parts  of  the  system,  the  commentators  never  hesitated  to 
offer  such  slight  modifications  of  the  doctrines  as  could  harmonize 
them  into  a  complete  whole.  These  elaborations  or  modifications 
generally  developed  the  traditionary  system,  but  did  not  effect  any 
serious  change  in  the  system  as  expounded  by  the  older  teachers, 
for  the  new  exponents  always  bound  themselves  to  the  explana- 
tions of  the  older  teachers  and  never  contradicted  them.  They 
would  only  interpret  them  to  suit  their  own  ideas,  or  say  new  things 
only  in  those  cases  where  the  older  teachers  had  remained  silent. 
It  is  not  therefore  possible  to  describe  the  growth  of  any  system 
by  treating  the  contributions  of  the  individual  commentators  sepa- 
rately. This  would  only  mean  unnecessary  repetition.  Except 
when  there  is  a  specially  new  development,  the  system  is  to  be 
interpreted  on  the  basis  of  the  joint  work  of  the  commentators 
treating  their  contributions  as  forming  one  whole. 

The  fact  that  each  system  had  to  contend  with  other  rival 
systems  in  order  to  hold  its  own  has  left  its  permanent  mark 
upon  all  the  philosophic  literatures  of  India  which  are  always 
written  in  the  form  of  disputes,  where  the  writer  is  supposed  to 
be  always  faced  with  objections  from  rival  schools  to  whatever 
he  has  got  to  say.  At  each  step  he  supposes  certain  objections 
put  forth  against  him  which  he  answers,  and  points  out  the  defects 
of  the  objector  or  shows  that  the  objection  itself  is  ill  founded.  It 
is  thus  through  interminable  byways  of  objections,  counter-objec- 
tions and  their  answers  that  the  writer  can  wend  his  way  to  his 
destination.  Most  often  the  objections  of  the  rival  schools  are 
referred  to  in  so  brief  a  manner  that  those  only  who  know  the 
views  can  catch  them.  To  add  to  these  difficulties  the  Sanskrit 
style  of  most  of  the  commentaries  is  so  condensed  and  different 
from  literary  Sanskrit,  and  aims  so  much  at  precision  and  brevity, 
leading  to  the  use  of  technical  words  current  in  the  diverse  systems, 
that  a  study  of  these  becomes  often  impossible  without  the  aid 
of  an  expert  preceptor;  it  is  difficult  therefore  for  all  who  are  not 
widely  read  in  all  the  different  systems  to  follow  any  advanced 


iv]  Different  Types  of  Literature  67 

work  of  any  particular  system,  as  the  deliberations  of  that  par- 
ticular system  are  expressed  in  such  close  interconnection  with 
the  views  of  other  systems  that  these  can  hardly  be  understood 
without  them.  Each  system  of  India  has  grown  (at  least  in 
particular  epochs)  in  relation  to  and  in  opposition  to  the  growth 
of  other  systems  of  thought,and  to  be  a  thorough  student  of  Indian 
philosophy  one  should  study  all  the  systems  in  their  mutual 
opposition  and  relation  from  the  earliest  times  to  a  period  at 
which  they  ceased  to  grow  and  came  to  a  stop — a  purpose  for 
which  a  work  like  the  present  one  may  only  be  regarded  as 
forming  a  preliminary  introduction. 

Besides  the  sutras  and  their  commentaries  there  are  also  in- 
dependent treatises  on  the  systems  in  verse  called  kdrikds,  which 
try  to  summarize  the  important  topics  of  any  system  in  a  succinct 
manner;  the  Sdnikhya  kdrikd  may  be  mentioned  as  a  work  of  this 
kind.  In  addition  to  these  there  were  also  long  dissertations, 
commentaries,  or  general  observations  on  any  system  written  in 
verses  called  the  varttikas;  the  ^Z^/^rti'Z^^;'/^//^^,  of  Kumarila  or  the 
Vdrttika  of  Suresvara  may  be  mentioned  as  examples.  All  these 
of  course  had  their  commentaries  to  explain  them.  In  addition 
to  these  there  were  also  advanced  treatises  on  the  systems  in  prose 
in  which  the  writers  either  nominally  followed  some  selected 
sutras  or  proceeded  independently  of  them.  Of  the  former  class 
the  Nydyamanjari  of  Jayanta  may  be  mentioned  as  an  example 
and  of  the  latter  the  Prasastapdda  bhdsya,  the  Advaitasiddhi  of 
Madhusudana  Sarasvati  or  the  Vedditta-paribhdsd  of  Dharmara- 
jadhvarlndra.  The  more  remarkable  of  these  treatises  were  of  a 
masterly  nature  in  which  the  writers  represented  the  systems  they 
adhered  to  in  a  highly  forcible  and  logical  manner  by  dint  of 
their  own  great  mental  powers  and  genius.  These  also  had  their 
commentaries  to  explain  and  elaborate  them.  The  period  of  the 
growth  of  the  philosophic  literatures  of  India  begins  from  about 
500  B.C.  (about  the  time  of  the  Buddha)  and  practically  ends  in 
the  later  half  of  the  seventeenth  century,  though  even  now  some 
minor  publications  are  seen  to  come  out. 

The  Indian  Systems  of  Philosophy. 

The  Hindus  classify  the  systems  of  philosophy  into  two  classes, 
namely,  the  ndstika  and  the  dstika.  The  nastika  {na  asti  "it  is 
not")  views  are  those  which  neither  regard  the  Vedas  as  infallible 

5—2 


68       Observations  on  Systems  of  Indian  Philosophy    [ch. 

nor  try  to  establish  their  own  validity  on  their  authority.  These  are 
principally  three  in  number,  the  Buddhist,  Jaina  and  the  Carvaka. 
The  astika-mata  or  orthodox  schools  are  six  in  number,  Sarnkhya, 
Yoga,  Vedanta,  Mimarnsa,  Nyaya  and  Vai^esika,  generally  known 
as  the  six  systems  {saddarsana^). 

The  Sarnkhya  is  ascribed  to  a  mythical  Kapila,  but  the 
earliest  works  on  the  subject  are  probably  now  lost.  The  Yoga 
system  is  attributed  to  Patafijali  and  the  original  sutras  are  called 
the  Pdtanjala  Yoga  sutras.  The  general  metaphysical  position 
of  these  two  systems  with  regard  to  soul,  nature,  cosmology  and 
the  final  goal  is  almost  the  same,  and  the  difference  lies  in  this 
that  the  Yoga  system  acknowledges  a  god  {Isvara)  as  distinct 
from  Atman  and  lays  much  importance  on  certain  mystical 
practices  (commonly  known  as  Yoga  practices)  for  the  achieve- 
ment of  liberation,  whereas  the  Sarnkhya  denies  the  existence  of 
Isvara  and  thinks  that  sincere  philosophic  thought  and  culture 
are  sufficient  to  produce  the  true  conviction  of  the  truth  and 
thereby  bring  about  liberation.  It  is  probable  that  the  system 
of  Sarnkhya  associated  with  Kapila  and  the  Yoga  system 
associated  with  Patanjali  are  but  two  divergent  modifications  of 
an  original  Sarnkhya  school,  of  which  we  now  get  only  references 
here  and  there.  These  systems  therefore  though  generally  counted 
as  two  should  more  properly  be  looked  upon  as  two  different 
schools  of  the  same  Sarnkhya  system — one  may  be  called  the 
Kapila  Sarnkhya  and  the  other  Pataiijala  Sarnkhya. 

The  Purva  Mimamsa  (from  the  root  man  to  think — rational 
conclusions)  cannot  properly  be  spoken  of  as  a  system  of  philo- 
sophy. It  is  a  systematized  code  of  principles  in  accordance  with 
which  the  Vedic  texts  are  to  be  interpreted  for  purposes  of  sacrifices. 

^  The  word  'Var/a«tz"  in  the  sense  of  true  philosophic  knowledge  has  its  earliest 
use  in  the  VaUesika  sutras  of  Kanada  (ix.  ii.  13)  which  I  consider  as  pre-Buddhistic. 
The  Buddhist  pitakas  (400  B.C.)  called  the  heretical  opinions  '^ditthi"  (Sanskrit — drsti 
from  the  same  root  drs  from  which  dar^ana  is  formed).  Haribhadra  (fifth  century  a.d.) 
uses  the  word  Dar^ana  in  the  sense  of  systems  of  philosophy  {sarvadarhinavdcyd' 
rthah — Saddar^anasamuccaya  I.).  Ratnakirtti  (end  of  the  tenth  century  A.D.)  uses  the 
word  also  in  the  same  sense  {^^  Yadi  naina  dariane  darianc  nanaprakdram  sattvalak- 
sanainuklafiiasti.'"  Ksanahhahgasiddhiva  Six  Buddhist  Nydya  tracts,  p.  20).  Madhava 
( 1 33 1  A.  D. )  calls  his  Compendium  of  all  systems  of  philosophy,  Sa}-vadarsanasanigraha. 
The  word  "■mata'"  (opinion  or  view)  was  also  freely  used  in  quoting  the  views  of  other 
systems.  But  there  is  no  word  to  denote  '  philosophers '  in  the  technical  sense.  The 
Buddhists  used  tocall  those  who  held  heretical  views  "/rtw-Z/^/z^a."  The  words  "siddha," 
"y«rt«iM,"  etc.  do  not  denote  philosophers  in  the  modern  sense,  they  are  used  rather  in 
the  sense  of  "  seers"  or  "perfects." 


iv]  Purva  Mimamsa  69 

The  Vedic  texts  were  used  as  mantras  (incantations)  for  sacrifices, 
and  people  often  disputed  as  to  the  relation  of  words  in  a 
sentence  or  their  mutual  relative  importance  with  reference  to  the 
general  drift  of  the  sentence.  There  were  also  differences  of  view 
with  regard  to  the  meaning  of  a  sentence,  the  use  to  which  it  may 
be  applied  as  a  mantra,  its  relative  importance  or  the  exact 
nature  of  its  connection  with  other  similar  sentences  in  a  complex 
Vedic  context.  The  Mimamsa  formulated  some  principles  accord- 
ing to  which  one  could  arrive  at  rational  and  uniform  solutions 
for  all  these  difficulties.  Preliminary  to  these  its  main  objects,  it 
indulges  in  speculations  with  regard  to  the  external  world,  soul, 
perception,  inference,  the  validity  of  the  Vedas,  or  the  like,  for  in 
order  that  a  man  might  perform  sacrifices  with  mantras,  a  definite 
order  of  the  universe  and  its  relation  to  man  or  the  position  and 
nature  of  the  mantras  of  the  Veda  must  be  demonstrated  and 
established.  Though  its  interest  in  such  abstract  speculations  is 
but  secondary  yet  it  briefly  discusses  these  in  order  to  prepare  a 
rational  ground  for  its  doctrine  of  the  mantras  and  their  practical 
utility  for  man.  It  is  only  so  far  as  there  are  these  preliminary 
discussions  in  the  Mimarnsa  that  it  may  be  called  a  system  of 
philosophy.  Its  principles  and  maxims  for  the  interpretation  of 
the  import  of  words  and  sentences  have  a  legal  value  even  to  this 
day.  The  sutras  of  Mimamsa  are  attributed  to  Jaimini,  and  Sahara 
wrote  a  bhasya  upon  it.  The  two  great  names  in  the  history  of 
Mimarnsa  literature  after  Jaimini  and  Sahara  are  Kumarila  Bhatta 
and  his  pupil  Prabhakara,  who  criticized  the  opinions  of  his  master 
so  much,  that  the  master  used  to  call  him  guru  (master)  in  sarcasm, 
and  to  this  day  his  opinions  pass  as  giiru-mata,  whereas  the  views 
of  Kumarila  Bhatta  pass  as  bhatta-mata}.  It  may  not  be  out  of 
place  to  mention  here  that  Hindu  Law  {smrti)  accepts  without 
any  reservation  the  maxims  and  principles  settled  and  formulated 
by  the  Mimamsa. 

^  There  is  a  story  that  Kumarila  could  not  understand  the  meaning  of  a  Sanskrit 
sentence  '■'■  Atra  tunoktam  tatrdpinoktam  iti  paunaruktam"  (hence  spoken  twice). 
Tunoktam  phonetically  admits  of  two  combinations,  tu  noktam  (but  not  said)  and  tuna 
uktam  (said  by  the  particle  tu)  and  tatrdpi  noktam  as  tatra  apt  na  uktam  (not  said  also 
there)  and  tatra  apind  uktam  (said  there  by  the  particle  apt).  Under  the  first  inter- 
pretation the  sentence  would  mean, "  Not  spoken  here,  not  spoken  there,  it  is  thus  spoken 
twice."  This  puzzled  Kumarila,  when  Prabhakara  taking  the  second  meaning  pointed 
out  to  him  that  the  meaning  was  ' '  here  it  is  indicated  by  tu  and  there  by  api,  and  so  it  is 
indicated  twice."  Kumarila  was  so  pleased  that  he  called  his  pupil  "Guru"  (master) 
at  this. 


70      Observations  on  Systems  of  Indian  Philosophy    [ch. 

The  Veddnta  sutras,  also  called  Uttara  Mimamsa,  written  by 
Badarayana,  otherwise  known  as  the  Brahma-sutras,  form  the 
original  authoritative  work  of  Vedanta.  The  word  Vedanta  means 
"end  of  the  Veda,"  i.e.  the  Upanisads,  and  the  Veddnta  sutras  are 
so  called  as  they  are  but  a  summarized  statement  of  the  general 
views  of  the  Upanisads.    This  work  is  divided  into  four  books  or 
adhyayas  and  each  adhyaya  is  divided  into  four  padas  or  chapters. 
The  first  four  sutras  of  the  work  commonly  known  as  CaUihsutri 
are  (i)  How  to  ask  about  Brahman,  (2)  From  whom  proceed  birth 
and  decay,  (3)  This  is  because  from  him  the  Vedas  have  come  forth, 
(4)  This  is  shown  by  the  harmonious  testimony  of  the  Upanisads. 
The  whole  of  the  first  chapter  of  the  second  book  is  devoted  to 
justifying  the  position  of  the  Vedanta  against  the  attacks  of  the 
rival  schools.   The  second  chapter  of  the  second  book  is  busy  in 
dealing  blows  at  rival  systems.    All  the  other  parts  of  the  book  are 
devoted  to  settling  the  disputed  interpretations  of  a  number  of  in- 
dividual Upanisad  texts.  The  really  philosophical  portion  of  the 
work  is  thus  limited  to  the  first  four  sutras  and  the  first  and  second 
chapters  of  the  second  book.    The  other  portions  are  like  com- 
mentaries to  the  Upanisads,  which  however  contain  many  theo- 
logical views  of  the  system.   The  first  commentary  of  the  Brahma- 
sutra  was  probably  written  by  Baudhayana,  which  however  is  not 
available  now.   The  earliest  commentary  that  is  now  found  is  that 
of  the  great  Sahkara.    His  interpretations  of  the  Brahma-sutras 
together  with  all  the  commentaries  and  other  works  that  follow 
his  views  are  popularly  known  as  Vedanta  philosophy,  though 
this  philosophy  ought  more  properly  to  be  called  Visuddhadvaita- 
vada  school  of  Vedanta  philosophy  (i.e.  the  Vedanta  philosophy 
of  the  school  of  absolute  monism).    Variant  forms  of  dualistic 
philosophy  as  represented  by  the  Vaisnavas,  Saivas,  Ramayatas, 
etc.,  also  claim  to  express  the  original  purport  of  the  Brahma 
sutras.    We  thus  find  that  apostles  of  dualistic  creeds  such  as 
Ramanuja,  Vallabha,   Madhva,  Srikantha,  Baladeva,  etc.,  have 
written  independent  commentaries  on  the  Brahma-sutra  to  show 
that  the  philosophy  as  elaborated  by  themselves  is  the  view  of 
the  Upanisads  and  as  summarized  in  the  Brahma-sutras.    These 
differed  largely  and  often  vehemently  attacked  Sarikara's  inter- 
pretations of  the  same  sutras.    These  systems  as  expounded  by 
them  also  pass  by  the  name  of  Vedanta  as  these  are  also  claimed 
to  be  the  real  interpretations  intended  by  the  Vedanta  (Upanisads) 


iv]  Some  Points  of  Agreement  7 1 

and  the  Veddnta  stltras.    Of  these  the  system  of  Ramanuja  has 
great  philosophical  importance. 

The  Nydyasutras  attributed  to  Gautama,  called  also  Aksapada, 
and  the  Vaisesika  sutras  attributed  to  Kanada,  called  also  Uluka, 
represent  the  same  system  for  all  practical  purposes.  They  are 
in  later  times  considered  to  differ  only  in  a  few  points  of  minor 
importance.  So  far  as  the  sutras  are  concerned  the  Nydya  sutras 
lay  particular  stress  on  the  cultivation  of  logic  as  an  art,  while 
the  Vaisesika  sutras  deal  mostly  with  metaphysics  and  physics. 
In  addition  to  these  six  systems,  the  Tantras  had  also  philoso- 
phies of  their  own,  which  however  may  generally  be  looked  upon 
largely  as  modifications  of  the  Sarnkhya  and  Vedanta  systems, 
though  their  own  contributions  are  also  noteworthy. 

Some  fundamental  Points  of  Agreement. 
I.    The  Karma  Theory. 

It  is,  however,  remarkable  that  with  the  exception  of  the 
Carvaka  materialists  all  the  other  systems  agree  on  some  funda- 
mental points  of  importance.  The  systems  of  philosophy  in  India 
were  not  stirred  up  merely  by  the  speculative  demands  of  the 
human  mind  which  has  a  natural  inclination  for  indulging  in 
abstract  thought,  but  by  a  deep  craving  after  the  realization  of 
the  religious  purpose  of  life.  It  is  surprising  to  note  that  the 
postulates,  aims  and  conditions  for  such  a  realization  were  found 
to  be  identical  in  all  the  conflicting  systems.  Whatever  may  be 
their  differences  of  opinion  in  other  matters,  so  far  as  the  general 
postulates  for  the  realization  of  the  transcendent  state,  the  j^/wwww 
bonum  of  life,  were  concerned,  all  the  systems  were  practically  in 
thorough  agreement.  It  may  be  worth  while  to  note  some  of  them 
at  this  stage. 

First,  the  theory  of  Karma  and  rebirth.  All  the  Indian  systems 
agree  in  believing  that  whatever  action  is  done  by  an  individual 
leaves  behind  it  some  sort  of  potency  which  has  the  power  to 
ordain  for  him  joy  or  sorrow  in  the  future  according  as  it  is  good 
or  bad.  When  the  fruits  of  the  actions  are  such  that  they  cannot 
be  enjoyed  in  the  present  life  or  in  a  human  life,  the  individual 
has  to  take  another  birth  as  a  man  or  any  other  being  in  order  to 
suffer  them. 

The  Vedic  belief  that  the  mantras  uttered  in  the  correct  accent 
at  the  sacrifices  with  the  proper  observance  of  all  ritualistic 


72       Observations  on  Systems  of  Indian  Philosot>hy    [ch. 

details,  exactly  according  to  the  directions  without  the  slightest 
error  even  in  the  smallest  trifle,  had  something  like  a  magical 
virtue  automatically  to  produce  the  desired  object  immediately 
or  after  a  lapse  of  time,  was  probably  the  earliest  form  of  the 
Karma  doctrine.  It  postulates  a  semi-conscious  belief  that  certain 
mystical  actions  can  produce  at  a  distant  time  certain  effects 
without  the  ordinary  process  of  the  instrumentality  of  visible 
agents  of  ordinary  cause  and  effect.  When  the  sacrifice  is  per- 
formed, the  action  leaves  such  an  unseen  magical  virtue,  called 
the  adrsta  (the  unseen)  or  the  apurva  (new),  that  by  it  the  desired 
object  will  be  achieved  in  a  mysterious  manner,  for  the  modus 
operandi  of  the  apurva  is  unknown.  There  is  also  the  notion 
prevalent  in  the  Samhitas,  as  we  have  already  noticed,  that  he 
who  commits  wicked  deeds  suffers  in  another  world,  whereas  he 
who  performs  good  deeds  enjoys  the  highest '  material  pleasures. 
These  were  probably  associated  with  the  conception  of  rta,  the 
inviolable  order  of  things.  Thus  these  are  probably  the  elements 
which  built  up  the  Karma  theory  which  we  find  pretty  well 
established  but  not  emphasized  in  the  Upanisads,  where  it  is  said 
that  according  to  good  or  bad  actions  men  will  have  good  or  bad 
births. 

To  notice  other  relevant  points  in  connection  with  the  Karma 
doctrine  as  established  in  the  astika  systems  we  find  that  it  was 
believed  that  the  unseen  {adrsta)  potency  of  the  action  generally 
required  some  time  before  it  could  be  fit  for  giving  the  doer  the 
merited  punishment  or  enjoyment.  These  would  often  accumulate 
and  prepare  the  items  of  suffering  and  enjoyment  for  the  doer  in 
his  next  life.  Only  the  fruits  of  those  actions  which  are  extremely 
wicked  or  particularly  good  could  be  reaped  in  this  life.  The 
nature  of  the  next  birth  of  a  man  is  determined  by  the  nature  of 
pleasurable  or  painful  experiences  that  have  been  made  ready  for 
him  by  his  maturing  actions  of  this  life.  If  the  experiences  deter- 
mined for  him  by  his  action  are  such  that  they  are  possible  to  be 
realized  in  the  life  of  a  goat,  the  man  will  die  and  be  born  as  a 
goat.  As  there  is  no  ultimate  beginning  in  time  of  this  world 
process,  so  there  is  no  time  at  which  any  person  first  began  his 
actions  or  experiences.  Man  has  had  an  infinite  number  of  past 
lives  of  the  most  varied  nature,  and  the  instincts  of  each  kind  of 
life  exist  dormant  in  the  life  of  every  individual,  and  thus  when- 
ever he  has  any  particular  birth  as  this  or  that  animal  or  man, 


iv]  Theory  of  Karma  y^ 

the  special  instincts  of  that  life  (technically  called  vdsand)  come 
forth.  In  accordance  with  these  vasanas  the  person  passes  through 
the  painful  or  pleasurable  experiences  as  determined  for  him  by 
his  action.  The  length  of  life  is  also  determined  by  the  number 
and  duration  of  experiences  as  preordained  by  the  fructifying 
actions  of  his  past  life.  When  once  certain  actions  become  fit  for 
giving  certain  experiences,  these  cannot  be  avoided,  but  those 
actions  which  have  not  matured  are  uprooted  once  for  all  if  the 
person  attains  true  knowledge  as  advocated  by  philosophy.  But 
even  such  an  emancipated  {fuukta)  person  has  to  pass  through 
the  pleasurable  or  painful  experiences  ordained  for  him  by  the 
actions  just  ripened  for  giving  their  fruits.  There  are  four  kinds 
of  actions,  white  or  virtuous  {inkld),  black  or  wicked  {krsna), 
white-black  or  partly  virtuous  and  partly  vicious  {sukla-krsnd)  as 
most  of  our  actions  are,  neither  black  nor  white  {asuklakrsna), 
i.e.  those  acts  of  self-renunciation  or  meditation  which  are  not 
associated  with  any  desires  for  the  fruit.  It  is  only  when  a  person 
can  so  restrain  himself  as  to  perform  only  the  last  kind  of  action 
that  he  ceases  to  accumulate  any  new  karma  for  giving  fresh  fruits. 
He  has  thus  only  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  previous  karmas  which 
have  ripened  for  giving  fruits.  If  in  the  meantime  he  attains  true 
knowledge,  all  his  past  accumulated  actions  become  destroyed, 
and  as  his  acts  are  only  of  the  asuklakrsna  type  no  fresh  karma 
for  ripening  is  accumulated,  and  thus  he  becomes  divested  of  all 
karma  after  enjoying  the  fruits  of  the  ripened  karmas  alone. 

The  Jains  think  that  through  the  actions  of  body,  speech 
and  mind  a  kind  of  subtle  matter  technically  called  karma  is  pro- 
duced. The  passions  of  a  man  act  like  a  viscous  substance  that 
attracts  this  karma  matter,  which  thus  pours  into  the  soul  and 
sticks  to  it.  The  karma  matter  thus  accumulated  round  the  soul 
during  the  infinite  number  of  past  lives  is  technically  called  kar- 
mas arir  a, -which,  encircles  the  soul  as  it  passes  on  from  birth  to  birth. 
This  karma  matter  sticking  to  the  soul  gradually  ripens  and  ex- 
hausts itself  in  ordaining  the  sufferance  of  pains  or  the  enjoyment 
of  pleasures  for  the  individual.  While  some  karma  matter  is  being 
expended  in  this  way,  other  karma  matters  are  accumulating  by 
his  activities,  and  thus  keep  him  in  a  continuous  process  of 
suffering  and  enjoyment.  The  karma  matter  thus  accumulated 
in  the  soul  produces  a  kind  of  coloration  called  iesyd,  such  as 
white,  black,  etc.,  which  marks  the  character  of  the  soul.    The 


74       Observations  on  Systems  of  Indian  Philosophy    [ch. 

idea  of  the  sukla  and  krsna  karmas  of  the  Yoga  system  was  pro- 
bably suggested  by  the  Jaina  view.  But  when  a  man  is  free  from 
passions,  and  acts  in  strict  compliance  with  the  rules  of  conduct, 
his  actions  produce  karma  which  lasts  but  for  a  moment  and  is 
then  annihilated.  Every  karma  that  the  sage  has  previously 
earned  has  its  predestined  limits  within  which  it  must  take  effect 
and  be  purged  away.  But  when  by  contemplation  and  the  strict 
adherence  to  the  five  great  vows,  no  new  karma  is  generated,  and 
when  all  the  karmas  are  exhausted  the  worldly  existence  of  the 
person  rapidly  draws  towards  its  end.  Thus  in  the  last  stage  of 
contemplation,  all  karma  being  annihilated,  and  all  activities 
having  ceased,  the  soul  leaves  the  body  and  goes  up  to  the  top 
of  the  universe,  where  the  liberated  souls  stay  for  ever. 

Buddhism  also  contributes  some  new  traits  to  the  karma 
theory  which  however  being  intimately  connected  with  their 
metaphysics  will  be  treated  later  on. 

2.    The  Doctrine  of  Mukti. 

Not  only  do  the  Indian  systems  agree  as  to  the  cause  of  the 
inequalities  in  the  share  of  sufferings  and  enjoyments  in  the  case 
of  different  persons,  and  the  manner  in  which  the  cycle  of  births 
and  rebirths  has  been  kept  going  from  beginningless  time,  on  the 
basis  of  the  mysterious  connection  of  one's  actions  with  the 
happenings  of  the  world,  but  they  also  agree  in  believing  that 
this  beginningless  chain  of  karma  and  its  fruits,  of  births  and  re- 
births, this  running  on  from  beginningless  time  has  somewhere 
its  end.  This  end  was  not  to  be  attained  at  some  distant  time  or 
in  some  distant  kingdom,  but  was  to  be  sought  within  us.  Karma 
leads  us  to  this  endless  cycle,  and  if  we  could  divest  ourselves  of 
all  such  emotions,  ideas  or  desires  as  lead  us  to  action  we  should 
find  within  us  the  actionless  self  which  neither  suffers  nor  enjoys, 
neither  works  nor  undergoes  rebirth.  When  the  Indians,  wearied 
by  the  endless  bustle  and  turmoil  of  worldly  events,  sought  for  and 
believed  that  somewhere  a  peaceful  goal  could  be  found,  they 
generally  hit  upon  the  self  of  man.  The  belief  that  the  soul  could 
be  realized  in  some  stage  as  being  permanently  divested  of  all 
action,  feelings  or  ideas,  led  logically  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
connection  of  the  soul  with  these  worldly  elements  was  extraneous, 
artificial  or  even  illusory.  In  its  true  nature  the  soul  is  untouched 
by  the  impurities  of  our  ordinary  life,  and  it  is  through  ignorance 


iv]  Pessimism  and  Optimism  75 

and  passion  as  inherited  from  the  cycle  of  karma  from  beginning- 
less  time  that  we  connect  it  with  these.  The  realization  of  this 
transcendent  state  is  the  goal  and  final  achievement  of  this  endless 
cycle  of  births  and  rebirths  through  karma.  The  Buddhists  did 
not  admit  the  existence  of  soul,  but  recognized  that  the  final 
realization  of  the  process  of  karma  is  to  be  found  in  the  ultimate 
dissolution  called  Nirvana,  the  nature  of  which  we  shall  discuss 
later  on. 

3.    The  Doctrine  of  Soul. 

All  the  Indian  systems  except  Buddhism  admit  the  existence 
of  a  permanent  entity  variously  called  atman,  purusa  or  jiva. 
As  to  the  exact  nature  of  this  soul  there  are  indeed  diver- 
gences of  view.  Thus  while  the  Nyaya  calls  it  absolutely 
qualityless  and  characterless,  indeterminate  unconscious  entity, 
Samkhya  describes  it  as  being  of  the  nature  of  pure  conscious- 
ness, the  Vedanta  says  that  it  is  that  fundamental  point  of  unity 
implied  in  pure  consciousness  {cit),  pure  bliss  {ananda),  and  pure 
being  {sat).  But  all  agree  in  holding  that  it  is  pure  and  unsullied 
in  its  nature  and  that  all  impurities  of  action  or  passion  do  not 
form  a  real  part  of  it.  The  sunmiuni  bonuni  of  life  is  attained 
when  all  impurities  are  removed  and  the  pure  nature  of  the  self 
is  thoroughly  and  permanently  apprehended  and  all  other  ex- 
traneous connections  with  it  are  absolutely  dissociated. 

The  Pessimistic  Attitude  towards  the  World  and  the 
Optimistic  Faith  in  the  end. 

Though  the  belief  that  the  world  is  full  of  sorrow  has  not  been 
equally  prominently  emphasized  in  all  systems,  yet  it  may  be 
considered  as  being  shared  by  all  of  them.  It  finds  its  strongest 
utterance  in  Samkhya,  Yoga,  and  Buddhism.  This  interminable 
chain  of  pleasurable  and  painful  experiences  was  looked  upon  as 
nearing  no  peaceful  end  but  embroiling  and  entangling  us  in  the 
meshes  of  karma,  rebirth,  and  sorrow.  What  appear  as  pleasures 
are  but  a  mere  appearance  for  the  attempt  to  keep  them  steady  is 
painful,  there  is  pain  when  we  lose  the  pleasures  or  when  we  are 
anxious  to  have  them.  When  the  pleasures  are  so  much  asso- 
ciated with  pains  they  are  but  pains  themselves.  We  are  but  duped 
when  we  seek  pleasures,  for  they  are  sure  to  lead  us  to  pain.  All 
our  experiences  are  essentially  sorrowful  and  ultimately  sorrow- 
begetting.    Sorrow  is  the  ultimate  truth  of  this  process  of  the 


76       Observations  on  Systems  of  Indian  Philosophy    [ch. 

world.  That  which  to  an  ordinary  person  seems  pleasurable 
appears  to  a  wise  person  or  to  a  yogin  who  has  a  clearer  vision  as 
painful.  The  greater  the  knowledge  the  higher  is  the  sensitiveness 
to  sorrow  and  dissatisfaction  with  world  experiences.  The  yogin 
is  like  the  pupil  of  the  eye  to  which  even  the  smallest  grain  of  dis- 
turbance is  unbearable.  This  sorrow  of  worldly  experiences  cannot 
be  removed  by  bringing  in  remedies  for  each  sorrow  as  it  comes, 
for  the  moment  it  is  remedied  another  sorrow  comes  in.  It  cannot 
also  be  avoided  by  mere  inaction  or  suicide,  for  we  are  continually 
being  forced  to  action  by  our  nature,  and  suicide  will  but  lead  to 
another  life  of  sorrow  and  rebirth.  The  only  way  to  get  rid  of 
it  is  by  the  culmination  of  moral  greatness  and  true  knowledge 
which  uproot  sorrow  once  for  all.  It  is  our  ignorance  that  the  self 
is  intimately  connected  with  the  experiences  of  life  or  its  pleasures, 
that  leads  us  to  action  and  arouses  passion  in  us  for  the  enjoy- 
ment of  pleasures  and  other  emotions  and  activities.  Through 
the  highest  moral  elevation  a  man  may  attain  absolute  dispassion 
towards  world-experiences  and  retire  in  body,  mind,  and  speech 
from  all  worldly  concerns.  When  the  mind  is  so  purified,  the  self 
shines  in  its  true  light,  and  its  true  nature  is  rightly  conceived. 
When  this  is  once  done  the  self  can  never  again  be  associated 
with  passion  or  ignorance.  It  becomes  at  this  stage  ultimately 
dissociated  from  citta  which  contains  within  it  the  root  of  all 
emotions,  ideas,  and  actions.  Thus  emancipated  the  self  for  ever 
conquers  all  sorrow.  It  is  important,  however,  to  note  in  this 
connection  that  emancipation  is  not  based  on  a  general  aversion 
to  intercourse  with  the  world  or  on  such  feelings  as  a  disappointed 
person  may  have,  but  on  the  appreciation  of  the  state  of  mukti 
as  the  supremely  blessed  one.  The  details  of  the  pessimistic 
creed  of  each  system  have  developed  from  the  logical  necessity 
peculiar  to  each  system.  There  was  never  the  slightest  tendency 
to  shirk  the  duties  of  this  life,  but  to  rise  above  them  through 
right  performance  and  right  understanding.  It  is  only  when  a 
man  rises  to  the  highest  pinnacle  of  moral  glory  that  he  is  fit  for 
aspiring  to  that  realization  of  selfhood  in  comparison  with  which 
all  worldly  things  or  even  the  joys  of  Heaven  would  not  only 
shrink  into  insignificance,  but  appear  in  their  true  character  as 
sorrowful  and  loathsome.  It  is  when  his  mind  has  thus  turned  from 
all  ordinary  joys  that  he  can  strive  towards  his  ideal  of  salvation. 
In  fact  it  seems  to  me  that  a  sincere  religious  craving  after  some 


iv]  Unity  in  Sadhana  77 

ideal  blessedness  and  quiet  of  self-realization  is  indeed  the  funda- 
mental fact  from  which  not  only  her  philosophy  but  many  of  the 
complex  phenomena  of  the  civilization  of  India  can  be  logically 
deduced.  The  sorrow  around  us  has  no  fear  for  us  if  we  remember 
that  we  are  naturally  sorrowless  and  blessed  in  ourselves.  The 
pessimistic  view  loses  all  terror  as  it  closes  in  absolute  optimistic 
confidence  in  one's  own  self  and  the  ultimate  destiny  and  goal  of! 
emancipation. 

Unity  in  Indian  Sadhana  (philosophical,  religious 
and  ethical  endeavours). 

As  might  be  expected  the  Indian  systems  are  all  agreed  upon 
the  general  principles  of  ethical  conduct  which  must  be  followed 
for  the  attainment  of  salvation.  That  all  passions  are  to  be  con- 
trolled, no  injury  to  life  in  any  form  should  be  done,  and  that  all 
desire  for  pleasures  should  be  checked,  are  principles  which  are 
almost  universally  acknowledged.  When  a  man  attains  a  very 
high  degree  of  moral  greatness  he  has  to  strengthen  and  prepare 
his  mind  for  further  purifying  and  steadying  it  for  the  attainment 
of  his  ideal;  and  most  of  the  Indian  systems  are  unanimous  with 
regard  to  the  means  to  be  employed  for  the  purpose.  There  are 
indeed  divergences  in  certain  details  or  technical  names,  but  the 
means  to  be  adopted  for  purification  are  almost  everywhere  essen- 
tially the  same  as  those  advocated  by  the  Yoga  system.  It  is  only 
in  later  times  that  devotion  {bhakti)  is  seen  to  occupy  a  more 
prominent  place  specially  in  Vaisnava  schools  of  thought.  Thus 
it  was  that  though  there  were  many  differences  among  the  various 
systems,  yet  their  goal  of  life,  their  attitude  towards  the  world  and 
the  means  for  the  attainment  of  the  goal  {sadhana)  being  funda- 
mentally the  same,  there  was  a  unique  unity  in  the  practical  sadhana 
of  almost  all  the  Indian  systems.  The  religious  craving  has  been 
universal  in  India  and  this  uniformity  of  sadhana  has  therefore 
secured  for  India  a  unity  in  all  her  aspirations  and  strivings. 


CHAPTER  V 

BUDDHIST  PHILOSOPHY 

Many  scholars  are  of  opinion  that  the  Samkhya  and  the  Yoga 
represent  the  earliest  systematic  speculations  of  India.  It  is  also 
suggested  that  Buddhism  drew  much  of  its  inspiration  from  them. 
It  may  be  that  there  is  some  truth  in  such  a  view,  but  the 
systematic  Samkhya  and  Yoga  treatises  as  we  have  them  had 
decidedly  been  written  after  Buddhism.  Moreover  it  is  well-known 
to  every  student  of  Hindu  philosophy  that  a  conflict  with  the 
Buddhists  has  largely  stimulated  philosophic  enquiry  in  most  of 
the  systems  of  Hindu  thought.  A  knowledge  of  Buddhism  is 
therefore  indispensable  for  a  right  understanding  of  the  different 
systems  in  their  mutual  relation  and  opposition  to  Buddhism.  It 
seems  desirable  therefore  that  I  should  begin  with  Buddhism 
first. 

The  State  of  Philosophy  in  India  before  the  Buddha. 

It  is  indeed  difficult  to  give  a  short  sketch  of  the  different 
philosophical  speculations  that  were  prevalent  in  India  before 
Buddhism.  The  doctrines  of  the  Upanisads  are  well  known,  and 
these  have  already  been  briefly  described.  But  these  were  not  the 
only  ones.  Even  in  the  Upanisads  we  find  references  to  diverse 
atheistical  creeds^  We  find  there  that  the  origin  of  the  world 
and  its  processes  were  sometimes  discussed,  and  some  thought 
that  "  time  "  was  the  ultimate  cause  of  all,  others  that  all  these 
had  sprung  forth  by  their  own  nature  {svabkdva),  others  that 
everything  had  come  forth  in  accordance  with  an  inexorable 
destiny  or  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  accidental  happenings,  or 
through  matter  combinations  in  general.  References  to  diverse 
kinds  of  heresies  are  found  in  Buddhist  literature  also,  but  no 
detailed  accounts  of  these  views  are  known.  Of  the  Upanisad 
type  of  materialists  the  two  schools  of  Carvakas  (Dhurtta  and 
Su^iksita)  are  referred  to  in  later  literature,  though  the  time  in 
which  these  flourished  cannot  rightly  be  discovered  I    But  it  seems 

^  Sveta^vatara,  l.  2,  kalah svabhabo  niyaiiryadrcchd bhutaniyonih purusa iti cintyam. 

2  Lokayata  (literally,  that  which  is  found  among  people  in  general)  seems  to  have 
been  the  name  by  which  all  carvaka  doctrines  were  generally  known.  See  Gunaratna 
on  the  Lokayatas. 


CH.  v]  Carvakas  79 

probable  however  that  the  allusion  to  the  materialists  contained 
in  the  Upanisads  refers  to  these  or  to  similar  schools.  The 
Carvakas  did  not  believe  in  the  authority  of  the  Vedas  or  any 
other  holy  scripture.  According  to  them  there  was  no  soul.  Life 
and  consciousness  were  the  products  of  the  combination  of  matter, 
just  as  red  colour  was  the  result  of  mixing  up  white  with 
yellow  or  as  the  power  of  intoxication  was  generated  in  molasses 
{madasakti).  There  is  no  after-life,  and  no  reward  of  actions,  as 
there  is  neither  virtue  nor  vice.  Life  is  only  for  enjoyment.  So 
long  as  it  lasts  it  is  needless  to  think  of  anything  else,  as  every- 
thing will  end  with  death,  for  when  at  death  the  body  is  burnt 
to  ashes  there  cannot  be  any  rebirth.  They  do  not  believe  in 
the  validity  of  inference.  Nothing  is  trustworthy  but  what  can 
be  directly  perceived,  for  it  is  impossible  to  determine  that  the 
distribution  of  the  middle  term  {hetu)  has  not  depended  upon 
some  extraneous  condition,  the  absence  of  which  might  destroy 
the  validity  of  any  particular  piece  of  inference.  If  in  any  case 
any  inference  comes  to  be  true,  it  is  only  an  accidental  fact  and 
there  is  no  certitude  about  it.  They  were  called  Carvaka  because 
they  would  only  eat  but  would  not  accept  any  other  religious  or 
moral  responsibility.  The  word  comes  from  carv  to  eat.  The 
Dhurtta  Carvakas  held  that  there  was  nothing  but  the  four 
elements  of  earth,  water,  air  and  fire,  and  that  the  body  was  but  the 
result  of  atomic  combination.  There  was  no  self  or  soul,  no 
virtue  or  vice.  The  Susiksita  Carvakas  held  that  there  was 
a  soul  apart  from  the  body  but  that  it  also  was  destroyed  with 
the  destruction  of  the  body.  The  original  work  of  the  Carvakas 
was  written  in  sutras  probably  by  Brhaspati.  Jayanta  and  Gunar- 
atna  quote  two  sutras  from  it.  Short  accounts  of  this  school  may  be 
found  in  Jayanta's  Nydyatnafijarl,  Madhava's  Sarvadarsanasam- 
graha  and  Gunaratna's  Tarkarahasyadlpikd.  Mahdbhdrata  gives 
an  account  of  a  man  called  Carvaka  meeting  Yudhisthira. 

Side  by  side  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Carvaka  materialists  we 
are  reminded  of  the  Ajivakas  of  which  Makkhali  Gosala,  probably 
a  renegade  disciple  of  the  Jain  saint  Mahavira  and  a  contemporary 
of  Buddha  and  Mahavira,  was  the  leader.  This  was  a  thorough- 
going determinism  denying  the  free  will  of  man  and  his  moral 
responsibility  for  any  so-called  good  or  evil.  The  essence  of 
Makkhali's  system  is  this,  that  "there  is  no  cause,  either  proximate 
or  remote,  for  the  depravity  of  beings  or  for  their  purity.    They 


8o  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

become  so  without  any  cause.  Nothing  depends  either  on  one's 
own  efforts  or  on  the  efforts  of  others,  in  short  nothing  depends 
on  any  human  effort,  for  there  is  no  such  thing  as  power  or  energy, 
or  human  exertion.  The  varying  conditions  at  any  time  are  due 
to  fate,  to  their  environment  and  their  own  nature^" 

Another  sophistical  school  led  by  Ajita  Kesakambali  taught 
that  there  was  no  fruit  or  result  of  good  or  evil  deeds  ;  there  is  no 
other  world,  nor  was  this  one  real;  nor  had  parents  nor  any 
former  lives  any  efficacy  with  respect  to  this  life.  Nothing  that 
we  can  do  prevents  any  of  us  alike  from  being  wholly  brought  to 
an  end  at  death 2. 

There  were  thus  at  least  three  currents  of  thought:  firstly  the 
sacrificial  Karma  by  the  force  of  the  magical  rites  of  which  any 
person  could  attain  anything  he  desired;  secondly  the  Upanisad 
teaching  that  the  Brahman,  the  self,  is  the  ultimate  reality  and 
being,  and  all  else  but  name  and  form  which  pass  away  but  do 
not  abide.  That  which  permanently  abides  without  change  is  the 
real  and  true,  and  this  is  self.  Thirdly  the  nihilistic  conceptions 
that  there  is  no  law,  no  abiding  reality,  that  everything  comes 
into  being  by  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  circumstances  or  by  some 
unknown  fate.  In  each  of  these  schools,  philosophy  had  probably 
come  to  a  deadlock.  There  were  the  Yoga  practices  prevalent  in 
the  country  and  these  were  accepted  partly  on  the  strength  of 
traditional  custom  among  certain  sections,  and  partly  by  virtue 
of  the  great  spiritual,  intellectual  and  physical  power  which  they 
gave  to  those  who  performed  them.  But  these  had  no  rational 
basis  behind  them  on  which  they  could  lean  for  support.  These 
were  probably  then  just  tending  towards  being  affiliated  to  the 
nebulous  Sarnkhya  doctrines  which  had  grown  up  among  certain 
sections.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  we  find  Buddha  erecting 
a  new  superstructure  of  thought  on  altogether  original  lines  which 
thenceforth  opened  up  a  new  avenue  of  philosophy  for  all  posterity 
to  come.  If  the  Being  of  the  Upanisads,  the  superlatively  motion- 
less, was  the  only  real,  how  could  it  offer  scope  for  further  new 
speculations,  as  it  had  already  discarded  all  other  matters  of 
interest  ?  If  everything  was  due  to  a  reasonless  fortuitous  con- 
course of  circumstances,  reason  could  not  proceed  further  in  the 
direction  to  create  any  philosophy  of  the  unreason.    The  magical 

1  Sdmannaphala-siitta,  Diglia,  ii.  20.    Hoernle's  article  on  the  Ajivakas,  E.  R.  E. 
^  Sdtnannapkala-sutta,  II.  23. 


v]  Buddha! s  Life  8i 

force  of  the  hocus-pocus  of  sorcery  or  sacrifice  had  but  little  that 
was  inviting  for  philosophy  to  proceed  on.  If  we  thus  take  into 
account  the  state  of  Indian  philosophic  culture  before  Buddha, 
we  shall  be  better  able  to  understand  the  value  of  the  Buddhistic 
contribution  to  philosophy. 

Buddha  :  his  Life. 

Gautama  the  Buddha  was  born  in  or  about  the  year  560  B.C. 
in  the  Lumbini  Grove  near  the  ancient  town  of  Kapilavastu  in 
the  now  dense  terai  region  of  Nepal.  His  father  was  Suddhodana, 
a  prince  of  the  Sakya  clan,  and  his  mother  Queen  Mahamaya. 
According  to  the  legends  it  was  foretold  of  him  that  he  would 
enter  upon  the  ascetic  life  when  he  should  see  "  A  decrepit  old 
man,  a  diseased  man,  a  dead  man,  and  a  monk."  His  father  tried 
his  best  to  keep  him  away  from  these  by  marrying  him  and 
surrounding  him  with  luxuries.  But  on  successive  occasions, 
issuing  from  the  palace,  he  was  confronted  by  those  four 
things,  which  filled  him  with  amazement  and  distress,  and 
realizing  the  impermanence  of  all  earthly  things  determined  to 
forsake  his  home  and  try  if  he  could  to  discover  some  means  to 
immortality  to  remove  the  sufferings  of  men.  He  made  his  "  Great 
Renunciation  "  when  he  was  twenty-nine  years  old.  He  travelled 
on  foot  to  Rajagrha  (Rajgir)  and  thence  to  Uruvela,  where  in 
company  with  other  five  ascetics  he  entered  upon  a  course  of 
extreme  self-discipline,  carrying  his  austerities  to  such  a  length 
that  his  body  became  utterly  emaciated  and  he  fell  down  sense- 
less and  was  believed  to  be  dead.  After  six  years  of  this  great 
struggle  he  was  convinced  that  the  truth  was  not  to  be  won  hv 
the  way  of  extreme  asceticism,  and  resuming  an  ordinary  course 
of  life  at  last  attained  absolute  and  supreme  enlightenment.  There- 
after the  Buddha  spent  a  life  prolonged  over  forty-five  years  in 
travelling  from  place  to  place  and  preaching  the  doctrine  to 
all  who  would  listen.  At  the  age  of  over  eighty  years  Buddha 
realized  that  the  time  drew  near  for  him  to  die.  He  then  entered 
into  Dhyana  and  passing  through  its  successive  stages  attained 
nirvana^  The  vast  developments  which  the  system  of  this  great 
teacher- underwent  in  the  succeeding  centuries  in  India  and  in 
other  countries  have  not  been  thoroughly  studied,  and  it  will 
probably  take  yet  many  years  more  before  even  the  materials  for 

^  Mahdparimbbanasuttaiita,  Digha,  xvi.  6,  8,  9. 
D.  6 


82  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

such  a  study  can  be  collected.  But  from  what  we  now  possess 
it  is  proved  incontestably  that  it  is  one  of  the  most  wonderful  and 
subtle  productions  of  human  wisdom.  It  is  impossible  to  over- 
estimate the  debt  that  the  philosophy,  culture  and  civilization 
of  India  owe  to  it  in  all  her  developments  for  many  succeeding 
centuries. 

Early  Buddhist  Literature. 

The  Buddhist  Pali  Scriptures  containthree  different  collections: 
the  Sutta  (relating  to  the  doctrines),  the  Vinaya  (relating  to  the 
discipline  of  the  monks)  and  the  Abhidhamma  (relating  generally 
to  the  same  subjects  as  the  suttas  but  dealing  with  them  in  a 
scholastic  and  technical  manner).  Scholars  of  Buddhistic  religious 
history  of  modern  times  have  failed  as  yet  to  fix  any  definite  dates 
for  the  collection  or  composition  of  the  different  parts  of  the 
aforesaid  canonical  literature  of  the  Buddhists.  The  suttas  were 
however  composed  before  the  Abhidhamma  and  it  is  very 
probable  that  almost  the  whole  of  the  canonical  works  were 
completed  before  241  B.C.,  the  date  of  the  third  council  during 
the  reign  of  King  Asoka.  The  suttas  mainly  deal  with  the  doctrine 
(Dhamma)  of  the  Buddhistic  faith  whereas  the  Vinaya  deals 
only  with  the  regulations  concerning  the  discipline  of  the  monks. 
The  subject  of  the  Abhidhamma  is  mostly  the  same  as  that 
of  the  suttas,  namely,  the  interpretation  of  the  Dhamma. 
Buddhaghosa  in  his  introduction  to  Atthasdli7tl,the  commentary 
on  the  Dhanunasahgani,  says  that  the  Abhidhamma  is  so  called 
iabhid,x\A  dhamma)  because  it  describes  the  same  Dhammas  as  are 
related  in  the  suttas  in  a  more  intensified  {dhammatireka)  and 
specialized  {dhammavisesatthena)  manner.  The  Abhidhammas 
do  not  give  any  new  doctrines  that  are  not  in  the  suttas,  but 
they  deal  somewhat  elaborately  with  those  that  are  already  found 
in  the  suttas.  Buddhaghosa  in  distinguishing  the  special  features 
of  the  suttas  from  the  Abhidhammas  says  that  the  acquirement 
of  the  former  leads  one  to  attain  meditation  {samadhi)  whereas 
the  latter  leads  one  to  attain  wisdom  {pahhdsampadam).  The  force 
of  this  statement  probably  lies  in  this,  that  the  dialogues  of  the 
suttas  leave  a  chastening  effect  on  the  mind,  the  like  of  which  is 
not  to  be  found  in  the  Abhidhammas,  which  busy  themselves  in 
enumerating  the  Buddhistic  doctrines  and  defining  them  in  a 
technical  manner,  which  is  more  fitted  to  produce  a  reasoned 


v]  Early  Buddhist  Literature  83 

insight  into  the  doctrines  than  directly  to  generate  a  craving 
for  following  the  path  of  meditation  for  the  extinction  of  sorrow. 
The  Abhidhamma  known  as  the  KatJiavatthic  differs  from  the 
other  Abhidhammas  in  this,  that  it  attempts  to  reduce  the  views 
of  the  heterodox  schools  to  absurdity.  The  discussions  proceed 
in  the  form  of  questions  and  answers,  and  the  answers  of  the 
opponents  are  often  shown  to  be  based  on  contradictory 
assumptions. 

The  suttas  contain  five  groupsof  collections  called  the  Nikayas. 
These  are  (i)  Digha  Nikdya,  called  so  on  account  of  the  length 
of  the  suttas  contained  in  it;  (2)  Majjhima  Nikaya  (middling 
Nikaya),  called  so  on  account  of  the  middling  extent  of  the 
suttas  contained  in  it ;  (3)  Samyutta  Nikdya  (Nikayas  relating 
to  special  meetings),  called  sarnyutta  on  account  of  their  being 
delivered  owing  to  the  meetings  {samyogd)  of  special  persons  which 
were  the  occasions  for  them ;  (4)  A  ngiittara  Nikdya,  so  called  be- 
cause in  each  succeeding  book  of  this  work  the  topics  of  discussion 
increase  by  one^;  (5)  Khuddaka  Nikdya  containing  Khuddaka 
patha,  Dhammapada,  Uddna,  Itivuttaka,  Siitta  Nipdta,  Vvudna- 
vatthu^  Petavatthu,  Theragathd,  Therlgdthd,  Jdtaka,  Niddesa, 
Patisambhiddmagga,  Apaddna,    Buddhavanisa,  Carydpitaka. 

The  Abhidhammas  are  Patthdna,  Dhamniasahgani,  Dhdtic- 
kathd,  Piiggalapafinattiy  Vibhanga,  Yaniaka  and  Kathdvatthu. 
There  exists  also  a  large  commentary  literature  on  diverse  parts 
of  the  above  works  known  as  atthakatha.  The  work  known  as 
Milinda  Pahha  (questions  of  King  Milinda),  of  uncertain  date,  is 
of  considerable  philosophical  value. 

The  doctrines  and  views  incorporated  in  the  above  literature 
is  generally  now  known  as  Sthaviravada  or  Theravada.  On  the 
origin  of  the  name  Theravada  (the  doctrine  of  the  elders)  Dipa- 
vanisa  says  that  since  the  Theras  (elders)  met  (at  the  first  council) 
and  collected  the  doctrines  it  was  known  as  the  Thera  Vada^  It 
does  not  appear  that  Buddhism  as  it  appears  in  this  Pali  litera- 
ture developed  much  since  the  time  of  Buddhaghosa  (400  A.D.),  the 
writer  of  Visiiddliimagga  (a  compendium  of  theravada  doctrines) 
and  the  commentator  of  Dlghanikdya,  Dhaniniasahgani,  etc. 

Hindu  philosophy  in  later  times  seems  to  have  been  influenced 
by  the  later  offshoots  of  the  different  schools  of  Buddhism,  but 
it  does  not  appear  that  Pali  Buddhism  had  any  share  in  it.     I 
^  See  Buddhaghosa's  Atthasalinl,  p.  25.  ^  Ol^enberg's  DTpavamsa,  p.  31. 

6—2 


84  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

have  not  been  able  to  discover  any  old  Hindu  writer  who  could 
be  considered  as  being  acquainted  with  Pali. 

The  Doctrine  of  Causal  Connection  of  early  Buddhism^ 

The  word  Dhamma  in  the  Buddhist  scriptures  is  used  generally 
in  four  senses:  (i)  Scriptural  texts,  (2)  quality  {guna),  (3)  cause 
(Jietii)  and  (4)  unsubstantial  and  soulless  {nissatta  nijjlva%  Of 
these  it  is  the  last  meaning  which  is  particularly  important  from 
the  point  of  view  of  Buddhist  philosophy.  The  early  Buddhist 
philosophy  did  not  accept  any  fixed  entity  as  determining  all 
reality;  the  only  things  with  it  were  the  unsubstantial  pheno- 
mena and  these  were  called  dhammas.  The  question  arises  that 
if  there  is  no  substance  or  reality  how  are  we  to  account  for  the 
phenomena?  But  the  phenomena  are  happening  and  passing 
away  and  the  main  point  of  interest  with  the  Buddha  was  to  find 
out  "  What  being  what  else  is,"  "  What  happening  what  else 
happens  "  and  "  What  not  being  what  else  is  not."  The  pheno- 
mena are  happening  in  a  series  and  we  see  that  there  being 
certain  phenomena  there  become  some  others;  by  the  happening 
of  some  events  others  also  are  produced.  This  is  called  {paticca- 
smnuppddd)  dependent  origination.  But  it  is  difficult  to  understand 
what  is  the  exact  nature  of  this  dependence.  The  question  as 
Samyutta  Nikdya  (li.  5)  has  it  with  which  the  Buddha  started 
before  attaining  Buddhahood  was  this:  in  what  miserable  condition 
are  the  people !  they  are  born,  they  decay,  they  die,  pass  away 
and  are  born  again  ;  and  they  do  not  know  the  path  of  escape 
from  this  decay,  death  and  misery. 

How  to  know  the  way  to  escape  from  this  misery  of  decay 
and  death.  Then  it  occurred  to  him  what  being  there,  are  decay 
and  death,  depending  on  what  do  they  come  ?  As  he  thought 
deeply  into  the  root  of  the  matter,  it  occurred  to  him  that  decay 
and  death  can  only  occur  when  there  is  birth  {jdti),  so  they  depend 

^  There  are  some  differences  of  opinion  as  to  whether  one  could  take  the  doctrine 
of  the  twelve  links  of  causes  as  we  find  it  in  the  Samyntta  Nikaya  as  the  earliest 
Buddhist  view,  as  Sarnyutta  does  not  represent  the  oldest  part  of  the  suttas.  But  as 
this  doctrine  of  the  twelve  causes  became  regarded  as  a  fundamental  Buddhist  doctrine 
and  as  it  gives  us  a  start  in  philosophy  I  have  not  thought  it  fit  to  enter  into  conjec- 
tural discussions  as  to  the  earliest  form.    Dr  E.  J.  Thomas  drew  my  attention  to  this  fact. 

^  Atthasdlinl,  p.  38.  There  are  also  other  senses  in  which  the  word  is  used,  as 
dhamma  desana  where  it  means  religious  teaching.  'YXxe.  Lankiivatara  described  Dharmma 
as  gtmadravyapiirvakd  dharmma ,  i.e.  Dharmmas  are  those  which  are  associated  as  attri- 
butes and  substances. 


v]  Doctrine  of  Causal  Connection  85 

on  birth.  What  being  there,  is  there  birth,  on  what  does  birth 
depend  ?  Then  it  occurred  to  him  that  birth  could  only  be  if 
there  were  previous  existence  {bhavay.  But  on  what  does  this 
existence  depend,  or  what  being  there  is  there  bhava.  Then  it 
occurred  to  him  that  there  could  not  be  existence  unless  there 
were  holding  fast  (upaddna)'.  But  on  what  did  upadana  depend? 
It  occurred  to  him  that  it  was  desire  {tanha)  on  which  upadana 
depended.  There  can  be  upadana  if  there  is  desire  {tanhdy.  But 
what  being  there,  can  there  be  desire  }  To  this  question  it 
occurred  to  him  that  there  must  be  feeling  {vedand)  in  order  that 
there  may  be  desire.  But  on  what  does  vedana  depend,  or  rather 
what  must  be  there,  that  there  may  be  keVmg  (vedand)?  To  this 
it  occurred  to  him  that  there  must  be  a  sense-contact  (p/iassa) 
in  order  that  there  may  be  feeling*.  If  there  should  be  no  sense- 
contact  there  would  be  no  feeling.  But  on  what  does  sense- 
contact  depend?  It  occurred  to  him  that  as  there  are  six  sense- 
contacts,  there  are  the  six  fields  of  contact  {dyatanay.  But  on 
what  do  the  six  ayatanas  depend  ?  It  occurred  to  him  that 
there  must  be  the  mind  and  body  {iidmarupd)  in  order  that  there 
may  be  the  six  fields  of  contact^;  but  on  what  does  namarupa 
depend  ?  It  occurred  to  him  that  without  consciousness  {vinfidnd) 
there  could  be  no  namarupa^    But  what  being  there  would  there 

1  This  word  bhava  is  interpreted  by  Candrakirtti  in  his  Mddhyamika  vrtti,  p.  565 
(La  Vallee  Poussin's  edition)  as  the  deed  which  brought  about  rebirth  {ptcnarbhava- 
janakam  karma  satnutthdpayati  kayena  vdca  manasd  ca). 

^  Atthasdlini,  p.  385,  upadanantidalhagahanani.  Candrakirtti  in  explaining  upadana 
says  that  whatever  thing  a  man  desires  he  holds  fast  to  the  materials  necessary  for 
attaining  it  (yatra  vastuni  satrsnastasya  vastuno  'rjanaya  vidhapandya  updddnamupd- 
datte  tatra  tatra  prdrthayate).    Mddhyamika  vrtti,  p.  565. 

^  Candrakirtti  describes  trsna  as  dsvddatidbhinandanddhyavasdnasthdndddtmapri- 
yarupairviyogo  md  bhut,  nityavtaparitydgo  bhavediti,  yeyam  prdrthand — the  desire 
that  there  may  not  ever  be  any  separation  from  those  pleasures,  etc.,  which  are  dear  to 
us.    Ibid.  565. 

*  We  read  also  of  phassayatana  and  phassakaya.  M.  N.  Ii.  ■261,  in.  280,  etc.  Can- 
drakirtti says  that  sadbhirdyatanadvdraih  krtyaprakriydh  pravarttante  prajiidyante. 
tanndmarHpapratyayam  saddyatanamucyatt.  sadbhyascdyatanebhyah  saisparlakdydk 
pravarttante.    M.   V.  565. 

*  Ayatana  means  the  six  senses  together  with  their  objects.  Ayatana  literally  is 
"Field  of  operation."  Salayatana  means  six  senses  as  six  fields  of  operation.  Candra- 
kirtti has  dyatanadvdraih. 

®  I  have  followed  the  translation  of  Aung  in  rendering  namariipa  as  mind  and  body, 
Compendium,  p.  271.  This  seems  to  me  to  be  fairly  correct.  The  four  skandhas  are  called 
nama  in  each  birth.  These  together  with  rupa  (matter)  give  us  namarupa  (mind 
and  body)  which  being  developed  render  the  activities  through  the  six  sense-gates 
possiblesothattheremaybeknowledge.  Cf.^.  K  564.  Govindananda,  the  commentator 


86  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

be  vinnana.  Here  it  occurred  to  him  that  in  order  that  there 
might  be  vinnana  there  must  be  the  conformations  {sankkdray. 
But  what  being  there  are  there  the  sahkharas  ?  Here  it  occurred 
to  him  that  the  sahkharas  can  only  be  if  there  is  ignorance 
{avijjd).  If  avijja  could  be  stopped  then  the  saiikharas  will  be 
stopped,  and  if  the  sahkharas  could  be  stopped  vinnana  could  be 
stopped  and  so  on''. 

It  is  indeed  difficult  to  be  definite  as  to  what  the  Buddha 
actually  wished  to  mean  by  this  cycle  of  dependence  of  existence 
sometimes  called  Bhavacakra  (wheel  of  existence).  Decay  and 
death  {jardinaraiid)  could  not  have  happened  if  there  was  no 
birthl  This  seems  to  be  clear.  But  at  this  point  the  difficulty 
begins.    We  must   remember  that   the  theory  of  rebirth  was 

on  Sankara's  bhasya  on  the  Brahma-siitras  (ii.  ii.  19),  gives  a  different  interpretation  of 
Namarupa  which  may  probably  refer  to  the  Vijnanavada  view  though  we  have  no  means 
at  hand  to  verify  it.  He  says — To  think  the  momentary  as  the  permanent  is  Avidya; 
from  there  come  the  samskaras  of  attachment,  antipathy  or  anger,  and  infatuation ;  from 
there  the  first  vijriana  or  thought  of  the  foetus  is  produced;  from  that  alayavijiiana,  and 
the  four  elements  (which  are  objects  of  name  and  are  hence  called  nama)  are  produced, 
and  from  those  are  produced  the  white  and  black,  semen  and  blood  called  riipa. 
Both  Vacaspati  and  Amalananda  agree  with  Govindananda  in  holding  that  nama 
signifies  the  semen  and  the  ovum  while  rupa  means  the  visible  physical  body  built  out 
of  them.  Vijfiana  entered  the  womb  and  on  account  of  it  namariipa  were  produced 
through  the  association  of  previous  karma.  See  Veddntakalpataru,  pp.  274,  275.  On 
the  doctrine  of  the  entrance  of  vijnaiia  into  the  womb  compare  D.  N.  Ii.  63. 

^  It  is  difficult  to  say  what  is  the  exact  sense  of  the  word  here.  The  Buddha  was 
one  of  the  first  few  earliest  thinkers  to  introduce  proper  philosophical  terms  and  phraseo- 
logy with  a  distinct  philosophical  method  and  he  had  often  to  use  the  same  word  in 
more  or  less  different  senses.  Some  of  the  philosophical  terms  at  least  are  therefore 
rather  elastic  when  compared  with  the  terms  of  precise  and  definite  meaning  which  we  find 
in  later  Sanskrit  thought.  Thus  in  6".  N.  III.  p.  87,  '■'■  Sahkhatam  abhisahkharonti" 
saiikhara  means  that  which  synthesises  the  complexes.  In  the  Cofupendium  it  is  trans- 
lated as  will,  action.  Mr  Aung  thinks  that  it  means  the  same  as  karma ;  it  is  here  used 
in  a  different  sense  from  what  we  find  in  the  word  sahkhara  khandha  (viz.  mental 
states).  We  get  a  list  of  51  mental  states  forming  safikhara  khandha  in  Dhaftima 
Sangani,  p.  18,  and  another  different  set  of  40  mental  states  in  Dhar7nasamgraha,  p.  6. 
In  addition  to  these  forty  cittasamprayiiktasamskara,  it  also  counts  thirteen  cittavi- 
prayuktasamskara.  Candraklrtti  interprets  it  as  meaning  attachment,  antipathy  and 
infatuation,  p.  563.  Govindananda,  the  commentator  on  Saiikara's  Brahma-sutra  (n.  ii. 
19),  also  interprets  the  word  in  connection  with  the  doctrine  of  Pratttyasamutpada  as 
attachment,  antipathy  and  infatuation. 

''■  Samyutta  Nikdya,  II.  7-8. 

*  Jara  and  marana  bring  in  ^oka  (grief),  paridevana  (lamentation),  duhkha  (suffer- 
ing), daurmanasya  (feeling  of  wretchedness  and  miserableness)  and  upayasa  (feeling  of 
extreme  destitution)  at  the  prospect  of  one's  death  or  the  death  of  other  dear  ones. 
All  these  make  up  suffering  and  are  the  results  of  jati  (birth).  M.  V.  (B.  T.  S.  p.  208). 
Saiikara  in  his  bhasya  counted  all  the  terms  from  jara,  separately.  The  whole  series 
is  to  be  taken  as  representing  the  entirety  of  duhkhaskandha. 


v]  Theory  of  Rebirth  87 

enunciated  in  the  Upanisads.  The  Brhadaranyaka  says  that  just 
as  an  insect  going  to  the  end  of  a  leaf  of  grass  by  a  new  effort 
collects  itself  in  another  so  does  the  soul  coming  to  the  end  of 
this  life  collect  itself  in  another.  This  life  thus  presupposes 
another  existence.  So  far  as  I  remember  there  has  seldom  been 
before  or  after  Buddha  any  serious  attempt  to  prove  or  disprove 
the  doctrine  of  rebirths  All  schools  of  philosophy  except  the 
Carvakas  believed  in  it  and  so  little  is  known  to  us  of  the  Car- 
vaka  sutras  that  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  they  did  to  refute  this 
doctrine.  The  Buddha  also  accepts  it  as  a  fact  and  does  not 
criticize  it.  This  life  therefore  comes  only  as  one  which  had  an 
infinite  number  of  lives  before,  and  which  except  in  the  case  of 
a  few  emancipated  ones  would  have  an  infinite  number  of  them 
in  the  future.  It  was  strongly  believed  by  all  people,  and  the 
Buddha  also,  when  he  came  to  think  to  what  our  present  birth 
might  be  due,  had  to  fall  back  upon  another  existence  {bhavd). 
If  bhava  means  karma  which  brings  rebirth  as  Candraklrtti  takes 
it  to  mean,  then  it  would  mean  that  the  present  birth  could  only 
take  place  on  account  of  the  works  of  a  previous  existence  which 
determined  it.  Here  also  we  are  reminded  of  the  Upanisad  note 
"  as  a  man  does  so  will  he  be  born  "  (  Yat  karma  kurute  tadabhi- 
sampadyate,  Brh.  IV.  iv.  5).  Candraklrtti's  interpretation  of  "bhava" 
as  Karma  {punarbhavajanakam  kai'nia)  seems  to  me  to  suit 
better  than  "  existence."  The  word  was  probably  used  rather 
loosely  for  kaimnabJiava.  The  word  bhava  is  not  found  in  the 
earlier  Upanisads  and  was  used  in  the  Pali  scriptures  for  the 
first  time  as  a  philosophical  term.  But  on  what  does  this 
bhava  depend  ?  There  could  not  have  been  a  previous  existence 
if  people  had  not  betaken  themselves  to  things  or  works  they 
desired.  This  betaking  oneself  to  actions  or  things  in  accord- 
ance with  desire  is  called  upadana.  In  the  Upanisads  we  read, 
"  whatever  one  betakes  himself  to,  so  does  he  work"  (  Yatkratur- 
bhavati  tatkarmma  kiinite,  Brh.  IV.  iv.  5).  As  this  betaking  to 
the  thing  depends  upon  desire  {trsnd),  it  is  said  that  in  order 
that  there  may  be  upadana  there  must  be  tanha.  In  the  Upani- 
sads also  we  read  "Whatever  one  desires  so  does  he  betake 
himself  to"  {sa  yathdkdmo  bhavati  tatkratiirbhavati).  Neither 
the  word  upadana  nor  trsna  (the  Sanskrit  word  corresponding 

^  The  attempts  to  prove  the  doctrine  of  rebirth  in  the  Hindu  philosophical  works 
such  as  the  Nyaya,  etc,  are  slight  and  inadequate. 


88  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

to  tanha)  is  found  in  the  earlier  Upanisads,  but  the  ideas  contained 
in  them  are  similar  to  the  words  "kratu"  and  "kdma."  Desire 
{tanha)  is  then  said  to  depend  on  feeling  or  sense-contact. 
Sense-contact  presupposes  the  six  senses  as  fields  of  operation ^ 
These  six  senses  or  operating  fields  would  again  presuppose  the 
whole  psychosis  of  the  man  (the  body  and  the  mind  together) 
called  namarupa.  We  are  familiar  with  this  word  in  the  Upani- 
sads but  there  it  is  used  in  the  sense  of  determinate  forms  and 
names  as  distinguished  from  the  indeterminate  indefinable 
reality  I  Buddhaghosa  in  the  Visuddhimagga  says  that  by 
"  Name "  are  meant  the  three  groups  beginning  with  sensation 
(i.e.  sensation,  perception  and  the  predisposition);  by  "Form" 
the  four  elements  and  form  derivative  from  the  four  elements ^ 
He  further  says  that  name  by  itself  can  produce  physical  changes, 
such  as  eating,  drinking,  making  movements  or  the  like.  So  form 
also  cannot  produce  any  of  those  changes  by  itself  But  like 
the  cripple  and  the  blind  they  mutually  help  one  another  and 
effectuate  the  changes*.  But  there  exists  no  heap  or  collection 
of  material  for  the  production  of  Name  and  Form  ;  "  but  just  as 
when  a  lute  is  played  upon,  there  is  no  previous  store  of  sound ; 
and  when  the  sound  comes  into  existence  it  does  not  come  from 
any  such  store ;  and  when  it  ceases,  it  does  not  go  to  any  of  the 
cardinal  or  intermediate  points  of  the  compass  ;...in  exactly  the 
same  way  all  the  elements  of  being  both  those  with  form  and 
those  without,  come  into  existence  after  having  previously  been 
non-existent  and  having  come  into  existence  pass  away^"  Nama- 
rupa taken  in  this  sense  will  not  mean  the  whole  of  mind  and 
body,  but  only  the  sense  functions  and  the  body  which  are  found 
to  operate  in  the  six  doors  of  sense  {saldyatana).  If  we  take 
namarupa  in  this  sense,  we  can  see  that  it  may  be  said  to  depend 
upon  the  vinnana  (consciousness).  Consciousness  has  been  com- 
pared in  the  Milinda  Pahha  with  a  watchman  at  the  middle  of 

^  The  word  ayatana  is  found  in  many  places  in  the  earlier  Upanisads  in  the  sense 
of  "field  or  place,"  Cha.  i.  5,  Brh.  in.  9.  10,  but  sadayatana  does  not  occur. 

*  Candrakirtti  interprets  nama  as  Vedanddaycf  rupina§catvarah  skandhdstatra  iatra 
bhave  ndmayantlli  ndma.  saha  rupaskandhena  ca  noma  ritpam  ceti  ndmarupamucyate. 
The  four  skandhas  in  each  specific  birth  act  as  name.  These  together  with  rupa  make 
namarupa.    M.  V.  564. 

'  Warren's  Buddhism  in  Translations,  p.  184. 

*  Ibid.  p.  185,  Visuddhimagga,  Ch.  XVI  i. 

"  Ibid.  pp.  185-186,  Visuddhimagga,  Ch.  xvii. 


v]  Theory  of  Consciousness  89 

the  cross-roads  beholding  all  that  come  from  any  direction^.  Bud- 
dhaghosa  in  the  Atthasdlini  also  says  that  consciousness  means 
that  which  thinks  its  object.  If  we  are  to  define  its  characteristics 
we  must  say  that  it  knows  {yijdnana),  goes  in  advance  {piibbah- 
gama),  connects  {sandhdna),  and  stands  on  namarupa  {iidmarupa- 
padatthdnam).  When  the  consciousness  gets  a  door,  at  a  place 
the  objects  of  sense  are  discerned  {drainmana-vibhdvanatthdne) 
and  it  goes  first  as  the  precursor.  When  a  visual  object  is  seen 
by  the  eye  it  is  known  only  by  the  consciousness,  and  when  the 
dhammas  are  made  the  objects  of  (mind)  mano,  it  is  known  only 
by  the  consciousness^  Buddhaghosa  also  refers  here  to  the  passage 
in  the  Milinda  Pafiha  we  have  just  referred  to.  He  further  goes 
on  to  say  that  when  states  of  consciousness  rise  one  after  another, 
they  leave  no  gap  between  the  previous  state  and  the  later  and 
consciousness  therefore  appears  as  connected.  When  there  are  the 
aggregates  of  the  five  khandhas  it  is  lost ;  but  there  are  the  four 
aggregates  as  namarupa,  it  stands  on  nama  and  therefore  it  is 
said  that  it  stands  on  namarupa.  He  further  asks,  Is  this  con- 
sciousness the  same  as  the  previous  consciousness  or  different 
from  it?  He  answers  that  it  is  the  same.  Just  so,  the  sun  shows 
itself  with  all  its  colours,  etc.,  but  he  is  not  different  from  those 
in  truth  ;  and  it  is  said  that  just  when  the  sun  rises,  its  collected 
heat  and  yellow  colour  also  rise  then,  but  it  does  not  mean  that 
the  sun  is  different  from  these.  So  the  citta  or  consciousness 
takes  the  phenomena  of  contact,  etc.,  and  cognizes  them.  So 
though  it  is  the  same  as  they  are  yet  in  a  sense  it  is  different 
from  them'. 

To  go  back  to  the  chain  of  twelve  causes,  we  find  that  jati 
(birth)  is  the  cause  of  decay  and  deaith,  jardmarajia,  etc.  Jati  is 
the  appearance  of  the  body  or  the  totality  of  the  five  skandhas*. 
Coming  to  bhava  which  determines  jati,  I  cannot  think  of  any 
better  rational  explanation  of  bhava,  than  that  I  have  already 

^  Warren's  Buddhism  in  Translations,  p.  182.   Milinda  Paiiha  (62^). 

^  Atthasdlini,  p.  11 -2. 

'  Ibid.  p.  113,  Yathd  hi  rUpddini  upaddya  pahhatta  suriyddayo  na  atthato  rUpd- 
dihi  aiiiie  honti  ten''  eva  yasmin  samaye  suriyo  tideti  tasmin  samaye  tassa  tejd-sah- 
khdtam  rUpam  ptti  evam  vticcamdne  pi  na  rupddihi  aiino  suriyo  7idma  atthi.  Tathd 
cittam  phassddayo  dhatnme  updddya  paiiiiapiyati.  Atthato  pan!  ettha  tehi  afinam  eva. 
Tena  yasmin  samaye  cittam  uppannam  hoti  ekamsen  eva  tasmin  samaye  phassddihi 
atthato  anhad  eva  hoti  ti. 

*  '■'■Jdtirdehajanvia  pancaskandkasamttddyah,^^  Govindananda's  Ratnaprabhd  on 
Sankara's  bhasya,  11.  ii.  19. 


90  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

suggested,  namely,  the  works  {karma)  which  produce  the  births 
Upadana  is  an  advanced  trsna  leading  to  positive  clinging''.  It 
is  produced  by  trsna  (desire)  which  again  is  the  result  of  vedana 
(pleasure  and  pain).  But  this  vedana  is  of  course  vedana  with 
ignorance  {avidya),  for  an  Arhat  may  have  also  vedana  but  as 
he  has  no  avidya,  the  vedana  cannot  produce  trsna  in  turn.  On 
its  development  it  immediately  passes  into  upadana.  Vedana 
means  pleasurable,  painful  or  indifferent  feeling.  On  the  one 
side  it  leads  to  trsna  (desire)  and  on  the  other  it  is  produced  by 
sense-contact  {sparsa).  Prof.  De  la  Vallee  Poussin  says  that 
^rilabha  distinguishes  three  processes  in  the  production  of 
vedana.  Thus  first  there  is  the  contact  between  the  sense  and 
the  object ;  then  there  is  the  knowledge  of  the  object,  and  then 
there  is  the  vedana.  Depending  on  Majjhima  Nikdya,  iii.  242, 
Poussin  gives  the  other  opinion  that  just  as  in  the  case  of  two 
sticks  heat  takes  place  simultaneously  with  rubbing,  so  here  also 
vedana  takes  place  simultaneously  with  sparsa  for  they  are 
"produits  par  un  meme  complexe  de  causes  {sdmagrtY." 

Sparsa  is  produced  by  sadayatana,  sadayatana  by  namarupa, 
and  namarupa  by  vijnana,  and  is  said  to  descend  in  the  womb 
of  the  mother  and  produce  the  five  skandhas  as  namarupa,  out 
of  which  the  six  senses  are  specialized. 

Vijnana  in  this  connection  probably  means  the  principle  or 
germ  of  consciousness  in  the  womb  of  the  mother  upholding  the 
five  elements  of  the  new  body  there.  It  is  the  product  of  the 
past  karmas  {sankhdra)  of  the  dying  man  and  of  his  past 
consciousness  too. 

We  sometimes  find  that  the  Buddhists  believed  that  the  last 
thoughts  of  the  dying  man  determined  the  nature  of  his  next 

^  Govindananda  in  his  ^a/wa/raMaonSankara'sbhasya,  ii.ii.  19,  explains  "bhava" 
as  that  from  which  anything  becomes,  as  merit  and  demerit  (dharmddi).  See  also 
Vibhanga,  p.  137  and  Warren's  Buddhism  in  Trans latiotis,  p.  201.  Mr  Aung  says  in 
Abhidhaminatthasangaha,  p.  189,  that  bhavo  includes  kammabhavo  (the  active  side  of 
an  existence)  and  upapattibliavo  {the  passive  side).  And  the  commentators  say  that 
bhava  is  a  contraction  of  '' kammabhava"  or  Karma — becoming  i.e.  karmic  activity. 

^  Prof.  De  la  Vallee  Poussin  in  his  Thdorie  des  Doiize  Causes,  p.  26,  says  that 
Sdlisfambkasutra  explains  the  word  "upadana"  as  " trsna vaipulya"  or  hyper-trsna 
and  Candraklitti  also  gives  the  same  meaning,  M.  V.  (B.  T.  S.  p.  210).  Govindananda 
explains  "upadana"  as  pravrtti  (movement)  generated  by  trsna  (desire),  i.e.  the  active 
tendency  in  pursuance  of  desire.  But  if  upadana  means  "support"  it  would  denote  all 
the  five  skandhas.  Thus  Madhyamaka  vrtti  says  updddnam  pancaskandhalaksanam . . . 
paHcopddanaskandhdkhyatn  updddnam.     M.  V.  XXVI I.  6. 

^  Poussin's  Thiorie  des  Douze  Causes,  p.  23. 


v]  Consciousness  and  Rebirth  91 

births  The  manner  in  which  the  vijfiana  produced  in  the  womb 
is  determined  by  the  past  vijnana  of  the  previous  existence  is 
according  to  some  authorities  of  the  nature  of  a  reflected  image, 
like  the  transmission  of  learning  from  the  teacher  to  the  disciple, 
like  the  lighting  of  a  lamp  from  another  lamp  or  like  the  impress 
of  a  stamp  on  wax.  As  all  the  skandhas  are  changing  in  life, 
so  death  also  is  but  a  similar  change ;  there  is  no  great  break, 
but  the  same  uniform  sort  of  destruction  and  coming  into  being. 
New  skandhas  are  produced  as  simultaneously  as  the  two  scale 
pans  of  a  balance  rise  up  and  fall,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  lamp 
is  lighted  or  an  image  is  reflected.  At  the  death  of  the  man  the 
vijnana  resulting  from  his  previous  karmas  and  vijnanas  enters 
into  the  womb  of  that  mother  (animal,  man  or  the  gods)  in  which 
the  next  skandhas  are  to  be  matured.  This  vijnana  thus  forms 
the  principle  of  the  new  life.  It  is  in  this  vijMna  that  name 
{ndnia)  and  form  {rupa)  become  associated. 

The  vijnana  is  indeed  a  direct  product  of  the  samskaras  and 
the  sort  of  birth  in  which  vijnana  should  bring  down  {ndmayati) 
the  new  existence  {upapatti)  is  determined  by  the  samskaras'^  for 
in  reality  the  happening  of  death  {jnaranabhava)  and  the  instil- 
lation of  the  vijfiana  as  the  beginning  of  the  new  life  {jipapatti- 
bhava)  cannot  be  simultaneous,  but  the  latter  succeeds  just  at 
the  next  moment,  and  it  is  to  signify  this  close  succession  that 
they  are  said  to  be  simultaneous.  If  the  vijnana  had  not  entered 
the  womb  then  no  namarupa  could  have  appeared  ^ 

This  chain  of  twelve  causes  extends  over  three  lives.  Thus 
avidya  and  sarnskara  of  the  past  life  produce  the  vijnana,  nama- 

^  The  deities  of  the  gardens,  the  woods,  the  trees  and  the  plants,  finding  the 
master  of  the  house,  Citta,  ill  said  "  make  your  resolution,  '  May  I  be  a  cakravartti 
king  in  a  next  existence,' "  Satnyutta,  iv.  303. 

^  "  sa  ceddnandavijndnatn  ?ndtukkuksim  ndvakrdmeta,  na  tat  kalalam  kalalatvdya 
sannivartteta,^'  M.  V.  552.  Compare  Caraka,  Sdrlra,  III,  5-8,  where  he  speaks  of  a 
"upapaduka  sattva"  which  connects  the  soul  with  body  and  by  the  absence  of  which 
the  character  is  changed,  the  senses  become  affected  and  life  ceases,  when  it  is  in  a 
pure  condition  one  can  remember  even  the  previous  births ;  character,  purity,  antipathy, 
memory,  fear,  energy,  all  mental  qualities  are  produced  out  of  it.  Just  as  a  chariot  is 
made  by  the  combination  of  many  elements,  so  is  the  foetus. 

^  Madhyamaka  vrtti  (B.T.  S.  ■202-203).  Poussin  quotes  from  Digha,  II.  63,  "si  le 
vijfiana  ne  descendait  pas  dans  le  sein  maternel  la  namarupa  s'y  constituerait-il?  " 
Govindananda  on  Sarikara's  commentary  on  the  Brahma-sutras  (ll.  ii.  19)  says  that  the 
first  consciousness  (vijnana)  of  the  foetus  is  produced  by  the  samskaras  of  the  previous 
birth,  and  from  that  the  four  elements  (which  he  calls  nama)  and  from  that  the  white 
and  red,  semen  and  ovum,  and  the  first  stage  of  the  foetus  (kalala-budhuddvastha)  is 
produced. 


92  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

rupa,  sadayatana,  spar^a,  vedana,  trsna,  upadana  and  the  bhava 
(leading  to  another  life)  of  the  present  actual  life.  This  bhava 
produces  the  jati  and  jaramarana  of  the  next  life\ 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  these  twelve  links  in  the  chain 
extending  in  three  sections  over  three  lives  are  all  but  the 
manifestations  of  sorrow  to  the  bringing  in  of  which  they  natur- 
ally determine  one  another.  Thus  Abhidhmnmatthasangaha 
says  "  each  of  these  twelve  terms  is  a  factor.  For  the  composite 
term  'sorrow,'  etc.  is  only  meant  to  show  incidental  consequences 
of  birth.  Again  when  *  ignorance '  and  '  the  actions  of  the 
mind '  have  been  taken  into  account,  craving  {trsnd),  grasping 
{updddna)  and  {karma)  becoming  {bhava)  are  implicitly  ac- 
counted for  also.  In  the  same  manner  when  craving,  grasping 
and  {karma)  becoming  have  been  taken  into  account,  ignorance 
and  the  actions  of  the  mind  are  (implicitly)  accounted  for,  also ; 
and  when  birth,  decay,  and  death  are  taken  into  account,  even 
the  fivefold  fruit,  to  wit  (rebirth),  consciousness,  and  the  rest  are 
accounted  for.    And  thus  : 

Five  causes  in  the  Past  and  Now  a  fivefold  '  fruit' 

Five  causes  Now  and  yet  to  come  a  fivefold  '  fruit '  make  up 
the  Twenty  Modes,  the  Three  Connections  (i.  sahkhara  and 
vinnana,  2.  vedana  and  tanha,  3.  bhava  and  jati)  and  the  four 
groups  (one  causal  group  in  the  Past,  one  resultant  group  in  the 
Present,  one  causal  group  in  the  Present  and  one  resultant 
group  in  the  Future,  each  group  consisting  of  five  modes)l" 

These  twelve  interdependent  links  {dvddasdnga)  represent 
the  paticcasamuppada  {pratityasamutpdda)  doctrines  (dependent 
origination)^  which  are  themselves  but  sorrow  and  lead  to  cycles 
of  sorrow.  The  term  paticcasamuppada  or  pratltyasamutpada 
has  been  differently   interpreted   in  later  Buddhist  literature*. 

^  This  explanation  probably  cannot  be  found  in  the  early  Pali  texts;  but  Buddha- 
ghosa  mentions  it  in  Suniangalavilasini  on  Mahdnidana  suttanta.  We  find  it  also  in 
Abhidhamtnatihasangaha,  viii.  3.  Ignorance  and  the  actions  of  the  mind  belong  to 
the  past;  "birth,"  "decay  and  death"  to  the  future;  the  intermediate  eight  to  the 
present.  It  is  styled  as  trikandaka  (having  three  branches)  in  Abhidhartnakoia,  in. 
co-24.  Two  in  the  past  branch,  two  in  the  future  and  eight  in  the  middle  '■'■sa 
pratltyasamutpada  dvddaJdngastrikdndakak  purvdpardntayordve  dve  madkyestati." 

^  Aung  and  Mrs  Rhys  Davids'  translation  oi  Abkidhanwiatthasangaha,  pp.  189-190. 

'  The  twelve  links  are  not  always  constant.  Thus  in  the  list  given  in  the  Dialogues 
of  the  Buddha,  11.  ■23  f.,  avijja  and  sankhara  have  been  omitted  and  the  start  has  been 
made  with  consciousness,  and  it  has  been  said  that  "Cognition  turns  back  from  name 
and  form;  it  goes  not  beyond." 

*  M.  V.  p.  5  f. 


v]  Avijja  in  Paticcasamuppada  93 

Samutpada  means  appearance  or  arising  {prddurbhdva)  and  pra- 
tltya  means  after  getting  {prati+i-\-ya)\  combining  the  two  we 
find,  arising  after  getting  (something).  The  elements,  depending 
on  which  there  is  some  kind  of  arising,  are  called  hetu  (cause)  and 
paccaya  (ground).  These  two  words  however  are  often  used  in 
the  same  sense  and  are  interchangeable.  But  paccaya  is  also 
used  in  a  specific  sense.  Thus  when  it  is  said  that  avijja  is  the 
paccaya  of  sarikhara  it  is  meant  that  avijja  is  the  ground  {thiti) 
of  the  origin  of  the  sahkharas,  is  the  ground  of  their  movement, 
of  the  instrument  through  which  they  stand  {nimittatthiti),  of 
their  ayuhana  (conglomeration),  of  their  interconnection,  of  their 
intelligibility,  of  their  conjoint  arising,  of  their  function  as  cause 
and  of  their  function  as  the  ground  with  reference  to  those  which 
are  determined  by  them.  Avijja  in  all  these  nine  ways  is 
the  ground  of  sarikhara  both  in  the  past  and  also  in  the  future, 
though  avijja  itself  is  determined  in  its  turn  by  other  grounds ^ 
When  we  take  the  hetu  aspect  of  the  causal  chain,  we  cannot 
think  of  anything  else  but  succession,  but  when  we  take  the 
paccaya  aspect  we  can  have  a  better  vision  into  the  nature  of  the 
cause  as  ground.  Thus  when  avijja  is  said  to  be  the  ground 
of  the  sarikharas  in  the  nine  ways  mentioned  above,  it  seems 
reasonable  to  think  that  the  sarikharas  were  in  some  sense 
regarded  as  special  manifestations  of  avijja^.  But  as  this  point 
was  not  further  developed  in  the  early  Buddhist  texts  it  would 
be  unwise  to  proceed  further  with  it. 

The  Khandhas. 

The  word  khandha  (Skr.  skandha)  means  the  trunk  of  a  tree 
and  is  generally  used  to  mean  group  or  aggregate*.  We  have 
seen  that  Buddha  said  that  there  was  no  atman  (soul).  He  said 
that  when  people  held  that  they  found  the  much  spoken  of  soul, 
they  really  only  found  the  five  khandhas  together  or  any  one  of 
them.  The  khandhas  are  aggregates  of  bodily  and  psychical 
states   which  are  immediate  with  us  and  are  divided  into  five 

^  See  Patisambhidamagga,  vol.  I.  p.  50;  see  also  MaJJkima  Nikdya,  I.  67,  san- 
khara. .  .avijjanidand  avijjdsamudaya  avijjdjdlikd  avijjdpabhavd. 

^  In  the  Yoga  derivation  of  asmita  (egoism),  raga  (attachment),  dvesa  (antipathy) 
and  abhinive^a  (self  love)  from  avidya  vv^e  find  also  that  ail  the  five  are  regarded  as  the 
five  special  stages  of  the  growth  of  avidya  {paticaparvd  avidyd). 

'  The  word  skandha  is  used  in  Chandogya,  11.  23  [irayo  dharmaskandhdh  yajiiah 
adhyayanarn  ddnam)  in  the  sense  of  branches  and  in  almost  the  same  sense  in  Maitri, 

VII.    II. 


94  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

classes:  (i)  rupa  (four  elements,  the  body,  the  senses),  sense 
data,  etc.,  (2)  vedana  (feeling — pleasurable,  painful  and  in- 
different), (3)  sanna  (conceptual  knowledge),  (4)  sarikhara  (syn- 
thetic mental  states  and  the  synthetic  functioning  of  compound 
sense-affections,  compound  feelings  and  compound  concepts), 
(5)  viniiana  (consciousness)^ 

All  these  states  rise  depending  one  upon  the  other  {paticca- 
samuppanna)  and  when  a  man  says  that  he  perceives  the  self  he 
only  deludes  himself,  for  he  only  perceives  one  or  more  of  these. 
The  word  rupa  in  rupakhandha  stands  for  matter  and  material 
qualities,  the  senses,  and  the  sense  data^.  But  "  rupa "  is  also 
used  in  the  sense  of  pure  organic  affections  or  states  of  mind 
as  we  find  in  the  Khandha  Yamaka,  I.  p.  16,  and  also  in  Sam- 
yutta  Nikdya,  III.  ^6.  Rupaskandha  according  to  Dharma- 
sanigraha  means  the  aggregate  of  five  senses,  the  five  sensations, 
and  the  implicatory  communications  associated  in  sense  per- 
ceptions {vijnapti). 

The  elaborate  discussion  of  Dhammasangani  h^gins  by  defin- 
ing rupa  as  "  cattdro  ca  mahdbJiutd  catimnahca  mahdbhutdnam 
updddya  rupatn''  (the  four  mahabhutas  or  elements  and  that 
proceeding  from  the  grasping  of  that  is  called  rupa)*.  Buddha- 
ghosa  explains  it  by  saying  that  rupa  means  the  four  maha- 
bhutas and  those  which  arise  depending  {nissdyd)  on  them  as 
a  modification  of  them.  In  the  rupa  the  six  senses  including 
their  affections  are  also  included.  In  explaining  why  the  four 
elements  are  called  mahabhutas,  Buddhaghosa  says  :  "Just  as  a 
magician  {mdydkdrd)  makes  the  water  which  is  not  hard  appear 
as  hard,  makes  the  stone  which  is  not  gold  appear  as  gold  ; 
just  as  he  himself  though  not  a  ghost  nor  a  bird  makes  himself 
appear  as  a  ghost  or  a  bird,  so  these  elements  though  not  them- 
selves blue  make  themselves  appear  as  blue  {nllam  upddd  rupam), 
not  yellow,  red,  or  white  make  themselves  appear  as  yellow,  red 
or  white  {oddtain  updddrupani),  so  on  account  of  their  similarity 
to  the  appearances  created  by  the  magician  they  are  called 
mahabhutas" 

In  the  Samyutta  Nikdya  we  find  that  the  Buddha  says,  "O 
Bhikkhus  it  is  called  rupam  because  it  manifests  {rupyati);  how 

^  Samyutta  Nikdya,  HI.  86,  etc. 

*  Ahhidhammatlhasangaha,  J.  P.  T.  S.  1884,  p.  27  ff. 

^  Dhani?)iasangani,  pp.  124-179.  ■*  Atthasalini,  p.  299. 


v]  Theory  of  Matter  95 

does  it  manifest?  It  manifests  as  cold,  and  as  heat,  as  hunger  and 
as  thirst,  it  manifests  as  the  touch  of  gnats,  mosquitos,  wind,  the 
sun  and  the  snake;  it  manifests,  therefore  it  is  called  rupa\" 

If  we  take  the  somewhat  conflicting  passages  referred  to  above 
for  our  consideration  and  try  to  combine  them  so  as  to  understand 
what  is  meant  by  rupa,  I  think  we  find  that  that  which  mani- 
fested itself  to  the  senses  and  organs  was  called  rupa.  No  dis- 
tinction seems  to  have  been  made  between  the  sense-data  as 
colours,  smells,  etc.,  as  existing  in  the  physical  world  and  their 
appearance  as  sensations.  They  were  only  numerically  different 
and  the  appearance  of  the  sensations  was  dependent  upon  the 
sense-data  and  the  senses  but  the  sense-data  and  the  sensations 
were  "  rupa."  Under  certain  conditions  the  sense-data  were  fol- 
lowed by  the  sensations.  Buddhism  did  not  probably  start  with 
the  same  kind  of  division  of  matter  and  mind  as  we  now  do. 
And  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  mention  that  such  an  opposi- 
tion and  duality  were  found  neither  in  the  Upanisads  nor  in  the 
Samkhya  system  which  is  regarded  by  some  as  pre-Buddhistic. 
The  four  elements  manifested  themselves  in  certain  forms  and 
were  therefore  called  rupa ;  the  forms  of  affection  that  appeared 
were  also  called  rupa ;  many  other  mental  states  or  features 
which  appeared  with  them  were  also  called  rupa^.  The  ayatanas 
or  the  senses  were  also  called  rupa^  The  mahabhutas  or  four 
elements  were  themselves  but  changing  manifestations,  and  they 
together  with  all  that  appeared  in  association  with  them  were 
called  rupa  and  formed  the  rupa  khandha  (the  classes  of  sense- 
materials,  sense-data,  senses  and  sensations). 

In  Samyutta  Nikdya  (III.  10 1)  it  is  said  that  "the  four 
mahabhutas  were  the  hetu  and  the  paccaya  for  the  communica- 
tion of  the  rupakkhandha  {rupakkhandhassa  panndpandya).  Con- 
tact (sense-contact,  phassa)  is  the  cause  of  the  communication  of 
feelings  {vedand);  sense-contact  was  also  the  hetu  and  paccaya 
for  the  communication  of  the  saiiiiakkhandha;  sense-contact  is 
also  the  hetu  and  paccaya  for  the  communication  of  the  sahkhara- 
kkhandha.  But  namarupa  is  the  hetu  and  the  paccaya  for  the 
communication  of  the  vifiiianakkhandha."  Thus  not  only  feelings 
arise  on  account  of  the  sense-contact  but  safifia  and  sahkhara 
also  arise  therefrom.    Sanfia  is  that  where  specific  knowing  or 

^  Sarnyutta  Nikdya,  III.  86.  "^  Khandhayamaka. 

^  Dhammasahgani,  p.  I24ff. 


96  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

conceiving  takes  place.  This  is  the  stage  where  the  specific  dis- 
tinctive knowledge  as  the  yellow  or  the  red  takes  place. 

Mrs  Rhys  Davids  writing  on  saiina  says:  "In  editing  the 
second  book  of  the  Abhidhamma  pitaka  I  found  a  classification 
distinguishing  between  sanna  as  cognitive  assimilation  on  occasion 
of  sense,  and  sanna  as  cognitive  assimilation  of  ideas  by  way  of 
naming.  The  former  is  called  perception  of  resistance,  or  opposi- 
tion {patigha-sannd).  This,  writes  Buddhaghosa,  is  perception  on 
occasion  of  sight,  hearing,  etc.,  when  consciousness  is  aware  of  the 
impact  of  impressions  ;  of  external  things  as  different,  we  might 
say.  The  latter  is  called  perception  of  the  equivalent  word  or 
name  {adhivachdnd-sanna)  and  is  exercised  by  the  sensus  com- 
munis (mano),  when  e.g.  'one  is  seated... and  asks  another  who 
is  thoughtful:  "What  are  you  thinking  of?"  one  perceives  through 
his  speech.'  Thus  there  are  two  stages  of  sanfia-consciousness, 
I.  contemplating  sense-impressions,  2.  ability  to  know  what  they 
are  by  naming^" 

About  sarikhara  we  read  in  Samyutta  Nikdya  (ill.  87)  that  it 
is  called  saiikhara  because  it  synthesises  {abhisankharonti),  it  is 
that  which  conglomerated  rupa  as  rupa,  conglomerated  sanna 
as  saniia,  sarikhara  as  sarikhara  and  consciousness  {vihhdnd) 
as  consciousness.  It  is  called  sarikhara  because  it  synthesises 
the  conglomerated  {sankhatam  abhisankharonti).  It  is  thus  a 
synthetic  function  which  synthesises  the  passive  rupa,  sanna, 
sarikhara  and  vinnana  elements.  The  fact  that  we  hear  of  52 
sarikhara  states  and  also  that  the  sarikhara  exercises  its  syn- 
thetic activity  on  the  conglomerated  elements  in  it,  goes  to  show 
that  probably  the  word  sarikhara  is  used  in  two  senses,  as  mental 
states  and  as  synthetic  activity. 

Vinnana  or  consciousness  meant  according  to  Buddhaghosa, 
as  we  have  already  seen  in  the  previous  section,  both  the  stage 
at  which  the  intellectual  process  started  and  also  the  final 
resulting  consciousness. 

Buddhaghosa  in  explainingthe  process  of  Buddhist  psychology 
says  that  "consciousness  («//<■?)  first  comes  into  touch  {phassa)  with 
its  object  {drammajm)  and  thereafter  feeling,  conception  {sanna) 
and  volition  {cetand)  come  in.  This  contact  is  like  the  pillars  of 
a  palace,  and  the  rest  are  but  the  superstructure  built  upon  it 
{dabbasambhdrasadisd).   But  it  should  not  be  thought  that  contact 

'  Buddhist  Psychology,  pp.  49,  50. 


v]  Theory  of  Sense-contact  97 

is  the  beginning  of  the  psychological  processes,  for  in  one  whole 
consciousness  {ekacittasmini)  it  cannot  be  said  that  this  comes 
first  and  that  comes  after,  so  we  can  take  contact  in  association 
with  feeling  {vedana),  conceiving  {santia)  or  volition  {cetana); 
it  is  itself  an  immaterial  state  but  yet  since  it  comprehends 
objects  it  is  called  contact."  "There  is  no  impinging  on  one  side 
of  the  object  (as  in  physical  contact),  nevertheless  contact  causes 
consciousness  and  object  to  be  in  collision,  as  visible  object  and 
visual  organs,  sound  and  hearing;  thus  impact  is  its  function;  or 
it  has  impact  as  its  essential  property  in  the  sense  of  attainment, 
owing  to  the  impact  of  the  physical  basis  with  the  mental  object. 
For  it  is  said  in  the  Commentary: — "contact  in  the  four  planes  of 
existence  is  never  without  the  characteristic  of  touch  with  the 
object;  but  the  function  of  impact  takes  place  in  the  five  doors. 
For  to  sense,  or  five-door  contact,  is  given  the  name  'having  the 
characteristic  of  touch'  as  well  as  'having  the  function  of  impact.' 
But  to  contact  in  the  mind-door  there  is  only  the  characteristic 
of  touch,  but  not  the  function  of  impact.  And  then  this  Sutta  is 
quoted  'As  if,  sire,  two  rams  were  to  fight,  one  ram  to  represent 
the  eye,  the  second  the  visible  object,  and  their  collision  contact. 
And  as  if,  sire,  two  cymbals  were  to  strike  against  each  other,  or 
two  hands  were  to  clap  against  each  other;  one  hand  would 
represent  the  eye,  the  second  the  visible  object  and  their  collision 
contact.  Thus  contact  has  the  characteristic  of  touch  and  the 
function  of  impact^'.  Contact  is  the  manifestation  of  the  union 
of  the  three  (the  object,  the  consciousness  and  the  sense)  and  its 
effect  is  feeling  {vedana);  though  it  is  generated  by  the  objects 
it  is  felt  in  the  consciousness  and  its  chief  feature  is  experiencing 
{anubhavd)  the  taste  of  the  object.  As  regards  enjoying  the 
taste  of  an  object,  the  remaining  associated  states  enjoy  it  only 
partially.  Of  contact  there  is  (the  function  oO  the  mere  touching, 
of  perception  the  mere  noting  or  perceiving,  of  volition  the  mere 
coordinating,  of  consciousness  the  mere  cognizing.  But  feeling 
alone,  through  governance,  proficiency,  mastery,  enjoys  the  taste 
of  an  object.  For  feeling  is  like  the  king,  the  remaining  states 
are  like  the  cook.  As  the  cook,  when  he  has  prepared  food  of 
diverse  tastes,  puts  it  in  a  basket,  seals  it,  takes  it  to  the  king, 
breaks  the  seal,  opens  the  basket,  takes  the  best  of  all  the  soup 
and  curries,  puts  them  in  a  dish,  swallows  (a  portion)  to  find  out 

^  Atthasdlini,  p.  io8;  translation,  pp.  143-144. 
D.  7 


qS  Buddhist  PhUosophy  [ch. 

whether  they  are  faulty  or  not  and  afterwards  offers  the  food  of 
various  excellent  tastes  to  the  king,  and  the  king,  being  lord, 
expert,  and  master,  eats  whatever  he  likes,  even  so  the  mere  tasting 
of  the  food  by  the  cook  is  like  the  partial  enjoyment  of  the  object 
by  the  remaining  states,  and  as  the  cook  tastes  a  portion  of  the 
food,  so  the  remaining  states  enjoy  a  portion  of  the  object,  and 
as  the  king,  being  lord,  expert  and  master,  eats  the  meal  according 
to  his  pleasure  so  feeling  being  lord  expert,  and  master,  enjoys 
the  taste  of  the  object  and  therefore  it  is  said  that  enjoyment  or 
experience  is  its  function i." 

The  special  feature  of  safina  is  said  to  be  the  recognizing 
{paccabJiihna)  by  means  of  a  sign  {abhinndnend).  According  to 
another  explanation,  a  recognition  takes  place  by  the  inclusion 
of  the  totality  (of  aspects) — sabbasahgaJiikavaseua.  The  work  of 
volition  {cetana)  is  said  to  be  coordination  or  binding  together 
{abJiisandahand).  "Volition  is  exceedingly  energetic  and  makes 
a  double  effort,  a  double  exertion.  Hence  the  Ancients  said 
'  Volition  is  like  the  nature  of  a  landowner,  a  cultivator  who  taking 
fifty-five  strong  men,  went  down  to  the  fields  to  reap.  He  was 
exceedingly  energetic  and  exceedingly  strenuous ;  he  doubled  his 
strength  and  said  "Take  your  sickles"  and  so  forth,  pointed  out 
the  portion  to  be  reaped,  offered  them  drink,  food,  scent,  flowers, 
etc.,  and  took  an  equal  share  of  the  work.'  The  simile  should  be 
thus  applied:  volition  is  like  the  cultivator,  the  fifty-five  moral 
states  which  arise  as  factors  of  consciousness  are  like  the  fifty-five 
strong  men;  like  the  time  of  doubling  strength,  doubling  effort 
by  the  cultivator  is  the  doubled  strength,  doubled  effort  of 
volition  as  regards  activity  in  moral  and  immoral  actsl"  It 
seems  that  probably  the  active  side  operating  in  saiikhara  was 
separately  designated  as  cetana  (volition). 

"  When  one  says  '  1,'  what  he  does  is  that  he  refers  either  to 
all  the  khandhas  combined  or  any  one  of  them  and  deludes  him- 
self that  that  was  'I,'  Just  as  one  could  not  say  that  the 
fragrance  of  the  lotus  belonged  to  the  petals,  the  colour  or  the 
pollen,  so  one  could  not  say  that  the  rupa  was  T'  or  that  the 
vedana  was  T  or  any  of  the  other  khandhas  was  'I.'  There  is 
nowhere  to  be  found  in  the  khandhas  'I  am*'." 

1  Atlhasdlinl,  pp.  109-110;  translation,  pp.  145-146. 
-  Ibid.  p.  Ill  ;  translation,  pp.  147-148. 

•*  Sa  my  III  I  a  Nikdya,  in.  130. 


v]  Ignorance  99 

Avijja  and  Asava. 

As  to  the  question  how  the  avijja  (ignorance)  first  started 
there  can  be  no  answer,  for  we  could  never  say  that  either 
ignorance  or  desire  for  existence  ever  has  any  beginning^  Its 
fruition  is  seen  in  the  cycle  of  existence  and  the  sorrow  that  comes 
in  its  train,  and  it  comes  and  goes  with  them  all.  Thus  as  we 
can  never  say  that  it  has  any  beginning,  it  determines  the  elements 
which  bring  about  cycles  of  existence  and  is  itself  determined  by 
certain  others.  This  mutual  determination  can  only  take  place 
in  and  through  the  changing  series  of  dependent  phenomena,  for 
there  is  nothing  which  can  be  said  to  have  any  absolute  priority 
in  time  or  stability.  It  is  said  that  it  is  through  the  coming  into 
being  of  the  asavas  or  depravities  that  the  avijja  came  into 
being,  and  that  through  the  destruction  of  the  depravities  {dsava) 
the  avijja  was  destroyed-.  These  asavas  are  classified  in  the 
Dhaniinasahgani  as  kamasava,  bhavasava,  ditthasava  and  avij- 
jasava.  Kamasava  means  desire,  attachment,  pleasure,  and  thirst 
after  the  qualities  associated  with  the  senses;  bhavasava  means 
desire,  attachment  and  will  for  existence  or  birth;  ditthasava 
means  the  holding  of  heretical  views,  such  as,  the  world  is  eternal 
or  non-eternal,  or  that  the  world  will  come  to  an  end  or  will  not 
come  to  an  end,  or  that  the  body  and  the  soul  are  one  or  are 
different;  avijjasava  means  the  ignorance  of  sorrow,  its  cause,  its 
extinction  and  its  means  of  extinction.  Dhavwiasahgani  adds 
four  more  supplementary  ones,  viz.  ignorance  about  the  nature  of 
anterior  mental  khandhas,  posterior  mental  khandhas,  anterior 
and  posterior  together,  and  their  mutual  dependence  I  Kamasava 
and  bhavasava  can  as  Buddhaghosa  says  be  counted  as  one,  for 
they  are  both  but  depravities  due  to  attachment*. 

•*  Warren's  Buddhism  in  Translations  {Visuddhiinas^ga,  chap,  xvn.),  p.  175. 

"  M.  N.  I.  p.  54.  Childers  translates  "asava"  as  "depravities"  and  Mrs  Rhys 
Davids  as  "intoxicants."  The  word  "asava"  in  Skr.  means  "old  wine."  It  is  derived 
from  "su"  to  produce  by  Buddhaghosa  and  the  meaning  that  he  gives  to  it  is  '■'cira 
piu-ivdsikattkena''''  (on  account  of  its  being  stored  up  for  a  long  time  like  wine).  They 
work  through  the  eye  and  the  mind  and  continue  to  produce  all  beings  up  to  Indra. 
As  those  wines  which  are  kept  long  are  called  "asavas"  so  these  are  also  called 
asavas  for  remaining  a  long  time.  The  other  alternative  that  Buddhaghosa  gives  is 
that  they  are  called  asava  on  account  of  their  producing  samsaradukkha  (sorrows  of 
the  world),  Atthasalini,  p.  48.  Contrast  it  with  Jaina  asrava  (flowing  in  of  karma 
matter).  Finding  it  difficult  to  translate  it  in  one  word  after  Buddhaghosa,  I  have 
translated  it  as  "depravities,"  after  Childers. 

^  See  Dhammasahgani,  p.  195.  ^  Buddhaghosa's  Atthasalini,  p.  371. 

7—2 


lOO  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

The  ditthasavas  by  clouding  the  mind  with  false  metaphysical 
views  stand  in  the  way  of  one's  adopting  the  true  Buddhistic  doc- 
trines. The  kamasavas  stand  in  the  way  of  one's  entering  into 
the  way  of  Nirvana  {andgdmimagga)  and  the  bhavasavas  and 
avijjasavas  stand  in  the  way  of  one's  attaining  arhattva  or  final 
emancipation.  When  the  Majjhima  Nikdya  says  that  from  the 
rise  of  the  asavas  avijja  rises,  it  evidently  counts  avijja  there  as 
in  some  sense  separate  from  the  other  asavas,  such  as  those  of 
attachment  and  desire  of  existence  which  veil  the  true  know- 
ledge about  sorrow. 

The  afflictions  {kilesas)  do  not  differ  much  from  the  asavas 
for  they  are  but  the  specific  passions  in  forms  ordinarily  familiar 
to  us,  such  as  covetousness  {lobhd),  anger  or  hatred  {dosa), 
infatuation  {nioha),  arrogance,  pride  or  vanity  (mdna),  heresy 
{ditthi)^  doubt  or  uncertainty  {vicikicchd),  idleness  {thlnd),  boast- 
fulness  {udhacca),  shamelessness  {ahirikd)  and  hardness  of  heart 
{anottapa);  these  kilesas  proceed  directly  as  a  result  of  the  asavas. 
In  spite  of  these  varieties  they  are  often  counted  as  three  (lobha, 
dosa,  moha)  and  these  together  are  called  kilesa.  They  are 
associated  with  the  vedanakkhandha,  sanfiakkhandha,  sahkharak- 
khandha  and  viiifianakkhandha.  From  these  arise  the  three  kinds 
of  actions,  of  speech,  of  body,  and  of  mind^ 

Sila  and  Samadhi. 

We  are  intertwined  all  through  outside  and  inside  by  the 
tangles  of  desire  {tanhd  jatd\  and  the  only  way  by  which  these 
may  be  loosened  is  by  the  practice  of  right  discipline  {sild),  con- 
centration {sainddhi)  and  wisdom  {pahud).  Sila  briefly  means 
the  desisting  from  committing  all  sinful  deeds  {sabbapdpassa 
akaranmn).  With  sila  therefore  the  first  start  has  to  be  made, 
for  by  it  one  ceases  to  do  all  actions  prompted  by  bad  desires 
and  thereby  removes  the  inrush  of  dangers  and  disturbances. 
This  serves  to  remove  the  kilesas,  and  therefore  the  proper  per- 
formance of  the  sila  would  lead  one  to  the  first  two  successive 
stages  of  sainthood,  viz.  the  sotapannabhava  (the  stage  in  which 
one  is  put  in  the  right  current)  and  the  sakadagamibhava  (the 
stage  when  one  has  only  one  more  birth  to  undergo).  Samadhi 
is  a  more  advanced  effort,  for  by  it  all  the  old  roots  of  the  old 
kilesas  are  destroyed  and  the  tanha  or  desire  is  removed  and 

'   Dhainmasahgani,  p.  180. 


v]  Right  Conduct  loi 

by  it  one  is  led  to  the  more  advanced  states  of  a  saint.  It 
directly  brings  in  panfia  (true  wisdom)  and  by  panfia  the  saint 
achieves  final  emancipation  and  becomes  what  is  called  an 
arhat^  Wisdom  {pafina)  is  right  knowledge  about  the  four 
ariya  saccas,  viz.  sorrow,  its  cause,  its  destruction  and  its  cause 
of  destruction. 

Slla  means  those  particular  volitions  and  mental  states,  etc. 
by  which  a  man  who  desists  from  committing  sinful  actions 
maintains  himself  on  the  right  path.  Sila  thus  means  i.  right 
volition  {cetand),  2.  the  associated  mental  states  {cetasikd), 
3.  mental  control  {samvara)  and  4.  the  actual  non-transgression 
(in  body  and  speech)  of  the  course  of  conduct  already  in  the  mind 
by  the  preceding  three  sllas  called  avitikkama.  Samvara  is 
spoken  of  as  being  of  five  kinds,  i.  Patimokkhasarnvara  (the 
control  which  saves  him  who  abides  by  it),  2.  Satisarnvara  (the 
control  of  mindfulness),  3.  Nanasarnvara  (the  control  of  know- 
ledge), 4.  Khantisamvara  (the  control  of  patience),  5.  Viriya- 
samvara  (the  control  of  active  self-restraint).  Patimokkha- 
sarnvara means  all  self-control  in  general.  Satisarnvara  means 
the  mindfulness  by  which  one  can  bring  in  the  right  and  good 
associations  when  using  one's  cognitive  senses.  Even  when 
looking  at  any  tempting  object  he  will  by  virtue  of  his  mindful- 
ness {sati)  control  himself  from  being  tempted  by  avoiding  to 
think  of  its  tempting  side  and  by  thinking  on  such  aspects  of  it 
as  may  lead  in  the  right  direction.  Khantisamvara  is  that  by 
which  one  can  remain  unperturbed  in  heat  and  cold.  By  the 
proper  adherence  to  sila  all  our  bodily,  mental  and  vocal  activities 
(kammd)  are  duly  systematized,  organized,  stabilized  {samddhd- 
nam,  upadJidranam,  patitthdy. 

The  sage  who  adopts  the  full  course  should  also  follow  a 
number  of  healthy  monastic  rules  with  reference  to  dress,  sitting, 
dining,  etc.,  which  are  called  the  dhutarigas  or  pure  disciplinary 
parts^  The  practice  of  sila  and  the  dhutangas  help  the  sage  to 
adopt  the  course  of  samadhi.  Samadhi  as  we  have  seen  means 
the  concentration  of  the  mind  bent  on  right  endeavours  {kusala- 
cittekaggatd  samddhiJi)  together  with  its  states  upon  one  parti- 
cular object  {ekdrammana)  so  that  they  may  completely  cease  to 
shift  and  change  {saintnd  ca  avikkhipamdndy. 

^  Visuddhimagga  Nidanddikatha.  -  Visiiddhimagga-sUaniddeso,  pp.  7  and  8. 

-  Visuddhhnagga,  ii.  *  Visuddhimagga,  pp.  84-85. 


I02  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

The  man  who  has  practised  slla  must  train  his  mind  first 
in  particular  ways,  so  that  it  may  be  possible  for  him  to  acquire 
the  chief  concentration  of  meditation  called  jhana  (fixed  and 
steady  meditation).  These  preliminary  endeavours  of  the  mind 
for  the  acquirement  of  jhanasamadhi  eventually  lead  to  it 
and  are  called  upacara  samadhi  (preliminary  samadhi)  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  jhanasamadhi  called  the  appanasamadhi 
(achieved  samadhi)\  Thus  as  a  preparatory  measure,  firstly  he 
has  to  train  his  mind  continually  to  view  with  disgust  the  appe- 
titive desires  for  eating  and  drinking  {ahdre  patikkrdasafma)  by 
emphasizing  in  the  mind  the  various  troubles  that  are  associated 
in  seeking  food  and  drink  and  their  ultimate  loathsome  trans- 
formations as  various  nauseating  bodily  elements.  When  a  man 
continually  habituates  himself  to  emphasize  the  disgusting 
associations  of  food  and  drink,  he  ceases  to  have  any  attach- 
ment to  them  and  simply  takes  them  as  an  unavoidable  evil, 
only  awaiting  the  day  when  the  final  dissolution  of  all  sorrows 
will  come^  Secondly  he  has  to  habituate  his  mind  to  the  idea 
that  all  the  parts  of  our  body  are  made  up  of  the  four  elements, 
ksiti  (earth),  ap  (water),  tejas  (fire)  and  wind  (air),  like  the  carcase 
of  a  cow  at  the  butcher's  shop.  This  is  technically  called  catu- 
dhatuvavatthanabhavana  (the  meditation  of  the  body  as  being 
made  up  of  the  four  elements)^  Thirdly  he  has  to  habituate  his 
mind  to  think  again  and  again  {mtussati)  about  the  virtues  or 
greatness  of  the  Buddha,  the  sarigha  (the  monks  following  the 
Buddha),  the  gods  and  the  law  {dhaninia)  of  the  Buddha,  about 
the  good  effects  of  slla,  and  the  making  of  gifts  {cdgdmissati^, 
about  the  nature  of  death  {ntarandnussati)  and  about  the  deep 
nature  and  qualities  of  the  final  extinction  of  all  phenomena 
{upasamdnussati)  *. 

'  As  it  is  not  possible  for  me  to  enter  into  details,  I  follow  what  appears  to  me  to 
be  the  main  line  of  division  showing  the  interconnection  of  jhana  (Skr.  dhydnd)  with 
its  accessory  stages  called  parikammas  {Visnddhimagga,  pp.  85  f.). 

2  Visttddhimagga,  pp.  341-347;  mark  the  intense  pessimistic  attitude,  "  Iman  ca 
pana  ahdre  patikulasahndm  anuyiittassa  bhikkhuno  rasatanhdya  cittani  patillyati, 
patikuttati,  pativattati ;  so,  kantdranittharanatthiko  viya  puttarnavisani  tngatamado 
ahdrant  dhdreti  ydvad  e.7)a  dukkhassa  uittharannlthdya"  p.  347.  The  mind  of  him  who 
inspires  himself  with  this  supreme  disgust  to  all  food,  becomes  free  from  all  desires  for 
palatable  tastes,  and  turns  its  back  to  them  and  flies  off  from  them.  As  a  means  of 
getting  rid  of  all  sorrow  he  takes  his  food  without  any  attachment  as  one  would  eat 
the  flesh  of  his  own  son  to  sustain  himself  in  crossing  a  forest. 

'  Visuddhimagga,  pp.  347-370.  *  Visnddhimagga,  pp.  197-294. 


v]  Meditation  1 03 

Advancing  further  from  the  preHminary  meditations  or  pre- 
parations called  the  upacara  samadhi  we  come  to  those  other 
sources  of  concentration  and  meditation  called  the  appanasamadhi 
which  directly  lead  to  the  achievement  of  the  highest  samadhi. 
The  processes  of  purification  and  strengthening  of  the  mind 
continue  in  this  stage  also,  but  these  represent  the  last  attempts 
which  lead  the  mind  to  its  final  goal  Nibbana.  In  the  first  part 
of  this  stage  the  sage  has  to  go  to  the  cremation  grounds  and 
notice  the  diverse  horrifying  changes  of  the  human  carcases  and 
think  how  nauseating,  loathsome,  unsightly  and  impure  they  are, 
and  from  this  he  will  turn  his  mind  to  the  living  human  bodies 
and  convince  himself  that  they  being  in  essence  the  same  as  the 
dead  carcases  are  as  loathsome  as  they\  This  is  called  asubhakam- 
matthana  or  the  endeavour  to  perceive  the  impurity  of  our  bodies. 
He  should  think  of  the  anatomical  parts  and  constituents  of  the 
body  as  well  as  their  processes,  and  this  will  help  him  to  enter 
into  the  first  jhana  by  leading  his  mind  away  from  his  body. 
This  is  called  the  kayagatasati  or  the  continual  mindfulness 
about  the  nature  of  the  body".  As  an  aid  to  concentration  the 
sage  should  sit  in  a  quiet  place  and  fix  his  mind  on  the  inhaling 
{passdsa)  and  the  exhaling  {dssdsa)  of  his  breath,  so  that  instead 
of  breathing  in  a  more  or  less  unconscious  manner  he  may  be 
aware  whether  he  is  breathing  quickly  or  slowly;  he  ought  to 
mark  it  definitely  by  counting  numbers,  so  that  by  fixing  his 
mind  on  the  numbers  counted  he  may  fix  his  mind  on  the  whole 
process  of  inhalation  and  exhalation  in  all  stages  of  its  course. 
This  is  called  the  anapanasati  or  the  mindfulness  of  inhalation 
and  exhalation  ^ 

Next  to  this  we  come  to  Brahmavihara,  the  fourfold  medi- 
tation of  metta  (universal  friendship),  karuna  (universal  pity), 
mudita  (happiness  in  the  prosperity  and  happiness  of  all)  and 
upekkha  (indifference  to  any  kind  of  preferment  of  oneself,  his 
friend,  enemy  or  a  third  party).  In  order  to  habituate  oneself  to 
the  meditation  on  universal  friendship, one  should  start  with  think- 
ing how  he  should  himself  like  to  root  out  all  misery  and  become 
happy,  how  he  should  himself  like  to  avoid  death  and  live  cheer- 
fully, and  then  pass  over  to  the  idea  that  other  beings  would  also 
have  the  same  desires.  He  should  thus  habituate  himself  to  think 
that  his  friends,  his  enemies,  and  all  those  with  whom  he  is  not 

^  Visiiddhimagga,  vi.  -  Ibid.  pp.  239-266.  *  Ibid.  pp.  266-292. 


I04  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

connected  nmight  all  live  and  become  happy.  He  should  fix  himself 
to  such  an  extent  in  this  meditation  that  he  would  not  find  any 
difference  between  the  happiness  or  safety  of  himself  and  of  others. 
He  should  never  become  angry  with  any  person.  Should  he  at  any 
time  feel  himself  offended  on  account  of  the  injuries  inflicted  on 
him  by  his  enemies,  he  should  think  of  the  futility  of  doubling 
his  sadness  by  becoming  sorry  or  vexed  on  that  account.  He 
should  think  that  if  he  should  allow  himself  to  be  affected  by 
anger,  he  would  spoil  all  his  slla  which  he  was  so  carefully  prac- 
tising. If  anyone  has  done  a  vile  action  by  inflicting  injury, 
should  he  himself  also  do  the  same  by  being  angry  at  it  ?  If  he 
were  finding  fault  with  others  for  being  angry,  could  he  himself 
indulge  in  anger?  Moreover  he  should  think  that  all  the  dhammas 
are  momentary  ikhanikatta)  ;  that  there  no  longer  existed  the 
khandhas  which  had  inflicted  the  injury,  and  moreover  the  inflic- 
tion of  any  injury  being  only  a  joint  product,  the  man  who  was 
injured  was  himself  an  indispensable  element  in  the  production 
of  the  infliction  as  much  as  the  man  who  inflicted  the  injury,  and 
there  could  not  thus  be  any  special  reason  for  making  him  re- 
sponsible and  of  being  angry  with  him.  If  even  after  thinking 
in  this  way  the  anger  does  not  subside,  he  should  think  that  by 
indulging  in  anger  he  could  only  bring  mischief  on  himself  through 
his  bad  deeds,  and  he  should  further  think  that  the  other  man 
by  being  angry  was  only  producing  mischief  to  himself  but  not 
to  him.  By  thinking  in  these  ways  the  sage  would  be  able  to 
free  his  mind  from  anger  against  his  enemies  and  establish  him- 
self in  an  attitude  of  universal  friendship^  This  is  called  the 
metta-bhavana.  In  the  meditation  of  universal  pity  {karund) 
also  one  should  sympathize  with  the  sorrows  of  his  friends  and 
foes  alike.  The  sage  being  more  keen-sighted  will  feel  pity  for 
those  who  are  apparently  leading  a  happy  life,  but  are  neither 
acquiring  merits  nor  endeavouring  to  proceed  on  the  way  to 
Nibbana,  for  they  are  to  suffer  innumerable  lives  of  sorrow^. 

We  next  come  to  the  jhanas  with  the  help  of  material  things 
as  objects  of  concentration  called  the  Kasinam.  These  objects  of 
concentration  may  either  be  earth,  water,  fire,  wind,  blue  colour, 
yellow  colour,  red  colour,  white  colour,  light  or  limited  space 
{paricchinndkdsd).  Thus  the  sage  may  take  a  brown  ball  of  earth 
and  concentrate  his  mind  upon  it  as  an  earth  ball,  sometimes 

1  Visuddhitnagga,  pp.  295-314.  -  Ibid.  pp.  .3 14-3 15- 


v]  Meditation  105 

with  eyes  open  and  sometimes  with  eyes  shut.  When  he  finds 
that  even  in  shutting  his  eyes  he  can  visualize  the  object  in  his 
mind,  he  may  leave  off  the  object  and  retire  to  another  place  to 
concentrate  upon  the  image  of  the  earth  ball  in  his  mind. 

In  the  first  stages  of  the  first  meditation  {pathamam  jhdnani) 
the  mind  is  concentrated  on  the  object  in  the  way  of  understanding 
it  with  its  form  and  name  and  of  comprehending  it  with  its  diverse 
relations.  This  state  of  concentration  is  called  vitakka  (discursive 
meditation).  The  next  stage  of  the  first  meditation  is  that  in 
which  the  mind  does  not  move  in  the  object  in  relational  terms 
but  becomes  fixed  and  settled  in  it  and  penetrates  into  it  without 
any  quivering.  This  state  is  called  vicara  (steadily  moving).  The 
first  stage  vitakka  has  been  compared  in  Buddhaghosa's  Visud- 
dhimagga  to  the  flying  of  a  kite  with  its  wings  flapping,  whereas 
the  second  stage  is  compared  to  its  flying  in  a  sweep  without  the 
least  quiver  of  its  wings.  These  two  stages  are  associated  with 
a  buoyant  exaltation  {pltt)  and  a  steady  inward  bliss  called  sukha^ 
instilling  the  mind.  The  formation  of  this  first  jhana  roots  out 
five  ties  of  avijja,  kamacchando  (dallying  with  desires),  vyapado 
(hatred),  thinamiddham  (sloth  and  torpor),  uddhaccakukkuccam 
(pride  and  restlessness),  and  vicikiccha  (doubt).  The  five  elements 
of  which  this  jhana  is  constituted  are  vitakka,  vicara,  piti,  sukham 
and  ekaggata  (one  pointedness). 

When  the  sage  masters  the  first  jhana  he  finds  it  defective 
and  wants  to  enter  into  the  second  meditation  {diitiyam  jhanatri), 
where  there  is  neither  any  vitakka  nor  vicara  of  the  first  jhana, 
but  the  mind  is  in  one  unruffled  state  {ekodibJidvani).  It  is  a 
much  steadier  state  and  does  not  possess  the  movement  which 
characterized  the  vitakka  and  the  vicara  stages  of  the  first  jhana 
and  is  therefore  a  very  placid  state  {vitakka-vicdrakkhobha- 
virahena  ativiya  acalatd  suppasannatd  ca).  It  is  however  associ- 
ated with  pIti,  sukha  and  ekaggata  as  the  first  jhana  was. 

When  the  second  jhana  is  mastered  the  sage  becomes  disin- 
clined towards  the  enjoyment  of  the  piti  of  that  stage  and  becomes 
indifferent  to  them  {upekkhako).  A  sage  in  this  stage  sees  the 
objects  but  is  neither  pleased  nor  displeased.  At  this  stage  all 
the  asavas  of  the  sage  become  loosened  {khindsava).  The 
enjoyment  of  sukha  however  still  remains  in  the  stage  and  the 

^  Where  there  is  piti  there  is  sukha,  but  where  there   is  sukha  there  may  not 
necessarily  be  piti.    Visuddhimagga,  p.  145. 


io6  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

mind  if  not  properly  and  carefully  watched  would  like  sometimes 
to  turn  back  to  the  enjoyment  of  piti  again.  The  two  character- 
istics of  this  jhana  are  sukha  and  ekaggata.  It  should  however 
be  noted  that  though  there  is  the  feeling  of  highest  sukha  here, 
the  mind  is  not  only  not  attached  to  it  but  is  indifferent  to  it 
{atimadJiurasukhe  sukJiapdramippatte  pi  tatiyajjhdne  upekkhako , 
na  tattha  sjikhdbhisangena dkaddhiyatiy .  The  earth  ball  {pathavi) 
is  however  still  the  object  of  the  jhana. 

In  the  fourth  or  the  last  jhana  both  the  sukha  (happiness)  and 
the  dukkha  (misery)  vanish  away  and  all  the  roots  of  attachment 
and  antipathies  are  destroyed.  This  state  is  characterized  by 
supreme  and  absolute  indifference  (upekkkd)  which  was  slowly 
growing  in  all  the  various  stages  of  the  jhanas.  The  characteris- 
tics of  this  jhana  are  therefore  upekkha  and  ekaggata.  With  the 
mastery  of  this  jhana  comes  final  perfection  and  total  extinction 
of  the  citta  called  cetovimutti,  and  the  sage  becomes  thereby  an 
arhat^  There  is  no  further  production  of  the  khandhas,  no  rebirth, 
and  there  is  the  absolute  cessation  of  all  sorrows  and  sufferings — 
Nibbana. 

Kamma. 

In  the  Katha  (II.  6)  Yama  says  that  "  a  fool  who  is  blinded 
with  the  infatuation  of  riches  does  not  believe  in  a  future  life;  he 
thinks  that  only  this  life  exists  and  not  any  other,  and  thus  he 
comes  again  and  again  within  my  grasp."  In  the  Digha  Nikaya 
also  we  read  how  Payasi  was  trying  to  give  his  reasons  in  support 
of  his  belief  that  "Neither  is  there  any  other  world,  nor  are  there 
beings,  reborn  otherwise  than  from  parents,  nor  is  there  fruit  or 
result  of  deeds  well  done  or  ill  donel"  Some  of  his  arguments 
were  that  neither  the  vicious  nor  the  virtuous  return  to  tell  us 
that  they  suffered  or  enjoyed  happiness  in  the  other  world,  that 
if  the  virtuous  had  a  better  life  in  store,  and  if  they  believed 
in  it,  they  would  certainly  commit  suicide  in  order  to  get  it  at 
the  earliest  opportunity,  that  in  spite  of  taking  the  best  precau- 
tions we  do  not  find  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  any  person  that 
his  soul  goes  out,  or  that  his  body  weighs  less  on  account  of 
the  departure  of  his  soul,  and  so  on.  Kassapa  refutes  his  argu- 
ments with  apt  illustrations.    But  in  spite  of  a  few  agnostics  of 

*  Vistiddhiiiiagga.,  p.  163. 

^  Majjhima  NikHya,  i.  p.  296,  and  Visitddhimagga,  pp.  167-168. 

'  Dialogues  of  the  Buddha,  \\.  p.  349;  D.N.  Ii.  pp.  317  ff- 


v]  Deeds  and  Desires  107 

Payasi's  type,  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  doctrine 
of  rebirth  in  other  worlds  and  in  this  was  often  spoken  of  in  the 
Upanisads  and  taken  as  an  accepted  fact  by  the  Buddha.  In 
the  Milinda  Pahha,  we  find  Nagasena  saying  "  it  is  through  a 
difference  in  their  karma  that  men  are  not  all  alike,  but  some 
long  lived,  some  short  lived,  some  healthy  and  some  sickly,  some 
handsome  and  some  ugly,  some  powerful  and  some  weak,  some 
rich  and  some  poor,  some  of  high  degree  and  some  of  low 
degree,  some  wise  and  some  foolish  \"  We  have  seen  in  the 
third  chapter  that  the  same  sort  of  views  was  enunciated  by  the 
Upanisad  sages. 

But  karma  could  produce  its  effect  in  this  life  or  any 
other  life  only  when  there  were  covetousness,  antipathy  and  in- 
fatuation. But  "  when  a  man's  deeds  are  performed  without 
covetousness,  arise  without  covetousness  and  are  occasioned  with- 
out covetousness,  then  inasmuch  as  covetousness  is  gone  these 
deeds  are  abandoned,  uprooted,  pulled  out  of  the  ground  like  a 
palmyra  tree  and  become  non-existent  and  not  liable  to  spring 
up  again  in  the  future^"  Karma  by  itself  without  craving  {tanJia) 
is  incapable  of  bearing  good  or  bad  fruits.  Thus  we  read  in  the 
Mahdsatipatthdna  sutta,  "even  this  craving,  potent  for  rebirth, 
that  is  accompanied  by  lust  and  self-indulgence,  seeking  satis- 
faction now  here,  now  there,  to  wit,  the  craving  for  the  life  of 
sense,  the  craving  for  becoming  (renewed  life)  and  the  craving 
for  not  becoming  (for  no  new  rebirth)^"  "  Craving  for  things 
visible,  craving  for  things  audible,  craving  for  things  that  may 
be  smelt,  tasted,  touched,  for  things  in  memory  recalled.  These 
are  the  things  in  this  world  that  are  dear,  that  are  pleasant. 
There  does  craving  take  its  rise,  there  does  it  dwells"  Pre-occu- 
pation  and  deliberation  of  sensual  gratification  giving  rise  to 
craving  is  the  reason  why  sorrow  comes.  And  this  is  the  first 
arya  satya  (noble  truth). 

The  cessation  of  sorrow  can  only  happen  with  "  the  utter 
cessation  of  and  disenchantment  about  that  very  craving,  giving 
it  up,  renouncing  it  and  emancipation  from  itl" 

When  the  desire  or  craving  {tau/ui)  has  once  ceased  the 
sage  becomes  an  arhat,  and  the  deeds  that  he  may  do  after 
that  will  bear  no  fruit.    An  arhat  cannot  have  any  good  or  bad 

*  Warren's  Buddhism  in  Translations,  p.  215.  -  /did.  pp.  216-217. 

3  Dialogues  of  the  Buddha,  n.  p.  340.  *  Ibid.  p.  341.  "  Ibid.  p.  341. 


io8  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

fruits  of  whatever  he  does.  For  it  is  through  desire  that  karma 
finds  its  scope  of  giving  fruit.  With  the  cessation  of  desire  all 
ignorance,  antipathy  and  grasping  cease  and  consequently  there 
is  nothing  which  can  determine  rebirth.  An  arhat  may  suffer  the 
effects  of  the  deeds  done  by  him  in  some  previous  birth  just  as 
Moggallana  did,  but  in  spite  of  the  remnants  of  his  past  karma 
an  arhat  was  an  emancipated  man  on  account  of  the  cessation  of 
his  desired 

Kammas  are  said  to  be  of  three  kinds,  of  body,  speech  and 
mind  {kdyika,  vdcika  and  mmiasikd).  The  root  of  this  kamma 
is  however  volition  {cetatid)  and  the  states  associated  with  it^  If 
a  man  wishing  to  kill  animals  goes  out  into  the  forest  in  search  of 
them,  but  cannot  get  any  of  them  there  even  after  a  long  search, 
his  misconduct  is  not  a  bodily  one,  for  he  could  not  actually 
commit  the  deed  with  his  body.  So  if  he  gives  an  order  for  com- 
mitting a  similar  misdeed,  and  if  it  is  not  actually  carried  out 
with  the  body,  it  would  be  a  misdeed  by  speech  {vdcika)  and  not 
by  the  body.  But  the  merest  bad  thought  or  ill  will  alone  whether 
carried  into  effect  or  not  would  be  a  kamma  of  the  mind  {tnana- 
sikay.  But  the  mental  kamma  must  be  present  as  the  root  of 
all  bodily  and  vocal  kammas,  for  if  this  is  absent,  as  in  the  case 
of  an  arhat,  there  cannot  be  any  kammas  at  all  for  him. 

Kammas  are  divided  from  the  point  of  view  of  effects  into 
four  classes,  viz.  (i)  those  which  are  bad  and  produce  impurity, 
(2)  those  which  are  good  and  productive  of  purity,  (3)  those 
which  are  partly  good  and  partly  bad  and  thus  productive  of 
both  purity  and  impurity,  (4)  those  which  are  neither  good  nor 
bad  and  productive  neither  of  purity  nor  of  impurity,  but  which 
contribute  to  the  destruction  of  kammas*. 

Final  extinction  of  sorrow  {nibbdtid)  takes  place  as  the  natural 
result  of  the  destruction  of  desires.  Scholars  of  Buddhism  have 
tried  to  discover  the  meaning  of  this  ultimate  happening,  and 
various  interpretations  have  been  offered.  Professor  De  la  Vallee 
Poussin  has  pointed  out  that  in  the  Pali  texts  Nibbana  has 
sometimes  been  represented  as  a  happy  state,  as  pure  annihila- 
tion, as  an   inconceivable  existence  or  as  a  changeless  state®. 

'  See  Kathavatihu  and  Warren's  Buddhism  in  Translations,  pp.  221  flf. 

2  Aithasalini,  p.  88.  *  See  Atthasdlini,  p.  90.  *  See  Atthasdlinl,  p.  89. 

*  Prof.  De  la  Vallee  Poussin's  article  in  the  E.  R.  E.  on  Nirvana.  See  also 
Cullavagga,  IX.  i.  4 ;  Mrs  Rhys  Davids's  Psalms  of  the  early  Buddhists,  i.  and  II., 
Introduction,  p.  xxxvii;  Digha,  11.  15;  Udana,  viil.;  Samyutta,  iii.  109. 


v]  Nibbdna  1 09 

Mr  Schrader,  in  discussing  Nibbana  in  Pali  Text  Society  Journal, 
1905,  says  that  the  Buddha  held  that  those  who  sought  to  become 
identified  after  death  with  the  soul  of  the  world  as  infinite  space 
(akdsd)  or  consciousness  {vinndna)  attained  to  a  state  in  which 
they  had  a  corresponding  feeling  of  infiniteness  without  having 
really  lost  their  individuality.  This  latter  interpretation  of 
Nibbana  seems  to  me  to  be  very  new  and  quite  against  the  spirit 
of  the  Buddhistic  texts.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  a  hopeless  task 
to  explain  Nibbana  in  terms  of  worldly  experience,  and  there 
is  no  way  in  which  we  can  better  indicate  it  than  by  saying  that 
it  is  a  cessation  of  all  sorrow;  the  stage  at  which  all  worldly 
experiences  have  ceased  can  hardly  be  described  either  as  positive 
or  negative.  Whether  we  exist  in  some  form  eternally  or  do  not 
exist  is  not  a  proper  Buddhistic  question,  for  it  is  a  heresy  to 
think  of  a  Tathagata  as  existing  eternally  (sdsvata)  or  not- 
existing  [asdsvata]  or  whether  he  is  existing  as  well  as  not 
existing  or  whether  he  is  neither  existing  nor  non-existing.  Any 
one  who  seeks  to  discuss  whether  Nibbana  is  either  a  positive 
and  eternal  state  or  a  mere  state  of  non-existence  or  annihilation, 
takes  a  view  which  has  been  discarded  in  Buddhism  as  heretical. 
It  is  true  that  we  in  modern  times  are  not  satisfied  with  it,  for 
we  want  to  know  what  it  all  means.  But  it  is  not  possible  to 
give  any  answer  since  Buddhism  regarded  all  these  questions  as 
illegitimate. 

Later  Buddhistic  writers  like  Nagarjuna  and  Candrakirtti 
took  advantage  of  this  attitude  of  early  Buddhism  and  inter- 
preted it  as  meaning  the  non-essential  character  of  all  existence. 
Nothing  existed,  and  therefore  any  question  regarding  the  exist- 
ence or  non-existence  of  anything  would  be  meaningless.  There 
is  no  difference  between  the  wordly  stage  (samsdra)  and  Nibbana, 
for  as  all  appearances  are  non-essential,  they  never  existed  during 
the  sarnsara  so  that  they  could  not  be  annihilated  in  Nibbana. 

Upanisads  and  Buddhism. 

The  Upanisads  had  discovered  that  the  true  self  was  ananda 
(bliss)  ^  We  could  suppose  that  early  Buddhism  tacitly  pre- 
supposes some  such  idea.  It  was  probably  thought  that  if  there  was 
the  self  (attd)  it  must  be  bliss.  The  Upanisads  had  asserted  that 
the  self  (dtman)  was  indestructible  and  eternal*.    If  we  are  allowed 

1  Tait.  u.  5.  2  Bj-h.  IV.  5.  14.    Katha.  v.  13. 


no  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

to  make  explicit  what  was  implicit  in  early  Buddhism  we  could 
conceive  it  as  holding  that  if  there  was  the  self  it  must  be  bliss, 
because  it  was  eternal.  This  causal  connection  has  not  indeed 
been  anywhere  definitely  pronounced  in  the  Upanisads,  but  he 
who  carefully  reads  the  Upanisads  cannot  but  think  that  the 
reason  why  the  Upanisads  speak  of  the  self  as  bliss  is  that  it  is 
eternal.  But  the  converse  statement  that  what  was  not  eternal 
was  sorrow  does  not  appear  to  be  emphasized  clearly  in  the 
Upanisads.  The  important  postulate  of  the  Buddha  is  that  that 
which  is  changing  is  sorrow,  and  whatever  is  sorrow  is  not  self^ 
The  point  at  which  Buddhism  parted  from  the  Upanisads  lies 
in  the  experiences  of  the  self  The  Upanisads  doubtless  con- 
sidered that  there  were  many  experiences  which  we  often  iden- 
tify with  self,  but  which  are  impermanent.  But  the  belief  is 
found  in  the  Upanisads  that  there  was  associated  with  these  a 
permanent  part  as  well,  and  that  it  was  this  permanent  essence 
which  was  the  true  and  unchangeable  self,  the  blissful.  They  con- 
sidered that  this  permanent  self  as  pure  bliss  could  not  be  defined 
as  this,  but  could  only  be  indicated  as  not  this,  not  this  {neti 
neti)-.  But  the  early  Pali  scriptures  hold  that  we  could  nowhere 
find  out  such  a  permanent  essence,  any  constant  self,  in  our 
changing  experiences.  All  were  but  changing  phenomena  and 
therefore  sorrow  and  therefore  non-self,  and  what  was  non-self 
was  not  mine,  neither  I  belonged  to  it,  nor  did  it  belong  to  me 
as  my  selP. 

The  true  self  was  with  the  Upanisads  a  matter  of  tran- 
scendental experience  as  it  were,  for  they  said  that  it  could  not 
be  described  in  terms  of  anything,  but  could  only  be  pointed  out 
as  "  there,"  behind  all  the  changing  mental  categories.  The 
Buddha  looked  into  the  mind  and  saw  that  it  did  not  exist.  But 
how  was  it  that  the  existence  of  this  self  was  so  widely  spoken 
of  as  demonstrated  in  experience }  To  this  the  reply  of  the 
Buddha  was  that  what  people  perceived  there  when  they  said 
that  they  perceived  the  self  was  but  the  mental  experiences 
either  individually  or  together.  The  ignorant  ordinary  man  did 
not  know  the  noble  truths  and  was  not  trained  in  the  way  of  wise 
men,  and  considered  himself  to  be  endowed  with  form  {rupd) 
or  found   the   forms   in  his  self  or  the  self  in  the  forms.    He 

^  Samyutta  Nikaya,  HI.  pp.  44-45  ff. 

-  See  JJih.  IV.  iv.    Chandogya,  vin.  7-12.  ■*  Santyutta  Nikaya,  in.  45. 


v]  Upanisads  and  Buddhis7ii  1 1 1 

experienced  the  thought  (of  the  moment)  as  it  were  the  self  or  ex- 
perienced himself  as  being  endowed  with  thought,  or  the  thought 
in  the  self  or  the  self  in  the  thought.  It  is  these  kinds  of  experi- 
ences that  he  considered  as  the  perception  of  the  self  ^ 

The  Upanisads  did  not  try  to  establish  any  school  of  discipline 
or  systematic  thought.  They  revealed  throughout  the  dawn  of  an 
experience  of  an  immutable  Reality  as  the  self  of  man,  as  the  only 
abiding  truth  behind  all  changes.  But  Buddhism  holds  that  this 
immutable  self  of  man  is  a  delusion  and  a  false  knowledge. 
The  first  postulate  of  the  system  is  that  impermanence  is  sorrow. 
Ignorance  about  sorrow,  ignorance  about  the  way  it  originates, 
ignorance  about  the  nature  of  the  extinction  of  sorrow,  and  ignor- 
ance about  the  means  of  bringing  about  this  extinction  represent 
the  fourfold  ignorance  {avijj'd)'^.  The  avidya,  which  is  equivalent 
to  the  Pali  word  avijja,  occurs  in  the  Upanisads  also,  but  there 
it  means  ignorance  about  the  atman  doctrine,  and  it  is  sometimes 
contrasted  with  vidya  or  true  knowledge  about  the  self  {atman)". 
With  the  Upanisads  the  highest  truth  was  the  permanent  self, 
the  bliss,  but  with  the  Buddha  there  was  nothing  permanent;  and 
all  was  change;  and  all  change  and  impermanence  was  sorrow*. 
This  is,  then,  the  cardinal  truth  of  Buddhism,  and  ignorance  con- 
cerning it  in  the  above  fourfold  ways  represented  the  fourfold 
ignorance  which  stood  in  the  way  of  the  right  comprehension  of 
the  fourfold  cardinal  truths  {ariya  sacca) — sorrow,  cause  of  the 
origination  of  sorrow,  extinction  of  sorrow,  and  the  means  thereto. 
There  is  no  Brahman  or  supreme  permanent  reality  and  no 
self,  and  this  ignorance  does  not  belong  to  any  ego  or  self  as  we 
may  ordinarily  be  led  to  suppose. 

Thus  it  is  said  in  the  Visuddhimagga  "  inasmuch  however 
as  ignorance  is  empty  of  stability  from  being  subject  to  a  coming 
into  existence  and  a  disappearing  from  existence... and  is  empty 
of  a  self-determining  Ego  from  being  subject  to  dependence, — 
...or  in  other  words  inasmuch  as  ignorance  is  not  an  Ego,  and 
similarly  with  reference  to  Karma  and  the  rest — therefore  is  it 
to  be  understood  of  the  wheel  of  existence  that  it  is  empty  with 
a  twelvefold  emptiness^" 

1  Samyutta  Nikdya,  in.  46.  -  Majjhima  Nikdya,  I.  p.  54. 

"•  Cha.  I.  I.  10.    Brh.  iv.  3.  20.   There  are  some  passages  where  vidya  and  avidya 
have  been  used  in  a  different  and  rather  obscure  sense,  Isa  9-1 1. 
■*  Aiig.  Nikaya,  in.  85. 
^  Warren's  Buddhism  in  Translations  {Visuddhimagga,  chap,  xvil.),  p.  175. 


1 1 2  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

The  Schools  of  Theravada  Buddhism. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  oral  instructions  of  the 
Buddha  were  not  collected  until  a  few  centuries  after  his  death. 
Serious  quarrels  arose  amongst  his  disciples  or  rather  amongst 
the  successive  generations  of  the  disciples  of  his  disciples  about 
his  doctrines  and  other  monastic  rules  which  he  had  enjoined 
upon  his  followers.  Thus  we  find  that  when  the  council  of  Vesali 
decided  against  the  Vrjin  monks,  called  also  the  Vajjiputtakas, 
they  in  their  turn  held  another  great  meeting  (Mahasahgha)  and 
came  to  their  own  decisions  about  certain  monastic  rules  and  thus 
came  to  be  called  as  the  Mahasarighikas\  According  to  Vasu- 
mitra  as  translated  by  Vassilief,  the  Mahasahghikas  seceded  in 
400  B.C.  and  during  the  next  one  hundred  years  they  gave  rise 
first  to  the  three  schools  Ekavyavaharikas,  Lokottaravadins,  and 
Kukkulikas  and  after  that  the  Bahusrutlyas.  In  the  course  of  the 
next  one  hundred  years,  other  schools  rose  out  of  it  namely  the 
Prajnaptivadins,  Caittikas,  Aparasailas  and  Uttarasailas.  The 
Theravada  or  the  Sthaviravada  school  which  had  convened  the 
council  of  Vesali  developed  during  the  second  and  first  century  B.C. 
into  a  number  of  schools,  viz.  the  Haimavatas,  Dharmaguptikas, 
Mahlsasakas,  Kasyaplyas,  Sankrantikas  (more  well  known  as 
Sautrantikas)  and  the  Vatsiputtrlyas  which  latter  was  again  split  up 
into  the  Dharmottarlyas,  Bhadrayanlyas,  Sammitlyas  and  Chan- 
nagarikas.  The  main  branch  of  the  Theravada  school  was  from 
the  second  century  downwards  known  as  the  Hetuvadins  or 
Sarvastivadins^.  The  Mahdbodhiuainsa  identifies  the  Theravada 
school  with  the  Vibhajjavadins.  The  commentator  of  the  Kathd- 
vatthu  who  probably  lived  according  to  Mrs  Rhys  Davids  some- 
time in  the  fifth  century  A.D.  mentions  a  few  other  schools  of 
Buddhists.  But  of  all  these  Buddhist  schools  we  know  very  little. 
Vasumitra  (100  A.D.)  gives  us  some  very  meagre  accounts  of 

*  The  Mahavamsa  differs  from  Dtpavaitisa  in  holding  that  the  Vajjiputtakas  did 
not  develop  into  the  Mahasanghikas,  but  it  was  the  Mahasanghikas  who  first  seceded 
while  the  Vajjiputtakas  seceded  independently  of  them.  The  Mahdbodkivajnsa,  which 
according  to  Professor  Geiger  was  composed  975  A.D. — -ioooa.d.,  follows  the  Maha- 
varnsa  in  holding  the  Mahasanghikas  to  be  the  first  seceders  and  Vajjiputtakas  to  have 
seceded  independently. 

Vasumitra  confuses  the  council  of  Vesali  with  the  third  council  of  Pataliputra.  See 
introduction  to  translation  of  Kathdvatthu  by  Mrs  Rhys  Davids. 

*  For  other  accounts  of  the  schism  see  Mr  Aung  and  Mrs  Rhys  Davids's  translation 
of  Kathavatthu,  pp.  xxxvi-xlv. 


v]  Schools  of  Buddhism  113 

certain  schools,  of  the  Mahasarighikas,  Lokottaravadins,  Ekavya- 
vaharikas,  Kukkulikas,  Prajnaptivadins  and  Sarvastivadins,  but 
these  accounts  deal  more  with  subsidiary  matters  of  little  philo- 
sophical importance.  Some  of  the  points  of  interest  are  ( i )  that  the 
Mahasarighikas  were  said  to  believe  that  the  body  was  filled  with 
mind  {cittd)  which  was  represented  as  sitting,  (2)  that  the  Prajiiap- 
tivadins  held  that  there  was  no  agent  in  man,  that  there  was  no 
untimely  death,  for  it  was  caused  by  the  previous  deeds  of  man, 
(3)  that  the  Sarvastivadins  believed  that  everything  existed.  From 
the  discussions  found  in  the  Kathdvatthu  also  we  may  know  the 
views  of  some  of  the  schools  on  some  points  which  are  not  always 
devoid  of  philosophical  interest.  But  there  is  nothing  to  be  found 
by  which  we  can  properly  know  the  philosophy  of  these  schools.  It 
is  quite  possible  however  that  these  so-called  schools  of  Buddhism 
were  not  so  many  different  systems  but  only  differed  from  one 
another  on  some  points  of  dogma  or  practice  which  were  con- 
sidered as  being  of  sufficient  interest  to  them,  but  which  to  us  now 
appear  to  be  quite  trifling.  But  as  we  do  not  know  any  of  their 
literatures,  it  is  better  not  to  make  any  unwarrantable  surmises. 
These  schools  are  however  not  very  important  for  a  history  of  later 
Indian  Philosophy,  for  none  of  them  are  even  referred  to  in  any 
of  the  systems  of  Hindu  thought.  The  only  schools  of  Buddhism 
with  which  other  schools  of  philosophical  thought  came  in  direct 
contact,  are  the  Sarvastivadins  including  the  Sautrantikas  and 
the  Vaibhasikas,  the  Yogacara  or  the  Vijnanavadins  and  the 
Madhyamikas  or  the  Sunyavadins.  We  do  not  know  which  of  the 
diverse  smaller  schools  were  taken  up  into  these  four  great  schools, 
the  Sautrantika,  Vaibhasika,  Yogacara  and  the  Madhyamika 
schools.  But  as  these  schools  were  most  important  in  relation 
to  the  development  of  the  different  systems  in  Hindu  thought, 
it  is  best  that  we  should  set  ourselves  to  gather  what  we  can 
about  these  systems  of  Buddhistic  thought. 

When  the  Hindu  writers  refer  to  the  Buddhist  doctrine  in 
general  terms  such  as  "the  Buddhists  say"  without  calling 
them  the  Vijnanavadins  or  the  Yogacaras  and  the  Sunyavadins, 
they  often  refer  to  the  Sarvastivadins  by  which  they  mean 
both  the  Sautrantikas  and  the  Vaibhasikas,  ignoring  the  differ- 
ence that  exists  between  these  two  schools.  It  is  well  to 
mention  that  there  is  hardly  any  evidence  to  prove  that  the 
Hindu  writers  were  acquainted  with  the  Theravada  doctrines 

D.  8 


114  Buddhist  Philosophy  [cii. 

as  expressed  in  the  Pali  works.  The  Vaibhasikas  and  the  Sau- 
trantikas  have  been  more  or  less  associated  with  each  other.  Thus 
the  Abhidharmakosasdstra  of  Vasubandhu  who  was  a  Vaibhasika 
was  commented  upon  by  Yasomitra  who  was  a  Sautrantika.  The 
difference  between  the  Vaibhasikas  and  the  Sautrantikas  that 
attracted  the  notice  of  the  Hindu  writers  was  this,  that  the  former 
believed  that  external  objects  were  directly  perceived,  whereas 
the  latter  believed  that  the  existence  of  the  external  objects  could 
only  be  inferred  from  our  diversified  knowledge  \  Gunaratna 
(fourteenth  century  A.D.)  in  his  commentary  Tarkarahasyadlpikd 
on  Saddarsanasaimiccaya  says  that  the  Vaibhasika  was  but  another 
name  of  the  Aryasammitlya  school.  According  to  Gunaratna  the 
Vaibhasikas  held  that  things  existeci  ior  four  moments fllie 
moment  of  procluctl67i,  the  nibmerit  bre?d5t6tTe€yJ^>&-ffl0ment  of 
dfecay  ana  the  moment  of  annihilation.  It  has  BHSfT^ointed-OTT 
mvasubandhu's  Abhidharniakosa  that  the  Vaibhasikas  believed 
these  to  be  four  kinds  of  forces  which  by  coming  in  combination 
with  the  permanent  essence  of  an  entity  produced  its  imperma- 
nent manifestations  in  life  (see  Prof  Stcherbatsky's  translation 
of  Yasomitra  on  Abhidharmakosa  kdrikd^  V.  25).  The  self  called 
pudgala  also  possessed  those  characteristics.  Knowledge  was 
formless  and  was  produced  along  with  its  object  by  the  very 
same  conditions  {arthasahabhdsl  ekasamdgryadhmah).  The  Sau- 
trantikas according  to  Gunaratna  held  that  there  was  no  soul  but 
only  the  five  skandhas.  These  skandhas  transmigrated.  The  past, 
the  future,  annihilation,  dependence  on  cause,  aka^a  and  pudgala 
are  but  names  {samjhdmdtram),  mere  diSSQr\.\ox\s{ pratijhdindtrafti), 
mere  limitations  {sanivrtamdtram)  and  mere  phenomena  {vya- 
vahdramdtrani).  By  pudgala  they  meant  that  which  other  people 
called  eternal  and  all-pervasive  soul.  External  objects  are  never 
directly  perceived  but  are  only  inferred  as  existing  for  explaining 
the  diversity  of  knowledge.  Definite  cognitions  are  valid;  all 
compounded  things  are  momentary  {ksa?nkdh  sarvasamskdrdh). 

^  Madhavacarya's  Sarvadarianasamgraha,  chapter  ii.  Sdstradtpikd,  the  discussions 
on  Pratyaksa,  Amalananda's  commentary  (on  Bhdtna(i)  Veddntakalpataru,  p.  286, 
'''■  vaibhdsikasya  bdhyoWthah  pratyaksah,  saiUrdntikasya  jiidnagatdkdravaicitryen 
anumeyah."  The  nature  of  the  inference  of  the  Sautrantikas  is  shown  thus  by  Amala- 
nanda  (1247-1260  A.D.)  "  ye  yasmin  satyapi  kdddcitkdh  te  iadatiriktdptksdh"  (those 
(i.e.  cognitions)  which  in  spite  ot  certain  unvaried  conditions  are  of  unaccounted 
diversity  must  depend  on  other  things  in  addition  to  these,  i.e.  the  external  objects) 
Vedantakalpataru,  p.  289. 


v]  Schools  of  Buddhism  115 

The  atoms  of  colour,  taste,  smell  and  touch,  and  cognition  are 
being  destroyed  every  moment.  The  meanings  of  words  always 
imply  the  negations  of  all  other  things,  excepting  that  which  is 
intended  to  be  signified  by  that  word  {anydpohah  sabddrthah). 
Salvation  {inoksd)  comes  as  the  result  of  the  destruction  of  the 
process  of  knowledge  through  continual  meditation  that  there 
is  no  soul^ 

One  of  the  main  differences  between  the  Vibhajjavadins,  Sau- 
trantikas  and  the  Vaibhasikas  or  the  Sarvastivadins  appears  to 
refer  to  the  notion  of  time  which  is  a  subject  of  great  interest 
with  Buddhist  philosophy.  Thus  Abhidharniakosa  (v.  24...) 
describes  the  Sarvastivadins  as  those  who  maintain  the  universal 
existence  of  everything  past,  present  and  future.  The  Vibhajja- 
vadins are  those  "  who  maintain  that  the  present  elements  and 
those  among  the  past  that  have  not  yet  produced  their  fruition, 
are  existent,  but  they  deny  the  existence  of  the  future  ones  and 
of  those  among  the  past  that  have  already  produced  fruition," 
There  were  four  branches  of  this  school  represented  by  Dhar- 
matrata,  Ghosa,  Vasumitra  and  Buddhadeva.  Dharmatrata  main- 
tained that  when  an  element  enters  different  times,  its  existence 
changes  but  not  its  essence,  just  as  when  milk  is  changed  into  curd 
or  a  golden  vessel  is  broken,  the  form  of  the  existence  changes 
though  the  essence  remains  the  same.  Ghosa  held  that  "  when 
an  element  appears  at  different  times,  the  past  one  retains  its 
past  aspects  without  being  severed  from  its  future  and  present 
aspects,  the  present  likewise  retains  its  present  aspect  without 
completely  losing  its  past  and  future  aspects,"  just  as  a  man  in 
passionate  love  with  a  woman  does  not  lose  his  capacity  to  love 
other  women  though  he  is  not  actually  in  love  with  them.  Vasu- 
mitra held  that  an  entity  is  called  present,  past  and  future  accord- 
ing as  it  produces  its  efficiency,  ceases  to  produce  after  having 
once  produced  it  or  has  not  yet  begun  to  produce  it.  Buddha- 
deva maintained  the  view  that  just  as  the  same  woman  may 
be  called  mother,  daughter,  wife,  so  the  same  entity  may  be 
called  present,  past  or  future  in  accordance  with  its  relation  to  the 
preceding  or  the  succeeding  moment. 

All  these  schools  are  in  some  sense  Sarvastivadins,  for  they 
maintain  universal  existence.  But  the  Vaibhasika  finds  them  all 
defective  excepting  the  view  of  Vasumitra.    For  Dharmatrata's 

^  Gunaratna's  Tarkarahasyadlpika,  pp.  46-47. 

8—2 


ii6  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

view  is  only  a  veiled  Samkhya  doctrine;  that  of  Ghosa  is  a 
confusion  of  the  notion  of  time,  since  it  presupposes  the  co- 
existence of  all  the  aspects  of  an  entity  at  the  same  time,  and 
that  of  Buddhadeva  is  also  an  impossible  situation,  since  it  would 
suppose  that  all  the  three  times  were  found  together  and  included 
in  one  of  them.  The  Vaibhasika  finds  himself  in  agreement 
with  Vasumitra's  view  and  holds  that  the  difference  in  time 
depends  upon  the  difference  of  the  function  of  an  entity  ;  at  the 
time  when  an  entity  does  not  actually  produce  its  function  it  is 
future;  when  it  produces  it,  it  becomes  present;  when  after  having 
produced  it,  it  stops,  it  becomes  past ;  there  is  a  real  existence 
of  the  past  and  the  future  as  much  as  of  the  present.  He  thinks 
that  if  the  past  did  not  exist  and  assert  some  efficiency  it  could 
not  have  been  the  object  of  my  knowledge,  and  deeds  done  in 
past  times  could  not  have  produced  its  effects  in  the  present 
time.  The  Sautrantika  however  thought  that  the  Vaibhasika's 
doctrine  would  imply  the  heretical  doctrine  of  eternal  existence, 
for  according  to  them  the  stuff  remained  the  same  and  the  time- 
difference  appeared  in  it.  The  true  view  according  to  him  was, 
that  there  was  no  difference  between  the  efficiency  of  an  entity, 
the  entity  and  the  time  of  its  appearance.  Entities  appeared 
from  non-existence,  existed  for  a  moment  and  again  ceased  to 
exist.  He  objected  to  the  Vaibhasika  view  that  the  past  is  to 
be  regarded  as  existent  because  it  exerts  efficiency  in  bringing 
about  the  present  on  the  ground  that  in  that  case  there  should 
be  no  difference  between  the  past  and  the  present,  since  both 
exerted  efficiency.  If  a  distinction  is  made  between  past,  present 
and  future  efficiency  by  a  second  grade  of  efficiencies,  then  we 
should  have  to  continue  it  and  thus  have  a  vicious  infinite.  We 
can  know  non-existent  entities  as  much  as  we  can  know  existent 
ones,  and  hence  our  knowledge  of  the  past  does  not  imply 
that  the  past  is  exerting  any  efficiency.  If  a  distinction  is 
made  between  an  efficiency  and  an  entity,  then  the  reason  why 
efficiency  started  at  any  particular  time  and  ceased  at  another 
would  be  inexplicable.  Once  you  admit  that  there  is  no  dif- 
ference between  efficiency  and  the  entity,  you  at  once  find  that 
there  is  no  time  at  all  and  the  efficiency,  the  entity  and  the 
moment  are  all  one  and  the  same.  When  we  remember  a  thing 
of  the  past  we  do  not  know  it  as  existing  in  the  past,  but  in  the 
same  way  in  which  we  knew  it  when  it  was  present.    We  are 


v]  Vasubandhu  and  the  Vatslputtrlyas  1 1 7 

never  attracted  to  past  passions  as  the  Vaibhasika  suggests,  but 
past  passions  leave  residues  which  become  the  causes  of  new 
passions  of  the  present  momenta 

Again  we  can  have  a  ghmpse  of  the  respective  positions  of 
the  Vatslputtrlyas  and  the  Sarvastivadins  as  represented  by 
Vasubandhu  if  we  attend  to  the  discussion  on  the  subject  of 
the  existence  of  soul  in  Abhidharmakosa.  The  argument  of 
Vasubandhu  against  the  existence  of  soul  is  this,  that  though 
it  is  true  that  the  sense  organs  may  be  regarded  as  a  deter- 
mining cause  of  perception,  no  such  cause  can  be  found  which 
may  render  the  inference  of  the  existence  of  soul  necessary. 
If  soul  actually  exists,  it  must  have  an  essence  of  its  own  and 
must  be  something  different  from  the  elements  or  entities  of  a 
personal  life.  Moreover,  such  an  eternal,  uncaused  and  un- 
changing being  would  be  without  any  practical  efficiency  {artha- 
kriydkdritvd)  which  alone  determines  or  proves  existence.  The 
soul  can  thus  be  said  to  have  a  mere  nominal  existence  as  a 
mere  object  of  current  usage.  There  is  no  soul,  but  there  are 
only  the  elements  of  a  personal  life.  But  the  Vatslputtrlya 
school  held  that  just  as  fire  could  not  be  said  to  be  either  the 
same  as  the  burning  wood  or  as  different  from  it,  and  yet  it  is 
separate  from  it,  so  the  soul  is  an  individual  {pudgala)  which  has 
a  separate  existence,  though  we  could  not  say  that  it  was 
altogether  different  from  the  elements  of  a  personal  life  or  the 
same  as  these.  It  exists  as  being  conditioned  by  the  elements 
of  personal  life,  but  it  cannot  further  be  defined.  But  its  existence 
cannot  be  denied,  for  wherever  there  is  an  activity,  there  must 
be  an  agent  (e.g.  Devadatta  walks).  To  be  conscious  is  likewise 
an  action,  hence  the  agent  who  is  conscious  must  also  exist. 
To  this  Vasubandhu  replies  that  Devadatta  (the  name  of  a 
person)  does  not  represent  an  unity.  "  It  is  only  an  unbroken 
continuity  of  momentary  forces  (flashing  into  existence),  which 
simple  people  believe  to  be  a  unity  and  to  which  they  give  the 
name  Devadatta.  Their  belief  that  Devadatta  moves  is  con- 
ditioned, and  is  based  on  an  analogy  with  their  own  experience, 
but  their  own  continuity  of  life  consists  in  constantly  moving 
from  one  place  to  another.    This  movement,  though  regarded  as 

^  I  am  indebted  for  the  above  account  to  the  unpublished  translation  from  Tibetan 
of  a  small  portion  of  Abhidharmakosa  by  my  esteemed  friend  Prof.  Th.  Stcherbatsky 
of  Petrograd.    I  am  grateful  to  him  that  he  allowed  me  to  utilize  it. 


1 1 8  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

belonging  to  a  permanent  entity,  is  but  a  series  of  new  produc- 
tions in  different  places,  just  as  the  expressions  '  fire  moves,' 
'  sound  spreads '  have  the  meaning  of  continuities  (of  new  pro- 
ductions in  new  places).  They  likewise  use  the  words  'Devadatta 
cognises'  in  order  to  express  the  fact  that  a  cognition  (takes  place 
in  the  present  moment)  which  has  a  cause  (in  the  former  moments, 
these  former  moments  coming  in  close  succession  being  called 
Devadatta)." 

The  problem  of  memory  also  does  not  bring  any  difficulty, 
for  the  stream  of  consciousness  being  one  throughout,  it  produces 
its  recollections  when  connected  with  a  previous  knowledge  of 
the  remembered  object  under  certain  conditions  of  attention, 
etc.,  and  absence  of  distractive  factors,  such  as  bodily  pains  or 
violent  emotions.  No  agent  is  required  in  the  phenomena  of 
memory.  The  cause  of  recollection  is  a  suitable  state  of  mind 
and  nothing  else.  When  the  Buddha  told  his  birth  stories  saying 
that  he  was  such  and  such  in  such  and  such  a  life,  he  only 
meant  that  his  past  and  his  present  belonged  to  one  and  the 
same  lineage  of  momentary  existences.  Just  as  when  we  say 
"  this  same  fire  which  had  been  consuming  that  has  reached  this 
object,"  we  know  that  the  fire  is  not  identical  at  any  two 
moments,  but  yet  we  overlook  the  difference  and  say  that  it  is 
the  same  fire.  Again,  what  we  call  an  individual  can  only  be 
known  by  descriptions  such  as  "  this  venerable  man,  having  this 
name,  of  such  a  caste,  of  such  a  family,  of  such  an  age,  eating 
such  food,  finding  pleasure  or  displeasure  in  such  things,  of  such 
an  age,  the  man  who  after  a  life  of  such  length,  will  pass  away 
having  reached  an  age."  Only  so  much  description  can  be 
understood,  but  we  have  never  a  direct  acquaintance  with  the 
individual ;  all  that  is  perceived  are  the  momentary  elements  of 
sensations,  images,  feelings,  etc.,  and  these  happening  at  the 
former  moments  exert  a  pressure  on  the  later  ones.  The  in- 
dividual is  thus  only  a  fiction,  a  mere  nominal  existence,  a  mere 
thing  of  description  and  not  of  acquaintance ;  it  cannot  be 
grasped  either  by  the  senses  or  by  the  action  of  pure  intellect. 
This  becomes  evident  when  we  judge  it  by  analogies  from  other 
fields.  Thus  whenever  we  use  any  common  noun,  e.g.  milk,  we 
sometimes  falsely  think  that  there  is  such  an  entity  as  milk,  but 
what  really  exists  is  only  certain  momentary  colours,  tastes,  etc., 
fictitiously  unified  as  milk;   and  "just  as  milk  and  water  are 


v]  Sabbatthivddins  119 

conventional  names  (for  a  set  of  independent  elements)  for  some 
colour,  smell  (taste  and  touch)  taken  together,  so  is  the  designa- 
tion '  individual '  but  a  common  name  for  the  different  elements 
of  which  it  is  composed." 

The  reason  why  the  Buddha  declined  to  decide  the  question 
whether  the  "  living  being  is  identical  with  the  body  or  not "  is 
just  because  there  did  not  exist  any  living  being  as  "  individual," 
as  is  generally  supposed.  He  did  not  declare  that  the  living 
being  did  not  exist,  because  in  that  case  the  questioner  would 
have  thought  that  the  continuity  of  the  elements  of  a  life  was 
also  denied.  In  truth  the  "  living  being  "  is  only  a  conventional 
name  for  a  set  of  constantly  changing  elements^ 

The  only  book  of  the  Sammitlyas  known  to  us  and  that  by 
name  only  is  the  Sammitlyasdstra  translated  into  Chinese  between 
350  A.D.  to  431  A.D. ;  the  original  Sanskrit  works  are  however 
probably  lost  I 

The  Vaibhasikas  are  identified  with  the  Sarvastivadins  who 
according  to  Dipavamsa  V.  47,  as  pointed  out  by  Takakusu, 
branched  off  from  the  Mahisasakas,  who  in  their  turn  had 
separated  from  the  Theravada  school. 

From  the  KatJidvatthu  we  know  (i)  that  the  Sabbatthivadins 
believed  that  everything  existed,  (2)  that  the  dawn  of  right  attain- 
ment was  not  a  momentary  flash  of  insight  but  by  a  gradual 
process,  (3)  that  consciousness  or  even  samadhi  was  nothing  but 

^  This  account  is  based  on  the  translation  of  Astamako^asthananibaddhah  pudgala- 
vinikayah,  a  special  appendix  to  the  eighth  chapter  oi  Abhidharmakoia^  by  Prof.  Th. 
Stcherbatsky,  Bulletin  Je  PAcadt'mie  des  Sciences  de  Etissie,  1919. 

^  Professor  De  la  Vallee  Poussin  has  collected  some  of  the  points  of  this  doctrine 
in  an  article  on  the  Sammitiyas  in  the  E.  R.  E.  He  there  says  that  in  the  Ahhidhar- 
tnakosavydkhyd  the  Sammitiyas  have  been  identified  with  the  Vatslputtriyas  and  that 
many  of  its  texts  were  admitted  by  the  Vaibhasikas  of  a  later  age.  Some  of  their  views 
are  as  follows:  (i)  An  arhat  in  possession  of  nirvana  can  fall  away;  (2)  there  is  an 
intermediate  state  between  death  and  rebirth  called  antardbhava ;  (3)  merit  accrues  not 
only  by  gift  {tyagdnvayd)  but  also  by  the  fact  of  the  actual  use  and  advantage  reaped 
by  the  man  to  whom  the  thing  was  given  (paribhogdnvaya  punya);  (4)  not  only 
abstention  from  evil  deeds  but  a  declaration  of  intention  to  that  end  produces  merit 
by  itself  alone ;  (5)  they  believe  in  a  pudgala  (soul)  as  distinct  from  the  skandhas  from 
which  it  can  be  said  to  be  either  different  or  non-different.  "  The  pudgala  cannot  be 
said  to  be  transitory  [anitya)  like  the  skandhas  since  it  transmigrates  laying  down 
the  burden  (skandhas)  shouldering  a  new  burden ;  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  permanent, 
since  it  is  made  of  transitory  constituents."  This  pudgala  doctrine  of  the  Sammitiyas 
as  sketched  by  Professor  De  la  Vallee  Poussin  is  not  in  full  agreement  with  the 
pudgala  doctrine  of  the  Sammitiyas  as  sketched  by  Gunaratna  which  we  have  noticed 
above. 


1 20  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

a  flux  and  (4)  that  an  arhat  (saint)  may  fall  away\  The  Sab- 
batthivadins  or  Sarvastivadins  have  a  vast  Abhidharma  literature 
still  existing  in  Chinese  translations  which  is  different  from  the 
Abhidharma  of  the  Theravada  school  which  we  have  already 
mentioned^.  These  are  \.  Jndnaprastlidna  Sdstra  of  Katyayani- 
puttra  which  passed  by  the  name  of  Mahd  Vibhdsd  from  which 
the  Sabbatthivadins  who  followed  it  are  called  Vaibhasikas^  This 
work  is  said  to  have  been  given  a  literary  form  by  Asvaghosa. 
2.  Dharmaskandha  by  Sariputtra.  3.  DJidtukdya  by  Purna. 
4.  Prajfiaptisdstra  by  Maudgalyayana.  5.  Vijndnakdya  by  De- 
vaksema.  6.  Sangitiparyydya  by  Sariputtra  and  Prakaranapdda 
by  Vasumitra.  Vasubandhu  (420  A.D. — 500  A.D.)  wrote  a  work  on 
the  Vaibhasika*  system  in  verses  {kdrikd)  known  as  the  Abhidhar- 
niakosa,  to  which  he  appended  a  commentary  of  his  own  which 
passes  by  the  name  AbJiidharnia  Kosabhdsya  in  which  he  pointed 
out  some  of  the  defects  of  the  Vaibhasika  school  from  the  Sau- 
trantika  point  of  view^  This  work  was  commented  upon  by 
Vasumitra  and  Gunamati  and  later  on  by  Yasomitra  who  was 
himself  a  Sautrantika  and  called  his  work  Abhidharmakosa 
vydkhyd ;  Sanghabhadra  a  contemporary  of  Vasubandhu  wrote 
Samayapradipa  and  Nydydmisdra  (Chinese  translations  of  which 
are  available)  on  strict  Vaibhasika  lines.  We  hear  also  of  other 
Vaibhasika  writers  such  as  Dharmatrata,  Ghosaka,  Vasumitra 
and  Bhadanta,  the  writer  of  Sainyiiktdbhidhannasdstra  and  Ma- 
hdvibJidsd.  Dihnaga(48oA.D.),the  celebrated  logician,  a  Vaibhasika 
or  a  Sautrantika  and  reputed  to  be  a  pupil  of  Vasubandhu,  wrote 
his  famous  work  Pranidiiasaimiccaya  in  which  he  established 
Buddhist  logic  and  refuted  many  of  the  views  of  Vatsyayana 
the  celebrated  commentator  of  the  Nydya  sutras\  but  we  regret 

1  See  Mrs  Rhys  Davids's  translation  Kathavatthu,  p.  xix,  and  Sections  1.6,  7 ; 
II.  9  and  XI.  6. 

■^  Mahdvyutpatti  gives  two  names  for  Sarvastivada,  viz.  Mulasarvastivada  and  Ary- 
yasarvastivada.  Itsing  (671-695  A.D.)  speaks  of  Aryyamidasarvastivada  and  Mulasar- 
vastivada. In  his  time  he  found  it  prevailing  in  Magadha,  Guzrat,  Sind,  S.  India, 
E.  India.  Takakusu  says  {P.  T.S.  1904-1905)  that  Paramartha,  in  his  life  of  Vasu- 
bandhu, says  that  it  was  propagated  from  Kashmere  to  Middle  India  by  Vasubhadra, 
who  studied  it  there. 

*  Takakusu  says  (/'.  T.S.  1904-1905)  that  Katyayaniputtra's  work  was  probably 
a  compilation  from  other  Vibhasas  which  existed  before  the  Chinese  translations  and 
Vibhasa  texts  dated  383  A.  D. 

*  See  Takakusu's  article_/.  R.  A.  S.  1905. 

'  The  Sautrantikas  did  not  regard  the  Abhidharmas  of  the  Vaibhasikas  as  authentic 
and  laid  stress  on  the  suttanta  doctrines  as  given  in  the  Suttapitaka. 


v]  Sabbatthivadins  121 

to  say  that  none  of  the  above  works  are  available  in  Sanskrit, 
nor  have  they  been  retranslated  from  Chinese  or  Tibetan  into 
any  of  the  modern  European  or  Indian  languages. 

The  Japanese  scholar  Mr  Yamakami  Sogen,  late  lecturer  at 
Calcutta  University,  describes  the  doctrine  of  the  Sabbatthivadins 
from  the  Chinese  versions  of  the  Abkidhar?nakosa,  Mahdvibhd- 
sdsdstra,  etc,  rather  elaborately  ^  The  following  is  a  short  sketch, 
which  is  borrowed  mainly  from  the  accounts  given  by  Mr  Sogen. 

The  Sabbatthivadins  admitted  the  five  skandhas,  twelve 
ayatanas,  eighteen  dhatus,  the  three  asarnskrta  dharmas  of 
pratisarnkhyanirodha  apratisarnkhyanirodha  and  akasa,  and  the 
samskrta  dharmas  (things  composite  and  interdependent)  of  rupa 
(matter),  citta  (mind),  caitta  (mental)  and  cittaviprayukta  (non- 
mental)".  All  effects  are  produced  by  the  coming  together 
(samskrta)  of  a  number  of  causes.  The  five  skandhas,  and  the 
rupa,  citta,  etc.,  are  thus  called  samskrta  dharmas  (composite 
things  or  collocations — sambhuyakdri).  The  rupa  dharmas  are 
eleven  in  number,  one  citta  dharma,  46  caitta  dharmas  and  14 
cittaviprayukta  samskara  dharmas  (non-mental  composite  things); 
adding  to  these  the  three  asarnskrta  dharmas  we  have  the  seventy- 
five  dharmas.  Rupa  is  that  which  has  the  capacity  to  obstruct  the 
sense  organs.  Matter  is  regarded  as  the  collective  organism  or 
collocation,  consisting  of  the  fourfold  substratum  of  colour,  smell, 
taste  and  contact.  The  unit  possessing  this  fourfold  substratum 
is  known  as  paramanu,  which  is  the  minutest  form  of  rupa.  It 
cannot  be  pierced  through  or  picked  up  or  thrown  away.  It  is 
indivisible,  unanalysable,  invisible,  inaudible,  untastable  and  in- 
tangible. But  yet  it  is  not  permanent,  but  is  like  a  momentary 
flash  into  being.  The  simple  atoms  are  called  dravyaparanidnu 
and  the  compound  ones  sainghdtaparanidnii.  In  the  words  of 
Prof.  Stcherbatsky  "  the  universal  elements  of  matter  are  mani- 
fested in  their  actions  or  functions.  They  are  consequently  more 
energies  than  substances."  The  organs  of  sense  are  also  regarded 
as  modifications  of  atomic  matter.  Seven  such  paramanus  com- 
bine together  to  form  an  anu,  and  it  is  in  this  combined  form 
only  that  they  become  perceptible.  The  combination  takes 
place  in  the  form  of  a  cluster  having  one  atom  at  the  centre  and 

1  Systems  of  Buddhistic  Thought,  published  by  the  Calcutta  University. 
-  Sankara  in  his  meagre  sketch  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Sar\'astivadins  in  his  bhasya 
on  the  Brahma- siitras  n.  2  notices  some  of  the  categories  mentioned  by  Sogen. 


122  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

others  around  it.  The  point  which  must  be  remembered  in  con- 
nection with  the  conception  of  matter  is  this,  that  the  quaHties 
of  all  the  mahabhutas  are  inherent  in  the  paramanus.  The  special 
characteristics  of  roughness  (which  naturally  belongs  to  earth), 
viscousness  (which  naturally  belongs  to  water),  heat  (belonging 
to  fire),  movableness  (belonging  to  wind),  combine  together  to 
form  each  of  the  elements  ;  the  difference  between  the  different 
elements  consists  only  in  this,  that  in  each  of  them  its  own  special 
characteristics  were  predominant  and  active,  and  other  charac- 
teristics though  present  remained  only  in  a  potential  form.  The 
mutual  resistance  of  material  things  is  due  to  the  quality  of 
earth  or  the  solidness  inherent  in  them ;  the  mutual  attraction  of 
things  is  due  to  moisture  or  the  quality  of  water,  and  so  forth. 
The  four  elements  are  to  be  observed  from  three  aspects,  namely, 
(i)  as  things,  (2)  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  natures  (such  as 
activity,  moisture,  etc.),  and  (3)  function  (such  as  dhrti  or  attrac- 
tion, samgraha  or  cohesion,  pakti  or  chemical  heat,  and  vyuhana 
or  clustering  and  collecting).  These  combine  together  naturally 
by  other  conditions  or  causes.  The  main  point  of  distinction 
between  the  Vaibhasika  Sarvastivadins  and  other  forms  of  Bud- 
dhism is  this,  that  here  the  five  skandhas  and  matter  are  re- 
garded as  permanent  and  eternal ;  they  are  said  to  be  momentary 
only  in  the  sense  that  they  are  changing  their  phases  constantly, 
owing  to  their  constant  change  of  combination.  Avidya  is  not 
regarded  here  as  a  link  in  the  chain  of  the  causal  series  of 
pratltyasamutpada ;  nor  is  it  ignorance  of  any  particular  in- 
dividual, but  is  rather  identical  with  "moha"  or  delusion  and 
represents  the  ultimate  state  of  immaterial  dharmas.  Avidya, 
which  through  sarnskara,  etc.,  produces  namarupa  in  the  case  of 
a  particular  individual,  is  not  his  avidya  in  the  present  existence 
but  the  avidya  of  his  past  existence  bearing  fruit  in  the  present 
life. 

"  The  cause  never  perishes  but  only  changes  its  name,  when 
it  becomes  an  effect,  having  changed  its  state."  For  example, 
clay  becomes  jar,  having  changed  its  state  ;  and  in  this  case  the 
name  clay  is  lost  and  the  name  jar  arises^  The  Sarvastivadins 
allowed  simultaneousness  between  cause  and  effect  only  in  the 
case  of  composite  things  {sainprayukta  hetu)  and  in  the  case  of 

^  Sogen's  quotation  from  Kumarajiva's  Chinese  version  of  Aryyadeva's  commentary 
on  the  Mddhyaniika  Jdsira  (chapter  XX.  Karika  9). 


v]  Sabbatthivadins  123 

the  interaction  of  mental  and  material  things.  The  substratum 
of  "  vijnana  "  or  "  consciousness  "  is  regarded  as  permanent  and 
the  aggregate  of  the  five  senses  {indriyas)  is  called  the  perceiver. 
It  must  be  remembered  that  the  indriyas  being  material  had  a 
permanent  substratum,  and  their  aggregate  had  therefore  also  a 
substratum  formed  of  them. 

The  sense  of  sight  grasps  the  four  main  colours  of  blue,  yellow, 
red,  white,  and  their  combinations,  as  also  the  visual  forms  of 
appearance  {sarnsthdnd)  of  long,  short,  round,  square,  high,  low, 
straight,  and  crooked.  The  sense  of  touch  {kdyendriyd)  has  for 
its  object  the  four  elements  and  the  qualities  of  smoothness, 
roughness,  lightness,  heaviness,  cold,  hunger  and  thirst.  These 
qualities  represent  the  feelings  generated  in  sentient  beings  by 
the  objects  of  touch,  hunger,  thirst,  etc.,  and  are  also  counted 
under  it,  as  they  are  the  organic  effects  produced  by  a  touch 
which  excites  the  physical  frame  at  a  time  when  the  energy  of 
wind  becomes  active  in  our  body  and  predominates  over  other 
energies  ;  so  also  the  feeling  of  thirst  is  caused  by  a  touch  which 
excites  the  physical  frame  when  the  energy  of  the  element  of  fire 
becomes  active  and  predominates  over  the  other  energies.  The 
indriyas  (senses)  can  after  grasping  the  external  objects  arouse 
thought  {yijiidnd) ;  each  of  the  five  senses  is  an  agent  without 
which  none  of  the  five  vijnanas  would  become  capable  of  per- 
ceiving an  external  object.  The  essence  of  the  senses  is  entirely 
material.  Each  sense  has  two  subdivisions,  namely,  the  principal 
sense  and  the  auxiliary  sense.  The  substratum  of  the  principal 
senses  consists  of  a  combination  of  paramanus,  which  are  ex- 
tremely pure  and  minute,  while  the  substratum  of  the  latter  is 
the  flesh,  made  of  grosser  materials.  The  five  senses  differ  from 
one  another  with  respect  to  the  manner  and  form  of  their  respec- 
tive atomic  combinations.  In  all  sense-acts,  whenever  an  act  is 
performed  and  an  idea  is  impressed,  a  latent  energy  is  impressed 
on  our  person  which  is  designated  as  avijfiapti  rupa.  It  is  called 
rupa  because  it  is  a  result  or  effect  of  rupa-contact ;  it  is  called 
avijnapti  because  it  is  latent  and  unconscious;  this  latent  energy 
is  bound  sooner  or  later  to  express  itself  in  karma  effects  and  is 
the  only  bridge  which  connects  the  cause  and  the  effect  of  karma 
done  by  body  or  speech.  Karma  in  this  school  is  considered 
as  twofold,  namely,  that  as  thought  {cetana  karma)  and  that  as 
activity  {caitasika  karma).    This  last,  again,  is  of  two  kinds,  viz. 


1 24  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

that  due  to  body-motion  {kdyika  karma)  and  speech  {vdcika 
karma).  Both  these  may  again  be  latent  {avijnapti)  and  patent 
{vijfiapti),  giving  us  the  kayika-vijfiapti  karma,  kayikavijnapti 
karma,  vacika-vijnapti  karma  and  vacikavijnapti  karma.  Avijnapti 
rupa  and  avijnapti  karma  are  what  we  should  call  in  modern 
phraseology  sub-conscious  ideas,  feelings  and  activity.  Corre- 
sponding to  each  conscious  sensation,  feeling,  thought  or  activity 
there  is  another  similar  sub-conscious  state  which  expresses  itself 
in  future  thoughts  and  actions ;  as  these  are  not  directly  known  but 
are  similar  to  those  which  are  known,  they  are  called  avijnapti. 

The  mind,  says  Vasubandhu,  is  called  cittam,  because  it 
wills  {cetati),  manas  because  it  thinks  {manvate)  and  vijnana 
because  it  discriminates  {nirdisati).  The  discrimination  may  be 
of  three  kinds:  (i)  svabhava  nirdesa  (natural  perceptual  discrimi- 
nation), (2)  prayoga  nirdesa  (actual  discrimination  as  present, 
past  and  future),  and  (3)  anusmrti  nirdesa  (reminiscent  discrimi- 
nation referring  only  to  the  past).  The  senses  only  possess  the 
svabhava  jiirdesa,thQ  other  two  belong  exclusively  to  manovijnana. 
Each  of  the  vijnanas  as  associated  with  its  specific  sense  dis- 
criminates its  particular  object  and  perceives  its  general  charac- 
teristics; the  six  vijnanas  combine  to  form  what  is  known  as  the 
Vijnanaskandha,  which  is  presided  over  by  mind  {mafio).  There 
are  forty-six  caitta  samskrta  dharmas.  Of  the  three  asamskrta 
dharmas  akasa  (ether)  is  in  essence  the  freedom  from  obstruction, 
establishing  it  as  a  permanent  omnipresent  immaterial  substance 
{nirupdkhya,  non-rupa).  The  second  asarnskrta  dharma,  aprati- 
samkhya  nirodha,  means  the  non-perception  of  dharmas  caused 
by  the  absence  of  pratyayas  or  conditions.  Thus  when  I  fix  my 
attention  on  one  thing,  other  things  are  not  seen  then,  not  because 
they  are  non-existent  but  because  the  conditions  which  would 
have  made  them  visible  were  absent.  The  third  asamskrta 
dharma,  pratisamkhya  nirodha,  is  the  final  deliverance  from 
bondage.  Its  essential  characteristic  is  everlastingness.  These 
are  called  asarnskrta  because  being  of  the  nature  of  negation 
they  are  non-collocative  and  hence  have  no  production  or  dis- 
solution. The  eightfold  noble  path  which  leads  to  this  state 
consists  of  right  views,  right  aspirations,  right  speech,  right  con- 
duct, right  livelihood,  right  effort,  right  mindfulness,  right  rapture^ 

^  Mr  Sogen  mentions  the  name  of  another  Buddhist   Hinayana  thinker   (about 
250  A. D.),  Ilarivarman,  who  founded  a  school  known  as  Satyasiddhi  school,  which 


v]  Makayanism  125 

Mahayanism. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  precisely  at  what  time  Mahayanism  took 
its  rise.  But  there  is  reason  to  think  that  as  the  Mahasarighikas 
separated  themselves  from  the  Theravadins  probably  some  time  in 
400  B.C.  and  split  themselves  up  into  eight  different  schools,  those 
elements  of  thoughts  and  ideas  which  in  later  days  came  to  be 
labelled  as  Mahayana  were  gradually  on  the  way  to  taking  their 
first  inception.  We  hear  in  about  100  a.d.  of  a  number  of  works 
which  are  regarded  as  various  Mahayana  sutras,  some  of  which 
are  probably  as  old  as  at  least  100  B.C.  (if  not  earlier)  and  others 
as  late  as  300  or  400  A.D.  ^  These  Mahayanasutras,  also  called 
the  Vaipulyasutras,  are  generally  all  in  the  form  of  instructions 
given  by  the  Buddha.  Nothing  is  known  about  their  authors  or 
compilers,  but  they  are  all  written  in  some  form  of  Sanskrit  and 
were  probably  written  by  those  who  seceded  from  the  Theravada 
school. 

The  word  Hinayana  refers  to  the  schools  of  Theravada,  and 
as  such  it  is  contrasted  with  Mahayana.  The  words  are  generally 
translated  as  small  vehicle  {kma=  sn\2i.\\,  ydna  =  vehicle)  and  great 
vehicle  {itialid  =  great,  ydna  —  vehicle).  But  this  translation  by 
no  means  expresses  what  is  meant  by  Mahayana  and  Hlna- 
yanal     Asahga  (480  A.D.)  in  his  M ahdydnasutrdlamkdra  gives 

propounded  the  same  sort  of  doctrines  as  those  preached  by  Nagarjuna.  None  of  his 
works  are  available  in  Sanskrit  and  I  have  never  come  across  any  allusion  to  his  name 
by  Sanskrit  writers. 

^  Quotations  and  references  to  many  of  these  siitras  are  found  in  Candrakirtti's  com- 
mentary on  the  Aladhyainika  karikds  of  Nagarjuna;  some  of  these  are  the  following: 
Astasahasrikaprajiidparamita  (translated  into  Chinese  164  A.D.-167  A.D.),  Satasdhas- 
rikdprajndpdramitd,  Gaganaganja,  Samddhisutra,  Tathdgatagiihyasutra,  Drdhddhyd- 
iayasaiicodandsutra,  Dhydyitamustisutra,  Pitdputrasa77tdganiasiitra,  Alahdydnasutra, 
Mdradafnanasutra,  Ratnakutasutra,  Katnacuddparip»-cchdsutra,  Ratnameghasutra, 
Ratnardsisutra,  Ratndkarasiitra,  Rdstrapdlapariprcchdsutra,  Lankdvatdrasiitra, 
Lalitavisiarasutra,  Vajracchedikdsutra,  Vimalakirttinirde^asutra,  Sdlistanibhasutra, 
Samddkirajasutra,  Sukhdvativyuha,  Suvaf-naprabhdsasutra,  Saddharmapundarika 
(translated  into  Chinese  A.D.  255),  Amitdyurdhydnasutra,  Hastikdkhyasutra,  etc. 

^  The  word  Yana  is  generally  translated  as  vehicle,  but  a  consideration  of  numerous 
contexts  in  which  the  word  occurs  seems  to  suggest  that  it  means  career  or  course  or 
way,  rather  than  vehicle  {Lalitavistara,  pp.  25,  38;  Prajndpdramitd,  pp.  24,  319; 
Sarnddhirdjasiitra,  p.  i ;  KarundpU7idarlka,  p.  67 ;  Laiikdvatdrasutra,  pp.  68, 108, 132). 
The  word  Yana  is  as  old  as  the  Upanisads  where  we  read  of  Devayana  and  Pitryana. 
There  is  no  reason  why  this  word  should  be  taken  in  a  different  sense.  We  hear  in 
Lahkdvatdra  of  Sravakayana  (career  of  the  .Sravakas  or  the  Theravadin  Buddhists), 
Pratyekabuddhayana  (the  career  of  saints  before  the  coming  of  the  Buddha),  Buddha 
yana  (career  of  the  Buddhas),  Ekayana  (one  career),  Devayana  (career  of  the  gods), 


126  Btiddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

us  the  reason  why  one  school  was  called  Hinayana  whereas  the 
other,  which  he  professed,  was  called  Mahayana.  He  says  that, 
considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  ultimate  goal  of  religion, 
the  instructions,  attempts,  realization,  and  time,  the  Hinayana 
occupies  a  lower  and  smaller  place  than  the  other  called  Maha 
(great)  Yana,  and  hence  it  is  branded  as  Hina  (small,  or  low). 
This  brings  us  to  one  of  the  fundamental  points  of  distinction 
between  Hinayana  and  Mahayana.  The  ultimate  good  of  an 
adherent  of  the  Hinayana  is  to  attain  his  own  nirvana  or  salva- 
tion, whereas  the  ultimate  goal  of  those  who  professed  the  Maha- 
yana creed  was  not  to  seek  their  own  salvation  but  to  seek  the 
salvation  of  all  beings.  So  the  Hinayana  goal  was  lower,  and  in 
consequence  of  that  the  instructions  that  its  followers  received, 
the  attempts  they  undertook,  and  the  results  they  achieved  were 
narrower  than  that  of  the  Mahayana  adherents.  A  Hinayana  man 
had  only  a  short  business  in  attaining  his  own  salvation,  and  this 
could  be  done  in  three  lives,  whereas  a  Mahayana  adherent  was 
prepared  to  work  for  infinite  time  in  helping  all  beings  to  attain 
salvation.  So  the  Hinayana  adherents  required  only  a  short  period 
of  work  and  may  from  that  point  of  view  also  be  called  hma,  or 
lower. 

This  point,  though  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
difference  in  the  creed  of  the  two  schools,  is  not  so  from  the  point 
of  view  of  philosophy.  But  there  is  another  trait  of  the  Maha- 
yanists  which  distinguishes  them  from  the  Hinayanists  from  the 
philosophical  point  of  view.  The  Mahayanists  believed  that  all 
things  were  of  a  non-essential  and  indefinable  character  and 
void  at  bottom,  whereas  the  Hinayanists  only  believed  in  the 
impermanence  of  all  things,  but  did  not  proceed  further  than 
that. 

It  is  sometimes  erroneously  thought  that  Nagarjuna  first 
preached  the  doctrine  of  Sunyavada  (essencelessness  or  voidness 
of  all  appearance),  but  in  reality  almost  all  the  Mahayana  sutras 
either  definitely  preach  this  doctrine  or  allude  to  it.  Thus  if  we 
take  some  of  those  sutras  which  were  in  all  probability  earlier  than 
Nagarjuna,  we  find  that  the  doctrine  which  Nagarjuna  expounded 

Brahmayana  (career  of  becoming  a  Brahma),  Tathagatayana  (career  of  a  Tathagata). 
In  one  place  Laiikavatara  says  that  ordinarily  distinction  is  made  between  the  three 
careers  and  one  career  and  no  career,  but  these  distinctions  are  only  for  the  ignorant 
(Lankdvatdra,  p.  68). 


II 


v]  '     Mahay  ana  Philosophy  127 

with  all  the  rigour  of  his  powerful  dialectic  was  quietly  accepted 
as  an  indisputable  truth.  Thus  we  find  Subhuti  saying  to 
the  Buddha  that  vedana  (feeling),  sarnjna  (concepts)  and  the 
samskaras  (conformations)  are  all  maya  (illusion)^  All  the 
skandhas,  dhatus  (elements)  and  ayatanas  are  void  and  absolute 
cessation.  The  highest  knowledge  of  everything  as  pure  void 
is  not  different  from  the  skandhas,  dhatus  and  ayatanas,  and  this 
absolute  cessation  of  dharmas  is  regarded  as  the  highest  know- 
ledge {prajndpdramitdy.  Everything  being  void  there  is  in  reality 
no  process  and  no  cessation.  The  truth  is  neither  eternal  {sdsvata) 
nor  non-eternal  {asdsvatd)  but  pure  void.  It  should  be  the  object 
of  a  saint's  endeavour  to  put  himself  in  the  "thatness"(/^///a/rt)  and 
consider  all  things  as  void.  The  saint  {bodhisativa)  has  to  estab- 
lish himself  in  all  the  virtues  {pdraniitd),  benevolence  {ddna- 
pdramitd),  the  virtue  of  character  {stlapdramitd),  the  virtue  of 
forbearance  {ksdntipdramitd),  the  virtue  of  tenacity  and  strength 
(vlryyapdramitd)  and  the  virtue  of  meditation  {dhydnapdra- 
mitd).  The  saint  {bodhisattva)  is  firmly  determined  that  he  will 
help  an  infinite  number  of  souls  to  attain  nirvana.  In  reality, 
however,  there  are  no  beings,  there  is  no  bondage,  no  salva- 
tion ;  and  the  saint  knows  it  but  too  well,  yet  he  is  not  afraid 
of  this  high  truth,  but  proceeds  on  his  career  of  attaining  for 
all  illusory  beings  illusory  emancipation  from  illusory  bondage. 
The  saint  is  actuated  with  that  feeling  and  proceeds  in  his 
work  on  the  strength  of  his  paramitas,  though  in  reality  there 
is  no  one  who  is  to  attain  salvation  in  reality  and  no  one  who 
is  to  help  him  to  attain  it^  The  true  prajfiaparamita  is  the 
absolute  cessation  of  all  appearance  {yah  aniipalambhah  sarva- 
dharmdndni  sa  prajndpdramitd  ityucyatey. 

The  Mahayana  doctrine  has  developed  on  two  lines,  viz.  that 
of  Sunyavada  or  the  Madhyamika  doctrine  and  Vijnanavada. 
The  difference  between  Sunyavada  and  Vijnanavada  (the  theory 
that  there  is  only  the  appearance  of  phenomena  of  consciousness) 
is  not  fundamental,  but  is  rather  one  of  method.  Both  of  them 
agree  in  holding  that  there  is  no  truth  in  anything,  everything 
is  only  passing  appearance  akin  to  dream  or  magic.  But 
while  the  Sunyavadins  were  more  busy  in  showing  this  indefin- 
ableness  of  all  phenomena,  the  Vijfianavadins,  tacitly  accepting 

^  Astasdhasrikaprajnapdramitd,  p.  i6.  -  Ibid.  p.  177. 

3  Ibid.  p.  21,  *  Ibid.  p.  177. 


1 28  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

the  truth  preached  by  the  Sunyavadins,  interested  themselves  in 
explaining  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  by  their  theory  of 
beginningless  illusory  root-ideas  or  instincts  of  the  mind  {vasana). 

A^vaghosa  (100  A.D.)  seems  to  have  been  the  greatest  teacher 
of  a  new  type  of  idealism  {vijfidnavddd)  known  as  the  Tathata 
philosophy.  Trusting  in  Suzuki's  identification  of  a  quotation  in 
Asvaghosa's  Sraddhotpddasdstra  as  being  made  from  Lankdva- 
tdrasfitra,  we  should  think  of  the  Lankdvatdrasutra  as  being  one 
of  the  early  works  of  the  Vijnanavadins\  The  greatest  later  writer 
of  the  Vijnanavada  school  was  Asafiga  (400  A.D.),  to  whom  are 
attributed  the  Saptadasabhumi  sutra,  Mahdydna  sutra,  Upadesa, 
Mahdydnasamparigraha  sdstra,  Yogdcdrabhumi  sdstra  and 
Mahdydnasutrdlanikdra,  None  of  these  works  excepting  the 
last  one  is  available  to  readers  who  have  no  access  to  the 
Chinese  and  Tibetan  manuscripts,  as  the  Sanskrit  originals  are 
in  all  probability  lost.  The  Vijnanavada  school  is  known  to 
Hindu  writers  by  another  name  also,  viz.  Yogacara,  and  it  does 
not  seem  an  improbable  supposition  that  Asanga's  Yogdcdra- 
bhumi sdstra  was  responsible  for  the  new  name.  Vasubandhu, 
a  younger  brother  of  Asafiga,  was,  as  Paramartha  (499-569)  tells 
us,  at  first  a  liberal  Sarvastivadin,  but  was  converted  to  Vijna- 
navada, late  in  his  life,  by  Asanga.  Thus  Vasubandhu,  who 
wrote  in  his  early  life  the  great  standard  work  of  the  Sarvasti- 
v^.dms,  Abhidharmakosa,  devoted  himself  in  his  later  life  to  Vijna- 
navada^  He  is  said  to  have  commented  upon  a  number  of 
Mahayana  sutras,  such  disAvatainsaka,  Nirvdna,  Saddharmapun- 
darika,  Prajfidpdramitd,  Vimalakirtti  and  Srtmdldsimhandda,  and 
compiled  some  Mahayana  sutras,  such  as  Vijndnamdtrasiddhi, 
Ratnatraya,  etc.  The  school  of  Vijnanavada  continued  for  at 
least  a  century  or  two  after  Vasubandhu,  but  we  are  not  in 
possession  of  any  work  of  great  fame  of  this  school  after  him. 

We  have  already  noticed  that  the  Sunyavada  formed  the  fun- 
damental principle  of  all  schools  of  Mahayana.  The  most  powerful 
exponent  of  this  doctrine  was  Nagarjuna  (100  A.D.),  a  brief  account 
of  whose  system  will  be  given  in  its  proper  place.  Nagarjuna's 
karikas  (verses)  were  commented  upon  by  Aryyadeva,  a  disciple 
of  his,  Kumarajlva  (383  A.D.),  Buddhapalita  and  Candraklrtti 
(550A.D.).    Aryyadeva  in  addition  to  this  commentary  wrote  at 

'  Dr  S.  C.  Viclyabhushana  thinks  that  Lahkavatai-a  belongs  to  about  300  A.D. 

*  Takakusu's  "A  study  of  the  Paramartha's  life  of  Vasubandhu,  "y.  i?.^.  i".  1905. 


v]'  Aryyadevas  Philosophy  129 

least  three  other  books,  viz.  Catiihsataka,  Hastabdlaprakarana- 
vrtti  and  Cittavisuddhiprakarana^.  In  the  small  work  called 
Hastabdlaprakaranavrtti  Aryyadeva  says  that  whatever  depends 
for  its  existence  on  anything  else  may  be  proved  to  be  illusory; 
all  our  notions  of  external  objects  depend  on  space  perceptions 
and  notions  of  part  and  whole  and  should  therefore  be  regarded 
as  mere  appearance.  Knowing  therefore  that  all  that  is  depen- 
dent on  others  for  establishing  itself  is  illusory,  no  wise  man 
should  feel  attachment  or  antipathy  towards  these  mere  phe- 
nomenal appearances.  In  his  Cittavisuddhiprakarana  he  says 
that  just  as  a  crystal  appears  to  be  coloured,  catching  the  reflec- 
tion of  a  coloured  object,  even  so  the  mind  though  in  itself 
colourless  appears  to  show  diverse  colours  by  coloration  of  ima- 
gination {vikalpa).  In  reality  the  mind  {cittd)  without  a  touch 
of  imagination  {kalpand)  in  it  is  the  pure  reality. 

It  does  not  seem  however  that  the  Sunyavadins  could  produce 
any  great  writers  after  Candraklrtti.  References  to  Sunyavada 
show  that  it  was  a  living  philosophy  amongst  the  Hindu  writers 
until  the  time  of  the  great  Mimamsa  authority  Kumarila  who 
flourished  in  the  eighth  century;  but  in  later  times  the  Sunyavadins 
were  no  longer  occupying  the  position  of  strong  and  active  dis- 
putants. 

The  Tathata  Philosophy  of  A^vaghosa  (8oA.D.)l 

Asvaghosa  was  the  son  of  a  Brahmin  named  Saimhaguhya 
who  spent  his  early  days  in  travelling  over  the  different  parts  of 
India  and  defeating  the  Buddhists  in  open  debates.  He  was  pro- 
bably converted  to  Buddhism  by  Parsva  who  was  an  important 
person  in  the  third  Buddhist  Council  promoted,  according  to 
some  authorities,  by  the  King  of  Kashmere  and  according  to  other 
authorities  by  Punyayasas^ 

^  Aryyadeva's  Hastabalaprakaranavrtti  has  been  reclaimed  by  Dr  F.  W.  Thomas. 
Fragmentary  portions  of  his  Cittavihiddhiprakai-ana  were  published  by  Mahamahopad- 
hyaya  Haraprasada  ^astri  in  the  Bengal  Asiatic  Society's  journal,  1898. 

^  The  above  section  is  based  on|  the  Awakening  of  Faith,  an  English  trans- 
lation by  Suzuki  of  the  Chinese  version  of  Sraddhotpddasastra  by  Asvaghosa,  the 
Sanskrit  original  of  which  appears  to  have  been  lost.  Suzuki  has  brought  forward  a 
mass  of  evidence  to  show  that  Asvaghosa  was  a  contemporary  of  Kaniska. 

^  Taranatha  says  that  he  was  converted  by  Aryadeva,  a  disciple  of  Nagarjuna, 
Geschichte  des  Buddhismus,  German  translation  by  Schiefner,  pp.  84-85.  See  Suzuki's 
Awakening  of  Faith,  pp.  24-32.  Asvaghosa  wrote  the  Buddhacaritakavya,  of  great 
poetical  excellence,  and  the  AlahalamkdraiSstra.    He  was  also  a  musician  and  had 


130  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

He  held  that  in  the  soul  two  aspects  may  be  distinguished 
— the  aspect  as  thatness  {bhutatathata)  and  the  aspect  as  the  cycle 
of  birth  and  death  {samsdra).  The  soul  as  bhutatathata  means 
the  oneness  of  the  totality  of  all  things  {dharmadhdtu).  Its  essen- 
tial nature  is  uncreate  and  external.  All  things  simply  on  account 
of  the  beginningless  traces  of  the  incipient  and  unconscious 
memory  of  our  past  experiences  of  many  previous  lives  {smrti) 
appear  under  the  forms  of  individuation^  If  we  could  overcome 
this  smrti  "the  signs  of  individuation  would  disappear  and  there 
would  be  no  trace  of  a  world  of  objects."  "All  things  in  their 
fundamental  nature  are  not  nameable  or  explicable.  They  can- 
not be  adequately  expressed  in  any  form  of  language.  They 
possess  absolute  sameness  {saviata).  They  are  subject  neither  to 
transformation  nor  to  destruction.  They  are  nothing  but  one  soul " 
— thatness  {bhutatathata).  This  "thatness"  has  no  attribute  and 
it  can  only  be  somehow  pointed  out  in  speech  as  "thatness." 
As  soon  as  you  understand  that  when  the  totality  of  existence  is 
spoken  of  or  thought  of,  there  is  neither  that  which  speaks  nor 
that  which  is  spoken  of,  there  is  neither  that  which  thinks  nor 
that  which  is  thought  of,  "this  is  the  stage  of  thatness."  This 
bhutatathata  is  neither  that  which  is  existence,  nor  that  which  is 
non-existence,  nor  that  which  is  at  once  existence  and  non- 
existence, nor  that  which  is  not  at  once  existence  and  non-exist- 
ence; it  is  neither  that  which  is  plurality,  nor  that  which  is 
at  once  unity  and  plurality,  nor  that  which  is  not  at  once  unity 
and  plurality.  It  is  a  negative  concept  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
beyond  all  that  is  conditional  and  yet  it  is  a  positive  concept 
in  the  sense  that  it  holds  all  within  it.  It  cannot  be  compre- 
hended by  any  kind  of  particularization  or  distinction.  It  is 
only  by  transcending  the  range  of  our  intellectual  categories  of 
the  comprehension  of  the  limited  range  of  finite  phenomena  that 
we  can  get  a  glimpse  of  it.  It  cannot  be  comprehended  by  the 
particularizing  consciousness  of  all  beings,  and  we  thus  may  call 
it  negation,  "sunyata,"  in  this  sense.    The  truth  is  that  which 

invented  a  musical  instrument  called  Rastavara  that  he  might  by  that  means  convert  the 
people  of  the  city.  "  Its  melody  was  classical,  mournful,  and  melodious,  inducing  the 
audience  to  ponder  on  the  misery,  emptiness,  and  non-atmanness  of  life."  Suzuki,  p.  35. 
1  I  have  ventured  to  translate  "jwr//"  in  the  sense  of  vasana  in  preference  to 
Suzuki's  "confused  subjectivity"  because  smrti  in  the  sense  of  vasana  is  not  unfamiliar 
to  the  readers  of  such  Buddhist  works  as  Lahkdvatara.  The  word  "subjectivity" 
seems  to  be  too  European  a  term  to  be  used  as  a  word  to  represent  the  Buddhist  sense. 


v]  Asvagkosas  Absolutistn  131 

subjectively  does  not  exist  by  itself,  that  the  negation  {sunyata)  is 
also  void  {silnyd)  in  its  nature,  that  neither  that  which  is  negated 
nor  that  which  negates  is  an  independent  entity.  It  is  the  pure 
soul  that  manifests  itself  as  eternal,  permanent,  immutable,  and 
completely  holds  all  things  within  it.  On  that  account  it  may  be 
called  affirmation.  But  yet  there  is  no  trace  of  affirmation  in  it, 
because  it  is  not  the  product  of  the  creative  instinctive  memory 
{smrti)  of  conceptual  thought  and  the  only  way  of  grasping  the 
truth — the  thatness,  is  by  transcending  all  conceptual  creations. 

"The  soul  as  birth  and  death  (samsdra)  comes  forth  from 
the  Tathagata  womb  itathdgatagarbhd),  the  ultimate  reality. 
But  the  immortal  and  the  mortal  coincide  with  each  other. 
Though  they  are  not  identical  they  are  not  duality  either.  Thus 
when  the  absolute  soul  assumes  a  relative  aspect  by  its  self- 
affirmation  it  is  called  the  all-conserving  mind  {dlayavijhdnd). 
It  embraces  two  principles,  (i)  enlightenment,  (2)  non-enlighten- 
ment. Enlightenment  is  the  perfection  of  the  mind  when  it  is 
free  from  the  corruptions  of  the  creative  instinctive  incipient 
memory  {smrti).  It  penetrates  all  and  is  the  unity  of  all  {dharma- 
dhdtu).  That  is  to  say,  it  is  the  universal  dharmakaya  of  all 
Tathagatas  constituting  the  ultimate  foundation  of  existence. 

"When  it  is  said  that  all  consciousness  starts  from  this  funda- 
mental truth,  it  should  not  be  thought  that  consciousness  had  any 
real  origin,  for  it  was  merely  phenomenal  existence — a  mere  ima- 
ginary creation  of  the  perceivers  under  the  influence  of  the 
delusive  smrti.  The  multitude  of  people  {bahujajia)  are  said  to  be 
lacking  in  enlightenment,  because  ignorance  {avidyd)  prevails 
there  from  all  eternity,  because  there  is  a  constant  succession  of 
smrti  (past  confused  memory  working  as  instinct)  from  which 
they  have  never  been  emancipated.  But  when  they  are  divested 
of  this  smrti  they  can  then  recognize  that  no  states  of  mentation, 
viz.  their  appearance,  presence,  change  and  disappearance,  have 
any  reality.  They  are  neither  in  a  temporal  nor  in  a  spatial  relation 
with  the  one  soul,  for  they  are  not  self-existent. 

"This  high  enlightenment  shows  itself  imperfectly  in  our  cor- 
rupted phenomenal  experience  as  prajna  (wisdom)  and  karma 
(incomprehensible  activity  of  life).  By  pure  wisdom  we  under- 
stand that  when  one,  by  virtue  of  the  perfuming  power  of  dharma, 
disciplines  himself  truthfully  (i.e.  according  to  the  dharma)  and 
accomplishes  meritorious  deeds,  the  mind  (i.e.  the  dlayavijiidnd) 

9—2 


132  Buddh  ist  Ph  ilosophy  [c  h  . 

which  implicates  itself  with  birth  and  death  will  be  broken  down 
and  the  modes  of  the  evolving  consciousness  will  be  annulled,  and 
the  pure  and  the  genuine  wisdom  of  the  Dharmakaya  will  manifest 
itself.  Though  all  modes  of  consciousness  and  mentation  are 
mere  products  of  ignorance,  ignorance  in  its  ultimate  nature  is 
identical  and  non-identical  with  enlightenment;  and  therefore 
ignorance  is  in  one  sense  destructible,  though  in  another  sense 
it  is  indestructible.  This  may  be  illustrated  by  the  simile  of  the 
water  and  the  waves  which  are  stirred  up  in  the  ocean.  Here 
the  water  can  be  said  to  be  both  identical  and  non-identical 
with  the  waves.  The  waves  are  stirred  up  by  the  wind,  but  the 
water  remains  the  same.  When  the  wind  ceases  the  motion  of 
the  waves  subsides,  but  the  water  remains  the  same.  Likewise 
when  the  mind  of  all  creatures,  which  in  its  own  nature  is  pure  and 
clean,  is  stirred  up  by  the  wind  of  ignorance  {avidya),  the  waves 
of  mentality  {vijndnd)  make  their  appearance.  These  three  (i.e. 
the  mind,  ignorance,  and  mentality)  however  have  no  existence, 
and  they  are  neither  unity  nor  plurality.  When  the  ignorance  is 
annihilated,  the  awakened  mentality  is  tranquillized,  whilst  the 
essence  of  the  wisdom  remains  unmolested."  The  truth  or  the 
enlightenment  "is  absolutely  unobtainable  by  any  modes  of  rela- 
tivity or  by  any  outward  signs  of  enlightenment.  All  events  in 
the  phenomenal  world  are  reflected  in  enlightenment,  so  that  they 
neither  pass  out  of  it,  nor  enter  into  it,  and  they  neither  disappear 
nor  are  destroyed."  It  is  for  ever  cut  off  from  the  hindrances  both 
affectional  {klesdvarand)  and  intellectual  {jfieydvarajm),  as  well 
as  from  the  mind  (i.e.  dlayavijndnd)  which  implicates  itself  with 
birth  and  death,  since  it  is  in  its  true  nature  clean,  pure,  eternal, 
calm,  and  immutable.  The  truth  again  is  such  that  it  transforms 
and  unfolds  itself  wherever  conditions  are  favourable  in  the  form 
of  a  tathagata  or  in  some  other  forms,  in  order  that  all  beings 
may  be  induced  thereby  to  bring  their  virtue  to  maturity. 

"Non-elightenment  has  no  existence  of  its  own  aside  from  its 
relation  with  enlightenment  a  priori."  But  enlightenment  a  priori 
is  spoken  of  only  in  contrast  to  non-enlightenment,  and  as  non- 
enlightenment  is  a  non-entity,  true  enlightenment  in  turn  loses 
its  significance  too.  They  are  distinguished  only  in  mutual  rela- 
tion as  enlightenment  or  non-enlightenment.  The  manifestations 
of  non-enlightenment  are  made  in  three  ways:  (i)  as  a  disturb- 
ance of  the  mind  {dlayavijndnd),  by  the  avidyakarma  (ignorant 


v]  Theory  of  world-construction  133 

action),  producing  misery  {duhkha);  (2)  by  the  appearance  of  an 
ego  or  of  a  perceiver ;  and  (3)  by  the  creation  of  an  external  world 
which  does  not  exist  in  itself,  independent  of  the  perceiver.  Con- 
ditioned by  the  unreal  external  world  six  kinds  of  phenomena 
arise  in  succession.  The  first  phenomenon  is  intelligence  (sensa- 
tion); being  affected  by  the  external  world  the  mind  becomes 
conscious  of  the  difference  between  the  agreeable  and  the  disagree- 
able. The  second  phenomenon  is  succession.  Following  upon 
intelligence,  memory  retains  the  sensations,  agreeable  as  well 
as  disagreeable,  in  a  continuous  succession  of  subjective  states. 
The  third  phenomenon  is  clinging.  Through  the  retention  and 
succession  of  sensations,  agreeable  as  well  as  disagreeable,  there 
arises  the  desire  of  clinging.  The  fourth  phenomenon  is  an  attach- 
ment to  names  or  ideas  {santjfid),  etc.  By  clinging  the  mind 
hypostatizes  all  names  whereby  to  give  definitions  to  all  things. 
The  fifth  phenomenon  is  the  performance  of  deeds  {karma).  On 
account  of  attachment  to  names,  etc.,  there  arise  all  the  variations 
of  deeds,  productive  of  individuality.  "The  sixth  phenomenon 
is  the  suffering  due  to  the  fetter  of  deeds.  Through  deeds  suffering 
arises  in  which  the  mind  finds  itself  entangled  and  curtailed  of 
its  freedom."  All  these  phenomena  have  thus  sprung  forth  through 
avidya. 

The  relation  between  this  truth  and  avidya  is  in  one  sense 
a  mere  identity  and  may  be  illustrated  by  the  simile  of  all  kinds 
of  pottery  which  though  different  are  all  made  of  the  same  clay'. 
Likewise  the  undefiled  {andsravd)  and  ignorance  {avidya)  and 
their  various  transient  forms  all  come  from  one  and  the  same 
entity.  Therefore  Buddha  teaches  that  all  beings  are  from  all 
eternity  abiding  in  Nirvana. 

It  is  by  the  touch  of  ignorance  {avidya)  that  this  truth  assumes 
all  the  phenomenal  forms  of  existence. 

In  the  all-conserving  mind  {dlayavijndnd)  ignorance  manifests 
itself;  and  from  non-enlightenment  starts  that  which  sees,  that 
which  represents,  that  which  apprehends  an  objective  world,  and 
that  which  constantly  particularizes.  This  is  called  ego  {manas). 
Five  different  names  are  given  to  the  ego  (according  to  its  dif- 
ferent modes  of  operation).  The  first  name  is  activity-conscious- 
ness {karmavijndna)  in  the  sense  that  through  the  agency  of 
ignorance  an  unenlightened   mind   begins  to  be  disturbed  (or 

^  Compare  Chandogya,  vi.  1.4. 


1 34  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

awakened).  The  second  name  is  evolving-consciousness  {pravrtti- 
vijhdnd)  in  the  sense  that  when  the  mind  is  disturbed,  there 
evolves  that  which  sees  an  external  world.  The  third  name  is 
representation-consciousness  in  the  sense  that  the  ego  (manas) 
represents  (or  reflects)  an  external  world.  As  a  clean  mirror 
reflects  the  images  of  all  description,  it  is  even  so  with  the  repre- 
sentation-consciousness. When  it  is  confronted,  for  instance,  with 
the  objects  of  the  five  senses,  it  represents  them  instantaneously 
and  without  efibrt.  The  fourth  is  particularization-consciousness, 
in  the  sense  that  it  discriminates  between  different  things  defiled 
as  well  as  pure.  The  fifth  name  is  succession-consciousness,  in  the 
sense  that  continuously  directed  by  the  awakening  consciousness 
of  attention  {inanaskdrd)  it  {jnanas)  retains  all  experiences  and 
never  loses  or  suffers  the  destruction  of  any  karma,  good  as  well 
as  evil,  which  had  been  sown  in  the  past,  and  whose  retribution, 
painful  or  agreeable,  it  never  fails  to  mature,  be  it  in  the  present 
or  in  the  future,  and  also  in  the  sense  that  it  unconsciously 
recollects  things  gone  by  and  in  imagination  anticipates  things 
to  come.  Therefore  the  three  domains  {kdmaloka,  domain  of 
feeling — rupaloka,  domain  of  bodily  existence — arupaloka,  domain 
of  incorporeality)  are  nothing  but  the  self  manifestation  of  the 
mind  (i.e.  dlayavijfidna  which  is  practically  identical  with  bhiita- 
tathatd).  Since  all  things,  owing  the  principle  of  their  existence 
to  the  mind  {dlayavijndna),  are  produced  by  smrti,  all  the  modes 
of  particularization  are  the  self-particularizations  of  the  mind.  The 
mind  in  itself  (or  the  soul)  being  however  free  from  all  attributes 
is  not  differentiated.  Therefore  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
all  things  and  conditions  in  the  phenomenal  world,  hypostatized 
and  established  only  through  ignorance  {avidyd)  and  memory 
{smrti),  have  no  more  reality  than  the  images  in  a  mirror.  They 
arise  simply  from  the  ideality  of  a  particularizing  mind.  When 
the  mind  is  disturbed,  the  multiplicity  of  things  is  produced;  but 
when  the  mind  is  quieted,  the  multiplicity  of  things  disappears. 
By  ego-consciousness  {manovijildnd)  we  mean  the  ignorant  mind 
which  by  its  succession-consciousness  clings  to  the  conception  of 
I  and  Not-I  and  misapprehends  the  nature  of  the  six  objects  of 
sense.  The  ego-consciousness  is  also  called  separation-conscious- 
ness, because  it  is  nourished  by  the  perfuming  influence  of  the 
prejudices  {dsrava),  intellectual  as  well  as  affectional.  Thus  believ- 
ing in  the  external  world  produced  by  memory,  the  mind  becomes 


v]  Theory  of  Good  and  Evil  135 

oblivious  of  the  principle  of  sameness  {samata)  that  underlies  all 
things  which  are  one  and  perfectly  calm  and  tranquil  and  show  no 
sign  of  becoming. 

Non-enlightenment  is  the  raison  d'etre  of  samsara.  When 
this  is  annihilated  the  conditions — the  external  world — are  also 
annihilated  and  with  them  the  state  of  an  interrelated  mind  is  also 
annihilated.  But  this  annihilation  does  not  mean  the  annihilation 
of  the  mind  but  of  its  modes  only.  It  becomes  calm  like  an  un- 
ruffled sea  when  all  winds  which  were  disturbing  it  and  producing 
the  waves  have  been  annihilated. 

In  describing  the  relation  of  the  interaction  of  avidya  (ignor- 
ance), karmavijfiana  (activity-consciousness — the  subjective  mind), 
visaya  (external  world — represented  by  the  senses)  and  the  tathata 
(suchness),  Asvaghosa  says  that  there  is  an  interperfuming  of 
these  elements.  Thus  Asvaghosa  says,  "By  perfuming  we  mean 
that  while  our  worldly  clothes  (viz.  those  which  we  wear)  have  no 
odour  of  their  own,  neither  offensive  nor  agreeable,  they  can  yet 
acquire  one  or  the  other  odour  according  to  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
stance with  which  they  are  perfumed.  Suchness  {tathata)  is  likewise 
a  pure  dharma  free  from  all  defilements  caused  by  the  perfuming 
power  of  ignorance.  On  the  other  hand  ignorance  has  nothing  to 
do  with  purity.  Nevertheless  we  speak  of  its  being  able  to  do  the 
work  of  purity  because  it  in  its  turn  is  perfumed  by  suchness. 
Determined  by  suchness  ignorance  becomes  the  raison  d'etre  of 
all  forms  of  defilement.  And  this  ignorance  perfumes  suchness 
and  produces  smrti.  This  smrti  in  its  turn  perfumes  ignorance. 
On  account  of  this  (reciprocal)  perfuming,  the  truth  is  misunder- 
stood. On  account  of  its  being  misunderstood  an  external  world 
of  subjectivity  appears.  Further,  on  account  of  the  perfuming 
power  of  memory,  various  modes  of  individuation  are  produced. 
And  by  clinging  to  them  various  deeds  are  done,  and  we  suffer 
as  the  result  miseries  mentally  as  well  as  bodily."  Again  "such- 
ness perfumes  ignorance,  and  in  consequence  of  this  perfuming 
the  individual  in  subjectivity  is  caused  to  loathe  the  misery  of 
birth  and  death  and  to  seek  after  the  blessing  of  Nirvana.  This 
longing  and  loathing  on  the  part  of  the  subjective  mind  in  turn 
perfumes  suchness.  On  account  of  this  perfuming  influence  we 
are  enabled  to  believe  that  we  are  in  possession  within  ourselves 
of  suchness  whose  essential  nature  is  pure  and  immaculate;  and 
we  also  recognize  that  all  phenomena  in  the  world  are  nothing 


136  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

but  the  illusory  manifestations  of  the  mind  {alayavijndnd)  and 
have  no  reality  of  their  own.  Since  we  thus  rightly  understand 
the  truth,  we  can  practise  the  means  of  liberation,  can  perform 
those  actions  which  are  in  accordance  with  the  dharma.  We 
should  neither  particularize,  nor  cling  to  objects  of  desire.  By 
virtue  of  this  discipline  and  habituation  during  the  lapse  of  innu- 
merable asarikhyeyakalpas^  we  get  ignorance  annihilated.  As 
ignorance  is  thus  annihilated,  the  mind  {dlayavijhdnd)  is  no  longer 
disturbed,  so  as  to  be  subject  to  individuation.  As  the  mind  is  no 
longer  disturbed,  the  particularization  of  the  surrounding  world 
is  annihilated.  When  in  this  wise  the  principle  and  the  condition 
of  defilement,  their  products,  and  the  mental  disturbances  are  all 
annihilated,  it  is  said  that  we  attain  Nirvana  and  that  various 
spontaneous  displays  of  activity  are  accomplished."  The  Nirvana 
of  the  tathata  philosophy  is  not  nothingness,  but  tathata  (suchness 
or  thatness)  in  its  purity  unassociated  with  any  kind  of  disturbance 
which  produces  all  the  diversity  of  experience. 

To  the  question  that  if  all  beings  are  uniformly  in  possession 
of  suchness  and  are  therefore  equally  perfumed  by  it,  how  is  it 
that  there  are  some  who  do  not  believe  in  it,  while  others  do, 
Asvaghosa's  reply  is  that  though  all  beings  are  uniformly  in 
possession  of  suchness,  the  intensity  of  ignorance  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  individuation,  that  work  from  all  eternity,  vary  in  such 
manifold  grades  as  to  outnumber  the  sands  of  the  Ganges,  and 
hence  the  difference.  There  is  an  inherent  perfuming  principle 
in  one's  own  being  which,  embraced  and  protected  by  the  love 
iinaitri)  and  compassion  {karuna)  of  all  Buddhas  and  Bodhisatt- 
vas,  is  caused  to  loathe  the  misery  of  birth  and  death,  to  believe 
in  nirvana,  to  cultivate  the  root  of  merit  {kusalamUld),  to  habit- 
uate oneself  to  it  and  to  bring  it  to  maturity.  In  consequence 
of  this,  one  is  enabled  to  see  all  Buddhas  and  Bodhisattvas  and,  re- 
ceiving instructions  from  them,  is  benefited,  gladdened  and  induced 
to  practise  good  deeds,  etc.,  till  one  can  attain  to  Buddhahood  and 
enter  into  Nirvana.  This  implies  that  all  beings  have  such  perfum- 
ing power  in  them  that  they  may  be  affected  by  the  good  wishes 
of  the  Buddhas  and  Bodhisattvas  for  leading  them  to  the  path 
of  virtue,  and  thus  it  is  that  sometimes  hearing  the  Bodhisattvas 
and  sometimes  seeing  them,  "all  beings  thereby  acquire  (spiritual) 
benefits  {hitatd)"  and  "entering  into  the  samadhi  of  purity,  they 

'  Technical  name  for  a  very  vast  period  of  time. 


v]  Theory  of  Good  and  Evil  137 

destroy  hindrances  wherever  they  are  met  with  and  obtain  all- 
penetrating  insight  that  enables  them  to  become  conscious  of 
the  absolute  oneness  {samatd)  of  the  universe  {sarvalokd)  and  to 
see  innumerable  Buddhas  and  Bodhisattvas." 

There  is  a  difference  between  the  perfuming  which  is  not  in 
unison  with  suchness,  as  in  the  case  of  sravakas  (theravadin 
monks),  pratyekabuddhas  and  the  novice  bodhisattvas,  who  only 
continue  their  religious  discipline  but  do  not  attain  to  the  state 
of  non-particularization  in  unison  with  the  essence  of  suchness. 
But  those  bodhisattvas  whose  perfuming  is  already  in  unison  with 
suchness  attain  to  the  state  of  non-particularization  and  allow 
themselves  to  be  influenced  only  by  the  power  of  the  dharma. 
The  incessant  perfuming  of  the  defiled  dharma  (ignorance  from 
all  eternity)  works  on,  but  when  one  attains  to  Buddhahood  one 
at  once  puts  an  end  to  it.  The  perfuming  of  the  pure  dharma 
(i.e.  suchness)  however  works  on  to  eternity  without  any  interrup- 
tion. For  this  suchness  or  thatness  is  the  effulgence  of  great 
wisdom,  the  universal  illumination  of  the  dharmadhatu  (universe), 
the  true  and  adequate  knowledge,  the  mind  pure  and  clean  in  its 
own  nature,  the  eternal,  the  blessed,  the  self-regulating  and  the 
pure,  the  tranquil,  the  inimitable  and  the  free,  and  this  is  called 
the  tathagatagarbha  or  the  dharmakaya.  It  may  be  objected  that 
since  thatness  or  suchness  has  been  described  as  being  without 
characteristics,  it  is  now  a  contradiction  to  speak  of  it  as  embracing 
all  merits,  but  it  is  held,  that  in  spite  of  its  embracing  all  merits, 
it  is  free  in  its  nature  from  all  forms  of  distinction,  because  all 
objects  in  the  world  are  of  one  and  the  same  taste;  and  being 
of  one  reality  they  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  modes  of  par- 
ticularization  or  of  dualistic  character.  "Though  all  things  in  their 
(metaphysical)  origin  come  from  the  soul  alone  and  in  truth  are 
free  from  particularization,  yet  on  account  of  non-enlightenment 
there  originates  a  subjective  mind  {alayavijndna)  that  becomes 
conscious  of  an  external  world."  This  is  called  ignorance  or 
avidya.  Nevertheless  the  pure  essence  of  the  mind  is  perfectly 
pure  and  there  is  no  awakening  of  ignorance  in  it.  Hence  we  assign 
to  suchness  this  quality,  the  effulgence  of  great  wisdom.  It  is 
called  universal  illumination,  because  there  is  nothing  for  it  to 
illumine.  This  perfuming  of  suchness  therefore  continues  for  ever, 
though  the  stage  of  the  perfuming  of  avidya  comes  to  an  end  with 
the  Buddhas  when  they  attain  to  nirvana.    All  Buddhas  while  at 


138  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

the  stage  of  discipline  feel  a  deep  compassion  (inahdkarima)  for  all 
beings,  practise  all  virtues  {pdraniitds)  and  many  other  meritorious 
deeds,  treat  others  as  their  own  selves,  and  wish  to  work  out  a 
universal  salvation  of  mankind  in  ages  to  come,  through  limitless 
numbers  of  kalpas,  recognize  truthfully  and  adequately  the 
principle  of  equality  {samatd)  among  people;  and  do  not  cling 
to  the  individual  existence  of  a  sentient  being.  This  is  what  is 
meant  by  the  activity  of  tathata.  The  main  idea  of  this  tathata 
philosophy  seems  to  be  this,  that  this  transcendent  "thatness"  is 
at  once  the  quintessence  of  all  thought  and  activity;  as  avidya  veils 
it  or  perfumes  it,  the  world-appearance  springs  forth,  but  as  the 
pure  thatness  also  perfumes  the  avidya  there  is  a  striving  for  the 
good  as  well.  As  the  stage  of  avidya  is  passed  its  luminous 
character  shines  forth,  for  it  is  the  ultimate  truth  which  only 
illusorily  appeared  as  the  many  of  the  world. 

This  doctrine  seems  to  be  more  in  agreement  with  the  view 
of  an  absolute  unchangeable  reality  as  the  ultimate  truth  than 
that  of  the  nihilistic  idealism  of  Lahkdvatdra.  Considering  the 
fact  that  Asvaghosa  was  a  learned  Brahmin  scholar  in  his  early 
life,  it  is  easy  to  guess  that  there  was  much  Upanisad  influence  in 
this  interpretation  of  Buddhism,  which  compares  so  favourably 
with  the  Vedanta  as  interpreted  by  Sahkara.  The  Lankdvatdra 
admitted  a  reality  only  as  a  make-believe  to  attract  the  Tairthikas 
(heretics)  who  had  a  prejudice  in  favour  of  an  unchangeable  self 
idtmati).  But  Asvaghosa  plainly  admitted  an  unspeakable  reality 
as  the  ultimate  truth.  Nagarjuna's  Madhyamika  doctrines  which 
eclipsed  the  profound  philosophy  of  Asvaghosa  seem  to  be  more 
faithful  to  the  traditional  Buddhist  creed  and  to  the  Vijflanavada 
creed  of  Buddhism  as  explained  in  the  Lahkdvatdra^. 

The  Madhyamika  or  the  Sunyavada  school. — Nihilism. 

Candraklrtti,  the  commentator  of  Nagarjuna's  verses  known  as 
"  MddJiyamika  kdrikd^'  in  explaining  the  doctrine  of  dependent 
origination  {pratityasamutpdda)  as  described  by  Nagarjuna  starts 
with  two  interpretations  of  the  word.  According  to  one  the  word 
pratityasamutpada  means  the  origination  {iitpddd)  of  the  non- 
existent {abhdva)  depending  on  {pratitya)  reasons  and  causes 

1  As  I  have  no  access  to  the  Chinese  translation  of  Ai^vaghosa's  Sraddhoipdda 
Sastra,  I  had  to  depend  entirely  on  Suzuki's  expressions  as  they  appear  in  his  trans- 
lation. 


v]  Pratityasainutpada  139 

(hetupratyaya).  According  to  the  other  interpretation  pratltya 
means  each  and  every  destructible  individual  and  pratityasamut- 
pada  means  the  origination  of  each  and  every  destructible  in- 
dividual. But  he  disapproves  of  both  these  meanings.  The 
second  meaning  does  not  suit  the  context  in  which  the  Pali 
Scriptures  generally  speak  of  pratityasamutpada  (e.g.  caksuh 
pratltya  rupdni  ca  utpadyante  caksurvijhdnam)  for  it  does  not 
mean  the  origination  of  each  and  every  destructible  individual, 
but  the  originating  of  specific  individual  phenomena  (e.g.  per- 
ception of  form  by  the  operation  in  connection  with  the  eye) 
depending  upon  certain  specific  conditions. 

The  first  meaning  also  is  equally  unsuitable.  Thus  for  example 
if  we  take  the  case  of  any  origination,  e.g.  that  of  the  visual  per- 
cept, we  see  that  there  cannot  be  any  contact  between  visual 
knowledge  and  physical  sense,  the  eye,  and  so  it  would  not  be 
intelligible  that  the  former  should  depend  upon  the  latter.  If  we 
interpret  the  maxim  of  pratityasamutpada  as  this  happening  that 
happens,  that  would  not  explain  any  specific  origination.  All 
origination  is  false,  for  a  thing  can  neither  originate  by  itself  nor 
by  others,  nor  by  a  co-operation  of  both  nor  without  any  reason. 
For  if  a  thing  exists  already  it  caimot  originate  again  by  itself. 
To  suppose  that  it  is  originated  by  others  would  also  mean 
that  the  origination  was  of  a  thing  already  existing.  If  again 
without  any  further  qualification  it  is  said  that  depending  on 
one  the  other  comes  into  being,  then  depending  on  anything  any 
other  thing  could  come  into  being — from  light  we  could  have  dark- 
ness! Since  a  thing  could  not  originate  from  itself  or  by  others, 
it  could  not  also  be  originated  by  a  combination  of  both  of  them 
together.  A  thing  also  could  not  originate  without  any  cause, 
for  then  all  things  could  come  into  being  at  all  times.  It  is  there- 
fore to  be  acknowledged  that  wherever  the  Buddha  spoke  of  this 
so-called  dependent  origination  {pratityasavuitpdda)  it  was  re- 
ferred to  as  illusory  manifestations  appearing  to  intellects  and 
senses  stricken  with  ignorance.  This  dependent  origination  is 
not  thus  a  real  law,  but  only  an  appearance  due  to  ignorance 
{avidya).  The  only  thing  which  is  not  lost  {amosadharnid)  is 
nirvana;  but  all  other  forms  of  knowledge  and  phenomena 
{samskdras)  are  false  and  are  lost  with  their  appearances  {sarva- 
samskdrdsca  mrsdviosadhannduali). 

It  is  sometimes  objected  to  this  doctrine  that  if  all  appear- 


140  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

ances  are  false,  then  they  do  not  exist  at  all.  There  are  then  no 
good  or  bad  works  and  no  cycle  of  existence,  and  if  such  is  the 
case,  then  it  may  be  argued  that  no  philosophical  discussion 
should  be  attempted.  But  the  reply  to  such  an  objection  is  that  the 
nihilistic  doctrine  is  engaged  in  destroying  the  misplaced  con- 
fidence of  the  people  that  things  are  true.  H'hose  who  are  really 
wise  do  not  find  anything  either  false  or  true,  for  to  them  clearly 
they  do  not  exist  at  all  and  they  do  not  trouble  themselves  with 
the  question  of  their  truth  or  falsehood  For  him  who  knows  thus 
there  are  neither  works  nor  cycles  of  births  (sanisdra)  and  also  he 
does  not  trouble  himself  about  the  existence  or  non-existence  of 
any  of  the  appearances.  Thus  it  is  said  in  the  Ratnakutasutra  that 
howsoever  carefully  one  may  search  one  cannot  discover  conscious- 
ness {citta)\  what  cannot  be  perceived  cannot  be  said  to  exist, 
and  what  does  not  exist  is  neither  past,  nor  luture,  nor  present,  and 
as  such  it  cannot  be  said  to  have  any  nature  at  all ;  and  that  which 
has  no  nature  is  subject  neither  to  origination  nor  to  extinction. 
He  who  through  his  false  knowledge  {viparyydsd)  does  not  com- 
prehend the  falsehood  of  all  appearances,  but  thinks  them  to  be 
real,  works  and  suffers  the  cycles  of  rebirth  {samsdrd).  Like  all 
illusions,  though  false  these  appearances  can  produce  all  the  harm 
of  rebirth  and  sorrow. 

It  may  again  be  objected  that  if  there  is  nothing  true 
according  to  the  nihilists  {sunyavddins),  then  their  statement  that 
there  is  no  origination  or  extinction  is  also  not  true.  Candraklrtti 
in  replying  to  this  says  that  with  sunyavadins  the  truth  is  absolute 
silence.  When  the  Sunyavadin  sages  argue,  they  only  accept  for 
the  moment  what  other  people  regard  as  reasons,  and  deal  with 
them  in  their  own  manner  to  help  them  to  come  to  a  right 
comprehension  of  all  appearances.  It  is  of  no  use  to  say,  in  spite 
of  all  arguments  tending  to  show  the  falsehood  of  all  appearances, 
that  they  are  testified  by  our  experience,  for  the  whole  thing  that 
we  call  "our  experience"  is  but  false  illusion  inasmuch  as  these 
phenomena  have  no  true  essence. 

When  the  doctrine  of  pratltyasamutpada  is  described  as  "this 
being  that  is,"  what  is  really  meant  is  that  things  can  only  be 
indicated  as  mere  appearances  one  after  another,  for  they  have 
no  essence  or  true  nature.  Nihilism  {sunyavdda)  also  means  just 
this.  The  true  meaning  of  pratltyasamutpada  or  sunyavada  is 
this,  that  there  is  no  truth,  no  essence  in  all  phenomena  that 


v]  Essencelessness  1 4 1 

appear^  As  the  phenomena  have  no  essence  they  are  neither 
produced  nor  destroyed ;  they  really  neither  come  nor  go.  They 
are  merely  the  appearance  of  maya  or  illusion.  The  void  {sTmyd) 
does  not  mean  pure  negation,  for  that  is  relative  to  some  kind  of 
position.  It  simply  means  that  none  of  the  appearances  have  any 
intrinsic  nature  of  their  own  {nihsvabhdvatvani). 

The  Madhyamaka  or  Sunya  system  does  not  hold  that  any- 
thing has  any  essence  or  nature  {svabhdva)  of  its  own;  even 
heat  cannot  be  said  to  be  the  essence  of  fire;  for  both  the  heat 
and  the  fire  are  the  result  of  the  combination  of  many  conditions, 
and  what  depends  on  many  conditions  cannot  be  said  to  be  the 
nature  or  essence  of  the  thing.  That  alone  may  be  said  to  be  the 
true  essence  or  nature  of  anything  which  does  not  depend  on 
anything  else,  and  since  no  such  essence  or  nature  can  be  pointed 
out  which  stands  independently  by  itself  we  cannot  say  that  it 
exists.  If  a  thing  has  no  essence  or  existence  of  its  own,  we  can- 
not affirm  the  essence  of  other  things  to  it  {parabhdva).  If  we 
cannot  affirm  anything  of  anything  as  positive,  we  cannot  conse- 
quently assert  anything  of  anything  as  negative.  If  anyone  first 
believes  in  things  positive  and  afterwards  discovers  that  they  are 
not  so,  he  no  doubt  thus  takes  his  stand  on  a  negation  {abhdva), 
but  in  reality  since  we  cannot  speak  of  anything  positive,  we  can- 
not speak  of  anything  negative  either^. 

It  is  again  objected  that  we  nevertheless  perceive  a  process^. 
going  on.  To  this  the  Madhyamaka  reply  is  that  a  process  of 
change  coulcTnor  be  arhrmed  ot  things  that  are  permanent.  But  we 
can  Hardly  speak  of  a  process  with  reference  to  momentary  things; 
for  those  which  are  momentary  are  destroyed  the  next  moment 
after  they  appear,  and  so  there  is  nothing  which  can  continue  to 
justify  a  process.  That  which  appears  as  being  neither  comes 
from  anywhere  nor  goes  anywhere,  and  that  which  appears  as  de- 
stroyed also  does  not  come  from  anywhere  nor  go  anywhere, 
and  so  a  process  {samsdra)  cannot  be  affirmed  of  them.  It  cannot 
be  that  when  the  second  moment  arose,  the  first  moment  had 
suffered  a  change  in  the  process,  for  it  was  not  the  same  as  the 
second,  as  there  is  no  so-called  cause-effect  connection.  In  fact 
there  being  no  relation  between  the  two,  the  temporal  determina- 
tion as  prior  and  later  is  wrong.  The  supposition  that  there  is  a 
self  which  suffers  changes  is  also  not  valid,  for  howsoever  we 

^  See  Mddhyamikavrtti  (B.T.S.),  p.  50.  ^  Ibid.  pp.  93-100. 


142  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

may  search  we  find  the  five  skandhas  but  no  self.  Moreover  if 
the  soul  is  a  unity  it  cannot  undergo  any  process  or  progression, 
for  that  would  presuppose  that  the  soul  abandons  one  character 
and  takes  up  another  at  the  same  identical  moment  which  is 
inconceivable  ^ 

But  then  again  the  question  arises  that  if  there  is  no  process, 
and  no  cycle  of  worldly  existence  of  thousands  of  afflictions,  what 
is  then  the  nirvana  which  is  described  as  the  final  extinction  of 
all  afflictions  {klesd)}  To  this  the  Madhyamaka  reply  is  that  it  does 
not  agree  to  such  a  definition  of  nirvana.  Nirvana  on  the  Madhya- 
maka theory  is  the  absence  of  the  essence  of  all  phenomena,  that 
which  cannot  be  conceived  either  as  anything  which  has  ceased 
or  as  anything  which  is  produced  {aiiiruddhain  aniitpannatn).  In 
nirvana  all  phenomena  are  lost;  we  say  that  the  phenomena  cease 
to  exist  in  nirvana,  but  like  the  illusory  snake  in  the  rope  they 
never  existed-.  Nirvana  cannot  be  any  positive  thing  or  any  sort 
of  state  of  being  {bhdvd),  for  all  positive  states  or  things  are  joint 
products  of  combined  causes  {samskrtd)  and  are  liable  to  decay 
and  destruction.  Neither  can  it  be  a  negative  existence,  for  since 
we  cannot  speak  of  any  positive  existence,  we  cannot  speak  of  a 
negative  existence  either.  The  appearances  or  the  phenomena  are 
communicated  as  being  in  a  state  of  change  and  process  coming 
one  after  another,  but  beyond  that  no  essence,  existence,  or  truth 
can  be  affirmed  of  them.  Phenomena  sometimes  appear  to  be 
produced  and  sometimes  to  be  destroyed,  but  they  cannot  be 
determined  as  existent  or  non-existent.  Nirvana  is  merely  the 
cessation  of  the  seeming  phenomenal  flow  {prapancapravrtti).  It 
cannot  therefore  be  designated  either  as  positive  or  as  negative  for 
these  conceptions  belong  to  phenomena  {na  cdpravrttimdtrani 
bhdvdbhdveti  parikalpitum  pdryyate  evani  na  bhdvdbhdvanir- 
vdnam,  M.V.  197).  In  this  state  there  is  nothing  which  is  known, 
and  even  the  knowledge  that  the  phenomena  have  ceased  to 
appear  is  not  found.  Even  the  Buddha  himself  is  a  phenomenon, 
a  mirage  or  a  dream,  and  so  are  all  his  teachings'^ 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  in  this  system  there  cannot  exist  any 
bondage  or  emancipation ;  all  phenomena  are  like  shadows,  like 
the  mirage,  the  dream,  the  maya,  and  the  magic  without  any  real 
nature  {tiihsvabJidva).   It  is  mere  false  knowledge  to  suppose  that 

'  See  Mdd/i}farfii^aw-ih'  (Ji.T.S.),  pp.  101-102.  '^  //>id.  p.  194. 

^  //'it/,  pp.  162  and  201. 


v]  Causal  conditions  143 

one  is  trying  to  win  a  real  nirvana^  It  is  this  false  egoism  that 
is  to  be  considered  as  avidya.  When  considered  deeply  it  is  found 
that  there  is  not  even  the  slightest  trace  of  any  positive  existence. 
Thus  it  is  seen  that  if  there  were  no  ignorance  iavidya),  there 
would  have  been  no  conformations  {sainskdras),  and  if  there  were 
no  conformations  there  would  have  been  no  consciousness,  and  so 
on;  but  it  cannot  be  said  of  the  ignorance  "I  am  generating  the 
samskaras,"  and  it  can  be  said  of  the  samskaras  "we  are  being 
produced  by  the  avidya."  But  there  being  avidya,  there  come  the 
samskaras  and  so  on  with  other  categories  too.  This  character  of 
the  pratltyasamutpada  is  known  as  the  coming  of  the  consequent 
depending  on  an  antecedent  reason  {hetfipambandha). 

It  can  be  viewed  from  another  aspect,  namely  that  of  depend- 
ence on  conglomeration  or  combination  {pratyayopanibandlid). 
It  is  by  the  combination  {samavdyd)  of  the  four  elements,  space 
{dkdsa)  and  consciousness  {vij'ndfia)  that  a  man  is  made.  It  is 
due  to  earth  {prt/iivl)  that  the  body  becomes  solid,  it  is  due  to 
water  that  there  is  fat  in  the  body,  it  is  due  to  fire  that  there  is 
digestion,  it  is  due  to  wind  that  there  is  respiration;  it  is  due 
to  akasa  that  there  is  porosity,  and  it  is  due  to  vijnana  that 
there  is  mind-consciousness.  It  is  by  their  mutual  combination 
that  we  find  a  man  as  he  is.  But  none  of  these  elements  think 
that  they  have  done  any  of  the  functions  that  are  considered  to  be 
allotted  to  them.  None  of  these  are  real  substances  or  beings  or 
souls.  It  is  by  ignorance  that  these  are  thought  of  as  existents  and 
attachment  is  generated  for  them.  Through  ignorance  thus  come 
the  samskaras,  consisting  of  attachment,  antipathy  and  thought- 
lessness {rdga,  dvesa,  mohd) ;  from  these  proceed  the  vijnana  and 
the  four  skandhas.  These  with  the  four  elements  bring  about  name 
and  form  {ndinarupd),  from  these  proceed  the  senses  {saddyatand), 
from  the  coming  together  of  those  three  comes  contact  {sparsd) ; 
from  that  feelings,  from  that  comes  desire  {trsnd)  and  so  on. 
These  flow  on  like  the  stream  of  a  river,  but  there  is  no  essence 
or  truth  behind  them  all  or  as  the  ground  of  them  all^.  The 
phenomena  therefore  cannot  be  said  to  be  either  existent  or 
non-existent,  and  no  truth  can  be  affirmed  of  either  eternalism 
(Jdsvatavddd)  or  nihilism  {ucchedavddd),  and  it  is  for  this  reason 

^  SeQ  Madhyamikavrtti  {Q.T.S.),  pp.  ioi-io8. 

-  Ibid.  pp.  209-211,  quoted  from  Salistambhasutra.    Vacaspatimisra  also  quotes 
this  passage  in  his  Bhdmati  on  Sankara's  Brahma-ifitra. 


144  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

that  this  doctrine  is  called  the  middle  doctrine  {madhyamakay . 
Existence  and  non-existence  have  only  a  relative  truth  {sam- 
vrtisatyd)  in  them,  as  in  all  phenomena,  but  there  is  no  true 
reality  {paraindrthasatyd)  in  them  or  anything  else.  Morality 
plays  as  high  a  part  in  this  nihilistic  system  as  it  does  in  any 
other  Indian  system.  I  quote  below  some  stanzas  from  Nagar- 
juna's  SuJirllekha  as  translated  by  Wenzel  (P.T.S.  1886)  from 
the  Tibetan  translation. 

6.  Knowing  that  riches  are  unstable  and  void  {asdrd)  give  according  to 
the  moral  precepts,  to  Bhikshus,  Brahmins,  the  poor  and  friends  for  there  is 
no  better  friend  than  giving. 

7.  Exhibit  morality  (iJ/a)  faultless  and  sublime,  unmixed  and  spotless, 
for  morality  is  the  supporting  ground  of  all  eminence,  as  the  earth  is  of  the 
moving  and  immovable. 

8.  Exercise  the  imponderable,  transcendental  virtues  of  charity,  morality, 
patience,  energy,  meditation,  and  likevv^ise  wisdom,  in  order  that,  having 
reached  the  farther  shore  of  the  sea  of  existence,  you  may  become  a  Jina 
prince. 

9.  View  as  enemies,  avarice  {matsaryyd)^  deceit  {sathya),  duplicity  {tnaya), 
lust,  indolence  {kauszdya\  pride  {mana),  greed  {raga\  hatred  [dvesa)  and 
pride  itnada)  concerning  family,  figure,  glory,  youth,  or  power. 

15.  Since  nothing  is  so  difficult  of  attainment  as  patience,  open  no  door 
for  anger ;  the  Buddha  has  pronounced  that  he  who  renounces  anger  shall 
attain  the  degree  of  an  anagamin  (a  saint  who  never  suffers  rebirth). 

21.  Do  not  look  after  another's  wife;  but  if  you  see  her,  regard  her, 
according  to  age,  like  your  mother,  daughter  or  sister. 

24.  Of  him  who  has  conquered  the  unstable,  ever  moving  objects  of  the 
six  senses  and  him  who  has  overcome  the  mass  of  his  enemies  in  battle,  the 
wise  praise  the  first  as  the  greater  hero. 

29.  Thou  who  knowest  the  world,  be  equanimous  against  the  eight  worldly 
conditions,  gain  and  loss,  happiness  and  suffering,  fame  and  dishonour,  blame 
and  praise,  for  they  are  not  objects  for  your  thoughts. 

37.  But  one  (a  woman)  that  is  gentle  as  a  sister,  winning  as  a  friend, 
careful  of  your  well  being  as  a  mother,  obedient  as  a  servant  her  (you  must) 
honour  as  the  guardian  god(dess)  of  the  family. 

40.  Always  perfectly  meditate  on  (turn  your  thoughts  to)  kindness,  pity, 
joy  and  indifference  ;  then  if  you  do  not  obtain  a  higher  degree  you  (certainly) 
will  obtain  the  happiness  of  Brahman's  world  {brahmavihara). 

41.  By  the  four  dhyanas  completely  abandoning  desire  {kdma)^  reflection 
{vicdra),  joy  {Priii),  and  happiness  and  pain  {sukha,  duhkhd)  you  will  obtain 
as  fruit  the  lot  of  a  Brahman. 

49.  If  you  say  "I  am  not  the  form,  you  thereby  will  understand  I  am 
not  endowed  with  form,  I  do  not  dwell  in  form,  the  form  does  not  dwell  in  me  ; 
and  in  like  manner  you  will  understand  the  voidness  of  the  other  four  aggre- 
gates." 

50.  The  aggregates  do  not  arise  from  desire,  nor  from  time,  nor  from 

'   ^GQ  Madhyamikavrtti  {^.T.'i.).,-^.  i6o. 


v]  Vijnanavada  i45 

nature  {prakrii),  not  from  themselves  {svabhavat\  nor  from  the  Lord  {tsvara), 
nor  yet  are  they  without  cause  ;  know  that  they  arise  from  ignorance  {avidya) 
and  desire  {trsna). 

51.  Know  that  attachment  to  rehgious  ceremonies  {iilabratapardmarsa\ 
wrong  views  {mithyadrsti)  and  doubt  {vicikitsd)  are  the  three  fetters. 

53.  Steadily  instruct  yourself  (more  and  more)  in  the  highest  morality, 
the  highest  wisdom  and  the  highest  thought,  for  the  hundred  and  fifty  one 
rules  {oiih&  prdtimoksa)  are  combined  perfectly  in  these  three. 

58.  Because  thus  (as  demonstrated)  all  this  is  unstable  {anitya)  without 
substance  {andtma)  without  help  {asarand)  without  protector  {andthd)  and 
without  abode  {asthdJid)  thou  O  Lord  of  men  must  become  discontented  with 
this  worthless  (asdra)  kadali-tree  of  the  orb. 

104.  If  a  fire  were  to  seize  your  head  or  your  dress  you  would  extinguish 
and  subdue  it,  even  then  endeavour  to  annihilate  desire,  for  there  is  no  other 
higher  necessity  than  this. 

105.  By  morality,  knowledge  and  contemplation,  attain  the  spotless  dig- 
nity of  the  quieting  and  the  subduing  nirvana  not  subject  to  age,  death  or 
decay,  devoid  of  earth,  water,  fire,  wind,  sun  and  moon. 

107.  Where  there  is  no  wisdom  {prajnd)  there  is  also  no  contemplation 
{dhydna\  where  there  is  no  contemplation  there  is  also  no  wisdom ;  but  know 
that  for  him  who  possesses  these  two  the  sea  of  existence  is  like  a  grove. 


Uncompromising  Idealism  or  the  School 
of  Vijnanavada  Buddhism. 

The  school  of  Buddhist  philosophy  known  as  the  Vijnanavada 
or  Yogacara  has  often  been  referred  to  by  such  prominent  teachers 
of  Hindu  thought  as  Kumarila  and  Sarikara.  It  agrees  to  a  great 
extent  with  the  Sunyavadins  whom  we  have  already  described. 
All  the  dharmas  (qualities  and  substances)  are  but  imaginary 
constructions  of  ignorant  minds.  There  is  no  movement  in  the 
so-called  external  world  as  we  suppose,  for  it  does  not  exist.  We 
construct  it  ourselves  and  then  are  ourselves  deluded  that  it  exists 
hy\ts&\{  {nirmmitapratiinohiy.  There  are  two  functions  involved 
in  our  consciousness,  viz.  that  which  holds  the  perceptions  {khydti 
vijndna),  and  that  which  orders  them  by  imaginary  constructions 
{vastuprativikalpavijiidna).  The  two  functions  however  mutually 
determine  each  other  and  cannot  be  separately  distinguished 
{abhinnalaksane  anyonyaJietuke).  These  functions  are  set  to  work 
on  account  of  the  beginningless  instinctive  tendencies  inherent 
in  them  in  relation  to  the  world  of  appearance  {anddikdla-pra- 
panca-vdsandhetukahca)  '\ 

All  sense  knowledge  can  be  stopped  only  when  the  diverse 

■*  Lahkdvatdrasutra,  pp.  21-22.  -  Ibid.  p.  44. 

D.  10 


146  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

unmanifested  instincts  of  imagination  are  stopped  {abhuta- 
parikalpa-vasand-vaicitra-7iirodhdy.  All  our  phenomenal  know- 
ledge is  without  any  essence  or  truth  {iiihsvabhdvd)  and  is  but  a 
creation  of  maya,  a  mirage  or  a  dream.  There  is  nothing  which 
may  be  called  external,  but  all  is  the  imaginary  creation  of  the 
mind  (svacittd),  which  has  been  accustomed  to  create  imaginary 
appearances  from  beginningless  time.  This  mind  by  whose  move- 
ment these  creations  take  place  as  subject  and  object  has  no 
appearance  in  itself  and  is  thus  without  any  origination,  existence 
a.nd&-K.X.\nci{on{utpddasthitibkangavarjJam)dind  is  called  the  alaya- 
vijnana.  The  reason  why  this  alayavijnana  itself  is  said  to  be 
without  origination,  existence,  and  extinction  is  probably  this, 
that  it  is  always  a  hypothetical  state  which  merely  explains  all 
the  phenomenal  states  that  appear,  and  therefore  it  has  no  exist- 
ence in  the  sense  in  which  the  term  is  used  and  we  could  not 
affirm  any  special  essence  of  it. 

We  do  not  realize  that  all  visible  phenomena  are  of  nothing 
external  but  of  our  own  mind  {svacitta),  and  there  is  also  the  begin- 
ningless tendency  for  believing  and  creating  a  phenomenal  world 
of  appearance.  There  is  also  the  nature  of  knowledge  (which 
takes  things  as  the  perceiver  and  the  perceived)  and  there  is  also 
the  instinct  in  the  mind  to  experience  diverse  forms.  On  account 
of  these  four  reasons  there  are  produced  in  the  alayavijnana  (mind) 
the  ripples  of  our  sense  experiences  {pravrttivijiidnd)  as  in  a  lake, 
and  these  are  manifested  as  sense  experiences.  All  the  five  skan- 
dhas  called  pahcavijiidnakdya  thus  appear  in  a  proper  synthetic 
form.  None  of  the  phenomenal  knowledge  that  appears  is  either 
identical  or  different  from  the  alayavijnana  just  as  the  waves  can- 
not be  said  to  be  either  identical  or  different  from  the  ocean.  As 
the  ocean  dances  on  in  waves  so  the  citta  or  the  alayavijiiana 
is  also  dancing  as  it  were  in  its  diverse  operations  {vrtti).  As 
citta  it  collects  all  movements  {karma)  within  it,  as  manas  it 
synthesizes  {yidhiyate)  and  as  vijnana  it  constructs  the  fivefold 
perceptions  {yijndncn  vijdndti  drsyam  kalpate  pancabhihy. 

It  is  only  due  to  maya  (illusion)  that  the  phenomena  appear 
in  their  twofold  aspect  as  subject  and  object.  This  must  always 
be  regarded  as  an  appearance  {samvrtisatyatd)  whereas  in  the  real 
aspect  we  could  never  say  whether  they  existed  {bhdva)  or  did  not 
exist^ 

1  Lankavatdrasutra,  p.  44.  ^  /^^q^  pp.  50-55. 


'  j^anKavaiarastitra,  p.  44. 

'  Asanga's  Mahaydnasutralanikdra,  pp.  58-59 


v]  Vijnanavada  and  Vedanta  147 

All  phenomena  both  being  and  non-being  are  illusory  {sada- 
santah  mdyopamdk).  When  we  look  deeply  into  them  we  find  that 
there  is  an  absolute  negation  of  all  appearances,  including  even 
all  negations,  for  they  are  also  appearances.  This  would  make  the 
ultimate  truth  positive.  But  this  is  not  so,  for  it  is  that  in  which 
the  positive  and  negative  are  one  and  the  same  {bhdvdbhdvasa- 
mdnatdy.  Such  a  state  which  is  complete  in  itself  and  has  no 
name  and  no  substance  had  been  described  in  the  Laiikavatara- 
sutra  as  thatness  {tathatd)"'.  This  state  is  also  described  in  another 
place  in  the  Lankdvatdra  as  voidness  {sunyatd)  which  is  one  and 
has  no  origination  and  no  essence^.  In  another  place  it  is  also 
designated  as  tathagatagarbha^ 

It  may  be  supposed  that  this  doctrine  of  an  unqualified 
ultimate  truth  comes  near  to  the  Vedantic  atman  or  Brahman 
like  the  tathata  doctrine  of  Asvaghosa;  and  we  find  in  Lahka- 
vatara  that  Ravana  asks  the  Buddha  "  How  can  you  say  that 
your  doctrine  of  tathagatagarbha  was  not  the  same  as  the  atman 
doctrine  of  the  other  schools  of  philosophers,  for  those  heretics 
also  consider  the  atman  as  eternal,  agent,  unqualified,  all-per- 
vading and  unchanged.-*"  To  this  the  Buddha  is  found  to  reply 
thus — "Our  doctrine  is  not  the  same  as  the  doctrine  of  those 
heretics;  it  is  in  consideration  of  the  fact  that  the  instruction 
of  a  philosophy  which  considered  that  there  was  no  soul  or  sub- 
stance in  anything  {nairdtmyd)  would  frighten  the  disciples,  that 
I  say  that  all  things  are  in  reality  the  tathagatagarbha.  This 
should  not  be  regarded  as  atman.  Just  as  a  lump  of  clay  is  made 
into  various  shapes,  so  it  is  the  non-essential  nature  of  all 
phenomena  and  their  freedom  from  all  characteristics  {sarvavikal- 
palaksanavinivrttani)  that  is  variously  described  as  the  garbha 
or  the  nairatmya  (essencelessness).  This  explanation  of  tathaga- 
tagarbha as  the  ultimate  truth  and  reality  is  given  in  order  to 
attract  to  our  creed  those  heretics  who  are  superstitiously  inclined 
to  believe  in  the  atman  doctrine^" 

So  far  as  the  appearance  of  the  phenomena  was  concerned 
the  idealistic  Buddhists  {vijndnavddins)  agreed  to  the  doctrine  of 
pratltyasamutpada  with  certain  modifications.  There  was  with 
them  an  external  pratltyasamutpada  just  as  it  appeared  in  the 

^  Asanga's  Alakdydnasutrdlamkdra,  p.  65. 

^  Lankdvatdrasutra,  p.  70.  *  Ibid.  p.  78. 

*  Ibid.  p.  80.  °  Ibid.  pp.  80-81. 

10 — 2 


148  Buddhist  Philosophy  [cH. 

objective  aspect  and  an  internal  pratltyasamutpada.  The  external 
pratityasamutpada  (dependent  origination)  is  represented  in  the 
way  in  which  material  things  (e.g.  a  jug)  came  into  being  by  the 
co-operation  of  diverse  elements — the  lump  of  clay,  the  potter, 
the  wheel,  etc.  The  internal  {ddliydtmika)  pratltyasamutpada 
was  represented  by  avidya,  trsna,  karma,  the  skandhas,  and  the 
ayatanas  produced  out  of  them  ^ 

Our  understanding  is  composed  of  two  categories  called  the 
pravicayabuddhi  and  the  vikalpalaksanagrahdbhinivesapratisthd- 
pikdbuddhi.  The  pravicayabuddhi  is  that  which  always  seeks  to 
take  things  in  either  of  the  following  four  ways,  that  they  are 
either  this  or  the  other  {ekatvdnyatvd);  either  both  or  not  both 
{ubhaydnubkayd),  either  are  or  are  not  {astindsti\  either  eternal 
or  non-eternal  ijiitydnityd).  But  in  reality  none  of  these  can  be 
affirmed  of  the  phenomena.  The  second  category  consists  of  that 
habit  of  the  mind  by  virtue  of  which  it  constructs  diversities  and 
arranges  them  (created  in  their  turn  by  its  own  constructive  activity 
— parikalpa)  in  a  logical  order  of  diverse  relations  of  subject  and 
predicate,  causal  and  other  relations.  He  who  knows  the  nature 
of  these  two  categories  of  the  mind  knows  that  there  is  no  external 
world  of  matter  and  that  they  are  all  experienced  only  in  the 
mind.  There  is  no  water,  but  it  is  the  sense  construction  of 
smoothness  (snehd)  that  constructs  the  water  as  an  external  sub- 
stance; it  is  the  sense  construction  of  activity  or  energy  that 
constructs  the  external  substance  of  fire;  it  is  the  sense  construc- 
tion of  movement  that  constructs  the  external  substance  of  air. 
In  this  way  through  the  false  habit  of  taking  the  unreal  as  the 
real  {mithydsatydbhinivesd)  five  skandhas  appear.  If  these  were 
to  appear  all  together,  we  could  not  speak  of  any  kind  of  causal 
relations,  and  if  they  appeared  in  succession  there  could  be 
no  connection  between  them,  as  there  is  nothing  to  bind  them 
together.  In  reality  there  is  nothing  which  is  produced  or 
destroyed,  it  is  only  our  constructive  imagination  that  builds  up 
things  as  perceived  with  all  their  relations,  and  ourselves  as  per- 
ceivers.  It  is  simply  a  convention  {vyavakdrd)  to  speak  of  things 
as  known"''.  Whatever  we  designate  by  speech  is  mere  speech- 
construction  iydgvikalpa)  and  unreal.  In  speech  one  could  not 
speak  of  anything  without  relating  things  in  some  kind  of  causal 

'  Lankavatarasutra,  p.  85. 

'  Lankavatarasutra,  p.  87,  compare  the  term  "  vyavaharika "  as  used  of  the  pheno- 
menal and  the  conventional  world  in  almost  the  same  sense  by  ^ahkara. 


v]  Voidness  of  all  phenomena  149 

relation,  but  none  of  these  characters  may  be  said  to  be  true; 
the  real  truth  {paramdrthd)  can  never  be  referred  to  by  such 
speech-construction. 

The  nothingness  {sunyata)  of  things  may  be  viewed  from 
seven  aspects — (i)  that  they  are  always  interdependent,  and  hence 
have  no  special  characteristics  by  themselves,  and  as  they  cannot 
be  determined  in  themselves  they  cannot  be  determined  in  terms 
of  others,  for,  their  own  nature  being  undetermined,  a  reference 
to  an  "  other  "  is  also  undetermined,  and  hence  they  are  all  in- 
definable {laksanasunyata) ;  (2)  that  they  have  no  positive  essence 
(bhdvasvabhdvasunyata),  since  they  spring  up  from  a  natural  non- 
existence {svabhdvdbhdvotpatti);  (3)  that  they  are  of  an  unknown 
type  of  non-existence  iapracaritasunyatd),  since  all  the  skandhas 
vanish  in  the  nirvana ;  (4)  that  they  appear  phenomenally  as  con- 
nected though  non-existent  {pracaritasunyatd),  for  their  skandhas 
have  no  reality  in  themselves  nor  are  they  related  to  others,  but 
yet  they  appear  to  be  somehow  causally  connected ;  (5)  that  none 
of  the  things  can  be  described  as  having  any  definite  nature, 
they  are  all  undemonstrable  by  language  {nirabhilapyasi'myatd)  ; 
(6)  that  there  cannot  be  any  knowledge  about  them  except  that 
which  is  brought  about  by  the  long-standing  defects  of  desires 
which  pollute  all  our  vision ;  (7)  that  things  are  also  non-existent 
in  the  sense  that  we  affirm  them  to  be  in  a  particular  place  and 
time  in  which  they  are  not  {itaretarasunyatd). 

There  is  thus  only  non-existence,  which  again  is  neither  eternal 
nor  destructible,  and  the  world  is  but  a  dream  and  a  maya  ;  the 
two  kinds  of  negation  {nirodhd)  are  akasa  (space)  and  nirvana ; 
things  which  are  neither  existent  nor  non-existent  are  only 
imagined  to  be  existent  by  fools. 

This  view  apparently  comes  into  conflict  with  the  doctrine  of 
this  school,  that  the  reality  is  called  the  tathagatagarbha  (the 
womb  of  all  that  is  merged  in  thatness)  and  all  the  phenomenal 
appearances  of  the  clusters  {skandhas),  elements  {dhdtus),  and 
fields  of  sense  operation  {dyatajtas)  only  serve  to  veil  it  with 
impurities,  and  this  would  bring  it  nearer  to  the  assumption  of  a 
universal  soul  as  the  reality.  But  the  Lahkdvatdra  attempts  to 
explain  away  this  conflict  by  suggesting  that  the  reference  to 
the  tathagatagarbha  as  the  reality  is  only  a  sort  of  false  bait  to 
attract  those  who  are  afraid  of  listening  to  the  nairatmya  (non- 
soul)  doctrine^ 

^  Lahkdvatarasiiira,  p.  80. 


150  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

The  Bodhisattvas  may  attain  their  highest  by  the  fourfold 
knowledge  of  (i)  svacittadrsyabkdvand,  (2)  utpddasthitibhanga- 
vivarjjanatd,  (3)  bdhyabhdvdbhdvopalaksanatd  and  (4)  svapra- 
tydryyajfidtiddhiganidbhinnalaksanatd.  The  first  means  that  all 
things  are  but  creations  of  the  imagination  of  one's  mind.  The 
second  means  that  as  things  have  no  essence  there  is  no  origina- 
tion, existence  or  destruction.  The  third  means  that  one  should 
know  the  distinctive  sense  in  which  all  external  things  are  said 
either  to  be  existent  or  non-existent,  for  their  existence  is  merely 
like  the  mirage  which  is  produced  by  the  beginningless  desire 
{vdsand)  of  creating  and  perceiving  the  manifold.  This  brings  us 
to  the  fourth  one,  which  means  the  right  comprehension  of  the 
nature  of  all  things. 

The  four  dhyanas  spoken  of  in  the  Lankdvatdra  seem  to  be 
different  from  those  which  have  been  described  in  connection  with 
the  Theravada  Buddhism.  These  dhyanas  are  called  (i)  bdlo- 
pacdrika,  (2)  arthapravicaya,  (3)  tathatdlambana  and  (4)  tathd- 
gata.  The  first  one  is  said  to  be  that  practised  by  the  sravakas 
and  the  pratyekabuddhas.  It  consists  in  concentrating  upon  the 
doctrine  that  there  is  no  soul  {pudgalanairdhnyd),  and  that  every- 
thing is  transitory,  miserable  and  impure.  When  considering  all 
things  in  this  way  from  beginning  to  end  the  sage  advances  on 
till  all  conceptual  knowing  ceases  {dsamjndnirodhdt);  we  have 
what  is  called  the  valopacarika  dhyana  (the  meditation  for  be- 
ginners). 

The  second  is  the  advanced  state  where  not  only  there  is 
full  consciousness  that  there  is  no  self,  but  there  is  also  the  com- 
prehension that  neither  these  nor  the  doctrines  of  other  heretics 
may  be  said  to  exist,  and  that  there  is  none  of  the  dharmas  that 
appears.  This  is  called  the  arthapravicayadhydna,  for  the  sage 
concentrates  here  on  the  subject  of  thoroughly  seeking  out  {pra- 
vicaya)  the  nature  of  all  things  (artha). 

The  third  dhyana,  that  in  which  the  mind  realizes  that  the 
thought  that  there  is  no  self  nor  that  there  are  the  appearances, 
is  itself  the  result  of  imagination  and  thus  lapses  into  the  thatness 
{tathatd).  This  dhyana  is  called  tathatdlambana,  because  it  has  for 
its  object  tathata  or  thatness. 

The  last  or  the  fourth  dhyana  is  that  in  which  the  lapse  of 
the  mind  into  the  state  of  thatness  is  such  that  the  nothingness 
and  incomprehensibility  of  all  phenomena  is  perfectly  realized; 


v]  Ultimate  goal  151 

and  nirvana  is  that  in  which  all  root  desires  iydsana)  manifesting 
themselves  in  knowledge  are  destroyed  and  the  mind  with  know- 
ledge and  perceptions, making  false  creations,  ceases  to  work.  This 
cannot  be  called  death,  for  it  will  not  have  any  rebirth  and  it  can- 
not be  called  destruction,  for  only  compounded  things  {samskrtd) 
suffer  destruction,  so  that  it  is  different  from  either  death  or 
destruction.  This  nirvana  is  different  from  that  of  the  Sravakas 
and  the  pratyekabuddhas  for  they  are  satisfied  to  call  that  state 
nirvana,  in  which  by  the  knowledge  of  the  general  characteristics 
of  all  things  (transitoriness  and  misery)  they  are  not  attached  to 
things  and  cease  to  make  erroneous  judgments^ 

Thus  we  see  that  there  is  no  cause  (in  the  sense  of  ground) 
of  all  these  phenomena  as  other  heretics  maintain.  When  it  is 
said  that  the  world  is  maya  or  illusion,  what  is  meant  to  be 
emphasized  is  this,  that  there  is  no  cause,  no  ground.  The  pheno- 
mena that  seem  to  originate,  stay,  and  be  destroyed  are  mere 
constructions  of  tainted  imagination,  and  the  tathata  or  thatness 
is  nothing  but  the  turning  away  of  this  constructive  activity  or 
nature  of  the  imagination  (vikalpd)  tainted  with  the  associations 
of  beginningless  root  desires  {vasandy.  The  tathata  has  no 
separate  reality  from  illusion,  but  it  is  illusion  itself  when  the 
course  of  the  construction  of  illusion  has  ceased.  It  is  therefore 
also  spoken  of  as  that  which  is  cut  off  or  detached  from  the  mind 
{cittavimuktd),  for  here  there  is  no  construction  of  imagination 
{sarvakalpmidvirahitamy. 

Sautrantika  Theory  of  Perception. 

Dharmottara  (847  A.D.),  a  commentator  of  Dharmakirtti's* 
(about  635  A.D.)  Nydyabindu,  a  Sautrantika  logical  and  episte- 
mological  work,  describes  right  knowledge  {samyagjndna)  as  an 
invariable  antecedent  to  the  accomplishment  of  all  that  a  man 

1  Lankdvatarasutra,  p.  loo.  ^  Ibid.  p.  109. 

"^  This  account  of  the  Vijnanavada  school  is  collected  mainly  from  Lankdvatara- 
sutra,  as  no  other  authentic  work  of  the  Vijiianavada  school  is  available.  Hindu 
accounts  and  criticisms  of  this  school  may  be  had  in  such  books  as  Kumarila's  Sloka 
varttika  or  sankara's  bhasya,  n.  ii,  etc.  Asanga's  Mahdydnasutrdlatnkdra  deals  more 
with  the  duties  concerning  the  career  of  a  saint  {Bodhisattva)  than  with  the  metaphysics 
of  the  system. 

*  Dharmakirtti  calls  himself  an  adherent  of  Vijnanavada  in  his  Santdndntara- 
siddhi,  a  treatise  on  solipsism,  but  his  Nydyabindu  seems  rightly  to  have  been  considered 
by  the  author  oi  Nydyabitidutikdtipfani  (p.  19)  as  being  written  from  the  Sautrantika 
point  of  view. 


152  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

desires  to  have  {sainyagjndnapurvikd  sarvapuriisdrthasiddhiy. 
When  on  proceeding,  in  accordance  with  the  presentation  of  any 
knowledge,  we  get  a  thing  as  presented  by  it  we  call  it  right 
knowledge.  Right  knowledge  is  thus  the  knowledge  by  which  one 
can  practically  acquire  the  thing  he  wants  to  acquire  {arthddhi- 
gati).  The  process  of  knowledge,  therefore,  starts  with  the  per- 
ceptual presentation  and  ends  with  the  attainment  of  the  thing 
represented  by  it  and  the  fulfilment  of  the  practical  need  by  it 
{arthddhigaindt  samdptah  pramdnavydpdrali).  Thus  there  are 
three  moments  in  the  perceptual  acquirement  of  knowledge : 
(i)  the  presentation,  (2)  our  prompting  in  accordance  with  it, 
and  (3)  the  final  realization  of  the  object  in  accordance  with 
our  endeavour  following  the  direction  of  knowledge.  Inference 
is  also  to  be  called  right  knowledge,  as  it  also  serves  our  practical 
need  by  representing  the  presence  of  objects  in  certain  connec- 
tions and  helping  us  to  realize  them.  In  perception  this  presen- 
tation is  direct,  while  in  inference  this  is  brought  about  indirectly 
through  the  linga  (reason).  Knowledge  is  sought  by  men  for  the 
realization  of  their  ends,  and  the  subject  of  knowledge  is  dis- 
cussed in  philosophical  works  only  because  knowledge  is  sought 
by  men.  Any  knowledge,  therefore,  which  will  not  lead  us  to 
the  realization  of  the  object  represented  by  it  could  not  be  called 
right  knowledge.  All  illusory  perceptions,  therefore,  such  as  the 
perception  of  a  white  conch-shell  as  yellow  or  dream  perceptions, 
are  not  right  knowledge,  since  they  do  not  lead  to  the  realization 
of  such  objects  as  are  presented  by  them.  It  is  true  no  doubt 
that  since  all  objects  are  momentary,  the  object  which  was  per- 
ceived at  the  moment  of  perception  was  not  the  same  as  that 
which  was  realized  at  a  later  moment.  But  the  series  of  existents 
which  started  with  the  first  perception  of  a  blue  object  finds  itself 
realized  by  the  realization  of  other  existents  of  the  same  series 
{nilddaa  ya  eva  santdnah  paricchinno  nllajiidnena  sa  eva  tena 
prdpitah  tena  nllajhdnavi  pramdnamy. 

When  it  is  said  that  right  knowledge  is  an  invariable  ante- 
cedent of  the  realization  of  any  desirable  thing  or  the  retarding 
of  any  undesirable  thing,  it  must  be  noted  that  it  is  not  meant 

^  Brief  extracts  from  the  opinions  of  two  other  commentators  of  Nydyabindu, 
Vinltadeva  and  Santabhadra  (seventh  century),  are  found  in  Nyayabindutikatippani, 
a  commentary  of  Nydyabiiidiitika  of  Dharmmottara,  but  their  texts  are  not  available 
to  us. 

''■  Nydyabindutlkatippani,  p.  n. 


v]  Theory  of  Perception  153 

that  right  knowledge  is  directly  the  cause  of  it ;  for,  with  the  rise 
of  any  right  perception,  there Js^^ajnemory  of  past^^exgenences, 
desire  is  aroused,  through  desire  an  endeavour  in  accordance  with 
it  is  launched,  and  as  a  result  of  that  there  is  realization  of  the 
object  of  desire.  Thus,  looked  at  from  this  point  of  view,  right 
knowledge  is  not  directly  the  cause  of  the  realization  of  the  object. 
Right  knowledge  of  course  directly  indicates  the  presentation,  the 
object  of  desire,  but  so  far  as  the  object  is  a  mere  presentation  it 
is  not  a  subject  of  enquiry.  It  becomes  a  subject  of  enquiry  only  in 
connection  with  our  achieving  the  object  presented  by  perception. 
Perception  {pratyaksa)  has  been  defined  by  Dharmaklrtti  as 
a  presentation,  which  is  generated  by  the  objects  alone,  unasso- 
ciated  by  any  names  or  relations  (kalpana)  and  which  is  not 
erroneous  {kalpaiidpodhamabJirdntamy.  This  definition  does  not 
indeed  represent  the  actual  nature  {svarnpa)  of  perception,  but  only 
shows  the  condition  which  must  be  fulfilled  in  order  that  anything 
may  be  valid  perception.  What  is  meant  by  saying  that  a  per- 
ception is  not  erroneous  is  simply  this,  that  it  will  be  such  that 
\.{  one  engages  himself  in  an  endeavour  in  accordance  with  it, 
he  will  not  be  baffled  in  the  object  which  was  presented  to  him 
by  his  perception  {tasmddgrdhye  arthe  vasturupe  yadaviparyastam 
tadabhrdntamiha  veditavyam).  It  is  said  that  a  right  perception 
could  not  be  associated  with  names  {kalpand  or  abhildpd).  This 
qualification  is  added  only  with  a  view  of  leaving  out  all  that  is  not 
directly  generated  by  the  object.  A  name  is  given  to  a  thing 
only  when  it  is  associated  in  the  mind,  through  memory,  as  being 
the  same  as  perceived  before.  This  cannot,  therefore,  be  regarded 
as  being  produced  by  the  object  of  perception.  The  senses  present 
the  objects  by  coming  in  contact  with  them,  and  the  objects  also 
must  of  necessity  allow  themselves  to  be  presented  as  they  are 
when  they  are  in  contact  with  the  proper  senses.  But  the  work 
of  recognition  or  giving  names  is  not  what  is  directly  produced 
by  the  objects  themselves,  for  this  involves  the  unification  of 
previous  experiences,  and  this  is  certainly  not  what  is  presented 

^  The  definition  first  given  in  the  Prantdnasamuccaya  (not  available  in  Sanskrit)  of 
Dinnaga  (500  A. D.)  was  '''■  Kalpanapodham."  According  to  Dharmaklrtti  it  is  the  in- 
determinate knowledge  {nirvikalpa  jndna)  consisting  only  of  the  copy  of  the  object 
presented  to  the  senses  that  constitutes  the  valid  element  presented  to  perception. 
The  determinate  knowledge  {savikalpa  Jndna),  as  formed  by  the  conceptual  activity  of 
the  mind  identifying  the  object  with  what  has  been  experienced  before,  cannot  be 
regarded  as  truly  representing  what  is  really  presented  to  the  senses. 


154  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

to  the  sense  {purvadrstdparadrstahcdrthamekikurvadvijndnam.- 
asarmihitavisayani  purvadrstasydsawiihitatvdf).  In  all  illusory 
perceptions  it  is  the  sense  which  is  affected  either  by  extraneous 
or  by  inherent  physiological  causes.  If  the  senses  are  not  per- 
verted they  are  bound  to  present  the  object  correctly.  Perception 
thus  means  the  correct  presentation  through  the  senses  of  an 
object  in  its  own  uniqueness  as  containing  only  those  features 
which  are  its  and  its  alone  {svalaksajiam).  The  validity  of  know- 
ledge consists  in  the  sameness  that  it  has  with  the  objects  presented 
by  it  {arthena  saha  yatsdrupyam  sddrsyamasya  jndnasya  tatpra- 
indnmnihd).  But  the  objection  here  is  that  if  our  percept  is  only 
similar  to  the  external  object  then  this  similarity  is  a  thing  which 
is  different  from  the  presentation,  and  thus  perception  becomes 
invalid.  But  the  similarity  is  not  different  from  the  percept  which 
appears  as  being  similar  to  the  object.  It  is  by  virtue  of  their 
sameness  that  we  refer  to  the  object  by  the  percept  {taditi  sdrupyam 
tasya  vasdt)  and  our  perception  of  the  object  becomes  possible. 
It  is  because  we  have  an  awareness  of  blueness  that  we  speak  of 
having  perceived  a  blue  object.  The  relation,  however,  between 
the  notion  of  similarity  of  the  perception  with  the  blue  object  and 
the  indefinite  awareness  of  blue  in  perception  is  not  one  of 
causation  but  of  a  determinant  and  a  determinate  {yyavasthdpya- 
vyavasthdpakabhdvend).  Thus  it  is  the  same  cognition  which  in 
one  form  stands  as  signifying  the  similarity  with  the  object  of 
perception  and  is  in  another  indefinite  form  the  awareness  as  the 
percept  {lata  ekasya  vastunah  kihcidrupani  prmndnatn  kificitpra- 
fndnaphalain  na  virudhyate).  It  is  on  account  of  this  similarity 
with  the  object  that  a  cognition  can  be  a  determinant  of  the 
definite  awareness  {yyavasthdpanaheturhi  sdrupyani),  so  that  by 
the  determinate  we  know  the  determinant  and  thus  by  the 
similarity  of  the  sense-datum  with  the  object  {pramdnd)  we  come 
to  think  that  our  awareness  has  this  particular  form  as  "blue" 
{pramdnaphald).  If  this  sameness  between  the  knowledge  and  its 
object  was  not  felt  we  could  not  have  spoken  of  the  object  from 
the  awareness  {sdrnpyamanubhilta7)t  vyavasthdpanahetuli).  The 
object  generates  an  awareness  similar  to  itself,  and  it  is  this 
correspondence  that  can  lead  us  to  the  realization  of  the  object 
so  presented  by  right  knowledge  ^ 

^  See  also  pp.  340  and  409.  It  is  unfortunate  that,  excepting  the  Nyayabindu, 
Nyayabindutlkd,  Nyayabindittikiitippani  {'^\.  Petersburg,  1909),  no  other  works  dealing 
with  this  interesting  doctrine  of  perception  are  available  to  us.  Nyayabindti  is  probably 


Inference  155 


Sautrantika  theory  of  Inference^ 

According  to  the  Sautrantika  doctrine  of  Buddhism  as  de- 
scribed by  Dharmaklrtti  and  Dharmmottara  which  is  probably  the 
only  account  of  systematic  Buddhist  logic  that  is  now  available  to 
us  in  Sanskrit,  inference  {aminidjia)  is  divided  into  two  classes, 
called  svarthanumana  (inferential  knowledge  attained  by  a  person 
arguing  in  his  own  mind  or  judgments),  and  pararthanumana  (in- 
ference through  the  help  of  articulated  propositions  for  convincing 
others  in  a  debate).  The  validity  of  inference  depended,  like  the 
validity  of  perception,  on  copying  the  actually  existing  facts  of 
the  external  world.  Inference  copied  external  realities  as  much 
as  perception  did;  just  as  the  validity  of  the  immediate  perception 
of  blue  depends  upon  its  similarity  to  the  external  blue  thing 
perceived,  so  the  validity  of  the  inference  of  a  blue  thing  also, 
so  far  as  it  is  knowledge,  depends  upon  its  resemblance  to  the 
external  fact  thus  inferred  {sdrupyavasdddhi  tannilapratltirupam 
sidhyati). 

The  reason  by  which  an  inference  is  made  should  be  such 
that  it  may  be  present  only  in  those  cases  where  the  thing  to 
be  inferred  exists,  and  absent  in  every  case  where  it  does  not 
exist.  It  is  only  when  the  reason  is  tested  by  both  these  joint 
conditions  that  an  unfailing  connection  {pratibandha)  between 
the  reason  and  the  thing  to  be  inferred  can  be  established.  It  is 
not  enough  that  the  reason  should  be  present  in  all  cases  where 
the  thing  to  be  inferred  exists  and  absent  where  it  does  not 
exist,  but  it  is  necessary  that  it  should  be  present  only  in  the 
above  case.  This  law  {niyanid)  is  essential  for  establishing 
the  unfailing  condition  necessary  for  inference^.  This  unfailing 
natural  connection  {svabJidvapratibandhd)  is  found  in  two  types 

one  of  the  earliest  works  in  which  we  hear  of  the  doctrine  of  arthakriyakaritva  (practical 
fulfilment  of  our  desire  as  a  criterion  of  right  knowledge).  Later  on  it  was  regarded 
as  a  criterion  of  existence,  as  Ratnakirtti's  works  and  the  profuse  references  by  Hindu 
writers  to  the  Buddhistic  doctrines  prove.  The  word  arthakriyd  is  found  in  Candra- 
kirtti's  commentary  on  Nagarjunaand  also  in  such  early  works  as  Lalitavistara  (pointed 
out  to. me  by  Dr  E.  J-  Thomas  of  the  Cambridge  University  Library)  but  the  word 
has  no  philosophical  significance  there. 

^  As  the  Prajitanasamuccaya  of  Dihnaga  is  not  available  in  Sanskrit,  we  can  hardly 
know  anything  of  developed  Buddhist  logic  except  what  can  be  got  from  the  Nyaya- 
bindutikd  of  Dharmmottara. 

'  tastnat  niyamavatorevanvayavyatirekayoh  prayogah  karttavyah  yena  pratibandho 
gamyeta  sadkaiiyasa  sadhyena.    Nydyabindutlka,  p.  24. 


156  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

of  cases.  The  first  is  that  where  the  nature  of  the  reason  is  con- 
tained in  the  thing  to  be  inferred  as  a  part  of  its  nature,  i.e.  where 
the  reason  stands  for  a  species  of  which  the  thing  to  be  inferred 
is  a  genus;  thus  a  stupid  person  living  in  a  place  full  of  tall  pines 
may  come  to  think  that  pines  are  called  trees  because  they  are 
tall  and  it  may  be  useful  to  point  out  to  him  that  even  a  small 
pine  plant  is  a  tree  because  it  is  pine;  the  quality  of  pineness 
forms  a  part  of  the  essence  of  treeness,  for  the  former  being 
a  species  is  contained  in  the  latter  as  a  genus;  the  nature  of  the 
species  being  identical  with  the  nature  of  the  genus,  one  could 
infer  the  latter  from  the  former  but  not  vice  versa;  this  is  called 
the  unfailing  natural  connection  of  identity  of  nature  {tdddtmyd). 
The  second  is  that  where  the  cause  is  inferred  from  the  effect 
which  stands  as  the  reason  of  the  former.  Thus  from  the  smoke 
the  fire  which  has  produced  it  may  be  inferred.  The  ground  of 
these  inferences  is  that  reason  is  naturally  indissolubly  connected 
with  the  thing  to  be  inferred,  and  unless  this  is  the  case,  no 
inference  is  warrantable. 

This  natural  indissoluble  connection  {svabhdvapratibandhd), 
be  it  of  the  nature  of  identity  of  essence  of  the  species  in  the 
genus  or  inseparable  connection  of  the  effect  with  the  cause,  is 
the  ground  of  all  inference^  The  svabhavapratibandha  deter- 
mines the  inseparability  of  connection  {avinabhavatiiyamd)  and 
the  inference  is  made  not  through  a  series  of  premisses  but 
directly  by  the  lihga  (reason)  which  has  the  inseparable  con- 
nection I 

The  second  type  of  inference  known  as  pararthanumana 
agrees  with  svarthanumana  in  all  essential  characteristics;  the 
main  difference  between  the  two  is  this,  that  in  the  case  of 
pararthanumana,  the  inferential  process  has  to  be  put  verbally  in 
premisses. 

Pandit  Ratnakarasanti,  probably  of  the  ninth  or  the  tenth  cen- 
tury A.D.,  wrote  a  paper  named  Antarvydptisamarthana  in  which 

^  na  hi yo  yatra  svahhdvena  na  pratibaddhah  sa  tarn  apratibaddkavisayamavcdya- 
meva  na  vyahhicaratlti  ndsti  tayoravyabhicaraniyamah.    Nyayabhidutika,  p.  29. 

^  The  inseparable  connection  determining  inference  is  only  possible  when  the 
linga  satisfies  the  three  following  conditions,  viz.  (i)  paksasattva  (existence  of  the 
liriga  in  the  paksa — the  thing  about  which  something  is  inferred) ;  (2)  sapaksasattva 
(existence  of  the  linga  in  those  cases  where  the  sadhya  or  probandum  existed),  and 
(3)  vipaksasattva  (its  non-existence  in  all  those  places  where  the  sadhya  did  not  exist). 
The  Buddhists  admitted  three  propositions  in  a  syllogism,  e.g.  The  hill  has  fire,  because 
it  has  smoke,  like  a  kitchen  but  unlike  a  lake. 


v]  Inference  157 

he  tried  to  show  that  the  concomitance  is  not  between  those 
cases  which  possess  the  hriga  or  reason  with  the  cases  which 
possess  the  sadhya  (probandum)  but  between  that  which  has  the 
characteristics  of  the  Hiiga  with  that  which  has  the  characteristics 
of  the  sadhya  (probandum);  or  in  other  words  the  concomitance 
is  not  between  the  places  containing  the  smoke  such  as  kitchen, 
etc.,  and  the  places  containing  fire  but  between  that  which  has  the 
characteristic  of  the  liriga,  viz.  the  smoke,  and  that  which  has  the 
characteristic  of  the  sadhya,  viz.  the  fire.  This  view  of  the  nature 
of  concomitance  is  known  as  inner  concomitance  {antarvydpti), 
whereas  the  former,  viz.  the  concomitance  between  the  thing 
possessing  liriga  and  that  possessing  sadhya,  is  known  as  outer 
concomitance  {bahirvyapti)  and  generally  accepted  by  the  Nyaya 
school  of  thought.  This  antarvyapti  doctrine  of  concomitance  is 
indeed  a  later  Buddhist  doctrine. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  remark  that  evidences  of 
some  form  of  Buddhist  logic  probably  go  back  at  least  as  early 
as  the  KathdvattJm  (200  B.C.).  Thus  Aung  on  the  evidence  of 
the  Yamaka  points  out  that  Buddhist  logic  at  the  time  of  Asoka 
"was  conversant  with  the  distribution  of  terms"  and  the  process 
of  conversion.  He  further  points  out  that  the  logical  premisses 
such  as  the  udaharana  (  Yo  yo  aggimd  so  so  dhianavd — whatever  is 
fiery  is  smoky),  the  upanayana  {ayain  pabbato  dhumavd — this 
hill  is  smoky)  and  the  niggama  {tasmddayam  aggimd — therefore 
that  is  fiery)  were  also  known.  (Aung  further  sums  up  the 
method  of  the  arguments  which  are  found  in  the  Kathdvatthu  as 
follows : 

"Adherent.    Is  A  B?  {thdpand). 
Opponent.   Yes. 
Adherent.    Is  CD}  {pdpand). 
Opponent.    No. 
Adherent.    But  if  ^  be  ^  then  (you  should  have  said)  C  is  D. 

That  B  can  be  affirmed  of  A  but  D  oi  C  is  false. 

Hence  your  first  answer  is  refuted.") 

The  antecedent  of  the  hypothetical  major  premiss  is  termed 
thapana,  because  the  opponent's  position,  A  is  B,  is  conditionally 
established  for  the  purpose  of  refutation. 

The  consequent  of  the  hypothetical  major  premiss  is  termed 
papana  because  it  is  got  from  the  antecedent.    And  the  con- 


158  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

elusion  is  termed  ropana  because  the  regulation  is  placed  on  the 
opponent.    Next: 

"If  Z>  be  derived  of  C. 

Then  B  should  have  been  derived  of  A. 

But  you  affirmed  B  of  A. 

(therefore)    That  B  can  be  affirmed  of  A  but  not  o(  D  or  C  is 
wrong." 

This  is  the  patiloma,  inverse  or  indirect  method,  as  contrasted 
with  the  former  or  direct  method,  anuloma.  In  both  methods  the 
consequent  is  derived.  But  if  we  reverse  the  hypothetical  major 
in  the  latter  method  we  get 

UAisBCisD. 
But  A  is  B. 
Therefore  C  is  D. 

By  this  indirect  method  the  opponent's  second   answer  is  re- 
established \" 

The  Doctrine  of  Momentariness. 

Ratnakirtti  (950  A.D.)  sought  to  prove  the  momentariness  of 
all  existence  (sattva),  first,  by  the  concomitance  discovered  by  the 
method  of  agreement  in  presence  {anvayavydpti),  and  then  by  the 
method  of  difference  by  proving  that  the  production  of  effects 
could  not  be  justified  on  the  assumption  of  things  being  per- 
manent and  hence  accepting  the  doctrine  of  momentariness 
as  the  only  alternative.  Existence  is  defined  as  the  capacity  of 
producing  anything  {arthakriydkdritvd).  The  form  of  the  first 
type  of  argument  by  anvayavyapti  may  be  given  thus:  "What- 
ever exists  is  momentary,  by  virtue  of  its  existence,  as  for  example 
the  jug;  all  things  about  the  momentariness  of  which  we  are  dis- 
cussing are  existents  and  are  therefore  momentary."  It  cannot 
be  said  that  the  jug  which  has  been  chosen  as  an  example  of  an 
existent  is  not  momentary;  for  the  jug  is  producing  certain 
effects  at  the  present  moment;  and  it  cannot  be  held  that  these 
are  all  identical  in  the  past  and  the  future  or  that  it  is  producing 
no  effect  at  all  in  the  past  and  future,  for  the  first  is  impossible, 
for  those  which  are  done  now  could  not  be  done  again  in  the 
future;   the  second  is  impossible,  for  if  it  has  any  capacity  to 

*  See  introduction  to  the  translation  of  Kathavatthu  {Points  of  Controversy)  by 
Mrs  Rhys  Davids. 


v]  Momentariness  159 

produce  effects  it  must  not  cease  doing  so,  as  in  that  case  one 
might  as  well  expect  that  there  should  not  be  any  effect  even  at 
the  present  moment.  Whatever  has  the  capacity  of  producing 
anything  at  any  time  must  of  necessity  do  it.  So  if  it  does  pro- 
duce at  one  moment  and  does  not  produce  at  another,  this 
contradiction  will  prove  the  supposition  that  the  things  were 
different  at  the  different  moments.  If  it  is  held  that  the  nature 
of  production  varies  at  different  moments,  then  also  the  thing  at 
those  two  moments  must  be  different,  for  a  thing  could  not  have 
in  it  two  contradictory  capacities. 

Since  the  jug  does  not  produce  at  the  present  moment  the 
work  of  the  past  and  the  future  moments,  it  cannot  evidently  do 
so,  and  hence  is  not  identical  with  the  jug  in  the  past  and  in  the 
future,  for  the  fact  that  the  jug  has  the  capacity  and  has  not  the 
capacity  as  well,  proves  that  it  is  not  the  same  jug  at  the  two 
moments  {saktdsaktasvabhdvatayd  pratiksanam  bhedak).  The 
capacity  of  producing  effects  {arthakriydsakti),  which  is  but  the 
other  name  of  existence,  is  universally  concomitant  with  momen- 
tariness iksanikatvavydpta). 

The  Nyaya  school  of  philosophy  objects  to  this  view  and  says 
that  the  capacity  of  anything  cannot  be  known  until  the  effect 
produced  is  known,  and  if  capacity  to  produce  effects  be  regarded 
as  existence  or  being,  then  the  being  or  existence  of  the  effect 
cannot  be  known,  until  that  has  produced  another  effect  and 
that  another  ad  infinitum.  Since  there  can  be  no  being  that  has 
not  capacity  of  producing  effects,  and  as  this  capacity  can 
demonstrate  itself  only  in  an  infinite  chain,  it  will  be  impossible 
to  know  any  being  or  to  affirm  the  capacity  of  producing  effects 
as  the  definition  of  existence.  Moreover  if  all  things  were 
momentary  there  would  be  no  permanent  perceiver  to  observe 
the  change,  and  there  being  nothing  fixed  there  could  hardly  be 
any  means  even  of  taking  to  any  kind  of  inference.  To  this 
Ratnakirtti  replies  that  capacity  {sdmarthyd)  cannot  be  denied, 
for  it  is  demonstrated  even  in  making  the  denial.  The  observation 
of  any  concomitance  in  agreement  in  presence,  or  agreement  in 
absence,  does  not  require  any  permanent  observer,  for  under 
certain  conditions  of  agreement  there  is  the  knowledge  of  the 
concomitance  of  agreement  in  presence,  and  in  other  conditions 
there  is  the  knowledge  of  the  concomitance  in  absence.  This 
knowledge  of  concomitance  atthe  succeeding  momentholds  within 


i6o  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

itself  the  experience  of  the  conditions  of  the  preceding  moment, 
and  this  alone  is  what  we  find  and  not  any  permanent  observer. 

The  Buddhist  definition  of  being  or  existence  {sattva)  is 
indeed  capacity,  and  we  arrived  at  this  when  it  was  observed  that 
in  all  proved  cases  capacity  was  all  that  could  be  defined  of 
being  I — seed  was  but  the  capacity  of  producing  shoots,  and 
even  if  this  capacity  should  require  further  capacity  to  produce 
effects,  the  fact  which  has  been  perceived  still  remains,  viz.  that 
the  existence  of  seeds  is  nothing  but  the  capacity  of  producing 
the  shoots  and  thus  there  is  no  vicious  infinite^  Though  things  are 
momentary,  yet  we  could  have  concomitance  between  things  only 
so  long  as  their  apparent  forms  are  not  different  {atadrUpa- 
pardvrttayoreva  sddhyasddhanayoh  pratyaksena  vydptigrahandt). 
The  vyapti  or  concomitance  of  any  two  things  (e.g.  the  fire  and 
the  smoke)  is  based  on  extreme  similarity  and  not  on  identity. 

Another  objection  raised  against  the  doctrine  of  momentariness 
is  this,  that  a  cause  (e.g.  seed)  must  wait  for  a  number  of  other 
collocations  of  earth,  water,  etc.,  before  it  can  produce  the  effect 
(e.g.  the  shoots)  and  hence  the  doctrine  must  fail.  To  this  Ratna- 
klrtti  replies  that  the  seed  does  not  exist  before  and  produce  the 
effect  when  joined  by  other  collocations,  but  such  is  the  special 
effectiveness  of  a  particular  seed-moment,  that  it  produces  both 
the  collocations  or  conditions  as  well  as  the  effect,  the  shoot. 
How  a  special  seed-moment  became  endowed  with  such  special 
effectiveness  is  to  be  sought  in  other  causal  moments  which 
preceded  it,  and  on  which  it  was  dependent,  Ratnakirtti  wishes  to 
draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  as  one  perceptual  moment  reveals 
a  number  of  objects,  so  one  causal  moment  may  produce  a  number 
of  effects.  Thus  he  says  that  the  inference  that  whatever  has 
being  is  momentary  is  valid  and  free  from  any  fallacy. 

It  is  not  important  to  enlarge  upon  the  second  part  of 
Ratnaklrtti's  arguments  in  which  he  tries  to  show  that  the  pro- 
duction of  effects  could  not  be  explained  if  we  did  not  suppose 

^  The  distinction  between  vicious  and  harmless  infinites  was  known  to  the  Indians 
at  least  as  early  as  the  sixth  or  the  seventh  century.  Jayanta  quotes  a  passage  which 
differentiates  the  two  clearly  {NyayamatljarT,  p.  22)  : 

"  7nulaksatikar'imdhuranavasthd7n  hi  ditsanam. 
mulasiddhau  tvarucyapi  ndnavaslha  mvdryaie." 
The  infinite  regress  that  has  to  be  gone  through  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  root 
matter  awaiting  to  be  solved  destroys  the  root  and  is  hence  vicious,  whereas  if  the 
root  is  saved  there  is  no  harm  in  a  regress  though  one  may  not  be  willing  to  have  it. 


v]  Monientariness  1 6 1 

all  things  to  be  momentary,  for  this  is  more  an  attempt  to  refute 
the  doctrines  of  Nyaya  than  an  elaboration  of  the  Buddhist 
principles. 

The  doctrine  of  momentariness  ought  to  be  a  direct  corollary 
of  the  Buddhist  metaphysics.  But  it  is  curious  that  though  all 
dharmas  were  regarded  as  changing,  the  fact  that  they  were  all 
strictly  momentary  {ksanika — i.e.  existing  only  for  one  moment) 
was  not  emphasized  in  early  Pali  literature.  Asvaghosa  in  his 
Sraddhotpddasdstra  speaks  of  all  skandhas  as  ksanika  (Suzuki's 
translation,  p.  105).  Buddhaghosa  also  speaks  of  the  meditation 
of  the  khandhas  as  khanika  in  his  Visuddhiniagga.  But  from  the 
seventh  century  A.D.  till  the  tenth  century  this  doctrine  together 
with  the  doctrine  of  arthakriyakaritva  received  great  attention  at 
the  hands  of  the  Sautrantikas  and  the  Vaibhasikas.  All  the 
Nyaya  and  Vedanta  literature  of  this  period  is  full  of  refutations 
and  criticisms  of  these  doctrines.  The  only  Buddhist  account 
available  of  the  doctrine  of  momentariness  is  from  the  pen  of 
Ratnaklrtti.  Some  of  the  general  features  of  his  argument  in 
favour  of  the  view  have  been  given  above.  Elaborate  accounts  of  it 
may  be  found  in  any  of  the  important  Nyaya  works  of  this  period 
such  as  Nyayanianjari,  Tdtparyyatikd  of  Vacaspati  Misra,  etc. 

Buddhism  did  not  at  any  time  believe  anything  to  be  per- 
manent. With  the  development  of  this  doctrine  they  gave  great 
emphasis  to  this  point.  Things  came  to  view  at  one  moment  and 
the  next  moment  they  were  destroyed.  Whatever  is  existent  is 
momentary.  It  is  said  that  our  notion  of  permanence  is  derived 
from  the  notion  of  permanence  of  ourselves,  but  Buddhism  denied 
the  existence  of  any  such  permanent  selves.  What  appears  as 
self  is  but  the  bundle  of  ideas,  emotions,  and  active  tendencies 
manifesting  at  any  particular  moment.  The  next  moment  these 
dissolve,  and  new  bundles  determined  by  the  preceding  ones 
appear  and  so  on.  The  present  thought  is  thus  the  only  thinker. 
Apart  from  the  emotions,  ideas,  and  active  tendencies,  we  cannot 
discover  any  separate  self  or  soul.  It  is  the  combined  product  of 
these  ideas,  emotions,  etc.,  that  yield  the  illusory  appearance  of 
self  at  any  moment.  The  consciousness  of  self  is  the  resultant  pro- 
duct as  it  were  of  the  combination  of  ideas,  emotions,  etc.,  at  any 
particular  moment.  As  these  ideas,  emotions,  etc.,  change  every 
moment  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  permanent  self 

The  fact  that  I   remember   that    I    have   been   existing    for 

D.  II 


1 62  Buddhist  Philosophy  [CH. 

a  long  time  past  does  not  prove  that  a  permanent  self  has  been 
existing  for  such  a  long  period.  When  I  say  this  is  that  book,  I 
perceive  the  book  with  my  eye  at  the  present  moment,  but  that 
"this  book"  is  the  same  as  "that  book"  (i.e.  the  book  arising  in 
memory),  cannot  be  perceived  by  the  senses.  It  is  evident 
that  the  "that  book"  of  memory  refers  to  a  book  seen  in  the 
past,  whereas  "this  book"  refers  to  the  book  which  is  before 
my  eyes.  The  feeling  of  identity  which  is  adduced  to  prove  per- 
manence is  thus  due  to  a  confusion  between  an  object  of  memory 
referring  to  a  past  and  different  object  with  the  object  as  perceived 
at  the  present  moment  by  the  senses  ^  This  is  true  not  only  of 
all  recognition  of  identity  and  permanence  of  external  objects  but 
also  of  the  perception  of  the  identity  of  self,  for  the  perception  of 
self-identity  results  from  the  confusion  of  certain  ideas  or  emotions 
arising  in  memory  with  similar  ideas  of  the  present  moment.  But 
since  memory  points  to  an  object  of  past  perception,  and  the  per- 
ception to  another  object  of  the  present  moment,  identity  cannot 
be  proved  by  a  confusion  of  the  two.  Every  moment  all  objects 
of  the  world  are  suffering  dissolution  and  destruction,  but  yet 
things  appear  to  persist,  and  destruction  cannot  often  be  noticed. 
Our  hair  and  nails  grow  and  are  cut,  but  yet  we  think  that  we 
have  the  same  hair  and  nail  that  we  had  before,  in  place  of  old 
hairs  new  ones  similar  to  them  have  sprung  forth,  and  they  leave 
the  impression  as  if  the  old  ones  were  persisting.  So  it  is  that 
though  things  are  destroyed  every  moment,  others  similar  to 
these  often  rise  into  being  and  are  destroyed  the  next  moment 
and  so  on,  and  these  similar  things  succeeding  in  a  series  produce 
the  impression  that  it  is  one  and  the  same  thing  which  has  been 
persisting  through  all  the  passing  moments^  Just  as  the  flame 
of  a  candle  is  changing  every  moment  and  yet  it  seems  to  us  as 
if  we  have  been  perceiving  the  same  flame  all  the  while,  so 
all  our  bodies,  our  ideas,  emotions,  etc.,  all  external  objects 
around  us  are  being  destroyed  every  moment,  and  new  ones  are 
being  generated  at  every  succeeding  moment,  but  so  long  as  the 
objects  of  the  succeeding  moments  are  similar  to  those  of  the 
preceding  moments,  it  appears  to  us  that  things  have  remained 
the  same  and  no  destruction  has  taken  place. 

^  See  pratyabhijflanirasa  of  the  Buddhists,  Nydyamanjari,  V.S.  Series,  pp.  449,  etc. 
^  See  Tarkarahasyadtpikd  of  Gunaratna,  p.  30,  and  also  NyayamaiijarT,  V.S. 
edition,  p.  450. 


v]  Causal  Efficiency  163 

The  Doctrine  of  Momentariness  and  the  Doctrine 
of  Causal  Efficiency  (Arthakriyakaritva). 

It  appears  that  a  thing  era  phenomenon  may  be  defined  from 
the  Buddhist  point  of  view  as  being  the  combination  of  diverse 
characteristics^  What  we  call  a  thing  is  but  a  conglomeration  of 
diverse  characteristics  which  are  found  to  affect,  determine  or 
influence  other  conglomerations  appearing  as  sentient  or  as 
inanimate  bodies.  So  long  as  the  characteristics  forming  the 
elements  of  any  conglomeration  remain  perfectly  the  same,  the 
conglomeration  may  be  said  to  be  the  same.  As  soon  as  any  of 
these  characteristics  is  supplanted  by  any  other  new  characteristic, 
the  conglomeration  is  to  be  called  a  new  one-.  Existence  or 
being  of  things  means  the  work  that  any  conglomeration  does  or 
the  influence  that  it  exerts  on  other  conglomerations.  This  in 
Sanskrit  is  called  arthakriyakaritva  which  literally  translated 
means — the  power  of  performing  actions  and  purposes  of  some 
kindl  The  criterion  of  existence  or  being  is  the  performance  of 
certain  specific  actions,  or  rather  existence  means  that  a  certain 
effect  has  been  produced  in  some  way  (causal  efficiency).  That 
which  has  produced  such  an  effect  is  then  called  existent  or  sat. 
Any  change  in  the  effect  thus  produced  means  a  corresponding 
change  of  existence.    Now,  that  selfsame  definite  specific  effect 

^  Compare  Milindapaiiha,  ii.  i.  i — The  Chariot  Simile. 

^  Compare  Tarkarahasyadipikd  of  Gunaratna,  A.  S.'s  edition,  pp.  24,  28  and 
Nyayatnaiijart,  V.S.  edition,  pp.  445,  etc.,  and  also  the  paper  on  Ksanabhahga- 
siddhi  by  Ratnaklrtti  in  Six  Buddhist  Nydya  tracts. 

3  This  meaning  of  the  word  "arthakriyakaritva"  is  different  from  the  meaning  of 
the  word  as  we  found  in  the  section  "sautrantika  theory  of  perception."  But  we  find 
the  development  of  this  meaning  both  in  Ratnakirtti  as  well  as  in  Nyaya  writers  who 
referred  to  this  doctrine.  With  Vinitadeva  (seventh  century  A.D.)  the  word  "■arthakriya- 
siddhi'"  meant  the  fulfilment  of  any  need  such  as  the  cooking  of  rice  by  fire  {artha- 
sabdena  prayojanamucyate punisasya  prayojanam  danipdkddi  tasya  siddhih  nispattih — 
the  word  artha  means  need ;  the  need  of  man  such  as  cooking  by  logs,  etc. ;  siddhi  of 
that,  means  accomplishment).  With  Dharmottara  who  flourished  about  a  century  and 
a  half  later  arlhasiddhi  means  action  (anusthiti)  with  reference  to  undesirable  and 
desirable  objects  (heyopddeydrthavisayd).  But  with  Ratnaklrtti  (950  A.D.)  the  word 
arthakriyakaritva  has  an  entirely  different  sense.  It  means  with  him  efficiency  of 
producing  any  action  or  event,  and  as  such  it  is  regarded  as  the  characteristic  definition 
of  existence  {sattva).  Thus  he  says  in  his  Ksanabhahgasiddhi,  pp.  20,  21,  that  though 
in  different  philosophies  there  are  different  definitions  of  existence  or  being,  he  will 
open  his  argument  with  the  universally  accepted  definition  of  existence  as  arthakriya- 
karitva (efficiency  of  causing  any  action  or  event).  Whenever  Hindu  writers  after 
Ratnakirtti  refer  to  the  Buddhist  doctrine  of  arthakriyakaritva  they  usually  refer  to  this 
doctrine  in  Ratnakirtti's  sense. 


1 64  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

which  is  produced  now  was  never  produced  before,  and  cannot 
be  repeated  in  the  future,  for  that  identical  effect  which  is  once 
produced  cannot  be  produced  again.  So  the  effects  produced  in 
us  by  objects  at  different  moments  of  time  may  be  similar  but 
cannot  be  identical.  Each  moment  is  associated  with  a  new  effect 
and  each  new  effect  thus  produced  means  in  each  case  the  coming 
into  being  of  a  correspondingly  new  existence  of  things.  If  things 
were  permanent  there  would  be  no  reason  why  they  should  be 
performing  different  effects  at  different  points  of  time.  Any 
difference  in  the  effect  produced,  whether  due  to  the  thing  itself 
or  its  combination  with  other  accessories,  justifies  us  in  asserting 
that  the  thing  has  changed  and  a  new  one  has  come  in  its  place. 
The  existence  of  a  jug  for  example  is  known  by  the  power  it 
has  of  forcing  itself  upon  our  minds;  if  it  had  no  such  power 
then  we  could  not  have  said  that  it  existed.  We  can  have  no 
notion  of  the  meaning  of  existence  other  than  the  impression 
produced  on  us;  this  impression  is  nothing  else  but  the  power 
exerted  by  things  on  us,  for  there  is  no  reason  why  one  should 
hold  that  beyond  such  powers  as  are  associated  with  the  pro- 
duction of  impressions  or  effects  there  should  be  some  other 
permanent  entity  to  which  the  power  adhered,  and  which  existed 
even  when  the  power  was  not  exerted.  We  perceive  the  power 
of  producing  effects  and  define  each  unit  of  such  power  as 
amounting  to  a  unit  of  existence.  And  as  there  would  be 
different  units  of  power  at  different  moments,  there  should  also 
be  as  many  new  existences,  i.e.  existents  must  be  regarded  as 
momentary,  existing  at  each  moment  that  exerts  a  new  power. 
This  definition  of  existence  naturally  brings  in  the  doctrine  of 
momentariness  shown  by  Ratnaklrtti. 

Some  Ontological  Problems  on  which  the 
Different  Indian  Systems  Diverged. 

We  cannot  close  our  examination  of  Buddhist  philosophy 
without  briefly  referring  to  its  views  on  some  ontological  problems 
which  were  favourite  subjects  of  discussion  in  almost  all  philo- 
sophical circles  of  India.  These  are  in  brief:  (i)  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect,  (2)  the  relation  of  the  whole  iavayavt)  and  the 
part  {avnyavd),  (3)  the  relation  of  generality  {samdnya)  to  the 
specific  individuals,  (4)  the  relation  of  attributes  or  qualities  and 
the  substance  and  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  inherence,  (5)  the 


v]  Ontological  Problems  165 

relation  of  power  {sakti)  to  the  power-possessor  {saktinidn).  Thus 
on  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  Sarikara  held  that  cause  alone 
was  permanent,  real,  and  all  effects  as  such  were  but  impermanent 
illusions  due  to  ignorance,  Sarnkhya  held  that  there  was  no 
difference  between  cause  and  effect,  except  that  the  former  was 
only  the  earlier  stage  which  when  transformed  through  certain 
changes  became  the  effect.  The  history  of  any  causal  activity  is 
the  history  of  the  transformation  of  the  cause  into  the  effects. 
Buddhism  holds  everything  to  be  momentary,  so  neither  cause  nor 
effect  can  abide.  One  is  called  the  effect  because  its  momentary 
existence  has  been  determined  by  the  destruction  of  its  momen- 
tary antecedent  called  the  cause.  There  is  no  permanent  reality 
which  undergoes  the  change,  but  one  change  is  determined  by 
another  and  this  determination  is  nothing  more  than  "  that 
happening,  this  happened."  On  the  relation  of  parts  to  whole. 
Buddhism  does  not  believe  in  the  existence  of  wholes.  According 
to  it,  it  is  the  parts  which  illusorily  appear  as  the  whole,  the 
individual  atoms  rise  into  being  and  die  the  next  moment  and 
thus  there  is  no  such  thing  as  "  wholes"  The  Buddhists  hold  again 
that  there  are  no  universals,  for  it  is  the  individuals  alone  which 
come  and  go.  There  are  my  five  fingers  as  individuals  but  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  fingerness  {angnlitva)  as  the  abstract  universal 
of  the  fingers.  On  the  relation  of  attributes  and  substance  we 
know  that  the  Sautrantika  Buddhists  did  not  believe  in  the  exist- 
ence of  any  substance  apart  from  its  attributes;  what  we  call  a 
substance  is  but  a  unit  capable  of  producing  a  unit  of  sensation. 
In  the  external  world  there  are  as  many  individual  simple  units 
(atoms)  as  there  are  points  of  sensations.  Corresponding  to  each 
unit  of  sensation  there  is  a  separate  simple  unit  in  the  objective 
world.  Our  perception  of  a  thing  is  thus  the  perception  of  the 
assemblage  of  these  sensations.  In  the  objective  world  also  there 
are  no  substances  but  atoms  or  reals,  each  representing  a  unit  of 
sensation,  force  or  attribute,  rising  into  being  and  dying  the  next 
moment.  Buddhism  thus  denies  the  existence  of  any  such  rela- 
tion as  that  of  inherence  {samavdya)  in  which  relation  the  attri- 
butes are  said  to  exist  in  the  substance,  for  since  there  are  no 
separate  substances  there  is  no  necessity  for  admitting  the  relation 
of  inherence.    Following  the  same  logic  Buddhism  also  does  not 

^  See  Avayavinirakarana,  Six  Buddhist  Nydya  tracts,  Bibliotheca  Indica,  Calcutta, 
1910. 


1 66  Buddhist  Philosophy  [ch. 

believe  in  the  existence  of  a  power-possessor  separate  from  the 
power. 

Brief  survey  of  the  evolution  of  Buddhist  Thought. 

In  the  earliest  period  of  Buddhism  more  attention  was  paid 
to  the  four  noble  truths  than  to  systematic  metaphysics.  What 
was  sorrow,  what  was  the  cause  of  sorrow,  what  was  the  cessation 
of  sorrow  and  what  could  lead  to  it  ?  The  doctrine  of  paticcasa- 
muppdda  was  offered  only  to  explain  how  sorrow  came  in  and 
not  with  a  view  to  the  solving  of  a  metaphysical  problem.  The 
discussion  of  ultimate  metaphysical  problems,  such  as  whether 
the  world  was  eternal  or  non-eternal,  or  whether  a  Tathagata 
existed  after  death  or  not,  were  considered  as  heresies  in  early 
Buddhism.  Great  emphasis  was  laid  on  slla,  samadhi  and  panfia 
and  the  doctrine  that  there  was  no  soul.  The  Abhidhammas 
hardly  give  us  any  new  philosophy  which  was  not  contained  in 
the  Suttas.  They  only  elaborated  the  materials  of  the  suttas  with 
enumerations  and  definitions.  With  the  evolution  of  Mahayana 
scriptures  from  some  time  about  200  B.C.  the  doctrine  of  the  non- 
essentialness  and  voidness  of  all  dhammas  began  to  be  preached. 
This  doctrine,  which  was  taken  up  and  elaborated  by  Nagarjuna, 
Aryyadeva,  Kumarajlva  and  Candraklrtti,  is  more  or  less  a  co- 
rollary from  the  older  doctrine  of  Buddhism,  If  one  could  not 
say  whether  the  world  was  eternal  or  non-eternal,  or  whether  a 
Tathagata  existed  or  did  not  exist  after  death,  and  if  there  was 
no  permanent  soul  and  all  the  dhammas  were  changing,  the  only 
legitimate  way  of  thinking  about  all  things  appeared  to  be  to 
think  of  them  as  mere  void  and  non-essential  appearances.  These 
appearances  appear  as  being  mutually  related  but  apart  from 
their  appearance  they  have  no  other  essence,  no  being  or  reality. 
The  Tathata  doctrine  which  was  preached  by  Asvaghosa  oscillated 
between  the  position  of  this  absolute  non-essentialness  of  all 
dhammas  and  the  Brahminic  idea  that  something  existed  as  the 
background  of  all  these  non-essential  dhammas.  This  he  called 
tathata,  but  he  could  not  consistently  say  that  any  such  per- 
manent entity  could  exist.  The  Vijnanavada  doctrine  which  also 
took  its  rise  at  this  time  appears  to  me  to  be  a  mixture  of  the 
^unyavada  doctrine  and  the  Tathata  doctrine;  but  when  carefully 
examined  it  seems  to  be  nothing  but  Sunyavada,  with  an  attempt 
at  explaining  all  the  observed  phenomena.    If  everything  was 


v]  Buddhist  Schools  167 

non-essential  howdid  it  originate?  Vijfianavada  proposes  togivean 
answer.and  says  that  these  phenomena  are  all  but  ideas  of  the  mind 
generated  by  the  beginningless  vasana  (desire)  of  the  mind.  The 
difficulty  which  is  felt  with  regard  to  the  Tathata  doctrine  that 
there  must  be  some  reality  which  is  generating  all  these  ideas 
appearing  as  phenomena,  is  the  same  as  that  in  the  Vijnanavada 
doctrine.  The  Vijiianavadins  could  not  admit  the  existence  of  such 
a  reality,  but  yet  their  doctrines  led  them  to  it.  They  could  not 
properly  solve  the  difficulty,  and  admitted  that  their  doctrine  was 
some  sort  of  a  compromise  with  the  Brahminical  doctrines  of 
heresy,  but  they  said  that  this  was  a  compromise  to  make  the 
doctrine  intelligible  to  the  heretics;  in  truth  however  the  reality 
assumed  in  the  doctrine  was  also  non-essential.  The  Vijfianavada 
literature  that  is  available  to  us  is  very  scanty  and  from  that  we 
are  not  in  a  position  to  judge  what  answers  Vijnanavada  could  give 
on  the  point.  These  three  doctrines  developed  almost  about  the 
same  time  and  the  difficulty  of  conceiving  sunya  (void),  tathata, 
(thatness)  and  the  alayavijfiana  of  Vijnanavada  is  more  or  less 
the  same. 

The  Tathata  doctrine  of  Asvaghosa  practically  ceased  with 
him.  But  the  Sijnyavada  and  the  Vijnanavada  doctrines  which 
originated  probably  about  200  B.C.  continued  to  develop  probably 
till  the  eighth  century  A.D.  Vigorous  disputes  with  Sunyavada 
doctrines  are  rarely  made  in  any  independent  work  of  Hindu 
philosophy,  after  Kumarila  and  Saiikara.  From  the  third  or 
the  fourth  century  A.D.  some  Buddhists  took  to  the  study  of 
systematic  logic  and  began  to  criticize  the  doctrine  of  the  Hindu 
logicians.  Diiinaga  the  Buddhist  logician  (500  A.D.)  probably 
started  these  hostile  criticisms  by  trying  to  refute  the  doctrines 
of  the  great  Hindu  logician  Vatsyayana,  in  his  Pramana- 
samuccaya.  In  association  with  this  logical  activity  we  find  the 
activity  of  two  other  schools  of  Buddhism,  viz.  the  Sarvastivadins 
(known  also  as  Vaibhasikas)  and  the  Sautrantikas.  Both  the 
Vaibhasikas  and  the  Sautrantikas  accepted  the  existence  of  the 
external  world,  and  they  were  generally  in  conflict  with  the 
Hindu  schools  of  thought  Nyaya-Vaisesika  and  Sarnkhya  which 
also  admitted  the  existence  of  the  external  world.  Vasubandhu 
(420-500  A.D.)  was  one  of  the  most  illustrious  names  of  this  school. 
We  have  from  this  time  forth  a  number  of  great  Buddhist 
thinkers  such  as  Yasomitra  (commentator  of  Vasubandhu's  work). 


1 68  BuddJiist  Philosophy  [ch.  v 

Dharmmaklrtti  (writer  of  Nyayabindu  635  A.D.),  Vinltadeva  and 
Santabhadra  (commentators  of  Nyayabindu),  Dharmmottara 
(commentator  of  Nyayabindu  847  A.D.),  Ratnaklrtti  (950  A.D.), 
Pandita  Asoka,  and  Ratnakara  Santi,  some  of  whose  contributious 
have  been  published  in  the  Six  Buddhist  Nydya  Tracts^  pubHshed 
in  Calcutta  in  the  Bibliotheca  Indica  series.  These  Buddhist 
writers  were  mainly  interested  in  discussions  regarding  the  nature 
of  perception,  inference,  the  doctrine  of  momentariness,  and 
the  doctrine  of  causal  efficiency  {arthakriydkdritvd)  as  demon- 
strating the  nature  of  existence.  On  the  negative  side  they  were 
interested  in  denying  the  ontological  theories  of  Nyaya  and 
Sarnkhya  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  class-concepts,  negation, 
relation  of  whole  and  part,  connotation  of  terms,  etc.  These 
problems  hardly  attracted  any  notice  in  the  non-Sautrantika  and 
non-Vaibhasika  schools  of  Buddhism  of  earlier  times.  They  of 
course  agreed  with  the  earlier  Buddhists  in  denying  the  existence 
of  a  permanent  soul,  but  this  they  did  with  the  help  of  their 
doctrine  of  causal  efficiency.  The  points  of  disagreement  between 
Hindu  thought  up  to  Saiikara  (800  A.D.)  and  Buddhist  thought 
till  the  time  of  Saiikara  consisted  mainly  in  the  denial  by  the 
Buddhists  of  a  permanent  soul  and  the  permanent  external  world. 
For  Hindu  thought  was  more  or  less  realistic,  and  even  the 
Vedanta  of  Saiikara  admitted  the  existence  of  the  permanent 
external  world  in  some  sense.  With  Saiikara  the  forms  of  the 
external  world  were  no  doubt  illusory,  but  they  all  had  a  per- 
manent background  in  the  Brahman,  which  was  the  only  reality 
behind  all  mental  and  the  physical  phenomena.  The  Sautrantikas 
admitted  the  existence  of  the  external  world  and  so  their  quarrel 
with  Nyaya  and  Sarnkhya  was  with  regard  to  their  doctrine 
of  momentariness;  their  denial  of  soul  and  their  views  on  the 
different  ontological  problems  were  in  accordance  with  their 
doctrine  of  momentariness.  After  the  twelfth  century  we  do  not 
hear  much  of  any  new  disputes  with  the  Buddhists.  From  this 
time  the  disputes  were  mainly  between  the  different  systems  of 
Hindu  philosophers,  viz.  Nyaya,  the  Vedanta  of  the  school  of 
Sankara  and  the  Theistic  Vedanta  of  Ramanuja,  Madhva,  etc. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  JAINA  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Origin  of  Jainism. 

Notwithstanding  the  radical  differences  in  their  philosophical 
notions  Jainism  and  Buddhism,  which  were  originally  both  orders 
of  monks  outside  the  pale  of  Brahmanism,  present  some  re- 
semblance in  outward  appearance,  and  some  European  scholars 
who  became  acquainted  with  Jainism  through  inadequate  samples 
of  Jaina  literature  easily  persuaded  themselves  that  it  was  an  off- 
shoot of  Buddhism,  and  even  Indians  unacquainted  with  Jaina 
literature  are  often  found  to  commit  the  same  mistake.  But  it 
has  now  been  proved  beyond  doubt  that  this  idea  is  wrong 
and  Jainism  is  at  least  as  old  as  Buddhism.  The  oldest  Buddhist 
works  frequently  mention  the  Jains  as  a  rival  sect,  under  their 
old  name  Nigantha  and  their  leader  Nataputta  Varddhamana 
Mahavira,  the  last  prophet  of  the  Jains.  The  canonical  books  of 
the  Jains  mention  as  contemporaries  of  Mahavira  the  same  kings 
as  reigned  during  Buddha's  career. 

Thus  Mahavira  was  a  contemporary  of  Buddha,  but  unlike 
Buddha  he  was  neither  the  author  of  the  religion  nor  the  founder 
of  the  sect,  but  a  monk  who  having  espoused  the  Jaina  creed 
afterwards  became  the  seer  and  the  last  prophet  (Tlrthaiikara)  of 
Jainism ^  His  predecessor  Parsva,  the  last  Tlrthaiikara  but  one, 
is  said  to  have  died  250  years  before  Mahavira,  while  Parsva's 
predecessor  Aristanemi  is  said  to  have  died  84,000  years  before 
Mahavlra's  Nirvana.  The  story  in  Uttarddhyayanasutra  that  a 
disciple  of  Parsva  met  a  disciple  of  Mahavira  and  brought  about 
the  union  of  the  old  Jainism  and  that  propounded  by  Mahavira 
seems  to  suggest  that  this  Parsva  was  probably  a  historical  person. 

According  to  the  belief  of  the  orthodox  Jains,  the  Jaina  religion 
is  eternal,  and  it  has  been  revealed  again  and  again  in  every  one 
of  the  endless  succeeding  periods  of  the  world  by  innumerable 
Tirtharikaras.  In  the  present  period  the  first  Tlrthaiikara  was 
Rsabha  and  the  last,  the  24th,  was  Vardhamana  Mahavira.    All 

^  See  Jacobi's  article  on  Jainism,  E.  R.  E. 


170  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

Tlrthafikaras  have  reached  moksa  at  their  death,  and  they 
neither  care  for  nor  have  any  influence  on  worldly  affairs,  but  yet 
they  are  regarded  as  "Gods"  by  the  Jains  and  are  worshipped^ 

Two  Sects  of  Jainism^ 
There  are  two  main  sects  of  Jains,  Svetambaras  (wearers  of 
white  cloths)  and  Digambaras  (the  naked).  They  are  generally 
agreed  on  all  the  fundamental  principles  of  Jainism.  The  tenets 
peculiar  to  the  Digambaras  are  firstly  that  perfect  saints  such  as 
the  Tlrthaiikaras  live  without  food,  secondly  that  the  embryo  of 
Mahavira  was  not  removed  from  the  womb  of  Devananda  to  that 
of  Trisala  as  the  Svetambaras  contend,  thirdly  that  a  monk 
who  owns  any  property  and  wears  clothes  cannot  reach  Moksa, 
fourthly  that  no  woman  can  reach  Moksa^  The  Digambaras 
deny  the  canonical  works  of  the  Svetambaras  and  assert  that 
these  had  been  lost  immediately  after  Mahavira.  The  origin  of 
the  Digambaras  is  attributed  to  Sivabhuti  (a.D.  83)  by  the 
Svetambaras  as  due  to  a  schism  in  the  old  Svetambara  church, 
of  which  there  had  already  been  previous  to  that  seven  other 
schisms.  The  Digambaras  in  their  turn  deny  this,  and  say  that 
they  themselves  alone  have  preserved  the  original  practices,  and 
that  under  Bhadrabahu,  the  eighth  sage  after  Mahavira,  the  last 
Tlrthaiikara,  there  rose  the  sect  of  Ardhaphalakas  with  laxer 
principles,  from  which  developed  the  present  sect  of  Svetambaras 
(a.D.  80).  The  Digambaras  having  separated  in  early  times 
from  the  Svetambaras  developed  peculiar  religious  ceremonies  of 
their  own,  and  have  a  different  ecclesiastical  and  literary  history, 
though  there  is  practically  no  difference  about  the  main  creed. 
It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  mention  that  the  Sanskrit 
works  of  the  Digambaras  go  back  to  a  greater  antiquity  than 
those  of  the  Svetambaras,  if  we  except  the  canonical  books  of 
the  latter.  It  may  be  noted  in  this  connection  that  there  developed 
in  later  times  about  84  different  schools  of  Jainism  differing  from 
one  another  only  in  minute  details  of  conduct.  These  were  called 
gacchns,  and  the  most  important  of  these  is  the  Kharatara  Gaccha, 
which  had  split  into  many  minor  gacchas.  Both  sects  of  Jains  have 

^  See  ^^  Digiimbara  Jain  Iconography  {\.  A,  xxxii  [1903]  p.  459"  of  J.  Burgess,  and 
Buhler's  "  Specimens  of  Jina  sculptures  from  Mathura,"  in  Epigraphica  Indica,  11. 
pp.  311  etc.    See  also  Jacobi's  article  on  Jainism,  E.  R.  E. 

^  See  Jacobi's  article  on  Jainism,  E.  R.  E. 

*  See  Gunaratna's  commentary  on  Jainism  in  Saddarianasamuccaya. 


vi]  Jatna  Literature  171 

preserved  a  list  of  the  succession  of  their  teachers  from  Mahavira 
{sthavirdvali,  pattdvali,  giirvdvali)  and  also  many  legends  about 
them  such  as  those  in  the  Kalpasutra^  the  Parisista-parvan  of 
Hemacandra,  etc. 

The  Canonical  and  other  Literature  of  the  Jains. 

According  to  the  Jains  there  were  originally  two  kinds  of 
sacred  books,  the  fourteen  Purvas  and  the  eleven  Aiigas.  The 
Purvas  continued  to  be  transmitted  for  some  time  but  were 
gradually  lost.  The  works  known  as  the  eleven  Ahgas  are  now 
the  oldest  parts  of  the  existing  Jain  canon.  The  names  of  these 
are  Acdra,  Sutrakrta,  Sthdna,  Saniavdya  Bhagavatl,  Jfidtadhar- 
inakathds,  Updsakadasds,  Antakrtadasds  Aniittaraiipapdtikadasds, 
Prasnavydkarana,  Vipdka.  In  addition  to  these  there  are  the  twelve 
Updngas'^,  the  ten  Prakiruas'^,  six  Chedasutras^,  Ndndl  and  Ann- 
yogadvdra  and  four  Midasutras  {Uttarddhyayana,  Avasyaka, 
Dasavaikdlika,  and  Pindaniryukti).  The  Digambaras  however 
assert  that  these  original  works  have  all  been  lost,  and  that  the 
present  works  which  pass  by  the  old  names  are  spurious.  The 
original  language  of  these  according  to  the  Jains  was  Ardhama- 
gadhl,  but  these  suffered  attempts  at  modernization  and  it  is  best 
to  call  the  language  of  the  sacred  texts  Jaina  Prakrit  and  that 
of  the  later  works  Jaina  Maharastrl.  A  large  literature  of  glosses 
and  commentaries  has  grown  up  round  the  sacred  texts.  And 
besides  these,  the  Jains  possess  separate  works,  which  contain 
systematic  expositions  of  their  faith  in  Prakrit  and  Sanskrit. 
Many  commentaries  have  also  been  written  upon  these  indepen- 
dent treatises.  One  of  the  oldest  of  these  treatises  is  Umasvati's 
Tattvdrthddhigamasutra  (1-85  A.D.).  Some  of  the  most  important 
later  Jaina  works  on  which  this  chapter  is  based  are  Visesdva- 
syakabhdsya,  Jaina  Tarkavdritika^  with  the  commentary  of 
Santyacaryya,  Dravyasamgraha  of  Nemicandra  (1150  A.D.), 
Syddvddamanjari  of  Mallisena  (1292  A.D.),  Nydydvatdra  of 
Siddhasena  Divakara  (533  A.D.),  ParlksdmtikhasutralagJiuvrtti  of 
Anantavlryya  (1039  A.D.),  Prameyakamalamdrtanda  of  Prabha- 

^  Aupapatika,  RSjaprcdniya,  Jivdbhigafna,  Prajiiapana,  fambudvipaprajiiapti, 
Candrapraj fiapti,  Suryapraj'napti,  Niraydvali,  Kalpavatamsikd,  Puspika,  Puspaculika, 
Vrsnidaias. 

^  CattiMarana,  Samstara,  Aturapraiyakhyana,  Bhaktaparijna,  Tandulavaiydlt, 
Canddvtja,  Devendrastava,  Ganivija,  Mahdpratydkhydna,   Virastava. 

•^  NUTtha,  MahdnUitha,  Vyavahdra,  DaJairutaskandha,  Brhatkalpa,  Pancakalpa. 


172  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

candra  (825  A.D.),  Yogasdstra  of  Hemacandra(io88-i  172 A.D.),and 
Pramdnanayatattvdlokdlamkdra  of  Deva  Suri  (1086-1 169  A.D.). 
I  am  indebted  for  these  dates  to  Vidyabhusana's  Indian  Logic. 

It  may  here  be  mentioned  that  the  Jains  also  possess  a  secular 
literature  of  their  own  in  poetry  and  prose,  both  Sanskrit  and 
Prakrit.  There  are  also  many  moral  tales  (e.g.  Samardicca-kahd, 
Upaniitabhavaprapanca-kathd  in  Prakrit,  and  the  Yasastilaka  of 
Somadevaand  Dhanapala's  Tilakamanjari);  Jaina  Sanskrit  poems 
both  in  the  Purana  and  Kavya  style  and  hymns  in  Prakrit  and 
Sanskrit  are  also  very  numerous.  There  are  also  many  Jaina 
dramas.  The  Jaina  authors  have  also  contributed  many  works, 
original  treatises  as  well  as  commentaries,  to  the  scientific  litera- 
ture of  India  in  its  various  branches:  grammar, biography, metrics, 
poetics,  philosophy,  etc.  The  contributions  of  the  Jains  to  logic 
deserve  special  noticed 

Some  General  Characteristics  of  the  Jains. 

The  Jains  exist  only  in  India  and  their  number  is  a  little  less 
than  a  million  and  a  half.  The  Digambaras  are  found  chiefly  in 
Southern  India  but  also  in  the  North,  in  the  North-western  pro- 
vinces. Eastern  Rajputana  and  the  Punjab.  The  head-quarters  of 
the  Svetambaras  are  in  Gujarat  and  Western  Rajputana,  but  they 
are  to  be  found  also  all  over  Northern  and  Central  India. 

The  outfit  of  a  monk,  as  Jacobi  describes  it,  is  restricted  to 
bare  necessaries, and  these  hemust  beg — clothes,a  blanket, an  alms- 
bowl,  a  stick,  a  broom  to  sweep  the  ground,  a  piece  of  cloth  to  cover 
his  mouth  when  speaking  lest  insects  should  enter  it^  The  outfit  of 
nuns  is  the  same  except  that  they  have  additional  clothes.  The 
Digambaras  have  a  similar  outfit,  but  keep  no  clothes,  use  brooms 
of  peacock's  feathers  or  hairs  of  the  tail  of  a  cow  {cdmaray.  The 
monks  shave  the  head  or  remove  the  hair  by  plucking  it  out.  The 
latter  method  of  getting  rid  of  the  hair  is  to  be  preferred,  and  is 
regarded  sometimes  as  an  essential  rite.  The  duties  of  monks 
are  very  hard.  They  should  sleep  only  three  hours  and  spend 
the  rest  of  the  time  in  repenting  of  and  expiating  sins,  meditating, 
studying,  begging  alms  (in  the  afternoon),  and  careful  inspection  of 
their  clothes  and  other  things  for  the  removal  of  insects.  The  lay- 
men should  try  to  approach  the  ideal  of  conduct  of  the  monks 

*  See  Jacobi's  article  on  Jainism,  E.  K.  E.  ^  See  Jacobi,  loc.  cit. 

^  See  Saddar.(anasamuccaya,  chapter  iv. 


vi]  Mahavtra  173 

by  taking  upon  themselves  particular  vows,  and  the  monks  are 
required  to  deliver  sermons  and  explain  the  sacred  texts  in 
the  upasrayas  (separate  buildings  for  monks  like  the  Buddhist 
viharas).  The  principle  of  extreme  carefulness  not  to  destroy  any 
living  being  has  been  in  monastic  life  carried  out  to  its  very 
last  consequences,  and  has  shaped  the  conduct  of  the  laity  in  a 
great  measure.  No  layman  will  intentionally  kill  any  living  being, 
not  even  an  insect,  however  troublesome.  He  will  remove  it  care- 
fully without  hurting  it.  The  principle  of  not  hurting  any  living  y 
being  thus  bars  them  from  many  professions  such  as  agriculture, 
etc.,  and  has  thrust  them  into  commerced 

Life  of  Mahavira. 

Mahavira,  the  last  prophet  of  the  Jains,  was  a  Ksattriya  of 
the  Jfiata  clan  and  a  native  of  Vaisali  (modern  Besarh,  27  miles 
north  of  Patna).  He  was  the  second  son  of  Siddhartha  and  Trisala. 
The  Svetambaras  maintain  that  the  embryo  of  the  Tlrthaiikara 
which  first  entered  the  womb  of  the  Brahmin  lady  Devananda 
was  then  transferred  to  the  womb  of  Trisala.  This  story  the 
Digambaras  do  not  believe  as  we  have  already  seen.  His  parents 
were  the  worshippers  of  Parsva  and  gave  him  the  name  Varddha- 
mana  (Vira  or  Mahavira).  He  married  Yasoda  and  had  a  daughter 
by  her.  In  his  thirtieth  year  his  parents  died  and  with  the  per- 
mission of  his  brother  Nandivardhana  he  became  a  monk.  After 
twelve  years  of  self-mortification  and  meditation  he  attained 
omniscience  {kevala,  cf  bod/u  of  the  Buddhists).  He  lived  to 
preach  for  forty-two  years  more,  and  attained  moksa  (emanci- 
pation) some  years  before  Buddha  in  about  480  B.C.I 

The  Fundamental  Ideas  of  Jaina  Ontology. 

A  thing  (such  as  clay)  is  seen  to  assume  various  shapes  and 
to  undergo  diverse  changes  (such  as  the  form  of  a  jug,  or 
pan,  etc.),  and  we  have  seen  that  the  Chandogya  Upanisad  held 
that  since  in  all  changes  the  clay-matter  remained  permanent, 
that  alone  was  true,  whereas  the  changes  of  form  and  state 
were  but  appearances,  the  nature  of  which  cannot  be  rationally 

^  See  Jacobi's  article  on  Jainism,  E.  R.  E. 

"^  See  Hoernle's  translation  of  Uvdsagadasao,  Jacobi,  loc.  cit.,  and  Hoernle's  article 
on  the  Ajivakas,  E.  R.  E.  The  Svetambaras,  however,  say  that  this  date  was  527  B.C., 
and  the  Digambaras  place  it  eighteen  years  later. 


174  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

demonstrated  or  explained.  The  unchangeable  substance  (e.g. 
the  clay-matter)  alone  is  true,  and  the  changing  forms  are  mere 
illusions  of  the  senses,  mere  objects  of  name  {ndma-rupay.  What 
we  call  tangibility,  visibility,  or  other  sense-qualities,  have  no  real 
existence,  for  they  are  always  changing,  and  are  like  mere  phan- 
toms of  which  no  conception  can  be  made  by  the  light  of  reason. 
The  Buddhists  hold  that  changing  qualities  can  alone  be  per- 

^  ceived  and  that  there  is  no  unchanging  substance  behind  them. 
What  we  perceive  as  clay  is  but  some  specific  quality,  what  we 
perceive  as  jug  is  also  some  quality.  Apart  from  these  qualities 
we  do  not  perceive  any  qualitiless  substance,  which  the  Upan- 
isads  regard  as  permanent  and  unchangeable.  The  permanent 
and  unchangeable  substance  is  thus  a  mere  fiction  of  ignorance, 
as  there  are  only  the  passing  collocations  of  qualities.  Qualities 
do  not  imply  that  there  are  substances  to  which  they  adhere, 
for  the  so-called  pure  substance  does  not  exist,  as  it  can  neither 
be  perceived  by  the  senses  nor  inferred.  There  are  only  the 
momentary  passing  qualities.  We  should  regard  each  change  of 
quality  as  a  new  existence. 

The  Jains  we  know  were  the  contemporaries  of  Buddha  and 
possibly  of  some  of  the  Upanisads  too,  and  they  had  also  a  solu- 
tion  to  offer.    They  held   that  it  was  not  true  that  substance 

-i  alone  was  true  and  qualities  were  mere  false  and  illusory  ap- 
pearances. Further  it  was  not  true  as  the  Buddhists  said  that 
there  was  no  permanent  substance  but  merely  the  change  of 
passing  qualities,  for  both  these  represent  two  extreme  views 
and  are  contrary  to  experience.  Both  of  them,  however,  contain 
some  elements  of  truth  but  not  the  whole  truth  as  given  in 
experience.  Experience  shows  that  in  all  changes  there  are 
three  elements:  (i)  that  some  collocations  of  qualities  appear 
to  remain  unchanged ;  (2)  that  some  new  qualities  are  generated  ; 
(3)  that  some  old  qualities  are  destroyed.  It  is  true  that  qualities 
of  things  are  changing  every  minute,  but  all  qualities  are  not 
changing.  Thus  when  a  jug  is  made,  it  means  that  the  clay-lump 
has  been  destroyed,  a  jug  has  been  generated  and  the  clay  is 
permanent,  i.e.  all  production  means  that  some  old  qualities  have 
been  lost,  some  new  ones  brought  in,  and  there  is  some  part  in 
it  which  is  permanent  The  clay  has  become  lost  in  some  form, 
has  generated  itself  in  another,  and  remained  permanent  in  still 

^  See  Chandogya,  vi.  i. 


vi]  Relative  Pluralism  175 

another  form.  It  is  by  virtue  of  these  unchanged  qualities  that  a 
thing  is  said  to  be  permanent  though  undergoing  change.  Thus 
when  a  lump  of  gold  is  turned  into  a  rod  or  a  ring,  all  the  specific 
qualities  which  come  under  the  connotation  of  the  word  "gold" 
are  seen  to  continue,  though  the  forms  are  successively  changed, 
and  with  each  such  change  some  of  its  qualities  are  lost  and  some 
new  ones  are  acquired.  Such  being  the  case,  the  truth  comes  to 
this,  that  there  is  always  a  permanent  entity  as  represented  by  the 
permanence  of  such  qualities  as  lead  us  to  call  it  a  substance  in 
spite  of  all  its  diverse  changes.  The  nature  of  being  {sat)  then  is 
neither  the  absolutely  unchangeable,  nor  the  momentary  changing 
qualities  or  existences,  but  involves  them  both.  Being  then,  as  is  v 
testified  by  experience,  is  that  which  involves  a  permanent  unit, 
which  is  incessantly  every  moment  losing  some  qualities  and 
gaining  new  ones.  The  notion  of  being  involves  a  permanent 
{dJiruvd)  accession  of  some  new  qualities  {utpddci)  and  loss  of 
some  old  qualities  {vyayay.  The  solution  of  Jainism  is  thus  a  re- 
conciliation of  the  two  extremes  of  Vedantism  and  Buddhism  on 
grounds  of  common-sense  experience. 

The  Doctrine  of  Relative  Pluralism  (anekantavada). 

This  conception  of  being  as  the  union  of  the  permanent  and 
change  brings  us  naturally  to  the  doctrine  of  Anekantavada  or 
what  we  may  call  relative  pluralism  as  against  the  extreme  abso-  4 
lutism  of  the  Upanisads  and  the  pluralism  of  the  Buddhists. 
The  Jains  regarded  all  things  as  anekdfita  {na-ekdntd),  or  in 
other  words  they  held  that  nothing  could  be  afifirmed  absolutely, 
as  all  affirmations  were  true  only  under  certain  conditions  and  v 
limitations.  Thus  speaking  of  a  gold  jug,  we  see  that  its  exist- 
ence as  a  substance  {dravyd)  is  of  the  nature  of  a  collocation 
of  atoms  and  not  as  any  other  substance  such  as  space  {dkdsd), 
i.e.  a  gold  jug  is  a  dravya  only  in  one  sense  of  the  term  and 
not  in  every  sense;  so^it  is  a  dravya  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a 
collocation  of  atoms  and  not  a  dravya  in  the  sense  of  space  or 
time  {kdla).  It  is  thus  both  a  dravya  and  not  a  dravya  at  one 
and  the  same  time.  Again  it  is  atomic  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a 
composite  of  earth-atoms  and  not  atomic  in  the  sense  that  it  is 

1  See  Tativdrlhddhigamasutra,  and  Gunaratna's  treatment  of  Jainism  in  Saddar- 
ianasam  uccaya . 


176  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

not  a  composite  of  water-atoms.  Again  it  is  a  composite  of  earth- 
atoms  only  in  the  sense  that  gold  is  a  metallic  modification  of 
earth,  and  not  any  other  modification  of  earth  as  clay  or  stone. 
Its  being  constituted  of  metal-atoms  is  again  true  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  made  up  of  gold-atoms  and  not  of  iron-atoms.  It 
is  made  up  again  of  gold-atoms  in  the  sense  of  melted  and  un- 
sullied gold  and  not  as  gold  in  the  natural  condition.  It  is  again 
made  up  of  such  unsullied  and  melted  gold  as  has  been  hammered 
and  shaped  by  the  goldsmith  Devadatta  and  not  by  Yajnadatta. 
Its  being  made  up  of  atoms  conditioned  as  above  is  again  only 
true  in  the  sense  that  the  collocation  has  been  shaped  as  a  jug 
and  not  as  a  pot  and  so  on.  Thus  proceeding  in  a  similar  manner 
the  Jains  say  that  all  affirmations  are  true  of  a  thing  only  in  a 
certain  limited  sense.  All  things  {vastu)  thus  possess  an  infinite 
number  of  qualities  {anantadJiarmdtmakam  vastu),  each  of  which 
can  only  be  affirmed  in  a  particular  sense.  Such  an  ordinary  thing 
as  a  jug  will  be  found  to  be  the  object  of  an  infinite  number  of 
affirmations  and  the  possessor  of  an  infinite  number  of  qualities 
from  infinite  points  of  view,  which  are  all  true  in  certain  restricted 
senses  and  not  absolutely  \  Thus  in  the  positive  relation  riches 
cannot  be  affirmed  of  poverty  but  in  the  negative  relation  such 
an  affirmation  is  possible  as  when  we  say  "the  poor  man  has  no 
riches."  The  poor  man  possesses  riches  not  in  a  positive  but  in 
a  negative  way.  Thus  in  some  relation  or  other  anything  may  be 
affirmed  of  any  other  thing,  and  again  in  other  relations  the  very 
same  thing  cannot  be  affirmed  of  it.  The  different  standpoints 
from  which  things  (though  possessed  of  infinite  determinations) 
can  be  spoken  of  as  possessing  this  or  that  quality  or  as  ap- 
pearing in  relation  to  this  or  that,  are  technically  called  naya^. 

The  Doctrine  of  Nayas. 

In  framing  judgments  about  things  there  are  two  ways  open 
to  us,  firstly  we  may  notice  the  manifold  qualities  and  character- 
istics of  anything  but  view  them  as  unified  in  the  thing;  thus  when 
we  say  "this  is  a  book"  we  do  not  look  at  its  characteristic 
qualities  as  being  different  from  it,  but  rather  the  qualities  or 
characteristics  are  perceived  as  having  no  separate  existence  from 

^  See  Gunaratna  on  Jainamata  in  Saddarianasamuccaya,  pp.  211,  etc.,  and  also 
Tattvarthadhigatnasfdra . 

^  See  TatLvdrthadhiganiasutra,  and  Viiesava^yaka  b/idsya,  pp.  895-923. 


vi]  Standpoints  of  Judgment  177 

the  thing.  Secondly  we  may  notice  the  quaHties  separately  and 
regard  the  thing  as  a  mere  non-existent  fiction  (cf.  the  Buddhist 
view);  thus  I  may  speak  of  the  different  qualities  of  the  book 
separately  and  hold  that  the  qualities  of  things  are  alone  percep- 
tible and  the  book  apart  from  these  cannot  be  found.  These  two 
points  of  view  are  respectively  called  dravyanaya?in^  parydyanaya} . 
The  dravyanaya  again  shows  itself  in  three  forms,  and  paryaya- 
naya  in  four  forms,  of  which  the  first  form  only  is  important  for 
our  purposes,  the  other  three  being  important  rather  from  the 
point  of  view  of  grammar  and  language  had  better  be  omitted 
here.  The  three  nayas  under  dravyanaya  are  called  naigama-naya, 
samgraha-naya  and  vyavahara-naya. 

When  we  speak  of  a  thing  from  a  purely  common  sense  point 
of  view,  we  do  not  make  our  ideas  clear  or  precise.  Thus  I  may 
hold  a  book  in  my  hand  and  when  asked  whether  my  hands  are 
empty,  I  may  say,  no,  I  have  something  in  my  hand,  or  I  may  say, 
I  have  a  book  in  my  hand.  It  is  evident  that  in  the  first  answer 
I  looked  at  the  book  from  the  widest  and  most  general  point  of 
view  as  a  "thing,"  whereas  in  the  second  I  looked  at  it  in  its 
special  existence  as  a  book.  Again  I  may  be  reading  a  page  of 
a  book,  and  I  may  say  I  am  reading  a  book,  but  in  reality  I  was 
reading  only  one  of  the  pages  of  the  book.  I  may  be  scribbling 
on  loose  sheets,  and  may  say  this  is  my  book  on  Jaina  philosophy, 
whereas  in  reality  there  were  no  books  but  merely  some  loose 
sheets.  This  looking  at  things  from  the  loose  common  sense  view, 
in  which  we  do  not  consider  them  from  the  point  of  view  of  their 
most  general  characteristic  as  "being"  or  as  any  of  their  special 
characteristics,  but  simply  as  they  appear  at  first  sight,  is  techni- 
cally called  the  naigama  standpoint.  This  empirical  view  probably 
proceeds  on  the  assumption  that  a  thing  possesses  the  most 
general  as  well  as  the  most  special  qualities,  and  hence  we  may 
lay  stress  on  any  one  of  these  at  any  time  and  ignore  the  other 
ones.  This  is  the  point  of  view  from  which  according  to  the 
Jains  the  Nyaya  and  Vaisesika  schools  interpret  experience. 

Sarngraha-naya  is  the  looking  at  things  merely  from  the 
most  general  point  of  view.  Thus  we  may  speak  of  all  individual 
things  from  their  most  general  and  fundamental  aspect  as  "being." 
This  according  to  the  Jains  is  the  Vedanta  way  of  looking  at 
things. 

^  Syddvdda/nanjarl,  ^]i.  171-173. 


1^8  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [cH. 

The  vyavahara-naya  standpoint  holds  that  the  real  essence 
of  things  is  to  be  regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  actual  prac- 
tical experience  of  the  thing,  which  unifies  within  it  some  general 
as  well  as  some  special  traits,  which  has  been  existing  from  past 
times  and  remain  in  the  future,  but  yet  suffer  trifling  changes 
all  the  while,  changes  which  are  serviceable  to  us  in  a  thousand 
ways.  Thus  a  "book"  has  no  doubt  some  general  traits,  shared 
by  all  books,  but  it  has  some  special  traits  as  well.  Its  atoms  are 
continually  suffering  some  displacement  and  rearrangement,  but 
yet  it  has  been  existing  as  a  book  for  some  time  past  and  will 
exist  for  some  time  in  the  future  as  well.  All  these  characteristics, 
go  to  make  up  the  essence  of  the  "book"  of  our  everyday  ex- 
perience, and  none  of  these  can  be  separated  and  held  up  as  being 
the  concept  of  a  "book."  This  according  to  the  Jains  is  the 
Samkhya  way  of  looking  at  things. 

The  first  view  of  paryaya-naya  called  rjiisutra  is  the  Buddhist 
view  which  does  not  believe  in  the  existence  of  the  thing  in  the 
past  or  in  the  future,  but  holds  that  a  thing  is  a  mere  conglomera- 
'  tion  of  characteristics  which  may  be  said  to  produce  effects  at 
any  given  moment.  At  each  new  moment  there  are  new  colloca- 
tions of  new  qualities  and  it  is  these  which  may  be  regarded  as 
the  true  essence  of  our  notion  of  things  ^ 

The  nayas  as  we  have  already  said  are  but  points  of  view,  or 
aspects  of  looking  at  things,  and  as  such  are  infinite  in  number. 
The  above  four  represent  only  a  broad  classification  of  these.  The 
Jains  hold  that  the  Nyaya-Vaisesika,  the  Vedanta,  the  Samkhya, 
■■  and  the  Buddhist,(  have  each  tried  to  interpret  and  systematize 
experience  from  one  of  the  above  four  points  of  view,)  and  each  re- 
gards the  interpretation  from  his  point  of  view  as  being  absolutely 
true  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  points  of  view.  This  is  their  error 
{naydbhdsa),  for  each  standpoint  represents  only  one  of  the  many 
points  of  view  from  which  a  thing  can  be  looked  at.  The  affirma- 
;  tions  from  any  point  of  view  are  thus  true  in  a  limited  sense  and 
under  limited  conditions.  Infinite  numbers  of  affirmations  may 
be  made  of  things  from  infinite  points  of  view.  Affirmations  or 
judgments  according  to  any  naya  or  standpoint  cannot  therefore 
be  absolute,  for  even  contrary  affirmations  of  the  very  selfsame 

*  The  other  standpoints  of  paryaya-naya,  which  represent  grammatical  and  lin- 
guistic points  of  view,  are  iabda-naya,  satnabhiriidha-naya,  and  evambhuta-naya.  See 
Vihsavalyaka  bhasya,  pp.  895-923. 


vi]  Syddvada  179 

things  may  be  held  to  be  true  from  other  points  of  view.  The 
truth  of  each  affirmation  is  thus  only  conditional,  and  incon- 
ceivable from  the  absolute  point  of  view.  To  guarantee  correctness 
therefore  each  affirmation  should  be  preceded  by  the  phrase  sydt 
(may  be).  This  will  indicate  that  the  affirmation  is  only  relative,  j 
made  somehow,  from  some  point  of  view  and  under  some  reser- 
vations and  not  in  any  sense  absolute.  There  is  no  judgment 
which  is  absolutely  true,  and  no  judgment  which  is  absolutely 
false.  All  judgments  are  true  in  some  sense  and  false  in  another. 
This  brings  us  to  the  famous  Jaina  doctrine  of  Syadvada^ 

The  Doctrine  of  Syadvada. 
The  doctrine  of  Syadvada  holds  that  since  the  most  contrary 
characteristics  of  infinite  variety  may  be  associated  with  a  thing, 
affirmation  made  from  whatever  standpoint  {nayd)  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  absolute.  All  affirmations  are  true  (in  some  syddasti  or 
"may  be  it  is"  sense);  all  affirmations  are  false  in  some  sense; 
all  affirmations  are  indefinite  or  inconceivable  in  some  sense 
(syddavaktavyd) ;  all  affirmations  are  true  as  well  as  false  in  some 
sense  {syddasti  sydnndsti) ;  all  affirmations  are  true  as  well  as  in- 
definite {syddasti  cdvaktavyascd) ;  all  affirmations  are  false  as  well 
as  indefinite;  all  affirmations  are  true  and  false  and  indefinite  in 
some  sense  {syddasti  sydnndsti  syddavaktavyasca).  Thus  we  may 
say  "the  jug  is"  or  the  jug  has  being,  but  it  is  more  correct  to 
say  explicitly  that  "may  be  {sydt)  that  the  jug  is,"  otherwise  if 
"being"  here  is  taken  absolutely  of  any  and  every  kind  of  being, 
it  might  also  mean  that  there  is  a  lump  of  clay  or  a  pillar,  or  a 
cloth  or  any  other  thing.  The  existence  here  is  limited  and  defined 
by  the  form  of  the  jug.  "The  jug  is"  does  not  mean  absolute 
existence  but  a  limited  kind  of  existence  as  determined  by  the 
form  of  the  jug,  "The  jug  is"  thus  means  that  a  limited  kind  of 
existence,  namely  the  jug-existence  is  affirmed  and  not  existence 
in  general  in  the  absolute  or  unlimited  sense,  for  then  the  sentence 
"the  jug  is"  might  as  well  mean  "the  clay  is,"  "the  tree  is,"  "the 
cloth  is,"  etc.  Again  the  existence  of  the  jug  is  determined  by  the 
negation  of  all  other  things  in  the  world ;  each  quality  or  charac- 
teristic (such  as  red  colour)  of  the  jug  is  apprehended  and  defined 
by  the  negation  of  all  the  infinite  varieties  (such  as  black,  blue, 
golden),  etc.,  of  its  class,  and  it  is  by  the  combined  negation  of  all 

^  See  Viksavaiyaka  bhdsya,  pp.  895,  etc.,  and  Syadvadamanjari,  pp.  170,  etc. 

12 — 2 


i8o  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

the  infinite  number  of  characteristics  or  qualities  other  than  those 
constituting  the  jug  that  a  jug  may  be  apprehended  or  defined. 
What  we  call  the  being  of  the  jug  is  thus  the  non-being  of  all  the 
rest  except  itself  Thus  though  looked  at  from  one  point  of  view 
the  judgment  "the  jug  is"  may  mean  affirmation  of  being,  looked 
at  from  another  point  of  view  it  means  an  affirmation  of  non-being 
(of  all  other  objects).  Thus  of  the  judgment  "the  jug  is"  one  may 
say,  may  be  it  is  an  affirmation  of  being  {syddasti),  may  be  it  is  a 
negation  of  being  {sydnndsti);  or  I  may  proceed  in  quite  another 
way  and  say  that  "the  jug  is"  means  "this  jug  is  here,"  which 
naturally  indicates  that  "this  jug  is  not  there"  and  thus  the  judg- 
ment "the  jug  is"  (i.e.  is  here)  also  means  that  "the  jug  is  not 
there,"  and  so  we  see  that  the  affirmation  of  the  being  of  the  jug 
is  true  only  of  this  place  and  false  of  another,  and  this  justifies  us 
in  saying  that  "may  be  that  in  some  sense  the  jug  is,"  and  "may 
be  in  some  sense  that  the  jug  is  not."  Combining  these  two 
aspects  we  may  say  that  in  some  sense  "may  be  that  the  jug  is," 
and  in  some  sense  "may  be  that  the  jug  is  not."  We  understood 
here  that  if  we  put  emphasis  on  the  side  of  the  characteristics 
constituting  being,  we  may  say  "the  jug  is,"  but  if  we  put  emphasis 
on  the  other  side,  we  may  as  well  say  "the  jug  is  not."  Both  the 
affirmations  hold  good  of  the  jug  according  as  the  emphasis  is 
put  on  either  side.  But  if  without  emphasis  on  either  side  we  try 
to  comprehend  the  two  opposite  and  contradictory  judgments 
regarding  the  jug,  we  see  that  the  nature  of  the  jug  or  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  jug  is  indefinite,  unspeakable  and  inconceivable — 
avaktavya,  for  how  can  we  affirm  both  being  and  non-being  of 
the  same  thing,  and  yet  such  is  the  nature  of  things  that  we  cannot 
but  do  it.  Thus  all  affirmations  are  true,  are  not  true,  are  both 
true  and  untrue,  and  are  thus  unspeakable,  inconceivable,  and 
indefinite.  Combining  these  four  again  we  derive  another  three, 
(i)  that  in  some  sense  it  may  be  that  the  jug  is,  and  (2)  is  yet 
unspeakable,  or  (3)  that  the  jug  is  not  and  is  unspeakable,  or 
finally  that  the  jug  is,  is  not,  and  is  unspeakable.  Thus  the  Jains 
hold  that  no  affirmation,  or  judgment,  is  absolute  in  its  nature,  each 
is  true  in  its  own  limited  sense  only,  and  for  each  one  of  them  any 
of  the  above  seven  alternatives  (technically  called  saptabhahgi) 
holds  good^  The  Jains  say  that  other  Indian  systems  each  from 
its  own  point  of  view  asserts  itself  to  be  the  absolute  and  the  only 

'  See  Syddvadamanfart,  with  Heniacandra's  commentary,  pp.  i66,  etc. 


vi]  Relativity  of  Judgments  1 8 1 

point  of  view.  They  do  not  perceive  that  the  nature  of  reality- 
is  such  that  the  truth  of  any  assertion  is  merely  conditional, 
and  holds  good  only  in  certain  conditions,  circumstances,  or 
senses  {upddhi).  It  is  thus  impossible  to  make  any  affirmation  V 
which  is  universally  and  absolutely  valid.  For  a  contrary  or 
contradictory  affirmation  will  always  be  found  to  hold  good  of 
any  judgment  in  some  sense  or  other.  As  all  reality  is  partly 
permanent  and  partly  exposed  to  change  of  the  form  of  losing 
and  gaining  old  and  new  qualities,  and  is  thus  relatively  perma- 
nent and  changeful,  so  all  our  affirmations  regarding  truth  are  also 
only  relatively  valid  and  invalid.  Being,  non-being  and  indefinite, 
the  three  categories  of  logic,  are  all  equally  available  in  some  sense 
or  other  in  all  their  permutations  for  any  and  every  kind  of 
judgment.  There  is  no  universal  and  absolute  position  or  negation, 
and  all  judgments  are  valid  only  conditionally.  The  relation  of 
the  naya  doctrine  with  the  syadvada  doctrine  is  therefore  this,  that 
for  any  judgment  according  to  any  and  every  naya  there  are  as 
many  alternatives  as  are  indicated  by  syadvada.  The  validity  of 
such  a  judgment  is  therefore  only  conditional.  If  this  is  borne 
in  mind  when  making  any  judgment  according  to  any  naya, 
the  naya  is  rightly  used.  If,  however,  the  judgments  are  made  ab- 
solutely according  to  any  particular  naya  without  any  reference  to 
other  nayas  as  required  by  the  syadvada  doctrine  the  nayas  are 
wrongly  used  as  in  the  case  of  other  systems,  and  then  such 
judgments  are  false  and  should  therefore  be  called  false  nayas 
{naydbhdsd)  \ 

Knowledge,  its  value  for  us. 
The  Buddhist  Dharmottara  in  his  commentary  on  Nydyabindu 
says  that  people  who  are  anxious  to  fulfil  some  purpose  or  end  in 
which  they  are  interested,  value  the  knowledge  which  helps  them 
to  attain  that  purpose.  It  is  because  knowledge  is  thus  found 
to  be  useful  and  sought  by  men  that  philosophy  takes  upon  it  the 
task  of  examining  the  nature  of  true  knowledge  {samyagjndna  or 
pramdnd).  The  main  test  of  true  knowledge  is  that  it  helps  us 
to  attain  our  purpose.  The  Jains  also  are  in  general  agreement xiJ 
with  the  above  view  of  knowledge  of  the  Buddhists".    They  also 

^  The  earliest  mention  of  the  doctrine  of  syadvada  and  saptabhangi  probably  occurs 
in  Bhadrabahu's  (433-357  B.C.)  commentary  Sutrakrtahganiryukti. 

2  See  Pramana-naya-tattvalokala7nkdra  (Benares),  p.  26;  also  Parlksd-mukha- 
sictra-vrtti  (Asiatic  Society),  ch.  i. 


1 82  The  J aina  Philosophy  [ch. 

say  that  knowledge  is  not  to  be  valued  for  its  own  sake.  The 
validity  {prdmdnya)  of  anything  consists  in  this,  that  it  directly 
helps  us  to  get  what  is  good  for  us  and  to  avoid  what  is  bad 
\  for  us.  Knowledge  alone  has  this  capacity,  for  by  it  we  can 
adapt  ourselves  to  our  environments  and  try  to  acquire  what 
is  good  for  us  and  avoid  what  is  bad^  The  conditions  that 
lead  to  the  production  of  such  knowledge  (such  as  the  presence 
of  full  light  and  proximity  to  the  eye  in  the  case  of  seeing  an 
object  by  visual  perception)  have  but  little  relevancy  in  this  con- 
nection. For  we  are  not  concerned  with  how  a  cognition  is 
produced,  as  it  can  be  of  no  help  to  us  in  serving  our  purposes. 
It  is  enough  for  us  to  know  that  external  objects  under  certain 
conditions  assume  such  a  special  fitness  {yogyatd)  that  v/e  can 
have  knowledge  of  them.  We  have  no  guarantee  that  they 
generate  knowledge  in  us,  for  we  are  only  aware  that  under 
certain  conditions  we  know  a  thing,  whereas  under  other  con- 
ditions we  do  not  know  it-.  The  enquiry  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
special  fitness  of  things  which  makes  knowledge  of  them  pos- 
sible does  not  concern  us.  Those  conditions  which  confer  such 
a  special  fitness  on  things  as  to  render  them  perceivable  have  but 
little  to  do  with  us;  for  our  purposes  which  consist  only  in  the 
acquirement  of  good  and  avoidance  of  evil,  can  only  be  served  by 
knowledge  and  not  by  those  conditions  of  external  objects. 

Knowledge  reveals  our  own  self  as  a  knowing  subject  as  well 
as  the  objects  that  are  known  by  us.  We  have  no  reason  to 
suppose  (like  the  Buddhists)  that  all  knowledge  by  perception  of 
external  objects  is  in  the  first  instance  indefinite  and  indeterminate, 
and  that  all  our  determinate  notions  of  form,  colour,  size  and  other 
characteristics  of  the  thing  are  not  directly  given  in  our  perceptual 
experience,  but  are  derived  only  by  imagination  {utpreksd),  and 
that  therefore  true  perceptual  knowledge  only  certifies  the  validity 
of  the  indefinite  and  indeterminate  crude  sense  data  {nirvikalpa 
jndna).  Experience  shows  that  true  knowledge  on  the  one  hand 
reveals  us  as  subjects  or  knowers,  and  on  the  other  hand  gives 
a  correct  sketch  of  the  external  objects  in  all  the  diversity  of 
their  characteristics.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  knowledge  is  our 
immediate  and  most  prominent  means  of  serving  our  purposes. 

^  Pramana-naya-tattvdlokdlamkdra,  p.  26. 

"^  See  Pariksd-mukha-sutra,  il.  9,  and  its  vrtti,  and  also  the  concluding  vrtti  of 
ch.  II. 


vi]  Knowledge  183 

Of  course  knowledge  cannot  directly  and  immediately  bring  to 
us  the  good  we  want,  but  since  it  faithfully  communicates  to  us 
the  nature  of  the  objects  around  us,  it  renders  our  actions  for  the 
attainment  of  good  and  the  avoidance  of  evil,  possible;  for  if 
knowledge  did  not  possess  these  functions,  this  would  have  been 
impossible.  The  validity  of  knowledge  thus  consists  in  this,  that 
it  is  the  most  direct,  immediate,  and  indispensable  means  for 
serving  our  purposes.  So  long  as  any  knowledge  is  uncontra- 
dicted it  should  be  held  as  true.  False  knowledge  is  that 
which  represents  things  in  relations  in  which  they  do  not  exist. 
When  a  rope  in  a  badly  lighted  place  gives  rise  to  the  illusion  of 
a  snake,  the  illusion  consists  in  taking  the  rope  to  be  a  snake,  i.e. 
perceiving  a  snake  where  it  does  not  exist.  Snakes  exist  and 
ropes  also  exist,  there  is  no  untruth  in  that^  The  error  thus  con- 
sists in  this,  that  the  snake  is  perceived  where  the  rope  exists. 
The  perception  of  a  snake  under  relations  and  environments  in 
which  it  was  not  then  existing  is  what  is  meant  by  error  here. 
What  was  at  first  perceived  as  a  snake  was  later  on  contradicted 
and  thus  found  false.  Falsehood  therefore  consists  in  the  mis- 
representation of  objective  facts  in  experience.  True  knowledge  j 
therefore  is  that  which  gives  such  a  correct  and  faithful  repre- 
sentation of  its  object  as  is  never  afterwards  found  to  be  contra- 
dicted. Thus  knowledge  when  imparted  directly  in  association 
with  the  organs  in  sense-perception  is  very  clear,  vivid,  and 
distinct,  and  is  called  perceptional  {praiyaksa)\  when  attained 
otherwise  the  knowledge  is  not  so  clear  and  vivid  and  is  then 
called  non-perceptional  (parok^a^). 

Theory  of  Perception. 
The  main  difference  of  the  Jains  from  the  Buddhists  in  the 
theory  of  perception  lies,  as  we  have  already  seen,  in  this,  that  the 
Jains  think  that  perception  {pratyak^d)  reveals  to  us  the  external    ,i'i 
objects  just  as  they  are  with  most  of  their  diverse  characteristics  of 
colour,  form,  etc.,  and  also  in  this,  that  knowledge  arises  in  the  soul 

^  Illusion  consists  in  attributing  such  spatial,  temporal  or  other  kinds  of  relations 
to  the  objects  of  our  judgment  as  do  not  actually  exist,  but  the  objects  themselves 
actually  exist  in  other  relations.  When  I  mistake  the  rope  for  the  snake,  the  snake 
actually  exists  though  its  relationing  with  the  "  this  "  as  "  this  is  a  snake  "  does  not 
exist,  for  the  snake  is  not  the  rope.  This  illusion  is  thus  called  satkhydti  or  misrelationing 
of  existents  {sat). 

*  See  Jaina-tarka-varitika  of  Siddhasena,  ch.  i.,  and  vrtti  by  Santyacarya, 
Pramananayatattvalokalarnkara,  ch.  I.,  Pariksa-mukha-sutra-vrtti,  ch.  I. 


184  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch, 

from  within  it  as  if  by  removing  a  veil  which  had  been  covering  it 
before.  Objects  are  also  not  mere  forms  of  knowledge  (as  the  Vi- 
jnanavadin  Buddhist  thinks)  but  are  actually  existing.  Knowledge 
of  external  objects  by  perception  is  gained  through  the  senses. 
The  exterior  physical  sense  such  as  the  eye  must  be  distinguished 
from  the  invisible  faculty  or  power  of  vision  of  the  soul,  which 
alone  deserves  the  name  of  sense.  We  have  five  such  cognitive 
senses.  But  the  Jains  think  that  since  by  our  experience  we  are 
only  aware  of  five  kinds  of  sense  knowledge  corresponding  to  the 
five  senses,  it  is  better  to  say  that  it  is  the  "self"  which  gains  of 
itself  those  different  kinds  of  sense-knowledge  in  association  with 
those  exterior  senses  as  if  by  removal  of  a  covering,  on  account 
of  the  existence  of  which  the  knowledge  could  not  reveal  itself 
before.  The  process  of  external  perception  does  not  thus  involve 
the  exercise  of  any  separate  and  distinct  sense,  though  the  rise 
of  the  sense-knowledge  in  the  soul  takes  place  in  association  with 
the  particular  sense-organ  such  as  e\  e,  etc.  The  soul  is  in  touch 
with  all  parts  of  the  body,  and  visual  knowledge  is  that  knowledge 
which  is  generated  in  the  soul  through  that  part  of  it  which  is 
associated  with,  or  is  in  touch  with  the  eye.  To  take  an  example, 
I  look  before  me  and  see  a  rose.  Before  looking  at  it  the  know- 
ledge of  rose  was  in  me,  but  only  in  a  covered  condition,  and 
hence  could  not  get  itself  manifested.  The  act  of  looking  at  the 
rose  means  that  such  a  fitness  has  come  into  the  rose  and  into 
myself  that  the  rose  is  made  visible,  and  the  veil  over  my  know- 
ledge of  rose  is  removed.  When  visual  knowledge  arises,  this 
happens  in  association  with  the  eye ;  I  say  that  I  see  through 
the  visual  sense,  whereas  in  reality  experience  shows  that  I  have 
only  a  knowledge  of  the  visual  type  (associated  with  eye).  As 
experience  does  not  reveal  the  separate  senses,  it  is  unwarrantable 
to  assert  that  they  have  an  existence  apart  from  the  self  Pro- 
ceeding in  a  similar  way  the  Jains  discard  the  separate  existence 
of  manas  (mind-organ)  also,  for  manas  also  is  not  given  in  ex- 
perience, and  the  hypothesis  of  its  existence  is  unnecessary,  as 
self  alone  can  serve  its  purposed    Perception  of  an  object  means 

'  Tanna  indriyam  bhautikam  kim  tu  dtmaca  indriyam . .  .antcpahatacaksurddideiesu 
eva  atmanah  karmaksayopaianiastenasthagitagavaksatulyani  caksuradlni  upakaranani. 
Jaina- Vattika-Vrtti,  ir.  p.  98.  In  many  places,  however,  the  five  senses,  such  as 
eye,  ear,  etc.,  are  mentioned  as  senses,  and  living  beings  are  often  classified  according 
to  the  number  of  senses  they  possess.  (See  Pramanamimamsa.  See  also  Tattvarthd- 
dhi^amasiitra,  ch.  11.  etc.)    But  this  is  with  reference  to  the  sense  organs.    The  denial 


vi]  Non-perceptual  Knowledge  185 

that  the  veil  of  ignorance  upon  the  "self"  regarding  the  object  has 
been  removed.  Inwardly  this  removal  is  determined  by  the 
karma  of  the  individual,  outwardly  it  is  determined  by  the  pre- 
sence of  the  object  of  perception,  light,  the  capacity  of  the  sense 
organs,  and  such  other  conditions.  Contrary  to  the  Buddhists 
and  many  other  Indian  systems,  the  Jains  denied  the  existence 
of  any  nirvikalpa  (indeterminate)  stage  preceding  the  final  savi- 
kalpa  (determinate)  stage  of  perception.  There  was  a  direct 
revelation  of  objects  from  within  and  no  indeterminate  sense-  ^'7 
materials  were  necessary  for  the  development  of  determinate 
perceptions.  We  must  contrast  this  with  the  Buddhists  who 
regarded  that  the  first  stage  consisting  of  the  presentation  of  in->;jj 
determinate  sense  materials  was  the  only  valid  part  of  perception. 
The  determinate  stage  with  them  is  the  result  of  the  application 
of  mental  categories,  such  as  imagination,  memory,  etc.,  and  hence 
does  not  truly  represent  the  presentative  part^ 

Non-Perceptual  Knowledge. 

Non-perceptual  knowledge  {paroksa)  differs  from  pratyaksa 
in  this,  that  it  does  not  give  us  so  vivid  a  picture  of  objects  as  the 
latter.  Since  the  Jains  do  not  admit  that  the  senses  had  any  func- 
tion in  determining  the  cognitions  of  the  soul,  the  only  distinction 
they  could  draw  between  perception  and  other  forms  of  knowledge 
was  that  the  knowledge  of  the  former  kind  (perception)  gave  us 
clearer  features  and  characteristics  of  objects  than  the  latter. 
Paroksa  thus  includes  inference,  recognition,  implication,  memory, 
etc. ;  and  this  knowledge  is  decidedly  less  vivid  than  perception. 

Regarding  inference,  the  Jains  hold  that  it  is  unnecessary  to 
have  five  propositions,  such  as:  (i)  "the  hill  is  fiery,"  (2)  "because  \ 
of  smoke,"  (3)  "wherever  there  is  smoke  there  is  fire,  such  as  the 
kitchen,"  (4)  "this  hill  is  smoky,"  (5)  "therefore  it  is  fiery,"  called 
respectively  pratijiid,  hetu,  drstdnta,  upanaya  and  nigamana,  ex- 
cept for  the  purpose  of  explicitness.  It  is  only  the  first  two 
propositions  which  actually  enter  into  the  inferential  process 
{Prameyakamalamdrtanda,  pp.   108,  109).     When  we  make  an 

of  separate  senses  is  with  reference  to  admitting  them  as  entities  or  capacities  having 
a  distinct  and  separate  category  of  existence  from  the  soul.  The  sense  organs  are  like 
windows  for  the  soul  to  look  out.  They  cannot  thus  modify  the  sense-knowledge 
which  rises  in  the  soul  by  inward  determination ;  for  it  is  already  existent  in  it ;  the 
perceptual  process  only  means  that  the  veil  which  was  observing  it  is  removed. 
^  Prameyakamalanidrtanda,  pp.  8-11. 


1 86  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

inference  we  do  not  proceed  through  the  five  propositions  as 
above.  They  who  know  that  the  reason  is  inseparably  connected 
with  the  probanda m  either  as  coexistence  {sahabhdva)  or  as  in- 
variable antecedence  {kramabhdvd)  will  from  the  mere  statement 
of  the  existence  of  the  reason  (e.g.  smoke)  in  the  hill  jump  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  hill  has  got  fire.  A  syllogism  consisting  of 
five  propositions  is  rather  for  explaining  the  matter  to  a  child 
than  for  representing  the  actual  state  of  the  mind  in  making  an 
inference^ 

As  regards  proof  by  testimony  the  Jains  do  not  admit  the 
authority  of  the  Vedas,  but  believe  that  the  Jaina  scriptures  give 
us  right  knowledge,  for  these  are  the  utterances  of  persons  who 
have  lived  a  worldly  life  but  afterwards  by  right  actions  and 
right  knowledge  have  conquered  all  passions  and  removed  all 
ignorance^. 

Knowledge  as  Revelation. 

The  Buddhists  had  affirmed  that  the  proof  of  the  existence  of 
anything  depended  upon  the  effect  that  it  could  produce  on  us. 
That  which  could  produce  any  effect  on  us  was  existent,  and  that 

^  As  regards  concomitance  {vyapti)  some  of  the  Jaina  logicians  like  the  Buddhists 
prefer  antarvyapti  (between  smoke  and  fire)  to  bahirvyapti  (the  place  containing  smoke 
with  the  place  containing  fire).  They  also  divide  inference  into  two  classes,  svartha- 
numdna  for  one's  own  self  and  pardrthanumdna  for  convincing  others.  It  may  not 
be  out  of  place  to  note  that  the  earliest  Jaina  view  as  maintained  by  Bhadrabahu  in  his 
Da^avaikalikaniryukti  was  in  favour  of  ten  propositions  for  making  an  inference ; 
(i)  Pratijfid  (e.g.  non-injury  to  life  is  thegreatest  virtue),  (2)  Pratijhdvibhakti  (non-in- 
jury to  life  is  the  greatest  virtue  according  to  Jaina  scriptures),  (3)  Hetu  (because  those 
who  adhere  to  non-injury  are  loved  by  gods  and  it  is  meritorious  to  do  them  honour), 
{4)  Hetu  vibhakti  (those  who  do  so  are  the  only  persons  who  can  live  in  the  highest 
places  of  virtue),  (5)  Vipaksa  (but  even  by  doing  injury  one  may  prosper  and  even  by 
reviling  Jaina  scriptures  one  may  attain  merit  as  is  the  case  with  Brahmins),  (6)  Vipaksa 
pratisedha  (it  is  not  so,  it  is  impossible  that  those  who  despise  Jaina  scriptuies  should 
be  loved  by  gods  or  should  deserve  honour),  (7)  Drstdnta  (the  Arhats  take  food  from 
householders  as  they  do  not  like  to  cook  themselves  for  fear  of  killing  insects),  (8)  As- 
anka  (but  the  sins  of  the  householders  should  touch  the  arhats,  for  they  cook  for  them), 
(9)  Asankdpratisedha  (this  cannot  be,  for  the  arhats  go  to  certain  houses  unexpectedly, 
so  it  could  not  be  said  that  the  cooking  was  undertaken  for  them),  (10)  Naigamana 
(non-injury  is  therefore  the  greatest  virtue)  (Vidyabhiisana's  Indian  Logic).  These  are 
persuasive  statements  which  are  often  actually  adopted  in  a  discussion,  but  from  a 
formal  point  of  view  many  of  these  are  irrelevant.  When  Vatsyayana  in  his  Nydya- 
sutrabhdsya,  1.  i.  32,  says  that  Gautama  introduced  the  doctrine  of  five  propositions  as 
against  the  doctrine  of  ten  propositions  as  held  by  other  logicians,  he  probably  had 
this  Jaina  view  in  his  mind. 

"^  Sqq /ainaiarkavdrilika,  and  Pariksdmukhasiitravrtti,  and  Saddar§anasamuccaya 
with  Gunaratna  on  Jainism. 


vi]  Theory  of  Being  187 

which  could  not  non-existent.  In  fact  production  of  effect  was 
with  them  the  only  definition  of  existence  (being).  Theoretically 
each  unit  of  effect  being  different  from  any  other  unit  of  effect, 
they  supposed  that  there  was  a  succession  of  different  units  of 
effect  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  acknowledged  a  succession  of 
new  substances  every  moment.  All  things  were  thus  momentary. 
The  Jains  urged  that  the  reason  why  the  production  of  effect 
may  be  regarded  as  the  only  proof  of  being  is  that  we  can  assert 
only  that  thing  the  existence  of  which  is  indicated  by  a  corre- 
sponding experience.  When  we  have  a  unit  of  experience  we 
suppose  the  existence  of  the  object  as  its  ground.  This  being  so, 
the  theoretical  analysis  of  the  Buddhists  that  each  unit  of  effect 
produced  in  us  is  not  exactly  the  same  at  each  new  point  of  time, 
and  that  therefore  all  things  are  momentary,  is  fallacious ;  for  ex- 
perience shows  that  not  all  of  an  object  is  found  to  be  changing 
every  moment ;  some  part  of  it  (e.g.  gold  in  a  gold  ornament)  is 
found  to  remain  permanent  while  other  parts  (e.g.  its  form  as  ear- 
rings or  bangles)  are  seen  to  undergo  change.  How  in  the  face 
of  such  an  experience  can  we  assert  that  the  whole  thing  vanishes 
every  moment  and  that  new  things  are  being  renewed  at  each 
succeeding  moment?  Hence  leaving  aside  mere  abstract  and 
unfounded  speculations,  if  we  look  to  experience  we  find  that  the 
conception  of  being  or  existence  involves  a  notion  of  permanence 
associated  with  change — parydya  (acquirement  of  new  qualities 
and  the  loss  of  old  ones).  The  Jains  hold  that  the  defects  of  other 
systems  lie  in  this,  that  they  interpret  experience  only  from  one 
particular  standpoint  {nayd)  whereas  they  alone  carefully  weigh 
experience  from  all  points  of  view  and  acquiesce  in  the  truths 
indicated  by  it,  not  absolutely  but  under  proper  reservations  and 
limitations.  The  Jains  hold'  that  in  formulating  the  doctrine  of 
arthakriydkdritva  the  Buddhists  at  first  showed  signs  of  starting 
on  their  enquiry  on  the  evidence  of  experience,  but  soon  they 
became  one-sided  in  their  analysis  and  indulged  in  unwarrantable 
abstract  speculations  which  went  directly  against  experience. 
Thus  if  we  go  by  experience  we  can  neither  reject  the  self  nor 
the  external  world  as  some  Buddhists  did.  Knowledge  which 
reveals  to  us  the  clear-cut  features  of  the  external  world  certifies 
at  the  same  time  that  such  knowledge  is  part  and  parcel  of  myself 
as  the  subject.  Knowledge  is  thus  felt  to  be  an  expression  of  my 
own  self.    We  do  not  perceive  in  experience  that  knowledge 


1 88  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

in  us  is  generated  by  the  external  world,  but  there  is  in  us  the 
rise  of  knowledge  and  of  certain  objects  made  known  to  us  by  it. 
The  rise  of  knowledge  is  thus  only  parallel  to  certain  objective 
collocations  of  things  which  somehow  have  the  special  fitness 
that  they  and  they  alone  are  perceived  at  that  particular  moment. 
Looked  at  from  this  point  of  view  all  our  experiences  are  centred 
in  ourselves,  for  determined  somehow,  our  experiences  come  to  us 
as  modifications  of  our  own  self.  Knowledge  being  a  character 
of  the  self,  it  shows  itself  as  manifestations  of  the  self  independent 
of  the  senses.  No  distinction  should  be  made  between  a  conscious 
and  an  unconscious  element  in  knowledge  as  Samkhya  does.  Nor 
should  knowledge  be  regarded  as  a  copy  of  the  objects  which  it 
reveals,  as  the  Sautrantikas  think,  for  then  by  copying  the  materi- 
ality of  the  object,  knowledge  would  itself  become  material. 
Knowledge  should  thus  be  regarded  as  a  formless  quality  of  the 
self  revealing  all  objects  by  itself  But  the  Mlmarnsa  view  that  the 
validity  {prdmdnya)  of  all  knowledge  is  proved  by  knowledge  W.- 
se\^ {svatahprdjudnyd)  is  wrong.  Both  logically  and  psychologically 
the  validity  of  knowledge  depends  upon  outward  correspondence 
{samvddd)  with  facts.  But  in  those  cases  where  by  previous 
knowledge  of  correspondence  a  right  belief  has  been  produced 
there  may  be  a  psychological  ascertainment  of  validity  without 
reference  to  objective  facts  {prdmdnyamutpattau  parata  eva 
jnaptau  svakdrye  ca  svatah  paratasca  abhydsdnabhydsdpeksaydy. 
The  objective  world  exists  as  it  is  certified  by  experience.  But 
that  it  generates  knowledge  in  us  is  an  unwarrantable  hypo- 
thesis, for  knowledge  appears  as  a  revelation  of  our  own  self  This 
brings  us  to  a  consideration  of  Jaina  metaphysics. 

The  JTvas. 

The  Jains  say  that  experience  shows  that  all  things  may  be 
divided  into  the  living  {Jiva)  and  the  non-living  {ajiva).  The 
principle  of  life  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  body,  and  it  is  most 
erroneous  to  think  that  life  is  either  the  product  or  the  property 
of  the  body-.  It  is  on  account  of  this  life-principle  that  the  body 
appears  to  be  living  This  principle  is  the  soul.  The  soul  is 
directly  perceived  (by  introspection)  just  as  the  external  things 
are.    It  is  not  a  mere  symbolical  object  indicated  by  a  phrase  or 

^  Prameyakamalatnartanda,  pp.  38-43. 
"^  Set  Jaina  Vartlika,  p.  60. 


vi]  Souls  1 89 

a  description.  This  is  directly  against  the  view  of  the  great 
Mimamsa  authority  Prabhakara^  The  soul  in  its  pure  state  is 
possessed  of  infinite  perception  (aiianta-darsand)^  infinite  know- 
ledge {ananta-jndna\  infinite  bliss  {aiianta- sukhd)  and  infinite 
power  {ananta-viryay.  It  is  all  perfect.  Ordinarily  however,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  released  pure  souls  {mukta-Jiva),  all  the 
other  jivas  (samsdrhi)  have  all  their  purity  and  power  covered  with 
a  thin  veil  of  karma  matter  which  has  been  accumulating  in  them 
from  beginningless  time.  These  souls  are  infinite  in  number.  They 
are  substances  and  are  eternal.  They  in  reality  occupy  innumer- 
able space-points  in  our  mundane  world  {lokdkdsa),  have  a  limited 
size  {madhyaina-parimdna)  and  are  neither  all-pervasive  ivibhi) 
nor  atomic  {ami};  it  is  on  account  of  this  that  Jzva  is  called 
Jivdstikdya.  The  word  astikdya  means  anything  that  occupies 
space  or  has  some  pervasiveness;  but  these  souls  expand  and 
contract  themselves  according  to  the  dimensions  of  the  body 
which  they  occupy  at  any  time  (bigger  in  the  elephant  and 
smaller  in  the  ant  life).  It  is  well  to  remember  that  according  to 
the  Jains  the  soul  occupies  the  whole  of  the  body  in  which  it 
lives,  so  that  from  the  tip  of  the  hair  to  the  nail  of  the  foot, 
wherever  there  may  be  any  cause  of  sensation,  it  can  at  once  feel 
it.  The  manner  in  which  the  soul  occupies  the  body  is  often  ex- 
plained as  being  similar  to  the  manner  in  which  a  lamp  illumines 
the  whole  room  though  remaining  in  one  corner  of  the  room.  The 
Jains  divide  the  jivas  according  to  the  number  of  sense-organs 
they  possess.  The  lowest  class  consists  of  plants,  which  possess 
only  the  sense-organ  of  touch.  The  next  higher  class  is  that 
of  worms,  which  possess  two  sense-organs  of  touch  and  taste. 
Next  come  the  ants,  etc.,  which  possess  touch,  taste,  and  smell. 
The  next  higher  one  that  of  bees,  etc.,  possessing  vision  in 
addition  to  touch,  taste,  and  smell.  The  vertebrates  possess  all 
the  five  sense-organs.  The  higher  animals  among  these,  namely 
men,  denizens  of  hell,  and  the  gods  possess  in  addition  to  these 
an  inner  sense-organ  namely  inanas  by  virtue  of  which  they  are 

^  See  Pravieyakamalamartatida,  p.  33. 

"^  The  Jains  distinguish  between  dariana  and  jndna.  Dar^ana  is  the  knowledge  of 
things  without  their  details,  e.g.  I  see  a  cloth.  Jiiana  means  the  knowledge  of  details, 
e.g.  I  not  only  see  the  cloth,  but  know  to  whom  it  belongs,  of  what  quality  it  is, 
where  it  was  prepared,  etc.  In  all  cognition  we  have  first  dar^ana  and  then  jnana. 
The  pure  souls  possess  infinite  general  perception  of  all  things  as  well  as  infinite 
knowledge  of  all  things  in  all  their  details. 


I90  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

called  rational  {samjnin)  while  the  lower  animals  have  no  reason 
and  are  called  asamjhin. 

Proceeding  towards  the  lowest  animal  we  find  that  the  Jains 
regard  all  the  four  elements  (earth,  water,  air,  fire)  as  being  ani- 
mated by  souls.  Thus  particles  of  earth,  etc.,  are  the  bodies  of 
souls,  called  earth-lives,  etc.  These  we  may  call  elementary  lives; 
they  live  and  die  and  are  born  again  in  another  elementary  body. 
These  elementary  lives  are  either  gross  or  subtle ;  in  the  latter  case 
they  are  invisible.  The  last  class  of  one-organ  lives  are  plants. 
Of  some  plants  each  is  the  body  of  one  soul  only;  but  of  other 
plants,  each  is  an  aggregation  of  embodied  souls,  which  have  all 
the  functions  of  life  such  as  respiration  and  nutrition  in  common. 
Plants  in  which  only  one  soul  is  embodied  are  always  gross ;  they 
exist  in  the  habitable  part  of  the  world  only.  But  those  plants 
of  which  each  is  a  colony  of  plant  lives  may  also  be  subtle  and 
invisible,  and  in  that  case  they  are  distributed  all  over  the  world. 
The  whole  universe  is  full  of  minute  beings  called  nigodas;  they 
are  groups  of  infinite  number  of  souls  forming  very  small  clusters, 
having  respiration  and  nutrition  in  common  and  experiencing  ex- 
treme pains.  The  whole  space  of  the  world  is  closely  packed  with 
them  like  a  box  filled  with  powder.  The  nigodas  furnish  the  supply 
of  souls  in  place  of  those  that  have  reached  Moksa.  But  an 
infinitesimally  small  fraction  of  one  single  nigoda  has  sufficed  to 
replace  the  vacancy  caused  in  the  world  by  the  Nirvana  of  all  the 
souls  that  have  been  liberated  from  beginningless  past  down  to 
the  present.  Thus  it  is  evident  the  samsara  will  never  be  empty 
of  living  beings.  Those  of  the  nigodas  who  long  for  development 
come  out  and  contiune  their  course  of  progress  through  successive 
stages  ^ 

Karma  Theory. 

It  is  on  account  of  their  merits  or  demerits  that  the  jivas  are 
born  as  gods,  men,  animals,  or  denizens  of  hell.  We  have  already 
noticed  in  Chapter  III  that  the  cause  of  the  embodiment  of  soul 
is  the  presence  in  it  of  karma  matter.  The  natural  perfections  of 
the  pure  soul  are  sullied  by  the  different  kinds  of  karma  matter. 
Those  which  obscure  right  knowledge  of  details  {Jndna)  are 
called  jhdndvararilya,  those  which  obscure  right  perception 
(darsana)  as  in  sleep  are  called  darsandvaranlya,  those  which 

^  See  Jacobi's  article  on  Jainism,  E.  R.  E.,  and  LokaprakaSa,  vi.  pp.  31  ff. 


vi]  Ejects  of  Karma  191 

obscure  the  bliss-nature  of  the  soul  and  thus  produce  pleasure  and 
pain  are  vedaniya,  and  those  which  obscure  the  right  attitude  of  the 
soul  towards  faith  and  right  conduct  mohanlya^.  In  addition  to 
these  four  kinds  of  karma  there  are  other  four  kinds  of  karma  which 
determine  (i)  the  length  of  life  in  any  birth,  (2)  the  peculiar  body 
with  its  general  and  special  qualities  and  faculties,  (3)  the  nation- 
ality, caste,  family,  social  standing,  etc.,  (4)  the  inborn  energy  of  the 
soul  by  the  obstruction  of  which  it  prevents  the  doing  of  a  good 
action  when  there  is  a  desire  to  do  it.  These  are  respectively  called 
(i)  dynska  karma,  (2)  ndma  karma,  {t,) gotra  karma,  (4)  antardya 
karma.  By  our  actions  of  mind,  speech  and  body,  we  are  con- 
tinually producing  certain  subtle  karma  matter  which  in  the  first 
instance  is  called  bhdva  karma,  which  transforms  itself  into  dravya 
karma  and  pours  itself  into  the  soul  and  sticks  there  by  coming 
into  contact  with  the  passions  {kasdya)  of  the  soul.  These  act  like 
viscous  substances  in  retaining  the  inpouring  karma  matter.  This 
matter  acts  in  eight  different  ways  and  it  is  accordingly  divided 
into  eight  classes,  as  we  have  already  noticed.  This  karma  is  the 
cause  of  bondage  and  sorrow.  According  as  good  or  bad  karma 
matter  sticks  to  the  soul  it  gets  itself  coloured  respectively  as 
golden,  lotus-pink,  white  and  black,  blue  and  grey  and  they  are 
called  the  lesyds.  The  feelings  generated  by  the  accumulation  of 
the  karma-matter  are  called  bhdva-lesyd  and  the  actual  coloration  ^ 
of  the  soul  by  it  is  called  dravya-lesyd.  According  as  any  karma 
matter  has  been  generated  by  good,  bad,  or  indifferent  actions,  it  ^ 
gives  us  pleasure,  pain,  or  feeling  of  indifference.  Even  the  know- 
ledge that  we  are  constantly  getting  by  perception,  inference,  etc., 
is  but  the  result  of  the  effect  of  karmas  in  accordance  with  which 
the  particular  kind  of  veil  which  was  obscuring  any  particular  kind 
of  knowledge  is  removed  at  any  time  and  we  have  a  knowledge 
of  a  corresponding  nature.  By  our  own  karmas  the  veils  over  our 
knowledge,  feeling,  etc.,  are  so  removed  that  we  have  just  that 
kind  of  knowledge  and  feeling  that  we  deserved  to  have.  All 
knowledge,  feeling,  etc.,  are  thus  in  one  sense  generated  from 
within,  the  external  objects  which  are  ordinarily  said  to  be 
generating  them  all  being  but  mere  coexistent  external  con- 
ditions. 

^  The  Jains  acknowledge  five  kinds  of  knowledge  :  (i)  mati/nana  (ordinary  cog- 
nition), (2)  sruti  (testimony),  (3)  avadhi  (supernatural  cognition),  (4)  manahparyaya 
(thought-reading),  (5)  kevala-jiidna  (omniscience). 


192  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

After  the  effect  of  a  particular  karma  matter  {karma-vargand) 
is  once  produced,  it  is  discharged  and  purged  from  off  the  soul. 
This  process  of  purging  off  the  karmas  is  called  nirjard.  If  no 
new  karma  matter  should  accumulate  then,  the  gradual  purging 
off  of  the  karmas  might  make  the  soul  free  of  karma  matter,  but  as 
it  is,  while  some  karma  matter  is  being  purged  off,  other  karma 
matter  is  continually  pouring  in,  and  thus  the  purging  and 
binding  processes  continuing  simultaneously  force  the  soul  to 
continue  its  mundane  cycle  of  existence,  transmigration,  and  re- 
birth. After  the  death  of  each  individual  his  soul,  together  with 
its  karmic  body  {kdrmanasarira\  goes  in  a  few  moments  to  the 
place  of  its  new  birth  and  there  assumes  a  new  body,  expanding 
or  contracting  in  accordance  with  the  dimensions  of  the  latter. 

In  the  ordinary  course  karma  takes  effect  and  produces  its 
proper  results,  and  at  such  a  stage  the  soul  is  said  to  be  in  the 
audayika  state.  By  proper  efforts  karma  may  however  be  pre- 
vented from  taking  effect,  though  it  still  continues  to  exist,  and 
this  is  said  to  be  the  aupasamika  state  of  the  soul.  When  karma 
is  not  only  prevented  from  operating  but  is  annihilated,  the  soul 
is  said  to  be  in  the  ksdyika  state,  and  it  is  from  this  state  that 
Moksa  is  attained.  There  is,  however,  a  fourth  state  of  ordinary 
good  men  with  whom  some  karma  is  annihilated,  some  neutralized, 
and  some  active  {ksdyopasamikdy . 

Karma,  Asrava  and  Nirjara. 

It  is  on  account  of  karma  that  the  souls  have  to  suffer  all 
the  experiences  of  this  world  process,  including  births  and  re- 
births in  diverse  spheres  of  life  as  gods,  men  or  animals,  or  insects. 
The  karmas  are  certain  sorts  of  infra-atomic  particles  of  matter 
(karma-vargand).  The  influx  of  these  karma  particles  into  the 
soul  is  called  asrava  in  Jainism.  These  karmas  are  produced  by 
body,  mind,  and  speech.  The  asravas  represent  the  channels  or 
modes  through  which  the  karmas  enter  the  soul,  just  like  the 
channels  through  which  water  enters  into  a  pond.  But  the  Jains 
distinguish  between  the  channels  and  the  karmas  which  actually 

1  The  stages  through  which  a  developing  soul  passes  are  technically  called  gmta- 
sthanas  which  are  fourteen  in  number.  The  first  three  stages  represent  the  growth  of 
faith  in  Jainism,  the  next  five  stages  are  those  in  which  all  the  passions  are  controlled, 
in  the  next  four  stages  the  ascetic  practises  yoga  and  destroys  all  his  karmas,  at  the 
thirteenth  stage  he  is  divested  of  all  karmas  but  he  still  practises  yoga  and  at  the 
fourteenth  stage  he  attains  liberation  (see  Dravyasamgrahavrtti,  13th  verse). 


vi]  Influx  of  Karma  i93 

enter  through  those  channels.  Thus  they  distinguish  two  kinds 
of  asravas,  bhavasrava  and  karmasrava.  Bhavasrava  means  the 
thought  activities  of  the  soul  through  which  or  on  account  of 
which  the  karma  particles  enter  the  souP.  Thus  Nemicandra 
says  that  bhavasrava  is  that  kind  of  change  in  the  soul  (which 
is  the  contrary  to  what  can  destroy  the  karmasrava),  by  which 
the  karmas  enter  the  soul-.  Karmasrava,  however,  means  the 
actual  entrance  of  the  karma  matter  into  the  soul.  These 
bhavasravas  are  in  general  of  five  kinds,  namely  delusion 
{ntithydtva\  want  of  control  {avirati),  inadvertence  {praindda\ 
the  activities  of  body,  mind  and  speech  {yoga)  and  the  pas- 
sions {kasdyas).  Delusion  again  is  of  five  kinds,  namely  ekdnta 
(a  false  belief  unknowingly  accepted  and  uncritically  followed), 
viparlta  (uncertainty  as  to  the  exact  nature  of  truth),  vinaya 
(retention  of  a  belief  knowing  it  to  be  false,  due  to  old  habit), 
samsaya  (doubt  as  to  right  or  wrong)  and  ajndna  (want  of  any 
belief  due  to  the  want  of  application  of  reasoning  powers). 
Avirati  is  again  of  five  kinds,  injury  ijihnsd),  falsehood  {anrta), 
stealing  {catiryya\  incontinence  {abrahnia),  and  desire  to  have 
things  which  one  does  not  already  possess  {parigrahdkdnksd). 
Pramada  or  inadvertence  is  again  of  five  kinds,  namely  bad  con- 
versation {vikathd),  passions  {kasdyd),  bad  use  of  the  five  senses 
{indriya),  sleep  {tiidrd),  attachment  {rdgd)^. 

Coming  to  dravyasrava  we  find  that  it  means  that  actual  in- 
flux of  karma  which  affects  the  soul  in  eight  different  manners 
in  accordance  with  which  these  karmas  are  classed  into  eight 
different  kinds,  namely  jnanavaranlya,  darsanavaraniya,  veda- 
niya,  mohanlya,  ayu,  nama,  gotra  and  antaraya.  These  actual 
influxes  take  place  only  as  a  result  of  the  bhavasrava  or  the  re- 
prehensible thought  activities,  or  changes  {parindind)  of  the  soul. 
The  states  of  thought  which  condition  the  coming  in  of  the  karmas 
is  called  bhavabandha  and  the  actual  bondage  of  the  soul  by  the 
actual  impure  connections  of  the  karmas  is  technically  called 
dravyabandha.  It  is  on  account  of  bhavabandha  that  the  actual 
connection  between  the  karmas  and  the  soul  can  take  placed  The 
actual  connections  of  the  karmas  with  the  soul  are  like  the  sticking 

^  Dravyasamgraha,  SI.  29. 

^  Nemicandra's  commentary  on  Dravyasamgraha,  SI.  29,  edited  by  S.  C.  Ghoshal, 
Arrah,  191 7. 

^  See  Nemicandra's  commentary  on  SI.  30. 

*  Nemicandra  on  31,  and  Vardhaiiianaptirana  XVI.  44,  quoted  by  Ghoshal. 
D.  13 


194  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch 

of  dust  on  the  body  of  a  person  who  is  besmeared  all  over  with 
oil.  Thus  Gunaratna  says:  "The  influx  of  karma  means  the 
contact  of  the  particles  of  karma  matter,  in  accordance  with  the 
particular  kind  of  karma,  with  the  soul,  just  like  the  sticking  of 
dust  on  the  body  of  a  person  besmeared  with  oil.  In  all  parts  of 
the  soul  there  being  infinite  number  of  karma  atoms  it  becomes 
so  completely  covered  with  them  that  in  some  sense  when  looked 
at  from  that  point  of  view  the  soul  is  sometimes  regarded  as  a 
material  body  during  its  sarnsara  staged"  From  one  point  of 
view  the  bondage  of  karma  is  only  of  punya  and  papa  (good 
and  bad  karmas)^.  From  another  this  bondage  is  of  four  kinds, 
according  to  the  nature  of  karma  {prakrti),  duration  of  bondage 
{sthiti),  intensity  {amibhaga)  and  extension  {pradesa).  The 
nature  of  karma  refers  to  the  eight  classes  of  karma  already 
mentioned,  namely  the  jnanavaranlya  karma  which  obscures  the 
infinite  knowledge  of  the  soul  of  all  things  in  detail,  darsana- 
varaniya  karma  which  obscures  the  infinite  general  knowledge 
of  the  soul,  vedanlya  karma  which  produces  the  feelings  of 
pleasure  and  pain  in  the  soul,  mohanlya  karma,  which  so  in- 
fatuates souls  that  they  fail  to  distinguish  what  is  right  from 
what  is  wrong,  ayu  karma,  which  determines  the  tenure  of  any 
particular  life,  nama  karma  which  gives  them  personalities,  gotra 
karma  which  brings  about  a  particular  kind  of  social  surrounding 
for  the  soul  and  antaraya  karma  which  tends  to  oppose  the  per- 
formance of  right  actions  by  the  soul.  The  duration  of  the  stay 
of  any  karma  in  the  soul  is  called  sthiti.  Again  a  karma  may  be 
intense,  middling  or  mild,  and  this  indicates  the  third  principle 
of  division,  anubhaga.  Pradesa  refers  to  the  different  parts  of 
the  soul  to  which  the  karma  particles  attach  themselves.  The 
duration  of  stay  of  any  karma  and  its  varying  intensity  are  due 
to  the  nature  of  the  kasayas  or  passions  of  the  soul,  whereas  the 
different  classification  of  karmas  as  jflanavaranlya,  etc.,  are  due  to 
the  nature  of  specific  contact  of  the  soul  with  karma  matter^ 

Corresponding  to  the  two  modes  of  inrush  of  karmas  (bhava- 
srava  and  dravyasrava)  are  two  kinds  of  control  opposing  this 
inrush,  by  actual  thought  modification  of  a  contrary  nature  and 
by  the  actual  stoppage  of  the  inrush  of  karma  particles,  and 
these  are  respectively  called  bhavasarnvara  and  dravyasarnvara*. 

1  See  Gunaratna,  p.  i8i.  ^  Ibid.  ^  Nemicandra,  33. 

*    Varddhafmlnapurana,  XVI.  67-68,  and  Dravyasamgrahavrtti,  61.  35. 


vi]  Self-control  195 

The  bhavasamvaras  are  (i)  the  vows  of  non-injury,  truthfulness, 
abstinence  from  stealing,  sex-control,  and  non-acceptance  of  objects 
of  desire,  (2)  samitis  consisting  of  the  use  of  trodden  tracks  in  order 
to  avoid  injury  to  insects  {tryd),  gentle  and  holy  talk  {bkdsd),  re- 
ceiving proper  alms  {esand),  etc.,  (3)  guptis  or  restraints  of  body, 
speech  and  mind,  (4)  dharmas  consisting  of  habits  of  forgive- 
ness, humility,  straightforwardness,  truth,  cleanliness,  restraint, 
penance,  abandonment,  indifference  to  any  kind  of  gain  or  loss, 
and  supreme  sex-control \  (5)  antipreksd  consisting  of  meditation 
about  the  transient  character  of  the  world,  about  our  helplessness 
without  the  truth,  about  the  cycles  of  world-existence,  about  our 
own  responsibilities  for  our  good  and  bad  actions,  about  the 
difference  between  the  soul  and  the  non-soul,  about  the  unclean- 
liness  of  our  body  and  all  that  is  associated  with  it,  about  the  in- 
flux of  karma  and  its  stoppage  and  the  destruction  of  those 
karmas  which  have  already  entered  the  soul,  about  soul,  matter 
and  the  substance  of  the  universe,  about  the  difficulty  of  attaining 
true  knowledge,  faith,  and  conduct,  and  about  the  essential  prin- 
ciples of  the  world ^,  (6)  the  parlsahajaya  consisting  of  the  con- 
quering of  all  kinds  of  physical  troubles  of  heat,  cold,  etc.,  and 
of  feelings  of  discomforts  of  various  kinds,  (7)  cdritra  or  right 
conduct. 

Next  to  this  we  come  to  nirjara  or  the  purging  off  of  the 
karmas  or  rather  their  destruction.  This  nirjara  also  is  of  two 
kinds,  bhavanirjara  and  dravyanirjara.  Bhavanirjara  means  that 
change  in  the  soul  by  virtue  of  which  the  karma  particles  are 
destroyed.  Dravyanirjara  means  the  actual  destruction  of  these 
karma  particles  either  by  the  reaping  of  their  effects  or  by 
penances  before  their  time  of  fruition,  called  savipaka  and  avipaka 
nirjaras  respectively.  When  all  the  karmas  are  destroyed  moksa 
or  liberation  is  effected. 

Pudgala. 

The  ajlva  (non-living)  is  divided  into  pudgaldstikdya,  dharma 
stikdya,  adharmdstikdya,  dkdsdstikdya,  kdla,  punya,  papa.    The 
word  pudgala  means  matter*,  and  it  is  called  astikdya  in   the 
sense   that  it  occupies  space.     Pudgala  is  made  up  of  atoms 

1   Tattvdrthddhigamasutra.  2  /3/(/^ 

*  This  is  entirely  different  from  the  Buddhist  sense.    With  the  Buddhists  pudgala 
means  an  individual  or  a  person. 


196  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

which  are  without  size  and  eternal.  Matter  may  exist  in  two 
states,  gross  (such  as  things  we  see  around  us),  and  subtle  (such 
as  the  karma  matter  which  sullies  the  soul).  All  material  things 
are  ultimately  produced  by  the  combination  of  atoms.  The 
smallest  indivisible  particle  of  matter  is  called  an  atom  {anu). 
The  atoms  are  all  eternal  and  they  all  have  touch,  taste,  smell, 
and  colour.  The  formation  of  different  substances  is  due  to  the 
different  geometrical,  spherical  or  cubical  modes  of  the  combi- 
nation of  the  atoms,  to  the  diverse  modes  of  their  inner  arrange- 
ment and  to  the  existence  of  different  degrees  of  inter-atomic 
space  {ghanapratarabhedena).  Some  combinations  take  place  by 
simple  mutual  contact  at  two  points  {yugmapi'adesa)  whereas 
in  others  the  atoms  are  only  held  together  by  the  points  of  at- 
tractive force  {pjahpradesd)  {Prajfidpanopdngasiltra,  pp.  10-12). 
Two  atoms  form  a  compound  {skmidhd),  when  the  one  is  viscous 
and  the  other  dry  or  both  are  of  different  degrees  of  viscosity  or 
dryness.  It  must  be  noted  that  while  the  Buddhists  thought  that 
there  was  no  actual  contact  between  the  atoms  the  Jains  regarded 
the  contact  as  essential  and  as  testified  by  experience.  These 
compounds  combine  with  other  compounds  and  thus  produce 
the  gross  things  of  the  world.  They  are,  however,  liable  to 
constant  change  {parind7na)  by  which  they  lose  some  of  their 
old  qualities  {gimas)  and  acquire  new  ones.  There  are  four 
elements,  earth,  water,  air,  and  fire,  and  the  atoms  of  all  these 
are  alike  in  character.  The  perception  of  grossness  however 
is  not  an  error  which  is  imposed  upon  the  perception  of  the 
atoms  by  our  mind  (as  the  Buddhists  think)  nor  is  it  due  to  the 
perception  of  atoms  scattered  spatially  lengthwise  and  breadthwise 
(as  the  Samkhya-Yoga  supposes),  but  it  is  due  to  the  accession  of 
a  similar  property  of  grossness,  blueness  or  hardness  in  the  com- 
bined atoms,  so  that  such  knowledge  is  generated  in  us  as  is  given 
in  the  perception  of  a  gross,  blue,  or  a  hard  thing.  When  a  thing 
appears  as  blue,  what  happens  is  this,  that  the  atoms  there  have 
all  acquired  the  property  of  blueness  and  on  the  removal  of  the 
darsanavaranlya  and  jnanavaraniya  veil,  there  arises  in  the  soul 
the  perception  and  knowledge  of  that  blue  thing.  This  sameness 
{samdna-riipatd)  of  the  accession  of  a  quality  in  an  aggregate  of 
atoms  by  virtue  of  which  it  appears  as  one  object  (e.g.  a  cow) 
is  technically  called  tiryaksdmdnya.  This  samanya  or  generality 
is  thus  neither  an  imposition  of  the  mind  nor  an  abstract  entity 


vi]  D  karma  197 

(as  maintained  by  the  Naiyayikas)  but  represents  only  the  ac- 
cession of  similar  quahties  by  a  similar  development  of  qualities 
of  atoms  forming  an  aggregate.  So  long  as  this  similarity  of 
qualities  continues  we  perceive  the  thing  to  be  the  same  and 
to  continue  for  some  length  of  time.  When  we  think  of  a  thing 
to  be  permanent,  we  do  so  by  referring  to  this  sameness  in  the 
developing  tendencies  of  an  aggregate  of  atoms  resulting  in  the 
relative  permanence  of  similar  qualities  in  them.  According  to 
the  Jains  things  are  not  momentary  and  in  spite  of  the  loss  of 
some  old  qualities  and  the  accession  of  other  ones,  the  thing  as 
a  whole  may  remain  more  or  less  the  same  for  some  time.  This 
sameness  of  qualities  in  time  is  technically  called  urdhvasdmdnya^. 
If  the  atoms  are  looked  at  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  change 
and  accession  of  new  qualities,  they  may  be  regarded  as  liable  to 
destruction,  but  if  they  are  looked  at  from  the  point  of  view  of 
substance  {dravyd)  they  are  eternal. 

Dharma,  Adharma,  Akasa. 

The  conception  of  dharma  and  adharma  in  Jainism  is 
absolutely  different  from  what  they  mean  in  other  systems  of 
Indian  philosophy.  Dharma  is  devoid  of  taste,  touch,  smell, 
sound  and  colour;  it  is  conterminous  with  the  mundane  universe 
{lokdkdsd)  and  pervades  every  part  of  it.  The  term  astikdya 
is  therefore  applied  to  it.  It  is  the  principle  of  motion,  the  ac- 
companying circumstance  or  cause  which  makes  motion  possible, 
like  water  to  a  moving  fish.  The  water  is  a  passive  condition 
or  circumstance  of  the  movement  of  a  fish,  i.e.  it  is  indifferent 
or  passive  {uddsind)  and  not  an  active  or  solicitous  {prerakd) 
cause.  The  water  cannot  compel  a  fish  at  rest  to  move ;  but  if 
the  fish  wants  to  move,  water  is  then  the  necessary  help  to  its 
motion.  Dharma  cannot  make  the  soul  or  matter  move  ;  but 
if  they  are  to  move,  they  cannot  do  so  without  the  presence  of 
dharma.  Hence  at  the  extremity  of  the  mundane  world  (lokd) 
in  the  region  of  the  liberated  souls,  there  being  no  dharma,  the 
liberated  souls  attain  perfect  rest.  They  cannot  move  there 
because  there  is  not  the  necessary  motion-element,  dharma^ 
Adharma  is  also  regarded  as  a  similar  pervasive  entity  which 

^  iie.Q  Prameyaka?nalamdrianda.i  \>Y).  i^6-i^^;  Jainatarkavdrttika,  ■p.  io6. 
^  Dravyasamgrahavrtti,  17-20. 


198  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

helps  jivas  and  pudgalas  to  keep  themselves  at  rest.  No  substance 
could  move  if  there  were  no  dharma,  or  could  remain  at  rest  if 
there  were  no  adharma.  The  necessity  of  admitting  these  two 
categories  seems  probably  to  have  been  felt  by  the  Jains  on 
account  of  their  notion  that  the  inner  activity  of  the  jiva  or  the 
atoms  required  for  its  exterior  realization  the  help  of  some  other 
extraneous  entity,  without  which  this  could  not  have  been  trans- 
formed into  actual  exterior  motion.  Moreover  since  the  jIvas 
were  regarded  as  having  activity  inherent  in  them  they  would  be 
found  to  be  moving  even  at  the  time  of  liberation  (moksa),  which 
was  undesirable;  thus  it  was  conceived  that  actual  motion  required 
for  its  fulfilment  the  help  of  an  extraneous  entity  which  was  absent 
in  the  region  of  the  liberated  souls. 

The  category  of  akasa  is  that  subtle  entity  which  pervades 
the  mundane  universe  ijoka)  and  the  transcendent  region  of 
liberated  souls  {alokd)  which  allows  the  subsistence  of  all  other 
substances  such  as  dharma,  adharma,  jiva,  pudgala.  It  is  not  a 
mere  negation  and  absence  of  veil  or  obstruction,  or  mere  empti- 
ness, but  a  positive  entity  which  helps  other  things  to  inter- 
penetrate it.  On  account  of  its  pervasive  character  it  is  called 
dkdsdstikdya}. 

Kala  and  Samaya. 

Time  {kdla)  in  reality  consists  of  those  innumerable  particles 
which  never  mix  with  one  another,  but  which  help  the  happening 
of  the  modification  or  accession  of  new  qualities  and  the  change 
of  qualities  of  the  atoms.  Kala  does  not  bring  about  the  changes 
of  qualities,  in  things,  but  just  as  akasa  helps  interpenetration 
and  dharma  motion,  so  also  kala  helps  the  action  of  the  transfor- 
mation of  new  qualities  in  things.  Time  perceived  as  moments, 
hours,  days,  etc.,  is  called  samaya.  This  is  the  appearance  of  the 
unchangeable  kala  in  so  many  forms.  Kala  thus  not  only  aids 
the  modifications  of  other  things,  but  also  allows  its  own  modifi- 
cations as  moments,  hours,  etc.  It  is  thus  a  dravya  (substance), 
and  the  moments,  hours,  etc.,  are  its  paryayas.  The  unit  of  samaya 
is  the  time  required  by  an  atom  to  traverse  a  unit  of  space  by  a 
slow  movement. 

1  Dravyasamp-ahavrtti,  19. 


vi]  Rules  of  Conduct  1 99 

Jaina  Cosmography. 

According  to  the  Jains,  the  world  is  eternal,  without  beginning 
or  end.  Loka  is  that  place  in  which  happiness  and  misery  are  expe- 
rienced as  results  of  virtue  and  vice.  It  is  composed  of  three  parts, 
urdhva  (where  the  gods  reside),  madJiya  (this  world  of  ours),  and 
adho  (where  the  denizens  of  hell  reside).  The  mundane  universe 
{lokdkdsa)  is  pervaded  with  dharma  which  makes  all  movement 
possible.  Beyond  the  lokakasa  there  is  no  dharma  and  therefore 
no  movement,  but  only  space  {dkdsd).  Surrounding  this  lokakasa 
are  three  layers  of  air.  The  perfected  soul  rising  straight  over 
the  urdhvaloka  goes  to  the  top  of  this  lokakasa  and  (there  being 
no  dharma)  remains  motionless  there. 

Jaina  Yoga. 
Yoga  according  to  Jainism  is  the  cause  of  moksa  (salvation). 
This  yoga  consists  of  jilana  (knowledge  of  reality  as  it  is),  sraddha 
(faith  in  the  teachings  of  the  Jinas),  and  caritra  (cessation  from 
doing  all  that  is  evil).  This  caritra  consists  of  ahhnsd  (not 
taking  any  life  even  by  mistake  or  unmindfulness),  sunrta 
(speaking  in  such  a  way  as  is  true,  good  and  pleasing),  asteya 
(not  taking  anything  which  has  not  been  given),  brahniacaryya 
(abandoning  lust  for  all  kinds  of  objects,  in  mind,  speech  and 
body),  and  aparigraha  (abandoning  attachment  for  all  things)^ 
These  strict  rules  of  conduct  only  apply  to  ascetics  who  are  bent 
on  attaining  perfection.  The  standard  proposed  for  the  ordinary 
householders  is  fairly  workable.  Thus  it  is  said  by  Hemacandra, 
that  ordinary  householders  should  earn  money  honestly,  should 
follow  the  customs  of  good  people,  should  marry  a  good  girl  from 
a  good  family,  should  follow  the  customs  of  the  country  and  so 
forth.    These  are  just  what  we  should  expect  from  any  good  and 

^  Certain  external  rules  of  conduct  are  also  called  caritra.  These  are :  Iryyd  (to 
go  by  the  path  already  trodden  by  others  and  illuminated  by  the  sun's  rays,  so  that 
proper  precaution  may  be  taken  while  walking  to  prevent  oneself  from  treading  on 
insects,  etc.,  which  may  be  lying  on  the  way),  hhasd  (to  speak  well  and  pleasantly 
to  all  beings),  isana  (to  beg  alms  in  the  proper  monastic  manner),  ddnasamiti  (to 
inspect  carefully  the  seats  avoiding  all  transgressions  when  taking  or  giving  anything), 
titsargasamiti  (to  take  care  that  bodily  refuse  may  not  be  thrown  in  such  a  way  as  to 
injure  any  being),  manogupti  (to  remove  all  false  thoughts,  to  remain  satisfied  within 
oneself,  and  hold  all  people  to  be  the  same  in  mind),  vaggtipti  (absolute  silence),  and 
kayagupii  (absolute  steadiness  and  fixity  of  the  body).  Five  other  kinds  of  caritra  are 
counted  in  Dravyasamgrahavrtti  35. 


200  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

honest  householder  of  the  present  day.  Great  stress  is  laid  upon 
the  virtues  of  ahimsa,  sunrta,  asteya  and  brahmacaryya,  but  the 
root  of  all  these  is  ahirnsa.  The  virtues  of  sunrta,  asteya  and 
brahmacaryya  are  made  to  follow  directly  as  secondary  corrol- 
laries  of  ahirnsa.  Ahirnsa  may  thus  be  generalized  as  the  funda- 
mental ethical  virtue  of  Jainism ;  judgment  on  all  actions  may  be 
passed  in  accordance  with  the  standard  of  ahimsa  ;  sunrta,  asteya 
and  brahmacaryya  are  regarded  as  virtues  as  their  transgression 
leads  to  hirnsa  (injury  to  beings).  A  milder  form  of  the  practice 
of  these  virtues  is  expected  from  ordinary  householders  and  this 
is  called  anubrata  (small  vows).  But  those  who  are  struggling 
for  the  attainment  of  emancipation  must  practise  these  virtues 
according  to  the  highest  and  strictest  standard,  and  this  is  called 
mahabrata  (great  vows).  Thus  for  example  brahmacaryya  for  a 
householder  according  to  the  anubrata  standard  would  be  mere 
cessation  from  adultery,  whereas  according  to  mahabrata  it  would 
be  absolute  abstention  from  sex-thoughts,  sex-words  and  sex- 
acts.  Ahirnsa  according  to  a  householder,  according  to  anubrata, 
would  require  abstinence  from  killing  any  animals,  but  according 
to  mahavrata  it  would  entail  all  the  rigour  and  carefulness  to 
prevent  oneself  from  being  the  cause  of  any  kind  of  injury  to 
any  living  being  in  any  way. 

Many  other  minor  duties  are  imposed  upon  householders,  all 
of  which  are  based  upon  the  cardinal  virtue  of  ahimsa.  These 
are  (i)  digvirati  (to  carry  out  activities  within  a  restricted  area 
and  thereby  desist  from  injuring  living  beings  in  different  places), 
(2)  bhogopabhogamdna  (to  desist  from  drinking  liquors,  taking 
flesh,  butter,  honey,  figs,  certain  other  kinds  of  plants,  fruits,  and 
vegetables,  to  observe  certain  other  kinds  of  restrictions  regarding 
time  and  place  of  taking  meals),  (3)  anarthadanda  consisting  of 
{a)  apadhydna  (cessation  from  inflicting  any  bodily  injuries, 
killing  of  one's  enemies,  etc.),  {b)  papopadesa  (desisting  from 
advising  people  to  take  to  agriculture  which  leads  to  the  killing 
of  so  many  insects),  {c)  hiinsopakd^'iddna  (desisting  from  giving 
implements  of  agriculture  to  people  which  will  lead  to  the  injury 
of  insects),  {d^  pranidddcarana  (to  desist  from  attending  musical 
parties,  theatres,  or  reading  sex-literature,gambling,etc.),  (4)  siksd- 
padabrata  consisting  of  {a)  sdtnayikabrata  (to  try  to  treat  all 
beings  equally),  {b)  desdvakdsikabrata  (gradually  to  practise  the 
digviratibrata   more   and    more   extensively),   ic)   posadhabrata 


vij  Rules  of  Co7iduct  201 

(certain  other  kinds  of  restriction),  id)  atithisavivibhdgabrata  (to 
make  gifts  to  guests).  All  transgressions  of  these  virtues,  called 
aticdra,  should  be  carefully  avoided. 

All  perception,  wisdom,  and  morals  belong  to  the  soul,  and  to 
know  the  soul  as  possessing  these  is  the  right  knowledge  of  the 
soul.  All  sorrows  proceeding  out  of  want  of  self-knowledge  can 
be  removed  only  by  true  self-knowledge.  The  soul  in  itself  is 
pure  intelligence,  and  it  becomes  endowed  with  the  body  only  on 
account  of  its  karma.  When  by  meditation,  all  the  karmas  are 
burnt  {dhydndgnidagdhakarmd)  the  self  becomes  purified.  The 
soul  is  itself  the  sarnsara  (the  cycle  of  rebirths)  when  it  is  over- 
powered by  the  four  kasayas  (passions)  and  the  senses.  The  four 
kasayas  are  krodha  (anger),  nidna  (vanity  and  pride),  mdyd 
(insincerity  and  the  tendency  to  dupe  others),  and  lobka  (greed). 
These  kasayas  cannot  be  removed  except  by  a  control  of  the 
senses  ;  and  self-control  alone  leads  to  the  purity  of  the  mind 
{tnanahsuddhi).  Without  the  control  of  the  mind  no  one  can 
proceed  in  the  path  of  yoga.  All  our  acts  become  controlled  when 
the  mind  is  controlled,  so  those  who  seek  emancipation  should 
make  every  effort  to  control  the  mind.  No  kind  of  asceticism 
{tapas)  can  be  of  any  good  until  the  mind  is  purified.  All  attach- 
ment and  antipathy  {rdgadvesa)  can  be  removed  only  by  the 
purification  of  the  mind.  It  is  by  attachment  and  antipathy  that 
man  loses  his  independence.  It  is  thus  necessary  for  the  yogin 
(sage)  that  he  should  be  free  from  them  and  become  independent 
in  the  real  sense  of  the  term.  When  a  man  learns  to  look  upon 
all  beings  with  equality  {samatvd)  he  can  effect  such  a  conquest 
over  raga  and  dvesa  as  one  could  never  do  even  by  the  strictest 
asceticism  through  millions  of  years.  In  order  to  effect  this 
samatva  towards  all,  we  should  take  to  the  following  kinds  of 
meditation  {bhdvand)  : 

We  should  think  of  the  transitoriness  {anityatd)  of  all  things, 
that  what  a  thing  was  in  the  morning,  it  is  not  at  mid-day, 
what  it  was  at  mid-day  it  is  not  at  night ;  for  all  things  are 
transitory  and  changing.  Our  body,  all  our  objects  of  pleasure, 
wealth  and  youth  all  are  fleeting  like  dreams,  or  cotton  particles 
in  a  whirlwind. 

All,  even  the  gods,  are  subject  to  death.  All  our  relatives  will 
by  their  works  fall  a  prey  to  death.  This  world  is  thus  full  of 
misery  and  there  is  nothing  which  can  support  us  in  it.    Thus  in 


202  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

whatever  way  we  look  for  anything,  on  which  we  can  depend,  we 
find  that  it  fails  us.  This  is  called  asaranabhavana  (the  meditation 
of  helplessness). 

Some  are  born  in  this  world,  some  suffer,  some  reap  the  fruits 
of  the  karma  done  in  another  life.  We  are  all  different  from  one 
another  by  our  surroundings,  karma,  by  our  separate  bodies  and 
by  all  other  gifts  which  each  of  us  severally  enjoy.  To  meditate 
on  these  aspects  is  called  ekatvabhavana  and  anyatvabhavana. 

To  think  that  the  body  is  made  up  of  defiled  things,  the  flesh, 
blood,  and  bones,  and  is  therefore  impure  is  called  asucibhavana 
(meditation  of  the  impurity  of  the  body). 

To  think  that  if  the  mind  is  purified  by  the  thoughts  of  uni- 
versal friendship  and  compassion  and  the  passions  are  removed,^ 
then  only  will  good  {subhd)  accrue  to  me,  but  if  on  the  contrary 
I  commit  sinful  deeds  and  transgress  the  virtues,  then  all  evil 
will  befall  me,  is  called  asravabhavana  (meditation  of  the  be- 
falling of  evil).  By  the  control  of  the  asrava  (inrush  of  karma) 
comes  the  sarnvara  (cessation  of  the  influx  of  karma)  and  the 
destruction  of  the  karmas  already  accumulated  leads  to  nirjara 
(decay  and  destruction  of  karma  matter). 

Again  one  should  think  that  the  practice  of  the  ten  dharmas 
(virtues)  of  self  control  (samyama),  truthfulness  {siinrta),  purity 
{sauca\  chastity  {brahma),  absolute  want  of  greed  {akihcanatd)^ 
asceticism  {tapas),  forbearance,  patience  {ksdnti),  mildness 
{mdrdava),  sincerity  {rjutd),  and  freedom  or  emancipation  from 
all  sins  {inuktt)  can  alone  help  us  in  the  achievement  of  the 
highest  goal.  These  are  the  only  supports  to  which  we  can 
look.  It  is  these  which  uphold  the  world-order.  This  is  called 
dharmasvakhyatatabhavana. 

Again  one  should  think  of  the  Jaina  cosmology  and  also 
of  the  nature  of  the  influence  of  karma  in  producing  all  the 
diverse  conditions  of  men.  These  two  are  called  lokabhdvand 
and  bodhibhdvand. 

When  by  the  continual  practice  of  the  above  thoughts  man 
becomes  unattached  to  all  things  and  adopts  equality  to  all  beings, 
and  becomes  disinclined  to  all  worldly  enjoyments,  then  with  a 
mind  full  of  peace  he  gets  rid  of  all  passions,  and  then  he  should 
take  to  the  performance  of  dhyana  or  meditation  by  deep  concen- 
tration. The  samatva  or  perfect  equality  of  the  mind  and  dhyana 
are  interdependent,  so  that  without  dhyana  there  is  no  samatva 


vi]  Anti-theistic  Arguments  203 

and  without  samatva  there  is  no  dhyana.  In  order  to  make  the 
mind  steady  by  dhyana  one  should  think  of  niaitrl  (universal 
friendship), /r(2;«c'(a?'<^  (the  habit  of  emphasizing  the  good  sides  of 
men),  karwid  (universal  compassion)  and  mddhyastJta  (indifference 
to  the  wickedness  of  people,  i.e.  the  habit  of  not  taking  any 
note  of  sinners).  The  Jaina  dhyana  consists  in  concentrating 
the  mind  on  the  syllables  of  the  Jaina  prayer  phrases.  The 
dhyana  however  as  we  have  seen  is  only  practised  as  an  aid  to 
making  the  mind  steady  and  perfectly  equal  and  undisturbed 
towards  all  things.  Emancipation  comes  only  as  the  result  of  the 
final  extinction  of  the  karma  materials.  Jaina  yoga  is  thus  a  com- 
plete course  of  moral  discipline  which  leads  to  the  purification 
of  the  mind  and  is  hence  different  from  the  traditional  Hindu 
yoga  of  Patafijali  or  even  of  the  Buddhists'. 

Jaina  Atheism^ 

The  Naiyayikas  assert  that  as  the  world  is  of  the  nature  of 
an  effect,  it  must  have  been  created  by  an  intelligent  agent  and 
this  agent  is  Isvara  (God).  To  this  the  Jain  replies,  "  What  does 
the  Naiyayika  mean  when  he  says  that  the  world  is  of  the  nature 
of  an  effect"?  Does  he  mean  by  "effect,"  (i)  that  which  is  made 
up  of  parts  {sdvayava\  or,  (2)  the  coinherence  of  the  causes  of  a 
non-existent  thing,  or,  (3)  that  which  is  regarded  by  anyone  as 
having  been  made,  or,  (4)  that  which  is  liable  to  change  {vikdrit- 
vam).  Again,  what  is  meant  by  being  "made  up  of  parts"?  If  it 
means  existence  in  parts,  then  the  class-concepts  {sdmdnyd) 
existing  in  the  parts  should  also  be  regarded  as  effects,  and  hence 
destructible,  but  these  the  Naiyayikas  regard  as  being  partless  and 
eternal.  If  it  means  "that  which  has  parts,"  then  even  "space" 
idkdsd)  has  to  be  regarded  as  "effect,"  but  the  Naiyayika  regards 
it  as  eternal. 

Again  "effect"  cannot  mean  "coinherence  of  the  causes  of  a 
thing  which  were  previously  non-existent,"  for  in  that  case  one 
could  not  speak  of  the  world  as  an  effect,  for  the  atoms  of  the 
elements  of  earth,  etc.,  are  regarded  as  eternal. 

Again  if  "effect"  means  "that  which  is  regarded  by  anyone  as 

'    Yogaiastra,  by  Hemacandra,  edited  by  Windisch,  in  Zeitschrift  der  Deuischen 
Morg.  Gesellschaft,  Leipsig,  1874,  and  Dravyasamgraha,  edited  by  Ghoshal,  191 7. 
'^  See  Gunaratna's  Tarkarahasyadipika. 


204  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [cH. 

having  been  made,"  then  it  would  apply  even  to  space,  for  when 
a  man  digs  the  ground  he  thinks  that  he  has  made  new  space  in 
the  hollow  which  he  dug. 

If  it  means  "that  which  is  liable  to  change,"  then  one  could 
suppose  that  God  was  also  liable  to  change  and  he  would  require 
another  creator  to  create  him  and  he  another,  and  so  on  ad 
infinitum.  Moreover,  if  God  creates  he  cannot  but  be  liable  to 
change  with  reference  to  his  creative  activity. 

Moreover,  we  know  that  those  things  which  happen  at  some 
time  and  do  not  happen  at  other  times  are  regarded  as  "effects." 
But  the  world  as  a  whole  exists  always.  If  it  is  argued  that  things 
contained  within  it  such  as  trees,  plants,  etc.,  are  "effects,"  then 
that  would  apply  even  to  this  hypothetical  God,  for,  his  will  and 
thought  must  be  diversely  operating  at  diverse  times  and  these 
are  contained  in  him.  He  also  becomes  a  created  being  by  virtue 
of  that.  And  even  atoms  would  be  "effects,"  for  they  also  undergo 
changes  of  colour  by  heat. 

Let  us  grant  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  the  world  as  a 
whole  is  an  "effect."  And  every  effect  has  a  cause,  and  so  the 
world  as  a  whole  has  a  cause.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
cause  is  an  intelligent  one,  as  God  is  supposed  to  be.  If  it  is 
argued  that  he  is  regarded  as  intelligent  on  the  analogy  of  human 
causation  then  he  might  also  be  regarded  as  imperfect  as  human 
beings.  If  it  is  held  that  the  world  as  a  whole  is  not  exactly 
an  effect  of  the  type  of  effects  produced  by  human  beings 
but  is  similar  to  those,  this  will  lead  to  no  inference.  Because 
water-vapour  is  similar  to  smoke,  nobody  will  be  justified  in 
inferring  fire  from  water-vapour,  as  he  would  do  from  smoke. 
If  it  is  said  that  this  is  so  different  an  effect  that  from  it  the 
inference  is  possible,  though  nobody  has  ever  been  seen  to  pro- 
duce such  an  effect,  well  then,  one  could  also  infer  on  seeing 
old  houses  ruined  in  course  of  time  that  these  ruins  were  pro- 
duced by  intelligent  agents.  For  these  are  also  effects  of  which 
we  do  not  know  of  any  intelligent  agent,  for  both  are  effects, 
and  the  invisibility  of  the  agent  is  present  in  both  cases.  If  it  is 
said  that  the  world  is  such  that  we  have  a  sense  that  it  has  been 
made  by  some  one,  then  the  question  will  be,  whether  you  infer 
the  agency  of  God  from  this  sense  or  infer  the  sense  of  its  having 
been  made  from  the  fact  of  its  being  made  by  God,  and  you  have 
a  vicious  circle  {anyonydsrayd). 


vi]  Anti-theistic  Argimients  205 

Again,  even  if  we  should  grant  that  the  world  was  created  by 
an  agent,  then  such  an  agent  should  have  a  body,  for  we  have 
never  seen  any  intelligent  creator  without  a  body.  If  it  is  held 
that  we  should  consider  the  general  condition  of  agency  only, 
namely,  that  the  agent  is  intelligent,  the  objection  will  be  that 
this  is  impossible,  for  agency  is  always  associated  with  some  kind 
of  body.  If  you  take  the  instances  of  other  kinds  of  effects  such 
as  the  shoots  of  corn  growing  in  the  fields,  it  will  be  found  that 
these  had  no  intelligent  agents  behind  them  to  create  them.  If  it 
is  said  that  these  are  also  made  by  God,  then  you  have  an 
argument  in  a  circle  {cakraka),  for  this  was  the  very  matter  which 
you  sought  to  prove. 

Let  it  be  granted  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  God  exists. 
Does  his  mere  abstract  existence  produce  the  world?  Well,  in 
that  case,  the  abstract  existence  of  a  potter  may  also  create  the 
world,  for  the  abstract  existence  is  the  same  in  both  cases.  Does 
he  produce  the  world  by  knowledge  and  will.'*  Well,  that  is  im- 
possible, for  there  cannot  be  any  knowledge  and  will  without  a 
body.  Does  he  produce  the  world  by  physical  movement  or  any 
other  kind  of  movement?  In  any  case  that  is  impossible,  for  there 
cannot  be  any  movement  without  a  body.  If  you  suppose  that 
he  is  omniscient,  you  may  do  so,  but  that  does  not  prove  that 
he  can  be  all-creator. 

Let  us  again  grant  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  a  bodiless 
God  can  create  the  world  by  his  will  and  activity.  Did  he  take 
to  creation  through  a  personal  whim?  In  that  case  there  would 
be  no  natural  laws  and  order  in  the  world.  Did  he  take  to  it 
in  accordance  with  the  moral  and  immoral  actions  of  men?  Then 
he  is  guided  by  a  moral  order  and  is  not  independent.  Is  it 
through  mercy  that  he  took  to  creation?  Well  then,  we  suppose 
there  should  have  been  only  happiness  in  the  world  and  nothing 
else.  If  it  is  said  that  it  is  by  the  past  actions  of  men  that  they 
suffer  pains  and  enjoy  pleasure,  and  if  men  are  led  to  do  vicious 
actions  by  past  deeds  which  work  like  blind  destiny,  then  such 
a  blind  destiny  {adrstd)  might  take  the  place  of  God.  If  He  took 
to  creation  as  mere  play,  then  he  must  be  a  child  who  did  things 
without  a  purpose.  If  it  was  due  to  his  desire  of  punishing  certain 
people  and  favouring  others,  then  he  must  harbour  favouritism 
on  behalf  of  some  and  hatred  against  others.  If  the  creation  took 
place  simply  through  his  own  nature,  then,  what  is  the  good  of 


2o6  The  Jaina  Philosophy  [ch. 

admitting  him  at  all  ?   You  may  rather  say  that  the  world  came 
into  being  out  of  its  own  nature. 

It  is  preposterous  to  suppose  that  one  God  without  the  help 
of  any  instruments  or  other  accessories  of  any  kind,  could  create 
this  world.    This  is  against  all  experience. 

Admitting  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  such  a  God  exists, 
you  could  never  justify  the  adjectives  with  which  you  wish  to 
qualify  him.  Thus  you  say  that  he  is  eternal.  But  since  he  has 
no  body,  he  must  be  of  the  nature  of  intelligence  and  will. 
But  this  nature  must  have  changed  in  diverse  forms  for  the  pro- 
duction of  diverse  kinds  of  worldly  things,  which  are  of  so  varied 
a  nature.  If  there  were  no  change  in  his  knowledge  and  will,  then 
there  could  not  have  been  diverse  kinds  of  creation  and  de- 
struction. Destruction  and  creation  cannot  be  the  result  of  one 
unchangeable  will  and  knowledge.  Moreover  it  is  the  character 
of  knowledge  to  change,  if  the  word  is  used  in  the  sense  in  which 
knowledge  is  applied  to  human  beings,  and  surely  we  are  not 
aware  of  any  other  kind  of  knowledge.  You  say  that  God  is 
omniscient,  but  it  is  difficult  to  suppose  how  he  can  have  any 
knowledge  at  all,  for  as  he  has  no  organs  he  cannot  have  any 
perception,  and  since  he  cannot  have  any  perception  he  cannot 
have  any  inference  either.  If  it  is  said  that  without  the  supposi- 
tion of  a  God  the  variety  of  the  world  would  be  inexplicable,  this 
also  is  not  true,  for  this  implication  would  only  be  justified  if 
there  were  no  other  hypothesis  left.  But  there  are  other  supposi- 
tions also.  Even  without  an  omniscient  God  you  could  explain 
all  things  merely  by  the  doctrine  of  moral  order  or  the  law  of 
karma.  If  there  were  one  God,  there  could  be  a  society  of  Gods 
too.  You  say  that  if  there  were  many  Gods,  then  there  would  be 
quarrels  and  differences  of  opinion.  This  is  like  the  story  of 
a  miser  who  for  fear  of  incurring  expenses  left  all  his  sons  and 
wife  and  retired  into  the  forest.  When  even  ants  and  bees  can 
co-operate  together  and  act  harmoniously,  the  supposition  that  if 
there  were  many  Gods  they  would  have  fallen  out,  would  indicate 
that  in  spite  of  all  the  virtues  that  you  ascribe  to  God  you  think 
his  nature  to  be  quite  unreliable,  if  not  vicious.  Thus  in  which- 
ever way  one  tries  to  justify  the  existence  of  God  he  finds  that  it 
is  absolutely  a  hopeless  task.  The  best  way  then  is  to  dispense 
with  the  supposition  altogether^ 

'  See  SadJar^anasafnuccaya,  Gunaratna  on  Jainism,  pp.  1 15-124. 


vi]  Emancipation  207 

Moksa  (emancipation). 

The  motive  which  leads  a  man  to  strive  for  release  {moksa)  is 
the  avoidance  of  pain  and  the  attainment  of  happiness,  for  the 
state  of  mukti  is  the  state  of  the  soul  in  pure  happiness.  It  is 
also  a  state  of  pure  and  infinite  knowledge  {anantajfidnd)  and  infi- 
nite perception  {anantadarsand).  In  the  sarnsara  state  on  account 
of  the  karma  veils  this  purity  is  sullied,  and  the  veils  are  only  worn 
out  imperfectly  and  thus  reveal  this  and  that  object  at  this  and 
that  time  as  ordinary  knowledge  {inati),  testimony  {srutd),  super- 
natural cognition,  as  in  trance  or  hypnotism  iavadhi),  and  direct 
knowledge  of  the  thoughts  of  others  or  thought  reading  {mmiah- 
parydyd).  In  the  state  of  release  however  there  is  omniscience 
{kevala-jfidnd)  and  all  things  are  simultaneously  known  to  the 
perfect  {kevaliii)  as  they  are.  In  the  sarnsara  stage  the  soul  always 
acquires  new  qualities,  and  thus  suffers  a  continual  change  though 
remaining  the  same  in  substance.  But  in  the  emancipated  stage 
the  changes  that  a  soul  suffers  are  all  exactly  the  same,  and  thus 
it  is  that  at  this  stage  the  soul  appears  to  be  the  same  in  substance 
as  well  as  in  its  qualities  of  infinite  knowledge,  etc.,  the  change 
meaning  in  this  state  only  the  repetition  of  the  same  qualities. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  mention  here  that  though  the 
karmas  of  man  are  constantly  determining  him  in  various  ways 
yet  there  is  in  him  infinite  capacity  or  power  for  right  action 
ianantavlryd),  so  that  karma  can  never  subdue  this  freedom  and 
infinite  capacity,  though  this  may  be  suppressed  from  time  to  time 
by  the  influence  of  karma.  It  is  thus  that  by  an  exercise  of  this 
power  man  can  overcome  all  karma  and  become  finally  liberated. 
If  man  had  not  this  anantavlrya  in  him  he  might  have  been  eter- 
nally under  the  sway  of  the  accumulated  karma  which  secured 
his  bondage  {bandhd).  But  since  man  is  the  repository  of  this 
indomitable  power  the  karmas  can  only  throw  obstacles  and 
produce  sufferings,  but  can  never  prevent  him  from  attaining  his 
highest  good. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  KAPILA  AND  THE  PATANJALA  SAMKHYA  (YOGA)i. 

A  Review. 

The  examination  of  the  two  ancient  Nastika  schools  of 
Buddhism  and  Jainism  of  two  different  types  ought  to  convince 
us  that  serious  philosophical  speculations  were  indulged  in,  in 
circles  other  than  those  of  the  Upanisad  sages.  That  certain 
practices  known  as  Yoga  were  generally  prevalent  amongst  the 
wise  seems  very  probable,  for  these  are  not  only  alluded  to  in  some 
of  the  Upanisads  but  were  accepted  by  the  two  nastika  schools 
of  Buddhism  and  Jainism.  Whether  we  look  at  them  from  the 
point  of  view  of  ethics  or  metaphysics,  the  two  Nastika  schools 
appear  to  have  arisen  out  of  a  reaction  against  the  sacrificial 
disciplines  of  the  Brahmanas.  Both  these  systems  originated  with 
the  Ksattriyas  and  were  marked  by  a  strong  aversion  against  the 
taking  of  animal  life,  and  against  the  doctrine  of  offering  animals 
at  the  sacrifices. 

The  doctrine  of  the  sacrifices  supposed  that  a  suitable  com- 
bination of  rites,  rituals,  and  articles  of  sacrifice  had  the  magical 
power  of  producing  the  desired  effect — a  shower  of  rain,  the 
birth  of  a  son,  the  routing  of  a  huge  army,  etc.  The  sacrifices 
were  enjoined  generally  not  so  much  for  any  moral  elevation,  as 
for  the  achievement  of  objects  of  practical  welfare.  The  Vedas 
were  the  eternal  revelations  which  were  competent  so  to  dictate 
a  detailed  procedure,  that  we  could  by  following  it  proceed  on  a 
certain  course  of  action  and  refrain  from  other  injurious  courses 
in  such  a  manner  that  we  might  obtain  the  objects  we  desired 
by  the  accurate  performance  of  any  sacrifice.  If  we  are  to  define 
truth  in  accordance  with  the  philosophy  of  such  a  ritualistic 
culture  we  might  say  that,  that  alone  is  true,  in  accordance  with 
which  we  may  realize  our  objects  in  the  world  about  us;  the  truth 
of  Vedic  injunctions  is  shown  by  the  practical  attainment  of  our 

'  This  chapter  is  based  on  my  Study  of  Patanjali,  published  by  the  Calcutta 
University,  and  my  Yoga  philosophy  in  relation  to  other  Indian  Systems  of  thought, 
awaiting  publication  with  the  same  authority.  The  system  has  been  treated  in  detail  in 
those  two  works. 


CH.  vii]  Buddhism  and  Jainism  209 

objects.    Truth  cannot  be  determined  a  priori  but  depends  upon 
the  test  of  experienced 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  Buddhism  and  Jainism  though 
probably  born  out  of  a  reactionary  movement  against  this  artificial 
creed,  yet  could  not  but  be  influenced  by  some  of  its  fundamental 
principles  which,  whether  distinctly  formulated  or  not,  were  at 
least  tacitly  implied  in  all  sacrificial  performances.  Thus  we  see 
that  Buddhism  regarded  all  production  and  destruction  as  being 
due  to  the  assemblage  of  conditions,  and  defined  truth  as  that 
which  could  produce  any  effect.  But  to  such  a  logical  extreme 
did  the  Buddhists  carry  these  doctrines  that  they  ended  in 
formulating  the  doctrine  of  absolute  momentariness'^.  Turning 
to  the  Jains  we  find  that  they  also  regarded  the  value  of  know- 
ledge as  consisting  in  the  help  that  it  offers  in  securing  what  is 
good  for  us  and  avoiding  what  is  evil;  truth  gives  us  such  an 
account  of  things  that  on  proceeding  according  to  its  directions 
we  may  verify  it  by  actual  experience.  Proceeding  on  a  correct 
estimate  of  things  we  may  easily  avail  ourselves  of  what  is  good 
and  avoid  what  is  bad.  The  Jains  also  believed  that  changes 
were  produced  by  the  assemblage  of  conditions,  but  they  did  not 
carry  this  doctrine  to  its  logical  extreme.  There  was  change  in 
the  world  as  well  as  permanence.  The  Buddhists  had  gone  so 
far  that  they  had  even  denied  the  existence  of  any  permanent 
soul.  The  Jains  said  that  no  ultimate,  one-sided  and  absolute 
view  of  things  could  be  taken,  and  held  that  not  only  the  happening 
of  events  was  conditional,  but  even  all  our  judgments,  are  true 
only  in  a  limited  sense.  This  is  indeed  true  for  common  sense, 
which  we  acknowledge  as  superior  to  mere  a  priori  abstrac- 
tions, which  lead  to  absolute  and  one-sided  conclusions.  By  the 
assemblage  of  conditions,  old  qualities  in  things  disappeared,  new 
qualities  came  in,  and  a  part  remained  permanent.  But  this 
common-sense  view,  though  in  agreement  with  our  ordinary 
experience,  could  not  satisfy  our  inner  a  priori  demands  for 
finding  out  ultimate  truth,  which  was  true  not  relatively  but 
absolutely.    When  asked  whether  anything  was  true,  Jainism 

^  The  philosophy  of  the  Vedas  as  formulated  by  the  Mimamsa  of  Kumarila  and 
Prabhakara  holds  the  opposite  view.  Truth  according  to  them  is  determined  a  priori 
while  error  is  determined  by  experience. 

"^  Historically  the  doctrine  of  momentariness  is  probably  prior  to  the  doctrine  of 
arthakriydkaritva.  But  the  later  Buddhists  sought  to  prove  that  momentariness  was 
the  logical  result  of  the  doctrine  of  arthakriydkaritva. 

D.  14 


2IO  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [cii. 

would  answer,  "yes,  this  is  true  from  this  point  of  view,  but 
untrue  from  that  point  of  view,  while  that  is  also  true  from  such 
a  point  of  view  and  untrue  from  another."  But  such  an  answer 
cannot  satisfy  the  mind  which  seeks  to  reach  a  definite  pro- 
nouncement, an  absolute  judgment. 

The  main  departure  of  the  systems  of  Jainism  and  Buddhism 
from  the  sacrificial  creed  consisted  in  this,  that  they  tried  to  formu- 
^\  late  a  theory  of  the  universe,  the  reality  and  the  position  of  sentient 
beings  and  more  particularly  of  man.  The  sacrificial  creed  was 
busy  with  individual  rituals  and  sacrifices,  and  cared  for  principles 
or  maxims  only  so  far  as  they  were  of  use  for  the  actual  perform- 
ances of  sacrifices.  Again  action  with  the  new  systems  did  not  mean 
sacrifice  but  any  general  action  that  we  always  perform.  Actions 
were  here  considered  bad  or  good  according  as  they  brought 
about  our  moral  elevation  or  not.  The  followers  of  the  sacrificial 
creed  refrained  from  untruth  not  so  much  from  a  sense  of  personal 
degradation,  but  because  the  Vedas  had  dictated  that  untruth 
should  not  be  spoken,  and  the  Vedas  must  be  obeyed.  The 
sacrificial  creed  wanted  more  and  more  happiness  here  or  in  the 
other  world.  The  systems  of  Buddhist  and  Jain  philosophy  turned 
their  backs  upon  ordinary  happiness  and  wanted  an  ultimate  and 
unchangeable  state  where  all  pains  and  sorrows  were  for  ever 
dissolved  (Buddhism)  or  where  infinite  happiness,  ever  unshaken, 
was  realized.  A  course  of  right  conduct  to  be  followed  merely  for 
the  moral  elevation  of  the  person  had  no  place  in  the  sacrificial 
creed,  for  with  itf  a  course  of  right  conduct  could  be  followed 
only  if  it  was  so  dictated  in  the  Vedas.  Karma  and  the  fruit  of 
karma  {karmaphald)  only  meant  the  karma  of  sacrifice  and  its 
fruits — temporary  happiness,  such  as  was  produced  as  the  fruit 
of  sacrifices ;  knowledge  with  them  meant  only  the  knowledge  of 
sacrifice  and  of  the  dictates  of  the  Vedas.  In  the  systems  how- 
ever, karma,  karmaphala,  happiness,  knowledge,  all  these  were 
taken  in  their  widest  and  most  universal  sense.  Happiness  or 
absolute  extinction  of  sorrow  was  still  the  goal,  but  this  was  no 
narrow  sacrificial  happiness  but  infinite  and  unchangeable  happi- 
ness or  destruction  of  sorrow ;  karma  was  still  the  way,  but  not 
sacrificial  karma,  for  it  meant  all  moral  and  immoral  actions 
performed  by  us ;  knowledge  here  meant  the  knowledge  of  truth 
or  reality  and  not  the  knowledge  of  sacrifice. 

Such  an  advance  had  however  already  begun  in  the  Upa- 


vii]  Samkhya  in  the  Upanisads  2 1 1 

nisads  which  had  anticipated  the  new  systems  in  all  these 
directions.  The  pioneers  of  these  new  systems  probably  drew 
their  suggestions  both  from  the  sacrificial  creed  and  from  the 
Upanisads,  and  built  their  systems  independently  by  their  own 
rational  thinking.  But  if  the  suggestions  of  the  Upanisads  were 
thus  utilized  by  heretics  who  denied  the  authority  of  the  Vedas, 
it  was  natural  to  expect  that  we  should  find  in  the  Hindu  camp 
such  germs  of  rational  thinking  as  might  indicate  an  attempt  to 
harmonize  the  suggestions  of  the  Upanisads  and  of  the  sacrificial 
creed  in  such  a  manner  as  might  lead  to  the  construction  of  a  con- 
sistent and  well-worked  system  of  thought.  Our  expectations  are 
indeed  fulfilled  in  the  Samkhya  philosophy,  germs  of  which  may 
be  discovered  in  the  Upanisads. 

The  Germs  of  Samkhya  in  the  Upanisads. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  in  the  Upanisads  there  is  a  large  number 
of  texts  that  describe  the  ultimate  reality  as  the  Brahman,  the 
infinite,  knowledge,  bliss,  and  speak  of  all  else  as  mere  changing 
forms  and  names.  The  word  Brahman  originally  meant  in  the 
earliest  Vedic  literature,  mantra,  duly  performed  sacrifice,  and 
also  the  power  of  sacrifice  which  could  bring  about  the  desired  re- 
sults In  many  passages  of  the  Upanisads  this  Brahman  appears 
as  the  universal  and  supreme  principle  from  which  all  others  de- 
rived their  powers.  Such  a  Brahman  is  sought  for  in  many  passages 
for  personal  gain  or  welfare.  But  through  a  gradual  process  of 
development  the  conception  of  Brahman  reached  a  superior  level 
in  which  the  reality  and  truth  of  the  world  are  tacitly  ignored, 
and  the  One,  the  infinite,  knowledge,  the  real  is  regarded  as  the 
only  Truth.  This  type  of  thought  gradually  developed  into  the 
monistic  Vedanta  as  explained  by  Sahkara.  But  there  was 
another  line  of  thought  which  was  developing  alongside  of  it, 
which  regarded  the  world  as  having  a  reality  and  as  being  made 
up  of  water,  fire,  and  earth.  There  are  also  passages  in  Sveta- 
svatara  and  particularly  in  MaitrayanI  from  which  it  appears 
that  the  Sarnkhya  line  of  thought  had  considerably  developed,  and 
many  of  its  technical  terms  were  already  in  use^  But  the  date 
of  MaitrayanI  has  not  yet  been  definitely  settled,  and  the  details 

'  See  Hillebrandt's  article,  "  Brahman"  {E.  R.  E.). 

^  Katha  in.  lo,  v.  7.  Sveta.  V.  7,  8,  11,  iv.  5,  i.  3.  This  has  been  dealt  with  in 
detail  in  my  Yoga  Philosophy  in  relation  to  other  Indian  Systems  of  Thought,  in  the  first 
chapter. 

14—2 


212  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Smnkhya         [ch. 

found  there  are  also  not  such  that  we  can  form  a  distinct  notion 
of  the  Samkhya  thought  as  it  developed  in  the  Upanisads.  It  is 
not  improbable  that  at  this  stage  of  development  it  also  gave 
some  suggestions  to  Buddhism  or  Jainism,  but  the  Samkhya-Yoga 
philosophy  as  we  now  get  it  is  a  system  in  which  are  found  all 
the  results  of  Buddhism  and  Jainism  in  such  a  manner  that  it 
unites  the  doctrine  of  permanence  of  the  Upanisads  with  the 
doctrine  of  momentariness  of  the  Buddhists  and  the  doctrine  of 
relativism  of  the  Jains. 

Sarnkhya  and  Yoga  Literature. 

The  main  exposition  of  the  system  of  Samkhya  and  Yoga  in 
this  section  has  been  based  on  the  Samkhya  kdrikd,  the  Sam- 
khya sutras,  and  the  Yoga  sutras  of  Patanjali  with  their  commen- 
taries and  sub-commentaries.  The  Samkhya  kdrikd  (about 
200  A.D.)  was  written  by  Isvarakrsna.  The  account  of  Sarnkhya 
given  by  Caraka  (78  A.D.)  represents  probably  an  earlier  school  and 
this  has  been  treated  separately.  Vacaspati  Misra  (ninth  century 
A.D.)  wrote  a  commentary  on  it  known  as  Tattvakanmudi.  But 
before  him  Gaudapada  and  Raja  wrote  commentaries  on  the 
Sdmkhya  kdrikd^,  Narayanatlrtha  wrote  his  Candrikd  on  Gauda- 
pada's  commentary.  The  Samkhya  sfitras  which  have  been  com- 
mented on  by  Vijfiana  Bhiksu  (called  Pravacanabhasyd)  of  the 
sixteenth  century  seems  to  be  a  work  of  some  unknown  author 
after  the  ninth  century.  Aniruddha  of  the  latter  half  of  the 
fifteenth  century  was  the  first  man  to  write  a  commentary  on  the 
Sdmkhya  sutras.  Vijnana  Bhiksu  wrote  also  another  elementary 
work  on  Sarnkhya  known  as  Sdmkhyasdra.  Another  short  work 
of  late  origin  is  Tattvasamdsa  (probably  fourteenth  century).  Two 
other  works  on  Sarnkhya,  viz.  Simananda's  Sdinkhyatattvavivecana 
and  Bhavaganesa's  Sdmkhyatattvayathdrthyadipana  (both  later 
than  Vijnanabhiksu)  of  real  philosophical  value  have  also  been 
freely  consulted.  Pataiijali's  Yoga  sutra  (not  earlier  than  147  B.C.) 
was  commented  on  by  Vyasa  (400  A.D.)  and  Vyasa's  bhasya 
commented  on  by  Vacaspati  Misra  is  called  Tattvavaisdradl, 
by  Vijfiana  Bhiksu  Yogavdrttika,  by  Bhoja  in  the  tenth  century 
Bhojavrtti,  and  by  Nage^a  (seventeenth  century)  Chdydvyakhyd. 

^  I  suppose  that  Raja's  commentary  on  the  Kdrikd  was  the  same  as  Rdjavdrttika 
quoted  by  Vacaspati.  Raja's  commentary  on  the  Kdrikd  has  been  referred  to  by 
Jayanta  in  his  NydyamaHjari,  p.  109.    This  book  is  probably  now  lost. 


VI  i]  Samkhya  in  Caraka  213 

Amongst  the  modern  works  to  which  I  owe  an  obligation  I  may 
mention  the  two  treatises  Mechanical, physical  and  chemical  theories 
of  the  A  ncient  Hindus  and  XhePositiveSciencesof  the  Ancient  Hindus 
by  Dr  B.  N.  Seal  and  my  two  works  on  Yoga  Study  ofPatanjali  pub- 
lished by  the  Calcutta  University,  and  Yoga  Philosophy  in  relation 
to  other  Indian  Systems  of  Thought  which  is  shortly  to  be  published, 
and  my  Natural  Philosophy  of  the  Ancient  Hindus,  awaiting  publi- 
cation with  the  Calcutta  University. 

Gunaratna  mentions  two  other  authoritative  Sarnkhya  works, 
viz.  Mdtharabhasya  and  Atreyatantra.  Of  these  the  second  is 
probably  the  same  as  Caraka's  treatment  of  Samkhya,  for  we  know 
that  the  sage  Atri  is  the  speaker  in  Caraka's  work  and  for  that  it 
was  called  Atreyasajnhitd  or  Atreyatantra.  Nothing  is  known 
of  the  Mdtharabhasya^. 

An  Early  School  of  Sarnkhya. 

It  is  important  for  the  history  of  Samkhya  philosophy  that 
Caraka's  treatment  of  it,  which  so  far  as  I  know  has  never  been 
dealt  with  in  any  of  the  modern  studies  of  Samkhya,  should 
be  brought  before  the  notice  of  the  students  of  this  philosophy. 
According  to  Caraka  there  are  six  elements  {dhdtus),  viz.  the 
five  elements  such  as  akasa,  vayu  etc.  and  cetana,  called  also 
purusa.  From  other  points  of  view,  the  categories  may  be  said  to 
be  twenty-four  only,  viz.  the  ten  senses  (five  cognitive  and  five 
conative),  manas,  the  five  objects  of  senses  and  the  eightfold 
prakrti  (prakrti,  mahat,  aharnkara  and  the  five  elements)^.  The 
manas  works  through  the  senses.  It  is  atomic  and  its  existence 
is  proved  by  the  fact  that  in  spite  of  the  existence  of  the  senses 
there  cannot  be  any  knowledge  unless  manas  is  in  touch  with 
them.  There  are  two  movements  of  manas  as  indeterminate 
sensing  {iiha)  and  conceiving (zvV^r^) before  definite  understanding 
{buddhi)  arises.  Each  of  the  five  senses  is  the  product  of  the 
combination  of  five  elements  but  the  auditory  sense  is  made  with 
a  preponderance  of  akasa,  the  sense  of  touch  with  a  preponderance 

^  Readers  unacquainted  with  Samkhya- Yoga  may  omit  the  following  three  sections 
at  the  time  of  first  reading. 

2  Purusa  is  here  excluded  from  the  list.  Cakrapani,  the  commentator,  says  that 
the  prakrti  and  purusa  both  being  unmanifested,  the  two  together  have  been  counted 
as  one.  Prakrtivyatiriktancodastnani  purusamavyaktatvasddharmyat  avyaktdydm 
prakrtdveva  praksipya  avyakta^abdenaiva  grhndti.  Harinatha  Vi^arada's  edition  of 
Caraka,  Sdrtra,  p.  4. 


214  1^^^  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [en. 

of  air,  the  visual  sense  with  a  preponderance  of  light,  the  taste  with 
a  preponderance  of  water  and  the  sense  of  smell  with  a  preponder- 
ance of  earth.  Caraka  does  not  mention  the  tanmatras  at  alP.  The 
conglomeration  of  the  sense-objects  {indriydrthd)  or  gross  matter, 
the  ten  senses,  manas,  the  five  subtle  bhutas  and  prakrti,  mahat 
and  aharnkara  taking  place  through  rajas  make  up  what  we  call 
man.  When  the  sattva  is  at  its  height  this  conglomeration  ceases. 
All  karma,  the  fruit  of  karma,  cognition,  pleasure,  pain,  ignorance, 
life  and  death  belongs  to  this  conglomeration.  But  there  is  also 
the  purusa,  for  had  it  not  been  so  there  would  be  no  birth,  death, 
bondage,  or  salvation.  If  the  atman  were  not  regarded  as  cause, 
all  illuminations  of  cognition  would  be  without  any  reason.  If  a 
permanent  self  were  not  recognized,  then  for  the  work  of  one 
others  would  be  responsible.  This  purusa,  called  3\so paramdtman, 
is  beginningless  and  it  has  no  cause  beyond  itself  The  self  is  in 
itself  without  consciousness.  Consciousness  can  only  come  to  it 
through  its  connection  with  the  sense  organs  and  manas.  By 
ignorance,  will,antipathy,  and  work,  this  conglomeration  of  purusa 
and  the  other  elements  takes  place.  Knowledge,  feeling,  or  action, 
cannot  be  produced  without  this  combination.  All  positive  effects 
are  due  to  conglomerations  of  causes  and  not  by  a  single  cause,  but 
all  destruction  comes  naturally  and  without  cause.  That  which 
is  eternal  is  never  the  product  of  anything.  Caraka  identifies  the 
avyakta  part  of  prakrti  with  purusa  as  forming  one  category. 
The  vikara  or  evolutionary  products  of  prakrti  are  called  ksetra, 
whereas  the  avyakta  part  of  prakrti  is  regarded  as  the  ksetrajna 
{avyaktamasya  ksetrasya  ksetrajnamrsayo  vidiih).  This  avyakta 
and  cetana  are  one  and  the  same  entity.  From  this  unmanifested 
prakrti  or  cetana  is  derived  the  buddhi,  and  from  the  buddhi  is 
derived  the  ego  {ahamkdrd)  and  from  the  aharnkara  the  five 
elements  and  the  senses  are  produced,  and  when  this  production 
is  complete,  we  say  that  creation  has  taken  place.  At  the  time 
of  pralaya  (periodical  cosmic  dissolution)  all  the  evolutes  return 
back  to  prakrti,  and  thus  become  unmanifest  with  it,  whereas  at  the 
time  of  a  new  creation  from  the  purusa  the  unmanifest  {avyakta), 
all  the  manifested  forms — the  evolutes  of  buddhi,  aharnkara,  etc. — 

*  But  some  sort  of  subtle  matter,  different  from  gross  matter,  is  referred  to  as 
forming  part  of  prakrti  which  is  regarded  as  having  eight  elements  in  it  {prakrtisca- 
stadhdttiki),  viz.  avyakta.mahat, aharnkara,  and  five  other  elements.  In  addition  to  these 
elements  forming  part  of  the  prakrti  we  hear  of  indriyartha,  the  five  sense  objects 
which  have  evolved  out  of  the  prakrti. 


vii]  Samkhya  in  Caraka  215 

appear^  This  cycle  of  births  or  rebirths  or  of  dissolution  and 
new  creation  acts  through  the  influence  of  rajas  and  tamas,  and 
so  those  who  can  get  rid  of  these  two  will  never  again  suffer  this 
revolution  in  a  cycle.  The  manas  can  only  become  active  in  asso- 
ciation with  the  self,  which  is  the  real  agent.  This  self  of  itself  takes 
rebirth  in  all  kinds  of  lives  according  to  its  own  wish,  undeter- 
mined by  anyone  else.  It  works  according  to  its  own  free  will 
and  reaps  the  fruits  of  its  karma.  Though  all  the  souls  are  pervasive, 
yet  they  can  only  perceive  in  particular  bodies  where  they  are 
associated  with  their  own  specific  senses.  All  pleasures  and  pains 
are  felt  by  the  conglomeration  {rdsi),  and  not  by  the  atman  pre- 
siding over  it.  From  the  enjoyment  and  suffering  of  pleasure  and 
pain  comes  desire  (trsna)  consisting  of  wish  and  antipathy,  and 
from  desire  again  comes  pleasure  and  pain.  Moksa  means  complete 
cessation  of  pleasure  and  pain,  arising  through  the  association 
of  the  self  with  the  manas,  the  sense,  and  sense-objects.  If  the 
manas  is  settled  steadily  in  the  self,  it  is  the  state  of  yoga  when 
there  is  neither  pleasure  nor  pain.  When  true  knowledge  dawns 
that  "all  are  produced  by  causes,  are  transitory,  rise  of  them- 
selves, but  are  not  produced  by  the  self  and  are  sorrow,  and  do 
not  belong  to  me  the  self,"  the  self  transcends  all.  This  is  the  last 
renunciation  when  all  affections  and  knowledge  become  finally 
extinct.  There  remains  no  indication  of  any  positive  existence 
of  the  self  at  this  time,  and  the  self  can  no  longer  be  perceived  2. 
It  is  the  state  of  Brahman.  Those  who  know  Brahman  call  this 
state  the  Brahman,  which  is  eternal  and  absolutely  devoid  of  any 
characteristic.  This  state  is  spoken  of  by  the  Sarnkhyas  as  their 
goal,  and  also  that  of  the  Yogins.  When  rajas  and  tamas  are 
rooted  out  and  the  karma  of  the  past  whose  fruits  have  to  be 
enjoyed  are  exhausted,  and  there  is  no  new  karma  and  new  birth, 

^  This  passage  has  been  differently  explained  in  a  commentary  previous  to  Cakra- 
pani  as  meaning  that  at  the  time  of  death  these  resolve  back  into  the  prakrti — the 
purusa — and  at  the  time  of  rebirth  they  become  manifest  again.  See  Cakrapani  on 
^arira,  i.  46. 

^  Though  this  state  is  called  brahmabhuta,  it  is  not  in  any  sense  like  the  Brahman 
of  Vedanta  which  is  of  the  nature  of  pure  being,  pure  intelligence  and  pure  bliss.  This 
indescribable  state  is  more  like  absolute  annihilation  without  any  sign  of  existence 
[alaksana?>i),  resembling  Nagarjuna's  Nirvana.  Thus  Caraka  writes  : — tastnimscarania- 
sannyase  saf?iuldksarvavedandk  asanijndjndnavijudna  nivrttini  ydntyasesatah.  atah- 
param  brahmabhuto  bhidatmd  nopalabhyate  nUisrtah  sarvabhdvebhyah  cihnam  yasya 
na  vidyate.  gatirbrahmaviddtn  brahma  taccdksaramalaksanain.  Caraka,  Sdrtra  1. 
08-100. 


2i6  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Sainkhya        [ch. 

the  state  of  moksa  comes  about.  Various  kinds  of  moral  en- 
deavours in  the  shape  of  association  with  good  people,  abandoning 
of  desires,  determined  attempts  at  discovering  the  truth  with  fixed 
attention,  are  spoken  of  as  indispensable  means.  Truth  (tattva) 
thus  discovered  should  be  recalled  again  and  again ^  and  this  will 
ultimately  effect  the  disunion  of  the  body  with  the  self.  As  the 
self  is  avyakta  (unmanifested)  and  has  no  specific  nature  or 
character,  this  state  can  only  be  described  as  absolute  cessation 
{inokse  nivrttirnihsesd). 

The  main  features  of  the  Sarnkhya  doctrine  as  given  by  Caraka 
are  thus:  i.  Purusa  is  the  state  of  avyakta.  2.  By  a  conglomera- 
of  this  avyakta  with  its  later  products  a  conglomeration  is  formed 
which  generates  the  so-called  living  being.  3.  The  tanmatras  are 
not  mentioned.  4.  Rajas  and  tamas  represent  the  bad  states  of 
the  mind  and  sattva  the  good  ones.  5.  The  ultimate  state  of 
emancipation  is  either  absolute  annihilation  or  characterless  abso- 
lute existence  and  it  is  spoken  of  as  the  Brahman  state;  there  is 
no  consciousness  in  this  state,  for  consciousness  is  due  to  the  con- 
glomeration of  the  self  with  its  evolutes,  buddhi,  aharnkara  etc. 
6.  The  senses  are  formed  of  matter  {bhautikd). 

This  account  of  Sarnkhya  agrees  with  the  system  of  Sarnkhya 
propounded  by  Paiicasikha  (who  is  said  to  be  the  direct  pupil  of 
Asuri  the  pupil  of  Kapila,  the  founder  of  the  system)  in  the 
Mahabharata  XII.  219.  Pancasikha  of  course  does  not  describe 
the  system  as  elaborately  as  Caraka  does.  But  even  from  what 
little  he  says  it  may  be  supposed  that  the  system  of  Sarnkhya 
he  sketches  is  the  same  as  that  of  Carakal  Pancasikha  speaks 
of  the  ultimate  truth  as  being  avyakta  (a  term  applied  in  all 
Sarnkhya  literature  to  prakrti)  in  the  state  of  purusa  {purusd- 
vasthamavyaktani).  If  man  is  the  product  of  a  mere  combination 
of  the  different  elements,  then  one  may  assume  that  all  ceases 
with  death.  Caraka  in  answer  to  such  an  objection  introduces  a 
discussion,  in  which  he  tries  to  establish  the  existence  of  a  self  as 
the  postulate  of  all  our  duties  and  sense  of  moral  responsibility. 
The  same  discussion  occurs  in  Paflcasikha  also,  and  the  proofs 

^  Four  causes  are  spoken  of  here  as  being  causes  of  memory;  (i)  Thinking  of  the 
cause  leads  to  the  remembering  of  the  effect,  (2)  by  similarity,  (3)  by  opposite  things, 
and  (4)  by  acute  attempt  to  remember. 

2  Some  European  scholars  have  experienced  great  difficulty  in  accepting  Paii- 
ca^ikha's  doctrine  as  a  genuine  Sanikhya  doctrine.  This  may  probably  be  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  Sarnkhya  doctrines  sketched  in  Caraka  did  not  attract  their  notice. 


vii]  Samkhya  of  Pancasikha  and  Caraka  217 

for  the  existence  of  the  self  are  also  the  same.  Like  Caraka  again 
Pancasikha  also  says  that  all  consciousness  is  due  to  the  conditions 
of  the  conglomeration  of  our  physical  body  mind, — and  the 
element  of  "cetas."  They  are  mutually  independent,  and  by  such 
independence  carry  on  the  process  of  life  and  work.  None  of  the 
phenomena  produced  by  such  a  conglomeration  are  self  All  our 
suffering  comes  in  because  we  think  these  to  be  the  self  Moksa 
is  realized  when  we  can  practise  absolute  renunciation  of  these 
phenomena.  The  gunas  described  by  Pancasikha  are  the  different 
kinds  of  good  and  bad  qualities  of  the  mind  as  Caraka  has  it. 
The  state  of  the  conglomeration  is  spoken  of  as  the  ksetra,  as 
Caraka  says,  and  there  is  no  annihilation  or  eternality;  and  the 
last  state  is  described  as  being  like  that  when  all  rivers  lose 
themselves  in  the  ocean  and  it  is  called  alinga  (without  any 
characteristic) — a  term  reserved  for  prakrti  in  later  Samkhya. 
This  state  is  attainable  by  the  doctrine  of  ultimate  renuncia- 
tion which  is  also  called  the  doctrine  of  complete  destruction 
{samyagbadha). 

Gunaratna  (fourteenth  century  A.D.),  a  commentator  of  Sad- 
darsanasamuccaya,  mentions  two  schools  of  Sarnkhya,  the 
Maulikya  (original)  and  the  Uttara  or  (later)\  Of  these  the 
doctrine  of  the  Maulikya  Sarnkhya  is  said  to  be  that  which 
believed  that  there  was  a  separate  pradhana  for  each  atman 
{matdikyasdmkhyd  hydtmdnanidUndnain  prati  prthak  pradJidnam 
vadanti).  This  seems  to  be  a  reference  to  the  Samkhya  doctrine 
I  have  just  sketched.  I  am  therefore  disposed  to  think  that  this 
represents  the  earliest  systematic  doctrine  of  Sarnkhya. 

In  Mahdbhdrata  XII.  318  three  schools  of  Samkhya  are 
mentioned,  viz.  those  who  admitted  twenty-four  categories  (the 
school  I  have  sketched  above),  those  who  admitted  twenty- 
five  (the  well-known  orthodox  Samkhya  system)  and  those  who 
admitted  twenty-six  categories.  This  last  school  admitted  a 
supreme  being  in  addition  to  purusa  and  this  was  the  twenty-sixth 
principle.  This  agrees  with  the  orthodox  Yoga  system  and  the 
form  of  Sarnkhya  advocated  in  the  Mahabharata.  The  schools  of 
Sarnkhya  of  twenty-four  and  twenty-five  categories  are  here 
denounced  as  unsatisfactory.  Doctrines  similar  to  the  school  of 
Samkhya  we  have  sketched  above  are  referred  to  in  some  of  the 

^  Gunaratna's  Tarkarahasyadipikd,  p.  99. 


2 1 8  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

other  chapters  of  the  Mahdbhdrata  (xil,  203,  204).  The  self 
apart  from  the  body  is  described  as  the  moon  of  the  new  moon 
day;  it  is  said  that  as  Rahu  (the  shadow  on  the  sun  during  an 
echpse)  cannot  be  seen  apart  from  the  sun,  so  the  self  cannot  be 
seen  apart  from  the  body.  The  selfs  {sarlrinak)  are  spoken  of  as 
manifesting  from  prakrti. 

We  do  not  know  anything  about  Asuri  the  direct  disciple 
of  Kapila\  But  it  seems  probable  that  the  system  of  Sarnkhya 
we  have  sketched  here  which  appears  in  fundamentally  the  same 
form  in  the  Mahdbhdrata  and  has  been  attributed  there  to  Pan- 
casikha  is  probably  the  earliest  form  of  Samkhya  available  to  us 
in  a  systematic  form.  Not  only  does  Gunaratna's  reference  to  the 
school  of  Maulikya  Samkhya  justify  it,  but  the  fact  that  Caraka 
(78  A.D.)  does  not  refer  to  the  Samkhya  as  described  by  Isvarak- 
rsna  and  referred  to  in  other  parts  of  Mahdbhdrata  is  a  definite 
proof  that  Isvarakrsna's  Samkhya  is  a  later  modification,  which 
was  either  non-existent  in  Caraka's  time  or  was  not  regarded  as 
an  authoritative  old  Sarnkhya  view. 

Wassilief  says  quoting  Tibetan  sources  that  Vindhyavasin  al- 
tered the  Sarnkhya  according  to  his  own  views^  Takakusu  thinks 
that  Vindhyavasin  was  a  title  of  Isvarakrsna^  and  Garbe  holds  that 
the  date  of  Isvarakrsna  was  about  100  A.D.  It  seems  to  be  a  very 
plausible  view  that  Isvarakrsna  was  indebted  for  his  karikas  to 
another  work,  which  was  probably  written  in  a  style  different 
from  what  he  employs.  The  seventh  verse  of  his  Kdrikd  seems  to 
be  in  purport  the  same  as  a  passage  which  is  found  quoted  in  the 

1  A  verse  attributed  to  Asuri  is  quoted  by  Gunaratna  [Tarkarahasyadipika,  p.  104). 
The  purport  of  this  verse  is  that  when  buddhi  is  transformed  in  a  particular  manner, 
it  (purusa)  has  experience.    It  is  like  the  reflection  of  the  moon  in  transparent  water. 

^  Vassilief's  Buddhismus,  p.  240. 

^  Takakusu's  "A  study  of  Paramartha's  life  of  Vasubaudhu," _/.  R.A.S.,  1905. 
This  identification  by  Takakusu,  however,  appears  to  be  extremely  doubtful,  for 
Gunaratna  mentions  Isvarakrsna  and  Vindhyavasin  as  two  different  authorities  ( Tarka- 
rahasyadipika, pp.  102  and  104).  The  verse  quoted  from  Vindhyavasin  (p.  104)  in 
anustubh  metre  cannot  be  traced  as  belonging  to  Isvarakrsna.  It  appears  that  Isvara- 
krsna wrote  two  books ;  one  is  the  Samkhya  kdrikd  and  another  an  independent  work 
on  Samkhya,  a  line  from  which,  quoted  by  Gunaratna,  stands  as  follows  : 

^'' Pratiniyatddhyavasdyah  irotrddisamuttha  adhyakmfii"  (p.  108). 

If  Vacaspati's  interpretation  of  the  classification  of  anumana  in  his  Tattvakaumudi 
be  considered  to  be  a  correct  explanation  of  Samkhya  kdrikd  then  ISvarakrsna  must  be 
a  different  person  from  Vindhyavasin  whose  views  on  anumana  as  referred  to  in 
SlokavdrUika,  p.  393,  are  altogether  different.  But  Vacaspati's  own  statement  in  the 
Tdtparyyatlkd  (pp.  109  and  131)  shows  that  his  treatment  there  was  not  faithful. 


VI i]  Isvarakrmds  Samkhya  219 

Mahdbhdsya  of  Patafijali  the  grammarian  (147  B.C.)^  The  subject 
of  the  two  passages  are  the  enumeration  of  reasons  which  frustrate 
visual  perception.  This  however  is  not  a  doctrine  concerned  with 
the  strictly  technical  part  of  Samkhya,  and  it  is  just  possible 
that  the  book  from  which  Patafijali  quoted  the  passage,  and  which 
was  probably  paraphrased  in  the  Arya  metre  by  Isvarakrsna 
was  not  a  Sarnkhya  book  at  all.  But  though  the  subject  of  the 
verse  is  not  one  of  the  strictly  technical  parts  of  Sarnkhya,  yet 
since  such  an  enumeration  is  not  seen  in  any  other  system  of 
Indian  philosophy,  and  as  it  has  some  special  bearing  as  a  safe- 
guard against  certain  objections  against  the  Samkhya  doctrine  of 
prakrti,  the  natural  and  plausible  supposition  is  that  it  was  the 
verse  of  a  Sarnkhya  book  which  was  paraphrased  by  Isvarakrsna. 

The  earliest  descriptions  of  a  Sarnkhya  which  agrees  with 
Isvarakrsna's  Samkhya  (but  with  an  addition  of  Isvara)  are  to  be 
found  in  Patanjali's  Yoga  siltras  and  in  the  Mahdbhdrata\  but  we 
are  pretty  certain  that  the  Samkhya  of  Caraka  we  have  sketched 
here  was  known  to  Patafijali,  for  in  Yoga  siltra  I.  19  a  reference  is 
made  to  a  view  of  Sarnkhya  similar  to  this. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  history  of  philosophy  the  Sarnkhya 
of  Caraka  and  Paficasikha  is  very  important ;  for  it  shows  a 
transitional  stage  of  thought  between  the  Upanisad  ideas  and 
the  orthodox  Sarnkhya  doctrine  as  represented  by  Isvarakrsna. 
On  the  one  hand  its  doctrine  that  the  senses  are  material,  and 
that  effects  are  produced  only  as  a  result  of  collocations,  and  that 
the  purusa  is  unconscious,  brings  it  in  close  relation  with  Nyaya, 
and  on  the  other  its  connections  with  Buddhism  seem  to  be  nearer 
than  the  orthodox  Sarnkhya. 

We  hear  of  a  Sastitantrasastra  as  being  one  of  the  oldest  Sam- 
khya works.  This  is  described  in  the  Ahirbudhnya  Samhitd  as 
containing  two  books  of  thirty-two  and  twenty-eight  chapters^ 
A  quotation  from  Rdjavdrttika  (a  work  about  which  there  is  no 
definite  information)  in  Vacaspati  MiSra's  commentary  on  the 
Sdmkhya  kdrika{j2)  says  that  it  was  called  the  Sastitantra  because 
it  dealt  with  the  existence  of  prakrti,  its  oneness,  its  difference 
from  purusas,  its  purposefulness  for  purusas,  the  multiplicity  of 
purusas,  connection  and  separation  from  purusas,  the  evolution  of 

^  Patanjali's  Mahabhasya,  iv.  i.  3.    Atisannikarsadativiprakarsdt  murttyautara- 
vyavadhanat  tamasdvrtatvdt  indriyadaurvalyddatipramdddt,  etc.    (Benares  edition.) 
^  Ahirbudhnya  Satnhitd,  pp.  108,  1 10. 


2  20  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

the  categories,  the  inactivity  of  the  purusas  and  the  ^v^viparyyayas, 
nine  tustis,  the  defects  of  organs  of  twenty-eight  kinds,  and  the 
eight  siddhis^ 

But  the  content  of  the  Sastitantra  as  given  in  Ahirbudhnya 
Samhitd'is  different  from  it,  and  it  appears  from  it  that  theSarnkhya 
of  the  Sastitmitra  referred  to  in  the  Ahirbudluiya  Samhitd  was  of 
a  theistic  character  resembling  the  doctrine  of  the  Paficaratra 
Vaisnavas  and  the  Ahirbudhnya  Samhitd  says  that  Kapila's 
theory  of  Samkhya  was  a  Vaisnava  one.  Vijiiana  Bhiksu,  the 
greatest  expounder  of  Sarnkhya,  says  in  many  places  of  his  work 
Vijiidndmrta Bhasya  that  Sarnkhya  was  originally  theistic,  and  that 
the  atheistic  Samkhya  is  only  a  praudhivdda  (an  exaggerated 
attempt  to  show  that  no  supposition  of  Isvara  is  necessary  to 
explain  the  world  process)  though  the  Mahdbhdrata  points  out 
that  the  difference  between  Sarnkhya  and  Yoga  is  this,  that  the 
former  is  atheistic,  while  the  latter  is  theistic.  The  discrepancy 
between  the  two  accounts  of  Sastitantra  suggests  that  the  original 
Sastitantra  as  referred  to  in  the  Ahirbudhnya  Samhitd  was  sub- 
sequently revised  and  considerably  changed.  This  supposition  is 
corroborated  by  the  fact  that  Gunaratna  does  not  mention  among 
the  important  Samkhya  works  Sastitantra  but  Sastitantroddhdra 

^  The  doctrine  of  the  viparyyaya,  tusti,  defects  of  organs,  and  the  siddhi  are  men- 
tioned in  the  Karika  of  I^varakrsna,  but  I  have  omitted  them  in  my  account  of 
Samkhya  as  these  have  little  philosophical  importance.  The  viparyyaya  (false  know- 
ledge) are  five,  viz.  avidya  (ignorance),  asmita  (egoism),  raga  (attachment),  dvesa  (anti- 
pathy), abhinive^a  (self-love),  which  are  also  called  tatno,  moha,  mahdmoha,  tamisrd, 
and  andhatdmisra.  These  are  of  nine  kinds  of  tusti,  such  as  the  idea  that  no  exertion 
is  necessary,  since  prakrti  will  herself  bring  our  salvation  {ambhas),  that  it  is  not 
necessary  to  meditate,  for  it  is  enough  if  we  renounce  the  householder's  life  (salila), 
that  there  is  no  hurry,  salvation  will  come  in  time  (niegha),  that  salvation  will  be 
worked  out  by  fate  (d/idgya),  and  the  contentment  leading  to  renunciation  proceeding 
from  five  kinds  of  causes,  e.g.  the  troubles  of  earning  (para),  the  troubles  of  protecting 
the  earned  money  (siipard),  the  natural  waste  of  things  earned  by  enjoyment  {para- 
para),  increase  of  desires  leading  to  greater  disappointments  (anuitamdmbhas),  all  gain 
leads  to  the  injury  of  others  (utiamdnibhas).  This  renunciation  proceeds  from  external 
considerations  with  those  who  consider  prakrti  and  its  evolutes  as  the  self.  The 
siddhis  or  ways  of  success  are  eight  in  number,  viz.  (i)  reading  of  scriptures  (idra), 
(2)  enquiry  into  their  meaning  [sutdra],  (3)  proper  reasoning  [tdratdra),  (4)  corrobo- 
rating one's  own  ideas  with  the  ideas  of  the  teachers  and  other  workers  of  the  same 
field  {ramya/ca),  (5)  clearance  of  the  mind  by  long-continued  practice  (saddnmdita). 
The  three  other  siddhis  called  pramoda,  mudita,  and  modamana  lead  directly  to  the 
separation  of  the  prakrti  from  the  purusa.  The  twenty-eight  sense  defects  are  the 
eleven  defects  of  the  eleven  senses  and  seventeen  kinds  of  defects  of  the  understanding 
corresponding  to  the  absence  of  siddhis  and  the  presence  of  tustis.  The  viparyyayas, 
tustis  and  the  defects  of  the  organs  are  hindrances  in  the  way  of  the  achievement  of 
the  Samkhya  goal. 


VI i]  Changes  in  the  Sdmkhya  doctrine  221 

(revised  edition  of  Sastitantrdy.    Probably  the  earlier  Sastitantra 
was  lost  even  before  Vacaspati's  time. 

If  we  believe  the  Sastitantra  referred  to  in  the  Ahirbiidlmya 
Samhitd  to  be  in  all  essential  parts  the  same  work  which  was 
composed  by  Kapila  and  based  faithfully  on  his  teachings,  then  it 
has  to  be  assumed  that  Kapila's  Sarnkhya  was  theistic-.  It  seems 
probable  that  his  disciple  Asuri  tried  to  popularise  it.  But  it  seems 
that  a  great  change  occurred  when  Panca^ikha  the  disciple  of 
Asuri  came  to  deal  with  it.  For  we  know  that  his  doctrine 
differed  from  the  traditional  one  in  many  important  respects.  It 
is  said  in  Sdmkhya  kdrikd  (70)  that  the  literature  was  divided  by 
him  into  many  parts  {tena  bahudhdkrtam  tantrum).  The  exact 
meaning  of  this  reference  is  difficult  to  guess.  It  might  mean  that 
the  original  Sastitantra  was  rewritten  by  him  in  various  treatises. 
It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  most  of  the  schools  of  Vaisnavas 
accepted  the  form  of  cosmology  which  is  the  same  in  most  essen- 
tial parts  as  the  Sarnkhya  cosmology.  This  justifies  the  assump- 
tion that  Kapila's  doctrine  was  probably  theistic.  But  there  are 
a  few  other  points  of  difference  between  the  Kapila  and  the 
Patanjala  Sarnkhya  (Yoga).  The  only  supposition  that  may 
be  ventured  is  that  Paficasikha  probably  modified  Kapila's 
work  in  an  atheistic  way  and  passed  it  as  Kapila's  work.  If  this 
supposition  is  held  reasonable,  then  we  have  three  strata  of 
Sarnkhya,  first  a  theistic  one,  the  details  of  which  are  lost,  but 
which  is  kept  in  a  modified  form  by  the  Patanjala  school  of  Sarn- 
khya, second  an  atheistic  one  as  represented  by  Paficasikha,  and 
a  third  atheistic  modification  as  the  orthodox  Sarnkhya  system. 
An  important  change  in  the  Sarnkhya  doctrine  seems  to  have 
been  introduced  by  Vijnana  Bhiksu  (sixteenth  century  A.D.)  by  his 
treatment  of  gunas  as  types  of  reals.  I  have  myself  accepted  this 
interpretation  of  Sarnkhya  as  the  most  rational  and  philosophical 
one,  and  have  therefore  followed  it  in  giving  a  connected  system 
of  the  accepted  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  school  of  Sarnkhya.  But 
it  must  be  pointed  out  that  originally  the  notion  of  gunas  was 
applied  to  different  types  of  good  and  bad  mental  states,  and  then 
they  were  supposed  in  some  mysterious  way  by  mutual  increase 
and  decrease  to  form  the  objective  world  on  the  one  hand  and  the 

^   Tarkarahasyadipikd,  p.  109. 

*  evam  sadvim^akam  prahiih  sariramih  nidnavah  sdmkkyam  samkhyatniakatvacca 
kapilddibhirucyate .   Matsyapurdna,  iv.  28. 


2  22  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

totality  of  human  psychosis  on  the  other.  A  systematic  explana- 
nation  of  the  gunas  was  attempted  in  two  different  Hnes  by 
Vijnana  Bhiksu  and  the  Vaisnava  writer  Venkata^  As  the  Yoga 
philosophy  compiled  by  Patafijali  and  commented  on  by  Vyasa, 
Vacaspati  and  Vijfiana  Bhiksu,  agree  with  the  Samkhya  doctrine 
as  explained  by  Vacaspati  and  Vijilana  Bhiksu  in  most  points  I 
have  preferred  to  call  them  the  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  schools 
of  Samkhya  and  have  treated  them  together — a  principle  which 
was  followed  by  Haribhadra  in  his  Saddarsanasamuccaya. 

The  other  important  Sarnkhya  teachers  mentioned  by  Gauda- 
pada  are  Sanaka,  Sananda,  Sanatana  and  Vodhu.  Nothing  is 
rcnown  about  their  historicity  or  doctrines. 

Samkhya  karika,  Sarnkhya  sutra,  Vacaspati  Misra  and 
Vijnana  Bhiksu. 

A  word  of  explanation  is  necessary  as  regards  my  inter- 
pretation of  the  Sarnkhya-Yoga  system.  The  Samkhya  kdrikd  is 
the  oldest  Sanikhya  text  on  which  we  have  commentaries  by 
later  writers.  The  Samkhya  sutra  was  not  referred  to  by  any 
writer  until  it  was  commented  upon  by  Aniruddha  (fifteenth 
century  A.D.).  Even  Gunaratna  of  the  fourteenth  century  A.D.  who 
made  allusions  to  a  number  of  Sarnkhya  works,  did  not  make  any 
reference  to  the  Sdinkhya  sfitra,  and  no  other  writer  who  is  known 
to  have  flourished  before  Gunaratna  seems  to  have  made  any 
reference  to  the  Sdinkhya  sutra.  The  natural  conclusion  therefore 
is  that  these  sutras  were  probably  written  some  time  after 
the  fourteenth  century.  But  there  is  no  positive  evidence  to 
prove  that  it  was  so  late  a  work  as  the  fifteenth  century.  It  is 
said  at  the  end  of  the  Sdinkhya  kdrikd  of  Isvarakrsna  that  the 
karikas  give  an  exposition  of  the  Sarnkhya  doctrine  excluding 
the  refutations  of  the  doctrines  of  other  people  and  excluding  the 
parables  attached  to  the  original  Sarnkhya  works — the  Sastitan- 
trasdstra.  The  Sdinkhya  sutras  cont^An  refutations  of  other  doc- 
trines and  also  a  number  of  parables.  It  is  not  improbable  that 
these  were  collected  from  some  earlier  Sarnkhya  work  which  is 
now  lost  to  us.  It  may  be  that  it  was  done  from  some  later  edition 
of  the  Sastitantrasdstra  {Sastitantroddhdra   as   mentioned    by 

^  Vehkata's  philosopby  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  second  volume  of  the  present 
work. 


vii]  Interpretations  of  Samkhy a  223 

Gunaratna),  but  this  is  a  mere  conjecture.  There  is  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  the  Sarnkhya  doctrine  found  in  the  sutras  differs  in 
any  important  way  from  the  Sarnkhya  doctrine  as  found  in  the 
Sdmkhya  kdrikd.  The  only  point  of  importance  is  this,  that  the 
Sarnkhya  sutras  hold  that  when  the  Upanisads  spoke  of  one  ab- 
solute pure  intelligence  they  meant  to  speak  of  unity  as  involved 
in  the  class  of  intelligent  purusas  as  distinct  from  the  class  of 
the  gunas.  As  all  purusas  were  of  the  nature  of  pure  intelligence, 
they  were  spoken  of  in  the  Upanisads  as  one,  for  they  all  form 
the  category  or  class  of  pure  intelligence,  and  hence  may  in  some 
sense  be  regarded  as  one.  This  compromise  cannot  be  found  in 
the  Sdmkhya  kdrikd.  This  is,  however,  a  case  of  omission  and  not 
of  difference.  Vijftana  Bhiksu,  the  commentator  of  the  Sdm- 
khya si'itra,  was  more  inclined  to  theistic  Sarnkhya  or  Yoga  than 
to  atheistic  Sarnkhya.  This  is  proved  by  his  own  remarks  in 
his  Sdnikhyapravacanabhdsya,  Yogavdritika,  and  Vijnandmrta- 
bhdsya  (an  independent  commentary  on  the  Brahmasutras  of 
Badarayana  on  theistic  Sarnkhya  lines).  Vijfiana  Bhiksu's  own 
view  could  not  properly  be  called  a  thorough  Yoga  view,  for  he 
agreed  more  with  the  views  of  the  Sarnkhya  doctrine  of  the 
Puranas,  where  both  the  diverse  purusas  and  the  prakrti  are  said 
to  be  merged  in  the  end  in  Isvara,  by  whose  will  the  creative 
process  again  began  in  the  prakrti  at  the  end  of  each  pralaya. 
He  could  not  avoid  the  distinctively  atheistic  arguments  of  the 
Sarnkhya  sutras,  but  he  remarked  that  these  were  used  only  with 
a  view  to  showing  that  the  Sarnkhya  system  gave  such  a  rational 
explanation  that  even  without  the  intervention  of  an  Isvara  it  could 
explain  all  facts.  Vijfiana  Bhiksu  in  his  interpretation  of  Sarnkhya 
differed  on  many  points  from  those  of  Vacaspati,  and  it  is  difficult 
to  say  who  is  right.  Vijilana  Bhiksu  has  this  advantage  that 
he  hasboldly  tried  to  give  interpretations  on  some  difficult  points 
on  which  Vacaspati  remained  silent.  I  refer  principally  to  the 
nature  of  the  conception  of  the  gunas,  which  I  believe  is  the  most 
important  thing  in  Sarnkhya.  Vijftana  Bhiksu  described  the 
gunas  as  reals  or  super-subtle  substances,  but  Vacaspati  and 
Gaudapada  (the  other  commentator  of  the  Sdmkhya  kdrikd) 
remained  silent  on  the  point.  There  is  nothing,  however,  in  their 
interpretations  which  would  militate  against  the  interpretation  of 
Vijftana  Bhiksu,  but  yet  while  they  were  silent  as  to  any  definite 
explanations  regarding  the  nature  of  the  gunas,  Bhiksu  definitely 


2  24  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Sanikhya        [ch. 

came  forward  with  a  very  satisfactory  and  rational  interpretation 
of  their  nature. 

Since  no  definite  explanation  of  the  gunas  is  found  in  any 
other  work  before  Bhiksu,  it  is  quite  probable  that  this  matter 
may  not  have  been  definitely  worked  out  before.  Neither  Caraka 
nor  the  Mahdbhdrata  explains  the  nature  of  the  gunas.  But 
Bhiksu's  interpretation  suits  exceedingly  well  all  that  is  known 
of  the  manifestations  and  the  workings  of  the  gunas  in  all  early 
documents.  I  have  therefore  accepted  the  interpretation  of  Bhiksu 
in  giving  my  account  of  the  nature  of  the  gunas.  The  Kdrikd 
speaks  of  the  gunas  as  being  of  the  nature  of  pleasure,  pain,  and 
dullness  {sattva,  rajas  and  tamas).  It  also  describes  sattva  as 
being  light  and  illuminating,  rajas  as  of  the  nature  of  energy  and 
causing  motion,  and  tamas  as  heavy  and  obstructing.  Vacaspati 
merely  paraphrases  this  statement  o{^\\&Kdrikd  but  does  not  enter 
into  any  further  explanations.  Bhiksu's  interpretation  fits  in  well 
with  all  that  is  known  of  the  gunas,  though  it  is  quite  possible 
that  this  view  might  not  have  been  known  before,  and  when  the 
original  Sarnkhya  doctrine  was  formulated  there  was  a  real  vague- 
ness as  to  the  conception  of  the  gunas. 

There  are  some  other  points  in  which  Bhiksu's  interpretation 
differs  from  that  of  Vacaspati.  The  most  important  of  these  may 
be  mentioned  here.  The  first  is  the  nature  of  the  connection  of 
the  buddhi  states  with  the  purusa.  Vacaspati  holds  that  there  is 
no  contact  {samyogd)  of  any  buddhi  state  with  the  purusa  but  that 
a  reflection  of  the  purusa  is  caught  in  the  state  of  buddhi  by 
virtue  of  which  the  buddhi  state  becomes  intelligized  and  trans- 
formed into  consciousness.  But  this  view  is  open  to  the  objection 
that  it  does  not  explain  how  the  purusa  can  be  said  to  be  the 
experiencer  of  the  conscious  states  of  the  buddhi,  for  its  reflection 
in  the  buddhi  is  merely  an  image,  and  there  cannot  be  an  ex- 
perience {bhoga)  on  the  basis  of  that  image  alone  without  any 
actual  connection  of  the  purusa  with  the  buddhi.  The  answer  of 
Vacaspati  Misra  is  that  there  is  no  contact  of  the  two  in  space 
and  time,  but  that  their  proximity  {sannidhi)  means  only  a  specific 
kind  of  fitness  {yogyatd)  by  virtue  of  which  the  purusa,  though  it 
remains  aloof,  is  yet  felt  to  be  united  and  identified  in  the  buddhi, 
and  as  a  result  of  that  the  states  of  the  buddhi  appear  as  ascribed 
to  a  person.  Vijftana  Bhiksu  differs  from  Vacaspati  and  says  that 
if  such  a  special  kind  of  fitness  be  admitted,  then  there  is  no 


vii]  Interpretations  of  Bhiksu  and  Vdcaspati         225 

reason  why  purusa  should  be  deprived  of  such  a  fitness  at  the  time 
of  emancipation,  and  thus  there  would  be  no  emancipation  at  all, 
for  the  fitness  being  in  the  purusa,  he  could  not  be  divested  of  it, 
and  he  would  continue  to  enjoy  the  experiences  represented  in 
the  buddhi  for  ever.  Vijnana  Bhiksu  thus  holds  that  there  is  a 
real  contact  of  the  purusa  with  the  buddhi  state  in  any  cognitive 
state.  Such  a  contact  of  the  purusa  and  the  buddhi  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  the  former  will  be  liable  to  change  on 
account  of  it,  for  contact  and  change  are  not  synonymous.  Change 
means  the  rise  of  new  qualities.  It  is  the  buddhi  which  suffers 
changes,  and  when  these  changes  are  reflected  in  the  purusa,  there 
is  the  notion  of  a  person  or  experiencer  in  the  purusa,  and  when 
the  puru.sa  is  reflected  back  in  the  buddhi  the  buddhi  state  appears 
as  a  conscious  state.  The  second,  is  the  difference  between 
Vacaspati  and  Bhiksu  as  regards  the  nature  of  the  perceptual 
process.  Bhiksu  thinks  that  the  senses  can  directly  perceive  the 
determinate  qualities  of  things  without  any  intervention  of  manas, 
whereas  Vacaspati  ascribes  to  manas  the  power  of  arranging  the 
sense-data  in  a  definite  order  and  of  making  the  indeterminate 
sense-data  determinate.  With  him  the  first  stage  of  cognition  is 
the  stage  when  indeterminate  sense  materials  are  first  presented,  at 
the  next  stage  there  is  assimilation,  differentiation,  and  association 
by  which  the  indeterminate  materials  are  ordered  and  classified 
by  the  activity  of  manas  called  sarnkalpa  which  coordinates  the 
indeterminate  sense  materials  into  determinate  perceptual  and 
conceptual  forms  as  class  notions  with  particular  characteristics. 
Bhiksu  who  supposes  that  the  determinate  character  of  things  is 
directly  perceived  by  the  senses  has  necessarily  to  assign  a  sub- 
ordinate position  to  manas  as  being  only  the  faculty  of  desire, 
doubt,  and  imagination. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  to  mention  here  that  there  are 
one  or  two  passages  in  Vacaspati's  commentary  on  the  SamkJiya 
kdrikd  which  seem  to  suggest  that  he  considered  the  ego  {aham- 
kdrd)  as  producing  the  subjective  series  of  the  senses  and  the 
objective  series  of  the  external  world  by  a  sort  of  desire  or  will, 
but  he  did  not  work  out  this  doctrine,  and  it  is  therefore  not 
necessary  to  enlarge  upon  it.  There  is  also  a  difference  of  view 
with  regard  to  the  evolution  of  the  tanmatras  from  the  mahat; 
for  contrary  to  the  view  of  Vydsabhdsya  and  Vijnana  Bhiksu  etc. 
Vacaspati  holds  that  from  the  mahat  there  was  ahamkara  and 

D.  15 


2  26  The  Kapila  and  the  Patahjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

from  ahamkara  the  tanmatras\  Vijnana  Bhiksu  however  holds  that 
both  the  separation  of  aharnkara  and  the  evolution  of  thetanmatras 
take  place  in  the  mahat,  and  as  this  appeared  to  me  to  be  more 
reasonable,  I  have  followed  this  interpretation.  There  are  some 
other  minor  points  of  difference  about  the  Yoga  doctrines  between 
Vacaspati  and  Bhiksu  which  are  not  of  much  philosophical 
importance. 

Yoga  and  Patahjali. 

The  word  yoga  occurs  in  the  Rg-Veda  in  various  senses  such 
as  yoking  or  harnessing,  achieving  the  unachieved,  connection, 
and  the  like.  The  sense  of  yoking  is  not  so  frequent  as  the 
other  senses;  but  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  word  was 
used  in  this  sense  in  Rg-Veda  and  in  such  later  Vedic  works  as 
the  Satapatha  Brahmana  and  the  Brhadaranyaka  Upanisadl  The 
word  has  another  derivative  "yugya"  in  later  Sanskrit  literature*. 

With  the  growth  of  religious  and  philosophical  ideas  in  the 
Rg-Veda,  we  find  that  the  religious  austerities  were  generally  very 
much  valued.  Tapas  (asceticism)  and  brahmacarya  (the  holy  vow 
of  celibacy  and  life-long  study)  were  regarded  as  greatest  virtues 
and  considered  as  being  productive  of  the  highest  powers 

As  these  ideas  of  asceticism  and  self-control  grew  the  force 
of  the  flying  passions  was  felt  to  be  as  uncontrollable  as  that  of 
a  spirited  steed,  and  thus  the  word  yoga  which  was  originally 
applied  to  the  control  of  steeds  began  to  be  applied  to  the  control 
of  the  senses^ 

In  Panini's  time  the  word  yoga  had  attained  its  technical 
meaning,  and  he  distinguished  this  root  '''' ynj  samddhau  "  {yuj 
in  the  sense  of  concentration)  from  '' yujir  yoge"  (root  yujir  in 
the  sense  of  connecting).  Yiijm  the  first  sense  is  seldom  used  as 
a  verb.  It  is  more  or  less  an  imaginary  root  for  the  etymological 
derivation  of  the  word  yoga*^. 

^  See  my  Study  of  Patanjali,  p.  60  ff. 

2  Compare  R.V.  i.  34.  9/vn.  67.  8/in.  •27.  ii/x.  30.  ii/x.  114.  9/1V.  24.  4/1.  5. 
3/1.  30.  7;  Satapatha  Brahmana  14.  7.  i.  11. 

*  It  is  probably  an  old  word  of  the  Aryan  stock ;  compare  German  Joch,  A.S. 
geoc,  Latin  jugum. 

*  See  Chandogya  in.  17.  4;  Brh.  i.  2.  6;  Brh.  Hi.  8.  10;  Taitt.  I.  9.  i/ni.  2.  i/ni. 
3.  I  ;  Taitt.  Brah.  11.  ^.  3.  3;  R.V.  x.  129;  .'^atap.  Brah.  xi.  5.  8.  i. 

*  Katha  ni.  4,  indriyani  haydnahuh  visayatesugocaran.  The  senses  are  the  horses 
and  whatever  they  grasp  are  their  objects.  Maitr.  2.  6.  Karmetidriyanyasya  haydh 
the  conative  senses  are  its  horses. 

*  Yttgyah  is  used  from  the  root  q{ yujir  yoge  and  not  {xom.  yuja  samddhau.  A  con- 
sideration of  Panini's  rule   ^^Tadasya  brahinacaryain,''^  V.  i.  94  shows  that  not  only 


I 


vii]  Antiquity  of  Yoga  227 

In  the  Bhagavadgltd,  we  find  that  the  word  yoga  has  been 
used  not  only  in  conformity  with  the  root  " yuj-samddhati "  but 
also  with  "■  yicjir  yoger  This  has  been  the  source  of  some  confu- 
sion to  the  readers  of  the  Bhagavadgltd.  "Yogin"  in  the  sense 
of  a  person  who  has  lost  himself  in  meditation  is  there  regarded 
with  extreme  veneration.  One  of  the  main  features  of  the  use  of 
this  word  lies  in  this  that  the  Bhagavadgltd  tried  to  mark  out  a 
middle  path  between  the  austere  discipline  of  meditative  abstrac- 
tion on  the  one  hand  and  the  course  of  duties  of  sacrificial  action 
of  a  Vedic  worshipper  in  the  life  of  a  new  type  of  Yogin  (evidently 
from  yuj'ir yoge)  on  the  other,  who  should  combine  in  himself  the 
best  parts  of  the  two  paths,  devote  himself  to  his  duties,  and  yet 
abstract  himself  from  all  selfish  motives  associated  with  desires. 

Kautilya  in  his  A  rthasdstra  when  enumerating  the  philosophic 
sciences  of  study  names  Samkhya,  Yoga,  and  Lokayata.  The 
oldest  Buddhist  sutras  (e.g.  the  Satipatthdna  siitta)  are  fully 
familiar  with  the  stages  of  Yoga  concentration.  We  may  thus 
infer  that  self-concentration  and  Yoga  had  developed  as  a  tech- 
nical method  of  mystic  absorption  some  time  before  the  Buddha. 

As  regards  the  connection  of  Yoga  with  Sarnkhya,  as  we  find 
it  in  the  Yoga  sutras  of  Patafijali,  it  is  indeed  difficult  to  come  to 
any  definite  conclusion.  The  science  of  breath  had  attracted 
notice  in  many  of  the  earlier  Upanisads,  though  there  had  not 
probably  developed  any  systematic  form  of  pranayama  (a  system 
of  breath  control)  of  the  Yoga  system.  It  is  only  when  we 
come  to  Maitrayanl  that  we  find  that  the  Yoga  method  had  at- 
tained a  systematic  development.  The  other  two  Upanisads  in 
which  the  Yoga  ideas  can  be  traced  are  the  Svetasvatara  and 
the  Katha.  It  is  indeed  curious  to  notice  that  these  three 
Upanisads  of  Krsna  Yajurveda,  where  we  find  reference  to  Yoga 
methods,  are  the  only  ones  where  we  find  clear  references  also  to 
the  Sarnkhya  tenets,  though  the  Sarnkhya  and  Yoga  ideas  do  not 
appear  there  as  related  to  each  other  or  associated  as  parts  of 
the  same  system.  But  there  is  a  remarkable  passage  in  the 
Maitrayanl  in  the  conversation  between  Sakyayana  and  Brhad 
ratha  where  we  find  that  the  Samkhya  metaphysics  was  offered 

different  kinds  of  asceticism  and  rigour  whicli  passed  by  the  name  of  brahmacarya 
were  prevalent  in  the  country  at  the  time  (Panini  as  Goldstiicker  has  proved  is  pre- 
buddhistic),  but  associated  with  these  had  grown  up  a  definite  system  of  mental 
discipline  which  passed  by  the  name  of  Yoga. 

15—2 


2  28  The  Kapila  and  the  Pdtanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

in  some  quarters  to  explain  the  validity  of  the  Yoga  processes, 
and  it  seems  therefore  that  the  association  and  grafting  of  the 
Samkhya  metaphysics  on  the  Yoga  system  as  its  basis,  was  the 
work  of  the  followers  of  this  school  of  ideas  which  was  subsequently 
systematized  by  Patanjali.  Thus  Sakyayana  says:  "Here  some 
say  it  is  the  guna  which  through  the  differences  of  nature  goes 
into  bondage  to  the  will,  and  that  deliverance  takes  place  when 
the  fault  of  the  will  has  been  removed,  because  he  sees  by  the 
mind;  and  all  that  we  call  desire,  imagination,  doubt,  belief,  un- 
belief, certainty,  uncertainty,  shame,  thought,  fear,  all  that  is  but 
mind.  Carried  along  by  the  waves  of  the  qualities  darkened  in 
his  imagination,  unstable,  fickle,  crippled,  full  of  desires,  vacil- 
lating he  enters  into  belief,  believing  I  am  he,  this  is  mine,  and 
he  binds  his  self  by  his  self  as  a  bird  with  a  net.  Therefore,  a 
man  being  possessed  of  will,  imagination  and  belief  is  a  slave, 
but  he  who  is  the  opposite  is  free.  For  this  reason  let  a  man 
stand  free  from  will,  imagination  and  belief — this  is  the  sign  of 
liberty,  this  is  the  path  that  leads  to  Brahman,  this  is  the  opening 
of  the  door,  and  through  it  he  will  go  to  the  other  shore  of  dark- 
ness. All  desires  are  there  fulfilled.  And  for  this,  they  quote  a 
verse:  'When  the  five  instruments  of  knowledge  stand  still  together 
with  the  mind,  and  when  the  intellect  does  not  move,  that  is  called 
the  highest  stated' " 

An  examination  of  such  Yoga  Upanisads  as  Sandilya,  Yoga- 
tattva,  Dhyanabindu,  Harnsa,  Amrtanada,  Varaha,  Mandala 
Brahmana,  Nadabindu,  and  Yogakundall,  shows  that  the  Yoga 
practices  had  undergone  diverse  changes  in  diverse  schools,  but 
none  of  these  show  any  predilection  for  the  Samkhya.  Thus  the 
Yoga  practices  grew  in    accordance  with  the  doctrines  of  the 

^  Vatsyayana,  however,  in  his  bhasya  on  Nyaya  siiira,  i.  i.  29,  distinguishes 
Samkhya  from  Yoga  in  the  following  way:  The  Sarnkhya  holds  that  nothing  can 
come  into  being  nor  be  destroyed,  there  cannot  be  any  change  in  the  pure  intelligence 
{niratisayak  cetanah).  All  changes  are  due  to  changes  in  the  body,  the  senses,  the 
manas  and  the  objects.  Yoga  holds  that  all  creation  is  due  to  the  karma  of  the  purusa. 
Dosas  (passions)  and  the  pravrtti  (action)  are  the  cause  of  karma.  The  intelligences 
or  souls  (cetana)  are  associated  with  qualities.  Non-being  can  come  into  being  and 
what  is  produced  may  be  destroyed.  The  last  view  is  indeed  quite  different  from 
the  Yoga  of  Vyasabhdsya.  It  is  closer  to  Nyaya  in  its  doctrines.  If  Vatsyayana's 
statement  is  correct,  it  would  appear  that  the  doctrine  of  there  being  a  moral  purpose 
in  creation  was  borrowed  by  Sarnkhya  from  Yoga.  Udyotakara's  remarks  on  the  same 
siitra  do  not  indicate  a  difference  but  an  agreement  between  Samkhya  and  Yoga  on  the 
doctrine  of  the  indriyas  being  " abhautika.'"  Curiously  enough  Vatsyayana  quotes  a 
passage  from  Vyasabhdsya,  HI.  13,  in  his  bhasya,  i.  ii.  6,  and  criticizes  it  as  self-con- 
tradictory (viruddhd). 


VI i]  Patanjali,  a  Compiler  229 

Saivas  and  Saktas  and  assumed  a  peculiar  form  as  the  Mantra- 
yoga;  they  grew  in  another  direction  as  the  Hathayoga  which 
was  supposed  to  produce  mystic  and  magical  feats  through 
constant  practices  of  elaborate  nervous  exercises,  which  were  also 
associated  with  healing  and  other  supernatural  powers.  The 
Yogatattva  Upanisad  says  that  there  are  four  kinds  of  yoga,  the 
Mantra  Yoga,  Laya  Yoga,  Hathayoga  and  Rajayoga  ^  In  some  cases 
we  find  that  there  was  a  great  attempt  even  to  associate  Vedantism 
with  these  mystic  practices.  The  influence  of  these  practices  in 
the  development  of  Tantra  and  other  modes  of  worship  was  also 
very  great,  but  we  have  to  leave  out  these  from  our  present 
consideration  as  they  have  little  philosophic  importance  and  as 
they  are  not  connected  with  our  present  endeavour. 

Of  the  Patanjala  school  of  Sarnkhya,  which  forms  the  subject  of 
the  Yoga  with  which  we  are  now  dealing,  Patafijali  was  probably 
the  most  notable  person  for  he  not  only  collected  the  different 
forms  of  Yoga  practices,  and  gleaned  the  diverse  ideas  which 
were  or  could  be  associated  with  the  Yoga,  but  grafted  them  all 
on  the  Sarnkhya  metaphysics,  and  gave  them  the  form  in  which 
they  have  been  handed  down  to  us.  Vacaspati  and  Vijnana 
Bhiksu,  the  two  great  commentators  on  the  Vydsabhdsya,  agree 
with  us  in  holding  that  Patanjali  was  not  the  founder  of  the  Yoga, 
but  an  editor.  Analytic  study  of  the  siitras  also  brings  the  con- 
viction that  the  sutras  do  not  show  any  original  attempt,  but  a 
masterly  and  systematic  compilation  which  was  also  supple- 
mented by  fitting  contributions.  The  systematic  manner  also 
in  which  the  first  three  chapters  are  written  by  way  of  definition 
and  classification  shows  that  the  materials  were  already  in 
existence  and  that  Patanjali  only  systematized  them.  There  was 
no  missionizing  zeal,  no  attempt  to  overthrow  the  doctrines  of 
other  systems,  except  as  far  as  they  might  come  in,  by  way  of 
explaining  the  system.  Patanjali  is  not  even  anxious  to  establish 
the  system,  but  he  is  only  engaged  in  systematizing  the  facts 
as  he  had  them.  Most  of  the  criticisms  against  the  Buddhists 
occur  in  the  last  chapter.  The  doctrines  of  the  Yoga  are 
described  in  the  first  three  chapters,  and  this  part  is  separated 
from  the  last  chapter  where   the  views  of  the  Buddhists  are 

'  The  Yoga  writer  Jaigisavya  wrote  '■'■  Dhdranasastra^''  which  dealt  with  Yoga  more 
in  the  fashion  of  Tantra  than  that  given  by  PatanjaU.  He  mentions  different  places 
in  the  body  (e.g.  heart,  throat,  tip  of  the  nose,  palate,  forehead,  centre  of  the  brain) 
which  are  centres  of  memory  where  concentration  is  to  be  made.  See  Vacaspati's 
Tatparyattkd  or  Vatsyayana's  bhasya  on  Nydya  siitra,  HI.  ii.  43. 


230  The  Kapila  and  the  Pdtanjala  Sdmkkya        [ch. 

criticized;  the  putting  of  an  "z/z"  (the  word  to  denote  the  conclu- 
sion of  any  work)  at  the  end  of  the  third  chapter  is  evidently  to 
denote  the  conclusion  of  his  Yoga  compilation.  There  is  of  course 
another  '' iti"  at  the  end  of  the  fourth  chapter  to  denote  the 
conclusion  of  the  whole  work.  The  most  legitimate  hypothesis 
seems  to  be  that  the  last  chapter  is  a  subsequent  addition  by  a 
hand  other  than  that  of  Patanjali  who  was  anxious  to  supply 
some  new  links  of  argument  which  were  felt  to  be  necessary  for 
the  strengthening  of  the  Yoga  position  from  an  internal  point  of 
view,  as  well  as  for  securing  the  strength  of  the  Yoga  from  the 
supposed  attacks  of  Buddhist  metaphysics.  There  is  also  a 
marked  change  (due  either  to  its  supplementary  character  or 
to  the  manipulation  of  a  foreign  hand)  in  the  style  of  the  last 
chapter  as  compared  with  the  style  of  the  other  three. 

The  sutras,  30-34,  of  the  last  chapter  seem  to  repeat  what 
has  already  been  said  in  the  second  chapter  and  some  of  the 
topics  introduced  are  such  that  they  could  well  have  been 
dealt  with  in  a  more  relevant  manner  in  connection  with  similar 
discussions  in  the  preceding  chapters.  The  extent  of  this  chapter 
is  also  disproportionately  small,  as  it  contains  only  34  sutras, 
whereas  the  average  number  of  sutras  in  other  chapters  is  between 
51  to  55. 

We  have  now  to  meet  the  vexed  question  of  the  probable  date 
of  this  famous  Yoga  author  Patanjali.  Weber  had  tried  to  con- 
nect him  with  Kapya  Patamchala  of  Satapatha  Brahmana^ ;  in 
Katyayana's  Vdrttika  we  get  the  name  Patanjali  which  is  ex- 
plained by  later  commentators  as  patantah  anjalayaJi  yasniai  (for 
whom  the  hands  are  folded  as  a  mark  of  reverence),  but  it  is  indeed 
difficult  to  come  to  any  conclusion  merely  from  the  similarity  of 
names.  There  is  however  another  theory  which  identifies  the 
writer  of  the  great  commentary  on  Panini  called  the  Mahd- 
bhdsya  with  the  Patanjali  of  the  Yoga  siitra.  This  theory  has  been 
accepted  by  many  western  scholars  probably  on  the  strength  of 
some  Indian  commentators  who  identified  the  two  Patanjalis. 
Of  these  one  is  the  writer  of  the  Pataiijalicarita  (Ramabhadra 
Diksita)  who  could  not  have  flourished  earlier  than  the  eighteenth 
century.  The  other  is  that  cited  in  Sivarama's  commentary  on 
Vdsavadattd  which  Aufrecht  assigns  to  the  eighteenth  century. 
The  other  two  are  king   Bhoja  of  Dhar  and  Cakrapanidatta, 

^  Weber's  History  of  Indian  Literature,  p.  223  n. 


vii]  Identity  of  Patanjali  231 

the  commentator  of  Caraka,  who  belonged  to  the  eleventh 
century  A.D.  Thus  Cakrapani  says  that  he  adores  the  Ahipati 
(mythical  serpent  chief)  who  removed  the  defects  of  mind,  speech 
and  body  by  his  Pdtahjala  niahdbhdsya  and  the  revision  of 
Caraka.  Bhoja  says  :  "  Victory  be  to  the  luminous  words  of 
that  illustrious  sovereign  Ranaraiigamalla  who  by  composing  his 
grammar,  by  writing  his  commentary  on  the  Patanjala  and  by 
producing  a  treatise  on  medicine  called  Rdjavirgdhka  has  like  the 
lord  of  the  holder  of  serpents  removed  defilement  from  speech, 
mind  and  body."  The  adoration  hymn  of  Vyasa  (which  is  con- 
sidered to  be  an  interpolation  even  by  orthodox  scholars)  is  also 
based  upon  the  same  tradition.  It  is  not  impossible  therefore  that 
the  later  Indian  commentators  might  have  made  some  confusion 
between  the  three  Patanjalis,  the  grammarian,  the  Yoga  editor, 
and  the  medical  writer  to  whom  is  ascribed  the  book  known  as 
P dtanjalataiitra,  and  who  has  been  quoted  by  Sivadasa  in  his 
commentary  on  Cakradatta  in  connection  with  the  heating  of 
metals. 

Professor  J.  H.  Woods  of  Harvard  University  is  therefore 
in  a  way  justified  in  his  unwillingness  to  identify  the  gram- 
marian and  the  Yoga  editor  on  the  slender  evidence  of  these 
commentators.  It  is  indeed  curious  to  notice  that  the  great 
commentators  of  the  grammar  school  such  as  Bhartrhari,  Kaiy- 
yata,  Vamana,  Jayaditya,  Nagesa,  etc.  are  silent  on  this  point. 
This  is  indeed  a  point  against  the  identification  of  the  two 
Patanjalis  by  some  Yoga  and  medical  commentators  of  a  later 
age.  And  if  other  proofs  are  available  which  go  against  such 
an  identification,  we  could  not  think  the  grammarian  and  the 
Yoga  writer  to  be  the  same  person. 

Let  us  now  see  if  Patanjali's  grammatical  work  contains  any- 
thing which  may  lead  us  to  think  that  he  was  not  the  same 
person  as  the  writer  on  Yoga.  Professor  Woods  supposes  that  the 
philosophic  concept  of  substance  idravyd)  of  the  two  Patanjalis 
differs  and  therefore  they  cannot  be  identified.  He  holds  that 
dravya  is  described  in  Vydsabhdsya  in  one  place  as  being  the 
unity  of  species  and  qualities  {sdmdnyavisesdtviaka),  whereas 
the  Mahdbhdsya  holds  that  a  dravya  denotes  a  genus  and  also 
specific  qualities  according  as  the  emphasis  or  stress  is  laid  on 
either  side.  I  fail  to  see  how  these  ideas  are  totally  antago- 
nistic.   Moreover,  we  know  that  these  two  views  were  held  by 


232  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

Vyadi  and  Vajapyayana  (Vyadi  holding  that  words  denoted 
qualities  or  dravya  and  Vajapyayana  holding  that  words  denoted 
species').  Even  Panini  had  these  two  different  ideas  in  ''■jdtydkhyd- 
ydinekasviin  baJmvacanamanyatarasydnil'  and  "  sarupdnanieka- 
sesamekavibhaktan"  and  Patafijali  the  writer  of  the  Mahdbhdsya 
only  combined  these  two  views.  This  does  not  show  that  he 
opposes  the  view  of  Vydsabhdsya,  though  we  must  remember 
that  even  if  he  did,  that  would  not  prove  anything  with  regard 
to  the  writer  of  the  sutras.  Moreover,  when  we  read  that  dravya 
is  spoken  of  in  the  Mahdbhdsya  as  that  object  which  is  the 
specific  kind  of  the  conglomeration  of  its  parts,  just  as  a  cow  is 
of  its  tail,  hoofs,  horns,  etc. — '' yat  sdsndldhgulakakudakhura- 
visdnyartharupam"  we  are  reminded  of  its  similarity  with 
"  ayutasiddhdvayavabheddnugatah  samuJiah  dravyam "  (a  con- 
glomeration of  interrelated  parts  is  called  dravya)  in  the  Vydsa- 
bhdsya.  So  far  as  I  have  examined  the  Mahdbhdsya  I  have 
not  been  able  to  discover  anything  there  which  can  warrant  us 
in  holding  that  the  two  Patanjalis  cannot  be  identified.  There 
are  no  doubt  many  apparent  divergences  of  view,  but  even 
in  these  it  is  only  the  traditional  views  of  the  old  grammarians 
that  are  exposed  and  reconciled,  and  it  would  be  very  un- 
warrantable for  us  to  judge  anything  about  the  personal  views 
of  the  grammarian  from  them.  I  am  also  convinced  that  the 
writer  of  the  Mahdbhdsya  knew  most  of  the  important  points  of 
the  Samkhya- Yoga  metaphysics;  as  a  few  examples  I  may  refer 
to  the  guna  theory  (i.  2.  64,  4.  i.  3),  the  Samkhya  dictum  of  ex 
nihilo  nihil  fit  (i.  i.  56),  the  ideas  of  time  (2.  2.  5,  3.  2.  123),  the 
idea  of  the  return  of  similars  into  similars  (i.  i.  50),  the  idea  of 
change  vikdra  as  production  of  new  qualities  gmidntarddhdna 
(5.  1.2,  5.  1.3)  and  the  distinction  of  indriya  and  Buddhi  (3.  3.  133). 
We  may  add  to  it  that  the  Mahdbhdsya  agrees  with  the  Yoga 
view  as  regards  the  Sphotavada,  which  is  not  held  in  common 
by  any  other  school  of  Indian  philosophy.  There  is  also  this 
external  similarity,  that  unlike  any  other  work  they  both  begin 
their  works  in  a  similar  manner  {atha yogdnusdsanam  and  atha 
sdbddmisdsanavt) — "  now  begins  the  compilation  of  the  instruc- 
tions on  Yoga"  {Yoga  sfitrd) — and  "now  begins  the  compilation 
of  the  instructions  of  words"  {Mahdbhdsya). 

It  may  further  be  noticed  in  this  connection  that  the  arguments 

'  Patanjali's  Mahabhasya,  I.  2.  64. 


vii]  Kitab  Patanjal  233 

which  Professor  Woods  has  adduced  to  assign  the  date  of  the 
Yoga  sutra  between  300  and  500  A.D.  are  not  at  all  conclusive, 
as  they  stand  on  a  weak  basis ;  for  firstly  if  the  two  Patafijalis 
cannot  be  identified,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  editor  of  the 
Yoga  should  necessarily  be  made  later;  secondly,  the  supposed 
Buddhist  1  reference  is  found  in  the  fourth  chapter  which,  as  I 
have  shown  above,  is  a  later  interpolation;  thirdly,  even  if  they 
were  written  by  Patanjali  it  cannot  be  inferred  that  because 
Vacaspati  describes  the  opposite  school  as  being  of  the  Vijiiana- 
vadi  type,  we  are  to  infer  that  the  sutras  refer  to  Vasubandhu  or 
even  to  Nagarjuna,  for  such  ideas  as  have  been  refuted  in  the  sutras 
had  been  developing  long  before  the  time  of  Nagarjuna. 

Thus  we  see  that  though  the  tradition  of  later  commentators 
may  not  be  accepted  as  a  sufficient  ground  to  identify  the  two 
Patafijalis,  we  cannot  discover  anything  from  a  comparative 
critical  study  of  the  Yoga  sutras  and  the  text  of  the  Mahd- 
bhdsya,  which  can  lead  us  to  say  that  the  writer  of  the  Yoga 
sutras  flourished  at  a  later  date  than  the  other  Patanjali. 

Postponing  our  views  about  the  time  of  Pataiijali  the  Yoga 
editor,  I  regret  I  have  to  increase  the  confusion  by  introducing 
the  other  work  Kitdb  Patanjal,  of  which  Alberuni  speaks,  for 
our  consideration.  Alberuni  considers  this  work  as  a  very  famous 
one  and  he  translates  it  along  with  another  book  called  Sdnka 
(Sarnkhya)  ascribed  to  Kapila.  This  book  was  written  in  the 
form  of  dialogue  between  master  and  pupil,  and  it  is  certain  that 
this  book  was  not  the  present  Yoga  sutra  of  Patanjali,  though  it 
had  the  same  aim  as  the  latter,  namely  the  search  for  liberation 
and  for  the  union  of  the  soul  with  the  object  of  its  meditation. 
The  book  was  called  by  Alberuni  Kitdb  Patanjal,  which  is  to 
be  translated  as  the  book  of  Patafijala,  because  in  another  place, 
speaking  of  its  author,  he  puts  in  a  Persian  phrase  which  when 
translated  stands  as  "the  author  of  the  book  of  Patanjal."  It 
had  also  an  elaborate  commentary  from  which  Alberuni  quotes 
many  extracts,  though  he  does  not  tell  us  the  author's  name.  It 
treats  of  God,  soul,  bondage,  karma,  salvation,  etc.,  as  we  find  in 
the  Yoga  sutra,  but  the  manner  in  which  these  are  described  (so 

1  It  is  important  to  notice  that  the  most  important  Buddhist  reference  nacaika- 
cittatantram  vastu  tadapramdnakam  tadd  kim  sydt  (iv.  i6)  was  probably  a  line  of  the 
Vydsabhasya,  as  Bhoja,  who  had  consulted  many  commentaries  as  he  says  in  the 
preface,  does  not  count  it  as  a  siitra. 


234  The  Kapila  and  the  Pdtanjala  Sdmkhya        [ch. 

far  as  can  be  judged  from  the  copious  extracts  supplied  by 
Alberuni)  shows  that  these  ideas  had  undergone  some  change 
from  what  we  find  in  the  Yoga  sutra.  Following  the  idea  of  God 
in  Alberuni  we  find  that  he  retains  his  character  as  a  timeless 
emancipated  being,  but  he  speaks,  hands  over  the  Vedas  and 
shows  the  way  to  Yoga  and  inspires  men  in  such  a  way  that  they 
could  obtain  by  cogitation  what  he  bestowed  on  them.  The  name 
of  God  proves  his  existence,  for  there  cannot  exist  anything  of 
which  the  name  existed,  but  not  the  thing.  The  soul  perceives 
him  and  thought  comprehends  his  qualities.  Meditation  is  iden- 
tical with  worshipping  him  exclusively,  and  by  practising  it 
uninterruptedly  the  individual  comes  into  supreme  absorption 
with  him  and  beatitude  is  obtained  \ 

The  idea  of  soul  is  the  same  as  we  find  in  the  Yoga  sutra. 
The  idea  of  metempsychosis  is  also  the  same.  He  speaks  of  the 
eight  siddhis  (miraculous  powers)  at  the  first  stage  of  meditation 
on  the  unity  of  God.  Then  follow  the  other  four  stages  of  medi- 
tation corresponding  to  the  four  stages  we  have  as  in  the  Yoga 
sutra.  He  gives  four  kinds  of  waysfor  the  achievement  of  salvation, 
of  which  the  first  is  the  abhydsa  (habit)  of  Patanjali,  and  the 
object  of  this  abhyasa  is  unity  with  God  I  The  second  stands 
for  vairagya;  the  third  is  the  worship  of  God  with  a  view  to  seek 
his  favour  in  the  attainment  of  salvation  (cf  Yoga  sutra,  I.  23  and 
I.  29).  The  fourth  is  a  new  introduction,  namely  that  of  rasa- 
yana  or  alchemy.  As  regards  liberation  the  view  is  almost  the 
same  as  in  the  Yoga  sutra,  il.  25  and  iv.  34,  but  the  liberated 
state  is  spoken  of  in  one  place  as  absorption  in  God  or  being 
one  with  him.  The  Brahman  is  conceived  as  an  urddhvainula 
avdksdkha  asvattha  (a  tree  with  roots  upwards  and  branches 
below),  after  the  Upanisad  fashion,  the  upper  root  is  pure 
Brahman,  the  trunk  is  Veda,  the  branches  are  the  different 
doctrines  and  schools,  its  leaves  are  the  different  modes  of  inter- 
pretation.    Its  nourishment  comes   from  the  three  forces  ;  the 

1  Cf.  Yoga  sutra  i.  ■23-29  and  ii.  1,  45.  The  Yoga  siitras  speak  of  I^vara  (God) 
as  an  eternally  emancipated  purusa,  omniscient,  and  the  teacher  of  all  past  teachers. 
By  meditating  on  him  many  of  the  obstacles  such  as  illness,  etc.,  which  stand  in  the 
way  of  Yoga  practice  are  removed.  He  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  alternative  objects 
of  concentration.  The  commentator  Vyasa  notes  that  he  is  the  best  object,  for  being 
drawn  towards  the  Yogin  by  his  concentration  He  so  wills  that  he  can  easily  attain 
concentration  and  through  it  salvation.  No  argument  is  given  in  the  Yoga  sutras  of 
the  existence  of  God. 

-  Cf.  Yoga  11.  I. 


vii]  Patanjali  of  Kitab  Patanjal  235 

object  of  the  worshipper  is  to  leave  the  tree  and  go  back  to  the 
roots. 

The  difference  of  this  system  from  that  of  the  Yoga  sUtra  is  : 
(i)  the  conception  of  God  has  risen  here  to  such  an  importance 
that  he  has  become  the  only  object  of  meditation,  and  absorption 
in  him  is  the  goal ;  (2)  the  importance  of  the  yama^  and  the 
niyama  has  been  reduced  to  the  minimum ;  (3)  the  value  of  the 
Yoga  discipline  as  a  separate  means  of  salvation  apart  from  any 
connection  with  God  as  we  find  in  the  Yoga  sutra  has  been  lost 
sight  of;  (4)  liberation  and  Yoga  are  defined  as  absorption  in 
God  ;  (5)  the  introduction  of  Brahman  ;  (6)  the  very  significance 
of  Yoga  as  control  of  mental  states  icittavrttinirodha)  is  lost 
sight  of,  and  (7)  rasayana  (alchemy)  is  introduced  as  one  of  the 
means  of  salvation. 

From  this  we  can  fairly  assume  that  this  was  a  new  modi- 
fication of  the  Yoga  doctrine  on  the  basis  of  Patafijali's   Yoga 
sutra  in  the  direction  of  Vedanta  and  Tantra,  and  as  such  it 
probably  stands  as  the  transition  link  through  which  the  Yoga 
doctrine  of  the  sutras  entered  into  a  new  channel  in  such  a  way 
that  it  could  be  easily  assimilated  from  there  by  later  develop- 
ments of  Vedanta,  Tantra  and  Saiva  doctrines-.    As  the  author 
mentions  rasayana  as  a  means  of  salvation,  it  is  very  probable 
that  he  flourished  after  Nagarjuna  and  was  probably  the  same 
person  who  wrote  Pdtahjala  tantra,  who  has  been  quoted  by 
Sivadasa  in  connection  with  alchemical  matters  and  spoken  of 
by  Nagesa  as  ''Carake  Patanjalih."  We  can  also  assume  with  some 
degree  of  probability  that  it  is  with  reference  to  this  man  that 
Cakrapani  and  Bhoja  made  the  confusion  of  identifying  him  with 
the  writer  of  the  Mahdbhdsya.  It  is  also  very  probable  that  Cakra- 
pani   by  his  line  '' pdtahjalamahdbhdsyacarakapratisajnskrtaih'" 
refers  to  this  work  which  was  called  "  Patanjala."    The  commen- 
tator of  this  work  gives  some  description  of  the  lokas,  dvlpas  and 
the  sagaras,  which  runs  counter  to  the  descriptions  given  in  the 
Vydsabkdsya,  III.  26,  and  from  this  we  can  infer  that  it  was  pro- 
bably written  at  a  time  when  the  Vydsabhdsya  was  not  written 
or  had  not  attained  any  great  sanctity  or  authority.    Alberuni 

^  Alberuni,  in  his  account  of  the  book  of  Samkhya,  gives  a  list  of  commandments 
which  practically  is  the  same  as  yama  and  niyama,  but  it  is  said  that  through  them 
one  cannot  attain  salvation. 

-  Cf.  the  account  of  Paiupatadariana  in  Sarvadarsanasanigraha. 


o 


6  TAe  Kapila  aiid  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 


also  described  the  book  as  being  very  famous  at  the  time,  and 
Bhoja  and  Cakrapani  also  probably  confused  him  with  Patanjali 
the  grammarian  ;  from  this  we  can  fairly  assume  that  this  book 
of  Patanjali  was  probably  written  by  some  other  Patanjali  within 
the  first  300  or  400  years  of  the  Christian  era;  and  it  may  not 
be  improbable  that  when  Vydsabhdsya  quotes  in  III.  44  as  "  iti 
Patafijalih,"  he  refers  to  this  Patanjali. 

The  conception  of  Yoga  as  we  meet  it  in  the  Maitrayana 
Upanisad  consisted  of  six  afigas  or  accessories,  namely  prana- 
yama,  pratyahara,  dhyana,  dharana,  tarka  and  samadhi\  Com- 
paring this  list  with  that  of  the  list  in  the  Yoga  sTitras  we  find 
that  two  new  elements  have  been  added,  and  tarka  has  been 
replaced  by  asana.  Now  from  the  account  of  the  sixty-two 
heresies  given  in  the  Brahmajdla  sutta  we  know  that  there  were 
people  who  either  from  meditation  of  three  degrees  or  through 
logic  and  reasoning  had  come  to  believe  that  both  the  external 
world  as  a  whole  and  individual  souls  were  eternal.  From  the 
association  of  this  last  mentioned  logical  school  with  the  Samadhi 
or  Dhyana  school  as  belonging  to  one  class  of  thinkers  called 
sasvatavada,  and  from  the  inclusion  of  tarka  as  an  anga  in 
samadhi,  we  can  fairly  assume  that  the  last  of  the  angas  given  in 
MaitrayanI  Upanisad  represents  the  oldest  list  of  the  Yoga  doc- 
trine, when  the  Samkhya  and  the  Yoga  were  in  a  process  of  being 
grafted  on  each  other,  and  when  the  Samkhya  method  of  dis- 
cussion did  not  stand  as  a  method  independent  of  the  Yoga.  The 
substitution  of  asana  for  tarka  in  the  list  of  Patanjali  shows  that 
the  Yoga  had  developed  a  method  separate  from  the  Sarnkhya. 
The  introduction  of  ahirnsa  (non-injury),  satya  (truthfulness), 
asteya  (want  of  stealing),  brahmacaryya  (sex-control),  aparigraha 
(want  of  greed)  as  yama  and  sauca  (purity),  santosa  (content- 
ment) as  niyama,  as  a  system  of  morality  without  which  Yoga  is 
deemed  impossible  (for  the  first  time  in  the  sutras),  probably 
marks  the  period  when  the  disputes  between  the  Hindus  and  the 
Buddhists  had  not  become  so  keen.  The  introduction  of  maitrl, 
karuna,  mudita,  upeksa  is  also  equally  significant,  as  we  do  not 
find  them  mentioned  in  such  a  prominent  form  in  any  other 
literature  of  the  Hindus  dealing  with  the  subject  of  emancipa- 
tion.   Beginning  from  the  Acdrdhgasutra,  Uttarddhyayatiasutra, 

^  prdndydmah  pratyahdrah  dhydnam  dhdrand  tarkah  samddhih  sadahga  ityucyate 
yogah  (Maitr.  6.  8). 


VI i]  Yoga  and  Buddhism  237 

the  Sutrakrtdhgasutra,  etc.,  and  passing  through  Umasvati's  Tat- 
tvdrthddhigamasutra  to  Hemacandra's  Yogasdstra  we  find  that 
the  Jains  had  been  founding  their  Yoga  discipHne  mainly  on  the 
basis  of  a  system  of  morahty  indicated  by  the  yamas,  and  the 
opinion  expressed  in  Alberuni's  Pdta?ijal  that  these  cannot  give 
salvation  marks  the  divergence  of  the  Hindus  in  later  days  from 
the  Jains.  Another  important  characteristic  of  Yoga  is  its 
thoroughly  pessimistic  tone.  Its  treatment  of  sorrow  in  connec- 
tion with  the  statement  of  the  scope  and  ideal  of  Yoga  is  the 
same  as  that  of  the  four  sacred  truths  of  the  Buddhists,  namely 
suffering,  origin  of  suffering,  the  removal  of  suffering,  and  of  the 
path  to  the  removal  of  suffering^  Again,  the  metaphysics  of  the 
samsara  (rebirth)  cycle  in  connection  with  sorrow,  origination, 
decease,  rebirth,  etc.  is  described  with  a  remarkable  degree  of 
similarity  with  the  cycle  of  causes  as  described  in  early  Buddhism. 
Avidya  is  placed  at  the  head  of  the  group ;  yet  this  avidya  should 
not  be  confused  with  the  Vedanta  avidya  of  Sankara,  as  it  is  an 
avidya  of  the  Buddhist  type ;  it  is  not  a  cosmic  power  of  illusion 
nor  anything  like  a  mysterious  original  sin,  but  it  is  within  the 
range  of  earthly  tangible  reality.  Yoga  avidya  is  the  ignorance 
of  the  four  sacred  truths,  as  we  have  in  the  s,vXx2l"  ajiitydsuciduh- 
khdndtmasu  nityasuciduhkhdtmakhydtiravidyd''  (ll.  5). 

The  ground  of  our  existing  is  our  will  to  live  {abhinivesd). 
"This  is  our  besetting  sin  that  we  will  to  be,  that  we  will  to  be 
ourselves,  that  we  fondly  will  our  being  to  blend  with  other  kinds 
of  existence  and  extend.  The  negation  of  the  will  to  be,  cuts 
off  being  for  us  at  leasts"  This  is  true  as  much  of  Buddhism  as 
of  the  Yoga  abhinivesa,  which  is  a  term  coined  and  used  in  the 
Yoga  for  the  first  time  to  suit  the  Buddhist  idea,  and  which  has 
never  been  accepted,  so  far  as  I  know,  in  any  other  Hindu 
literature  in  this  sense.  My  sole  aim  in  pointing  out  these  things 
in  this  section  is  to  show  that  the  Yoga  sntras  proper  (first  three 
chapters)  were  composed  at  a  time  when  the  later  forms  of 
Buddhism  had  not  developed,  and  when  the  quarrels  between 
the  Hindus  and  the  Buddhists  and  Jains  had  not  reached  such 

^  Yoga  sutra,  n.  15,  16,  17.  Yathacikitsasdstram  caturvyuham  rogo  rogahetuh 
arogyani  bhaisajyamiti  evatnidamapi  sdstram  caturvyuhameva  ;  tadyatha  samsdrah, 
samsarahetuli  moksah  inoksopayah  ;  duhkhabahulah  samsaro  ktyah, pradhdnapurusayok 
sainyogo  heyahetuh,  satityogasyatyantikl  nivrttirhanam  hanopdyah  samyagdarsanam, 
Vydsabhdsya,  II.  15 

^  Oldenberg's  Biiddhism^. 


238  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

a  stage  that  they  would  not  like  to  borrow  from  one  another. 
As  this  can  only  be  held  true  of  earlier  Buddhism  I  am  disposed 
to  think  that  the  date  of  the  first  three  chapters  of  the  Yoga 
sutras  must  be  placed  about  the  second  century  B.C.  Since  there 
is  no  evidence  which  can  stand  in  the  way  of  identifying  the 
grammarian  Patanjali  with  the  Yoga  writer,  I  believe  we  may 
take  them  as  being  identicals 

The  Samkhya  and  the  Yoga  Doctrine  of  Soul  or  Purusa. 

The  Sarnkhya  philosophy  as  we  have  it  now  admits  two  prin- 
ciples, souls  and  prakrti,  the  root  principle  of  matter.  Souls  are 
many,  like  the  Jaina  souls,  but  they  are  without  parts  and  qualities. 
They  do  not  contract  or  expand  according  as  they  occupy  a 
smaller  or  a  larger  body,  but  are  always  all-pervasive,  and  are 
not  contained  in  the  bodies  in  which  they  are  manifested.  But 
the  relation  between  body  or  rather  the  mind  associated  with  it 
and  soul  is  such  that  whatever  mental  phenomena  happen  in  the 
mind  are  interpreted  as  the  experience  of  its  soul.  The  souls  are 
many,  and  had  it  not  been  so  (the  Samkhya  argues)  with  the 
birth  of  one  all  would  have  been  born  and  with  the  death  of  one 
all  would  have  died^. 

The  exact  nature  of  soul  is  however  very  difficult  of  compre- 
hension, and  yet  it  is  exactly  this  which  one  must  thoroughly 
grasp  in  order  to  understand  the  Sarnkhya  philosophy.  Unlike 
the  Jaina  soul  possessing  anantajhdna,  anantadarsana,  ananta- 
sukha,  and  anantavlryya,  the  Samkhya  soul  is  described  as  being 
devoid  of  any  and  every  characteristic;  but  its  nature  is  abso- 
lute pure  consciousness  {cit).  The  Samkhya  view  differs  from 
the  Vedanta,  firstly  in  this  that  it  does  not  consider  the  soul  to 
be  of  the  nature  of  pure  intelligence  and  bliss  {dnanday.  Bliss 
with  Sarnkhya  is  but  another  name  for  pleasure  and  as  such  it 
belongs  to  prakrti  and  does  not  constitute  the  nature  of  soul ; 
secondly,  according  to  Vedanta  the  individual  souls  {jiva)  are 

^  See  S.  N.  Das  Gupta,  Yoga  Philosophy  in  relation  to  other  Indian  systems  of 
thought,  ch.  II.  The  most  important  point  in  favour  of  this  identification  seems  to  be 
that  both  the  Patafijalis  as  against  the  other  Indian  systems  admitted  the  doctrine  of 
sphota  which  was  denied  even  by  Samkhya.  On  the  doctrine  of  Sphota  see  my  Study 
of  Patanjali,  Appendix  i. 
^  Karikd,  18. 
''  See  Citsukha's  Tattvapradipikd,  iv. 


vii]  Analysis  of  Knowledge  239 

but  illusory  manifestations  of  one  soul  or  pure  consciousness  the 
Brahman,  but  according  to  Samkhya  they  are  all  real  and  many. 
The  most  interesting  feature  of  Sarnkhya  as  of  Vedanta  is 
the  analysis  of  knowledge.  Sarnkhya  holds  that  our  knowledge 
of  things  are  mere  ideational  pictures  or  images.  External  things 
are  indeed  material,  but  the  sense  data  and  images  of  the  mind, 
the  coming  and  going  of  which  is  called  knowledge,  are  also  in 
some  sense  matter-stuff,  since  they  are  limited  in  their  nature 
like  the  external  things.  The  sense-data  and  images  come  and  go, 
they  are  often  the  prototypes,  or  photographs  of  external  things, 
and  as  such  ought  to  be  considered  as  in  some  sense  material, 
but  the  matter  of  which  these  are  composed  is  the  subtlest. 
These  images  of  the  mind  could  not  have  appeared  as  conscious, 
if  there  were  no  separate  principles  of  consciousness  in  connec- 
tion with  which  the  whole  conscious  plane  could  be  interpreted 
as  the  experience  of  a  person  ^  We  know  that  the  Upanisads 
consider  the  soul  or  atman  as  pure  and  infinite  consciousness, 
distinct  from  the  forms  of  knowledge,  the  ideas,  and  the  images. 
In  our  ordinary  ways  of  mental  analysis  we  do  not  detect  that 
beneath  the  forms  of  knowledge  there  is  some  other  principle 
which  has  no  change,  no  form,  but  which  is  like  a  light  which 
illumines  the  mute,  pictorial  forms  which  the  mind  assumes. 
The  self  is  nothing  but  this  light.  We  all  speak  of  our  "self" 
but  we  have  no  mental  picture  of  the  self  as  we  have  of  other 
things,  yet  in  all  our  knowledge  we  seem  to  know  our  self.  The 
Jains  had  said  that  the  soul  was  veiled  by  karma  matter,  and 
every  act  of  knowledge  meant  only  the  partial  removal  of  the 
veil.  Sarnkhya  says  that  the  self  cannot  be  found  as  an  image 
of  knowledge,  but  that  is  because  it  is  a  distinct,  transcendent 
principle,  whose  real  nature  as  such  is  behind  or  beyond  the  subtle 
matter  of  knowledge.  Our  cognitions,  so  far  as  they  are  mere  forms 
or  images,  are  merely  compositions  or  complexes  of  subtle  mind- 
substance,  and  thus  are  like  a  sheet  of  painted  canvas  immersed 
in  darkness;  as  the  canvas  gets  prints  from  outside  and  moves, 
the  pictures  appear  one  by  one  before  the  light  and  are  illu- 
minated. So  it  is  with  our  knowledge.  The  special  characteristic 
of  self  is  that  it  is  like  a  light,  without  which  all  knowledge  would 
be  blind.    Form  and  motion  are  the  characteristics  of  matter,  and 

'   TatlakaumudT,  ^-y  Yogavarttika,  IV.  22;  Vijiidnamrtahhdsya,'^.  74;  Yogavarttika 
and  Tattvavaisaradl,  I.  4,  11.  6,  18,  20;  VyasabhCisya,  i.  6,  7. 


240  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

so  far  as  knowledge  is  mere  limited  form  and  movement  it  is  the 
same  as  matter;  but  there  is  some  other  principle  which  enlivens 
these  knowledge-forms,  by  virtue  of  which  they  become  con- 
scious. This  principle  of  consciousness  {cit)  cannot  indeed  be 
separately  perceived  per  se,  but  the  presence  of  this  principle  in 
all  our  forms  of  knowledge  is  distinctly  indicated  by  inference. 
This  principle  of  consciousness  has  no  motion,  no  form,  no  quality, 
no  impurity  ^  The  movement  of  the  knowledge-stuff  takes  place 
in  relation  to  it,  so  that  it  is  illuminated  as  consciousness  by  it, 
and  produces  the  appearance  of  itself  as  undergoing  all  changes 
of  knowledge  and  experiences  of  pleasure  and  pain.  Each  item 
of  knowledge  so  far  as  it  is  an  image  or  a  picture  of  some  sort  is 
but  a  subtle  knowledge-stuff  which  has  been  illumined  by  the 
principle  of  consciousness,  but  so  far  as  each  item  of  knowledge 
carries  with  it  the  awakening  or  the  enlivening  of  consciousness, 
it  is  the  manifestation  of  the  principle  of  consciousness.  Know- 
ledge-revelation is  not  the  unveiling  or  revelation  of  a  particular 
part  of  the  self,  as  the  Jains  supposed,  but  it  is  a  revelation  of 
the  self  only  so  far  as  knowledge  is  pure  awakening,  pure  en- 
livening, pure  consciousness.  So  far  as  the  content  of  knowledge 
or  the  image  is  concerned,  it  is  not  the  revelation  of  self  but  is 
the  blind  knowledge-stuff. 

The  Buddhists  had  analysed  knowledge  into  its  diverse  con- 
stituent parts,  and  had  held  that  the  coming  together  of  these 
brought  about  the  conscious  states.  This  coming  together  was 
to  them  the  point  of  the  illusory  notion  of  self,  since  this  unity 
or  coming  together  was  not  a  permanent  thing  but  a  momentary 
collocation.  With  Sarnkhya  however  the  self,  the  pure  cit,  is 
neither  illusory  nor  an  abstraction ;  it  is  concrete  but  transcen- 
dent. Coming  into  touch  with  it  gives  unity  to  all  the  movements 
of  the  knowledge-composites  of  subtle  stuff,  which  would  otherwise 
have  remained  aimless  and  unintelligent.  It  is  by  coming  into 
connection  with  this  principle  of  intelligence  that  they  are  inter- 
preted as  the  systematic  and  coherent  experience  of  a  person,  and 
may  thus  be  said  to  be  intelligized.  Intelligizing  means  the  ex- 
pression and  interpretation  of  the  events  or  the  happenings  of 

•  It  is  important  to  note  that  Sanikhya  has  two  terms  to  denote  the  two  aspects 
involved  in  knowledge,  viz.  the  relating  element  of  awareness  as  such  {cti),  and  the 
content  {buddhi)  which  is  the  form  of  the  mind-stuff  representing  the  sense-data  and 
the  image.    Cognition  takes  place  by  the  reflection  of  the  former  in  the  latter. 


vii]  The  Stuff  of  Thought  and  Matter  241 

knowledge  in  connection  with  a  person,  so  as  to  make  them  a 
system  of  experience.  This  principle  of  intelligence  is  called 
purusa.  There  is  a  separate  purusa  in  Sarnkhya  for  each  indi- 
vidual, and  it  is  of  the  nature  of  pure  intelligence.  The  Vedanta 
atman  however  is  different  from  the  Sarnkhya  purusa  in  this  that 
it  is  one  and  is  of  the  nature  of  pure  intelligence,  pure  being, 
and  pure  bliss.  It  alone  is  the  reality  and  by  illusory  maya  it 
appears  as  many. 

Thought  and  Matter. 

A  question  naturally  arises,  that  if  the  knowledge  forms  are 
made  up  of  some  sort  of  stuff  as  the  objective  forms  of  matter 
are,  why  then  should  the  purusa  illuminate  it  and  not  external 
material  objects.  The  answer  that  Sarnkhya  gives  is  that  the 
knowledge-complexes  are  certainly  different  from  external  ob- 
jects in  this,  that  they  are  far  subtler  and  have  a  preponderance 
of  a  special  quality  of  plasticity  and  translucence  {sattva),  which 
resembles  the  light  of  purusa,  and  is  thus  fit  for  reflecting  and 
absorbing  the  light  of  the  purusa.  The  two  principal  character- 
istics of  external  gross  matter  are  mass  and  energy.  But  it 
has  also  the  other  characteristic  of  allowing  itself  to  be  photo- 
graphed by  our  mind;  this  thought-photograph  of  matter  has 
again  the  special  privilege  of  being  so  translucent  as  to  be  able 
to  catch  the  reflection  of  the  cit — the  super-translucent  transcen- 
dent principle  of  intelligence.  The  fundamental  characteristic 
of  external  gross  matter  is  its  mass;  energy  is  common  to 
both  gross  matter  and  the  subtle  thought-stuff.  But  mass  is 
at  its  lowest  minimum  in  thought-stuff,  whereas  the  capacity 
of  translucence,  or  what  may  be  otherwise  designated  as  the 
intelligence-stuff,  is  at  its  highest  in  thought-stuff.  But  if  the 
gross  matter  had  none  of  the  characteristics  of  translucence  that 
thought  possesses,  it  could  not  have  made  itself  an  object  of 
thought;  for  thought  transforms  itself  into  the  shape,  colour, 
and  other  characteristics  of  the  thing  which  has  been  made  its 
object.  Thought  could  not  have  copied  the  matter,  if  the  matter 
did  not  possess  some  of  the  essential  substances  of  which  the 
copy  was  made  up.  But  this  plastic  entity  {sattva)  which  is 
so  predominant  in  thought  is  at  its  lowest  limit  of  subordination 
in  matter.  Similarly  mass  is  not  noticed  in  thought,  but  some 
such  notions  as  are  associated  with  mass  may  be  discernible  in 

D.  16 


242  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

thought;  thus  the  images  of  thought  are  Hmited,  separate,  have 
movement,  and  have  more  or  less  clear  cut  forms.  The  images 
do  not  extend  in  space,  but  they  can  represent  space.  The  trans- 
lucent and  plastic  element  of  thought  {sattva)  in  association  with 
movement  {rajas)  would  have  resulted  in  a  simultaneous  revelation 
of  all  objects;  it  is  on  account  of  mass  or  tendency  of  obstruction 
{tamas)  that  knowledge  proceeds  from  image  to  image  and  dis- 
closes things  in  a  successive  manner.  The  buddhi  (thought-stuff) 
holds  within  it  all  knowledge  immersed  as  it  were  in  utter  dark- 
ness, and  actual  knowledge  comes  before  our  view  as  though 
by  the  removal  of  the  darkness  or  veil,  by  the  reflection  of  the 
light  of  the  purusa.  This  characteristic  of  knowledge,  that  all  its 
stores  are  hidden  as  if  lost  at  any  moment,  and  only  one  picture 
or  idea  comes  at  a  time  to  the  arena  of  revelation,  demonstrates 
that  in  knowledge  there  is  a  factor  of  obstruction  which  manifests 
itself  in  its  full  actuality  in  gross  matter  as  mass.  Thus  both 
thought  and  gross  matter  are  made  up  of  three  elements,  a 
plasticity  of  intelligence-stuff  {sattva),  energy-stuff  {rajas),  and 
mass-stuff  {tamas),  or  the  factor  of  obstruction.  Of  these  the  last 
two  are  predominant  in  gross  matter  and  the  first  two  in  thought. 

Feelings,  the  Ultimate  Substances'. 

Another  question  that  arises  in  this  connection  is  the  position 
of  feeling  in  such  an  analysis  of  thought  and  matter.  Sarnkhya 
holds  that  the  three  characteristic  constituents  that  we  have 
analyzed  just  now  are  feeling  substances.  Feeling  is  the  most 
interesting  side  of  our  consciousness.  It  is  in  our  feelings  that 
we  think  of  our  thoughts  as  being  parts  of  ourselves.  If  we 
should  analyze  any  percept  into  the  crude  and  undeveloped 
sensations  of  which  it  is  composed  at  the  first  moment  of  its 
appearance,  it  comes  more  as  a  shock  than  as  an  image,  and 
we  find  that  it  is  felt  more  as  a  feeling  mass  than  as  an  image. 
Even  in  our  ordinary  life  the  elements  which  precede  an  act  of 
knowledge  are  probably  mere  feelings.  As  we  go  lower  down 
the  scale  of  evolution  the  automatic  actions  and  relations  of 
matter  are  concomitant  with  crude  manifestations  of  feeling 
which  never  rise  to  the  level  of  knowledge.  The  lower  the  scale 
of  evolution  the  less  is  the  keenness  of  feeling,  till  at  last  there 
comes  a  stage  where  matter-complexes  do  not  give  rise  to  feeling 

'  Kdrikd,  12,  with  Gaudpada  and  Narayanatirtha. 


vii]  The  Gu7j,as  243 

reactions  but  to  mere  physical  reactions.  Feelings  thus  mark 
the  earliest  track  of  consciousness,  whether  we  look  at  it  from  the 
point  of  view  of  evolution  or  of  the  genesis  of  consciousness  in 
ordinary  life.  What  we  call  matter  complexes  become  at  a  certain 
stage  feeling-complexes  and  what  we  call  feeling-complexes  at 
a  certain  stage  of  descent  sink  into  mere  matter-complexes  with 
matter  reaction.  The  feelings  are  therefore  the  things-in-them- 
selves,  the  ultimate  substances  of  which  consciousness  and  gross 
matter  are  made  up.  Ordinarily  a  difficulty  might  be  felt  in 
taking  feelings  to  be  the  ultimate  substances  of  which  gross 
matter  and  thought  are  made  up;  for  we  are  more  accustomed 
to  take  feelings  as  being  merely  subjective,  but  if  we  remember 
the  Samkhya  analysis,  we  find  that  it  holds  that  thought  and 
matter  are  but  two  different  modifications  of  certain  subtle  sub- 
stances which  are  in  essence  but  three  types  of  feeling  entities. 
The  three  principal  characteristics  of  thought  and  matter  that  we 
have  noticed  in  the  preceding  section  are  but  the  manifestations 
of  three  types  of  feeling  substances.  There  is  the  class  of  feelings 
that  we  call  the  sorrowful,  there  is  another  class  of  feelings  that 
we  call  pleasurable,  and  there  is  still  another  class  which  is  neither 
sorrowful  nor  pleasurable,  but  is  one  of  ignorance,  depression 
{visdda)  or  dullness.  Thus  corresponding  to  these  three  types  of 
manifestations  as  pleasure,  pain,  and  dullness,  and  materially  as 
shining  {prakdsa),  energy  {pravrtti),  obstruction  {niyama),  there 
are  three  types  of  feeling-substances  which  must  be  regarded  as 
the  ultimate  things  which  make  up  all  the  diverse  kinds  of  gross 
matter  and  thought  by  their  varying  modifications. 

The  Gunas^ 

These  three  types  of  ultimate  subtle  entities  are  technically 
called  guna  in  Samkhya  philosophy.  Guna  in  Sanskrit  has  three 
meanings,  namely  (i)  quality,  (2)  rope,  (3)  not  primary.  These 
entities,  however,  are  substances  and  not  mere  qualities.  But  it 
may  be  mentioned  in  this  connection  that  in  Sarnkhya  philosophy 
there  is  no  separate  existence  of  qualities;  it  holds  that  each 
and  every  unit  of  quality  is  but  a  unit  of  substance.  What 
we  call  quality  is  but  a  particular  manifestation  or  appearance 
of  a  subtle  entity.   Things  do  not  possess  quality,  but  quality 

1  Yogavdrttika,  II.  i8;  Bhavagane^a's  Tattvayatharthyadlpana,  pp.  1-3;  Vijiid- 
ndmrtabhdsya,  p.  100;  Tativakaumudi,  13;  also  Gaudapada  and  Narayanatlrtha,  13. 

16 — 2 


244  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

signifies  merely  the  manner  in  which  a  substance  reacts  ;  any 
object  we  see  seems  to  possess  many  qualities,  but  the  Sarnkhya 
holds  that  corresponding  to  each  and  every  new  unit  of  quality, 
however  fine  and  subtle  it  may  be,  there  is  a  corresponding 
subtle  entity,  the  reaction  of  which  is  interpreted  by  us  as  a 
quality.  This  is  true  not  only  of  qualities  of  external  objects 
but  also  of  mental  qualities  as  well.  These  ultimate  entities 
were  thus  called  gunas  probably  to  suggest  that  they  are  the 
entities  which  by  their  various  modifications  manifest  them- 
selves as  gunas  or  qualities.  These  subtle  entities  may  also  be 
called  gunas  in  the  sense  of  ropes  because  they  are  like  ropes 
by  which  the  soul  is  chained  down  as  if  it  were  to  thought  and 
matter.  These  may  also  be  called  gunas  as  things  of  secondary 
importance,  because  though  permanent  and  indestructible,  they 
continually  suffer  modifications  and  changes  by  their  mutual 
groupings  and  re-groupings,  and  thus  not  primarily  and  unalter- 
ably constant  like  the  souls  {purusa).  Moreover  the  object  of  the 
world  process  being  the  enjoyment  and  salvation  of  the  purusas, 
the  matter-principle  could  not  naturally  be  regarded  as  being  of 
primary  importance.  But  in  whatever  senses  we  may  be  inclined 
to  justify  the  name  guna  as  applied  to  these  subtle  entities,  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  they  are  substantive  entities  or 
subtle  substances  and  not  abstract  qualities.  These  gunas  are 
infinite  in  number,  but  in  accordance  with  their  three  main  char- 
acteristics as  described  above  they  have  been  arranged  in  three 
classes  or  types  called  sattva  (intelligence-stuff),  rajas  (energy- 
stuff)  and  tamas  (mass-stuff).  An  infinite  number  of  subtle  sub- 
stances which  agree  in  certain  characteristics  of  self-shining  or 
plasticity  are  called  the  sattva-gwias  and  those  which  behave  as 
units  of  activity  are  called  the  rajo-gnnas  and  those  which  behave 
as  factors  of  obstruction,  mass  or  materiality  are  called  tavio-gimas. 
These  subtle  guna  substances  are  united  in  different  proportions 
(e.g.  a  larger  number  of  sattva  substances  with  a  lesser  number  of 
rajas  or  tamas,  or  a  larger  number  of  tamas  substances  with  a 
smaller  number  of  rajas  and  sattva  substances  and  so  on  in 
varying  proportions),  and  as  a  result  of  this,  different  substances 
with  different  qualities  come  into  being.  Though  attached  to  one 
another  when  united  in  different  proportions,  they  mutually  act 
and  react  upon  one  another,  and  thus  by  their  combined  resultant 
produce  new  characters,  qualities  and  substances.   There  is  how- 


VI i]  Prakrti  as  Equilibrium  of  Gunas  245 

ever  one  and  only  one  stage  in  which  the  gunas  are  not  com- 
pounded in  varying  proportions.  In  this  state  each  of  the  guna 
substances  is  opposed  by  each  of  the  other  guna  substances,  and 
thus  by  their  equal  mutual  opposition  create  an  equilibrium,  in 
which  none  of  the  characters  of  the  gunas  manifest  themselves. 
This  is  a  state  which  is  so  absolutely  devoid  of  all  characteristics 
that  it  is  absolutely  incoherent,  indeterminate,  and  indefinite.  It 
is  a  qualitiless  simple  homogeneity.  It  is  a  state  of  being  which 
is  as  it  were  non-being.  This  state  of  the  mutual  equilibrium 
of  the  gunas  is  called  prakrti'.  This  is  a  state  which  cannot  be 
said  either  to  exist  or  to  non-exist  for  it  serves  no  purpose,  but 
it  is  hypothetically  the  mother  of  all  things.  This  is  however  the 
earliest  stage,  by  the  breaking  of  which,  later  on,  all  modifications 
take  place. 

Prakrti  and  its  Evolution. 

Samkhya  believes  that  before  this  world  came  into  being  there 
was  such  a  state  of  dissolution — a  state  in  which  the  guna  com- 
pounds had  disintegrated  into  a  state  of  disunion  and  had  by  their 
mutual  opposition  produced  an  equilibrium  the  prakrti.  Then 
later  on  disturbance  arose  in  the  prakrti,  and  as  a  result  of  that  a 
process  of  unequal  aggregation  of  the  gunas  in  varying  proportions 
took  place,  which  brought  forth  the  creation  of  the  manifold. 
Prakrti,  the  state  of  perfect  homogeneity  and  incoherence  of  the 
gunas,  thus  gradually  evolved  and  became  more  and  more  deter- 
minate, differentiated,  heterogeneous,  and  coherent.  The  gunas  are 
always  uniting,  separating,  and  uniting  again^  Varying  qualities 
of  essence,  energy,  and  mass  in  varied  groupings  act  on  one  another 
and  through  their  mutual  interaction  and  interdependence  evolve 
from  the  indefinite  or  qualitatively  indeterminate  the  definite  or 
qualitatively  determinate.  And  though  co-operating  to  produce 
the  world  of  effects,  these  diverse  moments  with  diverse  tendencies 
never  coalesce.  Thus  in  the  phenomenal  product  whatever  energy 
there  is  is  due  to  the  element  of  rajas  and  rajas  alone;  all  matter, 
resistance,  stability,  is  due  to  tamas,and  all  conscious  manifestation 
to  sattva.  The  particular  guna  which  happens  to  be  predominant 
in  any  phenomenon  becomes  manifest  in  that  phenomenon  and 
others  become  latent,  though  their  presence  is  inferred  by  their 

'  Yogavarttika,  \\.  19,  and  Pravacanabhasya,  I.  61. 

-  Kauinudl,  13-16;  Tattvavai^dradi,  11.  20,  iv.  13,  14;  also  Yogavarttika,  iv.  13, 14. 


246  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

effect.  Thus,  for  example,  in  a  body  at  rest  mass  is  patent,  energy 
latent  and  potentiality  of  conscious  manifestation  sublatent.  In  a 
moving  body,  the  rajas  is  predominant  (kinetic)  and  the  mass  is 
partially  overcome.  All  these  transformations  of  the  groupings  of 
the  gunas  in  different  proportions  presuppose  the  state  of  prakrti 
as  the  starting  point.  It  is  at  this  stage  that  the  tendencies  to 
conscious  manifestation,  as  well  as  the  powers  of  doing  work,  are 
exactly  counterbalanced  by  the  resistance  of  inertia  or  mass, 
and  the  process  of  cosmic  evolution  is  at  rest.  When  this  equi- 
librium is  once  destroyed,  it  is  supposed  that  out  of  a  natural 
affinity  of  all  the  sattva  reals  for  themselves,  of  rajas  reals  for  other 
reals  of  their  type,  of  tamas  reals  for  others  of  their  type,  there 
arises  an  unequal  aggregation  of  sattva,  rajas,  or  tamas  at  differ- 
ent moments.  When  one  guna  is  preponderant  in  any  particular 
collocation,  the  others  are  co-operant.  This  evolutionary  series 
beginning  from  the  first  disturbance  of  the  prakrti  to  the  final 
transformation  as  the  world-order,  is  subject  to  "a  definite  law 
which  it  cannot  overstep."  In  the  words  of  Dr  B.N. Seal \" the  pro- 
cess of  evolution  consists  in  the  development  of  the  differentiated 
ivaisamyd)  within  the  undifferentiated  {sdmydvastha)  of  the  deter- 
minate ivisesa)  within  the  indeterminate  iavisesd)  of  the  coherent 
{yutasiddha)  within  the  incoherent  {ayutasiddha).  The  order  of 
succession  is  neither  from  parts  to  whole  nor  from  whole  to  the 
parts,  but  ever  from  a  relatively  less  differentiated,  less  deter- 
minate, less  coherent  whole  to  a  relatively  more  differentiated, 
more  determinate,  more  coherent  whole."  The  meaning  of  such 
an  evolution  is  this,  that  all  the  changes  and  modifications  in 
the  shape  of  the  evolving  collocations  of  guna  reals  take  place 
within  the  body  of  the  prakrti.  Prakrti  consisting  of  the  in- 
finite reals  is  infinite,  and  that  it  has  been  disturbed  does  not 
mean  that  the  whole  of  it  has  been  disturbed  and  upset,  or 
that  the  totality  of  the  gunas  in  the  prakrti  has  been  unhinged 
from  a  state  of  equilibrium.  It  means  rather  that  a  very  vast 
number  of  gunas  constituting  the  worlds  of  thought  and  matter 
has  been  upset.  These  gunas  once  thrown  out  of  balance  begin  to 
group  themselves  together  first  in  one  form,  then  in  another,  then 
in  another,  and  so  on.  But  such  a  change  in  the  formation  of 
aggregates  should  not  be  thought  to  take  place  in  such  a  way 
that  the  later  aggregates  appear  in  supersession  of  the  former  ones, 
so  that  when  the  former  comes  into  being  the  latter  ceases  to  exist. 

^  Dr  B.  N.  Seal's  Positive  Sciences  of  the  Ancient  Hindus,  19 15,  p.  7. 


VI i]  Prakrit  and  its  Evolution  247 

For  the  truth  is  that  one  stage  is  produced  after  another ;  this 
second  stage  is  the  result  of  a  new  aggregation  of  some  of  the 
reals  of  the  first  stage.  This  deficiency  of  the  reals  of  the  first 
stage  which  had  gone  forth  to  form  the  new  aggregate  as  the 
second  stage  is  made  good  by  a  refilling  from  the  prakrti.  So  also, 
as  the  third  stage  of  aggregation  takes  place  from  out  of  the  reals 
of  the  second  stage,  the  deficiency  of  the  reals  of  the  second  stage 
is  made  good  by  a  refilling  from  the  first  stage  and  that  of  the 
first  stage  from  the  prakrti.  Thus  by  a  succession  of  refillings  the 
process  of  evolution  proceeds,  till  we  come  to  its  last  limit,  where 
there  is  no  real  evolution  of  new  substance,  but  mere  chemical 
and  physical  changes  of  qualities  in  things  which  had  already 
evolved.  Evolution  {tattvdntaraparindmd)  in  Sarnkhya  means  the 
development  of  categories  of  existence  and  not  mere  changes  of 
qualities  of  substances  (physical,  chemical,  biological  or  mental). 
Thus  each  of  the  stages  of  evolution  remains  as  a  permanent 
category  of  being,  and  offers  scope  to  the  more  and  more  differ- 
entiated and  coherent  groupings  of  the  succeeding  stages.  Thus 
it  is  said  that  the  evolutionary  process  is  regarded  as  a  differen- 
tiation of  new  stages  as  integrated  in  previous  stages  {samsrsta- 
vivekd). 

Pralaya  and  the  disturbance  of  the  Prakrti  Equilibrium. 

But  how  or  rather  why  prakrti  should  be  disturbed  is  the  most 
knotty  point  in  Sarnkhya.  It  is  postulated  that  the  prakrti  or  the 
sum-total  of  the  gunas  is  so  connected  with  the  purusas,  and  there 
is  such  an  inherent  teleology  or  blind  purpose  in  the  lifeless  prakrti, 
that  all  its  evolution  and  transformations  take  place  for  the  sake 
of  the  diverse  purusas,  to  serve  the  enjoyment  of  pleasures  and 
sufferance  of  pain  through  experiences,  and  finally  leading  them 
to  absolute  freedom  or  mukti.  A  return  of  this  manifold  world 
into  the  quiescent  state  (^pralaya)  of  prakrti  takes  place  when  the 
karmas  of  all  purusas  collectively  require  that  there  should  be 
such  a  temporary  cessation  of  all  experience.  At  such  a  moment 
the  guna  compounds  are  gradually  broken, and  there  is  a  backward 
movement  {pratisaficara)  till  everything  is  reduced  to  the  gunas  in 
their  elementary  disintegrated  state  when  their  mutual  opposition 
brings  about  their  equilibrium.  This  equilibrium  however  is  not  a 
mere  passive  state,  but  one  of  utmost  tension;  there  is  intense 
activity,  but  the  activity  here  does  not  lead  to  the  generation  of 
new  things  and  qualities  {visadrsa-parittdma);  this  course  of  new 


248  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

production  being  suspended,  the  activity  here  repeats  the  same 
state  isadrsa-parindmd)  of  equilibrium,  so  that  there  is  no  change 
or  new  production.  The  state  of  pralaya  thus  is  not  a  suspension 
of  the  teleology  or  purpose  of  the  gunas,  or  an  absolute  break  of 
the  course  of  guna  evolution ;  for  the  state  of  pralaya,  since  it 
has  been  generated  to  fulfil  the  demands  of  the  accumulated 
karmas  of  purusas,  and  since  there  is  still  the  activity  of  the 
gunas  in  keeping  themselves  in  a  state  of  suspended  production, 
is  also  a  stage  of  the  samsara  cycle.  The  state  of  mukti  (libera- 
tion) is  of  course  quite  different,  for  in  that  stage  the  movement 
of  the  gunas  ceases  for  ever  with  reference  to  the  liberated  soul. 
But  still  the  question  remains,what  breaks  the  state  of  equilibrium? 
The  Sarnkhya  answer  is  that  it  is  due  to  the  transcendental  (non- 
mechanical)  influence  of  the  purusa^  This  influence  of  the  purusa 
again,  if  it  means  anything,  means  that  there  is  inherent  in  the 
gunas  a  teleology  that  all  their  movements  or  modifications  should 
take  place  in  such  a  way  that  these  may  serve  the  purposes  of  the 
purusas.  Thus  when  the  karmas  of  the  purusas  had  demanded 
that  there  should  be  a  suspension  of  all  experience,  for  a  period 
there  was  a  pralaya.  At  the  end  of  it,  it  is  the  same  inherent  pur- 
pose of  the  prakrti  that  wakes  it  up  for  the  formation  of  a  suitable 
world  for  the  experiences  of  the  purusas  by  which  its  quiescent 
state  is  disturbed.  This  is  but  another  way  of  looking  at  the 
inherent  teleology  of  the  prakrti,  which  demands  that  a  state  of 
pralaya  should  cease  and  a  state  of  world-framing  activity  should 
begin.  Since  there  is  a  purpose  in  the  gunas  which  brought 
them  to  a  state  of  equilibrium,  the  state  of  equilibrium  also  pre- 
supposes that  it  also  may  be  broken  up  again  when  the  purpose 
so  demands.  Thus  the  inherent  purpose  of  the  prakrti  brought 
about  the  state  of  pralaya  and  then  broke  it  up  for  the  creative 
work  again,  and  it  is  this  natural  change  in  the  prakrti  that  may 
be  regarded  from  another  point  of  view  as  the  transcendental 
influence  of  the  purusas. 

Mahat  and  Ahamkara. 

The  first  evolute  of  the  prakrti  is  generated  by  a  preponderance 
of  the  sattva  (intelligence-stuff).  This  is  indeed  the  earliest  state 
from  which  all  the  rest  of  the  world  has  sprung  forth;  and  it  is  a 
state  in  which  the  stuff  of  sattva  predominates.    It  thus  holds 

*  The  Yoga  answer  is  of  course  different.    It  believes  that  the  disturbance  of  the 
equilibrium  of  the  prakrti  for  new  creation  takes  place  by  the  will  of  I^vara  (God). 


vii]  Evolution  of  Mahat  249 

within  it  the  minds  {buddhi)  of  all  purusas  which  were  lost  in  the 
prakrti  during  the  pralaya.  The  very  first  work  of  the  evolution 
of  prakrti  to  serve  the  purusas  is  thus  manifested  by  the  separating 
out  of  the  old  buddhis  or  minds  (of  the  purusas)  which  hold  within 
themselves  the  old  specific  ignorance  {avidyd)  inherent  in  them 
with  reference  to  each  purusa  with  which  any  particular  buddhi 
is  associated  from  beginningless  time  before  the  pralaya.  This 
state  of  evolution  consisting  of  all  the  collected  minds  (buddhi) 
of  all  the  purusas  is  therefore  called  buddliitattva.  It  is  a  state 
which  holds  or  comprehends  within  it  the  buddhis  of  all  indi- 
viduals. The  individual  buddhis  of  individual  purusas  are  on  one 
hand  integrated  with  the  buddhitattva  and  on  the  other  associated 
with  their  specific  purusas.  When  some  buddhis  once  begin  to 
be  separated  from  the  prakrti,  other  buddhi  evolutions  take 
place.  In  other  words,  we  are  to  understand  that  once  the  trans- 
formation of  buddhis  is  effected  for  the  service  of  the  purusas, 
all  the  other  direct  transformations  that  take  place  from  the 
prakrti  take  the  same  line,  i.e.  a  preponderance  of  sattva  being 
once  created  by  the  bringing  out  of  some  buddhis,  other  trans- 
formations of  prakrti  that  follow  them  have  also  the  sattva  pre- 
ponderance, which  thus  have  exactly  the  same  composition  as  the 
first  buddhis.  Thus  the  first  transformation  from  prakrti  becomes 
buddhi-transformation.  This  stage  of  buddhis  may  thus  be  re- 
garded as  the  most  universal  stage,  which  comprehends  within  it 
all  the  buddhis  of  individuals  and  potentially  all  the  matter  of 
which  the  gross  world  is  formed.  Looked  at  from  this  point  of 
view  it  has  the  widest  and  most  universal  existence  comprising 
all  creation,  and  is  thus  called  mahat  (the  great  one).  It  is  called 
lihga  (sign),  as  the  other  later  existences  or  evolutes  give  us  the 
ground  of  inferring  its  existence,  and  as  such  must  be  distin- 
guished from  the  prakrti  which  is  called  alinga,  i.e.  of  which  no 
lihga  or  characteristic  may  be  affirmed. 

This  mahat-tattva  being  once  produced,  further  modifications 
begin  to  take  place  in  three  lines  by  three  different  kinds  of 
undulations  representing  the  sattva  preponderance,  rajas  pre- 
ponderance and  tamas  preponderance.  This  state  when  the  mahat 
is  disturbed  by  the  three  parallel  tendencies  of  a  preponderance  of 
tamas,  rajas  and  sattva  is  called  ahamkdra,  and  the  above  three 
tendencies  are  respectively  called  tdniasika  ahamkdra  or  bhutddi, 
rdjasika  or  taijasa  ahamkdra,  and  vaikdrika  ahamkdra.  The  raja- 
sika  ahamkara  cannot  mark  a  new  preponderance  by  itself;  it  only 


250         The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

helps  isahakdrt)  the  transformations  of  the  sattva  preponderance 
and  the  tamas  preponderance.  The  development  of  the  former 
preponderance,  as  is  easy  to  see,  is  only  the  assumption  of  a  more 
and  more  determinate  character  of  the  buddhi,  for  we  remember 
that  buddhi  itself  has  been  the  resulting  transformation  of  a  sattva 
preponderance.  Further  development  with  the  help  of  rajas  on 
the  line  of  sattva  development  could  only  take  place  when  the 
buddhi  as  mind  determined  itself  in  specific  ways.  The  first 
development  of  the  buddhi  on  this  line  is  called  sdttvika  or  vat- 
kdrika  ahamkdra.  This  aharnkara  represents  the  development 
in  buddhi  to  produce  a  consciousness-stuff  as  I  or  rather  "mine," 
and  must  thus  be  distinguished  from  the  first  stage  as  buddhi,  the 
function  of  which  is  a  mere  understanding  and  general  datum  as 
thisness. 

The  ego  or  aharnkara  {abhhndna-dravya)  is  the  specific  expres- 
sion of  the  general  consciousness  which  takes  experience  as  mine. 
The  function  of  the  ego  is  therefore  called  abhimdna  (self-asser- 
tion). From  this  again  come  the  five  cognitive  senses  of  vision, 
touch,  smell,  taste,  and  hearing,  the  five  conative  senses  of  speech, 
handling,  foot-movement,  the  ejective  sense  and  the  generative 
sense ;  the  prdnas  (bio-motor  force)  which  help  both  conation  and 
cognition  are  but  aspects  of  buddhi-movement  as  life.  The  indi- 
vidual aharnkaras  and  senses  are  related  to  the  individual  buddhis 
by  the  developing  sattva  determinations  from  which  they  had  come 
into  being.  Each  buddhi  with  its  own  group  of  aharnkara  (ego) 
and  sense-evolutes  thus  forms  a  microcosm  separate  from  similar 
other  buddhis  with  their  associated  groups.  So  far  therefore  as 
knowledge  is  subject  to  sense-influence  and  the  ego,  it  is  different 
for  each  individual,  but  so  far  as  a  general  mind  {kdrana  buddhi) 
apart  from  sense  knowledge  is  concerned,  there  is  a  community  of 
all  buddhis  in  the  buddhitattva.  Even  there  however  each  buddhi 
is  separated  from  other  buddhis  by  its  own  peculiarly  associated 
ignorance  {avidyd).  The  buddhi  and  its  sattva  evolutes  of  aharn- 
kara and  the  senses  are  so  related  that  though  they  are  different 
from  buddhi  in  their  functions,  they  are  all  comprehended  in  the 
buddhi,  and  mark  only  its  gradual  differentiations  and  modes.  We 
must  again  remember  in  this  connection  the  doctrine  of  refilling, 
for  as  buddhi  exhausts  its  part  in  giving  rise  to  aharnkara,  the  de- 
ficiency of  buddhi  is  made  good  by  prakrti ;  again  as  aharnkara 
partially  exhausts  itself  in  generating  sense-faculties,  the  defi- 


vii]  Evolution  of  Infra-atoms  251 

ciency  is  made  good  by  a  refilling  from  the  buddhi.  Thus  the 
change  and  wastage  of  each  of  the  stadia  are  always  made  good 
and  kept  constant  by  a  constant  refilling  from  each  higher  state 
and  finally  from  prakrti. 

The  Tanmatras  and  the  Paramanus^ 

The  other  tendency,  namely  that  of  tamas,  has  to  be  helped 
by  the  liberated  rajas  of  ahamkara,  in  order  to  make  itself  pre- 
ponderant, and  this  state  in  which  the  tamas  succeeds  in  over- 
coming the  sattva  side  which  was  so  preponderant  in  the  buddhi, 
is  called  bhutddi.  From  this  bhutadi  with  the  help  of  rajas  are 
generated  the  tanmatras,  the  immediately  preceding  causes  of  the 
gross  elements.  The  bhutadi  thus  represents  only  the  intermediate 
stage  through  which  the  differentiations  and  regroupings  of  tamas 
reals  in  the  mahat  proceed  for  the  generation  of  the  tanmatras. 
There  has  been  some  controversy  between  Samkhya  and  Yoga 
as  to  whether  the  tanmatras  are  generated  from  the  mahat  or  from 
aharnkara.  The  situation  becomes  intelligible  if  we  remember  that 
evolution  here  does  not  mean  coming  out  or  emanation,  but  in- 
creasing differentiation  in  integration  within  the  evolving  whole. 
Thus  the  regroupings  of  tamas  reals  marks  the  differentiation 
which  takes  place  within  the  mahat  but  through  its  stage  as 
bhutadi.  Bhutadi  is  absolutely  homogeneous  and  inert,  devoid 
of  all  physical  and  chemical  characters  except  quantum  or  mass. 
The  second  stadium  tanmatra  represents  subtle  matter,  vibratory, 
impingent,  radiant,  instinct  with  potential  energy.  These  "poten- 
tials" arise  from  the  unequal  aggregation  of  the  original  mass-units 
in  different  proportions  and  collocations  with  an  unequal  distribu- 
tion of  the  original  energy  {rajas).  The  tanmatras  possess  some- 
thing more  than  quantum  of  mass  and  energy;  they  possess 
physical  characters,  some  of  them  penetrability,  others  powers  of 
impact  or  pressure,  others  radiant  heat,  others  again  capability  of 
viscous  and  cohesive  attraction  I 

In  intimate  relation  with  those  physical  characters  they  also 
possess  the  potentials  of  the  energies  represented  by  sound,  touch, 
colour,  taste,  and  smell ;  but,  being  subtle  matter,  they  are  devoid 

1  I  have  accepted  in  this  section  and  in  the  next  many  of  the  translations  of  Sanskrit 
terms  and  expressions  of  Dr  Seal  and  am  largely  indebted  to  him  for  his  illuminating 
exposition  of  this  subject  as  given  in  Ray's  Hindu  Chemistry.  The  credit  of  explaining 
Samkhya  physics  in  the  light  of  the  text  belongs  entirely  to  him. 

^  Dr  Seal's  Positive  Sciences  of  the  Ancient  Hindus. 


252  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [cri. 

of  the  peculiar  forms  which  these  "potentials"  assume  in  particles 
of  gross  matter  like  the  atoms  and  their  aggregates.  In  other 
words,  the  potentials  lodged  in  subtle  matter  must  undergo  peculiar 
transformations  by  new  groupings  or  collocations  before  they  can 
act  as  sensory  stimuli  as  gross  matter,  though  in  the  minutest 
particles  thereof  the  sensory  stimuli  may  be  infra-sensible  {atin- 
driya  but  not  amidbhfitay. 

Of  the  tanmatras  the  sabda  or  dkdsa  tamndtra  (the  sound- 
potential)  is  first  generated  directly  from  the  bhutadi.  Next 
comes  the  sparsa  or  the  vdyu  tanmdtra  (touch-potential)  which  is 
generated  by  the  union  of  a  unit  of  tamas  from  bhutadi  with  the 
akasa  tanmatra.  The  rupa  tanmdtra  (colour-potential)  is  generated 
similarly  by  the  accretion  of  a  unit  of  tamas  from  bhutadi ;  the 
rasa  tamndtra  (taste-potential)  or  the  ap  tamndtra  is  also  similarly 
formed.  This  ap  tanmatra  again  by  its  union  with  a  unit  of  tamas 
from  bhutadi  produces  the  gandha  tamndtj'a  (smell-potential)  or 
the  ksiti  tamndtra'^.  The  difference  of  tanmatras  or  infra-atomic 
units  and  atoms  {pararndnu)  is  this,  that  the  tanmatras  have  only 
the  potential  power  of  affecting  our  senses,  which  must  be  grouped 
and  regrouped  in  a  particular  form  to  constitute  a  new  existence 
as  atoms  before  they  can  have  the  power  of  affecting  our  senses. 
It  is  important  in  this  connection  to  point  out  that  the  classifica- 
tion of  all  gross  objects  as  ksiti,  ap,  tejas,  marut  and  vyoman  is 
not  based  upon  a  chemical  analysis,  but  from  the  points  of  view 
of  the  five  senses  through  which  knowledge  of  them  could  be 
brought  home  to  us.  Each  of  our  senses  can  only  apprehend  a 
particular  quality  and  thus  five  different  ultimate  substances  are 
said  to  exist  corresponding  to  the  five  qualities  which  may  be 
grasped  by  the  five  senses.  In  accordance  with  the  existence  of 
these  five  elements,  the  existence  of  the  five  potential  states  or 
tanmatras  was  also  conceived  to  exist  as  the  ground  of  the  five 
gross  forms. 

The  five  classes  of  atoms  are  generated  from  the  tanmatras  as 
follows:  the  sound-potential,  with  accretion  of  rudiment  matter 
from  ^/////a^z  generates  the  akasa-atom.  The  touch-potentials  com- 
bine with  the  vibratory  particles  (sound-potential)  to  generate  the 

^  Dr  Seal's  Positive  Sciences  of  (he  Ancient  Hindus. 

2  There  were  various  ways  in  which  the  genesis  of  tanmatras  and  atoms  were  ex- 
plained in  literatures  other  than  Sanikhya ;  for  some  account  of  it  see  Dr  Seal's  Positive 
Sciences  of  the  Ancient  Hindus. 


vii]  Evolution  of  Atoms  253 

vayu-atom.  The  light-and-heat  potentials  combine  with  touch- 
potentials  and  sound-potentials  to  produce  the  tejas-atom.  The 
taste-potentials  combine  with  light-and-heat  potentials,  touch- 
potentials  and  sound-potentials  to  generate  the  ap-atom  and  the 
smell-potentials  combine  with  the  preceding  potentials  to  generate 
the  earth-atom.  The  akasa-atom  possesses  penetrability,  the  vayu- 
atom  impact  or  mechanical  pressure,  the  tejas-atom  radiant  heat 
and  light,  the  ap-atom  viscous  attraction  and  the  earth-atom 
cohesive  attraction.  The  aka^a  we  have  seen  forms  the  transition 
link  from  the  bhutadi  to  the  tanmatra  and  from  the  tanmatra  to 
the  atomic  production ;  it  therefore  deserves  a  special  notice  at 
this  stage.  Sarnkhya  distinguishes  between  a  karana-aka^a  and 
karyakasa.  The  karana-akasa  (non-atomic  and  all-pervasive) 
is  the  formless  tamas — the  mass  in  prakrti  or  bhutadi ;  it  is 
indeed  all-pervasive,  and  is  not  a  mere  negation,  a  mere  un- 
occupiedness  {dvarandbhdvd)  or  vacuum \  When  energy  is  first 
associated  with  this  tamas  element  it  gives  rise  to  the  sound- 
potential  ;  the  atomic  akasa  is  the  result  of  the  integration  of  the 
original  mass-units  from  bhutadi  with  this  sound-potential  (Jabda 
tanmatra).  Such  an  akasa-atom  is  called  the  karyakasa;  it  is 
formed  everywhere  and  held  up  in  the  original  karana  akasa  as 
the  medium  for  the  development  of  vayu  atoms.  Being  atomic 
it  occupies  limited  space. 

The  aharnkara  and  the  five  tanmatras  are  technically  called 
avisesa  or  indeterminate,  for  further  determinations  or  differentia- 
tions of  them  for  the  formation  of  newer  categories  of  existence 
are  possible.  The  eleven  senses  and  the  five  atoms  are  called 
visesa,  i.e.  determinate,  for  they  cannot  further  be  so  determined 
as  to  form  a  new  category  of  existence.  It  is  thus  that  the  course 
of  evolution  which  started  in  the  prakrti  reaches  its  furthest  limit 
in  the  production  of  the  senses  on  the  one  side  and  the  atoms 
on  the  other.  Changes  no  doubt  take  place  in  bodies  having 
atomic  constitution,  but  these  changes  are  changes  of  quality  due 
to  spatial  changes  in  the  position  of  the  atoms  or  to  the  intro- 
duction of  new  atoms  and  their  re-arrangement.  But  these  are 
not  such  that  a  newer  category  of  existence  could  be  formed  by 
them  which  was  substantially  different  from  the  combined  atoms. 

^  Dr  B.  N.  Seal  in  describing  this  aka^a  says  "  Aka^a  corresponds  in  some  respects 
to  the  ether  of  the  physicists  and  in  others  to  what  may  be  called  proto-atom  (protyle)." 
Ray's  History  of  Hindu  Chemistry,  p.  88. 


254         The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

The  changes  that  take  place  in  the  atomic  constitution  of  things 
certainly  deserve  to  be  noticed.  But  before  we  go  on  to  this,  it 
will  be  better  to  enquire  about  the  principle  of  causation  accord- 
ing to  which  the  Sarnkhya-Yoga  evolution  should  be  compre- 
hended or  interpreted. 

Principle  of  Causation  and  Conservation  of  Energy^ 

The  question  is  raised,  how  can  the  prakrti  supply  the  de- 
ficiences  made  in  its  evolutes  by  the  formation  of  other  evolutes 
from  them?  When  from  mahat  some  tanmatras  have  evolved,  or 
when  from  the  tanmatras  some  atoms  have  evolved,  how  can  the 
deficiency  in  mahat  and  the  tanmatras  be  made  good  by  the 
prakrti  ? 

Or  again,  what  is  the  principle  that  guides  the  transformations 
that  take  place  in  the  atomic  stage  when  one  gross  body,  say  milk, 
changes  into  curd,  and  so  on?  Sarnkhya  says  that  "as  the  total 
energy  remains  the  same  while  the  world  is  constantly  evolving, 
cause  and  effect  are  only  more  or  less  evolved  forms  of  the  same 
ultimate  Energy.  The  sum  of  effects  exists  in  the  sum  of  causes 
in  a  potential  form.  The  grouping  or  collocation  alone  changes, 
and  this  brings  on  the  manifestation  of  the  latent  powers  of  the 
gunas,  but  without  creation  of  anything  new.  What  is  called  the 
(material)  cause  is  only  the  power  which  is  efficient  in  the  pro- 
duction or  rather  the  vehicle  of  the  power.  This  power  is  the 
unmanifested  (or  potential)  form  of  the  Energy  set  free  {udbhuta- 
vrtti)  in  the  effect.  But  the  concomitant  conditions  are  necessary 
to  call  forth  the  so-called  material  cause  into  activity^"  The 
appearance  of  an  effect  (such  as  the  manifestation  of  the  figure 
of  the  statue  in  the  marble  block  by  the  causal  efficiency  of  the 
sculptor's  art)  is  only  its  passage  from  potentiality  to  actuality 
and  the  concomitant  conditions  {sahakdri-sakti)  or  efficient  cause 
{nimitta-kdrajia,  such  as  the  sculptor's  art)  is  a  sort  of  mechanical 
help  or  instrumental  help  to  this  passage  or  the  transition^  The 
refilling  from  prakrti  thus  means  nothing  more  than  this,  that 
by  the  inherent  teleology  of  the  prakrti,  the  reals  there  are  so 
collocated  as  to  be  transformed  into  mahat  as  those  of  the  mahat 
have  been  collocated  to  form  the  bhutadi  or  the  tanmatras. 

1  Vyasahhdsya  and  Yogavarttika,  iv.  3 ;  Tattvavai§dradi,  iv.  3. 

2  Ray,  History  of  Hindu  Chemistry,  p.  72.  '  Ibid.  p.  73. 


vii]  Conservation  of  Energy  and  Change  255 

Yoga  however  explains  this  more  vividly  on  the  basis  of 
transformation  of  the  liberated  potential  energy.  The  sum  of 
material  causes  potentially  contains  the  energy  manifested  in  the 
sum  of  effects.  When  the  effectuating  condition  is  added  to  the 
sum  of  material  conditions  in  a  given  collocation,  all  that  happens 
is  that  a  stimulus  is  imparted  which  removes  the  arrest,  disturbs 
the  relatively  stable  equilibrium,  and  brings  on  a  liberation  of 
energy  together  with  a  fresh  collocation  {gunasaitnivesavisesd). 
As  the  owner  of  an  adjacent  field  in  transferring  water  from  one 
field  to  another  of  the  same  or  lower  level  has  only  to  remove 
the  obstructing  mud  barriers,  whereupon  the  water  flows  of  itself 
to  the  other  field,  so  when  the  efficient  or  instrumental  causes 
(such  as  the  sculptor's  art)  remove  the  barrier  inherent  in  any 
collocation  against  its  transformation  into  any  other  collocation, 
the  energy  from  that  collocation  flows  out  in  a  corresponding 
manner  and  determines  the  collocation.  Thus  for  example  the 
energy  which  collocated  the  milk-atoms  to  form  milk  was  in  a 
state  of  arrest  in  the  milk  state.  If  by  heat  or  other  causes  this 
barrier  is  removed,  the  energy  naturally  changes  direction  in  a 
corresponding  manner  and  collocates  the  atoms  accordingly  for 
the  formation  of  curd.  So  also  as  soon  as  the  barriers  are  removed 
from  the  prakrti,  guided  by  the  constant  will  of  Isvara,  the  reals 
in  equilibrium  in  the  state  of  prakrti  leave  their  state  of  arrest 
and  evolve  themselves  into  mahat,  etc. 

Change  as  the  formation  of  new  collocations. 

It  is  easy  to  see  from  what  we  have  already  said  that  any 
collocation  of  atoms  forming  a  thing  could  not  change  its  form, 
unless  the  barrier  inherent  or  caused  by  the  formation  of  the 
present  collocation  could  be  removed  by  some  other  extraneous 
instrumental  cause.  All  gross  things  are  formed  by  the  colloca- 
tion of  the  five  atoms  of  ksiti,  ap,  tejas,  marut,  and  vyoman.  The 
difference  between  one  thing  and  another  is  simply  this,  that  its 
collocation  of  atoms  or  the  arrangement  or  grouping  of  atoms 
is  different  from  that  in  another.  The  formation  of  a  collocation 
has  an  inherent  barrier  against  any  change,  which  keeps  that 
collocation  in  a  state  of  equilibrium,  and  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
these  barriers  exist  in  infinite  directions  in  which  all  the  other 
infinite  objects  of  the  world  exist.  From  whichever  side  the  barrier 
is  removed,  the  energy  flows  in  that  direction  and  helps  the 


256  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Sdmkhya        [ch. 

formation  of  a  corresponding  object.  Provided  the  suitable  barriers 
could  be  removed,  anything  could  be  changed  into  any  other  thing. 
And  it  is  believed  that  the  Yogins  can  acquire  the  powers  by 
which  they  can  remove  any  barriers,  and  thus  make  anything  out  of 
any  other  thing.  But  generally  in  the  normal  course  of  events  the 
line  of  evolution  follows  "a  definite  law  which  cannot  be  over- 
stepped" {parindmakramaniyama)  or  in  other  words  there  are 
some  natural  barriers  which  cannot  be  removed,  and  thus  the 
evolutionary  course  has  to  take  a  path  to  the  exclusion  of  those 
lines  where  the  barriers  could  not  be  removed.  Thus  saffron  grows 
in  countries  like  Kashmere  and  not  in  Bengal,  this  is  limitation  of 
countries  {desdpabandhd) ;  certain  kinds  of  paddy  grow  in  the  rainy 
season  only,  this  is  limitation  of  season  or  time  {kdldpabandhd)\ 
deer  cannot  beget  men,  this  is  limitation  by  form  idkdrdpabandhd)', 
curd  can  come  out  of  milk,  this  is  the  limitation  of  causes  {iiiniit- 
tdpabandha).  The  evolutionary  course  can  thus  follow  only  that 
path  which  is  not  barricaded  by  any  of  these  limitations  or  natural 
obstructions^ 

Change  is  taking  place  everywhere,  from  the  smallest  and  least 
to  the  highest.  Atoms  and  reals  are  continually  vibrating  and 
changing  places  in  any  and  every  object.  At  each  moment  the 
whole  universe  is  undergoing  change,  and  the  collocation  of  atoms 
at  any  moment  is  different  from  what  it  was  at  the  previous 
moment.  When  these  changes  are  perceivable,  they  are  perceived 
as  dharmapavindnta  or  changes  of  dharma  or  quality;  but  per- 
ceived or  unperceived  the  changes  are  continually  going  on.  This 
change  of  appearance  may  be  viewed  from  another  aspect  by 
virtue  of  which  we  may  call  it  present  or  past,  and  old  or  new, 
and  these  are  respectively  called  the  laksanaparindma  a.ndavastkd- 
parindfna.  At  every  moment  every  object  of  the  world  is  under- 
going evolution  or  change,  change  as  past,  present  and  future, 
as  new,  old  or  unborn.  When  any  change  is  in  a  potential  state 
we  call  it  future,  when  manifested  present,  when  it  becomes  sub- 
latent  again  it  is  said  to  be  past.  Thus  it  is  that  the  potential, 
manifest,  and  sub-latent  changes  of  a  thing  are  called  future, 
present  and  past^ 

'   Vydsabhi'isya,  Tattvavai^dradi ?in6.  Yogavarttika,  III.  14. 

^  It  is  well  to  note  in  this  connection  that  Samkhya-yoga  does  not  admit  the  exist- 
ence of  time  as  an  independent  entity  like  the  Nyaya-Vai^esika.  Time  represents  the 
order  of  moments  in  which  the  mind  grasps  the  phenomenal  changes.  It  is  hence  a 
construction  of  the  mind  {buddhi-nirmana).    The  time  required  by  an  atom  to  move 


vii]  Theory  of  Causation  257 

Causation  as  Satkaryavada  (the  theory  that  the  effect  poten- 
tially exists  before  it  is  generated  by  the  movement  of 
the  cause). 

The  above  consideration  brings  us  to  an  important  aspect  of 
the  Sarnkhya  view  of  causation  as  satkaryavada.  Sarnkhya  holds 
that  there  can  be  no  production  of  a  thing  previously  non-existent ; 
causation  means  the  appearance  or  manifestation  of  a  quality  due 
to  certain  changes  of  collocations  in  the  causes  which  were  already 
held  in  them  in  a  potential  form.  Production  of  effect  only  means 
an  internal  change  of  the  arrangement  of  atoms  in  the  cause,  and 
this  exists  in  it  in  a  potential  form,  and  just  a  little  loosening  of 
the  barrier  which  was  standing  in  the  way  of  the  happening  of 
such  a  change  of  arrangement  will  produce  the  desired  new  col- 
location— the  effect.  This  doctrine  is  called  satkaryavada,  i.e. 
that  the  karya  or  effect  is  sat  or  existent  even  before  the  causal 
operation  to  produce  the  effect  was  launched.  The  oil  exists  in 
the  sesamum,  the  statue  in  the  stone,  the  curd  in  the  milk.  The 
causal  operation  ikdrakavydpdra)  only  renders  that  manifest 
{dvirbhutd)  which  was  formerly  in  an  un manifested  condition 
{tirohitdy. 

The  Buddhists  also  believed  in  change,  as  much  as  Sarnkhya 
did,  but  with  them  there  was  no  background  to  the  change; 
every  change  was  thus  absolutely  a  new  one,  and  when  it  was 
past,  the  next  moment  the  change  was  lost  absolutely.  There 
were  only  the  passing  dharmas  or  manifestations  of  forms  and 
qualities,  but  there  was  no  permanent  underlying  dharma  or  sub- 
stance. Sarnkhya  also  holds  in  the  continual  change  of  dharmas, 
but  it  also  holds  that  these  dharmas  represent  only  the  conditions 
of  the  permanent  reals.  The  conditions  and  collocations  of  the  reals 
change  constantly,  but  the  reals  themselves  are  unchangeable. 
The  effect  according  to  the  Buddhists  was  non-existent,  it  came 
into  being  for  a  moment  and  was  lost.  On  account  of  this  theory 
of  causation  and  also  on  account  of  their  doctrine  of  sunya,  they 
were  called  vaindsikas  (nihilists)  by  the  Vedantins.  This  doctrine 
is  therefore  contrasted  to  Sarnkhya  doctrine  as  asatkdryavdda. 

its  own  measure  of  space  is  called  a  moment  (ksana)  or  one  unit  of  time.   Vijiiana 
Bhiksu  regards  one  unit  movement  of  the  gunas  or  reals  as  a  moment.    When  by 
true  wisdom  the  gunas  are  perceived  as  they  are  both  the  illusory  notions  of  time  and 
space  vanish.    Vydsabhdsya,  Tattvavaiiaradi,  and  Yogavdrttika,  ni.  52  and  iii.  13. 
^   Tattvakauimtdi,  9. 

D.  17 


258  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

The  Jain  view  holds  that  both  these  views  are  relatively  true  and 
that  from  one  point  of  view  satkaryavada  is  true  and  from  another 
asatkaryavada.  The  Sarnkhya  view  that  the  cause  is  continually 
transforming  itself  into  its  effects  is  technically  called  parindma- 
vdda  as  against  the  Vedanta  view  called  the  vivarttavdda:  that 
cause  remains  ever  the  same,  and  what  we  call  effects  are  but 
illusory  impositions  of  mere  unreal  appearance  of  name  and  form 
— mere  Maya\ 

sarnkhya  Atheism  and  Yoga  Theism. 

Granted  that  the  interchange  of  the  positions  of  the  infinite 
number  of  reals  produce  all  the  world  and  its  transformations ; 
whence  comes  this  fixed  order  of  the  universe,  the  fixed  order  of 
cause  and  effect,  the  fixed  order  of  the  so-called  barriers  which 
prevent  the  transformation  of  any  cause  into  any  effect  or  the 
first  disturbance  of  the  equilibrium  of  the  prakrti?  Samkhya 
denies  the  existence  of  Tsvara(God)  or  any  other  exterior  influence, 
and  holds  that  there  is  an  inherent  tendency  in  these  reals  which 
guides  all  their  movements.  This  tendency  or  teleology  demands 
that  the  movements  of  the  reals  should  be  in  such  a  manner  that 
they  may  render  some  service  to  the  souls  either  in  the  direction 
of  enjoyment  or  salvation.  It  is  by  the  natural  course  of  such  a 
tendency  that  prakrti  is  disturbed,  and  the  gunas  develop  on  two 
lines — on  the  mental  plane,  citta  or  mind  comprising  the  sense 
faculties,  and  on  the  objective  plane  as  material  objects;  and  it  is 
in  fulfilment  of  the  demands  of  this  tendency  that  on  the  one 
hand  take  place  subjective  experiences  as  the  changes  of  the 
buddhi  and  on  the  other  the  infinite  modes  of  the  changes  of  ob- 
jective things.  It  is  this  tendency  to  be  of  service  to  the  purusas 
{puriisdrthatd)  that  guides  all  the  movements  of  the  reals,  restrains 
all  disorder,  renders  the  world  a  fit  object  of  experience,  and 
finally  rouses  them  to  turn  back  from  the  world  and  seek  to  attain 
liberation  from  the  association  of  prakrti  and  its  gratuitous  service, 
which  causes  us  all  this  trouble  of  sarnsara. 

Yoga  here  asks,  how  the  blind  tendency  of  the  non-intelligent 

'  Both  the  Vedanta  and  the  Samkhya  theories  of  causation  are  sometimes  loosely 
called  salkdryyavdda.  But  correctly  speaking  as  some  discerning  commentators  have 
pointed  out,  the  Vedanta  theory  of  causation  should  be  called  satkaranavada  for  ac- 
cording to  it  the  karana  (cause)  alone  exists  [sat)  and  all  karyyas  (effects)  are  illusory 
appearances  of  the  karana  ;  but  according  to  Samkhya  the  karyya  exists  in  a  potential 
state  in  the  karana  and  is  hence  always  existing  and  real. 


vii]  Yoga  Theism  259 

prakrti  can  bring  forth  this  order  and  harmony  of  the  universe, 
how  can  it  determine  what  course  of  evolution  will  be  of  the  best 
service  to  the  purusas,  how  can  it  remove  its  own  barriers  and 
lend  itself  to  the  evolutionary  process  from  the  state  of  prakrti 
equilibrium?  How  too  can  this  blind  tendency  so  regulate  the 
evolutionary  order  that  all  men  must  suffer  pains  according  to 
their  bad  karmas,  and  happiness  according  to  their  good  ones? 
There  must  be  some  intelligent  Being  who  should  help  the  course 
of  evolution  in  such  a  way  that  this  system  of  order  and  harmony 
may  be  attained.  This  Being  is  Isvara.  Isvara  is  a  purusa  who 
had  never  been  subject  to  ignorance,  afflictions,  or  passions.  His 
body  is  of  pure  sattva  quality  which  can  never  be  touched  by 
ignorance.  He  is  all  knowledge  and  all  powerful.  He  has  a  per- 
manent wish  that  those  barriers  in  the  course  of  the  evolution  of 
the  reals  by  which  the  evolution  of  the  gunas  may  best  serve  the 
double  interest  of  the  purusa's  experience  {bhoga)  and  liberation 
{apavarga)  should  be  removed.  It  is  according  to  this  perma- 
nent will  of  Isvara  that  the  proper  barriers  are  removed  and  the 
gunas  follow  naturally  an  intelligent  course  of  evolution  for  the 
service  of  the  best  interests  of  the  purusas.  Isvara  has  not  created 
the  prakrti;  he  only  disturbs  the  equilibrium  of  the  prakrti  in  its 
quiescent  state,  and  later  on  helps  it  to  follow  an  intelligent  order 
by  which  the  fruits  of  karma  are  properly  distributed  and  the  order 
of  the  world  is  brought  about.  This  acknowledgement  of  Isvara 
in  Yoga  and  its  denial  by  Samkhya  marks  the  main  theoretic 
difference  between  the  two  according  to  which  the  Yoga  and 
Sarnkhya  are  distinguished  as  Sesvara  Samkhya  (Samkhya  with 
Isvara)  and  Nirlsvara  Sarnkhya  (Atheistic  Samkhya)  ^ 

Buddhi  and  Purusa. 

The  question  again  arises  that  though  purusa  is  pure  intel- 
ligence, the  gunas  are  non-intelligent  subtle  substances,  how 
can  the  latter  come  into  touch  with  the  former?  Moreover, 
the  purusa  is  pure  inactive  intelligence  without  any  touch  of 
impurity  and  what  service  or  need  can  such  a  purusa  have  of 
the  gunas?  This  difficulty  is  anticipated  by  Samkhya,  which  has 
already  made  room  for  its  answer  by  assuming  that  one  class  of 
the  gunas  called  sattva  is  such  that  it  resembles  the  purity  and 
the  intelligence  of  the  purusa  to  a  very  high  degree,  so  much  so 

^    Tattvavaisdradi,  IV.  3;  Yogavdrtiika,\.  24;  and  Pravacanabhdsya,  V.  1-12. 

17 — 2 


26o  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [cH. 

that  it  can  reflect  the  intelHgence  of  the  purusa,  and  thus  render 
its  non-intelHgent  transformations  to  appear  as  if  they  were  in- 
telHgent.  Thus  all  our  thoughts  and  other  emotional  or  volitional 
operations  are  really  the  non-intelligent  transformations  of  the 
buddhi  or  citta  having  a  large  sattva  preponderance;  but  by  virtue 
of  the  reflection  of  the  purusa  in  the  buddhi,  these  appear  as  if 
they  are  intelligent.  The  self  (purusa)  according  to  Samkhya- 
Yoga  is  not  directly  demonstrated  by  self-consciousness.  Its 
existence  is  a  matter  of  inference  on  teleological  grounds  and 
grounds  of  moral  responsibility.  The  self  cannot  be  directly 
noticed  as  being  separate  from  the  buddhi  modifications.  Through 
beginningless  ignorance  there  is  a  confusion  and  the  changing 
states  of  buddhi  are  regarded  as  conscious.  These  buddhi  changes 
are  further  so  associated  with  the  reflection  of  the  purusa  in  the 
buddhi  that  they  are  interpreted  as  the  experiences  of  the  purusa. 
This  association  of  the  buddhi  with  the  reflection  of  the  purusa 
in  the  buddhi  has  such  a  special  fitness  {yogyata)  that  it  is  inter- 
preted as  the  experience  of  the  purusa.  This  explanation  of 
Vacaspati  of  the  situation  is  objected  to  by  Vijfiana  Bhiksu. 
Vijnana  Bhiksu  says  that  the  association  of  the  buddhi  with  the 
image  of  the  purusa  cannot  give  us  the  notion  of  a  real  person 
who  undergoes  the  experiences.  It  is  to  be  supposed  therefore 
that  when  the  buddhi  is  intelligized  by  the  reflection  of  the  purusa, 
it  is  then  superimposed  upon  the  purusa,  and  we  have  the  notion 
of  an  abiding  person  who  experiences^  Whatever  may  be  the 
explanation,  it  seems  that  the  union  of  the  buddhi  with  the  purusa 
is  somewhat  mystical.  As  a  result  of  this  reflection  of  cit  on 
buddhi  and  the  superimposition  of  the  buddhi  the  purusa  cannot 
realize  that  the  transformations  of  the  buddhi  are  not  its  own. 
Buddhi  resembles  purusa  in  transparency,  and  the  purusa  fails  to 
differentiate  itself  from  the  modifications  of  the  buddhi,  and  as 
a  result  of  this  non-distinction  the  purusa  becomes  bound  down 
to  the  buddhi,  always  failing  to  recognize  the  truth  that  the 
buddhi  and  its  transformations  are  wholly  alien  to  it.  This  non- 
distinction  of  purusa  from  buddhi  which  is  itself  a  mode  of  buddhi 
is  what  is  meant  by  avidyd  (non-knowledge)  in  Samkhya,  and  is 
the  root  of  all  experience  and  all  misery^. 

^   TattvavaUaradi  and  Yogavdrttika,  i.  4. 

'  This  indicates  the  nature  of  the  analysis  of  illusion  with  Samkhya.     It  is  the 
non-apprehension  of  the  distinction  of  two  things  (e.g.  the  snake  and  the  rope)  that 


vii]  Ignorance  and  Illusion  261 

Yoga  holds  a  slightly  different  view  and  supposes  that  the 
purusa  not  only  fails  to  distinguish  the  difference  between  it- 
self and  the  buddhi  but  positively  takes  the  transformations  of 
buddhi  as  its  own.  It  is  no  non-perception  of  the  difference 
but  positively  false  knowledge,  that  we  take  the  purusa  to  be 
that  which  it  is  not  {anyathdkhydti).  It  takes  the  changing, 
impure,  sorrowful,  and  objective  prakrti  or  buddhi  to  be  the 
changeless,  pure,  happiness-begetting  subject.  It  wrongly  thinks 
buddhi  to  be  the  self  and  regards  it  as  pure,  permanent  and 
capable  of  giving  us  happiness.  This  is  the  avidya  of  Yoga. 
A  buddhi  associated  with  a  purusa  is  dominated  by  such  an 
avidya,  and  when  birth  after  birth  the  same  buddhi  is  associated 
with  the  same  purusa,  it  cannot  easily  get  rid  of  this  avidya. 
If  in  the  meantime  pralaya  takes  place,  the  buddhi  is  submerged 
in  the  prakrti,  and  the  avidya  also  sleeps  with  it.  When  at  the 
beginning  of  the  next  creation  the  individual  buddhis  associated 
with  the  purusas  emerge,  the  old  avidyas  also  become  manifest 
by  virtue  of  it  and  the  buddhis  associate  themselves  with  the 
purusas  to  which  they  were  attached  before  the  pralaya.  Thus 
proceeds  the  course  of  samsara.  When  the  avidya  of  a  person 
is  rooted  out  by  the  rise  of  true  knowledge,  the  buddhi  fails  to 
attach  itself  to  the  purusa  and  is  forever  dissociated  from  it,  and 
this  is  the  state  of  mukti. 

The  Cognitive  Process  and  some  characteristics  of  Citta. 

It  has  been  said  that  buddhi  and  the  internal  objects  have 
evolved  in  order  to  giving  scope  to  the  experience  of  the  purusa. 
What  is  the  process  of  this  experience?  Samkhya  (as  explained 
by  Vacaspati)  holds  that  through  the  senses  the  buddhi  comes 
into  touch  with  external  objects.  At  the  first  moment  of  this 
touch  there  is  an  indeterminate  consciousness  in  which  the  parti- 
culars of  the  thing  cannot  be  noticed.  This  is  called  nirvikalpa 
pratyaksa  (indeterminate  perception).  At  the  next  moment  by 
the  function  of  the  samkalpa  (synthesis)  and  vikalpa  (abstraction 
or  imagination)  of  manas  (mind-organ)  the  thing  is  perceived  in 
all  its  determinate  character;  the  manas  differentiates,  integrates, 
and  associates  the  sense-data  received  through  the  senses,  and 

is  the  cause  of  illusion ;  it  is  therefore  called  the  akhydti  (non-apprehension)  theory  of 
illusion  which  must  be  distinguished  from  the  anyathdkhydii  (misapprehension)  theory 
of  illusion  of  Yoga  which  consists  in  positively  misapprehending  one  (e.g.  the  rope) 
for  the  other  (e.g.  snake).    Yogavdrttika,  i.  8. 


262  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Sanikhya        [ch. 

thus  generates  the  determinate  perception,  which  when  intelligized 
by  the  purusa  and  associated  with  it  becomes  interpreted  as  the 
experience  of  the  person.  The  action  of  the  senses,  ahamkara, 
and  buddhi,  may  take  place  sometimes  successively  and  at  other 
times  as  in  cases  of  sudden  fear  simultaneously.  Vijnana  Bhiksu 
differs  from  this  view  of  Vacaspati,  and  denies  the  synthetic 
activity  of  the  mind-organ  (manas),  and  says  that  the  buddhi 
directly  comes  into  touch  with  the  objects  through  the  senses. 
At  the  first  moment  of  touch  the  perception  is  indeterminate, 
but  at  the  second  moment  it  becomes  clear  and  determinated 
It  is  evident  that  on  this  view  the  importance  of  manas  is  reduced 
to  a  minimum  and  it  is  regarded  as  being  only  the  faculty  of  de- 
sire, doubt  and  imagination. 

Buddhi,  including  ahamkara  and  the  senses,  often  called  citta 
in  Yoga,  is  always  incessantly  suffering  changes  like  the  flame 
of  a  lamp;  it  is  made  up  of  a  large  preponderance  of  the  pure 
sattva  substances,  and  is  constantly  moulding  itself  from  one  con- 
tent to  another.  These  images  by  the  dual  reflection  of  buddhi 
and  purusa  are  constantly  becoming  "conscious,  and  are  being 
interpreted  as  the  experiences  of  a  person.  The  existence  of  the 
purusa  is  to  be  postulated  for  explaining  the  illumination  of  con- 
sciousness and  for  explaining  experience  and  moral  endeavour. 
The  buddhi  is  spread  all  over  the  body,  as  it  were,  for  it  is  by  its 
functions  that  the  life  of  the  body  is  kept  up;  for  the  Sarnkhya 
does  not  admit  any  separate  prana  vayu  (vital  breath)  to  keep  the 
body  living.  What  are  called  vdyus  (bio-motor  force)  in  Vedanta 
are  but  the  different  modes  of  operation  of  this  category  of 
buddhi,  which  acts  all  through  the  body  and  by  its  diverse  move- 
ments performs  the  life-functions  and  sense-funstions  of  the  body. 

^  As  the  contact  of  the  buddhi  with  the  external  objects  takes  place  through  the 
senses,  the  sense-data  of  colours,  etc.,  are  modified  by  the  senses  if  they  are  defective. 
The  spatial  qualities  of  things  are  however  perceived  by  the  senses  directly,  but  the 
time-order  is  a  scheme  of  the  citta  or  the  buddhi.  Generally  speaking  Yoga  holds 
that  the  external  objects  are  faithfully  copied  by  the  buddhi  in  which  they  are  reflected, 
like  trees  in  a  lake  : 

''  tasmimsca  darpane  spkdre  samastd  vastudrstayah 
iviastah  pratibinibantisaraslva  tatadrumdh.^^      Yogavdrttika,  r.  4. 

The  buddhi  assumes  the  form  of  the  object  which  is  reflected  on  it  by  the  senses, 
or  rather  the  mind  flows  out  through  the  senses  to  the  external  objects  and  assumes 
their  forms  :  "  indriydnyeva  prandlikd  cittasaficarananidrgah  taih  samynjya  tadgola- 
kadvdrd  hahyavasinsuparaktasya  cittasyendriyasdh  ityenaivdrthdkdrah  parindmo 
bhavati."    Yogavdrtlika,  i.  vi.  7.    Contrast  Tattvakaut?iitdi,  27  and  30. 


vii]  Instinct  and  Desire  263 

Apart  from  the  perceptions  and  the  Hfe-functions,  buddhi,  or 
rather  citta  as  Yoga  describes  it,  contains  within  it  the  root  im- 
pressions {samskdras)  and  the  tastes  and  instincts  or  tendencies 
of  all  past  lives  {ydsandy.  These  samskaras  are  revived  under  suit- 
able associations.  Every  man  had  had  infinite  numbers  of  births  in 
their  past  lives  as  man  and  as  some  animal.  In  all  these  lives  the 
same  citta  was  always  following  him.  The  citta  has  thus  collected 
within  itself  the  instincts  and  tendencies  of  all  those  different 
animal  lives.  It  is  knotted  with  these  vasanas  like  a  net.  If  a  man 
passes  into  a  dog  life  by  rebirth,  the  vasanas  of  a  dog  life,  which 
the  man  must  have  had  in  some  of  his  previous  infinite  number  of 
births,  are  revived,  and  the  man's  tendencies  become  like  those  of 
a  dog.  He  forgets  the  experiences  of  his  previous  life  and  becomes 
attached  to  enjoyment  in  the  manner  of  a  dog.  It  is  by  the  revival 
of  the  vasana  suitable  to  each  particular  birth  that  there  cannot  be 
any  collision  such  as  might  have  occurred  if  the  instincts  and 
tendencies  of  a  previous  dog-life  were  active  when  any  one  was 
born  as  man. 

The  sarnskaras  represent  the  root  impressions  by  which  any 
habit  of  life  that  man  has  lived  through,  or  any  pleasure  in 
which  he  took  delight  for  some  time,  or  any  passions  which  were 

1  The  word  samskara  is  used  by  Panini  who  probably  preceded  Buddha  in  three 
different  senses :  (i)  improving  a  thing  as  distinguished  from  generating  a  new  quality 
{^Sata  utkarsadhanam  samskarah,  Kasika  on  Panini,  VI.  ii.  i6j,  (2)  conglomeration 
or  aggregation,  and  (3)  adornment  (Panini,  vi.  i.  137,  138).  In  the  Pitakas  the  word 
sankhara  is  used  in  various  senses  such  as  constructing,  preparing,  perfecting,  embel- 
lishing, aggregation,  matter,  karma,  the  skandhas  (collected  by  Childers).  In  fact 
sankhara  stands  for  almost  anything  of  which  impermanence  could  be  predicated. 
But  in  spite  of  so  many  diversities  of  meaning  I  venture  to  suggest  that  the  meaning 
of  aggregation  {samavdya  of  Panini)  is  prominent.  The  word  samskaroii  is  used  in 
Kausltaki,  11,  6,  Chandogya,  iv.  xvi.  2,  3,  4,  viii.  8,  5,  and  Brhadaranyaka,  VI.  iii.  i, 
in  the  sense  of  improving.  I  have  not  yet  come  across  any  literary  use  of  the  second 
meaning  in  Sanskrit.  The  meaning  of  sarnskara  in  Hindu  philosophy  is  altogether 
different.  It  means  the  impressions  (which  exist  sub-consciously  in  the  mind)  of  the 
objects  experienced.  All  our  experiences  whether  cognitive,  emotional  or  conative 
exist  in  sub-conscious  states  and  may  under  suitable  conditions  be  reproduced  as 
memory  (smrti).  The  word  vasana  (  Yoga  sutra,  iv.  24)  seems  to  be  a  later  word.  The 
earlier  Upanisads  do  not  mention  it  and  so  far  as  I  know  it  is  not  mentioned  in  the  Pali 
pitakas.  Abhidhanappadlpikd  of  Moggallana  mentions  .it,  and  it  occurs  in  the  Muktika 
Upanisad.  It  comes  from  the  root  "z/aj-"  to  stay.  It  is  often  loosely  used  in  the  sense 
of  sarnskara,  and  in  Vydsabhdsya  they  are  identified  in  IV.  9.  But  vasana  generally 
refers  to  the  tendencies  of  past  lives  most  of  which  lie  dormant  in  the  mind.  Only  those 
appear  which  can  find  scope  in  this  life.  But  sariiskaras  are  the  sub-conscious  states 
which  are  being  constantly  generated  by  experience.  Vasanas  are  innate  saniskaras  not 
acquired  in  this  life.    See  Vydsabhdsya,  Tatlvdvaisdradi  2iX\A  Yogavdrttika,  \\.  13. 


264  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Sdinkhya        [ch. 

engrossing  to  him,  tend  to  be  revived,  for  though  these  might 
not  now  be  experienced,  yet  the  fact  that  they  were  experienced 
before  has  so  moulded  and  given  shape  to  the  citta  that  the 
citta  will  try  to  reproduce  them  by  its  own  nature  even  without 
any  such  effort  on  our  part.  To  safeguard  against  the  revival  of 
any  undesirable  idea  or  tendency  it  is  therefore  necessary  that  its 
roots  as  already  left  in  the  citta  in  the  form  of  sarnskaras  should 
be  eradicated  completely  by  the  formation  of  the  habit  of  a  con- 
trary tendency,  which  if  made  sufficiently  strong  will  by  its  own 
samskara  naturally  stop  the  revival  of  the  previous  undesirable 
sarnskaras. 

Apart  from  these  the  citta  possesses  volitional  activity  (cestd) 
by  which  the  conative  senses  are  brought  into  relation  to  their 
objects.  There  is  also  the  reserved  potent  power  {sakti)  of  citta, 
by  which  it  can  restrain  itself  and  change  its  courses  or  continue 
to  persist  in  any  one  direction.  These  characteristics  are  involved 
in  the  very  essence  of  citta,  and  form  the  groundwork  of  the  Yoga 
method  of  practice,  which  consists  in  steadying  a  particular  state 
of  mind  to  the  exclusion  of  others. 

Merit  or  demerit  {pimya,  papa)  also  is  imbedded  in  the  citta 
as  its  tendencies,  regulating  the  mode  of  its  movements,  and 
giving  pleasures  and  pains  in  accordance  with  it. 

Sorrow  and  its  Dissolution^ 

Sarnkhya  and  the  Yoga,  like  the  Buddhists,  hold  that  all 
experience  is  sorrowful.  Tamas,  we  know,  represents  the  pain 
substance.  As  tamas  must  be  present  in  some  degree  in  all  com- 
binations, all  intellectual  operations  are  fraught  with  some  degree 
of  painful  feeling.  Moreover  even  in  states  of  temporary  pleasure, 
we  had  sorrow  at  the  previous  moment  when  we  had  solicited 
it,  and  we  have  sorrow  even  when  we  enjoy  it,  for  we  have  the 
fear  that  we  may  lose  it.  The  sum  total  of  sorrows  is  thus  much 
greater  than  the  pleasures,  and  the  pleasures  only  strengthen  the 
keenness  of  the  sorrow.  The  wiser  the  man  the  greater  is  his 
capacity  of  realizing  that  the  world  and  our  experiences  are  all  full 
of  sorrow.  For  unless  a  man  is  convinced  of  this  great  truth  that 
all  is  sorrow,  and  that  temporary  pleasures,  whether  generated  by 
ordinary  worldly  experience  or  by  enjoying  heavenly  experiences 
through  the  performance  of  Vedic  sacrifices,  are  quite  unable  to 

^   TaKvavai^dradi  dind  Yogavdrttika,  II.  15,  and  Tattvakaumudi,  i. 


yii]  Sorrow  and  its  Dissolution  265 

eradicate  the  roots  of  sorrow,  he  will  not  be  anxious  for  mukti  or 
the  final  uprooting  of  pains.  A  man  must  feel  that  all  pleasures 
lead  to  sorrow,  and  that  the  ordinary  ways  of  removing 
sorrows  by  seeking  enjoyment  cannot  remove  them  ultimately; 
he  must  turn  his  back  on  the  pleasures  of  the  world  and  on  the 
pleasures  of  paradise.  The  performances  of  sacrifices  according 
to  the  Vedic  rites  may  indeed  give  happiness,  but  as  these  involve 
the  sacrifice  of  animals  they  must  involve  some  sins  and  hence  also 
some  pains.  Thus  the  performance  of  these  cannot  be  regarded 
as  desirable.  It  is  when  a  man  ceases  from  seeking  pleasures 
that  he  thinks  how  best  he  can  eradicate  the  roots  of  sorrow. 
Philosophy  shows  how  extensive  is  sorrow,  why  sorrow  comes, 
what  is  the  way  to  uproot  it,  and  what  is  the  state  when  it  is 
uprooted.  The  man  who  has  resolved  to  uproot  sorrow  turns  to 
philosophy  to  find  out  the  means  of  doing  it. 

The  way  of  eradicating  the  root  of  sorrow  is  thus  the  practical 
■enquiry  of  the  Sarnkhya  philosophy  ^  All  experiences  are  sorrow. 
Therefore  some  means  must  be  discovered  by  which  all  experi- 
ences may  be  shut  out  for  ever.  Death  cannot  bring  it,  for  after 
death  we  shall  have  rebirth.  So  long  as  citta  (mind)  and  purusa 
are  associated  with  each  other,  the  sufferings  will  continue. 
Citta  must  be  dissociated  from  purusa.  Citta  or  buddhi,  Sarn- 
khya says,  is  associated  with  purusa  because  of  the  non-dis- 
tinction of  itself  from  buddhi  I  It  is  necessary  therefore  that  in 
buddhi  we  should  be  able  to  generate  the  true  conception  of  the 
nature  of  purusa  ;  when  this  true  conception  of  purusa  arises  in 
the  buddhi  it  feels  itself  to  be  different,  and  distinct,  from  and 
quite  unrelated  to  purusa,  and  thus  ignorance  is  destroyed.  As 
a  result  of  that,  buddhi  turns  its  back  on  purusa  and  can  no 
longer  bind  it  to  its  experiences,  which  are  all  irrevocably  con- 
nected with  sorrow,  and  thus  the  purusa  remains  in  its  true 
form.  This  according  to  Sarnkhya  philosophy  is  alone  adequate 
to  bring  about  the  liberation  of  the  purusa.  Prakrti  which  was 
leading  us  through  cycles  of  experiences  from  birth  to  birth,  fulfils 
its  final  purpose  when  this  true  knowledge  arises  differentiating 

^  Yoga  puts  it  in  a  slightly  modified  form.  Its  object  is  the  cessation  of  the  rebirth- 
process  which  is  so  much  associated  with  sorrow  (dnhkhabahulah  samsdrah  heyaJi). 

*  The  word  citta  is  a  Yoga  term.  It  is  so  called  because  it  is  the  repository  of  all 
sub-conscious  states.  Sarnkhya  generally  uses  the  word  buddhi.  Both  the  words  mean 
the  same  substance,  the  mind,  but  they  emphasize  its  two  different  functions.  Buddhi 
means  intellection. 


266  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

purusa  from  prakrti.  This  final  purpose  being  attained  the 
prakrti  can  never  again  bind  the  purusa  with  reference  to  whom 
this  right  knowledge  was  generated  ;  for  other  purusas  however 
the  bondage  remains  as  before,  and  they  continue  their  experi- 
ences from  one  birth  to  another  in  an  endless  cycle. 

Yoga,  however,  thinks  that  mere  philosophy  is  not  sufficient. 
In  order  to  bring  about  liberation  it  is  not  enough  that  a  true 
knowledge  differentiating  purusa  and  buddhi  should  arise,  but  it 
is  necessary  that  all  the  old  habits  of  experience  of  buddhi,  all 
its  sarnskaras  should  be  once  for  all  destroyed  never  to  be  revived 
again.  At  this  stage  the  buddhi  is  transformed  into  its  purest 
state,  reflecting  steadily  the  true  nature  of  the  purusa.  This  is 
the  kevala  (oneness)  state  of  existence  after  which  (all  sarnskaras, 
all  avidya  being  altogether  uprooted)  the  citta  is  impotent  any 
longer  to  hold  on  to  the  purusa,  and  like  a  stone  hurled  from  a 
mountain  top,  gravitates  back  into  the  prakrti  \  To  destroy  the 
old  sarnskaras,  knowledge  alone  not  being  sufficient,  a  graduated 
course  of  practice  is  necessary.  This  graduated  practice  should 
be  so  arranged  that  by  generating  the  practice  of  living  higher 
and  better  modes  of  life,  and  steadying  the  mind  on  its  subtler 
states,  the  habits  of  ordinary  life  may  be  removed.  As  the  yogin 
advances  he  has  to  give  up  what  he  had  adopted  as  good  and 
try  for  that  which  is  still  better.  Continuing  thus  he  reaches  the 
state  when  the  buddhi  is  in  its  ultimate  perfection  and  purity. 
At  this  stage  the  buddhi  assumes  the  form  of  the  purusa,  and 
final  liberation  takes  place. 

Karmas  in  Yoga  are  divided  into  four  classes:  (i)  sukla  or 
white  {puny a,  those  that  produce  happiness),  (2)  krsna  or  black 
{papa,  those  that  produce  sorrow),  (3)  sukla-krsna  {punya-pdpa, 
most  of  our  ordinary  actions  are  partly  virtuous  and  partly  vicious 
as  they  involve,  if  not  anything  else,  at  least  the  death  of  many 
insects),  (4)  asukldkrsna  (those  inner  acts  of  self-abnegation,  and 
meditation  which  are  devoid  of  any  fruits  as  pleasures  or  pains). 
All  external  actions  involve  some  sins,  for  it  is  difficult  to  work 
in  the  world  and  avoid  taking  the  lives  of  insects-.    All  karmas 


'  Both  Samkhya  and  Yoga  speak  of  this  emancipated  state  as  Kaivalya  (alone-ness) , 
the  former  because  all  sorrows  have  been  absolutely  uprooted,  never  to  grow  up  again 
and  the  latter  because  at  this  state  purusa  remains  for  ever  alone  without  any  associa- 
tion with  buddhi,  see  Samkhya  km-ikd,  68  and  Yoga  sutras,  iv.  34. 

*    Vyasabhasya  and  7'attviivaisdriidr,  IV.  7. 


vii]  Modes  of  Ignorance  267 

proceed  from  the  five-fold  afflictions  {klesas),  namely  avidyd, 
asmitd,  rdga,  dvesa  and  abhinivesa. 

We  have  already  noticed  what  was  meant  by  avidya.  It  con- 
sists generally  in  ascribing  intelligence  to  buddhi,  in  thinking  it 
as  permanent  and  leading  to  happiness.  This  false  knowledge 
while  remaining  in  this  form  further  manifests  itself  in  the  other 
four  forms  of  asmita,  etc.  Asmita  means  the  thinking  of  worldly 
objects  and  our  experiences  as  really  belonging  to  us — the 
sense  of  "  mine  "  or  "  I  "  to  things  that  really  are  the  qualities  or 
transformations  of  the  gunas.  Raga  means  the  consequent  attach- 
ment to  pleasures  and  things.  Dvesa  means  aversion  or  antipathy 
to  unpleasant  things.  Abhinivesa  is  the  desire  for  life  or  love  of 
life — the  will  to  be.  We  proceed  to  work  because  we  think  our 
experiences  to  be  our  own,  our  body  to  be  our  own,  our  family 
to  be  our  own,  our  possessions  to  be  our  own;  because  we  are 
attached  to  these ;  because  we  feel  great  antipathy  against  any 
mischief  that  might  befall  them,  and  also  because  we  love  our 
life  and  always  try  to  preserve  it  against  any  mischief  These  all 
proceed,  as  is  easy  to  see,  from  their  root  avidya,  which  consists 
in  the  false  identification  of  buddhi  with  purusa.  These  five, 
avidya,  asmita,  raga,  dvesa  and  abhinivesa,  permeate  our  buddhi, 
and  lead  us  to  perform  karma  and  to  suffer.  These  together 
with  the  performed  karmas  which  lie  inherent  in  the  buddhi  as 
a  particular  mode  of  it  transmigrate  with  the  buddhi  from  birth 
to  birth,  and  it  is  hard  to  get  rid  of  them^  The  karma  in  the 
aspect  in  which  it  lies  in  the  buddhi  as  a  mode  or  modification  of 
it  is  called  karmdsaya  (the  bed  of  karma  for  the  purusa  to  lie  in). 
We  perform  a  karma  actuated  by  the  vicious  tendencies  {klesd)  of 
the  buddhi.  The  karma  when  thus  performed  leaves  its  stain  or 
modification  on  the  buddhi,  and  it  is  so  ordained  according  to  the 
teleology  of  the  prakrti  and  the  removal  of  obstacles  in  the  course 
of  its  evolution  in  accordance  with  it  by  the  permanent  will  of 
Isvara  that  each  vicious  action  brings  sufferance  and  a  virtuous 
one  pleasure. 

The  karmas  performed  in  the  present  life  will  generally  ac- 
cumulate, and  when  the  time  for  giving  their  fruits  comes,  such 
a  life  is  ordained  for  the  person,  such  a  body  is  made  ready  for 
him  according  to  the  evolution  of  prakrti  as  shall  make  it  possible 
for  him  to  suffer  or  enjoy  the  fruits  thereof    The  karma  of  the 

^    Vyasabhasya  and  Tattvavaisdradi ,  II.  3-9. 


268  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Samkhya        [ch. 

present  life  thus  determines  the  particular  kind  of  future  birth 
(as  this  or  that  animal  or  man),  the  period  of  life  {dyus)  and  the 
painful  or  pleasurable  experiences  {bhogd)  destined  for  that  life. 
Exceedingly  good  actions  and  extremely  bad  actions  often  pro- 
duce their  effects  in  this  life.  It  may  also  happen  that  a  man  has 
done  certain  bad  actions,  for  the  realization  of  the  fruits  of  which 
he  requires  a  dog-life  and  good  actions  for  the  fruits  of  which 
he  requires  a  man-life.  In  such  cases  the  good  action  may  remain 
in  abeyance  and  the  man  may  suffer  the  pains  of  a  dog-life  first 
and  then  be  born  again  as  a  man  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  good 
actions.  But  if  we  can  remove  ignorance  and  the  other  afflictions, 
all  his  previous  unfulfilled  karmas  are  for  ever  lost  and  cannot 
again  be  revived.  He  has  of  course  to  suffer  the  fruits  of  those 
karmas  which  have  already  ripened.  This  is  the.  Jivamntikti  stage, 
when  the  sage  has  attained  true  knowledge  and  is  yet  suffering 
mundane  life  in  order  to  experience  the  karmas  that  have  already 
ripened  {tisthati  samskdravasdt  cakrabhramivaddhrtasariraJt). 

Citta. 

The  word  Yoga  which  was  formerly  used  in  Vedic  literature 
in  the  sense  of  the  restraint  of  the  senses  is  used  by  Patafijali  in 
his  Yoga  sutra  in  the  sense  of  the  partial  or  full  restraint  or 
steadying  of  the  states  of  citta.  Some  sort  of  concentration  may 
be  brought  about  by  violent  passions,  as  when  fighting  against 
a  mortal  enemy,  or  even  by  an  ignorant  attachment  or  instinct. 
The  citta  which  has  the  concentration  of  the  former  type  is  called 
ksipta  (wild)  and  of  the  latter  \.y^e  pramudha  (ignorant).  There 
is  another  kind  of  citta,  as  with  all  ordinary  people,  in  which 
concentration  is  only  possible  for  a  time,  the  mind  remaining 
steady  on  one  thing  for  a  short  time  leaves  that  off  and  clings  to 
another  thing  and  so  on.  This  is  called  the  viksipta  (unsteady) 
stage  of  mind  {cittabhumi).  As  distinguished  from  these  there  is 
an  advanced  stage  of  citta  in  which  it  can  concentrate  steadily  on 
an  object  for  a  long  time.  This  is  the  ekdgra  (one-pointed)  stage. 
There  is  a  still  further  advanced  stage  in  which  the  citta  processes 
are  absolutely  stopped.  This  happens  immediately  before  mukti, 
and  is  called  the  nirodha  (cessation)  state  of  citta.  The  purpose  of 
Yoga  is  to  achieve  the  conditions  of  the  last  two  stages  of  citta. 

The  cittas  have  five  processes  {vrtti),  (i)  pramdna^  (valid 

1  Samkhya  holds  that  both  validity  and  invalidity  of  any  cognition  depend  upon 
the  cognitive  state  itself  and  not  on  correspondence  with  external  facts  or  objects 
(svatah  prdmdnyam  svatah  apramanyam).    The  contribution  of  Sanikhya  to  the  doc- 


vii]  Tendencies  of  Good  and  Evil  269 

cognitive  states  such  as  are  generated  by  perception,  inference 
and  scriptural  testimony),  (2)  viparyaya  (false  knowledge,  illusion, 
etc.),  (3)  vikalpa  (abstraction,  construction  and  different  kinds  of 
imagination),  (4)  nidrd  (sleep,  is  a  vacant  state  of  mind,  in  which 
tamas  tends  to  predominate),  (5)  smrti  (memory). 

These  states  of  mind  (vrtti)  comprise  our  inner  experience. 
When  they  lead  us  towards  sarnsara  into  the  course  of  passions 
and  their  satisfactions,  they  are  said  to  be  klista  (afflicted  or 
leading  to  affliction) ;  when  they  lead  us  towards  liberation,  they 
are  called  aklista  (unafflicted).  To  whichever  side  we  go,  towards 
sarnsara  or  towards  mukti,  we  have  to  make  use  of  our  states  of 
mind ;  the  states  which  are  bad  often  alternate  with  good  states, 
and  whichever  state  should  tend  towards  our  final  good  (libera- 
tion) must  be  regarded  as  good. 

This  draws  attention  to  that  important  characteristic  of  citta, 
that  it  sometimes  tends  towards  good  (i.e.  liberation)  and  some- 
times towards  bad  (sarnsara).  It  is  like  a  river,  as  the  Vydsa- 
bhdsya  says,  which  flows  both  ways,  towards  sin  and  towards  the 
good.  The  teleology  of  prakrti  requires  that  it  should  produce 
in  man  the  sarnsara  as  well  as  the  liberation  tendency. 

Thus  in  accordance  with  it  in  the  midst  of  many  bad  thoughts 
and  bad  habits  there  come  good  moral  will  and  good  thoughts, 
and  in  the  midst  of  good  thoughts  and  habits  come  also  bad 
thoughts  and  vicious  tendencies.  The  will  to  be  good  is  therefore 
never  lost  in  man,  as  it  is  an  innate  tendency  in  him  which  is 
as  strong  as  his  desire  to  enjoy  pleasures.  This  point  is  rather 
remarkable,  for  it  gives  us  the  key  of  Yoga  ethics  and  shows  that 
our  desire  of  liberation  is  not  actuated  by  any  hedonistic  attraction 
for  happiness  or  even  removal  of  pain,  but  by  an  innate  tendency 
of  the  mind  to  follow  the  path  of  liberation ^    Removal  of  pains 

trine  of  inference  is  not  definitely  known.  What  little  Vacaspati  says  on  the  subject  has 
been  borrowed  from  Vatsyayana  such  as  the  putvavat,  iesavat  and  sdmanyatodrsta  types 
of  inference,  and  these  may  better  be  consulted  in  our  chapter  on  Nyaya  or  in  the  Tatpar- 
yattka  of  Vacaspati.  Samkhya  inference  was  probably  from  particular  to  particular  on 
the  ground  of  seven  kinds  of  relations  according  to  which  they  had  seven  kinds  of  in- 
ference ' '  mdtranimittasamyogivirodhisahacaribhih.  Svasvamibadhyaghdtadyaih  sdm- 
kkydndm  saptadhdnumd"  {Tdtparyatlkd,  p.  109).  Samkhya  definition  of  inference  as 
given  by  Udyotakara  (l.  i.  v)  is  ^' sambandhddekasmdi  pratyaksdcchesasiddhiranumd- 
nam. 

^  Samkhya  however  makes  the  absolute  and  complete  destruction  of  three  kinds 
of  sorrows,  ddhydtmika  (generated  internally  by  the  illness  of  the  body  or  the  unsatis- 
fied passions  of  the  mind),  ddhibhautika  (generated  externally  by  the  injuries  inflicted 
by  other  men,  beasts,  etc.)  and  adhidaivika  (generated  by  the  injuries  inflicted  by  demons 
and  ghosts)  the  object  of  all  our  endeavours  {purusdrtha). 


270  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Sainkhya        [ch. 

is  of  course  the  concomitant  effect  of  following  such  a  course,  but 
still  the  motive  to  follow  this  path  is  a  natural  and  irresistible 
tendency  of  the  mind.  Man  has  power  (sakti)  stored  up  in  his 
citta,  and  he  has  to  use  it  in  such  a  way  that  this  tendency  may 
gradually  grow  stronger  and  stronger  and  ultimately  uproot  the 
other.  He  must  succeed  in  this,  since  prakrti  wants  liberation  for 
her  final  realization  \ 

Yoga  Purificatory  Practices  (Parikarma). 

The  purpose  of  Yoga  meditation  is  to  steady  the  mind  on 
the  gradually  advancing  stages  of  thoughts  towards  liberation, 
so  that  vicious  tendencies  may  gradually  be  more  and  more 
weakened  and  at  last  disappear  altogether.  But  before  the  mind 
can  be  fit  for  this  lofty  meditation,  it  is  necessary  that  it  should 
be  purged  of  ordinary  impurities.  Thus  the  intending  yogin 
should  practise  absolute  non-injury  to  all  living  beings  {ahimsa), 
absolute  and  strict  truthfulness  {satyd),  non-stealing  {asteyd), 
absolute  sexual  restraint  {brahmacarya)  and  the  acceptance  of 
nothing  but  that  which  is  absolutely  necessary  {aparigraha). 
These  are  collectively  called  yama.  Again  side  by  side  with  these 
abstinences  one  must  also  practise  external  cleanliness  by  ablu- 
tions and  inner  cleanliness  of  the  mind,  contentment  of  mind,  the 
habit  of  bearing  all  privations  of  heat  and  cold,  or  keeping  the 
body  unmoved  and  remaining  silent  in  speech  {tapas),  the  study 
of  philosophy  {svddhydyd)  and  meditation  on  Isvara  (Jsvara- 
pranidhdnd).  These  are  collectively  called  niyamas.  To  these  are 
also  to  be  added  certain  other  moral  disciplines  such  ^s pratipaksa- 
bhdvand,  maitrl,  kariind,  vmditd  and  upeksd.  Pratipaksa-bhavana 
means  that  whenever  a  bad  thought  (e.g.  selfish  motive)  may 
come  one  should  practise  the  opposite  good  thought  (self- 
sacrifice);  so  that  the  bad  thoughts  may  not  find  any  scope. 
Most  of  our  vices  are  originated  by  our  unfriendly  relations 
with  our  fellow-beings.  To  remove  these  the  practice  of  mere 
abstinence  may  not  be  sufficient,  and  therefore  one  should 
habituate  the  mind  to  keep  itself  in  positive  good  relations  with 
our  fellow-beings.  The  practice  of  maitrl  means  to  think  of 
all  beings  as  friends.  If  we  continually  habituate  ourselves  to 
think  this,  we  can  never  be  displeased  with  them.  So  too  one 
should  practise  karuna  or  kindly  feeling  for  sufferers,  mudita 
'  See  my  "■Yoga  Psychology T  Quest,  October,  1921. 


VI i]  Vo£-a  Meditation  271 

or  a  feeling  of  happiness  for  the  good  of  all  beings,  and  upeksa 
or  a  feeling  of  equanimity  and  indifference  for  the  vices  of  others. 
The  last  one  indicates  that  the  yogin  should  not  take  any  note 
of  the  vices  of  vicious  men. 

When  the  mind  becomes  disinclined  to  all  worldly  pleasures 
iyairdgya)  and  to  all  such  as  are  promised  in  heaven  by  the  per- 
formances of  Vedic  sacrifices,  and  the  mind  purged  of  its  dross 
and  made  fit  for  the  practice  of  Yoga  meditation,  the  yogin  may 
attain  liberation  by  a  constant  practice  {abhydsd)  attended  with 
faith,  confidence  {sraddhd),  strength  of  purpose  and  execution 
{virya)  and  wisdom  {prajnd)  attained  at  each  advance. 

The  Yoga  Meditation. 

When  the  mind  has  become  pure  the  chances  of  its  being 
ruffled  by  external  disturbances  are  greatly  reduced.  At  such 
a  stage  the  yogin  takes  a  firm  posture  {asana)  and  fixes  his  mind 
on  any  object  he  chooses.  It  is,  however,  preferable  that  he  should 
fix  it  on  Isvara,  for  in  that  case  Isvara  being  pleased  removes 
many  of  the  obstacles  in  his  path,  and  it  becomes  easier  for 
him  to  attain  success.  But  of  course  he  makes  his  own  choice, 
and  can  choose  anything  he  likes  for  the  unifying  concentration 
{samddhi)  of  his  mind.  There  are  four  states  of  this  unifying 
concentration  namely  vitarka,  vicdra,  dnanda  and  as^nitd.  Of 
these  vitarka  and  vicara  have  each  two  varieties,  savitarka,  nirvi- 
tarka,savicdra,nirvicdra> .  When  the  mind  concentrates  on  objects, 
remembering  their  names  and  qualities,  it  is  called  the  savitarka 
stage ;  when  on  the  five  tanmatras  with  a  remembrance  of  their 
qualities  it  is  called  savicara,  and  when  it  is  one  with  the  tan- 
matras without  any  notion  of  their  qualities  it  is  called  nirvicara. 
Higher  than  these  are  the  ananda  and  the  asmita  states.  In  the 
ananda  state  the  mind  concentrates  on  the  buddhi  with  its  func- 
tions of  the  senses  causing  pleasure.  In  the  asmita  stage  buddhi 
concentrates  on  pure  substance  as  divested  of  all  modifica- 
tions. In  all  these  stages  there  are  objects  on  which  the  mind 
consciously  concentrates,  these  are  therefore  called  the  saniprajhdta 
(with  knowledge  of  objects)  types  of  samadhi.  Next  to  this  comes 
the  last  stage  of  samadhi  called  the  asamprajfidta  or  nirodha 
samadhi,  in  which  the  mind  is  without  any  object.    By  remaining 

^  Vacaspati,  however,  thinks  that  ananda  and  asmita  have  also  two  other  varieties, 
which  is  denied  by  Bhiksu. 


272  The  Kapila  and  the  Patanjala  Sa^nkhya        [ch. 

long  in  this  stage  the  old  potencies  (sarnskaras)  or  impressions 
due  to  the  continued  experience  of  worldly  events  tending  towards 
the  objective  world  or  towards  any  process  of  experiencing  inner 
thinking  are  destroyed  by  the  production  of  a  strong  habit  of  the 
nirodha  state.  At  this  stage  dawns  the  true  knowledge,  when  the 
buddhi  becomes  as  pure  as  the  purusa,  and  after  that  the  citta  not 
being  able  to  bind  the  purusa  any  longer  returns  back  to  prakrti. 

In  order  to  practise  this  concentration  one  has  to  see  that 
there  may  be  no  disturbance,  and  the  yogin  should  select  a 
quiet  place  on  a  hill  or  in  a  forest.  One  of  the  main  obstacles 
is,  however,  to  be  found  in  our  constant  respiratory  action.  This 
has  to  be  stopped  by  the  practice  of  prdndydma.  Pranayama 
consists  in  taking  in  breath,  keeping  it  for  a  while  and  then 
giving  it  up.  With  practice  one  may  retain  breath  steadily  for 
hours,  days,  months  and  even  years.  When  there  is  no  need 
of  taking  in  breath  or  giving  it  out,  and  it  can  be  retained 
steady  for  a  long  time,  one  of  the  main  obstacles  is  removed. 

The  process  of  practising  concentration  is  begun  by  sitting 
in  a  steady  posture,  holding  the  breath  by  pranayama,  excluding 
all  other  thoughts,  and  fixing  the  mind  on  any  object  {dhdrand). 
At  first  it  is  difficult  to  fix  steadily  on  any  object,  and  the  same 
thought  has  to  be  repeated  constantly  in  the  mind,  this  is  called 
dhydna.  After  sufficient  practice  in  dhyana  the  mind  attains  the 
power  of  making  itself  steady;  at  this  stage  it  becomes  one 
with  its  object  and  there  is  no  change  or  repetition.  There  is 
no  consciousness  of  subject,  object  or  thinking,  but  the  mind 
becomes  steady  and  one  with  the  object  of  thought.  This  is  called 
samddhi^.  We  have  already  described  the  six  stages  of  samadhi. 
As  the  yogin  acquires  strength  in  one  stage  of  samadhi,  he  passes 
on  to  a  still  higher  stage  and  so  on.  As  he  progresses  onwards 
he  attains  miraculous  powers  {vibhuti)  and  his  faith  and  hope 
in  the  practice  increase.  Miraculous  powers  bring  with  them 
many  temptations,  but  the  yogin  is  firm  of  purpose  and  even 
though  the  position  of  Indra  is  offered  to  him  he  does  not  relax. 
His  wisdom  {prajnd)  also  increases  at  each  step.  Prajna  know- 
ledge is  as  clear  as  perception,  but  while  perception  is  limited  to 

^  It  should  be  noted  that  the  word  samadhi  cannot  properly  be  translated  either 
by  "  concentration"  or  by  "  meditation."  It  means  that  peculiar  kind  of  concentra- 
tion in  the  Yoga  sense  by  which  the  mind  becomes  one  with  its  object  and  there  is  no 
movement  of  the  mind  into  its  passing  states. 


VI i]  Wisdom  and  Emancipation 


'- 1  o 


certain  gross  things  and  certain  gross  qualities^  prajna  has  no 
such  limitations,  penetrating  into  the  subtlest  things,  the  tan- 
matras,  the  gunas,  and  perceiving  clearly  and  vividly  all  their 
subtle  conditions  and  qualities-.  As  the  potencies  {samskdra)  of  the 
prajfia  wisdom  grow  in  strength  the  potencies  of  ordinary  know- 
ledge are  rooted  out,  and  the  yogin  continues  to  remain  always 
in  his  prajfia  wisdom.  It  is  a  peculiarity  of  this  prajna  that  it 
leads  a  man  towards  liberation  and  cannot  bind  him  to  sarnsara. 
The  final  prajnas  which  lead  to  liberation  are  of  seven  kinds^ 
namely,  (i)  I  have  known  the  world,  the  object  of  suffering  and 
misery,  I  have  nothing  more  to  know  of  it.  (2)  The  grounds  and 
roots  of  sarnsara  have  been  thoroughly  uprooted,  nothing  more 
of  it  remains  to  be  uprooted.  (3)  Removal  has  become  a  fact  of 
direct  cognition  by  inhibitive  trance.  (4)  The  means  of  knowledge 
in  the  shape  of  a  discrimination  of  purusa  from  prakrti  has  been 
understood.  The  other  three  are  not  psychological  but  are  rather 
metaphysical  processes  associated  with  the  situation.  They  are 
as  follows  :  (5)  The  double  purpose  of  buddhi  experience  and 
emancipation  {bhoga  and  apavargd)  has  been  realized.  (6)  The 
strong  gravitating  tendency  of  the  disintegrated  gunas  drives 
them  into  prakrti  like  heavy  stones  dropped  from  high  hill  tops. 
(7)  The  buddhi  disintegrated  into  its  constituents  the  gunas 
become  merged  in  the  prakrti  and  remain  there  for  ever.  The 
purusa  having  passed  beyond  the  bondage  of  the  gunas  shines 
forth  in  its  pure  intelligence.  There  is  no  bliss  or  happiness  in 
this  Samkhya-Yoga  mukti,  for  all  feeling  belongs  to  prakrti.  It 
is  thus  a  state  of  pure  intelligence.  What  the  Sarnkhya  tries  to 
achieve  through  knowledge.  Yoga  achieves  through  the  perfected 
discipline  of  the  will  and  psychological  control  of  the  mental 
states. 

1  The  limitations  which  baffle  perception  are  counted  in  the  Karika  as  follows  : 
Extreme  remoteness  (e.g.  a  lark  high  up  in  the  sky),  extreme  proximity  (e.g.  collyrium 
inside  the  eye),  loss  of  sense-organ  (e.g.  a  blind  man),  want  of  attention,  extreme 
smallness  of  the  object  (e.g.  atoms),  obstruction  by  other  intervening  objects  (e.g.  by 
walls),  presence  of  superior  lights  (the  star  cannot  be  seen  in  daylight),  being  mixed 
up  with  other  things  of  its  own  kind  (e.g.  water  thrown  into  a  lake). 

^  Though  all  things  are  but  the  modifications  of  gunas  yet  the  real  nature  of  the 
gunas  is  never  revealed  by  the  sense-knowledge.  What  appears  to  the  senses  are  but 
illusory  characteristics  like  those  of  magic  (maya)  : 

"  iJunandtn  paramam  rupam  na  drstipathamrcchati 
Yattu  drstipatham  praptam  tanmdyeva  sutucchakam.'" 

Vyasabhdsya,  IV.  13. 
The  real  nature  of  the  gunas  is  thus  revealed  only  hy  prajna. 

D.  18 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  NYAYA-VAISESIKA  PHILOSOPHY 

Criticism  of  Buddhism  and  Samkhya  from  the 
Nyaya  standpoint. 

The    Buddhists   had    upset   all   common   sense   convictions   of 
substance   and  attribute,  cause  and  effect,  and  permanence  of 
things,   on    the   ground    that   all    collocations   are    momentary; 
each   group    of  collocations   exhausts   itself  in   giving   rise   to 
another  group  and  that  to   another    and    so    on.    But  if  a  col- 
location   representing    milk   generates   the   collocation   of  curd 
it  is  said  to  be  due  to  a  joint  action  of  the  elements  forming 
the  cause-collocation  and  the   modus  operandi  is  unintelligible; 
the  elements  composing  the  cause-collocation  cannot  separately 
generate  the  elements   composing  the  effect-collocation,  for  on 
such  a  supposition  it  becomes  hard  to   maintain  the  doctrine 
of  momentariness  as  the  individual  and  separate  exercise  of  in- 
fluence on  the  part  of  the  cause-elements  and  their  coordination 
and  manifestation  as  effect  cannot  but  take  more  than  one  moment. 
The  supposition  that  the  whole  of  the  effect-collocation  is  the 
result  of  the  joint  action  of  the  elements  of  cause-collocation  is 
against  our   universal  uncontradicted    experience  that   specific 
elements  constituting  the  cause  (e.g.  the  whiteness  of  milk)  are 
the  cause  of  other  corresponding  elements  of  the  effect  (e.g.  the 
whiteness  of  the  curd);  and  we  could  not  say  that  the  hardness, 
blackness,  and  other  properties  of  the  atoms  of  iron  in  a  lump 
state  should  not  be  regarded  as  the  cause  of  similar  qualities  in 
the   iron   ball,  for  this  is  against  the  testimony  of  experience. 
Moreover  there  would  be  no  difference  between  material  {updddna, 
e.g.  clay  of  the  jug),  instrumental  and  concomitant  causes  {niniitta 
and  sahakdri,  such  as  the  potter,  and  the  wheel,  the  stick  etc.  in 
forming  the  jug),  for  the  causes  jointly  produce  the  effect,  and 
there  was  no  room  for  distinguishing  the  material  and  the  instru- 
mental cau.ses,  as  such. 

Again  at  the  very  moment  in  which  a  cause-collocation  is 
brought  into  being,  it  cannot  exert  its  influence  to  produce  its 


CH.  viii]  Criticism  of  Samkhya  275 

effect-collocation.  Thus  after  coming  into  being  it  would  take  the 
cause-collocation  at  least  another  moment  to  exercise  its  influence 
to  produce  the  effect.  How  can  the  thing  which  is  destroyed  the 
moment  after  it  is  born  produce  any  effect  ?  The  truth  is  that 
causal  elements  remain  and  when  they  are  properly  collocated 
the  effect  is  produced.  Ordinary  experience  also  shows  that  we 
perceive  things  as  existing  from  a  past  time.  '  The  past  time  is 
perceived  by  us  as  past,  the  present  as  present  and  the  future  as 
future  and  things  are  perceived  as  existing  from  a  past  time  on- 
wards. 

The  Sarnkhya  assumption  that  effects  are  but  the  actualized 
states  of  the  potential  cause,  and  that  the  causal  entity  holds 
within  it  all  the  future  series  of  effects,  and  that  thus  the  effect  is 
already  existent  even  before  the  causal  movement  for  the  pro- 
duction of  the  effect,  is  also  baseless.  Samkhya  says  that  the 
oil  was  already  existent  in  the  sesamum  and  not  in  the  stone,  and 
that  it  is  thus  that  oil  can  be  got  from  sesamum  and  not  from  the 
stone.  The  action  of  the  instrumental  cause  with  them  consists 
only  in  actualizing  or  manifesting  what  was  already  existent  in 
a  potential  form  in  the  cause.  This  is  all  nonsense.  A  lump  of 
clay  is  called  the  cause  and  the  jug  the  effect ;  of  what  good  is  it 
to  say  that  the  jug  exists  in  the  clay  since  with  clay  we  can  never 
carry  water  t  A  jug  is  made  out  of  clay,  but  clay  is  not  a  jug. 
What  is  meant  by  saying  that  the  jug  was  unmanifested  or  was 
in  a  potential  state  before,  and  that  it  has  now  become  manifest 
or  actual  ?  What  does  potential  state  mean  ?  The  potential  state 
of  the  jug  is  not  the  same  as  its  actual  state;  thus  the  actual  state 
of  the  jug  must  be  admitted  as  non-existent  before.  If  it  is 
meant  that  the  jug  is  made  up  of  the  same  parts  (the  atoms)  of 
which  the  clay  is  made  up,  of  course  we  admit  it,  but  this  does 
not  mean  that  the  jug  was  existent  in  the  atoms  of  the  lump 
of  clay.  The  potency  inherent  in  the  clay  by  virtue  of  which  it 
can  expose  itself  to  the  influence  of  other  agents,  such  as  the 
potter,  for  being  transformed  into  a  jug  is  not  the  same  as  the 
effect,  the  jug.  Had  it  been  so,  then  we  should  rather  have  said 
that  the  jug  came  out  of  the  jug.  The  assumption  of  Samkhya 
that  the  substance  and  attribute  have  the  same  reality  is  also 
against  all  experience,  for  we  all  perceive  that  movement  and 
attribute  belong  to  substance  and  not  to  attribute.  Again 
Sarnkhya  holds  a  preposterous  doctrine  that  buddhi  is  different 


276  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

from  intelligence.  It  is  absolutely  unmeaning  to  call  buddhi  non- 
intelligent.  Again  what  is  the  good  of  all  this  fictitious  fuss  that 
the  qualities  of  buddhi  are  reflected  on  purusa  and  then  again  on 
buddhi.  Evidently  in  all  our  experience  we  find  that  the  soul 
{dtmaji)  knows,  feels  and  wills,  and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why 
Samkhya  does  not  accept  this  patent  fact  and  declare  that  know- 
ledge, feeling,  and  willing,  all  belonged  to  buddhi.  Then  again  in 
order  to  explain  experience  it  brought  forth  a  theory  of  double 
reflection.  Again  Samkhya  prakrti  is  non-intelligent,  and  where 
is  the  guarantee  that  she  (prakrti)  will  not  bind  the  wise  again 
and  will  emancipate  him  once  for  all  ?  Why  did  the  purusa  be- 
come bound  down?  Prakrti  is  being  utilized  for  enjoyment  by 
the  infinite  number  of  purusas,  and  she  is  no  delicate  girl  (as 
Sarnkhya  supposes)  who  will  leave  the  presence  of  the  purusa 
ashamed  as  soon  as  her  real  nature  is  discovered.  Again  pleasure 
{sukhd),  sorrow  {duhkJia)  and  a  blinding  feeling  through  ignorance 
{moha)  are  but  the  feeling-experiences  of  the  soul,  and  with  what 
impudence  could  Samkhya  think  of  these  as  material  substances? 
Again  their  cosmology  of  a  mahat,  ahamkara,  the  tanmatras, 
is  all  a  series  of  assumptions  never  testified  by  experience  nor 
by  reason.  They  are  all  a  series  of  hopeless  and  foolish  blunders. 
The  phenomena  of  experience  thus  call  for  a  new  careful  recon- 
struction in  the  light  of  reason  and  experience  such  as  cannot 
be  found  in  other  systems.  (See  Nydyainaiijari,  pp.  452-466 
and  490-496.) 

Nyaya  and  Vaisesika  sutras. 

It  is  very  probable  that  the  earliest  beginnings  of  Nyaya  are 
to  be  found  in  the  disputations  and  debates  amongst  scholars 
trying  to  find  out  the  right  meanings  of  the  Vedic  texts  for  use 
in  sacrifices  and  also  in  those  disputations  which  took  place  be- 
tween the  adherents  of  different  schools  of  thought  trying  to 
defeat  one  another.  I  suppose  that  such  disputations  occurred  in 
the  days  of  the  Upanisads,  and  the  art  of  disputation  was  regarded 
even  then  as  a  subject  of  study,  and  it  probably  passed  then  by 
the  name  oivdkovdkya.  Mr  Bodas  has  pointed  out  that  Apastamba 
who  according  to  Biihler  lived  before  the  third  century  B.C.  used  the 
word  Nyaya  in  the  sense  of  Mimarnsa'.    The  word  Nyaya  derived 

^  Apastamba,  trans,  by  Biihler,  Introduction,  p.  xxvii.,  and  Bodas's  article  on  the 
Historical  Survey  of  Indian  Logic  in  the  Bombay  Branch  of  J.R.A.S.,  vol.  XIX. 


VI 1 1]  The  Science  of  Nydya  277 

from  the  root  ni  is  sometimes  explained  as  that  by  which  sentences 
and  words  could  be  interpreted  as  having  one  particular  meaning 
and  not  another,  and  on  the  strength  of  this  even  Vedic  accents  of 
words  (which  indicate  the  meaning  of  compound  words  by  pointing 
out  the  particular  kind  of  compound  in  which  the  words  entered 
into  combination)  were  called  Nyaya^  Prof  Jacobi  on  the  strength 
of  Kautilya's  enumeration  of  the  vidyd  (sciences)  as  Anvlksikl 
(the  science  of  testing  the  perceptual  and  scriptural  knowledge 
by  further  scrutiny),  trayl  (the  three  Vedas),  vdrttd  (the  sciences 
of  agriculture,  cattle  keeping  etc.),  and  dandamti  (polity),  and  the 
enumeration  of  the  philosophies  as  Samkhya,  Yoga,  Lokayata 
and  Anvlksikl,  supposes  that  the  Nydya  sutra  was  not  in  existence 
in  Kautilya's  time  300  B.C.) I  Kautilya's  reference  to  Nyaya  as 
Anvlksikl  only  suggests  that  the  word  Nyaya  was  not  a  familiar 
name  for  Anvlksikl  in  Kautilya's  time.  He  seems  to  misunderstand 
Vatsyayana  in  thinking  that  Vatsyayana  distinguishes  Nyaya 
from  the  Anvlksikl  in  holding  that  while  the  latter  only  means 
the  science  of  logic  the  former  means  logic  as  well  as  metaphysics. 
What  appears  from  Vatsyayana's  statement  in  Nydya  sutra  I.  i.  i 
is  this  that  he  points  out  that  the  science  which  was  known  in  his 
time  as  Nyaya  was  the  same  as  was  referred  to  as  Anvlksikl  by 
Kautilya.  He  distinctly  identifies  Nyayavidya  with  Anvlksikl, 
but  justifies  the  separate  enumeration  of  certain  logical  categories 
such  as  savisaya  (doubt)  etc.,  though  these  were  already  contained 
within  the  first  two  terms  pramdna  (means  of  cognition)  and 
prameya  (objects  of  cognition),  by  holding  that  unless  these  its 
special  and  separate  branches  {prthakprasthdna)  were  treated, 
Nyayavidya  would  simply  become  metaphysics  {adhydtinavidyd) 
like  the  Upanisads.  The  old  meaning  of  Nyaya  as  the  means  of  de- 
termining the  right  meaning  or  the  right  thing  is  also  agreed  upon 
by  Vatsyayana  and  is  sanctioned  by  Vacaspati  in  his  Nydyavdrt- 
tikatdtparyatlkd  I.  i.  i).  He  compares  the  meaning  of  the  word 
Nyaya  {praindnairarthaparlksanain — to  scrutinize  an  object  by 
means  of  logical  proof)  with  the  etymological  meaning  of  the  word 
anvlksikl  (to  scrutinize  anything  after  it  has  been  known  by  percep- 
tion and  scriptures).  Vatsyayana  of  course  points  out  that  so  far  as 
this  logical  side  of  Nyaya  is  concerned  it  has  the  widest  scope  for 

^  Kalidasa's  Kiitnarasambhava  ^^  Udi^hdto  pranavo  ydsdtn  nydyaistribkirtidlranaviy^ 
also  Mallinatha's  gloss  on  it. 

^  Prof.  Jacobi's  '■'^The  early  history  of  Indian  Philosophy, ^^  Indian  Antiquary^  1918. 


2  78  The  Nyaya  -  Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

itself  as  it  includes  all  beings,  all  their  actions,  and  all  the  sciences^ 
He  quotes  Kautilya  to  show  that  in  this  capacity  Nyaya  is  like 
light  illumining  all  sciences  and  is  the  means  of  all  works.  In  its 
capacity  as  dealing  with  the  truths  of  metaphysics  it  may  show  the 
way  to  salvation.  I  do  not  dispute  Prof.  Jacobi's  main  point  that 
the  metaphysical  portion  of  the  work  was  a  later  addition,  for  this 
seems  to  me  to  be  a  very  probable  view.  In  fact  Vatsyayana  him- 
self designates  the  logical  portion  as  a  prthakprasthana  (separate 
branch).  But  I  do  not  find  that  any  statement  of  Vatsyayana  or 
Kautilya  can  justify  us  in  concluding  that  this  addition  was  made 
after  Kautilya.  Vatsyayana  has  no  doubt  put  more  stress  on  the 
importance  of  the  logical  side  of  the  work,  but  the  reason  of  that 
seems  to  be  quite  obvious,  for  the  importance  of  metaphysics  or 
adhydtmavidyd  was  acknowledged  by  all.  But  the  importance  of 
the  mere  logical  side  would  not  appeal  to  most  people.  None  of 
the  dharmasastras  (religious  scriptures)  or  the  Vedas  would  lend 
any  support  to  it,  and  Vatsyayana  had  to  seek  the  support  of 
Kautilya  in  the  matter  as  the  last  resource.  The  fact  that  Kau- 
tilya was  not  satisfied  by  counting  Anvlksiki  as  one  of  the  four 
vidyas  but  also  named  it  as  one  of  the  philosophies  side  by  side 
with  Samkhya  seems  to  lead  to  the  presumption  that  probably 
even  in  Kautilya's  time  Nyaya  was  composed  of  two  branches, 
one  as  adhyatmavidya  and  another  as  a  science  of  logic  or  rather 
of  debate.  This  combination  is  on  the  face  of  it  loose  and  external, 
and  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  metaphysical  portion  was  added 
to  increase  the  popularity  of  the  logical  part,  which  by  itself  might 
not  attract  sufficient  attention.  Mahamahopadhyaya  Haraprasada 
Sastrl  in  an  article  in  the  Journal  of  the  Bengal  Asiatic  Society 
1905  says  that  as  Vacaspati  made  two  attempts  to  collect  the 
Nyaya  siitras,or\e  ^.s Nyaya siici  and  the  other  d^sNydyas72troddhdra, 
it  seems  that  even  in  Vacaspati's  time  he  was  not  certain  as  to 
the  authenticity  of  many  of  the  Nydya  sutras.  He  further  points 
out  that  there  are  unmistakable  signs  that  many  of  the  sutras 
were  interpolated,  and  relates  the  Buddhist  tradition  from  China 
and    Japan   that    Mirok   mingled   Nyaya   and  Yoga.     He   also 

^  Yena  prayuktah  pravaritate  tat  prayojanam  (that  by  which  one  is  led  to  act  is 
called  prayojatiam) ;  yamart/iam  abhipsan  jthdsan  vd  karma  arabhate  tenanena  sarve 
prdninafi  sarvdni  karmdni  sarvaka  vidydh  vydptdh  taddiraydsca  nydyah  pravaritate 
(all  those  which  one  tries  to  have  or  to  fly  from  are  called  prayojana,  therefore  all 
beings,  all  their  actions,  and  all  sciences,  are  included  within  prayojana,  and  all  these 
depend  on  Nyaya).    Vdtsydyana  bhdsya,  i.  i.  i. 


VI ii]  Date  of  the  Nyaya  sutras  279 

thinks  that  the  sutras  underwent  two  additions,  one  at  the  hands 
of  some  Buddhists  and  another  at  the  hands  of  some  Hindu  who 
put  in  Hindu  arguments  against  the  Buddhist  ones.  These 
suggestions  of  this  learned  scholar  seem  to  be  very  probable,  but 
we  have  no  clue  by  which  we  can  ascertain  the  time  when  such 
additions  were  made.  The  fact  that  there  are  unmistakable  proofs 
of  the  interpolation  of  many  of  the  sutras  makes  the  fixing  of 
the  date  of  the  original  part  of  the  Nydya  sutras  still  more  diffi- 
cult, for  the  Buddhist  references  can  hardly  be  of  any  help,  and 
Prof.  Jacobi's  attempt  to  fix  the  date  of  the  Nydya  sutras  on  the 
basis  of  references  to  Sunyavada  naturally  loses  its  value,  except 
on  the  supposition  that  all  references  to  Sunyavada  must  be  later 
than  Nagarjuna,  which  is  not  correct,  since  the  Mahdydna  sutras 
written  before  Nagarjuna  also  held  the  Sunyavada  doctrine. 

The  late  Dr  S.  C.  Vidyabhusana  in  J.R.A.S.  1918  thinks 
that  the  earlier  part  of  Nyaya  was  written  by  Gautama  about 
550  B.C.  whereas  the  Nydya  sutras  of  Aksapada  were  written 
about  150  A.D.  and  says  that  the  use  of  the  word  Nyaya  in  the 
sense  of  logic  in  Mahdbhdrata  I.  I.  6"] ,  I.  70.  42-51,  must  be 
regarded  as  interpolations.  He,  however,  does  not  give  any 
reasons  in  support  of  his  assumption.  It  appears  from  his  treatment 
of  the  subject  that  the  fixing  of  the  date  of  x\ksapada  was  made 
to  fit  in  somehow  with  his  idea  that  Aksapada  wrote  his  Nydya 
sutras  under  the  influence  of  Aristotle — a  supposition  which  does 
not  require  serious  refutation,  at  least  so  far  as  Dr  Vidyabhusana 
has  proved  it.  Thus  after  all  this  discussion  we  have  not  advanced 
a  step  towards  the  ascertainment  of  the  date  of  the  original  part 
of  the  Nyaya.  Goldstucker  says  that  both  Patanjali  (140  B.C.) 
and  Katyayana  (fourth  century  B.C.)  knew  the  Nydya  Sutras'^.  We 
know  that  Kautilya  knew  the  Nyaya  in  some  form  as  Anvlksiki 
in  300  B.C.,  and  on  the  strength  of  this  we  may  venture  to  say 
that  the  Nyaya  existed  in  some  form  as  early  as  the  fourth 
century  B.C.  But  there  are  other  reasons  which  lead  me  to  think 
that  at  least  some  of  the  present  sutras  were  written  some  time 
in  the  second  century  A.D.  Bodas  points  out  that  Badarayana's 
sutras  make  allusions  to  the  Vaisesika  doctrines  and  not  to  Nyaya. 
On  this  ground  he  thinks  that  Vaisesika  sutras  were  written  be- 
fore Badarayana's  Brahma-sutras,  whereas  the  Nydya  sutras  were 
written  later.  Candrakanta  Tarkalamkara  also  contends  in  his 
^  Goldstucker's  Pdnini,  p.  157. 


28o  The  Ny  ay  a- Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

edition  of  Vaisesika  that  the  Vaisesika  sutras  were  earher  than  the 
Nyaya.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  perfectly  certain  that  the  Vaisesika 
sutras  were  written  before  Caraka  (80  A.D.) ;  for  he  not  only  quotes 
one  of  the  Vaisesika  sutras,  but  the  whole  foundation  of  his  medical 
physics  is  based  on  the  Vaisesika  physics^  The  Lahkdvatara 
sutra  (which  as  it  was  quoted  by  Asvaghosa  is  earlier  than 
80  A.D.)  also  makes  allusions  to  the  atomic  doctrine.  There  are 
other  weightier  grounds,  as  we  shall  see  later  on,  for  supposing 
that  the  Vaisesika  sutras  are  probably  pre-Buddhisticl 

It  is  certain  that  even  the  logical  part  of  the  present  Nyaya 
sutras  was  preceded  by  previous  speculations  on  the  subject  by 
thinkers  of  other  schools.  Thus  in  commenting  on  I.  i.  32  in  which 
the  sutra  states  that  a  syllogism  consists  of  five  premisses  (az/^j/^?/^) 
Vatsyayana  says  that  this  sutra  was  written  to  refute  the  views 
of  those  who  held  that  there  should  be  ten  premisses^  The 
Vaisesika  sutras  also  give  us  some  of  the  earliest  types  of  inference, 
which  do  not  show  any  acquaintance  with  the  technic  of  the  Nyaya 
doctrine  of  inference^ 

Does  Vaisesika  represent  an  Old  School  of  Mimarnsa  ? 

The  Vaisesika  is  so  much  associated  with  Nyaya  by  tradition 
that  it  seems  at  first  sight  quite  unlikely  that  it  could  be  supposed 
to  represent  an  old  school  of  Mimarnsa,  older  than  that  represented 
in  the  Mlmdnisd  sutras.  But  a  closer  inspection  of  the  Vaisesika 
sutras  seems  to  confirm  such  a  supposition  in  a  very  remarkable 
way.  We  have  seen  in  the  previous  section  that  Caraka  quotes 
a  Vaisesika  sUtra.  An  examination  of  Caraka's  Sutrasthdna  (I. 
35-38)  leaves  us  convinced  that  the  writer  of  the  verses  had  some 
compendium  of  Vaisesika  such  as  that  of  the  Bhdsdparicdieda 
before  him.  Caraka  sutra  or  kdrikd  (l.  i.  36)  says  that  the  gunas 
are  those  which  have  been  enumerated  such  as  heaviness,  etc., 
cognition,  and  those  which  begin  with  the  guna  "/«r«"  (univer- 
sality) and  end  with  ''prayatna"  (effort)  together  with  the  sense- 
qualities  {sdrthd).  It  seems  that  this  is  a  reference  to  some  well- 
known  enumeration.  But  this  enumeration  is  not  to  be  found 
in  the  Vaisesika  sutra  (I.  i.  6)  which  leaves  out  the  six  gunas, 

^   Caraka,  Saiira,  39. 
"^  See  the  next  section. 

*  Vatsyayana's  Bhasya  on  the  Nyaya  siitras,  i.  i.  32.  This  is  undoubtedly  a  reference 
to  the  Jaina  view  as  found  in  DaSavaikalikaniryukti  as  noted  before. 

*  Nyaya  sfitra  I.  i.  5,  and  Vaiksika  sutras  IX.  ii.  1-2,  4-5,  and  III.  i.  8-17. 


viii]  Antiquity  of  Vai^esika  281 

heaviness  {gurutvd),  liquidity(^r^z^«/^«),oiHness(j'«^^«),  elasticity 
{samskdra),  merit  {dharnia)  and  demerit  {adharmd)\  in  one  part 
of  the  sutra  the  enumeration  begins  with  "para"  (universality) 
and  ends  in  "prayatna,"  but  buddhi  (cognition)  comes  within 
the  enumeration  beginning  from  para  and  ending  in  prayatna, 
whereas  in  Caraka  buddhi  does  not  form  part  of  the  list  and  is 
separately  enumerated.  This  leads  me  to  suppose  that  Caraka's 
sutra  was  written  at  a  time  when  the  six  gunas  left  out  in  the 
Vaisesika  enumeration  had  come  to  be  counted  as  gunas,  and 
compendiums  had  been  made  in  which  these  were  enumerated. 
Bhdsdpariccheda  (a  later  Vaisesika  compendium),  is  a  compilation 
from  some  very  old  karikas  which  are  referred  to  by  Visvanatha 
as  being  collected  from  ''atisamksiptacirantanoktibhik'' — (from 
very  ancient  aphorisms^);  Caraka's  definition  of  samanya  and 
vi^esa  shows  that  they  had  not  then  been  counted  as  separate 
categories  as  in  later  Nyaya-Vaisesika  doctrines;  but  though 
slightly  different  it  is  quite  in  keeping  with  the  sort  of  definition 
one  finds  in  the  Vaisesika  sutra  that  samanya  (generality)  and 
visesa  are  relative  to  each  other".  Caraka's  sutras  were  therefore 
probably  written  at  a  time  when  the  Vaisesika  doctrines  were 
undergoing  changes,  and  well-known  compendiums  were  begin- 
ning to  be  written  on  them. 

The  Vaisesika  sutras  seem  to  be  ignorant  of  the  Buddhist 
doctrines.  In  their  discussions  on  the  existence  of  soul,  there  is 
no  reference  to  any  view  as  to  non-existence  of  soul,  but  the 
argument  turned  on  the  point  as  to  whether  the  self  is  to  be  an 
object  of  inference  or  revealed  to  us  by  our  notion  of  "I."  There 
is  also  no  other  reference  to  any  other  systems  except  to  some 
Mimamsa  doctrines  and  occasionally  to  Sannkhya.  There  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  Mimarnsa  doctrines  referred  to  allude 
to  the  Mhndmsd  sutras  of  Jaimini.  The  manner  in  which  the 
nature  of  inference  has  been  treated  shows  that  the  Nyaya 
phraseology  of  "pfirvavat"  and  "sesavaf  was  not  known.  Vaise- 
sika sutras  in  more  than  one  place  refer  to  time  as  the  ultimate 
caused  We  know  that  the  Svetasvatara  Upanisad  refers  to  those 
who  regard  time  as  the  cause  of  all  things,  but  in  none  of  the 

^  Professor  Vanamali  Vedantatirtha's  article  m  J.  A.S.B.,  1908. 

^  Caraka  (i.  i.  33)  says  that  samanya  is  that  which  produces  unity  and  viiesa  is 
that  which  separates.  V.  S.  n.  ii.  7.  Samanya  and  videsa  depend  upon  our  mode  of 
thinking  (as  united  or  as  separate). 

*  Vaiiesika  sutra  (ll.  ii.  9  and  V.  ii.  ■26). 


282  The  Ny  ay  a -Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

systems  that  we  have  can  we  trace  any  upholding  of  this  ancient 
view\  These  considerations  as  well  as  the  general  style  of  the 
work  and  the  methods  of  discussion  lead  me  to  think  that  these 
sutras  are  probably  the  oldest  that  we  have  and  in  all  probability 
are  pre-Buddhistic. 

The  Vaisesika  sutra  begins  with  the  statement  that  its  object 
is  to  explain  virtue,  "dharma."  This  is  we  know  the  manifest  duty 
of  Mimamsa  and  we  know  that  unlike  any  other  system  Jaimini 
begins  his  Mlnidmsd  sutras  by  defining  "dharma."  This  at  first 
seems  irrelevant  to  the  main  purpose  of  Vaisesika,  viz.,  the  de- 
scription of  the  nature  of  padartha^  He  then  defines  dharma  as 
that  which  gives  prosperity  and  ultimate  good  {nihsreyasa)  and 
says  that  the  Veda  must  be  regarded  as  valid,  since  it  can  dictate 
this.  He  ends  his  book  with  the  remarks  that  those  injunctions 
(of  Vedic  deeds)  which  are  performed  for  ordinary  human  motives 
bestow  prosperity  even  though  their  efficacy  is  not  known  to  us 
through  our  ordinary  experience,  and  in  this  matter  the  Veda  must 
be  regarded  as  the  authority  which  dictates  those  actsl  The  fact 
that  the  Vaisesika  begins  with  a  promise  to  describe  dharma  and 
after  describing  the  nature  of  substances,  qualities  and  actions 
and  also  the  adrsta  (unknown  virtue)  due  to  dharma  (merit 
accruing  from  the  performance  of  Vedic  deeds)  by  which  many 
of  our  unexplained  experiences  may  be  explained,  ends  his  book 
by  saying  that  those  Vedic  works  which  are  not  seen  to  produce 
any  direct  effect,  will  produce  prosperity  through  adrsta,  shows 
that  Kanada's  method  of  explaining  dharma  has  been  by  showing 
that  physical  phenomena  involving  substances,  qualities,  and 
actions  can  only  be  explained  up  to  a  certain  extent  while  a 
good  number  cannot  be  explained  at  all  except  on  the  as- 
sumption of  adrsta  (unseen  virtue)  produced  by  dharma.   The 

^  Sveta^vatara  i.  i.  a. 

"^  I  remember  a  verse  quoted  in  an  old  commentary  of  the  Kalapa  Vyakarana,  in 
which  it  is  said  that  the  description  of  the  six  categories  by  Kanada  in  his  Vaiksika 
sutras,  after  having  proposed  to  describe  the  nature  of  dharma,  is  as  irrelevant  as  to 
proceed  towards  the  sea  while  intending  to  go  to  the  mountain  Himavat  (Himalaya). 
"  Dharmain  vyakhyattikamasya  satpadarthopavarnanam  Himavadgantukamasya  saga- 
ragam  anopa  rii  am.''^ 

•'  The  sutra  "  Tadvacandd  dmnayasya  prdmdnyam  (l.  i.  3  and  X.  ii.  9)  has  been 
explained  by  Upaskara  as  meaning  "  The  Veda  being  the  word  of  I^vara  (God)  must 
be  regarded  as  valid,"  but  since  there  is  no  mention  of  "  I^vara  "  anywhere  in  the  text 
this  is  simply  reading  the  later  Nyaya  ideas  into  the  Vaisesika.  Sutra  X.  ii.  8  is  only 
a  repetition  of  vi.  ii.  i. 


VIII J  Antiquity  of  Vaisesika  283 

description  of  the  categories  of  substance  is  not  irrelevant,  but 
is  the  means  of  proving  that  our  ordinary  experience  of  these 
cannot  explain  many  facts  which  are  only  to  be  explained  on 
the  supposition  of  adrsta  proceeding  out  of  the  performance 
of  Vedic  deeds.  In  V.  i.  15  the  movement  of  needles  towards 
magnets,  in  v.  ii.  7  the  circulation  of  water  in  plant  bodies, 
V.  ii.  13  and  IV,  ii.  7  the  upward  motion  of  fire,  the  side  motion 
of  air,  the  combining  movement  of  atoms  (by  which  all  com- 
binations have  taken  place),  and  the  original  movement  of  the 
mind  are  said  to  be  due  to  adrsta.  In  v.  ii.  17  the  movement 
of  the  soul  after  death,  its  taking  hold  of  other  bodies,  the 
assimilation  of  food  and  drink  and  other  kinds  of  contact  (the 
movement  and  development  of  the  foetus  as  enumerated  in 
Upaskdrd)  are  said  to  be  due  to  adrsta.  Salvation  (moksa)  is 
said  to  be  produced  by  the  annihilation  of  adrsta  leading  to  the 
annihilation  of  all  contacts  and  non-production  of  rebirths. 
Vaisesika  marks  the  distinction  between  the  drsta  (experienced) 
and  the  adrsta.  All  the  categories  that  he  describes  are  founded 
on  drsta  (experience)  and  those  unexplained  by  known  experi- 
ence are  due  to  adrsta.  These  are  the  acts  on  which  depend  all 
life-process  of  animals  and  plants,  the  continuation  of  atoms  or 
the  construction  of  the  worlds,  natural  motion  of  fire  and  air, 
death  and  rebirth  (VI.  ii.  15)  and  even  the  physical  phenomena 
by  which  our  fortunes  are  affected  in  some  way  or  other  (v.  ii.  2), 
in  fact  all  with  which  we  are  vitally  interested  in  philosophy. 
Kanada's  philosophy  gives  only  some  facts  of  experience  regarding 
substances,  qualities  and  actions,  leaving  all  the  graver  issues  of 
metaphysics  to  adrsta.  But  what  leads  to  adrsta.-'  In  answer  to 
this,  Kanada  does  not  speak  of  good  or  bad  or  virtuous  or 
sinful  deeds,  but  of  Vedic  works,  such  as  holy  ablutions  {sndna), 
fasting,  holy  student  life  {brahmacaryd),  remaining  at  the  house 
of  the  teacher  {gurukidavdsa),  retired  forest  life  {vdnaprasthd), 
sacrifice  {yajhd),  gifts  (ddna),  certain  kinds  of  sacrificial  sprink- 
ling and  rules  of  performing  sacrificial  works  according  to  the 
prescribed  time  of  the  stars,  the  prescribed  hymns  (mantras) 
(VI.  ii.  2). 

He  described  what  is  pure  and  what  is  impure  food,  pure 
food  being  that  which  is  sacrificially  purified  (vi.  ii.  5)  the  con- 
trary being  impure;  and  he  says  that  the  taking  of  pure  food 
leads   to   prosperity  through   adrsta.     He    also  described  how 


284  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

feelings  of  attachment  to  things  are  also  generated  by  adrsta. 
Throughout  almost  the  whole  of  VI.  i  Kanada  is  busy  in  showing 
the  special  conditions  of  making  gifts  and  receiving  them.  A  refer- 
ence to  our  chapter  on  Mimarnsa  will  show  that  the  later  Mimarnsa 
writers  agreed  with  the  Nyaya-Vaisesika  doctrines  in  most  of  their 
views  regarding  substance,  qualities,  etc.  Some  of  the  main  points 
in  which  Mimarnsa  differs  from  Nyaya-Vaisesika  are  (i)  self- 
validity  of  the  Vedas,  (2)  the  eternality  of  the  Vedas,  (3)  disbelief 
in  any  creator  or  god,  (4)  eternality  of  sound  (sabda),  (5)  (accord- 
ing to  Kumarila)  direct  perception  of  self  in  the  notion  of  the  ego. 
Of  these  the  first  and  the  second  points  do  not  form  any  subject 
of  discussion  in  the  Vaisesika.  But  as  no  Isvara  is  mentioned, 
and  as  all  adrsta  depends  upon  the  authority  of  the  Vedas,  we 
may  assume  that  Vaisesika  had  no  dispute  with  Mimarnsa.  The 
fact  that  there  is  no  reference  to  any  dissension  is  probably  due 
to  the  fact  that  really  none  had  taken  place  at  the  time  of  the 
Vaisesika  sutras.  It  is  probable  that  Kanada  believed  that  the 
Vedas  were  written  by  some  persons  superior  to  us  (ll.  i.  18,  VI.  i. 
1-2).  But  the  fact  that  there  is  no  reference  to  any  conflict  with 
Mimarnsa  suggests  that  the  doctrine  that  the  Vedas  were  never 
written  by  anyone  was  formulated  at  a  later  period,  whereas  in 
the  days  of  the  Vaisesika  sutras,  the  view  was  probably  what  is 
represented  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras.  As  there  is  no  reference  to 
Isvara  and  as  adrsta  proceeding  out  of  the  performance  of  actions 
in  accordance  with  Vedic  injunctions  is  made  the  cause  of  all 
atomic  movements,  we  can  very  well  assume  that  Vaisesika  was 
as  atheistic  or  non-theistic  as  the  later  Mimarnsa  philosophers. 
As  regards  the  eternality  of  sound,  which  in  later  days  was  one 
of  the  main  points  of  quarrel  between  the  Nyaya-Vaisesika  and 
the  Mimamsa,  we  find  that  in  II.  ii.  25-32,  Kanada  gives  reasons 
in  favour  of  the  non-eternality  of  sound,  but  after  that  from  II.  ii.  33 
till  the  end  of  the  chapter  he  closes  the  argument  in  favour  of  the 
eternality  of  sound,  which  is  the  distinctive  Mimarnsa  view  as  we 
know  from  the  later  Mimarnsa  writers^  Next  comes  the  question 
of  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  self  The  traditional  Nyaya  view  is 

^  The  last  two  concluding  sutras  ii.  ii.  36  and  37  are  in  my  opinion  wrongly  inter- 
preted by  Sankara  Mi.4ra  in  his  Upaskara  (ii.  ii.  36  by  adding  an  ^^  apt"  to  the  sutra 
and  thereby  changing  the  issue,  and  11.  ii.  37  by  misreading  the  phonetic  combination 
"  sarnkhyabhava  "  as  samkhya  and  bhava  instead  of  sanikhya  and  abhava,  which  in 
my  opinion  is  the  rij^ht  combination  here)  in  favour  of  the  non-eternality  of  sound  as 
we  find  in  the  later  Nyaya-Vaisesika  view. 


viii]  Philosophy  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras  285 

that  the  self  is  supposed  to  exist  because  it  must  be  inferred  as  the 
seat  of  the  quaHties  of  pleasure,  pain,  cognition,  etc.  Traditionally 
this  is  regarded  as  the  Vaisesika  view  as  well.  But  in  Vai.sesika 
III.  ii.  4  the  existence  of  soul  is  first  inferred  by  reason  of  its 
activity  and  the  existence  of  pleasure,  pain,  etc.,  in  III.  ii.  6-7  this 
inference  is  challenged  by  saying  that  we  do  not  perceive  that  the 
activity,  etc.  belongs  to  the  soul  and  not  to  the  body  and  so  no 
certainty  can  be  arrived  at  by  inference,  and  in  ill.  ii.  8  it  is 
suggested  that  therefore  the  existence  of  soul  is  to  be  accepted 
on  the  authority  of  the  scriptures  {agama).  To  this  the  final 
Vaisesika  conclusion  is  given  that  we  can  directly  perceive  the  self 
in  our  feeling  as  "I"  {aham),  and  we  have  therefore  not  to  depend 
on  the  scriptures  for  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  self,  and  thus 
the  inference  of  the  existence  of  the  self  is  only  an  additional 
proof  of  what  we  already  find  in  perception  as  "I"  {ahavi)  (lii.  ii. 
10-18,  also  IX.  i.  11). 

These  considerations  lead  me  to  think  that  the  Vaisesika 
represented  a  school  of  Mlmarnsa  thought  which  supplemented 
a  metaphysics  to  strengthen  the  grounds  of  the  Vedas. 

Philosophy  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras. 

The  Vaisesika  sutras  begin  with  the  ostensible  purpose  of  ex- 
plaining virtue  {dharvia)  (I.  i.  i)  and  dharma  according  to  it  is 
that  by  which  prosperity  {abhyudaya)  and  salvation  {nihsreyasd) 
are  attained.  Then  it  goes  on  to  say  that  the  validity  of  the 
Vedas  depends  on  the  fact  that  it  leads  us  to  prosperity  and 
salvation.  Then  it  turns  back  to  the  second  sutra  and  says  that 
salvation  comes  as  the  result  of  real  knowledge,  produced  by 
special  excellence  of  dharma,  of  the  characteristic  features  of 
the  categories  of  substance  {dravya),  quality  {gima),  class  con- 
cept {sdmdnya),  particularity  {visesa),  and  inherence  (samavdyay. 
The  dravyas  are  earth,  water,  fire,  air,  ether,  time,  space,  soul, 
and  mind.  The  gunas  are  colour,  taste,  odour,  touch,  number, 
measure,  separations,  contact,  disjoining,  quality  of  belonging  to 
high  genus  or  to  species-.    Action  {karma)  means  upward  move- 

1  Upaskara  notes  that  visesa  here  refers  to  the  ultimate  differences  of  things  and 
not  to  species.  A  special  doctrine  of  this  system  is  this,  that  each  of  the  indivisible 
atoms  of  even  the  same  element  has  specific  features  of  difference. 

2  Here  the  well  known  qualities  of  heaviness  {gurtitva),  liquidity  (dravatTo),  oili- 
ness  (sneha),  elasticity  {sa>nskd7'a),  merit  {dharma),  and  demerit  {adharma)  have  been 
altogether  omitted.    These  are  all  counted  in  later  Vaiisesika  commentaries  and  com- 


286  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

ment,  downward  movement,  contraction,  expansion  and  horizontal 
movement.  The  three  common  quaHties  of  dravya.guna  and  karma 
are  that  they  are  existent,  non-eternal,  substantive,  effect,  cause, 
and  possess  generality  and  particularity.  Dravya  produces  other 
dravyas  and  the  gunas  other  gunas.  But  karma  is  not  necessarily 
produced  by  karma.  Dravya  does  not  destroy  either  its  cause  or 
its  effect,  but  the  gunas  are  destroyed  both  by  the  cause  and  by 
the  effect.  Karma  is  destroyed  by  karma,  Dravya  possesses 
karma  and  guna  and  is  regarded  as  the  material  {samavdyt)  cause. 
Gunas  inhere  in  dravya,  cannot  possess  further  gunas,  and  are 
not  by  themselves  the  cause  of  contact  or  disjoining.  Karma  is 
devoid  of  guna,  cannot  remain  at  one  time  in  more  than  one 
object,  inheres  in  dravya  alone,  and  is  an  independent  cause  of 
contact  or  disjoining.  Dravya  is  the  material  cause  (samavayi) 
of  (derivative)  dravyas,  guna,  and  karma;  guna  is  also  the  non- 
material  cause  {asamdvdyi)  of  dravya,  guna  and  karma.  Karma 
is  the  general  cause  of  contact,  disjoining,  and  inertia  in  motion 
{vegd).  Karma  is  not  the  cause  of  dravya.  For  dravya  may  be 
produced  even  without  karma\  Dravya  is  the  general  effect  of 
dravya.  Karma  is  dissimilar  to  guna  in  this  that  it  does  not  pro- 
duce karma.  The  numbers  two,  three,  etc.,  separateness,  contact 
and  disjoining  are  effected  by  more  than  one  dravya.  Each  karma 
not  being  connected  with  more  than  one  thing  is  not  produced 
by  more  than  one  things  A  dravya  is  the  result  of  many  con- 
tacts (of  the  atoms).  One  colour  may  be  the  result  of  many 
colours.  Upward  movement  is  the  result  of  heaviness,  effort  and 
contact.  Contact  and  disjoining  are  also  the  result  of  karma.  In 
denying  the  causality  of  karma  it  is  meant  that  karma  is  not  the 
cause  of  dravya  and  karma*. 

In  the  second  chapter  of  the  first  book  Kanada  first  says  that 
if  there  is  no  cause,  there  is  no  effect,  but  there  may  be  the  cause 
even  though  there  may  not  be  the  effect.  He  next  says  that 
genus  isdmdnyd)  and  species  {visesd)  are  relative  to  the  under- 

pendiums.  It  must  be  noted  that  "guna"  in  Vai^esika  means  qualities  and  not  subtle 
reals  or  substances  as  in  Sarnkhya-Yoga.  Guna  in  Vai^esika  would  be  akin  to  what 
Yoga  would  call  dharrna. 

1  It  is  only  when  the  karya  ceases  that  dravya  is  produced.   See  Upaskdra  I.  i.  22. 

2  If  karma  is  related  to  more  than  one  thing,  then  with  the  movement  of  one  we 
should  have  felt  that  two  or  more  things  were  moving. 

^  It  must  be  noted  that  "karma"  in  this  sense  is  quite  different  from  the  more 
extensive  use  of  karma  as  meritorious  or  vicious  action  which  is  the  cause  of  rebirth. 


viii]  Philosophy  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras  287 

standing;  being  {bhdva)  indicates  continuity  only  and  is  hence 
only  a  genus.  The  universals  of  substance,  quality  and  action 
may  be  both  genus  and  species,  but  visesa  as  constituting  the  ulti- 
mate differences  (of  atoms)  exists  (independent  of  any  percipient). 
In  connection  with  this  he  says  that  the  ultimate  genus  is  being 
{satta)  in  virtue  of  which  things  appear  as  existent;  all  other 
genera  may  only  relatively  be  regarded  as  relative  genera  or 
species.  Being  must  be  regarded  as  a  separate  category,  since  it 
is  different  from  dravya,  guna  and  karma,  and  yet  exists  in  them, 
and  has  no  genus  or  species.  It  gives  us  the  notion  that  some- 
thing is  and  must  be  regarded  as  a  category  existing  as  one 
identical  entity  in  all  dravya,  guna,  and  karma,  for  in  its  uni- 
versal nature  as  being  it  has  no  special  characteristics  in  the 
different  objects  in  which  it  inheres.  The  specific  universals  of 
thingness  {dravyatva),  qualitiness  {gunatva)  or  actionness  {kar- 
matva)  are  also  categories  which  are  separate  from  universal  being 
{bhdva  or  sattd)  for  they  also  have  no  separate  genus  or  species 
and  yet  may  be  distinguished  from  one  another,  but  bhava  or 
being  was  the  same  in  all. 

In  the  first  chapter  of  the  second  book  Kanada  deals  with 
substances.  Earth  possesses  colour,  taste,  smell,  and  touch ;  water, 
colour,  taste,  touch,  liquidity,  and  smoothness  {suigdha);  fire, 
colour  and  touch;  air,  touch;  but  none  of  these  qualities  can  be 
found  in  ether  {dkdsa).  Liquidity  is  a  special  quality  of  water 
because  butter,  lac,  wax,  lead,  iron,  silver,  gold,  become  liquids 
only  when  they  are  heated,  while  water  is  naturally  liquid  itselP. 
Though  air  cannot  be  seen,  yet  its  existence  can  be  inferred  by 
touch,  just  as  the  existence  of  the  genus  of  cows  may  be  inferred 
from  the  characteristics  of  horns,  tails,  etc.  Since  this  thing  in- 
ferred from  touch  possesses  motion  and  quality,  and  does  not 
itself  inhere  in  any  other  substance,  it  is  a  substance  (dravya) 
and  is  eternal  I  The  inference  of  air  is  of  the  type  of  inference 
of  imperceptible  things  from  certain  known  characteristics 
called  sdmdnyato  drsta.  The  name  of  air  "vdyu"  is  derived 
from  the  scriptures.  The  existence  of  others  different  from  us 
has   {asmadvisistdndm)  to  be  admitted  for  accounting   for   the 

^  It  should  be  noted  that  mercury  is  not  mentioned.  This  is  important  for  mercury 
was  known  at  a  time  later  than  Caraka. 

2  Substance  is  that  which  possesses  quality  and  action.  It  should  be  noted  that 
the  word  '^ adravyatvefia  "  in  n.  i.  1 3  has  been  interpreted  by  me  as  "  adravyavattvena." 


288  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [cri. 

giving  of  names  to  things  (ysmnjuakavnid).  Because  we  find 
that  the  giving  of  names  is  already  in  usage  (and  not  invented 
by  us)\  On  account  of  the  fact  that  movements  rest  "only  in 
one  thing,  the  phenomenon  that  a  thing  can  enter  into  any  un- 
occupied space,  would  not  lead  us  to  infer  the  existence  of  akasa 
(ether).  Akasa  has  to  be  admitted  as  the  hypothetical  substance 
in  which  the  quality  of  sound  inheres,  because,  since  sound  (a 
quality)  is  not  the  characteristic  of  things  which  can  be  touched, 
there  must  be  some  substance  of  which  it  is  a  quality.  And  this 
substance  is  akasa.  It  is  a  substance  and  eternal  like  air.  As 
being  is  one  so  akasa  is  one-. 

In  the  second  chapter  of  the  second  book  Kanada  tries  to 
prove  that  smell  is  a  special  characteristic  of  earth,  heat  of  fire, 
and  coldness  of  water.  Time  is  defined  as  that  which  gives  the 
notion  of  youth  in  the  young,  simultaneity,  and  quickness.  It  is 
one  like  being.  Time  is  the  cause  of  all  non-eternal  things,  be- 
cause the  notion  of  time  is  absent  in  eternal  things.  Space 
supplies  the  notion  that  this  is  so  far  away  from  this  or  so  much 
nearer  to  this.  Like  being  it  is  one.  One  space  appears  to  have 
diverse  inter-space  relations  in  connection  with  the  motion  of  the 
sun.  As  a  preliminary  to  discussing  the  problem  whether  sound 
is  eternal  or  not,  he  discusses  the  notion  of  doubt,  which  arises 
when  a  thing  is  seen  in  a  general  way,  but  the  particular  features 
coming  under  it  are  not  seen,  either  when  these  are  only  remem- 
bered, or  when  some  such  attribute  is  seen  which  resembles  some 
other  attribute  seen  before,  or  when  a  thing  is  seen  in  one  way 
but  appears  in  another,  or  when  what  is  seen  is  not  definitely 
grasped,  whether  rightly  seen  or  not.  He  then  discusses  the  ques- 
tion whether  sound  is  eternal  or  non-eternal  and  gives  his  reasons 
to  show  that  it  is  non-eternal,  but  concludes  the  discussion  with 
a  number  of  other  reasons  proving  that  it  is  eternal. 

The  first  chapter  of  the  third  book  is  entirely  devoted  to  the 
inference  of  the  existence  of  soul  from  the  fact  that  there  must 
be  some  substance  in  which  knowledge  produced  by  the  contact 
of  the  senses  and  their  object  inheres. 

The  knowledge  of  sense-objects  {indriydrtha)  is  the  reason  by 

1  I  have  differed  from  Upaskdra  in  interpreting  '■'■  samjndkarma^^  in  II.  i.  1 8,  19  as 
a  genitive  compound  while  Upaskdra  makes  it  a  dvandva  compound.  Upaskara's 
interpretation  seems  to  be  far-fetched.  He  wants  to  twist  it  into  an  argument  for  the 
existence  of  (jod. 

-  This  interi)retation  is  according  to  .Sankara  Miira's  Upaskdra. 


viii]  Philosophy  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras  289 

which  we  can  infer  the  existence  of  something  different  from  the 
senses  and  the  objects  which  appear  in  connection  with  them.  The 
types  of  inferences  referred  to  are  ( i )  inference  of  non-existence  of 
some  things  from  the  existence  of  some  things,  (2)  of  the  existence 
of  some  things  from  the  non-existence  of  some  things,  (3)  of  the 
existence  of  some  things  from  the  existence  of  others.  In  all 
these  cases  inference  is  possible  only  when  the  two  are  known  to 
be  connected  with  each  other  {prasiddhipurvakatvdt  apadesasyay. 
When  such  a  connection  does  not  exist  or  is  doubtful,  we  have 
anapadesa  (fallacious  middle)  and  sandigdha  (doubtful  middle); 
thus,  it  is  a  horse  because  it  has  a  horn,  or  it  is  a  cow  because  it 
has  a  horn  are  examples  of  fallacious  reason.  The  inference  of 
soul  from  the  cognition  produced  by  the  contact  of  soul,  senses 
and  objects  is  not  fallacious  in  the  above  way.  The  inference  of 
the  existence  of  the  soul  in  others  may  be  made  in  a  similar  way 
in  which  the  existence  of  one's  own  soul  is  inferred^,  i.e.  by  virtue 
of  the  existence  of  movement  and  cessation  of  movement.  In  the 
second  chapter  it  is  said  that  the  fact  that  there  is  cognition  only 
when  there  is  contact  between  the  self,  the  senses  and  the  objects 
proves  that  there  is  manas  (mind),  and  this  manas  is  a  substance 
and  eternal,  and  this  can  be  proved  because  there  is  no  simul- 
taneity of  production  of  efforts  and  various  kinds  of  cognition;  it 
may  also  be  inferred  that  this  manas  is  one  (with  each  person). 

The  soul  may  be  inferred  from  inhalation,  exhalation,  twinkling 
of  the  eye,  life,  the  movement  of  the  mind,  the  sense-affections 
pleasure,  pain,  will,  antipathy,  and  effort.  That  it  is  a  substance 
and  eternal  can  be  proved  after  the  manner  of  vayu.  An  objector 
is  supposed  to  say  that  since  when  I  see  a  man  I  do  not  see  his 
soul,  the  inference  of  the  soul  is  of  the  type  of  sdmduyatodrsta 
inference,  i.e.,  from  the  perceived  signs  of  pleasure,  pain,  cog- 
nition to  infer  an  unknown  entity  to  which  they  belong,  but 
that  this  was  the  self  could  not  be  affirmed.  So  the  existence  of 
soul  has  to  be  admitted  on  the  strength  of  the  scriptures.  But 
the  Vaise.sika  reply  is  that  since  there  is  nothing  else  but  self  to 
which  the  expression  "I"  may  be  applied,  there  is  no  need  of 
falling  back  on  the  scriptures  for  the  existence  of  the  soul.    But 

^  In  connection  with  this  there  is  a  short  reference  to  the  methods  of  fallacy  in 
which  Gautama's  terminology  does  not  appear.  There  is  no  generalised  statement,  but 
specific  types  of  inference  are  only  pointed  out  as  the  basis. 

^  The  forms  of  inference  used  show  that  Kanada  was  probably  not  aware  of 
Gautama's  terminology. 

D.  19 


290  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

then  it  is  said  that  if  the  self  is  directly  perceived  in  such  ex- 
periences as  "I  am  Yajnadatta"  or  "I  am  Devadatta,"  what  is  the 
good  of  turning  to  inference?  The  reply  to  this  is  that  inference 
lending  its  aid  to  the  same  existence  only  strengthens  the  con- 
viction. When  we  say  that  Devadatta  goes  or  Yajnadatta  goes, 
there  comes  the  doubt  whether  by  Devadatta  or  Yajnadatta  the 
body  alone  is  meant;  but  the  doubt  is  removed  when  we  think 
that  the  notion  of  "I"  refers  to  the  self  and  not  to  anything  else. 
As  there  is  no  difference  regarding  the  production  of  pleasure, 
pain,  and  cognition,  the  soul  is  one  in  all.  But  yet  it  is  many 
by  special  limitations  as  individuals  and  this  is  also  proved  on 
the  strength  of  the  scriptures^. 

In  the  first  chapter  of  the  fourth  book  it  is  said  that  that 
which  is  existent,  but  yet  has  no  cause,  should  be  considered 
eternal  {nityd).  It  can  be  inferred  by  its  effect,  for  the  effect  can 
only  take  place  because  of  the  cause.  When  we  speak  of  any- 
thing as  non-eternal,  it  is  only  a  negation  of  the  eternal,  so  that 
also  proves  that  there  is  something  eternal.  The  non-eternal 
is  ignorance  {avidydy.  Colour  is  visible  in  a  thing  which  is  great 
{niahat)  and  compounded.  Air  {vdyu)  is  not  perceived  to  have 
colour,  though  it  is  great  and  made  up  of  parts,  because  it  has  not 
the  actuality  of  colour  {rupasamskara — i.e.  in  air  there  is  only 
colour  in  its  unmanifested  form)  in  it  Colour  is  thus  visible  only 
when  there  is  colour  with  special  qualifications  and  conditions^.  In 
this  way  the  cognition  of  taste,  smell,  and  touch  is  also  explained. 
Number, measure, separateness, contact,  and  disjoining,  the  quality 
of  belonging  to  a  higher  or  lower  class,  action,  all  these  as  they 
abide  in  things  possessing  colour  are  visible  to  the  eye.  The 
number  etc.  of  those  which  have  no  colour  are  not  perceived  by  the 
eye.   But  the  notion  of  being  and  also  of  genus  of  quality  (gunatva) 

^  I  have  differed  here  from  the  meaning  given  in  Upaskdra.  I  think  the  three 
sutras  '■' Stikhaduhkhajnaiianispattyavisesddekatmyamr  "-vyavasthdto  nana,'"  and  ^' sas- 
trasamarthydt  ca  "  originally  meant  that  the  self  was  one,  though  for  the  sake  of  many 
limitations,  and  also  because  of  the  need  of  the  performance  of  acts  enjoined  by  the 
scriptures,  they  are  regarded  as  many. 

■■'  I  have  differed  here  also  in  my  meaning  from  the  Upaskdra,  which  regards  this 
sutra  "  a7jidyd"  to  mean  that  we  do  not  know  of  any  reasons  which  lead  to  the  non- 
eternality  of  the  atoms. 

"'  This  is  what  is  meant  in  the  later  distinctions  of  udbhutarupavattva  and  anud- 
bhutarupavattva.  The  word  samskdra  in  Vai^esika  has  many  senses.  It  means  inertia, 
elasticity,  collection  (samavdya),  production  (udi/iava)  and  not  hs'ing  overcome  {anab- 
hibhava).    For  the  last  three  senses  see  Upaskdra  iv.  i.  7. 


viii]  Philosophy  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras  291 

are  perceived  by  all  the  senses  (just  as  colour,  taste,  smell,  touch, 
and  sound  are  perceived  by  one  sense,  cognition,  pleasure,  pain, 
etc,  by  the  manas  and  number  etc.  by  the  visual  and  the  tactile 
sense) \ 

In  the  second  chapter  of  the  fourth  book  it  is  said  that  the 
earth,  etc.  exist  in  three  forms,  body,  sense,  and  objects.  There 
cannot  be  any  compounding  of  the  five  elements  or  even  of  the 
three,  but  the  atoms  of  different  elements  may  combine  when  one 
of  them  acts  as  the  central  radicle  {upastambhakd).  Bodies  are  of 
two  kinds,  those  produced  from  ovaries  and  those  which  are  other- 
wise produced  by  the  combination  of  the  atoms  in  accordance 
with  special  kinds  of  dharma.  All  combinations  of  atoms  are  due 
to  special  kinds  of  dharmas.  Such  super-mundane  bodies  are  to 
be  admitted  for  explaining  the  fact  that  things  must  have  been 
given  names  by  beings  having  such  super-mundane  bodies,  and 
also  on  account  of  the  authority  of  the  Vedas. 

In  the  first  chapter  of  the  fifth  book  action  {karma)  is  dis- 
cussed. Taking  the  example  of  threshing  the  corn,  it  is  said 
that  the  movement  of  the  hand  is  due  to  its  contact  with  the 
soul  in  a  state  of  effort,  and  the  movement  of  the  flail  is  due 
to  its  contact  with  the  hand.  But  in  the  case  of  the  uprising  of 
the  flail  in  the  threshing  pot  due  to  impact  the  movement  is 
not  due  to  contact  with  the  hands,  and  so  the  uplifting  of  the 
hand  in  touch  with  the  flail  is  not  due  to  its  contact  with  the 
soul;  for  it  is  due  to  the  impact  of  the  flail.  On  account  of 
heaviness  {gurutvd)  the  flail  will  fall  when  not  held  by  the  hand. 
Things  may  have  an  upward  or  side  motion  by  specially  directed 
motions  {nodanavisesa)  which  are  generated  by  special  kinds  of 
efforts.  Even  without  effort  the  body  may  move  during  sleep. 
The  movement  of  needles  towards  magnets  is  due  to  an  unknown 
cause  {adrstakaranaka).  The  arrow  first  acquires  motion  by 
specially  directed  movement,  and  then  on  account  of  its  inertia 
{vegasamskara)  keeps  on  moving  and  when  that  ceases  it  falls 
down  through  heaviness. 

The  second  chapter  abounds  with  extremely  crude  explana- 

^  This  portion  has  been  taken  from  the  Upaskdra  of  Sankara  Mi^ra  on  the  Vaise- 
sika sUtras  of  Kanada.  It  must  be  noted  here  that  the  notion  of  number  according  to 
Vaisesika  is  due  to  mental  relativity  or  oscillation  (apeksdbuddhijanya).  But  this  mental 
relativity  can  only  start  when  the  thing  having  number  is  either  seen  or  touched  ;  and  it 
is  in  this  sense  that  notion  of  number  is  said  to  depend  on  the  visual  or  the  tactual 
sense. 

19 — 2 


292  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

tions  of  certain  physical  phenomena  which  have  no  philosophical 
importance.  All  the  special  phenomena  of  nature  are  explained 
as  being  due  to  unknown  cause  {adrstakdritani)  and  no  ex- 
planation is  given  as  to  the  nature  of  this  unknown  {adrsta). 
It  is  however  said  that  with  the  absence  of  adrsta  there  is  no  con- 
tact of  body  with  soul,  and  thus  there  is  no  rebirth,  and  therefore 
moksa  (salvation);  pleasure  and  pain  are  due  to  contact  of  the 
self,  manas,  senses  and  objects.  Yoga  is  that  in  which  the  mind 
is  in  contact  with  the  self  alone,  by  which  the  former  becomes 
steady  and  there  is  no  pain  in  the  body.  Time,  space,  akasa  are 
regarded  as  inactive. 

The  whole  of  the  sixth  book  is  devoted  to  showing  that  gifts 
are  made  to  proper  persons  not  through  sympathy  but  on  account 
of  the  injunction  of  the  scriptures,  the  enumeration  of  certain 
Vedic  performances,  which  brings  in  adrsta,  purification  and  im- 
purities of  things,  how  passions  are  often  generated  by  adrsta, 
how  dharma  and  adharma  lead  to  birth  and  death  and  how  moksa 
takes  place  as  a  result  of  the  work  of  the  soul. 

In  the  seventh  book  it  is  said  that  the  qualities  in  eternal 
things  are  eternal  and  in  non-eternal  things  non-eternal.  The 
change  of  qualities  produced  by  heat  in  earth  has  its  beginning 
in  the  cause  (the  atoms).  Atomic  size  is  invisible  while  great  size 
is  visible.  Visibility  is  due  to  a  thing's  being  made  up  of  many 
causes^,  but  the  atom  is  therefore  different  from  those  that  have 
great  size.  The  same  thing  may  be  called  great  and  small  rela- 
tively at  the  same  time.  In  accordance  with  anutva  (atomic)  and 
mahattva  (great)  there  are  also  the  notions  of  small  and  big.  The 
eternal  size  oi parimandala  (round)  belongs  to  the  atoms.  Akasa 
and  atman  are  called  niahan  or  paraniamahan  (the  supremely 
great  or  all-pervasive);  since  manas  is  not  of  the  great  measure 
it  is  of  atomic  size.  Space  and  time  are  also  considered  as  being 
of  the  measure  "supremely  great"  (paramamahat).  Atomic  size 
(parimandala)  belonging  to  the  atoms  and  the  mind  (manas)  and 
the  supremely  great  size  belonging  to  space,  time,  soul  and  ether 
(akasa)  are  regarded  as  eternal. 

In  the  second  chapter  of  the  seventh  book  it  is  said  that  unity 

and  separateness  are  to  be  admitted  as  entities  distinct  from 

other  qualities.    There  is  no  number  in  movement  and  quality; 

the  appearance  of  number  in  them  is  false.    Cause  and  effect  are 

'  I  have  differed  from  the  Upaskara  in  the  interpretation  of  this  sutra. 


VI 1 1]  Philosophy  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras  293 

neither  one,  nor  have  they  distinctive  separateness  {ekaprthaktvd). 
The  notion  of  unity  is  the  cause  of  the  notion  of  duahty,  etc. 
Contact  may  be  due  to  the  action  of  one  or  two  things,  or  the 
effect  of  another  contact  and  so  is  disjoining.  There  is  neither 
contact  nor  disjoining  in  cause  and  effect  since  they  do  not  exist 
independently  {yuiasidd/iyabhdvdt).  In  the  eighth  book  it  is  said 
that  soul  and  manas  are  not  perceptible,  and  that  in  the  ap- 
prehension of  qualities,  action,  generality,  and  particularity 
perception  is  due  to  their  contact  with  the  thing.  Earth  is  the 
cause  of  perception  of  smell,  and  water,  fire,  and  air  are  the 
cause  of  taste,  colour  and  touchy  In  the  ninth  book  negation  is 
described ;  non-existence  {asat)  is  defined  as  that  to  which 
neither  action  nor  quality  can  be  attributed.  Even  existent  things 
may  become  non-existent  and  that  which  is  existent  in  one 
way  may  be  non-existent  in  another;  but  there  is  another  kind 
of  non-existence  which  is  different  from  the  above  kinds  of 
existence  and  non-existence-.  All  negation  can  be  directly  per- 
ceived through  the  help  of  the  memory  which  keeps  before  the 
mind  the  thing  to  which  the  negation  applies.  Allusion  is  also 
made  in  this  connection  to  the  special  perceptual  powers  of  the 
yogins  (sages  attaining  mystical  powers  through  Yoga  practices). 
In  the  second  chapter  the  nature  of  hetu  (reason)  or  the 
middle  term  is  described.  It  is  said  that  anything  connected 
with  any  other  thing,  as  effect,  cause,  as  in  contact,  or  as  con- 
trary or  as  inseparably  connected,  will  serve  as  liiiga  (reason). 
The  main  point  is  the  notion  "this  is  associated  with  this,"  or 
"these  two  are  related  as  cause  and  effect,"  and  since  this  may 
also  be  produced  through  premisses,  there  may  be  a  formal  syllo- 
gism from  propositions  fulfilling  the  above  condition.  Verbal 
cognition  comes  without  inference.  False  knowledge  iavidyd)  is 
due  to  the  defect  of  the  senses  or  non-observation  and  mal- 
observation  due  to  wrong  expectant  impressions.  The  opposite 
of  this  is  true  knowledge  (yidyd).  In  the  tenth  it  is  said  that 
pleasure  and  pain  are  not  cognitions,  since  they  are  not  related  to 
doubt  and  certainty. 

^  Upaskdra  here  explains  that  it  is  intended  that  the  senses  are  produced  by  those 
specific  elements,  but  this  cannot  be  found  in  the  sutras. 

2  In  the  previous  three  kinds  of  non-existence,  prdgabhava  (negation  before  pro- 
duction), dhvamsabhdva  (negation  after  destruction),  and  anyonydbhdva  (mutual 
negation  of  each  other  in  each  other),  have  been  described.  The  fourth  one  is  sdnidn- 
ydbhdva  (general  negation). 


294  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

A  dravya  may  be  caused  by  the  inhering  of  the  effect  in  it,  for 
because  of  its  contact  with  another  thing  the  effect  is  produced. 
Karma  (motion)  is  also  a  cause  since  it  inheres  in  the  cause.  Con- 
tact is  also  a  cause  since  it  inheres  in  the  cause.  A  contact  which 
inheres  in  the  cause  of  the  cause  and  thereby  helps  the  production 
of  the  effect  is  also  a  cause.  The  special  quality  of  the  heat  of 
fire  is  also  a  cause. 

Works  according  to  the  injunctions  of  the  scriptures  since  they 
have  no  visible  effect  are  the  cause  of  prosperity,  and  because  the 
Vedas  direct  them,  they  have  validity. 

Philosophy  in  the  Nyaya  sutras^ 

The  Nyaya  sntras  begin  with  an  enumeration  of  the  sixteen 
subjects,  viz.  means  of  right  knowledge  {pramdna),  object  of  right 
knowledge  {prarneyd),  doubt  (samsaya),  purpose  (prayq/ana),  il- 
lustrative instances  {drstdntd),  accepted  conclusions  {siddkdnta), 
premisses  {avayava),  argumentation  {tarka),  ascertainment  {nir- 
naya)y  debates  {vddd),  disputations  {jalpa),  destructive  criticisms 
{vitandd),  fallacy  {hetvdbhdsa),  quibble  {chala),  refutations  {Jdti), 
points  of  opponent's  defeat  {nigrakasthdna),  and  hold  that  by  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  these  the  highest  good  {nihsreyasa),  is 
attained.  In  the  second  sutra  it  is  said  that  salvation  iapavargd) 
is  attained  by  the  successive  disappearance  of  false  knowledge 
{mithydjndnd),  defects  {dosa),  endeavours  {pravrtti),  birth  {j'an- 
md),  and  ultimately  of  sorrow.  Then  the  means  of  proof  are  said 
to  be  of  four  kinds,  perception  {pratyaksd),  inference  {anumdna), 
analogy  {upamdna),  and  testimony  {sabda).  Perception  is  defined 
as  uncontradicted  determinate  knowledge  unassociated  with  names 
proceeding  out  of  sense  contact  with  objects.  Inference  is  of  three 
kinds,  from  cause  to  effect  {purvavat),  effect  to  cause  {sesavat), 
and  inference  from  common  characteristics  {sd'^ndnyato  drsta). 
Upamana  is  the  knowing  of  anything  by  similarity  with  any  well- 
known  thing. 

Sabda  is  defined  as  the  testimony  of  reliable  authority  (apta)^ 

^  This  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  doctrines  found  in  Nyaya  sutras,  supplemented 
here  and  there  with  the  views  of  Vatsyayana,  the  commentator.  This  follows  the 
order  of  the  sutras,  and  tries  to  present  their  ideas  with  as  little  additions  from  those 
of  later  day  Nyaya  as  possible.  The  general  treatment  of  Nyaya- Vai^esika  expounds 
the  two  systems  in  the  light  of  later  writers  and  commentators. 

^  It  is  curious  to  notice  that  Vatsyayana  says  that  an  arya,  a  rsi  or  a  ndeccha 
(foreigner),  may  be  an  apla  (reliable  authority). 


viii]  Philosophy  in  the  Nyaya  sutras  295 

Such  a  testimony  may  tell  us  about  things  which  may  be  ex- 
perienced and  which  are  beyond  experience.  Objects  of  know- 
ledge are  said  to  be  self  {dtman),  body,  senses,  sense-objects, 
understanding  {budd/ii),  mind  {manas),  endeavour  {pravrtH\  re- 
births, enjoyment  of  pleasure  and  suffering  of  pain,  sorrow  and 
salvation.  Desire,  antipathy,  effort  {prayatna),  pleasure,  pain,  and 
knowledge  indicate  the  existence  of  the  self  Body  is  that  which 
upholds  movement,  the  senses  and  the  rise  of  pleasure  and  pain 
as  arising  out  of  the  contact  of  sense  with  sense-objects  i;  the  five 
senses  are  derived  from  the  five  elements,  such  as  prthivl,  ap, 
tejas,  vayu  and  akasa;  smell,  taste,  colour,  touch,  and  sound  are 
the  qualities  of  the  above  five  elements,  and  these  are  also  the 
objects  of  the  senses.  The  fact  that  many  cognitions  cannot 
occur  at  any  one  moment  indicates  the  existence  of  mind  {ina7ias). 
Endeavour  means  what  is  done  by  speech,  understanding,  and 
body.  Dosas  (attachment,  antipathy,  etc.)  are  those  which  lead 
men  to  virtue  and  vice.  Pain  is  that  which  causes  suffering*. 
Ultimate  cessation  from  pain  is  called  apavarga"^.  Doubt  arises 
when  through  confusion  of  similar  qualities  or  conflicting  opinions 
etc.,  one  wants  to  settle  one  of  the  two  alternatives.  That  for 
attaining  which,  or  for  giving  up  which  one  sets  himself  to  work 
is  called  prayojana. 

Illustrative  example  {drstdntd)  is  that  on  which  both  the 
common  man  and  the  expert  {parzksaka)  hold  the  same  opinion. 
Established  texts  or  conclusions  (siddhdnta)  are  of  four  kinds, 
viz.  (i)  those  which  are  accepted  by  all  schools  of  thought  called 
the  sarvatantrasiddhdnta\  (2)  those  which  are  held  by  one  school 
or  similar  schools  but  opposed  by  others  called  the  pratitantra- 
siddkdnta;  (3)  those  which  being  accepted  other  conclusions  will 
also  naturally  follow  called  adhikaranasiddhdnta\  (4)  those  of  the 
opponent's  views  which  are  uncritically  granted  by  a  debater,  who 
proceeds  then  to  refute  the  consequences  that  follow  and  thereby 
show  his  own  special  skill  and  bring  the  opponent's  intellect  to 
disrepute   {abhyiipagamasiddhdntay.     The    premisses    are    five: 

^  Here  I  have  followed  Vatsyayana's  meaning. 

^  Vatsyayana  comments  here  that  when  one  finds  all  things  full  of  misery,  he 
wishes  to  avoid  misery,  and  finding  birth  to  be  associated  with  pain  becomes  unattached 
and  thus  is  emancipated. 

^  Vatsyayana  wants  to  emphasize  that  there  is  no  bliss  in  salvation,  but  only 
cessation  from  pain. 

^  I  have  followed  Vatsyayana's  interpretation  here. 


296  The  Ny  ay  a- Vaiiesika  Philosophy  [cH. 

(i)  pratijha  (the  first  enunciation  of  the  thing  to  be  proved); 
(2)  hetii  (the  reason  which  establishes  the  conclusion  on  the 
strength  of  the  similarity  of  the  case  in  hand  with  known  exam- 
ples or  negative  instances);  (3)  uddharana  (positive  or  negative 
illustrative  instances) ;  (4)  iipanaya  (corroboration  by  the  instance) ; 
(5)  nigamana  (to  reach  the  conclusion  which  has  been  proved). 
Then  come  the  definitions  of  tarka,  nirnaya,  vada,  jalpa,  vitanda, 
the  fallacies  (hetvabhasa),  chala,  jati,  and  nigrahasthana,  which 
have  been  enumerated  in  the  first  sutra. 

The  second  book  deals  with  the  refutations  of  objections 
against  the  means  of  right  knowledge  (pramana).  In  refutation 
of  certain  objections  against  the  possibility  of  the  happening 
of  doubt,  which  held  that  doubt  could  not  happen,  since  there 
was  always  a  difference  between  the  two  things  regarding  which 
doubt  arose,  it  is  held  that  doubt  arises  when  the  special  dif- 
ferentiating characteristics  between  the  two  things  are  not  noted. 
Certain  objectors,  probably  the  Buddhists,  are  supposed  to  object 
to  the  validity  of  the  pramana  in  general  and  particularly  of 
perceptions  on  the  ground  that  if  they  were  generated  before 
the  sense-object  contact,  they  could  not  be  due  to  the  latter, 
and  if  they  are  produced  after  the  sense-object  contact,  they 
could  not  establish  the  nature  of  the  objects,  and  if  the  two 
happened  together  then  there  would  be  no  notion  of  succession 
in  our  cognitions.  To  this  the  Nyaya  reply  is  that  if  there  were 
no  means  of  right  knowledge,  then  there  would  be  no  means  of 
knowledge  by  means  of  which  the  objector  would  refute  all 
means  of  right  knowledge;  if  the  objector  presumes  to  have  any 
means  of  valid  knowledge  then  he  cannot  say  that  there  are  no 
means  of  valid  knowledge  at  all.  Just  as  from  the  diverse  kinds 
of  sounds  of  different  musical  instruments,  one  can  infer  the  pre- 
vious existence  of  those  different  kinds  of  musical  instruments, 
so  from  our  knowledge  of  objects  we  can  infer  the  previous  exist- 
ence of  those  objects  of  knowledge*. 

The  same  things  (e.g.  the  senses,  etc.)  which  are  regarded  as 
instruments  of  right  knowledge  with  reference  to  the  right  cog- 
nition of  other  things   may  themselves  be  the  objects  of  right 

'  Yathdpakdlsiddhena  sabdena  purvasiddham  atodyamanunnyate  sddhyam  ca  ato- 
dyam  sadhanam  ca  §abdah  antarhite  hydtodye  svanatah  anuvidnam  bhavattti,  vtna 
vddyate  venuh  puryyate  iti  svanavihsena  dtodyaviksam  pratipadyate  tathd  purvasid- 
dham upalabdhivisayam  pakdtsiddhena  upalabdhihetund  pratipadyate.  Vdtsydyana 
bhdsya,  ll.  i.  15. 


viiij  Philosophy  in  the  Nyaya  sutras  297 

knowledge.  There  are  no  hard  and  fast  limits  that  those  which 
are  instruments  of  knowledge  should  always  be  treated  as  mere 
instruments,  for  they  themselves  may  be  objects  of  right  know- 
ledge. The  means  of  right  knowledge  (pramana)  do  not  require 
other  sets  of  means  for  revealing  them,  for  they  like  the  light  of 
a  lamp  in  revealing  the  objects  of  right  knowledge  reveal  them- 
selves as  well. 

Coming  to  the  question  of  the  correctness  of  the  definition 
of  perception,  it  is  held  that  the  definition  includes  the  contact 
of  the  soul  with  the  mind^  Then  it  is  said  that  though  we  per- 
ceive only  parts  of  things,  yet  since  there  is  a  whole,  the  per- 
ception of  the  part  will  naturally  refer  to  the  whole.  Since  we 
can  pull  and  draw  things  wholes  exist,  and  the  whole  is  not 
merely  the  parts  collected  together,  for  were  it  so  one  could 
say  that  we  perceived  the  ultimate  parts  or  the  atomsl  Some 
objectors  hold  that  since  there  may  be  a  plurality  of  causes  it  is 
wrong  to  infer  particular  causes  from  particular  effects.  To  this 
the  Nyaya  answer  is  that  there  is  always  such  a  difference  in  the 
specific  nature  of  each  effect  that  if  properly  observed  each  par- 
ticular effect  will  lead  us  to  a  correct  inference  of  its  own  par- 
ticular caused  In  refuting  those  who  object  to  the  existence  of 
time  on  the  ground  of  relativity,  it  is  said  that  if  the  present  time 
did  not  exist,  then  no  perception  of  it  would  have  been  possible. 
The  past  and  future  also  exist,  for  otherwise  we  should  not  have 
perceived  things  as  being  done  in  the  past  or  as  going  to  be 
done  in  the  future.  The  validity  of  analogy  {iipamdnd)  as  a 
means  of  knowledge  and  the  validity  of  the  Vedas  is  then  proved. 
The  four  pramanas  of  perception,  inference,  analogy,  and  scripture 

'  Here  the  sutras,  ii.  i.  20-28,  are  probably  later  interpolations  to  answer  criticisms, 
not  against  the  Nyaya  doctrine  of  perception,  but  against  the  wording  of  the  definition 
of  perception  as  given  in  the  Nyaya  sutra,  11.  i.  4. 

-  This  is  a  refutation  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Buddhists,  who  rejected  the  existence 
of  wholes  (avayavi).  On  this  subject  a  later  Buddhist  monograph  by  Pandita  A^oka 
(9th  century  A. D.),  Avayavinirakarana  in  Six  Buddhist  Nyaya  Tracts,  may  be  re- 
ferred to. 

^  PHrvodakaviHstam  khalii  varsodakan  ^ighrataram  srotasd  bahutaraphetiaphala- 
parnakdsthadivahanaficopalabhama7iah  purnatvena,  nadyd  upari  vrsto  deva  ityanu- 
tninoti  nodakabrddhimdtrena.  Vdtsydyana  bhdsya,  II.  i.  38.  The  inference  that  there 
has  been  rain  up  the  river  is  not  made  merely  from  seeing  the  rise  of  water,  but  from 
the  rainwater  augmenting  the  previous  water  of  the  river  and  carrying  with  its  current 
large  quantities  of  foam,  fruits,  leaves,  wood,  etc.  These  characteristics,  associated 
with  the  rise  of  water,  mark  it  as  a  special  kind  of  rise  of  water,  which  can  only  be 
due  to  the  happening  of  rain  up  the  river. 


298  The  Ny  ay  a- Vaisesika  Philosophy  [cH. 

are  quite  sufficient  and  it  is  needless  to  accept  arthapatti  (impli- 
cation), aitihya  (tradition),  sambhava  (when  a  thing  is  understood 
in  terms  of  higher  measure  the  lower  measure  contained  in  it  is 
also  understood — if  we  know  that  there  is  a  bushel  of  corn  any- 
where we  understand  that  the  same  contains  eight  gallons  of 
corn  as  well)  and  abhava  (non-existence)  as  separate  pramanas 
for  the  tradition  is  included  in  verbal  testimony  and  arthapatti, 
sambhava  and  abhava  are  included  within  inference. 

The  validity  of  these  as  pramanas  is  recognized,  but  they  are 
said  to  be  included  in  the  four  pramanas  mentioned  before.  The 
theory  of  the  eternity  of  sound  is  then  refuted  and  the  non- 
eternity  proved  in  great  detail.  The  meaning  of  words  is  said  to 
refer  to  class-notions  {Jdti),  individuals  (vyakti),  and  the  specific 
position  of  the  limbs  {dkrti),  by  which  the  class  notion  is  mani- 
fested. Class  {Jdti)  is  defined  as  that  which  produces  the  notion 
of  sameness  {samdnaprasavdtmikd  jdtiJi). 

The  third  book  begins  with  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of 
the  self  or  atman.  It  is  said  that  each  of  the  senses  is  associated 
with  its  own  specific  object,  but  there  must  exist  some  other  entity 
in  us  which  gathered  together  the  different  sense-cognitions  and 
produced  the  perception  of  the  total  object  as  distinguished  from 
the  separate  sense-perceptions.  If  there  were  no  self  then  there 
would  be  no  sin  in  injuring  the  bodies  of  men;  again  if  there 
were  no  permanent  self,  no  one  would  be  able  to  recognize 
things  as  having  seen  them  before;  the  two  images  produced  by 
the  eyes  in  visual  perception  could  not  also  have  been  united 
together  as  one  visual  perception  of  the  things"';  moreover  if 
there  were  no  permanent  cognizer  then  by  the  sight  of  a  sour 
fruit  one  couM  not  be  reminded  of  its  sour  taste.  If  conscious- 
ness belonged  to  the  senses  only,  then  there  would  be  no  recogni- 
tion, for  the  experience  of  one  could  not  be  recognized  by  another. 
If  it  is  said  that  the  unity  of  sensations  could  as  well  be  effected 
by  manas  (mind),  then  the  manas  would  serve  the  same  purpose 
as  self  and  it  would  only  be  a  quarrel  over  a  name,  for  this 
entity  the  knower  would  require  some  instrument  by  which  it 
would  co-ordinate  the  sensations  and  cognize;  unless  manas  is 
admitted  as  a  separate  instrument  of  the  soul,  then  though  the 
sense  perceptions  could  be  explained  as  being  the  work  of  the 

'  According  to  Vatsyayana,  in  the  two  eyes  we  have  two  different  senses.    Udyo- 
takara,  however,  thinks  that  there  is  one  visual  sense  which  works  in  both  eyes. 


viii]  Philosophy  in  the  Nyaya  sutras  299 

senses,  yet  imagining,  thinking,  etc.,  could  not  be  explained. 
Another  argument  for  the  admission  of  soul  is  this,  that  infants 
show  signs  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  quite  early  stages  of  infancy 
and  this  could  not  be  due  to  anything  but  similar  experiences  in 
previous  lives.  Moreover  every  creature  is  born  with  some  desires, 
and  no  one  is  seen  to  be  born  without  desires.  All  attachments 
and  desires  are  due  to  previous  experiences,  and  therefore  it  is 
argued  that  desires  in  infants  are  due  to  their  experience  in 
previous  existences. 

The  body  is  made  up  of  the  ksiti  element.  The  visual  sense 
is  material  and  so  also  are  all  other  senses^  Incidentally  the 
view  held  by  some  that  the  skin  is  the  only  organ  of  sensation 
is  also  refuted.  The  earth  possesses  four  qualities,  water  three, 
fire  two,  air  one,  and  ether  one,  but  the  sense  of  smell,  taste,  eye, 
and  touch  which  are  made  respectively  by  the  four  elements  of 
earth,  etc.,  can  only  grasp  the  distinctive  features  of  the  elements 
of  which  they  are  made.  Thus  though  the  organ  of  smell  is  made 
by  earth  which  contains  four  qualities,  it  can  only  grasp  the  dis- 
tinctive quality  of  earth,  viz.  smell. 

Against  the  Samkhya  distinction  of  biiddhi  (cognition)  and 
cit  (pure  intelligence)  it  is  said  that  there  is  no  difference  between 
the  biiddhi  and  cit.  We  do  not  find  in  our  consciousness  two 
elements  of  a  phenomenal  and  a  non-phenomenal  consciousness, 
but  only  one,  by  whichever  name  it  may  be  called.  The  Samkhya 
epistemology  that  the  antahkarana  assumes  diverse  forms  in 
cognitive  acts  is  also  denied,  and  these  are  explained  on  the  sup- 
position of  contacts  of  manas  with  the  senses,  atman  and  external 
objects.  The  Buddhist  objection  against  the  Samkhya  explana- 
tion that  the  antahkaranas  catch  reflection  from  the  external 
world  just  as  a  crystal  does  from  the  coloured  objects  that  may 
lie  near  it,  that  there  were  really  momentary  productions  of 
crystals  and  no  permanent  crystal  catching  different  reflections  at 
different  times  is  refuted  by  Nyaya;  for  it  says  that  it  cannot  be 
said  that  all  creations  are  momentary,  but  it  can  only  be  agreed  to 
in  those  cases  where  momentariness  was  actually  experienced. 
In  the  case  of  the  transformation  of  milk  into  curd  there  is  no 
coming  in  of  new  qualities  and  disappearance  of  old  ones,  but 

^  It  is  well  to  remember  that  Samkhya  did  not  believe  that  the  senses  were  con- 
stituted of  the  gross  elements.  But  the  Samkhya- Yoga  view  represented  in  Aireya- 
samhita  {Caraka)  regarded  the  senses  as  bhautika  or  constituted  of  the  gross  elements. 


300  The  Nydya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

the  old  milk  is  destroyed  and  the  curd  originates  anew.  The 
contact  of  manas  with  soul  {dtman)  takes  place  within  the  body 
and  not  in  that  part  of  atman  which  is  outside  the  body;  know- 
ledge belongs  to  the  self  and  not  to  the  senses  or  the  object  for 
even  when  they  are  destroyed  knowledge  remains.  New  cogni- 
tions destroy  the  old  ones.  No  two  recollections  can  be  simul- 
taneous. Desire  and  antipathy  also  belong  to  the  soul.  None  of 
these  can  belong  either  to  the  body  or  to  the  mind  (manas). 
Manas  cannot  be  conscious  for  it  is  dependent  upon  self.  Again 
if  it  was  conscious  then  the  actions  done  by  it  would  have  to  be 
borne  by  the  self  and  one  cannot  reap  the  fruits  of  the  actions  of 
another.  The  causes  of  recollection  on  the  part  of  self  are  given 
as  follows:  (i)  attention,  (2)  context,  (3)  repetition,  (4)  sign, 
(5)  association,  (6)  likeness,  (7)  association  of  the  possessor 
and  the  possessed  or  master  and  servant,  or  things  which 
are  generally  seen  to  follow  each  other,  (8)  separation  (as  of 
husband  and  wife),  (9)  simpler  employment,  (10)  opposition, 
(11)  excess,  (12)  that  from  which  anything  can  be  got,  (13)  cover 
and  covered,  (14)  pleasure  and  pain  causing  memory  of  that 
which  caused  them,  (15)  fear,  (16)  entreaty,  (17)  action  such 
as  that  of  the  chariot  reminding  the  charioteer,  (18)  affection, 
(19)  merit  and  demerits  It  is  said  that  knowledge  does  not  belong 
to  body,  and  then  the  question  of  the  production  of  the  body  as 
due  to  adrsta  is  described.  Salvation  {apavargd)  is  effected  by 
the  manas  being  permanenly  separated  from  the  soul  (atman) 
through  the  destruction  of  karma. 

In  the  fourth  book  in  course  of  the  examination  of  dosa 
(defects),  it  is  said  that  moha  (ignorance),  is  at  the  root  of  all 
other  defects  such  as  raga  (attachment)  and  dvesa  (antipathy). 
As  against  the  Buddhist  view  that  a  thing  could  be  produced  by 
destruction,  it  is  said  that  destruction  is  only  a  stage  in  the 
process  of  origination.  Isvara  is  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the 
production  of  effects  of  deeds  performed  by  men's  efforts,  for 
man  is  not  always  found  to  attain  success  according  to  his  efforts. 
A  reference  is  made  to  the  doctrine  of  those  who  say  that  all 
things  have  come  into  being  by  no-cause  {animittd),  for  then 
no-cause  would  be  the  cause,  which  is  impossible. 

The  doctrine  of  some  that  all  things  are  eternal  is  next  refuted 
on  the  ground  that  we  always  see  things  produced  and  destroyed, 

'   Nyaya  siltra  in.  ii.  44. 


viii]  Caraka,  Nydya  and  Vaisesika  301 

The  doctrine  of  the  nihilistic  Buddhists  (sunyavadin  Bauddhas) 
that  all  things  are  what  they  are  by  virtue  of  their  relations  to 
other  things,  and  that  of  other  Buddhists  who  hold  that  there  are 
merely  the  qualities  and  parts  but  no  substances  or  wholes,  are 
then  refuted.  The  fruits  of  karmas  are  regarded  as  being  like 
the  fruits  of  trees  which  take  some  time  before  they  can  ripen. 
Even  though  there  may  be  pleasures  here  and  there,  birth  means 
sorrow  for  men,  for  even  the  man  who  enjoys  pleasure  is  tor- 
mented by  many  sorrows,  and  sometimes  one  mistakes  pains  for 
pleasures.  As  there  is  no  sorrow  in  the  man  who  is  in  deep  dream- 
less sleep,  so  there  is  no  affliction  {klesa)  in  the  man  who  attains 
apavarga  (salvation)^  When  once  this  state  is  attained  all  efforts 
{pravrtti)  cease  for  ever,  for  though  efforts  were  beginningless 
with  us  they  were  all  due  to  attachment,  antipathy,  etc.  Then 
there  are  short  discussions  regarding  the  way  in  which  egoism 
{ahainkdra)  ceases  with  the  knowledge  of  the  true  causes  of  de- 
fects (dosa);  about  the  nature  of  whole  and  parts  and  about  the 
nature  of  atoms  (anus)  which  cannot  further  be  divided.  A  dis- 
cussion is  then  introduced  against  the  doctrine  of  the  Vijfiana- 
vadins  that  nothing  can  be  regarded  as  having  any  reality  when 
separated  from  thoughts.  Incidentally  Yoga  is  mentioned  as 
leading  to  right  knowledge. 

The  whole  of  the  fifth  book  which  seems  to  be  a  later  addition 
is  devoted  to  the  enumeration  of  different  kinds  of  refutations 
inigrahasthdnd)  and  futilities  {jati). 

Caraka,  Nyaya  sutras  and  Vaisesika  sutras. 

When  we  compare  the  Nyaya  sutras  with  the  Vaisesika 
sutras  we  find  that  in  the  former  two  or  three  different  streams 
of  purposes  have  met,  whereas  the  latter  is  much  more  homo- 
geneous. The  large  amount  of  materials  relating  to  debates 
treated  as  a  practical  art  for  defeating  an  opponent  would  lead 
one  to  suppose  that  it  was  probably  originally  compiled  from 
some  other  existing  treatises  which  were  used  by  Hindus  and 
Buddhists  alike  for  rendering  themselves  fit  to  hold  their  own  in 
debates  with  their  opponents^   This  assumption  is  justified  when 

^  Vatsyayana  notes  that  this  is  the  salvation  of  him  who  has  known  Brahman,  iv.  i.  63. 

'  A  reference  to  the  Suvarnaprabhasa  sutra  shows  that  the  Buddhist  missionaries 
used  to  get  certain  preparations  for  improving  their  voice  in  order  to  be  able  to  argue 
with  force,  and  they  took  to  the  worship  of  Sarasvati  (goddess  of  learning),  who  they 
supposed  would  help  them  in  bringing  readily  before  their  mind  all  the  information 
and  ideas  of  which  they  stood  so  much  in  need  at  the  time  of  debates. 


302  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

we  compare  the  futilities  (jati)  quibbles  (chala),  etc.,  relating  to 
disputations  as  found  in  the  Nyaya  sutra  with  those  that  are 
found  in  the  medical  work  of  Caraka  (78  A.D.),  III.  viii.    There 
are  no  other  works  in  early  Sanskrit  literature,  excepting  the 
Nyaya  sutra  and  Caraka-samliita   which   have  treated  of  these 
matters.    Caraka's  description   of  some  of  the  categories  (e.g. 
drstanta,  prayojana,  pratijfia  and  vitanda)  follows  very  closely 
the  definitions  given  of  those  in  the  Nyaya  sutras.    There  are 
others  such  as  the  definitions  of  jalpa,  chala,  nigrahasthana,  etc., 
where  the  definitions  of  two  authorities  differ  more.    There  are 
some  other  logical  categories  mentioned  in  Caraka  (e.g.  pra- 
tisthdpand,  jijiidsd,   vyavasdya,   vdkyadosa,  vdkyaprasamsd,  tipa- 
lambha,  parihdra,  abhyanujnd,  etc.)  which  are  not  found  in  the 
Nyaya  sutra^.  Again.the  various  types  of  futilities  (jati)  and  points 
of  opponent's  refutation  {nigrahasthdna)  mentioned  in  the  Nyaya 
sutra  are  not  found  in  Caraka.    There  are  some  terms  which  are 
found  in  slightly  variant  forms  in  the  two  works,  e.g.  aupamya  in 
Caraka,  upamdna  in  Nyaya  sutra,  artJidpatti  in  Nyaya  sutra  and 
arthaprdpti  in  Caraka.   Caraka  does  not  seem  to  know  anything 
about  the  Nyaya  work  on  this  subject,  and  it  is  plain  that  the 
treatment  of  these  terms  of  disputations  in  the  Caraka  is  much 
simpler  and  less  technical  than  what  we  find  in  the  Nyaya  sutras. 
If  we  leave  out  the  varieties  of  jati  and  nigrahasthana  of  the 
fifth  book,  there  is  on  the  whole  a  great  agreement  between  the 
treatment  of  Caraka  and  that  of  the  Nyaya  sutras.  It  seems  there- 
fore in  a  high  degree  probable  that  both  Caraka  and  the  Nyaya 
sutras  were  indebted  for  their  treatment  of  these  terms  of  dispu- 
tation to  some  other  earlier  work.  Of  these,  Caraka's  compilation 
was  earlier,  whereas  the  compilation  of  the  Nyaya  sutras  repre- 
sents a  later  work  when  a  hotter  atmosphere  of  disputations  had 
necessitated  the  use  of  more  technical  terms  which  are  embodied 
in  this  work,  but  which  were  not  contained  in  the  earlier  work. 
It  does  not  seem  therefore  that  this  part  of  the  work  could  have 
been  earlier  than  the  second  century  A.D.  Another  stream  flowing 
through  the  Nyaya  sutras  is  that  of  a  polemic  against  the  doctrines 
which  could  be  attributed   to  the  Sautrantika   Buddhists,  the 
Vijnanavada  Buddhists,  the  nihilists,  the  Sarnkhya,  the  Carvaka, 
and  some  other  unknown  schools  of  thought  to  which  we  find  no 

^  Like  Vai^esika,  Caraka  does  not  know  the  threefold  division  of  inference  (anu- 
mana)  as  purvavat,  sesanat  and  sdmanyalodrsta. 


viii]  Nyaya  sutras  and  Vaisesika  sutras  303 

further  allusion  elsewhere.  The  Vaisesika  sutras  as  we  have  already- 
seen  had  argued  only  against  the  Mimarnsa,  and  ultimately  agreed 
with  them  on  most  points.  The  dispute  with  Mimarnsa  in  the 
Nyaya  sutras  is  the  same  as  in  the  Vaisesika  over  the  question 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  eternality  of  sound.  The  question  of  the 
self- validity  of  knowledge  {svatah prdmdnyavdda)  and  the  akhyati 
doctrine  of  illusion  of  the  Mimamsists,  which  form  the  two  chief 
points  of  discussion  between  later  Mimarnsa  and  later  Nyaya, 
are  never  alluded  to  in  the  Nyaya  sutras.  The  advocacy  of  Yoga 
methods  {Nyaya  sutras,  IV.  ii.  38-42  and  46)  seems  also  to  be 
an  alien  element;  these  are  not  found  in  Vaisesika  and  are  not  in 
keeping  with  the  general  tendency  of  the  Nyaya  sutras,  and  the 
Japanese  tradition  that  Mirok  added  them  later  on  as  Mahamaho- 
padhyaya  Haraprasada  Sastrl  has  pointed  out^  is  not  improbable. 
The  Vaisesika  sutras,  III.  i.  18  and  ill.  ii.  i,  describe  per- 
ceptional knowledge  as  produced  by  the  close  proximity  of  the 
self  (atman),  the  senses  and  the  objects  of  sense,  and  they 
also  adhere  to  the  doctrine,  that  colour  can  only  be  perceived 
under  special  conditions  of  samskdra  (conglomeration  etc.). 
The  reason  for  inferring  the  existence  of  manas  from  the  non- 
simultaneity  {ayaugapadya)  of  knowledge  and  efforts  is  almost 
the  same  with  Vaisesika  as  with  Nyaya.  The  Nyaya  sutras 
give  a  more  technical  definition  of  perception,  but  do  not  bring 
in  the  questions  of  sarnskara  or  udbhutarupavattva  which  Vai- 
sesika does.  On  the  question  of  inference  Nyaya  gives  three 
classifications  as  purvavat,  sesavat  and  samanyatodrsta,  but  no 
definition.  The  Vaisesika  sutras  do  not  know  of  these  classifica- 
tions, and  give  only  particular  types  or  instances  of  inference 
(V.  S.  III.  i.  7-17,  IX,  ii.  1-2,  4-5).  Inference  is  said  to  be  made 
when  a  thing  is  in  contact  with  another,  or  when  it  is  in  a  relation 
of  inherence  in  it,  or  when  it  inheres  in  a  third  thing ;  one  kind 
of  effect  may  lead  to  the  inference  of  another  kind  of  effect,  and 
so  on.  These  are  but  mere  collections  of  specific  instances  of  infer- 
ence without  reaching  a  general  theory.  The  doctrine  of  vyapti 
(concomitance  oihetu  (reason)  and  i'^^-^j«(probandum))  which  be- 
came so  important  in  later  Nyaya  has  never  been  properly  formu- 
lated either  in  the  Nyaya  sutras  or  in  the  Vaisesika.  Vaisesika 
sutra,  III,  i.  24,  no  doubt  assumes  the  knowledge  of  concomitance 
between   hetu   and    sadhya    {prasiddhipiirvakatvdt  apadesasya), 

^  J.A.S.B.  1905. 


304  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

but  the  technical  vyapti  is  not  known,  and  the  connotation  of 
the  term  prasiddhipUrvakatva  of  Vaisesika  seems  to  be  more 
loose  than  the  term  vyapti  as  we  know  it  in  the  later  Nyaya.    The 
Vaisesika  sutras  do  not  count  scriptures  {sabda)  as  a  separate 
pramana,  but  they  tacitly  admit  the  great  validity  of  the  Vedas. 
With  Nyaya  sutras  sabda  as  a  pramana  applies  not  only  to  the 
Vedas,  but  to  the  testimony  of  any  trustworthy  person,  and 
Vatsyayana  says   that  trustworthy    persons    may   be  of  three 
kinds  rsi,  drya  and   mleccha  (foreigners).     Upamana   which  is 
regarded  as  a  means  of  right  cognition  in  Nyaya  is  not  even 
referred  to  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras.    The  Nyaya  sutras  know  of 
other  pramanas,  such  as  artJidpatti,  sambhava  and  aitihya,  but 
include  them  within  the  pramanas  admitted  by  them,  but  the 
Vaisesika  sutras  do  not  seem  to  know  them  at  alP.    The  Vaise- 
sika sutras  believe  in  the  perception  of  negation  (abhava)  through 
the  perception  of  the  locus  to  which  such  negation  refers  (ix.  i. 
i-io).    The  Nyaya  sutras  (II.  ii.  i,  2,  7-12)  consider  that  abhava  as 
non-existence  or  negation  can  be  perceived ;  when  one  asks  another 
to  "bring  the  clothes  which  are  not  marked,"  he  finds  that  marks 
are  absent  in  some  clothes  and  brings  them  ;  so  it  is  argued  that 
absence  or  non-existence  can  be  directly  perceived^.    Though 
there  is  thus  an  agreement  between  the  Nyaya  and  the  Vaisesika 
sutras  about  the  acceptance  of  abhava  as  being  due  to  perception, 
yet  their  method  of  handling  the  matter  is  different.   The  Nyaya 
sutras  say  nothing  about  the  categories  of  dravya,  guna,  karma, 
visesa  and  samavdya  which  form  the  main  subjects  of  Vaiseska 
discussions^    The  Nyaya  sutras  take  much  pains  to  prove  the 
materiality  of  the  senses.  But  this  question  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  important  with   Vaisesika.    The  slight  reference   to   this 
question   in   Vlil.  ii.  5-6  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  sufficient. 
The  Vaisesika  sutras  do  not  mention  the  name  of"  Isvara,"  whereas 
the  Nyaya  sutras  try  to  prove  his  existence  on  eschatological 
grounds.    The  reasons  given  in  support  of  the  existence  of  self 
in  the  Nyaya  sutras  are  mainly  on  the  ground  of  the  unity  of 
sense-cognitions  and  the  phenomenon  of  recognition,  whereas  the 

1  The  only  old  authority  which  knows  these  pramanas  is  Caraka.  But  he  also  gives 
an  interpretation  of  sambhava  which  is  different  from  Nyaya  and  calls  arthdpatti 
arthaprdpti  {Caraka  ill.  viii.). 

2  The  details  of  this  example  are  taken  from  Vatsyayana's  commentary. 

3  The  Nyaya  sfitra  no  doubt  incidentally  gives  a  definition  of  jati  as  ^'  samdnapra- 
savatmikd  jdtih  "  (H.  ii.  71). 


viii]  Nyaya  sutras  and  Vaisesika  sutras  305 

Vaisesika  lays  its  main  emphasis  on  self-consciousness  as  a  fact 
of  knowledge.  Both  the  Nyaya  and  the  Vaisesika  sutras  admit 
the  existence  of  atoms,  but  all  the  details  of  the  doctrine  of 
atomic  structure  in  later  Nyaya- Vaisesika  are  absent  there.  The 
Vaisesika  calls  salvation  nihsreyasa  or  moksa  and  the  Nyaya 
apavarga.  Moksa  with  Vaisesika  is  the  permanent  cessation  of 
connection  with  body;  the  apavarga  with  Nyaya  is  cessation  of 
pain^  In  later  times  the  main  points  of  difference  between  the 
Vaisesika  and  Nyaya  are  said  to  lie  with  regard  to  theory  of  the 
notion  of  number,  changes  of  colour  in  the  molecules  by  heat,  etc. 
Thus  the  former  admitted  a  special  procedure  of  the  mind  by  which 
cognitions  of  number  arose  in  the  mind  (e.g.  at  the  first  moment 
there  is  the  sense  contact  with  an  object,  then  the  notion  of  one- 
ness, then  from  a  sense  of  relativeness — apeksabuddhi — notion 
of  two,  then  a  notion  of  two-ness,  and  then  the  notion  of  two 
things)  ;  again,  the  doctrine  of  pilupaka  (changes  of  qualities  by 
heat  are  produced  in  atoms  and  not  in  molecules  as  Nyaya  held) 
was  held  by  Vaisesika,  which  the  Naiyayikas  did  not  admits  But 
as  the  Nyaya  sutras  are  silent  on  these  points,  it  is  not  possible  to 
say  that  such  were  really  the  differences  between  early  Nyaya  and 
early  Vaisesika.  These  differences  may  be  said  to  hold  between 
the  later  interpreters  of  Vaisesika  and  the  later  interpreters  of 
Nyaya.  The  Vaisesika  as  we  find  it  in  the  commentary  of 
Prasastapada  (probably  sixth  century  A.D.),  and  the  Nyaya  from 
the  time  of  Udyotakara  have  come  to  be  treated  as  almost 
the  same  system  with  slight  variations  only.  I  have  therefore 
preferred  to  treat  them  together.  The  main  presentation  of  the 
Nyaya-Vaisesika  philosophy  in  this  chapter  is  that  which  is  found 
from  the  sixth  century  onwards. 

The  Vaisesika  and  Nyaya  Literature. 
It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  definitely  the  date  of  the  Vaisesika 
sutras  by  Kanada,  also  called  Aulukya  the  son  of  Uluka,  though 
there  is  every  reason  to  suppose  it  to  be  pre-Buddhistic.     It 

^  Professor  Vanamali  Vedantatirtha  quotes  a  passage  from  Saniksepa§ahkarajaya, 
XVI.  68-69  in  J.A.S.B.,  1905,  and  another  passage  from  a  Nyaya  writer  Bhasarvajna, 
pp.  39-41,  '\xv  J.A.S.B.,  1 91 4,  to  show  that  the  old  Naiyayikas  considered  that  there 
was  an  element  of  happiness  {sukha)  in  the  state  of  mukti  (salvation)  which  the  Vai^e- 
sikas  denied.  No  evidence  in  support  of  this  opinion  is  found  in  the  Nyaya  or  the 
Vaiksika  sutras,  unless  the  cessation  of  pain  with  Nyaya  is  interpreted  as  meaning  the 
presence  of  some  sort  of  bliss  or  happiness. 

*  See  Madhava's  Sarvadarianasamgraha-Aulukyadariana. 
D.  20 


3o6     .  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

appears  from  the  Vdyu  purdna  that  he  was  born  in  Prabhasa  near 
Dvaraka,  and  was  the  disciple  of  Somasarma.  The  time  of 
Prasastapada  who  wrote  a  bhasya  (commentary)  of  the  Vaise- 
sika  sutras  cannot  also  unfortunately  be  ascertained.  The  pecu- 
liarity of  Prasastapada's  bhasya  is  this  that  unlike  other  bhasyas 
(which  first  give  brief  explanations  of  the  text  of  the  sutras  and 
then  continue  to  elaborate  independent  explanations  by  explain- 
ing the  first  brief  comments),  it  does  not  follow  the  sutras  but 
is  an  independent  dissertation  based  on  their  main  contents  \ 
There  were  two  other  bhasyas  on  the  Vaisesika  sutras,  namely 
Rdvana-bhdsya  and  Bharddvdja-vrtti,  but  these  are  now  probably 
lost.  References  to  the  former  are  found  in  Kirandvallbhdskara 
of  Padmanabha  Misra  and  also  in  Ratnaprabhd  2.  2.  11.  Four 
commentaries  were  written  on  this  bhasya,  namely  Vyomavati  by 
Vyomasekharacarya,  Nydyakatidalt  by  Sridhara,  Kirandvali  by 
Udayana  (984  A.D.)  and  Ltldvatihy  Srivatsacarya.  In  addition  to 
theseJagadlsaBhattacarya  of  Navadvlpa  andSahkara  Misra  wrote 
two  other  commentaries  on  the  Prasastapdda-bhdsja,  namely 
Bhdsyasukti  and  Kandda-rahasya.  Sahkara  Misra  (1425  A.D.) 
also  wrote  a  commentary  on  the  Vaisesika  sutras  called  the 
Upaskdra.  Of  these  Nydya-kandall  of  Sridhara  on  account  of  its 
simplicity  of  style  and  elaborate  nature  of  exposition  is  probably 
the  best  for  a  modern  student  of  Vaisesika.  Its  author  was  a 
native  of  the  village  of  Bhurisrsti  in  Bengal  (Radha).  His  father's 
name  was  Baladeva  and  mother's  name  was  Acchoka  and  he 
wrote  his  work  in  913  Saka  era  (990  A.D.)  as  he  himself  writes 
at  the  end  of  his  work. 

The  Nydya  sutra  was  written  by  Aksapada  or  Gautama,  and 
the  earliest  commentary  on  it  written  by  Vatsyayana  is  known 
as  the    Vdtsydyana-bhdsj/a.    The  date  of  Vatsyayana  has  not 

^  The  bhasya  of  Prasastapada  can  hardly  be  called  a  bhasya  (elaborate  commen- 
tary). He  himself  makes  no  such  claim  and  calls  his  work  a  compendium  of  the 
properties  of  the  categories  {Paddrthadhannasamgraha).  He  takes  the  categories  of 
dravya,  guna,  karma,  sdmdnya,  visesa  and  samavdya  in  order  and  without  raising  any 
discussions  plainly  narrates  what  he  has  got  to  say  on  them.  Some  of  the  doctrines 
which  are  important  in  later  Nyaya- Vaisesika  discussions,  such  as  the  doctrine  of 
creation  and  dissolution,  doctrine  of  number,  the  theory  that  the  number  of  atoms 
contributes  to  the  atomic  measure  of  the  molecules,  the  doctrine  of  pilupaka  in  con- 
nection with  the  transformation  of  colours  by  heat  occur  in  his  narration  for  the  first 
time  as  the  Vaiksika  sfitras  are  silent  on  these  points.  It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  his 
date  definitely ;  he  is  the  earliest  writer  on  Vaisesika  available  to  us  after  Kanada 
and  it  is  not  improbable  that  he  lived  in  the  5th  or  6th  century  a.d. 


viii]  Nyaya  Literature  307 

been  definitely  settled,  but  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  he  lived 
some  time  in  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  century  A.D.  Jacobi 
places  him  in  300  A.D.  Udyotakara  (about  635  A.D.)  wrote  a 
Vdrttika  on  Vatsyayana's  bhasya  to  establish  the  Nyaya  views 
and  to  refute  the  criticisms  of  the  Buddhist  logician  Diiinaga 
(about  500  A.D.)  in  his  Pramdnasanmccaya.  Vacaspatimisra 
(840  A.D.)  wrote  a  sub-commentary  on  the  Nydyavdrttika  of 
Udyotakara  called  Nydyavdrttikatdtparyatikd  in  order  to  make 
clear  the  right  meanings  of  Udyotakara's  Vdrttika  which  was  sink- 
ing in  the  mud  as  it  were  through  numerous  other  bad  writings 
{dustarakunibandhapahkaniagndjidm').  Udayana  (984  A.D.)  wrote 
a  sub-commentary  on  the  Tdtparyatlkd  called  Tdtparyatlkd- 
parisuddhi.  Varddhamana  (1225  A.D.)  wrote  a  sub-commentary 
on  that  called  the  Nydyanibandhaprakdsa.  Padmanabha  wrote 
a  sub-commentary  on  that  called  Varddhamdnendu  and  Sahkara 
Misra  (1425  A.D.)  wrote  a  sub-commentary  on  that  called  the 
Nydyatdtparyamandana.  In  the  seventeenth  century  Visvanatha 
wrote  an  independent  short  commentary  known  as  Visvandtha- 
vrtti,  on  the  Nydya  sutra,  and  Radhamohana  wrote  a  separate 
commentary  on  the  Nydya  sutras  known  as  Nydyasutravivarana. 
In  addition  to  these  works  on  the  Nydya  sutras  many  other 
independent  works  of  great  philosophical  value  have  been  written 
on  the  Nyaya  system.  The  most  important  of  these  in  medieval 
times  is  the  Nydyanianjari  of  Jayanta  (880  A.D.),  who  flourished 
shortly  after  Vacaspatimisra.  Jayanta  chooses  some  of  the  Nydya 
sutras  for  interpretation,  but  he  discusses  the  Nyaya  views  quite 
independently,  and  criticizes  the  views  of  other  systems  of  Indian 
thought  of  his  time.  It  is  far  more  comprehensive  than  Vacaspati's 
Tdtparyatlkd,  and  its  style  is  most  delightfully  lucid.  Another 
important  work  is  Udayana's  Kusumdiijali  in  which  he  tries  to 
prove  the  existence  of  Isvara  (God).  This  work  ought  to  be  read 
with  its  commentary  Prakdsa  by  Varddhamana  (1225  A.D.)  and  its 
sv\i-covi\r^&i\\.'Axy Makara7tda\iy  Rucidatta(i275  A.D.).  Udayana's 
Atmatattvaviveka  is  a  polemical  work  against  the  Buddhists,  in 
which  he  tries  to  establish  the  Nyaya  doctrine  of  soul.  In  addition 
to  these  we  have  a  number  of  useful  works  on  Nyaya  in  later 
times.  Of  these  the  following  deserve  special  mention  in  connec- 
tion with  the  present  work.  Bhdsdpariccheda  by  Visvanatha  with 
its  commentaries  Miiktdvall,  Dinakari  and  Rdmarudrl,  Tarka- 
sanigraha  with  Nydyanirnaya,  Tarkabhdsd  of  Kesava  Misra  with 


3o8  The  Nydya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [en. 

the  commentary  Nyayapradlpa,  Saptapaddrthl  of  Sivaditya, 
Tdrkikaraksa  of  Varadaraja  with  the  commentary  Niskantaka  of 
Mallinatha,  Nydyasdra  of  Madhava  Deva  of  the  city  of  Dhara 
and  Nydyasiddhdntamanjari  of  Janaklnatha  Bhattacarya  with 
the  Nyaymnanjarisara  by  Yadavacarya,  and  Nydyasiddhdntadipa 
of  Sasadhara  with  Prabhd  by  Sesanantacarya. 

The  new  school  of  Nyaya  philosophy  known  as  Navya-Nyaya 
began  with  Gaiigesa  Upadhyaya  of  Mithila,  about  1200  A.D. 
Garige^a  wrote  only  on  the  four  pramanas  admitted  by  the  Nyaya, 
viz.pratyaksa,anumana,upamana,andsabda,and  not  on  any  of  the 
topics  of  Nyaya  metaphysics.  But  it  so  happened  that  his  dis- 
cussionsonanumana(inference)  attracted  unusually  great  attention 
in  Navadvipa  (Bengal),  and  large  numbers  of  commentaries  and 
commentaries  of  commentaries  were  written  on  the  anumana 
portion  of  his  work  Tattvacintdmani,  and  many  independent 
treatises  on  sabda  and  anumana  were  also  written  by  the  scholars 
of  Bengal,  which  became  thenceforth  for  some  centuries  the  home 
of  Nyaya  studies.  The  commentaries  of  Raghunatha  Siromani 
(1500  A.D.),  Mathura  Bhattacarya  (1580  A.D.),  Gadadhara  Bhatta- 
carya (1650  A.D.)  and  Jagadlsa  Bhattacarya  (1590  A.D.),  commen- 
taries on  Siromani's  commentary  on  Tattvacintdmani,  had  been 
very  widely  read  in  Bengal.  The  new  school  of  Nyaya  became  the 
most  important  study  in  Navadvipa  and  there  appeared  a  series 
of  thinkers  who  produced  an  extensive  literature  on  the  subjects 
The  contribution  was  not  in  the  direction  of  metaphysics,  theology, 
ethics,  or  religion,  but  consisted  mainly  in  developing  a  system 
of  linguistic  notations  to  specify  accurately  and  precisely  any 
concept  or  its  relation  with  other  concepts^. 

Thus  for  example  when  they  wished  to  define  precisely  the 
nature  of  the  concomitance  of  one  concept  with  another  (e.g.  smoke 
and  fire),  they  would  so  specify  the  relation  that  the  exact  nature 
of  the  concomitance  should  be  clearly  expressed,  and  that  there 
should  be  no  confusion  or  ambiguity.  Close  subtle  analytic 
thinking  and  the  development  of  a  system  of  highly  technical 

^  From  the  latter  half  of  the  twelfth  century  to  the  third  quarter  of  the  sixteenth 
century  the  new  school  of  Nyaya  was  started  in  Mithila  (Behar) ;  but  from  the  fifteenth 
to  the  seventeenth  century  Bengal  became  pre-eminently  the  home  of  Nyaya  studies. 
See  Mr  Cakravartti's  paper, y.  ^.  .S".  j9.  1915.  I  am  indebted  to  it  for  some  of  the 
dates  mentioned  in  this  section. 

'  hvaranurnana  of  Raghunatha  as  well  as  his  Paddi-thatattvanirupana  are,  how- 
ever, notable  exceptions. 


viii]  Nyaya  Literature  309 

expressions  mark  the  development  of  this  Hterature.  The  technical 
expressions  invented  by  this  school  were  thus  generally  accepted 
even  by  other  systems  of  thought,  wherever  the  need  of  accurate 
and  subtle  thinking  was  felt.  But  from  the  time  that  Sanskrit 
ceased  to  be  the  vehicle  of  philosophical  thinking  in  India  the 
importance  of  this  literature  has  gradually  lost  ground,  and  it 
can  hardly  be  hoped  that  it  will  ever  regain  its  old  position  by 
attracting  enthusiastic  students  in  large  numbers. 

I  cannot  close  this  chapter  without  mentioning  the  fact  that 
so  far  as  the  logical  portion  of  the  Nyaya  system  is  concerned, 
though  Aksapada  was  the  first  to  write  a  comprehensive  account 
of  it,  the  Jains  and  Buddhists  in  medieval  times  had  indepen- 
dently worked  at  this  subject  and  had  criticized  the  Nyaya  ac- 
count of  logic  and  made  valuable  contributions.  In  Jaina  logic 
Dasavaikdlikaniryukti  of  Bhadrabahu  (357  B.C.),  Umasvati's 
Tattvdrthddhigama  sutra,  Nydydvatdra  of  Siddhasena  Divakara 
(533  A.D.)  Manikya  Nandl's  (800  A.D.)  Parlksdmukha  sutra,  and 
Pranidnanayatattvdlokdlavikdra  of  Deva  Suri  (1159  A.D.)  and 
Prameyakanialamdrtanda  of  Prabhacandra  deserve  special  notice. 
Pratndnasamuccaya  and  Nydyapravesa  of  Diiinaga  (500A.D.), 
Pramdnavdrttika  kdrikd  and  Nydyabhidu  of  Dharmaklrtti 
(650  A.D.)  with  the  commentary  of  Dharmottara  are  the  most 
interesting  of  the  Buddhist  works  on  systematic  logics  The 
diverse  points  of  difference  between  the  Hindu,  Jain  and 
Buddhist  logic  require  to  be  dealt  with  in  a  separate  work  on 
Indian  logic  and  can  hardly  be  treated  within  the  compass  of  the 
present  volume. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  between  the  Vdtsydyana 
bhdsya  and  the  Udyotakara's  Vdrttika  no  Hindu  work  on  logic 
of  importance  seems  to  have  been  written  :  it  appears  that  the 
science  of  logic  in  this  period  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Jains  and 
the  Buddhists  ;  and  it  was  Diiinaga's  criticism  of  Hindu  Nyaya 
that  roused  Udyotakara  to  write  the  Vdrttika.  The  Buddhist  and 
the  Jain  method  of  treating  logic  separately  from  metaphysics 
as  an  independent  study  was  not  accepted  by  the  Hindus  till  we 
come  to  Gahgesa,  and  there  is  probably  only  one  Hindu  work  of 
importance  on  Nyaya  in  the  Buddhist  style  namely  Nydyasdra 
of  Bhasarvajna.    Other  older  Hindu  works  generally  treated  of 

1  See  Indian  Logic  Medieval  School,  by  Dr  S.  C.  Vidyabhiisana,  for  a  biblio- 
graphy of  Jain  and  Buddhist  Logic. 


3ip  The  Nyay a- Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

inference  only  along  with  metaphysical  and  other  points  of  Nyaya 
interest^ 

The  main  doctrine  of  the  Nyaya- Vaisesika  Philosophy^ 

The  Nyaya- Vaisesika  having  dismissed  the  doctrine  of  mo- 
mentariness  took  a  common-sense  view  of  things,  and  held  that 
things  remain  permanent  until  suitable  collocations  so  arrange 
themselves  that  the  thing  can  be  destroyed.  Thus  the  jug  con- 
tinues to  remain  a  jug  unless  or  until  it  is  broken  to  pieces  by 
the  stroke  of  a  stick.  Things  exist  not  because  they  can  produce 
an  impression  on  us,  or  serve  my  purposes  either  directly  or 
through  knowledge,  as  the  Buddhists  suppose,  but  because  exist- 
ence is  one  of  their  characteristics.  If  I  or  you  or  any  other  perceiver 
did  not  exist,  the  things  would  continue  to  exist  all  the  same. 
Whether  they  produce  any  effect  on  us  or  on  their  surrounding 
environments  is  immaterial.  Existence  is  the  most  general 
characteristic  of  things,  and  it  is  on  account  of  this  that  things 
are  testified  by  experience  to  be  existing. 

As  the  Nyaya- Vaisesikas  depended  solely  on  experience  and 
on  valid  reasons,  they  dismissed  the  Sarnkhya  cosmology,  but 
accepted  the  atomic  doctrine  of  the  four  elements  {bhutas),  earth 
{ksiti),  water  {ap\  fire  {tej'as),  and  air  {marut).  These  atoms  are 
eternal;  the  fifth  substance  {dkdsa)  is  all  pervasive  and  eternal. 
It  is  regarded  as  the  cause  of  propagating  sound;  though  all- 
pervading  and  thus  in  touch  with  the  ears  of  all  persons,  it  mani- 
fests sound  only  in  the  ear-drum,  as  it  is  only  there  that  it  shows 
itself  as  a  sense-organ  and  manifests  such  sounds  as  the  man  de- 
serves to  hear  by  reason  of  his  merit  and  demerit.  Thus  a  deaf 
man  though  he  has  the  akasa  as  his  sense  of  hearing,  cannot  hear 
on  account  of  his  demerit  which  impedes  the  faculty  of  that  sense 
organs  In  addition  to  these  they  admitted  the  existence  of  time 
(kdld)  as  extending  from  the  past  through  the  present  to  the 

^  Almost  all  the  books  on  Nyaya  and  Vaisesika  referred  to  have  been  consulted  in 
the  writing  of  this  chapter.  Those  who  want  to  be  acquainted  with  a  fuller  bibliography 
of  the  new  school  of  logic  should  refer  to  the  paper  called  "The  History  of  Navya 
Nyaya  in  Bengal,"  by  Mr  Cakravartti  mj.  A.  S.  B.  1915. 

^  I  have  treated  Nyaya  and  Vaisesika  as  the  same  system.  Whatever  may  have  been 
their  original  differences,  they  are  regarded  since  about  600  A. D.  as  being  in  complete 
agreement  except  in  some  minor  points.  The  views  of  one  system  are  often  supple- 
mented by  those  of  the  other.  The  original  character  of  the  two  systems  has  already 
been  treated. 

^  See  Nyayakandall,  pp.  59-64. 


viii]  Metaphysical  Categories  3 1 1 

endless  futurity  before  us.  Had  there  been  no  time  we  could 
have  no  knowledge  of  it  and  there  would  be  nothing  to  account 
for  our  time-notions  associated  with  all  changes.  The  Sarnkhya 
did  not  admit  the  existence  of  any  real  time;  to  them  the  unit 
of  kala  is  regarded  as  the  time  taken  by  an  atom  to  traverse  its 
own  unit  of  space.  It  has  no  existence  separate  from  the  atoms 
and  their  movements.  The  appearance  of  kala  as  a  separate  entity 
is  a  creation  of  our  buddhi  {buddhinirmdna)  as  it  represents  the 
order  or  mode  in  which  the  buddhi  records  its  perceptions.  But 
kala  in  Nyaya-Vaisesika  is  regarded  as  a  substance  existing  by 
itself  In  accordance  with  the  changes  of  things  it  reveals  itself 
as  past,  present,  and  future.  Sarnkhya  regarded  it  as  past,  present, 
and  future,  as  being  the  modes  of  the  constitution  of  the  things 
in  its  different  manifesting  stages  of  evolution  {adhvan).  The 
astronomers  regarded  it  as  being  due  to  the  motion  of  the  planets. 
These  must  all  be  contrasted  with  the  Nyaya-Vaisesika  con- 
ception of  kala  which  is  regarded  as  an  all-pervading,  partless 
substance  which  appears  as  many  in  association  with  the  changes 
related  to  it\ 

The  seventh  substance  is  relative  space  {dik).  It  is  that  sub- 
stance by  virtue  of  which  things  are  perceived  as  being  on  the 
right,  left,  east,  west,  upwards  and  downwards;  kala  like  dik  is 
also  one.  But  yet  tradition  has  given  us  varieties  of  it  in  the  eight 
directions  and  in  the  upper  and  lowers  The  eighth  substance  is 
the  soul  {atmmi)  which  is  all-pervading.  There  are  separate  atmans 
for  each  person;  the  qualities  of  knowledge,  feelings  of  pleasure 
and  pain,  desire,  etc.  belong  to  dtman.  Manas  (mind)  is  the  ninth 
substance.  It  is  atomic  in  size  and  the  vehicle  of  memory ;  all  affec- 
tions of  the  soul  such  as  knowing,  feeling,  and  willing,  are  generated 
by  the  connection  of  manas  with  soul,  the  senses  and  the  objects. 
It  is  the  intermediate  link  which  connects  the  soul  with  the  senses, 
and  thereby  produces  the  affections  of  knowledge,  feeling,  or 
willing.  With  each  single  connection  of  soul  with  manas  we  have^; 
a  separate  affection  of  the  soul,  and  thus  our  intellectual  experience 
is  conducted  in  a  series,  one  coming  after  another  and  not  simul- 
taneously. Over  and  above  all  these  we  have  Isvara.  The  definition 

^  Se&  Nyayakandali,  pp.  64-66,  and  Nydyaniarijari,  pp.  136-139.  The  Vaisesika 
siltras  regarded  time  as  the  cause  of  things  which  suffer  change  but  denied  it  of  things 
which  are  eternal. 

"^  See  Nyayakandali,  pp.  66-69,  ^"^  Nydyamahjarl,  p.  140. 


312  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

of  substance  consists  in  this,  that  it  is  independent  by  itself,  whereas 
the  other  things  such  as  quaHty  {guna),  action  {karma),  sameness 
or  generahty  {sdmdnya),  speciaHty  or  specific  individuaUty  {visesa) 
and  the  relation  of  inherence  {saniavdyd)  cannot  show  themselves 
without  the  help  of  substance  {dravya).  Dravya  is  thus  the  place 
of  rest  {dsraya)  on  which  all  the  others  depend  {dsrta).  Dravya, 
guna,  karma,  samanya,  visesa,  and  samavaya  are  the  six  original 
entities  of  which  all  things  in  the  world  are  made  up^  When  a 
man  through  some  special  merit,  by  the  cultivation  of  reason  and 
a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  fallacies  and  pitfalls  in  the  way 
of  right  thinking,  comes  to  know  the  respective  characteristics 
and  differences  of  the  above  entities,  he  ceases  to  have  any 
passions  and  to  work  in  accordance  with  their  promptings  and 
attains  a  conviction  of  the  nature  of  self,  and  is  liberated^  The 
Nyaya-Vaisesika  is  a  pluralistic  system  which  neither  tries  to 
reduce  the  diversity  of  experience  to  any  universal  principle,  nor 
dismisses  patent  facts  of  experience  on  the  strength  of  the  de- 
mands of  the  logical  coherence  of  mere  abstract  thought.  The 
entities  it  admits  are  taken  directly  from  experience.  The  under- 
lying principle  is  that  at  the  root  of  each  kind  of  perception  there 
must  be  something  to  which  the  perception  is  due.  It  classified  the 
percepts  and  concepts  of  experience  into  several  ultimate  types 
or  categories  {paddrthd),  and  held  that  the  notion  of  each  type 
was  due  to  the  presence  of  that  entity.  These  types  are  six  in 
number — dravya,  guna,  etc.  If  we  take  a  percept  "I  see  a  red 
book,"  the  book  appears  to  be  an  independent  entity  on  which 
rests  the  concept  of  "redness  "  and  "oneness,"  and  we  thus  call  the 
book  a  substance  {dravya) ;  dravya  is  thus  defined  as  that  which 
has  the  characteristic  of  a  dravya  {dravyatva).  So  also  guna  and 
karma.  In  the  subdivision  of  different  kinds  of  dravya  also  the 
same  principle  of  classification  is  followed.  In  contrasting  it  with 
Sarnkhya  or  Buddhism  we  see  that  for  each  unit  of  sensation  (say 

^  Abhava  (negation)  as  dependent  on  bhava  (position)  is  mentioned  in  the  VaUesika 
sutras.  Later  Nyaya  writers  such  as  Udayana  include  abhava  as  a  separate  category, 
but  Sridhara  a  contemporary  of  Udayana  rightly  remarks  that  abhava  was  not  counted 
by  Pra^astapada  as  it  was  dependent  on  bhava — '■' abhdvasya  prthagajiupadeSah 
bhdvaparatantrydt  na  tvabhdvdt."    NydyakandalT,  p.  6,  and  Laksandvali,  p.  i. 

^  "  Tattvato  jndtesu  bdhyddhydtmikesu  visayesu  dosadar§andt  viraktasya  samihd- 
nivrttau  dtniajnasya  tadarthdni  karmdnyaku7~vatah  tatparitydgasddhanditi  Irutismr- 
tytiditdni  asankalpitaplialdni  upddaddnasya  dtmajndnamabhyasyatah  prakrstanivart- 
takadharmopacayt  sali  paripakvdt7najndnasydtyantikasariraviyogasya  bhdvdt."  Ibid, 
p.  7. 


viii]  Category  of  Quality  3 1 3 

whiteness)  the  latter  would  admit  a  corresponding  real,  but 
Nyaya-Vaisesika  would  collect  "all  whiteness"  under  the  name 
of  "the  quality  of  white  colour"  which  the  atom  possessed \  They 
only  regarded  as  a  separate  entity  what  represented  an  ultimate 
mode  of  thought.  They  did  not  enquire  whether  such  notions 
could  be  regarded  as  the  modification  of  some  other  notion  or 
not ;  but  whenever  they  found  that  there  were  some  experiences 
which  were  similar  and  universal,  they  classed  them  as  separate 
entities  or  categories. 

The  six  Padarthas  :  Dravya,  Guna,  Karma,  Samanya, 
Visesa,  Samavaya. 

Of  the  six  classes  of  entities  or  categories  {paddrtha)  we  have 
already  given  some  account  of  dravya^  Let  us  now  turn  to 
the  others.  Of  the  qualities  {guna)  the  first  one  called  rupa 
(colour)  is  that  which  can  be  apprehended  by  the  eye  alone 
and  not  by  any  other  sense.  The  colours  are  white,  blue, 
yellow,  red,  green,  brown  and  variegated  {citrd).  Colours  are 
found  only  in  ksiti,  ap  and  tejas.  The  colours  of  ap  and  tejas  are 
permanent  {nitya),  but  the  colour  of  ksiti  changes  when  heat 
is  applied,  and  this,  Sridhara  holds,  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
heat  changes  the  atomic  structure  of  ksiti  (earth)  and  thus  the 
old  constitution  of  the  substance  being  destroyed,  its  old  colour 
is  also  destroyed,  and  a  new  one  is  generated.  Rupa  is  the  general 
name  for  the  specific  individual  colours.  There  is  the  genus  ru- 
patva  (colourness),  and  the  rupa  guna  (quality)  is  that  on  which 
rests  this  genus;  rupa  is  not  itself  a  genus  and  can  be  appre- 
hended by  the  eye. 

The  second  is  rasa  (taste),  that  quality  of  things  which  can  be 
apprehended  only  by  the  tongue  ;  these  are  sweet,  sour,  pungent 
{katu),  astringent  {kasdya)  and  bitter  {tikta).  Only  ksiti  and  ap 
have  taste.  The  natural  taste  of  ap  is  sweetness.  Rasa  like 
rupa  also  denotes  the  genus  rasatva,  and  rasa  as  quality  must 
be  distinguished  from  rasa  as  genus,  though  both  of  them  are 
apprehended  by  the  tongue. 

The  third  is  gandha  (odour),  that  quality  which  can  be  ap- 
prehended by  the  nose  alone.    It  belongs  to  ksiti  alone.    Water 

^  The  reference  is  to  Sautrantika  Buddhism,  ^' yo  yo  viruddhadhyasavdn  ndsave- 
kak."    See  Pandita^oka's  Avayavinirakarana,  Six  Buddhist  Nyaya  tracts. 
^  The  word  '■'paddrtha"  literally  means  denotations  of  words. 


314  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [cH. 

or  air  is  apprehended  as  having  odour  on  account  of  the  presence 
of  earth  materials. 

The  fourth  is  sparsa  (touch),  that  quality  which  can  be  ap- 
prehended only  by  the  skin.  There  are  three  kinds  of  touch,  cold, 
hot,  neither  hot  nor  cold.  Sparsa  belongs  to  ksiti ;  ap,  tejas,  and 
vayu.  The  fifth  sabda  (sound)  is  an  attribute  of  aka^a.  Had  there 
been  no  akasa  there  would  have  been  no  sound. 

The  sixth  is  samkhya  (number),  that  entityof  quality  belonging 
to  things  by  virtue  of  which  we  can  count  them  as  one,  two,  three, 
etc.  The  conception  of  numbers  two,  three,  etc.  is  due  to  a  relative 
oscillatory  state  of  the  mind  {apeksabuddJii^ ;  thus  when  there  are 
two  jugs  before  my  eyes,  I  have  the  notion — This  is  one  jug  and 
that  is  another  jug.  This  is  called  apeksabuddhi ;  then  in  the 
two  jugs  there  arises  the  quality  of  twoness  {dvitvd)  and  then  an 
indeterminate  perception  {7iirvikalpa-dvitva-gund)  of  dvitva  in  us 
and  then  the  determinate  perceptions  that  there  are  the  two  jugs. 
The  conceptions  of  other  numbers  as  well  as  of  many  arise  in  a 
similar  manner^ 

The  seventh  is  parimiti  (measure),  that  entity  of  quality  in 
things  by  virtue  of  which  we  perceive  them  as  great  or  small  and 
speak  of  them  as  such.  The  measure  of  the  partless  atoms  is 
called  parimaridala  parinidna  ;  it  is  eternal,  and  it  cannot  gene- 
rate the  measure  of  any  other  thing.  Its  measure  is  its  own  abso- 
lutely; when  two  atoms  generate  a  dyad  {dvyanttkd)  it  is  not 
the  measure  of  the  atom  that  generates  the  anu  (atomic)  and 
the  hrasva  (small)  measure  of  the  dyad  molecule  {dvyaniikd), 
for  then  the  size  {parimana)  of  it  would  have  been  still  smaller 
than  the  measure  of  the  atom  {parimandala),  whereas  the 
measure  of  the  dyanuka  is  of  a  different  kind,  namely  the 
small  (hrasvay.  Of  course  two  atoms  generate  a  dyad,  but 
then  the  number  (samkhya)  of  the  atom  should  be  regarded  as 
bringing  forth  a  new  kind  of  measure,  namely  the  small  {hrasva) 
measure  in  the  dyads.  So  again  when  three  dyads  (dyanuka) 
compose  a  tryanuka  the  number  and  not  the  measure  "  small " 

^  This  is  distinctively  a  Vaisesika  view  introduced  by  Prasastapada.  Nyaya  seems 
to  be  silent  on  this  matter.    See  Sankara  Mi^ra's  Upaskdra,  vii.  ii.  8. 

2  It  should  be  noted  that  the  atomic  measure  appears  in  two  forms  as  eternal  as  in 
"paramanus"  and  non-eternal  as  in  the  dvyanuka.  The  parimaridala  parimana  is  thus 
a  variety  of  anuparimana.  The  anuparimana  and  the  hrasvaparimana  represent  the 
two  dimensions  of  the  measure  of  dvyanukas  as  mahat  and  dirgha  are  with  reference 
to  tryanukas.    See  Nyayakandalt,  p.  133. 


viii]  The  Quality  of  Measure  315 

{hrasvd)  of  the  dyad  is  the  cause  of  the  measure  "  great "  {mahat) 
of  the  tryanuka.  But  when  we  come  to  the  region  of  these  gross 
tryanukas  we  find  that  the  "  great "  measure  of  the  tryanukas  is 
the  cause  of  the  measure  of  other  grosser  bodies  composed  by 
them.  For  as  many  tryanukas  constitute  a  gross  body,  so  much 
bigger  does  the  thing  become.  Thus  the  cumulation  of  the  trya- 
nukas of  mahat  parimana  makes  things  of  still  more  mahat  pari- 
mana.  The  measure  of  tryanukas  is  not  only  regarded  as  mahat 
but  also  as  dirgha  (long)  and  this  dirgha  parimana  has  to  be  ad- 
mitted as  coexisting  with  mahat  parimana  but  not  identical,  for 
things  not  only  appear  as  great  but  also  as  long  {dirgha).  Here 
we  find  that  the  accumulation  of  tryanukas  means  the  accumula- 
tion of  "great"  {mahat)  and  "long"  {dirgha)  parimana,  and  hence 
the  thing  generated  happens  to  possess  a  measure  which  is  greater 
and  longer  than  the  individual  atoms  which  composed  them. 
Now  the  hrasva  parimana  of  the  dyads  is  not  regarded  as  having 
a  lower  degree  of  greatness  or  length  but  as  a  separate  and  distinct 
type  of  measure  which  is  called  small  {hrasva).  As  accumulation 
of  grossness,  greatness  or  length,  generates  still  more  greatness, 
grossness  and  length  in  its  effect,  so  an  accumulation  of  the 
hrasva  (small)  parimana  ought  to  generate  still  more  hrasva 
parimana,  and  we  should  expect  that  if  the  hrasva  measure  of 
the  dyads  was  the  cause  of  the  measure  of  the  tryanukas,  the 
tryanukas  should  be  even  smaller  than  the  dyanukas.  So  also  if 
the  atomic  and  circular  {parimandala)  size  of  the  atoms  is  re- 
garded as  generating  by  their  measure  the  measure  of  the  dya- 
nukas, then  the  measure  of  the  dyanukas  ought  to  be  more  atomic 
than  the  atoms.  The  atomic,  small,  and  great  measures  should 
not  be  regarded  as  representing  successively  bigger  measures  pro- 
duced by  the  mere  cumulation  of  measures,  but  each  should  be 
regarded  as  a  measure  absolutely  distinct,  different  from  or  foreign 
to  the  other  measure.  It  is  therefore  held  that  if  grossness  in  the 
cause  generates  still  more  greatness  in  the  effect,  the  smallness 
and  the  parimandala  measure  of  the  dyads  and  atoms  ought  to 
generate  still  more  smallness  and  subtleness  in  their  effect. 
But  since  the  dyads  and  the  tryanuka  molecules  are  seen  to 
be  constituted  of  atoms  and  dyads  respectively,  and  yet  are 
not  found  to  share  the  measure  of  their  causes,  it  is  to  be  argued 
that  the  measures  of  the  atoms  and  dyads  do  not  generate  the 
measure  of  their  effects,  but  it  is  their  number  which  is  the  cause 


3i6  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

of  the  measure  of  the  latter.  This  explains  anuparimana,  hrasva 
parimana,  mahat  parimana,  and  dirgha  parimana.  The  parimana 
of  akasa,  kala,  dik  and  atman  which  are  regarded  as  all-pervasive, 
is  said  to  be  paramamahat  (absolutely  large).  The  parimanas 
of  the  atoms,  akasa,  kala,  dik,  manas,  and  atman  are  regarded 
as  eternal  {nitya).  All  other  kinds  of  parimanas  as  belonging  to 
non-eternal  things  are  regarded  as  non-eternal. 

The  eighth  is  prthaktva  (mutual  difference  or  separateness  of 
things),  that  entity  or  quality  in  things  by  virtue  of  which  things 
appear  as  different  (e.g.  this  is  different  from  that).  Difference  is 
perceived  by  us  as  a  positive  notion  and  not  as  a  mere  negation 
such  as  this  jug  is  not  this  pot. 

The  ninth  is  samyoga  (connection),  that  entity  of  guna  by 
virtue  of  which  things  appear  to  us  as  connected. 

The  tenth  is  vibhdga  (separation),  that  entity  of  guna  which 
destroys  the  connection  or  contact  of  things. 

The  eleventh  and  twelfth  %\m^s,,  paratva  and  aparatva,  give 
rise  in  us  to  the  perceptions  of  long  time  and  short  time,  remote 
and  near. 

The  other  gunas  such  as  ^?^^^>^/ (knowledge),  j2^-^^«  (happiness), 
dnhkha  (sorrow),  icchd  (will),  d'-iesa  (antipathy  or  hatred)  and 
yatna  (effort)  can  occur  only  with  reference  to  soul. 

The  characteristic  of  gurutva  (heaviness)  is  that  by  virtue  of 
which  things  fall  to  the  ground.  The  guna  of  sneha  (oiliness) 
belongs  to  water.  The  guna  oi samskdra  is  of  three  kinds,  ( i)  vega 
(velocity)  which  keeps  a  thing  moving  in  different  directions, 
(2)  sthiti-stfidpaka  (elasticity)  on  account  of  which  a  gross  thing 
tries  to  get  back  its  old  state  even  though  disturbed,  (3)  bhd- 
vand  is  that  quality  of  atman  by  which  things  are  constantly 
practised  or  by  which  things  experienced  are  remembered  and 
recognized  ^  Dharina  is  the  quality  the  presence  of  which  enables 
the  soul  to  enjoy  happiness  or  to  attain  salvation^    Adharma  is 

^  Pra^astapada  says  that  bhavana  is  a  special  characteristic  of  the  soul,  contrary  to 
intoxication,  sorrow  and  knowledge,  by  which  things  seen,  heard  and  felt  are  remem- 
bered and  recognized.  Through  unexpectedness  (as  the  sight  of  a  camel  for  a  man  of 
South  India),  repetition  (as  in  studies,  art  etc.)  and  intensity  of  interest,  the  samskara 
becomes  particularly  strong.  See  Nyayakandali,  p.  267.  Kanada  however  is  silent 
on  these  points.  He  only  says  that  by  a  special  kind  of  contact  of  the  mind  with  soul 
and  also  by  the  samskara,  memory  (smrti)  is  produced  (ix.  1.  6). 

"^  Prai^astapada  speaks  of  d/iarma  (merit)  as  being  a  quality  of  the  soul.  Thereupon 
Sridhara  points  out  that  this  view  does  not  admit  that  dharma  is  a  power  of  karma  {na 
karmaidmarthyam).   Sacrifice  etc.  cannot  be  dharma  for  these  actions  being  momentary 


viii]  Category  of  Universality  317 

the  opposite  quality,  the  presence  of  which  in  the  soul  leads  a 
man  to  suffer.  Adrsta  or  destiny  is  that  unknown  quality  of 
things  and  of  the  soul  which  brings  about  the  cosmic  order,  and 
arranges  it  for  the  experience  of  the  souls  in  accordance  with 
their  merits  or  demerits. 

Karma  means  movement ;  it  is  the  third  thing  which  must 
be  held  to  be  as  irreducible  a  reality  as  dravya  or  guua.  There 
are  five  kinds  of  movement,  (i)  upward,  (2)  downward,  (3)  con- 
traction, (4)  expansion,  (5)  movement  in  general.  All  kinds  of 
karmas  rest  on  substances  just  as  the  gunas  do,  and  cause  the 
things  to  which  they  belong  to  move. 

Sdmdnya  is  the  fourth  category.  It  means  the  genus,  or  aspect 
of  generality  or  sameness  that  we  notice  in  things.  Thus  in  spite 
of  the  difference  of  colour  between  one  cow  and  another,  both  of 
them  are  found  to  have  such  a  sameness  that  we  call  them  cows. 
In  spite  of  all  diversity  in  all  objects  around  us,  they  are  all 
perceived  as  sat  or  existing.  This  sat  or  existence  is  thus  a  same- 
ness, which  is  found  to  exist  in  all  the  three  things,  dravya,  guna, 
and  karma.  This  sameness  is  called  sdmdnya  or  jdti,  and  it  is 
regarded  as  a  separate  thing  which  rests  on  dravya,  guna,  or 
karma.  This  highest  genus  i-^/Zii  (being)  is  called /<5:r^rt/z  (highest 
universal),  the  other  intermediate  jatis  are  called  aparajdti  (lower 
universals),  such  as  the  genus  of  dravya,  of  karma,  or  of  guna,  or 
still  more  intermediate  jatis  such  as  gotvajdti  (the  genus  cow), 
nllatvajdti  (the  genus  blue).  The  intermediate  jatis  or  genera 
sometimes  appear  to  have  a  special  aspect  as  a  species,  such  as 
pasutva  (animal  jati)  and  gotva  (the  cow  jati);  here  however 
gotva  appears  as  a  species,  yet  it  is  in  reality  nothing  but  a  jati. 
The  aspect  as  species  has  no  separate  existence.  It  is  jati  which 
from  one  aspect  appears  as  genus  and  from  another  as  species. 

they  cannot  generate  the  effects  which  are  only  to  be  reaped  at  a  future  time.  If  the 
action  is  destroyed  its  power  {samarthya)  cannot  last.  So  dharma  is  to  be  admitted 
as  a  quality  generated  in  the  self  by  certain  courses  of  conduct  which  produce  happi- 
ness for  him  when  helped  by  certain  other  conditions  of  time,  place,  etc.  Faith 
(iraddha),  non-injury,  doing  good  to  all  beings,  truthfulness,  non-stealing,  sex-control, 
sincerity,  control  of  anger,  ablutions,  taking  of  pure  food,  devotion  to  particular  gods, 
fasting,  strict  adherence  to  scriptural  duties,  and  the  performance  of  duties  assigned 
to  each  caste  and  stage  of  life,  are  enumerated  by  Pra^astapada  as  producing  dharma. 
The  person  who  strictly  adheres  to  these  duties  and  the  yamas  and  niyamas  (cf. 
Patanjali's  Yoga)  and  attains  Yoga  by  a  meditation  on  the  six  padarthas  attains  a 
dharma  which  brings  liberation  {moksa).  Sridhara  refers  to  the  Sanikhya-Yoga 
account  of  the  method  of  attaining  salvation  {Nyiiyakaiidali,  pp.  272-280).  See  also 
Vallabha's  Nydyalildvati,  pp.  74-75.    (Bombay,  191 5.) 


3i8  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

This  jati  or  sdmdnya  thus  must  be  regarded  as  having  a  separate 
independent  reality  though  it  is  existent  in  dravya,  guna  and 
karma.  The  Buddhists  denied  the  existence  of  any  indepen- 
dent reahty  of  samanya,  but  said  that  the  sameness  as  cow 
was  really  but  the  negation  of  all  non-cows  {apoka).  The  per- 
ception of  cow  realizes  the  negation  of  all  non-cows  and  this 
is  represented  in  consciousness  as  the  sameness  as  cow.  He  who 
should  regard  this  sameness  to  be  a  separate  and  independent 
reality  perceived  in  experience  might  also  discover  two  horns 
on  his  own  head^  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  said  that  negation 
of  non-cows  is  a  negative  perception,  whereas  the  sameness  per- 
ceived as  cow  is  a  positive  perception,  which  cannot  be  explained 
by  the  aforesaid  negation  theory_o_f  the  JBuddhists.  Samanya  has 
thus  to  be  admitted  to  have  a  separate  reality.  All  perception  as 
sameness  of  a  thing  is  due  to  the  presence  of  this  thing  in  that 
objects  This  jati  is  eternal  or  non-destructible;  for  even  with 
the  destruction  of  individuals  comprehended  within  the  jati,  the 
latter  is  not  destroyed^. 

Through  visesa  things  are  perceived  as  diverse.  No  single 
sensation  that  we  receive  from  the  external  world  probably  agrees 
with  any  other  sensation,  and  this  difference  must  be  due  to  the 
existence  of  some  specific  differences  amongst  the  atoms  them- 
selves. The  specific  difference  existing  in  the  atoms,  emancipated 
souls  and  minds  must  be  regarded  as  eternally  existing,  and  it 

^  The  Buddhist  Pandita^oka  says  that  there  is  no  single  thing  running  through 
different  individuals  (e.g.  cooks)  by  virtue  of  which  the  samanya  could  be  established. 
For  if  it  did  exist  then  we  could  have  known  it  simply  by  seeing  any  cook  without 
any  reference  to  his  action  of  cooking  by  virtue  of  which  the  notion  of  generality  is 
formed.  If  there  is  a  similarity  between  the  action  of  cooks  that  cannot  establish 
jati  in  the  cooks,  for  the  similarity  applies  to  other  things,  viz.  the  action  of  the 
cooks.  If  the  specific  individualities  of  a  cow  should  require  one  common  factor  to 
hold  them  together,  then  these  should  require  another  and  that  another,  and  we  have 
a  regressus  ad  infinitum.  Whatever  being  perceptible  is  not  perceived  is  non-existent 
(yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptam  sannopalabhyate  tattadasat).  Samanya  is  such, 
therefore  samanya  is  non-existent.  No  samanya  can  be  admitted  to  exist  as  an 
entity.  But  it  is  only  as  a  result  of  the  impressions  of  past  experiences  of  existence 
and  non-existence  that  this  notion  is  formed  and  transferred  erroneously  to  external 
objects.  Apart  from  this  no  samanya  can  be  pointed  out  as  being  externally  per- 
ceptible— Sdmdnyadusanadikprasarita — in  Six  Buddhist  Nydya  Tracts.  The  Vedanta 
also  does  not  think  that  either  by  perception  or  by  inference  we  can  know  jati  as  a 
separate  substance.  So  it  discards  jati.  See  Veddntaparibhdsd ,  Sikhdmani  and  Mani- 
prabhd,  pp.  69-71.    See  also  .Sriharsa's  Khandanakhandakhddya,  pp.  1079-1086. 

2  Similarity  [fddr^ya)  is  not  regarded  as  a  separate  category,  for  it  is  defined  as 
identity  in  difference  {tadbhiimatve  sati  tadgatabhuyodharmavattva»i). 


viii]  Category  of  Inherence  319 

is  on  account  of  its  presence  that  atoms  appear  as  different  to  the 
yogins  who  can  perceive  them. 

Samavdya,  the  inseparable  relation  of  inherence,  is  a  relation 
by  virtue  of  which  two  different  things  such  as  substance  and 
attribute,  substance  and  karma,  substance  and  samanya,  karana 
(cause)  and  karya  (effect),  atoms  and  visesa,  appear  so  unified 
that  they  represent  one  whole,  or  one  identical  inseparable  reality. 
This  peculiar  relation  of  inseparable  inherence  is  the  cause  why 
substance,  action,  and  attribute,  cause  and  effect,  and  jati  in  sub- 
stance and  attribute  appear  as  indissolubly  connected  as  if  they 
are  one  and  the  same  thing.  Sarnyoga  or  contact  may  take  place 
between  two  things  of  the  same  nature  which  exist  as  disconnected 
and  may  later  on  be  connected  {yutasiddhd),  such  as  when  I  put 
my  pen  on  the  table.  The  pen  and  the  table  are  both  substances 
and  were  disconnected;  the  sarnyoga  relation  is  the  guna  by 
virtue  of  which  they  appear  to  be  connected  for  a  while.  Samavaya 
however  makes  absolutely  different  things  such  as  dravya  and 
guna  and  karma  or  karana  and  karya  (clay  and  jug)  appear  as 
one  inseparable  whole  {ayutasiddlia).  This  relation  is  thus  a 
separate  and  independent  category.  This  is  not  regarded  as 
many  like  sarnyogas  (contact)  but  as  one  and  eternal  because 
it  has  no  cause.  This  or  that  object  (e.g.  jug)  may  be  destroyed 
but  the  samavaya  relation  which  was  never  brought  into  being 
by  anybody  always  remains^ 

These  six  things  are  called  the  six  padarthas  or  independent 
realities  experienced  in  perception  and  expressed  in  language. 

The  Theory  of  Causation. 

The  Nyaya-Vai^esika  in  most  of  its  speculations  took  that 
view  of  things  which  finds  expression  in  our  language,  and  which 
we  tacitly  assume  as  true  in  all  our  ordinary  experience.    Thus 

^  The  Vedanta  does  not  admit  the  existence  of  the  relation  of  samavaya  as  sub- 
sisting between  two  different  entities  (e.g.  substance  and  qualities).  Thus  -Sankara 
says  [Brahma -siitrabhasy a  II.  ii.  13)  that  if  a  samavaya  relation  is  to  be  admitted  to 
connect  two  different  things,  then  another  samavaya  would  be  necessary  to  connect 
it  with  either  of  the  two  entities  that  it  intended  to  connect,  and  that  another, 
and  so  there  will  be  a  vicious  infinite  (anavastha).  Nyaya,  however,  would  not  re- 
gard it  as  vicious  at  all.  It  is  well  to  remember  that  the  Indian  systems  acknow- 
ledge two  kinds  of  anavastha — pramanikl  (valid  infinite,  as  in  case  of  the  question  of 
the  seed  and  the  tree,  or  of  the  avidya  and  the  passions),  and  another  apraniaitikt 
anavastha  (vicious  infinite)  as  when  the  admission  of  anything  involves  an  infinite  chain 
before  it  can  be  completed. 


3  2o  The  Nyaya  -  Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

they  admitted  dravya,  guna,  karma  and  samanya.  Vi^esa  they 
had  to  admit  as  the  ultimate  peculiarities  of  atoms,  for  they  did 
not  admit  that  things  were  continually  changing  their  qualities, 
and  that  everything  could  be  produced  out  of  everj'thing  by  a 
change  of  the  collocation  or  arrangement  of  the  constituting  atoms. 
In  the  production  of  the  effect  too  they  did  not  admit  that  the 
effect  was  potentially  pre-existent  in  the  cause.  They  held  that 
the  material  cause  (e.g.  clay)  had  some  power  within  it,  and  the 
accessory  and  other  instrumental  causes  (such  as  the  stick,  the 
wheel  etc.)  had  other  powers;  the  collocation  of  these  two  de- 
stroyed the  cause,  and  produced  the  effect  which  was  not  existent 
before  but  was  newly  produced.  This  is  what  is  called  the 
doctrine  of  asatkdryavdda.  This  is  just  the  opposite  of  the 
Sarnkhya  axiom,  that  what  is  existent  cannot  be  destroyed  {rid- 
bhdvo  vidyate  satah)  and  that  the  non-existent  could  never  be 
produced  {ndsato  vidyate  bkdvak).  The  objection  to  this  view  is 
that  if  what  is  non-existent  is  produced,  then  even  such  im- 
possible things  as  the  hare's  horn  could  also  be  produced.  The 
Nyaya- Vaisesika  answer  is  that  the  view  is  not  that  anything 
that  is  non-existent  can  be  produced,  but  that  which  is  produced 
was  non-existent^ 

It  is  held  by  Mimarnsa  that  an  unseen  power  resides  in  the 
cause  which  produces  the  effect.  To  this  Nyaya  objects  that  this 
is  neither  a  matter  of  observation  nor  of  legitimate  hypothesis,  for 
there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  there  is  any  transcendental 
operation  in  causal  movement  as  this  can  be  satisfactorily  ex- 
plained by  molecular  movement  {parispandd).  There  is  nothing 
except  the  invariable  time  relation  (antecedence  and  sequence) 
between  the  cause  and  the  effect,  but  the  mere  invariableness  of 
an  antecedent  does  not  suffice  ^o  make  it  the  cause  of  what 
succeeds;  it  must  be  an  unconditional  antecedent  as  well  {anya- 
thasiddhisunyasya  niyatdpurvavarttitd).  Unconditionality  and  in- 
variability are  indispensable  for  kdryakdrana-bhdva  or  cause  and 
effect  relation.  For  example,  the  non-essential  or  adventitious 
accompaniments  of  an  invariable  antecedent  may  also  be  invari- 
able antecedents;  but  they  are  not  unconditional,  only  collateral 
or  indirect.  In  other  words  their  antecedence  is  conditional 
upon  something  else  {tia  svdtantryend).  The  potter's  stick  is  an 
unconditional  invariable  antecedent  of  the  jar;  but  the  colour 

^  Nydyatnanjari,  p.  494. 


viii]  Doctrine  of  Causation  321 

of  a  stick  or  its  texture  or  size,  or  any  other  accompaniment 
or  accident  which  does  not  contribute  to  the  work  done,  is 
not  an  unconditional  antecedent,  and  must  not  therefore  be 
regarded  as  a  cause.  Similarly  the  co-effects  of  the  invari- 
able antecedents  or  what  enters  into  the  production  of  their 
co-effects  may  themselves  be  invariable  antecedents;  but  they 
are  not  unconditional,  being  themselves  conditioned  by  those 
of  the  antecedents  of  which  they  are  effects.  For  example,  the 
sound  produced  by  the  stick  or  by  the  potter's  wheel  invariably 
precedes  the  jar  but  it  is  a  co-effect;  and  akasa  (ether)  as  the 
substrate  and  vayu  (air)  as  the  vehicle  of  the  sound  enter  into 
the  production  of  this  co-effect,  but  these  are  no  unconditional 
antecedents,  and  must  therefore  be  rejected  in  an  enumera- 
tion of  conditions  or  causes  of  the  jar.  The  conditions  of  the 
conditions  should  also  be  rejected ;  the  invariable  antecedent 
of  the  potter  (who  is  an  invariable  antecedent  of  the  jar), 
the  potter's  father,  does  not  stand  in  a  causal  relation  to  the 
potter's  handiv/ork.  In  fact  the  antecedence  must  not  only  be 
unconditionally  invariable,  but  must  also  be  immediate.  Finally 
all  seemingly  invariable  antecedents  which  may  be  dispensed  with 
or  left  out  are  not  unconditional  and  cannot  therefore  be  regarded 
as  causal  conditions.  Thus  Dr  Seal  in  describing  it  rightly 
remarks,  "In  the  end,  the  discrimination  of  what  is  necessary  to 
complete  the  sum  of  causes  from  what  is  dependent,  collateral, 
secondary,  superfluous,  or  inert  (i.e.  of  the  relevant  from  the 
irrelevant  factors),  must  depend  on  the  test  of  expenditure  of 
energy.  This  test  the  Nyaya  would  accept  only  in  the  sense  of 
an  operation  analysable  into  molar  or  molecular  motion  {parts- 
panda  eva  bhaiitiko  vydpdrah  karotyarthah  atlndriyastu  vyd- 
paro  ndsti.  Jayanta's  Manjarl  Ahnika  I),  but  would  emphatically 
reject,  if  it  is  advanced  in  support  of  the  notion  of  a  mysterious 
causal  power  or  efficiency  {saktiy."  With  Nyaya  all  energy  is 
necessarily  kinetic.  This  is  a  peculiarity  of  Nyaya — its  insisting 
that  the  effect  is  only  the  sum  or  resultant  of  the  operations 
of  the  different  causal  conditions — that  these  operations  are  of 
the  nature  of  motion  or  kinetic,  in  other  words  it  firmly  holds 
to  the  view  that  causation  is  a  case  of  expenditure  of  energy, 
i.e.  a  redistribution  of  motion,  but  at  the  same  time  absolutely 
repudiates  the    Samkhya   conception   of  power   or   productive 

^  Dr  P.  C.  Ray's  Hindu  Chemistry,  1909,  pp.  249-250. 
D.  21 


322  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

efficiency  as  metaphysical  or  transcendental  {atlndriyd)  and  finds 
nothing  in  the  cause  other  than  unconditional  invariable  com- 
plements of  operative  conditions  {kdrana-sdmagrl),  and  nothing 
in  the  effect  other  than  the  consequent  phenomenon  which  results 
from  the  joint  operations  of  the  antecedent  conditions^  Certain 
general  conditions  such  as  relative  space  {dik),  time  {kdla),  the  will 
of  Isvara,  destiny  {adrsja)  are  regarded  as  the  common  cause  of  all 
effects  {kdryatva-prayojaka).  Those  are  called  sddhdrana-kdrana 
(common  cause)  as  distinguished  from  the  specific  causes  which 
determine  the  specific  effects  which  are  called  asddhdrana  kdrana. 
It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  notice  that  Nyaya  while 
repudiating  transcendental  power  {sakti)  in  the  mechanism  of 
nature  and  natural  causation,  does  not  deny  the  existence  of 
metaphysical  conditions  like  merit  {dharmd),  which  constitutes 
a  system  of  moral  ends  that  fulfil  themselves  through  the 
mechanical  systems  and  order  of  nature. 

The  causal  relation  then  like  the  relation  of  genus  to  species, 
is  a  natural  relation  of  concomitance,  which  can  be  ascertained 
only  by  the  uniform  and  uninterrupted  experience  of  agreement  in 
presence  and  agreement  in  absence,  and  not  by  a  deduction  from 
a  certain  a  priori  principle  like  that  of  causality  or  identity  of 
essence^ 

The  material  cause  such  as  the  clay  is  technically  called  the 
^amavdyi-kdrana  of  the  jug.  Samavaya  means  as  we  have  seen 
an  intimate,  inseparable  relation  of  inherence.  A  karana  is  called 
sainavHyi  when  its  materials  are  found  inseparably  connected 
with  the  materials  of  the  effect.  Asamavayi-karana  is  that  which 
produces  its  characteristics  in  the  effect  through  the  medium  of 
the  samavayi  or  material  cause,  e.g.  the  clay  is  not  the  cause  of 
the  colour  of  the  jug  but  the  colour  of  the  clay  is  the  cause  of  the 
colour  of  the  jug.  The  colour  of  the  clay  which  exists  in  the  clay 
in  inseparable  relation  is  the  cause  of  the  colour  of  the  jug.  This 
colour  of  the  clay  is  thus  called  the  asamavayi  cause  of  the  jug. 
Any  quality  {giind)  or  movement  which  existing  in  the  samavaya 
cause  in  the  samavaya  relation  determines  the  characteristics  of 
the  effect  is  called    the   asamavayi-karana.    The   instrumental 

^  Dr  P.  C.  Ray's  Hindu  Chemistry,  1909,  pp.  249-250. 

''^  See  for  this  portion  Dr  B.  N.  Seal's  Positive  Sciences  of  the  Ancient  Hindus, 
pp.  263-266.  Sarvadarianasam^aha  on  Buddhism.  Nydyamaiijari,  Bhasd-pariccheda, 
with  Muktavali  and  Dinakari,  and  Tarkasampaha.  The  doctrine  of  Anyathasiddhi 
was  systematically  developed  from  the  time  of  Gange^a. 


VIII J  Dissolution  and  Creation  323 

nimitta  and  accessory  {sakakdri)  causes  are  those  which  help  the 
material  cause  to  produce  the  effect.  Thus  the  potter,  the  wheel 
and  the  stick  may  be  regarded  as  the  nimitta  and  the  sahakari 
causes  of  the  effect. 

We  know  that  the  Nyaya-Vaisesika  regards  the  effect  as  non- 
existent, before  the  operation  of  the  cause  in  producing  it,  but  it 
holds  that  the  gunas  in  the  cause  are  the  causes  of  the  gunas  in 
the  effect,  e.g.  the  black  colour  of  the  clay  is  the  cause  of  the 
black  colour  of  the  effect,  except  in  cases  where  heat  comes  as  an 
extraneous  cause  to  generate  other  qualities ;  thus  when  a  clay 
jug  is  burnt,  on  account  of  the  heat  we  get  red  colour,  though  the 
colour  of  the  original  clay  and  the  jug  was  black.  Another  im- 
portant exception  is  to  be  found  in  the  case  of  the  production  of 
the  parimanas  of  dvyanukas  and  trasarenus  which  are  not  pro- 
duced by  the  parimanas  of  an  anu  or  a  dyanuka,  but  by  their 
number  as  we  have  already  seen. 

Dissolution  (Pralaya)  and  Creation  (Srsti). 

The  docrine  of  pralaya  is  accepted  by  all  the  Hindu  systems 
except  the  Mimarnsa\  According  to  the  Nyaya-Vaisesika  view 
Isvara  wishing  to  give  some  respite  or  rest  to  all  living  beings 
desires  to  bring  about  dissolution  {samhdreccho  bhavati).  Simul- 
taneously with  it  the  adrsta  force  residing  in  all  the  souls  and 
forming  bodies,  senses,  and  the  gross  elements,  ceases  to  act 
{sakti-pratibandha).  As  a  result  of  this  no  further  bodies,  senses, 
or  other  products  come  into  being.  Then  for  the  bringing  about 
of  the  dissolution  of  all  produced  things  (by  the  desire  of  Isvara) 
the  separation  of  the  atoms  commences  and  thus  all  combinations 
as  bodies  or  senses  are  disintegrated;  so  all  earth  is  reduced  to 
the  disintegrated  atomic  state,  then  all  ap,  then  all  tejas  and  then 
all  vayu.  These  disintegrated  atoms  and  the  souls  associated 
with  dharma,  adharma  and  past  impressions  {samskdra)  remain 
suspended  in  their  own  inanimate  condition.  For  we  know  that 
souls  in  their  natural  condition  are  lifeless  and  knowledgeless, 
non-intelligent  entities.  It  is  only  when  these  are  connected 
with  bodies  that  they  possess  knowledge  through  the  activity  of 
manas.    In  the  state  of  pralaya  owing  to  the  adrsta  of  souls  the 

^  The  doctrine  of  pralaya  and  srsti  is  found  only  in  later  Nyaya-Vaisesika  works, 
but  the  sutras  of  both  the  systems  seem  to  be  silent  on  the  matter. 


324  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

atoms  do  not  conglomerate.  It  is  not  an  act  of  cruelty  on  the 
part  of  Isvara  that  he  brings  about  dissolution,  for  he  does  it  to 
give  some  rest  to  the  sufferings  of  the  living  beings. 

At  the  time  of  creation,  Isvara  wishes  to  create  and  this  desire 
of  Isvara  works  in  all  the  souls  as  adrsta.  This  one  eternal 
desire  of  Isvara  under  certain  conditions  of  time  (e.g.  of  pralaya) 
as  accessory  causes  {sahakdri)  helps  the  disintegration  of  atoms 
and  at  other  times  (e.g.  that  of  creation)  the  constructive  process 
of  integration  and  unification  of  atoms  for  the  world-creation. 
When  it  acts  in  a  specific  capacity  in  the  diverse  souls  it  is  called 
adrsta.  At  the  time  of  dissolution  the  creative  function  of  this 
adrsta  is  suspended  and  at  the  time  of  creation  it  finds  full  play. 
At  the  time  of  creation  action  first  begins  in  the  vayu  atoms  by 
the  kinetic  function  of  this  adrsta,  by  the  contact  of  the  souls 
with  the  atoms.  By  such  action  the  air  atoms  come  in  contact 
with  one  another  and  the  dvyanukas  are  formed  and  then  in  a 
similar  way  the  tryanukas  are  formed,  and  thus  vayu  originates. 
After  vayu,  the  ap  is  formed  by  the  conglomeration  of  water 
atoms,  and  then  the  tejas  atoms  conglomerate  and  then  the  earth 
atoms.  When  the  four  elements  are  thus  conglomerated  in  the 
gross  form,  the  god  Brahma  and  all  the  worlds  are  created  by 
Isvara  and  Brahma  is  directed  by  Isvara  to  do  the  rest  of  the 
work.  Brahma  thus  arranges  for  the  enjoyment  and  suffering  of 
the  fruits  of  diverse  kinds  of  karma,  good  or  bad.  Isvara  brings 
about  this  creation  not  for  any  selfish  purpose  but  for  the  good 
of  all  beings.  Even  here  sorrows  have  their  place  that  they 
may  lead  men  to  turn  from  worldly  attachment  and  try  for 
the  attainment  of  the  highest  good,  mukti.  Moreover  Isvara 
arranges  for  the  enjoyment  of  pleasures  and  the  suffering  of 
pains  according  to  the  merits  and  demerits  of  men,  just  as  in 
our  ordinary  experience  we  find  that  a  master  awards  prizes 
or  punishments  according  to  good  or  bad  deeds\  Many  Nyaya 
books  do  not  speak  of  the  appointment  of  a  Brahma  as  de- 
puty for  supervision  of  the  due  disposal  of  the  fruits  of  karma 
according  to  merit  or  demerit.  It  is  also  held  that  pralaya  and 
creation  were  brought  about  in  accordance  with  the  karma  of 
men,  or  that  it  may  be  due  to  a  mere  play  {Ilia)  of  Isvara. 
Isvara  is  one,  for  if  there  were  many  Isvaras  they  might  quarrel. 
The  will  of  Isvara  not  only  brings  about  dissolution  and  creation, 

^  See  Nyayakandalt,  pp.  48-54. 


viii]  Proof  of  the  Existence  of  God  325 

but  also  acts  always  among  us  in  a  general  way,  for  without  it 
our  karmas  could  not  ripen,  and  the  consequent  disposal  of 
pleasures  and  sorrows  to  us  and  a  corresponding  change  in  the 
exterior  world  in  the  form  of  order  or  harmony  could  not  happen. 
The  exterior  world  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  men's  actions. 
Their  merits  and  demerits  and  all  its  changes  and  modifications 
take  place  in  accordance  with  merits  and  demerits.  This  desire 
{icchd)  of  Isvara  may  thus  be  compared  with  the  icchd  of  Isvara 
as  we  find  it  in  the  Yoga  system. 

Proof  of  the  Existence  of  Isvara. 

Sarnkhya  asserts  that  the  teleology  of  the  prakrti  is  suffi- 
cient to  explain  all  order  and  arrangement  of  the  cosmos.  The 
Mimarnsakas,  the  Carvakas,  the  Buddhists  and  the  Jains  all 
deny  the  existence  of  Isvara  (God),  Nyaya  believes  that  Isvara 
has  fashioned  this  universe  by  his  will  out  of  the  ever-existing 
atoms.  For  every  effect  (e.g.  a  jug)  must  have  its  cause.  If 
this  be  so,  then  this  world  with  all  its  order  and  arrangement 
must  also  be  due  to  the  agency  of  some  cause,  and  this  cause  is 
Isvara.  This  world  is  not  momentary  as  the  Buddhists  suppose, 
but  is  permanent  as  atoms,  is  also  an  effect  so  far  as  it  is  a 
collocation  of  atoms  and  is  made  up  of  parts  like  all  other  in- 
dividual objects  (e.g.  jug,  etc.),  which  we  call  effects.  The  world 
being  an  effect  like  any  other  effect  must  have  a  cause  like  any 
other  effect.  The  objection  made  against  this  view  is  that  such 
effects  as  we  ordinarily  perceive  may  be  said  to  have  agents 
as  their  causes  but  this  manifest  world  with  mountains,  rivers, 
oceans  etc,  is  so  utterly  different  in  form  from  ordinary  effects 
that  we  notice  every  day,  that  the  law  that  every  effect  must  have 
a  cause  cannot  be  said  to  hold  good  in  the  present  case.  The 
answer  that  Nyaya  gives  is  that  the  concomitance  between  two 
things  must  be  taken  in  its  general  aspect  neglecting  the  specific 
peculiarities  of  each  case  of  observed  concomitance.  Thus  I  had 
seen  many  cases  of  the  concomitance  of  smoke  with  fire,  and  had 
thence  formed  the  notion  that  "wherever  there  is  smoke  there  is 
fire";  but  if  I  had  only  observed  small  puffs  of  smoke  and  small 
fires,  could  I  say  that  only  small  quantities  of  smoke  could  lead 
us  to  the  inference  of  fire,  and  could  I  hold  that  therefore  large 
volumes  of  smoke  from  the  burning  of  a  forest  should  not  be 
sufficient  reason  for  us  to  infer  the  existence  of  fire  in  the  forest? 


326  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [cH. 

Thus  our  conclusion  should  not  be  that  only  smaller  effects 
are  preceded  by  their  causes,  but  that  all  effects  are  invariably 
and  unconditionally  preceded  by  causes.  This  world  therefore 
being  an  effect  must  be  preceded  by  a  cause,  and  this  cause  is 
Isvara.  This  cause  we  cannot  see,  because  Tsvara  has  no  visible 
body,  not  because  he  does  not  exist.  It  is  sometimes  said  that 
we  see  every  day  that  shoots  come  out  of  seeds  and  they  are 
not  produced  by  any  agent.  To  such  an  objection  the  Nyaya 
answer  is  that  even  they  are  created  by  God,  for  they  are  also 
effects.  That  we  do  not  see  any  one  to  fashion  them  is  not 
because  there  is  no  maker  of  them,  but  because  the  creator  can- 
not be  seen.  If  the  objector  could  distinctly  prove  that  there  was 
no  invisible  maker  shaping  these  shoots,  then  only  could  he  point 
to  it  as  a  case  of  contradiction.  But  so  long  as  this  is  not  done 
it  is  still  only  a  doubtful  case  of  enquiry  and  it  is  therefore  legiti- 
mate for  us  to  infer  that  since  all  effects  have  a  cause,  the  shoots 
as  well  as  the  manifest  world  being  effects  must  have  a  cause. 
This  cause  is  Isvara.  He  has  infinite  knowledge  and  is  all  merciful. 
At  the  beginning  of  creation  He  created  the  Vedas.  He  is  like  our 
father  who  is  always  engaged  in  doing  us  good^ 

The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Physics. 

The  four  kinds  of  atoms  are  earth,  water,  fire,  and  air  atoms. 
These  have  mass,  number,  weight,  fluidity  (or  hardness),  vis- 
cosity (or  its  opposite),  velocity,  characteristic  potential  colour, 
taste,  smell,  or  touch,  not  produced  by  the  chemical  operation  of 
heat.  Akasa  (space)  is  absolutely  inert  and  structure-less  being 
only  as  the  substratum  of  sound,  which  is  supposed  to  travel 
wave-like  in  the  manifesting  medium  of  air.  Atomic  combina- 
tion is  only  possible  with  the  four  elements.  Atoms  cannot 
exist  in  an  uncombined  condition  in  the  creation  stage;  atmo- 
spheric air  however  consists  of  atoms  in  an  uncombined  state. 

Two  atoms  combine  to  form  a  binary  molecule  {dvyanuka).  Two, 
three,  four,  or  five  dvyanukas  form  themselves  into  grosser  mole- 
cules of  tryanuka,  caturanuka,  etc.^  Though  this  was  the  generally 
current  view,  there  was  also  another  view  as  has  been  pointed  out 
by  Dr  B.  N.  Seal  in  his  Positive  Sciences  of  the  Ancient  Hindus, \\\2X 
the  "atoms  have  also  an  inherent  tendency  to  unite,"  and  that 

^  See  Jayanta's  Nyayamanjari,  pp.  190-204,  and  Udayana's  Kusumanjali  with 
Prakaia  and  I.ivardnumana  of  Raghunatha. 

"^  Kaddcit  Iribhirdrabhyate  iti  tryatiukamityucyate,  kaddcit  caturbhirdrabhyate 
kaddcit pancabhiriti yathestam  kalpand.    Nydyakandalt,  p.  32. 


viii]  Molecular  Changes  327 

they  do  so  in  twos,  threes,  or  fours,  "either  by  the  atoms  falling  into 
groups  of  threes,  fours,  etc.  directly,  or  by  the  successive  addition 
of  one  atom  to  each  preceding  aggregate'."  Of  course  the  atoms 
are  regarded  as  possessed  of  an  incessant  vibratory  motion.  It 
must  however  be  noted  in  this  connection  that  behind  this 
physical  explanation  of  the  union  of  atoms  there  is  the  adrsta,  the 
will  of  Isvara,  which  gives  the  direction  of  all  such  unions  in  har- 
mony with  the  principle  of  a  "moral  government  of  the  universe," 
so  that  only  such  things  are  produced  as  can  be  arranged  for  the 
due  disposal  of  the  effects  of  karma.  "An  elementary  substance 
thus  produced  by  primary  atomic  combination  may  however  suffer 
qualitative  changes  under  the  influence  of  heat  {pdkajotpatti)." 
The  impact  of  heat  corpuscles  decomposes  a  dvyanuka  into  the 
atoms  and  transforms  the  characters  of  the  atoms  determining 
them  all  in  the  same  way.  The  heat  particles  continuing  to  im- 
pinge reunite  the  atoms  so  transformed  to  form  binary  or  other 
molecules  in  different  orders  or  arrangements,  which  account  for 
the  specific  characters  or  qualities  finally  produced.  The  Vaisesika 
holds  that  there  is  first  a  disintegration  into  simple  atoms,  then 
change  of  atomic  qualities,  and  then  the  final  re-combination, 
under  the  influence  of  heat.  This  doctrine  is  called  the  doctrine 
oi  plliipdka  (heating  of  atoms).  Nyaya  on  the  other  hand  thinks 
that  no  disintegration  into  atoms  is  necessary  for  change  of  quali- 
ties, but  it  is  the  molecules  which  assume  new  characters  under  the 
influence  of  heat.  Heat  thus  according  to  Nyaya  directly  affects 
the  characters  of  the  molecules  and  changes  their  qualities  with- 
out effecting  a  change  in  the  atoms.  Nyaya  holds  that  the 
heat-corpuscles  penetrate  into  the  porous  body  of  the  object  and 
thereby  produce  the  change  of  colour.  The  object  as  a  whole  is 
not  disintegrated  into  atoms  and  then  reconstituted  again,  for 
such  a  procedure  is  never  experienced  by  observation.  This  is 
called  the  doctrine  of  pitharapdka  (heating  of  molecules).  This 
is  one  of  the  few  points  of  difference  between  the  later  Nyaya 
and  Vaisesika  systems-. 

Chemical  compounds  of  atoms  may  take  place  between  the 

^  Utpala's  commentary  on  Brhatsamhita  i.  7. 

"^  See  Dr  B.  N.  Seal  in  P.  C.  Ray's  Hindu  Chemistry,  pp.  190-191,  Nydyamanjari, 
p.  438,  and  Udyotakara's  Varttika.  There  is  very  little  indication  in  the  Nyaya  and 
Vaihsika  sutras  that  they  had  any  of  those  differences  indicated  here.  Though  there 
are  slight  indications  of  these  matters  in  the  Vaisesika  sutras  (vii.  i),  the  Nyaya 
sutras  are  almost  silent  upon  the  matter.  A  systematic  development  of  the  theory 
of  creation  and  atomic  combinations  appear  to  have  taken  place  after  Vatsyayana. 


328  T'he  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

atoms  of  the  same  bhuta  or  of  many  bhutas.  According  to  the 
Nyaya  view  there  are  no  differences  in  the  atoms  of  the  same 
bhuta,  and  all  differences  of  quality  and  characteristics  of  the 
compound  of  the  same  bhuta  are  due  only  to  diverse  collocations 
of  those  atoms.  Thus  Udyotakara  says  (ill.  i.  4)  that  there  is  no 
difference  between  the  atom  of  a  barley  seed  and  paddy  seed, 
since  these  are  all  but  atoms  of  earth.  Under  the  continued  impact 
of  heat  particles  the  atoms  take  new  characters.  It  is  heat  and 
heat  alone  that  can  cause  the  transformations  of  colours,  tastes 
etc.  in  the  original  bhuta  atoms.  The  change  of  these  physical 
characters  depends  on  the  colours  etc.  of  the  constituent  substances 
in  contact,  on  the  intensity  or  degree  of  heat  and  also  on  the 
species  of  tejas  corpuscles  that  impinge  on  the  atoms.  Heat  breaks 
bodies  in  contact  into  atoms,  transforms  their  qualities,  and  forms 
separate  bodies  with  them. 

Prasastapada  (the  commentator  of  Vaisesika)  holds  that  in 
the  higher  compounds  of  the  same  bhuta  the  transformation  takes 
place  (under  internal  heat)  in  the  constituent  atoms  of  the  com- 
pound molecules,  atoms  specially  determined  as  the  compound 
and  not  in  the  original  atoms  of  the  bhuta  entering  into  the  com- 
position of  the  compound.  Thus  when  milk  is  turned  into  curd, 
the  transformation  as  curd  takes  place  in  the  atoms  determined 
as  milk  in  the  milk  molecule,  and  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
milk  molecule  should  be  disintegrated  into  the  atoms  of  the 
original  bhuta  of  which  the  milk  is  a  modification.  The  change 
as  curd  thus  takes  place  in  the  milk  atom,  and  the  milk  molecule 
has  not  to  be  disintegrated  into  ksiti  or  ap  atoms.  So  again  in 
the  fertilized  ovum,  the  germ  and  the  ovum  substances,  which  in 
the  Vaisesika  view  are  both  isomeric  modes  of  earth  (with  accom- 
paniments of  other  bhutas)  are  broken  up  into  homogeneous  earth 
atoms,  and  it  is  these  that  chemically  combine  under  the  animal 
heat  and  biomotor  force  vayu  to  form  the  germ  {kalald).  But 
when  the  germ  plasm  develops,  deriving  its  nutrition  from  the 
blood  of  the  mother,  the  animal  heat  breaks  up  the  molecules  of 
the  germ  plasm  into  its  constituent  atoms,  i.e.  atoms  specifically 
determined  which  by  their  grouping  formed  the  germ  plasm. 
These  germ-plasm  atoms  chemically  combine  with  the  atoms  of 
the  food  constituents  and  thus  produce  cells  and  tissues*.  This 
atomic  contact  is  called  drambhaka-samyoga. 

^  See  Dr  IJ.  N.  Seal's  Positive  Sciences,  pp.  104-108,  and  Nydyakandali,  pp.  33-34, 
''^  Sarirdrambhe  paramCinava  eva  kdranam  na  ^ukra-sonitasannipdtah  kriydvibkdgd- 


viii]  Molecular  Changes  and  Heat  329 

In  the  case  of  poly-bhautik  or  bi-bhautik  compounds  there  is 
another  kind  of  contact  called  upastambha.  Thus  in  the  case  of 
such  compounds  as  oils,  fats,  and  fruit  juices,  the  earth  atoms 
cannot  combine  with  one  another  unless  they  are  surrounded  by 
the  water  atoms  which  congregate  round  the  former,  and  by  the 
infra-atomic  forces  thus  set  up  the  earth  atoms  take  peculiar 
qualities  under  the  impact  of  heat  corpuscles.  Other  compounds 
are  also  possible  where  the  ap,  tejas,  or  the  vayu  atoms  form  the 
inner  radicle  and  earth  atoms  dynamically  surround  them  (e.g. 
gold,  which  is  the  tejas  atom  with  the  earth  atoms  as  the  sur- 
rounding upastambhaka).  Solutions  (of  earth  substances  in  ap) 
are  regarded  as  physical  mixtures. 

Udayana  points  out  that  the  solar  heat  is  the  source  of  all  the 
stores  of  heat  required  for  chemical  change.  But  there  are 
differences  in  the  modes  of  the  action  of  heat ;  and  the  kind  of 
contact  with  heat-corpuscles,  or  the  kind  of  heat  with  chemical 
action  which  transforms  colours,  is  supposed  to  differ  from  what 
transforms  flavour  or  taste. 

Heat  and  light  rays  are  supposed  to  consist  of  indefinitely 
small  particles  which  dart  forth  or  radiate  in  all  directions  recti- 
lineally  with  inconceivable  velocity.  Heat  may  penetrate  through 
the  interatomic  space  as  in  the  case  of  the  conduction  of  heat,  as 
when  water  boils  in  a  pot  put  on  the  fire;  in  cases  of  transparency 
light  rays  penetrate  through  the  inter-atomic  spaces  with  pari- 
spanda  of  the  nature  of  deflection  or  refraction  {tiryag-gamana). 
In  other  cases  heat  rays  may  impinge  on  the  atoms  and  rebound 
back — which  explains  reflection.  Lastly  heat  may  strike  the 
atoms  in  a  peculiar  way,  so  as  to  break  up  their  grouping,  transform 
the  physico-chemical  characters  of  the  atoms,  and  again  recom- 
bine  them,  all  by  means  of  continual  impact  with  inconceivable 
velocity,  an  operation  which  explains  all  cases  of  chemical 
combination  ^  Govardhana  a  later  Nyaya  writer  says  that  paka 
means  the  combination  of  different  kinds  of  heat.  The  heat  that 


dinyayena  tayorvinase  satiutpannapakajaihparamanubhirdrambhat,  na  ca  sukraSonita- 

paramdniindm  kascidvisesah  parthivatvavihsdt Pituh  iukram  matuh  Sonitam  tayos 

sannipatanantararn  jathardnalasambandhdt  htkra-sonitdratnbhakesu  paramdnusu 
purvarupddivindse  samdnagundntarotpattau  dvyamikddikramena  kalalasarirotpattih 
tatrdntahkaranapraveso . .  .talra  mdtttrdhdraraso  mdtrayd  sanikrd7nate,  adrstava§dttatra 
punarjathardnalasa7}ibandhdt  kalalaravibhakaparamdnusii  kriydvibhdgddinydyefia 
kalalasarire  naste  samutpannapdkajaik  kalaldrambhakaparamdnubkiradrsiavaidd 
upajdtakriyairdhdraparamdmibhih  saha  sambkuya  sartrdntaramdrabhyate." 
'  See  Dr  Seal's  Positive  Sciences  of  the  Hindus. 


330  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

changes  the  colour  of  a  fruit  is  different  from  that  which  generates 
or  changes  the  taste.  Even  when  the  colour  and  taste  remain  the 
same  a  particular  kind  of  heat  may  change  the  smell.  When 
grass  eaten  by  cows  is  broken  up  into  atoms  special  kinds  of 
heat-light  rays  change  its  old  taste,  colour,  touch  and  smell  into 
such  forms  as  those  that  belong  to  milk^ 

In  the  Nyaya-Vai^esika  system  all  action  of  matter  on  matter 
is  thus  resolved  into  motion.  Conscious  activity  {prayatna)  is 
distinguished  from  all  forms  of  motion  as  against  the  Sarnkhya 
doctrine  which  considered  everything  other  than  purusa  (in- 
telligence) to  arise  in  the  course  of  cosmic  evolution  and  therefore 
to  be  subject  to  vibratory  motion. 

The  Origin  of  Knowledge  (Pramana). 

The  manner  in  which  knowledge  originates  is  one  of  the 
most  favourite  topics  of  discussion  in  Indian  philosophy.  We 
have  already  seen  that  Sarnkhya- Yoga  explained  it  by  supposing 
that  the  buddhi  (place  of  consciousness)  assumed  the  form  of  the 
object  of  perception,  and  that  the  buddhi  so  transformed  was 
then  intelligized  by  the  reflection  of  the  pure  intelligence  or  purusa. 
The  Jains  regarded  the  origin  of  any  knowledge  as  being  due  to 
a  withdrawal  of  a  veil  of  karma  which  was  covering  the  all- 
intelligence  of  the  self. 

Nyaya-Vaisesika  regarded  all  effects  as  being  due  to  the  as- 
semblage of  certain  collocations  which  unconditionally,  invariably, 
and  immediately  preceded  these  effects.  That  collocation  {sctmagrt) 
which  produced  knowlege  involved  certain  non-intelligent  as  well 
as  intelligent  elements  and  through  their  conjoint  action  un- 
contradicted and  determinate  knowledge  was  produced,  and  this 
collocation  is  thus  called  pramana  or  the  determining  cause  of  the 
origin  of  knowledge^    None  of  the  separate  elements  composing 

*  Govardhana's  Nyayabodhini  or\  Tarkasamgraka,  pp.  9,  10. 

^  "  Avyabhicdrininiasandigdhdrthopalabdhim  vidadhatl bodhabodhasvabhavd  sama- 
gri  pra/ndfiam."  Nydyamanjari,  p.  12.  Udyotakara  however  defined  "pramana" 
as  upalabdhihetu  (cause  of  knowledge).  This  view  does  not  go  against  Jayanta's  view 
which  I  have  followed,  but  it  emphasizes  the  side  of  vyapara  or  movement  of  the 
senses,  etc.  by  virtue  of  which  the  objects  come  in  contact  with  them  and  knowledge 
is  produced.  Thus  Vacaspati  says:  '■^ siddhamindrtyddi,  asiddhniica  tatsannikarsadi 
vydpdrayanuutpddayan  karaiia  eva  caritdrthah  karnam  tvindriyddi  tatsannikarsadi  vd 
ndnyatra  caritarthainiti  sdksddupalabdhdveva  pkalc  vydpriyate.''''  Tdtparyatika^  p.  15. 
Thus  it  is  the  action  of  the  senses  as  pramana  which  is  the  direct  cause  of  the  pro- 
duction of  knowledge,  but  as  this  production  could  not  have  taken  place  without  the 


viii]  Nature  of  Pramana  331 

the  causal  collocation  can  be  called  the  primary  cause;  it  is  only 
their  joint  collocation  that  can  be  said  to  determine  the  effect,  for 
sometimes  the  absence  of  a  single  element  composing  the  causal 
collocation  is  sufficient  to  stop  the  production  of  the  effect.  Of 
course  the  collocation  or  combination  is  not  an  entity  separated 
from  the  collocated  or  combined  things.  But  in  any  case  it  is  the 
preceding  collocations  that  combine  to  produce  the  effect  jointly. 
These  involve  not  only  intellectual  elements  (e.g.  indeterminate 
cognition  as  qualification  (visesana)  in  determinate  perceptions, 
the  knowledge  of  linga  in  inference,  the  seeing  of  similar  things  in 
upamana,  the  hearing  of  sound  in  sabda)  but  also  the  assemblage 
of  such  physical  things  (e.g.  proximity  of  the  object  of  perception, 
capacity  of  the  sense,  light,  etc.),  which  are  all  indispensable  for 
the  origin  of  knowledge.  The  cognitive  and  physical  elements 
all  co-operate  in  the  same  plane,  combine  together  and  produce 
further  determinate  knowledge.  It  is  this  capacity  of  the  colloca- 
tions that  is  called  pramana. 

Nyaya  argues  that  in  the  Sarnkhya  view  knowledge  origi- 
nates by  the  transcendent  influence  of  purusa  on  a  particular 
state  of  buddhi ;  this  is  quite  unintelligible,  for  knowledge  does 
not  belong  to  buddhi  as  it  is  non-intelligent,  though  it  contains 
within  it  the  content  and  the  form  of  the  concept  or  the  percept 
(knowledge).  The  purusa  to  whom  the  knowledge  belongs,  how- 
ever, neither  knows,  nor  feels,  neither  conceives  nor  perceives,  as 
it  always  remains  in  its  own  transcendental  purity.  If  the  trans- 
cendental contact  of  the  purusa  with  buddhi  is  but  a  mere  sem- 
blance or  appearance  or  illusion,  then  the  Sarnkhya  has  to  admit 
that  there  is  no  real  knowledge  according  to  them.  All  knowledge 
is  false.  And  since  all  knowledge  is  false,  the  Sarnkhyists  have 
precious  little  wherewith  to  explain  the  origin  of  right  knowledge. 

There  are  again  some  Buddhists  who  advocate  the  doctrine 
that  simultaneously  with  the  generation  of  an  object  there  is  the 
knowledge  corresponding  to  it,  and  that  corresponding  to  the 
rise  of  any  knowledge  there  is  the  rise  of  the  object  of  it.  Neither 
is  the  knowledge  generated  by  the  object  nor  the  object  by  the 
knowledge;  but  there  is  a  sort  of  simultaneous  parallelism.  It  is 
evident  that  this  view  does  not  explain  why  knowledge  should 

subject  and  the  object,  they  also  are  to  be  regarded  as  causes  in  some  sense.  "  Pramdlr- 
prameyayoh  pramane  caritdythatvamacaritarthatvam  pramanasya  tasmat  tadeva  pha- 
lahetuh.   Prainatrpraineye  tii  phaloddescna  pravrtte  iti  taddhetii  katJia/ictt."  Ibid.  p.  1 6. 


332  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

express  or  manifest  its  object.  If  knowledge  and  the  object  are 
both  but  corresponding  points  in  a  parallel  series,  whence  comes 
this  correspondence?  Why  should  knowledge  illuminate  the 
object.  The  doctrine  of  the  Vijfiana  vadins,  that  it  is  knowledge 
alone  that  shows  itself  both  as  knowledge  and  as  its  object,  is  also 
irrational,  for  how  can  knowledge  divide  itself  as  subject  and  ob- 
ject in  such  a  manner  that  knowledge  as  object  should  require 
the  knowledge  as  subject  to  illuminate  it  .<*  If  this  be  the  case  we 
might  again  expect  that  knowledge  as  knowledge  should  also 
require  another  knowledge  to  manifest  it  and  this  another,  and  so 
on  adinfinitum.  Again  if  pramana  be  defined  s.sprdpana  (capacity 
of  being  realized)  then  also  it  would  not  hold,  for  all  things  being 
momentary  according  to  the  Buddhists,  the  thing  known  cannot 
be  realized,  so  there  would  be  nothing  which  could  be  called 
pramana.  These  views  moreover  do  not  explain  the  origin  of 
knowledge.  Knowledge  is  thus  to  be  regarded  as  an  effect  like 
any  other  effect,  and  its  origin  or  production  occurs  in  the  same 
way  as  any  other  effect,  namely  by  the  joint  collocation  of  causes 
intellectual  and  physicals  There  is  no  transcendent  element 
involved  in  the  production  of  knowledge,  but  it  is  a  production 
on  the  same  plane  as  that  in  which  many  physical  phenomena 
are  produced  ^ 

The  four  Pramanas  of  Nyaya. 

We  know  that  the  Carvakas  admitted  perception  {pratyaksd) 
alone  as  the  valid  source  of  knowledge.  The  Buddhists  and  the 
Vaisesika  admitted  two  sources,  pratyaksa  and  inference  {anu- 
nidnay.  Sarnkhya  added  sabda  (testimony)  as  the  third  source; 

^  See  Nydyamat'ijari,  pp.  12-26. 

^  Discussing  the  question  of  the  validity  of  knowledge  Gaftge^a,  a  later  naiyayika 
of  great  fame,  says  that  it  is  derived  as  a  result  of  our  inference  from  the  correspondence 
of  the  perception  of  a  thing  with  the  activity  which  prompted  us  to  realize  it.  That 
which  leads  us  to  successful  activity  is  valid  and  the  opposite  invalid.  When  I  am  sure 
that  if  I  work  in  accordance  with  the  perception  of  an  object  I  shall  be  successful,  1 
call  it  valid  knowledge.     Tattvacintdmani,  K.  Tarkavagi^a's  edition,  Prdmanyavada. 

^  The  Vaiiesika  sutras  tacitly  admit  the  Vedas  as  a  pramana.  The  view  that 
Vaisesika  only  admitted  two  pramanas,  perception  and  inference,  is  traditionally  ac- 
cepted, '''' pratyaksainekamcarvakah  kanddasugatau  punah  anumananca  iaccdpi,  etc." 
Pra^astapada  divides  all  cognition  {buddhi)  as  vidyd  (right  knowledge)  and  avidyd 
(ignorance).  Under  avidyd  he  counts  sam^aya  (doubt  or  uncertainty),  viparyaya 
(illusion  or  error),  anadhyavasdya  (want  of  definite  knowledge,  thus  when  a  man  who 
had  never  seen  a  mango,  sees  it  for  the  first  time,  he  wonders  what  it  may  be)  and  svapna 
(dream).  Right  knowledge  (vidyd)  is  of  four  kinds,  perception,  inference,  memory  and 
the  supernatural  knowledge  of  the  sages  (drsa).  Interpreting  the  Vaiksika  sutras  i.  i.  3, 


viii]  Perception  333 

Nyaya  adds  a  fourth,  upamana  (analogy).  The  principle  on  which 
the  four-fold  division  of  pramanas  depends  is  that  the  causal 
collocation  which  generates  the  knowledge  as  well  as  the  nature 
or  characteristic  kind  of  knowledge  in  each  of  the  four  cases  is 
different.  The  same  thing  which  appears  to  us  as  the  object  of 
our  perception,  may  become  the  object  of  inference  or  sabda 
(testimony),  but  the  manner  or  mode  of  manifestation  of  know- 
ledge being  different  in  each  case,  and  the  manner  or  conditions 
producing  knowledge  being  different  in  each  case,  it  is  to  be 
admitted  that  inference  and  sabda  are  different  pramanas,  though 
they  point  to  the  same  object  indicated  by  the  perception.  Nyaya 
thus  objects  to  the  incorporation  of  sabda  (testimony)  or  upamana 
within  inference,  on  the  ground  that  since  the  mode  of  produc- 
tion of  knowledge  is  different,  these  are  to  be  held  as  different 
pramanas^ 

Perception  (Pratyaksa). 

The  naiyayikas  admitted  only  the  five  cognitive  senses  which 
they  believed  to  be  composed  of  one  or  other  of  the  five  elements. 
These  senses  could  each  come  in  contact  with  the  special  charac- 
teristic of  that  element  of  which  they  were  composed.  Thus  the 
ear  could  perceive  sound,  because  sound  was  the  attribute  of 
akasa,  of  which  the  auditory  sense,  the  ear,  was  made  up.  The 
eye  could  send  forth  rays  to  receive  the  colour,  etc.,  of  things. 
Thus  the  cognitive  senses  can  only  manifest  their  specific  objects 
by  going  over  to  them  and  thereby  coming  in  contact  with  them. 
The  conative  senses  {ydk,pdni,pdda,payu,  and  iipastha)x^co^v\\z^di 
in  Samkhya  as  separate  senses  are  not  recognized  here  as  such 
for  the  functions  of  these  so-called  senses  are  discharged  by  the 
general  motor  functions  of  the  body. 

Perception  is  defined  as  that  right  knowledge  generated  by  the 
contact  of  the  senses  with  the  object,  devoid  of  doubt  and  error 
not  associated  with  any  other  simultaneous  sound  cognition  (such 

VI.  i.  I,  and  vi.  i.  3,  to  mean  that  the  validity  of  the  Vedas  depends  upon  the  trust- 
worthy character  of  their  author,  he  does  not  consider  scriptures  as  valid  in  themselves. 
Their  validity  is  only  derived  by  inference  from  the  trustworthy  character  of  their  author. 
.(4r//4a/(z//i  (implication)  and  anupalabdhi  (non-perception)  are  also  classed  as  inference 
and  upatndna  (analogy)  and  aitihya  (tradition)  are  regarded  as  being  the  same  as  faith 
in  trustworthy  persons  and  hence  cases  of  inference. 

^  Sdmagrtbheddt  phalabhedacca  pramdnabhedak 

Anye  eva  hi  sdmagriphale  pratyaksalitzgayok 
Anye  eva  ca  sdmagriphale  sabdopamdnayoh.    Nydyamatijari,  p.  33. 


334  The  Ny  ay  a- Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

as  the  name  of  the  object  as  heard  from  a  person  uttering  it,  just 
at  the  time  when  the  object  is  seen)  or  name  association,  and  de- 
terminated If  when  we  see  a  cow,  a  man  says  here  is  a  cow,  the 
knowledge  of  the  sound  as  associated  with  the  percept  cannot  be 
counted  as  perception  but  as  sound-knowledge  {sabda-pramdna). 
That  right  knowledge  which  is  generated  directly  by  the  contact 
of  the  senses  with  the  object  is  said  to  be  the  product  of  the 
perceptual  process.  Perception  may  be  divided  as  indeterminate 
{nirvikalpa)  and  {savikalpd)  determinate.  Indeterminate  percep- 
tion is  that  in  which  the  thing  is  taken  at  the  very  first  moment  of 
perception  in  which  it  appears  without  any  association  with  name. 
Deterniinate  perception  takes  place  after  the  indeterminate  stage 
is  just  passed ;  it  reveals  things  as  being  endowed  with  all  charac- 
teristics and  qualities  and  names  just  as  we  find  in  all  our  concrete 
experience.  Indeterminate  perception  reveals  the  things  with  their 
characteristics  and  universals,  but  at  this  stage  there  being  no 
association  of  name  it  is  more  or  less  indistinct.  When  once  the 
names  are  connected  with  the  percept  it  forms  the  determinate 
perception  of  a  thing  called  savikalpa-pratyaksa.  If  at  the  time 
of  having  the  perception  of  a  thing  of  which  the  name  is  not  known 
to  me  anybody  utters  its  name  then  the  hearing  of  that  should 
be  regarded  as  a  separate  auditory  name  perception.  Only  that 
product  is  said  to  constitute  nirvikalpa  perception  which  results 
from  the  perceiving  process  of  the  contact  of  the  senses  with 
the  object.  Of  this  nirvikalpa  (indeterminate)  perception  it  is 
held  by  the  later  naiyayikas  that  we  are  not  conscious  of  it 
directly,  but  yet  it  has  to  be  admitted  as  a  necessary  first 
stage  without  which  the  determinate  consciousness  could  not 
arise.  The  indeterminate  perception  is  regarded  as  the  first  stage 
in  the  process  of  perception.  At  the  second  stage  it  joins  the 
other  conditions  of  perception  in  producing  the  determinate  per- 
ception. The  contact  of  the  sense  with  the  object  is  regarded 
as  being  of  six  kinds:  (i)  contact  with  the  dravya  (thing)  called 
sarnyoga,  (2)  contact  with  the  gunas  (qualities)  through  the  thing 
{samyukta-smnavdyd)  in  which  they  inhere  in  samavaya  (insepar- 
able) relation,  (3)  contact  with  the  gunas  (such  as  colour  etc.)  in 
the  generic  character  as  universals  of  those  qualities, e.g.  colourness 
(rupatva),  which  inhere  in  the  gunas  in  the  samavaya  relation. 

^  Gahge^a,  a  later  naiyayika  of  great  reputation,  describes  perception  as  immediate 
awareness  {pratyaksasya  sdksdtkdritvam  lakmnam). 


viii]  Sense-contact  and  Perception  335 

This  species  of  contact  is  called  samyukta-samaveta-samavaya, 
for  the  eye  is  in  contact  with  the  thing,  in  the  thing  the  colour 
is  in  samavaya  relation,  and  in  the  specific  colour  there  is  the 
colour  universal  or  the  generic  character  of  colour  in  samavaya 
relation.  (4)  There  is  another  kind  of  contact  called  samavaya 
by  which  sounds  are  said  to  be  perceived  by  the  ear.  The  auditory 
sense  is  akasa  and  the  sound  exists  in  akasa  in  the  samavaya 
relation,  and  thus  the  auditory  sense  can  perceive  sound  in  a  pe- 
culiar kind  of  contact  called  samaveta-samavaya.  (5)  The  generic 
character  of  sound  as  the  universal  of  sound  (sabdatva)  is  perceived 
by  the  kind  of  contact  known  as  samaveta-samavaya.  (6)  There  is 
another  kind  of  contact  by  which  negation  {abhdvd)  is  perceived, 
namely  samyukta  visesana  (as  qualifying  contact).  This  is  so 
called  because  the  eye  perceives  only  the  empty  space  which  is 
qualified  by  the  absence  of  an  object  and  through  it  the  negation. 
Thus  I  see  that  there  is  no  jug  here  on  the  ground.  My  eye  in 
this  case  is  in  touch  with  the  ground  and  the  absence  of  the  jug 
is  only  a  kind  of  quality  of  the  ground  which  is  perceived  along 
with  the  perception  of  the  empty  ground.  It  will  thus  be  seen 
that  Nyaya  admits  not  only  the  substances  and  qualities  but  all 
kinds  of  relations  as  real  and  existing  and  as  being  directly 
apprehended  by  perception  (so  far  as  they  are  directly  presented). 
The  most  important  thing  about  the  Nya^-Vai^esika  theory 
.of.  perrpptioEL  is  this  that  the  whole  process  beginning  from  the 
contact  of  the  sense  with  the  object  to  the  distinct  and  clear  per- 
ception of  the  thing,  sometimes  involving  the  appreciation  of  its 
usefulness  or  harmfulness,  is  regarded  as  the  process  of  percep- 
tion and  its  result  perception.  The  self,  the  mind,  the  senses  and 
the  objects  are  the  main  factors  by  the  particular  kinds  of  contact 
between  which  perceptual  knowledge  is  produced.  All  know- 
ledge is  indeed  arthaprakdsa,  revelation  of  objects,  and  it  is  called 
perception  when  the  sense  factors  are  the  instruments  of  its 
production  and  the  knowledge  produced  is  of  the  objects  with 
which  the  senses  are  in  contact.  The  contact  of  the  senses  with 
the  objects  is  not  in  any  sense  metaphorical  but  actual.  Not 
only  in  the  case  of  touch  and  taste  are  the  senses  in  contact  with 
the  objects,  but  in  the  cases  of  sight,  hearing  and  smell  as  well. 
The  senses  according  to  Nyaya- Vaisesika  are  material  and  wehave 
seen  that  the  system  does  not  admit  of  any  other  kind  of  trans- 
cendental {atlndriya)  power  {sakti)  than  that  of  actual  vibratory 


336  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

movement  which  is  within  the  purview  of  sense-cognition  ^ 
The  production  of  knowledge  is  thus  no  transcendental  occur- 
rence, but  is  one  which  is  similar  to  the  effects  produced  by 
the  conglomeration  and  movements  of  physical  causes.  When 
I  perceive  an  orange,  my  visual  or  the  tactual  sense  is  in  touch 
not  only  with  its  specific  colour,  or  hardness,  but  also  with  the 
universals  associated  with  them  in  a  relation  of  inherence  and  also 
with  the  object  itself  of  which  the  colour  etc.  are  predicated.  The 
result  of  this  sense-contact  at  the  first  stage  is  called  dlocana- 
jhdna  (sense-cognition)  and  as  a  result  of  that  there  is  roused  the 
memory  of  its  previous  taste  and  a  sense  of  pleasurable  character 
{sukhasadhanatvasnirti)  and  as  a  result  of  that  I  perceive  the 
orange  before  me  to  have  a  certain  pleasure-giving  character ^ 
It  is  urged  that  this  appreciation  of  the  orange  as  a  pleasurable 
object  should  also  be  regarded  as  a  direct  result  of  perception 
through  the  action  of  the  memory  operating  as  a  concomitant 
cause  (sahakari).  I  perceive  the  orange  with  the  eye  and  under- 
stand the  pleasure  it  will  give,  by  the  mind,  and  thereupon 
understand  by  the  mind  that  it  is  a  pleasurable  object.  So  though 
this  perception  results  immediately  by  the  operation  of  the  mind, 
yet  since  it  could  only  happen  in  association  with  sense-contact, 
it  must  be  considered  as  a  subsidiary  effect  of  sense-contact  and 
hence  regarded  as  visual  perception.  Whatever  may  be  the  succes- 
sive intermediary  processes,  if  the  knowledge  is  a  result  of  sense- 
contact  and  if  it  appertains  to  the  object  with  which  the  sense  is 
in  contact,  we  should  regard  it  as  a  result  of  the  perceptual  pro- 
cess. Sense-contact  with  the  object  is  thus  the  primary  and  indis- 
pensable condition  of  all  perceptions  and  not  only  can  the  senses 
be  in  contact  with  the  objects,  their  qualities,  and  the  universals 
associated  with  them  but  also  with  negation.  A  perception  is 
erroneous  when  it  presents  an  object  in  a  character  which  it  does 
not  possess  {atasmimstaditi)  and  right  knowledge  {pramd)  is  that 
which  presents  an  object  with  a  character  which  it  really  has 

^  Na  khalvatindriya  ^aktirasmdbhirupagamyate 

yayd  saha  na  kdryyasya  sambandhajndnasambhavah. 

Nyayamanjart,  p.  69. 
'  Sukhadi  manasa  buddhva  kapitthadi  ca  caksusd 

tasya  karanatd  tatra  manasaivdvagamyate... 
. . .  Sainbandhagrahanakdle  yattatkapitthddivisayamaksajam 
jfidnain  tadupddeyddijiidnaphalamiti  bhdsyakrtaketasi  sthitam 
sukhasddhanatvajndnainupddeyajfidnam. 

Nydyamarijari,  pp.  69-70;  see  also  pp.  66-71. 


viii]  Nature  of  Illusion  337 

{tadvati  tatprakdrakdnubhavay .  In  all  cases  of  perceptual  illu- 
sion the  sense  is  in  real  contact  with  the  right  object,  but  it  is 
only  on  account  of  the  presence  of  certain  other  conditions  that 
it  is  associated  with  wrong  characteristics  or  misapprehended  as 
a  different  object.  Thus  when  the  sun's  rays  are  perceived  in  a 
desert  and  misapprehended  as  a  stream,  at  the  first  indeterminate 
stage  the  visual  sense  is  in  real  contact  with  the  rays  and  thus 
far  there  is  no  illusion  so  far  as  the  contact  with  a  real  object  is 
concerned,  but  at  the  second  determinate  stage  it  is  owing  to  the 
similarity  of  certain  of  its  characteristics  with  those  of  a  stream 
that  it  is  misapprehended  as  a  stream-.  Jayanta  observes  that  on 
account  of  the  presence  of  the  defect  of  the  organs  or  the  rousing 
of  the  memory  of  similar  objects,  the  object  with  which  the  sense 
is  in  contact  hides  its  own  characteristics  and  appears  with  the 
characteristics  of  other  objects  and  this  is  what  is  meant  by 
illusion^  In  the  case  of  mental  delusions  however  there  is  no 
sense-contact  with  any  object  and  the  rousing  of  irrelevant 
memories  is  sufficient  to  produce  illusory  notions*.  This  doctrine 
of  illusion  is  known  as  viparitakhydti  or  anyathdkhydti.  What 
existed  in  the  mind  appeared  as  the  object  before  us  (Jtvdaye 
parispJniratdrthasya  baJiiravabhdsananiY.  Later  Vaisesika  as 
interpreted  by  Prasastapada  and  Sridhara  is  in  full  agreement 
with  Nyaya  in  this  doctrine  of  illusion  {bhrania  or  as  Vaisesika 
calls  it  viparyayd)  that  the  object  of  illusion  is  always  the  right 
thing  with  which  the  sense  is  in  contact  and  that  the  illusion 
consists  in  the  imposition  of  wrong  characteristics*^. 

I  have  pointed  out  above  that  Nyaya  divided  perception  into 
two  classes  as  nirvikalpa  (indeterminate)  and  savikalpa  (deter- 
minate) according  as  it  is  an  earlier  or  a  later  stage.  Vacaspati 
says,  that  at  the  first  stage  perception  reveals  an  object  as  a 
particular;  the  perception  of  an  orange  at  this  avikalpikaox  nir- 
vikalpika  stage  gives  us  indeed  all  its  colour,  form,  and  also  the 
universal  of  orangeness  associated  with  it,  but  it  does  not  reveal 

^  See  Udyotakara's  Nydyavdrttika,  p.  37,  and  Gange^a's  Tattvacintdmani,  p.  401, 
Bibliotheca  Indica. 

2  '■^  Indriyenalocya  marlcin  uccavacamuccalato  nirvikalpena  grhttvd  palcattairo- 
paghdtadosdt  viparyyeti,  savikalpako' sya  pratyayo  bhrdnto  '  jay  ate  tasmddvijndnasya 
wabhicdro  ndrthasya,  Vacaspati's  Tdtparyatlkd"  p.  87. 

3  Nydyamafijari,  p.  88.  ^  Ibid.  pp.  89  and  184.  *  Ibid.  p.  184. 

^  Nydyakandali,  pp.  1 77-181,  '■^  Suktisaniyukienendriyena  dosasahakdrind  rajata- 
samskdrasacivena  sddrsyanianunindhatd  hiktikdvisayo  rajatddhyavasdyak  krtah." 

D.  22 


^^S  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [cH. 

it  in  a  subject-predicate  relation  as  when  I  say  "this  is  an  orange." 
The  avikalpika  stage  thus  reveals  the  universal  associated  with 
the  particular,  but  as  there  is  no  association  of  name  at  this  stage, 
the  universal  and  the  particular  are  taken  in  one  sweep  and  not 
as  terms  of  relation  as  subject  and  predicate  or  substance  and 
attribute  {jdtyddisvarupdvagdki  na  tu  Jdtyddindm  tnitho  visesana- 
visesyabhdvdvagdhiti yavatY'  He  thinks  that  such  a  stage,  when 
the  object  is  only  seen  but  not  associated  with  name  or  a  subject- 
predicate  relation,  can  be  distinguished  in  perception  not  only  in 
the  case  of  infants  or  dumb  persons  that  do  not  know  the  names 
of  things,  but  also  in  the  case  of  all  ordinary  persons,  for  the 
association  of  the  names  and  relations  could  be  distinguished 
as  occurring  at  a  succeeding  stage-.  Sridhara,  in  explaining  the 
Vaisesika  view,  seems  to  be  largely  in  agreement  with  the  above 
view  of  Vacaspati.  Thus  Sridhara  says  that  in  the  nirvikalpa  stage 
not  only  the  universals  were  perceived  but  the  differences  as  well. 
But  as  at  this  stage  there  is  no  memory  of  other  things,  there  is  no 
manifest  differentiation  and  unification  such  as  can  only  result 
by  comparison.  But  the  differences  and  the  universals  as  they 
are  in  the  thing  are  perceived,  only  they  are  not  consciously 
ordered  as  "different  from  this"  or  "similar  to  this,"  which  can 
only  take  place  at  the  savikalpa  staged  Vacaspati  did  not 
bring  in  the  question  of  comparison  with  others,  but  had  only 
spoken  of  the  determinate  notion  of  the  thing  in  definite  subject- 
predicate  relation  in  association  with  names.  The  later  Nyaya 
writers  however,  following  Gaiigesa,  hold  an  altogether  dif- 
ferent opinion  on  the  subject.  With  them  nirvikalpa  knowledge 
means  the  knowledge  of  mere  predication  without  any  associa- 
tion with  the  subject  or  the  thing  to  which  the  predicate  refers. 
But  such  a  knowledge  is  never  testified  by  experience.  The  nir- 
vikalpa stage  is  thus  a  logical  stage  in  the  development  of  per- 
ceptual cognition  and  not  a  psychological  stage.    They  would 

*  Tatparyattka ,  p.  82,  also  ibid.  p.  91,  '■'■  prathama77idlocii6'rtha}i  sdmdnyavisesa- 
vdn." 

'^  Ibid.  p.  84,  "■'  tasmadvyutpannasydpi  ndmadheyastnaraitdya  pm-vamesitavyo  vi- 
naiva  ndmadheyatnarthapratyayah." 

'  Nydyakandali,  p.  189  ff.,  ^^ atah  savihalpakamicchatd  nirvikalpakamapyesitavyam, 
tacca  na  sdnidnyamdtraiii  grhndti  bhedasydpi  praiibkdsandt  71dpi  svalaksananidtram 
sdmdnydkdrasydpi  samvedandt  vyaklyantaradai-^atie  pratisandhdndcca,  kintu  sdtndn- 
yam  viiesaficobhayamapi  i^rhndti  yadi  paramidam  sdmdnyamayam  visesah  ityevani 
vivicya  na  pralyeti  vastvantardtiusandhdnavirahdi,  pinddtitardnuvrttigrahandddhi 
sdmdnyam  vivicyate,  vydvi/ttigrahanddvihsoyamiti  vivekah.^' 


viii]  Indeterminate  Perception  339 

not  like  to  dispense  with  it  for  they  think  that  it  is  impossible 
to  have  the  knowledge  of  a  thing  as  qualified  by  a  predicate  or  a 
quality,  without  previously  knowing  the  quality  or  the  predicate 
{yisistavaisistyajndnam  prati  hi  visesanatavacchedakaprakdram 
jndnain  kdranamy.  So,  before  any  determinate  knowledge  such 
as  "I  see  a  cow,"  "this  is  a  cow"  or  "a  cow"  can  arise  it  must 
be  preceded  by  an  indeterminate  stage  presenting  only  the 
indeterminate,  unrelated,  predicative  quality  as  nirvikalpa,  un- 
connected with  universality  or  any  other  relations  {jdtyddiyo- 
jandrahitam  vaisistydnavagdhi  nisprakdrakam  nirvikalpakaviY- 
But  this  stage  is  never  psychologically  experienced  {atindriyd) 
and  it  is  only  a  logical  necessity  arising  out  of  their  synthetic 
conception  of  a  proposition  as  being  the  relationing  of  a  pre- 
dicate with  a  subject.  Thus  Visvanatha  says  in  his  Siddhanta- 
muktavall,  "the  cognition  which  does  not  involve  relationing 
cannot  be  perceptual  for  the  perception  is  of  the  form  'I  know 
the  jug';  here  the  knowledge  is  related  to  the  self,  the  knower, 
the  jug  again  is  related  to  knowledge  and  the  definite  content  of 
jugness  is  related  to  the  jug.  It  is  this  content  which  forms  the 
predicative  quality  {yisesanatdvacchedaka)  of  the  predicate  'jug' 
which  is  related  to  knowledge.  We  cannot  therefore  have  the 
knowledge  of  the  jug  without  having  the  knowledge  of  the  pre- 
dicative quality,  the  contents"  But  in  order  that  the  knowledge 
of  the  jug  could  be  rendered  possible,  there  must  be  a  stage  at 
which  the  universal  or  the  pure  predication  should  be  known 
and  this  is  the  nirvikalpa  stage,  the  admission  of  which  though 
not  testified  by  experience  is  after  all  logically  indispensably 
necessary.  In  the  proposition  "It  is  a  cow,"  the  cow  is  an 
universal,  and  this  must  be  intuited  directly  before  it  could  be 
related  to  the  particular  with  which  it  is  associated. 

But  both  the  old  and  the  new  schools  of  Nyaya  and  Vai- 
sesika  admitted  the  validity  of  the  savikalpa  perception  which 
the  Buddhists  denied.  Things  are  not  of  the  nature  of  momentary 
particulars,  but  they  are  endowed  with  class-characters  or  uni- 
versal and  thus  our  knowledge  of  universals  as  revealed  by  the 
perception  of  objects  is  not  erroneous  and  is  directly  produced 
by  objects.  The  Buddhists  hold  that  the  error  of  savikalpa  per- 
ception consists  in  the  attribution  of  jati  (universal), guna  (quality), 

^  Tativacintdmani,  p.  812.  -  Ibid.  p.  809. 

*  Siddhdntamnktdvall  on  Bhdsdpariccheda  kdrikd,  58. 


340  The  Ny  ay  a -Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

kriya  (action),  nama  (name),  and  dravya  (substance)  to  things\ 
The  universal  and  that  of  which  the  universal  is  predicated  are 
not  different  but  are  the  same  identical  entity.  Thus  the  predi- 
cation of  an  universal  in  the  savikalpa  perception  involves  the 
false  creation  of  a  difference  where  there  was  none.  So  also  the 
quality  is  not  different  from  the  substance  and  to  speak  of  a 
thing  as  qualified  is  thus  an  error  similar  to  the  former.  The 
same  remark  applies  to  action,  for  motion  is  not  something  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  moves.  But  name  is  completely  different 
from  the  thing  and  yet  the  name  and  the  thing  are  identified, 
and  again  the  percept  "man  with  a  stick"  is  regarded  as  if  it 
was  a  single  thing  or  substance,  though  "man"  and  "stick"  are 
altogether  different  and  there  is  no  unity  between  them.  Now 
as  regards  the  first  three  objections  it  is  a  question  of  the  dif- 
ference of  the  Nyaya  ontological  position  with  that  of  the  Bud- 
dhists, for  we  know  that  Nyaya  and  Vaisesika  believe  jati,  guna 
and  kriya  to  be  different  from  substance  and  therefore  the  pre- 
dicating of  them  of  substance  as  different  categories  related  to  it 
at  the  determinate  stage  of  perception  cannot  be  regarded  as 
erroneous.  As  to  the  fourth  objection  Vacaspati  replies  that  the 
memory  of  the  name  of  the  thing  roused  by  its  sight  cannot  make 
the  perception  erroneous.  The  fact  that  memory  operates  cannot 
in  any  way  vitiate  perception.  The  fact  that  name  is  not  asso- 
ciated until  the  second  stage  through  the  joint  action  of  memory 
is  easily  explained,  for  the  operation  of  memory  was  necessary  in 
order  to  bring  about  the  association.  But  so  long  as  it  is  borne  in 
mind  that  the  name  is  not  identical  with  the  thing  but  is  only  asso- 
ciated with  it  as  being  the  same  as  was  previously  acquired,  there 
cannot  be  any  objection  to  the  association  of  the  name.  But  the 
Buddhists  further  object  that  there  is  no  reascn  why  one  should 
identify  a  thing  seen  at  the  present  moment  as  being  that  which 
was  seen  before,  for  this  identity  is  never  the  object  of  visual 
perception.  To  this  Vacaspati  says  that  through  the  help  of 
memory  or  past  impressions  {sainskdra)  this  can  be  considered 
as  being  directly  the  object  of  perception,  for  whatever  may  be 
the  concomitant  causes  when  the  main  cause  of  sense-contact  is 


^  Nydyamanjarl ,  pp.  93-100,  "■Pahca  caite  kalpand  hhavanti  jatikalpand,  gunakal- 
pana,  kriya  kalpand,  ndmakalpand  dravyakalpand  ceti,  tdka  kvacidabhede^ pi  bhedakal- 
panat  kvacicca  bhede' pyabhedakalpandt  kalpand  ucyante."  See  Dharmakirtti's  theory  of 
Perception,  pp.  151-4.    See  also  pp.  409-410  of  this  book. 


viii]  Transcendental  Contact  341 

present,  this  perception  of  identity  should  be  regarded  as  an 
effect  of  it.  But  the  Buddhists  still  emphasize  the  point  that  an 
object  of  past  experience  refers  to  a  past  time  and  place  and 
is  not  experienced  now  and  cannot  therefore  be  identified  with 
an  object  which  is  experienced  at  the  present  moment.  It 
has  to  be  admitted  that  Vacaspati's  answer  is  not  very  satis- 
factory for  it  leads  ultimately  to  the  testimony  of  direct  percep- 
tion which  was  challenged  by  the  Buddhists ^  It  is  easy  to  see 
that  early  Nyaya-Vaisesika  could  not  dismiss  the  savikalpa  per- 
ception as  invalid  for  it  was  the  same  as  the  nirvikalpa  and 
differed  from  it  only  in  this,  that  a  name  was  associated  with 
the  thing  of  perception  at  this  stage.  As  it  admits  a  gradual 
development  of  perception  as  the  progressive  effects  of  causal 
operations  continued  through  the  contacts  of  the  mind  with  the 
self  and  the  object  under  the  influence  of  various  intellectual 
(e.g.  memory)  and  physical  (e.g.  light  rays)  concomitant  causes, 
it  does  not,  like  Vedanta,  require  that  right  perception  should  only 
give  knowledge  which  was  not  previously  acquired.  The  varia- 
tion as  well  as  production  of  knowledge  in  the  soul  depends  upon 
the  variety  of  causal  collocations. 

Mind  according  to  Nyaya  is  regarded  as  a  separate  sense 
and  can  come  in  contact  with  pleasure,  pain,  desire,  antipathy 
and  will.  The  later  Nyaya  writers  speak  of  three  other  kinds 
of  contact  of  a  transcendental  nature  called  sdmdnyalaksana, 
jhdiialaksana  3.nd  _yo£-a/a  (miraculous).  The  contact  samanyalak- 
sana  is  that  by  virtue  of  which  by  coming  in  contact  with  a 
particular  we  are  transcendentally  {alaiikika)  in  contact  with  all 
the  particulars  (in  a  general  way)  of  which  the  correspond- 
ing universal  may  be  predicated.  Thus  when  I  see  smoke  and 
through  it  my  sense  is  in  contact  with  the  universal  associated 
with  smoke  my  visual  sense  is  in  transcendental  contact  with  all 
smoke  in  general.  Jnanalaksana  contact  is  that  by  virtue  of  which 
we  can  associate  the  perceptions  of  other  senses  when  perceiving 
by  any  one  sense.  Thus  when  we  are  looking  at  a  piece  of 
sandal  wood  our  visual  sense  is  in  touch  with  its  colour  only, 
but  still  we  perceive  it  to  be  fragrant  without  any  direct  contact 
of  the  object  with  the  organ  of  smell.  The  sort  of  transcendental 
contact  {alaiikika  sannikarsa)  by  virtue  of  which  this  is  rendered 

^  Tdtparyatika,  pp.  88-95. 


342  The  Ny  ay  a -Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

possible  is  called  jnanalaksana.  But  the  knowledge  acquired  by 
these  two  contacts  is  not  counted  as  perception  ^ 

Pleasures  and  pains  {siikha  and  duhkhd)  are  held  by  Nyaya 
to  be  different  from  knowledge  (jiiana).  For  knowledge  interprets, 
conceives  or  illumines  things,  but  sukha  etc.  are  never  found  to 
appear  as  behaving  in  that  character.  On  the  other  hand  we  feel 
that  we  grasp  them  after  having  some  knowledge.  They  cannot 
be  self-revealing,  for  even  knowledge  is  not  so ;  if  it  were  so,  then 
that  experience  which  generates  sukha  in  one  should  have  gene- 
rated the  same  kind  of  feeling  in  others,  or  in  other  words  it  should 
have  manifested  its  nature  as  sukha  to  all;  and  this  does  not 
happen,  for  the  same  thing  which  generates  sukha  in  one  might 
not  do  so  in  others.  Moreover  even  admitting  for  argument's 
sake  that  it  is  knowledge  itself  that  appears  as  pleasure  and  pain, 
it  is  evident  that  there  must  be  some  differences  between  the 
pleasurable  and  painful  experiences  that  make  them  so  different, 
and  this  difference  is  due  to  the  fact  that  knowledge  in  one  case 
was  associated  with  sukha  and  in  another  case  with  duhkha. 
This  shows  that  sukha  and  duhkha  are  not  themselves  knowledge. 
Such  is  the  course  of  things  that  sukha  and  duhkha  are  generated 
bythe  collocation  of  certain  conditions,and  are  manifested  through 
or  in  association  with  other  objects  either  in  direct  perception  or 
in  memory.  They  are  thus  the  qualities  which  are  generated  in 
the  self  as  a  result  of  causal  operation.  It  should  however  be 
remembered  that  merit  and  demerit  act  as  concomitant  causes 
in  their  production. 

The  yogins  are  believed  to  have  the  pratyaksa  of  the  most 
distant  things  beyond  our  senses ;  they  can  acquire  this  power 
by  gradually  increasing  their  powers  of  concentration  and  per- 
ceive the  subtlest  and  most  distant  objects  directly  by  their 
mind.  Even  we  ourselves  may  at  some  time  have  the  notions 
of  future  events  which  come  to  be  true,  e.g.  sometimes  I  may 
have   the  intuition   that    "  To-morrow   my  brother  will   come," 

1  Siddha niamuktavalT  on  Kdrika  63  and  64.  We  must  remember  that  Gafige^a 
discarded  the  definition  of  perception  as  given  in  the  Nyaya  sutra  which  we  have  dis- 
cussed aVjove,  and  held  that  perception  should  be  defined  as  that  cognition  which  has 
the  special  class-character  of  direct  apprehension.  He  thinks  that  the  old  definition 
of  perception  as  the  cognition  generated  by  sense-contact  involves  a  vicious  circle 
(TativaciiUdmani,  pp.  538-546).  Sense-contact  is  still  regarded  by  him  as  the  cause  of 
perception,  but  it  should  not  be  included  in  the  definition.  He  agrees  to  the  six  kinds 
of  contact  described  first  by  Udyotakara  as  mentioned  above. 


VI 1 1]  Inference  343 

and  this  may  happen  to  be  true.  This  is  called  pratibhana- 
jnana,  which  is  also  to  be  regarded  as  a  pratyaksa  directly 
by  the  mind.  This  is  of  course  different  from  the  other  form 
of  perception  called  manasa-pratyaksa,  by  which  memories  of 
past  perceptions  by  other  senses  are  associated  with  a  percept 
visualized  at  the  present  moment ;  thus  we  see  a  rose  and  per- 
ceive that  it  is  fragrant ;  the  fragrance  is  not  perceived  by  the 
eye,  but  the  manas  perceives  it  directly  and  associates  the  visual 
percept  with  it.  According  to  Vedanta  this  acquired  perception 
is  only  a  case  of  inference.  The  pratibha-pratyaksa  however  is 
that  which  is  with  reference  to  the  happening  of  a  future  event. 
When  a  cognition  is  produced,  it  is  produced  only  as  an  objective 
cognition,  e.g.  This  is  a  pot,  but  after  this  it  is  again  related  to 
the  self  by  the  mind  as  "  I  know  this  pot."  This  is  effected  by 
the  mind  again  coming  in  contact  for  reperception  of  the  cogni- 
tion which  had  already  been  generated  in  the  soul.  This  second 
reperception  is  called  anuvyavasaya,  and  all  practical  work  can 
proceed  as  a  result  of  this  anuvyavasaya^ 

Inference. 

Inference  {anuindnd)  is  the  second  means  of  proof  (pramana) 
and  the  most  valuable  contribution  that  Nyaya  has  made  has 
been  on  this  subject.  It  consists  in  making  an  assertion  about  a 
thing  on  the  strength  of  the  mark  or  liriga  which  is  associated 
with  it,  as  when  finding  smoke  rising  from  a  hill  we  remember 
that  since  smoke  cannot  be  without  fire,  there  must  also  be  fire 
in  yonder  hill.  In  an  example  like  this  smoke  is  technically 
called  lihga,  or  hetu.  That  about  which  the  assertion  has  been 
made  (the  hill  in  this  example)  is  called  pak.sa,  and  the  term 
"  fire "  is  called  sadhya.  To  make  a  correct  inference  it  is 
necessary  that  the  hetu  or  lihga  must  be  present  in  the  paksa, 

^  This  later  Nyaya  doctrine  that  the  cognition  of  self  in  association  with  cognition  is 
produced  at  a  later  moment  must  be  contrasted  with  the  triputlpratyaksa  doctrine  of 
Prabhakara,  which  holds  that  the  object,  knower  and  knowledge  are  all  given  simul- 
taneously in  knowledge.  Vyavasaya  (determinate  cognition),  according  to  Gaiigesa, 
gives  us  only  the  cognition  of  the  object,  but  the  cognition  that  I  am  aware  of  this 
object  or  cognition  is  a  different  functioning  succeeding  the  former  one  and  is  called 
anu  (after)  vyavasaya  (cognition),  ^'- idamahain  jandmiti  vyavasaye  na  bhasate  tad- 
bodhakendriyasannikarsabhavdt  kinividamvisayakajhanatvaviUstasya  jiianasya  vai- 
sistyafudtmani  bhasate;  na  ca  svaprakase  vyavasaye  tadr§am  svasya  vaUistyam  bhd- 
siiutnarhati,prtrvamviksanasyatasydjt~tdndt,tas))iadldamahamjandniitinavyavasayak 
kitttu  aniivyavasdyah.^'    Taitvadntd>?ian> ,  p.  795. 


344  T^^  Nyaya-  Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

and  in  all  other  known  objects  similar  to  the  paksa  in  having  the 
sadhya  in  it  (sapaksa-satta),  i.e.,  which  are  known  to  possess  the 
sadhya  (possessing  fire  in  the  present  example).  The  lihga  must 
not  be  present  in  any  such  object  as  does  not  possess  the 
sadhya  {vipaksa-vydvrtti  absent  from  vipaksa  or  that  which  does 
not  possess  the  sadhya).  The  inferred  assertion  should  not  be 
such  that  it  is  invalidated  by  direct  perception  {pratyaksa)  or 
the  testimony  of  the  sastra  {abddhita-visayatvd).  The  liriga 
should  not  be  such  that  by  it  an  inference  in  the  opposite  way 
could  also  be  possible  {asat-pratipaksa).  The  violation  of  any 
one  of  these  conditions  would  spoil  the  certitude  of  the  hetu 
as  determining  the  inference,  and  thus  would  only  make  the 
hetu  fallacious,  or  what  is  technically  called  hetvabhasa  or 
seeming  hetu  by  which  no  correct  inference  could  be  made. 
Thus  the  inference  that  sound  is  eternal  because  it  is  visible 
is  fallacious,  for  visibility  is  a  quality  which  sound  (here  the 
paksa)  does  not  possess  ^  This  hetvabhasa  is  technically 
called  asiddha-hetu.  Again,  hetvabhasa  of  the  second  type, 
technically  called  viruddha-Jietii,  may  be  exemplified  in  the  case 
that  sound  is  eternal,  since  it  is  created ;  the  hetu  "  being 
created  "  is  present  in  the  opposite  of  sadhya  {vipaksa},  namely 
non-eternality,  for  we  know  that  non-eternality  is  a  quality 
which  belongs  to  all  created  things.  A  fallacy  of  the  third  type, 
technically  called  anaikdntika-hetu,  is  found  in  the  case  that 
sound  is  eternal,  since  it  is  an  object  of  knowledge.  Now  "  being 
an  object  of  knowledge  "  {prameyatva)  is  here  the  hetu,  but  it  is 
present  in  things  eternal  (i.e.  things  possessing  sadhya),  as  well 
as  in  things  that  are  not  eternal  (i.e.  which  do  not  possess  the 
sadhya),  and  therefore  the  concomitance  of  the  hetu  with  the 
sadhya  is  not  absolute  {anaikdntika).  A  fallacy  of  the  fourth 
type,  technically  called  kdldtyaydpadista,  may  be  found  in  the 
example — fire  is  not  hot,  since  it  is  created  like  a  jug,  etc. 
Here  pratyaksa  shows  that  fire  is  hot,  and  hence  the  hetu  is 
fallacious.  The  fifth  fallacy,  called  prakaranasama,  is  to  be 
found  in  cases  where  opposite  hetus  are  available  at  the  same 
time   for  opposite  conclusions,   e.g.   sound    like  a  jug  is  non- 

^  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  Nyaya  did  not  believe  in  the  doctrine  of  the 
eternality  of  sound,  which  the  Mimanisa  did.  Eternality  of  sound  meant  with  Mimamsa 
the  theory  that  sounds  existed  as  eternal  indestructible  entities,  and  they  were  only 
manifested  in  our  ears  under  certain  conditions,  e.g.  the  stroke  of  a  drum  or  a 
particular  kind  of  movement  of  the  vocal  muscles. 


viii]  Nyaya  and  Buddhism  on  Causation  345 

eternal,  since  no  eternal  qualities  are  found  in  it,  and  sound  like 
akasa  is  eternal,  since  no  non-eternal  qualities  are  found  in  it. 

The  Buddhists  held  in  answer  to  the  objections  raised  against 
inference  by  the  Carvakas,  that  inferential  arguments  are 
valid,  because  they  are  arguments  on  the  principle  of  the  uni- 
formity of  nature  in  two  relations,  viz.  tdddtmya  (essential 
identity)  and  tadictpatti  (succession  in  a  relation  of  cause  and 
effect).  Tadatmya  is  a  relation  of  genus  and  species  and  not 
of  causation  ;  thus  we  know  that  all  pines  are  trees,  and  infer 
that  this  is  a  tree  since  it  is  a  pine;  tree  and  pine  are  related 
to  each  other  as  genus  and  species,  and  the  co-inherence  of 
the  generic  qualities  of  a  tree  with  the  specific  characters  of  a 
pine  tree  may  be  viewed  as  a  relation  of  essential  identity 
{tdddtmya).  The  relation  of  tadutpatti  is  that  of  uniformity  of 
succession  of  cause  and  effect,  e.g.  of  smoke  to  fire. 

Nyaya  holds  that  inference  is  made  because  of  the  invariable 
association  {niyamd)  of  the  lihga  or  hetu  (the  concomitance  of 
which  with  the  sadhya  has  been  safeguarded  by  the  five  conditions 
noted  above)  with  the  sadhya,  and  not  because  of  such  specific 
relations  as  tadatmya  or  tadutpatti.  If  it  is  held  that  the 
inference  that  it  is  a  tree  because  it  is  a  pine  is  due  to  the 
essential  identity  of  tree  and  pine,  then  the  opposite  argument 
that  it  is  a  pine  because  it  is  a  tree  ought  to  be  valid  as  well; 
for  if  it  were  a  case  of  identity  it  ought  to  be  the  same  both 
ways.  If  in  answer  to  this  it  is  said  that  the  characteristics  of  a 
pine  are  associated  with  those  of  a  tree  and  not  those  of  a  tree  with 
those  of  a  pine,  then  certainly  the  argument  is  not  due  to  essen- 
tial identity,  but  to  the  invariable  association  of  the  lihga  (mark) 
with  the  liiigin  (the  possessor  of  lihga),  otherwise  called  niyama. 
The  argument  from  tadutpatti  (association  as  cause  and  effect) 
is  also  really  due  to  invariable  association,  for  it  explains  the 
case  of  the  inference  of  the  type  of  cause  and  effect  as  well  as  of 
other  types  of  inference,  where  the  association  as  cause  and 
effect  is  not  available  (e.g.  from  sunset  the  rise  of  stars  is 
inferred).  Thus  it  is  that  the  invariable  concomitance  of  the 
lihga  with  the  lihgin,  as  safeguarded  by  the  conditions  noted 
above,  is  what  leads  us  to  make  a  valid  inference^ 

We  perceived  in  many  cases  that  a  lihga  (e.g.  smoke)  was 
associated  with  a  lihgin  (fire),  and  had  thence  formed  the  notion 

^  See  Nyayamaftjarl  on  anumana. 


346  The  Ny  ay  a- Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

that  wherever  there  was  smoke  there  was  fire.  Now  when  we 
perceived  that  there  was  smoke  in  yonder  hill,  we  remembered 
the  concomitance  {vydpti)  of  smoke  and  fire  which  we  had 
observed  before,  and  then  since  there  was  smoke  in  the  hill, 
which  was  known  to  us  to  be  inseparably  connected  with  fire,  we 
concluded  that  there  was  fire  in  the  hill.  The  discovery  of  the 
liiiga  (smoke)  in  the  hill  as  associated  with  the  memory  of  its 
concomitance  with  fire  {trtiya-lihga-pardinarsd)  is  thus  the  cause 
{anumitikarana  or  amimdnd)  of  the  inference  {anumitt).  The  con- 
comitance of  smoke  with  fire  is  technically  called  vydpti.  When 
this  refers  to  the  concomitance  of  cases  containing  smoke  with 
those  having  fire,  it  is  called  bahirvydpti\  and  when  it  refers  to  the 
conviction  of  the  concomitance  of  smoke  with  fire,  without  any 
relation  to  the  circumstances  under  which  the  concomitance  was 
observed,  it  is  called  antarvydpti.  The  Buddhists  since  they  did 
not  admit  the  notions  of  generality,  etc.  preferred  antarvyapti 
view  of  concomitance  to  bahirvyapti  as  a  means  of  inference^ 

Now  the  question  arises  that  since  the  validity  of  an  inference 
will  depend  mainly  on  the  validity  of  the  concomitance  of  sign 
{Jietii)  with  the  signate  {sddhya),  how  are  we  to  assure  ourselves  in 
each  case  that  the  process  of  ascertaining  the  concomitance  (yydp- 
tigraha)  had  been  correct,  and  the  observation  of  concomitance 
had  been  valid.  The  Mimarnsa  school  held,  as  we  shall  see  in 
the  next  chapter,  that  if  we  had  no  knowledge  of  any  such  case 
in  which  there  was  smoke  but  no  fire,  and  if  in  all  the  cases 
I  knew  I  had  perceived  that  wherever  there  was  smoke  there 
was  fire,  I  could  enunciate  the  concomitance  of  smoke  with  fire. 
But  Nyaya  holds  that  it  is  not  enough  that  in  all  cases  where 
there  is  smoke  there  should  be  fire,  but  it  is  necessary  that  in 
all  those  cases  where  there  is  no  fire  there  should  not  be  any 
smoke,  i.e.  not  only  every  case  of  the  existence  of  smoke  should 
be  a  case  of  the  existence  of  fire,  but  every  case  of  absence  of  fire 
should  be  a  case  of  absence  of  smoke.  The  former  is  technically 
called  anvayavydpti  and  the  latter  lyatirekavydpti.  But  even  this 
is  not  enough.  Thus  there  may  have  been  an  ass  sitting,  in  a 
hundred  cases  where  I  had  seen  smoke,  and  there  might  have 
been  a  hundred  cases  where  there  was  neither  ass  nor  smoke,  but 
it  cannot  be  asserted  from  it  that  there  is  any  relation  of  concomi- 

'  S&e  Anlarvydptisamarihana,hy  Ratnakara^anti  in  the  Six  Buddhist  Nyaya  Tracts, 
Bibliotheca  Indica,  1910. 


viii]         Invariable  Unconditional  Concomitance  347 

tance,  or  of  cause  and  effect  between  the  ass  and  the  smoke.  It 
may  be  that  one  might  never  have  observed  smoke  without  an 
antecedent  ass,  or  an  ass  without  the  smoke  following  it,  but  even 
that  is  not  enough.  If  it  were  such  that  we  had  so  experienced  in 
a  very  large  number  of  cases  that  the  introduction  of  the  ass 
produced  the  smoke,  and  that  even  when  all  the  antecedents  re- 
mained the  same,  the  disappearance  of  the  ass  was  immediately 
followed  by  the  disappearance  of  smoke  {yasmm  sati  bJiavanam 
yato  vind  na  bhava?iant  iti  bJiuyodarsanam,  Nydyamanjari, 
p.  122),  then  only  could  we  say  that  there  was  any  relation  of 
concomitance  {yydpti)  between  the  ass  and  the  smoked  But  of 
course  it  might  be  that  what  we  concluded  to  be  the  hetu  by  the 
above  observations  of  anvaya-vyatireka  might  not  be  a  real  hetu, 
and  there  might  be  some  other  condition  {upddhi)  associated 
with  the  hetu  which  was  the  real  hetu.  Thus  we  know  that  fire 
in  green  wood  {drdrendhand)  produced  smoke,  but  one  might 
doubt  that  it  was  not  the  fire  in  the  green  wood  that  pro- 
duced smoke,  but  there  was  some  hidden  demon  who  did  it. 
But  there  would  be  no  end  of  such  doubts,  and  if  we  indulged 
in  them,  all  our  work  endeavour  and  practical  activities  would 
have  to  be  dispensed  with  {vydghdtd).  Thus  such  doubts  as 
lead  us  to  the  suspension  of  all  work  should  not  disturb  or 
unsettle  the  notion  of  vyapti  or  concomitance  at  which  we 
had  arrived  by  careful  observation  and  consideration-.  The 
Buddhists  and  the  naiyayikas  generally  agreed  as  to  the  method 
of  forming  the  notion  of  concomitance  or  vyapti  {zydptigraha\ 
but  the  former  tried  to  assert  that  the  validity  of  such  a  con- 
comitance always  depended  on  a  relation  of  cause  and  effect 
or  of  identity  of  essence,  whereas  Nya}'a  held  that  neither  the 
relations  of  cause  and  effect,  nor  that  of  essential  identity  of 
genus  and  species,  exhausted  the  field  of  inference,  and  there  was 
quite  a  number  of  other  types  of  inference  which  could  not  be 
brought  under  either  of  them  (e.g.  the  rise  of  the  moon  and  the 
tide  of  the  ocean).  A  natural  fixed  order  that  certain  things  hap- 
pening other  things  would  happen  could  certainly  exist,  even 
without  the  supposition  of  an  identity  of  essence. 

But  sometimes  it  happens  that  different  kinds  of  causes  often 
have  the  same  kind  of  effect,  and  in  such  cases  it  is  difficult  to 

^  See  Tatparyatlkd  on  anumana  and  vyaptigraha. 

"^  Tatparyatlkd  on  vyaptigraha,  and  Tattvacinidmani  of  Gange^a  on  vyaptigraha. 


348  The  Ny  ay  a- Vaisesika  Philosophy  [cH. 

infer  the  particular  cause  from  the  effect.  Nyaya  holds  how- 
ever that  though  different  causes  are  often  found  to  produce 
the  same  effect,  yet  there  must  be  some  difference  between  one 
effect  and  another.  If  each  effect  is  taken  by  itself  with  its 
other  attendant  circumstances  and  peculiarities,  it  will  be  found 
that  it  may  then  be  possible  to  distinguish  it  from  similar  other 
effects.  Thus  a  flood  in  the  street  may  be  due  either  to  a  heavy 
downpour  of  rain  immediately  before,  or  to  the  rise  in  the  water 
of  the  river  close  by,  but  if  observed  carefully  the  flooding  of 
the  street  due  to  rain  will  be  found  to  have  such  special  traits 
that  it  could  be  distinguished  from  a  similar  flooding  due  to  the 
rise  of  water  in  the  river.  Thus  from  the  flooding  of  the  street 
of  a  special  type,  as  demonstrated  by  its  other  attendant  circum- 
stances, the  special  manner  in  which  the  water  flows  by  small 
rivulets  or  in  sheets,  will  enable  us  to  infer  that  the  flood  was 
due  to  rains  and  not  to  the  rise  of  water  in  the  river.  Thus  we 
see  that  Nyaya  relied  on  empirical  induction  based  on  uniform 
and  uninterrupted  agreement  in  nature,  whereas  the  Buddhists 
assumed  a  priori  principles  of  causality  or  identity  of  essence. 
It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  mention  that  in  later  Nyaya 
works  great  emphasis  is  laid  on  the  necessity  of  getting  ourselves 
assured  that  there  was  no  such  upadhi  (condition)  associated  with 
the  hetu  on  account  of  which  the  concomitance  happened,  but 
that  the  hetu  was  unconditionally  associated  with  the  sadhya  in 
a  relation  of  inseparable  concomitance.  Thus  all  fire  does  not  pro- 
duce smoke;  fire  must  be  associated  with  green  wood  in  order  to 
produce  smoke.  Green  wood  is  thus  the  necessary  condition 
{upadhi)  wiihout  which  no  smoke  could  be  produced.  It  is  on 
account  of  this  condition  that  fire  is  associated  with  smoke ;  and 
so  we  cannot  say  that  there  is  smoke  because  there  is  fire.  But  in 
the  concomitance  of  smoke  with  fire  there  is  no  condition,  and  so 
in  every  case  of  smoke  there  is  fire.  In  order  to  be  assured  of  the 
validity  of  vyapti,  it  is  necessary  that  we  must  be  assured  that 
there  should  be  nothing  associated  with  the  hetu  which  con- 
ditioned the  concomitance,  and  this  must  be  settled  by  wide 
experience  ibhuyodarsana). 

Prasastapada  in  defining  inference  as  the  "  knowledge  of  that 
(e.g.  fire)  associated  with  the  reason  (e.g.  smoke)  by  the  sight  of 
the  reason"  described  a  valid  reason  {lingo)  as  that  which  is  con- 
nected with  the  object  of  inference  {anumeyd)  and  which  exists 
wherever  the  object  of  inference  exists  and  is  absent  in  all  cases 


viii]      Prasastapdda  s  Interpretation  of  Inference        349 

where  it  does  not  exist.  This  is  indeed  the  same  as  the  Nyaya 
qualifications  of  paksasattva,  sapaksasattva  and  vipaksdsattva  of 
a  valid  reason  (hetu).  Prasastapada  further  quotes  a  verse  to  say 
that  this  is  the  same  as  what  Kasyapa  (believed  to  be  the  family 
name  of  Kanada)  said.  Kanada  says  that  we  can  infer  a  cause 
from  the  effect,  the  effect  from  the  cause,  or  we  can  infer  one 
thing  by  another  when  they  are  mutually  connected,  or  in  op- 
position or  in  a  relation  of  inherence  (ix.  ii.  i  and  III.  i.  9).  We 
can  infer  by  a  reason  because  it  is  duly  associated  {prasiddhipiir- 
vakatvd)  with  the  object  of  inference.  What  this  association  was 
according  to  Kanada  can  also  be  understood  for  he  tells  us  (III. 
i.  15)  that  where  there  is  no  proper  association,  the  reason  (hetu) 
is  either  non-existent  in  the  object  to  be  inferred  or  it  has  no 
concomitance  with  it  {aprasiddhd)  or  it  has  a  doubtful  existence 
(sandigdhd).  Thus  if  I  say  this  ass  is  a  horse  because  it  has 
horns  it  is  fallacious,  for  neither  the  horse  nor  the  ass  has  horns. 
Again  if  I  say  it  is  a  cow  because  it  has  horns,  it  is  fallacious,  for 
there  is  no  concomitance  between  horns  and  a  cow,  and  though 
a  cow  may  have  a  horn,  all  that  have  horns  are  not  cows.  The 
first  fallacy  is  a  combination  of  paksasattva  and  sapaksasattva, 
for  not  only  the  present  paksa  (the  ass)  had  no  horns,  but  no 
horses  had  any  horns,  and  the  second  is  a  case  of  vipaksasattva, 
for  those  which  are  not  cows  (e.g.  buffaloes)  have  also  horns.  Thus, 
it  seems  that  when  Prasastapada  says  that  he  is  giving  us  the  view 
of  Kanada  he  is  faithful  to  it.  Prasastapada  says  that  wherever 
there  is  smoke  there  is  fire,  if  there  is  no  fire  there  is  no  smoke. 
When  one  knows  this  concomitance  and  unerringly  perceives  the 
smoke,  he  remembers  the  concomitance  and  feels  certain  that 
there  is  fire.  But  with  regard  to  Kanada's  enumeration  of  types  of 
inference  such  as  "  a  cause  is  inferred  from  its  effect,  or  an  effect 
from  the  cause,"  etc.,  Prasastapada  holds  that  these  are  not  the 
only  types  of  inference,  but  are  only  some  examples  for  showing 
the  general  nature  of  inference.  Inference  merely  shows  a  connec- 
tion such  that  from  this  that  can  be  inferred.  He  then  divides 
inference  into  two  classes,  drsta  (from  the  experienced  charac- 
teristics of  one  member  of  a  class  to  another  member  of  the  same 
class),  and  samanyato  drsta.  Drsta  (perceived  resemblance)  is 
that  where  the  previously  known  case  and  the  inferred  case  is 
exactly  of  the  same  class.  Thus  as  an  example  of  it  we  can  point 
out  that  by  perceiving  that  only  a  cow  has  a  hanging  mass  of 
flesh  on  its  neck  (sasna),  I  can  whenever  I  see  the  same  hanging 


350  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [cH. 

mass  of  flesh  at  the  neck  of  an  animal  infer  that  it  is  a  cow.  But 
when  on  the  strength  of  a  common  quality  the  inference  is  ex- 
tended to  a  different  class  of  objects,  it  is  called  samanyato  drsta. 
Thus  on  perceiving  that  the  work  of  the  peasants  is  rewarded 
with  a  good  harvest  I  may  infer  that  the  work  of  the  priests, 
namely  the  performance  of  sacrifices,  will  also  be  rewarded  with 
the  objects  for  which  they  are  performed  (i.e.  the  attainment  of 
heaven).  When  the  conclusion  to  which  one  has  arrived  {svani- 
scitdrthd)  is  expressed  in  five  premisses  for  convincing  others 
who  are  either  in  doubt,  or  in  error  or  are  simply  ignorant,  then 
the  inference  is  called  pararthanumana.  We  know  that  the  distinc- 
tion of  svarthanumana  (inference  for  oneself)  and  pararthanumana 
(inference  for  others)  was  made  by  the  Jains  and  Buddhists. 
Prasastapada  does  not  make  a  sharp  distinction  of  two  classes 
of  inference,  but  he  seems  to  mean  that  what  one  infers,  it  can  be 
conveyed  to  others  by  means  of  five  premisses  in  which  case  it  is 
called  pararthanumana.  But  this  need  not  be  considered  as  an 
entirely  new  innovation  of  Prasastapada,  for  in  IX.  2,  Kanada 
himself  definitely  alludes  to  this  distinction  {asyedain  kdryyakdra- 
nasainbandhascdvayavadbhavatV).  The  five  premisses  which  are 
called  in  Nyaya  pratijnd,  Jietu  drstdnta,  upanaya,  and  nigamana 
are  called  in  Y 2dses\\^di pratijnd,  apadesa,  nidarsana,  anusandhdna, 
and  pratydmndya.  Kanada  however  does  not  mention  the  name 
of  any  of  these  premisses  excepting  the  second  "  apadesa." 
Pratijiia  is  of  course  the  same  as  we  have  in  Nyaya,  and  the  term 
nidarsana  is  very  similar  to  Nyaya  drstanta,  but  the  last  two  are 
entirely  different.  Nidarsana  may  be  of  two  kinds,  (i)  agreement 
in  presence  (e.g.  that  which  has  motion  is  a  substance  as  is  seen 
in  the  case  of  an  arrow),  (2)  agreement  in  absence  (e.g.  what  is  not 
a  substance  has  no  motion  as  is  seen  in  the  case  of  the  universal 
beingi).    He  also  points  out  cases  of  the  fallacy  of  the  example 

^  Dr  Vidyabhusana  says  that  "An  example  before  the  time  of  Dignaga  served  as 
a  mere  familiar  case  which  was  cited  to  help  the  understanding  of  the  listener,  e.g.  The 
hill  is  fiery  ;  because  it  has  smoke  ;  like  a  kitchen  (example).  Asahga  made  the  ex- 
ample more  serviceable  to  reasoning,  but  Dignaga  converted  it  into  a  universal 
proposition,  that  is  a  proposition  expressive  of  the  universal  or  inseparable  connection 
between  the  middle  term  and  the  major  term,  e.g.  The  hill  is  fiery  ;  because  it  has 
smoke  ;  all  that  has  smoke  is  fiery  as  a  kitciien  "  {Indian  Logic,  pp.  95,  96).  It  is  of 
course  true  that  Vatsyayana  had  an  imperfect  example  as  "  like  a  kitchen  "  {^abdah 
utpattidharmakatvadanityah  sthdlyddivat,  I.  i.  36),  but  Prasastapada  has  it  in  the 
proper  form.  Whether  Prasastapada  borrowed  it  from  Dihnaga  or  Dinnaga  from 
Prasastapada  cannot  be  easily  settled. 


viii]  Doctrine  of  Conco77titance  351 

{iiidarsandbhdsd).  Prasastapada's  contribution  thus  seems  to  con- 
sist of  the  enumeration  of  the  five  premisses  and  the  fallacy  of 
the  nidarsana,  but  the  names  of  the  last  two  premisses  are  so 
different  from  what  are  current  in  other  systems  that  it  is  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  he  collected  them  from  some  other  traditional 
Vaisesika  work  which  is  now  lost  to  us.  It  however  definitely 
indicates  that  the  study  of  the  problem  of  inference  was  being 
pursued  in  Vaisesika  circles  independently  of  Nyaya.  There  is 
no  reason  however  to  suppose  that  Prasastapada  borrowed  any- 
thing from  Dihnaga  as  Professor  Stcherbatsky  or  Keith  supposes, 
for,  as  I  have  shown  above,  most  of  Prasastapada's  apparent  in- 
novations are  all  definitely  alluded  to  by  Kanada  himself,  and 
Professor  Keith  has  not  discussed  this  alternative.  On  the 
question  of  the  fallacies  of  nidarsana,  unless  it  is  definitely  proved 
that  Dihnaga  preceded  Prasastapada,  there  is  no  reason  whatever 
to  suppose  that  the  latter  borrowed  it  from  the  former ^ 

The  nature  and  ascertainment  of  concomitance  is  the  most 
important  part  of  inference.  Vatsyayana  says  that  an  inference 
can  be  made  by  the  sight  of  the  lifiga  (reason  or  middle)  through 
the  memory  of  the  connection  between  the  middle  and  the  major 
previously  perceived.  Udyotakara  raises  the  question  whether  it 
is  the  present  perception  of  the  middle  or  the  memory  of  the 
connection  of  the  middle  with  the  major  that  should  be  regarded 
as  leading  to  inference.  His  answer  is  that  both  these  lead  to 
inference,  but  that  which  immediately  leads  to  inference  is  linga- 
pardmarsa,  i.e.  the  present  perception  of  the  middle  in  the  minor 
associated  with  the  memory  of  its  connection  with  the  major,  for 
inference  does  not  immediately  follow  the  memory  of  the  con- 
nection, but  the  present  perception  of  the  middle  associated  with 
the  memory  of  the  connection  {snirtyanngrhito  lingapardmarso). 
But  he  is  silent  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  concomitance. 
Udyotakara's  criticisms  of  Dihnaga  as  shown  by  Vacaspati  have 
no  reference  to  this  point.  The  doctrine  of  tdddtmya  and  tadut- 
patti  was  therefore  in  all  probability  a  new  contribution  to 
Buddhist  logic  by  Dharmaklrtti.  Dharmaklrtti's  contention  was 
that  the  root  principle  of  the  connection  between  the  middle  and 
the  major  was  that  the  former  was  either  identical  in  essence 
with  the  latter  or  its  effect  and  that  unless  this  was  grasped  a 
mere  collection  of  positive  or  negative  instances  will  not  give  us 

^  Prasastapada's  bhasya  with  Nyayakandall,  pp.  200-255. 


352  The  Ny  ay  a -Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

the  desired  connection \    Vacaspati  in  his  refutation  of  this  view- 
says  that  the  cause-effect  relation  cannot  be  determined  as  a 
separate  relation.    If  causality  means  invariable  immediate  ante- 
cedence such  that  there  being  fire  there  is  smoke  and  there  being 
no  fire  there  is  no  smoke,  then  it  cannot  be  ascertained  with 
perfect  satisfaction,  for  there  is  no  proof  that  in  each  case  the 
smoke  was  caused  by  fire  and  not  by  an  invisible  demon.   Unless 
it  can  be  ascertained  that  there  was  no   invisible  element  as- 
sociated, it  cannot   be  said   that  the  smoke  was  immediately 
preceded  by  fire  and  fire  alone.    Again  accepting  for  the  sake  of 
argument  that  causality  can  be  determined,  then  also  cause  is 
known  to  precede  the  effect  and  therefore  the  perception  of  smoke 
can  only  lead  us  to  infer  the  presence  of  fire  at  a  preceding  time 
and  not  contemporaneously  with  it.    Moreover  there  are  many 
cases  where  inference  is  possible,  but  there  is  no  relation  of  cause 
and    effect  or  of  identity  of  essence  (e.g.  the  sunrise  of  this 
morning  by  the  sunrise  of  yesterday  morning).    In  the  case  of 
identity  of  essence  {tdddtmya  as  in  the  case  of  the  pine  and  the 
tree)  also  there  cannot  be  any  inference,  for  one  thing  has  to  be 
inferred  by  another,  but  if  they  are  identical  there  cannot  be  any 
inference.    The  nature  of  concomitance  therefore  cannot  be  de- 
scribed in  either  of  these  ways.    Some  things  (e.g.  smoke)  are 
naturally  connected  with  some  other  things  (e.g.  fire)  and  when 
such  is  the  case,  though  we  may  not  know  any  further  about  the 
nature  of  this  connection,  we  may  infer  the  latter  from  the  former 
and  not  vice  versa,  for  fire  is  connected  with  smoke  only  under 
certain  conditions  (e.g.  green  wood).    It  may  be  argued  that  there 
may  always  be  certain  unknown  conditions  which  may  vitiate 
the  validity  of  inference.    To  this  Vacaspati's  answer  is  that  if 
even  after  observing  a  large  number  of  cases  and  careful  search 
such  conditions  {iipddhi)  cannot  be  discovered,  we  have  to  take 
it  for  granted  that  they  do  not  exist  and  that  there  is  a  natural 
connection    between   the    middle   and    the    major.     The    later 
Buddhists  introduced  the  method  of  Pancakdranl  in  order  to 
determine  effectively  the  causal  relation.   These  five  conditions 
determining  the  causal  relation  are  (i)  neither  the  cause  nor  the 
effect  is  perceived,  (2)  the  cause  is  perceived,  (3)  in  immediate 
succession  the  effect  is  perceived,  (4)  the  cause  disappears,  (5)  in 

'  Karyyakdranabhdvadva  svabhavadva  niydmakat  avinabhdvaniyamd'  darsandnna 
na  dariandt.    Tdtparyatikd,  p.  1 05. 


viii]  Classification  of  Inference  353 

immediate  succession  the  effect  disappears.  But  this  method 
cannot  guarantee  the  infalHbiHty  of  the  determination  of  cause 
and  effect  relation  ;  and  if  by  the  assumption  of  a  cause-effect 
relation  no  higher  degree  of  certainty  is  available,  it  is  better 
to  accept  a  natural  relation  without  limiting  it  to  a  cause-effect 
relation'. 

In  early  Nyaya  books  three  kinds  of  inference  are  described, 
namely  purvavat,  sesavat,  and  samanyato-drsta.  Piirvavat  is  the 
inference  of  effects  from  causes,  e.g.  that  of  impending  rain  from 
heavy  dark  clouds  ;  sesavat  is  the  inference  of  causes  from  effects, 
e.g.  that  of  rain  from  the  rise  of  water  in  the  river ;  samanyato- 
drsta  refers  to  the  inference  in  all  cases  other  than  those  of 
cause  and  effect,  e.g.  the  inference  of  the  sour  taste  of  the 
tamarind  from  its  form  and  colour.  Nydyaniafijarl  mentions 
another  form  of  anumana,  namely  parisesamana  {reductio  ad 
absurdiim),  which  consists  in  asserting  anything  (e.g.  conscious- 
ness) of  any  other  thing  (e.g.  atman),  because  it  was  already 
definitely  found  out  that  consciousness  was  not  produced  in  any 
other  part  of  man.  Since  consciousness  could  not  belong  to 
anything  else,  it  must  belong  to  soul  of  necessity.  In  spite  of 
these  variant  forms  they  are  all  however  of  one  kind,  namely 
that  of  the  inference  of  the  probandum  {sddJiyd)  by  virtue  of  the 
unconditional  and  invariable  concomitance  of  the  hetu,  called 
the  vyapti-niyama.  In  the  new  school  of  Nyaya  (Navya-Nyaya) 
a  formal  distinction  of  three  kinds  of  inference  occupies  an 
important  place,  namely  anvayavyatireki,  kevalanvayi,  and 
kevalavyatireki.  Anvayavyatireki  is  that  inference  where  the 
vyapti  has  been  observed  by  a  combination  of  a  large  number  of 
instances  of  agreement  in  presence  and  agreement  in  absence, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  concomitance  of  smoke  and  fire  (wherever 
there  is  smoke  there  is  fire  {anvaya),  and  where  there  is  no  fire, 
there  is  no  smoke  {vyatirekd)).  An  inference  could  be  for  one's 
own  self  {svdrtkdnumdna)  or  for  the  sake  of  convincing  others 
{pardrthdiiumdnd).  In  the  latter  case,  when  it  was  necessary  that 
an  inference  should  be  put  explicitly  in  an  unambiguous  manner, 
five  propositions  {avayavas)  were  regarded  as  necessary,  namely 
pratijna  (e.g.  the  hill  is  fiery),  hetu  (since  it  has  smoke),  uda- 
harana  (where  there  is  smoke  there  is  fire,  as  in  the  kitchen), 
upanaya  (this  hill  has  smoke),  nigamana  (therefore  it  has  got 

^  Vatsyayana's  bhasya,  Udyotakara's  Vdrttika  and  Tatparyyatika,  I.  i.  5. 
D.  23 


354  '^^^^  Nydya-  Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

fire).  Kevalanvayi  is  that  type  of  inference,  the  vyapti  of  which 
could  not  be  based  on  any  negative  instance,  as  in  the  case 
"  this  object  has  a  name,  since  it  is  an  object  of  knowledge 
{idafri,  vdcyani prameyatvdt)"  Now  no  such  case  is  known  which 
is  not  an  object  of  knowledge  ;  we  cannot  therefore  know  of  any 
case  where  there  was  no  object  of  knowledge  {prameyatva)  and 
no  name  {vacyatva) ;  the  vyapti  here  has  therefore  to  be  based 
necessarily  on  cases  of  agreement — wherever  there  is  prame- 
yatva  or  an  object  of  knowledge,  there  is  vacyatva  or  name. 
The  third  form  of  kevalavyatireki  is  that  where  positive  in- 
stances in  agreement  cannot  be  found,  such  as  in  the  case  of  the 
inference  that  earth  differs  from  other  elements  in  possessing 
the  specific  quality  of  smell,  since  all  that  does  not  differ  from 
other  elements  is  not  earth,  such  as  water;  here  it  is  evident 
that  there  cannot  be  any  positive  instance  of  agreement  and  the 
concomitance  has  to  be  taken  from  negative  instances.  There 
is  only  one  instance,  which  is  exactly  the  proposition  of  our 
inference — earth  differs  from  other  elements,  since  it  has  the 
special  qualities  of  earth.  This  inference  could  be  of  use  only  in 
those  cases  where  we  had  to  infer  anything  by  reason  of  such 
special  traits  of  it  as  was  possessed  by  it  and  it  alone. 

Upamana  and  Sabda. 

The  third  pramana,  which  is  admitted  by  Nyaya  and  not  by 
Vaisesika,  is  upmndna,  and  consists  in  associating  a  thing  un- 
known before  with  its  name  by  virtue  of  its  similarity  with  some 
other  known  thing.  Thus  a  man  of  the  city  who  has  never 
seen  a  wild  ox  {gavayd)  goes  to  the  forest,  asks  a  forester — 
"  what  is  gavaya  ?  "  and  the  forester  replies — "  oh,  you  do  not 
know  it,  it  is  just  like  a  cow";  after  hearing  this  from  the 
forester  he  travels  on,  and  on  seeing  a  gavaya  and  finding  it  to 
be  similar  to  a  cow  he  forms  the  opinion  that  this  is  a  gavaya. 
This  knowing  an  hitherto  unknown  thing  by  virtue  of  its 
similarity  to  a  known  thing  is  called  upamana.  If  some  forester 
had  pointed  out  a  gavaya  to  a  man  of  the  city  and  had  told  him 
that  it  was  called  a  gavaya,  then  also  the  man  would  have 
known  the  animal  by  the  name  gavaya,  but  then  this  would 
have  been  due  to  testimony  {sabda-praindna).  The  knowledge  is 
said  to  be  generated  by  the  upamana  process  when  the  associa- 
tion of  the  unknown  animal  with  its  name  is  made  by  the  observer 


viii]  Upamana  and  Sabda  355 

on  the  strength  of  the  experience  of  the  similarity  of  the  un- 
known animal  to  a  known  one.  The  naiyayikas  are  thorough 
realists,  and  as  such  they  do  not  regard  the  observation  of 
similarity  as  being  due  to  any  subjective  process  of  the  mind. 
Similarity  is  indeed  perceived  by  the  visual  sense  but  yet  the 
association  of  the  name  in  accordance  with  the  perception  of 
similarity  and  the  instruction  received  is  a  separate  act  and  is 
called  upamdna\ 

Sabda-pramana  or  testimony  is  the  right  knowledge  which 
we  derive  from  the  utterances  of  infallible  and  absolutely  truthful 
persons.  All  knowledge  derived  from  the  Vedas  is  valid,  for  the 
Vedas  were  uttered  by  Isvara  himself.  The  Vedas  give  us 
right  knowledge  not  of  itself,  but  because  they  came  out  as  the 
utterances  of  the  infallible  Isvara.  The  Vaisesikas  did  not  admit 
sabda  as  a  separate  pramana,  but  they  sought  to  establish  the 
validity  of  testimony  {sabda)  on  the  strength  of  inference  {anu- 
miti)  on  the  ground  of  its  being  the  utterance  of  an  infallible 
person.  But  as  I  have  said  before,  this  explanation  is  hardly 
corroborated  by  the  Vaisesika  sutras,  which  tacitly  admit  the 
validity  of  the  scriptures  on  its  own  authority.  But  anyhow  this 
was  how  Vaisesika  was  interpreted  in  later  times. 

Negation  in  Nyaya-Vaisesika. 

The  problem  of  negation  or  non-existence  {abhdva)  is  of  great 
interest  in  Indian  philosophy.  In  this  section  we  can  describe  its 
nature  only  from  the  point  of  view  of  perceptibility.    Kumarila'^ 

^  See  Nydyamafijari  on  upamana.  The  oldest  Nyaya  view  was  that  the  instruction 
given  by  the  forester  by  virtue  of  which  the  association  of  the  name  "  wild  ox"  to  the 
strange  animal  was  possible  was  itself  "upamana."  When  Pra^astapada  held  that  upa- 
mana should  be  treated  as  a  case  of  testimony  {aptavacana),  he  had  probably  this  inter- 
pretation in  view.  But  Udyotakara  and  Vacaspati  hold  that  it  was  not  by  the  instruction 
alone  of  the  forester  that  the  association  of  the  name  "  wild  ox  "  was  made,  but  there 
was  the  perception  of  similarity,  and  the  memory  of  the  instruction  of  the  forester  too. 
So  it  is  the  perception  of  similarity  with  the  other  two  factors  as  accessories  that  lead 
us  to  this  association  called  upamana.  What  Vatsyayana  meant  is  not  very  clear,  but 
Dinnaga  supposes  that  according  to  him  the  result  of  upamana  was  the  knowledge  of 
similarity  or  the  knowledge  of  a  thing  having  similarity.  Vacaspati  of  course  holds  that 
he  has  correctly  interpreted  Vatsyayana's  intention.  It  is  however  definite  that  upamana 
means  the  associating  of  a  name  to  a  new  object  {samakhyasambandhapratipattirupamd- 
narthah,  Vatsyayana).  Jayanta  points  out  that  it  is  the  preception  of  similarity  which 
directly  leads  to  the  association  of  the  name  and  hence  the  instruction  of  the  forester 
cannot  be  regarded  as  the  direct  cause  and  consequently  it  cannot  be  classed  under 
testimony  {sabda).  See  Pra^astapada  and  Nydyakandall,  pp.  210-22,  Vatsyayana, 
Udyotakara,  Vacaspati  and  Jayanta  on  Upamana. 

^  See  Kumarila's  treatment  of  abhava  in  the  Slokavarttika,  pp.  473-492. 

23—2 


35^  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

and  his  followers,  whose  philosophy  we  shall  deal  with  in  the 
next  chapter,  hold  that  negation  {abhdvd)  appears  as  an  intuition 
{indnani)  with  reference  to  the  object  negated  where  there  are  no 
means  of  ordinary  cognition(pra7udna)  leading  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence isatparicchedakaui)  of  that  thing.  They  held  that  the  notion 
"it  is  not  existent"  cannot  be  due  to  perception,  for  there  is  no 
contact  here  with  sense  and  object.  It  is  true  indeed  that  when 
we  turn  our  eyes  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  the  perception  of  the  non- 
existence of  a  jug)  to  the  ground,  we  see  both  the  ground  and 
the  non-existence  of  a  jug,  and  when  we  shut  them  we  can  see 
neither  the  jug  nor  the  ground,  and  therefore  it  could  be  urged 
that  if  we  called  the  ground  visually  perceptible,  we  could  say 
the  same  with  regard  to  the  non-existence  of  the  jug.  But  even 
then  since  in  the  case  of  the  perception  of  the  jug  there  is  sense- 
contact,  which  is  absent  in  the  other  case,  we  could  never  say 
that  both  are  grasped  by  perception.  We  see  the  ground  and 
remember  the  jug  (which  is  absent)  and  thus  in  the  mind  rises 
the  notion  of  non-existence  which  has  no  reference  at  all  to  visual 
perception.  A  man  may  be  sitting  in  a  place  where  there  were 
no  tigers,  but  he  might  not  then  be  aware  of  their  non-existence 
at  the  time,  since  he  did  not  think  of  them,  but  when  later  on  he 
is  asked  in  the  evening  if  there  were  any  tigers  at  the  place  where 
he  was  sitting  in  the  morning,  he  then  thinks  and  becomes  aware 
of  the  non-existence  of  tigers  there  in  the  morning,  even 
without  perceiving  the  place  and  without  any  operation  of  the 
memory  of  the  non-existence  of  tigers.  There  is  no  question  of 
there  being  any  inference  in  the  rise  of  our  notion  of  non-existence, 
for  it  is  not  preceded  by  any  notion  of  concomitance  of  any  kind, 
and  neither  the  ground  nor  the  non-perception  of  the  jug  could 
be  regarded  as  a  reason  {lingo),  for  the  non- perception  of  the  jug 
is  related  to  the  jug  and  not  to  the  negation  of  the  jug,  and  no 
concomitance  is  known  between  the  non-perception  of  the  jug  and 
its  non-existence,  and  when  the  question  of  the  concomitance  of 
non-perception  with  non-existence  is  brought  in,  the  same  diffi- 
culty about  the  notion  of  non-existence  {abhdvd)  which  was  sought 
to  be  explained  will  recur  again.  Negation  is  therefore  to  be 
admitted  as  cognized  by  a  separate  and  independent  process 
of  knowledge.  Nyaya  however  says  that  the  perception  of 
non-existence  (e.g.  there  is  no  jug  here)  is  a  unitary  perception 
of  one  whole,  just  as  any  perception  of  positive  existence  (e.g. 


viii]  Mimanisa  vietv  of  Negation  357 

there  is  a  jug  on  the  ground)  is.  Both  the  knowledge  of  the 
ground  as  well  as  the  knowledge  of  the  non-existence  of  the  jug 
arise  there  by  the  same  kind  of  action  of  the  visual  organ,  and 
there  is  therefore  no  reason  why  the  knowledge  of  the  ground 
should  be  said  to  be  due  to  perception,  whereas  the  knowledge  of 
the  negation  of  the  jug  on  the  ground  should  be  said  to  be  due 
to  a  separate  process  of  knowledge.  The  non-existence  of  the  jug 
is  taken  in  the  same  act  as  the  ground  is  perceived.  The  principle 
that  in  order  to  perceive  a  thing  one  should  have  sense-contact 
with  it,  applies  only  to  positive  existents  and  not  to  negation  or 
non-existence.  Negation  or  non-existence  can  be  cognized  even 
without  any  sense-contact.  Non-existence  is  not  a  positive  sub- 
stance, and  hence  there  cannot  be  any  question  here  of  sense- 
contact.  It  may  be  urged  that  if  no  sense-contact  is  required 
in  apprehending  negation,  one  could  as  well  apprehend  negation 
or  non-existence  of  other  places  which  are  far  away  from  him. 
To  this  the  reply  is  that  to  apprehend  negation  it  is  necessary 
that  the  place  where  it  exists  must  be  perceived.  We  know  a 
thing  and  its  quality  to  be  different,  and  yet  the  quality  can  only 
be  taken  in  association  with  the  thing  and  it  is  so  in  this  case  as 
well.  We  can  apprehend  non-existence  only  through  the  appre- 
hension of  its  locus.  In  the  case  when  non-existence  is  said  to 
be  apprehended  later  on  it  is  really  no  later  apprehension  of  non- 
existence but  a  memory  of  non-existence  (e.g.  of  jug)  perceived 
before  along  with  the  perception  of  the  locus  of  non-existence 
(e.g.  ground).  Negation  or  non-existence  {abhdvtz)  can  thus,  ac- 
cording to  Nyaya,  generate  its  cognition  just  as  any  positive 
existence  can  do.  Negation  is  not  mere  negativity  or  mere 
vacuous  absence,  but  is  what  generates  the  cognition  "is  not," 
as  position  {bJidvd)  is  what  generates  the  cognition  "it  is." 

The  Buddhists  deny  the  existence  of  negation.  They  hold 
that  when  a  negation  is  apprehended,  it  is  apprehended  with 
specific  time  and  space  conditions  (e.g.  this  is  not  here  now); 
but  in  spite  of  such  an  apprehension,  we  could  never  think 
that  negation  could  thus  be  associated  with  them  in  any 
relation.  There  is  also  no  relation  between  the  negation  and  its 
pratiyogi  (thing  negated — e.g.  jug  in  the  negation  of  jug),  for 
when  there  is  the  pratiyogi  there  is  no  negation,  and  when  there 
is  the  negation  there  is  no  pratiyogi.  There  is  not  even  the 
relation  of  opposition  {virodha),  for  we  could  have  admitted  it,  if 


358  The  Nyaya-VaUesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

the  negation  of  the  jug  existed  before  and  opposed  the  jug, 
for  how  can  the  negation  of  the  jug  oppose  the  jug,  without 
effecting  anything  at  all?  Again,  it  may  be  asked  whether  nega- 
tion is  to  be  regarded  as  a  positive  being  or  becoming  or  of  the 
nature  of  not  becoming  or  non-being.  In  the  first  alternative  it 
will  be  like  any  other  positive  existents,  and  in  the  second  case  it 
will  be  permanent  and  eternal,  and  it  cannot  be  related  to  this  or 
that  particular  negation.  There  are  however  many  kinds  of  non- 
perception,  e.g.  (i)  svabhavanupalabdhi  (natural  non-perception — 
there  is  no  jug  because  none  is  perceived);  (2)  karananupalabdhi 
(non-perception  of  cause — there  is  no  smoke  here,  since  there  is 
no  fire);  (3)  vyapakanupalabdhi  (non-perception  of  the  species — 
there  is  no  pine  here,  since  there  is  no  tree);  (4)  karyanupalabdhi 
(non-perception  of  effects — there  are  not  the  causes  of  smoke  here, 
since  there  is  no  smoke);  (5)  svabhavaviruddhopalabdhi  (percep- 
tion of  contradictory  natures— there  is  no  cold  touch  here  because 
of  fire) ;  (6)  viruddhakaryopalabdhi  (perception  of  contradictory 
effects — there  is  no  cold  touch  here  because  of  smoke);  (7)  virud- 
dhavyaptopalabdhi  (opposite  concomitance — past  is  not  of  neces- 
sity destructible,  since  it  depends  on  other  causes);  (8)  karyyavi- 
ruddhopalabdhi  (opposition  of  effects — there  is  not  here  the  causes 
which  can  give  cold  since  there  is  fire);  (9)  vyapakaviruddhopa- 
labdhi  (opposite  concomitants — there  is  no  touch  of  snow  here, 
because  of  fire);  (10)  karanaviruddhopalabdhi  (opposite  causes — 
there  is  no  shivering  through  cold  here,  since  he  is  near  the  fire) ; 
(11)  karanaviruddhakaryyopalabdhi  (effects  of  opposite  causes — 
this  place  is  not  occupied  by  men  of  shivering  sensations  for  it 
is  full  of  smoke^). 

There  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  above  ways  we  speak  of  nega- 
tion, but  that  does  not  prove  that  there  is  any  reason  for  the 
cognition  of  negation  {heturnabJidvasamvidaJi).  All  that  we  can 
say  is  this  that  there  are  certain  situations  which  justify  the  use 
{yogyata)  of  negative  appellations.  But  this  situation  or  yogyata 
is  positive  in  character.  What  we  all  speak  of  in  ordinary  usage 
as  non-perception  is  of  the  nature  of  perception  of  some  sort. 
Perception  of  negation  thus  does  not  prove  the  existence  of 
negation,  but  only  shows  that  there  are  certain  positive  percep- 
tions which  are  only  interpreted  in  that  way.  It  is  the  positive 
perception  of  the  ground  where  the  visible  jug  is  absent  that 

^  See  Nydyabindti,  p.  ii,  and  Nyayamarijari,  pp.  53-7. 


viii]  Nyaya  vieiv  of  Negation  359 

leads  us  to  speak  of  having  perceived  the  negation  of  the  jug 
{amipalmnbhah  abhdvam  vyavahdrayatiy . 

The  Nyaya  reply  against  this  is  that  the  perception  of  positive 
existents  is  as  much  a  fact  as  the  perception  of  negation,  and  we 
have  no  right  to  say  that  the  former  alone  is  valid.  It  is  said 
that  the  non-perception  of  jug  on  the  ground  is  but  the  percep- 
tion of  the  ground  without  the  jug.  But  is  this  being  without 
the  jug  identical  with  the  ground  or  different?  If  identical  then 
it  is  the  same  as  the  ground,  and  we  shall  expect  to  have  it  even 
when  the  jug  is  there.  If  different  then  the  quarrel  is  only  over 
the  name,  for  whatever  you  may  call  it,  it  is  admitted  to  be  a 
distinct  category.  If  some  difference  is  noted  between  the  ground 
with  the  jug,  and  the  ground  without  it,  then  call  it  "ground, 
without  the  jugness"  or  "the  negation  of  jug,"  it  does  not  matter 
much,  for  a  distinct  category  has  anyhow  been  admitted.  Nega- 
tion is  apprehended  by  perception  as  much  as  any  positive 
existent  is;  the  nature  of  the  objects  of  perception  only  are  dif- 
ferent; just  as  even  in  the  perception  of  positive  sense-objects 
there  are  such  diversities  as  colour,  taste,  etc.  The  relation  of 
negation  with  space  and  time  with  which  it  appears  associated  is 
the  relation  that  subsists  between  the  qualified  and  the  quality 
{yisesya  visesand).  The  relation  between  the  negation  and  its 
pratiyogi  is  one  of  opposition,  in  the  sense  that  where  the  one  is 
the  other  is  not.  The  Vaiscsika  sutra  (ix.  i.  6)  seems  to  take  abhava 
in  a  similar  way  as  Kumarila  the  Mimarnsist  does,  though  the 
commentators  have  tried  to  explain  it  away^  In  Vaisesika  the 
four  kinds  of  negation  are  enumerated  as  (i)  prdgabhdva  (the 
negation  preceding  the  production  of  an  object — e.g.  of  the  jug 
before  it  is  made  by  the  potter);  (2)  dhvainsdbhdva  (the  negation 
following  the  destruction  of  an  object — as  of  the  jug  after  it  is 
destroyed  by  the  stroke  of  a  stick);  (3)  anyonydbhdva  (mutual 
negation — e.g.  in  the  cow  there  is  the  negation  of  the  horse  and 

^  See  Nyayabindutlkd,  pp.  34  ff.,  and  also  Nydyamanj'ari,  pp.  48-63. 

^  Prasastapada  says  that  as  the  pro  luction  of  an  effect  is  the  sign  of  the  existence 
of  the  cause,  so  the  non-production  of  it  is  the  sign  of  its  non-existence.  Sridhara  in 
commenting  upon  it  says  that  the  non-preception  of  a  sensible  object  is  the  sign  {h'/iga} 
of  its  non-existence.  But  evidently  he  is  not  satisfied  with  the  view  for  he  says  that 
non-existence  is  also  directly  perceived  by  the  senses  i^bhdvavad  abhavo' pindriyagra- 
hanayogyah)  and  that  there  is  an  actual  sense-contact  with  non-existence  which  is  the 
collocating  cause  of  the  preception  of  non-existence  (abhdvendriyasannikarsd'pi  abhd- 
vagrahanasdmagrl),  Nydyakandali,  pp.  225-30. 


360  The  Ny  ay  a- Vaisesika  Philosophy  [cH. 

in  the  horse  that  of  the  cow) ;  (4)  atyantdbJidva  (a  negation  which 
always  exists — e.g.  even  when  there  is  a  jug  here,  its  negation  in 
other  places  is  not  destroyed) \ 

The  necessity  of  the  Acquirement  of  debating  devices 
for  the  seeker  of  Salvation. 

It  is  probable  that  the  Nyaya  philosophy  arose  in  an  atmo- 
sphere of  continued  disputes  and  debates ;  as  a  consequence 
of  this  we  find  here  many  terms  related  to  debates  which  we  do 
not  notice  in  any  other  system  of  Indian  philosophy.  These  are 
tarka^  nirnaya,  vdda,  jalpa,  vitandd,  hetvdbJidsa,  chala,  jdti  and 
n  igrahasthdna. 

Tarka  means  deliberation  on  an  unknown  thing  to  discern 
its  real  nature;  it  thus  consists  of  seeking  reasons  in  favour  of 
some  supposition  to  the  exclusion  of  other  suppositions  ;  it  is  not 
inference,  but  merely  an  oscillation  of  the  mind  to  come  to  a  right 
conclusion.  When  there  is  doubt  (samsaya)  about  the  specific 
nature  of  anything  we  have  to  take  to  tarka.  Nirnaya  means  the 
conclusion  to  which  we  arrive  as  a  result  of  tarka.  When  two 
opposite  parties  dispute  over  their  respective  theses,  such  as  the 
doctrines  that  there  is  or  is  not  an  atman,  in  which  each  of  them 
tries  to  prove  his  own  thesis  with  reasons,  each  of  the  theses  is 
called  a  vdda.  Jalpa  means  a  dispute  in  which  the  disputants 
give  wrangling  rejoinders  in  order  to  defeat  their  respective  op- 
ponents. A  jalpa  is  called  a  vitandd  when  it  is  only  a  destructive 
criticism  which  seeks  to  refute  the  opponent's  doctrine  without 
seeking  to  establish  or  formulate  any  new  doctrine.  Hetvabhasas 
are  those  which  appear  as  hetus  but  are  really  not  so.  Nyaya 
sutras  enumerate  five  fallacies  {hetvabhasas)  of  the  middle  (hetu): 
savyabhicdra  (erratic),  viniddha  (contradictory),  prakaranasama 
(tautology),  sddhyasaina  (unproved  reason)  and  kdldtlta  (inop- 
portune). Savyabhicara  is  that  where  the  same  reason  may  prove 
opposite  conclusions  (e.g.  sound  is  eternal  because  it  is  intangible 
like  the  atoms  which  are  eternal,  and  sound  is  non-eternal  because 
it  is  intangible  like  cognitions  which  are  non-eternal) ;  viruddha 
is  that  where  the  reason  opposes  the  premiss  to  be  proved  (e.g.  a 
jug  is  eternal,  because  it  is  produced) ;  prakaranasama  is  that 

^  The  doctrine  of  negation,  its  function  and  value  with  refeience  to  diverse  logical 
problems,  have  many  diverse  aspects,  and  it  is  impossible  to  do  them  justice  in  a  small 
section  like  this. 


viii]  Fallacies  361 

where  the  reason  repeats  the  thesis  to  be  proved  in  another  form 
(e.g.  sound  is  non-eternal  because  it  has  not  the  quality  of 
eternality)  ;  sadhyasama  is  that  where  the  reason  itself  requires 
to  be  proved  (e.g.  shadow  is  a  substance  because  it  has  motion, 
but  it  remains  to  be  proved  whether  shadows  have  motion  or  not)  ; 
kalatita  is  a  false  analogy  where  the  reason  fails  because  it  does  not 
tally  with  the  example  in  point  of  time.  Thus  one  may  argue  that 
sound  is  eternal  because  it  is  the  result  of  contact  (stick  and  the 
drum)  like  colour  which  is  also  a  result  of  contact  of  light  and 
the  object  and  is  eternal.  Here  the  fallacy  lies  in  this,  that  colour 
is  simultaneous  with  the  contact  of  light  which  shows  what  was 
already  there  and  only  manifested  by  the  light,  whereas  in  the 
case  of  sound  it  is  produced  immediately  after  the  contact  of  the 
stick  and  drum  and  is  hence  a  product  and  hence  non-eternal. 
The  later  Nyaya  works  divide  savyabhicara  into  three  classes, 
(i)  sadharana  or  common  (e.g.  the  mountain  is  fiery  because  it  is 
an  object  of  knowledge,  but  even  a  lake  which  is  opposed  to  fire 
is  also  an  object  of  knowledge),  (2)  asadharana  or  too  restricted 
(e.g.  sound  is  eternal  because  it  has  the  nature  of  sound  ;  this 
cannot  be  a  reason  for  the  nature  of  sound  exists  only  in  the 
sound  and  nowhere  else),  and  (3)  anupasarnharin  or  unsubsuming 
(e.g.  everything  is  non-eternal,  because  they  are  all  objects  of 
knowledge ;  here  the  fallacy  lies  in  this,  that  no  instance  can  be 
found  which  is  not  an  object  of  knowledge  and  an  opposite  con- 
clusion may  also  be  drawn).  The  fallacy  satpratipaksa  is  that  in 
which  there  is  a  contrary  reason  which  may  prove  the  opposite 
conclusion  (e.g.  sound  is  eternal  because  it  is  audible,  sound  is 
non-eternal  because  it  is  an  effect).  The  fallacy  asiddha  (unreal) 
is  of  three  kinds  (i)  dsraydsiddJia  (the  lotus  of  the  sky  is  fragrant 
because  it  is  like  other  lotuses;  now  there  cannot  be  any  lotus  in 
the  sky),  (2)  svarfipdsiddJia  (sound  is  a  quality  because  it  is 
visible  ;  but  sound  has  no  visibility),  (3)  vydpyatvdsiddha  is  that 
where  the  concomitance  between  the  middle  and  the  consequence 
is  not  invariable  and  inevitable;  there  is  smoke  in  the  hill  because 
there  is  fire;  but  there  may  be  fire  without  the  smoke  as  in  a  red 
hot  iron  ball,  it  is  only  green-wood  fire  that  is  invariably  associated 
with  smoke.  The  fallacy  bddJiita  is  that  which  pretends  to  prove 
a  thesis  which  is  against  direct  experience,  e.g.  fire  is  not  hot 
because  it  is  a  substance.  We  have  already  enumerated  the 
fallacies    counted    by    Vaisesika.    Contrary   to    Nyaya    practice 


362  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

Pra^astapada  counts  the  fallacies  of  the  example.  Dirinaga  also 
counted  fallacies  of  example  (e.g.  sound  is  eternal,  because  it  is 
incorporeal,  that  which  is  incorporeal  is  eternal  as  the  atoms  ; 
but  atoms  are  not  incorporeal)  and  Dharmaklrtti  counted  also  the 
fallacies  of  the  paksa  (minor)  ;  but  Nyaya  rightly  considers  that 
the  fallacies  of  the  middle  if  avoided  will  completely  safeguard 
inference  and  that  these  are  mere  repetitions.  Chala  means  the 
intentional  misinterpretation  of  the  opponent's  arguments  for  the 
purpose  of  defeating  him.  Jati  consists  in  the  drawing  of  contra- 
dictory conclusions,  the  raising  of  false  issues  or  the  like  with 
the  deliberate  intention  of  defeating  an  opponent.  Nigrahasthana 
means  the  exposure  of  the  opponent's  argument  as  involving 
self-contradiction,  inconsistency  or  the  like,  by  which  his  defeat  is 
conclusively  proved  before  the  people  to  the  glory  of  the  victorious 
opponent.  As  to  the  utility  of  the  description  of  so  many  debating 
tricks  by  which  an  opponent  might  be  defeated  in  a  metaphysical 
work,  the  aim  of  which  ought  to  be  to  direct  the  ways  that  lead  to 
emancipation,  it  is  said  by  Jayanta  in  his  Nydyaniahjari  that  these 
had  to  be  resorted  to  as  a  protective  measure  against  arrogant 
disputants  who  often  tried  to  humiliate  a  teacher  before  his  pupils. 
If  the  teacher  could  not  silence  the  opponent,  the  faith  of  the 
pupils  in  him  would  be  shaken  and  great  disorder  would  follow, 
and  it  was  therefore  deemed  necessary  that  he  who  was  plodding 
onward  for  the  attainment  of  moksa  should  acquire  these  devices 
for  the  protection  of  his  own  faith  and  that  of  his  pupils.  A  know- 
ledge of  these  has  therefore  been  enjoined  in  the  Nydya  sutra  as 
being  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  salvation  \ 

The  doctrine  of  Soul. 

Dhurtta  Carvakas  denied  the  existence  of  soul  and  regarded 
consciousness  and  life  as  products  of  bodily  changes;  there  were 
other  Carvakas  called  Susiksita  Carvakas  who  admitted  the 
existence  of  soul  but  thought  that  it  was  destroyed  at  death. 
The  Buddhists  also  denied  the  existence  of  any  permanent  self. 
The  naiyayikas  ascertained  all  the  categories  of  metaphysics 
mainly  by  such  inference  as  was  corroborated  by  experience. 
They  argued  that  since  consciousness,  pleasures,  pains,  wiHing, 
etc.  could  not  belong  to  our  body  or  the  senses,  there  must  be 

^  See  Nyayamanjarl ,  pp.  586-659,  and   Tarkikaraksd  of  Varadaraja  and  Nis- 
kantaka  of  Mallinatha,  pp.  185  fif. 


viii]  Doctrine  of  Soul  363 

some  entity  to  which  they  belonged;  the  existence  of  the  self 
is  not  proved  according  to  Nyaya  merely  by  the  notion  of  our 
self-consciousness,  as  in  the  case  of  Mlmamsa,  for  Nyaya  holds 
that  we  cannot  depend  upon  such  a  perception,  for  it  may 
be  erroneous.  It  often  happens  that  I  say  that  I  am  white  or 
I  am  black,  but  it  is  evident  that  such  a  perception  cannot 
be  relied  upon,  for  the  self  cannot  have  any  colour.  So  we 
cannot  safely  depend  on  our  self-consciousness  as  upon  the 
inference  that  the  self  has  to  be  admitted  as  that  entity  to 
which  consciousness,  emotion,  etc.  adhere  when  they  are  pro- 
duced as  a  result  of  collocations.  Never  has  the  production  of 
atman  been  experienced,  nor  has  it  been  found  to  suffer  any 
destruction  like  the  body,  so  the  soul  must  be  eternal.  It  is  not 
located  in  any  part  of  the  body,  but  is  all-pervading,  i.e.  exists  at 
the  same  time  in  all  places  (vibku),  and  does  not  travel  with 
the  body  but  exists  everywhere  at  the  same  time.  But  though 
atman  is  thus  disconnected  from  the  body,  yet  its  actions  are 
seen  in  the  body  because  it  is  with  the  help  of  the  collocation 
of  bodily  limbs,  etc.  that  action  in  the  self  can  be  manifested 
or  produced.  It  is  unconscious  in  itself  and  acquires  conscious- 
ness as  a  result  of  suitable  collocations^ 

Even  at  birth  children  show  signs  of  pleasure  by  their  different 
facial  features,  and  this  could  not  be  due  to  anything  else  than 
the  memory  of  the  past  experiences  in  past  lives  of  pleasures  and 
pains.  Moreover  the  inequalities  in  the  distribution  of  pleasures 
and  pains  and  of  successes  and  failures  prove  that  these  must  be 
due  to  the  different  kinds  of  good  and  bad  action  that  men  per- 
formed in  their  past  lives.  Since  the  inequality  of  the  world 
must  have  some  reasons  behind  it,  it  is  better  to  admit  karma  as 
the  determining  factor  than  to  leave  it  to  irresponsible  chance. 

Isvara  and  Salvation. 

Nyaya  seeks  to  establish  the  existence  of  Isvara  on  the 
basis  of  inference.  We  know  that  the  Jains,  the  Sarnkhya  and 
the  Buddhists  did  not  believe  in  the  existence  of  Isvara  and 
offered  many  antitheistic  arguments.  Nyaya  wanted  to  refute 
these  and  prove  the  existence  of  Isvara  by  an  inference  of  the 
samanyato-drsta  type. 

1  Jndnasamavayanibandhanamevatmanaketayitrtvam,    &c.     See   Nydyafnanjarl, 
pp.  432  ff. 


364  The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  Philosophy  [ch. 

The  Jains  and  other  atheists  held  that  though  things  in  the 
world  have  production  and  decay,  the  world  as  a  whole  was  never 
produced,  and  it  was  never  therefore  an  effect.  In  contrast  to 
this  view  the  Nyaya  holds  that  the  world  as  a  whole  is  also  an 
effect  like  any  other  effect.  Many  geological  changes  and  land- 
slips occur,  and  from  these  destructive  operations  proceeding  in 
nature  it  may  be  assumed  that  this  world  is  not  eternal  but  a 
result  of  production.  But  even  if  this  is  not  admitted  by  the 
atheists  they  can  in  no  way  deny  the  arrangement  and  order  of 
the  universe.  But  they  would  argue  that  there  was  certainly  a 
difference  between  the  order  and  arrangement  of  human  produc- 
tions (e.g.  a  jug)  and  the  order  and  arrangement  of  the  universe; 
and  therefore  from  the  order  and  3.rrangement(sanmvesa-viszstatd) 
of  the  universe  it  could  not  be  argued  that  the  universe  was 
produced  by  a  creator ;  for,  it  is  from  the  sort  of  order  and 
arrangement  that  is  found  in  human  productions  that  a  creator 
or  producer  could  be  inferred.  To  this,  Nyaya  answers  that  the 
concomitance  is  to  be  taken  between  the  "order  and  arrangement" 
in  a  general  sense  and  "the  existence  of  a  creator"  and  not  with 
specific  cases  of  "  order  and  arrangement,"  for  each  specific  case 
may  have  some  such  peculiarity  in  which  it  differs  from  similar 
other  specific  cases ;  thus  the  fire  in  the  kitchen  is  not  the  same 
kind  of  fire  as  we  find  in  a  forest  fire,  but  yet  we  are  to  disregard 
the  specific  individual  peculiarities  of  fire  in  each  case  and  con- 
sider the  concomitance  of  fire  in  general  with  smoke  in  general. 
So  here,  we  have  to  consider  the  concomitance  of  "  order  and 
arrangement "  in  general  with  "  the  existence  of  a  creator,"  and 
thus  though  the  order  and  arrangement  of  the  world  may  be 
different  from  the  order  and  arrangement  of  things  produced  by 
man,  yet  an  inference  from  it  for  the  existence  of  a  creator  would 
not  be  inadmissible.  The  objection  that  even  now  we  see  many 
effects  (e.g.  trees)  which  are  daily  shooting  forth  from  the  ground 
without  any  creator  being  found  to  produce  them,  does  not  hold, 
for  it  can  never  be  proved  that  the  plants  are  not  actually  created 
by  a  creator.  The  inference  therefore  stands  that  the  world  has 
a  creator,  since  it  is  an  effect  and  has  order  and  arrangement  in 
its  construction.  Everything  that  is  an  effect  and  has  an  order 
and  arrangement  has  a  creator,  like  the  jug.  The  world  is  an 
effect  and  has  order  and  arrangement  and  has  therefore  a  creator. 
Just  as  the  potter  knows  all  the  purposes  of  the  jug  that  he  makes. 


viii]  God  and  Salvation  365 

so  Isvara  knows  all  the  purposes  of  this  wide  universe  and  is  thus 
omniscient.  He  knows  all  things  always  and  therefore  does  not 
require  memory;  all  things  are  perceived  by  him  directly  without 
any  intervention  of  any  internal  sense  such  as  manas,  etc.  He  is 
always  happy.  His  will  is  eternal,  and  in  accordance  with  the 
karma  of  men  the  same  will  produces  dissolution,  creates,  or 
protects  the  world,  in  the  order  by  which  each  man  reaps  the 
results  of  his  own  deeds.  As  our  self  which  is  in  itself  bodiless 
can  by  its  will  produce  changes  in  our  body  and  through  it  in 
the  external  world,  so  Isvara  also  can  by  his  will  create  the 
universe  though  he  has  no  body.  Some,  however,  say  that  if  any 
association  of  body  with  Isvara  is  indispensable  for  our  con- 
ception of  him,  the  atoms  may  as  well  be  regarded  as  his  body, 
so  that  just  as  by  the  will  of  our  self  changes  and  movement  of 
our  body  take  place,  so  also  by  his  will  changes  and  movements 
are  produced  in  the  atoms  \ 

The  naiyayikas  in  common  with  most  other  systems  of  Indian 
philosophy  believed  that  the  world  was  full  of  sorrow  and  that 
the  small  bits  of  pleasure  only  served  to  intensify  the  force  of 
sorrow.  To  a  wise  person  therefore  everything  is  sorrow  {sai^aiii 
duhkham  vivekinali)  ;  the  wise  therefore  is  never  attached  to  the 
so-called  pleasures  of  life  which  only  lead  us  to  further  sorrows. 

The  bondage  of  the  world  is  due  to  false  knowledge  {inithyd- 
jfidnd)  which  consists  in  thinking  as  my  own  self  that  which 
is  not  my  self,  namely  body,  senses,  manas,  feelings  and  know- 
ledge ;  when  once  the  true  knowledge  of  the  six  padarthas  and 
as  Nyaya  says,  of  the  proofs  {pranidnd),  the  objects  of  knowledge 
{prameya),  and  of  the  other  logical  categories  of  inference  is 
attained,  false  knowledge  is  destroyed.  False  knowledge  can 
be  removed  by  constant  thinking  of  its  opposite  (ypratipaksa- 
bhdvand),  namely  the  true  estimates  of  things.  Thus  when  any 
pleasure  attracts  us,  we  are  to  think  that  this  is  in  reality  but 
pain,  and  thus  the  right  knowledge  about  it  will  dawn  and  it 
will  never  attract  us  again.  Thus  it  is  that  with  the  destruction 
of  false  knowledge  our  attachment  or  antipathy  to  things  and 
ignorance  about  them  (collectively  called  dosa,  cf.  the  klesa  of 
Patanjali)  are  also  destroyed. 

With  the  destruction  of  attachment  actions  {pravrtH)  for  the 

^  See  Nyayamafijari,  pp.  190-204,  Itnaranumdna  of  Raghunatha  .Siromani  and 
Udayana's  Kitsiandnjali. 


366  The  Nyaya-  Vaisesika  Philosophy       [ch.  viii 

fulfilment  of  desires  cease  and  with  it  rebirth  ceases  and  with 
it  sorrow  ceases.  Without  false  knowledge  and  attachment, 
actions  cannot  produce  the  bondage  of  karma  that  leads  to  the 
production  of  body  and  its  experiences.  With  the  cessation  of 
sorrow  there  is  emancipation  in  which  the  self  is  divested  of  all 
its  qualities  (consciousness,  feeling,  willing,  etc.)  and  remains 
in  its  own  inert  state.  The  state  of  mukti  according  to  Nyaya- 
Vaisesika  is  neither  a  state  of  pure  knowledge  nor  of  bliss  but  a 
state  of  perfect  qualitilessness,  in  which  the  self  remains  in  itself  in 
its  own  purity.  It  is  the  negative  state  of  absolute  painlessness 
in  mukti  that  is  sometimes  spoken  of  as  being  a  state  of  absolute 
happiness  {dnanda),  though  really  speaking  the  state  of  mukti 
can  never  be  a  state  of  happiness.  It  is  a  passive  state  of  self  in 
its  original  and  natural  purity  unassociated  with  pleasure,  pain, 
knowledge,  willing,  etc.^ 

1  Nydyamarijarl,  pp.  499-533. 


CHAPTER  IX 

MIMAMSA  PHILOSOPHY^ 

A  Comparative  Review. 

The  Nyaya-Vaisesika  philosophy  looked  at  experience  from 
a  purely  common  sense  point  of  view  and  did  not  work  with  any 
such  monistic  tendency  that  the  ultimate  conceptions  of  our 
common  sense  experience  should  be  considered  as  coming  out  of 
an  original  universal  (e.g.  prakrti  of  the  Samkhya).  Space,  time, 
the  four  elements,  soul,  etc.  convey  the  impression  that  they  are  sub- 
stantive entities  or  substances.  What  is  perceived  of  the  material 
things  as  qualities  such  as  colour,  taste,  etc.  is  regarded  as  so  many 
entities  which  have  distinct  and  separate  existence  but  which 
manifest  themselves  in  connection  with  the  substances.  So  also 
karma  or  action  is  supposed  to  be  a  separate  entity,  and  even 
the  class  notions  are  perceived  as  separate  entities  inhering  in 
substances.  Knowledge  {j'ndna)  which  illuminates  all  things  is 
regarded  only  as  a  quality  belonging  to  soul,  just  as  there  are 
other  qualities  of  material  objects.  Causation  is  viewed  merely 
as  the  collocation  of  conditions.  The  genesis  of  knowledge  is 
also  viewed  as  similar  in  nature  to  the  production  of  any  other 
physical  event.  Thus  just  as  by  the  collocation  of  certain  physical 
circumstances  a  jug  and  its  qualities  are  produced,  so  by  the 
combination  and  respective  contacts  of  the  soul,  mind,  sense,  and 
the  objects  of  sense,  knowledge  {Jndna)  is  produced.  Soul  with 
Nyaya  is  an  inert  unconscious  entity  in  which  knowledge,  etc. 
inhere.  The  relation  between  a  substance  and  its  quality,  action, 
class  notion,  etc.  has  also  to  be  admitted  as  a  separate  entity,  as 
without  it  the  different  entities  being  without  any  principle  of 
relation  would  naturally  fail  to  give  us  a  philosophic  construction. 
Samkhya  had  conceived  of  a  principle  which  consisted  of  an 
infinite  number  of  reals  of  three  different  types,  which  by  their 
combination  were  conceived  to  be  able  to  produce  all  substances, 
qualities,  actions,  etc.  No  difference  was  acknowledged  to  exist 
between  substances,  qualities  and  actions,  and  it  was  conceived 

^  On  the  meaning  of  the  word  Mimamsa  see  Chapter  iv. 


368  Mimmnsa  Philosophy  [cH. 

that  these  were  but  so  many  aspects  of  a  combination  of  the  three 
types  of  reals  in  different  proportions.  The  reals  contained  within 
them  the  rudiments  of  all  developments  of  matter,  knowledge, 
willing,  feelings,  etc.  As  combinations  of  reals  changed  incessantly 
and  new  phenomena  of  matter  and  mind  were  manifested,  collo- 
cations did  not  bring  about  any  new  thing  but  brought  about  a 
phenomenon  which  was  already  there  in  its  causes  in  another 
form.  What  we  call  knowledge  or  thought  ordinarily,  is  with  them 
merely  a  form  of  subtle  illuminating  matter-stuff.  Samkhya  holds 
however  that  there  is  a  transcendent  entity  as  pure  conscious- 
ness and  that  by  some  kind  of  transcendent  reflection  or  contact 
this  pure  consciousness  transforms  the  bare  translucent  thought- 
matter  into  conscious  thought  or  experience  of  a  person. 

But  this  hypothesis  of  a  pure  self,  as  essentially  distinct  and 
separate  from  knowledge  as  ordinarily  understood,  can  hardly 
be  demonstrated  in  our  common  sense  experience ;  and  this  has 
been  pointed  out  by  the  Nyaya  school  in  a  very  strong  and 
emphatic  manner.  Even  Samkhya  did  not  try  to  prove  that  the 
existence  of  its  transcendent  purusa  could  be  demonstrated  in 
experience,  and  it  had  to  attempt  to  support  its  hypothesis  of  the 
existence  of  a  transcendent  self  on  the  ground  of  the  need  of 
a  permanent  entity  as  a  fixed  object,  to  which  the  passing  states 
of  knowledge  could  cling,  and  on  grounds  of  moral  struggle 
towards  virtue  and  emancipation.  Sarnkhya  had  first  supposed 
knowledge  to  be  merely  a  combination  of  changing  reals,  and 
then  had  as  a  matter  of  necessity  to  admit  a  fixed  principle  as 
purusa  (pure  transcendent  consciousness).  The  self  is  thus  here 
in  some  sense  an  object  of  inference  to  fill  up  the  gap  left  by 
the  inadequate  analysis  of  consciousness  {buddhi)  as  being  non- 
intelligent  and  incessantly  changing. 

Nyaya  fared  no  better,  for  it  also  had  to  demonstrate  self 
on  the  ground  that  since  knowledge  existed  it  was  a  quality, 
and  therefore  must  inhere  in  some  substance.  This  hypothesis 
is  again  based  upon  another  uncritical  assumption  that  substances 
and  attributes  were  entirely  separate,  and  that  it  was  the  nature 
of  the  latter  to  inhere  in  the  former,  and  also  that  knowledge  was 
a  quality  requiring  (similarly  with  other  attributes)  a  substance 
in  which  to  inhere.  None  of  them  could  take  their  stand  upon 
the  self-conscious  nature  of  our  ordinary  thought  and  draw  their 
conclusions  on  the  strength  of  the  direct  evidence  of  this  self- 


ix]  Nyaya  and  Mimamsa  369 

conscious  thought.  Of  course  it  is  true  that  Sarnkhya  had  ap- 
proached nearer  to  this  view  than  Nyaya,  but  it  had  separated 
the  content  of  knowledge  and  its  essence  so  irrevocably  that  it 
threatened  to  break  the  integrity  of  thought  in  a  manner  quite 
unwarranted  by  common  sense  experience,  which  does  not  seem 
to  reveal  this  dual  element  in  thought.  Anyhow  the  unification 
of  the  content  of  thought  and  its  essence  had  to  be  made,  and  this 
could  not  be  done  except  by  what  may  be  regarded  as  a  make- 
shift— a  transcendent  illusion  running  on  from  beginningless 
time.  These  difficulties  occurred  because  Sarnkhya  soared  to  a 
region  which  was  not  directly  illuminated  by  the  light  of  common 
sense  experience.  The  Nyaya  position  is  of  course  much  worse 
as  a  metaphysical  solution,  for  it  did  not  indeed  try  to  solve  any- 
thing, but  only  gave  us  a  schedule  of  inferential  results  which  could 
not  be  tested  by  experience,  and  which  were  based  ultimately  on 
a  one-sided  and  uncritical  assumption.  It  is  an  uncritical  common 
sense  experience  that  substances  are  different  from  qualities  and 
actions,  and  that  the  latter  inhere  in  the  former.  To  base  the 
whole  of  metaphysics  on  such  a  tender  and  fragile  experience  is, 
to  say  the  least,  building  on  a  weak  foundation.  It  was  necessary 
that  the  importance  of  the  self-revealing  thought  must  be  brought 
to  the  forefront,  its  evidence  should  be  collected  and  trusted,  and 
an  account  of  experience  should  be  given  according  to  its  verdict. 
No  construction  of  metaphysics  can  ever  satisfy  us  which  ignores 
the  direct  immediate  convictions  of  self-conscious  thought.  It  is 
a  relief  to  find  that  a  movement  of  philosophy  in  this  direction 
is  ushered  in  by  the  Mimarnsa  system.  The  Mimamsd  sutras 
were  written  by  Jaimini  and  the  commentary  {bhdsyd)  on  it  was 
written  by  Sahara.  But  the  systematic  elaboration  of  it  was  made 
by  Kumarila,  who  preceded  the  great  Saiikaracarya,  and  a  disciple 
of  Kumarila,  Prabhakara. 

The  Mimarnsa  Literature. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  how  the  sacrificial  system  of  worship  grew 
in  India  in  the  Brahmanas.  This  system  once  set  up  gradually 
began  to  develop  into  a  net-work  of  elaborate  rituals,  the  details 
of  which  were  probably  taken  note  of  by  the  priests.  As  some 
generations  passed  and  the  sacrifices  spread  over  larger  tracts  of 
India  and  grew  up  into  more  and  more  elaborate  details,  the  old 
rules  and  regulations  began  to  be  collected  probably  as  tradition 

D.  24 


370  Mimamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

had  it,  and  this  it  seems  gave  rise  to  the  smrti  literature.  Dis- 
cussions and  doubts  became  more  common  about  the  many 
intricacies  of  the  sacrificial  rituals,  and  regular  rational  enquiries 
into  them  were  begun  in  different  circles  by  different  scholars  and 
priests.  These  represent  the  beginnings  of  Mimarnsa  (lit.  at- 
tempts at  rational  enquiry),  and  it  is  probable  that  there  were 
different  schools  of  this  thought.  That  Jaimini's  Mlmdmsd  sutras 
(which  are  with  us  the  foundations  of  Mimamsa)  are  only  a  compre- 
hensive and  systematic  compilation  of  one  school  is  evident  from 
the  references  he  gives  to  the  views  in  different  matters  of  other 
preceding  writers  who  dealt  with  the  subject.  These  works  are  not 
available  now,  and  we  cannot  say  how  much  of  what  Jaimini  has 
written  is  his  original  work  and  how  much  of  it  borrowed.  But  it 
may  be  said  with  some  degree  of  confidence  that  it  was  deemed  so 
masterly  a  work  at  least  of  one  school  that  it  has  survived  all  other 
attempts  that  were  made  before  him.  Jaimini's  Mlmdmsd  sutras 
were  probably  written  about  200  B.C.  and  are  now  the  ground  work 
of  the  Mimarnsa  system.  Commentaries  were  written  on  it  by 
various  persons  such  as  Bhartrmitra  (alluded  to  in  Nydyaratndkara 
verse  10  of  Slokavdrttika),  Bhavadasa  {Pratijhasutra  63),  Hari  and 
Upavarsa  (mentioned  in  Sdstradipikd).  It  is  probable  that  at  least 
some  of  these  preceded  Sahara,  the  writer  of  the  famous  com- 
mentary known  as  the  Sabara-bhdsya.  It  is  difficult  to  say  any- 
thing about  the  time  in  which  he  flourished.  Dr  Gaiiganatha 
Jha  would  have  him  about  57  B.C.  on  the  evidence  of  a  current 
verse  which  speaks  of  King  Vikramaditya  as  being  the  son 
of  Sabarasvamin  by  a  Ksattriya  wife.  This  bhasya  of  Sahara 
is  the  basis  of  the  later  Mimamsa  works.  It  was  commented 
upon  by  an  unknown  person  alluded  to  as  Varttikakara  by 
Prabhakara  and  merely  referred  to  as  "  yathahuh  "  (as  they  say) 
by  Kumarila.  Dr  Gahganatha  Jha  says  that  Prabhakara's  com- 
mentary Brhati  on  the  Saba^-a-bJidsya  was  based  upon  the  work 
of  this  Varttikakara.  This  Brhati  of  Prabhakara  had  another 
commentary  on  it — RJiivimdld  by  Salikanatha  Misra,  who  also 
wrote  a  compendium  on  the  Prabhakara  interpretation  of  Mi- 
mamsa called  Prakaranapancikd.  Tradition  says  that  Prab- 
hakara (often  referred  to  as  Nibandhakara),  whose  views  are 
often  alluded  to  as  "gurumata,"  was  a  pupil  of  Kumarila.  Ku- 
marila Bhatta,  who  is  traditionally  believed  to  be  the  senior  con- 
temporary of  Sahkara  (788  A.D.),  wrote  his  celebrated  independent 


ix]  Mimamsa  Literature  37 1 

exposition  of  Sahara's  bhasya  in  three  parts  known  as  Sloka- 
vdrttika  (dealing  only  with  the  philosophical  portion  of  Sahara's 
work  as  contained  in  the  first  chapter  of  the  first  book  known  as 
Tarkapada),  Tantravdrttika  (dealing  with  the  remaining  three 
chapters  of  the  first  book,  the  second  and  the  third  book)  and 
Tuptlkd  (containing  brief  notes  on  the  remaining  nine  books)'. 
Kumarila  is  referred  to  by  his  later  followers  as  Bhatta,  Bhatta- 
pada,  and  Varttikakara.  The  next  great  Mimamsa  scholar  and 
follower  of  Kumarila  was  Mandana  Misra,  the  author  of  Vidhi- 
viveka,  Mlmdvisdnukrainam  and  the  commentator  of  Tantra- 
vdrttika,-whQ  became  later  on  converted  by  Sahkara  to  Vedantism. 
Parthasarathi  Mi^ra  (about  ninth  century  A.D.)  wrote  his  Sdstradi- 
ptkd,  Tantraratna,  and  Nydyarat7iamdld  following  the  footprints 
of  Kumarila.  Amongst  the  numerous  other  followers  of  Kumarila, 
the  names  of  Sucarita  Misra  the  author  of  Kdsikd  and  Somesvara 
the  author  of  Nydyasudhd  deserve  special  notice.  Ramakrsna 
Bhatta  wrote  an  excellent  commentary  on  the  Tarkapdda  of  vS'^i'- 
tradipikd  called  the  Yuktisnehapurafu-siddhdnta-caiidrikd  and 
Somanatha  wrote  his  Mayukhanidlikd  on  the  remaining  chapters 
of  Sdstradipikd.  Other  important  current  Mimarnsa  works  which 
deserve  notice  are  such  as  Nydyamdldvistara  of  Madhava,  Subo- 
dhinl,  Mimdmsdbdlaprakdsa  of  Sahkara  Bhatta,  Nydyakanikd  of 
Vacaspati  Misra,  Mhndinsdparibhdsa  by  Krsnayajvan,  Mlmdmsd- 
nydyaprakdsa  by  Anantadeva,  Gaga  Bhatta's  Bhattacintdmani, 
etc.  Most  of  the  books  mentioned  here  have  been  consulted  in  the 
writing  of  this  chapter.  The  importance  of  the  Mimamsa  litera- 
ture for  a  Hindu  is  indeed  great.  For  not  only  are  all  Vedic  duties 
to  be  performed  according  to  its  maxims,  but  even  the  smrti 
literatures  which  regulate  the  daily  duties,  ceremonials  and  rituals 
of  Hindus  even  at  the  present  day  are  all  guided  and  explained 
by  them.  The  legal  side  of  the  smrtis  consisting  of  inheritance, 
proprietory  rights,  adoption,  etc.  which  guide  Hindu  civil  life  even 
under  the  British  administration  is  explained  according  to  the 
Mimamsa  maxims.  Its  relations  to  the  Vedanta  philosophy  will 
be  briefly  indicated  in  the  next  chapter.  Its  relations  with  Nyaya- 
Vaisesika  have  also  been  pointed  out  in  various  places  of  this 
chapter.  The  views  of  the  two  schools  of  Mimamsa  as  propounded 
by  Prabhakara  and  Kumarila  on  all  the  important  topics  have 

1  Mahamahopadhyaya  Haraprasada  Sastri  says,  in  his  introduction  to  Six  Buddhist 
Nyaya  Tracts,  that  '*  Kumarila  preceded  Sankara  by  two  generations." 

24—2 


372  Mimamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

also  been  pointed  out.  Prabhakara's  views  however  could  not 
win  many  followers  in  later  times,  but  while  living  it  is  said  that 
he  was  regarded  by  Kumarila  as  a  very  strong  rivaP.  Hardly 
any  new  contribution  has  been  made  to  the  Mimarnsa  philosophy 
after  Kumarila  and  Prabhakara.  The  Mlmdmsd  sutras  deal  mostly 
with  the  principles  of  the  interpretation  of  the  Vedic  texts  in 
connection  with  sacrifices,  and  very  little  of  philosophy  can  be 
gleaned  out  of  them.  Sahara's  contributions  are  also  slight  and 
vague.  Varttikakara's  views  also  can  only  be  gathered  from  the 
references  to  them  by  Kumarila  and  Prabhakara.  What  we  know 
of  Mimarnsa  philosophy  consists  of  their  views  and  theirs  alone. 
It  did  not  develop  any  further  after  them.  Works  written  on  the 
subject  in  later  times  were  but  of  a  purely  expository  nature.  I  do 
not  know  of  any  work  on  Mimamsa  written  in  English  except 
the  excellent  one  by  Dr  Gahganatha  Jha  on  the  Prabhakara 
Mimarnsa  to  which  I  have  frequently  referred. 

The  Paratah-pramanya  doctrine  of  Nyaya  and  the 
Svatah-pramanya  doctrine  of  Mimamsa. 

The  doctrine  of  the  self-validity  of  knowledge  {svatah- 
prdmdnya)  forms  the  cornerstone  on  which  the  whole  structure 
of  the  Mimarnsa  philosophy  is  based.  Validity  means  the  certi- 
tude of  truth.  The  Mimarnsa  philosophy  asserts  that  all  know- 
ledge excepting  the  action  of  remembering  {smrti)  or  memory  is 
valid  in  itself,  for  it  itself  certifies  its  own  truth,  and  neither 
depends  on  any  other  extraneous  condition  nor  on  any  other 
knowledge  for  its  validity.  But  Nyaya  holds  that  this  self- 
validity  of  knowledge  is  a  question  which  requires  an  explanation. 
It  is  true  that  under  certain  conditions  a  piece  of  knowledge 
is  produced  in  us,  but  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  this 
knowledge  is  a  proof  of  its  own  truth  ?  When  we  perceive 
anything  as  blue,  it  is  the  direct  result  of  visual  contact,  and  this 
visual  contact  cannot  certify  that  the  knowledge  generated  is 
true,  as  the  visual  contact  is  not  in  any  touch  with  the  knowledge 

^  There  is  a  story  that  Kumarila,  not  being  able  to  convert  Prabhakara,  his  own 
pupil,  to  his  views,  attempted  a  trick  and  pretended  that  he  was  dead.  His  disciples 
then  asked  Prabhakara  whether  his  burial  rites  should  be  performed  according  to 
Kumarila's  views  or  Prabhakara's.  Prabhakara  said  that  his  own  views  were  erroneous, 
but  these  were  held  by  him  only  to  rouse  up  Kumarila's  pointed  attacks,  whereas 
Kumarila's  views  were  the  right  ones.  Kumarila  then  rose  up  and  said  that  Prabhakara 
was  defeated,  but  the  latter  said  he  was  not  defeated  so  long  as  he  was  alive.  But 
this  has  of  course  no  historic  value. 


ix]  Objections  against  the  Self-validity  of  Knowledge   373 

it  has  conditioned.  Moreover,  knowledge  is  a  mental  affair  and 
how  can  it  certify  the  objective  truth  of  its  representation?  In 
other  words,  how  can  my  perception  "  a  blue  thing  "  guarantee 
that  what  is  subjectively  perceived  as  blue  is  really  so  objectively 
as  well  ?  After  my  perception  of  anything  as  blue  we  do  not 
have  any  such  perception  that  what  I  have  perceived  as  blue 
is  really  so.  So  this  so-called  self-validity  of  knowledge  cannot 
be  testified  or  justified  by  any  perception.  We  can  only  be  cer- 
tain that  knowledge  has  been  produced  by  the  perceptual  act,  but 
there  is  nothing  in  this  knowledge  or  its  revelation  of  its  object 
from  which  we  can  infer  that  the  perception  is  also  objectively 
valid  or  true.  If  the  production  of  any  knowledge  should  certify 
its  validity  then  there  would  be  no  invalidity,  no  illusory  know- 
ledge, and  following  our  perception  of  even  a  mirage  we  should 
never  come  to  grief.  But  we  are  disappointed  often  in  our  per- 
ceptions, and  this  proves  that  when  we  practically  follow  the 
directions  of  our  perception  we  are  undecided  as  to  its  validity, 
which  can  only  be  ascertained  by  the  correspondence  of  the  per- 
ception with  what  we  find  later  on  in  practical  experience.  Again, 
every  piece  of  knowledge  is  the  result  of  certain  causal  colloca- 
tions, and  as  such  depends  upon  them  for  its  production,  and 
hence  cannot  be  said  to  rise  without  depending  on  anything  else. 
It  is  meaningless  to  speak  of  the  validity  of  knowledge,  for 
validity  always  refers  to  objective  realization  of  our  desires  and 
attempts  proceeding  in  accordance  with  our  knowledge.  People 
only  declare  their  knowledge  invalid  when  proceeding  practically 
in  accordance  with  it  they  are  disappointed.  The  perception  of 
a  mirage  is  called  invalid  when  proceeding  in  accordance  with 
our  perception  we  do  not  find  anything  that  can  serve  the  pur- 
poses of  water  (e.g.  drinking,  bathing).  The  validity  or  truth  of 
knowledge  is  thus  the  attainment  by  practical  experience  of  the 
object  and  the  fulfilment  of  all  our  purposes  from  it  {arthakriyd- 
jnd7ia  or  phalajndnd)  just  as  perception  or  knowledge  repre- 
sented them  to  the  perceiver.  There  is  thus  no  self- validity  of 
knowledge  {svatah-prdmdnyd),  but  validity  is  ascertained  by 
samvdda  or  agreement  with  the  objective  facts  of  experienced 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  this  Nyaya  objection  is  based  on  the 
supposition  that  knowledge  is  generated  by  certain  objective 
collocations  of  conditions,  and  that  knowledge  so  produced  can 
^  See  Nydyamanjarl,  pp.  160-173. 


374  Mlmamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

only  be  tested  by  its  agreement  with  objective  facts.  But  this 
theory  of  knowledge  is  merely  an  hypothesis ;  for  it  can  never  be 
experienced  that  knowledge  is  the  product  of  any  collocations  ; 
we  have  a  perception  and  immediately  we  become  aware  of  cer- 
tain objective  things;  knowledge  reveals  to  us  the  facts  of  the 
objective  world  and  this  is  experienced  by  us  always.  But  that 
the  objective  world  generates  knowledge  in  us  is  only  an  hypothesis 
which  can  hardly  be  demonstrated  by  experience.  It  is  the  supreme 
prerogative  of  knowledge  that  it  reveals  all  other  things.  It  is  not  a 
phenomenon  like  any  other  phenomenon  of  the  world.  When  we 
say  that  knowledge  has  been  produced  in  us  by  the  external 
collocations,  we  just  take  a  perverse  point  of  view  which  is  un- 
warranted by  experience;  knowledge  only  photographs  the 
objective  phenomena  for  us ;  but  there  is  nothing  to  show  that 
knowledge  has  been  generated  by  these  phenomena.  This  is 
only  a  theory  which  applies  the  ordinary  conceptions  of  causation 
to  knowledge  and  this  is  evidently  unwarrantable.  Knowledge  is 
not  like  any  other  phenomena  for  it  stands  above  them  and 
interprets  or  illumines  them  all.  There  can  be  no  validity  in 
things,  for  truth  applies  to  knowledge  and  knowledge  alone.  What 
we  call  agreement  with  facts  by  practical  experience  is  but  the 
agreement  of  previous  knowledge  with  later  knowledge;  for  ob- 
jective facts  never  come  to  us  directly,  they  are  always  taken 
on  the  evidence  of  knowledge,  and  they  have  no  other  certainty 
than  what  is  bestowed  on  them  by  knowledge.  There  arise  in- 
deed different  kinds  of  knowledge  revealing  different  things,  but 
these  latter  do  not  on  that  account  generate  the  former,  for  this 
is  never  experienced ;  we  are  never  aware  of  any  objective  fact 
before  it  is  revealed  by  knowledge.  Why  knowledge  makes 
different  kinds  of  revelations  is  indeed  more  than  we  can  say,  for 
experience  only  shows  that  knowledge  reveals  objective  facts  and 
not  why  it  does  so.  The  rise  of  knowledge  is  never  perceived  by 
us  to  be  dependent  on  any  objective  fact,  for  all  objective  facts 
are  dependent  on  it  for  its  revelation  or  illumination.  This  is 
what  is  said  to  be  the  self-validity  {svatah-prdmdnyd)  of  know- 
ledge in  its  production  {utpatti).  As  soon  as  knowledge  is  pro- 
duced, objects  are  revealed  to  us;  there  is  no  intermediate  link 
between  the  rise  of  knowledge  and  the  revelation  of  objects  on 
which  knowledge  depends  for  producing  its  action  of  revealing 
or  illuminating  them.    Thus  knowledge  is  not  only  independent 


ix]  Self -validity  of  Knowledge  375 

of  anything  else  in  its  own  rise  but  in  its  own  action  as  well 
{svakdryakarane  svatah  prdmdnyam  jhdnasya).  Whenever  there 
is  any  knowledge  it  carries  with  it  the  impression  that  it  is 
certain  and  valid,  and  we  are  naturally  thus  prompted  to  work 
{pravrtti)  according  to  its  direction.  There  is  no  indecision  in 
our  mind  at  the  time  of  the  rise  of  knowledge  as  to  the  correct- 
ness of  knowledge ;  but  just  as  knowledge  rises,  it  carries  with 
it  the  certainty  of  its  revelation,  presence,  or  action.  But  in  cases 
of  illusory  perception  other  perceptions  or  cognitions  dawn  which 
carry  with  them  the  notion  that  our  original  knowledge  was  not 
valid.  Thus  though  the  invalidity  of  any  knowledge  may  appear 
to  us  by  later  experience,  and  in  accordance  with  which  we 
reject  our  former  knowledge,  yet  when  the  knowledge  first  revealed 
itself  to  us  it  carried  with  it  the  conviction  of  certainty  which 
goaded  us  on  to  work  according  to  its  indication.  Whenever  a  man 
works  according  to  his  knowledge,  he  does  so  with  the  conviction 
that  his  knowledge  is  valid,  and  not  in  a  passive  or  uncertain  temper 
of  mind.  This  is  what  Mimarnsa  means  when  it  says  that  the 
validity  of  knowledge  appears  immediately  with  its  rise,  though 
its  invalidity  may  be  derived  from  later  experience  or  some  other 
data  {Jndnasya  prdmdnyam  svatah  aprdmdnyain  parata/i).  Know- 
ledge attained  is  proved  invalid  when  later  on  a  contradictory 
experience  {bddhakajndna)  comes  in  or  when  our  organs  etc.  are 
known  to  be  faulty  and  defective  {karanadosajnd^ia).  It  is  from 
these  that  knowledge  appearing  as  valid  is  invalidated;  when 
we  take  all  necessary  care  to  look  for  these  and  yet  find  them 
not,  we  must  think  that  they  do  not  exist.  Thus  the  validity  of 
knowledge  certified  at  the  moment  of  its  production  need  not 
be  doubted  unnecessarily  when  even  after  enquiry  we  do  not  find 
any  defect  in  sense  or  any  contradiction  in  later  experience.  All 
knowledge  except  memory  is  thus  regarded  as  valid  independently 
by  itself  as  a  general  rule,  unless  it  is  invalidated  later  on.  Memory 
is  excluded  because  the  phenomenon  of  memory  depends  upon 
a  previous  experience,  and  its  existing  latent  impressions,  and 
cannot  thus  be  regarded  as  arising  independently  by  itself. 

The  place  of  sense  organs  in  perception. 

We  have  just  said  that  knowledge  arises  by  itself  and  that  it 
could  not  have  been  generated  by  sense-contact.  If  this  be  so, 
the  diversity  of  perceptions  is  however  left  unexplained.    But  in 


376  Mlmamsd  Philosophy  [ch. 

face  of  the  Nyaya  philosophy  explaining  all  perceptions  on  the 
ground  of  diverse  sense-contact  the  Mimarnsa  probably  could  not 
afford  to  remain  silent  on  such  an  important  point.  It  therefore 
accepted  the  Nyaya  view  of  sense-contact  as  a  condition  of  know- 
ledge with  slight  modifications,  and  yet  held  their  doctrine  of 
svatah-pramanya.  It  does  not  appear  to  have  been  conscious  of 
a  conflict  between  these  two  different  principles  of  the  production 
of  knowledge.  Evidently  the  point  of  view  from  which  it  looked 
at  it  was  that  the  fact  that  there  were  the  senses  and  contacts 
of  them  with  the  objects,  or  such  special  capacities  in  them  by 
virtue  of  which  the  things  could  be  perceived,  was  with  us  a 
matter  of  inference.  Their  actions  in  producing  the  knowledge 
are  never  experienced  at  the  time  of  the  rise  of  knowledge,  but 
when  the  knowledge  arises  we  argue  that  such  and  such  senses 
must  have  acted.  The  only  case  where  knowledge  is  found  to 
be  dependent  on  anything  else  seems  to  be  the  case  where  one 
knowledge  is  found  to  depend  on  a  previous  experience  or  know- 
ledge as  in  the  case  of  memory.  In  other  cases  the  dependence 
of  the  rise  of  knowledge  on  anything  else  cannot  be  felt,  for  the 
physical  collocations  conditioning  knowledge  are  not  felt  to  be 
operating  before  the  rise  of  knowledge,  and  these  are  only  in- 
ferred later  on  in  accordance  with  the  nature  and  characteristic 
of  knowledge.  We  always  have  our  first  start  in  knowledge 
which  is  directly  experienced  from  which  we  may  proceed  later 
on  to  the  operation  and  nature  of  objective  facts  in  relation  to  it. 
Thus  it  is  that  though  contact  of  the  senses  with  the  objects 
may  later  on  be  imagined  to  be  the  conditioning  factor,  yet  the 
rise  of  knowledge  as  well  as  our  notion  of  its  validity  strikes  us 
as  original,  underived,  immediate,  and  first-hand. 

Prabhakara  gives  us  a  sketch  as  to  how  the  existence  of 
the  senses  may  be  inferred.  Thus  our  cognitions  of  objects  are 
phenomena  which  are  not  all  the  same,  and  do  not  happen  always 
in  the  same  manner.for  these  vary  differently  at  different  moments ; 
the  cognitions  of  course  take  place  in  the  soul  which  may  thus 
be  regarded  as  the  material  cause  {samavdyikdrand) ;  but  there 
must  be  some  such  movements  or  other  specific  associations 
{asarnavdyikdrana)  which  render  the  production  of  this  or 
that  specific  cognition  possible.  The  immaterial  causes  subsist 
either  in  the  cause  of  the  material  cause  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  the 
colouring  of  a  white  piece  of  cloth,  the  colour  of  the  yarns  which 


ix]  Sense-contact  and  Perception  Tf'jj 

is  the  cause  of  the  colour  in  the  cloth  subsists  in  the  yarns  which 
form  the  material  cause  of  the  cloth)  or  in  the  material  cause  it- 
self (e.g.  in  the  case  of  a  new  form  of  smell  being  produced  in  a 
substance  by  fire-contact,  this  contact,  which  is  the  immaterial 
cause  of  the  smell,  subsists  in  that  substance  itself  which  is  put 
in  the  fire  and  in  which  the  smell  is  produced).  The  soul  is 
eternal  and  has  no  other  cause,  and  it  has  to  be  assumed  that 
the  immaterial  cause  required  for  the  rise  of  a  cognition  must 
inhere  in  the  soul,  and  hence  must  be  a  quality.  Then  again 
accepting  the  Nyaya  conclusions  we  know  that  the  rise  of  qualities 
in  an  eternal  thing  can  only  take  place  by  contact  with  some 
other  substances.  Now  cognition  being  a  quality  which  the  soul 
acquires  would  naturally  require  the  contact  of  such  substances. 
Since  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  such  substances  inhere  in 
other  substances  they  are  also  to  be  taken  as  eternal.  There  are 
three  eternal  substances,  time,  space,  and  atoms.  But  time  and 
space  being  all-pervasive  the  soul  is  always  in  contact  with  them. 
Contact  with  these  therefore  cannot  explain  the  occasional  rise 
of  diiTerent  cognitions.  This  contact  must  then  be  of  some  kind 
of  atom  which  resides  in  the  body  ensouled  by  the  cognizing  soul. 
This  atom  may  be  called  manas  (mind).  This  manas  alone  by 
itself  brings  about  cognitions,  pleasure,  pain,  desire,  aversion, 
effort,  etc.  The  manas  however  by  itself  is  found  to  be  devoid 
of  any  such  qualities  as  colour,  smell,  etc.,  and  as  such  cannot 
lead  the  soul  to  experience  or  cognize  these  qualities  ;  hence 
it  stands  in  need  of  such  other  organs  as  may  be  characterized 
by  these  qualities  ;  for  the  cognition  of  colour,  the  mind  will 
need  the  aid  of  an  organ  of  which  colour  is  the  characteristic 
quality;  for  the  cognition  of  smell,  an  organ  having  the  odorous 
characteristic  and  so  on  with  touch,  taste,  vision.  Now  we  know 
that  the  organ  which  has  colour  for  its  distinctive  feature  must 
be  one  composed  of  tejas  or  light,  as  colour  is  a  feature  of  light, 
and  this  proves  the  existence  of  the  organ,  the  eye — for  the  cogni- 
tion of  colour ;  in  a  similar  manner  the  existence  of  the  earthly 
organ  (organ  of  smell),  the  aqueous  organ  (organ  of  taste),  the 
akasic  organ  (organ  of  sound)  and  the  airy  organ  (organ  of 
touch)  may  be  demonstrated.  But  without  manas  none  of  these 
organs  is  found  to  be  effective.  Four  necessary  contacts  have 
to  be  admitted,  (O  of  the  sense  organs  with  the  object,  (2)  of  the 
sense  organs  with  the  qualities  of  the  object,  (3)  of  the  manas 


2,yS  Mtma^nsa  Philosophy  [cH. 

with  the  sense  organs,  and  (4)  of  the  manas  with  the  soul.  The 
objects  of  perception  are  of  three  kinds,(i)  substances,(2)  qualities, 
(3)  jati  or  class.  The  material  substances  are  tangible  objects  of 
earth,  fire,  water,  air  in  large  dimensions  (for  in  their  fine  atomic 
states  they  cannot  be  perceived).  The  qualities  are  colour,  taste, 
smell,  touch,  number,  dimension,  separateness,  conjunction,  dis- 
junction, priority,  posteriority,  pleasure,  pain,  desire,  aversion,  and 
efforts 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  mention  in  conclusion  that 
Kumarila  Bhatta  was  rather  undecided  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
senses  or  of  their  contact  with  the  objects.  Thus  he  says  that 
the  senses  may  be  conceived  either  as  certain  functions  or 
activities,  or  as  entities  having  the  capacity  of  revealing  things 
without  coming  into  actual  contact  with  them,  or  that  they  might 
be  entities  which  actually  come  in  contact  with  their  objects^  and 
he  prefers  this  last  view  as  being  more  satisfactory. 

Indeterminate  and  determinate  perception. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  perception  in  two  stages,  the  first 
stage  is  called  nirvikalpa  (indeterminate)  and  the  second  savikalpa 
(determinate).  The  nirvikalpa  perception  of  a  thing  is  its  per- 
ception at  the  first  moment  of  the  association  of  the  senses  and 
their  objects.  Thus  Kumarila  says  that  the  cognition  that  appears 
first  is  a  mere  dlocana  or  simple  perception,  called  non-determinate 
pertaining  to  the  object  itself  pure  and  simple,  and  resembling 
the  cognitions  that  the  new-born  infant  has  of  things  around 
himself  In  this  cognition  neither  the  genus  nor  the  differentia  is 
presented  to  consciousness ;  all  that  is  present  there  is  the 
individual  wherein  these  two  subsist.  This  view  of  indeterminate 
perception  may  seem  in  some  sense  to  resemble  the  Buddhist 
view  which  defines  it  as  being  merely  the  specific  individuality 
{svalaksand)  and  regards  it  as  being  the  only  valid  element  in 
perception,  whereas  all  the  rest  are  conceived  as  being  imaginary 

■*  See  Prakaranapaficika,  pp.  52  etc.,  and  Dr  Gaiiganalha  Jha's  Prahhakaranii- 
mdmsa,  pp.  35  etc. 

^  Slokavdrttika,  see  Pratyaksasutra,  40  etc.,  and  Nyayaratndkara  on  it.  It  may  be 
noted  in  this  connection  that  Samkhya-Yoga  did  not  think  like  Nyaya  that  the  senses 
actually  went  out  to  meet  the  objects  {prapyakdritva)  but  held  that  there  was  a  special 
kind  of  functioning  {vrtti)  by  virtue  of  which  the  senses  could  grasp  even  such  distant 
objects  as  the  sun  and  the  stars.  It  is  the  functioning  of  the  sense  that  reached  the 
objects.  The  nature  of  this  vrtti  is  not  further  clearly  explained  and  Parthasarathi  objects 
to  it  as  being  almost  a  dififerent  category  {tattvantara). 


IX J         Indeterminate  and  Determinate  Perception      379 

impositions.  But  both  Kumarila  and  Prabhakara  think  that  both 
the  genus  and  the  differentia  are  perceived  in  the  indeterminate 
stage,  but  these  do  not  manifest  themselves  to  us  only  because 
we  do  not  remember  the  other  things  in  relation  to  v^^hich,  or  in 
contrast  to  v^^hich,  the  percept  has  to  show  its  character  as  genus  or 
differentia;  a  thing  can  be  cognized  as  an  "individual"  only  in 
comparison  with  other  things  from  which  it  differs  in  certain  well- 
defined  characters;  and  it  can  be  apprehended  as  belonging  to  a 
class  only  when  it  is  found  to  possess  certain  characteristic  features 
in  common  with  some  other  things ;  so  we  see  that  as  other  things 
are  not  presented  to  consciousness  through  memory,  the  percept 
at  the  indeterminate  stage  cannot  be  fully  apprehended  as  an 
individual  belonging  to  a  class,  though  the  data  constituting  the 
characteristic  of  the  thing  as  a  genus  and  its  differentia  are  per- 
ceived at  the  indeterminate  staged  So  long  as  other  things  are  not 
remembered  these  data  cannot  manifest  themselves  properly,  and 
hence  the  perception  of  the  thing  remains  indeterminate  at  the  first 
stage  of  perception.  At  the  second  stage  the  self  by  its  past  im- 
pressions brings  the  present  perception  in  relation  to  past  ones 
and  realizes  its  character  as  involving  universal  and  particular.  It 
is  thus  apparent  that  the  difference  between  the  indeterminate 
and  the  determinate  perception  is  this,  that  in  the  latter  case 
memory  of  other  things  creeps  in,  but  this  association  of  memory 
in  the  determinate  perception  refers  to  those  other  objects  of 
memory  and  not  to  the  percept.  It  is  also  held  that  though  the 
determinate  perception  is  based  upon  the  indeterminate  one,  yet 
since  the  former  also  apprehends  certain  such  factors  as  did  not 
enter  into  the  indeterminate  perception,  it  is  to  be  regarded  as 
a  valid  cognition.  Kumarila  also  agrees  with  Prabhakara  in 
holding  both  the  indeterminate  and  the  determinate  perception 
valid  I 

Some  Ontological  Problems  connected  with  the 
Doctrine  of  Perception. 

The  perception  of  the  class  {Jdti)  of  a  percept  in  relation  to 
other  things  may  thus  be  regarded  in  the  main  as  a  difference 
between  determinate  and  indeterminate  perceptions.  The  pro- 
blems of  jati  and  avayavavayavl  (part  and  whole  notion)  were 

^  Compare  this  with  the  Vai^esika  view  as  interpreted  by  Sridhara. 
^  See  Prakaranapaficika  and  Sastradipika. 


380  Mimamsa  Philosophy  [cH. 

the  subjects  of  hot  dispute  in  Indian  philosophy.  Before  enter- 
ing into  discussion  about  jati,  Prabhakara  first  introduced  the 
problem  of  avayava  (part)  and  avayavl  (whole).  He  argues  as 
an  exponent  of  svatah-pramanyavada  that  the  proof  of  the  true 
existence  of  anything  must  ultimately  rest  on  our  own  con- 
sciousness, and  what  is  distinctly  recognized  in  consciousness 
must  be  admitted  to  have  its  existence  established.  Following 
this  canon  Prabhakara  says  that  gross  objects  as  a  whole  exist, 
since  they  are  so  perceived.  The  subtle  atoms  are  the  material 
cause  and  their  connection  {samyoga)  is  the  immaterial  cause 
{asamavayikarand),  and  it  is  the  latter  which  renders  the  whole 
altogether  different  from  the  parts  of  which  it  is  composed  ;  and 
it  is  not  necessary  that  all  the  parts  should  be  perceived  before  the 
whole  is  perceived.  Kumarila  holds  that  it  is  due  to  the  point  of 
view  from  which  we  look  at  a  thing  that  we  call  it  a  separate 
whole  or  only  a  conglomeration  of  parts.  In  reality  they  are  iden- 
tical, but  when  we  lay  stress  on  the  notion  of  parts,  the  thing 
appears  to  be  a  conglomeration  of  them,  and  when  we  look  at  it 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  unity  appearing  as  a  whole,  the  thing 
appears  to  be  a  whole  of  which  there  are  parts  (see  Slokavdrttika, 
Vanavddd)  ^ 

Jati,  though  incorporating  the  idea  of  having  many  units  within 
one,  is  different  from  the  conception  of  whole  in  this,  that  it  resides 
in  its  entirety  in  each  individual  constituting  that  jati  {yydsajya- 

^  According  to  Samkhya-Yoga  a  thing  is  regarded  as  the  unity  of  the  universal  and 
the  particular  (samdnyavisesasamudayo  dravyam,  Vydsabhasya,  III.  44);  for  there  is  no 
other  separate  entity  which  is  different  from  them  both  in  which  they  would  inhere 
as  Nyaya  holds.  Conglomerations  can  be  of  two  kinds,  namely  those  in  which  the  parts 
exist  at  a  distance  from  one  another  (e.g.  a  forest),  and  those  in  which  they  exist  close  to- 
gether (nirantard  hi  tadavayavdk),  and  it  is  this  latter  combination  {ayutasiddhdvayavd) 
which  is  called  a  dravya,  but  here  also  there  is  no  separate  whole  distinct  from  the  parts  ; 
it  is  the  parts  connected  in  a  particular  way  and  having  no  perceptible  space  between 
them  that  is  called  a  thing  or  a  whole.  The  Buddhists  as  Pandita^oka  has  shown  did 
not  believe  in  any  whole  {avayavl) ;  it  is  the  atoms  which  in  connection  with  one 
another  appeared  as  a  whole  occupying  space  (paramdnava  eva  hi  parariipadesapari- 
hdrenotpanndh  parasparasahitd  avabhdsamdnd  desavitdnavanto  bhavanti).  The  whole 
is  thus  a  mere  appearance  and  nota  reality  {stQ  Avayavinirdkarana,  Six  Buddhist  Nydya 
Tracts).  Nyaya  however  held  that  the  atoms  were  partless  (niravayavn)  and  hence  it 
would  be  wrong  to  say  that  when  we  see  an  object  we  see  the  atoms.  The  existence 
of  a  whole  as  different  from  the  parts  which  belong  to  it  is  directly  experienced  and 
there  is  no  valid  reason  against  it  : 

"  adustakaranodbhatamandvirbhutabddhakam 
asandigdancavijFidnani  katham  niithyeti  kathyate." 

Nydyatiianjarl,  pp.  550  ff. 


ix]  Jati  and  Samavdya  381 

vrtii),  but  the  establishment  of  the  existence  of  wholes  refutes  the 
argument  that  jati  should  be  denied,  because  it  involves  the  concep- 
tion of  a  whole  (class)  consisting  of  many  parts  (individuals).  The 
class  character  or  jati  exists  because  it  is  distinctly  perceived  by 
us  in  the  individuals  included  in  any  particular  class.  It  is  eternal 
in  the  sense  that  it  continues  to  exist  in  other  individuals,  even 
when  one  of  the  individuals  ceases  to  exist.  When  a  new  in- 
dividual of  that  class  (e.g.  cow  class)  comes  into  being,  a  new 
relation  of  inherence  is  generated  by  which  the  individual  is 
brought  into  relation  with  the  class-character  existing  in  other 
individuals ;  for  inherence  {samavdya)  according  to  Prabhakara 
is  not  an  eternal  entity  but  an  entity  which  is  both  produced 
and  not  produced  according  as  the  thing  in  which  it  exists  is 
non-eternal  or  eternal,  and  it  is  not  regarded  as  one  as  Nyaya 
holds,  but  as  many,  according  as  there  is  the  infinite  number  of 
things  in  which  it  exists.  When  any  individual  is  destroyed,  the 
class-character  does  not  go  elsewhere,  nor  subsist  in  that  in- 
dividual, nor  is  itself  destroyed,  but  it  is  only  the  inherence  of 
class-character  with  that  individual  that  ceases  to  exist.  With 
the  destruction  of  an  individual  or  its  production  it  is  a  new 
relation  of  inherence  that  is  destroyed  or  produced.  But  the  class- 
character  or  jati  has  no  separate  existence  apart  from  the  indivi- 
duals as  Nyaya  supposes.  Apprehension  of  jati  is  essentially 
the  apprehension  of  the  class-character  of  a  thing  in  relation  to 
other  similar  things  of  that  class  by  the  perception  of  the  common 
characteristics.  But  Prabhakara  would  not  admit  the  existence  of 
a  highest  genus  satta  (being)  as  acknowledged  by  Nyaya.  He 
argues  that  the  existence  of  class-character  is  apprehended  be- 
cause we  find  that  the  individuals  of  a  class  possess  some  common 
characteristic  possessed  by  all  the  heterogeneous  and  disparate 
things  of  the  world  as  can  give  rise  to  the  conception  of  a  separate 
jati  as  satta,  as  demanded  by  the  naiyayikas.  That  all  things  are 
said  to  be  sat  (existing)  is  more  or  less  a  word  or  a  name  without 
the  corresponding  apprehension  of  a  common  quality.  Our  ex- 
perience always  gives  us  concrete  existing  individuals,  but  we 
can  never  experience  such  a  highest  genus  as  pure  existence  or 
being,  as  it  has  no  concrete  form  which  may  be  perceived.  When 
we  speak  of  a  thing  as  sat,  we  do  not  mean  that  it  is  possessed 
of  any  such  class-characters  as  satta  (being) ;  what  we  mean 
is  simply  that  the  individual  has  its  specific  existence  or  svaru- 


382  Mimamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

pasattd.  Thus  the  Nyaya  view  of  perception  as  taking  only  the 
thing  in  its  pure  being  apart  from  qualities,  etc.  {sanmdtra-visayam 
pratyaksavi)  is  made  untenable  by  Prabhakara,  as  according  to 
him  the  thing  is  perceived  direct  with  all  its  qualities.  According 
to  Kumarila  however  jati  is  not  something  different  from  the 
individuals  comprehended  by  it  and  it  is  directly  perceived. 
Kumarila's  view  of  jati  is  thus  similar  to  that  held  by  Sarnkhya, 
namely  that  when  we  look  at  an  individual  from  one  point  of 
view  (jati  as  identical  with  the  individual),  it  is  the  individual  that 
lays  its  stress  upon  our  consciousness  and  the  notion  of  jati  be- 
comes latent,  but  when  we  look  at  it  from  another  point  of  view 
(the  individual  as  identical  with  jati)  it  is  the  jati  which  presents 
itself  to  consciousness,  and  the  aspect  as  individual  becomes  latent. 
The  apprehension  as  jati  or  as  individual  is  thus  only  a  matter 
of  different  points  of  view  or  angles  of  vision  from  which  we  look 
at  a  thing.  Quite  in  harmony  with  the  conception  of  jati,  Kumarila 
holds  that  the  relation  of  inherence  is  not  anything  which  is  dis- 
tinct from  the  things  themselves  in  which  it  is  supposed  to  exist, 
but  only  a  particular  aspect  or  phase  of  the  things  themselves 
{Slokavdrttika,  Pratyaksasutra,  149,  150,  abheddt  samavdyo'stu 
svarupam  dharmadharmmok),  Kumarila  agrees  with  Prabhakara 
that  jati  is  perceived  by  the  senses  {tatraikabuddhinirgrdhyd 
Jdtirmdriyagocard). 

It  is  not  out  of  place  to  mention  that  on  the  evidence  of 
Prabhakara  we  find  that  the  category  of  visesa  admitted  by  the 
Kanada  school  is  not  accepted  as  a  separate  category  by  the 
Mimarnsa  on  the  ground  that  the  differentiation  of  eternal 
things  from  one  another,  for  which  the  category  of  visesa  is 
admitted,  may  very  well  be  effected  on  the  basis  of  the  ordinary 
qualities  of  these  things.  The  quality  of  prthaktva  or  specific 
differences  in  atoms,  as  inferred  by  the  difference  of  things  they 
constitute,  can  very  well  serve  the  purposes  of  visesa. 

The  nature  of  knowledge. 

All  knowledge  involves  the  knower,  the  known  object,  and  the 
knowledge  at  the  same  identical  moment.  All  knowledge  whether 
perceptual,  inferential  or  of  any  other  kind  must  necessarily  reveal 
the  self  or  the  knower  directly.  Thus  as  in  all  knowledge  the  .self 
is  directly  and  immediately  perceived,  all  knowledge  may  be  re- 
garded as  perception  from  the  point  of  view  of  self  The  division 


ix]  Self-revealing  Character  of  Knowledge  383 

of  the  pramanas  as  pratyaksa  (perception),  anumana  (inference), 
etc.  is  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  objects  of  knowledge  with 
reference  to  the  varying  modes  in  which  they  are  brought  within 
the  purview  of  knowledge.  Theself  itself  however  has  no  illumining 
or  revealing  powers,  for  then  even  in  deep  sleep  we  could  have 
knowledge,  for  the  self  is  present  even  then,  as  is  proved  by  the 
remembrance  of  dreams.  It  is  knowledge  {samvid)  that  reveals 
by  its  very  appearance  both  the  self,  the  knower,  and  the  objects. 
It  is  generally  argued  against  the  self-illuminative  character  of 
knowledge  that  all  cognitions  are  of  the  forms  of  the  objects  they 
are  said  to  reveal ;  and  if  they  have  the  same  form  we  may  rather 
say  that  they  have  the  same  identical  reality  too.  The  Mimamsa 
answer  to  these  objections  is  this,  that  if  the  cognition  and  the 
cognized  were  not  different  from  one  another,  they  could  not 
have  been  felt  as  such,  and  we  could  not  have  felt  that  it  is 
by  cognition  that  we  apprehend  the  cognized  objects.  The 
cognition  {samvedana)  of  a  person  simply  means  that  such  a 
special  kind  of  quality  idharma)  has  been  manifested  in  the 
self  by  virtue  of  which  his  active  operation  with  reference  to 
a  certain  object  is  favoured  or  determined,  and  the  object  of  cog- 
nition is  that  with  reference  to  which  the  active  operation  of  the 
self  has  been  induced.  Cognitions  are  not  indeed  absolutely  form- 
less, for  they  have  the  cognitional  character  by  which  things  are 
illumined  and  manifested.  Cognition  has  no  other  character  than 
this,  that  it  illumines  and  reveals  objects.  The  things  only  are 
believed  to  have  forms  and  only  such  forms  as  knowledge  reveal 
to  us  about  them.  Even  the  dream  cognition  is  with  reference  to 
objects  that  were  perceived  previously,  and  of  which  the  im- 
pressions were  left  in  the  mind  and  were  aroused  by  the 
unseen  agency  {adrsta).  Dream  cognition  is  thus  only  a  kind  of 
remembrance  of  that  which  was  previously  experienced.  Only 
such  of  the  impressions  of  cognized  objects  are  roused  in  dreams 
as  can  beget  just  that  amount  of  pleasurable  or  painful  experience, 
in  accordance  with  the  operation  of  adrsta,  as  the  person  deserves 
to  have  in  accordance  with  his  previous  merit  or  demerit. 

The  Prabhakara  Mimarnsa,  in  refuting  the  arguments  of  those 
who  hold  that  our  cognitions  of  objects  are  themselves  cognized 
by  some  other  cognition,  says  that  this  is  not  possible,  since  we 
do  not  experience  any  such  double  cognition  and  also  because  it 
would  lead  us  to  a  regressus  ad  infinitum,  for  if  a  second  cognition 


384  Mimamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

is  necessary  to  interpret  the  first,  then  that  would  require  a  third 
and  so  on.  If  a  cognition  could  be  the  object  of  another  cognition, 
then  it  could  not  be  self-valid.  The  cognition  is  not  of  course  un- 
known to  us,  but  that  is  of  course  because  it  is  self-cognized,  and 
reveals  itself  to  us  the  moment  it  reveals  its  objects.  From  the 
illumination  of  objects  also  we  can  infer  the  presence  of  this  self- 
cognizing  knowledge.  But  it  is  only  its  presence  that  is  inferred 
and  not  the  cognition  itself,  for  inference  can  only  indicate  the 
presence  of  an  object  and  not  in  the  form  in  which  it  can  be 
apprehended  by  perception  {pratyaksd).  Prabhakara  draws  a 
subtle  distinction  between  perceptuality  {samvedyatva)  and  being 
object  of  knowledge  {prameyatvd).  A  thing  can  only  be  appre- 
hended {samvedyate)  by  perception,  whereas  inference  can  only 
indicate  the  presence  of  an  object  without  apprehending  the 
object  itself  Our  cognition  cannot  be  apprehended  by  any  other 
cognition.  Inference  can  only  indicate  the  presence  or  existence 
of  knowledge  but  cannot  apprehend  the  cognition  itself  ^ 

Kumarila  also  agrees  with  Prabhakara  in  holding  that  per- 
ception is  never  the  object  of  another  perception  and  that  it  ends 
in  the  direct  apprehensibility  of  the  object  of  perception.  But  he 
says  that  every  perception  involves  a  relationship  between  the 
perceiver  and  the  perceived,  wherein  the  perceiver  behaves  as 
the  agent  whose  activity  in  grasping  the  object  is  known  as  cog- 
nition. This  is  indeed  different  from  the  Prabhakara  view,  that 
in  one  manifestation  of  knowledge  the  knower,  the  known,  and 
the  knowledge,  are  simultaneously  illuminated  (the  doctrine  of 
triputlpratyaksd)  -. 

The  Psychology  of  Illusion. 

The  question  however  arises  that  if  all  apprehensions  are 
valid,  how  are  we  to  account  for  illusory  perceptions  which  cannot 
be  regarded  as  valid  ?  The  problem  of  illusory  perception  and 
its  psychology  is  a  very  favourite  topic  of  discussion  in  Indian 
philosophy.  Omitting  the  theory  of  illusion  of  the  Jains  called 
satkhydti  which  we  have  described  before,  and  of  the  Vedantists, 
which  we  shall  describe  in  the  next  chapter,  there  are  three 
different  theories  of  illusion,  viz.  (i)  dtmakkydti,  (2)  viparitakhydti 
or  anyatkdkhydti,  and  (3)  akhydti  of  the  Mlmarnsa  school.    The 

^  See  Prabhdkara?nimdmsa,  by  Dr  Ganganatha  Jha. 
2  loc.  cit.  pp.  26-28. 


ix]  Buddhist  and  Ny  ay  a  Doctrine  of  Illusion        385 

viparltakhyati  or  anyathakhyati  theory  of  illusion  is  accepted  by 
the  Nyaya,  Vaisesika  and  the  Yoga,  the  akhyati  theory  by 
Mimarnsa  and  Sarnkhya  and  the  atmakhyati  by  the  Buddhists. 

The  commonest  example  of  illusion  in  Indian  philosophy  is 
the  illusory  appearance  of  a  piece  of  broken  conch-shell  as  a  piece 
of  silver.  That  such  an  illusion  occurs  is  a  fact  which  is  experienced 
by  all  and  agreed  to  by  all.  The  differences  of  view  are  with  regard 
to  its  cause  or  its  psychology.  The  idealistic  Buddhists  who  deny 
the  existence  of  the  external  world  and  think  that  there  are  only 
the  forms  of  knowledge,  generated  by  the  accumulated  karma  of 
past  lives,  hold  that  just  as  in  the  case  of  a  correct  perception,  so 
also  in  the  case  of  illusory  perception  it  is  the  flow  of  knowledge 
which  must  be  held  responsible.  The  flow  of  knowledge  on  account 
of  the  peculiarities  of  its  own  collocating  conditions  generates 
sometimes  what  we  call  right  perception  and  sometimes  wrong 
perception  or  illusion.  On  this  view  nothing  depends  upon  the  so- 
called  external  data.  For  they  do  not  exist,  and  even  if  they  did 
exist,  why  should  the  same  data  sometimes  bring  about  the  right 
perception  and  sometimes  the  illusion?  The  flow  of  knowledge 
creates  both  the  percept  and  the  perceiver  and  unites  them.  This 
is  true  both  in  the  case  of  correct  perception  and  illusory  per- 
ception. Nyaya  objects  to  the  above  view,  and  says  that  if 
knowledge  irrespective  of  any  external  condition  imposes  upon 
itself  the  knower  and  the  illusory  percept,  then  the  perception 
ought  to  be  of  the  form  'T  am  silver"  and  not  "this  is  silver." 
Moreover  this  theory  stands  refuted,  as  it  is  based  upon  a  false 
hypothesis  that  it  is  the  inner  knowledge  which  appears  as  coming 
from  outside  and  that  the  external  as  such  does  not  exist. 

The  viparltakhyati  or  the  anyathakhyati  theory  supposes  that 
the  illusion  takes  place  because  on  account  of  malobservation  we 
do  not  note  the  peculiar  traits  of  the  conch-shell  as  distinguished 
from  the  silver,  and  at  the  same  time  by  the  glow  etc.  of  the 
conch-shell  unconsciously  the  silver  which  I  had  seen  elsewhere 
is  remembered  and  the  object  before  me  is  taken  as  silver.  In 
illusion  the  object  before  us  with  which  our  eye  is  associated  is 
not  conch-shell,  for  the  traits  peculiar  to  it  not  being  grasped,  it 
is  merely  an  object.  The  silver  is  not  utterly  non-existent,  for  it 
exists  elsewhere  and  it  is  the  memory  of  it  as  experienced  before 
that  creates  confusion  and  leads  us  to  think  of  the  conch-shell  as 
silver.    This  school  agrees  with  the  akhyati  school  that  the  fact 


386  Mtmamsa  Philosophy  [cH. 

that  I  remember  silver  is  not  taken  note  of  at  the  time  of 
illusion.  But  it  holds  that  the  mere  non-distinction  is  not  enough 
to  account  for  the  phenomenon  of  illusion,  for  there  is  a  definite 
positive  aspect  associated  with  it,  viz.  the  false  identification  of 
silver  (seen  elsewhere)  with  the  conch-shell  before  us. 

The  akhyati  theory  of  Mimarnsa  holds  that  since  the  special 
peculiarities  of  the  conch-shell  are  not  noticed,  it  is  erroneous 
to  say  that  we  identify  or  cognize  positively  the  conch-shell  as 
the  silver  (perceived  elsewhere),  for  the  conch-shell  is  not  cog- 
nized at  all.  What  happens  here  is  simply  this,  that  only  the 
features  common  to  conch-shell  and  silver  being  noticed,  the  per- 
ceiver  fails  to  apprehend  the  difference  between  these  two  things, 
and  this  gives  rise  to  the  cognition  of  silver.  Owing  to  a  certain 
weakness  of  the  mind  the  remembrance  of  silver  roused  by  the 
common  features  of  the  conch-shell  and  silver  is  not  apprehended, 
and  the  fact  that  it  is  only  a  memory  of  silver  seen  in  some  past 
time  that  has  appeared  before  him  is  not  perceived;  and  it  is  as 
a  result  of  this  non-apprehension  of  the  difference  between  the 
silver  remembered  and  the  present  conch-shell  that  the  illusion 
takes  place.  Thus,  though  the  illusory  perception  partakes  of  a 
dual  character  of  remembrance  and  apprehension,  and  as  such  is 
different  from  the  ordinary  valid  perception  (which  is  wholly  a 
matter  of  direct  apprehension)  of  real  silver  before  us,  yet  as  the 
difference  between  the  remembrance  of  silver  and  the  sight  of 
the  present  object  is  not  apprehended,  the  illusory  perception 
appears  at  the  moment  of  its  production  to  be  as  valid  as  a  real 
valid  perception.  Both  give  rise  to  the  same  kind  of  activity  on 
the  part  of  the  agent,  for  in  illusory  perception  the  perceiver 
would  be  as  eager  to  stoop  and  pick  up  the  thing  as  in  the  case 
of  a  real  perception.  Kumarila  agrees  with  this  view  as  expounded 
by  Prabhakara,  and  further  says  that  the  illusory  judgment  is  as 
valid  to  the  cognizor  at  the  time  that  he  has  the  cognition  as  any 
real  judgment  could  be.  If  subsequent  experience  rejects  it,  that 
does  not  matter,  for  it  is  admitted  in  Mimarnsa  that  when  later 
experience  finds  out  the  defects  of  any  perception  it  can  invalidate 
the  original  perception  which  was  self-valid  at  the  time  of  its 
production  ^  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  Mimarnsa  had  to  adopt 
this  view  of  illusion  to  maintain  the  doctrine  that  all  cognition 
at  the  moment  of  its  production  is  valid.    The  akhyati  theory 

'  See  Prakaranapancikd,  Sastradipika,  and  Slokavarttika,  sutra  1. 


ix]  Inference  387 

tries  to  establish  the  view  that  the  illusion  is  not  due  to  any- 
positive  wrong  knowledge,  but  to  a  mere  negative  factor  of  non- 
apprehension  due  to  certain  weakness  of  mind.  So  it  is  that 
though  illusion  is  the  result,  yet  the  cognition  so  far  as  it  is  cog- 
nition, is  made  up  of  two  elements,  the  present  perception  and 
memory,  both  of  which  are  true  so  far  as  they  are  individually 
present  to  us,  and  the  cognition  itself  has  all  the  characteristics  of 
any  other  valid  knowledge,  for  the  mark  of  the  validity  of  a  cogni- 
tion is  its  power  to  prompt  us  to  action.  In  doubtful  cognitions  also, 
as  in  the  case  "  Is  this  a  post  or  a  man?"  what  is  actually  perceived 
is  some  tall  object  and  thus  far  it  is  valid  too.  But  when  this 
perception  gives  rise  to  two  different  kinds  of  remembrance  (of 
the  pillar  and  the  man),  doubt  comes  in.  So  the  element  of  ap- 
prehension involved  in  doubtful  cognitions  should  be  regarded 
as  self-valid  as  any  other  cognition. 

Inference. 

Sabara  says  that  when  a  certain  fixed  or  permanent  relation 
has  been  known  to  exist  between  two  things,  we  can  have  the 
idea  of  one  thing  when  the  other  one  is  perceived,  and  this  kind 
of  knowledge  is  called  inference.  Kumarila  on  the  basis  of  this 
tries  to  show  that  inference  is  only  possible  when  we  notice 
that  in  a  large  number  of  cases  two  things  (e.g.  smoke  and  fire) 
subsist  together  in  a  third  thing  (e.g.  kitchen,  etc.)  in  some  inde- 
pendent relation,  i.e.  when  their  coexistence  does  not  depend 
upon  any  other  eliminable  condition  or  factor.  It  is  also  neces- 
sary that  the  two  things  (smoke  and  fire)  coexisting  in  a  third 
thing  should  be  so  experienced  that  all  cases  of  the  existence  of 
one  thing  should  also  be  cases  involving  the  existence  of  the 
other,  but  the  cases  of  the  existence  of  one  thing  (e.g.  fire), 
though  including  all  the  cases  of  the  existence  of  the  other 
(smoke),  may  have  yet  a  more  extensive  sphere  where  the  latter 
(smoke)  may  not  exist.  When  once  a  permanent  relation,  whether 
it  be  a  case  of  coexistence  (as  in  the  case  of  the  contiguity  of 
the  constellation  of  Krttika  with  RohinI,  where,  by  the  rise  of  the 
former  the  early  rise  of  the  latter  may  be  inferred),  or  a  case  of 
identity  (as  in  the  relation  between  a  genus  and  its  species),  or 
a  case  of  cause  and  effect  or  otherwise  between  two  things  and 
a  third  thing  which  had  been  apprehended  in  a  large  number  of 
cases,  is  perceived,  they  fuse  together  in  the  mind  as  forming 


388  Mlmamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

one  whole,  and  as  a  result  of  that  when  the  existence  of  the 
one  (e.g.  smoke)  in  a  thing  (hill)  is  noticed,  we  can  infer  the 
existence  of  the  thing  (hill)  with  its  counterpart  (fire).  In  all 
such  cases  the  thing  (e.g.  fire)  which  has  a  sphere  extending 
beyond  that  in  which  the  other  (e.g.  smoke)  can  exist  is  called 
gainya  or  vydpaka  and  the  other  (e.g.  smoke)  vydpya  or  gamaka 
and  it  is  only  by  the  presence  of  gamaka  in  a  thing  (e.g.  hill, 
the  paksa)  that  the  other  counterpart  the  gamya  (fire)  may  be 
inferred.  The  general  proposition,  universal  coexistence  of  the 
gamaka  with  the  gamya  (e.g.  wherever  there  is  smoke  there  is 
fire)  cannot  be  the  cause  of  inference,  for  it  is  itself  a  case 
of  inference.  Inference  involves  the  memory  of  a  permanent 
relation  subsisting  between  two  things  (e.g.  smoke  and  fire)  in  a 
third  thing  (e.g.  kitchen);  but  the  third  thing  is  remembered  only 
in  a  general  way  that  the  coexisting  things  must  have  a  place 
where  they  are  found  associated.  It  is  by  virtue  of  such  a  memory 
that  the  direct  perception  of  a  basis  (e.g.  hill)  with  the  gamaka 
thing  (e.g.  smoke)  in  it  would  naturally  bring  to  my  mind  that 
the  same  basis  (hill)  must  contain  the  gamya  (i.e.  fire)  also. 
Every  case  of  inference  thus  proceeds  directly  from  a  perception 
and  not  from  any  universal  general  proposition.  Kumarila  holds 
that  the  inference  gives  us  the  minor  as  associated  with  the  major 
and  not  of  the  major  alone,  i.e.  of  the  fiery  mountain  and  not  of 
fire.  Thus  inference  gives  us  a  new  knowledge,  for  though  it  was 
known  in  a  general  way  that  the  possessor  of  smoke  is  the  pos- 
sessor of  fire,  yet  the  case  of  the  mountain  was  not  anticipated 
and  the  inference  of  the  fiery  mountain  is  thus  a  distinctly  new 
knowledge  {desakdlddhikyddyuktamagrhltagrdhitvam  anumdna- 
sya,  Nyayavatnakara,  p.  363) \  It  should  also  be  noted  that  in 
forming  the  notion  of  the  permanent  relation  between  two  things, 
a  third  thing  in  which  these  two  subsist  is  always  remembered 
and  for  the  conception  of  this  permanent  relation  it  is  enough 
that  in  the  large  number  of  cases  whore  the  concomitance  was 
noted  there  was  no  knowledge  of  any  case  where  the  concomit- 
ance failed,  and  it  is  not  indispensable  that  the  negative  instances 
in  which  the  absence  of  the  gamya  or  vyapaka  was  marked  by  an 

1  It  is  important  to  note  that  it  is  not  unlikely  that  Kumarila  was  indebted  to 
Dihnaga  for  this  ;  for  Dinnaga's  main  contention  is  that  "  it  is  not  fire,  nor  the  con- 
nection between  it  and  the  hill,  but  it  is  the  fiery  hill  that  is  inferred"  for  otherwise 
inference  would  give  us  no  new  knowledge  (see  Vidyabhusana's  Indian  Logic,  p.  87 
and  Tdtparyatikd,  p.  120. 


ix]  Inference  389 

absence  of  the  gamaka  or  vyapya,  should  also  be  noted,  for  a 
knowledge  of  such  a  negative  relation  is  not  indispensable  for 
the  forming  of  the  notion  of  the  permanent  relation ^  The  ex- 
perience of  a  large  number  of  particular  cases  in  which  any  two 
things  were  found  to  coexist  together  in  another  thing  in  some 
relation  associated  with  the  non-perception  of  any  case  of  failure 
creates  an  expectancy  in  us  of  inferring  the  presence  of  the 
gamya  in  that  thing  in  which  the  gamaka  is  perceived  to  exist 
in  exactly  the  same  relation^.  In  those  cases  where  the  circle  of 
the  existence  of  the  gamya  coincides  with  the  circle  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  gamaka,  each  of  them  becomes  a  gamaka  for  the  other. 
It  is  clear  that  this  form  of  inference  not  only  includes  all  cases 
of  cause  and  effect,  of  genus  and  species  but  also  all  cases  of 
coexistence  as  well. 

The  question  arises  that  if  no  inference  is  possible  without 
a  memory  of  the  permanent  relation,  is  not  the  self-validity 
of  inference  destroyed  on  that  account,  for  memory  is  not  re- 
garded as  self-valid.  To  this  Kumarila's  answer  is  that  memory 
is  not  invalid,  but  it  has  not  the  status  of  pramana,  as  it  does 
not  bring  to  us  a  new  knowledge.  But  inference  involves  the 
acquirement  of  a  new  knowledge  in  this,  that  though  the  coex- 
istence of  two  things  in  another  was  known  in  a  number  of  cases, 
yet  in  the  present  case  a  new  case  of  the  existence  of  the  gamya 
in  a  thing  is  known  from  the  perception  of  the  existence  of  the 
gamaka  and  this  knowledge  is  gained  by  a  means  which  is  not 
perception,  for  it  is  only  the  gamaka  that  is  seen  and  not  the 
gamya.    If  the  gamya  is  also  seen  it  is  no  inference  at  all. 

As  regards  the  number  of  propositions  necessary  for  the  ex- 
plicit statement  of  the  process  of  inference  for  convincing  others 
{pdrdrthdmcmdna)  both  Kumarila  and  Prabhakara  hold  that  three 
premisses  are  quite  sufficient  for  inference.  Thus  the  first  three 
premisses  pratijfia,  hetu  and  drstanta  may  quite  serve  the  purpose 
of  an  anumana.  « 

There  are  two  kinds  of  anumana  according  to  Kumarila 
viz.  pratyaksatodrstasambandha  and  samanyatodrstasambandha. 
The   former   is   that    kind   of  inference  where  the  permanent 

1  Kumarila  strongly  opposes  a  Buddhist  view  that  concomitance  {vydJ>H)  is  ascer- 
tained only  by  the  negative  instances  and  not  by  the  positive  ones. 

2  "  tasmadanavagate' pi sarvatrdnvaye  saf^atasca  vyatireke  bahusah  sdhitydvagarna- 
mdtrddeva  vyabhicdrddarsanasandthddaniimdnotpattirangika)-tavyah."  Nydyaratnd- 
kara,  p.  288. 


390  Mtinamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

relation  between  two  concrete  things,  as  in  the  case  of  smoke  and 
fire,  has  been  noticed.  The  latter  is  that  kind  of  inference  where 
the  permanent  relation  is  observed  not  between  two  concrete 
things  but  between  two  general  notions,  as  in  the  case  of  move- 
ment and  change  of  place,  e.g.  the  perceived  cases  where  there  is 
change  of  place  there  is  also  motion  involved  with  it;  so  from  the 
change  of  place  of  the  sun  its  motion  is  inferred  and  it  is  held 
that  this  general  notion  is  directly  perceived  like  all  universals^ 
Prabhakara  recognizes  the  need  of  forming  the  notion  of  the 
permanent  relation,  but  he  does  not  lay  any  stress  on  the  fact 
that  this  permanent  relation  between  two  things  (fire  and  smoke) 
is  taken  in  connection  with  a  third  thing  in  which  they  both 
subsist.  He  says  that  the  notion  of  the  permanent  relation  be- 
tween two  things  is  the  main  point,  whereas  in  all  other  associa- 
tions of  time  and  place  the  things  in  which  these  two  subsist 
together  are  taken  only  as  adjuncts  to  qualify  the  two  things 
(e.g.  fire  and  smoke).  It  is  also  necessary  to  recognize  the  fact  that 
though  the  concomitance  of  smoke  in  fire  is  only  conditional,  the 
concomitance  of  the  fire  in  smoke  is  unconditional  and  abso- 
lute^. When  such  a  conviction  is  firmly  rooted  in  the  mind  that 
the  concept  of  the  presence  of  smoke  involves  the  concept  of  the 
presence  of  fire,  the  inference  of  fire  is  made  as  soon  as  any 
smoke  is  seen.  Prabhakara  counts  separately  the  fallacies  of  the 
minor  {paksdbhdsa),  of  the  enunciation  {pratijnabhasa)  and  of 
the  example  idrstdntdbhdsd)?i\or\^'w\'^  the  fallacies  of  the  middle 
and  this  seems  to  indicate  that  the  Mimarnsa  logic  was  not  alto- 
gether free  from  Buddhist  influence.  The  cognition  of  smoke 
includes  within  itself  the  cognition  of  fire  also,  and  thus  there 
would  be  nothing  left  unknown  to  be  cognized  by  the  inferential 
cognition.  But  this  objection  has  little  force  with  Prabhakara, 
for  he  does  not  admit  that  a  pramana  should  necessarily  bring 
us  any  new  knowledge,  for  pramana  is  simply  defined  as  "appre- 
hension." So  though  the  inferential  cognition  always  pertains  to 
things  already  known  it  is  yet  regarded  by  him  as  a  pramana, 
since  it  is  in  any  case  no  doubt  an  apprehension. 

^  See  Slokavarttika,  Nyayarat}idkara,  Sasiradtpika,  Yuktisnehapurani-,  Siddhdn- 
tacandrikd  on  anumana. 

^  On  the  subject  of  the  means  of  assuring  oneself  that  there  is  no  condition  {upddhi) 
which  may  vitiate  the  inference,  Prabhakara  has  nothing  new  to  tell  us.  He  says  that 
where  even  after  careful  enquiry  in  a  large  number  of  cases  the  condition  cannot  be 
discovered  we  must  say  that  it  does  not  exist  {prayatnendtivisyaindne  aupddhikatva- 
navagamdt,  see  Prakaranapaficikd,  p.  71). 


ix]  Upamana  and  Arthdpatti  391 

Upamana,  Arthapatti. 

Analogy  {upamana)  is  accepted  by  Mimamsa  in  a  sense  which 
is  different  from  that  in  which  Nyaya  took  it.  The  man  who 
has  seen  a  cow  {go)  goes  to  the  forest  and  sees  a  wild  ox 
{gavaya),  and  apprehends  the  similarity  of  the  gavaya  with 
the  go,  and  then  cognizes  the  similarity  of  the  go  (which  is  not 
within  the  limits  of  his  perception  then)  with  the  gavaya.  The 
cognition  of  this  similarity  of  the  gavaya  in  the  go,  as  it  follows 
directly  from  the  perception  of  the  similarity  of  the  go  in  the 
gavaya,  is  called  upamana  (analogy).  It  is  regarded  as  a  sepa- 
rate pramana,  because  by  it  we  can  apprehend  the  similarity 
existing  in  a  thing  which  is  not  perceived  at  the  moment.  It  is 
not  mere  remembrance,  for  at  the  time  the  go  was  seen  the 
gavaya  was  not  seen,  and  hence  the  similarity  also  was  not  seen, 
and  what  was  not  seen  could  not  be  remembered.  The  difference 
of  Prabhakara  and  Kumarila  on  this  point  is  that  while  the 
latter  regards  similarity  as  only  a  quality  consisting  in  the  fact 
of  more  than  one  object  having  the  same  set  of  qualities,  the 
former  regards  it  as  a  distinct  category. 

Arthdpatti  (implication)  is  a  new  pramana  which  is  admitted 
by  the  Mimamsa.  Thus  when  we  know  that  a  person  Devadatta 
is  alive  and  perceive  that  he  is  not  in  the  house,  we  cannot  re- 
concile these  two  facts,  viz.  his  remaining  alive  and  his  not  being 
in  the  house  without  presuming  his  existence  somewhere  outside 
the  house,  and  this  method  of  cognizing  the  existence  of  Deva- 
datta outside  the  house  is  called  arthdpatti  (presumption  or 
implication). 

The  exact  psychological  analysis  of  the  mind  in  this  artha- 
patti cognition  is  a  matter  on  which  Prabhakara  and  Kumarila 
disagree.  Prabhakara  holds  that  when  a  man  knows  that  Deva- 
datta habitually  resides  in  his  house  but  yet  does  not  iind  him 
there,  his  knowledge  that  Devadatta  is  living  (though  acquired 
previously  by  some  other  means  of  proof)  is  made  doubtful,  and 
the  cause  of  this  doubt  is  that  he  does  not  find  Devadatta  at  his 
house.  The  absence  of  Devadatta  from  the  house  is  not  the  cause 
of  implication,  but  it  throws  into  doubt  the  very  existence  of  Deva- 
datta, and  thus  forces  us  to  imagine  that  Devadatta  must  remain 
somewhere  outside.  That  can  only  be  found  by  implication, 
without  the  hypothesis  of  which  the  doubt  cannot  be  removed. 
The  mere  absence  of  Devadatta  from  the  house  is  not  enough  for 


392  Mlmamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

making  the  presumption  that  he  is  outside  the  house,  for  he 
might  also  be  dead.  But  I  know  that  Devadatta  was  living  and 
also  that  he  was  not  at  home;  this  perception  of  his  absence  from 
home  creates  a  doubt  as  regards  my  first  knowledge  that  he  is 
living,  and  it  is  for  the  removal  of  this  doubt  that  there  creeps  in 
the  presumption  that  he  must  be  living  somewhere  else.  The 
perception  of  the  absence  of  Devadatta  through  the  intermediate 
link  of  a  doubt  passes  into  the  notion  of  a  presumption  that  he 
must  then  remain  somewhere  else.  In  inference  there  is  no  ele- 
ment of  doubt,  for  it  is  only  when  the  smoke  is  perceived  to  exist 
beyond  the  least  element  of  doubt  that  the  inference  of  the  fire 
is  possible,  but  in  presumption  the  perceived  non-existence  in  the 
house  leads  to  the  presumption  of  an  external  existence  only 
when  it  has  thrown  the  fact  of  the  man's  being  alive  into  doubt 
and  uncertainty^ 

Kumarila  however  objects  to  this  explanation  of  Prabhakara, 
and  says  that  if  the  fact  that  Devadatta  is  living  is  made  doubt- 
ful by  the  absence  of  Devadatta  at  his  house,  then  the  doubt 
may  as  well  be  removed  by  the  supposition  that  Devadatta  is 
dead,  for  it  does  not  follow  that  the  doubt  with  regard  to  the  life 
of  Devadatta  should  necessarily  be  resolved  by  the  supposition 
of  his  being  outside  the  house.  Doubt  can  only  be  removed 
when  the  cause  or  the  root  of  doubt  is  removed,  and  it  does  not 
follow  that  because  Devadatta  is  not  in  the  house  therefore  he  is 
living.  If  it  was  already  known  that  Devadatta  was  living  and  his 
absence  from  the  house  creates  the  doubt,  how  then  can  the  very 
fact  which  created  the  doubt  remove  the  doubt?  The  cause  of 
doubt  cannot  be  the  cause  of  its  removal  too.  The  real  procedure 
of  the  presumption  is  quite  the  other  way.  The  doubt  about 
the  life  of  Devadatta  being  removed  by  previous  knowledge  or 
by  some  other  means,  we  may  presume  that  he  must  be  outside 
the  house  when  he  is  found  absent  from  the  house.  So  there  can- 
not be  any  doubt  about  the  life  of  Devadatta.  It  is  the  certainty 
of  his  life  associated  with  the  perception  of  his  absence  from  the 
house  that  leads  us  to  the  presumption  of  his  external  existence. 
There  is  an  opposition  between  the  life  of  Devadatta  and  his 
absence  from  the  house,  and  the  mind  cannot  come  to  rest  without 
the  presumption  of  his  external  existence.  The  mind  oscillates 
between  two  contradictory  poles  both  of  which  it  accepts  but 

'  StQ  Prakaranapancika,  pp.  113-115. 


I  x]  A  rthapatti  393 

cannot  reconcile,  and  as  a  result  of  that  finds  an  outlet  and  a  re- 
conciliation in  the  presumption  that  the  existence  of  Devadatta 
must  be  found  outside  the  house. 

Well  then,  if  that  be  so,  inference  may  as  well  be  interpreted 
as  presumption.  For  if  we  say  that  we  know  that  wherever  there 
is  smoke  there  is  fire,  and  then  perceive  that  there  is  smoke 
in  the  hill,  but  no  fire,  then  the  existence  of  the  smoke  becomes 
irreconcilable,  or  the  universal  proposition  of  the  concomitance 
of  smoke  with  fire  becomes  false,  and  hence  the  presumption 
that  there  is  fire  in  the  hill.  This  would  have  been  all  right  if 
the  universal  concomitance  of  smoke  with  fire  could  be  known 
otherwise  than  by  inference.  But  this  is  not  so,  for  the  concomit- 
ance was  seen  only  in  individual  cases,  and  from  that  came  the 
inference  that  wherever  there  is  smoke  there  is  fire.  It  cannot 
be  said  that  the  concomitance  perceived  in  individual  cases  suf- 
fered any  contradiction  without  the  presumption  of  the  universal 
proposition  (wherever  there  is  smoke  there  is  fire);  thus  artha- 
patti  is  of  no  avail  here  and  inference  has  to  be  accepted.  Now 
when  it  is  proved  that  there  are  cases  where  the  purpose  of  in- 
ference cannot  be  served  by  arthapatti,  the  validity  of  inference 
as  a  means  of  proof  becomes  established.  That  being  done  we 
admit  that  the  knowledge  of  the  fire  in  the  hill  may  come  to  us 
either  by  inference  or  by  arthapatti. 

So  inference  also  cannot  serve  the  purpose  of  arthapatti,  for 
in  inference  also  it  is  the  hetu  (reason)  which  is  known  first,  and 
later  on  from  that  the  sadhya  (what  is  to  be  proved) ;  both  of 
them  however  cannot  be  apprehended  at  the  same  moment,  and 
it  is  exactly  this  that  distinguishes  arthapatti  from  anumana. 
For  arthapatti  takes  place  where,  without  the  presumption  of 
Devadatta's  external  existence,  the  absence  from  the  house  of 
Devadatta  who  is  living  cannot  be  comprehended.  If  Devadatta  is 
living  he  must  exist  inside  or  outside  the  house.  The  mind  cannot 
swallow  a  contradiction,  and  hence  without  presuming  the  external 
existence  of  Devadatta  even  the  perceived  non-existence  cannot 
be  comprehended.  It  is  thus  that  the  contradiction  is  resolved  by 
presuming  his  existence  outside  the  house.  Arthapatti  is  thus 
the  result  of  arthanupapatti  or  the  contradiction  of  the  present 
perception  with  a  previously  acquired  certain  knowledge. 

It  is  by  this  arthapattipramana  that  we  have  to  admit  that 
there  is  a  special  potency  in  seeds  by  which  they  produce  the 


394  Mimamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

shoots,  and  that  a  special  potency  is  beh'eved  to  exist  in  sacrifices 
by  which  these  can  lead  the  sacrificer  to  Heaven  or  some  such 
beneficent  state  of  existence. 

Sabda  pramana. 

Sabda  or  word  is  regarded  as  a  separate  means  of  proof  by 
most  of  the  recognized  Indian  systems  of  thought  excepting  the 
Jaina,  Buddhist,  Carvaka  and  Vaisesika,  A  discussion  on  this 
topic  however  has  but  little  philosophical  value  and  I  have  there- 
fore omitted  to  give  any  attention  to  it  in  connection  with  the 
Nyaya,  and  the  Sarnkhya-Yoga  systems.  The  validity  and  au- 
thority of  the  Vedas  were  acknowledged  by  all  Hindu  writers  and 
they  had  wordy  battles  over  it  with  the  Buddhists  who  denied 
it.  Some  sought  to  establish  this  authority  on  the  supposition 
that  they  were  the  word  of  God,  while  others,  particularly  the 
Mimamsists  strove  to  prove  that  they  were  not  written  by  any- 
one, and  had  no  beginning  in  time  nor  end  and  were  eternal. 
Their  authority  was  not  derived  from  the  authority  of  any 
trustworthy  person  or  God.  Their  words  are  valid  in  themselves. 
Evidently  a  discussion  on  these  matters  has  but  little  value  with 
us,  though  it  was  a  very  favourite  theme  of  debate  in  the  old 
days  of  India.  It  was  in  fact  the  most  important  subject  for 
Mimarnsa,  for  the  Mimamsa  siitras  were  written  for  the  purpose 
of  laying  down  canons  for  a  right  interpretation  of  the  Vedas. 
The  slight  extent  to  which  it  has  dealt  with  its  own  epistemo- 
logical  doctrines  has  been  due  solely  to  their  laying  the  foun- 
dation of  its  structure  of  interpretative  maxims,  and  not  to 
writing  philosophy  for  its  own  sake.  It  does  not  dwell  so  much 
upon  salvation  as  other  systems  do,  but  seeks  to  serve  as  a 
rational  compendium  of  maxims  with  the  help  of  which  the 
Vedas  may  be  rightly  understood  and  the  sacrifices  rightly  per- 
formed. But  a  brief  examination  of  the  doctrine  of  word  {sabda) 
as  a  means  of  proof  cannot  be  dispensed  with  in  connection  with 
Mimamsa  as  it  is  its  very  soul. 

Sabda  (word)  as  a  pramana  means  the  knowledge  that  we 
get  about  things  (not  within  the  purview  of  our  perception)  from 
relevant  sentences  by  understanding  the  meaning  of  the  words  of 
which  they  are  made  up.  These  sentences  may  be  of  two  kinds, 
viz.  those  uttered  by  men  and  those  which  belong  to  the  Vedas. 
The  first  becomes  a  valid  means  of  knowledge  when  it  is  not 


ix]  Sab  da  Pramana  395 

uttered  by  untrustworthy  persons  and  the  second  is  valid  in 
itself.  The  meanings  of  words  are  of  course  known  to  us 
before,  and  cannot  therefore  be  counted  as  a  means  of  proof; 
but  the  meanings  of  sentences  involving  a  knowledge  of  the 
relations  of  words  cannot  be  known  by  any  other  acknowledged 
means  of  proof,  and  it  is  for  this  that  we  have  to  accept  sabda 
as  a  separate  means  of  proof  Even  if  it  is  admitted  that  the 
validity  of  any  sentence  may  be  inferred  on  the  ground  of  its 
being  uttered  by  a  trustworthy  person,  yet  that  would  not 
explain  how  we  understand  the  meanings  of  sentences,  for  when 
even  the  name  or  person  of  a  writer  or  speaker  is  not  known, 
we  have  no  difficulty  in  understanding  the  meaning  of  any 
sentence. 

Prabhakara  thinks  that  all  sounds  are  in  the  form  of  letters, 
or  are  understandable  as  combinations  of  letters.  The  constituent 
letters  of  a  word  however  cannot  yield  any  meaning,  and  are 
thus  to  be  regarded  as  elements  of  auditory  perception  which 
serve  as  a  means  for  understanding  the  meaning  of  a  word.  The 
reason  of  our  apprehension  of  the  meaning  of  any  word  is  to  be 
found  in  a  separate  potency  existing  in  the  letters  by  which  the 
denotation  of  the  word  may  be  comprehended.  The  percep- 
tion of  each  letter-sound  vanishes  the  moment  it  is  uttered,  but 
leaves  behind  an  impression  which  combines  with  the  impressions 
of  the  successively  dying  perceptions  of  letters,  and  this  brings 
about  the  whole  word  which  contains  the  potency  of  bringing 
about  the  comprehension  of  a  certain  meaning.  If  even  on  hearing 
a  word  the  meaning  cannot  be  comprehended,  it  has  to  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  hearer  lacks  certain  auxiliaries  necessary  for  the 
purpose.  As  the  potency  of  the  word  originates  from  the  separate 
potencies  of  the  letters,  it  has  to  be  admitted  that  the  latter  is 
the  direct  cause  of  verbal  cognition.  Both  Prabhakara  and 
Kumarila  agree  on  this  point. 

Another  peculiar  doctrine  expounded  here  is  that  all  words 
have  natural  denotative  powers  by  which  they  themselves  out  of 
their  own  nature  refer  to  certain  objects  irrespective  of  their  com- 
prehension or  non-comprehension  by  the  hearer.  The  hearer  will 
not  understand  the  meaning  unless  it  is  known  to  him  that  the 
word  in  question  is  expressive  of  such  and  such  a  meaning, 
but  the  word  was  all  along  competent  to  denote  that  meaning 
and  it  is  the  hearer's  knowledge  of  that  fact  that  helps  him  to 


396  Mlmamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

understand  the  meaning  of  a  word,  Mlmamsa  does  not  think 
that  the  association  of  a  particular  meaning  with  a  word  is  due 
to  conventions  among  people  who  introduce  and  give  meanings 
to  the  words \  Words  are  thus  acknowledged  to  be  denotative 
of  themselves.  It  is  only  about  proper  names  that  convention 
is  admitted  to  be  the  cause  of  denotation.  It  is  easy  to  see 
the  bearing  of  this  doctrine  on  the  self-validity  of  the  Vedic 
commandments,  by  the  performance  of  which  such  results  would 
arise  as  could  not  have  been  predicted  by  any  other  person. 
Again  all  words  are  believed  to  be  eternally  existent ;  but  though 
they  are  ever  present  some  manifestive  agency  is  required  by 
which  they  are  manifested  to  us.  This  manifestive  agency  con- 
sists of  the  effort  put  forth  by  the  man  who  pronounces  the 
word.  Nyaya  thinks  that  this  effort  of  pronouncing  is  the  cause 
that  produces  the  word  while  Mlmamsa  thinks  that  it  only  mani- 
fests to  the  hearer  the  ever-existing  word. 

The  process  by  which  according  to  Prabhakara  the  meanings 
of  words  are  acquired  may  be  exemplified  thus:  a  senior  com- 
mands a  junior  to  bring  a  cow  and  to  bind  a  horse,  and  the 
child  on  noticing  the  action  of  the  junior  in  obedience  to  the 
senior's  commands  comes  to  understand  the  meaning  of  "  cow  " 
and  "  horse."  Thus  according  to  him  the  meanings  of  words  can 
only  be  known  from  words  occuring  in  injunctive  sentences;  he 
deduces  from  this  the  conclusion  that  words  must  denote  things 
only  as  related  to  the  other  factors  of  the  injunction  {anvitdbhid- 
hdna  vdda),  and  no  word  can  be  comprehended  as  having  any 
denotation  when  taken  apart  from  such  a  sentence.  This  doctrine 
holds  that  each  word  yields  its  meaning  only  as  being  generally 
related  to  other  factors  or  only  as  a  part  of  an  injunctive  sentence, 
thus  the  word  gdm  accusative  case  of  go  (cow)  means  that  it  is 
intended  that  something  is  to  be  done  with  the  cow  or  the  bovine 
genus,  and  it  appears  only  as  connected  with  a  specific  kind  of 
action,  viz.  bringing  in  the  sentence  gdm  dnaya — bring  the  cow. 
Kumarila  however  thinks  that  words  independently  express 
separate  meanings  which  are  subsequently  combined  into  a  sen- 
tence expressing  one  connected  idea  {abJiihitdnvayavdda).  Thus 
in  gdm  dnaya,  according  to  Kumarila,  gdm  means  the  bovine 
class  in  the  accusative  character  and  dnaya  independently  means 

1  According  to   Nyaya  God   created  all  words  and  associated  them   with  their 
meanings. 


ix]  Non-perception  397 

bring;  these  two  are  then  combined  into  the  meaning  "  bring  the 
cow."  But  on  the  former  theory  the  word  gam  means  that  it  is 
connected  with  some  kind  of  action,  and  the  particular  sentence 
only  shows  what  the  special  kind  of  action  is,  as  in  the  above 
sentence  it  appears  as  associated  with  bringing,  but  it  cannot 
have  any  meaning  separately  by  itself.  This  theory  of  Kumarila 
which  is  also  the  Nyaya  theory  is  called  abhihitanvayavada\ 

Lastly  according  to  Prabhakara  it  is  only  the  Veda  that  can 
be  called  sabda-pramana,  and  only  those  sentences  of  it  which 
contain  injunctions  (such  as,  perform  this  sacrifice  in  this  way 
with  these  things).  In  all  other  cases  the  validity  of  words  is 
only  inferred  on  the  ground  of  the  trustworthy  character  of  the 
speaker.  But  Kumarila  considers  the  words  of  all  trustworthy 
persons  as  sabda-pramana. 

The  Pramana  of  Non-perception  (anupalabdhi). 

In  addition  to  the  above  pramanas  Kumarila  admits  a  fifth 
kind  of  pramana,  viz.  amipalabdhi  for  the  perception  of  the  non- 
existence of  a  thing.  Kumarila  argues  that  the  non-existence  of 
a  thing  (e.g.  there  is  no  jug  in  this  room)  cannot  be  perceived 
by  the  senses,  for  there  is  nothing  with  which  the  senses  could 
come  into  contact  in  order  to  perceive  the  non-existence.  Some 
people  prefer  to  explain  this  non-perception  as  a  case  of  anumana. 
They  say  that  wherever  there  is  the  existence  of  a  visible  object 
there  is  the  vision  of  it  by  a  perceiver.  When  there  is  no  vision 
of  a  visible  object,  there  is  no  existence  of  it  also.  But  it  is  easy 
to  see  that  such  an  inference  presupposes  the  perception  of  want 
of  vision  and  want  of  existence,  but  how  these  non-perceptions 
are  to  be  accounted  for  is  exactly  the  point  to  be  solved.  How 
can  the  perception  of  wantof  vision orwantof  existence  begrasped? 
It  is  for  this  that  we  have  to  admit  a  separate  mode  of  pramana 
namely  anupalabdhi. 

All  things  exist  in  places  either  in  a  positive  {sadrupci)  or  in 
a  negative  relation  (asadrupa),  and  it  is  only  in  the  former  case 

^  See  Prabhdkaramimamsa  by  Dr  Ganganatha  Jha  and  S.  N.  Dasgupta's  Study  of 
Paianjali,  appendix.  It  may  be  noted  in  this  connection  that  Miniamsa  did  not  favour 
the  Sphota  doctrine  of  sound  which  consists  in  the  Vjelief  that  apart  from  the  momentary 
sounds  of  letters  composing  a  word,  there  was  a  complete  word  form  which  was  mani- 
fested (sphota)  but  not  created  by  the  passing  sounds  of  the  syllables.  The  work  of 
the  syllable  sounds  is  only  to  project  this  word-manifestation.  See  Vacaspati's  Tattva- 
bindu,  Slokavarttika  and  Prakarattapancikd.  For  the  doctrine  of  anvitabhidhana  see 
Salikanatha's  Vakydrthamdtrkdvrtti. 


398  Mtmamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

that  they  come  within  the  purview  of  the  senses,  while  in  the 
latter  case  the  perception  of  the  negative  existence  can  only  be 
had  by  a  separate  mode  of  the  movement  of  the  mind  which  we 
designate  as  a  separate  pramana  as  anupalabdhi.  Prabhakara 
holds  that  non-perception  of  a  visible  object  in  a  place  is  only  the 
perception  of  the  empty  place,  and  that  therefore  there  is  no  need 
of  admitting  a  separate  pramana  as  anupalabdhi.  For  what  is 
meant  by  empty  space  ?  If  it  is  necessary  that  for  the  perception 
of  the  non-existence  of  jug  there  should  be  absolutely  empty 
space  before  us,  then  if  the  place  be  occupied  by  a  stone  we  ought 
not  to  perceive  the  non-existence  of  the  jug,  inasmuch  as  the 
place  is  not  absolutely  empty.  If  empty  space  is  defined  as  that 
which  is  not  associated  with  the  jug,  then  the  category  of  negation 
is  practically  admitted  as  a  separate  entity.  If  the  perception  of 
empty  space  is  defined  as  the  perception  of  space  at  the  moment 
which  we  associated  with  a  want  of  knowledge  about  the  jug,  then 
also  want  of  knowledge  as  a  separate  entity  has  to  be  accepted, 
which  amounts  to  the  same  thing  as  the  admission  of  the  want  or 
negation  of  the  jug.  Whatever  attempt  may  be  made  to  explain 
the  notion  of  negation  by  any  positive  conception,  it  will  at  best 
be  an  attempt  to  shift  negation  from  the  objective  field  to  know- 
ledge, or  in  other  words  to  substitute  for  the  place  of  the  external 
absence  of  a  thing  an  associated  want  of  knowledge  about  the 
thing  (in  spite  of  its  being  a  visible  object)  and  this  naturally  ends 
in  failure,  for  negation  as  a  separate  category  has  to  be  admitted 
either  in  the  field  of  knowledge  or  in  the  external  world.  Nega- 
tion or  abhava  as  a  separate  category  has  anyhow  to  be  admitted. 
It  is  said  that  at  the  first  moment  only  the  ground  is  seen  without 
any  knowledge  of  the  jug  or  its  negation,  and  then  at  the  next 
moment  comes  the  comprehension  of  the  non-existence  of  the  jug 
But  this  also  means  that  the  moment  of  the  perception  of  the 
ground  is  associated  with  the  want  of  knowledge  of  the  jug  or 
its  negation.  But  this  comes  to  the  same  thing  as  the  admission 
of  negation  as  a  separate  category,  for  what  other  meaning  can 
there  be  in  the  perception  of  "  only  the  ground  "  if  it  is  not  meant 
that  it  (the  perception  of  the  ground)  is  associated  with  or  quali- 
fied by  the  want  of  knowledge  of  the  jug?  For  the  perception  of 
the  ground  cannot  generate  the  notion  of  the  non-existence  of 
the  jug,  since  even  where  there  is  a  jug  the  ground  is  perceived. 
The  qualifying  phrase  that  "  only  the  ground  is  perceived  "  be- 


ix]  Self  399 

comes  meaningless,  if  things  whose  presence  is  excluded  are  not 
specified  as  negative  conditions  qualifying  the  perception  of  the 
ground.  And  this  would  require  that  we  had  already  the  notion 
of  negation  in  us,  which  appeared  to  us  of  itself  in  a  special 
manner  unaccountable  by  other  means  of  proof  It  should  also 
be  noted  that  non-perception  of  a  sensible  object  generates  the 
notion  of  negation  immediately  and  not  through  other  negations, 
and  this  is  true  not  only  of  things  of  the  present  moment  but  also 
of  the  memory  of  past  perceptions  of  non-existence,  as  when  we 
remember  that  there  was  no  jug  here.  Anupalabdhi  is  thus  a 
separate  pramana  by  which  the  absence  or  want  of  a  sensible 
object — the  negation  of  a  thing — can  be  comprehended. 

Self,  Salvation,  God. 

Mlmarnsa  has  to  accept  the  existence  of  soul,  for  without  it 
who  would  perform  the  Vedic  commandments,  and  what  would 
be  the  meaning  of  those  Vedic  texts  which  speak  of  men  as  per- 
forming sacrifices  and  going  to  Heaven  thereby?  The  soul  is 
thus  regarded  as  something  entirely  distinct  from  the  body,  the 
sense  organs,  and  buddhi ;  it  is  eternal,  omnipresent,  and  many, 
one  in  each  body.  Prabhakara  thinks  that  it  is  manifested  to  us  in 
all  cognitions.  Indeed  he  makes  this  also  a  proof  for  the  existence 
of  self  as  a  separate  entity  from  the  body,  for  had  it  not  been  so, 
why  should  we  have  the  notion  of  self-persistence  in  all  our  cog- 
nitions— even  in  those  where  there  is  no  perception  of  the  body? 
Kumarila  however  differs  from  Prabhakara  about  this  analysis  of 
the  consciousness  of  self  in  our  cognitions,  and  says  that  even 
though  we  may  not  have  any  notion  of  the  parts  of  our  body  or 
their  specific  combination,  yet  the  notion  of  ourselves  as  embodied 
beings  always  appears  in  all  our  cognitions.  Moreover  in  our 
cognitions  of  external  objects  we  are  not  always  conscious  of  the 
self  as  the  knower;  so  it  is  not  correct  to  say  that  self  is  different 
from  the  body  on  the  ground  that  the  consciousness  of  self  is 
present  in  all  our  cognitions,  and  that  the  body  is  not  cognized  in 
many  of  our  cognitions.  But  the  true  reason  for  admitting  that 
the  self  is  different  from  the  body  is  this,  that  movement  or 
willing,  knowledge,  pleasure,  pain,  etc.,  cannot  be  attributed  to 
the  body,  for  though  the  body  exists  at  death  these  cannot  then  be 
found.  So  it  has  to  be  admitted  that  they  must  belong  to  some 
other  entity  owing  to  the  association  with  which  the  body  ap- 


400  Mimamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

pears  to  be  endowed  with  movement  etc.  Moreover  knowledge, 
feeling,  etc.  though  apparent  to  the  perceiver,  are  not  yet  per- 
ceived by  others  as  other  qualities  of  the  body,  as  colour  etc., 
are  perceived  by  other  men.  It  is  a  general  law  of  causation 
that  the  qualities  of  the  constituent  elements  (in  the  cause)  impart 
themselves  to  the  effect,  but  the  earth  atoms  of  which  the  body 
is  made  up  do  not  contain  the  qualities  of  knowledge  etc.,  and 
this  also  corroborates  the  inference  of  a  separate  entity  as  the 
vehicle  of  knowledge  etc.  The  objection  is  sometimes  raised  that 
if  the  soul  is  omnipresent  how  can  it  be  called  an  agent  or  a 
mover?  But  Mimamsa  does  not  admit  that  movement  means 
atomic  motion,  for  the  principle  of  movement  is  the  energy  which 
moves  the  atoms,  and  this  is  possessed  by  the  omnipresent  soul. 
It  is  by  the  energy  imparted  by  it  to  the  body  that  the  latter 
moves.  So  it  is  that  though  the  soul  does  not  move  it  is  called  an 
agent  on  account  of  the  fact  that  it  causes  the  movement  of 
the  body.  The  self  must  also  be  understood  as  being  different 
from  the  senses,  for  even  when  one  loses  some  of  the  senses 
he  continues  to  perceive  his  self  all  the  same  as  persisting  all 
through. 

The  question  now  arises,  how  is  self  cognized  ?  Prabhakara 
holds  that  the  self  as  cognizor  is  never  cognized  apart  from  the 
cognized  object,  nor  is  the  object  ever  cognized  without  the  cog- 
nizor entering  into  the  cognition  as  a  necessary  factor.  Both  the 
self  and  the  object  shine  forth  in  the  self-luminous  knowledge  in 
what  we  have  already  described  as  triputi-pratyaksa  (perception 
as  three-together).  It  is  not  the  soul  which  is  self-illumined  but 
knowledge;  so  it  is  knowledge  which  illumines  both  the  self  and 
the  object  in  one  operation.  But  just  as  in  the  case  of  a  man 
who  walks,  the  action  of  walking  rests  upon  the  walker,  yet  he  is 
regarded  as  the  agent  of  the  work  and  not  as  the  object,  so  in  the 
case  of  the  operation  of  knowledge,  though  it  affects  the  self,  yet 
it  appears  as  the  agent  and  not  as  the  object.  Cognition  is  not 
soul,  but  the  soul  is  manifested  in  cognition  as  its  substratum, 
and  appears  in  it  as  the  cognitive  element  "  I "  which  is  inseparable 
from  all  cognitions.  In  deep  sleep  therefore  when  no  object  is 
cognized  the  self  also  is  not  cognized. 

Kumarila  however  thinks  that  the  soul  which  is  distinct  from 
the  body  is  perceived  by  a  mental  perception  {mdnasa-pratyaksd) 
as  the  substratum  of  the  notion  of  "  I,"  or  in  other  words  the  self 
perceives  itself  by  mental  perception,  and  the  perception  of  its 


ix]  Consciousness  of  Self  401 

own  nature  shines  forth  in  consciousness  as  the  "  I."  The  objec- 
tion that  the  self  cannot  itself  be  both  subject  and  object  to  its 
own  operation  does  not  hold,  for  it  applies  equally  to  Prabhakara's 
theory  in  which  knowledge  reveals  the  self  as  its  object  and  yet 
considers  it  as  the  subject  of  the  operation.  The  analogy  of 
linguistic  usage  that  though  the  walking  affects  the  walker  yet 
he  is  the  agent,  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  escape  from  this  charge, 
for  the  usage  of  language  is  not  philosophical  analysis.  Though 
at  the  time  of  the  cognition  of  objects  the  self  is  cognized,  yet  it 
does  not  appear  as  the  knower  of  the  knowledge  of  objects,  but 
reveals  itself  as  an  object  of  a  separate  mental  perception  which 
is  distinct  from  the  knowledge  of  objects.  The  self  is  no  doubt 
known  as  the  substratum  of  "  I,"  but  the  knowledge  of  this  self 
does  not  reveal  itself  necessarily  with  the  cognition  of  objects, 
nor  does  the  self  show  itself  as  the  knower  of  all  knowledge  of 
objects,  but  the  self  is  apprehended  by  a  separate  mental  intuition 
which  we  represent  as  the  "  I,"  The  self  does  not  reveal  itself  as 
the  knower  but  as  an  object  of  a  separate  intuitive  process  of  the 
mind.  This  is  indeed  different  from  Prabhakara's  analysis,  who 
regarded  the  cognition  of  self  as  inseparable  from  the  object- 
cognition,  both  being  the  result  of  the  illumination  of  knowledge. 
Kumarila  agrees  with  Prabhakara  however  in  holding  that  soul 
is  not  self-illuminating  {svayamprakdsd),  for  then  even  in  deep 
sleep  the  soul  should  have  manifested  itself;  but  there  is  no  such 
manifestation  then,  and  the  state  of  deep  sleep  appears  as  an 
unconscious  state.  There  is  also  no  bliss  in  deep  sleep,  for  had 
it  been  so  people  would  not  have  regretted  that  they  had  missed 
sensual  enjoyments  by  untimely  sleep.  The  expression  that 
"  I  slept  in  bliss  "  signifies  only  that  no  misery  was  felt.  Moreover 
the  opposite  representation  of  the  deep  sleep  state  is  also  found 
when  a  man  on  rising  from  sleep  says  "  I  slept  so  long  with- 
out knowing  anything  not  even  my  own  self"  The  self  is  not 
atomic,  since  we  can  simultaneously  feel  a  sensation  in  the  head 
as  well  as  in  the  leg.  The  Jaina  theory  that  it  is  of  the  size  of 
the  body  which  contracts  and  expands  according  to  the  body  it 
occupies  is  unacceptable.  It  is  better  therefore  that  the  soul  should 
be  regarded  as  all-pervading  as  described  in  the  Vedas.  This 
self  must  also  be  different  in  different  persons  for  otherwise  their 
individual  experiences  of  objects  and  of  pleasure  and  pain  cannot 
be  explained \ 

^  See  Slokavarttika,  atmavada  Sastra-dtpika,  atmavada  and  moksavada. 
D.  26 


402  Minia7nsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

Kumarila  considered  the  self  to  be  merely  the  potency  of 
knowledge  {jndnasaktiy.  Cognitions  of  things  were  generated 
by  the  activity  of  the  manas  and  the  other  senses.  This  self 
itself  can  only  be  cognized  by  mental  perception.  Or  at  the 
time  of  salvation  there  being  none  of  the  senses  nor  the  manas 
the  self  remains  in  pure  existence  as  the  potency  of  knowledge 
without  any  actual  expression  or  manifestation.  So  the  state  of 
salvation  is  the  state  in  which  the  self  remains  devoid  of  any 
of  its  characteristic  qualities  such  as  pleasure,  pain,  knowledge, 
willing,  etc.,  for  the  self  itself  is  not  knowledge  nor  is  it  bliss 
or  ananda  as  Vedanta  supposes ;  but  these  are  generated  in  it  by 
its  energy  and  the  operation  of  the  senses.  The  self  being  divested 
of  all  its  senses  at  that  time,  remains  as  a  mere  potency  of  the 
energy  of  knowledge,  a  mere  existence.  This  view  of  salvation 
is  accepted  in  the  main  by  Prabhakara  also. 

Salvation  is  brought  about  when  a  man  enjoys  and  suffers 
the  fruits  of  his  good  and  bad  actions  and  thereby  exhausts  them 
and  stops  the  further  generation  of  new  effects  by  refraining  from 
the  performance  of  kamya-karmas  (sacrifices  etc.  performed  for 
the  attainment  of  certain  beneficent  results)  and  guarantees 
himself  against  the  evil  effects  of  sin  by  assiduously  performing 
the  nitya-karmas  (such  as  the  sandhya  prayers  etc.,  by  the  per- 
formance of  which  there  is  no  benefit  but  the  non-performance 
of  which  produces  sins).  This  state  is  characterized  by  the 
dissolution  of  the  body  and  the  non-production  of  any  further 
body  or  rebirth. 

Mimarnsa  does  not  admit  the  existence  of  any  God  as  the 
creator  and  destroyer  of  the  universe.  Though  the  universe  is 
made  up  of  parts,  yet  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
universe  had  ever  any  beginning  in  time,  or  that  any  God  created 
it.  Every  day  animals  and  men  are  coming  into  being  by  the 
action  of  the  parents  without  the  operation  of  any  God.  Neither 
is  it  necessary  as  Nyaya  supposes  that  dharma  and  adharma 
should  have  a  supervisor,  for  these  belong  to  the  performer  and 

^  It  may  be  mentioned  in  this  connection  that  unlike  Nyaya  Mimamsa  did  not 
consider  all  activity  as  being  only  of  the  nature  of  molecular  vibration  [parispanda).  It 
admitted  the  existence  of  energy  {.(akti)  as  a  separate  category  which  manifested  itself 
in  actual  movements.  The  self  being  considered  as  a  ^akti  can  move  the  body  and 
yet  remain  unmoved  itself.  Manifestation  of  action  only  means  the  relationing  of  the 
energy  with  a  thing.  Nyaya  strongly  opposes  this  doctrine  of  a  non-sensible  (atindriya) 
energy  and  seeks  to  explain  all  action  by  actual  molecular  motion. 


ix]  Mimamsa  and  Nyaya-Vaisesika  403 

no  one  can  have  any  knowledge  of  them.  Moreover  there  cannot 
be  any  contact  [samyoga)  or  inherence  {samavdya)  of  dharma 
and  adharma  with  God  that  he  might  supervise  them;  he  cannot 
have  any  tools  or  body  wherewith  to  fashion  the  world  like 
the  carpenter.  Moreover  he  could  have  no  motive  to  create  the 
world  either  as  a  merciful  or  as  a  cruel  act.  For  when  in  the 
beginning  there  were  no  beings  towards  whom  should  he  be 
actuated  with  a  feeling  of  mercy?  Moreover  he  would  himself 
require  a  creator  to  create  him.  So  there  is  no  God,  no  creator, 
no  creation,  no  dissolution  or  pralaya.  The  world  has  ever  been 
running  the  same,  without  any  new  creation  or  dissolution,  srsti 
or  pralaya. 

Mimamsa  as  philosophy  and  Mimamsa  as  ritualism. 

From  what  we  have  said  before  it  will  be  easy  to  see  that 
Mimamsa  agrees  in  the  main  with  Vaisesika  about  the  existence 
of  the  categories  of  things  such  as  the  five  elements,  the  qualities, 
rupa,  rasa,  etc.  Kumarila's  differences  on  the  points  of  jati, 
samavaya,  etc.  and  Prabhakara's  peculiarities  have  also  been 
mentioned  before.  On  some  of  these  points  it  appears  that 
Kumarila  was  influenced  by  Sarnkhya  thought  rather  than  by 
Nyaya.  Sarnkhya  and  Vaisesika  are  the  only  Hindu  systems  which 
have  tried  to  construct  a  physics  as  a  part  of  their  metaphysics ; 
other  systems  have  generally  followed  them  or  have  differed  from 
them  only  on  minor  matters.  The  physics  of  Prabhakara  and 
Kumarila  have  thus  but  little  importance,  as  they  agree  in 
general  with  the  Vaisesika  view.  In  fact  they  were  justified  in  not 
laying  any  special  stress  on  this  part,  because  for  the  performance 
of  sacrifices  the  common-sense  view  of  Nyaya-Vaisesika  about 
the  world  was  most  suitable. 

The  main  difference  of  Mimarnsa  with  Nyaya  consists  of  the 
theory  of  knowledge.  The  former  was  required  to  prove  that  the 
Veda  was  self-valid  and  that  it  did  not  derive  its  validity  from 
God,  and  also  that  it  was  not  necessary  to  test  its  validity  by  any 
other  means.  To  do  this  it  began  by  trying  to  establish  the  self- 
validity  of  all  knowledge.  This  would  secure  for  the  Veda  the 
advantage  that  as  soon  as  its  orders  or  injunctions  were  com- 
municated to  us  they  would  appear  to  us  as  valid  knowledge,  and 
there  being  nothing  to  contradict  them  later  on  there  would  be 
nothing  in  the  world  which  could  render  the  Vedic  injunctions 

26 — 2 


404  Mimamsa  Philosophy  [ch. 

invalid.  The  other  pramanas  such  as  perception,  inference,  etc. 
were  described,  firstly  to  indicate  that  they  could  not  show  to  us 
how  dharma  could  be  acquired,  for  dharma  was  not  an  existing 
thing  which  could  be  perceived  by  the  other  pramanas,  but 
a  thing  which  could  only  be  produced  by  acting  according  to 
the  injunctions  of  the  Vedas.  For  the  knowledge  of  dharma 
and  adharma  therefore  the  sabdapramana  of  the  Veda  was  our 
only  source.  Secondly  it  was  necessary  that  we  should  have  a 
knowledge  of  the  different  means  of  cognition,  as  without  them 
it  would  be  difficult  to  discuss  and  verify  the  meanings  of  de- 
batable Vedic  sentences.  The  doctrine  of  creation  and  dissolution 
which  is  recognized  by  all  other  Hindu  systems  could  not  be 
acknowledged  by  the  Mimarnsa  as  it  would  have  endangered  the 
eternality  of  the  Vedas.  Even  God  had  to  be  dispensed  with  on 
that  account. 

The  Veda  is  defined  as  the  collection  of  Mantras  and  Brah- 
manas  (also  called  the  vidhis  or  injunctive  sentences).  There  are 
three  classes  of  injunctions  (i)  apurva-vidhi,  (2)  niyama-vidhi,  and 
(3)  parisahkhya-vidhi.  Apurva-vidhi  is  an  order  which  enjoins 
something  not  otherwise  known,  e.g.  the  grains  should  be  washed 
(we  could  not  know  that  this  part  of  the  duty  was  necessary  for  the 
sacrifice  except  by  the  above  injunction).  Niyama-vidhi  is  that 
where  when  a  thing  could  have  been  done  in  a  number  of  ways, 
an  order  is  made  by  the  Veda  which  restricts  us  to  following 
some  definite  alternative  (e.g.  though  the  chaff  from  the  corn 
could  be  separated  even  by  the  nails,  the  order  that  "corn  should 
be  threshed"  restricts  us  to  the  alternative  of  threshing  as  the 
only  course  acceptable  for  the  sacrifice).  In  the  niyama-vidhi 
that  which  is  ordered  is  already  known  as  possible  but  only  as 
an  alternative,  and  the  vidhi  insists  upon  one  of  these  methods  as 
the  only  one.  In  apurva-vidhi  the  thing  to  be  done  would  have 
remained  undone  and  unknown  had  it  not  been  for  the  vidhi. 
In  parisafikhya-vidhi  all  that  is  enjoined  is  already  known  but 
not  necessarily  as  possible  alternatives.  A  certain  mantra  "I  take 
up  the  rein"  {imam  agrbJindm  7'asandni)  which  could  be  used  in 
a  number  of  cases  should  not  however  be  used  at  the  time  of 
holding  the  reins  of  an  ass. 

There  are  three  main  principles  of  interpreting  the  Vedic 
sentences,  (i)  When  some  sentences  are  such  that  connectively 
they  yield  a  meaning  but  not  individually,  then  they  should  be 


ix]  Vidhis  and  Arthavadas  405 

taken  together  connectively  as  a  whole.  (2)  If  the  separate  sen- 
tences can  however  yield  meanings  separately  by  themselves  they 
should  not  be  connected  together.  (3)  In  the  case  of  certain 
sentences  which  are  incomplete  suitable  words  from  the  context 
of  immediately  preceding  sentences  are  to  be  supplied. 

,  The  vidhis  properly  interpreted  are  the  main  source  of  dharma. 
The  mantras  which  are  generally  hymns  in  praise  of  some  deities 
or  powers  are  to  be  taken  as  being  for  the  specification  of  the 
deity  to  whom  the  libation  is  to  be  offered.  It  should  be  re- 
membered that  as  dharma  can  only  be  acquired  by  following 
the  injunctions  of  the  Vedas  they  should  all  be  interpreted  as 
giving  us  injunctions.  Anything  therefore  found  in  the  Vedas 
which  cannot  be  connected  with  the  injunctive  orders  as  forming 
part  of  them  is  to  be  regarded  as  untrustworthy  or  at  best  inex- 
pressive. Thus  it  is  that  those  sentences  in  the  Vedas  which 
describe  existing  things  merely  or  praise  some  deed  of  injunction 
(called  the  arthavadas)  should  be  interpreted  as  forming  part 
of  a  vidhi-vakya  (injunction)  or  be  rejected  altogether.  Even 
those  expressions  which  give  reasons  for  the  performance  of 
certain  actions  are  to  be  treated  as  mere  arthavadas  and  inter- 
preted as  praising  injunctions.  For  Vedas  have  value  only  as 
mandates  by  the  performance  of  which  dharma  may  be  acquired. 

When  a  sacrifice  is  performed  according  to  the  injunctions  of 
the  Vedas,  a  capacity  which  did  not  exist  before  and  whose  ex- 
istence is  proved  by  the  authority  of  the  scriptures  is  generated 
either  in  the  action  or  in  the  agent.  This  capacity  or  positive 
force  called  apurva  produces  in  time  the  beneficient  results  of  the 
sacrifice  (e.g.  leads  the  performer  to  Heaven).  This  apurva  is  like 
a  potency  or  faculty  in  the  agent  which  abides  in  him  until  the 
desired  results  follow  \ 

It  is  needless  to  dilate  upon  these,  for  the  voluminous  works 
of  Sahara  and  Kumarila  make  an  elaborate  research  into  the 
nature  of  sacrifices,  rituals,  and  other  relevant  matters  in  great 
detail,  which  anyhow  can  have  but  little  interest  for  a  student 
of  philosophy. 

^  See  Dr  Ganganatha  Jha's  Prabhakaramtmamsa  and  Madhava's  Nyayamald- 
vistara. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  SANKARA  SCHOOL  OF  VEDANTA 

Comprehension  of  the  philosophical  Issues  more  essential 
than  the  Dialectic  of  controversy. 

Pramana  in  Sanskrit  signifies  the  means  and  the  movement 
by  which  knowledge  is  acquired, /r^/^^/^i  means  the  subject  or 
the  knower  who  cognizes,  pramd  the  result  of  pramana — rigiit 
knowledge,  prameya  the  object  of  knowedge,  and  prdmdnya  the 
validity  of  knowledge  acquired.  The  validity  of  knowledge  is 
sometimes  used  in  the  sense  of  the  faithfulness  of  knowledge  to 
its  object,  and  sometimes  in  the  sense  of  an  inner  notion  of 
validity  in  the  mind  of  the  subject — the  knower  (that  his  percep- 
tions are  true),  which  moves  him  to  work  in  accordance  with 
his  perceptions  to  adapt  himself  to  his  environment  for  the 
attainment  of  pleasurable  and  the  avoidance  of  painful  things. 
The  question  wherein  consists  the  pramanya  of  knowledge  has 
not  only  an  epistemological  and  psychological  bearing  but  a 
metaphysical  one  also.  It  contains  on  one  side  a  theory  of  know- 
ledge based  on  an  analysis  of  psychological  experience,  and  on 
the  other  indicates  a  metaphysical  situation  consistent  with  the 
theory  of  knowledge.  All  the  different  schools  tried  to  justify 
a  theory  of  knowledge  by  an  appeal  to  the  analysis  and  inter- 
pretation of  experience  which  the  others  sometimes  ignored  or 
sometimes  regarded  as  unimportant.  The  thinkers  of  different 
schools  were  accustomed  often  to  meet  together  and  defeat  one 
another  in  actual  debates,  and  the  result  of  these  debates  was  fre- 
quently very  important  in  determining  the  prestige  of  any  school 
of  thought.  If  a  Buddhist  for  example  could  defeat  a  great  Nyaya 
or  Mlmarnsa  thinker  in  a  great  public  debate  attended  by  many 
learned  scholars  from  different  parts  of  the  country,  his  fame  at 
once  spread  all  over  the  country  and  he  could  probably  secure  a 
large  number  of  followers  on  the  spot.  Extensive  tours  of  disputa- 
tion were  often  undertaken  by  great  masters  all  over  the  country 
for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  teachers  of  the  opposite  schools 
and  of  securing  adherents  to  their  own.  These  debates  were  there- 
fore not  generally  conducted  merely  in  a  passionless  philosophical 


CH.  x]  Old  Methods  of  Controversy  407 

mood  with  the  object  of  arriving  at  the  truth  but  in  order  to 
inflict  a  defeat  on  opponents  and  to  estabHsh  the  ascendency  of 
some  particular  school  of  thought.  It  was  often  a  sense  of  personal 
victory  and  of  the  victory  of  the  school  of  thought  to  which  the 
debater  adhered  that  led  him  to  pursue  the  debate. '^Advanced 
Sanskrit  philosophical  works  give  us  a  picture  of  the  attitude 
of  mind  of  these  debaters  and  we  find  that  most  of  these 
debates  attempt  to  criticize  the  different  schools  of  thinkers  by 
exposing  their  inconsistencies  and  self-contradictions  by  close 
dialectical  reasoning,  anticipating  the  answers  of  the  opponent, 
asking  him  to  define  his  statements,  and  ultimately  proving  that 
his  theory  was  inconsistent,  led  to  contradictions,  and  was  opposed 
to  the  testimony  of  experience.  In  reading  an  advanced  work  on 
Indian  philosophy  in  the  original,  a  student  has  to  pass  through  an 
interminable  series  of  dialectic  arguments,  and  negative  criticisms 
(to  thwart  opponents)  sometimes  called  vitanda,  before  he  can 
come  to  the  root  of  the  quarrel,  the  real  philosophical  diver- 
gence. All  the  resources  of  the  arts  of  controversy  find  full  play 
for  silencing  the  opponent  before  the  final  philosophical  answer 
is  given.  But  to  a  modern  student  of  philosophy,  who  belongs  to 
no  party  and  is  consequently  indifferent  to  the  respective  victory 
of  either  side,  the  most  important  thing  is  the  comprehension  of 
the  different  aspects  from  which  the  problem  of  the  theory  of 
knowledge  and  its  associated  metaphysical  theory  was  looked  at 
by  the  philosophers,  and  also  a  clear  understanding  of  the  de- 
ficiency of  each  view,  the  value  of  the  mutual  criticisms,  the  specu- 
lations on  the  experience  of  each  school,  their  analysis,  and  their 
net  contribution  to  philosophy.  With  Vedanta  we  come  to  an 
end  of  the  present  volume,  and  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  here 
to  make  a  brief  survey  of  the  main  conflicting  theories  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  in  order  to  indicate  the 
position  of  the  Vedanta  of  the  Sarikara  school  in  the  field  of 
Indian  philosophy  so  far  as  we  have  traversed  it.  I  shall  there- 
fore now  try  to  lay  before  my  readers  the  solution  of  the  theory 
of  knowledge  (^pramdnavdda)  reached  by  some  of  the  main 
schools  of  thought.  Their  relations  to  the  solution  offered  by 
the  Sahkara  Vedanta  will  also  be  dealt  with,  as  we  shall  attempt 
to  sketch  the  views  of  the  Vedanta  later  on  in  this  chapter. 


4o8  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

The  philosophical  situation.    A  Review. 

Before  dealing  with  the  Vedanta  system  it  seems  advisable 
to  review  the  general  attitude  of  the  schools  already  discussed  to 
the  main  philosophical  and  epistemological  questions  which  de- 
termine the  position  of  the  Vedanta  as  taught  by  Sankara  and 
his  school. 

The  Sautrantika  Buddhist  says  that  in  all  his  affairs  man  is 
concerned  with  the  fulfilment  of  his  ends  and  desires  {purusdrtha). 
This  however  cannot  be  done  without  right  knowledge  {samyag- 
jfidna)  which  rightly  represents  things  to  men.  Knowledge  is  said 
to  be  right  when  we  can  get  things  just  as  we  perceived  them. 
So  far  as  mere  representation  or  illumination  of  objects  is  con- 
cerned, it  is  a  patent  fact  that  we  all  have  knowledge,  and  therefore 
this  does  not  deserve  criticism  or  examination.  Our  enquiry  about 
knowledge  is  thus  restricted  to  its  aspect  of  later  verification  or 
contradiction  in  experience,  for  we  are  all  concerned  to  know  how 
far  our  perceptions  of  things  which  invariably  precede  all  our 
actions  can  be  trusted  as  rightly  indicating  what  we  want  to  get 
in  our  practical  experience  {arthaprdpakatvd).  The  perception  is 
right  {abhrdnta  non-illusory)  when  following  its  representation  we 
can  get  in  the  external  world  such  things  as  were  represented  by 
it  {samvddakatvd).  That  perception  alone  can  be  right  which  is 
generated  by  the  object  and  not  merely  supplied  by  our  imagina- 
tion. When  I  say  "  this  is  the  cow  I  had  seen,"  what  I  see  is  the 
object  with  the  brown  colour,  horns,  feet,  etc.,  but  the  fact  that 
this  is  called  cow,  or  that  this  is  existing  from  a  past  time,  is 
not  perceived  by  the  visual  sense,  as  this  is  not  generated  by 
the  visual  object.  For  all  things  are  momentary,  and  that  which 
I  see  now  never  existed  before  so  as  to  be  invested  with  this 
or  that  permanent  name.  This  association  of  name  and  per- 
manence to  objects  perceived  is  called  kalpatid  or  abhildpa. 
Our  perception  is  correct  only  so  far  as  it  is  without  the  abhilapa 
association  {kalpandpodJid),  for  though  this  is  taken  as  a  part  of 
our  perceptual  experience  it  is  not  derived  from  the  object,  and 
hence  its  association  with  the  object  is  an  evident  error.  The 
object  as  unassociated  with  name — the  nirvikalpa — is  thus  what 
is  perceived.  As  a  result  of  the  pratyaksa  the  manovijnana  or 
thought  and  mental  perception  of  pleasure  and  pain  is  also 
determined.    At  one  moment  perception  reveals  the  object  as  an 


x]      Dharmakirttts  View  of  Objects  of  Perception     409 

object  of  knowledge  {grdhyd),  and  by  the  fact  of  the  rise  of  such 
a  percept,  at  another  moment  it  appears  as  a  thing  reaHzable 
or  attainable  in  the  external  world.  The  special  features  of  the 
object  undefinable  in  themselves  as  being  what  they  are  in 
themselves  {svalaksand)  are  what  is  actually  perceived  {pra- 
tyaksavisayay.    The  pramdnaphala  (result  of  perception)  is  the 

^  There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  about  the  meaning  of  the  word  "svalaksana" 
of  Dharmakirtti  between  my  esteemed  friend  Professor  Stcherbatsky  of  Petrograd 
and  myself.  He  maintains  that  Dharmakirtti  held  that  the  content  of  the  presentative 
element  at  the  moment  of  perception  was  almost  totally  empty.  Thus  he  writes  to  me, 
"According  to  your  interpretation  svalaksana  means — the  object  (or  idea  with  Vijfia- 
navadin)  from  which  everything  past  and  everything  futtire  has  been  eliminated,  this 
I  do  not  deny  at  all.    But  I  maintain  that  if  everything  past  and  future  has  been  taken 

away,  what  remains?    The  present  and  the  present  is  a  ksana  i.e.  nothing The 

reverse  of  ksana  is  a  ksanasamtana  or  simply  sanitana  and  in  every  samtana  there  is 
a  synthesis  ekibhava  of  moments  past  and  future,  produced  by  the  intellect  (buddhi  = 

niscaya  =  kalpana  =  adhyavasaya) There  is  in  the   perception  of  a  jug   something 

(a  ksana  of  sense  knowledge)  which  we  must  distinguish  from  the  idea  of  a  jug 
(which  is  always  a  samtana,  always  vikalpita),  and  if  you  take  the  idea  away  in  a  strict 
unconditional  sense,  no  knowledge  remains  :  ksanasya  jnanena  prapayituma^akyatvat. 
This  is  absolutely  the  Kantian  teaching  about  Synthesis  of  Apprehension.  Accordingly 
pratyaksa  is  a  transcendental  source  of  knowledge,  because  practically  speaking  it  gives 
no  knowledge  at  all.  This  pramdna  is  asatkalpa.  Kant  says  that  without  the  elements 
of  intuition  (  =  sense-knowledge  =  pratyaksa  =  kalpanapodha)  our  cognitions  would  be 
empty  and  without  the  elements  of  intellect  (kalpana  =  buddhi  =  synthesis  =  ekibhava) 
they  would  be  blind.  Empirically  both  are  always  combined.  This  is  exactly  the 
theory  of  Dharmakirtti.  He  is  a  Vijiianavadi  as  I  understand,  because  he  maintains 
the  cognizability  of  ideas  (vijiiana)  alone,  but  the  reality  is  an  incognizable  foundation 
of  our  knowledge ;  he  admits,  it  is  bahya,  it  is  artha,  it  is  arthakriyaksana  =  svalaksana; 
that  is  the  reason  for  which  he  sometimes  is  called  Sautrantika  and  this  school  is  some- 
times called  Sautranta-vijnanavada,  as  opposed  to  the  Vijfianavada  of  A^vaghosa  and 
Aryasanga,  which  had  no  elaborate  theory  of  cognition.  If  the  jug  as  it  exists  in  our 
representation  were  the  svalaksana  and  paramarthasat,  what  would  remain  of  Vijfiana- 
vada? But  there  is  the  perception  of  the  jug  as  opposed  to  the  pure  idea  of  a  jug 
(Buddha  kalpana),  an  element  of  reality,  the  sensational  ksana,  which  is  communicated 
to  us  by  sense  knowledge.  Kant's  '  thing  in  itself  is  also  a  ksana  and  also  an  element 
of  sense  knowledge  of  pure  sense  as  opposed  to  pure  reason,  Dharmakirtti  has  also 
suddha  kalpana  and  suddham  pratyaksam.  ...And  very  interesting  is  the  opposition 
between  pratyaksa  and  anumana,  the  first  moves  from  ksana  to  samtana  and  the  second 
from  saintana  to  ksana,  that  is  the  reason  that  although  bhranta  the  anumana  is  never- 
theless pramana  because  through  it  we  indirectly  also  reach  ksana,  the  arthakriyaksana. 
It  is  bhranta  directly  and  pramana  indirectly ;  pratyaksa  is  pramana  directly  and  bhranta 

(asatkalpa)  indirectly "    So  far  as  the  passages  to  which  Professor  Stcherbatsky  refers 

are  concerned,  I  am  in  full  agreement  with  him.  But  I  think  that  he  pushes  the 
interpretation  too  far  on  Kantian  lines.  When  I  perceive  "this  is  blue,"  the  perception 
consists  of  two  parts,  the  actual  presentative  element  of  sense-knowledge  [svalaksana) 
and  the  affirmation  [niscaya).  So  far  we  are  in  complete  agreement.  But  Professor 
Stcherbatsky  says  that  this  sense-knowledge  is  a  ksana  (moment)  and  is  nothing.  I  also 
hold  that  it  is  a  ksana,  but  it  is  nothing  only  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  the  same  as 
the  notion  involving  affirmation  such  as  "this  is  blue."  The  affirmative  process 
occurring  at  the  succeeding  moments  is  determined  by  the  presentative  element  of  the 


4IO  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

ideational  concept  and  power  that  such  knowledge  has  of  showing 
the  means  which  being  followed  the  thing  can  be  got  {yena  krtena 
arthaJi  prdpito  bhavati).  Pramana  then  is  the  similarity  of  the 
knowledge  with  the  object  by  which  it  is  generated,  by  which  we 
assure  ourselves  that  this  is  our  knowledge  of  the  object  as  it  is 
perceived,  and  are  thus  led  to  attain  it  by  practical  experience. 
Yet  this  later  stage  is  pramanaphala  and  not  pramana  which 
consists  merely  in  the  vision  of  the  thing  (devoid  of  other  asso- 
ciations), and  which  determines  the  attitude  of  the  perceiver  to- 
wards the  perceived  object.  The  pramana  therefore  only  refers 
to  the  newly-acquired  knowledge  {ajiadhigatddhigantf)  as  this  is 
of  use  to  the  perceiver  in  determining  his  relations  with  the  ob- 
jective world.  This  account  of  perception  leaves  out  the  real 
epistemological  question  as  to  how  the  knowledge  is  generated 
by  the  external  world,  or  what  it  is  in  itself  It  only  looks  to 
the  correctness  or  faithfulness  of  the  perception  to  the  object  and 
its  value  for  us  in  the  practical  realization  of  our  ends.  The 
question  of  the  relation  of  the  external  world  with  knowledge  as 
determining  the  latter  is  regarded  as  unimportant. 

first  moment  {pratyaksabalotpanna  N.  T.,  p.  20)  but  this  presentative  element  divested 
from  the  product  of  the  affirmative  process  of  the  succeeding  moments  is  not  character- 
less, though  we  cannot  express  its  character ;  as  soon  as  we  try  to  express  it,  names  and 
other  ideas  consisting  of  affirmation  are  associated  and  these  did  not  form  a  part  of  the 
presentative  element.  Its  own  character  is  said  to  be  its  own  specific  nature  (svalaksand). 
But  what  is  this  specific  nature?  Dharmakirtti's  answer  on  this  point  is  that  by  specific 
nature  he  means  those  specific  characteristics  of  the  object  which  appear  clear  when 
the  object  is  near  and  hazy  when  it  is  at  a  distance  (yasydrthasya  sannidhandsanftidhd- 
ndbhydin  jjidnapratibhasabhedastat  svalaksanat?i  N.,  p.  i  and  N.  T.,  p.  16).  Sense- 
knowledge  thus  gives  us  the  specific  characteristics  of  the  object,  and  this  has  the  same 
form  as  the  object  itself;  it  is  the  appearance  of  the  "blue"  in  its  specific  character 
in  the  mind  and  when  this  is  associated  by  the  affirmative  or  ideational  process,  the 
result  is  the  concept  or  idea  ' '  this  is  blue  "  {fiilasariipam  pratyaksa7>ianubhuyamdna7n 
nilabodharupaiiiavasthdpyate  ...  Jttlasdrnpyafnasya  pramdnain  nilavikalpanariipam 
tvasya  pramdnaphalam,  N.  T.  p.  1^).  At  the  first  moment  there  is  the  appearance 
of  the  blue  {nilanirbhdsarn  hi  vijiidnatti,  N.T.  19)  and  this  is  direct  acquaintance 
{yatkincit  arthasya  sdksdtkdrijndnam  tatpratyaksajmicyate,  N.  T.  7)  and  this  is  real 
(paratHdrtkasat)  and  valid.  This  blue  sensation  is  different  from  the  idea  "  this  is 
blue"  (nllabodha,  N.T.  22)  which  is  the  result  of  the  former  (pramanaphala)  through 
the  association  of  the  affirmative  process  {adhyavasdya)  and  is  regarded  as  invalid  for 
it  contains  elements  other  than  what  were  presented  to  the  sense,  and  is  a  vikalpa- 
pratyaya.  In  my  opinion  svalaksana  therefore  means  pure  sensation  of  the  moment 
presenting  the  specific  features  of  the  object  and  with  Dharmakirtti  this  is  the  only 
thing  which  is  valid  in  perception  and  vikalpapratyaya  or  pramanaphala  is  the  idea 
or  concept  which  follows  it.  But  though  the  latter  is  a  product  of  the  former,  yet, 
being  the  construction  of  succeeding  moments,  it  cannot  give  us  the  pure  stage  of  the 
first  moment  of  sensation-presentation  {ksanasya  prdpayitumasakyatvdt ,  N.T.  16). 
N.T.  =.Nydyabindtitikd,  l>i  =  Nydyabindu  (Peterson's  edition). 


x]  Yogacara  Epistemology  4  t  i 

The  Yogacaras  or  idealistic  Buddhists  take  their  cue  from 
the  above-mentioned  Sautrantika  Buddhists,  and  say  that  since 
we  can  come  into  touch  with  knowledge  and  knowledge  alone, 
what  is  the  use  of  admitting  an  external  world  of  objects  as  the 
data  of  sensation  determining  our  knowledge  ?  You  say  that 
sensations  are  copies  of  the  external  world,  but  why  should  you 
say  that  they  copy,  and  not  that  they  alone  exist?  We  never  come 
into  touch  with  objects  in  themselves  ;  these  can  only  be  grasped 
by  us  simultaneously  with  knowledge  of  them,  they  must  there- 
fore be  the  same  as  knowledge  {sahopalambJianiyanidt  abhedo 
nilataddhiyoJi) ;  for  it  is  in  and  through  knowledge  that  ex- 
ternal objects  can  appear  to  us,  and  without  knowledge  we 
are  not  in  touch  with  the  so-called  external  objects.  So  it  is 
knowledge  which  is  self-apparent  in  itself,  that  projects  itself  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  appear  as  referring  to  other  external  ob- 
jects. We  all  acknowledge  that  in  dreams  there  are  no  ex- 
ternal objects,  but  even  there  we  have  knowledge.  The  question 
why  then  if  there  are  no  external  objects,  there  should  be  so 
much  diversity  in  the  forms  of  knowledge,  is  not  better  solved 
by  the  assumption  of  an  external  world  ;  for  in  such  an  assump- 
tion, the  external  objects  have  to  be  admitted  as  possessing  the 
infinitely  diverse  powers  of  diversely  affecting  and  determining 
our  knowledge ;  that  being  so,  it  may  rather  be  said  that  in 
the  beginningless  series  of  flowing  knowledge,  preceding  know- 
ledge-moments by  virtue  of  their  inherent  specific  qualities  de- 
termine the  succeeding  knowledge-moments.  Thus  knowledge 
alone  exists;  the  projection  of  an  external  word  is  an  illusion  of 
knowledge  brought  about  by  beginningless  potencies  of  desire 
{vdsand)  associated  with  it.  The  preceding  knowledge  determines 
the  succeeding  one  and  that  another  and  so  on.  Knowledge, 
pleasure,  pain,  etc.  are  not  qualities  requiring  a  permanent  entity 
as  soul  in  which  they  may  inhere,  but  are  the  various  forms 
in  which  knowledge  appears.  Even  the  cognition,  "  I  perceive  a 
blue  thing,"  is  but  a  form  of  knowledge,  and  this  is  often  errone- 
ously interpreted  as  referring  to  a  permanent  knower.  Though 
the  cognitions  are  all  passing  and  momentary,  yet  so  long  as 
the  series  continues  to  be  the  same,  as  in  the  case  of  one  person, 
say  Devadatta,  the  phenomena  of  memory,  recognition,  etc.  can 
happen  in  the  succeeding  moments,  for  these  are  evidently  illusory 
cognitions,  so  far  as  they  refer  to  the  permanence  of  the  objects 


412  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

believed  to  have  been  perceived  before,  for  things  or  know- 
ledge-moments, whatever  they  may  be,  are  destroyed  the  next 
moment  after  their  birth.  There  is  no  permanent  entity  as  per- 
ceiver  or  knower,  but  the  knowledge-moments  are  at  once  the 
knowledge,  the  knower  and  the  known.  This  thoroughgoing 
idealism  brushes  off  all  references  to  an  objective  field  of  ex- 
perience, interprets  the  verdict  of  knowledge  as  involving  a  knower 
and  the  known  as  mere  illusory  appearance,  and  considers  the 
flow  of  knowledge  as  a  self-determining  series  in  successive 
objective  forms  as  the  only  truth.  The  Hindu  schools  of  thought, 
Nyaya,  Sarnkhya,  and  the  Mimamsa,  accept  the  duality  of  soul 
and  matter,  and  attempt  to  explain  the  relation  between  the 
two.  With  the  Hindu  writers  it  was  not  the  practical  utility  of 
knowledge  that  was  the  only  important  thing,  but  the  nature  of 
knowledge  and  the  manner  in  which  it  came  into  being  were  also 
enquired  after  and  considered  important. 

Pramana  is  defined  by  Nyaya  as  the  collocation  of  instruments 
by  which  unerring  and  indubitable  knowledge  comes  into  being. 
The  collocation  of  instruments  which  brings  about  definite  know- 
ledge consists  partly  of  consciousness  {bodJid)  and  partly  of  ma- 
terial factors  {bodhdbodhasvabhdvd).  Thus  in  perception  the 
proper  contact  of  the  visual  sense  with  the  object  (e.g.  jug)  first 
brings  about  a  non-intelligent,  non-apprehensible  indeterminate 
consciousness  {nirvikalpd)  as  the  jugness  {gJiatatvd)  and  this  later 
on  combining  with  the  remaining  other  collocations  of  sense- 
contact  etc.  produces  the  determinate  consciousness:  this  is  a  jug. 
The  existence  of  this  indeterminate  state  of  consciousness  as  a 
factor  in  bringing  about  the  determinate  consciousness,  cannot  of 
course  be  perceived,  but  its  existence  can  be  inferred  from  the 
fact  that  if  the  perceiver  were  not  already  in  possession  of  the 
qualifying  factor  {insesanajndna  as  jugness)  he  could  not  have 
comprehended  the  qualified  object  {visistabuddhi)  the  jug  (i.e. 
the  object  which  possesses  jugness).  In  inference  {aiiumdnd) 
knowledge  of  the  Hhga  takes  part,  and  in  upamana  the  sight 
of  similarity  with  other  material  conglomerations.  In  the  case 
of  the  Buddhists  knowledge  itself  was  regarded  as  pramana; 
even  by  those  who  admitted  the  existence  of  the  objective  world, 
right  knowledge  was  called  pramana,  because  it  was  of  the  same 
form  as  the  external  objects  it  represented,  and  it  was  by  the  form 
of  the  knowledge  (e.g.  blue)  that  we  could  apprehend  that  the 


xj  Nyaya  Epistemology  413 

external  object  was  also  blue.    Knowledge  does  not  determine  the 
external  world  but  simply  enforces  our  convictions  about  the  ex- 
ternal world.   So  far  as  knowledge  leads  us  to  form  our  convictions 
of  the  external  world  it  is  pramana,  and  so  far  as  it  determines  our 
attitude  towards  the  external  world  it  is  pramanaphala.    The 
question  how  knowledge  is  generated  had  little  importance  with 
them,  but  how  with  knowledge  we  could  form   convictions  of 
the  external  world  was  the  most  important  thing.    Knowledge 
was  called  pramana,  because  it  was  the  means  by  which  we 
could  form  convictions  {adhyavasdya)  about  the  external  world. 
Nyaya   sought   to    answer   the    question    how    knowledge   was 
generated  in  us,  but  could  not  understand  that  knowledge  was  not 
a  mere  phenomenon  like  any  other  objective  phenomenon,  but 
thought  that  though  as  a  guna  (quality)  it  was  external  like  other 
gunas,  yet  it  was  associated  with  our  self  as  a  result  of  colloca- 
tions like  any  other  happening  in  the  material  world.    Pramana 
does  not  necessarily  bring  to  us  new  knowledge  {anadhigatddhi- 
gantf)  as  the  Buddhists  demanded,  but  whensoever  there  were 
collocations  of  pramana,  knowledge  was  produced,  no  matter 
whether  the  object  was  previously  unknown  or  known.   Even  the 
knowledge  of  known  things  may  be  repeated  if  there  be  suitable 
collocations.    Knowledge  like  any  other  physical  effect  is  pro- 
duced whenever  the  cause  of  it  namely  the  pramana  collocation 
is  present.    Categories  which  are  merely  mental  such  as  class 
(sdmdnya),  inherence  (samavdya),  etc.,  were  considered  as  having 
as  much  independent  existence  as  the  atoms  of  the  four  elements. 
The  phenomenon  of  the  rise  of  knowledge  in  the  soul  was  thus 
conceived  to  be  as  much  a  phenomenon  as  the  turning  of  the 
colour  of  the  jug   by  fire  from  black   to  red.    The  element   of 
indeterminate  consciousness  was  believed  to  be  combining  with 
the  sense  contact,  the  object,  etc.  to  produce  the  determinate  con- 
sciousness.   There  was  no  other  subtler  form  of  movement  than 
the  molecular.    Such  a  movement  brought  about  by  a  certain 
collocation  of  things  ended  in  a  certain  result   {phald).    Jnana 
(knowledge)  was  thus  the  result  of  certain  united  collocations 
{sdmagrl)  and  their  movements  (e.g.  contact  of  manas  with  soul, 
of  manas  with  the  senses,  of  the  senses  with  the  object,  etc.).   This 
confusion  renders  it  impossible   to  understand  the   real   philo- 
sophical distinction  between  knowledge  and  an  external  event 
of  the  objective  world.     Nyaya  thus  fails  to  explain  the  cause 


414  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

of  the  origin  of  knowledge,  and  its  true  relations  with  the  objective 
world.  Pleasure,  pain,  willing,  etc.  were  regarded  as  qualities 
which  belonged  to  the  soul,  and  the  soul  itself  was  regarded 
as  a  qualitiless  entity  which  could  not  be  apprehended  directly 
but  was  inferred  as  that  in  which  the  qualities  of  jnana,  sukha 
(pleasure),  etc.  inhered.  Qualities  had  independent  existence 
as  much  as  substances,  but  when  any  new  substances  were 
produced,  the  qualities  rushed  forward  and  inhered  in  them.  It 
is  very  probable  that  in  Nyaya  the  cultivation  of  the  art  of  in- 
ference was  originally  pre-eminent  and  metaphysics  was  deduced 
later  by  an  application  of  the  inferential  method  which  gave 
the  introspective  method  but  little  scope  for  its  application, 
so  that  inference  came  in  to  explain  even  perception  (e.g.  this  is 
a  jug  since  it  has  jugness)  and  the  testimony  of  personal  psycho- 
logical experience  was  taken  only  as  a  supplement  to  corroborate 
the  results  arrived  at  by  inference  and  was  not  used  to  criticize  it^ 
Sarnkhya  understood  the  difference  between  knowledge  and 
material  events.  But  so  far  as  knowledge  consisted  in  being  the 
copy  of  external  things,  it  could  not  be  absolutely  different  from 
the  objects  themselves ;  it  was  even  then  an  invisible  translucent 
sort  of  thing,  devoid  of  weight  and  grossness  such  as  the  external 
objects  possessed.  But  the  fact  that  it  copies  those  gross  objects 
makes  it  evident  that  knowledge  had  essentially  the  same  sub- 
stances though  in  a  subtler  form  as  that  of  which  the  objects  were 
made.  But  though  the  matter  of  knowledge,  which  assumed  the 
form  of  the  objects  with  which  it  came  in  touch,  was  probably 
thus  a  subtler  combination  of  the  same  elementary  substances 
of  which  matter  was  made  up,  yet  there  was  in  it  another  ele- 
ment, viz.  intelligence,  which  at  once  distinguished  it  as  utterly 
different  from  material  combinations.  This  element  of  intel- 
ligence is  indeed  different  from  the  substances  or  content  of 
the  knowledge  itself,  for  the  element  of  intelligence  is  like  a 
stationary  light,  "the  self,"  which  illuminates  the  crowding, 
bustling  knowledge  which  is  incessantly  changing  its  form  in 
accordance  with  the  objects  with  which  it  comes  in  touch.  This 
light  of  intelligence  is  the  same  that  finds  its  manifestation  in 
consciousness  as  the  "I,"  the  changeless  entity  amidst  all  the 
fluctuations  of  the  changeful  procession  of  knowledge.  How  this 
element  of  light  which  is  foreign  to  the  substance  of  knowledge 

1  See  Nyiiyamaiijart  on  pramana. 


x]  Samkhya  Epistemology  415 

relates  itself  to  knowledge,  and  how  knowledge  itself  takes  it  up 
into  itself  and  appears  as  conscious,  is  the  most  difficult  point 
of  the  Samkhya  epistemology  and  metaphysics.  The  substance 
of  knowledge  copies  the  external  world,  and  this  copy-shape  of 
knowledge  is  again  intelligized  by  the  pure  intelligence  {piiriisa) 
when  it  appears  as  conscious.  The  forming  of  the  buddhi-shape 
of  knowledge  is  thus  the  pramana  (instrument  and  process  of 
knowledge)  and  the  validity  or  invalidity  of  any  of  these  shapes 
is  criticized  by  the  later  shapes  of  knowledge  and  not  by  the 
external  objects  {svatah-prdmdnya  and  svatah-aprdmdnyd).  The 
pramana  however  can  lead  to  a  prama  or  right  knowledge  only 
when  it  is  intelligized  by  the  purusa.  The  purusa  comes  in  touch 
with  buddhi  not  by  the  ordinary  means  of  physical  contact  but 
by  what  may  be  called  an  inexplicable  transcendental  contact. 
It  is  the  transcendental  influence  of  purusa  that  sets  in  motion 
the  original  prakrti  in  Samkhya  metaphysics,  and  it  is  the  same 
transcendent  touch  (call  it  yogyata  according  to  Vacaspati  or 
sarnyoga  according  to  Bhiksu)  of  the  transcendent  entity  of 
purusa  that  transforms  the  non-intelligent  states  of  buddhi  into 
consciousness.  The  Vijfianavadin  Buddhist  did  not  make  any 
distinction  between  the  pure  consciousness  and  its  forms  {dkdrd) 
and  did  not  therefore  agree  that  the  akara  of  knowledge  was 
due  to  its  copying  the  objects.  Sarnkhya  was  however  a  realist 
who  admitted  the  external  world  and  regarded  the  forms  as 
all  due  to  copying,  all  stamped  as  such  upon  a  translucent  sub- 
stance {sattvd)  which  could  assume  the  shape  of  the  objects. 
But  Sarnkhya  was  also  transcendentalist  in  this,  that  it  did  not 
think  like  Nyaya  that  the  akara  of  knowledge  was  all  that  know- 
ledge had  to  show  ;  it  held  that  there  was  a  transcendent  element 
which  shone  forth  in  knowledge  and  made  it  conscious.  With 
Nyaya  there  was  no  distinction  between  the  shaped  buddhi  and 
the  intelligence,  and  that  being  so  consciousness  was  almost  like 
a  physical  event.  With  Samkhya  however  so  far  as  the  content 
and  the  shape  manifested  in  consciousness  were  concerned  it  was 
indeed  a  physical  event,  but  so  far  as  the  pure  intelligizing  element 
of  consciousness  was  concerned  it  was  a  wholly  transcendent 
affair  beyond  the  scope  and  province  of  physics.  The  rise  of 
consciousness  was  thus  at  once  both  transcendent  and  physical. 

The  Mimarnsist  Prabhakara  agreed  with  Nyaya  in  general 
as  regards  the  way  in  which  the  objective  world  and  sense  con- 


4i6  The  Sahka^^a  School  of  Veddnta  [ch. 

tact  induced  knowledge  in  us.  But  it  regarded  knowledge  as  a 
unique  phenomenon  which  at  once  revealed  itself,  the  knower 
and  the  known.  We  are  not  concerned  with  physical  colloca- 
tions, for  whatever  these  may  be  it  is  knowledge  which  reveals 
things — the  direct  apprehension  that  should  be  called  the  pra- 
mana,  Pramana  in  this  sense  is  the  same  as  pramiti  or  prama, 
the  phenomenon  of  apprehension.  Pramana  may  also  indeed 
mean  the  collocations  so  far  as  they  induce  the  prama.  For 
prama  or  right  knowledge  is  never  produced,  it  always  exists, 
but  it  manifests  itself  differently  under  different  circumstances. 
The  validity  of  knowledge  means  the  conviction  or  the  specific 
attitude  that  is  generated  in  us  with  reference  to  the  objective 
world.  This  validity  is  manifested  with  the  rise  of  knowledge, 
and  it  does  not  await  the  verdict  of  any  later  experience  in  the 
objective  field  {samvddin).  Knowledge  as  nirvikalpa  (indeter- 
minate) means  the  whole  knowledge  of  the  object  and  not  merely 
a  non-sensible  hypothetical  indeterminate  class-notion  as  Nyaya 
holds.  The  savikalpa  (determinate)  knowledge  only  re-establishes 
the  knowledge  thus  formed  by  relating  it  with  other  objects  as 
represented  by  memory  ^ 

Prabhakara  rejected  theSarnkhya  conception  of  a  dual  element 
in  consciousness  as  involving  a  transcendent  intelligence  {cit)  and 
a  material  part,  the  buddhi ;  but  it  regarded  consciousness  as  an 
unique  thing  which  by  itself  in  one  flash  represented  both  the 
knower  and  the  known.  The  validity  of  knowledge  did  not  depend 
upon  its  faithfulness  in  reproducing  or  indicating  {pradarsakatva) 
external  objects,  but  upon  the  force  that  all  direct  apprehension 
{anubkiiti)  has  of  prompting  us  to  action  in  the  external  world  ; 
knowledge  is  thus  a  complete  and  independent  unit  in  all  its 
self-revealing  aspects.  But  what  the  knowledge  was  in  itself  apart 
from  its  self-revealing  character  Prabhakara  did  not  enquire. 

Kumarila  declared  that  jfiana  (knowledge)  was  a  movement 
brought  about  by  the  activity  of  the  self  which  resulted  in  pro- 
ducing consciousness  {jhdtata)  of  objective  things.  Jnana  itself 
cannot  be  perceived,  but  can  only  be  inferred  as  the  movement 
necessary  for  producing  the  jnatata  or  consciousness  of  things. 
Movement  with  Kumarila  was  not  a  mere  atomic  vibration,  but 
was  a  non-sensuous  transcendent  operation  of  which  vibration 

^  Samkhya  considered  nirvikalpa  as  the  dim  knowledge  of  the  first  moment  of 
consciousness,  which,  when  it  became  clear  at  the  next  moment,  was  called  savikalpa. 


x]  Epistemology  of  Kumdrila  417 

was  sometimes  the  result.  Jfiana  was  a  movement  and  not  the 
result  of  causal  operation  as  Nyaya  supposed.  Nyaya  would 
not  also  admit  any  movement  on  the  part  of  the  self,  but  it 
would  hold  that  when  the  self  is  possessed  of  certain  qualities, 
such  as  desire,  etc.,  it  becomes  an  instrument  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  a  physical  movement.  Kumarila  accords  the  same 
self-validity  to  knowledge  that  Prabhakara  gives.  Later  know- 
ledge by  experience  is  not  endowed  with  any  special  quality 
which  should  decide  as  to  the  validity  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
previous  movement.  For  what  is  called  samvadi  or  later  testimony 
of  experience  is  but  later  knowledge  and  nothing  more\  The 
self  is  not  revealed  in  the  knowledge  of  external  objects,  but  we 
can  know  it  by  a  mental  perception  of  self-consciousness.  It  is 
the  movement  of  this  self  in  presence  of  certain  collocating  cir- 
cumstances leading  to  cognition  of  things  that  is  called  jfianal 
Here  Kumarila  distinguishes  knowledge  as  movement  from  know- 
ledge as  objective  consciousness.  Knowledge  as  movement  was 
beyond  sense  perception  and  could  only  be  inferred. 

The  idealistic  tendency  of  Vijfianavada  Buddhism,  Samkhya,^ 
and  Mimamsa  was  manifest  in  its  attempt  at  establishing  the  unique  | 
character  of  knowledge  as  being  that  with  which  alone  we  are  in|_ 
touch.    But  Vijfianavada  denied  the  external  world,  and  thereby 
did  violence  to  the  testimony  of  knowledge.    Sarnkhya  admitted*! 
the  external  world  but  created  a  gulf  between  the  content  of  know- ' 
ledge  and  pure  intelligence ;  Prabhakara  ignored  this  difference, 
and  was  satisfied  with  the  introspective  assertion  that  knowledge 
was  such  a  unique  thing  that  it  revealed  with  itself,  the  knower  and 
the  known ;  Kumarila  however  admitted  a  transcendent  element 
of  movement  as  being  the  cause  of  our  objective  consciousness, 
but  regarded  this  as  being  separate  from  self.    But  the  question 
remained  unsolved  as  to  why,  in  spite  of  the  unique  character  of 
knowledge,  knowledge  could  relate  itself  to  the  world  of  objects, 
how  far  the  world  of  external  objects  or  of  knowledge  could  be 
regarded  as  absolutely  true.    Hitherto  judgments  were  only  re- 
lative, either  referring  to  one's  being  prompted  to  the  objective 
world,  to  the  faithfulness  of  the  representation  of  objects,  the 
suitability  of  fulfilling  our  requirements,  or  to  verification  by  later 

1  See  Nyayaratnamdla,  svatah-pramanya-nirnaya. 

-  See  Nyaya mafijari  on  Pramana,  Slokavarttika  on  Pratyaksa,  and  Gaga  Bhatta's 
Bhattacintdviani  on  Pratyaksa. 

D.  27 


4i8  The  Sankai'a  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

uncontradicted  experience.  But  no  enquiry  was  made  whether 
any  absolute  judgments  about  the  ultimate  truth  of  knowledge 
and  matter  could  be  made  at  all.  That  which  appeared  was  re- 
garded as  the  real.  But  the  question  was  not  asked,  whether 
there  was  anything  which  could  be  regarded  as  absolute  truth, 
the  basis  of  all  appearance,  and  the  unchangeable  reality.  This 
philosophical  enquiry  had  the  most  wonderful  charm  for  the 
Hindu  mind. 

Vedanta  Literature. 

It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  the  time  when  the  Brahnia-sutras 
were  written,  but  since  they  contain  a  refutation  of  almost  all  the 
other  Indian  systems,  even  of  the  Sunyavada  Buddhism  (of  course 
according  to  Sankara's  interpretation),  they  cannot  have  been 
written  very  early.  I  think  it  may  not  be  far  from  the  truth  in 
supposing  that  they  were  written  some  time  in  the  second  century 
B.C.  About  the  period  780  A.D.  Gaudapada  revived  the  monistic 
teaching  of  the  Upanisads  by  his  commentary  on  the  Mandukya 
Upanisad  in  verse  called  Mdndukyakdrikd.  His  disciple  Govinda 
was  the  teacher  of  Sankara  (788 — 820A.D.).  Sankara's  com- 
mentary on  the  Brahma-sutras  is  the  root  from  which  sprang 
forth  a  host  of  commentaries  and  studies  on  Vedantism  of  great 
originality,  vigour,  and  philosophic  insight.  Thus  Anandagiri,  a 
disciple  of  Sankara,  wrote  a  commentary  called  Nydyaniniaya, 
and  Govindananda  wrote  another  commentary  named  Ratna- 
prabhd.  Vacaspati  Misra,  who  flourished  about  841  A.D.,  wrote 
another  commentary  on  it  called  the  Bhdrnati.  Amalananda 
(1247 — 1 260  A.D.)  wrote  his  Kalpataru  on  it,  and  Apyayadlksita 
(i  550  A.D.)  son  of  Rangarajadhvarlndra  of  KancI  wrote  his  Kalpa- 
tarupariniala  on  the  Kalpataru.  Another  disciple  of  Sankara, 
Padmapada,  also  called  Sanandana,  wrote  a  commentary  on  it 
known  as  Pancapddikd.  From  the  manner  in  which  the  book  is 
begun  one  would  expect  that  it  was  to  be  a  running  commentary 
on  the  whole  of  Sankara's  bhasya,  but  it  ends  abruptly  at  the 
end  of  the  fourth  sutra.  Madhava  (1350),  in  his  Sankaravijaya^ 
recites  an  interesting  story  about  it.  He  says  that  Suresvara  re- 
ceived Sankara's  permission  to  write  a  vdrttika  on  the  bhasya. 
But  other  pupils  objected  to  Sankara  that  since  Suresvara  was 
formerly  a  great  Mimamsist  (Mandana  Misra  was  called  Suresvara 
after  his  conversion  to  Vedantism)  he  was  not  competent  to  write 


x]  Vedanta  Literature  419 

a  good  vdrttika  on  the  bhasya.  Suresvara,  disappointed,  wrote 
a  treatise  called  Naiskarmyasiddhi.  Padmapada  wrote  a  tika 
but  this  was  burnt  in  his  uncle's  house.  Sankara,  who  had  once 
seen  it,  recited  it  from  memory  and  Padmapada  wrote  it  down. 
Prakasatman  (1200)  wrote  a  commentary  on  Padmapada's  Pah- 
capddikd  known  as  Pahcapddikdvivarana.  Akhandananda  wrote 
his  Tattvadlpana,  and  the  famous  Nrsirnhasrama  Muni  (1500) 
wrote  his  Vivaranablidvaprakdsikd  on  it.  Amalananda  and 
Vidyasagara  also  wrote  commentaries  on  Pahcapddikd,  named 
Pancapddikddarpaiia  and  Pancapddikdtikd  respectively,  but 
the  Paficapddikdvivarana  had  by  far  the  greatest  reputation. 
Vidyaranya  who  is  generally  identified  by  some  with  Mad- 
hava  (1350)  wrote  his  famous  work  Vivaranapraineyasamgraha^, 
elaborating  the  ideas  of  Paficapddikdvivarana ;  Vidyaranya 
wrote  also  another  excellent  work  named  Jivammiktiviveka  on 
the  Vedanta  doctrine  of  emancipation.  Suresvara's  (800  A.D.) 
excellent  work  Naiskarmyasiddhi  is  probably  the  earliest  inde- 
pendent treatise  on  Sankara's  philosophy  as  expressed  in  his 
bhasya.  It  has  been  commented  upon  by  Jnanottama  Misra. 
Vidyaranya  also  wrote  another  work  of  great  merit  known  as 
PancadaH,  which  is  a  very  popular  and  illuminating  treatise  in 
verse  on  Vedanta.  Another  important  work  written  in  verse  on 
the  main  teachings  of  Sankara's  bhasya  is  Samksepasdriraka, 
written  by  Sarvajnatma  Muni  (900  A.D.).  This  has  also  been 
commented  upon  by  Ramatlrtha.  Sriharsa  (i  190  A.D.)  wrote 
his  K haiidanakhajidakhddya,  the  most  celebrated  work  on  the 
Vedanta  dialectic.  Citsukha,  who  probably  flourished  shortly 
after  Sriharsa,  wrote  a  commentary  on  it,  and  also  wrote  an 
independent  work  on  Vedanta  dialectic  known  as  Tattvadlpikd 
which  has  also  a  commentary  called  Nayanaprasddini  written 
by  Pratyagrupa.  Sankara  Misra  and  Raghunatha  also  wrote 
commentaries  on  Khandanakhandakhddya.  A  work  on  Ve- 
danta epistemology  and  the  principal  topics  of  Vedanta  of 
great  originality  and  merit  known  as  Vcddntaparibhdsd  was 
written  by  Dharmarajadhvarlndra  (about  1550A.D.).  His  son 
Ramakrsnadhvarin  wrote  his  SikJidviani  on  it  and  Amaradasa  his 
ManiprabJid.  The  Veddntaparibhdsd  with  these  two  commen- 
taries forms  an  excellent  exposition  of  some  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of  Vedanta.    Another  work  of  supreme  importance 

^  See  Narasimhacarya's  article  in  the  Indian  Antiqiuxry,  1916. 

27 — 2 


420  The  Sahkara  School  of  Veddnta  [ch. 

(though  probably  the  last  great  work  on  Vedanta)  is  the 
Advaitasiddhi  of  Madhusudana  SarasvatI  who  followed  Dharma- 
rajadhvarlndra.  This  has  three  commentaries  known  as  Gauda- 
brahmdnandi,  Vitthalesopadhydyl  and  Siddhivydkhyd.  Sadananda 
Vyasa  wrote  also  a  summary  of  it  known  as  Advaitasiddhisid- 
dhdntasdra.  Sadananda  wrote  also  an  excellent  elementary  work 
named  Veddntasdra  which  has  also  two  commentaries  Subodhinl 
and  Vidvamnanoranjinl.  The  A  dvaitabrahmasiddhi  o{  Sadananda 
Yati  though  much  inferior  to  Advaitasiddhi  is  important,  as  it 
touches  on  many  points  of  Vedanta  interest  which  are  not  dealt 
with  in  other  Vedanta  works.  The  Nydyamakaranda  of  Ananda- 
bodha  Bhattarakacaryya  treats  of  the  doctrines  of  illusion  very 
well,  as  also  some  other  important  points  of  Vedanta  interest. 
VeddntasiddJidntamiiktdvall  of  Prakasananda  discusses  many  of 
the  subtle  points  regarding  the  nature  of  ajiiana  and  its  relations 
to  cit,  the  doctrine  of  drstisrstivdda,  etc.,  with  great  clearness. 
Siddhdntalesa  by  Apyayadlksita  is  very  important  as  a  summary 
of  the  divergent  views  of  different  writers  on  many  points  of 
interest.  Vcddntatattvadlpikd  and  Siddhdntatattva  are  also  good 
as  well  as  deep  in  their  general  summary  of  the  Vedanta  system. 
Bhedadhikkdra  of  Nrsimhasrama  Muni  also  is  to  be  regarded  as 
an  important  work  on  the  Vedanta  dialectic. 

The  above  is  only  a  list  of  some  of  the  most  important  Ve- 
danta works  on  which  the  present  chapter  has  been  based. 

Vedanta  in  Gaudapada. 

It  is  useless  I  think  to  attempt  to  bring  out  the  meaning  of 
the  Vedanta  thought  as  contained  in  the  Brahma-sutras  without 
making  any  reference  to  the  commentary  of  Sahkara  or  any 
other  commentator.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  Brahma- 
sutras  were  first  commented  upon  by  some  Vaisnava  writers  who 
held  some  form  of  modified  dualism  ^  There  have  been  more 
than  a  half  dozen  Vaisnava  commentators  of  the  Brahma-sutras 
who  not  only  differed  from  Sarikara's  interpretation,  but  also 
differed  largely  amongst  themselves  in  accordance  with  the 
different  degrees  of  stress  they  laid  on  the  different  aspects  of 
their  dualistic  creeds.  Every  one  of  them  claimed  that  his  inter- 
pretation was  the  only  one  that  was  faithful  to  the  sutras  and  to 

^  This  point  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  2nd  volume,  when  I  shall  deal  with  the 
systems  expounded  by  the  Vaisnava  commentators  of  the  Brahma-sutras. 


x]  Date  of  the  Brahma-sutras  421 

the  Upanisads.  Should  I  attempt  to  give  an  interpretation 
myself  and  claim  that  to  be  the  right  one,  it  would  be  only 
just  one  additional  view.  But  however  that  may  be,  I  am 
myself  inclined  to  believe  that  the  dualistic  interpretations  of  the 
Brahma-sutras  were  probably  more  faithful  to  the  sutras  than  the 
interpretations  of  Saiikara. 

The  Srimadbhagavadgltd,  which  itself  was  a  work  of  the 
Ekanti  (singularistic)  Vaisnavas,  mentions  the  Brahma-sutras  as 
having  the  same  purport  as  its  own,  giving  cogent  reasons ^ 
Professor  Jacobi  in  discussing  the  date  of  the  philosophical 
sutras  of  the  Hindus  has  shown  that  the  references  to  Buddhism 
found  in  the  Brahma-sutras  are  not  with  regard  to  the  Vijfiana- 
vada  of  Vasubandhu,  but  with  regard  to  the  Sunyavada,  but  he  re- 
gards the  composition  oiik\Q  Brahma-sutras  to  be  later  than  Nagar- 
juna.  I  agree  with  the  late  Dr  S.  C.  Vidyabhushana  in  holding  that 
both  the  Yogacara  system  and  the  system  of  Nagarjuna  evolved 
from  the  Prajhdpdramitd'^.  Nagarjuna's  merit  consisted  in  the 
dialectical  form  of  his  arguments  in  support  of  Sunyavada  ;  but  so 
far  as  the  essentials  of  Sunyavada  are  concerned  I  believe  that  the 
Tathata  philosophy  of  Asvaghosa  and  the  philosophy  of  the  Pra- 
jitdpdramitd  contained  no  less.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
the  works  of  Nagarjuna  were  better  known  to  the  Hindu  writers 
than  the  Mahdydna  sutras.  Even  in  such  later  times  as  that  of 
Vacaspati  Misra,  we  find  him  quoting  a  passage  of  the  Sdlistambha 
sutra  to  give  an  account  of  the  Buddhist  doctrine  of  pratltya- 
samutpada^.  We  could  interpret  any  reference  to  Sunyavada  as 
pointing  to  Nagarjuna  only  if  his  special  phraseology  or  dialectical 
methods  were  referred  to  in  any  way.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
reference  in  the  Bhagavadgltd  to  the  Brahma-sutras  clearly  points 
out  a  date  prior  to  that  of  Nagarjuna ;  though  we  may  be  slow 
to  believe  such  an  early  date  as  has  been  assigned  to  the  Bhaga- 
vadgltd by  Telang,  yet  I  suppose  that  its  date  could  safely  be 
placed  so  far  back  as  the  first  half  of  the  first  century  B.C.  or  the 
last  part  of  the  second  century  B.C.  The  Brahma-sutras  could 
thus  be  placed  slightly  earlier  than  the  date  of  the  Bhagavadgltd. 

^  "  Brahmasutrapadai^caiva  hetumadbhirvini^citah  "  Bhagavadgltd.  The  proofs 
in  support  of  the  view  that  the  Bhagavadgltd  is  a  Vaisnava  work  will  be  discussed 
in  the  ■znd  volume  of  the  present  work  in  the  section  on  Bhagavadgltd  and  its  philo- 
sophy. 

^  Indian  Antiquary,  1915. 

*  See  Vacaspati  Mi^ra's  Bhdmatl on  Sankara's  bhasya  on  Brahma-siitra,  li.  ii. 


42  2  The  Sankara  School  of  Veddnta  [cH. 

I  do  not  know  of  any  evidence  that  would  come  in  conflict  v/ith 
this  supposition.  The  fact  that  we  do  not  know  of  any  Hindu 
writer  who  held  such  monistic  views  as  Gaudapada  or  Saiikara, 
and  who  interpreted  the  Brahma-sutras  in  accordance  with  those 
monistic  ideas,  when  combined  with  the  fact  that  the  dualists 
had  been  writing  commentaries  on  the  Brahma-sutras,  goes  to 
show  that  the  Brahma-sutras  were  originally  regarded  as  an 
authoritative  work  of  the  dualists.  This  also  explains  the  fact  that 
the  Bhagavadgitd,  the  canonical  work  of  the  Ekanti  Vaisnavas, 
should  refer  to  it.  I  do  not  know  of  any  Hindu  writer  previous 
to  Gaudapada  who  attempted  to  give  an  exposition  of  the 
monistic  doctrine  (apart  from  the  Upanisads),  either  by  writing 
a  commentary  as  did  Saiikara,  or  by  writing  an  independent 
work  as  did  Gaudapada.  I  am  inclined  to  think  therefore  that 
as  the  pure  monism  of  the  Upanisads  was  not  worked  out  in  a 
coherent  manner  for  the  formation  of  a  monistic  system,  it 
was  dealt  with  by  people  who  had  sympathies  with  some  form 
of  dualism  which  was  already  developing  in  the  later  days  of 
the  Upanisads,  as  evidenced  by  the  dualistic  tendencies  of  such 
Upanisads  as  the  Svetasvatara,  and  the  like.  The  epic  Sarnkhya 
was  also  the  result  of  this  dualistic  development. 

It  seems  that  Badarayana,  the  writer  of  the  Brahma-sutras, 
was  probably  more  a  theist,  than  an  absolutist  like  his  commen- 
tator Sankara.  Gaudapada  seems  to  be  the  most  important 
man,  after  the  Upanisad  sages,  who  revived  the  monistic  .ten- 
dencies of  the  Upanisads  in  a  bold  and  clear  form  and  tried  to 
formulate  them  in  a  systematic  manner.  It  seems  very  signi- 
ficant that  no  other  karikas  on  the  Upanisads  were  interpreted, 
except  the  Mdndukyakdrikd  by  Gaudapada,  who  did  not  him- 
self make  any  reference  to  any  other  writer  of  the  monistic 
school,  not  even  Badarayana.  Sankara  himself  makes  the  con- 
fession that  the  absolutist  {advaita)  creed  was  recovered  from 
the  Vedas  by  Gaudapada.  Thus  at  the  conclusion  of  his  com- 
mentary on  Gaudapada's  karika,  he  says  that  "  he  adores  by 
falling  at  the  feet  of  that  great  guru  (teacher)  the  adored  of  his 
adored,  who  on  finding  all  the  people  sinking  in  the  ocean  made 
dreadful  by  the  crocodiles  of  rebirth,  out  of  kindness  for  all 
people,  by  churning  the  great  ocean  of  the  Veda  by  his  great 
churning  rod  of  wisdom  recovered  what  lay  deep  in  the  heart 
of  the   Veda,  and   is   hardly  attainable  even   by  the  immortal 


x]  Gaudapada  and  Buddhism  423 

gods\"  It  seems  particularly  significant  that  Sankara  should 
credit  Gaudapada  and  not  Badarayana  with  recovering  the 
Upanisad  creed.  Gaudapada  was  the  teacher  of  Govinda,  the 
teacher  of  Saiikara  ;  but  he  was  probably  living  when  Sankara 
was  a  student,  for  Sankara  says  that  he  was  directly  influenced  by 
his  great  wisdom,  and  also  speaks  of  the  learning,  self-control 
and  modesty  of  the  other  pupils  of  Gaudapada^  There  is  some 
dispute  about  the  date  of  Sankara,  but  accepting  the  date  pro- 
posed by  Bhandarkar,  Pathak  and  Deussen,  we  may  consider 
it  to  be  788  A.D.^  and  suppose  that  in  order  to  be  able  to  teach 
Saiikara,  Gaudapada  must  have  been  living  till  at  least  800  A.D. 
Gaudapada  thus  flourished  after  all  the  great  Buddhist 
teachers  Asvaghosa,  Nagarjuna,  Asahga  and  Vasubandhu  ;  and 
I  believe  that  there  is  sufficient  evidence  in  his  karikas  for  thinking 
that  he  was  possibly  himself  a  Buddhist,  and  considered  that 
the  teachings  of  the  Upanisads  tallied  with  those  of  Buddha. 
Thus  at  the  beginning  of  the  fourth  chapter  of  his  karikas  he 
says  that  he  adores  that  great  vcvdiwidvipaddm  ?7rt;r(2;;^)  who  by  know- 
ledge as  wide  as  the  sky  realized  {sanibiiddJid)  that  all  appearances 
{dharmd)  were  like  the  vacuous  sky  {gagaftop amain*).  He  then 
goes  on  to  say  that  he  adores  him  who  has  dictated  {desita) 
that  the  touch  of  untouch  {asparsayoga — probably  referring  to 
Nirvana)  was  the  good  that  produced  happiness  to  all  beings, 
and  that  he  was  neither  in  disagreement  with  this  doctrine  nor 
found  any  contradiction  in  it  {avivddah  aviruddhasca).  Some 
disputants  hold  that  coming  into  being  is  of  existents,  whereas 
others  quarrelling  with  them  hold  that  being  {jdta)  is  of  non- 
existents  {abhutasya);  there  are  others  who  quarrel  with  them 
and  say  that  neither  the  existents  nor  non-existents  are  liable  to 
being  and  there  is  one  non-coming-into-being  {advayamajdtini). 
He  agrees  with  those  who  hold  that  there  is  no  coming  into 
being^  In  IV.  19  of  his  karika  he  again  says  that  the  Buddhas 
have  shown  that  there  was  no  coming  into  being  in  any  way 
{sarvathd  Biiddhairajdtih  paridipitalt). 

1  Sankara's  bhasya  on  Gaudapada's  karika,  Anandasrama  edition,  p.  214. 

^  Anandasrama  edition  of  Sankara's  bliasya  on  Gaudapada's  karika,  p.  21. 

^  Telang  wishes  to  put  Sankara's  date  somewhere  in  the  8th  century,  and  Venka- 
teSvara  would  have  him  in  805  A.D.-897  a.d.,  as  he  did  not  beheve  that  Sankara  could 
have  lived  only  for  32  years.  J.  R.  A.  S.  1916. 

^  Compare  Lahkavaidra,  p.  29,  Kathani  ca  gaganopamam. 

*  Gaudapada's  karika,  iv.  2,  4. 


424  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

Again,  in  IV.  42  he  says  that  it  was  for  those  reaHsts  {vastii- 
vddi),  who  since  they  found  things  and  could  deal  with  them  and 
were  afraid  of  non-being,  that  the  Buddhas  had  spoken  of 
origination  {jdti).  In  I  v.  90  he  refers  to  agraydtia  which  we 
know  to  be  a  name  of  Mahdydna.  Again,  in  IV.  98  and  99 
he  says  that  all  appearances  are  pure  and  vacuous  by  nature. 
These  the  Buddhas,  the  emancipated  one  {mukta)  and  the  leaders 
know  first.  It  was  not  said  by  the  Buddha  that  all  appearances 
{dharnid)  were  knowledge.  He  then  closes  the  karikas  with  an 
adoration  which  in  all  probability  also  refers  to  the  Buddha\ 

Gaudapada's  work  is  divided  into  four  chapters:  (i)  Agama 
(scripture),  (2)  Vaitathya  (unreality),  (3)  Advaita  (unity),  (4)  Ala- 
tasanti  (the  extinction  of  the  burning  coal).  The  first  chapter  is 
more  in  the  way  of  explaining  the  Mandukya  Upanisad  by 
virtue  of  which  the  entire  work  is  known  as  Mdndukyakdrikd. 
The  second,  third,  and  fourth  chapters  are  the  constructive  parts 
of  Gaudapada's  work,  not  particularly  connected  with  the  Man- 
dukya Upanisad. 

In  the  first  chapter  Gaudapada  begins  with  the  three  ap- 
parent manifestations  of  the  self:  (i)  as  the  experiencer  of  the 
external  world  while  we  are  awake  {visva  or  vaisvdnara  dtind), 
(2)  as  the  experiencer  in  the  dream  state  {taijasa  dtmd),  (3)  as  the 
experiencer  in  deep  sleep  {susupti),  called  the  prdj'na  when  there 
is  no  determinate  knowledge,  but  pure  consciousness  and  pure 
bliss  {dnandd).  He  who  knows  these  three  as  one  is  never 
attached  to  his  experiences.  Gaudapada  then  enumerates  some 
theories  of  creation  :  some  think  that  the  world  has  proceeded 
as  a  creation  from  the  prana  (vital  activity),  others  consider 
creation  as  an  expansion  {vibhuti)  of  that  cause  from  which  it  has 
proceeded ;  others  imagine  that  creation  is  like  dream  {svapnd) 
and  magic  {indyd);  others,  that  creation  proceeds  simply  by  the 
will  of  the  Lord ;  others  that  it  proceeds  from  time ;  others  that  it 
is  for  the  enjoyment  of  the  Lord  {bhogdrthant)  or  for  his  play  only 
{kriddrtham),  for  such  is  the  nature  {svabhdva)  of  the  Lord,  that 
he  creates,  but  he  cannot  have  any  longing,  as  all  his  desires  are 
in  a  state  of  fulfilment. 

1  Gauclapada's  karika,  iv.  loo.  In  my  translation  I  have  not  followed  Sankara, 
for  he  has  I  think  tried  his  level  best  to  explain  away  even  the  most  obvious  references 
to  Buddha  and  Buddhism  in  Gaudapada's  karika.  I  have,  therefore,  drawn  my  meaning 
directly  as  Gaudapada's  karikas  seemed  to  indicate.  I  have  followed  the  same  principle 
in  giving  the  short  exposition  of  Gaudapada's  philosophy  below. 


x]  Gaudapada  s  Philosophy  425 

Gaudapada  does  not  indicate  his  preference  one  way  or  the 
other,  but  describes  the  fourth  state  of  the  self  as  unseen  {adrsta), 
unrelationable  {avyavaJidryani),  ungraspable  {agrdhyam),  inde- 
finable {alaksaim),  unthinkable  {acintyani),  unspeakable  {avya- 
padesyd),  the  essence  as  oneness  with  the  self  {ekdtmapratya- 
yasdrd),  as  the  extinction  of  the  appearance  {prapancopasamd), 
the  quiescent  {sdntam),  the  good  {sivarn),  the  one  {advaitdf.  The 
world-appearance(/!';'«/^;/m)  would  have  ceased  if  it  had  existed, 
but  all  this  duality  is  mere  maya  (magic  or  illusion),  the  one 
is  the  ultimately  real  {parmndrtJiataJi).  In  the  second  chapter 
Gaudapada  says  that  what  is  meant  by  calling  the  world  a 
dream  is  that  all  existence  is  unreal.  That  which  neither  exists 
in  the  beginning  nor  in  the  end  cannot  be  said  to  exist  in  the 
present.  Being  like  unreal  it  appears  as  real.  The  appearance 
has  a  beginning  and  an  end  and  is  therefore  false.  In  dreams 
things  are  imagined  internally,  and  in  the  experience  that  we 
have  when  we  are  awake  things  are  imagined  as  if  existing  out- 
side, but  both  of  them  are  but  illusory  creations  of  the  self 
What  is  perceived  in  the  mind  is  perceived  as  existing  at  the 
moment  of  perception  only ;  external  objects  are  supposed  to 
have  two  moments  of  existence  (namely  before  they  are  per- 
ceived, and  when  they  begin  to  be  perceived),  but  this  is  all  mere 
imagination.  That  which  is  unmanifested  in  the  mind  and  that 
which  appears  as  distinct  and  manifest  outside  are  all  imaginary 
productions  in  association  with  the  sense  faculties.  There  is  first 
the  imagination  of  a  perceiver  or  soul  {Jivd)  and  then  along  with 
it  the  imaginary  creations  of  diverse  inner  states  and  the  external 
world.  Just  as  in  darkness  the  rope  is  imagined  to  be  a  snake, 
so  the  self  is  also  imagined  by  its  own  illusion  in  diverse  forms. 
There  is  neither  any  production  nor  any  destruction  {na  nirodho, 
na  cotpatti//),  there  is  no  one  who  is  enchained,  no  one  who  is 
striving,  no  one  who  wants  to  be  released-.  Imagination  finds 
itself  realized  in  the  non-existent  existents  and  also  in  the  sense 

^  Compare  in  Nagarjuna's  first  karika  the  idea  of  prapancopasaniatn  sivavi. 
Anirodhamantitpadamanucchedamasdsvatam  attekdrthamandndrihatiiandgamamanir- 
gamam  yah  pratltyasatnutpddam  prapahcopasamam  sivam  desaydmdsa  sambuddhastam 
vande  vadatdmvaram.  Compare  also  Nagarjuna's  Chapter  on  Nv-vdnapariksd,  Purvo- 
palavibhopasamah  prapancopasamah  sivah  na  kvacit  kasyacit  kascit  dharmmo  bud- 
dheiiadesitah.  So  far  as  I  know  the  Buddhists  were  the  first  to  use  the  v/oxAsprapari- 
copaiaman  sivam, 

'^  Compare  Nagarjuna's  karika,  "anirodhamanutpadam"  in  Mddkyamikavrtti, 
B.  T.  S.,  p.  3. 


426  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  ■   [ch 

of  unity;  all  imagination  either  as  the  many  or  the  one  {advaya) 
is  false  ;  it  is  only  the  oneness  {advayata)  that  is  good.  There 
is  no  many,  nor  are  things  different  or  non-different  {iia  ndnedani 
...na prthag  ndprthaky.  The  sages  who  have  transcended  attach- 
ment, fear,  and  anger  and  have  gone  beyond  the  depths  of  the 
Vedas  have  perceived  it  as  the  imaginationless  cessation  of  all 
appearance  {nirvikalpah  prapancopasaniaJi),  the  one^. 

In  the  third  chapter  Gaudapada  says  that  truth  is  like  the 
void  {dkdsd)  which  is  falsely  conceived  as  taking  part  in  birth 
and  death,  coming  and  going  and  as  existing  in  all  bodies  ;  but 
howsoever  it  be  conceived,  it  is  all  the  while  not  different  from 
akasa.  All  things  that  appear  as  compounded  are  but  dreams 
{svapnd)  and  maya  (magic).  Duality  is  a  distinction  imposed 
upon  the  one  {advaitd)  by  maya.  The  truth  is  immortal,  it  cannot 
therefore  by  its  own  nature  suffer  change.  It  has  no  birth.  All 
birth  and  death,  all  this  manifold  is  but  the  result  of  an  imposi- 
tion of  maya  upon  it^  One  mind  appears  as  many  in  the  dream, 
so  also  in  the  waking  state  one  appears  as  many,  but  when  the 
mind  activity  of  the  Togins  (sages)  is  stopped  arises  this  fearless 
state,  the  extinction  of  all  sorrow,  final  cessation.  Thinking  every- 
thing to  be  misery  {diihkhani  sarvani  anusmrtyd)  one  should  stop 
all  desires  and  enjoyments,  and  thinking  that  nothing  has  any 
birth  he  should  not  see  any  production  at  all.  He  should  awaken 
the  mind  {cittd)  into  its  final  dissolution  {layd)  and  pacify  it 
when  distracted  ;  he  should  not  move  it  towards  diverse  objects 
when  it  stops.  He  should  not  taste  any  pleasure  {sukJiani)  and  by 
wisdom  remain  unattached,  by  strong  effort  making  it  motionless 
and  still.  When  he  neither  passes  into  dissolution  nor  into  dis- 
traction ;  when  there  is  no  sign,  no  appearance  that  is  the  perfect 
Brahman.  When  there  is  no  object  of  knowledge  to  come  into 
being,  the  unproduced  is  then  called  the  omniscent  {sarvajfid). 

In  the  fourth  chapter,  called  the  Alatasanti,  Gaudapada  further 

^  Compare  AJddhyamikakarika,  B.  T.  S.,  p.  3,  anekCirtham  ananartha?n,  etc. 

^  Compare  Lankdz>atdrasuira,  p.  78,  AdvaydsamsdJ'oparinirvdnavatsai'vadhar- 
nidh  tasmdt  tarhi  tnakdmate  Sttnyatdnutpddddvayanihsvabhdvalaksane  yogah  kara- 
niyah ;  also  8,  46,  Yaduta  svacittavisayavikalpadrstydnavabodhandt  vijuditdndm 
svacitladr^yanidtrdnavaidrena  tnakdmate  vdlaprthagjandh  bhdvdbhdvasvabhdvapara- 
mdrthadrstidvayaiiddhio  bhavanti. 

•''  Compare  Nagarjuna's  karika,  B.  T.  S.,  p.  196,  Akd^am  saiasrHganca  ban- 
dhydydh  putra  eva  ca  asantascdbhivyajyanle  tathdbhdvcna  kalpand,  with  Gaudapada's 
karika,  Hi.  ■zS,  Asato  nidyaya  jamiia  taivato  naiva  jdyaie  bandhydpiitro  na  tattvena 
maydya  vdpi  jdyate. 


x]  Gaudapada  s  Philosophy  427 

describes  this  final  stated  All  the  dharmas  (appearances)  are 
without  death  or  decays.  Gaudapada  then  follows  a  dialectical 
form  of  argument  which  reminds  us  of  Nagarjuna.  Gaudapada 
continues  thus:  Those  who  regard  karana  (cause)  as  the  karyya 
(effect  in  a  potential  form)  cannot  consider  the  cause  as  truly 
unproduced  {aja).,  for  it  suffers  production  ;  how  can  it  be  called 
eternal  and  yet  changing?  If  it  is  said  that  things  come  into 
being  from  that  which  has  no  production,  there  is  no  example 
with  which  such  a  case  may  be  illustrated.  Nor  can  we  con- 
sider that  anything  is  born  from  that  which  has  itself  suffered 
production.  How  again  can  one  come  to  a  right  conclusion 
about  the  regressus  ad  infinitum  of  cause  and  effect  {Jietit 
and  phald)}  Without  reference  to  the  effect  there  is  no  cause, 
and  without  reference  to  cause  there  is  no  effect.  Nothing  is  born 
either  by  itself  or  through  others ;  call  it  either  being,  non- 
being,  or  being-non-being,  nothing  suffers  any  birth,  neither  the 
cause  nor  the  effect  is  produced  out  of  its  own  nature  {svabhd- 
vatak),  and  thus  that  which  has  no  beginning  anywhere  cannot 
be  said  to  have  a  production.  All  experience  {prajilapti)  is 
dependent  on  reasons,  for  otherwise  both  would  vanish,  and  there 
would  be  none  of  the  afflictions  isarnklesd)  that  we  suffer.  When 
we  look  at  all  things  in  a  connected  manner  they  seem  to  be 
dependent,  but  when  we  look  at  them  from  the  point  of  view  of 
reality  or  truth  the  reasons  cease  to  be  reasons.  The  mind  {citta) 
does  not  come  in  touch  with  objects  and  thereby  manifest 
them,  for  since  things  do  not  exist  they  are  not  different  from 
their  manifestations  in  knowledge.  It  is  not  in  any  particular 
case  that  the  mind  produces  the  manifestations  of  objects  while 
they  do  not  exist  so  that  it  could  be  said  to  be  an  error,  for  in 
present,  past,  and  future  the  mind  never  comes  in  touch  with 
objects  which  only  appear  by  reason  of  their  diverse  manifesta- 
tions. Therefore  neither  the  mind  nor  the  objects  seen  by  it  are 
ever  produced.  Those  who  perceive  them  to  suffer  production  are 
really  traversing  the  reason  of  vacuity  {khe),  for  all  production 
is  but  false  imposition  on  the  vacuity.  Since  the  unborn  is 
perceived  as    being    born,   the  essence  then    is  the    absence  of 

1  The  very  name  Alatasanti  is  absolutely  Buddhistic.  Compare  Nagarjuna's 
karika,  B.  T.  S. ,  p.  206,  where  he  quotes  a  verse  from  the  Sataka. 

^  The  use  of  the  word  dharma  in  the  sense  of  appearance  or  entity  is  peculiarly 
Buddhistic.  The  Hindu  sense  is  that  given  by  Jaimini,  "  Codanalaksanah  artiiah, 
dharmah."    Dharma  is  determined  by  the  injunctions  of  the  Vedas. 


428  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [_CH. 

production,  for  it  being  of  the  nature  of  absence  of  production  it 
could  never  change  its  nature.  Everything  has  a  beginning  and 
an  end  and  is  therefore  false.  The  existence  of  all  things  is  like 
a  magical  or  illusory  elephant  {mdydhastt)  and  exists  only  as  far 
as  it  merely  appears  or  is  related  to  experience.  There  is  thus 
the  appearance  of  production,  movement  and  things,  but  the  one 
knowledge  {vijndna)  is  the  unborn,  unmoved,  the  unthingness 
{avastiitva),  the  cessation  {sdntam).  As  the  movement  of 
burning  charcoal  is  perceived  as  straight  or  curved,  so  it  is  the 
movement  {spanditd)  of  consciousness  that  appears  as  the  per- 
ceiving and  the  perceived.  All  the  attributes  (e.g.  straight  or 
curved)  are  imposed  upon  the  charcoal  fire,  though  in  reality  it 
does  not  possess  them  ;  so  also  all  the  appearances  are  im- 
posed upon  consciousness,  though  in  reality  they  do  not  possess 
them.  We  could  never  indicate  any  kind  of  causal  relation 
between  the  consciousness  and  its  appearance,  which  are  there- 
fore to  be  demonstrated  as  unthinkable  {acintya).  A  thing 
{dravya)  is  the  cause  of  a  thing  {dravya),  and  that  which  is  not 
a  thing  may  be  the  cause  of  that  which  is  not  a  thing,  but  all 
the  appearances  are  neither  things  nor  those  which  are  not 
things,  so  neither  are  appearances  produced  from  the  mind 
{citta),  nor  is  the  mind  produced  by  appearances.  So  long  as 
one  thinks  of  cause  and  effect  he  has  to  suffer  the  cycle  of 
existence  {sainsdrd),  but  when  that  notion  ceases  there  is  no 
samsara.  All  things  are  regarded  as  being  produced  from  a 
relative  point  of  view  only  {sanivrti),  there  is  therefore  nothing 
permanent  {sdsvata).  Again,  no  existent  things  are  produced, 
hence  there  cannot  be  any  destruction  {ucchedd).  Appearances 
{dliarma)  are  produced  only  apparently,  not  in  reality;  their 
coming  into  being  is  like  maya,  and  that  maya  again  does  not 
exist.  All  appearances  are  like  shoots  of  magic  coming  out  of 
seeds  of  magic  and  are  not  therefore  neither  eternal  nor  destruc- 
tible. As  in  dreams,  or  in  magic,  men  are  born  and  die,  so  are  all 
appearances.  That  which  appears  as  existing  from  an  imaginary 
relative  point  of  view  {kalpita  sainvrti)  is  not  so  in  reality  (para- 
mdrtka),  for  the  existence  depending  on  others,  as  shown  in  all 
relative  appearance,  is  after  all  not  a  real  existence.  That  things 
exist,  do  not  exist,  do  exist  and  not  exist,  and  neither  exist  nor 
not  exist;  that  they  are  moving  or  steady,  or  none  of  those,  are 
but  thoughts  with  which  fools  are  deluded. 


x]  Veddnta  and  Saiikara  429 

It  is  so  obvious  that  these  doctrines  are  borrowed  from  the 
Madhyamika  doctrines,  as  found  in  the  Nagarjuna's  karikas  and 
the  Vijnanavada  doctrines,  as  found  in  Lankdvatdra,  that  it  is 
needless  to  attempt  to  prove  it.  Gaudapada  assimilated  all  the 
Buddhist  Sunyavada  and  Vijnanavada  teachings,  and  thought  that 
these  held  good  of  the  ultimate  truth  preached  by  the  Upanisads. 
It  is  immaterial  whether  he  was  a  Hindu  or  a  Buddhist,  so  long 
as  we  are  sure  that  he  had  the  highest  respect  for  the  Buddha  and 
for  the  teachings  which  he  believed  to  be  his.  Gaudapada  took 
the  smallest  Upanisads  to  comment  upon,  probably  because  he 
wished  to  give  his  opinions  unrestricted  by  the  textual  limita- 
tions of  the  bigger  ones.  His  main  emphasis  is  on  the  truth 
that  he  realized  to  be  perfect.  He  only  incidentally  suggested 
that  the  great  Buddhist  truth  of  indefinable  and  unspeakable 
vijnana  or  vacuity  would  hold  good  of  the  highest  atman  of  the 
Upanisads,  and  thus  laid  the  foundation  of  a  revival  of  the 
Upanisad  studies  on  Buddhist  lines.  How  far  the  Upanisads 
guaranteed  in  detail  the  truth  of  Gaudapada's  views  it  was  left 
for  his  disciple,  the  great  Sahkara,  to  examine  and  explain. 

Vedanta  and  Sahkara  (788-820  A.D.). 

Vedanta  philosophy  is  the  philosophy  which  claims  to  be 
the  exposition  of  the  philosophy  taught  in  the  Upanisads  and 
summarized  in  the  Brahma-sutras  of  Badarayana.  The  Upanisads 
form  the  last  part  of  the  Veda  literature,  and  its  philosophy  is 
therefore  also  called  sometimes  the  Uttara-Mimamsa  or  the 
Mimamsa  (decision)  of  the  later  part  of  the  Vedas  as  distinguished 
from  the  Mimarnsa  of  the  previous  part  of  the  Vedas  and  the 
Brahmanas  as  incorporated  in  the  Purvamimdmsd  sutras  of 
Jaimini.  Though  these  Brahma-sutras  were  differently  interpreted 
by  different  exponents,  the  views  expressed  in  the  earliest  com- 
mentary on  them  now  available,  written  by  Sankaracarya,  have 
attained  wonderful  celebrity,  both  on  account  of  the  subtle  and 
deep  ideas  it  contains,  and  also  on  account  of  the  association  of  the 
illustrious  personality  of  Saiikara.  So  great  is  the  influence  of  the 
philosophy  propounded  by  Saiikara  and  elaborated  by  his  illus- 
trious followers,  that  whenever  we  speak  of  the  Vedanta  philosophy 
we  mean  the  philosophy  that  was  propounded  by  Saiikara.  If 
other  expositions  are  intended  the  names  of  the  exponents  have 
to  be  mentioned  (e.g.  Ramanuja-mata,Vallabha-mata,  etc.).  In  this 


430  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

chapter  we  shall  limit  ourselves  to  the  exposition  of  the  Vedanta 
philosophy  as  elaborated  by  Sankara  and  his  followers.  In  San- 
kara's  work  (the  commentaries  on  the  Brahma-sutra  and  the  ten 
Upanisads)  many  ideas  have  been  briefly  incorporated  which  as 
found  in  Sankara  do  not  appear  to  be  sufficiently  clear,  but  are 
more  intelligible  as  elaborated  by  his  followers.  It  is  therefore 
better  to  take  up  the  Vedanta  system,  not  as  we  find  it  in  Sankara, 
but  as  elaborated  by  his  followers,  all  of  whom  openly  declare 
that  they  are  true  to  their  master's  philosophy. 

For  the  other  Hindu  systems  of  thought,  the  sutras  {Jaimini 
sutra,  Nydya  siltra,  etc.)  are  the  only  original  treatises,  and  no 
foundation  other  than  these  is  available.  In  the  case  of  the 
Vedanta  however  the  original  source  is  the  Upanisads,  and 
the  sutras  are  but  an  extremely  condensed  summary  in  a 
systematic  form.  Sankara  did  not  claim  to  be  the  inventor  or 
expounder  of  an  original  system,  but  interpreted  the  sutras 
and  the  Upanisads  in  order  to  show  that  there  existed  a  connected 
and  systematic  philosophy  in  the  Upanisads  which  was  also 
enunciated  in  the  sutras  of  Badarayana.  The  Upanisads  were  a 
part  of  the  Vedas  and  w^ere  thus  regarded  as  infallible  by  the 
Hindus.  If  Sankara  could  only  show  that  his  exposition  of  them 
was  the  right  one,  then  his  philosophy  being  founded  upon  the 
highest  authority  would  be  accepted  by  all  Hindus.  The  most 
formidable  opponents  in  the  way  of  accomplishing  his  task  were 
the  Mimamsists,  who  held  that  the  Vedas  did  not  preach  any 
philosophy,  for  whatever  there  was  in  the  Vedas  was  to  be 
interpreted  as  issuing  commands  to  us  for  performing  this  or 
that  action.  They  held  that  if  the  Upanisads  spoke  of  Brahman 
and  demonstrated  the  nature  of  its  pure  essence,  these  were  mere 
exaggerations  intended  to  put  the  commandment  of  performing 
some  kind  of  worship  of  Brahman  into  a  more  attractive  form. 
Sankara  could  not  deny  that  the  purport  of  the  Vedas  as  found 
in  the  Brahmanas  was  explicitly  of  a  mandatory  nature  as  de- 
clared by  the  Mimarnsa,  but  he  sought  to  prove  that  such  could 
not  be  the  purport  of  the  Upanisads,  which  spoke  of  the  truest 
and  the  highest  knowledge  of  the  Absolute  by  which  the  wise 
could  attain  salvation.  He  said  that  in  the  karmakanda — the 
(sacrificial  injunctions)  Brahmanas  of  the  Vedas — the  purport  of 
the  Vedas  was  certainly  of  a  mandatory  nature,  as  it  was  intended 
for  ordinary  people  who  were  anxious  for  this  or  that  pleasure, 


x]  Sahkara  and  the  Upanisads  431 

and  were  never  actuated  by  any  desire  of  knowing  the  absolute 
truth,  but  the  Upanisads,  which  were  intended  for  the  wise  who 
had  controlled  their  senses  and  become  disinclined  to  all  earthly 
joys,  demonstrated  the  one  Absolute,  Unchangeable,  Brahman 
as  the  only  Truth  of  the  universe.  The  two  parts  of  the  Vedas 
were  intended  for  two  classes  of  persons.  Sahkara  thus  did  not 
begin  by  formulating  a  philosophy  of  his  own  by  logical  and 
psychological  analysis,  induction,  and  deduction.  He  tried  to  show 
by  textual  comparison  of  the  different  Upanisads,  and  by  refer- 
ence to  the  content  of  passages  in  the  Upanisads,  that  they 
were  concerned  in  demonstrating  the  nature  of  Brahman  (as  he 
understood  it)  as  their  ultimate  end.  He  had  thus  to  show  that 
the  uncontradicted  testimony  of  all  the  Upanisads  was  in  favour 
of  the  view  which  he  held.  He  had  to  explain  all  doubtful  and 
apparently  conflicting  texts,  and  also  to  show  that  none  of  the 
texts  referred  to  the  doctrines  of  mahat,  prakrti,  etc.  of  the 
Samkhya.  He  had  also  to  interpret  the  few  scattered  ideas 
about  physics,  cosmology,  eschatology,  etc.  that  are  found  in  the 
Upanisads  consistently  with  the  Brahman  philosophy.  In  order 
to  show  that  the  philosophy  of  the  Upanisads  as  he  expounded  it 
was  a  consistent  system,  he  had  to  remove  all  the  objections  that 
his  opponents  could  make  regarding  the  Brahman  philosophy,  to 
criticize  the  philosophies  of  all  other  schools,  to  prove  them  to 
be  self-contradictory,  and  to  show  that  any  interpretation  of  the 
Upanisads,  other  than  that  which  he  gave,  was  inconsistent  and 
wrong.  This  he  did  not  only  in  his  bhasya  on  the  Brahma-sutras 
but  also  in  his  commentaries  on  the  Upanisads.  Logic  with  him 
had  a  subordinate  place,  as  its  main  value  for  us  was  the  aid 
which  it  lent  to  consistent  interpretations  of  the  purport  of  the 
Upanisad  texts,  and  to  persuading  the  mind  to  accept  the  un- 
contradicted testimony  of  the  Upanisads  as  the  absolute  truth. 
His  disciples  followed  him  in  all,  and  moreover  showed  in  great 
detail  that  the  Brahman  philosophy  was  never  contradicted 
either  in  perceptual  experience  or  in  rational  thought,  and  that 
all  the  realistic  categories  which  Nyaya  and  other  systems 
had  put  forth  were  self-contradictory  and  erroneous.  They  also 
supplemented  his  philosophy  by  constructing  a  Vedanta  epistem- 
ology,  and  by  rethinking  elaborately  the  relation  of  the  maya, 
the  Brahman,  and  the  world  of  appearance  and  other  relevant 
topics.    Many  problems    of  great   philosophical   interest  which 


432  The  Saiikara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

had  been  left  out  or  slightly  touched  by  Sarikara  were  discussed 
fully  by  his  followers.  But  it  should  always  be  remembered  that 
philosophical  reasonings  and  criticisms  are  always  to  be  taken 
as  but  aids  for  convincing  our  intellect  and  strengthening  our 
faith  in  the  truth  revealed  in  the  Upanisads.  The  true  work  of 
logic  is  to  adapt  the  mind  to  accept  them.  Logic  used  for  upset- 
ting the  instructions  of  the  Upanisads  is  logic  gone  astray.  Many 
lives  of  Sarikaracarya  were  written  in  Sanskrit  such  as  the  Sankara- 
digvijaya,  Sankara-vij'aya-vildsa,  Sankara-jaya,  etc.  It  is  regarded 
as  almost  certain  that  he  was  born  between  700  and  800  A.D.  in 
the  Malabar  country  in  the  Deccan.  His  father  Sivaguru  was 
a  Yajurvedi  Brahmin  of  the  Taittirlya  branch.  Many  miracles 
are  related  of  Saiikara,  and  he  is  believed  to  have  been  the 
incarnation  of  Siva.  He  turned  ascetic  in  his  eighth  year  and 
became  the  disciple  of  Govinda,  a  renowned  sage  then  residing  in 
a  mountain  cell  on  the  banks  of  the  Narbuda,  He  then  came  over 
to  Benares  and  thence  went  to  Badarikasrama.  It  is  said  that 
he  wrote  his  illustrious  bhasya  on  the  Brahma-sutra  in  his  twelfth 
year.  Later  on  he  also  wrote  his  commentaries  on  ten  Upanisads. 
He  returned  to  Benares,  and  from  this  time  forth  he  decided  to 
travel  all  over  India  in  order  to  defeat  the  adherents  of  other 
schools  of  thought  in  open  debate.  It  is  said  that  he  first  went  to 
meet  Kumarila,  but  Kumarila  was  then  at  the  point  of  death,  and 
he  advised  him  to  meet  Kumarila's  disciple.  He  defeated  Mandana 
and  converted  him  into  an  ascetic  follower  of  his  own.  He  then 
travelled  in  various  places,  and  defeating  his  opponents  everywhere 
he  established  his  Vedanta  philosophy,  which  from  that  time  forth 
acquired  a  dominant  influence  in  moulding  the  religious  life  of 
India. 

Saiikara  carried  on  the  work  of  his  teacher  Gaudapada  and 
by  writing  commentaries  on  the  ten  Upanisads  and  the  Brahma- 
sutras  tried  to  prove,  that  the  absolutist  creed  was  the  one  which 
was  intended  to  be  preached  in  the  Upanisads  and  the  Brahma- 
Sutras'^.  Throughout  his  commentary  on  the  Brahma-sutras, 
there  is  ample  evidence  that  he  was  contending  against  some 
other  rival  interpretations  of  a  dualistic  tendency  which  held 
that  the  Upanisads  partly  favoured   the  Samkhya  cosmology 

^  The  main  works  of  Saiikara  are  his  commentaries  (bhasya)  on  the  ten  Upanisads 
(i^a,  Kena,  Katha,  Pra^na,  Mundaka,  Mandukya,  Aitareya,  Taittiriya,  Brhadaran- 
yaka,  and  Chandogya),  and  on  the  Brah?na-sritra. 


xj  Brahma-sutra  433 

of  the  existence  of  prakrti.  That  these  were  actual  textual  in- 
terpretations of  the  Brahma-sutras  is  proved  by  the  fact  that 
Sarikara  in  some  places  tries  to  show  that  these  textual  con- 
structions were  faulty^  In  one  place  he  says  that  others  (re- 
ferring according  to  Vacaspati  to  the  Mlmarnsa)  and  some  of 
us  (referring  probably  to  those  who  interpreted  the  sutras  and 
the  Upanisads  from  the  Vedanta  point  of  view)  think  that  the 
soul  is  permanent.  It  is  to  refute  all  those  who  were  opposed 
to  the  right  doctrine  of  perceiving  everything  as  the  unity 
of  the  self  {atmaikatvd)  that  this  Sariraka  commentary  of 
mine  is  being  attempted-.  Ramanuja,  in  the  introductory  por- 
tion of  his  bhasya  on  the  Brahma-sutra,  says  that  the  views  of 
Bodhayana  who  wrote  an  elaborate  commentary  on  the  Brahma- 
sutra  were  summarized  by  previous  teachers,  and  that  he  was 
following  this  Bodhayana  bhasya  in  writing  his  commentary.  In 
the  Veddrthasaingraha  of  Ramanuja  mention  is  made  of  Bodha- 
yana,Tarika,Guhadeva,Kapardin,Bharuci  as  Vedantic  authorities, 
and  Dravidacaryya  is  referred  to  as  the  "bhasyakara"  commen- 
tator. In  Chandogya  HI.  x.  4,  where  the  Upanisad  cosmology 
appeared  to  be  different  from  the  Visnupurdna  cosmology,  Sari- 
kara refers  to  an  explanation  offered  on  the  point  by  one  whom 
he  calls  "acaryya"  {atroktah parihdrah  dcdryyaili)  and  Anandagiri 
says  that  "acaryya"  there  refers  to  Dravidacaryya.  This  Dravid- 
acaryya is  known  to  us  from  Ramanuja's  statement  as  being  a 
commentator  of  the  dualistic  school,  and  we  have  evidence  here 
that  he  had  written  a  commentary  on  the  Chandogya  Upanisad. 
A  study  of  the  extant  commentaries  on  the  Brahma-sutras  of 
Badarayana  by  the  adherents  of  different  schools  of  thought 
leaves  us  convinced  that  these  sutras  were  regarded  by  all  as 
condensations  of  the  teachings  of  the  Upanisads.  The  differences 
of  opinion  were  with  regard  to  the  meaning  of  these  sutras  and 
the  Upanisad  texts  to  which  references  were  made  by  them 
in  each  particular  case.  The  Brahma-sutra  is  divided  into  four 
adhyayas  or  books,  and  each  of  these  is  divided  into  four  chapters 
or  padas.  Each  of  these  contains  a  number  of  topics  of  discussion 
(adhikarand)  which  are  composed  of  a  number  of  sutras,  which 
raise  the  point  at  issue,  the  points  that  lead  to  doubt  and  un- 
certainty, and  the  considerations  that  should  lead  one  to  favour 

^  See  note  on  p.  432. 

^  Sankara's  bhasya  on  the  Brahma-sutras,  I.  iii.  19, 

D.  28 


434  "^^^  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

a  particular  conclusion.  As  explained  by  Sankara,  most  of  these 
sutras  except  the  first  four  and  the  first  two  chapters  of  the 
second  book  are  devoted  to  the  textual  interpretations  of  the 
Upanisad  passages.  Saiikara's  method  of  explaining  the  abso- 
lutist Vedanta  creed  does  not  consist  in  proving  the  Vedanta  to 
be  a  consistent  system  of  metaphysics,  complete  in  all  parts,  but 
in  so  interpreting  the  Upanisad  texts  as  to  show  that  they  all  agree 
in  holding  the  Brahman  to  be  the  self  and  that  alone  to  be  the 
only  truth.  In  Chapter  I  of  Book  II  Sankara  tries  to  answer 
some  of  the  objections  that  may  be  made  from  the  Samkhya 
point  of  view  against  his  absolutist  creed  and  to  show  that  some 
apparent  difficulties  of  the  absolutist  doctrine  did  not  present 
any  real  difficulty.  In  Chapter  II  of  Book  II  he  tries  to  refute 
the  Samkhya,  Yoga,  Nyaya-Vaisesika,  the  Buddhist,  Jaina,  Bha- 
gavata  and  Saiva  systems  of  thought.  These  two  chapters  and 
his  commentaries  on  the  first  four  sutras  contain  the  main  points 
of  his  system.  The  rest  of  the  work  is  mainly  occupied  in  show- 
ing that  the  conclusion  of  the  sutras  was  always  in  strict  agree- 
ment with  the  Upanisad  doctrines.  Reason  with  Sankara  never 
occupied  the  premier  position;  its  value  was  considered  only 
secondary,  only  so  far  as  it  helped  one  to  the  right  understanding 
of  the  revealed  scriptures,  the  Upanisads.  The  ultimate  truth  can- 
not be  known  by  reason  alone.  What  one  debater  shows  to  be 
reasonable  a  more  expert  debater  shows  to  be  false,  and  what  he 
shows  to  be  right  is  again  proved  to  be  false  by  another  debater. 
So  there  is  no  final  certainty  to  which  we  can  arrive  by  logic 
and  argument  alone.  The  ultimate  truth  can  thus  only  be  found 
in  the  Upanisads;  reason,  discrimination  and  judgment  are  all  to 
be  used  only  with  a  view  to  the  discovery  of  the  real  purport 
of  the  Upanisads.  From  his  own  position  Sankara  was  not  thus 
bound  to  vindicate  the  position  of  the  Vedanta  as  a  thoroughly 
rational  system  of  metaphysics.  For  its  truth  did  not  depend  on 
its  rationality  but  on  the  authority  of  the  Upanisads.  But  what 
was  true  could  not  contradict  experience.  If  therefore  Saiikara's 
interpretation  of  the  Upanisads  was  true,  then  it  would  not  con- 
tradict experience.  Sankara  was  therefore  bound  to  show  that 
his  interpretation  was  rational  and  did  not  contradict  experience. 
If  he  could  show  that  his  interpretation  was  the  only  interpreta- 
tion that  was  faithful  to  the  Upanisads,  and  that  its  apparent 
contradictions  with  experience  could  in  some  way  be  explained, 


^. 


x]  Sahkara's  Interpretation  435 

he  considered  that  he  had  nothing  more  to  do.  He  was  not  writing 
a  philosophy  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term,  but  giving  us  the 
whole  truth  as  taught  and  revealed  in  the  Upanisads  and  not 
simply  a  system  spun  by  a  clever  thinker,  which  may  erroneously 
appear  to  be  quite  reasonable,  Ultimate  validity  does  not  belong 
to  reason  but  to  the  scriptures. 

He  started  with  the  premise  that  whatever  may  be  the  reason 
It  is  a  fact  that  all  experience  starts  and  moves  in  an  error  which 
identifies  the  self  with  the  body,  the  senses,  or  the  objects  of  the 
senses.  All  cognitive  acts  presuppose  this  illusory  identification, 
for  without  it  the  pure  self  can  never  behave  as  a  phenomenal 
knower  or  perceiver,  and  without  such  a  perceiver  there  would 
be  no  cognitive  act.  Sahkara  does  not  try  to  prove  philosophi- 
cally the  existence  of  the  pure  self  as  distinct  from  all  other 
things,  for  he  is  satisfied  in  showing  that  the  Upanisads  describe 
the  pure  self  unattached  to  any  kind  of  impurity  as  the  ultimate 
truth.  This  with  him  is  a  matter  to  which  no  exception  can  be 
taken,  for  it  is  so  revealed  in  the  Upanisads.  This  point  being 
granted,  the  next  point  is  that  our  experience  is  always  based 
upon  an  identification  of  the  self  with  the  body,  the  senses,  etc.  and 
the  imposition  of  all  phenomenal  qualities  of  pleasure,  pain,  etc. 
upon  the  self;  and  this  with  Sahkara  is  a  beginningless  illusion. 
All  this  had  been  said  by  Gaudapada.  Saiikara  accepted  Gauda- 
pada's  conclusions,  but  did  not  develop  his  dialectic  for  a  positive 
proof  of  his  thesis.  He  made  use  of  the  dialectic  only  for  the 
refutation  of  other  systems  of  thought.  This  being  done  he 
thought  that  he  had  nothing  more  to  do  than  to  show  that  his 
idea  was  in  agreement  with  the  teachings  of  the  Upanisads.  He 
showed  that  the  Upanisads  held  that  the  pure  self  as  pure  being, 
pure  intelligence  and  pure  bliss  was  the  ultimate  truth.  This 
being  accepted  the  world  as  it  appears  could  not  be  real.  It  must 
be  a  mere  magic  show  of  illusion  or  maya.  Sahkara  never  tries 
to  prove  that  the  world  is  maya,  but  accepts  it  as  indisputable. 
For,  if  the  self  is  what  is  ultimately  real,  the  necessary  con- 
clusion is  that  all  else  is  mere  illusion  or  maya.  He  had  thus  to 
quarrel  on  one  side  with  the  Mimarnsa  realists  and  on  the  other 
with  the  Sarnkhya  realists,  both  of  whom  accepted  the  validity 
of  the  scriptures,  but  interpreted  them  in  their  own  way.  The 
Mlmarnsists  held  that  everything  that  is  said  in  the  Vedas  is  to  be 
interpreted  as  requiring  us  to  perform  particular  kinds  of  action, 


436  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

or  to  desist  from  doing  certain  other  kinds.  This  would  mean  that 
the  Upanisads  being  a  part  of  the  Veda  should  also  be  interpreted 
as  containing  injunctions  for  the  performance  of  certain  kinds  of 
actions.  The  description  of  Brahman  in  the  Upanisads  does  not 
therefore  represent  a  simple  statement  of  the  nature  of  Brahman, 
but  it  implies  that  the  Brahman  should  be  meditated  upon  as 
possessing  the  particular  nature  described  there,  i.e.  Brahman 
should  be  meditated  upon  as  being  an  entity  which  possesses  a 
nature  which  is  identical  with  our  self;  such  a  procedure  would 
then  lead  to  beneficial  results  to  the  man  who  so  meditates. 
Sahkara  could  not  agree  to  such  a  view.  For  his  main  point  was 
that  the  Upanisads  revealed  the  highest  truth  as  the  Brahman. 
No  meditation  or  worship  or  action  of  any  kind  was  required; 
but  one  reached  absolute  wisdom  and  emancipation  when 
the  truth  dawned  on  him  that  the  Brahman  or  self  was  the 
ultimate  reality.  The  teachings  of  the  other  parts  of  the  Vedas, 
the  karmakanda  (those  dealing  with  the  injunctions  relating 
to  the  performance  of  duties  and  actions),  were  intended  for  in- 
ferior types  of  aspirants,  whereas  the  teachings  of  the  Upanisads, 
the  jnanakanda  (those  which  declare  the  nature  of  ultimate 
truth  and  reality),  were  intended  only  for  superior  aspirants  who 
had  transcended  the  limits  of  sacrificial  duties  and  actions,  and 
who  had  no  desire  for  any  earthly  blessing  or  for  any  heavenly 
joy.  Throughout  his  commentary  on  the  Bhagavadgitd  Sahkara 
tried  to  demonstrate  that  those  who  should  follow  the  injunc- 
tions of  the  Veda  and  perform  Vedic  deeds,  such  as  sacrifices, 
etc.,  belonged  to  a  lower  order.  So  long  as  they  remained  in 
that  order  they  had  no  right  to  follow  the  higher  teachings  of 
the  Upanisads.  They  were  but  karmins  (performers  of  scriptural 
duties).  When  they  succeeded  in  purging  their  minds  of  all 
desires  which  led  them  to  the  performance  of  the  Vedic  injunc- 
tions, the  field  of  karmamarga  (the  path  of  duties),  and  wanted 
to  know  the  truth  alone,  they  entered  the  jfianamarga  (the  way 
of  wisdom)  and  had  no  duties  to  perform.  The  study  of  Vedanta 
was  thus  reserved  for  advanced  persons  who  were  no  longer 
inclined  to  the  ordinary  joys  of  life  but  wanted  complete 
emancipation.  The  qualifications  necessary  for  a  man  intending 
to  study  the  Vedanta  are  (i)  discerning  knowledge  about  what  is 
eternal  and  what  is  transitory  {nitydnityavastuvivekd),  (2)  disin- 
clination to  the  enjoyment  of  the  pleasures  of  this  world  or  of 


x]  Sankaras  Interpretation  437 

the  after  world  {ihdmutraphalabhogavirdga),  (3)  attainment  of 
peace,  self-restraint,  renunciation,  patience,  deep  concentration 
and  faith  {samadaniddisddJianasampaf)  and  desire  for  salvation 
{mmnuksntvd).  The  person  who  had  these  qualifications  should 
study  the  Upanisads,  and  as  soon  as  he  became  convinced  of  the 
truth  about  the  identity  of  the  self  and  the  Brahman  he  attained 
emancipation.  When  once  a  man  realized  that  the  self  alone 
was  the  reality  and  all  else  was  maya,  all  injunctions  ceased  to 
have  any  force  with  him.  Thus,  the  path  of  duties  {karma)  and 
the  path  of  wisdom  {jfidjia)  were  intended  for  different  classes  of 
persons  or  adhikarins.  There  could  be  no  joint  performance  of 
Vedic  duties  and  the  seeking  of  the  highest  truth  as  taught  in 
the  Upanisads  {jndna-kartna-sa7miccaydbhdvah).  As  against  the 
dualists  he  tried  to  show  that  the  Upanisads  never  favoured  any 
kind  of  dualistic  interpretations.  The  main  difference  between 
the  Vedanta  as  expounded  by  Gaudapada  and  as  explained  by 
Saiikara  consists  in  this,  that  Saiikara  tried  as  best  he  could  to 
dissociate  the  distinctive  Buddhist  traits  found  in  the  exposition 
of  the  former  and  to  formulate  the  philosophy  as  a  direct 
interpretation  of  the  older  Upanisad  texts.  In  this  he  achieved 
remarkable  success.  He  was  no  doubt  regarded  by  some  as  a 
hidden  Buddhist  {pracchanna  Banddha),  but  his  influence  on 
Hindu  thought  and  religion  became  so  great  that  he  was  re- 
garded in  later  times  as  being  almost  a  divine  person  or  an 
incarnation.  His  immediate  disciples,  the  disciples  of  his  dis- 
ciples, and  those  who  adhered  to  his  doctrine  in  the  succeeding 
generations,  tried  to  build  a  rational  basis  for  his  system  in  a 
much  stronger  way  than  Safikara  did.  Our  treatment  of  Safikara's 
philosophy  has  been  based  on  the  interpretations  of  Vedanta 
thought,  as  offered  by  these  followers  of  Saiikara,  These  inter- 
pretations are  nowhere  in  conflict  with  Safikara's  doctrines,  but 
the  questions  and  problems  which  Saiikara  did  not  raise  have 
been  raised  and  discussed  by  his  followers,  and  without  these  one 
could  not  treat  Vedanta  as  a  complete  and  coherent  system  of 
metaphysics.  As  these  will  be  discussed  in  the  later  sections, 
we  may  close  this  with  a  short  description  of  some  of  the  main 
features  of  the  Vedanta  thought  as  explained  by  Saiikara. 

Brahman  according  to  Saiikara  is  "the  cause  from  which 
(proceeds)  the  origin  or  subsistence  and  dissolution  of  this  world 
which  is  extended  in  names  and  forms,  which  includes  many 


438  The  Sahkara  School  of  Veddnta  [ch. 

agents  and  enjoyers,  which  contains  the  fruit  of  works  specially 
determined  according  to  space,  time,  and  cause,  a  world  which  is 
formed  after  an  arrangement  inconceivable  even  by  the  (imagina- 
tion of  the)  mind^"  The  reasons  that  Sahkara  adduces  for  the 
existence  of  Brahman  may  be  considered  to  be  threefold:  (i)  The 
world  must  have  been  produced  as  the  modification  of  some- 
thing, but  in  the  Upanisads  all  other  things  have  been  spoken  of 
as  having  been  originated  from  something  other  than  Brahman, 
so  Brahman  is  the  cause  from  which  the  world  has  sprung  into 
being,  but  we  could  not  think  that  Brahman  itself  originated  from 
something  else,  for  then  we  should  have  a  regressus  ad  infinitum 
{anavasthd).  (2)  The  world  is  so  orderly  that  it  could  not  have 
come  forth  from  a  non-intelligent  source.  The  intelligent  source 
then  from  which  this  world  has  come  into  being  is  Brahman. 
(3)  This  Brahman  is  the  immediate  consciousness  (sdksi)  which 
shines  as  the  self,  as  well  as  through  the  objects  of  cognition 
which  the  self  knows.  It  is  thus  the  essence  of  us  all,  the  self, 
and  hence  it  remains  undenied  even  when  one  tries  to  deny  it, 
for  even  in  the  denial  it  shows  itself  forth.  It  is  the  self  of  us  all 
and  is  hence  ever  present  to  us  in  all  our  cognitions. 

Brahman  according  to  Saiikara  is  the  identity  of  pure  intelli- 
gence, pure  being,  and  pure  blessedness.  Brahman  is  the  self  of 
us  all.  So  long  as  we  are  in  our  ordinary  waking  life,  we  are 
identifying  the  self  with  thousands  of  illusory  things,  with  all  that 
we  call  "  I "  or  mine,  but  when  in  dreamless  sleep  we  are  absolutely 
without  any  touch  of  these  phenomenal  notions  the  nature  of  our 
true  state  as  pure  blessedness  is  partially  realized.  The  individual 
self  as  it  appears  is  but  an  appearance  only,  while  the  real  truth 
is  the  true  self  which  is  one  for  all,  as  pure  intelligence,  pure 
blessedness,  and  pure  being. 

All  creation  is  illusory  maya.  But  accepting  it  as  maya,  it 
may  be  conceived  that  God  (Isvara)  created  the  world  as  a,  mere 
sport;  from  the  true  point  of  view  there  is  no  Isvara  who  creates 
the  world,  but  in  the  sense  in  which  the  world  exists,  and  we  all 
exist  as  separate  individuals,  we  can  affirm  the  existence  of 
Isvara,  as  engaged  in  creating  and  maintaining  the  world.  In 
reality  all  creation  is  illusory  and  so  the  creator  also  is  illusory. 
Brahman,  the  self,  is  at  once  the  material  cause  (updddna-kdrana) 
as  well  as  the  efficient   cause   {niviitta-kdrand)   of  the  world. 

*  6ahkara's  commentary,  i.  i.  2.    See  also  Deussen's  System  of  the  Veddnta. 


x]  Main  idea  of  the  Vedanta  439 

There  is  no  difference  between  the  cause  and  the  effect,  and  the 
effect  is  but  an  illusory  imposition  on  the  cause — a  mere  illusion 
of  name  and  form.  We  may  mould  clay  into  plates  and  jugs  and 
call  them  by  so  many  different  names,  but  it  cannot  be  admitted 
that  they  are  by  that  fact  anything  more  than  clay;  their  trans- 
formations as  plates  and  jugs  are  only  appearances  of  name  and 
form  {udmarupd).  This  world,  inasmuch  as  it  is  but  an  effect 
imposed  upon  the  Brahman,  is  only  phenomenally  existent 
{vyavahdrikd)  as  mere  objects  of  name  and  form  {ndmarHpa\  but 
the  cause,  the  Brahman,  is  alone  the  true  reality  (^pdramdrthikdf. 

The  main  idea  of  the  Vedanta  philosophy. 
The  main  idea  of  the  advaita  (non-dualistic)  Vedanta  philo- 
sophy as  taught  by  the  Sahkara  school  is  this,  that  the  ultimate 
and  absolute  truth  is  the  self,  which  is  one,  though  appearing  as 
many  in  different  individuals.  The  world  also  as  apart  from 
us  the  individuals  has  no  reality  and  has  no  other  truth 
to  show  than  this  self.  All  other  events,  mental  or  physical, 
are  but  passing  appearances,  while  the  only  absolute  and  un- 
changeable truth  underlying  them  all  is  the  self.  While  other 
systems  investigated  the  pramanas  only  to  examine  how  far 
they  could  determine  the  objective  truth  of  things  or  our  at- 
titude in  practical  life  towards  them,  Vedanta  sought  to  reach 
beneath  the  surface  of  appearances,  and  enquired  after  the  final 
and  ultimate  truth  underlying  the  microcosm  and  the  macro- 
cosm, the  subject  and  the  object.  The  famous  instruction  of 
Svetaketu,  the  most  important  Vedanta  text  {makdvdkya)  says, 
"That  art  thou,  O  Svetaketu."  This  comprehension  of  my  self 
as  the  ultimate  truth  is  the  highest  knowledge,  for  when  this 
knowledge  is  once  produced,  our  cognition  of  world-appearances 
will  automatically  cease.  Unless  the  mind  is  chastened  and  purged 
of  all  passions  and  desires,  the  soul  cannot  comprehend  this 
truth;  but  when  this  is  once  done,  and  the  soul  is  anxious  for 
salvation  by  a  knowledge  of  the  highest  truth,  the  preceptor 
instructs  him,  "That  art  thou."  At  once  he  becomes  the  truth 
itself,  which  is  at  once  identical  with  pure  bliss  and  pure  intelli- 
gence; all  ordinary  notions  and  cognitions  of  diversity  and  of  the 

'  All  that  is  important  in  Saiikara's  commentary  of  the  Brahma-siitras  has  been 
excellently  systematised  by  Deussen  in  his  System  of  the  Vedanta',  it  is  therefore  un- 
necessary for  me  to  give  any  long  account  of  this  part.  Most  of  what  follows  has  been 
taken  from  the  writings  of  his  followers. 


440  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

many  cease;  there  is  no  duality,  no  notion  of  mine  and  thine;  the 
vast  illusion  of  this  world  process  is  extinct  in  him,  and  he  shines 
forth  as  the  one,  the  truth,  the  Brahman.  All  Hindu  systems  be- 
lieved that  when  man  attained  salvation,  he  became  divested  of  all 
world-consciousness,  or  of  all  consciousness  of  himself  and  his  in- 
terests, and  was  thus  reduced  to  his  own  original  purity  untouched 
by  all  sensations,  perceptions,  feelings  and  willing,  but  there  the 
idea  was  this  that  when  man  had  no  bonds  of  karma  and  no  desire 
and  attachment  with  the  world  and  had  known  the  nature  of 
his  self  as  absolutely  free  and  unattached  to  the  world  and  his 
own  psychosis,  he  became  emancipated  from  the  world  and  all 
his  connections  with  the  world  ceased,  though  the  world  continued 
as  ever  the  same  with  others.  The  external  world  was  a  reality 
with  them;  the  unreality  or  illusion  consisted  in  want  of  true 
knowledge  about  the  real  nature  of  the  self,  on  account  of  which 
the  self  foolishly  identified  itself  with  world-experiences,  worldly 
joys  and  world-events,  and  performed  good  and  bad  works  ac- 
cordingly. The  force  of  accumulated  karmas  led  him  to  undergo 
the  experiences  brought  about  by  them.  While  reaping  the  fruits 
of  past  karmas  he,  as  ignorant  as  ever  of  his  own  self,  worked 
again  under  the  delusion  of  a  false  relationship  between  himself 
and  the  world,  and  so  the  world  process  ran  on.  Mukti  (salvation) 
meant  the  dissociation  of  the  self  from  the  subjective  psychosis 
and  the  world.  This  condition  of  the  pure  state  of  self  was  re- 
garded as  an  unconscious  one  by  Nyaya-Vaisesika  and  Mlmarnsa, 
and  as  a  state  of  pure  intelligence  by  Sarnkhya  and  Yoga.  But 
with  Vedanta  the  case  is  different,  for  it  held  that  the  world  as 
such  has  no  real  existence  at  all,  but  is  only  an  illusory  imagina- 
tion which  lasts  till  the  moment  when  true  knowledge  is  acquired. 
As  soon  as  we  come  to  know  that  the  one  truth  is  the  self,  the 
Brahman,  all  our  illusory  perceptions  representing  the  world  as 
a  field  of  experience  cease.  This  happens  not  because  the  con- 
nections of  the  self  with  the  world  cease,  but  because  the  appear- 
ance of  the  world  process  does  not  represent  the  ultimate  and 
highest  truth  about  it.  All  our  notions  about  the  abiding 
diversified  world  (lasting  though  they  may  be  from  beginningless 
time)  are  false  in  the  sense  that  they  do  not  represent  the  real 
truth  about  it.  We  not  only  do  not  know  what  we  ourselves 
really  are,  but  do  not  also  know  what  the  world  about  us  is. 
We  take  our  ordinary  experiences  of  the  world  as  representing 


x]  World-appearance  as  Illusion  441 

it  correctly,  and  proceed  on  our  career  of  daily  activity.  It  is  no 
doubt  true  that  these  experiences  show  us  an  established  order 
having  its  own  laws,  but  this  does  not  represent  the  real  truth. 
They  are  true  only  in  a  relative  sense,  so  long  as  they  appear  to 
be  so;  for  the  moment  the  real  truth  about  them  and  the  self  is 
comprehended  all  world-appearances  become  unreal,  and  that  one 
truth,  the  Brahman,  pure  being,  bliss,  intelligence,  shines  forth  as 
the  absolute — the  only  truth  in  world  and  man.  The  world-ap- 
pearance as  experienced  by  us  is  thus  often  likened  to  the 
illusory  perception  of  silver  in  a  conch-shell;  for  the  moment 
the  perception  appears  to  be  true  and  ^he  man  runs  to  pick 
it  up,  as  if  the  conch-shell  were  a  real  piece  of  silver;  but 
as  soon  as  he  finds  out  the  truth  that  this  is  only  a  piece  of 
conch-shell,  he  turns  his  back  on  it  and  is  no  longer  deluded 
by  the  appearance  or  again  attracted  towards  it.  The  illusion 
of  silver  is  inexplicable  in  itself,  for  it  was  true  for  all  pur- 
poses so  long  as  it  persisted,  but  when  true  knowledge  was 
acquired,  it  forthwith  vanished.  This  world-appearance  will  also 
vanish  when  the  true  knowledge  of  reality  dawns.  When  false 
knowledge  is  once  found  to  be  false  it  cannot  return  again. 
The  Upanisads  tell  us  that  he  who  sees  the  many  here  is 
doomed.  The  one,  the  Brahman,  alone  is  true;  all  else  is  but 
delusion  of  name  and  form.  Other  systems  believed  that  even 
after  emancipation,  the  world  would  continue  as  it  is,  that 
there  was  nothing  illusory  in  it,  but  I  could  not  have  any 
knowledge  of  it  because  of  the  absence  of  the  instruments  by 
the  processes  of  which  knowledge  was  generated.  The  Sam- 
khya  purusa  cannot  know  the  world  when  the  buddhi-stufif 
is  dissociated  from  it  and  merged  in  the  prakrti,  the  Mimarnsa 
and  the  Nyaya  soul  is  also  incapable  of  knowing  the  world 
after  emancipation,  as  it  is  then  dissociated  from  manas.  But 
the  Vedanta  position  is  quite  distinct  here.  We  cannot  know 
the  world,  for  when  the  right  knowledge  dawns,  the  percep- 
tion of  this  world-appearance  proves  itself  to  be  false  to  the 
person  who  has  witnessed  the  truth,  the  Brahman.  An  illusion 
cannot  last  when  the  truth  is  known;  what  is  truth  is  known  to 
us,  but  what  is  illusion  is  undemonstrable,  unspeakable,  and 
indefinite.  The  illusion  runs  on  from  beginningless  time;  we  do 
not  know  how  it  is  related  to  truth,  the  Brahman,  but  we  know 
that  when  the  truth  is  once  known  the  false  knowledge  of  this 


442  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

world -appearance  disappears  once  for  all.  No  intermediate  link 
is  necessary  to  effect  it,  no  mechanical  dissociation  of  buddhi  or 
manas,  but  just  as  by  finding  out  the  glittering  piece  to  be  a  conch- 
shell  the  illusory  perception  of  silver  is  destroyed,  so  this  illusory 
perception  of  world-appearance  is  also  destroyed  by  a  true 
knowledge  of  the  reality,  the  Brahman.  The  Upanisads  held 
that  reality  or  truth  was  one,  and  there  was  "no  many"  anywhere, 
and  Safikara  explained  it  by  adding  that  the  "many"  was  merely 
an  illusion,  and  hence  did  not  exist  in  reality  and  was  bound 
to  disappear  when  the  truth  was  known.  The  world-appearance 
is  maya  (illusion).  This  is  what  Sankara  emphasizes  in  ex- 
pounding his  constructive  system  of  the  Upanisad  doctrine. 
The  question  is  sometimes  asked,  how  the  maya  becomes  asso- 
ciated with  Brahman.  But  Vedanta  thinks  this  question  illegiti- 
mate, for  this  association  did  not  begin  in  time  either  with 
reference  to  the  cosmos  or  with  reference  to  individual  persons. 
In  fact  there  is  no  real  association,  for  the  creation  of  illusion 
does  not  affect  the  unchangeable  truth.  Maya  or  illusion  is  no 
real  entity,  it  is  only  false  knowledge  {avidya)  that  makes  the 
appearance,  which  vanishes  when  the  reality  is  grasped  and  found. 
Maya  or  avidya  has  an  apparent  existence  only  so  long  as  it 
lasts,  but  the  moment  the  truth  is  known  it  is  dissolved.  It  is 
not  a  real  entity  in  association  with  which  a  real  world-appear- 
ance has  been  brought  into  permanent  existence,  for  it  only  has 
existence  so  long  as  we  are  deluded  by  it  {prdtitika-sattd). 
Maya  therefore  is  a  category  which  baffles  the  ordinary  logical 
division  of  existence  and  non-existence  and  the  principle  of  ex- 
cluded middle.  For  the  maya  can  neither  be  said  to  be  "is"  nor 
"is  not"  {tattvdnyatvdbhydm  anirvacamyd).  It  cannot  be  said  that 
such  a  logical  category  does  not  exist,  for  all  our  dream  and 
illusory  cognitions  demonstrate  it  to  us.  They  exist  as  they  are 
perceived,  but  they  do  not  exist  since  they  have  no  other  inde- 
pendent existence  than  the  fact  of  their  perception.  If  it  has  any 
creative  function,  that  function  is  as  illusive  as  its  own  nature,  for 
the  creation  only  lasts  so  long  as  the  error  lasts.  Brahman,  the 
truth,  is  not  in  any  way  sullied  or  affected  by  association  with 
maya,  for  there  can  be  no  association  of  the  real  with  the  empty, 
the  maya,  the  illusory.  It  is  no  real  association  but  a  mere 
appearance. 


x]  Nature  of  World-appearance  443 

In  what  sense  is  the  world-appearance  false? 

The  world  is  said  to  be  false — a  mere  product  of  maya.  The 
falsehood  of  this  world-appearance  has  been  explained  as  in- 
volved in  the  category  of  the  indefinite  which  is  neither  sat  "is" 
nor  asat  "is  not."  Here  the  opposition  of  the  "is"  and  "is  not" 
is  solved  by  the  category  of  time.  The  world-appearance  is  "is 
not,"  since  it  does  not  continue  to  manifest  itself  in  all  times,  and 
has  its  manifestation  up  to  the  moment  that  the  right  knowledge 
dawns.  It  is  not  therefore  "is  not"  in  the  sense  that  a  "castle  in 
the  air"  or  a  hare's  horn  is  "is  not,"  for  these  are  called  tuccha, 
the  absolutely  non-existent.  The  world-appearance  is  said  to  be 
"is"  or  existing,  since  it  appears  to  be  so  for  the  time  the  state  of 
ignorance  persists  in  us.  Since  it  exists  for  a  time  it  is  sat  (is), 
but  since  it  does  not  exist  for  all  times  it  is  asat  (is  not).  This 
is  the  appearance,  the  falsehood  of  the  world-appearance  {Jagat- 
prapanca)  that  it  is  neither  sat  nor  asat  in  an  absolute  sense.  Or 
rather  it  may  also  be  said  in  another  way  that  the  falsehood  of 
the  world-appearance  consists  in  this,  that  though  it  appears  to 
be  the  reality  or  an  expression  or  manifestation  of  the  reality,  the 
being,  sat,  yet  when  the  reality  is  once  rightly  comprehended,  it 
will  be  manifest  that  the  world  never  existed,  does  not  exist, 
and  will  never  exist  again.  This  is  just  what  we  find  in  an  illusory 
perception ;  when  once  the  truth  is  found  out  that  it  is  a  conch- 
shell,  we  say  that  the  silver,  though  it  appeared  at  the  time  of 
illusory  perception  to  be  what  we  saw  before  us  as  "this"  (this 
is  silver),  yet  it  never  existed  before,  does  not  now  exist,  and 
will  never  exist  again.  In  the  case  of  the  illusory  perception  of 
silver,  the  "this"  (pointing  to  a  thing  before  me)  appeared  as 
silver;  in  the  case  of  the  world-appearance,  it  is  the  being  {sat), 
the  Brahman,  that  appears  as  the  world ;  but  as  in  the  case  when 
the  "this"  before  us  is  found  to  be  a  piece  of  conch-shell,  the 
silver  is  at  once  dismissed  as  having  had  no  existence  in  the  "this" 
before  us,  so  when  the  Brahman,  the  being,  the  reality,  is  once 
directly  realized,  the  conviction  comes  that  the  world  never 
existed.  The  negation  of  the  world-appearance  however  has  no 
separate  existence  other  than  the  comprehension  of  the  identity 
of  the  real.  The  fact  that  the  real  is  realized  is  the  same  as  that 
the  world-appearance  is  negated.  The  negation  here  involved 
refers  both  to  the  thing  negated  (the  world-appearance)  and  the 


444  1^^^  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

negation  itself,  and  hence  it  cannot  be  contended  that  when  the 
conviction  of  the  negation  of  the  world  is  also  regarded  as  false 
(for  if  the  negation  is  not  false  then  it  remains  as  an  entity  different 
from  Brahman  and  hence  the  unqualified  monism  fails),  then  this 
reinstates  the  reality  of  the  world-appearance;  for  negation  of  the 
world-appearance  is  as  much  false  as  the  world-appearance  itself, 
and  hence  on  the  realization  of  the  truth  the  negative  thesis, 
that  the  world-appearance  does  not  exist,  includes  the  negation 
also  as  a  manifestation  of  world-appearance,  and  hence  the  only 
thing  left  is  the  realized  identity  of  the  truth,  the  being.  The 
peculiarity  of  this  illusion  of  world-appearance  is  this,  that  it 
appears  as  consistent  with  or  inlaid  in  the  being  {sat)  though  it 
is  not  there.  This  of  course  is  dissolved  when  right  knowledge 
dawns.  This  indeed  brings  home  to  us  the  truth  that  the  world- 
appearance  is  an  appearance  which  is  different  from  what  we 
know  as  real  {sadvilaksana);  for  the  real  is  known  to  us  as 
that  which  is  proved  by  the  pramanas,  and  which  will  never 
again  be  falsified  by  later  experience  or  other  means  of  proof. 
A  thing  is  said  to  be  true  only  so  long  as  it  is  not  contradicted ; 
but  since  at  the  dawn  of  right  knowledge  this  world-appearance 
will  be  found  to  be  false  and  non-existing,  it  cannot  be  regarded 
as  reap.  Thus  Brahman  alone  is  true,  and  the  world-appearance 
is  false;  falsehood  and  truth  are  not  contrary  entities  such 
that  the  negation  or  the  falsehood  of  falsehood  will  mean  truth. 
The  world-appearance  is  a  whole  and  in  referring  to  it  the 
negation  refers  also  to  itself  as  a  part  of  the  world-appearance 
and  hence  not  only  is  the  positive  world-appearance  false,  but 
the  falsehood  itself  is  also  false;  when  the  world-appearance  is 
contradicted  at  the  dawn  of  right  knowledge,  the  falsehood  itself 
is  also  contradicted. 

Brahman  differs  from  all  other  things  in  this  that  it  is  self- 
luminous  {svaprakdsd)  and  has  no  form ;  it  cannot  therefore  be  the 
object  of  any  other  consciousness  that  grasps  it.  All  other  things, 
ideas,  emotions,  etc.,  in  contrast  to  it  are  called  drsya  (objects  of 
consciousness),  while  it  is  the  drastd  (the  pure  consciousness  com- 
prehending all  objects).  As  soon  as  anything  is  comprehended  as 
an  expression  of  a  mental  state  {vrtti),  it  is  said  to  have  a  form  and 
it  becomes  drsya,  and  this  is  the  characteristic  of  all  objects  of 
consciousness  that  they  cannot  reveal  themselves  apart  from  being 
manifested  as  objects  of  consciousness  through  a  mental  state. 

^  See  Advaitastddhi,  Mithydtvanirtikti. 


x]  Brahman  and  the  Appearance  445 

Brahman  also,  so  long  as  it  is  understood  as  a  meaning  of  the 
Upanisad  text,  is  not  in  its  true  nature;  it  is  only  when  it  shines 
forth  as  apart  from  the  associations  of  any  form  that  it  is  svaprakasa 
and  drasta.  The  knowledge  of  the  pure  Brahman  is  devoid  of  any 
form  or  mode.  The  notion  of  drsyatva  (objectivity)  carries  with 
it  also  the  notion  o{  Jadatva  (materiality)  or  its  nature  as  non- 
consciousness  {ajndnatva)  and  non-selfness  (andtmatvd)  which 
consists  in  the  want  of  self-luminosity  of  objects  of  consciousness. 
The  relation  of  consciousness  {Jndna)  to  its  objects  cannot  be 
regarded  as  real  but  as  mere  illusory  impositions,  for  as  we  shall 
see  later,  it  is  not  possible  to  determine  the  relation  between 
knowledge  and  its  forms.  Just  as  the  silver-appearance  of  the 
conch-shell  is  not  its  own  natural  appearance,  so  the  forms  in 
which  consciousness  shows  itself  are  not  its  own  natural  essence. 
In  the  state  of  emancipation  when  supreme  bliss  {dnaiidd)  shines 
forth,  the  ananda  is  not  an  object  or  form  of  the  illuminating 
consciousness,  but  it  is  the  illumination  itself.  Whenever  there 
is  a  form  associated  with  consciousness,  it  is  an  extraneous  illusory 
imposition  on  the  pure  consciousness.  These  forms  are  different 
from  the  essence  of  consciousness,  not  only  in  this  that  they 
depend  on  consciousness  for  their  expression  and  are  themselves 
but  objects  of  consciousness,  but  also  in  this  that  they  are  all 
finite  determinations  {paricchintia),  whereas  consciousness,  the 
abiding  essence,  is  everywhere  present  without  any  limit  what- 
soever. The  forms  of  the  object  such  as  cow,  jug,  etc.  are  limited 
in  themselves  in  what  they  are,  but  through  them  all  the  pure 
being  runs  by  virtue  of  which  we  say  that  the  cow  is,  the  jug  is, 
the  pot  is.  Apart  from  this  pure  being  running  through  all  the 
individual  appearances,  there  is  no  other  class  {jdti)  such  as 
cowness  or  jugness,  but  it  is  on  this  pure  being  that  different 
individual  forms  are  illusorily  imposed  {ghatddikani  sadarthe- 
kalpitam.^  pratyekam  tadannbiddhatvena  pratlyamdtiatvdt).  So 
this  world-appearance  which  is  essentially  different  from  the 
Brahman,  the  being  which  forms  the  material  cause  on  which  it 
is  imposed,  is  false  {updddnanisthdtyantdbhdvapratiyogitvalak- 
sanamWiydtvasiddJiih — as  Citsukha  has  it). 

The  nature  of  the  world-appearance,  phenomena. 

The  world-appearance  is  not  however  so  illusory  as  the  per- 
ception of  silver  in  the  conch-shell,  for  the  latter  type  of  worldly 
illusions  is  called  prdtibhdsika,  as  they  are  contradicted  by  other 


446  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

laterexperiences, whereas  the  illusion  of  world-appearance  is  never 
contradicted  in  this  worldly  stage  and  is  thus  called  vyavahdrika 
(from  vyavahdra,  practice,  i.e.  that  on  which  is  based  all  our 
practical  movements).  So  long  as  the  right  knowledge  of  the 
Brahman  as  the  only  reality  does  not  dawn,  the  world-appearance 
runs  on  in  an  orderly  manner  uncontradicted  by  the  accumulated 
experience  of  all  men,  and  as  such  it  must  be  held  to  be  true. 
It  is  only  because  there  comes  such  a  stage  in  which  the  world- 
appearance  ceases  to  manifest  itself  that  we  have  to  say  that  from 
the  ultimate  and  absolute  point  of  view  the  world-appearance  is 
false  and  unreal.  As  against  this  doctrine  of  the  Vedanta  it  is 
sometimes  asked  how,  as  we  see  the  reality  {sattva)  before  us, 
we  can  deny  that  it  has  truth.  To  this  the  Vedanta  answers 
that  the  notion  of  reality  cannot  be  derived  from  the  senses,  nor 
can  it  be  defined  as  that  which  is  the  content  of  right  knowledge, 
for  we  cannot  have  any  conception  of  right  knowledge  without 
a  conception  of  reality,  and  no  conception  of  reality  without  a 
conception  of  right  knowledge.  The  conception  of  reality  com- 
prehends within  it  the  notions  of  unalterability,  absoluteness,  and 
independence,  which  cannot  be  had  directly  from  experience, 
as  this  gives  only  an  appearance  but  cannot  certify  its  truth. 
Judged  from  this  point  of  view  it  will  be  evident  that  the  true 
reality  in  all  our  experience  is  the  one  self-luminous  flash  of 
consciousness  which  is  all  through  identical  with  itself  in  all  its 
manifestations  of  appearance.  Our  present  experience  of  the 
world-appearance  cannot  in  any  way  guarantee  that  it  will  not 
be  contradicted  at  some  later  stage.  What  really  persists  in  all 
experience  is  the  being  {sat)  and  not  its  forms.  This  being  that 
is  associated  with  all  our  experience  is  not  a  universal  genus  nor 
merely  the  individual  appearance  of  the  moment,  but  it  is  the 
being,  the  truth  which  forms  the  substratum  of  all  objective  events 
and  appearances  {ekenaiva  sarvdnugatena  sarvatra  satpratitih). 
Things  are  not  existent  because  they  possess  the  genus  of  being 
{sat)  as  Nyaya  supposes,  but  they  are  so  because  they  are  them- 
selves but  appearance  imposed  on  one  identical  being  as  the  basis 
and  ground  of  all  experience.  Being  is  thus  said  to  be  the  basis 
{adhisthdna)  on  which  the  illusions  appear.  This  being  is  not 
different  with  different  things  but  one  in  all  appearances.  Our 
perceptions  of  the  world-appearance  could  have  been  taken  as  a 
guarantee  of  their  reality,  if  the  reality  which  is  supposed  of  them 


x]  World-appearance  not  ultiynately  true  447 

could  be  perceived  by  the  senses,  and  if  inference  and  sruti  (scrip- 
tures) did  not  point  the  other  way.  Perception  can  of  course  in- 
validate inference,  but  it  can  do  so  only  when  its  own  validity 
has  been  ascertained  in  an  undoubted  and  uncontested  manner. 
But  this  is  not  the  case  with  our  perceptions  of  the  world-ap- 
pearance, for  our  present  perceptions  cannot  prove  that  these 
will  never  be  contradicted  in  future,  and  inference  and  sruti  are 
also  against  it.  The  mere  fact  that  I  perceive  the  world-appearance 
cannot  prove  that  what  I  perceive  is  true  or  real,  if  it  is  contradicted 
by  inference.  We  all  perceive  the  sun  to  be  small,  but  our  per- 
ception in  this  case  is  contradicted  by  inference  and  we  have 
hence  to  admit  that  our  perceptions  are  erroneous.  We  depend 
{upajivyd)  indeed  for  all  our  transactions  on  perception,  but  such 
dependence  cannot  prove  that  that  on  which  we  depend  is  ab- 
solutely valid.  Validity  or  reality  can  only  be  ascertained  by 
proper  examination  and  enquiry  {pariksd),  which  may  convince 
us  that  there  is  no  error  in  it.  True  it  is  that  by  the  universal 
testimony  of  our  contemporaries  and  by  the  practical  fruition  and 
realization  of  our  endeavours  in  the  external  world,  it  is  proved 
beyond  doubt  that  the  world-appearance  before  us  is  a  reality. 
But  this  sort  of  examination  and  enquiry  cannot  prove  to  us  with 
any  degree  of  satisfaction  that  the  world-appearance  will  never 
be  contradicted  at  any  time  or  at  any  stage.  The  Vedanta  also 
admits  that  our  examination  and  enquiry  prove  to  us  that  the 
world-appearance  now  exists  as  it  appears ;  it  only  denies  that  it 
cannot  continue  to  exist  for  all  times,  and  a  time  will  come  when 
to  the  emancipated  person  the  world-appearance  will  cease  to 
exist.  The  experience,  observation,  and  practical  utility  of  the 
objects  as  perceived  by  us  cannot  prove  to  us  that  these  will 
never  be  contradicted  at  any  future  time.  Our  perception  of  the 
world-appearance  cannot  therefore  disprove  the  Vedanta  inference 
that  the  world-appearance  is  false,  and  it  will  demonstrate  itself 
to  be  so  at  the  time  when  the  right  knowledge  of  Brahman  as 
one  dawns  in  us.  The  testimony  of  the  Upanisads  also  contradicts 
the  perception  which  grasps  the  world-appearance  in  its  manifold 
aspect. 

Moreover  we  are  led  to  think  that  the  world-appearance  is 
false,  for  it  is  not  possible  for  us  to  discover  any  true  relation 
between  the  consciousness  {drk)  and  the  objects  of  consciousness 
{drsya).    Consciousness  must  be  admitted  to  have  some  kind  of 


448  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

connection  with  the  objects  which  it  illumines,  for  had  it  not  been 
so  there  could  be  any  knowledge  at  any  time  irrespective  of  its 
connections  with  the  objects.  But  it  is  not  possible  to  imagine 
any  kind  of  connection  between  consciousness  and  its  objects,  for 
it  can  neither  be  contact  {samyogd)  nor  inherence  {samavdyd) ; 
and  apart  from  these  two  kinds  of  connections  we  know  of  no 
other.  We  say  that  things  are  the  objects  of  our  consciousness, 
but  what  is  meant  by  it  is  ii*ideed  difficult  to  define.  It  cannot 
be  that  objectivity  of  consciousness  means  that  a  special  effect 
like  the  jnatata  of  Mlmarnsa  is^'produced  upon  the  object,  for  such 
an  effect  is  not  admi.^ible  or  perceivable  in  any  way;  nor  can 
objectivity  also  mean  any  practical  purpose  (of  being  useful  to  us) 
associated  with  the  object  as  Prabhakara  thinks,  for  there  are 
many  things  which  are  the  objects  of  our  consciousness  but  not 
considered  as  useful  (e.g.  the  sky).  Objectivity  also  cannot  mean 
that  the  thing  is  the  object  of  the  thought-movement  {jnd?ta- 
kdrand)  involved  in  knowledge,  for  this  can  only  be  with  reference 
to  objects  present  to  the  perceiver,  and  cannot  apply  to  objects 
of  past  time  about  which  one  may  be  conscious,  for  if  the  thing  is 
not  present  how  can  it  be  made  an  object  of  thought-movement  ? 
Objectivity  further  cannot  mean  that  the  things  project  their  own 
forms  on  the  knowledge  and  are  hence  called  objects,  for  though 
this  may  apply  in  the  case  of  perception,  it  cannot  be  true  of 
inference,  where  the  object  of  consciousness  is  far  away  and  does 
not  mould  consciousness  after  its  own  form.  Thus  in  whatever 
way  we  may  try  to  conceive  manifold  things  existing  separately 
and  becoming  objects  of  consciousness  we  fail.  We  have  also 
seen  that  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  any  kind  of  relation  sub- 
sisting between  objects  and  consciousness,  and  hence  it  has  to  be 
admitted  that  the  imposition  of  the  world-appearance  is  after  all 
nothing  but  illusory. 

Now  though  all  things  are  but  illusory  impositions  on  con- 
sciousness yet  for  the  illumination  of  specific  objects  it  is  admitted 
even  by  Vedanta  that  this  can  only  take  place  through  specific 
sense-contact  and  particular  mental  states  {vrtti)  or  modes;  but 
if  that  be  so  why  not  rather  admit  that  this  can  take  place 
even  on  the  assumption  of  the  absolute  reality  of  the  manifold 
external  world  without  ?  The  answer  that  the  Vedanta  gives  to 
such  a  question  is  this,  that  the  phenomenon  of  illumination  has 
not  to  undergo  any  gradual  process,  for  it  is  the  work  of  one 


x]  Consciousness  as  Illumination  449 

flash  like  the  work  of  the  Hght  of  a  lamp  in  removing  darkness: 
so  it  is  not  possible  that  the  external  reality  should  have  to 
pass  through  any  process  before  consciousness  could  arise;  what 
happens  is  simply  this,  that  the  reality  {sat)  which  subsists  in  all 
things  as  the  same  iderttical  one  reveals  the  object  as  soon  as  its 
veil  is  removed  by  association  with  the  vrtti  (mental  mould  or 
state).  It  is  like  a  light  which  directly  and  immediately  illuminates 
everything  with  which  it  comes  into  relation.  Such  an  illumina- 
tion of  objects  by  its  underlying  reality  would  have  been  con- 
tinuous if  there  were  no  veils  or  covers,  but  that  is  not  so  as  the 
reality  is  hidden  by  the  veil  of  ajfiana  (nescience).  This  veil  is 
removed  as  soon  as  the  light  of  consciousness  shines  through  a 
mental  mould  or  vrtti,  and  as  soon  as  it  is  removed  the  thing 
shines  forth.  Even  before  the  formation  of  the  vrtti  the  illusory 
impositions  on  the  reality  had  still  been  continuing  objectively, 
but  it  could  not  be  revealed  as  it  was  hidden  by  ajfiana  which  is 
removed  by  the  action  of  the  corresponding  vrtti ;  and  as  soon  as 
the  veil  is  removed  the  thing  shines  forth  in  its  true  light.  The 
action  of  the  senses,  eye,  etc.  serves  but  to  modify  the  vrtti  of  the 
mind,  and  the  vrtti  of  the  mind  once  formed,  the  corresponding 
ajfiana  veil  which  was  covering  the  corresponding  specific  part  of 
the  world-appearance  is  removed,  and  the  illumination  of  the 
object  which  was  already  present,  being  divested  of  the  veil,  shows 
itself  forth.  The  illusory  creations  were  there,  but  they  could  not 
be  manifested  on  account  of  the  veil  of  nescience.  As  soon  as  the 
veil  is  removed  by  the  action  of  the  vrtti  the  light  of  reality  shows 
the  corresponding  illusory  creations.  So  consciousness  in  itself 
is  the  ever-shining  light  of  reality  which  is  never  generated  but 
ever  exists ;  errors  of  perception  (e.g.  silver  in  the  conch-shell) 
take  place  not  because  the  dosa  consisting  of  the  defect  of  the 
eye,  the  glaze  of  the  object  and  such  other  elements  that  con- 
tributed to  the  illusion,  generated  the  knowledge,  but  because  it 
generated  a  wrong  vrtti.  It  is  because  of  the  generation  of  the 
wrong  vrtti  that  the  manifestation  is  illusory.  In  the  illusion 
"this  is  silver"  as  when  we  mistake  the  conch-shell  for  the  silver, 
it  is  the  cit,  consciousness  or  reality  as  underlying  the  object 
represented  to  us  by  "this"  or  ''idam"  that  is  the  basis  {adhisthdna) 
of  the  illusion  of  silver.  The  cause  of  error  is  our  nescience  or 
non-cognition  {ajhdnd)  of  it  in  the  form  of  the  conch-shell,  whereas 
the  right  knowledge  is  the  cognition  of  it  as  conch-shell.    The 

D.  29 


450  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

basis  is  not  in  the  content  of  my  knowledge  as  manifested  in  my 
mental    state   {vrtti),  so  that  the  illusion   is   not  of  the   form 
that  the  "knowledge  is  silver"  but  of  "this  is  silver."    Objective 
phenomena  as  such  have  reality  as  their  basis,  whereas  the  ex- 
pression of  illumination  of  them  as  states  of  knowledge  is  made 
through  the  cit  being  manifested  through  the  mental  mould  or 
states.    Without  the  vrtti  there  is  no  illuminating  knowledge. 
Phenomenal  creations  are  there  in  the  world  moving  about  as 
shadowy  forms  on  the  unchangeable  basis  of  one  cit  or  reality, 
but  this  basis,  this  light  of  reality,  can  only  manifest  these  forms 
when  the  veil  of  nescience  covering  them  is  temporarily  removed 
by  their  coming  in  touch  with  a  mental  mould  or  mind-modifica- 
tion {vrtti).    It  is  sometimes  said  that  since  all  illumination  of 
knowledge  must  be  through  the  mental  states  there  is  no  other 
entity  of  pure    consciousness   apart    from    what   is  manifested 
through  the  states.    This  Vedanta  does  not  admit,  for  it  holds 
that   it  is  necessary  that  before   the  operation   of  the  mental 
states  can  begin  to  interpret  reality,  reality  must  already  be 
there  and  this  reality  is  nothing  but  pure  consciousness.    Had 
there  been  no  reality  apart  from  the  manifesting  states  of  know- 
ledge, the  validity  of  knowledge  would  also  cease;  so  it  has  to 
be  admitted  that  there  is  the  one  eternal  self-luminous  reality 
untouched  by  the  characteristics  of  the  mental  states,  which  are 
material  and  suffer  origination  and  destruction.    It  is  this  self- 
luminous    consciousness   that    seems    to   assume  diverse  forms 
in  connection  with  diverse  kinds  of  associations  or  limitations 
{upddhi).   It  manifests  ajndna  (nescience)  and  hence  does  not  by 
itself  remove  the  ajnana,  except  when  it  is  reflected  through  any 
specific  kind  of  vrtti.    There  is  of  course  no  difference,  no  inner 
and  outer  varieties  between  the  reality,  the  pure  consciousness 
which  is  the  essence,  the  basis  and  the  ground  of  all  phenomenal 
appearances  of  the  objective  world,  and  the  consciousness  that 
manifests  itself  through  the  mental  states.    There  is  only  one 
identical  pure  consciousness  or  reality,  which  is  at  once  the  basis 
of  the  phenomena  as  well  as  their  interpreter  by  a  reflection 
through  the  mental  states  or  vrttis. 

The  phenomena  or  objects  called  the  drsya  can  only  be  de- 
termined in  their  various  forms  and  manifestations  but  not  as 
to  their  ultimate  reality;  there  is  no  existence  as  an  entity  of 
any  relation  such  as  samyoga  (contact)  or  samavaya  (inherence) 


x]        Brahman,  the  ground  of  Illusory  Impositions     451 

between  them  and  the  pure  consciousness  called  the  drk  ;  for  the 
truth  is  this,  that  the  drk  (perceiver)  and  the  drsya  (perceived) 
have  one  identical  reality;  the  forms  of  phenomena  are  but 
illusory  creations  on  it. 

It  is  sometimes  objected  that  in  the  ordinary  psychological 
illusion  such  as  "this  is  silver,"  the  knowledge  of  "this"  as  a  thing 
is  only  of  a  general  and  indefinite  nature,  for  it  is  perceived 
as  a  thing  but  its  special  characteristics  as  a  conch-shell  are  not 
noticed,  and  thus  the  illusion  is  possible.  But  in  Brahman  or  pure 
consciousness  there  are  neither  definite  nor  indefinite  charac- 
teristics of  any  kind,  and  hence  it  cannot  be  the  ground  of  any 
illusion  as  the  piece  of  conch-shell  perceived  indefinitely  as  a  mere 
"this"  can  be.  The  answer  of  Vedanta  is  that  when  the  Brahman 
stands  as  the  ground  {adhisthdnd)  of  the  world-appearance  its 
characteristic  as  sat  or  real  only  is  manifested,  whereas  its  special 
character  as  pure  and  infinite  bliss  is  never  noticed ;  or  rather  it 
may  be  said  that  the  illusion  of  world-appearance  is  possible 
because  the  Brahman  in  its  true  and  correct  nature  is  never  re- 
vealed to  us  in  our  objective  consciousness;  when  I  say  "the  jug  is," 
the  "isness,"  or  "being,"  does  not  shine  in  its  purity,  but  only  as 
a  characteristic  of  the  jug-form,  and  this  is  the  root  of  the  illusion. 
In  all  our  experiences  only  the  aspect  of  Brahman  as  real  shines 
forth  in  association  with  the  manifold  objects,  and  therefore  the 
Brahman  in  its  true  nature  being  unknown  the  illusion  is  made 
possible.  It  is  again  objected  that  since  the  world-appearance 
can  serve  all  practical  purposes,  it  must  be  considered  as  real  and 
not  illusory.  But  the  Vedanta  points  out  that  even  by  illusory 
perceptions  practical  effects  are  seen  to  take  place ;  the  illusory 
perception  of  a  snake  in  a  rope  causes  all  the  fear  that  a  real  snake 
could  do  ;  even  in  dreams  we  feel  happy  and  sad,  and  dreams 
may  be  so  bad  as  to  affect  or  incapacitate  the  actual  physical 
functions  and  organs  of  a  man.  So  it  is  that  the  past  impressions 
imbedded  in  us  continuing  from  beginningless  time  are  sufficient 
to  account  for  our  illusory  notions,  just  as  the  impressions  pro- 
duced in  actual  waking  life  account  for  the  dream  creations. 
According  to  the  good  or  bad  deeds  that  a  man  has  done  in 
previous  lives  and  according  to  the  impressions  or  potencies 
{saviskdra)  of  his  past  lives  each  man  has  a  particular  kind  of 
world-experience  for  himself  and  the  impressions  of  one  cannot 
affect  the  formation  of  the  illusory  experience  of  the  other.    But 

29 — 2 


452  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

the  experience  of  the  world-appearance  is  not  wholly  a  subjective 
creation  for  each  individual,  for  even  before  his  cognition  the 
phenomena  of  world-appearance  were  running  in  some  unknow- 
able state  of  existence  {svena  adhyastasya  samskdrasya  viyaddd- 
yadhydsajanakatvopapatteh  tatpratityabJidvepi  tadadhydsasya pur- 
vam  sattvdt  krtsnasydpi  vyavahdrikapaddrthasya  ajhdtasattvd- 
Bhyupagamdt).  It  is  again  sometimes  objected  that  illusion  is 
produced  by  malobserved  similarity  between  the  ground  {adhi- 
sthdnd)  and  the  illusory  notion  as  silver  in  "this  is  silver,"  but 
no  such  similarity  is  found  between  the  Brahman  and  the  world- 
appearance.  To  this  Vedanta  says  that  similarity  is  not  an  in- 
dispensable factor  in  the  production  of  an  illusion  (e.g.  when  a 
white  conch  is  perceived  as  yellow  owing  to  the  defect  of  the  eye 
through  the  influence  of  bile  or  pitta).  Similarity  helps  the  pro- 
duction of  illusion  by  rousing  up  the  potencies  of  past  impressions 
or  memories ;  but  this  rousing  of  past  memories  may  as  well  be 
done  by  adrsta — the  unseen  power  of  our  past  good  or  bad  deeds. 
In  ordinary  illusion  some  defect  is  necessary  but  the  illusion  of 
this  world-appearance  is  beginningless,  and  hence  it  awaits  no 
other  dosa  (defect)  than  the  avidya  (nescience)  which  constitutes 
the  appearance.  Here  avidya  is  the  only  dosa  and  Brahman  is  the 
only  adhisthana  or  ground.  Had  there  not  been  the  Brahman,  the 
self-luminous  as  the  adhisthana,  the  illusory  creations  could  not 
have  been  manifested  at  all.  The  cause  of  the  direct  perception 
of  illusion  is  the  direct  but  indefinite  perception  of  the  adhisthana. 
Hence  where  the  adhisthana  is  hidden  by  the  veil  of  avidya,  the 
association  with  mental  states  becomes  necessary  for  removing 
the  veil  and  manifesting  thereby  the  self-luminous  adhisthana. 
As  soon  as  the  adhisthana,  the  ground,  the  reality,  the  blissful 
self-luminous  Brahman  is  completely  realized  the  illusions  dis- 
appear. The  disappearance  of  the  phenomena  means  nothing 
more  than  the  realization  of  the  self-luminous  Brahman. 

The  Definition  of  Ajnana  (nescience). 

Ajnana  the  cause  of  all  illusions  is  defined  as  that  which  is 
beginningless,  yet  positive  and  removable  by  knowledge  {anddi- 
bhdvarupatve  sati  jndnanivartyatvavt).  Though  it  manifests  itself 
in  all  ordinary  things  (veiled  by  it  before  they  become  objects  of 
perception)  which  have  a  beginning  in  time,  yet  it  itself  has  no 
beginning,  for  it  is  associated  with  the  pure  consciousness  which 


x]  Nature  of  A j nana  453 

is  beginningless.    Again  though  it  has  been  described  as  positive 
{bhdvarupd)  it  can  very  well  constitute  the  essence  of  negation 
{abhdva)  too,  for  the  positivity  {bJidvatva)  does  not  mean  here  the 
opposite  of  abhava  (negation)  but  notes  merely  its  difference  from 
abhava  {abhdva-vilaksanatvamdtram  vivaksitam).    Ajfiana  is  not 
a  positive  entity  {bhdva)  like  any  other  positive  entity,  but  it  is 
called  positive  simply  because  it  is  not  a  mere  negation  {abhdva). 
It  is  a  category  which  is  believed  neither  to  be  positive  in  the 
ordinary  sense  nor  negative,  but  a  third  one  which  is  different 
both  from  position  as  well  as  from  negation.    It  is  sometimes 
objected  that  ajfiana  is  a  mere  illusory  imagination  of  the  moment 
caused  by  defect  {dosa)  and  hence  it  cannot  be  beginningless 
{anddi)\  but  Vedanta  holds  that  the  fact  that  it  is  an  imagination 
or  rather  imposition,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  is  merely 
a  temporary  notion  produced  by  the  defects  ;  for  it  could  have 
been  said  to  be  a  temporary  product  of  the  moment  if  the  ground 
as  well  as  the  illusory  creation  associated  with  it  came  into  being 
for  the  moment,  but  this  is  not  the  case  here,  as  the  cit,  the 
ground  of  illusion,  is  ever-present  and  the  ajfiana  therefore  being 
ever  associated  with  it  is  also  beginningless.    The  ajfiana  is  the 
indefinite  which  is  veiling  everything,  and  as  such  is  different 
from  the  definite  or  the  positive  and  the  negative.    Though  it  is 
beginningless  yet  it  can  be  removed  by  knowledge,  for  to  have 
a  beginning  or  not  to  have  it  does  not  in  any  way  determine 
whether  the  thing  is  subject  to  dissolution  or  not  for  the  dis- 
solution of  a  thing  depends  upon  the  presence  of  the  thing  which 
can  cause  it ;  and  it  is  a  fact  that  when  knowledge  comes  the 
illusion  is  destroyed ;  it  does  not  matter  whether  the  cause  which 
produced  the  illusion  was  beginningless  or  not.    Some  Vedantists 
however  define  ajiiana  as  the  substance  constituting  illusion,  and 
say  that  though  it  is  not  a  positive  entity  yet  it  may  be  regarded 
as  forming  the  substance  of  the  illusion ;  it  is  not  necessary  that    v 
only  a  positive  entity  should  be  the  matter  of  any  thing,  for  what , 
is  necessary  for  the  notion  of  a  material  cause  {updddna)  is  this, 
that  it  should  continue  or  persist  as  the  same  in  all  changes  of 
effects.    It  is  not  true  that  only  what  is  positive  can  persist  in 
and  through  the  effects  which  are  produced  in  the  time  process. 
Illusion  is  unreal  and  it  is  not  unnatural  that  the  ajfiana  which 
also  is  unreal  should  be  the  cause  of  it. 


454  The  Sankara  School  of  Veddnta  [cii. 

Ajiiana  established  by  Perception  and  Inference. 

Ajnana  defined  as  the  indefinite  which  is  neither  positive  nor 
negative  is  also  directly  experienced  by  us  in  such  perceptions 
as  "  I  do  not  know,  or  I  do  not  know  myself  or  anybody  else," 
or  "  I  do  not  know  what  you  say,"  or  more  particularly  "  I  had 
been  sleeping  so  long  happily  and  did  not  know  anything."  Such 
perceptions  point  to  an  object  which  has  no  definite  characteristics, 
and  which  cannot  properly  be  said  to  be  either  positive  or  negative. 
It  may  be  objected  that  the  perception  "  I  do  not  know"  is  not 
the  perception  of  the  indefinite,  the  ajnana,  but  merely  the  nega- 
tion of  knowledge.  To  this  Vedanta  says  that  had  it  been  the 
perception  of  a  negation  merely,  then  the  negation  must  have 
been  associated  with  the  specific  object  to  which  it  applied. 
A  negation  must  imply  the  thing  negatived ;  in  fact  negation 
generally  appears  as  a  substantive  with  the  object  of  negation 
as  a  qualifying  character  specifying  the  nature  of  the  negation. 
But  the  perception  "I  do  not  know  or  I  had  no  knowledge"  does 
not  involve  the  negation  of  any  particular  knowledge  of  any 
specific  object,  but  the  knowledge  of  an  indefinite  objectless 
ignorance.  Such  an  indefinite  ajnana  is  positive  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  certainlynot  negative,but  this  positive  indefinite  is  not  positive 
in  the  same  sense  in  which  other  definite  entities  are  called  positive, 
for  it  is  merely  the  characterless,  passive  indefinite  showing  itself 
in  our  experience.  If  negation  meant  only  a  general  negation, 
and  if  the  perception  of  negation  meant  in  each  case  the  per- 
ception of  a  general  negation,  then  even  where  there  is  a  jug  on 
the  ground,  one  should  perceive  the  negation  of  the  jug  on  the 
ground,  for  the  general  negation  in  relation  to  other  things  is  there. 
Thus  negation  of  a  thing  cannot  mean  the  general  notion  of  the 
negation  of  all  specific  things  ;  similarly  a  general  negation  with- 
out any  specific  object  to  which  it  might  apply  cannot  manifest 
itself  to  consciousness ;  the  notion  of  a  general  negation  of  know- 
ledge is  thus  opposed  to  any  and  every  knowledge,  so  that  if  the 
latter  is  present  the  former  cannot  be,  but  the  perception  "  I  do 
not  know  "  can  persist,  even  though  many  individual  objects  be 
known  to  us.  Thus  instead  of  saying  that  the  perception  of  "I  do 
not  know  "  is  the  perception  of  a  special  kind  of  negation,  it  is 
rather  better  to  say  that  it  is  the  perception  of  a  different  category 
namely  the  indefinite,  the  ajnana.    It  is  our  common  experience 


x]  Ajnana  not  Negation  455 

that  after  experiencing  the  indefinite  {ajndnd)  of  a  specific  type 
we  launch  forth  in  our  endeavours  to  remove  it.  So  it  has  to  be 
admitted  that  the  perception  of  the  indefinite  is  different  from  the 
perception  of  mere  negation.  The  character  of  our  perceiving 
consciousness  {sdksi)  is  such  that  both  the  root  ajnana  as  well 
as  its  diverse  forms  with  reference  to  particular  objects  as  repre- 
sented in  mental  states  {vrtti-jhdna),  are  comprehended  by  it. 
Of  course  when  the  vrttijnana  about  a  thing  as  in  ordinary 
perceptions  of  objects  comes  in,  the  ajnana  with  regard  to  it  is 
temporarily  removed,  for  the  vrttijnana  is  opposed  to  the  ajnana. 
But  so  far  as  our  own  perceiving  consciousness  {sdksi-caitanyd) 
is  conceived  it  can  comprehend  both  the  ajiiana  and  the  jflana 
(knowledge)  of  things.  It  is  thus  often  said  that  all  things  show 
themselves  to  the  perceiving  consciousness  either  as  known  or 
as  unknown.  Thus  the  perceiving  consciousness  comprehends  all 
positives  either  as  indefinite  ajiiana  or  as  states  of  knowledge 
or  as  specific  kinds  of  ajnana  or  ignorance,  but  it  is  unable  to 
comprehend  a  negation,  for  negation  {abhdvd)  is  not  a  perception, 
but  merely  the  absence  of  perception  {anupalabdhi).  Thus  when 
I  say  I  do  not  know  this,  I  perceive  the  indefinite  in  consciousness 
with  reference  to  that  thing,  and  this  is  not  the  perception  of  a 
negation  of  the  thing.  An  objection  is  sometimes  raised  from 
the  Nyaya  point  of  view  that  since  without  the  knowledge  of  a 
qualification  {visesand)  the  qualified  thing  {visista)  cannot  be 
known,  the  indefinite  about  an  object  cannot  be  present  in  con- 
sciousness without  the  object  being  known  first.  To  this  Vedanta 
replies  that  the  maxim  that  the  qualification  must  be  known 
before  the  qualified  thing  is  known  is  groundless,  for  we  can  as 
well  perceive  the  thing  first  and  then  its  qualification.  It  is  not 
out  of  place  here  to  say  that  negation  is  not  a  separate  entity, 
but  is  only  a  peculiar  mode  of  the  manifestation  of  the  positive. 
Even  the  naiyayikas  would  agree  that  in  the  expression  "  there 
is  no  negation  of  a  jug  here,"  no  separate  negation  can  be  accepted, 
for  the  jug  is  already  present  before  us.  As  there  are  distinctions 
and  differences  in  positive  entities  by  illusory  impositions,  so 
negations  are  also  distinguished  by  similar  illusory  impositions 
and  appear  as  the  negation  of  jug,  negation  of  cloth,  etc. ;  so  all 
distinctions  between  negations  are  unnecessary,  and  it  may  be 
accepted  that  negation  like  position  is  one  which  appears  as  many 
on  account  of  illusory  distinctions  and  impositions.    Thus  the 


456  The  Sankara  School  of  Veddnta  [en. 

content  of  negation  being  itself  positive,  there  is  no  reason  to 
object  that  such  perceptions  as  "  I  do  not  know "  refer  to  the 
perception  of  an  indefinite  ajfiana  in  consciousness.  So  also  the 
perception  "  I  do  not  know  what  you  say  "  is  not  the  perception 
of  negation,  for  this  would  require  that  the  hearer  should  know 
first  what  was  said  by  the  speaker,  and  if  this  is  so  then  it  is 
impossible  to  say  "  I  do  not  know  what  you  say." 

So  also  the  cognition  "  I  was  sleeping  long  and  did  not 
know  anything  "  has  to  be  admitted  as  referring  to  the  perception 
of  the  indefinite  during  sleep.  It  is  not  true  as  some  say  that 
during  sleep  there  is  no  perception,  but  what  appears  to  the 
awakened  man  as  "  I  did  not  know  anything  so  long"  is  only  an 
inference;  for,  it  is  not  possible  to  infer  from  the  pleasant  and 
active  state  of  the  senses  in  the  awakened  state  that  the  activity 
had  ceased  in  the  sleep  state  and  that  since  he  had  no  object  of 
knowledge  then,  he  could  not  know  anything;  for  there  is  no 
invariable  concomitance  between  the  pleasant  and  active  state  of 
the  senses  and  the  absence  of  objects  of  knowledge  in  the  im- 
mediately preceding  state.  During  sleep  there  is  a  mental  state 
of  the  form  of  the  indefinite,  and  during  the  awakened  state  it  is 
by  the  impression  isainskdra)  of  the  aforesaid  mental  state  of 
ajfiana  that  one  remembers  that  state  and  says  that  "  I  did  not 
perceive  anything  so  long."  The  indefinite  {ajhand)  perceived  in 
consciousness  is  more  fundamental  and  general  than  the  mere 
negation  of  knowledge  {j'ndndbhava)  and  the  two  are  so  connected 
that  though  the  latter  may  not  be  felt,  yet  it  can  be  inferred  from 
the  perception  of  the  indefinite.  The  indefinite  though  not  definite 
is  thus  a  positive  content  different  from  negation  and  is  perceived  as 
such  in  direct  and  immediate  consciousness  both  in  the  awakened 
state  as  well  as  in  the  sleeping  state. 

The  presence  of  this  ajnana  may  also  be  inferred  from  the 
manner  in  which  knowledge  of  objects  is  revealed  in  consciousness, 
as  this  always  takes  place  in  bringing  a  thing  into  consciousness 
which  was  not  known  or  rather  known  as  indefinite  before  we 
say  "  I  did  not  know  it  before,  but  I  know  it  now."  My  present 
knowledge  of  the  thing  thus  involves  the  removal  of  an  indefinite 
which  was  veiling  it  before  and  positing  it  in  consciousness,  just 
as  the  first  streak  of  light  in  utter  darkness  manifests  itself  by 
removing  the  darkness'.    Apart  from  such  an  inference  its  exist- 

*  See  Paiicapadikavivarana ,  Tattvadipana,  and  Advaitasiddhi. 


x]  Locus  of  Ajnana  457 

ence  is  also  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the  infinite  bliss  of  Brahman 
does  not  show  itself  in  its  complete  and  limitless  aspect.  If  there 
was  no  ajnana  to  obstruct,  it  would  surely  have  manifested  itself 
in  its  fullness.  Again  had  it  not  been  for  this  ajnana  there  would 
have  been  no  illusion.  It  is  the  ajnana  that  constitutes  the  sub- 
stance of  the  illusion ;  for  there  is  nothing  else  that  can  be  regarded 
as  constituting  its  substance;  certainly  Brahman  could  not,  as  it 
\is  unchangeable.  This  ajnana  is  manifested  by  the  perceiving 
consciousness  {saksi)  and  not  by  the  pure  consciousness.  The 
perceiving  consciousness  is  nothing  but  pure  intelligence  which 
reflects  itself  in  the  states  of  avidya  (ignorance). 

Locus  and  Object  of  Ajnana,  Aharnkara,  and  Antahkarana. 

This  ajflana  rests  on  the  pure  cit  or  intelligence.  This  cit  or 
Brahman  is  of  the  nature  of  pure  illumination,  but  yet  it  is  not 
opposed  to  the  ajnana  or  the  indefinite.  The  cit  becomes  opposed 
to  the  ajnana  and  destroys  it  only  when  it  is  reflected  through  the 
mental  states  {vrtti).  The  ajnana  thus  rests  on  the  pure  cit  and  not 
on  the  cit  as  associated  with  such  illusory  impositions  as  go  to 
produce  the  notion  of  ego  ''akam"  or  the  individual  soul.  Vacaspati 
Mi^ra  however  holds  that  the  ajnana  does  not  rest  on  the  pure  cit 
but  on  the  jiva  (individual  soul).  Madhava  reconciles  this  view  of 
Vacaspati  with  the  above  view,  and  says  that  the  ajnana  may  be 
regarded  as  resting  on  the  jIva  or  individual  soul  from  this  point  of 
view  that  the  obstruction  of  the  pure  cit  is  with  reference  to  the  jIva 
{Cinmdtrdsritavi  ajndnam  jlvapaksapdtitvdt  jlvdsritam  iicyate 
Vivaranaprameya,  p.  48).  The  feeling  "  I  do  not  know "  seems 
however  to  indicate  that  the  ajnana  is  with  reference  to  the  per- 
ceiving self  in  association  with  its  feeling  as  ego  or  "  I  " ;  but  this 
is  not  so ;  such  an  appearance  however  is  caused  on  account  of 
the  close  association  of  ajnana  with  antahkarana  (mind)  both  of 
which  are  in  essence  the  same  (see  Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, 
p.  48). 

The  ajftana  however  does  not  only  rest  on  the  cit,  but  it  has 
the  cit  as  its  visaya  or  object  too,  i.e.  its  manifestations  are 
with  reference  to  the  self-luminous  cit.  The  self-luminous  cit  is 
thus  the  entity  on  which  the  veiling  action  of  the  ajnana  is  noticed; 
the  veiling  action  is  manifested  not  bydestroying  the  self-luminous 
character,  nor  by  stopping  a  future  course  of  luminous  career  on 
the  part  of  the  cit,  nor  by  stopping  its  relations  with  the  visaya, 


45^  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

but  by  causing  such  an  appearance  that  the  self-luminous  cit 
seems  so  to  behave  that  we  seem  to  think  that  it  is  not  or  it  does 
not  shine  {jidsti  na  prakdsate  iti  vyavahdrak)  or  rather  there  is  no 
appearance  of  its  shining  or  luminosity.  To  say  that  Brahman  is 
hidden  by  the  ajnana  means  nothing  more  than  this,  that  it  is 
such  {tadyogyata)  that  the  ajnana  can  so  relate  itself  with  it  that 
it  appears  to  be  hidden  as  in  the  state  of  deep  sleep  and  other 
states  of  ajnana-consciousness  in  experience.  Ajnana  is  thus 
considered  to  have  both  its  locus  and  object  in  the  pure  cit.  It 
is  opposed  to  the  states  of  consciousness,  for  these  at  once  dispel 
it.  The  action  of  this  ajnana  is  thus  on  the  light  of  the  reality 
which  it  obstructs  for  us,  so  long  as  the  obstruction  is  not  dissolved 
by  the  states  of  consciousness.  This  obstruction  of  the  cit  is  not 
only  with  regard  to  its  character  as  pure  limitless  consciousness 
but  also  with  regard  to  its  character  as  pure  and  infinite  bliss; 
so  it  is  that  though  we  do  not  experience  the  indefinite  in  our 
pleasurable  feelings,  yet  its  presence  as  obstructing  the  pure  cit 
is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the  full  infinite  bliss  constituting  the 
essence  of  Brahman  is  obstructed ;  and  as  a  result  of  that  there 
is  only  an  incomplete  manifestation  of  the  bliss  in  our  phenomenal 
experiences  of  pleasure.  The  ajnana  is  one,  but  it  seems  to  obstruct 
the  pure  cit  in  various  aspects  or  modes,  with  regard  to  which  it 
may  be  said  that  the  ajnana  has  many  states  as  constituting  the 
individual  experiences  of  the  indefinite  with  reference  to  the 
diverse  individual  objects  of  experience.  These  states  of  ajnana 
are  technically  called  tulajnana  or  avasthajnana.  Any  state  of 
consciousness  (vrttijnana)  removes  a  manifestation  of  the  ajnana 
as  tulajnana  and  reveals  itself  as  the  knowledge  of  an  object. 

The  most  important  action  of  this  ajnana  as  obstructing  the 
pure  cit,  and  as  creating  an  illusory  phenomenon  is  demonstrated 
in  the  notion  of  the  ego  or  ahamkara.  This  notion  of  ahamkara 
is  a  union  of  the  true  self,  the  pure  consciousness  and  other 
associations,  such  as  the  body,  the  continued  past  experiences,  etc.; 
it  is  the  self-luminous  characterless  Brahman  that  is  found  ob- 
structed in  the  notion  of  the  ego  as  the  repository  of  a  thousand 
limitations,  characters,  and  associations.  This  illusory  creation  of 
the  notion  of  the  ego  runs  on  from  beginningless  time,  each  set 
of  previous  false  impositions  determining  the  succeeding  set  of 
impositions  and  so  on.  This  blending  of  the  unreal  associations 
held  up  in  the  mind  {antahkarand)  with  the  real,  the  false  with 


x]  Mimamsd  and  Ny  ay  a  Objections  459 

the  true,  that  is  at  the  root  of  illusion.  It  is  the  antahkarana  taken 
as  the  self-luminous  self  that  reflects  itself  in  the  cit  as  the  notion 
of  the  ego.  Just  as  when  we  say  that  the  iron  ball  (red  hot)  burns, 
there  are  two  entities  of  the  ball  and  the  fire  fused  into  one,  so 
here  also  when  I  say  "  I  perceive"  there  are  two  distinct  elements 
of  the  self  as  consciousness  and  the  mind  or  antahkarana  fused 
into  one.  The  part  or  aspect  associated  with  sorrow,  materiality, 
and  changefulness  represents  the  antahkarana,  whereas  that  which 
appears  as  the  unchangeable  perceiving  consciousness  is  the  self 
Thus  the  notion  of  ego  contains  two  parts,  one  real  and  the  other 
unreal. 

We  remember  that  this  is  distinctly  that  which  Prabhakara 
sought  to  repudiate.  Prabhakara  did  not  consider  the  self  to  be 
self-luminous,  and  held  that  such  is  the  threefold  nature  of 
thought  {triputi),  that  it  at  once  reveals  the  knowledge,  the 
object  of  knowledge,  and  the  self  He  further  said  that  the 
analogy  of  the  red-hot  iron  ball  did  not  hold,  for  the  iron  ball 
and  the  fire  are  separately  experienced,  but  the  self  and  the 
antahkarana  are  never  separately  experienced,  and  we  can 
never  say  that  these  two  are  really  different  and  only  have  an 
illusory  appearance  of  a  seeming  unity.  Perception  {anubhavd) 
is  like  a  light  which  illuminates  both  the  object  and  the  self,  and 
like  it  does  not  require  the  assistance  of  anything  else  for  the 
fulfilling  of  its  purpose.  But  the  Vedanta  objects  to  this  saying 
that  according  to  Prabhakara's  supposition  it  is  impossible  to 
discover  any  relation  between  the  self  and  the  knowledge.  If 
knowledge  can  be  regarded  as  revealing  itself,  the  self  may  as 
well  be  held  to  be  self-luminous;  the  self  and  the  knowledge 
are  indeed  one  and  the  same.  Kumarila  thinks  this  thought 
{anubhavd)  to  be  a  movement,  Nyaya  and  Prabhakara  as  a 
quality  of  the  self  \  But  if  it  were  a  movement  like  other  move- 
mentSjit  could  not  affect  itself  as  illumination.  If  it  were  a  substance 
and  atomic  in  size,  it  would  only  manifest  a  small  portion  of 
a  thing,  if  all-pervasive  then  it  wbuld  illuminate  everything, 
if  of  medium  size  it  would  depend   on    its  parts  for  its  own 

^  According  to  Nyaya  the  atman  is  conscious  only  through  association  with  con- 
sciousness, but  it  is  not  consciousness  (cit).  Consciousness  is  associated  with  it  only 
as  a  result  of  suitable  collocations.  Thus  Nydyamanjari  in  refuting  the  doctrine  of 
self-luminosity  (svaprakdia)  says  (p.  432) 

sacetanascita  yogaitadyogena  vind  jadah 
ndrthavabhdsadanyaddki  caitanyam  ndma  manmahe. 


460  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

constitution  and  not  on  the  self.  If  it  is  regarded  as  a  quality 
of  the  self  as  the  light  is  of  the  lamp,  then  also  it  has  necessarily 
to  be  supposed  that  it  was  produced  by  the  self,  for  from  what 
else  could  it  be  produced  ?  Thus  it  is  to  be  admitted  that  the 
self,  the  atman,  is  the  self-luminous  entity.  No  one  doubts  any 
of  his  knowledge,  whether  it  is  he  who  sees  or  anybody  else. 
The  self  is  thus  the  same  as  vijfiana,  the  pure  consciousness, 
which  is  always  of  itself  self-luminous^ 

Again,  though  consciousness  is  continuous  in  all  stages, 
waking  or  sleeping,  yet  ahamkara  is  absent  during  deep  sleep. 
It  is  true  that  on  waking  from  deep  sleep  one  feels  "  I  slept 
happily  and  did  not  know  anything"  :  yet  what  happens  is  this, 
that  during  deep  sleep  the  antahkarana  and  the  ahamkara  are 
altogether  submerged  in  the  ajfiana,  and  there  are  only  the 
ajnana  and  the  self;  on  waking,  this  ahamkara  as  a  state  of 
antahkarna  is  again  generated,  and  then  it  associates  the  per- 
ception of  the  ajfiana  in  the  sleep  and  originates  the  perception 
"  I  did  not  know  anything."  This  ahamkara  which  is  a  mode 
ivrtti)  of  the  antahkarana  is  thus  constituted  by  avidya,  and  is 
manifested  as  jfianasakti  (power  of  knowledge)  and  kriyas'akti 
(power  of  work).  This  kriya^akti  of  the  ahamkara  is  illusorily 
imposed  upon  the  self,  and  as  a  result  of  that  the  self  appears  to 
be  an  active  agent  in  knowing  and  willing.  The  ahamkara 
itself  is  regarded,  as  we  have  already  seen,  as  a  mode  or  vrtti  of 
the  antahkarana,  and  as  such  the  aharnkara  of  a  past  period  can 
now  be  associated;  but  even  then  the  vrtti  of  antahkarana, 
ahamkara,  may  be  regarded  as  only  the  active  side  or  aspect  of. 
the  antahkarana.  The  same  antahkarana  is  called  manas  in  its 
capacity  as  doubt,  buddhi  in  its  capacity  as  achieving  certainty  of 
knowledge,  and  citta  in  its  capacity  as  remembering-.  When  the 
pure  cit  shines  forth  in  association  with  this  antahkarana,  it  is 
called  a  jiva.  It  is  clear  from  the  above  account  that  the  ajnana 
is  not  a  mere  nothing,  but  is  the  principle  of  the  phenomena.  But 
it  cannot  stand  alone,  without  the  principle  of  the  real  to  support 
it  {dsraya);  its  own  nature  as  the  ajnana  or  indefinite  is  perceived 
directly  by  the  pure  consciousness;  its  movements  as  originating 
the  phenomena  remain  indefinite  in  themselves,  the  real  as  under- 

^  See  Nyayamakaranda,  pp.  130-140,  Citsukha  and  Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, 
PP-  53-58- 

^  See  Veddnta-paribhasd ,  p.  88,  Bombay  edition. 


x]  Indefinable  Character  of  World- appearance      46 1 

lying  these  phenomenal  movements  can  only  manifest  itself 
through  these  which  hide  it,  when  corresponding  states  arise  in 
the  antahkarana,  and  the  light  of  the  real  shines  forth  through 
these  states.  The  antahkarana  of  which  aharnkara  is  a  moment, 
is  itself  a  beginningless  system  of  ajfiana-phenomena  containing 
within  it  the  associations  and  impressions  of  past  phenomena  as 
merit,  demerit,  instincts,  etc.  from  a  beginningless  time  when  the 
jiva  or  individual  soul  began  his  career. 

Anirvacyavada  and  the  Vedanta  Dialectic. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  indefinite  ajnana  could  be 
experienced  in  direct  perception  and  according  to  Vedanta  there 
are  only  two  categories.     The  category  of  the  real,  the  self- 
luminous  Brahman,  and  the  category  of  the  indefinite.  The  latter 
has  for  its  ground  the  world-appearance,  and  is  the  principle  by 
which  the  one  unchangeable  Brahman  is  falsely  manifested  in  all 
the  diversity  of  the  manifold  world.    But  this  indefinite  which  is 
different  from  the  category  of  the  positive  and  the  negative,  has 
only  a  relative  existence  and  will  ultimately  vanish,  when  the 
true  knowledge  of  the  Brahman  dawns.    Nothing  however  can 
be  known  about  the  nature  of  this  indefinite  except  its  character 
as  indefinite.    That  all  the  phenomena  of  the  world,  the  fixed 
order  of  events,  the  infinite  variety  of  world-forms  and  names, 
all  these  are  originated  by  this  avidya,  ajnana  or  maya  is  indeed 
hardly  comprehensible.     If  it  is  indefinite  nescience,  how  can  all 
these  well-defined  forms  of  world-existence  come  out  of  it  ?    It  is 
said  to  exist  only  relatively,  and  to  have  only  a  temporary  existence 
beside  the  permanent  infinite  reality.    To  take  such  a  principle 
and  to  derive  from  it  the  mind,  matter,  and  indeed  everything 
else   except   the   pure   self-luminous    Brahman,    would    hardly 
appeal  to  our  reason.     If  this  system  of  world-order  were  only 
seeming  appearance,  with  no  other  element  of  truth  in  it  except 
pure  being,  then  it  would  be  indefensible  in  the  light  of  reason. 
It  has  been  proved  that  whatever  notions  we  have  about  the 
objective  world  are  all  self-contradictory,  and  thus  groundless  and 
false.    If  they  have  all  proceeded  from  the  indefinite  they  must 
show  this  character  when  exposed  to  discerning  criticism.    All 
categories  have  to  be  shown  to  be  so  hopelessly  confused  and  to 
be  without  any  conceivable  notion  that  though  apparent  before 
us    yet  they  crumble   into   indefiniteness  as  soon  as  they  are 


462  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

examined,  and  one  cannot  make  any  such  assertion  about  them  as 
that  they  are  or  that  they  are  not.  Such  negative  criticisms  of  our 
fundamental  notions  about  the  world-order  were  undertaken  by 
Sriharsa  and  his  commentator  and  follower  Citsukha.  It  is  im- 
possible within  the  limits  of  this  chapter  to  give  a  complete 
account  of  their  criticisms  of  our  various  notions  of  reality. 
I  shall  give  here  only  one  example. 

Let  us  take  the  examination  of  the  notion  of  difference 
{bhedd)  from  Khandanakhandakhddya.  Four  explanations  are 
possible  of  the  notion  of  difference:  (i)  the  difference  may  be 
perceived  as  appearing  in  its  own  characteristics  in  our  ex- 
perience {svariipa-bheda)  as  Prabhakara  thinks  ;  (2)  the  difference 
between  two  things  is  nothing  but  the  absence  of  one  in  the  other 
ianyonydbhdva),  as  some  Naiyayikas  and  Bhattas  think  ;  (3)  dif- 
ference means  divergence  of  characteristics  {vaidharniya)  as  the 
Vaisesikas  speak  of  it ;  (4)  difference  may-  be  a  separate  quality 
in  itself  like  the  prthaktva  quality  of  Nyaya.  Taking  the  first 
alternative,  we  see  that  it  is  said  that  the  jug  and  the  cloth 
represent  in  themselves  by  their  very  form  and  existence  their 
mutual  difference  from  each  other.  But  if  by  perceiving  the 
cloth  we  perceive  only  its  difference  from  the  jug  as  the  charac- 
teristic of  the  cloth,  then  the  jug  also  must  have  penetrated 
into  the  form  of  the  cloth,  otherwise  how  could  we  perceive 
in  the  cloth  its  characteristics  as  the  difference  from  the  jug? 
i.e.  if  difference  is  a  thing  which  can  be  directly  perceived  by 
the  senses,  then  as  difference  would  naturally  mean  difference 
from  something  else,  it  is  expected  that  something  else  such 
as  jug,  etc.  from  which  the  difference  is  perceived  must  also 
be  perceived  directly  in  the  perception  of  the  cloth.  But  if 
the  perception  of  difference  between  two  things  has  penetrated 
together  in  the  same  identical  perception,  then  the  self-contra- 
diction becomes  apparent.  Difference  as  an  entity  is  not  what 
we  perceive  in  the  cloth,  for  difference  means  difference  from 
something  else,  and  if  that  thing  from  which  the  difference  is 
perceived  is  not  perceived,  then  how  can  the  difference  as  an 
entity  be  perceived  ?  If  it  is  said  that  the  cloth  itself  represents 
its  difference  from  the  jug,  and  that  this  is  indicated  by  the  jug, 
then  we  may  ask,  what  is  the  nature  of  the  jug  ?  If  the  difference 
from  the  cloth  be  the  very  nature  of  the  jug,  then  the  cloth 
itself  is  also  involved  in  the  nature  of  the  jug.     If  it  is  said  that 


x]  Category  of  Difference  463 

the  jug  only  indicates  that  it  is  a  term  from  which  difierence 
is  intended  to  be  conveyed,  then  that  also  becomes  impossible, 
for  how  can  we  imagine  that  there  is  a  term  which  is  inde- 
pendent of  any  association  of  its  difference  from  other  things, 
and  is  yet  a  term  which  establishes  the  notion  of  difference?  If 
it  is  a  term  of  difference,  it  cannot  be  independent  of  its  relation 
to  other  things  from  which  it  is  differentiated.  If  its  difference 
from  the  cloth  is  a  quality  of  the  jug,  then  also  the  old  difficulty 
comes  in,  for  its  difference  from  the  cloth  would  involve  the 
cloth  also  in  itself;  and  if  the  cloth  is  involved  in  the  nature  of 
the  jug  as  its  quality,  then  by  the  same  manner  the  jug  would 
also  be  the  character  of  the  cloth,  and  hence  not  difference  but 
identity  results.  Moreover,  if  a  cloth  is  perceived  as  a  character 
of  the  jug,  the  two  will  appear  to  be  hanging  one  over  the  other, 
but  this  is  never  so  experienced  by  us.  Moreover,  it  is  difficult  to 
ascertain  if  qualities  have  any  relation  with  things ;  if  they  have 
not,  then  absence  of  relation  being  the  same  everywhere  every- 
thing might  be  the  quality  of  everything.  If  there  is  a  relation 
between  these  two,  then  that  relation  would  require  another 
relation  to  relate  itself  with  that  relation,  and  that  would  again 
require  another  relation  and  that  another,  and  so  on.  Again,  it 
may  be  said  that  when  the  jug,  etc.  are  seen  without  reference 
to  other  things,  they  appear  as  jug,  etc.,  but  when  they  are 
viewed  with  reference  to  cloth,  etc.  they  appear  as  difference. 
But  this  cannot  be  so,  for  the  perception  as  jug  is  entirely 
different  from  the  perception  of  difference.  It  should  also  be 
noted  that  the  notion  of  difference  is  also  different  from  the 
notions  of  both  the  jug  and  the  cloth.  It  is  one  thing  to  say 
that  there  are  jug  and  cloth,  and  quite  another  thing  to  say 
that  the  jug  is  different  from  the  cloth.  Thus  a  jug  cannot  appear 
as  difference,  though  it  may  be  viewed  with  reference  to  cloth. - 
The  notion  of  a  jug  does  not  require  the  notions  of  other  things 
for  its  manifestation.  Moreover,  when  I  say  the  jug  is  different 
from  the  cloth,  I  never  mean  that  difference  is  an  entity  which  is 
the  same  as  the  jug  or  the  cloth ;  what  I  mean  is  that  the 
difference  of  the  cloth  from  the  jug  has  its  limits  in  the  jug,  and 
not  merely  that  the  notion  of  cloth  has  a  reference  to  jug.  This 
shows  that  difference  cannot  be  the  characteristic  nature  of  the 
thing  perceived. 

Again,  in   the  second   alternative  where   difference  of  two 


464  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

things  is  defined  as  the  absence  of  each  thing  in  the  other,  we 
find  that  if  difference  in  jug  and  cloth  means  that  the  jug  is  not 
in  the  cloth  or  that  cloth  is  not  in  jug,  then  also  the  same 
difficulty  arises  ;  for  when  I  say  that  the  absence  or  negation  of 
jug  in  the  cloth  is  its  difference  from  the  jug,  then  also  the 
residence  of  the  absence  of  jug  in  the  cloth  would  require 
that  the  jug  also  resides  in  the  cloth,  and  this  would  reduce 
difference  to  identity.  If  it  is  said  that  the  absence  of  jug  in  the 
cloth  is  not  a  separate  thing,  but  is  rather  the  identical  cloth 
itself,  then  also  their  difference  as  mutual  exclusion  cannot  be 
explained.  If  this  mutual  negation  {anyonyabhdvd)  is  explained 
as  the  mere  absence  of  jugness  in  the  cloth  and  of  clothness  in 
the  jug,  then  also  a  difficulty  arises;  for  there  is  no  such  quality 
in  jugness  or  clothness  that  they  may  be  mutually  excluded; 
and  there  is  no  such  quality  in  them  that  they  can  be  treated  as 
identical,  and  so  when  it  is  said  that  there  is  no  jugness  in  cloth 
we  might  as  well  say  that  there  is  no  clothness  in  cloth,  for 
clothness  and  jugness  are  one  and  the  same,  and  hence  absence 
of  jugness  in  the  cloth  would  amount  to  the  absence  of  clothness 
in  the  cloth  which  is  self-contradictory.  Taking  again  the  third 
alternative  we  see  that  if  difference  means  divergence  of  charac- 
teristics {vaidharmya),  then  the  question  arises  whether  the 
vaidharmya  or  divergence  as  existing  in  jug  has  such  a  divergence 
as  can  distinguish  it  from  the  divergence  existing  in  the  cloth;  if 
the  answer  is  in  the  affirmative  then  we  require  a  series  of  endless 
vaidharmyas  progressing  ad  infinitum.  If  the  answer  is  in  the 
negative  then  there  being  no  divergence  between  the  two  diver- 
gences they  become  identical,  and  hence  divergence  of  character- 
istics as  such  ceases  to  exist.  If  it  is  said  that  the  natural  forms  of 
things  are  difference  in  themselves,  for  each  of  them  excludes  the 
other,  then  apart  from  the  differences — the  natural  forms — the 
things  are  reduced  to  {oxTcA&s's,x\Qss{nihsvarupatd).  If  natural  forms 
isvariipd)  mean  special  natural  {oxvns  {svariipa-visesd)  then  as  the 
special  natural  forms  or  characteristics  only  represent  difference, 
the  natural  forms  of  the  things  as  apart  from  the  special  ones 
would  appear  to  be  identical.  So  also  it  may  be  proved  that  there 
is  no  such  quality  as  prthaktva  (separateness)  which  can  explain 
differences  of  things,  for  there  also  the  questions  would  arise  as 
to  whether  separateness  exists  in  different  things  or  similar  ones 
or  whether  separateness  is  identical  with  the  thing  in  which  it 
exists  or  not,  and  so  forth. 


x]  Dialectical  Arguments  465 

The  earliest  beginnings  of  this  method  of  subtle  analysis  and 
dialectic  in  Indian  philosophy  are  found  in  the  opening  chapters 
of  KathdvatthiL.  In  the  great  Mahdbhasya  on  Panini  by  Patafijali 
also  we  find  some  traces  of  it.  But  Nagarjuna  was  the  man  who 
took  it  up  in  right  earnest  and  systematically  cultivated  it  in  all 
its  subtle  and  abstruse  issues  and  counter-issues  in  order  to  prove 
that  everything  that  appeared  as  a  fixed  order  or  system  was 
non-existent,  for  all  were  unspeakable,  indescribable  and  self- 
contradictory,  and  thus  everything  being  discarded  there  was 
only  the  void  {sunya).  Sarikara  partially  utilized  this  method  in 
his  refutations  of  Nyaya  and  the  Buddhist  systems ;  but  Sriharsa 
again  revived  and  developed  it  in  a  striking  manner,  and  after 
having  criticized  the  most  important  notions  and  concepts  of  our 
everyday  life,  which  are  often  backed  by  the  Nyaya  system,  sought 
to  prove  that  nothing  in  the  world  can  be  defined,  and  that  we 
cannot  ascertain  whether  a  thing  is  or  is  not.  The  refutations  of 
all  possible  definitions  that  the  Nyaya  could  give  necessarily  led 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  things  sought  to  be  defined  did  not 
exist  though  they  appeared  to  do  so;  the  Vedantic  contention 
was  that  this  is  exactly  as  it  should  be,  for  the  indefinite  ajnana 
produces  only  appearances  which  when  exposed  to  reason  show 
that  no  consistent  notions  of  them  can  be  formed,  or  in  other 
words  the  world-appearance,  the  phenomena  of  maya  or  ajnana, 
are  indefinable  or  anirvacanlya.  This  great  work  of  Sriharsa 
was  followed  by  Tattvadipikd  of  Citsukha,  in  which  he  generally 
followed  Sriharsa  and  sometimes  supplemented  him  with  the 
addition  of  criticisms  of  certain  new  concepts.  The  method  of 
Vedanta  thus  followed  on  one  side  the  method  of  Sunyavada  in 
annulling  all  the  concepts  of  world-appearance  and  on  the  other 
Vijiianavada  Buddhism  in  proving  the  self-illuminating  character 
of  knowledge  and  ultimately  established  the  self  as  the  only  self- 
luminous  ultimate  reality. 

The  Theory  of  Causation. 

The  Vedanta  philosophy  looked  at  the  constantly  changing 
phenomena  of  the  world-appearance  and  sought  to  discover  the 
root  whence  proceeded  the  endless  series  of  events  and  effects. 
The  theory  that  effects  were  altogether  new  productions  caused 
by  the  invariable  unconditional  and  immediately  preceding  ante- 
cedents, as  well  as  the  theory  that  it  was  the  cause  which  evolved 

D.  30 


466  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

and  by  its  transformations  produced  the  effect,  are  considered 
insufficient  to  explain  the  problem  which  the  Vedanta  had  before 
it.  Certain  collocations  invariably  and  unconditionally  preceded 
certain  effects,  but  this  cannot  explain  how  the  previous  set  of 
phenomena  could  be  regarded  as  producing  the  succeeding  set. 
In  fact  the  concept  of  causation  and  production  had  in  it 
something  quite  undefinable  and  inexplicable.  Our  enquiry 
after  the  cause  is  an  enquiry  after  a  more  fundamental  and 
primary  form  of  the  truth  of  a  thing  than  what  appears  at  the 
present  moment  when  we  wished  to  know  what  was  the  cause  of 
the  jug,  what  we  sought  was  a  simpler  form  of  which  the  effect 
was  only  a  more  complex  form  of  manifestation,  what  is  the 
ground,  the  root,  out  of  which  the  effect  has  come  forth?  If 
apart  from  such  an  enquiry  we  take  the  pictorial  representation 
of  the  causal  phenomena  in  which  some  collocations  being  in- 
variably present  at  an  antecedent  point  of  time,  the  effect  springs 
forth  into  being,  we  find  that  we  are  just  where  we  were  before, 
and  are  unable  to  penetrate  into  the  logic  of  the  affair.  The 
Nyaya  definition  of  cause  and  effect  may  be  of  use  to  us  in  a 
general  way  in  associating  certain  groups  of  things  of  a  particular 
kind  with  certain  other  phenomena  happening  at  a  succeeding 
moment  as  being  relevant  pairs  of  which  one  being  present  the 
other  also  has  a  probability  of  being  present,  but  can  do  nothing 
more  than  this.  It  does  not  answer  our  question  as  to  the  nature 
of  cause.  Antecedence  in  time  is  regarded  in  this  view  as  an  indis- 
pensable condition  for  the  cause.  But  time,  according  to  Nyaya, 
is  one  continuous  entity ;  succession  of  time  can  only  be  con- 
ceived as  antecedence  and  consequence  of  phenomena,  and  these 
again  involve  succession;  thus  the  notions  of  succession  of  time 
and  of  the  antecedence  and  consequence  of  time  being  mutually 
dependent  upon  each  other  ianyo7iydsrayd)  neither  of  these  can 
be  conceived  independently.  Another  important  condition  is 
invariability.  But  what  does  that  mean.-*  If  it  means  invariable 
antecedence,  then  even  an  ass  which  is  invariably  present  as 
an  antecedent  to  the  smoke  rising  from  the  washerman's 
house,  must  be  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the  smoked  If  it  means 
such  an  antecedence  as  contributes  to  the  happening  of  the  effect, 
it  becomes  again  difficult  to  understand  anything  about  its  contri- 

^  Asses  are  used  in  carrying  soiled  linen  in  India.    Asses  are  always  present  when 
water  is  boiled  for  washing  in  the  laundry. 


x]  Theory  of  Causation  467 

buting  to  the  effect,  for  the  only  intelHgible  thing  is  the  antece- 
dence and  nothing  more.  If  invariabihty  means  the  existence  of 
that  at  the  presence  of  which  the  effect  comes  into  being,  then  also 
it  fails,  for  there  maybe  the  seed  but  no  shoot,  for  the  mere  presence 
of  the  seed  will  not  suffice  to  produce  the  effect,  the  shoot.  If  it 
is  said  that  a  cause  can  produce  an  effect  only  when  it  is  asso- 
ciated with  its  accessory  factors,  then  also  the  question  remains 
the  same,  for  we  have  not  understood  what  is  meant  by  cause. 
Again  when  the  same  effect  is  often  seen  to  be  produced  by  a 
plurality  of  causes,  the  cause  cannot  be  defined  as  that  which 
happening  the  effect  happens  and  failing  the  effect  fails.  It  cannot 
also  be  said  that  in  spite  of  the  plurality  of  causes,  each  particular 
cause  is  so  associated  with  its  own  particular  kind  of  effect  that 
from  a  special  kind  of  cause  we  can  without  fail  get  a  special 
kind  of  effect  (cf  Vatsyayana  and  Nydyamanjarl\  for  out  of  the 
same  clay  different  effects  come  forth  namely  the  jug,  the  plate, 
etc.  Again  if  cause  is  defined  as  the  collocation  of  factors,  then 
the  question  arises  as  to  what  is  meant  by  this  collocation ;  does 
it  mean  the  factors  themselves  or  something  else  above  them?  On 
the  former  supposition  the  scattered  factors  being  always  present 
in  the  universe  there  should  always  be  the  effect;  if  it  means 
something  else  above  the  specific  factors,  then  that  something  al- 
ways existing,  there  should  always  be  the  effect.  Nor  can  colloca- 
tion {sdmagrt)  be  defined  as  the  last  movement  of  the  causes 
immediately  succeeding  which  the  effect  comes  into  being,  for  the 
relation  of  movement  with  the  collocating  cause  is  incomprehen- 
sible. Moreover  if  movement  is  defined  as  that  which  produces 
the  effect,  the  very  conception  of  causation  which  was  required 
to  be  proved  is  taken  for  granted.  The  idea  of  necessity  involved 
in  the  causal  conception  that  a  cause  is  that  which  must  produce 
its  effect  is  also  equally  undefinable,  inexplicable,  and  logically 
inconceivable.  Thus  in  whatsoever  way  we  may  seek  to  find  out 
the  real  nature  of  the  causal  principle  from  the  interminable 
series  of  cause-effect  phenomena  we  fail.  All  the  characteristics 
of  the  effects  are  indescribable  and  indefinable  ajfiana  of  maya, 
and  in  whatever  way  we  may  try  to  conceive  these  phenomena  in 
themselves  or  in  relation  to  one  another  we  fail,  for  they  are  all 
carved  out  of  the  indefinite  and  are  illogical  and  illusory,  and 
some  day  will  vanish  for  ever.  The  true  cause  is  thus  the  pure 
being,  the  reality  which  is  unshakable  in  itself,  the  ground  upon 


468  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

^  which  all  appearances  being  imposed  they  appear  as  real.  The 
true  cause  is  thus  the  unchangeable  being  which  persists  through 
all  experience,  and  the  effect-phenomena  are  but  impositions  upon 
it  of  ajfiana  or  avidya.  It  is  thus  the  clay,  the  permanent,  that 
is  regarded  as  the  cause  of  all  clay-phenomena  as  jug,  plates, 
etc.  All  the  various  modes  in  which  the  clay  appears  are  mere 
appearances,  unreal,  indefinable,  and  so  illusory.  The  one  truth 
is  the  clay.  So  in  all  world-phenomena  the  one  truth  is 
being,  the  Brahman,  and  all  the  phenomena  that  are  being 
imposed  on  it  are  but  illusory  forms  and  names.  This  is  what 
is  called  the  satkdryavdda  or  more  properly  the  satkdranavdda 
of  the  Vedanta,  that  the  cause  alone  is  true  and  ever  existing,  ' 
and  phenomena  in  themselves  are  false.  There  is  only  this 
much  truth  in  them,  that  all  are  imposed  on  the  reality  or  being 
which  alone  is  true.  This  appearance  of  the  one  cause  the 
being,  as  the  unreal  many  of  the  phenomena  is  what  is  called 
the  vivarttavdda  as  distinguished  from  the  sdmkhyayogaparind- 
mavdda,  in  which  the  effect  is  regarded  as  the  real  develop- 
ment of  the  cause  in  its  potential  state.  When  the  effect  has  a 
different  kind  of  being  from  the  cause  it  is  called  vivartta  but 
when  the  effect  has  the  same  kind  of  being  as  the  cause  it  is  called 
parindma  {kdranasvalaksandnyatkdbhdvah  parindmah  tadvilak- 
sano  vivarttah  or  vastunastatsamatidkd'nyathdbhdvah  parindmak 
tadvisainasattdkah  vivarttah).  Vedanta  has  as  much  to  object 
against  the  Nyaya  as  against  the  parinama  theory  of  causation 
of  the  Sarnkhya;  for  movement,  development,  form,  potentiality, 
and  actuality — all  these  are  indefinable  and  inconceivable  in  the 
light  of  reason;  they  cannot  explain  causation  but  only  restate 
things  and  phenomena  as  they  appear  in  the  world.  In  reality 
however  though  phenomena  are  not  identical  with  the  cause, 
they  can  never  be  defined  except  in  terms  of  the  cause  {Tada- 
hhedani  vinaiva  tadvyatirekena  durvacani  kdryyam  vivarttah). 

This  being  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  or  Brahman  and  the 
world,  the  different  followers  of  Saiikara  Vedanta  in  explaining 
the  cause  of  the  world-appearance  sometimes  lay  stress  on  the 
maya,  ajnana  or  avidya,  sometimes  on  the  Brahman,  and  some- 
times on  them  both.  Thus  Sarvajiiatmamuni,  the  writer  of 
Sanksepa-sdriraka  and  his  followers  think  that  the  pure  Brahman 
should  be  regarded  as  the  causal  substance  {updddna)  of  the 
world-appearance,   whereas    Prakasatman    Akhandananda,   and 


x]  Maya  aiid  Avidya  469 

Madhava  hold  that  Brahman  in  association  with  maya,  i.e.  the 
maya-reflected  form  of  Brahman  as  Isvara  should  be  regarded 
as  the  cause  of  the  world-appearance.  The  world-appearance 
is  an  evolution  or  parinama  of  the  maya  as  located  in  Isvara, 
whereas  Isvara  (God)  is  the  vivartta  causal  matter.  Others 
however  make  a  distinction  between  maya  as  the  cosmical  factor 
of  illusion  and  avidya  as  the  manifestation  of  the  same  entity 
in  the  individual  or  jiva.  They  hold  that  though  the  world- 
appearance  may  be  said  to  be  produced  by  the  maya  yet  the 
mind  etc.  associated  with  the  individual  are  produced  by  the 
avidya  with  the  jIva  or  the  individual  as  the  causal  matter 
{iipdddnd).  Others  hold  that  since  it  is  the  individual  to  whom 
both  Isvara  and  the  world-appearance  are  manifested,  it  is  better 
rather  to  think  that  these  are  all  manifestations  of  the  jIva  in 
association  with  his  avidya  or  ajilana.  Others  however  hold  that 
since  in  the  world-appearance  we  find  in  one  aspect  pure  being 
and  in  another  materiality  etc.,  both  Brahman  and  maya  are  to 
be  regarded  as  the  cause,  Brahman  as  the  permanent  causal 
matter,  upadana  and  maya  as  the  entity  evolving  in  parinama. 
Vacaspati  Misra  thinks  that  Brahman  is  the  permanent  cause  of 
the  world-appearance  through  maya  as  associated  with  jiva. 
Maya  is  thus  only  a  sahakari  or  instrument  as  it  were,  b^  which 
the  one  Brahman  appears  in  the  eye  of  the  jIva  as  the  manifold 
world  of  appearance.  Prakasananda  holds  however  in  his  Sid- 
dhdnta  Miiktdvali  that  Brahman  itself  is  pure  and  absolutely  un- 
affected even  as  illusory  appearance,  and  is  not  even  the  causal 
matter  of  the  world-appearance.  Everything  that  we  see  in  the 
phenomenal  world,  the  whole  field  of  world-appearance,  is  the 
product  of  maya,  which  is  both  the  instrumental  and  the  upadana 
(causal  matter)  of  the  world-illusion.  But  whatever  these  diver- 
gences of  view  may  be,  it  is  clear  that  they  do  not  in  any  way  affect 
the  principal  Vedanta  text  that  the  only  unchangeable  cause  is 
the  Brahman,  whereas  all  else,  the  effect-phenomena,  have  only 
a  temporary  existence  as  indefinable  illusion.  The  word  maya 
was  used  in  the  Rg-Veda  in  the  sense  of  supernatural  power  and 
wonderful  skill,  and  the  idea  of  an  inherent  mystery  underlying 
it  was  gradually  emphasized  in  the  Atharva  Veda,  and  it  began 
to  be  used  in  the  sense  of  magic  or  illusion.  In  the  Brhadaranyaka, 
Prasna,  and  Svetasvatara  Upani.sads  the  word  means  magic.  It 
is  not  out  of  place  here  to  mention  that  in  the  older  Upani.sads 


4/0  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

the  word  maya  occurs  only  once  in  the  Brhadaranyaka  and  once 
only  in  the  Prasna.  In  early  Pali  Buddhist  writings  it  occurs 
only  in  the  sense  of  deception  or  deceitful  conduct.  Buddhaghosa 
uses  it  in  the  sense  of  magical  power.  In  Nagarjuna  and  the  Lan- 
kdvatdra  it  has  acquired  the  sense  of  illusion.  In  Saiikara  the 
word  maya  is  used  in  the  sense  of  illusion,  both  as  a  principle 
of  creation  as  a  sakti  (power)  or  accessory  cause,  and  as  the 
phenomenal  creation  itself,  as  the  illusion  of  world-appearance. 

It  may  also  be  mentioned  here  that  Gaudapada  the  teacher 
of  Sankara's  teacher  Govinda  worked  out  a  system  with  the  help 
of  the  maya  doctrine.  The  Upanisads  are  permeated  with  the 
spirit  of  an  earnest  enquiry  after  absolute  truth.  They  do  not 
pay  any  attention  towards  explaining  the  world-appearance  or 
enquiring  into  its  relations  with  absolute  truth.  Gaudapada  asserts 
clearly  and  probably  for  the  first  time  among  Hindu  thinkers,  that 
the  world  does  not  exist  in  reality,  that  it  is  maya,  and  not  reality. 
When  the  highest  truth  is  realized  maya  is  not  removed,  for  it  is 
not  a  thing,  but  the  whole  world-illusion  is  dissolved  into  its  own 
airy  nothing  never  to  recur  again.  It  was  Gaudapada  who  compared 
the  world-appearance  with  dream  appearances,  and  held  that  ob- 
jects seen  in  the  waking  world  are  unreal,  because  they  are  capable 
of  being  seen  like  objects  seen  in  a  dream,  which  are  false  and 
unreal.  The  atman  says  Gaudapada  is  at  once  the  cognizer  and 
the  cognized,  the  world  subsists  in  the  atman  through  maya. 
As  atman  alone  is  real  and  all  duality  an  illusion,  it  necessarily 
follows  that  all  experience  is  also  illusory.  Sankara  expounded 
this  doctrine  in  his  elaborate  commentaries  on  the  Upanisads 
and  the  Brahma-sutra,  but  he  seems  to  me  to  have  done  little 
more  than  making  explicit  the  doctrine  of  maya.  Some  of  his 
followers  however  examined  and  thought  over  the  concept  of 
maya  and  brought  out  in  bold  relief  its  character  as  the  indefin- 
able thereby  substantially  contributing  to  the  development  of 
the  Vedanta  philosophy. 

Vedanta  theory  of  Perception  and  Inference^ 

Pramana  is  the  means  that  leads  to  right  knowledge.  If 
memory  is  intended   to  be  excluded  from  the  definition  then 

^  Dharmarajadhvarindra  and  his  son  Ramakrsna  worked  out  a  complete  scheme 
of  the  theory  of  Vedantic  perception  and  inference.  This  is  in  complete  agreement  with 
the  general  Vedanta  metaphysics.     The  early  Vedantists  were  more  interested   in 


x]'  Theory  of  Perception  471 

pramana  is  to  be  defined  as  the  means  that  leads  to  such  right 
knowledge  as  has  not  already  been  acquired.  Right  knowledge 
{pravid)  in  Vedanta  is  the  knowledge  of  an  object  which  has  not 
been  found  contradicted  {abddhitdrthavisayajnmiatva).  Except 
when  specially  expressed  otherwise, prama  is  generally  considered 
as  being  excludent  of  memory  and  applies  to  previously  unac- 
quired ianadhigata)  and  uncontradicted  knowledge.  Objections 
are  sometimes  raised  that  when  we  are  looking  at  a  thing  for  a 
few  minutes,  the  perception  of  the  thing  in  all  the  successive 
moments  after  the  first  refers  to  the  image  of  the  thing  acquired 
in  the  previous  moments.  To  this  the  reply  is  that  the  Vedanta 
considers  that  so  long  as  a  different  mental  state  does  not  arise, 
any  mental  state  is  not  to  be  considered  as  momentary  but  as 
remaining  ever  the  same.  So  long  as  we  continue  to  perceive 
one  thing  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  there  has  been  a 
series  of  mental  states.  So  there  is  no  question  as  to  the  know- 
ledge of  the  succeeding  moments  being  referred  to  the  know- 
ledge of  the  preceding  moments,  for  so  long  as  any  mental 
state  has  any  one  thing  for  its  object  it  is  to  be  considered  as 
having  remained  unchanged  all  through  the  series  of  moments. 
There  is  of  course  this  difference  between  the  same  percept  of  a 
previous  and  a  later  moment  following  in  succession,  that  fresh 
elements  of  time  are  being  perceived  as  prior  and  later,  though 
the  content  of  the  mental  state  so  far  as  the  object  is  concerned 
remains  unchanged.  This  time  element  is  perceived  by  the  senses 
though  the  content  of  the  mental  state  may  remain  undisturbed. 
When  I  see  the  same  book  for  two  seconds,  my  mental  state 
representing  the  book  is  not  changed  every  second,  and  hence 
there  can  be  no  sudi  supposition  that  I  am  having  separate  mental 
states  in  succession  each  of  which  is  a  repetition  of  the  previous 
one,  for  so  long  as  the  general  content  of  the  mental  state  remains 
the  same  there  is  no  reason  for  supposing  that  there  has  been  any 
change  in  the  mental  state.  The  mental  state  thus  remains  the 
same  so  long  as  the  content  is  not  changed,  but  though  it  remains 
the  same  it  can  note  the  change  in  the  time  elements  as  extraneous 

demonstrating  the  illusory  nature  of  the  world  of  appearance,  and  did  not  work  out  a 
logical  theory.  It  may  be  incidentally  mentioned  that  in  the  theory  of  inference  as 
worked  out  by  Dharmarajadhvarindra  he  was  largely  indebted  to  the  Mimanisa  school 
of  thought.  In  recognizing  arthapatti,  upamana  Sabda  and  anupalabdhi  also  Dharma- 
rajadhvarindra accepted  the  Mimanisa  view.  The  Vedantins,  previous  to  Dharmara- 
jadhvarindra, had  also  tacitly  followed  the  Mimamsa  in  these  matters. 


472  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

addition.  AH  our  uncontradicted  knowledge  of  the  objects  of  the 
external  world  should  be  regarded  as  right  knowledge  until  the 
absolute  is  realized. 

When  the  antahkarana  (mind)  comes  in  contact  with  the 
external  objects  through  the  senses  and  becomes  transformed  as 
it  were  into  their  forms,  it  is  said  that  the  antahkarana  has 
been  transformed  into  a  state  {vrttiy.  As  soon  as  the  antahka- 
rana has  assumed  the  shape  or  form  of  the  object  of  its  know- 
ledge, the  ignorance  {ajhdnd)  with  reference  to  that  object  is 
removed,  and  thereupon  the  steady  light  of  the  pure  conscious- 
ness {cif)  shows  the  object  which  was  so  long  hidden  by 
ignorance.  The  appearance  or  the  perception  of  an  object 
is  thus  the  self-shining  of  the  cit  through  a  vrtti  of  a  form 
resembling  an  object  of  knowledge.  This  therefore  pre-sup- 
poses  that  by  the  action  of  ajiiana,  pure  consciousness  or  being 
is  in  a  state  of  diverse  kinds  of  modifications.  In  spite  of 
the  cit  underlying  all  this  diversified  objective  world  which  is 
but  the  transformation  of  ignorance  (ajfiana),  the  former  cannot 
manifest  itself  by  itself,  for  the  creations  being  of  ignorance 
they  are  but  sustained  by  modifications  of  ignorance.  The 
diversified  objects  of  the  world  are  but  transformations  of 
the  principle  of  ajnana  which  is  neither  real  nor  unreal.  It 
is  the  nature  of  ajnana  that  it  veils  its  own  creations.  Thus 
on  each  of  the  objects  created  by  the  ajnana  by  its  creating 
iviksepd)  capacity  there  is  a  veil  by  its  veiling  {avarand)  capacity. 
But  when  any  object  comes  in  direct  touch  with  antahkarana 
through  the  senses  the  antahkarana  becomes  transformed  into 
the  form  of  the  object,  and  this  leads  to  the  removal  of  the  veil 
on  that  particular  ajnana  form — the  object,  and  as  the  self- 
shining  cit  is  shining  through  the  particular  ajfiana  state,  we 
have  what  is  called  the  perception  of  the  thing.  Though  there  is 
in  reality  no  such  distinction  as  the  inner  and  the  outer  yet  the 
ajnana  has  created  such  illusory  distinctions  as  individual  souls 
and  the  external  world  of  objects  the  distinctions  of  time,  space, 

'  Vedanta  does  not  regard  manas  (mind)  as  a  sense  (indriya).  The  same  antah- 
karana, according  to  its  diverse  functions,  is  called  manas,  buddhi,  ahamkara,  and 
citta.  In  its  functions  as  doubt  it  is  called  manas,  as  originating  definite  cognitions  it 
is  called  buddhi.  As  presenting  the  notion  of  an  ego  in  consciousness  ahamkara,  and 
as  producing  memory  citta.  These  four  represent  the  different  modifications  or  states 
(vrtti)  of  the  same  entity  (which  in  itself  is  but  a  special  kind  of  modification  of 
ajnana  as  antahkarana). 


x]  Inference  473 

etc.  and  veiled  these  forms.  Perception  leads  to  the  temporary 
and  the  partial  breaking  of  the  veil  over  specific  ajfiana  forms 
so  that  there  is  a  temporary  union  of  the  cit  as  underlying  the 
subject  and  the  object  through  the  broken  veil.  Perception  on 
the  subjective  side  is  thus  defined  as  the  union  or  undifferentia- 
tion  {abheda)  of  the  subjective  consciousness  with  the  objective 
consciousness  comprehending  the  sensible  objects  through  the 
specific  mental  st^.tes{tattadindriyayogyavisaydvacchinnacaitanyd- 
bhinnatvam  tattaddkdravisaydvacchinnajndnasya  tattadanise  pra- 
tyaksatvam).  This  union  in  perception  means  that  the  objective 
has  at  that  moment  no  separate  existence  from  the  subjective 
consciousness  of  the  perceiver.  The  consciousness  manifesting 
through  the  antahkarana  is  called  jivasaksi. 

Inference  {amividna),  according  to  Vedanta,  is  made  by  our 
notion  of  concomitance  {vydptijhdnd)  between  two  things,  acting 
through  specific  past  impressions  {saviskdra).  Thus  when  I  see 
smoke  on  a  hill,  my  previous  notion  of  the  concomitance  of  smoke 
with  fire  becomes  roused  as  a  subconscious  impression,  and  I 
infer  that  there  is  fire  on  the  hill.  My  knowledge  of  the  hill  and 
the  smoke  is  by  direct  perception.  The  notion  of  concomitance 
revived  in  the  subconscious  only  establishes  the  connection  be- 
tween the  smoke  and  the  fire.  The  notion  of  concomitance  is 
generated  by  the  perception  of  two  things  together,  when  no 
case  of  the  failure  of  concomitance  is  known  {vyabhicdrdjiidnd) 
regarding  the  subject.  The  notion  of  concomitance  being  alto- 
gether subjective,  the  Vedantist  does  not  emphasize  the  necessity 
of  perceiving  the  concomitance  in  a  large  number  of  cases  {bhu- 
yodarsanain  sakrddarsanani  veti  viseso  nddaramyah).  Vedanta  is 
not  anxious  to  establish  any  material  validity  for  the  inference, 
but  only  subjective  and  formal  validity.  A  single  perception  of 
concomitance  may  in  certain  cases  generate  the  notion  of  the 
concomitance  of  one  thing  with  another  when  no  contradictory 
instance  is  known.  It  is  immaterial  with  the  Vedanta  whether  this 
concomitance  is  experienced  in  one  case  or  in  hundreds  of  cases. 
The  method  of  agreement  in  presence  is  the  only  form  of  con- 
comitance {aiivayavydpti)  that  the  Vedanta  allows.  So  the 
Vedanta  discards  all  the  other  kinds  of  inference  that  Nyaya 
supported,  viz.  anvayavyatireki  (by  joining  agreement  in  pre- 
sence with  agreement  in  absence),  k evaldnv ay i  {by  universal  agree- 
ment where  no  test  could  be  applied  of  agreement  in  absence)  and 


474  '^^^  Saiikara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

kevalavyatireki  (by  universal  agreement  in  absence).  Vedanta 
advocates  three  premisses,  viz.  (i)  pratijha  (the  hill  is  fiery); 
(2)  hetu  (because  it  has  smoke)  and  (3)  drstdnta  (as  in  the 
kitchen)  instead  of  the  five  propositions  that  Nyaya  maintained ^ 
Since  one  case  of  concomitance  is  regarded  by  Vedanta  as 
being  sufficient  for  making  an  inference  it  holds  that  seeing  the 
one  case  of  appearance  (silver  in  the  conch-shell)  to  be  false, 
we  can  infer  that  all  things  (except  Brahman)  are  false  {Brah- 
mabhinnani  sarvani  inithyd  Brahmabhinnatvdt  yedevam  tadevam 
yathd  suktirupyam).  First  premiss  {pratijnd)  all  else  excepting 
Brahman  is  false;  second  premiss  {Jietii)  since  all  is  different  from 
Brahman;  third  premiss  {drstdnta)  whatever  is  so  is  so  as  the 
silver  in  the  conch  ^. 

Atman,  Jiva,  Isvara,  EkajTvavada  and  Drstisrstivada. 

We  have  many  times  spoken  of  truth  or  reality  as  self- 
luminous  {svayamprakdsd).  But  what  does  this  mean?  Vedanta 
defines  it  as  that  which  is  never  the  object  of  a  knowing  act  but 
is  yet  immediate  and  direct  with  us  {avedyatve  sati  aparoksavya- 
vahdrayogyatvam).  Self-luminosity  thus  means  the  capacity  of 
being  ever  present  in  all  our  acts  of  consciousness  without  in  any 
way  being  an  object  of  consciousness.  Whenever  anything  is 
described  as  an  object  of  consciousness,  its  character  as  constitu- 
ting its  knowability  is  a  quality,  which  may  or  may  not  be  present 
in  it,  or  may  be  present  at  one  time  and  absent  at  another. 
This  makes  it  dependent  on  some  other  such  entity  which  can 
produce  it  or  manifest  it.  Pure  consciousness  differs  from  all  its 
objects  in  this  that  it  is  never  dependent  on  anything  else  for 
its  manifestation,  but  manifests  all  other  objects  such  as  the  jug, 
the  cloth,  etc.  If  consciousness  should  require  another  conscious- 
ness to  manifest  it,  then  that  might  again  require  another,  and 
that  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum  {anavastJid).  If  conscious- 
ness did  not  manifest  itself  at  the  time  of  the  object-manifestation, 
then  even  on  seeing  or  knowing  a  thing  one  might  doubt  if  he 
had  seen  or  known  it.  It  is  thus  to  be  admitted  that  conscious- 
i|[iess  {anubhuti)  manifests  itself  and  thereby  maintains  the  ap- 

1  Vedanta  would  have  either  pratijna,  hetu  and  udaharana,  or  udaharana,  upanaya 
and  nigamana,  and  not  all  the  five  of  Nyaya,  viz.  pratijna,  hetu,  udaharana,  upanaya 
and  nigamana. 

"  Vedantic  notions  of  the  pramana  of  upamana,  arthapatti,  sabda  and  anupalabdhi, 
being  similar  to  the  mimanisa  view,  do  not  require  to  be  treated  here  separately. 


x]  Atman  and  Jiva  475 

pearance  of  all  our  world  experience.  This  goes  directly  against 
the  jnatata  theory  of  Kumarila  that  consciousness  was  not  im- 
mediate but  was  only  inferable  from  the  manifesting  quality 
{jnatata)  of  objects  when  they  are  known  in  consciousness. 

Now  Vedanta  says  that  this  self-luminous  pure  consciousness 
is  the  same  as  the  self  For  it  is  only  self  which  is  not  the  object 
of  any  knowledge  and  is  yet  immediate  and  ever  present  in 
consciousness.  No  one  doubts  about  his  own  self,  because  it 
is  of  itself  manifested  along  with  all  states  of  knowledge.  The 
self  itself  is  the  revealer  of  all  objects  of  knowledge,  but  is 
never  itself  the  object  of  knowledge,  for  what  appears  as  the 
perceiving  of  self  as  object  of  knowledge  is  but  association 
comprehended  under  the  term  ahamkara  (ego).  The  real  self  is 
identical  with  the  pure  manifesting  unity  of  all  consciousness. 
This  real  self  called  the  atman  is  not  the  same  as  the  jlva  or 
individual  soul,  which  passes  through  the  diverse  experiences 
of  worldly  life.  Isvara  also  must  be  distinguished  from  this 
highest  atman  or  Brahman.  We  have  already  seen  that  many 
Vedantists  draw  a  distinction  between  maya  and  avidya.  Maya 
is  that  aspect  of  ajfiana  by  which  only  the  best  attributes 
are  projected,  whereas  avidya  is  that  aspect  by  which  impure 
qualities  are  projected.  In  the  former  aspect  the  functions  are 
more  of  a  creative,  generative  {viksepa)  type,  whereas  in  the  latter 
veiling  (dvarana)  characteristics  are  most  prominent.  The  rela- 
tion of  the  cit  or  pure  intelligence,  the  highest  self,  with  maya  and 
avidya  (also  called  ajfiana)  was  believed  respectively  to  explain  the 
phenomenal  Isvara  and  the  phenomenal  jlva  or  individual.  This 
relation  is  conceived  in  two  ways,  namely  as  upadhi  or  pratibimba, 
and  avaccheda.  The  conception  of  pratibimba  or  reflection  is 
like  the  reflection  of  the  sun  in  the  water  where  the  image, 
though  it  has  the  same  brilliance  as  the  sun,  yet  undergoes 
the  effect  of  the  impurity  and  movements  of  the  water.  The 
sun  remains  ever  the  same  in  its  purity  untouched  by  the 
impurities  from  which  the  image  sun  suffers.  The  sun  may 
be  the  same  but  it  may  be  reflected  in  different  kinds  of 
water  and  yield  different  kinds  of  images  possessing  different 
characteristics  and  changes  which  though  unreal  yet  phenome- 
nally have  all  the  appearance  of  reality.  The  other  conception 
of  the  relation  is  that  when  we  speak  of  akasa  (space)  in  the  jug 
or  of  akasa  in  the  room.    The  akasa  in  reality  does  not  suffer 


476  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

any  modification  in  being  within  the  jug  or  within  the  room.  In 
reality  it  is  all-pervasive  and  is  neither  Hmited  {avachinna) 
within  the  jug  or  the  room,  but  is  yet  conceived  as  being  Hmited 
by  the  jug  or  by  the  room.  So  long  as  the  jug  remains,  the 
akasa  limited  within  it  will  remain  as  separate  from  the  akasa 
limited  within  the  room. 

Of  the  Vedantists  who  accept  the  reflection  analogy  the  fol- 
lowers of  Nrsirnhasrama  think  that  when  the  pure  cit  is  reflected 
in  the  maya,  Isvara  is  phenomenally  produced,  and  when  in  the 
avidya  the  individual  or  jiva.  Sarvajnatma  however  does  not 
distinguish  between  the  maya  and  the  avidya,  and  thinks  that 
when  the  cit  is  reflected  in  the  avidya  in  its  total  aspect  as  cause, 
we  get  Isvara,  and  when  reflected  in  the  antahkarana — a  product 
of  the  avidya — we  have  jiva  or  individual  soul. 

JIva  or  individual  means  the  self  in  association  with  the  ego 
and  other  personal  experiences,  i.e.  phenomenal  self,  which  feels, 
suffers  and  is  affected  by  world-experiences.  In  jTva  also  three 
stages  are  distinguished ;  thus  when  during  deep  sleep  the  antah- 
karana is  submerged,  the  self  perceives  merely  the  ajnana  and  the 
jiva  in  this  state  is  called  prajna  or  anandamaya.  In  the  dream- 
state  the  self  is  in  association  with  a  subtle  body  and  is  called 
taijasa.  In  the  awakened  state  the  self  as  associated  with  a 
subtle  and  gross  body  is  called  visva.  So  also  the  self  in  its  pure 
state  is  called  Brahman,  when  associated  with  maya  it  is  called 
Isvara,  when  associated  with  the  fine  subtle  element  of  matter  as 
controlling  them,  it  is  called  hiranyagarbha;  when  with  the  gross 
elements  as  the  ruler  or  controller  of  them  it  is  called  virat 
purusa. 

The  jiva  in  itself  as  limited  by  its  avidya  is  often  spoken  of 
as  paramarthika  (real),  when  manifested  through  the  sense  and 
the  ego  in  the  waking  states  as  vyavaharika  (phenomenal),  and 
when  in  the  dream  states  as  dream-self,  pratibhasika  (illusory). 

Prakasatma  and  his  followers  think  that  since  ajnana  is  one 
there  cannot  be  two  separate  reflections  such  as  jiva  and  Isvara; 
but  it  is  better  to  admit  that  jiva  is  the  image  of  Isvara  in  the 
ajnana.  The  totality  of  Brahma-cit  in  association  with  maya  is 
Isvara,  and  this  when  again  reflected  through  the  ajnana  gives 
us  the  jiva.  The  manifestation  of  the  jiva  is  in  the  antahkarana 
as  states  of  knowledge.  The  jiva  thus  in  reality  is  Isvara  and 
apart  from  jiva  and  Isvara  there  is  no  other  separate  existence  of 


x]  Ekajiva  Doctrine  477 

Brahma-caitanya.  Jiva  being  the  image  of  Isvara  is  thus  de- 
pendent on  him,  but  when  the  limitations  of  jIva  are  removed 
by  right  knowledge,  the  jIva  is  the  same  Brahman  it  always  was. 

Those  who  prefer  to  conceive  the  relation  as  being  of  the 
avaccheda  type  hold  that  reflection  (pratibimba)  is  only  possible 
of  things  which  have  colour,  and  therefore  jiva  is  cit  limited  (avac- 
chinna)  by  the  antahkarana  (mind).  Isvara  is  that  which  is  be- 
yond it;  the  diversity  of  antahkaranas  accounts  for  the  diversity 
of  the  jivas.  It  is  easy  however  to  see  that  these  discussions  are 
not  of  much  fruit  from  the  point  of  view  of  philosophy  in  deter- 
mining or  comprehending  the  relation  of  Isvara  and  jIva.  In  the 
Vedanta  system  Iisvara  has  but  little  importance,  for  he  is  but  a 
phenomenal  being;  he  may  be  better,  purer,  and  much  more 
powerful  than  we,  but  yet  he  is  as  much  phenomenal  as  any  of 
us.  The  highest  truth  is  the  self,  the  reality,  the  Brahman,  and 
both  jiva  and  Isvara  are  but  illusory  impositions  on  it.  Some 
Vedantists  hold  that  there  is  but  one  jIva  and  one  body,  and 
that  all  the  world  as  well  as  all  the  jIvas  in  it  are  merely  his 
imaginings.  These  dream  jivas  and  the  dream  world  will 
continue  so  long  as  that  super-jlva  continues  to  undergo  his 
experiences ;  the  world-appearance  and  all  of  us  imaginary 
individuals,  run  our  course  and  salvation  is  as  much  imaginary 
salvation  as  our  world-experience  is  an  imaginary  experience  of 
the  imaginary  jIvas.  The  cosmic  jiva  is  alone  the  awakened  jIva 
and  all  the  rest  are  but  his  imaginings.  This  is  known  as  the 
doctrine  of  ekajiva  (one-soul). 

The  opposite  of  this  doctrine  is  the  theory  held  by  some 
Vedantists  that  there  are  many  individuals  and  the  world-appear- 
ance has  no  permanent  illusion  for  all  people,  but  each  person 
creates  for  himself  his  own  illusion,  and  there  is  no  objective 
datum  which  forms  the  common  ground  for  the  illusory  percep- 
tion of  all  people ;  just  as  when  ten  persons  see  in  the  darkness  a 
rope  and  having  the  illusion  of  a  snake  there,  run  away,  and 
agree  in  their  individual  perceptions  that  they  have  all  seen 
the  same  snake,  though  each  really  had  his  own  illusion  and 
there  was  no  snake  at  all.  According  to  this  view  the  illusory 
perception  of  each  happens  for  him  subjectively  and  has  no 
corresponding  objective  phenomena  as  its  ground.  This  must 
be  distinguished  from  the  normal  Vedanta  view  which  holds 
that  objectively  phenomena  are  also  happening,  but  that  these 


47 8  The  Sahkai^a  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

are  illusory  only  in  the  sense  that  they  will  not  last  permanently 
and  have  thus  only  a  temporary  and  relative  existence  in  com- 
parison with  the  truth  or  reality  which  is  ever  the  same  constant 
and  unchangeable  entity  in  all  our  perceptions  and  in  all  world- 
appearance.  According  to  the  other  view  phenomena  are  not 
objectively  existent  but  are  only  subjectively  imagined;  so  that 
the  jug  I  see  had  no  existence  before  I  happened  to  have  the 
perception  that  there  was  the  jug;  as  soon  as  the  jug  illusion 
occurred  to  me  I  said  that  there  was  the  jug,  but  it  did  not  exist 
before.  As  soon  as  I  had  the  perception  there  was  the  illusion, 
and  there  was  no  other  reality  apart  from  the  illusion.  It  is  there- 
fore called  the  theory  of  drstisrstivada,  i.e.  the  theory  that  the 
subjective  perception  is  the  creating  of  the  objects  and  that  there 
are  no  other  objective  phenomena  apart  from  subjective  per- 
ceptions. In  the  normal  Vedanta  view  however  the  objects  of 
the  world  are  existent  as  phenomena  by  the  sense-contact  with 
which  the  subjective  perceptions  are  created.  The  objective 
phenomena  in  themselves  are  of  course  but  modifications  of  ajnana, 
but  still  these  phenomena  of  the  ajfiana  are  there  as  the  common 
ground  for  the  experience  of  all.  This  therefore  has  an  objec- 
tive epistemology  whereas  the  drstisrstivada  has  no  proper 
epistemology,  for  the  experiences  of  each  person  are  determined 
by  his  own  subjective  avidya  and  previous  impressions  as  modi- 
fications of  the  avidya.  The  drstisrstivada  theory  approaches 
nearest  to  the  Vijnanavada  Buddhism,  only  with  this  difference 
that  while  Buddhism  does  not  admit  of  any  permanent  being 
Vedanta  admits  the  Brahman,  the  permanent  unchangeable 
reality  as  the  only  truth,  whereas  the  illusory  and  momentary 
perceptions  are  but  impositions  on  it. 

The  mental  and  physical  phenomena  are  alike  in  this,  that 
both  are  modifications  of  ajnana.  It  is  indeed  difficult  to 
comprehend  the  nature  of  ajnana,  though  its  presence  in  con- 
sciousness can  be  perceived,  and  though  by  dialectic  criticism 
all  our  most  well-founded  notions  seem  to  vanish  away  and 
become  self-contradictory  and  indefinable.  Vedanta  explains 
the  reason  of  this  difficulty  as  due  to  the  fact  that  all  these 
indefinable  forms  and  names  can  only  be  experienced  as  modes 
of  the  real,  the  self-luminous.  Our  innate  error  which  we  con- 
tinue from  beginningless  time  consists  in  this,  that  the  real  in 
its  full  complete  light  is  ever  hidden  from  us,  and  the  glimpse 


x]  Indefinable  Nature  of  A jnana  479 

that  we  get  of  it  is  always  through  manifestations  of  forms 
and  names;  these  phenomenal  forms  and  names  are  undefinable, 
incomprehensible,  and  unknowable  in  themselves,  but  under 
certain  conditions  they  are  manifested  by  the  self-luminous  real, 
and  at  the  time  they  are  so  manifested  they  seem  to  have  a 
positive  being  which  is  undeniable.  This  positive  being  is  only 
the  highest  being,  the  real  which  appears  as  the  being  of  those  forms 
and  names.  A  lump  of  clay  may  be  moulded  into  a  plate  or  a 
cup,  but  the  plate-form  or  the  cup-form  has  no  existence  or  being 
apart  from  the  being  of  the  clay ;  it  is  the  being  of  the  clay  that 
is  imposed  on  the  diverse  forms  which  also  then  seem  to  have 
being  in  themselves.  Our  illusion  thus  consists  in  mutually  mis- 
attributing  the  characteristics  of  the  unreal  forms — the  modes  of 
ajnana  and  the  real  being.  As  this  illusion  is  the  mode  of  all  our 
experience  and  its  very  essence,  it  is  indeed  difficult  for  us  to 
conceive  of  the  Brahman  as  apart  from  the  modes  of  ajnana. 
Moreover  such  is  the  nature  of  ajfianas  that  they  are  knowable 
only  by  a  false  identification  of  them  with  the  self-luminous 
Brahman  or  atman.  Being  as  such  is  the  highest  truth,  the 
Brahman.  The  ajnana  states  are  not  non-being  in  the  sense  of 
nothing  of  pure  negation  {abhdvd),  but  in  the  sense  that  they  are 
not  being.  Being  that  is  the  self-luminous  illuminates  non-being, 
the  ajnana,  and  this  illumination  means  nothing  more  than  a 
false  identification  of  being  with  non-being.  The  forms  of  ajnana 
if  they  are  to  be  known  must  be  associated  with  pure  conscious- 
ness, and  this  association  means  an  illusion,  superimposition,  and 
mutual  misattribution.  But  apart  from  pure  consciousness  these 
cannot  be  manifested  or  known,  for  it  is  pure  consciousness  alone 
that  is  self-luminous.  Thus  when  we  try  to  know  the  ajnana 
states  in  themselves  as  apart  from  the  atman  we  fall  in  a  dilemma, 
for  knowledge  means  illusory  superimposition  or  illusion,  and 
when  it  is  not  knowledge  they  evidently  cannot  be  known.  Thus 
apart  from  its  being  a  factor  in  our  illusory  experience  no  other 
kind  of  its  existence  is  known  to  us.  If  ajnana  had  been  a  non- 
entity altogether  it  could  never  come  at  all,  if  it  were  a  positive 
entity  then  it  would  never  cease  to  be;  the  ajnana  thus  is  a 
mysterious  category  midway  between  being  and  non-being  and 
indefinable  in  every  way;  and  it  is  on  account  of  this  that  it  is 
called  tattvdnyatvdbhydni  anirvdcya  or  undefinable  and  undeter- 
minable either  as  real  or  unreal.    It  is  real  in  the  sense  that  it  is 


480  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

a  necessary  postulate  of  our  phenomenal  experience  and  unreal 
in  its  own  nature,  for  apart  from  its  connection  with  consciousness 
it  is  incomprehensible  and  undefinable.  Its  forms  even  while  they 
are  manifested  in  consciousness  are  self-contradictory  and  in- 
comprehensible as  to  their  real  nature  or  mutual  relation,  and 
comprehensible  only  so  far  as  they  are  manifested  in  conscious- 
ness, but  apart  from  these  no  rational  conception  of  them  can  be 
formed.  Thus  it  is  impossible  to  say  anything  about  the  ajnana 
(for  no  knowledge  of  it  is  possible)  save  so  far  as  manifested  in 
consciousness  and  depending  on  this  the  Drstisrstivadins  asserted 
that  our  experience  was  inexplicably  produced  under  the  influence 
of  avidya  and  that  beyond  that  no  objective  common  ground 
could  be  admitted.  But  though  this  has  the  general  assent  of 
Vedanta  and  is  irrefutable  in  itself,  still  for  the  sake  of  explain- 
ing our  common  sense  view  {pratikarmavyavasatha)  we  may 
think  that  we  have  an  objective  world  before  us  as  the  common 
field  of  experience.  We  can  also  imagine  a  scheme  of  things  and 
operations  by  which  the  phenomenon  of  our  experience  may  be 
interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  Vedanta  metaphysics. 

The  subject  can  be  conceived  in  three  forms:  firstly  as  the 
atman,  the  one  highest  reality,  secondly  as  jiva  or  the  atman  as 
limited  by  its  psychosis,  when  the  psychosis  is  not  differentiated 
from  the  atman,  but  atman  is  regarded  as  identical  with  the  psy- 
chosis thus  appearing  as  a  living  and  knowing  h€\r\^,2AJivasdksi  or 
perceiving  consciousness,  or  the  aspect  in  which  the  jIva  compre- 
hends, knows,  or  experiences  ;  thirdly  the  antahkarana  psychosis  or 
mind  which  is  an  inner  centre  or  bundle  of  avidya  manifesta- 
tions, just  as  the  outer  world  objects  are  exterior  centres  of 
avidya  phenomena  or  objective  entities.  The  antahkarana  is  not 
only  the  avidya  capable  of  supplying  all  forms  to  our  present  ex- 
periences, but  it  also  contains  all  the  tendencies  and  modes  of 
past  impressions  of  experience  in  this  life  or  in  past  lives.  The 
antahkarana  is  always  turning  the  various  avidya  modes  of  it  into 
the  jivasak.si  (jIva  in  its  aspect  as  illuminating  mental  states),  and 
these  are  also  immediately  manifested,  made  known,  and  trans- 
formed into  experience.  These  avidya  states  of  the  antahkarana 
are  called  its  vrttis  or  states.  The  specific  peculiarity  of  the  vrtti- 
ajftanas  is  this  that  only  in  these  forms  can  they  be  superimposed 
upon  pure  consciousness,  and  thus  be  interpreted  as  states  of  con- 
sciousness and  have  their  indefiniteness  or  cover  removed.    The 


x]  Perception  and  Objective  Existence  48 1 

forms  of  ajftana  remain  as  indefinite  and  hidden  or  veiled  only 
so  long  as  they  do  not  come  into  relation  to  these  vrttis  of  antah- 
karana,  for  the  ajftana  can  be  destroyed  by  the  cit  only  in  the 
form  of  a  vrtti,  while  in  all  other  forms  the  ajftana  veils  the  cit 
from  manifestation.  The  removal  of  ajnana-vrttis  of  the  antah- 
karana  or  the  manifestation  of  vrtti-jnana  is  nothing  but  this,  that 
the  antahkarana  states  of  avidya  are  the  only  states  of  ajftana 
which  can  be  superimposed  upon  the  self-luminous  atman 
{adhydsa,  false  attribution).  The  objective  world  consists  of  the 
avidya  phenomena  with  the  self  as  its  background.  Its  objectivity 
consists  in  this  that  avidya  in  this  form  cannot  be  superimposed 
on  the  self-luminous  cit  but  exists  only  as  veiling  the  cit.  These 
avidya  phenomena  may  be  regarded  as  many  and  diverse,  but  in 
all  these  forms  they  serve  only  to  veil  the  cit  and  are  beyond  con- 
sciousness. It  is  only  when  they  come  in  contact  with  the  avidya 
phenomena  as  antahkarana  states  that  they  coalesce  with  the 
avidya  states  and  render  themselves  objects  of  consciousness  or 
have  their  veil  of  avarana  removed.  It  is  thus  assumed  that  in 
ordinary  perceptions  of  objects  such  as  jug,  etc.  the  antahkarana 
goes  out  of  the  man's  body  isariramadhydf)  and  coming  in 
touch  with  the  jug  becomes  transformed  into  the  same  form, 
and  as  soon  as  this  transformation  takes  place  the  cit  which 
is  always  steadily  shining  illuminates  the  jug-form  or  the  jug. 
The  jug  phenomena  in  the  objective  world  could  not  be  mani- 
fested (though  these  were  taking  place  on  the  background  of 
the  same  self-luminous  Brahman  or  atman  as  forms  of  the  highest 
truth  of  my  subjective  consciousness)  because  the  ajftana  pheno- 
mena in  these  forms  serve  to  veil  their  illuminator,  the  self-lumin- 
ous. It  was  only  by  coming  into  contact  with  these  phenomena 
that  the  antahkarana  could  be  transformed  into  corresponding 
states  and  that  the  illumination  dawned  which  at  once  revealed 
the  antahkarana  states  and  the  objects  with  which  these  states  or 
vrttis  had  coalesced.  The  consciousness  manifested  through  the 
vrttis  alone  has  the  power  of  removing  the  ajftana  veiling  the 
cit.  Of  course  there  are  no  actual  distinctions  of  inner  or  outer, 
or  the  cit  within  me  and  the  cit  without  me.  These  are  only  of 
appearance  and  due  to  avidya.  And  it  is  only  from  the  point  of 
view  of  appearance  that  we  suppose  that  knowledge  of  objects 
can  only  dawn  when  the  inner  cit  and  the  outer  cit  unite  together 
through  the  antahkaranavrtti,  which  makes  the  external  objects 

D.  31 


482  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

translucent  as  it  were  by  its  own  translucence,  removes  the  ajnana 
which  was  veiHng  the  external  self-luminous  cit  and  reveals  the 
object  phenomena  by  the  very  union  of  the  cit  as  reflected 
through  it  and  the  cit  as  underlying  the  object  phenomena.  The 
pratyaksa-prama  or  right  knowledge  by  perception  is  the  cit,  the 
pure  consciousness,  reflected  through  the  vrtti  and  identical  with 
the  cit  as  the  background  of  the  object  phenomena  revealed  by 
it.  From  the  relative  point  of  view  we  may  thus  distinguish  three 
consciousnesses:  (i)  consciousness  as  the  background  of  objec- 
tive phenomena,  (2)  consciousness  as  the  background  of  the  jiva 
or  pramata,  the  individual,  (3)  consciousness  reflected  in  the  vrtti 
of  the  antahkarana;  when  these  three  unite  perception  is  effected. 

Prama  or  right  knowledge  means  in  Vedanta  the  acquire- 
ment of  such  new  knowledge  as  has  not  been  contradicted  by 
experience  {abddhitd).  There  is  thus  no  absolute  definition  of 
truth.  A  knowledge  acquired  can  be  said  to  be  true  only  so  long 
as  it  is  not  contradicted.  Thus  the  world  appearance  though  it 
is  very  true  now,  may  be  rendered  false,  when  this  is  contradicted 
by  right  knowledge  of  Brahman  as  the  one  reality.  Thus  the. 
knowledge  of  the  world  appearance  is  true  now,  but  not  true 
absolutely.  The  only  absolute  truth  is  the  pure  consciousness 
which  is  never  contradicted  in  any  experience  at  any  time.  The 
truth  of  our  world-knowledge  is  thus  to  be  tested  by  finding  out 
whether  it  will  be  contradicted  at  any  stage  of  world  experience 
or  not.  That  which  is  not  contradicted  by  later  experience  is  to 
be  regarded  as  true,  for  all  world  knowledge  as  a  whole  will  be 
contradicted  when  Brahma-knowledge  is  realized. 

The  inner  experiences  of  pleasure  and  pain  also  are  gene- 
rated by  a  false  identification  of  antahkarana  transformations  as 
pleasure  or  pain  with  the  self,  by  virtue  of  which  are  gene- 
rated the  perceptions,  "I  am  happy,"  or  "I  am  sorry."  In  con- 
tinuous perception  of  anything  for  a  certain  time  as  an  object 
or  as  pleasure,  etc.  the  mental  state  or  vrtti  is  said  to  last  in  the 
same  way  all  the  while  so  long  as  any  other  new  form  is  not 
taken  up  by  the  antahkarana  for  the  acquirement  of  any  new 
knowledge.  In  such  cases  when  I  infer  that  there  is  fire  on  the 
hill  that  I  see,  the  hill  is  an  object  of  perception,  for  the  antah- 
karana vrtti  is  one  with  it,  but  that  there  is  fire  in  it  is  a  matter 
of  inference,  for  the  antahkarana  vrtti  cannot  be  in  touch  with  the 
fire ;  so  in  the  same  experience  there  may  be  two   modes  of 


x]  Perception  483 

mental  modification,  as  perception  in  seeing  the  hill,  and  as 
inference  in  inferring  the  fire  in  the  hill.  In  cases  of  acquired 
perception,  as  when  on  seeing  sandal  wood  I  think  that  it  is 
odoriferous  sandal  wood,  it  is  pure  perception  so  far  as  the  sandal 
wood  is  concerned,  it  is  inference  or  memory  so  far  as  I  assert  it 
to  be  odoriferous,  Vedanta  does  not  admit  the  existence  of  the 
relation  called  samavdya  (inherence)  or  jdti  (class  notion)  ;  and 
so  does  not  distinguish  perception  as  a  class  as  distinct  from  the 
other  class  called  inference,  and  holds  that  both  perception  and 
inference  are  but  different  modes  of  the  transformations  of  the 
antahkarana  reflecting  the  cit  in  the  corresponding  vrttis.  The 
perception  is  thus  nothing  but  the  cit  manifestation  in  the  antah- 
karana vrtti  transformed  into  the  form  of  an  object  with  which  it  is 
in  contact.  Perception  in  its  objective  aspect  is  the  identity  of 
the  cit  underlying  the  object  with  the  subject,  and  perception  in 
the  subjective  aspect  is  regarded  as  the  identity  of  the  subjective 
cit  with  the  objective  cit.  This  identity  of  course  means  that 
through  the  vrtti  the  same  reality  subsisting  in  the  object  and 
the  subject  is  realized,  whereas  in  inference  the  thing  to  be  in- 
ferred, being  away  from  contact  with  antahkarana,  has  apparently 
a  different  reality  from  that  manifested  in  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness. Thus  perception  is  regarded  as  the  mental  state  represent- 
ing the  same  identical  reality  in  the  object  and  the  subject  by 
antahkarana  contact,  and  it  is  held  that  the  knowledge  produced 
b}'  words  (e.g.  this  is  the  same  Devadatta)  referring  identically 
to  the  same  thing  which  is  seen  (e.g.  when  I  see  Devadatta 
before  me  another  man  says  this  is  Devadatta,  and  the  know- 
ledge produced  by  "  this  is  Devadatta  "  though  a  verbal  {sdbda) 
knowledge  is  to  be  regarded  as  perception,  for  the  antahkarana 
vrtti  is  the  same)  is  to  be  regarded  as  perception  or  pratyaksa. 
The  content  of  these  words  (this  is  Devadatta)  being  the  same 
as  the  perception,  and  there  being  no  new  relationing  knowledge  as 
represented  in  the  proposition  "  this  is  Devadatta  "  involving  the 
unity  of  two  terms  "this"  and  "Devadatta"  with  a  copula,  but 
only  the  indication  of  one  whole  as  Devadatta  under  visual  per- 
ception already  experienced,  the  knowledge  proceeding  from 
"  this  is  Devadatta  "  is  regarded  as  an  example  of  nirvikalpa 
knowledge.  So  on  the  occasion  of  the  rise  of  Brahma-conscious- 
ness when  the  preceptor  instructs  "  thou  art  Brahman "  the 
knowledge  proceeding  from  the   sentence  is  not  savikalpa,  for 

31—2 


484  The  Sahkara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

though  grammatically  there  are  two  ideas  and  a  copula,  yet 
from  the  point  of  view  of  intrinsic  significance  {tdtparyd)  one 
identical  reality  only  is  indicated.  Vedanta  does  not  distinguish 
nirvikalpa  and  savikalpa  in  visual  perception,  but  only  in  sabda 
perception  as  in  cases  referred  to  above.  In  all  such  cases  the 
condition  for  nirvikalpa  is  that  the  notion  conveyed  by  the 
sentence  should  be  one  whole  or  one  identical  reality,  whereas 
in  savikalpa  perception  we  have  a  combination  of  different 
ideas  as  in  the  sentence,  "the  king's  man  is  coming"  {rdjapuriisa 
agacchati).  Here  no  identical  reality  is  signified,  but  what  is 
signified  is  the  combination  of  two  or  three  different  concepts\ 

It  is  not  out  of  place  to  mention  in  this  connection  that 
Vedanta  admits  all  the  six  pramanas  of  Kumarila  and  con- 
siders like  Mimarnsa  that  all  knowledge  is  self-valid  {svatah- 
pranidnd).  But  prama  has  not  the  same  meaning  in  Vedanta 
as  in  Mimamsa.  There  as  we  remember  prama  meant  the 
knowledge  which  goaded  one  to  practical  action  and  as  such 
all  knowledge  was  prama,  until  practical  experience  showed  the 
course  of  action  in  accordance  with  which  it  was  found  to  be 
contradicted.  In  Vedanta  however  there  is  no  reference  to  action, 
but  prama  means  only  uncontradicted  cognition.  To  the  definition 
of  self-validity  as  given  by  Mimarnsa  Vedanta  adds  another 
objective  qualification,  that  such  knowledge  can  have  svatah- 
pramanya  as  is  not  vitiated  by  the  presence  of  any  dosa  (cause 
of  error,  such  as  defect  of  senses  or  the  like).  Vedanta  of  course 
does  not  think  like  Nyaya  that  positive  conditions  (e.g.  cor- 
respondence, etc.)  are  necessary  for  the  validity  of  knowledge, 
nor  does  it  divest  knowledge  of  all  qualifications  like  the 
Mimarnsists,  for  whom  all  knowledge  is  self-valid  as  such.  It 
adopts  a  middle  course  and  holds  that  absence  of  dosa  is  a  neces- 
sary condition  for  the  self- validity  of  knowledge.  It  is  clear  that 
this  is  a  compromise,  for  whenever  an  external  condition  has  to 
be  admitted,  the  knowledge  cannot  be  regarded  as  self-valid, 
but  Vedanta  says  that  as  it  requires  only  a  negative  condition 
for  the  absence  of  dosa,  the  objection  does  not  apply  to  it,  and  it 
holds  that  if  it  depended  on  the  presence  of  any  positive  con- 
dition for  proving  the  validity  of  knowledge  like  the  Nyaya, 
then  only  its  theory  of  self-validity  would  have  been  damaged. 
But  since  it  wants  only  a  negative  condition,  no  blame  can  be 

'  See  Veddntaparibhdsa  and  Sikhdmani. 


x]  Theory  of  Illusion  485 

attributed  to  its  theory  of  self-validity.  Vedanta  was  bound  to 
follow  this  slippery  middle  course,  for  it  could  not  say  that  the 
pure  cit  reflected  in  consciousness  could  require  anything  else 
for  establishing  its  validity,  nor  could  it  say  that  all  phenomenal 
forms  of  knowledge  were  also  all  valid,  for  then  the  world- 
appearance  would  come  to  be  valid  ;  so  it  held  that  know- 
ledge could  be  regarded  as  valid  only  when  there  was  no  dosa 
present ;  thus  from  the  absolute  point  of  view  all  world-know- 
ledge was  false  and  had  no  validity,  because  there  was  the 
avidya-dosa,  and  in  the  ordinary  sphere  also  that  knowledge  was 
valid  in  which  there  was  no  dosa.  Validity  (pramanya)  with 
Mimamsa  meant  the  capacity  that  knowledge  has  to  goad  us  to 
practical  action  in  accordance  vvith  it,  but  with  Vedanta  it  meant 
correctness  to  facts  and  want  of  contradiction.  The  absence  of 
dosa  being  guaranteed  there  is  nothing  which  can  vitiate  the 
correctness  of  knowledge^ 

Vedanta  Theory  of  Illusion. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  Mimamsists  had  asserted  that 
all  knowledge  was  true  simply  because  it  was  knowledge  {yath- 
drthah  sarve  vivddaspadibhutdh  pratyaydh  pratyayatvdt).  Even 
illusions  were  explained  by  them  as  being  non-perception  of  the 
distinction  between  the  thing  perceived  (e.g.  the  conch-shell),  and 
the  thing  remembered  (e.g.  silver).  But  Vedanta  objects  to  this, 
and  asks  how  there  can  be  non-distinction  between  a  thing  which 
is  clearly  perceived  and  a  thing  which  is  remembered?  If  it  is 
said  that  it  is  merely  a  non-perception  of  the  non-association  (i.e. 
non-perception  of  the  fact  that  this  is  not  connected  with  silver), 
then  also  it  cannot  be,  for  then  it  is  on  either  side  mere  negation, 
and  negation  with  Mimamsa  is  nothing  but  the  bare  presence  of  the 
locus  of  negation  (e.g.  negation  of  jug  on  the  ground  is  nothing  but 
the  bare  presence  of  the  ground),  or  in  other  words  non-percep- 
tion of  the  non-association  of  "silver"  and  "this"  means  barely 
and  merely  the  "silver"  and  "this."  Even  admitting  for  argu- 
ment's sake  that  the  distinction  between  two  things  or  two  ideas 
is  not  perceived,  yet  merely  from  such  a  negative  aspect  no  one 
could  be  tempted  to  move  forward  to  action  (such  as  stoop- 
ing down  to  pick  up  a  piece  of  illusory  silver).    It  is  positive 

^  See    Veddntaparibhdsd,  Sikhdmani,   Maniprabhd  and  Citsukha   on  svatahpra- 
manya. 


486  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [cH. 

conviction  or  perception  that  can  lead  a  man  to  actual  practical 
movement.  If  again  it  is  said  that  it  is  the  general  and  imperfect 
perception  of  a  thing  (which  has  not  been  properly  differentiated 
and  comprehended)  before  me,  which  by  the  memory  of  silver 
appears  to  be  like  true  silver  before  me  and  this  generates  the 
movement  for  picking  it  up,  then  this  also  is  objectionable.  For 
the  appearance  of  the  similarity  with  real  silver  cannot  lead  us 
to  behave  with  the  thing  before  me  as  if  it  were  real  silver.  Thus 
I  may  perceive  that  gavaya  (wild  ox)  is  similar  to  cow,  but  despite 
this  similarity  I  am  not  tempted  to  behave  with  the  gavaya  as 
if  it  were  a  cow.  Thus  in  whatever  way  the  Mimarnsa  position 
may  be  defined  it  fails^  Vedanta  thinks  that  the  illusion  is 
not  merely  subjective,  but  that  there  is  actually  a  phenomenon 
of  illusion  as  there  are  phenomena  of  actual  external  objects; 
the  difference  in  the  two  cases  consists  in  this,  that  the  illusion 
is  generated  by  the  dosa  or  defect  of  the  senses  etc.,  whereas  the 
phenomena  of  external  objects  are  not  due  to  such  specific  dosas. 
The  process  of  illusory  perception  in  Vedanta  may  be  described 
thus.  First  by  the  contact  of  the  senses  vitiated  by  dosas  a 
mental  state  as  "thisness"  with  reference  to  the  thing  before  me 
is  generated;  then  in  the  thing  as  "this"  and  in  the  mental  state 
of  the  form  of  that  "this"  the  cit  is  reflected.  Then  the  avidya 
(nescience)  associated  with  the  cit  is  disturbed  by  the  presence 
of  the  dosa,  and  this  disturbance  along  with  the  impression  of 
silver  remembered  through  similarity  is  transformed  into  the 
appearance  of  silver.  There  is  thus  an  objective  illusory  silver 
appearance,  as  well  as  a  similar  transformation  of  the  mental  state 
generated  by  its  contact  with  the  illusory  silver.  These  two  trans- 
formations, the  silver  state  of  the  mind  and  external  phenomenal 
illusory  silver  state, are  manifested  by  the  perceiving  consciousness 
{sdksicaitanyd).  There  are  thus  here  two  phenomenal  transforma- 
tions, one  in  the  avidya  states  forming  the  illusory  objective  silver 
phenomenon,  and  another  in  the  antahkarana-vrtti  or  mind  state. 
But  in  spite  of  there  being  two  distinct  and  separate  phenomena, 
their  object  being  the  same  as  the  "this"  in  perception,  we  have 
one  knowledge  of  illusion.  The  special  feature  of  this  theory  of 
illusion  is  that  an  indefinable  {aniriiacanlya-khydti)  illusory  silver 
is  created  in  every  case  where  an  illusory  perception  of  silver 
occurs.  There  arc  three  orders  of  reality  in  Vedanta,  namely  the 

^  See  Vivarana-prameya-samgraha  and  Nyayamakaranda  on  akhyati  refutation. 


x]  Nature  of  Illusion  487 

pdramdrthika  or  absolute,  vyavahdrika  or  practical  ordinary 
experience,  and  prdtibhdsika,  illusory.  The  first  one  represents 
the  absolute  truth;  the  other  two  are  false  impressions  due 
to  dosa.  The  difference  between  vyavaharika  and  pratibhasika 
is  that  the  dosa  of  the  vyavaharika  perception  is  neither  dis- 
covered nor  removed  until  salvation,  whereas  the  dosa  of  the 
pratibhasika  reality  which  occurs  in  many  extraneous  forms  (such 
as  defect  of  the  senses,  sleep,  etc.)  is  perceived  in  the  world  of 
our  ordinary  experience,  and  thus  the  pratibhasika  experience 
lasts  for  a  much  shorter  period  than  the  vyavaharika.  But  just 
as  the  vyavaharika  world  is  regarded  as  phenomenal  modifica- 
tions of  the  ajiiana,  as  apart  from  our  subjective  experience  and 
even  before  it,  so  the  illusion  (e.g.  of  silver  in  the  conch-shell)  is 
also  regarded  as  a  modification  of  avidya,  an  undefinable  creation 
of  the  object  of  illusion,  by  the  agency  of  the  dosa.  Thus  in  the 
case  of  the  illusion  of  silver  in  the  conch-shell,  indefinable  silver 
is  created  by  the  dosa  in  association  with  the  senses,  which  is 
called  the  creation  of  an  indefinable  {aiiirvacamyd)  silver  of  illu- 
sion. Here  the  cit  underlying  the  conch-shell  remains  the  same 
but  the  avidya  of  antahkarana  suffers  modifications  {parindfna) 
on  account  of  dosa,  and  thus  gives  rise  to  the  illusory  creation. 
The  illusory  silver  is  thus  vivartta  (appearance)  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  cit  and  parinama  from  the  point  of  view  of 
avidya,  for  the  difference  between  vivartta  and  parinama  is,  that 
in  the  former  the  transformations  have  a  different  reality  from 
the  cause  (cit  is  different  from  the  appearance  imposed  on  it), 
while  in  the  latter  case  the  transformations  have  the  same  reality 
as  the  transforming  entity  (appearance  of  silver  has  the  same 
stuff  as  the  avidya  whose  transformations  it  is).  But  now  a 
difficulty  arises  that  if  the  illusory  perception  of  silver  is  due  to 
a  coalescing  of  the  cit  underlying  the  antahkarana-vrtti  as  modi- 
fied by  dosa  and  the  object — cit  as  underlying  the  "this"  before 
me  (in  the  illusion  of  "this  is  silver"),  then  I  ought  to  have  the 
experience  that  "I  am  silver"  like  "I  am  happy"  and  not  that 
"this  is  silver";  the  answer  is,  that  as  the  coalescing  takes  place 
in  connection  with  my  previous  notion  as  "this,"  the  form  of 
the  knowledge  also  is  "this  is  silver,"  whereas  in  the  notion 
"  I  am  happy,"  the  notion  of  happiness  takes  place  in  connec- 
tion with  a  previous  vrtti  of  "I."  Thus  though  the  coalescing 
of  the  two  "cits"  is  the  same  in  both  cases,  yet  in  one  case  the 


488  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

knowledge  takes  the  form  of  "I  am,"  and  in  another  as  "this  is" 
according  as  the  previous  impression  is  "I"  or  "this."  In  dreams 
also  the  dream  perceptions  are  the  same  as  the  illusory  percep- 
tion of  silver  in  the  conch-shell.  There  the  illusory  creations  are 
generated  through  the  defects  of  sleep,  and  these  creations  are 
imposed  upon  the  cit.  The  dream  experiences  cannot  be  regarded 
merely  as  memory-products,  for  the  perception  in  dream  is  in  the 
form  that  "I  see  that  I  ride  in  the  air  on  chariots,  etc."  and  not 
that  "  I  remember  the  chariots."  In  the  dream  state  all  the  senses 
are  inactive,  and  therefore  there  is  no  separate  objective  cit  there, 
but  the  whole  dream  experience  with  all  characteristics  of  space, 
time,  objects,  etc.  is  imposed  upon  the  cit.  The  objection  that 
since  the  imposition  is  on  the  pure  cit  the  imposition  ought  to 
last  even  in  waking  stages,  and  that  the  dream  experiences  ought 
to  continue  even  in  waking  life,  does  not  hold ;  for  in  the  waking 
stages  the  antahkarana  is  being  constantly  transformed  into  dif- 
ferent states  on  the  expiry  of  the  defects  of  sleep,  etc.,  which  were 
causing  the  dream  cognitions.  This  is  called  nivrtti  (negation) 
as  distinguished  from  bddha  (cessation).  The  illusory  creation  of 
dream  experiences  may  still  be  there  on  the  pure  cit,  but  these 
cannot  be  experienced  any  longer,  for  there  being  no  dosa  of 
sleep  the  antahkarana  is  active  and  suffering  modifications  in 
accordance  with  the  objects  presented  before  us.  This  is  what  is 
called  nivrtti,  for  though  the  illusion  is  there  I  cannot  experience 
it,  whereas  badha  or  cessation  occurs  when  the  illusory  creation 
ceases,  as  when  on  finding  out  the  real  nature  of  the  conch-shell 
the  illusion  of  silver  ceases,  and  we  feel  that  this  is  not  silver,  this 
was  not  and  will  not  be  silver.  When  the  conch-shell  is  perceived 
as  silver,  the  silver  is  felt  as  a  reality,  but  this  feeling  of  reality 
was  not  an  illusory  creation,  though  the  silver  was  an  objective 
illusory  creation ;  for  the  reality  in  the  sukti  (conch-shell)  is  trans- 
ferred and  felt  as  belonging  to  the  illusion  of  silver  imposed  upon 
it.  Here  we  see  that  the  illusion  of  silver  has  two  different  kinds 
of  illusion  comprehended  in  it.  One  is  the  creation  of  an  inde- 
finable silver  {anirvacanlya-r'ajatotpatti)  and  the  other  is  the  attri- 
bution of  the  reality  belonging  to  the  conch-shell  to  the  illusory 
silver  imposed  upon  it,  by  which  we  feel  at  the  time  of  the  illu- 
sion that  it  is  a  reality.  This  is  no  doubt  the  anyathdkhydti 
form  of  illusion  as  advocated  by  Nyaya.  Vedanta  admits  that 
when  two  things  (e.g.  red  flower  and  crystal)  are  both  present 


x]  Vedanta  Ethics  489 

before  my  senses,  and  I  attribute  the  quality  of  one  to  the  other 
by  illusion  (e.g.  the  illusion  that  the  crystal  is  red),  then  the  illusion 
is  of  the  form  of  anyathakhyati ;  but  if  one  of  the  things  is  not 
present  before  my  senses  and  the  other  is,  then  the  illusion  is  not 
of  the  anyathakhyati  type,  but  of  the  anirvacanlyakhyati  type. 
Vedanta  could  not  avoid  the  former  type  of  illusion,  for  it  be- 
lieved that  all  appearance  of  reality  in  the  world-appearance 
was  really  derived  from  the  reality  of  Brahman,  which  was  self- 
luminous  in  all  our  experiences.  The  world  appearance  is  an 
illusory  creation,  but  the  sense  of  reality  that  it  carries  with  it 
is  a  misattribution  {anyathakhyati)  of  the  characteristic  of  the 
Brahman  to  it,  for  Brahman  alone  is  the  true  and  the  real,  which 
manifests  itself  as  the  reality  of  all  our  illusory  world-experience, 
just  as  it  is  the  reality  of  sukti  that  gives  to  the  appearance  of 
silver  its  reality. 

Vedanta  Ethics  and  Vedanta  Emancipation. 

Vedanta  says  that  when  a  duly  qualified  man  takes  to  the 
study  of  Vedanta  and  is  instructed  by  the  preceptor — "  Thou 
art  that  (Brahman),"  he  attains  the  emancipating  knowledge, 
and  the  world-appearance  becomes  for  him  false  and  illusory. 
The  qualifications  necessary  for  the  study  of  Vedanta  are  (i) 
that  the  person  having  studied  all  the  Vedas  with  the  proper 
accessories,  such  as  grammar,  lexicon  etc.  is  in  full  possession  of 
the  knowledge  of  the  Vedas,(2)that  either  in  this  life  or  in  another, 
he  must  have  performed  only  the  obligatory  Vedic  duties  (such 
as  daily  prayer,  etc.  called  nitya-karmd)  and  occasionally  obli- 
gatory duty  (such  as  the  birth  ceremony  at  the  birth  of  a  son, 
called  naimittika-karmd)  and  must  have  avoided  all  actions  for 
the  fulfilment  of  selfish  desires  {kdmya-karmas,  such  as  the 
performance  of  sacrifices  for  going  to  Heaven)  and  all  pro- 
hibited actions  (e.g.  murder,  etc.  nisiddha-karma)  in  such  a 
way  that  his  mind  is  purged  of  all  good  and  bad  actions  (no 
karma  is  generated  by  the  nitya  and  naimittika-karnia,  and  as 
he  has  not  performed  the  kdmya  and  prohibited  karmas,  he  has 
acquired  no  new  karma).  When  he  has  thus  properly  purified 
his  mind  and  is  in  possession  of  the  four  virtues  or  means  of 
fitting  the  mind  for  Vedanta  instruction  (called  sddhand)  he 
can  regard  himself  as  properly  qualified  for  the  Vedanta  in- 
struction.   These  virtues  are  (i)  knowledge  of  what  is  eternal 


490  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch, 

and  what  is  transient,  (2)  disinclination  to  enjoyments  of  this 
life  and  of  the  heavenly  life  after  death,  (3)  extreme  distaste  for 
all  enjoyments,  and  anxiety  for  attaining  the  means  of  right  know- 
ledge, (4)  control  over  the  senses  by  which  these  are  restrained 
from  everything  but  that  which  aids  the  attainment  of  right 
knowledge  {dama),  (a)  having  restrained  them,  the  attainment 
of  such  power  that  these  senses  may  not  again  be  tempted  to- 
wards worldly  enjoyments  {tiparati),  {b)  power  of  bearing  extremes 
of  heat,  cold,  etc.,  {c)  employment  of  mind  towards  the  at- 
tainment of  right  knowledge,  {d)  faith  in  the  instructor  and 
Upanisads ;  (5)  strong  desire  to  attain  salvation.  A  man  pos- 
sessing the  above  qualities  should  try  to  understand  correctly 
the  true  purport  of  the  Upanisads  (called  sravana),  and  by 
arguments  in  favour  of  the  purport  of  the  Upanisads  to 
strengthen  his  conviction  as  stated  in  the  Upanisads  (called 
manana)  and  then  by  tiididhydsa?ta  (meditation)  which  includes 
all  the  Yoga  processes  of  concentration,  try  to  realize  the  truth 
as  one.  Vedanta  therefore  in  ethics  covers  the  ground  of 
Yoga ;  but  while  for  Yoga  emancipation  proceeds  from  under- 
standing the  difference  between  purusa  and  prakrti,  with  Vedanta 
salvation  comes  by  the  dawn  of  right  knowledge  that  Brahman 
alone  is  the  true  reality,  his  own  self^  Mlmamsa  asserts  that  the 
Vedas  do  not  declare  the  knowledge  of  one  Brahman  to  be  the 
supreme  goal,  but  holds  that  all  persons  should  act  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Vedic  injunctions  for  the  attainment  of  good 
and  the  removal  of  evil.  But  Vedanta  holds  that  though  the 
purport  of  the  earlier  Vedas  is  as  Mimamsa  has  it,  yet  this 
is  meant  only  for  ordinary  people,  whereas  for  the  elect  the 
goal  is  clearly  as  the  Upanisads  indicate  it,  namely  the  attain- 
ment of  the  highest  knowledge.  The  performance  of  Vedic 
duties  is  intended  only  for  ordinary  men,  but  yet  it  was 
believed  by  many  (e.g.  Vacaspati  Misra  and  his  followers)  that 
due  performance  of  Vedic  duties  helped  a  man  to  acquire  a 
great  keenness  for  the  attainment  of  right  knowledge;  others 
believed  (e.g.  Prakasatma  and  his  followers)  that  it  served  to 
bring  about  suitable  opportunities  by  securing  good  preceptors, 
etc.  and  to  remove  many  obstacles  from  the  way  so  that  it  be- 
came easier  for  a  person  to  attain  the  desired  right  knowledge. 
In  the  acquirement  of  ordinary  knowledge  the  ajfianas  re- 

'  See  Veddntasdra  and  Advaitahrahmasiddhi. 


x]  Emancipation  49 1 

moved  are  only  smaller  states  of  ajnana,  whereas  when  the 
Brahma-knowledge  dawns  the  ajnana  as  a  whole  is  removed. 
Brahma-knowledge  at  the  stage  of  its  first  rise  is  itself  also  a 
state  of  knowledge,  but  such  is  its  special  strength  that  when 
this  knowledge  once  dawns,  even  the  state  of  knowledge  which 
at  first  reflects  it  (and  which  being  a  state  is  itself  ajnana  modi- 
fication) is  destroyed  by  it.  The  state  itself  being  destroyed, 
only  the  pure  infinite  and  unlimited  Brahman  shines  forth  in  its 
own  true  light.  Thus  it  is  said  that  just  as  fire  riding  on  a  piece 
of  wood  would  burn  the  whole  city  and  after  that  would  burn 
the  very  same  wood,  so  in  the  last  state  of  mind  the  Brahma- 
knowledge  would  destroy  all  the  illusory  world-appearance  and 
at  last  destroy  even  that  final  stated 

The  mukti  stage  is  one  in  which  the  pure  light  of  Brahman 
as  the  identity  of  pure  intelligence,  being  and  complete  bliss 
shines  forth  in  its  unique  glory,  and  all  the  rest  vanishes  as 
illusory  nothing.  As  all  being  of  the  world-appearance  is  but 
limited  manifestations  of  that  one  being,  so  all  pleasures  also 
are  but  limited  manifestations  of  that  supreme  bliss,  a  taste 
of  which  we  all  can  get  in  deep  dreamless  sleep.  The  being 
of  Brahman  however  is  not  an  abstraction  from  all  existent 
beings  as  the  sattd  (being  as  class  notion)  of  the  naiyayika,  but 
the  concrete,  the  real,  which  in  its  aspect  as  pure  consciousness 
and  pure  bliss  is  always  identical  with  itself  Being  {sat)  is  pure 
bliss  and  pure  consciousness.  What  becomes  of  the  avidya  during 
mukti  (emancipation)  is  as  difficult  for  one  to  answer  as  the 
question,  how  the  avidya  came  forth  and  stayed  during  the  world- 
appearance.  It  is  best  to  remember  that  the  category  of  the 
indefinite  avidya  is  indefinite  as  regards  its  origin,  manifestation 
and  destruction.  Vedanta  however  believes  that  even  when  the 
true  knowledge  has  once  been  attained,  the  body  may  last  for  a 
while,  if  the  individual's  previously  ripened  karmas  demand  it. 
Thus  the  emancipated  person  may  walk  about  and  behave  like 
an  ordinary  sage,  but  yet  he  is  emancipated  and  can  no  longer 
acquire  any  new  karma.  As  soon  as  the  fruits  due  to  his  ripe 
karmas  are  enjoyed  and  exhausted,  the  sage  loses  his  body  and 
there  will  never  be  any  other  birth  for  him,  for  the  dawn  of 
perfect  knowledge  has  burnt  up  for  him  all  budding  karmas  of 
beginningless  previous  lives,  and  he  is  no  longer  subject  to  any 

^  Siddhantalesa. 


492  The  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch. 

of  the  illusions  subjective  or  objective  which  could  make  any 
knowledge,  action,  or  feeling  possible  for  him.  Such  a  man  is 
called  jivanmukta,  i.e.  emancipated  while  living.  For  him  all 
world-appearance  has  ceased.  He  is  the  one  light  burning  alone 
in  himself  where  everything  else  has  vanished  for  ever  from  the 
staged 

Vedanta  and  other  Indian  Systems. 

Vedanta  is  distinctly  antagonistic  to  Nyaya,  and  most  of 
its  powerful  dialectic  criticism  is  generally  directed  against  it. 
Sankara  himself  had  begun  it  by  showing  contradictions  and 
inconsistencies  in  many  of  the  Nyaya  conceptions,  such  as  the 
theory  of  causation,  conception  of  the  atom,  the  relation  of  sama- 
vaya,  the  conception  of  jati,  etc.^  His  followers  carried  it  to  still 
greater  lengths  as  is  fully  demonstrated  by  the  labours  of  Sriharsa, 
Citsukha,  Madhusudana,  etc.  It  was  opposed  to  Mimamsa  so 
far  as  this  admitted  the  Nyaya- Vaisesika  categories,  but  agreed 
with  it  generally  as  regards  the  pramanas  of  anumana,  upamiti, 
arthapatti,  sabda,  and  anupalabdhi.  It  also  found  a  great  sup- 
porter in  Mimamsa  with  its  doctrine  of  the  self-validity  and  self- 
manifesting  power  of  knowledge.  But  it  differed  from  Mimamsa 
in  the  field  of  practical  duties  and  entered  into  many  elaborate 
discussions  to  prove  that  the  duties  of  the  Vedas  referred  only  to 
ordinary  men,  whereas  men  of  higher  order  had  no  Vedic  duties 
to  perform  but  were  to  rise  above  them  and  attain  the  highest 
knowledge,  and  that  a  man  should  perform  the  Vedic  duties 
only  so  long  as  he  was  not  fit  for  Vedanta  instruction  and 
studies. 

With  Sarnkhya  and  Yoga  the  relation  of  Vedanta  seems  to 
be  very  close.  We  have  already  seen  that  Vedanta  had  accepted 
all  the  special  means  of  self-purification,  meditation,  etc.,  that 
were  advocated  by  Yoga.  The  main  difference  between  Vedanta 
and  Sarnkhya  was  this  that  Sarnkhya  believed  that  the  stuff  of 
which  the  world  consisted  was  a  reality  side  by  side  with  the 
purusas.  In  later  times  Vedanta  had  compromised  so  far  with 
Sarnkhya  that  it  also  sometimes  described  maya  as  being  made 
up  of  sattva,  rajas,  and  tamas.  Vedanta  also  held  that  according 
to  these  three  characteristics  were  formed  diverse  modifications 

^  See  Pancada^i. 

'•*  See  Sankara's  refutation  of  Nyaya,  Sankara-bhdsya,  ii.  ii. 


x]  Vedanta  and  other  Systems  493 

of  the  maya.  Thus  Tsvara  is  believed  to  possess  a  mind  of  pure 
sattva  alone.  But  sattva,  rajas  and  tamas  were  accepted  in 
Vedanta  in  the  sense  of  tendencies  and  not  as  reals  as  Sarnkhya 
held  it.  Moreover,  in  spite  of  all  modifications  that  maya  was 
believed  to  pass  through  as  the  stuff  of  the  world-appearance,  it 
was  indefinable  and  indefinite,  and  in  its  nature  different  from 
what  we  understand  as  positive  or  negative.  It  was  an  unsub- 
stantial nothing,  a  magic  entity  which  had  its  being  only  so  long 
as  it  appeared.  Prakrti  also  was  indefinable  or  rather  undemon- 
strable  as  regards  its  own  essential  nature  apart  from  its  mani- 
festation, but  even  then  it  was  believed  to  be  a  combination  of 
positive  reals.  It  was  undefinable  because  so  long  as  the  reals 
composing  it  did  not  combine,  no  demonstrable  qualities  belonged 
to  it  with  which  it  could  be  defined.  Maya  however  was  unde- 
monstrable,  indefinite,  and  indefinable  in  all  forms ;  it  was  a 
separate  category  of  the  indefinite.  Sarnkhya  believed  in  the 
personal  individuality  of  souls,  while  for  Vedanta  there  was  only 
one  soul  or  self,  which  appeared  as  many  by  virtue  of  the  maya 
transformations.  There  was  an  adhyasa  or  illusion  in  Sarnkhya 
as  well  as  in  Vedanta;  but  in  the  former  the  illusion  was  due 
to  a  mere  non-distinction  between  prakrti  and  purusa  or  mere 
misattribution  of  characters  or  identities,  but  in  Vedanta  there 
was  not  only  misattribution,  but  a  false  and  altogether  inde- 
finable creation.  Causation  with  Sarnkhya  meant  real  transforma- 
tion, but  with  Vedanta  all  transformation  was  mere  appearance. 
Though  there  were  so  many  differences,  it  is  however  easy  to 
see  that  probably  at  the  time  of  the  origin  of  the  two  systems 
during  the  Upanisad  period  each  was  built  up  from  very  similar 
ideas  which  differed  only  in  tendencies  that  gradually  manifested 
themselves  into  the  present  divergences  of  the  two  systems. 
Though  Saiikara  laboured  hard  to  prove  that  the  Sarnkhya 
view  could  not  be  found  in  the  Upanisads,  we  can  hardly  be 
convinced  by  his  interpretations  and  arguments.  The  more 
he  argues,  the  more  we  are  led  to  suspect  that  the  Sarnkhya 
thought  had  its  origin  in  the  Upanisads.  Safikara  and  his 
followers  borrowed  much  of  their  dialectic  form  of  criticism  from 
the  Buddhists.  His  Brahman  was  very  much  like  the  sunya 
of  Nagarjuna.  It  is  difficult  indeed  to  distinguish  between 
pure  being  and  pure  non-being  as  a  category.  The  debts  of 
Safikara  to  the  self-luminosity  of  the  Vijnanavada  Buddhism 


494  ^'^^^  Sankara  School  of  Vedanta  [ch.  x 

can  hardly  be  overestimated.  There  seems  to  be  much  truth 
in  the  accusations  against  Sankara  by  Vijnana  Bhiksu  and 
others  that  he  was  a  hidden  Buddhist  himself.  I  am  led  to 
think  that  Safikara's  philosophy  is  largely  a  compound  of 
Vijnanavada  and  Sunyavada  Buddhism  with  the  Upanisad 
notion  of  the  permanence  of  self  superadded. 


INDEX 


abadhita,  482 

abddhita7)isayatva.,  344 

abddhitdrthavisayajna7iatva,  47 1 

abhautika,  228  n. 

abhdva,  138,  (41,  284M.,  298,  304,  3I2«., 

335.  355,  356,  359'  453.  455 
abhava-vilaksanatvamdtram,  453 
abhdvendriyasannikarso,  359  n. 
abhdvd'pindriyagrahatiayo^yah,  359  n. 
Abhidhamma,  82,  83,  166 
Abkidhanuna  Pitaka,  96 
Abhidhamtnatthasangaha,  gon.,  92,  94;/. 
Abhidfiarmakosa,   115,   117,   119W.,   120, 

121,  128;  on  paticcasannippdda,  92  w. 
Abhidkarmakosabhdsya,  1 20 
Abhidharma  literature,  120 
Abhidkarmako^aldstra,  114 
Abhidharmakosavydkhyd,  119M.,  120 
Abhidhdnappadlpikd,  263  w. 
abhihitdnvayavdda,  396,  397 
abhildpa,  153,  408 
abhimdna,  250 
ahhimdna-dravya,  250 
abhinivesa,  93«.,  220  «.,  237,  267 
abhinnalaksane  anyonyahetuke,  145 
abhinildneiia,  98 
abhisandahana,  98 
abhism'ikharonti,  96 
abhrdnta,  408 
abhiita  -parikalpa  -  vdsand  -  vaicitra  -  niro- 

dha,  146 
ahhutasya,  423 
abhyaniijnd,  302 
abkydsa,  234,  271 
abhyiidaya,  285 
abhyupagamasiddhdnta,  295 
abrakma,  193 
Absolutism,  175 
Acchoka,  306 
acintya,  428 
acintyam,  425 
Actual,  275 
adkartna,  56,  197,  198,  281,  285  w.,  292, 

316,  323.  403.  404 
adhartndstikdya,  195 
adkikaranasiddhdnta,  295 
adhikdribheda,  30  «. 
adhikdri,  2 

adkisthdna,  446,  449,  451,  452 
adhivacdnd  safind,  96 
arf/5tf,  199 


adhvan,  3 1 1 

adhyavasdya,  ^ogn.,  410  w.,  413 

adAydsa,  481,  493 

adhydtma.,  28//. 

adhydtmavidyd,  277,  278 

Adhydyas,  70,  433 

Aditi,  23 

adrsta,  72,  205,  282,  283,  284,  292,  317, 

'322,  323>  324.  327.  383.  425.  452 
adrsiakaranaka,  291 
adrstakdritam,  292 
advaita,  422,  424,  425,  426,  439 
Advaitabrahmasiddhi,  420,  490  «. 
Advaitasiddhi,  67,  420,  444/2.,  456  «. 
Advaitasiddhisiddhdntasdra,  420 
advaya,  426 
advayamajdtim,  423 
advayatd,  426 
Advayaidraka,  28  «. 
Affliction,  301 
Afflictions,  259 
Aggregate,  93,  94,  123,  327 
Aggregates,  89,  144,  252 
Aggregation,  245,  247,  251,  263  «. 
Agni,  12,  16,  17,  37 
Agnostics,  106 
agraydna,  424 
agrdhyani,  425 
agrhltagrdhiivam,  388 
a/iam,  285,  457 
ahamkdra,  213,  214,  216,  225,  226,  248, 

249,  250,  253,  262,  276,  301,  457,  458, 

460,  461 
akimsd,  200,  236,  270 
Ahipati,  231 

Ahirbudhnya  Samhitd,  219,  220,  221 
ahirika,  100 

Aitareya,  28  w.,  30,  39,  57,  432  «.       -»• 
Aitareya-Aranyaka,  36 
Aitareya  school,  30 
aitihyaj  298,  304,  333  «. 
«/'«,  427 

Ajata4atru,  33,  34 
ajdiik,  423 
Ajitakesakambali,  80 
ajlva,  188,  195 
ajndna,    193,   449,   450,    452,    453,    454, 

455.  456,  457'  458,  460,  461,  465,  467, 

468,  469,  472,  481,  487,  491 
ajiiana-consciousness ,  458 
ajiidna-phenotnena,  46 1 


^  The  words  are  arranged  in  the  order  of  the  English  alphabet.  Sanskrit  and  Piili 
technical  terms  and  words  are  in  small  italics ;  names  of  books  are  in  italics  with  a 
capital.  English  words  and  other  names  are  in  Roman  with  a  capital.  Letters  with 
diacritical  marks  come  after  ordinary  ones.  But  throughout  the  body  of  the  book  the 
names  of  Vedic  works  are  in  Roman  with  a  capital,  as  a  mark  of  respect  for  their 
supposed  revealed  character. 


496 


Index 


ajndnas,  490 

ajnanatva,  445 

ajndna-vrtti,  481 

ajnatasaitvdbhyupagamdty  452 

Akhandananda,  4 19 

akhyati,  261  «.,  303,  384,  385,  386,  486  n. 

akiticanatd,  202 

aklista,  269 

Aksamdld,  28  n. 

Aksapada,  63,  71,  279,  306,  309 

Aksi,  28  n. 

alaksana,  425 

alaksanam,  21  ^n. 

alaukika,  341 

alaukika  sannikarsa,  341 

aldtaidnti,  424,  426 

Alberuni,  233,  234,  235,  237 

Alchemy,  235 

alinga,  217,  249 

aloka,  198 

Amalananda,  86  «.,  ii4«.,  418,  419 

Amaradasa,  419 

ambhas,  220 n. 

Amitdyurdhydnasutra,  125  ». 

amosadhartna,  139 

Anirtafidda,  28  n.,  228 

anabhibhava,  290  «. 

anadhigata,  471 

anadhigatddliigatitr,  410,  413 

anadhyavasdya,  332  «. 

anaikdntika-hetu,  344 

anantadariana,  189,  207,  238 

Anantadeva,  371 

anantadharmdtmakam  vasiu,  176 

anantajndna,  189,  207,  238 

anantasukha,  189,  238 

ana7itavlrya^  i^ji,  1 89,  207,  238 

auapade^a,  289 

anarthadanda,  200 

Anatomical,  103 

anavasthd,  i6o«.,  438 

anavasthd  {aprdmdniki),  319  «. 

attavast/id  (prd/Ndniki),  319  «. 

an  adz,  453 

anddibhdvarupatve    sati  jndnanivartya- 

ivam,  452 
anddikdla-prapaiica-vdsandhetukanca,  145 
andgdmi  magga,  100 
andsrava,  133 
andtha,  145 
andtt?ia,  145 
andtmaiva,  445 
a}idkaid?nisra,  220  n. 
anekdnta,  175 
anekdntavdda,  175 
anekdrlhamandndriham,  426  «. 
animitia,  300 

a7ih-odhamanutpddam,  425  «. 
Aniruddha,  212,  222 
aniruddham  anutpannam,  142 
anirvacaniya,  487 
anirvacamyakhydti,  486,  489 
anirvacaniyara-iaiopatti,  488 


anirvdcyavdda,  461 

anitya,  119  «.,  145 

anityatd,  201 

annamaya,  46 

annamaya  kosa,  60 

Annapicrnd,  28  w. 

Annihilation,  108,  109,  114,  135,  283 

anottapa,  100 

Anquetil  Duperron,  39 

anrta,  193 

aniakkarana,   299,    457,    458,   460,   461, 

472,  481,  482,  483,  487,  488 
antahkarana  vrtti,   481,    482,   483,  486, 

487 
Antakrtada^ds,  171 
antardbhava,  iign. 
aniardya,  193 
antardya-karma,  191 
antarvydpti,  157,  186,  346 
Antarvydptisamarthatia,  156,  346  «. 
aniarydmin,  48 
Antecedent,  465,  466 
a««, 196 

anubkava,  97,  459 
anubhdga,  194 
anuhkiiti,  416 
anubrata,  200 
anudbhuta,  252 
anudbhutarupavaiiva,  290  «. 
anumdna,  155,  302  «.,  308,  343,  346,  353, 

383.  389.  390  «•'  393.  397>  409  «•.  412, 

492 
anumeya,  348 
anumiti,  346,  355 
anumitikarana,  346 
anupalabdhi,  333  «.,  397,  398,  399,  455, 

471,  492 
anupalambhah,  359 
anupasamhdrin,  361 
aw^a,  236 
angas,  171 
ahgulitva,  165 

Anguttara  Nikdya,  83,  ii i  «. 
a««,  189,  301,  314,  323 
anuparividna,  314  «.,  316 
atiupreksd,  195 
anitsandhdna,  350 
anustnrti  nirdesa,  1 24 
anussati,  102 
anusthiti,  1 63  «. 
amistubh^  218  «. 
anutlamdinbhas,  220  n. 
Anuttaraupapdtikada^ds^  171 
anuvyavasdya,  343 
Anuyogadvdra,  171 
a«z/a>/a,  353 
anvaya-vyatireka,  347 
anvayavyaiirekt,  353 
anvayavydpti,  158,  346 
anvitdbhidkdnavdda,  396 
anyathdkhydti,  261,  384,  385,  488,  489 
anyathdsiddhi,  322  «. 
anyathdsiddhiiunyasya,  320 


Index 


497 


anyatvabhdvand,  202 

anyapohah,   115 

anyonydbhdva,   293  «.,  359,  462,  464 

anyonydiraya,   204,  466 

a/,  51,  252,  255,  295,  310,  313,  314,  323, 

324,  328,  329 
apaddna,  83 
apadeia,  289,  303,  350 
apad/iydna,  200 
aparajdti,  317 
aparaJailas,  1 1 2 
aparatiia,  316 
aparigraha,  199,  236,  270 
rt/-atom,  253 
apavarga,  259,   273,  294,   295,  300,  301, 

305 
apeksdbtiddhi,  305,  314 
apeksdbuddhijanya,  291  «. 
Aphorisms,  65 
a/?',  284  n, 
apoha,  318 

appandsaniddhi,  102,  103 
apracaritaiunyatd,  1 49 
aprasiddha,  349 
apralisarnkhydnirodka,  121 
aprdmdnyani  paratah,  375 
a^  tanmdtra,  252 
apiirva,  72,  405 
apurva-vidhi,  404 
Apyayadiksita,  418,  420 
Ardhamagadhi,  171 
Ardhaphalakas,  170 
arhat,  90,  loi,  106,  107,  120 
arkattva,  100 
Aristotle,  279 
Aristanemi,  169 
Arrah,  193  «. 
Arrangement,  364 
Arrowsmith,  18  «. 
art'ia,  150,  163  «.,  409  «. 
artkak  prdpitah,  410 
arthakriyd,  i^n. 
arthakriydjiidna,  373 
arthakriydkdritva,  117,  158,  i6i,  168,  187, 

209 ;;. ;  changes  of  meaning  of,  155  «. ; 

Nyaya-obj actions  to,  159;  development 

of  the  meaning  of,  163  n. 
arthakriydksana,  409  n. 
arthakriydsiddhi,  16^  n. 
arthakriydiakti,  159 
arthaprakdsa,  335 
arthapravicaya,  150 
artkaprdpakaiva,  40S 
arthaprdpti,  302 
arthasahabhdsi,  114 
arthasiddhi,  163  w. 
Artha^dstra,  227 
arthavdda,  405 
arthddhigati,  152 
arthdniipapatti,  393 
arthdpatti,  298,   302,   304,    333 «.,    391, 

393'  471.  492 
arupaloka,  134 
Aryan  people,  15 


asadrfipa,  397 

asamavdyi,  322 

asamavdyi-kdrana,  322,  376,  380 

asainprajftdta,  271 

asatnjnin,  190 

asaviskrta,  124 

asamskrta  dharmas,  121,  124 

Asanga,  125,  128,  i46«.,  I47W.,  151  «•, 
350  «.,  423 

asankhyeyakalpas,  1 36 

ajaA  45,  293,  443 

asatkalpa,  409  «. 

asalkdryavdda,  257,  258,  320 

asaipratipaksa,  344 

asddhdrana,  361 

asddkdrana-kdrana,  322 

asdra,  144,  145 

asdsvata,  109 

Asceticism,  36,  58,  81,  201,  226 

Ascetics,  I,  199 

^j/,  45  ;«. 

asiddha,  361 

asiddka-ketu,  344 

asito,  45  «. 

asmadvisistdndm,  287 

asmild,  93  w.,  220M.,  267,  271 

aspar.hiyoga,  423 

Assimilation,  225 

Association,  225 

asteya,  199,  200,  236,  270 

asthdiia,  145 

astikdya,  189,  195,  197 

asti-ndsti,  148 

aj'^,  26 

asiibhakammatthdna,  103 

asarana,  145 

asaranabhdvand,  202 

Asoka,  82,  157 

ahisvata,  127 

ahikldkrsna,  73,  266 

A^vaghosa,  120,  128,  129,  135,  136,  138, 
147,  161,  166,  167,  280,  409 «.,  421, 
423;  ethics  of,  136,  137;  ignorance 
and  truth,  132;  ignorance — manifesta- 
tions of,  133,  134;  perfuming  theory, 
135;  soul  as  samsdra,  131;  soul  as 
that-ness,  130 

Ah'amedha,  14 

A^vapati-kaikeya,  33,  34 

aJvattha,  234 

A^vins,  18 

Astamakosasthdnanibaddhah  pudgalavt- 
nikayah,  iign. 

Astasdhasrikd  prajnapdramitd,  125 «., 
127  «. 

atadrupapardvrttayoreva,  1 60 

atasmimslatiiti,  336 

Atharz'aHkhd,  28  «. 

Atharvasiras,  28  «. 

Atha>-va-  Veda,  12,  13,  24,  31,  469;  com- 
plementary to  Rg-Veda,  13 

Atheism,  258 

Atheistic,  220,  221,  223 

Atheistic  Samkhya,  259 

32 


498 


Index 


aficdra,  201 

atisaniksiptacirantanoktibhih,  281 

atithisamvibhagabrata,  201 

atindriya,  252,  322,  335,  339 

Atom,  492 

Atomic,  213,  253,  254,  323,  401,  416; 
combination,  326,  327;  doctrine,  280; 
measure,  306  «.,  314  n.  ;  size,  292  ; 
structure,  305,  313 

Atoms,  115,  121,  165,  175,  196,  204, 
252,  253,  255,  256,  291,  292,  297, 
305,  3o6«.,  311,  314,  315,  316,  318, 
319.  320,  323,  324,  325,  326,  327, 
328,  329,  362,  377,  380,  400 

Atri,  213 

ai/d,  109 

attha  katkd,  83 

Atthasdlim,  82,  84  n.,  85  n.,  89,  94, 
97«.,  98«.,  108  w. 

Attributes,  165 

atyantdbhdva,  360 

audayika,  192 

Aufrecht,  230 

Aulukya  dat-iana,  305 

Aung,  85  «.,  86«.,  90  w.,  92«.,  win., 

157 
aupamya,  302 
Aupapdtika,  171  w. 
aupaiamika,  192 
Aurangzeb,  28  n. 
avadht,  191  «.,  207 
Avadhuta,  28  «. 
avaktavya,  180 
avasthdjndna,  458 
avast kaparindvia,  256 
avastutva,  428 
Avatamsaka,  128 
avayava,  164,  280,  294,  353,  380 
avayavdvayavi,  379 
Avayavinirdkarana,  165  «.,  297  «.,  3i3«., 

380  «. 
avayavi,  164,  297  «.,  380 
avdk^dkha,  234 
avidyd,    86  «.,    90,91,    93  «•,    tii,    122, 

131.  132,  133.  I34>  137.  138,  139.  143. 
145,  148,  220 «.,  237,  249,  250,  260, 
261,  266,  267,  290,  293,  319  «•,  332  «., 
442,  452,  457,  460,  468,  469,  481,  486, 
487,  491 

avidyddosa,  485 

avidydkarma,  132 

avijjd,  86,  gin.,  93,  105,  in;  and  the 
dsavas,  99  ;  as  beginningless,  99 

avijjdsava,  99,  100 

avijfiapti,  124 

avijfiaptikarma,  124 

avijnaptirupa,  123,  124 

avikalpika,  337,  338 

avindbhdvaniyama,  156,  352  «. 

avipdka,  195 

avirati,  193 

avihsa,  246,  253 

avivddah  aviruddhaka,  423 

avitikkama,  loi 


avyakta,  214,  216 

avyapadeiya,  425 

avyavahdryani,  425 

Awakening  of  Faith ,  1 2  9  «. 

ayaugapadya,  303 

ayutasiddha,  246,  319 

ayntasiddhdvayava,  380  «. 

ayutasiddhdvayavabhedanugatah  ,232 

Acdra,  171 

Acdrangasutra,  236 

dcdrya,  433 

ddhibhautika,  269  «. 

ddhidaiz'ika,  269  «. 

ddhydtmika,  148,  269  w. 

Aditya,  43 

dgama,  285,  424 

djidre  patikidasannd,  102 

Ajivaka,  79,  8o«.,  173  «. 

dkdra,  415 

dkdrapabandha,  256 

dkd^a,  43,  46,  48,  51,  109,  114,  124,  143, 
i49>  i75»  197.  198,  199.  203,  213,  253, 
287,  288,  292,  295,  310,  314,  316,  321, 
326,  333,  335,  426;  atom,  252,  253 

akasa  tanmatra,  252 

dkd^dstikdya,  195,  198 

dkrti,  298 

dlayavijndna,  86  ?z.,  131,  132,  136,  137, 
146,  167 

dlocana,  378 

dlocana-jndna,  336 

dnanda,  75,  109,  238,  271,  366,  424,  445 

Anandabodha  Bhattarakacarya,  420 

Anandagiri,  418,  433 

dnandat?iaya  dtman,  46 

Ananda^rama,  423  w. 

dnaya,  396 

dndpdnasati,  103 

djivtksiki,  277,  278,  279 

Apastamba,  276 

a//'a,  294 

dptavacana,  355  «. 

drambhaka-samyoga,  328 

dramviana,  96 

djatnmana-vibhdvanatthdne,  89 

Aranyakas,  6,  12,  14,  27,  28,  29,  33,  35, 
43;  character  of,  14;  composition  of, 
14;  fanciful  unifications  in,  36;  rela- 
tion of,  to  Upanisads,  14 

drdrendhana,  347 

driya  sacca,  loi,  in 

Aruni.  33»  34 

Arunika,  28  w. 

«rya,  294  w.,  304 

Aryadeva,  122  «.,  128,  166;  his  doctrine, 

129 
Aryamulasarvastivada,  120  «. 
Aryasammitiya,  114 
Aryasarvastivada,  i20«. 
arya  satya,  107 
Arya,  219 
Aryasahga,  409;;. 
anra,  332  «. 
dsanijndnirodhdt,  1 50 


Index 


499 


dsana,  236,  271 

dsava,  99,  100,  105;  meaning  of,  99  «. 

dsrava,  99  «.,  134,  192,  193 

dsrarjabkavand,  202 

dssdsa,  103 

dstika,  67 

astika-mata,  six  classes  of,  68 

Astika  systems,  karma  doctrine  of,  72 

Asuri,  216,  218,  221 

diahkd,  186  «. 

diankd-pratisedha,  \%^n. 

d^raya,  312,  460 

diraydsiddha,  361 

airta,  312 

Atmabodha,  28  n. 

dtmaikatva,  433 

dtmakhydti  384,  385 

a^»za«,  23,  26,  27,  32,  45,  52,  65,  68,  75, 
93,  III,  138,  147,  214,  215,  217,  276, 
292,  295,  298,  300,  303,  311,  316,  353, 
360,  429,  459 «.,  460,  470,  481;  as 
vital  breath,  26 

Atman,  28  «. ,  31  n. 

Atmatattvaviveka,  307 

dtmavdda,  401  n. 

dtodya,  296  «. 

AJreya-samhitd,  213 

Ajreya-samhitd  (Caraka),  299  «. 

AJreyatant7-a,  213 

Aturapratydkhydna,  171  w. 

dvarana,  472,  481 

dyarandbhdva,  253 

Avaiyaka,  171 

dvirbhuta,  257 

dyatana,  85,  88  «.,  95,  121,  127,  149 

dyatanadvdraih,  85  k. 

dyukana,  93 

dyu-karma,  194 

ayw/,  268 

dyu  ska-karma,  191 

Badarika^rama,  432 

bahiravabhdsanam,  337 

bahirvydpti,  157,  i86«.,  346 

bakudhdkrtam  tantram,  221 

bakiijana,  131 

Bahu^rutiyas,  112 

Bahvrca,  28  «. 

Baladeva,  70,  306 

bandha,  207 

Baudhayana,  70 

Badarayana,  70,  223,  279,  422,  423,  429, 

430.  433 
bddha,  488 
bddhita,  361 
Bahva,  45 
bdhya,  409  «. 

bdhyabhdvdbhdvopalaksanatd,  1 50 
Balaki  Gargya,  33,  34 
balopacarika,  150 
Behar,  308  «. 
Benares,  39,  181  «.,  432 
Bengal,  40,  256,  306,  308 
Bengal  Asiatic  Society^ s  Journal,  129  «. 


Bengali,  40 

Besarh,  173 

Bhadanta,  120 

Bhadrabahu,  170,  181  «.,  186  «.,  309 

Bhadrayanikas,  112 

Bhagavadgltd,  8,  64,  227,  421,  422,  436 

Bhagavatl,  171 

Bhaktdparijnd,  1 7 1  w. 

bhakti,  77 

Bhandarkar,  423 

Bharadvdja-vrtti,  306 

Bhartrhari,  231 

Bhartrmitra,  370 

Bhasmajdbdla,  28  «. 

Bhattacititdmani,  371,  417 

bhatta-niata,  69 

bhautika,  216,  299  «. 

bhava,  85,  87,  89,  90  «.,  92;  meaning  of, 

85  «. ;  meaning  of,  discussed,  90  «. 
bhavacakra,  86 
Bhavadasa,  370 
bhavdsava,  99,  100 
Bhagavata,  434 
bhdgya,  220  «. 

Bhdmati,  114  «.,  143W.,  418,  421  «. 
Bharuci,  433 
Bhasarvajna,  305  w.,  309 
bhdsd,  195,   199  «. 
Bhdsdpariccheda,  280,    281,  307,    322 «., 

339  «■ 
bhdsya,  86«.,  89«.,  90W.,  306,  369,  418, 

419,  432,  433 
bhasyakdra,  433 
Bkdsyasukti,  306 
Bhdsya  vdrttika,  63 
Bhattas,  462 

bhdva,  142,  146,  287,  312  «.,  357 
bhdvabandha,  193 
bhdva- karma,  191 
bkdva-le^yd,  191 
bhdvand,  28«.,  201,  316 
bhdvanirjard,  195 
bhavapdratatitrydt,  312  «. 
bhdvarUpa,  453 
bhdvasami<ara,  194,  195 
bhdvasvabhdvasunyatd,  1 49 
bhdvatva,  453 
bhdvdbhdvasamdnatd,  147 
Bhavagane^a,  212,  24^  n. 
bhdvdsrava,  193,  194 
bkeda,  462 
Bhedadhikkdra,  420 
bhedakalpand,  340  «. 
Bhiksu,  224,  271  «.,  415 
Bhiksuka,  28  «. 
bhoga,  224,  259,  268,  273 
bhogdrthatn,  424 
bhogopabhogamdna,  200 
Bhoja,  212,  230,  233  «.,  235,  236 
bkrarna,  337 
Bhurisrsti,  306 
bhiita,  328 
bhiitas,  214,  310 
bhUtatathatd,  130,  134 

32—2 


500 


Index 


bhutadi,  249,  251,  253 

bhiiyodariana,  347,  348 

Bi-bhautik,  329 

Bibliotheca  Indica,  337  «.,  346  n. 

Birth,  84,  89;  determined  by  last  thought, 
90 

Blessedness,  61 

Bodas,  276,  279 

bodha,  412 

bodhdbodhasvabhava,  412 

Bodhayana,  433 

Bodhdyana  bhdsya,  433 

bod  hi,  173 

bodkibkdvaftd,  202 

bodhisattva,  127,  150,  151  «• 

Bodhisattvas,  136,  137 

Bombay,  2w.,  28  n.,  317M. 

brahmabhuta,  21  ^n. 

Brahmabindu,  28  n. 

brahtnacarya,  199,  200,  226,  227  w.,  236, 
270,  283 

Brahmahood,  55 

Brakmajdlasutta,  65  n.,  236 

Brahma-knowledge,  491 

Brahman,  20,  21,  23,  28w.,  32,  34,  35, 
Z^,  43>  52,  54'  55»  58,  60,  80,  III,  144, 
168,  202,211,  215,228,  234,235,239, 
301  «.,  430,  431,  434,  436,  437,  438, 
440,443,444,  445,  446,  447,  451,  452, 
457.  458,  461,  468,  469,  481,  482, 
483,  489,  491;  as  highest  liliss,  48; 
as  immanent  and  transcendent,  50; 
as  ordainer,  49 ;  as  silence,  45 ;  as  su- 
preme principle  in  Satapatha,  20;  as 
the  cause  of  all,  48 ;  as  ultimate  cause, 
53;  dualistic  conception  of,  48;  equi- 
valent to  dtman,  45 ;  identified  with 
natural  objects,  44 ;  instruction  of  Praja- 
pati  on,  46;  meanings  of,  20;  negative 
method  of  knowing,  44;  positive  defi- 
nition of,  impossible,  44;  powers  of 
gods  depended  on,  37 ;  powers  of 
natural  objects  depended  on,  37 ;  priest, 
i3«.;  quest  after,  42;  substitutes  of, 
inadequate,  43;  transition  of  the  mean- 
ing of,  37 ;  three  currents  of  thought 
regarding,  50;  universe  created  out  of, 
49 ;  unknowability  of,  44 

Brahmanaspati,  23,  32,  43 

Brahma  Samaj,  40 

Bf'ahma-sutra,  45  «.,  86  «.,  91  n.,  143  n., 

430.  432,  470 
Brahmasutras,  62,  64,   70,    121  «.,  223, 

279,  418,420,  421,  422,  429,  43'.433i 

439  n. ;  Vaisnava  commentaries  of,  8 
Brahma-sutrabhdsya,  319  «. 
Brahmavidyd,  28  n. 
brakfnavidyd,  34  n. 
braktnavihdra,  103,  144 
Brahmayana,  126??. 
Brahma,  12671.,  324 
Brahmins,  10,  11,  12,  31,  35 
Brahmanas,  6,   12,  13,  13«.,   25,   27,  28, 

29>   30.   3'.   33.    35»    208,  404,   429; 


dtman  as  supreme  essence  in,  27 ; 
character  of,  13;  composition  of,  13; 
creation  and  evolution  theory  com- 
bined in,  25 ;  development  of,  into 
Upanisads,  31 ;  karma  AocU'me  of,  72; 
meaning  of,  1 3  n. 

Brahmana  thought,  transition  of,  into 
Aranyaka  thought,  35 

Brahmanism,  169 

Breath,  272 

British,  11,  371 

Bruno,  40  w. 

Brhadaranyaka,  14,  28  «.,  31,  33,  34  ?«., 

35.  37«-,  39>  42«-,  45w->  49'«-»  5°.  55. 
56,  57,  6i,  88«.,  lion.,  iiin.,  226, 
263  «.,  432  «.,  469,  470;  rebirth  in,  87 

Brhadratha,  227 

Brhajjdbdla,  28  n. 

Brhaspati,  79 

Brhati,  370 

Brhatkalpa,  1 7 1 », 

Brhatsainhitd,  327  «. 

Buddha,  7,  64,  65,  67,  79,  80,  84,  86, 
86«.,  93,  94,  102,  107,  109,  no,  112, 
118,  119,  125,  127,  133,  142,  144,  147, 
169,  173,  174,  227,  263  w.;  his  life,  81 

Buddhacaritakdvya,  129  «. 

Buddhadeva,  115,  116 

Buddhaghosa,  82,  83,  92  n.,  94,  96,  99, 
105,  161,  470;  his  view  of  name  and 
form,  88;  his  view  of  vinndna,  89; 
on  theory  of  perception,  97 

Buddhahood,  84,  136,  137 

Buddhapalita,  128 

Buddhas,  136,  137,  424 

Biiddhavainsa,  83 

Buddhayana,  125 «. 

buddhi,  213,  214,  216,  218  «.,  224,  225, 
240  w.,  242,  249,  251,  258,  259,  260, 
261,  262,  263,  265,  266,  267,  271,  273, 
275,  276,  281,  295,  299,  311,  316, 
330.  331.  332  «•,  368,  399.  415.  416, 
460 

buddhi-nirmdna,  256  «.,  311 

buddhinUcaya,  409  n. 

Buddhism,  i,  9,  74,  75,  78,  83,  95,  to8, 
no,  III,  129,  138,  155,  161,  165,  [68, 
169,  175,  208,  209,  212,  219,  237 «., 
238,  274,  312,  322 «.,  417,  465;  dt- 
w^M^^/rt/Ztheory  of  illusion,  385;  causa- 
tion as  tdddtmya  and  iadutpatti,  345 ; 
criticism  of  momentariness  by  Nyaya, 
274;  criticism  of  the  nirvikalpa  per- 
ception of  Nyaya,  339  ff. ;  currents  of 
thought  prior  to,  80 ;  denial  of  the 
existence  of  negation,  357  ff. ;  denial 
of  wholes,  380;/.;  Dharmakirtti's  con- 
tribution to  the  theory  of  concomi- 
tance, 351  ;  Dinnaga's  doctrine  of 
universal  proposition  and  inference, 
350 «.;  Dinnaga's  view  of  the  new 
knowledgeacquiredbyinference,  388^.; 
doctrine  of  matter,  95;  doctrme  of 
momentariness,  158;  doctrine  of  non- 


Index 


501 


self,  161  ff. ;  doctrine  of  momentariness 
and  the  doctrine  of  causal  efficiency, 
163 ff.;  doctrine  of  paiicakdrani  as 
determining  cause-effect  relation,  re- 
futed by  Vacaspati,  352;  doctrine  of 
tdddtmya  and  tadutpatti  as  grounds  of 
inference  refuted  by  Vacaspati,  352  ; 
epistemologyof  the  Sautrantikas,  408  ff.; 
evolution  of  thought  in,  166;  heretical 
schools  prior  to,  79;  identity  and  re- 
cognition, 162;  influence  on  Mlmarnsa 
logic,  388,  390;  nature  of  existence, 
163;  no-soul  doctrine  in,  93;  onto- 
logical  problems,  i64ff. ;  relation  of 
substance  and  quality,  164;  relation  of 
universals  and  particulars,  164;  relation 
of  the  whole  and  the  part,  164;  relation 
of  cause  and  effect,  164;  relation  of 
inherence,  165;  relation  of  power  to 
the  power-possessor,  165;  relation  to 
Upanisads,  80;  schools,  rise  of,  112; 
sense-data  and  sensations  in,  95;  state 
of  philosophy  prior  to,  78 ;  the  khandha- 
doctrine,  93  ;  Theravada  schools,  112; 
views  on  sdmdnya,  318 «.;  vydpti  by 
negative  instances,  389  «.;  Yogacara 
epistemology,  41  iff. 

Buddhism  (early),  avijjd  in,  99;  causal 
connection,  84;  definition  of  samadhi, 
loi ;  four  noble  truths,  loi ;  import- 
ance of  feeling,  97 ;  kamma,  classifica- 
tion of,  108;  kamma,  the  doctrine  of, 
106;  karma  and  desire,  108 ;  khan- 
dhas  as  "I,"  98;  kilesas  in,  100; 
meditation  in,  stages  of,  105 ;  medita- 
tion of  human  body  as  impure,  103 ; 
meditation  of  universal  friendship,  pity 
etc.,  103;  Mzz/zfawa  and  heresy  in,  109; 
itiwdna,  theory  of,  108 ;  no-selfdoctrine, 
contrasted  with  Upanisad  self-doctrine, 
no;  objects  of  concentration,  104; 
pessimism  in,  102  n. ;  preparatory 
measures  for  meditation,  102;  science 
of  breath,  103;  sense-contact  theory 
in,  97;  sila  and  sa>nddki  in,  100; 
theory  of  cognition  in,  96;  Upanisads, 
relation  with,  109;  volition  in,  98 

Buddhism  in  Translations,  88  m.,  89«., 
90  M.,  99«.,  107  ».,  108  «.,  niw. 

Buddhismus,  2i8». 

Buddhist,  i30«.,  i6i,  163,  169,  177,  178, 
230,  233,  237,  278,  299,  300,  378, 
389  n.,  390,  394,  406,  423,  429,  434, 
437)  A^h't  canonical  works,  82;  council, 
129;  doctrines,  281;  literature,  78,  82, 
92;  logic,  120,  155,  157,  309;  mis- 
sionaries, 301  M. ;  philosophy,  3,  7,  84, 
145,  164,  210;  psychology,  96,  96 «. 

Buddhistic,  81,  427 «.;  doctrines,  82, 
100;  texts,  109 

Buddhists,  7,  68,  68«.,  75,  112,  129,  147, 
167,  173,  174,  182,  185,  186,  187,  196, 
203,  229,  240 «.,  257,  274,  279,  296, 
301,  307,  309,  310,  318,  335,  331,  332, 


339.  340.  341.  345.  346,  347.  348,  3.'iO. 

352.  357»  362,  363.  380 w.,  385.  4". 

413 
buddhitattva,  249,  2-;o 
Bulletin  de  I  Aca/Mmie  des  Sciences  de 

Russie,  1 19  w. 
Burgess,  J.,  i7o«. 
BUhler,  i7o«.,  276 

caitasikakarma,  123 

caitta,  121 

caittadharma,  12  r 

caittasamskrta  dkarmas,  124 

caittikas,  t  r  2 

cakrabhramivaddhrtaiartrak,  268 

Cakradatta,  231 

cakraka,  205 

Cakrapani,  213  «.,  231,  235,  236 

Cakrapanidatta,  230 

cakravartti,  91  «. 

Cakravartti,  Mr,  308  n. 

Calcutta,  165  «.,  168 

Calcutta  University,  12 1,  208  «.,  213 

Cambridge,  ie;5w. 

Candrakanta  Tarkalamkara,  279 

Candrakirti,  85  «.,  86«.,  87,  90«.,  109, 

125 «.,   128,    129,    138,    140,   166;  his 

interpretation  of  nama,  88  n. 
Candraprajnapti,  171  «. 
Candrikd,  212 
Canddvija,  171  n. 
Capacity,  159,  160 
Caraka,  91  «.,  212,  213,  216,  217,  218, 

219,  224,  231,  280,  281,  287 «.,  302, 

304  «. ;  his  view  of  soul,  91  «.  ;  system 

of  Sanikhya  in,  214 
Caraka  kdrikd,  280 
Caraka  samhitd,  302 
Caraka,  idrlra,  280  n. 
Carake  Patanjalih,  235 
carv,  79 
Carydpitaka,  83 
Categories,  281,  283,  287,  312,  313,  365, 

413,  461,  492 
Category,  317,  378  n.,  398,  442,  443,  493 
catudhdtuvavatthdnabhdvand,  102 
catuhsHtri,  70 
catuhlarana,  1 7 1  «. 
catuk.(ataka,  129 
catiiranuka,  326 
cauryya,  193 
Causal  activity,   165;    collocations,   34 1  ; 

efficiency,  163,  168;  movement,  320 
Causation,   466,    468 ;    as    real    change, 

53 
Cause,  326 

Cause-collocation,  274,  275 
cdgdniissati,  102 
cdmara,  172 
cdritra,  195,  199 
Carvaka,  68,  71,  87,  302 
Carvakas,  78,  79,  325,  332,  345,  362,  394; 

philosophy  of,  79 
Central  India,  172 


502 


Index 


cestd,  ifi\ 

cetana  karma,  123 

cetand,  96,  97,  98,    loi,   108,    213,   214, 

228  «. 
cetas,  217 
cetasika,  loi 
cetati,  124 
cetovimutti,  106 
chala,  294,  296,  302,  360,  362 
Channagarikas,  112 
Chandogya,  28  «.,  30,  33,  34  m.,  35  «.,  36, 

39.  46«-,  47«-.  49«-.  5i«v  53.  54«-, 

88«.,  iio«.,  iii«.,  i33«.,  173,  I74«., 

226  «.,  263  «.,  432  «.,  433 
Chdydvyakhyd,  212 
Chedasutras ,  171 
Childers,  99  w.,  263  «. 
China,  278 

Chinese,  4,  119, 122  w.,  125  w.,  128,  138  «. 
Chinese  translations,  120 
Christian,  21 

cinmdtrd^ritam  ajndnam,  457 
«V,    75,    238,    240,    241,    260,    299,   416, 

450.  453.  457.  458.  472,  481,  482,  486, 

487,  488 
citra,  313 
Citsukha,  238 «.,  445,  462,   465,   485  «., 

492 
citta,   76,   89,    91  «.,  96,   106,    113,    121, 

124,  129,  140,  I46,  258,  260,  261,  262, 

162  n.,  263,   264,   265,   266,   268,  269, 

272,  426,  427,  428,  460 
cittabhumi,  268 
cittadharnia,  121 
cittasamprayuktasamskdra,  86  7i. 
cittavimukta,  151 
cittaviprayukta,  121 
cittaviprayuktasaniskdra,  86  n. 
cittaviprayuktasamskdradhartna,  121 
cittaviiuddhiprakarana,  129 
cittavrttinirodha,  235 
codandlaksanah  art  hah,  ^zin. 
Co-effects,  321 
Collocation,    255,    256,    257,    274,    320, 

330.  331.  332,  342.  412,  413.  416,  "467 
Collocations,  160,  363,  367,  374,  466 
Commentaries,  63,  67,  285  «.,  308,  422, 

470;  their  method  of  treatment,  66 
Commentary,  70,  306,  309,  433 
Commentators,  64,  65 ;  elaborations  made 

by,  66 
Compendium,  85  «.,  86  n. 
Compendiums,  2 

Compound  concepts,  94;  feelings,  94 
Concentration,  103,  104,  105,  227,  234 «., 

268,  271,  272,  342,  437,  490 
Concomitance,   157,   159,  160,  308,  322, 

325.  344.  345.  346,  347.  348.  349'  35 L 

352,   353.    354.    356,    358,    364,    388, 

389  w.,  390,  393,  456 
Conformations,  86 
Conglomeration,  163 
Consciousness,   94,    161,   214,  239,  240, 

243.    353.    366,    368,    378,    379,    380, 


399,  400,  412,  415,  416,  417,  428, 
438,  444.  445>_447..  448. .  449«  45©^ 
451,  '4F4.  455.  456.  467.  458,  460, 
472,  481,  482,  485,  491 

Consciousness-stuff,  250 

Copernican,  31 

Cornell  University,  3 

Cosmology,  221,  276 

Cosmos,  325 

Cowell,  2 

Craving,  107 

Creation,  206,  324,  326 

Creator,  326,  364 

Cullavagga,  108  w. 

dabbasambhdrasadisd,  96 

Daksa,  23 

daksitid,  36 

DaksindmHrtti,  28  n. 

dania,  490 

daudaniii,  277 

darsana,  189,  190;  meaning  of,  68  «. 

darsandvaraniya,  190,  193,  196 

dariandvaraniya  karma,  194 

Dasgupta,  S.  N.,  397  «. 

Daiasrutaskandha,  \lin. 

Da^avaikdlika,  171 

Daiavaikdlikaniryiikti,    186  «.,    280  «., 

309 
Dattdtreya,  28  «. 
daurmanasya,  86  n. 
ddna,  283 
ddnapdramitd,  127 
ddnasatiiiti,  igg  n. 
Darashiko,  28«.,  39 
Death,  50,  58,  59,  84,  103,  201 
Debate,  406,  407 
Deccan,  432 
Delhi,  39 

Denierit,  264,  281,  317,  324,  325,  342 
Desire,  108,  225,  228,  295,  299,  300,  311, 

325.  411 
desdpabandha,  256 
deldvakdhkabrata,  200 
dehta,  423 
Determinate,    185,    225,   261,    262,  337, 

379,    412,    413,   416,   424;    cognition, 

343  n.  ;  perception,  331,  334,  378 
Deussen,    26  n.,    29,   32  «.,   38,   39  n., 

45«.,   49«.,    52,    58«.,   423,    438 «., 

439  «• 
Devadatta,  117,  118,  176,  290,  391,  392, 

393,  411,  483 
Devaksema,  120 
Devananda,  170,  173 
Deva  Siiri,  172,  309 
devaydna,  34,  54,  58,  12^  n. 
Devendrastava,  iji  n. 
Devi,  28  «. 
dhamma,  82,  102;  different  meanings  of, 

84 
dhammadesand,  84  n, 
Dha7nmapada,  83 
dhammas,  104,  166 


Index 


503 


Dhammasangani,  82,  83,  94,  95  n.,  99, 
100  «. 

dhammavisesatthena,  82 

dhamnidtireka,  82 

Dhanapala,  172 

dharma,  56,  122,  131,  136,  137,  145,  161, 
195,  197,  198,  202,  256,  257,  281,  282, 
285,  286  «.,  291,  292,  316, 3i6«.,3i7M., 
S'^^,  323,  383,  403,  404,  405,  423,  424, 
427  w.,  428;  meaning  of,  84  «. 

dharmadhatu,  130,  131,  137 

Dharmaguptikas,  112 

dharmakdya,  132,  137 

Dharmakirti,  151,  155,  168,  309,  340«., 
351,  362,  409  «.,  410 «.;  theory  of  in- 
ference, i55ff. ;  theory  of  perception, 
151  ff. 

dhartnapartndma,  256 

Dharmarajadhvarlndra,  67,  419,  420, 
470  «.,  471 

Dharrnasamgraha,  86  «.,  94 

dkarmaskandka,  120 

dharmasvdkhydtatdbhdvand,  202 

dharmahistras,  278 

Dharmatrata,  115,  120 

dharmdstikdya,  195 

Dharmottara,  151,  i52«.,  I53«.,  154, 155, 
163  «.,  168,  181,  309 

Dharmottarlyas,  112 

Dhar,  230,  308 

dhdrand,  272 

Dhdrandidstra,  'i2()n. 

dhdtu,  111,  127,  149,  213 

Dhdtukathd,  83 

Dhdtukdya,  120 

dkruva,  175 

dhrti,  122 

Dliurtta  Carvakas,  78,  79,  362 

dhutangas,  loi 

dhvatnsabhdva,  293  «.,  359 

dhydna,  81,  102 «.,  145,  150,  202,  203, 
236,  272 

Dhydnabindu,  28  n.,  228 

dhydnapdram  itd,  127 

dhydndgn idagdh akarm a,  201 

Dhydyitamusti  sfdra,  125  n. 

Dialectic,  407,  435,  492 

Dialectical,  421 

Dialogues  of  the  Buddha,  92  «.,  io6«., 
107  «. 

Difference,  462,  463,  464 

Differentiation,  225 

Digambaras,  170,  172 

Digambara  Jain  Iconography,  1 70  «. 

Dignaga,  350  «. 

digvirati,  200 

digviratibrata,  200 

dik,  311,  316,  322 

Dinakari,  307,  322  «. 

Dinnaga,  63,  120,  155  w.,  167,  307,  309, 
350  «•,  351.  355  «•»  362,  388  w. 

Disputes,  66 

Dissolution,  324 

ditthdsava,  99,  100 


ditthi,  68  «.,  100 

Divergence,  464 

Dlgha,  8o«.,  8i  «.,  91  «.,  108  «. 

Dlgha  Nikdya,  83,  106 

Dipavarnsa,  83«.,  ii2«.,  119 

dlrgha,  l\\n.,  315 

dtrghaparimana,  316 

dosa,  100,  294,  300,  301,  365,  452,  453, 

484,  486,  487 
dosas,  228  w. ,  295 
Doubt,  225,  262,  294,  295 
drastd,  444,  445 
dravatva,  280,  285  n. 
Dravidacarya,  433 
dravya,  175,  197,  198,231,232,285,286, 

287,  294,  304,  306 «.,  3 1 2, 3 1 3,  3 1 7,  3 1 8, 

320,  334,  340,  380  «.,  428 
dravyabandha,  193 
dravyakalpand,  340«. 
dravya  karma,  191 
dravyale^yd,  191 
dravyanaya,  177 
dravyanirjard,  195 
dravyaparamdnu,  121 
Dravyasamgraha,  171,  193  «.,  203  «. 
Dravyasamgrahavrtti,      192 «.,      194/;., 

197  «.,  198  «.,  199  «. 
dravyasamvara,  194 
dravyatva,  287,  312 
dravydsrava,  194 
Dream,  425,  442,  451,  470,  488 
Drdhddhydiayasancodatidsutra,  125  «. 

<^r^.  447.  450 

flVy,  68  «. 

u'r/ya,  444,  447,  450,  451 

driyatva,  445 

drsta,  349 

drstdnta,  185,  186  «.,  294,  295,  302,  350, 

'  389 
drstantabhasa,  390 
drsti,  68  «. 
drstisr:.tivdda,  420 
duhkha,  86 «.,  106,  133,  276,  316,  342, 

426 
duhkhabahulah  samsdrah  heyah,  265  «. 
duhkham  vivekinah,  365 
dukkhaskaiidha,  86  «. 
dustarakunibandhapahkamagndndm ,  307 
dutiyam  jhdnam,  105 
dvandva,  288  «. 
dvddasdnga,  92 
Dvaraka,  306 

dvesa,  g^n.,  143,  144,  220 «.,  267,  316 
dvipaddtn  varam,  423 
dvitva,  314 
dvipas,  235 

dvyanuka,  314,  323,  324,  326,  327 
Dyads,  314,  315 

Earth,  23 

Earth  ball,  104,  106 

Eastern  Rajputana,  172 

East  India,  120«. 

Effect,  164,  165,  325,  326,  331,  332,  345, 


504 


Index 


347,  348,  349,  359  «•.  364.  400,  427, 

439.  465*  466,  467.  468 
Effect-collocation,  274,  275 
Efficiency,  116 
Eggeling,  i3«.,  ion.,  24 ». 
Ego,  III,  133,  134,  225,  458 
Egoism,  301 
Egyptians,  4 
eka,  18 

ekacittasmifn,  97 
ekaggatd,  105,  106 
ekaprthaktva,  293 
ekasdm agryadh inak,  1 1 4 
ekatvabhavana,  202 
ekatvdnyatva,  148 
Ekavyavaharikas,  112,  113 
ekaydna,  125  «. 
ekdgra,  268 
Ekdksara.,  28  w. 
ekdtita,  193 
Ekanti,  421,  422 
ekdra?nmana,  loi 
ekdtmapratyayasdra,  425 
ekibkdva,  409  «. 
ekodibhdvam,  105 
Emancipation,  loi,  107,  127,  201,  203, 

225,   236,    273,   362,    366,    419,    436, 

441,  445,  490;  as  optimism,  76 
Embryo,  57 

Empirical  induction,  348 
Encyclopaedia  of  Religion   and  Ethics, 

26  M.,      36  «.,      80  W.,      108  «.,      119  M., 

169M.,   i7o«.,  172 «.,   i73«.,    i90«., 

211  «. 
Energy,  255,  251,  253,  254,  321 
Energy-stuff,  242,  244 
English,  40 

Epigraphica  Indica,  1 70  n. 
Epistemological,  2,  3,  406,  408,  410 
Epistemology,  299,  415,  419,  431 
Equilibrium,  245,  246,  248,  255,  258,  259 
Eschatological,  304 
Essential  identity,  345 
esaria,  195 
Eternal,  290,  292 
Europe,  i,  6,  40,  62 
European,    i,    6,    9,    121,    I30«.,    169; 

philosophy,  62 
evambhUta-naya,  178  w. 
Evolution,  225,  245,  246,  247,  259,  311 
Evolutionary  course,  256;  process,  259 
Existence,  164,  168;  Buddhist  definition 

of,  160 

Faizabad,  39 

Fallacies,  312,  390 

Fallacy,  361 

Feeling-substances,  243 

Flame,  162 

Forces  of  Nature  adored,  17 

Gacchas,  170 

Gadadhara  Bhattacarya,  308 

Gaganagaiija,  125  «. 


gaganopamam,  423 

gamaka,  388,  389 

gamya,  388,  389 

gandha,  313 

Gandharvas,  55 

gandha  tanmdtra,  252 

Ganges,  136 

Ganganatha  Jha,  Dr,  384  n. 

Gange^a,    63,   308,    309,    322 «.,  332 «., 

334  n.,  338,  342  «.,  343  «.,  347  n. 
Gaiiapati,  28  n. 
GanivTja,  171  n. 
Garbe,  33,  34,  218 
Garbha,  28;?.,  31  n. 
Garuda,  28  n. 
Gaudabrahtndnandl,  420 
Gaudapada,  212,  222,  223,  242  w.,  243  «., 

418,  422,  423,  424,  425,  426,  427,  429, 

435.  437 
Gautama,  59,  63,  65,  71,  81,  186  «.,  279, 

289  n.,  306 
gavaya,  354,  391,  486 
Gaga  Bhatta,  371,  417;/. 
gam,  396, '397 
Geiger,  1 1 2  «. 
Genus,  156,  285,  286,  287,  313,  317,  345, 

378,  379>  389 
Germany,  40 

Geschichte  der  indischen  Litteratur,  35  ;;. 
Geschichte  des  Buddhismus,  i2gn, 
ghanapratarabhedena,  196 
ghatatva,  412 

Ghoshal,  S.  C.,  193  «,,  203  >«. 
Ghosa,  115,  116 
Ghosaka,  120 
Gift,'  36 
Gnostics,  14 
go,  391,  396 
God,  10,  17,  49,  204,  205,  206,  233,  234, 

288,  325,  326,  394,  396«.,  399,  403, 404 
Goldstucker,  227  «,  279 
Gopdlapurvatdpini,  28  m. 
Gopdlottartdpinl,  28  n. 
gotra,  193 

gotra-karma,  191,  194 
gotva,ll^ 
gotvajdti,  317 
Gough,  2 

Govardhana,  329,  330  «. 
Govinda,  418,  423,  432 
Govindananda,  85  «.,  86«.,  89«.,  90«., 

91 71.,  419 
grdhya,  409 
Greek  gods,  16 
Greek  literature,  40 
Greek  philosophy,  42 
Greeks,  4 
Guhadeva,  433 
Gujarat,  120  n.,  172 
guna,  84,   196,  217,  221,  222,  223,  224, 

228,    244,    245,    246,    258,    259,   273, 

ilin.,  280,  281,  285,  286,  287,  304, 

3o6«.,  312,  313,  316,  317,  318,  320, 

322,  334.  339.  413 


Index 


505 


gunakalpan&y  340  k. 

Gunamati,  120 

Gunaratna,  2,  3,  7,  78«.,  79,  114,  ii5«., 
ii9«.,  162  «.,  163  w.,  170  «.,  175  M., 
176M.,  i86w.,  i94«.,  203«.,  2o6m., 
213,  217,  218,  220,  222,  223 

Gunas,  323 

gimasannivesavisesa,  255 

gunasthdnas,  192  w. 

gunatva,  287,  290 

gundntaradhana,  232 

^«//'?,  195 

guru,  69,  422 

gurukulavdsa,  283 

guru-mata,  69,  370 ;  story  relating  to,  69  «. 

gurutva,  281,  285  w.,  291,  316 

Gurvavali,  171 

Haimavatas,  112 

Haldane,  40  «. 

Hamsa,  28  n.,  228 

Haribhadra,  2,  7,  68«. ,  222 

Harinatha  Viiarada,  213  «. 

Harivarman,  124  «. 

Harvard  University,  231 

Hastabdlaprakaranavrtti.,  129 

Hastikdkhyasutra,  12^  n. 

Hathayoga,  229 

Haug,  10,  20,  21,  22,  36 

Hayagriva,  28  «. 

Heaven,  17,  23,  76,  394,  399,  405 

Hemacandra,   172,    180  w.,    199,    203 «., 

237 

Henotheism,  17,  18,  19 

Heresies,  65,  78,  236 

Heresy,  109 

Heretical  opinions,  68 

Heretics,  138,  150,  151,  167 

Heterodox,  83 

/leiu,  79,  84,  93,  95,  185,  i86«.,  293,  296, 
303-  343.  344.  345.  346,  347.  348.  349. 
350,  353.  389.  393.  427 

hetupratyaya,  139 

Hetuvadins,  ii2 

hettivibh  akti,  1 8  6  « . 

hetupattibandka,  143 

ketvdbkdsa,  294,  296,  344,  360 

heyopddeydrthavisayd,  163  n. 

Hillebrandt,  36,  211  «. 

Himavat,  282  «. 

Himalaya,  282  n. 

himsd,  193,  200 

hi?nsopakdriddna,  200 

Hinayana,  124  «.,  125,  126 

Hindi,  40 

Hindu,  I,  7,  8,  14,  29,  57,  84,  151  «., 
155  «•.  ^63  «.,  279,  309,  323,  394,  422, 
429,  430,  440;  law,  11,69;  Nyaya,  309; 
philosophy,  41,  167 ;  philosophy — 
mythological,  4 ;  philosophy — not  in- 
fluenced by  Pali  Buddhism,  83;  schools 
of  thought,  412  ;  six  systems  of  thought, 
7;  thinkers,  470;  thought,  78,  113, 
145;  writers,  129;  yoga,  203 


Hindu  Chemistry y    251  «.,    321,    322  «., 

327  w. 
Hindu  monism,  33«m  34'*' 
Hindus,  4,  10,  11,  41,  67,  236,  237,  301, 

309,  371.  430 
Hiranyagarbha,  23,  32,52  ;  hymn  in  praise 

of,  19 
Historical  Survey  of  Indiati  Logic,  276  n. 
History  of  Hindu  Chemistry,  254  «. 
History    of    Indian    Literature,     13  «., 

230«. 

History  of  Indian  Philosophy,  attempt 
possible,  4;  chronological  data,  6;  de- 
velopment, 5 ;  diiTerent  from  history  of 
European  philosophy,  6;  method  of 
study,  64 

History  of  Satiskrit  Literature,  13  «. 

hita,  12 

hit  at  a,  136 

Hoemle,  8o«.,  i73«. 

hotr,  36 

hrasva,  314,  315 

hrasvaparimdna,  314  «.,  315 

hymns,  283 

Hyper-trsna,  90  n. 

Hypothetical,  157,  158 

icchd,  316,  325 

idam,  449 

Idealism,  128 

Identity,  160,  162;  of  essence,  322,  347, 

352 
Ignorance,  59,  74,   in,   132,   133,   134, 

137.    139.    143.    259,    267,    268,    276, 

300,  365,  455,  457,  472 
ihdmutraphalabhogavirdga,  43 7 
Illusion,    140,    146,   237,    260 «.,  261 «., 

269,  303.  331.  332  «•.  337.  384.  385. 
386,   411,    420,    440,    441,    446,   450, 

451.    452,    453'   457.   459.    469.   485. 
486,  488,  489,  493 
Illusory,   127,   129,   139,    142,    147,  161, 
168,  240,  257  «.,  373,  375,  385,  386, 

412,  425,   435,   439,    440,    443,    445, 

448,    449'    45I'   452,    453'    455.    458. 

467,  468,  470,  472,  488,  489,  491 
Illusory  perception,  152 
Images,  262 
Imagination,  225,  269 
Imagining,  299 
Immaterial  cause,  376,  380 
Immortal,  58 
Irnpermanence,  126 
Implication,  185,  391 
Implicaiory  communications,  94 
Indefinable,  429,  467,  468,  487,  493 
Indeterminate,  185,  213,  225,  245,  261, 

262,    331,    334,    339,    378,    379,  412, 

413,  416 

India,  i,  5,  6,  7,  10,  15,  46,  47,  50,  62, 
63,  64,  66,  67,  77,  78,  81,  164,   172, 

394 
Indian  Antiquary,  i-jon.,  277  w.,  419 «. 
Indian  ideas,   similarity  with  European 


5o6 


Index 


ideas,  9;  languages,  121;  logic,  172, 
309,  350,  388 «.;  Medieval  School, 
309  «.;  mind,  31 

Indian  philosophy,  62,  67,  113,  197,  232, 
355>  360,  380,  385-  407,  465  ;  associa- 
tion and  conflict  of  systems  in,  6 ; 
difficulties,  3  ;  historical  records,  5 ; 
history  of,  3,  5 ;  later  stages,  5,  6  ; 
method  of  treatment  different,  62  ;  not 
popularised,  i ;  not  translatable,  i ; 
optimism  of,  76 ;  order  of  systems  of, 
9  ;  texts  published,  i 

Indians,  i,  3,  74,  160 «.,  169 

Indian,  scholars,  41;  system,  64,  144; 
thinkers,  3 ;  thought,  22  ;  wisdom, 
40 

Indian  systems,  75,  180,  185,  394,418; 
karma  theory,  general  account  of,  71; 
pessimistic  attitude  of,  75;  points  of 
agreement   between,   71,    77 

Individual,  117,  118,  119,  122 

Indo-European,  10 

Indra,  18,  21,  272 

indriya,  123,  184  «.,  193,  228  «.,  472 

indriydrtha,  i\Ai,  288 

Inertia,  246 

Inference,  155,  156,  159,  160,  185,  269, 
280,  285,  287,  289,  293,  297,  298,  303, 
308.  331.  332,  333'  343>  344.  345.  346, 
347.  348.  350,  351.  352.  353.  354.  355. 
356,  360,  363,  364,  376,  384,  387,  388, 
389,  390,  393,  404,  412,  414,  447,  454, 
456,  470,  482,  483;  (Buddhist),  con- 
ditions of  concomitance,  156 

Infiniteness,  58 

Infinite  regress,  160  «. 

Infinitude,  61 

Inherence,  165,  285,  312,  319,  336,  349, 
381,  382,  403,  450,  483 

Injunction,  396,  397,  403,  404,  405,  430, 

436.  437.  490 

Inorganic,  51 

Instrumental  cause,  274 

Intelligence,  61 

Intelligence-stuff,  241,  244,  248 

Invariability,  320 

Invariable,  321,  322,  352,  465,  466 

Isomaric,  328 

isana,  199  n. 

itaretaraiunyatdt  1 49 

iti,  230 

Itivuttaka,  83 

Itsing,  i20«. 

try  a,  195,  199  «. 

//a,  28  w.,  31,  39,  50,  III  «.,  432  n. 

Kan  a,  50 

iivarUy  68,  145,  203,  220,  223,  234 «., 
248  «.,  255,  258,  259,  267,  271,  282  «., 
284,  300,  304,  307,  311,  322,  323,  324, 
325,  326,  327,  355,  363,  365,  438,  469, 

.  493 

I^varakrsna,  212,  218,  219,  222 
livara-pranidhdna,  270 
livardniimana,  308  «.,  326  «.,  365  «. 


Jdbdla,  28«.,  31  «.,  35  w. 
Jdbdladariana,  28  n. 
Jabdli,  28  n. 

Jacobi,  Prof.,  169 «.,  170M.,  172,  173M., 
190 «.,  277,  278,  279,  307,  421 

Jadatva,  445 

Jagadl^a  Bhattacarya,  306,  308 

jagatprapaiica,  443 

Jaigisavya,  22gn. 

Jaimini,  69,  281,  282,  369,  370,  427, 
429 

Jai7nini  sutra,  430 

Jain,  79,  258,  309 

Jaina,  65,  68,  74,  280 «.,  394,  401,  434; 
literature,  169;  logic,  309;  logicians, 
i86«. ;  Maharastrl,  171;  philosophy, 
210;  prakrit,  171;  religion,  169; 
scriptures,  186 

[ainatarkavdrtika,  171,  183 «.,  184 «., 
186  «.,  188  «.,  197  «. 

Jainism,  3,  9,  175,  192,  208,  209,  212; 
atheism  in,  203  ff.;  classification  of 
kartna,  191;  cosmography,  199;  di- 
vision of  living  beings,  189;  doctrine 
of  emancipation,  207 ;  doctrine  of 
kartna,  i9off. ;  doctrine  of  matter, 
195 ff.;  doctrine  of  nayas,  176;  doc- 
trine of  ten  propositions,  186  «.;  doc- 
trine of  senses,  184W.;  doctrine  of 
syddvdda,  I'jg;  doctrine  of  universals, 
196,  197;  ethics  of,  i99ff-;  its  ontology, 
i73ff. ;  literature  of,  171;  monks  in, 
172;  nature  of  knowledge,  t8iff. ; 
nature  of  substance,  174;  non-per- 
ceptual knowledge,  185;  origin  of, 
169;  relative  pluralism,  i75ff. ;  rela- 
tivity of  judgments,  i79ff. ;  sects  of, 
170;  soul-theory,  188 ff.;  standpoints 
of  judgment,  177;  theory  of  being, 
187;  theory  of  illusion,  183,  183  «•; 
theory  of  perception,  i83ff. ;  validity 
of  knowledge,  188;  yoga,  199 

Jains,  7,  73,  170,  172,  173,  174,  175, 
176,  177,  180,  184,  185,  186,  197, 
198,  209,  212,  240,  309,  325,  330,  350, 
363,  364;  some  characteristics  of,  172 

Ja/pa,  294,  296,  302,  360 

Jambiidvipaprajnapti,  1 7 1  «. 

Janaka,  34 

janma,  294 

Japan,  278 

Japanese,  303 

jard,  86  n. 

Jardmarana,  86,  89,  92 

Jayanta,  67,  79,  160 «.,  307,  321,  326  k., 

3.30  «•,  337.  355  «•.  362 
Jayaditya,  231 

Janaklnatha  Bhattacarya,  308 
jdta,  423 
Jdtaka,  83 
jdii,  84,  89,  92,    294,' 296,  298,  301,  302, 

304 «.,  317,  318,  319,  339,   360,  362, 

378,  379.  380,  381,  382,  403.  424.  445. 

483,  492 


Index 


507 


jatikalpana,  340  w 

jatirindriyagocara,  382 

Jatyddtsrarupdvagahi,  338 

Jhalkikar,  Bhimacarya,  2  «. 

Jha  Gariganatha,   Dr,   370,  372,  378 «., 

397  «•'  405  "■ 

Jhana,  102,  103,  104,  105,  106;  pre- 
paratory measures  for,  102 

jhana-samCidhi^  102 

jijnasa,  302 

jina,  144,  199 

jtva,  75,  188,  189,  198,  238,  425,  457, 
461,  469,  482 

nvanmukta,  4g2 

jivanmukti,  268 

Jivanmuktiviveka,  419 

Jivabhigama,  171  «. 

jivdstikdya,  189 

jndna,  189  «.,  190,  199,  367,  413,  414, 
416,  417,  437,  445,  455 

jndna-karfna-samuccaydbhdvah  ,437 

jiidnakdnda,  436 

jndna-kdrana,  448 

jndnalaksana,  341,  342 

jndna-mdrga,  29,  436 

Jndnaprasthdna  Sdstra,  120 

jndnaJakti,  402,  460 

jndnasainavdya7iibandhanam,  363 

jndndbhdva,  456 

Jndndvaraniya,  190,  193,  196 

jndndvara7uya  karma,  194 

Jndnin,  68  «. 

Jnanottama  Mi^ra,  419 

Jnata  clan,  173 

Indtadharmakathds,  171 

jndtatd,  416,  448 

j'neydvarana,  132 

Journal  of  ihe  Bengal  Asiatic  Society,  278, 
276 «.,  279 

/ottrnal  of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Society, 
281  «.,  303  «.,  308  «.,  310  «. 

jyotisdrn  jyotih,  54 

Kaegi,  15,  16,  17W.,  i8«.,   19M.,  20«., 

24  ». 
kaivalya,  28«.,  266  «. 
Kaiyyata,  231 
kalala,  328 

kalala-bttdbuddvasthd,  91  «. 
Kaldpa  Vydkarana,  282  «. 
Kalisantarana,  28  «. 
kalpand,  129,  153,  408,  409 «. 
kalpandpodha,  408,  409  w. 
kalpandpocihamabhrdntam,  153 
kalpas,  138 
kalpasutra,  171 
Kalpataru,  418 
Kalpataruparimala,  418 
Kalpdvatamsikd,  171  «. 
kalpita  samvrti,  428 
kamma,  10 1,  106 
kammabhava,  87,  90  «. 
Kaniska,  129  «. 
Kant,  42 


Kantian,  409  «. 

Kanada,  65,  68«.,  71,  282,  284,  286, 
287,  288,  289 «.,  291  «.,  305,  316  «., 
349'  350.  351,  382 

Kandda-Rahasya,  306 

kapardin,  433 

Kapila,  68,  216,  218,  220,  221,  222,  233 

Kapilavastu,  81 

karanadosajndna,  375 

>^ar^«<z,  54,  55,  56,  57,  72,  74,  75,  80, 
86  «.,  87,  90,  9o«.,  91,  107,  108,  III, 
123,  131,  133,  148,  192,  193,  194,  195, 
-202,  203,  206,  207,  210,  214,  215, 
228 «.,  233,  248,  266,  267,  268,  285, 
286,  287,  291,  294,  300,  301,  304, 
3o6«.,  312,  313,  3i6«.,  317,  318, 
319.  320,  324,  327,  330,  363,  366,  440; 
different  kinds  of,  73 ;  Jaina  view  of, 
73;  matter,  73,  99«.,  190,  191,  192, 
i93>  239;  Yoga-view  and  Jaina- view 
compared,  74;  marga,  29;  vargand, 
192 

karmakdnda,  430,  436 

karmaphala,  210 

karmas,  201,  259,  325,  491 

karmasdmai'tkyafn,  316  «. 

karmatva,  287 

karmavijndna,  133,  135 

karnidsrava,  193 

karmd^aya,  26"] 

Karmins,  436 

karund,  103,  104,  136,  203,  236,  270 

Karundpundarika,  1 2 5  «. 

Kashmere,  39,  120  n.,  256 

kasinani,  104 

Kassapa,  106 

kasdya,  191,  193,  201,  313 

Kathdvaithu,  83,  108 «.,  112,  113,  119, 
120  «.,  157,  158  «.,  465 

Kathenotheism ,  18 

Katha,  28  n.,  39,  45«.,  59,  60  n.,  io6, 
211  «.,  226  w.,  227,  432  n. ;    school,  31 

Katharudra,  28  n. 

katii,  313 

kaumudi,  245  n. 

kansidya,  144 

Kausltaki,  28 «.,  30,  39«. ,  50,  57  «•> 
263  «.;  school,  30 

Kautilya,  227,  277,  278,  279 

kdla,  175,  195,  198,  310,  311,  316,  322 

Kdldgnirtidra,  28  «. 

kdldpabandha,  256 

kdldttta,  360 

kdldtyaydpadista,  344 

Kalidasa,  277  «. 

kdtna,  57,  88,  144 

kdjnacckanda,  105 

kdmaloka,  134 

kdmdsava,  99,  icx) 

kdmya-karma,  489 

Kanci,  418 

Kapila  Sarnkhya,  68 

Kapya  Patainchala,  230 

kdrakazydpdra,  257 


5o8 


Index 


karana,  258  «.,  319,  322,  427 

karana-dkaia,  253 

karana-buddhi,  250 

kdrana-saniagrl,  322 

kdranasvalaksattanyathdbhdvah,  468 

kdratiaviriiddhakdryyopalabdhi,  358 

kdrmiaviruddhopalabdhi,  358 

kdrandnupalabdhi,  358 

kdrikd,  67,  224,  273  «.,  342  w.,  423 

kdrma^arira,  73 

kdrmanaiarira,  192 

kdrya,  257,  258 «.,  2S6n.,  319,  427 

kdryakdrana-bhdva,  320 

kdryakdranabhdvddvd,  352  «. 

kdryatva  -prayojaka,  322 

kdryaviruddhopalabdhi,  358 

kdrydkdia,  253 

kdrydnupalabdhi,  358 

KdHkd,  26^  n.,  371 

Ka^yapa,  349 

Ka^yapiyas,  112 

Katyayana,  230,  279 

Katyayanlputtra,  120 

Kdthaka.,  31 

Kavya,  172 

kdyagatdsati,  103 

kdyagupti,  iggn. 

kdyendriya,  123 

kdyika,  108 

kdyikakarma,  124 

kdyikavijiiapti  karma,  124 

Keith,  Prof.,  36  w.,  351 

Kemp,  40  «. 

Kena,  28  «.,  30,  37,  39,  432  «. 

Ke^ava  Mi^ra,  307 

kevala,  173,  266 

kevala/ndna,  191  «.,  207 

kevalavyatireki,  353 

kevaldnvayi,  353,  354 

kevalin,  207 

khandha,  89,  93,  95,  104,  106,  161 

Khatidha  Yamaka,  94,  95  «. 

khantisamvara,  loi 

Khanabhahga  siddhi,  68  «. 

Khandanakhandakhddya,  318  «.,  419,  462 

khanikattd,  104 

Kharatara  Gacchas,  170 

>&M  427 

khindsava,  105 

Khuddaka  nikdya,  83 

Kkuddaka  pdtha,  83 

khydti  vijiidna,  1 45 

kilesas,  100 

Kinetic,  246 

Kirandvall,  306 

Kirandvallbhdskara^  306 

A'?Va(^  Pdtafijal,  233 

,^/^/a,  142,  267,  301,  365 

kleldvarana,  132 

klisia,  269 

Knowledge  as  movement,  416 

Knowledge-moments,    411,   412;    -stuff, 

240 
kramabhdva,  186 


kratu,  88 

kriyd,  340 

kriydkalpand,  340  w. 

kriydiakti,  460 

krtddriham,  424 

krodha,  201 

krsna,  28  «.,  73,  74,  266 

Krsna  yaju7-veda,  227 

Krsnayajvan,  371 

Krttikd,  387 

ksana,  257  «.,  409^2. 

Ksajiabhangasiddhi,  163  «. 

ksanasamidna,  409  «. 

ksanasya  prapayitumaiakyatvdt,  410  «. 

ksanika,  161 

ksanikatvavydpta,  159 

ksanikdk,  1 1 4 

ksattriya,  34,  35,  173,  208 

ksdnti,  202 

ksdntipdramitd,  127 

ksdyika,  192 

ksdyopa^atnika,  192 

ksetra,  214,  217 

ksetrajna,  214 

ksipta,  268 

>^«Vj,  51,  252,  255,  310,  313,  314,  328 

Ksurika,  28  n. 

Kukkulikas,  112,  113 

Kumarajiva,  122  «.,  128,  166 

Kujndrasambhava,  277;?. 

Kumarila,  67,  69,  129,  145,  151 «.,  167, 
209 «.,  284,  355,  359,  369,  370,  371, 
372,  378>  379'  380,  382,  384,  386,  387, 
388,  389,  391,  392,  395,  396,  397,  399, 
400,  401,  402,  403,  405,  416,  417,  432, 

459..  484 
Kundika,  28  w. 

Kusumdnjali,  307,  326  «.,  365  «. 
ku^alamiila,  136 

laksanaparindma,  256 

laksanahlnyatd,  149 

Laksandvali,  312  w. 

Lankdvatdra,  S^n.,  125  «.,  126 «.,  128, 
130  w.,  138,  145  «.,  146K.,  147,  148  «., 
149,  150,  151  w.,  280,  423,  426  w.,  429, 
470 

/aya,  426 

layayoga,  229 

Le  Gentil,  39 

Leipsig,  203  «. 

/^/^fl,  73,  191 

Liberation,  273,  317  «. 

Life-functions,  262 

/zM^a,  152,    156,   157,  249,  293 «.,  331, 

343.   344.    345.    348,    351.    356,    359. 

412 
linga-pardniaria,  351 
/w^w,  345 
/?/«,  324 
Lildvati,  306 
lobha,  100,  20  r 
Logic,  172,  277 
/<»^a:,  197,  198,  199 


Index 


509 


lokabhdvand,  202 
Lokaprakaia,  igow. 
lokas,  235 

lokakdia,  189,  197,  199 
Lokayata,  78«.,  227,  277 
Lokottaravadins,  112 
Lumbini  Grove,  81 

Macdonell,  12,  I3«.,   18,   19M.,  22,  23, 

25«.,  26  «. 
mada,  144 
madaiakti,  79 
Madhusudana,  492 
Madhusudana  Sarasvati,  67,  420 
Madhva,  70,  168 
?nadhya,  199 

madhyatnaka,  its  meaning,  144 
Madhyamaka  philosophy,  138 
madhyama-parimdna,  189 
Magadha,  120  n. 
Magic,    127,    142,    424,   426,  428,    435, 

469 
Magical,    80,    229;    force,    37;    verses, 

36 
mahat,  45,  213,  225,  226,  248,  249,  254, 

255,  276,  290,  3i4«.,  315,  431 
niahatparimdna,  315 
niakat-tattva,  249 
Mahd,  28  n. 
Mahdbhdrata,    79,  216,  217,    218,    219, 

224,  279 
Mahdbhdsya,    2ig,    230,    231,    232,    233, 

235.  465 
mahdbhuta,  94,  95,  122 
Mahdbodhivainsa,  112 
mahdbrata,  200 
mahdkarimd,  138 
Mahdlamkdrcddstra,  129  «. 
Mahamaya,  81 
?>tahdmoka,  220  n. 
mahdn,  292 

Makdndrayana,  31,  39  w. 
Mahdniddna  suttanta,  92  n. 
Mahdniiitka,  171  n. 
Mahdpaj-inibbdnasutlanta ,  81  «. 
Mahdpratydkhydna,  171 ;«. 
Mahasangha,  112 
Mahasanghikas,  112,  113,  125 
Mahdsalipatthdna  Suit  a,  107 
Mahdvdkya,  28  n. 
niahdvdkya,  439 
Makdvibkdsd,  110 
Mahavira,  79,   169,   170,   171;     his  life, 

173 

Mahdvyutpatti,  \2on. 

Mahayana,  125,  166,  424;  its  differ- 
ence from  Hinayana,  126;  literature, 
125«.;  meaning  of,  125 

Mahdydnasainparigrahaidstra,  1 28 

Mahdydnasutnllamkdra,  125,  128,  146W., 
147  «.,  151  n. 

Mahayana  siatras,  125,  128,  279,  421; 
their  doctrine,  127 

Mahayanism,  125 


Mahayanists,  126 

Mahi^asakas,  112,  119 

Mahommedan,  39 

MailrdyanT,   2Sn.,  31,   39«.,   211,  227, 

236 
Maitreyt,  28  «. 
Maitreyi,  35  «.,  61 

niaitri,  93«.,  136,  203,  226  w.,  236,  270 
Majjhima  Nikdya,  83,  93M.,  99«.,  100, 

III  «. 
Major,  351 
A/akaranda,  307 
Makkhali  Gosala,  79 
Malabar,  432 
Malebranche,  40  «. 
Mallinatha,  277  «.,  308,  362  «. 
Mallisena,  171 
man,  68 

Man,  as  universe,  23 
manahparydya,  191  «.,  207 
manahhiddhi,  201 
tnanana,  490 
manas,   25,  26,  43,   133,   146,    189,   213, 

214,  215,  225,  261,  262,  289,  291,  292, 

295.  298,  300,  303,  311,  316,  365,  377, 

378,  402,  413,  460,  472  «. 
manaskdra,  134 
viano,  89,  96,  124 
fnanogzipii,  1 99  n. 
manoniaya,  60 
manomaya  dtinan,  46 
nianovijfidna,  124,  134,  408 
manh-a,  211 
niantradrastd,  10 

mantras,  36,  69,  71,  283,  404,  405 
mantrayoga,  229 
fnanvate,  124 

Mandalabrdkmana,  28  n.,  228 
Mandana  Mi^ra,  371,  418,  432 
Maniprabhd,  318  w.,  419,  485  «. 
7narana,  86  «. 
maranabkava,  91 
marandnussa/i,  102 
marut,  252,  255,  310 
Mass-stuff,  242,  244 
mata,  68  «. 
Material  cause,  274,  286,  322,  323,  376, 

377,  445,  453 
Mathura  Bhattacarya,  308 
mati,  207 
matijndna,  191  w. 
Matter,  196 
Maudgalyana,  120 
Maulikya  Samkhya,  217,  218 
Max    Miiller,    10,    i3«.,    18,   38,   39  w., 

40  }i.,  45  n. 
Mayiikkamdlikd  ,371 
Madhava,  68«.,  79,  305  «.,  371,  405  «., 

418,  419,  457,  469 
Madhava  Deva,  308 
Madhavacarya,  ii^n. 
mddhyamika,  127,  138,  429 
Mddhyamika  karikd,  125  «.,  138,  426  «. 
Madhyamikas,  113 


5IO 


Index 


Mddhyamika   vrtti,    85«.,    86«.,    88«., 

90«.,    91  «.,    141  n.,    142 «.,    143  M., 

144  ».,  425  «. 
Alddhya 711  ikaMstra ,  122  n. 
madhyastha,  203 
mana,  100,  144,  201 
mdnam,  356 

mdnasa-pratyaksa,  343,  400 
mdnasika,  108 
Mdndiikya,    28«.,   3i«.,    39,  418,   424, 

432  «. 
Alandukya  kdrika,  418,  422 
Manikya  Nandi,  309 
Mdrada7nanasutra,  125  ft. 
mardava,  202 
mdtsaryya,  144 
Mdtharabhdsya,  213 
mdyd,  50,   127,  141,  142,  144,  146,   149, 

151,  201,  241,  258,  273«.,  424,  426, 

431.  435.  437.  438,  442.  443.  461, 465, 

467,  468,  469,  470,  492,  493 
maydhasti,  428 
mdydkdra,  94 
Mechanical,      Physical     and     Chemical 

Theories  of  the  Ancient  Hindus,  213 
Meditation,  103,  104,  105,  115,  161,  173, 

201,  202,  227,  234,  235,  317  «. 
megha,  220  w. 
Memory,  185,  269,  316  «.,  340;  causes  of, 

2l6«. 

Mental  perception,  400 

Mercury,  287  n. 

Merit,  264,  281,  312,  317,  324,  325,  342 

Metaphysical,  406 

Metaphysics,  i6i,  166,  403,  414,  415 

Metempsychosis,  25,  234 

mettd,  103 

tnettdbhdvand,  104 

Middle,  351,  362 

Middle  India,  120  n. 

Milinda,  83 

Milindapanha,  83,  88,  89,  107,  163  «. 

Mindfulness,  loi,  103 

Mind  stuff,  240  n. 

Minor,  351,  362 

Mirok,  278,  303 

Misery,  295  «. 

Mithila,  308 

mithyddrsti,  145 

mithydjndna,  294,  365 

m  ithydsatydbh  in  ivela ,  148 

mithydtva,  193 

mithydtvanirukti,  444  n. 

Mimdmsd,  7,  9,  68,  129,  188,  189,  209  w., 
276,  280,  281,  284,  303,  320,  323, 
343  «•.  344  «•.  346,  357.  363.  367, 
369.  370.  371.  372,  375.  376,  382, 
383.  385.  386,  39°.  391.  394.  396,  400. 
403,  404,  406,  412,417,  429,  430,  433, 
435.  440.  448,  47'.  484.  485.  486,  490, 
497, ;  agreement  with  Nyaya  Vai^esika, 
403;  akhydti  theory  of  illusion,  386; 
amiitdbhidhdnavdda  and  abhihitdnva- 
ya7)dda,  395  ;    comparison  with  other 


systems,  367  ff. ;  conceptions  of  jdti 
and  avayavin,  379  ff. ;  conception  of 
Jakti,  402  n. ;  consciousness  of  self, 
how  attained,  Kumarila  and  Prab- 
hakara,  400  ff. ;  denial  of  sphota, 
397  «. ;  doctrine  of  samavdya,  381  ; 
epistemology  of  Kumarila,  416  ff.; 
epistemology  of  Prabhakara,  415  ff.; 
general  account  of,  69;  indeterminate 
and  determinate  perception,  378  ff.  ; 
inference,  387  ff. ;  influence  of  Buddhist 
logic  on  Mimainsa  logic,  388,  390 ; 
Kumarila  and  Prabhakara,  372  ; 
Kumarila's  view  of  self-luminosity, 
459;  legal  value  of,  69;  literature, 
369  ff.;  non-perception,  397  ff.;  Nyaya 
objections  against  the  self-validity  of 
knowledge,  372  ff.;  perception,  sense- 
organs  and  sense-contact,  375  ff.;  Prab- 
hakara's  doctrine  of  perception  con- 
trasted with  that  of  Nyaya,  343 «.; 
Prabhakara's  view  of  self-luminosity, 
459 ;  Sabda  pramana,  394  ff. ;  self, 
399  ff. ;  self  as  jfidnaiakti,  402 ;  self- 
revealing  character  of  knowledge, 
382  ff. ;  self-validity  of  knowledge, 
3 73  ff. ;  upamdna  and  arthdpatti,  39 1  ff. ; 
vidhis,  404  ff.;  view  of  negation,  355  ff. 

Mmidmsdbdlaprakdia,  371 

Mimdmsdnukratnani,  371 

Mitndmsd  -  nydya  -prakdia,  371 

Mimdrnsdpartbhdsd,  371 

Mimdmsd  sUtras,  280,  281,  282,  285,  370, 

372,' 394 
Mimarnsist,  359 
mleccha,  294  «.,  304 
modamdna,  220 n. 
Moggallana,  108,  263  «. 
vioha,  100,  122,  143,  220  «.,  276,  300 
mohantya,  191,  193 
mohanlya  karma,  194 
moksa,  115,  170,  173,  190,  192,  195,  198, 

199,  207,  215,  216,  217,  283,  305,  3i7«, 
moksavada,  401  n. 
mokse  nivrttirnihhsd,  216 
Molar,  321 

Molecular  motion,  32 1 
Molecules,  327 
Momentariness,  158,  161,   164,  168,  209, 

212 
Momentary,  104,  114,  141,  152,  159,  160, 

165,   174,  187,   274,  299,  3x6 «.,  325, 

332,  3.39.  408.  471 
Monk,  172,  173 
Monotheism,  17 
Monotheistic,  33 
Mudgala,  28  n. 
muditd,  103,  220  «.,  236,  270 
Muir,  20W.,  23  «.,  32«.,  33  «. 
viukta,  73 
mukta-jiva,  189 
Miiktdvalt,  307,  322  n. 
mukti,  58,  202,  248,  261,  269,  273,  305  «., 

324,  366,  424,  440,  491  ;  general  ac- 


Index 


511 


count   of,    74;    general   agreement   of 

Indian  systems  in,  74 
Muklika,  28  n.,  263  «. 
tnumuksutva,  437 
Mundaka,  28«.,  39,  49,  56,  432 
Mula  Sarvastivada,  120 
Miilasutras,  i-ji 
Mystic,  229 

na  asti,  67 

Naciketas,  59,  60 

na-ekdnta,  175 

naiganiana,  1 86  n. 

naigamanaya,  177 

naimittika-karvia,  489 

nairatmya,  147,  149 

Naiskarmyasiddhi,  419 

Naiyayika,    197,   203,    305,   332 «.,    333, 

,347;  355.  362,  365.  381,  462,  491 
Nandivardhana,  173 
na  nirodho  na  cotpattih,  425 
Narasimhacarya,  419  n. 
Narbuda,  432 
NaUiral  Philosophy  of  the  Ancient  Hindus, 

213 

Nature,  43 

Navadvipa,  306,  308 

Navya-Nyaya,  308,  353 

naya,  176,  179,  187 

Nayanaprasadini ,  419 

naydbhasa,  178,  181 

Nddabittdu,  28«.,  228 

Nagasena,  107 

Nagarjuna,  109,  125  «.,  126,  128,  129 «., 
138,  144,  155  «.,  166,  215  «.,  233,  235, 
279,  421,  423,  425 «.,  427,  429,465, 
470,  493;  essencelessness  of  all  things, 
141;  ethics  of,  144;  his  doctrine  that 
nothing  exists,  140;  Nirvana  in,  142; 
pratityasamutpdda  in,  139,  143 

Nage^a,  212,  231,  235 

ndma,  86w.,  91,  193,  340 

ndmakalpand,  340  «. 

ndma-karma,  191,  194 

ndmarupa,   85,   86«.,    88,    89,  90,   122, 

174.  439 
namarupa-padatthdnam,  89 
ndmayati,  91 
Ndndt,  171 

Ndradaparivrdjaka,  28  k. 
Ndrdyana,  28  «. 
Narayanatirtha,  212,  242  n. 
ndsti  na  prakaiate,  458 
ndstika,  67,  68,  208 

Nataputta  Varddhamana  Mahavira,  169 
Negation,  147,  293,  304,   316,  318,  335, 

336,    355.    356,    357,    358,  359,    398, 

399'    444.   453'   454.    455,    45^,    464, 

485,  488 
Negative,  461 

Nemicandra,  171,  193,  194 «. 
Nepal,  81 

nescience,  449,  450,  452,  461 
neti  neti,  44,  45,  61,  65,  110 


New  York,  3  n. 

ni,  38 

Nibandhakara,  370 

nidariana,  350,  351 

nidar^andbhdsa,  351 

Niddesa,  83 

nididhydsana,  490 

nidrd,  193,  269 

nigamana,  185,  296,  350,  353 

Nigantha,  169 

niggama,  157 

nigodas,  190 

nigrahasthdna,  294,  296,  301,  302,  360, 
362 

Nihilism,  138,  143 

Nihilistic,  80;  doctrine,  140 

nihsvabhdva,  142,  146 

nihsvabhdvaivam  ,141 

nihsvarupatd,  464 

nihsreyasa,  282,  285,  294,  305 

Nikaya,  83 

nimitta,  274,  323 

nimitta-kdrana,  254,  438 

nimittatthiti,  93 

nimitedpabandha,  256 

nirabhilapyah'myatd,  149 

niratiiaydh  cetandh,  228  n. 

niravayava,  380  w. 

Niraydvali,  1 7 1  w. 

Nirdlatnba,  28  n. 

nirdiiati,  124 

Nirl^vara  Sanikhya,  259 

nirjard,  192,  195 

nirmmitapratimohi,  145 

nirnaya,  294,  296,  360 

Nirnaya-Sagara,  28  n. 

nirodha,  149,  268,  272 

nirodha  sainddhi,  271 

Nirvana,  28«.,  75,  81,  100,  ii9«.,  126, 
127,  128,  u^  135,  136,  139,  142,  143, 
145.  149.  151,  169,  190,  215  w.,  423 

Nirvdnapartksd ,  425  n. 

nirvicdra,  271 

nirvikalpa,  334,  337,  378,  408,  412,  416, 

483,  484 
nirvikalpa-dvitva-gima,  3 1 4 
nirvikalpahprapahcopaiamah,  426 
nirvikalpajfidna,  i^^n.,  182 
nirvikalpaka,  339 
nirvikalpa  pratyaksa,  261 
nirvikalpikd,  337 
nirvitarka,  271 
7t  is  salt  a  7iijjiva,  84 
nissdya,  94 
niicaya,  409  «. 
Niiltha,  I'ji  n, 
nisedha,  29 
nisjddha-kanna,  489 
Niskantaka,  308,  362  «. 
nitya,  290,  316 
nitya-kar»ia,  489 
nitydnitya,  148 
nitydnityavastuviveka,  436 
nivrtti,  488 


512 


Index 


nivvdna,  103,  104,  106,  108,  109 
niyama,  155,  235,  270,  317  «.,  345 
niyama-vidhi,  404 
niyatdpurvavarttitd,  320 
ni,  277 

ntlabodha,  410  «. 
nilatvajdtii  317 
niriipakhya,  124 
Noble  path,  124 
nodanaviiesa,  291 
Non-existence,  356,  357 
Non-perception,  a6i,  356,  358,  359,  397, 

485 
North-western  Province,  172 
Nrsimhapiirvatdpini,  28  n.,  32  «. 
Nrsimha^rama  Muni,  419,  420 
Number,  291,  292,  305,  306 «.,  315 
Nyaya,  7,  9,  63,  68,  75,  87  «.,   I57>  ^59' 
161, 168,  177,  219,  269 «.,  274,  276,  277, 
278,  279,  280,  294,  296,  297,  299,  303, 
304.  305.  307»  308,  309.  310.  312  «., 

320,  321,  325,  326,  327,  328,  331,  332, 

333.  335.  337>  338,  339.  340,  343. 
344 «.,  346,  347,  348,  349,  350,  353, 
354.  356.  360,  3<5i.  362,  363'  364.  367. 
368,  369,  372,  373,  376,  377,  378 «., 
380,  381,  382,  385,  391,  394,  396 «., 
397,  403,  406,  412,  413,  414,  415,  416, 

417.  431.  434.  440.  446,  455.  459'  462, 
465,  466,  484,  488,  492;  nature  of  the 
self,  459  K.;  notion  of  time,  466 

Nydyabindu,  151,  152  «.,  I54«.,  i55«., 
168,  181,  309,  358 «.,  4io«. 

Nydyabindutlkd,  152  «.,  154 «.,  155 «., 
156  «.,  359«.,  410W. 

Nydyabindutikatippani,  i^i  n.,  152  «., 
154  «. 

Nydyabodhmt,  330  «. 

Nydyakandali,  306,  3io«.,  31 1«.,  312 «., 
314  «.,  316  «.,  317  «.,  324  «.,  326  «., 
328  «.,  337  W-,  338  «•,  351  «•>  355  «•. 

359  «• 

Nydyakanika,  371 
Nydyakoia,  2  ;;. 
NydyalJldvati,  317  w. 
Nydyamakaranda,  420,  486 
Nydyamaiijari,  67,  79,  i6ow.,  161,  j62n., 
i63«.,   2I2W.,   276,  307,  311  M.,  320, 

321,  322  «.,  326,  327  n.,  330  «.,  332  «., 
336,  337  «•'  340«.,  345  «•.  347.  353' 
355  «•.  358  «.,  359  «•>  362,  362  «.,  363. 
365  «.,  366W.,  373«-'  38o«.,  414'^-' 
417  w.,  459  «.,  467 

JVydyama/tjarisara,  308 
Nyayarndldvistara,  371,  405  «. 
Nydyanibandhaprakdia,  63,  307 
Nydyanirnaya,  307,  418 
Nydyapradlpa,  308 
Nydyapravc'ia,  309 
Nydyaratnaindld,  371,  417  «. 
Nydyaratndkara,  370,  378».,  388,  sSp^., 

390  «. 
Nydyasara,  308,  309 
Nydyasiddhdntadipa,  308 


Nydyasiddhdntamatijari,  308 
Nydya  suci,  278 
Nyayasudhd,  371 

Nydya  sutra,  118  n.,  22gn.,  277,  297  «., 
300  «.,    302,    306,    307,    342  «.,    362, 

430 

Nydya  sutrabhdsya,  186  «. 

Nydya siitras,  71,  120,  276,278,  279,  294, 

301.  303.  305'  327  «•'  360 
Nyayasutravivarana,  307 
Nydyasiitroddhdra,  278 
Nydyatdtparyamandana,  63,  307 
NydyatdtpayyatJkdpariiuddh  i,  6  3 
Nyaya-Vai^esilia,  167,  178,  256  w.,  281, 
284,  294 «.,  305,  310,  311,  312,  313, 
318,  319,  320,  323,  326,  330,  335,  341, 
355.  366,  367.  371.403.492;  antiquity 
of  the  Vaiiesika  sutras,  280  ff. ;  argu- 
ment from  order  and  arrangement,  in 
favour  of  the  existence  of  God,  363  ff.; 
arguments  against  the  Buddhist  doctrine 
of  causation  as  tdddtmya  and  tadutpatti, 
345 ff.;  atomic  combination,  326;  Bud- 
dhist criticism  of  nirvikalpa  and  Vacas- 
pati's  answer,  339  ff. ;  Caraka  and  the 
Nydyasutras,  302  ;  causes  of  recol- 
lection, 300 ;  causation  as  invariable 
antecedence,  321  ;  causation  as  mole- 
cular motion,  321;  causation  as  opera- 
tive conditions,  322 ;  classification  of 
inference,  353  ff.;  classification  of  nega- 
tion, 359 ;  conception  of  wholes,  380  n. ; 
criticism  of  momentariness,  274;  criti- 
cism of  the  Saipkhya  and  the  Buddhist 
view  of  pramana,  331  ff.;  criticism  of 
Samkhya  satkdryavdda,  etc.,  275  ff. ; 
criticism  of  the  theory  of  causation  by 
Vedanta,  466;  debating  devices  and 
fallacies,  360  ff. ;  discussion  on  the 
meaning  of  «/a/«a«<2,  355 «•;  discussion 
on  the  sutras,  276  ff.;  doctrine  of  dis- 
solution, 323;  doctrine  of  inference, 
343  ff.;  doctrine  of  illusion,  337;  Aoc- 
\xin&  oi  paratakpi'dmdnya,  372  ff.;  doc- 
trine of  perception,  333 ;  doctrine  of 
soul,  362  ff.;  doctrine  of  substance 
{dravya),  310  ff.;  doctrine  of  upamdna 
and  Jabda,  354  ff;  doctrine  of  vydpti, 
345  ff.;  epistemology,  412  ff. ;  erroneous 
perception,  336;  fallacies  of  hetu,  344; 
five  premisses  of  Pra^astapada,  350; 
formation  of  radicles,  329;  four  kinds 
of  pramanas,  332  ff.;  Gange^a's  defi- 
nition of  perception,  334 «.,  342  «.; 
general  epistemological  situation  as 
compared  with  Mimarnsa,  367  ;  indeter- 
minate and  determinate  perception, 
334 ;  inference  from  effects  to  causes, 
297;  inference  of  a  creator,  325  ff.; 
literature,  307  ff. ;  merits  and  demerits 
operating  as  teleological  causes  of 
atomic  combination,  323  ff.;  Mimarnsa 
doctrine  of  negation,  355  ff.;  miracu- 
lous, intuitive  and  mental  perception, 


Index 


513 


342  ff.;  modes  of  atomic  combination 
at  the  time  of  creation,  324 ;  mode  of 
operation  of  heat -light  rays,  329;  mode 
of  sense-contact  as  contrasted  with  that 
of  Sarnkhya-yoga,  378 «.;  molecular 
changes  and  heat,  327  ff.;  nature  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  342;  notion  of  time 
compared  with  the  Sarnkhya  notion  of 
time,  311;  Nyaya  inference  of  cause, 
297  n. ;  object  of  Nyaya  studies,  2T!  ff.; 
philosophy  of  the  Vaiiesika  sutras, 
285  ff. ;  pramana  as  collocation  and 
causal  operation,  330;  Pradastapada's 
classification  of  cognition,  332  n. ; 
Pra^astapada's  classification  of  svar- 
ihdmimana  2ir\(^.  f'ardrtkdnumdna,  350; 
Pra^astapada's  doctrine  of  example 
compared  with  that  of  Dinnaga, 
350  «.;  Prasastapada's  interpretation  of 
Kanada's  doctrine  of  inference,  348  ff.; 
Prasastapada's  view  of  atomic  combina- 
tion, 328;  principle  on  which  the  cate- 
gories are  admitted,  312;  relations 
directly  apprehended  by  perception, 
335  ;  salvation  through  knowledge, 
365  ff. ;  samavdyi  and  asamavdyi 
kdrana,  322;  science  of  Nyaya  {nydya 
vidyd),  277  ff.;  self  compared  with 
Sarnkhya  and  Mimarnsa,  368;  sense- 
contact  and  perception,  335  ff-;  six 
kinds  of  sense-contact,  334;  theory  of 
anuvyavasdya  contrasted  with  the  tri- 
putTpraiyaksa  doctrine  of  Prabhakara, 

343,  343  n.%  transcendental  contact, 
341;  transmission  of  qualities  from 
causes  to  effects,  323;  unconditional 
concomitance  and  induction,  347  ff.; 
Vacaspati's  refutation  of  identity  of 
essence  and  causality  as  being  grounds 
of  inference,  352 ;  Vacaspati,  Sri- 
dhara  and  Gange^a  on  indeterminate 
perception,  337  ff. ;  Vai^esika  an  old 
school  of  Mimaiiisa,  282  ff.;  Vatsya- 
yana,  Udyotakara,  Vacaspati,  Dinnaga 
and  Dharmakirtti  on  the  doctrine  of 
concomitance,  351  ff.;  view  of  motion 
contrasted  with  Sarnkhya,  330;  view 
of  negation,  359;  view  of  perception 
contrasted   with   that   of   Prabhakara, 

343  w.;  view  of  sdmdnya  contrasted 
with  that  of  the  Buddhists,  318  w.; 
viparitakhydti  theory  of  illusion,  385; 
will  of  God  and  teleology,  324  ff. 

Nydyavdrttika,  307,  ay  n. 
Nydyavdrttikatdtparyatikd,  63,  277,  307 
nydyavidyd,  277 
Nydyanusdra,  120 
Nydydvatdra,  iji,  309 
iidnasamvara,  loi 

oddtaMi,  94 
ojahpradesa-i  196 
Oldenburg,  83«.,  237  «. 
Om,  36 


Omniscience,  173 
Ontological,  2,  3,  340 
Oral  discussions,  65 
Order,  364 
Organic,  51 
Organic  affections,  94 
Oriental,  34 
Oupanikhat,  40 
Ovum,  328 
Oxford,  40  «. 

paccabhinnd,  98 

paccaya,  93,  95 

paddrtha,    282,    312,    313,    317 «.,   319, 

365 
Paddrthadkartnasarngraha,  306  n. 
Paddrthatatti<a>tirfipana,  308  ;/. 
Padmanabha  Misra,  63,  306,  307 
Padmapada,  418,  419 
Paingala,  28  «.,  31  n. 
paksa,  156W.,  343,  344,  349,  362,  388 
paksasattva,  1^6  n.,  349 
paksdbhdsa,  390 
pakti,  122 

Pancadast,  419,  492  «, 
Pancakalpa,  171  n. 
pancakdranl,  352 
Pancapddikd,  418,  419 
Paiicapddikddarpatta,  4 1 9 
Pattcapddikdtikd,  4 19 
Paiicapddikdvivarana,  419,  456  «. 
Pancaratra  Vaisnavas,  220 
Panca^ikha,  216,  217,  219,  221 
patuavijndnakdya,  1 46 
pancdgnividyd,  37 
parind,  100,  loi,  166 
panndsampadam,  82 
Pandita  A^oka,  168,  297 «.,  313M.,  3i8«., 

380  w. 
para,  220«.,  280,  281 
parabhdva,  141 
Parabrahvia,  28  «. 
parajati,  317 
Paramakamsa,  28  «. 
Paraviahainsaparivrdjaka,  28  n. 
paramamakat,  292,  316 
paramnmahdn,  292 
parar)idnava,  380  «. 

paramdnu,  121,  122,  123,  251,  252,  314M. 
Paramartha,  i2o«.,  128,  149,  2i8M.,i428 
paramdrthasat,  409  «.,  410  «. 
paramdrthasattd,  1 44 
paranidrihatah,  425 
paramdtman,  214 
paratah-prdnumya,  372 
paratva,  316 
pardpara,  220  «. 
pardrthdnumdna,   155,  156,  186 «.,  350, 

353.  389 
paribhogdnvaya ptmya,  iig  fi. 
paricchiytna,  445 
paricckinndkdsa,  104 
paridevatid,  86  «. 
parigrahdkdttksd,  193 

33 


514 


Index 


parihara,  30'2 

parikalpa,  148 

parikamma,  102  n. 

parikartfza,  270 

parimandala,  292 

parimandala  parintana,  314 

parimdna,  315,  316,  323 

parimiti,  314 

parindtna,  53,  193,  196,  468,  487 

parindmakramaniyauia,  256 

pariitamavdda,  258 

parisankhyd-vidhi,  4O4 

parispanda,  320,  321,  329 

parUesamdna,  353 

Parisistaparvatii  171 

parisahajaya,  195 

partksaka,  295 

pariksd,  447 

Pariksdtnukhasutra,  182  «.,  309 

Parlksdniukhasutravrtti,  171,  181  «., 
183  w.,  186  «. 

Parmenides,  42 

paroksa,  183,  185 

Part,  165 

Parthasarathi  Mi^ra,  371,  378  «. 

parydya,  187,  198 

parydyanaya,  I'j'j,  178 

passasa,  103 

paiutva,  317 

Pataiijali,  68,  203,  212,  219,  222,  227, 
228,  229,  230,  232,  233,  234,  236, 
238,  268,  279,  317 «.,  365,  465;  his 
date  and  identification,  230  ff. ;  his 
relation  with  yoga,  226  ff. 

Patanjalicarita,  230 

patkamam  jhdnam,  105 

Patna,  173 

pathavi,  106 

paticcasamuppanna,  94 

paticcaaavnippdda,  84,  i66;  as  manifesta- 
tion of  sorrow,  92 ;  extending  over 
three  lives,  92 

patighasaiind ,  96 

patiloma,  158 

Patisambhidamagga,  83,  93  w. 
Pattdvali,  171 

/a^a,  70,  333,  433 

paka,  329 
pdkajotpatti,  327 

Pali,  3,  82,  84,  87,  92  w.,  108,  nt,  114, 
139,  263  «.,  470;  literature,  161 

pdni,  333 

Panini,  i2w.,  226,  227  «.,  230,  232,  263  «., 
279  «.,  465 

papa,  195,  264,  266 

pdpand,  157 

pdpopade^a,  200 

pdramdrlhika,  439,  487 
pdrainitd,  127,  138 
Par^va,  129,  169,  173 
Pdhipatabrahma,  28  «. 
PaiupaladaHatia,  235  «. 
Patafijala,  233,  235 
Pdtafijala  mahdbhdsya,  231 


pdtanjalamahdbhdsyacarakapratisamskr- 

taik,  235 
Patafijala  Samkhya,  68,  221 
Patafijala  school,  229 
Pdtafijalataiitra,  231,  235 
Patafijala  P'o^'a  sulfas,  68 
Patimokkhasarnvara,  loi 
Pathak,  423 
Payasi,  106,  107 
Perception,  269,  297,  298,  318,  332,  333, 

334.  335,  336,  340.  341.  34'2,  344.  etc. 
Perfuming,     137 ;    influence,    134,    135 ; 

power,  131 
Persian,  233 
Pessimism,  76 
Pessimistic,  237 
Petavatthu,  83 
Petrograd,  409  «. 
phala,  413,  427 
phalajildna,  373 
pkassa,  85,  95,  96 
phassakdya,  85  71. 
phassdyatana,  85  «. 
Phenomena,  84,  89,   no,  127,  128,  133, 

139,  140,  141,  142,  143,  144,  146,  147, 

150,  151,  166,  167,  168,  217,  276,  282, 

292.  332.  368,  373'  4".  450.  451.  452, 

460,  465,  466,  467,  468,  481,  482,  486 
Phenomenal,  435,  450,  458,  461,  484 
Philosophic     literatures,     66 ;     different 

classes  of,  67 ;  growth  of,  65 
Philosophy  of  the  Upanishads,  32«.,  38«., 

45«.,  49«.,  54«.,  58  «. 
Physical  characters,  328 
Physics,  403 

pilupdka,  305,  306  «.,  327 
Pindaniryukti,  i^i 
Pitdputrasanidgamasiltra,  125  w. 
Pitrs,  55 

pitrydna,  34,  54,  56,  58,  125  w. 
pitta,  452 

pitakas,  68  «.,  263  n. 
pitharapdka,  7,11 
piti,  105,  106 
Plato,  42 
Pluralism,  175 
Poly-bhautik,  329 
Polytheism,  17 
Positive  Sciences  of  the  Ancient  Hindus, 

213,  246^.,  i^\n.,  322M.,  326,  328  «. 
posadhabrata,  200 
Potencies,  272,  273 
Potential,  254,  255,  258  w.,  275,  468 
Potentials,  252 
Poussin,  De  la  Vallee,  85  n.,  90,  91  «., 

108,  ii9«. 
Prabahana  Jaibali,  33,  34 
Prabhd,  308 
Prabhacandra,  171,  309 
Prabhakara,  69,    189,   209 «.,   369,   370, 

371,  372,  376.  379'  380,  382,  384,  386, 

389.  390,  391.  392.  395.  396.397.  398. 

399,  400,  401,  402,  403,  415,  416,  417, 

448.  459 


Index 


515 


Prabhakaramimamsd,      378  «.,      384  w., 

397  «.,  405  n. 
Prabhasa,  306 
pracchanna  Bauddha,  437 
pradariakatva,  416 
pradeia,  194 
pradhana,  1 1 7 
Prajapati,  19,  20,  26,  32,  36,  43,  46,  47, 

55 

prajilapti,  427 

Prajnaptisdstra,  1 20 

Prajhaptivddins,  112,  113 

prajna,  55,  131,  145,  271,  272,  273, 
424 

Prajnapand,  171  «. 

Prajiidpanopdngasutra,  196 

Prajndpdramitd,  127,  128,  42 1 

Prakaranapaiicikd,  370,  378 «.,  379 «., 
386  «.,  390  «.,  392  «.,  397  w. 

Prakaranapdda,  120 

prakaranasama,  344,  360 

prakdia,  243,  307,  326  «. 

Praka^ananda,  420,  469 

Praka^atman,  419,  490 

Praka^atman  Akhandananda,  468 

Prakirnas,  171 

prakrti,  145,  194,  213,  214,  216,  217,  218, 
219,  220 «.,  223,  238,  245,  246,  247, 
249,  250,  251,  253,  254,  255,  258,  259, 
261,  265,  266,  267,  269,  270,  272,  273, 
^76,  325.  367.  415.  43i>  433.  441,  49O' 
493  .^ 

prakrtiscdstadhdtuki,  214  m. 

pralaya,  214,  223,  247,  248,  261,  323, 
324.  403 

pramd,  336,  406,  415,  416,  471,  482,  484 
pramdda,  193 

pramdddcarana,  200 

pramdna,  154,  268,  277,  294,  296,  298, 
304.  330.  331.  332,  333.  343.  354. 355, 
356,  365,  390.  391.  394.  397.  398.  399. 
404,  406,  409  «.,  410,  412,  413,  414  «., 

415,  416,  417  «•.  444.  470.  484.  492 
pramdnabhedah,  333  n. 
praindnairarthapariksanam  ,111 
Pramdna- MI mdmsd,  184  «. 
Pranidnanayatattvdlokdlamkdra,         172, 

181  «.,  182  «.,  183  «.,  309 
pramdttaphala,  154,  409,  410,  413 
Pranianasamuccaya,   120,   153  «.,  155  «., 

167.  307.  309 
pramdnavdda,  407 
Pramdnavdrttikakarikd,  309 
pramdtd,  406,  482 
prameya,  277,  294,  365,  406 
Prameyakarnalamdrtanda ,       171,       185, 

188  «.,  189  «.,  igi  n.,  309 
prameyatva,  344,  354,  384 
pramoda,  203,  220  «. 
pramudka,  268 
prapafica,  425 
prapancapravrtti,  142 
prapaficopasama,  425 
prasiddhipurvakatva,  304,  349 


prasiddhipurvakatvdt,  289,  303 
Prasastapada,   305,   306,   312 «.,    314  w., 
3i6«.,   3i7«.,  328,  332W.,  337,  348, 

349.350.  351,  355 «•.  359  «•.  362 
Praiastapada-blidsya,  67,  306 
Praina,  28«.,  31  «.,  39,  432,  470 
PraJnavydkarana,  171 

pradbandka,  155 

pratibhdnajndna,  343 

pratijnd,  i8f,  t86«.,  296,  302,  350,  353, 

389 
pratijndbhdsa,  390 
pratijtidmdtram  ,114 
Pratijndsutra,  370 
pratijndvibhaktiy  1 86  «. 
praiipaksabkdvand,  270,  365 
pratisamkhydvirodha,  121,  124 
pratisancara,  247 
pratist/idpand,  302 
pratitantrasiddhdnta,  295 
pratiyogi,  357 
pratika,  43 
pratUya,  93,  138,  139 
pratttyasamutpada,  86 «.,  92,    r22,   138, 

139,  143,  147,  421;  meaning  of,  93 
pratyabhijndnirdsa,  1 62  «. 
Pratyagrilpa,  419 
pratyaksa,   153,  183,  294,  308,  332,  333, 

342,  343.  344,  383.  384.  409  «•.  417  «• 
pratyaksabalotpanna,  410  «. 
pratyaksa-pramd,  482 
Pratyaksasutra,  378  «.,  382 
pratyaksatodrstasambandha,  389 
pratyaksavisayatva,  409 
pratyayaSi  124 
pratyayopanibandha,  143 
pratydhdra,  236 
pratydmndya,  350 
pratyekabuddha,  137,  150,  151 
Pratyekabuddhayana,  125  w. 
praudhivdda,  220 

Pravacanabhdsya,  2r2,  245  «.,  259  «. 
pravkayabitddhi,  1 48 
pravrtti,    gon.,    228 «.,    243,    294,    295, 

301,  365,  375 
pravi-ttivijiidna,  134,  146 
prayatna,  280,  281,  295,  330 
prayoga  uirdesa,  124 
prayojana,  i-jS  n.,  294,  295,  302 
prddurbhdva,  93 
prdgabhdva,  293  «.,  359 
Prakrit,  171,  172 
prdmdnya,  182,  188,  406,  485 
prdmdnyavdda,  332  «. 
Prana,  20,  36,  43,  55,  250,  424 
prdnamaya  atman,  46 
prdnamaya  kosa,  60 
prdnavdyu,  262 
Prdndgnihotra,  28  «. 
prdndydma,  227,  236,  272 
prdpana,  332 
prdpyakdritva,  378;?. 
prdlibha-pratyaksa,  343 
prdtibhdsika,  445,  487 

33—2 


5i6 


Index 


Prdtimoksa,  145 
prdtitika-sattd,  442 

Preceptor,  66 

Premisses,  280,  293,  295 
preraka,  197 

Presumption,  392,  393 

prlti,  144 

Probandum,  157 

Propositions,  i56«. 

prthakprasthdna,  277,  278 

prthaktva,  316,  382,  464 

prthivl,  51,  143,  295 

prthivimdtra,  51 

Psychological,  273,  338,  406,  451;  pro- 
cesses, 97 

Psychosis,  88,  222 

Ptolemaic,  31 

pubbangama,  89 

pudgala,  114,  117,  119  «.,  195,  198; 
Buddhist,  195  n. 

pudgalanairdtniya,  150 

pudgaldstikdya,  195 

Puggalapaiinatti,  83 

Punjab,  172 

punya,  195,  264,  266 

punya-pdpa,  266 

Punyayalas,  129 

Purana,  i,  16,  172,  223;  gods  of  the,  16 

purusa,  20,  21,  32,  33,  43,  52,  75,  213, 
214,  216,  219,  223,  224,  225,  228 «., 
234 «.,  241,  242,  244,  247,  248,  249, 
258,  259,  260,  262,  265,  266,  267,  272, 
273>  276,  330>  331.  368,  415'  441,  49O' 

493 

purusartha,  269  «.,  408 
purtisd7-thatd,  258 

Purusa-sukta,  21  «.,  32 
piirusdvasthamavyaktani,  216 

Puspaciilikd,  ijin. 

Puspikd,  1 7 1  «. 

Purna,  120 

Purva-Mimainsa,  7,  68,  429 

Piirvas,  171 

purvavat,  269 «.,  281,  294,  302  «.,  303, 
353 

Quest,  270  «. 

Radical,  291 

Raghunatha      Siromani,      308,      326  «., 

365  «.,  419 
rajas,  214,  215,  224,  242,  244,  245,  246, 

249,  250,  251,  492,  493 
rajo-guna,  244 
ramyaka,  220  w. 
Rangarajadhvarindra,  418 
Ranaraiiganialla,  231 
rasa,  313,  403 
rasa  tanvidtra,  252 , 
rasdyana,  235 
raiandm,  404 

Ratnacuddpariprcchdsfdra,  \i^n. 
Ratnakirti,  68«.,   155M.,  158,  159,  160, 

161,  163  n.,  164,  168 


Patnakutasittra,  125  «.,  140 
Ratnameghasutra,  12^  n. 
Ratnaprabhd,  89«.,  90M.,  306,  418 
RatnardHsutra,  \i^n. 
Ratndkarasiitra,  125  «. 
Ratnakara^anti,  156,  168,  346  «. 
Ray,  Dr  P.  C,  251  «.,    254  «.,    321  «., 

322  «.,  327  «. 
Ray  Rammohan,  40 
Radha,  306 

rdga,  143,  144,  193,  220  «.,  267,  300 
rdgadvesa,  201 
Rahu,  218 
Rajagaha,  81 
Rajamrganka,  231 
Rdjapraintya,  171  «. 
rdjasika  aha^nkdra,  249 
Rdjavdrttika,  2 1 9 
Rajayoga,  229 
Raja,  212 
Rajgir,  81 

Ramabhadra  Diksita,  230 
Ramakrsna,  371,  470  w. 
Ramakrsnadhvarin,  4 19 
Rdviapurvatdpint,  28  «. 
Rdmarahasya,  28  «. 
Ramarudri,  307 
Ramatirtha,  419 
Ramanuja,  50,  70,  71,  168,  433 
Ramanuja-mata,  429 
Ramayatas,  70 
Ramottaratapim,  28  m. 
Rastavara,  130;?. 
rdH,  215 

Rdstrapdlapariprcchdsutra,  125  «. 
Ravana,  147 
Rdvana-b hdsya,  306 

Reality,    iii,   418,  428,  442,   443,   446, 
448,  449,  458,  462,  465,  467,  468,  470, 
486,  487,  488,  489,  490 
Reals,  223,  258,  259,  368 
Rebirth,  55,  56,  58,  59,  71,  75,  86,  106, 
107,  108,  140,  201,  215,  263,  265,283, 
286  «.,  292,  366,  422;  Buddhistic  com- 
pared with  Upanisadic,  87 
Recognition,  185 
Relative  pluralism,  175 
Rhys    Davids,     Mrs,    92  n.,    96,    99  n., 

108 «.,   112,  120W.,   i58«. 
Right  knowledge,  296,  297,  471 
Rishi,  24 
Rohini,  387 
ropana,  158 
Roth,  20 
Roer,  45  «. 
Rucidatta,  307 
Rudrahrdaya,  28  «. 
Riidrdksajdbdla,  28  «. 
rupa,  85«.,  88«.,  91,  94,  95,  96,   no, 

121,  313.  403 
rupadhar7nas,  121 
rupa-khandha,  95  ;  meaning  of,  94 
rupaloka,  134 
rupasa77iskdra,  290 


Index 


517 


rupa  tanmatra,  253 

rupatva,  313,  334 

Rg-Veda,  12,  14,  16,  17,  19,  20,  21,  23, 

24,  26,  32,  36,  45,  52,  226,  469 
rjusiitra,  178 
rjutd,  202 
Rjuvimald,  370 
Ksabha,  169 
_;7Z,  294  w.,  304 
r/a,  36,  37,  72;  (order),  22,  26;  Law  of 

Karma  derived  from,  26 

sabbasangahikavasena,  98 

Sabbatthivadins,  119,  120,  121;  their 
doctrine,  121;  their  doctrine  of  matter, 
121 

Sacrifice,  8r,  208,  316 «.,  397;  creation 
due  to,  22;  eternal,  22;  fruits  of,  not 
gifts  of  gods,  2 1 ;  has  a  mystical  po- 
tency, 22;  magical  character  of,  i\  ; 
minute  ritualistic  details  of,  21;  not 
propitiatory,  22 

Sacrifices,  71,  264,  276,  369,  372,  489; 
as  karma  and  law,  22;  replaced  by 
meditations,  37 

Sacrificial,  209,  211,  369,  370,  436 

sad,  38 

sadasantah  nidyopa?nah,  147 

saddm  udita ,  2  2  o  « . 

Sadananda  Vyasa,  420 

Sadananda  Yati,  420 

Saddharmapundarika,  125  w.,  128 

sadrupa,  397 

sadrsa-parindma,  248 

sadvilaksana,  444 

Sage,  105,  107 

sahabkdva,  186 

sahakdri,  250,  274,  323,  324,  336,  469 

sahakdri-iakti,  254 

sahopalambhaniyamdt  abhedonilataddhi- 
yoh,  411 

Saimhaguhya,  129 

Saint,  loi 

Sainthood,  100 

sakaddgdmibhdva,  100 

salila,  lion. 

salt,  61 

Salvation,  77,  115,  126,  234  w.,  235,  300, 
301,  305.  316,  317"-.  363.  399'  402, 
440,  487,  490 

saldyatana,  85  «.,  88 

sam,  12 

samabhiriidha-naya,  I'jSn. 

Samardicca-kahd,  172 

samatd,  130,  135,  137,  138 

samatva,  201,  202,  203 

samavdya,  143,  165,  171,  263 «.,  285, 
290  w.,  304,  306  «.,  312,  313,  319, 
322.  334.  335,  381,  403,  413,  448, 
450,  483,  492 

samavdyi,  286 

samavdyi-kdrana,  322,  376 

samaveta-samavdya,  335 

samaya,  198 


Samayapradipa,  120 

samddhdnam,  10 1 

samddhi,    82,    lOO,    loi,    103,    135,    166, 

271,  272 
samddhirdjasutra,  I25«. 
Samadhi  school,  236 
Samddfiisfttra,  125  «. 
samdkhydsainbandhapratipattih,  355  n. 
samdiiaprasavdt?nikd  jdtih,  298,  304  «. 
samdna-riipatd,  196 
sambhava,  298,  304 
sambhuyakdri,  121 
sambuddha,  423 
samiti,  195 
Sammitiyas,    112,    119;    their   doctrines, 

119W. 
Sammitiya^dstra,  119 
samprajiidta,  271 
samprayukta  hettt,  122 
satiiutpdda,  93 
samyagbadha,  217 
samyagjiidna,  151,  181,  408 
samyagJHdnapurvikd       sarvapztrusdrtha- 

siddhi,   152 
sddhana,  77,  489 
sddhdrana,  361 
sddhdratta-kdrana,  322 
sddhya,   156;?.,   157,  303,  343,  344,  345, 

346,  353.  393 
sddkyasama,  360 
sddrlya,  3 1 8  «. 
sdgaras,  235 

sdksdtkdrijndnam ,  4 1  o  » . 
sdksdtkdritvam,  334  «. 
^a>^//,  438,  455,  457 
sdksicaitanya,  455,  486 
sdmagri,  90,  330,  413,  467 
sdman,  36 

Samaveda,  12,  30,  36 
Sdmaniiaphala-siitta,  80  w. 
sdmarthya,  159,  ^17  ft. 
samayikabrata,  200 
sdmdnya,  164,  196,   203,  281,  285,  286, 

306 «.,  312,  313,  317,   318,  319,  320, 

Savidnyadusanadikprasdrttd,  318  «. 

Sd mcnyalaksana,  341 

sdmdtiyatodrsta,   26gn.,   287,    289,   294, 

302  w.,  303,  349,  350,  353,  363 
sdmdnyaiodrsiasambandha,  389 
sdindnyaviiesasamuddyo,  380  «. 
sdmdnyaviiesdtmaka,  231 
sdmdnydbkdva,  293  w. 
sdmydvasthd,  246 
samghdtaparamdnii,  1 2  x 
samgraha,  122 
sam^rahanaya,  177 
samhdreccho,  323 
Samhita,  12,  13,  30M.,  43,  72 
samj/id,  127,  133 
samjndkarma,  288 
samjndmdtram,  1 14 
samjfiin,  190 
sainkalpa,  225 


5i8 


Index 


samkhydbhdva,  •284  «. 

sanikleia,  427 

Samksepasankarajaya,  305  n. 

Saniksepaiarlraka,  419,  468 

Samnydsa,  28  w. 

samsara,   109,   130,    131,    135,    140,    141, 

201,    237,    248,    258,    261,    269,    273, 

438 
samsara-diikkka,  99  n. 
samsdriM,  189 
samskaroti,  263  n. 
samskdra,  S6n.,  91,  122,   263,  264,  273, 

281,  285  «.,  290  «.,  303,  316,  323,  340, 

451.  456 
saniskaras,  127,  139,  143,  266,  272 
samskrta,  121,  142,  151 
samskrtadhartnas,  121 
samsrstaviveka,  247 
Samstara,  171  n. 
samsthdna,  123 

sani^aya,  193,  277,  294,  332  «.,  360 
samtdna,  409 
samvara,  loi,  202 
satnvdda,  188,  373 
satnvddakatva,  408 
samvddi,  416,  417 
samvedana,  383 
samvedyaiva,  384 
sa?nvid,  383 
sanivrtamdtrani,  114 
samvrti,  428 
samvriisatya,  144 
samvrtisatyaid,  146 
samyama,  202 
samyoga,  83,  224,316,  3i9»334;  38o»  403> 

415,  448,  450 
samyukta-sainavdya,  334 
samyukta-samaveta-samavdya,  335 
samyuktavihsana,  335 
Samynktdbhidhar7naddstra,  1 20 
Sa7nyittta  Nikdya,  83,  84,  91 «. ,  94, 95,  96, 

98M.,   108  «.,   IIO«. ,   III  «. 

Sanaka,  222 

Sananda,  222 

Sanandana,  418 

Sanatana,  222 

sandkdna,  89 

sandigdha,  289,  349 

sanmdtra-visaya7n  pratyaksam,  382 

sannidhdndsannidhdndbhydm  jndnaprati- 
bhdsabhedah,  410M. 

sannidhi,  224 

sanniveia-visisfaid,  364 

Sanskrit,  66,  86 «.,  119,  121,  125,  128, 
153  «•'  155'  i7o»  171.  172,  309.  406, 
407  ;  language,  38,  39  ;  literature,  40, 
302 

Sanskrit  Philosophy,  technical  and  ab- 
struse, I 

Sanskrit    Texts,    20  «.,    23  «.,    32  «., 

33  «• 

Santdndntarasiddhi,  151  «. 
santosa,  236 
sangha.  102 


Sanghabhadra,  120 

Sangitiparyydya,  120 

sahkhdra,  86,  90,  92W.,  93,  94,  96,  26^n.; 

discussion  of   the  meaning  of,  86 «. ; 

meaning  of,  96 
sankhdrakkhandha,  86  n.,  95,  100 
Sahkrantikas,  112 
sannd,  94,  95,  96,97,  98;  different  stages 

of,  96 
sanndkkkandha,  95,  100 
sapaksasattd,  344 
sapaksasattva,  156M.  ,349 
sapiabhangi,  180,  181  «. 
Saptada^abhumisutra,  128 
Saptapaddrt hi ,  308 
Saras vati,  301  m. 
Sarasvatlrahasya,  28  «. 
Sarvadarsanasamgraha,     2,     68 «.,     79, 

114W.,  235«.,  305«.,  322«. 
Sarvadarsanavdcyd' 7-tkak,  68  w. 
sarvajiia,  426 

Sarvajiiatmamuni,  419,  468 
sarvakaJpandvira/nta77i  ,151 
sarvaloka,  137 
sarvasaTTiskdrah,  114 
Sa7~vasdra,  28  «• 
sa7^atantrasiddkdnta,  295 
sa7^avikalpalaksatiavi7tivrtta7H,  147 
Sarvahammani  Hiranyagarbha,  32  «. 
Sarvastivada,  i20«. 
Sarvastivadins,  112,  113,  115,  117,  119, 

120,  122,  128,  167;  their  theory  of  the 

senses,   123;  their  doctrine  of  karma, 

124;  their  doctrine  of  mind,  124 
ja/,    75,   163,    175,   183 «.,   257,    258 «., 

317,  381,  443,  444,  446,  449,  491 

Jfl^2,   lOI 

Satipatthdna  sutta,  227 

satisa7nvara,  lor 

satkdrartavdda,  258  «.,  468 

satkdryavdda,  257,  258,  468 

satkhydti,  183  «.,  384 

satparicchedakatti,  356 

satpratipaksa,  361 

^a//r2,  287,  317,  381,  491 

sattva,  158,  160,  163 «.,  224,  241,  242, 
244>  245,  246,  248,  249,  250,  259,  415, 
446,  492,  493 

sattva-gima,  244 

satya,  236,  270 

Satyakama,  35  «. 

Satyasiddhi  school,  1 24  n. 

SaubhagyalaksTTii,  28  «. 

Sautranta-vijiianavada,  409  «. 

Sautrantika,  116,  120,  151,  161,  168, 
188,  302,  3i3«.,  408,  409«.,  411; 
Buddhists,  165;  notion  of  time  in, 
116;  theory  of  inference,  155  ff. ;  theory 
of  perception,  1 5 1 

Sautrantikas,  112,  113,  115,  167;  dis- 
tinguished from  the  Vaibhasikas,  1 14  j 
their  philosophy  according  to  Guna- 
ratna,  114 

sava7ta,  36 


Index 


519 


savtcdra,  271 

savikalpa,  334,  337,  338,  340,  378,  416, 
483,  484 

savikalpajfiana,  153  «. 

savikalpapratyaksa,  261,  334 

sa7>ipaka,  195 

saviiarka,  271 

savyabhicara,  360 

Samkhya,  7,  9,  51,  53,  68,  71,  75,  78, 
80,  95,  116,  165,  167,  168,  178,  188, 
211,  212,  213,  216,  217,  218,  219,  220, 
221,  222,  223,  227,  228,  229,  233, 
235  «•.  236,  237,  238,  239,  241,  243, 
244,  257,  258,  259,  261,  262,  264, 
265,  268  «.,  273,  274,  275,  276,  277, 
281,  284  «.,  299,  302,  311,  312,  314, 
321,  325.  33o>  331.  363.  367.  368, 
369,  382,  385,  403,  4T2,  414,  415, 
416,  417,  422,  432,  434,  435,  440, 
468,  492,  493  ;  an  early  school,  213  ff.; 
axiom,  320 ;  discussion  of  the  different 
schools  of,  218  fif.  ;  discussions  on 
Samkhya  kdrikd,  Samkhya  siitra,  Vaca- 
spati  and  Bhiksu,  222  ff.;  distinguished 
from  yoga,  68 ;  relation  with  the 
Upanisads,  211;  theory  of  viparyyaya, 
etc.,  220  «. 

Samkhya  kdrikd,  67,  212,  218 «.,  219, 
221,  222,  223,  266  «. 

Sdmkhyapravacanabhdsya,  223 

Sdmkhyasdra,  212 

Samkhya  sutra,  212,  222 

Sdmkhyatattvavivecana,  212 

Sdmkhyatattvaydthdrthyadipana,  212 

Samkhya- Yoga,  196,232,  254,  2^6n.,  260 
266m.,  273,  286 «.,  3I7M.,  329,  378«. 
394;   analysis   of  knowledge,    239  ff. 
atheism  and  theism,  258 ff.;  causation 
as    conservation    of    energy,    254  ff. 
causation    contrasted     with    Vedanta 
258  ;z. ;    conception    of  time,    256  n. 
conception    of    thought    and    matter 
241  ff. ;  conception  of  wholes  (avayavi) 
380  «.;   criticism  oi  satkdryavdda  etc. 
275ff. ;  development  of  infra-atoms  and 
atoms,  251  ff.;  dissolution  and  creation 
247 ff.;  doctrine  of  validity  of  know 
ledge  and    inference,    268  n. ;    episte 
mology,  414 ff.;  evolution  of  the  cate 
gories,  248 ff.;  feelings  as  ultimate  sub 
stances,  242  ff.;   fruits  of  karma,  267 
general    epistemological    situation    as 
compared  with  Mimarnsa,  367  ff. ;  in 
discernible   nature    of  gttnas,   273 «. 
meaning  of  giina,  243 ;   means  of  up 
rooting  sorrow  in,  265 ff.;    meditation 
271  ff.;    methods    of    discipline,    270 
modes    of    ignorance,    267 ;    mode   of 
sense-contact  as  contrasted   with  that 
of   Nyaya,    378 «.;    nature   of   evolu- 
tionary   change,     255  ff. ;     nature    of 
illusion ,  2  60  «. ;  nature  oiprakrti,  2  45  ff. ; 
nature   of  subconscious   mind,   263 ff.; 
nature  of  the  gttnas,  244;  perceptual 


process,  261  ff.;  pessimism  of,  264  ff.; 
purnsa  doctrine,  238  ff.;  obstructions 
of  perception,  273  «.;  relation  with 
Buddhism  and  Jainism,  208  ff. ;  sams- 
kdra  and  vdsand,  263  «. ;  self  and  mind, 
259 ff.;  self  compared  with  Nyaya  and 
Mimarnsa,  368 ;  states  and  tendencies 
of  citta  (mind)  268  ff.;  theory  of  causa- 
tion, 257;  Vatsayana's  distinction  of, 
228  «.;  view  of  motion  contrasted  with 
Nyaya,  330 ;  wisdom  and  emancipation, 

273 

sainkhyayogaparindmavdda,  468 

Sdnka,  233 

Sariputtra,  120 

sarthd,  280 

sdriipyam,  154 

sdsnd,  349 

sdsvata,  109 

sdttvika  ahamkdra,  250 

sdvayava,  203 

Sdvitrt,  28  «. 

Sayana,  20,  36 

Schiefner,  129W. 

Schools  of  philosophy,  63 

Schopenhauer,  39,  40 

Schrader,  109 

Schroeder,  39  «. 

Scotus  Erigena,  40  «. 

Seal,  B.  N.,  213,  246,  251  «,  253«., 
321,  322  «.,  326,  327  «.,  328  «. 

Secret  doctrine,  38 

Seers,  68  n. 

Self,  33,  34.  55'  58,  60,  61,  76,  ixo,  iii, 
161,  162,  187,  215,  217,  218,  239,  240, 
260,  261,  285,  290,  295,  298,  300,  303, 
312,  317  «.,  330,  335,  343  «•.  362,  363. 
365.  366,  368,  383,  399,  400,  401,  402, 
413,  414,  416,  417,  424,  425,  433,  434, 
435.  437.  438.  458,  460,  465,  482,  490, 
494;  and  death,  55;  as  a  compound  of 
the  khandhas,  94;  as  found  in  dreams, 
47;  as  in  deep  sleep,  47;  doctrine  of 
sheaths  of,  46 

Self-conscious,  368,  369 

Self-consciousness,  363,  417 

Self-knowledge,  59 

Self-luminosity,  493 

Self-luminous,  444,  446,  450,  452,  458, 
459,  460,  461,  482,  487 

Self-modification,  173 

Self-restraint,  101 

Self- revealing,  369,  416 

Self-valid,  384,  386,  387,  403 

Self-validity,  372,  373,  374,  389,  396,  483, 
484 

Sensation,  165,  312,  318,  411 

Sense-affections,  94 

Sense-contact,  336,  342  «. 

Sense-data,  94,  239,  240  «.,  262  «. 

Sense-functions,  262 

Sense-materials,  225 

Senses,  94 

Sensus  communis,  96 


520 


Index 


Separateness,  293 

Seivara  Sarnkhya,  259 

Sex-desire,  57 

Shah  Jahan,  39 

Shuja-uddaulah,  39 

siddha,  68  n. 

Siddhasena,  183  «. 

Siddhasena  Divakara,  171,  309 

siddhdnta,  294,  295 

Siddhantacandnkd,  390  «. 

Siddhdntalesa,  420,  491  n. 

Siddhdntat?iuktdvalt,  339,  339?z-,  342  ;«., 
469 

Siddhdntatattva,  420 

Siddhartha,  173 

siddhi,  163  «.,  220 

siddhis,  234 

Siddkivyd khyd,  420 

Similarity  (Nyaya),  318  «. 

Sindh,  i20«. 

^/x  Buddhist  Nydya  Tracts,  68  «•, 
163  «.,  165  w.,  168,  297  «.,  313  «., 
318  «.,  346  «.,  371 «.,  380  «. 

Simananda,  212 

Sita,  28  «. 

Skambha,  24 

Skanda,  28  «. 

skandha,  89,  93,  149,  196;  in  Chandogya, 
93  «. 

skandkas,  85  «.,  88  «.,  114,  ii9«.,  12 1, 
122,  127,  142,  143,  146,  148,  161, 
263  n. 

smrti,  69,  130,  131,  134,  263  «.,  269, 
316  «.,  370,  371,  372 

sndna,  283 

sjteha,  148,  281,  285,  316 

snigdha,  287 

Sogen  Yamakami,  121,  122  «.,  124  «. 

Soma,  36 

Somadeva,  172 

Somanatha,  371 

Soma^arma,  306 

Somesvara,  371 

Sophistical,  80 

Sorcery,  8i 

Sorrow,  75,  76,  107,  108,  no,  iii,  140, 
166,  191,  201,  210,  237,  264,  265,  266, 
295'30i'  324.  366,  426,  459;  as  ulti- 
mate truth,  75 

sotdpannabhdva,  100 

Soul,  25,  26,  74,  75,  93,  114,  115,  117, 
166,  168,  184,  188,  191,  192,  193,  194, 
201,  207,  234,  276,  281,  285,  288, 289, 
■29^'  299,  300,  307,  311,  316,  317,  363, 
367.  376,  377,  378.  399-  400,  413,  414, 
425.  439,  457.  461;  general  account 
of,  75 

Souls,  197,  238,  244,  323,  324,  472,  493 

South  India,  i20«.,  316  «. 

Southern  India,  172 

spandita,  428 

Sparta,  90,  92,  143,  314 

sparia  tanmdtra,  252 

Species,  156,  285,  287,  317,  345,  389 


Speciftiens  of  Jama  sculptures  from  Ma- 
tkura,  1 70  «. 

spkota,  238  «.,  397  «. 

sphotavdda,  232 

Spider,  49 

Spinoza,  40  «. 

srsti,  323,  403 

Stcherbatsky,  Prof.,  114,  ifj  n.,  iigti., 
121,  351,  409  «. 

sthaviravdda,  83,  112 

Stkavirdvali,  171 

Sthdtia,  I'ji 

sthiti,  194 

sthiti-sthdpaka,  316 

Study  of  Patanjali,  208  «.,  213,  226  «., 
238  n.,  397  n. 

Study  of  Sanskrit,  40 

Subdla,  28  n. 

Sub-Commentary,  307 

Sub-conscious,  124,  263  «. 

Subhuti,  127 

Subodhinl,  371,  420 

Substance,  165,  174,  175,  285,  287 «., 
288,319,  367,368 

Substances,  223,  367,  378 

Sucarita  Mi^ra,  371 

Suddhodana,  81 

Suffering,  207,  237,  324 

Stikrllekha,  144 

sukha,  105,  106,  276,  305 «.,  316,  342, 
414 

sukha  duhkha,   144 

sukhani,  426 

sukhasddhanatvasmrti,  336 

Sukhdvativyuha,  125  «. 

Sumarigalavildsini,  92  w. 

Sun,  23 

siipara,  220  «. 

Sure^vara,  67,  418,  419 

siinrta,  199,  200,  202 

Siirya,  18,  20,  28  «. 

Sujyaprajnapti,  171  w. 

Su^iksita  Carvakas,  78,  79,  362 

susupti,  424 

sutdra,  220  n. 

sz'itra,  280,  281,  284  «.,  285,  292  n.,  294, 
296 

Sfitrahrta,  i'ji 

Siitrakrtdnganiryukti,  181  n. 

Sutrakrtdfigasutra,  237 

sutrcLS,  62,  64,  67,  69,  70,  71,  79,  233, 
236,  278,  279,  293  «.,  294,  297  «.,  306, 
43°,  433  '■>  ^^  lecture-hints,  62 ;  de- 
veloped by  commentators,  64 ;  how 
they  were  written,  ()i, ;  traditionally 
explained,  (>}, 

Siltrasthdna,  280 

Siitta,  82 

Sutta  Nipdta,  83 

Suttapitaka,  120  ft. 

stittas,  82,  83,  166 

Suvarnaprabhdsa  siltra,  125  «.,  301  n. 

Suzuki,  128,  129  «.,  130  «.,  138  «.,  161 

Svabhdva,  78, 424 


Index 


521 


svabhavanirdesa.,  124 
svabhdva  pratibandha,  155,  156 
svabkdvatak,  427 
svabhdvaviriiddhopalabdhi,  358 
svabhavdbhdvotpatti,  149 
svabhdvdnupalabdhi,  358 
svabhdvdt,  145 
svacitta,  146 

svacittadrsyabhdvana,  150 
svalaksana,  378,  409,  4io«. 
svalaksanavi,  154 
svanihitdrtha,  350 
svapna,  332  «.,  424,  426 
svaprakdia,  444,  445,  459  w. 
svapratyd)'yyajndnddhigamdbhinnalaksa  - 

«(Z/a,  150 
svarupa,  153,  464 
svaricpa-bheda,  462 
svarupasattd,  382 
svarupavUesa,  464 
svanlpdsiddha,  361 
svaiah  aprdmdnya,  268  «.,  415 
svatahprdmdnya,   188,   268 «.,  372,   373, 

374.  375.  376,  415.  484.  485  «• 
svatah-prdmdnya-nirnaya,  4  r  7  «. 
svatahprdmdnyavdda,  303,  380 
Svayambhii,  21 
svayamprakdsa,  401 
svddkydya,  270 

svdrthdnumdna,  155,  i86m.,  350,  353 
svdtantiyena,  320 
syddasti,  179,  180 
syddasti-cdvaktavyaica,  1 79 
syddasti-sydnndsti,  179 
syddasti-sydnndsti-syddavaktavyaka,  1 79 
syddavaktavya,  179 
syddvdda,  181 
Syddvdda7nanjari,    171,     ly-j  n.,     lygn., 

180  «. 
syd7tndsii,  180 
jya/,  179 

Syllogism,  156  «.,  186,  293 
Symbolic  meditations,  35 
Synthesis,  261 
Synthetic  activity,  262 
System  of  the  Veddnia,  438  «.,  439  «. 
Systems,  66 

Systems  of  Buddhistic  Thought,  121  n. 
Systems  of  Philosophy,  general  accounts 

of,  68  ff.  ;  interrelated,  67  ;  two  classes 

of,  67 
Sahara,  69,  369,  370,  371,  372,  387,  405 
Sabara-bhdsya,  370 
Sabarasvamin,  370 
/a<iafrt,  284,  294,  304,  30S,  314,  331,  332, 

333.  354.  355.  394.  483.  484.  492 
iabdanaya,  I'jSn. 

iabdapramdna,  334,  354,  394,  397,  404 
iabda-tanmdtra,  252,  253 
iabdatva,  335 
iabddnuidsanam,  232 
Saiva,  39,  70,  228,  235,  434 
Saiva  Thought,  8,  28  n. 
iaktdiaktasvabhdvatayd,  159 


ia/^//,  165,  264,  270,  321,  322,  335 
iaktirndn,  165 
^aktipratibandha,  323 
iavi  ad  a  m  ddisddh  ansa  nipat,  437 
Sahkara,  30,  38,  39,  42,  45  n.,  48,  50,  5r, 
52,   64,  70,  86«.,  89«.,  gon.,  gin., 
121  «.,  143  «.,  145,  i48«.,  151  «.,  165, 
167,  168,  211,  237,  319M.,  370,  371, 
371 «.,  407,  418,  420,  421,  421  «.,  423, 
429,  430,  431,  432,  433,  434,  437,  438, 

,  465,  470.  492,  493.  494 

Sahkara-bhdsya,  492  n. 

Saiikara  Bhatta,  371 

Saiikara-digvijaya,  432 

Sahkara-jaya,  432 

Sahkara  Mi^ra,  63,  284  «.,  288  «.,  291  «., 
,  306,  307,  419 

Sahkara  Vedanta,  468 

Sankara-vijaya,  418 

Saiikara-vijaya-vildsa,  432 

Sahkaracarya,  369 

Sarabha,  28  n. 

^ariramadhydt,  481 

iarlrinak,  218 

Sa^adhara,  308 

Sataka,  427  w. 

Satapatha  Brdhmana,  20  n.,  24,  25,  31, 
226,  230;  creation  in,  24;  doctrine  of 
^  rebirth  in,  25 

Satasdhasrikdprajfidpdrainitd,  12^  n. 

Jauca,  202,  236 

Saunaka,  31  n. 

Sakha,  30 ;  origin  of  the,  30  n. 

Sdkta,  2%  ft.,  228 

^akya,  81 

Sakyayana,  228 

Salikanatha  Misra,  370,  397  n. 

Sdlistanibhasfitra,gon.,  I25«.,  I43«.,  421 

Santabhadra,  i-,2  7i.,  168 

Sdntam,  425,  428 

Santyacaryya,  171 

Sdndilya,  28«.,  228 

Sdrira,  39,  91  n. 

Sdriraka ,  2  8  « . ,  433 

Sdrlraka-sutras ,  62 

Mstra,  344 

Sdstradipikd,    114W.,    370,    371,    379 «., 

386  «.,  390  «.,  401  «. 
Sastrl    Haraprasada,    129  n.,    278,    303, 

371W. 
Idsvata,  127,  428 
^dJvatavdda,  143,  236 
hlthya,  1 44 
Sdthydyaniya,  28  «. 

lesavat,  269 «.,  281,  294,  302  «.,  303,  353 
Sesanantacarya,  308 
Sikhdinani,  318  «.,  419,  484  «.,  485 
Hksdpadabrata,  200 
$iva,  39,  432 
Sivabhuti,  170 
Sivadasa,  231,  235 
Sivaguru,  432 
Sivam,  425 
Sivarama,  230 


522 


Index 


Sivaditya,  308 

ilia,  144,  166,  {slid)  100,  102,  104;  and 
sainthood,    100;   what   it   consists    of, 

lOI 

Hlabratapardmaria,  145 

Slokavilrttika,  67,  151  «.,  •ziS  n.,  355  n., 

370.     371.    378  «•,    380,    382,    386 «., 

390  M.,  397  «.,  401  «.,  417  n. 
Joka,  86  M. 

iraddha,  58,  199,  271,  317  «. 
SraddhotpMa  Idstra,  128,  138  «.,  161 
ir avail  a,  490 

irdvaka,  125  «.,  137,  150,  151 
Sravakayana,  125  w. 
^rldhara,  306,  312,  313,  316  «.,  317  «., 

,  337.  338,  359  «•.  379  «• 

Sriharsa,  419,  462,  465,  492 

Srikantha,  70 

Srilabha,  90 

Srimadbhagavadgitd,  421 

Srhndldsimhandda,  1 28 

Srivatsacarya,  306 

iru,  II 

iruta,  207 

hull,  II,  12,  191  «.,  447 

iubha,  202 

hiddham  pratyaksain,  409  «. 

hiddkdkalpand,  409  «. 

Sukarahasya,  28  «. 

iukla,  73,  74,  266 

hikla-krsna,  73,  266 

/m.^'^z,  488,  489 

/27«ya,  131,  141,  167,  257,  465,  493 

h'cnyatd,  130,  131,  147,  149 

Sunyavada,  126,  127,  129,  140,  166,  167, 
279,  418,  421,  429,  465,  494;  com- 
pared with  Vijnanavada,  127 

Sunyavadin,  113,  127,  128,  129,  140,  145, 

,  301 

Svetaketu,  33,  34,  49,  439 
Svetambaras,  170,  172,  173 
Svetdivatara,  28«.,  31,  32 «.,  39«.,49, 

50,   52,   78 «.,  211,   227,   281,   282  «., 

422,  469 
saddyatana,  90,  92,  143 
saddar§ana,  08 
Saddarianasamuccaya,     2,     68«.,      114, 

I'jon.,  i'j2u.,   i75«.,    176;?.,    i86n., 

206  n.,  217,  222 
Sastitantra,  220,  221 
Sastitantraidstra,  219,  222 
Sastitantroddhdra,  220,  222 

tadutpatti,  345,  351 

tadyogyatd,  458 

taijasa  ahamkdra,  249 

iaijasa  dimd,  424 

tairthika,  68  n.,  138 

Taittiriyut  28«.,  31,  39,  46«.,  51,  2  26«., 

432  «. 
Taittirlya  Aranyaka,  26 
Taittiriya  Brdhmana,  23,  26,  226  «. 
Taittiriya  school,  30 
Takakusu,  119,  i20«.,  I28«.,  218 


Talavakaras,  30 

Talavakdra  Upanisad,  30 

tamas,  215,  224,  242,  244,  246,  249,  252, 

264,  269,  492,  493 
tamisrd,  220  n. 
tamo,  220  n. 
tamo-guna,  244 
tanmdtra,  51,   214,  216,   225,   226,   251, 

253.  254,  271,  273,  276 
tantra,  71,  229,  235 
Tantraratna,  371 
Tantra  thought,  8 
Tantravdrttika,  371 
Tandulavaiydll,  1 7 1  «. 
tanhd,  85,  87,  88,  107 
tanhd-jatd,  100 

tapas,  54,  58,  201,  202,  226,  270 
tarka,  294,  296,  360 
Tarkabhdsd,  307 
Tarkapdda,  371 
Tarkarahasyadipikd,     79,     114,     115M., 

162  «.,  163  «.,  203  «.,  217  «.,  218  «. 
Tarkasatngraha,  307,  322,  330  «. 
Tarkavagi^a,  K.,  332  n. 
tathatd,   127,    128,    135,    136,    138,    147, 

150,  166,  167,  421;  philosophy,  1296". 
tatkatdlambana,  150 
Tathdgata,  126 «.,  150,  166 
Tathdgatagarbha,  131,  137,  147,  149 
Tathdgaiaguhyasutra,  125  «. 
Tathagatayana,  126M. 
tatprakdrakdnubhava,  337 
tattva,  216 
Tattvabindu,  ^g'j  n. 
Tattvacintdmani,     308,     332 «.,     337 «., 

339  «.,  342  «.,  343  «.,  347  «• 
Tattvadipaita,  419,  456  «. 
Tattvadipikd,  419,  465 
Tattvakatimiidi,     212,     239 «.,      243 «., 

257  «.,  262  «.,  264  «. 
Tattvapradlpikd,  238  «. 
Taitvasamdsa,  212 
Tattvavaisdradi,     212,     239 «.,     24S«., 

254  «.,  256  «.,  257  M.,   259  «.,   263  «., 

264  «.,  266  «.,  267  «. 
Tattvaydthdrthyadlpana,  243  «. 
tattvdntara,  378  «. 
taitvdniaraparindtna,  247 
iattvdnyatvdbhydtn  atiirvacaniya,  442 
TattvdrihddhigamasTdra,      171,      1 7  5  «. , 

176  «.,  184  w.,  195  w.,  237,  309 
tdddti7iya,  156,  345,  35 1,  352 
tdmasika  ahamkdra,  249 
Tandins,  30 
Mra,  220  n. 
Taranatha,  i29«. 
Tdrasdra,  28  «. 
tdratdra,  220 n. 
Tdrkikaraksd,  362  ;i.,  308 
tdtparya,  484 
Tdtparyatikd,  6^ri.,  161,  2i8w.,  229 «., 

269«.,  330M.,  337«-.  338«-,  347«-. 

352  «■-  353  «•.  388  «. 
Tdtparyatikdparihiddhi,  307 


Index 


523 


Teachers,  traditional  transmission  from, 

2,  8 
Technical,  66,  77,  304,  308,  309 
Technical  terms,   different   in    meaning, 

invented,  2  ;  elastic  in  Pali  Buddhism,  3 
tejas,  51,  252,  255,  295,  310,  313,  314, 

323'  329.  377 
tejas-z.\.om,  253 
Tejobindu,  28  n. 
Telang,  421,  423  n. 
Teleology,  247,  248,  254,  258,  267,  269, 

325 
Testimony,  332,  333 
The  Early  History  of  Indian  Philosophy, 

277  n. 
The  History  of  Navya  Nydya  in  Bengal, 

3io«. 
Theism,  33,  50,  258 
Theistic,  220,  221,  223 
Theistic  systems,  8 
Theragdthd,  83 
Theravada,  83,   112,  113,  119,  120,  125, 

150 
Theravadins,  125 
77/1?    Rigveda,    15  n.,    18,    iQw.,    20 «., 

24  «. 
TherFgdthd,  83 

Thdorie  des  Douze  Causes,  90  «. 
Thilly,  Frank,  3 
tklna,  100 
thtnamiddham,  105 
Thomas,  E.  J.,  84  «.,  155  «. 
Thomas,  F.  W.,  [29M. 
Thought-photograph,  241 
Thought-stuff,  241,  242 
Tibetan,  121,  128,  144,  218 
tikta,  313 

Tilak,  Bal  Gangadhar,  10 
Tilakamanjari,  172 
Time,  311 
tirohita,  257 

Tirthankara,  169,  170,  173 
tiryag-gamana,  329 
tiryaksdjHdnya,  1 96 
Traditionary  explanations,  65 
Transcendental  contact,  341 ;  power  ,  335 
Transcendent  influence,  331 
Translation  of  Aitareya  Aranyaka,  36  m. 
Translation  of  the  Upanisads,  38  «. 
Transmigration,  26,  27,  53,  54,  55,  57,  58 
trasaremi,  323 
tray  I,  277 
trikdndaka,  92  n. 

Tripddvibhiitimahdndrdyana,  28  n. 
Tripurd,  28  n, 
Tripurdtdpini,  28  n. 
triputi,  459 

triputipratyaksa,  343  «.,  384,  400 
Tri^ala,  170,  173 
Triiaikhibrahmana,  28  m. 
tryanuka,  314,  315,  324,  326 
trsftd,  85M.,  87,  90,  92,   143,   145,    148, 
'215 
trsnd-vaipulya,  90;?. 


trtiya-linga-pardmaria,  346 

tuccha,  443 

tuldjndna,  458 

Turiydtita,  28  w. 

tusti,  220 

Tvastr,  21 

tydgdnvaya,  1 1 9  «. 

Tahka,  433 

tkdpand,  i^^i 

thiti,  93 

Tuptikd,  371 

ubhaydnuhhaya,  148 

ttcckeda,  428 

ucchedavdda,  143 

Udayana,  63,  306,  307,  312  «.,  326M.,  329, 
365  n. 

uddharana,  157,  296,  353 

Udana,  83,  108  n. 

iiddsina,  197 

itdbhava,  290  w. 

ttdbhutarupavattva,  290  «.,  303 

udbhiiiavrtti,  254 

uddhaccakukkuccam,  105 

Udgltha,  36 

udkacca,  100 

Udyotakara,  63,  228  «.,  269  «.,  298  «., 
305,  307'  309'  327  «•.  328,  330  «•, 
337  «•.  342  «•,  35'.  353  «•>  355  «• 

Uktha,  36 

Uluka,  71,  305 

Umasvati,  171,  237,  309 

Unconditional,  321,  322,  465 

Unconditionality,  320 

Universals,  165 

Unmanifested,  275 

upacdrasamddhi,  102,  103 

Upadesa,  128 

upadhdranatn ,  loi 

upajivya,  447 

iipalabdhiheiu,  330  n. 

upalambha,  302 

upamdna,  294,   297,  302,  304,   308,  333, 

354.  355.39'.  4'2 

upamdna  iabdas  47  i 

Upamitabhavaprapahcakathd,  i-j2 

ttpamiti,  492 

upanaya,  185,  296,  350,  353 

npanayana,  157 

Upanisad,  418,  422,  433,  434,  436,  441, 
445,  494;  causation  in,  173;  meaning 
of  the  word,  38 

Upanisads,  1,  7,  8,  12,  14,  27,  28,  29,  30, 
64,  65,  70,  72,  79,  80,  87,  88,  107,  no, 
III,  i25«.,  174,  175,  208,  210,  211, 
212,  223,  227,  234,  239,  263  «.,  276, 
421,  423,  429,  430,  431,  432,  437,  438, 
442,  447,  470,  490,  493,  etc. ;  accident 
as  cause,  78;  age  of  the,  39;  Atharva- 
veda,  31 ;  atheistic  creeds  referred  to 
in,  78 ;  circles  of  philosophy  outside  of, 
65;  composition  of,  38;  creation  in, 
51  ;  desire  as  cause  of  re-birth,  56; 
different   classes   of,    39 ;    doctrine   of 


524 


Index 


self,  no;  doctrine  of  transmigration, 
53 ;  duty  of  a  modern  interpretor  of, 
42;  emancipation  in,  58  ff. ;  interpreta- 
tions of,  41 ;  karma-doctrine  in,  com- 
pared with  Buddhistic,  107;  ksattriya 
influence  on,  3 1 ;  matter-combinations 
as  cause,  78;  matter  produced  by  com- 
pounding, 5 1 ;  nature  as  cause,  78 ; 
names  of,  according  to  subjects,  31; 
not  a  systematic  philosophy,  48 ;  place 
in  Vedic  literature,  28;  revival  of,  39; 
self  as  aggregation  of  categories,  56 ; 
self  as  highest  truth,  60 ;  self  as  know- 
ledge, 58;  self  unchangeable,  60;  self 
as  unity  of  moral,  psychological  and 
physical  elements,  56  ;  subtler  elements 
in,  51 ;  superior  to  reason,  41 ;  theory 
of  karma,  55  ;  three  kinds  of  birth,  57  ; 
time  as  cause,  78;  two  theories  of 
causation,  53  ;  vidya  and  avidyd,  mean- 
ing of,  in;  wise  man  becomes  Brah- 
man, 58 ;  world  as  field  of  karma,  56 ; 
world  in,  51;  world-soul,  52 

upapatti,  91 

upapddukasattva,  gi  n. 

uparati,  490 

upasanidmissati,  102 

Upaskdra,  2S2n.,  283,  284;?.,  285 «., 
286  w.,  288  «.,  290  w.,  291  «.,  292  M., 
293  w.,  306,  314  «. 

upastha,  333 

upastambha,  329 

upastambhaka,  291 

Upavarsa,  370 

updddna,  85,  87,  90,  92,  274,  453,  468, 
469 

updddna-kdrana,  438 

updddnanisthdtyantdbhdvapratiyogitva- 
laksanamithydtvasiddh  ih  ,445 

updddriipain,  94 

iipddhi,  181,  347,  348,  352,  390,  450 

Updngas,  171 

Updsakadasds,  171 

updirayas,  173 

updydsa,  86  «. 

upekkhd,  103,  106 

upekkhako,  105 

upeksd,  236,  270,  271 

Uruvela,  81 

Usas,  14 

Utpala,  327  tt. 

utpatti,  374 

utpdda,  138,  175 

utpddasthitibhahgavarjjam,  1 46 

tilpddasthitibhangavivarjjanatd,  1 50 

utpreksa,  182 

it/sa)gasamiti,  199  n. 

uttanidmbhas,  220  «. 

Uttardd/iyayana,  171 

Uttarddhyayatiasidra,  169,  236 

Uttara  Mimamsa,  7,  70,  429 

Uttara^ailas,  1 12 

Uttara  Samkhya,  217 

Ultanapada,  23 


Uvdsagadasdo,  ilin. 
Uha,  213 
urdhva,  199 
iirdhvaloka,  199 
urdhvainfila,  234 
urdhvasdmdnya,  197 

Vaibhasika,  116,  117,  161,  168;  literature, 
120;  notion  of  time  in,  116 

Vaibhasikas,  113,  114,  115,  119,  120, 
167;  their  philosophy  according  to 
Gunaratna,  114 

Vaibhasika  Sarvastivadins,  their  difference 
from  other  Buddhists,  122 

vaidharmya,  462,  464 

vaikdrika  ahamkdra,  249,  250 

vaindUka,  257 

Vaipulyasutras,  125 

vairdgya,  271 

Vai^ali,  173 

Vai^esika,  7,  9,  68,  177,  280,  281,  283, 
285,  289,  290,  302  «.,  303,  304,  305, 
314 «.,  327,  328,  332,  337,  338,  339, 
340,  350,  351.  354.  355.  359.  361. 
379  «■'  385.  394.  403.  434.  440.  462 

Vaihsika  sutras,  68  «.,  71,  276,  279,  280, 
281,  282,284,  285,  291,  301,  303,305, 
306,  312  «.,  327  «.,  332  w.,  355,  359 

vaisvdnara  agni,  34 

vaisvdnara  dtind,  424 

vaisamya,  246 

Vaisnava,  8,  21,  28  «.,  70,  77,  221,  420, 
422 

vaitathya,  424 

Vajjiputtakas,  1 12 

Vajracchedikdsutra,  125  «. 

Vajrasiicikd,  28  11. 

Validity,  268  n. 

Vallabha,  70,  317  «. 

Vallabha-mata,  429 

Vanavdda,  380 

Varadaraja,  308,  362  «. 

Vardha,  28  n.,  228 

Varddhamana,  63,  173,  307 

Varddkamdna-purdna,  193  «.,  194  «. 

Varddhafndnendu,  63,  307 

Varuna,  18 

vas,  263  n. 

Vassilief,  112,  218  w. 

vastu,  176 

vastunastatsaniattdkd'nyathdbhdvah  pari- 
ndniah  tadvisamasatidkah  vuiarttah, 
^68' 

vastuprativikalpavijndna.,  1 45 

vashivddi,  424 

Vasubandhu,  114,  117,  120,  124,  128, 
167,  218  «.,  233,  421,  423;  soul- 
doctrine  criticised  by,  117 

Vasubhadra,  i20«. 

Vasumitra,  112,  115,  ii6,  120 

Vaskali,  45 

Vacaspati,  63,  86w.,  143  w.,  i6r,  212, 
2i8«.,  219,  221,  222,  223,  224,  225, 
229,  233,  260,  261,  262,  269«.,  271  w.. 


Index 


525 


277,  278,  307,  330 «.,  337,  338,  340, 
341,  351. 352, 355 «- 371. 397  "•.415, 

418,   421  «.,  433,  457,   469,  490;    his 
differences  with  Bhiksu,  223  ff. 

vacika,  108 

vacikakanna,  124 

vacikavijiiaptikarma,  124 

vdcyatva,  354 

vdJa,  294,  296,  360 

vdggupti,  199  «. 

vdgvikalpa,  148 

Vajapyayana,  232 

Vajasaneyi  school,  31 

vak,  333 

vdkovdkya,  276 

vdkyadosa,  302 

vdkyaprasatnsd,  302 

Vdkydrthamdtrkdvrtti,  397 ;/. 

Vamana,  231 

vdnaprastha,  283 

vdrttd,  I'll 

Vdrttika,  67,  230,  307,  309,  327  «.,  353«., 
418,  419 

Varttikakara,  372 

Varttikakarapada,  370 
Vdrttika-tdtparyatikd.,  63 

vcrsand,  73,  128,  I30«.,  150,  151,  167, 
263,  411 

Vasavadatta,  230 

Vdsudeva,  28  w. 

Vata,  17 

Vatsiputtriya,  112,  117,  ncfti.;  doctrine 
of  soul  of,  117 

Vatsyayana,  63,  120,  167,  186  «.,  229  «., 
269  «.,  277,  278,  280,  294  «.,  295  «., 
296  «.,  298  «.,  301  «.,  304,  307, 
327  «.,  350,  351,  353  «•.  355  «•'  467; 
his  distinction  of  Samkhya  and  Yoga, 

228«. 

Vdtsydyana  bkdsya,  63,  297  «.,  306,  309 

vdyit,  20,  37,  43,  50,  213,  262,  287,  289, 
290,  295,  321,  323,  324,  328,  329 

vdyu-zXom,  253 

Vdyti  purdna,  306 

vdyu  tanmdtra,  252 

Veda,  397,  422,  436;  literature,  429 

vedand,  85,  90,  92,  94,  95,  97,  r27 

vedandkkhandha,  lOO 

vedaniya,  191,  193 

vedaniya  karma,  194 

Vedanta,  i,  7,  20,  29,  30,  41,  42,  48,  50, 
52,  62,  68,  71,  75,  138,  161,  168,  177, 
178,  211,  2i5«.,  235,  237,  238,  239, 
241,  258,  3i9«.,  341.  343.  371.  402, 
407,  408,  419,  420,  429,  430,  431,  432, 
4361  439»  447.  448,  450>  45i.  452,  453, 
454.  455.  459'  461.  466,  468,  470,  471, 
472  w.,  482,  483,  486,  488,  489,  492; 
ajiidna  as  the  material  cause  of  illusion, 
453  >  ajiidna  and  vrdijndna,  481  ; 
ajiidna  established  by  perception  and 
inference,  454  ff.;  ajiidna  not  negation, 
455;  anirvdcyavdda,  461  ff. ;  antahka- 
rana  and  its  vritis,  472 ;  dtrnan,  474 ; 


at  man  and  jlva,  475;  dtman  as  self- 
luminous,  460;  Brahman  as  the  adhi- 
sthdna  of  illusion,  45 1 ;  cessation  of 
illusion  as  bddha  and  nivrtti,  488 ;  cit 
not  opposed  to  ajiidna,  457;  conscious- 
ness as  illumination,  449;  controversy 
of  the  schools,  406;  creation  of  an 
illusory  object,  487;  criticism  of  the 
Nyaya  doctrine  of  causation,  466;  de- 
finition of  ajiidna,  452  ff. ;  definition  of 
perception,  473;  dialectic,  419,  420, 
461;  dialectical  arguments,  465;  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  illusion,  487 ;  discussions 
with  Kumarila  and  I'rabhakara  on  the 
nature  of  self-luminosity  of  knowledge, 
459;  doctrine  of  duties,  489;  doctrine 
of  inference,  473;  doctrine  oijivasdksi, 
480;  dualistic  interpretations  of,  70; 
ekajiva  doctrine,  477;  epistemology  of 
Kumarila,  416  ff. ;  epistemology  of 
Prabhakara  Mimarnsa,  415  ff.;  episte- 
mology of  the  Sautrantika  Buddhists, 
408  ff. ;  examination  of  the  category  of 
difference,  462  ff. ;  existence  of  the 
objective  world,  480;  function  olvrtti- 
jUdna  in  perception,  481 ;  general  ac- 
count of,  70;  history  of  the  doctrine  of 
i/idyd,  469-470;  indefinable  character 
of  the  world-appearance,  461 ;  indefin- 
able nature  of  aJildna,  479;  literature, 
418  ff.;  locus  and  objects  of  ajiidna, 
457  ff.;  mdyd  and  avidyd,  469,  475, 
476;  methods  of  controversy,  407; 
nature  of  ahamkdra,  458,  460;  nature 
of  antahkarana,  460  ;  nature  of  eman- 
cipation, 491;  nature  of  livara,  476; 
nature  of  perception,  483 ;  nature  of 
pratnd,  482;  necessary  qualifications, 
489;  nirvikalpa  perception,  483 ; 
Nyaya  epistemology,  412  ff.;  objections 
against  the  view  that  world -appearance 
is  illusion,  451  ;  drstisrsti  A.oc\xvnQ,  \-i%\ 
perception  of  ajiidna  in  the  sleeping 
state,  456;  philosophy,  ~,q;  pratibimba, 
avacckeda  zxiA  ttpddki,  475;  refutation 
of  the  Mimarnsa  theory  of  illusion,  485 ; 
relation  with  other  systems,  492  ff.; 
relation  with  Vedic  duties,  490 ;  Sam- 
khya epistemology,  4i4ff.;  self- validity 
of  knowledge,  484;  Sankara,  iheBrah- 
»ia-stitras  and  the  Upanisads,  429  ff.; 
similarity  not  essential  for  illusion,  452 ; 
theory  of  causation,  465  ff.;  theory  of 
illusion,  486  ff. ;  theory  of  perception, 
470 ff.;  three  functions  of  the  subject, 
480;  three  stages  oi  jlva,  476;  views 
on  samavdya,  319;?.;  vivartia  and  pari- 
ndma,  468;  vrlti  and  consciousness, 
449,  450;  world-appearance  not  a  sub- 
iective  creation,  452;  Vogacara  episte- 
mology. 

Veddntakalpataru,  86«.,  ii4«. 

Veddntaparibhdsd,(i'j ,  318;/.,  419,  460 «., 
484,  485  n. 


526 


Index 


Vedantasara,  420,  490  n. 
Vedantasiddhantam ukt avail,  420 
Vedanta  sutras,  70,  71  ;  as  interpretations 

of  Upanisad  texts,  70 
Veddntatattvadipika,  420 
Vedantatirtha   Vanamali,    Prof.,    28 r  «., 

305  n. 
Vedantic,  433,  465 
Vedantins,  257 

Vedantism,  175,  229,  371,  418 
Veddrthasamgraha,  433 
Vedas,    i,    6,    11,    13,    14,   20,    24,    25, 

40,    67,    69,    186,    208,    209 «.,    234, 

277,    278,    282,    284,    285,    291,    294, 

297,  304.  326,  333  W-.  355,  394,  401, 
403,  404,  405,  426,  430,  431,  435, 
489 ;  allegiance  of  Hindu  philosophy 
to,  11;  dtman  in  the,  26;  authorship 
of,  10 ;  bearing  of,  to  Hindu  law,  1 1 ; 
classification  of,  12;  doctrine  of  ^arwa, 
2 id;  earliest  record,  10;  idea  of 
morality,  210;  influence  of,  on  later 
thought,  10;  learnt  by  hearing,  10; 
monotheistic  tendency  in,  19 ;  trans- 
migration not  developed  in,  53 

Vedic,  I,  6,  10,  11,  14,  264,  265,  292, 
396,  404,  436  ;  belief  in  another  world, 
25;  belief  in  punishment  of  evildoers, 
25  ;  commandments  do  not  depend  on 
reason,  29  ;  conception  of  manas  as 
seat  of  thought,  26  ;  conception  of  the 
origin  of  the  world,  25  ;  cosmogony 
(mythological),  23  ;  cosmogony  (philo- 
sophical), 23 ;  creation  hymn,  24 ; 
doctrine  of  dtman,  25 ;  doctrine  that 
soul  could  be  separated,  25  ;  duties, 
different  from  Upanisads,  29 ;  escha- 
tology,  25;  law  of  karma,  21;  moral 
idea,  25;  obligatory  ceremonies,  11; 
sacrifices  and  rituals,  1 1 ;  teaching  as 
kartfia-mdrga,  29 

Vedic  duties,  371,  437,  489,  490,  492; 
for  inferior  persons,  30 

Vedic  gods,  16;  contrasted  with  Greek 
gods,  16  ;  contrasted  with  Purana  gods, 
16;  have  no  fixed  leader,  r8;  instru- 
ments of  sacrifice,  22 

Vedic  hymns,  18,  22,  31 ;  two  tendencies, 
6  ;  different  from  the  Upanisads,  31 

Vedic  literature,  41,  211,  268 

Vedic  mythology,  i8«.,  19M.,  22  «.,  23«., 
25  n.,  26  n. 

Vedic  sacrifices,  271 

Vedic  texts,  68,  69,  276,  372,  399 

vega,  286,  316 

vegasamskdra,  291 

Venkata,  222 

Vehkate^vara,  423 

Vesali,  112 

vibhdga,  316 

Vibhajjavadins,  112,  115;  schools  of, 
115;  their  notion  of  time,  1 15 

Vibhanga,  83,  90  n. 

Vibhdsd,  lion. 


vib/m,  189,  363 

vibhuti,  272,  424 

Vibratory,  327 

vicdra,  105,  144,  213,  271 

vicikicchd,  100,  105 

vicikitsd,  145 

Vicious  infinite,  160,  319  «. 

vidhi,  29,  4O4,  405 

vid/d-vdkya,  405 

vidhiviveka,  371 

vidhiyate,  146 

Vidvanmanorafijinl,  420 

vidya,  m,  277,  278,  293,  332  «. 

Vidyabhusana,  DrS.C,  128M.,  172,  279, 
309  n.,  350  n.,  388  «.,  421 

Vidyaranya,  419 

vihdras,  173 

vijdnana,  89 

vijiiapti,  94,  124 

vijndna,  86  «.,  90,  91  n.,  123,  124,  132, 
143,  146,  409«.,  428,  460;  determining 
ndmarupa,  91 ;  in  relation  to  skandhas, 
91 ;  meaning  of,  in  Sanskrit  works,  86  «. 

Vijflana  Bhiksu,  212,  220,  221,  222,  223, 
225,  226,  229,  257  «.,  260,  262,  494; 
his  differences  with  Vacaspati,  223  ff. 

Vijtidnakdya,  120 

vijndnamaya,  60 

vijndnamaya  dtman,  46 
Vijildnamatrasiddhi,  128 

vijiidnaskandha,  124 

Vijiianavada,  86«.,  127,  128,  145,  166, 
167,  302,  417,  42  r,  429,  465,  493,  494; 
aspects  of  nothingness,  149;  Bodhi- 
sattva  doctrine,  150;  categories  of  the 
understanding,  148;  consciousness,  two 
functions  of,  145;  doctrine  of  dhydna, 
150;  doctrine  of  essencelessness,  147; 
doctrine  of  illusion  (mdyd),  147;  nir- 
vana-doctrine,  151;  doctrine  of  nai- 
rdtmya  and  tathdgatagarbha,  149  ; 
doctrine  of  pratttyasamutpada,  148 ; 
doctrine  that  all  things  are  mental 
creations,  146;  its  literature,  128 

Vijnanavadin,   113,  127,    128,   147,   167, 

184,  233,  301,  332,  409  «.,  415 
Vijildndmrta   bkdsya,  220,    223,    239 «., 
243  «. 

vikalpa,  129,  151,  261,  269 

vikalpalaksanagrahdbhinivesapratistkdpi- 
kdbuddhi,  148 

vikalpapratyaya,  410  «. 

vikalpita,  409  «. 

vikathd,  193 

vikdra,  232 

vikdritvam,  203 

Vikramaditya,  370 

viksepa,  472 

viksipta,  268 
Vimalaklrti,  128 
Vimalaklrtinirdesasiitra,  125  «. 
Vimdnavatthu,  83 
Vinaya,  82 

vinaya,  193 


Index 


527 


Vindhyavasin,  2 18 
Vinltadeva,  152  h.,  163  «.,  168 
vinndna,  85,  86,  94,  96,  109 
viniianakkhandha,  100 
vipaksa,  186  «.,  344 
vipaksa-pratisedha,  1 86  n, 
vipaksa-vydvrUi,  344 
vipaksasattva,  1 56  «. ,  349 
Vtparita,  193 

viparitakkyati,  337,  384,  385 
viparyaya,  220,  269,  332  «.,  337 
viparyyasa,  140 
Vipdka,  171 
viriyasamvara,  loi 
Virocana,  46 
virodha,  357 
viruddha,  360 
viruddhakaryopalabdhi,  358 
viruddhavydptopalabdhi,  358 
visadriaparindma,  i\'i 
Visibility,  292 
Visuddhiviagga,    83,   88,    99 «.,    loi «., 

102  n.,  103 «.,  1047;.,  105,  106  M.,  Ill, 

161 
viksa,    246,    253,    285,    286,    287,    304, 

30672.,  312,  313,  318,  319,  320,  382 
viiesana,ii\,  455 
viiesa?tajiidna,  412 
vihsanatdvacchedaka,  339 
vihsanatdvacchedakaprakaram,  339 
vihsanavisesyabhdvdvagdh  r,  3  3  8 
Visesdvasyakabhdsya,  171,  176  7«.,  178  «., 

i79«. 
vthsyaviiesana,  359 
viiista,  455 
visistabuddhi,  412 
viHstavaiHstyajiidnam  ,339 
Visuddhadvaitavada,  70 
viiva,  A,iif 

Vi^vakarma,  19,  20,  32,  43,  52 
Visvanatha,  281,  307,  339 
Visvandtha-vrttii  ^oj 
visaya,  135,  457 
visdda,  243 
Visnu,  18,  39 
Visnupurdna,  433 
vitakka,  105 

vitandd,  294,  296,  302,  360,  407 
vitarka,  111 
Vitthaleiopddhydyi,  420 
VivaranabhdvaprakdHka,  419 
Vivaranaprameya,  457 
Vivaranaprameyasamgraha,     419,     457, 

486  «. 
vivartta,  468,  487 
vivarttavdda,  258,  468 
Vtrastava,  i"!  n. 
vTrya,  271 
vlryapdramitd,  127 
Vodhu,  222 
Void,  127 

Voidness,  126,  147,  166 
Vows,  74 
Vrjin,  112 


Vrptidaids,  \lin. 

vrtti,    146,    268,   269,   378 «.,   444,    448, 
449,    450,    457,    460,    472,    481,    482, 

483 
vrttijnd7ia,  455,  458,  481 
vyakit,  298 
vyatireka,  353 
vyattrekavydpti,  346 
vyavakdra,  148,  171  «.,  446 
vyavahdramdtram,  114 
vyavahdranaya,  177,  178 
vyavakdrika,  148  «.,  439,  446,  487 
vyavasdya,  302,  343  «. 
vyavastkdpyavyavasthdpakabhdvena,   1 54 
wj'aya,  175 
Vyadi,  232 
vydghdta,  347 
vydpaka,  388 

vydpakaviruddhopalabdhi,  358 
vydpakdnupalabdhi,  358 
vydpddo,  105 
vydpdra,  330  «. 
z/^/a///,   160,    186  M.,  303,  304,  346,  347, 

348.  354.  389  «• 
vydptigraha,  346,  347 
vydpti-niyama,  353 
z'/.f/ja,  388,  389 
vydpyaivdsiddha,  36 1 
Vyasa,  212,  222,  231,  234«. 
Vydsabhdsya,  225,  229,  231,  232,  233 «., 

235.  236,  237  «.,  239  «.,  254  «.,  256  «., 

257  «.,    263  «.,    266  «.,    267  «.,    269, 

273  «.,  380  «. 
vydsajyavrtti,  380  «. 
zyonian,  252,  255 
Vyonia^ekharacarya,  306 
Vyomavati,  306 
vyukana,  122 

Warren,  88«.,  89«.,  9o«.,  99  w.,  107  «., 

108  «.,   I  I  I  w. 
Weber,  13  «.,  230 
Wj//  a/j  ^iV/if  Mwrf  Vorstellung,  40 

Wenzel,  144 

West,  3 

Western,  4,  5 

Western  Rajputana,  172 

Whole,  165 

Windisch,  203  n. 

Winternitz,  34,  35  n.,  39  7t. 

Woods,  Prof.,  231,  233 

World-appearance,  441,  442,  443,    446, 

447,  449,  451,  452,  461,  468,  469,  470, 

489,  491 
World-soul,  its  mythical  character,  52 

yajna,  283 

Yajnadatta,  176,  290 
Yajur-Veda,  12,  30 
yama,  59,  106,  235,  236,  270,  317  «• 
yamaka,  83,  157 

Yantrikd,  28  «. 

Yasastilaka,  172 


528 


Index 


Ya^oda,  173 

Ya^omitra,  114,  120,  167 

yatna,  316 

yatharthah  pratyayah,  485 

Yadavacarya,  308 

Yajnavalkya,  28«.,  34M.,  35^.,  44,  54 

ydna,  54,  125  «.,  126 

Yoga,  7,  9,  28«.,  39,  68,  74,  75,  78,  80, 
93  «.,  ig2n.,  193,  199,  201,  203,  208, 
215,  217,  220,  221,  222,  223,  226, 
228,  229,  233,  234,  235,  236,  237, 
248  w.,  255,  259,  261,  262,  263,  264, 
265 «.,  266,  268,   273,  277,  278,  292, 

293.  301.  iOh  317  «•>  325.  3^5'  434' 

440,   490,   492  ;    compilation    of   the 

surras,  229  ff.;  different  types  of,  228; 

its  early  origin,  227;  its  meaning,  226; 

its    relation    with    Buddhism,    236  ff.; 

pessimism  in,  76 ;  the  school  mentioned 

by  Alberuni,  233  ff. 
Yogacaryabhwniiastra,  128 
Yoga  compilation,  230 
Yogacudamani,  28  «. 
Yoga  discipline,  235,  237 
Yoga  editor,  231,  233 
Yoga  ethics,  269 
yogaja,  341 

Yogakundali,  28  n.,  228 
Yoga  meditation,  270,  271 
Yoga  philosophy  in  relation  to  other  Indian 

systems  of  thought,  203  «.,  21 1«.,  213, 

238  «. 
Yoga  Psychology,  270  «. 


Yoga  sutra,    219,    230,    233,    234,    235, 
263  «.,  268 

Yoga  sutras,  212,  236,  237,  238,  266  w. 
Yoga  system,  77 

Yogaiast7-a,  172,  203  «.,  237 

Yogahkhd,  28  n. 

Yogatattva,  18  n.,  228 
Yoga  Upanisads,  228 

Yogavdrttika,    212,  .223,    239 «.,    243 «., 
245  «.,   254  «.,   256  «.,   257  «.,  259  «., 
261  «.,  262  «.,  263  «.,  264  w. 
Yogacara,  113,  128,  145,  411,  421 
yogdnusdsanam,  232 
yogin,    76,   215,   227,  234 «.,    256,   266, 

270,  271,  272,  273,  293,  342;  426 
yogyatd,  182,  224,  260,  358,  415 
yo  yo  aggimd  so  so  dhiimavd,  157 

Yudhisthira,  79 

yitgmapradesa,  196 

yugya,  226 

ytij,  226 

yuj  saniddhau,  226,  227 

yujir  yoge,  226,  227 

Yuktisnehapurani,  390  n. 

Yuktisnehapuraiu  -  siddhdnta  •  candrikd, 

371 
yutasiddha,  246,  319 
yutasiddhyabhdvdt,  293 

Zeitschrift  der  Deutschen  Morg.   Gesell- 

schaft,  203  n. 
Zend-Avesta,  39 
Zeus,  18 


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